360

 WIσTER Iσ THE LAσD τF RÛMμ
KOMNENIAN DEFENSES AGAINST THE TURKS IN WESTERN ANATOLIA
A Master‘s Thesis


January 2015
Castles constitute the most abundant group of Byzantine remains in Anatolia,
and offer historians and archaeologists the opportunity to more fully understand both
Byzantine settlement patterns and defensive systems through the ages. However, due
to their inaccessibility, lack of distinctive construction techniques, and an absence of
evidence for secure dating these monuments have often been neglected by
Byzantinists. At the same time, historical sources of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries make it clear that the Komnenian emperors Alexios, John, and Manuel all
engaged in extensive fortification activities. This thesis seeks to critically unite the
historical and archaeological evidence for Komnenian fortifications, with the goal of
further understanding the Komnenian defensive strategy and evaluating its results.
Following a historical overview of Turkish settlement in Anatolia and the Byzantine
response, forty Komnenian castles are surveyed, half of them historically attested and
the other half assigned to the period based on historical likelihood and, where
iv
possible, stylistic similarities with known Komnenian fortifications. The conclusion
argues that while the Komneni were generally successful in dealing with the Selçuks
diplomatically, they were unable to solve the problem of the nomadic Türkmen,
against whom their fortification program was overwhelmingly directed.
Keywords: Western Anatolia, Byzantine, Anatolian Selçuks, Türkmen, Alexios,
John, Manuel Komnenos, Kılıç Arslan, Castle, Fortifications, Defense Strategy,
Settlement
v
ÖZET
RÛM TτPRAĞIσDA KIΑμ
BATI AσADτLU‘DA TÜRKLER KARΑISIσDAKİ KτMσEστSLARIσ
MÜDÂFAASI
DeLuigi, Humberto Cesar Hugo
Yüksek Lisans, Arkeoloji Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisiμ Prof. Dr. Charles Gates
Ocak 2015
Kaleler, Anadolu‘da Bizans kalıntılarının en bol olduğu grubu teΒkil eder ve
hem tarihçilere hem de arkeologlara, Bizans müdafaa sistemlerini ve yerleΒim
desenlerini anlamlandırabilmek için bir fırsat verir. Halbuki kalenin ulaΒılmazlık,
özgün olmayan inΒaat tekniği ve kesin tarihleme için kanıt eksikliği yüzünden bu
yapılar, Bizans araΒtırmacıları tarafından ihmal edilmiΒtir. Aynı zamanda, M.S. 11.
ve 12. yüzyıllara ait tarihi kaynaklar göstermektedir ki; Aleksios, Yannis, ve Manuel
Komnenos tarafından kapsamlı bir tahkimat inΒa edilmiΒtir. Bu tez, Komnenoslar
dönemindeki kaleler için tarihsel ve kazılardan elde edilen bilimsel kanıtları ciddi
olarak birleΒtirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu Βekilde, Komnenoslar‘ın müdafaa stratejisi
anlaΒılabilecek ve onun sonuçları değerlendirebilecektir. İlk Türk yerleΒimi ve
Bizans müdahaleleri hakkında genel bir tarihsel taslaktan sonra, kırk adet
Komnenoslar dönemine ait kale incelenmiΒtir. Yarısı tarihi kaynaklardan bilinirken,
diğer yarısı da Komnenoslar dönemi tarihsel olasılık ve stilistik kriterler araΒtırılarak
vi
elde edilmiΒtir. Sonuç bölümüν Komnenoslar‘ın Selçuklularla diplomatik açıdan
iliΒkilerinin baΒarılı olduğunu fakat göçebe Türkmenlerle sorunlarının
çözülemediğini ayrıca Komnenoslar‘ın savunma sistemini Türklere karΒı değil
göçebe Türkmenlere karΒı olduğu gerçeğini kesin olarak ortaya koymaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Batı Anadolu Bölgesi, Bizans, Anadolu Selçuklular,
Türkmenler, Aleksios, Yannis, Manuel Komnenos, Kale, Tahkimat, Müdafaa
Strateji, YerleΒim
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my Thesis Supervisor Dr. Charles Gates for helping me
to choose this topic and for his patience as I worked my way through it. Although I
did not know the final conclusions I would reach Dr. Gates encouraged me to
continue researching and expanding my knowledge of a period that was largely new
to me when I began this project. I am also appreciative of my examining committee
members Dr. Jacques Morin and Dr. Eugenia Kermeli Ünal for their helpful
comments and insightful questions.
I am extremely grateful to the rest of the faculty in the Department of
Archaeology here at Bilkent, for creating an environment where scholarship and
intellectual exploration is so thoroughly nurtured and encouraged. I also owe thanks
to the Bilkent library staff, especially Füsun Yurdakul for her kind and prompt
assistance with interlibrary loan requests.
I also have to thank my friends and colleagues, past and present, in the
Department of Archaeology, Burak Arcan, Bahattin İpek, Leyla Yorulmaz, Tom
Moore, Andy Beard, Kasia Kuncewicz, Selim Yıldız, and σurcan AktaΒ, for their
support, encouragement, and many interesting and productive discussions. I am
especially grateful to Nurcan for providing me with so many pictures of the castle in
Kütahya before I was able to go there myself.
viii
I want to thank my family for supporting my decision to pursue graduate
studies and write this thesis, and in particular my brother Christiaan and my sister-inlaw
Dara for being my first introduction to Anatolia and its immense archaeological
and cultural wealth.
Finally I owe an immense debt of gratitude to Seçil Birkan, my constant
travel companion, unfailing supporter, and best friend. Hayatımda en çok sana
borçluyum, en fazla teΒekkürü de sana etmem gerekiyor.
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………....……………iii
ÖZET………………………………………………………………….……......…….v
ACKστWLEDGEMEσTS…………………………………………......….……….vii
TABLE OF CτσTEσTS……………………………………………………...……..ix
LIST τF FIGURES………………………………………..........................………..xii
CHAPTER 1: IσTRτDUCTIτσ…………………………………………..………...1
CHAPTER 2: ANATOLIA FROM THE FIRST TURKISH RAIDS TO THE
FOURTH CRUSADE………………………………………………...8
2.1 Byzantium in the Eleventh Century…………………………..…….………...κ
2.2 Early Turkish Incursions in Anatolia……………………………..…………11
2.3 Romanos IV Diogenes and the Battle of Mantzikert………….………..…...13
2.4 Sources for the History of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries………….....17
2.5 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 10κ1-1118:
Alexios I Komnenos………………………………………...………24
2.6 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 111κ-1143:
John II Komnenos……………………………………………....…...35
2.7 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1143-1180:
Manuel I Komnenos…………………………………………………39
2.8 Anatolia from the death of Manuel to the Fourth Crusade………..………...46
x
CHAPTER 3: KOMNENIAN FORTIFICATIONS: THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE………………………………………………..……….49
3.1 Previous Studies…………………………………………………..….……...50
3.2 Fortifications of Alexios I Komnenos…………………………….…....……η2
3.2.1 Didyma/Hieron (Didim, Aydın)……………………………….....……52
3.2.2 Korykos (Kızkalesi, Mersin)………………………………..……...….ηζ
3.2.3 Seleukeia (Silifke - Mersin)……………………………….....………..56
3.2.4 Kibotos/Civetot/Helenopolis? (Hersek, Yalova)……………………...57
3.2.5 Sidera…………………………………………………….…...……….58
3.2.6 Nikaia (İznik, Bursa)………………………………………….....…….ηκ
3.2.7 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)…………………..……...………60
3.2.8 Possible Fortifications of Alexios…………………………..……...….60
3.2.8.1 Aizanoi (Çavdarhisar, Kütahya)………………………....……...61
3.2.8.2 Akrokos (Eğrigöz, Emet, Kütahya)…………………..….……...61
3.3 Fortifications of John II Komnenos…………………………..…..…………63
3.3.1 Laodikeia (Denizli)……………………………………..…..…………63
3.3.2 Apollonia Sozopolis (Uluborlu, Isparta)………………….…………...66
3.3.3 Lopadion (Uluabat, Bursa)…………………………………….....……6ι
3.3.4 Achyraous (Pamukçu, Balıkesir)……………………………………...6κ
3.3.5 Possible fortifications of John…………………………….…………...ι0
3.3.5.1 Pegadia (Bigadiç, Balıkesir)…………………………..……..….ι0
3.3.5.2 Sultan Çayir………………………………………….……..…...ι1
3.3.5.3 Trebenna and YarbaΒçandır Kalesi (Konyaaltı, Antalya)…….....72
3.3.5.4 Kalanoros/Ala‘iyya (Alanya)……………………….…..……….ιζ
3.3.5.5 KızılcaΒehir (τba, Alanya)………………………….…..………ιη
3.3.5.6 Pegai (Karabiga, Çanakkale)……………………...…………….ι6
xi
3.4 Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos…………………………….…………ιι
3.4.1 Malagina (PaΒalar, Sakarya) and Pithekas (Köprühisar, Sakarya) …...78
3.4.2 The Theme of Neokastra……………………………….........………...κ0
3.4.2.1 Chliara (Darkale, Soma, Manisa)………………………………..κ1
3.4.2.2 Pergamon (Bergama, İzmir)……………………..……..………..κ2
3.4.2.3 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)…………………....………κη
3.4.2.4 Other fortresses of the theme of σeokastra………..……..……...κη
3.4.3 Dorylaion (Αarhöyük, EskiΒehir)……………………………….……..κ6
3.4.4 Choma-Soublaion…………………………………………….……….κλ
3.4.5 Attaleia (Kaleici, Antalya)………………………………….....………λ0
3.4.6 Possible fortifications of Manuel…………………………….....……..λ1
3.4.6.1 Kotyaeion (Kütahya)………………………...………..…………λ1
3.4.6.2 Kayser Kale and Karacahisar………………………....…………λ3
3.4.6.3 Abydos and Atik Hisar/Gavur Hisar (Çanakkale)……...……….λζ
3.4.6.4 Anaia (Kadıkalesi, KuΒadası, Aydin)……………………………λη
3.4.6.5 σiketiaton (Eskihisar, Gebze) and Ritzion (Darıca, İzmit).…......97
3.4.6.6 Telmessos (Fethiye, Muğla), Myra (Demre, Antalya) and the
Lykian coast……………………………………….…….98
3.5 Epilogue One: Castles of the Maeander………………………...……….…..λλ
3.6 Epilogue Two: Nikomedeia…………………………………………….….100
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION: WINTER IN THE LAND OF RÛM…………….102
SELECT BIBLIτGRAPHY……………………………………………..…..…….110
APPENDIX: OTHER POSSIBLE KOMNENIAN ACTIVITY..............................123
FIGURES………………………………………………………………..…………126
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The Byzantine Empire in 1025, Themes and Major Cities.......................127
Figure 2: Empire in 1076, after Mantzikert, before the Civil War...........................127
Figure 3: Byzantine Settlement Pattern in the 11th Century....................................128
Figure 4: Empire in 1081 at the Accession of Alexios I Komnenos........................128
Figure 5: Empire in 1143 at the Accession of Manuel I Komnenos.........................129
Figure 6: Detailed view of Anatolia in 1143............................................................129
Figure 7: Campaign Routes and Fortifications.........................................................130
Figure 8: Fortifications of Alexios I Komnenos.......................................................131
Figure 9: Didyma......................................................................................................131
Figure 10: Satellite view of Korykos land castle......................................................132
Figure 11: Korykos land castle plan.........................................................................132
Figure 12: Korykos aerial view.................................................................................133
Figure 13: Walls of Korykos.....................................................................................133
Figure 14: Seleukeia satellite view...........................................................................134
Figure 15: Walls of Seleukeia...................................................................................134
Figure 16: Satellite view of Bithynia........................................................................135
Figure 17: Satellite view of Nikaia...........................................................................135
Figure 1κμ Selçuk gravestones in tower wall............................................................135
Figure 19: Nikaia Tower 106B.................................................................................135
Figure 20: Satellite view of Aizanoi........................................................................136
Figure 21: Aizanoi plan............................................................................................136
xiii
Figure 22: Aizanoi tower foundation, with spolia....................................................136
Figure 23: Akrokos satellite view.............................................................................136
Figure 24: Akrokos view from the castle..................................................................136
Figure 25: Fortifications of John II Komnenos.........................................................137
Figure 26: Laodikeia plan.........................................................................................137
Figure 27: Laodikeia satellite view...........................................................................137
Figure 28: Ancient Laodikeia and the medieval city................................................138
Figure 29: Walls of Laodikeia..................................................................................138
Figure 30: Detail of cloisonné...................................................................................138
Figure 31: Apollonia Sozopolis satellite view..........................................................139
Figure 32: Apollonia Sozopolis castle walls.............................................................139
Figure 33: 19th century plan of Lopadion................................................................140
Figure 34: Satellite view of Lopadion and the Makestos Bridge..............................140
Figure 35: Makestos Bridge......................................................................................140
Figure 36: Walls of Lopadion...................................................................................140
Figure 37: Satellite view of Achyraous-Esseron and the İkizcetepeler Dam...........141
Figure 38: Achyraous................................................................................................141
Figure 39: Achyraous wall detail..............................................................................141
Figure 40: Pegadia wall detail...................................................................................142
Figure 41: Medieval walls of Trebenna....................................................................142
Figure ζ2μ Tower at YarbaΒçandir............................................................................142
Figure 43: View fromYarbaΒçandir towards Attaleia...............................................143
Figure 44: The walls of Alanya, sector 5 is Byzantine.............................................143
Figure ζημ Satellite view of KızılcaΒehir..................................................................144
Figure 46: View from KızılcaΒehir towards Alanya.................................................144
xiv
Figure 47: Plan of Pegai............................................................................................145
Figure 48: Satellite view of Pegai.............................................................................145
Figure 49: Pegai........................................................................................................146
Figure 50: Pegai tower detail, lower section is Komnenian.....................................146
Figure 51: Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos....................................................147
Figure 52: Plan of Metabole.....................................................................................147
Figure 53: Metabole..................................................................................................148
Figure 54: The view from Metabole.........................................................................148
Figure 55: The Theme of Neokastra.........................................................................149
Figure 56: Byzantine Pergamon................................................................................149
Figure 57: Satellite view of Pergamon......................................................................150
Figure 58: Komnenian wall at Pergamon.................................................................150
Figure 59: View from the acropolis of Pergamon....................................................151
Figure 60: Isometric reconstruction of Komnenian Pergamon.................................151
Figure 61: Map showing the position of Adramytteion and modern Edremit..........152
Figure 62: Preger‘s map of Dorylaion......................................................................152
Figure 63: Satellite view of Dorylaion......................................................................153
Figure 6ζμ Αarhöyük from the air..............................................................................153
Figure 65: View from Dorylaion over the Tembris valley.......................................154
Figure 66: Satellite view of Kotyaeion.....................................................................154
Figure 67: Closely spaced towers of Kotyaeion.......................................................155
Figure 68: Circular tower, Kotyaeion.......................................................................155
Figure 69: Kotyaeion................................................................................................156
Figure 70: Kayser Kale.............................................................................................156
Figure ι1μ Route between Kütahya and EskiΒehir, passing Kayser Kale.................157
xv
Figure 72: Atik Hisar................................................................................................157
Figure 73: Satellite view of Anaia............................................................................158
Figure 74: Walls of Anaia.........................................................................................158
Figure 75: Ritzion.....................................................................................................159
Figure 76: View from acropolis of Telmessos..........................................................159
Figure 77: The walls of Telmessos...........................................................................160
Figure 78: The castles of the Maeander....................................................................160
Figure 79: View of the gulf from the acropolis of Nikomedeia...............................161
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
İndik Rûm'u kıΒladık, çok hayr ü Βer iΒledik
ÜΒ bahar geldi, geri göçtük Elhamdü-lillah
We went down to Rûm to winter, deeds good and bad we did there
Come the Spring, we returned home, praise be to God
Yunus Emre
***
The Roman world was defined by its cities, with their massive public
buildings and aqueducts, and by its road system which allowed the legions to travel
the civilized world from end to end to deal with any threat to Rome‘s imperium. The
capital itself was not walled until the third century. By contrast, Constantinople from
its foundation was defined by its walls. Built by Theodosios II to expand the city
founded (and walled) by Constantine, the walls of Constantinople are the most
salient expression of the Byzantine defensive mentality. They allowed the empire to
survive its darkest days and they were the basis from which ambitious emperors
launched their attempts at revival. Every Byzantine dynasty left its mark on these
2
walls as they were constantly repaired and reinforced both to counter omnipresent
threats and to allow emperors to physically leave their mark in Byzantine history.
When one travels through Anatolia, the sheer number of castles encountered
is striking. In addition to the plethora of standing remains, dozens of towns and
villages bear toponyms such as Hisar, Asar, or Kale, which preserve the memory of a
castle even when the remains no longer exist or the location itself long ago lost its
strategic importance. These remains offer us testimony that at some time in history
an emperor or a sultan, a local potentate or even the local peasantry had something to
protect and were willing to expend an enormous effort to do so. Castles can have
several functions. The most obvious and the most common are as military bases,
garrison posts, or control points for strategic bridges and mountain passes. But they
can also be residences for the ruler or the aristocracy, like the Blachernae Palace or
the Topkapı Sarayı in İstanbul. Castles and walls can also be a way for an empire or
an emperor to promote himself. Such is the case with Selçuk fortifications, and also
the walls of Constantinople itself. And of course they can also be refuge sites for the
local population. The function of a fortification can also change dramatically over
time. As an example, Diocletian‘s palace in Split, Croatia, was built as a personal
residence for the retired emperor and a garrison post for his personal guard. This
was a fortress as a statement of power, a message to his empire and its people that he
and his new system of government and defense had saved them. In the turmoil of the
sixth and seventh century, the residents of nearby Salona took refuge in the
abandoned palace and converted its symbolic function to one of grim practicality in
the face of the Avar and Slav invasions. Examples of this sort of reuse abound in
Anatolia; in the Dark Ages many of the monuments of antiquity were repurposed as
foundations for defense systems. Fortifications themselves were also regularly
3
reused and rebuilt. During peaceful times cities spread far beyond their walls and
people left their hilltop refuges, and fortifications decayed either through neglect or
due to conscious demolition. Yet when conditions became more dangerous these
same sites were reoccupied and their walls were rebuilt. Fortifications were only
rarely constructed de novo and thus they always bear a record of their history within
themselves.
Komnenian fortifications usually had both a past and a future. They were
often times built on the remains of earlier Byzantine walls, or walls from Late
Antiquity or even the Hellenistic period. Subsequently, they were used by the
Laskarids, the Latins, the Selçuks, the Turkish emirates, and ultimately the
Ottomans. On these walls the historical political, social, and military situations of
the ages are written. But this wealth of information is not always written in a
―language‖ that is easy to understand. In the Komnenian period inscriptions are
frustratingly rare, even when compared with the situation in the Dark Ages. While
criteria like masonry techniques and the composition of mortar can be used to
tentatively establish relative chronologies, without some fixed points it is difficult to
fit these into an historical framework. Fortunately, the eleventh and twelfth centuries
are well covered by Byzantine historians, who regularly mention the construction of
fortifications in the course of their narratives. In addition, accounts written by the
Crusaders as they crossed western Asia Minor provide valuable counterpoints to the
Byzantine histories, describing the cities and the countryside in admirable detail and
from the perspective of an outsider.
This thesis will explore the contribution which archaeology can offer to the
historical record. When Alexios I came to power in 1081 the Byzantine defensive
system in Anatolia had been neglected for decades and the army which had
4
supported and defended the fortified cities had also decayed. Consequently Alexios
and his successors John and Manuel had to rebuild a defensible frontier which would
provide some measure of security for the cities and people of Byzantine Anatolia.
Under their direction the empire recovered much of western Asia Minor, including
the all-important river valleys and the coastal plains, which allowed a limited return
to normal economic and agricultural life. It is clear that each of the Komneni took
the work of fortification seriously and allocated significant resources for this task.
Alexios focused on reclaiming the coasts and the first Anatolian Selçuk capital of
σikaia (İznik). John pushed into the interior, fortifying Laodikeia (Denizli),
Lopadion (Uluabat) and Achyraous (Balıkesir) among others, as well as directing an
extensive restoration of the fortresses of the southern Anatolian coast. Manuel was
the most prolific builder, and his most significant act was the creation of the new
theme of Neokastra, fortifying Pergamon (Bergama), Adrymyttion (Edremit) and
Chliara (Darkale) and their surroundings.
Meanwhile, the Selçuk Turks established themselves more securely and
permanently, with the capital of their state first at Nikaia and then at Konya. For
most of this period, the Selçuks were more concerned with other Turkish states in
Anatolia and Mesopotamia than with the Byzantines, and despite the Byzantine
hostility towards the Turks so frequently encountered in the written sources it is clear
that Constantinople and Konya viewed each other with a high degree of mutual
respect and tolerance. This diplomatic accommodation was often undermined,
however, by the nature of Turkish settlement. While the Selçuks and their sultans
quickly adopted an urban way of life, their nomadic followers, known as Türkmen,
continued to practice their traditional transhumant lifestyle, moving annually
between their high summer pastures (yaylas) and the warmer, wetter river valleys
5
(kıΒlaks) where they wintered their flocks and engaged in raids of the Byzantine
towns. Byzantine historians do not always recognize that the sultan could not really
control these groups, and to the extent that he could control them he obviously
preferred that they direct their attacks away from his own possessions.
Geographically, the Türkmen were concentrated on the Anatolian plateau, to the west
in the area around Dorylaion (EskiΒehir), Kotyaeion (Kütahya), and Akroinon
(Afyonkarahisar), to the north around Gangra (Çankırı) and Kastamon, and to the
south on the Pamphylian plain and the Tekke plateau. These areas all bordered
Byzantine territory and consequently the emperors were obliged to campaign and
build fortresses almost constantly, regardless of the agreements they reached with the
Selçuk sultans. The culmination of the Byzantine revival was to have occurred in
1176 when Manuel Komnenos led a large campaign against the Selçuks and Kılıç
Arslan II, but his army was utterly defeated at Myriokephalon and the Empire never
again seriously entertained thoughts of reconquering the east.
Chapter two is an outline of the history and the historical record of the
Komnenian emperors, focusing heavily on their military campaigns and their
building activities in Anatolia. In addition, the origins of the Selçuks in Anatolia and
the nature of their settlement patterns will be discussed. I begin in 1025, when
medieval Byzantium was at the height of its power, and finish in 1204 with the
Fourth Crusade, although the period from 1081 to 1180 is covered in greater depth.
The third chapter explores Komnenian fortresses in detail and tries to answer the
question of whether there is a distinctive Komnenian style which can be used to
identify fortresses which are not mentioned in the historical record. I have identified
more than forty castles, city walls, and forts which fall into the Komnenian period,
mostly in western and southern Anatolia. I have divided this chapter into six
6
sections, two each for each emperor, the first listing his historically attested building
activities and the second listing those fortresses which I believe can be assigned to
him. My conclusion will summarize the defensive strategies of each emperor as well
as offer an assessment of their results.
The castles of Anatolia have been noted by travelers since the nineteenth
century, but as most of these travelers were far more interested in classical and
Roman remains their descriptions rarely go beyond calling a castle Byzantine. The
first modern scholar to focus on eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine fortifications
specifically was Helene Ahrweiler in the 1950s, although her work only mentions
historically attested castles (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960). Wolfgang Müller-Wiener
also studied middle and late Byzantine remains in western Anatolia, and sought to
use archaeology to expand on our historical knowledge (Müller-Wiener, 1961). A
more detailed investigation of the Komnenian period, incorporating both archaeology
and history, was done in the 1970s and 1980s by Clive Foss, who studied the
fortifications both in the context of the decline of the classical city and in terms of
regional defenses against the Turkish invasion (Foss, 1982; 1985; 1990; 1998).
Since Foss‘s work there has been no general study or overview or Komnenian
fortifications, although several sites have been surveyed or exacavated over the last
twenty years. Many of these new findings were reported and discussed during the
First International Sevgi Gönül Byzantine Studies Symposium in June 2007, and
several of the projects mentioned therein have been ongoing since. This thesis
reevaluates several of Foss‘s conclusions in light of the last two decades of
archaeological work. In addition, studies of early Turkish settlement in Anatolia
have advanced considerably in recent years, again in light of archaeological
evidence. In the 1970s and 1980s the important works written by Speros Vryonis
7
(1971), Osman Turan (1971), and Claude Cahen (1968) relied almost exclusively on
historical texts, and in the case of Vryonis and Turan were heavily colored by the
ideological biases of the authors. While Cahen did try to incorporate archaeological
evidence as a corrective, he obviously had far less data available than we have today.
Today the history of Anatolian Selçuks, the Türkmen nomads, and their relationship
with Byzantium has been and is still being thoroughly reassessed by historians like
Carole Hillenbrand (2008), Andrew Peacock (2010), and Songül Mecit (2013). This
thesis brings together recent historical and archaeological research.
8
CHAPTER 2
ANATOLIA FROM THE FIRST TURKISH RAIDS
TO THE FOURTH CRUSADE
2.1 Byzantium in the Eleventh Century1
―Such was Monomachos in his earlier years,
enjoying multifarious delights and petty distractions.‖
(Attaleiates, 89)
When Basil II (976-1025) died late in 1025 the Byzantine Empire stretched
from southern Italy to the Caucasus Mountains, and Basil‘s successful military
campaigns and domestic policies had effectively neutralized nearly every
conceivable threat (Figure 1). Yet Basil‘s successors utterly failed to maintain this
position of strength and instead allowed the defense system to decay as they
squabbled amongst themselves. In short, the provincial nobility or landed aristocracy
was no longer effectively controlled by the emperor, and in fact emperors were made
and unmade by civil or military aristocrats, who then turned the apparatus of state on
their real and perceived rivals, spending their energies intriguing in Constantinople
while the frontiers were ignored (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 283). Romanos III Argyros
(1028-34) and Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-55) were both civil aristocrats
1
For the general framework of Byzantine history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries my main
secondary sources have been George τstrogorsky‘s History of the Byzantine State (1957), Michael
Angold‘s The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204: A Political History (1λλι), Warren Treadgold‘s A
History of the Byzantine State and Society (1997), and John Haldon‘s Warfare, State, and Society in
the Byzantine World: 565-1204 (1999). For the general framework of Turkish settlement my sources
have been the books and articles of Speros Vryonis and especially Claude Cahen, in addition to
Andrew Peacock‘s Early Seljuk History: A New Interpretation (2010).
9
who married Zoe (1028-η0), the daughter of Basil‘s brother Constantine VIII (102η-
28), and both dedicated the worst of their collective incompetence to the destruction
of the military, reducing its numbers and allowing those eligible for service to buy
exemptions. In addition, Constantine IX completely dismantled the army of Iberia in
1053 or 1054:
―For a formidable army used to be stationed in Iberia and drew its support
and supplies from the neighboring public lands. But the emperor deprived
them of this means of support, and by taking away such a great power, not
only did he lose his own allies but he turned them into powerful enemies,
granting them to the enemy as an invincible addition.‖ (Attaleiates, 2012: 79)
Constantine both feared a potential rebellion and wanted to convert these soldiers
from a financial obligation into tax-payers; even before disbanding this army he had
dramatically debased the coins with which they were paid (Treadgold, 1995: 40; 216-
217). Lost native troops were usually replaced by mercenaries, a practice which
would only become more fraught as Turkish attacks increased in intensity and
frequency, and as the Byzantine Empire increasingly dealt with hired soldiers from a
position of weakness rather than strength. Perhaps in the time of Basil II the
argument can be made that mercenaries were more professional, more specialized,
and easier to control; mercenaries were loyal to their paymasters in a way that
indigenous troops might not always be (Haldon, 1999: 93). But without strong
commanders and especially without regular pay, the conditions prevalent in the
middle of the eleventh century, these mercenary troops could prove extremely fickle,
and had no connection to Byzantine traditions or to the land they were supposed to
be defending (Charanis, 1975: 17-18). Constantine IX also witnessed what would
become the final break between the Roman and Orthodox Churches. Only a strong
Emperor could have used his diplomatic clout to prevent ecclesiastical disagreements
from becoming political, and Constantine was unable to moderate the hard line taken
10
by Patriarch Michael Keroularios. Thus, the papal legates and the Byzantines
mutually excommunicated each other, an event not at all unprecedented but which in
this case would never be rectified (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 298). Constantine died in
1055 and after Theodora, Zoe‘s sister and co-empress, died in 1056 without any
children, the remnants of the Macedonian dynasty were finished. The new Emperor,
Michael VI, had been chosen by Theodora and was also from the civil bureaucracy.
In addition his previous position had been the logothetes ton stratiotikou and so it
had been he who had been paying the armies with Constantine‘s debased coinage
(Treadgold, 1997: 597). During his short reign the excessive promotion of civil
servants only increased, and the military aristocracy rallied behind Isaac I Komnenos
(1057-1059) whose relatives would ultimately reign throughout the twelfth century.
The Komneni were originally from Thrace but during the reign of Basil II
Isaac‘s father Manuel had been given lands in Paphlagonia and had built a fortress
there known as Kastra Komnenon (Kastamonu). Before rising in revolt, Isaac had
been the commander of the Anatolian field army and although his reign was brief he
attempted to strengthen both the army and the treasury after the excesses of his
predecessors. To do this he resorted to the confiscation of property, including even
Church property. Keroularios, who had been the decisive agent in Isaac‘s accession,
found this unacceptable and Isaac attempted to have him deposed on charges of
usurping imperial authority (Angold, 1991: 11). Yet during the synod of deposition
Keroularios died, and as the Patriarch had been beloved by the people of
Constantinople, Isaac‘s situation became untenable. Without the support of the
Church he had no choice but to abdicate and enter a monastery, allowing the throne
to pass to Constantine X Doukas (1059-67), who again came from the civil
aristocracy and reinstated the worst practices of his predecessors. The army was
11
neglected entirely, the civil bureaucracy ballooned, and the right to collect taxes was
farmed out to the highest bidders (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 302). In addition, the defense
of the eastern frontier was entrusted to Armenians and Syrians who were at the same
time being persecuted for their diversions from orthodoxy (Angold, 1997: 42). By
the end of his reign the consequences were becoming clear, especially on the
frontiers. Byzantium found itself surrounded by external enemies and severely
lacking in defenses.
2.2 Early Turkish Incursions in Anatolia
―My lands are too small to accommodate you and to provide what you require.
The best plan is for you to go and raid the Byzantines, to strive on the path of God
and to gain booty. I shall follow in your tracks and aid you in your enterprise.‖ –
İbrahim Yınal
(Ibn al-Athir, 546)
The first mention of the Turkish raiders in Anatolia comes from the chronicle
of Matthew of Edessa, who refers to them as a ―death-breathing dragon,
accompanied by a destroying fire‖ (Vryonis, 1971: 81) which terrorized the
Armenian kingdom of Vaspurakan in 1016-1017, or more likely a decade later in
1029 (Cahen, 1968: 67). This initial incursion was probably not the work of the
Selçuks, nor even directly authorized by them, but it was nevertheless considered
extremely disruptive for the Armenians and according to the Byzantine historian
George Kedrenos it caused the Armenian prince Senekerim to cede his kingdom to
Byzantium in exchange for lands in Cappadocia (Vryonis, 1971: 54). In any case, the
Selçuks were occupied until 10ζ0 with a struggle against the Ghaznavids for
Khorasan. Their victory in 1040 at Dandanakan established the Selçuks as a
powerful state in the Middle East, and after 1040 raiding activity in Anatolia
increased dramatically.
12
The first attack came around 1043, in which the Byzantine governor of Syria
Leichoudes was taken prisoner. While Attaleiates attributes this attack to the Selçuk
sultan Tuğrul and claims that annual raids began after this date (Attaleiates, 78-79),
Cahen characterizes the raiders as Türkmen, who were in fact fleeing the Selçuk
advance following Dandanakan (Cahen, 1968: 67-68). In 1045 a force under the
command of KutalmıΒ (a cousin of Tuğrul) attacked ErciΒ on Lake Van and took its
commander prisoner. From 10ζ6 to 10ζκ KutalmıΒ and Ibrahim Yinal (Tuğrul‘s
foster-brother) were engaged in a struggle with the Shaddadids for control of
Caucasian Albania (Peacock, 2010: 140). KutalmıΒ besieged the Shaddadid capital
Dvin for a year and a half, while Ibrahim Yinal also ventured further into Anatolia,
attacking Chaldia, Tao, Taron, Trebizond, Mantzikert, and destroying utterly Arzen
(Erzurum). This raid culminated in the Battle of Kapetron, where a Selçuk force
inflicted its first defeat on a major Byzantine army. Ibn al-Athir reports that Ibrahim
returned with 100,000 captives and ten thousand camels laden with booty (Ibn al-
Athir, 546). In 1054 and 1055, Tuğrul himself campaigned in both Anatolia and
Caucasia, sacking Paipert and Perkri, and unsuccessfully besieging Mantzikert (Ibn
al-Athir, 599; Attaleiates, 81-82). In 10ηη Tuğrul entered Baghdad and entered into
negotiations with the Caliphate, presenting himself as a defender of Sunni orthodoxy
and promising to restore order to those Islamic lands which were experiencing the
depredations of the Türkmen (Cahen, 1968: 23-25). Naturally their customary
raiding activities were extremely disruptive in the context of a settled state. But as
Bar Hebraeus notes, Tuğrul himself maintained his Turkish identityμ
―I am a minister (or, servant) of the Head of the Kingdom of the ARABS, and
in all the countries over which I reign I have made to triumph the
proclamation of the Khalifah, and I have made men to rest from the
oppression of the governors MAHMUD and MES‘UD, who were my
predecessors. And it is evident that I am not inferior in any wayto them. Now
they were slaves of the Khalifah who enjoyed dominion (i.e. they ruled), but I
13
am the son of free men, and am of the royal stock of the HUNS. And besides
thesethings, although I am honored even as they were honored, I think that
service to me, and the manner in which I am distinguished, should be greater
than theirs.‖ (Bar Hebraeus, X:225)
The Selçuk sultan had a careful balance to maintain, between the orderly
administration of his lands and the needs of his army which was composed mostly of
Türkmen. Anatolia served as an ideal area for the latter. It was not populated by
Muslims and thus could serve as an acceptable outlet for the Türkmen when they
were not needed on campaign. The rest of Tuğrul‘s reign saw continued raids which
the Byzantines were unable to control, much less stop, and the Anatolian military
aristocracy rose in revolt against the bureaucrat emperor Michael VI, backing Isaac I
Komnenos (see above). In 1057 another Turkish army, led by Dinar, sacked
Melitene (Malatya), killing or enslaving the inhabitants and carrying off huge
amounts of booty (Vryonis, 1971: 88). It must also be noted that Isaac had also
denuded the frontier of troops to support his bid for the throne (Angold, 1997: 41).
The Byzantines lost Ani to the Turks in 1064 and saw Kaisareia (Kayseri) sacked
shortly thereafter. Yet this apparent solution to the problem of the Türkmen soon
became its own problem, as chiefs who wished to establish themselves free from
Selçuk suzerainty were able to do so in Anatolia. In 106ι and 106κ they pushed
even further west, to Amorion, Ikonion (Konya) and even as far west as Chonai
(Honaz) in 1070. In stark contrast to encountering any resistance, some of these
raiders even found themselves fighting as mercenaries for the depleted Byzantine
army (Cahen, 1969a: 147-148).
2.3 Romanos IV Diogenes and the Battle of Mantzikert
―But I will not imitate your severity and harshness.‖ – Alp Arslan
(Attaleiates, 301)
14
When Romanos IV Diogenes came to power in 1068 he not only had to
confront the relentless attacks of the Turks, he also had to contend with the ongoing
political strife in Constantinople, as well as the decayed and depleted army. He
married Eudokia, the widow of his predecessor, but the Caesar John Doukas (brother
of Constantine X) was not to be a loyal subordinate (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 304).
Romanos immediately led campaigns against the Turks, and in both 1068 and 1069
he had middling success at best, as he was never able to force a decisive encounter
(Friendly, 1981: 149-162). In 1071 the opportunity finally arrived, and Romanos
met the army of the Selçuk sultan Alp Arslan at Mantzikert (Malazgirt), where he
suffered a total defeat and was captured by the sultan.2 This battle is rightly seen as a
major turning point, although at the time Alp Arslan did not change his policy toward
Anatolia and made no serious attempt either to consolidate his gains or to take
advantage of the fact that Anatolia was now truly undefended. Rather, he concluded
a fairly generous treaty with Romanos and ostensibly seemed to welcome a peace
settlement which would allow him to focus on matters outside of Anatolia, in
particular his ongoing confrontation with the Fatimids in Egypt (Cahen, 1969a: 148-
149). In any case, the intentions with which Romanos Diogenes and Alp Arslan
established their treaty were irrelevant a year later, because both rulers were dead.
After the battle, even though he had been set free by the sultan, Romanos was
2Romanos offered battle despite being without his infantry archers and so the mounted Selçuk archers
could harass the Byzantines with impunity. In addition, the Byzantine army was drawn away from
their camp as the Selçuk forces engaged in their traditional tactic of organized retreat. As the daylight
faded, Romanos signaled for his army to return to their undefended camp, but this retreat turned into a
rout when Alp Arslan saw the opportunity and ordered an attack. By this time the Byzantines,
especially the heavy cavalry were exhausted from their long day of marching across the steppe,
although Romanos did unsuccessfully try to rally his forces to finally engage the Turks. See pages
144-153 in Brian Carey‘s Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071, with tactical
maps drawn by Joshua Allfree. Carey puts all the blame for the loss on Romanos, on the one hand
because Romanos placed substantial parts of his army under men of questionable loyalty and on the
other hand because of his disastrous decisions immediately before and during the battle, in which he
disregarded centuries of Byzantine strategic doctrine due to his intense desire for a decisive encounter.
15
immediately deposed in favor of Michael VII Doukas (1071-1078) and was
ultimately blinded in Kotyaeion (Kütahya), dying almost immediately. Alp Arslan‘s
death was no more dignified. He was murdered by a prisoner during an expedition
against the Karakhanids in Central Asia (Cahen, 1λ6κμ 30). His son MelikΒah was to
be an administrator and not a warrior, and so at this crucial time Anatolia was largely
left to the Türkmen.
The decade following Mantzikert is highly complicated from both the
Byzantine and Selçuk perspectives. Romanos was replaced by Michael VII Doukas
(1071-1078), ―a pitiful puppet, a cloistered bookworm, surrounded by court
intriguers and long-winded pedants‖ (Ostrogorsky, 1957: 305), on the insistence of
the Caesar John Doukas and Psellos. Alp Arslan was succeeded by his son
MelikΒah, but the new sultan also had to deal with the sons of KutalmıΒ, Süleyman,
Mansur, Alp-Ilek, and Devlet, who began to establish themselves as rulers since no
other members of the Selçuk family were present in Anatolia (Cahen, 2001: 8). It
must be stressed that the loss of Anatolia was not the inevitable consequence of
Mantzikert, but rather resulted from the decade of disorder which followed the battle
(Figures 2-3) (Angold, 1997: 117). The Byzantine army in Anatolia, although not
destroyed in the battle (Theotokis, 2014: 79), quickly fractured into groups loyal to
the new emperor, groups under various pretenders, and the group led by Roussel de
Bailleul, a mercenary commander who ultimately rebelled against the empire in
1073. Meanwhile the Türkmen who had followed Alp Arslan into Anatolia had no
real leader but also no significant enemy preventing them from staying. On the
contrary, the Byzantines themselves turned to the sons of KutalmıΒ for aid against
one another. In 1078 the general Nikephoros Botaneiates, the future emperor,
revolted, and turned to the Türkmen who had by this time gathered around Süleyman
16
and Mansur. Michael was actually forced to abdicate before Botaneiates reached the
capital, but although Botaneiates‘ Turkish followers nominally swore fealty to him,
they were in reality independent and established themselves just across the
Bosphorus (Vryonis, 1976: 6). The Turks then aided Botaneiates against yet another
imperial pretender, Nikephoros Bryennios. Furthermore, still another would-be
usurper, Nikephoros Melissenos actually granted his Turkish soldiers access to the
fortified towns and cities which they had previously avoided (Cahen, 2001, 9). At
the same time, a Turkish raider called Çaka (Tzachas) was captured by the
Byzantines and attracted the attention of the Emperor Botaneiates. Although he lost
his position when Alexios I came to power, he used the knowledge he had gained in
Constantinople to establish himself in Smyrna. His beylik enjoyed several successful
years of piracy in the Aegean (Brand, 1989, 3). In the east the DaniΒmendids (about
whom more will be said below), and later the Mengücekids, Saltukids, and Sökmenli
took advantage of both the lack of an imperial presence and their remoteness from
the great Selçuk sultan to establish independent states, although their early history is
largely unknown. By the time Alexios I Komnenos came to the throne in 1081 the
Turks occupied almost all of Anatolia. As Anna Komnene wrote:
―there was a time when the frontiers of Roman power were the two pillars at
the limits of east and west – the so-called Pillars of Hercules in the west and
those of Dionysos not far from the Indian border in the east. But at the time
we are speaking of, the boundary of Roman power on the east was our
neighbor the Bosphorus, and on the west the city of Adrianople.‖ (Anna
Komnene, 205-206)
From this complex narrative several salient points emerge. Firstly, the
Byzantine response to the threat was at best incompetent and at worst actively selfdefeating.
The earliest incursions were ignored almost entirely and even as the
empire was forced to take notice no coherent or appropriate response was
forthcoming. The reigns of Constantine IX and Constantine X in particular served to
17
weaken the Byzantine military and forced the empire to hire unreliable mercenaries,
ultimately including the Turks themselves. Secondly, the Byzantines engaged in a
disastrous struggle between the military commanders and the bureaucratic elite in
Constantinople, ensuring that even an accomplished general like Romanos Diogenes
would not be successful. The empire focused on re-establishing its nominal authority
in the Anatolian provinces even as they were being lost in practice (Angold, 1997:
118). After Mantzikert, this contradiction inspired the emperors and aspiring
emperors to turn to the invaders themselves as warriors to help them seize or keep
the throne. By giving the Turks access to the towns, the Byzantines likely inspired
them to stay and consolidate their gains instead of merely raiding and withdrawing.
From the Selçuk side, the raids and campaigns before 10ι1 tend to return again and
again to the same places (Peacock, 2010: 144). After 1071 the Turks became
increasingly opportunistic. In the east the DaniΒmend, Mengücek, Saltukid, and
Sökmenli founded independent beyliks in a frontier region beyond the reach of the
Great Seljuk sultan and no longer defended by the Byzantines. In the west Çaka of
Smyrna and the sons of KutalmıΒ used the empire to establish their polities, the latter
ultimately becoming the Selçuk Sultanate of Rûm. As the Selçuk state established
itself and the Byzantines attempted to recover, the activities of the Türkmen would
threaten the security of the new frontier region as well as undermine diplomatic
attempts at coexistence.
2.4 Sources for the History of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries
Before Mantzikert, the activities of the Selçuks in Anatolia (but not
necessarily the Türkmen) are recorded by the Islamic historians, although only
insofar as they relate to the Great Selçuks. The battle itself was seen a momentous
18
occasion in Islamic history, and thus finds a place in almost any universal history,
although many accounts are formulaic and thoroughly divorced from any
relationship with the ongoing Turkification of Anatolia (Hillenbrand, 2008). The
earliest source to present events in Anatolia from an Anatolian perspective is the
history of Ibn Bibi, but his history begins only in 1192 and thus offers no information
on the first century of the Anatolian Selçuk state. An alternate source is the Mir’at al
Zaman of Sibt b. al-Jawzi, who covers the reigns of Tuğrul, Alp Arslan, and
MelikΒah, though again the early Anatolian sultans are not covered. Al-Jawzi is
primarily concerned with events in Baghdad, deriving his information from the
historian Ghars al-σi‘ma (Peacock, 2010μ λ). τne of his departures from events at
Baghdad concerns the Battle of Mantzikert, and this fairly long account became the
main source for many other Islamic chroniclers. But again, the doubtlessly complex
mix of Selçuk rulers with their Türkmen nomadic subjects, the degree of Islamization
among the Selçuks, and the actual impact of the newcomers on agriculture and daily
life in Anatolia are largely unmentioned (Hillenbrand, 2008: 85).
For the twelfth century the Selçuk record is sparser. τccasional mentions are
made by some Syrian authors from Aleppo and Damascus, but these only concern
the Anatolian Selçuks insofar as their policies intersected with Syria and
Mesopotamia (Cahen, 1968: 56-57). Ibn al-Athir‘s al-Kamil fi’l Tarikh deals
extensively with the crusades and thus with Byzantine diplomacy, although it was of
course written somewhat after the events it describes, in the thirteenth century.
For writers who were closer to the events, the best sources are Armenian,
Jacobite Syrian, and Georgian. Although they again focus on the east and are
stronger for the period before Mantzikert, they come closer to offering a true picture
19
of Selçuk motives in Anatolia. Aristakes of Lastivert describes the Selçuks as a
divine punishment:
―[God] poured His wrath down upon us by means of a foreign people, for we
had sinned against Him. But once again He regretted this and ceased visiting
His evils upon us, for He is merciful. But He did not grow totally angry nor
did He hold His grudge forever. He was obliged to try us, since He is the
righteous judge; yet He hastened with His mercy, since He is the forgiving
Father. He regretted the evils visited upon us since He is the God of mercy.
Indeed He displayed both toward us: first requiting us with a deserved
vengeance, then His anger would pass so that we would not be completely
exterminated.‖ (Aristakes 11:65)
He later describes a devastating raid led by Tuğrul:
―The year after this occurred was η03 of our era [10ηζ]. σow the same
month, and the same date of the month as [the previous year] when [the
Selçuks] took the land captive, and burned Arcn and other cities and awans,
that death-breathing, bloodthirsty and murderous beast, the Sultan [Tughril,
1055-1063], advanced with countless troops, elephants, carts, horses, women,
children, and much preparation. Skipping over Archesh and Berkri, they came
and camped near the city called Manazkert in the Apahunik' district, seizing
all the extensive places in the fields. [The Sultan] dispatched marauding
parties across the face of the land: north as far as the stronghold of the
Abkhaz and to the mountain called Parxar to the base of the Caucasus; west
as far as the forests of Chanet'ia; and south as far as the place called Sim
mountain. And they seized the entire land as reapers working a field.
Who can record the evils which [the Selçuks] then visited upon the land?
Whose mind is able to enumerate them? The entire land was full of corpses—
cultivated and uncultivated places, roads and desolate places, caves, craggy
spots, pine groves and steep places—and [the Selçuks] set on fire and
polluted all the cultivated places, homes and churches. And the flame of that
fire rose higher than the furnace of Babylon. In this way they ruined the entire
land, not once but three times, one after the other, until the country was
totally devoid of inhabitants and the bellowing of animals ceased.‖ (Aristakes
16:92-94)
Despite the religious tone and the strong influence of the Old Testament (Thompson,
2001: 96) on his writings, Aristakes gives details which are lacking in the Islamic
and Byzantine sources. He includes the specific targets of the raid, and also
mentions areas which were avoided. The Selçuks are most interested in land, and
cities are seen as an impediment to their easy access to the land. Their burning of the
lands of Armenia would certainly have been seen by the inhabitants as divine wrath,
20
but the Turks themselves were at this point clearing the land to make it more suitable
to their partially nomadic way of life.
Another Armenian, Matthew of Edessa, follows Aristakes as seeing the Turks
as a harbinger of the apocalypse, but he sees them more as an inevitability than as a
punishment. He portrays the Armenian king Senekerim after a very early setback:
―Sitting down, he examined the chronicles and utterances of the divinely
inspired prophets, the holy teachers, and found written in these books the time
specified for the coming of the Turkish troops. He also learned of the
impending destruction and end of the whole world.‖ (Hillenbrand, 2001μ λ6)
Matthew wrote almost one hundred years after this early raid, however, so his view
that a conquest was inevitable is clearly tainted by hindsight. In his section
describing the Battle of Mantzikert, he mentions both Alp Arslan‘s initial desire for a
treaty and his generous treatment of the defeated Romanos. It is only after Romanos
is betrayed that Alp Arslan unleashes the fury of the Turks on Anatolia:
―The Byzantine nation has no God, so this day the oath of peace and
friendship taken by both the Persians [Turks] and Byzantines is nullified;
henceforth I shall consume with the sword all those people who venerate the
cross, and all the lands of the Christians shall be enslaved…henceforth all of
you will be like lion cubs and eagle young, racing through the countryside
day and night slaying the Christians and not sparing any mercy on the
Byzantine nation.‖ (Hillenbrand, 200κμ 2ζζ)
Matthew here echoes Aristakes who also blames Byzantine treachery for the
subsequent Turkish occupation of Anatolia (Aristakes 24: 173). As Armenians,
neither writer was particularly in favor of either the Byzantines or the Turks. Thus,
their accounts are in some ways more objective, in addition to being focused on the
events in these important areas of Anatolia. Furthermore, since their accounts can be
situated within a long tradition of Armenian historiography, their biases and stylistic
characteristics can be taken into account when assessing their accuracy.
Georgian chronicles are even more explicit in describing the sort of area
which attracted the Turks:
21
―They [the Turks] led a blessed existenceν they would hunt, relax, take their
pleasure, and they experienced no lack of anything. They would engage in
commerce in their cities, but would invade our borders for their fill of
captives and plunder. In spring they would ascend the mountains of Somkhiti
and Ararat. Thus during summer they would have ease and recreation on the
grass and pleasant fields, with springs and flowering meadows. So great was
their strength and multitude that you could say ‗All Turks of the whole world
are here‘.‖ (Peacock, 200ημ 221-222)
Caucasia experienced Turkish incursions even before Anatolia, and the pattern of the
attacks there foreshadows the early attacks in Anatolia. While the Turks were
interested in plundering cities, their main objective was the pasturelands. Cities
which could threaten these pastures needed to be destroyed. Interestingly, Georgia
suffered more invasions while engaged in a damaging conflict with Byzantium.
After the Georgian king David the Builder expelled the Türkmen from Georgia, raids
in Anatolia increased (Peacock, 2010: 151).
As for the Byzantine sources themselves, The History of Michael Attaleiates
was dedicated to Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081) and the author was in an
ideal position to observe the breakdown of the Byzantine army before and after
Mantzikert. He was present at the battle and his account is both detailed and
dramatic; he captures well the despair felt by the Byzantines:
―It was a terribly sad sight, beyond lament and mourning. For what could be
more pitiable than the entire imperial army in flight, defeated and chased by
inhuman and cruel barbarians, the emperor defenseless and surrounded by
armed barbarians, and the tents of the emperor, the officers, and the soldiers
taken over by men of that ilk, and to see the whole Roman state overturned,
and knowing that the empire itself might collapse in a momentς‖ (Attaleiates,
297)
Attaleiates contrasts the emperors and generals of his day unfavorably with the
glorious Romans of the past:
―The commander of the army cares not one whit for the war nor does what is
right and proper by his fatherland, and even shows contempt for the glory of
victory; instead he bends his whole self to the making of profit, converting his
command to a mercantile venture, and so he brings neither prosperity nor
glory to his own people. The rest of the army, for their part, take the cue of
22
injustice from their leaders and with an unstoppable and shameless fervor
they inhumanly maltreat their own countrymen. They violently seize their
property and act like the enemy in what is their own home and country,
falling short of the nominal enemy in no respect of evildoing or plunder.‖
(Attaleiates, 357)
He is clearly referring to the extensive reliance on mercenaries, and to the tendency
of even the generals to abandon their posts in an effort to manipulate events in
Constantinople. Furthermore, Attaleiates hints at the fact that the deep
dissatisfaction felt by the people of Anatolia allowed them to more easily accept the
Turkish invaders.
For the Komneni and their immediate successors, three sources are of the
greatest importance. These are the Alexiad of Anna Komnene, and the histories of
John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. Anna Komnene, as the eldest daughter of
Alexios I, was naturally not an eyewitness to much of what she describes. Yet she
was able to make use of her husband σikephoros Bryennios‘s unfinished history. In
addition, Anna had hoped that she would succeed her father instead of her younger
brother John, and so the Alexiad alternately minimizes and denigrates him. Despite
her ostensible lack of objectivity, Anna conveys the Byzantine reaction
diplomatically and militarily to both the Turks and the Crusaders. In 1081 the
empire had almost entirely disappeared, and Anna‘s work is the only Byzantine
history which documents the beginning of its recovery. The history of John
Kinnamos continues where Anna leaves off, with the accession of John II Komnenos
in 111κ. Kinnamos was born after John‘s death and so his history covers Manuel I
Komnenos‘s reign in much greater detail, the period to which he was an eyewitness.
Like the Alexiad, Kinnamos‘s history glorifies his emperor, although it unfortunately
breaks off just before Manuel‘s greatest defeat at Myriokephalon, although the
historian was probably present at the battle. His style is less overtly learned than that
23
of Anna, with fewer classical allusions and no attempt to write in ―Attic‖ Greek.
Kinnamos was an imperial secretary, a bureaucrat, and thus had a normal education
which prepared him for his job. σiketas Choniates‘s history also begins with the
accession of John, but it continues until after the fall of Constantinople to the
Crusaders in 1204. This longer perspective means that Choniates takes a far less
adulatory tone toward the Komneni, as he looks for the seeds of that disaster in their
reigns. By reading Choniates and Kinnamos together it is easier to get an idea of
what really happened. Kinnamos is richer in detail but sometimes this detail is used
to obfuscate rather than enlighten.
As for the Crusaders, their own narratives are often valuable because they
depict the realities of life in Anatolia during this period. During the First Crusade, the
anonymous, probably Norman, author of the Gesta Francorum writes of encounters
with the Turks from Nikaia, Dorylaion, and Herakleia (Gesta, II:viii, III:ix, IV:x).
He stresses their great numbers and says that one ―could not find stronger or braver
or more skillful soldiers (Gesta, III:ix). In addition, he introduces what will become
a recurring theme in crusader narratives, harsh criticism of the Byzantines.
Following the surrender of Nikaia, he claims that Alexios freed the Turks so that he
could use them himself to obstruct and hinder the crusaders (Gesta, II:viii). Fulcher
of Chartres, another eyewitness, emphasizes the bravery of the Turks and their skill
with the bow (Fulcher, I:IX:4), which confused and devastated the crusader armies in
their first encounters with the enemy (Fulcher, I:IX:5, X:6). Although not an
eyewitness account, the history written by Albert of Aachen is longer and more
detailed than the written eyewitness accounts; Albert did not only use the available
writings, he also used oral reports of the participants (Albert: 2-3). For the Second
24
Crusade, Odo of Deuil, the chaplain of the French king Louis VII, is the best
eyewitness source; he describes Romania, as he calls Byzantine Anatolia, as such:
―Romania, a land which is very broad and exceedingly rugged with stony
mountains, lies beyond [Constantinople], extending to Antioch on the south
and bordering Turkey on the east. Although all Romania was formerly under
Greek jurisdiction, the Turks now possess a great part and, after expelling the
Greeks, have devastated another part; but where the Greeks still hold castles
the two peoples divide the revenues. In such subjection the Greeks retain the
territory the Franks procured because they went in quest of Jerusalem; the
lazy people would have lost all if they had not defended themselves by
importing knights from various nations, thus compelling gold to redeem gold.
Nevertheless, they always lose (but since they possess much they cannot lose
all at once), for mercenaries do not suffice a people without forces of its
own.‖ (τdo of Deuil, κκ-89)
Odo succinctly notes all salient characteristics of the landscape, as well as the
political and financial conditions which compel the Byzantines to resort to
mercenaries. While the crusader narratives often excessively criticize the Byzantines
for their perceived lack of support or even outright treachery, they nevertheless also
offer compelling testimony about conditions in the Anatolian countryside.
2.5 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1081-1118:
Alexios I Komnenos
―The Emperor Alexios, fighting two-fisted against barbarians who attacked
him on either flank, maneuvered round Byzantium, the center of the circle
as it were, and proceeded to broaden the Empire.‖
(Anna Komnene, 206)
As has been mentioned previously, when Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118)
came to power little to nothing remained to the Byzantines in Anatolia aside from the
Black Sea coast, the fortresses and fortified cities near the sources of the Maeander,
and Attaleia (Figure 4). His army was small and composed of mercenaries along with
a few elite Byzantine units, though by the end of 1090 defeats in Europe meant that
he had only 500 soldiers available (Haldon, 1999: 93). Even Nikomedeia was in a
precarious position, being threatened by the nascent Selçuk Sultanate at σikaiaν the
25
Aegean coast as well as the islands were under attack from Çaka, the Turkish lord of
Smyrna (İzmir). Çaka had previously been a prisoner of the Byzantine emperor
Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081) and had risen in the court to the level of
protonobilissimus. In any case, with Alexios in power, Çaka left the capital and
established himself in Smyrna and Ephesos, and used his knowledge of Byzantium to
make war on the empire. ―He met a certain man from Smyrna who had considerable
experience in [shipbuilding] and to him he entrusted the business of constructing
pirate vessels. Somewhere near Smyrna a large fleet was equipped.‖ (Anna
Komnene, 233) In the early years of Alexios‘s reign it was Çaka who posed the
greatest threat to the capital itself, since he fully understood that only a combined
land and sea operation would be able to take the city. Due to this threat, Alexios
quickly realized that the more prudent course of action was to establish a truce with
the Anatolian Selçuk ―sultan‖ Süleyman at Nikaia (Charanis, 1969: 214). Thus from
the beginning Alexios also saw the Selçuks as potential allies,3 a state of affairs
which would continue under his successors, despite the inevitable hostilities which
would regularly surface. In 10λ1 Çaka went so far as to claim the title of emperor
but as he prepared his attack Alexios cleverly sent a letter to Kılıç Arslan claiming
that Çaka knew ―perfectly well that the Roman Empire [was] not for him‖ and that
―the whole mischievous plan [was] directed against [the sultan]‖ (Anna Komnene,
274-275). Finding himself caught between the sultan and the Emperor near Abydos
on the Hellespont, Çaka reached out to Kılıç Arslan, who feigned friendship, invited
him to dinner, and killed him. Although Anna claims that the removal of the threat
led to peace in the maritime provinces, and the megas doux John Doukas did
3In fact Alexios had recognized the potential of Turkish allies as early as 1074, when he persuaded
TutuΒ, the Emir of Damascus and brother of MelikΒah, to deal with Roussel de Bailleul by tacitly
promising to legitimize Turkish conquests in eastern Anatolia (Anna Komnene, 33-34).
26
successfully reclaim the Aegean islands and most of the coast, the Byzantines did not
yet have the armies or the money to fully fill the power vacuum left by Çaka.
Regarding the earliest Anatolian Selçuk Sultanate, it had first been
established around the time that Alexios had become the emperor. Since the earlier
sources like Attaleiates finish before this date and the later sources are more
explicitly pro-Komnene, the exact circumstances of its founding are obscure. What
is clear is that the Byzantine civil war had allowed the Turks to occupy both the
abandoned countryside and those cities to which imperial claimants had granted
access, since the Turks at this point were largely ignorant of siege warfare. Thus for
a significant fortified city like Nikaia to have become their first capital, and
Süleyman to have become their first sultan, Byzantine assistance was required.
σaturally, the later sources put the ―blame‖ for the complete loss of Anatolia on
Michael Doukas, Nikephoros Botaneiates and especially on Nikephoros Melissenos,
yet another of the Byzantine generals who had contended for the throne during the
civil war. Of Melissenos, Nikephoros Bryennios writes that due to his ambitions he
willingly ceded all the cities of Asia, Galatia, and Phrygia to the Turks (Bryennios,
300-301). Yet Frankopan has an intriguing suggestion that it was actually Alexios
himself who should be held accountable, because Bryennios‘s accusation is not
elaborated upon and Anna Komnene does not mention it at all. As Frankopan notes,
by the time the historians wrote about the loss of Anatolia, Alexios and his family
were beyond criticism, whereas Melissenos had largely disappeared from history
(Frankopan, 2006: 176-179). A pro-Alexian point of view, best exemplified by the
Alexiad itself, naturally stresses the desperate situation in which Alexios found
himself upon his accession and the heroic actions by which he ―saved‖ Byzantium.
The reality may have been more complicated. Even Anna states that Alexios was
27
eager for peace with the sultan and after very limited attempts to recapture the coasts
of the Gulf of Nikomedeia concluded a treaty in June 1081 that made the border
between the two the River Drakon (Yalakdere) near the site of Helenopolis (Anna
Komnene, 130). This boundary of course left Nikaia well within Turkish territory,
but the Byzantines in possession of the coasts. This state of affairs was ostensibly
acceptable to both sides, since Alexios turned his attention west to deal with the
Normans and north to deal with the Petchenegs, while Süleyman left his lieutenant
Ebu‘l Kasım in Nikaia to campaign in Cilicia and Syria.
Süleyman died in 10κ6, killed by his cousin TutuΒ, the Selçuk ruler of Syria.
Ebu‘l Kasım declared himself the sultan and promptly broke the treaty with
Byzantium. Like Çaka, he built a fleet with the intention of attacking the capital
(Anna Komnene, 202). Alexios‘s response was to send Manuel Boutoumites by sea
and a Byzantinized Turk named Tatikios who had been commanding Byzantine
forces against the Normans and Petchenegs to handle land operations (Brand, 1989:
3). Boutoumites succeeded quickly in his objective, and as Tatikios was pushing
Ebu‘l Kasım back, Alexios proposed peace and invited Ebu‘l Kasım to
Constantinople to discuss terms. Ebu‘l Kasım had by this time also captured
Nikomedeia and so while he was in the capital Alexios ordered the construction of a
fortress near Helenopolis known as Kibotos or Civetot (Anna Komnene, 203-204),
which thus controlled the entrance to the gulf. At the same time Alexios was
engaged in diplomacy with the distant Great Selçuk sultan MelikΒah, who though he
had no designs on Anatolia nevertheless considered Ebu‘l Kasım no less an affront to
his authority than Süleyman had been (Cahen, 1968: 80). While simultaneously
entertaining and flattering MelikΒah‘s ambassador Siaous, Alexios concluded a treaty
28
with Ebu‘l Kasım against Bursuk (Prosouch), MelikΒah‘s experienced general. Anna
Komnene describes his strategy:
―For when two enemies of the Roman Empire were fighting one another, it
would pay him to support the weaker – not in order to make him more
powerful, but to repel the one while taking the city from the other, a city
which was not at the moment under Roman jurisdiction but would be
incorporated in the Roman sphere by this means; little by little a second
would be taken, and then another, so that Roman influence, which was then
reduced to almost nothing, especially since Turkish military strength had
increased, would be much extended.‖ (Anna Komnene, 20η)
Although the Byzantines did not yet regain Nikaia, Alexios was able to convince
Siaous, who had been sent to propose a marriage alliance, to switch sides. MelikΒah
had sent Siaous with a document that commanded any Turkish commander to return
his conquered city to the Byzantines, and by converting Siaous (both politically and
religiously), Alexios was able to use this letter to regain Sinope. For his part, Siaous
was made the doux of Anchialos, on the Bulgarian coast (Brand, 1989: 4).
Undeterred, MelikΒah sent another army commanded by Buzan (Pouzanos) with the
same offer of marriage for Alexios. Buzan‘s siege of σikaia did not take the city but
his army had done enough damage that Ebu‘l Kasım tried to come to terms with
MelikΒah, hoping to bribe him with gold. MelikΒah rejected this overture and turned
Ebu‘l Kasım over to Buzan, who promptly had him strangled (Anna Komnene, 20ι).
As fate would have it, shortly thereafter in 10λ2, MelikΒah died, and the Great Selçuk
Empire would never again intervene in western Asia Minor (Cahen, 1968: 81). The
sultanate of Nikaia fell to Süleyman‘s son İzzeddin Kılıç Arslan I (10λ2-1107). With
no hope of an alliance with the east to dislodge the Turks still so uncomfortably close
to his capital, Alexios now turned to the west.
By 1095, when Alexios appealed to Pope Urban II for assistance,
Byzantium‘s position was as stable as it had been before Mantzikert. The new sultan
Kılıç Arslan was directing his ambitions east toward the DaniΒmendids. The
29
Danişmendname is extremely problematic as a historical source; it relates in a poetic
and heroic style the deeds of Melik DaniΒmend Ahmad Ghazi, which were initially
oral tales describing his personality and his military prowess. The work was
compiled during the reign of İzzeddin Keykavus II (1246-1257) and was later
embellished by Arif Ali under the patronage of the Ottoman sultan Murat II (1421-
1451) (Köprülü, 1λλ2a: 41-42). Therefore, the work likely describes conditions in
three different centuries, and certain religious aspects may pertain more to the
τttoman period than to that of the early DaniΒmendid beylik. The ghazis are
described as carrying the banners of Abu Muslim and Battal Ghazi, accompanied by
seyyids (descendants of the Prophet), shaikhs, and barefoot dervishes. Their golden
crests are woven with the words ―victory is from God and conquest is at hand.‖
(Köprülü, 1λλ2a: 42) The ghazis attack churches and monasteries, and even convert
the Christian populations by force in their zeal. More reliable information
concerning the early DaniΒmendids is difficult to find, but in the twelfth century they
were the main rivals to the Selçuks in Anatolia. Kılıç Arslan regarded them as his
subjects, much as the Great Selçuk sultan MelikΒah had regarded him as an unruly
subject (Cahen, 2001: 11). By 10λη DaniΒmend Ghazi controlled Ancyra (Ankara),
Kaisareia (Kayseri), and Sebasteia (Sivas), in other words the northern route across
Anatolia. The focal point of the conflict between the Selçuks and the DaniΒmendids
was and would be Melitene (Malatya), the key point by which both the northern and
southern routes across Anatolia led to the east (Cahen, 1968: 84).
As for Alexios, he saw in the crusaders an opportunity to finally make
significant gains in Anatolia. He insisted that their various commanders swear an
oath of fealty and promise to return to him all the conquered territories that had once
belonged to the empire (Anna Komnene, 322-329; Fulcher, I:IX:1; Gesta, II). Yet
30
Alexios also made his own plan to take Nikaia, ordering his general Boutoumites ―to
suborn the barbarians in Nikaia by all kinds of guarantees and the promise of a
complete amnesty, but also by holding over them the prospect of this or that
retribution – even massacre – if the [crusaders] took the city‖ (Anna Komnene, 331).
Meanwhile, Kılıç Arslan broke off his siege of Melitene when he realized that his
capital (where he had also left his family) was in fact facing a serious threat. Yet
after arriving and engaging the crusader armies in a daylong battle, the sultan
decided to withdraw and wait for a better opportunity. He sent a message to the
garrison telling them to ―do just what you consider best‖ (Anna Komnene, 33η),
likely knowing that the option of surrender to the Byzantines was available. Thus
just as the crusader siege was beginning a final assault, Boutoumites ―climbed to the
battlements and set up there the imperial scepters and standards, and acclaimed the
emperor to the accompaniment of trumpets and horns.‖ (Anna Komnene, 33κ) As
promised, the Byzantines allowed the Turks to leave, and they also took Kılıç
Arslan‘s wife prisoner, since she was Çaka‘s daughter. She thus served as proof of
the fall of Nikaia to those Turks still occupying Smyrna and the Aegean coast (Anna
Komnene, 346). Alexios dispatched his brother-in-law John Doukas to secure their
surrender.
In the meantime, the crusader armies, guided by Tatikios, moved east towards
Dorylaion (EskiΒehir). They met the full army of the sultan, which included
DaniΒmend detachments, and won an overwhelming victory, seizing the Selçuk camp
and forcing their army into flight (Fulcher, I:XI-XII; Gesta, III:ix; Runciman, 1969a:
293-294). They now faced a choice of routes, and chose the most westerly, which
would head south, avoiding the salt desert and passing Philomelion (AkΒehir),
Ikonion (Konya), and Tyana before reaching the Cilician Gates (Runciman, 1969:
31
292). For the Byzantines, this westerly route also served well, as it may have further
intimidated the Turks of Smyrna (Shepard, 1996; 87-88). However, it must be
mentioned that while the crusaders‘ chronology is well-known, the campaign of John
Doukas is less so. According to Anna Komnene it should have taken place while the
crusaders were already in Antioch in 1098. Thus the crusaders would already have
left Anatolia and would not have played even a threatening role towards those Turks
who remained (Roche, 2009: 151). Here again it must be remembered that the Turks
who had occupied the Aegean were not in any way Selçuks or loyal to Kılıç Arslan
(Roche, 2009: 152). Rather, the relative ease with which first the crusaders and then
the Byzantine army crossed western Anatolia indicates that the Selçuk hold on the
western lands had been extremely tenuous and ceased to exist after the successful
siege of Nikaia and the Battle of Dorylaion. Yet concomitantly, the Byzantines
possessed neither the men nor the money to properly reoccupy or protect the plateau,
which had in any case never been well suited to Byzantine settled life and
agriculture. By contrast, the plateau was ideally suited to the transhumant Türkmen,
as it resembled their ancestral lands in northern Iran and Central Asia (Cahen, 1968:
85). And so, for the next two centuries the Turks would not have a permanent
presence on the Aegean or Black Sea coasts; they were effectively pushed back to
the Anatolian plateau, although their raiding would continue to be a problem.
Ikonion would become their capital city, and the Selçuk sultans would turn to a
―continental‖ way of life (Cahen, 1λ6κμ κη). To this point Alexios‘s efforts had all
been ostensibly successful, although he soon faced growing tensions with the
crusaders, and the difficulties with the Türkmen would recur unceasingly.
As has been mentioned, the crusader armies were being guided and aided by
Alexios‘s general Tatikios. Along their route, he had been accepting cities and lands
32
taken back from the Turks in the name of the emperor (Brand, 1989: 3), and thus
Philadelphia (AlaΒehir) as well as significant parts of Ionia, Phrygia, and Lydia had
once again come under Byzantine control (Foss, 1982: 149). Alexios himself also
led an army toward Antioch (Anna Komnene, 348), but he got only as far as
Philomelion before he collected the Byzantine subjects and returned to safer territory
(Anna Komnene, 350; Gesta, IX:xxvii). Yet as the crusader host departed from
Anatolia their ambitions and rivalries began to surface. After months of besieging
Antioch with the crusaders, Tatikios abruptly left and returned to Alexios.
According to Anna Komnene, the reason was that Bohemond had falsely caused
Tatikios to believe that the soldiers were plotting to murder him. An ongoing theme
in the Alexiad is that the Norman Prince Bohemond had designs on Antioch from the
beginning, and thus he needed to be rid of Tatikios in order to have a reason for
breaking his oath of fealty to Alexios (Anna Komnene, 343). For his part,
Bohemond claimed that Tatikios had left due to his cowardice and that thus the oath
was nullified (Runciman, 1969b: 313-314), and that Antioch was his by right since
―the city had been acquired by his negotiations and stratagems‖ (Fulcher, I:XXV:4).
Alexios lost no time in trying to deny Bohemond access to the sea and thus to any
reinforcement. The Byzantines already controlled the ports of Latakia, Valania, and
Maraclea as well as Cyprus, and Alexios also ordered the occupation and
construction of fortresses at Korykos (Kızkalesi) and Seleukia (Silifke) in Cilicia
(Fink, 1969: 373). Following an unsuccessful attempt at taking Latakia and a belated
visit to Jerusalem to repair his relationship with the other crusader leaders, in 1100
Bohemond was captured on the road to Melitene by the DaniΒmend leader Melik
Ghazi and was held as a prisoner in Neokaisaria (Niksar) for several years (Fulcher,
I:XXXV).
33
The Crusade of 1101 was organized primarily to reinforce the nascent
crusader kingdoms, but those who set out faced considerable difficulties simply in
reaching Jerusalem. Neither the Byzantines nor the crusaders had reoccupied or
fortified the Anatolian plateau, and Kılıç Arslan and DaniΒmend Ghazi had recovered
from their earlier defeats. Having learned of Bohemond‘s capture, the Lombards
(who formed the majority of the force) pushed to make Neokaisaria and Bohemond
the first objective. They were able to get as far as Ancyra and after massacring the
Turkish garrison (Ancyra had been taken by Turks shortly after Mantzikert) they
duly turned it over to the Byzantines, although by this time the city was too far away
from Byzantine territory to be held (Treadgold, 1997: 624). The next major fortress,
Gangra (Çankırı) was too well-fortified to take, and Turkish attacks had started to
become more frequent. In addition, the army was running out of food in an area with
no market towns and only unripe grain in the fields (Lea Cate, 1969: 354-355). The
expedition met its end at Mersyphon (Merzifon) when it was attacked by a combined
force of Selçuks and DaniΒmends, who set aside their differences to deal with their
common enemy (Turan, 1971: 167-169). Two other groups of crusaders attempted
to retrace the route of the First Crusade, but both were defeated and almost entirely
destroyed by Kılıç Arslan at Herakleia Kybistra (Ereğli). Although some of the
crusaders held Alexios accountable for this debacle and accused him of treachery, the
fact is that he had explicitly warned them to follow the same route as their
predecessors (Anna Komnene, 355-356). The expedition had been a failure both
diplomatically and logistically; the crusaders of 1101 had foolishly chosen a route
without adequate supplies and had the misfortune of having to fight against the
combined Turkish force.
34
That Turkish alliance soon dissolved, again over the issue of Melitene, and
Bohemond for his part was able to parlay this disagreement into a release from
captivity (Fulcher, II:XXII). DaniΒmend Ghazi saw Bohemond as a potential ally
precisely because he was the enemy of both Alexios and Kılıç Arslan (Cahen, 1968:
κ6). Thus the emperor and the sultan also reconciled, with Kılıç Arslan even sending
troops to aid Alexios when Bohemond reemerged attacking Epiros in 1106 (Cahen,
2001: 13). When DaniΒmend died in 110ζ Kılıç Arslan was at last able to take
Melitene, as well as establish his capital at Ikonion. In 1107 he too died intervening
in Upper Mesopotamia, and with him the alliance with Byzantium died as well.
During the reign of his son ΑahinΒah (1110-1116)4 Türkmen attacks resumed almost
everywhere. These attacks were sometimes officially sanctioned and sometimes not,
but this distinction meant little to the Byzantines. Again it is clear that aside from the
fortified cities, Anatolia was in no place secure, with bands of Turks raiding even to
the coast (Anna Komnene, 453) although of course they always withdrew with their
booty. In 1116 Alexios set out against Αahinsah in what would be his final military
campaign. He used the route running south from Dorylaion past Polybotos
(Bolvadin) and Philomelion and sent back any Christians to safer territory. Near
Philomelion Alexios defeated ΑahınΒah. The sultan, according the Anna, agreed to a
treaty by which the borders would be set as they had been before the Battle of
Mantzikert (Anna Komnene, 488). Such a treaty would have been impossible to
enforce at this point, so Anna probably meant that the sultan accepted Byzantine
sovereignty in principle and agreed to stop the raids (Cahen, 1968: 92). In any case,
the Türkmen did not accept the agreement and ΑahınΒah was deposed, blinded, and
strangled. His brother İzzeddin Mes‘ud (1116-1156) became the sultan and Alexios
4Αahinsah was in fact taken prisoner when his father was killed, and for three years his cousin Hasan
of Cappadocia ruled as regent in Ikonion.
35
withdrew without having achieved any meaningful expansion of Byzantine territory,
though the retreat was orderly and he safely conveyed the Christian refugees back to
Bithynia. Considering the state in which he had come to the throne, the
reestablishment of a professional army capable of such an orderly retreat was a
significant achievement and one that would greatly benefit his successors
(Birkenmeier, 2002: 79-80).
In summary, Alexios began his reign in chaos and spent it struggling almost
without rest against enemies on all sides. Despite his efforts almost all of Western
and Northern Anatolia was either Turkish territory outright or was subjected to raids.
Further to the east the crusader princes were beyond Byzantine reach. Yet Alexios
was nevertheless a successful emperor. It was because of his actions and his
diplomacy that Byzantium had survived at all. While the countryside may have
remained dangerous, the major cities and towns, especially along the coasts, were in
Byzantine hands and provided a basis for his successors to build upon. Perhaps most
importantly, he left the army far more disciplined, loyal, and reliable than it had been
when he came to power. In a stark contrast to the decades of intermittent civil wars
which had preceded his reign, Alexios, John, and Manuel, father, son, and grandson,
reigned for almost one hundred years, in wartime no less.
2.6 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1118-1143: John II Komnenos
―East and West saw me warring, and I attacked the nations of both continents.
I remained but little in the palace; nearly my whole life was lived out of a tent,
and I have always diligently sought the open air.‖ – John II Komnenos
(Choniates, 42-43)
With the accession of John II Komnenos (1118-11ζ3) Anna Komnene‘s
narrative ends, and Choniates and Kinnamos offer only brief summaries as preludes
36
to their more detailed writings on Manuel. Thus John‘s reign is much less wellcovered
than that of either his predecessor or his successor. It is clear, however, that
where the Turks were concerned he intended to pursue his father‘s policy. In 1119
he directed his first campaign against Laodikeia on the Lykos (near modern Denizli)
and took the city, expelling the Turkish garrison and Alp-Kara, its commander
(Kinnamos, 5-6; Choniates 12). He also fortified the city. The next year he set out
against Sozopolis (Uluborlu) in Pamphylia. Both Kinnamos and Choniates describe
the difficulties in approaching this citadel (Kinnamos, 6; Choniates, 13) which had
been well-fortified by Romanos Diogenes (Foss, 1982: 153) but lost nevertheless.
John took the fortress by luring the Turkish defenders out with a feigned retreat, a
typically Turkish tactic that required discipline and careful timing (Birkenmeier,
2002; 89). He concluded the year‘s campaign by taking several other fortresses to
open the route south to Attaleia (Kinnamos, 7; Choniates, 13).
Due to wars in Europe, John could not campaign in the east again until 1130
or 1132. By 1130 the dominant Turkish power in Anatolia were the DaniΒmendids,
which had united under the leadership of GümüΒtekin (110ης-1134/35). While
during this period the Selçuk sultan Mes‘ud was usually the junior partner to
GümüΒtekin in a Turkish alliance, John‘s campaigns coincided with a rupture in their
relationship (Cahen, 1969b: 677). His purpose was initially less to conquer the
DaniΒmendids than it was to curtail their raids on adjacent Byzantine territories
(Kinnamos, 13), and on his first campaign he took Kastamon, though it was quickly
recaptured by GümüΒtekin (Kinnamos, 14; Choniates, 19). In 1134 or 1135, shortly
after receiving the title of melik (king) from the Caliph in Baghdad GümüΒtekin died,
and his son Melik Muhammed (1134-1142) came to power with ostensibly greater
ambitions (Bar Hebraeus, Xμ2λζ). τn his coinage he styles himself as ―Μέγα􀈢
37
Μέ􀈜􀈚􀈛􀈚􀈢 πά􀄱􀈘􀈢 Ῥω􀈝α􀈞􀜝α􀈢 􀈛α􀜜 Ἀ􀈞a􀄲ό􀈜􀈘􀈢‖, the Grand King of all Romania and the
East, meaning essentially those areas of Asia Minor and upper Mesopotamia which
were under the control of Turkish emirs (Oikonomides, 1983: 198; 201-202). Now
John and Mes‘ud joined forces (however briefly – the troops sent by Mes‘ud secretly
deserted the Byzantines) against Muhammed, and the Byzantines retook Kastamon
and also successfully besieged Gangra (Çankırı), ―one of the largest and most
illustrious of the cities of the Pontos that had not been subject to the Turks in former
times‖ (Choniates, 20; Kinnamos, 15). Yet despite his impressive victory, soon
thereafter ―the Turks returned in even greater numbers and much stronger than
before‖ and retook the fortress (Choniates, 21).
John spent the next three years campaigning in Cilicia and Syria, and just as
the DaniΒmendids had undone his gains so too the sultan Mes‘ud ―had taken
advantage of the opportunity to launch attacks against the Romans‖ (Choniates, 31).
Once again he was successful so long as he was in the field, but he could not rest
easy in the capital. In 1139 he decided to push even deeper into DaniΒmendid
territory, all the way to Neokaisareia (Kinnamos, 21). The campaign was not lacking
in bravery but it was nevertheless inconclusive due to both the very cold winter and
to the defection of the emperor‘s nephew John, who the emperor feared would reveal
the full weakness of his army to the Turks (Choniates, 34-36). In any case, it seems
unlikely that even had he taken Neokaisareia that the gain would be permanent,
given the unrelenting and opportunistic nature of the DaniΒmendids.
In 1142 John was again obligated to counter a Turkish threat to Sozopolis.
During this campaign one of the more extraordinary episodes is described by both
historians (Kinnamos, 22; Choniates, 37-38). While pursuing the fleeing Turks, John
came to Lake Pousgouse (BeyΒehir Gölü) which contained several islands inhabited
38
by Christians. These have been identified as Mada Adası and Kilise Adası, though
only the latter preserves its fortifications (Foss, 1998: 158-160). Although Christian,
these islanders were well within Selçuk territory and refused to submit to John,
forcing him to mount siege engines on rafts to make an assault. This incident
demonstrates that at least some Byzantine peasants accepted Selçuk rule instead of
placing their hopes on the often-distant emperor, while the Selçuks could take the
obvious benefits which came from having peasants working the land (Cahen, 1968:
156-157). John died in 1143 in a hunting accident (Kinnamos, 24; Choniates, 40)5
while once again pursuing the Komnenids‘ ―burning desire to unite Antioch to
Constantinople‖ (Choniates, 3λ). Although it had seemed as though war with the
Latins was inevitable, John‘s death and Manuel‘s immediate departure for the capital
prevented its outbreak.
When compared with that of Alexios, John‘s reign seems much more
straightforward. He campaigned almost constantly, but his campaigns always had a
clear objective. Unlike Alexios, whose wars were almost always defensive and
reactive, John made attempts to expand and roll back the Turks in Lykia, Pamphylia,
Pisidia, and Paphlagonia, and his efforts in Cilicia and Syria apparently had a similar
purpose. He wanted to reestablish imperial control and access to the key cities of the
empire, and he evidently believed that this was primarily a military issue instead of a
diplomatic one. When compared to both his father and his son, John seems to have
engaged in far less diplomacy. Part of this difference is probably due to the far less
detailed nature of the sources for his reign, especially when compared with the
overwhelming (even confusing) mass of details presented by Anna Komnene. But it
also stands to reason that John, who came to power possessing a professional and
5
Robert Browning has suggested on the basis of two nearly contemporary orations that John was
actually murdered, but this view has not found wide acceptance (Browning, 1961: 229-235).
39
battle-tested army (Birkenmeier, 2002; 95), was simply using the most effective
means at his disposal to solve problems. Choniates even relates that in 1139 before
the expedition against Neokaisareia the army complained bitterly about their
exhaustion, lack of adequate supplies, and absence from their domestic affairs
(Choniates, 33). In addition, by John‘s reign Turkish immigration from Iran had
stopped almost entirely (Cahen, 2001: 13), and furthermore he did not have to
contend with a Crusade outside the walls of Constantinople or crossing Byzantine
Anatolia. Yet the question must be asked, was John really all that successful? His
campaigns in Paphlagonia and Syria accomplished almost nothing of any
permanence, and his defense of western Anatolia was ephemeral at best; Manuel
would be fighting for most of the same cities again and again. Only his fortresses
seem to have had a truly lasting value, a lesson which his son Manuel certainly
seems to have learned well.
2.7 Anatolia between the Byzantines and Selçuks 1143-1180:
Manuel I Komnenos
―The science of generalship knows one excellent thingμ
that he who braves danger for his country sways matters in balance.
Should one not grasp this, he loses everything.‖ - Manuel I Komnenos
(Kinnamos, 197)
After securing his accession in Constantinople, Manuel turned his attention to
the east (Figure 5). Raymond of Antioch initially tried to take advantage of
Manuel‘s absence to lay claim to Byzantine territory in Cilicia, but Raymond‘s own
troubles further east with Zengi of Mosul, who conquered Edessa in 1144, forced the
crusader prince to petition for Byzantine help (Magdalino, 1993: 42). The Selçuk
sultan Mes‘ud also caused trouble in the area, pillaging and capturing Prakana near
Seleukeia. In the meantime, Kinnamos also says that the Turks raided the
40
Thrakesian Theme and the Cayster valley. In 1146 Manuel led his first campaign
against the Turks, defeating them at Akroinos (Afyonkarahisar) (Kinnamos, 38-39).
Advancing further he stormed and destroyed Philomelion, releasing those Byzantines
who had been confined there (Kinnamos: 40; Choniates, 53). Although he was
unable to take the Selçuk capital, the expedition was a success, and the destruction of
Philomelion (repeating the actions of his grandfather a half-century earlier)
demonstrates that his objective was less about conquest than about demonstrating
Byzantine power to the Selçuks and the west (Figure 6).
For the rest of the decade Manuel was largely preoccupied with the Second
Crusade and its aftermath, a crusade which was devastated by the Selçuks as it
proceeded across Anatolia without significant Byzantine support. In fact, the
pillaging and destruction caused by the crusade itself actually incited the Greek
residents to make common cause with the Turks. The German army was defeated
near Dorylaion and the French reached Attaleia but were unable to continue over
land (Lilie, 1993: 157). Particularly with the French, Manuel seems to have been
unwilling to assist; they were evidently considered more dangerous to Byzantium
than the Turks. In the meantime the Norman king of Sicily Roger II took advantage
of the situation to attack Greece, which lacked the troops that Manuel had withdrawn
to keep an eye on the crusaders (Magdalino, 1993: 51). In addition to the war with
the Normans, developments in the Balkans prevented Manuel from turning back to
the Turkish situation until 1157 or 1158.
At that time Manuel renewed his diplomatic agreement with the new sultan
Kılıç Arslan II (1156-1192), although war soon broke out again when the Byzantine
army, commanded by the emperor, marched through the sultan‘s territory
(Kinnamos, 190; Choniates, 110). With the continuing significant Byzantine interest
41
in Antioch, the lack of a direct and safe land route back to the capital was to be an
ongoing problem. Several years of warfare ensued, without significant gains by
either side. Finally the two powers attempted a more permanent diplomatic solution,
and in 1162 Kılıç Arslan himself came to Constantinople ―to petition the emperor
regarding matters beneficial to him.‖ (Kinnamos, 204; Choniates, 118). Manuel
aimed to impress his guest with the might and wealth of Byzantium, treating him to
lavish banquets and elaborate entertainments. Manuel ―charmed [the sultan] with
horseraces, and according to custom set alight some boats and skiffs with liquid fire,
and absolutely gorged the man with spectacles in the hippodrome, whereby the
grandeur of cities is particularly likely to appear.‖ (Kinnamos, 207). The terms of
their agreement left the sultan in the position of vassal:
―Throughout his life to be hostile to those who cherished enmity against the
emperor, but to be friendly to those who, on the contrary, were settled in his
favor. Of the cities which he had won, he would give the greater and more
notable to the emperor. It was not allowed for him to make peace with any of
the enemy unless the emperor directed. He would fight as ally with the
Romans on request, and come with his entire force whether the conflict was
an eastern or a western one. Nor would he allow those who lay beneath his
authority, but who are clever at living by thefts and customarily are called
Turkomans, to do any harm whatsoever to the Romans‘ land, unpunished.‖
(Kinnamos, 207-208)
In other words, the whole of the sultan‘s foreign relations would be conducted on the
whim of Byzantium. Yet at the same time, Kılıç Arslan was eventually accorded
certain dignities, such as being enthroned beside the emperor and the right to serve as
the intermediary between Byzantium and other Turkish emirs (Magdalino, 1993: 77).
In any case, Kılıç Arslan would also benefit greatly from this treaty, as it allowed
him to consolidate his own power in Anatolia while Manuel turned his attention once
again to the situation in the west.
Kılıç Arslan II had finally become the sultan of Ikonion in 1156. During his
long reign he greatly expanded Selçuk territory as well as strengthening their hold on
42
that territory. In the early years of his reign he had to consolidate his power, and thus
despite the Byzantine incursions he was anxious to make peace. Both rulers realized
that there was no clear border between their territories and that each had more
dangerous enemies. For the Selçuks, the most significant rivals were still the
DaniΒmendids, whose ambitions stretched at least as far west as Ancyra. The
DaniΒmendid ruler Yağıbasan had allied himself with Kılıç Arslan‘s brother
ΑahinΒah (who held Ancyra and Gangra) and also supported his young nephew
Mehmed in Melitene (Cahen, 2001: 24). In 116ζ Yağıbasan died and the ensuing
succession was contested, which allowed Kılıç Arslan to take Elbistan as well as his
brother‘s strongholds of Ancyra and Gangra (Cahen, 2001: 27). Naturally his
successes drew the attention of Nureddin, the Zengid ruler of Syria, who was
approached by ΑahinΒah, Afıdun of Malatya, and Dhu‘l-Nun of Sivas. In 1173
Nureddin led a campaign into Anatolia, although its distance from his real power
base in Syria encouraged him to settle matters quickly and reestablish the status quo
(Cahen, 2001: 28). Thus Kılıç Arslan lost most of what he had gained, although
when Nureddin died in 1174 the sultan quickly and bloodlessly regained all of it. At
this point ΑahinΒah and Dhu‘l-Nun turned to Constantinople for help (Cahen, 2001:
29).Kılıç Arslan‘s consolidation was thus ensured both by his own diplomatic skills
and the timely deaths of his greatest potential rivals. The DaniΒmendids essentially
disintegrated after the death of Yağıbasan, and σureddin was too preoccupied to do
more in Anatolia. In 11ιζ the Selçuks were the preeminent power in Anatolia, and
Manuel felt compelled to do something to check their ever growing power.
Manuel also made use of the decade of peace in Anatolia, continuing the
Komnenian policy of fortifying territory which was exposed to Türkmen raids. As
his destruction of Philomelion demonstrates, however, he was most interested in
43
securing territory which could actually be held. John had built fortresses at
Achyraous, Laodikeia and Lopadion with the goal of restoring agricultural
productivity in the western Anatolian river valleys (Magdalino, 1993: 125).
Regardless of treaties with the Selçuks, these areas were always subject to disruptive
raids which may or may not have been tacitly encouraged by the sultanate. Manuel‘s
fortifications were concentrated to the northwest, in the new province known as
Neokastra. Choniates mentions three of them, Chliara, Pergamon, and
Adryamytteion, which:
―were suffering terribly at the hands of the Turks. Formerly, the neighboring
provinces had not been settled because the inhabitants of villages were
exposed to enemy attack. Manuel fortified these with walls and protected the
nearby horse-breeding plains with fortresses. In this way, these fortress
towns swelled in population and abounded in the good things of civilized
life.‖ (Choniates, 150)
Most importantly this prosperous new province contributed to the imperial revenues.
The new fortresses also allowed Manuel to change the way the Byzantines related to
the Türkmen, requiring them to pay for winter pasturage and to stop attacking
travelers (Magdalino, 1993: 127). The logical next step would be to push the Turks
further east by advancing into the Anatolian plains.
In 1174 Manuel began preparations to check the growing power of Kılıç
Arslan. His pretext for war was that the sultan had not abided by the terms of the
agreement of 1162. In particular he had not returned any cities to Manuel, nor had
the Türkmen attacks entirely ceased (Cahen, 2001: 28). Yet the bigger reason was
undoubtedly that Kılıç Arslan had become far too powerful and the alliance which
had benefited both sides now only appeared to benefit the Selçuks. In addition the
Emperor believed that a campaign against the Turks would increase his prestige in
the west if presented as a crusade. His first action was to fortify two key points on
the road to Ikonion, Dorylaion and Soublaion. Unlike the fortresses of Neokastra,
44
the intended purpose of these two was to secure the road for pilgrims as well as
crusaders. As a letter from the Pope Alexander III indicates:
―He has constructed a certain great and populous city in the middle of the
land of the Sultan of Iconium, where he has placed the Latins and Greeks to
defend it, and by this city he dominates agreat region of the Turks, so much
that he has restored the road for all Christians, both Greeks and Latins, to visit
the Lord‘s Sepulcher.‖ (Magdalino, 1993: 96)
σaturally Manuel‘s motives were in fact more practical. While he may have wished
to impress his western audience with a grand gesture, the land route through Anatolia
to the Holy Land would also bring more tangible benefits. Throughout the 1160s
neither the Byzantines nor their erstwhile Selçuk allies could guarantee the security
of pilgrims on the road, and consequently the Italian maritime trading cities were
taking them by sea. Constantinople lost both money and a chance to recruit
mercenaries (Lilie, 1993: 213). In addition Byzantium also had continuing interests
in the crusader states themselves, and needed reliable access to them. Kinnamos
even relates that the Byzantines planned a naval expedition to Egypt against Saladin,
although his narrative breaks off at just this point (Kinnamos, 300). Here too the
resurgent empire looked like an appealing ally for the crusaders, who were dealing
with the growing power of Saladin (Magdalino, 1993: 97). Despite the support of
Pope Alexander only Philip of Flanders answered the call and traveled to the Holy
Land; the Byzantines proceeded toward Ikonion alone (Lilie, 1993: 212).
At the beginning of the campaign in 1176 Kılıç Arslan offered peace, but
Manuel further demanded that the sultan reinstate the DaniΒmendids, a condition
which was clearly not going to be met. Manuel‘s attack would be twofold. He sent
Michael Gabras to Paphlagonia to take Amaseia (Kinnamos, 293), and afterwards he
was to continue to Neokaisareia. His hope was for a DaniΒmendid insurrection while
he was assaulting Ikonion, thus ensuring its success (Lilie, 1991: 41). In the
45
meantime Manuel proceeded to Dorylaion, passed through western Phrygia and
Laodikeia to Chonai (Kinnamos, 298; Choniates, 177-178) and from there he
followed the course of the Maeander River to Soublaion, at which point he entered
Selçuk territory. Kılıç Arslan once again requested peace, and Manuel ignored the
advice of his most senior officers, men experienced in combat with the Turks, and
continued on. Choniates puts the blame on the desire of Manuel‘s less experienced
relatives, who were eager for glory (Choniates, 179). After leaving the ruined fortress
of Myriokephalon he had to cross very difficult terrain in the defiles of Tzibiritze6
and here Kılıç Arslan made his attack. Unfortunately Kinnamos‘s narrative breaks
off right before the battle, so only Choniates records what happened. Manuel‘s army
was burdened with many pack animals and heavy siege engines intended for Ikonion,
and once in the narrow pass the Selçuk archers unleashed their arrows and
surrounded the Byzantine army in the pass. The Byzantine siege engines turned into
a barricade which further trapped the army (Choniates, 181). The battle became a
rout and the Emperor, according to Choniates, lost heart, even enduring extremely
disrespectful verbal abuse from a subordinate who chastised him for not accepting
peace when it had been offered (Choniates, 186). As night fell the Byzantines were
surrounded without hope of escape, although Manuel himself considered fleeing
(Choniates, 187). Kinnamos, despite not actually recording the battle, foreshadows it
two times and says that he personally saw Manuel fighting bravely, ―resisting entire
Turkish regiments‖ (Kinnamos, 192) and ―surpass[ing] the bounds of human
excellence‖ (Kinnamos, 207).The next day Kılıç Arslan through an emissary again
6The fortress of Myriokephalon only appears in Choniates‘s account and the location of the battle has
been the subject of debate. According to Choniates the defile should be the Kufu Çayı, in the vicinity
of Choma. But the other sources are in agreement placing the battle one day‘s march from Konya
(Michael the Syrian, 200; Kinnamos, 44) at Tzibrelitzemani, ten kilometers west of Konya (Belke,
1984: 238). Hendy locates Tzibrelitzemani at the Bağırsak Dere Boğazı, between Konya and Lake
BeyΒehir (Hendy, 1λκημ 1ζ6-154).
46
offered peace on very similar terms, although he requested that Manuel demolish the
fortresses at Dorylaion and Soublaion.
This time Manuel had to accept and the army withdrew to Chonai still being
harried by the Turks. Choniates puts the blame for this on the sultan (Choniates,
191), but it is more likely that Kılıç Arslan‘s forces were not entirely disciplined and
saw the chance to gain more booty. Manuel destroyed Soublaion but not Dorylaion
and as a result the sultan sent a huge force which pillaged the whole of the Maeander
valley down to the Aegean coast (Magdalino, 1993: 99). Yet nevertheless the
Byzantine army was evidently in good enough shape to ambush this Selçuk army as
it was returning from the raid (Brand, 1992: 17). For Manuel himself, however, the
defeat at Myriokephalon was traumatic, and he compared it to Romanos Diogenes‘s
defeat at Mantzikert (Choniates, 191). Given the grand motives which Manuel had
espoused, Kılıç Arslan‘s disinclination to take more territory is surprising. As with
Alp Arslan in 10ι1, Kılıç Arslan‘s policy was focused on his own realm.
Myriokephalon was probably not even perceived as being a particularly significant
battle by the Selçuks. There is only one Muslim source which even mentions the
battle, but it is short and straightforward (Hillenbrand, 2008: 155) and contrasts with
the large number of sources which describe and glorify the victory at Mantzikert. It
is true that the Muslim sources never really focus on the Anatolian Selçuks, but even
Ibn Bibi does not mention it in his dynastic history (Hillenbrand, 2008: 157).
2.8 Anatolia from the death of Manuel to the Fourth Crusade
In 1180 Manuel died; his successor was his eleven-year-old son Alexios II
(1180-1182), with his mother Maria of Antioch as the power behind the throne.
Shortly thereafter Kılıç Arslan took Kotyaeion and Sozopolis (Choniates, 262) and
47
this combined with Byzantine losses in Europe inspired Manuel‘s cousin Andronikos
I Komnenos (1183-1185) to seize the throne for himself. Andronikos utterly
destroyed the carefully constructed Komnenian system of government and
relentlessly persecuted anyone whom he perceived as an enemy (Treadgold, 1997:
656). In the end his arbitrary cruelty prompted Isaac II Angelos (1185-95; 1203-
1204) to rebel. Andronikos was blinded and mutilated, and then dismembered in the
Hippodrome (Choniates, 348-353). Isaac restored some measure of stability during
his decade in power and even apparently rebuilt the fortress at Choma-Soublaion,
calling it Angelokastron after his new dynasty (Ahrweiler, 1966: 282). But relations
with the west continued to deteriorate, and prevented the Byzantines from taking
advantage of what Cahen describes as the Selçuk ―crisis of growth‖ (Cahen, 2001μ
39).
At the end of his long and successful reign Kılıç Arslan partitioned his
territories among nine of his sons, his brother, and his nephew. This partition
illustrates which cities were considered as definitive parts of the Selçuk territoryμ
Sivas and Aksaray, Tokat and its surroundings, Niksar, Kayseri, Elbistan, Malatya,
Amasya, Ereğli, σiğde, Ankara along with Çankırı and Kastamonu, and Kütahya and
Uluborlu. Dorylaion was also included in the territory of Ankara, and Kılıç Arslan
retained only Konya for himself. Turan saw this partition as an attempt at imposing
a feudal system in the tradition of past Turkish states like the Göktürks or the Great
Selçuks (Turan, 1971: 242). Cahen, on the other hand, saw the partition as an attempt
to deal with the Türkmen. Most of these cities were on the borders of the Selçuk
realm, and Kılıç Arslan was thus seeking to organize his sultanate as it expanded.
Significantly, Gıyaseddin I Keyhüsrev (1192-1196; 1205-1211), whose mother was a
Greek Christian, was granted the recently conquered Uluborlu and Kütahya. This
48
being the case, it has been assumed that Keyhüsrev spoke Greek fluently (Shukurov,
2013: 130-31) and this may have been the reason he was granted territories that
would have been largely Greek-speaking. Predictably, however, the Selçuks began
infighting even before the death of Kılıç Arslan, and the situation was not settled
until 120η when Keyhüsrev definitively controlled the sultanate and all of its
territories. By that time the situation in Anatolia had completely changed due to the
Fourth Crusade and its aftermath.
As it happened, the Byzantines and the Selçuks both experienced their crises
of succession at the same time, meaning neither was able to take advantage of the
other‘s difficulties and expand. For the Byzantines, the crisis became a catastrophe
when Constantinople was lost in 1204. For the Selçuks, the crisis was only
temporary, and under Keyhüsrev and his successors İzzeddin I Keykavus (1211-
1220) and Alaeddin I Keykubad (1220-1237) the sultanate reached its apogee. In
1207 Attaleia was taken, in 1214 Sinope, and in 1221 Kalanoros (Alanya) became
Selçuk cities. An inscription on the Kızıl Kale in Alanya describes Keykubad:
―the shadow of God in the lands, the splendor of the victorious empire, the
helper of the flourishing community … the enlivener of justice in the two
worlds, the sultan of the land and the two seas, the holder of the two horizons,
the crown of the house of Selçuk, the master of king and sultan, Abu’l Fath
Keykubad b. Keyhüsrev b. Kılıç Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the
Faithful – may God make his reign last eternally.‖ (Mecit, 2014: 113-114)
49
CHAPTER 3
KOMNENIAN FORTIFICATIONS:
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
Eustathios of Thessalonike compared the first three Komnenian emperors‘
reconquest of Anatolia to a series of waves; saying that Alexios drove the Turks back
from the sea, John pushed them back further, and Manuel removed them entirely
(Eustathios, 29). In light of the historical facts, this praise is clearly overstated, but it
does express generally the pattern of the Komnenian fortification policy. Alexios
generally restricted his efforts to the coasts, John built fortresses which protected the
major routes from the coasts to the interior, and Manuel attempted both to reinforce
John‘s foundations and to push still further east with his fortresses at Dorylaion and
Soublaion (Figure 7). Fortifications are often singled out for praise by both the
panegyrists and the historians, but those same histories also make it clear that
fortifications alone were not enough to counter endemic Turkish raids on the
surrounding territories. By analyzing historically attested fortifications and
comparing their construction techniques with undated or unattested fortifications in
the frontier regions, a fuller picture of the Byzantine defensive strategy can be
reached.
50
3.1 Previous Studies
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, travelers in Anatolia noted
many remains of fortifications, but the interests of most of these early visitors lay
more in recording inscriptions and identifying classical cities than in the later
Byzantine centuries. Calling a fortification ―Byzantine‖ or medieval says nothing
about whether that fortification was constructed to counter the Arabs, the Turks, or
for some other purpose entirely. Thus, although the locations of many fortifications
are known, they are all too often undated and lacking in context which can make
them useful to a historian. Stylistically, they were often crudely and hurriedly
constructed, which was appropriate under the historical circumstances but makes
them far less interesting to an art historian than a Byzantine church or palace (Foss,
1982: 146-147). From an archaeological perspective, several surveys have been
conducted but very few excavations, so ceramic and numismatic evidence which
could confirm or disprove conclusions based on historical reasoning is still lacking.
Without a doubt Clive Foss has made the greatest contribution to an
understanding of Komnenian fortifications. In addition to numerous books and
articles concerning the cities and regions of western Anatolia, under the auspices of
the British Institute at Ankara, he conducted in-depth surveys of the Turkish vilayets
of Kocaeli and Kütahya, in which he identified and described all Byzantine remains
within their boundaries (Foss, 1985; 1996a) as well as attempted to set these remains
into a historical context. In addition to the contribution these publications have made
to an understanding of their subjects, they also provide a valuable framework for
future surveys in as yet unstudied vilayets. The Kütahya project focused on
Byzantine Kotyaeion, a city with a substantial castle but a largely unknown history,
whereas the Kocaeli project focused on Nikomedeia, a city well-known in history but
51
which had escaped much scholarly attention. Foss also co-authored a more general
study of Byzantine fortifications with David Winfield (Foss and Winfield, 1986),
which attempts to set out a methodology for studying and dating them. Another
general work is ―A Skeletal History of Byzantine Fortification‖ by Arnold Lawrence
(Lawrence, 1λκ3) though it is indeed quite ―skeletal‖ in its treatment of fortifications
constructed after the ninth century.
The British Institute‘s castle survey was continued by Hugh Barnes and Mark
Whittow in the 1990s (Barnes and Whittow, 1998), although with a different focus.
Rather than attempting to survey entire vilayets, this survey identified five sites along
the upper Maeander and spent a season at each of them. Unfortunately only the
preliminary reports and a brief summary have been published. In addition to this
project, Whittow‘s doctoral thesis offers a more in-depth look at many of the sites
and fortresses along the Maeander (Whittow, 1987).
Detailed regional surveys of Byzantine fortifications exist for several other
regions as well. For the Pontos, from Sinope to Trebizond, Anthony Bryer and
David Winfield have written an extremely detailed and lavishly illustrated survey of
the Byzantine monuments (Bryer and Winfield, 1985). Naturally this work focuses
on the Empire of Trebizond, which due to historical circumstances and geographical
isolation led an existence almost entirely divorced from the Byzantine Empire. In
Cilicia, which was of more interest and importance to the Komnenian emperors,
Robert Edwards has written a thorough survey which both encompasses and
supersedes all previous work on the region (Edwards, 1987a). Although it focuses
on Armenian fortresses, Byzantine and Crusader castles (which were often re-used
and re-built by the Armenian princes) are also described and illustrated. Outside of
Anatolia, Nikolas Bakirtzis has written on the fortifications of Aegean Macedonia, in
52
particular those of Thessaloniki (Bakirtzis, 2010). Here again the focus has been on
considering these monuments in their historical and geographical context.
Finally, mention must be made of the Tabula Imperii Byzantini. This longterm
project seeks to map the Byzantine road system throughout the empire. In
addition to its excellent maps, the TIB offers extensive bibliographies for all of the
sites and cities that it mentions. Although the volumes dealing with Bithynia and
Mysia have not yet appeared, the volume dealing with Phrygia and Pisidia covers
numerous sites which were important in the Komnenian period (Belke and Merisch,
1990).
3.2 Fortifications of Alexios I Komnenos
While Alexios is credited with the construction of many coastal fortresses,
few have been securely identified (Figure 8). These are the fortresses of
Didyma/Hieron, Seleukeia, and Korykos. In addition, Anna Komnene mentions the
fortress of Kibotos (Civetot), near or at Helenopolis on the southern coast of the
Astacene Gulf (İzmit Körfezi), and also gives a detailed description of the
construction of a fortress known as Sidera near Lake Baanes (Sapanca Gölü). The
exact location of the former is questionable and the latter has not been found.Finally,
the walls of σikaia contain Selçuk grave stones which must have been incorporated
after Alexios reclaimed the city in 1097.
3.2.1 Didyma/Hieron (Didim, Aydın)
The fortress at Didyma was constructed on the remains of the famous Temple
of Apollo (Figure 9). In addition, it had served as a fortress two times before in its
history, first against the Gothic invasion of the third century and then in the seventh
53
century against Arab raids, when it was also made into the bishopric known as
Hieron (Foss, 1977: 479). In the reign of Alexios it was again apparently rebuilt and
further augmented with a semi-circular wall projecting beyond the east colonnade.
The walls inside the temple used spolia and rubble without any sort of arrangement,
while the new semicircular wall used rough and unsorted spolia without any
decorative arrangement and a good deal of mortar. Such a construction style reveals
only that the work was completed quickly. Without the inscription found during early
twentieth century excavations it would be impossible to date the work (Foss, 1982:
157-158), although a coin of Alexios was found in the cistern south of the main
staircase leading to the nave (Knackfuß, 1941:26).
The inscription found at Didyma is open to interpretation, since the date is not
completely clear. It can be dated to 1088/9, 1094, or 1103/47 depending on whether
the inscription mentions the second or the twelfth indiction8, all within the reign of
Alexios but all in different historical circumstances (see above, 2.5). In addition, the
renovator of the castle is described as the vestarch and doux of Crete Michael
Phoukas the Karatouinos, titles which only make sense if the later date is preferred,
due to Alexios‘s changes to the hierarchy of Byzantine titles (Ragia, 200ιμ 13κ-139).
This would mean that the renovation of Hieron was not actually a response to the
Turks, but rather against the Italians in the south Aegean (Ragia, 2007: 141). On the
basis of historical likelihood, Foss prefers to read the date as 1094, since this was
after the murder of Çaka but before the full reconquest of the southern Aegean coast
(Foss, 1982: 157). But it seems unlikely that Alexios would have ordered the
fortification of a relatively unimportant site when he was preoccupied with troubles
7
A much earlier date in the tenth century has also been proposed, based on the epigraphic character of
the letters, but H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler convincingly argues for dating it to the reign of Alexios based
on historical circumstance and the titles mentioned (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960: 184-185).
8
The Byzantine indictions followed a fifteen year cycle which had begun in the year 312. See A.
Bryer‘s chapter ―Chronology and Dating‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies.
54
much closer to Constantinople. Furthermore in 1097 or 1098 John Doukas defeated a
large army of Turks near Ephesos that was commanded by several Turkish emirs
from the region, causing them to flee toward the interior (Anna Komnene, 347).
During her narrative of this campaign Anna makes no mention of any Byzantine
stronghold south of Ephesos. Thus it makes the most sense to see the fortress of
Hieron as demonstrating that not every fortification dated to the reign of a particular
emperor need to have been built under his intimate direction.
3.2.2 Korykos (Kızkalesi, Mersin)
In 1099 Alexios ordered the royal eunuch Eustathios to fortify Korykos and
Seleukeia in anticipation of an attack by Bohemond (Figures 10-11). Anna Komnene
says that ―it had been a very strong city, but later fell into ruins‖ (Anna Komnene,
363) (Figure 12). Ostensibly on this basis Foss, Winfield (Foss, 1982: 159; Foss and
Winfield, 1986: 22-23) and in particular Lawrence believe that the fortress was
constructed in the seventh century if not earlier. Lawrence notes the extensive use of
classical spolia, including the arch which serves as the main gateway, and argues that
the site would have been ideal for defense against the seafaring raids of the Arabs
(Lawrence, 1983: 177). Edwards, however, believes that there is no evidence for
construction prior to the twelfth century, further noting that the Arab geographers
make no mention of a fortified site and that no bishop is attested during the period of
the Arab invasions (Edwards, 1987a: 166-167). Due to the large amount of ashlar
blocks Lawrence‘s suggestion seems more plausible, as this fine masonry suggests
that the buildings so repurposed had either just fallen into disrepair or were
demolished specifically to build the castle (Figure 13).
55
For a time Alexios‘s policy seems to have successfully prevented Bohemond
from receiving help from the west (Lilie, 1993: 72) but perhaps as early as 1109
(Lilie, 1993: 108) and certainly by the reign of John Korykoshad been lost and had to
be reconquered on the emperor‘s campaign against Antioch in 1137 (Lilie, 1993:
117). By the late 1160s Korykos was under the control of the Armenians, according
to Benjamin of Tudela, who describes the city as ―the frontier of the empire of
Thoros9‖ (Benjamin, 1η). Choniates accuses Manuel‘s finance minister, John of
Poutze, of diverting money needed for the upkeep of the navy to the treasury
(Choniates, 55-56); in light of this the ultimate loss of Korykos is unsurprising.
Korykos actually comprises two fortresses, one on the mainland and the
other, smaller, castle on an island close to the coast. The land castle has a square
shape, square towers, and a fully concentric plan, the only one in Cilicia (Edwards,
1987a: 163). The sea castle has a single wall circuit and its Byzantine walls were
more extensively reconstructed by the Armenians than those of the mainland castle.
On the mainland, the Byzantine plan survives on the south and east walls, notable for
their square towers, whereas Armenian rounded towers project from the north wall
(Edwards, 1987a: 14). Nevertheless, Edwards notes that even on the south side the
Armenians refaced the walls with newly quarried ashlar blocks, making the land
castle a better example of Byzantine construction (Edwards, 1987a: 164). Edwards
sees all the re-used ashlar blocks as being the work of Eustathios, and thus assigns
what he refers to as small crude and large crude masonry (Edwards, 1987a: 21-22) to
the fourteenth century Lusignan occupation (Edwards, 1987a: 165). By contrast Foss
sees this as representing the twelfth century Byzantine work since for him the castle
was constructed in the seventh century (Foss, 1982: 159). Likewise, Lawrence only
9
Prince Toros II, lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1144/45-116λ. For an account of the kingdom‘s
history and a gazetteer see T.S.R. Boase‘s The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, 1-33 and 145-185.
56
attributes what he calls ―the first unseemly repairs to the outer line‖ to Eustathios
(Lawrence, 1983: 179), and Winfield concurs with this view, though without the
artistic judgment (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 22). Considering the need for haste and
the limited manpower available, it seems highly unlikely that he would have been
able to do much more than shore up the formidable, if ancient, fortifications of
Korykos.
3.2.3 Seleukeia (Silifke, Mersin)
Like Korykos, Seleukeia was hastily refortified by Eustathios, but it seems to
have remained Byzantine for far longer, until the 1180s (Figure 14). Kinnamos and
Choniates both mention John‘s campaign against Levon10, who had conquered most
of Cilicia and was besieging Seleukeia (Kinnamos, 16; Choniates, 29). During the
early 1130s it was the Byzantine border town along the Cilician coast, and after it
passed to Levon II11 it was alternately controlled by both the Franks and the
Armenians. Consequently, the building history of the castle, especially the
renovation work of Eustathios, is almost impossible to determine without excavation
(Figure 15) (Edwards, 1987a: 228). One of the only indisputable remains of the
Komnenian period is the dry moat, which is mentioned by Anna; ―at once, too,
Seleukeia was rebuilt and strengthened with ditches all round the city‖ (Anna
Komnene, 363). Yet even here it is most likely that the original ditches were also
heavily augmented (Edwards, 1987a: 228-229). Seleukeia illustrates very clearly the
difficulties in constructing chronologies of often-rebuilt and repaired fortifications in
the absence of excavation.
10 Prince Levon I, Lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1129/30-1137.
11Prince Levon II, Lord of Armenian Cilicia from 1187–1198/1199 and then king of Armenian Cilicia
from 1198/1199–1219.
57
3.2.4 Kibotos/Civetot/Helenopolis? (Hersek, Yalova)
The fortification known as Kibotos to the Byzantines and Civetot to the
crusaders no longer exists, but its location is nevertheless known due to the important
role it played in history (Figure 16). It had been built on Alexios‘s orders in 1087
while he was entertaining Ebu‘l Kasım in Constantinople (Anna Komnene, 203-204),
and was located near or possibly on the site of the older city of Helenopolis, although
this identification is not certain.12 The site is on Dil Burnu, a peninsula formed by
alluvium carried down by the Yalakdere creek, which projects north into the gulf of
Iznik; thus it both controlled access to the gulf and served as a port for travelers
going between Nikaia and the capital. Although no remains survive today, the
nineteenth-century traveler Charles Texier noted many remains of walls near the
shore (Ulugün, 2010μ 1κ3). According to the chronicler Orderic Vitalis, Alexios had
intended to garrison the fortress with Anglo-Saxon mercenaries, but the castle was
never actually completed (Orderic, 38-39). Albert of Aachen refers to this castle
near to Civetot as ―ancient and abandoned‖ and says that the crusaders had to
supplement the missing gates with their shields to fend off the pursuing forces of
Kılıç Arslan (Albert, 42-43). As Foss suggests this apparent ruin was most likely the
fort left unfinished by Alexios (Foss, 1996a: 65).
12 While Foss is quite certain that Helenopolis and Kibotos are one and the same (Foss, 1996: 64),
İnalcik identifies Helenopolis with the τttoman Yalak-Hisar (modern Yalova) (İnalcik, 1λλ3μ ιζ).
Furthermore, neither Ainsworth nor Texier equated Helenopolis with modern Hersek (Ulugün, 2010μ
173; 183). In Anna Komnene it seems, contrary to Foss, that the two places are distinct. In addition,
Helenopolis was famous for its thermal springs, which do not exist on the peninsula but are in fact
located further to the west. Finally, the sources state that Peter the Hermit and his followers initially
pitched a camp at Helenopolis (Anna Komnene, 311), but only later, after unsuccessful attacks, did
they enter the ruined fortress at Civetot to take refuge.
58
3.2.5 Sidera
Although the location of the fortress of Sidera is not known (Figure 16), Anna
Komnene offers her most detailed description of Alexios‘s building activity in
relation to the fort.
―South of Lake Baane [Sapanca Gölü] he [Alexios] noticed a very long trench
and when he followed its course to the end he concluded from its position and
shape that the excavation had not been merely aciddental, nor was it the result
of some natural process, but the deliberate work of some human hand. Once
he had been led to the same idea he ordered the trench to be dug to a great
depth, but fearing that at the point where lake and canal met it might be
possible to get across, he built an extremely strong fort there, completely
secure and proof against all assaults, not only because of the water, but also
because of the height and thickness of its walls – for which reason it was
called the Iron Tower. Even today it constitutes a city in front of a city, an
outlying bastion to protect a wall. The emperor himself directed its
construction from early morning till evening. Enormous sums of money were
spent to ensure that the walls should be really strong and impregnable. He
paid generous wages to the men who dragged the stones, one by one, even if
fifty or a hundred workers were involved at a time. The money attracted not
casual laborers, but all the soldiers and their servants, natives and foreigners
alike; they were glad to move stones for such liberal pay under the direction
of the emperor in person. To them he seemed like a prize-giver at the games.
He made skillful use of the crowds who flocked to help and the transport of
these huge blocks of stone was made easier.‖(Anna Komnene, 30ι-308)
Sidera was thus intended to be a more forward point of defense for the approaches to
Nikomedeia and Constantinople. It was probably built in 1095, shortly before the
arrival of the first of the crusaders. By this time both Çaka and Ebu‘l Kasım were
dead, and so only Kılıç Arslan remained to threaten Bithynia. Thus it seems that this
new fortress was also intended to set the stage for further gains in Anatolia.
3.2.6 Nikaia (İznik, Bursa)
The recapture of Nikaia was surely the most impressive achievement of
Alexios, but since the city had undoubtedly had walls since its founding 1500 years
earlier he did not have to build extensively. In their plan and in most of their
construction, the walls date to the reigns of Gallienus (253-268) and Claudius
59
Gothicus (268-270); they run for five kilometers and had over eighty towers, with
four main double gates (Figure 17) (Foss, 2003: 250). The greatest testament to their
strength is that throughout their history the city was always taken by negotiation or
trickery, and never by direct assault. The most substantial alteration was undertaken
by Michael III (842-867), who added new towers between the old towers on the
south and south-east sections. This work can only be dated due to inscriptions, since
the builders of the towers tried to follow the original style (Foss, 2003: 253). In 1065
an earthquake accomplished what no attacker had been able to, and a large section of
the eastern wall had to be reconstructed, this time with extensive brickwork instead
of stone.
With its apparently impregnable walls and its proximity to the capital, Nikaia
was an ideal base for aspiring and successful usurpers. Bardas Skleros in 978, Isaac
Komnenos in 1057, and Nikephoros Botaneiates in 1078 all used the city as their
base. It was also in this context that the city fell to the Turks of Süleyman in 10κ1ν
he had been installed in the city by σikephoros Melissenos. σaturally Süleyman had
no need to add to the substantial fortifications, and the only archaeological remnants
of the Sultanate of Nikaia are some Selçuk tombstones which were themselves
reused in a later rebuilding. These stones reveal the only glimpse of σikaia‘s brief
time as a Turkish and Islamic city, and are also the earliest Selçuk inscriptions in
Anatolia (Figure 18). One of them commemorates Ahmad the tanner, another
Mahmud ibn Abdullah, from Isfahan. Mahmud‘s stone and another contain
quotations from the Kur‘an (Foss, 1λλκ, 1ηη-157). They demonstrate not only the
distant origins and the rapid advance of the Turks across Anatolia, but also that
tradesmen accompanied the Selçuk armies and practiced their craft in the context of
60
settled life. They offer an insight into life in this period of transition which could
never be obtained from Anna Komnene‘s martial narrative.
As mentioned above (2.5), the crusaders were on the verge of taking Nikaia
by force when Kılıç Arslan allowed it to be surrendered to the Byzantines. Thus the
city did not suffer a sack, but the siege nevertheless damaged the walls. In particular
the crusaders had caused the so-called Gonatas or Kneeling Tower13 on the
southwestern corner to collapseby digging beneath it and later setting fire to the
tunnels supports (Albert, 120-125). In its place Alexios constructed a smaller tower,
which as Foss says is really more of a pentagonal buttress (Figure 19). The work
employs reused stones, including the Selçuk tombstones and has its superstructure in
the brickwork added after the earthquake of 1065 (Foss, 2003: 257). Like all of
Alexios‘s fortifications, the tower displays hasty and expedient construction
techniques. Naturally this means that accurately identifying an undated or
unmentioned fortification as being by Alexios is difficult if not impossible, since his
constructions are always adapted to their circumstances.
3.2.7 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)
For a description and discussion in connection with Manuel, see 3.4.2.3.
3.2.8 Possible Fortifications of Alexios
The lack of any distinctive style makes it difficult to assign fortresses to
Alexios, and it is quite possible that he was responsible for more than he can be
given credit for. Two fortresses in western Phrygia, Aizanoi and Akrokos, may have
been constructed by him, as they occupy routes by which he is known to have
13The tower had been damaged during Bardas Skleros‘s attempt to take the city in λικν his removal of
the stones at the base caused the tower to lean forward as if kneeling.
61
traveled and the construction techniques employed give no reason to assign them to
John or Manuel.
3.2.8.1 Aizanoi (Çavdarhisar, Kütahya)
The impressive ruins of Aizanoi at first reveal little of its Byzantine history
(Figures 20-21). It was apparently an important center well into Late Antiquity until
the rise in importance of Kotyaeion with its superior defensive position. The name at
least survived into the Ottoman period as Sazanos, a nahiye or sub-district of
Kütahyaν Hisar-i Çavdar, which has led to the name of the current village, most
likely referred to only one section of the larger, ruined, ancient city (Foss, 1985:
118). The temenos wall of the Temple of Zeus was strengthened and outfitted with
round towers faced with rubble and spoils, although only the foundations uncovered
during excavations in 1983 and 1984 remain (Figure 22) (Naumann, 1985: 275-283).
The obvious parallel for an Alexian fortress at Aizanoi is Didyma. There too,
abundant spoils were used to quickly build a fortress in the midst of enemy territory.
Naumann prefers to date these walls to the reign of Manuel (Naumann, 1985: 294)
but Aizanoi does not appear to have been on any of his campaign routes and is also
far removed from the regions where he enacted extensive fortification programs.
Alexios, on the other hand, campaigned in this area late in his reign, and he can also
be credited with the nearby fortress of Akrokos.
3.2.8.2 Akrokos (Eğrigöz, Emet, Kütahya)
The present remoteness of the castle at Akrokos belies its former strategic
importance (Figures 23-24). The rock on which it stands controls a valley in which
two routes through the mountains from Mysia converge and continue east toward
62
Phrygia. In the Alexiad the emperor crosses Mount τlympos (Uludağ) by difficult
and lesser known paths with the intention of cutting off a Turkish raiding party
which had plundered Mysia (Anna Komnene, 453). It is clear that Akrokos was
close to a river valley large enough to allow the two armies to draw up their battle
lines. Furthermore, two Byzantine generals pursuing another Turkish force returning
from a raid in the Troad were defeated and captured next to an old and abandoned
fort (Anna Komnene, 456)14 which may well have been Akrokos. Furthermore the
Turkish forces tried to hide from the emperor in a reed-filled marsh, which Alexios
then had burned to draw them out. The castle thus sits at the narrowest point of the
valley and is surrounded on either side by broader plains which are today
agricultural. Finally, there is a clear connection between the ancient and modern
names (Foss, 1985: 112). The Turkish name can mean ―crooked eye‖ but it is likely
that this represents an attempt to give meaning to the Greek name, a common
practice. That ―eğri‖ is so appropriate to describe a gorge is thus a happy
coincidence.
The standing remains complement the text which states that in Alexios‘s time
the fortress was old and not in use. According to Foss the bulk of the fortress dates
to the ninth century, with only the gate and minor repairs being later (Foss, 1985:
116-117). The gate‘s second phase likely represents the work of Alexios. It consists
of a rough pink mortar with small pieces of stone and brick and an arch faced with
brick. As is typical of Alexios‘s work, there is no recognizable technique or style to
this work, especially since so little survives.
14
The date of these events is unclear. Foss favors 1117 (Foss, 1985: 111) whereas Vryonis says 1113
(Vryonis, 1971: 149-150). The earlier date is more likely given that Alexios‘s campaigns in 1116-7
were directed towards Konya and the events mentioned here seem to have been a more spontaneous
defensive effort.
63
3.3 Fortifications of John II Komnenos
While the work of fortification carried out by Alexios always seems to have
been constructed in a hasty and opportunistic manner, John‘s fortifications show a
deliberate attempt at controlling a major military route (Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 1960:
185) (Figure 25). This difference mirrors the difference between the campaigns of
Alexios and John. Whereas Alexios spent much of his reign on the defensive, John
was constantly on campaign in enemy lands. John is known to have built
fortifications at Laodikeia on the Lykos, Lopadion, and Achyraous. In addition it
seems logical to assign at least a rebuilding of Apollonia Sozopolis to John.
3.3.1 Laodikeia (Kaleiçi, Denizli)
Laodikeia, located in the valley of the Lykos River (Çürüksu Çayı), and its
neighboring city Khonai (Honaz) were the last major cities in Byzantine territory
before the Selçuk frontier15 after they were recaptured by John in 1119. Thus the
city protected the route running down the Maeander which had previously seen
intensive raiding activity. It was also the juncture where the overland route from
Lopadion joined with the Maeander route and from Laodikeia an army could either
continue east toward Ikonion or march south to Attaleia.
Laodikeia had been an important city well into Late Antiquity, but during the
reign of Phokas (602-610) it suffered an earthquake from which excavations reveal it
never recovered. Due to the damage done to the water supply the inhabitants seem to
have moved ten kilometers south, out of the valley of the Lykos and onto the
foothills of Mount Salbakos (Babadağ). The modern city of Denizli grew up around
15
Both Chonai and Laodikeia had been taken in the decade after Mantzikert but were reclaimed by
John Doukas in 1098, who then appointed a military commander for the region at Lampe, still further
to the east (Anna Komnene. 348). In any case they must have been lost again late in the reign of
Alexios.
64
one of these new settlements, Kaleiçi, while the other two (Bereketli Hisarköyü and
Asartepe) are somewhat further into the hills (Figures 26-28) (ΑimΒek, 2013μ ηκ). On
the basis of both textual and archaeological evidence it seems as though Kaleiçi
should be Komnenian Laodikeia, although this identification has been challenged.
Whittow preferred to identify the Komnenian city with the older site (Whittow, 1987:
190-192), although when he wrote excavations had only just begun and so the extent
of the seventh century abandonment was not yet known. Baykara claims Kaleiçi as a
Turkish foundation due to an inscription which mentions Seyfettin Karasunger, the
governor of the region during the reign of Gıyaseddin Kayhüsrev II (1236-1246)
(Baykara, 1λ6λμ ζ6). Gökçe closely follows Baykara in assigning Kaleiçi to
Karasunger (Gökçe, 2000μ 6η-66), though both scholars do not mention the
excavations of the classical site and their implications. Tanyeli seems to have been
the first to identify Kaleiçi as the new site of Byzantine Laodikeia, and he claimed
that the walls should originally be assigned to John (Tanyeli, 1989: 343) and that
Karasunger merely repaired them, a view that has been accepted by both İnceoğlu
(İnceoğlu, 2003μ 1η-16) and ΑimΒek, the excavator of the classical city. ΑimΒek also
notes that the late antique city had been fortified by Theodosios and Arkadios in the
late fourth century and thus would not have needed new walls (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ 3λ-40).
In a more recent publication Baykara is dismissive of the archaeological evidence
and claims that even well into the Turkish period the Christian population of Denizli
continued to live on the ancient site even as they worked in the newer city (Baykara,
2007: 107). This hypothesis does not explain how the purported residents of the older
site would have obtained water, and thus it seems far more reasonable to follow the
excavators in their belief that there was no settlement of significance there after the
water system had been destroyed (ΑimΒek and Büyükkolancı, 2006μ λ1).
65
Both Kinnamos and Choniates mention John‘s reconquest of Laodikeia in
1119, although only Choniates mentions that a wall was built by the emperor around
the city (Kinnamos, 5-6; Choniates, 12). It is logical to identify these walls with
those that surround Kaleiçi in the middle of modern Denizli (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ ζ0). The
castle wall is roughly rectangular, though it follows the contours of the hill (Figure
27). It measures 280 by 160 meters and appears to have had at least six gates,
although they were perhaps not all original as the area used to be Denizli‘s main
market area (Darıverenli, 1λζ3μ η). Into the twentieth century the walls were still
eight to ten meters high in some places (Figure 29), although the remains suffered
severe damage during an earthquake in 1950. Where they can still be seen, the walls
consist of travertine blocks bonded together with lime mortar with gaps filled in with
smaller stones or brick pieces, although not in any sort of regular cloisonné (Figure
30). On the west wall there is a triangular projection, though the earlier plan more of
these projections are shown. The plan also shows at least two square towers;
although neither can be seen today (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ ζ1-42).
The sources reveal two more interesting aspects of Komnenian Laodikeia.
Odo of Deuil, when he passed through the city in 1148 states that the inhabitants
evacuated the city with all their provisions and that the crusaders could not buy any
food for their continuing journey to Attaleia (Odo of Deuil, 113-114). Choniates,
describing the city in Manuel‘s time, says that it was not surrounded by walls and
that it was a collection of villages on the slopes of the mountain (Choniates, 124).
Both of these passages, in addition to the nearly constant raids mentioned as
occurring in the Lykos Valley, testify to the insecurity of the region. Thus, if John
did in fact fortify this hill, he cannot have intended it to be a place for the protection
of the people living in the valley. Rather, it was intended mainly as a military base
66
along the main campaign route. As Kinnamos says, John left behind a garrison and
adequate supplies (Kinnamos, 6). The history of John‘s campaigns demonstrates that
he was more interested in opening and protecting routes to the most important cities
than he was in reclaiming and protecting the territories through and in which he
campaigned.
3.3.2 Apollonia Sozopolis (Uluborlu, Isparta)
For most of the twelfth century the fortress of Apollonia Sozopolis was the
easternmost Byzantine possession. Its strategic location had already been recognized
by Romanos Diogenes before the Battle of Mantzikert; according to an inscription
the walls were built by him in 1070 (Figures 31-32) (Foss, 1982: 153). The
inscription was reused in the wall either during John‘s rebuilding or perhaps even
after the Turks took the city sometime after Mantzikert. John could not take the city
by force in 1120, but instead had his commander Paktarios fire missiles at the walls
to try and lure out the defenders. When they emerged the Byzantines drew them
away from the walls and into an ambush with a feigned retreat. They were then able
to take the undefended fortress (Choniates, 13). It remained Byzantine until the
death of Manuel, when Kılıç Arslan took it along with Kotyaeion (Choniates, 262)
and Dorylaion.
The remains of the walls, gates, and towers show two phases of construction,
although the second amounts to little more than repairs (Foss, 1982: 156). This
assessment agrees with the history; if the first phase is attributed to Romanos, the
second should be the repairs carried out by John after his besiegers damaged the
walls. The first phase contains larger stones and more spolia while the second is
mostly squared fieldstones with still smaller stones filling the interstices. There is
67
very little brick used but rows of flat stones seems to serve a similar function in
keeping the stone courses level (Foss, 1982: 154).
3.3.3 Lopadion (Uluabat, Bursa)
The fortress of Lopadion commanded a key bridge over the Rhyndakos River
(τrhaneli Çayı), and thus the route from Prusa (Bursa) to Kyzikos as well as the
route heading southeast toward Phrygia (Figures 33-36). It was located to the west
of Lake Apolloniatis (Uluabat or Apolyont Gölü) and by crossing the bridge a
traveler would avoid a journey of several days around the lake (Bondoux, 2003:
393). This central location also made Lopadion the place where troops from the
Hellespontine provinces could gather, and made it the natural location for the defense
of those shores (Hasluck, 1910: 82). Late in Alexios‘s reign the whole region was
raided by the Turkish emir Monoluğ (Monolykos) with a massive army drawn from
the east, who found the defenses wholly inadequate (Anna Komnene, 448; 453).
During these raids it seems clear that Lopadion was either unfortified or that the
fortifications were completely destroyed, since John had to build or rebuild them
completely (Kinnamos, 38; Choniates, 20).16 In addition to the walls, two churches
of Saint Michael survive and the village was still a place of pilgrimage until the
middle of the nineteenth century on account of a miracle-working icon (Hasluck,
1910: 79). Today the site has been given over to agriculture, although the fields
follow the line of the crumbling walls.
According to Hasluck, who saw the walls in the early twentieth century when
they were in better condition, the fort was an irregular rectangle measuring about 475
by 150 meters, with the river protecting its long northern side. The southern long
16
Neither Kinnamos nor Choniates gives a date, but the fortress ostensibly had to be constructed
between John‘s Hungarian War (112λ-1130) and his first campaign against the DaniΒmendids (1132).
Thus 1130 is the date most often given in the secondary literature.
68
side had twelve towers and each short side had six (Hasluck, 1910: 80). The towers
were round or polygonal and projected from the walls, and there were at least five
gates. Today one large tower remains standing, along with a gate, and a structure
containing a vaulted passage. The tower has a core of mortar and rubble and is faced
with fieldstones and occasional spolia; the stones are of different sizes and thus some
regularity is imposed by brick or stone horizontal lacing courses. The tower was
bonded to the wall (Figure 36). On the walls themselves, a recessed brickwork
technique was used, so only narrow single brick bands would have been visible, the
rest having been covered with mortar (Foss, 1982: 159-161). Thus even broken
bricks could be incorporated to fill interstices without unduly damaging the aesthetic
impression. Overall the remains give the impression that they were constructed at
the same time, and only minor repairs were ever done. When combined with the
literary sources, it is clear that Lopadion is a definitive example of John‘s style of
fortification.
3.3.4 Achyraous (Pamukçu, Balıkesir)
Achyraous was built by John in 1139, as a further attempt to fortify the
regions west of the Sangarios (Choniates, 33). Like Lopadion it also guarded the
overland route to Philadelphia and Laodikeia. The castle stood on a cliff next to a
tributary of the Makestos River and thus commanded the route between the plain of
Hadrianoutherai and the plains of Lydia and Ionia (Foss, 1982: 162). The name of
the site has been the subject of dispute and some confusion. In addition to being
called Achyraous it also appears as Ochyrai in Choniates text and as Esseron or
Sycheron in crusader accounts. Hasluck preferred this site over Bigadiç (see below
3.3.5.1) for the location of Achyraous (Hasluck, 1910: 94) agreeing with Ramsay,
69
who had noted that Achyraous replaces Hadrianoutherai (Balıkesir) in contemporary
Byzantine documents (Ramsay, 1890: 156), although without mentioning the socalled
Hoca Kalesi, as the site used to be known colloquially.
Today this fortress is colloquially known as İkizcetepeler Kalesi (Umar,
2006: 152) and its geographical situation has been dramatically changed by the
İkizcetepeler Dam, which was constructed in 1980. The hill is today located at the
northernmost point of the lake formed by this dam (Figure 37), but when Hasluck
visited in the early twentieth century the stream surrounded it on three sides and the
fourth was also naturally protected by a steep slope (Hasluck, 1910: 93). In addition,
prior to the dam construction and the flooding caused by the resulting lake the road
coming from the south and heading towards Pteleia (Pamukçu)17 passed directly
below the surviving towers (Mercangöz, 2003μ 36-37). The plan was apparently a
rough trapezoid two hundred meters in length, with at least five rounded towers,
which survive in much better condition than the walls (Figure 38) (Özdemir, 1λλιμ
213-216). Two of these towers still survive to a height of more than five meters, and
retain their facing of vertical and horizontal fieldstones, occasional spolia, and brick.
The brickwork is used both horizontally and vertically as cloisonné (Figure 39)
(Foss, 1982: 164). On the higher courses brickwork is used in a decorative fashion,
more reminiscent of contemporary churches than fortifications (Foss and Winfield,
1986: 146). According to Foss, this elaborate decoration is due to the personal role
played by the emperor in the construction, and combined with the relatively small
dimensions it seems clear that the fortress was intended as both a military camp and a
demonstration of imperial power (Foss, 1λκ2μ 166). The fortress‘s decoration does
contrast with Lopadion‘s, but according to Choniates John was able to spend more
17Pamukçu‘s older Turkish name was Eftele, an apparent survival of the Greek Pteleia, mentioned in
the Life of Theodore the Studite (759-826) in the context of his return from exile in Smyrna to
Constantinople (Robert, 1962: 385)
70
time on the construction (Choniates, 33). Close examination of the better-preserved
tower‘s construction reveals that the brickwork also has the effect of fixing stones of
various sizes into more regular courses, thus guaranteeing stability as the walls rose.
In addition, the holes now seen at regular intervals in the cloisonné courses originally
had wooden beams which served to connect the facing to the wall‘s rubble core. In
all likelihood these wooden beams also served to stabilize the tower during
construction; Ousterhout notes that without such reinforcement a quickly-constructed
building could become deformed or even collapse due to tension and lateral forces
(Ousterhout, 1999: 194). By the time the wood had decayed, however, the mortar
would have fully set.
3.3.5 Possible fortifications of John
While some of the fortifications which can be attributed to John also fall
along the same crucial inland road system as Lopadion and Achyraous, his coastal
activities are not mentioned by the historians. In particular, John‘s campaigns in
Cilicia seem to have been accompanied by an extensive program of fortress
construction, both in harbor cities and in strategic valleys which separate these
harbor cities from the interior.
3.3.5.1 Pegadia (Bigadiç, Balıkesir)
The fortress of Pegadia has no known history aside from a mention in the Life
of Saint Peter of Atroa (773-837), but the similarity of the modern name (Robert,
1978: 451), its strategic position, and its masonry style all allow it to be assigned to
the reign of John. It is located overlooking the broad plain of the Makestos River,
along the same route which passes Achyraous and Balıkesir. Even when Hamilton
71
saw the ruins in the 1830s not much existed, although he was able to estimate the
area enclosed as being less than one hectare (Hamilton, 1842: 116). Today remains
of nine towers and some of the walls survive; they consist of brick and stone facing
over a rubble core (Mercangöz, 2003μ 3λ). Although most of the facing has
disappeared, where it survives it reveals the same sort of cloisonné technique which
can be seen in the towers at Achyraous (Figure 40). Another parallel with Achyraous
is the use of cribwork to attach the facing to the rubble core (Foss, 1982: 189-190).
The strategic location of the castle caused Munro to identify this site as Achyraous
(Munro, 1897: 258-259), although he apparently never saw the fortress of Hoca
Kalesi and thus was not able to compare the two.
3.3.5.2 Sultan Çayir
Although very little remains of the fortress at Sultan Çayır, its proximity to a
once-important Roman or Byzantine bridge which spanned the Makestos means that
the ruin has been noted many times by travelers and researchers, although it had
already been heavily damaged due to quarrying and boracite mining (Hamilton,
1842: 110; Munro, 1897: 163; Hasluck, 1910: 131-32). Enough remains of one
tower to see that it was constructed of stone and brick pieces attached to the rubble
core with cribwork. The brick pieces are also occasionally arranged surrounding the
larger stones, another example of the cloisonné technique which regularly appears in
John‘s constructions (Foss, 1982: 191). Taken together with the fortresses of
Lopadion, Achyraous, and Pegadia, the remains at Sultan Çayır reveal John‘s
concerted strategy to defend the Makestos Valley against Turkish attacks. In
addition, these regular bases would have provided a secure route for the Byzantine
72
army as it headed south along the frontier zone to the Maeander Valley, another area
to which John devoted significant attention.
3.3.5.3 Trebenna and Yarbaşçandır Kalesi (Konyaaltı, Antalya)
Although not specifically attested, some of the Byzantine remains at
Trebenna have convincingly been assigned to the reign of John. Trebenna has been
known from its coins since the middle of the nineteenth century. Later research
focused mainly on the city‘s classical inscriptions, although Semavi Eyice
investigated the Byzantine remains (focusing on a medieval church) during the 1970s
(Çevik, 200ημ 1ηλ). In 2001 more extensive work began under the direction of Engin
Akyürek. This research, taken together with mentions of the city‘s bishops, has
indicated that settlement was continuous throughout the Byzantine period, and that
the city was only abandoned after the Selçuk conquest of Attaleia in 120ι. In the
Komnenian period Trebenna‘s fortunes were inevitably tied to Attaleia‘s, and John‘s
building activity in the city should be seen in this context. Attaleia was the most
important naval base on the Mediterranean and came to play a key role in
communications and troop movement to the east. Choniates mentions John‘s stay in
the city in 1142, when he attempted to organize its surrounding provinces
(Choniates, 37). Trebenna‘s Byzantine fortifications fall into two distinct periods.
Located on the ancient acropolis, the earlier ones date to the period of Arab raids in
the seventh or eighth centuries. These include the lower parts of most of the towers
and walls, which incorporate spolia such as Roman period sarcophagi (Akyürek,
2005: 207). In a later period, these walls and towers, in particular those along the
western and southern sides were reinforced with rubble stones set in white mortar,
along with brick pieces (Figure 41) (Akyürek, 2010: 234). In addition, fresco
73
fragments from the church in Trebenna ostensibly depict Saint George (Akyürek,
2010: 236-237) the military saint who incidentally also appears for the first time on
the coins of John (Grierson, 1982: 220).
The same team which excavated Trebenna also carried out a survey in the
surrounding Bey Dağları which tentatively dated the castle at YarbaΒçandır to the
reign of John. The castle‘s northern, northeastern, and western sides are sheer cliffs,
so the only fortifications are located to the south and east, with two towers on the
southern side (Figure 42). The pottery found during a surface survey was all of the
twelfth century. The castle commands the Çandır Valley, one of the routes from the
interior plateau of the Teke Peninsula towards Attaleia (Akyürek, 2006μ 6-7).
Taken together with Trebenna, YarbaΒçandır Castle seems to be part of
John‘s protection program for Attaleia‘s countryside. As was the case in other areas
like the Western Anatolian and Cilician river valleys, castles were constructed here
to monitor and impede the progress of nomadic raiders from the highlands, and to
keep them away from the essential harbor cities (Figure 43). It should be noted that
the Byzantines never reconquered the interior of Lykia, and that the Tekke Plateau
was in many ways a microcosm of the larger Anatolian plateau and was thus an ideal
place for the nomadic Türkmen to live. Armstrong has proposed that before the
refortification of the coastal areas, the Türkmen and the local Greeks may well have
had a mutually beneficial relationship (Armstrong, 2001: 279-280). Kinnamos and
Choniates relate the conundrum John encountered at Lake Pousgouse (see above)
and in Lykia the situation might have been the same, nominal Byzantine subjects
coming to an accommodation with the ―enemy‖. To support her claim, Armstrong
describes a specific type of ceramics which initially confounded the archaeologists
conducting a survey at Balboura in northwest Lykia from 1986 to 1993. This ware is
74
wheel-made, very hard, brittle, and brick-red or brown in color. It is decorated with
vertical or diagonal parallel lines and was considered an unknown type.
Furthermore, since many of these sherds were found at sites with no chronological
indicators this peculiar burnished ware could not be dated. The discovery of an
almost complete water jar and a one-handled pot of the same fabric in the final
destruction layers of a church at Xanthos, which were apparently occupied by
squatters in the twelfth and thirteenth century, has suggested a date for this ware
(Armstrong, 1998: 322-24). According to Armstrong, this pottery is nomadic,
because the water jar has a rounded base and is apparently designed to sit on the
ground instead of a table (Armstrong, 1998: 328). Nomadic pottery of the twelfth
century in this region can only have been produced by the Türkmen, and thus
Armstrong has suggested that this distinctive ware might be used to identify their
almost invisible presence in the archaeological record.
3.3.5.4 Kalanoros/Ala’iyya (Alanya)
The castle at Alanya is mostly a product of the Selçuk sultan Alaaddin
Keykubad (1220-1237) who famously conquered and refortified the city in 1221,
rebuilding and repairing the walls. Yet such an important harbor must have played a
role in John‘s Cilician campaigns and as such it is logical to look for fortification
activity which can be associated with him (Figure 44) (Redford, 2000: 14-15). The
only definite Komnenian remains of Kalanoros are those of a chapel, built into and
over the much older Hellenistic walls, and evidently not converted to a mosque since
it lacks a mihrab niche. Although there are no frescoes, the traditional attribution of
this chapel is to Saint George (Lloyd and Rice, 1958: 36-37). This would parallel
John‘s association of himself with the military saint at Trebenna and at other coastal
75
defense sites in the region. According to Redford, however, the walls which connect
the harbor to the acropolis should also be Byzantine. Although their style is
indistinct, it makes no sense that the harbor would be left undefended when
Kalanoros was reestablished as a naval base (Krabbenhöft, 2011μ η1-52).
3.3.5.5 Kızılcaşehir (Oba, Alanya)
The fortress at KızılcaΒehir has no known medieval name and sits on a
limestone cliff east of Alanya in the Oba valley (Figures 45-46). It appears to have
only one major phase of construction and on this basis Redford has dated it to the
Byzantine period because it reflects a major investment that could only have been
accomplished by the Byzantine state. It is constructed of small stones arranged in
rough courses on the northern, eastern, and southern sides. In addition, a small
church built into the walls resembles the Byzantine chapels at Kalanoros and Iotape
(Redford, 2000: 16-18). In 200ζ and 200η Sema Doğan conducted more extensive
research in the castle, including the preparation of a detailed plan. Its dimensions are
121 x 63 meters and the only gate is near the southeast corner. The northeastern
corner and the eastern side are protected by a double wall with towers (Doğan, 2006μ
65). The survey also revealed pot sherds that date to the late twelfth and early
thirteenth century, further confirmation of the fortress as Komnenian (Doğan, 2010μ
374).
This castle would have protected the approach to Kalanoros through the Oba
valley, similarly to how the fortresses at Trebenna and YarbaΒçandır guarded valleys
leading towards Attaleia. YarbaΒçandır shows the greatest parallelsν both castles
were built on naturally protected sites that only required fortification on their
unprotected sides, and neither appears to have had any previous history of
76
occupation. Although none of this is mentioned in the historical sources, John‘s
program of coastal defense clearly expanded upon the work begun by Alexios.
3.3.5.6 Pegai (Karabiga, Çanakkale)
The walls of Pegai do not appear in any twelfth century historical source, but
its strategic location and its construction techniques strongly suggest that it was
originally constructed by either John or Manuel. Like Constantinople, the site is a
triangular peninsula which was fortified with both land and sea walls, which are
poorly preserved (Figures 47-48). The standing remains include most of the twentyfour
towers and sections of the walls which ran between them (Figure 49). In
addition, there is a citadel in the northeastern corner, which overlooks a fortified
upper terrace that in turn overlooks a larger fortified lower terrace. The lower terrace
was only identified with cesium magnetometry prospection. The presence of these
fortified areas inside the walls indicates that in addition to having a harbor and a
garrison, Pegai also had a civilian population (Aylward, 2006: 181).
The walls and towers of Pegai show at least three distinct phases. The
earliest consisted of the land wall with its round towers at regular intervals. These
towers were built of brick pieces and stones over a rubble core, and the brick was
apparently produced locally (Aylward, 2010: 347). The second phase dramatically
changed the appearance of the towers; all of them were transformed into pentagonalshaped
structures, faced entirely with brick and mortar and bonded to the earlier
rounded face with mortared rubble (Figure 50). In addition, more towers were added
to the southern stretch of the wall (Aylward, 2006: 189-190). Finally, a proteichisma
was added, which must be later than the pentagonal towers because it follows their
line closely (Aylward, 2006: 199). Today the first phase can only be seen due to the
77
deterioration of the second; perhaps this dramatic transformation reflects either the
increasing military importance of Pegai or the increasing sophistication of its
attackers.
Müller-Wiener proposed a very early date for the first phase of construction,
attributing it to Michael III (842-867) while allowing that the second phase was
Laskarid (Müller-Wiener, 1989: 169). Foss also recognized two phases but dated
both of them to the thirteenth century (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 154-55). According
to Aylward, however, the walls must have an initial Komnenian phase. The style of
the initial rounded towers shows close parallels with Lopadion and a survey
conducted in the surroundings has confirmed that there was no significant settlement
here from late antiquity to the twelfth century (Aylward, 2010: 343). This is
probably confirmed by the historical record, because Anna Komnene makes no
mention of any raids on Pegai (or of Pegai at all) during the Turkish raid of 1113.
Thus, it is most logical that Pegai was originally fortified and settled early in the
reign of John, perhaps around the same time as the construction of Lopadion. The
following two phases could then represent the activity of the Laskarids and/or the
Latins, whose presence is well-attested historically. As Aylward notes, only an
excavation can answer the question definitively.
3.4 Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos
Fortifications play a constant role in the reign of Manuel, who was especially
concerned with providing protection for the local populations and returning land to
productivity. All of his historically attested works are essentially defensive (Figure
51). Early in his reign he built the castles of Metabole and Pithekas, during the long
78
peace with the Selçuks he founded the new theme of Neokastra, and late in his reign
he tried to resettle the Anatolian plateau by rebuilding Dorylaion and Soublaion.
3.4.1 Melangeia-Malagina (Paşalar, Sakarya) and Pithekas (Köprühisar,
Sakarya)
Manuel‘s earliest attested fortification is a castle located near the Sangarios
River in the district of Melangeia (Figure 16). According to Choniates and
Kinnamos, in 1144 or 1145 Manuel built this fortress to protect Bithynia from
Turkish attacks (Kinnamos, 36; Choniates, 52). During the time of the Arab raids, it
had been the first aplekton where the armies from Thrace and the Opsikion theme
met the emperor (Huxley, 1975: 90) but it has fallen into ruin and the territory was
occupied by nomads (Foss, 1990: 162-63). Afterwards it regained some of its
importance as a mustering post, and was used by both the Germans during the
Second Crusade and by Manuel when he advanced to rebuild Dorylaion (Kinnamos,
81; 294). Yet it should be noted that even Manuel generally favored the route
running from Lopadion through Achyraous to Laodikeia and the valley of the
Maeander; although it was longer it was more secure, allowing an army to leave
Byzantine territory much closer to Konya.
Although the general location of Melangeia has always been clear, the
specifics of the geography have been the subject of debate. Foss calls attention to the
mention of a castle called Metabole in Melangeia (Figure 52) (Kinnamos, 127). This
same fortress was also mentioned by Bryennios as being a night‘s ride away from
Nikomedeia (Bryennios, 172) and thus Foss identifies Metabole with a fortress above
the village of PaΒalar and Melangeia with the plain between this fortress and the
Sangarios. Foss noted three distinct periods of construction, one pre-Byzantine, one
seventh century, and one from the time of Manuel (Foss, 1990: 172). This last phase
79
is most evident on a large catapult platform which projects over the valley, and is
constructed of mortared rubble faced with brick bands and Hellenistic spolia (Figure
53). The walls which connect this platform to the rest of the castle also have brick
bands separating the stone courses, and also employ thin stones horizontally and
occasionally vertically to correct the irregularities of the larger fieldstones (Foss,
1990: 170-71). The castle measures about two hundred by two hundred meters, with
the most formidable walls to the west and the projecting platform to the southeast
overlooking the plain (Figure 54) (Giros, 2003: 218-219).
σine kilometers southwest of PaΒalar, the fortress of Mekece has also been
identified with Metabole (Αahin, 1λκ6μ 166). While Mekece also borders the plain of
Melangeia, it is at least two or three days journey from Nikomedeia (Foss, 1990:
170). In addition, the Byzantine pottery found during surface survey dates to the
fourteenth century, whereas PaΒalar yielded pottery from the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries (François, 2003μ 302).
According to Kinnamos, Pithekas was also constructed by Manuel,
somewhere between Nikaia and Melangeia (Kinnamos, 38). Giros identifies it with
Köprühisar (Giros, 2003μ 21ι), although this location is not really on the way
between those two sites. Anna Komnene also mentions Alexios‘s campaign routes in
1113 and 1116; each time he went from Nikaia through Malagina (or as it is called
the in the latter instance, the Malagni range) before entering western Phrygia (Anna
Komnene, 455; 473). These Malagni mountains must thus be a distinct location from
the plain of Melangeia, and Foss identifies them with the Avdan Dağı, south of the
İznik lake (Foss, 1λλ0μ 1ιι). Anna apparently conflated the two locations due to the
similarity of their names; Melangeia was not Byzantine territory during the reign of
Alexios, and none of his campaigns were even directed towards Dorylaion and the
80
older military road. In any case, if Köprühisar is in fact Pithekas the strategic value
is evident. It guards the approaches to Nikaia as well as the plains of YeniΒehir and
Prousa. Unfortunately the only remains of the castle can be seen in the name itself.
3.4.2 The Theme of Neokastra
After concluding a treaty with Kılıç Arslan II in 1162, Manuel began a
comprehensive program of fortification designed to protect essential agricultural land
from the depredations of the Türkmen (Figure 55). Choniates describes the project
in detail:
―A glorious deed was now performed by the emperor. The cities of Asia,
Chliara, Pergamon, and Atramyttion, were suffering terribly at the hands of
the Turks. Formerly, the neighboring provinces had not been settled because
the inhabitants of villages were exposed to enemy attack. Manuel fortified
these with walls and protected the nearby horse-breeding plains with
fortresses. In this way, these fortress towns swelled in population and
abounded in the good things of civilized life, surpassing many prosperous
cities…If Manuel had conceived and performed but one great deed, if one
action had profited his subjects the most during the years he ruled the
Romans, it was this, perhaps the finest and most beneficial to the common
welfare…These fortresses, all with the same name (σeokastra), were sent a
governor from Byzantion and contributed annual revenues to the imperial
treasury.‖ (Choniates, 150)
It is clear that these fortresses had more than just a military function. They were
intended to allow a civilian population to reestablish itself and contribute their
productivity to the empire. At the same time they represent a recognition on the part
of Manuel that the borders of the empire had changed and that the Turkish presence
was permanent (Hendy, 1985: 130-131). In addition to the three cities mentioned by
Choniates, several of smaller fortresses can be identified. Although the theme of
σeokastra originally encompassed the Kaikos (Bakırçay) valley and the route north
towards Adramytteion, during the Laskarid period it extended much further south to
81
include the Hermos valley and the cities of Magnesia (Manisa) and Sardis (Angold,
1975: 246).
3.4.2.1 Chliara (Darkale, Soma, Manisa)
While it is accepted that Chliara is located somewhere in the Kaikos valley,
its exact location has been the subject of some debate. Ramsay located Chliara at the
town of Kırkağaç (Ramsay, 1890: 117-18) and this is still the view found in most of
non-specialist books and articles. τther possible locations near to Kırkağaç include
Maltepe, Nakrasos, and Soma itself, but some researchers have suggested further
flung locations at Koyuneli or Gördükkale (Rheidt, 1λκ6μ 22λ-230). This last
suggestion is Rheidt‘s own, based largely on literary sources and medieval itineraries
(Rheidt, 1λκ6μ 23η), but Foss strongly disagrees, preferring to identify Gördükkale
with Meteorion (Foss, 1987: 96), the fortress where Michael VIII Palaiologos
received the news that Constantinople had been retaken in 1261 (Akropolites, 86).
Foss instead places Chliara to the northwest, at Tarhala or Darkale, a village in the
hills above Soma (Foss, 1998: 163). Foss claims that the fortifications at Gördükkale
are Laskarid, although they are in such poor condition that distinguishing Laskarid
from Komnenian work is probably impossible. There are two much stronger
arguments for locating Chliara at Darkale and Meteorion as Gördükkale, one based
on historical geography and one based on the toponymy. Most importantly, Darkale
is actually located above the Kaikos river valley whereas Gördükkale is in the Lykos
valley. In the treaty Theodore Laskaris (1204-1222) signed with the Latin emperor
Henry (1206-1216) in 1212, Achyraous was given to the Latins while Chliara,
Pergamon and Lopadion remained Byzantine. The town of Kalamos (Gelenbe) was
left uninhabited (Akropolites, 15). It is clear that by the terms of this treaty the
82
geographical borders were formed by the Kaikos and Makestos valleys, and that
Chliara must have been in the Kaikos border region. Admittedly Kırkağaç is also a
geographically logical location, but the similarities between the ancient and modern
names favors Darkale18 (Foss, 1998: 165).
Darkale‘s outstanding geographical characteristic is its hot spring water, and
although in the twentieth century most of the population moved to Soma it used to
have a thriving tanning and shoe-making industry (Arel, 1992: 122). There are very
few Byzantine remains aside from spolia built into the mosques and fountains and
the mortared rubble core of a fortification wall (Foss, 1998: 165). Even these meager
remains are enough to show that the place was fortified and also prominent enough
to have had a significant church. Soma, only three kilometers to the north, also
shows signs of Roman activity (Umar, 2006: 101-102). If there is continuity
between Soma and Chliara it would be another example of the way settlements
shifted through the centuries between unprotected yet accessible locations on the
plains and more defensible hilltop or mountain strongholds. Within the Komnenian
period similar examples of this phenomenon can be seen at Pergamon and Laodikeia.
3.4.2.2 Pergamon (Bergama, İzmir)
Thanks to extensive interest in its classical remains, Pergamon is one of the
few Byzantine sites to have received extensive attention from archaeologists, and
thus it is has been thoroughly excavated and comparatively well-published. While
most fortified Byzantine sites have revealed little more than their walls and cisterns,
18Ta Chliara – Ta Chlera – Tahlara – Tırhala or Tarhala – Darkale, only the current name has any
meaning in Turkish. Likewise, Gördükkale is located near to a village called Medar, which most
likely comes from Meteorion. Ramsay identifies Darkale as the Byzantine Trakoula (Ramsay, 1890:
127), but since this name only appears once in history (787) and Chliara is not mentioned before the
eleventh century the name of the place could have changed.
83
Pergamon is also an example of how life was lived inside and around a fortress
(Figures 56-57). The city had already been fortified in the third century in the face of
Gothic attacks (Rheidt, 1998: 397) and again in the sixth or seventh century against
the Persians or the Arabs. In both cases it was the acropolis that was protected, both
for its natural inaccessibility and because it offered the most convenient spolia.
Where they survive, the walls of the acropolis preserve three distinct phases,
Hellenistic ashlar at the base, regularly arranged spolia above this, and finally
smaller fieldstones with brick (Figure 58) (Foss, 1982: 168). In the troubled eighth
century the city was finally abandoned and remained that way for almost four
centuries, although coin finds indicate that the acropolis may have still been used
occasionally as a military base (Rheidt, 1998: 402). It was only under Manuel that
Pergamon once again showed signs of urban life, although of course in a diminished
state.
Whereas the fortifications of late antiquity had been an attempt to preserve
and protect the remnants of a civilization in decline, those of the Komnenian period
were really a rebuilding. At Pergamon, the security afforded by its status as a
military base allowed a bishop to take up residence, which in turn encouraged the
limited return of merchants and craftsmen (Rheidt, 1996: 222). Of course, the
prosperity of an inland town like Pergamon ultimately depended on the security of
the surrounding farmland and of its communication network (Figure 59), and in fact
the archaeological evidence indicates that Pergamon was more of a fortified village
than a city. The more elaborate houses had three or four rooms (kitchen, living
room, storeroom(s)) surrounding an L-shaped courtyard, although houses with only
one room and a courtyard are more common (Figure 60). Their construction
technique is not so different from that of the facing of fortification walls, mostly
84
small stones and tile fragments (Rheidt, 1996: 224-228). These houses illustrate that
the reality of the Komnenian achievement in Anatolia was far less grandiose than the
picture painted by historians and panegyrists. That even these glorified villages were
so dependent on the constant presence of the imperial armies indicates just how
precarious the Byzantine hold on Anatolia had become.
The walls of Pergamon are the best preserved historically attested
fortifications of Manuel in Asia Minor.19 His activity is visible both on the acropolis
and on the lower terrace. The work on the acropolis generally follows the line of the
older walls and ten square towers are preserved. These walls and towers are faced
with a mix of spolia, fieldstone, and brick which is often arranged to form a rough
cloisonné (Foss, 1982: 168-171). The acropolis walls appear more as a repair and an
embellishment of walls that were already serving a defensive function. The
fortifications of the lower terrace, on the other hand, appear to have been new,
although some sections stand on third century walls. The ancient gymnasium terrace
provided a base for a wall and six towers, one square and five rounded. The tower
beside the main gate has the most extensive cloisonné brickwork forming regular
coursesν the other towers‘ brickwork is less regular, with bricks mostly used to
compensate for the irregularities of the stones (Foss, 1982: 166-68). Klinkott sees
this wall as being Palaiologan (Rheidt, 2002: 625), but the similarities in style with
the acropolis walls argues more for a twelfth century date.
Pergamon demonstrates Manuel‘s goals when he established the theme of
Neokastra. He wanted to rebuild and protect the rural economy in these provinces,
with the ultimate goal of allowing the empire to benefit from its resources. Yet the
difference between the late antique and the restored city must be stressed. Rheidt has
19 Manuel is also of course credited with an extension of the walls of Constantinople (Choniates, 543 ;
Foss and Winfield, 1986).
85
estimated that early Byzantine Pergamon had a population of 35,000 whereas the
Komnenian ―city‖ could have accommodated only 2,ζ00 (Rheidt, 2002μ 62ζ-25).
Obviously without ongoing extensive imperial military support settlements of this
size would have had great trouble remaining Byzantine.
3.4.2.3 Adramytteion (Burhaniye, Balıkesir)
According to the sources, the defenses of Adramytteion were rebuilt or
renewed by both Alexios and Manuel, although unfortunately no trace of this work
seems to remain. Anna Komnene first mentions that Çaka ―had reduced it to rubble
and wiped it out entirely‖ and that it was rebuilt and recolonized by Alexios‘s
governor Eumathios Philokales (Anna Komnene, 436-437). Yet as Choniates
indicates, the region surrounding the city was not adequately secured. The location
of the ancient and medieval city is not the same as that of modern Edremit;
Adramytteion was located on the coastal plain in the Ören neighborhood of
Burhaniye (Figure 61). Excavations in Ören undertaken by Tülin Çoruhlu revealed a
church dated to the tenth or eleventh century (Çoruhlu, 2006μ.22λ-230) but no traces
of fortifications.
3.4.2.4 Other fortresses of the theme of Neokastra
In the Kaikos valley two additional castles can be assigned to the theme of
Neokastra (Figure 55). The site known as Kızılasar is located near the town of Kınık
about twenty-five kilometers west of Soma. It overlooks a particularly wide part of
the valley midway between Chliara and Pergamon and its protective function is
evident (Tok, 2010: 307). The walls and most of the towers are in a ruined state, but
one tower on the western side is preserved almost to its full height. Its most
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prominent characteristic is its extensive decorated brickworkand cloisonné. As Foss
notes, this style could be assigned to either John or Manuel, but the construction can
most logically be connected to the other Neokastra (Foss, 1982: 186-87). Further to
the west a hill above the village of Koyuneli has some remains of an ostensibly
Komnenian-period wall (Tok, 2010: 307). Finally, the ancient Aeolian city of Aigai
(Herodotus, 1.149), on the mountain road between Pergamon and Magnesia ad
Sipylum, has been being excavated since 2004. In addition to sparse remains of
fortification walls and gates, twelfth and thirteenth century Byzantine pottery has
been found in the area of a Byzantine chapel and in the cisterns (Doğer et al., 200κμ
210-11; 220).
3.4.3 Dorylaion (Şarhöyük, Eskişehir)
The refortification of Dorylaion is thoroughly covered by the historical
sources. In 1175, as a prelude to his ill-fated campaign against Konya, Manuel
ordered the city rebuilt. According to Kinnamos, who likely witnessed the
construction:
―Within forty days the emperor had erected the city, and when he encircled it
with a trench, settled a great many Romans there, and left a sufficient
garrison, he departed and camped in the regions around the Rhyndakos.‖
(Kinnamos, 297)
Likewise, Choniates:
―Manuel, the first man to carry stones on his back, set the manly example for
others to follow. Thus the walls were raised with great speed, the palisade
was thrown up outside, and wells were excavated inside for drawing up an
abundant water supply.‖ (Choniates, 1ι6)
In addition, two orations of Euthymios Malakes (Stone, 2003) and one of Eustathios
of Thessaloniki (Wirth, 1962) extensively praise Manuel for restoring the city and
revitalizing its surroundings. This wealth of historical information is unfortunately
87
not equaled by the nonexistent physical remains. Nevertheless, since the location is
known some sense of the strategic value of the site in the context of its surroundings
can still be obtained.
Dorylaion was located on the plain of the Tembris (Porsuk) River, and also
had access to hot springs which made it well-suited to be a military base (Figure 62).
It was also the location of massive imperial stables which provided horses for the
army. By the tenth century, Dorylaion served as the second aplekton after Malagina,
and it was here that the general of the Thrakesion theme met the emperor as he
proceeded to the east (Belke and Merisch, 1990: 239). The broad plain provided an
ideal location for a large army to gather and organize itself, and the loss of Dorylaion
sometime in the decade after Mantzikert severely damaged Byzantine prospects for
regaining the Anatolian plateau. Furthermore, the same conditions which made the
plain a natural aplekton also made it ideal for the nomadic Türkmen, who settled here
in great numbers. The sources mention the nomads with their vast herds of goats and
cattle, and the same mountain passes by which the imperial armies traveled east also
served to convey raiding parties from the plain towards the western river valleys and
the coasts. From the Selçuk perspective, keeping the nomads on the Byzantine
border yet far from Konya ensured that they would direct their destructive tendencies
away from the Selçuk cities. τf course this also made it more difficult for the sultan
and the emperor to honor the terms of their treaties, and it was the rebuilding of
Dorylaion and the reoccupation of the plain by the Byzantines that ultimately ended
Manuel‘s alliance with Kılıç Arslan (Belke, 1λλ1μ 163). It is also telling that after
his victory at Myriokephalon Kılıç Arslan did not demand additional territory, but
simply ―stipulated that the fortresses of Dorylaion and Soublaion were to be
demolished‖ (Choniates, 189). Soublaion was much closer to encroaching on Selçuk
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territory; Dorylaion was clearly on a distant border if not outside entirely. Thus Kılıç
Arslan‘s demand that it be demolished must have been made on behalf of the
Türkmen who had been driven off by Manuel. Although Manuel did not honor the
treaty and demolish the fortress, the plain was again in Turkish hands by 1180, and
according to the Arab traveler Al-Harawi was already called Sultanyuki (Sultan
Höyüğü/Mound of the Sultan), ―at the limit of infidel territory‖ (Foss, 1λλ6cμ ζλ).
When Kılıç Arslan divided his territories among his sons in 11κι, Muhiddin Mes‘ud
received Ankara and its territory, including Dorylaion/Sultan Höyüğü (Turan, 1λι1μ
242).
Based on a nineteenth century description, Foss believes that Dorylaion was
originally fortified in the seventh century, with an extension in the ninth century
(Foss, 1996c: 52-53). The sources make it clear that Manuel found the walls in a
ruined state and had to rebuild them, and Kinnamos mentions that the rebuilt city was
smaller than it had been (Kinnamos, 295). Modern satellite images clearly show the
foundations of two sets of walls, one on the hill itself and one which surrounds the
hill (Figures 63-64). Since Manuel also dug a ditch around his walls, it is the lower
section which should be assigned to him. In addition, the fact that this work was
completed in only forty days suggests that it was more of a restoration than a
complete rebuilding, although the panegyrists naturally want to emphasize the
seemingly miraculous nature of this construction in enemy territory (Figure 65), as
an anonymous poem likely delivered soon after the completion of the work indicates:
―[Manuel] spoke and placed a stone with his divine right hand. He laid it
down as the mighty foundation stone of this city, and so too did the
magnanimous and illustrious men: they laid stones until the builders, like
swarms of clustering bees, had completed this admirable work on the spot
and this had again become a very significant part of the Roman Empire. The
mad dog, who has broken his sharp jaws, shall hurt himself if he dares set his
teeth in this wall of stones.‖ (Spingou, 2011μ 165-166)
89
3.4.4 Choma-Soublaion
The fortress of Soublaion is only mentioned in tandem with that of Dorylaion.
The name appears to be an alternate Byzantine form for Siblia, and according to the
Tabula Imperii Byzantini it should be somewhere close to Apamea (Belke and
Merisch, 1990: 382) at the headwaters of the Maeander. Thus it is clear that
Soublaion was intended to complement Dorylaion, and guard the southern entrance
to Phrygia and the Anatolian plateau. The Maeander valley was subjected to
constant raids by the Türkmen even after John‘s program of fortification. While the
fortress is mentioned only in passing by Kinnamos and Choniates, Euthymios
Malakes provides further details:
―But the emperor, seeing the city, but rather the remnants of the ancient city,
praises the place and thinks it worthy of a city, and raises both the walls and
fashions its circuit anew so keenly that it seems in notion that the fashioning
of the work cannot be done by deed…the emperor, dripping little sweat, has
in some way worked miraculously the raising in four days of this city, as it
were which was dead, lying on the ground.‖ (Malakes, quoted in Stone, 2003μ
198)
If in fact Manuel spent only four days at Soublaion, then he cannot have constructed
much more than a marching camp or perhaps the restoration of a gate. He may have
instead simply ordered the construction and again set the example as he had at
Dorylaion. Yet the reaction of Kılıç Arslan to this new fortress on the border of his
lands indicates that it must have been formidable.
The region around IΒıklı has several traces of eleventh and twelfth century
fortifications, and one of these should be Soublaion. The situation is complicated by
the fortress of Angelokastron, itself a refoundation of the fortress of Choma by Isaac
II Angelos (1185-1195) in 1192. Thonemann identifies this site with a höyük east of
IΒıklı, and cites an inscription that assigns an earlier reconstruction of Choma to
Romanos Diogenes in 1070 (Thonemann, 2011: 161). Cheynet and Drew-Bear, on
the other hand, have recently connected this inscription with Soublaion instead
90
(Cheynet and Drew-Bear, 2012: 209-220). In addition to this höyük, the site of
Beycesultan, only twenty kilometers away, also revealed traces of Byzantine
fortifications when excavations began in 1954 (Wright, 2007: 150). That there are at
least two sites to match the names of two fortresses of the correct period would seem
to allow the issue to be resolved easily, but so far neither one has been identified with
Beycesultan.
3.4.5 Attaleia (Kaleici, Antalya)
While Attaleia features prominently in twelfth-century history, only one
source definitely mentions any renewal of the fortifications. This is the Chronicle of
Roger of Hoveden, which describes Attaleia as being two cities, one old and
abandoned and the new one which was founded and fortified by Manuel (Roger of
Hoveden, 157). This reference appears to be erroneous, however, since there is no
evidence that the location of the city ever changed, nor indeed that the city ever
actually fell to the Turks before 1207. The walls were instead rebuilt in the tenth
century, and evidently they were strong enough to resist nearly constant attacks
throughout the twelfth century (Foss, 1996b: 8). Thus Attaleia served Alexios, who
―was anxious to secure the whole of Cilicia,‖ as a base for his recovery of other
coastal cities (Anna Komnene, 359). John was concerned with opening a land route
to Attaleia and recovering some of its surrounding territory, as well as developing the
harbor cities of western Cilicia (see above). Manuel also came to Attaleia, in 1158,
during his Cilician campaign (Kinnamos, 179). All three emperors likely ordered
repairs of the walls as necessary, but none of them needed to carry out a major
rebuilding. Thus their activities were restricted to protecting its approaches both by
land and by sea. Both William of Tyre and Odo of Deuil describe the mixed results
91
of these efforts in the context of the Second Crusade in 1147. While the city was
well-provisioned by sea, its inhabitants were unable to produce anything for
themselves due to the constant Turkish presence in the Pamphylian plain (William of
Tyre, II-178-79; Odo of Deuil, 128-130).
3.4.6 Possible fortifications of Manuel
Manuel‘s building program was more extensive than Alexios‘s or John‘s,
given that he was concerned with more than just securing military routes. Many
fortifications assigned to Manuel seem to show at least some attempt at protecting
civilian populations in order to return the land to a productive state. It is thus to be
expected that his fortifications cluster around one another into distinct groups.
3.4.6.1 Kotyaeion (Kütahya)
The castle at Kotyaeion is undoubtedly the most impressive and imposing
fortress assigned to Manuel, and yet it is hardly ever mentioned by the historians
(Figure 66). Kinnamos describes a Türkmen attack on Manuel as he was returning
from the east in 1159 (Kinnamos, 191) and Choniates relates how the city fell to
Kılıç Arslan in 11κ2 and afterward became part of the inheritance of Gıyaseddin
Keyhüsrev (Choniates, 262ν η21) who also received the recently conquered Uluborlu
(Turan, 242). The strategic value of Kotyaeion is evident; it stands at the edge of the
Anatolian plateau and offers easy access in all directions except directly east, where
the Türkmen Dağı impedes passage.
The castle has never been excavated but Clive Foss and Robin Fursdon
conducted an extensive and detailed survey of the standing remains in 1982. Foss
identified four major periods based on mortar, masonry, and construction techniques
92
and then proposed absolute dates for each one based on historical likelihood (Foss,
1985: 64-79). According to him the earliest phase is of the ninth century, the second
phase is Komnenian, the third phase Germiyanid and the latest phase Ottoman.
While the last two periods of construction entailed relatively minor alterations to the
Komnenian walls and towers, the Komnenian plan itself dramatically altered the
earlier plan, adding forty-two new towers, and refashioning fourteen towers from
period one to fit the new defensive scheme (Foss, 1985: 68).The preponderant
features are the closely spaced U-shaped towers, most of which were apparently
artillery platforms (Figures 67-68). The towers were faced with banded masonry
with regular alterations of stone and brick courses. When combined with the
naturally steep topography these towers would have presented a formidable obstacle
to any attacker (Figure 69). The gates were apparently small and very welldefended,
and it is clear that the main function of this fortress was as a military base,
at least initially.
Foss also recognizes a second phase to the Komnenian work, near the lower
gate and connected by style with the lower city wall (Foss, 1985: 84). This detail
offers a clue into the way the castle was built. The first phase of period two should
probably be seen as the work of John. He favored military fortresses, and apparently
devoted significant time and resources to constructing new castles at key points to his
exact specifications. By contrast, Manuel‘s fortifications are somewhat more
improvisational and have a hurried character. The lower city wall is also in accord
with the attention paid by Manuel to the civilian population. Finally, perhaps the
lack of attention paid to Kotyaeion in the historical sources also points towards John
as its builder. His reign is covered in far less detail than Manuel‘s, and both
Kinnamos and Choniates excessively praise even minor constructions by Manuel. If
93
he had also effected a major fortress like Kotyaeion it is only logical that his
historians and panegyrists would have mentioned it. The castle would certainly
benefit from a targeted excavation aimed at clarifying this speculative chronology.
3.4.6.2 Kayser Kale and Karacahisar
Kayser Kale stands on a high, conical peak about halfway between Kotyaeion
and Dorylaion (Figure 70). Although the location is exceedingly remote today, in
Byzantine times the most direct road between the two passed below Kayser Kale
(Figure 71) (Edwards, 1987b: 679). It was visited by Emilie Haspels in 1950, who
noted its commanding views and described it as Byzantine (Haspels, 2009: 107). In
connection with the survey of Kütahya province, Clive Foss described the castle in
more detail. He noted two periods of construction, assigning the first to the Dark
Ages and the second to the twelfth century and most probably the time of Manuel.
The style of the masonry is closest to that of the Komnenian lower gate and lower
city wall at Kotyaeion (Foss, 1985: 92). Although Foss saw the fortress as an
isolated beacon station, he apparently did not recognize that in Byzantine times it
was on an important route. There is no evidence that the Byzantine beacon system of
the Dark Ages was revitalized and reused under the Komneni, nor is there any reason
why it should have been. During the Dark Ages such a system made sense since the
Arab raiders did not stay in western Anatolia. The Turks, on the other hand, were
always present, especially in the area around Dorylaion and Kotyaeion. Thus it
makes more sense to see Kayser Kale as forming a part of a regional defense network
along with Kotyaeion, Karacahisar, and ultimately Dorylaion.
The castle of Karacahisar is only nine kilometers from Dorylaion, along the
same route as Kayser Kale. It too may once have been part of the Byzantine beacon
94
network, but in the time of Manuel it was also refortified and used to secure the
valley of the Tembris River (Parman, 2001: 453). Like Kayser Kale it should be
seen as part of the same defensive network as Kotyaeion. Although none of these
sites are mentioned by the historians, they can be compared to Manuel‘s σeokastra.
Unlike Neokastra, however, the valley of the Tembris never formed part of the
Laskarid domains; it was lost permanently in the aftermath of the defeat at
Myriokephalon. Given the close proximity of the Türkmen nomads and the relative
distance of the centers of Byzantine power, it is not surprising that this was the case.
3.4.6.3 Abydos and Atik Hisar/Gavur Hisar (Çanakkale)
Although it has almost no standing remains today, the sources make it clear
that Abydos was an important castle in the twelfth century. It played an important
role as a toll and customs station on the way to Constantinople and only lost that
function when it was superseded by the Kale-i Sultaniye, which became today‘s
Çanakkale (Cook, 1λι3: 56). Abydos was apparently already fortified, since it was
besieged by Çaka in 10λ2 (Anna Komnene, 2ιη) and was a base for imperial naval
expeditions throughout the reign of Alexios (Anna Komnene, 346; 436).In addition,
early in Manuel‘s reign he unsuccessfully suggested that the Second Crusade take the
route which crossed into Asia at Abydos instead of trying to pass by Nikomedeia and
Malagina (Kinnamos, 72). A poem of Theodore Prodromos says that Abydos was
fortified by Manuel (Cook, 1973: 56) but when exactly this occurred or why it was
felt to be necessary is unknown.
In 1113 a massive Turkish raiding party reached as far as Abydos and
devastated its surroundings (Anna Komnene, 453). Even though the city itself was
securely held, further fortification was necessary to truly safeguard the local
95
population. The castle of Atik or Gavur Hisar guards the valley of the Sarıçay,
which is the easiest and most natural road between Abydos and Adramytteion, as
well as the route which comes west from Mysia (Türker, 2010μ 31ζ). This valley in
all likelihood was the route taken by the Turks in 1113. The castle sits on a steep hill
which today overlooks the Atikhisar Dam and has a roughly triangular shape. The
remains of nine round towers can still be seen; they are faced with brick and stone
over a rubble core (Figure 72) (Türker, 2001μ 194-95). The brickwork sometimes
forms an irregular cloisonné and also occurs in regular courses. Lower on some the
towers there is a layer of five brick courses and higher up the bricks are arranged into
a herringbone pattern. At the same time, the stones become smaller and less regular
as the towers get higher. Türker argues that the building techniques show some
parallels with known Laskarid architecture but acknowledges that it is extremely
difficult to date Laskarid work on style alone (Türker, 2001μ 1λ6). Based on
historical likelihood, it makes sense to assign this castle to John or Manuel, and since
Prodromos specifically mentions Manuel‘s activity regarding Abydos, it seems
logical to assume that his defensive reinvigoration of the city included this defense of
its most vulnerable approach.
3.4.6.4 Anaia (Kadıkalesi, Kuşadası, Aydin)
The castle of Anaia is perhaps the most thoroughly excavated middle
Byzantine fortress, although when exactly it was constructed is still an open
question. It is located in the middle of the resort town of KuΒadası on a much older
manmade mound (Figure 73). The standing remains of the fortifications include
sixteen round towers and a curtain wall surrounding the seaward side (Foss, 1982:
184). Although it has been noted and mapped by travelers for over a century Müller96
Wiener was the first to propose a date, suggesting the late twelfth or early thirteenth
century (Müller-Wiener, 1961: 73). In other words this castle may be either
Komnenian or Laskarid. The excavations, conducted since 2001 by Zeynep
Mercangöz, have revealed the way in which the castle‘s function changed over the
centuries.
On the basis of historical likelihood, Foss first assigned the castle to the time
of Manuel (Foss, 1979: 125), although based on a more detailed survey of the wall
construction he pushed the date earlier, to the reign of John or even Alexios (Figure
74) (Foss, 1982: 185). The current excavations have revealed coins of both John and
Manuel, as well as seals that date to the later twelfth century (Mercangöz, 2010μ 284-
285). The attention of the excavators has been focused on the large quantities of
Zeuxippos ware which have been discoveredat and around Anaia. In the late
thirteenth century the castle evidently became a production center for this type of
pottery, which is post-Komnenian. A ceramics workshop has even been discovered
in the ruins of a church, which was destroyed by an earthquake, probably in the
middle of the thirteenth century (Mercangöz, 2013μ 21). Further evidence includes
large amounts of wasted pottery which were found in the castle‘s cisterns, indicating
that Anaia no longer required a secure source of water (Mercangöz, 2013μ 16). This
demonstrates that Anaia changed from a fortress into a factory, likely after the
Genoese were given control in 1261 by the Treaty of Nymphaion (Mercangöz, 2013μ
170).
The walls and towers at Anaia look most similar to those at Pergamon, with
extensive cloisonné brickwork surrounding fieldstones. This facing is attached to the
rubble core with wooden beams, another feature which supports the position that
Manuel built this castle. It may have been due to the increase in piracy that occurred
97
in the Aegean when the fleet was deprived of funding early in Manuel‘s reign
(Choniates, 55). It is possible that the continuing excavations may be able to answer
the question definitively, especially if an inscription can be found.
3.4.6.5 Nikitiaton (Eskihisar, Gebze, Kocaeli) and Ritzion (Darıca, Kocaeli)
These two castles, located on the northern shore of the Gulf of İzmit, can be
assigned to Manuel and served both to defend the gulf and to serve as embarkation
points for expeditions into Anatolia (Figure 16). Of the two, Ritzion is less well
preserved, with only one horseshoe shaped tower surviving (Figure 75). Its base is
composed of large blocks, and as the tower rises the stones become smaller and are
interrupted by courses of alternating recessed brick. Foss identified two phases of
construction, Komnenian and Palaiologan, and assigns the tower to the earlier phase
(Foss, 1996a: 49-50). Ritzion appears only once in history, as the place from which
Manuel crossed the gulf early in 1160 (Kinnamos, 194).
Nikitiaton is better preserved and has three phases of construction,
Komnenian, Laskarid or Latin, and Palaiologan. By analogy with the walls of
Constantinople Foss assigns the earliest phase to Manuel (Foss, 1996a: 57-58),
although Nikitiaton does not appear in history until 1241 when it was reclaimed from
the Latins by John III Vatatzes (1222-1254) (Akropolites, 37). The towers assigned
by Foss to Manuel are rectangular and apparently had two levels. The facing is
alternating brick which sometimes forms a very irregular cloisonné pattern, although
all walls and towers bear extensive signs of poorly executed repair work. Actually,
the evidence connecting this castle to Manuel is quite thin. While its strategic
location cannot be denied, the fortress also seems to be somewhat redundant given
the nearby castle of Ritzion as well as the historically attested but no longer extant
98
castle at Dakibyza to the north. These two castles would have guarded the crossing
of the gulf and the land route towards Constantinople.
3.4.6.6 Telmessos (Fethiye, Muğla), Myra (Demre, Antalya) and the Lykian
coast
Control of the coasts remained a priority under Manuel, as it had been under
both Alexios and John. In Lykia this meant protecting the cities and harbors both
from the Türkmen of the inner Tekke peninsula and from the piracy that became
endemic in Manuel‘s reign. The fortress of Telmessos was apparently the center of a
defense system intended to protect the harbor (Figure 76). The site itself has both
harbor walls which were repaired in the twelfth century and a small upper fortress
which appears to be a construction of the later twelfth century and was intended to
allow the defenders to overshoot the lower walls (Figure 77). Foss assigns these
walls to Manuel based mostly on their extensive use of cloisonné and decorative
brickwork (Foss, 1982: 193-λη). These features appear in John‘s fortresses as well,
but the cloisonné employed by Manuel is on the whole rougher and only applied to
the towers, as it is at Telmessos. The land defenses were supplemented by fortresses
on the island of Makri (Hoskyn, 1842: 146), which can only have been to protect
against piracy.
The region of Myra also saw a dramatic recovery during the twelfth century.
Although the city quickly contracted to the acropolis in the aftermath of Mantzikert,
even under Alexios it began to regain its importance. Several twelfth century
chapels have been found in the surrounding countryside and at least two locations
(Sura and Beymelek) show signs of revitalized fortification walls (Foss, 1994: 35-
36). As at Telmessos, it seems that equal attention was paid to defending the city
against attacks from the land and the sea. Between Telmessos and Myra, traces of
99
Komnenian occupation can be seen at Xanthos, Patara, Kyaneai, and Limyra, as well
as in the surroundings of these cities. As on the Cilician coast, the remains include
important traces of civilian occupation, most notably chapels and churches (Foss,
1994: 51). Armstrong has demonstrated that the relationship between these coastal
Greeks and the Türkmen of the interior was not necessarily always antagonistic, and
indeed the greater danger likely came from the sea.
3.5 Epilogue One: The Castles of the Maeander
The project undertaken by the British Institute of Archaeology in Ankara
from 1992 to 1998 to survey the castles of the Maeander was directed by Hugh
Barnes and Mark Whittow. Their team surveyed six sites in the Maeander valley,
almost all of which can be connected with the Komneni (Figure 78). The first castle
studied was Mastaura Kalesi, five kilometers north-east of Nazilli, Aydin. The walls
and towers of Mastaura are constructed of a fieldstone and rubble core with a facing
of roughly coursed fieldstones bonded to the core by cribwork. In addition one
stretch of wall preserves two parallel brick bands (Barnes and Whittow, 1992: 120-
25). Fifteen cisterns testify that Mastaura once had a large population. The
surveyors propose a twelfth or thirteenth-century date based on the wall construction
(Barnes and Whittow, 1993: 130). According to them the ancient city of Mastaura
moved to the mountain in response to Turkish depredations in the valley; Barnes and
Whittow believe that much of the work at Mastaura was done under local initiative
rather than imperial direction (Barnes and Whittow, 1994: 193).
The castle at Yöre, east of Mastaura, shows similar construction techniques,
and ceramics collected during the survey also suggest a twelfth or thirteenth-century
date (Barnes and Whittow, 1996: 15). Ninety kilometers further east, the castle at
100
Çardak was also apparently used in the twelfth century, with the eighth or ninth
century walls being strengthened and a tower added (Whittow, 1995: 24. Finally,
located close to Yöre but on the southern side of the Maeander, the ancient city of
Antioch ad Maeandrum shows four phases of construction. The surveyors consider
the last two Laskarid with the second and perhaps the first being Komnenian (Barnes
and Whittow, 1998a: 18). Unique among these castles, Antioch appears briefly in
history, as the place where Manuel ―transformed himself from a wily traitor to an
avowed enemy‖ (τdo of Deuil, 113) during the Second Crusade‘s disastrous march
towards Attaleia. According to Odo the Turks who had been attacking the crusaders
sought and received refuge within the walls of Antioch
The Maeander valley was important both as a military route andas a
population center, and it stands to reason that it should have received significant
imperial attention. τdo‘s acecdote shows that the local Greeks reached an
accommodation with the Türkmen. While τdo saw this as imperial treachery, in
reality it was more akin to the islanders of Lake Pousgouse refusing to submit to
John. Despite frequent imperial campaigns, the people of this border region found it
easier to cooperate with the seasonal Türkmen raiders than to defend the imperial
prerogative. In addition, the surveys conducted by Barnes and Whittow also
underscore the limits of survey, as in most cases they have not been able to
definitively assign construction to a particular century, much less the reign of any
emperor.
3.6 Epilogue Two: Nikomedeia (İzmit, Kocaeli)
The sources present a paradoxical picture of Nikomedeia. On the one hand,
its strategic location as the last major fortress before the capital meant that it was
101
constantly contested and frequently changed hands (Figures 7, 16, 79). On the other
hand, most contemporary descriptions of the site describe it as being in ruins. The
walls cannot be definitively dated, and Alexios, John, and Manuel all would have
had reason to reinforce this important bulwark. Alexios‘s nearby activity at Sidera
and Kibotos is well-attested, and Nikomedeia must have played a role in his
defensive system for the capital. As a regular stop for the armies, the city would also
have attracted the attention of John, and Manuel would have used it both as a base
and as protection for the surrounding countryside. The walls reflect this turbulent
history, and bear the traces of repairs and rebuildings from the third century until the
Ottoman period. In an effort to make sense of the fortress, Clive Foss identified at
least fifteen distinctive masonry types. The earliest phases and the Ottoman work are
easily identifiable, but the problem of sequencing the Byzantine phases is intractable
(Foss, 1996a: 39-41). The defining characteristic of the walls Foss assigns to the
twelfth century is unsurprisingly cloisonné, which is careless but constant, possibly
representing several periods of repair and reconstruction.
Odo of Deuil wrote a description of the city as it appeared to him in 1147,
calling it a ruin in which even the strategic harbor was not used (Odo of Deuil, 88).
Although Odo is always critical of the Byzantines, there is no reason to think that he
was exaggerating. But at the same time, the fact that the ancient city lay in ruins
does not mean that the fortress on the acropolis was not functioning. Many of the
cities of Asia Minor had contracted drastically to include only their most defensible
areas. The walls and towers of Nikomedeia are thus testimony to the conditions of
the age in which they were built.
102
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: WINTER IN THE LAND OF RÛM
Nikomedeia encapsulates the opportunities offered by detailed studies of
Komnenian fortifications, as well as the challenges encountered in such studies.
Although it appears frequently in history, the sources can only offer clues to its
history, and these clues must be confirmed or rejected based on the remains
themselves. In general, the masonry style can provide a rough guide to a fortress‘s
building history. In the case of Komnenian work, especially that of John and
Manuel, brickwork and cribwork stand out as the defining characteristics. These are
found in all of the emperors‘ historically attested works and thus it is logical to use
them to identify unmentioned castles. Being more specific on the basis of masonry
techniques is highly subjective, however. Clive Foss, undoubtedly the authority on
Komnenian fortifications, nevertheless often can only cite his own work when
offering justification for assigning a fortress to a particular period on the basis of its
masonry. He generally assigns careful and regular cloisonné to John and less careful
more hurried work to Manuel. But surely the circumstances of construction also
played a role in determining how much attention to detail would be paid by the
builders. For example, was the brick used in decorative cloisonné reused or was it
produced locally? If the latter is the case, much more specific dating should be
103
possible. This question can only be answered by excavation, and in many cases
answering it may be impossible.
In addition to masonry techniques, historical likelihood is a fruitful if still
speculative method for assigning a particular castle to a particular emperor. It
appears as though all Komnenian fortifications were constructed on the initiative if
not under the direct supervision of the emperor himself. Since the reigns of the
emperors, and especially their military campaigns were covered in admirable detail
by the historians, we generally have a good idea of when a particular fortress would
have been able to attract the emperor‘s attention, even if its construction is not
specifically mentioned. The most salient example of this sort of reasoning is
Manuel‘s reconstruction of Kotyaeion. Additionally, John‘s fortresses near Attaleia
and Kalanoros can likewise be assigned to him on the basis of historical likelihood,
as can Pegadia and Sultan Çayir.
If we return to the words of Eustathios of Thessaloniki, how successful were
the ―three waves‖ of the Komneniς This question should be answered in relation to
both the short and long term perspective. In the short term, the Byzantine twelfth
century revival seems almost miraculous. Alexios‘s energetic and opportunistic
campaigns were equaled by his brilliant diplomacy, and he successfully staved off
the complete destruction of the empire despite being almost entirely lacking in
military and financial resources. He quickly recognized the importance of the coasts
and the attention he paid to them was built upon by his successors. Although
Alexios‘s words were often overly ambitious, his deeds show his shrewd
pragmatism. Most importantly, he reorganized the Byzantine political system and
brought stability to the capital, without which his successors would have been unable
to accomplish anything. John‘s campaigns, especially in Paphlagonia, produced little
104
of lasting value, but his military road to the east was the logistical basis for Manuel‘s
accomplishments.
Evaluating Manuel is more complex. Manuel‘s reign is often assessed in
light of the Fourth Crusade, but this perspective can minimize Komnenian
achievements. Whereas Alexios and John had had the good fortune of having mature
and militarily experienced sons ready to take command, Manuel had to leave the
empire to a young boy unable to control the factions which had been undoubtedly
been festering and chafing at the yoke of the autocratic Manuel. Cheynet has
exhaustively catalogued eleventh and twelfth century rebellions and conspiracies.
He found that from 1025 to 1081 there were over ninety, and early in Alexios‘s reign
this pattern continued, but during the second half of his reign as well as during the
reigns of John and Manuel there were almost no such disruptions. After 1180 the
earlier pattern reasserted itself; there were fifty-eight conspiracies from 1180 until
the loss of Constantinople in 1204, which was itself in large part due to these
intrigues (Angold, 1999: 261-262). Yet it is anachronistic and unfair to expect
Manuel to have done more than he did to ensure the succession (Angold, 1999: 268).
Throughout Byzantine and indeed Roman history, the successful functioning of the
state was irrevocably linked to the emperor, and usually the emperor intended his son
to succeed him. Bad emperors could and did destroy the accomplishments of the
good ones, and weak emperors invited rebellion. This was an unchanging feature of
the Byzantine system, and an attempt to change it would not necessarily have been in
the immediate interest of its rulers. As Treadgold points out, had the Komneni
wanted to completely restore the empire they would have had to do so by sharing
more of their power with potentially hostile elements (Treadgold, 1997: 628-629). It
105
is almost inconceivable that this would have been successful; the empire would have
degenerated into civil war and its external enemies would have taken advantage.
Judging by the attention paid by the emperors, it seems as though threats to
the empire were prioritized as follows.
1. Internal revolts and plots against the emperor
2. The Latins
3. The Selçuks and the DaniΒmendids
4. The Türkmen
In keeping with the standard Byzantine strategy, the lesser threats were seen as
acceptable methods of dealing with the greater ones. Thus all three foreign groups
could be used to secure the throne, the Selçuks, DaniΒmendids, and Latins could be
used to check the power of the others, and the threat posed by the Türkmen was
never dealt with decisively. All three emperors had an obsession with reestablishing
Byzantine suzerainty over Antioch, whereas it would have been more realistic to
focus on territory closer to the capital. Given that it was the Latins who ultimately
took Constantinople, it may seem logical that the threat they posed was correctly
prioritized, but this again is to confuse the cause with the effect. The Sack of
Constantinople was the result of the internal fighting amongst the Angeli, and the
people of the city did not strongly resist the conquest despite their hatred for the
Latins (Angold, 1999: 277).
The Byzantine policy regarding the Selçuks was usually successful
diplomatically but less so militarily. Rather than seeking to eliminate the Sultanate
of Rûm, the Komneni recognized and accepted their presence, usually engaging in
normal diplomatic relations (Lilie, 1991: 38-39). They wanted to maintain a balance
of power in Anatolia, with the empire playing the predominant but not the sole role,
106
and they understood that eliminating either the Selçuks or the DaniΒmendids would
only serve to strengthen the other. Thus Alexios‘s campaigns had the objective of
weakening the Selçuks, but John‘s were more directed at the DaniΒmendids. Manuel
was content after 11ηλ to make a treaty with Kılıç Arslan, although at this time he
would have had the greatest chance of eliminating him (Lilie, 1991: 40). Even the
disastrous 1176 campaign can be seen in this light. Manuel attacked Kılıç Arslan
because the sultan was not honoring the terms of their treaty, and had used the
breakup of the DaniΒmendids to aggrandize himself instead of returning this
conquered territory to Byzantium.
The Byzantine and Selçuk ideologies were not diametrically opposed. For
the Byzantines, the Selçuks were simply the latest in a long line of barbarian
outsiders whose presence could be tamed and normalized; they could be brought into
the imperial system and even used to the empire‘s advantage. Alexios‘s advice to
John was to espouse moral virtue and to ―lay up treasure which will clamp the jaws
of the barbarians who breathe enmity against us‖ (Magdalino, 1λλ3μ 2κ). In this way
the Selçuks would recognize the superiority of the Byzantines and the empire would
live on. Although this advice may seem somewhat didactic and overly idealistic, the
inextricable role the emperors played in all affairs of state means that their ideology
is of paramount importance. As for the Selçuk ideology, the lack of sources makes
puzzling it out more difficult. It is clear, however, that in referring to themselves as
the Selçuks of Rûm they accepted the existence of the Roman Empire and the
inherent legitimacy of its rulers (Mecit, 2014: 128). σotably, the Selçuk sultans
almost neverattacked the empire and were always eager for treaties that would allow
them to focus on establishing their suzerainty over the other Turkish groups in
Anatolia and ultimately over Syria, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. Both the
107
Byzantines and the Selçuks were far more concerned with their legitimacy than they
were with their physical territory. For the Byzantines, this meant holding off the
Latin west and its claims of preponderance in Christendom. For the Selçuks it meant
securing the recognition of the Muslim world as the preeminent defenders of the Dar
al-Islam. There was no inherent contradiction between these two ideologies, and this
is reflected in the relative lack of warfare between the two states.
This leaves only the Türkmen, an intractable problem which the Byzantines
were sometimes able to manage and were never able to solve. It was the Türkmen
who were also at the core of the disputes between the empire and the sultanate. They
were essential to the Selçuk armies but they were difficult to fit into an organized
political framework (Bombaci, 1978: 365). Of course this contradiction had spurred
Türkmen activities in Anatolia even before Mantzikert, when the Great Selçuks tried
to divert the harmful raids away from their own territory without overtly alienating
these essential warriors. Both the Anatolian Selçuk sultanate and the DaniΒmendid
emirate initially developed when groups of Türkmen coalesced around leaders with
the prestige and martial prowess to corral them, but as the Selçuk state developed it
too faced the problem of what to do with its unruly warriors. The result was that the
Türkmen congregated in the Byzantine border regions, specifically the Anatolian and
Tekke plateaus. Here they had access to good grazing land for their animalsand
tempting targets for their winter raids. It was thus against these raids that the
Komneni were obliged to provide physical protection.
The concentration of Komnenian fortifications along the coasts and in the
river valleys of western Anatolia demonstrates that these castles were primarily built
to defend against the Türkmen. The Selçuk sultanate was best dealt with
diplomatically, but the Türkmen recognized no treaties and respected no borders.
108
These fortifications are the tangible evidence of a Byzantine response to what
ultimately proved to be its foremost threat. But the imperial initiative taken in the
construction and maintenance of these castles is itself what led to their ultimate
failure because the system was too dependent on imperial attention, and the emperor
could not be everywhere at once. Whittow agrees that the centralization of imperial
authority prevented a successful defense of the land because the emperor saw any
sort of autonomous provincial power as a greater threat to his authority than an
outside enemy. Furthermore, land itself was not the basis of an emperor‘s power,
which lay only in Constantinople (Whittow, 1996: 66-6ι). Manuel‘s policies of
resettlement and fortification were thus successful so long as imperial attention
continued to be focused on them, and it is certainly true that the Laskarids used and
expanded on Manuel‘s foundations, but here again they were using Anatolia as a
basis from which to retake the capital. With the reconquest of Constantinople in
1261 imperial attention shifted away from most of Anatolia forever. By contrast, the
Grand Komneni of Trebizond were better able to resist the Türkmen and come to an
accommodation with their neighbors, thereby demonstrating what was lacking in
western Anatolia, namely local autonomy and a will to resist (Bryer, 1975: 115).
As Keith Hopwood has suggested in several articles, the essential conflict was not
between Byzantines and Selçuks or Christians and Muslims, but between nomads
and settled life (Hopwood, 1991; 2000), a struggle which could have been won if the
Byzantines had chosen to fight it.
The Türkmen were a fundamentally different enemy from those which had
threatened the empire in the past. The Persians had been a highly organized state
whose attacks were always aimed at establishing a more favorable peace treaty. The
Arab raids have some superficial similarities with Türkmen activities, but the
109
essential difference is that the Arabs did not want to stay in western Anatolia.
Although the Byzantines could not prevent these raids, they were able to mitigate the
damage caused by constructing fortresses both along the frontier and as refuges for
local populations. Byzantium‘s western enemies like the Bulgars and the Slavs were
converted to Christianity and brought into the Byzantine system. The Turks, and
particularly the Türkmen, could not be placated. Their way of life was
fundamentally opposed to Byzantine settlement (at least as the empire wished to see
it organized) and at the same time Anatolia was ideally suited for the traditional
transhumant lifestyle, more so even than central Asia. The broad plains and fertile
river valleys offered abundant pasturage as well as irresistible opportunities for
plunder and adventure. The Komneni were extremely energetic in trying to stem this
tide, but the emperor could not be everywhere. It is striking how time and again
imperial and Crusader expeditions faced difficulties in the same places. If a solution
was to be had, it would have been to fully deputize and militarize the local
population, and charge them with recovering their lands from the Turks. This never
happened, and given the ruling ideology of the Komnenian emperors, it is unlikely
that they would have even considered the rewards of such a dramatic transformation
of their society to be worth the costs.
110
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123
APPENDIX:
OTHER POSSIBLE KOMNENIAN ACTIVITY
Antiochia-ad-Cragum (Güneyköy, Alanya, Antalya)
This site may also have seen building activity under John. A chapel similar to the
one at Kalanoros is also built into the fortification walls near the gate (Huber, 1967:
21).
Syedra and Iotape (Aytap, Alanya, Antalya)
The citadel of Syedra has a twelfth-century church (Redford, 2000: 19) and the port
of Iotape contains a chapel of Saint George Stratelates (Huber, 1967: 38) just outside
its hastily constructed walls.
Philokrini (Bayramoğlu, Darıca, Kocaeli)
This castle has disappeared almost entirely, but was well-described sixty years ago
by Dirimtekin who dated it to the Palaiologan period (Dirimtekin, 1954: 52). Foss
proposes that they might have been built by Alexios when he was trying to reclaim
the coast between Constantinople and Nikomedeia early in his reign (Foss, 1996a:
49).
Dakibyza (Gebze, Kocaeli)
There are no remains but the location is frequently mentioned in history (Foss,
1996a: 50).
124
Tili (Toprakkale, Osmaniye)
Tili was captured by John in 1137, lost to the Armenian baron Toros II in 1151, and
recaptured by Manuel in 1158 (Kinnamos, 180). Both Lawrence and Boase suggest
that the black basalt fortress is Byzantine (Boase, 1978: 152; Lawrence, 1983: 183-
84). Edwards sees two main building phases, with the earlier being either Arabic,
Byzantine, or Frankish (Edwards, 1987a: 245), although by Byzantine he means
seventh century or earlier. Hellenkemper attributed one tower to John
(Hellenkemper, 1976: 151).
Ephesos (Efes, Selçuk, İzmir)
Ephesos had already contracted long before the Komnenian period. The newer
settlement on the hill of Ayasuluk was more of a fortress than a city. It was this
fortress that was retaken by John Doukas during Alexios‘s recovery of the coasts in
the wake of the First Crusade. The walls should thus bear at least some traces of
Komnenian activity. Foss notes that some repairs to the citadel walls with a ―less
careful‖ combination of brick and fieldstone point to Manuel (Foss, 1λκ2: 196). On
the other hand, Müller-Wiener‘s more detailed study concluded that the walls are
Laskarid (Müller-Wiener, 1961: 109-110).
Hieron (Anadolukavağı, Beykoz, İstanbul)
This fairly well-preserved castle and its ruined European counterpart were part of the
defenses of the capital in the twelfth-century. At this narrow point a chain, like the
one at the Golden Horn, could be stretched across the strait to cut off access from the
Black Sea. The walls consist of bands of brick which alternate with long, flat stones
(Gabriel, 1λζ3μ ιλ. They show many similarities with Manuel‘s walls in
125
Constantinople (Foss and Winfield, 1986: 148). Although this castle is almost
certainly the work of Manuel, it was not built to counter the Selçuks, who never
reached the Bosporos.
Tabala (Yurtbaşı, Kula, Manisa)
Tabala is located on a mesa overlooking the Hermos (Gediz) river and thus it is both
naturally strategic and defensible. The site would logically fall into John‘s network
of fortresses between Lopadion and Laodikeia; the crude northern walls may be
Komnenian, but most of what survives is Laskarid (Foss, 1979b: 319).
Meteorion (Gördükkale, Akhisar, Manisa)
As mentioned above (3.4.2.1) Rheidt identified Gördükkale with Chliara whereas
Foss following Ramsay sees it as Meteorion and dates the walls to the Laskarid
period (Foss, 1987: 96-97).
Kharakipolis (Karayakup, Gördes, Manisa)
Tok dates the scant remains at Kharakipolis to the late twelfth or early thirteenth
century (Tok, 2008: 383), and considers them to be part of the theme of Neokastra.
Foss considers the fort to have been constructed by the Laskarids (Foss, 1987: 92-
93).
126
FIGURES
127
Figure 1: The Byzantine Empire in 1025, Themes and Major Cities
(Wikimedia Commons)
Figure 2: Empire in 1076, after Mantzikert, before the Civil War
(Wikimedia Commons)
128
Figure 3: Byzantine Settlement Pattern in the 11th Century (Hendy, 1985: 95)
Figure 4: Empire in 1081 at the Accession of Alexios I Komnenos
(Wikimedia Commons)
129
Figure 7: Campaign Routes and Fortifications (Hendy, 1985: 111)
Figure 5: Empire in 1143 at the Accession of Manuel I Komnenos
(Wikimedia Commons)
Figure 6: Detailed view of Anatolia in 1143 (Wikimedia Commons)
130
Figure 7: Campaign Routes and Fortifications (Hendy, 1985: 111)
131
Figure 8: Fortifications of Alexios I Komnenos (Wikimedia Commons)
Figure 9: Didyma (Wikimedia Commons)
132
Figure 10: Satellite view of Korykos land castle (Google Earth)
Figure 11: Korykos land castle plan (Edwards, 1987a)
133
Figure 12: Korykos aerial view (Photo: B. Elliott)
Figure 13: Walls of Korykos (Edwards, 1987a)
134
Figure 14: Seleukeia satellite view (Google Earth)
Figure 15: Walls of Seleukeia (Edwards, 1987a)
135
Figure 16: Satellite view of Bithynia (Google Earth)
Figure 17: Satellite view of Nikaia (Google Earth)
Figure 18μ Selçuk gravestones in tower wall Figure 19: Nikaia Tower 106B.
(Foss, 2003: 256)
136
Figure 20: Satellite view of Aizanoi Figure 21: Aizanoi plan
(Google Earth) (Naumann, 1985: 275)
Figure 22: Aizanoi tower foundation, with spolia (Photo: Author)
Figure 23: Akrokos satellite view Figure 24: Akrokos view
from the castle
(Google Earth) (Photo: M. Toprak)
137
Figure 25: Fortifications of John II Komnenos (Wikimedia Commons)
Figure 26: Laodikeia plan (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ ζ6) Figure 27: Laodikeia satellite
view (Google Earth)
138
Figure 28: Ancient Laodikeia (A) and the medieval city (B) (Google Earth)
Figure 2λμ Walls of Laodikeia (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ ζ6)
Figure 30: Detail of cloisonné (ΑimΒek, 200ιμ ζ6)
139
Figure 31: Apollonia Sozopolis satellite view (Google Earth)
Figure 32: Apollonia Sozopolis castle walls (Photoμ H. Canlı)
140
Figure 33: 19th century plan of Lopadion (Hasluck, 1910: 80)
Figure 34: Satellite view of Lopadion and the Makestos Bridge
(Google Earth)
Figure 35: Makestos Bridge Figure 36: Walls of Lopadion
(Photo: Author) (Roche, 2004: 251)
141
Figure 37: Satellite view of Achyraous-Esseron and the İkizcetepeler Dam
(Google Earth)
Figure 38: Achyraous (Photo: Author)
Figure 39μ Achyraous wall detail (Mercangöz, 2003μ 3ι)
142
Figure 40: Pegadia wall detail (Mercangöz, 2003μ 3λ)
Figure 41: Medieval walls of Trebenna Figure 42μ Tower at YarbaΒçandir
(Akyürek, 2006μ 16) (Akyürek, 2006μ 16)
143
Figure 43μ View fromYarbaΒçandir towards Attaleia (Photoμ A. Çubukçu)
Figure 44: The walls of Alanya, sector 5 is Byzantine (Lloyd and Rice, 1954)
144
Figure 45: Satellite view of KızılcaΒehir (Google Earth)
Figure 46μ View from KızılcaΒehir towards Alanya (Photoμ τ. Özdil)
145
Figure 47: Plan of Pegai (Aylward, 2010: 345)
Figure 48: Satellite view of Pegai (Google Earth)
146
Figure 49μ Pegai (Photoμ Α. Apaydın)
Figure 50μ Pegai tower detail, lower section is Komnenian (Photoμ S. Çançin)
147
Figure 51: Fortifications of Manuel I Komnenos (Wikimedia Commons)
Figure 52: Plan of Metabole (Giros, 2003: 218)
148
Figure 53: Metabole (Photo: Sakarya Gezi Rehberi)
Figure 54: The view from Metabole (Photo: Sakarya Gezi Rehberi)
149
Figure 55: The Theme of Neokastra (Google Earth)
Figure 56: Byzantine Pergamon (Rheidt, 1990: 196)
150
Figure 57: Satellite view of Pergamon (Google Earth)
Figure 58: Komnenian wall at Pergamon (Photo: Author)
151
Figure 59: View from the acropolis of Pergamon (Photo: Author)
Figure 60: Isometric reconstruction of Komnenian Pergamon (Rheidt, 1990: Fig. 12)
152
Figure 61: Map showing the position of Adramytteion and modern Edremit (Stauber,
1996)
Figure 62μ Preger‘s map of Dorylaion (Preger, 1κλζμ 301)
153
Figure 63: Satellite view of Dorylaion (Google Earth)
Figure 64μ Αarhöyük from the air (Photo: T. Sivas)
154
Figure 65: View from Dorylaion over the Tembris valley (Photo: Author)
Figure 66: Satellite view of Kotyaeion (Google Earth)
155
Figure 67μ Closely spaced towers of Kotyaeion (Photoμ σ. AktaΒ)
Figure 68: Circular tower, Kotyaeion (Photoμ σ. AktaΒ)
156
Figure 69: Kotyaeion (Photo: Author)
Figure 70μ Kayser Kale (Photoμ H. Özyürt)
157
Figure 71μ Route between Kütahya and EskiΒehir, passing Kayser Kale
(Demirli Köyü) (Google Maps)
Figure 72: Atik Hisar (Photo: M. Avci)
158
Figure 73: Satellite view of Anaia (Google Earth)
Figure 74μ Walls of Anaia (Photoμ M. Schüle)
159
Figure 75: Ritzion (Photo: J. Roche)
Figure 76μ View from acropolis of Telmessos (Photoμ M. Schüle)
160
Figure 77: The walls of Telmessos (Photoμ K. Sarıçalı)
Figure 78: The castles of the Maeander (Barnes and Whittow, 1994: 189)
161
Figure 79μ View of the gulf from the acropolis of σikomedeia (Photoμ A. Kıyga)