658

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Despite being initially disappointed by the loss of funding for the Commonwealth Ph.D. scholarship in 2018, I was subsequently awarded the YTB scholarship for a Ph.D. program in Turkey, a choice influenced by recommendations from my father, colleagues and teachers, given Turkey’s significance in the realm of Muslim history. I embarked my academic journey in Turkey in September 2019, following approval for study leave by Jagannath University, where I serve as an Associate Professor in the Department of Islamic History and Culture. I express gratitude to the authority of JnU and Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities for their assistance in my Ph.D. journey. The initial phase proved challenging, primarily due to the linguistic barrier, while I was totally unfamiliar with the Turkish language. However, through diligent efforts and enrollment in a one-year diploma program in Turkish language at TÖMER, Sakarya University, I successfully overcame this hurdle, thus facilitating a smoother progression towards my Ph.D. endeavor. Upon arriving at Sakarya University, I was impressed by Professor Ali Balcı’s esteemed research reputation, despite having engaged studying his academic works from Bangladesh. Choosing him as my supervisor posed a challenge due to my background in the history department, while Balcı is a professor of International Relations. Due to his expertise in historical IR, particularly in hierarchy studies, he considered me as his fellow. Initially, he was harbored skepticism regarding my capacity for theoretical research, as students with a history orientation were not typically acquainted with IR theories. Nonetheless, spurred by determination, I embraced the challenge, resolute in my commitment to pursue research under Professor Balcı’s guidance. The early stages were challenging due to my limited understanding of theory and scientific research methodology. I am grateful for Professor Balcı’s suggestions, guidance, support, and encouragement to deepen my knowledge in these areas. His unwavering guidance and inspiration throughout all stages of my study kept me focused and dedicated. Moreover, each thesis monitoring examination served as a crucial juncture, wherein I would submit a chapter of my thesis for evaluation. Professor Balcı’s feedback on the submitted manuscript served as a catalyst for refinement, emphasizing the need for rigorous theoretical exposition, cogent argumentation, and lucid prose. Particularly noteworthy was his generosity in permitting the recording of
his lectures, which served to stimulate a recalibration of my thought process. I express my gratefulness to Professor Ali Balcı for accepting me as his fellow and for illuminating my academic path with his expertise and guidance. I express profound gratitude to Professor Dr. Arif Bilgin, a distinguished historian and the founding dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Sakarya University. Professor Bilgin provided invaluable guidance during my coursework and comprehensive exam for my Ph.D. His support extended beyond academic matters; during a challenging period when I fractured my leg, slipping on the muddy road in front of Medar Hospital, Sakarya, while seeking medical care for my child, Professor Bilgin offered his assistance. I also wish to acknowledge the kindness and support of some young Research Assistants of the History Department, as well as my friends, particularly Dr. Burak Çıtır, Dr. Efe Yeşildurak, Burhan Çağlar and Mehmet Kerim, whose help was indispensable during that time. Furthermore, I am grateful for the assistance provided by my friend Dr. Yakup Oruç, Assistant Professor of the Law Department at Sakarya University, Dr. Abdullah Özçelik of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Mahmut Güldalı, the esteem Imam of Ali Çakaroğlu Cami, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fatih Bozkurt, and Prof. Dr. Ümit Ekin of History Deparment for their unwavering support in providing necessary medical supplies and care during my convalescence. Throughout my hospitalization period, lasting ten days, I found solace in the compassionate assistance extended by several individuals, including Bangladeshi students, my Egyptian friend Omer and Ahmed Fathy along with Iranian acquaintance Mehdi Shirazi. Their kindness and support served as a source of comfort during a challenging chapter of my life. I extend my sincere gratitude to Dr. Ismail Ediz, Associate Professor of International Relations, and Dr. Mustafa Sarı, Associate Professor in the History Department, for their invaluable contributions as members of my ‘thesis monitoring committee’. Their guidance, insightful suggestions, and inspirational support were instrumental to elucidate my inquaries and understandings. Particularly noteworthy is Dr. Sari and Dr. Özçelik’s invaluable assistance in navigating and contextualizing Ottoman archival documents, and integrating them into my arguments. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Professor Dr. Tuncay Kardaş, Director of the Middle East Institute, and Dr. Yıldırım Turan, Associate Professor and Assistant
Director of the Middle East Institute at Sakarya University, for allowing me access to the institute’s facilities and arranging my study accommodations in the institute office. Their commitment to academic excellence and innovative thinking has significantly influenced my scholarly pursuits, motivating me to explore new frontiers in my research. This collaborative and stimulating atmosphere at Middle East Institute has been instrumental in shaping my academic trajectory, providing me with invaluable insights and fostering a culture of rigorous inquiry and intellectual growth. I am profoundly inspired by the dynamic intellectual environment fostered by the young faculty members and my friends at the Middle East Institute of Sakarya University namely, Serra Can, Dr. Talha İsmail Duman, Dr. Mehmet Rakipoğlu, Zana Baykal, Melih Yıldız and others. Additionally, I am grateful for the assistance provided by the staff of the Sakarya University Central Library, Ibn Haldun Library of the Middle East Institute, Serdivan Fikir ve Sanat Library, Başbakanlık Osmalı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive), Bangladesh National Archives, State Archives of West Bengal, Indian National Archives, and The British Library and the India Office Records whose support and resources have been indispensable in the meticulous documentation and analysis integral to my academic inquiry.
I express profound gratitude to my parents, Md. Khalilur Rahman and Asma Begum, as well as to my maternal uncle, Md. Mozibur Rahman, my only younger brother (Arifur) and two sisters (Shirin & Shilpi) for their unwavering support and prayers. Their encouragement and love have been pivotal in my pursuit of higher education. Their constant motivation to engage in research has been a guiding force in my academic journey, for which I am deeply thankful. Additionally, I am indebted to the memory of my centenarian grandmother, whose blessings continue to resonate despite her passing during the Konona pandemic of 2020. I would like to express my profound gratitude to the memory of my maternal grandmother, whose passing occurred five days following my thesis defense.
Finally, I acknowledge the endless support, encouragement, and assistance of my beloved wife, Afroza Khatun (Santona) throughout the entirety of my doctoral journey at Sakarya University. Her unwavering support and efficient home management,
especially in caring for our offspring, Aamera Raunaf Rahman and Ahmed Abrar Rahman, have provided me with the necessary time and space to focus on my research.

04/06/2024
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATION .......................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLE ............................................................................................................ v
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………....vi
ÖZET…………………………………………………………………………………..vii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1: THEORY .............................................................................................. 19
1.1. Re-reading Hierarchy .............................................................................................. 22
1.1.1. Non-Western Historical Case and Indian Muslim Subordination to the Ottoman Order .................................................................................................. 27
1.1.2. Secluded Subordinate, Hierarchy and Declining Hegemony ................. 29
1.1.3. How Subordinate Fashioned a Hierarchical Order................................. 32
1.2. Understanding the Ottoman Hierarchy .................................................................... 34
1.2.1. Order Building Entity and Ottoman Hierarchy ...................................... 35
1.2.2. Imperial Negotiation and Ottoman Hierarchy ........................................ 40
1.2.3. Religious Symbolism and Ottoman Hierarchy ....................................... 44
1.2.4. Ottoman Caliphal Order and Indian Muslim: A Bottom-Up Perspective .......................................................................................................................... 46
1.2.5. Late Ottoman International Order and Indian Muslims ......................... 51
1.3. Indian Muslims in Fashioning the Ottoman Hierarchical Order ............................. 53
1.3.1. How Muslim Resistance in India Endorsed the Ottoman Hierarchy ..... 58
1.3.2. Normative Order in Framing the Indian Muslim Subordinates ............. 61
CHAPTER 2: THE FUNCTION OF THE OTTOMAN KHILAFAT IN THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIALISM ............................... 65
2.1. Khilafat and New-fangled Political Paradigm in Indian Political Hegemony ........ 68
2.1.1. British Promoted Ottoman Khilafat and a New Conflict in Unintended Way .................................................................................................................. 69
2.1.2. Revisiting the ‘Crown’s Subject’ Tussles .............................................. 71 2.1.3. Scandaling Caliphate: British Projects and Indian Muslim Responses .. 77
2.2. To the Edge of Polarity and Muslim Quest for another Order ................................ 80
ii
2.2.1. Ottoman’s Westward Policy: Lets Muslim Hegemony of South Asia to Die .................................................................................................................... 83
2.2.2. Re-reading Khilafat as Order-Building Entity among Indian Muslim ... 85
2.3. Re-Picturing Ottoman Order in India ...................................................................... 91
2.3.1. Pan-Islamism in Contructing Khilafat Order in India ............................ 95 2.3.2. Exploring Indian Muslim’s Visit to Istanbul and Pro-Ottoman Muslim Mentality .......................................................................................................... 99
2.3.3. Ottoman High Officials in Promoting Ottoman Order in India ........... 102
2.3.4. Projection of Khilafat Order in Pan-Indian Muslim Politics and Imperial Challenges ...................................................................................................... 103
CHAPTER 3: ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTTOMAN KHILAFAT TO LEGITIMIZE MUSLIM RESISTANC IN INDIA ................................................. 107
3.1. The Turmoil and Triumph: Muslim Resilience in the 19th Century and the March for Regeneration ........................................................................................................... 110
3.1.1. Unraveling the Tapestry: Disintegration of Bengal Partition and Muslim Struggle against Colonialism.......................................................................... 113
3.1.2. British Discord Surrounding Muslim University and the Trajectory of Muslim Resilience .......................................................................................... 117
3.1.3. Kanpur Mosque Tragedy and Muslim’s Anti-British Stance ............... 122
3.1.4. Muslim Political Resentment: Disloyalties to Resistance .................... 124
3.2: Indian Muslim Politics in the 1900s: Hope, Aspiration and Resistance ............... 126
3.2.1. The Evolutionary Tapestry of Political Parties in India ....................... 128
3.2.2. Muslim League and Changing Discourses of Muslim Politics ............ 130
3. 3. Ottoman Phenomenon in Shaping the Muslim Resistance ................................... 134
3.3.1. Response and Resistance of the Indian Muslims during Tripoli War .. 137
3. 3. 2. Balkan War and Ottoman Order-Building Phenomenon in India ...... 141
3. 3. 3. Conflicting Ideas on Resistance during the First World War ............ 145
CHAPTER 4: INSIDE THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT: ACTORS AND OPPONENTS .............................................................................................................. 150
4.1. Actors of Bringing the Ottoman Order in Indian Politics ..................................... 153
4.1.1. Pro-Ottoman Organizations in Constructing the Ottoman Order ......... 153
4.1.1.1. Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kabba………………………………..157
iii
4.1.1.2. Indian Muslim Red Crescent Medical Mission for Ottoman…159
4.1.1.3. The Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Hind ……...…………………………160
4.1.1.4. All India Khilafat Committee ……..…………...…………….162
4.1.2. Muslim Institutions in Constructing the Ottoman Order ...................... 160
4.1.2.1. Aligarh's Nexus of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Khilafat Order…………………………………………………………………..165
4.1.2.2. Deoband and Khilafat Order……………………………...…..167
4.1.2.3. Firangi Mahal and Pro-Ottoman Activitie……………………168
4.1.2.4. Madrasha and Mosque in Promoting Khilafat Order…...…….169
4.1.2.5. Pro-Ottoman Newspapers and Gazette….……………………170
4.1.3. ‘New Generation’ Muslim Leadership in Framing the ‘Ottoman Order’ ........................................................................................................................ 169
4.1.3.1. Ulamas Political Emergence and Navigating the Khilafat Order in India.......……………………………………………………………....175
4.2. Opponent of the Khilafat Order ............................................................................. 174
4.2.1. British Imperialism and the Anxiety over the Ottoman Order ............. 174
4.2.2. Colonial Agent Group .......................................................................... 177
4.2.3. Hindu Orientalist, Orthodoxy and Their Organizations ....................... 180
4.3. Forging a New Subjective Identity: Khilafat Order and Resistance ..................... 182
4.3.1. Resistance for the Existence of Khilafat .............................................. 182
4.3.2. Resistance for Indian Autonomy and Home Rule ................................ 184
4.3.3. Disappointment, Disintegration and Changing Aspect ........................ 185
4.4. A New Subjective Identity of Indian Muslim ....................................................... 187
4.4.1. Normative Identity ............................................................................... 188
4.4.2. Resistant Oriented Muslim Identity ..................................................... 192
4.4.3. Subaltern Muslim Identity .................................................................... 194
4.4.4. Secular Indian Identity ......................................................................... 195
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 198
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 204
CURRICULUM VITAE ............................................................................................ 223
iv
ABBREVIATION
AIKC
: All India Khilafat Committee
AIML : All India Muslim League
AKK : Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kabba
BOA : Başbakanlık Osmalı Arşivi
HIR : Historical International Relations
IMRCM : Indian Muslim Red Crescent Mission
IMRCSO : Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society for Ottomans
IOL&R : India Office Records and Private Papers
INC : Indian National Congress
IR : International Relations
M.A.O College : Mohammedan Anglo Oriental College
NAI : National Archives of India.
ORF : Ottoman Relief Fund
PKK : Kurdistan Workers Party
SIT : Social Identity Theory
JUH : Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind
YTB : Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı
WBSA
: West Bengal State Archives
WMD
: Weapons of Mass Destruction
v
LIST OF TABLE
Table 1: The Complexities of Dual Hierarchies among Indian Muslims…..…..........24 Table 2: Normative structure of the Indian Muslim Community…………………..190
vi
ABSTRACT
Title of Thesis: Embracing the Falling Giant: How Indian Muslims Clasped the
Shattering Ottoman Khalifa
Author of Thesis: Md Anisur RAHMAN
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali BALCI
Accepted Date: 04/06/2024 Number of Pages: vii (pre text) + 204
(main body) + 21 (add)
This research examines the dynamics of Indian Muslim resistance against British colonial rule during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the theoretical lens of hierarchy. The most intriguing puzzle is why a resistance movement embraces a dying giant without expecting any material support? This study seeks to understand how Muslim resistance in India appropriated the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘order’ to contest the legitimacy of British rule. This analysis illustrates the paradoxical nature of the late Ottoman order-declining within its own domain yet serving as an emerging order in the context of Indian Muslim resistance, demonstrating ‘decline is not an obstacle but an order-builder’. Indian Muslims constructed this order in their resistance against colonial rule, in which subordinates are the key actors, thereby introducing the concept of a ‘subordinate-centric hierarchical order’. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the existing literature on hierarchical order studies and Historical International Relations (HIR) by offering a nuanced understanding of how subordinate entities can construct and leverage hierarchical order to contest prevailing hegemonies, thereby offering new insights into the complex processes of order construction through resistance in colonial contexts.
Keywords: Hierarchy, Khilafat Order, Indian Muslim, Resistance, British Colonialism
vii
ÖZET
Başlık: Düşmekte Olan Devi Kucaklamak: Hintli Müslümanlar Yıkılan Osmanlı
Halifesini Nasıl Kucakladı
Yazar: Md Anisur RAHMAN
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Ali BALCI
Kabul Tarihi: 04/06/2024
Sayfa Sayısı: vii (ön kısım) + 204 (ana kısım) +
21 (ek)
Bu araştırma, on dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonları ve yirminci yüzyılın başlarında İngiliz sömürge yönetimine karşı Hintli Müslüman direnişinin dinamiklerini hiyerarşi kuramsal merceğinden incelemektedir. En ilgi çekici sorunsal, bir direniş hareketinin neden hiçbir maddi destek beklemeden can çekişen bir devi kucakladığıdır? Bu çalışma, Hindistan’daki Müslüman direnişinin İngiliz yönetiminin meşruiyetine karşı çıkmak için Osmanlı Hilafetini bir ‘düzen’ olarak nasıl sahiplendiğini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu analiz, son dönem Osmanlı düzeninin paradoksal doğasını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu paradoksal düzen, kendi alanında gerilemekte, ancak Hintli Müslüman direnişi bağlamında yükselen bir düzen olarak hizmet etmekte ve ‘gerilemenin bir engel değil, düzen kurucu’ olduğunu göstermektedir. Hintli Müslümanlar, sömürge yönetimine karşı direnişlerinde astların temel aktörler olduğu bu düzeni inşa etmiş ve böylece ‘ast merkezli hiyerarşik düzen’ kavramını ortaya atmışlardır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, hiyerarşik düzen çalışmaları ve Tarihsel Uluslararası İlişkiler (TUİ) alanındaki mevcut literatüre, ast konumdaki oluşumların hakim hegemonyalara karşı çıkmak için hiyerarşik düzeni nasıl inşa edebildiklerine ve bu düzenden nasıl yararlanabildiklerine dair incelikli bir anlayış sunarak ve böylece sömürge bağlamlarında direniş yoluyla düzen inşasının karmaşık süreçlerine dair yeni kavrayışlar teklif ederek katkıda bulunmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hiyerarşi, Hilafet Düzeni, Hintli Müslüman, Direniş, İngiliz Sömürgeciliği
1
INTRODUCTION
Subject of the Research
At the dawn of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse. Especially the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war made the Empire unable to protect itself, let alone helping other countries and movements. Militarily and economically, the empire was in a desperate situation and was struggling with internal revolts from eastern Anatolia to its almost isolated lands in the Balkans. Despite this rather depressing picture, Muslim movements in South Asia began to see the Ottoman Empire as the supreme authority in their struggle against British rule. Moreover, just a few decades ago, in 1857, in the uprising in the Indian subcontinent against the British, the same Ottoman Empire had taken a side with the British and played an active role in suppressing the uprising. But in the 1880s, a Muslim movement, whose main goal was to overthrow the colonial rule, was choosing a crumbling empire as its supreme authority. Not only was it incapable of providing military and economic support, the Ottoman state was geographically distant from the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, let alone protecting the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent against the British, the Porte had to leave its Muslim lands such as Egypt to the British. So why would a Muslim movement struggling against the British, instead of seeking other functional and powerful alliances (for example, Germany), join the ranks of a crumbling empire and see it as the supreme authority? Moreover, following the Indian uprising of 1857, the British Crown assumed direct control over India, and declaring the Indians as ‘Crown Subject’ that delegitimized the Muslim prospect of opposing colonial hegemony over India. It posed two significant challenges for the Muslim community. Firstly, the acceptance of Khilafat order stood in stark contrast to their allegiance to the colonial government, which symbolized Muslim as traitor. Secondly, the acceptance of the declining Ottoman Khilafat in the face of formidable colonial dominance, poses formidable risk, particularly considering the lack of economic and military capacity on the part of the acknowledged hegemon to resist the British rule. Despite these challenges and risks, the Muslim attachment to the Khilafat order began to intensify in the 1880s and persisted til the 1920s, when the empire took its last breath.
2
The prevailing scholarship predominantly examines the increasing Muslim attachment to the Ottoman Khilafat through a ‘top-down’ and ‘ontological’ lens, mostly focusing on the Hamidian foreign policy of ‘globalizing the Khilafat’ and the growth of Pan-Islamic sentiments. Despite these dominant discourses, the acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat by Indian Muslims as an order-building entity in their resistance against British rule in the 1910s opens up avenues for exploring this phenomenon from a ‘bottom-up’ or ‘functionalist’ perspective. This was mainly because; the end of the Hamidian regime in 1908 and the subsequent decline in the prominence of Pan-Islam did not impede the deepening connection between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Khilafat. This thesis explores the ‘Indian Muslim aspirations’ for integration within the broader Muslim world under the Ottoman Khilafat. Therefore, we argue for a ‘bottom-up’ approach that views Indian Muslims as subordinate entities and the Khilafat as a hierarchical order, examining what functionality made the Khilafat as the ‘order-builder’ in the Muslim resistance and how Muslims projected the functions of the Khilafat order to delegitimize the existing colonial rule in India.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, Muslims actively embraced, promoted, and projected the Khilafat order, showcasing their functional standing with the Ottomans. This was evident in their support for the Ottomans during the Tripoli and Balkan wars, where they dispatched medical missions. Furthermore, in defiance of colonial restrictions, Muslims spearheaded fundraising campaigns throughout India for the Ottomans, portraying the Khilafat as their paramount authority. Moreover, the Muslim projection of the Khilafat as a political order garnered recognition from the British government during World War I. This acknowledgment was predicated upon strategic imperatives, a move aimed at mollifying Muslim discontent in Indian subcontinent and preempting potential mutinies among Indian Muslim soldiers serving in the British army. As part of this acknowledgment, the British government pledged to maintain the Islamic holy sites in the Middle East under the authority of the Khilafat, thereby ensuring that the war’s conclusion would not jeopardize this arrangement. Despite their commitment, the British could not uphold their pledge.
There was much more puzzling picture in 1919. The Ottoman Empire was on the verge of dying, let alone collapsing. The Indian Muslim movement, also known as the Khilafat movement or the Caliphate movement, intensely embraced the Ottoman
3
Empire. They launched a vehement resistance, inflaming pressure on the British colonial power to protect the Ottoman Khilafat from Western exploitation. The First World War ended with a unanimous defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and the victorious European powers were preparing a peace treaty that would divide Ottoman territories. Moreover, the Arabs were seeking independence from their Ottoman overlords, and the Turks themselves were drawing away from their imperial past in favor of a regenerated Turkish homeland. In such a context, in a distance geographical boundary, a Muslim movement embraced the dying Ottoman Empire for their existence. It explores how a hegemonic power in decline continues to exert influence over its subordinate entities despite its diminishing stature in the international system. Therefore, this study elucidates the rationale, arguments, and underlying motivations that led Indian Muslims to embrace the Ottoman order to contest the prevailing colonial power over India. Since its inception, Muslim leaders and their followers consistently invoked the Ottoman Khalifa as a central order, utilizing it to unite Muslims under a common authority. Primarily, the conceptualization of the Khalifa with political significance served as a catalyst for Muslim resistance, fostering a collective consciousness that opposed the existing colonial regime. This burgeoning sentiment, rooted in nationalist fervor, gradually influenced the broader currents of Indian independence. The resonance of this nationalist fervor within the Muslim movement also attracted other nationalist entities in India to the Khilafat order. More significantly, the progressive wing of Hindu leaders, including Gandhi, Nehru, and Lajpat Rai, spontaneously engaged in the discourse of Muslim resistance. This cross-communal solidarity underscores the broader significance of the Khilafat order, as it transcended religious boundaries to challenge the legitimacy of British colonial hegemony in India. Secondly, the embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat engendered a distinct Muslim subjectivity within the Indian Muslim populace, delineating them from advocates of a separatist Muslim identity disengaged from the global Muslim community and aligned with colonial authorities. This phenomenon exposed them to a novel form of Muslimness, one that embraced the Khilafat as an order-builder and projected this order in their resistance against British rule. This new Muslim subjects espoused that resistance was imperative to legitimize the Muslim existance in India and to challenge the legitimacy of the colonial power structure. Consequently, the discourse of Muslim resistance rendered them more dynamically
4
engaged and influential within the Indian political landscape. Muslim subjectivity under the construction of the Khilafat has left a lasting legacy. Even today, the Khilafat serves as a founding memory in the minds of South Asian Muslims.
Research Question This dissertation will attempt to answer the following research questions raised by the above puzzle. While the first of these questions constitutes the basic research question of the dissertation, the other three questions reflect the basic theoretical premise of the dissertation. Why the Indian Muslims embraced the declining Ottoman order against the powerful colonial rule over India? How did the Ottoman Khilafat function in delegitimizing British colonialism? What was the role of the Ottoman Khilafat in the legitimization of Indian Muslims resistance against the British rule? How did the embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat contribute to forming a distinct subjectivity of Indian Muslims?
Importance of the Research
Indian Muslims embraced the declining giant-the Ottoman Khilafat to legitimize their existence in the colonial power structure, a counter-hegemonic presence to resist the colonial entity, and a heteronymous political resistance to delegitimize the colonial power. Although the history of the Khilafat movement in India is the subject of many academic studies, the number of systematic studies on this movement from a theoretical perspective is very few. While this thesis is a candidate to fill this gap, it also aims to present a new perspective in understanding the Khilafat movement through the lens of hierarchical order studies. By conceptualizing the Khilafat as an order-building entity and positioning Indian Muslims as its subordinates, this dissertation will potentially contribute to four research areas; the history of the Khilafat movement, the late Ottoman history, the external relations of resistance movements, and ideational construction of order. In this research, the functional aspects of the Khilafat movement, especially its courses of action for resistance in the colonial power structure, will be entirely a different deliberation than the existing dominant discourses. The Ottoman Empire was
5
an imperial order, and it ruled many subordinates in North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. This dissertation will show how the Ottoman Empire appealed to new subordinates in distant geographies in its decaying decades. Rather than appealing to independent political entities, the Ottoman Empire turned into a superior authority for resistant movements in the colonies of European powers, especially in South and Southeast Asia. Therefore, functioning as an external order within the colonial power structure, Khilafat acted as a significant catalyst for Indian Muslim resistance while it was passing its dying decades in its own lands. This was mainly because, Muslim leaders strategically positioned the Khilafat as an order-building entity that garnered all Muslims beyond their sectarian differences under a common order to delegitimize colonial rule in India. This phenomenon explores a new deliberation of resistance, illustrating how a declining hegemon stimulates its subordinate’s resistance to overthrow the existing rule. The resistance differentiated its participants from other Indians not only through their opposition to colonial power but also by cultivating a distinct subjective identity for Indian Muslims, centering on the Khilafat. This subjective construction can be analyzed by comparing the ideational framework of the Khilafat with other ideological connotations. For instance, the case of Vietnam provides a relevant parallel, as Vietnam legitimized US order despite its geographic nearness to the Soviet Union. Finally, this research will keep a distinct contribution to hierarchy theory.
Purpose of the Research ‘Delegitimization of Colonial Order in India’, by referring the Ottoman Khalifa, how Khalifat leaders, their subjects, and members delegitimized British colonial rule over India? Khilafat movement embraced Ottoman Khilafat to delegitimize British rule over India because the connection of Khilafat to create the solidarity with Islamic Ummah can function to delegitimize ruling entities in India as foreigner or alien. The British initially arrived in India as a trading entity, the East India Company, navigating the intricate webs of trade prevalent in the region during the 17th and 18th centuries. But, their trajectory quickly transcended mere mercantilism, evolving into a strategic and imperialistic enterprise characterized by acquiring political authority and territorial dominion. Therefore, they progressively consolidated their political authority through a
6
series of military conquests. Beginning with the Battle of Plassey in 1757, it expanded across other provinces, culminating in the fall of Delhi in 1857. This event not only signaled the end of Mughal sovereignty but also the decline of Muslim hegemony over South Asia. While all Indians perceived the British as colonizers, the Muslim population experienced this transition differently as they lost their political dominance to this foreign force. Muslims were the ruler of India, and they committed to present their existence in Indian politics by delegitimizing colonial dominance. ‘Legitimization of the Movement’, how the Khilafat movement legitimized resistance within the Indian setting by referring to the Ottoman Khilafat order? Why these resistance movements employed the authority of the falling empire? Khilafat leaders legitimized their resistance against the colonial governance by embracing Khalifa of the Ottoman Empire. They were fighting against the common enemy because they were the extension of the legitimate entity, Ottoman Khilafat. The Ottoman Empire was the sole remaining Muslim hegemon. Rather, the fall of the Mughal Empire under British dominion had left a significant void in Muslim politico-religious authority in India. Consequently, Indian Muslims gravitated towards the Ottoman Khilafat, perceiving it as a source of legitimate authority to bolster their anti-colonial struggle. Indian leaders framed their resistance narrative by highlighting the Ottoman Empire’s persistent struggle with Western dominance. They posited that both the Ottoman Empire and Indian Muslims shared a common interest in resisting Western imperialism, thereby justifying their alliance with the Ottoman Khilafat. ‘Constructing New Subject’, how did the Khilafat movement and its leaders turn ordinary Indian Muslims into a new subject useful in the fight against the British colonial rule through a discourse on the Khilafat order? This transformation of ordinary Indian Muslims into resistance fighters was subjectification. This subjectification was based on two distinct discursive constructions: who are true Indian Muslims and who are not. Through a discourse on the Ottoman Empire, the Khilafat movement defined the key determinants of being true Indian Muslim and excluded some practices as the signifiers of treason. The key point is how Khilafat leaders communicated, and mobilized a lot of supporters by referencing the Ottoman Khilafat? What was the function of Ottoman connection in the construction of supporters all round the India, and how this movement increased its subjects, and convinced them about the fight
7
against British colonialism? Ultimately the movement turns itself into mass resistance against British imperialism. Construction of subjects is not only about imposing responsibility such as loyalty and scarification to Ottoman Khilafat. It is also about the condemnation of those who behave against the constructed subject. The existing study of positive participants in the Khilafat movement failed to explain the British loyalist wing of Muslim leaders, who behave against the constructed subject. Method of the Research This study employs hierarchy theory to analyze Indian Muslim resistance against British colonial rule, presenting the Ottoman Khilafat as a hierarchical order and Indian Muslims as a subordinate entity. It explores how this subordinate accepted the Ottoman order to delegitimize colonial rule in India and legitimize Muslim resistance within the colonial context. Focusing on the Indian Muslim case, the study adopts the ‘case study method’ to examine this phenomenon through the theoretical lens of hierarchy.
Alternative Explanations The question of Indian Muslim embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat has been addressed by previous scholars. Prevailing scholarly investigations of this phenomenon delineate two primary frameworks: the ontological paradigm and the top-down perspective. The ontological framework delves into the identity-driven dynamics of the Khilafat Movement, emphasizing the conceptual congruence between Pan-Islam and the veneration of the Ottoman Khilafat as the apex authority. It predicated upon shared religious affiliation and cultural affinity, viewing the Ottoman Khilafat as a symbol of religious unity representing the unity of the global Muslim community. Proponents of this view argue that the emotional and religious ties between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Khalifa were fundamental in motivating their support for the Khilafat Movement. Conversely, the top-down accounts elucidates the influence of Hamidian foreign policy and the strategic objectives of the empire, illuminating the geopolitical considerations and intentions underpinning the convergence of interests between the Indian Muslim populace and the Ottoman Khilafat. Prominent scholars, such as Azmi Özcan, Naeem Qureshi, Gail Minault, and A.C. Niemeijers, have extensively examined the ontological underpinnings of Indian
8
Muslims’ embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat. Özcan explores the identity explanation of the Khilafat Movement which embraces Pan-Islam and recognizes the Ottoman Khilafat as a supreme authority because both are Muslims and they have a similar identity. He briefly examines the historical relationship between the Mughal and Ottoman Empires before focusing on Indian Muslim sympathies with the Ottomans, which began to intensify notably after the Russo-Turkish War. Most significantly he presented Indian Muslim relation with Ottoman Khilafat within the framework of Pan-Islam, rather the British reaction to the Pan-Islamic developments is also discussed extensively in this book.1 This well-known study on the matter does not look at the functionality of the Khilafat Movement in terms of the power struggle, which is much related to the resistance movement against the colonial entity. Therefore, Pan-Islamism had not affected the Muslim politics of India extensively. Even contrary literary argument narrates that Jamal Uddin Afghani visited India on several occasions. However, his visits remained largely unnoticed by the broader Muslim population, and he did not amass a significant following in India. That’s why, beyond the traditional concept, our inquiries focus on functionality, recognizing how Muslim resistance accepted the Ottoman Khilafat as an order to delegitimize the prevailing colonial rule in India. Qureshi’s study delves into the critical period spanning from 1918 to 1924, focusing on the Khilafat Movement as a pivotal phase in Indian Muslim history.2 He elucidates the factual chronicles and historical narrative of the Muslim movement, delving into the intricate ‘emotional solidarity’ that bound Indian Muslims to the cause of the Ottoman Khilafat. His analysis centers on the Hijrat movement, portraying it as a poignant manifestation of emotional fervor. Furthermore, it meticulously examines the strategic manifestation of Muslim non-cooperation within the overarching nationalist paradigm, delineating the nuanced interplay between emotive allegiance and pragmatic political objectives within the broader tapestry of Indian Muslim movement. Therefore, the prevailing interpretation of Qureshi’s work overlooks the pragmatic dimensions inherent in the dynamics of power. We explore that despite the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Khilafat became the newly emerging order of Muslim resistance
1 Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain 1877-1924 (Leiden-Newyork-Köln: Brill, 1997).
2 M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan Islam in British Indian Politics A Study Of the Khilafat Movement 1918-1924 (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 1999).
9
in India, seemingly capable of resisting Europe. It epitomized the Khilafat as a universal Muslim order, which the Indian Muslims embraced to challenge the legitimacy of British colonial rule and to delegitimize colonial existence over India. The affinity of Indian Muslims towards the Ottoman Khilafat intensified following the demise of the Mughal hegemony in 1857. Subsequent to the collapse of the Mughal Empire, divergences based on regional, linguistic, class, and sectarian lines grew within Indian Muslim society. Against this backdrop of fragmentation, leaders of the Khilafat movement strategically leveraged the Ottoman Khalifa as a unifying order, essential for the construction of a cohesive political resistance against colonial power. Minault also presented an ontological account of the Khilafat Movement, arguing Indian Muslim’s embracement of the Ottoman Khilafat due to the Khalifa’s role as the natural and spiritual leader of all Muslim communities.3 She views the Ottoman Khilafat as a fundamental entity fostering Muslim identity in India, examining how the construction of Muslim identity embodied Khilafat. She further explored that Khilafat served as a unifying factor for Muslim solidarity in India, acting as a ‘common denominator’ for their collective identity, focusing how Indian Muslims incorporated ‘extra-territorial loyalty’ into their nationalist pursuits, linking Pan-Islamic ideals with a more assertive stance. Spotlighting the political mobilization around the Khalifa, Minault sheds light on the Pan-Islamic dimensions of the Khilafat movement, highlighting its role in shaping a cohesive Pan-Indian Muslim constituency. Her scholarly endeavors also overlooked the nuanced exploration of the operational dynamics inherent within the Muslim movement. Therefore, our inquiry delves into how Khilafat stimulated the Muslim resistance that engendered a novel subjective identity among Indian Muslims, with the Khilafat order at its core. Niemeijers has extensively examined the convergence of the Khilafat movement and the Indian nationalist movement, particularly Muslims alignment with the Non-cooperation movement and their consequential role in Indian independent movement.4 Niemeijer’s study sheds light on how the Khilafat served as a mechanism for fostering temporary unity between Hindus and Muslims. He elucidated the pivotal role played by Muslim leadership in fostering communal unity; a development of significance given the
3 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982).
4 A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924 (Martinus Nijhoff, Hague: Brill, 1972).
10
subsequent challenges faced by the colonial government. His insightful analysis of the Khilafat leadership, particularly spotlighting its key leaders such as the Ali brothers, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Mahmud-ul-Hasan, provide us a new understanding of constructing the idea of a new subjective identity of the Indian Muslims centering the Ottoman Khilafat. Consequently, our academic inquiry delves into the subjective identity formation of Indian Muslims affiliated with the Khilafat order, while concurrently illuminating the contours of resistance discourse delineated by anti-Khilafat factions. In his theory-driven book, Hendrik Spruyt provides a comprehensive examination of the Ottoman Empire within the framework of international order studies.5 He also offers an ontological perspective to elucidate the interrelations among the three Islamic empires-the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal-highlighting their shared intersubjective understandings within the context of an Islamic international society. Conversely, Balcı critiques Spruyt’s approach through his scholarly investigation, emphasizing the functionality of the Ottoman Empire.6 Balcı posits that the Ottoman Empire should be viewed as a distinct international order, characterized by its functional relations not only with other European powers but also with the Mughal and Safavid Empires. He argues that these three Muslim hegemons operated as separate, order-building entities, each contributing uniquely to the construction of international order. However, the prevailing scholarly discourses have tended to overlook the functional aspects of the Khilafat Movement, with a predominant focus on identity-related aspects. They overlooked the most intriguing dimensions of the Khilafat Movement, for example, ‘the Muslim resistance for autonomy’ or ‘the Muslim resistance to delegitimize the existing colonial rule’. But Muslims were ambivalently nationalist, and Khilafat leaders upheld the Indian national unity against the British; such phenomenon has been critically examined in Professor Halil İnancık’s paper.7 Margrit Pernau and Mushirul Hasan have elucidated the imperative significance of Khilafat and the consequential mobilization of Indian Muslims in a collective endeavor to safeguard the
5 Hendrik Spruyt, The World Imagined: Collective Beliefs and Political Order in the Sinocentric, Islamic and Southeast Asian International Societies (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
6 Ali Balcı, “Bringing the Ottoman Order Back into International Relations: A Distinct International Order or Part of an Islamic International Society?”, International Studies Review 23 (2021), 2090-2107.
7 Halil Inalcik, “Islamic Caliphate, Turkey and Muslims in India”, Dr. I.H. Qureshi Memorial Lecture Shariah, Ummah and Khilafah, auth. Yusuf Abbas Hashmi (Karachi: University of Karachi, 2008), 14-34.
11
institution from perceived Western machinations.8 However, their studies overlook a crucial aspect of the Muslim struggle for autonomy during this period. Beyond its external focus on the protection of the Khilafat, the Khilafat leaders represented a concerted effort to establish a form of domestic political legitimacy in the colonial power structure. Pursuing this objective, they quest for an alternative order served as a unifying force, providing a common ideological ground for resisting the hegemony of British colonial rule. We explore the resistance effort intertwined with the narrative of Indian nationalism, as Muslims sought to garner broader support by rallying behind the Ottoman Khalifa, thereby imbuing their struggle with a nationalist ethos aimed at delegitimizing the colonial rule. Their comprehensive resistance further evolved through its alignment with the Non-cooperation and Boycott movement, wherein Hindus and Muslims jointly engaged, demonstrating a unified stance in opposition to colonial authority. Therefore, the Khilafat movement served as a unifying force for Hindu and Muslim leadership, fostering a shared goal of challenging British rule in India. B.R. Nanda’s scholarly work has elucidated Congress’s involvement in this movement, particularly Gandhi’s motivation for engaging with Muslim resistance.9 Nanda’s analysis highlights how Pan-Islamic sentiment bolstered Indian nationalist rhetoric against colonial powers. His research is pivotal in understanding the rationale behind Muslim resistance and the Khilafat’s role in mobilizing a comprehensive anti-colonial movement. Furthermore, we focus how the Khilafat leaders utilized the Khalifa as a symbol of Muslim liberation from colonial dominance, leveraging religious symbolism for political legitimacy in the Indian political landscape. Numerous leading scholarly investigations have predominantly concentrated on a top-down perspective. The Khilafat movement comprises socializational aspects; for instance, many Khilafat leaders trained in Ottoman or Islamic oriented Medrasha. Barbara D. Metcalf’s focused the revival of Islamic education in the Muslim society in India through his scholarly explanation.10 Such narratives also have some discrepancies and obscurity. Many of the leaders of the Khilafat movement were educated in
8 Margrit Pernau-Mushirul Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism Documents on the Khilafat Movement (Manohar: New Delhi, 2005).
9 B.R. Nanda, Gandhi Pan Islamism, Imperialism, and Nationalism in India (USA: Oxford University Press, 1990).
10 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India Deoband, 1860-1900 (USA: Princeton University Press, 2014).
12
Madrasas, while some received their education in Europe. The European-educated segment harbored a strong aversion to colonial rule, stemming from their direct observations of colonial neglect. In contrast, Madrasa-educated Muslim students often viewed Europeans through a lens of religious difference, considering them as infidels. In the 1910s, a convergence occurred wherein both the emerging modern educated class and the traditional Madrasha-oriented class in India aligned themselves under the Khilafat order. This alignment was driven by a shared imperative to assert their stance against British colonialism. In her analysis, Nikki R. Keddie delves into the top-down construction of the Ottoman imperial order, specifically examining how Istanbul strategically promoted the universal Khilafat to challenge Western hegemony.11 This trend, prevalent during the Hamidian era, globalized the concept of Khilafat, leading colonized Muslims around the world to increasingly view the Ottoman Khilafat as their legitimate authority in their resistance against Western powers. This narrative aligns with Camil Aydın’s exploration of the ‘Muslim World’, illustrating how colonized Muslims, particularly since the late nineteenth century, utilized this terminology in their identity formation and resistance efforts.12 Therefore, in a recent scholarly inquiry, Faiz Ahmed undertook an interesting analysis of the top-down dynamics characterizing late Ottoman diplomatic relations, with a particular focus on the Hamidian era’s interaction with the Muslim princely states of India.13 Ahmed’s investigation delved into the mechanisms through which Istanbul sought to extend the reach of the globalizing Khilafat beyond its immediate geographical confines. Despite the meticulous examination provided, the study encountered a notable lacuna in explicating the grounds underlying the heightened interest among Indian Muslims in the Ottoman phenomenon during the 1910s. In contrast to Faiz Ahmed’s top-down perspective our study aims to provide a bottom-up explanation for the increasing Muslim attachment to the Ottoman Khilafat in the 1910s. While Ahmed’s work sheds light on Istanbul’s efforts to project the globalizing Khilafat, it leaves unanswered questions regarding the motivations of Indian Muslims
11 Nikki R. Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II”, Middle Eastern Studies 3/1 (1996), 46-67.
12 Camil Aydın, The Idea of the Muslim World A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2017).
13 Faiz Ahmed, “Meddling with Medals, Defending the Dead: Late Ottoman Soft Power from South Asia to North America”, The International History Review 43/5 (2021), 1041-1059.
13
during a period when Hamidian rule was ending and Pan-Islam was in decline. Therefore, it becomes imperative to adopt a bottom-up perspective to elucidate the underlying rationales propelling the surge in Muslim attachment to the Ottoman Khilafat during this epoch. In my analysis, I conceptualize the Ottoman Khilafat as a hierarchical order employed by Indian Muslims to challenge and undermine the legitimacy of British colonial rule in India. It elucidates the transformation of the Indian Muslim populace into a politically salient entity through the agency of the Khilafat, rendering them more actively engaged in politics to legitimize resistance against the colonial order, thereby engendering a novel subjective identity. Within this framework, the quest for hegemony within Indian politics among Muslims is discerned as an endeavor rooted in resistance against colonial subjugation. This necessitated the articulation of an alternative order, where the adoption of the Khilafat order served as a potent instrument for challenging the legitimacy of British colonial authority in India. The inquiry focuses on the genesis of this alternative order within the Indian context, elucidating the strategies employed by Muslim leaders to promote its relevance within the prevailing colonial power dynamics. The conceptual underpinning of this analysis situates the Indian Muslim as a subordinate entity, prompting an exploration into the intriguing dynamics that prompted their embrace of the waning Ottoman hegemony vis-à-vis the ostensibly superior British colonial order. This intriguing puzzle motivates our research into why Indian Muslims embraced the fading Ottoman order instead of pursuing a more pragmatic alliance, such as with Germany, to contest British colonial hegemony. This investigation pursues the framework of hierarchy-oriented order studies that delves into the complex dynamics of power, legitimacy, and identity that shaped the choices of Indian Muslims to align with the declining Ottoman Khilafat. Moreover, hierarchy theories encompass a variety of perspectives, including the ‘material perspective’, ‘patron-centric accounts of order’, ‘constitutive order’, and ‘state-oriented order’. In his seminal work, David A. Lake focused on the material dynamics of establishing international hierarchy.14 Central to Lake’s argument is the recognition of the dual nature of power projection in international relations, epitomized by the symbiotic interplay between military prowess and economic leverage. Through a rigorous
14 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009).
14
analytical lens, Lake elucidates how dominant states employ these potent tools to consolidate and perpetuate their dominance over subordinates. Lake’s scholarship underscores the material and patron-centric orientations of order, wherein the patron state exercises its hegemonic influence by providing military and economic assistance to sustain hierarchical arrangements among subordinate states. Evelyn Goh undertook a comprehensive examination of the international hierarchy by exploring the constitutive framewor, focusing on how international institutions function to both construct and sustain the prevailing international order.15 David Campbell’s scholarly inquiry centers on state-centric order, with a particular emphasis on the construction of the international order by dominant states. His analysis delves into the complexities of this process and elucidates how the foreign policy of dominant states constructs its order.16 However, these theoretical expositions are not directly applicable in our case because the Ottoman Empire had no military and economic capacity to support Indian Muslim resistance against British colonial rule. Additionally, as a patron, the Ottomans did not impose any demands on Indian Muslims. Instead, Indian Muslims, lacking a sovereign state, functioned as non-state actors. To substantiate our argument within the framework of hierarchy-oriented order studies, it is essential to consider the ‘non-material dimensions’ of international hierarchy. Despite this, examining ‘non-state order’, ‘resistance-oriented order’, and ‘subordinate-centric order’ within the international hierarchy provides a close exploration of why Indian Muslim subordinates accepted the declining Ottoman order. Zarakol’s scholarly work presents a distinctive feature through its examination of the medieval Eurasian case of the Chinggisid Empire, offering a unique perspective on historical IR.17 This approach provides valuable insights into the dynamics of international hierarchy, extending beyond the Western experience, enriching our understanding of how non-material connectivity and institutional legacies can shape and maintain international order in diverse geopolitical settings. Her work inspires the similar exploration of the Indian Muslim case, considering the absence of material
15 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order Hegemony, Hierarchy abd Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).
16 David Campbell, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
17 Ayşe Zarakol, Before the West: The Rise and fall of Eastern World Order (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
15
assistance from the Ottoman center and the reasons behind Indian Muslims’ embrace of the Ottoman order, from a non-material perspective.
Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman have posited the presence of an international hierarchy in Indian Ocean focusing the non-state actor of hierarchy.18 Their splendid work seeks to unravel the intricate dynamics of the early modern globalized era, particularly focusing on on how the international system evolved and persisted in this maritime space of India prior to Western hegemony. A central inquiry in their study is the dual nature of the Indian Ocean, serving as a primary arena for European-Asian military and diplomatic interactions since 1500 C.E., while also being the epicenter of early modern trade and cross-cultural exchanges. Despite these pivotal roles, the Indian Ocean international system never conformed to a hierarchical structure under a single sovereign authority. Instead, they emphasize the presence of diverse and dynamic interactions among various non-state actors. This perspective shapes our investigation of Indian Muslim subordination within the Ottoman hierarchical order, focusing on the non-state actor phenomenon of order studies. This is mainly because the Indian Muslims had no state and they were living under the colonial order. Balcı’s scholarly work provides invaluable insights into the intricate mechanisms through which hierarchical orders are legitimized within dissident movements.19 Within the context of the waning order of the the Soviet Union during the 1980s, Balcı elucidates the mechanisms through which leaders of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) endeavored to validate their hegemonic authority amidst a backdrop of perceived decline. Central to Balcı’s analysis is the exploration of how PKK leaders navigated the complexities of legitimizing their hierarchical order despite the prevailing awareness of the Soviet Union’s diminishing influence. Balcı delves into the psychological and strategic calculus underlying the persistence of resistance among PKK adherents, revealing a profound tension between the acknowledgment of the hierarchical order’s decline and the enduring hope for its revitalization. This tension underscores the intricate interplay between ideology, power dynamics, and pragmatic considerations within dissident movements. That’s why; Balcı’s work offers a nuanced understanding
18 Andrew Phillips-J. C. Sharman, International Order in Diversity War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
19 Ali Balcı, The PKK-Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s Regional Politics during and after the Cold War (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
16
of how dissident movements navigate the shifting tides of power and legitimacy in tumultuous geopolitical landscapes. Therefore Balcı’s study contributes significantly to our comprehension of India Muslim resistance and hegemonic struggles since 1880s. Despite knowing the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims were resolute in leveraging this imperial order to legitimize their resistance against the prevailing colonial order over India. The Muslim resistance strategically justified Khilafat as order-building entity within the Indian context, and aligning themselves with this order, Khilafat leaders sought to imbue their struggle with a sense of continuity and legitimacy, portraying them as an extension (subordinates) of this order. This perspective explores a novel facet of the hierarchy literature, examining the necessity of order for resistance movements and elucidating how a declining hegemon perpetually fuels the resistance of its subordinates. In another scholarly exposition, Balcı explored the ‘subordinate centric order’, focusing on the Algerian case.20 He analyzed why Algiers remained loyal to the falling Ottoman patron instead of making alliances with more functional entities, particularly in the face of European powers. This study provides a theoretical foundation for my research, which aims to investigate why Indian Muslims, situated in geographically distant regions, remained stedfast in sticking with the falling Khilafat order in their resistance against the colonial rule. In our examination, I will apply hierarchical order theories inspired by the works of Zarakol, Phillips & Sharman, and Balcı to understand the phenomenon of Indian Muslims’ acceptance of the Ottoman order despite the empire’s declining status. This theoretical perspective will help us elucidate why Indian Muslims chose to align themselves with a declining power and without expecting any material assistance from the led entity to legitimize their resistance against the prevailing colonial order in India.
Design of Chapters This research is structured into distinct segments, commencing with an introduction, followed by four distinctive chapters, and a conclusion. The opening chapter of this thesis delves into its theoretical framework, examining the dissenting Muslim movement from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century through the lens of
20 Ali Balcı, “Algeria in declining ottoman hierarchy: Why Algiers remained loyal to the falling patron”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35/ 3 (2020), 375-393.
17
hierarchy theory. This analysis positions the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘order-building entity’ and Indian Muslims as ‘subordinate’ within this framework. This chapter elucidates three key arguments. Firstly, it explores why subordinate entities residing in geographically distant territories would accept the hegemony of the waning Ottoman order over the more powerful British colonial order. Despite the apparent benefits of aligning with a more active and powerful order for example, Germany, Indian Muslims is shown to have embraced the dying Khilafat order. It also highlights the enduring influence of the Ottoman Khilafat paradigm on Musilms of South Asia, juxtaposed with its diminishing authority within Ottoman territories during its decline. It demonstrates the notions that while an empire may cease to exist; its influence can endure, shaping the political discourses of its subordinates. The second argument investigates how subordinate entities can become more functional within a hierarchical order. While existing literature on hierarchy typically focuses on the functions of leading powers and portrays subordinates as passive participants in order-building processes, my research highlights the proactive role of Muslim subordination in revitalizing the Ottoman order within the context of Indian politics. Finally, it examines how the concept of ‘resistance-oriented hierarchy,’ explores the symbiotic relationship between resistance movements and hierarchical orders. This argument sheds light on how a resistance movement can lend functionality to an order, and conversely, how an order can support and be reinforced by a resistance movement. By applying these theoretical perspectives, this thesis aims to provide a deeper understanding of the Indian Muslim resistance movement’s embrace of the Ottoman order in opposition to colonial dominance. In the second chapter, the analysis shifts towards examining the functional dynamics of the Ottoman order within the resistance narratives of Indian Muslims. This section elucidates two key arguments. Firstly, the study on ‘order-building trends of Khilafat’ delves into the strategic manipulation by colonial authorities of the Ottoman Khilafat phenomenon to secure legitimacy among Muslim populations for their governance, while also examining how Muslims utilized the concept of Khilafat to justify their political stance in India. Secondly, the exploration of ‘Khilafat as an alternative order’ critically analyzes the evolving narratives surrounding the Indian Muslim embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat as a global Muslim order. Of particular interest is the manner in
18
which the Muslim movement centered on the Khilafat constructed an alternative order to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule in India. The subsequent chapter emphasizes how Indian Muslims projected the Khilafat order for their existence in the colonial power structure. This projection was influenced by two significant factors. Firstly, the antagonistic policies pursued by the British against the Muslims interests during the 1910s, coupled with a perceived Western conspiracy targeting the Ottoman Khilafat contemporaneously, engendered a heightened sense of agency among Muslims in safeguarding their interests within the Indian context and counteracting perceived threats to their order emanating from Western conspiracy. The fourth chapter explores the most intriguing aspect of this thesis, investigating the actors and opponents of the Khilafat movement, which catalyzed a significant shift in the subjective identity of Indian Muslims. Firstly, it delves into the institutional dynamics that orchestrated a populace predisposed towards resistance against British colonial rule. Secondly, it analyzes the entities opposing the Khilafat order, including the colonial administration, Hindu counterparts, and Muslim orientalists. Lastly, it explores the conceptualization of the Khilafat movement as a set of counter-discourses aimed at contesting the prevailing colonial hegemony, thereby enabling the construction of alternative subjectivities. The conclusion synthesizes the research findings regarding the application of hierarchical theory in the depiction of the Ottoman order within the context of Indian Muslim resistance against British colonial hegemony. It contributes a new perspective to the discourse on international order literature by suggesting that a declining hegemonic power can effectively influence its subordinates to undermine an alternative order. The Indian Muslim’s allegiance to the Ottoman order reveals a nuanced understanding that resistance needs an order, thereby expanding existing scholarly contribution on hierarchy literature understanding the ‘resistant-oriented hierarchy’.
19
CHAPTER 1: THEORY
The Ottoman Empire, which had once been a powerful Muslim order, had been in decline since the late eighteenth century, the Empire had lost significant territory to European powers, and its economy was struggling. The Ottomans’ authority over their subordinates in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe was also weakening, and there were many challenges to their rule. Despite this depressing picture, the declining Ottoman order during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century indeed presents an intriguing puzzle, particularly in the context of how Muslims from geographically distant territories behaved within the declining Ottoman order. During this period, Indian Muslim’s approach to the waning Ottoman order provides an interesting puzzle for fashioning international hierarchical order.1
Regarding Indian Muslims, the shift towards the Ottoman Khilafat was primarily due to the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1858, which caused a significant disruption in the Muslim’s political hegemony in India, and created a void in the Muslim’s religious order.2 The absence of a centralized politico-religious authority for Muslims within the colonial power structure created a sense of insecurity among the Indian Muslim community. In such circumstances, the concept of the Ottoman Khilafat gained popularity among them. Moreover, Indian Muslim’s acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat as a counter-authority against the colonial order was the result of several interrelated factors. The first factor was the desire of Indian Muslims to reinvigorate their power in India. Pursuing that, they chose an ‘alternative order’ by which they wished to delegitimize the colonial power over India. Muslim move to the Ottoman Khilafat was motivated by the belief that the Ottoman Khilafat provided them with a sense of global
1 In this study, I aim to investigate the subordination of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman order within the framework of international hierarchy. Despite the existence of several renowned research works focusing on imperial cases in the context of international hierarchy, the Ottoman international order has received little attention. Therefore, I aim to explore the late Ottoman hierarchal order while focusing on the Indian Muslim case, where they embraced this order as a means of resistance against the British colonial rule in India. Moreover, the ‘imperial cases’ fashioning of the international hierarchy significantly increased in recent decades. For example, Balcı, “Algeria”, pp. 375-393., Lemke Tobias et al., “Forum: doing historical international relation”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 36/ 1 (2022), 3-34., Ayşe Zarakol (ed.), Hierarchies in World Politics (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017). David C Kang, East Asia before the West, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). David C Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations”, International Security 28/3 (Winter 2003-2004), 165-180.
2 Manjeet S Pardesi, “Mughal Hegemony and the Emergence of South Asia as a “Region” for Regional Order-building”, European Journal of International Relations 25/1 (2019), 276-301.
20
Muslim unity and a powerful symbol of Muslim leadership. Therefore, in the early twentieth century, the emergence of Pan-Islamism, which aimed to unite Muslims worldwide under the banner of Islam, and the desire to promote Muslim unity in the face of colonial rule, played a significant role in this shift.3
The second factor was the colonial ‘exploitation, oppression, and dominance’, which made Indian Muslims resistive to the existing colonial order. The colonial policies, such as the ‘divide-and-rule’ and the ‘inequitable treatment’ towards the Muslims, fueled resentment and anger among the Muslim community.4 In terms of which Muslims found the Ottoman order as an alternative and a counter-authority lay in its ability to provide a sense of solidarity and collective resistance against colonial tyranny.
The third factor was the construction of an ‘alternative Muslim subjectivities’. Before that, ‘Aligarh Movement’5 and the ‘Deoband Movement’ played a dominating role in
3 Conor Meleady, “Negotiating the caliphate: British responses to pan-Islamic appeals, 1914-1924”, Middle Eastern Studies 52/2 (2016), 182-197. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam Ideology and Organization (UK: Clarendon Press, 1990), 10.
4 From the very inception of the colonial establishment in India, the British introduced the ‘Divide and Rule Policy’ with the objective of maintaining their control over the Indian politics. This policy involved creating divisions among the Indian populace by exploiting differences in their religion, culture, and language, and pitting them against each other. The application of this policy was twofold: firstly, to destroy communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims, and secondly, to promote Hinduism to suppress Muslim dominance over India. The British implemented this policy in a strategic manner, with the aim of strengthening their control over India. One such example was the ‘partition of Bengal’ in 1905 that was intended to create two separate administrative units, with the predominantly Muslim eastern region being separated from the Hindu-majority western region. The British saw this as an opportunity to weaken the nationalist movement and suppress the growing demands for self-rule by dividing the Bengali-speaking population along religious lines. Furthermore, the promotion of Hinduism was a conscious strategy employed by the British to counter Muslim dominance in India. The British encouraged the Hindu community to take pride in their cultural and religious identity and to assert their dominance over the Muslim population. This was achieved by promoting Hinduism in various spheres of life, including education, religion, and politics. The promotion of Hinduism by the British was aimed at breaking the Muslim unity and weakening their position in Indian society. Nile Stewart, “Divide and Rule: British Policy in Indian History”, Science and Society 15/1 (1951), 49-57. Amar Farooqui, “Divide and Rule? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Centruy Colonial India”, Social Scientist 43/3-4 (2015), 49-59. Andrew Phillips, “Making Empires: Hierarchy, Conquest and Customization” Hierarchies in World Politics, auth. Ayşe Zarakol (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 43-65.
5 The Aligarh Movement, spearheaded by Syed Ahmad Khan, represents a significant Muslim reform movement that sought to revitalize and modernize Indian Muslim society through a synthesis of Islamic and western values. This initiative aimed to create a modern Muslim community that could actively engage with the rapidly changing social, political, and economic landscape of India in the nineteenth century. The Aligarh Movement played a crucial role in shaping the intellectual and cultural ethos of the Indian Muslim community and served as a catalyst for the emergence of a new class of educated and empowered Muslims who actively participated in the country’s political and social spheres. Tariq Hasan, The Aligarh Movement and the Making of the Indian Muslim Mind 1857-2002 (New Delhi: Rupa Publication, 2006).
21
constructing a modern Muslim identity in India.6 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Muslim acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat as ‘a counter-authority’ was a similar way to construct a ‘new Muslim subjectivity’ that could transcend the divisions and limitations among the Indian Muslims imposed by colonialism. Such construction of an alternative Muslim identity centering the Ottoman Khilafat allowed them to assert their cultural and religious identity through assimilation efforts for unity and strength to delegitimize the colonial entities in India.
As a coronary of these reasoning, this research aims to investigate the Ottoman Empire’s hierarchical order, particularly the Khilafat’s role in creating subordinate entities in South Asia. The study seeks to contribute to the literature on hierarchical order studies in four main ways. Firstly, it delves into the ‘integration of the Ottoman Empire in hierarchy studies,’ portraying the late Ottoman order, focusing on how Indian Muslim resistance projected this order against British rule. Secondly, it investigates the ‘role of subordinates in both constructing and deconstructing orders’. Rather than solely focusing on how dominant actors organize weaker entities, this approach considers how subordinates actively shaped hierarchical orders for their own legitimacy. It examines how Indian Muslims, through their subordination to the Ottoman Khilafat, used the Ottoman order in their struggle to dismantle the existing colonial order. This perspective offers a nuanced understanding of hierarchy dynamics, highlighting how subordinate entities navigate and contest their positions within hierarchical orders to challenge existing structures.
Thirdly, the study examines the concept that ‘decline is not an obstacle but an order builder,’ exploring how a declining order can still serve as a cohesive force among its subordinates. By analyzing Indian Muslims’ subordination to the declining Ottoman hegemony and their continued allegiance amidst its shattering, this research sheds light on the dynamics between dominant and subordinate entities within hierarchical orders
6 The Deoband Movement was a religious reform movement centered on the ‘Darul Ulum Deoband’, a religious seminary established in 1866, which became a hub of Islamic scholarship and activism that aimed to promote the upholding of Islamic religious identity in shaping modern Indian Muslim subjectivity. This movement differed significantly from the Aligarh Movement in terms of its reformist attitude. The Deoband Movement rejected colonial modernization and instead sought to revive Muslim society in India by upholding Islamic civilizational dignity. The Deoband Movement can be understood by its proponents sought to revive and strengthen Muslim identity by emphasizing Islamic traditions, teachings, and practices. Kenneth W. Jones, The New Cambridge History of India, Vol.3, Socio-Religious Reform Movement in British India (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 57-62.
22
form a new perspective. Lastly, the study addresses ‘non-material connections between ‘subordinate and leading entities’, highlighting the absence of direct material connections between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire. While some scholars argue that material connectivity is essential for a hierarchical order, this study, influenced by Spruyt7 and Zarakol’s8 perspective, emphasizes the significance of identity over material ties. Thus, the subordination of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman order is viewed as primarily as a response to an emergent necessity for resistance ‘functionality in Khilafat order discourse’ against the prevailing colonial hegemony, surpassing mere material connections. This research endeavors to elucidate the dynamics of Indian Muslim subordination to the Ottoman order through a meticulous examination rooted in order-oriented studies.
1.1. Re-reading Hierarchy
Hierarchy is a growing branch and one of the key contemporary International Relations theories that focuses on the relationships between dominant and subordinate entities. This theoretical framework illuminates the intricate interplay of power dynamics within the international system, particularly emphasizing the asymmetrical relationship between dominant and subordinate states. It elucidates how dominant states wield their superior capabilities to assert and perpetuate a hierarchical order, thereby exercising influence and control over weaker states. This conceptual lens underscores the mechanisms through which dominant states establish and maintain their order, encompassing various dimensions such as economic, military, and diplomatic prowess.9 Through meticulous analysis, this theory seeks to elucidate the complexities of hegemonic power dynamics and their ramifications on the global political landscape. Moreover, the present dominant hierarchy literature focuses the discourses of inter-state interest in fashioning hierarchial order. Therefore, the theory of hierarchy also provides insights into the behavior of subordinate entities and how they respond to dominant orders but some cases insight the feckless of the subordinates in introducing
7 Hendrik, The World Imagined.
8 Zarakol, Before the West.
9 David A. Lake, Hierarchy, 10. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 139.
23
independent policies in case of national securities, economic and foreign policy issues.10 This does not mean that subordinates are necessarily ‘feckless’ or incapable of introducing independent policies. In fact, in some extends, subordinates may be able to use their own expertise, networks, and resources to influence the decision-making process and advocate for alternative policies. The subordination of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman order presents a different deliberation of international order studies, wherein subordinates assume a central role in order construction. This dynamic, termed ‘subordinate-centric order construction,’ elucidates how Indian Muslims deliberately fashioned the Khilafat order to legitimize their resistance against colonial hegemony. This perspective demonstrates how an order can be constructed without explicit demands from subordinates or directives from the leading entity. It delves into the construction of order within Muslim resistance, noting that the Ottoman ruling elite was likely unaware of this emergent order in India, as Istanbul was busy with its domestic affairs, and its focus was primarily on the Tripolitanian, Balkan, and First World Wars. Therefore, the construction of the Khilafat order in India occurred without any negotiation between subordinates and the led entity, while the dominating studies focus on the ‘negatioation aspect of order construction’. This perspective on hierarchy literature suggests that subordinate entities can be instrumental in fashioning an alternative order through their resistance against the prevailing order system. Departing from conventional perspectives wherein the led actor is typically viewed as functionally passive, this paradigm contends that it is the subordinate entity that is more functional in order construction.
10 Considering the dominant discourse of the order, the subordinates certainly lose their decision-making status. For instance, Saudi Arabia failed to conduct independent foreign relations with Iraq and other Gulf States during the gulf war of 1990, when they called the USA to deploy US forces. In the war, the USA became the led actor in the foreign policy decision-making of Saudi Arabia. Lake, Hierarchy, 55.
24
Actors Involved
Central Actor
Hierarchy
Subordinate Entities
Led-1
Colonial Hierarchy in India
British colonial power, which exercised political, economic, and military control over India since 1757.
British at the top, controlling Indian political, economic, and social structures.
Indian natives including Muslims were often considered subordinate entities under British colonial rule, facing discrimination and marginalization in various aspects of life.
Led-2
Ottoman Hierarchy in India
Ottoman Empire, which had diplomatic, cultural, and religious ties with Indian Muslim communities.
Ottoman Sultan/Khalifa at the top, representing Islamic authority
Indian Muslims, viewing the Ottoman Khalifa as a political hegemony and order building-entity.
Table 1: The Complexities of Dual Hierarchies among Indian Muslims Source: Created by the Author. The figures presented here underscore how Indian Muslims navigated the complexities of dual hierarchies during the colonial period: one imposed by the British colonial system and the other rooted in their allegiance to the Ottoman Khalifa. Muslim community was not happy to accept their subordination under the colonial order mostly because of the colonial exploitation and the decay of Muslim political dominance over India. This dissatisfaction led them to seek an alternative order, aligning them with the Ottoman Khalifa to challenge and undermine colonial hegemony in India. Moreover, the construction of an alternative order by Muslims within the colonial power structure presents a compelling puzzle: how subordinates embedded within an existing hegemonic order actively contributed to the formation of another order to undermine the prevailing hegemony.
Hierarchy studies refer to the unequal distribution of power and authority among states. This can manifest in various ways, such as through economic or military dominance, cultural influence or political leverage. In this way, the dominant states may use their power to impose their preferences and values on weaker states, which may then be expected to comply with certain demands or provide certain services in exchange for benefits such as security guarantees or economic aid. This can create a dynamics of
25
dependence, where weaker states rely on the dominant state for support and protection, but may also feel constrained in their ability to pursue their own interest and priorities. At the same time, the dominant state may face challenges in maintaining its position of power, as other states may seek to challenge or undermine its authority.11
Moreover, hierarchy studies focuse strategies how the dominant states make weaker states subordinate to its own order or examine the cases of subordination of the weak countries to a hierarchical order in the avenues of modern state phenomenon.12 Indeed, hierarchy plays a significant role in shaping the international system and determining the distribution of power among states. In this context, hierarchy studies may also look at how the concept of the state itself has been used to reinforce dominant power structures. For example, some scholars have argued that the modern state system was established as a way for powerful states to maintain control over weaker ones, and that this system continues to shape global politics today.13 Thus the study of hierarchy in international relations is concerned with understanding ‘power dynamics’ in the international system and the strategies that states use to establish and maintain their position of dominance.14
Despite this modern state phenomenon, the hierarchy approach in international relations theory has opened an opportunity to explore the historical antecedents in the mainstream IR research. This is mainly due to the influence of the English School, who argued a liberal realism approach to studying world politics that emphasizes the importance of international society and the normative framework of world order.15 The investigation of the scholars associated with this school has led to a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of international relations, prompting scholars to explore the relationships among polities, for example, empires and tributary states, as well as other forms of
11 Ali Balcı-Furkan Halit Yolcu, “The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from the US-Led Order?” Foreign Policy Analysis 19/1 (2023) orac026.
12 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977). Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
13 Charles A Kupchan, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana”, Security Studies 23/2 (2014), 219-57.
14 David Campbell, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p.2.
15 Adam Watson-Hedley Bull, “States System and International Societies”, Review of International Studies 13/2 (1987), 147-153. Adam Watson, “System of States”, Review of International Studies 16/2 (1990), 99-109.
26
political organization beyond the Westphalia system.16 Their arguments prove that the Westphalia system is not the only way to understand international relations and that empire and tributary states have played significant roles in world politics throughout history. This was so because other polities paid tribute under the imperial power structure in exchange for protection and other benefits. We can justify their relationship through the lenses of hierarchical power structures and a shared system of norms and values. Therefore, there has been a growing interest among scholars in the ‘historical IR’.17 One key aspect of this branch of IR is the evaluation of imperial orders, which have significant implications for international relations, as they often shape states’ power dynamics and interactions.18 By analyzing imperial orders through the frames of IR theory, scholars can gain insights into the motivations and strategies of past empires, as well as the impact of these orders on the global political landscape. By examining historical cases, the hierarchy approach provides a broader perspective on international relations, allowing scholars to understand how historical legacies continue to shape contemporary politics and how historical perspective provides a deeper understanding of the power dynamics between dominant and weaker states, and how these dynamics have evolved over time.
As the corollary of this reasoning, the hierarchy approach challenges the notion of Western-centric narratives in understanding international relations and encourages scholars to adopt a more inclusive and diverse perspective that examines non-Western historical cases and brings the imperial orders in the mainstream IR research.19 Our research focuses on a non-Western historical case, specifically examining the Indian Muslim resistance that employed the Ottoman order against British colonial rule. This case serves as a compelling example for understanding the dynamics of the late Ottoman international hierarchy. Despite the decline of the Ottoman Empire as a hegemonic power, Indian Muslims embraced the Khilafat order and incorporated it into their resistance discourse against the prevailing colonial hegemony. The most intriguing aspect of this order construction is the role of the subordinates as the principal architects
16 Balkan Devlen et al., “The English School, International Relations, and Progress”, International Studies Review 7/2 (2005), 171-197.
17 Benjamin de Carvalho et al. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations (UK: Taylor and Francis, 2021).
18 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), 84-88.
19 Ali Balcı, “Bringing the Ottoman Order Back”, 2090-2107.
27
in constructing, projecting, and elevating the Ottoman order within their resistance framework. Notably, the Ottoman center played no active role in the emergence of this order in India. Through this lens, our study aims to elucidate the dynamics by which subordinate entities contribute to the construction and sustenance of an international hierarchical order, even in the context of a declining hegemony.
1.1.1. Non-Western Historical Case and Indian Muslim Subordination to the Ottoman Order
In recent decades, scholars have increasingly explored non-Western historical cases through the lens of hierarchy-oriented studies.20 This approach involves examining the power dynamics and relationships between different actors within a given historical context, such as empires or kingdoms. One of the key criticisms of this approach is that dominant discourses often attribute agency and importance to the lead actors or the rulers of a particular empire, while the subordinate actors are overlooked or under-discussed hierarchical order studies. However, recent studies have sought to address this issue by exploring the importance of subordinate actors in shaping the power dynamics and hierarchy within an imperial order. In that respect, one of the key arguments is made by Balcı, who explored how the subordinate entities play a crucial role in shaping and perpetuating imperial orders.21 By focusing on the importance of subordinate actors, scholars are able to develop a more nuanced understanding of hierarchy and power relations within non-Western imperial orders. This can help to challenge dominant discourses and to draw attention to the contributions of subordinates in hierarchy oriented literature that have traditionally been overlooked in scholarly narratives.
Despite the increasing trends in imperial hierarchy research, in the recent decade, Chinese imperial order has got primary focus.22 While other enriched non-Western imperial orders, such as the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empire (three Islamic
20 Balcı “Algeria”, 375-393., Kang, East Asia. Phillips-Sharman, International Order in Diversity. Seo-Hyun Park, Sovereignty and Status in East Asian International Relations (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Pardesi, “Region, Syaytem, and Order”, 249-78., Zarakol (ed.), Hierarchy. Zarakol, Before the West.
21 Ali Balcı, “When Hierarchy Shattered: Turkey’s Post-2013 Crisis with the US-led Order,” (TÜBİTAK: August 2019) 118K413.
22 David C Kang et al., “War, rebellion, and intervention under hierarchy: Vietnam-China relation, 1365 to 1841” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63/4 (2018), 896-922. Ji-Young Lee, China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). Goh, The Struggle for Order. Freg Zhang, Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).
28
empires) have been relatively neglected.23 Our study on India Muslim’s subordination towards the Ottoman order can bring the late Ottoman hierarchal order in a study of non-Western case that may open up a new avenue for IR research and may enrich our understanding of the diversity of imperial orders in history.
The study on the Indian Muslim as subordinate and the Ottoman Empire as the lead actor of order during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is a suitable imperial case for hierarchy studies, because it can facilitate an understanding of the role of subordinate actors in the pursuit of hierarchy. By studying this, we can gain insights into how subordinate actors operate within a hierarchical system and how they contribute to the endurance of the hierarchical order. This study examines Indian Muslim subordination with the Ottoman order that involves analyzing the relationship between a dominant power ‘the Ottoman Empire’ and a subordinate ‘the Indian Muslim community’ within a hierarchical system.
This case is interesting because the Indian Muslim community found themselves aligned with a declining hierarchical order while typically hierarchical systems portray the dominant state as being more powerful in all aspects of power.24 But in our case the dominant authority is declining in which the Indian Muslims as subordinate entities decided to join within a dying hierarchical authority. This phenomenon offers insights into why certain subordinates persist with declining hierarchical orders, providing a valuable understanding of the dynamics of hierarchical systems and the factors that influence the behavior of subordinate actors within such orders. By examining the Indian Muslim community’s preferences to remain within the declining Ottoman order, we could explore the complex interplay of factors that shape the behavior of subordinates in hierarchical systems and how their actions contributed to the endurance of the hierarchical order that could provide a nuanced understanding of the roles played by different actors in sustaining hierarchical orders. Therefore, this research underscores the significance of examining ‘subordinate-oriented hierarchical order’, providing a nuanced understanding of the active role played by subordinates in sustaining hierarchical orders. It delves into a novel dimension,
23 Houssine Alloul-Darina Martykanova, ‘Introduction: Charting New Ground in the Study of Ottoman Foreign Relations’ The International History Review 43/5 (2021), 1018-1040.
24 Campbell, Writing Security. Lake, Hierarchy.
29
where, amidst the disruption or decline of hierarchies, subordinates actively contribute to the emergence and maintenance of hierarchical orders as emerging one.
This thesis proposes three dynamics to explain why Indian Muslim subordinates may feel comfortable sticking with the falling Ottoman patron, despite the patron’s laxity in terms of power and economy. The first dynamic, ‘resistance necessitates an order’, examines how Indian Muslim resistance constructed the Ottoman order to unite diverse Muslim entities under a common order to delegitimize British colonial rule. The phenomenon of the Khilafat generated a shared platform for Muslims, who were otherwise divided by sectarian differences due to colonial influence and their own religious affiliations. The Khilafat order fostered a sense of solidarity among Muslims against British rule, creating a cohesive front in their resistance efforts. The second dynamic explores ‘subordinate-centric order construction’, distinguishing itself from dominant order literature that emphasizes the role of led entities in constructing order. Our study specifically examines functionality of Indian Muslim subordinates in order construction by investigating how Indian Muslim subordinates actively constructed, promoted, and projected the Ottoman order to legitimize their resistance against British colonial rule. The third dynamic involves the ‘subordinate’s projection of order for domestic political legitimacy’. This refers to a situation where Indian Muslims projected the Khilafat order to legitimize their political existence in the colonial power structure. By emphasizing the authority of the Ottoman patron, they sought to enhance their power and dominance within the domestic political landscape. As a result of these dynamics, this thesis suggests that subordinates are the primary architects in the construction of order, shaping it as a means of resistance against the dominant colonial hegemony in India.
1.1.2. Secluded Subordinate, Hierarchy and Declining Hegemony
Though the existing hierarchy literature predominantly explains the dominance of hegemonial powers in fashioning hierarchy and how they create, maintain and protect subordinates.25 The behavior of a subordinate sitting in the distant geographical boundary towards a declining hierarchy is quite unexplored. This is so because this research put forward a venture to investigate why some subordinates of the distant
25 John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China and Middle State Strategies in East Asia”, Political Science Quarterly 131/ 1 (2016), 9-43.
30
geographical boundaries stick to the falling patron. In that respect, the cases of Indian Muslims under the aegis of the Ottoman hierarchical order is a suitable and rich case for hierarchy studies for two reasons. Firstly, the concept of the ‘declining order functioning as an order center’ explores how a declining hegemon can still serve as a source of order for its subordinates. Despite the Ottoman Empire’s near-collapse in the early twentieth century, marked by significant challenges such as Western aggression in Tripoli, the Balkan Wars, and World War I, its subordinates in the Middle East and Africa sought independence from Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, this dire situation did not hinder the emergence of the Ottoman order within its subordinate entities beyond its geographical border. Indian Muslims, in particular, projected the Khilafat order in their resistance against the prevailing colonial order, demonstrating the continued relevance of the Ottoman order despite its weakening position. Therefore, Indian Muslim acceptance of the Ottoman order offers a novel perspective on order studies by elucidating how a declining hegemon can still function as a source of order within international hierarchies. It elucidates the mechanisms through which a weakening authority can exert influence over subordinate entities, signifying the non-material dimensions of hierarchical order. Secondly, the Indian Muslim case offers a valuable opportunity to examine the dynamics of power relations within a context where the hegemon is in decline, and subordinates are situated within a rival order. This case addresses a significant puzzle in order studies: the notion that being situated within a rival order does not preclude the acceptance of another order. Indian Muslims, living under the colonial power structure, embraced the Ottoman order, demonstrating that a subordinate entity can accept an alternative order to delegitimize the prevailing power structure. The British solidified their hegemonic control over India with the occupation of Delhi in 1857, effectively terminating Muslim dominance in the region.26 The Muslim population in India, unwilling to accept British rule, faced relentless colonial tyranny, exploitation, and suppression. These oppressive conditions compelled them to seek an alternative authority to challenge and delegitimize the colonial regime. Despite the formidable obstacles imposed by the British colonial power structure, Indian Muslims embraced the
26 Amar Farooqui, ‘Sanitizing Indigenous Memory 1857 and Mughal Exile’, The Great Rebellion of 1857 in India Exploring Transgressions Contests and Diversities, Auth. Biswamoy Pali (UK: Routledge, 2010), 146-160.
31
Khilafat order to undermine British rule. This phenomenon elucidates the nuanced understanding that the desire to delegitimize an existing power structure can drive subordinates to align with an external order, thus navigating and overcoming the constraints imposed by the dominant hegemon. As a corollary of this reasoning, the Indian Muslim subordination to the Ottoman order presents a compelling case study for understanding the dynamics of order within a historical context, elucidated through several interrelated factors. Firstly, the decline of a hegemonic power does not necessarily signify its end but can instead become a catalyst for the emergence of new orders. The Ottoman Empire, despite its waning influence, retained the capacity to exert significant influence over its Indian Muslim subordinate entities. This phenomenon illustrates how a declining hegemonic power can continue to shape and influence subordinate actors, thereby contributing to the construction of an alternative order.
Secondly, subordinates embedded within a rival hierarchy can reconfigure their allegiance within another order to resist the prevailing power structure. Indian Muslims, under the British colonial order, demonstrated a pronounced willingness to accept an external order to undermine and delegitimize colonial rule. This reconfiguration highlights the strategic agency of subordinates in navigating and challenging existing hierarchies by aligning with alternative sources of authority.
Thirdly, an order can emerge and be sustained beyond the realm of material connectivity. The Ottoman Empire, despite lacking material assistance for the Indian Muslim resistance movement against British colonial power, became an order-building entity of the Muslim resistance. Therefore, Indian Muslims exhibited unwavering allegiance to the declining Ottoman Empire, a loyalty that persisted until the empire's collapse in 1924. This enduring commitment underscores the potency of non-meterial connections in the construction and maintenance of order, independent of material support. These factors collectively provide a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of order, illustrating how a declining hegemonic power can still exert influence, how subordinates can strategically navigate rival hierarchies, and how non-material connections can sustain allegiance and order construction.
32
1.1.3. How Subordinate Fashioned a Hierarchical Order
David A. Lake argued that the dominant states provide order in many ways for their subordinates27, but the case of Indian Muslim’s subordination towards the Ottoman Khilafat is different as they stacked with a falling order; rather, Indian Muslims worked as the led actor to protect and uphold the Ottoman order in existence. This is so because, it provides a new narrative, while subordinates construct and fashion the hierarchy. We posit this phenomenon as ‘subordinate oriented hierarchy’. Indian Muslims constructed the Ottoman order for their own need and the rationale behind this subordination is multifaceted. Firstly, the concept of ‘Khilafat order for a new subjective identity’ delves into the impact of Khilafat in shaping a novel Muslim subjectivity. This paradigm shift aimed to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule in India by embracing the Ottoman Khilafat as the preeminent political authority for Muslims, thereby asserting their political hegemony within the Indian context. Secondly, ‘quest for a common order in the disintegrated paradigm’; in the discourse surrounding the decline of the Muslim order in 1858 and the subsequent emergence of a new colonial order in India, it is noted that Muslim society underwent a process of disintegration into various sectarian classes and creeds. However, by the 1910s, the Khilafat order provided a unifying framework that brought these disparate elements together in their resistance against British imperialism. This new order facilitated the consolidation of the Muslim community onto a common platform for their collective resistance. Thirdly, the ‘oppressive nature of colonial rule’ spurred the Muslim community to to seek an alternative order. This search for an alternative was driven by the desire to counteract Western hegemony and validate their presence in India and Indian independence.
Indian Muslim subordination to the Ottoman order is intriguing because, as subordinates, they had no requirements or demands to the led order, the Ottoman Empire. Conversely, the Porte also had no influence or role in constructing their order in India. Despite these factors, Indian Muslims actively constructed the Ottoman order to serve their own needs, particularly in the context of resisting colonial rule; it explores the ‘bottom-up exposition of Khilafat order’.
27 Lake, Hierarchy, 99.
33
By framing the Khilafat as a unifying force, Indian Muslim leaders were able to bring diverse Muslim communities together under a single narrative of resistance. Muslims endeavored to project the Ottoman order as a nucleus in their resistance efforts, seizing upon instances of Western aggression in Tripoli and the Balkans as opportunities to enhance its appeal among the populace. These events provided a platform for Muslim demonstrations against Western interventions in Muslim territories and underscored the necessity for Indian Muslims to reaffirm their connectivity with the broader Muslim world. Therefor, the challenges faced by the Ottoman Empire prompted Indian Muslims to reevaluate and reinforce their position within the colonial power structure. Moreover, to popularize the Ottoman order, Muslim newspapers played a crucial role by publishing pro-Ottoman news, which helped create a soft power of the Khilafat order among Muslim intellectuals and the literate population.
Additionally, Muslim organizations worked to institutionalize the Ottoman order, further promoting it among the masses through various activities and initiatives. This strategic effort to project and institutionalize the Ottoman order demonstrates how Indian Muslim subordinates actively contributed to constructing and promoting their own order within the colonial context. Moreover, demonstrations against Western aggression in Ottoman territories, fundraising initiatives for the Ottoman cause, and the boycott of Western goods in the Indian market significantly bolstered the Muslim resistance narrative against British colonial rule.
Indian Muslims not only mobilized material support to sustain their hierarchical authority during the Balkan Wars but also cautioned the Ottoman administration in Istanbul to maintain neutrality or avoid alliance against the British in World War I. This dynamic underscores the supportive policies of subordinate entities towards a declining hegemon. Therefore, following World War I, when the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire seemed imminent, Indian Muslims remained steadfast in their allegiance to the faltering hegemon. They actively campaigned for the preservation of the Khilafat, urging the British government to maintain its integrity and desist from actions that would lead to its dissolution. This phenomenon illustrates the complex relationship between subordinates and their declining hegemonic authority, reflecting a strategic choice to remain with the declining Ottoman Khilafat in the face of colonial domination.
34
1.2. Understanding the Ottoman Hierarchy During the early modern period, the “Devlet-i-Aliye Osmaniye”, or the Ottoman Empire attained the zenith of its glory and prosperity, establishing itself as one of the most powerful and influential empires in the world.28 The empire expanded its territorial reach across three continents, encompassing vast stretches of land and water from Hungary in Europe to Algeria in Africa, and from the Persian Gulf in the east to Ethiopia in the south. This broad geopolitical expanse granted the Ottoman Empire at a central position in global trade and economy, thereby providing them with political dominance and the ability to fashion a hierarchal order among their subordinate within the Ottoman geography and beyond its borders. This expansive reach enabled the empire to exercise significant influence in the wider Afro-Eurasian world, bolstering their economic and political power. As a coronary of these reasoning, we consider the early sixteenth century is a pivotal period in strengthening the Ottoman order in the global context focusing three significant factors. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire emerged as a potent rival against the Portuguese for dominance over global trade routes by extending their naval power beyond the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Indian Ocean.29 Moreover, Ottoman’s victory over the Safavids30 and their subsequent control over the Red Sea and Persian Gulf provided the empire with an opportunity to dominate the trade routes between East and West. Secondly, the Ottoman Empire’s annexation of the Islamic Khilafat in 1517, coupled with its significant presence in the religiously significant sites, led to the empire’s rise to prominence. The empire’s unique characteristic of accommodating three monotheistic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, further reinforced its cosmopolitan and syncretistic nature
28 Einar Wigen conducted a critical analysis of the Ottoman notions of state and empire. In his analysis, he highlighted the term ‘Devlet-i-Aliyye-i-Osmaniye’ to refer the Ottoman State and Empire and how the Ottoman rulers expanded their domination over the world during the sixteenth century. For details, Einar Wigen, “Ottoman Concept of Empire”, Contribution to the History of Concepts 8/1 (2013), 44-66.
29 Kaya Şahin, Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 27.
30 Filiz Çağman-Zeren Tanindi, “Remarks on Some Manuscripts from the Topkapi Palace Treasury in the Context of Ottoman-Safavid Relations”, Muqarnas 13 (1996), 132-148.
35
which was a product of the inclusion of diverse ethnic and political entities under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire.31
The cosmopolitan nature of the empire, allowed for a degree of local autonomy and flexibility in terms of religious and administrative practices. Thirdly, the Ottoman Empire possessed a robust and centralized administrative apparatus that enabled them to establish a hierarchical structure within various entities in Ottoman geography and beyond its border. Balcı and Kardaş’s investigation reveals that the flexible and relatively independent status of peripheral polity played a crucial role in both the survival of the Ottoman Empire and the functioning of its international system.32 Over the subsequent century following its establishment in the late thirteenth century, the Ottoman Empire expanded its territories through a combination of conquest and diplomacy. At its zenith, the empire encompassed vast regions across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Beyond these borders, the Ottoman Empire exerted considerable influence in diverse regions, notably within the Indian Oceanic sphere; for instance, the empire maintained its order with numerous subordinate entities, including Southern and Coastal India, Ache in Indonesia, and Maldives.33 Similarly, the Ottoman Empire maintained subordinates in Europe, including the Habsburgs, the Venetians, and Poland.34 Like this, Ottoman had their subordinates in “Maghrib” (North Africa) and Sub-Sahara Africa.35 These territories served as important partners for the Ottomans, helping them to expand their political, economic, and military influence beyond their immediate region of influence.
1.2.1. Order Building Entity and Ottoman Hierarchy
The Ottoman Empire had a complex hierarchal system in their state construction that was based on both political and religious factors. At the top of the Empire was the
31 Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model”, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 19/1-2 (2005), 5-19. Hüseyin Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined the Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 1-4.
32 Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş, “The Ottoman International System: Power Projection, Interconnectedness, and the Autonomy of Frontier Politics”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 51/ 3 (2023), 1-26.
33 İsmail Hakkı Kadı, “An Old Ally Revisited: Diplomatic Interactions Between the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan of Ache in the Face of Dutch Colonial Expansion”, The International History review 43/5 (2021) 1080-1097.
34 Palmira Brummett, Mapping the Ottomans (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 78-79.
35 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Imparatorluğun̓un Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1974), P.76.
36
sultan, who was both the political and religious leader of the empire. Below the sultan were various levels of bureaucrats, military commanders, and religious leaders, each with their own degree of power and authority.36 The Ottoman hierarchy provided a certain level of protection for its subordinates, particularly those who were loyal to the empire and its rulers. Local rulers were allowed to retain some degree of autonomy as long as they paid tribute to the central government and remained loyal to the Sultan. This system allowed the Ottomans to expand their empire without having to govern every region directly, which made it easier to manage and control. In addition, the Ottomans were skilled at forming strategic alliances with peripheral regions, such as the Crimean Khanate, to help protect their borders and extend their influence.37
As an order builder, the Ottoman Empire had its ability to build alliances with the neighboring powers; the alliances were often based on mutual interests, such as trade, military protection, or religious affiliation along with ensures security for its subordinates under its rule. The Ottoman Empire’s central authority maintained its alliances with subordinate entities through diplomacy and negotiation, thereby promoting security and autonomy and avoiding unnecessary conflict. Such a relationship with the subordinate entities gave the empire the strength to project its power to the contemporary powers, for example, the Hapsburgs38 and Safavids.39 This strategic alliance of the empire with the subordinate entities was built up in a frame system that promoted the empire in building alliances and ensuring security for its subordinates under Ottoman rule. Thus, we consider the empire’s hierarchal structure to its multifaceted approach, which incorporated ‘diplomatic negotiations’ and ‘strategic alliances’, as well as ‘military conquest’, as key components of its overall strategy and success.
36 AbdurRaman Atçıl, Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 49. Marinos Sariyanmis, “Ruler and State, State and Society in Ottoman Political Thought”, Turkish Historical Review 4 (2013), 92-126.
37 Natalia Krolikowaka, “Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations Sixteenth-Eighteenth Century”, The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, auth. Gabon Karman-Lovro Kunce Vic (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), 43-65.
38 Gabor Agoston, “Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defence, Military Change and Shifts in Power”, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 22/1 (1998), 126-141., Gabor Agoston, “Empires and warfare in east-central Europe, 1550-1750: the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation”, European Warfare 1350-1750, auth. Frank Tallet-D.J.B.Trim (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 110-134.
39 Zahit Atçil, “Warfare as a tool of Diplomacy: Background of the First Ottoman-Safavid Treaty in 1555”, Turkish Historical Review 10 (2019), 3-24.
37
During the Ottoman Empire’s classical period, (1300-1600 C.E.), a series of substantive reforms were implemented that solidified the empire’s central institutions, fostering a more stable political and social milieu. This period was marked by a concerted effort to establish a strong legal framework, promote cultural and intellectual pursuits, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative machinery. The state’s hierarchical structure played a pivotal role in ensuring effective governance over the expansive territories. Central institutions were instituted to uphold law and order and to oversee the administration of the provinces. The system of delegating authority to provincial governors was meticulously designed to balance power between the center and the periphery, thereby mitigating the potential rise of local strongmen.40 By the early 17th century, the empire had entered a period of decline, marked by political instability, economic stagnation, social unrest, institutional decay and a waning of centralized authority. It was during this time, the empire faced numerous challenges, including foreign invasions, internal rebellions, and a lack of visionary leadership. The empire’s vulnerability to external pressures was exposed, and its military capabilities declined, leading to territorial losses and the erosion of the state’s power. Moreover, during the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire experienced a significant power struggle between the Sultan and increasingly autonomous provincial governors, who often disregarded central authority. In response, the Sultan sought to curtail the governors’ absolute power and reassert control over the provinces. This led to the enhanced significance of the “Kadi” and the “Defterdar” within the provincial administration, as they functioned as direct representatives of the Sultan. Notably, the Kadi emerged as a local “Ayan”, wielding considerable influence over the administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order in the provinces.41 This transformation signified a pivotal shift in the power dynamics between the central authority and provincial entities, underscoring the intricate and multifaceted nature of Ottoman governance during the seventeenth century.
During the latter half of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the “Köprülüs” served as the grand “vizirs”. They implemented a rational policy aimed at protecting the
40 Cyril E. Black-L. Karl Brown (ed.), Modernization in the Middle East the Ottoman Empire and Its Afro-Asian Successors (INC, Princeton-New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1992), 217.
41 Robert Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, History Studies 3/3 (2011), 433-447.
38
Reaya, or the tax-paying subjects of the empire. This policy helped to restore stability and prosperity to the empire and solidify the central government’s control over its subordinate entities. Through a combination of administration, military, and fiscal reforms, the “Köprülüs” sought to strengthen the state’s capacity to maintain law and order, suppress rebellion and provide for the welfare of its subordinates.42 The success of this program was predicated upon a nuanced understanding of the complex and evolving socio-political dynamics of the empire, as well as a deft management of the tensions between centralization and perifary autonomy. However, throughout the eighteenth century, provincial notables did indeed become a consolidated and essential component of the state through both formal and informal contractual relations.
In many European countries during this century, the state was growing in power and influence, and needed to rely on local elites to help manage the affairs of the provinces. These local elites, often referred to as provincial notables, were typically wealthy landowners, merchants, or members of the clergy who held significant social and political influence in their local communities. To bring these provincial notables into the fold of the state, formal contracts and agreements were often established between the state and the notables. These contracts, known as ‘grands contrats’ or ‘pactes de gouvernance’, laid out the obligations of both parties and often included provisions for the notables to serve as local administrators, tax collectors, and representatives of the
42 The Köprülüs were a prominent family of statesmen in the Ottoman Empire during the latter half of the 17th and early 18th centuries. They produced four successive grand viziers who played significant roles in the empire’s history. The Köprülü family rose to prominence with Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, who became grand vizier in 1656. He initiated a series of reforms aimed at strengthening the central authority of the Ottoman Empire. One of his major achievements was the reorganization of the Ottoman military, known as the Nizam-ı Cedid. These reforms modernized and revitalized the army, making it more efficient and capable of dealing with external threats. Following Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's death in 1661, his son Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha succeeded him as grand vizier who continued his father’s policies and further consolidated the central authority of the empire. He implemented measures to curb corruption, reformed the financial system, and emphasized the importance of meritocracy in the bureaucracy. His younger brother, Köprülü Mustafa Pasha, became grand vizier in 1676. He continued the reforms initiated by his predecessors and sought to strengthen the empire both internally and externally. Mustafa Pasha is particularly known for his military campaigns against the Venetians and the Habsburgs, which resulted in significant territorial gains for the Ottoman Empire. The Köprülü family’s influence reached its peak with Köprülü Mehmed Pasha the Younger, who became grand vizier in 1689. He implemented further administrative and military reforms, including measures to combat corruption and improve governance in the provinces and subordinate regions. Mehmed Pasha also played a crucial role in the empire’s military successes, most notably during the Great Ottoman War against the Holy League (an alliance of European powers). We deem that the Köprülüs exercised significant power in the Ottoman Empire, both within the palace and in the subordinates. Their reforms helped to centralize authority, strengthen the empire’s military capabilities, and enhance governance. See also, Cumhur Bekar, “The Rise of the Köprülü Household: the Transformation of Patronage in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeen Century”, Turkish Historical Review 11/ 2-3 (2021), 229-256.
39
state.43 Similarly, such kind of formal contracts, informal relationships between the state and the provincial notables was developed in the Ottoman Empire during that time. The notables often had personal connections with members of the royal court or other influential figures in the state, which allowed them to exert their influence and secure favorable treatment for themselves and their communities. As a result of these formal and informal relationships, provincial notables became a consolidated and essential component of the state during the eighteenth century.44 They played a crucial role in maintaining social order and stability in their local communities, and helped to extend the reach of the state beyond the capital and into the provinces.
Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. Throughout its history, the empire was ruled by a system of government that combined secular and religious authority, with the Sultan serving as both the political and religious leader of the empire. As the empire was so vast, the provincial governments often operated with varying degrees of autonomy, depending on their relationship with the central authority. In situations where the central authority was weak or lacked influence, the provincial governments often took advantage of their autonomy by refusing to submit to the central authority or even initiating rebellions. In such cases, the Sultan employed military force to restore his authority or pursued diplomatic negotiations to legitimize Ottoman rule in the provinces and maintain stability within the empire.45
Therefore, the Ottoman hierarchical system was based on a series of interdependent relationships between different entities within the empire, ranging from the central government to the provinces, and from religious communities to individual households. The most significant aspect was the cosmopolitan nature of the Empire and its pluralist accommodation that allowed the subject population to maintain a hierarchal order. In that respect, we integrate the ‘Millet System’ of the Ottoman Empire under the aegis of the hierarchical oriented study, which was introduced in the sixteenth century with a philosophy to divide the population of the empire into distinct religious communities or millets and recognized the existence of different religious communities under a common Ottoman order. Each millet, or religious community, was granted a significant degree of
43 M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteen Century 1713-1739 (UK: Routledge, 2000) 24-30 & 103-113.
44 Jane Hathway, “Rewriting Eighteenth Century Ottoman History”, Mediterranean Historical Review 19/1(2004), 29-53.
45 Mesut Uyar-Edward J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottoman from Osman to Ataturk (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009), 53.
40
autonomy in matters of internal governance, including the administration of its own legal system and the collection of taxes which helped to maintain the social order and stability within the empire by giving the diverse populations a sense of belonging and identity. This autonomy was always subject to the ultimate authority of the Ottoman state, which retained the power to intervene in the affairs of any millet when necessary.46 This system was based on a series of interdependent relationships that reflected a clear hierarchy of authority and power, with the ultimate authority always resting with the Ottoman state. The hierarchical ordering of the Ottoman Empire was instrumental in enabling the empire to manage its vast territories and diverse populations, and it played a significant role in shaping the history and legacy of the Ottoman Empire.
1.2.2. Imperial Negotiation and Ottoman Hierarchy
Ottoman Empire was lasted for over six centuries. One of the reasons for its longevity was its ability to adapt and maintain a ‘flexible and negotiable’ power structure that allowed it to bargain with its subordinates. They maintained asymmetric relations in which center kept a flexible and negotiable relationship with the subordinate polities. The Empire was cosmopolitan in character due to its geographical extensiveness. Moreover, syncretistic and pluralist society of the empire gave space for the people of different race, ethnicity, culture and religious belief in the Ottoman state structure. It strengthened the Ottoman imperial order among different religious and ethnic entities. The imperial order maintained the supremacy of the center (Istanbul) which enjoyed and exercise the ultimate power and authority, while the periphery (the various regions and provinces) maintained a hierarchical chain in the local governance systems. Such an asymmetric relationship allowed the empire to provide and ensure for a certain degree of autonomy and self-governance in the subordinate regions.
Moreover, the Ottomans were able to conquer and control vast territories through a combination of superior military tactics and flexible diplomacy. In doing that, they showed skills at incorporating conquered peoples and territories into their empire, allowing them to maintain their distinct identities while they were pledging loyalty to the Ottoman central government. Ali Yaycioglu’s analysis highlights the complex and
46 Sener Akturk, “Persistance of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood”, Middle Eastern Studies 45/6 (2009), 893-909.
41
ever-shifting nature of the relationship between provincial elites and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.47 His arguments suggest that the interaction between provincial notables and the Ottoman Empire was characterized by a dynamic and uncertain environment in which both parties engaged in negotiations and transactions that lacked the security and stability provided by formal contacts. This situation created a unique set of challenges for subordinates who were required to balance their own interests and objectives with those of the empire while navigating a complex web of social and economic relationships. Furthermore, the absence of formal contact and legal protections meant that these subordinates were often to rely on personal connections, reputation, and influence to secure their positions and protect their assets.
Understanding the imperial negotiation with its subordinates, Karen Barkey’s conception of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘negotiated enterprise’ provides a useful framework. He underscores the Ottoman Empire’s ability to remain agile and responsive to shifting circumstances by adopting techniques that fostered adaptability. It reveals how the Ottoman administrative system, prior to the nineteenth century, facilitated the accommodation of differences while retaining a certain degree of authority through the utilization of a ‘hub-and-spoke’ model. This model connected the Ottoman subordinates vertically to the center of power, while lacking horizontal links between them.48 Barkey’s arguments characterize the Ottoman Empire as negotiated enterprise which was shaped by various political, economic, and social factors. We refer to the vertical relations of the imperial integration from direct and indirect ways in which the Ottoman center exercised its authority over the subordinate entities. This could involve the imposition of taxes, the collection of tribute, the enforcement of law and order, and the provision of public goods and services. At the same time, however, these relationships were not always straightforward, and there was often a great deal of negotiation involved in how they were implemented. The horizontal relations of segmentation, on the other hand, referred to the ways in which different subordinate entities of the empire interacted with one another. These relationships were often characterized by competition, conflict, and negotiation over resources, power, and
47 Ali Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire the Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 2-3.
48 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9.
42
influence. Moreover, the intriguing puzzle the ‘imperial negotiation’ provides a structural framework to understand the Ottoman hierarchical order among different subordinates highlights the complex and dynamic nature of imperial governance in the pre-modern world.
As we have mentioned earlier, the Ottoman Empire was a highly centralized state, characterizes its complexity and heterogeneous entity that allowed for a degree of local autonomy in certain regions. As such, negotiations and the pursuit of the hierarchal order were not always entirely dictated by the Porte, but local actors often played a significant role in shaping the political and social landscape of the empire. In fact, remote provinces did often negotiate with the Porte on their own terms, and had a degree of autonomy in the construction and pursuit of the Ottoman hierarchal order. This was especially true for provinces that were geographically isolated, as they were often allowed to maintain a greater degree of independence in exchange for their loyalty to the empire. For example, in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire allowed local leaders to retain some degree of authority over their respective regions, as long as they pledged their loyalty to the Sultan and paid their taxes.49 Similarly, in Anatolia, local landowners and religious leaders were granted a degree of autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the Ottoman state.50 Through a meticulously crafted hierarchal order, the Ottomans established an unshakable grip over their expansive realm, while ensuring that the centre always maintained a mutually beneficial and negotiated relationship with the various provinces. The negotiated relationship between the center and the provinces was the key to maintaining empire’s stability and cohesion, and it remains a testament to the Ottoman Empire’s enduring legacy.
Moreover, the concept of the negotiated character of the Ottoman Empire and David Lake’s concept of hierarchy share similarities in their analytical approach to understanding power relations in international politics.51 The negotiated character of the empire refers to the way in which power was negotiated and contested among different entities within the Ottoman state, including the central and provincial elites, subordinate
49 Irene A. Bierman, ‘The Ottomanization of Crete’, The Ottoman City and Its Parts Urban Structure and Social Order, auth. Irene A. Bierman et al. (New Rodelle-New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1991), 53-75.
50 Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia Amasya 1576-1643 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 63.
51 Lake, Hierarchy.
43
authorities, and peripheral polity. This concept recognizes that power was not simply imposed from the top down, but rather was constantly negotiated and contested through a complex process of interaction and bargaining. Similarly, Lake’s concept of hierarchy emphasizes the ways in which hierarchy is constructed and maintained through a variety of mechanisms, including economic coercion, military force, and institutionalized norms and practices between a dominant state and its subordinates.
Moreover, Ottoman imperial negotiation was not only limited in terms of making order among its subordinates but the imperial negotiation allowed to adopt the values of imperial Europe especially during the Tanzimat era. It paved the way of a clean break with the traditional practices of oriental despotism. While the empire was indeed transformed from a post-colonial imperial system to a westernized imperial system, the process of transformation was far from smooth and involved many compromises, setbacks, and struggles for power and influence.52 The negotiations that took place during this era were multifaceted and involved a wide range of actors, both within and outside the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, the Ottomans were forced to negotiate with European powers that were increasingly encroaching on their territory and demanding concessions in the form of trade agreements, treaty rights, and military protection. On the other hand, the Ottomans also had to negotiate with their own subjects, who were demanding greater political participation, civil rights, and economic opportunities. The result of these negotiations was a complex and often contradictory set of policies and practices that reflected both the Ottoman Empire’s historical legacy and its changing relationship with the West. Furthermore, Jonathan Endelman analyzed the evolving perceptions of the Ottoman Empire towards its subordinates during the ‘Reform Era’.53 One of the changing aspect of the empire which he analyzed the ‘provincial priority’ in which the Ottoman Empire categorizing its provinces into different developmental priorities, where certain regions such as Egypt were accorded special attention as the “Eyalet-i-Mümtaze” or extraordinary provinces. This categorization led to the emergence of a state of states within the empire, where some provinces gained administrative autonomy from the centre.
52 Marc Aymes et al. (ed.), Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century (London: Brill, 2015).
53 Jonathan Endelman, “In the Shadow of Empire: States in an Ottoman System”, Social Science History 42/4 (2018), 811-834.
44
Another aspect of the Ottoman imperial order in the changing episode of the Tanzimat legacy has been analyzed by Ussama Makdisi. In his path breaking study on ‘Ottoman Orientalism’ he argued that the Ottoman elite of the late nineteenth century had a colonial mindset that led to the marginalization and suppression of local rulers’ autonomy.54 Makdisi contended that the Ottoman state’s efforts to modernize and centralize its authority in the late 1900s were driven by a desire to catch up with European powers and maintain its territorial integrity. In this context, the Ottoman ruling elite increasingly saw the Arab provinces as backward and in need of reform. However, according to Makdisi, the Ottoman reforms aimed at modernizing the empire and centralizing power did not address the needs and concerns of the local populations in the Arab provinces. Instead, they led to the further concentration of power in the hands of Ottoman officials and elites, who were often non-Arab and lacked local knowledge and legitimacy. This approach to governance was reminiscent of colonialism, as it emphasized the control of the periphery by a distant center, rather than the recognition of the autonomy and agency of local rulers and populations. This mindset ultimately contributed to the Arab awakening of the early twentieth century, as Arab populations increasingly pushed back against Ottoman rule and demanded greater self-determination and representation. Despite these changing aspects of the Ottoman order in the nineteenth century, we want to explore the Ottoman imperial order into hierarchal oriented study because its system of governance exhibited a clear hierarchical arrangement, wherein the central authority, known as the Porte, exerted varying degrees of control over subordinate regions and peripheral polity.
1.2.3. Religious Symbolism and Ottoman Hierarchy
After conquest of Egypt in the battle of ‘Marj-i-Dabik’55, the Ottoman Empire asserted Islam as its primary source of legitimacy, thereby claiming the right to control Islamic holy sites. This provided the empire with an ideological foundation for the acceptance of its legitimacy among Muslims. Subsequently, Ottoman rulers consciously constructed an imperial Sunni Islamic realm, which reached its pinnacle under Kanunı Sultan Suleyman (1520-1566). By incorporating Islam into the state apparatus and the
54 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, The American Historical Review 107/3 (2002), 768-96.
55 Vernie Liebl, “The Caliphate”, Middle Eastern Studies 45/3 (2009), 373-391.
45
fabric of the imperial order, Ottoman rulers were able to strengthen their legitimacy for two key reasons. Firstly, it solidified the empire’s authority among its Muslim subjects. Secondly, the occupation of Islamic holy cities brought the Sunni Muslim order under Ottoman control, thereby fostering a shared normative subjectivity among Muslims worldwide. Thus the classical age of the Ottoman Empire (from the late 16th to the early 18th century), was characterized by a strong emphasis on the Islamic construction of the empire that facilitated Ottoman dominance over the Sunni Muslim world.
Despite this, their counter-parts, the Safavid of Iran and the Mughals in India would not recognize the Ottoman’s religious authority over them. Moreover, the Ottomans actively sought to promote their Islamic credentials to the wider Sunni Muslim world, particularly through their control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and their patronage of Islamic scholarship and culture.56 This strategy enabled the empire to establish itself as the preeminent political and cultural power among Sunni Muslims, and helped to ensure its long-term stability and success in creating and maintaining subordinates under its aegis. Because the Ottoman Empire’s Islamic construction played a significant role in shaping its identity and legitimizing its dominance over its Muslim subordinates in the Middle-East, Africa and Eastern Europe, along with the distant Muslim lands in Indian Ocean and Sub-Sahara Africa.
Moreover, by using the Khilafat, the symbol of Islamic political identity, Ottoman Sultans enjoyed the unanimous religious authority of the Muslim Ummah. More frequently, Sultans legitimized his power, dignity to other contemporary ruler by using the symbol of Islamic identity.57 Furthermore, the integration of the Khilafat and Sultanate within the Ottoman imperial framework facilitated the emergence of a religio-political order wherein the intertwining of Islam and Ottoman imperial benevolence engendered a syncretic and cosmopolitan state structure. Moreover, the Ottoman imperial benevolence functioned as the catalyst of safeguarding the rights of all subjects, irrespective of their religious affiliation, including Muslims, Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims that ultimately generated cosmopolitan character of the empire. This pluralistic integration in the imperial order and its benevolence sheltered, cultivated, and promoted the multi-ethnic and multi-religious co-existence in the
56 Halil Inalcik, “Islamic Caliphate”, 14-34.
57 Einar Wigen, “Ottoman Concepts of Empire”, Contribution to the History of Concepts 8/1 (2013), 44-66.
46
Ottoman Empire. This phenomenon explores the influential association between Islam and the state in the Ottoman state structure.58
The spatial integration of religion and state in the Ottoman Empire strengthened its imperial authority and made easier in maintaining its order over their subordinates. Furthermore, the influential association between Islam and the state in the Ottoman Empire played a pivotal role in reinforcing the empire’s legitimacy and authority, both within its own geography and beyond. Most significantly, from the mid-nineteenth century onward the religious affiliation of the Empire bolstered its position within the broader Muslim world. Therefore, Khilafat produced a hierarchal order in the Ottoman imperial construction that connected the Muslims of the different territories of the globe under the Khlafat order. This hierarchical structure was instrumental in uniting Muslims under a common religious and political identity transcending geographical boundaries. The Hamidian regime astutely leveraged the globalizing Khilafat phenomenon to fortify the Khilafat order among its subordinate entities. This strategy yielded significant successes; for instance, as a Muslim hegemon, the Empire received material assistance for major projects, such as the Baghdad-Hejaz railway, from various parts of the Muslim world.59 The globalizing approach of Ottoman Khilafat also affected the political movement of the Muslims in distant territories, who had lost their political authority to European colonial powers, found renewed hope in the Ottoman Khilafat as a source of revitalizing Muslim hegemony in their lands. Such as the Indian Muslims, since 1880s they began to project the Khilafat order in their struggle against Western colonialism.
1.2.4. Ottoman Caliphal Order and Indian Muslim: A Bottom-Up Perspective
The concept of the Khilafat was central to Ottoman identity and power since the reign of Yavuz Sultan Selim. With the victory of the Battle of ‘Marz-i-Dabik’, the Ottoman rulers saw themselves as the rightful heirs to the Islamic Khilafat, which had been established by the Prophet Muhammad (SM) and had been held by various Islamic dynasties over the centuries. This symbolic authority allowed the Ottomans to extend
58 Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial model”, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 19 (2005), 5-19.
59 Michael O’ Sullivan, “Pan-Islamic Bonds and Interests: Ottoman Bonds, Red Crescent Remittances and the Limits of Indian Muslim Capital, 1877-1924”, The Indian Economic and Social History Review 55/2 (2018), 183-220.
47
their influence far beyond their territorial borders.60 The Khilafat, as the symbolic and political seat of authority in the Islamic world, engendered the notion of imperial hierarchies, wherein the Sultan-Caliph was regarded as the spiritual and temporal leader of Muslims worldwide. This hierarchical order was not merely symbolic but also practical, as it delineated the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim subjects in different territories. It established a framework through which Muslims could relate to each other, with the Sultan-Caliph at the apex of this hierarchy, symbolizing the unity of the “Ummah” (Muslim community) and embodying the concept of a universal Islamic authority. Moreover, the idea of imperial hierarchies fostered by the Khilafat contributed to a sense of solidarity and shared identity among Muslims, transcending linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences. This hierarchical order not only provided a sense of belonging and unity but also served as a mechanism for the dissemination of Islamic principles and values, reinforcing the religious and cultural ties that bound Muslims together.
Thus, Khilafat produced a hierarchical order within the Ottoman imperial construction that connected Muslims across different territories, emphasizing the universal nature of Islam and the unity of the “Ummah” under the leadership of the Sultan-Caliph. This idea garnered significant appreciation from both the Ottoman center and Muslims in various regions during the nineteenth century for two primary reasons. Firstly, Istanbul actively promoted the concept of a universal Khilafat as a strategic means to challenge Western hegemony, particularly evident in the Pan-Islamic policies aimed at asserting Ottoman influence on a global scale during the Hamidian era.61 Secondly, the prevailing geopolitical landscape of the time witnessed the majority of Muslim territories beyond the Ottoman realm succumbing to colonial domination. This phenomenon precipitated the emergence of a cohesive ‘global Muslim community’62, wherein these subjugated entities looked to the Ottoman Khilafat as a symbol of authority in resisting Western encroachment upon their lands.
Moreover, the Khilafat, as the political and religious institution governed the Islamic world from the death of the Prophet Muhammad (SM) in 632 C.E. until the dissolution
60 Suraiya Faroqhi, Another Mirror for Princes the Public Image of the Ottoman Sultans and its Reception (USA: Gorgias Press, 2009), p.53.
61 Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal”, 46-67.
62 Aydın, The Idea of the Muslim World, 3.
48
of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. During this time, the Khilafat produced a ‘normative order’ among the Muslim across the world. For example, Muslim Sultans in India historically sought recognition from the Baghdad Khilafat as a means to legitimize their rule within the Indian subcontinent.63 This strategic endeavor underscored a multifaceted approach to governance, wherein religious authority played a pivotal role in validating their rule. By seeking acknowledgment from the central Islamic authority in Baghdad, these Sultans aimed to align themselves with a broader Islamic framework of legitimacy, thereby reinforcing their political standing among their predominantly Muslim subjects. This practice exemplifies the intricate interplay between religious endorsement and political power dynamics in medieval Indian history, highlighting the significance of transregional religious institutions in shaping the legitimacy of local rulers. During the Ottoman rule, Khilafat produced a system of international hierarchy in their subordinate territory in Asia, Europe and Africa. Ottoman Sultans produced a normative order of the Khilafat among the Sunni Muslim world as the head of the Ottoman government. This is precisely why Tipu Sultan, a Muslim ruler of the princely state of Mysore in India, sought support from the Khilafat during his resistance against British colonialism.64 Tipu astutely discerned the potential of the Khilafat order as a means to bolster his resistance endeavors against the British. He perceived the Ottoman Khilafat as a source of broader support, transcending regional and sectarian demarcations, thereby enhancing his military and diplomatic capabilities in countering the colonial hegemony. His collaboration underscored the dynamic nature of anti-colonial alliances, shaped by a confluence of factors ranging from religious identity to geopolitical exigencies, focusing Khilafat as an international order. Moreover, the title “Khadim-ul-Haremein-ish-Sherifein” denotes the Ottoman Sultan’s role as the custodian of the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, a position of significant religious and political importance within Sunni Muslim belief and practice. To what extent the Ottoman elite believed that their Sultan was the supreme ruler of the Islamic world, Khalifa of Islam, the spiritual leader of the Muslim community and the
63 Tanvir Anjum, “The Emergence of Muslim Rule in India: Some Historical Disconnects and Missing Links”, Islamic Studies 46/2 (2007), 217-240.
64 Iqbal Husain, “The Diplomatic Visison of Tipu Sultan Briefs for Embassies to Turkey and France 1758-86”, State and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan Documents and Essays, auth. Irfan Habid (Delhi: Tulika Book, 2001), 111-119.
49
ultimate authority on all matters related to religion and governance.65 The Ottoman elites viewed the Sultan’s role as not just that of a political ruler but also as a spiritual leader who had a duty to protect and promote Islam. Marinos Sariyanmis delineated the hierarchical structure of the Ottoman polity as the “Devlet-i-Din”, wherein the “Şeyhülislam” occupies the apex position as the supreme authority on religious matters, the grand vizir assumes the foremost position as the head of the state machinery, and the Sultan holds the preeminent positions as the ultimate authority on both religious and secular affairs.66 During the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire encountered formidable obstacles, including internal strife, the imperative for reform, and external encroachments by Western powers. These multifaceted challenges precipitated a pervasive sentiment of unease and susceptibility throughout the empire. In response to these exigencies, the Ottoman administration, notably under the auspices of the Hamidian regime, strategically leveraged the concept of Khilafat as a means to cultivate legitimacy among Muslim populations globally, whilst concurrently fostering unity within the imperial domain. By invoking the normative framework of Khilafat, Ottoman Sultans endeavored to galvanize Muslim communities worldwide in opposition to Western imperialism, thus fortifying the empire’s resilience amidst a volatile geopolitical landscape. During this time, Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, promoted Pan-Islamism to rally Muslims against what was perceived as a Western conspiracy. By presenting the Ottoman Khilafat as the symbolic leader of the Muslim world, the empire aimed to foster solidarity among Muslims and garner support in countering Western influence and intervention. As a coronary of these reasonings, Indian Muslim leaders conceptualized the Khilafat as an ‘international order’ and embraced this order to delegitimize colonial rule over India.
While dominant studies on the Khilafat Movement primarily focus on its ontological aspects67, our exploration adopts a bottom-up approach, elucidating how Indian Muslims actively constructed the Khilafat order as part of their resistance against colonial rule. This perspective highlights the agency of Indian Muslims as the creators of the Khilafat order, independent of the central Ottoman authority. We characterize the
65 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World around It (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.2.
66 Marinos Sariyanmis, “Ruler and State, State and Society in Ottoman Political Thought”, Turkish Historical Review 4 (2013), 92-126.
67 Özcan, Pan-Islamism. Qureshi, Pan Islam. Minault, The Khilafat. Niemeijer, The Khilafat.
50
rise of Khilafat as order in India by a grassroots construction, demonstrating that the followers of Islam could forge a normative order aligned with their needs. Unlike established studies that emphasize the role of leading entities in order construction, this approach underscores the unique aspect of subordinates shaping the order without the direct involvement of the order’s nominal leaders. We propose that the Khilafat order in India functioned as a ‘normative order’, possessing significant non-material strength to unite its adherents. The legitimacy of this order did not stem from the Ottoman Empire but rather from the politico-religious and cultural solidarity among Indian Muslims. Therefore, the Ottoman center, preoccupied with its own vulnerabilities following the First World War and the encroachment of Western powers, was largely indifferent to the emergent Khilafat order in India. Notably, the projection of the Ottoman order by Indian Muslims did not require legitimacy from Istanbul. Instead, the source of legitimacy derived from religion itself, independent of Ottoman sanction. This construction of the Khilafat by Indian Muslims represents a distinct deliberation, wherein subordinates constructed an order without the explicit knowledge or endorsement of the central authority. Thereby, underscores how a normative order can be constructed by subordinates without the assistance of the central authority, projecting the resistance narratives in constructing of order. Indian Muslim resistance required an alternative order to effectively delegitimize British colonial domination in India.
In this context, Muslim leaders strategically positioned the Khilafat as a unified and cohesive order, aiming to consolidate Muslims from various social strata under a shared framework and to galvanize a comprehensive resistance against British colonial rule. By promoting the Khilafat as an emergent and legitimate order within the Indian political landscape, they endeavored to mobilize support not only from the Muslim populace but also from other anti-colonial entities. This strategic maneuver was implemented despite the Khilafat experiencing a period of decline in Ottoman territories, thereby illustrating how a normative order, even in its fragility, can mobilize and inspire its subordinates to challenge dominant power structures. This phenomenon underscores the capacity of a declining order to act as a catalyst for resistance, emphasizing the potential for normative frameworks to influence and reshape socio-political dynamics despite their inherent vulnerabilities.
51
1.2.5. Late Ottoman International Order and Indian Muslims In recent scholarship, Balcı and Kardaş have undertaken an examination of the formation and functioning of the Ottoman international system.68 Their research provides compelling evidence that the Ottoman Empire established and managed a sophisticated international system, enabling it to consolidate and fortify its position across a vast expanse of territory spanning the Afro-Eurasian world. They projected how the Ottoman Empire orchestrated an international system through its hegemonic control over trade, diplomacy, and religious authority, encompassing adherents of diverse races, cultures, and beliefs within a unified imperial framework that extended beyond its territorial confines. Balcı and Kardaş primarily concentrated on a ‘top-down interpretation’ of the Ottoman order, emphasizing the central authority’s role in constructing and maintaining hierarchical order. However, their analysis lacks a comprehensive examination of the Ottoman order, while top-down perspectives changed during its declining decades. During this era subordinates became the order builder. We aim to address this gap by exploring the response of Ottoman subordinates, specifically Indian Muslims, during the empire’s waning years. Despite the evident vulnerabilities of the Ottoman Empire, Indian Muslims continued to accept and align with this Ottoman order. This investigation seeks to elucidate the retionals behind this subordination, providing a nuanced understanding of the dynamics at play underpinning Indian Muslims’ embracement to a declining hegemon. Prior to their work, Pardesi posited the existence of an integrated international system among three prominent Muslim Empires in Asia, namely the Ottomans, Mughals, and Safavids.69 Pardesi’s research sheds light on the extensive web of international relations of these three empires, spanning from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and even reaching as far as the Malacca region in Southeast Asia. While Spruyt offers an ontological explanation to elucidate the interconnected relationships among these three empires by emphasizing their ‘shared subjective identity’.70 Balcı critiques Spruyt’s approach through a ‘functionality account’. Balcı significantly contributes to the scholarly discourse by highlighting an often overlooked aspect of the Ottoman
68 Balcı-Kardaş, “The Ottoman International System”, 866-891.
69 Pardesi, “Region, System, and Order”, 249-278.
70 Hendrik Spruyt, The World Imagined.
52
international system and his argument delineates the unique international order of the Ottoman Empire, examining the complex interactions and networks that characterized the Ottoman Empire’s diplomatic and political engagements with other Islamic Empires.71
Recently, Topal interestingly argued the existence of the Ottoman internationalism before the Euro-centric internationalism through the case-study of the Ottoman-Iran relation in the early decades of the twentieth century.72 He argued how the bilateral agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Iran aimed to provide support for the establishment of independent Muslim states, safeguarding the rights of their respective populations. It also underscores a commitment to advocating for the rights of Muslims, while concurrently emphasizing the reinforcement of amicable relations among Muslim nations, preservation of political autonomy, and territorial integrity. These conceptual underpinnings represent a departure from conventional paradigms, advocating for the sovereignty of individual Muslim states rather than a unified Islamic community “Ummah”. His argument centered on the emergence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism as responsive strategy to counterbalance the prevailing Western-dominated international order. Topal’s investigation is intriguing as it examines the order-building capacity of a declining hegemon. This study offers a valuable top-down perspective on the dynamics of order studies, providing critical insights into how waning dominant powers attempt to construct and maintain international order despite their diminishing influence. Kadı delved into the intricate web of Ottoman diplomatic relations with the Sultanate of Aceh, specifically examining the Porte’s reaction to the Sultan’s plea for aid in safeguarding the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia.73 Through meticulous analysis, Kadı illuminated the multifaceted dimensions of this historical interaction, shedding light on the complexities inherent in Ottoman diplomatic engagements beyond its immediate borders. These studies enhance our comprehension of the pursuit of research regarding the late Ottoman international hierarchy in India, a subject that remains significantly underexplored; despite the fact that Indian Muslims embraced the Ottoman order in the
71 Ali Balcı, “Bringing the Ottoman Order”, 2090-2107.
72 Omer Faruk Topal, “Ottoman Internationalism”, The International History Review 45/ 3 (2023), 445-461.
73 Kadı, “An Old Ally”, 1080-1097.
53
late nineteenth century as part of their resistance against colonial powers. The most captivating conundrum regarding the endorsement of the Ottoman hierarchy by Indian Muslims lies in understanding why subordinates from a distant geography embraced a waning hegemon in opposition to the most formidable colonial powers of that era. Some historical studies were conducted, but the study, from the perspective of theoretical explanation, is almost absent. In these depressing aspects, the research conducted by Faiz Ahmed explored a new understanding of the late Ottoman diplomatic relations with the Muslims princely states of India.74 Ahmed’s research aimed to understand Ottoman diplomacy’s role in maintaining order among the Muslim subjects of British colonial India. Despite providing valuable descriptive historical narratives, Ahmed’s work also lacked theoretical explanations regarding the late Ottoman international order. Therefore, Ahmed provided a top-down analysis of the Ottoman order, focusing on Istanbul’s attempts to assert its authority over Indian Muslim princes living under British colonial rule. However, this study did not adequately address the bottom-up dynamics of the Khilafat order in India. To address this gap, our research investigates why the Ottoman order remained highly functional from the 1910s until the end of the Khilafat in 1924, a period marked by the absence of the Hamidian regime and the decline of Pan-Islam. This perspective highlights the most intriguing aspect of the Khilafat movement: the bottom-up construction of the Khilafat order by Indian Muslim subordinates as a counter-authority to delegitimize British colonial rule in India. We intend to build upon Ahmed’s empirical arguments by theorizing the subordination of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman order. We examine how the concept of Khilafat influenced Indian Muslims to accept the Ottoman order as a means to overthrow the existing colonial order. Specifically, it explores Khilafat’s role as an ‘order-building entity’, the functionality of the Khilafat and analyze how Indian Muslims, as subordinate entities, incorporated the Ottoman hierarchical order into their political discourses.
1.3. Indian Muslims in Fashioning the Ottoman Hierarchical Order
Indian Muslim’s shift to the Ottoman order holds significant implications for understanding the international hierarchy for three significant reasons. Firstly,
74 Ahmed, “Meddling with Medals”, 1041-1059.
54
‘subordinates as architects of hierarchy’, it demonstrates how subordinates residing in distance geographical locations could become leading actor in fashioning a hierarchical order focusing the resistance against the existing colonial order. Secondly, ‘declining orders can be an order-builder’ that underscores the capacity of a declining hegemonic order to exert influence over its subordinates, catalyzing how the declining Khilafat order stimulated the Indian Muslim subordinate’s resistance against prevailing colonial powers. Thirdly, ‘resistance as order-builder’, which exemplifies the potential of resistance movements to serve as foundational elements in the construction of new hierarchical orders. Moreover, the scholarly investigation of Algerian Muslims and Acehnese Muslims of Indonesia during the waning decades of the Ottoman Empire, particularly their acceptance of the Ottoman international order to delegitimize the colonial entities, represents a frequently cited research endeavor aimed at comprehending the hierarchical dynamics of the Ottoman Empire.75 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the acceptance of the Ottoman order by Indian Muslims presents an intriguing puzzle in fashioning Ottoman hierarchical order, but distinct from the cases of Algeria and Aceh for two considerable facts. Firstly, India never came under direct Ottoman imperial rule, and secondly, the Ottoman Empire was in declining, lacking sufficient military and economic power to assist Indian Muslims in their resistance against colonial powers. These reasons intensify the puzzle, raising the question of why Indian Muslim embraced the declining Ottoman order as a means to overthrow British authority in India. In this context, our objective is to explore the emergence of the Ottoman imperial order in India through a hierarchical-oriented perspective, providing a significant non-western historical case to understand the dynamics of international hierarchy. The examination primarily aims to understand why certain subordinate entities adhered to a declining hegemony, aiming to delegitimize the existing colonial order.
However, since the last decades of the nineteenth century, Indian Muslims sought to regain their power and political dominance by delegitimizing the legitimacy of British colonial rule over India. In doing this, Muslims accepted the Ottoman order, which was passing its dying decades in it own lands. Exploring the reasons why some subordinate stick with the declining hegemonic powers, we can examine the arguments put forth by
75 Balcı, “Algeria”, 375-393. , Kadı, “An Old Ally”, 1080-1097.
55
two contemporary scholars, Balcı and Shifrinson, shedding light on the complexities of this phenomenon. While Balcı examined the decline of the Ottoman Empire, with a particular focus on the Algerian context, to elucidate why subordinate entities continued to adhere to a diminishing hegemonic power.76 He articulated three primary reasons: first, subordinates often prefer the relative safety and lower costs associated with aligning with a declining hegemon; second, they seek a counterbalance against encroaching European dominance; and third, they leverage this alignment for domestic political legitimacy. While these arguments offer insights into the subordination of Indian Muslims to the declining Ottoman Empire, they fall short in fully explaining this case. Thus, we introduce an additional argument overlooked by Balcı: the aspect of resistance among Algerians against the emerging European order. We argue that resistance plays a crucial role in shaping the construction of order, as it requires an established order to delegitimize the prevailing order. In our analysis of Muslim resistance in India against colonial rule, we highlight how Indian Muslims strategically invoked the Ottoman hierarchical order in their resistance to undermine the legitimacy of the British order. By delving deeper into their perspectives, we can gain a more nuanced understanding of the motivations behind Muslim’s choice to align themselves with the fading Ottoman hegemony in their struggle against British dominance in India. Shifrinson’s book offers a profound insight into the dynamics of a declining hegemon.77 By meticulously dissecting the intricate processes through which ascending powers capitalize on the waning influence of a hegemon, Shifrinson illuminates the consequentiality of this transitional phase in reshaping the global order. Central to his analysis is the recognition of the declining hegemon’s ‘strategic considerations’ within the context of a declining hegemon’s role in shaping international hierarchies, while a rising power seeks to leverage the influence of the waning hegemon to undermine rival hierarchies. Shifrinson’s perspective diverges when applied to the case of Indian Muslims, as the Khilafat order, while in decline within the Ottoman Empire, was simultaneously an emerging and unifying order within the Indian Muslim movement. This order effectively consolidated the majority Muslim population and allied anti-colonial entities under a shared framework of resistance against colonial domination.
76 Balcı, “Algeria”, 375-393.
77 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shift (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).
56
The enduring significance of the Khilafat order illustrates its capacity to construct and maintain order among its subordinates, even amid its decline. This suggests that the waning influence of a dying hegemon does not necessarily entail an immediate loss of its significant position within the international system. Instead, the residual authority and normative value of such an order can persist and be leveraged by subordinates to galvanize and legitimize their resistance efforts against prevailing hegemonies.
Indian Muslims, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were seeking alternative political and religious authority beyond the British colonial hegemony and they sought to align themselves with the Ottoman order which was seen as a symbol of Muslim power and authority and accepted this order as a way to resist British colonialism and assert their own political and religious identity. The Ottoman Empire was indeed in a state of decline during this period, both economically and militarily. While, these two components are significant prerequisites for establishing and maintaining hierarchical order, a category to which the Ottoman Empire did not belong during this time.78 This explores the Indian Muslim acceptance of the Ottoman’s hierarchal order as an intriguing puzzle in the fashioning hierarchy which determines other factors, such as ‘normative patron’, ‘supportive strategies’, ‘non-meterial connectivity of an order’ and ‘historical relationship’.
As we have mentioned here that the acceptance of the Ottoman order by Indian Muslims was not determined by considering economic or military capacity of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, it was primarily motivated by the Muslim community’s aspiration to reclaim political dominancy, a status forfeited with the onset of colonial rule. The decline of Mughal rule created a vacuum in the religio-political landscape, prompting Indian Muslims to seek alternative sources of authority, both religious and political. This quest led to the symbolic inclusion of the Ottoman Khalifa’s name in the Friday prayers during the 1880s. Over time, this symbolic gesture evolved into a formalized integration, particularly during Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s reign, as he sought to strengthen the Ottoman Empire by emphasizing its universal Khilafat authority, centered on the Yıldız Palace. The transformation of Indian Muslims’ religious allegiance toward the Ottoman Khalifa is a compelling phenomenon. It underscores how the concept of Khilafat became not just a religious symbol but also a potent political
78 Michael Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation (UK: Oxford University Press, 2018).
57
tool, utilized to challenge and delegitimize colonial rule. This strategic alignment with the Ottoman Khilafat posed a formidable challenge to British colonialism, culminating in the emergence of a Muslim resistance movement rooted in the defense of the Ottoman Khilafat’s authority. Therefore, Indian Muslim’s acceptance of the Ottoman order highlights the complex interplay between religious identity, political power, and resistance against colonial dominance. It demonstrates how the Ottoman order provided Indian Muslims with a powerful narrative and framework to assert their distinct identity and challenge the legitimacy of colonial entities.
Moreover, Indian Muslim leaders’ support for the Ottoman Empire can be understood in the context of the political climate of the time because the Ottoman Empire was the last remaining Islamic Khilafat, and it held great significance for Muslims worldwide. The Ottoman Khilafat was seen as a symbol of Muslim unity and strength, and the Indian Muslims saw the Ottoman Khalifa as their religious leader, and their loyalty to the Khilafat was based on a shared Islamic identity rather than financial or military gains. They perceived the Ottoman Empire as the legitimate representative of the Islamic world. This symbolism and the perception of the Ottoman Empire as the defender of Islam made it an attractive alternative against the British colonial power. Therefore, the Indian Muslims saw the British colonial power as a threat to their religious and cultural identity because British colonial rulers introduced policies that undermined Islamic traditions, leading to a sense of insecurity and fear among the Indian Muslims.79 This is mainly because, from the very inception of colonial rule, Muslims kept them beyond British influence and took resistance and war as the way to reinvigorate their power. In contrast, the Ottoman Khilafat represented an alternative to British colonialism because of common cultural and religious identity of the Muslims and the inter-subjective understandings that brought the Indian Muslims and the Ottomans close. Despite the economic and military dominance, social contact and inter-subjective connectivity and normative relation can play a significant role in establishing dominant order in subordinates.80 Moreover, Indian Muslims perceived that that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was not immediately apparent, and many of them believed that the empire would eventually recover its former strength. They believed that if the Ottomans
79 Mujeeb Ashraf, Muslim Attitudes towards British Rule and Western Culture in India (New Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i Delli, 1982), 5.
80 Lake, Hierarchy, p.8.
58
regained their strength, they could provide support to Muslims in India who were struggling for independence from British colonial rule.81
1.3.1. How Muslim Resistance in India Endorsed the Ottoman Hierarchy Our objective is to examine the theoretical elucidation of the Ottoman hierarchy and its manifestation within the historical narratives of the Muslim resistance movement against British colonialism. We aim to elucidate the ways in which the Ottoman order was invoked, appropriated, and sustained within the resistance discourse, shedding light on its significance and impact on the collective Muslim effort to counteract colonial domination. The fact was, from 1757-1947, British hierarchical order played a crucial role in shaping the new subjectivity of the Indian. Constructing a Europen-oriented Indian Muslim, British believed that the Indian Muslims as the Muslims by born but in thinking like European.82 Therefore, from the very inception of the colonial rule, British tried to establish the ‘colonial order’ by different policies, for example, ‘Divide and Rule’, ‘Grant of Dewani’, ‘Permanent Settlement’ and ‘English Education Policy’. Among these, ‘Divide and Rule’ and ‘English Education Policy’ were more effective in creating communal divergence for colonial interest and creating a generation who belong Western dominance with having negative connotation towards own culture and heritage accordingly. With their ‘English Education Policy’ British were successful in creating a British loyal generation both in Muslim and Hindu community. But in the 1880s, the rapid rise of modern educated middle class and the formation of political parties discarded the colonial order soon. This exploration delves into the phenomenon wherein policies may fail to align with the imperatives of the established order, and certain policies can yield unintended consequences.83
However, during this time, Muslim’s acceptance of the Ottoman order in their resistance significantly dominated the discources of the Indian politics that challenged the prevailing colonial order over India. The intriguing puzzle of delegitimizing the colonial order in India and assuring this objective, the acceptance of the Ottoman order by the
81 Mushirul Hasan, “Indian Muslims since Independence: In Search of Integration and Identity”, Third World Quarterly 10/2 (1988), 818-842.
82 A. R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal 1757-1856 (Dacca: Bangla Academy, 1977), 246.
83 William G. Nomikos, et al., “Unintended Consequences: Reconsidering the Effects of UN Peacekeeping on State-Sponsored Violence”, International Peacekeeping 29/4 (2022): 551-623.
59
Indian Muslims inspire the phenomenon of reconstructing the colonial Indian history through the lens of hierarchy literature in IR. Such notion of study allow us to address a systematic relation between Indian Muslim ‘the subordinate entities’ and the Ottoman Empire ‘the lead actor’ in fashioning Ottoman international order.
Therefore, the examination of the Khilafat Movement presents a compelling case study for comprehending the intricate dynamics of hierarchy and power relations. Through an analysis of power relations and social dynamics within a hierarchical framework, a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding the Muslim resistance movement, which revolved around the Ottoman Khilafat and its broader historical context, can be attained. Indian Muslims embraced the Ottoman Khilafat as a manifestation of global Muslim authority, rooted in Muslim identical dominance. By aligning themselves with the Khilafat, Indian Muslims aimed to assert their collective identity as members of a broader global Muslim community, utilizing this normative authority as a means of resistance and to challenge the prevailing hegemony of the British colonial order. Within the context of their political power struggle, they strategically employed this shared authority, addressing the challenges posed by the colonial power structure. Khilafat may be considered as the purposeful agents in which Indian Muslims intended another objective of attaining their self-rule, while Zarakol explores that hierarchies in the international system served as purposeful agents, exerting influence over the behavior of actors and facilitating structured and orderly interactions.84 The Khilafat movement exemplifies this dynamic, wherein the hierarchal order of the Ottoman Khilafat served as a persistent representative for Indian Muslims who were engaged in a struggle against colonial power to attain autonomy and independence for India with the Ottoman order serving as a symbolic and meaningful reference point in their endeavor.
Furthermore, Muslims accepted the Ottoman Khilafat as an order against the colonial power structure, mainly because they struggled for power and in their construction of alternative subjectivities. In certain instances, subordinate entities are capable of upholding a counter authority while sitting in the formal definition of empire. Lake’s proposition suggests that “under a formal-legal definition of empire, the subordinate cannot negotiate agreements in its own name nor set its own policies.” 85 If this is the case, we may posit that the Muslim acceptance of Ottoman order was not only a
84 Zarakol (ed.), Hierarchy, 6.
85 Lake, Hierarchy, 58.
60
violation of formal imperial order, but also a negotiation tactic intended to undermine the prevailing order. However, it is noteworthy that Indian Muslims, who were the ruling elite of India, could not overlook their political dominance that had been in place for over six centuries of Muslim rule in India. For this very reason, they were less likely to embrace the authority of foreign infidels following the establishment of the British Crown’s regime in the aftermath of the Indian resistance in 1857. Muslim’s disagreement to accept the colonial rule also fascinates to consider the contrasting perspectives between Indian Muslims and Hindus.86 While Hindus may have viewed the colonial domination of India as a political transition, Muslims saw it through a lens of antipathy towards foreign domination, which influenced their resistance.
Therefore, we examine the application of ‘Khilafat order’ as a significant episode of Muslim resistance in which this order acted as the main actor to delegitimize the colonial order in India. Our study of hierarchy in the Khilafat can shed light on how power relations were negotiated and contested between the British colonial authorities and Indian Muslim communities. It can also help to understand the social, moral, and behavioral dynamics of the resistance movement’s participants that allows understanding the scope of hierarchy.87 This approach elucidates the intricate web of relationships among the diverse actors who rallied behind the Ottoman order as a legitimate authority. Through the lens of hierarchy, we can discern the discernible patterns of power dynamics and domination that existed in colonial India, shedding light on the underlying mechanisms shaping the discourses of resistance. Furthermore, the Khilafat order engendered a shift in the locus of authority within the Muslim community, elevating Muslim leaders to positions of prominence, while Hindu leaders similarly wielded significant influence within their respective community spheres. These power dynamics exerted a profound influence on the trajectory of the movement and its ultimate outcomes. Thus, a hierarchy-oriented study provides a nuanced understanding of the shared, suitable, and behavioral dynamics of the Indian Muslim resistance centering the Khilafat order. Moreover, Muslim organizations played a dominating role to spread Ottoman order in India. From the analysis of Evelyn Goh, we can understand how the organizations promote, uphold and invigorate the
86 Mohammed Ayoob, “The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in Historical Perspective”, India Review 19/4 (2020), 414-425.
87 Zarakol (ed.), Hierarchy, 2.
61
hierarchical order.88 Furthermore, the Ottoman order produced a social compact that reunited the scattered Muslims with a common interest, belief and values of resistance for power and authority. By doing this Muslims formed different organizations that played a unique role in the manifestation as well as constitution of such changing social compacts. Most significantly Muslim institutions provided a normative construction of the Ottoman order over India.
We explore the acceptance of the Ottoman order by Muslims constituted a crucial milestone in their resistance against colonial rule, serving as both a repudiation of British colonial authority and an endeavor to forge a novel collective identity for the Muslims. The gesture of rejecting the authority of the British colonial regime gave a new idea of establishing sense of Muslim political identity in India. Furthermore, the utilization of the Ottoman order by Muslim leaders served as a means to shape a renewed sense of Muslim subjectivity in their struggle against the colonial power. Such inclination to maintain allegiance with their historical patron can be attributed to their belief in the efficacy of the prevailing hierarchical framework for fostering domestic political legitimacy and overcoming domestic adversaries. As subordinates sometimes prefer to remain with their historical patron due to their confidence that the existing hierarchical order can function for domestic political legitimacy in defeating the domestic antagonist.89 Thus we manifest the Indian Muslims commitments to the Ottoman order had two distinctions the ‘domestic political legitimacy’ and ‘overcoming domestic challenges’.
1.3.2. Normative Order in Framing the Indian Muslim Subordinates
The utilization of a normative framework is instrumental in the stablemen and preservation of order among subordinates; therefore, a comprehensive grasp of ideational concepts plays a significant role in upholding order. Our case of Indian Muslim’s embracement of the Ottoman order is closely intertwined with their ideational understanding associated with the concept of Khilafat. In this regards, the shared Islamic authority and institutional connections between the Ottomans and Indian Muslims provide a valuable avenue to elucidate the factors contributing to the Indian
88 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 29.
89Ji-Young Lee, “Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia”, Security Studies 25/2 (2016), 320-352.
62
Muslim’s pursuit of a renewed subjective identity within the Ottoman order. The Khilafat offers a new insight through which to interpret Indian Muslim identity construction, considering the shared subjective identity between Indian Muslims and Ottomans, rooted in Islamic culture and civilizational heritage. As M. Alagappa notes, “the construction of order is a historical process that involves the negotiation and translation of inter-subjective understandings into institutional frameworks through a variety of means, including struggle, conflict, accommodation, and cooperation.”90 Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the socio-political context of the period in which this identity shift occurred, taking into account the various factors that influenced the construction of this new Muslim subjective identity. This analysis should include an examination of the roles played by political actors, religious leaders, and other social dynamics that shaped Indian Muslims’ perceptions of the Ottoman Khilafat. Additionally, it would be valuable to investigate the impact of colonialism on the construction of this new identity, including how colonial policies and practices may have contributed to the development of a shared subjective identity among Indian Muslims and Ottomans.
The Khilafat Movement emerged as a means for Muslim identity regeneration in response to the colonial behavior of the British in India. We want to explore the movement through the lens of post-structural and post-colonial theories, which focus on power relations and identity construction. Post-colonial theories draw upon literature documenting the Muslim resistance against the colonizers, providing a basis for constructing theoretical frameworks. Although the Khilafat Movement was not an armed struggle, it represented a form of resistance against British authority in India. This movement can be understood as a counter-hegemonic narrative that challenged the dominant colonial discourse, leading to the emergence of a new kind of Muslim subjectivity in India centered on the idea of Ottoman Khilafat. Consequently, Khilafat was framed up, inscribed, and predetermined in the Indian context to entail the subaltern Muslims in order to strengthen their identity construction, and reasoning for the new political subjectivities against the existing colonial power.
90 Alagappa Muthiah (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 39.
63
Therefore, the concept of ‘counter-hegemonic resistance’ implies that the Indian Khilafat movement was a dissident religious movement that offered an alternative Muslim subjectivity in India, one that diverged from the prevailing colonial discourse. This notion highlights the movement’s significance in challenging the colonial hegemon and in paving the way for the development of an alternative Muslim identity in India. Replicating such attitudes of the Muslims, we ponder the Khilafat Movement from resistance-oriented explanation that pursued the struggle for power and the construction of alternative subjectivities because this Muslim movement changed the trajectory of Indian politics from colonial rapture. Muslims found better alternatives in terms of their identity and authority to put forward the integrity of Khalifa than the British as a counter to hegemonic legitimization. Indian Khilafat Movement was not only a political resistance, but it had cultural and ideological terms. Muslims tried to tear down and destroy the established colonial order by resistance and identical hegemony.
This research examines the Khilafat Movement as a counter-hegemonic narrative that entails the emergence of a new kind of subjectivity and sense of belonging, capable of challenging colonial power. It specifically focuses on the construction of a new Muslim subjectivity who seeks to elucidate the role of Khilafat as authoritative actors in the resistance against colonial rule. Following their loss of political hegemony in 1857, Indian Muslims accepted the Ottoman Khilafat as counter-hegemonic language, a means of reclaiming political authority in India. Within this context, Ottoman order provided a framework for the construction of a new political identity that challenged colonial power and positioned Indian Muslims as a resistance-oriented entity against colonial rule. Our study aims to investigate a non-Western imperial case, emphasizing the role of subordinates in shaping hierarchical order and questioning why Indian Muslims adhered to a declining hegemony. This intriguing puzzle generates a counter-hegemonic discourse within the existing colonial power. While dominant discourses typically emphasize the perspective of powerful states in constructing order, our research posits the subordinate as the true architect of an order. We focus on how Indian Muslim subordinates accepted, projected, and utilized the Ottoman order to unite Indian Muslims under a common umbrella in their resistance against colonial power. We further propose that Muslims accepted Ottoman Khilafat as a power transition, essential
64
elements of raising a hierarchical order focusing on the normative structure of the Muslim movement in India.91 The normative order construction of the Ottoman Khilafat represents a significant case study within international relations and hierarchy literature. This substantive investigation explores the phenomenon through three distinct dimensions: Firstly, we examine how subordinate Indian Muslims adhered to the declining Ottoman order in their resistance against a dominant colonial hegemon. This instance of Indian Muslim subordination to the Ottoman Empire exemplifies the role of subordinates in shaping and sustaining a hegemonic order. Secondly, we analyze the acceptance of a declining hegemon by Indian Muslim subordinates, illustrating that decline does not necessarily impede order construction. Despite the Ottoman Empire’s imminent collapse in the aftermath of World War I, it concurrently emerged as an emerging order in the context of Indian Muslim resistance. Finally, we delve into the concept of a 'resistance-oriented hierarchical order,' wherein Muslims utilized the Ottoman order as a foundation for their fervent resistance against British domination in India. This aspect underscores how the Ottoman Khilafat functioned as an order-building mechanism despite its declining status, highlighting the complex interplay between resistance and hierarchical order construction.
91 Charles A. Kupchan, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana”, Security Studies 23/2 (2014), 219-257.
65
CHAPTER 2: THE FUNCTION OF THE OTTOMAN KHILAFAT IN THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIALISM During the Mughal era (1526-1857 C.E.), Indian Muslims exhibited a limited inclination to recognize Ottoman authority, primarily because of the distinct religious legitimacy attributed to Mughal rule within the Indian Muslim populace.1 Despite the Ottoman Empire’s status as the custodian of the Islamic Khilafat, its claim to the Khilafat did not resonate strongly with Indian Muslims. Following the failure of the momentous Indian resistance (mainly known as Sepoy Mutiny) against the colonial power in 1857, Indian Muslims not only forfeited their political hegemony but also their privileged status, leading to a void in their religious authority. The subsequent imposition of colonial rule marginalized Muslims, as they suffered economic setbacks due to the East India Company’s trade monopoly. Local cottage industries were decimated by the influx of British industrial products. Moreover, the implementation of British policies such as the ‘Resumption Proceedings’ and the ‘Sun-Set Law’ further exacerbated the situation, leading to the dispossession of Muslim Zamindars from their property and lands.2 The Muslim middle class faced significant economic decline, leading to a consolidation with the impoverished lower class. Their limited access to Western education, stemming from both religious and economic constraints, hindered their social advancement. This situation rendered Muslims unable to secure government positions, particularly as the British East India Company mandated English as India’s official language in 1837.3 Consequently, Muslims found themselves marginalized in various spheres of national life during this transformative period.
1 Catherine B. Asher, “Sub-Imperial Palaces: Power and Authority in Mughal India”, Ars Orientalis 23 (1993), 281-302.
2 Resumption Proceedings and Sun Set Law are two weapons of the colonial administration by which the British took unanimous control over the land of India, and most of the Muslim notables and Zamindars lost their property under these laws. In 1793, the British permanently redistributed the native’s land with the ‘Permanent Settlement’ proceedings, under which Hindu officials who worked under the Muslim Zamindars became the new landlord in Bengal. Sirajul Islam, The Permanent Settlement in Bengal, A Study of Its Operation 1790-1819 (Dacca: Bangla Academy, 1979), 171. Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1982), 167.
3 A.R. Mallick, British Policy, 65. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 A Quest for Identity (UK: Oxford University Press, 1981), 137. Aminur Rahim, “The Political Economy of English Education in Muslim Bengal: 1871-1912”, Comparative Education Review 36/3 (1992), 309-317.
66
In this rather depressing picture, in the 1880s, Muslims were earnestly seeking an authority to delegitimize the colonial existence over themselves in particular and India in general. But until this date, Muslims had endeavored to reconcile with British governance for several discernible rationales. Firstly, recollecting the memory of the traumatic events of the Indian Revolt in 1857 discouraged Muslims from immediately engaging in direct conflict with the British. Secondly, the Anglo-Ottoman close ties left Indian Muslims without a recognized source of legitimate authority to oppose British rule. Thirdly, the formal declaration by the British Crown designating Indians as ‘Crown Subjects’ constrained Muslims, compelling them to consider any alternative authority as potentially seditious. Despite this, the mutual bond, deeply embedded in the Islamic Khilafat and wider Muslim hegemony, constituted a formidable mechanism for the British to assimilate Indian Muslims within the colonial framework. Persuing this objective, following 1858,the British leveraged the institution of the Ottoman Khilafat to validate their engagement with this Muslim authority, strategically deploying the Khilafhal influence among Indian Muslims to legitimize their governance, acknowledging the historical and cultural affinities between Indian and Ottoman Muslims. Simultaneously, this period catalyzed a transformative reevaluation of the concept of Khilafat among Indian Muslims. Khilafat came to be regarded as an order-building entity and a poignant emblem of erstwhile Muslim dominance. This recognition fueled a concerted effort among Indian Muslims to reestablish the Khilafat order within their own community, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the colonial order in India.
Thus we identify it as a pathway by which a state apparatus can unintentionally create a new conflict because the British policy of instrumentalizing the Khilafat for its rule in India had some inadvertent outcomes; it increased awareness of Khilafat among Indian Muslims. In fact, within two decades after the Sepoy Mutiny, the Muslims perceived the Ottoman Khilafat as an authority, power, and strength to suppress the Christian rule. Furthermore, considering the Khilafat as a threat to the colonial government, the British took a reverse move of isolating the Ottoman order in India during the 1880s. Meanwhile, in the changing segregation of the Ottoman-British relation after the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, the British invaded and occupied some Ottoman lands, such as Egypt and Cyprus, strategically affected transforming the British policy over India.
67
Meanwhile, some direct connections between Indian Muslims and Ottoman elite transformed the meaning of Khilafat from a British tool to an authentic alternative authority in the eyes of Indian Muslims. Rather, Muslims’ religious necessity for reciting a Khalifa in the Friday prayer replicated the Ottoman Khalifa as the ecclesiastical authority over the Indian Muslims. Moreover, the principal schools of Indian Muslim scholars4 explicitly embraced the Ottoman Khalifa as the authority of Sunni Islam and delegitimized the infidel British rule by declaring India as “Darul Harb”. Furthermore, the Hamidian (1876-1909) foreign policy enhanced Ottoman’s high official activities in India, and the ideology of Pan-Islam kept a significant influence in spreading Khilafat order in India. All these stimulous influenced the Indian Muslim intellectuals and political leaders accepting the Ottoman Khilafat as an international Muslim order.
Therefore, I argue that British imperialism would have rampant putative stagnant in case of the rapid rise of the Khilafat influence in India. It also identifies that while British attempted to contain the spread of Khilafat’s power, it paved the way to increase the potentials for new conflicts. Consequently, this chapter explores to two significant puzzles. Firstly ‘Khilafat as new conflict in Indian political hegemony’ examines the British policy of initially supporting the Khilafat order for colonial gains, and later adjusting their policies when Khilafat was going to be emerged as a unifying force among Muslims. The second puzzle explores ‘the functional aspects of Khilafat’, illustrating how Muslims revitalized their political hegemony within the colonial power structure by embracing the authority of the Ottoman Khilafat as an order-building entity. This galvanized spatial integration among Muslims in their resistance against British colonial rule. This is primarily due to the fact that the following discussion has been structured into two main divisions. The first segment examines the Ottoman Khilafat in the broader context of British imperial strategy. The second part delves into how Indian Muslims constructed the Khilafat as an order in Indian politics that explores the strategies and tactics employed by Indian Muslims to leverage the Khilafat order as a means to delegitimize British colonial rule.
4 For example, the Waliullah School, the Deoband School, the Finagi Mahal school, and Nadwatul Ulama accepted the Ottoman Khilafat as the legal ecclesiastical authority of Islam. After the Sepoy Mutiny, Ottoman Khilafat became popular in India due to the immense propagation of these schools because they had tremendous influence among the mass Muslims.
68
2.1. Khilafat and New-fangled Political Paradigm in Indian Political Hegemony
As I have mentioned, Indian Muslim had no close association with the Ottoman Khilafat primarily due to the enduring influence and legitimacy of the Mughal rule in the religious and political spheres of South Asian Muslims. The collapse of the Mughal Empire created a void in the political and religious leadership of the Muslim community, leading to the Ottoman Khilafat becoming the symbolic embodiment of Muslim political and religious identity. But, the Ottomans were not at the table to prey on the Mughal death. Instead, they watched the demise of the Mughal and even facilitated their defeat by supporting the British. Despite this, Istanbul extended financial support to Muslims in India to aid their recovery following the Sepoy Mutiny. This was mainly because; the Ottoman Empire was in its declining years, facing internal challenges and external threats, particularly from Russia. In pursuit of domestic stability and protection against potential Russian aggression, the Ottomans sought to establish a strategic partnership with the British.5 Moreover, the transformation in the Ottoman Empire’s stance towards Indian Muslims during the 1880s underscores a compelling dynamic: a significant shift in the latter’s perception and utilization of the Ottoman Khilafat as ‘an order-building entity’ in their resistance against colonial rule. This phenomenon presents a captivating puzzle: how does a declining hegemon, in the throes of decline within its own borders, manage to exert such profound influence over the discourse and actions of its distant subordinates? This phenomenon highlights the enduring influence of imperial constructs, demonstrating that even as an empire falters, its ideological and symbolic power can continue to shape narratives and actions of resistance of its subordinates in distant regions. However, the British strategically leveraged their association with the Ottoman Khilafat, exploiting its influence to garner support from Indian Muslims in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt, thereby consolidating their colonial hegemony over India. Therefore, Khalifa’s issued a fatwa advising Indian Muslims to align themselves with the British government, enhanced British prestige through the soft power of the Ottoman Khilafat
5 Hakan Kirimli, “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War”, Middle Eastern Studies 44/5 (2008), 751-773.
69
in the Indian context.6 This dynamic persisted until the 1870s, while India Office of London extensively publicizing the visit of Ottoman Sultan Abdul Aziz to London, aiming to capitalize Indian Muslim’s legitimacy towards colonial rule.7 The situation was poised for change, with the onset of the Hamidian regime; British-Istanbul relations began to deteriorate, culminating in a rupture following the British occupation of Ottoman Egypt in 1882. This evolving Ottoman-British relation had a profound impact on British policy discourses regarding Indian Muslims.
Meanwhile, in the 1880s, there was a notable increase in Muslim engagement in Indian politics, economy, and education, reflecting a growing Muslim middle class. Perceiving their community’s lagging status, Muslim politicians and intellectuals endeavored to revive their hegemony in Indian political affairs. Consequently, they sought to challenge British colonial rule by seeking an alternative authority, believing the fact that only overthrowing the British colonialism could restore their dominance in India. During this period, Indian Muslims strengthened their ties with Istanbul. This was facilitated by visits of Indian Muslims to Ottoman territories, the implementation of Hamidian foreign policy, which sought to portray the Ottoman Khilafat as a global Muslim authority, and the influence of Pan-Islamism.8 Furthermore, the close association of Indian Muslims with the Ottoman Khilafat heightened British anxiety. This was mainly because of the ‘significant influence of the Khilafat on Muslim entities’, and the British viewed the Khilafat as a potential catalyst for unifying Muslims under a common order, thereby posing a potential challenge to British hegemony in India. This intriguing dynamic positioned the Khilafat a new order-building entity in the political landscape of India. Consequently, this section seeks to delve into the British interpretation of the Khilafat and how the British read the Khilafat order within the Indian context.
2.1.1. British Promoted Ottoman Khilafat and a New Conflict in Unintended Way British Crown rule in India was unable to quell separatist conflicts, and in its efforts to mitigate these tensions, it strategically utilized the concept of the Ottoman Khilafat
6 Azmi Özcan, “Attempts to use the Ottoman Caliphate as the legitimator of British rule in India”, Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia, auth. Anthony Reid-Michael Gilsenan (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 71-80.
7 The Friend of India, (29 August 1867), 1028.
8 Cemil Aydın, “Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianiam and the Revolt against the West”, Journal of Modern European History 4/2 (2006), 204-223.
70
within the Muslim context to bolster its legitimacy. We argue that the British policy of instrumentalizing the Ottoman Khilafat effectively pacified uneasiness among Indian Muslims about the British government. This approach not only served to ameliorate apprehensions among Indian Muslims regarding British governance but also fostered new interpretations of the Ottoman Khilafat as a means to delegitimize colonial authority in India. This analysis highlights a consequential pathway wherein state-building initiatives inadvertently engender new forms of conflict.9 Moreover, after the Indian resistance in1857, the British Empire endeavored to consolidate its authority in India; achieving their goal, they sought assistance from the Ottomans in securing the loyalty of Indian Muslims to the colonial government and in pacifying Muslim resistance. Despite this, the British government of India supported British-Ottoman amity, framing it as a significant diplomatic relationship. This was exemplified by England’s portrayal of the visit of Sultan Abdul Aziz to England in July 1867 as emblematic of the enduring friendship between Istanbul and London.10 Though, Indian newspaper critique regarding the perceived exaggeration of the British Indian Office’s expenditure on the Khalifa’s honor juxtaposed with the alleged lack of adequate measures taken by the government in response to the Orissa famine.11 Therefore, the British employed a multifaceted approach to legitimize colonial rule and engendering trust among Muslim populations. One significant strategy involved portraying Russia as a primary adversary of Islam.12 This was accomplished by highlighting Russian atrocities during the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, as well as instances of Russian brutality towards Ottomans. British officials extensively documented Russian incursions into Iran and Central Asia, emphasizing a pattern of aggression spanning from the Ural Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea. This narrative sought to underscore the perceived threat posed by Russian expansionism to Muslim lands, thereby positioning Britain as a defender of Islam’s interests.
By monopolizing Muslim trust and subjugating Indian Muslims within the colonial order, the British strategically leveraged the soft power of the Ottoman Khilafat in India. They recognized that Muslims were likely to mount a fierce resistance against
9 Nomikos, et al., “Unintended Consequences”, 551-623.
10 Cemil Ayın, The Idea of the Muslim World, 41.
11 The Times, 13 to 24 July 1867.
12 Saad Omar Khan, The ‘Caliphate Question’ British Views and Policy Toward Pan-Islamic Politics and the End of the Ottoman Khilafat, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24 (2007), 1-25.
71
British colonialism, with the Ottoman Khilafat as a focal point. This policy effectively suppressed immediate conflicts but inadvertently paved the way for new forms of conflict centering the Ottoman Khilafat that gave birth of an essential tension for British imperialism in India. We explore such episode as anxiety that emerged inadvertently by the state apparatus. It also consider that the persistence, evolution, or emergence of the Khilafat in India occurred within various contexts of colonial interests and the tacit support of the British government of India that reveals a pathway through which the Ottoman Khilafat could unintentionally generate further conflict in the future. This was mainly because Khilafat was transferred to an authoritative actor for Muslim resistance against the colonial power structure. This shift in perception was notably observed in the 1880s when Muslims embraced the Khilafat as counter-hegemony against the British. Muslim leaders and intellectuals regarded the Khilafat as an actual authority capable of revitalizing Muslim power in India. This explores the way of institutionalizing the colonial power among the Muslim subjects of India forwarded other unintended factors that constructed jeopardy for colonial rule.
2.1.2. Revisiting the ‘Crown’s Subject’ Tussles
Prior to British colonization, Muslims held political hegemony in India for several centuries. That’s why, the establishment of colonial rule did not immediately eradicate the dominance, legacy, and hierarchical authority associated with Muslim rule. Moreover, the British Crown’s rule faced immediate challenges from local resistance movements mostly dominated by the Muslims. As the British sought to consolidate their governance in India, they looked for a loyal native class that would accept colonial administration and assist in establishing colonial order. In pursuit of this objective, the colonial administration selectively provided facilities to those groups able to align with colonial objectives. Hindus, perceived as more compliant, often received favor from the government. While Hindus viewed the colonial establishment as a change in ruling class, Muslims perceived it as a disruption of political dominance and an ideological disorder. This perception stemmed from Muslims’ historical disobedience towards British rule and their refusal to legitimize the colonialists as the rightful rulers of India. Some Muslim intellectuals posited that disobedience with the colonial administration would yield no tangible benefits for their society, potentially leading to enduring
72
hardships that could weaken their position across all aspects of national life. This understanding prompted a segment of Muslim intellectuals to advocate for loyalty to British rule and discourage resistance. They promoted Western education and values as a means to rejuvenate Muslim society within the colonial power structure. Syed Ahmad Khan was a leading figure in this faction.13 Additionally, they opposed the notion of accepting the Ottoman Khilafat as the supreme authority of the Muslim Ummah. They harbored suspicions that embracing the Ottoman Khilafat’s authority could lead to a complete collapse of Muslim community, especially in the aftermath of the tragic events of the Sepoy Mutiny. Despite this picture, In the 1880s, the emerging Ottoman order presented a complex dynamic for Muslims, devoid of immediate apprehensions regarding its implications. Primarily, Muslims perceived it as a potent symbol of the international Muslim order, capable of influencing, fostering, and unifying them against colonial powers. Secondly, they embrace the Khilafat as the supreme authority for mobilizing, consolidating, and organizing all fragmented Muslim entities toward a collective objective of challenging colonialism. But the acceptance of the Ottoman order posed a significant challenge for Muslims because they were living under the colonial government and had no political dominance over India. Muslims strategically employed identity-related phenomena in their acceptance strategies, particularly through the promotion of the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘order building entity’ in Indian Muslim politics. In terms of expanding their identity-related phenomenon in politics, and functional marvel to unite the Mass, Muslims promoted the Ottoman Khilafat as an ideational denominator that represents a new understanding of Muslim politics in India. Central to this strategy was the promotion of the Ottoman Khilafat as a unifying ideological concept. Moreover, the replacement of the Khilafat order among the Muslims inaugurated from the Friday Khutba, where traditionally, the recitation of the Muslim Khalifa’s name was a common practice and an expression of the religious-political identity, as was enjoyed by the Mughals in Indian mosques. However, with the fall of the Mughal Empire, the name of the Ottoman Khalifa began
13 Shafey Kidwai, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Reason, Religion and Nation (UK: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2021), 197-222.
73
to replace the Mughal in Friday recitations, becoming the last symbol of Sunni Muslim identity by the 1880s, signifying a symbolic transfer of Indian Muslim identity to the Ottoman Khalifa.14 It implies that despite their political subordination under the British colonial order, Muslims maintained a religious subordination with the Ottoman Khilafat. It undermines the colonial hegemony over the religiously connected Muslim hegemon. This connection served to undermine colonial hegemony over a populace whose religious affiliations transcended political boundaries, thereby challenging the colonial narrative of total dominance. The practice of reciting the name of Ottoman Khalifa gained further prominence during the Hamidian era, with Chiragh Ali, a prominent Muslim scholar in India, recognizing Sultan Abd al-Hamid as “Amir al Muminin” (leader of the believers) and Khalifa, thereby emphasizing the Ottoman Sultan’s role as the leader of the Muslim community.15
During this time, the British adopted a strategic approach to impede the Muslim community’s alignment with the Ottoman order. They leveraged the concept of ‘Crown Subjectivity’ among Indian Muslims, which questioned their allegiance to another authority while residing within the British imperial domain. This tactic not only facilitated the British administration’s suppression of native resistance but also framed all opposition as acts of sedition and rebellion against the Crown. Despit this fact, Muslims perceived the British pronouncement as deceitful and as part of a larger conspiracy to solidify authoritarian colonial rule over India. Moreover, they viewed it as a threat to Muslim cultural and political dominance under non-Muslim rule. Muslim intellectuals and politicians implicitly characterized the British declaration as a strategic maneuver aimed at undermining native resistance. Educated Muslims perceived the ‘Crown Subjectivity’ as a deceptive tussle, wherein they closely observed the colonial entity’s neglect of Muslim interests. They projected negative connotation of the colonial rule while despite possessing requisite qualifications, Muslims faced barriers in securing government positions. This disparity, coupled with British exploitation, oppression, monopolistic practices in trade and commerce, and indifference towards the local
14 Gail Minault, The Khilafat, 6.
15 Chiragh Ali (1844-1895) was an eminent Muslim intellectual in India and a close companion of Syed Ahmad Khan. Ali kept a vital role in the development of Muslim education, especially the Quranic reference in the question of Jihad and in protecting Islam from western criticism; he also taught the Muslims how to establish community interest in a diverse colonial rule and involved him in the Aligarh Movement. Ali emphasized the authority of Ottoman Khilafat in the identical question of the Muslims. P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 119.
74
population, particularly evident during the Bengal and Orissa famine, served as a catalyst in discrediting the British assertion of ‘the Queen’s Subject.’16 Furthermore, a poignant illustration of colonial apparatus towards overall indigenous populations is evident in the experiences of Mahatma Gandhi, widely revered as the father of the Indian nation. Following his completion of the esteemed Bar-at-Law in England, Gandhi embarked on his legal practice at the Calcutta High Court. As a Barrister, Gandhi was called by the Indian marchents to South Africa to conduct a case to represent them in a legal matter. However, it was his subsequent journey to South Africa that exposed him firsthand to the virulent racism entrenched within the British colonial system. Gandhi’s reflections on this journey, as detailed in his autobiography, offer profound insights into the systemic discrimination faced by Asian and African peoples at the hands of British authorities. Through his articulate recounting, Gandhi illuminates the pervasive injustices and dehumanizing treatment endured by marginalized communities under colonial rule.
“……But a passenger came next, and looked me up and down. He saw that I was a ‘coloured’ man. This disturbed him. Out he went and came in again with one and two officials. They all kept quiet, when another official came to me and said, ‘Come along’, you must go to the van compartment.’ ‘But I have a first class ticket,’ said I. ‘That doesn’t matter,’ rejoined the other. ‘I tell you, you must go to the van compartment.’ ‘I tell you, I was permitted to travel in this compartment at Durban, and I insist on going on in it.’ ‘No, you won’t,’ said the official. ‘You must leave this compartment, or else I shall have to call a police constable to push you out.” 17 Gandhi was apprehended by the police. The train proceeded on its journey, leaving Gandhi behind. On the following morning, Gandhi was permitted to continue his journey, albeit without access to the first-class compartment of the train. This event proved the reality of the British colonial maltreatment, individuals of Indian descent traveling in the first and second-class compartments of trains, regardless of their professional standing (such as barristers or doctors), often encountered difficulties with railway officials and white passengers. Furthermore, as a graduate from British
16 Senjuti Mallik, “The British East India Company and the Great Bengal Famine of 1770: Towards a corporate Colonial Biopolitics”, Geographical Review (2024), 1-25.
17 M.K. Gandhi, An Autobiography The Story of My Experiments with Truth (New Delhi: Indialog Publication Pvt. Ltd., 1940), 76.
75
university, Gandhi was shocked by the treatment he and his fellow Indians received, raising doubts about the sincerity of British claims of benevolence towards their colonial subjects. Moreover, Gandhi’s autobiography vividly illustrates the pervasive British bias against their colonial subjects, raising questions about the credibility of British claims to uphold the rights of ‘the Queen’s Subjects’. Both Muslim and Hindu politicians frequently referred to Gandhi’s experience to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule over India. Moreover, the experience Gandhi witnessed in South Africa further fueled his resolve to challenge British authority, marking a significant shift towards more radical anti-British sentiments. This transformation marked his transition from a legal professional to a prominent politician in the Indian National Congress, where he advocated for the rights of all Indians, including supporting the Muslim resistance movement centering the Ottoman Khilafat.18 The discourse surrounding colonial exploitation served as a significant focal point in delegitimizing the status of being ‘Queen’s Subjects’. An insightful analysis of British economic exploitation in India can be gleaned from the scholarly contributions of Shashi Tharoor. Tharoor offers a comparative perspective, juxtaposing the economic dynamics under the Mughal rule with those of the British colonial era. This approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the economic impact of British imperialism on India. Tharoor draws upon the research of eminent British historian Angus Maddison, whose seminal works provide empirical data and comparative analysis, shedding light on the stark disparities in economic development and wealth accumulation between the Mughal and British periods in India. Through Tharoor’s lens, Maddison’s findings serve as a foundation for comprehending the magnitude of British economic exploitation and its enduring consequences for the Indian subcontinent. He asserted at the commencement of the eighteenth century, India’s contribution to the global economy, stood at 23 percent, a figure on par with the entirety of Europe. This share, which stood at 27 percent in 1700, underscored the economic vitality of the Indian subcontinent, exemplified by the considerable wealth amassed under the rule of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, whose treasury alone accrued $100 million in tax revenue. However, by the time of Britain’s withdrawal from India, this share had precipitously dwindled to
18 B.R. Nanda, Gandhi Pan Islamism.
76
slightly over 3 percent.19 This decline can be attributed to a fundamental factor: India’s governance was structured to serve Britain’s interests. Over a span of two centuries, Britain’s ascent was substantively underwritten by the systematic exploitation of Indian resources. Consequently, India’s economic potency was sapped, its productive capacities harnessed to fuel the burgeoning British empire. These extensive evidences substantiate the colonial discrepancies, thereby affirming the legitimate stance of the Muslims in delegitimizing colonial rule through resistance and the acceptance of an alternative authentic order. However, since the inception of British colonial rule, Muslims displayed a consistent refusal of acknowledging the British legitimacy, actively engaging in various forms of resistance. This resistance was particularly pronounced in Bengal, which was among the first regions to be colonized in India. From the 1760s onward, Muslims played a central role in the resistance movement known as the “Proja Bidroho”, which was characterized by its subaltern nature and its multifaceted socio-political, cultural, and religious implications. The Fakir-Sannasi movement, the Faraizi movement, and other peasant uprisings in Bengal between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries were significant expressions of Muslim resistance against the established colonial power structures. 20
While British colonial authority spread throughout India, Muslim resistance also took its extensive character, representing significant challenges to colonial rule. Two notable instances were the “Tarika-i-Muhammadi” Movement led by Syed Ahmed Barelvi and Titumir’s resistance in the mid-19th century. Suppressing the resistance, the British labeled the Muslim movement with Islamophobic identity, referred to as ‘Wahabis in India,’ and bound them to treason.21 Moreover, the British strategically utilized this depiction of Muslim resistance as ‘Wahabis’ to appeal to the Ottoman Empire, which held authority over the Muslims. The Ottomans, at that time, were known to be opposed to the Wahabi movement in Arabia. By framing the Muslim resistance in India as Wahabi-inspired, the British sought to align themselves with Ottoman interests and to curry favor with the Ottoman authorities.
19 Shashi Tharoor, An Era of Darkness The British Empire in India (New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2016), 24.
20 Nurul H. Chaoudhury, Peasant Radicalism in Nineteenth Century Bengal: The Faraizi, Indigo, and Pabna Moveemnts (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2001), 41. Muin-Ud-Din Ahmad Khan, “Faraidi Movement”, Islamic Studies 9/2 (1970), 123-147.
21 Qeyamuddin Ahmad, The Wahhabi Movement in India (London: Routledge, 2020), 291.
77
Moreover, Muslim intellectual schools also had not accepted the colonial existence in India; for example, Shah Abdul Aziz, chief of the Wali-Ullah school of thought, declared India as “Dar-ul-Harb”, the state of war. Under this construction, Muslims could not live in India, and the ulama issued the fatwa for “Hijrat-migration” in the neighboring Muslim country, hoping to lead military escalation for Indian independence.22 Furthermore, Muslim political entities refused to acknowledge British existence in India; for example, Tipu Sultan of Hyderabad, the sovereign of a minor Muslim dynasty, vehemently resisted British encroachment and actively sought support from Istanbul in his struggle against British forces.23 The Indian Revolt of 1857, considered the culmination of Indian resistance, saw participation from both Hindus and Muslims in an attempt to resist British rule. Despite their efforts, the revolt failed, leading to prolonged suffering for the Muslim population.24 Following the Mutiny, British policy systematically marginalized Muslims within the colonial state apparatus, rendering them vulnerable across various domains. Amidst this precarious juncture for India’s Muslim community, intellectuals rebuffed the British notion of allegiance to the ‘Crown Subjectivity’, instead invoking their ideational affinity with the Khilafat to align with the Ottoman order in the 1880s. The main objective of Muslim resistance was to challenge and delegitimize the hegemonic authority of the British colonial rule, seeking to revitalize Muslim dominance over the Indian subcontinent. 2.1.3. Scandaling Caliphate: British Projects and Indian Muslim Responses When Indian Muslims moved to embrace the Ottoman Khilafat as a legitimizing authority, the British government responded by shifting its policies and employing discursive strategies to undermine this Muslim initiative. Initially, British authorities depicted Islamic political discourses as inherently perilous, portraying them as regressive and entailing the risk of exacerbating tensions in India. Additionally, the ascension of Gladstone to power in England in 1880 changed the British policy toward
22 Sotten Sen, Britishbirodi Sadhinota Songrame Musulmander Vomika (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1986), 11.
23 Kate Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s Search for Legitimacy Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 28.
24 Syed Mahdi Husain, Bahadur Shah Zafar and the War of 1857 in Delhi, (Delhi: Aakar Books, 1958), 415.
78
the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East, resulting in significant changes in their approach to India. The relationship between Istanbul and London deteriorated, primarily due to the British hostility with Hamidian regime and their occupation of Egypt in 1882, a heartland of the Ottoman Empire.25
Despite this, the British anticipated a de-facto Khalifa in Istanbul to safeguard their interests in the Middle East and the global market network spanning from the Mediterranean to the Indian Sea, they were wary of a strong Sultan like Abdul Hamid remaining in power. That’s the way, throughout the Hamidian Era, the British sought to undermine the Hamidian regime through various unethical means. Initially, they questioned the Ottoman Empire’s legitimacy in holding the Islamic Khilafat, and encouraged internal opposition forces within the Sultanate to play a more active role against Sultan Hamid. The British opposed Sultan’s efforts to unify the Muslim world under the Khilafat order, recognizing that only a united Khilafat could effectively challenge Western hegemony in the Eastern world. British officials and intellectuals employed a strategic approach to undermine the legitimacy of the Ottoman Islamic Khilafat through two key methods. Firstly, they actively promoted Arab nationalism, and secondly, they extended significant support towards the establishment of an Arab Khilafat under the leadership of Sharif Hussein of Hejaz.26 This strategic manipulation of affairs is exemplified in a letter dated 31 October 1914, authored by Lord Kitchener, showcasing British intrigue in the region.
“……it may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring.”27 In this way, British sought to undermine the legitimacy of the Ottoman Khilafat by promoting the idea of an Arab Khilafat led by a Khalifa from the Quraysh family. This strategy included endorsing Sharif Hussain as the Khalifa of the Muslim world. Through a comprehensive policy focused on the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East, the British succeeded in challenging the legitimacy of the Ottoman Khilafat among its subordinates in the region. This strategic move led to a heterogeneous convergence
25 M. Rifat Bey, The Awaking of Modern Egypt (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1964), 73.
26 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstruction Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209.
27 FO 141/578/2 ‘Extract from Letter to the Sherif of Mecca’, 31.10.1914, also cited in Khan, “The Caliphate Question”, 1-25.
79
within the Muslim world, ultimately weakening the political and spiritual authority of the Khilafat. The perplexing reality is that when the British plotted such a conspiracy with the Ottoman subordinates in the Middle East, Khilafat appeared as an order in a distant geography to delegitimize the colonial authority. The case of Muslim resistance in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa produced a new scholarship to understand the Ottoman hierarchal order. Despite being geographically distant from the Ottoman Empire and subordinate to its authority, South Asian Muslims not only accepted the Ottoman Khilafat as a legitimate authority to resist British colonial rule but also actively rejected Hussein’s call for an Arab Khilafat. This rejection was a manifestation of their commitment to preserving the Ottoman Khilafat and can be viewed as an effort to safeguard one of the oldest institutions of Islam.28 During this time, Western scholars also engaged in discourse regarding the legitimacy of the Ottoman Khilafat. Some scholars advocated for the Hamidian vision of establishing the Ottoman Khilafat as a universal Islamic order and criticized Hamidian era as authoritian and legitimized the Khilafat’s processions with Arabs. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and William Muir emerged as prominent figures in the discourse surrounding the Ottoman occupation of the Islamic Khilafat, employing a critical lens to scrutinize the legitimacy of the Ottoman Khalifa. Through their respective writings and engagements, they strategically interrogated the notion of Arab succession to the Khalifa, a matter intricately linked to broader debates regarding the rightful leadership of the Muslim community. Their deliberate interrogation of this issue served to sow seeds of doubt and fostered a climate of uncertainty among global Muslim populations regarding the authenticity and legitimacy of the Ottoman rule under Khalifa Abdul Hamid II. Blunt and Muir’s interventions were not mere academic exercises; rather, they operated within a broader socio-political context characterized by shifting power dynamics and colonial incursions. By challenging the prevailing narrative propagated by the Hamidian regime, which positioned itself as the custodian of Muslim unity and authority, Blunt and Muir
28 FO 882/15 Director, Criminal Intelligence Simla-C.R. Cleveland, 20 June 1917, also cited in Meleady, “Negotiating the Caliphate” 182-197.
80
destabilized established perceptions and opened avenues for alternative interpretations of Islamic governance.29 Moreover, Western intellectuals sought to undermine Muslim notions by raising doubts about the legitimacy of Ottoman authority over the Islamic Khilafat. Their rationale stemmed from the belief that only a united Muslim world under the Khilafat could pose a threat to Western hegemony. However, Muslim intellectuals in India rejected Hussein’s call for the Khilafat and criticized the Blunt theory. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a prominent Muslim intellectual and leader, responded to European and Arab conspiracies by dismissing their arguments regarding an Arab Khilafat. Instead, he referenced Hadith to support the concept of a universal Khilafat, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the Ottoman claim to the Islamic Khilafat.30 Later, pro-Ottoman approaches of the Muslims and their institutions in protecting, preserving, and upholding the Khilafat made the Ottoman Khilafat as order-building entities in the Indian politics.
2.2. To the Edge of Polarity and Muslim Quest for another Order After centuries of dominion in India, Muslims experienced a significant political shift with the establishment of foreign, non-Muslim rule. This transition represented not only a loss of imperial power but also a profound upheaval of a longstanding Muslim civilization. The perceived superiority of Muslim Empires, believed to be divinely supported and capable of surmounting all obstacles, suffered a severe setback in the eyes of Indian Muslims.31 The transition to living under non-Muslim governance was thus a deeply poignant and traumatic experience, marking a stark departure from the centuries-long era of Islamic rule in India. Moreover, the colonial rule significantly undermined the socio-political status of Muslims in India, leading to a decline in their influence across various spheres of national life. In politics, they lost previous dominance, from a ruling elite, Muslims were submerged into polarity because of
29 Wilfred Scawen Blunt, The Future of Islam (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), 48-49. W. Muir, The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall from Original Sources (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1891), 594.
30 John Willis, “Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad”, The International History Review, 32/4 (2010), 711-732.
31 For a similar trauma of the Ottoman elite in the late eighteenth century, see Menchinger, Ethan L., The First of the Modern Ottomans (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 29.
81
colonial oppression, apprehension, killing, or exile. British agression further exacerbated the transfer of power from Muslim zamindars. This shift in power dynamics was particularly evident in the realm of land ownership, where Hindu officials, often serving under Muslim Zamindars, emerged as the new landowners following the displacement of their Muslim superiors. Muslim peasants faced increasing hardships, including heavy tax burdens and the compulsory cultivation of cash crops like indigo, leading many to abandon their lands.32 The influx of European industrial goods into local markets decimated the traditional Muslim cottage industry, while Muslim traders faced severe setbacks, either leaving the country or losing their assets due to imperial exploitation. The politico-economic deterioration of Muslims further eroded their previous societal standing. They struggled to counter Western cultural dominance and were slow to adopt Western education, leading to their perceived backwardness within Indian society. In the realm of education, Muslims faced marginalization due to their reluctance to embrace Christian education, religious cohesion, along with economic hardships. Hence, we argue ‘imperial intrusion’’ which explore the British encroachment on Muslim civilization in India. It engendered vulnerabilities within the Muslim community. This assertion finds support in the correspondence of Palmerston (1784-1865), the British Prime Minister, which underscores the sustained British efforts aimed at subjugating the Indian Muslim populace and their Islamic heritage. Palmerston’s letter to Lord Canning exemplifies this aggressive stance...
“Every civil building connected with Mohammedan tradition (an oblique reference to the Jama Masjid) should be leveled to the ground ‘without regard to antiquarian veneration or artistic predilection”. 33 32 The cultivation of indigo in Bengal was introduced by the British East India Company, and its demand surged in England due to the Industrial Revolution in the early 19th century. Local peasants, whose primary crops were paddy and jute, showed little interest in cultivating indigo. However, English governors and their agents coerced peasants into growing indigo, leading to a system of exploitation known as ‘Dadon’, where indigo planters heavily exploited the peasant community. This exploitation and oppression culminated in a significant peasant revolt against the British in 1859, following two years after the Sepoy Mutiny. In response to this tragic narrative of coerced indigo cultivation and the subsequent peasant revolt, Dinabandhu Mitra authored a drama titled ‘Nil Darpan’. This work, later translated into English by the renowned literalist Michael Madhusudan Dutt, gained widespread popularity in both contemporary India and England. Mitra’s work depicted the harsh realities of indigo cultivation and the suffering of the peasant community, highlighting the oppressive nature of British colonialism. See, Subhas Bhattacharya, “The Indigo Revolt of Bengal”, Social Scientist, 5/12 (July 1977), 13-23. Tirthankar Roy, “Indigo and Law in Colonial India”, The Economic History Review 64/S1 (2011), 13-23.
33 Letter no.9, (9 Oct. 1857) Canning Papers.
82
This statement highlights the implementation of anti-Muslim policies by the British in India, which left Muslims vulnerable to the erosion of their cultural and civilizational heritage. There are many other instances of the British discrepancy, with no concern whatsoever for the reference to the Indian Muslims. One such example is the characterization of the “Mujahidin” (often labeled as terrorists) as synonymous with the Muslim cause.34 The characterization of ‘Muslims as a danger’ to colonial authority was used to justify harsh measures against them, including accusations of overt sedition. In the context of consolidating colonial order, the British consistently depicted Muslims as a menace to colonial rule. This portrayal was particularly pronounced in their efforts to suppress Muslim resistance. Following the Sepoy Mutiny, Delhi endured a horrific colonial repression, transforming into a city of widespread distress. The landscape was marred by images of razed homes, displaced and wounded individuals, plundered palaces, and the targeted elimination of Muslim nobility and officials. The streets ran with blood, and the absence of the call to prayer in Delhi’s mosques underscored the extent of the devastation. This pervasive horror made it challenging for many to openly identify as Muslims. Furthermore, British authorities exiled Muslim leaders and activists to the remote Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean, adding a further dimension to their oppressive tactics.35
In such a political epilogue, Muslims succumbed to the edge of polarity, let made the Muslims fragile in the state. A schematic representation delineating the evolving social hierarchy of the Muslim community can be derived from the works of W.W. Hunter, a British civil servant of that era, who observed and documented this transition.
“The truth is that when the country passed under our rule, the Musalmans were the superior race, and superior not only in stoutness of heart and strength of arm, but in power of political organization, and in the science of practical government. Yet the Muhammadans are now shut out equally from government employ and from the higher occupations of non-official life.”36 This disenchanting circumstances prevalent at the time prompted Indian Muslims to seek avenues to reinvigorate political authority in India. This pursuit led them to seek an
34 Ismail Adam Patel, “Islamophobia in India: The Orientalist Reformatikn of Tipu Sultan-the Tiger of Mysore”, Islamophobia Studies Journal 7/1 (2022), 82-95.
35 Satadru Sen, Savagery and Colonialism in the Indian Ocean Power, Pleasure and the Andaman Islands (London: Routledge, 2010), 157. M.C.C. Bonington, Census of India 1931 Vol.II, The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1932), 5.
36 W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London: Trubner and Company, 1876), 102.
83
alternative legitimizing authority to challenge the colonial dominance. During the 1880s, they gravitated towards the Khilafat order, viewing it as a reliable and authentic authority. Despite this, they faced the challenge of embracing an external authority to contest the existing colonial order. Primarily, they leveraged the influence of the Khilafat as a unifying force among Muslim masses. Over time, spanning from the 1880s to the 1920s, the Khilafat Order emerged as a central actor in the Muslim resistance movement against colonial entities.
2.2.1. Ottoman’s Westward Policy: Lets Muslim Hegemony of South Asia to Die Ali Balcı has recently explored the proposition of reintegrating the Ottoman order into international relations theory.37 He argues that the Islamic hegemony of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, characterized by a shared inter-subjective understanding, serves as a significant parameter for this reintroduction. Despite this shared authority, an intriguing question arises: why did the Ottoman Khilafat remain loyal to London while the Mughal Empire became dismembered and succumbed to British colonial rule? Rather than resisting British incursion as the Mughals faltered, the Ottomans not only observed but also facilitated the Mughals’ defeat by extending support to the British. Furthermore, the British persuaded Istanbul to issue a fatwa from the Khalifa to quell Muslim resistance in India.38 This phenomenon symbolizes a semblance of amicable relations between the Ottoman Empire and the British colonial authorities.
Moreover, Ottomans had passed a critical phase in its historical landscape in the mid-nineteenth century due to the Tanzimat reforms, economic inflation, and military weakness.39 Simultaneously, it contended with Russian expansionism in its core territories and Western dominance over its peripheral regions. In response, the Ottomans pursued a ‘Western Window Foreign Policy’, seeking alliances that could protect them from Russian aggression and and impair western hegemony in their subordinates in Asia, Africa, and the Balkans. While India was not the Ottoman subordinate, it held an incredible power and position within the Muslim world and maintained a bilateral relationship with the Ottomans based not only on Islamic identity
37 Balcı, “Bringing the Ottoman Order”, 2090-2107.
38 Halil Inalçik, “Islamic Caliphate”, 14-34. Shamsaed Ali, “The Ottoman Caliphate and British Imperialism in India”, Proceeding of the Indian History Congress 54 (1993), 739-747.
39 Carter Vaughn Findley, “Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 28/1 (1986), 81-106.
84
but also on inter-subjective understanding. However, in the 1850s, the balance of power favored the British over the Mughals in India, as evidenced by the Ottoman Empire’s alignment with British interests during the Crimean War, where European powers, including the British, played a decisive role.40 However, the incredible Western wave of front war in the Ottoman lands and excessive foreign state interference in the internal affairs undermined the empire’s strength and its ability to advocate against colonial aggression and oppression in distant Muslim territories. Consequently, the Ottomans found themselves in a position of loyalty to the British, while their Muslim counterparts, such as the Mughals in India, succumbed to British colonial rule. Furthermore, from the 1840s onward, British geostrategic interests in Asia significantly influenced their relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Despite this, the strategic geopolitical alignment with the Ottoman Empire became a cornerstone of British foreign policy in the nineteenth century, driven by the goal of securing undisputed control over the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean, which was a crucial sea route for international trade. To achieve this, the British pursued a diplomatic strategy that involved engaging with the Ottomans in a mutually beneficial manner, aimed at securing the sea route while also thwarting Russian ambitions to gain access to the Mediterranean and Black Sea. At the same time, maintaining robust bilateral strategic relations with the Ottoman Empire became a pivotal aspect of British colonial interests in South Asia. This was primarily driven by India’s status as the largest British colony, a significant hub of the global agricultural economy, the primary market for British industrial goods, and a crucial source of British industrial supplies.41 Establishing and maintaining colonial order in India was particularly challenging due to its diverse ethnic and linguistic landscape. However, the British capitalized on the common normative religious identities within India, notably Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Buddhist, from the outset. They employed a divide-and-rule policy to differentiate among colonial subjects and consolidate their interests. Moreover, to exert control over the Indian Muslim population, the British leveraged the soft power of the Ottoman Khilafat in the 1850s,
40 Ali Balcı, et al., “When Doves Feed Hawks: Ottoman War Decision and European Powers Towards the Crimean War”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 47/2 (2022), 67-83.
41 Manu Vimalassery, “The Wealth of the Natives: towards a critique of settler colonial political economy”, Settler Colonial Studies 3/3-4 (2013), 295-310.
85
recognizing the shared Muslim identity between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire. In the context of colonial establishment in India, the British valued the friendship with the Ottoman Empire in the 1850s as it helped secure trade routes and provided a strategic bulwark against perceived Russian expansionism in the Middle East and Central Asia. Conversely, the Ottomans sought British support to implement their Tanzimat reforms and shield the empire from Western encroachment, particularly in the face of Russian assertiveness in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Nonetheless, the bilateral relationship between the Ottomans and the British in the 1850s takes on added significance when considering the Ottoman Empire’s relatively muted response to the decline of its Indian counterpart, the Mughal Empire, at the hands of the British.
2.2.2. Re-reading Khilafat as Order-Building Entity among Indian Muslim The decline of the Mughal Empire in 1858 marked a significant juncture wherein Indian Muslims witnessed the erosion of their socio-political, religious, and economic standing in the Indian subcontinent. This pivotal moment prompted a reevaluation of their position and aspirations, leading to a resurgence of interest in the authority of the Ottoman Khilafat. However, this renewed interest cannot be solely attributed to the Mughal downfall or the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny; rather, it is deeply rooted in the historical context of medieval India. The concept of Khilafat, viewed as a hierarchical authority, had long been intertwined with the fabric of Muslim rule in India. This connection is exemplified by the practice of Indian Sultans during the Delhi Sultanate (1191-1526) period, who sought legitimacy by acknowledging the authority of the Abbasid Khilafat. For instance, Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish (1211-1236), renowned for constructing the Qutb Minar,42 strategically utilized the Abbasid Khalifat to bolster his political legitimacy in the Indian context.43 During the Mughal era (1526-1858), despite the Mughals not formally recognizing the authority of the Ottoman Khilafat and instead using titles like Padisha, Sultan, or Shahen Shah, there existed a mutual understanding. This was evident in the friendly relations between the Ottomans and
42 Qutb Minar, the tallest minarets in Asia shows the glory of Muslim rule and Islamic civilization in India. For more information see, Burton-Page, Indian Islamic Architecture Forms and Typologies Sites and Monuments (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p.50.
43 Blain H. Auer, Symbol of authority in Medieval Islam: History, Religion and Muslim legitimacy in the Delhi Sultanate (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 16-17.
86
Mughals during the reign of Shah Jahan (1628-58).44 Towards the decline of the Mughal Empire, some smaller Muslim dynasties in India, such as Tipu Sultan of Hyderabad and Iqbal al-Dawla of Awadh, acknowledged the Ottoman Khilafat as their hierarchical authority. This gesture was often aimed at legitimizing their own rule or aligning with a broader Muslim framework in their resistance against colonial powers.
Tipu Sultan (r.1782-1799), the sovereign Muslim ruler of Hyderabad in South India, made a momentous resistance against British colonialism at the close of the eighteenth century. In his efforts to establish his legitimacy within the colonial power dynamics, Tipu aligned himself with the authority of the Ottoman Khalifa, positioning himself as a subordinate within the Ottoman Khilafat’s framework. He viewed the Khilafat as the universal Muslim authority and sought support from Istanbul in his resistance efforts and front war against the British.45 Despite his offer to form a commercial and military alliance with the Ottomans, Istanbul’s response remained limited. This event raises the question of how a petty Muslim ruler in India came to embrace the Khilafat as a universal Muslim authority. Before him, in 1777, Sultan of Malabar, Raza Ali Khan, appealed to Istanbul in his capacity as the Khalifa of Islam, seeking support against the British, thereby highlighting the perceived authority of the Ottoman Khalifa and the concept of Muslim hegemony.46 This episode suggests a growing recognition of the Ottoman Khalifa’s influence in India before the Sepoy Mutiny, especially in the south coastal region, as Muslim rulers endeavored to safeguard against Western incursions by leveraging Ottoman naval capabilities. From the onset of the eighteenth century, numerous smaller Muslim and non-Muslim dynasties in the southern coastal region of India found themselves increasingly vulnerable to exploitation and attack by Western colonial powers, including the Portuguese, Dutch, and British. The waning naval supremacy of the Mughal Empire rendered it incapable of adequately safeguarding its territorial waters against the relentless European maritime expeditions directed towards the southern Indian seaboard. Compounding this issue, the Mughal Empire was in decline, with the Delhi Emperor reliant on a pension from the British East India Company, effectively making
44 Cihan Oruc, “Şah Cihan Döneminde Babürlü Osmanlı Diplomatik İlişkileri” VAKANÜVİS Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 2/ 2 (2017), 191-215.
45 Nikhiles Guha, “Tipu Sultan’s Quest for Legitimacy”, 111-119.
46 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name Defteri, no. 9, 80-81.
87
the Company the de facto ruler and unable to effectively defend Delhi or the empire’s territorial integrity. Faced with such dire circumstances, the regional Muslim rulers of the Deccan, Mysore, Malabar, and coastal periphery sought refuge in the protective mantle of the Ottoman Khilafat, venerating the Sultan of Istanbul as the ‘Khalifatul Muslimin’.47 This symbolic act, exemplified by the inclusion of the Ottoman Khalifa’s name in Friday prayers within coastal mosques, underscored their allegiance to the Khilafat order. The inherent inadequacy of central authority compelled these coastal rulers to align themselves with the Ottoman Empire, a preeminent Muslim hegemon, in order to counteract the encroachments of European maritime piracy. Their acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty, thus, constituted a strategic maneuver aimed at fortifying their territorial sovereignty and integrating themselves into a more secure hierarchical framework. During the colonial period, religious and intellectual leaders also employed the concept of Khilafat to legitimize their authority within Muslim society and to mobilize Muslims against colonial powers. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, leaders of the Faraizi movement in Bengal, Hazi Shariyatullah and Dudu Miyan, invoked the idea of Khalifa to assert their position and rally Bengali Muslims against British colonial rule and local Hindu landlords.48 Similarly, in the nineteenth century, prominent Muslim ulama like Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi assumed the title of Khalifa to unify Indian Muslims in resistance against the British and Sikh forces.49 Barelvi and his followers utilized the notion of Khalifa as a symbol of Muslim authority, emphasizing their shared Muslim identity and the concept of Khilafat as a unifying force in their struggle. Many Islamic intellectual schools in India regard Shah Wali-Ullah as a seminal figure in spiritual education, often hailed as the patriarch of all scholars.50 Wali-Ullah recognized the crucial role of a universal Khilafat, considering its importance for Muslim unity. However, he initially adhered to the traditional belief that the Khilafat should be held by the Quraysh tribe.51 Over time, scholars from his school began to champion the
47 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name Defteri, no. 8, 292-293.
48 Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movement in British India (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21.
49 Hunter, Indian Musalmans, 5.
50 Muhammed Enam-Ul-Haq, Varoter Musalman o Sadhinota Andolon (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1993), 12.
51 Shah Wali Allah, Izala-al-Khafa and Hujjat al-Lahil Baligha , II Volumes (Delhi: 1878), 422-429.
88
Ottoman Khilafat as a symbol of Sunni Muslim identity and universal Muslim authority. His grandson, Shah Muhammad Ishaq, who migrated from India in 1841 and settled in Hijaz, similarly embraced the Ottoman Khilafat, recognizing its importance for the Muslim Ummah.52 Furthermore, the acknowledgment of the Ottoman Khilafat by the Indian ulama initially stemmed from the Wali-Ullah school, followed by the Deoband, Chirangi Mahal, and Nadwat al-Ulema schools, all of which played significant roles in disseminating the concept among Indian Muslims. These ‘Islamic intellectual schools’ tacitly affirmed the Ottoman Empire’s utmost claim to the Khilafat in discussions surrounding the decline of the Mughal rule in 1858. Through the considerable influence of the ulama and their institutions, the soft power of the Ottoman Khilafat permeated deeply into Indian Muslim society. Simultaneously, a pronounced influence of the Ottoman Khilafat is discernible among Shi’a intellectuals in India, despite the Shi’a community’s distinct religious ideology, particularly in contrast to their counterparts, the Iranian Shi’a, with whom the Ottomans historically engaged in enduring religio-political rivalry. Indian Shi’a leaders, however, perceived the Ottoman Khilafat as pivotal in global Muslim politics, viewing it as a bulwark against Western hegemony in Muslim-majority territories. This perception is evidenced by the appeals made by Indian Shi’a intellectuals, such as Badr-ud-din Tayyibji, who, in a protest published in the Bombay Gazette, criticized British propaganda regarding Ottomans involvement in the ‘Bulgarian Atrocities’ and petitioned Queen Victoria to support the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish war.53 Similarly, Chiragh Ali, a senior official in the Hyderabad state and a key associate of Syed Ahmed Khan, staunchly advocated for the significance of the Ottoman Khilafat in the Muslim world. He not only perceived a Western conspiracy aimed at undermining the Ottoman Khilafat but also vehemently rejected Blunt’s hypothesis of making Khilafat from a Qurayshite Arab.54 Despite the considerable risks involved, Indian Muslims in the 1880s adopted a cautious approach to accept the Khilafat order, primarily due to the traumatic memories of the severe reprisals they faced during the Indian resistance of 1857. Despite this, certain
52 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 123-124.
53 Sen, British Birodhi Sadhinota, 44.
54 Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, 130.
89
Muslim leaders argued that resistance was necessary as the British were unlikely to grant any concessions to Muslims without it. On the other hand, the loyalist faction of Muslims, led by Syed Ahmed Khan, advocated for a non-resistant stance, suggesting that Indian Muslims should refrain from opposing British rule and instead focus on fostering a modern Muslim society. This vision included embracing Islam and a Muslim social identity, alongside acquiring proficiency in modern European arts, sciences, and social norms.55 Moreover, Syed Ahmed’s perspectives exhibit a dualistic nature, oscillating between admiration and apprehension regarding the Ottoman Empire. Initially, he held the Ottomans in high regard, viewing their modern reforms as emblematic of progress within the Muslim world. However, when the idea of incorporating Khilafat order into the anti-British movement in India emerged, Ahmed staunchly opposed such efforts. He argued that resistance against British rule would lead to further detriment for Indian Muslims, and he viewed the acceptance of Ottoman authority as potentially endangering Muslim political standing in India. Furthermore, he contended that Sultan Abdul Hamid II lacked substantial influence in British India and therefore could not serve as the Khalifa for Indian Muslims. Instead, he asserted that the Sultan was the Khalifa solely for his own domain. Despite this, Ahmed emphasized the religious obligation of Indian Muslims to acknowledge the sovereignty of the British monarch.56 Syed Ahmad consistently prioritized British interests in his discourse, recognizing that Muslim could not do their community improvement by discord with the colonial administration. While Ahmad respected the concept of Muslim Khilafat, he viewed its instrumentalization to challenge colonial rule as a potential catalyst for Muslim fragmentation, a concern underscored by the colonial authorities. This is maily because, he obliquely criticized Indian Muslims for celebrating the Ottoman victory in the Turco-Greek war.57 In contrast, he introduced the Turkish coat and fez as the school uniform at
55 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 11.
56 Syed Ahmed Khan, Akhiri Mazamin, 32-33. Cemil Ayın, The Idea of the Muslim World, 56. Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement 1870-1920, (UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 287.
57 Syed Ahmed Khan, Yunani aur Turk (The Greeks and the Turks) republished in, Panipati (ed.), Maqalat-e-Sir, Vol.16, 411-413. K.H. Qadri, ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan An Assessment of his Personality, Contribution, and Achievements’ Sir Syed Centenary Papers, (Karachi: Sir Syed University Press, 1898), 50-52.
90
the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh.58 While in the 1880s, the Turkish fez gained widespread recognition among Muslims, facilitating the privilege of later rediscovering the Muslim identity through a definite political role based on the Ottoman Khilafat. However, during his lifetime, the students of Aligarh College refrained from engaging in anti-British activities. In the early twentieth century, the new generation of Aligarh students became very vigorous in the resistance movement against the British, utilizing the ideological underpinning of the Ottoman Khilafat to unite the entire Indian Muslim community on a common platform.
The Indian Muslim’s inclination to accept the Ottoman Khilafat as an authority in their resistance against the colonial power was solely connected with their losing power dominance. In the 1880s, prominent Muslim scholars and political figures demonstrated a lack of interest in integrating the Khilafat as their order-building entity against the colonial power because of their experience of colonial oppression following the Sepoy mutiny. Muslim intellectuals in the 1880s, for instance, Nawab Abdul Latif of Bengal, Syed Ameer Ali in Calcutta, Syed Ahmad Khan at the UP (Uttar Prodes-Northern Province), and Badruddin Tayabji in Bombay each tried to adapt to Western order in the development process of the Muslim community in India. They perceived community advancement as closely linked to accepting colonial rule and thus, eschewed active resistance. Moreover, they prioritized modern education and cultural advancement for Muslims. In the early 1900s, Syed Ameer Ali underwent a significant shift in his perspective, viewing the resistance struggle as a vehicle for establishing Muslim hegemony in India.59 He engaged from both London and India in highlighting the issues faced by Indian Muslims within the broader context of global Muslim concerns, identifying the surviving Ottoman Khilafat as the symbol of Muslim unity worldwide. Concurrently, the political landscape among Muslims began to evolve into a more pragmatic realm during the 1910s. This era witnessed the rise of a new generation of Muslim leaders, primarily from the educated middle class, who embraced the Khilafat as a means to delegitimize colonial authority in India. This shift led to the emergence of a new scholarship aimed at galvanizing front resistance against British colonialism, with
58 Kneeth W.Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movement in British India (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 69. Syed Tanvir Wasti, ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the Turks’, Middle Eastern Studies, 46/4, (2010), 529-542.
59 A.C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat, 31.
91
the Ottoman Khilafat as its focal point. 60 These leaders portrayed the Khilafat not only as a religious authority but also as a platform for engaging in realist constructivism. Simultaneously, they positioned it as a potent political force in Indian politics, instrumental in challenging and ultimately undermining colonial rule.
2.3. Re-Picturing Ottoman Order in India In the 1880s, a shift occurred in the Ottomans’ foreign policy, marked by Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s farsightmess and his Pan-Islamic ideology.61 This new approach heralded a renewed emphasis on fostering unity among Muslims worldwide against Western hegemony. Hamidian regime strategically positioned the Khilafat as a focal point for Pan-Islamic aspirations, leveraging Khalifat’s title to evoke sympathy and support across the Muslim world. His efforts aimed to revitalize the Ottoman hierarchical order, which asserted a universal authority that resonated particularly among Muslims who had been subjugated by European colonial powers.62 During this period, the Muslims of distance geographies, separated by thousands of miles from the Ottoman heartlands, embraced the Ottoman Khilafat as the supreme authority in their resistance against powerful European colonial powers. The Indian Muslims’ acceptance of the Ottoman’s order to undermine British colonial rule is astounding to justify the prevalence of the Ottoman’s order in the 1880s. To explore the concept of Ottoman order in the context of supporting Ottoman subordinates in distant regions during the empire’s declining years, we can refer the case of Algeria.63 Despite facing French colonial pressures, the Algerians, seeking to resist Western hegemony, maintained allegiance to the declining Ottoman Empire, highlights the Ottoman Empire’s enduring influence in its subordinate
60 Muslim leaders, for example, Maulana Mahmudul Hasan (1857-1920), Maulana Muhammed Ali (1878-1931), Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1838), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), Hekim Ajmal Khan (1863-1928), Maulana Ubaid-ullah Sindhi (1872-1944), Dr. M A Ansari (1880-1936), Maulana Abdul Bari (1878-1926), Altaf Husain Hali (1837-1914), poet Mohammad Iqbal (1876-1938), Maulana Shibli Numani (1857-1914), Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928), Abdul Halim Sharar (1860-1926), A. K. Fazlul Haque (1873-1962), poet Ismail Hossein Shirazi (1880-1931), and others who were brought up in the contemporary and went through an age of political development in India were the vanguards of the new scholarship of front resistance against the British who embraced the Khalifa as the main vehicle in their resistance against the colonial power.
61 J.M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islamism. Anthony Reid, “Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia”, Journal of Asian Studies xxvi (1976), 267-283.
62 F.A.K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy Abdulhamid II and The Great Powers 1878-1888 (USA:Gorgias Press, 2011), 29. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 (London: Routledge, 2012), 22. Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 16.
63 Ali Balci, “Algeria”, 1-19.
92
entities. The same case took into consideration about Aceh, Indonesia, while defending the Dutch hegemony in the mid of nineteenth century, Acehnese Muslim Sultan Ibrahim Mansur Shah (r.1838-70) accepted the Ottoman Khalifa as his legitimizer.64 During this era, Indian Muslims strategically incorporated the Khilafat as an order into their political discourses. Therefore, the Ottoman officials actively cultivated strong relationships with local communities and patron elites, including non-Sunni minorities in India. The Porte’s efforts to elevate the Ottoman Empire’s global status served as a crucial factor in enhancing Ottoman soft power in India. Furthermore, the Hamidian regime’s policies enhanced the Sultan’s image as a universal Muslim ruler, with extensive diplomatic outreach. Istanbul’s engagement with Indian notables increased on a satisfactory scale, initially exemplified by the conferment of the imperial order of the Mecidiye Nişanı upon Muslim dignitaries, symbolizing exceptional service to the Ottoman Empire. One notable instance was the Nawab of Awadh, Iqbal al-Dawla, receiving a diamond-studded imperial gift from the Yıldız Palace in May 1879.65 Thus, the late Ottoman imperial endeavors, coupled with religious solidarity, effectively politicized the concept of the Khilafat. Therefore, British administration expressed their discontents with the Sultan’s extensive efforts to project Ottoman order and demonstrates extraterritorial influence in British India. This sentiment coincided with the British government’s heightened focus on the Muslim question and the escalation of Islamophobic tensions in the 1880s. British administration saw the transnational Pan-Islamic presence in India as a source of worry.66 Perceiving the rise of Ottoman soft power in India as a potential threat to colonial hegemony, British authorities were adamant about restricting the expansion of Ottoman consulates into the Indian hinterlands. The restrictive measures were primarily aimed at curtailing Ottoman officials’ engagement with Muslim communities, reflecting colonial suspicions regarding the potential of Ottoman influence to challenge the stability of British colonial rule. This is the mainly because, despite repeated appeals from Istanbul to London, the British government in India consisttantly rejected Ottoman’s request to expand its consular representation and firmly reminded their
64 Kadı, “An Old Ally” 1080-1097. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 53.
65 National Archives of India (NAI)- FP/A/August/1879/43.
66 Barbara Metcalf, “Islam and Power in Colonial India: The Making and Unmaking of a Muslim Princess”, The American History Review 116/1 (2011), 1-30.
93
Ottoman counterparts that Indian Muslims were subjects of the British Crown, cautioning against any political maneuvering that could be perceived as interference with the Queen’s subjects.67 Despite British actions, the trends of Pan-Islamic ideology at the fence of Abdul Hamid’s foreign policy elevated the Khilafat to an international Muslim order among the Indian Muslims. Concurrently, Indian Muslims sought to establish and strengthen their ties with the broader Muslim world and Khilafat became the driving force of Muslim integrity against the colonial government. Cemil Aydin posits that the concept of a Muslim World is a modern notion originating in the nineteenth century, formulated by colonized Muslims in response to European imperial discourses that denigrated their racial and civilizational standing.68 Aydin argues that this emergent notion aimed to bolster the dignity of colonized Muslims but inadvertently mirrored colonialist essentialist perspectives and delineated a purported geopolitical unity characterized by a shared religion and civilization, often leading to a separation between Muslims and non-Muslims. During this time, Indian Muslim increasingly recognized and internalized their religious and civilizational ties with the Ottoman Khilafat. This understanding fostered a propensity among them to perceive the Khilafat as an order-building entity conducive to counterbalancing colonial dominance within the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, throughout this epoch, Muslim intellectuals delineated an envisioned Islamic geographic expanse enveloping regions under Muslim dominion extending from Southeast Asia to the Horn of Africa, spanning from the Chinese periphery to the Balkans. This conceptualization fostered a sense of Muslim unity and solidarity. It prompted colonized Muslims to engage with resistance literature against Western powers and to perceive the Ottoman Khilafat as a vanguard of decolonization.69 Furthemore, Hamidian era orchestrated a global Khilafat narrative as a bulwark against Western imperialism, garnering allegiance from Muslims beyond Ottoman territorial confines. Regrettably, colonized Muslims dispersed across the globe perceived this narrative as a potent instrument for anti-colonial defiance. The multifaceted response of Muslims from various regions transformed the waning Ottoman Khilafat into a symbol
67 Özcan, Pan-Islamism,14.
68 Aydin, “The Idea”, 15.
69 Johan Mathew, “Specters of Pan-Islam: Methodological Nationalism and British Imperial Policy after the First World War”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45/6 (2017), 942-968.
94
of order-builder that could influence the courses of resistance against Western imperialism. Indian Muslims, notably, have espoused this concept since the Hamidian Era in dual capacities: firstly, by endorsing the Ottoman Khilafat as a cohesive order, they endeavored to consolidate the Muslim populace for opposing British rule. Secondly, perceiving themselves as a subordinate entity, they harbored the belief that augmenting the hegemon’s power would afford greater protection to its subordinates. In this vein, they exhibited eagerness to aid the Ottoman Empire through material support, as evidenced by their substantial financial contributions to the hegemon’s Baghdad-Hijaz railway project. The Khilafat’s significance grew gradually within Indian Muslim political discourse, and emerged as a pivotal factor in fostering the cohesion and resilience of the Indian Muslim community, serving as a unifying force against Western imperialism. It’s particularly exhibition was focused during the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 while the decisive victory of the Ottomans over the Greeks elicited widespread jubilation among Indian Muslims, leading to celebratory gatherings in Simla and Bombay to extend felicitations to the Sultan. Delegations were dispatched to Istanbul under the auspices of the Ottoman consul-general, reaffirming the community’s allegiance to the Khilafat order. Notably, a Khutba was solemnly delivered in honor of the Khalifa, emblematic of the enduring resonance of Khilafat within Indian Muslim socio-political consciousness.70
Moreover, the Hamidian reign witnessed a concerted effort to reassert the Ottoman Empire’s international standing and extend the influence of the Khilafat globally. This period marked a notable increase in Ottoman extraterritorial authority in India, a development that can be understood through three distinct yet interrelated factors. Firstly, the ideological tenet of Pan-Islamism emerged as a pivotal driver in the propagation of Ottoman authority in India. This doctrine, advocating for the unity of the global Muslim ummah under the leadership of the Ottoman Khilafat, served as a potent catalyst for garnering support and allegiance among Indian Muslims, thereby fortifying the Empire’s sway in the region. Secondly, the burgeoning affinity of educated Indian Muslims towards the Ottoman cause significantly contributed to the amplification of Ottoman influence in India. Intellectual circles within the Indian Muslim populace,
70 Praba Dixit ‘Political Objective of the Khilafat Movement in India’, Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, auth. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi: Monohar, 1981), 43-65.
95
imbued with a sense of transnational solidarity and religious kinship, actively espoused pro-Ottoman sentiments, thereby further solidifying the Empire’s extraterritorial reach. Lastly, there was a notable expansion in the activities of Ottoman high officials, which played a crucial role in enhancing the Ottoman presence and influence in the region.71 Furthermore, prominent Ottoman dignitaries, such as Halil Halid Bey, who served as the consul general in Bombay, actively fostered the dissemination of Khilafat ideals within India. Their efforts involved engaging with Muslim leaders and intellectuals, thereby fostering a deeper connection between the Ottoman Empire and the Indian Muslim community that underscores the Ottoman Empire’s concerted efforts to assert its presence and influence beyond its territorial confines. These multifaceted dynamics of Ottoman engagement in India during Sultan Abdul Hamid’s reign underscore the intricate interplay between diplomatic, ideological, and socio-cultural factors in the expansion of Ottoman influence beyond its traditional border.
2.3.1. Pan-Islamism in Contructing Khilafat Order in India In the 1880s, a group of writers and religious scholars in Istanbul established the ‘Ittihad-i-Islam’ movement with the goal of preserving Muslim culture from Western domination and promoting Muslim unity against imperialism. Concurrently, the Yildiz Palace imbued Pan-Islamic ideology with renewed vigor, garnering Ottoman Khilafat’s significant popularity across Muslim lands and becoming a focal point for aspirations of united Muslim resistance against Western hegemony. In India, the 1880s witnessed a rise in pro-Ottoman sentiments, championed by both modern educated Muslims and traditional religious scholars. They actively promoted Pan-Islamism and the pro-Khilafat ideology not only as a defense against Western hegemony but also as a means to assert their identity in Indian political discourse. While existing literature extensively covers Pan-Islamism in India, our research diverges by focusing on a distinct strand that emphasizes India’s version of Pan-Islamism, which promoted pan-Indian Muslim nationalism driven by pragmatic geopolitical considerations. Our scholarship explores the historical roots of Pan-Islamism, tracing them back over fourteen centuries ago to the expansion of Islam beyond the confines of Arabia, proliferating across Asia, Europe, and Africa, thereby establishing itself as a global faith within a mere century following
71 Diren Çakılcı, “Hindistanda Osmanlılar Bombay Osmanlı Şehbenderliği”, Türkiyat Mecmuası 25 (2015), 81-106
96
the demise of Muhammad (S.M.).72 Moreover, India was not outside the sphere of influence of the Islamic Khilafat, as Islam’s presence in India dates back to its age of revelation (610-632 C.E.) through Arab trade.73 However, the Muslim conquest of India in 712 C.E., during the Umayyad Caliphate under al-Walid (r.705-715 CE), established a partial political authority. It was not until the victory in the battle of Tarain in 1191 C.E. that Muslims firmly established political control over India. Throughout the period of Muslim rule in India, the Khilafat served as a legitimizing authority for Muslim Sultans. By accepting the hierarchical authority of the Khilafat, Indian Sultans legitimized their position among the Muslim entities of India and forged connections with the wider Islamic world. This is mainly because the concept of Pan-Islamism resonates deeply in the Indian context, as articulated by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a prominent Indian Pan-Islamic leader. Azad argued that Pan-Islamism is a historical phenomenon spanning fourteen centuries, with its revival becoming imperative during the Hamidian era. This modern Pan-Islamic perspective emphasizes intra-Muslim connectivity, nurtures a sense of Muslim self-identity, and catalyzes efforts to end colonialism in Muslim lands.74 Furthermore, in her scholarly discourse, Nikki R. Keddie posits that the genesis of the Pan-Islamic concept cannot be singularly attributed to Abdul Hamid or Jamal Uddin Afghani. Instead, Keddie underscores the pivotal role played by the Young Ottomans, particularly highlighting the contributions of Namik Kamal, as the progenitors of Pan-Islamism. Central to Kamal’s ideological framework was the advocacy for Islamic solidarity aimed at safeguarding the collective interests of the Muslim world. Through her academic analysis, Keddie elucidates the nuanced historical trajectory wherein the Pan-Islamic ethos emerged as a multifaceted phenomenon rooted in the intellectual ferment of the Young Ottoman movement.75 Rather in discussions of Islamic globalism, Pan-Islam emerges as a form of Muslim political universalism that acknowledges the shared identity of Muslims worldwide. During the rapid ascendancy of Pan-Islamic ideology in the Hamidian era, Ottoman order extended significantly beyond its territorial borders. During the historical period
72 Anisur Rahman, Globalization and Islam A Study of South Asian Muslim (Dhaka: Dyu Publication, 2019), 37.
73 Board of Researcher, Islam in Bangladesh through Ages (Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, 1995), 7-11.
74 Al-Hilal, col.2. (6 November 1912), 20.
75 Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal”, 46-67.
97
under consideration, the concept of Pan-Islam exerted a profound influence on the intellectual milieu of Indian Muslim scholars, engendering a steadfast belief in the primacy of the Ottoman Khilafat as the preeminent global Muslim authority. This ideological orientation significantly shaped Muslim political discourses, leading them to portray the Khilafat as a hegemonic entity. Embracing this notion, Indian Muslim thinkers sought to undermine the legitimacy of colonial rule in India by positioning the Khilafat as a potent symbol of Islamic sovereignty, thus articulating a narrative that sought to reframe the colonial presence as an illegitimate imposition over a politically conscious and unified Muslim populace.
Jamal ad-Din Afghani, a prominent proponent of Pan-Islamism, made two notable visits to India, first in the 1850s and later in the 1860s.76 While historical accounts initially presented discrepancies regarding his arrival in India, Nikki R. Keddie’s analysis, drawing extensively from archival sources in India, Iran, Egypt, and Istanbul, suggests that Afghani’s documented visit occurred from the late 1879s to the late 1882s.77 During this period, Afghani traversed across various regions of India, including Bombay, Hyderabad, Delhi, and Calcutta, where he engaged with Muslim scholars and intellectuals, particularly those associated with Aligarh. Afghani’s oratorical prowess earned him admiration among Indian Muslims, who viewed him as a Sunni advocate advancing the cause of universal Khilafat to free Muslim nations from colonial domination. While traditional narratives often credit Afghani with the development of Pan-Islamism in India, an assessment of his success can be made by examining his followership. It appears that Afghani struggled to amass a substantial following in India, and he was not acknowledged by Indian Pan-Islamic leaders as their forerunner. In fact, during his lifetime and for several years after, Afghani remained relatively unknown or overlooked in India. Naeem Qureshi has argued that Pan-Islamism had already begun to take root in India prior to Afghani’s arrival, suggesting that his influence on its development may have been overstated.78
In reconsidering Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s role as the principal propagator of Pan-Islamism in India, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant impact of his visit to the
76 Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam, 7.
77 Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din-Afghani A Political Biography (California:University of California Press, 1972), 143.
78 Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 37.
98
region, particularly in revitalizing the perspectives of Indian ulama towards the concept of the universal Khilafat. While Afghani’s contributions were profound, Indian ulama attributed the essence of the universal Khilafat more closely to the ideological framework of Shah Waliullah, the pioneering Muslim intellectual who underscored the importance of the universal Khilafat.79 This narrative aims to reevaluate the predominant view that Afghani was the primary source of Pan-Islamism in India. Moreover, Afghani’s vision of a Pan-Islamic unity, encompassing the universal Khilafat, remained largely unfulfilled during his lifetime, primarily due to his forced seclusion. His profound understanding of Abdul Hamid’s strategies led to suspicions from the Hamidian administration, which believed he was collaborating with the Ottoman Empire’s adversaries advocating for an Arab Khilafat.80 This situation further hindered the realization of Afghani’s Pan-Islamic aspirations, highlighting the complexities and challenges he faced in advancing his vision. Our research underscores the pivotal role of Pan-Islamism and its historical underpinnings in precipitating the ascendancy of the Ottoman order in South Asia, thereby influencing the emergence of Pan-Indian Muslim nationalism. Muslim leaders in India embraced the principles and manifestations of Pan-Islam, recognizing it as a potent tool for galvanizing political mobilization against British colonial rule, viewing Khilafat as an international platform for Muslims solidarity, with the Ottoman Sultan serving as the mechanism for maintaining this solidarity. Their construction of Ottoman Khilafat as the order-building entity legitimized their political existence in India and this inspiration made them more resistive against the colonial rule in the 1910s. Moreover, the rise of pro-Khilafat approach in India gained momentum and evolved into a potent force in Indian Muslim politics by the onset of World War I, while the declaration of Jihad by the Shaikhul Islam increased anxiety in colonial administartion.81 Concerns arose among the British regarding the allegiance of Muslim soldiers in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, as they questioned whether these soldiers would be
79 Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington, D.C: Public Affairs Press, 1963), 126-127.
80 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 163.
81 K.H. Ansari, “Pan-Islam and the making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialist”, Modern Asian Studies 20/3 (1986), 509-537.
99
willing to fight against their Ottoman Muslim counterparts.82 Conversely, the Ottoman proclamation of Jihad against the British contributed significantly to the cultivation of anti-British sentiment among Muslim political leaders in India. This sentiment was further fueled by the collaborative efforts of the Ottoman and German forces, which galvanized certain segments of the Muslim populace in India toward the aspiration of liberating the country from colonial rule.83 This fervor for Indian independence among Muslims intensified following the war, leading to the emergence of discourses of Muslim resistance, prominently exemplified through the Khilafat movement and its collaboration with the non-cooperation movement against colonial authority.
This convergence of Muslim aspirations for Indian independence, coupled with the broader resistance movements against British colonial rule, engendered a spontaneous and inclusive participation of various political entities within India, including Hindus. This collaborative engagement underscored a shared desire to challenge and ultimately dismantle colonial authority, while simultaneously reaffirming the cultural and civilizational integrity of the Indian subcontinent. Within the discourse of Indian independence, Indian Muslims actively advocated for the cause of the Ottoman Khilafat, viewing it as a means to revitalize their cultural heritage and assert their political dominance over India. Muslim leadership not only portrayed the British as adversaries of Muslims but also as antagonists of entire Eastern civilizations, viewing their actions as eroding indigenous cultural and civilizational foundations, thereby reinforcing Western hegemony. 2.3.2. Exploring Indian Muslim’s Visit to Istanbul and Pro-Ottoman Muslim Mentality During the 1880s, there was a notable increase in the visits of Indian Muslims to Istanbul, exemplified by Shahzada Sultan Ibrahim, a descendant of the Indian Sultan, seeking refuge in Istanbul and receiving the benevolence and hospitality of the Khalifa. Functioning as the leader of Indian Muslim exiles, Shahzada Sultan Ibrahim was
82 Nikolas Gardner, “Sepoy and the siege of Kut-al-Amara December 1915- April 1916”, War in History II/3 (2004), 307-326.
83 Syed Tanvir Wasti, “The Political Aspiration of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus”, Middle Eastern Studies 42/5 (2006), 709-722.
100
granted a monthly stipend of 500 kuruş by the Ottoman government.84 Another prominent Muslim intellectual Nusrat Ali Khan (Moula Bukhsh), who espoused the cause of Pan-Islamism, cemented ties with the Ottoman realm by marrying a Turkish woman and founding the “Peyk-i-Islam”, a significant periodical advocating the Ottoman Sultan’s universal Khalifa status. However, the British colonial administration in India proscribed this publication. Upon seeking sanctuary in Istanbul, Nusrat Ali Khan faced allegations from the British authorities regarding his purported role in presenting a memorandum, endorsed by approximately seventy Muslim princes of India, affirming the Ottoman Sultan as the Khalifa of the Muslim world.85 Iskender Efendi, a prominent Indian Muslim intellectual, gained significant recognition through the publication of the “Akhbar-i-Darul-Khilafat”, which notably captured the attention of intellectuals in India, notably captivating Syed Ameer Ali’s interest in Ottoman affairs.86 Ali played a pivotal role in catalyzing the emergence of the Khilafat order within the Indian Muslim community. He sought to portray the Khilafat as a symbol of pan-Islamic solidarity and a vehicle for resistance against British colonial hegemony in India. His oratory prowess and written works accentuated the spiritual and political significance of the Ottoman Khilafat, elevating its status among Indian Muslims.87 Moreover, his leadership was indispensable in mobilizing support for the Khilafat, contributing significantly to its widespread acceptance and recognition as a rallying point for Muslim grievances against British imperialism. In parallel, Shaikh Abdul Qadir, author of the “Maqam-i-Khilafat”, embarked on a seminal journey to Istanbul in 1906, encapsulating his experiences in a comprehensive anthology that illuminates the pivotal role of Khilafat in Muslim identity discourse and its significance in countering colonial hegemony.88 Central to Qadir’s inquiry was the inquiry into why Muslims should adopt the Ottoman Khilafat to fortify their identity against colonial dominance. Another influential Islamic intellectual, Maulana Shibli Numani, visited Istanbul in 1892 and penned the renowned “Safarnama”, offering
84 Syed Tanvir Wasti, “Two Muslim Travelogues: to and formIstanbul”, Middle Eastern Studies 27/3 (1991), 457-476.
85 Ram Lakhan Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish Empire 1853-1882 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973), 158-159.
86‘The Memories of Rt. Hon’ble Syed Ameer Ali’, (Calcutta: Islamic Culture Centre, 1932), 505 &517-518.
87 Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideals of Islam, With a Life of the Prophet (UK: Christophers, 1922).
88 Shaikh Abdul Qadir, Maqam-E-Khilafat Safar-e-Istanbul ke Haalat (Delhi: Makhzan Press, 1906).
101
invaluable insights into the sanctity of Islamic holy sites, and the centrality of Khilafat and Khalifa.89 These visits and literary works by Muslim intellectuals profoundly influenced the perspectives of young and educated Muslims in India, often referred to as ‘pro-Ottoman Indians’. They served as catalysts for the growing acceptance of Ottoman order, and their embrace of Ottoman Khilafat as a legitimizing authority laid the groundwork for robust resistance against colonial hegemony in India. Moreoevr, since the late 19th century, a discernible augmentation in the pro-Ottoman adherents emerged within India and London, primarily comprising Western-educated Muslim intellectuals disillusioned by the ramifications of colonialism in the Indian subcontinent. These individuals identified the annoyance of British colonialism as the key obstacle to the progress and well-being of the Muslim community. They advocated for the importance of the Khilafat as a unifying symbol for Muslims worldwide in their resistance against colonial hegemony. London-based Indian Muslim scholars responded the most in promoting Pan-Islamism in India. Among them, Barrister Mushir Hosain Kidwai (1878-1938) from Gadia, Northern Province (UP) played an active role in advancing different programs of the ‘Pan-Islamic Society’ based in London. Moreover, the roots of this movement can be traced back to the establishment of the ‘Anjuman-i-Islam’ in London in 1886, with branches in India and other countries. In 1903, Barrister Abdullah al Mamun Suhrawardy (1875-1935) revitalized the dormant ‘Anjuman-i-Islam’ under the Pan-Islamic Society of London, and renamed it as ‘the Islamic Society’. This organization became more functional in advocating for the rights of Muslims, while Syed Ameer Ali became the principal patron.90 Thus, Muslim intellectuals actively promoted the Ottoman Khilafat, which served as the symbolic
89 Shibli Numani, Safar Nama-i-Misr-o-Rum-o-Sham (Türkıye Mısır Suriye Bir Seyahatname), trans. Muharrem Varol (Istanbul:Timaş Yayınları, 2021).
90 Syed Ameer Ali emerged as a prominent Muslim intellectual in nineteenth-century India, distinguished by his Western education and the synthesis of Western values with Islamic knowledge. His scholarship aimed to reconcile Islamic teachings with scientific principles, advocating for the revitalization of Muslim society through the integration of Western and Islamic scholarship. Ameer Ali’s prolific writings on Islamic history, including works such as ‘The Spirit of Islam’, ‘A Short History of Saracens’, ‘Islam A Critical Examination of the Life and Teaching of Mohammed’, ‘Ethics of Islam’, and ‘The Legal Position of Women in Islam’, established him as a veteran scholar in the field. Noteworthy for his founding roles in the London Muslim League and the Central National Muhamedan Association, Ameer Ali was also the first Indian to serve as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. His visit to Istanbul in several times underscored his deep interest in the legacy of Islamic Khilafat, and he was one of the leading pro-Ottoman intellectual in India, particularly through his support for the Khilafat movement. M.A. Rahim, “Syed Ameer Ali and Muslim Politics and Renaissance”, Islamic Studies7/2 (1968), 33-112. K.K.Aziz, Ameer Ali: His Life and Works, 1849-1928, (Lahore: Publishers United Limited, 1968).
102
nucleus of the Islamic polity, encapsulating both temporal and spiritual dimensions deemed essential for the preservation of Islam’s prestige and authority. This resonated profoundly with Indian Muslims, as it underscored as an order of safeguarding Muslim’s power dominance against the Westen powers.
2.3.3. Ottoman High Officials in Promoting Ottoman Order in India The official engagements of the Ottoman’s high officials, particularly through its consulate in Bombay, significantly contributed to the dissemination of pro-Khilafat ideals in India. The Porte actively advocated for enhanced ties between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim population of India. Halil Halid Bey (1869-1931), as previously mentioned, the recently appointed Ottoman consul in India, established fruitful relationships with Indian pro-Ottoman leaders and intellectuals. Bey’s extensive travels to various cities in India included the presentation of prayer mats for mosques on behalf of the Ottoman Khalifa and Sultan, furthering the propagation of global Khilafat sentiments.91 Furthermore, the establishment of Ottoman consulates in Bombay and Calcutta in 1849 marked a significant development in the Ottoman Khilafat’s efforts to expand its influence in India. This move held particular significance as Calcutta served as the capital of British India at the time, while Bombay stood as one of India’s major port cities. The opening of these consulates provided Istanbul with a platform to exert its soft power in South Asia.92 During the 1910s, there was a noticeable uptick in the engagement of Ottoman visitors within the Indian subcontinent. Among these visitors was Muhammad Samey Bey, dispatched to India by the Committee of Union and Progress with the purpose of galvanizing Indian Muslims about Khilafat order. Additionally, Kemal Umar Bey, Adnan Bey, and Lieutenant Mustafa Sadek of the Ottoman army arrived in Bombay, where they held discussions with the Ottoman vice-consul in Bombey. The presence of Ottoman emissaries in India during this period elicited significant scrutiny from the British government of India. Certain individuals were even detained. However, when pressed, the Ottoman representatives justified their visit by expressing gratitude to their Muslim brethren in India for their support during
91 Tanvir Wasti, “Halil Halid: Anti-Imperialist Muslim Intellectual”, Middle Eastern Studies 29/ 3 (1993), 559-579.
92 Başbakanlık Arşivi (BOA), Şehbender Defteri, Vol.I, (1802-1879), 41-42.
103
the Balkan War.93 Despite this, the British government harbored apprehensions regarding the presence of Ottoman officials in India, particularly fearing potential Muslim resistance on the eve of the First World War. They perceived the visits by Ottoman officials as potential instigators of anti-colonial sentiments among the Muslim population. This suspicious attitude underscores the notion that a hegemon in decline can paradoxically exhibit heightened efficacy in power projection, while its subordinate entities may concurrently display tendencies of resistance against prevailing power structures.
2.3.4. Projection of Khilafat Order in Pan-Indian Muslim Politics and Imperial Challenges
Indian Muslims sought to establish a cohesive narrative that could validate their status within the colonial power dynamics. Embracing the Khilafat as an order, they aimed to challenge the colonial hegemony in India, aspiring to reinstate Muslim dominance in the region through the quest for Indian independence. In an effort to intertwine Pan-Islamism with the Indian nationalist sentiment, Abul Kalam Azad recognized the imperative of forging a Muslim-Hindu alliance.94 He diligently pursued this objective, successfully garnering Hindu support for the nationalist interpretation of the Khilafat movement. This collaboration saw Hindu leaders endorsing the Muslim resistance centered around the Ottoman Khilafat, acknowledging its profound impact on Indian political discourse. The involvement of Congress leader Mahatma Gandhi in the 1919’s Muslim resistance for the Khilafat further underscores the intertwined nature of these movements.95
This historical context illustrates the Muslim community’s endeavor to reclaim their political dominance within the Indian landscape through the Khilafat order. In addition, ideological variances existed among Muslim intellectual schools in India, exemplified by contrasting approaches to engagement with Western ideas. Syed Ahmad Khan epitomized the pro-Western stance, advocating a modernist Muslim identity shaped by European enlightenment principles.96 In contrast, the Deoband Ulama pursued a
93 Tanvir Wasti, “The Political Aspirations”, 559-579.
94 John Willis, ‘Debating the Caliphate”, 711-732.
95 Shabnum Tejani, “Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and its aftermath, 1919-1927”, South Asia Research 27/3 (2007), 249-269.
96 Syed Ahmad Khan, “Sultan -e- Rum aur Hindustan ke Mussalman”, Maqulat13 (1888), 428.
104
revivalist agenda, seeking to rejuvenate Islamic civilization.97 Despite these differences, in the 1910s, pro-Ottoman intellectuals projected Khilafat as a common ground to bridge the divide, fostering a sense of unity among Indian Muslims. Pro-Ottoman leaders, for example, Ali-brothers- Muhammed and Shaukat Ali, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, and Zafar Ali Khan played pivotal roles in promoting this unity, asserting that resistance against British rule was essential to safeguarding Muslim interests in India. The ulama oriented towards Deoband declared India as “Darul Harb”, justifying “Jihad” against the British as both legally permissible and religiously obligatory. In contrast, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad led a more radical faction that sought to forge an alliance with Hindus in resisting British rule.98 This group advocated for the establishment of an international communication network to strengthen the Khilafat order and garner greater support for Indian independence. They framed the Ottoman Khilafat as a bulwark against Christendom, rallying the Muslim East against the Christian West by promoting the Islamic Khilafat as a global Muslim order. This Pan-Islamic initiative inspired efforts to unify Indian Muslims in a Pan-Indian resistance, with the Khilafat at its core. Consequently, Pan-Islamism and pro-Ottoman Khilafat sentiments played a crucial role in fostering Pan-Indian Muslim political unity, uniting diverse Indian Muslims who were divided by regional, linguistic, class, and sectarian differences within the colonial social structure.99 To comprehend the nature of the Pan-Indian Muslim resistance, we can refer to the assessment of Ottoman ministers Jamal and Enver, who had pledged that Ottomans and her allies would support Indian independence at the peace conference after the victory of the central power.100 The British administration became increasingly concerned over the increasing influence of the Khilafat order within Indian Muslim society. This apprehension stemmed from the perception that a segment of the younger, educated Muslim leadership regarded the Ottoman Khilafat as a legitimate authority, leveraging it to challenge British colonial rule in India. Syed Ameer Ali, in particular, exemplified this trend when he advocated for Muslim interests within the Indian government, notably supporting the Muslim demand for a ‘Separate Electorate’ under
97 Yoginder Sikand, “The Indian Madrassahs and the agenda of Rerorm”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25/2 (2005), 219-248.
98 K.H. Ansari, ‘Pan-Islam and the Making”, 509-537.
99 Ishtiaq Ahmad-Mahmud-ul-Hasan Butt, “From Pan-Islamism to Muslim Nationalism: Khilafat Movement and the Struggle for Pakistan”, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XXXIII/2 (2012), 1-22.
100 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, 133-134.
105
the Morley-Minto Reforms Acts of 1909.101 Ameer Ali underscored to Morley, the British Secretary of State for India, that any perceived injustice or suspicion of unjust treatment of Muslims in India by the British could evoke a significant and detrimental reaction in Constantinople.102 Consequently, the British administration could not ignore the Muslim demand, leading to the establishment of Muslim political legitimacy for the first time in India through the Indian Act of 1909. This event witnessed the Ottoman Empire, despite its declining influence, revitalizing itself as a potent Muslim hegemon capable of engendering counter-order among its subordinates to confront colonial hegemony.
British colonial rule disrupted existing power dynamics in India, prompting various communities to either accept or adapt to the new ruling authority. However, for Indian Muslims, this shift was particularly profound and marked by tragic consequences, leading to their marginalization across political, economic, cultural, and educational spheres. Amidst the discourse of declining Muslim hegemony over India, Indian Muslims turned to the Ottoman Khilafat as a symbol of Muslim hierarchical order. While embracing this order, they also sought to challenge British colonial dominance in India, aiming to establish their legitimacy in the political landscape. This dual objective motivated Indian Muslims to actively participate in the anti-British movement, demonstrating a persistent resistance against colonial rule. Between the 1880s and the 1920s, the Khilafat emerged as a unifying entity for Indian Muslims, fostering a sense of unity and resistance against colonial rule.
Moreover, Indian Muslims’ embrace of the Ottoman Khilafat as an order was intricately linked to their desire to rejuvenate their political ascendancy in India which they lost due to colonial occupancy. By endorsing the Khilafat order, they sought to incorporate 101 The Morley-Minto Reforms Act, enacted by the British Parliament in 1909, marked a significant development in the evolution of Indian governance by introducing reforms to the Legislative Council of India and facilitating increased Indian participation in the political process. Prior to the implementation of this act, Indian leaders, representing diverse religious and cultural backgrounds, articulated various demands for reform. Notably, a delegation of Muslim leaders, led by Aga Khan, met with Lord Minto in 1906 to advocate for the establishment of separate electorates for Muslims within the Indian government. The eventual enactment of the Morley-Minto Reforms Act represented a milestone in Indian political history, as it formally acknowledged and institutionalized Muslim representation in the Indian political landscape, a recognition that had been notably absent for over five decades following the decline of Muslim political authority in India. Reece Jones, ‘The False Premise of Partition’, Space and Polity 18/3 (2014), 285-300. Harish Kumar, “The Marle-Minto Reforms Established the Moral and Legal Bases for the Establishment of Imperialism in Indian Subcontinent: An Overview”, International Journal of History, 3/1 (2021), 21-23.
102 Niemeijer, Nationalism and Pan-Islamism, 48.
106
the masses into their narratives of resistance against colonial rule. This intriguing dynamic allows for the portrayal of Indian Muslims as subordinate entities and the Ottoman Khilafat as the order-building entity. In exploring this phenomenon, a new perspective emerges within the hierarchy literature, particularly in two key frameworks. Firstly, it illustrates how resistance can shape the order, focusing on Indian Muslim resistance that embraced the Ottoman order in opposition to the existing colonial order. Secondly, it highlights the functionality of the waning Ottoman order outside its territorial domain, offering insights into hierarchy literature regarding how a declining hegemon can maintain functionality within its subordinate territories beyond geographical confines. The proceeding discussion will focus the functional aspect of the Ottoman hierarchical order in the context of Muslim resistance in India, shedding light on the intricate interplay between political aspirations, religious solidarity, and hierarchical structures in shaping historical narratives.
107
CHAPTER 3: ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTTOMAN KHILAFAT TO LEGITIMIZE MUSLIM RESISTANC IN INDIA
This chapter delves into the dynamics of Indian Muslim subordination within the Ottoman hierarchical order during the 1910s, aiming to legitimize their political presence against the colonial power structure. During this period, Indian Muslims turned to the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘alternative order’ to challenge and undermine the colonial regime through organized resistance. This resistance was primarily motivated by two fundamental factors: firstly, the ‘internal grievances’ faced by Muslims under British rule, and secondly, the perception of the ‘western conspiracy centering on the Ottoman Khilafat’. These two influential factors stimulate them to resist British colonial rule over India. This chapter aims to elucidate how these factors significantly influenced the trajectory of the Muslim resistance and how the Muslim movement constructed the Ottoman Khilafat as ‘order building phenomenon’ to a position of prominence in Indian politics.
In this chapter, I build a framework to understand anti-colonial Muslim resistance through the lenses of hierarchy oriented studies, examining the main hypothesis that how Muslim resistance accepted the Ottoman order to delegitimize the colonial order in India. The framework is based on two core arguments, each supported by a set of six cases. These cases are divided into two categories: three cases that are internally linked to the Muslims within the colonial power structure, and another three that pertain to Ottoman affairs. The first internal case explores how the British policy of the ‘cancellation of the partition of Bengal’ increased Muslim grievances and inspired them to organize a fervent resistance against the colonial rule. The second case delves into how specific British policies, for instance, the ‘refusal of establishing a Muslim university in Uttar Pradesh (UP)’ contributed to the process of delegitimizing colonial rule over India. The third case focuses on how the demolishment of a ‘Muslim religious relics’ during the construction of a highway symbolized the disregard and insensitivity of the British colonial authorities towards the religious sentiments of the Muslim community and how it deepened the sense of mistrust among Muslims towards the British. Through an examination of these three pivotal cases, we posit the emergence of Muslim resistance as a response to the series of grievances they experienced under
108
British colonial rule in the 1910s. Therefore, these three dynamics failed to align with the aspirations of Indian Muslims, leading them to question the legitimacy of British colonial rule. Consequently, the initial arguments delve into the approach in which how these three domestic events contributed to a discernible shift in Muslim loyalty towards resistance.
These factors, coupled with the reverberations of the Western intrigue centering on the Ottoman Empire, engendered a heightened resistance against the prevailing colonial hegemony in India. Thus, the second argument delves into the collision of external factors, the dynamics within the Ottoman Empire, on shaping the resistance narrative among Indian Muslims. This analysis adopts a multifaceted framework, highlighting three pivotal case studies. The initial case delves into the ramifications of the ‘Battle of Tripoli’, elucidating how it instigated perturbation among Indian Muslims, who subsequently construed this event as an unfolding Western conspiracy targeting Muslim civilization. The second case scrutinizes the repercussions of the ‘Balkan Wars’, revealing the Western derision following the Ottoman defeat, which deeply perturbed Indian Muslims, interpreting these events as integral components of a concerted conspiracy against global Muslim interests. These events collectively underscore to the Muslim populace that their hierarchical authority- the Ottoman Khilafat, was susceptible to encroachments by Western power, while they were living under the confines of British rule. This perception influenced them to rethink their position in the colonial power structure and they believed that their cultural and civilizational integrity appeared precarious within the “dar-al-harb”. Such insight further fueled the burgeoning mistrust towards British colonial governance in India, galvanizing the Muslim community to accept the Ottoman order against colonial power, thereby intensifying their resistance against the British colonial entities. This paradigm sets the stage for the formulation of the third case, elucidating the nuanced responses of Indian Muslims to the Ottomans during the World War I.
Despite these, from the 1880s, the continuously changing character of the Ottoman Khilafat preponderance gives an idea of the extent, potential, and meaning of the Muslim political rise in India which in the 1910s was transferred as ‘order-building phenomenon’ by a flock of progressive Muslim leaders who tighten up the ‘Khilafat Order’ to delegitimize the British rule over India. This intriguing puzzle made a
109
fundamentally different narrative about the rise of Ottoman hierarchical authority in India in the early decades of the twentieth century. This is mostly because; during this time, the Muslim leaders became more aware of the questions of power, revolt, resistance, order while they founded All India Muslim League (AIML) as the first Muslim’s political organization. Moreover, this research undertakes an examination of resistance-oriented approaches, elucidating how the Muslim resistance strategically accepted the Ottoman order against colonial existence over India.
The exploration delves into the intricacies of the Muslim movement within the discourses of Indian politics, emphasizing the contingency of its motives rooted in resistance. Therefore, the first part of this chapter explores a framework, elucidating the rationale behind the Muslim community’s deliberate defiance of colonial authority, and the second section scrutinizes the manner in which Indian Muslims embraced the Ottoman order in their resistance narrative. Within the overarching context, Indian Muslims articulated their primary stance, asserting the imperative for autonomy as a means to liberate themselves from the shackles of British colonialism. This assertion was substantiated by referencing these specific cases, wherein the colonial policies perceived as detrimental to Muslims, proved inadequate in meeting their requirments, thereby, prompting their inclination towards embracing alternative order. Following this foundational argument, a secondary approach was advanced, elucidating the perception of a Western conspiracy revolving around the Ottoman Khilafat to elucidate their precarious position within the colonial power structure. Consequently, theoretical exploration of this investigation seeks to elucidate how the resistance enacted by the subordinate Muslim community served to illuminate the Ottoman hierarchical order over India. Moreover, The Ottoman order assumes a distinct role in Indian Muslim resistance narratives, particularly in contrast to non-Muslim resistance efforts, due to the collaborative nature of Indian Muslims with non-Muslim Indians in their shared resistance against British colonialism. Prior to this collaboration, Muslim participation had been marginalized within the discourse of resistance. This distinction highlights the continued relevance and active participation of the Ottoman order within the Muslims resistance narratives, even as Muslim-centric resistance discourse evolved and diminished over time in South Asia.
110
3.1. The Turmoil and Triumph: Muslim Resilience in the 19th Century and the March for Regeneration
The plight of Indian Muslims began in the mid-eighteenth century with the advent of British colonization and the subsequent occupation of Bengal by the British East India Company in 1757.1 Over the span of a century, India’s colonial government solidified its control, culminating in the abolishment of the Mughal rule in 1857. This transition of Indian politics had profound consequences for the Muslim population, as they experienced a significant decline in their societal standing across various domains, including politics, economy, trade and commerce, education, and land ownership. Previously part of the ruling elite, Muslims found themselves marginalized within Indian society.2 Consequently, the British rule, while perceived by the Hindus as a mere change of government, represented a more profound shift for the Muslims, accentuating their marginalized status.
This is the very reason, from the inception of colonial governance; Muslims actively opposed the oppressive British regime, fervently striving to dismantle foreign dominion. Due to their persistent endeavors, marked by resistance, they encountered exile, confinement, torture, and the formidable apparatus of colonial control.3 Therefore, the aftermath of the unsuccessful revolt in 1857 intensified the challenges faced by Muslims, exposing them to heightened oppression, mortality, apprehension, and forced displacement.
Subsequent to these tumultuous events, some Muslim intellectuals underwent a transformative process of reevaluation, contemplating avenues for regeneration within the prevailing colonial power structure. Acknowledging the shifting dynamics, these intellectuals initiated a trajectory of shared development by incorporating Western values while concurrently embracing Islamic enlightenment. This paradigmatic shift, signifying an inclination towards the acceptance of colonial rule and an aspiration for the modernization of the Muslim community in India, gained momentum during the
1 K.. M. Mohsin, A Bengal Distric in Transition- Murshidabad 1765-1793 (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1973), 73.
2 W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, 102.
3 Yasmin Saika, “Uncolonizable: Freedom in the Muslim mind in colonial British India”, South Asian History and Culture 7/2 (2016), 117-134.
111
mid-nineteenth century.4 The British administration, during this time, also provided certain opportunities that played a role in fostering an educated middle class among Muslims. This development is crucial, as education and the emergence of a middle class often contributed to social and intellectual transformation over the Muslim population in India.5
During this time, Muslim’s educational background, their acceptance of the Western values, coexistence of Islamic orientation with modernism gradually affected the discourses of raising a new Muslim regeneration in India. The emergent generation of Muslims and their inclination of Western values and Muslim nationalism manifests as a nuanced fusion of Western cultural elements within the framework of an enduring Islamic orientation. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in educational backgrounds among Muslims, ranging from attendance at traditional Islamic religious schools “Madrasah” to enrollment in Western educational institutions, underscores the diversity of perspectives and experiences within the Muslim community. This educational mobilization among Muslims engendered a novel discourse aimed at reassessing their socio-political standing in India.
This introspection was informed by a dual historical consciousness: a retrospective consideration of the erstwhile Mughal ascendancy and the subsequent subjugation under colonial dominion. The latter historical episode galvanized this new generation to advocate Ottoman order as a distinct international Muslim order to challenge the
4 The cohort of intellectuals colloquially labeled as the ‘Pro-British’ Muslim literate were prominent advocator for a collaborative stance with the British colonial administration, contending that such an alignment was indispensable for the educational and social advancement of the Muslim community in India. These leaders shared the perception that the assimilation of modern education and a cooperative relationship with the British authorities were imperative for fostering progress within the Muslim community. Their collective belief posited that resistance, rather than engendering favorable outcomes, would likely exacerbate the prevailing conditions of underdevelopment. Instead, they endorsed a pragmatic approach of allegiance to the British as a means to circumvent further socio-economic stagnation. At the forefront of this movement was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan dedicated himself to the revitalization of Indian Muslims in North India, with a primary objective of imbuing the Muslim populace with modern education. Concurrently, Nawab Abdul Latif directed his efforts towards collective development, leveraging Western enlightenment principles, particularly in the context of Bengal. Sir Syed Ameer Ali and the ‘Central National Mohammedan Association’ undertook initiatives aimed at both educational and political progress for Indian Muslims. The guiding principle underlying the endeavors of these leaders was a profound recognition of the imperative to embrace modern education as a catalyst for the regeneration of the Muslim community in India. This discernment, in turn, motivated their allegiance to British rule, viewing it as a strategic alignment conducive to the overarching objective of uplifting the educational, social, and political status of Muslims in colonial India. See also, Mazheruddin Siddiqi, “Islamic Modernism”, Islamic Studies 12/3(1973), 179-192.
5 Latifa Akanda, Social History of Muslim Bengal (Dhaka: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 156-189.
112
colonial hegemony in India. Commencing in the 1880s, they progressively identified with the Ottoman Khilafat, ultimately embracing this as an alternative Muslim order, thereby legitimizing their opposition to the colonial power dynamics. Moreover, the emergence of political parties in India during this time, with the establishment of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885 and the All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906 marked a significant juncture to the political development of the native Indian. Therefore, this period witnessed a notable augmentation in Muslim political involvement, coinciding with the burgeoning political landscape. Concurrently, the Ottoman phenomenon assumed a pivotal role as a formidable entity in the Muslim political discourses, thereby contributing substantially to the evolving political dynamics of the era.
However, at the onset of the twentieth century, Indian Muslims found a glimmer of hope and aspiration in the British partition plan for Bengal. For some Indian Muslims, this division was perceived as a potential return of Muslim ruling authority to a province in India, a prospect unseen since the Battle of Pallasy in 1757.6 However, this optimistic outlook proved short-lived, as Hindu nationalism gained momentum and the government ultimately revoked the partition scheme. Compounding this disappointment, Muslims experienced a series of discriminatory policies imposed by the British government during the 1910s. The government’s neglect regarding the establishment of a Muslim university in North India, and the demolition of the Kanpur Mosque for the construction of a thoroughfare collectively exacerbated Muslim sentiments, fostering heightened grievances and suspicions. During this particular phase of historical epoch, these events unfolded and underscored the inadequacy of British policies in accommodating Muslim requisites, while simultaneously disregarding their demands and interests, leading to a shift within the Muslim community from a stance of loyalty to one of resistance. This transformation was marked by the emergence of Muslim narratives emphasizing political rights, self-determination, and independence from colonial rule. The evolving discourse within the ensuing Muslim resistance movement accepted the Ottoman order as an order-building entity aimed at uniting the Muslims of all classes in delegitimizing colonial hegemony over India. This resistance
6 Sufia Ahmed, Muslim Community in Bengal (1884-1912) Banglar Muslim Samproday Tran. Syed Mohammad Shahed (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 2002), 145.
113
movement sought to legitimize its actions by highlighting these three key instances of colonial disregard for Muslim prerequisites.
3.1.1. Unraveling the Tapestry: Disintegration of Bengal Partition and Muslim Struggle against Colonialism
Lord Curzon’s endorsement of the partition of Bengal was grounded in a pragmatic assessment influenced by two primary considerations. Firstly, he contended that Bengal’s expansive geographical dimensions and burgeoning population imposed a substantial administrative strain. Secondly, Curzon maintained that the bifurcation of Bengal would facilitate more targeted and efficient rule, offering improved care and governance for its substantial populace.7 The British means of the Partition of Bengal was to address these challenges, facilitating more efficient governance, control over remote areas, and fostering facilities for the natives. Presenting these ostensibly rational motives of the British government executed this plan in 1905.
Despite this ostensibly laudable tableau, the effective implementation of the British ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy transpired through the process of partition. Examination of the escalating communal discord, instances of terrorism, and retaliatory actions among the indigenous populace, particularly within the Hindu and Muslim segments, underscores the adept manipulation by the British authorities in fomenting internal conflicts among native inhabitants.8 Furthermore, the strategic leveraging of their advantageous position enabled the British to exploit and exacerbate existing tensions among these communities. Moreover, since its inception, this partition elicited a spectrum of varied responses within both the Hindu and Muslim communities, especially it sparked communal violences.9
The Hindu populations, traditionally associated with a pro-colonial stance, encountered a contentious predicament amid the unfolding dynamics of the partition process. This complexity stemmed from the divergence of opinion within the Hindu elite regarding the envisaged benefits of partition for regional development, notably with the
7 India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R), MSS/Eur/ (F 111/323), 1905.
8 Akhand Akhtar Hossain, “Hindu-Muslim Separateness in Bengal: A Review of Some Historical Issues from a Contemporary Bangladesh Muslim Standpoint”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies n.s. XXXI/2 (2008), 364-382.
9 Suranjana Choudhury, A reading of Violence in Partition Stories from Bengal (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020), 1.
114
designation of Dhaka as the capital of Eastern Bengal. They articulated reservations, perceiving the partition as engendering a form of competition with Calcutta, the established bastion and traditional locus of Hindu influence and power.10 This discontent manifested as a multifaceted challenge, wherein concerns about regional prosperity and the potential eclipsing of Calcutta as a focal point of Hindu interests coalesced, contributing to the intricate landscape of the partition discourse. The Gentos11 mainly opposed the partition plan, aligning themselves with the Congress in a concerted effort to resist the British partition proposal. Initially grounded in a constitutional approach, their movement underwent a gradual evolution, acquiring a more radical and militant character over time.12 Moreover, their anti-colonial agitation manifested through the advocacy of the ‘Boycott and Swadeshi’ slogan. This campaign aimed at repudiating British products within the Indian market, urging local entrepreneurs to engage in the production of indigenous goods. This dual strategy, involving both resistance activities and economic self-sufficiency initiatives, through a widespread rejection of British commodities, prompted the colonial authority to reassess their partition plan.
Moreover, due to their intensive agitation at home and England, in the early 1910s, there existed a sense of optimism among the Hindu community regarding the potential reconsideration of partition scheme by the British authorities. This anticipation coincided with the impending visit of King George V and Queen Mary in India in the early 1910s. Prior to ascending to the throne, the prince had undertaken a visit to India
10 Calcutta emerged as the inaugural capital of the British, attaining eminence in trade, commerce, and education. The denizens of Calcutta wielded significant influence, particularly exemplified by the prominence of advocates from the Calcutta High Court within the colonial power structure. The hypothetical division of Bengal raises the prospect of a decline in Calcutta’s prominence, potentially yielding ascendancy to Dhaka in East Bengal. See also, Syed Zawwar Husain Zaidi, The Partition of Bengal and Its Annulment-a Survey of the Schemes of Territorial Redistribution of Bengal (1902-1911) (London: University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1964), 187-189.
11 An elite stratum of Hindu population emerged on the periphery of the colonial establishment centered on Calcutta. These urbanized elite class, comprising professionals, and businessmen. Their opposition to the proposed Bengal partition stemmed from a discernible apprehension that the emergence of an alternate urban center in East Bengal could potentially undermine their existing hegemonic status. This opposition was grounded in a nuanced understanding of the intricate dynamics between regional power structures and the perceived ramifications for their socio-economic and political influence. See also, Semanti Ghosh, Nationalism and the Problem of ‘difference’ Bengal, 1905-1947’ (USA: Tufts University, Department of History, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1999), 32-36.
12 Gordon Johnson, “Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908”, Modern Asian Studies 7/3 (1973), 533-588.
115
in 1906, during which he judiciously communicated the adversities resulting from the Bengal partition. Motivating by a desire for benevolence towards the Indian populace, and strengthening loyalty among indigenous of his subsequent arrival he declared two significant issues. Firstly, he orchestrated the relocation of the British Indian Empire’s capital from Calcutta to Delhi and resolved to rescind the partition of Bengal.13
This controversial policy of the British government triggered a widespread discontent among Indian Muslims as it shattered Bengali Muslim’s hopes, aspirations, and prospects. The disillusionment stemmed from the perceived betrayal of the colonial government, which, despite affirming the Bengal partition as a ‘settled fact’, proceeded to implement policies contrary to their assurances. Believing in the phenomenon of the established fact, Muslims welcomed this British initiative, and they got substantial advancements across various domains such as politics, economy, urbanization, municipal development, education, and culture in East Bengal from 1905-1911. Some Muslims considered these changes to be the ‘Muslim Renaissance in Bengal’ and the return of ‘Muslim Hegemony’ in Bengal after 1757.14 Moreover, the abrogation of the partition evoked consternation within the Muslim community of India as whole. Salimullah, the Nawab of Bengal, conveyed his displeasure in response to the altered policy of the British government towards the Muslims, notwithstanding his unwavering allegiance to the British Raj. The Nawab also expressed optimism regarding the assurance of British support for the ongoing advancement of the Muslim community.15
But the progressive wing of Muslim leaders considered the annulment as the result of Hindu resistance against the British policy. Muslims mirrored Hindu resistance against colonial rule, drawing inspiration from it to intensify their own struggle against British rule and assert their legitimacy within the colonial power structure. This transformative perception propelled a heightened engagement among Muslims in the resistance movement, particularly aimed at safeguarding Muslim rights within the colonial state. Central to this evolution was the emergence of a new Muslim leadership dynamics, composed by an educated Muslim middle class, whose burgeoning prominence signaled
13 F.A. Eustis II- Z. H. Zaidi, “King, Viceroy and Cabinet: The Modification of the Partition of Bengal, 1911”, History, 49/1 (1964), 171-184.
14 Anisur Rahman, “Banglar Musulmander Rajnoitik Bikash 1905-1911”, Itihas Academy Probondhomala 12/1(2012), 60-67.
15 India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R), MSS. Eur. F/111/434.
116
a departure from traditional leadership paradigms.16 Their inclination towards resistance got a new splendor while they sought to forge coalitions with Congress leaders to collectively challenge colonial power. It demonstrates their pragmatism and willingness to collaborate with kindered entities while maintaining their commitment to resistance. They perceived the colonial order as inadequate in addressing Muslim concerns. Additionally, the British implementation of the ‘divide and rule policy’ during the Bengal partition exacerbated communal tensions between Bengali Muslims and Hindus, leading to increased tensions and violence in the region. This situation underscored the necessity for protecting Muslim interests within the colonial power structure, prompting Muslims to seek an alternative order to reassert Muslim dominance in Indian politics. During this time, Muslim resistance against colonial hegemony required a new legitimizing order for two key reasons: firstly, to legitimize their resistance efforts and preventing their disappearence from the resistance narrative, and secondly, to delegitimize the colonial presence in India. This understanding rendered the Ottoman order more functional in the 1910s for fostering Muslim unity against colonialism. By embracing the Ottoman order, Muslims endeavored to not only fortify their collective ressistance efforts but also to challenge the colonial hegemony over India. This event prompted the Bengali Muslims actively aligned with the Ottoman order to assert Khilafat as a hegemonic power against British colonial rule. Their attachment to the Khilafat was prominently demonstrated through their leadership in fundraising campaigns for the Ottomans during the Tripoli and Balkan wars. While their assitance was not limited to the material support, they organized processions, meetings, and boycotts of British goods to protest Western aggression in Muslim territories. They participated in the ‘Indian Muslim Red Crescent Mission’ (IMRCM); Syed Ismail Hussain Shirazi, was an esteem Bengali member of this mission, authored ‘Turosko Vromon’, a travelogue depicting the suffering of Muslim soldiers, women, and children in the Balkan War.17 Shirazi’s narrative, highlighting the hardships faced by Muslims,
16 Harun or Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987),11-13. 17 Syed Ismail Hossain Shirazi, Turosko Vromon (Dacca: al-Eslam, 1913). Shirazi assumed the role of editor for the “Islam Procharak”, a Bengali monthly magazine that espoused pro-Ottoman sentiments. This periodical served as a platform for disseminating ideas and narratives that highlighted Western conspiracies against the Ottoman Khilafat. The publication played a significant role in cultivating a sense of soft power for the Khilafat among Bengali Muslims.
117
served to legitimize Indian Muslims resistance to Western aggression and further strengthened the Muslim community’s adhearance to the Khilafat order.
3.1.2. British Discord Surrounding Muslim University and the Trajectory of Muslim Resilience
Following the cancellation of the Bengal partition, a significant resistance to this British initiative emerged, primarily spearheaded by the Bengali Muslims but this resistance subsequently exerted a discernible impact on the broader political landscape of Muslim politics throughout India that underscored the inadequacy of representation of Muslim interests within the framework of colonial governance. Pacifying the Bengali Muslims resistance, British declared to establish a public university in Dacca in 1911, coupled with a commitment to sustain developmental efforts in East Bengal.18 This British proclamation regarding the establishment of a university in the predominantly Muslim region of East Bengal significantly influenced prevailing Muslim demands for the transformation of the Aligarh College into a university.
However, the “Madrasatul Uloom Musalmana-i-Hind” underwent a name transformation within a brief span of two years, becoming the ‘Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (M.A.O College)’ in 1875. It was a visionary endeavor of Syed Ahmad, inspired by his visit to England in the 1870s, reflected a steadfast commitment to establish a contemporary educational institution to cater to the educational requirements of the Muslim community in India.19 The renaming of this institution reflected an evident shift towards an educational model infused with both Islamic principles and Anglo-oriented learning approaches, which kept its promise to create a new generation of Muslims who were enlightened with Islamic and modern knowledge. Ultimately, its graduates became the key actors in the Muslim’s socio-cultural and political development over India since the early of the twentieth century, and this institution became the ‘light house’ of Muslim’s regeneration in India and the centre of the Muslim movement.
18 M. A. Rahim, The History of the University of Dacca (Dhaka: Dhaka University press, 1981).
19 Riazuddin H. Zobairi, The Educational and Social Ideas of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (Illinois: Southern Illinois University, Department of Educational Administration and Foundations, Graduate School, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1971), 141.
118
Moreover, the graduates of this institution spearheaded the Aligarh movement, exhibiting a pronounced commitment to the concept of ‘loyalty to the British.’ The initial advocacy for loyalty stemmed from the conviction that aligning with British authority would afford developmental opportunities for the Muslim community. This strategic alignment was perceived as a pragmatic approach to securing educational and social advancements for Muslims within the colonial framework, a perspective upheld until the demise of Ahmad in 1898. However, in the early twentieth century, the efficacy of the loyalty-based approach underwent critical scrutiny. This was mainly because, despite the aspirations of the Muslim community to elevate the Aligarh College into a university, the British administration exhibited reluctance. Instead, they proposed the establishment of a Hindu university in Benares to address Hindu interests. This intricate conundrum prompts an exploration into the reasons behind the British hesitancy while Muslims of North India marched for establishing a university. An examination of the British reluctance to establish a university in Uttar Pradesh reveals a potential explanation rooted in their perception of such an institution as a ‘political danger’. This was mainly because, during this time, the North Indian Muslims accepted the Khilafat as an order-building entity in the discourses of resistance against the prevailing colonial power. The incorporation of the Khilafat order in constructing the anti-British resistance was perceived as the threat or danger for colonial entities. Furthermore, the notion of ‘danger’ is a subjective concept, with hierarchical power structures projecting and defining it according to their own interests in establishing and maintaining order. David Campbell, in his analysis of the rationale behind the U.S. attack on Iraq, argues that ‘danger’ is a subject open to interpretation, highlighting how dominant powers construe and justify the concept of danger according to their own interpretations of security imperatives.20 Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States depicted the Saddam Hussein regime as a significant threat to the security of the Middle East region. This portrayal encompassed not only the perceived menace posed to neighboring states but also emphasized the purported danger to the well-being of the Iraqi populace itself. Such representations, deeply embedded within prevailing power dynamics, served to legitimate the military intervention in Iraq. Central to the justification for intervention was the assertion of Iraq’s possession and potential use of
20 Campbell, Writing Security, 2.
119
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including but not limited to nuclear, chemical, and biological armaments.21 Despite extensive international scrutiny and investigations, conclusive evidence verifying the existence of such weaponry remained elusive. The absence of tangible proof regarding the presence of WMDs, particularly the widely publicized ‘smoking gun’ of an alleged nuclear program or stockpiles of chemical or biological agents, underscored the divergence between rhetoric and reality. Nevertheless, the narrative of imminent danger persisted, fueled by a confluence of political, strategic, and ideological factors. The discourse surrounding Iraq’s purported WMD capabilities served as a focal point for justifying the military campaign, providing a moral imperative and strategic pretext for intervention. This construction of threat perception, shaped by hegemonic powers such as the United States, underscored the instrumentalization of security concerns to advance geopolitical agendas. Similarly, while the demand for a university in UP was logical for North Indian Muslims, the British perceived it as a danger to their hegemonic interests. The inception of a Muslim university was perceived as potentially undermining the colonial establishment due to the burgeoning awareness among Aligarh Muslims of global Muslim affairs. Particularly, the discourse surrounding the status of Islamic holy sites and the institution of the Khalifa garnered considerable attention, assuming a central position in the political narrative of Indian Muslims, predominantly in the wake of the Tripoli and Balkan Wars. The perceived Western interventions or machinations against the Khalifa institution were interpreted as direct challenges to a crucial symbol of Muslim identity, further exacerbating tensions between the colonial administration and the Muslim populace. Therefore, we endeavor to scrutinize the British conceptualization and perception of ‘political danger’ concerning the establishment of a Muslim university, delineating three salient indicators. Firstly, during the 1910s, the Muslim populace displayed ‘spontaneous resistance’ against colonial rule. Aligarh students, particularly those aligned with the rationalist factions, actively participated in the formation, mobilization, and execution of resistance efforts against the colonial hegemony. Most significantly, they allied themselves with Congress leaders in executing the movement for home rule. Secondly, the ‘projection of Khilafat order in the Muslim resistance’ explored how the
21 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications”, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16/3 (2007), 209-228.
120
Aligrah graduates exhibited Khilafat as an alternative order against the colonial rule. By endorsing the Khilafat order, these graduates assumed a pivotal role in advancing Muslim resistance, challenging British authority. Despite colonial prohibitions, students actively sought funds to aid wounded Ottoman soldiers during the Tripoli and Balkan wars.22 Throughout these conflicts, Aligarh leaders and students played an active role in disseminating anti-British sentiment and advocating for the boycott of English and Italian goods. These collective efforts led to direct confrontations between Muslims and colonial authorities, fostering a sense of political activism and nationalist fervor within the Aligarh campus. This sheds light on how colonial subjects, despite their position within the colonial power structure, could provide tangible support to their external order fighting against Western hegemony. Additionally, prominent Aligarh leader Maulana Muhammad Ali, beseeched the college authority to redirect university funds in aid of the Ottoman Khalifa, citing the significant toll of life and property endured by Muslims during the Balkan war.23 These actions and advocacy by the Aligrah students and Muslim leaders contributed to exacerbating the British government’s reservations towards the proposed Muslim university in North India. They perceived that establishing such a university would increase the visibility of the Khilafat order on the campus and its surroundings, posing a potential threat that the British were not prepared to confront.
Thirdly, ‘notable hub of anti-British activities’, the colonial government keenly observed the political landscape of the early 1910s, where Uttar Pradesh and Bengali Muslims exhibited spontaneous resistance against colonial existence over India. The colonial administration were concern about Aligrah which they recognized the ‘hub of resistance’ because of its influential position for intellectual and political activities among Indian Muslims. British could not have provided a wide platform for further political mobilization and resistance through the transformation of this institution into a university.24 Their suspicion was connected with a concern that the university might become a breeding ground for anti-colonial activities. The perceived ‘political danger’
22 Gulzar N. Buddhani, The Role and Contribution of the Aligrah Muslim University in Modern Indian Islam (1877-1947) (Manchester: The Victoria University of Manchester, M Phil Thesis, May 1987), 93.
23 Aijaz Ahmad, Aligarh and Non-Cooperation Movement, 1919-1922 (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, Department of History, M Phill Thesis, 1994), 29.
24 Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, “The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920”, Modern Asian Studies 8/2 (1974), 145-189.
121
arising from Muslim resistance, Muslim’s alliance with the Congress, and Muslim’s pro-Ottoman sentiments got significant concern which influenced the British decision-making process or found themselves in a quandary.
Following the disagreement of the British authority, this section explores how the Muslim’s aspiration for a university came to reflect the trajectory of Muslim politics. The government’s reluctance elicited a substantial response within the echelons of Aligrah leadership, intellectual circles, trustees, alumni and the students. These stakeholders found themselves divided along two distinct ideological currents: one faction espousing nationalist sentiments- nationalist group (N-G), and the other adhering to a loyalist orientation- loyalist group (L-G). N-G, inspired by the rising wave of Indian nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments, began to actively engage in national politics. They advocated for a joint struggle against British rule by aligning with the Indian National Congress and sought a more assertive and resistive stance against colonialism and believed to forge closer ties with Congress leaders could bring fortune for Indian Muslim.25 Evidencing this transformative sentiment, certain Aligarh graduates embraced active political participation within the Congress, thereby enmeshing them within the broader nationalist struggle against colonial dominion. They hitherto entrenched loyalist doctrine, initially introduced by Syed Ahmad Khan, and underwent a paradigm shift towards a more confrontational stance. This ideological shift found its initial expression in the occupation of the Muslim League office in Lucknow in 1912 by the young nationalists from the MAO College.26 This audacious act exerted pressure on the League’s leadership, compelling them to adopt a more assertive posture in addressing the concerns of the Muslim community, later this group became the main vanguard of the Khilafat movement in India. However, the disapproval of the university status seems to have catalyzed a shift toward a more resistant attitude. The burgeoning nationalist ethos prompted introspection within the Muslim community, compelling a re-evaluation of their role within the contours of Indian political discourse. Moreover, the convergence of Muslim interests and Indian nationalism was a significant development in their struggle. They demonstrated the increasing willingness of Muslims
25 Shamim Akhtar, “Aligrah and Muslim Politics”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 78 (2017), 762-769.
26 Ahmad, Aligarh, 12.
122
to participate in broader anti-colonial movements and rethink their role within the larger Indian political context.
L-G, rooted in the legacy established by Syed Ahmad Khan, initially espoused a collaborative stance with British authorities. They anticipated favorable support from the British, leveraging their elite status in society and economy to extract various benefits from the government, albeit at the expense of broader Muslim interests. This faction refrained from acknowledging the Khilafat order against the colonial rule and maintained a conspicuous silence on the matters pertaining to Western aggression in the Muslim land to express their loyality to the British rule.27 Their abstention from acknowledging the Khilafat as an order delineated a distinct subjective identity among Muslims, particularly those who identified the Khilafat order as a counter to colonialism.
3.1.3. Kanpur Mosque Tragedy and Muslim’s Anti-British Stance
The events of the Kanpur Mosque demolishment prove another illustration signifying the British establishment in India as a pivotal juncture which not only terminated Muslim rule but also imperiling significant vestiges of the Islamic civilization. As elucidated in Chapter II, the steadfastness of British authority towards Muslim heritage is exemplified through a missive addressed to British Prime Minister Palmerstone.28 These colonial policies towards the Islamic heritage extensively elucidated anti-British feelings among the Muslim population. The city of Cawnpore, known contemporarily as Kanpur, emerged as a focal point of Muslim dissent and upheaval against the colonial government in 1910s. The impetus behind this Muslim resistance stemmed from the demolition of a religious relic in 1913 by the municipal corporation, undertaken to facilitate the construction of a highway. This incident exacerbated the grievances
27 Innitially, Syed Ahmed and his adherents espoused a loyalist stance towards the British colonial authorities. Their reluctance to recognize the Ottoman Khalifa as the head of the Muslim Ummah stemmed from their close alignment with British interests. Embracing British hegemony was seen as a strategic move to facilitate the restoration of Muslim influence in India. Following Syed Ahmed’s demise, his followers such as Vikhar-ul Mulk, Aga Khan, and even Muhammad Ali Jinnah, exhibited a similar disinterest in acknowledging the Ottoman Khalifa as the global Muslim leader and the leader of the Indian Muslim community. This can be interpreted as a manifestation of their loyalty to the colonial government, a deliberate alignment against the Khilafat movement. See also, Belkacem Belmekki, “Rationale for the Indian Muslims’ Philosophy of Loyalism to British Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century”, Atenea XXVII/1 (2007), 41-52.
28 India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R), Letter no. 9, (9 Oct. 1857), Canning Papers.
123
harbored by Indian Muslims towards colonial governance, as the wanton destruction of a sacred edifice devoid of due consultation or regard for the sensitivities of the Muslim community was perceived as an injudicious act. Ultimately fueled the escalating disaffection directed at the colonial government, thereby galvanizing a spontaneous display of resistance among Muslims. Moreover, the resistance was met with a brutal reprisal orchestrated by British law enforcement, culminating in the tragic loss of 20 to 30 lives among Muslim nationalists and a massive arrest.29
The ‘Kanpur Killing’ effectively ignited a surge of resistance against the prevailing colonial dominion over India. Notably, the AIML and the Indian Ulama exhibited robust dissent against the governmental action to dismantle Muslim religious artifacts. Evidencing their unified stance, the League formally adopted a resolution beseeching the British Viceroy’s intervention in the Kanpur Mosque issue.30 Concurrently, the India Ulama marshaled mass mobilization by issuing a ‘Fatwa’, a religious edict, and orchestrating special congregational prayers aimed at the restoration of the desecrated Mosque.31 This concerted endeavor not only signified a palpable convergence of religious and political forces but also underscored the significance of the Kanpur incident as a galvanizing force within the overarching fabric of anti-colonial agitation.
Prominent Muslim periodicals synergistically converged to articulate and amplify noteworthy public perspectives on this lamentable occurrence. Moreover, the Muslim publications adeptly contextualized this incident by juxtaposing it with the historical backdrop of the fall of Adrianople in April 1913, thereby intertwining local grievances with broader international dynamics.32 In a broader narrative, the Muslim press skillfully paralleled this episode with Western transgressions witnessed during the Balkan and Tripoli conflicts, effectively magnifying the narrative of injustice. Moreover, this incident underscores a profound shift in the perceptions of Muslims, revealing the colonialists’ broader agenda of not only dismantling Islamic relics in India but also desecrating Islamic holy sites under the Khilafat’s jurisdiction. This
29 Spencer Lavan, “The Kanpur Mosque Incident of 1913: The North Indian Muslim Press and Its Reaction to Community Crisis”, Journal of the American Academy Religion 42/2, (June-1974), 263-279.
30 Mujeeb Ahmad, Safi Ullah Khan Marwat, “Politics through the Pulpit: The Ulama and the Cawnpore, Shahid Ganj and Manzil Gah Mosque Incidents”, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XLII/1 (2021), 75-100.
31 Hassan Imam, Mazharul Haq and His Role in the Freedom Struggle (Aligrah: Aligarh Muslim University, Centre of Advance Study, Department of History, M Phil Thesis, 1989), 40.
32 Al-Hilal (13 August 1913), 4.
124
understanding galvanized Muslims, compelling them to actively safeguard their civilization against Western encroachments simultaneously defending the hegemonic authority of the Ottoman Khilafat from Western conspiratorial designs. Such British policy was a tragic for the Muslims but its resonance, interwoven with historical and international parallels, left an indelible imprint on the Muslim collective acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat as an order to delegitimize the colonial encroachments in India.
3.1.4. Muslim Political Resentment: Disloyalties to Resistance
The above sections debated three important turning points in the trajectory of Indian Muslim resistance, probing the fundamental query of how these events catalyzed a shift in Muslim allegiance to the colonial rule from loyalty to a disposition of resistance. These historical moments effectively undermined the legitimacy of the colonial hegemony in India, prompting Muslims to contextualize these occurrences within the broader narrative of global Muslim affairs. This process validated their embrace of the Ottoman order as a counterpoint to the prevailing colonial authority. Moreover, these instances underscored the shortcomings of the British order in addressing Muslim demands, leading to a shift in the subjective identity of Muslims from one of loyalty to a resistance-oriented community. Moreover, Muslim leaders perceived resistance as the sole means to delegitimize colonial rule. Pursuing this objective, they sought an order capable of galvanizing the Muslim community under a unified front against colonial entities. Within this narrative of resistance, Muslims embraced the Ottoman Khilafat as a legitimate authority against colonial hegemony in India. However, the puzzle remains, while the British had previously enacted policies contrary to Muslim interests, these actions did not provoke such intense resistance from the Muslim community prior to the 1850s. What distinguishes this period in history when minor issues escalated into vehement resistance can be attributed to the incorporation of the Khilafat order into the discourse of resistance.
This narrative makes the distinction of the previous Muslim resistance against the British from the new resistance aspects of Indian Muslims, where the Ottoman order got
125
the prominence of authority in the resistance discourse.33 It highlights the significance of the Khilafat order in galvanizing Muslims to actively participate in the resistance movement, thus distinguishing it as a pivotal factor in shaping Indian Muslim resistance.
However, the abrogation of the partition of Bengal rose to first massive Muslim grievances against the British followed second resistance against the government disagreement to establish a Muslim university in Aligarh and the third resistance against the trajectory of the Cawnpore mosque. These events presented an opportunity for the Muslims to delegitimize the colonial power in terms of protecting Muslim interest, and also give the lesson for the Muslims that without resistance Muslim could not place their position in Indian political hegemony. Therefore, these domestic events coincided with the Ottoman issues of Tripoli, Balkan and First World War that led to Muslim disappointment, fostering an increased disaffection towards the British’s actions against the Muslim order, thereby enabling Muslims to challenge the established colonial order in India.
In examining the historical trajectory of Muslim political discourses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it becomes evident that during the 1880s, there was a notable inclination among Muslims to align themselves with British policies in order to secure a foothold within the colonial power structure. However, a pivotal shift in Muslim political development materialized in 1906 with the establishment of a political organization.34 Although in this political party an initial allegiance to British authorities persisted, but aforementioned domestic events catalyzed a transformation in Muslim political consciousness, prompting a shift from loyalist towards an active resistance. The evolving landscape of Muslim politics underscored the realization among them that mere loyalty to the British colonial administration would not suffice to legitimize their position in India. The resistance-oriented lessons gleaned from the political milieu drew attention to the realization that British acknowledgment of Muslim
33 Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslims experienced various forms of resistance against colonial rule. However, these efforts often struggled to mobilize the disparate and geographically dispersed Muslim community effectively. The emergence of the Khilafat order marked a significant departure in Muslim resistance discourse by providing a unifying ideological framework that transcended regional and cultural differences, offering a common ground for Muslims to resist the colonial order. For details of 19th century Muslim resistance please see, Haque, Varoter Mususlman.
34 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Jinnah: His Success, Failure and Role in History (New Delhi: Penguin Rendom House, 2020).
126
standing in India necessitated active opposition. Against this backdrop, the Muslims’ embrace of the Ottoman order had a pronounced impact on the course of Indian politics, compelling the British to acknowledge the Khilafat as the authoritative order of the Muslim world. Consequently, in the aftermath of the First World War, British assurances to Muslim leaders regarding non-interference with the Ottoman Khilafat underscored the culmination of a nuanced negotiation between resistance and diplomatic engagement in the pursuit of political objectives.35
3.2: Indian Muslim Politics in the 1900s: Hope, Aspiration and Resistance
Following the aftermath of the great Indian resurgence in 1857, the Indian socio-political landscape experienced profound transformations, fostering the emergence of diverse intellectual movements as responses to the British colonial dominion. Within this context, Muslim intellectuals discerned two pivotal imperatives: firstly, addressing the multifaceted challenges that beset the Muslim community, and secondly, charting a nuanced course of engagement with the colonial government. Muslim intellectuals astutely recognized the formidable ascendancy of the British, manifesting through military prowess, economic hegemony, and political control, thereby rendering conventional confrontational strategies futile and liable to elicit severe reprisals. Consequently, a paradigm shift towards pragmatism materialized, characterized by an inclination to operate within the existing framework. Central to this pragmatic outlook was the pursuit of ameliorative measures targeting the socio-economic and educational underpinnings of the Muslim populace, as opposed to overtly antagonistic stances against colonial authorities. The enunciated pragmatic trajectory was underpinned by a diplomatic, non-confrontational ethos, strategically calibrated to redress grievances and safeguard Muslim interests within the established colonial structure. Of note, Muslim intellectuals adroitly advocated for introspective dialogue with colonial administrators, wherein certain deleterious policies and administrative choices were underscored as exacerbating communal tensions. By positioning themselves as exemplars of loyalty, willing to collaborate harmoniously with the colonial administration, their objectives encompassed securing concessions and endorsements for initiatives benefiting the Muslim community, notably the propagation of modern educational paradigms. The
35 Johan Mathew, ‘Spectres of Pan-Islam: Methodological Nationalism and British Imperial Policy after the First World War’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45/6 (2017), 942-968.
127
linchpin of their ideological stance rested upon the conviction that the Muslim community necessitated an epochal rejuvenation, particularly concerning the domains of erudition and societal mores. This entailed an impetus towards transformative educational pursuits and the recalibration of societal norms, mutually aimed at invigorating the Muslim collective identity in an evolving landscape dominated by colonial imperatives.
The final decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a pronounced focus on educational advancements within the Indians, driven by the emergence of an educated middle class.36 This trend was underpinned by an augmented awareness of the political and societal circumstances among Muslims. This newfound awareness prompted recognition that organized representation was imperative to safeguard their interests and establish a substantive presence within the colonial political milieu. Notably, the inception of the INC in 1885, primarily reflecting Hindu concerns and advocating for enhanced Indian participation in colonial governance, accentuated the apprehensions of Muslims regarding their own representation and interests. Consequently, Muslims began contemplating the establishment of a distinct political entity dedicated to upholding their rights. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that certain eminent Muslim intellectual, most notably Syed Ahmad Khan, initially accorded precedence to educational progress for the Muslim populace over the immediate creation of a political entity. This emphasis on educational development culminated in the foundation of the ‘All India Muhammadan Educational Conference’. This forum was dedicated to addressing the educational challenges confronting Muslims within India. In a pivotal juncture, a significant milestone was achieved through the convocation of an annual conference in Dacca in 1906.37 This gathering drew the participation of Muslim leaders and intellectuals from disparate regions of India. The most significant outcome of this conference was the evolution of the AIML as the first Muslim political organization in Indian subcontinent. This League was conceived as a platform wherein Muslims could articulate their concerns, champion their rights, and diligently pursue the attainment of political safeguards for their community within the confines of British colonial
36 Vijaya Ramadas Mandala, “Colonialism, Education, and the Spatial Dimension of Play-the Creation of Middle Class Space at Schools and Colleges in Modern India 1790-1910”, The Historian 80/1 (2018), 34-85.
37 Aliyah Khan, “All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference and the Foundation of the All-India Muslim League”, Journal of Pakistan Historical Society 55/1-2 (2007), 65-83.
128
governance, all while adhering to established constitutional mechanisms. The establishment of the AIML instilled hope and optimism among the Muslim populace, who came to regard this organization as the vanguard of Muslims interests within the Indian politics. Initially aligned with British colonial authorities, the AIML’s loyalty sifted over time. In the 1910s, amidst evolving dynamics of Indian politics, Muslim leadership came to realize that concessions from the British administration would not be forthcoming without a display of resistance, and it was during this period, Indian Muslim community incorporated the ‘Ottoman Khilafat’ as unifying factor of their resistance movement against the prevailing colonial dominion over India.38
3.2.1. The Evolutionary Tapestry of Political Parties in India
Following the decline of Mughals in India, colonial powers established a pervasive dominion across the subcontinent to preempt potential native resistance, uprisings, and rebellions against their rule. It is because of that under the colonial power structure, the initial foray into political organization in the post-Mughal era was orchestrated by Elen Octavian Hume, a retired British civil servant, in 1885.39 Hume’s primary objective was to impart political education to the indigenous population, acquainting them with political norms, constitutional principles, and legal frameworks. Therefore, the overarching goal was to cultivate loyalty towards the British government and to channel political engagement through constitutional means. Initially INC aimed to work within the existing colonial framework, advocating for incremental reforms that would benefit Indians.
Moreover, the political trajectory of the INC between 1885 and 1924 can be dissected into three distinct phases: ‘loyalist politics,’ ‘militancy and resistance,’ and ‘politics for independence.’ The phase of ‘loyalist politics,’ spanned from the inception of the Congress until 1905. During this period, the Congress leadership adhered to a loyalist stance towards the British government, articulating their demands through diplomatic and conciliatory means. While some of their demands were met, there was often disappointment with the slow pace of reform, leading to a growing sense of
38 Nadeem Shafiq Malik, “Formation of the All India Muslim League and its Response to Some Foreign Issues 1906-1911”, Journal of Political Studies 19/2 (2012), 169-186.
39 Amvika Charan Mazumdar, Indian National Evolution a Brief Survey of the Origin and Progress of the India National Congress and the Growth of Indian Nationalism (Delhi: G.A. Natesan & co. Madras, 1917),1.
129
disillusionment. This reality lead INC towards a subsequent shift of the ‘militancy and resistance’ basically emerged in the context of the Bengal partition in 1905. This pivotal juncture prompted a transformation in Congress leadership in which a group of young progressive leaders adopted a more militant approach, leading INC into the nationalist organization.40 This phase can be characterized by the advocacy of resistance through the ‘Swadeshi and Boycott’ movement. The third discernible dimension of Congress, ‘politics for independence’, gained prominence with Mahatma Gandhi’s return to India from South Africa in 1915. Under Gandhi’s dynamic leadership, the Indian National Congress evolved into a mass-based and democratic organization. Gandhi introduced the concept of nonviolent civil disobedience ‘Satyagraha’-truth force and mass mobilization through the ‘Non-Cooperation Movement’ in 1919, marging this movement with the Ottoman Khilafat which aimed to challenge British authority.41 Under his leadership, the INC adopted a mass-based approach that united Hindus and Muslims involving a broader section of society in the struggle for independence. Meanwhile, Gandhi’s leadership approached to extend support for the Muslim resistance in the 1919s against British colonialism, particularly in relation to the Ottoman Khilafat. These phases represent an evolution from constitutional appeals within a loyalist framework to a more confrontational stance, culminating in a united pursuit of Indian independence.
Moreover, in the early years of the INC were marked by limited Muslim participation due to two primary factors. Firstly, this was due to the perceived Hindu-centric orientation and unilateral policies adopted by the Congress. Secondly, the active discouragement of Muslim leaders from engaging in Congress activities played a significant role. The fact was, in the inaugural session of the INC, a mere two out of seventy attendees were Muslims. Despite this picture, the subsequent years witnessed increased Muslim representation with thirty-three attendees at the second year meeting held in Calcutta.42 Despite the gradual increase in Muslim participation, discontent among Muslim leaders with the Congress persisted due to Congress’s Hindu favoritism, which mainly made Muslims hesitant to join in this organization. An example of this
40 N. R. Inamdar, “Tilak and the Indian National Congress”, The Indian Journal of Political Science 46/ 4 (1985), 387-400.
41 Gopal Krishna, “The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923”, The Journal of Asian Studies 25/ 3 (1966), 413-430.
42 Amvika Charan Mazumdar, Indian National, 148-149.
130
discord was evident through the actions of Syed Ameer Ali, founder of the ‘Central National Mohammedan Association’ in which Ali himself refused to join in the Calcutta conference of Congress and also discouraged other Muslims to participate there. The result was, for the first time, a conference of INC was held without Muslim participation. Ali and other Muslim leaders desired to address the concerns of the Muslim community by establishing a separate platform that would serve their interests in colonial India. This desire came to existence within a decade whereas in 1906 AIML was founded as the first political party of Indian Muslim.
3.2.2. Muslim League and Changing Discourses of Muslim Politics
The endeavors of Muslim leaders aimed at establishing alternative platforms to address the concerns of the Muslim populace reflect the intricate contextual dynamics of the era and the diverse array of political strategies embraced by Muslims within colonial paradigm. The dreams came as truth in 1906 while Muslim leaders accorded to the formation of the AIML. This pivotal organization displayed two primary characteristics from its nascent stages. Firstly, during its initial decades, the AIML predominantly operated as a ‘party of Muslim elites,’ wherein the leadership was primarily composed of influential Muslims which would not pay attention for mass involvement. Secondly, the early leadership of the AIML demonstrated a distinct ‘loyalist’ stance towards the British colonial authorities. The approach adopted by the Muslim leadership for advancing their demands was notably characterized by a conventional and constitutional trajectory. Employing a measured and diplomatic approach, Muslims pursued their objectives through established channels that involved the presentation of deputations, public demonstrations, and orchestrated meetings with significant figures such as the viceroy and other high-ranking officials. These interactions were designed to elucidate the concerns and interests of the Muslim community in a tactful and refined manner. These methods were in line with the broader political climate of the time, which saw many political groups using similar tactics to communicate their grievances and aspirations. This strategy was partly influenced by the belief that collaboration with the British could lead to concessions for Muslims within the colonial framework. Muslim’s conciliatory approach in hopes of securing political rights and protections for Muslims within the colonial administration, however, faced criticism from more radical segments
131
of the Muslim population who sought a more assertive stance against British rule since the early decades of the twentieth century.
In the 1910s, shift in the loyalist orientations of the league’s leadership became apparent, with the educated Muslim middle class assuming a prominent role. This transition was characterized by an embrace of nationalist inclinations within political endeavors, favoring acts of defiance to safeguard Muslim entitlements and prerogatives within the framework of colonial authority. A significant outcome of this shift was the cultivation of the ‘resistance-oriented’ Muslim subjective identity. It determines to delineate the approaches of AIML during this period into three main characters. Firstly, ‘legitimacy alongside concurrent acts of resistance,’ by which the league’s leadership endeavored to establish both the legitimacy of their cause and the necessity of resistance against colonial authorities. This approach aimed to substantiate the rightful demands of the Muslim population and underscore their resolve to confront oppressive colonial policies. During this period, the AIML advocated for enhance Muslim representation within the Indian governmental framework. Most significantly, in 1906, Muslim leadership under the guidance of Aga Khan orchestrated the ‘Simla Deputation,’ a mission directed towards the Viceroy of India.43 This Muslim endeavor was to secure the establishment of the ‘Separate Electorate’ intended to ensure Muslim participation in municipal bodies, district boards, and legislative councils. Pursuing this proposed agenda of Muslim participation in the Indian government, the AIML effectively contextualized their quest for representation, citing compelling reasons and justifications. Amir Ali, for instance, ardently articulated that the Muslim community was not pursuing unwarranted privileges but rather asserting their rightful political entitlements and prerogatives.44 This sentiment reflects the Muslim League’s position that Muslims wanted equal participation and representation within the Indian political system. The Morley-Minto Reform Act of 1909 introduced separate electorates for the Muslim population in India which was considered as a significant step in acknowledging the demands of the AIML for political representation in India. Meanwhile, the radical faction within the Congress leadership mounted a vigorous resistance in the form of the ‘Swadeshi and Boycott Movement,’ aimed at opposing the
43 Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement, 51.
44 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), Foundation of Pakistan All India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947 Vol.III (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1990), 28.
132
partition of Bengal on a nationwide scale. Responding to the Congress’ demands, the British government ultimately acceded to the reversal of the Partition plan. Nevertheless, the British administration’s refusal to support the establishment of a Muslim university in Northern India, along with their actions leading to the demolition of the Kanpur Mosque, fostered a sense of Muslim antipathy and disillusionment against the colonial rule. This sense of disillusionment had a profound impact on the Muslim population in India, leading to a division within the Muslim League regarding its stance towards the British government. The loyalist faction adhered to a stance of continued allegiance to the British, continuing to believe in the benevolence of British intentions toward the Muslim community. Conversely, the progressive faction rejected the League’s loyalist approach, asserting that resistance was the only viable path forward.
Secondly, ‘League’s active engagement in global Muslim issues’; it demonstrates an expanded engagement of the AIML beyond regional concerns, engaging with broader global Muslim issues, exemplifying a concerted endeavor to align the interests of Indian Muslims with the international Muslim community.45 This concerted effort aimed to bolster their collective influence and prominence on the global stage. Concurrently, the faction within the League adhering to nationalist sentiments propagated a form of religious nationalism. This group of League’s leadership accepted the Khilafat as global Muslim order, considering it Islam’s most poignant emblem, and held the Khalifa as the symbolic leader of the Muslim Ummah. This conceptualization of Khilafat in Indian Muslim politics began in limited scale since the 1880s, as we have elucidated this phenomenon in Chapter II, and Khilafat became an order-building entity in Indian Muslim politics in the 1910s, while AIML engaged actively in matters concerning the Ottoman Khilafat and acknowledged the Ottoman Sultan’s role as the global Khalifa of Muslims.
However, Ottoman phenomenon within the League’s activity increased during the Tripoli War, the London-based committee of the AIML raised concerns with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding the Italian military’s brutalities in Tripoli and the Italian advancements in the Dardanelles and Aegean Sea.46 Notably, the
45 Malik, “Formation of the All India Muslim League”, 169-186.
46 Pirzada (ed.), Foundation of Pakistan, 105.
133
Muslim leadership meticulously unraveled the geopolitical intricacies underpinning Muslim world dynamics during the Tripoli and Balkan conflicts. They astutely leveraged the aftermath of these events to decipher the overarching colonial influence on India. Furthermore, the AIML played a significant role in responding to the challenges faced by the Ottoman Khilafat during the post-World War I period, particularly amidst Western powers’ decisions to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. AIML’s engagements included the passage of resolutions and the issuance of memoranda that underscored the organization’s commitment to the preservation of the Khilafat institution. These actions reflected AIML’s strategic positioning to advocate for the maintenance of the Khilafat as an order of Muslim unity and sovereignty, highlighting its significance in the context of emerging geopolitical shifts and challenges to Muslim hegemony and authority. Furthermore, the twelfth session at Amritsar in 1919 conveyed the League’s stance on the Ottoman Khilafat and warned that any British action leading to the dismantling of the Khilafat would provoke discontent in India.47 This phase saw the AIML metamorphose into the authorized advocate for Muslim interests within the colonial Indian context, as well as in the broader ambit of global Muslim affairs.
Thirdly, ‘March to Indian independence’, it express the AIML’s nationalist aspirations; the AIML leaders articulated their commitment to the broader Indian independence movement that marked a strategic alignment between the league’s objectives and the overarching struggle for India’s self-governance. This notion of League effectively positions this organization as a significant player within the broader nationalist discourse. This is mainly because, the League emerged as a prominent Muslim organization during the 1930s, achieving considerable popularity and attaining significant success in the Indian provincial election of 1937.48 Furthermore, in the ensuing decade, the focus of the League’s movement shifted decisively towards the proposition and advocacy for the establishment of Pakistan-a distinct homeland for Muslims. This transition marked a pivotal in the League’s trajectory, solidifying its position as a key actor in the unfolding nationalist narrative.
47 Pirzada (ed.), Foundation of Pakistan, 208.
48 Dharitri Bhattacharjee, “Provincial Autonomy, Decolonization, War and Nationalism: Fazlul Haq’s Chief Ministerial Tenure, 1937-1943”, South Asian History and Culture 9/2 (2018), 159-180.
134
3. 3. Ottoman Phenomenon in Shaping the Muslim Resistance
As we have mentioned earlier that during the 1910s, a notable transformation occurred in Indian Muslim political discourse, attributed to the active engagement of educated middle-class. This cohort primarily consisted of individuals with Western education, although even the traditionally religious-educated class became involved in political matters.49 Notably, the resonance of the Ottoman Khilafat issues during this period within Indian Muslim political circles provided a cohesive platform for the convergence of modern and religiously educated segments. This convergence aimed to collectively oppose colonial rule. Central actors in this dynamic included prominent political figure, Muslim institutions, organizations, the press, and intellectual luminaries.50 These entities played crucial roles in galvanizing the Muslim masses toward a unified stance, fostering a collective spirit of vehement resistance against colonial rule. They projected the Khilafat order prominently in their resistance discourses, integrating it deeply within the sphere of Indian Muslim politics.
Foremost among the distinguishing facets of this period was the trajectory of Muslim political orientation, as it transitioned from a disposition of loyalty towards a nationalist fervor. In this evolution of Muslims politics the Khilafat order became a potent locus for organizing Muslim entities against the colonial establishment in India. This nationalist shift within the Muslim populace garnered favorable reception from leaders within the Indian National Congress, thereby culminating in a mutual commitment to a unified front against colonial rule. This cooperative sentiment of resistance against the colonial order found articulation in the ‘Lucknow Pact’, a significant historical juncture wherein the INC acceded to the Muslim demand for a ‘Separate Electorate’ and ‘Weightage’ in the colonial power structure.51 It is within this backdrop that the interwoven dynamics of Hindu-Muslim collaboration gained remarkable prominence, most notably during the span from 1919 to 1924. During this period, the Ottoman order gained prominence in Indian resistance narratives, particularly through the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements, predominantly led by Muslims but witnessed concerted endeavors involving non-Muslim participants in this discourse. Their main concern was to
49 Saikia, “uncolonizable: Freedom”, 117-134.
50 Mushirul Hasan, “Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-Colonial Predicament”, India International Centre Quarterly 22/1 (1995), 100-122.
51 Hugh F. Owen, “Negotiating the Lucknow Pact”, the Journal of Asian Studies 31/3 (1971), 561-587.
135
delegitimize British imperialist dominion over India. Minault’s scholarly analysis underscores the substantial significance of the Indian Khilafat Movement as a pivotal socio-political phenomenon. She elucidates how this movement strategically employed the Ottoman Caliphate as an emblem of Muslim cohesion and resilience in the face of European colonialism.52 In the narrative of resistance against British colonial rule in India, the Ottoman order distinguished itself through two pivotal aspects. Firstly, it fostered a sense of unity among Indians, transcending the religio-cultural variances between Muslim and Non-Muslim participants. Secondly, this order exerted a profound influence on Indian nationalism, which was primarily focused on emancipating India from colonial subjugation. These factors underscore the Ottoman order’s unique ability to not only consolidate the participation of Muslims in the resistance movement but also to engender a broader alignment among Non-Muslims with its ideological underpinnings.
Moreover, from the 1910s, Ottoman Khilafat was constructed as the order-building phenomenon in the Muslim’s political discourses. This construction was vehemently exposed while Western aggression was conducted in the Ottoman lands. Therefore, the aggression uncovered the Western approaches centering the Muslim world. Indian Muslim population strategically leveraged the events in the Ottoman Empire to reconstruct their position within the colonial power framework. They articulated the Western incursion into Ottoman territories as tantamount to the erosion of Muslim civilization within India, advancing this argument with three pivotal assertions.
Initially, they contended that Western imperialism harbored not only the ambition to dismantle the Ottoman Empire but also aimed, by extension, to obliterate Muslim civilization from the Orient. This narrative posited Western imperialism as an existential threat to the very essence of Islamic heritage and identity, framing the Ottoman Empire as a bastion of Muslim civilization whose demise would precipitate the erosion of Islamic culture in India. Secondly, Indian Muslims perceived their position within the colonial order as inherently precarious, contending that the demise of the Ottoman Empire would further marginalize their minority status. By contrast, the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a protective shield for Muslim entities in India against colonial hegemony, thus advocating for the preservation of the
52 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 2.
136
Ottoman order as a means of safeguarding their position within the colonial framework. Lastly, the portrayal of the Western incursion into Ottoman territories as an assault on the heart of Islamic civilization underscored the interconnectedness of Muslim heritage between the Ottoman lands and India. Indian Muslims feared that the destruction of the Ottoman nucleus would irreparably damage the broader fabric of Muslim civilization, making it unsustainable in the face of colonial encroachment. This narrative framed the Ottoman Empire not just as a political entity but as a symbolic and ideological cornerstone of Islamic civilization, the preservation of which was deemed essential for the cultural and spiritual survival of Indian Muslims in the colonial milieu.
This understanding saw a convergence of all Muslims under the Khilafat order; despite their differences Muslims were unified to delegitimize colonial power over India. Central to this unity was the substantive role attributed to the Khilafat. Most importantly, during this era, a growing range of Muslim politicians endeavored to use the Khilafat order as a potent instrument for galvanizing Muslim mobilization against the western imperialism. They picked up this order for their own mobilization, there by furnishing a more nuanced structural understanding for comprehending the trajectory of the Muslim resistance movement.53 Furthermore, Indian Muslim connection with the wider Muslim world increased during this era due to two important factors. Firstly, the rapid growth of Indian pilgrimage and more travel in the Ottoman lands, and secondly, remarkable growth of the vernacular press.54 Subsequently, this discourse seeks to delve into pivotal Ottoman events, for example, the Tripoli and the Balkan Wars, as integral components in constructing and contextualizing the Indian Muslim resistance against the colonial authority. Moreover, during this time, the incorporation of the Ottoman
53 During the colonial epoch, the Muslim populace exhibited a multifaceted array of divisions, predicated on divergent religious affiliations, sectarian variances, and socioeconomic strata. The religious schism predominantly manifested as a dichotomy between the Shia and Sunni denominations. Additionally, within the ambit of religious erudition, discernible dissimilarities arose between the ‘Aliya’ and ‘Deoband’ orientations. Discrepancies in theological perspectives, specifically pertaining to Mazhab and Sufi orders, further underscored the religious heterogeneity among Muslims. Moreover, an economic stratification emerged, categorizing Muslims into distinct groups denoted as the ‘Ashraf’ and ‘Atraf,’ predicated on their socioeconomic standing. Notwithstanding these internal divisions, a unifying factor coalesced under the overarching umbrella of the Ottoman Khilafat, commencing in the 1910s. See also, Asim Roy, “Impact of Islamic Revival and Reform in Colonial Bengal and Bengali Muslim Identity: A Revisit”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 22/ s1 (1999), 39-77.
54 Ansari, “Pan Islam ” 509-537.
137
Khilafat within the framework of the Muslim movement exerted a substantial influence in galvanizing the ‘subaltern Muslim’ population to resist colonial rule.55
By integrating the concept of the Ottoman Khilafat into their political discourses, the Muslim community augmented its capacity to contest the colonial prevailing power dynamics, primarily attributing this order to its consolidating impact on a previously fragmented Muslim populace. As disparate factions within the Muslim community sought common ground, the symbolic and ideological resonance of the Khilafat emerged as a potent instrument for mobilization and consolidation. Consequently, Muslim leaders strategically leveraged the Khilafat’s instrumental role in rallying and unifying disparate elements of the Muslim resistance. This elucidates why Muslim leaders began to underscore the instrumental function of the Khilafat order in mobilizing and consolidating Muslim resistance, fostering a shared sense of collective purpose and unified opposition against colonial hegemony.
3.3.1. Response and Resistance of the Indian Muslims during Tripoli War
This part undertakes an examination of the Indian Muslim response to the Tripoli War through a two-fold analytical framework. Primarily, it employs an ‘order-building approach’ to delve into the nuances of Muslim perceptions regarding the conflict. This approach delves into a hypothesis that how the Ottoman phenomenon in Indian Muslim politics acted an order building phenomenon. Muslims projected the Ottoman facts in their political discourses in three folds way. Firstly, ‘showcase of Ottoman attachment’, Muslim notables, politicians, intellectuals explored the Tripoli War as an opportunity to focus their attachment to this order. On 9 December, 1911, prominent Muslim leaders convened a protest rally in Calcutta, vehemently denouncing the atrocities undertaken by the Italian military in Tripoli.56 This collective denunciation is emblematic of the consternation felt within the Indian Muslim community. The assembly endorsed of a
55 We want to explore a discourse of the Subaltern Muslims and their pivotal role in fostering the Khilafat order within rural landscapes encompasses a demographic primarily composed of agrarian laborers, day-wage workers, and individuals with modest economic means, yet deeply rooted in religious devotion. This cohort, notwithstanding their religious affinity, experienced exploitation at the hands of colonial agents, particularly the Zamindars or landowners. Khilafat leaders strategically instigated a sense of resistance among these marginalized communities against colonial oppression and exploitation, with the Khilafat order serving as a focal point. The central figure in mobilizing local Muslims around this cause was often the Imam of the community mosque. See also, Camil Aydın, “Imperial Paradox: A Caliphate for Subaltern Muslims”, ReOrient 1/2 (2016), 171-191.
56 The Comrade, (17 October, 1911).
138
resolution dispatched to the Ottoman Grand Vizier, articulating a profound expression of solidarity with the Ottoman Empire. Central to this resolution was the articulation of sympathetic sentiments towards the Ottomans, underlining the pivotal role of the Ottoman Khilafat in safeguarding the honor and dignity of the Islamic realm. This stance of the Indian Muslims not only underscored the common ideational connectivity between the Indian Muslim and the Ottomans but also signify the Khilafat as an order that is a unifying emblem for the defense of Islamic world from the western aggression.
Secondly, ‘pro-Ottoman expose’, it includes the activities of the Muslim press, newspapers and proceedings. How these actors portrayed the Italian aggression as a contemporary crusade and a manifestation of western projects aimed at undermining global Islam and Muslim civilization. An illustrative instance was depicted in The Observer, the predominant and only English newspaper of Lahore at that time, which described Italy as an aggressor and highlighted the Italian atrocities as the most notorious act of western powers of the contemporaneous. The Observer wrote,
“A great outrage has been committed and the first scene of a dark tragedy has been enacted on the stage of the world……….Italy has thus taken an unprecedented step, backing up her insolent ultimatum by an act of piracy in a spirit of the most unblushing effrontery……like the barbarian hordes who once descended on Rome and played havoc with her in the past, modern Italy is making her name a byword for revolting rapacity and downright lawlessness.” 57
This writing delves into the Italian aggression as a series of tragic events perpetrated by Italy, driven by a historical legacy rooted in Barbarian Rome. The coverage of this aggression was followed by other national and regional Muslim newspapers. For example, Al-Hilal, Comrade, the Musalman took the pro-Ottoman stance and their appeals played a pivotal role in enhancing Ottoman order within the Indian Muslim society. Due to the pro-Ottoman stance, British government banned Al-Hilal and Comrade during the First World War and confiscated their property. Moreover, during the colonial era, the control exerted by the colonial authority over the vernacular press was meticulous, with severe repercussions for any publication that dared to criticize the colonial administration.58 The banning of newspapers and the confiscation of property
57 The Observer, (4 October, 1911), See also, India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R), L/R/5/192.
58 U. Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the Public Sphere in India”, Journal of Historical Sociology 14/4 (2001), 418-440.
139
were common tactics employed to bring the vernacular press under colonial control. Additionally, the perceived threat posed by pro-Ottoman press outlets was a significant concern for the colonial rule in India, driven by several key factors. Primarily, the propagation of pro-Ottoman narratives within the press bolstered Ottoman soft power among the Muslim populace, potentially undermining western hegemony. Secondly, such news coverage had the potential to foster resistance to Western imperialism among Muslims, particularly by highlighting Western actions against the Ottoman Empire. Thirdly, the British authorities feared that pro-Ottoman news could incite Muslim soldiers to revolt against the colonial regime, especially considering European military actions in Balkans and Tripoli, where fellow Muslims were being targeted. Moreover, as the First World War loomed, British authorities were keen to prevent the spread of pro-Ottoman sentiments among Indian Muslims, viewing it as a potential threat to Indian security. Consequently, the British administration was resolute in its efforts to curtail the proliferation of pro-Ottoman newspapers in India, employing stringent measures to suppress any publications that posed a challenge to colonial authority.
The Comrade published a series of documentaries in 1912 that highlighted the pro-Ottoman sentiments among Indian Muslims. These documentaries portrayed the aspirations of Indian Muslims for the triumph of the Muslim army in Tripoli, as well as their contributions to the Ottoman relief fund. Another example shedding light on the appeals made by Muslims to the Ottomans can be gleaned from a letter sent by Swaleh Sherwani to the editor of the Comrade. “My only daughter just finished her Quran. In honor of the occasion, I entertained the notion of hosting a celebratory dinner for friends. However, amidst the prevailing concerns of the global Muslim community regarding ongoing conflicts, I found myself unable to derive any personal satisfaction from such a gathering. Therefore, I resolved to redirect the funds earmarked for the dinner towards supporting the Turkish and Arabs grappling with the ramifications of these conflicts.”59
These documents endeavor to examine the potential for assessing the pro-Ottoman inclinations prevalent among influential Muslims, which played a significant role in reinforcing Ottoman authority within the Indian Muslim community by portraying their appeals, affiliations, and attachments to the Khilafat. This phenomenon emerged as a
59 The Comrade, (20 November, 1912).
140
result of Indian Muslims perceiving the Ottoman Empire as an order for Muslim solidarity and resistance against Western imperialism.
Thirdly the ‘organizational approach’ following the Italians attacks in Tripoli, Muslim established ‘Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society’ (IMRCS). This organization undertook a duel-pronged approach, primarily aimed at raising funds to aid wounded Muslim soldiers in the Tripoli War, and then, organizing a medical mission to Tripoli. These initiatives inadvertently served to solidify Ottoman influence among the Muslim populace. An illustrative example of this Muslim fund collection’s approaches and the ordinary Muslim’s response in this cause can be found in a letter penned by N.A. Ghulam, which provides valuable insights into the depth of Muslim attachment with the Ottoman Empire. Ghulam’s letter was addressed to the editor of the Comrade.
“Dear brother-Yesterday I sent you a money order for rupees four only as a little contribution to the Turkish Fund. It is my humble aspiration that this modest sum might facilitate the acquisition of bandages, thus aiding in the alleviation of the injuries sustained by our Turkish and Arab compatriots engaged in the struggle for the preservation of Islam. This remittance was made under the auspices of my son, Feroz Hussain. May Allah accept him a good Muslim.”60
This missive delineates the entreaties of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman Empire and articulates their sentiments regarding their co-religionists afflicted by the war. The Muslim community’s ascription of significance to the Ottoman relief fund is construed as a virtuous undertaking underscored by the spiritual nexus between the Khilafat and the worldwide Muslim populace.
Moreover, Indian Muslims dispatched a medical mission to Tripoli in May 1912.61 This mission’s primary objective was to provide vital medical assistance to wounded Muslim soldiers, but it also played a pivotal role in conveying critical information regarding the human sufferings due to Italian aggression. This dissemination of information served a dual purpose: firstly, it portrayed the perceived oppressive actions of Western powers against Muslims, and secondly, it influenced Indian Muslims to reassess their position within the colonial milieu. The perceived vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire, the foremost Muslim hegemon, to Western aggression led Indian Muslims to question how
60 The Comrade, (17 August, 1912).
61 National Archives of India (NAI). F. D. Secret E. (February 1912), 298.
141
they could secure their legitimacy and protect their cultural and heritage under colonial rule. This realization fostered a heightened anti-colonial sentiment among Indian Muslims. Consequently, the events surrounding the Ottomans significantly influenced Indian Muslims’ opposition to colonial rule, with the Ottoman order emerging as a pivotal factor in galvanizing anti-British resistance in India.
The events centering on the Italian attack in Tripoli had profound implications for constructing the Ottoman order among the Indian Muslims. This new order influenced the Muslim to the anti-British resistance. The resistance movement, in turn, catalyzed the emergence of a new leadership paradigm within the Muslim community, which was largely shaped by the educated middle class. This leadership, characterized by hope, aspiration, and collaboration with Hindus, found inspiration in the Ottoman order and leveraged the concept of Khilafat as a symbol of authority in their struggle against British colonial rule until 1924.62 Furthermore, the Ottoman-Italian war had the profound effect of bridging the gap between traditional ulama (Islamic scholars)63, particularly those associated with Deoband and Firangi Mahal, and the western-educated Muslims. Moreover, during a convened special council session of the AIML, condemnation was expressed regarding the unjustifiable Italian assault in Tripoli. Subsequently, a resolution was adopted to institute a comprehensive boycott on all categories of Italian merchandise.64 Boycott of the Italian goods as a means of exerting pressure to bring an end to the war, despite this, economic boycotts were a common tactic during anti-colonial movements in India to pressure the colonial powers.
3. 3. 2. Balkan War and Ottoman Order-Building Phenomenon in India
The Ottoman Empire had experienced a period of decline in Eastern Europe marked by its defeat in the Balkan Wars during the 1910s. This defeat at the hand of Western powers had a profound impact on Ottoman domestic politics, leading to a sense of despondency. However, it simultaneously engendered a wave of sympathy for the Ottoman Empire in distant Muslim regions. During this time, Indian Muslims exhibited
62 Maulana Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Wazir Hasan, Syed Hasan Bilgrami, Zafar Ali Khan, and Abul Kalam Azad represented the vanguard of this new generation of Muslim leaders.
63 Influential figures among the ulama during this period included Maulana Mahmudul Hasan of Deoband, Maulana Abul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Shibli Nomani, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.
64 The Comrade, (14 October, 1911), 315. Hasan Imam, “Pan-Islamism and Khilafat Movement: Understanding Muslim Minds in Colonial Perspectives”, Islam in India History, Politics and Society, ed. Nasir Raza Khan (London: Routledge, 2023), 243-258.
142
a profound attachment and sympathy towards the Ottoman Empire. Despite the Empire’s impending demise, they envisioned its resurgence with greater vigor, believing that its return to power would invigorate their resistance against the colonial order. This conviction further energized their resistance against the colonial order, imbuing it with a renewed sense of purpose and determination. A parallel scenario reminiscent of the analysis presented by Ali Balcı emerges, wherein he examines the PKK’s resistance against the Turkish state in the late 1980s, notes a similar intensification of resistance despite the fact that the Soviet Union, the PKK’s hegemonic supporter, was collapsing.65 In both cases, the waning power of the respective hegemonies did not dampen but rather fuelled the legitimization and fortification of resistance movements, with the anticipation of their hegemon’s resurgence. The Indian Muslim community did not mourn the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans but instead offered material assistance in a bid to sustain their hegemony. This assistance was characterized by the strong attachment and sense of solidarity exhibited by them towards the Ottomans, stemming from their profound commitment to the Khilafat and their recognition of the Ottoman Empire as an order-building entity in shaping their resistance against the colonial rule over India. Thus, the allure of the subordinate entities towards the waning Empire underscores a noteworthy phenomenon wherein an imperial power, in the twilight of its existence, can paradoxically catalyze the resurgence of resistance discourses among its subjugated subjects. The manifestation of Indian Muslim’s allegiance to the Ottoman order during the Balkan War can be delineated through two pivotal avenues. Firstly, the ‘fundraising campaigns for the Ottomans’66 signifies the proactive efforts of Indian Muslims in advocating for the cause of the Khilafat and promoting solidarity with the Ottoman Empire, alongside their substantial fundraising endeavors aimed at supporting the Ottoman war efforts. In their fundraising activities, Muslim leaders adopted some policies, for example, ‘demonstration’, it implies the role of Muslims organization, and institutions, the activities of “Ulamas” and “Imams” who impressed the local Muslim by the “Friday Khutba” in which they pictured the importance of the Ottoman Khilafat for the Muslim “Ummah”. Those kind of activities mobilized Indian Muslims into specific subjectivity creating them as a new subject who are united under the Khilafat order. They depicted
65 Balcı, The PKK-Kurdistan.
66 Mim Kemal Öke, Hitafet Hareketleri (Istanbul: Irfan Yayinlari, 2005), 43-44.
143
Western powers as a menace to Islam, highlighting the crucial role of the Khilafat, which is considered a fundamental aspect of Islam. In underscoring the importance of Khilafat, religious scholars issued a “Fatwa” in support of Ottoman Funds.67 ‘Public meeting’ was another way in collaboration with the Ottoman cause turned the subaltern Muslim’s interactions to the Ottoman Khilafat which facilitated fund-raising activities for the Ottomans. These activities, dignified the Ottoman causes among the masses in a multi-faceted ways, for example, Muslim’s women appeals to protect Ottoman Khilafat while they sold their jewelry to send money for the Ottomans.68 The ‘press activities’, was another way for fund-raising, it includes the publication of articles, news and poems related to signify the Ottoman Khilafat and crisis of the Ottoman in the Balkan and the western plot regarding the war.69 During this time, Shibli Numani wrote his most recited poem the “Shahr-i-Ashub-i-Islam”, in which he described how the Islamic cities were ruining by the western attack. Furthermore, the fundraising for the Ottomans can be considered a strong way to delegitimize the colonial rule over India as they collected money sitting in the colonial state to serve another order against the west.
Secondly, the ‘sending of a medical mission’70 elucidates how Indian Muslims orchestrated a medical mission on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, and underscores the instrumental role played by the members of this mission in contributing to the reinvigoration of the Ottoman order and its significance within the Muslim community in India. The Indian medical mission for the Ottoman firstly served the war wounded soldiers, men, women and children.71 Secondly their experiences were depicted by the Muslim press in India and Istanbul. The Comrade and al-Hilal continuously published the experiences of the Indian Muslim Medical Mission, especially Ansari’s report regarding Ottoman’s sufferings in the Balkan.72 Returning back at home one of the leading members of the mission, Syed Ismail Husain Shirazi, wrote a book entitled as
67 Arshad Islam, “Indian Muslim’s Support for Ottoman Pan-Islamism: The Case of Shibli Numani”, Intellectual Discourses 27/1 (2019), 197- 220.
68 Hatice Görgün, “Balkan Savaşları Döneminde Hindistan Müslümanlarının Faaliyetleri”, Şarkiyat Mecmuası 41 (2022), 181-196.
69 Wasti, “The Political Aspirations”, 709-722.
70 Syed Tanvir Wasti, “The Indian Red Crescent Mission to the Balkan Wars”, Middle Eastern Studies 53/ 3 (2009), 393-406.
71 Mahmut Cihat İzgi-Ümit Ekin, “Doctor Indian Nationalist and Humanitarian: Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880-1936)”, Journal of Medical Biography (2023), 1-9.
72 Zuhal Özaydin, “The Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society’s Aid to the Ottoman State During the Balkan War in 1912”, Journal of the International Society for the History of Islamic Medicine, 2/4 (2003), 12-18.
144
“Turosko Vromon” (Travel in Turkey), in which he depicted the tragic condition of the Ottoman army fighting in the Balkan War and the shabby treatment meted out the Ottomans by the Western powers.73 The mission recorded Ottoman refugee stories, for example, narratives of murder, mutilation, rape, expulsion. Their experiences and writings influenced to mold public opinion in order to bring attention to the Balkan war. These gestures gave an opportunity for the India Muslim leaders and intellectuals to determine their position in the colonial power structure by presenting the western plot centering the Khilafat which gave them a lesson that they are not safe in the British colonial rule as their hierarchal authority the Ottoman Khilafat was under the deep conspiracy of the western power.
Muslim leaders had come to believe that resistance against the British rule was the only effective way of safeguarding Muslim interest in India and they used the Khilafat as agitation tools for the solidarity of “Dar-al-Islam” against the encroaching west. This was mostly because of their hope and aspiration to regain their long-standing political hegemony over India. They contributed to the end of European hegemony in South Asia with their revolt against the west, while at the same time their own legitimacy and self-identity were initially shaped and continued to be strongly influenced by Pro-Ottoman notion of civilization and modernity. Thus the anti-colonial solidarity of Indian Muslims in which Ottoman Khilafat was the main actor for the unification of all Muslims against the colonial power over India while Indian Muslim scholar, for example, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad argued Khilafat as the root of Shari’a. Maulana Azad argued that Indian Muslims must abandon the colonial jobs, goods and commodities, a gesture consisted with the larger anti-colonial project of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movement of which he was a major protagonist.74 Indian Muslims perceived a direct correlation between the precarious state of the Khilafat and the perceived jeopardy to Islam itself. Confronted with the Ottoman Empire’s vulnerabilities in the Balkans, Indian Muslims conjectured that Western powers were orchestrating a deliberate dismantling of the Ottoman Khilafat, thereby posing a threat to the cultural and civilizational heritage of Islam. This apprehension led them to surmise that the preservation of the Ottoman Khilafat was integral to safeguarding not only the sanctity of Islam but also the broader
73 Al Islam, (05, Vadro, 1325 Bongabdo).
74 Sherail Tareen, “Contesting Friendship in Colonial Muslim India”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38/3 (2015), 419-434.
145
civilization of Indian Muslims. Moreover, Muslim revolt against the British colonial order was shaped by century long conflict between Islamic and Christian civilization which Camil Aydin referred to a conflict of ‘orientalism vis-à-vis oxidentalism’.75
3. 3. 3. Conflicting Ideas on Resistance during the First World War
During the World War I, Indian Muslims manifested a spectrum of perspectives concerning the Ottoman Khilafat, revealing a multifaceted array of approaches. Led by Maulana Abdul Bari, a faction of Muslims associated with ‘Firangi Mahal’ sought to appeal to the Ottoman Sultan, arguing restrain from aligning with British adversaries.76 Their plea, suggesting that if Ottoman participation was inevitable, it should be in alignment with the British, showcased a nuanced stance. Despite this appeal, the Ottoman Empire, driven by its strategic considerations and broader wartime alliances chose alignment with Germany and issued a ‘Fatwa’ proclaiming the war as ‘Jihad’.77 But this decision triggered a profound impact on Indian Muslims. Their active response to the Ottoman call for ‘Jihad’, despite residing within a colonial state, underscores the intricate dynamics of identity and allegiance, illustrating how hegemonic decisions resonate within subordinate entities. Moreover, the case of Maulana Abdul Bari’s nuanced approach can be construed as an endeavor to navigate the complexities of loyalty within a colonial milieu. Nonetheless, the subsequent reactions of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman after ‘Fatwa’ highlights the intricate dynamics of hierarchy, illustrating the notion that the hegemon always exploits the actions, approaches, and decisions of subordinate entities.
Another group, predominately led by the Deobandi Ulama, aspired to liberate India from British colonial rule through collaboration with the Ottomans. Throughout the 1910s, there was a notable upswing in the presence of Ottoman diplomats and visitors in Indian, notably marked by heightened activities of the Ottoman Embassy at Bombay.78 This diplomatic involvement intensified with the appointment of Halil Halid Bey as the consul general in Bombay in 1913, and a consequential visit by an Ottoman delegation
75 Cemil Aydin, “The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West”, Ethics and International Affairs 18/3 (2004), 89-96.
76 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 178-179.
77 Ali Balci, et al. “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: the Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War”, War in History 27/4 (2020), 643-669.
78 Çakılcı, “Hindistanda Osmanlılar”, 81-106
146
headed by Taufiq Pasha in 1914 underscoring the Ottoman Empire’s deepening diplomatic involvements within the Indian Muslim community. The expression of gratitude by the Ottoman delegate to Indian Muslims for their support during the crises in Tripoli and the Balkans signified a discernible sense of solidarity and collaboration between two entities. This sentiment was further reinforced during a meeting of ‘Anjuman-i-Islam’ on February 23, 1914, in Patna in which Ottoman delegation was warmly received and Muslim iterated the enduring allegiance to the Ottoman Khalifa.79 Moreover, on behalf of the Deobandi ulama, “Sheikhul Hind” Maulana Mahmudul Hasan cultivated significant diplomatic ties with high-ranking Ottoman officials. Under his tutelage, Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi and his adherents embarked on a migration to Afghanistan, where Muslim revolutionaries coalesced to establish the ‘Provisional Indian Government in Exile’. The primary objective of this provisional government encompassed two distinct aims: firstly, the facilitation of collaboration between Hindu and Muslim revolutionaries to collectively oppose colonial rule, and secondly, the solicitation of international support, notably from the Ottoman Empire, with a specific focus on military escalation emanating from Kabul to liberate India.80 In 1916, leaders of the Ghadar Party, Raja Mahendra Pratap and Muhammed Baraktullah Bhopali, journeyed to Kabul for a meeting with Maulana Sindhi. Subsequently, these revolutionaries meet with the Ottoman-German mission in Kabul. This government also endeavored to establish connections with the governors of Russian Turkestan, China, and Persia, seeking assistance in their anti-colonial struggle. Moreover, they orchestrated the formation of a military entity known as ‘Jand-Allah’ or ‘Junudu-i-Rabbaniyya,’ denoting the army of Allah, to spearhead military escalation against British.81 The main leader of this group, Sheikhul Hind, sought refuge in Hijaz (presently incorporated into Saudi Arabia) with the aim of garnering support from the Ottoman Empire in the pursuit of India’s independence. While in Hijaz, he received assistance from Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani, a devoted follower who had been residing there since 1909 and had fostered significant rapport with influential Ottoman dignitaries. Facilitated by Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Hijaz, these two
79 Imam, ‘Pan-Islamism and Khilafat Movement”, 243-258.
80 Muhammadullah Qasmi, tran., Silken Letter Movement Accounts of ‘ Silken Handkerchief Letters Conspiracy Case’ From British Records (New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2012), 48.
81 Saul Kelly, “Crazy in the Extream? The Silk Letters Conspiracy”, Middle Eastern Studies 49/2 (2013), 162-178.
147
Indian Muslim nationalists engaged in deliberations with Ottoman ministers Jamal Pasha and Enver Pasha. This assembly held assurances of India’s self-governance during the post-victory peace conference of the Central Powers.82
The Third group actively spearheaded pro-Ottoman initiatives within India through their press engagements. Muhammed Ali, a prominent member, contributed an article to the Comrade titled ‘The choice of the Turks’, elucidating the rationale behind the Ottoman Empire’s engagement in the war.83 While this piece generated enthusiasm among Muslim readers, it concurrently heightened tensions with government authorities, who perceived a potential for mass unrest. The publication resulted in the forfeiture of the Comrade’s deposit, and Ali was apprehended by government authorities. The British administration regarded this group as more perilous than others. In the nascent stages of the war, law enforcement agencies preemptively detained all members of this faction.
However, the Ottoman’s declaration of Jihad significantly impacted the British Indian Government’s strategic considerations for justifying the loyalty of the Indian army, particularly in light of indelible memories from the events of 1857. At the time, approximately 1.3 million Indian soldiers were actively engaged in serving the British Empire, with a significant contingent deployed in the Middle East. Notably, a substantial proportion of these soldiers were of Muslim faith. The British apprehension was closely tied to the perceived ideological affinity between the Muslim soldiers and the Ottoman Khilafat. This convergence of ideological factors necessitated a nuanced analysis of the British Indian Government’s strategic considerations during this pivotal period. Moreover, the escalation of German propaganda further heightened tensions for the British authorities. Germany persuaded two distinct objectives aimed at destabilizing the imperial system in India. Firstly, ‘inciting the Muslim soldiers for revolt’ in which Germany portrayed the Jihad propaganda and addressing the Muslim’s sufferings to make a situation of revenge. 84 Secondly, ‘making a collection with the Hindu revolutionaries for resistance against the British’ for that purpose German mission meet with the leaders of Indian Ghader party at Kabul and San Francisco.
82 Wasti, “The Political Aspirations”, 709-722.
83 Minault, The Khilafat, 51.
84 West Bengal State Archives (WBSA), Bagawat-i-Hind, FN-580/15.
148
Taking into consideration all of these perspectives, British authorities exercised a judicious approach in addressing Muslim resistance, particularly evident in their interactions with the Indian Defense Council. At a convened conference, assurances were extended to Muslim soldiers regarding the inviolability of their sacred sites, coupled with a commitment to preserve the prestige and position of the Khalifa would be remained after the post-war. Paradoxically, the British, in characterizing the Ottoman declaration of Jihad as ‘German Projected Propaganda,’ adopted a stratagem aimed at mitigating the resonance of the Ottoman Empire’s call for Jihad within the Muslim populace. Simultaneously, strategic collaboration with Sharif Hussain of Mecca materialized, culminating in the orchestration of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This collaboration, however, was not devoid of coercive measures, as exemplified by the apprehension of Sheikhul Hind and Ahmed Madani by British intelligence, subsequently leading to their three-year exile in Malta due to their anti-British activities.85 The intricacies of the Muslim revolutionist movement in Kabul unfolded amid formidable challenges, ultimately resulting in its failure. The recalcitrance of Afghan Ameer Habibullah played a pivotal role in impeding the success of the movement. Despite earnest efforts and reassurances proffered by the British, the tangible impact of external support on India’s independence movement remained circumscribed. This limited efficacy can be attributed, in part, to the transformative shifts in the geopolitical landscape following World War I, compounded by the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. These geopolitical changes engendered constraints on the potential influence of external actors on the course of India’s struggle for independence. Nevertheless, the protracted nature of the struggle persisted through diverse channels and movements, underscoring the nuanced and multifaceted nature of resistance pivoting around the Ottoman Khilafat till 1922.
In this chapter, I have projected three pivotal factors that significantly underpinned the development of Muslim resistance against colonial rule over India. I have also elucidated the interconnection between these factors and the historical contexts of the Ottoman Empire. The central premise of this chapter posits the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘order-building authority’, thereby asserting that Indian Muslims turned to the concept of the Khilafat as an order to delegitimize the colonial rule over India. From the
85 Ansari, “Pan-Islam”, 509-537.
149
perspective of Indian Muslims, the Khilafat assumed the role of a unifying force for Muslims across the globe, offering a means of solidarity in the face of perceived Western encroachments. The crux of my argument revolves around the portrayal of Indian Muslims as a subordinate entity vis-a vis the Ottoman Khilafat as an established order. This conceptual framework underscores how Indian Muslims strategically constructed the phenomenon of the Ottoman Empire within their resistance narrative against British colonialism. The shared objective of countering Western colonialism binds both the subordinate position of Indian Muslims and the ordering authority of the Ottoman Khilafat. This interplay between the two facets forms the crux of my argument sheds light on the intricate dynamics that fueled Muslim resistance in the 1910s.
Muslim resistance primary due to the dissatisfaction of the Muslim population stemmed from the perception that the colonial administration was undermining their interests in the country. This perception was reinforced when the British government revoked the partition of Bengal, a move that cast doubt on their commitment to safeguarding Muslim interests. Furthermore, the British government’s reluctance to support the establishment of a Muslim university in North India was viewed as an impediment to Muslim educational and cultural progress. Additionally, the demolition of a mosque in Kanpur for the construction of a highway exemplified how colonial policies appeared to disregard Muslim civilization. These incidents collectively eroded the trust of Indian Muslims in the colonial administration. Concurrently, the factors of Ottoman Empire-the order of Indian Muslims contributed to the perception that Western powers were hostile to the Khilafat and Muslim civilization. This fueled their concerns that the British and their alliances were planning to undermine the Ottoman Khilafat on the global stage and their distinct culture and civilization in India is not protected, preserved and honored by the colonial dominion. Muslim considered their position within the framework of the colonial power structure and they were acutely aware that not only their civilization at home but also their hierarchical authority, Ottoman Khilafat, was being eroded in the face of Western conspiracy. This understanding further influenced them to mount strong resistance in the aftermath of World War I, as the British and Western powers aimed to partition Ottoman territories and dismantle the Khilafat.
150
CHAPTER 4: INSIDE THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT: ACTORS AND OPPONENTS This thesis undertakes an examination of the Khilafat Movement through the lens of a hierarchy-oriented study, elucidating the Khilafat as an order and positioning the Indian Muslim as a subordinate entity. Within this paradigm, during and after the First World War, the movement’s proponents portrayed the Khilafat order as a paramount force capable of dismantling the colonial presence in India. During this period, British policy concerning the Ottoman Khilafat significantly influenced a burgeoning cohort of Muslim political figures, prompting them to reevaluate and realign their perspectives towards the British authorities. Moreover, Muslim movement had two main objectives; firstly, attainment of ‘Swaraj’ home rule of India through the resistance against colonial rule, and secondly, the preservation of the Khilafat from Western-centric construction. This context allows the current chapter to scrutinize the key actors and opponents involved in the movement. The most intriguing puzzle is that, the movement engendered a noteworthy transformation in the subjective identity of Indian Muslims. Moreover, the constitution of subjects extends beyond the imposition of responsibilities such as ‘loyalty and sacrifice’ to the Ottoman Khilafat. Existing analyses focusing on the positive engagement of participants in the Khilafat movement have inadequately addressed the segment of Muslim leaders who aligned themselves with British loyalty, thereby diverging from the established subject. This is very reason, the central hypothesis of this chapter is to what extent how the Khilafat movement and its prominent leaders contribute to the transformation of Indian Muslims into a politically engaged and instrumental entity in the resistance against British colonialism, and who were the opponent of this construction.
This chapter undertakes an exploration of three intricate puzzles, primarily focusing on the ‘key actors’ who played a pivotal role in incorporating the Ottoman order into the discourses of Muslim resistance against the British colonial regime. The examination involves with a specific focus on Muslim organizations, institutions, and leadership, elucidating how these entities systematically molded a populace inclined towards resistance in the face of colonialism. Moreover, the study investigates how these actors strategically portrayed the Ottoman Khilafat as a ‘unifying force’, presenting it as an
151
‘alternative order’ that fostered a cohesive front against the prevailing colonial rule in India. The theoretical analysis of these interrelated aspects of Muslim resistance is anchored in the concepts of ‘order’, and ‘hegemony,’ which forged of a ‘common subjective identity’ delineating the processes of ‘coalition-building’ among Muslims across diverse social strata.
The second argument elucidates the ‘opponent to the Khilafat order’, primarily scrutinizing the responses of colonial authority towards the Khilafat. This analysis encompasses an examination of the diverse strategies employed by colonial powers to manage or quell such resistance. Furthermore, within the realm of the ‘colonial agent group,’ there is a distinct disavowal of the Ottoman Khalifa as the authority for Indian Muslims. This non-acknowledgment is posited to have exerted influence on their policy formulations and interactions with the Muslim community. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that despite the official colonial standpoint, a significant proportion of Indian Muslims recognized the Khilafat as a legitimate order. The exploration of this acceptance entails an examination of how it contributed to the cohesion of the Muslim community and functioned as a mechanism for undermining the legitimacy of colonial governance. Lastly, the investigation into the role of Hindu counterparts in delegitimizing Muslim resistance involves a nuanced analysis of their perspectives, motivations, and actions within the specific context of opposing the Khilafat order.
The third argument elucidates the manner in which the Muslim resistance engendered a novel subjective identity among Indian Muslims. It delves into the conceptualization of the Khilafat as counter-discourses aimed at challenging the prevailing colonial hegemony, thereby facilitating the construction of alternative subjectivities. This analysis underscores the pivotal role played by Khilafat discourses in fostering a collective identity. Building upon this proposition, I posit the significance of the Ottoman Khilafat in catalyzing dissident Muslim movements during the early two decades of the twentieth century, which actively contested the prevailing British hegemonic power and contributed to the formulation of an alternative Muslim identity. For this reason, we endeavor to delineate the process of Muslim identity construction within the context of Ottoman hegemonic perspectives, adopting an interpretive stance that introduces a novel perspective. This perspective emphasizes the role of the emergent subjective identity in fueling widespread resistance against colonial powers.
152
Therefore my argument is how Khilafat order shaped the subjective construction of Indian Muslims, a collective entity to force the British government positively toward the Muslims. In pursuit of their objectives, a group of Muslim leaders strategically fabricated distinct Muslim identity in the construction of their movement embarked on a campaign for the Khilafat, seeking to rejuvenate Muslim identity through a widespread mobilization. Primarily, they leveraged the popularity of the Khilafat to foster unity among mass Muslims. Secondly, they meticulously prepared the Muslim populace for resolute resistance against the British colonial rule. Thirdly, through the movement, they aimed at establishing Muslim political dominance within the Indian political landscape. To achieve their goals, Muslim leaders adeptly utilized the Khilafat as a bargaining tool in three strategic dimensions: a) negotiating with the subaltern Muslim masses to secure unity, compliance, and active participation in the movement, b) engaging in negotiations with the colonial government to legitimize their demands for political legitimacy of Muslims in India and endorsing the Ottoman Khilafat as a global Muslim order, and c) entering negotiations with fellow Congress leaders for political coexistence within the broader nationalist struggle for independence.
Consequently, this chapter argues that Khilafat emerged as a dominant discourse in the order-building phenomenon among the Muslim masses, contributing to the formation of a new subjectivity oriented towards resistance. This constructive framework projects the Ottoman Khilafat as a unified platform encompassing all Muslims, irrespective of religious and cultural disparities during the colonial era. It furnishes a nuanced comprehension of hegemonic dynamics, delineating the emergence of an alternative center of power emerges from the discursive Muslim struggle against the existing colonial power. This chapter is organized into distinct sections for a comprehensive examination of the Khilafat as an order of the Muslim resistance movement in India. The initial segment delves into an analysis of the actors and their respective roles in shaping the Khilafat into an organizational framework. Subsequently, a detailed exploration is undertaken to elucidate an intriguing yet underexplored phenomenon pertaining to opposition against the Khilafat order, focusing on the strategies employed to undermine and delegitimize the Muslim resistance. In the final section, a scholarly examination is conducted to unveil a novel conceptualization regarding the redefinition of the Indian Muslim subjectivity within the ambit of the Khilafat order.
153
4.1. Actors of Bringing the Ottoman Order in Indian Politics
The emergence of the Khilafat as a nucleus for dissident Muslim movements in India during the 1910s was characterized by the active involvement of Muslim organizations, institutions, and a burgeoning cohort of modern-educated and religiously oriented middle-class leaders. These actors played a pivotal role in framing Khilafat as a cohesive and order-building entity within the Indian Muslim community. The organizational and institutional framework, rather than a purely political movement, rendered Khilafat more resonant among the Muslim populace. The conceptual underpinning of this phenomenon lies in perceiving the Ottoman order as a hierarchal authority stemming from a social compact that arbitrates among divergent interests, beliefs, and values regarding power and authority. Central to this transformative social compact among Indian Muslims were the proactive roles played by Muslim organizations, instrumental in the manifestation and constitution of this evolving order. Moreover, Muslim institutions and organizations provided normative mechanisms to restrain and delegitimize colonial power, thereby contributing significantly to the resistance against colonialism. The Muslim leadership, and political party serving as the vanguard, played a crucial role as the driving force behind the rejuvenation of organizational and institutional activities. The ensuing discourse aims to elucidate two key themes: firstly, a conceptual exploration into the genesis of pro-Ottoman Muslim organizations, institutions and their roles in India, examining their functions in advocating the Ottoman order in resistance against colonialism. Secondly, a nuanced analysis of the political negotiations undertaken by Muslims leaders and their political party, utilizing Khilafat as a social compact to confront and challenge the established British order.
4.1.1. Pro-Ottoman Organizations in Constructing the Ottoman Order Edward Keen’s analysis underscores the pivotal role of hegemonic states in the established and configuration of hierarchical structures witin the international system, primarily through the establishment of supranational organization.1 Conversely, Evelyn
1 Edward Keene, “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century”, International Organization 61/2 (2007), 311-339.
154
Goh delves into the multifaceted functions of international organizations and institutions, elucidating their contributions to the perpetuation, reinforcement, and symbolic representation of global hierarchical order.2 Despite this, there is a noticeable gap in the discourse concerning the agency of subordinates in formulating, establishing, and maintaining organizational structures within hierarchical studies. This argument prompts an exploration into how Muslim organizations contributed to the establishment of the Ottoman order in India. This section endeavors to scrutinize a spectrum of viewpoints regarding international hierarchical structures, particularly within the framework of the Ottoman order, with a specialized focus on the Indian Khilafat Movement as a case study. The chosen case presents a compelling puzzle as it unravels the manner in which Indian Muslim subordinates intricately shaped the Ottoman hierarchical order within the realm of Indian politics. This section systematically analyzes key Muslim organizations pivotal in orchestrating the Ottoman Khilafat as a key denominator for Indian Muslim resistance. It scrutinizes their inception, objectives, leadership dynamics, and the strategic methodologies employed to mobilize Muslims against the colonial order. Additionally, the exploration extends to elucidate how these Muslim organizations adeptly amalgamated diverse regional and religious factions under a cohesive umbrella, championing the cause of the Khilafat.
4.1.1.1. Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kabba
Colonial rule had a profound impact on the educational, economic, and political landscape of Muslims, resulting in perceived backwardness. A transformative shift from this depressing picture was seen in the early twentieth century, marked by the establishment of the Muslim League as their inaugural political organization, and the rise of Muslim middle class.3 This development among the Muslim communities witnessed a resurgence of interest in addressing domestic challenges and engaging with global Muslim issues. This is the very reason, during Italy’s aggressive assault on Tripoli, a territory of the Ottoman Empire in Africa, stirred strong protests among Indian Muslims. Their protests preceded an organizational set up with the formation of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kabba (AKK) driven by dual objectives. Firstly, it aimed to safeguard the Islamic holy places in the West Asia under Ottoman Khilafat’s
2 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order, 29.
3 Yasmin Saikia, “Uncolonizable: Freedom”, 117-134.
155
jurisdiction. To achieve this goal, under the capacity of this organization Muslim sought to provide material assistance to fortify the Khilafat.4 They considered the preservation of the Islamic holy places is only possible which the Khilafat would be more strong and functional to raise voice for global Muslims. They provided the material assistance to Istanbul pursuing an objective for strengthing the Ottoman international order. Indian Muslims perceived the preservation of the Islamic holy sites as intricately intertwined with the vitality of the Ottoman Khilafat.5 Within this paradigm, the absence of a robust Khalifa position posed a significant challenge to safeguarding global Muslim interests against Western encroachments. In response, Indian Muslims envisioned the Ottoman Empire as a bastion of support and actively extended material assistance to Istanbul to fortify the Ottoman international order. This strategic alignment underscored Indian Muslims’ conviction that the advancement of their community relied heavily on the enduring strength of the Khilafat order. Noteworthy figures such as Shaukat Ali from the Western educational stream and Abdul Bari from the Islamic educational stream collaborated to mobilize Muslims under the common banner of Khilafat order. Their collective objective was to popularize the Khilafat among the masses and activate the subaltern entities in the resistance against the colonial exploitation. Secondly, this organization focused the further act of resistance against the Western powers seeking to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. The 1910s witnessed a strategic move to resist Western influence in India, notably exemplified by the declaration of a boycott against Italian goods in the Indian market during the Ottoman-Italian war.6 This bold stance, taken by Muslim entities, underscored their commitment to challenging Western colonialism in Muslim lands. Moreover, Muslim’s extensive fundraising efforts across the subcontinent aimed to bolster the Ottoman order, symbolizing a spontaneous and widespread rejection of Western hegemony. It is imperative to underscore the noteworthy phenomenon wherein a subordinate entity residing within the framework of colonial hegemony engages in fundraising activities aimed at supporting an alternate hegemonic entity.
4 Osmanlı Arsivi (BOA), Defteri Iane-i-Hindiyye, no.290/18220.
5 Yuvraj Deva Prasad, “Indian Muslims and the Arab Revolt”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 34/2 (1973), 32-37.
6 Shamshed Ali, “Turko-Italian War and Its Impact on Indian Politics”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 53 (1992-93), 571-579.
156
Indian Muslim understands stems from the underlying conviction that the trajectory of Muslim liberation from Western dominion is intricately intertwined with the robust existence of the Khilafat. Consequently, concerted efforts by the AKK are directed towards enhancing the authority of the Khilafat as a strategic measure to fortify against the incursions of Western colonialism within India. The primary objective lies in bolstering the efficacy of Khilafat authority to serve as a formidable defense mechanism against the pervasive influence of colonial powers in Muslim territories, leveraging the Khilafat’s authority in the Muslim quest for liberation from British colonial rule.
4.1.1.2. Indian Muslims Red Crescent Medical Mission for Ottomans
During the tumultuous period of the Ottoman Empire marked by a crisis in its suzerainty over the Balkans and simultaneous challenges to its authority in Eastern Europe due to revolts and wars, seizing the opportune moment, Western powers decided to dismantle Ottoman rule from the Balkans. Despite the diminishing stature of the Ottoman order, its subordinates in India maintained a steadfast faith in the potential resurgence of this waning hegemonic power, viewing its revival as a legitimizing force for their resistance against colonial domination. This perception of a declining yet still authoritative Ottoman order significantly influenced the narrative of Muslim political discourse in India, marking the profound impact of Western encroachment on the region.
Moreover, in response to the Balkan crisis, Indian Muslims fervently pledged their support to the ailing Ottoman order. To formalize their commitment, they established the Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society for Ottomans (IMRCSO) and, leveraging this organizational framework, dispatched a medical mission to Istanbul.7 The influence of these actions on the acceptance of the Ottoman hierarchical order among Indian Muslims can be delineated in three key facets. Primarily, the creation of the IMRCSO provided Muslim politicians with avenues to connect with the masses while mobilizing funds for the Ottoman cause, thereby challenging the local government’s policy of monitoring countryside populations. This interaction facilitated a nuanced understanding of the Ottoman predicament among the Indian Muslim populace. Secondly, through their conscientious efforts, the political leaders inadvertently fostered
7 Wasti, “The Indian Red Crescent”, 393-406.
157
Ottoman soft power among the Muslim masses. Consequently, a sense of unity emerged, bound by the common order of Khilafat, inspiring vehement resistance against Western colonialism. This ideological alignment had a profound impact on shaping the collective consciousness of Indian Muslims and made them distinct subjective identity from the other Indian community. Finally, the Muslim community disrupted the colonial power structure while collecting substances and dispatch of essential resources to the Ottoman Empire.8 This commitment to the Khilafat order persisted despite their coexistence within the colonial power structure. The confluence of these factors facilitated a multifaceted transformation in the political landscape, as Indian Muslims not only challenged local governance policies but also strengthened their allegiance to the Khilafat cause, thereby shaping a complex narrative of resistance against Western colonial powers. However, the multifaceted impact of the Balkan crisis on Indian Muslim politics is evident in the strategic use of the IMRCSO, the cultivation of Ottoman order, and the subversion of colonial structures.
4.1.1.3. The Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Hind
The Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), a prominent Muslim organization, played a significant role constructing the Khilafat order in India in the early 20th century. It addressed the concerns of Indian Muslims regarding the fate of the Ottoman Caliphate, particularly after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the Allied powers.9 The leaders of the JUH aligned themselves with the Khilafat order and provided intellectual and religious guidance to Muslims emphasizing the idea of Muslim unity and the protection of the Ottoman Khilafat by introducing this as the hegemonial authority of the Muslims. They viewed the Khilafat as a symbol of Muslim unity and felt a moral obligation to support it. Their movement aimed at both preserving the Khilafat and addressing the issues of unfairness faced by Indian Muslims in the colonial rule.
Furthermore, this organization mobilized the Muslim masses and worked towards fostering a sense of solidarity among the Muslim community in India supporting for the resistance against the existing colonial order. The Ulamas served as the primary
8 Michael O’Sullivan, “Pan-Islamic Bonds and Interest: Ottoman bonds, Red Crescent Remittances and the Limits of Indian Muslim Capitals, 1877-1924”, The Indian Economic and Social History Review 55/2 (2018), 183-220.
9 Metcalf, Islamic Revival, 13.
158
vanguard within this organization, assuming a pivotal role in influencing mass Muslims, particularly through their inspirational engagement with local farmers and peasants, expounding upon the significance of the Khilafat cause during Friday Khutbas. Their involvement extended to disseminating Khilafat pamphlets and leaflets, thereby emphasizing the importance of Khilafat and elucidating the challenges posed by Western powers. Their acts helped to generate a new subjectivity among South Asian Muslims, who embraced the Khilafat order as a defining hegemon, thus distinguishing their resistance movement from other native resistance. Khilafat was the main stimulus of their resistance discourse. Additionally, this organization played a crucial function in facilitating fundraising efforts for the Ottoman Empire from the Tripoli War through to the culmination of the Khilafat in 1924.
Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar were key figures associated with this organization and played crucial roles in shaping the Muslim resistance narrative against the prevailing colonial order centering the Ottoman Khilafat.10 They not only mobilized the Muslim community but also collaborated with leaders from the Indian National Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who were sympathetic to their cause and emphasized Hindu-Muslim alliance to delegitimize the colonial rule over India. Leaders of the JUH were actively involved in the post-World War I agitation in support of the existence of Ottoman Khilafat.11 They thought that without the existence of Khilafat, the world Muslim civilization and Muslim identity would fall into crisis because of the absence of a unified Muslim hegemon. Pursuing their main target of protecting the Ottoman Empire from Western construction, they organized resistance in India, and in their courses of resistance movement, they collaborated with the other anti-colonial groups of India. Through their tremendous efforts, Muslim leaders of the Khilafat Movement formed a coalition with the INC. This was a significant march of anti-colonial resistance where Hindu-Muslim unity made the resistance narratives unique and strengthened the broader Indian independence struggle against British colonial rule. They posited that the absence of a unified Muslim hegemon, exemplified by the dissolution of the Khilafat, would precipitate a crisis within the world Muslim civilization and undermine Muslim identity. Consequently, they endeavored to safeguard the Ottoman Empire from
10 Noman Omar, Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2013).
11 Amir Ali, “Evolution of Public Sprehein India”, Economic and Political Weekly (2001), 2419-2425.
159
Western encroachment, marshalling resistance efforts in India. In the pursuit of this objective, they fostered alliances with various anti-colonial factions within the Indian subcontinent. Notably, their collaboration with the INC marked a pivotal juncture in the anti-colonial struggle, wherein Hindu-Muslim unity imbued the resistance discourse with distinctiveness, thereby fortifying the broader movement for Indian independence against British colonial domination.
4.1.1.4. All India Khilafat Committee
The Indian Muslim resistance intensified in 1919 when the Treaty of Sèvres was declared. Muslims rejected the Euro-centric delineation of the Khilafat, particularly concerning its anticipated loss of control over Arab territories and Islamic sacred sites. The imposition of British and French mandates on certain Arab regions, the cession of Izmir and Eastern Thrace to Greece, and the allocation of the Dodecanese islands to Italy further fueled the vehement dissent.12 Although Istanbul retained its Ottoman status, the internationalization of the Bosporus Straits contributed to the deepening discontent. In these waning years of the Ottoman Empire, Indian Muslim subordinates exhibited a deep-seated allegiance to the Ottoman order, displaying fervent dedication to the preservation of the Khilafat despite its diminishing stature. They confronted the stark reality of their hegemon’s decline, yet remained steadfast in their commitment, unable to reconcile with its potential demise. Consequently, Muslim advocates endeavored to shield the institution of Khilafat from perceived Western transgressions. They established the All India Khilafat Committee (AIKC) and designated 19 March 1920 as Khilafat Day, with the objective of consolidating Indian Muslim leaders onto a unified platform. This collective initiative aimed to organize and spearhead resistance against encroachments by Western powers targeting the Khilafat’s integrity.
Within this organizational framework, Muslim leaders employed fervent resistance strategies against the colonial government, employing diverse methodologies to present the importance of the Khilafat order for Muslims. The AIKC implemented a dual-pronged strategy encompassing ‘domestic resistance initiative’ and the ‘international dissemination of Khilafat values’. Primarily emphasizing robust resistance on the home
12 P. Hardy, The Muslims, 188-189.
160
front, they formally renounced titles conferred by the British government, initiated a comprehensive boycott of English goods, and strategically resigned from governmental positions, particularly within the British military and police forces. Demonstrating bold defiance, they exhibited a collective refusal to comply with government-imposed taxes. Their advocacy for Swaraj (self-government) prompted a strategic alliance with the Congress leadership, fostering the expansion of the civil disobedience movement.13 With the aim of redressing and protesting the perceived injustices inflicted upon the Ottoman Khilafat by the Allied Powers in the aftermath of World War I, the leadership of AIKC embarked on a European tour to advocate for their cause on the international stage. During this period, Khilafat leaders transmitted a telegraph to Sultan Vahiduddin, conveying their solidarity and emphatically urging him to repudiate the treaty in question.14 This episode offers a lens through which to analyze the dynamics of hierarchical relationships in international relations literature, suggesting that a subordinate entity can still imbue its hegemon with inspiration and instill a degree of confidence in its own existence, even when cognizant of the hegemon’s diminishing stature within the international system.
4.1.2. Muslim Institutions in Constructing the Ottoman Order The following analysis examines the efforts of Indian Muslim institutions to advocate for the Ottoman order within the South Asian societal framework. It comprises two distinct components: a theoretical inquiry into the nexus between Muslim institutions and notions of order. It explores how the pro-Ottoman institutions demonstrated Khilafat order in their resistance to challenge the colonial regime. Through this exploration, it elucidates the transformative trajectory of Muslim institutions, particularly in their engagement with the Ottoman Khilafat, and their strategic incorporation of Khilafat discourse into the Indian resistance narrative. Secondly, the negotiated arrangements of the pro-Ottoman institutions, it comprises how Muslim institutions strategically navigated diplomatic channels with colonial authorities while fostering robust connections with Istanbul, underscoring a multifaceted approach to resistance and alliance-building. Our primary focus revolves around delineating two
13 Niemeijer, the Khilafat, 85.
14 M. Naeem Qureshi, “the Indian Khilafat Movement (1918-1924)”, Journal of Asian History 12/2 (1978), 152-168.
161
pivotal insights: firstly, the concept of ‘institutional bargain’, while IR scholars profoundly analyzed the institutional mechanism in fashioning the contemporary international order.15 Moreover, institutions serve as crucial instruments for addressing hierarchical authority within this framework, prompting scholars to diverge in their assessments of the institution’s role in order formation, contingent upon their theoretical inclinations. For instance, Alagappa delved into the dimensions of hegemony and normativity inherent within institutions and their contributions to order construction.16 These explanations allow our understanding how Muslim institutions produced Khilafat order in India. We can explore an insight of Muslim’s institutional activities to serve the Ottoman order in Indian politics with some categories. For example, ‘bargaining for order’ sitting in the colonial state structure, how Indian Muslims institutions projected the sufferings of Ottomans as a consequence of the western aggression since the 1910s and how they led the major role for Ottoman fund collections to assist their hegemon.17 With the outbreak of the Tripoli War, Muslim institutions and organizations became the led actor in making fund collections to assist their hegemon, in terms of helping the Ottoman soldiers and re-habitation for war victims. It showed how to rally public support through fund-raising and membership drives, through publication of pamphlets and journals, through “Khutbas” in the mosques and through composing literary works like poems and verse. Then the ‘promoting Khilafat order against colonial oppression’ which implies how the institutions promoted the Khilafat order among the Muslim community focusing its authority to resist the domestic colonial oppression. And finally, ‘bargain with the colonial government’ it implies how Muslim institutions informed the colonial authority about their attachment with the Khilafat and urged the colonial entities to be more positive to the Ottomans. Secondly, ‘institution and resistance’ encapsulates how Muslim institutions have articulated narratives of resistance against prevailing colonial hegemony. Muslim institutions projected the Ottoman Khilafat as alternative centers of power for articulating dissenting voices and challenging the legitimacy of colonial rule. In their
15 Barry Buzan, “The Primary Institutions of International Society”, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization (UK:Cambridge University Press, 2004), 161-204.
16 Muthiah Alagappa, “Institutional Framework: Recommendation for Change”, The 2nd ASEAN Reader, auth. Sharon Siddique -Sree Kumar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 22-27.
17 Zuhal Özaydın, “Osmanlı Hilal i Ahmer Cemiyetinin Kuruluşu ve Çalışmaları” Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol. 13, ed. Celal Güzel, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub., 2002), 692.
162
resistance narratives they propagated the colonial oppression. They highlighted the injustices perpetrated by colonial authorities, including economic exploitation, cultural imperialism, and political marginalization.18 Through sermons, publications, and public gatherings, these institutions disseminated messages of defiance and empowerment among the Muslim populace. Furthermore, Muslim institutions played a pivotal role in organizing members, associates, and followers in resistance movements. They mobilized communities through networks of religious leaders, intellectuals, and activists, fostering solidarity and collective action against colonial domination. This organizing effort ranged from peaceful protests and civil disobedience to more confrontational forms of resistance. Muslim institutions also engaged in cultural and intellectual resistance, promoting indigenous knowledge systems, traditions, and identities as a counter to colonial hegemony.19 They sought to reclaim agency and autonomy by affirming the value of Islamic heritage and cultural practices, thereby challenging the colonial narrative of superiority and inferiority. Furthermore, in their courses of resistance Muslim institutions often collaborated with other anti-colonial forces, including nationalist movements, religious organizations, and social reformers, to amplify their resistance efforts. This solidarity forged alliances across religious, ethnic, and ideological lines, strengthening the broader struggle against colonial rule in India. 4.1.2.1. Aligarh’s Nexus of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Khilafat Order
The Aligarh College was mainly a secular Muslim institution based on western values; it primarily focused on education and later intrigued modes of Muslim life. Its graduates learned western science, literature and philosophy along with basic Islamic knowledge, despite this Islamic culture fashioned here with core western values. Moreover, Aligarh emerged as one of the pivotal hub for the ‘Muslim Renaissance’, characterized by distinctive education and material features such as students’ attire comprising ‘black coats and ‘Turkish fezzes’, which distinguished them as members of a neo-liberal community within the Muslim populace. This unique milieu was fostered by a
18 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, 1850-1950 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
19 Francis Adyanga Akena, “Critical Analysis of the Production of Western Knowledge and Its Implications for Indigenous Knowledge and Decolonization”, Journal of Black Studies 43/6 (2012), 599-619.
163
curriculum that seamlessly integrated secular and Islamic education. Initially apolitical, the institution’s student body and faculty only began to engage in political discourse following the demise of its founder, Syed Ahmad. However, by the 1910s, Aligarh had transformed into a focal point for Muslim political activism, resistance, and mobilization. During this period, alumni and students alike exhibited a heightened sensitivity towards global Muslim issues, particularly expressing solidarity with the Ottoman khilafat as a symbol of Muslim order. Western attacks targeting the Khilafat in the 1910s galvanized their involvement in resisting Western imperialism, thereby amplifying their political engagement.20Aligrah graduates, alumni, students expressed their affiliation with the Khilafat order through various means, initially by actively engaging with the Muslim League’s endeavors centering the Ottoman Khilafat. Additionally, their alumni association served as a source of inspiration for current students, fostering participation in campaigns aimed at procuring funds for the Ottoman cause during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars. Notably, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali, the college administration was petitioned to allocate college funds to support the Ottoman war effort, specifically aiding Muslim casualties.21 Furthermore, students directly engaged in demonstrations against colonial powers, particularly focusing on Western interventions in Ottoman territories. Subsequently, they projected the Ottoman Khilafat as a transcendent Muslim authority on an international scale. The stakeholders of this institution conspicuously embraced, endorsed, and overtly articulated their allegiance to the Ottoman Khilafat as a means to legitimizing their resistance against colonial rule. This assertion of Khilafat served as a cornerstone for their resistance movement, endowing them with a novel subjective identity steeped in the ethos of the Khilafat order. Evident in their attire, notably the adoption of the Turkish fez by Aligarh students was a discernible departure from the sartorial norms prevalent among their contemporaries across India. Furthermore, their involvement in political activism, particularly their direct participation in AIML politics, alongside their inclination towards coalition-building with the INC, delineated their resistance discourse as distinctive amidst the broader landscape of anti-British movements. Within this narrative of resistance and the attendant subjective identity formation, the Khilafat
20 Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961), 20.
21 Minault, The Khilafat, 23.
164
order emerged as a primary catalyst, orchestrating their mobilization against British colonial hegemony under a unified banner.
4.1.2.2. Deoband and Khilafat Order in India Despite the traditionally conservative ethos of the Deoband School, certain scholars within its ranks demonstrated a willingness to incorporate elements of Western-style education while maintaining a steadfast focus on Islamic scholarship.22 Since its inception in the 1870s, the institution has remained financially independent, which shielded it from governmental influence and bolstering its anti-colonial stance. Faculty, students, and alumni actively propagated a discourse of decolonization during the 1910s, advocating for the recognition of the Khilafat as a global Muslim order. Through the fatwas issued by the “Darul Ifta”, they affirmed the Khilafat’s status and vigorously opposed colonial hegemony, primarily advocating for Indian independence and safeguarding the Khilafat against Western-centric narratives and construction.23 The Deoband Institute, comprising its faculty, alumni, and student body, notably evinced a profound adherence to the Khilafat order, leveraging this allegiance as a means to contest the legitimacy of colonial authority in India. Prominent figures within the institution’s scholarly community, such as Maulana Obaidullah Sind and Maulana Mahmudul Hasan, exhibited an unwavering commitment to securing India’s independence from colonial subjugation, by accepting the Ottoman order, particularly evident during the tumultuous period of World War I.24 Therefore, in the 1910s, by aligning with the Ottoman order, the institute strategically positioned itself as a bastion of resistance against colonial dominance, harnessing the collective aspirations of its community towards the overarching goal of Indian self-rule. This narrative underscores the Deoband Institute in fostering a socio-political consciousness imbued with aspirations for autonomy and sovereignty, grounded within the broader framework of Islamic solidarity and anti-colonial resistance.
22 Ron Geaves, “The Symbolic Construction of the Walls of Deoband”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relation 23/3 (2012), 315-328.
23 Fatawa-i-Rashidiyya (vol.1), 90-91.
24 Syed Tanvir Wasti, “The Political Aspirations”, 709-722.
165
4.1.2.3. Firangi Mahal and Pro-Ottoman Activities
Firangi Mahal emerged as a significant bastion of Islamic education within the Indian Muslim community, originating during the reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. Throughout the nineteenth century, it underwent a transformative period marked by the reinvigoration of Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy, logic, and Arabic grammar through the implementation of the comprehensive curriculum known as “Ders-i-Nizamiyah”.25 This curriculum revitalized the pursuit of “Mulaqat” (Islamic Science) within the institution, fostering a renewed intellectual vigor. By the early twentieth century, Firangi Mahal had evolved into a pivotal center for both Islamic scholarship and Muslim political engagement under the stewardship of Maulana Abdul Bari. Bari’s leadership was characterized by his alignment with the Khilafat order, which sought to galvanize Muslim political agency in India. His advocacy for the Khilafat was underscored by his close ties with the Ottoman Empire, particularly demonstrated through his pilgrimage to Mecca and visit to Istanbul during 1910-11.
This pilgrimage not only deepened his personal connection with the Ottoman Khilafat but also facilitated collaborations aimed at bolstering Muslim solidarity and challenging colonial dominance. Bari’s strategic initiatives extended beyond rhetoric, as evidenced by his instrumental role in fundraising endeavors for the Indian Muslim Red Crescent Society and the establishment of the Anjuman Khuddam i Kabba. Moreover, he sought to bridge the divide between traditional religious scholars and the emerging class of modern-educated Muslims, recognizing the imperative of unity in advancing the Khilafat cause and contesting colonial rule in India. One notable aspect of Bari’s advocacy was his counsel to the Sultan of Istanbul regarding the Ottoman Empire’s stance in the First World War. Advising against direct involvement, Bari recommended a strategic alignment with England if participation became unavoidable, reflecting a nuanced understanding of geopolitical dynamics and the imperatives of preserving Muslim interests amidst global conflicts.26
25 Iqbal Husain, “Change within the Islamic Tradition of Learning: Firangi Mahaland the Dars-i- Nizami”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 63 (2002), 439-446.
26 Gail Minault, The Khilafat, 37-38.
166
4.1.2.4. Madrasah and Mosque in Promoting Khilafat Order Madrasas have historically served as pivotal centers for Muslim education in South Asia, dating back to the early advent of Islam in the region and attained significant institutional renown during the Mughal era. Despite the colonial imposition of English as the official language of India and the concurrent proliferation of Western-style education, Madrasah persisted as vital educational establishments. Even in rural areas, these institutions remained fundamental to the dissemination of Islamic knowledge. The British administration could not delegitimize the enduring significance of Madrasah education to the Muslim populace, exemplified by the establishment of the Calcutta Aliya Madrasha in 1780 prior to the introduction of modern educational institutions.27 In course of time, these Islamic educational institutions undertook multifaceted functions aimed at fostering and disseminating the ideals of the Khilafat among Muslim populace. Moreover, since the inception of the twentieth century, Madrasas have increasingly assumed a pivotal role as centers for the propagation of nationalist sentiments and the galvanization of Muslim youth in opposition to colonial governance. This transformation can be attributed to the perceived injustices and exploitative practices imposed by colonial authorities, which, in turn, fostered disenchantment with the colonial educational system and its purported disregard for Islamic education and Muslim cultural heritage. Madrasha-educated Muslims and ulama projected the Khilafat as the root of Islamic heritage; rather than conceptualizing the Khilafat solely as a political entity, they imbued it with profound religious significance, perceiving it as emblematic of Muslim order. The upheavals in the Balkans and Western incursions into Khilafat territories heightened political awareness among Indian Muslims at large. Madrasa students and “Mualliam” (teachers) actively engaged in fundraising initiatives in support of the Ottomans, disseminating Khilafat literature, and depicting Western atrocities in Muslim-populated regions.
These educational establishments orchestrated special prayers dedicated to the Khilafat, while Khilafat leaders convened public gatherings wherein Muslim intellectuals expounded upon the import of the Khilafat. Through orchestrated activities, including
27 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2 (1999), 294-323.
167
the organization of special prayers and public lectures extolling the significance of the Khilafat, these institutions effectively galvanized popular support for the cause. Mosques emerged as pivotal hubs for propagating the ideals of the Khilafat, with its veneration permeating from the historic grand mosque of Delhi to the rural mosques dotting the landscapes of every corner of India. The invocation of the Khalifa’s name during Friday prayers, coupled with sermons delivered by Imams extolling the virtues of the Khilafat, served to dignify its significance and galvanize Muslim sentiments.28 Moreover, the looming specter of Western encroachment upon the Khilafat underscored the imperative for Muslim action in safeguarding its integrity. Thus, these pivotal Muslim institutions not only advocated for the institution of the Khilafat but also used the Khilafat order against the British hegemony over India.
4.1.2.5. Pro-Ottoman Newspapers and Gazette
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the proliferation of newspapers, particularly those in vernacular languages, garnered significant popularity among indigenous populations. Within this landscape, newspapers edited by Muslims played a crucial role in disseminating information regarding developments within the Islamic world, with a particular emphasis on the Ottoman Empire, seen as a paramount symbol of Muslim dignity. These publications mirrored the domestic challenges faced by Indian Muslims within the colonial power structure. Notable instances included Muslim discontentment over the annulment of the Bengal partition in 1911, British opposition to the establishment of the Aligarh Muslim University, and perceived neglect of Islamic civilizations, such as the destruction of the Kanpur mosque in 1913. These occurrences drew parallels with imperialist incursions in regions like the Balkans and Tripoli, garnering focused attention within the editorial pages of select Indian Muslim newspapers. However, the landscape of newspaper publication became increasingly fraught following the implementation of the Morley-Minto Indian Act of 1909, which sought to exert stringent control over expressions of dissent towards British authority. This legislative framework curtailed the freedom of expression among Indian populace, leading to instances of newspaper closures, editor arrests, and confiscation of security deposits under allegations of anti-government sentiments. Notably, newspapers with a
28 M. Naeem Qureshi, “The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920”, Modern Asian Studies 13/ 1 (1979), 41-59.
168
pro-Ottoman stance, such as the Comrade, al-Hilal, Zamindar, and the Musalman, openly espoused sympathy towards the Ottoman cause, resulting in punitive measures including deposit forfeiture and editor apprehension.
Moreover, Muslim newspapers played a significant role in galvanizing support for humanitarian efforts for Ottomans during the 1910s, particularly through their contributions to the ‘Ottoman Relief Fund’ ORF. This fund aimed to provide assistance to orphans, widows, and refugees affected in Tripoli and the Balkans. The increasing list of subscriptions to the fund was regularly documented within the pages of publications such as Comrade.29 The Comrade also featured numerous articles addressing Western incursions into Muslim territories, generating considerable attention among Muslim communities and fostering a sense of solidarity with the Ottoman cause in India. Furthermore, the Hamdard published a series of visual representations depicting the arrival of relief mission members, while the Times of India reported on the warm reception accorded to these members by the Muslim populace at the Delhi Cami mosque.30 Additionally, these newspapers disseminated articles detailing the experiences of the mission members and critiquing Western involvement in the crisis. These writings served to raise awareness among Muslims and fostered greater engagement with the Khilafat order. Maulana Azad’s editorial stance in newspapers such as al-Hilal was perceived as a significant threat by the colonial government due to its pronounced pro-Ottoman position. He regarded the preservation of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Sultan as crucial for Islam’s security and the Muslim world’s unity. 31 A considerable portion of al-Hilal’s content focused on Ottoman affairs, portraying the Ottoman Khalifa as the guardian of Muslims and Islamic holy sites. This editorial approach, seen as supportive of the Ottomans by colonial authorities, raised apprehensions about the newspaper’s influence. The British administration considered al-Hilal’s editorial content, particularly an article by Azad discussing the choice of Turks, as a challenge to British imperial integrity in India.32 Consequently, in November 1914, the paper was banned, and its security deposit was
29 Comrade, (12 July 1913), 27-29.
30 Faridah Zaman, “Beyond Nostalgia: Time and Place in Indian Muslim Politics”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 27/ 4 (2017), 627-647.
31 Ghulam Mihir, Tabakat-i-Azad, (Lahore, 1959), 203-204.
32 Al- Hilal, (6 November 1912), 20/2
169
confiscated by the government. Azad himself described in his autobiography, “India Wins Freedom”, how al-Hilal garnered substantial public support and how al-Hilal aimed to cultivate a national public opinion among its diverse readership.33 Initially, Muslim-edited periodicals disseminated news and editorials focusing on Ottoman affairs, fostering awareness among the educated Muslim populace who subsequently transmitted these narratives to the masses, particularly in rural marketplaces. This narrative sheds light on the construction of the Ottoman order among Muslim masses through the pro-Ottoman stance of newspapers. It presents a compelling puzzle: how did Muslim journalists promote the Ottoman order while operating within the colonial power structure? Furthermore, it underscores the notion that while an order may decline, it can be revitalized to resist another order, possess the capacity for rejuvenation, particularly when its subordinates strongly align themselves in opposition to existed hegemonic forces.
4.1.3. ‘New Generation’ Muslim Leadership in Framing the ‘Ottoman Order’
This section will focus on the Muslim leadership who actively participated in the Khilafat Movement. Our aim is to highlighting their roles in uniting the Muslim community for the Khilafat order and articulating their grievances which made them resistive against the colonial authorities. Muslim leadership in India exposed through the establishment of Muslim League as the first Muslim’s political organization. In the 1910s, entry of a progressive, educated middle class Muslims in politics changed the discourses of the Muslim politics in British India. They can be posited as the ‘patriotic group’ who believed in Indian nationalism and worked for Indian independence to overthrow the colonial rule through the resistance. This group accepted the Khilafat order in the 1910s in their resistance narrative in which they found the stimulus of bridging the ‘scattered Muslim community’ under a common order. This was mainly because, during this time, despite the existence of the religious, linguistic, class and sectarian differences of the Indian Muslims, the Khilafat order offered them a way of articulating a common hegemonial explanation. Minault referred this phenomenon of the Muslim politics in India as the age of raising the ‘professional politician’.34
33 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1989), 8.
34 Gail Minault, The Khilafat, 4.
170
Muslim leaders strategically adopted a triple-pronged approach, initially prioritizing ‘political resistance’ against British colonial rule. In pursuit of this objective, they employed a ‘soft-power’ strategy to garner support for the concept of Khilafat among the masses. This entailed emphasizing the religio-cultural connection of Indian Muslims with the Khilafat, one of the pioneering leaders of the Khilafat movement, Maulana Azad portraying the Khilafat as one of the fundamental tenets of Islam.35 Additionally, Muslims underscored narratives of Western conspiracy surrounding Khilafat, urging Muslims to engage with the discourse as a means of resistance against Western imperialism. Employing the soft-power strategy, Muslim leaders engaged in grassroots activities such as ‘door-to-door’ outreach to mobilize mass participation in fundraising efforts for the Ottoman Empire. Through the dissemination of Khilafat pamphlets and leaflets, as well as organizing processions and meetings, they facilitated widespread awareness within Muslim society in the early 1910s. Positioning Khilafat as a symbol of authority served as a strategic maneuver to enhance Muslim involvement in the resistance movement, recognizing that mass participation was essential for effective opposition against the formidable British imperial power. This gave the Muslim resistance a subaltern character. Moreover, Indian Muslim’s alignment with Khilafat order and the ensuing Muslim resistance presented a formidable challenge to the British government during the First World War. Considering possible revolt of Muslim troops within the British army and mounting security concerns in India, the British government initiated ongoing dialogues with Muslim leaders. They sought to reassure Muslims regarding the protection of Islamic holy sites, pledging to safeguard them under Khilafat jurisdiction. Such commitments by the British government solidified the Muslims’ position as influential political actors in India, while the Khilafat order serving as a source of strength and unity for the Muslim community. Following the conclusion of the war, the changing British policy towards Khilafat and the Islamic holy places agitated the Indian Muslim leaders to overthrow the prevailing colonial dominance over India. Consequently, from 1919 to 1924, Indian Muslim leaders engaged in fervent resistance against British colonial rule, adopting a multifaceted approach.
35 Abul Kalam Azad, “Masla-i-Khilafat wa Jazirat al Arab”, (Al Balagh, 1920), 11-28.
171
Secondly, the notion of ‘coalition with anti-British nationalist groups’ signifies the strategic endeavors of Muslim leaders to form alliances with Congress leaders in their resistance against colonial rule. This resistance was underpinned by dual objectives: firstly, the protection of the Khilafat, and secondly, the attainment of India’s independence from British colonial dominance. This resistance, characterized by non-cooperation with British authorities, took on a nationalist character. During the All-India Khilafat Conference in Karachi in July 1921, chaired by Muhammad Ali, a resolution was adopted, denouncing the continued service of Muslims in the British army as religiously impermissible. Additionally, it was declared that if Britain were to intervene against the Ottomans, Indian Muslims would proclaim India’s independence as a republic. Subsequently, in October 1921, the Congress Working Committee ratified the Karachi resolution and initiated a civil disobedience campaign, thus inaugurating a joint Hindu-Muslim struggle aimed at freeing their homeland from British colonial subjugation. This phenomenon underscores the influence of the Ottoman order on the Indian people’s aspiration for independence.36 Thirdly, Muslims portrayed the ‘Ottoman Khilafat as an order for the Muslim world,’ framing its abolition as the eradication of the last vestige of Muslim hegemony globally. To safeguard this Muslim hegemon, they employed a variety of strategies, including domestic resistance against colonial policies related to the Khilafat, such as demonstrations, hartals, and boycotts of Western goods. Additionally, they dispatched Khilafat missions to Europe to apprise the British government of their profound attachment to this order. 37 Moreover, the dissemination of pro-Ottoman narratives catalyzed widespread engagement in political resistance against Western powers. The oratory, writings, and organizational acumen of political leaders mobilized Muslims across India, thereby contributing to the cultivation of a distinct Muslim subjectivity integral to the anti-British resistance movement. This concerted effort projected the Khilafat as a viable alternative order. Consequently, adherents of the Khilafat movement shared a unified ideology and purpose. Their allegiance to the Khilafat stemmed from aspirations for improved political standing within the colonial power structures, driven by the global momentum of the Khilafat order, which instilled in
36 P. Hardy, The Muslims, 190.
37 Niemeijer, The Khilafat , 99.
172
Indian Muslims a sense of solidarity within a transnational religious fraternity under the auspices of a Khalifa.
4.1.3.1. Ulama’s Political Emergence and Navigating the Khilafat Order in India
The Indian ulama, constituting the educated religious class, played a pivotal role in advancing the Khilafat order within India during the 1910s through active engagement in political affairs. Their entrance into national politics was a significant shift, as they assumed a prominent role in directing the courses of the Khilafat agitation. Their adeptness in mass mobilization, previously untested, became evident, lending vital legitimacy to a cause that appeared precarious, particularly in the absence of substantial support from Western-educated Muslim elites. Moreover, despite variances in their theological orientations, they coalesced around the fundamental tenets of Islamic faith, particularly the concept of a singular Allah, scripture, prophet, and Khilafat. This unity was particularly pronounced during the 1910s when the Ottoman Khilafat came under assault from Western powers.
Furthermore, the ulama’s visits to Istanbul during the Hamidian period left indelible impressions, fueling their subsequent pro-Ottoman endeavors in India political and social structure. Notably, the visit of figures such as Shibli Nomani to Istanbul holds significance as a testament to how the ulama projected the ethos of the Khilafat within their discourses, writings, and advocacy.38 Nomani’s literary work detailing his journey to Istanbul and revered Muslim sites in the Middle East served as a catalyst for influencing other contemporaneous Muslim intellectuals toward advocating for the preservation of the Ottoman Khilafat. Moreover, his Urdu poetry focusing on the Ottoman Khilafat served to cultivate a form of soft power, enhancing the hegemonic sway of the Khilafat among Muslims. Furthermore, the enthusiastic acceptance of the Khilafat order by the scholars of Deoband was marked by a fervent desire to challenge British rule in India. This sentiment was particularly evident in the actions of Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi of the Deoband School, who sought refuge in Kabul in 1914 and established contact with leaders of the Ghadar party, as well as with the Turco-German mission. Additionally, Sheikhul Hind, Maulana Mahmudul Hasan, a prominent figure within the institution,
38 Shibli Numani, Safar Nama, 2021.
173
embarked on a journey to Hejaz, where he engaged with Ottoman ministers. Their primary aim was to leverage the authority of the Ottoman Khilafat to secure India’s liberation from British colonial rule.39 Moreover, the march of the Ulama towards the Muslim League and its subsequent influence on party politics elicited heightened participation from Muslim masses in political movements, rather than merely inspiring them with the ideals of Islamic Khilafat. Moreover, their issuance of ‘fatwa’, advocating non-cooperation and the boycott of Western goods held significant implications on multiple fronts. The widespread endorsement of boycotting Western products precipitated considerable economic repercussions, notably contributing to the decline of British dominance in India.
These measures served as strategic tools to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent. In analyzing the Western perspective towards the Khilafat order, Maulana Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, a prominent member of the Khilafat delegation, underscored the significance of Muslims’ intensive political activism in the context of India’s struggle for independence. Nadwi’s elucidation emphasized the intrinsic link between the attainment of India’s sovereignty and the safeguarding of the Khilafat order from what he perceived as Western-centric constructions.40 Moreover, Nadwi’s perspective underscores the agency of Indian Muslims in shaping their political destiny within the broader context of anti-colonial resistance. During this period, Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal played the significant role in fostering a cohesive nationalist resistance centering the Khilafat against British colonial rule, particularly when many influential pro-Ottoman leaders, such as the Ali Brothers, Maulana Azad were under confinement by the British authorities. Recognizing the imperative for Hindu-Muslim cooperation, Maulana Abdul Bari advocated for Hindu-Muslim unity within the resistance movement, marking a significant episode in the trajectory of Indian resistance to depose British colonialism.41
39 Maulana Muhammad Miyan (ed.), Silken Letters Movement, 4.
40 Mushirul Hasan, “Religious and Politics in India: The Ulama and the Khilfat Movement”, Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, auth. Mushirul Hasan, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981), 1-26.
41 Gail Minault, The Khilafat, 68.
174
4.2. Opponent of the Khilafat Order This segment aims to delve into the lesser-explored facets of the Khilafat movement in India, particularly concerning the opposition it faced. While extant research predominantly focuses on the primary actors involved, this section posits a hypothesis regarding the oppositional factions within Indian society towards the Khilafat order. Emphasis is placed on elucidating the motivations behind such opposition, which may include the British apprehensions regarding potential radicalization within the movement and its repercussions on interreligious dynamics within the Indian societal fabric. Central to this investigation are the colonial administration’s strategies in addressing Muslim dissenting narratives. Through a nuanced analysis, this part seeks to unravel the reasons behind the dissent among certain segments of the Muslim populace towards embracing the Khilafat as an order, despite the considerable support garnered by the Khilafat Movement within the Muslim community. Additionally, this segment delves into the stances adopted by fellow Hindu counterparts who refrained from endorsing the Muslim movement, contrasting with the mainstream Hindu leaders such as Gandhi, Lala Lajpat Rai, and Nehru, who lent their support to the Muslim resistance to delegitimize the colonial authority in India.
4.2.1. British Imperialism and the Anxiety over the Ottoman Order
Before the final establishment of colonial rule in 1857, various forms of resistance were evident across India against British colonial entities. The resistance was not limited to any specific religious or ethnic group, but Muslims played a significant role, along with Hindus and other communities, in opposing colonial rule. The reasons for resistance were diverse, encompassing economic exploitation, cultural clashes, and a sense of loss of political power. However, during this period, the British authorities often portrayed the resistance, especially Muslim participation, as fanatic and treasonous.42 The British sought to paint the resistance as a threat to their authority, attempting to discredit it in the eyes of the local population and justify their colonial control as a means of maintaining order. This portrayal was part of a broader strategy to justify colonial order over India.
42 Ismail Adam Patel, “Islamophobia in India” 82-95.
175
After 1858, following the quelling of the rebellion, British authorities evinced heightened suspicion toward any manifestation of dissent especially to the Muslims.43 Most significantly Islamophobic tension increased among the colonial authorities throughout nineteenth century. Subsequent to this period of tension, the British administration implemented policies and measures that exacerbated communal divisions, manifesting a deliberate ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy.44 This stratagem sought to disrupt the communal harmony in India by accentuating religious identities, delineating Indians along Hindu and Muslim lines. The resultant imposition of a polarizing ‘politics of hate’ aimed at fomenting animosity among the populace served to safeguard colonial interests. This policy, discernibly favoring Hindus over Muslims in terms of provided facilities and privileges. Moreover, the colonial administration consistently harbored apprehensions regarding the Muslim community, perceiving them as former rulers whose aspirations for political resurgence posed a potential threat. Consequently, British authorities adopted a vigilant approach toward Muslim movements aimed at revitalizing their political influence in India. This cautious stance was particularly evident in their response to Muslim leanings toward the Ottoman Empire, fearing that a unified Muslim community under the Khilafat order could precipitate the collapse of the colonial order in India. Therefore, the British interpretation of the Khilafat within the Indian context can be analyzed through a strategic lens, as it underscores their intricate understanding of the geopolitical ramifications of the Ottoman Khalifa. This understanding was predicated upon the recognition of the Khilafat’s potential to foster transnational solidarity among Muslims worldwide, owing to its profound religious symbolism. Leveraging this recognition, British colonial authorities strategically capitalized on the association between the Ottoman Khalifa and their imperial interests in India. By aligning themselves with the Ottoman Khalifa, the British sought to co-opt religious sentiment to bolster their own legitimacy within the Muslim community after their occupation of India in 1858. Colonel C.E. Wilson, a key British proponent of the Arab Revolt, articulated that during the period of pro-Ottoman sentiments and anti-Russian inclinations efforts were made to enlist support from Indian Muslims by imbuing them
43 Arshad Islam, “The Backlash in Delhi: British Treatment of the Mughal Royal Family following the Indian ‘’Sepoy Mutiny’’ of 1857”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31/2 (2011), 197-215.
44 Andrew Phillips, “Making Empires”, 43-65.
176
with unconventional notions pertaining to the Ottoman Khilafat.45 In the 1980s, there was a notable transformation in the British perspective, which was significantly shaped by the enduring allegiance of Indian Muslims to the concept of Khilafat. This paradigm shift was exacerbated by the waning British affiliations with the Hamidian government, a rapport that had undergone a gradual decline subsequent to the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 and amidst broader geopolitical strains between the Ottoman Empire and Western powers. Consequently, despite the allure of Istanbul, the British government abstained from expanding the establishment of additional Ottoman consulates in India.46 Throughout the dawn of the twentieth century, British propagandist endeavors endured, perpetuating inquiries fundamental to the conceptualization of Khilafat. These endeavors were characterized by an advocacy for the centralization of Khilafat among Arab communities, concurrently emphasizing prerequisites such as lineage tracing back to the Quraysh family, a phenomenon notably accentuated during the 1910s. Within the paradigm of Arab Nationalism, the objectives of British propagandist efforts were strategically aligned towards the establishment of an Arab Khilafat, under Sharif Hussain.47 This British scheme instigated heightened resistance among Indian Muslims. Nonetheless, the colonial administration meticulously monitored the Muslim community’s allegiance to the Ottoman Khilafat, and amidst the First World War, they employed strategic policy to convince the Muslim leaders by pledging to maintain the sanctity of Islamic sacred sites under the jurisdiction of the Khalifa. This strategic maneuver by the British was devised to mitigate the potential uprising within the Muslim military contingent serving under the British Empire.48 Following the conclusion of the war, the British authorities did not uphold their commitments to the Indian Muslim leaders and proceeded with their agenda to dismantle the Ottoman Khilafat. This strategic shift by the British significantly influenced the discourse surrounding Muslim resistance, catalyzing a fervent opposition focused on the preservation of the Khilafat institution. Such strategic adjustments profoundly influenced the narrative surrounding Muslim resistance, catalyzing the emergence of a
45 Saad Omar Khan, “The Khilafat Question”, 1-25.
46 Özcan, Pan Islamism, 113.
47 Niemeijer, The Khilafat, 64.
48 Prabha Dixit, “Political Objectives of the Khilafat Movement in India” Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, auth. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981), 45-46.
177
robust opposition anchored in the Khilafat order. This development posed a formidable challenge to the predominant Euro-centric global paradigm in the post-World War I era.
4.2.2. Colonial Agent Group Following the establishment of colonial dominance in India, the British administration actively cultivated and safeguarded a loyal indigenous cohort characterized by being ‘European in mind and Indian in blood’, with the explicit aim of advancing British interests. This stratagem proved successful in engendering a segment within both the Hindu and Muslim communities, whose pivotal role served colonial objectives. Within this discourse, we assert the notion of a ‘loyal Muslim class’ as exemplifying the archetype of the ‘colonial agent’ phenomenon among the Muslims. Notably, notwithstanding their allegiance to British authority, members of this cohort also facilitated advantageous outcomes for their own community. Within this context, we examine this cohort as a counterforce to the Khilafat movement in India. Syed Ahmed Khan, a prominent Muslim intellectual during the colonial era in India, undertook visits to various European cities, during which he found particular fascination with the modernization and progress evident within the Ottoman Empire, notably during his visit to Istanbul. This admiration was evident in his positive portrayal of Sultan Abdul Aziz’s visit to London and his endorsement of Ottoman cultural elements, such as the Turkish fez and court attire, which he introduced among Aligarh students.49 Khan’s initial stance praised the Ottoman modernization process as pioneering within the Muslim world. However, his stance toward the Ottomans evolved alongside shifting discourses concerning the relationship dynamics between Istanbul and London. This changing geopolitical landscape prompted Khan to reassess his views on the Ottomans, reflecting a nuanced response to the shifting power dynamics and imperial rivalries of the era. Such complexities in Khan’s attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire highlight the intricate interplay between colonial encounters, geopolitical dynamics, and intellectual formations during this period of Indian history. Moreover, the evolving dynamics between the British and Ottoman empires had a discernible impact on the attitudes of a segment of Indian Muslims towards the concept of Khilafat, hereafter referred to as the ‘British-aligned Muslim elite’. Moreover, Indian
49 Syed Tanvir Wasti, “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan”, 529-542.
178
Muslims experienced a heightened proximity to the Ottoman political sphere owing to the foreign policies implemented during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, characterized by a deliberate promotion of pan-Islamism and facilitated by increased Muslim pilgrimages to the Ottoman territories. Consequently, a gradual assimilation of Khilafat as a cornerstone of Muslim global governance occurred within the Indian Muslim populace, exemplified by their jubilant celebrations following Ottoman victories such as those witnessed during the Greco-Ottoman War. However, the segment identified as the loyalist class diverged from the prevailing sentiment among Indian Muslims, refusing to acknowledge Khilafat as a unifying Muslim institution. Syed Ahmed articulated a series of articles delineating the argument that the Ottoman Khalifa’s authority did not extend to Indian Muslims, suggesting instead that his jurisdiction pertained primarily to the Turks as Khalifa and Sultan. Khan’s deviation from pro-Ottoman sentiment elicited sharp criticism from within his own Muslim constituency despite having his pivotal contributions for Muslim interest in colonial India underscores the complex interplay of geopolitical allegiances and ideological tensions prevalent within the Muslim community during the early 20th century, shedding light on the multifaceted dynamics shaping the trajectory of Muslim political thought and action centering the Khilafat order. While various rationales may underpin his anti-Ottoman stance, it is very imperative to examine how his alignment with colonial powers influenced his shifting stance on the Khilafat order. By delving into the ramifications of his pro-British disposition and anti-Ottoman position, it becomes apparent how these ideological inclinations engendered shifts in his stance on the Khilafat order. Moreover, Ahmed’s pro-British disposition and antagonism towards the Ottoman Empire had notable repercussions on the perspectives of his close adherents. For instance, Syed Mehdi Ali (Mohsin-ul-Mulk) asserted in 1906 that the Sultan of Turkey ought not to be regarded as the Khalifa of Indian Muslims despite the reality that a burgeoning faction of educated middle-class Muslims embraced the Ottoman order and actively engaged in the Indian National Congress to resist British colonial dominance. This divergence underscores the propagation of Ahmed’s ideological framework within his intellectual circle, emblematic of a paradigm wherein the elite class of Muslims failed to apprehend the burgeoning sentiment of the middle-class Muslim populace towards the Khilafat
179
order.50 Moreover, the emergence of a progressive and educated middle class among Muslims ushered in a paradigm shift wherein the Ottoman order found resonance, notably within the youth cohort. Contrary to the entrenched perspectives of the elite class, this burgeoning demographic aligned itself with the Ottoman order while concurrently engaging in the Congress’s efforts to actively resist and subvert British colonial rule. This confluence of factors underscores a pivotal juncture wherein divergent ideological currents among Muslim elites and the burgeoning middle class delineated contrasting trajectories towards the quest of Ottoman order for Indian independence. Aga Khan, the incumbent president of the All India Muslim League (AIML) and a prominent figure in Muslim political circles, faced significant reproach from within his own community following his declaration of an anti-Ottoman stance in 1913. During an address published in the Times of India, he advocated for the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from European territories and urged contentment with holdings in Asia Minor. This stance led to considerable criticism from fellow Muslims, culminating in his resignation from the presidency of the League.51 Furthermore, certain Shi’a Muslims and the Ahmadiyya community raised objections regarding the legitimacy of the Ottoman Khilafat procession and expressed significant criticism towards the acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat as the central authority of the Muslim world by Indian Muslims. Among these dissenting voices was Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, who not only voiced opposition to the Khilafat movement but also spearheaded a counter-campaign in collaboration with various Maulvis. This divergence in perspective underscores the diverse interpretations and contestations surrounding the concept of Khilafat within Islamic communities during the period under examination. Their opposition to the movement might have stemmed from various reasons, including theological differences, political considerations, or concerns about the implications of aligning with a specific authority. Therefore, the Ahmadiyya community, in particular, had a distinct understanding of religious authority and leadership, which might have conflicted with the concept of the Ottoman Khilafat.52 Launching a counter-campaign
50 B.N. Pande (ed.), Concise History of the Indian National Congress, 1858-1947 (Delhi: Vikas Publication 1900), 66.
51 Minault, The Khilafat, 49.
52 S.R. Valentine, “Prophecy after the Prophet, albeit Lesser Prophets? The Ahmadiyya Jamaát in Pakistan”, Cont Islam, 8 (2014), 99-113.
180
indicates the depth of disagreement and the active efforts made by certain individuals and groups to challenge the prevailing narrative and influence public opinion within the Muslim community.
4.2.3. Hindu Orientalist, Orthodoxy and Their Organizations The Hindu Sabha, representing orthodox Hindu beliefs, espoused the notion of Muslims as extrinsic entities within the Indian societal fabric, advocating for an exclusive ‘Hindistan for Hindu’ stance.53 This ideological stance actively dissuaded, proscribed, and coerced its adherents to abstain from participating in the Muslim resistance movement aligned with the Khilafat order. Their representation within the Indian National Congress, engaged in extremist activities that often targeted Muslim interests, notably during the partition of Bengal. Their organization known as the ‘Onusilon Somity’ and its affiliated newspaper, the ‘Jugantor’, adopted an extremist stance against the advancement of Muslims in East Bengal and Assam in the early 1900s. Their activities were perceived as terrorist in nature, and their espousal of extremist ideologies, particularly their militant opposition to the Swadeshi and Boycott movement, drew considerable ire from the British government.54
They notably refrained from supporting Muslim movements aligned with the Ottoman Khilafat, viewing the Khilafat movement primarily through a religious lens.55 In contrast, the progressive wing of the Congress, led by Gandhi and Nehru, Lala Lajpat adopted a more inclusive approach.56 They recognized the significance of the Ottoman Khilafat within the broader context of their resistance against colonial rule in India. They framed the Khilafat movement within a nationalist discourse, interpreting the Khilafat movement as a form of protest against colonial entities, emphasizing strategies such as boycotts and non-cooperation to challenge the colonial order. Despite this divergence in viewpoints highlights the complex interplay of religious and nationalist ideologies within the Indian resistance against the colonial hegemony, reflects the differing interpretations of how best to resist colonial rule and assert Indian autonomy. Orthodox Hindu leaders within the Congress, such as Tilak, Patel, and Indulal, along
53 Ian Copland, “Crucibles of Hindutva? V.D. Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Indian Princely States”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 25/3 (2002), 211-234.
54 India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R), Mss/Eur/D709.
55 Niemeijer, The Khilafat, p. 27.
56 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1946), 360.
181
with their associates, emerged as prominent critics of the Khilafat movement. Their opposition stemmed from a religious standpoint that influenced their reluctance to support Muslim resistance and their aversion to the Pan-Islamic solidarity of Indian Muslims.57 Despite religious motivations, there existed a prevailing perspective aimed at marginalizing Muslims as extraneous entities within the socio-political fabric of India, effectively relegating them to outsider status devoid of meaningful participation in state affairs or societal identity.58 This narrative portrayed Muslims as intruders, lacking inherent belonging within the Indian context. Moreover, these leaders viewed the Khilafat movement as a catalyst for uniting Muslims and transforming them into a community oriented towards resistance. This transformation, in their view, threatened to reinvigorate the Muslim position in India, a prospect they found unsettling. This perspective influenced their decision to distance themselves from subsequent vehement resistance movements organized by the Muslim community in India. Consequently, they refrained from endorsing further vigorous resistance movements organized by the Muslim community. This narrative characterizes the individuals involved in the Khilafat movement as representing emergent subjectivities, delineating them from those holding contrasting views. It illustrates that despite facing resistance from select Hindu leaders on account of its Islamic nature and political rivalry, as well as dissent from pro-British factions within the Muslim populace, the Khilafat movement garnered support from prominent leaders of both the Hindu and Muslim communities that made the Khilafat order instrumental in bringing the Hindus and Muslims under a common umbrella in the resistance against the colonial rule. That is why, despite religious differences, many Hindus sympathized with the cause of the Khilafat, viewing it as a fight against imperialism and injustice. This shared sense of solidarity led to joint protests, boycotts, and demonstrations against British colonial policies. The collaboration between Hindus and Muslims under the Khilafat order laid the foundation for the broader non-cooperation movement against the British in the early of the 1920s, as it brought together various segments of society in a unified resistance.
57 Qureshi, Pan Islam, 125.
58 Atul Mishra, “Locusts vs. the gangatic octopus: the Hindutva international and “Akhand Bharat’’ in V.D. Savarkar’s history of India”, India Review 21/ 4-5 (2022), 512-545.
182
4.3. Forging a New Subjective Identity: Khilafat Order and Resistance
This section elucidates how the Khilafat order engendered a novel subjective identity among Indian Muslims through their persistent resistance. It produces a counter-discourse which challenged the prevailing colonial order over India. Muslim resistance for Ottoman Khilafat took the vehement character in the aftermath of World War I. During this time, Muslim sought to protect the Ottoman Khilafat from Westrocentric construction and address their attachment, belongingness and dedication regarding this Muslim order. After the Treaty of Sèvres Muslim’s resistance narratives against the colonial rule and safeguarding the Khilafat order got the multidimensional character, for example, ‘coalition with the co-religionist’, ‘representing their demands in the international community’, ‘resistance for home rule’ and others. Most importantly, these resistance narratives gave the paradigm of a new subjective identity of the Indian Muslims. This subjective identity was not only accentuating with the Muslim community but the merging with the phenomenon congress leader Mahatma Gandhi, creating a secular subjective identity through the anti-colonial alliance.
The spark of this resistance spread to every part of India and it is considered as the last and biggest united resistance before the partition of India under a cohesive order, pursued the overarching goal of attaining ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-governance’. Alex Padamsee has extensively documented this phenomenon as ‘widespread civil unrest’.59 Furthermore, Gail Minault elucidated this nature of resistance dynamics through an analysis of the ‘Pan-Indian’ paradigm within the discursive framework of Pan-Islamic trajectories in Indian Muslim political discourse.60 Therefore, we consider this collaborative effort stands as a pinnacle achievement of the ‘Ottoman Order’, providing Indians with a shared platform within resistance literature to contest the legitimacy of colonial dominance in India. It signifies the emergence of a novel subjective identity, which can be characterized as a ‘resistance-oriented subjectivity.’
4.3.1. Resistance for the Existence of Khilafat Following World War I, Indian Muslims directed their opposition towards the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat, viewing it through a lens that
59Alex Padamsee, Representation of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 13.
60 Minault, The Khilafat, 2.
183
challenged Western-centric narratives. While Ottoman’s accession to Germany in the War and its crushing defeat opened ample opportunity for the Allies to carve up the territories belonging to the Ottoman Empire. After the war, the Western power imposed the ‘Treaty of Sevres’ on the Ottoman Empire, which narrowed and threatened the future of the Empire. The coronary of the Ottoman’s defeat aroused anxiety among the Muslims because the Islamic Khilafat was under Ottoman authority. Many Indian Muslims perceived the destruction of the Ottoman Khilafat as symbolizing the erosion of Muslim civilization. This event engendered concerns about the diminishing stature of Muslims in India, drawing parallels to the historical fate of the Jewish community, which, after the loss of its sovereign state, was often perceived as a religious sect lacking political authority.61 Such comprehension led the Muslims towards a dissident movement against the British colonial rule from 1919 to 1923. They assumed that only vehement resistance could protect the Khilafat from the western-centric construction and could legitimize their position in the colonial power structure. Their resistance endeavor led them to adopt some strategies. Initially, their resistance was predominantly non-violent, which gradually was evolving towards acts of defiance such as the refusal to pay taxes to the colonial government. During the Karachi conference of the Khilafat Committee on July 10, 1920, several resolutions were adopted, notably one prohibiting Muslims from serving in the British military. Consequently, Ali Brothers, Dr. Kitshlew, and four associates were apprehended and subsequently sentenced to a two-year imprisonment.62 This punitive response underscored the colonial administration’s determination to suppress any form of dissent that directly challenged its authority, particularly when it pertained to matters as politically charged as the Khilafat movement.
The Muslim resistance during this period was characterized by a multifaceted approach, encompassing various segments of society. Women played a significant role in mobilizing resources for the movement, often by selling their ornaments to contribute to fundraising efforts.63 Simultaneously, large numbers of individuals opted for direct action, utilizing methods such as processions, strikes, and highway protests to express
61 Qureshi, Pan Islam, 1.
62 Niemeijer, The Khilafat, 131.
63 Siobhan Lambert Hurley, “Princes, Paramountcy and the Politics of Muslim Identity: The Begam of Bhopal on the Indian National Stage, 1901-1926”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 26/2(2003), 165-191.
184
their discontent. The movement saw widespread participation across different socio-economic strata. Peasants abandoned their fields, laborers deserted factories, and students boycotted educational institutions, all in a collective display of non-cooperation. Moreover, individuals from diverse professional backgrounds, including those in lucrative positions and prestigious ranks, chose to renounce their privileges to join the cause. A notable aspect of the resistance was the involvement of religious scholars (Ulama) and their affiliates, who directed their protest towards what they perceived as “Darul Harb”, or the domain of infidel rule. This ideological framing galvanized Muslims across India, fostering a unified front against British colonial authority.
In essence, the normative principles of the Khilafat order served as a unifying force, rallying Muslims from various walks of life to vehemently oppose British rule. This collective mobilization underscores the depth of discontent and the widespread desire for change within the Muslim community during this period of colonial rule. It was deemed justified by adherents pledging allegiance to the Khalifa and actively engaging in the defense of his authority to anticipate reciprocal support in safeguarding their rights during times of crisis. The ethos of Indian independence found resonance within the Khilafat movement, as evidenced by the actions of Muslim leaders such as Mohammad Ali. His endeavors exemplify the influence of the Khilafat order on Muslim leaders, as they endeavored to dismantle European imperialism and secure liberation not solely for India, but also for the broader Muslim nations of the East.64
4.3.2. Resistance for Indian Autonomy and Home Rule Within the historical context spanning from 1919 to 1922, narratives of resistance in the framework of the Khilafat order embraced strategies of protest, boycotts, and non cooperation against British colonial hegemony, thereby accentuating aspirations for Indian autonomy and self-governance. By employing a synthesis of realist and constructivist perspectives in International Relations (IR) theories, this section endeavors to elucidate the intricate dynamics underpinning the nexus between the Khilafat movement and the broader struggle for Indian independence. Central to this investigation hypothesized to a nuance understanding that Indian leaders perceived their
64 Prabha Dixit, “Political Objectives of the Khilafat”, 76.
185
emancipation is intricately linked with the existence of the Khilafat. This perception led them to project the Khilafat order in shaping the resistance narratives against colonial rule. During World War I, the British government initially committed to safeguarding the sanctity of Islamic holy sites in the Hijaz and Jerusalem under Ottoman Khilafat. However, after confirming British victory, there was a notable policy shift as they openly supported the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. This shift included measures to isolate Mecca and Medina from the communications of the Khilafat, and Jerusalem was separated from Ottoman control. These actions heightened tensions among Indian Muslims against British colonial rule, driven by the fear that the Khilafat’s demise would lead to the decline of Muslim civilization in India. The dissolution of the Ottoman Khilafat by British authorities prompted Indian Muslims to engage more actively in the struggle for independence. Pursuing this objective they forged alliances with their Hindu compatriots. This collaboration, alongside the Congress’s assimilation of the fervent Muslim resistance, infused greater strength into the broader movement for Indian independence.65 By integrating the narrative of Muslim resistance into its own, the Congress also augmented the anti-colonial movement, rallying Indians across religious and cultural spectra against colonial rule. Thus Khilafat order produced an inclusive nationalist approach to fortify the Indian anti-colonial stance and the greater project of Indian independence.
4.3.3. Disappointment, Disintegration and Changing Aspect The Muslim resistance faced setbacks due to internal leadership conflicts. Rather Numerous disparities and contentions arose between Muslim leaders and Congress members regarding various political matters, notably exacerbated by the outbreak of the Moplah rebellion.66 This uprising exacerbated communal discord, fostering suspicion and undermining the interfaith rapport between Hindus and Muslims. Despite its initial role as a cohesive factor in the struggle against colonialism, some Hindu leaders demonstrated the Khilafat movement as a catalyst for escalating communal tensions. This escalation of distrust between the Hindu and Muslims had significant consequences, including the suspension of the resistance struggle and the non-
65 Qureshi, “The Indian Khilafat Movement”, 152-168.
66 D. N. Dhanagare, “Agrarian Conflict, Religion and Politics: The Moplah Rebellions in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, Past and Present 74 (1977), 112-141.
186
cooperation movement. Additionally, the rebellion instilled fear among Hindu leadership, who perceived a potential resurgence of Muslim dominance in India under the Khilafat order. This shift in dynamics was particularly evident in the aftermath of the movement’s support for the non-cooperation movement and the ‘Chauri Chaura’ incident of 1922. Despite this, the British government had a strategic stand to increase communal tension during the 1920s among the natives to sustain their position and to repress the resistance movement into a different narrative. This was mainly because; they faced with an inclusive Indian resistance centering the Ottoman Khilafat since 1918 and seeking to maintain its control over India, strategically exploited existing communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims. By fostering and manipulating these divisions, they aimed to divert the focus of the nationalist movement away from unified anti-colonial efforts towards internal strife and discord. This strategy served several purposes. First, it helped to create a sense of dependency on British rule among certain communities by portraying themselves as protectors against potential communal violence. Second, it allowed the British to justify their continued presence in India as a necessary means of maintaining order and preventing intercommunal conflict. Finally, by fragmenting the nationalist movement along religious lines, the British sought to weaken the overall strength and unity of the resistance. This approach had far-reaching implications, as it not only influenced the course of the nationalist movement but also left a lasting impact on communal relations in the region. The legacy of these tactics can still be seen in the challenges of communalism and sectarianism that persist in South Asia to this day. Moreover, the oppressive measures undertaken by the colonial administration, such as widespread arrests and exiles, resulted in a dearth of Muslim leadership capable of sustaining the resistance movement, which underscores the complex interplay between colonial strategies of repression and the resilience of resistance efforts. Meanwhile, a faction of nationalist Muslims led the Hijrat (migration) campaign to Afghanistan.67 While many prominent narratives deem this Hijrat a significant mistake by Muslim leadership, citing the hardships faced by the migrants, including scarcity of resources and loss of life. We argue an alternative perspective that posits that the Hijrat campaign represented a form of anti-British resistance, as Muslim revolutionaries viewed
67 M. Naeem Qureshi, “The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920”, Modern Asian Studies 13/1 (1979), 41-59.
187
continued participation in the resistance movement within India as untenable. Acknowledging this reality, they designated India as “Darul-Harb”, a land of conflict, deeming it unsafe for Muslims. Rather than migrating to “Darul- Islam” (land of Islam), they sought to build the capacity for military confrontation against colonial power. In pursuit of this goal, Muslim revolutionaries drew inspiration from the Bolshevik revolution, and accepted the Bolshevik hegemony to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule in India.68 This narrative allows the Hijrat campaign to consider as a complex and nuanced form of resistance, reflecting the strategic thinking and commitment of Muslim revolutionaries to challenge colonial authority in India. Therefore, Muslims continued their resistance to the existence of Khilafat. During this time, the rise of Mustafa Kemal was seen by Indina Muslims as a heroic figure, a champion and defender of the Muslim world, particularly following his resounding victory in the Battle of Çanakkale. Indian Muslims continued to provide material assistance for Khalifa in the hope of restoring its former hegemonic authority. However, Mustafa Kemal’s abolition of the Khilafat dashed these hopes, leading Indian Muslims to shift their focus towards the pursuit of a separate homeland in the later discourse of Indian politics under the colonial power structure.
4.4. A New Subjective Identity of Indian Muslim This section delves into an analysis of how participants within the Khilafat Movement strategically engineered a distinctive Muslim identity by crafting narratives of resistance against the prevailing colonial hegemony. The acknowledgment of Khilafat as a fundamental ideology of Islam is exemplified by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s proclamation; while issuing a fatwa, he elucidated its paramount significance within the Islamic framework, thereby exemplifying its acknowledgment within the theological discourse.69 This declaration underscored the reasons why Indian Muslims fervently rallied around the core principles associated with Khilafat, both in political and existential contexts. This perception of Pro-Ottoman leaders changed the discourses of the Muslim’s subjective identity in the 1910s. Their construction was much related to the Khilafat through their focus of Khilafat as order-building phenomenon in the Muslim political discourses.
68 Ansari, “Pan-Islam”, 509-537.
69 Azad, “Masla-i-Khilafat wa Jazirat al Arab” 11-28.
188
Therefore, scholars have certainly applied the Social Identity Theory (SIT) to understand political phenomena, particularly in analyzing how political entities construct and choose their identities. In recent explorations, SIT has been used to delve into how political entities, such as parties, movements, or even nations, shape their identities and interact with others based on these identities.70 This approach provides insights into the processes through which political identities are formed, maintained, and manipulated, contributing to a deeper understanding of political behavior and outcomes. It provides a framework for analyzing the ways in which political entities navigate their identities, negotiate intergroup relations, and mobilize support, ultimately contributing to a richer understanding of contemporary political processes. Muslim’s construction of the Khilafat order in Indian politics not only endorsed Muslim’s acceptance of a hegemon but also provides idea of identity construction pursuing three primary objectives: firstly, legitimizing their presence within India’s political landscape; secondly, delegitimizing colonial rule over India; and thirdly, steadfastly resisting safeguarding the integrity of the Khilafat order against Western-centric narratives. These narratives made the Khilafat order more popular among different group of Muslims who were divided in the colonial era due to their ethnic, caste and creed differences. Khilafat made them unified under a common order in their resistance against colonialism. Furthermore, the adoption of Khilafat as an organizational paradigm prompted Indian leaders to align themselves with the concept of the ‘True Muslim’. This phenomenon bears resemblance to the pursuit of a ‘True American’ identity, as explored by Citrin et al. in their examination of American identity through this specific lens.71 We focus the Khilafat order’s role in shaping Indian Muslim subjective identity and its impact in legitimizing Muslim political hegemony over India.
4.4.1. Normative Identity
The ideologically divided Muslim communities in India found a common platform in the Ottoman Khilafat, which served to legitimize their position and identitical
70 Leonie Huddy, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory”, Political Psychology 22/1(2001), 127-156.
71 J., Citrin et al. “American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change”, Journal of Politics 52 (1990), 1124-1154.
189
explanation within Indian politics. This investigation into the acceptance of the Khilafat order among Muslims reveals two key distinctions: firstly, it fostered unity among them, and secondly, it inspired resistance against colonial rule. The dissent among some Muslims regarding the Khilafat order underscores the existing narratives that sought to marginalize certain groups as not being true Muslims. These dissenters, whom we term ‘Khilafatists,’ believed in the concept of ‘resistance for existence’. Our focus is on the normative attachment of Indian Muslims to the Khilafat from two specific angles. Firstly, their acceptance of the Khilafat order validated their political legitimacy within India. Secondly, the Khilafat order legitimized their resistance to delegitimize the colonial rule. Moreover, it explores how the discourse surrounding the fall of the Mughal rule and the Indian Muslim’s connection to the Ottoman Khilafat from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century as the framework for understanding the normative identity of Muslims. This analysis is grounded in the ‘order-building’ theories of International Relations. We propose to evaluate the normative structure of the Indian Muslim Society in the following structure.
190
Table 2: Normative Structure of the Indian Muslim Community
Source: Created by the Author We suggest the normative dynamics of Indian Muslims within the framework of the Khilafat movement in the construction of new subjectivity. This movement, characterized by a hierarchical structure, inspired a rejection of colonial rule, and accepted the Khilafat order to legitimize Muslim hegemony over India. Therefore, notable leaders such as Obaidullah Sindhi and Mahendra Prata Singh advocated for a Normative Processes Social Dimensions of Power Resistance and Contestation
In the demographic representation of British India, the two primary communities at the center were Muslims and Hindus. While Hindus perceived British rule as a transition of political authority, Muslim held a distinct perspective. For the Muslims, British colonial rule represented a substantial departure, signifying the irrevocable erosion of their enduring political, economic, and social influence in India. This is significantly influenced the Muslims to play a pivotal role against the colonial establishment over India and were steadfast in their refusal to confer legitimacy upon British rule right from its inception.
Colonial Order in India:
From 1858, British undisputedly establish their power in India and became the central and dominant authority over India.
Identity
Order Core theme of Indian Muslims Reconstruction of the new subjectivity Legitimizing the Ottoman order Identity Delegitimizing the colonial power over India
191
radical spiritual humanism rooted in the sub-continental culture, where governance, people, and religion were viewed as interdependent entities.72 This perspective aimed to regenerate a new generation of Muslims in India, characterized by a profound historical consciousness, modern educational outlook, and comprehensive intellectual engagement. Their central objective was to integrate the concept of Khilafat into the identity construction of Indian Muslims. Their acceptance of this political order underscored the belief that resistance against colonial rule was essential for the legitimization of their identity within the colonial state structure, and also distinguishing them from other communities. Their adherence to the Khilafat order not only influenced their political hegemony but also permeated various aspects of their lives, imbuing their existence with a distinct narrative of Muslim identity. This was exemplified by the attire of Khilafat volunteers, characterized by their green uniforms, Turkish fez, Arab-style robes, and the display of the redcrescent, symbolized a commitment to a normative Muslim identity.73 Moreover, the construction of Muslim identity underwent a structural transformation, driven by various factors such as the influence of the Muslim institutions, political leaders, and intellectuals. These entities, along with public demonstrations, gatherings, and the mobilization of fund for the Ottoman Empire after all the mass participation, promoted the concept of Khilafat as a unifying authority for Muslims, fostering a sense of collective adherence despite living under colonial rule. As Nick et al. explained a political entity’s interpretation of its identity and an interest within the power structure is crucial.74 By showcasing their universal belongingness, Muslims challenged their marginalized status in colonial India. Moreover, the narratives surrounding Khilafat not only influenced individual and collective norms and behaviors but also distinguished Muslims from other communities in India. Consequently, Muslim ideologies, norms, and values associated with the Khilafat order became deeply integrated into the decolonization narrative.
72 Yasmin Saikia, “Uncolonizable: Freedom”, 117-134.
73 Minault, The Khilafat, 119.
74 Nick Hopkins and Vered Kahani Hopkins, “Identity Construction and British Muslims’ Political Activity: Beyond Rational Actor Theory”, British Journal of Social Psychology 43 (2004), 339-356.
192
4.4.2. Resistant Oriented Muslim Identity Post-structural and post-colonial theories offer valuable analytical frameworks for examining the responses of colonized populations to their colonizers. These theoretical perspectives allow for an exploration of how the Indian Khilafat movement articulated the Khilafat order within discourses of resistance against British colonial domination, thereby engendering a transformative subjective identity among Indian Muslims within the colonial power structure. By establishing an ideological foundation for broader unity in their resistance rhetoric, Muslim leaders imbued their discourse with an emancipatory ethos, rejecting subjugation by the hegemonic colonial order. This framework elucidates how Muslim resistance articulated a distinct global Muslim identity through the Khilafat. Indian Muslims embraced ‘resistance as a means of emancipation’ that can be aligned with Balci’s notion that dissenting ethnic movements seek to deconstruct and challenge dominant representations.75 Furthermore, Resistance needs an order to delegitimize the existing order. This perspective underscores how Muslims in India contested colonial presence by framing the Khilafat as both a formative societal structure and a discursive challenge to colonial authority. Moreover, counter discourse functions as a linguistic tool employed by resistance factions to assert an alternative narrative against the dominant state authority, thereby establishing novel political dynamics and fostering a resistance-oriented political identity. Judith Butler posited that such oppositional political identities are formulated within the confines of regulatory hegemony, wherein their enactment is contingent upon the performative construction of these subjects.76 Within this framework, Khilafat assumed a pivotal role in the reshaping of Muslim identity as a ‘dominant resistance subject’, eclipsing alternative modes of identification. Through the lens of resistance as a gauge of power dynamics, Indian Muslims elucidated dual dimensions of their mobilization: firstly, it engendered a mass mobilization within the discourses of the Khilafat order, and secondly, it delineated them as an ‘insurgent subjectivity’. Moreover, the Muslim League’s Delhi session in 1918 expressed the intensive
75 Ali Balcı, “Writing the World into Counter-Hegemony: Identity, Power and ‘Foreign Policy’ in Ethnic Movements”, International Relations 31/ 4 (2017), 466-483.
76 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 2006), 3.
193
resistance of Indian Muslims if the Khilafat is collapsed.77 Such expression describes how they challenged or resist dominant power structures.
Therefore, in their academic exploration, Alexandra and Oliver delved into how narratives shape state identities, particularly examining the intricate interplay between order and discourse on the global stage.78 Such explanation allows to reconstruct the Indian Muslim case how Muslim leaders and their collaborations with Hindu counterparts used the counter-hegemonic discourse to challenge the colonial order. This discourse aimed to construct a resistance-oriented identity against the prevailing colonial structures. Muslim leaders adopted various strategies employed by the movement, including civil disobedience, boycotts of entering British Indian army, police, and taxes, renunciation of titles, and resignation from government service. Additionally, the movement embraced swadeshi activities, promoting locally made products while boycotting foreign goods. These efforts were aimed at subverting colonial authority and constructing a distinct identity rooted in resistance to external control. Despite these phenomenons, Khilafat movement employed a variety of strategies to resist British colonial rule, including fundraising efforts, membership drives, and the publication of propaganda materials such as booklets, pamphlets, and journals. Participation in the Hartal, a form of protest involving the cessation of work and the closure of businesses, as well as non-cooperation with British institutions, disobedience to colonial authorities, and boycotts of English goods, were all central to the movement’s approach. It facilitates the examination of the Khilafat movement with de-colonial texts that delegitimize the colonial existence in India through resistance. These narratives of resistance helped forge a dissident community among Muslims under colonial rule, challenging the legitimacy of British presence in India. Their resistance efforts were collective and transcended religious boundaries, resonating with people of all classes and creeds. By rejecting colonial disciplinary measures and advocating for home rule, Muslim resistance directly confronted colonial power. This form of resistance, which included non-cooperation, disobedience, and economic boycotts, represented a significant challenge to the existence of colonial authority. Mona Lilja has
77 Qureshi, “The Indian Khilafat”, 152-168.
78 Alexandra Homolar and Oliver Turner, “Narrative Alliances: The Discourse Foundations of International Order”, International Affairs 100/1 (2024), 203-220.
194
characterized such kinds of resistance as a form of ‘breaking resistance’ that highlights its disruptive nature and its direct challenge to the existing power.79 By examining the Khilafat movement through such de-colonial texts, it becomes evident that Muslim resistance was directed to delegitimize the colonial presence in India.
4.4.3. Subaltern Muslim Identity The concept of the ‘global Muslim’ or the ‘Muslim world’ emerged among the colonized Muslim community from the sense of unity in their struggle against colonialism since the last decades of the nineteenth century.80 This broader identity construction of the Muslims focused the Ottoman Khilafat as political hegemony of the Muslim world. Muslims from Java to the Maghreb, and from the Balkans to Canton had a sense of belonging with the Khilafat order. During this time, Indian Muslims accepted the Khilafat as an alternative order to delegitimize the British rule over India, making the Khilafat order narratives different, while its appeals made the subaltern Muslims in the resistance discourse. By accepting this order, Indian Muslims sparked a new light of Muslim unity and Islamic solidarity under a common order, concurrently intensifying their fraternal bonds despite the presence of varying social strata and doctrinal distinctions among them. Most significantly, Khilafat appealed to the subaltern Muslims in the political discourse of India, providing them with a significant platform of unity against the colonial exploitation. Therefore, the subaltern entrance with this movement provided a new dimension in shaping the phenomenon of the new subjective identity for Muslims, transcending traditional divisions of the Muslim society with two distinctions as “Ashraf” and “Atraf”. For instance, during this time, rural Muslims of Sindh experienced their inaugural foray into political mobilization centering the Khilafat order.81 Therfore, the Mopla community in Malabar participated in a violent uprising against the Hindu upper classes and colonial authorities, while the revolt was primarily driven by local grievances, colonial administrators attributed its violence to fears of invasion by foreign Muslim empires. In this way, the Khilafat movement acquired a subaltern character as it became intertwined with the activities of the Kisan, or peasant,
79Mona Lilja, “The definition of Resistance”, Journal of Political Power 15/2 (2022), 202-220.
80 Aydin
81 Johan Mathew, “Spectres of Pan-Islam”, 942-968.
195
community in their engagement with Swadeshi initiatives, particularly in the realm of hand weaving production.82 This alignment was further pronounced through the involvement of students, laborers, Imams from local mosques, and women, whose financial contributions lent a dissenting quality to the movement.
4.4.4. Secular Indian Identity The enigmatic nature of Muslim resistance in India presents a compelling puzzle, underscored by the imperative for an ‘alternative order for resistance’ to challenge the prevailing colonial dominance. This study adopts order-building strategies that not only galvanized Muslims but also appealed to other communities, enriching their discourse of resistance. The involvement of diverse religious groups in the Muslim resistance movement redefined the notion of ‘secular Indian identity’, highlighting the coexistence of various communities within the Indian social fabric and bolstering the foundation of Indian national identity. Moreover, the ‘Lucknow Pact’ was a significant juncture in Hindu-Muslim relations; epitomizing a collaborative approaches that ushered in a new paradigm in Indian politics.83 This paradigm was characterized by a secular framework aimed at ensuring the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious communities within the Indian state framework. By concluding this pact, Congress leaders discerned the strategic importance of Muslim resistance against the colonial order, viewing it as advantageous for the broader goals of Indian nationalism and self-governance. Subsequently, the Khilafat agitation in India became a new juncture for Hindu-Muslim unity, as both communities shared the common objective of attaining Indian autonomy by overthrowing colonial rule. Starting from 1916, Hindu leaders showed their presence in Khilafat-related protests, conferences, and delegations, which signal a significant shift in their approach towards collaborative resistance. Therefore, the ‘Jallianwala Bagh Massacre’ served as a catalyst for the escalation of united resistance against British colonial rule in India.84 Following this brutal event, the site became a symbolic center of political inspiration both for Hindu and Muslms. This was mainly because; this massacre again epitomized the oppressive nature of British rule and galvanized
82 Diwan Bahadur C. Gopalan Nair, The Moplah Rebellion, 1921 (Calcutta: The Norman Printing Bureau, 1923), 76.
83 Hugh F. Owen, “Negotiating the Lucknow Pact”, The Journal of Asian Studies 31/3(1972), 561-587.
84 Irfan Habib, “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre”, Social Scientist 47/5-6 (2019), 3-8.
196
nationalists to intensify their efforts towards delegitimizing the colonial existence over India. Both the Hindu and Muslim nationalists strategically linked this atrocity to the broader context of the Khilafat agitation, emphasizing their shared objective of overthrowing colonial dominance. This narrative helped to solidify a unified resistance movement, driven by a common goal of liberation from British imperial rule. During this period, Hindu leaders strategically aligned with the Ottoman order as a strategic counterbalance to European imperialism in Asia. They believed that the abolition of the Ottoman Empire would pave the way for unchecked Western colonial expansion into West and Central Asia, thereby solidifying European dominance in whole Asia.85 This perception heightened the importance of the Ottoman order in Indian politics, Hindu leader, for example, Lajpat Rai asserting that British imperialism’s spread in Asia would intensify global tensions and impede the quest for human liberties. Rai emphasized the significance of the Ottoman Khilafat as a bulwark against European imperialism, framing its existence as crucial for safeguarding humanity from further imperial encroachment. Moreover, Indian nationalists projected the Ottoman order against the Eurocentric imperial world, portraying the Khilafat as a pivotal symbol of Asian identity opposing the Christian order. This portrayal aimed to strengthen Indian nationalism by aligning with the Ottoman cause, thus advancing a broader anti-imperialist international agenda, and also projected a nationalist argument in it for Indian autonomy.
This engagement with the Khilafat order created a secular space in Indian politics, fostering an era of mutual respect and inter-communal interests. Gandhi emerged as a central figure in recognizing the significance of the Ottoman order within Indian political discourses. He effectively integrated Muslim resistance into his non-cooperation movement against British rule, realizing that both movements shared the common objective of delegitimizing colonial presence. Therefore, the Congress actively supported the Muslim community’s embrace of the Ottoman order, viewing it as a catalyst for the broader movement toward decolonization.
Mohammad Ali, a prominent leader in the Khilafat movement, advocated the Hindu participation in the Muslim resistance as a collaborative efforts of the ‘federation of faith’, asserting that religious collaboration could be a fundamental pillar for national
85 Vanya Vaidehi Bhargav, “A Hindu Champion of Pan-Islam: Lajpat Rai and the Khilafat Movement”, The Journal of Asian Studies 81 (2022), 689-705.
197
unity.86 The overarching objective of Khilafat leaders was to position the Khilafat order as a unifying force across religious boundaries, fostering inter-faith collaboration in the collective and shared pursuit of resistance against British colonial rule. This strategic alignment aimed to establish a coalition capable of exerting political pressure on colonial authorities. The synthesis of Hindu-Muslim unity within the Khilafat movement heralded a paradigm shift towards a secular Indian identity, one that embraced religious diversity within the framework of a singular national identity. This novel conceptualization of nationalism engendered a transformative era characterized by heightened Hindu-Muslim solidarity, imbued with the ideological construct of a unified Indian nation. Consequently, the colonial administration confronted unprecedented and formidable resistance from India between 1919 and 1924 and Khilafat as the led actor propelled the normative ideal of unity rooted in the consciousness of a singular national identity to delegitimize the colonial existence over India.
86 Johan Mathew, “Specters of Pan-Islam”, 942-968.
CONCLUSION This thesis examines the resistance of Indian Muslims during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, highlighting their embracement of the Ottoman Khilafat as an ‘order’ to challenge the prevailing colonial rule in India. Their construction of the Ottoman Khilafat as ‘order’ presents a compelling case for elucidating the intricacies of hierarchy and power dynamics in global politics. Through an analysis of power relations and social dynamics within the lens of hierarchy, this study provides insights into the complexities of the Muslim resistance movement and its broader historical context. Therefore, the thesis proposes a theoretical framework for studying dissident Muslim movements in India, conceptualizing the Ottoman Khilafat as a hierarchical order. It focuses the late Ottoman hierarchical order, while its authority within its own territory was diminishing but became a rising order in the distant geography of South Asia. This phenomenon underscores the complex dynamics surrounding the perception of imperial order that despite experiencing significant military defeats and territorial losses, it can paradoxically manifest in the political discourses of its subordinates even beyond the confines of geographical boundaries. In the case examined, the declining Ottoman Empire underwent a resurgence of its order in India, where it was projected as a counter to Western hegemony, fostering an alternative Muslim subjectivity through the prism of resistance movements. By aligning with the Khilafat, Indian Muslims aimed to assert their identity within the broader global Muslim community, leveraging this shared hegemony to resist and contest the British colonial order. This understanding portrays the Ottoman Empire as a great power in the international system capable of challenging British colonialism, signifying a shift in power dynamics within the phenomenon of Khilafat’s hegemony. This transformation was primarily driven by Indian Muslims’ perception of the Khilafat as an ‘order-building entity’ in their resistance against the colonial rule. This construction introduced the Khilafat as an alternative order within the Muslim dissenting movement, aimed at contesting the legitimacy of the prevailing colonial hegemony. Therefore, the power struggle between the Indian Muslim community and the British colonial government prompted the former to seek an alternative order to challenge the legitimacy of later one. The quest for reinvigorating Muslim hegemony over India
198
199
placed the Ottoman Khilafat as an order-building entity in the phenomenon of the Muslim resistance against the prevailing colonial rule. Moreover, the acceptance of the Ottoman order by the Muslims can be attributed to the absence of Mughal rule, which historically represented as the last Muslim hegemon over India. Therefore, the decline of the Mughal order and the ascendancy of colonial rule endured significant hardships under the colonial apparatus and resulted in the marginalization of Indian Muslims in their religio-political hegemony. Therefore, the colonial hierarchy engendered feelings of humiliation, alienation, and marginalization which negativity fueled a sentiment of resistance among the Muslims. Despite this, following the establishment of colonial rule, Muslims found themselves subordinated within the colonial order but this order failed to garner legitimacy from the Muslim community due to its perceived exploitation, tyranny, and monopolistic tendencies towards Muslim culture and civilization, thereby engendering a sense of unease among Muslims regarding Western dominance. Consequently, this discontent motivated Muslims to pursue an alternative authority against British rule over India. In response to this disheartening predicament, Indian Muslims accepted an alternative order to challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule. Primarily, the Hamidian foreign policy, Pan-Islamism, and the Muslim inclination towards the Ottoman Khalifa influenced Indian Muslims to accept the Khilafat order as a legitimate authority of the Muslims. The Khilafat order gained prominence in the early twentieth century, as Muslim leaders, intellectuals, and institutions embraced, employed, and made this order more functional in the Muslim resistance narratives against Western dominance. From the 1910s onward, Indian Muslim perceived a Western conspiracy aimed at undermining the Ottoman Empire, further bolstering the importance of the Khilafat. Muslims offered tangible support to the Ottomans in their struggle against Western aggression, revealing a significant dimension of the order literature on how subordinate entities advanced, furnished, and safeguarded their dominant authority. Therefore, Muslims perceived the waning essence of the Ottoman hegemony. Despite knowing the Ottoman Empire’s decline, Indian Muslims sought to legitimize its authority in their resistance movement, aspiring to restore Ottoman power within the global hierarchy system.
200
Following the aftermath of the First World War, Indian Muslims emerged as significant actors in the resistance against colonial rule, particularly in response to the perceived decline of the Khilafat order. Recognizing the potential diminution of their hegemony within the global power framework, they foresaw a concomitant decline in their societal standing within the colonial power structure in India. This anticipation among Indian Muslims harbored deep concerns that the decline of the Ottoman Empire would jeopardize their standing in the country, viewing the Khilafat order as a counterbalance to challenge the hegemony of the colonial power structure. Therefore, safeguarding their hegemon and placing their position in the colonial milieu, they galvanized robust resistance in 1919. They sought to unite with other communities, particularly Hindus, to strengthen their collective struggle against colonial rule. Recognizing the significance of Muslim resistance, the Congress aligned with the Muslim movement. Therefore, the Khilafat order fostered a Pan-Indian Muslim political solidarity and engaged the Non-cooperation movement within its discourse, thereby emerging as a potent force during the 1919 era. It emerged as a formidable entity, amalgamating subconscious motivations, idealistic visions, youthful vigor, and ambitions for authority and influence within a nuanced amalgamation. Therefore, this resistance endeavor engendered a new collective identity for Indian Muslims, motivating them to integrate into the broader movement for Indian independence and to challenge the existing colonial order.
Within the colonial power structure, Muslims were geographically, linguistically, socially, and religiously divided. The emergence of the Khilafat within Muslim political discourse gained prominence as it provided a unifying platform for previously fragmented and sectarian Muslim communities, offering a common umbrella under which they could coalesce to assert their influence over Indian politics. Muslim’s main purpose was by acceptancing the Ottoman order was to delegitimize the colonial rule for reignvigorating Muslim dominace again in Indian politics. Considering my position with Zarakol’s explation of international hierarchy as the ‘purposeful agent’, I propose the ‘Khilafat order’ as ‘persistent representative’ for the Muslim resistance against the existing colonial authority over India. It seeks to understand why the Muslim subordinates in India accepted the hegemony of the Ottoman Khilafat and how this hegemony influenced their political discourses. It can be attributed to their desire to reinvigorate their power, resistance against western domination, and the construction of
201
alternative Muslim subjectivities against the Western domination. By uniting the Indian Muslims in support of the Ottoman Khilafat, the Muslim movement demonstrated the enduring power of Islamic symbols and the potential for Muslim political mobilization in the face of colonialism and foreign domination. Therefore, the Khilafat leaders perceived the Ottoman Empire as the legitimate authority of their resistance. Beside the Muslim leadership, Indian Muslim organizations and institutions played a significant role in constructing the Khilafat order in the Muslim resistance movement. This thesis makes a dual contribution within the realms of historical inquiry and international relations theory. It enriches the scholarly discourse on the Khilafat movement, distinguishing itself from prior analyses by luminaries such as Azmi Özcan, Gail Minault, M. Naeem Qureshi, A.C. Niemeijer, and others. While extant literature has predominantly focused on delineating Muslim linkages, the conceptual underpinnings of the Khilafat movement, and its pan-Islamic dimensions, this research diverges by accentuating the Khilafat’s evolution into an order-building entity within the framework of Muslim resistance against the prevailing colonial hegemony in India. It explores the actual motivation of the Khilafat and its functions are to legitimize the Muslim resistance against the colonial order. Moreover, this study aspires to elucidate the local historical dynamics through a lens of interconnectivity. While the locus of Muslim resistance was situated within the Indian milieu, its reverberations were intricately interwoven with the broader Ottoman and British contexts, illustrating the interconnected nature of local historical dynamics within the broader tapestry of international interconnectedness.
In the realm of International Relations (IR) scholarship, extensive literature has delved into the intricacies of order emergence and functionality. While a considerable body of work centers on material dynamics as pivotal in the construction and perpetuation of order, the present study deviates from this conventional framework. Notably, it endeavors to elucidate a novel dimension within the discourse on order construction by examining the Ottoman order in India, devoid of discernible material dynamics. This study’s distinctiveness lies in its exploration of how order can be constructed without the traditional reliance on material factors, highlighting the pivotal role of social dynamics in shaping and sustaining order. The absence of material aid, occupation, or territorial integration from the Ottomans underscores the unique nature of the Ottoman
202
order’s establishment in India, which was predominantly shaped by social dynamics. This distinctive approach underscores the paramount role of social dynamics in shaping and sustaining order, thus contributing a nuanced perspective to the existing scholarship, thereby enriching scholarly discourse with an alternative analytical lens. Moreover, the research undertakes a dual exploration, examining firstly the mechanisms through which a declining hegemonic power can exert influence the political resistance of its subordinates across vast geographical distances, and secondly, the process by which these subordinate entities harness functional strategies to construct an order that legitimizes their resistance. By probing these dimensions, the study not only contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of hegemony and resistance but also sheds light on the agency of subordinate actors in shaping the contours of political order within the broader international landscape. This thesis has some limitations in its capacity to fully elucidate several significant aspects. These limitations can be broadly categorized into two overarching dimensions. Firstly, there is a need for a more comprehensive examination of ‘British policy aimed at quelling Muslim resistance’, encompassing an analysis of the measures, policies, and actions employed by the British government that strengthened further colonial dominance over India. This inquiry should also extend to an exploration of how this policy was implemented, leading to the decline of the Khilafat movement in 1924 and coinciding with the emergence of the modern nation-state in Turkey. Secondly, the exploration of ‘evolving contours of Muslim resistance’ delves into the repercussions of the Khilafat order’s decline on subsequent trajectories within the Muslim movement, particularly within the colonial power dynamics, with a particular emphasis on the advocacy for a distinct Muslim homeland in South Asia. While these points offer intriguing avenues for research, a more comprehensive understanding could be achieved through additional historical and archival investigations to better elucidate these intricate connections.
Furthermore, this research provides a foundation for further exploration of the Khilafat order and its impact on the decolonization process. Future studies could delve into the interplay between subaltern agency and the formal-legal definition of Empire, examining how negotiations and power dynamics shaped the outcomes of anti-colonial
203
movements. Moreover, comparative analyses with other resistance movements could shed light on the broader patterns of subaltern agency within imperial contexts. Therefore, this thesis presents a potential source of inspiration for similar inquiries, offering a framework for analyzing similar historical phenomena through theoretical perspective. For instance, it could shed light on the functions of the Ottoman Order in regions such as Aceh and the Maldives, where despite lacking direct material connections, Muslim domains embraced the Ottoman order in their resistance against Western colonial powers. Additionally, contemporary cases, such as the functions of the American international order in Iran’s opposition movement, can be examine through the lens of this thesis. This would involve examining how pro-American Iranians aligned themselves with the American order against the dominant regime of Iran. The conceptual framework and insights presented in this thesis could be applied to explore similar global connections. Therefore, my perspective can be useful to study the connection of the oppositional movement with external orders.
204
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archives Documents Başbakanlık Osmalı Arşivi (BOA)-Ottoman Archives
BOA, Osmanli Arşivi. Defteri Iane-i-Hindiyye. 290/18220.
BOA, Osmanli Arşivi. Name Defteri. no. 8.
BOA, Osmanli Arşivi. Name Defteri. no. 9.
BOA, Osmanli Arşivi. Şehbender Defteri, no. I.
India Office Records and Private Papers (IOL&R)
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. Canning Papers. no.9, dated 9 Oct. 1857 of letters from H.M. Minister Feb. 1856 to Feb, 1862.
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. FO 141/578/2.
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. L/R/5/192.
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. MSS. Eur. F/111/434.
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. MSS/Eur/ (F 111/323), 1905.
IOL&R, India Office Records and Private Papers. Mss/Eur/D709.
National Archives of India (NAI)
NAI, National Archives of India. F. D. Secret E. (February 1912), 298.
NAI, National Archives of India. FO 882/15. no. 9, (9 Oct. 1857).
NAI, National Archives of India. FP/A/August/1879/43.
West Bengal State Archives (WBSA)
WBSA, West Bengal State Archives. FN-580/15.
Newspapers of the 1910s
Akhiri Mazamin (June 1888).
Al-Hilal (13 August 1913).
Al-Hilal (6 November 1912).
205
Al-Islam (05, Vadro, 1325 Bongabdo).
Comrade (12 July 1913).
Comrade (14 October, 1911).
Comrade (17 August, 1912).
Comrade (17 October, 1911).
Comrade (20 November, 1912).
The Friend of India (29 August, 1867).
The Observer (4 October, 1911).
The Times (13 to 24 July 1867).
Books
Ahmad, Aziz. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Ahmad, Qeyamuddin. The Wahhabi Movement in India. London: Routledge, 2020.
Ahmed, Ishtiaq. Jinnah: His Success, Failure and Role in History. New Delhi: Penguin Rendom House, 2020.
Ahmed, Rafiuddin. The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 A Quest for Identity. UK: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Akanda, Latifa. Social History of Muslim Bengal. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation, 1981.
Ali, Ameer. The Spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideals of Islam, with a Life of the Prophet. UK: Christophers, 1922.
Allah, Shah Wali. Izala-al-Khafa and Hujjat al-Lahil Baligha. II. Volumes. Delhi.
Anderson, M.S. Europe in the Eighteen Century 1713-1739. UK: Routledge, 2000.
Ashraf, Mujeeb. Muslim Attitudes towards British Rule and Western Culture in India. New Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i Delli, 1982.
Atçıl, Abdur Raman. Scholars and Sultans in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Auer, Blain H. Symbol of authority in Medieval Islam: History, Religion and Muslim legitimacy in the Delhi Sultanate. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.
206
Aydın, Camil. The Idea of the Muslim World a Global Intellectual History. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press, 2017.
Aymes, Marc et al. Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century. London: Brill, 2015.
Azad, Abul Kalam. India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1989.
Aziz, K.K. Ameer Ali: His Life and Works, 1849-1928. Lahore: Publishers United Limited, 1968.
Balcı, Ali. The PKK-Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s Regional Politics During and After the Cold War. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Barkey, Karen. Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Bey, M. Rifat. The Awaking of Modern Egypt. Lahore: Premier Book House, 1964.
Black, Cyril E. – Brown, L. Karl. (ed.). Modernization in the Middle East the Ottoman Empire and Its Afro-Asian Successors. INC, Princeton-New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1992.
Blunt, Wilfred Scawen. The Future of Islam. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882.
Board of Researcher. Islam in Bangladesh Through Ages. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, 1995.
Bonington, M.C.C. Census of India 1931. II. Vollumes. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1932.
Brittlebank, Kate. Tipu Sultan’s Search for Legitimacy Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Brummett, Palmira. Mapping the Ottomans. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Burke, Peter. History and Social Theory. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge, 2006.
Buzan, Barry. The Primary Institutions of International Society from International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
207
Campbell, David. Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
Carvalho, Benjamin de et al. Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations. UK: Taylor and Francis, 2021.
Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, 1850-1950. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Chaoudhury, Nurul H. Peasant Radicalism in Nineteenth Century Bengal: The Faraizi, Indigo, and Pabna Moveemnts. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2001.
Choudhury, Suranjana. A reading of Violence in Partition Stories from Bengal. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.
D. Metcalf, Barbara. Islamic Revival in British India Deoband 1860-1900. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
Enam-Ul-Haq, Muhammed. Varoter Musalman o Sadhinota Andolon. Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1993.
Ethan L., Menchinger. The First of the Modern Ottomans. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Faroqhi, Suraiya. Another Mirror for Princes the Public Image of the Ottoman Sultans and its Reception. USA: Gorgias Press, 2009.
Faroqhi, Suraiya. The Ottoman Empire and the World around It. London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography the Story of My Experiments with Truth. New Delhi: Indialog Publication Pvt. Ltd., 1940.
Goh, Evelyn. The Struggle for Order Hegemony, Hierarchy abd Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Guha, Ranajit Guha. A rule of Property for Bengal an Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement. Delhi: Orient Longman, 1982.
Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774. London: Routledge, 2012.
Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Hasan, Tariq. The Aligarh Movement and the Making of the Indian Muslim Mind 1857-2002. New Delhi: Rupa Publication, 2006.
Hendrik, Spruyt. The World Imagined: Collective Beliefs and Political Order in the Sinocentric, Islamic and Southeast Asian International Societies. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Ahmed, Sufia. Muslim Community in
208
Bengal (1884-1912) Trans.Syed Mohammad Shahed, Banglar Muslim Samproday. Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 2002.
Hunter, W.W. The Indian Musalmans. London: Trubner and Company, 1876.
Husain, Syed Mahdi. Bahadur Shah Zafar and the War of 1857 in Delhi. Delhi: Aakar Books, 1958.
Ikenberry, John. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Islam, Sirajul. The Permanent Settlement in Bengal, A Study of Its Operation 1790-1819. Dacca: Bangla Academy, 1979.
Jones, Kenneth W. Socio-Religious Reform Movement in British India. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Jones, Kenneth W. The New Cambridge History of India. III.1Volumes. Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Kang, David C. East Asia before the West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Karpat, Kemal H. The Politicization of Islam: Reconstruction Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Keddie, Nikki R. Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din-Afghani A Political Biography. California: University of California Press, 1972.
Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry. Pathway to Pakistan. Lahore: Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961.
Kidwai, Shafey. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Reason, Religion and Nation. UK: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2021.
Lake, David. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009.
Landau, Jacob M. The Politics of Pan-Islamism: Ideology and Organization. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Lee, Ji-Young. China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Malik, Hafeez. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington, D.C: Public Affairs Press, 1963.
209
Mallick, A. R. British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal 1757-1856. Dacca: Bangla Academy, 1977.
Mazumdar, Amvika Charan. Indian National Evolution. Madras: G.A. Natesan & Co., 1917.
Mihir, Ghulam. Tabakat-i-Azad, Lahore, 1959.
Minault, Gail. The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Miyan, Maulana Muhammad. (ed.). Silken Letter Movement Accounts of ‘Silken Handkerchief Letters Conspiracy Case’ From British Records. tran. Muhammadullah Qasmi. New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2012.
Mohsin, K. M. A Bengal Distric in Transition- Murshidabad 1765-1793. Dacca: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1973.
Muir, W. The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall from Original Sources. London: The Religious Tract Society, 1891.
Muthiah, Alagappa (ed.). Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Nair, Diwan Bahadur C. Gopalan. The Moplah Rebellion, 1921. Calcutta: The Norman Printing Bureau, 1923.
Nanda, B.R. Gandhi Pan Islamism, Imperialism, and Nationalism in India. USA: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Niemeijer, A. C. The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924. Martinus Nijhoff, Hague: Brill, 1972.
Numani, Shibli. Safar Nama-i-Misr-o-Rum-o-Sham trans. Muharrem Varol. Türkıye Mısır Suriye Bir Seyahatname. Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2021.
Öke, Mim Kemal. Hitafet Hareketleri. Istanbul: Irfan Yayinlari, 2005.
Omar, Noman. Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947. London: Routledge, 2013.
Orhonlu, Cengiz. Osmanlı Imparatorluğun̓un Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1974.
Özcan, Azmi. Pan-Islamism Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain 1877-1924. Leiden-Newyork-Köln: Brill, 1997.
Özel, Oktay. The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia Amasya 1576-1643. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
210
Padamsee, Alex. Representation of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Page, Burton. Indian Islamic Architecture Forms and Typologies Sites and Monuments. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
Pande, B.N. (ed.). Concise History of the Indian National Congress, 1858-1947. Delhi: Vikas Publication 1900.
Panipati (ed.). Maqalat-e-Sir. XVI.Volumes. (Lahore: 1932)
Park, Seo-Hyun. Sovereignty and Status in East Asian International Relations. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Pernau, Margrit- Hasan, Mushirul. (ed.). Regionalizing Pan-Islamism Documents on the Khilafat Movement. Manohar: New Delhi, 2005.
Phillips, Andrew- Sharman, J. C. International Order in Diversity War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. (ed.). Foundation of Pakistan All India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947. III. Volumes. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1990.
Qadir, Shaikh Abdul. Maqam-E-Khilafat Safar-e-Istanbul ke Haalat. Delhi: Makhzan Press, 1906.
Qureshi, M. Naeem. Pan Islam in British Indian Politics A Study Of The Khilafat Movement 1918-1924. Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 1999.
Rahim, M. A. The History of the University of Dacca. Dhaka: Dhaka University press, 1981.
Rahman, Anisur. Globalization and Islam A Study of South Asian Muslim. Dhaka: Dyu Publication, 2019.
Rashid, Harun or. The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987.
Şahin, Kaya. Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement 1870-1920. UK: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Sen, Satadru. Savagery and Colonialism in the Indian Ocean Power, Pleasure and the Andaman Islands. London: Routledge, 2010.
Sen, Sotten. Britishbirodi Sadhinota Songrame Musulmander Vomika. Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1986.
211
Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shift. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018.
Shirazi, Syed Ismail Hossain. Turosko Vromon. Dacca: al-Eslam, 1913.
Shukla, Ram Lakhan. Britain, India and the Turkish Empire 1853-1882. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973.
Tharoor, Shashi. An Era of Darkness the British Empire in India. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2016.
The Memories of Rt. Hon’ble Syed Ameer Ali. Calcutta: Islamic Culture Centre, 1932.
Uyar, Mesut. - Erickson, Edward J. A Military History of the Ottoman from Osman to Ataturk, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009.
Wight, Martin. Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977.
Yasamee, F.A.K. Ottoman Diplomacy Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888. USA: Gorgias Press, 2011.
Yaycioglu, Ali. Partners of the Empire the Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolution. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.
Yılmaz, Hüseyin. Caliphate Redefined the Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Zarakol, Ayşe (ed.). Hierarchies in World Politics. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Zarakol, Ayşe. Before the West: the Rise and fall of Eastern World Order. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Zhang, Freg. Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Zürn, Michael. A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation. UK: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Book Chapter
Agoston, Gabor. “Empires and warfare in east-central Europe, 1550-1750: the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation”. European Warfare 1350-1750. auth. Frank Tallet-D.J.B.Trim. 110-134. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Alagappa, Muthiah. “Institutional Framework: Recommendation for Change”. The 2nd ASEAN Reader. ed. Sharon Siddique -Sree Kumar. 22-27. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
212
Bierman, Irene A. “The Ottomanization of Crete”. The Ottoman City and Its Parts Urban Structure and Social Order. ed. Irene A. Bierman et al. 53-75. New Rodelle-New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1991.
Dixit, Prabha. “Political Objective of the Khilafat Movement in India”. Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India. auth. Mushirul Hasan. 43-65. New Delhi: Monohar, 1981.
Farooqui, Amar. “Sanitizing Indigenous Memory 1857 and Mughal Exile”. The Great Rebellion of 1857 in India Exploring Transgressions Contests and Diversities. auth. Biswamoy Pali. 146-160. UK: Routledge, 2010.
Hasan, Mushirul “Religious and Politics in India: The Ulama and the Khilfat Movement”, Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, auth. Mushirul Hasan. New Delhi: Manohar, 1981.
Husain, Iqbal. “The Diplomatic Visison of Tipu Sultan Briefs for Embassies to Turkey and France 1758-86”. State and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan Documents and Essays. auth. Irfan Habid. 111-119. Delhi: Tulika Book, 2001.
Imam, Hasan. “Pan-Islamism and Khilafat Movement: Understanding Muslim Minds in Colonial Perspectives”. Islam in India History, Politics and Society. auth. Nasir Raza Khan. 243-258. London: Routledge, 2023.
Inalcik, Halil. “Islamic Caliphate, Turkey and Muslims in India”. Dr. I.H. Qureshi Memorial Lecture Shariah, Ummah and Khilafah. auth. Yusuf Abbas Hashmi. 14-34. Karachi: University of Karachi, 2008.
Krolikowaka, Natalia. “Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations Sixteenth-Eighteenth Century”. The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. ed. Gabon Karman-Lovro Kunce Vic. 43-65. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013.
Özcan, Azmi. “Attempts to use the Ottoman Caliphate as the legitimator of British rule in India”. Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia. auth. Anthony Reid-Michael Gilsenan. 71-80. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
Phillips, Andrew. “Making Empires: Hierarchy, Conquest and Customization” Hierarchies in World Politics. auth. Ayşe Zarakol. 43-65. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Encyclopedia
Özaydın, Zuhal. “Osmanlı Hilal i Ahmer Cemiyetinin Kuruluşu ve Çalışmaları”. Türkler Ansiklopedisi ed. Celal Güzel. Vol. 13. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub., 2002.
Article
213
Agoston, Gabor. “Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defence, Military Change and Shifts in Power”. Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 22/1 (1998), 126-141.
Ahmad Mujeeb -Marwat, Safi Ullah Khan. “Politics through the Pulpit: The Ulama and the Cawnpore, Shahid Ganj and Manzil Gah Mosque Incidents”. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XLII/1 (2021), 75-100.
Ahmad, Ishtiaq -Butt, Mahmud-ul-Hasan. “From Pan-Islamism to Muslim Nationalism: Khilafat Movement and the Struggle for Pakistan”. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XXXIII/2 (2012), 1-22.
Ahmed, Faiz. “Meddling with Medals, Defending the Dead: Late Ottoman Soft Power from South Asia to North America”. The International History Review 43/5 (2021), 1041-1059.
Akena, Francis Adyanga. “Critical Analysis of the Production of Western Knowledge and Its Implications for Indigenous Knowledge and Decolonization”. Journal of Black Studies 43/6 (2012), 599-619.
Akhtar, Shamim. “Aligrah and Muslim Politics”. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 78 (2017), 762-769.
Akturk, Sener. “Persistance of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood”. Middle Eastern Studies 45/6 (2009), 893-909.
Ali, Amir. ‘Evolution of Public Sprehein India’. Economic and Political Weekly (2001), 2419-2425.
Ali, Shamsaed. “The Ottoman Caliphate and British Imperialism in India”. Proceeding of the Indian History Congress, 54 (1993), 739-747.
Ali, Shamshed. “Turko-Italian War and Its Impact on Indian Politics”. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 53 (1992-93), 571-579.
Alloul, Houssine -Martykanova, Darina. “Introduction: Charting New Ground in the Study of Ottoman Foreign Relations”. The International History Review 43/5 (2021), 1018-1040.
Anjum, Tanvir. “The Emergence of Muslim Rule in India: Some Historical Disconnects and Missing Links”. Islamic Studies 46/2 (2007), 217-240.
Ansari, K.H. “Pan-Islam and the making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialist”. Modern Asian Studies 20/3 (1986), 509-537.
Asher, Catherine B. “Sub-Imperial Palaces: Power and Authority in Mughal India”. Ars Orientalis 23 (1993), 281-302.
Atçil, Zahit. “Warfare as a tool of Diplomacy: Background of the First Ottoman-Safavid Treaty in 1555”. Turkish Historical Review 10, (2019), 3-24.
214
Aydın, Camil. “Imperial Paradox: A Caliphate for Subaltern Muslims”. ReOrient 1/2 (2016), 171-191.
Aydın, Cemil. “Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianiam and the Revolt against the West”. Journal of Modern European History 4/2 (2006), 204-223.
Aydın, Cemil. “The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West”. Ethics and International Affairs 18/3 (2004), 89-96.
Ayoob, Mohammed. “The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in Historical Perspective”, India Review 19/4 (2020), 414-425.
Azad, Abul Kalam. “Masla-i-Khilafat wa Jazirat al Arab”. Al Balagh, (1920), 11-28.
Balcı Ali- Yolcu, Furkan Halit. “The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from the US-Led Order?”. Foreign Policy Analysis 19/1 (2023) orac026.
Balcı, Ali et al. “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: the Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War”. War in History 27/4 (2020), 643-669.
Balcı, Ali et al. “When Doves Feed Hawks: Ottoman War Decision and European Powers Towards the Crimean War”. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 47/2 (2022), 67-83.
Balcı, Ali -Kardaş, Tuncay. “The Ottoman International System: Power Projection, Interconnectedness, and the Autonomy of Frontier Politics”. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 51/ 3 (2023), 1-26.
Balcı, Ali. “Algeria in declining ottoman hierarchy: Why Algiers remained loyal to the falling patron”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35/ 3 (2020), 375-393.
Balcı, Ali. “Bringing the Ottoman Order Back into International Relations: A Distinct International Order or Part of an Islamic International Society?”. International Studies Review 23 (2021), 2090-2107.
Balcı, Ali. “Writing the World into Counter-Hegemony: Identity, Power and ‘Foreign Policy’ in Ethnic Movements”. International Relations 31/ 4 (2017), 466-483.
Barkey, Karen. “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial model”. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 19/1-2 (2005), 5-19.
Bekar, Cumhur. “The Rise of the Köprülü Household: the Transformation of Patronage in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeen Century”. Turkish Historical Review 11/ 2-3 (2021), 229-256.
Belmekki, Belkacem. “Rationale for the Indian Muslims’ Philosophy of Loyalism to British Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century”. Atenea XXVII/1 (2007), 41-52.
215
Bhargav, Vanya Vaidehi. “A Hindu Champion of Pan-Islam: Lajpat Rai and the Khilafat Movement”. The Journal of Asian Studies 81 (2022), 689-705.
Bhattacharjee, Dharitri. “Provincial Autonomy, Decolonization, War and Nationalism: Fazlul Haq’s Chief Ministerial Tenure, 1937-1943”. South Asian History and Culture 9/2 (2018), 159-180.
Findley, Carter Vaughn. “Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 28/1 (1986), 81-106.
Bhattacharya, Subhas. “The Indigo Revolt of Bengal”. Social Scientist, 5/12 (July 1977), 13-23.
Çağman, Filiz. -Tanindi, Zeren. “Remarks on Some Manuscripts from the Topkapi Palace Treasury in the Context of Ottoman-Safavid Relations”. Muqarnas 13 (1996), 132-148.
Çakılcı, Diren. “Hindistanda Osmanlılar Bombay Osmanlı Şehbenderliği”. Türkiyat Mecmuası 25 (2015), 81-106.
Citrin J. et al. “American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change”. Journal of Politics 52 (1990), 1124-1154.
Copland, Ian. “Crucibles of Hindutva? V.D. Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Indian Princely States”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 25/3 (2002), 211-234.
Devlen, Balkan et al. “The English School, International Relations, and Progress”. International Studies Review 7/2 (2005), 171-197.
Dhanagare, D. N. “Agrarian Conflict, Religion and Politics: The Moplah Rebellions in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, Past and Present 74 (1977), 112-141.
Endelman, Jonathan. “In the Shadow of Empire: States in an Ottoman System”. Social Science History 42/4 (2018), 811-834.
Eustis II, F.A. - Zaidi, Z. H. “King, Viceroy and Cabinet: The Modification of the Partition of Bengal, 1911”. History, 49/1 (1964), 171-184.
Farooqui, Amar. “Divide and Rule? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Centruy Colonial India”. Social Scientist 43/3-4 (2015), 49-59.
Gardner, Nikolas. “Sepoy and the Siege of Kut-al-Amara, December 1915- April 1916”. War in History 11/3 (2004), 307-326.
Geaves, Ron. “The Symbolic Construction of the Walls of Deoband”. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relation 23/3 (2012), 315-328.
216
Görgün, Hatice. ‘Balkan Savaşları Döneminde Hindistan Müslümanlarının Faaliyetleri’. Şarkiyat Mecmuası, 41 (2022), 181-196.
Habib, Irfan. “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre”. Social Scientist 47/5-6 (2019), 3-8.
Hasan, Mushirul. “Indian Muslims since Independence: In Search of Integration and Identity”, Third World Quarterly 10/2 (1988), 818-842.
Hasan, Mushirul. “Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-Colonial Predicament”. India International Centre Quarterly 22/1 (1995), 100-122.
Hathway, Jane. “Rewriting Eighteenth Century Ottoman History”, Mediterranean Historical Review 19/1(2004), 29-53.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. “The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications”. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16/3 (2007), 209-228.
Homolar, Alexandra- Turner, Oliver. “Narrative Alliances: The Discourse Foundations of International Order”. International Affairs, 100/1 (2024), 203-220.
Hopkins, Nick -Hopkins, Vered Kahani. “Identity Construction and British Muslims’ Political Activity: Beyond Rational Actor Theory”. British Journal of Social Psychology 43 (2004), 339-356.
Hossain, Akhand Akhtar. “Hindu-Muslim Separateness in Bengal: A Review of Some Historical Issues from a Contemporary Bangladesh Muslim Standpoint”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies n.s. XXXI/2 (2008), 364-382.
Huddy, Leonie. “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory”. Political Psychology 22/1(2001), 127-156.
Hurley, Siobhan Lambert. “Princes, Paramountcy and the Politics of Muslim Identity: The Begam of Bhopal on the Indian National Stage, 1901-1926”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 26/2 (2003), 165-191.
Husain, Iqbal. “Change within the Islamic Tradition of Learning: Firangi Mahaland the Dars-i- Nizami”. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 63 (2002), 439-446.
Ikenberry, John. “Between the Cagle and the Dragon: America, China and Middle State Strategies in East Asia”. Political Science Quarterly 131/ 1 (2016), 9-43.
Inamdar, N. R. “Tilak and the Indian National Congress”. The Indian Journal of Political Science 46/ 4 (1985), 387-400.
Islam, Arshad. “Indian Muslim’s Support for Ottoman Pan-Islamism: The Case of Shibli Numani”. Intellectual Discourses. 27/1 (2019), 197- 220.
217
Islam, Arshad. “The Backlash in Delhi: British Treatment of the Mughal Royal Family following the Indian ‘’Sepoy Mutiny’’ of 1857”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31/2 (2011), 197-215.
İzgi, Mahmut Cihat - Ekin, Ümit “Doctor Indian Nationalist and Humanitarian: Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880-1936)”. Journal of Medical Biography (2023), 1-9.
Johnson, Gordon. “Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908”. Modern Asian Studies 7/3 (1973), 533-588.
Jones, Reece. “The False Premise of Partition”. Space and Polity 18/3 (2014), 285-300.
Kadı, İsmail Hakkı. “An Old Ally Revisited: Diplomatic Interactions Between the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan of Ache in the Face of Dutch Colonial Expansion”. The International History review 43/5 (2021) 1080-1097.
Kalpagam, U. “Colonial Governmentality and the Public Sphere in India”. Journal of Historical Sociology 14/4 (2001), 418-440.
Kang, David C. “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations”. International Security 28/3 (Winter 2003-2004) 165-180.
Kang, David C. et al. “War, rebellion, and intervention under hierarchy: Vietnam-China relation, 1365 to 1841”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 63/4 (2018), 896-922.
Keddie, Nikki R. “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II”. Middle Eastern Studies 3/1 (1966), 46-67.
Keene, Edward. “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century”. International Organization 61/2 (2007), 311-339.
Kelly, Saul. “Crazy in the Extream? The Silk Letters Conspiracy”. Middle Eastern Studies 49/2 (2013), 162-178.
Kirimli, Hakan. “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War”, Middle Eastern Studies 44/5 (2008), 751-773.
Khan, Aliyah. “All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference and the Foundation of the All-India Muslim League”. Journal of Pakistan Historical Society 55/1-2 (2007), 65-83.
Khan, Muin-Ud-Din Ahmad. “Faraidi Movement”. Islamic Studies 9/2 (1970), 123-147.
Khan, Saad Omar. “The ‘Caliphate Question’ British Views and Policy toward Pan-Islamic Politics and the End of the Ottoman Khilafat”. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24 (2007), 1-25.
218
Khan, Syed Ahmad. “Sultan -e- Rum aur Hindustan ke Mussalman”, Maqulat 13 (1888), 428.
Krishna, Gopal. “The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923”. The Journal of Asian Studies 25/ 3 (1966), 413-430.
Kumar, Harish. “The Marle-Minto Reforms Established the Moral and Legal Bases for the Establishment of Imperialism in Indian Subcontinent: An Overview”. International Journal of History, 3/1 (2021), 21-23.
Kupchan, Charles A. “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana”. Security Studies 23/2 (2014), 219-57.
Lavan, Spencer. “The Kanpur Mosque Incident of 1913: The North Indian Muslim Press and Its Reaction to Community Crisis”. Journal of the American Academy Religion 42/2, (June-1974), 263-279.
Lee, Ji-Young. “Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia”. Security Studies 25/2 (2016), 320-352.
Lemke, Tobias et al. “Forum: doing historical international relation”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 36/ 1 (2022), 3-34.
Liebl, Vernie. “The Caliphate”. Middle Eastern Studies 45/3 (2009), 373-391.
Lilja, Mona. “The definition of Resistance”. Journal of Political Power 15/2 (2022), 202-220.
Makdisi, Ussama. “Ottoman Orientalism”. The American Historical Review 107/3 (2002), 768-96.
Malik, Nadeem Shafiq. “Formation of the All India Muslim League and its Response to Some Foreign Issues 1906-1911”. Journal of Political Studies 19/2 (2012), 169-186.
Mallik, Senjuti. “The British East India Company and the Great Bengal Famine of 1770: Towards a corporate Colonial Biopolitics”. Geographical Review (2024), 1-25.
Mandala, Vijaya Ramadas. “Colonialism, Education, and the Spatial Dimension of Play-the Creation of Middle Class Space at Schools and Colleges in Modern India 1790-1910”. The Historian 80/1 (2018), 34-85.
Mathew, Johan. ‘Spectres of Pan-Islam: Methodological Nationalism and British Imperial Policy after the First World War’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45/6 (2017), 942-968.
Meleady, Conor. “Negotiating the caliphate: British responses to pan-Islamic appeals, 1914-1924”. Middle Eastern Studies 52/2 (2016), 182-197.
219
Metcalf, Barbara. “Islam and Power in Colonial India: The Making and Unmaking of a Muslim Princess”. The American History Review 116/1 (2011), 1-30.
Minault, Gail. - Lelyveld, David. “The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920”. Modern Asian Studies 8/2 (1974), 145-189.
Mishra, Atul. “Locusts vs. the gangatic octopus: the Hindutva international and “Akhand Bharat’’ in V.D. Savarkar’s history of India”. India Review 21/ 4-5 (2022), 512-545.
Nomikos, William G. et al. “Unintended Consequences: Reconsidering the Effects of UN Peacekeeping on State-Sponsored Violence”. International Peacekeeping 29/4 (2022), 551-623.
O’Sullivan, Michael. “Pan-Islamic Bonds and Interest: Ottoman bonds, Red Crescent Remittances and the Limits of Indian Muslim Capitals, 1877-1924”. The Indian Economic and Social History Review 55/2 (2018), 183-220.
Oruc, Cihan. “Şah Cihan Döneminde Babürlü Osmanlı Diplomatik İlişkileri”. VAKANÜVİS Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 2/ 2 (2017), 191-215.
Owen, Hugh F. “Negotiating the Lucknow Pact”. The Journal of Asian Studies, 31/3(1972), 561-587.
Özaydin, Zuhal. “The Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society’s Aid to the Ottoman State During the Balkan War in 1912”. Journal of the International Society for the History of Islamic Medicine, 2/4 (2003), 12-18.
Pardesi, Manjeet S. “Mughal Hegemony and the Emergence of South Asia as a “Region” for Regional Order-building”. European Journal of International Relations 25/1 (2019) 276-301.
Patel, Ismail Adam. “Islamophobia in India: The Orientalist Reformation of Tipu Sultan-The Tiger of Mysore”. Islamophobia Studies Journal 7/1, (2022), 82-95.
Prasad, Yuvraj Deva. “Indian Muslims and the Arab Revolt”. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 34/2 (1973), 32-37.
Qureshi, M. Naeem. “The Indian Khilafat Movement (1918-1924)”. Journal of Asian History 12/2 (1978), 152-168.
Qureshi, M. Naeem. “The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920”. Modern Asian Studies 13/ 1 (1979), 41-59.
Rahim, Aminur. “The Political Economy of English Education in Muslim Bengal: 1871-1912”. Comparative Education Review 36/3 (1992), 309-317.
Rahim, M.A. “Syed Ameer Ali and Muslim Politics and Renaissance”. Islamic Studies 7/2 (1968), 33-112.
220
Rahman, Anisur. “Banglar Musulmander Rajnoitik Bikash 1905-1911”. Itihas Academy Probondhomala 12/1 (2012), 60-67.
Reid, Anthony. ‘Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia’. Journal of Asian Studies xxvi (1976), 267-283.
Roy, Asim. “Impact of Islamic Revival and Reform in Colonial Bengal and Bengali Muslim Identity: A Revisit”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 22/ s1 (1999), 39-77.
Roy, Tirthankar. “Indigo and Law in Colonial India”. The Economic History Review 64/S1 (2011), 13-23.
Saika, Yasmin. “Uncolonizable: Freedom in the Muslim mind in colonial British India”. South Asian History and Culture 7/2 (2016), 117-134.
Sariyanmis, Marinos. “Ruler and State, State and Society in Ottoman Political Thought”. Turkish Historical Review 4 (2013), 92-126.
Siddiqi, Mazheruddin. “Islamic Modernism”. Islamic Studies 12/3(1973), 179-192.
Sikand, Yoginder. “The Indian Madrassahs and the agenda of Rerorm”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 25/2 (2005), 219-248.
Stewart, Nile. “Divide and Rule: British Policy in Indian History”. Science and Society 15/1 (1951), 49-57.
Tareen, Sherail. “Contesting Friendship in Colonial Muslim India”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38/3 (2015), 419-434.
Topal, Omer Faruk. “Ottoman Internationalism”. The International History Review 45/ 3 (2023), 445-461.
Tejani, Shabnum. “Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and its aftermath, 1919-1927”. South Asia Research 27/3 (2007), 249-269.
Valentine, S.R. “Prophecy after the Prophet, albeit Lesser Prophets? The Ahmadiyya Jamaát in Pakistan”. Cont Islam, 8(2014), 99-113.
Vimalassery, Manu. “The Wealth of the Natives: Towards a Critique of Settler Colonial Political Economy”. Settler Colonial Studies 3/3-4 (2013), 295-310.
Wasti, Syed Tanvir. ‘Halil Halid: Anti-Imperialist Muslim Intellectual’. Middle Eastern Studies 29/ 3 (1993), 559-579.
Wasti, Syed Tanvir. “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the Turks”. Middle Eastern Studies 46/4 (2010), 529-542.
221
Wasti, Syed Tanvir. “The Indian Red Crescent Mission to the Balkan Wars”. Middle Eastern Studies 53/ 3 (2009), 393-406.
Wasti, Syed Tanvir. “The Political Aspiration of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus”. Middle Eastern Studies 42/5 (2006), 709-722.
Wasti, Syed Tanvir. “Two Muslim Travelogues: to and form Istanbul”. Middle Eastern Studies 27/3 (1991), 457-476.
Watson, Adam- Bull, Hedley. “States System and International Societies”. Review of International Studies 13/2 (1987) 147-153.
Watson, Adam. “System of States”. Review of International Studies 16/2 (1990), 99-109.
Wigen, Einar. “Ottoman Concept of Empire”. Contribution to the History of Concepts 8/1 (2013), 44-66.
Willis, John. “Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad”. The International History Review 32/ 4 (2010), 711-732.
Zaman, Faridah. “Beyond Nostalgia: Time and Place in Indian Muslim Politics”. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 27/ 4 (2017), 627-647.
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. “Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan”. Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2 (1999), 294-323.
Zens, Robert. “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”. History Studies 3/3 (2011), 433-447.
Fatwa
Fatawa-i-Rashidiyya. I volumes. 90-91.
Projects
Balcı, Ali. “When Hierarchy Shattered: Turkey’s Post-2013 Crisis with the US-led Order”. 118K413. TÜBİTAK: August 2019.
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation
Semanti Ghosh, Nationalism and the Problem of ‘difference’ Bengal, 1905-1947. USA: Tufts University, Department of History, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1999.
Zaidi, Syed Zawwar Husain. The Partition of Bengal and Its Annulment-a Survey of the Schemes of Territorial Redistribution of Bengal (1902-1911). London: University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1964.
222
Zobairi, Riazuddin H. The Educational and Social Ideas of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. Illinois: Southern Illinois University, Department of Educational Administration and Foundations, Graduate School, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1971.
Unpublished M Phil Dissertation
Ahmad, Aijaz. Aligarh and Non-Cooperation Movement, 1919-1922. Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, Department of History, M Phill Thesis, 1994.
Buddhani, Gulzar N. The Role and Contribution of the Aligrah Muslim University in Modern Indian Islam (1877-1947. Manchester: The Victoria University of Manchester. M Phil Thesis, May 1987.
Imam, Hassan. Mazharul Haq and His Role in the Freedom Struggle. Aligrah: Aligarh Muslim University, Centre of Advance Study, Department of History, M Phil Thesis, 1989.
223
CURRICULUM VITAE
Full Name: Md Anisur RAHMAN
Education Information
Undergraduate
University
University of Dhaka
Faculty
Faculty of Arts
Department
Islamic History and Culture
Master’s Degree
University
University of Dhaka
Faculty
Faculty of Arts
Department
Islamic History and Culture
Program
M A in Modern History
M Phil Degree
University
University of Dhaka
Faculty
Faculty of Arts
Thesis Title
The Role of Islam in Globalization: A Case Study of South Asia
Articles and Papers
1. Rahamn, Md Anisur- Rahaman, Md Shafiqur. “Zohra Begum Kazi: Pioneering Bengali female doctor and nationalist representation”. Journal of Medical Bíography 0/0 (2024) 1-10. doi:10.1177/09677720231223508
2. Rahamn, Md Anisur. “Reflections of Ottoman Studies: A Contextual Analysis of University Education in Bangladesh”. Kadim 2 (2021) 91-111.