032

 THE ROLE OF THE YOUNG OTTOMANS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF

MENTALITY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE THESIS SUMBITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and

presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also

declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and

referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE YOUNG OTTOMANS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF

MENTALITY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

May 2007, 85 pages

The main topic of this study is determining the role of the Young Ottomans in

mentality transformation in the Ottoman Empire from the traditional one to a

modern one. Their proposals aim to change three patterns of the Ottoman state and

society. The relation between state and the individual is the first issue. They tried to

create an Ottoman citizenry, enhanced with freedom and political rights, from a

reaya. In the second step they imagined a modern society. Their proposals, which

imply a secular system, aim to secure the people from the yoke of the tradition and

some religious bonds. Nationalism is also important for the abolition of the

traditional stratification of the Ottoman society. As a last point, the individual,

himself, is tried to be changed into an active, enthusiastic, this-worldly, and rational

being. However what is interesting is that while their main concern had been the

survival of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic order, their proposals had the

potential to undermine these very institutions. This study will try to find the traces

of these contradictions and the beginning of a mental transformation.

Keywords: Mentality, Ottoman Ideal, Mental Transformation, Freedom.

v

ÖZ

OSMANLI MPARATORLUGU’NDAK ZHNYET DEGSMNDE GENÇ

OSMANLILAR’IN OYNADIGI ROL

Ferhat Kaplan

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kürsad Ertugrul

Mayıs 2006, 85 Sayfa

Bu çalısmanın ana baslıgı Osmanlı mparatorlugu’ndaki geleneksel zihniyetin

modern zihniyete dönüsümünde Genç Osmanlılar hareketinin oynadıgı rolü tespit

etmektir. Bu hareketin önerilerinin amacı Osmanlı’daki üç temel ögeyi degistirmek

üzerine kurulmustur. Devlet ile birey arasındaki iliski ilk konudur. Bunlar reayadan

hürriyet mevhumu ve siyasi haklarla güçlendirilmis bir birey yaratmaya

çalısmıslardır. kinci asamada modern bir toplum hayali kurmuslardır. Laikligi ima

eden önerilerinin amacı toplumu önünü tıkayan geleneksel ve bir takım dini

baglardan kurtarmayı hedeflemistir. Milliyetçilik vurguları ise Osmanlı geleneksel

toplum yapılanmasının sonunu hazırlaması açısından önemlidir. Son bir nokta

olarak ise aktif, bu dünya konusunda istekli ve aklıyla hareket eden bir birey

yaratma konusundaki çabaları sayılabilir. Ancak ilginç olan su ki temel kaygılarının

Osmanlı devletini ve slami düzeni korumak ve yasatmak olmasına ragmen

getirdikleri önerilerin tam da bu kurumların altını oyuyor olmasıdır. Bu çalısma iste

bu çeliskileri ve bir zihniyet dönüsümünün baslangıcının izlerini bulmaya

çalısacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Zihniyet, Osmanlı deali, Zihniyet Dönüsümü, Hürriyet.

vi

To family but especially my brother and his family.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor for his patience and support. I am also grateful

to the instructors whose courses offered me wide and different perspectives during

my Master program.

I would like to express my special thanks to the members of examining committee

Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren and Assist. Prof Dr. Necmi Erdogan because of their

patience and care. Their critics helped me too much to complete the study.

I have to mention both financial and moral support of my brother lhan Kaplan, his

wife Aslı Kaplan and my nephew Zeynep Kaplan. Also the support of my family is

unforgettable during my education. I thank them all for helping me realize a dream.

I am sure I forget many to mention here. This study could not be shaped without the

existence of all the people in my life.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM…………………………………………………………………..iii

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………..iv

ÖZ………………………………………………………………………………..v

DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………..vi

ACKOWLEDGEMENT………………………………………………………...vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………..vii

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………..1

CHAPTER

1.ON METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………..14

2.THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT………………………………………………24

3.THE OTTOMAN IDEAL……………………………………………………..32

4.THE MAN AND THE STATE………………………………………………..44

5.THE SOCIETY (OR THE COMMUNITY)…………………………………..57

5.1.Secularism…………………………………………………………………58

5.2.Nationalism………………………………………………………………...62

6.THE MENTALITY OF THE ORDINARY MAN……………………….……68

CONCLUSSION……………………………………………………………..…..78

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………..….82

1

INTRODUCTION

There have been different theories on the causes of the “decline” and demise

of the Ottoman Empire1; some argue that the lives of the states or civilizations

resemble the life of human, so the civilizations have had a common and inevitable

fate that they disappear at the end of their natural lives. In this respect the Ottoman

Empire, as a civilization with a long life, encountered its inevitable fate and

demised; the First World War only accelerated this process. This theory is derived

from the study of Ibn Khaldun, the Mukkadimma.

According to another theory, the Empire could not make necessary moves

and transformations in the face of technological and scientific developments of the

European states because of the clumsiness of the administrators and the

conservatism of the ulama. As a result, the effectiveness and power of the Ottoman

Empire declined against the European powers and it became a semi-colonial country

at the disposal of Western capitalism. According to the proponents of this theory, the

Empire could have survived and might have been a part of the Western capitalism if

it only had made necessary reforms at the right time.

It is certain that both theories have brought important contributions for the

understanding of the “decline” and demise of the Ottoman Empire, but they also

ignore some important points: while first one depends highly on fate, the second one

ignores the social stratification of the Ottoman Empire. It requires the Empire to

make quick adaptations to the changing conditions in order to survive. Besides, it

does not pay enough attention to the mentality of the Ottoman people for the success

of such an adaptation.

However it can be argued that the main reason behind the disappearance of

the Ottoman Empire from the political arena is the mentality imposed by both

1 We should state at the beginning that, we do not think it is a demise of decline but decay. As will be

expressed, the main system of the Empire worked till its disappearance, however the effectiveness of

this system could not resist against the changing conditions.

2

Islamic doctrines and traditional order on the state, society and the ordinary people.

This mentality did not stimulate the “elements”2 of the Empire to act in the same

way as the elements of European capitalist states.

First of all, this mentality did not let the state apply mercantilist policies

because the main duty of the administrators was the satisfaction of the basic needs of

their subjects. Also the state could not pull away the subjects from their lands by

force to create cheap labor for a probable capitalist class. Secondly, this mentality

did not let the society challenge the state to obtain certain rights. Lastly, it did not let

ordinary man concentrate on worldly affairs.

When the elements of the Western countries were considered, a different

picture would be seen. In those countries the state could use their subjects to satisfy

the needs of the bourgeoisie. They also had colonial lands for the exchange of

commodities and the supply of labor. Their societies were also dynamic and had the

power to get political rights from the state. The individualism was also dominant;

there have been furious, selfish and eager beings living for themselves in that

particular geography.

The comparison of these two different mentalities has been one of the main

determinants of the analysis and understanding of the Ottoman and Turkish

modernization. This is also true for this study, but we will try to avoid two main

tendencies while approaching the issue. First one is the glorification and

mystification of this mentality like both some Turkish nationalists and Islamists do.

Such a tendency naturally bears its antithesis, because, first of all, the Ottoman

Empire was not a state of Islam as Islamists praised, but an Islamic state. This means

that it used Islam to legalize and legitimize its existence. The state has always been

prior to religion. Second, the Ottoman Empire never let the dominance of one ethnic

group or Millet in the society. To this effect, it even tried to keep the Turks away

from politics. In addition to these the mentality of the Ottoman Empire and society

2 Subjects of the Empire, the rulers and society (millets, communities, traditional orgnizations…etc.)

3

do not represent any ideal type which should be applied today. It has many

deficiencies and contradictions.

The other tendency, which should be avoided, accepts the mentality of the

Empire as essentially inferior. It is a determinist and positivist approach to the

historical facts.3 In this tendency, it is supposed that the mentality of the Empire was

inferior compared to European liberalism and capitalism. However, if it were, the

Empire could not stand against the assaults of the European powers. Besides, this

tendency bears a belief that accepts the European culture and mentality as superior

and ideal. However, such a tendency means the denial of the massacres and disasters

caused by the European states all around the world.

Anyway, in this study one of the issues focused on will be the mentality

dominant in the Ottoman Empire. The ideal mentality imposed by the fundamental

sources (Canonic and traditional) will be important for this study. It is well known

that the realities had been different from theories, just as the abundance of the texts,

written for advice to both administrators and ordinary man, are the proofs of the

deviations from the ideal. Yet, the need for modernization of the Ottoman Empire

started when the deviations could not be contained by the traditional and religious

sources.

The studies about the modernization of the Ottoman Empire fall into two

main streams. In the first group the reform attempts of the Ottoman state are focused

and the modernization of the Empire is attempted to be understood in terms of the

effects of these reforms. The main tendency of these studies is to start the

modernization of the Empire by the reform attempts of Selim III. Enver Ziya Karal

(1995) follows the traces of the reforms and tries to show the repercussions of these

3 This approach was dominant during the early period of Turkish Republic.According to the belief of

the intellectuals and administrators of this period, Turkish nation could prosper if correct methods,

which were not adapted by the Ottoman Empire at the right time, are applied. The criticism of the

Ottoman Empire had been the main determinant of their methodology. The Empire collapsed because

it could not adopt the mentality of the West. There have always been the represantatives of this

philosophy until present day. The studies of Taner Timur (1998) can be given as examples of this

tendency.

4

reforms in Ottoman state and in its international relations. However the social

dimension of these reforms is omitted by his studies: the effects of the reforms on

the lives of the Ottoman people are ignored by him. Berkes (1964) also follows such

a methodology. But his focus is wider than Karal. Berkes inspects the changes in the

institutions of the Empire with the reforms promulgated by the state. He also tries to

reveal the effects of the reforms on the society of the Empire through his focus on

the institutional changes. However he does not pay enough attention to the effects of

the modernization on micro lives. He is concerned with wider groups and

institutions.

The proponents of the second group claim that the research on modernization

phenomenon needs wider perspective. It can be neither constrained within the period

starting with the reform attempt of Selim III, nor understood only focusing on

institutional changes. The Empire always adopted innovations of the Europe within

its philosophy and mentality (Grant 2006). The scope of the effects of modernization

was also wider than what the first group focused (Ortaylı 1995). Individuals felt the

changing conditions in their micro life. This study will also try to use this wider

perspective.

The nineteenth century had been the period in which the Ottoman Empire

tried to change its character; the society and subjects experienced on dilemma

between the traditional and religious order and the success and influence of the

West. The traditional sources started to be ineffective against the challenge of the

European penetration, and a new voice represented by a certain group of intellectual

and bureaucratic cadre was attempted to respond to the social and political problems.

The rapid and multiple losses of lands in Europe and military failures caused

Ottomans drop the belief in their superiority and forced them to observe and

understand their European counterparts. The Empire started to see her survival in

alliance with one or more European states. This led to the increasing influence of

foreign office bureaucrats. These bureaucrats had contacts with Europe thanks to

5

either being an official in the Translation Bureau or being appointed to the

embassies. They were influenced by the European civilization and prosperity of

these states. They aspired their state to take part in modern civilization.

Though they could not give up some basic notions of the Ottoman culture,

they were different from the classic Ottoman bureaucrat and intelligentsia. What

they tried to do was the synthesis of the concepts and mentalities of two cultures.

Namely, they tried to remain Ottoman, but, at the same time, become modern and

prosper as a European. We can see the members of this class while offering or

applying reforms in the Ottoman state administration or while writing books and

articles in newspapers expressing their proposals about the transformation of state

and society.

As is just said, this new type of intelligentsia tried to harmonize the concepts

of the European Enlightenment with the concepts of the Ottoman tradition and

Islam. However while bringing the European traditions they could not understand

that they undermined the very bases of the institutions on which they themselves and

the Ottoman culture stand. The aspects of the European culture contained the

abandonment of the basic institutions and mentality of the Ottoman society and

state.

Of course it was impossible for them to realize the probable consequences of

their ideal in that time, but we may now see this transformation in retrospect. They

tried to bring a different look to time, property, individual, nature, world…etc., and

make the Ottoman Empire a member of the civilized world.

The members of this class of intelligentsia either held official posts or tried

to express their views outside the governmental circle. In this study a group of

intelligentsia, which can be considered in both categories4, will be the main actors to

4 The Young Ottomans were officials in origin. Their experience of publishing, for some time, went

hand in hand with their official posts. The period, in which they were out of administrative circle,

was their most productive times for the name of political agitation.

6

be focused on. They are called the Young Ottomans in the history of Turkish

modernization. We will try to evaluate their role in the transformation of the

Ottoman traditional mentality towards a modernist one.

There are, of course, some certain reasons why we choose the Young

Ottomans. First of all, they can be considered as the first modern systematic

opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire. The Empire did ever experience

before such a systematic opposition movement because the head of the state had

been the Sultan. The Sultanate was adorned with traditional and religious sublimity.

The Sultan was the shadow of God on earth, so the objection towards him meant the

opposition against the religion and örf5. The Sultan could immediately execute any

opposition attempt. Beside this, the administration of the state could be handled by

the kul6 of the Sultan; there were no vacuum left for others to express their views.

Because both financial and intellectual sources concentrated at the center, no one or

no group managed to challenge the center. In this respect, the members of the Young

Ottoman movement did not face with, at least, one of these obstacles, because with

the Tanzimat and the increasing influence of bureaucracy, the administration of the

state was transferred from the Palace to the Sublime Porte; that’s the control of the

administration was passed to the bureaucrats. Thanks to this, the Young Ottomans

could target the administration by excluding the Sultan from their opposition.

Second, the members of this movement left behind important material for the

researchers, so that one can understand their position, ideology and mood from their

writings. Today we have articles poems, novels, etc. from which we can drive

important information about them. Because they used their literary skills as an

instrument to express their views and ideologies, the aspects of their standings can

still be seen in their works. However two points should be clarified: First they did

not concentrate on one field; they did not have thorough knowledge in specific

fields; instead they dealt with every problem of the Empire. So they approached the

5 The traditions driven from Turkish state and society heritage.

6 The subjects of the Sultan. They were also called reaya (the flock)

7

science and philosophy pragmatically and learnt them superficially. Namely, they

had an encyclopedic knowledge. They could not offer thorough information about

economy, sociology, philosophy, politics, etc. and second, because they used mainly

newspapers to inform the public, there had been controversies in their writings. The

daily events sometimes affected their perspective. Nevertheless, thanks to their

effort to inform the public, they left behind voluminous textual material.

The last reason is also the main reason in our choice. As we have already

mentioned above, they were also the members of the new type of intelligentsia who

lived between the old and the new. They were neither as conservative as the

intelligentsia of the earlier periods nor as radical as the following generations, but

they were crucial intermediaries for the transfer of new ideas. They were the

initiators of the adaptation of the concepts of European philosophical heritage in the

Ottoman soil. The “Young Turks” of the latter period became more radical and

braver thanks to the license provided by the Young Ottomans (especially Namık

Kemal). They were the individuals who lived the duality of the Tanzimat in their

own existence and reflected this duality with their ideologies; the duality which

would end in favor of the new. The Young Ottomans expressed Seriat and the

Ottoman culture and identity as the bases of their ideology but the proposals they

brought undermined these institutions, and opened new vistas.

A last point is that they were the first Islamist ideologists. What do we mean?

As is well known, the Ottoman Empire always showed itself as the banner holder of

Islam. The Empire exploited religion to legitimize itself. The main ideology of the

Empire and all Muslims was Islam, but not Islamism. There was no challenge

against Islam, so no need to be an Islamist. The glory and effectiveness of the

religion filled every sphere of the community. However when the superiority of the

Empire had been lost, the early proposals suggested a return to the order of the

classical age. The basic institutions, the understanding of state, the society and the

subject were not changed. But these new bureaucrats had a different attitude. They

also accepted the superiority of Islam and Ottoman culture but at the same time they

8

tried to find the corollaries for European prosperity and development in the Islamic

and traditional sources. This was in keeping with the common reflex of the

communities outside the Western world. They could not see that their ideology

would lead to a different mentality contrary to the one they tried to preserve.

Shortly, they generated an Islamist ideology. They tried to reconcile Islamic doctrine

with the Western concepts. However, because they took a defensive position against

Europe, what they did became the adaptation of Islam to European philosophy. They

created a hybrid philosophy which is not Islam anymore. While Islam has been a

different ideology than capitalism and Western liberalism, this Islamism became an

auxiliary ideology of capitalism.

When we talk about the Young Ottomans, mainly, three figures are

prominent: Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi. They were the most active and

productive members of the movement, and made important contributions to the

opposition movement with their literary skills. In fact there are important differences

in their ideologies, and these differences increased in time, but they can be

considered as a group of individuals gathered for the same purpose. In our analysis,

Namık Kemal will be mentioned more because of his literary talent and, relatively,

more thorough knowledge.

This group has always attracted the interest of the scholars studying on the

modernization of the Ottoman Empire. The first study about the Young Ottomans

belongs to an ex-member of the movement, Ebuzziya Tevfik (1973). However, the

historical facts are, sometimes, sacrificed for a romantic description, and his

sympathy towards Namık Kemal. The analysis of their ideology is also not the

interest of this study. There are also studies focusing on only the most famous

member of the movement, Namık Kemal. Mithat Cemal Kuntay (1946) is the

prominent example in this trend. However his study gives the life of Namık Kemal

like a heroic story. It is hard also in this study to find a through analysis. There are

articles published by the scholars about Namık Kemal at the anniversaries of birth

and death of him. They were the studies focusing on one dimension of the ideology

9

of Namık Kemal7. Besides, the sympathy towards Namık Kemal is apparent in all

these studies. (Buradaki son cümle çıkarıldı)

The article of hsan Sungu (1999) is another study in the field. In his study,

Sungu deals with the objections of the Young Ottomans towards the Tanzimat

administration. The study is mainly composed of the quotations of the members of

the Young Ottoman movement. Their criticisms are represented by the study. We

cannot find the analysis of the ideology of the Young Ottomans.

The scholars studying on the modernization of the Empire, inevitably,

mentioned the movement. We can find important and illuminating ideas about the

movement in these studies. For instances, Berkes (1964) names it as an important

opposition movement against the authority of the Tanzimat administration. Bernard

Lewis (1972) also emphasizes their importance in the modernization of the Ottoman

Empire8. However these studies focus rather on a wider picture, so it is not proper to

expect more thorough analysis from these studies.

There are also studies which try to understand the modernization of the

Ottoman Empire by analyzing the standings of the prominent figures in the Turkish

philosophical history. Also the ideology of the Young Ottomans attracted the

interest of these studies. Ülken (1966, 1999) is an important scholar in this trend. He

sketches out the ideological standings of each member of the movement. His critical

position is illuminative. He tries to reveal the philosophical perspective of the

members with reference to the effects of the European thought on their ideologies.

The main difference between Ülken’s studies and this study is that Ülken does not

mention the effects of the ideologies of the Young Ottomans on society and on the

following generations. Also his study is not a mentality inspection. The aim is to

analyze the ideology of the prominent figures in the movement.

7 see Gökçün (1955), Fındıkoglu (1939), Boran (1942), Berkes (1942), Banarlı (1947), Aksin (1988)

and Aktas (1936)

8 Also see Ortaylı (1995), Carter (1980), Karpat (2001, 2006), Mardin (2002) and Shaw (1985)

10

In addition, Tanpınar (1985) evaluates the members of the movement not

only from the perspective of their positions in the literature but also in terms of their

ideological standpoints. His ingenious claims about the members of the Young

Ottomans are beyond the history of 19th century Turkish literature. His interest on

the mentality of the societies and comparison between the mentalities of the East

and West gives his work an outstanding value. He tries to reveal the traces of the

mentality changes implied in the studies of the Young Ottomans. In fact what we

will do in this study is to enlarge these allusions and try to see the traces of them on

the state, society, individual and economy.

The most important and thorough study in this field belongs to Serif Mardin

(2000). This study specifically focuses on the Young Ottoman movement. He

analyzes both the philosophical background inherited by the members of the

movement and the intellectual atmosphere in which their ideologies flourished. The

analysis of the ideology of each member of the movement consists of the main body

of this study. He uses a critical methodology for his analysis. The study gives also

the cultural background of the members. We can see how the members of the

movement tried to match the traditional and religious institutions and beliefs of the

Ottoman Empire with the philosophical notions of the West. Their contradictions

and deficiencies are also shown in this study. However the aim of Mardin’s study is

not to show the repercussions of this contradictions and deficiencies for the

mentality of the Ottoman state and society. As will be shown in this study, this

contradictions and deficiencies meant some open ended claims which would be the

bases for the ideologies of the following generations.

In this study, the historical realities (or context) will be the base on which the

ideological analysis of these figures stands. We will try to show their effects and the

importance of their activities and declarations within the period they occurred.

As is mentioned above, the aim of the study is to show the contributions of

the Young Ottomans in the transformation of Ottoman mind from Ottoman ideal

11

type to more individualist, liberal and somehow capitalist type. Their attempt for

generating Ottoman-Turkish modernity will be brought under scrutiny. But it

should be stated that we do not claim that this transformation was initiated,

accelerated or completed by these men. All we want to show is in what points these

men opened ways for further changes. It is known that the latter Young Turks tried

to legalize their movement with the arguments already used and introduced by

Namık Kemal and his friends.

The body of this study will be composed of six chapters. In the first chapter

the methodology of this study will be given. The Weberian approach of social

sciences will be mentioned in order to clarify the two concepts; mentality and

morality. They will be accepted as the main determinants in the behavior of the

social actors. Besides, the similar studies in the field will also be mentioned in this

chapter, and the difference of this study will be clarified.

Just after, the historical context of the period, between 1865 and 1876, will

be given briefly. This period may rightly be labeled as the longest decade of “the

longest century of the Ottoman Empire” (Ortaylı 1995). The repercussions of the

two edicts (Gulhane and Islahat) mixed with the turmoil in European history and the

Ottoman social harmony. The real face of the agitations of the Young Ottomans can

be understood clearly under this atmosphere.

What is meant by Ottoman ideal must be explained properly; so in the third

chapter the worldviews of the elements of Ottoman society will be the described.

The atmosphere in which the mentality is shaped will be illuminated. This chapter

also bears the phenomenon which implies that the transformation of the institutions

mentioned prepares the disappearance of their essence in micro and macro levels.

In the following chapter, the attempt of the Young Ottomans to create a

citizenry from reaya will be evaluated. They hoped that the emergence of free

individuals with political rights would undermine the despotism of the Sublime

12

Porte and they would become proponents of the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. In

this respect, they conceptualized ‘freedom’ and emphasized personal rights. Their

social contract theories also determine the scope of the state which was too norrow

for the Ottoman Empire. They also questioned the basic institutions of the Ottoman

Empire such as the Sultanate and the Caliphate. It will be seen that their proposals

prepared the eventual dissolution of both institutions.

There will be two related concepts in the title of chapter five; secularism and

nationalism. It will be seen that the main tool which led the Young Ottomans to

secular notions was their emphasis on reason. When they suggested that the state

must be administrated by reason, science and technology, they also criticized the

traditional state understanding of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, their clear proposals

about the distinction between worldly affairs and moral dimension contradict the

unlimited scope of Islam. On the other side, the legal dimension of the secular

proposals prepared the end of the millet system which had been the guarantee of the

stability in the classical period of the Ottoman Empire.

The nationalism of the Young Ottomans also bore notions which

contradicted the prevailing social structure of the Ottoman society. They claimed

they are Ottoman nationalists and tried to gather the Ottoman nations under a

common identity and flag. However, because of the lack of an Ottoman nation as

such, they praised the Turks. This tendency helped the agitators of the communities

in the way of dissolution from the Empire.

In the last chapter, the traces of the mentality transformation of the ordinary

people will be analyzed. The changing conditions which affected the daily life of the

people forced them to adapt new rules. They tried to reconcile their beliefs and

traditions. In this respect the Young Ottomans had been their voice in this

reconciliation. However, as will be seen, this reconciliation in favor of modernism

and capitalism led to depreciation of Islamic belief and traditional understanding.

13

Also as a result of this reconciliation, the world view of the people of the Empire

was exposed to dramatic changes.

In this thesis, it is going to be argued that the ideational values of the Young

Ottomans expressed a project for modernizing the Ottoman political and social

structures while preserving their essence. However, this project, historically,

represented the formidable contradictions between the project of modernization and

the traditional Ottoman establishment.

14

CHAPTER 1. ON METHODOLOGY

The main aim of this study is to analyze the role and contribution of “a few

men” in the transformation of the mentality of the Ottomans. Or, to be clear, it can

be said that we will try to unearth how they tried to legalize a mental transformation

by using both Islamic doctrines and Ottoman traditional concepts and

understandings. In other words, the aim is to show how they tried to make the

Empire accept the mental transformation. They addressed ordinary people,

administrators and the Sultan to show the necessity of a mental transformation.

In order to handle such a study, two crucial concepts and their

interrelationships must be explained properly. These are mentality and morality.

Mentality is the actual beliefs and attitudes towards the outside world in a

society. It is the total description of the perceptions of the people. It is shaped by the

political, social, economic, legal, religious, etc. institutions. There can be different

mentalities in a given period in a society both colliding and conflicting among

themselves. On the other hand, morality is the ideal beliefs and attitudes supported

by norms, rules, sanctions. It is the determinant according to which the attitudes and

beliefs (mentality) of the people can be legalized. It is mainly shaped by traditions

and religious rules. Moralists (they can be clergies, intellectuals or the state itself)

set the standards that every element of society is expected to obey. These moral

values and norms, sometimes, are more effective than legal codes. The more

mentality matches with morality, the more is it effective9.

Whereas mentality is the actual beliefs and attitudes morality is the ideal, or

expected, beliefs and attitudes. It is impossible to expect that both match any time.

We can even say that because of the nature of man, there has not been a time in

which the mentality and morality matched completely; there have always been

deviations. In order to be effective, morality should be supported by the authority.

9 mostly composed from the study of Ülgener (1981)

15

The political body can either base its legal structure on moral values and norms10 or

regard morality as one of the stabilizers of society. Some moral norms and values

can be put among legal codes.

However such supports from the authorities do not always suffice to

maintain the effectiveness of the moral norms and values. The most important

condition is the suitability of the moral norms with contemporary atmosphere.

Because of their conservative nature, it is hard for these norms and values to adopt

themselves to the changing conditions. In this case the deviations increase, namely

the mentality and morality follow different paths. However, as soon as the standards

are set by morality, the people feel oblige to legalize their attitudes according to

predetermined norms and values. This situation leads, first, to the acceleration of

hypocrisy, and second, to the depreciation in morality. The former is obvious, but

the latter needs further explanation: When the people could not arrange their

attitudes according to actual moral values anymore11, they try to adopt moral norms

and values to their attitudes. Their relative flexibility permits such adaptations.12

After this point a new and different morality starts to be shaped.

To sum up our thoughts, it can be said that mentality is more open to changes

than morality. As soon as mentality, expected by morality, is dominant in a society,

the effectiveness of the values and norms, proposed by mentality, will be safe. In

this study the mentality, expected by morality, will be important, because it is

mentality, which is a mixture of Islamic (both orthodox and heterodox) doctrines

and Turco-Mungol traditions, which the Young Ottomans tried to transform.

10 Mostly in traditional and charismatic authorities.

11 We do not mention religious values separately when we state moral ones, because religion is stated

as one component of morality in the explanations. Of course, we do not mean that atheism does not

have morality, but we thought that the subject and the society under investigation permit such

negligence.

12 “For this reason, Islam has been exposed to different approaches and used to legalize both

monarchy, dictatorship, democracy and republic” (Esposito 2002, 111)

16

In fact there were two different and complementary mentalities in the

Ottoman social structure: above is the mentality of the protectionist, traditional ruler

and administrators, and below is the mentality of the subjects. Although the former

was exposed to some dramatic changes in 19th and 20th centuries, the latter had

continued with little changes whose traces can even be seen today.

Because our concern is directed to ideal beliefs and attitudes, proposed by

morality, more than the actual situation, we should construct ideal types in order to

clarify what we mean about the mentality of two sectors of the Ottoman Empire.

…it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the

corresponding forms of actions which in case involve the highest possible

degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy on the

level of meaning. (Weber 1978, 20)

In order to construct such ideal types properly, the legal codes, moral values

and norms, and the political applications of the Empire should be examined

carefully. Such an examination can provide our ideal types with reflections in

reality. Also because the Young Ottomans put these ideal types on their target

boards, using such a method seem to be illuminative.

When we think about the Ottoman state and society, it can be observed that

values and traditions played important roles. These values and traditions reflected in

the attitude and behavior of the subjects, administrators and the Sultan himself.

Because values and traditions were shared and owned by every element of the

society, any attitude and behavior was performed with the expectation of certain

repercussions or feedback from the others. For instance, when a wealthy person

establishes a pious endowment or helps the poor, he/she expects prestige and

appreciation in turn. Every action, performed by any member of the society, is

attached a subjective meaning by that member. (Weber (1978, 4)

17

According to Weber action is social insofar as its subjective meaning takes

account of the behavior of others, and is thereby oriented in its course. He divides

social action into four:

i) instrumentally rational, that is determined by expectations as to the

behavior of objects in the environment of other human beings; these

expectations are used as conditions or means for the attainment of the actors

own rationally pursued and calculated ends.

ii) value oriented, that is determined by a conscious belief in the value for its

own sake of some ethical, ascetic, religious or other form of behavior,

independently of its prospects of success.

iii) effectual (especially emotional) that is determined by the actor’s specific

affects and feeling states.

iv) traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation. (Weber 1978,

24-25)

Weber states that first one can only be seen in Occident as a result of

Protestant asceticism which perceives the order in the world as an important

religious doctrine for the salvation. The importance of work and ethic in Protestant

sect leads the demand for a rational and legal order.

As a consequence, and although the enjoyment of wealth is forbidden to the

ascetic, it becomes his vacation to engage in economic activity which is

faithful to rationalized ethical requirements and which conforms to strict

legality. (Weber 1978, 257)

According to him, the rational order is the uniqueness of the Occident.

Although he believes that the asceticism also exists in the East, the difference

between dervish asceticism and Protestant asceticism hinders the former to reach

same results like the latter (Weber 1978, 556). The difference lies in their

approaches to this world and worldly affairs. While the asceticism of Occident

(Protestant asceticism) seeks the salvation in this world, the other seeks it in

isolation from the world and worldly affairs. The members of this type of asceticism

(Dervish asceticism) have a loose touch with this world. This difference makes the

former to engage himself in this world that this leads to the desire for world

domination (Weber 1976).

18

The other social actions are common in a pre-capitalist social formation.

Weber puts the Ottoman Empire in patrimonial administration category (Weber

1978, 228). For him, the two reasons of the irrationality of the Orient are oriental

and Asiatic types of salvation religion and patrimonialism. Like the former, the latter

(patrimonialism) does not base on rational thinking. Values and traditions play key

role in the institutions of the administration. Instead of rational thinking and logical

applications, rituals symbols, status and honor direct the social action. Because of

the lack of any tendency toward rationality in the Eastern cultures, the Orient lagged

behind in industrialization and capitalism. The lack of tendency towards world

domination, for Weber, is the main obstacle for the Orient. Weber makes clear

distinction between Oriental religions and Occidental (especially Protestantism)

ones

The decisive historical difference between predominantly Oriental and

Asiatic types of salvation religion and those found primarily in the Occident

is that, the former usually culminate in contemplation, the latter in

asceticism. (Weber 1978, 551)

He claims that Oriental religions are based on mystical and magical beliefs

and rituals, ignore worldly affairs and mostly look for salvation in the other world.

On the other hand, asceticism of the Occident considers this world crucial and looks

for salvation within the order of this world, it is important for the ascetics to work

over and dominate the world. If we say the difference in one sentence, while the

Oriental religions see the salvation out of this world, the asceticism of the Occident

sees it through this world.

However Weber looks at Islam from a different perspective. He states that

the early Islam contained some puritan notions, no individual request for salvation,

and no mysticism. The religious promises of it pertained to this world (Weber 1978,

625). However, after the warrior type appeared and took the control of the religion,

this notion has changed; martyrdom, war and conquest became the most important

rhetoric of the Muslims. With the advent of the cult of the saints and finally magic,

19

Islam was completely diverted from any real methodological control of life (Weber

1978, 627)

Weber’s perception of Islam contains an allusion that if Islam had preserved

its early form, it would have adapted to capitalism and industrialization.13 But it

should be noted that it is impossible to disagree with Bryan S. Turner (1998) that

Weber was affected by the atmosphere of 19th century Western intellectual circles

regarding his views about Islam. The details of Weber’s views about Islam are not

the subject of this study, but some important clarifications must be here.

As mentioned above, the claims of Weber about Islam contain an allusion

that Islam, in its original form, bears suitable notions for a perception like Protestant

asceticism, or in other words, it could have been conducive to modernism and

capitalism. In Economy and Society he states:

Industrialization was not impeded by the Islam as the religion of individuals,

but by the religiously determined structure of the Islamic states, their

officialdom and their jurisprudence. (Weber 1978, 1095)

Weber was wrong in his perception of the Orient, but especially Islam,

according to two important points. These are the main determinants of capitalism

and modernism: individualism and domination of nature. Actually these two

concepts, especially the latter, are fundamentally contrary to Eastern beliefs, not

rationalism. In Islam there is obvious stress on reason and rational man. Belief is

valid as soon as it is supported by reason. Stress on science is also the case in Islam.

We can see same notions in Confucianism and Taoism. In these beliefs rational

thinking is a gift given to human to understand the world and its order. However the

notion of rationality in these beliefs does not lead to same consequences like in the

West even if had they preserved their original form. Shortly, it is not the mere matter

13 which is claimed directly by Maxime Radinson (1968): “Islam is not a hinderance for the

development of capitalism”

20

of rationality; we should search for some other reasons behind the modernization

and capitalism seen in the West.

Selfish and particularized individual has played a key role in the

accumulation of wealth. The accumulated capital has been reinvested to get more

capital. The mentality of the individuals in Western societies became totally

different from the Eastern ones and all ties between the individual and feudal

relations were swept away. Private property, political rights and economic freedom

provided the realm of individual autonomy. As liberal tradition claims, individuals

are worthy and successful as soon as they gain profit in the economic struggle.

Protestant belief and its ethic also accelerated the process.

However the individualization owes much more to the Enlightenment,

because most of the Enlightenment ideologies put the societies shaped by particular

individuals as the main object of their philosophies. In Eastern societies and beliefs,

the community has always been more important than the individuals. The interest of

individual has been seen as sacrificial for the stability and confidence of the

community. The wealth has also been accepted as the common property of the

community and wealthy persons have always been expected to contribute to charity,

found pious endowment, help the poor, etc. The wealthy persons also used their

wealth as a social mean to gain appreciation and confidence of the people or as an

‘investment’ for the other world. Individuals have not been particularized in Islam

(even in its original form) as the supporter of these relations. In this respect, Islam

could not lead to capitalism. It may have some ascetic characteristics like the

Protestant sect such as the prohibition of luxury, condemnation of extravagance and

the appreciation of the property gained as a result of one’s own labor, but the wealth,

according to doctrine, must be spent in the name of Allah, distributed among needy

and shared with others.

Beside individualism, Enlightenment and developments in technology and

science have led the emergence of a belief in people’s mind that human can

21

overcome nature and in fact dominate over it. With the Enlightenment, the Western

people could be rescued from the domination of the Church. The rationality

provided them to save themselves from further burdens. They thought that rational

thinking could solve all human problems. Beside this moral domination of the

Church and moral values, nature was another obstacle to be overcome.14 Every

scientific and technological progress has been announced as another victory over

nature. The exploitation of nature has been legalized and seen necessary for the

development of humanity. The natural objects reshaped, changed, deformed, etc. in

order to make them usable for the people. This freedom of action led to the

abundance of the products and accelerated the spread of capitalism. On the other

hand, in the Orient, nature and human being have been seen inseparable. As a part of

the nature, man should respect it and benefit from it without extravagance. For

instance in Islam, the nature is accepted as given in trust to the human by God.

Shortly, the Orient could not find the right to exploit the nature: “Orient accepts the

object as it is …. Occident always changes its form.” (Tanpınar 1961, 132)

Under the light of these points, it can be seen that any attempt in the name of

“modernization” of the non-European societies is an Occidentalization process. In

this respect, the aim of the Young Ottomans, directed towards the modernization of

the Ottoman Empire, was not a return to the original form of Islam and the classic

age of the Ottoman Empire as they claimed, but a new perspective, a new vision, or

actually, a new mentality for the Empire. In other words, it was, unintentionally, the

Occidentalization of the Ottoman people. It was a process which demanded

fundamental changes in the perspective of every subject of the Empire. Shortly, it is

not a simple rationalization process but a different look at time, space, nature and the

world. In this respect, our methodology will be unearthing the traces of this

projected mentality transformation.

14 In fact, fight with nature has been the main subject in Western mind starting with Homer. West has

always faught with nature and searched ways to dominate it.

22

Of course this study is not the first in this field. It owes much to the studies

of Ülgener (1981) and Mardin (2000). It can be said that Ülgener dedicated his

academic career to understand the mentality of the Ottoman people. His studies give

a different perspective about the Ottoman world. His studies cover a broad period of

the Empire and he uses poems to understand the mentality hidden behind the words.

He analyzes the mentality of the people with a Weberian methodology. Ülgener

determines two different mentalities as it is proposed in this study, but he puts to the

stage a good and evil play. While he evaluates lower stratum, the subjects,

sympathetic and sees them all the time exploited, he evaluates the upper one as

extravagant and exploiter. However this is a misleading approach to the Ottoman

state apparatus. As nalcık (1973) states, and will be discussed in the following

chapter, the Ottoman state philosophy is a mixture of Islamic, Turco-Mungol and

Byzantine state traditions. According to this philosophy the state is responsible for

the maintenance of the basic needs of the subjects, and the Sultan is the protector of

the subjects against any abuse. He is also the provider of justice. Because of this, the

Ottoman Empire could not follow mercantilist or despotic policies. Namely

mentality of both strata was a result of the basic structures that shaped the Ottoman

state and society. Lastly, the periods investigated in this study and in the studies of

Ülgener are very different. He is, as if, surfing in time. One can find the poem of a

14th century poet in one page while a 19th poem was mentioned in the following one.

Mardin (2000) has an important study on the Young Ottomans: The Genesis

of the Young Ottoman Thought. As the title implies, this study analyzes the ideology

of the Young Ottomans in the intellectual tradition of the Empire; the intellectual

sources they utilize and main points of their ideologies are the main topics of it.

However for our study, not every single thought of the Young Ottomans is as

important, but the ones which reflected their concern with the transformation in the

mentality of the Ottoman elements.

In addition the study of Nevin Yazıcı (2002) should also be mentioned. The

content of the book, unfortunately, does not provide what the title promises:

23

Osmanlılık Fikri ve Genç Osmanlılar Cemiyeti (The Idea of Ottomanism and the

Young Turks Organization). The book was composed of the quotations from the

eminent scholars of the field and the Young Ottomans. It is hard to find thoughts of

Nevin Yazıcı from these quotations.

Tanpınar (1961, 1985), Ülken (1966) and Berkes (1942) also notice such a

mentality transformation, but they either do not give further details, or prefer to

study more concrete data. In the following chapter the characteristics of the two

mentalities will be analyzed for the two sectors of the Ottoman Empire.

In conclusion, the methodology of the study is given in this chapter. In the

next chapter the historical context of the period, in which the effects of the Young

Ottoman movement were seen clearly, will be discussed.

24

CHAPTER 2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This chapter will focus on the period between 1865 and 1876. Before 1865

the main incidences in the Ottoman Empire were the promulgation of Gülhane Edict

(Tanzimat Fermanı) and the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı). The Gülhane Edict

was promulgated in 1839. With this Edict the protection of life, property and honor

of the subjects was guaranteed by the Sultan. The scope of the Edict covered all

subjects, disregarding their religion, millet and sect. This Edict was the first shock in

the eyes of the Ottoman millets which threatened the harmony in the Empire. The

process accelerated the dissolution of the social bonds in the Empire contrary to the

expectations.

After sixteen years from the promulgation of the Gulhane Edict, the Reform

Edict was promulgated in 1856. This Edict expanded the scope of rights given by

the Tanzimat. As a result of this Edict the position of the “minorities” had been

strengthened. The Embassies in the capital shouldered the protection of each of these

minorities. As soon as the members of these minorities obtained the passport of a

foreign state (which is not that difficult), they became exempted from many taxes,

arrestment...etc. Shortly, they could obtain the same rights given to the citizens of

the states concerned.

The aim of the rulers while they promulgated these reforms was to give an

end to the economic backwardness of the Empire. However, despite these reforms

the economic condition of the Empire worsened year by year. The loss of lands also

did not stop. First foreign debt, borrowed under the reign of Abdulmecid,

accelerated the discomfort among the Ottoman subjects (but especially among the

Muslims).

The administration of the Empire was held by two leading figures, Ali and

Fuad Pashas, from 1843 to 1871 (excluding short interruptions). In this period it was

these figures, but not the Sultans, who were in charge of the administration. It was

25

the time of the Sublime Porte. The two pashas administered the state without

accepting any interference in their affairs. This situation led both the jealousy

against the pashas and also fawning for them. This two edged sword always kept the

tension high in the politics of the Empire.

On the other hand, the economic penetration of European capitalism

increased day by day and the local producers of the Empire started to suffer from the

unfair competition of European products. The Ottoman administration in lacked

enough economic and political power and ability to challenge these assaults on its

domestic market. The regime of the two Pashas was also insufficient to suppress the

revolts all around the country and the Empire lost many lands under their rule.

Because their positions depended on the atmosphere of the international relations of

the Empire, they could not take necessary measures against these revolts. This

“poor” situation of the Empire and the submissive attitude of the rulers inevitably

led to some opposition. The Kuleli Revolt15 (1859) was the first signal of the

impending danger. The conspiracy was not successful but the attempt itself showed

the discomfort among the intellectuals, some bureaucrats and military officials.

Probably after the failure of this attempt the opposition became more cautious. In

this respect the meeting of some young intellectuals, who were sad and mad about

the situation of the country in a picnic in the Forest of Belgrade (which is even

further away from the city center) in 1865 to discuss the ways to bring remedies for

the recent problems of the Empire, is interesting. According to Ebuzziya, who is the

first author to write about the Young Ottoman movement, first fire of the Young

Ottoman movement was ignited in this picnic.16

15 It was a conspiracy against the Sublime Porte. It is an interesting conspiracy because of the

composition of the men involved in it. There were the members of ulema, military and bureaucracy.

There are not clear documents about the revolt but what is known is the members were arrested

before they took any action. One thing interesting in this revolt is that the men involved were

forgiven by Sultan Abdulmecid.

16 We have to trust Ebuzziya (1978) about the picnic incidence but we have further information about

the following circumstances.

26

The organization of the movement was imitated from the Italian nationalist

movement Carbonari. According to this cell type organization, every cell would be

composed of seven members. The ordinary members would only know the other

members of his cell. According to allegations many high ranked officials were

among the members of the movement besides some low ranked ones, military

personnel and intellectuals. The active members of the so-called movement were

Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi. They were, mainly, seen as columnists in

the newspapers of the capital during this period. They led the opposition against Ali

and Fuad Pashas from their columns. The newspaper of Namık Kemal was Tasvir-i

Efkar17. Ali Suavi used the Muhbir18 for his agitations. However these two

newspapers have always been under threat of Ali Pasha government. Because of this

reason they had to be cautious in their criticism.

The year 1867 was a turning point for both editors of these newspapers (we

mean Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi) as well as the movement. The Cretan crisis and

the insolvency of the government against it were highly criticized by the

newspapers. However the most effective attempt was Ali Suavi’s private charity

organization for the Cretans who had been driven out of their homes. Such a private

organization meant the declaration of the insolvency of the government in public

eye. Ali Pasha noted this move as a minus grade for Ali Suavi. After one month Ali

Suavi wrote a bitter criticism about the Porte’s relinquishment of the fortress of

Belgrade. It was the right time for Ali Pasha to close the Muhbir and exile Ali Suavi.

Tasvir-i Efkar responded to this measure of the government by printing the

order closing Muhbir and a protesting commentary of the Filip Efendi (the owner of

the Muhbir). When the article of Namık Kemal, protesting the European interference

in the Cretan revolt, was added to this protest, the inevitable end came for Tasvir-i

Efkar. Now the leading figures of the movement were deactivated by the

17Tasvir-i Efkar (The description of the thoughts): It was a private newspaper in the capital city. The

owner of the newspaper was Agah Efendi.

18 Muhbir (informer, news reporter): It was owned by Ali Suavi. It was famous for its harsh criticism

against Sublime Porte.

27

government; Ali Suavi was arrested and exiled to Kastamonu and the newspaper,

which Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha expressed their views, was closed. It seemed

that the political atmosphere of the capital calmed down in favor of the government.

However the opposition was already beginning.

Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (then would be the financier of the movement) was the

descendant of Mehmet Ali Pasha who captured the administrative hold of Egypt

from the Ottoman Empire. The governors of the Egypt were called khedive. The

administrative right of Egypt passed to the elder member of the family. At that

period the governor of Egypt was the brother of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Khedive

Ismail. Mustafa Fazıl was raised in Istanbul and held important posts. However his

ultimate goal was to ascend to the throne of Egypt. Being in the capital and

obtaining important posts were only means for this goal.

While he was holding one of these important posts, he committed a “crime”

which was totally contrary to his aim: criticizing the financial policies of Fuad

Pasha. As a result of his this criticism he was asked to leave the capital within

twenty four hours. He left the capital for Paris. He was further away from reaching

goal. On the other hand, Ismail, now, became advantageous against his brother. His

plan was getting approval of the Sultan in order to transfer the administration of

Egypt to his own descendents. There was only one solution for Mustafa Fazıl:

degrading the government which left the door open for Ismail to realize his plans.

His first attempt was the declaration of his leadership of the movement

named the Young Ottomans. It was criticized, even mockered, by some European

newspapers like Nord. According to this newspaper, Mustafa Fazıl was a forger who

uses people to reach his ultimate goal of obtaining the throne of the Egypt. First

Namık Kemal responded bitterly to this criticism, and then Mustafa Fazıl replied the

allegations. In the following period Mustafa Fazıl issued a letter addressed to the

Sultan about the reform proposals of the Young Ottomans. The arrival of the letter

coincided with the closing of the Muhbir and Tasvir-i Efkar.

28

The letter was immediately translated and 50.000 copies of it were

distributed in the capital. The turmoil, accelerated by this letter, caused the exile of

the opposition movement. Ali Suavi was already exiled and he was forced to go

Kastamonu. Namık Kemal was appointed to Erzurum as assistant governor while

Ziya Pasha to Cyprus as the Council of Judicial Ordinances. However thanks to their

good connections Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha managed to postpone their

appointment.

At this time Mustafa Fazıl invited them to Paris to generate an opposition

front. Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi accepted the invitation and fled to

Paris secretly to organize the opposition. The figures, gathered in the residence of

Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, were promised the financing of their activities. Mustafa Fazıl

deposited a certain amount of money to the bank in the name of Ziya Pasha and their

salaries were paid by the Pasha. At the first meeting Ali Suavi demanded to publish

Muhbir in London. They agreed on this proposal, but they decided to initiate the

publication of a new one in the near future.

However the visit of Abdulaziz to the European countries changed the fate of

the movement. In Abdulaziz’s visit to Paris, Mustafa Fazıl was invited to the

presence of the Sultan and he was advised to return to Istanbul. He was also

promised a post. He accepted this offer and returned to Istanbul even before the first

issue of Muhbir. He told the members that he accepted to return to Istanbul in order

to make the necessary reforms. However his main intention was different. When it

was realized that his return did not bring any progress the tone of the Muhbir in its

approach to the government, in which Mustafa Pasha was involved, became harsher.

This was a break between Ali Suavi and the other members of the movement.

When Muhbir took a different side, Mustafa Fazıl ordered Namık Kemal to

establish a newspaper urgently. As a result the famous Hürriyet emerged in 1868.

However, the more Mustafa Fazıl got involved in the politics of the Sublime Porte,

29

the more distanced he became from the critical stand of Hürriyet about the policies

of the government. He demanded smoother criticism from Namık Kemal and Ziya

Pasha. Such orders inevitably led the members to question their positions. In

addition to these, the financial support of the Pasha shrunk in time to such an extent

that Namık Kemal could not meet the publication costs.

In the following period, the leading figures of the movement, Namık Kemal

and Ziya Pasha, diverged into different camps because of the ongoing orders of

Mustafa Pasha to Namık Kemal to dissociate himself from Ziya Pasha. Namık

Kemal obeyed the order at the end, and left Hürriyet and declared his dissociation

from the newspaper. Now Ziya Pasha was left alone. He wanted to continue

publishing but he had no financial sources. But there appeared one who needed such

a platform to use for his aims: Ismail, the khedive of Egypt.

Meanwhile, Mustafa Fazıl was back in Istanbul and founded good relations

with the Porte. He had only one goal in his mind which inevitably disturbed his

brother Ismail. Ismail feared the probable circumstances in the Porte and saw Ali

Pasha and his brother in alliance. In order to abolish this alliance and hinder his

brother capturing the throne of Egypt after him, he decided to use Ziya Pasha and

Hürriyet for an anti-Ali Pasha propaganda. Ziya accepted the offer and followed the

order of his new financier.

However the continuity of financial support of Ismail depended on his

relations with the Porte. Just when he reached his goal in 1870, he cut off his

support. Now Ziya Pasha was deprived of both money and staff. In addition to this

the British authorities started a lawsuit against him for the article of Suavi

advocating the assassination of Ali Pasha. Under these conditions he fled to Geneva

and continued the publication of Hürriyet under difficult conditions.

On the other hand, Namık Kemal stayed in London for a while then returned

to capital in 1870. He was promised to be safe in capital by the government. In 1871

30

Ali Pasha died. The Young Ottomans always thought the most important obstacle

for the modernization of the Empire had been Ali and Fuad Pashas. Now the last

member of this coalition had died19 and was succeeded by Mahmud Nedim Pasha.

The other members of the Movement came back to the capital with great hopes after

the general amnesty of the Grand Vizier. But the coherence of the Movement almost

disappeared. Ziya Pasha, also returned to Istanbul and took and important political

post in the government. Namık Kemal and his friends started to publish the

newspaper bret20.

To sum up, the Young Ottomans could not find what they expected from the

new government. The despotic reign of Abdulaziz was completed with the

clumsiness of the Grand Vizier soon after. They remembered the regime of Ali and

Fuad Pashas with yearning. The freedom promised was not delivered; the

publication of their newspapers was suspended many times.

However the worst was yet to come. As a result of a conspiracy, the bret,

the leading voice of the opposition, was closed and its stuff was exiled to different

ends of the Empire. Although their enthusiasm and expectations were refreshed in

1876 by the deposition of Abdulaziz and promulgation of the constitution, new

Sultan Abdulhamid, soon found a way to close the parliament and suspend the

constitution.

In the following years the last ashes of the Young Ottoman Movement

disappeared. Abdulhamid II was keen to eliminate any opposition against his

regime. He first exiled and executed Ahmet Mithat Pasha. After a while Namık

Kemal and Ziya Pasha were exiled for official posts in rural areas of the Empire.

The autocracy of the Sultanate was built up by Abdulhamid II and the first

opposition movement of the Empire came to an end under his rule.

19 Fuad Pahsa died earlier.

20 bret (lesson learnt through a misfortune)

31

At the end, none of the opponents reached their goals; Ismail got approval

from the Sultan to transfer the throne of Egypt to his own descendants. Mustafa

Fazıl was forced to content himself with money which was enough for his

extravagant life and gambling habit. Ali Suavi was killed in a coup attempt to bring

Prince Murad to the Sultanate. Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha died in great poverty

where they were exiled.

In fact this complex set of occurrences was the reflection of their standings.

They were not autonomous like European intellectuals. They were bureaucrats and

stayed as such till the end of their lives. As we said above, they lived the duality of

the Tanzimat through their lives. They neither totally rejected the past nor accepted

the whole process of modernity and European civilization. However the door they

opened became a point of entry for the more radical movements.

The historical context is important to understand the philosophy of the

intellectuals. The atmosphere in which the intellectual thinking flourished should be

kept in mind to comprehend the real effects of their philosophy. In this sense, in this

chapter the history of the movement and the period mentioned has been given

briefly. In the following chapter, an ideal Ottoman type will be described in order to

be able to comprehend the effects of the aspired mentality transformation in the

Ottoman social body.

32

CHAPTER 3. THE OTTOMAN IDEAL

The Ottoman Empire is a synthesis between Turko-Mungol (including

Sasanid), Islamic and Byzantine state and social traditions. Despite similarities

between with either one of them, it’s hard to put it into one of these categories. Only

thanks to its cultural heritage, experiences and geographical position, it could create

a unique state and society model. Especially in its classical age, it strengthened its

state structure by avoiding the mistakes of previous Turkish and Islamic states, and

put the dynasty and the state above everything in order avoid any dissolution

attempt. In the Ottoman Empire there had been only one noble entity: the Ottoman

family. Although Sheria had been the main jurisdiction body, the Sultans and the

state did not abandon the jurisdiction power completely to it. In fact, many times the

jurisdiction power of the Sultans came over the Sheria. Shortly, the stability of the

state was over everything. As Ocak (1998) puts it correctly, that in the Ottoman

Empire everything was for the state; also the religion itself. Namely, here, what we

will do is to describe a unique state and society model, understand the main

characteristic of it, or in other words, “the official ideology” of the Ottoman Empire

will be examined in order to understand how the transformation of it into a modern

structure, to the extent that it could be transformed, had been a difficult process.

Before we proceed any further, it will be illuminative to cite Ocak’s

description of the official ideology of a state.

Official ideology of a state, shortly, is a completion of its manner of

perception and understanding of itself, the land it reigns, the people living on

this land and other states, and its world view, mentality, and the values it

praises. (Ocak, 1998, 72)

Under the light of this explanation we can detail our analysis. First of all, the

Ottoman Empire was a precapitalist traditional state and society. Because of this, the

division of ruler and the ruled was made carefully and the way, each should behave

and approach each other, is described in detail. The ruled, reaya, was expected to

stay in his compartment and not to interfere with the administration task. The rulers

33

created a different and high class and perceived themselves totally different from the

ruled. Given these, it is important to divide the Ottoman society into two main

sectors and analyze each of them separately. Firstly, the ruling class will be

discussed and later the reaya21.

As noted, the Ottomans avoided the main deficiencies of the past Turkish

states which caused the dissolution of them. It had been because of the preservation

of possession and sovereignty rights of the tribal chiefs (beys) and the warrior

leaders on the lands they conquer. This right caused the continuation of nobility in

society and an ongoing threat against the central authority. The first Ottoman rulers,

although they were one of the tribal chiefs under Seljuk state, ignored the right of

their warlords and gathered every piece of land under their suzerainty, with the

expansion of the state through Anatolia. They abolished the nobility of the tribal

chiefs and offered them only a rank in the Ottoman body of administration. Besides,

the Sultans paid attention to keep the members of these tribes away from the central

administration in case of any rebellion. With the dismissal and execution of Çandarlı

family by Mehmet II, the last remnants of high ranking Turkish administrators were

removed from the center. Their successors were the administrators educated and

trained through the slave system.

The “devsirme” system was used by all Near Eastern states, but reached its

zenith under the Ottoman control. Murat I was the initiator of the system. He used

the war captives and trained Christian boys in the Janissary corps. In latter period

the system was expanded and the periodic collection of Christian boys became the

main source of the system. These boys were divided into two main groups according

their appearance, talent and intelligence and the most able ones were taken for the

inner (Enderun) section of the Palace. Enderun was the education and training

institute of high–ranking administrators of the empire. The boys were raised with a

complete obedience to the Sultan. Their legal position was also different from the

subjects. They were the slaves (kuls) of the Sultan and their fate was depended on

21 the subjects of the Sultan. Its simple meaning is flock where the shepherd is the Sultan

34

the Sultan. They were also raised in complete isolation from the outside world. In

this close system their only duty was to serve the Sultan, and the state. When their

education was completed, they were either sent to provinces as governors or placed

to a post in the Palace.

Beside these, there was ulema class which was shaped by educated Muslims

under the supervision of Seyh'ul–Islam. They were mainly educated with religious

sciences and appointed as mufti22 and khadi23 to the provinces, müderris24 to the

medreses or official under the control of Seyh'ül–Islam. The last administrative unit

involved the provincial rulers. They were either leading figures (esraf) or

exgovernors of the region who were appointed by the central authority to collect the

tax as effectively as possible. Namely they were the ones who were essential to keep

the preferred status quo.

These are the men who were called the Ottomans. Namely the Ottoman

identity does not include all the people of the Empire but the rulers. “It is not an

ethnic but a political description of an identity transcending all ethnic social and

economic identities… the identity of the ruling class.” (Köprülü 1984, 39). The

members of this identity were expected to know Ottoman Turkish language which is

composed of Arabic Persian and Turkish language elements, and shared the same

values, perception, taste and culture; a high culture involving the most refined

elements of living, art and knowledge. They were aware of the same codes which

were important for the administration of such a large Empire. They were at the same

distance towards all ethnic communities of the Empire. The only aim of them was

the preservation of the ongoing order. The changes and innovations were perceived

suspiciously and the preservation of the exiting order was always preferred.

22 executive of the religious affairs in provinces.

23 responsible for the judicial affairs in provinces.

24 professor of the medresses

35

The preservation of the existing order highly depended on the preservation of

justice. Justice had been the main backbone of the Middle Eastern states. The

prestige of the Sultan was always related with the justice he set on his land. Ottoman

Sultans also saw justice as the main issue for the stability of their state. The main

function of the state was ruling its subjects justly. Justice is also the main element of

one of the most important doctrines of the Turkish states: the circle of justice.

“According to it, to control the state requires a large army, to support the troops

requires great wealth, to obtain wealth the people must be prosperous, for the people

to be prosperous the laws must be just.” (nalcık 1973, 14). Justice was so important

for the Ottoman state that the divan, main administrative organ of the state, was also

used as a court to deal with every application and complain made by ordinary

people.

As is expressed in circle of justice schema, justice is a must to obtain the

wealth. However wealth was not perceived by the Ottoman rulers in the same way as

was perceived by the mercantilist European states. To begin with the rulers, the

wealth came in the second place after obtaining a post in the higher administration

circle. The trade of post, as Mardin (2002, 210) states, was the distinguishing feature

of the Ottoman system. The officials used their wealth to distribute to the poor, or

found pious foundations to gain the confidence and sympathy of the people, or to

ascent to higher ranks. Both were related with obtaining power. Besides, the security

of the wealth they obtained depended on the preservation of their posts. Because

they were the slaves of Sultan, their properties were confiscated after their demise or

dismissal. They could not transfer the wealth to their heirs. Because of these reasons,

wealth was a temporary possession of something which can be dispensed for the

above goals. When we consider the Islamic notion (especially its humble form) the

unimportance of wealth and the people’s perception about it can be understood more

clearly. The picture, concerning the state (treasury) and the Sultan, appears different.

Muslim rulers were expected to be generous for their subjects. Their prestige

was mostly determined by their charity activities, distributing presents in ceremonies

36

and appointments, organizing feasts for everyone, etc. The accumulating and

keeping of wealth in the treasuries by the Sultans had been a shame for them and

condemned by both ancient sources of Turko-Islamic traditions such as

Siyasetname, Kutadgubilig, and by the numerous Ottoman chronicles. The

abundance of coin in circulation was also another indicator of the prestige of

Sultans. It is believed that the more coin in circulation, the wealthier the state and its

subjects. That is the mentality of the Ottoman treasury. As Immanuel Wallerstein

stresses, the Ottoman Empire was a world empire:

A world-empire and a world-economy are two very different kinds of social

systems in terms of their politics, their economics and their cultural

expressions. A world-empire is defined as a single social economy (division

of labor) with an overarching, political structure. A world-economy is

defined as a single social economy containing multiple state structures.

These two systems have different modes of production. A world-empire uses

a redistributive/ tributary mode in which capital accumulation is not

maximized, and in which the basic redistribution is a function of political

decisions. A world-economy uses a capitalist mode in which capital

accumulation perse is the controlling consideration of social action, and this

objective is pursued through the market, which is however at most only

partially free from political and social constraint. (Wallerstein 1981, 117)

This quotation summarizes why a world-empire, like the Ottoman Empire,

could not seek to achieve what the mercantilist states did. Besides, the attitude of the

Ottoman Empire against the export and the import trade was another indicator of

their traditionalist character. The Ottoman rulers paid attention to the abundance of

product in the market and satisfaction of basic needs of their subjects. In this respect,

they saw import positively and export negatively since the import provided the flow

of products and satisfaction of market, and export meant the withdrawal of products

from local bazaars.25 They did not seek the accumulation of silver and coin in state

treasury.

The other and most important tool of the Ottoman rulers for controlling the

local market was the “narh” system. According to this system, the prices of the basic

25 For further information see Faroqui (1997, 2003) and Pamuk (1988)

37

products (in fact it included almost everything except luxury products) were

determined and strictly controlled by the agents of the state. The products could only

be supplied between maximum and minimum prices determined by khadi in

provinces and central administration in capital by consulting with the merchants and

producers. The main aim of this system was the protection of the subjects from the

scarcity and abundance of the goods. The guild system is also a component of the

system. In addition to the price determination, the number of the artisans and

craftsmen deployed in every guild was also fixed by the agents of the state.

Besides, the increase in tax rates was disliked by the administrators and

chronicles of the Empire (Akdag, 1974). It was perceived as a setback for the

welfare of the subjects. In fact, all above measures and applications were done for

for the sake of a fair system, for justice. Justice is for the protection of the reaya

from abuses. In this respect, tyranny (zulüm) was a very important concept in the

Ottoman justice system. “’zulüm’ according to Ottoman law, is the application of the

bad innovations (bid'at), which are approved by neither örf nor Sheria, by the

officials on the reaya.” (Mumcu 1972, 9). The Sultan had to protect reaya from

such abuses of his kuls and provide the security and confidence of the subjects.

According to Near Eastern state tradition, the reaya is given in trust by God to the

Sultan (nalcık 1973, 67). In this respect, any subject had right to apply to the divan

in case of any abuse. Divan and the Sultan had to take these complaints into

consideration and listen to the reaya. In early times even the Sultan himself, was

called to the court as a defendant.

However, although the confidence of the subjects was essential for the

Ottoman administration, the subjects had no political commitment right to the

administration of the state. In fact all these measures were taken to keep them away

and avoid any discomfort which can turn into a political upheaval. According to

Ottoman official ideology, the ideal reaya is the one who:

i)is obedient to the order of the Sultan,

ii)does not demand any political right in the administration,

38

iii)does not resist in any condition against the state stability,

iv)does not leave his place and comportment be belong to, (Ocak 1998, 92)

v)does not change his reaya situation [For a man to pass from reaya to

military status was considered a breach of the fundamental principles of

state. (nalcık 1973, 69)]

The subjects were organized according to an order onto which the

protectionist, interventionist and absolute state notion could fit. On the economic

level, the state expected reaya to be contained with few and adopt the livelihood

economic conditions. The basic needs of the subjects were provided by the state, so

demanding more and luxury items were seen as a threat against the stability of the

society and the state. The taxation system of the Empire gives clear evidence about

this mentality such as surplus, from which the tax is taken, is accepted as the amount

above what the peasants needed to feed, cloth themselves and maintain production.

(Owen 1981, p.11)

These are the main features of the upper sector of the Empire. Some other

comments will be added in the end of this part after analyzing the situation of the

ruled, reaya.

The subjects were divided into communities on the basis of millet system

according to their religions. There were three main communities: the Christians the

Jews, and the Muslims. Each of them were applied their own religious laws and

directed by their own religious authorities. In the cities each community were

accommodated in their own compartment, in different regions of the city, but this

division had never caused any problem in their interrelations. In fact, as a traditional

society, this separate order was desired by each of them. Because in case of a

mixture, the non-Muslims could have faced the Sheria law and the Muslims could

have suspected about the religious character of their state. The administration

tolerated the religious beliefs and customs of the non-Muslims because the stability

and security had been the main concern of the rulers.

39

For the Muslims, the Sunni belief was the determinant; the other sects were

perceived as deviations from the Sunni orthodox tradition. However the members

other sects were categorized under the Muslim sector. There was not any national

sentiment among the subjects in the classical age but the religion was the critical

point in their perception of the other. The religion was not an obstacle to access the

sources (except for being ulema or joining the askeriyya class) of the Empire.

According to “the circle of justice” the state needs tax and this depends on the

welfare of the reaya. The reaya was very important for the state because he was the

main tax unit. The reaya was expected not to change this situation, for instance by

becoming a soldier. The main part of the subjects was composed of peasants

working on the arable lands. The other categories were the merchants and the

craftsmen. As the transfer of reaya from his status to military was not approved by

the administration, the transfer among these categories was also not approved and

the administration always tried to block ones who tried to change their economic

category; the peasants fleeing to the cities were forced to return, the craftsmen were

forced to preserve their position, etc. Even the members of these categories

complained about their colleagues changing their status. For instance the craftsmen

complained to the authorities many times about the ones who decided to be

merchants. Like the state, society itself was intolerant to the changes; the members

of society preferred the existing order.

In fact, the social mobility had been rare as soon as economic and political

stability set in the Empire. While the state expected certain manners from the

subjects, the ruled also had some expectations and demands from the ruler. Firstly,

the state should provide enough goods for the market, the raw materials should be

available for the craftsmen and the security must be set in the Empire. Apart from

these, the subjects were aware of their obligations to stay away from any demand

participating in the administration of the state. In Middle Eastern state tradition,

there is a hierarchical order. The subjects of these states saw the state as a sublime

power providing their needs in return for full obedience. It’s impossible to reach and

40

touch it. The ruler is the one chosen by God (zil’ullah fi’l-arz26) and administration

of the state was monopolized by the able and educated people; the cultural and

sociological position of the subjects was accepted as unfit for the administration.

Shortly, from both Islamic and traditional point of view, the subjects perceived the

state as a different notion from their daily lives, sublime and provider of the order.

We can exemplify it by expressing revolts resulting in the dethroning of some

Sultans: Although the Sultans, Grand Viziers and some high-ranking officials were

dismissed by the rebellions, any change in dynasty or the administration style never

came to the agenda. Another member of the Ottoman family was ascended to the

throne and let the ongoing administration style was continued.

The policy of the upper strata, ruler, and the mentality of the lower one, the

ruled, was complementary. Namely, while the state set and protected the order,

collected the taxes as much as it could, and impose a modest livelihood to the

subjects, the ruled, sure of his living and satisfaction of his basic needs, lived and

worked without endeavoring and forcing himself too much. One of the policies of

the state, to keep the subjects within the modest standards was leaving the moral and

religious area to the dervish order and heterodox beliefs (especially tassavuf) while

for itself the Sunni orthodox belief was the main doctrine. The state let the otherworldly

Sufi orders flourish in society in so far as they did not threaten the public

order. The ruler even supported them by donating lands to their pious endowments.

Some Sultans joined Sufi orders and conversed with their sheikhs.

With the penetration of these mystic orders into society, people became more

humble, other-worldly, inactive, etc. The Bayramiye, Mevleviye and Bektashi orders

were the main groups. These heterodox beliefs shaped the people’s perception of

time, place, property and material. The main doctrine of these beliefs was their

ignorance of property, material and this world for the moral happiness of the man.

For these, this world is a place to make preparation for the eternal life. The man

becomes wise (or human-beser becomes man-insan) if he suits out himself from

26 the shadow of God on earth.

41

material needs. Because of this, the Ottoman people put long distances between

them and the property, they did not think to evaluate it, or break into pieces or

analyze its component...etc. As Tanpınar states “the East accepts the material as it is

or as the changes it gave it at first contact.” (Tanpınar 1961, 132). Because of this,

the Ottoman craft made only partial changes on the raw materials.

Nature is another object which remains away from the heavy contact of the

Eastern people. In Eastern beliefs, the nature has never been an object with which

the people should fight and dominate. The big religions of the East like Buddhism,

Hinduism and Islam accepted the nature as an element of the world with which the

human shares life. In Islam, nature is given in trust to the man, and man’s obligation

is to save it in its original form. In Sufi orders every object in this world repeats

(zikir) the name of God, so their exploitation or damage is a sin.

These orders also recommend people a livelihood economy; working and

examining too much are wasteful activities which block the man thinking Allah. For

instance in Marifetname one advice is:

It’s wise to deal with worldly affairs as much as needed... the wise man is the

one who does not worry about his body (nefs) and life and work too much to

own the day and does not work too much to hinder himself from pray and

contemplation. [quoted from Ülgener (1981, 10-11)]

The scientific activity should also be dedicated to understand the order of God,

it’s a way to reach to the divinity. This order puts belief, moral values and

contemplation in the place of speculative and rational thinking (Sayar 1986).

Namely, every attention was diverted to the other world. In this respect, the wealth

was a social function. The money was a mean, not the object, to gain regard of the

people by giving charity and almsgiving and for a good investment for the other

world. The riches, even today, have been expected to build a mosque or contribute to

charity, and help the poor and needy. Famous expression “Shroud does not have

pocket” summarizes all above.

42

According to one of the main doctrines of Islam, every one has a

predetermined fate and it’s impossible to escape from the decisions of the creator.

Working too much and investing for the future are wasteful activities because the

future is only known by God. In this respect the earnings should be daily, and

tomorrow should be considered tomorrow. The word “rızk” which refers to earning

means earning of one day. It is unwise to demand more since one earns his rıık for

the day.

The guild organization of the Empire, also, sharpened the situation. Guilds are

the organization of the artisans and craftsmen in which the number of people

deployed, working conditions and regulations to be obeyed were determined strictly.

There was a hierarchical structure in the guilds and appointment to a higher rank and

establishing a new business were subject to ceremonies and approval of the masters.

The apprentice-master relation was the key element in appointments and apprentices

were expected to be in full obedience to their master’s personalities. Every guild was

headed by a spiritual sheikh and words were strictly obeyed by the guild members.

Futuwwaname is the constitution of the guilds and it contains the direction and

orders of the sheikh. “According to Futuwwa ethic, the perfect person is the one who

is generous, self-sacrificing and obedient to his superiors.” (nalcık 1973, 151). The

amount of product and which goods would be produced and sold by which artisans

or craftsmen were fixed carefully. Within the extent of protection of the reaya, the

abundance and scarcity in the market was avoided by the state and it is imposed on

guilds. Avarice and competition were considered as shameful behavior among the

guild members.

This is the general atmosphere in which the mentality of the Ottoman people

was shaped. It has really been a difficult task to transform this mentality into

modern, individualist and capitalist one. The endeavor is still going on, but we can

say about the Ottoman Empire that the lower strata almost preserved its traditionalist

character until the demise of the Ottoman Empire and transfer it to the Republican

43

Turkey. On the other hand, the upper strata achieved partial modernization, and

bifurcation in education and justice system went on until its disappearance.

The following three chapters involve the main body of the study. In these

chapters the traces of the transformation of the mentality within the Ottoman society

and the role of the Young Ottomans in this process will be discussed. In the next

chapter the interchanges in the citizenry and the notion of state of the Ottoman

subjects (ruled) and the administrators (ruler) will be given respectively.

44

CHAPTER 4. MAN AND THE STATE

When one starts to analyze the European Enlightenment and modernity, one

can easily see that the individual is put as the main actor of both processes. Unlike

the traditional orders, which evaluate the status of the individuals in the extent of

their belongings to a community or a class (not the class in the modern sense), the

new era needed individuals, enhanced with activism and enthusiasm, acting freely

and selfishly. Because the theory has been that the collection of such individuals will

automatically take the societies and humanity further on the way of prosperity and

freedom. In order to create such individuals ancient institutions and beliefs had to be

shaken, reformed and if they resisted, destroyed. Just as the monarchies were

shaken, the Christian beliefs were reformed, and the feudal system and bonds were

destroyed. The individuals, emancipated from these bonds, revealed the

incorrectness of the superstitions, traveled the world; got richer thanks to the inflow

of bullion and increasing commerce, and most importantly, stood against ancient

regimes for democratic rights.

In this side of the world, there had, both vertically and horizontally, been

different structures, but there were traditions and beliefs that classified the man

according to their membership to a community. As is described in the previous

chapter, being Muslim, member of a guild, sect or order put the individuals to

certain departments which cannot be changed by their personal efforts. In this

respect a Muslim is the worthiest creature of all. It is a blessing given to him by

God; he is worthy because of his belonging to Muslim community. (Aktas 1936)

However what the Young Ottomans had in mind was different. They were

aware of the importance of the term individualism. Especially for Namık Kemal, the

individual is very important, because of the political rights he must hold.27 In order

to create such men, they also put the ancient bonds under critical scrutiny, and tried

27 In fact what his aim is to create an identity for a simple Ottoman subject. He always addresses to

the Ottoman people and tries to activate them with his writings.

45

to free man from them: The guild system was criticized because it hindered the

personal improvement, the religious orders were criticized because they imposed

indolence and humble lifestyle to their members, and the Ottoman state system was

criticized which divided the society among the rulers and ruled and decrease the

ruled to a subordinated position (flocks of the Sultan) and applied slave system for

the officials. The common concept of all their criticism (especially Namık Kemal’s)

had been freedom (hürriyet).

If we name Namık Kemal as the first banner-holder of freedom in Turkish

political history, it will not be a wrong expression. As being a loyal libertarian, he

accepts the freedom as a natural right of every human being; it is not a gift granted

by a superior, nor can be correlated with a rank or duty. The man is free because of

his very existence.

In this respect, it can easily be grasped that for Namık Kemal, the individual

rights are more important than the public rights. The freedom of the individuals can

not be limited in the name of the safety of the public, because what is good for

society is the collection of the satisfactions of individual needs. Two quotations

from Namık Kemal will be helpful to illuminate this issue:

If the creature of the past and the future gathered and picked a hair from the

head of an Abyssinian boy without his consent, it would be cruelty like a

man committing homicide.28

No one has right to attack to the freedom for the sake of public benefit.

Everyone is the sultan of his world.29

Especially last quotation depicts the clear contrast between the standing of

Namık Kemal and the Ottoman traditional order, as well as Islam. Because, starting

28 “Alemde gelmis gelecek ne kadar mahluk var ise bir yere toplanarak en aciz bir Habes çocugunun

rızasını istihsal etmeksizin basından bir kıl koparmaya tesebbüs etseler hareketleri aynıyla bir

adamın ifnaya kalkısması gibi bir zulm-i sarh olur.” [Bazı Mulahazat-ı Devlet ve Millet, quoted from

Özön (1938)]

29 “Umum namına o istiklale taarruz etmekte hiçbir ferdin kat’a hakkı olamaz.

Her kimse kendi aleminin padisahıdır.” [quoted from Aktas (1936, 6)]

46

from the latter, in the history of Islam first war30 between two groups occurred

because of the disagreement about the priority of the individual rights or the public

rights, and the proponents of the latter won the battle and the Islamic state tradition

flourished on this philosophy. The Ottoman Empire, as the follower of this tradition,

put the safety of all as the main target, and did not hesitate to kill thousands for the

sake of public benefits. The right given to the Sultan to eliminate his brother is

another example of the understanding of the Ottoman administrators.

While the source of the freedom is the very existence of individuals, they can

realize this by way of their reason. From this point of view, reason becomes the

main tool in comprehending the world in contrast to a traditional Ottoman subject

who tries to open his “eye of the hearth” (kalp gözü) to realize allegedly the ‘real’

side of occurrences. Thanks to reason, the individual can attain knowledge of his

existence and freedom. Namely he brings down the Truth to the material world. This

is a “bit” too much in extending the limit of reason according to Islamic thought.

Anyway, his emphasis on freedom is clear:

Man is free because he has will to act, he has will to act because he has

reason…If one’s head is even smashed with stones, is it possible to change

his mind? Or his heart is cut into pieces with knives, is it possible to change

what he believes to be correct? So every idea is free and natural. If it is

changed, it won’t be accomplished by force but will of the person.31

Namık Kemal uses Western liberal tradition to support his idea and tries to

reconcile it with Islam to found his hybrid philosophy. However this natural right

30 Camel Incidence: It is the first big conflict between two Muslim groups. The main cause of this

was the assassination of Caliph Osman. The first group was led by the successor caliph Ali and the

other by the wife of Prophet Ayse. Ayse claimed that the right of Muslim is more important than the

community, so the murderer of Osman should be found urgently. On the other side Ali claimed that

the stability of the community is more important so the assassin should be found and executed after

the establishment of stability.

31“nsanın hürriyeti, muhtar oldugundan, ihtiyarı ise sahib-i fikir bulundugundan gelir….Bir adamın velev

taslarla beyni ezilsin, fikrince kanaat etiigi tasdikatı tagyir etmek kabil midir? Velev hançerle yüregi

paralansın, vicdanınca tasdik ettigi mu’tekadatı gönlünden çıkarmak mümkün olabilir mi? Demek ki nakli,

akli, hikemi, siyasi, ilmi, zevki her nev’i efkar zaten serbest, zaten tabiidir. Degisirse kimsenin icbarıyla degil,

tabiatın ilcasıyle degisir.” [Hürriyet-iEfkar, quoted from Kaplan (1974, 203)]

47

notion is problematic for the Islamic point of view. Firstly, Western thinkers attained

this notion by releasing political philosophy from association with theology (Mardin

2000, 316). Namely, they built another domain for their play. According to this

philosophy, which Namık Kemal aspires, the law of nature can be known by the

light of reason, and the reason can attain knowledge of the natural law through sense

experience. “This assumption automatically leads to the point that the binding force

of law of the matter does not lapse even at God’s own command.”(Mardin 2000,

318). As is seen, Namık Kemal, while supporting this philosophy, unintentionally,

gives the control of the occurrences to natural law. Furthermore, if reason can attain

the knowledge of it, it may also control it. This maybe what Namık Kemal was

looking for, but one thing is certain; he found it in a very different source. Because,

according to Islam, God is the main commander of the natural occurrences. The

kaza32 and kader33 understanding gives partial control and understanding to human.

There are always some points and distances which human reason cannot attain. They

are the hidden proofs of the glory of God.

Very shortly, Namık Kemal is a member of the individualist tradition. He

laments on the tradition and customs which hinder the freedom of people. The

freedom of every man, normally, brings the equality among individuals to the

agenda. Namık Kemal’s answer to the following question “How can an order be

founded among individuals who are equal and have same rights?” leads to the state

philosophy of the Young Ottomans.

Loyal to the libertarian tradition, Namık Kemal states that the scope of the

freedom of an individual is limited with another individual’s freedom. Individuals

can enjoy this right as long as they do not interfere with another’s scope of freedom.

Here, the reason is again at the stage to set the order among individuals.

32 destiny, predestination

33 fate

48

A power is needed for the sake of the individual benefit in order not to let

anyone go beyond his freedom and interfere with another’s scope of

freedom. The one that is responsible for setting this power is not the divinity

or any secret superior but reason.34

Freedom is very important for the Young Ottomans, because freedom will

give the Ottoman subject political rights against the Ottoman administration. In

order to understand the importance of freedom, social contract theories of both

Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha should be analyzed.

For Namık Kemal, society is the collection of the individuals who hold

freedom and the will to act. As the above argument implies, at the very beginning

the individuals decided to found an order, in order to block any instability or chaos,

by their reason. Namely there was a peace (as Locke states) at the beginning among

individuals, and what they did was the preservation of the existing order.35 This

agreement neither abolished individual rights nor created a public law. Just as he

insists that “There is no public law but law of individuals.” [quoted from Fındıkoglu

(1941, 211)]

For him it is even absurd to state such a law. What society (or public)

consists of is only the individuals who have rights of their own. Namely, any law

that ignores personal rights is invalid.

In the following step, these individuals made a contract among themselves

and appointed a person as the administrator. But, this is not a transfer of sovereignty,

because the sovereignty belongs to each individual. In this respect, the Sultan, or

anyone, who is appointed by the agreement of these individuals, is only a trustee.

The agreement of the individuals can withdraw this appointment anytime in case of

any unjust administration. Again the transfer of administration does not create a

34 “hakk-ı hürriyetinin haricine çıkarmamak için cemiyet içinde bir kuvve-i galibenin vücudu,

selamet-i beserin levazım-ı zaruriyesindendir…kuvve-i galibe koymaya yetkili güç ne ilahidir, ne de

gizli bir güçtür. Akıldır.” [Namık Kemal, Hukuk, quoted from Aktas (1936, 6)]

35 This claim contradicts with Islamic theory which accepts the God as the order giver of the troublemaker

humanity.

49

different legal body. The right of the individuals always exists and there is no need

to create a different structure. According to him, such a distinction (individual rights

on one side and the public rights (hukuk-u siyasiye) on the opposite side) is the main

reason behind chaos in a society.

Firstly, what Namık Kemal does, which contradicts with Islamic philosophy,

is that, for the satisfaction of liberal understanding, he reverses the Islamic state

theory by changing the trusteeship notion. In Islam it is God that gives governor the

right to rule, not the individuals. According to the theory God appoints the wisest

person among believers, in order to continue the order set up. However Namık

Kemal omits God and gives the individuals the right to appoint whom they want.

Besides, sovereignty does not belong to all, in Islam, but to God only.

Second, the state is described as an invention of the people by him. It is an

artificial institution and the law exists to protect personal rights. However the state,

according to Islamic state philosophy, is the instrument to continue the divine order,

and the law, namely the Sheria, is not for the protection of the personal rights but for

he sake of preserving the divine order.

When the claims of Ziya Pasha about the origin of the society and state are

considered, it can be comprehended that he also labels the state as an artificial

institution. To understand the claims of Ziya Pasha, the following, long quotation is

needed,

If one ever brings the fashion in which society arise and which in turn gave

rise to tribal origin and governments, reason leads one to the following

explanation: at first a few families were roaming completely naked through

the mountains, remaining on an elevation in summer and living in lower

parts in the winter, inside caves and feeding on wild fruits. With the

establishment of contacts between families, this roaming was undertaken (by

a few families) at one time. The single families, who saw two or three

families gathered in one place, joined them, and a new form was evolved and

the community progressively came into being. However, ambition, greed and

the desire of the victories to subjugate the defeated being congenital

tendencies of human character, the result of daily intercourse between

50

families was the rise of dispute and enmity. To settle these disputes a

principle became necessary. Thus the wisest and oldest (man) among the

families was chosen and these words were said to him: ‘because of your

superior qualities, the members of the community have agreed that you be

brought to the office of government. You shall serve them by taking care of

such and such a matter. Since you consequently will not have time to gather

nourishment like others, as long as you occupy this function everybody or

every family shall give you this much victuals everyday. If you do not fulfill

your duty satisfactorily, they shall find somebody to replace you.’ In short he

was brought to this office with the words, ‘You shall be a paid servant of the

community.’ When with passing of the time, the community grew and

houses and villages were built and other families began to gather in various

places in a similar fashion and were shaped into a society, and when disputes

began to arise between them and the judge, who had been chosen to settle the

disputes, was not sufficient any longer, the need was felt for a superior chief

to protect the community from the attacks of the enemy and to enforce the

execution of the orders of the judge. Thus, again, the one person, who was

best known among all families for his ability and material spirit, was again

brought to the executive office of government with a salary.36

As is seen, unlike Namık Kemal, Ziya’s contract was made in case of a war

among people. But there were also similarities, such as: Ziya Pasha’s contract was

made between people and the administrator. But it is certain and a strict belief that

first contract was made between people and the God before the creation of the

world. Ziya Pasha also reverses this notion and creates an artificial contract between

man and the “judge”.

What is interesting in Ziya Pasha’s theory is the description of the ruler as

the paid servant of the community. Claiming such an argument means criticizing the

very existence of the Sultan as the ruler. His status is decreased to a position of an

officer appointed by the people with a payment, and the only way to preserve his

status is to rule fairly. However according to Ottoman state understanding, the

Sultan is a blessing of God for the community. The ruled are his flocks and they are

given to him by God.

36 quoted from Mardin (2000, 341-342)

51

When the arguments of both Young Ottomans are analyzed carefully, the

notion of the modern state theory can be found even though they try to stay loyal to

Islamic thought. Just as, Namık Kemal insists on a modern state understanding when

stating: “Never doubt that the state is neither the father, teacher, executor, nor the

tutor of the people.”37

When they tried to legitimize their liberal standings towards the state

concept, they emphasized on the purist form of the Islamic administration. They,

once again sounds the glory of the Era of Happiness (Asr-ı Saadet) where the

sovereignty belonged to God, and no rank or status made one superior over the

others. The administrator is responsible to God for the happiness of each citizen of

the community. Just as Caliph Omar states: “If a shepherd’s sheep dies in the Sinai

desert, God asks its explanation from me”

There should be a state, but the existence of this state must be dedicated to

the happiness of the citizens. According to the liberal tradition, the state should not

interfere with the freedom of citizens. Every one is equal before the law. In its purist

form, Islam accepts every one as equal in the application of the law of God. To be a

ruler or rich does not lead to a preferential treatment. Even to be a ruler is a burden

because he will be responsible not only for himself and family but also for every

citizen of the city. Shortly, the undermining of the monarchies by the liberal

tradition and the purist version of Islam provided the Young Ottomans with a means

to reconcile both in their ideologies.

However their emphasis on this issue shakes the very philosophical

foundation of the Islamic states, because from the time the control of the caliphate as

an institution passed to the control of dynasties, they “reformed” Islam to legalize

their sovereignty by reconciling it with their ancient philosophies of administration.

In this respect, the Sultan was given a superior position over his subjects, and his

37 “Hiç süphe edilmemek iktiza eder ki hükümet halkın ne babasıdır, ne hocasıdır, ne vasisidir, ne

lalasıdır.” [quoted from Ülken 1966, 151)]

52

position was enhanced with the dogma that he is the shadow of the God on earth.

But, this dogma (the superiority of one over the others) is the main criticism point of

the Young Ottomans. Just as Ali Suavi states:

There is no sovereign but God. There is no sovereign among people and no

Sultan either. Namely no one has the right to execute, assault on

others….namely no one is the slave of the Sultan. Yes there is a governor but

he is not the Sultan but only a trustee38

Ali Suavi goes further and investigates (frankly denies) the legality of the

caliphate institution. According to him there has never been such an institution, but

it is the invention of so-called Islamic states:

Isn’t it awkward to accept the Sultan as a Pope or Islamic state as the state of

divinity?

Now on, we can bravely and unhesitatingly claim that no one, even if he is

called caliph, imam, sultan, or whatever, is the successor of the Prophet. The

claim ‘The Sultan sits on the post’ is a kind of illiterate expression and has

no concrete proof. Even the first four successors (Hulefa-yı Rasidin) had

never used the term caliph for themselves, how could the other snotties use

it?39

Each of the leading Young Ottomans tried to decrease the status of the ruler

to improve their arguments that the sovereignty belongs to all and everyone is equal.

Anyone, whoever analyses the arguments of the Young Ottomans, probably cannot

hold himself from thinking that what they had in their subconscious was the idea of

a “Republican regime”. They were loyal to the sultan in the beginning, and thought

the Ottoman society was not ready for a Republic, but with the increasing

inconsistency of Abdulaziz and the despotism of the Bab-ı Ali, they started to praise

38“Hakim ancak Allahu tealadır. nsandan hiçbir ferd hakim degildir, insandan hiç fert sultan degildir. Yani

kimsenin kimse üzerinde tasallut ve kahr ve tegallübe hakkı yoktur... Evet bir padisah vardır, lakin padisah

emirdir, ecirdir, nazırdır.” [quoted from Çelik (1994, 557)]

39 “Padisaha hakim-i ruhani Papa gibi bakmak ve hükümeti slamiyeyi ahkamı ilahiy-i sırfa üzre müesses bir

hükümet-i ruhaniye gibi müteala etmek abes kalmaz mı?”

Artık kemal-i cesaretle ve bila-tereddüd hükmederiz ki halife, imam, padisah, hasılı her ne nam ve unvan ile

olursa olsun hiç biri Peygamberimizin kaimmakamı veya vekili degildir. (Padisah Peygamber postunda

oturuyor) makuli cahil sözüdür, bir asl-ı seriye müstenid degildir. Riyasete geçtik de Peygambere vekalet

manası Hulefay-ı Rasidin’in bile hatırlarına gelmedi: Nerede kaldı ki sonra gelen sümüklülere!” [quoted

from Danismend (1942, 25)]

53

the Republican regime by using mostly allusion in their writings. For instance

Namık Kemal states that: “It is a wrong belief among Europeans that the Monarchy

is peculiar to the East while the Republican regime is for the West”40

However, sometimes, they cannot avoid expressing themselves by going

beyond the allusions, and reveal what is in their subconscious. In these writings

they, unhesitatingly, express that in proper conditions the best regime is the

Republic:

Isn’t it a must to confess that the people have right to demand Republic when

it is approved that the sovereignty belongs to all? What does confession

mean? Who can deny that right? Was not Islam a kind of Republic at the

beginning?41

And Ziya Pasha argues:

In Republic, there is no sultan, emperor, Grand Vizier. The Sultan, the

Emperor, The Grand Vizier… of the country is the people

In Republic, no corvee is used for timber and rope needed for the dockyards.

If administration needs them it pays for them.

In Republic, the newspapers do not owe praise to the government, but have

right to criticize it within the limits of law.

In Republic, there is a National Assembly whose members are elected by the

people of that country42

40“Evellen: surasını bilmek lazımdır ki “suver-i hükümetten Cumhuriyet, ve hükümet-i ba’z suretlerine dair

efkar Garb’a mahsus olup, Sark mine’l evvwel ile’l-yevm hükümet-i vahid (monark) fikriyle yasardı” diye

Avrupa’da mevcud olan bahis yanlıs bir meseledir. Sark’da mine-kadim bu efkar malumdur.”

[quoted from Kaplan (1974, 535)]

41“ Halkın hakimiyete hakkı tasdik olundugu surette cumhur yapmaga da istihkakı ‘itiraf olunmak

lazım gelmez mi? Demek ne demek? O hakkı dünyada kim inkar edebilir? slam ibtida-i zuhurunda

bir nev-i cumhur degil miydi?” [Namık Kemal, Usul-u Mesveret Hakkında Mektuplar quoted from

Aktas (1936, 13)]

42“dare-i cumhuriyede padisah, imparator, sadrazam, hariciye nazırı falan yoktur. Memleketin padisahı,

imparatoru, kralı, sadrazamı hep ahali-yi memlekettir.

dare-icumhuriye’de Tersane’ye lüzum olan kereste ve halat için ahali angarya kullanılamaz. Eger idareye

kereste ve halat lazımsa, parasını verir, ahaliden satın alır.

dare-i cumhuriyede gazeteler hükümete müdahene etmege borçlu olmayıp hükm-i kanun dairesinde her

türlü ta’rize mezundurlar.

dare-i cumhuriyede bir Millet Meclisi olur. Bunun azasını ahali intihab eder.” [ quoted from Kaplan

(1974, 78-79)]

54

Shortly, it can be argued that, under proper conditions, the Young Ottomans

would be the prior banner-holders of the Republic. In this respect the tone of the

dreams of both Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha is interesting and important. In their

writings both of them depicted the monarchy as dark and horrifying while freedom

and Republic as bright; a prosperous and happy life is promised to the people under

Republican regime.

A careful eye can also grasp some revolutionary notions in the writings of

each Young Ottomans. Except for Ali Suavi, even though they said they were

against any coup d’etat attempt, they sometimes used some provocative words. For

instance in Namık Kemal’s play, Gülnihal, the dialog between the servant of Muhtar

Bey, Zülfikar, who arrange a flight for his master and Muhtar Bey, who is jailed as a

result of a fake allegation, and decided to kill his half-brother who is responsible for

this allegation, is interesting:

Zülfikar – My Lord, murdering is not a punishment for the cruel, a state

cannot be saved by killing a man! My Lord, people are fed of and want to get

rid of the trouble.

Muhtar Bey – If they want why do they not do it? Why are three hundred

thousand men trembling from a man like the insane who is afraid of his own

shadow?43

Ali Suavi, as the most active member of the Young Ottomans, uses clearer

words:

O people! How long are you still going to believe that a Mahdi shall appear

and save you?

….do you think that emirs, who are in charge and who are free of question

and responsibility, will abandon what profits they draw out of you and begin

favor you?44

43 Zülfikar – Zalime katillikle ceza olunmaz. Beyim, bir adam öldürülmekle bir memleket kurtulmaz! Efendim,

halk canından bizar olmus, halk üzerindeki belanın defini istiyor.

Muhtar Bey – stiyor da niçin def etmiyor? Niçin üç yüz bin kisi, gölgesinden korkan deliler gibi, bir

adamdan titriyor! Benim neme lazım?” [Namık Kemal, quoted from Kaplan (1974, 422)]

44 quoted from Mardin (2000, 378)

55

Lastly, the Young Ottomans have things to say for the officials of the

Ottoman Empire. It is clear that they are against the slave system which contradicts

their strongest claim that everyone is equal. As is noted above, the Sultan as being

only the governor of the state does not have the right to have slaves. The Young

Ottomans demanded that the officials, in modern sense, serve the citizens of the

country with the reason. Besides their main aim must not be the satisfaction of the

Sultan’s demand but the satisfaction of the era’s and people’s need.

In this respect they accept the officials as the servant of people:

Just as the official is the servant not the tutor of the people, the criteria for

his appointment should be talent, not his sect or identity. [Namık Kemal, ,

mtizac-ı Akvam; quoted from Kaplan (1974, 214)]

The second part of the sentence reveals another, different standing of the

Young Ottomans. When they propose to change the criteria for appointment, they

are also changing the main condition of Islam which describes the one who is to be

obeyed. In Islam, the Muslims are ordered to obey to the one who is also a Muslim.

In this respect, a non-Muslim governor, attorney…etc. is totally out of a Muslim’s

mind.

The main evaluations are saved for the last chapter (conclusion), but the

below arguments for Ali Suavi and Namık Kemal, respectively, will give clear

indications about their impact on the following generations:

This creature from fire (Ali Suavi) dreamed about secularism during

theocratic era, republic during the Monarchic era, Turkish nationalism in the

era of Ottomanism, he tried to interpret them and lastly died while trying to

realize them.45

The dominant thesis of that Era was theocratic and monarchic. Kemal stated

an antithesis, against monarchy with the idea of freedom and against

45“….bu atesten mahluk (Ali Suavi) Teokrasi devrinde Laiklik, Mutlakiyet devrinde, Cumhuriyet ve

Osmanlılık devrinde Türklük ve Türkçülük rüyaları görmüs, bu rüyalarını tabire çalısmıs ve nihayet

gene bu rüyalar ugrunda sehit olmustur.”( Danismend 1942, 5)

56

theocracy with the idea of motherland, which will reach to a synthesis with

the foundation of the Turkish Republic.46

In this chapter we tried to reveal the efforts of the Young Ottomans for the

transformation of the mentality of the Ottoman subjects. This projected

transformation encompassed both the subjects as individuals, and the Ottoman state

apparatus (including the Sultan and the officials). There was a clear tendency

towards the modernization of the state administration. In the following chapter we

will try to go a step further and discuss their thoughts on the social stratification of

the Ottoman Empire.

46 “O devirde henüz Türk cemiyetinde sekil bakımından konulmus olan tez monarsik ve teokratik

mahiyetteki idare idi. Kemal hürriyet fikri ile monarsiye, vatan fikri ile de teokratik idareye karsı bir

antitez vazetmis böylece, ancak istiklal harbinden sonra kati bir sentez haline gelebilen demokratik

cereyana suurunu vermis oluyordu.” (Karatay 1941, 11)

57

CHAPTER 5. THE SOCIETY (or THE COMMUNITY)

In this chapter two concepts will be emphasized; these are secularism and

nationalism. It is necessary to point out that the Young Ottomans brought new and

radical ideas onto the agenda of the Ottoman intellectual circles. It is debatable

whether they could make the ordinary people hear their voice but one of the

functions of the intellectuals in a society is their ability to name and describe the

changes effecting the social structures and life. The Young Ottomans might not drag

the people to the political arena as easily as they expected but they drew the picture

of a man who is trying to understand what is going on and reflected the panic and

flurry of a man who is trying to take necessary measures against the changing

conditions which effect every segment of his life.

In this respect they felt that something must be done very urgently and, by

reserving the basic institutions of the state and society, some adaptations must be

brought from the West for the problems which could not answered by the present

intellectual milieu. At this point it has to be said that, by way of their encyclopedic

and superficial knowledge, they could well understand that Western progress owed

much to the abolition of the hegemony of the religious institutions on intellectual

thinking. However what they could not realize was that the same process in an

Islamic state and society mean the depreciation of the values and institutions which

they tried to preserve.

Another important notion in Western progress is the invention of the

nationalism. It began as a project in almost every country. The modern state had to

be involved by the people who speak the official language, have a motherland vision

and sympathy to their country men. The scope of the modern state had to be wider

than the traditional state regarding the masses which will be motivated for the

prosperity of the nation and the state. If modernism would be the case for the

Ottoman Empire a re-imagination of the people as a nation was to be expected. The

Young Ottomans envisaged this thought and tried to motivate the subjects of the

58

Empire gather under the flag of the Ottoman state. However such a tendency,

inevitably, was a threat for the millet system which was regarded to be the guarantee

of the harmony and stability of the Empire.

In this chapter secularism and nationalism will be the challenging ideas

focused on.

Secularism:

Secularism was the attempt to turn the attentions of the people to this world.

It was the program of bringing back the ideal and the Truth to this world. It has been

a project to rescue humanity from the yoke of religion and dogma with the light of

reason and knowledge; shortly being more this-worldly in social and individual

level.

In the beginning it is useful to remember the thoughts of the Young

Ottomans about the Caliphate. First of all, according to them the state should be for

the protection of the basic individual rights. The political and social rights of the

citizens should be secured and the state should let everyone enjoy their rights. In

addition to this, they, especially Namık Kemal, did not accept any right (hukuk)

other than individual rights. If his social contract theory is remembered, he accepts

that the community or the state as the collection of the individuals who have

freedom. Such a collection does not mean a different legal body. At this very point

there is a critical position held by the Young Ottomans that because the caliphate is

the successor of the Prophet and responsible for the continuation of the divine order,

he has to have a legal standpoint of his own. Namely disclaiming the legacy of any

institution or structure other than the individual implies a rejection of the ultimate

authority of the Caliphate. Even if they did not say explicitly, their ideas bear the

arguments that there is no Islamic society or state either.

59

Let’s be clearer. In Islam the notion of community is very important; it is

supposed by Islam that the ideal society is the community of the Muslims which

shows the glory of the divine order on earth. There is some worship which Muslims

must perform with or in the community; for instance the Cuma pray, zekat

(almsgiving), even pilgrimage. The ummet does not refer to the addition of single

Muslims but to the community. Yes, there is a rule which expresses that everyone is

responsible for his own act, but this does not mean the individualism as understood

by the West. The individual can earn heaven as soon as he satisfies the need of his

family, relatives, community, etc, help the poor and the needy, etc.

State is somehow debatable, because some Islamic philosophers claim that

the state itself does not have to be a state of Islam as soon as it lets the believers

worship freely, while others insists on the state’s role as the representative and

banner-holder of the divinity. However the Young Ottomans insist on the

continuation of the Ottoman Empire as the representative of Islam. But as is seen

above, there are contradictions in their thoughts. They omit that the state and

religion are believed as two inseparable brothers (din –u devlet) the disappearance of

the one means the demise of the other for the Ottoman understanding.

While Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha, unintentionally, undermined the

Caliphate and Islamic state and society, Ali Suavi did it openly. As is stated in the

previous chapter, he is neither the opponent nor the proponent of the demise of the

Caliphate, because for him there had never been such an institution for the Muslims

(Danismend 1942, 25). He believes that the caliphate is an invention of the Eastern

monarchies to legalize their existence and continuity.

When the Caliphate and the Islamic state “reality” are disclaimed then the

law, moving side by side with these institutions, is opened to the criticism

automatically. The Sheria had always been the basic law for the Islamic states,

although they composed it with their traditional laws (örf, adet). In these orders the

dogmas imposed by these channels have priority against reason. Although Islam

60

addresses the people who have reason, the belief must be approved by the hearth

(kalp-gönül). In this atmosphere, the reason has a limit and is insufficient to

understand the Truth wholly. The doors of the Truth are opened according to rank

determined by the sincerity of the belief of the Muslims. The Prophets are the ones

who are allowed to know more, the others’ ability to know comes after them47.

Shortly, ordinary men can not know the result of his decision completely; they have

to obey the discretion of God who knows the good and bad for the people. As a

result, the human is deprived of comprehending the world.

However, as is stated in the previous chapter, and will be stated in the

following chapter in detail, the Young Ottomans believed that the human can attain

the knowledge of natural law with his reason. To make the long story short, they

argued that in the administration of the state reason must be used instead of

traditional beliefs. The science and technology must be the essence of the decisions

taken by the state: “The essence of the political science is not the Sheria but

Geography, Economics and Morality.”48

It is very clear that they demand the Sheria be constrained within the private

sphere. Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha insist on the application of the Sheria but it

must be stated that what they want is the reformed form of Sheria. Just as in the

letter, which was sent by Mustafa Fazıl Pasha to the Sultan, some clear messages are

given about the issue:

But my Lord, you, of course, know better than me that the religion and sect

address to the soul and promise us the moral blessings; it is clear that what

limits and determines the law of the nations is not the religion or sect. If

religion does not keep its position as the Truth, namely, interferes to worldly

affairs, it will destroy all and itself also.49

47 In this respect Mirach is the revelation or presentation of the Truth for the Prophet by God

48 “lmi siyasetin esası Seriat degil, Cografya, ktisat ve Ahlaktır.” [Ali Suavi quoted from

Danismend (1942, 24)]

49 “Ancak Padisahım Efendim, Zat-ı sahaneniz benden ra’na bilirsiniz ki, din ve mezhep ruha

hükmeder ve bize ni’am-ı uhreviye vaad eder; su kadar ki milletlerin hukukunu tahdid ve tayin eden

61

Or Ali Suavi states:

Reform in alphabet is a good reform (emr-i hasane). In such subjects it is

better not to mention bid’ at. Because bid’ at means to propose what does

not exist in religious terminology. Issues, such as this, are about the worldly

affairs, not the affairs of the divinity. We have to change and reorganize our

worldly affairs according to our needs.50

…otherwise, what we call the political science is not a thing donated with

miracles and extraordinary powers which cannot be attained with reason.51

If a comparison was made among the Young Ottomans to determine which

one was the most radical, the winner would be, unhesitatingly, Ali Suavi. His zealot

character (as named by Serif Mardin) shaped the tone of his writings. In addition to

his thought about the Caliphate and the secular state administration, he is also the

one who argued that worship can be performed in Turkish. To voice this idea is

extremely controversial even today he insists on the usage of Turkish in worships by

quoting the arguments of leading Islamic philosophers and leaders. According to

him the verses can be translated into Turkish, the hutbe, in Cuma prayer, can be

addressed in Turkish and the prayer can be performed in Turkish.52

It should not be assumed that Islam ordered that Arabic is the language of the

religion because Quran was sent in Arabic. It is not true; just as is not he

(mam-ı Azam Ebu Hanife) the one who announced a fatwa for the non-

Arabs to use their own languages while praying?53

din ve mezhep degildir. Din hakayık-ı ezeliye makamında durup kalmazsa, yani umur-ı dünyeviyeye

dahi müdahele ederse, cümleyi itlaf eder, kendisi dahi telef olur.”[Mustafa Fazıl Pahsa quoted from

Kaplan (1974, 10)]

50 “Islah-ı hat emr-i hasenedir. Böyle meselelerde bidat tabiri karıstırılmasa iyi olur. Çünkü bidat

ıstılah-ı serde dinde olmayan bir seyi peyda etmek demektir. Böyle hat gibi meseleler ise umur-ı

diniyyeden olmayıp, umur-ı dünyeviyyemizdendir. Umur-ı dünyeviyyemizi iktiza-yı mesalihe göre

tebdil ve tagyirde muhtarız..”[Ali Suavi quoted from Kaplan (1974, 521)]

51 “Yoksa ilm-i siyaset dedigimiz insanların aklı ermeyecegi avaid-i fevkalade üzre mucizat ile tertip olunmus

gibi bir sey degildir.” [Ali Suavi quoted from Kaplan (1974, 530)]

52 which means the verses can be read in Turkish while praying.

53 “Sakın zannolunmasın ki fil’asl Arabi olan su lisanın amme-i slama lisan olmasına Kur’anın

Arabi olusu ve adem-i tercemesi cebretmistir. ste bu da böyle degildir; zira (mam-ı Azam Ebu

Hanife) degil midir ki Arap olmayanlar için Kur’anı kendi lisanına terceme ile namazda bu tercemeyi

okumaga fetva verdi?”[Ali Suavi quoted from Danismend (1942, 34)]

62

So if this is the case, why are our people forced to read Arabic version of the

commentary on Quran like Khadi Celaleyn and Ebu-suud? How will we

mean this? Do you say it is tradition? Do you say, because they do not have a

Turkish version of the commentary on Quran, they read the Arabic version?

It is wrong, because there are Turkish versions.54

What all above meant for the people of the Ottoman Empire is clear. The

mentality shaped by morality and religion was forced to change; the social structure

shaped according to traditions was shaken. The mentality, proposed by the Young

Ottomans, leads the hesitation for the people about the things which they know and

believe as the truth.

Nationalism:

Most of this section will be shaped by the thoughts of Namık Kemal about

Turkish (even if he prefers to say Ottomanism) nationalism. H was a sincere

Ottomanist, however his followers accept him as one of the founders of Turkish

nationalism. In this part the dilemma of the Young Ottomans that they faced while

they were trying to offer a nation building project, will be discussed but firstly it is

necessary to understand the ideas of Namık Kemal about nationalism and the

motherland (Vatan).

As is mentioned in the third chapter, the motherland meant for an Ottoman

subject, the place where he was born. He was characterized by the people of another

region according to his birthplace (memleket). He, also, felt himself as stranger

outside of his own place. Turkish folk music is full of such feelings one feels when

he is out of his town. However this was for the micro lives. In the big picture, for a

Muslim, the world is divided into two sectors: one is the land of Islam (dar-u’l

Islam) and the rest is the land of infidels (dar-u’l Harp). But the owner of both is

God. What Muslims are expected to do is the Islamisation of the land of infidels.

54 “Hal böyle iken yine halkımızın camilerde medreselerde Kadı ve Celaleyn ve Ebusuud gibi Arabi Tefsir

okumaları ne içindir? Buna ne mana verecegiz? Görenek mi dersiniz? Bu görenek ne içindir derim?

Türkçede tefsir yok onun için Arapçadan okuyorlar mı dersiniz? Yanlıstır. Zira Türkçe tefsirlerimiz var.” [Ali

Suavi quoted from Kaplan (1974, 516)]

63

Namely, for a Muslim there cannot be a concrete, predetermined place which is

encircled with boundaries. In Ottoman reality, like other Islamic states, first (micro)

was for the subjects, the realization of the second one was transferred to the state by

the Muslim subjects while delivering the suzerainty right.

In micro level, there was no need for sharing the same goals among neighbor

villages or towns. Everyone was allowed to live on his own land and any

interference was forbidden by the state. The borderline of the “motherland”, for

those people, starts and finishes within their birthplace. Of course, such an

understanding cannot be accepted by the modern nation state which Namık Kemal

had in mind.

For this reason, he had to challenge both micro and macro understanding. In

micro level, he tried to create a motherland vision for the subjects of the Empire.

This was an attempt of enlargement which goes beyond the “motherland” vision of

the traditional perspective. He offered a motherland which refers to the lands of the

Ottoman Empire. He addressed all the people, disregarding their compartmental

position, in millet system, to gather under the flag of the state and defend their

motherland. The main tone of his plays and poems was the praise of the nation and

motherland.

In the macro level, an opposite attempt was made by Namık Kemal which

can be called the constraining attempt. According to this vision, the state is proposed

to concentrate on the land and people within its borders. It has to improve the

prosperity of the Ottoman nation. Namık Kemal tried to limit the tendency of the

Ottoman administration, towards keeping the interest of the Muslims all around the

world as the preserver of faith. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Young

Ottomans did not have any writings which criticized the assault of the Western

countries against the Muslim lands. Ziya Pasha even appreciated the British Empire

for her annexation of India thanks to her patience and effort in the way of progress.

64

[Hürriyet, N.40 quoted from Kaplan (1978, 101)] 55. Besides, the state is, also,

proposed to apply same law for the subjects irrespective of their religion and sect.

The subjects, now citizens, of the Empire were called to gather under the flag

of the Ottoman Empire and work for the prosperity of their nation. The glory and

harmony of the Ottoman society was praised by the Young Ottomans, namely a

nation living in the motherland for the same goals.

Up to this point everything is proper for a classic nation building. Namely

what they tried to do is Ottoman nationalism. But the ideas borrowed from the West

and their confused consciousness did not let them create a nation and motherland on

which all of the Ottoman millets desired to live. In Western nation states the

centralization and modernization forced the people of the countries to use official

language, sometimes believe official religion, and obey the rule of the central

authority. When the Young Ottomans borrowed the idea of the Western thinkers

about freedom, monarchy, nationalism and modernity, such applications would

inevitably, come after. Of course these requirements intensified their confusion and

while they tried to announce Ottomanism, they offered the Turkish as a common

language and the Turks as the glorious.

If we turn back to the discussion mentioned at the beginning, the Young

Ottomans realized the necessity of creating a nation from the communal structure of

the Ottoman Empire. They accepted the national state model of the West as the ideal

and tried to determine the main determinants of being a nation. In this respect,

Ottomanism was a political nationalism project. It is absolutely an “imagined”

nation56 which was tried to be created by the Young Ottomans57. Because, as is

55 Ali Suavi’s criticism about the Khive Khanate should have to be stated but it should be

remembered that the interest of Ali Suavi towards this country was about their nationality not

religion.

56 It was the expression used by Benedict Anderson; (1991)

57 The same process had been seen in the Habsburg Empire. As an Empire including many ethnic

communities, it tried to create a vision for its subject in the way of creating a nation.

65

stated in Chapter III, Ottomanism had never referred to an identity of any millet

within the Empire. It was the identity of the rulers. Expanding the scope of this

identity and making it the identity of the Ottoman people, firstly, required a change

in its meaning. In fact, the goal of the rulers, for some time58, was to gather all of the

subjects under the name of Ottoman. The Young Ottomans accepted the model of

the Tanzimat and used the expression “Osmanlı milleti” to refer the citizens of the

Ottoman Empire in their writings.

In the second step, a common language must be put aside for the citizens of

the Empire in order that they could communicate with the state and other citizens.

The classical Ottoman language was not suitable for this purpose. A more simple

language should be used for official writings and education. There was an attempt

for the name of using simple language before Tanzimat; it was in the first official

newspaper, Takvim-i Vakayi, published under the reign of Mahmud II. The language

used in this newspaper was, relatively, simpler.59 Also the Young Ottomans tried to

use a simple language in order to be able reach their readers easily. But this is not a

simple marketing tactic, they insisted on the usage of a simple and common

language for official writings, education and daily communication. They tried to

integrate the subjects of the Empire both politically and socially.

However, their confused consciousness, mentioned above, and the peculiar

situation of the Empire did not let them offer clear proposals. First of all, the identity

of the Ottoman became very wide when it is used for the entire range of subject.

Even the Turks hesitated to be named as Ottomans. To be clearer, the Young

Ottomans were in lack of a subject which can be called Ottoman. However they

needed one to build a nation so they emphasized the Turks to name the nation they

58 Begining with the Tanzimat

59 It should be stated that the newspaper was not published only in Turkish, but the copies in different

languages of the communities of the Empire, such as Arabic, language of Armenians..etc. were also

printed and circulated. This shows that , in that time, the Otoman state was far from a nation building

project.

66

tried to create. “Among the Ottoman community Turks, thanks to their glorious

talent, features and population, earn the prior status.”60

Their emphasis on Turks caused some hesitation about their Ottomanism

vision. However apart from this, the ideology of nationalism among ethnic

communities of the Empire revealed a different conclusion. Mutual emphasis on

ethnic identity (even the real intention of the Young Ottomans was Ottomanism)

accelerated the process.61

In conclusion we have to state, once again, that the Young Ottomans were

sincere Ottomanist. The process described above was totally different from the ideal

in their mind. They always worked for the unity of the Ottoman state and society.

They did not intentionally emphasize Turks and Turkish in order to construct a

Turkish nationalism. However their open-ended claims let the proponents of

different ideologies of the following generations interpret them differently.

Following two quotations are illuminative to show the repercussions of their

thoughts on the following generations:

Kemal’s most important and glorious inheritance is the love of the

motherland, it was once a moral love, and with the appearance of him it

became this-worldly (Tarhan 1955, 105)

We commemorate him (Namık Kemal) because he is one of the first showing

us the Western thought. He is the greatest ideologue of us. He is the

precursor of the present. He is nationalist, patriot… (Gündüz 1955, 105)

Secularism and nationalism are two important concepts of modernization.

They targeted the traditional state formations which depended on the religion (or

traditions) and the glorification of the imperial center. The Ottoman Empire had

always tried to avoid the disintegration of the harmony in the Empire that had rested

60 “Osmanlı camiası içinde gerek nüfus kalabalıgı gerekse kabiliyetleri itibariyle birinci mevkide

“vüsat-i havsa, itidal-i dem” tahammül ve sükunet gibi mümtaz meziyet ve sıfatlara malik bulunan

Türkler isgal etmektedir.” [Namık Kemal quoted from Kaplan (1974,..229)]

61 See Karpat (2001, 320)

67

on the millet system. The Young Ottomans also demanded the continuity of this

order but the unavoidable consequences of their proposals62 were in contradiction

with the very basis of this idealized order. In this chapter we tried to discuss their

proposals and their probable consequences. In the following chapter (which is the

last chapter of the main body) the changes in the world view of the ordinary

Ottoman man will be evaluated.

62 we should once again repeat that they are neither the initiator nor the sole cause of the destruction

of the harmony mentioned

68

CHAPTER 6. THE MENTALITY OF THE ORDINARY MAN

In this chapter the most elaborate dimension of the mentality transformation

will be handled: the transformation of mentality of the ordinary man who felt the

effects of the changing environment deeply, the deep effect of modernization in

beliefs and perspective. His understanding of time, space, economics and this-world

was forced to change. He had to find ways to survive under the new conditions. In

this respect the deviation from the morality set by the traditional doctrines was most

observed in this dimension. Namely, the mentality followed a different way to

position itself in new conditions. Besides, because the morality of the traditional

order did not disappear swiftly, the most dramatic bifurcation63 emerged in the lives

of the ordinary man; while he tried to or pretended to obey the traditional order, he

adopted new rules in his life in order to continue his livelihood.

The thoughts of the Young Ottomans were, actually, the reflection of this

dilemma in intellectual level; they were the voice of the Ottoman subjects who tried

to redefine their position. In fact their emphasis on the concept of individual was an

exit from this dilemma. The individual, enhanced with reason and ability to

comprehend the law of nature, could show enough resistance to the difficulties of

the new conditions. In this respect, their conception of individual is not only

important at the political level; the economic dimension of it should be kept in mind.

The enthusiastic and selfish human being has been the main actor of modernization

process, and the Young Ottomans showed that they well understood the importance

of this concept.

As is mentioned above, the individual is enhanced with reason and ability to

understand the law of nature. Namık Kemal stated that the human dominates the

world with reason. Because he has the ability to understand the law of nature and

can attain the knowledge of the Truth with reason, he can dominate the world.64 If

63 More dramatic than the bifurcation of Tanzimat as expressed by Berkes.

64 See Hikmet-i Hukuk quoted from Kaplan (1974, 207)

69

this argument is analyzed carefully, it can be understood that it will lead to an

understanding that the Truth belongs to this world, not to the eternal world as

expressed by the Islamic doctrine. So the effort must be searching it in this world.

Namely, like Protestant belief, the eternal happiness can be gained through this

world.65 Then isn’t it reasonable to work for this world? The answer of Namık

Kemal to this question is a clear “Yes”:

Although human is a mortal being he has to work as if he is immortal.

Otherwise, if everyone concentrates on only his time of existence in this

world and everyone arranges his effort according this time, humanity can not

last. There is a kalenderane66 mentality which claims that everything is done

by God only, labor and effort are all useless. Whereas, in this world the

property is accumulated, and this occurs as a consequence of work. In order

to guarantee the future, it should be earned twice but spent once.67

The achievement of such an understanding among Ottoman identities would

need a big shift in their economic mentality. In every traditional society,

subsistence-minded economic understanding had been dominant. In the Ottoman

and the Islamic understanding, because the owner of the property is god and he

gives rızk to his kuls according to measure he predetermined, the result of the

endeavor can not be foreseen by anyone. In tevekkül understanding, the final

decision is expected from God for the result of the human endeavor.

Besides, the accumulation was accepted as a bad habit by society; spending

money for almsgiving, founding pious endowment, organizing feasts…etc. were the

65 In this respect, it is meaningful that Ali Suavi was called as “Protestant Suavi” by the stanbul

newspapers. (Atay 1954, 104)

66 the expresion ‘kalenderane’ used for the people who almost cut his material bonds with this world.

They drink wine and establish loose connections with daily life. It can not be used for all members of

heteredox beliefs in the Ottoman society. However Namık Kemal’s tone implies that the expression

also involves the orders who prefer an “ascetic” life style

67 “nsan fani oldugu halde yine ebedi hayata mahzar olacak gibi çalısmalıdır. Yoksa herkes sayini müddeti

hayatı nispetiyle tahdit ederse ömrü daimi olan insaniyet baka bulamaz. Bizde kalenderane bir zihniyet

vardır; her ne yaparsa Allah yapar; emekler saiyler hep beyhudedir, diyorlar. Halbuki dünyada mal ıtlak

olunur ne varsa hepsi çalısmak ile vücuda gelir. Müstakbeldeki hali emniyet altına almak iki kazanıp bir

yemekle mümkün olur.”[ Say, quoted from Özön, M. Nihat, (1938, 221)]

70

signs of welfare, not the money one holds. Shortly what is important for such

societies was not production but consumption.

Such an atmosphere, normally, led to a bohemian life style which the Young

Ottomans could not accept. The humble, passive human had to be turned into a

furious and energetic one who has ideals about this world and one who is

enthusiastic to have the richness of this-world. However, firstly, the human must be

reminded that he has will to act and he can control his own action:

I do not care even if I am told that I have no freewill and what I know as

freewill is only the result of some successive occasions. Since I definitely

know I am free to write or not to write these lines when I get the pencil in my

hand and do not feel any outside effect determining my intention about

writing, I, of course, know I am free.68

Namely, the control of the human act is taken from God and given to human

himself, so human is given two certificates by the Young Ottomans, first

understanding that praises the labor for this world, second the freewill. Thanks to

these two certificates human could be braver, reasonable, he could make analytic

projections and will try to realize his very existence in this world. In fact what the

Young Ottomans tried to do was imposing the Ottoman subjects self-confidence.

They lamented the sluggish type imposed by the religious orders. In this respect, the

basic characters of Namık Kemal’s plays and novels are furious, energetic and selfconfident.

What do we have in our hand? Are not they totally a mind and a heart from a

piece of meat and a few drops of blood? But what did we do with this mind

and heart? What are we still doing? We gathered a few pieces of wood and

built a ship, put some trees on it and attached a piece of linen to these trees.

Thanks to these, we can travel all around the world and dominate the earth.

Air brings what power it has; winds from that side uproots the trees,

68 “bana istenildigi kadar sende fi-nefs-il emr ihtiyar yoktur. htiyar zannettigin ahval birbirini takip

ederek gelmekte olan bir takım esbabın netayicinden ibarettir denilsin dursun. Ben madem ki kalemi

elime aldıgım zaman su satırları yazmakta veya yazmamakta muhtar oldugumu ilmel-yakin, aynelyakin

biliyordum ve bana yazmayı istemekte veya istememekte hariçten hiçbir sebebin tesir eyledigini

göremiyorum, elbette kendimi muhtar bilirim.” [Namık Kemal, Hukuk, quoted from Özön (1938,

63)]

71

collapses the hills to each others; air drags the sea, mixes the deep of the seas

and reveals the stones of the bottom of the seas to the surface. It seems as if

it will swallow everything on its way but we, still, challenge it with those

trees and linen. We struggle again and again; wind gets tired but human does

not. He demands another storm, another enemy to challenge.69

What is expressed in this quotation is the next phase of the human who takes

the control of his action; fighting with the blockades on the way of progress. In

western progress, first step was the emancipation of the human from the traditional

and ancient bonds. He had been given an identity as an individual. Then the

hegemony of the religion on knowledge abolished. Thanks to this achievement, the

ordinary man (layman) realized the truth and forced the dogmas. Every progress

increased the self-confidence of the humanity. Human with reason, as the main actor

in this progress was praised and it is expressed that human can learn and know

everything with reason. If he can learn and know he can also control and dominate

it. Namely mental achievement should be completed with physical one. Shortly, the

nature, which is both a laboratory and obstacle for the human progress should be

controlled by humanity. As seen above, Namık Kemal does not draw a different

picture. He praises the achievement of humanity against natural obstacles and labels

nature as the enemy. “In the countries, called civilized, humanity almost totally

dominates the nature.”70

As is well known, this domination has not been an innocent control. It bears

exploitation which cannot be accepted by many Eastern belief systems. However

69 “Elimizde ne var? Ne oldugu bize meçhul bir akıl ile bir kaç lokma etten, birkaç damla kandan yapılmıs

bir gönül degil mi? Ya biz o akıl ile bu kalp ile neler yapmısız? Neler yapıyoruz? Birkaç tahtayı bir yere

toplamısız, bir tekne haline koymusuz, üzerine birkaç agaç dikmisiz, kenarlarına birkaç arsın bez baglamısız

o sayede su gibi bulundugumuz dünyanın dört yanını tutmus, haya gibi oturdugumuz kürenin her tarafını

ihata etmis iki mehip kudretin ittifakına galip geliyoruz. Hava ne kadar kuvveti var ise meydana çıkarıyor,

mesela su taraftan esiyor, agaçları kökünden söküyor, tepeleri birbirine çarpıyor, denizde ne kadar su varsa

önüne katıyor; ona da kanaat etmiyor, deryanın ka’arını karıstırıyor, rast geldigi tasları toprakları su yüzüne

çıkarıyor, bu tarafa dogru sürüyor. Önüne her ne tesadüf ederse yutacak gibi görünür, biz yine agaç

kırıklarıyla, o bez parçalarıyla karsısına, zıddına gidiyoruz. Ugrasıyoruz, ugrasıyoruz; rüzgar yoruluyor,

siddetinden kuvvetinden kalıyor, insan yine yorulmuyor, bir fırtına daha istiyor, çarpısacak bir düsman

bekliyor.” [Namık Kemal, Akif Bey quoted from Kaplan (1974, 428)]

70 “Memalik-i mütemeddine dedigimiz yerlerde tabiat-ı beser bayagı tabiat-ı aleme tahakküm etmis”

[Namık Kemal, Terakki quoted from Kaplan (1974, 199)]

72

this domination has always been tried to be legalized by its addition to the welfare of

humanity. Frankly, the Young Ottomans did not have time to discuss the negative

effects of this domination. They dealt with the result much more than the process.

They demanded modernization, individualization and welfare very urgently. Isn’t it

Islam that orders working? So the Ottomans must also work harder. Isn’t it Islam

that orders Muslim be powerful? So the state should set its order to progress…etc. If

the answers of such questions are given superficially who can say that they must be

“No”? Actually, no one. However a thorough analysis will reveal the reality that a

dramatic shift was needed for the Ottomans to accept this process.

In fact, even the result would not attract the Ottomans because of the humble

life style. Just as Namık Kemal, harshly, assaulted on this mentality.

Modesty, which means satisfaction with the things one earned as a result of

sufficient labor, is attributed a different meaning. When one owns a cloak

and a morsel, he felt himself as the owner of an inexhaustible treasury. Also

it becomes a merit to rest in his residence without doing anything. As soon as

these thoughts are dominant among people it is impossible to find any

surplus rebounded from the amount spent from the livelihood of anyone or

any stone building from one’s ancestors.71

From a different perspective, this quotation summarizes the mentality of the

Ottoman subjects. Because this world is the temporary residence of Muslims, extra

effort is meaningless when one earns his livelihood. The buildings were also the

reflection of this mentality, so they were very modest and feeble against time; timber

and brick were the main materials of the buildings. Namely every object and

atmosphere reminded people that this-world is temporal and extra effort is

meaningless (even sin) which made people too much involved with worldly affairs.

71 “Elden gelen sa’yi fi’ile getirdikten sonra müyesser olan kisb ile iktifa demek olan kanaat baska manaya

hamlolunmus. Bir hırka ile bir lokma nasib oldu mu, bir kenz-i layüfnaya malikiyet zehabı hasıl olarak tenperverlik

peygulesinde yan gelip zevke bakmak sevap hükmünde tutuluyor...Halkta bu fikirler mevcud iken

hemen hiç kimsenin çekmecesinde havayic-i zaruriyesini idare edecek miktardan ziyade ve belki o kadar para

bulunabilmek ve hemen hiç kimseye ceddinden –tamir ihtiyacından vareste- bir kargir hane kalmak ihtimali

yoktur.” [Namık Kemal, Terakki quoted from Kaplan (1974, 201)]

73

Both divan and folk literature supported this mentality. Firstly, the subjects

and objects of the divan literature were always abstract; the concrete issues were told

with allusions and abstract metaphors. Besides the style of the literal works were

accepted more important than the subject itself. The content was usually sacrificed

for the sake of style. Second, both divan literature and folk literature dictated the

mentality that extra effort for this world is meaningless. The divan literature did this

by proposing extravagancy and excess entertainment. Joy, wine and luxury had been

the main theme for this literature.

In folk literature there had been two main currents. The one, under the

control of religious orders, used the modesty and proposed people be modest and

content with what God gave them. The second currency was more “this worldly”, it

expressed the joy of life, natural beauties and love as its main theme. However even

this tendency had never been too much “this worldly”. People are recommended to

enjoy this world because it is a temporary existence. It is, again, dominant in this

type of folk literature that the effort devoted for this life is meaningless. Beside this,

according to both currents, justice will be set in the judgment day; so it is wise to let

the judgment to God prevail.

However, the Young Ottomans’ effort had been for this world. Because of

this, they criticized the main style of the divan literature and claimed that the idea or

meaning is the essence of the literature.72

In our literature the meaning is sacrificed for the style that contemplation

becomes excessive. It is excessive that, sometimes, it is unclear if there is an

idea given.73

The concept of time is also flu in both literature and lives of the people. What

is important for the people was the time they live; past was only a memory, it was

72See Namık Kemal, Talim-i Edebiyat quoted from Kaplan (1974, 381)

73 “Edebiyatımızda mana sanat ugruna feda oluna geldiginden vüs’at-i tasavvur o derece ifrata

varmıstır ki, bazı kere tahayyülde eb’ad-ı mutlaka dahiliye bile kanaat olunmaz.” [Namık Kemal;

Lisan-ı Osmani’nin Edebiyatı Hakkında Bazı Mülahazatı Samildir, quoted from Kaplan (1974, 186)]

74

remembered with stories and tales; the analysis of the past events were rare; it was

even meaningless for the ordinary man. Future was unclear for the human because it

can only be known to God, so making plans and projections on it meant interference

of God’s domain. However the modern man need to know what future may bring,

and make forecasts about the future to make preparations for the probable

consequences.

Let’s think freely. Does not the life of the people consist only of future?

What is past? A death…What is present? It is a last breath.

Both for individual and societies what is the benefit of the past events even

they were full of glory and happiness? And what will be left for the future

event even if the present is fine.74

Shortly the advantages of the modernization are always praised by the Young

Ottomans. While doing this, they criticized the mentality of the traditional order

which, for them, dragged people to laziness, sluggishness and unawareness about the

civilization. In this respect Namık Kemal, in ‘Medeniyet’ article, compares two

types of human, while one lives according to traditional order, the other enjoys the

modernity:

…is the security of the man who is accustomed to eat dye-bread and sleep on

the earth less comfortable than the man who eats delicious meals and sleeps

in bed?...What is the superiority of the French woolen cloth over aba in case

of warming the body?

Civilization offers people millions of gold. Does gold increase appetite? Or

does it lengthen life?

Civilization offers palaces from marble. Do such building block the death?

Or do they abolish illness?

Civilization offers light in the streets at night. What is the benefit for the man

wandering around on the street instead of spending time with his family after

the sunset?

Civilization offers ships and trains. Why does a man need to travel up to

three hundred hours and stay five to ten days on seas, when it is enough for

him to have a hut and two acres of land for his livelihood?

74 “Layıkıyle düsünülsün insanın hayatı yalnız istikbalden ibaret degil midir?Mazi nedir? Bir mevt-i

ebedi. Hal nedir, bir nefes-i va-pesin. Gerek fert için gerek cemiyet için mazi mesut imis sanlı imis,

bu güne ne faydası görülür, hal rahat imis, emin imis yarına ne lütfu kalır?” [Namık Kemal; stikbal,

quoted from Özön (1938, 46)]

75

Civilization invented telegraph. Isn’t it meaningless for the poor, who is even

unaware about the situation of next room, to learn the incidences in

America?...etc.

Such arguments are the signs of the man who is unaware about his nature and

talent as a human. As is seen while the birthrate of the humans is equal to

almost all creatures, there are more human than the creatures in number

thanks to his ability creating civilization. Just as, it is obvious that the

civilization is the guarantor of human life.

Apart from these, the new inventions, gained as a result of human labor and

idea in this world, are clear proofs that human is not created to eat a piece of

bread and sleep on earth. Just as, accepting civilization as meaningless

means claiming a deficiency in the creation of human.

Yes stone building can not block the death and illness, but they can resist

against fire and collapse.

Yes it is more proper for man to spend time with his family rather than

wandering around on the streets at night, but thanks to the light provided by

gasoline, the production and commerce can be active for an extra six to

seven hours.

The people, traveling on ships and trains, bring the richness and beauty of the

places all around the world to their citizens.

The civilization, using telegraph, can learn the incidences all over the world

and benefit from the results of the incidences.

To claim ‘That is enough for us, we have to content with it’ or ‘We inherited

this from our ancestors, rest is bid’at, lessons, experiments, books, machines,

progresses, inventions are all meaningless’ and to live under the yoke of the

infidels like Indians and Algerians are not wise thoughts for the humanity.”

In conclusion, being uncivilized means dying before the pre-determined

time.75

75 “çavdar ekmegi yemege ve toprak üzerinde yatmaga alısmıs bir adamın karnını doyurmak ve uykusunu

uyumakta gördügü asayis, nefis ta’amlar yemege ve yaldızlı karyolada yatmaga meluf olanların rahatından az

mıdır? Vücudu ısıtmakta Fransız çuhasının adi abaya ne rüçhanı olabilir?”

“Medeniyet insanı milyonlarla altına malik edermis. Altın istihayı mı ziyadelestirir? Hayat mı çogaltır?”

“Medeniyet mermerden masnu’ saraylar peyda edermis. O kadar metin binalar ecele mi medhal bırakmaz?

Hastalıgı mı men eder?”

“Medeniyet geceleri sokakta gaz peyda edermis. Allah’ın günesi zail olduktan sonra insana göre akrabasının

arasına girip de i’tilaf-ı aileden müstefid olmak gibi bir lezzeti terk ederek kahve kahve dolasmakta ne

ihtiyacı olabilir?”

“Medeniyet vapurlar, simendiferler husule getirmis. kametine bir kulübe ve maisetine iki dönüm toprak kafi

olan bir adamın üç yüz saatlik yerlere gitmeye ve bes on gün denizler içinde kalmaya ne ihtiyacı olabilir?”

“Medeniyet telgrafı icad eylemis. Yanı basındaki odada geçen ahvali bilmeyen biçareye göre Amerika’nın

vukuatını ögrenmeye çalısmakta ne mana vardır? Keza ve keza.”

Bu türlü mütaala insanın tabiat ve istidadından bütün bütün gaflet eseridir. Görüyoruz ki insan tevlid

kuvvetinde, hemen kaffe_i hayvanatın kafesinden birkaç bin kat ziyade bulunuyor; ve bu kesret sahra-yı

vahsette degil, saadet-sera-yı medeniyette görülüyor. Bundan bilbedahe sabit olur ki medeniyet hayat-ı

beserin kafilidir.”

“Bundan baska insanın sa’y ve fikir ile dünyada izhar ettigi bunca bedayi’ öyle bir parça ekmek yemek ve

topraklarda yuvarlanıp uyumak için yaratılmıs bir mahluk olmadıgına bürhan-ı kafidir.”

“Evet, kargir binalar ecele, hastalıga mukavemet etmez. Fakat, yanmaya, yıkılmaya karsı durur; letafet ve

mamuriyetle birkaç karn evlada kalır.”

76

Of course, it should be remembered that what Namık Kemal means as

civilization is modernization. Because the lives of the Ottomans do not resemble the

one who sleeps on earth. But he exaggerates the example to press his praise for

modernization.

The Young Ottomans needed modernism very urgently. The Ottoman

Empire should be as strong as the European states and the citizens of the Empire as

prosperous as the Europeans. In this respect, the civilization, industrial and scientific

methods of the Europeans should be applied in the Ottoman Empire.

Engineering has reached its zenith of expectations: through it, the continents

are separated, seas are united and plots of earth are located in the midst of

vast oceans and water found sandy in wastes.

Economics has given rise to the division of labor. A mediocre artisan is, in

his field, ten times as able as an ancient master craftsman.

When will we start taking example?

What we have done does not amount more than a few superficial changes

that newspapers and that through the efforts of the late Sinasi were able to

bring about the literature.

We have not a single factory. How are arts and crafts to prosper in our

country?

We have not been able to establish a single joint-stock company. Is this the

way to advance trade?

Is there a single Ottoman Bank in existence? How do we propose to go about

creating wealth? [Namık Kemal quoted from Mardin (2000, 406)]

According to Ali Suavi, basic reason why the Ottomans cannot industrialize

is the guild reality. He states that the traditional training system hinders the artisans

“Evet, geceleri issiz bir adam için muttasıl ailesini terk edip de sokaklarda eglence taharri etmekte bir letafet

yoktur. Fakat gaz olan yerlerde ashab-ı sa’y u ticaret geceleri de altı yedi saat isyle veya alısverisiyle mesgul

olur ve bu suretle ömrü üzerine bir ömür daha katar.”

“Simendifer veya vapur ile birkaç yüz saatlik yerlere giden veya birkaç gün deniz üzerinde çalkalananlar ise

marifetin bir keramet-i garibesiyle tayy-ı mekan etmis veya postuyla sulardan geçmis gibi cihanın ta öbür

tarafına giderler, havayic-i hayatı getirirler, vatandaslarının ayagına isar ederler.”

“Telgraf kullanan akvam, eger eski dünyada ise yeni dünyada bulunan bir tabinin hazakatinden veya zuhur

eden bir vak’anın tesiratından hayatlarına, büyük büyük faydalar görürler.”

“ <<Bize su lazım, onunla kanaat etmeliyiz>>. Ve <<Pederlerimizden bunu gördük, onun haricinde ne varsa

bid’attir. Dersler, talimler, kitaplar, makineler, terakkiler, icadlar ne ise yarar?>> diye Hintliler, Cezayirliler

gibi, ecanibin kahır ve galebesi altında hürriyete hiçbir suretle yakısır seylerden degildir.”

“Hülasa medeniyetsiz yasamak, ecelsiz ölmek kabilindendir.” [Namık Kemal quoted from Kaplan (1974,

231-233)]

77

learn new inventions and adapt a different method which may cause his expulsion

from the guild organization.

In fact the basic reason is the mentality of the traditional order which has

been an obstacle for the state and people to accept and adopt the modern mentality.

However, as is told at the beginning of this chapter, the individual, who is open to

net effects of the industrial and commercial progress of the Western states in his

daily life, had to accept some of them. His view about property and this-world

shifted dramatically (Sayar 1986, 345). As a result of this shift:

The changed patterns of social stratification and acquisition of wealth, the

modern educational system and other factors produced two seemingly

conflicting results: first, they undermined the traditional social order and

mobilized the masses in populist religious movements that appeared to

advocate a return to older, but actually sought to accommodate change

within a traditional Islamic social framework; second they participated in the

rise of a new and increasingly individualistic middle class, with its own

pragmatic values and modernist Islamic identity. The political impact of

these reactions began to materialize in the 1860s in the Young Ottoman

movement. (Karpat 2001, 181)

78

CONCLUSION

The modernization of societies is not a simple replacement of institutions and

interrelations. Every belief, institution, relation or whatever has deep roots in the

history of societies. The Ottoman modernization should also be observed from this

perspective. It is a multidimensional evolution that incorporated values and ideas of

the traditional culture and history (Karpat 2001, 328). The traditional establishment

of the Ottoman Empire had clear and deep inconsistencies with modernity like every

traditional order. If the modernization option is chosen the traditional order must be

out, because it requires a total change in the establishment of societies. The way of

life promised by modernity excludes the institutions and beliefs of the past. The

traditions survive only through their symbolic meanings.

However for the societies, living under the threat and assault of the European

state and capitalism had no other choice. They have to modernize their state and

societies in order to survive in new order. In the Ottoman Empire the threat was first

understood by the state elites after withdrawals, but at the beginning the technology

transfers seemed as the cure for the defeats in the military field. It was not a

modernization project. In the 19th century new bureaucratic cadre brought the

modernization of the state to the agenda. The members of the Young Ottomans

flourished from this cadre.

When we look at the thoughts of the Young Ottomans, it can be seen how the

evolution of the Ottoman modernization requires a profound and broad perspective.

Despite their superficial analysis and explanations, the Young Ottomans felt obliged

to deal with the multiple structures of Ottoman society. Like an encyclopedist, they

brought reform proposals for state, economy, family, population, press, literature,

local administration, etc. They needed urgent modernization of the Empire. They

demanded rapid changes. They were patriot Muslims who wanted the continuity of

both Ottoman Empire and its Islamic character.

79

In order to preserve the Empire they proposed that the governmental,

administrative and financial techniques of the West be applied to the Empire

(Mardin 2000, 404). They realized the incompatibility of the traditional order of the

Empire with the realities of the modern world. However they wanted both the

survival of the basic institutions of the Empire and Islam, and the modernization of

Ottoman state and society. So they tried to reconcile the thesis of modernity with the

Islamic doctrines and traditional teachings and understanding. In fact they searched

the equivalent of the Western concepts in Islamic and traditional doctrines.76

However it is important to note that such modernist arguments did not represent the

view of Muslim teaching and tradition common among Ottoman Turks (Davison

1963, 67).77 But they did not have time to consider such concerns. They brought the

examples of applications of European countries and proposed the way to follow for

the modernization of the Empire.

In this respect, they are the first Islamist thinkers. That is, they reformulated

the content of the Islamic concepts as to fill them with modern notions. In fact what

they did was the normal reflex of every intellectual of the non-European countries.

In this study, there is not any hesitation about the sincerity of their belief, but we

claim that while they tried to guarantee the survival of Islam and the basic

institutions of the Empire, their proposals undermined the bases of the two pillars of

society. Also we claim that this perspective is crucial to understand the philosophy

of the Young Ottomans.

The modernization of the Ottoman Empire was, at the same time a mental

transformation of every element of the Ottoman Empire. The understandings about

every particular field of life had to be adapted to the new conditions. The role of the

Young Ottomans in this process had been bringing new explanations and

understanding for the changing conditions. In fact every adaptation and

76 icma with national assembly, labor with endeavor for this world, election of the first four caliphs

with the democracy, biat with social contract…etc.

77 Davison, Roderic (1963) p.67

80

understanding had brought the end of the Empire, because the traditional mentality

of the Ottoman Empire contradicted with the mentality of the modernity. Every

attempt to transform the mentality in favor of the latter meant the dissolution of the

Empire. Of course the way to dissolution was neither opened solely by the Young

Ottomans nor concluded by them. However their open-ended claims were used by

different political currents in Turkish history; the modernists, nationalists, Islamists,

etc. They found roots of their philosophies in their writings.

The revolutions are made by intellectuals. It is wrong to attribute the success

of the reform in the Ottoman Empire only to the massacre in the Mountain of

Resne and the harsh protest of Salonica and Serez. Namık Kemal pressed the

hot stamp of love of freedom to the thoughts of the young generations with

his pencil of fire78

In earlier times, their claims were voiced in the first parliament. Some

members of the parliament used their thoughts to criticize the government (Karpat

2006, 377).

In the Turkish Republic the interest towards the Young Ottomans were

declared louder. Atatürk expressed his sympathy for Namık Kemal in a speech

addressed to his friends79. In this modernist era the philosophy of the Young

Ottomans was reevaluated and, sometimes, their effect was exaggerated. However

this exaggeration is important to show the destination their thoughts could point.

As a result, the modernization attempts of the Young Ottomans were

inherited by the future generations, and the ways they opened, made the activists of

the later periods more radical and brave. The human type they drew has become the

78 “nkılapları mütefekkirler yapar.. nkılabı Osmaniyi yalnız Resne daglarında vukua gelen kıyamın,

Selanik ve Serez’in siddetli protestolarının tesirine atfetmek büyük gaflet olur… Namık Kemal atesin

kalemiyle gençlerin dimagında hürriyete ask ve muhabbet hissini ikad ediyordu.” (Bedri Nuri 1955,

32)

79 “Vatanın kurtulusu ve istiklali için ölmeyi bugünkü nesle Namık Kemal ögretti. Harbiye

senelerinde siyaset fikirleri bas gösterdi. Namık Kemal’den gelen sesin büyüsüne kapılmıstık. Bu ses

ruhumuzu simsek gibi sarsıyor, bu ses simdiye dek okudugum hiçbir sese benzemiyordu. Namık

Kemal’in yigit sesi önümde bambaska bir ufkun açılmasına yol açıyordu.” (Karaalioglu 2005 back

page)

81

reality of many Muslims who tried to reconcile their beliefs with capitalist and

modernist notions. It is not possible, even today, to state that the bifurcation has

disappeared, but capitalism and modernism press their impact on the ancient beliefs

of the Eastern societies.

82

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