THE IMAGINARY OTTOMAN:
AN EXAMINATION OF “OTTOMANISM” AMONG THE ISLAMIC ELITES IN
TODAY’S TURKEY AS AN INTELLECTUAL BRIDGE BETWEEN THE LOCAL
Deniz Kabaagaç, “The Imaginary Ottoman: An Examination of “Ottomanism” among
the Islamic Elites in Today’s Turkey as an Intellectual Bridge Between the Local and the
Global”
The aim of this work was to shed light on the emergence of the idea of the Ottoman in modern
Turkey and its importance in Turkish politics. It was argued that this new idea of the Ottoman
was a representation of a social imaginary for the elites and for the leadership of Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), defining the position of Turkey in a globalized world. It was also
argued that the emergence of the idea of the Ottoman and the properties ascribed to it are closely
related to globalization. Within this framework, a research, focusing on depicting the critical
properties of the Ottoman idea, how it is imagined and how the political stances of the AKP
leadership relate to it, was conducted through a review of the written sources and by way of a
review of the speeches given by AKP leaders since 2007. The research revealed that this new
Ottoman, the imaginary Ottoman, is portrayed as a civilization with a different time and space
apprehension than the West and as an Islamic imaginary that extends to the present time with an
expanded conception of nation and motherland. The imaginary Ottoman, thus, is an attempt to
secure a new place with a different identity in the global world; it is a link between the global
and the local. The imaginary Ottoman includes elements from the real, historical Ottoman.
However, it offers a new sense of the present time, derived from the deconstruction of the past. It
is portrayed as a guide of action and identity for today and as a solution to the problems of the
national imaginary in the age of globalization. The research showed us that the imaginary
Ottoman is a product of the encounter of the newly emerging Islamic elite in Turkey with
globalization. Thus, its emergence is directly related to globalization as a historical event. AKP
leadership shares the same Ottoman imaginary. The AKP leadership tries to constitute and
institute the Turkish society in the way the Ottoman is imagined and projects itself as the
representative of the Ottoman imaginary. The Ottoman, in its imaginary form, is not static and
transforms continuously, thanks to the creative capability of imagination. Accordingly, it helps
the elites and the AKP leadership to redefine and reposition themselves in a globalizing world. It
helps them to introduce new ideas, in order to justify their position by selectively using certain
events from the vast reservoir of Ottoman history. It also helps the AKP leadership to adopt selfcontradictory
positions in politics, such as being nationalist without being nationalist and being
Islamist without being Islamist. The new habitus created through the imaginary Ottoman and the
creative adaptation that this imaginary Ottoman facilitates provide an advantage to the AKP
leadership in covering the political spectrum in Turkey and in answering the problems stemming
from the Turkish national imaginary. The imaginary Ottoman is, therefore, not an aspiration to
revive the historical Ottoman, which would have been a type of Ottomanism, but rather it
represents the social as imagined by the Islamic elites and the AKP leadership.
iv
Tez Özeti
Deniz Kabaagaç, “Tahayyül Edilen Osmanlı: Bugünkü Türkiye’de slami Elitler
Arasındaki Osmanlıcılıgın Yerel ile Küresel Arasında Entelektüel Bir Köprü Olarak
ncelenmesi”
Bu çalısmanın amacı, modern Türkiye’de Osmanlı fikrinin ortaya çıkısına ve bunun Türkiye
siyasetindeki önemine ısık tutmaktır. Buna baglı olarak, bu yeni Osmanlı fikrinin, elitler ve
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) liderligi için, Türkiye’nin, küresellesen bir dünya içindeki
yerini tanımlayan toplumsal bir tahayyülü temsil ettigi ileri sürülmüstür. Aynı zamanda, Osmanlı
fikrinin ortaya çıkısının ve bu tahayyüle yüklenen özelliklerin, küresellesmeyle yakından iliskili
oldugu öne sürülmektedir. Bu çerçevede, yazılı kaynaklar ve AKP liderliginin yaptıgı
konusmalar incelenerek, bu Osmanlı fikrinin önemli özelliklerini, nasıl tahayyül edildigini ve bu
tahayyülün AKP liderligi ile iliskisini tanımlamaya odaklanan bir arastırma yapılmıstır. Bu
arastırma, söz konusu yeni Osmanlı’nın, yani bu tahayyül edilen Osmanlı’nın, Batı’dan farklı bir
zaman ve mekan algısı olan bir medeniyet, genisletilmis bir vatan ve millet anlayısı olan ve
günümüze kadar uzanan bir slami tahayyül olarak tanımlandıgını ortaya çıkarmıstır. Bu
durumda, bu yeni Osmanlı tahayyülü, küresellesen bir dünyada, yeni bir kimlikle yeni bir yer
edinme tesebbüsü, küresel ile yerel arasında bir bag önerisidir. Bu Osmanlı tahayyülü, tarihteki
Osmanlı’nın unsurlarını içermekte ama, geçmisin dekonstrüksiyonu yoluyla yeni özelliklerin
eklenmesi sonucunda, bize yeni bir bugün sunmakta, günümüz için bir kılavuz ve küresellesen
dünyada, ulusal tahayyüllerin yarattıgı sorunlara bir çözüm olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu
arastırma, bize, yukarıda tanımlanan Osmanlı tahayyülünün, Türkiye’de yeni olusan slami elitin
küresellesmeyle karsılasması sonucunda ortaya çıktıgını göstermistir. Yani, bu fikrin ortaya
çıkısı, tarihsel bir olgu olarak, küresellesme ile dogrudan iliskilidir. AKP liderligi de aynı
Osmanlı tahayyülünü paylasmakta; toplumu, Osmanlı’nın tahayyül edildigi sekilde olusturmaya
ve biçimlendirmeye gayret etmekte ve bu tahayyül edilen Osmanlı’nın temsilcisi olarak öne
çıkmaktadır. Giderek, Osmanlı, bu tahayyül edilen sekliyle, statik olmayıp, hayal gücünün
yaratıcılık yetenegi sayesinde, sürekli olarak degismekte ve buna baglı olarak da, elitlere ve
AKP liderligine, küresellesen bir dünyada, kendilerini yeniden tanımlamak ve yeni pozisyonlar
almak konusunda yardımcı olmaktadır. Elitlerin ve AKP liderliginin, genis bir tarihi olaylar
spektrumu içinden seçim yaparak, yeni fikirler ortaya atmalarına ve kendi pozisyonlarını
savunmalarına imkan yaratmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, AKP liderliginin, milliyetçi olmadan
milliyetçi olmak veya slamcı olmadan slamcı olmak gibi çeliskili siyasi tavırlar almalarına
yardım etmektedir. Tahayyül edilen yeni Osmanlı’nın yarattıgı bu yeni habitus ve tahayyül
edilen Osmanlı’nın yardımıyla saglanan bu yaratıcı uyum, AKP liderligine, Türkiye’nin siyasal
spektrumunu kapsamakta ve ulusal Türklük tahayyülünden dogan sorunlara cevap bulmak
olanagını saglamaktadır. Bu nedenle, tahayyül edilen bu Osmanlı, tarihteki Osmanlı’yı
canlandırma arzusu, bir tür Osmanlıcılık olmayıp, elitler ve AKP liderligi tarafından tahayyül
edilmis bir toplumu temsil etmektedir.
v
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................1
CHAPTER 2. THE OTTOMAN AS AN IMAGINARY AND
THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN ITS IMAGINATION...............................33
CHAPTER 3. THE CRITICAL PROPERTIES OF THE
IMAGINARY OTTOMAN.......................................................................44
The Ottoman Civilization – Different Time and Place – Apprehension....................46
The Role of Islam.......................................................................................................48
We Are All Ottoman..................................................................................................55
The Hyperreal Ottoman vs. The Turk........................................................................59
The Imaginary Ottoman as a Guide in the Globalized World...................................65
CHAPTER 4. THE IMAGINARY OTTOMAN AND POLITICS..................................77
How the AKP Shares the Same Imaginary in the Words of Erdogan........................80
The Identification of the Society with the Ottoman...................................................93
How the AKP Leadership Lays Claim to the Ottoman……....................................113
The Impact of the Imaginary Ottoman on Turkish Politics......................................123
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................141
APPENDICES................................................................................................................153
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................175
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years we have been witnessing that Ottoman, new Ottoman or Ottomanism has
been increasingly used by different people to characterize or explain Turkey, Turkey’s
role, and AKP and its actions. We observe this trend not only in Turkey but also outside.
Furthermore, we encounter the Ottoman more and more in daily life, especially within
the cultural domain, with an additional emphasis that it represents the true culture of
Turkey.
It seems that the Ottoman image we are accustomed to see between the lines of
newspaper articles or in high school text books, often with negative connotations and as
a defunct structure buried in history, is re-emerging slowly at political rallies, official
ceremonies, panel discussions and on prime-time TV series in Turkish and foreign
media as a reference point used to explain today’s Turkey. What is striking about this
new Ottoman idea is that it is not antagonistic to the Republic and the modern life it
represents, as we are used to hear, but rather, it is something upon which the Republic
was grounded, and is, in some cases, presented as a solution to the problems of the
Republic. This new Ottoman is presented to us in Turkey as the basis of our culture and
our order, an order where we can find equality, justice and human rights while in foreign
sources, it is perceived as the proof and reason behind the efforts of Turkey to become a
regional power.
2
How was it possible that the Ottoman that was trapped and isolated in textbooks,
or in the emotional neighborhood meetings of Islamists, slowly but without a doubt,
became a reference point in culture as well as domestic and foreign politics? Is there any
significance of this re-emergence of the Ottoman? The main idea behind this thesis is to
shed light on this new phenomenon: The emergence of the Ottoman in modern Turkey.
The Argument
It is obvious that AKP’s repeated election victories is one of the reasons behind this reemergence
of the Ottoman because Islamists have always been connected to the
Ottoman and they proudly acknowledged this in the past. However, stating that Islamists
are Ottomanist because they are against the secular nature of the Republican order or
that AKP is following an Ottomanist policy because it is Islamist, are misleading
shortcuts. The dichotomy between the ancient and new regime or the perceived
contradictions between Islam and secularism are not sufficient to explain this new
phenomenon.
Within this perspective, I argue that this new Ottoman in Turkey is a
representation of a social imaginary for the elites and for the leadership of AKP, linking
global to local, defining their position and that of Turkey in the globalizing world, while
reflecting their understanding of the present and of the society. This imaginary Ottoman
has a strong connection to globalization, not only as a guide to it, but also as a product of
it.
3
Finally, I argue that, this imaginary Ottoman is not static, it is changing and
transforming.
This thesis, as mentioned above, aims specifically to understand this new-
Ottomanism ascribed to AKP, within the framework of the argument presented above.
Accordingly, the understanding of how the elites behind the AKP and the leadership of
AKP comprehend this new Ottoman is critical for this purpose.
Ottomanism, if it is the correct term, being observed in this form, does not seek
to re-institute the past. Rather than a repositioning of the “ancient regime” vis-à-vis the
new one, what is being laid down before us is a new present which is presumably a
continuation of a different past. From this perspective, the Ottoman for AKP leadership
is neither an ideology for bringing back the Ottoman regime – an effort to revive the
Ottoman – nor a political program or an aspiration in this direction. This new imaginary
Ottoman is about ideals, ideas and norms rather than institutions and it does not seek to
re-establish the institutions of the past. It is a different comprehension of the world; it is
a representation, an imaginary itself, of the social imagined by the elites in the
globalizing world. A new present and a new past, a new history by which a new identity
can be nourished is presented to us through this new, imaginary, Ottoman. In this
respect, this imaginary Ottoman is an answer to the ideology of the status quo - to
Turkish nationalism by the newly emerging bourgeoisie and the elites clustering around
it, hence by AKP leadership, in a globalized world.
4
Different Views
The scholarly work on the re-emergence of the Ottoman, or Ottomanism of AKP is quite
limited except for the area of international politics. The review here focuses on domestic
politics because the discussion on Ottomanism or the Neo-Ottomanism in foreign
politics revolves around axis change and focuses on the concept of strategic depth of
Davutoglu (Kramer, 2010, p. 3, 29) (Aydınlı & Mathews, 2008, p. 705). These
arguments, in other words, do not correlate Ottomanism, Neo-Ottomanism, with the
emergence of Ottoman in domestic politics except those who claim that Ottomanism in
its new form has a heavy Islamist connotation.
In the field of domestic politics it is true that there are a number of references to
the Ottoman in the conception of Islamist in Turkey but these references usually stay
within the bounds of defining it as another form of nationalism or at best as an
ingredient of an alternative modernity project (Çınar, 2005, p. 12, 138-167) (Kardas,
2010, p. 115).
In the area of domestic politics there are very few works focusing on the reemergence
of the Ottoman or elaborating its connectivity with the factors that gave birth
5
to the emergence of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) and to its surge to power1. This
may be due to the proposition that the Ottoman in the intellectual make of AKP is a
residue of early Islamists’ conception of Ottoman. In other words the Ottoman is
subdued under the Islam. This approach overlooks a possible transformation of the
Ottoman idea. It does not take into account that this Ottoman idea of today can be
different from that of earlier Islamist one. Secondly, and in conjunction with the first
one, it overlooks its possible connection with the developments that gave birth to AKP,
specifically to the developments that brought the separation of AKP leadership from the
rest of Islamists in Turkey. In short, the Ottoman in domestic politics is perceived as a
companion of the Islamist movement.
The only real exception to this approach is Yılmaz Çolak’s article where he
focuses on cultural pluralism in 1990. Çolak (2006) argues that “an idea of Ottoman
pluralism … was constructed as a part of Neo-Ottomanism … and this model was used
to formulate a superior identity encompassing all Turkish citizens” (p. 587, 588) by late
president Turgut Özal. He also adds that later Islamic movements in 1990s Islamised
this neo-Ottomanism (Çolak, 2006, p. 587, 588). Çolak’s work is important for this
study because, although his focus was different, he highlights certain points which are
1 In fact, a short research in the electronic resources through Bosphorus University Library returns only
three articles referring to Ottomanism or Ottoman & AKP in the described framework. Similarly, a review
of recent books, since 2009, on Turkish politics shows that only Hakan Yavuz (2009) touches the subjects
but very briefly. In all other sources, the issue is the subject of foreign politics.
6
elaborated and consolidated in the coming pages. The first one of these points is the
recognition that there is a new perception of Ottoman, a more positive one, has been
emerging in Turkey (Çolak, 2006, p. 587). Secondly, Çolak (2006) points out that Neo-
Ottomanism in form of re-writing the common Ottoman past, is something occurring in
the present through which the past is modified while shaping the future (p. 587). Third,
he points out that this re-writing of history is both critical in the era of globalization
where nation states are challenged and it is a result of this process in which new
histographies emerge (Çolak, 2006, p. 588). Çolak connects all these to the Neo-
Ottomanism of late President Turgut Özal. He discusses this Neo-Ottomanism within the
framework of foreign policy in general but the focus of his work is on cultural plurality
in Turkey. Finally, Çolak (2006) points out that, despite its failure, both as presented by
Özal and in the Islamist form, the Neo-Ottomanism poses a challenge to the nation state
by raising an alternative to the cultural homogeneity, and, by recalling historical cultural
diversity and plurality of the society (p. 588). Çolak’s approach carries the seeds of the
argument presented in this work despite it focuses on early 1990s. Today, as it will be
shown in the following chapters, what he discussed relating to 1990s became more
relevant and the challenges in front of the nation state, national Turkish imaginary are
more apparent.
Çolak (2006), in his article, refers to Hakan Yavuz when he cites the two critical
properties of Neo-Ottomanism as the re-articulation of Turkish nationalism in form of
increased tolerance to diversity and as the elimination of economic borders in the
7
Ottoman geography (p. 588). These two points within the presentation of Çolak are
intertwined with globalization. This is in line with the argument presented in this work.
However, it should be also noted that Yavuz takes a different position in another
occasion. In his latest book he argues, when explaining the conservative revolution, “the
transformation of Turkey’s Islamic revolution”, that “the conservative revolution is very
much based on the Ottoman imperial dream of becoming ‘bigger’ and ‘better’ by
overcoming the rigid nation-state ideology” (Yavuz, 2009, p. 13). He also adds that this
“conservative revolution...(means) creating new cognitive spaces for different
imaginings of the past and the reconstruction of the present” (Yavuz, 2009, p. 13).
However, he claims that this is not carried out by the elites but rather it is a bottom up
imagining (Yavuz, 2009, p. 13). In this formulation Yavuz suggests that this Ottoman
dream was already present in the society and it surfaced when AKP came to power.
Here, Yavuz clearly overlooks the role of globalization in the emergence of the idea of
Ottoman. Secondly, it seems the Ottoman in this formulation is a static idea as it always
existed and surfaced lately as a fuel to the conservative revolution.
In the second article, Günes Murat Tezcür (2003), explains Ottomanism as a
historical consciousness, “a central element in the conservative aspect of AKP”,
resulting from a search for authenticity in form of a feeling of a deep nostalgia.
According to Tezcür, this search for authenticity is a reaction of a feeling of inferiority
on the part of the Islamists and the glorious Ottoman past is the remedy to overcome
such feelings. The resulting nostalgia, on the other hand, positions Europe and the West
8
as the “ultimate other” in the eyes of AKP people (p. 13). In Tezcür again we see a
conviction that the Ottoman idea is static. It is what it was in the past and he overlooks
that it may be changing. He does not take into account that the glorious Ottoman past is
not as glorious as it seems for some critical Islamists.
Finally, we see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, touches the subject when evaluating the
minority legislation in Turkey. Grigoriadis (2007) argues that the introduction of
minority right legislation in Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria2 can be an example
of the rediscovery of Ottomanism of late Ottoman period and Ottomanism has an
enduring legacy in Turkish political thought (p. 424, 432, 434). He makes a clear
distinction between the Ottomanism as “nostalgia for Ottoman grandeur, territorial
expansionism and attempts to reintroduce Islam into Turkish politics” (Grigoriadis,
2007, p. 432) and Ottomanism as a “liberal political ideology which advocated a civic
understanding of Ottoman national identity, embracing all Ottoman subjects regardless
of religious and ethnic affiliation” (Grigoriadis, 2007, p. 432). Grigoriadis, in this
argument considers the Turkish political thought as a monolithic block and overlooks an
important point. The minority legislation was introduced by AKP, a political party with
Islamic roots. This point is critical because the Islamists until the separation from current
AKP leadership were neither valuing this late Ottoman “liberal political ideology” nor
2 The Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership, adopted at the Copenhagen EU Summit in June, 1993.
9
they had a different attitude towards the minorities in Turkey when compared to
Kemalists. It seems that the minority legislation carries the traces of an idea of peaceful
multiethnic coexistence but this cannot be easily explained by the legacy of Ottomanism
in Turkish political thought.
Imaginary and Representations
The theoretical foundation of this work is based on the works of Cornelius Castoriadis,
Benedict Anderson, Arjun Appadurai and Charles Taylor. In addition, referrals were
given to certain articles of Craig Calhoun, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Jonathan Culler and
Dilip P. Gaonkar, among others. The common point of all these writers is the conviction
that imaginary plays an important role in the construction of reality and they all agree
that human communities actualize themselves through certain imaginaries.
The term imaginary explains this new Ottoman better than ideology, paradigm,
weltanschauung or other similar concepts because, as it will be shown below, it is more
flexible, it has boundaries that are more porous and it does not require an internal
coherence and logic as in the case of ideology. On the other hand, it is not as ambiguous
and loose as paradigm since it certainly has boundaries and it is distinguishable.
10
However, imaginary is a contradictory concept. It is generally used in contrast to
real - as illusionary; but in other cases, it is used as the basis for reason (Castoriadis,
2005, p. 551). The simple dictionary definition “having existence only in imagination,
unreal”3 is not useful because imaginary has a connection to reality, directly or
indirectly. The influence of reality in the creation of imaginary and its role in the making
of reality compel us to define it in a different way, with less emphasis on its illusionary
properties and with a focus on its actualization.
The Social Imaginary and Its Representations:
The Ottoman as a Representation of Social Imaginary
The definition of Taylor in this perspective is a workable one. Taylor (2007) defines the
social imaginary as “the way people imagine their social existence, how they fit together
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are
normally met and deeper notions and images that underlie these expectations” (p. 23)
that is, as the “way we collectively imagine, even pre-theoretically, our social life” (p.
50). However, this definition is not very explanatory when it comes to the manifestations
of social imaginary, that is to depict social imaginaries.
3 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
11
At this point it may be helpful to look at the definition of social imaginary of
Castoriadis because of his emphasis on representations of social imaginary. Castoriadis,
when introducing the concept of social imaginary, argues, “a society is created through
the collective agency of social imaginary and is subject to alteration, mundane or
radical, within historical time” (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 7). For Castoriadis, society institutes
itself in the imaginary that is composed of social imaginings, significations, that is
representation, that have no correspondence to real or rational but through which the
creativity of the society is asserted. These representations are social because they can
only be instituted by the society and, therefore, they can neither be reduced to the
individual nor identified with the collective consciousness of society (Naranch, 2002, p.
6).
The social imaginary, in these definitions, is certainly more than a visual
presentation or a myth or a legend. It is reflected through different and deeper
significations or representations. It is represented “in and through things, objects and
individuals which presentify and figure, directly or indirectly” (Castoriadis, 2005, p.
233). These representations, which are also imaginaries, “can exist only through their
incarnation, their inscription, their presentation and figuration in and through a
network of individuals and objects which they inform, individuals and objects which
exist in general and are as they are only though these significations” (Castoriadis, 2005,
p. 233). In this sense, a signification, or a representation, “is an ambiguous ensemble of
indefinite referrals to things other, which themselves may or may not be significations,
12
than what would be observed, heard or perceived directly” (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 151).
For Castoriadis’ (2005) social imaginary uses the symbolic and its representations, not
only to express itself but to exist, to pass from the virtual to anything more than this (p.
82).
A critical question emerges at this point. How do the imaginaries emerge? In
Castoriadis’ framework, the emergence of the social imaginary is not dependent on the
existence of certain historical conditions, but rather, the emergence of social imaginary
makes the history. The new is created by the society and this “new” is not
predetermined, it is not the result of preset external conditions by any universal logic or
law but it is a result of imagination (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 6). This imaginary, social
imaginary, is created by each society and it is what makes a society a society, what
differentiates a society from another one.
For Anderson (2006), on the other hand, national imaginaries4 emerge within
certain historical contexts and are products of the encounter of vernacular languages
with print capitalism during a period where old dynastic realms and religious
communities were not able to combine “fraternity, power and time meaningfully
together” (p. 36, 46). In other words, national imaginaries emerged when “the
4 The critical element in Anderson’s analysis, his constructivist approach toward nationalism, crystallized
in his claim that nationality, nationhood and nationalism are “cultural artifacts of a particular kind”
(Culler, 1999, p. 20) (Anderson, 2006, p. 4). Anderson (2006) defines nations as an “imagined
community” and imagined “as both inherently limited and sovereign”. (p. 6)
13
fundamental cultural conceptions … [have] lost their axiomatic grip” (Anderson, 2006,
p. 33, 36) on the society, and when a new apprehension of time emerged.
This imaginary of Anderson is prone to replication, re-fabrication once it emerges. In
Anderson’s (2006) words, the national imaginary is the result of;
Spontaneous distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of discrete
historical forces, which once created become ‘modular’, capable
of being transplanted, with varying degrees of selfconsciousness,
to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and
be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political or
ideological constellations. (p. 4)
Thus, with Castoriadis and Anderson together, we have a more encompassing
understanding of the imaginary. First, the imaginary is a phenomenon that may emerge
from within the society and/or fabricated top-down by some groups in the society,
though we still do not know the interaction that occurs between these two processes.
Secondly, historical factors have a critical role in the emergence of imagination for
Anderson while, for Castoriadis, the imaginary is the determinant of history. Finally, the
social imaginary represents itself through representations, signifiers, that are more than
visual and it is through these representations that it manifests itself to us – it becomes
more real than real for us (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 90). The representations are also
imaginaries.
The Ottoman we face today in modern Turkey is accordingly conceptualized as
an imaginary, a representation which corresponds to things other than itself, other than
the historical Ottoman. It is an ensemble of meanings inscribed to it. It is a
14
representation of an imagined social, of a social imaginary. It represents “the way people
imagine themselves” and “how they fit together” in a globalizing world.
The conceptualization of the Ottoman as an imaginary, however, does not
explain its emergence. As discussed above, AKP’s surge to power is critical in this
respect but this does not explain the emergence of imaginary. It can, at best, highlight a
correlation between the two. We have seen that Castoriadis suggests an ex-nihilo
creation of the imaginaries and Anderson points out historical developments as the
critical factor in explaining the emergence of imaginaries. The argument presented in
this work leans toward Anderson with certain modifications.
The Critical Factor: Globalization and the Imaginary Ottoman
Castoriadis imbues the imaginary with a “world forming and meaning bestowing
creative force” but falls short of explaining how this imaginary becomes more real than
real5 (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 6). The actualization of the imaginary, on the other hand, is
5 Although the arguments of Castoriadis are critical for our understanding of imaginary, the question of
how this imaginary and its representations, the symbolic, are created by the social still remains unsolved
and, more importantly, how this imaginary is separated from fantasy, from the illusionary, i.e., how it
became a reality – how it is actualized, is still an open subject. Castoriadis brought an extended form of
Aristotelian praxis to answer this problem. The socio-historical world for Castoriadis is created ex-nihilo,
subject to certain restrictions, through the imaginative praxis (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 6). Within the framework
used by Castoriadis, praxis is the only way people can experience autonomy because it is not a predetermined
activity - it has no determined purpose. It is grounded in emotions, intellect, and character as
well as in interest in an environment full of uncertainty and plurality (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 8). The agents
tend to gravitate to praxis because only through praxis they can experience autonomy (Gaonkar, 2002, p.
15
critical because, without being actualized, the imaginary is not different from fantasy.
Therefore, the emergence and actualization of an imaginary should go hand by hand.
Anderson, as we saw above, highlights the historical developments as a critical factor in
the emergence of imaginaries.
Appadurai offers us an insight into the contemporary factors that affects the
emergence and actualization of imaginaries. The imaginary, in his framework, is neither
fantasy, nor a vicious cycle, but rather is “a form of negotiation between sites of agency
and globally defined fields of possibilities” (Appadurai, 2008, p. 31).
For him, the recent developments in the electronic media and deterritorialization
of people on a global scale provide resources and ground for the working of imagination
as “the constitutive force of modern subjectivity” (Appadurai, 2008, p. 3, 4).
Imagination, thus, according to him became “a collective social fact” and the role of
ordinary imaginary is transformed by breaking out from its conventional forms and by
8). Praxis according to Castoriadis, carries its purpose and cannot be reduced to a mere technique, it
follows a project but not as an implementation of a technique or theory but rather as anticipation
(Habermas, 1987, p. 2). Finally, praxis is related to a totality (Habermas, 1987, p. 2). Castoriadis, by
transcending Aristotle, argues that praxis is directed towards the other and towards the autonomy of others
and is certainly future oriented (Habermas, 1987, p. 2). Praxis, because it is creative (and we can say that it
is conditioned by the radical imaginary of the agent), overrides all determinations and creates the other -
the new (Habermas, 1987, p. 2). However, as many point out, this formulation has its own weaknesses and
does not fully explain how the social imaginary is actualized (Habermas, 1987, p. 330).
16
becoming “a part of mental work of ordinary people” (Appadurai, 2008, p. 5).
Imaginary thus turned out to be “fuel” or a “ground for action”.
This new role ascribed to imagination by Appadurai implies that the collective
experiences of human communities, geared with the resources provided by the electronic
media, provides new strength to the imagination – to the imaginary in the minds of
people, to initiate, direct, and act by shaping daily practices, thus constructing their
individual and collective biographies (Appadurai, 2008, p. 54). Accordingly,
construction of the imaginary, i.e., the act of imagination, slips out of the hands of social
engineering projects, out of the realm of nation- states, which excelled in top-down
fabrication, and becomes the everyday practice of individuals and groups (Appadurai,
2008, p. 9).
The context of Appadurai is globalization. Globalization enables people to
disembed themselves from their traditional social setting, thus provide the background
for the creation of new imaginaries and the power to actualize them. In this perspective,
there is an important point to be underlined. Globalization, as the historical factors affect
the imagination process. However, this time, the historical development, that is,
globalization, works against the national imaginaries.
This discussion establishes the theoretical foundations behind the argument that
the imaginary Ottoman as a representation of a social imaginary has a strong connection
to globalization. This connection is not only a one way relation as envisaged by the
elites. The imaginary Ottoman is not only a guide to this global world but it is also a
17
product of this world. The imaginary Ottoman refers to things other than historical
Ottoman, it is imaginary, and it is something new. It is a product of globalization.
Transforming Social Imaginaries: The Importance of Ottoman
Taylor, besides giving us a definition of social imaginary, also introduced the concept of
transformation of imaginaries. Taylor (2007) explains this process where “new
practices, modification of old ones either developed through improvisation or else
launched by elites in such a way to recruit a larger and larger base” (p. 30). Taylor
(2007) theorizes that “what starts as theories held by a few people come to infiltrate the
social imaginary, first of elites then the whole society” … that the social imaginary
gradually extends “below and beyond social elites” and to “other levels and niches of
social life” (p. 147). However, to counterbalance this top-down infiltration through
theories, Taylor (2007) adds that, “humans operated within a social imaginary well
before they ever got into the business of theorizing about themselves” (p. 26). He, in
other words, stresses that the transformation of the social imaginary is not a one-sided
top-down process, from elites to society , because the theories of the elites are
“schematized in the dense sphere of common practice” (Taylor, 2007, p. 30). They are
shaped by society. The antagonism between the creation by the society and the top-down
fabrication by the elites disappears in this process of transformation of social imaginary.
The new, emerging imaginary, according to Taylor (2007), is not superimposed on the
old one but, by reinterpretation, retains its origin in it (p. 153).
18
Thus, with Taylor, we come to an understanding of transforming social
imaginary that is shaped both by elites and/or by the everyday practices of individuals
when the historical conditions permit. This social imaginary is a product of a process
consisting of top-down and bottom up molding. The social is both imagined and
instituted through this process. In this framework, the representations and significations
of the social imaginary also transform while the imaginary is constructed and actualized.
The symbolism changes form and new symbols and representations appear while the old
ones either disappear or are transformed and are ascribed new meanings either by the
deliberate actions of some groups, elites, or by the society through the daily acts of
people. The changes in the meanings ascribed to representations are therefore critical to
our understanding of the social imaginary they represent. We can observe and
understand the transformation of the social imaginary by looking at the newly emerging
representations such as new objects, visuals, images, acts, ways of behavior that have
meanings corresponding to things other than themselves and/or by looking at changes in
the meaning of certain others as they lose their signifying capacity.
The imaginary Ottoman in this framework becomes critical. First, it helps us to
probe into the social imagined by the elites supporting AKP and by AKP leadership.
Secondly, it helps us to understand the transformation of this social.
19
Methodology
The design of the research for this work focuses on how the Ottoman is imagined, on its
critical properties and on the relation of AKP leadership with this imaginary. Naturally,
having an understanding of how and by what means the Ottoman is imagined was the
first pillar. The focus here, at the first step, was to understand the way in which the new
Ottoman was imagined by the elites and the relation of this process to the concept of
imagination. The second step aims at distinguishing the critical properties of this new
Ottoman, differentiating it from the Ottoman of the past and from the prevalent Turkish
national imaginary. Thirdly, the relation of AKP leadership with this imagination, e.g.,
with this new Ottoman was probed.
The books of Mustafa Armagan and Ahmet Davutoglu were extensively used for
the first step; that is, to understand the process through which this new Ottoman is
imagined and to identify the carriers of the imagination process, and to relate this
process to the concept of imaginary.
These two scholars were chosen because they both advanced in their careers after
the second half of 1990s, after the surge of Islamic political movements in Turkey, and
focused on the role and position of Turkey after the Cold War and on the meaning of the
Ottoman in such a world. Armagan is a prolific writer and a popular historian who has
20
written several books on these subjects. He is a well-known intellectual among the elites,
he has received the Türkiye Yazarlar Birligi6 award three times, and has written twenty
and edited nine books related to Ottoman studies. He currently writes at the leading
right-wing newspaper Zaman.7 Davutoglu, an active politician, is the Minister of
Foreign Affairs as of the date of this work and as an academician, he has written four
books and numerous articles mostly focusing on Ottoman, civilization, the apprehension
of history and foreign politics of Turkey in a globalized world (Vikipedi, n.d.). In this
sense, both Armagan and Davutoglu are the representatives of the elites that support the
AKP leadership.
Next, an extensive review of written sources was conducted to understand what
this Ottoman represents in the minds of the elites, the AKP leadership and to determine
how this imagined Ottoman is different from other imaginaries. This constitutes the
second step. However, making an imaginary discernible is problematic. Castoriadis
points out that imaginaries are not produced by single individuals, e.g., they cannot be
reduced to individuals, and they are social. What is looked for, therefore, is not the
6 Türkiye Yazarlar Birligi, Union of Turkish Writers, was founded in 1978. It is the leading association of
conservative, Islamist-oriented writers in Turkey. The awards have been given since 1981, mostly to
authors or poets focusing on Islam, Ottoman and on other similar subjects. Some of the recipients have
been Cemil Meriç (1981), Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1982), skender Pala (1989), saret Publishing House
(1991), Halil nalcık (1994), Hasan Celal Güzel (1999), Mim Kemal Öke (2002) and Zaman Newspaper
(2008).
7 Zaman is the leading Islamist newspaper in Turkey, which is closely affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen
Group.
21
fantasies of a group of people, but rather an imaginary that is emerging gradually in the
minds of a group of people . What is important is not the ideas of this or that person but
the reflection of this imaginary in peoples’ minds. In other words, a puzzle should be
completed to arrive to a a picture of this new Ottoman. Nevertheless, pieces of the
puzzle are held by different people who are connected to each other through the puzzle
itself.
A review of Islamist publications in Turkey on the subject of Ottoman since year
2000 was conducted to overcome this difficulty. The objective was to see whether
specific themes, properties, related to the Ottoman surfaced during this period. This
work involved an overall review of the titles and explanatory notes about books
published by publishing houses focusing on Islam and on related titles. An Internet
research focusing on two prominent online bookstores and queries of those titles
including “Islam” together with the review of other books published by the same
publishers were conducted and those publishing houses that focused on Islam, Islamic
lifestyle or similar subjects and books written by known Islamist intellectuals were
selected.8 The total number of titles published by them was 12,982. Approximately 80%
of these books were eliminated when the books that were exclusively related to Islam, to
its interpretation, its reflection in everyday life and fiction titles were excluded.
8 Total of one hundred and seventy-one publishing houses.
22
Similarly, the titles related to the general history of Ottoman Empire or biographies were
eliminated and ninty-one books related to the “Ottoman” were selected. The table below
shows the classification of these books according to their emphasis.
Table 1 The Classification of Books Related to the Ottoman
Certain subjects or themes appear on this table. These were the concept of Ottoman
civilization, the deconstruction of Ottoman history, a “Vatan”, which is larger than
Anatolia, and certain other ideas that would constitute a starting point in trying to
understand the imaginary Ottoman.
A second critical question concerning the second step of the research was where
to look for material. The very reason that led me to look at this subject, e.g., the Ottoman
phenomenon, became a problem because the Ottoman was practically everywhere. Since
the focus of this work is politics and AKP, a pool is created consisting of people around
AKP who would be examined in terms of their conception of Ottoman. This pool is
Classifications Number of
Books
Ottoman civilization is the central subject 12
Ottomanism in general 11
Books related to Ottomanism and Ottoman civilization as a
general subject
33
Glorification of the reign of Abdulhamid II 7
Deconstruction of post-1908 period 19
Reconstruction or emphasis of certain critical periods in
Ottoman or Islamic history such as ‘’Fetret Devri,’’ Çanakkale
War and Andalusia
3
Books related to deconstruction of Ottoman and Republican
history
29
Books related to continuity of the values in the society 9
Books that have a deconstructive / constructive nature on
‘Vatan’’
13
Unclassified Books 7
23
defined as “people connected to AKP” and the books authored or to which contributions
were made by these people were reviewed to comprehend, draw the boundaries, pinpoint
critical properties of the Ottoman as imagined and to understand how it has been reimagined.
Within this framework, the pool included the founding members of AKP,9 the
administrative cadres of the party,10 all the ministers of AKP governments since 2002,
AKP deputies as of August 31, 2010, the University Rectors appointed by Abdullah Gül
since July 2007 and the chairmen and board members of autonomous regulatory bodies
or special institutions such as RTÜK,11 SPK,12 and TRT13 appointed either by a AKP
majority in the parliament, by the AKP government or by Abdullah Gül as the president.
A research using Google Books and the two largest online bookstores in Turkish,
Antoloji14 and Pandora15 was carried out to find books written or to which contributions
were made by these people. This research uncovered fifty such books related to social
sciences, excluding economics and business administration, of which nineteen were
9 Sixty-five people.
10 One hundred and fourty-eight people.
11 Radio Television Supreme Council.
12 Capital Market Board.
13 Turkish Radio and Television, state-controlled broadcasting unit.
14 Website, http://www.antoloji.com/
15 Website, http://www.pandora.com.tr/
24
reviewed. These nineteen books were directly or indirectly related to the Ottoman and/or
to Islam or to the position of Turkey in a globalized world. Five of remaining books are
also related to the above subjects but they were neither on sale anymore nor available in
nearby libraries.
When reviewing this material, the focus was on the critical properties ascribed to
the Ottoman by the authors while keeping in mind the themes that were briefly listed
above. Naturally, as it will be later discuss in detail, these characteristics are presented as
historical realities in practically all instances, with qualifications in some cases.
However, the objective of the review was not to determine whether what was presented
was reality but rather, drawing a picture of the Ottoman with what was derived from
different sources.
Finally, in this second step, the works of certain other conservative writers were
reviewed to differentiate this new Ottoman imaginary from the earlier conceptions of
Ottoman, especially with the Ottoman in the mind of earlier Islamists and conservatives.
These works were those of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nurettin Topçu, Sabri Ülgener,
Mümtaz Turhan and smail Kara.
In the last, the third step of the research, all the speeches of Tayyip Erdogan
posted on the official AKP web-site and that mention the Ottoman were reviewed to
understand how AKP is connected to this imaginary. This source was chosen because it
is the official mouthpiece of the party; it covers a period of more than four years. The
issues of the newspaper Zaman, since 2007 were also reviewed in order to follow the
25
discourse and actions of AKP leadership pertaining to the subject.
Zaman was briefly mentioned above but it is appropriate to provide more
information about it in order to make clear why it is used. As the leading, right leaning,
and Islamist-oriented newspaper, Zaman is the first newspaper in Turkey to have created
a daily website, in 1995. The name of the newspaper is the reverse spelling of the word
Namaz (prayer) in Turkish. It is printed in local languages in Australia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and
the United States. The parent group also owns a weekly periodical, Aksiyon, and a news
agency, Cihan Haber Ajansı. Fehmi Koru, Mümtazer Türköne, Sahin Alpay, hsan Dagı,
Ali Bulaç, Besir Ayvazoglu, Hilmi Yavuz, skender Pala and similar conservativeleaning
writers with Islamist backgrounds periodically publish articles in Zaman. In
short, Zaman’s archives were one of the richest among all newspapers in Turkey where
the news related to the Ottoman in the discourse and actions of AKP leadership could be
extracted and analyzed.
The last point on the methodology is about the role of individual biographies.
The main source of this research was the written material produced by a group of people
and the speeches of the leaders of AKP. The personal biographies, life experiences of
these people have definitely a role in both the articulation and the formation of the
imaginary Ottoman. If the biography of Mustafa Armagan would have been probed, we
could have been able to see critical events which might hint us the ideas promoted by
him today. skender Pala for example, one of the authors that is refered, was expelled
26
from the Army in 1990s. The impact of this event in his psyche and its ramifications in
his articulation of the Ottoman is not probed in this work. The reasons behind subtle
nuances in the imaginary Ottoman portrayed by these people may lie deep in their life
experiences. While the focus of Armagan is on history, for example, we understand that
he is not a historian. Can this be a hint for his relentless criticism of historians?
Similarly, Davutoglu spent a part of his academic life in Malaysia when he started to
write about the concept civilization. Can this have an impact in his conception of the
Ottoman as an Islamic civilization center? There are many such questions. This work
was not designed to answer these questions but it acknowledges that it is not possible to
draw a line between these individuals, between the cultural forms in which they exist
and the social characteristic of the imaginary they voice. There is a complex interaction
between these points and we can neither deny nor ascribe a deterministic importance to
this interaction. This is an area that has to be worked on. The only reason why the
individual biographies are not probed in this work is to focus on the imaginary itself and
on its importance in Turkish politics.
Concepts
Finally, before proceeding to the organization of the work, the utilization of certain
concepts should be clarified.
Throughout this work, the Ottoman is used without any reference to the
imaginary whenever it is referred by a third person. In all other cases, either “imaginary
27
Ottoman”, is utilized or a reference to its imaginary character is given.
Islam and Islamist are probably the two widely used concepts after “the
Ottoman”. Islam is used as the religion instituted by the Prophet Mohammed and
Muslim as the follower of this religion; similarly “Islamism” is used as a political
ideology aiming to establish an order basing on this religion and the “Islamist” as the
followers of this ideology or activities guided by this ideology. Third, “actualize” is used
instead of “realize” for the imaginaries. Although both have similar meanings, “make
real or concrete, give reality, substance to something”, “actualize” looks better because
its meaning is narrower than “realize” as the latter also means “become aware”. In this
context, actualization of an imaginary means that it is no more an illusion - it becomes
reality or a part of the reality.
Organization of the Thesis
As noted above, this thesis is about the emerging Ottoman phenomena in Turkey and it
was argued that the Ottoman is a representation of the social imagined by the newly
emerging elites and shared by AKP leadership. Furthermore, it is argued that this
imaginary Ottoman serves as a guide in the global world and it is a product of
globalization. Within this framework, the work is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: The Ottoman as an Imaginary and the Role of History in its
Imagination starts with the elaboration of the idea that the Ottoman presented to us, with
various meanings ascribed to it, may not correspond to the historical Ottoman, e.g., to
28
reality and the difference between the imaginary and the real dimensions of the Ottoman
was emphasized. The first part of this chapter is fully devoted to the distinction of real
and imaginary dimensions of the Ottoman because the awareness of this difference is
critical for this work. It is clear that, if we disregard the imaginary dimension of the
Ottoman, we may end up in an endless discussion of what the real Ottoman is and as a
result, we will hardly be able to understand the importance of the imaginary Ottoman for
the newly emerging elites and AKP leadership. This is true, especially if we think that
the real Ottoman is different from what has been presented to us. The separation of
imaginary and real dimension of the Ottoman in this chapter, therefore, paves the way to
our comprehension of it as an ensemble of symbols – as an imaginary representing an
imaginary social. It also enables us to look at it critically, without being drawn into the
discussion of what the real history was.
Later in this chapter, the focus shifts to the way the elites imagine the Ottoman
by using the science of history. As noted above, the works of Armagan and Davutoglu
were used to show how the elites mobilize the imaginary capacity of the Ottoman, in
other words, the capacity to permit seeing something that does not exist, and instill the
imaginary dimension of the Ottoman with new meanings, thereby ascribing new
meanings to the Ottoman. This re-imagination of the Ottoman as a representation of a
social imaginary is accomplished by using the science of history. The correspondence,
of how Armagan and Davutoglu use history, and the historian to imagine a new
Ottoman, to the theoretical foundations of imaginaries and its representations laid down
29
by Castoriadis and others is probably the strongest evidence that this Ottoman is an
imaginary.
Chapter 3: The Critical Properties of the Imaginary Ottoman draws a picture of
the Ottoman as imagined with the assistance of history and later establishes its first
connection with globalization, with the historical factors. Seeing this picture is critical
not only to understand what this imaginary Ottoman is but also to comprehend the
imaginary social it represents and to differentiate it from the existing Turkish national
imaginary. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first three are devoted to the
different characteristics of the imagined Ottoman. The concepts of civilization, the role
of Islam and the hyperreality of the Ottoman are elaborated in these sections. In these
sections, we note that this imagined Ottoman presented to us is neither a defunct order
nor a historical entity buried in history. This imaginary Ottoman is a civilization having
a different conception of time and space than the West and it continues in the current
Turkish society as the common social imaginary. Islam is at the center of this imaginary
Ottoman but this Ottoman does not represent a religious order of the world. The
imaginary Ottoman cannot be reduced to Anatolia; nor is it an imaginary only for
speakers of Turkish language. It is a more encompassing imaginary than the national
Turkish imaginary. Nevertheless, it is not an alternative to Turkish identity, but rather a
cradle where a new identity can be constructed.
In the last section of this chapter, the focus was on showing how the imaginary
Ottoman is portrayed as a solution to the problems of globalization, of the national
30
imaginaries and nations in a globalized world. Defining the current problems in this
context requires the definition of the current world, which, at this point, is defined as a
global multi-civilization world and a locality where the real identity of the society is
replaced with a fake one. The imaginary Ottoman, however, is presented to us as a
solution to the problem of nation-states both globally and locally because while it is a
cradle of identity, it is global in nature, it represents an open civilization, and it has an
appeal to humanity.
One aspect of the connection between the imaginary Ottoman and globalization
is elaborated in this chapter. This aspect shows us only the role of the imaginary
Ottoman in a globalized world as a guide and it is obviously the point of view of the
elites. The elaboration of the second aspect of this relation, i.e., the role of globalization
in the imagination of the Ottoman, is discussed in next chapter.
This last section, in addition to highlighting the first connection between the
imagined Ottoman and globalization also shows us how the theories and views of the
elites, on which their imagined social are based, find their way into daily life in the form
of solutions to the problems. Taylor explains to us that these theories or views both
gradually shape the world and are shaped by it. From this perspective, in this last
section, we see an example of how the dual process of Taylor works at least partially.
Chapter 4: The Imaginary Ottoman and the Politics first focuses on the political
scene and explore the basic, preliminary relation between AKP and the imaginary
Ottoman. Later in this chapter, the case for connection between the imaginary Ottoman
31
and globalization is fully presented because this link with the globalization is critical for
us to understand the deeper impact of the imaginary Ottoman on politics. This chapter
starts with the elaboration of how and why this imaginary Ottoman pertains to politics in
general and to the AKP specifically by using the concept of “social magic” of Bourdieu.
Afterwards, in the first section, it is shown how in the words of Erdogan, in his different
speeches, the same Ottoman as imagined by the elites manifests itself. Second section
gives examples of how the AKP leadership imposes the idea that the current society is in
fact Ottoman. This section not only includes examples from the speeches of leaders but
also shows how an Ottoman space is created throughout Turkey and how our culture,
which is identified with Ottoman culture, is used to elaborate this argument. The third
section, in turn, shows how the AKP leadership asserts that it is the representatives of
this Ottoman.
In the fourth section, I attempted to demonstrate that the imaginary Ottoman is
both the product of globalization and a guide in the globalized world and I emphasized
the ability of the Ottoman, as an imaginary, to transform and to adapt. This is partly due
to the fluid nature of globalization that gave birth to it but also due to the creative
capacity of the imaginary itself as put forward by Castoriadis and by Gaonkar in form of
creative adaptation. This new imaginary, is, therefore, both in the process of making,
transforming, and a part of the process in making the world as a guide. In this sense, as
put by Castoriadis, it is illusionary but it also partakes in rationality. Later in this section,
I tried to show how this ability to change gives an important role to the imaginary
32
Ottoman in the intellectual make-up of AKP and why it is important in the context of
Turkish politics. The concept of habitus, with some possible qualifications, is used in
this chapter to explain the perceived discrepancy between the ambitions and capabilities
of both the AKP leadership and Turkey and to illustrate the daily, practical, actual
benefits that it offers to the AKP. Secondly, I tried to show how habitus, together with
the creative capability of imagination, is critical for AKP in internalizing outside
influences stemming from globalization.
33
CHAPTER 2
THE OTTOMAN AS AN IMAGINARY AND
THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN ITS IMAGINATION
“Ottomanist” is an adjective that denotes various concepts in Turkey, ranging from
Islamists to persons wanting more involvement in the Middle East. It has a negative or
positive connotation depending on usually where one positions himself on the
secularism debate. For example, we know that the Ottoman period or being the heir to
the Ottomans has always had a positive meaning in Islamist circles.
After the electoral victory of AKP in 2002, “Ottoman” became a more politically
loaded word. The secular front in Turkey started to label AKP and its policies as
New/Neo-Ottomanist, hence anti-Republican and Islamist with a negative connotation
despite AKP’s repeated rejection. The chorus grew with the addition of foreign
commentators the more Turkish foreign policy towards Middle East became more pro-
Palestinian and anti-Israeli in tone.
One explanation for the increasing utilization of Ottoman, Ottomanism or
New/Neo-Ottomanist is obviously related to the AKP’s successive electoral victories
and in its ability to reshape both domestic and foreign policy. Ottoman, before AKP
assumed power, was perceived as a distant utopia which could only be discussed in an
historical or cultural context and not as part of politics. AKP’s Islamist origin and the
long-standing emotional and intellectual ties of Islamists in Turkey with the Ottoman,
34
along with the “otherization” of the Ottoman by the secular Republic, seems, in this
perspective, to have set the stage for the reconnection of the Ottoman with politics.
However, this explanation is a limited one to start working on the Ottoman phenomenon
that we currently observe in Turkey. It does not take the changes in the world or the
transformation of the AKP leadership during the last decade of 1990s into account and,
more importantly, it assumes that the Ottoman presented to us today is the same
Ottoman honored by the Islamist before the 1990s. Accordingly, we have to look at
other explanations for the emergence of the Ottoman in modern Turkey.
The mere fact that the Ottoman signifies so many contradictory things, e.g.,
good, bad, pre-modern, theocracy and empire, glory, victory, defeat, Turk, devshirme
and so on is an indication of the capacity of the Ottoman to correspond to different
meanings. This capacity that we observe in the daily utilization of the word ‘’Ottoman’’
is a critical sign of the role that is attributed to it in this work.
These different meanings ascribed to the Ottoman may or may not correspond to
the reality. In order to make this clearer, we have to see the Ottoman as a symbolic
system with various, even contradictory, meanings ascribed to it. In this case, the
Ottoman may correspond both to a reality that is to the historical Ottoman, but also to
other meanings that have nothing to do with the historical Ottoman. This second group
of correspondences of Ottoman makes up its imaginary dimension. Thus, there are two
dimensions of Ottoman, its real dimension and its imaginary dimension.
35
It is impossible to think of the “Ottoman” without its first dimension, that is
without a real component that refers to the historical Ottoman state and society. In this
first dimension, the real one, what Ottoman refers to is already determined, it is “already
there” in history, and we are discovering, finding it. In this dimension, we can only be
questioning the link of the Ottoman with reality. Here, in its real dimension, its meaning,
what it represents, can only be verified or falsified by historians (Castoriadis, 2005, p.
89, 90). We obviously cannot avoid this real dimension of the Ottoman because we
cannot define it otherwise. However, a focus on the real dimension may confine us to an
endless discussion of what “real” history is. Such a discussion may lead us to ignore that
the Ottoman is continuously changing through the continuous ascription of different,
even contradictory, meanings to it and we may bypass this transformation process.
As argued above, the Ottoman is a representation of the social imagined by the
elites, of their theories and their conservative-leaning view of the social; it is an
imaginary. Therefore, as a representation of the social imaginary, in its second
dimension, the Ottoman is imagined by the elites. It is an imagination of a world and the
meanings related to it. These meanings are not based on facts or reality but rather they
are meanings ascribed to reality (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 82, 83). Similarly, the Ottoman
has also meanings ascribed to it by the society, which may or may not coincide with the
meanings ascribed to it by the elites. Thus, the imaginary dimension of the Ottoman is a
site where different meanings become intertwined and reflected back to their creators,
e.g., to the society and to the elites.
36
It is difficult to grasp the role of the imagining in the construction of meanings of
the Ottoman. Its real dimension continuously overshadows the imaginary dimension
because it is much easier to see, to understand and to draw a correspondence to the real.
The imaginary in the Ottoman, whether imagined by the elites or by society, therefore, is
in the mode of “none being” (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 90). It does not refer to anything real;
it does not correspond to any reality. Naturally, we cannot observe this non-referral state
because we have already observed the real dimension. However, this imaginary
dimension is in the continuous process of being made. We cannot have a grasp of the
Ottoman in the eyes of intellectuals, academicians and politicians without speculating
about this imaginary dimension of the Ottoman.
The existence of this dimension in the Ottoman reflects the actualization of an
imaginary capacity, the capacity to permit seeing something that is not, to see something
in it that which is not. The Ottoman as a representation, therefore, has been attributed a
capacity of being larger and different than the historical Ottoman through its imaginary
dimension and this dimension is used by the elites to express their imagination of the
social and to pass it from virtual to a different state. The imaginary dimension of the
Ottoman is instilled or filled with new content through the repetitive attempts of the
elites under the pretext of presenting new historical realities in the real dimension.
However, it is critical to note that the imaginary dimension of the Ottoman, that is the
repository of the meanings ascribed to Ottoman that do not correspond to reality,
represents the reality for those who ascribe these meanings to the Ottoman.
37
Up to now I discussed that imagining of the Ottoman, despite its illusionary
character, is presented to us as an effort to discover the reality. Now, I will show that the
history and the historian have a critical role in this process of imagination, veiled as a
process of searching for the truth. When we examine how Mustafa Armagan and Ahmet
Davutoglu conceive history, in general, and Ottoman history, in particular, we will see
that the history is a tool to imagine what is Ottoman.
Armagan (2008a) argues that our history is not an addendum to the Western
history (p. 88). A more academic formulation of the same idea comes from Davutoglu
(1994), in one of his earlier books where he argued that identifying world history with
the history of the West not only ignored the contributions of other civilizations but, more
importantly, it limited future alternatives to only those that might be produced by the
West (p. 5).
History as progression along a straight line, as held by modernity theory, is
rejected in this framework as the narrative of the dominant ideology, which characterizes
Europe as a success story. According to Armagan (2009), while this narrative is not real,
it nevertheless shapes the intellectual make-up of the defeated in such a way that history
is perceived as a history of decay (p. 91). The defeated, in this case, is obliged to accept
that past is past and there is nothing valuable in it. Armagan (2008b) argues that these
societies are, therefore, unable to transform their past into their history and are unable to
probe the past (p. 28). They fail to establish a meaningful relation with it and are unable
to humanize their past. They “fight with their histories” endlessly and become
38
completely blind to their history (Armagan, 2008b, p. 28, 147). Alternatively, they live
in their past continuously and lose their direction. Their history becomes either an object
of desire or an object of fear (Armagan, 2008b, p. 27). Similarly, Davutoglu (2009)
underlines that societies without a historical consciousness cannot assess the
interconnectivity of current realities and their historical experiences and perceive
themselves as the passive agents of history and their victories and defeats as the
consequences of the acts of others (p. 60). Armagan and Davutoglu are not alone in this
conception of history. Ayhan Buz (2008), in his book says, in the same vein, that we
should rely on our past to be confident in the future (p. back cover).
In this perspective, Armagan (2008b) argues that history has never been and
should never be objective; it has always been presented to us through the eyes of others
(p. 44). Accordingly, they both argue that we should look at the past from our own
perspective and make it our history – in other words, we should reject the idea that the
past is past (Armagan, 2008b, p. 26, 27). We should look at history, comprehend it - not
to go back to the past but to move forward (Armagan, 2008b, p. 32). In this perspective,
history is transformed into an interpretation of today and to a solution for tomorrow; it is
where we find the clues for arriving at the future (Armagan, 2008b, p. 32).
The reading of history, therefore, becomes a powerful tool that “we can use to
create a community of slaves or … to ignite freedom” (Armagan, 2008b, p. 35). “A real
historian should therefore be like a ghost hunter”, searching for the imperceptible to
make it visible (Armagan, 2009, p. 17). The role of the historian, in this context, is
39
similar to that of a magician who stimulates the capacity of his/her spectators of seeing
something in something that is not, which is the capacity of imagining. The historian has
therefore the capacity, as a person who has an access to history, to create new content in
the imaginary dimension of this representation by claiming that he/she is discovering the
reality.
Armagan (2009), in fact, says that history is a construction; it is continuously
redefined and, in return, determines today (p. 67). It is a process in the making
(Armagan, 2009, p. 88). Accordingly, if we do not reinterpret our history today, if we do
not interact with our history today, if we cannot get clues from our history about the
problems of today, that history will lose its meaning (Armagan, 2009, p. 88). However,
if we confront history, it will gradually present itself more; in other words, it will
increasingly be more discernible to us in the way we imagine (Armagan, 2009, p. 21). In
other words, this imaginary will look more and more real to us the more we use our
capacity to see something that is not through the meanings that we have already
attributed. In this respect, Davutoglu (2009) says, “history is the critical element that
determines the position of a society in time” (p. 65). Therefore, “it can be re-interpreted
by the political authority as a part of strategic apprehension but it cannot be changed or
disregarded” (Davutoglu, 2009, p. 65). This is a widespread view shared by many
40
intellectuals, academicians and politicians as noted in the introduction of a book, that
can be considered authoritative in respect to the perception, imagination of the Ottoman
by AKP (Çakır, 2006, p. v).16 The introduction suggests that history is more important
today as an instrument than as a concept. It became, “a science of future rather than a
science of past” and is a solution to the problems we face resulting from the
disappearance of modern nationalism and the emergence of modern empires (Çakır,
2006, p. v).
Such a conception of history is not only important as it is presented as a tool to
imagine a different world but also because it paves the way for the actualization of this
world. History, as we have seen, is perceived as a source of solutions to current
problems through which we can imagine our future. As a result, it is transformed into a
picture of the present, providing clues for solving current problems. The new meanings
of these representations, in return, are reflected to the society and shape the new social
imaginary. These theories, views which are the background of the proposed solutions of
16 Six of the fourteen contributors to the book have been appointed to various critical positions since 2002.
It is noteworthy that all the authors except one are prominent scholars and most of them, even those who
have no direct relation to AKP, are known for their pro-Islamist views. Ahmet Davutoglu is the current
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Ertem was the Istanbul Regional Director of General Directorate of
Foundations and later he was appointed to the position of Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Prime
Ministry, Çoskun Çakır is the president of the Board of Director of Turkish Radio and Television and also
a member of Radio Television Supreme Council, Akif Aydın is a newly appointed member of The
Council of Higher Education, Ömer Dinçer was the Undersecretary of the Prime Minister and later he was
appointed as the Minister of State and finally Iskender Pala is one of the three jurists of the Grand
Presidential Award for Culture and Art. Turgut Cansever is a prominent architect who won the Agha Khan
Award for Architecture twice and he is well known for his Islamist views.
41
the elites to current problems, through the process, became the solutions we find in
society - in its history in our case. History, in short, becomes a tool for imaging a new
world and breaks away from the past and from the reality. Armagan (2009), to refute this
“criticism”, argues, with a number of references to Karl-Otto Apel, Heidegger and
Wittgenstein, that he is not seeking objectivity but he is open to any verification
procedure (p. 33). However, this verification may never be possible because what is to
be verified may have already become a part of the reality in the imagination, and
become more real than real, impossible to refute. Therefore, the proposed solutions,
although they may originally be based on an imaginary, may become a part of the
process to actualize this imaginary.
Now that the role of the history in the imagination process is clarified, we have
to look at how the Ottoman history, specifically, is perceived and constructed within this
context.
Armagan (2008a), Davutoglu and others argue that our interpretations of
Ottoman history, despite the fact that we are direct descendants of the Ottoman, is either
directly based on the discourse and narrative created in Europe or it is a reaction to them
(p. 205-208). Erol Özvar (2006), similarly, maintains that although there are many
researches on Ottoman history, the history that is written is European history (p. 124).
Ahmet Sait Akçay (2009), paralleling others, states in his article, where he discusses the
construction of national literature, that history writing in Turkey employs a modernist
and progressive paradigm (p. 157). Davutoglu, finally, argues that the biggest obstacle to
42
a proper understanding of the Ottoman is the historical succession scheme, i.e., the
progressive reading of history, implanted in our minds by the dominant approach to
history. Davutoglu (2006) argues that quite a number of historians who identified the
history of humanity with European history; automatically connect Ottoman history to
European history (p. 3). The Ottoman, however, he continues, as the last ruler, in an area
covering Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Mediterranean, deeply affected human history
and, therefore, is an impediment to such readings (Davutoglu, 2006, p. 7). In conclusion,
all these writers share the view that we are alienated from the real Ottoman history.
Armagan (2008a) (2009) argues, we dehumanized it; we do not know Ottoman
women, men, and children and the subjects who made the history, the Ottoman people,
after Suleiman the Magnificent, are replaced by the West – by Europe (p. 239) (p. 31).
Armagan (2008b) argues that in response, we should hunt for the “ghost”, stop evading
ourselves, and stop replacing ourselves with the West (p. 130). Armagan warns us that in
this ghost hunting, in this search for ourselves, the Ottoman is an island similar to an
iceberg. It is something that is much larger and different from what we see today.
This is a call to imagine what else the Ottoman can be other than the meanings
that were already ascribed to it. It is a call to fill the imaginary dimension of the
Ottoman with contents produced on the real dimension with the help of the science of
history. This call for the imagination is direct and explicit in the words of Armagan
(2009), “The Ottoman people no longer exist. The word Ottoman does not point out any
place. There is no one who speaks Ottoman” (p. 140). In other words, he tells us that the
43
Ottoman is ready to be filled in with a new content. However, he warns us that Ottoman
means a core, a sprit, “something which circulates in the veins of the society” (Armagan,
2008b, p. 208). An attempt has been made to keep it alive – not by protecting it directly
but by safeguarding its ideals.
As we have seen, the science of history became a call for the imagination and
Ottoman history was transformed into a shell for the content of this imagination. The
imagination of the Ottoman – the utilization of its capacity of being something other
than itself, thus gives the elites an opportunity to reflect their imagination of the social
and to actualize it.
It is, therefore, no wonder, that Mustafa Özel, in the opening speech of a
Symposium on the Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Ottoman Empire, stated
that “history is the tutor for the future” (Özcan, 2000, p. 13) and brahim Refik (2009) in
the presentation of his book wrote “Ottoman history as a representative of culture,
civilization and identity is a treasure and inheritance from which we can benefit” (p.
back cover).
44
CHAPTER 3
THE CRITICAL PROPERTIES OF THE IMAGINARY OTTOMAN
The detail of the content which is elaborated by the elites on the real dimension is
critical for us to be able to comprehend what the imaginary Ottoman represents. This
chapter aims to show that the call for the imagination of the Ottoman that was
underlined in the previous chapter found a rich response in terms of the meaning
ascribed to it. The first four sections go over those properties of imaginary Ottoman that
show the distinctiveness of the social it represents. Later, in the last section, a second set
of properties of Ottoman will be discussed. These properties constitute the basis on
which the imaginary Ottoman is presented as a solution to the problems of globalization,
of nation states, of national imaginaries thus shows us how the imagined Ottoman
becomes a guide in the global world.
Social imaginary, Taylor (2007) says, “is an understanding rather than a
description of the social space” (p. 25). Therefore, the imaginary cannot be observed
directly. Observing it, similar to the observation of the black holes, the existence of
which we can only confirm by spotting the bending of the light on their boundaries
under the impact of gravitational forces and thereby looking at their difference.
Accordingly, the first focus in this chapter is on certain properties of this Ottoman that
enable us to see the difference of the social that it represents.
45
These properties are repetitively emphasized by the representatives, intellectuals,
academicians and artists, of the elites supporting AKP in different writings. Naturally,
the Ottoman has more properties in the eyes of these elites. However, only those that are
critical in showing that it represents a different social and helping us grasp the impact it
has on AKP and politics were selected rather than trying to give a complete picture.17 In
fact, giving a complete picture is nearly impossible because the social imaginary and its
representations are transforming continuously.
Probably, the first property of the Ottoman that should be underlined is the
presentation of the imaginary Ottoman as a realm different from the West and Western
Civilization. It represents a social with a peculiar time and space apprehension different
than those of the West. Secondly, Islam is the central element of this imaginary
Ottoman, not only as a normative component, but also as a legitimation of its claim to be
the sole and the last representative of Kadim18 civilizations and by providing the ground
on which the Ottoman plurality is constructed. Third, continuity of the Ottomans as a
social is strongly defended. Finally, and in conjunction with all of the above, the
17 I cannot suggest that the boundaries of the imagined Ottoman are equally shared by everyone related to
or supporting AKP. There are quite a number of dissident views who have different arguments on certain
subjects. I find this natural and I do not think that the existence of these arguments materially change the
picture of the Ottoman that I will try to depict when taking the overwhelming number academicians,
intellectuals and politicians who share a relatively common picture into account.
18 Kadim, in this context, is defined as “the one that no one remembers what was prior to it” in one of the
Kanunname (Cihan & Dogan, 2007, p. 31).
46
Ottoman is hyperreal in a geographical perspective and it is imagined as being different
from the imaginary Turk. It is larger than the Turk but certainly embodies the Turk.
As we will see below, this imaginary Ottoman is not an identity per se, although
it carries the claim that “we are all Ottoman”, it is, rather, a cradle in which the people
can construct an identity. These properties do not point out a specific identity that we
can denote certain people but they constitute a breeding ground for a different identity
without directly contradicting the existing one. The prototype of such an identity, for
example, is given by Bahadıroglu (2006) as “being an Ottoman means, unifying the
hearts in an embracing and encompassing axis of love without being part of any
ethnicity” (p. 11).
The Ottoman Civilization – Different Time and Place – Apprehension
Probably the most critical attribute of the Ottoman as imagined by the elite is its time
and space apprehension that differentiate it from the West and qualify it as a different
civilization.
Davutoglu (2006) argues that the Ottoman, the political and social integration of
the region under the umbrella of one civilization, has been an ideal since Alexander the
Great. This ideal was realized by the Ottomans through the integration of the geography
of Kadim civilizations and by embracing the consciousness of all these civilizations (p.
12). The Ottoman in this geography, through its interaction with different civilizations,
created its new original civilization (Çakır, 2006, p. 87). Davutoglu (2006) argues, the
47
long duration of Ottoman rule in the Afro-Eurasian region, depended upon a peculiar
relationship between the Ottoman order and Kadim, the ancient, civilizations (p. 7). He
notes that, the Ottoman power emerged after the Mongol invasion that dissolved various
structures in this geography and it established an order. The background behind the
gradual but continuous consolidation and expansion of Ottoman power is its position as
the sole representative of the Kadim civilizations in the region (Davutoglu, 2006, p. 10).
Similarly, Mehmet psirli (2000) says the Ottoman as a Cihan Devleti (Global State)
took over the experiences of various states created a synthesis and developed its own
style (p. 162). This style, he argues, not only manifested itself administratively but also
in every other sphere of life such as art, politics, bureaucracy and daily life. The
Ottoman, thus, is presented as a different world, a different civilization, a continuation of
the Kadim civilizations, and a natural inheritor of the region. The position of the
Ottoman, therefore, cannot be predicated on the degree of its modernization. The
difference of the Ottoman is not something that can be comprehended by determining
where the Ottoman was located on the trajectory of history vis-à-vis Europe. The space
of the Ottoman cannot be determined by looking at the boundaries drawn by the retreats
and advances of the West but by the reach of the people who belong to this world.
As far as the apprehension of time is concerned, it is argued that the Ottomans
had a self-assurance that was eternal, a conviction reflected in the official name of the
state Devlet-i Aliyye-i Ebed Müddet (The Eternal State) (Cihan & Dogan, 2007, p. 33).
According to Davutoglu (2006), this self-assurance, together with the concept of Kadim,
48
connects the past to the future in the Ottoman realm and represents the time
apprehension peculiar to it (p. 30). In this apprehension, the Ottoman does not move in
the homogeneous empty time of Anderson but exists, eternally, in the simultaneity of
past and future – in the instantaneous present of Anderson (Anderson, 2006, p. 24).
The West strengthened its dominance the more it loosened the time
consciousness of the Kadim civilizations, the conviction that it is eternal, and perceived
the Ottoman as the biggest obstacle in this process (Davutoglu, 2006, p. 13). The
confrontation with West, therefore, stems from the West’s insistence on the
superimposition of its own apprehension of space and time, its own social imaginary, on
the Ottoman. The Ottoman, Davutoglu (2006) argues, was sure about the eternity of its
historical existence, about its time, as much as it was sure about its comprehension of the
human accumulation, its space, thus its imagination of the world but it collapsed, under
the pressure of the West, when it lost this historical consciousness, the assurance that it
is eternal and universal (p. 13).
The Role of Islam
The imagined Ottoman, as a distinct civilization, has Islam as a central element. In fact,
the current apprehension of Ottoman civilization is an extension of Islamic social
imaginary.
We know that the Ulema (Muslim theologians and scholars), in the Ottoman
period, conceived the word Alem (universe), the world, in the Islamic literature and its
49
extension, Nizam-ı Alem (Islamic world order), in a way very close to the concept of
civilization (Hocaoglu, 2003, p. 124). The Islamic world, Alem, in this conception means
both the world of the Muslim and the world designated as Muslim world (Hocaoglu,
2003, p. 124). In other words, this is a world in the mind, in the imagination, of the
Muslim rather than being the geography of the Muslims. It represents the social
imaginary of the Muslim and it exists independently from the external designations. This
link between the concept of civilization and the Muslim social imaginary is a key in
understanding the Islamic nature of the Ottoman civilization, in other words, the social
imaginary represented by the imaginary Ottoman today.
Secondly, the Ottoman civilization, the imagined Ottoman world, was depicted
as a synthesis of all the previous Kadim civilizations and where different groups live
peacefully together under the umbrella of the Ottoman state, in the Ottoman order, in
Pax Ottomanica. When we probe this world, the concepts of synthesis and Pax
Ottomanica, we see how deeply they are related to Islam and see the imprints of Islamic
imaginary in its core.
The arguments that the Ottoman is the sole and last representation of the Kadim
civilization is symmetrical to the argument that Christianity and Judaism are embedded
in Islam and converged in Islam as it is the last religion (Karlıga, 2000, p. 103). The
argument of synthesis, amalgamation and representation of Kadim civilizations is
therefore deeply influenced by the Quranic claim of being the last religion,
encompassing and embodying the other two monistic religions. Similarly, there is the
50
argument that Muslims embrace the cultural accumulation of all the ancient,
civilizations as well as the ideas of the Christian philosophers because all the cultures
are considered as ezeli hikmet (eternal wisdom), which should be grasped by every
Muslim according to Qur’an (Karlıga, 2000, p. 104, 105).
When, on the other hand, the multi-linguistic, multi-religious structure of the
Ottoman, Pax Ottomanica is discussed, we see that the Ottoman is again perceived as an
Islamic melting pot, a multi-lingual, multi-religious and multicultural civilization that
existed peacefully, by respecting the rights of everybody (Pala, 2006, p. 156, 157).
psirli (2000) states that this order could last for centuries because the Ottoman ruled
according to Islamic law despite the fact that it was a Turkish state (p. 161). Within the
context of Pax Ottomanica, what is permitted and not permitted in the Ottoman is
determined according to Islamic principles and despite some variations in the history,
the Islamic law determined the boundaries of peace and tolerance in the Ottoman order
(Akgündüz, 2000, p. 63-65, 68, 69). In this respect, the Ottoman had superiority to other
Islamic states, excluding the first one run by the prophet, because all Muslims in the
world were considered as the equal members of Ottoman society until the Tanzimat19
(Akgündüz, 2000, p. 64). It is also argued that this tolerance was equally relevant for
19 Tanzimat refers to the introduction of new laws where the Muslims and non-Muslims had equal rights.
People living in Ottoman territories were considered as equal. Muslims who lived outside the the Ottoman
territories were consequently differentiated from those who lived inside.
51
diverse Islamic sects to whom the state was equidistant (Öz, 2000, p. 129) (Öngören,
2000, p. 135, 136) (Kursun, 2000, p. 149). Similarly, the rights of non-Muslims were
also perceived as God given and respected. Mehmet Aydın (2000), for example, points
out that non-Muslims had human rights in accordance with the general framework of
Islamic law (p. 121) (Akgündüz, 2000, p. 65).
Therefore, the Ottoman is perceived as the creator of a culture of divine
responsibility, an ideal of world order, Nizam-ı Alem. It is imagined as the social of
Muslims. In this imaginary Ottoman, minorities have never been oppressed as long as
they complied with Islamic law (Akgündüz, 2000, p. 66, 67). Ali Müfit Gürtuna,20 for
example says, “we did not segregate minorities from ourselves in our history”. All the
different elements of the Ottoman society, Gürtüna says, had a place in the construction
of this glorious civilization (Aydın, 2000, p. 188). Ahmed Akgündüz (2000), at this
point, notes that even a Christian slave could take an oath on a bible in the Ottoman
order though in Turkey we cannot do it today (p. 67). He argues, for example, what we
observe today as multi-jurisprudence is just a manifestation of the tolerance and freedom
granted to the subjects of the Ottoman state (Akgündüz, 2000, p. 69).
As we see, Islamic civilization, in this perspective is transformed into Ottoman
civilization or, at the very least, Ottoman civilization is perceived as an extension of
20 Former Mayor of Istanbul.
52
Islamic civilization and the Muslim social imaginary is transformed into a social
imaginary represented by imaginary Ottoman, albeit in a modified form (Sentürk, 2010,
p. 84). In the same context, to explain how the Ottoman broadened the equality of
Muslims to all the Muslims of the world as opposed to limiting it to those who are living
in its boundaries, Akgündüz (2000) also claims that the Ottoman was the center of
civilization in the Islamic world, i.e., the center of Islamic civilization (p. 64).
As we see, in these two arguments, in the synthesis and Pax Ottomanica, Islam is
the core of what is Ottoman; as Ahmet Mithat Efendi21 says, “The Ottoman ... had a
sacral meaning”22 (Armagan, 2008b, p. 225). This bonding of Islam with the Ottoman is
the backbone what Davutoglu calls the assurance of being Kadim and Ebed-i Müdded
(eternal time/eternity), being aware that it existed since time immemorial and is eternal.
This bond between the Islam and the Ottoman was, however broken during the
nineteenth century. A new understanding, of distinguishing true Islam from the existing
order, emerged and was maintained through the twentieth century. What we see today, at
the beginning of twenty-first century, in the imagined Ottoman, is a transformation again
on the reverse direction, a re-conciliation of Islam with the Ottoman in the mind of
elites.
21 A popular Ottoman writer and journalist (1844-1912).
22 “Osmanlı … bir mana-i mukaddesmis”.
53
During the late nineteenth century, an articulation of the difference between
Islam and Ottoman, the prevailing order at that time became widespread. A detachment
between the two had started. The Ottoman state had been retreating under the pressure of
the West. There was a radical questioning of the Seljuk – Ottoman period and of the
system that was already identified with Islam. However, the essence of Islam could not
be criticized because of its divine nature (Kara, 2005, p. 95). Its practice was therefore
the target. The criticism of the practice, however, meant criticizing the Ulema, the state,
the existing order. This was to protect Islam from the criticism, to defend it, as
maintained by Semsettin Günaltay,23 “It is not Islam that prohibits our progress, but the
Islamic faith that was taught to us”24 (Kara, 2005, p. 88, 89). Similarly, new ideas were
introduced to save the State but these had to be internalized through religion because
there was no other way to legitimize them. Pre-republican Islamists, for example,
reformulated the religion and pragmatically incorporated modern concepts such as
liberty, equality, and solidarity into religion under the pressure of finding a solution to
the problems of a collapsing Empire (Kara, 2005, p. 52, 60-62, 64, 87). All these new
ideas were contradicting with the then prevailing Ottoman order. As a result, the
23 He is a Turkish historian, politician and former Prime Minister (1883-1961). He was a member of
Ottoman Parliament from 1915 from the Committee of Union and Progress until its dissolution.
24 “Terakkimize mani olan Islamiyet degil bize ögretilen müslümanlıktır”.
54
religion, Islam and the prevailing order, the Ottoman, started shifting away from each
other.
At this point, a focus on true religion, which is closely correlated with
apprehending the Ottoman history as decay, emerged. This position of the Islamists
continued into the Republican period, with such prominent Islamists as Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu, while in different ways, all made a distinction between
Islam and Ottoman, at least for the period after Suleiman the Magnificent. Topçu (2008),
for example, mentions the greed of those who were supposed to defend religion is
behind the clash of religion and science in the Ottoman period (p. 57). The target of
Topçu was the Ottoman Ulema which was an integral part of the Ottoman order and he
severely critisized the Ulema in his other works also (Topçu, 1978, p. 159). Kısakürek
(1973) on the other hand wrote that “the ideal that makes us the conqueror of the world
shadowed more and more during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (p. 29). The
ideal he was mentioning was obviously Islam.
Today, as shown above, this detachment ends in the minds of elites, and, not
only the period before Suleiman the Magnificent, but the Ottoman in its entirety, is more
and more identified with Islam once again within the concept of civilization. This,
Islamic re-imagination of the Ottoman permit it to encompass the totality of the social
and it is a critical element of the continuity argument that will be discussed in the next
section.
55
In conclusion, the assurance of eternity and universality, the loss of which was
the cause of dissolution, is in the process of being re-imagined in the minds of the elites
through the reconciliation of the Ottoman with Islam. The imaginary Ottoman, as a
representation of a social imaginary, regardless of the degree of correspondence to
reality, is becoming an example of Islamic civilization, but is being referred to as
Ottoman. In the next section I would argue that elites imagine the Ottoman in such a
way that it becomes the “living” example of the Islamic civilization.
We Are All Ottoman
The imagined Ottoman is conceived not only as a historical entity but as if it also exists
today. In fact, there is strong emphasis that the social imaginary represented by the
Ottoman extends to the present; in other words, there is an argument of continuity. This
continuity of the Ottoman to the present has been discussed by many scholars, such as
Serif Mardin, but what is emphasized in our case is not a background effect infiltrating
the Republican structures, but an existence as a hidden identity as opposed to the
presumed new fake identity (Cihan & Dogan, 2007, p. 7). skender Pala, for example,
claims that “although we never accept, the foreigners see the Turks as the Ottomans”.
Yavuz Bahadıroglu (2009) wrote a book on the same subject entitling, “We are
Ottoman”.
56
The Continuity argument is important because it links the present to the past and
constructs an awareness that we have all been a part of the same whole and share the
social imaginary that is represented by the imaginary Ottoman (Vakkasoglu, 2007, p.
back cover). In continuity, we also see the re-emergence of the consciousness of time,
being eternal, that, Davutoglu suggests was lost. However, in order to suggest that the
current society is Ottoman, we have to overcome the problem posed by the historical
dissolution of the Ottoman state. The reconciliation of Ottoman with Islam is a critical
step in asserting continuity but it is not enough. It is strengthened by a second critical
argument: rejection of the Ottoman history as a decay and decomposition. This argument
is critical because it secures the separation of the historical Ottoman from the Ottoman
as an ideal or, better to say, as an imaginary and, makes projection to the present
possible.
In fact, rejection of decay and the reconciliation of the Ottoman with Islam are
the two sides of the same argument to re-gain the lost time and space apprehension of
the Ottoman as a civilization and as a social imaginary.
The history of decay in a certain sense is the rejection of a transition narrative,
which implies an absence, a lacking or incompetence vis-à-vis the other, i.e., Europe or
the West (Chakrabarty, 1992, p. 4). The imagination of the Ottoman without a history of
transition is new because it requires the rejection of decay and negation of modernist,
progressive reading of history. The Ottoman and the Turk, over the past hundred years,
have been figures symbolizing “lack” similar to that of “the Indian” which was
57
eloquently shown by Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty, 1992, p. 6). Today this “lack” if not
completely rejected is vigorously questioned and, as a consequence, continuity can
safely be defended. A number of intellectuals, academics and politicians share the view
that we cannot apprehend the last centuries of our own history as decay, decomposition
and degeneration (Armagan, 2008b, p. 18). In this argument, the obsession with the
concept of decay is one of the major obstacles to our understanding of the Ottoman. This
conception of the Ottoman as dead and no longer on the stage of history after a long
period of decay is called the discourse of impotence and the psychology of defeat. This
psychology of defeat, in turn, shows how we otherize the Ottoman. Through such a
process, we think we are not responsible for the decay and the dissolution of the empire
and turn its history into something that shows what we should not be rather then what
we should be (Armagan, 2009, p. 28, 45, 115). The reclaiming of the glorious past of
Ottoman history in its entirety and the rejection of decay, the psychology of defeat
inevitably attacks the official history, as noted by Mehmet D. Dogan (2007) in his book
“End of the Ideology of Defeat”, and claims that what we should be is already in the
history.
It is obvious that this imagination of the Ottoman contradicts with the history of
the imagined Turkish nation. However, it is striking that it also contradicts the Islamists
who, similarly, referred back to Asr-ı Saadet (Century of Happiness/Life time of the
Prophet Muhammad) and treated the Ottoman with the same severity as the Turk of
today during the late nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries. Necip Fazıl for
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example, who is one of the distinguished Islamic intellectuals of the Republican period
and highly praised even by AKP leadership (Kurt; April 25, 2007), characterizes
Ottoman history after the sixteenth century as a progress of disease. Similarly, Topçu
(1978), another prominent Islamist, said “the state power was the enemy of the people in
the last centuries of the Ottoman” (p. 198). He criticized the Ottoman as severely as
Kısakürek in many occasions. He, for example says “fitre (sedition) and taassup
(fanatisim) revived during the last centuries of the Ottoman and religious institutes
turned into state institutions, wordly institutions disguised under the cover of religion”
(Karaman, 2010, p. 169).
Rejecting the decay, therefore, opposes both the official history of the Republic
and also the perception of the Ottoman in the minds of many early Islamist intellectuals
who are the forefathers of the supporters of these views today. The current imagination
of the Ottoman transcends both the Republicans, which has roots in the Ittihadists, and
the Islamists who followed the late-Ottoman Islamists, all of which agreed on the
impotence and failure of the Ottoman. Mehmet Akif Aydın (2006), for example, on the
subject of Islamic/Ottoman law, tells us that the Ottoman state was able to survive for
more than six centuries because it provided its subjects an acceptable legal system and
justice, and provides examples to show that the Ottoman order was not completely
defunct and irrational (p. 190, 195). On the subject of the totality of legal system, in the
same context, Aydın (2006) (1996), took the subject to another level and suggested that
even the Kemalists wanted to preserve the old Ottoman legal system but refrained from
59
doing so under pressure at Lausanne (p. 221-224) (p. 310-312). In other words, he
claims that the Ottoman, rather than being defunct, was a working order that we had to
abandon under the pressure of West.
The Hyperreal Ottoman vs. The Turk
In the previous section, it was shown that the Ottoman is re-imagined by the elites as a
representation of a social imaginary in form of a civilization with a different time and
space apprehension where Islam is in its core. The rejection of Ottoman decay on the
other hand, paves the way to the expansion of this imaginary Ottoman to the present. In
this section, I want to probe another characteristic of the imaginary Ottoman.
The Ottoman that no longer carries the burden of its actual disappearance from
the scene of history and presented as eternal through its Islamic core is also hyperreal.
This term originally belongs to Jean Baudrillard and he defines it as “the simulation of
something which never really existed”, a stimulated version of reality. Here, a modified
version of the term as used by Chakrabarty is used. In this utilization, hyperreal “refers
to certain figures of imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat
indeterminate” (Chakrabarty, 1992, p. 1) while keeping its original meaning ascribed by
Baudrillard in mind. Europe for the Turk or for the Indian, for example, is hyperreal in
this context. It is something that does not exist in the form it is imagined even for those
who imagine it but nevertheless exists with its undetermined boundaries as an object of
desire. The term is used for the Ottoman in order to underline its difference from the
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Turk which already became a reality through actualization of national imaginary.
The best way to start may be to look at what Zekeriya Kursun says about the
Turk. He notes that the “Ottoman state is a Turkish state in terms of its founders” but “it
belongs to the Islamic world in terms of civilization” (Kursun, 2003, p. 161) and “it was
a universal system” (Kursun, 2003, p. 173), adding, that despite the Turkish identity, the
Turks were only one of the Muslim communities in the empire. The Turkishness of the
Ottoman is not disregarded but the Turk is only a part, though an important part, of the
Ottoman while the Islamic core and its system are more central, eternal and universal.
The imaginary Ottoman is first of all Islamic in terms of civilization, in terms of
the world it represents. The Turk was present but how and where? Many intellectuals
and academicians have addressed this issue and it is obvious that there has been an effort
to balance the Turkishness of the Ottoman. psirli (2000), for example, says the Ottoman
state was a Turkish state, though there were other elements influential in the
administration, in the economy and in daily life (p. 161). However, this Turkish state is
so Islamic that it called itself Devlet-i Islamiye (Islamic State) (psirli, 2000, p. 161).
The Turkishness of the Ottoman is defended on the grounds that the Imperial
court and the high Ulema have Turkish origins and the official language of the state was
Turkish. psirli (2000), for example, continues his argument by saying that, “in this
Islamic State, Turkishness of the court and high Ulema are critical elements of the
system” (p. 185). As far as the Turkishness of the court is concerned, the discussion
focus generally on two subjects. The first one is the devshirme issue and the second one
61
is the status of Harem and, despite various counter arguments, it is usually accepted that
neither the institution of Devshirme nor the ethnic origins of the women in the Harem
affects the Turkishness of the court (Taysi, 2000, p. 176, 177) (psirli, 2000, p. 164,
185). On the subject of language, the argument is that there would be no modern Turkish
if there had been no Ottoman. Moreover, the contradictions between the Seljuk State,
also a Turkish State, and the Ottoman are said to derive from the Seljuk’s use of Persian
as their official language, unlike the Ottomans (psirli, 2000, p. 166). However, it is also
noted that language has never been the subject of any policy either (Eryılmaz, 2000, p.
61). In the Ottoman order, Turkish was the official language of the bureaucracy but it
was not the language of the society and it was not considered a part of the identity
(Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 61).
These, however, are enough to preserve the central place of the Turk in this
social imaginary. The Turk, as it was demonstrated, is real; it is there, but it does not
have a central role in the imagining of the Ottoman world. In other words, the Turk
exists but it is not a building block of the social imaginary represented by the imaginary
Ottoman; it is already tainted with reality. The position of the Turk becomes more
apparent when we examine two critical concepts upon which the Turkish imaginary is
constructed: “Vatan” (motherland) and “Millet” (nation). Both of these concepts are
expanded in the context of the imaginary Ottoman in a way incompatible with the
current Turkish imaginary.
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We have to note that the Turkish national imaginary lacks the spatiality of the
third wave nationalism that Anderson explains. The borders of Turkish state were drawn
neither by the arbitrary orders of the central powers, as in the case of Africa, or by the
necessities arising from the problems of communication and transportation, as in the
case of Americas. In contrast, they were determined by temporary armistices ending
battles and became permanent borders after Lausanne. This is an issue that is largely
exploited by the intellectuals and academicians, with Anatolia being portrayed as the
point of last retreat rather than as the motherland. Accordingly, Anatolia or the borders
defined by Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) are not definite boundaries that determine the
space of the imagined social; they only point out an area where the Ottoman retreated
under the pressure of the West (Gürdogan, 2003, p. 119).
Armagan (2008b), for example, says that putting Anatolia at the core is at best
losing half of Ottoman history because we cannot ignore the importance of Rumeli (p.
19). Davutoglu (2009) reiterates the same point by saying that “the Ottoman state had a
political power base centered in Istanbul on the Anatolian-Rumeli axis” (p. 69) and
placing Anatolia at the center contradicts historical, cultural and geographical realities.
This perception we have of ourselves is an anomaly produced by colonialism and by the
Cold War. Therefore, we cannot, should not, construct our vision, today, as an entity
reduced to Anatolia. Armagan (2008a) says that this is a drama of a generation
conditioned to perceiving the world within the boundaries of Misak-ı Milli (p. 12). A
drama, in this context, that, Davutoglu (2009) argues, which “is the consequence of the
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decision taken to be a regional power under the umbrella of the dominant Western
civilizational realm instead of being a weak center of its own civilization” (p. 70).
Davutoglu (2009) argues “the new Turkish nation state accepted that it would contain
itself within Misak-ı Milli borders and it would be a part of the Western axis, in line with
the rejection of the political ideals and institutions of the Ottoman” (p. 69).
Anatolia is no longer our sacred fatherland, but a castle into which we have
retreated. The deconstruction of the sacred nature of Anatolia implies that our space is
not limited to Anatolia. Vatan is therefore relieved from its de jurae boundaries and is
enlarged conceptually without being redefined. Our motherland Anatolia, which was
vigorously defended by early Islamist and Republicans becomes just a location in the
hyperreal Ottoman. The imaginary Ottoman is hyperreal because it is everywhere, it has
no definite boundaries, it has no limits, and it just exists as it is. It is an ensemble of
symbols, and a symbol itself. It is presented as reality but it lacks the geographical
spatiality required to be a Vatan. Nevertheless, it exists. The creation of a hyperreal
geographical space with the help of the imaginary Ottoman is at stark contradiction with
the territorial Turkish nationalism. Clouding the existing conception of Vatan and
enlarging it without definite boundaries, has a substantial impact on our comprehension
of the present, on our understanding of where we locate ourselves within the global
world. This detachment from the Kemalist territorial nationalism is critical because it
represents a point of departure rather than a different place. Republic of Turkey was the
only country that did not pursue a pan-nationalism among those that were created out of
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ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The emmergence of the imaginary Ottoman represents a
clear demarcation form this point and it represents a journey in terms of defining the
boundaries. It makes them porous rather than highlighting new ones. Accordingly it is a
journey, the destination of which is impossible to know, due to the transforming nature
of the imaginary from which it is originating.
The hyperreality of the Ottoman in terms of Vatan takes us back to a point
highlighted by Anderson about the inherent limits of the nation as all nations implicitly
accept the existence of other nations. The Turk, for example is good example of this
limited imagination within the context of Misak-ı Milli and the Turkish language. The
hyperreal imaginary Ottoman, on the other hand, has quite porous and expendable
boundaries and it seems it denotes a different type of nation than the imagined
communities of Anderson. In fact, Davutoglu defines the Millet, nation as “not as an
eternal political unity ... but, as the consequence of a stable historical process and a
togetherness formed during long historical segments...”25 Millet in this definition, is first
of all, independent of the political structure, from the state, from which it is practically
impossible to separate the Turk. This independence in return precludes that the
boundaries of the state may not match with the space occupied by the Millet, an
25 “ezeli bir siyasi birlik … degil, istikrarlı bir tarih sürecinin ürünü olan ve uzun tarih dilimleri içinde
olusan bir birliktelik olarak kabul edersek…”
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assumption that was already discussed above. Secondly, the nation, in this definition, is
a product of common history that extends well beyond the boundaries of Turkey.
Therefore, the nation may include the Turk and the Vatan may include Anatolia but they
certainly are not limited to them. The Ottoman, as an imaginary, is much larger, more
encompassing than the Turk because the nation is separated from the state in all of its
dimensions; that is politically and geographically. The Turk has an importance only in
relation to the state as its founder, manager. Millet is envisaged as spanning well beyond
the boundaries of the Misak-ı Milli and the Vatan is enlarged together with the Millet
well beyond the boundaries of the state.
In this case, unlike the Turk, this hyperreal Ottoman denotes neither a certain
group of people nor a definite geographical space. It thus replaces the connotations made
by the Turk with wider and different ones. The hyperreal Ottoman is not in opposition to
the Turk or Turkish because the Turk is already a part, but only a part of this imaginary.
In fact, the imaginary Ottoman in this perception is not the opposite of anything; it exists
by itself as an imaginary, differently from others.
The Imaginary Ottoman as a Guide in the Globalized World
How the Ottoman is re-imagined through the new content in its imaginary dimension in
form of a cradle of an identity is discussed above but the imagined Ottoman is not
limited to it. It is also presented as a solution to the current problems of especially nation
states and national imaginaries through the meanings and content ascribed to it.
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The presentation of the Ottoman, the history, as a solution is important because
the implementation of the policies based on these solutions will, supposedly, be the
building block of the actualization of the social imaginary that it represents. This
process, that is the implementation of these solutions, implies the entry of the theories of
elites into the “dense sphere of daily life”, where they will be modified, once more,
through the dual process of Taylor. In other words, if the imaginary Ottoman were not
capable of being a source of these solutions, it would have remained a fantasy rather
than being an imaginary of a social on the way to actualization.
A second critical point is the nature and source of the problems addressed by the
imaginary Ottoman. It is important to underline that these problems are centered on
issues faced by national imaginaries- by nation-states, because of globalization. The
growing inability of such structures to hold multiplicity and diversity in their domain is
the primary problem addressed by the imaginary Ottoman.
However, it should be noted that the imaginary Ottoman is not presented as an
answer to the inequalities or social problems such as poverty, which may equally be
connected to globalization. In fact, these are not even discussed as critical issues. The
justice of the Ottoman order is about the equal treatment of different identities, about the
right of preserving these differences. In other words, the justice of the imaginary
Ottoman is a predicament for those who suffer under the national imaginaries and not
for those who suffer under the ever expanding market of globalization. This lack of
interest, which is concealed under the guise of equality for all, is a reminder to us that
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the Ottoman imaginary is a bourgeois imaginary aiming at guiding its owners in the
turbulent waters of the global world.
This chapter will first depict the present constructed through the imagined
Ottoman. Secondly, additional properties ascribed to the imaginary Ottoman by the
elites, that make it a suitable candidate for providing solutions for the problems of
national imaginaries will be presented.
When Hilal Görgün (2003) says, “we should not be discouraged from discussing
the future because to construct today we need an imagination of the future as much as
our history” (p. 173), we see that the present is a construction based on, both an
imagined future and on history. The past, the present and the future are immersed in
each other in an inseparable way. We see that there exists a present figured out with the
help of the imagined Ottoman and there is no separation between the present as an
external reality and the imagined Ottoman as a map to understand this present and to
construct the future.
We have already discussed how the past is re-imagined through deconstruction
and how continuity is asserted to prove that the same social imaginary represented by
the imaginary Ottoman prevails today. This deconstruction of the past not only helps us
in imagining a different “historical” Ottoman, but also reveals a different present
through continuity. Accordingly, to understand this present, we should look at the
deconstruction of the past more closely.
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This deconstruction has two aspects, each having a different but conjoined
understandings of the present. The first one is the rejection of the perception of world
history as the history of the West and the rejection of the idea that history progresses
along the trajectory drawn by modernity theories. This aspect reveals a present with a
global, multi-civilization world, whose appearance or, more accurately, re-appearance, is
facilitated by the collapse of the socialist system and by globalization (Çalıs & Özlük,
2007, p. 153, 203).
Secondly, and intrinsically tied to the first one, is the rejection of the perception
of the Ottoman history as a progression of a malaise. This aspect reveals a different, new
local having a different social order that is as valid as others in this global and multicivilization
world. In this different social, society, as an imagined social, is in a
historical continuum, which, however, has a fake identity based on a different and
incorrect time and space apprehension (Davutoglu, 2009, p. 59). Today, there is an
antagonism because, while the political system, established by the elites who decided to
annex to the historically adversary civilization, to the other social imaginary, the society
still is still grounded on its historical and geo-cultural characteristics – in other words, on
a different time and space apprehension of a different social imaginary (Davutoglu,
2009, p. 83).
Therefore, what the deconstruction reveals is a present characterized by a multicivilization
global world and a local where the real identity of the society contradicts
with the presumed identity, with the fake one in the words of Davutoglu. Globalization,
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a recent phenomenon, becomes critical at this point as the historical factor which
provides the background not only for the emergence of new imaginaries but also as the
ground for their actualization. It was already mentioned before, in the context of
Anderson and Appadurai, how historical developments were critical in the emergence
and actualization of imaginaries and how globalization, as a historical development,
works against national imaginaries in Appadurai.
Anderson (2006), when he was explaining the process through which the
national imaginaries emerged, said “No surprise then that the search was on for a new
way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together” (p. 36) because old
ways, that is the dynastic realms and religious societies “lost their axiomatic grip” (p.
36) over the society. This argument, with the emergence of globalization, is transposed.
In this context, Appadurai (2008) says, the new global realities make the search for
certainty more and more difficult, if not impossible, and the invention of new national
traditions to deal with these realities becomes more and more difficult with the existing
social imaginary (p. 10). In other words, the collective habitus becomes more and more
inadequate as a ground for action and decision. The existing national imaginary becomes
more and more insufficient to face these issues because the images that make up the
future for many individuals do not coincide with those sponsored by the state.
Furthermore, the disappearance of fixed reference points as critical choices become
pressing, is a serious issue not only for small groups as Appadurai shows but also for the
nation-states in dealing with the problems and opportunities brought by the globalization
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(Appadurai, 2008, p. 43, 44). In short, the nation-state is “losing its role as the sole
arbiter between the modernity and globalization” and its legitimacy and its sovereignty
is in question (Appadurai, 2008, p. 19).
Zeynep Dagı, an AKP deputy, similarly depicts our present world where
“national and global are crisscrossed and struggle against each other” as one in which
boundaries are becoming porous and inadequate to separate what is inside from what is
outside and ideas, capital, product as well as violence and crime rampantly move around
the globe. In this world, Dagı (2007) adds, “the way to understanding politics is through
comprehending the interior and exterior together” and “the plurality of the actors,
interests and identities requires a multi-layered analysis” (p. vii). Davutoglu (2009),
also, in the same framework, emphasizes that the present is characterized by the loss of
the legitimacy of nation-states as modern ideologies lose strength (p. 16).
The new present depicted through the imaginary Ottoman is, therefore, a present
in conformity with the present, characterized by globalization where national
imaginaries lose ground and at the same time the fake identity of the local, that is
grounded on a national imaginary, contradicts the real social imaginary of the society.
Within this framework, the imaginary Ottoman becomes a solution to the
problems of national imaginaries and to nation-states, i.e., the nation. It is a solution
because it can link the global to local because it provides a place for the local without
rejecting the global and it has certain properties that facilitate this role as a guide. These
additional properties are the global nature of the Ottoman and its ability to embrace a
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multi-cultural world without homogenizing it.
First, the Ottoman is historically imagined as a global state within a context of
Afro-European geography. This argument is related to positioning of the Ottoman as a
civilization center but this is not only an inference and various examples from historical
events have been cited in different sources. Armagan (2008a) and Davutoglu both state,
for example, that the Ottoman engaged in geo-strategic politics in the Indian Ocean and
South East Asia and the political changes in the geography of Kadim civilizations had
the effect of partial globalization which was properly managed by the Ottoman (p. 153).
Specifically, Armagan (2008a) says that if the Ottoman history is interpreted, or
understood, not as the advance and retreat of a power to and from Europe, but rather in
terms of its multidimensionality, within the context of the history of “Afro-Eurasian
complex”26, it can be placed within the frame of global history (p. 208). Such a
contextualization will permit us, he argues, to see the Ottoman as a global power
(Armagan, 2008a, p. 205). We also see the same emphasis on a “global Ottoman” in
Özel when he mentions about the Turkish model in Islamic history (Özel, 2003, p. 320).
Özel (2003) says there is a presumed omnipresence of the Ottoman that was manifested
in the various titles of the Sultans in different languages (p. 321). Through this
26 With reference to Marshall Hodgson (Armagan, 2008, p. 208).
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omnipresence, the Ottoman embraced not only its current subjects but also all of the
philosophies, beliefs and governing capacities of prior empires.
Second, this global player is an example of the institutionalized and modernized
version of the “open civilization”, an acceptance of a world full of multiplicity and
diversity (Sentürk, 2010, p. 32-34). Third, this Ottoman had an appeal to humanity. This
appeal manifests itself first, through being the sole representative of the Kadim, the
whole of human civilization that ever existed, thus, by embodying human accumulation
and having the ability to synthesize.
Finally, the imaginary Ottoman displays itself through the concept of Pax
Ottomanica, where various manifestations of these civilizations lived together and
continued into the future peacefully. The Ottoman, in this sense, has a claim that it can
rule better, a claim articulated Armagan, by Avni Özgürel (2005) in the “Lands
Yearning for the Ottoman”27, in “From the Sultanate of Provinces to the Sultanate of
Virtues”28 by Selim Yıldız (2003). Intellectuals and academicians who support AKP
have the conviction to portray the Ottoman order as an order of peace and tolerance and
a historical experiment (Karlıga, 2000, p. 100) (Özcan, 2000, p. 10) (Çetin, 2000, p. 99)
(Kavas, 2000, p. 104) (psirli, 2000, p. 222) (Aydın, 1996, p. 236). It seems Ottoman
27 Osmanlı’ya Hasret Topraklar.
28 Vilayetlerin Sultanlıgından Faziletlerin Sultanlıgına.
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society, in this sense, discovered the magic of living together and it is presented as a
universal example for other societies (Çetin, 2000, p. 95). This characteristic of the
imaginary Ottoman in some cases was presented in such a way that some academicians,
such as Atilla Çetin (2000), even suggested that the secularism that we have tried to find
in the West today in fact existed within the Ottoman structure (p. 97).
The Ottoman, thus, could sustain an order encompassing diversity because it
embraced human accumulation and it had the ability to synthesize the diversity of
cultures, integrate them, and allowed their existence (Davutoglu, 2006, p. 13). In this
context, the Ottoman was an interaction of different civilizations and sustained a
multilingual, multi-religious and multi-cultural state for a long time (Çakır, 2006, p. 87).
The success of the Ottoman order was not in keeping hundreds of sects, religious orders
together but its ability to let them live and flourish (Armagan, 2008b, p. 222). The
Ottoman, it is argued, made a vigorous attempt to ensure that the societies and groups
that it comprised stay as they are and able to solve all their problems by themselves
rather than being subject to homogenizing policies of a central administration (Armagan,
2000, p. 7). Davutoglu (2006), in this context, describes the Ottoman as an order in
which all civilizations and cultural groups had a relationship of legitimacy with the
political order, a relation that was only questioned in the nineteenth century (p. 12). The
Ottoman, thus, is imagined, in this framework, as a contrast to modern nation states.
Bilal Eryılmaz (2000), in elaborating this difference with the nation states, argues
that we have to analyze the Ottoman not according to the current binaries of majority
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and minority, the ruler and the ruled, but rather within a context where the contrasts are
recognized and protected by law (p. 56). The Ottoman state, he says, unlike nationstates,
and unlike colonial rulers, did not have a policy of homogenization (Eryılmaz,
2000, p. 58). In this respect, it is presented as a classical example of plurality (Eryılmaz,
2000, p. 56). However, he warns that this is not the kind of plurality that aims at
reducing differences, as was perceived in the West after the Enlightenment (Eryılmaz,
2000, p. 56). On the contrary, the Ottoman plurality has, as its goal, according to him,
the preservation of those differences (Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 57). In the Ottoman order,
Eryılmaz (2000) claims, the groups did not lose their identity; they lived together but
separately from each other (p. 56). The Ottoman state, he argued, did not coerce these
groups, especially the non-Muslim groups, and left them autonomous in their internal
affairs (Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 59). The arrangements made by the state were primarily
concerned with organizing the relationship between these groups and the state and the
relations between each other (Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 59). In addition to that, Eryılmaz
(2000) points out that the Ottoman State never exploited the differences between the
groups as a tool to provoke one against the other (p. 58). Finally, he advices us that we
should not compare the Ottoman order with the modern concept of multiculturalism,
which is seen as a solution to the problems of the nation-state, problems related to the
minorities that are themselves creations of the nation-state (Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 57).
In this framework, in the Ottoman order, the identity of the people were not
defined by their languages but rather by their religion and the relations between the
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central Ottoman administration and the non-Muslims were managed within the
framework provided by the Islamic law and protected by the law of the Sultans
(Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 61). This structure was critical in the positive relations between the
administration and the non-Muslim groups (Eryılmaz, 2000, p. 61). Eryılmaz (2000),
within this context claims that the resulting system, the “system of millets”, became a sui
generis structure and provided us a historical example on the subject of coexistence of
different communities (p. 62). The Ottoman state, thus, survived because it was the
representative of a great numbers of communities, languages, religions, cultural voices,
Ansar-ı Osmaniye (Union of Ottomans), and diversities. To achieve this, the state left all
its functions other than the security and judiciary to religious communities and to the
foundations (Armagan, 2009, p. 165). In other words, the social fabric of the Ottoman
was made up of independent cultural groups, similar to different islands, living together
(Armagan, 2009, p. 38). Accordingly, the Ottoman becomes a unifying concept as
opposed to national imaginaries which can only exist by otherizing the others.
The imaginary Ottoman, therefore, is presented as a response to the crises of the
national imaginaries of Anderson or to the crises of the Turkish or other national
imaginaries. The Ottoman is proposed as an alternative way of linking fraternity, power
and time in the global multi-civilization world. Therefore, it is asserted that the Ottoman,
as the synthesis of Kadim civilizations, as an order where multiplicity and plurality
existed peacefully together, as a power who had a global reach with the experience of a
prior process of globalization, is an example for us today. The imaginary Ottoman, thus,
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represents both an imagined social which continues to prevail today, extending to the
present, and it is a model for us to embrace globalization.
However, it is critical to note that the imaginary Ottoman represents these
solutions not in the form of recreating the Ottoman ecumene of the medieval world, but,
in the form of a cradle of a new identity, where localities exist side by side, as a
civilization center in a multi-civilizational world with its own vision, ideals, and morals.
This distinction is critical because it is the basis of the rejection of neo-Ottomanism by
AKP leadership which will be discuss in the next chapter.
The appeal of the imaginary Ottoman as a solution, on the other hand, together
with its claim to foster a new identity, is a call for its actualization. It is a call to solve
the contradictions in between the society, political culture, and the political structure in
Turkey. AKP, at this point, becomes critical because it provides the leadership; it
“connects localities and individuals to a larger political unit” (Tugal, 2009, p. 26, 27); it
provides an authority figure through which consent for the policies is built and it strives
to build political unity for the actualization of this social imaginary represented by the
Ottoman. Accordingly, the next chapter focuses on how AKP shares the same
imaginary, how it contributes its acceptance by the society as the social imaginary, how
it lays a claim to it and on the importance of the imaginary Ottoman for the Turkish
politics.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMAGINARY OTTOMAN AND POLITICS
Up to now, we have seen that there is an imaginary Ottoman and it represents a social,
embodied in the concept of “our civilization” and that Islam plays a central role in this
imagination of the social. This imaginary Ottoman, while emerging through the history,
represents the social imaginary of the present society for the elites. The Ottoman, thus,
in its imaginary form is something current, related to the existing society. This
imaginary Ottoman, however, is hyperreal in the sense that, neither the boundaries of its
territory nor the limits of the nation it embodies, that is, the society to which it refers, are
defined. We understand that the boundaries are well beyond the boundaries of current
Turkey and the nation to which it refers encompasses more than the current
apprehension of the Turkish nation. We also saw that the imagination of the Ottoman
also permits depicting a new present in line with globalization. The Ottoman, with its
additional properties, as a cradle of identity, in this perspective, also embodies the
solutions to the problems created by globalization, e.g., to the problems of nation-states.
As discussed before, the new meanings that are ascribed to the Ottoman by the
elites signifies the invasion of the imaginary dimension of the Ottoman with a new
content. Once such an invasion starts, a process with two moments take off. The first
moment of this process is the identification of the society with the Ottoman imagined by
the elites and the second moment is the identification of the elites by the society as the
78
representatives of this imaginary Ottoman. I call this process “the double identification
of the Ottoman”, the actualization of the social magic of Bourdieu.29
Bourdieu (2003) tells us that;
The objects of the social world can be perceived and expressed in
different ways ... as historical objects they are subject to
variations in time and their meaning ... is (are) itself in suspense,
in a pending and deferred state and thus relatively indeterminate.
(p. 234)
According to him, this is the reason behind the multiplicity of views and there is a
constant struggle to produce meanings for the objects of social world which cannot be
attributable explicitly by looking at the past or to future (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 235). To
him, this struggle can be explicit, especially in politics, “with reconstruction of a past
adjusted to the needs of present and especially the future, with creative foresight
associated with it ... to determine, delimit and define the ever-open meaning of the
present” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 235).
The imagined Ottoman, which was presented in the previous chapter, has its
reflection in politics, especially with respect to the argument of continuity, rejection of
decay, presenting the Ottoman as a solution for the problems of the national imaginary
and as the ground upon which the future can be constructed. In this context, AKP
29 Social Space and Genesis of Classes of Bourdieu is used to explain the process (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 229-
251).
79
becomes critical because political struggle as a struggle over the transformation of the
social world or to preserve it by transforming or preserving the perception of the world
is the domain of AKP (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 236). Moreover, AKP acquires tremendous
power by bringing into existence something not yet attained as an “objective and
collective existence” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 236). It does this by moving the social
imaginary from a virtual state into a different one. This power, political by nature, is the
“magical power of naming and bringing into existence by virtue of naming”. According
to Bourdieu (2003), a group;
can exist only by delegating power to a spokesperson who will
bring it into existence by speaking it... the group is created by the
person who speaks in its name, thus appearing as the source of
the power that exerts over those who are the real source. (p. 249)
In this context, the double identification process is a process through which the
imaginary Ottoman is constituted and instituted in the society by AKP while at the same
time AKP, itself, is constituted and instituted as the representative of this Ottoman
(Bourdieu, 2003, p. 248). This is the process through which the “social magic” works
and through which the society becomes Ottoman and AKP becomes the representative
of this Ottoman to the extent the process is successfully carried out.
At this point, I argue that the AKP leadership and cadres share the same
imaginary and, actively take the lead in this process of dual identification by giving
certain messages to the society. The following three sections aim to show these points.
First section aims to show that AKP leadership shares the same imagination as the elites.
80
The second aims to demonstrate how the society is continuously referred to as the
“Ottoman” as imagined by the leadership through the use of history, culture and by other
means. Finally, in the third section, the aim is to show how AKP leadership lays claim to
this Ottoman and presents itself as its representative. It is important to stress that today
the production and imposition of naming is the subject of the political struggle in the
field of “cultural production” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 236). I will illustrate that culture,
either as an integral part of the concept of civilization, in form of preserving cultural
heritage, or directly, is the primary site where the double identification of the Ottoman
takes place.
How the AKP Shares the Same Imaginary in the Words of Erdogan
Erdogan, in November 2008, when addressing to the crowd said “we have dreams for
Turkey”30 In another occasion in Istanbul, during a mass rally, he repeated the same31
and he is not alone in employing this rhetoric. Minister of Work and former
Undersecretary of Prime Ministry, Dinçer, used the same language in Kayseri, saying
“Others phantasize for and determine the fate of those who have no visions. For this
30 “Türkiye için hayallerimiz var”. (Taraf; November 10, 2008).
31 Erdogan: “We have great dreams for this country”. (Zaman; October 30, 2010).
81
reason, we have to have a vision for this country and create our own fate”.32 The same
idea that quoted in the previous chapter from Görgün is repeated over and over at
different occasions, emphasizing that AKP has an imagination for Turkey. This section,
thus, aims at providing an idea about how this imaginary coincides with the one that
described in the previous chapter: how the imaginary Ottoman with the content that
described above – that is, in the form of a cradle of an identity, is present in the
discourses of AKP leadership. A review of speeches made by Erdogan as Prime
Minister, the undisputable leader of AKP, and posted on the official web site of AKP is
a good source for this.33
We note that in his various speeches, Erdogan has been using history,
particularly Ottoman history, in the same way as Armagan and Davutoglu do and
emphasizes that we cannot and should not disregard our history and we should ground
our future on our history. He repeatedly ties the history, as Ottoman history, to the
concept of civilization – our civilization. Islam has a central role in this civilization and
certain symbols of a moral order are critical in his definition of civilization. Erdogan
asserts that contemporary society is the heir to this civilization and is, in fact, the current
32 “Hayal kurmayanların vizyon olusturmayanların yerine baskaları hayal kurup onların kaderlerini
takdir ediyorlar. O nedenle biz bu ülkenin hayalini kurarak kendi kaderimizi olusturmamız gerekiyor.”
(Kayseri Gündem; March 14, 2010).
33 In this section, only the speeches posted on the official website of AKP are used in order not to leave
any room for any discussion on whether these represent the official views of AKP.
82
manifestation of this civilization. In other words, he asserts that the Ottoman extends to
the present society. This society, however, the nation to which he refers, has a different
definition, one that is similar to Davutoglu’s. This vague definition allows him to
include ethnicities other than the Turk, even those that are not Turkish citizens and who
do not speak Turkish in the nation. Finally, he contributes to the hyperreality of Vatan
by expressing his keen interest in the Ottoman geography with the pretext that we are the
heirs to the Ottoman. In his speech in May 2010, on the occasion of Foundations Week,
Erdogan said, in the same way as Armagan and as many others that I pointed out in the
previous chapter;
Each person, each society may look upon history as a past time
segment or turn his/its back on it. But we cannot do this. We
cannot do it even if we wanted to. We cannot escape from our
history or its consequences reflected in our day.
In the same speech he later added;
We have been through periods when they wanted us to forget
history or when they tried to write history differently. However,
we have to understand the fact that, as a country and as people,
we owe our existence to our history. We have to know that those
who have no history will have no future. Our future will take
shape and is taking shape on the basis of our history. A tree lives
from its roots. I say openly that, no matter how well educated
generations are, no matter how well they are using technology,
no matter how closely they are following the world, they can
never build a lasting and strong future, unless they have no
knowledge of Seyh Edebalii, Osman Gazi, Ali Kusçu, Fatih,
Mimar Sinan, Fuzuli and Hacı Arif Bey. Arif Nihat Asya
expresses this in the most beautiful way: These books are Fatih,
Selim and Süleyman. That minaret is Sinan. Come; wake up your
legend (saga) that has been sleeping. (Appendix A) (Official
website of AKP; May 3, 2010)
83
This is an articulation of an old idea and Erdogan was actually repeating what he said
years ago. AKP official web site quotes him in 2006 as saying “We cannot build a future
without laying claim to our historical heritage”.34
Similarly, in another speech, in 2006, again on the start of the Year of Foundation
Civilization and the Foundations Week, he said;
We cannot build a future without laying claim to our historical
heritage. We cannot talk about patriotism if we are not laying
claim to our history, to our culture, with loyalty. With these
feelings, we are restoring (reviving) all our historical monuments
from Edirne to Sanlıurfa. While other countries and other
peoples are safe guarding/protecting, as a holy deposit, every
piece of stone they have taken over from their ancestors, we,
unfortunately, have abandoned our symbolic monuments, from
the Fortress of Ankara, Hacı Bayram, which are right beside us,
to Ishak Pasa Palace on our Eastern border. Now, we are
restoring/reconstructing them and bringing them to life for our
country and for the world. Can you imagine this: if the
descendants of a civilization that built, on a vast geography,
unique monuments such as the magnificent casern in Yemen and
the magnificent bridge in Mostar, disown the Seljuk and
Ottoman monuments under their hand, can you talk about
civilization? (Appendix B) (Official website of AKP; 2006)
In these speeches, Erdogan underlines the importance of history – the importance of the
Ottoman, our obligation to claim this history and to comprehend the meaning of this
history as the basis for building the future. He emphasizes the importance of preserving
the symbols of the history and he claims that this civilization and culture is an integral
34 “Tarihi mirasımıza sahip çıkmadan gelecegimizi insa edemeyiz.” (Official website of AKP; 2006)
84
part of our history. These points are the critical elements of the imaginary that was
described in the previous chapter and when we look at how Erdogan elaborates them on
other occasions, we note that they are a critical part of Erdogan’s discourse.
The concept of civilization, for example, is so critical for Erdogan that he uses it
practically whenever he talks about “us” and frequently defines “us” in terms of this
civilization. For example in October 26, 2010, in his speech to AKP parliamentarians at
the Group Meeting, he said “Words expressing ethnic roots, sects and different
geographies are inadequate for defining us as a millet. What defines us best is our
mutual history, our mutual civilization and our mutual ideologies”.35 On many
occasions, Erdogan states that when he talks about civilization he means Ottoman
civilization. For example, at a speech given at the opening ceremonies of an exhibition
in Washington D.C., he said36 “I pay great homage to the Ottoman Empire, which left us
the heritage of a supreme civilization”.37 Being the representative and heir to such a
civilization and its connectivity to Islam has an important place in Erdogan’s discourse,
35 “Etnik kökenleri, mezhepleri, cografyaları ifade eden kelime ve kavramlar bizi bir millet olarak tarif
etmekte yetersiz kalır. Bizi, ortak tarihimiz en güzel sekilde tarif eder. Bizi, ortak medeniyetimiz, ortak
ideallerimiz tarif eder.” (Official website of AKP; October 26, 2010).
36 Exibition at Sabancı Museum: “The Magnificence of the Ottoman exibited at Florantine palaces from
the Medici to Savoy families.” (December 22, 2003 – April 19, 2004).
37 “Bize yüce bir uygarlıgı miras olarak bırakan ecdadımız Osmanlı’yı, sonsuz saygıyla anıyorum.”
(Official website of AKP; n.d., a)
85
especially when he visits a city having an Ottoman past. In August 2010, while
delivering a speech to a crowd in Sivas, one such city, he said;
They should observe, from the example of this mosque, the kind
of cultural deposit this country has not only Divrigi Ulu Mosque,
my highly esteemed brothers, Tashan, Kursunlu Hamam, Ulu
Mosque and Gök Medrese, each one of these monuments is
narrating our history, describing us to us. Each one of these
monuments is telling us about our deep rooted history, our
glorious past, our civilization of love. Each one of these
monuments expresses the fact that this territory was a center of
art and science. As Arif Nihat Asya says, ‘These books are Fatih,
Selim and Süleyman. This niche is Sinanüddin, this minaret is
Sinan. Come; wake up your legend (saga) that has been sleeping.
You are the one; you are the renowned, the loved, and the
exalted. He was your age, when Fatih conquered Istanbul.’
and he continues…
Limited thinking is not suitable for people with such a history. It
is not suitable for a public with such historical monuments. t is
nor suitable for a youth sitting on such a civilization. Therefore,
we think big and, for this reason, we take big steps. We think big
for Turkey and we think big for our region also. We think big for
the whole world too. (Appendix C) (Official website of AKP;
August 24, 2010)
Erdogan repeats the same message also, when addressing the elites and underlines that
“we are the descendants of a profound civilization” (Official website of AKP; December
29, 2009). Erdogan defines this civilization as a civilization of love focusing on the
human being, a civilization strongly tied to Islam (Official website of AKP; September
5, 2010 and December 17, 2009), a civilization defined by its benevolence (Official
website of AKP; June 13, 2010), a civilization in search of conquering the hearths
(Official website of AKP; April 14, 2010) and on the side of oppressed (Official website
86
of AKP; June 13, 2010) as if he is citing the critical properties of the moral order
underlying the social imaginary represented by the Ottoman. In his words this
civilization is;
The civilization we founded on this territory is a civilization of
love, which is an example to the whole world. I underline these
words. We are the descendants of people who regarded their
fatherland as their honor and when necessary, ran, without
hesitation to the entrenchments and fought shoulder to shoulder,
sacrificing their lives in those entrancements. But, at the same
time, in times of peace, we are the followers of a culture that
founded human civilizations, harmonious with the environment,
living creatures, the soil, esthetics and nature.
Vakıf (foundation) civilization is based on devoting oneself to
humanity, on having human beings and the living at the center of
life and working for the benefit of humanity. This vakıf concept,
considers the migratory birds, the poor and the weak, the
destitute and the lost wanderer.
Features like love, fraternity, compassion, which bind us to each
other, strengthened with the vakıf concept and gave us
togetherness and oneness (tevhid). In fact, Vakıf is not a purse
made up of collections from left and right. Vakıf is, as our
ancestors defined it is a donation from the Sultan’s personal
money ceb-i hümayun (the personal riches of the Sultan) for the
benefit of the needy. This continues today in a very different
way.
Let the citizens live, so the state shall live.
Look, we have a state vision, which does not fall in the share of
many societies in the world. There is Seyh Edibali, who says, ‘let
the citizens live, so that the state shall live.’ as well as Osman
Gazi and Orhan Gazi, who founded a state with this vision of
civilization and exalted it, and provided peace and security for
this state.
This territory bred sultans such as Mevlana, Yunus, Hacı Bektas
Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal and Karacaoglan, as well as historically
renowned statesmen such as Alparslan, Meliksah, Kılıçarslan and
Selahaddin Eyyubi. Mehmet the Conqueror, Suleiman the
Magnificent and Yavuz Sultan Selim are great and noble
personalities in our history. All the same, Ak Semseddin, The
Architect Sinan, Barbarossa, Fuzuli, Nedim and many others are,
87
at least, as great, as noble and as renown as they are.
I say always that the pen comes before the sword in our
civilization. We must observe carefully how the Ottoman
Empire, which ruled over three continents, is described on those
continents. In the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire is remembered
not with its tyranny and cruelty but with the bridge of Mostar,
The bridge of Drina, Karagöz Bey Mosque, the bridge of Vardar,
the Stone Bridge of Kosovo, the bridge of Vidin, thousands of
public fountains, inns, public baths and libraries. In the Middle
East, the Ottoman is not remembered with its exploitation, abuse
and imperialism but with the medium of peace and tranquility it
has created in Jerusalem, the Hejaz Railroad, the Bagdad
Railroad and the water channels constructed in Mescid-i Haram
and in Karbala.
Likewise, in Africa, in Ace there is not an Ottoman Empire
which hijacked the riches of Africa, but there is an Ottoman
Empire, that built bridges, mosques, public fountains, Medresseh
(Moslem theological school) and libraries. (Appendix D)
(Official website of AKP; May 3, 2010)
This civilization, this social imaginary, according to Erdogan is different because it
established itself not by destroying the other civilizations but by encompassing them.
This civilization, with Islam at its center, included, synthesized, what the other, Western,
civilization has (Official website of AKP; September 9, 2007). Erdogan avoids referring
to religion directly but he always points out the links between this civilization and Islam
by emphasizing its symbols. How Erdogan explains, at the Sivas meeting, the way our
civilization manifests itself to us is a good example of this symbolism.
88
Each one of my brothers is proud of being a member of this
nation, why? Because we belong to a deep-rooted history, to a
great civilization and a strong state tradition. This is what this
Ulu Mosque is telling us. This is what the Çifte Minareli
Medrese, Gök Medrese and Sifahiye Medresesi are telling us.38
This civilization, according to him, on the other hand, is our civilization; that is, we are
the descendants of the Ottoman and we cannot separate ourselves from this Ottoman.
Erdogan continuously emphasizes that the Republic was established on the civilizational
ground of the Ottomans (Official website of AKP; February 13, 2009), and that we are
their decedents (Official website of AKP; July 13, 2010). He expressed a summary of
his ideas on the subject as;
At the beginning, the Seljuk and the Ottoman were a seed and a
shoot, that the seed and the shoot grew, flourished and developed
into a maple tree under the shadow of which continents
freshened/resided. This is why; the Ottoman is defined as a
maple tree in classical Ottoman poetry. Likewise, the Turkish
Republic was sewn as a shoot and is today growing, flourishing
and developing like a maple tree. However, don’t you forget that
the maple three lives with its roots. If you cut the roots, if you
forget them or ignore them, the maple tree will be disconnected
with the soil and that maple tree will fall over. We do not and
will not permit this. (Appendix E) (Official website of AKP;
May 8, 2010)
38 “Benim her bir kardesim, bu ülkenin, bu milletin bir mensubu olmaktan gurur duyuyor, neden? Çünkü
bizler, köklü bir tarihin, büyük bir medeniyetin, güçlü bir devlet geleneginin mensuplarıyız. Su Ulu
Cami'nin bize anlattıgı budur. Çifte Minareli Medrese'nin, Gök Medrese'nin, Sifahiye Medresesi'nin bize
anlattıgı budur.” (Official website of AKP; February 13, 2009).
89
And, in his speech in Sögüt, at the birth place of the Ottoman Empire, he says;
Our modern republic, built on the civilization and the (state)
experience of the Ottoman Empire, is, today, an element of
stability in its region and in the whole world. Yahya Kemal says,
‘the spirit lives not without a horizon.’ We have to give the
young generations the horizons of Mimar Sinan and Selimiye
and Süleymaniye as well the spirit of Fatih the Conqueror and
the spiritual world of the War of Dardanelles, our War of
Independence and of Gazi Mustafa Kemal.39
This civilization, as we have seen, defines who we are. It is our social imaginary as
imagined by the elites. In this sense, we also refer to our nation, and Erdogan has a very
different definition of the nation. In October 2010 Erdogan, when he was summarizing
his trip to Kosovo, explains to the deputies of AKP what is national. The following
excerpt is taken from the official web site of AKP;
Streets, houses, balconies were decorated with Turkish and
Kosovo flags. The people of Kosova were in their balconies and
the shopkeepers were outside, in front of their shops. They were
all cheering to greet our group. Naturally, at that time, we were
together with the president of Kosova. Together with him, we
went out and walked amidst the people. We talked to the
children, to the young people, listened to their problems. When
we reached the historical Sadırwan Square, we saw that, there,
the excitement was much different. Passing through the square, I
saw a lady in a window and a very old grandmother in the right
39 “Osmanlı'nın medeniyet birikimi ve devlet tecrübesi üzerinde kurulan modern Cumhuriyetimiz, bugün
bölgesinde ve dünyada bir istikrar unsurudur. Yahya Kemal, ‘ruh ufuksuz yasamaz’ diyor. Bizim de genç
nesillere Fatih'in ruhu kadar Çanakkale'nin, Kurtulus Savası'nın, Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in ruh dünyası
kadar, Mimar Sinan ve Selimiye'nin, Süleymaniye'nin ufkunu kazandırmamız gerekiyor.” (Official website
of AKP; October 9, 2006).
90
next to that one. They had tears in their eyes, they were close to
weeping. I said to Mr. Tachi, ‘Come, let us make a visit to a
house here.’ We entered the house and we were locked in a close
embrace with the grandmother and the lady. They were crying
their hearts out. And, how could we know? They were relatives
of a columnist from our country. Egemen Bey had his telephone
with him. He called this person and they talked to him. We
learned that they did not have his telephone number. So, we were
helpful to create such an occasion. This was a meaningful
picture, with the old lady crying. She had her daughters with her
and they were also old. I mean the old woman, a grandmother, an
aunty, was over 90. But her affection, her love was very alive.
And the people of Prizren, including their children and their
young boys and girls, were here, waiting for us and the members
of the Kosovo government. An old uncle came to us speaking
Turkish. He told us that Sadırwan Square had not seen such a
crowd and such excitement since Tito’s visit.
We lay claim to these lands and we address the people directly.
We fulfilled our longing with our cognates, the Kosovo people,
here. Then, we went to Sinan Pasa Mosque, which was built in
1625 by Sinan Pasa and which is right next to Sadırwan Square.
It is interesting that the mosque was converted to a museum in
1968. It looks deserted but we took over the renovation and
restoration of this building through our TIKA Company. The
renovation and restoration process is about to be completed.
nsallah, it is going to be finished by the end of the year or by the
New Year. We went there and we have seen it again. Later, we
addressed the people of Kosovo, together with the Prime
Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Tachi. Mr. Tachi spoke in Albanian, of
course and I spoke in Turkish. And both of us had perfect
communication with these people. The excitement was not
different from that in Turkey; we experienced the same
excitement. It is not possible to describe the enthusiasm and the
ecstasy. And, really, the demonstration of affection there was
worth seeing.
Even if we are nationalists of the Turkish Republic, we include
the citizens of Albania in our description of a nation.
Now, where does this enthusiasm, all this ecstasy comes from? It
comes from history, this is what makes us a nation, that culture,
and those mutual values come from this. We do not have to
speak the same language. As I have told you, we have seen this
fusion there, with the people talking Turkish and the people
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talking Albanian. (Appendix F) (Official website of AKP;
November 9, 2010)
As we see, his definition of the nation is very similar to what we have discussed
previously. This is not a nation limited by ethnicity or bounded by geography; it is
grounded upon history, one that is embraced by a common civilization and ideals
(Official website of AKP; November 9, 2010). It is, in effect, the social imaginary
represented by the Ottoman. In AKP Consultation Meeting, he explains the meaning of
the Turkish flag, the symbol of Turkish nationalism with his own dramatic words, as;
The crescent on our flag symbolizes independence but the star is
the symbol of our martyrs.40 There were times when star was
Turkish, there were times it was Kurdish, other times it was
Bosnian or Albanian and so on. People from each and all ethnic
components were martyred for the sake of that crescent. So, this
is the case.41
The non-ethnicity of this nationalism is so apparent (Official website of AKP;
November 9, 2010) that when he was talking about the emergence of our nationalism,
about how this sprit was created he says;
The War of Dardanelles is an important war. It was a prologue to
our War of Independence. In addition, our doctrine of national
40 A Muslim who has died for Islam.
41 “Ay yıldızlı bayragımızın hilali bagımsızlıgın simgesidir. Ama o yıldız sehitlerimizin simgesidir. O
yıldızın zaman olmustur Türk olmustur, zaman olmustur Kürt olmustur, zaman olmustur Bosnak olmustur,
Arnavut olmustur, su olmustur bu olmustur, tüm etnik unsurlar birer yıldız olarak o hilalin ugruna sehit
olmustur; böyle bir durum yani.” (Official website of AKP; October 16, 2010).
92
(millet) idealism took shape and gained an unwavering (strong)
quality with this war.
Almost all ethnic components of Ottoman geography, members
of all religious groups, Christians and Jews, together with
Muslims, urban people together with peasants, the poor with the
rich, illiterate people together with the educated, Alevis with the
Sunnis, Kurds, Armenians, Gypsies, Abkhazians and whoever
you can think of, together with Turks, fought side by side to
protect the motherland.42
Erdogan rejects the existing notion of Turkish nationalism that is based on ethnicity. He
instead prefers identifying it with the social imaginary that the Ottoman represents.
Finally, Erdogan touches the subject of Vatan cautiously, without explicitly rejecting the
national boundaries, but somewhat bypassing them, as he does for the nation. In his
speech in Sögüt on October 9, 2006, he says;
We should know that, although our country covers 780 thousand
square kilometers, our area of influence extends to a much larger
territory. This comes from history and covers 22 million square
meters. Jerusalem, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Hizan, Baku,
Ashgabat, Sarajevo, Thessalonica and Jordan are not faraway
places from Ankara. On the contrary, the distances are shorter
now. Eritrea and Banda Ache are closer to Ankara now. Let us
not forget, that those who thought big founded the Ottoman.
(Appendix G) (Official website of AKP; October 9, 2010)
42 “Çanakkale, Kurtulus Savasımızın girizgahı oldugu kadar, millet mefkuremizin olustugu ve sarsılmaz
nitelik kazandıgı önemli bir savastır. Osmanlı Cografyasında yasayan hemen her etnik grubun, her inanç
grubunun; Müslümanlarla birlikte Hıristiyanların, Musevilerin; köylülerle birlikte sehirlilerin;
yoksullarla zenginlerin; ümmilerle okumusların, Alevilerle Sünnilerin, Türklerle birlikte Kürtlerin,
Ermenilerin, Romanların, Abazaların, aklınıza ne gelirse, Arapların, Bosnakların, Makedonların ve daha
nice etnik grubun omuz omuza vatanı müdafaa ettikleri bir savastır.” (Official website of AKP; March 19,
2010).
93
At this point, it should be noted that Erdogan is not alone within the party in his critical
redefinition of the nation and the Ottoman. Zaman quoted the Minister of Culture as
saying “…the Ottoman Empire did not discriminate between its citizens/subjects as
Turk, Turcoman, Christian, Muslim, Greek, Armenian, Kurd, Alevi, Sunni but regarded
them equal as citizens and deemed it her duty to protect their rights…”43 Similarly,
Çelik, on a different occasion said that;
Turkey has pierced its bark. Turkey’s vision is no more the
borders of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli). Turkey has a
different point of view now. You have a different point of view.
You are aware of your ancestors. You are aware of Murat the
First. You are aware of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. (Appendix H)
(Zaman; September 6, 2009)
The Identification of the Society with the Ottoman
In the previous section, I tried to show how the Ottoman, as a representation of a social
imaginary, is reflected in the words of Erdogan. This Ottoman, as we noted, is nearly
identical to the Ottoman imagined by the elites. I argue that AKP leadership, through
their various acts, discourse and actions, works for the identification of the society with
this imagined Ottoman, which is the first moment of the dual identification.
Accordingly, in this section, I will try to show how AKP leadership persistently
43 “Osmanlı'nın, ahalisini, Türk, Türkmen, Hıristiyan, Müslüman, Rum, Ermeni, Kürt, Alevi, Sünni diye
ayırmadıgını ifade ederek, Osmanlı'nın hepsini bir tuttugunu, vatandas saydıgını, bunların haklarını
korumayı kendine görev saydıgını…” (Zaman; September 13, 2009).
94
emphasizes, through various means, that the Republic of Turkey and the current society
is the continuation of and successor to the Ottoman and that Ottoman history is our
history and Ottoman culture is our culture.
However, before we move into the details of this argument, we should note that
AKP leadership has always rejected any claim of revivalism or Neo-Ottomanism.
President Gül, in November 2010 during a conference in London, replying to a question
about the revival of Ottomanism in Turkish foreign politics, said that the Neo-
Ottomanism was not realistic today (Kanal D News; November 9, 2010). Erdogan
similarly asserted that there is no Neo-Ottomanist in the Republic of Turkey (Star
Gazetesi; December 9, 2009). Davutoglu also, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that
this expression, Neo-Ottomanism, was not correct (Milli Gazete; November 26, 2009).
Although this appears to conflict with the arguments in this work. This rejection
is understandable because, as argued before, what the Ottoman represents is a social
imaginary, it is not the historical Ottoman state with its institutions. The Ottoman, in the
framework of AKP, is a representation of a social and, in this respect, represents
something different than its historical itself. This imaginary is about the ideas, vision and
ideals, and about a moral background upon which society stands; it is about a different
apprehension of time and space. What continues today, in this framework, are the ideas,
vision, ideals and moral background of an order represented by the Ottoman, but not a
political regime or particular institutions? Türköne summarized this difference as
recently as December 2010 in an article in Zaman, when he was answering the critics of
95
AKP’s foreign policy as Neo-Ottoman;
The boundaries of Ottoman geography are superficial boundaries
that were established according to divide and rule policies. The
tracks queuing at Habur, at Cilvegözü, despite the abolition of
[the] visa [requirement] is a concrete indicator of this
superficiality. The economic and the simultaneous cultural
integration of the region depend on the removal of dams in the
way of the water. In this way, the people, societies will once
again find their own historical path and reach stability. It is
impossible and unnecessary for Turkey to have hegemony in the
region as the Ottomans. The region needs peace. This peace can
be established and sustained by Turkey in conformity with
historical experience. The name of this peace is not the new
Ottoman but Pax Ottomana, i.e., Ottoman Peace. (Appendix I)
(Türköne; December 16, 2010)
If we return to our subject, we can see that AKP leadership and cadres do not hesitate to
explicitly state that Turkey is the continuation of the Ottoman or that Turkey is the heir
to the Ottoman in the form I described above. AKP deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek,
for example, said during his flight back from Russia when he was returning from a
meeting of North Sea Economic Cooperation Council in November 2009, “There is a
heritage received from the Ottoman. We have had such an advantage throughout
history, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and over the Arab countries”. Egemen Bagıs,44
at the Alpbach European Forum in September 2009 said, “this time we came for
44 State Minister.
96
peace”45, when referring to Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union. Minister of State
Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoglu noted, “we are the continuation of the Empire” (Zaman;
February 1, 2008) when he was defending a new style of secularism. Erdogan, in his
speech at the Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in Istanbul, said they looked at
Africa as the heirs to and descendants of a major power and the citizens of a modern
Turkish state (Zaman; August 19, 2008).
On certain occasions, Erdogan has also directly identified people as Ottoman.
For example when he was referring to the teachers working in Turkish schools abroad,
he said “I see them as Ottoman raiders”46, or, when he was referring to people coming
to his meetings, he likened them to Ottomans leaving in small villages (Zaman; October
10, 2010) for the first time.
However, AKP has other, indirect, ways of promoting the identification of the
current society with the Ottoman.
First there is a continuous emphasize on the concept of “our civilization” that I
argued, is strongly related to the social imaginary and to the common history. Secondly,
there is a tremendous effort by AKP municipalities and by various government agencies
to recreate the Ottoman space both in Turkey and abroad. Third, there is a persistent
45 “Bu kez barıs için geldik.” (Bozkurt; September 3, 2009)
46 Akıncılar.
97
effort to identify the Ottoman culture as our culture at all levels starting from festivities
in small towns up to major international events.
The leadership persistently employs the concept of civilization or the theme of
common history that binds us together, which is equivalent to the social imaginary. In
the previous section, examples were given from Erdogan to explain how the AKP shares
the same imaginary with the elites. Erdogan is not alone in pointing out history and
civilization. President Gül, on the occasion of 728. Anniversary of the Establishment of
the Ottoman State, said that the Ottoman represents a pinnacle of civilization (Zaman;
September 13, 2009). Minister Özak, at the Academy of Politics, organized by AKP,
said “Ottoman is the nation that brought civilization to the world. We are the
descendants of that nation.”47 Minister of State Cevdet Yılmaz, in Bingöl, a small city in
Eastern Turkey, at a conference on Ottoman Culture and Civilization, said:
In reality, history is not something we leave behind, something
which has no relation to us. In fact, history makes up the ground
we stand up on. If we are not aware of this, if we do not know
our history well, we cannot take sound steps towards the future.
Therefore, the research conducted on regional histories and the
histories of different countries are very important. Also, it is very
important that this research be made on an objective basis. We
know about the distortions in historical research done in the past.
This was due to various ideological reasons. We know that
historical studies were used for narrow political ends (goals).
(Appendix J) (Zaman; August 2, 2009)
47 “Dünyaya medeniyeti getiren millet Osmanlı'dır. Biz o milletin torunlarıyız.” (Sahin; February 3, 2008)
98
Erdogan, on another occasion, refers to the Ottoman as our great civilization, our
history, but these are not limited to the Turkish nation or to Turkey (Zaman; April 14,
2010). For example, at an evening meal during Ramadan sponsored by the AKP Bursa
party organization in September 2010, he was quoted as saying;
During history, we succeeded in climbing over these steep
mountains,48 [to] meet and embrace each other. We did this all
together. The people in this region have a common history, a
common culture and mutual values. For example, when you set
off from Bursa and arrive in Sarajevo after travelling hundreds of
kilometers, you find yourself in a city which resembles Bursa
exactly. You see inns and market places called Bursa. When my
fellow brother from Skopje comes here to Bursa, he does not feel
at all like he is in a foreign city; on the contrary, he feels at
home, like he has come to a city [in his own country]. Our cities
are alike, with their minarets, bridges, inns, libraries and
medresses; you see this in Pristina, Bosnia, Costansa, Kırcaali,
Thessalonica, Komotini, and Manastır. Many more cities have
the same architecture, the same spirit and the same essence. Our
food, our culture, our songs, our folklore resemble each other.
Beyond this, we share a common future, like we share a common
history. We share, even a common fate. (Appendix K)
(September 7, 2010)
Bursa, in fact, deserves special attention because it is the first capital of the Ottomans.
AKP, it seems, pays special attention to Bursa and underlines this characteristic of the
city continuously as another way to give the message that the Ottoman extends to the
present by constantly reminding us that this space is Ottoman space. The governor of
48 He was referring to Balkan Mountains.
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Bursa, when speaking to Spanish guests, on the New Civilization Bridge Project,
emphasized the importance of Bursa as the capital of the Ottoman, his happiness in
living in such a city and underscored the common Ottoman – Turkish tradition, without
separating the Ottoman and the Turk from each other (Zaman; October 11, 2010).
Similarly, Bülent Arınç, Minister of State (Zaman; November 11, 2009), Ertugrul
Günay, Minister of Culture and Tourism (Zaman; September 21, 2010) and Mehmet Ali
Sahin, Chairman of Turkish Grand National Assembly (Zaman; September 12, 2009),
all, stressed, on different occasions, that the Ottoman is a civilization - that it is our
civilization and that we have a profound history that we should always take into account.
In all these instances, AKP tells society that history, our history, our civilization, is not
the past, but rather extends to the present and to the future, to all times and represents a
social order that has a specific moral ground. An example of this can be seen from what
Erdogan said at the opening of the Baghdad pavilion of Topkapı Palace after renovation.
The following description of his speech is on Zaman’s website:
…He pointed out that Bagdat Köskü (Baghdad Pavilion), open to
public as of today, is one of the important parts (the restoration
of which is complete) of Topkapı Palace; that they are watching
from here not only Istanbul but also the present day and the
future and refreshing their enthusiasm at the point of building a
future with the inspiration from the past.
Erdogan said, he told the officials to do what is necessary to
enable everybody, specially the students to watch Istanbul from
here. And he said:
Because I think that, a person, who has not seen this place, who
was not able to look at Istanbul and Turkey from here, will be
incapable of understanding Turkey’s past and plan its future. I
want to point out specially that there may be people who
understand the level of contemporary civilizations as economic
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and technical development only. We should never fall into this
fallacy. Economic development that does not occur along with
Enlightenment and civilization will not be a long lasting
development. Mentalities which do not claim all the values that
make up life, which do not perceive life as a whole, which do not
approach the solution of problems from a collective perspective,
cannot bring us to further heights. (Appendix L) (Zaman,
February 9, 2009)
AKP gives the same message through other means and in more sophisticated forms also.
The leadership and cadres actively create an Ottoman space by renovating Ottoman
artifacts, carrying out construction based on an Ottoman architecture, giving public
places Ottoman names and by actively promoting Ottoman culture. All these activities
serve the dual identification of the Ottoman. While the public is given the message that
the Ottoman extends to the present and the present society is Ottoman, a simultaneous
message that tells that AKP claims and represents this Ottoman is disseminated
continuously.
In terms of creating the Ottoman space, municipalities and government agencies
are all instrumental but the most important agent is the General Directorate of
Foundations. There are a total of 19,825 monuments, artifacts and cultural assets, mostly
from the Ottoman period, registered with General Directorate of Foundations in Turkey.
Between 2002 and 2008, the Directorate renovated 3,363, or 17%, of them after AKP
came to power. This is in contrast to only fourty-six between 1998 and 2002 (Official
Web Site of General Directorate of Foundations). The budget of the Directorate jumped
to TL. 443 million in 2009 from TL. 37 million in 2002 (Zaman; May 4, 2009). AKP
101
leadership actively promoted and used these renovations as a tool to give the message
that the Ottoman extends to the present and that the space in which we live is Ottoman
space. The activities of the Directorate are highly praised by the AKP leadership and the
opening ceremonies of renovated Ottoman artifacts are attended by the leadership and
high-level bureaucrats. As I noted above, the high-level presence of leadership at these
ceremonies serves two purposes. Leaders keep giving the message that the present
society is the continuation of the Ottoman. At the same time, they show that they will do
whatever is necessary to actualize this Ottoman. For example, Zaman reports Arınç,
Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of State, at the opening of a renovated Ottoman
Mosque in Besiktas, Istanbul, in the presence of the President Gül, Minister of Foreign
Affairs Davutoglu, the Governor and the Security Chief of Istanbul:
He reminded that fifteen days ago, a gala was held for the
opening of Yenikapı Mevlevihanesi (lodge used by Mevlevi
dervishes) put in footnote. The gala was attended by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and this was a symbolic
celebration for the opening of 111 monumental works, the
restorations of which were completed.
Arınç pointed out that, ‘In seven years, almost 3,500
monumental works were restored and opened to service. It is our
duty to reanimate these precious deposits which are the heirloom
of our ancestors and works of vakıf civilization and we are very
happy to be able to fulfill this duty.’
...
Minister Arınç noted that he took a tour in the mosque before the
opening and said, ‘The opening of this mosque on a Friday, after
so many years, is a demonstration of the fulfillment of one of our
responsibilities to our ancestors’. (Appendix M) (Zaman; May
21, 2010)
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AKP municipalities, and certain government agencies, too, have been undertaking
various projects with the aim of re-creating Ottoman quarters in the cities. The Housing
and Development Administration, for example, started projects in Ankara (Zaman; June
11, 2010) and Istanbul (Zaman; December 29, 2009) having Ottoman and Seljuk
architecture. Municipalities have also been active in creating an Ottoman space in their
areas. Zeytinburnu (Zaman; September 6, 2010), Bagcılar (Zaman; April 11, 2008),
Eyüp (Official web page of Eyüp Municipality; August 10, 2010), Esenyurt (Nethaberci;
November 24, 2010), Çekmeköy (Offical Web page of Esenyurt Municipality; October
10, 2010), and Fatih (Zaman; January 28, 2008) Municipalities in Istanbul and Yıldırım
(Zaman; August 28, 2010) and Nizip (Zaman; August 28, 2010) Municipalities in Bursa
and Gaziantep, respectively, as well as Kars (Zaman; July 14, 2007) and Ankara
(Zaman; July 29, 2010), for example, have all either started or already completed
projects variously characterized as “Ottoman houses”, “Ottoman neighborhoods”, and
“Ottoman parks” in recent years.
Municipalities are not alone in creating the Ottoman space; the Ministry of
Education, for example, actively promotes Ottoman, Seljuk and strangely enough,
Hittite architecture, in school buildings all over Turkey. Several newspapers in 2007
reported that the Ministry had made a decision in this direction (Bas; July 6, 2007). The
Minister of Education and Spokesmen for the Government, Çelik, at the opening of the
Exhibition of Architectural Project of School Buildings from Traditional to the Future
(Official website of Ministry of National Education; February 2, 2005) said that public
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buildings in Turkey did not represent our identity and the exhibition was an attempt to
highlight national alternatives. The projects were based on Ottoman, Seljuk and Hittite
architecture. This trend is not only relevant to schools but to other public buildings, as
Çelik emphasized in his speech (Zaman; July 6, 2007). For example, the General
Directorate of Highways replaced the names of certain bridges, tunnels and the names of
some new structures along the new highway in Western Anatolia with those of Ottoman
Sultans (Zaman; March 4, 2009).
Another example of bringing Ottoman to the present is the importance given to
Ottoman Sultans and the Ottoman dynasty. In this section, I will give two instances of
how this surfaces; a third one will be presented in the next section. The first of these is
related to the creation of Ottoman space with an additional symbolic meaning while the
second concerns the identification of culture with the Ottoman. Both cases serve
different purposes at the same time. On the one hand, they convey the message that “we
are the Ottoman”, indirectly, by naturalizing the Ottoman and creating an Ottoman
space, and directly, by giving this message at opening ceremonies. On the other hand,
these actions permit the leadership to show that they represent this Ottoman.
An example of this process is related to the Turbehs (the tombs of dignitaries and
Sultans) of Ottoman Sultans. The Turbehs were recently reopened to the public after
staying close to public for many years. The Turbehs in Istanbul were renovated through
the partial funding provided by the 2010 Cultural Capital of Istanbul Agency. The
Turbehs had been closed to the public since November 30, 1925 by Law no. 677
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(Zaman; August 19, 2009). Atatürk, when addressing to people in Kastamonu, said as a
preamble to this law that “to expect assistance from the dead is a shame for a civilized
society … the most truthful cult is the cult of civilization”.49 The opening of the Turbehs
in this respect has more than one meaning. While the Ottoman space is once more
expanded and elaborated, we, at the same time, observe how the rules are gradually
changed based on the new social imaginary. The social imaginary represented by the
Ottoman, in contrast to the Kemalist social imaginary which came down hard on such
elements of popular culture, nourishes itself from these cultural elements to establish a
new social. Consequently, it changes the rules of life and what was accepted as
scandalous and unlawful gradually becomes acceptable.50 The Undersecretary of
Tourism said, at re-opening of seven Turbehs in Haghia Sophia to the public, in the
presence of the Governor of Istanbul, Turbehs;
…of our ancestors are, for us, spiritual as well as material signs
…our awareness of history and past times spread over us, partly
from these elegant Turbehs that decorate the city. The turbeh
protect the city while the city protects the turbeh.51
49 “Ölülerden medet ummak, medeni bir cemiyet için lekedir... En dogru hakiki tarikat, medeniyet
tarikatıdır.” (Official website of Atatürk Research Center; Atatürk’s Speeches and Declarations I-III)
50 Taylor explains the same process, how new rules were put into effect in actualizing the ideal of civility
through a transformatory agenda (Taylor, 2007, p. 41-43)
51 “Türbelerin bizim için maddenin yanı basında mana kanıtlarıydı ... Tarih ve geçmis bilincimiz, biraz da
sehri donatan o zarif türbelerden üzerimize yayılır; türbeler sehre, sehir türbelere sahip çıkar.” (Sentürk
& Tosun; September 19, 2009)
105
In the same ceremony the Governor of Istanbul also said that “to lay claim to our
ancestors is possible through protection of their monuments. We become more powerful
as we protect these memories”.52 The renovation of Turbehs are neither limited to
Istanbul nor to Turkey. The AKP government, through various government and quasigovernmental
agencies, renovated Turbehs, along with other Ottoman artifacts outside
of Turkey and has shown high profile at their openings. Erdogan opened the renovated
Turbeh of Sultan Murat in Kosovo (Çam; November 4, 2010). Arınç participated in the
opening of another Turbehs in Sudan and said, “I brought you greetings from the
Turkish people. We see here, the signs of the days when the Sudanese and the Turkish
people lived here, together, under the same flag”.53
The second example related to the subject is related to the importance placed on
the Ottoman Sultans and how they become a part of the dual identification process is
from Bursa. Bursa is the first capital of the Ottomans and both the municipality and the
representatives of the central government underline the Ottoman character of the city in
various occasions. Arınç, as early as 2003, for example, at the opening of an old imperial
mansion after its renovation, said, “Bursa is the first capital of the Ottoman Empire,
52 “Ecdadına sahip, çıkmak onların eserlerine sahip çıkmakla olacak istir. O hatıralara sahip çıktıkça
bizler güçleniriz.” (Sentürk & Tosun; September 19, 2009).
53 “Sizlere Türk halkının selamını ve sevgilerini getirdim. Biz burada, Sudan ve Türk halkının aynı
zamanda ayrı bayrak altında özgürce birlikte yasadıgının isaretlerini görüyoruz.” (Zaman; January 16,
2007).
106
which is famous for its history of 700 years, its justice, human rights and
civilization...”54 The inauguration of a major cultural center in Bursa by Erdogan in June
2010 is a good example of how the Bursa municipality identifies the Turkish culture
with the Ottoman and how this occasion is used to praise Ottoman. The Merinos Ataturk
Cultural Center is a huge cultural complex in central Bursa; it covers a total area of
270,000 m2, with 67,600 m2 of it being covered (Official website of Arkitera; January
2007). The cultural center is a renovation of an old textile plant that was constructed
during the 1930s and it has been one of the symbols of the new Republic. The center has
four halls. The first is a 1,800-person capacity performance hall – the largest in Turkey.
The second is an eight hundred-person capacity auditorium. The third one is multipurpose
hall that can hold five hundred people. The last one is a ballroom with a
capacity of three hundred people (Zaman; June 7, 2010). These halls, which are the focal
points of a cultural complex, and expected to be the most important cultural venue of
Bursa, the fourth largest city in Turkey, with a metropolitan population of approximately
two million, are named as the Osman Gazi Hall, Orhan Gazi Hall, Hüdevendigar hall
and Yıldırım Beyazid Hall, after the first four Ottoman Sultans who lived in Bursa
(Official website of Merinos Atatürk Cultural Center; n.d.).
54 “Bursa, 700 yıllık tarihi, adaleti, insan hakları ve medeniyetiyle ün kazanmıs Osmanlı
mparatorlugu’nun ilk baskenti…” (Basmacı & Karakılıç; June 1, 2003)
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Bursa is not alone in promoting Ottoman culture actively. As one can expect, the
Istanbul municipality is also very active in this respect. As the capital of the Ottoman,
Istanbul has always been the focal point for the Islamist and has been identified with the
Ottoman not only in Turkey but also throughout the world. The commemorations of the
conquest of the city by the Ottomans have always been an alternative event for parties
with Islamic references in Turkey and Islamic literature in Turkey is full of books,
articles, objects of arts identifying the city with the Ottoman (Çınar, 2005, p. 142-148).
Therefore, it is not surprising to see the Istanbul Municipality, which is controlled by
AKP, focusing on the Ottoman character of the city. The municipality officially
organized, for example, in November 2010, one hundred and sixty-nine cultural
activities out of which sixty-nine were directly or indirectly related to the Ottoman.
During the month, out of sixty-three panels and seminars held, fourty-one had Ottoman
subjects; of the sixty concerts held, twenty-two had Ottoman themes; and four out of the
thirty-two children’s plays put on had Ottoman subjects.55
The activities of Istanbul Municipality are not restricted to local events. The
activities funded by the 2010 European Cultural Capital of Istanbul Agency became
another vehicle through which Ottoman culture was promoted in Istanbul. The agency is
a quasi-governmental organization in whose management central government
55 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Newsletter of Culture and Art, November 2010.
108
authorities, along with the Istanbul Municipality, are heavily represented (Official web
site of Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture Agency; A). To begin with, Erdogan
said, when referring to the selection of Istanbul as the cultural capital of Europe for the
year 2010, “Istanbul is the European Culture Capital of 2010 but, according to me,
Istanbul has been the Culture Capital of the world since 1453”.56 By saying so, he
identified the Ottoman, Istanbul, and culture with each other in a very strong and
emotional sentence.
A close look of the activities directly funded by the Agency reveals that out of
two hundred and fourty-nine activities carried out in Istanbul within the framework of
the program and directly funded by the agency, seventy-eight, that are 30%, are related,
either directly or indirectly, to the Ottoman. Erdogan presided over the official opening
of the festivities on January 16, 2010 and various activities were organized in different
parts of the city to celebrate the kick off. The Ottoman was present in these activities
also through a Mehteran (Ottoman military music) show at the historical heart of the
city: Sultanahmet (Zaman; January 16, 2010).
56 “2010 yılı için Avrupa Kültür Baskenti kabul edilen stanbul, bana göre 1453 yılından beri Dünya
Kültür Baskenti'dir ve bundan sonra da öyle olacaktır.” (Zaman; May 29, 2010)
109
The activities funded by the Agency cover a wide range from exhibitions to
seminars. Though it is impossible to list all such activities here, it is interesting to look at
some of them, which identifies the Ottoman with the current society.
“Sultans of Poetry”57 is an exhibition of poems written by Ottoman Sultans held
at Istanbul Atatürk International airport and co-sponsored by Turkish Airlines. In his
speech at the opening ceremonies, skender Pala said, “The Ottoman Sultans in our
minds are in reality, not emperors but are people who somehow live like us”,58 thus
answering the call of Armagan by humanizing the Ottoman and identifying the Ottoman
with the present society. Another interesting activity funded by the Agency, “A forgotten
Istanbul Ritual: Teravih-i Enderun and Public Muezzinship”,59 is the revival of the
practice of chanting religious rhythms during the special prayers60 in the month of
Ramadan. This has been hailed in conservative newspapers as a new beginning, and as
the resurgence of old Ottoman tradition.61
57 Siirlerin Sultanları.
58 “Zihinlerdeki Osmanlı sultanları hakikatte hükümdarlar degil, biraz bizim gibi yasayan insanlardır.”
(Zaman; August 4, 2010)
59 Enderûn Usûlü Teravih ve Cumhur Müezzinligi.
60 Teravih prayer is a special prayer additionally performed during the sacred month of Ramadan by the
Muslims.
61 “Ramazan’da camilerde Osmanlı rüzgârı esecek.” (Karabulut; August 29, 2008)
110
The identification of the city with the Ottoman may be no better highlighted than
with the movie “Payitaht”, House of Throne. This movie was also funded by the
Agency. The documentary identifies Istanbul with the Ottoman, and underscores its role
as the capital of empires. It gives the messages that the city keeps the secrets of life and
“whoever lives in here, looks at the world differently” (Official website of Istanbul 2010
European Capital of Culture Agency; B)
Another activity, again funded by the Agency, is the Royal Spectacle, Sultan-ı
Seyirlik, which reenacts the festivities, shows performed for the Ottoman Sultans
(Official website of Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture Agency; C). The show
was performed during the holy month of Ramadan and promoted as the presentation of
Ottoman life through the modern performance arts (Hürriyet; August 6, 2010).
This cultural identification of the society with the Ottoman is not restricted to
major cities or to major events. Quite a number of municipalities of smaller cities and
towns have been also very active in promoting the Ottoman culture as our culture. For
example, the Merzifon (Özyürek; December 28, 2009), Koceaeli (Hülagü; October 3,
2010), Konya (Hızlıca; November 23, 2009), Orhangazi (Zaman; August 12, 2007),
Kadirli (Zaman; August 23, 2009) and Zile (Tosun; October 14, 2010) municipalities
have all organized cultural activities focusing on the Ottoman.
Finally, there are sporadic activities, all around Turkey, which tear down the
boundaries between the Republic and the Ottoman, between the past and present, and
show that, as Erdogan said on one occasion, the Republic and the Ottoman, together
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with the Seldjuks, are the products of the same civilization (Zaman; May 4, 2009). It
seems the message that the Ottoman expands into present and represents us, or the
argument that we are all embraced by this civilization, is reaching the society, and the
wall between the Ottoman and the Republic is gradually being torn down. A symbolic
example of this process is, for example, the commemorations in Tekirdag and Bursa. In
both of these events, we observe, if not the shift, the emergence, of an equally praised
new founding moment62 for the nation. In Tekirdag, the conquest of the city by the
Ottoman was commemorated for the first time in 2007 with the presence of the
Governor, Mayor and high-level military officers. These officials, after they left flowers
in Atatürk monument, a representation of national Turkish imaginary, visited the newly
erected monument of the conqueror of the city, the Sultan Murat, Hüdevendigar, a clear
manifestation of the identification of the society with the Ottoman (Zaman; December 7,
2007). Similarly, in Bursa, the city’s conquest was celebrated in 2010 in a very different
form than it had been celebrated eight years earlier. Both in 2002 and 2010 the official
presence was the same. The Governor of Bursa, the Mayor, high-ranking military
officers, security chief were all present on both occasions. However, only a short text
was read during the ceremony by a high school teacher in 2002. The activities were
short, the municipality distributed rice and ayran during the event and there was only
62 An imaginary moment of conception when the history of the nation starts (Çınar, 2005, p. 142).
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Mehteran music. The activities in 2010, in contrast, were completely different. First,
both the Governor and the Mayor addressed the crowd. In his speech, the Governor
emphasized that humanity had confronted a new civilization with the conquest of Bursa
(Elitok; April 7, 2010). The Mayor, on the other hand, said “it was their responsibility to
carry the relic they inherited from their ancestors to the future”. Secondly, the activities
were not restricted to Atatürk monument as it was in 2002 (Official website of Bursa
Metropolitan Municipality; April 6, 2010). The officials moved to other locations and
visited the mausoleums, Turbehs of two Ottoman Sultans. Finally, 2010 witnessed wide
range of activities under the name of “Festivities for commemoration of Osman Gazi
and the Conquest of Bursa”63 which lasted one week. Mayors of smaller towns around
Bursa, Mayors from Bosnia-Herzegovina and some AKP deputies participated in the
activities (Elitok; April 10, 2010). It looks that the apprehension of the Republic and the
Ottoman in a continuous time frame that is the implicit assertion of the continuation
argument, manifests itself in Bursa and Tekirdag with the cooperation of authorities
representing the central government and municipalities and with the participation of
people in the festivities.
63 Osmangazi'yi Anma ve Fetih Senlikleri.
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How the AKP Leadership Lays Claim to the Ottoman
In the previous section, I tried to show how AKP leadership persistently gives the
message to the society that the Ottoman extends to the present society, how the Republic
is imagined as a continuation of the Ottoman and how a new definition of the nation, if
not yet Vatan, based on this imaginary Ottoman is asserted. This Ottoman corresponds
to the imaginary Ottoman that represents the social imagined by the elites that I tried to
introduce in the previous two chapters.
In this section, it is aimed to show how AKP leadership lays claim to this
Ottoman - how it asserts that it represents this Ottoman.
The message that AKP represents the Ottoman, thus the nation, is also given in a
variety of ways and these attempts should be read in conjunction with the conviction of
AKP leadership that the Ottoman expands to the present as a social imaginary of the
current society, and in conjunction with the new definition of the nation that I described
above through the words of Erdogan.
We see that the leadership and party convey this message – that they are the
representative of the Ottoman, through different means, the most symbolic one being
their interest in and respect for the members of the Ottoman dynasty. It was mentioned
in the previous section, the importance given to the renovation and to the public
visibility of the Turbehs of the Sultans and how AKP leadership has high profile
presence at the openings of renovated Turbehs and artifacts. Now, I want to show how
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the leadership pays respect to the dynastic family and turn their funerals into public
spectacles.
Ayse Adile, the granddaughter of Abdulhamid II, in an interview in July 2010,
questions why this respect was not shown before, when she was expressing her gratitude
for the keen interest of Erdogan, of Minister of Health, of certain AKP deputies, and of
the Mayor of Istanbul when her father, who had recently been hospitalized (Tokay; July
11, 2010). Osman Nabi Osmanoglu, the grandson of Abdulhamid II, was hospitalized in
Marmaris, a small summer resort in South Western Turkey, but later transferred to a
prominent state hospital in Istanbul by a helicopter under special order of the Minister of
Health (Zaman; July 15, 2010). When he died, a couple of days later, President Gül sent
an official Presidential message of condolence (Official website of Presidency; July 15,
2010). The interest of the AKP leadership in him, however, was not limited to health
matters and to a simple condelescence message. Except President Gül, the entire AKP
leadership was present in his funeral. The funeral was held at the Fatih Mosque in
Istanbul, built and named after the conqueror of the city Sultan Mehmed, and Erdogan,
Arınç, Minister of Interior, two Ministers of State, Vice Chairman of AKP, Governor of
Istanbul, Mayor of Istanbul and Security Chief of the city attended the funeral. The
funeral prayer was led by the Director of Religious Affair Department in Istanbul.
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Erdogan and the ministers helped in the carriage of his coffin (Dolmacı & Yenilmez;
July 18, 2010), a symbolic act in Muslim religion representing the highest level of
respect for the dead person.64 Osman Nabi was buried in the mausoleum compound of
Sultan Mahmud II, where his grandfather was also entombed (Zaman; July 18, 2010), by
special permission of the Council of Ministers.65 This interest in the Ottoman dynasty is
not new and Erdogan, who could not attend an earlier funeral of a prominent member of
them, visited personally in 2009. His wife, Minister of Interior, Minister of
Transportation, Governor and Mayor of Istanbul, accompanied him at that visit
(Bighaber; September 27, 2009). The information disseminated after this visit was the
great gratification of the family, in the words of Zeynep Tarzi Osman;
God bless him; he came back from America and, as soon as they
got off the plane, he and the lady visited me to express
condolences. Ministers and the Mayor of Istanbul were with him.
This was a great pleasure for me. Thanks to all of them.66
President Gül also issued an official presidential condolence message at that time and he
phoned the family personally (Zaman; September 25, 2009).
64 “Carrying the corpse on the shoulders to the grave is a sign of greatest respect and homage to the dead.
Such a deed shows the honour and value of humanity.” (Official website of General Directorate of
Religious Affairs; n.d.)
65 Law 1593, article 211 definitely forbids the burials outside of cemeteries without explicit permission
from the council of ministers.
66 “Eksik olmasın Amerika'dan döndü, uçaktan indi ayagının tozuyla bana bassaglıgı ziyaretinde bulundu
hanımefendiyle birlikte. Bakanlar, stanbul valisi, belediye baskanı ile beraber geldiler. Büyük
memnuniyet duydum. Eksik olmasınlar.” (Zaman; September 28, 2009)
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The Leadership of AKP, apart from the symbolic messages, such as the one
example I gave above, on some occasions, explicitly says that they are the followers of
the Ottoman and they have a duty, a responsibility in this respect. Erdogan, as the leader,
is the one who utters these messages most. In May 2009, on the occasion of Foundations
Week he stressed;
We have the responsibility of building a future on the legacy of
our past, to cherish the ideal of ‘a future the roots of which are in
the past’; like Hz. Mevlana said, hundreds of years ago, like a
pair of compasses, one of our feet shall remain stable, and the
other will move in the whole world.67
In December 2009, in his speech at the distribution of the Turgut Özal68 Awards, he
stated;
We have a lot of business in the Balkans, in the Gulf and in
Central Asia. We are not travelling to these places in vain. There
are lots of things we have to do in these lands. Because (doing)
this is the meeting of this generation with its ancestors. But, we
want the future generations to meet their ancestors with us. We
have to succeed in this. (Appendix N) (Zaman; December 29,
2009)
67 “Biz geçmisin mirası üzerine gelecegi insa etmek, ‘kökü mazide olan ati’ idealini yasatmak gibi bir
sorumlulugu tasıyoruz. Hz. Mevlana'nın yüzyıllar önce söyledigi gibi ‘pergel misali, bir ayagımız sabit
kalacak, digeriyle tüm dünyayı seyran edecegiz’.” (Zaman; May 4, 2009).
68 Turgut Özal is the first President of Turkey who does not have a military career after the 1967 coup
d’etat. He is known for his pro-Islamic views and is the architect of the liberalization of Turkish economy
in 1980s.
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In April 2010, when he was visiting the Turbeh of Sultan Murat Hüdavendigar in
Kosovo, he said;
May you rest in peace. We remember with mercy, you and our
ancestors who were martyred with you; we promise you here, in
your presence, that we shall pass from generation to generation,
the heroism, the feelings of peace, brotherhood and justice,
which you bequeathed to us 600 years ago.69
In April 2010, at the opening of the Piri Reis Exhibition in Washington DC, he said “we
are protecting our history, culture and civilization and we are bringing together our
heritage, which was abandoned to its fate, to young generations and the world”.70
AKP’s claim on the Ottoman is conveyed to the society through other means,
too; usually this message is interwoven with the claim that the Ottoman extends to the
present. First, it is explicitly asserted that AKP is protecting and is reviving our culture.
In the previous section, I tried to explain how culture is used to identify the current
society with the Ottoman. This time, AKP is presented as the protector and promoter of
this culture. This claim is defended most explicitly by disseminating information that
AKP government takes care of all historical monuments and artifacts from the Ottoman
period not only in Turkey but throughout all former Ottoman geography, as well.
69 “Ruhun sad olsun. Sen ve seninle sehit olmus ecdadımızı rahmetle yad ediyoruz. 600 yıl öncesinden
bizlere miras bıraktıgın kahramanlıgı, barıs, kardeslik ve adalet duygusunu nesilden nesile
aktaracagımıza dair size burada, huzurunuzda söz veriyoruz.” (Çam; November 4, 2010)
70 “Tarihimize, kültürümüze, medeniyetimize sahip çıkıyor, unutulmus, kendi kaderine terkedilmis
mirasımızı yeniden genç nesillerle, dünya ile bulusturuyoruz.” (Zaman; April 14, 2010)
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Arınç, as a concluding comment to his speech at the opening of Ertugrul Tekke
Mosque in Besiktas, in the presence of others, as cited in the previous section, said “The
fact that this mosque is opened on a Friday, after so many years, is a demonstration of
one of our duties to our ancestors being fulfilled”.71 In fact, AKP leadership is proud of
all the renovation work that has been undertaken by various government agencies and
municipalities all over Turkey and in the Ottoman geography. This renovation work, recreation
of the Ottoman space is mentioned and presented as a proof of the allegiance to
the history, to the ancestors that are the Ottomans. Erdogan is especially vocal in citing
the renovation work undertaken at his rallies and mass meetings. At the AKP Congress
in October 2010, he cited twenty renovation, reconstruction and construction works that
had been done in Turkey and abroad one by one and said, “we claimed them” (Zaman;
October 3, 2010) in the sense that AKP protects the cultural heritage. Similarly, on the
occasion of the start of the broadcasting of TRT 5 channel he said, “We did not neglect
Karatay Medresesi in Konya, Divrigi Ulu Mosque in Sivas, Drina Bridge in Bosnia
71 “Cuma gününde bu caminin bu kadar yıl sonra açılıyor olması, ecdadımıza karsı görevlerimizden biri
olarak önümüzdedir.” (Zaman; May 21, 2010)
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Herzegovina, Mostar, Ottoman cemetery in Jerusalem, the Turbeh of Murad
Hüdavendigar in Kosova”.72
In addition to maintaining high profile participation at the opening of Ottoman
artifacts in Turkey, the leadership either visits an Ottoman artifact or participates in the
opening of a cultural event related to Ottoman when they visit a foreign country. In this
way, they continuously create a picture through which they are identified with the
Ottoman. In the last three years, for example, Erdogan, opened the Piri Reis Exhibition
in Washington D.C. (Zaman; April 14, 2010), visited the Turbeh of Sultan Murat in
Kosovo and opened the Ottoman Edicts Exhibition in Bosnia Herzegovina (Zaman;
April 7, 2010); Minister Ömer Demir visited the Turbeh of Sultan Vahdettin in
Damascus (Zaman; November 3, 2010) and Arınç participated in the opening of an
Ottoman Turbeh in Sudan (Zaman; January 16, 2010). The General Secretary of
Organization of Islamic Conference, who is supported by AKP government, visited the
school opened by Abdulhamid II in China (Zaman; June 18, 2010). Davutoglu opened
the “Türckische Cammer” exhibition in Dresden (Zaman; March 7, 2010), Babacan
visited the Ottoman artifacts in Kosovo (Zaman; January 12, 2009), Ministers of State
Erken and Yazıcıoglu visited the newly renovated Sinan Pasa Mosque in Kosovo (2008,
72 “Konya'da Karatay Medresesi'ni, Sivas'ta Divrigi Ulu Camisini restore ederken, Bosna Hersek'te Drina
köprüsünü, Mostar'ı, Kudüs'te Osmanlı mezarlıgını, Kosova'da Murad Hüdavendigar türbesini ihmal
etmedik.” (Zaman; October 28, 2010)
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August 24), and Gül opened an exhibition related to the tolerance of the Ottoman in
Romania (Zaman; March 4, 2008).
AKP leadership also claims the Ottoman by showing how people outside of
Turkey, from former Ottoman geography, treat them as Ottomans. This, again, is a
double-sided argument as it both shows that the Ottoman is a part of the present and
AKP leaders are the representative of this Ottoman.
It is possible that these acts, gestures and actions abroad target different
audiences. The officials and the public of the foreign country visited are among them.
However, the information about these activities is also disseminated in Turkey. It is
always cited, in an intense emotional tone, by the leaders. In the previous section, it was
quoted what Erdogan said when he was addressing AKP deputies after returning from
Kosova. In another case, after visiting the tomb of zzetbegoviç, the founding father of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Erdogan when talking to a journalist, he cited his encounter with
zzetbegoviç just before he died, saying;
When I learned that the late Aliya was very ill, I changed my
route and passed by Sarajevo. I went to the hospital. We had a
heart to heart talk with Aliya, in private. He said, ‘You are the
descendants of the Ottoman. These are Ottoman territories,
protect them. I am going but you protect them. I did not sign
Dayton willingly; the conditions made me do it’. We wept
together. He was conscious. He pointed out Turkey’s help to
Bosnia. He expressed his thanks for the help and assistance
during the war. (Appendix O) (Zaman; July 13, 2010)
In this narrative, it is impossible not to notice the emotional tone of this encounter and
his citation of the crying episode just after zzetbegoviç told him that they are the heirs
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of the Ottoman. Similarly, Minister of State Özak, when addressing the party members,
cited an encounter of Arafat with five AKP deputies and quoted him as saying, “Where
are you, friend? What kind of Ottoman descendants are you? We are waiting for you
here”.73
Another way in which AKP leaders, especially Erdogan, lay claim to Ottoman is
by way of the justification of certain policies and acts through the Ottoman. This is, once
more, a double sided argument. These arguments both assert that AKP is following the
Ottoman by initiating these policies and justify what has been done as the natural result
of belonging to a specific social imaginary represented by the Ottoman. In a foreign
policy context, Erdogan, for example, said, “Therefore, the off-spring of the Ottoman
cannot be prisoners in Ankara. We have to unfold. We are doing what becomes us”.74
Erdogan is not alone in using the Ottoman to justify certain acts and policies. Top party
officials, when addressing the members of the party on different occasions, emphasize
that Turkey is the continuation of the Ottoman and that AKP should bear this
responsibility. Zaman reports that in his speech to party members, Minister of Work,
Çelik, pointed out that, “Turkey covered very important distances in development and
73 “Neredesiniz kardesim? Ne biçim Osmanlının torunlarısınız? Burada biz sizi bekliyoruz.” (Zaman;
February 28, 2010)
74 “Öyleyse Osmanlı'nın evlatları Ankara'ya mahkum kalamaz. Açılmak durumundayız. Biz, bize yakısanı
yapıyoruz.” (Zaman; February 7, 2010)
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progress during the Ak Parti government and said that the elections on March 29 are,
therefore, important”. Çelik noted that, “it can be seen how Turkey’s voice rises higher
when the country is stronger”. He said, “that is why, when our Prime Minister’s voice
rose in Davos, even our brothers in Bosnia had goose bumps. We have seen that the
Ottoman geography rose with this rising voice. Therefore, March 29 is very important”
(Appendix P) (Zaman; March 2, 2009). More interestingly, Bagıs when speaking about
the membership process to the European Union, defended the process as a return to
ourselves and to our values. Thus also giving the message that AKP is leading this
return. He gave the institution of Ombudsman as an example of how the Europeans
copied the institutions of the Ottomans (Yanatma; September 9, 2009).
Finally, AKP leadership asserts their claim to the Ottoman in other symbolic
ways. Giving and accepting gifts representing the Ottoman,75 76 77 labeling their life style
as Ottoman,78 using visuals and symbols related to Ottoman in their private lives,79 80
75 Bursa Chamber of Cutlers gave Erdogan an imitation of the sword of Osman Gazi, the founder of the
Ottoman state when Erdogan got sick because he is keeping the spirit of the Ottomans alive. The sword is
made by the last sword master in Bursa. (Basmacı; October 24, 2006)
76 Bilecik Governor gave a an Iznik tile with an Ottoman state emblem on it. (Zaman; September 13,
2009)
77 Governor of Gümüshane gave a plate showing the banknote printed in the city during the Ottoman time
to State Minister and Vice Prime Minister Yazıcı. (Bayraktar; August 7, 2010)
78 Mayor of Istanbul in an interview said his family follows an Ottoman style. (Akman; December 14,
2003)
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and organizing events centered on what is Ottoman81 are all messages given to the
society that the leadership represents the Ottoman.
The Impact of the Imaginary Ottoman on Turkish Politics
As we have seen, AKP leadership and the elites clustering around the newly emerging
bourgeoisie share the same imaginary and strive for the identification of the society with
this imaginary Ottoman, and the leadership asserts that it represents this Ottoman. In this
section, the focus is on the importance of this imaginary for AKP and in Turkish politics.
However, the interconnectivity of this imaginary Ottoman and globalization is a key in
understanding this importance. It is already shown that the imaginary Ottoman serves
the elites and AKP leadership as a guide in this globalized world. In this section, I will
try to explain that the emergence of the imaginary Ottoman depends, to a great extent,
on globalization. Consequently, I want to show that this imaginary, as a product of
globalization, is transforming continuously while serving as a background in
79 Emine Erdogan wears costumes from a tailor in Kütahya who is prominent Ottoman style. (Türken;
October 12, 2006)
80 The wedding gown of Gül’s daughter is embroideried by Ottoman motives. (Zaman; September 18,
2009).
81 The filoantropic association established by the wifes of AKP deputies organized a fashion show in 2003
focusing on ‘Osmanlı’dan Bu Yana Tesettür’. The show was attended by the wives of Gül, Erdogan,
Arınç. (Dolmacı; May 28, 2003)
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understanding the globalized world. We can say that the imaginary Ottoman is both in
the process of making by the elites and AKP leadership and takes part in the making of a
world by them as a guide.
The Ottoman had different roles in different periods. Historically, before 1923, it
was the image of self against the other, i.e., the West, thus, it represented the framework
that had to be changed to save the state, the Empire. After the establishment of the
Republic, it became the “other” of the Kemalist modernization project. Its defamation as
the “ancient regime” was critical for the establishment of the new regime. For the early
Islamists, on the other hand, it was important to maintain the link between the present
and the past but what they referred to as Ottoman was the period before Suleiman the
Magnificent. The last three hundred and fifty years of the Ottoman was considered loss
for both, most of the Islamists82 and Kemalists. However, as it was shown, the Ottoman
was re-imagined in the second half of the 1990s. It looks as though the rejection of the
Ottoman past by the Kemalist regime and the countervailing focus of Islamists on the
early period of the Empire and on Asr-ı Saadet for more than eighty years gave the
newly emerging elites and AKP leadership an unprecedented opportunity to stake a
claim on the Ottoman through its re-imagination with a different content. This Ottoman,
in its re-imagined form is neither a malaise nor it is a pre-modern order but it is rather a
82 Except perhaps the period of Abudulhamid II for the the Islamists.
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civilization, a representation of a specific social imaginary with Islam at its core. Two
transformative ideas were critical in the transformation of the Ottoman to a
representation of a new social imagined by the elites where a new identity can be
nourished from an Ottoman that was the culprit of these sins one generation ago. The
first one of these ideas is the apprehension of the Ottoman as the center of the Islamic
civilization - its reconciliation with Islam that secured a place to the Ottoman in today’s
multi-civilizational world and on which the claim of continuity was grounded. Second
idea was the rejection of decay, which, with the assistance of the reconciliation with
Islam, allows the Ottoman to expand to the present, allows the local to define itself.
It is not a coincidence that these two ideas, critical in the imagination of the new
Ottoman, surfaced during the second half of the 1990s. Globalization and the end of the
Cold War, as I discussed above, by delegitimizing nation-states, by directly and
indirectly loosening the grasp of national imaginaries provided a ground upon which
new identities could be sought. A wider space and a longer time horizon back to the
history which was not limited by the founding moments of national imaginaries
emerged. Imagination came on the scene again after nearly hundred and fifty years of
the emergence of national imaginaries to fill this extended space in time and in
geography. New imaginaries emerged once the national imaginaries had lost their ability
or had become relatively inadequate to link the local to the new global in this relatively
unrestrained world. The Ottoman was re-imagined using this new space and time
horizon provided by globalization. It expanded itself within this space and time, which
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provided it with new fields of opportunities. The disappearance of inferiority paradigm
was the intellectual ground on which this expansion was possible.83 Thus, we can say
that the imagined Ottoman, with a different time and space apprehension, was born in
the time and space that was opened up by globalization. This is the second facet of the
connection between the imagined Ottoman and globalization; it shows us that the
emergence of the imaginary Ottoman is strongly dependent on the historical
developments of the period.
Now that we have a complete picture of the relationship between the imaginary
Ottoman as the product of the encounter of the newly emerging elites of the local with
the global world and as their guide in this world, we can turn back to AKP. As we have
seen AKP leadership has the same imaginary; it strongly promotes the identification of
the society with this Ottoman and asserts that it represents this Ottoman. This picture,
although correct, is a general one. It is the first connection of imaginary Ottoman with
politics. It tells us how AKP works within the framework of the social magic of
83 The transformation of capitalism and the emerging post-industrial nature ofwestern societies may also
be important in the disappearance of the inferiority paradigm and, thus, in the emergence of new
imagination of the Ottoman. Material superiority and capitalism, which were the ground on which the
intellectual basis of the paradigm of inferiority is constructed, are no longer exclusive to the West and
they became something that can be acquired, developed at any part of the globe, such as in Malaysia or in
other South East Asian countries. The split of capitalism and its richness, in this perspective, from the
West help in re-positioning the West not as the superior one but as the other. This apprehension of the
world represents itself in the concept of multi-civilization world and in the rejection of progressive reading
of history. Obviously, this is a process related to globalization and can be included in the globalization
discussion. However, I prefer not to elaborate it despite its hidden potential to explain how the Islamists
became a part of neo liberal global capitalism because it has to be further substantiated.
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Bourdieu to get the support of the masses. However, the importance of the imaginary
Ottoman for AKP and in politics is more than that. When we probe into the building
blocks of this imagination process, in other words, when we look at the transformative
ideas that make this imagination possible within the space provided by globalization, we
see that they offer AKP leadership an Ottoman imagined by using the Ottoman history.
This historical space can contribute more to AKP leadership to understand the present,
and provide a better basis for action than Asr-ı Saadet or to the tales of Ergenekon84 can
do for Islamist or Nationalists. These two ideas open up a large repository of historical
events, where the appropriate ones can be selected to imagine a new world suitable for
apprehending current developments, and justifying and legitimizing certain acts, actions
and policies in today’s world. In other words, the Ottoman imagined through Ottoman
history provides a much deeper and extended imaginary experience to those who share it
to embrace the globalization. The global nature, of the imagined Ottoman, its acceptance
of others, different civilizations, and its sui generis plurality, together with its expanded
Millet and Vatan, are all derived, imagined by using these selected events through the
science of history.
84 The legendary story where the Turks were saved, guided by a wolf out of an valley in central Asia and
started their movement to the West.
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In this framework, with certain qualification, habitus can be helpful in explaining
the situation. Habitus represents, “a sort of deep structuring matrix” (Swartz, 1997, p.
104) as well as cognitive basis of action (Swartz, 1997, p. 101). Theoretically speaking,
habitus adjusts “aspirations and expectations according to the objective probability of
success and failure... for a particular behavior” (Swartz, 1997, p. 105). The habitus, in
this context, that is retreating in favor of improvisation according to Appadurai (2008)
emerges in a new form in the time and space of the new imaginary and what seems
improvisation may be a product of this new habitus (p. 54). This new habitus, generated
through the re-imagination of the Ottoman, thus, is the ground on which the aspiration of
the elites and the leadership takes shape. It is not possible to ascribe meanings to certain
acts and discourse of AKP leadership without having an understanding of this habitus
that has been shaped through the imagination of the Ottoman. This is why American
diplomats have had problems in understanding Davutoglu, said, “Turkey has the targets
of a Rolls Royce but the means of Rover” (Hürriyet; November 29, 2010). The reimagination
of the Ottoman as such provides AKP with a different “sense of one’s
place”, which is completely different from that of Islamists and Kemalists (Bourdieu,
2003, p. 235). This sense of what AKP and, consequently, Turkey can or cannot let itself
do, the sense of self-limit in terms of initiating policies and taking action, is clearly
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different for AKP from that of the Kemalists, nationalists and Islamists (Bourdieu, 2003,
p. 235). I think that this perspective explains the “one minute” in Davos85 in a better way
than speculating about the mood of Erdogan. Continuing along the same line, we note
that this new structuring matrix becomes critical in three areas:
First, it helps AKP to respond quickly to the enfolding events in the short term.
In other words, it conditions its reflexes in a globalized world in the appropriate way.
This is not surprising because as we have seen, the imaginary Ottoman is the product of
globalization. It is imagined within the realm of globalization as a guide to this realm.
Accordingly, it provides the right habitus to its adherents in the globalized world; it
conditions their reflexes in the right way. Behaviors, responses of AKP leadership that
we are inclined to characterize as improvisation or pragmatism are in some cases the
product of this new habitus.
85 During a session on Gaza at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos last month, in which Erdogan,
Israeli President Shimon Peres, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Arab League Secretary Amr
Moussa were panelists, Erdogan stalked off the stage when a moderator, Washington Post columnist
David Ignatius, cut off his remarks in response to an impassioned monologue by President Peres, who
strongly defended Israel’s offensive against Gaza, which claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent
civilians and injured thousands of others. When Ignatius tried to cut short Erdogan’s remarks, saying it
was past time to adjourn for dinner, the Turkish prime minister answered in frustration: “One minute... one
minute… one minute… Don’t interrupt me. You are not allowing me to speak”. Erdogan then directed
harsh criticism at Peres about Israel’s present and past policies against Gaza and walked off the stage
when he was interrupted again saying, “Davos is over for me from now on”. The remarks of Erdogan, who
does not speak English, were translated by an interpreter during the meeting, but asking for one minute
from the moderator, he spoke in English with an angry tone of voice and a flushed face.
130
A recent event in Athens is a good example of this. In May 2010, when replying
to a journalist asking whether he was disturbed by use of the adjective “Ecumenical” for
the Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul by his Greek Counterpart, Erdogan said, “why
should I be disturbed by something that had not disturbed my ancestors”. The
ecumenical character of the Patriarchy in Istanbul is a hot issue, largely exploited by
nationalists and Islamists, in domestic politics in Turkey. Turkish state has rejected the
ecumenical character of the patriarchy since 1923 on the basis of Lausanne Treaty. On
the other hand, the subject is a critical one in the relations of Turkey and Greece, given
the allegiance paid to the Patriarchy by a large part of Greek population. In addition, it is
a subject US diplomats in Turkey follow closely. Erdogan, in one sense, replied to the
question reflexively, structured by this new habitus, which also served to placate any
criticism arising from nationalists, Islamists and Kemalists, through his argument of
“ancestors”, or, “the Ottoman”. He also satisfied his Greek counterparts and the Greek
public by not rejecting the Ecumenical character of the Patriarchy. In addition to that, he
gave the message not only to the domestic audience but to the world that “we are
Ottomans”. Similarly, when he was addressing party members in the province of Kars,
where the tension between Kurds, Turks and the State run high, he said;
A fatherland is made up of many ethnicities. The Ottoman gave
the best example of this. There were different religions, different
sects there. There were different races. Was there any trouble?
No, there was not. Therefore, we should be calm and respect
each other. We should love each other for the sake of Allah.
(Appendix R) (Official website of AKP; n.d., b)
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In this example also, Erdogan talks with the impetus provided by his new habitus rather
than voicing the mechanical views of the State.
Secondly, this new habitus, apprehended as our history as suggested by
Armagan, facilitates creative adaptation of outside influences and ideas in the long run.
Creative adaptation, an extension of creativity of imagination of Castoriadis, to me, is
possible because the imaginary is not as robust as ideology and coherence is not a
requirement (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 12). Furthermore, the Ottoman in its re-imagined form is
a product of globalization itself and this property of it makes its boundaries more porous
to the influences of globalization.86 The multi-culturality and pluralism outlined in the
previous section can be considered examples of such creative adaptation of Western
concepts and ideas. Another good example is Hasan Tahsin Fendoglu. Fendoglu was the
Assistant Chairman of TRT, Chairman of National Committee of Human Rights, Head
of Human Rights Department of the Prime Ministry and he was recently selected as a
member of RTUK87 by the parliament.
86 The role of the imaginary in creative adaptation of foreign ideas is not a new subject for Turkey. Serif
Mardin, in his two books ‘The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought’ (Mardin, 2008a) and ‘Political Ideas
of Jeune Turks; 1895-1908’ (Mardin, 2008b), explains in detail how the ideas originating from Europe
infiltrated into Ottoman society through Islamic interpretations. Similarly, smail Kara in his book, ‘Din
ile Modernlesme’ (Kara, 2005) gives examples of how the Islamistsin the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth
centuries strived to use Islam to accommodate the concept of French Revolution with the
Ottoman.
87 Radio Television Supreme Council is the highest regulatory body of all television and radio brodcasting
in Turkey.
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In the introduction of his book, Fendoglu (2007) says;
…The concept of human rights in the dynamics of our history is
a much better digested, absorbed and internalized understanding
of human rights. For this reason, especially as to its theory,
basics and essence, it is not at all alien to our understanding of
human rights-democracy-universal values and the culture and
civilization of our day.88 (p. 23)
Other examples can be drawn from the discussions on the constitutional change that was
approved by a referendum in September 2010. One of the changes introduced was the
establishment of the Ombudsman as a constitutional institution. AKP tried to establish
the Ombudsman before 2007 through a change of law in line with the democratization
packages introduced for Turkey’s accession process to the EU. This first attempt was
rejected by the constitutional court on the ground that such an institution has no
constitutional ground. This time, the Ombudsman was on the agenda of the
constitutional change. AKP leadership defended the Ombudsman, arguing that it was
originally an Ottoman institution. Erdogan in Trabzon (Official website of AKP; August
10, 2010), State Minister Yılmaz in Malatya when he was talking to Businessmen
(Zaman; August 28, 2010), Bagıs in Trabzon (Yanatma; September 9, 2009), Kuzu, the
88 “...tarihimizin dinamiklerinde gördügümüz insan hakları kavramı, çok daha sindirilmis, içsellestirilmis
ve özümsenmis bir insan hakları anlayısıdır. Bu nedenle, özellikle teorisi, aslı ve özü itibariyle,
günümüzün insan hakları-demokrasi-evrensel degerler anlayısı, kültür ve medeniyetimize asla yabancı
degildir.”
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Chairman of Human Rights Commission in the Parliament, as early as 2008 (Zaman;
May 28, 2008), all stated that the Ombudsman was an Ottoman institution.
Creative adaptation of ideas, as we see, enables AKP leadership and elites to
incorporate various concepts into their intellectual make-up, to defend and justify them,
and to use them as the basis of their policies. Creative adaptation possibly serves, at the
same time, as a bulwark against Islamists and nationalist ideologies in introducing new
policies to adjust Turkey’s position in the global world.
The social imaginary is, therefore, constantly re-created through creative
adaptation, and it is also actualized and transformed as a result of modifications in
policies and theories as they are implemented. This is the manifestation of the dual
process of Taylor.
This imaginary is, therefore, different from the Kemalist or from early Islamist
ones, not only because it has a different content, which is something obvious, but also
because it has the ability to constantly change and transform itself in the globalizing
world. It provides fertile ground for creative adaptation. It is, at least, a candidate to be a
truly global imaginary in the sense that its eclectic nature allows it to embrace the
changes brought by the globalization.
However, it should be noted that there is a difference between this argument and
what the elites says. The argument of the elites is that the Ottoman embraces
globalization as a historical experience. Unlike elites, who claim that the history, the real
history makes the Ottoman a solution, in this thesis, it is argued that, the ability of the
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imaginary Ottoman to transform, derived from its imaginary nature, enables it to
embrace globalization. In other words, the imagined Ottoman is a product of
globalization rather than something external to it. In this context, the imagined Ottoman
enables AKP both to act on the basis of this imaginary and also to re-shape it, a
characteristic that can hardly be attributable to Islamists or to the Republicans, to preglobalization
imaginaries.
For example, as opposed to the vast reservoir of events which covers the totality
of the Ottoman period, Islamist and Kemalists are limited by their apprehension time.
Islamists are limited because they have to go back either to the Asr-ı Saadet or to the
period before Suleiman the Magnificent to draw inferences for today. Kemalists, on the
other hand, are even more limited as their historical pool is based on a very short time,
which limits their ability for creative adaptation. Furthermore, AKP finds an applicable
moral order in this imaginary, which is derived from the history. The arguments of “the
last bastion of humanity against colonialism” is the prime example of the claim of
embracing the totality of humanity as a representation of a different morality. Islamists
and Kemalists, on the other hand, derive the moral grounds in their respective
imaginaries from the theological readings of Islam or from the positivist reading of the
world inherited from the nineteenth century.
Finally, this Ottoman serves AKP in entrenching the society in its own space
within the multi-civilization world. The concept of open civilization articulated by
Recep Sentürk (2010) and presentation of the Ottoman as the institutionalization and
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modernization of open civilization, for example, is a recent attempt to establish the
foundations upon which the argument of civilizational alliance can be constructed and
shows how the imaginary Ottoman is able to respond to the multi-civilization globalized
world (p. 31, 32).
Ottoman history, this new habitus, thus enables AKP to quickly respond to daily
events arising in both domestic and foreign politics, in the short term, in conformity with
globalization. At the same time, it facilitates the continuous re-imagination of the
Ottoman through the creative adaptation, thus enabling the transformation of the social
imaginary through the dual process of Taylor, in the long run. In summary, the capacity
to represent something larger and different from itself and the new habitus that is based
on the reconciliation of Ottoman with Islam and on the rejection of decay that makes
creative adaptation possible provides AKP leadership and the elites, the intellectual
make-up through which the imagined social transforms continuously. This seemingly
superior ability of self-transformation is critical for AKP in embracing globalization
both domestically and internationally.89 This ability to transform, when coupled with the
dual identification, “institution” and “constitution” of the society as Ottoman and AKP
89 It is important to note that the Ottoman in its imaginary form may also plays an important role in
capitalizing the opportunities provided by globalization. The critical point here, is the apprehension of
globalization either as a problem or as an opportunity and it seems that those two are the two sides of the
same coin. This apprehension may be becoming a critical parameter for distiguishing the Islamists from
the AKP. The subject is not elaborated to stay within the limits of the work.
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as the representative of this Ottoman, thus of the society, on the other hand, opens new
roads for AKP in domestic politics and in the actualization of the social imaginary.
In order to understand the importance of this process, how it works and the role
of the Ottoman as a representation of a social imaginary in this respect, we have to look
at the consequences of dual identification or to the consequences of social magic. On the
part of the leadership of AKP, showed above, there is the self-assumed confidence in
their representation of the social imaginary of the society. This is manifested by their
claim that “we are all Ottoman”, “the continuation of the Ottoman” and AKP represents
this Ottoman. This is something self-assured because the social imaginary represented
by the Ottoman is itself an imaginary of the elites; nevertheless, the leadership claims
that they represent the true values of the society, i.e., the moral order of the social
imaginary represented by the Ottoman. As for society, we see the emergence of an
imagined nostalgia for an Ottoman as imagined by the elites. Imagined nostalgia, a term
that I borrow from Appadurai (2008), is a nostalgia “for things that never were, it thus
inverts temporal logic of fantasy” (p. 77), which “creates a much deeper want than
simply envy, imitation or greed could by themselves invite”, which “may take the form of
nostalgia for present, the stylized presentation of the present as if it has already slipped
away” (p. 78). This imagined nostalgia is induced by the creation of the Ottoman space,
by identifying the Ottoman culture with our culture and through other means that I
described in the previous section.
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This mutual attachment through the Ottoman between the society and AKP
leadership, a manifestation of the social magic of Bourdieu, to the degree it is achieved,
is critical for AKP to be able to get consent for its policies, its ability to connect
localities and individuals to the state, its presentation of itself as an authority figure and
to its efforts to build political unity in Turkey within a global world. The Ottoman in this
context, as a cradle of identity, becomes “a politically effective invention of common
past that was accepted by the people and became a part of their social imaginary”
(Taylor, 2007, p. 177) and provides the ground for AKP to be nationalist without being a
Turkish nationalist, Islamist without being Islamist and modern without being infidel.
These are alternative and contradictory positions that are usually explained either
through improvisation or by pragmatism.
As far as the nationalism is concerned, the imaginary Ottoman helps AKP to
oppose the nationalist ideology of the Turkish state and its variants defended by other
political parties such as Republican People Party (CHP) or Nationalist People Party
(MHP). At this point, a short discussion of nationalism is required. The concept of
nationalism suggests that it represents, defends and promotes the interests of a
monolithic nation. The monolithic nature of the nation can be secured by ethnicity,
common culture, common history, territorial unity, common ideology, ideas and vision
or with a combination of them. The nation state is critical in this conception because it is
the one who rules the nation. This formula is represented by the rhetoric of one nation,
one state, and one history (Çınar, 2005, p. 7, 8). Turkish nationalism, whether in its
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official version or in its other variants defended by MHP and CHP, is a good example of
this formula, which was uttered by Erdogan, too, on some occasions.
The imaginary Ottoman, however, permits AKP to confront this nationalism
without rejecting it, but, instead, by expanding it in terms of space and time. This
expansion is not based on language or ethnicity but rather on the common social
imaginary represented by the Ottoman without even naming it in most of the cases.90 It
is already discussed how the nation, in this framework, of the elites and the leadership, is
different from the conception of the nation of Turkish State of CHP and MHP. First of
all, this is a difference in terms of space. The hyperreal Ottoman surpasses the de jure
boundaries of the Republic of Turkey without denying their existence. Secondly, this is a
difference in apprehension of time. This nation expands further into history compared to
the nation of Turkish nationalism. The founding moment goes further back than the
official founding moment of October 29, 1923. This shift in the founding moment
creates a larger pool of historical events that the leadership can make inferences to the
present. The examples from the Bursa and Tekirdag provinces are signs of how the
founding moment has been gradually shifting back and how the wall between the
Ottoman and the Republic has been fading. The Ottoman in this context is important in
90 We already see that different meaning ascribed to the Ottoman but the symbols that represent the
Ottoman are not discussed. “Our history”, “ancestors”, “the Gazi’s”, “the conqueror” are some of those
words which directly and directly symbolize the Ottoman.
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the politics as an alternative to Turkish ethnic nationalism, both within the party and
against the other political actors. It is, therefore, no wonder that the leadership
emphasizes this new conception of nation frequently not only during mass rallies but
also when addressing the deputies and members of the party.
Regarding Islamism, AKP has always rejected that it has an Islamic agenda. On
the scholarly front it is generally agreed that it is not an Islamist political party (Yavuz,
2009, p. 2-13), (Özbudun & Hale, 2010, p. 57, 65). However, Erdogan’s remarks
concerning Islam as his main reference point is still widely quoted by its opponents in
and outside of Turkey and the dispute about the hidden Islamist agenda remains. The
social imaginary represented by the Ottoman and how this Ottoman is internalized in the
discourse of AKP are valuable references points in this discussion. It has to be noted that
the reconciliation of the Ottoman with Islam and the rejection of decay, once more,
becomes critical because they represent the replacement of flawed mentality of the
Ottoman society, inferior to the West, with a new social imaginary represented by the
Ottoman, on equal footing with the West, and described as a civilization of love
focusing on human being, a civilization strongly tied to Islam (Official website of AKP;
September 5, 2010 & December 17, 2009), a civilization defined by its benevolence
(Official website of AKP; June 13, 2010), one that is in search of conquering the hearths
(Official website of AKP; April 14, 2010) and on the side of the oppressed. (Official
website of AKP; June 13, 2010)
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This re-imagination of the Ottoman facilitates the introduction of Islam without
promoting Islam. In one sense, the Ottoman is sanctified and, thus, any referral to
Ottoman implicitly becomes a referral to Islam. On the other hand, Islam is also
secularized, as it is embedded in a worldly order, representing real people. This
imagination of the Ottoman provides AKP the ability to hold both diametrically opposed
positions at the same time and this ability, more than its usefulness against the secularist
critics, is important for AKP to hold its conservative electorate, and to neutralize the
Islamist91 criticisms of its policies. It enables it to defend its policies against the Islamic
critics and at the same time represent itself as being religious to its electorate because the
sanctification of Ottoman precludes a discussion on what Islam says, precludes the need
for theological knowledge and, consequently, the need for Ulema in proposing,
defending and justifying policies, actions while benefiting the support of religion. In
other words AKP, through the imagined Ottoman, can refrain from using Islam to
justify, promote and present ideas, policies and actions and can carry the creative
adaptation process without an explicit Islamic interpretation.
91 Islamist criticism, refers to the criticism of AKP’s views and policies from the perspective of Islam. All
critiques made by religiously affiliated groups are not Islamist critiques. An Islamist criticism in this
context would be criticizing a view, an action and policies because they are against Islam.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The starting point of this work was to explain the Ottoman phenomenon - the emergence
of Ottoman in modern Turkey. How did the Ottoman, with new meanings, emerge in
first decade of the 2000s? What does this phenomenon signify? Is this new Ottoman and
its emergence important? These and similar questions were the driving force behind this
work. Today, we observe that the Ottoman in the form that was discussed continues to
expand its presence.
The main idea behind this work even before the start, was that the re-emergence
of the Ottoman in Turkey could have an important meaning and it could highlight some
critical factors affecting AKP and Turkish politics. Similarly, confining the emergence
of the Ottoman to the Islamist-secularist, ancient regime – new regime, modern – premodern
binaries did not look promising. The construction of the argument that the
Ottoman is a representation of a social imagined by the elites clustering around the
newly emerging bourgeoisie and by the AKP leadership was the result of these and
similar ideas. This argument tells us that the elites imagined a social while trying to
answer questions such as “what is our place, the place of Turkey, in this changing
world”, “what kind of a society should we be in this world”.
In this framework, it was argued that the Ottoman is a representation, an
imaginary itself, of a social imagined by the elites to position themselves and Turkey in
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a globalizing world and it has certain properties. Furthermore, it was argued that this
Ottoman is a product of globalization.
The properties of this imaginary Ottoman are neither robust and clear-cut nor
totally indescribable. These are the meanings ascribed to the Ottoman by the elites –
which constitute the imagination of the elites. These properties of the Ottoman, a
civilization with a different time and space apprehension than the West, an Islamic
imaginary, an imaginary that prevails today and an imaginary with an extended Vatan
and Millet, makes the Ottoman a cradle for an identity. I say a cradle rather than an
identity because the Ottoman is still representing an imaginary on the way to
actualization; this imaginary and the Ottoman are continuously transforming and have
not encompassed the masses completely. Whether the Ottoman will be able to become
an identity, as Bahadıroglu suggests, is still an open question.
The Ottoman, with these properties, turns out to be a claim, an attempt, to secure
a new place with a different identity in the global world. In that sense, it is a link
between the global and local.
This imaginary Ottoman also links the past to the present by making the past
“history”. This is certainly a step towards establishing an identity but it also offers more.
It offers a new history to re-define today and it presents itself as the solution to certain of
today’s problems. It naturally includes the elements of the historical Ottoman but it
offers something new. In other words, the emergence of the imaginary Ottoman has
nothing to do with reviving the historical Ottoman. This “new”, before everything else,
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is a new present, derived from the deconstruction of the past and from the construction
of “our history”. This present in its most condensed form is a multi-civilization global
with certain problems stemming from the national imaginaries and a local searching for
its “true” identity which was overshadowed by its own national imaginary. The Ottoman
as a cradle of identity and with some additional properties is portrayed as the guide.
These additional properties, respect for human rights, allowing differences to co-exist
and acceptance of different civilizations in the world are all conducive to the idea that
the imaginary Ottoman is a solution to the problems of the nation-state and of national
imaginaries in today’s globalizing world.
In summary, the Ottoman we face today is a guide to the elites and to the
leadership of AKP in the global world. This relation of the Ottoman with globalization,
as a guide in the global world, as a link between the local and global and between the
past and present, is its first connection with the globalization. It represents the point of
view of the elites and AKP leadership. This view can be summarized as “our history will
show our way into the future in this new world”.
However, there is another link between globalization and the imaginary
Ottoman. This is the role of globalization in its emergence. Separating the imaginary and
the real dimensions of the Ottoman is once again a critical pre-requisite in understanding
this role. To understand the role of globalization in the re-emergence of the imaginary
Ottoman, we have to avoid discussing whether the properties ascribed to the Ottoman
are the properties of the historical Ottoman. We should not compare the new Ottoman
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with the historical Ottoman. We have to comprehend that the Ottoman has an imaginary
dimension; it is an imaginary. If we fail to do this, there is only one answer to the
question of why this new Ottoman emerged. This answer tells us that the Islamists, who
have been always opposed to Republican ideals, have aspired to revive the historical
Ottoman and the Ottoman we face today is this historical Ottoman. Its emergence is,
therefore, a manifestation of the Islamists gaining more and more power. Afterwards,
depending on where we position ourselves in Islamist-Republican, Islamist-secularist
debate, we start to ask whether this Ottoman really corresponds to the historical
Ottoman. However, once we accept that this Ottoman does not have to correspond to the
historical Ottoman, despite the fact that it derived its name from it, we can inquire into
the reasons why the Ottoman has emerged as an imaginary at a specific time, in the last
decade of the 1990s, in a specific locality that is Turkey.
This work reveals that the encounter of the newly emerging Islamic bourgeoisie
with globalization provided a background for the emergence of Ottoman as an
imaginary. Before elaborating this critical point, it should be noted that the inability of
the counter elites, the Republican elites, to position themselves and Turkey in the
globalizing world and the resulting inability of the Turkish national imaginary to link
Turkey to the newly establishing global is another critical factor affecting this
background. This failure was not examined in this work. However, as stated before, the
financial and political crises, were clear signs of the incapability of the ruling
Republican elites to position themselves and Turkey in the post-Cold War period.
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Globalization, by loosening the grasp of national imaginaries, was again the determining
factor in confusing Republican elites in this period.
If we go back to the encounter of the newly emerging elites with globalization,
we note that the two critical ideas that made the imagination of the Ottoman possible as
such and that gave it its representative power, both surfaced in late 1990s. The previous
conception of Ottoman, even by the current leaders of AKP today, was completely
different twenty-five/thirty years ago. The Ottoman, for the role models of current AKP
leadership, was a malaise and the Islam associated with the Ottoman was not the real
Islam, the Ottoman state was the enemy of people. Ottoman, rather than being the
representative of a new social imaginary, represented the flawed mentality of a defunct
order. These two ideas, rejection of the decay and the reconciliation of Islam emerged at
a specific time. This was the period when globalization opened a wider space and time
and loosened the grip of national Turkish imaginary. These ideas at this specific
historical juncture relieved the Ottoman from the burden of history. The rejection of
decay helped the elites to ignore that the Empire, the Ottoman state, collapsed while the
reconciliation with Islam made the Ottoman a potential candidate to represent the new
social imagined by them.
Globalization, while making the national Turkish imaginary gradually redundant,
required a new link to tie Turkey to the global and provided the ground for its
emergence by widening the space and time. The electronic media, movement of people
and similar developments, on the other hand, were giving more power to the imaginary.
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All of these happened at a time when the newly emerging elites were trying to define
their own social in response to unsuccessful attempts of counter elites to link Turkey to
the world. It seems, without these two ideas the Ottoman could not establish itself as a
representation of this social in the new, wider, time and space horizon provided by
globalization and the end of Cold War. The Ottoman transformed to a representation of
the new social imagined by the elites by the help of these two ideas. It is, therefore, in its
new form, can be conceived as a product of globalization rather than being the historical
Ottoman as claimed by the elites.
Having said that the imaginary Ottoman is closely related to historical
developments, that is to globalization, it should be pointed out that economy is
practically nowhere in this imagination. At first this looks like a contradiction because
globalization, after all, is an economic development at a great extent. It is true that AKP
leadership stresses a lot on the Vakıfs and puts great importance on its role in society in
terms of supporting the poor but this subjcet falls short of going further. Non-existence
of the economy in the imaginary Ottoman hints us that the economic order is something
universal. It is not related to our history. Economy, economic order, in other words, is
not a factor that distinguishes “us” from others. Although this point has not been
elaborated in this work, it is clear that it is another sign of how the imaginary Ottoman
conceives globalization, and its economic order, as a universal fact and as the normal
order of the world. The nonexistence of economy in the Ottoman imaginary, therefore,
represents the tacit approval of the economic order of globalization.
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A final but critical point in understanding the imaginary Ottoman is its gender
dimension. The imaginary Ottoman is clearly a male imaginary as it is nearly silent
about the women. In addition to that, the contribution of female authors, intellectuals, to
this imagination is very limited at best. Where do the women fit in this imaginary
Ottoman is an open question. Despite the emphasis on civilization which is an allencompassing
concept and despite the emphasis on a different realm, there is no
indication on the place and role of women in this imagined social and there is no
contribution of women in the imagination of this social in the sources that were
reviewed. This silence about the woman is disguised behind the importance given to the
individual and fits very well with the existing approach of the Islamic elites to gender
issues.
After having placed the Ottoman in its proper place, we can move on to the
relation of AKP with it. The work done, clearly shows that AKP leadership shares the
same imagination of the Ottoman. AKP, as a political agent, actively works for the
identification of the society as Ottoman and the leadership strongly asserts that it
represents this Ottoman. In other words, AKP leadership actively takes part in the
working of the social magic of Bourdieu. AKP tries to constitute and institute the society
in the way the Ottoman is imagined and projects itself as the representative of this
society. This process gives political power to AKP to the extent it is successful. This is
the transfer of political power from people to the AKP leadership in from of
representation through naming.
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This partly explains how AKP takes control of the political scene in Turkey.
However, it highlights one side of the story. First, there are many factors affecting the
political power of AKP and the process described above is only one of them. Secondly,
the importance of the imaginary Ottoman is not limited to its utilization by the AKP
leadership to increase its political power. Such a claim, a pure deliberate
instrumentalization of the Ottoman by AKP leadership is too mechanical and it fails to
explain the importance of the imaginary Ottoman fully.
The Ottoman, in its imaginary form, apart from assisting AKP leadership in
amassing political power, helps it, and the elites, to redefine themselves, to reposition
themselves through its ability to transform in today’s ever-changing world. At this point,
it is worthwhile to touch upon the subject of transformation of the Ottoman and the
consequences of having such a capacity. The Ottoman we face is not something static;
we saw that it is transforming. This capability is due to both its imaginary nature and the
role of globalization in its emergence. First, it seems that the creative capability of
imagination enables the Ottoman to transform continuously, facilitated by new meanings
ascribed to it. The Ottoman and what it represents, its imaginaries, have porous
boundaries. They are obviously related to reality but they are imaginary and, they have
imagined components also. They are the product of a process of imagination process and
imagination is inherently creative, not only able but prone to change. Secondly,
globalization as the ground on which this imaginary emerged, carries the change within
itself. It is, therefore, obvious that the imaginary Ottoman as a product of globalization
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has a tremendous capacity to change and to transform. I believe, and, as my work shows,
the importance of the imaginary Ottoman in politics is largely due to its capacity to
change apart from the opportunity it gives AKP leadership to get political power through
naming the society as Ottoman.
The question here is, of course, how in practice this change occurs and how this
change affects the politics. How the meaning corresponding to the Ottoman can
differentiate and new meanings can be added while some of them disappear. How, for
example the Ottoman is today identified with peace whereas the last hundred years of
the empire is full of blood and violent clashes. At this point, the concepts of habitus and
creative adaptation are introduced. The use of the science of history for the imagination
of the Ottoman to be the representative of a new social imaginary is critical at this point.
The imagination of the Ottoman, in practical terms, means ascription of certain
properties to it by reference to historical Ottoman by the historian. This effort is made in
the real dimension of the Ottoman but it affects its imaginary dimension. The two ideas
that was mentioned above, i.e., the rejection of decay and the reconciliation of Ottoman
with Islam, opened the door to a large reservoir of historical events from which the
appropriate ones can be selected in the process of imagination without being hampered
by the historical dissolution of the empire. A new habitus emerged in the sense that a
new structuring matrix, a new guide with which to position oneself and set different
limits on action, surfaced through the imagination process. As this process never ends,
the imaginary transforms endlessly to new forms; new ideas can be internalized and new
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positions are taken and different responses can be given based on selected historical
events. This is how the creative adaptation works and this how the imaginary, the
creativity of imagination, surfaces.
On the political scene, this nature of the imaginary Ottoman, its link with
globalization and its use of historical Ottoman without being the historical Ottoman
provides tremendous flexibility to AKP leadership, both in introducing new ideas and
justifying their positions.
The imaginary Ottoman helps the elites and AKP leadership in the presentation
of new ideas because it offers a wide reservoir of historical events from which a
selection can be made to support these views. Tolerance, human rights, universal values,
ombudsman, the acceptance of ecumenical character of the Orthodox Patriarchy in
Istanbul and many other ideas that have controversial nature are all introduced with the
assertion that the historical Ottoman, our history, already embodied them with the
qualification that our version is usually slightly different and better. This is a
manifestation of the creative adaptation and it is not that different from what the New
Ottomanists were trying to do in the mid-1800s with Islam. The role of the Ulema, or
theologians, now belongs to the historian and the subject is history rather than the divine
laws of the God. The Ottoman, directly, or indirectly, replaced religion, while keeping it
within the cycle through sacralisation of the Ottoman as a medium through which new
ideas can be internalized. The AKP leadership, through the imagination of the Ottoman,
can import, internalize, and defend new ideas. In other words, it acquires the ability to
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change without contradicting itself or their constituency. The Ottoman, sometimes,
directly, sometimes indirectly in the form of “our history” or “our ancestors”, lays the
ground for the internalization of ideas originating from the West without labeling them
as Western.
On the other hand, the imaginary Ottoman helps AKP in assuming contradictory
positions in politics. In fact, these positions are not even considered contradictory by the
leadership; they are a part of the same whole. As Taylor points out, the new social
imaginary is a transformation of the old one and carries the parts of the old within it.
These seemingly opposing positions, being nationalist without being nationalist and
being Islamist without being Islamist, in fact, reflect the amalgamation of preglobalization
imaginaries in the new, emerging imaginary. The positions held by AKP
leadership is proof or manifestation of their inconsistencies and the untenable position of
AKP for those who are ascribed to national Turkish imaginary or the Islamist
imaginaries of the past. However, for the leadership, these positions are the reflections
of the social they imagine. A social where the Turk is there but the critical properties
that defines the Turkish nationalism, such as the language, are no longer critical for
defining the nation. It is a social where Islam is already at its core; it is already here in
the world, therefore, it does not need to be brought back to the world.
The ability to hold these seemingly paradoxical positions all at the same time
allows AKP leadership to cover a substantial part of the political spectrum in Turkey.
AKP effectively corners the pre-globalization imaginaries, Kemalist or Islamist, through
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the imaginary Ottoman but this does not mean that AKP leadership instrumentalizes the
Ottoman deliberately to defend their contradictory position. It cannot be said that the
imaginary Ottoman is a tool for AKP leadership. It rather facilitates the internalization
of their position and at the same time helps them in negating criticisms coming from
nationalists and Islamists.
This Ottoman is, hence, neither a tool to be used by the leadership of AKP nor
the historical Ottoman they want to revive. Instead, it is their mind set; it represents the
world in their perception and a representation of the social they imagine. This social is
neither limited to Anatolia nor to the people who spoke Turkish. It embraces a wider
Millet and Vatan on a specific moral ground. The leadership assert that they represent
this social and this is one of the keys to understand the words of Erdogan on June 12,
2011. After his colossal electoral victory with 50% vote, just after the first results of the
elections were released, Erdogan said, “Believe me today, Sarajevo won as much as
Istanbul, Beirut won as much as zmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah,
Nablus, West Bank, Jerusalem, Gazze, won as much as Diyarbakır. Today, Middle East,
Caucasus, Balkans, Europe won as much as Turkey. Today, peace, justice, stability won
as much as democracy and freedom.” (Appendix S) (Official website of AKP; June 12,
2011) and hinted that their victory is the victory for all the people they represent.
153
APPENDICES
154
Appendix A: Basbakan Erdogan: “Milliyetçilik Irk Esasıyla Ayrımcılıga Gitmek
Degildir.”
Herkes, her toplum, tarihe geçip gitmis bir Zaman dilimi olarak bakabilir, nostalji
gözüyle bakabilir ya da geçmise sırtını dönebilir ama biz bunu yapamayız. Yapmak
istesek de yapamayız. Tarihimizden onun bugüne tasınan eserlerinden sıyrılamayız.
Tarihin unutturulmak istendigi, tarihin yeniden ve farklı sekilde yazılmak
istendigi dönemlerden geçtik. Oysa sunun idrakine varmak zorundayız: Bizi ülke ve
millet olarak var eden tarihimizdir. Tarihi olmayanların gelecegi olmaz bunu böyle
bilmek zorundayız. Bizim gelecegimiz de tarihimizle sekillenecektir ve
sekillenmektedir. Agaç kökleriyle yasar. Kökü olmayan agaç olmaz. Aynı sekilde
milletler de medeniyetler de kökleriyle yasar. Açık söylüyorum; istedigi kadar iyi egitim
alsın, teknolojiyi istedigi kadar iyi kullansın, dünyayı istedigi kadar yakından takip etsin
eger nesiller Seyh Edebali’yi, Osman Gazi’yi, Ali Kusçu’yu, Fatih’i, Mimar Sinan’ı,
Fuzuli’yi, Hacı Arif Bey’i tanımıyorsa, onlardan ilhamını almıyorsa, alamıyorsa, asla ve
asla kalıcı ve güçlü bir gelecek insa edemez. Arif Nihat Asya bunu en güzel sekilde
ifade ediyor. Bu kitaplar Fatih’tir, Selim’dir, Süleyman’dır. Su minare Sinan’dır haydi
artık uyuyan, destanını uyandır.
155
Appendix B: Basbakan Erdogan: “Kuvvetler Arasında O Birbiriyle Olan Dayanısma
Gerçeklesmedigi Sürece Biz O Beklenen Sıçramayı Gerçeklestirmekte
Maalesef Gecikecegiz. Bunu Asmamız Sart.”
Tarihimize, kültürümüze vefa duygusuyla, sadakatle sahip çıkmazsak vatanseverlikten
söz edemeyiz. ste bu düsüncelerle Edirne’den Sanlıurfa’ya bütün eserlerimizi ihya
ediyoruz. Baska ülkeler, baska milletler atalarından emanet aldıklar her tası mukaddes
bir emanet gibi korurken, yanı basımızdaki Ankara Kalesi’nden Hacı Bayram’dan, Dogu
hududumuzdaki shak Pasa Sarayı’na kadar maalesef sembol abidelerimizi adeta kendi
baslarına terketmisiz. Simdi bunları yeniden imar ediyoruz, yen den ülkemize ve
dünyamıza kazandırıyoruz. Düsünebiliyor musunuz, ta Yemen’in Sana sehrindeki
muhtesem kısladan Mostar Köprüsü’ne kadar hudutsuz bir cografyada essiz abideler
insa etmis bir medeniyetin, bir milletin çocukları, ellerinin altındaki Selçuklu, Osmanlı
eserlerine, hatta Cumhuriyet döneminin eserlerine bile sahip çıkamazsa medeniyet
iddiasından bahseder misiniz?
156
Appendix C: Basbakan Erdogan Sivas’ta
Bu milletin nasıl bir kültüre, nasıl bir bilim birikimine sahip oldugunu o cami örneginde
bizzat müsahede etsinler. Sadece Divrigi Ulu Cami degil, iste surada, yanı basımızda
Kale Cami, Buruciye Medresesi, Sifahiye Medresesi, Çifte Minareli Cami, degerli
kardeslerim, Tashan, Kursunlu Hamam, Ulu Cami, Gök Medrese bu eserlerin her biri
bize tarihimizi anlatıyor, bize bizi anlatıyor aslında. Bu eserlerin her biri köklü
tarihimizi, sanlı geçmisimizi, sevgi medeniyetimizi anlatıyor. Bu eserlerin her biri bu
toprakların nasıl bir kültür, nasıl bir sanat ve bilim sehri oldugunu anlatıyor. Hani Arif
Nihat Asya diyor ya, “bu kitaplar Fatih’tir, Selim’dir, Süleyman’dır. Su mihrap
Sinanüddin, su minare Sinan’dır. Haydi artık uyuyan destanını uyandır. Elde sensin,
dilde sen, gönüldesin bastasın, Fatih’in stanbul’u fethettigi yastasın”.
Böyle tarihi olan bir millete küçük düsünmek yakısmaz. Bu tarihi eserleri olan
bir millete küçük düsünmek yakısmaz. Böyle bir medeniyete sahip gençlere küçük
düsünmek yakısmaz. ste onun için biz büyük düsünüyoruz, iste onun için biz büyük
adımlar atıyoruz, Türkiye için de biz büyük düsünüyoruz. Bölgemizde büyük
düsünüyoruz, tüm dünyada büyük düsünüyoruz.
157
Appendix D: Basbakan Erdogan: “Milliyetçilik Irk Esasıyla Ayrımcılıga Gitmek
Degildir.”
Bizim bu topraklar üzerine kurdugumuz ve dünyaya örnek teskil eden medeniyet, altını
çizerek ifade ediyorum; bir sevgi medeniyetidir. Biz, gerektiginde vatanımızı savunmak
noktasında hiçbir tereddüt göstermeyen, vatanı namus olarak addedip, siperlere kosan ve
omuz omuza o siperlerde can feda eden insanların torunlarıyız. Ama aynı zamanda
bizler, barıs zamanlarında insan odaklı, daha genis manada canlı odaklı medeniyetler
insa eden, çevresiyle, canlılarla, toprakla, estetikle, tabiatla barısık bir kültürün de
takipçileriyiz.
Vakıf medeniyeti, kendisini insanlıga vakfetmek, insanı ve canı hayatın
merkezine alarak, insanlıgın yararına çalısmak anlayısı üzerine kuruludur. Bu vakıf
anlayısı, göçmen kuslarını da düsünür, garip gurebayı, fakir fukarayı da düsünür,
kimsesizi, yolda kalmısı da düsünür.
Bizi birbirimize baglayan sevgi, merhamet, dayanısma, kardeslik gibi özellikler,
vakıf anlayısıyla daha da güçlenmis, bizi bir ve beraber yapmıstır. Onun için vakıf
demek sagdan soldan toplanılarak olusturulmus bir kese degildir aslında. Vakıf denilen
aslında kisinin, geçmisteki büyüklerimizin ifadesiyle, ceb-i hümayundan (padisahın
kisisel parası) vermek suretiyle bir hayrı insa etmesi demektir. Bugün bunlar çok farklı
sekilde devam ediyor, süre gidiyor.
158
nsanı yasat ki devlet yasasın.
Bakınız, dünya üzerindeki birçok topluma nasip olmayan bir medeniyet
tasavvurumuz. Bu medeniyet tasavvurunda devlet kuran, o devleti yücelten, huzur ve
güvenlige kavusturan, Osman Gazi kadar, Orhan Gazi kadar, dikkat ediniz, “insanı
yasat ki devlet yasasın” diyen Seyh Edebali vardır.
Bu topraklar Alpaslan gibi, Melik Sah gibi, Kılıçarslan, Selahaddin Eyyubi gibi
tarihe mal olmus devlet adamları çıkarması yanında, Mevlana gibi, Yunus gibi, Hacı
Bektas Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal, Karacoglan gibi sultanlarını da yetistirmis topraklardır.
Bizim tarihimizde Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Yavuz Sultan
Selim büyüktür, ulu sahsiyetlerdir, ancak en az onlar kadar Ak Semsettin, Mimar Sinan,
Hayrettin, Fuzuli, Nedim ve daha niceleri büyüktür, uludur ve en az onlar kadar
söhretlidir.
Her zaman ifade ediyorum; bizim medeniyetimizde kalem, kılıcın önünde yer
alır. 3 kıta üzerinde hüküm sürmüs Osmanlı Devleti’nin, bugün o kıtalarda nasıl
anıldıgına hepimiz dikkat etmek durumundayız. Balkanlar’da Osmanlı Devleti, zulüm
ile baskı ile degil, Mostar Köprüsü’yle, Drina Köprüsü’yle, Karagöz Bey Camisi’yle,
Vardar Köprüsü, Kosova Tas Köprüsü’yle, Vidin Köprüsü’yle, binlerce sebiliyle, han,
hamam ve kütüphaneleriyle hatırlanmaktadır. Ortadogu’da Osmanlı, sömürüyle,
istismarla, emperyalizme degil, Kudüs'te tesis ettigi barıs ve huzur ortamıyla, Hicaz
Demiryoluyla, Bagdat Demiryoluyla, Mescid-i Haram ile Kerbela ile insa ettigi su
kanallarıyla anılmaktadır. Aynı sekilde Afrika’da, ta Ace’de Afrika’nın zenginliklerini
159
dısarıya kaçıran bir Osmanlı degil, oralara köprüler, camiler, sebiller, medrese ve
kütüphaneler insa eden bir Osmanlı vardır.
160
Appendix E: Basbakan Erdogan: “TBMM Üzerine Düsen Görevi Yaptı, Simdi Son Sözü
Millet Söyleyecek.”
Selçuklu ve Osmanlı’nın baslangıçta bir tohum ve fidan oldugunu, o tohum ve fidanın
büyüdügünü, gelistigini, serpildigini ve gölgesinde kıtaların serinledigi bir çınar haline
dönüstügünü anlatan Erdogan, onun için Divan edebiyatımızda Osmanlı’yı çınarla
tanımlarlar. Aynı sekilde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti de bu topraga bir fidan olarak dikildi ve
bugün o da bir çınargibi büyüyor, gelisiyor, kalkınıyor ve güzellesiyor. Ama unutmayın,
çınar kökleriyle yasar. Kökleri keserseniz, unutursanız, ihmal ederseniz, çınarın toprakla
baglantısı kopar ve o çınar devrilir, gider. Biz buna izin vermiyoruz, vermeyecegiz.
161
Appendix F: Ak Parti Grup Toplantısı
Sokaklar, evler, balkonlar, Türkiye ve Kosova bayraklarıyla donatılmıs, Kosovalılar
balkonlara çıkmıs, esnaf dükkanının önünde, bütün bir sehir, heyetimizi büyük bir
muhabbetle selamlıyordu. Biz tabi bu arada Kosova Basbakanı’yla beraberiz. Beraberce
çıktık yaya olarak bütün halkın içinde de yürüdük. Oradaki o çocuklarla, gençlerle hem
dert olduk. Tarihi Sadırvan Meydanı’na ulastıgımızda oradaki heyecanın çok daha farklı
oldugunu gördük. Hele oraya geçerken rasgele bir camda bir hanımefendiyi, hemen
onun yanındaki camda da çok çok yaslı bir nineyi gördüm. Baktım gözleri yaslıydı,
aglıyordu, aglamaklıydı. Ve hemen Sayın Taçi’ye dedim ki, söyle gel de surada bir eve
ugrayalım. Ve hemen o eve geçtik. Çıktık, o nineyle, o teyzeyle orada söyle bir sarmas
dolas olduk. Tabi hüngür hüngür aglıyor. Ve nereden bilirsin, ülkemizden bir köse
yazarının da akrabası çıktılar. Ondan sonra Egemen Bey'in yanında da telefonu vardı,
onlarla kendisini görüstürdüler. Ve onlarda da telefonu yokmus megerse. Böyle de bir
seye vesile olduk. Ve tabi bu anlamlı bir tabloydu, aglıyordu. Ve yanında kızları vesaire
aynı sekilde onlar da tabi yasça çok çok yaslanmıslar. Yani 90’nı askın bir yası olan bir
teyze, bir nine. Ama muhabbeti, sevgisi aynen, aynı canlılıgını koruyor. Ve Prizren halkı
çocuklarıyla, gençleriyle, aynı sekilde iste yaslılarıyla bizi ve Kosova Hükümet üyelerini
karsılamak üzere meydanda heyecanla bekliyordu. Ve yaslı bir amca Türkçe olarak
yanımıza sokuldu. Bize sunu söyledi: Sadırvan Meydanı, Tito’nun burayı ziyaretinden
bu yana böyle bir kalabalık, böyle bir heyecan görmemistir diyor. Oraları nasıl
sahipleniyoruz ve halka dogrudan nasıl hitap ediyoruz.
162
Orada Kosovalılarla, soydaslarımızla hasret giderdikten sonra, meydanın hemen
yanı basındaki Sinan Pasa Camii, 1615 yılında Sinan Pasa tarafından insa edilen bir
camii. Fakat enteresandır, 1968’de o da müzeye çevrilmis. Adeta metruk bir görüntü
içindeki Sinan Pasa Camiini artık biz TKA daremizle ele aldık. Renovasyon,
restorasyon su anda bitmek üzere. nsallah bu yıl sonu veya yıl bası itibariyle bitecek.
Orayıgittik, gezdik tekrar gördük. Daha sonra orada Kosova Basbakanı Sayın Taçi’yle
birlikte halka hitap ettik. Sayın Taçi tabi hitabını Arnavutça yaptı, ben de hitabımı
Türkçe yaptım. Ve ikimiz de o halkla çok iyi anlastık. Heyecan Türkiye’den farklı
degildi, aynı heyecanı yasadık. Ve cosku anlatılır gibi degildi. Ve hakikaten oradaki o
muhabbet görülmeye degerdi.
Ve biz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti milliyetçisi olsak da milli tanımına Arnavutluk
vatandaslarını da sokuyoruz.
Simdi bütün bu cosku, bu aradaki baglar, aslında nereden geliyor? ste tarihten
geliyor, iste o millilik bu, o kültür, o ortak degerler buradan geliyor. lla aynı dili
konusmak gerekmiyor. Bakın dedim ya, Arnavutça konusan, Türkçe konusan, hep
birlikte. Burada bu kaynasmayı gördük.
163
Appendix G: 725. Ertugrul Gazi'yi Anma Ve Sögüt Senlikleri. Basbakan Erdogan:
“Milletçe Birlik Ve Beraberligimizden Asla Taviz Vermedik,
Vermeyecegiz. Birligimiz Ve Beraberligimiz Üzerinde Yanlıs Hesaplar
Yapanlar Bilsinler Ki, Gayretleri Bosadır.”
Bilecegiz ki, bizim vatan topraklarımız 780 bin kilometre kare olsa da etki alanımız
bugün o tarihten gelen 22 milyon kilometre kareden daha genis bir alana uzanmaktadır.
Kudüs, Bagdat, Beyrut, Kahire, Hizan, Bakü, Askabat, Saraybosna, Selanik, Ürdün,
Ankara'ya uzak mesafeler degildir. Tam aksine geçen zaman içinde mesafeler daha da
kısalmıstır. Eritre’de, Ban’da, Açe’de Ankara’ya yaklasmıstır. Unutmayalım ki,
Osmanlı’yı büyük düsünenler kurmustur.
164
Appendix H: Bakan Çelik: “Demoktatik açılım partiler üstü bir meseledir.”
Türkiye artık kabugunu delmistir. Türkiye'nin vizyonu artık Misak-ı Milli sınırları
degildir. Türkiye artık bir baska bakıyor. Sizler artık bir baska türlü bakıyorsunuz.
Ecdadın farkındasınız. Birinci Murad’ın farkındasınız. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün
farkındasınız.
165
Appendix I: Yeni Osmanlı
Osmanlı cografyasının bugünkü sınırları ‘böl ve yönet’ politikasına göre olusturulmus
yapay sınırlar. Habur’da, vizenin kaldırılmasına ragmen Cilvegözü’nde kuyruk olan
tırlar, bu yapaylıgın somut göstergesi. Bölgenin önce ekonomik ve eszamanlı biçimde
kültürel entegrasyonu suyun önündeki bentlerin kaldırılmasına baglı. Halklar böylece
kendi dogal tarihî mecrasını yeniden bulacaklar ve istikrara kavusacaklar. Türkiye’nin
bölgede Osmanlı’ya benzer bir hakimiyet saglaması imkânsız, üstelik gereksiz. Bölgenin
barısa ihtiyacı var. ste bu barıs, tarihî tecrübeye uygun olarak Türkiye tarafından tesis
edilip sürdürülen bir barıs olabilir. Bunun adı ise Yeni Osmanlı degil, Pax Ottomanica
yani Osmanlı Barısı olur.
166
Appendix J: Bakan Yılmaz: “Tarihimizi iyi tanımazsak gelecege saglıklı bir sekilde
yürüyemeyiz.”
Gerçekten tarih dedigimiz sey, geride bıraktıgımız, bizimle iliskisi olmayan bir sey
degildir. Tarih dedigimiz sey, aslında üzerinde durdugumuz zemini olusturur. Biz bunun
farkında olmazsak, tarihimizi iyi tanımazsak gelecege saglıklı bir sekilde yürüyemeyiz.
Dolayısıyla gerek ülkelerin, gerek yörelerin tarihlerine iliskin yapılan bu tür çalısmalar
son derece önemlidir. Bunların objektif bir sekilde yapılması da son derece önemlidir.
Geçmiste biliyoruz, su veya bu ideolojik sebeplerle tarihe dönük çalısmalarda yapılan
çarpıtmaları. Tarih çalısmalarının dar, siyasi hedeflere alet edildigini biliyoruz.
167
Appendix K: Erdogan: “nsallah iki bayramı bir arada yaparız.”
Tarih boyunca biz bu sarp dagları asmayı, birbirimizle bulusmayı, kucaklasmayı hep
birlikte basardık. Bu bölgedeki tüm insanların ortak tarihi, kültürleri, degerleri var.
Örnegin, Bursa’dan yola çıkıp yüzlerce kilometre sonra Saraybosna’ya vardıgınızda
orada Bursa'ya tıpatıp benzeyen bir sehir buluyorsunuz. Adı Bursa olan hanlar, çarsılar
görüyorsunuz. Üsküp’teki kardesim buraya, Bursa’ya geldiginde asla yabancı sehre
degil, kendi sehrine, kendisinden bir sehre geldigini hissediyor. Minareleriyle,
köprüleriyle hanlarıyla, medreseleriyle, kütüphaneleriyle bizim sehirlerimiz hep
birbirine benziyor. Pristine’de bunu görüyorsunuz Bosna’da, Köstence’de, Kırcaali’de,
Selanik’te, Gümülcine’de, Manastır’da daha nice sehirler, aynı mimariyi, ruhu, özü
tasıyor. Yemeklerimiz, kültürlerimiz sarkılarımız folklorumuz birbirine benziyor.
Bunların ötesinde biz ortak tarihi paylastıgımız kadar ortak gelecegi de paylasıyoruz.
Hatta ortak kaderi paylasıyoruz.
168
Appendix L: Erdogan: “stanbul üzerinden dünyaya verecegimiz mesajlar var.”
…Bugün açılısı yapılan Bagdat Köskü'nün Topkapı Sarayı’nda onarımı tamamlanan
önemli bölümlerden biri oldugunu belirterek, buradan sadece stanbul’a degil, bugüne ve
gelecege baktıklarını, geçmisten aldıkları ilhamla gelecegi insa etme noktasındaki
sevklerini tazelediklerini belirtti.
stanbul’daki her bir vatandasın, özellikle ögrencilerin buradan stanbul’u
seyredebilmeleri için ne gerekiyorsa yapılması konusunu ilgililere ilettigini dile getiren
Erdogan, sunları kaydetti:
Çünkü burayı görmeyen, buradan stanbul’a ve Türkiye’ye bakmayanların
Türkiye’nin geçmisini anlamak ve gelecegini tasarlamak noktasında eksiklik içinde
olacagını düsünüyorum. Sunu da özellikle ifade etmek istiyorum; muasır medeniyetler
seviyesini sadece ekonomik olarak, sadece teknik olarak kalkınma seklinde anlayanlar
çıkabilir. Bu hataya asla düsmememiz gerekiyor. limle, irfanla, medeniyetle bir arada
yürümeyen bir ekonomik ilerleme, kalıcı bir ilerlemeye tekabül etmeyecektir. Hayatı
olusturan bütün degerleri aynı anda sahiplenmeyen, hayatı bir bütün olarak kavramayan,
sorunların çözümüne ortak bir perspektiften yaklasmayan anlayıslar bizi daha ileri
noktalara ulastıramaz.
169
Appendix M: Besiktas’taki Ertugrul Tekke Camisi badete Açıldı
15 gün önce Basbakan Recep Tayyip Erdogan’ın da hazır bulundugu törende Yenikapı
Mevlevihanesi’nin açılısını yaptıklarını, bu mevlevihaneyle birlikte Türkiye genelinde
restorasyonu biten 111 eserin de sembolik açılısını gerçeklestirdiklerini hatırlattı.
Arınç, 7 yıldan bu yana 3,500’e yakın eserin tamamlanarak hizmete açıldıgını
belirterek, “Ecdad yadigarı ve vakıf medeniyetinin eseri olan bu güzel birikimlerimizi
tekrar agaya kaldırmak bizim hem görevimizdir hem de yapmıs olduklarımızla büyük bir
mutluluk duyuyoruz”…Açılıstan önce camiyi gezdigini ifade eden Bakan Arınç, “Bir
cuma gününde bu caminin bu kadar yıl sonra açılıyor olması, ecdadımıza karsı
görevlerimizden biri olarak önümüzdedir” ifadesini kullandı.
170
Appendix N: Turgut Özal Ödülü aldı, onun gibi konustu: “Allah’ın verdigi ömrü O’ndan
baska alacak yoktur.”
Bizim Balkanlar’da, Körfez’de, Kafkaslar’da, Orta Asya’da çok isimiz var. Biz bosuna
bu yerlere gidip gelmiyoruz. Buralarda yapmamız gereken çok seyler var. Çünkü, bu, bu
neslin ecdadıyla bulusmasıdır. Ama istiyoruz ki gelecek kusaklar da bizlerle birlikte
ecdadıyla bulussun. Bunu basarmamız lazım.
171
Appendix O: Reformu 40 Maddelik Kitapla Anlatacagız
Rahmetli Aliya’nın durumunun kötü oldugunu ögrenince yolumu degistirip
Saraybosna’ya ugradım. Hastaneye gittim. Aliya ile bas basa dertlestik. “Siz Osmanlı
torunusunuz. Buralar Osmanlı toprakları, emanete sahip çıkın. Ben gidiyorum ama siz
sahip çıkın. Ben Dayton’u arzu ederek imzalamadım, sartlar zorladı” dedi. Karsılıklı
aglastık. Suuru yerindeydi. Türkiye’nin Bosna’ya olan ilgi ve alakasını ısrarla ifade etti.
Savas döneminde gösterilen ilgiyi anlattı, bundan dolayı sükranlarını ifade etti.
172
Appendix P: Çelik: “Irkçı kavgaları kaldıracagız.”
Türkiye’nin, iktidarları döneminde gelisme ve kalkınma noktasında çok önemli
mesafeler katettigini ifade ederek, bu nedenle 29 Mart yerel seçimlerinin önemli
oldugunu bildirdi. Türkiye’nin, güçlenince sesinin nasıl çıktıgının görüldügünü belirten
Çelik, o yüzden Davos’ta basbakanımızın sesi yükselince Bosna’daki kardesimizin de
tüyleri diken diken oldu. Osmanlı cografyasının bu yükselen sesle ayaga kalktıgını
gördük. Onun için 29 Mart çok önemlidir.
173
Appendix R: Ak Parti Genel Baskanı ve Basbakan Erdogan, Kars 1. Olagan l
Kongresi'nde Konustu
Bir vatan birçok etnik unsurdan meydana gelir. Osmanlı bunun en güzel örnegini
vermistir. Orada farklı dinler, farklı mezhepler var. Farklı ırklar var, hiç dert olmus mu?
Olmamıs. Onun için rahat olacagız ve birbirimize saygılı olacagız. Birbirimizi Allah için
sevecegiz.
174
Appendix S: Basbakan Erdogan’ın 12 Haziran’da Yaptıgı Konusma
nanın bugün stanbul kadar Saraybosna kazanmıstır; zmir kadar Beyrut kazanmıstır;
Ankara kadar Sam kazanmıstır; Diyarbakır kadar Ramallah, Nablus, Cenin, Batı Seria,
Kudüs, Gazze kazanmıstır. Bugün Türkiye kadar Orta Dogu, Kafkasya, Balkanlar,
Avrupa kazanmıstır. Bugün, demokrasi kadar, özgürlük kadar, barıs, adalet, istikrar
kazanmıstır.
175
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