43

 OTTOMAN INTERVENTION IN TRIPOLI (1835) AND THE QUESTION OF

OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY

OTTOMAN INTERVENTION IN TRIPOLI (1835) AND THE QUESTION OF

OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY

Keywords: Ottomans in North Africa, Tripoli, Karamanlı Dynasty, Ottoman

Intervention, Ottoman Imperialism

This thesis is a study of the relationship between the Ottoman central administration and

North African periphery, and more specifically, Tripoli in the first half of the 19th

century. The region was ruled by a local dynasty of Anatolian origin, Karamanlıs,

virtually independent from the Sublime Porte for more than a century. After the outbreak

of the unremedied internal upheavals in the 1830s, Ottoman center took the initiative to

eliminate the ruling dynasty, thus stabilizing the region in 1835. The stability of the region

was a top priority because of the Ottomans’ increased suspicion of further European

encroachment after the French aggression in Algeria. Nonetheless, there were also other

competitors preying on the Tripolitan territory, thus Ottoman action could be best

understood as active participation in an inter-imperial competition. The process, however,

shows us that the establishment of the central authority was the last resort. Before coming

to that point, Ottomans worked hard to ensure a noise-free continuation of the Karamanlı

Dynasty. The last part of the study attempts to make sense of Ottoman presence in the

Tripoli after the intervention. It demonstrates that some elements of the so-called Ottoman

orientalist attitude that came about in the late 19th century were taking root earlier.

Nonetheless, it finds the use the terms such as colonialism and even orientalism

problematic because the Ottoman imperial presence in Tripoli had never been officially

defined as colonialism. Alternatively, the term “imperial repertoires of power” is utilized

in accounting for the center-periphery relations in the period in question.

v

ÖZET

TRABLUSGARP’A OSMANLI MÜDAHELESİ VE 19. YY’DA OSMANLI

EMPERYALİZMİ TARTIŞMASI

İBRAHİM KILIÇASLAN

TARİH, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yusuf Hakan Erdem

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kuzey Afrikada Osmanlılar, Trablusgarp, Karamanlı Hanedanı,

Osmanlı Müdahelesi, Osmanlı Emperyalizmi

Bu çalışma 19. Yüzyıl’ın ilk yarısında Osmanlı merkezi yönetimi ile Garp Ocakları

arasında cari olan merkez-çevre ilişkisini daha ziyade Trablusgarp Ocağı çerçevesinde

ele almaktadır. Trablusgarp Ocağı her ne kadar Osmanlı toprağı gibi gözükse de 18.

Yüzyıl boyunca yerel bir hanedan olan Karamanlı ailesi tarafından merkezden neredeyse

tamamen bağımsız bir şekilde yönetilmiştir. Ancak 1830’lu yılların başında bu hanedan

bir yönetim krizinin içinde boğulmaya başlamış ve bölge şiddeti gittikçe artan bir iç

karışıklık dönemine girmiştir. Osmanlı merkezi yönetimi öncelikle Karamanlı

hanedanının devamını sağlayarak bölgeyi stabilize etmeye çalışmış, bunda başarısız

olunca ise hanedanı 1835’in mayıs ayında yönetimden indirip merkezden vali göndererek

bölgeyi olası bir dış işgale karşı güvence altına almıştır. Gerçekten de devletlerarası

güvenlik endişeleri özellikle Cezayir’in işgali sonrasında artan Fransız etkinliği sebebiyle

oldukça artmıştı. Diğer taraftan Fransızlar Kuzey Afrika’da genişleme arzusunda olan tek

güç de değildi. Dolayısıyla 1830 ile 1835 yılları arasında Osmanlı bürokratları ve

donanma ehlinin bölgedeki aktiviteleri devletlerarası bir güç mücadelesinde aktör olma

çabası olarak okunmalıdır ki Trablusgarp özelinde bu mücadeleden galip çıkılmıştır.

Çalışmanın son kısmında ise Osmanlı müdahalesinden sonra Trablusgarp’taki Osmanlı

varlığı sorgulanmıştır. Literatürde 19. Yüzyılın sonlarında ortaya çıktığı savunulan

Osmanlı oryantalist tavrının daha erken dönemde de emarelerinin var olduğu ortaya

konulsa da bu tavrın kavramsallaştırılmasında oryantalizm ve kolonyalizm gibi

kavramların kullanılması sorunlu görülmüştür. Çünkü Osmanlı Merkezi çeperlerindeki

varlığını resmi olarak hiçbir zaman bu şekilde tanımlamamıştır. Bunun yerine daha esnek

bir kavram olan “güç repertuvarı” kavramı önerilmiştir.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As every student of history, I also have incurred many debts and gratitude for quite many

individuals during my study at Sabancı University History Program. Each and every one

of them is dear to me for more than one way.

First and foremost, I am indebted to my advisor Hakan Erdem who has contributed a great

deal to my intellectual make-up and knowledge of the historians’ craft with subtle and

effective touches, creative criticisms and with his vast knowledge of Ottoman history. He

is an advisor who injects his student with the courage to make a statement even if he is

not in agreement with what he or she is arguing in his or her text. I am grateful for all

this.

The environment Sabancı History Program provides for its students is unique and

enriching thanks to the great scholars such as Halil Berktay, Tülay Artan, Ferenc Csirkés,

and Ayşe Ozil. World historical conceptualizations, the extreme necessity to pay attention

to minute details, the intricacies of the Islamic history and Orientalist tradition, first-hand

experience of the main texts of western historiographical tradition would have remained

largely unknown to me unless I hadn’t been lucky enough to attend their insightful

courses. I also wish to extend my thanks to Akşin Somel who not only familiarized me

with the language of 19th century Ottoman bureaucracy in archival documents but also

thoroughly read my thesis and provided invaluable criticisms for the betterment of the

text. Fatih Bayram also made vital criticism in this respect as the third member of the

thesis defense jury.

I am grateful to each and every one of my class at Sabancı University. In moments of

exhaustion, the small talks, laughter and a cup of tea drank among trusted friends have

revitalized my attention and kept me on track. I hope to always remember the moments

we shared as a cohort. İsa Uğurlu was kind enough to share one of his important findings

with me so that I can enrich my understanding of the entanglement of Hassune D’Ghies

with Ottoman diplomatic circles in London. He also has been great in terms of getting

into fruitful and funny discussions on history.

My academic journey has started at the Boğaziçi University where I had the privilege of

getting educated by outstanding scholars. Apart from that, though, I acquainted five

vii

friends of a lifetime, Ahmet Melik Aksoy, Arif Erbil, Hakan Cengiz, Kenan Arıkdoğan

and Ömer Faruk İlgezdi who in every step of the way not only encouraged me to become

a better student but also provided a constant opportunity of having lively intellectual

discussions. It was also in Boğaziçi University that I met Zahit Atçıl for whose undying

support, generosity in sharing his knowledge, intellectual encouragement and the

moments of joy we experienced together I need to express extreme gratitude. If he would

not be there for me and my friends in Boğaziçi, we wouldn’t come to notice the immense

spiritual satisfaction of being a mentor and teacher to younger generations that we see in

his eyes when he talked to young people around him. On a similar line, I owe huge thanks

to Davut Uğurlu and Abdülhamit Kırmızı for the initial push they have given to my

decision to pursue a university degree in history.

Other than archival documents, I have written this thesis using sources I located in three

distinguished libraries; namely, Sabancı Information Center, ISAM and Boğaziçi

University Aptullah Kuran Library. Having the privilege of benefitting from these

treasures of knowledge is something I hold very dear. The staff of all these libraries was

welcoming and helped me in ways I would not finish enumerating. However, I especially

would like to thank Bahadır Barut for his patience when I repeatedly returned the books

that arrived through the inter-library loan system late on schedule. He saved my

research.

From my days in Boğaziçi until now, I had one consistent benefactor who financially

supported my studies with extreme punctuality and without expectations other than a

sincere wish for my success and intellectual development. For her kind behavior, I wish

to express my undying gratitude to Fatma Ülker. If there were more people like her in

support of potential social scientists, Turkish academy certainly would have benefitted

greatly.

Above all, my family deserves the acknowledgment of their endurance against the

challenge of having a graduate student in their core family. I am eternally thankful to my

mom and dad who constantly supported my education and has never questioned my

decision to raise myself as a historian even though there have been monthly intervals that

we didn’t see each other. The real burden, though, was on the shoulders of my brave wife,

Safanur, who not only loved and cared for me but also has been understanding and

supportive during the financial and emotional ups and downs in the process, for which

viii

she has my eternal respect. Lastly, it goes without saying that all the mistakes,

discrepancies and flaw that may be found in this study are mine and mine alone.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... xi

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

2. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF YUSUF PASHA KARAMANLI .......................... 17

2.1 Yusuf Defying the Rules of Succession .............................................................. 17

2.2 Tripoli under Yusuf Pasha .................................................................................. 23

2.2.1 North African-American relations and Yusuf Pasha's disillusionment with the

treaty of 1796 ........................................................................................................... 24

2.2.2 Expansion of Yusuf's Patrimonial Rule .......................................................... 30

2.2.3 Beginnings of the End .................................................................................... 34

2.2.4 Last Years of Yusuf Pasha ............................................................................. 37

3. PRELUDE TO OTTOMAN INTERVENTION ................................................... 40

3.1 Milestones of Center-Periphery Relations in Ottoman North Africa .................. 40

3.2 Ottoman Decision-Making at Work during the Tripolitan Civil War ................. 47

3.2.1 Tripolitan Civil War ....................................................................................... 47

3.2.2 Claimants to Tripolitan Territory ................................................................... 52

3.2.3 Ottoman Policy During the Tripolitan Civil War and Mission's of Mehmed

Şakir Efendi in Tripoli and Tunis ................................................................................... 59

3.2.4 Necip Pasha's Takeover ................................................................................. 66

4. A CASE STUDY OF OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY 68

4.1 What have we done, what will we do? Meclis-i Şura meeting regarding the

upcoming policies in Tripoli. .......................................................................................... 72

4.2 Local Resistance and Ottoman Pashas justifying their use of violence ........... 75

4.3 Pacification of Cebel-i Garbi and Ottoman Missionaries ............................... 78

4.4 Perception of Center-Periphery Dichotomy in Perspective ............................. 80

5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 90

APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................. 99

x

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Karamanlı Succession and family tree ............................................................. 18

xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

COA: Presidential Ottoman Archive

C. DH: Muallim Cevdet Collection, Dâhiliye

C.HR Muallim Cevdet Collection, Hâriciye

İ.MSM: Mesâil-i Mühimme İrâdeleri Collection

İÜ NEK: Istanbul University Rare Books Library

1

1.INTRODUCTION

Historiography of the 18th Century Ottoman Empire works with the conception that the

period in question was distinctly marked by a gradually developing localization of

political power and its subsequent hereditation in some of the localities across the

Empire.1 Accordingly, this trend had reached its epitome at the turn of the nineteenth

century, a tide only to be reversed by the centralizing policies of Ottoman center starting

from the reign of Mahmud II (Zürcher 2004, 21). It must be stated that these observations

are very well-grounded in the historical realities of the period. However, this

generalization should not lead us to overlook the regional varieties in the alignments of

power because a quick survey of the imperial domains demonstrates that power relations

within the Ottoman Empire of the 18th Century were far more complicated, each region

having a special arrangement in terms of political authority, be that realized through

intentional policy-making or have risen circumstantially. Such awareness is crucial

because it is against the background of these regional differences that a historian of the

19th Century Ottoman Empire could understand the process of centralization with its

failures and successes.

Starting from an extremely weak position, Mahmud II and the central government in

Istanbul started to regain control of the imperial domains after the war with the Russian

Empire was concluded in 1812. It took nearly a decade to subdue the local notables across

Anatolia and Rumelia except for the Kurdish Emirates in Eastern Anatolia. A variety of

methods was used during the process. At times Mahmud II was granting titles to win over

loyalty or giving large sums of money out of his benevolence, at others he played upon

the rivalries between the notables (Zürcher 2004, 29-30). Thus far, the process was

1 For a classic example of this approach see (McGowan 1994); For a more recent critical perspective, see: Hathaway,

2004); Ali Yaycıoğlu has recently offered a revisionist reading of the late 18th and early 19th century in the context of

the Age of Revolutions, see: (Yaycıoğlu 2016). For a shorter version of his interpretation, see: (Yaycıoğlu 2011)

2

relatively peaceful. Yet, exactly at this moment, regional differences in the alignments of

power played into the unfolding of events. In places where centrifugal forces did not feel

an obligation to put up with the demands of Istanbul, the central government was

compelled to resort to the use of coercive power and violence to redefine center-periphery

relations. For example, in Bosnia, the dissidents found a champion in the person of

Hüseyin Kapudan, who acted as de facto ruler of the province for a year before Ottomans

finally suppressed his rebellion in 1832 and put him under house arrest in Istanbul.

However, he continued to communicate with Bosnian notables to play his part in stirring

rebellion until he died in 1834. (Turhan 2014, 461, 467, 469-470). Even though Reşid

Mehmed Pasha’s extraordinary measures has broken the power of local families in

Balkans Albania continued to be a center of opposition and 1840s witnessed the outbreak

of several rebellions (Atabaş 2017, 3). At the other end of the Empire, Mamluks of

Baghdad and Jalili family of Mosul remained resilient up until the 1831 and 1834,

respectively.[2 Tuzcuoğulları also resisted in three phases before eventually being put

down in 1834 (Aktepe 1953). At all these instances Ottomans used coercive methods and

succeeded in crushing the local power base. However, it was not all that smooth in other

regions. When Ali of Tepelene’s rebellion was subdued, the power vacuum was filled by

the Greeks seeking independence from the Sublime Porte.3 Similarly, Mehmet Ali of

Egypt and his successors had practically managed to carve a state of their own in the

prosperous province of Egypt.4

In the case of Ottoman provinces in North Africa and especially in Tripoli, it is rather

imperative to ask how far was the political power centralized in the hands of the

bureaucrats in Istanbul even before the process of decentralization had concurrently taken

roots across the imperial domains in the 18th Century? Probably, not too far. Did

Ottomans ever establish direct control over these territories and its inhabitants? The

answer is a strict no. Even in the 16th century when Ottoman Empire was at the zenith of

its power and prestige, the north African provinces and their infamous sailor/pirates were

2 Jalili family’s gradual rise to political prominence and their eventual defeat to Ottoman centralization policy is best

studied in (Khoury, 1997). For the downfall of Mamluks of Baghdad and subsequent integration of the province into

central government’s hold, see: (Ceylan 2011)

3 Ali Pasha’s rule in Balkans has been a relatively popular subject but most recently Katherine Flemming revisited the

subject, see: (Flemming. 2014). In the Turkish language, there are also valuable studies focusing on his clash with

centralization policies of Mahmud II, see for example: (Feyzioğlu 2017).

4 For Egypt’s rise to international prominence under Mehmet Ali Pasha, see: (Fahmy 1997). For one of the best analysis

of his bitter rivalry with Mahmud II in 1831-1841, see: (Kutluoğlu 1998).

3

cooperating with the Ottoman center, without being formally incorporated by it.5 Yet

again, 17th and 18th centuries meant a radical change for these regions as well. In Tunisia,

Muradi dynasty accumulated a vast amount of power, consequently securing a hereditary

governorship after 1631. After a brief attempt to formally integrate the Tunisian Province

into the Istanbul’s hold on the part of Ahmed III, Huseynid family had settled as

hereditary governors of Tunisia replacing Muradis (Abun-Nasr 1987, 172-173).

Similarly, in 1711, Karamanlı Ahmed Bey, a member of the Kuloğlu class, 6 established

his family as hereditary governors.7 Each of these provinces had virtually become

independent from Istanbul not only in terms of their domestic policy but also in dictating

their own foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis European states and the United States of

America. The localization and hereditation of political power went hand in hand in these

regions before nearly anywhere else in the vast territories Ottoman rule extended. To look

at the following anecdote would enlighten the extent of the disparity between the Ottoman

capital and the provinces in North Africa.

In the 1860s, Mustafa Aşir Efendi was appointed as the judge of Tripoli by Ottoman

authorities in Istanbul. It was a fortunate moment, indeed, because nobody involved

would have guessed that it would lead to the chain of events which ended up with his son

Mehmed Nehicüddin Efendi having translated and expanded upon a crucial book on the

history of the province of Tripoli; “Tarih-i Ibn Galbun Der Beyan-ı Trablusgarb.” He

managed to complete his work by 1864 and it was published by the print house Ceride-i

Havadis later in the 1867 (Nehicüddin Efendi and Hasan Sâfî 2013, vi). Approximately

thirty years after Ottoman armed intervention in 1835 and establishment of the agents of

the central government in the Tripoli, Nehicüddin Efendi, the writer of a first-ever

dedicated history book on its subject, remarks that “the true particulars of Tripoli are

unknown to us. Even though it is possible to gather bits and pieces of information from

5 Unfortunately, the Ottoman Empire’s flexible rule in North Africa is not always thoroughly appreciated. There is an

inclination especially in Turkish academia to see the nature of Ottoman rule as effectively centralized even in these

regions. In fact, the Ottoman Empire was operating in different levels of integration and forms of sovereignty in

different regions. See for an excellent discussion on limits of Ottoman power in frontier regions: (Agoston 2003). In

the case of Ottoman North Africa, Emrah Safa Gürkan developed the most advanced analysis concerning centerperiphery

relations, see: (Gürkan 2018).

6 Kuloğlu is the name of the tax-exempt political elite in the North African provinces. They are a mixture of Janissaries

coming from imperial heartlands with local women. At first, Kuloğlu class was not allowed to participate in politics of

the region and was only expected to offer military service to the provincial administrator. However, as of the 18th

century, their desire to take part in government bore fruit and they seized power concurrently all over the Maghreb.

7 Karamanlı Ahmed’s rise to political power and the subsequent power struggle in Tripoli leading to the recognition he

got from Ahmed III in 1722 can be easily followed in (Dearden 1976, 27-41).

4

various histories, all historians sufficed with passing on ancient wisdom …… such weak

and little information can’t be helpful in forming a definitive opinion.”8 These are telling,

indeed, in terms of understanding the Ottoman central government’s political

involvement with the region. What is more striking would arrive a couple of pages after

these opening remarks when Nehicüddin Efendi criticizes the writer of the original text

of being irrational in accounting for the initial Ottoman conquest of Tripoli in 1551.

Followingly, he states that “as these events pertain to the history of Istanbul, it seems

convenient to summarize the truth of the matter from our histories.”9 Surprisingly, here

we see a 19th century Ottoman ulema who clearly makes an us/them distinction between

Tripolitania and Istanbul.

In accordance with his observation, during my research for the writing of this thesis, it

came to my attention that almost none of the official court historians of the period in

question gives detailed accounts of what was happening in the North African provinces

of the Ottoman Empire except for the invasion of Algeria by the French.10 Of course, it

doesn’t mean that the Ottoman central government was completely indifferent to these

regions. Official communication was continuing between Istanbul and the pashas of

Tripoli and there is a considerable amount of information in the Mühimme registers that

would help us understand the relations between Tripoli and Ottoman Capital.11However,

tracing intimately the local history of the region from these records is rather problematic.

Consequently, even a basic search in the Ottoman archives reveals that the documents

produced after the 1830s outnumber nearly all the preceding centuries and this is not

without a reason: the establishment of Ottoman central control over the province in 1835.

A letter of reigning Yusuf Pasha arrived at the Sublime Porte in January 1833 (Taş 2016,

388).12 It was containing some troubling news, especially in the light of recent French

8 Translation is mine. For the original Turkish see: (Nehicüddin Efendi & Hasan Safi, 5). “… Trablusgarp’ın tefasil-i

hakikiyyesi bizce meçhul olup filvaki bazı tarihlerden malumat-ı cüziyye alınmakta ise de …. öyle ahbar-ı zaife ve

kalileden kanaat-i kafiye hasıl olamayacağından ….”

9 Translation is mine. For original Turkish see: (Nehicüddin Efendi & Hasan Safi, 19). “Mamafih şu keyfiyet İstanbul

vekayii olduğundan bizim tarihlerden hakikat-i halin ihtisaren beyanı münasip görülmüştür.”

10 Even in this occasion, Ottoman court historians focus on how the Ottoman center diplomatically reacted to the French

invasion of Algeria and they do not dwell much on socio-economic or political issues of the Algerian province itself.

An obvious example is Ahmet Lütfi Efendi. See especially (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, 519-526, 899-908).

11 Abdullah Erdem Taş uses Mühimme registers dating back to the 18th century to understand the dynamics of Ottoman

Center-Tripolitan periphery, see: (Taş 2016).

12 For the original of the letter see Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Hereafter COA), HAT.366.20242-D. 1248/1832-

1833.

5

aggression on Ottoman soil in North Africa. Yusuf Pasha was reporting the recent

developments in the Tripoli. His country was in serious disarray due to the actions of the

rebellious alliance gathered around his grandson Mehmed. He included in his letter that

he abdicated from his position in favor of his son, Ali, and requested from the Sublime

Porte to recognize him as his successor. Mahmud II’s immediate circle at the time decided

to take their time before granting what Yusuf Pasha had wanted and sent Mehmed Şakir

Efendi to Tripoli to investigate the situation. Eventually, in May 1835, Ottoman central

government dispatched a naval force composed of twenty-two ships manned by seven

thousand trained soldiers under the command of Mustafa Necip Pasha. They had easily

succeeded in removing the Karamanlı dynasty from power and deported most of the

family members to Istanbul. Necip Pasha and his successors were now tasked with

building up a formal centralized Ottoman province (Ibrahim, 1982, 1). Accordingly,

soldiers and bureaucrats needed to run this distant province were those who responsible

for the piles of documents produced after 1835 and stored in the Ottoman Archives and

Dar al-Mahfuzat al-Tarihiyye in today’s Libya.

This thesis sets out to understand and problematize the dynamics of the Ottoman

Intervention in Tripoli in 1835. Who were the actors behind this intervention? What kind

of decision-making processes were carried out? What were Ottomans’ principal

motivations in intervening such a distant province with which only seaborne

communication and travel were possible at the time? Were they just following an abstract

notion of state-centralization or in pursuit of solving more practical concerns? Similarly,

what kind of significance does this development bear in the context of world politics? I

believe not only in the fact that the pursuit of these questions allows us to nuance our

understanding of the 19th century Ottoman policy-making but it also gives us an

opportunity to integrate the Ottoman Empire to the study of 19th century empires, a field

in which Ottoman Empire was intentionally excluded for a long time as the ‘Sick Man of

Europe.’13 In this respect, it also becomes crucial to question the validity of the arguments

of some European observers of the time and subsequent scholars who have addressed the

13 The sick man of Europe is first termed by Tsar Nicholas in a conversation with the British ambassador to St.

Petersburg Sir G.H. Seymour in 1853 to describe the alleged weakness of the Ottoman Empire. His description proved

to be quite popular such that the subsequent scholarship largely adopted this as an analytical tool when trying to account

for the Eastern Question. For Nicholas’s conversation with the ambassador and a wonderful examination of the term’s

journey in Russian political culture see: (Taki, 2016, 129-167). For a critique of its historiographical burden see:

(Khoury and Kennedy 2007, 233)

6

Ottoman intervention as an act of establishing an overseas colony.14 Is such a claim

sustainable in light of historical evidence or not?

These are the questions that I seek to address in this thesis. It goes without saying that

some of them had already been asked and answered by previous scholars. For the

moment, therefore, let me embark upon a review of the historiography of the region to

demonstrate how far the lack of information Nehicüddin Efendi complains about had

gradually been tackled within the following centuries by the international scholarly

community and how does this thesis fit into the picture. In my analysis of the relevant

literature, I will focus on the following: (1) the intellectual and socio-political context of

the study itself (2) the kind of source material the study under scrutiny utilizes and its

implications for its overall arguments; (3) and last but not least its examination and

interpretation of the Ottoman intervention in 1835. Following the critical survey of the

literature, I will provide an outline of the chapters where the contentions and arguments

of the present thesis will be discussed.

The scholarly interest in Africa has not been well-developed in 19th Century Ottoman

literati and 20th-century Turkish academia (Kavas 2013, 17-34, 28-29). Even though

North Africa has been a subject of relatively wider interest, in the case of sub-Saharan

Africa, the interest was far more limited. Unfortunately, Tripoli occupies much little

space in this literature. Academic production of knowledge was, and to a large extent still

is, at best sporadic. One may corroborate this just by looking at the number of manuscripts

and published works written the 19th and early 20th century on the Tripoli at the catalogs

of Turkish libraries.15 After Nehicüddin Efendi published his expanded translation of Ibn

Galbun’s history in 1867, the interest in North Africa has faded away until the outbreak

of Turco-Italian war in 1911 with the notable exceptions of Sadık Muayyed Azmzade’s

and Cami Baykurt’s travel accounts.16 Following Italian aggression, Mehmed Naci’s

14 For the remarks of English Consul George Hanmer Warrington, see the quote Atabaş gives in (Atabaş 2017, 57) and

for a French perspective in early 20th century see: (Marchand, 1908: 245-252).

15 It doesn’t exceed a dozen. See for a complete list: (Ahmet Kavas ed, 2013, 293-294).

16 Cami Baykurt was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress when he was in imperial military school.

Thanks to his oppositional views, his first official post was Fezzan, a place that is known for being an exile destination.

Nevertheless, he developed a fondness for the region and became the MP of Fezzan in the Second Constitutional Period.

He published his memoirs and travel accounts in 1908 (Cami Bey 1908). This Arabic script edition is later transcribed

and republished. See: (Baykurt 2009). For detailed knowledge see: (Yılmaz 2018). Sadık Müeyyed’s accounts of his

official duties in Sahara were published in 1897 by Alem Matbaası (El-Müeyyed 1897). This travel account is also republished

in Latin transcription see: (Bostan 2010).

7

Trablusgarp Tarihi appeared in the bookshelves in Cağaloğlu. Additionally, Avanzâde

Mehmed Süleyman also started to publish his Trablusgarb ve Devlet-i Aliyye-İtalya

Vekâyiʻ-i Harbiyesi as the Ottoman-Italian war was going on.17 One may state that the

Young Turks’ era showed a more genuine interest in Ottoman Africa than the previous

century.18 However, as Italians successfully penetrated through the Ottoman defensive

and turned the region into an Italian colony after the defeat of Ottoman-Sanusiya alliance,

the charm surrounding the region slowly disappeared from the public sphere. On the other

hand, the Ottoman state remained officially interested in the region and tried to help

Sanusiya organize a front against the Italians during the Great War (Simon 1987, 229-

232).

The foundation of the Turkish Republic in a drastically different ideological framework

from that of the Ottoman Empire had some serious repercussions for the historiography

of the 20th century. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, institutionally incorporated Turkish

intellectuals and Turkish historians busied themselves with providing the new regime

with an official vision of the Turkish national history. In an environment where the denial

of Ottoman past was required to lay the ground for the new regime’s legitimacy discourse,

the former territories of the Empire were mostly left out from the scholarly attention of

historians. Accordingly, the first attempt at accounting for the Ottoman rule in North

Africa came outside of academia when Aziz Samih İlter published his important two

volumes book respectively in 1936 and 1937.19 It attempts to cover entire North Africa

from sixteenth to twentieth centuries and in its vast coverage, the Tripoli was squeezed

into the last seventy pages where İlter leans his back to Ibn Galbun, Hasan Safi and

Mühimme registers (İlter 1937, 185-256).20 He sticks to a descriptive approach in his

chapter about the political history of Tripoli. Analytical reasoning and historical

contextualization are rather weak. For example, it is hard to follow the dynamics of

Ottoman decision-making and international situation of the time. Nonetheless, it must be

stated that İlter’s works have become a foundational reference work for future scholars. I

17 For information on the text and its publishing history see: (Küçükefe 2015).

18 Apart from these book size publications related to the province of Tripoli, numerous articles and small pamphlets

were published during the Ottoman-Italian war in Tripoli. For a survey analysis of these publications see: (İlkbahar,

2009).

19 The first volume was published one year before the second one by the same publishing house. See: (İlter 1936)

20 See notes 1 and 2 in (İlter 1937, 219).

8

believe its value lies in the fact that he attempts to write a local history which does not

only talk about the relations between the Ottoman center and Tripolitan periphery.

After İlter’s work, the front has been silent for about three decades until Akdes Nimet

Kurat wrote an article on American-North African Relations (Kurat 1964). Later,

Ercüment Kuran and Abdurrahman Çaycı also approached North Africa from the

perspective of diplomatic history, both using effectively Ottoman and French Archives.

Kuran’s work analyzed the Ottoman diplomatic reactions to the invasion of the province

of Algeria in the context of the development of a modern ministry of foreign affairs.

Therefore, it may as well be understood as a history of Ottoman modernization in the 19th

century (Kuran 1957). For the purposes of this thesis, Çaycı’s work on the Turkish-French

competition in the Libyan Sahara occupies a special place. (Çaycı, 1995). He was

probably the first historian who makes an attempt to situate the Ottoman Empire and its

agents in the famous Scramble for Africa. He gives a special meaning to the Ottoman

intervention in the Tripoli as it gave the Ottoman government in Istanbul a chance to

declare the Libyan hinterland as its sphere of influence. He emphasizes that by making

the Tripoli a formal part of the Empire, Ottomans have found an opportunity to safeguard

the Muslims of Tripoli and Lake Chad basin from aggressive French and British colonial

expansion. Of course, Çaycı’s argument is only one side of the coin, but a shiny one

indeed. In this context, one must note that Ottoman policy after the 1880s itself had some

colonial aspects. In 2016, Çaycı’s thread was followed by Mustafa Minawi in a book

provokingly entitled as Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the

Sahara and Hijaz. In his thought-provoking conclusion, he urges historians of the

nineteenth-century empires not to be blinded by the teleology of failure in recognizing

the Ottoman Empire as an agent in the inter-imperial competition of the nineteenth

century whose strategies of rule worth a comparative analysis (Minawi 2016, 142-143).

If there has been any surge in the field of African Studies in Turkey, it is after 2005. This

was the date when the first congress on African Studies is organized. I take this as a

turning point because the number of academics and academic publications related to

Africa has significantly increased ever since this congress, not necessarily because of it.

On the other hand, the very organizing of the Congress has a lot to do with the new

political engagement the Republic of Turkey has gotten into with the African States who

has a seat in the United Nations. Subsequently, the year 2005 was proclaimed as the

African Year and ever since a lot of events were held in Turkey to promote African9

Turkish friendship. Nonetheless, it would be doing injustice to already existing academic

circles interested in Ottoman presence in Africa if we solely give the credit for the stirred

interest in African studies to the newly aroused political climate. One must cite the leading

figures of these circles such as Ahmet Kavas and Zekeriya Kurşun. The number of

publications has risen significantly thanks to scholarly associations established with the

prerogatives of these scholars such as ORDAF and AFAM.21 Even though these

institutions are not directly funded by the Turkish government, it is still noteworthy that

they appeared in a period when Turkey’s foreign policy priorities have shifted towards

an approach geared to strengthen the Turkish soft power across the Middle East, Africa,

and Central Asia. Quite naturally perhaps, most of these studies are emphasizing the

friendship and cooperation between the locals and Ottoman authorities along with

Ottomans’ role in postponing the intrusion of European imperialism into North and sub-

Saharan Africa.22 Themselves being prolific historians on the subject, their efforts also

paved the way of a new generation of historians who work on Ottoman Africa. Among

them are Abdullah Erdem Taş and Muhammed Tandoğan.23 Independently, Cemal

Atabaş also produced an important Ph.D. thesis on the process of centralization in the

province of Tripoli at Istanbul University (Atabaş 2017). They have one thing in common,

a good command of Arabic and impeccable archival research, a combination that would

result in a balanced understanding of center-periphery relations in the context of North

African provinces.

The studies of Taş and Atabaş are of particular importance for our purposes here because

each one of these authors has dealt with the history of Tripoli using primarily Ottoman

documentation. Erdem Taş completed his study of Karamanlı Period in Tripoli in 2016.

However, his title seems to humble the vast coverage of the thesis because the study

includes a lengthy discussion of the political history of the Tripoli until the rise of

Karamanlı dynasty and a very well researched discussion of the Ottoman intervention in

1835. When he contemplates on the challenges of writing a thesis on such a long time and

the relative academic neglect, he rightly states that “the lack of general and descriptive

studies makes it hard to carry out more analytical works.” However, he hopes that his

21 Ortadoğu ve Afrika Araştırmacıları Derneği (ORDAF) and Afrika Araştırmaları Merkezi (AFAM).

22 For example, (Kavas, 2006) See for a similar stance: (Akyıldız and Kurşun 2015).

23 Tandoğan published a book on the Tuareg tribes living in the Sahara and their relations with Sublime Porte. See:

(Tandoğan, 2018).

10

study would serve as a starting point for future researchers who would take up the

challenge and approach the history of the region from an analytical point of view. He also

suggests the process of centralization following the Ottoman intervention as a possible

venue of research for future scholars (Taş 2016, 434). His advice seems to be taken by

Cemal Atabaş who has completed his Ph.D. thesis on this very subject. He is more

analytical than Erdem Taş with regards to the larger meaning of Ottoman intervention in

Tripoli which he examines as a spin-off from the centralizing policies of Sublime Porte

(Atabaş 2017, 1-21). Even though both studies are really good examples in terms of the

historians’ attention to minute details and strict adherence to the primary sources, these

are not in conversation with highly debated historiographical currents in the international

scholarly community such as the comparative study of empires and post-colonial debates.

For example, Erdem Taş detects that in the decision-making process, several reports from

the Ottoman inspector in Tripoli, Mehmet Şakir Efendi, and a treaty written by Hassuna

D’Ghies were taken into consideration. The latter included in the treaty a highly

controversial word in its European rendering: the “civilization.”24 I believe that even the

existence of a word with such baggage must be alarming because Hassune Efendi openly

refers to the word’s meaning in the European context. It brings us to the question of how

far, Ottoman decision-makers appropriated a so-called ‘civilizing mission’ when they

intervened in Tripoli? Unfortunately, no discussion ensues Taş’s important finding. When

Atabaş unveiled the correspondence of English Consul Hanmer George Warrington and

see a clear reference to Ottoman intervention as an act of colonization that is doomed to

fail because of the lack of resources, he also misses an opportunity to problematize the

subject comparatively (Atabaş, 2017, 57). It may be the case that Warrington is an

outsider to Ottoman mentality and decision-making and was importing concepts from his

own political vocabulary, however, an elaboration of different strategies of power

projection might be quite useful to think about empires comparatively, especially given

the fact that a colonial discourse and self-presentation was eventually developed by

Ottoman ruling elite in the late 19th century.25

24 It is extremely noteworthy that Hassune Efendi does not refer to what he means as “medeniyet” but specifically

resorts to its European rendering as “sivilizasyon.” For a discussion of the journey of “medeniyet” as a concept see:

(Schäbler, 2004).

25 The literature on Ottoman imperialism and Ottoman orientalism are constantly growing. Some examples are Selim

(Deringil 2003); (Makdisi 2002); (Herzog and Motika, 2000); (Kühn 2007); For a critical survey of this literature see:

(Türesay 2013) It is also available in English translation.

11

However, it must also be said that these two studies enrich our understanding of centerperiphery

relations as well as the process leading to Ottoman intervention with their

reliance on Ottoman documentation while even the most advanced studies published in

English did not have concrete answers for the Ottoman motivations to integrate this region

formally into state-apparatus. While Seton Dearden, in his popular history of Karamanlı

Dynasty, refers to the “Turks’ fear from growing French influence in North Africa” as

the primary reason, it was only a fraction of the whole picture (Dearden 1976, 311).

Dearden’s work anticipated another important book on the history of Tripoli during the

reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, that of Kola Folayan (Fọlayan, 1979).

This study is by far the best analysis available pertaining to the last quarter of Karamanlı

rule in Tripoli. It examines the Yusuf Pasha’s efforts to make Tripoli a formidable power

in the Barbary coast and the reasons behind the failure of this project. He argues that

Yusuf Pasha intentionally raised his naval power to raise funds to finance the

centralization policy he would embark upon after 1806. This project includes the

subjugation of tribal contingents residing in Cyrenaica, Ghadames, and Fezzan. He was

remarkably successful realizing his ambition to pacify these regions. However, Yusuf’s

political ambitions did not stop at the traditional borders of his province and subsequently,

he tried to form an empire that would include Bornu and Kanem to the south of Fezzan.

However, such a venture was beyond the financial capabilities of his dynasty in the face

of growing international pressure on piracy and gradually diminishing customs revenues

due to the diversion of the trade routes traditionally flowing from sub-Saharan Africa,

through Fezzan into the port of Tripoli (Fọlayan 1979, xii).

Folayan does not use Ottoman documentation, therefore, his explanation for the

motivations behind Ottoman intervention relies on educated speculation of what Mehmed

Şakir Efendi could have reported when he went back to Istanbul after his mission to

inspect what was going on in Tripoli. Even though Folayan relies only on a short summary

of Şakir Efendi’s report, he speculated surprisingly well. For him, the inability of both

parties in the civil war to overcome the other was the primary reason behind Ottoman

action because Şakir Efendi must have reported the rumors that the Bey of Tunis or

Mehmed Ali of Egypt would take advantage of the situation if the matter is not resolved

soon enough. He adds that a possible French aggression was also rumored due to

suspicious contours a French naval officer along the shores of the province. (Fọlayan

1979, 161-163). A similar line of argument has also been offered by Ali İbrahim Abdullah

12

in his Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Utah in 1982.26 Efforts of Warrington

in persuading his government to intervene militarily in the civil war are further scrutinized

by Jamil M. Abun-Nasr in his monumental work on the history of Maghrib in the Islamic

period. (Abun-Nasr 1987, 204-205). He further argues that after 1835 Libya became an

outpost from where Ottomans tried to salvage what they can from their diminishing

influence in North African shores even though these prospects were seriously restrained

by the opposition of tribal leaders such as Abdülcelil Seyfünnasr, Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i

Garbi and the influence which European consuls had obtained before the Ottomans

arrived Tripoli (Abun-Nasr 1987, 314).

Another attempt to account for the Ottoman presence in Tripoli and its hinterland was

made by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida in a rather theoretical way. He opposes the arguments of

the segmentary model developed by social anthropologists such as E. Evans Pritchard,

and Ernest Gellner.27 He argues that “segmentary model assumes the existence of a tribal

society comprised of homogeneous tribal segments. In the absence of state control, the

order was kept through mutually deterring tribal segments in any clan that threatened to

disrupt the balance of power” whereas the social organization in North Africa was not

only “an agglomeration of tribes or tribal states basically isolated from the larger social

and economic structures of the region.” (Ahmida 1994, 3). He is also highly critical of

Modernization theorists like Daniel Lerner who holds the idea that the modern Maghrib

and the rest of the third world are composed of traditional societies whose modernization

began under the European colonialism. (Ahmida 1994. 3-4). Accordingly, he goes on to

propound that North African history has a dynamism of itself before the coming of

Europeans because “powerful tribal and peasant alliances ruled Libya before the

Ottomans and the construction of a modern urban-centered state began in alliance with

the Ottomans.” That is, before European colonial rule. (Ahmida 1994, 5).

His approach to the Libyan social history is heavily informed by New British Marxism,

exemplified most notably by Edward P. Thompson in his famous “The Making of the

26 It is important to remark that especially after the 1980s, American Universities has become important centers for

intellectual production about Libyan History. Apart from the work of historians of Libyan origin coming to these

universities as graduate students, others such as Michel Le Gall also participated in this new historiography rising in

the United States. I couldn’t help but notice a correlation between the forming of OPEC and the oil crises of the 1970s

and a rise of interest in an oil-producing country’s history. For notable examples, see: (Ahmida, 1990); (Barbar, 1980);

(Elbhloul 1986); (Le Gall 1986).

27 In this book, Pritchard has made the first attempt to understand the Sanusiyya movement (Evans-Pritchard 1954).

For Ernest Gellner’s views see: (Gellner and Micaud 1972)

13

English Working Class” where he emphasizes the agency of workers themselves rather

than an automatic relation between the rise of the factories and formation of the working

class. (Ahmida 1994, 3-9). Like Thompson, Ahmida also does not comply with rigid

explanations of class formation argued by traditional Marxism of the 19th century. For

Ahmida, this was especially fruitful because of the fluidity of tribal contingents in the

19th and 20th century Libya. Their coming together as a clearly discernible class was

made possible by a constant and deliberate struggle against the Italian colonial policy

even though they were intentionally excluded from capitalist agriculture. In a sense, they

were engaging with the transformative power of modern capitalism by resisting it. They

were able to resist both Ottomans and Italian colonialism because of their non-segmentary

social connections across North Africa and Lake Chad Basin.

However, the way Ahmida conceptualizes the motivation behind the initial Ottoman

intervention in Tripoli is rather ambiguous and seems to be far-fetching in terms of the

development of capitalist relations and mentality in the Ottoman Empire. He puts forward

that “capitalist transformation within the empire -toward the goal of asserting authority

over the periphery- culminated in the brutal colonial conquest of Ottoman Libya in 1835.”

(Ahmida 1994, 24). When a couple of pages later he goes on to explain what he means

by internal capitalist transformation, his account focuses on the rise of the tax-farming,

an application in which “the state sold state land to private owners to obtain quick cash

for the treasury.” This, in turn, led to the emergence of a new tax-farming class.

Accordingly, “by the end of the 18th century, capitalist tendencies became dominant in

the ruling class.” (Ahmida 1994, 31). In this scheme, he seems to mistake the

monetization of economy and taxation with the rise of capitalism per se. In fact, the

development of capitalism implies much more than a change in the way people carry out

their transactions and the form in which they pay their taxes. Even in strict Marxist terms,

it requires a bourgeoise class that owns the means of production and who is willing to set

the fire of social change. However, in non-Western contexts, it is hard to locate such a

class that is both willing and able.28 In other words, structurally speaking, he favors a

causality between the project of centralization and the rise of capitalist mentality. It seems

28 The rise of bourgeoise and its social role in changing the traditional societal norms and political structure is a highly

debated issue in Ottoman historiography. However, in any case, Ahmida’s approach is too hasty in accepting the idea

that the Ottoman Empire was transformed into a properly capitalist worldview. See for an overview of this

historiographical problem; (Göçek 1996, 12-20).

14

to me that in his analysis of the rise of capitalism in the Ottoman Empire and its

subsequent implications for the Empire’s people, he seems to be a vulgar Marxist rather

than a new Marxist.29 Why should, for example, the rise of capitalist mentality

automatically mean an instinctive expansion of the center’s control over the distant

province of Tripoli? It seems to me that the one hundred fifty thousand kuruş that is

entrusted to Necip Pasha to overthrow the ruling dynasty in Tripoli could have been

invested in a much more promising capitalist venture (Taş 2016, 417).30

As for the material causes of the “brutal colonial conquest of Ottoman Libya in 1835,”

Ahmida points to the fear of losing Tripoli which serves as a gateway to Muslim Africa

either to the French or to the British (Ahmida 1994, 31). However, he doesn’t carry out a

historical analysis related to this material cause; it rather pops up without a proper

discussion. His wording is referring to Ottoman intervention is also self-contradictory and

anachronistic not only because he clearly distinguishes the colonial Italian occupation

from the second period of direct Ottoman rule in his introduction but also because he fails

to elaborate on what was resembling of colonialism about the Ottoman intervention in

1835.

Lisa Anderson has also produced a book in which she discusses the dynamics of state

formation and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya from a comparative perspective.

The way she poses the central question of her book is revealing: “How was it that one of

these neighboring countries seemed to display many of the attributes of Western-inspired

parliamentary democracy while the regime of the other explicitly and emphatically

rejected them?” (Anderson 1987, 3). She puts forward the idea that a long tradition of

local bureaucracy is the key to understand the divergence in the fates of two countries.

This semi-independent garrison-states at the turn of the nineteenth century have entered

the path of creating modern mechanisms of rule which meant for both “the replacement

of kinship ties of tribes with those of wider and more flexible clientele networks of the

peasantry.” (Anderson 1987, 9). However, she adds that divergent experiences of two

countries with the European colonialism created the eventual outcome she stated in her

29 Here I am alluding to the sparkling distinction Eric Hobsbawm makes. summarizes what he means by vulgar Marxism

in seven points. However, his most important point in this context is that this type of Marxist historiography blindly

adheres to the base and superstructure model which assumes a simple interdependency between economic base and

political structure. In Ahmida’s case, it is the transformative effect of the rise of capitalism on how Ottomans wanted

to conceptualize their state. See: (Hobsbawm, 1997).

30 For the final decision as to how much funds should be allocated to Necip Pasha see (COA.HAT.454.22441).

15

question because while “the French under the guise of protectorate retained, strengthened,

and extended the bureaucratic administration of the local state, the Italians on the other

hand “destroyed the local administration, to replace it with an exclusively Italian one, in

which the local population was not permitted to participate.” (Anderson 1987, 9). In her

mind, at the time of independence, this left Tunisia with two paths to choose from,

democracy or dictatorship, whereas such a choice was out of the question in Libya. Even

though her book has its strength in making sense of the post-independence political orders

in Libya and Tunisia, she approaches her question from the perspective of a political

scientist and her analysis leans back to a good understanding of the secondary literature

of the time. As for why the Ottoman center acted in the way it did in 1835, she simply

refers to Ottomans’ fear of European encroachment.

So far, I put an effort into critically approaching the existing literature. What follows is

my general observation and a key to how I will try to approach the issue. The English

language publications are not well informed about the trends in Ottoman historiography

and confine their understanding of the Ottoman intervention only with the international

pressure of the time and Ottoman’s alleged fear of losing Tripoli to a foreign power. In

most of the cases, this general deduction is only based on outside sources such as consular

reports, diplomatic correspondence and alike. It is, of course, a part of the general picture

but real dynamics of Ottoman decision-making are obscure in these studies. How the real

actors viewed the issue is not properly addressed. On the other hand, even though recently

written theses in Turkish universities are extremely sensitive to how Ottomans carried out

this delicate operation, they do not problematize the attitude of operational Ottoman

agents. What were their backgrounds? How did they conceptualize what they were doing?

In what words did they project the Ottoman center’s power in Tripoli? And perhaps most

importantly, how does it compare to their contemporary rivals in North Africa. I believe

that it is time to offer a balanced account of the issue which is informed by both internal

dynamics within the empire and external pressures leading to the Ottoman intervention.

The present thesis tries to approach the issue more comprehensively, defining the actors,

their discourse, and larger implications of their actions within domestic and foreign

policies of the Ottoman Empire. I argue that Ottomans decided to intervene in Tripoli

because, as it is nicely put by Şükrü Hanioğlu, they see that “a loosely bound association

of disparate, semi-independently ruled territories could not expect to survive” and “the

attempt to establish a new balance between the center and the periphery was thus an

16

existential imperative” (Hanioğlu, 2010, 40). In other words, centralization was a form of

participating in the inter-imperial competition and it was in its essence a survival strategy.

As I have already touched upon, regional variables are extremely important to understand

the relative success of the Ottoman center’s expansion into the periphery. This is exactly

what I seek to achieve in Chapter 1 which discusses the processes leading to the decline

of Karamanlı power. I believe that the combination of the decline of Karamanlı power

and timeliness of Ottoman action was the major factor behind eventual success. In

Chapter 2, the process from the outbreak of dynastic struggle to Ottoman intervention is

analyzed. Moreover, major contenders to Libyan territory are enumerated and their

respective policies are examined. These include Mehmet Ali of Egypt, France, Britain,

and the Ottoman Empire, and for a brief period, Huseynids of Tunisia. Fear plays into the

picture exactly at this moment. Yet, I also delve into the major characters’ involvement

in the decision-making process. Serasker Hüsrev Mehmet Pasha, Damat Halil Rıfat

Pasha, and Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha were the masterminds of this intervention. I

mentioned some works that conceptualize the Ottoman intervention as an act of colonial

penetration into Libyan interior. However, my research shows that people directly

involved with the decision-making process do not attach such meaning to their action.

Nonetheless, it also does not mean that Ottoman intentions were devoid of imperial

designs and pursuit of the economic prospects of the region. Accordingly, Chapter 3

carries out a retrospective discussion of Ottoman political mentality in 19th century with

regards to what modern literature termed as Ottoman orientalism and colonialism to make

sense of the Ottoman policies after the city of Tripoli is put under direct control. It is clear

from the primary documents that Ottomans created a social otherness in viewing the

unruly tribal chiefs that defied the Ottoman authority and rebelled against officials sent

from Istanbul. In that sense, the findings of the study show that the emergence of such an

attitude predates the conventionally known period. Nonetheless, I disagree with the use

of the terms such as colonialism and orientalism in accounting for this behavior because

I believe that its use takes it out of its proper historical context.

17

2. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF YUSUF PASHA KARAMANLI (1795-1832)

2.1 Yusuf Defying the Rules of Succession

The Karamanlı family is a local dynasty with Anatolian origins. Even though some

sources date their settling in Tripoli back to initial conquest of the region by Turgut Reis

in 1551, it is more likely that they have come to the region sometime after 1600 (Mantran

2001). Territorially speaking, Libya, as it is known today, is a by-product of the

Karamanlı rule which united the hitherto unconnected regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica,

and Fezzan. Karamanlı rule has started with the Ahmed Bey who took advantage of

eventful years of the 1710s to establish himself as the sole power in the region. In the end,

he was able to get the official recognition of Ottoman Sultan instituting him as the

governor of the region in 1722. His descendants enjoyed a rule that is virtually

independent of the imperial center and held on to their title as the governor of the Tripoli

for four generations until 1835 when Ottomans finally removed the family from power.

The founder of the dynasty, Karamanlı Ahmed (r.1711-1745) tried to establish

primogeniture as the principle of succession. After his death, the fresh memory of his

achievements provided his son Mehmed with a smooth accession to his father’s position.

The remainder of his reign passed in tranquility concerning power struggles within the

family. However, the issue of succession appeared as a serious problem after him. When

Ali Pasha, as the eldest son of Mehmed, claimed his father’s position, his uncle Mustafa

opposed him, showing apparent disapproval of Ahmed Pasha’s preference for

primogeniture. His first attempt at overthrowing his nephew was silenced by appointing

Mustafa as the Bey and giving him the administration of Cyrenaica. It was understood

soon that this could only be a temporary solution when rumors aroused in the Tripoli that

other Karamanlı princes were plotting against Ali and intend to call Mustafa to lead

another coup d’état.

18

Table 1: Karamanlı Succession and family tree

In response, Ali Pasha sent a force of three thousand soldiers to Cyrenaica on the pretext

of suppressing tribal unrest whereas the covert mission was to arrest and assassinate

Mustafa and his trusted men. Running from them, Mustafa managed to escape to Tunis,

from where he continued to pose a serious threat to Ali Pasha’s regime. Mustafa’s

challenge, being not decisively eliminated, set an example for future princes of Karamanlı

family who are lusting for power (Fọlayan 1979, 4-5). Yusuf was indeed one of them.

Yusuf was the third and youngest son of reigning governor of the Tripoli, Ali Pasha

Karamanlı. Being as such, he was not entitled to ascend to the highest position in the

province, that of his father’s. However, this only encouraged him to take action as to

secure what he believed rightfully his. On his way to the throne, there was Hasan Bey,

the eldest brother, who consolidated his power in the late 1770s taking advantage of their

father’s incurable absenteeism from state business and his position as the commander-inchief

of the province’s army. Even though Ahmed, the second brother, hadn’t got as much

support in the administrative elite of Tripoli as his elder brother, he was still in a better

position compared to their little brother Yusuf in terms of being the heir apparent.

Nevertheless, Yusuf did not wait for fortune to come and find him, he had built up his

own luck.

Ahmed Karamanlı (r.1711-1745)

Mahmut Mehmed Karamanlı (r.1745-1754)

Ali Karamanlı (r.1754-1793)

Hasan Yusuf Karamanlı (r.1795-1832)

Mehmed

Mehmed

Ahmet Ali Karamanlı

(r.1832-1835) Mehmed Mustafa İbrahim Osman

Ahmed

Yusuf

19

In 1780s, Ali Pasha’s grip over the regions of Fezzan and Cyrenaica which are formerly

tied up to Tripoli by Ahmed Karamanli’s successful campaigns was loosening as the

internal revolts increased in frequency and intensity Hasan Bey was the one who actively

tried to pacify these revolts, a policy which wins him a considerable popularity in the

ruling elite. For inordinately ambitious Yusuf, this was unacceptable. Consequently, in

1788, Yusuf finally tried his chances twice to eliminate his brother during a campaign

against the rebellious Evlad-ı Süleyman tribe.

Even though the attempts were evaded thanks to the vigilance of Hasan Bey’s close men,

Yusuf was determined to clear his way. In the following year, Yusuf tricked his mother

to call Hasan Bey unarmed to her presence by claiming that he intends to reach a

permanent reconciliation. Hopeful of ending the vicious cycle of animosity, Hasan Bey

appeared unarmed in front of their mother despite his suspicions. A fatal underestimation

of Yusuf’s lust for power, indeed. On the spot, Yusuf murdered his own brother without

hesitation. This meant that if Yusuf was ever to get hold of Tripoli’s seat of government,

he needed to come up with a solution to win over the supports of the general populace

and government dignitaries.

Folayan’s estimation is that some measures taken by Yusuf were successful in

manipulating the populace so much so that about one and a half years’ time, Yusuf

gathered a force of six hundred armed men around him, especially in the Menşiye region,

a quarter whose geographical position was overseeing the main supply routes of the

Tripoli and its control was easing the monitoring of the movements of reinforcements and

blockading of the supply routes of the city (Fọlayan 1979, 8-9).

After his hopes to achieve a smoother transition in the Tripolitan throne by orchestrating

a palace coup came to naught when his brother turned his offer to cooperate, this left overambitious

Yusuf with a single choice, that is, paving his way by way of brute force. A

failed assassination attempt followed at his brother’s life followed this conviction.

Being aware of the growing tensions between his sons, Ali Pasha ordered the arming of

city-folk and called for reinforcements from Misurata Arabs. Resonation of this plea with

the Arabs of Misurata led Yusuf to hasten up his plans to lay a siege to the city. Ultimately,

Yusuf’s fear of being outnumbered and outplayed against the recently renovated city

defenses and refreshed manpower evolved into a civil war that will continue for two years,

1791-1793.

20

For about one and a half year, defensive forces in the city successfully repulsed Yusuf’s

attacks and briefly succeeded in pushing Yusuf’s forces to the suburbs of the Menşiye.

However, the initial disadvantageous position of Yusuf revolved into a stalemate. The

incessant flow of reinforcements thanks to the broad popular support enjoyed by his

brother and superior firepower of the city defenses was gradually dismantling due to Ali

Pasha’s vague treatment of his rebel son -he even publicly propagated for not considering

Yusuf as a rebel- and Yusuf’s ability to paralyze the economic life of the city.

Furthermore, Yusuf was working hard to broaden his power base by bargaining with

Berbers and Arabs of Tarhuna, Mesellate and Sahil regions. In the summer of 1793,

numerical superiority was lying with Yusuf and the desperateness of the city defenses

grew into fighting with stones. Under such circumstances, Ali Pasha made his move to

refresh the defensive by calling for the assistance of Huseynids of Tunisia against his

rebellious son. Refreshed as such, the defensive managed to halt the advancement of

Yusuf’s forces, creating one more deadlock, only to be crushed by an unexpected external

party, Ali Bulgur (Fọlayan 1979, 12-15).

Ali Bulgur was a convert in the service of the Dey of Algiers. He gradually rose to

prominence in his court and eventually reached the highest position in the navy. After he

was accused by those who are resented by his arrogant conduct in office, he fled to

Istanbul where his brother was serving Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. In this capacity, he was

sent to Tripoli when Ali Pasha’s governorship was symbolically renewed. It was exactly

at this time that he witnessed the decaying authority of Ali Pasha of Tripoli. Two brothers

had decided to venture into overthrowing the Karamanlı dynasty from power. To this end,

they persuaded some Tripolitan merchants to petition the Sultan with regards to their

discontent with the ruling family. Allegedly, Ali Pasha was empowering Jewish

merchants and was responsible for the death of his eldest son Hasan Bey. These prominent

merchants were asking a naval squadron to be dispatched to take full control of the

province by the Sultan. However, at the time, the Ottoman navy did not have the

necessary means to carry out operations in Tripoli as well.

Some historians have argued that Ali Bulgur arrived in Tripoli in an official capacity,

acting by the orders of Sultan Selim III. However, when presented with the petition of

Tripolitan merchants and Ali Bulgur’s plan, Selim simply dismissed these by saying “we

don’t attend to such low business.” It was rather a political adventure of Ali’s own at the

21

beginning as evidenced by the fact that he procured the eight ships and necessary crew to

operate these ships with his private means. Contemporary witnesses, though, recount that

upon boarding Tripolitan harbor, an official ferman declaring the dismissal of the Ali

Pasha Karamanlı and recognition of Ali Bulgur as the Sultan’s deputy was read aloud by

a çavuş coming from Istanbul. In fact, Ali Bulgur was presenting a mere fabrication read

by an impostor çavuş. Sublime Porte’s recognition came only after Ali Bulgur seized

power completely in March 1794. (Taş 2016, 252-256) This has provided Ali Bulgur’s

regime with a legal basis and the support of some tribes from the interior of the country.

While Yusuf remained in the Menşiye to sustain the siege, his brother and father took

refuge in Tunis.

Now, Yusuf, thus far an infamous rebel and murderer, was presented with a unique

opportunity to portray himself as the liberator of the Tripoli from the yoke of a political

adventurer who in part diminished the de facto independence of Tripoli from Istanbul.

This was, however, no easy task because Ali Bulgur was firmly establishing himself

within the city by persuading former Karamanlı officials to collaborate. Those who did

not comply were forced to vacate their positions and were replaced by Ali Bulgur’s

mercenary.

Things were further complicated for Yusuf by Ali Bulgur’s effective foreign policy. He

ingeniously played on the fear of small European states and urged their consuls to

consider Tripoli with equal international standing with the Algiers. This practically meant

a wider range of subsidies to be given to Ali Bulgur’s regime if these vulnerable states

were willing to renew their treaties which would protect their commercial shipping

operations from the harm that may possibly be done by Tripolitan corsairs. This translated

into thirty-five barrels of gunpowder, skilled artisans to build up a vessel of sixteen guns

and two hundred fifty tons of corn, a crucial supply to feed the mercenary garrison. When

Sultan Selim’s recognition instituting Ali Bulgur as the one who reigns in his name, the

dispatch also brought a vessel of twenty-two guns as a gift (Taş 2016, 256). Meanwhile,

he also enjoyed the arrival of a reinforcement of five hundred mercenary soldiers sent by

his brother. In short, Bulgur’s ranks were toughening.

In August 1794, now officially recognized Pasha of Tripoli defeated Yusuf’s forces in the

stationed in the Menşiye, making Yusuf abandon the siege and retreat from the region.

Ali Bulgur was ever more powerful in the Tripoli thanks to the new political arrangement

22

he made with the Arab chiefs of the interior. Bulgur’s success was mainly thanks to the

help they provided in the form of warriors and supplies for the city. They probably

reckoned that Ali Bulgur had come to stay after he got the affirmation of the Ottoman

Sultan (Fọlayan 1979, 19).

It may have been the end of Karamanlı dynasty if Ali Bulgur had acted with more caution

against the Bey of Tunisia. I have already touched upon the fact that Bey of Tunis offered

asylum to Karamanlı family after Bulgur’s takeover. This time, Yusuf turned to ask

military help against his now formidable enemy who succeeded in crushing his forces.

The answer was affirmative. The prime motivation of the bey of Tunis in deciding to help

Yusuf, however, was Ali Bulgur himself. After he had decisively beaten Yusuf, Ali

Bulgur launched a campaign against the territorial interest of the Bey of Tunis. He ordered

his forces to take possession of the island of Cerbe and continued to lay a siege to the city

of Sfax. Greatly alarmed by such bold moves of the Ali Bulgur, Bey of Tunis took

immediate action as to remove him. Escorted by the members of Karamanlı family, he

commanded a combination of naval and land forces nearly amounting to forty thousand

men to march against the occupational force in Cerbe. After easily securing victory there,

this huge army sailed towards Tripoli where they retook the Menşiye quarter in a matter

of hours in 18th January 1795 (Fọlayan 1979, 20).

Next morning, it appeared that Ali Bulgur had escaped from the Tripoli with two vessels,

plundering what is left from Karamanlı family in the mansion of Ali Pasha. Tripoli was

again about to go under the sway of Karamanlis, but city folk refused to open the gates,

being fearful of a looting activity on the part of Tunisian troops. At this critical juncture,

Yusuf assumed the leadership to persuade the general populace to raise an extraordinary

tax to buy off the Tunisian troops and pay for their troubles. After an agreement was

reached Tunisian troops left the Tripoli and Ahmed and Yusuf triumphantly re-entered

the city. As their father was seriously ill and his abdication was formally recognized by

Ottoman Sultan, Ahmed as the heir apparent assumed the throne. Nevertheless, his reign

proved to be short-lived. Drawing on the popular support he gained during his struggle

against the occupation of Ali Bulgur and his brother’s feebleness in devising any policy

that would put a halt to the disastrous situation of the country after four years of political

instability and warfare, Yusuf had the doors of the city closed when his brother Ahmed

went outside the city walls. Ahmed was left with no choice other than leaving (Abun23

Nasr 1987, 196). At last Yusuf’s long-awaited political ambition became the new reality

of Tripoli as he assumed the Tripoli’s seat of power.

2.2 Tripoli under Yusuf Pasha

Yusuf Pasha’s seizure of power after a protracted period of political instability, marked

by civil war and a struggle to regain power in Tripoli, was followed by a revival of the

economy and political prowess of the Tripoli in the international arena. Yusuf Pasha’s

way to achieve this was a distinctly North African phenomenon. Namely, the creation of

a strong navy that would pose a formidable threat to commercial shipping in the

Mediterranean.

To increase the naval strength of Tripoli, the port was secured by the amendment

fortifications of the city and stationing of canons. Then followed an increased investment

in shipbuilding. The rapid growth of the navy caught the attention of Istanbul which had

gifted two strong warships. The already impressive number of eleven ships in 1798 was

doubled due to the outbreak of the American War in 1801, building the naval inventory

up to twenty-four ships in 1805. (Fọlayan 1979, 27).

Before the eighteenth century closed, Tripolitan naval forces successfully targeted the

commercial shipping of several European states and the U.S.A and forced these countries

to renew or get into treaty arrangements with Tripoli to secure safe passage in the

Mediterranean. The policy of extortion was largely successful. While Spain and Venice

quickly paid their dues, the insubordinations of the Swedes, the Dutch and the Danish

were returned by attacking their shipping. The imminent danger made the first two have

a change of heart and they readily abide by what Yusuf Pasha had asked to release their

ships and prisoners. Denmark ordered his Mediterranean fleet under the command of

Captain Bille to attack Tripoli to save those who are captured. Significantly, Bille’s

success in the confrontation fell short of taking back the captives until a new peace

agreement was negotiated. Even more significant is that the naval victory did not lead to

a decrease either in the yearly tribute or the lump sum that must be paid right after the

conclusion of the agreement. Ragusans also fell victim to Yusuf Pasha’s ambition and

agreed to pay a yearly tribute despite the Sublime Porte’s protection of this Republic and

its active intervention on their behalf. After the use of naval force as an active tool of

24

diplomatic extortion, a sum of 322.000 Spanish piastres had been poured into Tripolitan

treasure (Taş 2016, 266-269). This money was about to be used in the pacification of the

regions of Fezzan and Cyrenaica.

The historical development of Tripolitan-American relations showed at the beginning an

almost verisimilitude with those stated above. In 1796, Yusuf Pasha negotiated with

American representative and parties signed a treaty of friendship. However, given the fact

that the terms of the treaty were not favorable in the eyes of Yusuf Pasha, American

attitude in honoring the mutually agreed terms was even more disappointing. As a result,

things took an unexpected turn in 1801 when Yusuf Pasha declared a war that would

continue for four years against the United States. To understand the reasons and outcomes

of this clash, it is imperative to take a detour and investigate the North African-American

relations in more detail before we delve into how Yusuf Pasha expanded his rule around

the nucleus he created in Tripoli with the help of the refilled treasury.

2.2.1 North African-American relations and Yusuf Pasha’s disillusionment with

the Treaty of 1796

The American Revolution had not only provided the American people with their

independence but also deprived them of the British protection that they were enjoying in

the Mediterranean waters. After the British recognition of American independence in

September 1783, the American commercial shipping had inevitably become a legitimate

target for the North African rulers. British efforts to put a halt to the American inflow into

the Mediterranean ports and a consequent flourishment of trade between U.S and

Mediterranean basin did not stop at abolishing their protection of the American shipping

(Lambert 2005, 15-16). Not only did they allegedly delivered the routes of American

ships to Algerians throughout the 1780s, but they also extended their diplomatic efforts

in 1793 to conclude the ongoing war between the Portuguese and Algiers to secure safe

passage for Algerian corsair navy which would hunt down American merchants even in

the Atlantic. As naturally infuriating as it was for the American public and the Congress,

they had not got a navy that would escort their merchant fleet, a fact which encouraged

British activities (Kurat. 1964, 188-189).

25

The imminent danger of being hunted by corsair fleets turned into a reality in 1784 when

Moroccans captured an American ship named Betsey. However, it was soon understood

that this hostile act was to establish proper diplomatic channels. The Moroccan ruler was

offended by the fact that no diplomatic mission was sent to his realm despite his

recognition of the United States as an independent country (Allison 1995, 7-8). After John

Adams had notified the Congress that it would be wise to negotiate with the Barbary

Powers in 1783, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams had been authorized to carry out the

negotiations. In the case of Morocco, the misunderstanding had been easily addressed and

two parties concluded a peace treaty within a month (Lambert 2005, 58-59).

The ease with which Americans had come to terms with the Moroccans had created an

illusion in the American diplomatic circles that the same would be possible with other

powers in the North African coastline. However, the truth of the matter unfolded in a

starkly contrasting manner. Problems for the Americans multiplied as the promise of the

French King to act as a mediator between the Barbary Powers and the United States came

to a naught after the outbreak of the French Revolution. Now, the only solution to reach

a rapprochement was to establish direct diplomatic contact with each of these powers. In

the meantime, Tripolitan and Algerian pirates were consistently preying on American

shipping.

The American diplomatic mission in Europe had for some time hoped that they would

not be obliged to pay large sums of money for brokering peace agreements. They were

soon to understand that their hopes were at best childish. In 1786, the American mission

represented by John Lamb tried to approach the Dey of Algiers with the expectation to

reach an agreement with regards to the release of the recently captured American citizens.

The amount demanded by Dey was fourteenth times higher than Lamb was keen to pay

on behalf of the United States (Allison 1995, 12). It goes without saying that under the

circumstances first American attempt proved to be an utter failure.

Upon the arrival of a letter written by the American captive Richard O’Brien, in which

he enumerated the conditions of a possible truce between U.S and Algiers, the American

President George Washington asked the Congress to consider acting in accordance with

the propositions of O’Brien. The news was also circulating that now the time is ripe to

renegotiate with the Dey of Algiers. However, both O’Brien and the ultimate ruling of

Congress was utterly optimistic. It was authorizing the payment of 40.000 dollars for

26

ransoming the prisoners, an additional 25.000 dollars of lumpsum and lastly a yearly

tribute of equal amount (Kurat 1964, 187). Shortly after American commissioner David

Humphreys departed from Lisbon, news reached that the peace between the Algerians

and the Portuguese had been concluded. Given the incentive, the Dey of Algiers

dispatched his navy which eventually captured eleven American ships in the Atlantic.

The Dey also sent word that he would accept no American commissioner whatsoever.

Now, the price of the peace was to be placed much higher, against the optimistic position

of American Congress. Even though Humphreys continued his efforts to establish a

connection with the Dey of Algiers, he soon realized that requesting the mediation of

other parties was in vain. He had returned to Lisbon after the second unfortunate

diplomatic failure (Kurat 1964, 188).

The recurring theme of diplomatic failures in the North African coast led to heated

debates in the Congress. There occurred a strong opinion that the U.S. should build its

own navy to fight back those who are acting against the interest of the American nation.

In fact, this was an idea which Thomas Jefferson put forward repeatedly in every chance

he gets ever since his days as the American representative at Paris. Now, him being the

Secretary of the State and, given the American diplomacy stuck into, the Congress agreed

to pay more than a million dollars to start constructing a strong navy (Lambert 2005,

impasse 79-80).

In the meantime, Humphreys restarted his efforts to negotiate with the Dey of Algiers

after he was authorized to spend 800.000 dollars to free American captives in Algeria.

Upon the request of Humphreys, the Swedish consul in Algiers mediated the delivery of

the news that Americans want to reach an agreement with Hasan Dey. It turned out shortly

after that what Hasan Dey was asking 2.435.000 dollars. Even though this was beyond

the imaginable for the Americans, the matter had to be resolved. Accordingly, Americans

have demonstrated a strong will to sit on to negotiate. The eventual agreement brokered

by American representative Joel Barlow included that Americans should pay a lump sum

of 642.000 dollars and 216.000 dollars yearly tribute or shipbuilding material of the same

value. It is said that with the added value of other presents to be given to Dey of Algiers,

the total cost of the long-awaited peace was about one million dollars (Lambert 2005, 82).

Americans also agreed to build and arm numerous ships in American dockyards to be

delivered to Algiers. Joel Barlow proved himself to be a good negotiator. He convinced

Hasan Dey to act as a mediator and guarantor of future agreements to be reached with

27

other Barbary Powers. After Humphreys on whose behalf Barlow was negotiating

approved the treaty in Lisbon, it was sent to be ratified by the U.S. government, which

did so on March 2, 1796 (Kurat 1964, 192).

The promise given by Hasan Dey to act as a mediator and guarantor of future treaties that

Americans would possibly sign with remaining powers along the North African coast

turned out to be a defining moment for Tripolitan-American relations which culminated

into a full-fledged naval confrontation in 1801. On the one hand, it was far easier to

approach Yusuf Pasha Karamanli who knew that the Hasan Dey’s backing of the United

States was binding for him. However, it was something he found disgracefully offensive.

Given that no treaty relationship between the two had yet to be established and Yusuf

Pasha was rebuilding the Tripolitan navy, it was only a matter of time American shipping

would be targeted. It was in August 1796 when American ships the Betsey and the Sophia

were captured that the Americans felt the encroachment of the Tripolitan corsair fleet

under the command of Scottish renegade Murad Reis, admiral of Yusuf Pasha. The Betsey

was added to Tripolitan naval inventory as a warship while the latter was released because

it carries the treaty money intended for Hasan Dey (Fọlayan 1979, 31).

The natural course of action for the United States was to seek an opportunity to negotiate.

Former captive of Hasan Dey, Richard O’Brien was tasked with finding common ground

with Yusuf Pasha. On the first round of talks, O’Brien’s offer was only 40.000 dollars for

the ransom and peace together. In the eyes of Yusuf Pasha, this was nothing, but an

outrageous insult compared to 642.000 paid by the U.S. to Algiers. Furthermore, rumors

of American willingness to pay 180.000 dollars to Tunis were circulating. Thus, he

refused to come to terms with O’Brien under these accords. Hasan Dey’s influence played

into the picture in favor of American representative and later in the month Pasha had

agreed to strike a peace deal in return for a “sum of 40.000 dollars, together with ‘consular

presents of 12.000 dollars cash and some naval stores – canvas, pitch, boards, etc.”

(Fọlayan 1979, 31). For the time being, peace was established but things were soon to

change.

The last ruler to make peace with was Hammuda Bey of Tunis. He had a direct way of

engaging with the Americans. The American commissioner in Algiers, Joel Barlow

received a notification from a French merchant residing in Tunis, Joseph Étienne Famin

which stated the desire of Hammuda Bey to get into peaceful relations. The letter also

28

asserted Bey’s terms for peace and included that Bey requires an answer within six

months. It translates as if his demands would not be met in due time, Bey would withdraw

his orders that banned preying on American shipping, thereby setting free all the wrath of

his corsair fleet. Americans were tempted by this offer in view of their thirteen years of

efforts to secure safe passage in the Mediterranean waters. They complied with what

Hammuda Bey demanded and paid 180.000 dollars in addition to the promise of the

delivery of an American-built brig in 1797 (Lambert 2005, 92).

For the maintenance of the peace, Americans had appointed resident consuls in each of

the North African capitals; Richard O’Brien as consul-general of Algiers with superintendant

power over the consuls of Tunis and Tripoli, and William Eaton as consul at

Tunis. However, the appointment of James Leander Cathcart as the consul at Tripoli

delayed until 1799. It must be said that it only made things worse for because especially

Cathcart’s was a bitter job given that Yusuf Pasha was obliged by Hasan Dey’s pressure

to sign a treaty that he did not want to (Kurat. 1964, 199).

It was upon the terms of this very peace treaty and absence of Cathcart that the tensions

between the United States and Tripoli had escalated. Articles I and XII stipulated that if

any disagreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty should arise between the

signatories, the mutual friend Hasan Dey would be the arbitrator. For Tripolitans, the

meaning of this was simple enough; arbitration of a mutual friend. On the other hand, the

American position was markedly different. They interpreted these articles as

manifestations of Tripoli’s dependence upon the Algiers and Hasan Dey’s position vis-àvis

Yusuf Pasha as one of a political overlord. In fact, this misconception was further

attested by the structure of consular representation in Barbary; Richard O’Brien having

the super-intendant duties. At least it was how he presented it to one of Yusuf Pasha’s

envoys to Algiers in 1797. For a man of Yusuf’s ambition, this misunderstanding was

unacceptable. He repeatedly demanded from Americans to treat him as an independent

ruler and his state as a sovereign one. In return, Americans had failed to honor treaty

obligations. There was no evidence whatsoever as to when the consular presents would

arrive. Neither any word was heard from the appointment of a resident consul. Nor the

promised warship had been delivered. When Yusuf Pasha formally requested a reply from

O’Brien, his answer worked only to aggravate the situation. While Tunis and Algiers were

getting the promised items in their treaties, Yusuf’s share was a mere excuse stipulating

the harsh winter in America as the reason why American promises were not still delivered

29

after almost two years since the treaty had been ratified (Fọlayan 1979, 32-35). Even after

the American Consul James Catchard’s arrival to Tripoli, the American attitude remained

mostly unchanged despite their firsthand experience of Yusuf Pasha’s protests.

Eventually, American attitude forced Yusuf Pasha to change his position. In the

meantime, the Tripolitan navy organized a capture of an American ship in October 1800.

Yusuf Pasha ordered its release and reprimanded the responsible parties only to show that

he is still inclined to honor the agreement of 1796. At the same time, it was to remind

Americans that Tripoli is a major naval power capable of reprehending the violations of

the treaties it is a signatory of. After a full year had passed and no answer from the

President had arrived in his court, Yusuf Pasha was left with one choice; that is to cut off

diplomatic relations and declare war against the U.S. on May 14, 1801. He also added

that as of now the terms of the treaty are obsolete and if Americans want to renew it, an

amount of 250.000 dollars and a yearly tribute of 20.000 dollars were the prices of the

peace (Kurat 1964, 199).

After deliberations with his cabinet and assuring the constitutionality of sending a naval

squadron into the Mediterranean, newly inaugurated president Thomas Jefferson decided

to retaliate with force. However, the main strategy of Jefferson was to “awe and talk.”

(Lambert 2005, 124) He thought that an effective naval blockade would teach Tripolitans

a sound lesson not to mess with U.S. shipping anymore. His hopes however foundered on

the shores of Tripoli. The American bombardments were highly ineffective, leaving

minimal damage in the city at best. Likewise, the naval blockade of Tripolitan harbor was

continuously breached by a Tripolitan fleet commanded by Murad Reis. Repeated

incursions to capture American ships was crowned by the seizing of American warship

the Philadelphia in 1803, which increased the number of enslaved Americans up to more

than three hundred (Dearden 1976, 159).

The success of the Tripolitan navy and city walls in warding off the American attacks led

Americans to come up with a brilliant plan. Even though it is not clear who first conceived

the idea of stirring Ahmed Karamanlı to stage a coup d’état, the plan was perfected and

executed by William Eaton who was serving as the American consul at Tunis at the time

(Folayan 1979, 36). It was envisioned that in every possible scenario, Ahmed’s challenge

to Yusuf’s regime would give a bargaining advantage to the Americans’ interest. Thus,

after tracking Ahmed into the deeps of Egypt, William Eaton convinced Ahmed

30

Karamanlı to a triumphant march through the Libyan desert in the company of unruly

tribal warriors. They eventually managed to take Derna, a coastal town east of Tripoli

(Dearden 1976, 189).

Hearing the victory of Ahmed, Yusuf Pasha finally agreed to finalize the armed-conflict

and negotiate a new treaty of “Peace and Amity”. It anticipated the evacuation of Derna

and mutual exchange of war-prisoners on the condition that the U.S. would pay a ransom

of 60.000 dollars. It has been publicized as a U.S. win by Thomas Jefferson and today, it

is mostly taken as a moment bolstering national pride. Be that as it may, it is safe to argue

that this was, in fact, a confrontation ending up with a draw because Yusuf Pasha had

obtained the international recognition he so desperately sought after ever since he

ascended to the throne. There was no mention of Algerine guarantee whatsoever in the

treaty. Moreover, any last glimmer of hope on the part of his brother Ahmed to seize the

Tripolitan seat of power had waned away. Last but not least, a handsome amount of

ransom was secured for the release of American prisoners (Folayan 1972, 261-70).

2.2.2 Expansion of Yusuf’s Patrimonial Rule

The administrative structure was much more elaborate in Yusuf pasha's time in office

compared to the system which existed under his predecessors even though it was still

patrimonial in essence. Now, the divan transformed from being a mere military council

into a more complex political structure which was presided over by Yusuf Pasha himself

and attended by top-level state officials such as the Treasurer (Hazinedar), Admiral of

the navy (Reis al-Marine), commander-in-chief of land forces (Agha), Yusuf’s deputy

(Grand Kahya), and mayor (sheikh) of Tripoli. The title Bey came to signify a generic

meaning of governor and assumed by appointed officials of Yusuf Pasha in Cyrenaica

and Fezzan.

Apart from the revenues, the government of Tripoli gained through piratical activities the

treasury was also fed by Trans Saharan trade, especially in slaves. His control of the slave

trade enabled him to strengthen his hold over the rulers of Fezzan by way of exerting

heavy tributes. He also established a state monopoly on the exportation of agricultural

goods and livestock. While personally overseeing the trade of some produce in others he

granted the privilege to trade that particular product to some merchants in return for a

31

fixed annual payment (Abun-Nasr 1987, 199). Accumulation of financial resources in the

hands of Yusuf Pasha allowed him to reorganize end expand the military force Tripoli

can put into use against those who defied pasha’s authority. The veterans of this army

were already battle-hardened in the American war and served as the nucleus around which

Yusuf could increase their strength.

Even before the war with America had come to an end, Yusuf Pasha’s political problems

started to surface. In the summer of 1803, Berbers of Gharian Mountains rejected to pay

the annual tribute they customarily owe to Yusuf Pasha responded with a large military

force, too great for Gharians to put up a fight against. At last, they not only find

themselves in the position of paying a heavy indemnity but also lost their autonomy as

Yusuf Pasha obliged them to permanently host a Tripolitan garrison in the region.

As soon as the peace with America had been concluded, Yusuf Pasha turned his attention

to Derna. After his brother's departure, he aimed at strengthening his authority by

reinforcing the military force whose cost of maintaining was burdened on the residents of

the city short-lived support to Ahmed.

This was only a preamble to Yusuf Pasha’s plan to systematically pacify the country. The

first problem on his way was the tribe of Evlad-ı Süleyman who had rebelled against the

pasha in 1807 due to their growing suspicion of Yusuf Pasha’s centralizing policies. Their

strategy was to cut off the link of Tripoli with Fezzan, thereby ensuring the obstruction

of the flow trans-Saharan trade which cripples Yusuf pasha's commercial gains from the

trade with regions like Sudan. The formidable force sent against them under the command

of Mehmed Bey, first son of the Pasha, managed to defeat their adversary and fortunately

for Tripolitan interests the leader of the Evlad-ı Süleyman tribe was killed during one of

the military confrontations along with many of his man. In the absence of strong

leadership, the rebellion died out. The remainder of the clan submitted to pasha’s

authority as their fellow tribesmen were taken as hostages against any future mischief.

Three years later in 1810, Yusuf started to proactively orchestrate his political program.

This time he aimed to put the regions bordering Sudan, that are Ghadames and Fezzan,

under the sway of his rule in hoping to fully exploit the economic prospects. These regions

were incredibly important trade hubs connecting Tripoli with Timbuktu (today located in

Mali), Hausaland (today correspond s to the area of northern Nigeria and the Republic of

Niger), and Bornu (today located in Nigeria) which also housed wealthy financiers of

32

Sudanese trade. The expedition to Ghadames led by Yusuf Pasha’s third son, Ali, did not

face any resistance by the city folk. Thinking that a protracted defensive war would be

bad for business, the city surrendered to Ali’s terms. They were to pay an indemnity and

accept the Pasha’s imposition of a governor who would directly collect the future customs

duties of the city.

In the case of Fezzan, Yusuf Pasha adopted a policy of gradual subjugation. Ruled by

Kanem from 13th to 15th centuries, Fezzan came to be dominated by a Sharifian dynasty

called Evlad-ı Muhammed in the 16th century. This family ruled over Fezzan

independently without interruption until the founder of the Karamanlı house had

succeeded in making Evlad-ı Muhammed a tributary of Tripoli in the first half of the 18th

century. In the subsequent years when the descendants of the Ahmed Karamanlı grow

weaker and fed up by indolent lives, Tripoli’s authority over Fezzan attenuated gradually.

When Yusuf Pasha ascended to the throne, Evlad-ı Muhammad had already fully

recovered its political power and annual tributes due to Tripoli came to be unregularized.

At first, Yusuf Pasha made do with the status quo. Yusuf’s growing military strength,

however, allowed him to exert pressure for the regularization of due tributes. For this

purpose, he appointed Muhammed al-Mukni as the collector in 1790s. Al-Mukni started

to build a case against the Evlad-ı Muhammed, trying to prove that Fezzan can pay a

significantly higher amount of tribute thanks to enormously rich resources of the region.

He suggested that Yusuf Pasha should establish more direct control over the region by

eliminating the reigning dynasty and put the region under someone who would act as

Yusuf’s delegate.

Al-Mukni’s suggestions resonated well with Yusuf Pasha who himself was actively trying

to better exploit commercially important parts of his realm. When all these coincided with

the lately hostile position of the reigning Sultan Muntasir of the Fezzan, Yusuf decided

that it is time to act. Not only Muntasir attempted to cut the direct trade between Bornu

and Tripoli in 1807, but he also provided safe haven to rebellious Evlad-ı Süleyman

tribesmen. Using these as a pretext to a successful military campaign, Yusuf Pasha

instigated his agent as the new ruler of the Fezzan and allowed him to use the titles

enjoyed by overthrown dynasty. In return, al-Mukni promised a yearly tribute three times

more than Evlad-ı Muhammed did. However, Yusuf Pasha’s control over the region was

33

now undisputed as it is evidenced by the fact that he removed al-Mukni from power when

he deemed it necessary in 1820 (Fọlayan 1979, 51-53).

In the meantime, trying to take advantage of Yusuf Pasha’s concentration on the southern

regions, various tribes in Benghazi, Gulf of Sirte and Derna refused to hold up their end

of the tributary arrangements. Therefore, a strong military contingent was put together

under the command of Mehmed Bey. This force quickly defeated the oppositional force

in Derna and executed the leading figures of this insurrection. Then, Bey continued to

Benghazi, tribes of which quickly fulfilled their obligations to pay tribute and reclaimed

their loyalty to Yusuf Pasha. The suppression of Evlad-ı Ali Arabs in the Gulf of Sirte,

however, proved much harder. Yet, Mehmed’s forces outnumbered them and possessed

superior firepower. When the insurgents were decisively defeated, Muhammed singled

out the leaders and brutally executed them to make an example out of them by hanging

their heads over the castle in Tripoli.

Muhammed taking pride with his decisive victory over the insurgents of eastern

Cyrenaica grew ever more arrogant and power-hungry. Consequently, to detract his son

from his proximity, Yusuf granted him the governorship of the Benghazi and Derna. This

could only be an opportunity for Mehmed who used it wisely by mounting a rebellion

with the support of Zuaza tribes in 1816. Against this threat, Yusuf Pasha charged his

second son Ahmed with the task of eliminating his brother’s rebellion. An unexpectedly

formidable force was gathered with the support of Misurata Arabs and several other

tribes. It was a triumphal march, indeed, as even before arriving at Derna, it scared off

most of the Mehmed’s supporters, leading Mehmed himself to retreat to Bombah, a small

town close to the Egyptian frontier.

As for the people of Derna who rallied around Mehmed Bey, Ahmed Bey granted a

tentative amnesty after they renounced Mehmed’s cause. After his victory in Derna,

Ahmed ordered each town in the Cyrenaica region to send a delegation to a ceremony in

which Ahmed would celebrate his victory and give Arab leaders red cloaks in recognition

of their contribution to Ahmed’s victory over his brother. Even though some of the leaders

grew suspicious of Ahmed’s invitation, most of them welcomed Ahmed’s offer.

Nonetheless, they insisted that only forty-three of their leaders would be present at the

celebrations. This, Ahmed agreed. Unalarmed by the fate expecting them in the official

residence in Benghazi, leaders of Zuaza tribe showed up in the celebrations on September

34

5, 1817. After the welcoming coffee was served, Ahmed’s guards relentlessly massacred

all the present leaders. Those who could escape the residence were hunted down before

they could exit the city and the hostages allegedly sent to Tripoli as political leverage was

returned, only to be added to death toll (Fọlayan, 1979, 53-57).

After campaign and campaign, the Yusuf’s hold over the entire regions of Fezzan,

Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica had grown to be firmly established and a proper provincial

administration was put in place. As long as the Pasha’s financial resources remained intact

the situation also remained unaltered. However, it was not to survive long.

2.2.3 Beginnings of the End

The ongoing Napoleonic wars had a delaying effect on the gradual demise of North

African maritime power. No nation was singlehandedly able to put up an effective naval

fight against the rulers of the region, combined with the fact that Tunis, Tripoli, and

Algiers join forces when they were facing an outside danger, it rendered the European

efforts to suppress piratical raids in the Mediterranean ineffective. Nevertheless, from

about 1810, the balance of power was tilted in favor of Europeans.

In the case of Yusuf Pasha, activities of British consul Warrington had a decisive effect.

With the encouragement of British government, Warrington forced Yusuf Pasha to

surrender his trade monopolies on agricultural goods and livestock to be shipped to Malta,

which had lately become the naval base of British Empire in the Mediterranean to Maltese

traders. Moreover, the income from piracy was also declining, again due to unsanctioned

activities of British consuls. The British had traditionally acted as the protector of smaller

nations in the Mediterranean waters. Taking on this honorable duty on its shoulders, the

British had always been trying to force the Yusuf Pasha to reach settlements with

countries under their diplomatic protection. Yet, the British consuls found another

shortcut solution to both enrich themselves and to expand the safe passage that originally

British shipping was enjoying. They started to issue British “Mediterranean passes” to

the ships of other countries, thereby dwindling the chance of pirates to prey on the socalled

legitimate targets (Abun-Nasr 1987, 199).

For the suppression of piracy, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was another turning point.

It was in this diplomatic meeting that European powers decided to act together in their

35

efforts to eliminate piracy.31 In 1816, English Admiral Lord Exmouth sailed to the

Mediterranean to put into effect the implications of the decisions taken in the Vienna,

thereby obliging the North African rulers to announce proclamations banning piracy from

their shores. At first, Yusuf Pasha only pretended to honor the promises he had given in

the agreement signed between Lord Exmouth and himself. However, when a final

resolution to effectively suppress the Mediterranean piracy was adopted in the Aix-la-

Chapelle in 1818, Yusuf Pasha had no chance against the joint British and French fleet

but to abide by what Europeans were asking (Panzac, 2005, 289-292).32 Yusuf Pasha had

taken these threats so seriously that his inability to provide the Ottoman navy with

properly equipped warships get Sublime Porte infuriated during the Greek rebellion (Taş

2016, 347-348).

Having been deprived of his main sources of income, Yusuf Pasha started to think about

invading the Bornu region. Even though his plan failed at the end, it may also be

understood as the transformation of centralization policies of Yusuf Pasha into a fullfledged

imperial design. This region was from about 1808 ruled by a charismatic religious

scholar and military leader, Al-Kanimi who successfully isolated the danger of jihadist

forces of Uthman dan Fadio in Hausaland. The first diplomatic contact between Tripoli

and Bornu came about when Al-Kanimi requested military help from Yusuf Pasha against

the adjacent political rivals threatening the Bornu. Yusuf Pasha replied favorably and sent

the Bey of Fezzan, al-Mukni to al-Kanimi’s help. When al-Mukni after a successful

campaign returned to Fezzan with a large booty which enabled him to present to Yusuf

Pasha with more than a thousand slaves, Yusuf Pasha confirmed that his design would

bring enormous economic profit to the Tripolitan treasury.

The problem was that Yusuf Pasha did not have financial means to provide the expedition

with the necessary arms and the provisions. In 1820, He turned to the British government

to raise a loan of 50.000 pounds. He suggested to Warrington who was acting as the

liaison between Yusuf and his government that the expedition is intended to exploit the

gold mines situated in Bornu. Warrington was aware of the fact that the region was not

rich in terms of gold mines, and that Pasha was hiding his real ambition to take full control

31 For a decent diplomatic history of the Congress of Vienna see: (Chapman, 1998). A more recent and comprehensive

book that has been recently published is (Vick 2014).

32 See for the docile answer given by Yusuf Pasha to combined fleets of Admiral Jurien de la Graviere and Admiral

Freemantle: (Taş 2016, 332).

36

of the slave trade behind this fabricated claim. He consequently ensured Yusuf Pasha

would not get hold of the money he seeks as he deemed such a monopoly as a serious

threat to British interest in the region. This only slowed down the imperial ambitions of

Yusuf Pasha as while maintaining an entente cordiale with al-Kanemi by once again

helping him win a victory over Baghirmi in 1821, he was still conspiring to raise the

necessary financial means to occupy the territory under al-Kanemi’s control.

In the meantime, impressed by the appearance sustained by Yusuf Pasha, Al-Kanemi sent

three of his sons to reside in Murzuk, the administrative center of Fezzan under the

auspice of al-Mukni. Yusuf Pasha once again thought that it was time to send another

expedition when Warrington had asked him to provide safe conduct for a team of British

explorers meant to discover Bornu. After agreeing to Warrington’s request, Pasha had the

company delayed about a year in order to assemble the force he needed to occupy Bornu.

Travelers delay must have raised the suspicions of al-Kanemi as he militarily prepared

his realm against a foreign invasion and requested his son’s release by Yusuf Pasha. After

one last attempt to secure the financial resources by applying for a loan from the British

government to provision his invading army, Yusuf Pasha necessarily abandoned his plan

to expand southwards due to the ongoing Greek rebellion, to fight against which Yusuf

Pasha was asked by Sublime Porte to equip two vessels (Fọlayan 1971 463-76).

Being uncomfortable with the ascendancy of consular nodes of power, Yusuf Pasha tried

to reassert his power by taking two measures. Firstly, he revitalized his long-neglected

navy by a round of fresh investment. For a time, smaller European powers restarted to

pay the price of peace, however, in light of the recent naval growth of the French and the

British, this venture was doomed to fail. Secondly, he appointed Hassuna D’Ghies33 as

his foreign minister, specifically giving him the task of curtailing the powers of British

and French Consuls in Tripoli. D’Ghies’s principal tactic was to balance Warrington with

33 Hassune D’Ghies was a member of an established Tripolitan merchant family. He was an utterly spectacular character

for any historian. His father and brother also served in Yusuf Pasha’s government. He was well acquainted with the

European ways of diplomacy. Documents from the Ottoman archives suggests that Ottoman Ambassador at London,

Nuri Efendi wanted him to be flattered by Sublime Porte so that he can continue benefitting from his precious

knowledge (COA.HAT.1174.46429, 27 Zilkade 1250/27 March 1835). We also have evidence that he traveled with

the company of Nuri Efendi’s predecessor Namık Pasha to Manchester. See for reference to Hassune D’Ghies’s

presence with the Ottoman delegation’s journey to Manchester and Liverpool; (Londra Seyahatnamesi, İÜ NEK-TY,

fol. 56b). (My special thanks are due to İsa Uğurlu who kindly pointed to this joint journey from London to Manchester

in one of our private conversations and shared with me the manuscript I cite here) In one of his journeys to England,

he also came across with the influential philosopher Jeremy Bentham and provided him with the information he

requested for the preparation of his “Securities against Misrule, adapted to a Mahommedan State and prepared with

particular reference to Tripoli in Barbary”, for detailed information see: (Hume 1980)

37

the French Consul Charles Rousseau. For some time, his plan proved to be effective.

Nevertheless, as it is aptly put by Folayan, these were “more like flickers of a dying fire”

(Fọlayan 1979, 108) rather than policies that can be systematically applied in view of the

present economic conditions of the Tripoli, given that now, apart from the developments

I already touched upon, Tripoli was struck by recurring famines throughout the 1820s. It

was only a matter of time that Warrington would find a scheme to obstruct Yusuf Pasha’s

renewed bid for power. Using a fabricated story to pressure the Pasha to dismiss the

Hassuna D’Ghies on the charges of conspiring against Consul’s son-in-law, Warrington

had Pasha issue a statement which publicly accuses the French consul and his minister

for getting involved with the murder of Major Laing. Warrington’s victory was twofolded,

having D’Ghies removed while at the same time striking a blow to the growing

influence of Rousseau (Abun-Nasr 1987, 202). Added up to already existing

undercurrents of political weakness, Pasha’s statement had given a push to the chain of

events that would bring his rule to an end.

2.2.4 Last Years of Yusuf Pasha

Before going forward to elaborate on the development of this political breakdown, it is

imperative to discuss the aggravation of the financial problems of the Tripolitan treasury,

especially after 1829 because it appears as the utmost bone of contention between the

Consuls of British and French governments and Yusuf Pasha. To supply the drained

treasury with fresh inflow, Yusuf Pasha came up with the plan to invade Bornu, which,

unfortunately for Pasha, failed. Moreover, the short-lived revival of piracy proved to be

a futile effort to refill it. After these developments, Yusuf Pasha resorted to the good old

method of debasing the Tripolitan currency. However, he took it to the extreme by doing

these seven times within the scope of three years between 1829-1832. The inevitable

outcome was an extremely volatile marketplace from which regular attendants started to

shy away. The problem for the treasury was even more serious because it also deprived

Yusuf of the exactions he used to take from the merchants. The Tripolitan government

started to confiscate any property which claimants to it could not document their

ownership. Yusuf’s legitimacy was taking serious damages from such outrageous

measures.

38

In the meantime, he tried to address the shortage of money by dragging himself into overindebtedness.

He resorted to a surprisingly modern method of raising loans when he

started to issue promissory papers which resembles today’s state bonds. However, it also

turned into a vicious cycle of reproducing his debts because every time the deadline of a

set of papers came close, a new set of promissory papers were issued. The real problem

arose when merchants of smaller nations such as Sweden or Denmark started to transfer

their assets to British and French traders, knowing that their own consuls would not be

able to exert the pressure to liquidate their assets. Consequently, nearly all these papers

accumulated in the hands of the French and British subjects, allowing their Consuls to

manipulate Yusuf Pasha as they see in alignment with their interests (Fọlayan 1979, 129-

134).

As a result, the resentment of French Consul Rousseau was to cost Yusuf Pasha dearly.

In August 1830, French Admiral Rosamel with the naval squadron under his command

had come aboard the Tripoli urging Yusuf Pasha to sign a treaty in which he obliged him

to refrain from meddling with the French interest in occupied Algeria and to limit the size

of the Tripolitan fleet. It was also added in the treaty that Rousseau had nothing to do

with the murder of Major Laing. We see here that Yusuf Pasha was sacrificing his power

by accepting a foreign imposition with regards to the size of his navy. An additional

request coming from Rosamel was the liquidation of the assets of Pasha’s French

creditors. In return, Warrington decided to retaliate for the allegedly uneven treatment the

British creditors had as their share. Coupled with the repudiation of the accusations put

forth against Rousseau, Yusuf Pasha was about to feel Warrington’s wrath right up to his

bones (Abun-Nasr 1987, 202).

The already damaged authority of Yusuf Pasha had continued to decline in the

countryside. In 1831, Evlad-ı Süleyman, sensing the feebleness of the pasha, put up a

rebellion against centralized Tripolitan rule once again. Judging from Warrington’s

conduct some historians rightly speculated that Warrington actively promoted the leader

of this tribe, Abdulcelil Seyfinnasr34 to lead an armed resistance in order to prepare the

country for a possible British invasion. Abdulcelil himself requested from Warrington

that he should lobby in favor of his government’s occupation of the Tripoli (Abun-Nasr

34 For a nearly contemporary account of Abdülcelil political career see: (Subtil 1844)

39

1987, 203).35 In the meantime, Warrington was squeezing the pasha for the settlement of

the debts of the British creditors because of the recent payments made to the French. After

he refused Yusuf’s offer to liquidate these accounts with intermittent installments, he

threatened Pasha to summon the British naval forces. It was soon understood that

Warrington was keen on living up to his promise when British warships came ashore to

demand the payment of the debts on July 14, 1832. It was, in fact, the exact moment when

Yusuf’s political career was permanently sealed. To pay back his enormous debts, he sold

everything in his possession, only to understand that they would not cover what he owes

to British creditors. As a last resort, he summoned the notables of the city including those

who are traditionally exempt from taxation and announced an emergency tax. Pretending

to be compliant, the Kuloğlu stroke the banner of rebellion when they returned to their

quarters, announcing Yusuf’s grandson as their Pasha. After they formed an alternative

government with some former members of Yusuf Pasha’s regime, Warrington also

permanently settled in Menşiye. His effort made sure that Abdülcelil’s rebellion would be

combined with that of Mehmed’s.

Having spent last thirty-seven years of his life in power, Yusuf Pasha presided over one

last divan meeting, after which it is decided that Yusuf’s only chance was to abdicate in

favor of his youngest son Ali and inform the Sublime Porte about the situation. The letter

he sent to Istanbul started the process that ended up with the Ottoman intervention in

1835.

35 For a more substantiated opinion see: (Fọlayan 1979, 120).

40

3. PRELUDE TO OTTOMAN INTERVENTION

3.1. Milestones of Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman North Africa in the

Early 19th Century.

The relationship between the North African provinces and Ottoman center had

traditionally been based on a mutual understanding given that it was not imposed by

territorial conquest in the first place. Even though the Ottomans started to appoint

governors from the center late sixteenth century onwards, they never ferociously seek

ultimate integration of these provinces. This was due to a combination of factors. Even if

we dismiss the problems of logistics created by the harsh winds of the winter and

operational radius of galleys as structural barriers to an effective policy of centralization,

the Ottomans would have been in a position to negotiate with different power groups such

as Janissaries, local ulema and various tribal groups, alienation of which would be

detrimental to Ottoman operations in the western Mediterranean in the 16th century. In

the following centuries, though the Habsburg frontier in the Mediterranean ceased to

exist, the corsairs’ role as the most effective part of the Sultan’s navy, motivated

Ottomans to continue maintaining the status quo. As long as the treasury kept fed by the

annual tribute they sent and the North Africans targeted successfully the Mediterranean

operations of the European powers, thereby blocking the full commercial exposure of the

Mediterranean to European traders, and occasionally participated in seasonal naval

patrolling campaigns, Ottomans were satisfied with minimal political involvement with

the local affairs (Gürkan 2010, 156).

When the decentralization of political authority became the salient feature of the Ottoman

dominions in the 18th century, Ottoman center mostly abandoned the administrative

practices such as acting as the supervisor of the military cooperation between three

provinces, or assuming the role of a mediator between the three provinces in case of a

41

border dispute, or regularly sending investigative envoys to ensure the maintenance of

justice (Gürkan 2010, 157-160). Each province produced a ruling elite that would address

such issues amongst themselves and except for Algeria, governorship became hereditary.

The most important is that each province started to dictate its own foreign policy priorities

and struck deals with European powers independently from late 17th century onwards.

On the other hand, they also continued to seek recognition from the Ottoman Sultan as it

was probably the most effective tool of legitimacy while also meaning diplomatic

protection of an Empire that could be accounted as a world power. In every renewal of

governorship, Ottoman Sultan had sent gifts to these rulers which included most needed

materials such as arms and ammunition; and occasionally fully-equipped warships. It is

also important to highlight that the perception of these provinces as semi-independent

regencies was not confined to Europeans, Ottomans themselves recognized this reality as

well.

The turn of the 19th century reinforced the notion of independence from the Sublime

Porte as a self-perception of North African rulers, especially in the case of Tripoli of

Yusuf Pasha. He assumed the title of emir’ul-muminin in his official correspondence

which is normally used by Ottoman Sultan himself as a manifestation of Ottomans’ claim

to Caliphate (Hanioğlu 2010, 10). Moreover, in every chance he gets, Yusuf Pasha not

only reiterated that he is an independent ruler but also occasionally acted against the

overall Ottoman interest. For example, I have already cited the extortions committed

against Ragusan shipping in Chapter 1. Normally, Ragusan merchants were the subjects

of the Ottoman Sultan, and their nominal diplomatic status was no different than that of

Tripolitans. Counting on this, Ragusan merchants appealed to Ottoman Sultan for him to

stop Yusuf Pasha’s illegal demands of tribute. When presented with the ferman issued by

Ottoman Sultan, Yusuf Pasha claimed that “you reckon that this ferman matters, but

anyone who pays forty kuruş can get one of these, in my eyes this is nothing but a piece

of paper” (Quoted in Taş 2016, 425) More dramatic was Yusuf Pasha’s policy during the

Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition. Infuriated by a long-standing ally’s infringement of

Ottoman territorial integrity, Sultan Selim III had sent orders to North African rulers to

prey on French shipping as well as a ruling to blockade the Toulon port.36 He also

36 The hükm sent to Algiers (COA.C.HR.3.1796, 29 Ramazan 1214/24 February 1800). Sublime Porte requested from

North African provinces to capture and arrest any personnel serving to the French State. Another request was the

equipping of strong warships to fight against the infidels (COA.C.HR.54.2655). However, Algerians took it to the

extreme and continued their hunt of French shipping even after a settlement was reached amongst Ottoman and French

42

requested the participation of Tripolitan naval forces in Ottoman campaign. Yusuf

ostensibly abided by the ruling of Sultan, but in effect, he did not see any profit in

damaging his own relationship with France. Accordingly, he delayed the departure of the

Tripolitan navy on purpose as far as he can before permanently calling it off with the

excuse of his own political problems, started to commercially gain by supplying French

forces with foodstuff and lastly allowed Tripoli to act as a communicative liaison between

Napoleon and Paris given that British exterminated the French naval force that would

normally carry out the official communication of the Egyptian expedition (Taş 2016, 276-

287).

While the aftermaths of the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle represent

continuity for the Ottoman position, it signifies a turning point for the North Africans.

Sublime Porte’s approach can be followed in a hatt-ı hümayun of Mahmud II which

summarizes a diplomatic exchange of words between Sublime Porte and Austrian

delegation right after the Congress of Vienna.37 As it is well-known Sublime Porte did

not send a delegation to Vienna in 1815 even though Prince Metternich made his effort

convince Sultan Mahmud II to send a representative to discuss the integration of the

Ottoman Empire into European States System as a barrier against Russian southward

expansion. Ottoman pretension at the time was the full recognition of the territorial

designations of Treaty of Bucharest which provisioned the Ottoman-Russian borders to

return to pre-war conditions in the Caucasia and Balkans (Bitis, 2006, 30-31). On the

other hand, Russians were deliberately delaying the evacuation of former Ottoman

territories. Moreover, rumors were circulating that Russia would bring the Serbian

Question to Congress. Therefore, Sublime Porte notified Prince Metternich that Ottoman

Sultan would send a delegation only if Austria was to guarantee act as a mediator in the

settlement of Russo-Ottoman Caucasian dispute in favor of Sublime Porte. Even though

Metternich was utterly uncomfortable with the Russian advances at the expense of

Ottomans, given European powers’ delicate preoccupation with the partition of Poland

States. It seemed that the outbreak of war was imminent as the French navy headed towards the Algiers from Toulon

Port. Then Sublime Porte interfered and mediated a ceasefire and peace between Algerians and the French. Ottoman

effort was successful, and the word was received that the French navy returned halfway (COA. HAT.242.13584, 23

Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1217/21 September 1802 & COA.HAT.175.7646). It is important to state that given the Algerian

enthusiasm to act in accordance with the Ottoman interests, Yusuf Pasha’ defiance stands even more interesting. Make

no mistake, however, each party was acting on his own foreign policy priorities, feeding into their mostly independent

status.

37 See COA, HAT, 22537, 1231/1815-1816. This crucial document is transcribed and published by Erdem Taş as an

appendix to his Ph.D. thesis. See Appendix 14 (Taş 2016, 493-498).

43

after Napoleon’s evacuation, he had to refuse Ottoman’s request for an Austrian

mediation.38 Nevertheless, he promised to bring the Ottoman interests on the table

(Sedivý, 2013, 39-41). It turned out that he actually intended to live up to his promise

when the final decision about the concerted efforts to suppress piracy was reached.

Metternich asked Austrian delegation in Istanbul to inquire the official Ottoman stance

regarding the Algerians’ diplomatic status.

At the time, the British fleet under the command of Lord Exmouth was fighting the

Algerians. Metternich was concerned about taking a wrong decision which would strain

Ottoman-Austrian relations. His delegation was requiring the answer for Metternich to

put forth the Ottoman claims in the next meeting intended to take place in London. It is

understood that the crux of the matter was Sublime Porte’s attitude if the scope of the

European anti-piracy policy would be broadened in the upcoming meeting in London.

Austrian delegation wanted to make sure whether Ottomans would maintain neutrality or

allow Europeans to take necessary precautions to suppress piracy or take the matter in its

own hands, thereby cutting European involvement altogether. As a matter of fact, the

Ottoman camp was divided. The minority view was seeing English aggression against the

Algerians as a violation of Ottoman territorial integrity not only because they are worthy

of the caliph’s backing as fellow Muslims but also because Algeria is historically an

Ottoman territory. The dominant view, however, did not see English actions as a violation

because in their view “that the regencies are independent in matters pertaining to

concluding peace with and declaring war to European states except for Russian and

Austrian states is known by everybody.” Therefore, Ottoman involvement with the matter

would be unprecedented. Well, these conversations were behind the doors and the answer

given to Austrian was much more diplomatic: “what would you say if you were asked to

a similar question about your own subjects who are also your co-religionists?” (Taş 2016,

496).

38 In this context, it is crucial to add that the issue of Barbary corsairs was brought forward by the Russians during the

deliberations. They were keen to obtain a portion of the Barbary coast to have a military commercial base of operations.

This was adding to Metternich’s displeasure as he was determined to sustain “the status quo in the Near East against

the threat of Russian expansion.” (Vick 2014, 222-223). This point of view is also reflected in the Ottoman

documentation. It is understood from Mahmud II’s response to his officers that in case Europeans are only seeking to

protect their interests in the Mediterranean, it is better to mediate between the regencies and them, however, if they

want to totally eliminate the regencies and “if the Russians are really intended to secure some posts there, it would be

hard to settle the matter.” (ancak merâmları bütün bütün ocakları kaldırmak ve Rusyalı ol tarafta bazı mahall zabt

etmek ise o takdîrce ortasını bulmak müşkildir) (Taş 2016, 493)

44

As for the meaning of these Congresses for the North African’s positions, we can again

follow their attitude in another hatt-ı hümayun of Mahmud II. Alarmed by the final

decision taken at Aix-la-Chapelle which ruled that Europeans should apply for the

Ottoman mediation with regards to the suppression of piracy and subsequent operations

of the joint British-French fleet, rulers of the provinces of Algeria and Tunis sent letters

to Sultan Mahmud II in which they requested the continuation of Sultan’s diplomatic

backing. These were in effect written to protest the position taken by Ottoman center after

the deliberations in the Meclis-i Vükela about the Europeans’ request for mediation

because of the alleged infringements of valid international agreements by North African

corsairs. It appears that after giving evasive answers to European diplomatic missions in

Istanbul, Sublime Porte also advised the North African powers “to abstain from attacking

the ships of these states and to pay attention to protect the frontiers of the Islamdom and

to get along well with them” (COA.HAT.1267.49039, 1818). In return, these letters were

positing that while each province was fully acting in accordance with the agreements they

signed with them, Europeans were aiming at the complete annulment of these treaties,

thereby taking down the entire customs revenue system operational in North African

ports. Besides, Europeans were also trying to prevent North African ships of any kind to

carry arms and ammunition. The clearly intended message is that the Sublime Porte and

the Sultan should not be led astray by the allegations put forth by Europeans and continue

to side with his loyal subjects. While the concerns of the Algerians and Tunisians

demonstrate their desire to feel the support of Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II’s note on the

matter is even more telling as to how he situates this part of his realm in his mind: “peoples

of Algiers are of the kind that is tough and courageous, even all the Christian states join

forces, it would not be in their power (to defeat them), may god’s help be with them

forever” (COA.HAT.1267.49039, 1818). Significantly, neither those who drafted the

hatt-ı hümayun nor Mahmud II makes a reference to strengthening the North African

provinces against the rising pressure of Europeans. In a way, it signals the decreasing

degree of cooperation between the Ottoman center and North African periphery. While

Algerians and Tunisians wanted to get closer, the Ottoman mentality seems to alienate

them.

Likewise, in the case of Yusuf Pasha, the years after the Aix-la-Chapelle represented a

dramatic change. Now, not only he abandoned the proud overtone in addressing the

Ottoman Sultan and assumed a much humbler discourse, but also his navy became an

45

essential part of the Ottoman forces fighting the Greek rebels. Even in the most distressing

financial situation, that is after 1825, he continued to supply Ottoman forces with ships

and manpower (Taş 2016, 425).

The ongoing discussion demonstrates that the Ottoman center was, in fact, sustaining the

very principle in place from the late 16th century onwards. From their perspective, the

ruling elites in three of the provinces, as long as they continue to cooperate with the

Ottoman war efforts, could sustain their independence from the Sublime Porte. It is also

Ahmet Cevdet Pasha’s impression that Mahmud II’s overestimation of the military

prowess of the North Africans was a wide-spread phenomenon amongst the Ottoman

ruling elite. He also reports that the Ottoman attitude during the question of Barbary

corsairs gave possible aggressors the pretext to deny Ottoman territorial claims in the

North African provinces (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa 1301, 229-230) and it was exactly the case

when French diplomats played the game of “farcical diplomacy of denial”39 when French

land forces embarked upon the conquest of Algeria.40

The real game-changer in the Ottoman point of view is the French annexation of Algeria.

Ercüment Kuran’s ageless study of the Ottoman Policy against the French aggression and

the subsequent failure of the diplomacy has shown that Ottoman diplomats sustained the

same rhetoric of Algeria being an Ottoman province in the international arena. It must

also be added that this seemingly unexpected French success dragged Ottoman ruling

elite into a nightmare of how to secure rest of the Ottoman North Africa from the French

imperial aspirations. This fearful frenzy is best exemplified by a letter written by Kaptanı

Derya Halil Rıfat Pasha to Mahmud II (COA.HAT.364.20161-D, 25 Safer 1247/5

August 1831). It is worth quoting at length to better demonstrate the mood of Ottoman

decision-makers.

“In view of the French ships that we come across ever since we sailed to the

Mediterranean with the glorious imperial navy, it is apparent that French is intent

to annex Algeria and may God forbid (ma’azallah-ı teala) if it remains in their

hands they would never be satisfied and find excuses to move on to Tunis and

Tripoli to invade and to subjugate…..and given that it is possible for them to be

39 I borrow this term from Mustafa Minawi who used it in a similar context of inconsequential diplomatic efforts of

Ottoman ambassadors to remind the French and the British that Tripolitan hinterland is Ottoman’s sphere of influence

according to Final Act of Berlin Congress. In the 1890s, they were also either evaded or lied to; see (Minawi 2016, 74-

79).

40 For a recent study of French colonization of Algeria see: (Sessions 2011).

46

victorious, Oh my lord, we have to never lay down on the issue of Algiers and do

everything in our power either in the form of talking, writing or expressing (ka’len

ve kalemen ve ifadeten) to have them evacuate.”

Nevertheless, the delineation of a thorough North African policy had to wait until

Mehmed Ali’s Syrian campaign was diplomatically worked through. Around the same

time with the arrival of Halil Rıfat Pasha’s frenzied letter, the word reached the Sublime

Porte that Egyptian forces are on their way to annex Syria which Mehmed Ali had asked

as the prize of his participation in the suppression of Greek rebellion in Morean peninsula.

In fact, the file in which Rıfat Pasha’s letter is stored in the Ottoman archives also contains

two other documents referring to the naval preparations Mehmed Ali was making in the

summer of 1831. In the first one, the intended purpose of these preparations is not known

but the intelligence was alarming enough to keep a record of as Ottomans were suspicious

of Pasha for some time (COA.HAT.20161-I). In the second document, however, Mehmed

Ali Pasha’s plan is out in the open: the ships were destined to sail to Acre to supply the

Egyptian army from where the forces under Ibrahim’s command would head to meet the

army of Mehmed Pasha in Hums (COA.HAT.364.20161-D, 25 Safer 1247/5 August

1831). After defeating Mehmed Pasha, Ibrahim went on to confront Hüseyin Pasha at the

battle of Bilan, which was a decisive victory on the part of Egyptian forces. Another

victory followed on the plains of Konya in 1832 from where Ibrahim’s forces proceeded

to Kütahya (Fahmy 2002, 61-67). The consecutive defeats of the Ottoman field armies

led Mahmud II to seek Russian help in containing the Mehmed Ali’s hazardous

advancement in the Anatolia. This, Russians agreed and started agglomerate large

numbers of soldiers in Istanbul, Beykoz. Such a bold move on the part of Mahmud II was

risking the growing influence of Russians in the Istanbul and stimulated the British and

French to put pressure on Mehmed Ali to reach an agreement with Mahmud II (Kurat

2011, 60-61).

Even though it was an agreement that would please none of the parties, the Sublime Porte

could now divert full attention to dealing with North African question. It must be stated

that the letter I cited at length above doesn’t outweigh either one of the so-called

remaining provinces, however, when Mehmed Ali and Sultan finally concluded the

tedious peace of Kütahya, Tripoli was torn apart by a succession struggle going on

between Mehmed and Ali Karamanlı. The Tripolitan exposure to a possible outside

invasion led Ottoman decision-makers to prioritize the problems of Karamanlı family. It

47

is also important to highlight that even though the stimulant for the Sublime Porte was as

such, the final decision as to how to work out the process was not clearly delineated until

late 1834. The matter complicated as Ottoman field agents were dragged more and more

into the intrigues of Tripolitan and international politics, only then the final plan was

devised to remove Karamanlı family from power. In the last analysis, growing French

influence was only a fraction of the Ottoman motivations, as claimants to the Tripolitan

territory were not limited only to the French Monarchy.

3.2. Ottoman Decision Making at Work During the Tripolitan Civil War

3.2.1 The Tripolitan Civil War (1832-1835)

In the first chapter, I already enumerated the reasons why the rebellion against the Yusuf

Pasha broke out. Politically paralyzed by his grandson’s opposition, Yusuf Pasha was left

with no choice but to abdicate from the throne. However, he could have delivered it to

his rebellious grandson. After all, Yusuf Pasha himself was a rebel once. Moreover, the

wide-spread support Mehmed gathered around his cause was closely resembling those

who backed up Yusuf Pasha during his succession struggle between 1791-1793.

Nevertheless, it did not turn out that way. It is, therefore, time to account for the

persistence of civil war conditions in the Tripoli for about three years.

To understand why it has continued for three years despite various attempts of the

Ottoman agents to mediate between the two parties, one must pay close attention to the

political factions on the scene. It is imperative to highlight that this was a revolution from

below. Instead of Mehmed having organized the entire attempt, he was announced Pasha

by those who were extremely critical of his grandfather’s rule. Consequently, the

challenge to Yusuf Pasha’s rule had risen on 26 July 1832. While the city was burst in

worry and people were taking up arms to defend themselves, the leaders of the rebellion

came together in a gathering organized in Menşiye. The social profile of those who

showed up in the gathering reveals the nature of the opposition against Yusuf’s rule. It

was an alliance of propertied Turkish and Jewish merchants and political outcasts which

is militarily supported by tax-exempt Kuloğlu class. While the former group was to risk

great financial loss if Yusuf Pasha himself or his policies would continue, the latter group

was characterized by their alienation from Yusuf Pasha due to the factitious political life

48

of Tripoli. The principal contention of these men such as Mehmed Beytülmal and Murad

Reis was the growing power of D’Ghies family in Karamanlı court. Especially the former

resented twice being superseded by members of this family when Yusuf Pasha appointed

them as his foreign ministers, a position which he desperately wanted to occupy. What

must have aggravated the opposition of the Mehmed Beytülmal to Ali Bey was probably

his marriage relationship with the D’Ghies family.41 Therefore, as a man of political and

financial capital, he was determined to put all the economic power he had into good use

against Ali’s newly forming regime. Therefore, after Ali’s unsanctioned accession to the

throne of Tripoli, Beytülmal swiftly packed up and sailed to Malta from where he would

supply much-needed arms, ammunition, and foodstuff for the Mehmed’s rebellious camp

stationed in Menşiye (Folayan 1979, 143).

The mismanagement of the country was pinned on Yusuf Pasha and leaders of the

rebellious group had chosen not to trust Ali Bey who, they thought, will continue Yusuf

Pasha’s policies. Mehmed, on the other hand, was considered to be easily pliable due to

his young age. Indeed, it was a good estimation. Before the crowd swore allegiance to

Mehmed, the leaders of the opposition had Mehmed pledge to set the precedent to act

under certain conditions, which Folayan argues, amounts to a Constitution. While

Beytülmal became the chief minister, Murad Reis assumed the admiralty. Mehmed’s

alternative government took a wise step by recognizing Abdülcelil Seyfünnasır, the

rebellious leader of Evlad-ı Süleyman who had taken control over Fezzan for about a year

now, as the legitimate governor of the region (Folayan 1979, 144-145)

Inside the walls of the city, another camp was also forming. It is important to remember

that when the rebellion of Mehmed broke out, Ali Bey had yet to assume his father's

position. given his father's old age he decided to take the initiative to provide a smooth

transition. He had the backing of most of the members of father's regime apart from those

people I have touched upon above. Ali’s former successes in suppressing Gharian risings

in 1826 and 1831 was speaking loud as to indicate he would be the one to put an end to

the ongoing upheaval. Nevertheless, it was not an easy decision to make while some

members of the divan argued Yusuf’s abdication would not only fuel up the existing

rebellions but also encourage another one. After two weeks of deliberations, Ali finally

rose up to the highest position in the Tripoli, only to be further challenged by his nephew.

41 Ali Bey’s marriage alliance is revealed in the correspondence of Reşid Bey (later Pasha), Ottoman ambassador to

Paris at the time, see (COA.HAT.46419. 1250).

49

It must also be added that most of the Karamanlı family was with him. His immediate

brother, Ibrahim, came second in command and two of his lesser brothers assumed the

control of military forces.

Now, the camps were ready to intensify their efforts to take full control over the Tripoli

and the region stretching into the Sahara. Apart from the actual struggle on land and the

sea, there were two principle and defining political challenges facing these alternative

governments. Each party was in dire need to broaden their social basis as much as they

required international recognition, especially that of Ottoman Sultan if either one of them

was to subdue the other.

Ali Bey’s party was much more agile in seeking foreign recognition. Right after he

succeeded to the throne, he not only notified the resident consuls of the European states

in Tripoli but also dispatched his agents across Europe to notify European states on their

own soil. While Muhammad D’Ghies as his chief minister sailed to Malta to seek British

recognition, his brother Hassuna was lobbying in London and Paris to win over Ottoman

support.42 It is also important to say that Yusuf was also writing letters all over to explain

the legality of his abdication and legitimacy of Ali Bey’s accession. Even though the

situation was in favor of Ali Bey, resident consuls had been also divided amongst

themselves. While consuls of Tuscany and America got aligned with Mehmed, the Dutch,

Swede, Neapolitan, and Spanish representatives expressed their support for Ali Bey.

Nevertheless, what mattered first and foremost was the respective positions of British and

French governments. Officially sanctioned position of each government was to remain

neutral as long as possible up until an official note of investiture favoring one of warring

parties would arrive from the Sublime Porte (Folayan 1979, 145-148).

Things on the ground, however, was utterly different. In direct contrast with what their

governments wanted them to do, the British Consul Warrington and the French Consul

Schwebel worked ferociously to ensure their candidate arise triumphantly. According to

Warrington, British interests as he saw them lied with Mehmed’s accession to power.

Accordingly, he moved the British embassy in Tripolitan city walls to Menşiye quarters

where Mehmed’s rebellion was based. Schwebel, on the contrary, sided with Ali Bey.

The consuls’ defiance of governmental orders was due to several reasons. First was the

personal animosity grown out of the Warrington’s ceaseless efforts to curb French

42 See for Namık Bey’s report containing information on his interviews with Hassune D’Ghies: (COA.HAT.1173.

46423)

50

influence in the Tripoli which sometimes amounted to outrageous insults to his

opponents. Their rivalry was also deeply rooted in the long-standing colonial rivalry

between their respective countries. It seemed obvious to Warrington that all the

Schwebel’s activities were intended to carve out another colony for his Metropolitan

France. He accordingly wrote to British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies

Frederick Goderich that “if Ali succeeds, this place will be more than a colony of France

as the advantages would be derived without the odium of the expenses.” Suspicions were,

on the other hand, reciprocal. The two frigates British stationed off the coast to protect

British subjects seemed evidence enough for Schwebel and French circles to think that

these vessels are the advance party of an imminent British occupation of the country

(Folayan, 1979, 149). At this point, it is important to remind that Ottoman diplomatic

missions in London and Paris were carefully taking notes of such rumors and

speculations.

Warrington had contributed to Mehmed’s cause in several ways. Apart from his efforts

to propagate Mehmed as the main medium through which the British government could

extend its influence in the region, he also futilely tried to convince his superiors to

intervene militarily to secure Mehmed’s victory as he thought that the British ascendancy

in Tripoli would translate as a colonial gateway to all North Africa, as taking over of the

commerce of the interior and as a means to abolish slavery. More importantly, he assumed

the role of an intermediary, connecting leadership of the Mehmed’s rebellion to its Arab

allies in the hinterland, thereby making sure of regular supplies of warriors. He also

attended the material needs of the rebellious camp by procuring arms and ammunitions.

These were, indeed, among the reasons that Şakir Efendi accused him of being the reason

why the chaos does not cease.43 Likewise, Ali Bey had written quite several letters to

British authorities asking the dismissal of Warrington.44

French Consul Schwebel, on the other hand, was not falling short of Warrington in his

own efforts to advertise the rule of Ali Bey as the legitimate one. He got in touch with his

connections across Europe to encourage them to publish articles condemning Mehmed’s

rebellion and Warrington’s support. One of the biggest achievements of Schwebel’s and

43 For Warrington’s mentions in Şakir Efendi’s reports, (COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 9 Receb 1250/11 November 1834).

44 Ali Bey wrote a letter intended directly to the King of England. He, likewise, asked Ottoman ambassador to London

Namık Bey to lobby for the dismissal of the Consul Warrington. For the former see (COA.HAT.788.36747 (22

Ramazan 1250/22 January 1835). For the latter see (COA.HAT.738.34986).

51

Ali Bey’s cooperation was probably the winning over of Cebel-i Garbi Arabs, led by

Şeyh Guma to their side. It was beyond doubt had important consequences in terms of

military superiority, tilting the balance in favor of Ali Bey. After Arabs of Cebel-i Garbi

and Evlad-ı Süleyman was included in the struggle, it expanded to sweep all the Tripolitan

interior.

The military confrontations started as early as July of 1832. Vigorous attempts on the part

of Mehmed at taking the city through a siege came to naught before the well-armed walls

of the Tripoli. After six months of siege and multiple open field confrontation, Mehmed

decided to increase his numerical strength by winning more Berber and Arab allies. When

it came to February of 1833, Mehmed’s forces were once more repulsed, suffering heavy

losses. It would hard to estimate that it came much to their relief when Abdülcelil supplied

the Mehmed a fresh round of reinforcements. However, the city walls were still

unbreachable which is why the rebellious camp thought that it would be wise to use heavy

armaments to breach the walls. As noted above Mehmed Beytülmal was tasked with

procuring this equipment from Malta. Nevertheless, the very next confrontation had seen

yet another defeat for the Mehmed’s party and most of the heavy war equipment passed

on to the hands of Ali Pasha. It is safe to say that the energetic and hopeful aura

surrounding the Mehmed’s party was slowly evaporating by the December of 1833 while

Ali’s party was becoming bolder and bolder (Folayan 1979, 155-157).

In April 1834, after pushing back the rebel forces, Ali took the offensive and started a

heavy bombardment of the Menşiye that lasted about three months. It was a traumatic

experience on the part of Mehmed’s supporters such that they lost faith in their own

military capacity to terminate the struggle in their favor. Turning desperately to the British

Consul who reported to his government that they promised to become a “voluntary

Colony of England” if his majesty would intervene militarily to put an end to Ali Bey’s

control of the city and remove him from the power (Folayan 1979, 157). The overseas

intervention they so recklessly sought to secure, however, had come from another

direction, in a way no one would have expected. Now, the so-called “Sick Man of Europe”

was hesitantly rising from his bed to assert direct control over the entire Tripolitania,

Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.

52

3.2.2 Claimants to Tripolitan Territory

In the years between 1829 and 1835, the race to seize the political control of the Tripolitan

territory had attracted quite a number of competitors. Ottoman Sultan was by no means

the only one who had wished to integrate this lively center of Saharan trade, though

mismanaged for some time, into his imperial domains. Without getting into detail, I

already enumerated the attendees of this fierce competition. It is, therefore, imperative to

situate these in the picture. Only then, it would be clear enough that for the Ottomans the

intervention of 1835 was a way of reasserting their imperial prowess in the context of

international competition.

Looking from the Ottoman perspective, there were perceived and real threats. Especially

the English threat was more perceived than real. The British government repeatedly

reminded consul Warrington that Britain does not have a territorial interest in Tripoli

when the consul delivered his first suggestion to invade the country. The British position

did not change either when Mehmed’s party requested a British intervention in favor of

their cause. However, as will be discussed further below, Warrington was giving an

extreme distrust to Mehmed Şakir Efendi, the Ottoman investigator sent twice by Sublime

Porte specifically to estimate the best course of action in Tripoli. On the contrary, there

were times when the threat was very much real. Mehmed Ali of Egypt in collaboration

with the French plotted to annex all the North Africa including Tripoli just before he

launched his Syrian campaign, a plot which is generally known as the Drovetti plan.

Moreover, Huseyin Bey of Tunisia also started to think that extending his power by

annexing Tripoli would be in his best interest. The Sublime Porte counterbalanced these

first by diplomacy and then by resorting to military force.

When Bernardino Drovetti, a long-time servant to the French Monarchy as consul and

consul-general in Egypt returned to Paris in retirement in mid-1829, he found an aura of

international revisionism. The French foreign minister Polignac was just about to

formulate his famous plan to either modify or completely nullify the post-1815 European

territorial delineations. Given the outcome of Morean War, he was arguing that Ottoman

Empire had come to the end of its place in the history and after its imminent fall, Russia

and Austria would share its territories, allowing France to particularly seek Belgium

territories up to the line of Meuse and Rhine as a compensation for the disturbance of

balances of power. His plan was to be carried out by signing a secret agreement between

53

France and Russia which would be extended to Prussia, then Austria would have no

chance but to get along and join the alliance. Indeed, a plan that would require a huge

military force on the part of France. After having it approved by Charles X who was also

eager to raise humiliated French nation on its foot in the international arena, the minister

ordered the Russian ambassador to communicate with Tsar Alexander I. Carried off by

the genius plan he made, Polignac was overlooking the fact that neither Prince Metternich

nor Tsar had any interest in tipping the balance in the West or in the East. Having known

it very well, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg did not take the chance to embarrass

himself in front of Tsar Alexander (Šedivý 2013, 411).

Though never put into action, what is significant about the Polignac plan in the context

of our discussion is its presupposition of the inevitability of the fall of the Ottoman Empire

and interestingly, he was not alone in this. In a study entitled as “Aperçu de la situation

politique de L’Egypte en 1828 et 1829”, Baron de Coehern, attaché of Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of France, was summarizing how the French aspired to see the political map of

Levant.45 He announced that “the most real cause why the people and issues of Egypt are

separated from the destiny of Turkish Empire is that the first has just started its future

while the other had completed the phases of its existence.” He elaborated by stating that

Mehmed Ali was the rising power who “started by making himself the sole master of

Egypt, elevated by conquering, subdued the Nubia, choked the Wahhabi reform, reunited

Arabia under his son-turned-pasha, established his regime in Cyprus and most recently in

a part of Candia.” He continued to propound that “the current position of the Ottoman

Empire exposes it to listen more to the cabinet of St. Petersburg and the naval forces of

Great Britain” and if France does not want “to play a secondary role”, it must support

“the third power that has arisen in the East and whose action is still hidden by an

appearance of suzerainty” who would “offer resources to our policy” to form a “new

empire.” His position was that by doing so France would “kill two birds with one

stone: prevent the disadvantages resulting from the dissolution of Turkish Empire by

rallying its pieces around a new empire which offer order and stability in the region” and

“reassert the bygone influence France exercised in the Orient.” Even though the naivety

of such a position was proved by the eventual outcome of the Mehmed Ali’s Syrian

45 This rather blunt memorandum is stored in French Archives with the catalog entry of A.E.Memoirs et documents.

Egypt 19; and is quoted at length in (Sabryr 1930, 170-172). Translations from French to English are mine. Originals

are to be found especially on page 170.

54

campaign, after which the so-called Turkish Empire continued to survive nearly a century

and Russians significantly increased their influence in Istanbul, to which direction this

new empire of Mehmed would grow into was not yet determined. This was exactly the

moment when Drovetti came up with a brilliant plan to encourage Mehmed Ali to expand

westwards, that is, into Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria.

After the famous fly-whisk episode happened in April 1827 between Hüseyin Dey of

Algeria and French Consul Pierre Deval, the French government sought redress with the

Sublime Porte. Came out empty-handed, and arguably disgraced, they moved onto a naval

blockade to Algerian ports, which was essentially inconsequential as well. In the eyes of

Hüseyin Dey, it only worked to prove that France has no intention to escalate the level of

violence. In the autumn of 1829, encouraged by unwieldy French policy, Hüseyin Dey

made it clear that he would not yield to the French demands of reparation. The truth of

the matter, however, was utterly different than it seemed to Hüseyin Dey. At the time,

Polignac was not eager to send the precious French troops he hoped to use in redesigning

the map of Europe (Šedivý 2013, 413). Therefore, when approached by Drovetti who in

fact conducted preliminary talks on his own initiative with Mehmed Ali before his return,

Polignac willingly agreed to follow the policy retired Consul of Egypt had suggested. In

Drovetti’s scheme, Mehmed Ali’s army appeared not only as of the punisher of Algerian

Dey but also as the conqueror of the Tripoli and Tunisia. If the plan was to succeed, he

convinced Polignac that although France would not make any territorial gains, it will

make an eternal ally of Mehmed Ali, thereby boosting its influence in the region. It was

indeed a plan in accordance with the spirit of the time in Paris. Moreover, the avoidance

from a possible English jealously if the French would undertake a military campaign was

a side gain of the plan, after all a stabile north African coastline ruled from Cairo would

be to the advantage of every European country (Dodwell, 1931, 97). For the plan, France

was ready to transfer a loan of 10 thousand francs along with the cooperation of the

French navy.

French diplomats Mimaut and Huder who were tasked to approach Mehmed Ali of Egypt

in an official capacity to negotiate the terms of an alliance arrive in Mehmed Ali’s court

on November 1829. Ostensibly favorable to French suggestions, Mehmed Ali Pasha

expressed that he could mobilize forty thousand men for the campaign if the French

government would be kind enough to raise for him a loan of twenty million francs and

donate four battleships, each equipped with eighty cannons. In fact, Mehmed Ali was not

55

as enthusiastic as Drovetti originally supposed him to be, but he still did not want to miss

the opportunity to boost his bond of friendship with France. Moreover, if French

proposals would materialize, it would mean a chance to rebuild his fleet which comes

close to complete annihilation. Therefore, though not abandoned for good, the project of

occupying Syria and Baghdad was suspended for a while. However, the fact that Mehmed

Ali’s demands were well beyond what French diplomats were authorized to settle with

appeared as a problem. In vain that they tried to convince Mehmed Ali to give up his

requests to obtain four French men-of-war. The Pasha obliged them to communicate his

counter-proposal. These requests found Polignac still hopeful to obtain Russian help to

secure territorial gains in Rhine region. He decided to get along with Mehmed Ali’s

demands and opened the issue for deliberations with the members of his cabinet. One can

only guess what he acted like when opposed by the cabinet who thought the transfer of

ships carrying French flag as a disgrace to the French nation. Polignac only induced them

to accept extensive help of the French navy, an assignment which would include

protecting Alexandria as well as Egyptian transport vessels from a possible attack of

Sultan’s navy. Moreover, to persuade Mehmed Ali, the French offered to partition North

Africa so as to share the financial burden of the campaign. Operations in Tunis and Tripoli

would be on Mehmed Ali’s account while French would attack Algiers.

The secrecy of these deliberations had been compromised from the start, not only because

Drovetti was engaged in loose talk with British representatives in Cairo. Right after

Egyptian mission hit the roads for the first round of talks, Polignac had written to

Guillemont, the French ambassador in Istanbul, an order in which he requested the

ambassador to obtain Sultan’s permission sanctioning Mehmed Ali’s occupation of the

entire north African littoral. When Mehmed Ali heard this, he contemplated that this

should be the last thing to do not only because the very effort to secure such a sanction is

futile but also because Sultan Mahmud would seek the help of British navy to counteract

his over empowerment (Dodwell, 1931, 9). In this estimation, he proved himself to be a

man of foresight. The internationalization of the Drovetti plan had been received very

badly by Ottoman Sultan and British diplomatic circles. In a rather sarcastic and ironical

letter which pretends that the news could be nothing, but rumors taken out of context, the

Sublime Porte urged Mehmed Ali to act in accordance with the Sultanic orders and God’s

providence as it would be “beyond comprehension to send soldiers against a Muslim land

in alliance with one of the favored nations” especially given that Mehmed Ali is in “ripe

56

old age.” (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, v.2, 519-521). It seems that Sublime Porte found it hard to

believe “a man who thinks methodically the pros and cons of a matter with extreme

precision” by virtue of his “lucid mind and righteous disposition” would embark upon

such an outrageous act “to deploy soldiers in alliance with the tribes of the area stretching

from the frontiers of Egypt to Moroccan borders against the north African regencies”

(Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, v.2, 520). It seems to me that the writer of this dispatch was

threatening Mehmed Ali by complimenting him. The frequent occurrence of the Sultanic

authority and description of Mehmed Ali as a governor instituted by Sultan Mahmud II

leads me to speculate that the overpass of France was perceived rightly as undermining

Sultan’s suzerainty over Mehmed Ali and Sultan was extremely uncomfortable with such

a thing. The dispatch also informed him that Tahir Pasha was sent to settle the matter

without bloodshed (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, 521-526).

Even though the British also sent a diplomatic mission to push Mehmed Ali to abort the

scheme planned with France, neither the Sultan’s intimidation nor the opposition of

enraged British diplomats was the real cause why Mehmed Ali had chosen to give up the

mission in the March of 1830. He had too much to risk against what he could expect to

achieve by such a campaign. He also found French hesitancy extremely disturbing under

the impression that they would not a good enough ally to elevate tensions with the British.

If gains would be greater, he would have gone ahead (Dodwell, 1931, 104). The lack of

Sultanic approval was very likely to create a legitimacy crisis which would be a source

of weakness than strength for Mehmed Ali, far away from his actual power base in Egypt.

Then, he turned his eyes from Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria to his long-awaited prize, Syria.

Even though the Drovetti scheme was abandoned in 1830, the specter of it continued to

haunt Ottoman decision-makers. The reason was not only the recent campaign of

Mehmed Ali ending with Kütahya agreement. The Sublime Porte had good reasons to

believe that Mehmed Ali might have revitalized a plan to annex Tripoli. Moreover, it was

not just on the air, it was also in writing. I have already mentioned the treaty Hassune

D’Ghies wrote to inform Reşid Bey and the Sublime Porte about the recent situation in

the Tripoli. In its essence, it is a reform package intended to reorganize and strengthen

the North African regencies. Important to highlight is that the text seems to play a rather

decisive role in formulating Sublime Porte’s Tripolitan policy in 1834-1835. Now is the

57

exact context it should be further discussed with regards to how he tries to convince

Sublime Porte to carry out reforms in North Africa.46

The proposals of Hassune Efendi are best to be understood as strategies concerned with

the evacuation of the French and isolation of Mehmed Ali’s westward ambitions. To

achieve this, he has specific and detailed instructions. In the case of kicking the French

back, the keystone of his proposal is the diplomatic, economic and military empowerment

of the Ahmed Bey of Constantine. On the other hand, he posits that if Sublime Porte

would like to get rid of Mehmed Ali once and for all, the Tripolitan civil war should be

ended by appointing Ali Bey as the governor of Tripoli. He goes on to argue that the rebel

Mehmed is a protégé of Mehmed Ali which means that if he succeeds to the governorship,

the province would slip through the hands of Ottomans into Mehmed Ali’s realm. When

the situation in the Tripoli is amended, the potent warriors in the Benghazi who is sick of

Mehmed Ali’s transgressions could be assembled in a strong army to push him back (Taş

2016b, 100).

What is most significant in Hassune Efendi’s succinct account, however, is the worstcase

scenario if the Ottoman center would fail to resolve the North African question by

taking the measures he proposed. As a result, he argues, Mehmed Ali’s power and

prowess which is diverted to Damascus only for a short time will enhance. When he has

his enemies subdued there, he will turn his attention to North Africa. Most interestingly,

he seems to believe that the French military activity against the Ahmed Bey of

Constantine is only for laying the ground for Mehmed Ali’s takeover. The French position

is that if Mehmed Ali grows stronger in the region the British hopes to obstruct French

interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean would become obsolete. Therefore,

Mehmed Ali and French are going to proceed as following (Taş 2016b, 102).

As a precaution to any possible British maneuver, French will continue to transfer large

numbers of soldiers to Algiers. In the meantime, Mehmed Ali will march into Tripoli to

put it under the sway of his rule, taking advantage of the weakness of the Pasha of Tripoli.

Next step will be the agglutination of Hüseyin Bey of Tunisia to Mehmed Ali’s political

orbit by making him a vassal. Hassune Efendi seems to believe that this would be an easy

task even though Tunis has a powerful army and solid finances because of Hüseyin Bey’s

disproportionate fear of the French. A threatening letter addressed to Hüseyin Bey,

46 The document is published by Erdem Taş, see: (Taş 2016b)

58

therefore, would be enough to make him yield to the Egyptian political supremacy.

Hassune Efendi estimates that a wave of political propaganda will follow the subjugation

of Tunisia before Mehmed Ali proceeds to Constantine and Algiers in which Mehmed

Ali would be portrayed as the savior of the Muslims of Algeria who suffered heavy losses

against the French and saw “their mosques turned into churches of the infidels, barns,

commercial warehouses and some other unthinkable of places.” The people follow the

suit by submitting to his authority while Mehmed Ali wages an imaginary war against

French forces which in effect are retreating to France in accordance with the agreement

between the French government and Mehmed Ali. Hassune Efendi goes on to argue that

Mehmed Ali will make good use of the abandoned and disordered resources of this fertile

land to grow strong enough to challenge all the Francs (cümle taife-i efrenc) with the help

of his naval alliance with the French government. It seems that Hassune Efendi thinks

even the British could not put up a fight against such a formidable alliance (Taş 2016b,

103).

One could not help but notice the resounding similarity of Hassune Efendi’s estimations

with the Drovetti plan even though there is no mention of the French diplomat in the

document. Moreover, it would be safe to argue that the Ottoman intervention was

genuinely motivated to curb the further increase of Mehmed Ali’s political influence in

North Africa. Nevertheless, Mehmed Ali was only one of the political contenders to grow

more powerful in North Africa.

Hüseyin Bey of Tunisia himself started to think about taking advantage of the Tripolitan

upheaval to integrate the region into his realm from October 1833 (Temimi 1975, 72).47

The mastermind of the Tunisian plan was Hüseyin Bey’s chief minister, Şakir al-Tabi.

His scheme included overthrowing the Karamanlı dynasty to put Tripoli under the sway

of Mustafa Bey who was Hüseyin Bey’s brother and heir apparent to Tunisian throne.

Minister secretly hoped to do away with the heir apparent by sending him to Tripoli,

thereby securing the succession for his own brother-in-law Prince Hamza, the eldest son

of the reigning Hüseyin Bey. It was a golden opportunity when a call for aid came from

the leaders of Mehmed’s rebellion in the Tripoli. Now, the Tunisian army could march

into Tripoli and eliminate the two warring camps on this pretext. Nevertheless, Hüseyin

Bey found it imperative to consult to the Sublime Porte and to obtain the official sanction

47 Hüseyin Bey revealed his intentions to French ambassador Deval. This article is originally written in Arabic. My

special thanks are due to my mother Fazilet Kılıçaslan who kindly translated the article from Arabic to Turkish.

59

of the Sultan Mahmud II (Temimi 1975, 72-73). However, we have evidence that he also

ostensibly responded to rebellious camp’s call for aid by ordering his representative in

Tripoli, Kasım b. Recep, to side with the rebels, probably to ensure the perpetuation of

the upheaval until the Sublime Porte’s answer arrives. In the meantime, the minister was

tasked to assemble the army of occupation. Eventually, Sublime Porte refused the

Tunisian plan, the reasons for which I will further discuss below. However, as Mehmed

Şakir Efendi’s reports reveal, Tunisian involvement continued to hangover like a question

mark in the minds of Ottoman decision-makers who eventually decided to establish direct

control over the region.

3.2.3 Ottoman Policy during the Tripolitan Civil War and Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s

Missions in Tripoli and Tunis.

The Sublime Porte’s priority during the Tripolitan civil war was to stabilize the region to

cut off the possibility of a foreign occupation of the country. However, the way through

which it would be carried out was an open question and remained as such until Necip

Pasha’s naval squadron landed the Ottoman forces it carried to the shores of Tripoli on

the 25 May 1835.

After Yusuf Pasha’s letter had arrived in Istanbul in January 1833, Meclis-i Vükela held

a meeting to decide how to proceed with the appointment of Ali Bey as the legitimate

governor of the Tripoli. The final act was to delay the fulfillment of the request as it would

be a violation of the precedent to renew governorships in North Africa every three years.

In fact, Sublime Porte wanted to take the measure of the situation given their on-going

occupation with the North African problem. A wrong move would have cost dearly.

Accordingly, it was decided to send a trusted man of Kapudan Pasha as an investigator

(COA.HAT.366.20242). This was the moment Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s troubles started.

He was the chief-scribe (sır katibi) of the admiral of the time, Mehmed Tahir Pasha.

Getting on a ship destined to Tunisia, he sailed to take off in Tripoli on the way. He set

foot on Tripoli in late August 1833.

At the time of his arrival, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was most graciously welcomed by Ali

Bey while the other contender was away in the interior to settle some local disputes among

60

his supporters. After Şakir Efendi demanded a complete ceasefire and called for a meeting

in which two parties could present their cases to be heard by Sultan’s representative, both

parties followed suit. After the contending claims were heard, Şakir Efendi was inclined

towards the Ali Bey not only because he was the eldest son of the Yusuf Pasha but also

because his energetic arguments were much more orderly compared to that of his rival’s

representatives but also because, as I have already touched upon, the rebellious party was

losing its commitment around the time Şakir Efendi arrived at Tripoli. They did not

resemble a group extremely determined to win over its rival (Folayan 1979, 158). It seems

that after assessing the situation Şakir Efendi departed from Tripoli in late September

1833 due to an order coming from Tahir Pasha, asking him to travel to Tunis.

When the Tunisian plan to annex the Tripoli and appointment of Mustafa Bey as the

governor of that region reached the Sublime Porte, they approached it with due care

because at first look the success of such a plan could not be taken for granted. On the

other hand, if it would turn out to be a success story, the protracted civil war in Tripoli

could have been terminated and a possible foreign invasion could be avoided.

Nevertheless, the Sublime Porte evaded a formal promise to deliver what Tunisian Bey

was asking. Mehmed Tahir Pasha, in his letter to Hüseyin Bey, enumerated Ottoman

demands if for the argument’s sake Sultan would authorize the Tunisian

plans. Apparently, Tahir Pasha sustains, the Sublime Porte may consider such an

arrangement under the condition that the Bey of Tunis could indeed bring stability to

Tripoli. Hüseyin Bey is also asked to prove the Tunisian government’s ability to repel a

possible foreign intervention by sending the required number of soldiers, arms and

ammunition as well as ships and naval equipment to Tripoli. Moreover, Tahir Pasha

reminded the Bey that he must undertake the liability of the foreign debts of Karamanlı

family if he wants his son to be recognized as the ruler of Tripoli. Tahir Pasha goes on to

add that he is going to send his chief-scribe Mehmed Şakir Efendi to negotiate a final

agreement. Upon departing Tripoli, therefore, Şakir Efendi’s days in Tunis started.48 It

seems that the gravity of the situation compelled Sublime Porte to consider every single

contingency plan.

After his journey from Tripoli to Tunis, Şakir Efendi was obliged to wait the return of

Hüseyin Bey’s chief minister, Şakir Sahib al-Tabi who was dealing with minor rebellions

48 Mehmet Tahir Pasha’s letter is included in (Temimi 1975, 73). It is in Arabic translation and it is dated to 1 February

1834.

61

in the south of Tunisian territories for some time. When he finally made the acquaintance

of the chief minister in October 1833, it was revealed in this meeting that the Sublime

Porte was inclined to dictate harsh conditions if it was to authorize the unification of

Tripoli and Tunis under Huseynid family. In the case that Hüseyin Bey’s son, Mustafa, is

instituted as the Pasha of Tripoli, Şakir Efendi conditioned a huge lumpsum payment of

Tunisian currency as well as a yearly tribute to Ottoman Sultan. It goes without saying

that Şakir Efendi restated the obligation of Mustafa to take over Karamanlı debts. In

return, the Tunisian chief minister propounded that, under such financial terms, the

Tunisian government can't bring stability to Tripoli by sending its troops and navy. The

deliberations were stuck and Mehmed Şakir Efendi left the Tunis for Istanbul at the end

of the same month (Temimi 1975, 74).

The unfruitful meetings with Tahir Pasha’s representative did not discourage Tunisian

Chief Minister to get in touch directly with the Tahir Pasha who he thinks has the power

to convince the Sultan to obtain the necessary orders instituting Mustafa as the Pasha of

Tripoli if the feasibility of Tunisian plan was to be clearly explained. They argued that

given the internal financial problems of the Tunis, it would be hard to assume the foreign

debts of the Yusuf Pasha as well as assembling an army and a navy powerful enough to

pacify the upheaval in Tripoli. Nonetheless, Tunis would be willing to pay the half of the

Karamanlı debts upfront and to restructure the remaining half by issuing new promissory

papers. It seemed a fair deal to them because they would rebuild the war-torn Tripolitan

city as well as bring stability to the entire region whose people are in a state of constant

misery and poverty. Moreover, given the call of Mehmed’s party, the transition from

Karamanlı rule to Huseynid rule would be a bloodless one (Temimi 1975, 74).

Though it was indeed a good line of thought, in August 1834, Grand Vizier Rauf Pasha

and Mehmed Tahir Pasha had written two separate letters rejecting the Tunisian plan

because the distance between Tripoli and Tunis is too great to employ it with efficiency.

On the other hand, they argued that the greatness of the prize Sublime Porte would be

bestowing to his person requires a swift proceeding rather than extensive bargaining.

Strictly speaking, these were more like excuses than real arguments. In fact, by the time

Tunisian counterproposal arrived at Istanbul, the Ottomans were considering the ultimate

plan to establish direct Ottoman rule in Tripoli. It would also be unwise to voluntarily

carve out a new Mehmed Ali of Egypt out of Huseynids of Tunisia. Therefore, Rauf Pasha

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added the Sublime Porte’s request for military help in Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s efforts to

subdue the Mehmed’s rebellion (Temimi 1975, 74-75).

For the time being, however, let us come back to the last months of the year 1833 and

early 1834. Upon the arrival of the Mehmed Şakir Efendi, the Sublime Porte took its time

to grant Ali Bey with the Sultanic order of investiture to watch the course of events and

gather more intelligence. It is understood from the Ottoman ambassador to London,

Namık Bey’s reports that British diplomats started to ask pressuring questions about who

would be the next ruler of Tripoli, a fact which led Sublime Porte to speed up the process

(COA.HAT.454.22450). Again, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was seen fit for the duty. This time

his task was to deliver the order of investiture recognizing Ali Bey as the Pasha of Tripoli

and help him to appease the rebellious leaders around Mehmed. In other words, for the

time being, the Ottoman official position was to stabilize the region by empowering Ali

Bey Karamanlı.

On his second mission, Mehmed Şakir Efendi arrived at Tripoli on 18 September 1834.

After the declaration of Sultan’s recognition of Ali Bey as the legitimate governor of the

Tripoli, stiff protests on the part of Menşiye rebellion ensued. They resisted the public

inauguration of the Ali Pasha. The Sultan’s representative gave the protestors six days to

come to terms with Sultanic decision (Folayan 1979, 158). However, it was in vain to talk

through the matter. Instead, he delayed his departure and worked to suppress the rebellion

by using coercive methods for three months.

From the report where Mehmed Şakir Efendi summarizes his activities to undermine the

rebellious party and the reports of British and French consuls, it is understood that he had

opted for three strategies. First was the naval blockade of Menşiye. However, the blockade

that he ordered was constantly sabotaged by the activities of the Warrington. Secondly,

he made numerous efforts to rally the Arabs in the interior around the Ali Pasha to

increase the numerical strength of the Tripolitan defensive against the rebels

(COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 06 Receb 1250/8 November 1834). When he understood that

these measures would not be sufficient to put an end to the civil war, he tried to broker

peace between the two parties. After a series of meetings with both parties, he came up

with the following proposals. Firstly, after the establishment of a final ceasefire, the city

gates would remain open. Secondly, the fighting forces of the contending parties in the

interior should leave their arms and withdraw. To appease the followers of Mehmed, he

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said that if they agree to these terms, thereafter the order of investiture would be nullified.

Until the final decision as to how to proceed will be re-discussed in Istanbul, they would

remain equals and a joint council made up of ten members from each side will be

assembled to act as a provisionary government. However, neither the Ali Pasha nor

Mehmed’ rebellious party was content with the proposals. The situation again dragged

into a painful stalemate before he finally set sails to Istanbul on 31 December 1834

(Folayan 1979, 160).

In accounting for his failure to resolve the situation, Mehmed Şakir enumerated the

following. He pinned the Consul Warrington as the primary reason for the continued

resistance of the Mehmed’s party. He says that the Consul did not respond to his call for

forty days and unceasingly acted to undermine the measures taken by him. Moreover, he

is a great source of moral support and political advisor to Mehmed who is also clearly

connected with Mehmed Ali of Egypt. It also seems clear to Sultan’s representative that

the English desires to further aggravate the situation to lay the ground of an impending

occupation, using their naval base in Malta as the center of the operations

(COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 9 Receb 1250/11 November 1834). He repeatedly calls for

action to have the English government dismiss the Consul because of his hostile and

inappropriate behavior.

Even though Ottoman effort to have him removed from the Tripoli had started earlier,

Şakir Efendi’s report moved the Sublime Porte to open a new line of correspondence with

its diplomatic missions in Europe. Upon the kind request of Ali Pasha, Namık Bey worked

hard to procure a congratulatory letter from the British crown intended for Ali Pasha

(COA.HAT.738.34986-E). This came in handy to partly curb Warrington’s acrimonious

activities. After Sublime Porte’s renewed request Namık Bey also approached to British

Colonial Office to persuade them to recall Warrington. In a private conversation with

Duke Wellington, Ottoman Ambassador, judging from his evasive tone, understood that

the task he was given would not be an easy one (COA.HAT.831.37520-A, 30 Zilkade

1250/30 March 1835). Nevertheless, he continued to push for it, and eventually obtained

an affirmative answer from the British authorities, only a few days left to the Ottoman

intervention (COA.HAT. 46430-Ç, 05 Muharrem 1251/3 May 1835)

The Sublime Porte’s support for Ali Pasha is not confined to Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s

activities on the ground and diplomatic efforts of Ottoman missions in Europe. In a letter

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addressed to Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha, Ali Pasha requested a substantive material help

from the Sublime Porte against the Mehmed Karamanlı, saying that ammunitions in the

Tripoli were nearly exhausted. The decision was taken to provide Ali Pasha with a

sizeable amount of gunpowder in view of his loyalty to Ottoman Sultan together with the

fact that the rebellion keeps going. Moreover, Ali Pasha is also authorized to enroll

fighters from western Anatolia (COA.HAT.1403.56719). In other words, Ali Pasha had

the complete operational, moral, diplomatic and material support of the Ottoman center.

Interestingly enough, the Sublime Porte was otherwise intended to sustain all these if

some petitions from the supporters of Mehmed Karamanlı would not arrive just before

new orders were issued to ensure people’s support for Ali Karamanlı. Upon the arrival of

these multiple complaint letters which served as a quick indication of the relentlessly nonconciliatory

attitudes of the rebels, the Ottoman decision-makers thought that keeping Ali

Pasha in power would only make things worse. Accordingly, a new meeting in which

Serasker Hüsrev Paşa, Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha and Damad Halil Rıfat Pasha would

be present was summoned in Istanbul (COA.HAT.1267.49043). Those who sent these

petitions would have never guessed the historical significance of their action, that is

setting the fire of Ottoman Intervention in Tripoli.

These attendants seem to be utterly frustrated by the fact that the rebels could not be

appeased no matter what the Sublime Porte has done so far. After the petitions of the

Tripolitans, they completely lost trust in Ali Pasha. Yet, they reckoned that Mehmed

Karamanlı was no better than the former one. As in the case of Samos, the only feasible

solution was to send a governor from Istanbul who can handle the situation. In their view,

the governor must be accompanied by a naval squadron as a precaution against

insurrection. In the meantime, it is imperative to continue the efforts to suppress the

rebellion until the naval campaign season will arrive. For this reason, each party should

be informed to carry out business as usual. As for the petitioners, the council decided to

dispatch a mitigating message. For the time being, it is argued that the naval preparations

should be carried out in complete secrecy of the real intention of the Sublime Porte to

avoid the protests of the Europeans (COA.HAT.457.22542).

The council’s foresight was proved when it was heard that the British navy is on its way

to Istanbul to take the measure of the Ottoman intentions. Such news led to a new meeting

in which two impending issues are discussed. The first concern was the answer to be

given to those inquiring the intentions of the navy. It seems that the council was worried

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about an interception of the British navy if the real intentions of the Sublime Porte would

be revealed. The official mission statement is therefore set as an aid to Ali Pasha

Karamanlı who had been unsuccessful to put an end to the protracted civil war which has

devastating effects for the general populace. The following concern to picking the highranking

personnel of the expedition had also been addressed under the shadow of the

British navy. The council propounds that anyone above the rank of Ferik (lieutenant

general) would raise the suspicions of foreign powers. After a period of uncertainty, Necip

Paşa was appointed as the commander of the squadron and he is also given the secret

mission statement. The Sublime Porte ordered him to swiftly sneak into the Tripolitan

fortress to arrest Yusuf and Ali Karamanlı, then to proceed to disaggregate the rebellious

group rallied around Mehmed Karamanlı (COA.HAT.455.22484).

Now, Ottoman intervention was slowly taking shape, however, it was still one meeting

away from reaching perfection. The final plan anticipated an advance dispatch of official

correspondence written by high-ranking officials of the Sublime Porte assuring Ali Pasha

of the continuation of his rule. These would also inform Ali Pasha about the ostensible

motivation of Sublime Porte to send Necip Pasha with a naval force. Nonetheless, it had

been decided that Necip Pasha must act on the capacity of a deputy governor (kaymakam)

because the masterminds of the plan hoped to lure rebellious Mehmed into the castle with

the promise of appointing him as the new governor after Ottoman force arrests and

dispatches Ali Karamanlı to Istanbul. Here is when the things get more interesting

because it is also provisioned that against any possible obligatory diversion from the

original plan, Necip Pasha was to be provided with contingency Sultanic orders. The

alternative scenarios included the ill-reception of the new governor sent from Istanbul. In

that case, Ali Pasha must remain in Ottoman custody until Necip Pasha could trick

Mehmed to come to the castle. Then send word to obtain orders for the renewal of the Ali

Pasha Karamanlı. Otherwise, Necip Pasha was ordered to present himself as the deputy

of Sultan who is sent to save the people from the oppression of the Karamanlı family

(COA.HAT.457.22538 in Taş 2019, 505-509). In any case, the protracted civil war which

made Tripoli vulnerable to occupation would be finally halted for good. In the eyes of the

Sultan and his close circle in the Sublime Porte, the matter carried weight such that Necip

Pasha is granted a budget increase of around thirty percent for his preparatory

expenditures.

66

It should not come as a surprise that Mehmed Şakir Efendi was the Ottoman agent at the

head of the advance party. The entire force of twenty-two ships departed from Adriatic

on 28 March 1835. However, the warship carrying Mehmed Şakir Efendi took the lead to

arrive at Tripoli exactly five days before the rest of the Necip Pasha’s naval force. Given

that North Africa and Europe was filled with curiosity and uncertainty about the rumors

of Ottoman motivations to fit a naval squadron, such a move was extremely needed to

avoid further disturbances in the Tripoli. Upon landing, Şakir Efendi presented Ali Pasha

with the papers written by Grand Vizier Rauf Pasha, Serasker Hüsrev Pasha, Kaptan-ı

Derya Tahir Pasha and commander-in-chief Necip Pasha, resting him assured that

Ottoman Sultan had sent the much-rumored naval force to help him and his governorship

is renewed. For now, everything was on the clock and Ali Pasha was pleased by the

Ottoman generosity to help him overthrow his rival (Taş 2016, 418-419 and

COA.HAT.1186.46759).

3.2.4 Necip Pasha’s Takeover

The long wait had come to an end on 25 May 1835 when Ottoman Naval squadron

appeared on Tripolitan shores. No one of Ali Pasha’s intimate circle suspected that Necip

Pasha would be the commander who will put an end to the dynasty of Karamanlı Pashas.

Things were to turn out very differently.

The same day he arrived at Tripolitan coast, Necip Pasha dispatched an invitation to Ali

Pasha who unsuspiciously returned to the call of his supposed savior to come aboard to

his vessel. Necip Pasha was extremely careful not to raise any doubt whatsoever of Ali

Pasha while he listed some of his demands. An immediate agreement on the disarmament

of the general populace who fought as defenders of the city was reached. Then, Ottoman

forces proceeded to disembark on Tripoli. In a matter of a couple of hours, all the citadel

was taken over by Necip Pasha’s soldiers who stationed heavy guns on the walls

protecting the city. For the time being, however, Necip Pasha hiding Sublime Porte’s real

intentions behind his friendly face, excused Ali Pasha to retreat to his quarters, notifying

him that he would set foot on Tripoli three days later. When the occasion came, the city

was blossoming with all the preparations Ali Pasha ordered his protégés to carry out.

Necip Pasha asked him again to come on board with his close circle to accompany his

entry into the port. This time, Ali Pasha and his immediate circle of forty men were

67

detained in the ship. Necip Pasha proceeded into the city to declare the Sultanic orders

notifying that he is sent to take control of the Tripoli in the name of Sultan Mahmud II,

thereby cutting the succession line of Karamanlı family (Taş 2016, 418-420).

Next day, the Menşiye rebellion dispersed quickly and residents of the quarter pledged

loyalty to Necip Pasha whereas the leadership of the rebellion sought protection either

with the British or in the interior of Tripoli. It was also on the same day that entire Menşiye

was disarmed. Foreign representatives were also notified that Sultan Mahmud II brought

the region under his direct control in the 1 June 1835.

In the scope of one week, the entire problem of bringing stability into the Tripoli was

resolved. It was a result of a thoroughly thought, timely plan. The Sublime Porte could

not have risked another case of Algiers which would mean a definitive end for the

Ottoman presence in North Africa. It seemed that from an abundance of claimants to the

Tripolitan territory, Ottoman Center had risen triumphantly. Nonetheless, creation of a

united Tripoli stretching from Tripolitania to Fezzan and into Cyrenaica like in the prime

days of Yusuf Karamanlı proved to be a serious challenge which could not be surmounted

permanently until 1858. Even after that, a completely centralized province did not come

about thanks to the rise of Sanusiyya order. However, the early episode of the Ottoman

direct rule itself which is quite frequently disturbed by outbreaks of tribal rebellions

allows a historian to think about the imperial characteristics of Ottoman polity and the

conflicting political mentalities of Ottoman agents.

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4. A CASE STUDY OF OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY

What is an empire? In a recent and most cherished book, Frederick Cooper and Jane

Burbank posed the very same question. They conceptualized empires as “large political

units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain

distinctions and hierarchy as they incorporate new people.” (Burbank and Cooper 2010,

8) As they aptly put it “the empire was a remarkably durable form of state.” How to

approach different empires then, how to pinpoint varying historical experiences of their

subjects? They suggest that rather than categorizing unfruitfully the empires as “modern”,

“premodern”, or “ancient”, it is better to concentrate on the different repertoires of power

which are defined as “ruling strategies that were imaginable and feasible in specific

historical situations” (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 3). As they also clearly demonstrate

there are some historiographical consequences of such chronologically freezing

designations. Under their dictate, for example, in “the western moment of imperial

domination”, which is conventionally understood as the “modern empire” as well, “the

empires of China, Russia, the Ottomans, and the Habsburgs are formulated as “imperial

has-beens” who are incapable of taking initiatives to counter economic and cultural

challenges” and “playing crucial roles in the conflicts and connections that animated

world politics even though they existed simultaneously” (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 9).

In other words, they are excluded from the very history they have participated in.

I find the concept “repertoires of power” as a useful analytical tool because of its

applicability to empires not only across time and space but also to simultaneously existing

empires of different political strength, thereby making feasible a comparative history.

Although it cannot claim to be exhaustive by any means, this chapter aims at exploring

the strategies of rule Ottoman agents resorted to in pacifying the Tripoli which I believe

gives a unique opportunity to critically approach to the growing literature of Ottoman

colonialism/imperialism in the 19th century.

69

This body of literature purports the idea that Ottoman colonialism and its discursive

counterpart Ottoman orientalism are products of the second half of the 19th century.

Adhering to their archenemies, Ottoman ruling class then produced a political mentality

that is markedly different from the way politics of difference is carried out in the earlier

centuries. The members of Ottoman central bureaucracy who had seen in themselves the

image of the civilized men developed a metropolitan arrogance through which they saw

the peoples of the outlying, mainly Arab, provinces of the empire as the exact opposite of

what they stood for and used it in legitimizing the top-down centralist reform programs

Ottoman government had imagined, which in fact amounted to what the modern literature

and contemporaries alike refer to as Ottoman civilizing mission (vazife-i temdin). It was

therefore closely connected with the development of modern state structures in the

Ottoman realm.

In the literature, the reign of Abdülhamit II appears as a crucial turning point with regards

to the reinforcement of the idea of Ottoman colonialism. After all, it was in the Final Act

of Berlin Conference in 1885 that for the first time, the word colony (müstemleke) was

used to define the Ottoman Africa provinces, especially Tripoli. By using the

internationally recognized terminology of imperialism, especially the principle of the

hinterland, Ottomans were hoping to lay claim to the area stretching from the southern

tip of Fezzan to Lake Chad region (Minawi 2016, 46-47). The increased circulation of the

word must have encouraged the Abdulhamid II to commission the translation of a

travelogue written by the infamous British traveler, Henry Morton Stanley. In the

introduction, the translator, Mehmed İzzet feels the need to clarify what the colonialism

means: “a civilized state sends its settlers out to lands where people still live in a state of

nomadism and savagery, developing these areas, and causing them to become a market

for its goods.” (Quoted in Deringil, 2003, 312).

It seems that the early 20th century saw only further entrenchment of it in the minds of

Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats. Indeed, famous Turkish nationalist and writer,

Ömer Seyfettin appears to have so much internalized the idea of Ottoman Turkish

colonialism that after enlisting a sizeable body of French, British, Portuguese and Belgian

colonial misconduct, he refers to Ottoman-Italian war in 1911 as a joint European effort

to expel the Ottoman Turks from their colonies (müstemlekat) in Africa, that is Tripoli

(Seyfeddin 2012, 234-237 and 251). In other words, he was perfectly fine with the

Ottoman polity being a colonial empire, but at the same time disgusted by the type of

70

colonialism that is European. As a matter of fact, conceiving the Ottoman Empire as a

colonial power extends beyond the literary allusions made by Ömer Seyfeddin in his

rather short story. One of the most influential Ottoman statesmen of the 20th century,

Cemal Paşa also conceptualized the territories which are situated outside of the Rumelia

and Anatolia as Ottoman colonies. Rather interestingly, in his memoirs, he goes on to

refer to Anatolia as his motherland while lamenting on the weak infrastructure that

connects Syria and his motherland (Erdem 2016).

The examples in which Ottoman military or bureaucratic elite refers to its periphery as

colonies can be multiplied and are abundantly available in the secondary literature.

Moreover, even in cases where Ottoman elites do not directly use the word itself, they

one way or another resort to the political vocabulary of cultural superiority I described

above in legitimizing their provincial reforms. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that Ottoman

colonialism and orientalism did exist on an ideological level. In this respect, the

framework delineated by Ottoman colonialism literature has grown out to be a way of

understanding center-periphery relations in the late Ottoman empire, by giving the

Ottoman provincial reforms a markedly different meaning. As Makdisi puts it,

(comparing with European desire to reshape and discipline non-European places) “so too

can Ottoman modernization be thought of as an Ottoman desire to reshape and discipline

not-yet Ottoman places and peoples” (Makdisi 2002a, 46). However, does all this really

mean that the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century become a colonial empire? I believe

not.

For one thing, the peripheral territories of Ottoman Empire had never been officially

organized in colonial terms even though the word “colony” was used in international

agreements and Ottomans were invited to meetings that are by definition exclusive to

imperial powers such as Berlin (1884) and Brussels Conferences (1889). Moreover, all

Ottoman citizens, regardless of their birthplace or ethnicity, could enjoy the very same

rights and privileges, including parliamentary representation and being a public servant.

(Erdem 2016).

Along the same lines, a rather sound criticism was recently put forward against the

conceiving of the new relationship between the peripheral provinces of the empire and

center as a type of colonialism by Özgür Türesay. After all, he argues, modern colonialism

that is decorated with the themes of bringing civilization to wilderness was primarily a

71

European phenomenon that had started to take roots in the early 16th century and only

after three centuries of historical development that it culminated in the great age of

imperial expansion in the second half of the 19th century. To be able to talk about a

modern colonialism, he sustains, one need to observe the coexistence of a racially defined

social Darwinism attached to imperial expansion, i.e. the civilizing mission of the white

man, a specific phase of capitalist development which squeezed the European economies

so much that they needed to accommodate the surplus workforce and capital outside

Europe, extensive missionary activity and lastly a group of stakeholders who would

encourage their governments’ colonial pursuits in extra-European territories. In the

Ottoman example, similarities end with the Ottoman civilizing mission. Even in that,

further qualification is needed as it was so much softer than European orientalist discourse

with regards to the racist element. As he rightly points out, in the absence of underlying

dynamics, it would be stretching too far to talk about an Ottoman colonial enterprise,

relying on a couple of observations based on narrative sources (Türesay 2013, 143-145).

Drawing inspiration from this criticism, I would say, perhaps, it is time to think about the

social otherness created by the modernizing Ottoman center in a more indigenously

developed way than associating it directly with the European conceptualizations. Perhaps,

as I will discuss further below, it is even proper to ask how modern was the social

otherness the people of the peripheries subjected to?

Why have I taken pains at delving into the literature on Ottoman orientalism? It is because

some elements of the social otherness created by the members of the Ottoman

bureaucratic elite later in the century was evident in the perceptions of the Ottoman agents

operational in the Tripoli right after the intervention. By now, it must have been wellunderstood

that I will refrain from calling their attitude a colonial one, however, the task

of making sense of the Ottoman imperial presence in Tripoli still awaits. The fact that the

Ottoman intervention in Tripoli is nearly contemporary with one of the most momentous

points of French colonial history makes it even more compelling. As I discussed

thoroughly in Chapter 2, it was even conducted in competition with France. Moreover,

the European officials and the public perceived it no different than what France was doing

in Algeria. In addressing this problem, I believe that the concept of “imperial repertoires

of power” comes in really handy not only because of the opportunity it gives to refrain

from discussing the problem with regards to a sort of imagined colonialism but also

because it allows tracing the historicity of some aspects of imperial politics in Tripoli.

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After all, it involved various strategies of rule ranging from resorting to extreme violence

to the accommodation of intermediaries, and conversion of the local population in the

most resilient region, Cebel-i Garbi, to Sunni Islam.

4.1 What Have We Done, What Will We Do? Meclis-I Şura Meeting Regarding the

Upcoming Policies in Tripoli.

After Necip Pasha successfully established the Ottoman forces in Tripolitan citadel, his

mission was complete, after all, he was only appointed as a deputy governor, not to draw

any unwanted attention from the foreign powers to Ottoman intervention in May 1835

(COA.HAT.457.22538 in Taş 2019, 505-509). At first, Osman Pasha was thought to be

appointed with the full authority of a governor, but his medical condition did not allow

him to assume the assignment (Atabaş 2017, 63). In his stead, Mehmed Raif Pasha was

sent to Tripoli to govern the newly acquired province. It seems that after making his

assessment of the situation, he has written a couple of letters to the Sublime Porte,

explaining the situation and making certain demands with regards to his plans. It was in

the Meclis-i Şura meeting which discussed Mehmed Raif Pasha’s demands that the

Sublime Porte decided how to proceed with Tripoli. These letters and the outcome of the

meeting provide insights as to how center-periphery relations played out in Tripoli as well

as how the Ottoman center conceived of Necip Pasha’s takeover.

The one thing the Sublime Porte understood from the short term of Necip Pasha and

Mehmed Raif Pasha’s dispatches was that the entire undertaking was about to put heavy

pressure on the shoulders of central treasury, not only because of Yusuf Pasha’s debts but

also because the hardships the Ottoman state apparatus was to endure in Tripoli. As Raif

Pasha narrates, Necip Pasha was approached by the local tribal chieftains who manifested

that they are inclined towards pledging loyalty to Sultan. In return, however, they

requested that Ottoman Pasha would please them with the generosity of Ottoman Sultan.

This, as the political precedent goes, was granted by Necip Pasha. Nonetheless, it was

beyond the limited financial means he held in his possession which obliged him to pay

for these gifts from the money intended originally for the stipends of Ottoman soldiers.

Raif Pasha recognized the inevitability of using gifts and bribes in making the tribes of

the interior yield to Ottoman authority. Accordingly, he requested at least four thousand

73

money bags of akçe from Istanbul. From this point onwards, things get even more

insightful. He thinks that if Tripoli would be relieved financially from the shoulders of

Istanbul, such expenditures must be taken back from the communities these leaders

presided over. Nonetheless, it can only be feasible if these leaders were to be escorted

back to their quarters by a company of three or four hundred soldiers. Then these soldiers

were to collect money from the locals in the presence of their leaders. It seems only then

a sustainable cycle of financing government expenditure would become possible

(COA.HAT.456.22505-D, 27 Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1251/20 September 1835). It seems to

me that Mehmed Raif Pasha’s plan of ensuring a steady flow of income is really

illuminating in terms of the limits of Ottoman centralization, the State apparatus

paradoxically had to accommodate intermediaries in an effort to establish a direct rule.49

It is understood from hatt-ı hümayun record of the Meclis-i Şura meeting that when

presented with a summary of Mehmed Raif Pasha’s requests, Sultan Mahmud II called

for deliberation to decide the best course of action. Meclis-i Şura sought the opinion of

Necip Pasha with the mediation of Serasker Hüsrev Paşa and a final decision in which

the transfer of the requested cavalry force is authorized together with the provisions and

stipends of the soldiers already stationed in Tripoli was reached because it is deemed

necessary to “get proper hold of the region and the people”50 The document goes on to

reveal the motivation of the Ottoman decision-makers in taking up such a financial

burden. It is worth quoting at length:

“…the final subjugation of the province by the shadow of your most powerful

Majesty is regarded as a new conquest; and it has brought to the Sublime State

of yours the glory and fame it required both in your realm and, especially in

Europe; if it is necessary to make some expenditures at the start, it is hoped

that those will not be in vain; that in the future its administrative and strategic

value will be observed is attested by the God’s grace …51”

49 Even though I excluded them as they are not relevant in making sense of the Ottomans’ imperial repertoire of power,

it is necessary to state that Mehmed Raif Pasha’s requests do not end with the financial and military reinforcements. In

his letters, he also states that a couple of well-conditioned ships are urgently needed to run administrative duties. He

also says that a kadı of the strong blend is needed to address the problem of people seeking foreign protection by

changing nationality. It was a problem because most of these were either family or former members of Yusuf Pasha’s

government which Ottoman authorities thought makes them accountable for the debts of Karamanlı family.

(COA.HAT.453.22420) and (COA.HAT.456.22505-A, 27 Cemâziye’l-Evvel 1251/20 September 1835)

50 ….. havali ve ahalisinin layıkıyla ele alınması zımnında bin nefer süvari asker isali…. (COA.HAT.827.37459; first

used in Atabaş 2017, 69-70)

51 …vakıa eyalet-i merkumenın bu def’a saye-i şevketvaye-i hazret-i şahanelerinde zabt-ı rabtı feth-i cedid ve sani

hükmünde olarak mülk ü saltanat ve bahusus avrupaca taraf-ı devlet-i alilerine bir kat dahi mucib-i şan ve şöhret olmuş

olduğu derkar ve bidayet-i maslahatta eğer ki biraz mesarif vuku bulursa da inşallah-ı teala zayi olmayarak ilerde

menafi’ mülkiyye ve mevkiyyesi müşahede olunacağı eltaf-ı ilahi delaletiyle aşikâr olup…. (COA.HAT.827.37459)

74

Nonetheless, the rest of the document demonstrates such a bold statement was not easy

to utter. The fact that the financial burden of penetrating further into the interior would

be incredibly heavy had led these statesmen to even consider reinstating the Ali

Karamanlı or handing over the province to Hüseyin Bey of Tunis who had long desired

to unite it with Tripoli. However, as the document goes, there are two possible dangers if

the Sublime Porte would withdraw so hastily; firstly, it is thought that it would bring

“contempt and defect” on the Exalted State. Secondly, the Ottoman diplomats were

communicating some rumors that ever since the French have invaded Algeria, the British

intended to prey on Tripoli by playing into the closeness they have established with the

people of the region. Therefore, the region would not pass on to who Ottoman center

aspires to deliver. The gist of the meeting, it seems, was that Ottoman statesmen had

perceived their intervention in the Tripoli as a matter of international prestige and took

pride in it. The roadmap, therefore, was to stay and to consolidate Ottoman presence in

Tripoli no matter what the financial consequences were. Mehmed Raif Pasha then was

granted full support.

It seems to me that economic prospects of the Tripolitan port appeared promising to

Ottoman decision-makers even though it was not as tempting as the international

recognition that the intervention had provided for the Empire. The first reference in the

documents is already cited in the form of “its administrative and strategic value.” What

exactly was its administrative and strategic value? Well, as demonstrated by Erdem in his

book on Ottoman slavery, Tripoli was an entrepot for the slave trade and its reconquest

had a reinvigorating effect to slave trade across Empire which, along with other factors,

ultimately amounted to “the recovery of Ottoman slave system” (Erdem 1996, 57). Even

though there is no direct reference to the economic prospects of the slave trade running

through Tripoli in the documents, it is worth reminding that when Necip Pasha was asked

of his opinion regarding the ships Raif Pasha had requested from the Sublime Porte, he

gave an affirmative answer citing the potential the ports along the Tripolitan coastline had

in creating a substantive customs revenue for the central treasury if the coastline is

properly inspected by the Ottoman ships (Atabaş 2017, 68-69). In the actual document,

Necip Pasha takes note of revenues that could be generated by customs on alcoholic

beverages and other products as well as port fees (gümrük ve zecriye rüsümatı ve sair

mahsulattan senevi on bin kese mikdarı menafi’ hasıl olacağına binaen). Given the fact

75

that one of the most sizeable merchandise running through the Tripolitan ports was the

black slaves (Dyer 1982, 78-79), it would be a safe speculation that Necip Pasha might

also have thought of revenues that could be generated through imposing customs on the

slave trade when he referred to a profit of ten thousand money bags

(COA.HAT.827.37459-B). It must be stated that this is not the only reference with

regards to the economic expectations that leads Ottoman agents to argue for the

sustainment of Ottoman rule in Tripoli. It will reappear below.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, though, Mehmed Raif Pasha was soon to realize

that his plan to impose taxation in return for giving out gifts is at best a dream. He saw

that the negotiation ground was extremely slippery and to make these tribal chieftains live

up to their political promise is harder than he could ever imagine.52 In his words;

“…the Bedouins and tribes are not the kinds that understand negotiation and

friendly manners; it is very well understood that these would be drawn under

the hold of government only by brute force, pressure, and threats; as it is clear,

they would not come to terms if the crushing force of your Majesty is not to

be shown to these at least once; even those chieftains who seem to approach

to pledge loyalty are not true to their word and God, inclined to corrupt; and

it is beyond any doubt whatsoever that they tend to try extorting money with

some schemes and political cunning from me as they did with the Necip

Pasha…”

The policy of accommodation seems to be abandoned after the frustration of Mehmed

Raif Pasha after his encounters with the tribal chieftains. A period of violent clashes

between the forces of the central government and tribal warriors was about to ensue. With

some intervals, these clashes continued until the rebellion of Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i Garbi

was eliminated in 1858.

4.2 Local Resistance and Ottoman Pashas Justifying their Use of Violence

The relatively easy subjugation of the Tripolitan citadel and its close surroundings by

Necip Pasha should not misguide a student of the history of Ottoman presence in Tripoli.

52 “….urbân ve kabâili te’lîf ve güler yüz irâesiyle insâf eder ve taht-ı raiyyete girer makūleler olmayup bunlar darb-ı

şedîd ve tazyîk ve tehdîd ile kabûl-i raiyyet eyleyecekleri güzelce anlaşılarak âşikâr olduğu halde ne vecihle olur ise

olsun kahr-ı satvet-i şâhâne bunlara bir kere irâe olunmadıkça emâna gelmeyecekleri ve gûyâ itaat sûretiyle gelmiş olan

şeyhler dahî hudâ bilir hakîkî olmayub meyl-i fesâda ve Necîb Paşa hazretlerinden plan ve politika ile bir takım kuruş

aldıkları gibi şimdi bu çâkerlerinizden dahî akçe isticlâbına mâil oldukları şüpheden müberrâ olub…” Quoted in

(Atabaş 2017, 76). See for the complete document; (COA.HAT.456.22505-E.3, 27 Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1251/20

September 1835).

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Indeed, the military force Necip Pasha brought with him was not to pull the trigger even

once. Nonetheless, the picture we see during the Ottoman penetration further into the

country is starkly different than the initial phase of the Ottoman takeover. If Ottomans

were to successfully unite Tripoli, they had to either come to terms with tribal chieftains

or to militarily defeat them. Or at best used them in conjunction with each other. It seems

that the Ottoman Pashas had used their choice in favor of the use of violence when they

felt strong enough to face the tribal chieftains in the battlefield. The path they had chosen,

however, was an expensive one. Given the distance between the Ottoman center and

Tripoli, maintenance of regular troops was incredibly hard, and Ottoman governors were

to constantly ask for reinforcements, foodstuff, and stipends for the soldiers in their

retinue. The constant warfare between the agents of the central government and tribal

chieftains was seriously constraining the possibility of local generation of the income that

is needed to provision the central government facilities in Tripoli. It was, therefore,

heavily dependent on Istanbul. For the complete pacification of the region, Ottoman

forces had to reckon with leaders such as Osman el-Edgam of Misurata, Ahmed el-Meriz

of Tarhuna, Abdülcelil of Fezzan and Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i Garbi (Atabaş 2017, 433).

It is also important to note that Tahir Pasha and Ali Aşkar Pasha were particularly known

for their brutality and relentlessness in dealing with the tribal insurgencies.

I do not intend to give a general survey of the violence born out of the clash between the

Ottoman forces and tribal chieftains. What I will stress out is the way Ottoman governors

justified their use of military force in Tripoli. Let us have a look of the report Mehmed

Tahir Pasha had written in which he asked to be recalled to Istanbul in 1837. As would

be recalled, Mehmed Tahir Pasha was one of the masterminds behind the Ottoman

intervention. Afterward, he was sent to Tripoli as the commander-in-chief of Tripoli when

Mehmed Raif Pasha was the governor of the province. He then replaced him as the

governor of Tripoli. His task was to permanently stabilize the region. After dealing

successfully with the insurgent forces in Misurata in August 1836, his forces suffered a

crushing defeat at the hands of Şeyh Guma in March 1837.53

After stating that he is tasked by Sublime Porte with ensuring the perfect loyalty (rabıtai

hüsnisi) of the Tripolitan notables, he starts to talk about his impression of the people

and why a military operation would not be feasible. He says that “the complete reordering

53 Atabaş provides a detailed chronology of Tripolitan political history after the intervention. I used it extensively in

this chapter see: (Atabaş 2016, Appendix 1)

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of Arab tribes of this province by bringing them into the hold of government is only

possible via a protracted use of force and provisions which the Exalted State cannot afford

amongst all the business it had to attend to.” Therefore “even though it would be

delightful to carry out a new wave of conquest to subjugate the various clans and savage

tribes” (aşair-i muhtelife ve kabail-i vahşiyye), given the financial situation, a policy of

appeasement (istimalet) should be assumed. Before launching an offensive, he thinks,

when the time is right, the clans and tribes must be treated with due care, and the existing

force can be used to punish and educate (tedip ve terbiyelerine) them if seen necessary

(COA.C.DH.107.5342, 25 Şevval 1252/2 February 1837)

A similar attitude is observable in the official correspondence of Mehmed Raif Pasha.

After he lists a couple of reasons why he is not worthy of the Sultan Mahmud’s

graciousness in appointing him as the governor of the Tripoli, he jumps into the question

of the use of military force. One gets the impression that Mahmud II did encourage a

more conciliatory policy, but Mehmed Raif seems to disagree. Addressing the Sultan, he

claims:

“as it is also known to you, my Gracious, the province consists only of tribes

and clans who are of the kind that is the worst of the bandits …. and in

accordance with your esteemed request, it is clear that I will not fail to work

to ensure their submission by showing benignity and presenting various gifts

but if they dare to demonstrate a sign of animosity as necessitated by the way

they are made, it would be necessary to deploy militias against them and as

there are some mines located around their quarters, it may also be necessary

to deploy soldiers….54”

According to Raif Pasha, then, the use of military force and violence against the tribal

population in Tripoli is a precaution against their god-given quality of being inclined

towards demonstrating animosity. However, he does not adhere to the usage of “savage”

as in the case of Tahir Pasha. Instead, he uses a much more commonly used terminology

at least from the 17th century Celali rebellions onwards, that is “tagi”, meaning bandit.55

Nonetheless, there is also a major difference between the two. Tagi is also a legal category

54 …. malum-ı veliniamileri buyurulduğu veçhile eyalet-i merkume aşair ve kabailden ibaret olarak tagi makulesinden

olduklarından bunların…. matlub-ı ali veçhiyle taht-ı rabıtaya idhallerine suret-i mülayimet ve enva’i taltifat ile sa’yda

kusur olunmayacağı ber-bidar ise de ber-muktezay-ı halkıyyet izhar-ı habasete cüret ettikleri halde üzerlerine urban

askeri sevk olunmak lazım geldiği ve bazı maden olan mahaller dahi ol makule aşair taraflarında bulunduğundan bunda

dahi kezalik asker irsali icap ettiği halde… (COA.HAT.1110.44695)

55 See for the commonly used terminology with regards to outlaws, social outcasts and outright rebels: (Sariyannis

2005)

78

that is mostly used synonymously with sai b’il-fesad. (Aykan 2019, 253) It was not a

coincidence that for example, Şeyh Abdülcelil of Fezzan was called menba’ul-fesad,

(Atabaş 2016, 171) and then assassinated by Ali Aşkar Pasha because the legitimate

punishment of a person who is found guilty of being tagi or sa’i b’il-fesad is death (Aykan

2019, 255).

Not to forget, the document also contains the second and crucial reference to the economic

expectations of the Ottoman agents operational in Tripoli, namely “the mines around their

quarters.” Comparing to Necip Pasha’s reasoning which anticipates the violence-free

Ottoman takeover of the Tripolitan customs regime, it appears as a justification for the

use of violence against the local population. It is possible that, these mines were salt

reserves, usufruct of which Karamanlı Pashas sold to Venetians throughout the second

half of the 18th century (Dyer 1982, 179) or the copper, steel and the Sulphur reserves

located around Gulf of Sirte, a location which houses Arab and Berber tribes (Atabaş

2017, 161). In either case, better exploitation of the natural resources of the country was

certainly on the agenda of early Ottoman Pashas in Tripoli.

All in all, it can be argued that while the discourse of early Ottoman Pashas in Tripoli

justifying the use of violence in the service of the consolidation of central authority is not

unidimensional and unison, they seem to share a common ground with regards to their

economic expectations from the region. The former ranged from a perceived cultural

superiority, as implied by the use of savagery as a derogatory term, to a legalistic

discourse criminalizing those who are perceived as a threat to public order. These also go

to show that a social distance between the Ottoman agents and the locals was evident as

early as the late 1830s. However, an even more striking case of acting on a discourse of

superiority is evident in the Ottoman religious policy after the remainders of Şeyh Guma’s

rebellion in Cebel-i Garbi was pacified by Ahmed Pasha in 1843.

4.3 Pacification of Cebel-i Garbi and Ottoman Missionaries

When Necip Pasha had arrived in Tripoli, Şeyh Guma was amongst the first party of tribal

chieftains who visited him. He was the leader of the Mehamid Tribe and paradoxically

led the most enduring armed opposition against the Ottomans in Tripoli. From 1835 to

1842, he had a fluctuating relationship with the Ottoman authorities. Mehmed Emin Pasha

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had him come to Tripoli to settle the disputes between Ottoman State and Mehamid Tribe.

For some time, he had been given an official post. Nonetheless, he was arrested and sent

to exile by the order of Mehmed Emin Pasha in December 1842. It was a major blow to

his armed opposition, however, the Mehamid tribe continued to resist for about four

months until Ahmed Pasha had inflicted a crushing defeat to the armed forces of a tribal

alliance based in the Cebel region. Ahmed Pasha has written extensive reports on how he

managed to defeat his opponents (COA.İ.MSM.72.2085, 28 Rabîu’l-Evvel 1259). I will

not discuss the details of the military operation here, luckily, however, these reports are

also rich in terms of how Ahmed Pasha and his other colleagues in Tripoli look down

upon the people of Cebel;56

“The nature of the people of Cebel is not a matter that can be described and

articulated; not only because for years and centuries they haven’t known state

control and each one of them has transformed into savages but also because,

they follow a false path they call the fifth sect which is popularized, May God

forbid, by the Wahhabis to the exclusion of the four great mezhebs…”

Here the culturally disdainful attitude of the Ahmed Pasha blends the religious affiliation

of the people of Cebel with their so-called savagery. Nonetheless, he was determined to

change the way they were and ordered them to follow one of the paths delineated by the

great Imams of Sunni tradition.57 However, as reflected from the documents relating to

the issue of the conversion, the real bone of contention was the fact that these people were

handling their dispute amongst themselves, which is strongly against the government’s

desire to shy away from legal pluralism. Ahmed Pasha had written to Governor Mehmed

Emin Pasha to appoint deputy judges to oversee legal matters, muftis that would attend

to local population’s need for religious opinion, imams to oversee compulsory prayers.

What is most striking, however, is that a group of people, specifically asked to be Hanefis

who would “teach the basics of the religion of Islam, and to practice them the conditions

56 “Cebel takımının ahvâli ta’rîf ve beyân kabûl eder mevâddan olmayub ez-cümle bunlar bunca sinîn ve a'sârdan berü

zabt u rabt ne olduğunu görmemiş ve her biri vahşî sûretine girmiş olduğundan mâadâ hâric-i ez-mezâhib-i celîle-i

erbaa neûzubillah Vehhâbî'nin iştihârı olan beşinci mezhep diyerek bir tarîk-i bâtıleye zâhib olduklarından bu

makūlelere bu cihetle i’timâd câiz olmayacağı…” (Quoted in Atabaş 2017, 176-177). In Atabaş the word “iştihar” is

understandably misread as “iştihâd.” However, this reading does not correspond to an Ottoman dictionary entry

whereas the “iştihâr” means “to popularize.”

57 For a subaltern account of what Ahmed Pasha asked the local population see the letter they have written to the seat

of government in Tripoli, see: (COA.İ.MSM.73.2091.4, 28 Rabîu’l-Ahir 1260/17 May 1844).

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of esteemed mezheb of ehl-i sünnet” (COA. İ.MSM.72.2086.3, 25 Cemâziye’l-Evvel

1259/23 June 1843) is also sent to the Cebel region so that

“…. those hordes of Bedouins who are associated with various bandits…...

those ignoramuses who have not taken their share of the truths of religion and

the nuances of Islam; a group of mutezile which is led astray by a false

mezhep…. have now taken the initiative to walk on the straight path.58.”

They are now “honored by the glory of Islam”59 and they started to attend the compulsory

Friday and Eid prayers. It is understood from the documents that even though most of

them had become Hanefites, some happened to choose to be Maliki. What is most

interesting however, in every step of the way, through which the “Sunnitizing mission”

is communicated with the Sublime Porte, those converted to mezhep of Imam Malik has

been erased. In the documents addressed to Sultan by officials located in Istanbul, the

only mention is the hanefization of the residents of the Cebel. While extremely

ornamented designations were used to address the mezhep of Numan b. Sabit in all these

documents, it was merely “Maliki mezhebi” which was used to address the latter. I don’t

mean to extrapolate any generalizations from here, but it would not be totally wrong to

speculate about the relative high esteem the Hanefism enjoyed in the eyes of Ottomans.

After the military pacification, therefore, the region was incorporated into the legal

framework of the empire. The Muftis were directly authorized to give legal opinions by

the Şeyhülislam in Istanbul (COA.İ.MSM.72.2086-4). Along the way, a discourse of

religious-cultural superiority is clearly discernible in the documents.

4.4 Perception of Center-Periphery Dichotomy in Perspective

I am very well aware of the fact that the ongoing discussion is quite similar to the late

19th century perceptions of the Ottoman military-bureaucratic elite who self-admittedly

assumed its “civilizing mission” in the outlying provinces and aimed at correcting the

58 …. Güruh-ı urban bunca sinin ve a’sardan beri me’luf-i enve-i bagi ve şakiden olduklarından başka ekserisi mezhebi

seniyye-i erba’adan hariç hamisi namıyla bir mezheb-i batılaya süluk ile hakaik-i diniyyeden ve dekaik-i islamiyyetten

cahil ve bi-behre bir taife-i mutezile…. Min-külli-vücuh tarik-i müstakimi ihtiyar ve iltizam ve bir takımı mezheb-i

celile-i hanefiyye ve birazı mezheb-i malikiye temessük ve itisam etmeleri… (COA.İ.MSM.73.2091.4, 28 Rabîu’l-Ahir

1260/17 May 1844)

59 “Şeref-i islam ile müşerref olup” (COA.İ.MSM.72.2086-4)

81

believes of the local populations and elevating them to the rank of civilization (Deringil

2012, 242). The only missing component is the ideological classification of Tripoli within

the ranks of African colonies, as with the case of Cemal Pasha. Yet, my objection is to

the discussion of this behavior, namely the posture of socio-cultural superiority of

Ottoman officials, as if it is unique to modernizing elites who got inspired by European

colonialist discourses throughout the second half of 19th century. To better illustrate the

point, let me turn to the writings of the famous intellectual of the 16th century, Mustafa

Ali on Cairo and its inhabitants. In describing the black Arabs of Cairo, he writes:

“It is noteworthy that the multitude of black Arabs, like hordes of studhorse,

are all naked, men and women. The women cover their pudenda with a piece

of cloth plaited of rope, the size of a palm of the hand, or with certain leaves;

the men cover themselves in the same way, hiding only the organ of

reproduction and the testicles, but leaving everything else uncovered.

Moreover, when they wander along like a herd of animals, naked from head

to foot, they would pass by a fountain spring and would, like bears, fill their

palms and cupped their hands with water and drink (Âli and Tietze 1975, 43

& for the original Ottoman Turkish, 117).”

Let alone a lens of social otherness, in modern standards, such a description of the people

of any locality would directly be termed racist, lucky for him that he had lived and died

in the 16th century. Things get even more interesting in the poem he added to his normally

prosed text. It is as if he talks about civilizing through enslaving, expectedly without

referring to a civilizing mission. According to Âli, the black Arabs of above qualities

through the enslavement and castration processes suddenly find the opportunity of

entering Ottoman Palace harem quarters, thereby enjoying true happiness and starting to

wear golden robes. By making careers out of not being able to reproduce, he says, “those

vile Arabs that in Egypt run around naked from head to toe/ Had now become men of

high respect.” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 44 & for the original Ottoman Turkish, 118). Even

though the rest of the poem reads as the familiar criticizing tone of Mustafa Âli of the

promotion of the unworthy in Ottoman career paths, the way he puts his disgust of the

eunuchs in the service of the Ottoman dynasty is remarkably illuminating in terms of how

a member of 16th century Ottoman bureaucracy saw the peripheral peoples of the empire.

How different it is from the perceptions of 19th century modernizing elites is an openended

question.

82

In fact, the mental barrier Mustafa Âli has built lies between the people of the land of

Rum and the people beyond, both in cultural and religious terms. In his monumental

Essence of History (Künh’ül-Ahbar), he goes on to describe them as following:

“Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days

of the Ottoman dynasty, who are not [generically] separate from those tribes

of Turks and Tatars dealt with in the third Pillar, are a select community and

pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their

state, are singled out for their piety (diyanet), cleanliness (nazafet), and faith

(akidet).” (Quoted in Fleischer 1986, 256)

Where does the land of the Rum Âli refer to correspond geographically in the 16th

century? As discussed brilliantly by Fleischer (Fleischer 1986, 256) and later by Kafadar

(Kafadar 2007), Rum refers to the core territories, or heartlands to be true to Fleischer’s

terminology, of the Ottoman State from where the early Ottomans started their nearly

unstoppable march in all directions. Perhaps, one should not be too hasty in asserting that

a sense of motherland embedded in the Ottoman mentality is the product of modern

sensibilities of the Ottoman ruling elite. Then perhaps, we should read Cemal Pasha’s

allusions to his motherland as a crystallization of a mental construct that is readily

available in the Ottoman literary tradition. It is also important to emphasize that Âli’s

emphasis is on more humane qualities such as being pious, clean and faithful rather than

the military prowess of the imperial army.

For a brief discussion of why this is important let me return to the Description of Cairo

for the moment as Âli’s misrepresentation of the people in and around Cairo extend

beyond the black Arabs to include both the nomadic Bedouins and settled city-folk. As

far as Mustafa Âli concerned, it is impossible to distinguish between the mischief-making

(bais’ül fesad) or badly suspected (bed-güman) Bedouins and the good ones because they

wear the very same costumes in the cities and behave humbly but when they get out of

the limits of settled areas on their horsebacks, they both immediately “throw off their

obedience and rebel as soon as they come across a victim” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 56). I

believe that this reference is not much different from that of Mehmed Raif Pasha who

thought that the Bedouins would “demonstrate a sign of animosity as necessitated by the

way they are made” (COA.HAT.1110.44695). In the following lines, Âli develops his

argument into an outright discourse of power projection. He cherishes the divided

83

loyalties and enmity driven nature of the Bedouins who constantly fight each other. He

sustains, if not for their internal clashes necessitated by their true nature, Ottoman Sultan

would not have been able to rule over these vast territories with such small garrisons

situated in the region when Âli was in there. By making them as the way they are, Âli

thinks, God bestowed upon the Sultan a great blessing (Âli and Tietze 1975, 57).

As will be demonstrated clearly by the following quote none could have escaped Âli’s

disdainful looking down upon the people of the seemingly distant Arab province. Âli

describes the settled city-folk in Cairo:

“Since the people of Cairo and the opportunists that have come from the

desert and settled here suffer from an excess of envy and rancor and duplicity

and since people of asinine obstinacy tend toward mischief and intrigue, the

population is agreed on (living in) disharmony as one never finds it in any

other country.” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 48-49)

When compared with the piety (diyanet), cleanliness (nazafet), and faith (akidet) of the

inhabitants of the land of Rum, the description of the innate qualities and inclinations of

the people of the Cairo is a good example of the imagined separateness of the center and

the periphery in the mind of Mustafa Âli. Even though he does not try to argue for a

religious policy as in the case of the conversion of the inhabitants of Cebel-i Garbi, Âli

could not abstain from criticizing the local imams as well as the Sufi Sheikhs of Egpyt.

As he relates “in our times the religious orders followed by the pious, the so-called sheiks

of Egypt, are not in harmony with the approved ways of the Sheikhs of the Khalvetiye

and Zeyniye orders and of the heads of Naqshbendiyye order of the land of Rum” (Âli

and Tietze 1975, 47). It is remarkable that in every chance Âli gets, he could not resist

the temptation of articulating the religious-cultural superiority of the people of the land

of Rum.

In light of the present discussion in which I tried to trace back the intellectual precedent

of the social otherness created by the Ottoman agents in Tripoli, I would like to raise the

question of how modern was the cultural logic of 19th-century Ottoman reform? How

much it has drawn inspiration from the colonizing logic of the European imperialism?

Perhaps, one should stress the continuities more than the changes in the minds of the

members of the Ottoman military-bureaucratic elites. All in all, this chapter argues that

in no way disregarding the fruitful discussions born out of the Ottoman colonialism

84

literature, Ottoman ruling elite’s perceptions of the peripheral provinces of their empire

must be discussed in its own terms.

In the case of Tripoli, Ottomans certainly had concrete imperial designs motivated by the

administrative and strategic value of the region and its economic prospects. Nonetheless,

such a reality does not automatically mean that they had become a colonial power or

developed a colonialist/orientalist discourse per se. I tend to see this as a continuation of

Ottoman imperial practice and for the attitude of the Ottoman agents in their justification

of the use of violence and Ottoman presence in Tripoli, I would say, it may be best

conceptualized as the reproduction and perpetuation of a long-standing feeling of

religious-cultural superiority in a slightly different terminology in the context of 19th

century.

85

5.CONCLUSION

The early 19th century had witnessed a transformation of unknown scale in the Ottoman

Empire ever before. The center-periphery relation was to be renegotiated, redefined even

reinvented. The ever-greater security concerns pouring from each side of the imperial

borders obliged Ottoman ruling elite to resort such dramatic measures in order to ensure

the survival of the Ottoman state. However, it was never a linear process, it played out

differently in every single case. Depending on the relative strength of the local

powerholders and on the international balance of power, the possible strategies were

constrained or released.

In Ottoman North Africa, central government’s options had traditionally been limited due

to a variety of reason ranging from maritime technology, geography to political

impossibilities. However, as the European military domination of the Mediterranean had

become the impending reality of the day in the early 19th century, the regencies in North

Africa felt the need to come closer with the Sublime Porte, joining its war efforts and

aligning international interests more closely. Nonetheless, the French aggression in the

western Mediterranean urged the Ottoman decision-makers to reconsider their position in

the region. With hastily made plans, they tried to make France evacuate the Algiers,

efforts which came to naught at the end. However, once the bell started ringing, they had

found themselves in an inter-imperial power competition in the region.

In the early 18th century, Tripoli started to be ruled by a local dynasty, Karamanlıs. They

saw the best of the days and the worst of the days under the reign of Yusuf Karamanlı. In

his early years, he established Tripoli as a maritime power to be reckoned with to ensure

safe passage in the Mediterranean Sea. The income generated by the corsair activities had

been channeled to finance to consolidate Karamanlı control in the interior. By the time it

had come to 1817 the process was nearly complete in terms of pacifying the country.

86

However, overdependency on the financial fruits of the piratical raids in the

Mediterranean, intrusion of Maltese traders into Tripolitan markets by the encouragement

of British consuls in Tripoli shrank the Tripolitan treasury, dragging Yusuf Pasha into a

vicious cycle of unpaid debts. Several outbreaks of rebellions in the interior blew further

to his authority. At last, he lost the last bit of legitimacy when he asked a traditionally

tax-exempt privileged military class to finance the liquidation of his debts to the French

traders and the Kuloğlu stroke the banner of rebellion, rallying around his grandson

Mehmed. Eventually, two rival parties emerged in Tripoli to fill the power vacuum

created by Yusuf Pasha’s mismanagement and resultant abdication in favor of his son Ali

Bey. The struggle was to endure until the Ottoman naval squadron sent by the Sultan

arrived in Tripoli on 25 May 1835. It was the moment which gave this thesis its title.

The received wisdom in which Tripoli is portrayed as an integral part of the Ottoman

Empire from the 16th century until 1912 Treaty of Ouchy may mislead us to think

Ottoman intervention as the natural course of action but the naval squadron was the last

card Ottomans had chosen to put forward. All along, the Ottoman decision-makers’

priority was to stabilize the region. To this end, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was sent to Tripoli

to investigate the situation. The first course of action was to wait, probably, for the civil

war to be sorted out by local contenders themselves. Prolongation of the conditions of

civil war, though, had transformed Ottoman policy into a policy of full support behind

Ali Bey in his fight against his nephew. Each party had its own local and international

allies, which was resulting in an impasse in which either side would not surmount the

other. On the other hand, the stalemate was rendering Tripolitan territory an easy target

laying out in the open for potential claimants, which include France, the British and

Hüseynids of Tunisia and Mehmed Ali of Egypt. Being aware of the escalating

vulnerability of the region, as reflected in the reports of Mehmed Şakir Efendi, Ottoman

high command ordered a naval squadron to be fit for duty. However, even days before its

departure, its real ambition was disguised behind the excuse of helping Ali Pasha to

dismantle his rival’s camp. An elaborate plan with a couple of contingency scenarios was

laid out and Ottoman direct rule became the new reality of political life in Tripoli.

Ottomans’ involvement in this inter-imperial competition had also its distinctive imperial

aspects. For one thing, it was conceptualized as a new conquest by the highest council in

the Empire. They decided to do more than to pacify the region for the benefit of the other

87

parties, seeking administrative, strategic and economic benefit for the Ottoman center

itself. And ultimately, they had achieved what they aspired for.

I believe that the very attempt at taking over the Tripoli and the plan’s eventual success

goes against the paradigms in which the 19th century Ottoman Empire is portrayed as

crumbling, disintegrating or diplomatically speaking as a passive object of the Eastern

Question. In the 1820s and 1830s, a period when contemporary rivals of Ottoman Empire

such as Russia and France see its destruction as imminent and impending, Ottoman center

started to decisively re-expand southwards through eliminating powerful local dynastic

structures around the empire, Karamanlı family being one of them. It doesn’t matter if

they singlehandedly orchestrated a southern policy or seized the opportunities when they

presented themselves, they were able enough not to be captioned as the “Sick Man of

Europe.” Therefore, as far as political and diplomatic history concerned it is imperative

to refrain from being blindfolded by what had happened at the end of the Great War. Such

a point of view would give us the opportunity of thoroughly assessing the political

choices, successes, and failures of the late Ottoman political elite.

I believe, therefore, that it is due here to take a detour to talk about those who involved

with the planning and execution of the Ottoman intervention and with the formulation of

a loosely defined North African policy which basically aims at containing French

expansion. Most important among them, those who sit at the table when the decisions

were being made and those who were operational in the field, were Hüsrev Mehmed

Pasha, Necip Pasha, Damad Halil Rıfat Pasha, and Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha.

First, it must be stated that each had become affiliated with the imperial navy, three of

them at its highest office. Unfortunately, the main executioner of the plan is the most

obscure one. Mustafa Necip Pasha was a graduate of palace school and after a career in

Ottoman military, details of which are unknown, he became a general in 1832 and tasked

with the elimination of Karamanlı dynasty in 1835. After he served as the guardian of

Varna, he died in the early years of Abdülmecid’s reign (Çaycı 1995, 5). Hüsrev Mehmed

Pasha is perhaps the most famous one. He was a Caucasian slave who had been also

educated in the palace school and became a protégé of Silahtar Yahya and Süfyan Aghas.

After his early years in the palace, he was attached to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and when his

master was appointed as the Kaptan-ı Derya of the imperial navy, Hüsrev followed him

as his kethüda, commencing his career out of the palace (Çelik 2013, 6-9). Mehmed Tahir

88

Pasha, also known as Çengeloğlu, had started his career in the North African corsair fleets

and rose up in the imperial navy. After avoiding the annihilation of his ship Mecray-ı

Zafer and his crew in the battle of Navarino (COA.HAT.402.21123, n.d), his career

blossomed, becoming a ferik, Kaptan-ı Derya and Governor of Tripoli, respectively in

1830, 1832 and 1837. After his second term as Kaptan-ı Derya between 1841 and 1843,

he served as governor in several provinces and died in 1847 (Çaycı 1995, 6). Damad Halil

Rıfat Pasha was also a Georgian slave. Interestingly enough, his master was Hüsrev

Mehmed Pasha. He was first tasked with being his master’s treasurer, become Kaptan-ı

Derya in 1830, and royal groom in 1834. He succeeded his master as the Serasker in 1836,

continued to hold prominent positions until he died in 1856 and buried next to his master,

Hüsrev Pasha (Çelik 2013, 421).

Apart from being involved with the naval affairs of the Empire, these men have one other

thing in common, that is, they are coming from traditional backgrounds. They were either

slaves or free-born graduates of palace school who are deeply entrenched in factional

politics. In the case of Tahir Pasha, he had entered the system through north Africa.

Wouldn’t it be logical to ask how different a cadre is this from let’s say the 17th century?

On the other hand, these so-called traditionally oriented people were smoothly

orchestrating a political scheme that could even be considered as overseas expansion. Not

only that, but they also started to lay the first bricks of Ottoman modernization in Tripoli.

I believe that their success calls for a better evaluation of their legacy, by that I mean the

legacy of their tradition to better understand the dynamics of the development of Ottoman

modernity in the 19th century.

Looking from such a perspective, the social distancing, even disdain, clearly discernible

from the official correspondence of these Ottoman agents is all the more interesting. After

all, apart from Mustafa Ali’s discussions of the people of the Cairo, Süleyman Penah

Efendi as well in his Esbab-ı Tebdir-i Nizam-i Ekâlim had seen the “noble savages” in

the persons of Albanians of Avlonya and Delvine in the late 18th century (Erdem 2017).60

Therefore, perhaps it is possible to follow the tracks of a nuanced understanding of how

the Ottoman center perceived and conceptualized its provinces and the people living in it

with a better historicization. In our case, apart from the usual discourse of tribal “savage”,

it turned out to be deeply intertwined with concerns of the legal jurisdiction of Ottoman

60 See for the text of Esbab-ı Tebdir-i Nizam-i Ekâlim: (Süleyman Penah & Zararsız, 2017).

89

central government which is also blended with a belief in the religious superiority of the

mezheb-i Numan b. Sabit.

90

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APPENDIX A:

MAP OF TRIPOLI

Source: (Dearden 1976)