44

 THE NEWS AGENCIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:

HAVAS, REUTERS AND THE OTTOMAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY

(1862-1914)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

THE NEWS AGENCIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: HAVAS, REUTERS

AND THE OTTOMAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY (1862-1914)

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

January 2019

Established in the nineteenth century, Havas, Reuters and Wolff’s became three

major and influential news agencies in the world. Especially Havas and Reuters

gave utmost importance to the Ottoman Empire and competed to gain control of

news collecting and dissemination in the imperial capital. Being challenged by the

Great Power politics of the century, the Ottoman Empire tried to have control of the

news Havas and Reuters disseminated in the empire and abroad along with other

carriers and makers of information through financial means. Not satisfied with the

outcomes of this policy, the empire searched for ways to have its own news agency

for more than three decades. The Ottoman Telegraph Agency, the first semi-formal

news agency of the Ottoman Empire came into existence in 1911.

Keywords: Havas, Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Telegraph Agency, Reuters.

iv

ÖZET

OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU’NDAKİ HABER AJANSLARI: HAVAS,

REUTERS VE OSMANLI TELGRAF AJANSI (1862-1914)

Uçan, Ceren

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Evgeniy R. Radushev

Ocak 2019

On dokuzuncu yüzyılda kurulan Havas, Reuters ve Wolff's dünyanın üç büyük ve

etkili haber ajansı olmuştur. Özellikle Havas ve Reuters, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na

büyük önem atfederek imparatorluk başkentinde haber toplama ve yayma

faaliyetlerini kontrol altına alabilmek için kıyasıya bir rekabet içerisine girmiştir.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Yüzyılın Büyük Güçleri ile devam eden mücadelesi

kapsamında diğer bilgi üreten ve taşıyan yapılar ile beraber Havas ve Reuters'in

hem İmparatorluk toprakları üzerinde hem de dışarıda haber toplama ve yayma

faaliyetleri üzerinde finansal yöntemler ile kontrol elde etmeye çalışmıştır.

Yürüttüğü bu politikanın sonuçlarından memnun kalmayan imparatorluk, otuz yılı

aşkın bir süre boyunca kendi haber ajansına sahip olmanın yollarını aramıştır. Bu

çerçevede, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun ilk yarı resmi haber ajansı olan Osmanlı

Telgraf Ajansı 1911’de ortaya çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Havas, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Osmanlı Telgraf Ajansı,

Reuters.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation, while an individual work, has come into existence with the

support and contributions of numerous people. I would like to express my deepest

gratitude to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Evgeniy R. Radushev, and members of

my dissertation supervision committee, Prof. Dr. Özer Ergenç and Asst. Prof. Dr.

Berrak Burçak. I am also thankful to my dissertation examining committee

members, Prof. Dr. Mehmet V. Seyitdanlioğlu and Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan for their

contributions. I would also like to thank my professors at İ.D. Bilkent University,

Asst. Prof. Dr. Oktay Özel, Asst. Prof. Dr. David Thornton, and Asst. Prof. Dr. Paul

Latimer, who contributed to my formation as historian. I would like to thank to The

Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) Science

Fellowship and Grant Programmes Department (BIDEB) for funding my research at

the United Kingdom with the grant 2214/A and making this dissertation possible. I

would also like to thank my friends at İ.D. Bilkent University, Sinan Çetin, Fatih

Pamuk, Abdürrahim Özer, and Müzeyyen Karabağ for their support. Finally, I am

grateful to my parents and my brother for always supporting me and my work.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. iii

ÖZET ........................................................................................................................ iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................... v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ vi

CHAPTER I: THE FORMATION OF THE NEWS AGENCIES IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY, THEIR RISING IMPORTANCE AS BUSINESS

VENTURES, AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ................................................... 1

1.1. Objectives of the Study ................................................................................. 17

1.2. Primary Sources ............................................................................................ 20

1.3. Literature Review .......................................................................................... 21

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation.......................................................................... 29

CHAPTER II: HAVAS, WOLFF’S, REUTERS AND THE GOVERNMENTS

.................................................................................................................................. 31

CHAPTER III: THE REUTER FAMILY’S ENTERPRISES AND THE

BRITISH EMPIRE ................................................................................................ 55

CHAPTER IV: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ..................................................... 114

4.1. Decentralization and an Overview of Centralization Policy in the Ottoman

Empire ................................................................................................................ 115

4.2. History of Telegraphy in the Ottoman Empire ........................................... 121

4.3. The Empire’s Endeavor to Establish a Telegraph Agency ......................... 126

CHAPTER V: THE OTTOMAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY (AGENCE

TELEGRAPHIQUE OTTOMANE) AND ITS SUCCESSORS ...................... 153

CHAPTER VI: L’AGENCE MILLI (THE NATIONAL OTTOMAN

TELEGRAPH AGENCY), LA TURQUIE AND L’AGENCE ORIENTALE

D’INFORMATIONS ........................................................................................... 153

6.1. l’Agence Milli (The National Ottoman Telegraph Agency) ....................... 176

6.2. La Turquie ................................................................................................... 183

6.3. l’Agence Orientale d’Informations ............................................................. 184

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 186

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................ 189

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE FORMATION OF THE NEWS AGENCIES IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY, THEIR RISING IMPORTANCE AS

BUSINESS VENTURES, AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Developments during the eighteenth century caused the establishment and

rise of news agencies in the next century. While the expansion of the printing press

and long-term changes in literacy, the industrial revolution, the growth of a

capitalist economy, and improvements in transportation and communication created

a modern society, the news agencies took their respected place in this contemporary

world. In the nineteenth century, the concept of ‘information’ was reformulated.

‘Information’ became ‘news’, a commodity to collect and distribute.1 This act of

collecting and distributing news created the first international or global media

1 Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, “The Globalization of News,” in The Globalization of

News (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 1.

2

organizations, the news agencies. These agencies were also among the very first

transnational or multinational corporations.2 Their significance was such that:

The news agencies were among the world’s first organizations to

operate, not only globally, but to operate globally in the

production and distribution of ‘consciousness’, through the

commodification of news, in ways which had very significant

implications for our understanding or appreciation of time and

space.3

The industrial revolution and the transformation of the capitalist market

made news agencies necessary. The stock exchange rates were the most important

commodity of the three major European news agencies during their first years. With

the introduction of new machine technologies and steam power from the late

eighteenth century onwards, the nature of capitalist enterprise was transformed, and

factories with hundreds of employees became the typical form of a business unit.

This transformation occurred most rapidly within the cotton industry. In Britain,

between 1792 and 1850, the number of factories increased from about 900 to over

1,400, whereas, between 1750 and 1850, the quantity of raw materials processed by

the cotton industry increased more than 200 times.4

As the victor of the Industrial Revolution, Britain’s industrial economy was

such that:

… it harnessed the power of a million horses in its steam-engines,

turned out two million yards of cotton cloth per year on over

seventeen million mechanical spindles, dug almost fifty million

tons of coal, imported and exported £170 millions worth of goods

in a single year. Its trade was twice that of its nearest competitor,

France: in 1780 it had only just exceeded it.5

Throughout the nineteenth century, all areas of the globe were being

discovered and mapped, world population doubled, and it was held together more

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 5.

4 Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London: Methuen, 1983), 8–10.

5 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 51.

3

tightly than ever with the moving of goods, people, capital and ideas by more

advanced methods of communication and transportation compared to the previous

century:6

Now the major fact about the nineteenth century is the creation of

a single global economy, progressively reaching into the most

remote corners of the world, an increasingly dense web of

economic transactions, communications and movements of goods,

money and people linking the developed countries with each other

and with the undeveloped world….This globalization of the

economy was not new, though it had accelerated considerably in

the middle decades of the century.7

A system of semaphores preceding the electric telegraph, created in 1793 by Claude

Chappe, was used effectively during the French Revolution and its aftermath by

French governments for the next fifty years. By 1850, France had five thousand

kilometers of lines and 566 stations. Because of this large investment in Chappe’s

system, France was to fall behind Britain in building telegraph lines after the

founding of the electric telegraph. In 1837, while William Cooke and Charles

Wheatstone built the first telegraph line in Britain, Samuel Morse developed and

patented his code. Morse opened the first public telegraph line in 1844 between

Baltimore and Washington. Whereas the first line was built in the Ottoman Empire

in 1854, during the Crimean War by the British Empire, which dominated the

telegraphic communication of the century, in terms of technology, cadre, and a web

of telegraph lines, by the 1840s, a telegraph network was already covering Europe

and the eastern United States.8 In 1895, world submarine cables extended 300,000

6 Ibid., 13–14.

7 Ibid., 62.

8 Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-

1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 11–28.

4

kilometers and land lines were over a million kilometers in length, carrying 15,000

messages daily.9

The nineteenth century was not only a time for the global economy but was

also the age of colonial empires. Rapid expansion of the electric telegraph was due

to the security concerns of the colonial empires. Between 1880 and 1914, territories

were partitioned by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,

Belgium, the USA and Japan. Britain added four million square miles to its

territories and controlled one quarter of the globe, France acquired 3.5 million,

Germany took possession of more than one million, Belgium and Italy gained just

under one million square miles each, and the USA and Japan acquired around

100,000 each.10 Possessing vast and distant territories, the empires had a great need

for electric telegraphy, allowing them to communicate with their colonies and

ensure the central government control:

As soon as areas were pacified, bureaucratic controls replaced the

free-wheeling agents of the frontier period. And inevitably the

controls operated through the telegraph wires and cables.11

The cable lines connecting an empire with its colonies were not only valuable in

enabling imperial governments to communicate with their agents in the periphery,

and to instruct and monitor their civil servants, but also to protect and preserve their

colonies against the threat of invasion by foreign empires. As such, the British

Empire was connected with its major colonies and naval bases through cable lines

which only passed through British territory or a friendly power.12

In the 1880s, large-scale businesses started to adopt limited liability

company status: “between 1885 and 1907 the number of firms in domestic

9 Ibid., 28.

10 Hobsbawm, Age of Empire, 59.

11 Headric, Invisible Weapon, 68.

12 Ibid., 98.

5

manufacturing and distribution with quotations on the London stock exchange grew

from only sixty to almost 600, and the provincial stock exchanges ‘were almost of

greater importance in relation to home securities than London’”.13 The capital

surplus in Britain and France turned their stock markets into the largest supplier of

capital.14 In 1915, capital exported from Europe was almost fifty times greater than

that exported in 1825.15 Between 1870 and 1914, emphasis on capital export was

not focused on the colonies but on places with more developed economies. America

was the leader of capital import with fourteen billion dollars, followed by the

colonial world with eleven billion dollars (only a small percentage of this went to

Africa). Europe received around seven billion dollars, Russia imported four billion

dollars, the Ottoman Empire imported one billion dollars and Austria-Hungary

received two billion dollars.16

The founders of the Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters agencies realized the need

for financiers, bankers and businessmen to obtain stock exchange rates in this new

era of global economy and colonial empires.17 In their humble beginnings, the

agencies only provided their clients with stock exchange rates and political news

that could influence the stock market, demonstrating the significance of capitalist

enterprise transformation into news agency formation. The founder of the Agence

Havas, Charles-Louis Havas (1783–1858), who was a bankrupt businessman, was

13 Hannah, Corporate Economy, 20.

14 Ibid.

15 Henk Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires 1815-1919 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004),

27.

16 Ibid., 124.

17 The names of the news agencies changed several times throughout the period in question. As it

does not serve the purpose of this work to follow the name and administration changes of each

agency, the conventional shorthand usage, as explained in Alexander Scott Nalbach’s, “The Ring

Combination: Information, Power and the World News Agency Cartel,” will be taken into account:

“The conventional shorthand in the literature on the telegraphic news agencies is ‘Havas’ for the

Agence Havas, ‘Reuters’ (although the firm name retained the apostrophe until 1984) for Reuter’s

Telegram Company (Limited), and either ‘Wolff’s’ or ‘the Continental’ (after 1865) for Wolff’s

Telegraphisches-Bureau-Continental Telegraphen-Compagnie.” (PhD diss., University of Chicago,

1999), 6.

6

the first to notice the possibilities the news business offered. After being arrested for

debt in January 1832, in August Havas opened a translation office which he

reorganized as the Agence Havas in 1835. Havas’ enterprise was the first

information bureau for the press. Dr. Bernard Wolff (1811–79), the founder of

Wolff’s Telegraphic Bureau, and Paul Julius Reuter, the founder of Reuters, worked

at the Agence Havas as translators.18

Working at Havas only briefly in 1848, Wolff returned to Berlin the very

same year to found his own newspaper, the National-Zeitung. In 1849, he

established the Telegraphic Bureau, which served financial and commercial groups.

Wolff’s bulletins included market quotations and political news affecting the

market. Until 1855, the bureau did not sell political and general news to the press.

Paul Julius Reuter (1816–99) also worked at Havas in 1848 and then established his

own business in Paris in the spring of 1849. Like Havas, Reuter and his wife were

translating extracts from leading French newspapers to send them to provincial

newspapers in Germany. Reuter’s office lasted only until the summer of 1849.

Having failed in Paris, Reuter moved to Aachen in Prussia where he carried

information between the unconnected points of the Prussian and French telegraph

systems. However, in the spring of 1851, the gap between Berlin and Paris was

closed. Having lost his advantage in financial news collecting, Reuter moved to

London in the summer of 1851.19 Like Wolff’s, Reuter’s bulletins included political

news that could affect market rates. He started selling general news to the London

press in 1858.20

18 Alexander Scott Nalbach, “Poisoned at the Source? Telegraphic News Services and Big Business

in the Nineteenth Century,” Business History Review, vol. 77, no. 4 (Winter 2003), 580–81.

19 Graham Storey, Reuters’ Century 1851-1951 (London: Max Parrish, 1951), 9–12.

20 Nalbach, “Poisoned at Source?” 581–82.

7

In 1865, Reuter reorganized his agency as Reuter’s Telegram Company

(Limited), a joint-stock enterprise. The new board had four members who were

bankers and traders in India and China. That same year, by means of newly raised

capital, Reuter tried to buy Wolff’s agency, together with Havas. To resist the

takeover, Wolff asked for help from Wilhelm I of Prussia. Under the king’s

initiative, Berlin bankers provided for the agency and became stockholders of the

new joint-stock holding firm, the Continental Telegraphen-Compagnie (Continental

Telegraph Company), founded on 20 May 1865 to transfer capital to Wolff’s. The

Havas agency was incorporated at 8.5 million francs in July 1879, and Baron

Frédéric-Émile d’Erlanger, a financier, became the stockholder of 637,000 francs

worth of shares.21

The capital surplus formed in this new global economy not only developed

the news agency business but also the news agency owners. As they gained wealth

and reputation through their news businesses, they started to take part in foreign

investments. The major stockholders of Havas and Wolff’s were financiers, and

while Reuter family members became investors with the wealth they gained through

their news agency, the rest of the board members were bankers and traders in the

new joint-stock holding company. As a product of modernization, Reuters gave its

founder and his family the opportunity to become capitalist investors through the

wealth they gained from the news agency business. Produced by the capitalist

economy, the news agencies contributed to the perpetuation of the capitalist system.

The major stockholders of the news agencies profited from the incomes of

the agencies, as well as from the influence they gained from having control of

21 Ibid., 584–86.

8

information.22 In some cases they managed to direct public policy and in some cases

they failed to do so. However, as will be discussed later through an examination of

the investments of the Reuter family, they always tried to impose policy on

governments which was beneficial to their financial interests.

Before World War I, the main European news agencies sought to secure

subsidies and privileges from every government possible. This policy helped them

to reduce the costs of their businesses. By prior access to official information they

could disseminate news faster than their competitors. The policy of the three major

European news agencies is explained thus:

In the case of nineteenth-century telegraphic news agencies,

official efforts to guide or control public opinion were not

imposed from above by authoritarian regimes upon reluctant

media struggling to maintain their independence. On the contrary,

Bernhard Wolff, Julius Reuter, Edouard Lebey, Sigmund

Engländer and Melville Stone all hounded palaces and foreign

offices both at home and abroad for subsidies or privileges,

volunteering their distribution networks for official publicity and

offering up blue-penciled copies of suppressed telegrams as proof

of their political reliability.23

The owners and managers of the international news agencies regarded the news

business like any other sector in trade and sought means to maximize their profits.

The subsidies, subscriptions, and reduced telegraph rates offered by governments to

these agencies were made in vain or, at best, helped these governments for only

short periods of time. This was because the agencies signed secret agreements with

22 John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Michigan: the University of Michigan Press, 2006),

60. In his book, Hobson explains that the financial houses were directing public opinion and,

therefore, public policy by holding the ownership of major newspapers: “The direct influence

exercised by great financial houses in ‘high politics’ is supported by the control which they exercise

over the body of public opinion through the Press, which, in every ‘civilized’ country, is becoming

more and more their obedient instrument. While the specifically financial newspaper imposes ‘facts’

and ‘opinions’ on the business classes, the general body of the Press comes more and more under the

conscious or unconscious domination of financiers…In Berlin, Vienna, and Paris many of the

influential newspapers have been held by financial houses, which used them, not primarily to make

direct profits out of them, but in order to put into the public mind beliefs and sentiments which

would influence public policy and thus affect the money market.”

23 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 571.

9

several governments around the same time in order to promote the finances of their

agencies and be able to collect and disseminate news faster. Serving the interests of

an empire was the discourse the news agencies used to conclude agreements with

governments. Once Reuters signed secret agreements with the Ottoman Empire, the

British Empire and the Japanese Empire, all around the same time.

Because the major European news agencies were in communication with

several governments at one time, the Ottoman Empire did not manage to keep them

under its complete control. By the end of the nineteenth century, after decades of

trying to control them by granting or withdrawing allowances and privileges, the

Ottoman Empire acknowledged the need to establish its own news agency. The

Ottoman statesmen’s judgement on this matter was that each major European news

agency was serving the interests of its domestic empire. Therefore, the Ottoman

Empire had to establish a news agency under its complete control, and only in its

service.

Despite searching for ways to establish a news agency, the empire only

managed to do so in the twentieth century. When finally its attempts bore fruit and

the Ottoman Empire founded its semi-formal news agency in 1911, during the

Second Constitutional Era, hostility between the European states was on the rise. As

an early indication of rising tension between the countries, in 1909, when the news

alliance contract was due to be renewed for another ten years, on Continental’s

demand, which was under pressure from the German Foreign Office, it was agreed

that: if a receiving agency refused to include a dispatch to its bulletin and service it,

the sending agency could demand its distribution in its ally’s reserved territory by

covering its expenses. Such dispatches would still be distributed by the receiving

10

agency but they were to carry the word ‘Tractatus’ (‘handling’ in Latin) to separate

them from the regular dispatches.24

Introducing telegraphic communication to the Ottoman Empire in 1855 was

part of state policy to consolidate the power of the center, which had been pursued

since the eighteenth century, like the launching of the postal system in 1834, and the

railways in 1856. Moreover, the news agencies, especially the European ones, were

regarded as tools to promote the empire’s image abroad, which was vital for

preserving the empire. Communication between the imperial center and the

provinces was the key in consolidating the center’s authority, as emphasized by

Frederick W. Frey: “Laxity in the execution of orders from the capital, banditry, the

sway of the local ağas, all varied inversely with the excellence of communications

contact between elite and mass.”25 From Selim III’s reign, in the last years of the

eighteenth century, Ottoman statesmen recognized the contemporary military,

economic and administrative challenges and addressed them. These policies

pursued by the Ottoman sultans to consolidate the power of the imperial center are

referred to as ‘reforms’ in Ottoman historical scholarship. Informing Ottoman

subjects about the reforms and being connected to them through a flow of

information were objectives of Ottoman statesmen, as were, simultaneously, trying

to influence foreign news agencies and later founding a semi-formal Ottoman news

agency.

Moreover, telegraphic communication did not only mean the circulation of

information promptly within the empire but also between the empire and the world.

The foreign telegraphic agencies were significant for the Ottoman Empire as they

24 Ibid., 558.

25 Frederick W. Frey, “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey,” in

Communications and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1963), 306.

11

were the carriers and makers of news.26 In the nineteenth century, Ottoman

statesmen were familiar with the concept of public opinion:

They recognized its existence both in their own Empire and in

European countries. As the number of newspapers grew, one finds

more and more references to Efkâr-i umumiye, public opinion.27

They were also aware that having a positive image abroad was vital for the empire’s

survival.28 As stated by Roderic Davison, “in nineteenth-century Europe the

Ottoman Empire had an ‘image problem’”; it was regarded as an oppressive and

backward empire.29 Therefore, Ottoman statesmen took measures to influence

public opinion in Europe.30 The establishment of a permanent Ottoman diplomatic

corps by Mahmud II was the beginning of these Ottoman efforts to change this

perception, which was called a “public relations campaign” by Davison.31 Besides

the regular duty of representing the Ottoman Empire and its views to the

government to which they were appointed, permanent Ottoman representatives

abroad also had the duty to represent the empire to the foreign public. The empire

also assigned representatives to international organizations and joined most of the

major international exhibitions, starting with the Crystal Palace Exhibition in

26 Terry N. Clark, ed., Gabriel Tarde On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 304. Gabriel Tarde’s opinion on journalism and

newspapers shows the power of the telegraphic news agencies as they were the suppliers of

information for journals and newspapers: “Journalism both sucks in and pumps out information,

which, coming in from all corners of the earth in the morning, is directed, the same day, back out to

all the corners of the earth, insofar as the journalist defines what is or appears to be interesting about

it, given the goals he is pursuing and the party for which he speaks. His information is in reality a

force which little by little becomes irresistible. Newspapers began by expressing opinion, first the

completely local opinion of privileged groups, a court, a parliament, a capital, whose gossip,

discussions, or debates they reproduced; they ended up directing opinion almost as they wished,

modelling it, and imposing the majority of their daily topics upon conversation.”

27 Roderic H. Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms (İstanbul: Isis Press,

1999), 351.

28 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the

Ottoman Empire 1876-1909 (Spain: Bookchase, 2004), 172.

29 Davison, Ottoman Diplomacy, 351.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

12

London, in 1851.32 Furthermore, as part of the campaign to improve the Ottoman

image the empire gave subventions to some European newspapers as early as

1846.33 The Sublime Porte hired European writers to publish books, paid journalists

and newspaper owners to plant articles prepared by the Sublime Porte in

newspapers, and published some of its important reform documents in French, such

as the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane, and distributed them to European governments. 34

The Tanzimat reforms were designed by Ottoman statesmen who were

aware of the importance of the imperial image. The Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane,

declared on 3 November 1839, initiated the Tanzimat period of reform. Although it

was presented as contributing to the modernization of the empire by promising a

guarantee of life, property, chastity, honor, the re-regulation of taxation and the

military service, and prohibiting execution without trial and bribery, it was also

prepared to please the Great Powers.35 Mustafa Reşid Paşa, architect of the 1839

edict, realized, while working as an ambassador in Paris and later in London, that

the western public had been hostile to the Ottoman Empire ever since the Greek

uprising, as the Greeks were regarded as part of western civilization.

Believing that it was necessary to first influence the western general public

in order to influence western statesmen, Mustafa Reşid Paşa advised the Sultan to

increase the number of embassies. Ambassadors were then to use the local press to

influence the public, a practice which was used by himself as well.36 Known for

being a proponent of Ottoman accession to the concert of Europe, Mustafa Reşid

Paşa contributed to the edict’s formation, which had two purposes:

32 Ibid., 353–54.

33 Ibid., 355.

34 Ibid., 355–56.

35 Hanioğlu, Brief History, 73.

36 Enver Ziya Karal, “Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu’nda Batı’nın Etkisi,” in Tanzimat: Değişim

Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, ed. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (Ankara: Türkiye İş

Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 123–24.

13

In a sense, the document served as an assurance to the Great

Powers that demanded domestic reforms in return for future

recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the concert of

Europe…Thus, the edict was directed both inward and outward, at

once a serious commitment to reform out of self-interest and an

appeasing gesture directed at Europe.37

The second and final phase of the Tanzimat started with the declaration of a

new edict, the Hatt-ı Hümayun, on 15 February 1856. Shortly after its proclamation,

on 30 March 1856, the Paris Treaty was signed, ending the Crimean War and

making the Ottoman Empire a member of the concert of Europe. Hanioğlu, the

historian, further emphasized the Ottoman statesmen’s desire to promote a positive

image in Europe in order to preserve the empire:

The Tanzimat leaders were undoubtedly sincere in their desire to

reinvigorate the empire through reform. But the reforms served

another principal goal for them: acquiring the international

respectability required for membership in the European concert.

The dual purpose of the reforms was especially evident in those

innovations aimed at achieving equality before the law: advancing

such equality promoted the cohesiveness of a fractious

multinational empire, and at the same time placated European

public opinion which was increasingly sensitive to the inequality

of the empire’s Christians…Winning over public opinion in

Europe was not merely a question of popularity; it was crucial for

the defense of the empire.38

He underlined that French and British support in the Crimean War was for the first

time an outcome of the “pro-Ottoman pressure of public opinion” besides strategic

concerns, and described the war as “a great victory for Ottoman public

diplomacy”.39

During the following decades, deliberately trying to prove that it was a Great

Power, as recognized by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Ottoman Empire continued

to make an appearance in world events by providing financial aid to humanitarian

37 Hanioğlu, Brief History, 73.

38 Ibid., 76.

39 Ibid., 77.

14

deeds, having representatives in international organizations, participating in

international exhibitions of industrial and agricultural goods, and sending

representatives to celebrations, funerals and international conferences.40

The Ottoman saw himself as an equal participant in the zero-sum

games of world politics, and demanded to be treated as such. The

European saw him as an anomaly, a master who should really be

servant, a ruler who should really be a subject. It was this

dichotomy which produced the Ottoman obsession with image

and a determination to defend it against all slights, insults and

slurs. Even worse, of course, was the possibility of being

ignored.41

The image that the Ottoman Empire wanted to promote of itself, and was obsessed

with, was a modern, civilized and strong empire with a long and glorious history,

and a land of great natural beauty.42

Abdülhamid II’s concern about the image of the Empire was rooted in the

events known as the Bulgarian horrors, which took place in 1876, shortly before his

accession to the throne. Since the summer of 1875, Christian rebels had been

organizing attacks on Muslims in Herzegovina, which eventually spread all over

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The empire suppressed these attacks harshly by force.

Attacks against the Muslim population also started to take place in Bulgaria in

1876, initiated by a couple of hundred rebels who had been trained in the Russian

Empire. While 300 Muslims were massacred by the rebels, 2,100 rebels were killed

by the Ottoman forces, among whom were Bulgarians who were not involved in the

attacks.43

40 Deringil, Well-Protected Domains, 353.

41 Ibid., 171.

42 Selim Deringil, “II. Abdülhamid döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde ‘İmaj’ Saplantısı,” in Sultan

II. Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri: 27-29 Mayıs 1992 (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat

Fakültesi Basımevi, 1994), 149–62.

43 Kemal Karpat and Robert W. Zens, “I. Meşrutiyet Dönemi ve II. Abdülhamid’in Saltanatı (1876-

1909),” in Genel Türk Tarihi Cilt 7, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel and Ali Birinci (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye

Yayınları, 2002), 286–87.

15

These events were presented to the European public as if the Muslim

fanatics were massacring innocent Christians. William Ewart Gladstone, the British

Liberal Party leader who later became prime minister four times (1868–74, 1880–

85, 1886 and 1892–94), used these events as a way to criticize the policy of his

opponent, Benjamin Disraeli, Conservative Party Leader and British Prime Minister

(1868, 1874–80), which he described as “questionable and erroneous”.44 The

pamphlet, referring to the Ottomans as the Turkish race, described them in the

following manner:

They were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first

entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.

Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track

behind them; and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization

disappeared from view. 45

Another issue that challenged the Ottoman Empire in the international arena

was the Armenian problem. Incidents that took place in 1894, in the district of

Sasun, followed by conflict between the Muslims and Armenians in 1895 and 1896,

drastically lowered Ottoman prestige in Europe.46

To win over foreign public opinion, especially European, the empire wanted

to control the foreign telegraphic news agencies, which were the suppliers of news

to the foreign press. Abdülhamid II tried to win them over by financial means.

However, realizing that this method was not working well to promote a positive

image of the Ottoman state, and feeling uneasy about not being able to express and

defend itself, the Ottoman statesmen acknowledged the need to establish an

Ottoman telegraphic news agency. Despite their endeavors, the Ottoman Empire

44 William Ewart Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London: William

Clowes and Sons, 1876), 12.

45 Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors, 12.

46 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 83.

16

only managed to set up its first semiformal telegraphic news agency, loyal only to

the empire, in 1911.

The Ottoman Telegraph Agency was founded by the initiative of Salih

Gürcü47. Gürcü, owner and manager of a Parisian journal La Turquie Nouvelle,

recognized the opportunities offered in the news agency business and asked for a

permit on 25 June 1909 to establish an agency called the Gürcü Agency in the

Ottoman capital; this was intended to be the semiformal agency of the empire. Salih

Gürcü did not succeed in making his agency the semiformal instrument of the

empire, but he did manage to turn another one, the Ottoman Telegraph Agency,

which he founded in August 1909, into the semiformal news agency of the empire

in the second half of 1911.

In 1914, Gürcü lost his administrative position in the Ottoman Telegraph

Agency. The duty of transforming the agency was given to Hüseyin Tosun, who

was a deputy of Erzurum at the time. The Ottoman Telegraph Agency was renamed

the National Telegraph Agency (Agence Milli) in 1914, La Turquie in 1919, and

finally l’Agence Orientale d’Informations in 1922. Planned for decades, based on

British intelligence reports, the semiformal Ottoman news agency served the

interests of the Ottoman Empire. However, the empire, under occupation, lost its

agency completely to the Allies in 1919; when the National Telegraph Agency

signed an agreement with Havas and Reuters, it was renamed the Havas-Reuter-

Turkish Agency, and was used to ease the occupation of Anatolia.

47 Salih Gürcü was referred as Gürcü or Gourdji in the Ottoman documents and Gourji, Gurji or

Gourdji in the British documents. To have consistency, he will be referred as Salih Gürcü throughout

the dissertation, unless it is a direct quote from a primary source in English or French.

17

1.1. Objectives of the Study

It is not the object of this dissertation to discuss the arguments regarding the public

sphere, as seen in Jürgen Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public

Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. What is important is that,

as discussed by Cengiz Kırlı, the perception of Ottoman statesmen changed with

regards to the public and public opinion after the 1840s. The legitimacy of public

opinion was implicitly accepted by Ottoman statesmen, and rather than denying or

silencing public opinion, it became a source they consulted indirectly.48 This

perception change, consulting the public in order to construct a public opinion,

started in Europe in the eighteenth century. While the phenomenon was described

by Michel Foucault as a “discovery of political thought”,49 it was referred to by

Keith Michael Baker as a “political invention”.50

When the coffeehouse was first introduced to Istanbul in the mid-sixteenth

century, conversations on state affairs were regarded as gossip and the only reason

for the empire to monitor them and other places where people gathered was to catch

48 Cengiz Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde ‘Havadis Jurnalleri’ (1840-

1844) (İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 13–25.

49 Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (New York:

Pantheon Books, 242. In an interview Foucault stated: “What was discovered at that time and this was

one of the great discoveries of political thought at the end of the eighteenth century was the idea of

society. That is to say, that government not only has to deal with a territory, with a domain, and with

its subjects, but that it also has to deal with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws

and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibilities of disturbance. This new reality

is society.”

50 Keith Michel Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the

Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 168: “Many studies of the idea

of public opinion assume the existence of some corresponding social referent as a residual fact of

common life in any society ̶ a kind of perpetual noise in the system which must in some way be

taken account of, whether or not its existence if formally acknowledged by political actors or

explicitly designated under the rubric of ‘public opinion.’ Others see it as a specific phenomenon of

modern societies, brought into being by long-term changes in literacy, by the growth of capitalism

and the commercial expansion of the press, by the bureaucratic transformation of particularistic

social orders into more integrated national (and now international) communities. Without denying

the importance of these latter developments, I wish to insist on the significance of public opinion as

a political invention rather than as a sociological function.”

18

those who conversed about the state and punish them. However, in the nineteenth

century, the practice changed drastically:

By recording these opinions without the purpose of persecuting political

gossipmongers, the state turned the oral into the literal, the anonymous

into the authored, and the elusive into the tangible. This was, in fact, the

process in which rumor became news; and the individual opinions that

were hitherto persecuted for their political content became a public

opinion to which the nineteenth-century Ottoman state was obliged to

appeal.51

In an age when ‘information’ became ‘news’, ‘individual opinions’ became ‘public

opinion’, and governments and rulers appealed to the public, the Ottoman Empire

lacked the means to infiltrate the public.

A change in the Ottoman statesmen’s perception of public opinion made the

nineteenth-century news agencies significant for the empire. The Ottomans wanted

to construct their own version of foreign and domestic public opinion as they

regarded it to be a necessity in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the

empire. As a tool to influence public opinion, especially foreign, Ottoman statesmen

tried to take advantage of foreign news agencies. However, the news agencies and

the empire had different agendas, which ultimately rendered this cooperation

unfruitful for the latter. For Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters, news was a commodity

that could be sold to any individual, company or empire that was willing to pay for

it. These agencies developed different discourses for every potential customer. The

package they offered the Ottoman Empire was to influence the perception of

statesmen and the general public in foreign societies. While the news agencies were

exporting their ‘commodities’ by taking advantage of international politics and

51 Cengiz Kırlı, “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” in

Public Islam and the Common Good, ed. Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore (Leiden: Brill,

2004), 96. For further information on coffeehouses in the Ottoman Empire, see also Yaşar Ahmet,

ed., Osmanlı Kahvehaneleri: Mekan, Sosyalleşme, İktidar (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2017). See also,

Robert Darnton for circulation of news in the eighteenth century: “An Early Information Society:

News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” American Historical Review, vol. 105, no. 1

(February), 1995.

19

contemporary tensions between the different empires, the circulation of news was a

matter of survival for the Ottoman Empire. It is argued in this dissertation that the

Ottoman Empire founded the Ottoman Telegraph Agency to empower the imperial

center, improve its image to preserve the empire, and counteract imperialism.

The timeframe the thesis covers is between 1862 and 1914. The first

telegraphic line of the Ottoman Empire was built in 1854 and began operating in

1855 during the Crimean War. Although Havas and Reuters had agents in

Constantinople to report war news throughout the Crimean War,52 it is very likely

that these agents were not correspondents working in these agencies but rather

locals, or British and French merchants residing in the imperial capital, who

reported to the agencies. There is no information regarding the operations of Havas,

Wolff’s or Reuters in Constantinople until 1862. In that year, Levant Herald started

to use Reuters’ telegrams,53 in 1866 Havas took over the subscribers in

Constantinople,54 and in 1869 Reuters’ Constantinople office was opened.55

Because permanent operations of the international news agencies do not seem to

have started until 1862, based on the contemporary documents available, the

dissertation starts with this date. Yet, it also briefly summarizes the arrival of the

telegraphic communication system to the Ottoman Empire. The period discussed in

the dissertation ends in 1914, with the start of World War I. The start of the war

52 Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1999), 17.

53 Orhan Koloğlu, Havas-Reuter'den Anadolu Ajansı'na (Ankara: Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği

Yayınları, 1994), 9.

54 Koloğlu, Havas-Reuter'den, 9.

55 Board Meeting Minutes, 17 November 1869, within the Minute Book (1868-1872). RA, 1/883502.

Orhan Koloğlu stated in Havas-Reuter'den Anadolu Ajansı'na that on 23 November 1868, Reuter’s

agent in Constantinople, Edward Virnard, announced in the Levant Times, a newspaper of

Constantinople published in English, that Reuters was soon to establish an office in the city. He also

announced on 16 December 1868, again in the Levant Times, that l’Agence de Constantinople, an

agency of Reuters, would begin its services at its office located in Pera, Tomtom Street, no. 11,

starting from 1 January 1869 (10-1). On the other hand, Donald Read, in the Power of News (54),

stated that the office in Constantinople was opened in 1870. However, Board Meeting minutes of 17

November 1869 documented that the office was established in the first half of 1869.

20

changed the characteristics of news dissemination by Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters,

as they became part of propaganda efforts on behalf of their empires.

1.2. Primary Sources

The majority of primary sources are documents from the Presidency of the

Republic of Turkey State Archives Directorate, Ottoman Archive, the United

Kingdom National Archives, Reuters Archive, and Grand National Assembly of

Turkey Archives. Through the Ottoman Archive, Grand National Assembly of

Turkey Archives, and the United Kingdom National Archives, the author has

managed to obtain an insight into the official opinions of the Ottoman and British

empires. At the United Kingdom National Archives, the author focused attention on

foreign office papers and secret service reports. The vast number of documents on

the concessions granted to the Reuter family in the National Archives have been

invaluable for informing the author about an aspect of the news agencies and news

agency owners that does not exist in company histories. Another significant archive

of this research has been the Reuters Archives in which the author found

information on Reuters’ Constantinople office that is not available in any other

archive.

News agency bulletins and news published, based on news agency

dispatches, were not examined as the author believes that the Ottoman Empire’s

official opinion on the news agencies and the news they disseminated serves the

purpose of this dissertation well enough. The examination of news agency bulletins

and journal articles is planned for a future research project.

21

1.3. Literature Review

By connecting British imperialism with the Ottoman Empire’s efforts to have a

news agency, this dissertation aims to contribute to the existing literature on both

Ottoman press history and imperialism. It is unique for being the first research

project that has studied the history of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency in a

comprehensive manner.

The general literature on imperialism mostly places the state and politicians

at the center of their narratives. This dissertation aims to contribute to the existing

literature on imperialism by revealing investor influence in policy making in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In some of their communications with

governments, due to their foreign investments, Reuter family members became

players in international politics. D. R. Headrick’s The Tools of Empire: Technology

and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century and The Invisible Weapon:

Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 are examples of works

on imperialism revolving around states and politicians. In The Tools of Empire,

Headrick discusses the technological advancements that allowed Europeans to

penetrate, conquest and subsume imperial possessions into a European economy in

the nineteenth century. He underlines in his work that the pace of progress in

communications and transportation is more fascinating than any other technological

advancements of the century. In his later work, The Invisible Weapon, he explains

the history of telegraphy technology and the strategic motives of the states in

expanding the world cable network during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

22

Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm, in his remarkable works The Age of Capital 1848–1875

and The Age of Empire 1875–1914, explains the triumph, transformation and

extension of capitalism to the whole globe through the social and economic

variables of states.

On the other hand, John Atkinson Hobson in his work Imperialism,

underlines the involvement of certain classes in shaping the imperialist policy of

Britain, declaring that Great Britain did not actually benefit from imperialism by

going through its various motives: the need for raw materials, markets, investment

and a population outlet. He makes his point by using numbers demonstrating that

the share of income from the imperialist endeavors was less than the share of every

other source of income in the British economy. He claims that such a policy, which

was not good for the population in general, was pursued because certain classes,

“the investing and speculative classes” benefited from the current policy and were

promoting the expansion of the British Empire. He named them as the “economic

parasites of imperialism”.56

An overview of some of the variables that Hobson mentions to prove his

case are that “between one-fifth and one-sixth of the country’s income was coming

from the production and transport of goods for export trade”,57 and that “the

external trade of Great Britain bore a small and diminishing proportion to its

internal industry and trade…of the external trade, that with British possessions bore

a diminishing proportion to that with foreign countries”.58 He claims that if the

British nation as a whole was not benefitting from its state’s imperialist policy, then

it had to be serving the interests of certain classes.

56 Hobson, Imperialism, 56.

57 Ibid., 28.

58 Ibid., 39.

23

Hobson also suggests an alternative economic policy for Great Britain to

pursue, that of domestic consumption. He states, “there is no necessary limit to the

quantity of capital and labour that can be employed in supplying the home markets,

provided the effective demand for the goods that are produced is so distributed that

every increase of production stimulates a corresponding increase of consumption”,

underlying the unnecessity of the imperialist policy, and the possibility of an

increase in domestic consumption.59 He mentions that domestic consumption could

be raised by a proper distribution of income, which then would facilitate the

expansion of the home markets that “are capable of indefinite expansion”.60

Hobson’s “investing and speculative classes”, which benefited from British

imperialist policy and therefore perpetuated it, were referred to as “the gentlemanly

class” in British Imperialism, 1688–2015 by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins. The

Reuter family, with its rising influence, exhibited “the growing wealth and power of

service capitalism after 1850”.61 Baron Paul Julius de Reuter and his sons were

members of “a new gentlemanly class arising from the service sector”62 in Britain,

taking over the power of the landed aristocracy.

The relations between the states and the three European news agencies in the

second half of the nineteenth century until World War I have been overlooked in

historical scholarship. The only piece of work that studies in detail the relations of

the news agencies with governments is Alexander Nalbach’s dissertation, “The

Ring Combination: Information, Power and the World News Agency Cartel 1856–

1914.” He discusses the same matter in his articles. His work also comprehensively

59 Ibid., 29.

60 Ibid., 88.

61 P. J. Cain and Antony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2015 (New York: Routledge, 2016),

55.

62 Ibid., 125.

24

explores cooperation and competition within international news circulation, like J.

Silberstein-Loeb’s The International Distribution of News: The Associated Press,

Press Association, and Reuters, 1848–1947. Nalbach’s dissertation is an elaborate,

and a remarkable, work which uses an extensive range of primary and secondary

sources, demonstrating that he invested long hours in conducting research in the

archives of the news agencies, and presenting primary sources in English, French

and German. Nalbach’s research in the archives of Havas has especially helped the

author of this present dissertation to be informed concerning French sources, and

the perspectives of the French government and representatives of Havas. Another

area of research focuses on technological developments with regards to telegraphy

throughout the world and in the Ottoman Empire.

The literature on Reuters focuses mainly on the news agency’s history rather

than the family’s foreign investments. The publications on the agencies are

“company histories commissioned by the world news agencies themselves to

promote publicity, to commemorate anniversaries”,63 as rightfully described by

Nalbach, and this is also the case for works on the Reuters. These sources merely

relate the chronological history of the agency, mentioning agency contact with the

governments in a very refined manner, and referring to them very briefly, if at all.

Graham Storey’s Reuter’s Century and Donald Read’s The Power of News: The

History of Reuters, 1849–1989 are examples of such works. They are descriptive

company histories. Though somewhat still useful for learning about key events in

the agency’s history, they do not have much to offer the researcher, and they lack

citations. The first one does not have any citations while the latter has citations here

and there.

63 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 29.

25

Among all the concessions granted to the Reuter family, only the concession

known as the Reuter Concession, granted by the Shah of Persia to Baron Paul Julius

de Reuter, has been examined thoroughly by Firuz Kazemzadeh as part of Russian-

British conflict in Persia, in a work titled Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914:

A Study in Imperialism. The rest of the concessions are only mentioned very briefly

in book chapters or articles. For example, in “Lord Curzon and British Strategic

Railways in Central Asia Before, During and After the First World War,” in

Railways and International Politics, Paths of Empire, 1848–1945, even the Reuter

Concession is mentioned only briefly as background context in the history of British

railway policy in Central Asia.

The Reuter Concession, the Greek Railway Concession, the Seoul

Waterworks Concession and the concession to create twenty “Burgos Agricolas”

(agricultural villages) in Brazil were secured by a family that owed its influence to

collecting and circulating news, exemplifying the involvement of British investors

who gradually became influential in the state’s policies and decision-making,

notably in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a period in which

investors sought foreign concessions. It was known that news agencies sometimes

received subsidies from governments before the First World War,64 but the Reuter

family’s investments abroad revealed different and deep connections between the

British government, local governments and the Reuter family.

The rest of the owners of European news agencies were not journalists

either; they were financiers, bankers and investors who had made their fortune

recently, or a generation ago, and were investing in different sectors which they

found profitable. Garson von Bleichröder, the owner of the Continental Company

64 See Nalbach, “Ring Combination.”

26

who bought Wolff’s, was a banker investing in news business. Similarly, after

Auguste Havas, the Havas agency was sold to Frédéric-Émile Erlanger, a financier

and an investor who later became partners with the Reuter family in a Greek

railway construction scheme.

As well as the literature on imperialism, this dissertation also contributes to

the existing literature on the Ottoman press by depicting the history of the first

Ottoman news agency and its successors, an area that has been neglected in the

historical scholarship. This dissertation is an attempt to fill the gap in Ottoman

historical scholarship.

Historiography on communication technologies in the Ottoman Empire and

Turkey can be identified as being descriptive. These works are still important for

contributing to the field and providing historians with material on which to build.

This being said, there is a need for more argumentative works in this field. Asaf

Tanrıkut’s Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf ve Telefon Tarihi ve Teşkilat ve Mevzuatı is the

very first elaborate work on the postage, telegram and telephone services in the

Ottoman Empire. The major works in the field that focus on the historical

development of communication technologies are: Türkiye'de Posta ve Telgrafçılık

by Aziz Akıncan, Türk Posta Tarihi by Eskin Şekip, Telgrafçılıkda Ana Dilimiz ve

Mustafa Efendi, Batı ve Doğuda Telgrafçılık Nasıl Doğdu? by A. Baha Gökoğlu,

Türkiye’de Çağdaş Haberleşmenin Tarihsel Kökenleri by Alemdar Korkmaz, İzmir

Posta Tarihi 1841–2001 by Nedim A. Atilla, Başlangıcından Günümüze Posta by

the Turkish Postage, Telegraph, and Telephone General Directorate, and Çağını

Yakalayan Osmanlı.

Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı: Osmanlı Devleti’nde Modern Haberleşme ve

Ulaştırma Teknikleri, edited by Ekmelleddin İhsanoğlu and Mustafa Kaçar, is a

27

combination of selected symposium papers and articles on the history of Ottoman

transportation and communication systems. Like the above-mentioned works, these

selected articles on communications are descriptive, yet, also very informative.

Tanju Demir’s Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, Türkiye’de Posta Telgraf

ve Telofon Teşkilatının Tarihsel Gelişimi (1840–1920), is not only useful and

interesting for historians but also for anyone who would like to be informed about

the history of communication technology in the Ottoman Empire. Published by the

Turkish Postage, Telegraph, and Telephone General Directorate, it is an

institutional history of the directorate, covering a period of forty years. Although his

work is descriptive, Demir performs an important duty by studying this subject and

time period. Another Philosophy of Arts dissertation, again, very useful but

descriptive, is “Osmanlı Dönemi’nde Posta Teşkilatı (Tanzimat Devri)” by Nesimi

Yazıcı. His article on “Posta Nezaretinin Kuruluşu,” in Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı:

Osmanlı Devleti’nde Modern Haberleşme ve Ulaştırma Teknikleri, has been written

along the same lines as his dissertation.

Master of Arts dissertations on communication technologies in the Ottoman

Empire and Turkey include: “The Transfer of Telegraph Technology to the

Ottoman Empire in the XIXth Century” by Bahri Ata, “İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti

ve Osmanlı Posta ve Telgraf Teşkilatı” by Seyfi Toptaş, “Türkiye'de Modern Posta

Teşkilatının Kuruluşu ve Gelişimi” by Özdemir Onur, and “The Ottoman Postal and

Telegraph Services in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century” by Ayşegül

Okan. In their descriptive dissertations, Bahri Ata outlines the arrival of telegraphic

communication to the Ottoman Empire and its expansion, Özdemir Onur depicts the

history of postal services, and Ayşegül Okan tells the story of postal services and

telegraphic communication in the empire. Seyfi Toptaş argues in her dissertation

28

that graduates of postage and telegraph schools were influenced by western political

thought during their education. Therefore, most of them either became members of

the Committee of Union or collaborated with its members, and took part in the

declaration of the Second Constitutional Era.

Only Orhan Koloğlu, who has written several works on the history of the

Turkish and Ottoman press, dedicates a chapter to the Ottoman Telegraph Agency

and its successors in Havas-Reuter’den Anadolu Ajansı’na. The information is

rather brief and most of the section about the agency consists of the complete text of

a parliamentary discussion from 1911 on the founding of a semiformal agency. In a

later work, Osmanlı Döneminde Basın Teknikleri ve Araçları, he spares a chapter

for the Ottoman Telegraph Agency; however, it is almost exactly, word for word,

the same piece. Furthermore, while some of the primary sources are not cited at all,

some of the secondary sources lack citation details, such as page numbers in Havas-

Reuter’den Anadolu Ajansı’na, Osmanlı Döneminde Basın Teknikleri ve Araçları,

which does not give any citation details throughout the text, only a bibliography list

at the end of each chapter. In a recent work on the history of the press in the

Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, Osmanlı’dan 21: Yüzyıla Basın Tarihi,

Koloğlu mentions the Ottoman Telegraph Agency in only a single sentence.

Although he was a pioneer with his extensive research on Ottoman and Turkish

press history, his works are more or less descriptive, and lack the basics of a

scholarly work.

Unlike the rest of the works in this field, which focus on the history of the

communication and transportation systems in the Ottoman Empire, a recent

Philosophy of Arts dissertation by Servet Yanatma discusses the activities of the

international news agencies in the empire. Yanatma’s dissertation, entitled “The

29

International News Agencies in the Ottoman Empire (1854–1908)”, is an

argumentative work but it excludes the history of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency.

Some parts of this dissertation might be found rather descriptive, especially

the chapter on the Ottoman Telegraph Agency. Because there is no other

comprehensive work on the Ottoman Empire’s endeavor to establish a telegraph

agency, or on its semiformal news agency, the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, the

author of this dissertation felt the need to integrate all the information available on

the agency and its founders, and attempt to form a coherent whole.

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter I explains the historical framework, states the dissertation’s argument,

introduces the archives the author has used for research, and reviews the published

works related to the dissertation.

Chapter II discusses relationships of Havas’, Wolff’s and Reuters’ with their

respective empires, and with others with whom they concluded secret agreements.

The chapter demonstrates that these three news agencies were only interested in

maximizing their profits, overcoming threats from each another, and having access

to news faster than any other agency.

Chapter III describes the foreign investments of the Reuter family. Starting

with the concession known as ‘the Reuter Concession’, granted by the Naser ed-Din

Shah, the Shah of Persia to Paul Julius Reuter in 1872, other members of the Reuter

family, Herbert Reuter and George Reuter, were also granted concessions. These

were the Greek Railway Concession, the Seoul Waterworks Concession and the

30

concession to create twenty “Burgos Agricolas” in Brazil. Also George Reuter was

the chairman of the Rexer Arms Company. Correspondence between the British

Foreign Office and Reuter family members regarding these investments reveal that

the Reuter family was seeking the aid of the British Foreign Office whenever they

experienced any disagreement with the foreign governments that had granted them

concessions. What is more striking is that Reuter family members were in a position

to suggest policies to the British Foreign Office, thus, placing themselves in great

power politics. This chapter shows that the news agency owners or stockholders

were in communication with their respective empires about investments, as well as

matters regarding news collection and distribution.

Chapter IV depicts the Ottoman Empire’s endeavor to establish a news

agency within its lands, connecting the imperial center with its distant territories

and promoting its image abroad, in order to overcome the challenges it was exposed

to by the Great Powers.

Chapter V gives detailed information on the Ottoman Telegraph Agency and

its founders, and a brief description of its successors, l’Agence Milli (the National

Telegraph Agency), La Turquie and l’Agence Orientale d’Informations.

Finally, Chapter VI mentions the different agendas of the foreign news

agencies and the Ottoman Empire.

31

CHAPTER II

HAVAS, WOLFF’S, REUTERS AND THE GOVERNMENTS

Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters had close relations with their respective

governments. But they were also ready to sign confidential contracts with foreign

governments to serve their interests so long as these governments were willing to

pay for their services. Nalbach stated that what the news agencies acquired with this

type of connection with their governments were “first crack at official information,

reduced rates and priority use of state telegraph and cable facilities, and special

subscriptions or outright subsidies”.65 Their gains were the same in their relations

with foreign governments. The relationship between Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters

with their home governments, as well as with foreign governments, will be

discussed and exemplified in this chapter.

To begin with, Havas always managed to maintain good relations with the

French government; this also helped it to avoid competition in France. A letter

written by Henri Houssaye, Director of Havas, to his Constantinople agent in 1909

65Alexander S. Nalbach, “’Poisoned at the Source?’ Telegraphic News Services and Big Business in

the Nineteenth Century,” Business History Review, vol. 77, no.4 (Winter 2003): 597.

32

shows how both the French government and Havas benefited from their close

contact, which was also relevant to Wolff’s and Reuters’ interaction with their

home governments, and reflects Havas’ opinion of its news service:

We are the first to be given certain news, certain notes, it is true,

and this constitutes an advantage for us to exploit; on the other

hand, in acting thus, the government has its ideas distributed, and

this is an advantage for it….We are not, in any way whatsoever, a

dependency of the ministry of Foreign Affairs; even more so, we

are not beholden in any way to this or that diplomat…we would

be the last to deny that one should try to accommodate the wishes

of the Embassy. But do not lose sight of the fact that we are and

must remain towards it and against everything absolutely

independent, because in the end, it is we who are responsible.

That said, do not forget either that we never fail to serve, to the

best of our ability, la politique française.66

In 1862, Auguste Havas suggested to the Ministry of the Interior that they send

them, on a daily basis, the news the French government wished to disseminate:

Above all, in the event of strikes or disorders, it would be well to

give us permission to communicate our version at once, without

waiting for a worse version to be sent to the newspapers.

Communicated by us, this version which, in reality, would be the

government’s, would not have an official link to it.67

Havas also suggested having a telegraph line between the cabinet and the agency

for this very purpose, and to be moderate in tailoring the news in order not to make

the newspapers suspect that the agency was sending them the official opinion of the

French government:

We must only be asked to act within the limits of moderation,

which will always have the effect of having our communications

accepted by newspapers of all shades of opinion; to act otherwise

would be to destroy a precious instrument with which one can

exercise the greatest influence possible at home and abroad.68

66 Ibid.

67 Nalbach, “The Ring Combination: Information, Power and the World News Agency Cartel,” PhD

Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999, 106.

68 Ibid., 107.

33

The agency managed to stay in touch with the French government on a daily basis.

Furthermore, Auguste Havas succeeded in convincing the government that the

agency’s news service was sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the government. In

September 1862, Napoleon III forbade the founding of any new news agencies. In

1863, the agency was paid 24,000 francs by the government, and additional

subsidies were paid to twenty-one provisional newspapers, on average 2,000 francs

to each to help them pay their Havas subscriptions.69 The Ministry of the Interior’s

notes on Havas, when its journalism was under attack by the French press for

distorting news, reveals the close contact between Havas and the French

government. On 4 April 1869, the following comment was noted, underlying

Havas’ ongoing standing in relation to different French administrations:

It [Havas] receives from all the administrations information which

is of interest for subscribers and, in exchange, it gives the

government the opportunity for diffusing information which the

latter judges appropriate to propagate, without the government

having any responsibility for the publications made by the Agence

Havas.70

In another note, dated 15 April 1869, the Ministry of the Interior emphasized its

private relationship with Havas by stating that:

Havas is at all times in daily correspondence with the Ministry.

Each time that a denial or a correction, or a useful news item

should be placed in circulation without delay, [Havas] condenses

it in telegraphic form and distributes it throughout all of France.

Agreement has been reached so that this service is used more

frequently, and replace all communications which are not judged

convenient to make directly. One may judge the capital

importance of this means of rapid publicity by the fact that M.

Havas serves 307 newspapers.71

In July 1879, Havas was sold to Frédéric-Émile Erlanger, a German-Jewish

financier who had close relations with governments and diplomats:

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., 240.

71 Ibid., 107.

34

He married the eldest daughter of United States Senator Slidell,

former Minister in Paris of the Confederacy…became the Consul

General for Greece in 1864...he earned the Cross of Isabelle-la-

Catholique, became a Knight of the Iron Crown (first class), and

grand officer and commander of almost all the Orders of Europe.

In 1878, he was named Knight of the Legion of Honour, and

became an officer in 1881. William I of Germany himself elevated

Erlanger to the rank of Baron. Erlanger became a leading member

of a curious French sect, the Saint-Simonians.72

Despite this, the close relationship between Havas and the French government

continued as before. In 1898, Erlanger became partners with Baron George de

Reuter, second son of Baron Paul Julius de Reuter, and Baron Herbert de Reuter,

managing director of Reuters (who had succeeded his father Baron Paul Julius de

Reuter in May 1878) in the construction of a Greek railway project which will be

discussed in detail in Chapter III. As will be shown in the next chapter, both the

Reuter family and Erlanger turned to their own imperial governments when they

had disagreements with the Greek government.

From 1905, which began a difficult time for Russian financial interests due

to the Russo–Japanese War, the Havas agency tried to distort or delay the news

coming from Russia as much as possible, with the French government’s approval

and support. Havas’ duty was to weather negative news from Russia in order to

calm down French investors and protect the Russian economy. On 1 March 1905,

Arthur Raffalovitch, the Russian economic journalist who was behind monitoring

and shaping the news on Russia in France, reviewed what had been done so far to

find a solution to temper the stock market after the loss of Port Arthur to the

Japanese:

We have taken action in the financial part of the newspapers, but

we have not interfered with the political section, regarding the

service of dispatches. …from the moment the censor allowed the

telegrams to pass, we could not stop the news from reaching Paris,

72 Ibid., 235.

35

London and Berlin; and even if it had stopped them, the news

would have come by other routes, and caused even more

damage.73

As a solution, Raffalovitch signed a three-month contract with Havas to soften the

news on Russia in return for a subsidy of 3,000 francs. In his letter to Cohen

Kokovtzev, the Russian Minister of Finance, Raffalovitch underlined the

importance of the service performed by Havas and the French press to legitimize

the payments he made, and convince the Russian government to continue making

these payments:

The internal events in Russia, the disturbances, mutinies and

massacres, created a very uneasy state of mind among the owners

of our securities in France, and it appeared that if the press were

left to its own devices it would not fail to upset the public even

further. …the outlook was so threatening that the Banque de Paris

put 50,000 francs at our disposal, which was used as follows:

10,000 to the Havas Agency, 7,000 francs to Hebrard of the

Temps, 4,000 to the Journal on 30 November, as much again on

30 December, plus Lenoir’s commission. The costly sacrifices to

Havas and the Temps are absolutely necessary….We must

continue the 100,000 francs for three months, and look forward to

paying Havas 10,000 francs for an even longer period.74

In 1907, Havas demanded an annual subscription of 5,000 francs per month from

the Russian Ministry of Finance. Raffalovitch advised a subscription for six months

with the following statements:

The service which Havas can render us is to inset the

communications which we have occasion to make, and if one

could have the certainty that it always inserts the communiques of

the Ministry of Finance, this would be worth a subscription of five

hundred francs per month, because there are times when one is

very much at a loss to get something through. Havas is the great

omnibus.75

73 Ibid., 241.

74 Ibid., 242.

75 Ibid., 244.

36

The minister agreed and Russian subsidies to Havas continued until the Revolution

of 1917. Havas also received subsidies from the Ottoman Empire for years, which

will be discussed in Chapter IV.

In February 1865, Reuters became a joint stock company called Reuter’s

Telegram Company (Limited) and, only a month later, it tried to establish a joint

office with Havas in Berlin, and to buy Wolff’s agency in cooperation with Havas.

Bernhard Wolff asked King Wilhelm I for help against Reuters. The king gave C.D.

von Oppenfeld, Viktor von Magnus and Gerson von Bleichröder, Berlin bankers,

the duty to become stockholders of a new share-holding company. On 20 May

1865, the Continental Telegraphen-Compagnie (Continental Telegraph Company)

was established and shortly afterwards it bought Wolff’s agency. The King,

Chancellor Bismarck and Gerson von Bleichröder were in charge of the new

company.76 Bleichröder, who had a majority of the shares, was described thus:

An ingenious Jewish financier and capitalist par excellence

Bleichröder the personal banker of the Iron Chancellor himself, an

intimate of the Rothschilds, adviser, lobbyist, kingmaker and

secret agent achieved a glittering political and social success in

the Germany of his day, becoming the first German Jew to be

raised to the ranks of hereditary nobility. Bleichröder was one of

the richest men in the world and a pronounced patriot…. 77

Despite his wealth, before taking part in its transformation Bleichröder examined

Wolff’s business records to see if the agency had the potential for future growth.

The fact that the stockholders of Wolff’s agency were Berlin bankers, and,

moreover, Bleichröder’s approach to buying stocks, is an indication that news

agency business was like any other business for the stockholders, who found a

personal interest in their investment.

76 Ibid., 108–12.

77 Ibid., 111.

37

Wolff’s shares were bought out with a separate agreement but he remained

as managing director of the new company until his retirement in 1871. Richard

Wentzel and one of his partners, Theodor Wimmel, were appointed as liable

directors for ten years by the Prussian state. The Continental received subsidies and

had official privileges, such as using the state telegraph system. In October 1874,

Bleichröder turned the Continental from a limited liability company into a public

company, reducing the state’s interference as it would no longer be able to appoint

liable directors, as public companies did not have such a post.78

Last but not the least, let us now discuss the agreements made between

Reuters and the British government, as well as other governments. Jonathan

Silberstein-Loeb accurately described Reuters from 1851 to 1930 as “a trading

company operating in news”.79 Its commodity was the news. In 1894 and 1895,

Reuters signed secret agreements with the British, Japanese and Ottoman

governments, and also received subsidies for decades from several others,

exemplifying the fact that news agencies were taking advantage of every

opportunity to maximize their profits, and not remaining in the service of any single

government. While the agreement between Reuters and the Ottoman Empire will be

discussed in Chapter IV, the rest of its agreements with the British Empire and other

states will be discussed here chronologically.

A Reuters’ office was established in Alexandria in 1866 and, for the next ten

years, Havas and Reuters jointly distributed bulletins in English and French.80 The

office was moved to Cairo in 1882 by Joseph Schnitzler, the chief agent.81 Having

78 Ibid., 224–27.

79 Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, The International Distribution of News (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2014), 165.

80 Graham Storey, Reuters’ Century, 1851-1951 (London: Max Parrish, 1951), 95.

81 Ibid.

38

criticized Havas in 1870 for receiving subsidies from the governments of Napoleon

III and the Turks, Reuters had been receiving subsidies from the Egyptian

government since at least as early as 1868 in the guise of a ‘subscription’. Gerald C.

Delany, Reuters’ general manager in Egypt, stated that they “took up the role of a

news agency in this country, on condition that the Government would support us in

various ways, principally as a subscriber to our telegrams, and the existence of our

organisation in this country depends upon the continuance of that support”.82 For

twenty-five years, 1,000 pounds a year was paid by the Egyptian government to

Reuters and Havas.83 Reuters’ cashbook from 1877 to 1893 shows that each month

in 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886 and 1887 the Egyptian government paid 85.9.4 pounds,

which added up to 1,031.28 a year.84. Besides receiving a subsidy from the

Egyptian government up to 1923, the agency also received subsidies regularly for

years from the Indian government, beginning in 1867. British colonial governments

in Africa were its other subsidy providers.85

In 1894, Reuters approached the British government with a similar

proposition made by Auguste Havas to the French Ministry of the Interior in 1862.

From 1894 to 1898, there was a secret agreement between the British government

and Reuters’ news agency in which the agency promised to forward its political

telegrams to a person designated by the Secretary of State as soon as they were

received, verify with the Foreign Office all ‘doubtful’ telegrams prior to publication

to prevent ‘mischief’ arising from the circulation of false news, compile

confidential reports from their agents and communicate them to the Foreign Office

82 Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1999), 66.

83 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 178.

84 Cashbook (1877–1893), 1/8911601, LN 462, Reuters Archive (hereafter cited as RA).

85 Read, Power of News, 66.

39

as soon as they were received, and observe the strictest secrecy in regard to the

origin of news communicated by the Foreign Office for publication.

In the first days of July 1894, Dr. Sigmund Engländer, Chief Editor of

Reuters established contact with the British Foreign Office to make an offer on

behalf of Reuters. Engländer’s first interview took place on 2 July 1894 with a

Foreign Office officer with the initials A.W. The agency’s proposal was to provide

“the foreign office with all the intelligence they receive from their agents all over

the world, much of it of a confidential nature and which is never published”, and the

agency also suggested that the Foreign Office should make use of the agency to

publish accurate information in foreign newspapers, or any statements the Foreign

Office might desire to be made known abroad.86 In order to prove the necessity of

this service offered by Reuters, Engländer underlined the importance of

disseminating news serving the interests of the British Empire:

Dr. Engländer, who has been in the service of Reuter’s agency

since I think he said the days of Lord Palmerstone, says that the

feeling against England abroad is a very bitter and hostile one, and

this in his opinion arises to some extent from ignorance of the

truth, and from the [?] news published in Foreign and Native

papers, and he urges the importance to the Foreign Office and this

country of taking measures to have true intelligence of our aims

and policy disseminated all over the world.87

He also claimed that “his agency would be able to get their communications

published in the local press anywhere, both through their own agents and thorough

other foreign news agencies with whom they are linked”.88 As if it were a company

in trade, Reuters tried to close a deal with the government to export its commodity,

the news. Another significant point is that it was Reuters which offered to modify

86 Confidential Report of A.W. regarding his conversation with Dr. Engländer, 3 July 1894, HD

3/97, National Archives (hereafter cited as NA.).

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

40

the news for the British government in favor of the British Empire. Apparently, the

Reuters family was taking advantage of contemporary world politics not only while

pursuing their foreign investments but also while selling news services. In the later

part of the conversation, Engländer suggested that the British government interfere

with the press and to use Reuters whilst doing so:

Dr. Engländer says that the day is past for indifference to

newspaper calumnies, which has been the traditional policy of this

country, and believes that much good could be done by

undertaking the services of their agency in some such way as he

proposes.89

Engländer received the response that his proposals would be laid before

Lord Kimberly, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that if anything came of

the idea he would be informed. He was also told that any such connection with a

news agency was not in accordance with the practice of British government

departments and that it was doubtful whether they would make a new departure

such as he proposed. Not pleased with this response, Engländer stated that he hoped

to have an interview with Lord Kimberly himself.90

Engländer had his next meeting with Sir Thomas Henry Sanderson,

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on 12 July 1894:

He repeated his previous offer viz: that Reuter’s agency should

place at our disposal all their telegrams and also their private

correspondence (of which he said there was much containing

valuable information). They would further direct their agents’

attention abroad to any particular subject which we might at any

time indicate.

Finally, which he thought would be of great service, they would

be ready at any time to insert in the foreign Press, at any of the

principal European capitals, corrections on statements which we

might desire, without of course giving the source from which they

came.91

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Report by Thomas Henry Sandeson, 13 July 1894, HD 3/97, NA.

41

The second meeting made it clearer that Reuters’ managers were offering to act as a

semi-formal agency of the government in secrecy. Secrecy was not only necessary

because the agency believed this was what the government would desire in order to

disseminate and impose its views unanimously so as to have a higher impact on

societies, but also because Reuters would lose its respectability and credibility.

Engländer did not give an exact price for the service, probably wishing to know first

the extent of the service for which the government would be willing to pay.

Sanderson reported that “he said they would ask nothing for supplying the

information which ordinarily came to them but the rest would require special

organisation and administrative changes which would incur expense, and this they

would ask to be re-paid”.92 Engländer’s response regarding the price of the service

demonstrates once again that Reuters proposed to act as an official organ of the

government and to reorganize its system to fulfil this purpose.

Engländer received the same response as he had before Sanderson told him

that he would speak to Lord Kimberly and that he should call the Foreign Office on

the 17th of July.93 He did so and was informed that Lord Kimberly did not find it

desirable to have any changes made in the organization of the agency in order to

accommodate the suggested special services. This was because he believed that

such a reorganization would make the arrangement between the government and the

agency known, or at least suspected, which would then cause any publications by

the agency to be regarded as semi-official and, thus, not be credited. Therefore,

Lord Kimberly decided “it should be much better that any increased interchange of

information should be tentative and experimental, and should for the present be

confined to the receipt by us of all telegrams or letters which the Agency thought

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

42

likely to be of interest, while we would communicate any corrections or information

which we thought useful for our purposes or for the purposes of the Agency”.94

To give an example, Sanderson entrusted to Engländer in confidence a

statement concerning the Harrar Convention which appeared in a Reuters’ telegram

from St. Petersburg. The telegram implied that the British Foreign Office had

communicated formally with Italy and had reached an agreement but the Russian

government had refused to recognize it. Sanderson told him that in fact this

information was inaccurate, and the fact was that the Foreign Office had not had

any communication on the subject, and that the discussions between the Italian and

Russian governments had been of an informal nature and had not been decisive.

Engländer immediately offered to correct it but Sanderson responded that it was not

worthwhile and that he had only given it as an instance of what might have been of

use to the agency. To clarify, with this arrangement, Reuters was putting itself

under governmental control by submitting telegrams it received from its sources

before sending them elsewhere or inserting them in its bulletins. The agency was

willingly exposing itself to government censorship. Engländer priced this service at

1,000 pounds, which was reduced to 500 pounds the next day by Baron Herbert de

Reuter.95

Information which Engländer provided Sanderson with, regarding a certain

person during interviews between the two, gives us an idea of what the content of

confidential reports might have been like. Engländer condemned Selim Faris for

being a secret agent of Abdülhamid II in London.96 Selim Faris was an owner of El-

Djawaib, a newspaper which was published in Constantinople from 1860 to 1885.

94 Lord Kimberley, 18 July 1894, HD 3/97.

95 Baron Herbert de Reuter to Sanderson, 17 July 1894, HD 3/97.

96 Report by Sanderson, 18 July 1894, HD 3/97.

43

Financed by the British government, in 1885, Faris closed down El-Djawaib to

establish a newspaper in Cairo named El-Kahira, which was to publish news in

accordance with British interests. El-Kahira began its publishing life in the British

government’s payroll under the guise of a ‘subscription’.97

Engländer also mentioned that Selim Faris “had recently received £2000

from the Sultan, was in receipt of £100 a month, and was asking for £20,000 in

order to bribe certain public officials”.98 Sanderson noted “all which is possible”.99

Besides offering Reuters the chance to become a semi-formal agency of the British

Empire, another thing Engländer proposed was to use the agency as an intelligence

organ of the British government, and its correspondents as if they were secret

service agents.

Disappointed with the Foreign Office’s response, Engländer stated that his

previous proposal had not been correctly understood and, therefore, he would

present it in a somewhat different form. In Sanderson’s words, Engländer’s

modified proposal was that:

…the Agency would supply to us all telegrams as fast as received

and all their private information. We might at any time inform

him or his assistant privately of any announcement we wished

made at any European capital on the bulletins of the Agency and it

would be done.100

As will be further discussed in Chapter III, for years the Ottoman Empire gave

payments to European news agencies with the expectation that they would

disseminate news to the Empire’s advantage, and there is archival evidence that, at

times, it was the news agencies themselves that approached Ottoman statesmen to

organize this. Reuters was one of these agencies that contacted the Ottoman

97 HD 3/66 1885.

98 Report by Sanderson, 18 July 1894, HD 3/97.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

44

government in order to make an arrangement, while at the same time it was trying

to become a semi-formal agency of the British Empire. The agency was trying to

make secret arrangements with every government that was willing to agree to its

proposals, which would maximize their profits. One may judge the impossibility of

the Japanese, Ottoman and British governments having reciprocal interests that

could be satisfied at the same time, and it is very likely that there were many more

countries to which Reuters brought such proposals.

After these private and confidential communications, which took place

mostly between Dr. Engländer and Sir Thomas Henry Sanderson, Engländer’s

proposal was agreed on provisionally by Lord Kimberley, who had doubted the

usefulness of such an arrangement. Communications within the Foreign Office

demonstrate the hesitancy of Lord Kimberley:

I do not believe that any statements of ‘fact’ will have much

influence on the kind of foreign opinion to which Dr. Engländer

refers. This bitterness against us arises from jealousy, and it will

continue to exist as long as we hold our present position in the

world. Such jealousy always attends success whether private or

national.101

Despite this, he believed that the agency might be useful occasionally and accepted

the proposal. He stated: “we might however make use of the Agency where we

thought it desirable, without committing ourselves to a general scheme of patriotic

propaganda”.102

It was Lord Rosebery, the First Lord of the Treasury, who was in favor of

the proposal but he wanted “to be sure of Reuters’ power to obtain access to foreign

papers”.103 “The enormous injury done by the Havas agency” was one of the

reasons he was in favor of experimenting using the services of Reuters. He also

101 Note of Lord Kimberley, 6 July 1894, HD 3/97.

102 Ibid.

103 Note of Lord Rosebery, 8 July 1894, HD 3/97.

45

stated that “we should not be too much hampered by tradition in endeavouring to

cope with it”.104 He proposed a trial run of Reuters’ services for a year in secrecy:

I should be inclined to try Reuter’s proposal experimentally for

one year. Of course he must be told that the arrangement must

remain absolutely secret. The moment the idea became known

that the F. O. had anything to do with Reuter’s telegrams the

experiment must ipso facto cease.105

However, Lord Kimberly decided to try the arrangement for six months, beginning

from the 1st August 1894.106 The agreement between Reuters and the British

Foreign Office had six articles, as listed by Baron Herbert de Reuter:

1. That the Company shall forward its political telegrams to the

person designated by the Secretary of State as soon as received. 2.

That the Company shall do its best to verify at the Foreign Office all

doubtful telegrams prior to publication so as to prevent the mischief

arising from the circulation of false news. 3. Confidential reports

from our Agents will be compiled under the supervision of

Engländer, who will himself supplement them from time to time, all

of which will be communicated to the Foreign Office as soon as

received. Special care will be taken by Dr. Engländer to introduce

into these reports matters of particular interest to the British

Government. 4. The Company pledges itself to observe the strictest

secrecy in regard to the origin of news communicated by the Foreign

Office for publication. 5. To defray the expenses entailed on the

Company by these arrangements the Foreign Office agrees to pay

Reuter’s Telegram Company ₤500. (Five hundred pounds) per

annum. 6. The provisional arrangement to continue in force for six

months as from the 1st of August next.107

Sanderson was given the duty to receive the political telegrams sent by the

company.108 Baron Herbert de Reuter received a cheque for ₤125 on 30 July 1894

which was sent on the 28th in advance as the payment for the first three months.109

Examination of a confidential agency report reveals that Reuters’ employees

and manager acted like secret service agents for the British Empire. In a

104 Ibid.

105 Lord Rosebery to the Foreign Office, 19 July 1894, HD 3/97.

106 Sanderson to Baron Herbert de Reuter, 26 July 1894, HD 3/97.

107 Reuter to Sanderson, 26 July 1894, HD 3/97.

108 Sanderson to Reuter, 28 July 1894, HD 3/97.

109 Reuter to Sanderson, 30 July 1894, HD 3/97.

46

confidential report, dated 22 October 1897, Baron Herbert de Reuter informed the

British Foreign Office about instructions received by Costaki Paşa, Turkish

Ambassador in London. The letter reported that Costaki Paşa was ordered to win

the sympathy of Lord Salisbury and find means to bring about a reconciliation with

England. The reason was that the Sultan “does not feel quite at ease at present,

situated as he is between France and Russia, and is extremely anxious to secure

once more English official favour and support”.110 To achieve this, the Sultan

ordered the granting of concessions to British subjects:

A privilege that has been studiously withheld of late, and a case

indeed has quite recently arisen in the matter of the Bayrouth

Waterworks, which concession was given to a Turkish subject on

condition that it was not transferred to any French Company but to

an English group, and I understand that the business has been in

principle acquired by some English capitalists for £15,000.111

Baron Herbert de Reuter also noted another piece of information he discovered

concerning the Ottoman Empire’s policy: “the immediate object of the Sultan’s

desire to conciliate England is to secure the withdrawal of Sir Philip Currie, and if

Costaki Pacha’s negotiations turn out favourably that will be one of the first points

for which the Ambassador will plead as the first fruits of an eventual

rapprochement”.112 This type of information was hardly the kind that a news

agency, or any press organization, would provide to their subscribers. Yet this

arrangement was being referred to as a subscription by the parties. The agreement

continued to be renewed annually until 1898.

In January 1898, Lord Salisbury decided to cease the subscription because of

news disseminated by Reuters concerning Port Arthur. Sanderson communicated an

explanation from Reuters to the Foreign Office about the incident. The agency’s

110 Reuter to Sanderson, 22 October 1897, HD 3/105.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

47

statement was that the information had been given by the Russian Foreign Office on

Friday at midnight, and then the agency submitted the message to the English

papers and also telegraphed it to Durban and Bombay, and from Bombay the

telegram was sent to Peking. The agency’s defense was that “the wording of the

message to Bombay differed somewhat from the communication made to the

English press”.113

Reuters’ agent asked Sanderson if it might not be desirable to correct this

announcement with a statement, and Sanderson gave him one which was later

inserted in the London papers on Monday morning. However, the statement that

Sanderson gave to Reuters was telegraphed to Bombay on Monday which meant a

delay in its printing in newspapers. Also, when the message arrived in Bombay on

Monday it had been shortened: “Officially explained visit and departure British

warships Port Arthur, merely ordinary cruising movements.”114 Reuters’ mistake in

circulating undesirable news for the British Foreign Office, and its inability to

correct it timely and properly, caused a cancellation of the secret agreement

between the two. It was decided to forward a check for £83.6.8 in payment up to 31

March 1898, after which date the subscription would cease.115 Displeased with the

news disseminated by the agency, Salisbury noted “we also won’t pay £500 a year

to get this kind of treatment”.116

As stated earlier, the agencies not only had relations with their respective

governments but also with foreign governments; Reuters’ agreement with the

Japanese government is an example. Around the same time Reuters concluded an

agreement with the British government, the company also signed another one on 26

113 Report of Sanderson, 29 January 1898, HD 3/109.

114 Ibid.

115 Draft Letter to Reuter, 31 January 1898, HD 3/109.

116 Salisbury’s Note in Report of Sanderson, 29 January 1898, HD 3/109.

48

July 1894 with the Japanese government, which resembled the secret agreement that

had been made with the British Foreign Office. Hence, Reuters was negotiating

with both the British and Japanese governments at the same time, and both

agreements were designed to come into effect from the 1st of August 1894. The

parties in the agreement were Viscount Aoki, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the

Emperor of Japan representing the government of Japan, and Engländer on behalf

of Reuters. It was agreed that Viscount Aoki would communicate to “Reuter’s

Telegram Company exclusively all telegrams of his Government destined for

publication containing facts, official comments, denials, documents etc. and will

cause his Government to send his special telegrams on political and military events

and measures of reform the publication of which will be useful to a better

understanding of the progress of Japan”.117 In return, Reuters promised to

“communicate their political telegrams before publication and also such extracts of

the private reports received from their different correspondents as may have direct

or indirect interest for Japan”.118 Moreover, Reuters was to “act in their respective

spheres as the intermediaries for the financial and commercial requirements of

Japan”.119 For these services, the Japanese government agreed to pay 600 pounds

annually starting from the 1st of August 1894, in equal monthly instalments of fifty

pounds. The agreement was made for a fixed term of one year from August 1894.120

Reuters managed to secure subsidies from the British government by

convincing it of the indispensability of its news service in areas where the cost was

more than the profit. In this way Reuters was securing its influence in distant

territories and preserving its prestigious position among the other news agencies

117Agreement with the Japanese government, 26 July 1894, 1/8714059, LN 238, RA.

118 Agreement, 1/8714059, LN 238, RA.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

49

with its large news network. The North China service of the agency is an example

of this policy. In July 1909 it was explained to Sir John Jordan, the British Minister

in Peking, by Arthur Cotter, Reuters’ correspondent, that Reuters’ news service in

North China was being run with a significant deficit and that the service would have

to be discontinued, owing to the loss suffered by the company, unless a subsidy was

forthcoming to enable the company to justify its continuance.121 Cotter explained

that the company was experiencing a profit loss because of a change in telegram

rates. Up to 1908, the company enjoyed special privileges from the Imperial

Chinese Telegraph Administration. Reuters was paying a low rate for the

transmission of messages and, in return, certain high Chinese officials were

receiving copies of Reuters’ telegrams for free. Towards the end of 1907, the

company was informed by the Imperial Telegraph Administration, through its

representative in Peking, that the special rates the company enjoyed until now had

to end and a new arrangement would be made.122 The reasons for this new

arrangement were because Chinese newspaper correspondents had complained that

a foreign news agency was receiving greater privileges for the transmission of news

than they were, as Reuters’ rate was four cents a word and their rate ten and a half

cents. Moreover, the German Legation was pressuring the Chinese government on

behalf of the subsidized German agency Ostasiatischer Lloyd, which wanted to

have the same privileges as the British agency and extend the German service

throughout the Empire, supplying German news gratis to high officials in return for

facilities for transmission of their messages over the Chinese lines.123

121 Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, 7 July 1909, FO 371/640, NA.

122 Arthur Cotter, “Memorandum on Reuter’s Service in North China” (Enclosure in J. Jordan’s letter

of 7 July 1909), 3 Aug 1909, FO 371/640, file no: 29064, 10 November 1909.

123 Ibid.

50

In the end, the Chinese authorities did not grant them the same privileges

enjoyed by Reuters but offered both agencies the same rate, twelve cents a word.

They were only granted “favourable rates” for their service to the city of Hankow.

Reuters accepted the rate of twelve cents and expressed its intention to Mr.

Dressing, Chief Superintendent and Foreign Advisor of the Imperial Chinese

Telegraph Administration, to continue giving copies to certain officials. Because of

this increased rate, the company increased the subscription to their news service by

fifty percent, which cost them the majority of their subscribers in Tientsin and

Peking.124

Cotter’s suggestion was “that perhaps His Majesty’s Government might

come to the rescue by subscribing a small sum which might justify the continuance

of the service”.125 Cotter further proposed that Edward Grey and Baron Herbert de

Reuter meet to decide on the amount, for Reuter “would not mention any definite

sum, but suggested that it would be easy for you to arrange this in London with

Baron de Reuter, the Managing Director of the Company”. 126

Sir John Jordan gave his opinion in favor of a continuance of Reuter’s news

service in North China, stating at the same time that if Reuters’ news service were

discontinued, the British and foreign communities would be dependent for their

news on the German agency:

As newspapers travel round by long sea taking about six weeks, we

are entirely dependent for news of what is happening in Europe on

the Reuter Agency or the subsidized German Agency, which

naturally gives a German colouring to the news it disseminates. The

Reuter service here has been maintained for twenty years, and I

consider that its disappearance would be a real loss to us, and I

should be sorry indeed to see all the native papers of the Capital

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

51

and of Tientsin dependent on the German Agency for all news of

events in Europe.127

The subsidized German agency referred to in the correspondence was the

Continental. Growing tension between the states and a polarization in world politics

at the time were reflected in these correspondence exchanges which speak of

“subsidized German Agency” and “German colouring” in the news.

The meeting suggested by Cotter took place between Reuter and William

George Tyrrell in London. Baron Herbert de Reuter demanded 200 pounds stating

that although he did not want to insist, it was the actual loss the agency suffered

from their North China service. He added that they did not feel justified in

continuing a service which they were running at a loss.128 In fact, Reuter was

pushing the British government to pay 200 pounds by emphasizing that it was

unjustifiable to keep a service which caused the agency to lose money. He was well

aware that it was highly undesirable for the British government to have a German

agency as the sole source of information in an area. As will be further discussed in

the next chapter concerning the Reuter family enterprises, family members were

taking advantage of the tensions between the Great Powers in order to impose

policies favorable towards their investment interests. Similarly, in this case, the

company emphasized the existence of a German agency in competition with

Reuters, which would take over the news market in North China if Reuters were to

withdraw.

Tyrrell stated in his report that the British state would gain from preventing

Reuters’ service from closing down in North China.129 It was decided on 20 August

127 Jordan to Grey, 7 July 1909, FO 371/640.

128 William George Tyrrell, Minutes on Sir J. Jordan’s Dispatch No. 243 of 7 July 1909, 20 August

1909, HD 3/138, NA.

129 Ibid.

52

1909 by Sir Edward Grey that a subsidy not exceeding 200 pounds a year should be

given by the British Minister in Peking to Reuters to cover its present losses and

facilitate the continuation of its news service in North China. Sir Jordan was

officially notified of this arrangement and his duty on 2 September 1909. On 10

November 1909, Reuters’ London office was informed that Mr. Cotter, Reuters’

Peking agent, was authorized to present a quarterly account to the British

Legation.130 Significantly, now that the British government was covering losses

incurred by Reuters’ North China service, Sir Jordan was instructed by the

government “to co-operate in disseminating accurate news favourable to British

policy in the Far East or calculated to correct false and unfavourable reports”.131

Reuters’ secretary wrote to Tyrrell on 4 November 1909 thanking him for his

effective intervention regarding the North China news service, and informing him

that Mr. Cotter was instructed to render a quarterly account to the Legation. He

referred to the payment as a subscription, which clearly it was not. It was a subsidy

as can be observed from negotiations between the government and the agency,

Foreign Office communications, and British government representatives’

expectations from this arrangement. His statement, “we learn with much pleasure

from our Peking correspondent that the British Minister has been authorised to

subscribe £200 per annum towards our news service to North China”,132 was

carefully penned for official records to declare the 200 pounds subsidy as a

subscription. Moreover, encouraged by the recent arrangement with the

government, he took advantage of the occasion and mentioned another wish of the

agency, that of gaining the ownership of the facilities the agency used in Peking:

130 Memorandum, 10 November 1909, HD 3/138.

131 Tyrrell, Minutes, 20 August 1909, HD 3/138.

132 Secretary of Reuters to Tyrrell, 4 November 1909, HD 3/138.

53

“Mr. Cotter added that from the friendly attitude of Sir John Jordan he was led to

hope that the news facilities upon which we set so great [a] store will be vouchsafed

to him in future”.133

In 1911, Reuters was hired by the British government to promote itself in

the British colonies. Asquith’s liberal government made an agreement with Reuters

for the circulation of the complete speech reports of the Ministers.134 Alexander

Murray, the Chief Whip explained to Winston Churchill, First Lord of the

Admiralty, in his letter dated 30 November 1911, what he hoped to gain from his

arrangement with the agency:

Under my arrangement with Reuters, by which from time to time

important speeches delivered by Ministers are cabled to British

Colonies and Possessions all over the world…I have now in this

manner dealt with certain speeches of Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George

and I am hoping that this system will give the Colonies the true idea

of liberal statesmanship.135

On 4 July 1911, Dickinson, Reuters’ chief editor, explained to Roderick Jones, the

general manager in South Africa, the benefits of the agreement:

It is a great advantage to us to act on these occasions as the handmaid

of the Government. Our doing so strengthens our position in

this country very considerably, and, at the same time, it shows to

those in authority, who have it in their power to be agreeable or

disagreeable to ourselves, that our great organization can be of

infinite value to them.136

The owners of the three European news agencies were businessmen who were

in the news business because it was profitable. Not only did they profit from the

incomes of their news agencies, but they also established or preserved their position

in society by means of their news agency ownership. They sought to maximize the

133 Ibid.

134 Read, Power of News, 93.

135 Murray to Churchill, 30 November 1911, CHAR 13/1/37–39, 29 Nov. 1911–30 Nov.

1911, Churchill Archive.

136 Read, Power of News, 93.

54

profit of their agencies and overcome competition by making agreements with

governments, both domestic and foreign. Despite any governmental changes, these

three European news agencies tried to remain in close contact with their domestic

governments.

It is not possible to know how many business connections of the news agency

owners were known about by the Ottoman Empire. However, from the archival

material this much can be said: the Empire was informed about the Reuter

Concession and the Bank Concession of the Reuter family. As will be further

discussed in Chapter IV, Ottoman statesmen continuously complained for decades

that European news agencies only served their governments. This is not an

inaccurate analysis concerning the nature of the news disseminated by Havas,

Wolff’s and Reuters based on an examination of the correspondence between the

agencies and government representatives, as has been carried out in this chapter.

55

CHAPTER III

THE REUTER FAMILY’S ENTERPRISES AND THE BRITISH

EMPIRE

Baron Paul Julius de Reuter, the founder of Reuters, and his family were

first and foremost news agency owners. However, their business involved more

than the mere conveyance of news, for the family sought to muster and exert

political force. Reuter, a German immigrant, established his life in the British

Empire in 1851 at the age of thirty-five. In 1865, he began to build a telegraph cable

between Lowestoft, in Suffolk, and Norderney, a north German island.137 The

telegraph line was later sold to the British Government in 1868 for a high profit, as

part of the nationalization of the internal telegraph lines of Britain.138 It was bought

for 726,000 pounds, five times more than its original cost of 153,000 pounds.139 In

1871, Reuter bought the title of Baron from the Duke of Coburg Gotha, and on 6

November 1891, he was recognized as Baron von Reuter by a Royal Warrant.140

137 Silberstein-Loeb, International Distribution, 187.

138 Storey, Reuters’ Century, 45.

139 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 136.

140 Memorandum by R.C. Dickie, “Railways in Persia: The Reuter Concession of 1872,” 11 February

1911, FO 371/1185, file no: 3606, no: 6824, 23 February 1911, NA.

56

He gained his wealth and influence through news reporting and distribution

and, shortly thereafter, became a capitalist investor who was able to secure

concessions all over the world. His close ties with both domestic and foreign

governments allowed him and his family to influence governments’ policies.

Through these ties, the family was granted two extensive concessions: the Reuter

Concession, granted by the Persian government to Baron Julius de Reuter in 1872,

and another granted by the Greek government to Baron George de Reuter’s

company in 1900 for the construction of the Piraeus–Larissa Railway. The family

also gained another two concessions: one was to build villages in Brazil, and the

other to construct waterways in Seoul. The family also had an arms business called

the Rexer Arms Company of which China was a client. Baron George de Reuter

was in charge of those investments which were not within the scope of news

business. These investments shall be discussed later in this chapter in order to reveal

the family’s connections with the British government, following a discussion on the

Reuter Concession in Persia and the Piraeus–Larissa Concession in Greece.

The chapter is a case study to show that news agency owners and

stockholders were in contact with their imperial centers concerning their foreign

investments. Also, the chapter discloses that the news business was only one of the

sectors they invested in. They were investors, seeking to maximize their profits and

secure their investments by all means, including taking part in international politics.

Having discussed relations of the news agencies with governments in the previous

chapter, in this chapter, the connections of their owners with imperial governments

will be exemplified through investments of the Reuter family.

On 25 July 1872, Baron Julius de Reuter was granted “for a period of

seventy years, the exclusive and definitive concession of a line of railway extending

57

from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, with the exclusive and definitive right of

constructing branch lines” by the Persian government for a yearly payment of

twenty percent of the net profits of the working of the line.141 He was also granted

the right to build and operate tramways, work all the mines (except those of

precious stones), construct waterways and sell water, and manage and generate

revenue from forests and uncultivated lands. The Persian government also granted

him the right to collect tariffs in the Empire for twenty years starting from the 1st of

March 1874 in return for payment to the government “the sum now paid by the

contractors for the Customs, and in addition a yearly premium of 500,000 fr.

[20,000l. sterling]” for the first five years, and for the remaining fifteen years, the

premium of 500,000 fr. was to be “exchanged for a premium of 60 percent on the

net profits over and above the contract price”.142 Reuter also received preferential

rights with regards to future enterprises and also the right to form a national bank.143

Lord Curzon, Conservative politician and member of the parliament

depicted the concession as one “without parallel”.144 He further stated: “when

published to the world, it was found to contain the most complete and extraordinary

surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has

probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history”.145 This

concession was later withdrawn by the Persian government owing to unrest among

the ruling class who were displeased with the terms of the agreement.

This unrest came against the backdrop of escalating British–Russian distrust

in Persia, hostilities caused by Russian land conquests in Central Asia. Russia began

141 “Reuter Concession of 25 July 1872 (Text)”, FO 371/1185.

142 “Reuter Concession,” FO 371/1185.

143 Ibid.

144 Mateo Mohammad Farzaneh, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership

of Khurasani (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2015), 46.

145 George Nathaniel Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,

1892), 480.

58

embarking upon the steady acquisition of territory in Central Asia in the latter part

of the nineteenth century, after redrawing territory with Persia in Transcaucasia on

the River Arax in the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828.146 The Russian Empire,

unable to fulfil its aspiration of having access to the Mediterranean, found land in

which to expand in Central Asia while the great European powers were occupied

with the Eastern Question.147 Britain regarded Russian advances in Central Asia as

dangerous to India’s security. For Persia, however, Russian advances jeopardized

her own territorial integrity. In 1895, Russian expansion in northern Persia and

Afghanistan ended with the signing of the Pamirs Agreement, dissipating the

possibility of an armed confrontation between Britain and Russia.148

In the context of simmering British–Russian hostilities in Persia, Naser ed-

Din, the Shah of Persia, took advantage of the Reuter Concession in order to

sidestep Russia’s railway construction demands. The Shah used it to play one great

power against the other to protect his sovereignty. On the other hand, while the

British Empire was trying to maintain a balance of power with Russia in the region

at that time, the British government used the concession to prevent others from

entering the region and building railways (especially in the southern part of Persia),

something Britain was able to do even without backing the Reuter Concession

officially.

In the midst of these Russian and British power plays, another significant

figure emerged in the diplomatic landscape. The Reuter family had been following

the twists and turns of world politics, considering how to pursue and guarantee their

146 Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895 (New York: Frank Cass,

2006), 38–50. Madhavan K. Palat and Anara Tabyshalieva (eds.), History of Civilizations of Central

Asia, Towards the Contemporary Period: From the Mid-nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth

Century, vol. VI (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2005), 103.

147 Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry, 38–50.

148 Ibid., 216.

59

interests. The family saw a path of influence over the political powers in policy

making, and sought advantages for itself from political conditions. In western Asia,

Baron Reuter sought the official support of the British government by taking

advantage of Russian and British conflicts of interest over Persia, not long after

reaching an agreement with the Persian government. A memorandum,149 prepared

by Robert Charles Dickie, demonstrates that the concession was at the center of

most conflicts pertaining to railway construction in Persia. According to the

memorandum, the British Foreign Office denied official support to Reuter in 1872

because of “the vastness of the Concession which had rendered its eventual

annulment practically certain, and the possibility of international trouble in view of

the political developments which would follow if such a Concession were supported

by Diplomatic intervention”.150 Indeed, the Russian Empire regarded the concession

as a threat and an attempt to shift the balance of power in Persia in favor of the

British Empire. Although British diplomats tried to convince their Russian

counterparts that the concession was a result of Reuter’s own private initiative, the

Russian government worked to see it annulled and to remove from power Mirza

Hoseyn Khan, the Sadrazam, who had negotiated with Reuter.151

Reuter’s plans were not limited to having unbridled access to the natural

resources and infrastructure construction in Persia. He had the intention to construct

a line from the Ottoman Empire to India, passing through Persia. On 27 April 1873,

his representatives applied for a permit to construct a railway line from Üsküdar to

149 The report was compiled in 1911 after the signing of the Potsdam Agreement between Germany

and Russia to review the history of the conflict between Britain and Russia over constructing railway

lines and forming policy in light of the recent turn of events.

150 Memorandum by R.C. Dickie, FO 371/1185, NA.

151 Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism

(Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1968), 116.

60

India.152 The Ottoman Empire did not accept Reuter’s proposal on the grounds that

the route and construction technology had not been declared, and it was

acknowledged by a decree that only the Ottoman Empire could construct railways

in Anatolia and Rumelia.153

Before Reuter, the concession had been offered to Dr. Strousberg and, later,

to Sir E. Watkin by Persian officials who were seeking to make a profit from it. The

first Concessionaire, Dr. Strousberg, who was a financier, experienced difficulties

with the Persian government while trying to build a line from Tehran to the shrine

of Shah Abdul Azim. He gave up his rights at the cost of the payment of caution

money, 4,000 pounds.154

Later, it was offered to Sir E. Watkin in 1871 but, this time, the scope of the

concession was to construct railways and exploit mines in Persia for a period of

twenty-five years. Having informed the Foreign Office that the Persian Minister had

approached him with the offer, Watkin asked for official support from the British

government and received a negative response, as Her Majesty’s Government:

…considered it undesirable to give any official countenance to

this scheme, as it was not believed that Persia seriously desired

any such development as was foreshadowed in the Concessions,

but that the real object of the Shah’s Ministers was the making of

those profits which are incidental to the negotiation of great

contracts, and the acquisition by the Persian Government of a

short railway from Tehran to Shah Abdul Azim (the shrine) at the

cost of the Concessionnaire.155

After the signing of the Reuter Concession, the Shah went to Europe. During

his absence, “elements of opposition, discordant in their nature, but each of

considerable power, had confederated to force the Grand Vizier from office, and for

152 A. MKT.MHM, D: 453, G: 23, 29.S.1290, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter cited as BAO).

153 A. MKT.MHM, D: 454, G: 15, 15.Ra.1290, BAO, A.MKT.MHM, D: 454, G:75, 21.Ra.1325,

BAO.

154 Memorandum by Dickie, FO 371/1185, NA.

155 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

61

the first time in the present reign the authority of the sovereign was set at

naught”.156 When the Shah returned to Persia, he found “a protest movement,

verging on revolt in some areas, directed against the concession and the prime

minister who had suggested it”,157 placing the Shah’s crown in jeopardy.158

Opposition to the Reuter Concession and the Grand Vizier consisted of:

Firstly, the reigning Sultana….Secondly, the fanatical party

headed by the Ulema and the Finance Minister who repudiated

any attempt to Europeanize Persia, and denounced the Grand

Vizier on this account as a traitor to his country. Thirdly, the

Princes of the Blood, …who had suffered innumerable personal

affronts at the hands of the minister, fourthly, the Russian party in

a body, guided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was,

moreover, a personal rival of the Grand Vizier’s; and fifthly, the

so-called national party, inspired and led by Ferhad Mirza who

had been left by the Shah as Regent at Teheran, and who,

although…loyal to his sovereign, had been nevertheless provoked

almost to frenzy by the threatened Reuter monopoly of Persian

industry and commerce. Before these antagonists the Grand Vizier

fell…159

Shortly after the cancellation of the Reuter Concession in early November 1873, the

fallen Grand Vizier was given a new position at the Shah’s court as the Minister of

Foreign Affairs.160

Reuter’s agent was informed of the concession’s withdrawal by the Persian

government on 5 November 1873.161 The Russian Empire might have fuelled

opposition to the concession among the elites and the public; however, it was the

text itself which ensured its own demise. Nevertheless, when Baron George de

Reuter, as his father’s representative, signed the Bank Concession in 1889 in place

of the original concession, he secured significant rights for the Reuter family. Its

156 Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London: John Murray, 1875), 133.

157 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London:

Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), 5.

158 Rawlinson, England and Russia, 129.

159 Ibid.

160 Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 120–25.

161 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

62

crucial points were as follows: the grant of an ‘Imperial Bank of Persia’ for sixty

years, exclusive rights to issue bank notes and serve as the Treasury, and the right to

monopolize all mines, except gold and silver, not already under concession and

being worked.162 Baron George de Reuter became one of the directors of the

Imperial Bank of Persia;163 with the Bank Concession, the Reuter family was able to

preserve its Persian economic interests.

As a non-political player in this matter, the Reuter family was trying to rally

official support from the British government while pursuing its interests in Persia by

exploiting political tension between Britain and Russia. On 12 September 1872,

Baron Julius de Reuter wrote a letter to Lord Granville, Gladstone’s Foreign

Secretary, asking the government to recognize the validity of his scheme, and

protect his rights if disagreements were to surface between the Persian government

and himself.164 The Baron expressed his desire to serve Great Britain with this

concession, noting that “in undertaking this gigantic task it is not only my earnest

desire both to improve the social condition of the Persians, and to open up the great

natural resources of their country for the benefit of the world at large, but also to

render my concession of the highest value to Great Britain”.165

In addition, he made a point of reminding Granville of the struggle between

the British and Russian Empires with regard to Persia, emphasizing that the

Russians had been ahead of the British in terms of transportation in the region. It

was also his intention to highlight the importance of his concession in contemporary

politics:

162 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

163 Storey, Reuters’ Century, 85.

164 Baron Julius de Reuter to Lord Granville, 12 September 1872, FO 60/405, 22 December 1873,

NA.

165 Reuter to Granville, FO 60/405.

63

The Select Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to

consider the question of a railway to the East, recommend to

speedy commencement of a line by the Euphrates Valley route.

Your Lordship is, doubtless, aware that the Russians are making

great progress with their railways toward the Caspian Sea, having

already partly completed three lines, each leading in that direction.

One route, viz. that from St. Petersburgh, via Moscow, to the Sea

of Azoff is open for traffic. A second one, from Dunaburg, via

Orel, to Zarazijn, on the Volga, is likewise in working order; the

journey thence to Astrachan, on the Caspian Sea, being performed

in two days only by steamer. There is, moreover, a third line

already complete, from Moscow to Zarazijn direct, which will

hereafter be extended to Astrachan.166

Baron Julius de Reuter received the response that “whilst Her Majesty’s

Government would view with satisfaction the efforts of the Shah’s Government to

increase by means of railways and roads, the resources of Persia, they cannot bind

themselves officially to protect your interests whilst carrying out your engagements

with that Government”.167

When details of the concession became public on 5 July 1873 in an article in

The Times, members of the government began a discussion. Lord Carnarvon,

Secretary of State for the Colonies (1874–1878), re-evaluated what the concession

meant for India’s security. He discussed the matter with Lord Derby, the Foreign

Secretary (1874–1878); Derby was not in favor of Reuter’s scheme, and described

his opposition to it in a conversation with Carnarvon on 7 July 1873:

Walk with Carnarvon on the terrace for an hour: he inclined to

take up the Euphrates valley line, which appears to be in some

way, not clearly explained, connected with Reuter’s schemes for

Persia: I dissuaded him: it is possible (though for my own part I

do not see it) that the thing might succeed, but without the

guarantee of the British parliament, it could not be attempted, and

166 Reuter to Granville, FO 60/405.

167 Viscount Enfield to Baron Julius de Reuter, 15 October 1872, FO 60/405, 22 December 1873,

NA.

64

it is quite certain that under present circumstances no such

guarantee will be given.168

Derby was soon to refuse Reuter’s demand for support against the Persian

government. Lord Carnarvon also discussed the matter with Sir Stafford Northcote,

conservative politician (1851–1885), on 13 July 1872:

Had a long talk with Northcote in the afternoon mainly on the

Persian question of Reuter’s concession. He was on the cautious

side as I expected but able, clear and open to all fair argument.169

A couple of months later, on 5 November 1873, Henry M. Collins, Reuter’s

agent in Tehran, was informed of the withdrawal of the concession by the Persian

government on the grounds of non-observance of Article 8, meaning that Reuter

had not commenced work within fifteen months of the date of the contract.170

William Taylour Thomson, the British Minister in Tehran, observed:

…that it was clear that the intention of the Persian Govt. was not

simply to get rid of what they considered to be a contract bad

commercially and financially, but to extricate themselves from a

disastrous political crisis fomented by foreign influence amongst a

bigoted priesthood and the personal enemies of the Persian Prime

Minister to such an extent as to threaten almost the stability of the

throne.171

When it was cancelled, Reuter once again sought the support of the British

government but was notified that Lord Derby:

…looked upon the undertaking as a private one in which H.M.G.

could not interfere, and although he was prepared to instruct H.

M. Minister at Tehran to obtain for Baron Reuter’s representations

at Tehran the same hearing to which the representations of any

British Subject who had entered into a contract with the Persian

Government would be entitled, H.L. [His Lordship] could not

168 John Vincent (ed.), A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby

(1826-93), between September 1869 and March 1878, Camden Fifth Series, vol. 4 (London: Royal

Historical Society, 1994), 141.

169 Peter Gordon (ed.), The Political Diaries of the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1857-1890, Colonial

Secretary and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Camden Fifth Series, vol. 35 (London: Royal Historical

Society, 2009), 203.

170 Memorandum, FO 371/1185, NA.

171 Thomson in Memorandum, 8 November 1873, FO 371/1185, 23 February 1911, NA.

65

authorise or instruct him to use any diplomatic influence or good

offices on Baron Reuter’s behalf except in that respect.172

Despite Carnarvon’s favorable opinion, Derby did not alter his thinking on the

Reuter Concession’s future.

The British government made use of the Reuter Concession after having

denied official support for its implementation in order to prevent the Russian

Empire from gaining a concession from the Persian government and disturbing the

delicate status quo. The Russian government then began urging the Persians to grant

a railway concession to a Russian general, Baron von Falkenhagen, following the

withdrawal of Reuters. In 1874, Falkenhagen submitted a draft of a concession to

the Persian government for a railway line between Julfa and Tabreez, a project that

would be no less burdensome than the previous one. The British minister in Tehran

addressed an official note to the Persian government, reminding it of the Reuter

Concession of 25 July 1872:

Being aware that a Concession for the construction of a line of

railway between Julfa and Tabreez is, with the official

intervention of the Russian Legation, under negotiation between

the Persian Government and General Falkenhagen, I think it right

to observe to your Highness that any such Concession being

prejudicial to the interests of Baron Reuter, whose Concession,

notwithstanding the declaration by Persia of its being null and

void, still remains an open question, I consider it my duty,

pending the receipt of instructions from H.M.G., hereby to reserve

to them the right to take such steps in the matter as under the

above-mentioned circumstances they may deem fit.173

The stance of the British government at the time, “was [to give] Baron Reuter

unofficial support in his claims for compensation, but as against the Falkenhagen

Concession he was receiving full official support: H.M.G. taking the ground that,

apart from the merits of Reuter’s case, the question of the avoidance of the

172 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

173 Ibid.

66

Concession was, in fact, still open”.174 The British Empire, unwilling to engage in

conflict with the Russian Empire over a controversial concession, did not support

the agreement officially, but used it as a tool against the signing of the Falkenhagen

Concession.

The articles of Falkenhagen’s agreement were drafted with no regard for the

interests of the Persian state. Articles 8, 10, 14, 17 and 21, especially, make clear

how the sovereignty of the Shah was challenged. Article 8 of the Concession made

it an obligation for the Persian government to pay “a yearly net profit of 6 ½ per

cent. upon the capital of the Company that is, 223,600 Russian Ducats a year

representing the profit upon the nominal Capital of the Company and a sinking

fund” to the company from commencement to completion of the working of the

railway until the expiration of the term of the concession forty-four years later.

Furthermore, Article 10 states the following to ensure that this amount would be

received by the company:

…the Persian Government makes over to the Company for the

entire period of the Concession the Customs of Tabreez, which

shall be transferred to an international Board of Customs at the

village of Julfa, or at some other part of the frontier, which will be

fixed in a separate convention between the Govt. of H.M. the

Shah, and that of Russia. The Government of H.M. the Shah

promises to make at once an arrangement with that of Russia for

the conclusion of a convention for the purpose of establishing on

the River Aras a united Russian and Persian Custom House under

an International administration similar to those which exist on the

Great Railways between some of the European States.

Moreover, the company would be entitled “to build a telegraph line along the track

[Article 14], and be allowed to mine coal, if any were found, within a fifty-mile

zone along the entire length of the railway [Article 17]”. The board of directors and

all those in the service of the company were to be under the protection of the

174 Ibid.

67

Russian Legation and consulates (Article 21). These were the main articles of

Falkenhagen’s drafted concession text.175

On the other side of the spectrum, as it lacked means to protect its own

sovereignty, the Persian government used one great power against the other,

attempting to convince the British to stand against Falkenhagen’s proposal in order

to sidestep a confrontation with the Russians. To this end, Mirza Malkan Khan, the

Persian Minister in London, told Lord Tenterden, Permanent Under-Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs, that the Persian government withdrew Reuter’s agreement

at the demand of the Russians. He attempted to convince Lord Tenterden to make

every effort to prevent granting the concession to Falkenhagen: “would the English

tamely look on while such a Concession as that of Baron Reuter was wrested from

her influence at the dictation of Russia and transferred to the Russian

Government?”176 The efforts of the Persian government turned out to be fruitful, for

on 13 November 1874, instructions were sent to Thomson:

H.M.G. feel that Baron Reuter has good cause to complain that, if

the Persian Government desire to consent to have a railway

constructed to Tabreez, the Concession should be granted to any

one else, and I have accordingly to instruct you to urge upon the

Persian Government the propriety of suspending any action in

regard to the Concession to the Russian Company until the

Baron’s claims have been duly considered and a settlement

arrived at with him.177

In late November and early December 1874, a concession was signed

between the Persian government and Falkenhagen based on the original draft

without the guarantee clauses.178 However, without these clauses, it was not a

pleasing concession for the Russian Empire. Therefore, on 5 May 1875,

175 Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, 135–39.

176 Tenderden in Memorandum, 30 October 1874, FO 371/1185, 23 February 1911, NA.

177 Tenderden in Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

178 Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, 145.

68

Falkenhagen requested the annulment of the Railway Concession on the grounds

that the Shah did not guarantee him the customs receipts from Tabriz.179 In 1877,

Thomson was to defend the policy by stating “it was only expected that, in all

matters favourable to our political and commercial interests in Persia and opposed

to their own, the influence of the Russian Mission at Tehran would be adversely

exerted” and referred to “the Falkenhagen Concession to show that the schemes

proposed for the benefit of Russian trade in the north of Persia had not been

unsuccessfully opposed”.180

In 1888, the Shah continued the policy of playing the British against the

Russians by means of the Reuter Concession to escape from Russian pressure. The

Shah, contrary to the sovereignty of the Persian state, had “under great pressure…in

Aug./Sept. 1887 given an undertaking to Russia not to give orders or permission to

construct railways or waterways to Companies of foreign nations before consulting

with H.M. the Emperor”.181 Unable to confront the Russian Empire, the Shah

instead sought the aid of the British government. For this purpose:

…the Amin-es-Sultan suggested to Sir H.D. Wolff that H.M.G.

should press the Reuter Concession, which, amended, the Shah

could defend, as dated years before, to Russia. The grand vizier

requested Sir H.D. Wolff to telegraph this as his own idea. It later

transpired that the idea emanated from the Shah.182

In October, 1888, Sir Wolff was instructed by the British Government to:

…make what use he could of the Concession in the new state of

matters, as the Persian Government, having prevented Reuter

from carrying out his Concession as a whole, was bound to grant

him some minor Concessions in satisfaction of his just claims;

care was to be taken that any Concessions so granted should be

179 John S. Galbraith, “British Policy on Railways in Persia, 1870-1900,” Middle Eastern Studies,

vol. 25 (1989): 489.

180 Jerome Anthony Saldanha, Persian Gulf Gazetteer Part 1. Historical and Political Materials

Precis Persian Arabistan Affairs, IOR/L/PS/20/C242, 1905, British Library: Asian and African

Studies.

181 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

182 Ibid.

69

much as would open the way to Tehran from the South and not

from the North.183

By December, an agreement had been reached on Reuter’s case; the family

was to receive a concession to establish a state bank in return for the transfer of his

original concession to the Persian government. Signed in January 1889, with a

duration of sixty years, the main points of the concession were the formation of the

Imperial Bank of Persia, exclusive issue of bank notes, the service of the Treasury,

and the monopoly over all the mines except gold and silver not already conceded

and worked. The bank was to have the exclusive right of issuing notes payable and

the government of the Shah bounded itself “not to issue any kind of paper money

during the terms of this concession, nor to authorize the creation of any other bank

or other institution possessing a like privilege” (Article 3). It was to be exempted

from taxes and be under the protection of the government (Article 5). The

exploitation of Persian mines was granted to Reuter by Article 11:

The Imperial Bank being ready to incur forthwith the sacrifices

necessary for developing the resources of the country by

exploitation of its natural riches, the Persian Government grants to

the said bank for the term of the present concession, the exclusive

right of working through the Empire the iron, copper, lead,

mercury, coal, petroleum, manganese borax, and asbestos mines

which belong to the State and which have not already been

conceded to others. The Persian Government shall, as an appendix

to this concession, deliver to the Baron de Reuter on the day of the

signature of these present an official list of mines already ceded.

The gold and silver mines of precious stones belong exclusively to

the State, …All the mines which the bank has not commenced

working within ten years of its formation shall be deemed to have

been abandoned by it, and the State may dispose of the same

without consulting the Bank.184

Furthermore, “Article 12 promised that the lands necessary for working the mines

shall, if on State domain, be given free, and if belonging to private individuals the

183 Ibid.

184 HR.SFR.3, D: 359, G: 65, 23.09.1889, BOA.

70

Government shall cooperate in getting them for the bank on the most favourable

terms…”185 The government’s share was sixteen percent of the profits of the mines

(Article 13).186 As outlined in Article 14, Reuter formally gave up all his claims

from his former concession.187

On 27 March 1889, Baron Reuter handed over his original concession to the

British Minister in Tehran for its delivery to the Persian government. The offices of

the bank were then established in Tehran and London and Baron George de Reuter

became one of its directors. Only three years later, the bank issued a large loan to

the Persian government.188

The conflict between Russia and Britain over railway construction in Persia

ended in 1890 with an agreement in which the Persian state declared that “the

Persian Government engages for the space of 10 years…neither itself to construct a

railway in Persian territory nor to permit nor grant a concession for the construction

of railways to a company or other persons”.189 In 1900, it was renewed for another

ten years. However, in 1911, the Potsdam Agreement was signed between Russia

and Germany, alarming Britain with Russia’s renewed ambitions concerning

railway construction. With the agreement, Germany assented “not to extend its

railway construction schemes into Persia and abstain from asking for road and

navigation concessions” in return for Russian assurance “not to oppose the building

of the Baghdad railway by the Germans”.190 Instantly, the British government began

reconsidering the construction of a railway line in southern Persia, basing its claim

on the Shah’s rescript of 16 September 1888, “by which British Government was

185 Ibid.

186 Ibid.

187 Ibid.

188 Read, Power of News, 85.

189 Hooshang Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars: Society, Economy,

Politics and Foreign Relations 1796-1926 (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 30.

190 Amirahmadi, Political Economy, 30.

71

given priority over others in the construction of southern railroads”, and an

assurance that the “British Government would be consulted before any southern

railway was granted to a foreign country”; in addition, possible route options would

be considered.191 Eventually, Britain abandoned the idea, and by the end of the First

World War there were only two railway lines on Persian soil: one stretching for six

miles between Tehran and Shah Abd ol-Azim, a line that the Belgians had

constructed in 1888, and the other being the Julfa-Uumiya and Zahidan-Nuskki line

built by Russia and Britain during the war as part of their war effort.192

In 1900, the Greek Railway Concession was secured and, like the Reuter

Concession, the family in the person of Baron George de Reuter had prepared

policies and suggested them to the British government. As before, contemporary

political concerns determined the future of the project, and Baron George de Reuter

tried to mould this future.

The Greek government had signed a contract with a firm in 1889 to

construct a line from Piraeus to the Greek border at Papapouli.193 However,

construction halted in 1893 because of the company’s financial problems.194 In

1898, to complete the Piraeus–Larissa Railway, the Eastern Railway Syndicate

Limited was formed under the initiative of Baron Herbert de Reuter, managing

director of Reuters (who succeeded his father Baron Paul Julius de Reuter in May

1878), with the cooperation of Frédéric-Émile Erlanger and Co. of London and M.

Jules Gouin, President of the Société de Construction des Batignolles de Paris.195 As

discussed in the previous chapter, Erlanger was also the owner of Havas. Though

191 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

192 Memorandum, FO 371/1185.

193 Irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum

(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 216.

194 Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 216.

195 Memorandum, “Respecting the Piraeus-Larissa Railway,” FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 12974,

21 April 1908, NA.

72

Baron Herbert de Reuter had founded the Syndicate, it was Baron George de Reuter

who carried out the rest of the tasks in the railway construction scheme.

On 22 March 1900, Baron George de Reuter, as the representative of the

Syndicate, signed a concession with the Greek Prime Minister and Minister of

Finance “for the completion of a proposed railway from the Piraeus to Larissa, in

the first instance to Demirly and eventually to the frontier”.196 To finance the

enterprise, the Greek Minister of Finance asked the International Financial

Commission in Athens to undertake the service of new loans to the Greek

government. The Greek government received a positive response from the

Commission after consultations with the states involved. In February 1902, Baron

George de Reuter, Gouin and Erlanger formed the Company of Greek Railways.197

In 1904, the King of Greece conferred the Cross of Commander of the Royal Order

of the Saviour upon Baron George de Reuter for his services.198

The Reuter family sought assistance from the British Foreign Office

whenever they encountered an obstacle in any of their projects. Regardless of

whether it was simply a matter of disagreement on construction or politics, in order

to impose what they wanted on the countries in question members of the family

asked the Foreign Office to intervene. In 1906, the Greek government and the

Company of Greek Railways experienced a disagreement. While the Railway

Company wanted to start constructing the line to Larissa before completing the

Demirly line, the Greek government wished to see the Piraeus–Demirly line

completed first. Baron de Reuter asked “for the intervention of the International

196 Memorandum, “Piraeus-Larissa Railway,” FO 371/537.

197 Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe, 216.

198 HO 45/10304/118695 (Home Office Registered Papers, 1901–1909), 14 May 1904, NA.

73

Financial Commission through the Foreign Office”.199 He claimed that the Greek

Railway Company had the right to start the construction of the Demirly–Larissa line

based on the convention:

By article 2 of this Law...the Greek Government are enjoined to

avail themselves of the option to call upon us to construct the

Demirly-Larissa section, upon the terms of article 34 of the

Convention; and are authorised to do so at any time, not later than

six months before the completion of the line from the Piraeus to

Demirly....Our contention is that while the Government need not

have given us this notification nor have authorised us to issue the

loan until six months before the completion of the line to Demirly,

their having allowed us to do the latter obliged them to permit us

to commence work on the Demirly-Larissa section, directly the

public had through us provided the necessary funds.200

Baron George de Reuter’s defence was that by allowing the Company to issue the

loan, the Greek government happened to allow the construction of the Demirly–

Larissa section.

In accord with Baron George de Reuter’s wishes, a copy of his letter was

sent to Alban Young, the British representative on the International Financial

Commission in Athens and his opinion on the subject was demanded.201 Before

Reuter’s letter reached him, Young had already written to the Foreign Office to

inform it about the matter and explain the source of the dispute. At the end of his

letter he wrote down the following under the title ‘confidential’:

The present state of affairs has arisen, on the one hand from the

desire of the Railway Company in its capacity as the financial

syndicate contracting to take over the loan at a price defined by

the convention, to issue the further instalment of the bonds to the

public at a time when it could do so to the best advantage

irrespective of the immediate needs of the work of construction,

and on the other from the wish of the Hellenic government not to

divest itself completely, when consenting to this premature issue,

of the hold over the Railway Company which they originally

199 Baron George de Reuter to Sir Thomas Sanderson, 4 January 1906, FO 371/81, file no: 622, no:

2666, 5 January 1906, NA.

200 Reuter to Sanderson, 4 January 1906, FO 371/81.

201 Campbell to Reuter, 13 January 1906, FO 371/81, 5 January 1906, NA.

74

possessed in virtue of their freedom to decide whether the line

should be extended to Larissa or not.

In point of fact there is at the present moment a dispute

between the company and the government with regard to a spot

between Brallo and Demirly where unexpected difficulties arising

from the nature of the soil have presented themselves.202

Basically, the Greek government wanted the Company to solve the problem on the

railway line on which it was already working before building the next section.

Instead, the Company took action against the government through Baron George de

Reuter, who complained to the British government and the International Financial

Commission, hoping that they would force Greece to do what the company desired.

With regards to the Baron’s letter dated 4 January 1906, Young explained to

Sir Edward Grey in his next letter that the Baron’s claim was not defendable:

Unfortunately the Commission finds itself disarmed from making

a protest on this ground by the fact that the Greek government

when notifying to the Company on November 19 1904, their

intention to prolong the line to Larissa, and authorizing the issue

of the loan, made an explicit reserve of their liberty to authorize

the commencement of the work at such moment as they might

consider expedient during a certain period, which is one expiring

in May or June 1906.203

In his letter Young also underlined that the current situation was not harmful to the

interests of the Greek Railway bondholders, implying that the Commission was not

responsible for protecting the interests of the Company, but rather the bondholders,

by stating that “the retention by the government of their liberty to postpone

commencement of work on the Demirly-Larissa line, an easy section of about 30

miles in length, …before the completion of the proceeding section could bring and

can bring no possible prejudice to the interests of…bond holders, on whose behalf

alone the Commission is qualified to intervene”.204

202 Young to Grey, 6 February 1906, FO 371/81, file no: 622, no: 5123, 12 February 1906, NA.

203 Ibid.

204 Young to Grey, FO 371/81.

75

Young again referred to the source of tension between the Greek

government and the Company and gave details on the subject:

…the Company declare that owing to the shifting nature of the

soil they cannot construct permanent works according to the brace

agreed upon. The question at issue between the government and

the Company is whether a deviation is really necessary and if so

who is to pay for it. The local representative of the Railway

Company with whom I am in constant intercourse considers that a

settlement either by compromise or by a resort to arbitration will

be shortly arrived at, and that he will not have to wait long for his

authorization to proceed with the Demirly-Larissa section.205

On 16 February 1906, Young was informed by Campbell on behalf of Sir

Edward Grey that “Sir E. Grey concurs in your view that the Commission is

debarred, under present circumstances, from taking any further action on behalf of

the Greek Railway Company”.206

After Reuter’s visit to Athens as the Vice President of the Company, the

matter was resolved in a way favorable to the Company. Young listed the terms of

the agreement between the Greek government and the Railway Company:

1. The Company will construct at their own expense such works

as are necessary to overcome the difficulties inherent in the soil at

Gappadia which gave rise to the dispute with the government

mentioned in my previous despatches. 2. The authorization to

commence work on the Demirly-Larissa section is considered by

Baron de Reuter to be forthcoming in four days. 3. The

government undertakes as soon as the chamber meets in May next

to reintroduce the measure cancelling the restriction imposed by

article 35 of the existing Convention which prohibits the

construction of the Larissa-Frontier section before an

announcement is arrived at with the Turkish Government for the

junction of the Greek line with the Turkish Railway

system....Monsieur Theotaky has promised that he will then

authorize the issue of the loan (5-6 millions of francs) for the

construction of the Larissa-Frontier section, and its immediate

application to that purpose. Baron de Reuter considers that there

will be no question on this occasion of separating the issue of the

loan from the permission to commence operations….207

205 Ibid.

206 Campbell to Young, 16 February 1906, FO 371/81, file no: 622, no: 5123, 12 February 1906, NA.

207 Young to Grey, 11 March 1906, FO 371/81, file no: 622, no: 9545, 19 March 1906, NA.

76

Baron George de Reuter managed to turn the crisis between the government and the

Company into an opportunity. Not only did the Greek government agree to allow

the Company to start constructing the Demirly–Larissa section, but it also agreed to

allow them to construct the Larissa–Frontier line before the junction between the

Greek and Turkish railway systems had been accepted by the Ottoman government.

In the following articles, financial matters were settled with regards to the Larissa–

Frontier section. Moreover, an alternative project was thought out by the Company

in case the junction between the Greek and Ottoman railway systems did not take

place, as it would mean a wasted thirty miles of railroad. The solution the parties

agreed on was depicted in Article 5:

5. In the event of the junction with the Ottoman system not having

been effected within two years after the completion of the Piraeus-

Frontier Railway, the Company undertake to construct a small

branch of about 3 miles in length from the frontier to the sea-coast

south of Platamona Point. Here a wooden tier running to a depth

of six metres is to be constructed and the Company will ensure a

daily service of steamers towards which the Greek Government

will give a postal subsidy of 100,000 francs a year with Salonica,

a distance of 4 or 5 hours….In default of a junction with the

Ottoman Railways it is better that this extra expense should be

incurred than that the thirty miles of the Larissa line should after

penetrating the picturesque but unfruitful recesses of the vale of

Tempè terminate at a Greek Custom House standing in a lonely

marsh.208

However, Young stated that such a contingency plan would not come to pass as

Reuter had revealed a secret agreement between Theotoky, the Greek Minister of

Finance, and himself to ensure that the junction would be constructed, an agreement

which Young found very convincing:

The promoters are however [aware]...that they will not be called

upon to fulfil this engagement as they consider that they have

reassuring prospects in regard to the construction of a Turkish line

90 kilometres in length joining Gida on the Salonica-Monastir line

208 Ibid.

77

to their system on the frontier. The most important advantage

which Baron de Reuter has gained from his visit is an

undertaking, which he wishes to be kept strictly confidential, on

the part of Monsieur Theotoky to accord a subvention which will

greatly facilitate the eventual negotiations in Constantinople, as

you are probably aware the interests of the Greek Railway

Company in regard to the Ottoman section have been transferred

to Messeur Vitalis, the well-known Railway constructor in

Turkey. When the Larissa-Frontier works are well under

construction an advance, which it is supposed, will for strategical

reasons predispose the Turks to make a similar move Messeur

Vitalis will apply to the Porte for a concession to construct the

section Gida-Frontier on the basis of a kilometres guarantee of

6000 francs. The subsidy offered by Messeur Theotoky amounts

in reality to raising this guarantee from 6 to 9 thousand francs.209

The two decided to give a subsidy to a Greek constructor Messeur Vitalis to lower

the project’s cost for the Ottoman Empire. In this way, they believed that the

Ottoman government would choose Vitalis as the constructor. The rest of the

money that would allow Vitalis to gain a profit from the railway project was to be

covered secretly by Greece. It seems that Reuter and Theotoky thought only

financial matters could prevent the junction’s construction, or they believed that

with enough money they could obtain the Ottoman Empire’s consent despite the

state of politics between the two countries. Another reason that made Young

hopeful that the project would take place was that he was told by Reuter that strong

German opposition in the past against the junction had now been withdrawn.

Realizing that Reuter and Theotoky were taking the Ottoman Empire’s

consent for granted, Young underlined that nothing was decisive yet and that all

these construction plans could only be carried out by the Greek government

dependent on the Turkish government’s action. But he still stated that he believed

“the prospects of an overland connection with Europe are better now than ever

209 Young to Grey, 11 March 1906, FO 371/81.

78

before”.210 He also wrote that, in his opinion, this junction would greatly enhance

Greek revenues: “I am convinced that in view of the Greek development throughout

Europe of the Tourist business, and in addition to this country’s own attractions, the

proximity of its ports to Egypt, the linking of Athens by 70 hours of rail with Paris

will bring a very perceptible increment to the slender sources of the Greek revenues.

Any well directed efforts to attain their result should consequently recommend

themselves to the International Commission.”211

In July, Young informed the British Foreign Office that the legislation

change desired by Baron de Reuter had occurred:

I am happy to report that so far the engagements entered into by

Monsieur Theotoky with Baron de Reuter in regard to the Piraeus-

Larissa-Frontier Railway have been faithfully carried out and that

the Chamber has passed…the necessary legislation for permitting

the immediate construction of the extension to the Turkish frontier

where the line is designed to effect a junction with the Ottoman

System, or pending that event, to a point nearby on the coast

whence a daily steamboat service with Salonica will be assured.212

Moreover, Young also discussed the developments on the matter of loan issuing in

his letter:

The formalities connected with the issue of the last portion of the

Greek Railways 4% Loan amounting to £270,000 [nominal].

[6,750,000 francs] have been completed…

I understand that any of this loan ₤40,000 have been

subscribed by Paris Bankers and ₤230,000 by London houses and

that no issue to the general public will take place at present.213

The majority of the loan had been subscribed by London houses, as stated by

Young. Later, in 1908, Baron George de Reuter was to remind the British Foreign

Office that a majority of the bonds belonged to British citizens and that the

Government should act to protect the interests of its citizens. Also, Young declared

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.

212 Young to Grey, 17 July 1906, FO 371/81, file no: 622, no: 25078, 23 July 1906, NA.

213 Ibid.

79

that the duty of the International Financial Commission was now complete as it had

conceded the amount agreed on for the line’s construction:

This last issue has been as presented by the Convention, taken

over by the Syndicate at the same price as the other portion viz 80

per cent. The entire loan for which the Commission consented to

undertake the service as assured on the surplus of the receipts: the

conceded revenues viz 35 millions of francs effective for the

Piraeus-Demirly section and ten millions effective for the

extension to the frontier has now been completed.214

In return for the Greek government arranging things as desired by the Railway

Company, the company expressed their intention to “overcome the difficulties they

encountered on the Piraeus-Demirly section before May of next year”.215

Young’s statement on granting a loan for the construction of an alternative

branch to the coast if the junction with the Ottoman railway system did not take

place demonstrates an overconfidence of the company regarding Ottoman

cooperation “the Company believe that they will never be called upon to construct

the alternative branch to the coast but in order to facilitate Baron de Reuter’s

negotiations with the Greek Government the Commission have consented, with

proper reservations, to the interest of the small loan [probably half a million

Drachmas] necessary for such construction…”216

Baron George de Reuter’s first attempt to influence international politics

through the railway project occurred in 1908 when the line reached Larissa, a time

when the railway company and the Greek government began seeking approval from

the Ottoman government for a junction between the Greek and Turkish railway

systems. Erlanger and Baron George de Reuter petitioned the British Foreign Office

with letters, as it remained reluctant to support the application to the Ottoman

214 Young to Grey, 17 July 1906, FO 371/81.

215 Ibid.

216 Ibid.

80

government for a concession to build the line, which would connect the Greek

railway system with the Ottoman Empire’s system. The British had no desire to

support the scheme with the Sublime Porte officially because of the former’s policy

of pushing reforms in Macedonia.

The ‘reform’ scheme of the British government, presented in March 1908,

was to have a single Governor-General for Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica, three

provinces constituting Macedonia. His term of office was to be determined before

his appointment, and his dismissal was to be subject to the approval of the European

Powers. The Governor-General would be supported by foreign military officers and

a European gendarmerie, and would receive his salary from the Macedonian budget

which was to be placed under the control of the European Powers in order to

challenge the Governor-General’s loyalty to the Sublime Porte. The scheme was

devised with the aim of undermining the control of the Ottoman Empire in

Macedonia, which would gradually lead to autonomy, and independence, for these

provinces. In May of that year, the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress

(CUP) found out Great Britain’s decision to cooperate with Russia instead of

European Powers to push reforms in Macedonia. Great Britain’s move played a role

in the 1908 Turkish revolution. Believing that this sort of cooperation would lead to

Macedonia’s separation and its immediate domination by a foreign power, ending

its influence in Macedonia, the Committee of the Union and Progress (CUP)

decided to act sooner initiating a revolutionary movement.217

Investors in the Greek Railway Company emphasized in their

correspondence that the enterprise was a British investment and therefore deserved

217 Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 87–89.

81

the protection of the British government. Erlanger stated that the railway project

was a British enterprise:

…the total amount of the loans issued for the above purpose is

₤2,250,000, in addition to which the share capital of the Greek

Railways Company, amounting to ₤400,000, has been subscribed

and entirely paid up in cash. Of these ₤2,650,000, more than

₤1,500,000 have been subscribed and are still held by British

subjects.

The railway can, therefore, well claim to be a British

enterprise, deserving of the special support of His Majesty’s

Government.218

He added that the junction was necessary for the sake of British bondholders:

Now this great enterprise is approaching conclusion; the line is

completed to Larissa and will be opened to the Frontier in a few

months. Active steps have, therefore, been taken by all the

interested parties to obtain the consent of the Porte to the

construction of a line some 50 miles in length to unite the Greek

and Turkish Railways.

Unless that junction be made the security of the bondholders

will be greatly impaired, and the share capital of the Greek

Railways Company, of which one-half was subscribed by Messrs.

Pauling and Co. (Limited) and my firm, will be practically

worthless.219

Furthermore, he tried to take advantage of rivalry between the Great Powers by

stating:

But, in making this appeal, I am also actuated by other motives,

for fear that it would be injurious to British prestige in Greece and

Turkey if the Concession were obtained with the support of all the

Great Powers with the exception of Great Britain, she alone

standing aloof from an enterprise which has been carried out in

the main by British subjects and with the aid of British capital.220

However, the government was reluctant to support the scheme, as it thought

backing the project would jeopardize its impartial stand in Macedonia. It was noted

in the Foreign Office minutes, in view of Erlanger’s letter, that:

218 Erlanger to Grey, 13 April 1908, FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 12974, 14 April 1908, NA.

219 Erlanger to Grey, 13 April 1908, FO 371/537.

220 Ibid.

82

It does not follow that if we do not support this project now, it will

never be realized at all and that the share capital of the Greek Co.

will be ‘practically worthless’. The two systems will obviously

have to be linked up someday: the only question is whether the

present moment is a favourable one for pushing the scheme.…

The fact that the Greek Railway is primarily a British

undertaking seems to me the strongest reason why H.M.G. should

not single it out as an object of their official support at a moment

when they have just expressed their views as to the

inopportuneness of the present time for pressing for railway

development in the Balkans. It would be a negation of our attitude

of disinterestedness in Macedonia and would weaken our position

enormously.221

On 21 April 1908, a few days after Erlanger’s correspondence, Baron

George de Reuter wrote a letter to the Foreign Office as Vice-President of the Greek

Railways Company and Chairman of the Eastern Railway Syndicate Limited. He

criticized Britain’s policy for being:

…not in conformity with the attitude of the British Government in

the past. During the negotiations for the obtention of the

Concession from the Greek Government I always enjoyed the

unofficial support of the Foreign Office, and in Greece, in 1900,

Sir Edward Egerton, then the British Minister there, gave me very

great assistance in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement with the

Greek Government. Moreover, the successive British Delegates

on the International Financial Commission at Athens invariably

did what they could to assist me in arranging the financial side of

the question.222

Reuter, confident in his scheme and position, took the liberty of telling the

British Foreign Office that it was pursuing an inconsistent policy and reminded it

that the government had provided support in the past. Then, like Erlanger, Reuter

mentioned the support of other great powers, pointing out that the Eastern Railways

Syndicate Limited was an English company and thus responsible for half of the

railway project:

Inasmuch as all the Powers support our scheme, it seems

anomalous that Great Britain should fail to do so for an enterprise

221 Minutes, FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 12974, 14 April 1908, NA.

222 Reuter to Grey, 21 April 1908, FO 371/537, file no; 4533, no: 13816, 22 April 1908, NA.

83

which is half English and which formerly received the support of

His Majesty’s Government.223

Like Baron Julius de Reuter’s attempt to take advantage of tensions between the

Russian and British empires over Persia, Baron George de Reuter tried to take

advantage of the political rivalry between the great powers to force the British

government into advocating for the railway junction scheme at the Sublime Porte.

Moreover, he underlined that the aim of the Concession was to join Greece with the

rest of Europe and it would not be fulfilled unless the junction came into

existence.224

The arguments of Erlanger and Reuter were reviewed in a Foreign Office

minute before a response was forthcoming. In the document the arguments in favor

of complying with their request were listed and the Foreign Office’s opinion was

written down:

1. That it is an old scheme to which we have given our support in

the past and therefore stands on a different footing from the

Serbian and Austro-Hungarian scheme which are new. This

argument is used by Baron de Reuter. 2. That it has the support of

the other Powers. 3. That it is largely a British enterprise.

The first appears to be the best, as it is undoubtedly true that we

have supported the scheme in the past. The second is only good if

there are no stronger (?) against it. The third appears to me to be

radically bad for we should cut a very poor figure if we refuse to

support the other two schemes in the interests of reform in

Macedonia and then supported this one because of British

interests [?], letting the reforms go by the board. What kind of an

impression would this give of our disinterestedness and [?] in the

cause of reform? In fact this argument is really an argument of the

other side. Moreover we have already told the Greek Minister that

we cannot support the scheme and have also told the other Powers

that we cannot support any such schemes at present.225

Not only the Company, but also the Greek government, sought the support

of the British government in this matter. On 28 April 1908, Mr. G. Barclay wrote a

223 Reuter to Grey, 21 April 1908, FO 371/537.

224 Reuter to Grey, 22 April 1908, FO 371/537.

225 Minutes, FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 13816, 22 April 1908, NA.

84

letter to Sir Edward Grey, which was received by the Foreign Office on 5 May

1908, informing it that the Greek Minister M. Gryparis had called him on 27 April

1908 and asked for his informal support for the application made to the Porte for the

linking of the Greek and Turkish railway systems. In Barclay’s words, Gryparis said

that:

He was aware of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government

towards the various railway projects in Macedonia, but he trusted

that I would see my way, should an opportunity occur, to say a

word in favour of the Greek scheme. He pointed out that Greece

was now the only country in Europe which had no railway

connection with other countries, and laid stress on the nonpolitical

and non-strategical purpose of the line, the objects of

which were purely commercial, the coast route having been

selected rather than a more western route which would have been

more agreeable to Turkey, only because it was shorter and easier

to construct.226

In response he was promised that this visit would be reported to Sir Edward Grey.

However, Barclay stated that “in view of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government,

with which he was familiar, in regard to railway construction at the present moment

in Macedonia, I could not see my way to saying anything at the Porte in favour of

the Larissa-Salonica line”. 227 In the meeting Barclay learned that the Greek

Minister had asked for the same informal support from the other embassies as had

been requested from him.228

On 6 May 1908, Émile Erlanger and Baron George de Reuter were notified

by the Foreign Office in separate letters that Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary

(1905–1916), was in favor of the junction in principle and would “use his influence

226 Barclay to Grey, 28 April 1908, FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 15167, 4 May 1908, NA.

227 Barclay to Grey, 28 April 1908, FO 371/537, 4 May 1908.

228 Barclay to Grey, 28 April 1908, FO 371/537.

85

to secure the Porte’s assent to it when this can be done without prejudice to

proposals for reform, which are at the moment under consideration”.229

Soon, the opportunity Reuter was waiting for came along with the rise of the

CUP in the Ottoman Empire. Hoping that regime change in the Empire would

convince the British government to support his scheme, he submitted copies to

London of confidential correspondence from years before between himself and

Greek officials. He hoped to prove that the junction was not only desired by the

railway company but also by the Greek government. The submitted documents

consisted of correspondence with A. Simopoulos, the Greek Minister of Finance,

and N. Calogéropoulos, the Greek Minister of the Interior, dated 1 March 1906.230

Reuter also added a more recent correspondence with Munir Paşa, Ottoman

Ambassador in Paris at that time, dated 4 May 1908.231 Louis Mallet, the Assistant

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, summarized the documents submitted by

Baron George de Reuter, arguing that there should be no reason for not supporting

Reuter after a regime change in the Ottoman Empire:

The Greek government are so keen on this junction that they are

ready to give a kilometre guarantee on the line which is in Turkish

territory. Munir Pasha who was negotiating the matter has fallen

and it remains to be seen how the present regime will regard the

junction which the Sultan has hitherto opposed. There is now no

reason for not giving our support at Constantinople.232

On 18 August 1908, Reuter was informed that the documents he had submitted

were read “with interest”233 by Sir Edward Grey, and:

…in view of the establishment of constitutional government in the

Ottoman Empire His Majesty’s Government have decided that

229 W. Langley to Erlanger, 6 May 1908, FO 371/537, file no: 4533, no: 13816, 22 April 1908.

230 “Joint Communication addressed to Greek Administration (Communicated by Baron de Reuter on

11 August 1908),” FO 371/465, file no: 28067, no: 27111, 12 August 1908.

231 “Joint Communication,” FO 371/465, 12 August 1908.

232 Louis Mallet, Minutes, 12 August 1908, FO 371/465, file no: 28067, no: 27111, 12 August 1908.

233 Louis Mallet to Baron George de Reuter, 18 August 1908, FO 371/465, file no: 28067, no: 27111,

12 August 1908, NA.

86

there is no longer any objection to supporting at the Sublime Porte

an application for a concession to permit this junction to be

effected, and that a dispatch in this sense has been addressed to

His Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople with instructions to

take the necessary action in accordance with this decision.234

On the same day, Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador in Constantinople,

was notified regarding the subject and received copies of the confidential

correspondence that Baron George de Reuter had submitted.235

Nevertheless, another obstacle stood in the way of Reuter’s scheme: the

declared union of Crete and Greece. To overcome this, the Baron, who had been

discussing the matter with George I, King of Greece, suggested a policy initiative to

the British Foreign Office: the offering of compensation to Turkey for recognizing

Greece’s unification with Crete. Reuter’s scheme was to capitalize on liberal terms

“the part of the Ottoman Debt which was borne by Crete” and to add “a further sum

as moral damages for the hauling down of the Turkish flag, which would

incidentally enable the Turkish Government to repatriate those Mussulmans who

would wish to leave Crete on the union with Greece”.236 Reuter estimated the

amount would be between 500,000 and 1,000,000 pounds.237 Furthermore, he

considered how the Ottoman government could make use of part of this

compensation after financing its Muslim subjects’ evacuation from Crete:

“500,000l. [pounds] would be applied to making a railway in Turkish territory, to

join the Larissa Railway with the Salonica-Monastir Railway at Ghida”.238

Baron George de Reuter then hinted his intentions by stating that “Greece

herself could not very well propose these terms to Turkey” and asking Sir Edward

234 Mallet to Reuter, 18 August 1908, FO 371/465.

235 Mallet to Lowther, 18 August 1908, FO 371/465.

236 Grey to Lowther, 4 November 1908, FO 371/444, file no: 34783, no: 38369, 4 November 1908,

NA.

237 Grey to Lowther, 4 November 1908, FO 371/444.

238 Ibid.

87

Grey if there would be further objections were Turkey to accept certain terms.239 He

was assured by Grey that “none of the Powers would make objections if Turkey

came forward and said that acceptable terms had been offered to her”.240 With his

visit, Reuter aimed to secure permission from the British government and the other

great powers to execute his plan. In addition, Reuter, acting as a mediator, was

planning to make the above-mentioned offer to the Turkish government himself,

seeking to convince it to recognize the unification of Greece and Crete. Grey

recounts, “I gathered from the way he put the question that he probably meant to

sound the Turkish Government himself”.241

There was more to Reuter’s proposal which was omitted in Grey’s letter to

Lowther. The Baron proposed to Grey that “there should be a secret agreement

between Greece and us by which, after the transfer of Crete to Greece, Suda Bey

should be leased to us. It would be a most valuable harbor for the Navy”.242 This

part of the proposal was unknown to the King of Greece. Based on the draft letter,

Grey’s response, which again was excluded, was:

So far as I knew, Suda Bey was a very valuable harbor; but that

the political disturbance caused by acquiring a new harbor in the

Mediterranean might more than counterbalance the advantage to

us. Other Powers might put forward other [“all sorts of” was

crossed and replaced by “other”] demands, and presently the

situation might be less favourable than if the ‘status quo’ had not

been disturbed at all. But, apart from this consideration, we were

one of four Powers who were occupying Crete: and it would be

absolutely impossible for us, while negotiating with Turkey in

concert with the other three Powers about Crete, to contemplate

acquiring any special advantage for ourselves. Such an idea was

quite out of the question, and could not be entertained.243

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

242 Memorandum, FO 371/465, file no: 34783, no: 38369, 4 November 1908.

243 Memorandum, FO 371/465, 4 November 1908.

88

To fulfil his own desires, Baron George de Reuter proposed to Grey to confiscate a

bay in Crete, where the British navy could be stationed, hoping that the British

government would then drop its current policy of demanding reform in Macedonia

due to this more profitable one. It is significant that a group of investors who were

in the news business could also regard themselves as being in a position to suggest

foreign policy, thus, demonstrating their elevated perception of their own sphere of

influence.

When the Company claimed to have finished the work and asked for the

caution money and warranty deductions to be returned, the Greek government

refused to take the railway line and return the “retenue de garantie” and caution

money. On 16 February 1909, Reuter communicated with the Foreign Office

regarding his complaint against the Greeks. The source of the dispute was the Greek

government’s refusal “to take ‘réception’ of the Piraeus-Larissa Railway, on the

grounds that the line is not yet working ‘en toute sécurité’”.244 The matter was

referred to Sir Elliot, British Minister in Athens. Meanwhile, the French partners of

the Greek Railway Company, Monsieur Bourée, President, and Monsieur Gaston

Gouin, Chairman of the Société des Constructions de Batignolles, were interviewed

by Monsieur Louis, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on this matter.245

On 23 February 1909, Sir Elliot was visited by Monsieur Georgiades, Baron

de Reuter’s representative in Athens, who explained why the Greek government had

refused “the ‘réception’ of the Piraeus-Larissa Railway Line”:

It appeared that, with the exception of a few sleepers which are

gradually being renewed, the main line is perfectly ready; it has

throughout stood the effects of a particularly wet winter, and is

244 Louis Mallet to Baron George de Reuter, 23 February 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 5935,

13 February 1909, NA.

245 Baron George de Reuter to Louis Mallet, 22 February 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 7622,

25 February 1909, NA.

89

being continually used without let or hindrance. Two small branch

lines are not finished, one on account of an order from the

Ministry to suspend the works while an alternative route was

being considered, the other owing to the opposition of the

Thessalian Railways to the proposed junction with their system at

Demerli. The real obstacles to the ‘réception’ are twofold: firstly

the difficulties raised by the advisory Committee of Engineers,

whom the Company of Construction have in Mr. Georgiades’s

opinion mistakenly not supplied with the customary inducements

to make a favourable report; secondly a question which has

become a personal one with the Minister of the Interior, who upon

the instigation of some of his constituents demands the dismissal

of a station-master who is regarded as a good servant of the

Company. The latter difficulty however is about to be arranged by

the removal of the station-master to a superior post.246

According to the Company’s account, the denial of the Greek government to accept

the railway line was due to the disagreeableness of individuals rather than a

technical problem with the work. It was stated that the Committee of Engineers was

waiting to be paid a bribe, while the Minister of the Interior was severely displeased

with a servant of the Company. The Company denied the Greek government’s

claim that the line was not completely secure. This was the second time that the

Company sought assistance from the British and French foreign offices instead of

trying to solve the problem themselves through negotiation with the Greek

government. These two incidences give a sense that Greece did not have much of a

say in how the railway project was run; rather, it appeared to be the investors who

were in charge. This time the British and French foreign offices cooperated, and

provided their representatives in Athens with instructions.

Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister in Greece, and M. de la Boulinière,

the French Minister in Greece, who were accustomed to being in touch on this

matter, started to work together with the arrival of instructions from the French

government in March 1909:

246 Elliot to Grey, 27 February 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935 no: 8734, 6 Mar 1909, NA.

90

The French Minister has received from his Government

Memoranda communicated by the Anglo-French group on the

subject of their claims against the Greek Government, together

with instructions which left him the greatest latitude both as to the

substance and as to the form of the representations to be made to

the Greek Government conjointly with me…247

The opinion they formed of the dispute shows that the problem was not as simple as

put forward by Monsieur Georgiades, Baron de Reuter’s representative in Athens:

M. de la Boulinière and I have carefully studied these documents,

as well as the Convention of the 22nd March, 1900, and the

‘Cahier des Charges’ annexed to it, and we have received verbal

explanations from the representatives of the Company. From them

we learnt that the application already made by them for the return

of the caution money and ‘retenues de garantie’ had met with a

very uncompromising reply, a copy of which I have the honour to

enclose herewith. It was therefore too late to prevent the Greek

Government from adopting an attitude to which they had already

committed themselves in black and white.

Our examination of the Convention and of the ‘Cahier des

Charges’ convinced us that the argument of the ‘retenue de

garantie’ and of half of the caution money is not sound….But it

seemed to us impossible to interpret the Convention

independently of the ‘Cahier des Charges’, and Article 30,

paragraph 4, of the latter justifies the contention of the

Government that the repayment of the ‘retenue de garantie’ only

becomes due upon the ‘réception’ of the line, … 248

The Company had demanded the whole “retenue de garantie”. However, the

investigation by Sir Elliot and M. de la Boulinière brought to light the fact that the

Company was not entitled to it until the government had received the railway line.

Nevertheless, they met with the Greek Minister of the Interior on 24 March 1909 to

attempt a conciliation of the parties.

On 4 May 1909, Elliot informed the Foreign Office that the Greek Minister

of the Interior had advised him that the government had decided to return one half

of the bonds representing the caution money and part of the retentions (350,000

247 Elliot to Grey, 24 March 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 12080, 30 March 1909,

NA.

248 Elliot to Grey, 24 March 1909, FO 371/677.

91

drachmas) to the Company, leaving only 150,000 drachmas as a “retenue de

garantie”.249 The Company accepted the arrangement and thanked Sir Elliot “for the

action taken in conjunction with the French Minister”.250 Baron George de Reuter

wrote a separate letter of thanks to the Foreign Office on 19 May 1909.251

With the resolution of the dispute, the Piraeus–Larissa Frontier Railway was

opened to business on 29 June 1909.252 One train a day in each direction began to

operate, covering 394 kilometers in around fifteen hours.253 Despite the efforts of

Baron George de Reuter, the junction between the Greek and Ottoman railway

systems was never completed, leaving close to 1.3 kilometers of Greek railway

leading to “an abrupt ending on the north of the kingdom”.254

While the Greek railway project was still ongoing, Baron George de Reuter

took over a concession in Brazil, and instantly sought official British support. On 16

January 1905, Reuter took control of a disputed concession to create twenty

“Burgos Agricolas” (agricultural villages). Analysis of the British Foreign Office

documents suggests that the disagreement between Reuter and the Brazilian

government occurred because Reuter took over a concession that had already been

the subject of a court case. The concession was that “the Government gave the

concessionaire the freehold of vast tracts of territory, the concessionaire

undertaking to build so many villages and bring so many families to each

village”.255

249 Elliot to Grey, 4 May 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 17652, 10 May 1909, NA.

250 Elliot to Grey, 4 May 1909, FO 371/677.

251 Reuter to Mallet, 19 May 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 18996, 20 May 1909, NA.

252 Elliot to Grey, 27 July 1909, FO 371/677, file no: 5935, no: 28994, 3 August 1909, NA.

253 Elliot to Grey, 27 July 1909, FO 371/677.

254 “Greek Railways,” Evening News, July 5, 1910.

255 “Claim against the Brazilian Government,” 8 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9

June 1906, NA.

92

By the finance law of 1899, Congress authorized the Brazilian government

to negotiate with Monsieur Gomes de Oliveira for the creation of twenty “Burgos

Agricolas”. Ten months later, after the Republic’s proclamation, M. de Oliveira

asked for an extension of the contract for another year, which was agreed upon by

the new government. He then asked for another extension; however, this time not

only was it refused but the request caused the new Minister of Agriculture to

announce that the concession had expired. The document, which was presented to

the British Foreign Office and signed by the Brazilian jurists, points to

governmental change and political unrest in the country as being the reason the

promised work was not completed by M. de Oliveira on time. However, it does not

shed light on whether any of the work was completed, which suggests that it was

not. It is unknown if de Oliveira had been committed to fulfilling the concession at

one time, but it is clear that neither David Saxe de Queirod nor Baron George de

Reuter had any intention of building agricultural estates but simply wished to

receive a high compensation from the Brazilian government. This deed was later

referred to as a “speculation” in the Foreign Office records.

The process from the granting of the concession to its cancelation, with an

emphasis on the political events, was depicted in a document entitled “the Claim

Against the Brazilian Government” which was submitted by Reuter to the British

government:

Ten months later the Republic having been proclaimed on the 25th

June 1890 the new Government upon the request of the

Concessionaire extended the contract for another year, and

Monsieur Gomes de Oliveira formed a limited liability Company

with a capital of 20,000 contos: and to this company were

transferred by decree of the Minister of Agriculture all the rights,

privileges etc. of the original concessionaire.

The revolutionary movement which broke out at this

moment interfered with and greatly obstructed the operations of

93

the Company: in consequence thereof a further extension should

have been granted the Company. But on the contrary, the new

Minister of Agriculture pronounced the concession lapsed, before

the expiry of the contract, and without even giving previous notice

to the Company.256

The liquidation of the company was the result of this “coup d’etat”.257

The original concessionaire, M. de Oliveira, realizing that he would not be

able to get his money back, sold his rights to M. David Saxe de Queirod, who in

turn hoped for a compensation from the Brazilian government much higher than

that which he had paid to de Oliveira. In the document, this incident was explained

in a more politically correct manner: “to Monsieur David Saxe de Queirod, who had

been associated with Monsieur de Oliveira from the first, were transferred all the

rights and liabilities of the latter: and M. de Queirod after having vainly

endeavoured to get the Minister of Agriculture to alter his decision, applied to the

Courts”.258

On 20 May 1897, the judge of the Court of First Instance decided in favor of

M. de Queirod; however, the government then appealed to the Supreme Court

which decided on 25 June 1898 that:

…the rights of the Plaintiff have been violated by the

Government, who in thus acting are bound to indemnify him by

the payment of damages, in consequence of the injury done him.

For these reasons judgement of the Court below confirmed, the

appellants [the Government] to pay the costs.259

The ministers of Finance and Agriculture offered M. de Queirod 5,000 contos but

he found it insufficient to satisfy the damages. As M. de Queirod and the

government could not agree on the amount, the government proposed taking the

case to arbitration, which was agreed upon by de Queirod. The arbitration court

256 Ibid.

257 “Claim against the Brazilian Government,” 8 June 1906, FO 371/12.

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.

94

decided that 8,000 contos should be paid to de Queirod; however, because of “an

error of procedure, and by mutual consent the parties had recourse to a second

arbitration”.260 This time, the second arbitration court, decided on a payment of

16,677 contos to de Queirod.

The government did not make any payments to M. de Queirod, so he again

applied to the courts, this time to enforce the award of the arbitrators. The judge of

the Court of First Instance found de Queirod to be in the right but he reduced the

damages to 5,000 contos. M. de Queirod then appealed to the Supreme Court;

however, the Court “refused to ratify the award…, decided that nothing was due to

M. De Queirod and ordered him to pay the costs”.261 Based on the document sent by

Reuter, “eminent Brazilian jurists”, namely, Councillor Laffaiete Rodriguez Pereira,

Viscount de Ouro Preto, Dr. José Huggino Duarte Pereira, Dr. Clovis Boviliqua,

Councillor Candido Maria Suéz d’Oliveira, Councillor Ruy Barbosa and Baron de

Peraira Franco, had the opinion that “this last judgement of the Supreme Court is

absolutely invalid and contrary to the laws of the Union”.262

Then, on 16 January 1905, Reuter became the owner of the larger portion of

M. de Queirod’s claim. Only three months after taking over the rights of de

Queirod, on 7 April 1905 Reuter communicated the matter to the British Foreign

Office, which suggests that Reuter assumed he could only achieve a profitable

settlement with its help. On 23 December 1905, Baron George de Reuter wrote to

the British Foreign Office requesting Monsieur Guyon’s representation to the

Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs by Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Chargé

d’Affaires in Rio de Janeiro, to express his claim against the Brazilian government

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid.

95

with regards to the “Burgos Agricolas”. In his letter, Reuter provided Francis Hyde

Villiers, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with “evidence that

Monsieur Saxe de Queirod, on the 16th of January last, assigned his rights relating

to building twenty Burgos Agricolas to the Baron and Monsieur Guyon”.263

Lowther was authorized to apply to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs to

grant an interview to Monsieur Guyon; however, he was strictly instructed “to make

it clear that no opinion is expressed by His Majesty’s Government on the merits of

the claim itself, on which His Majesty’s Government have had no sufficient means

of forming an opinion”.264 Baron George de Reuter was informed about the decision

of the Foreign Office on 8 January 1906.265 On the 10th of January, Reuter

responded to the Foreign Office’s letter stating that he would inform the office of

the date of M. Guyon’s journey to Brazil,266 which he did so on 25 February 1906,

addressing himself to Sir Edward Grey.267 On receiving Reuter’s letter, Lowther

was notified about Guyon’s journey from Paris to Rio de Janerio on 9 March 1906,

with the express purpose of coming to an agreement with the Brazilian government

with regards to his claim in the matter of the “Burgos Agricolas”, and, moreover,

Reuter’s request for him to apply to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs to

grant an interview to Guyon.268 Also, Lowther was reminded to “make it clear that

no opinion is expressed by His Majesty’s Government on the merits of the claim

itself”.269

263 Francis Hyde Villiers to Lowther, 8 January 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June

1906, NA.

264 Villiers to Lowther, 8 March 1906.

265 Villiers to Reuter, 8 January 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

266 Reuter to Villiers, 10 January 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

267 Reuter to Grey, 25 February 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

268 Gorst to Lowther, 8 March 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

269 Gorst to Lowther, 8 March 1906, FO 371/12.

96

However, by 25 April 1906, it appears that the British Foreign Office began

to be suspicious of the nature of the matter. Sir Charles Harding, Permanent Under-

Secretary for Foreign Affairs wrote to Arthur Larcom, Senior Clerk on 25 April

1906 outlining that “Reuter and friends have bought the claims of a Brazilian which

he could not obtain…from his government, as a speculation, and I do not consider

that the mere fact of one of these speculators [Reuter] happening to be British,

should be a reason for his speculation being backed by HMG”.270

Based on Reuter’s account, Reuter was informed by Sir Charles Harding and

Mr. Larcom that his Majesty’s Minister would not be instructed until the Foreign

Office was convinced that an injustice had occurred and that Reuter had tried all

other means of redress. Therefore, in his letter dated 8 June 1906, Reuter tried to

prove to the British Foreign Office that he had been exposed to a miscarriage of

justice and that he had exhausted all means to remedy it. In order to do so, he

summarized the judicial process:

…on the 25th June 1898, the Supreme Court of the United States

of Brazil gave judgement to the following effect: It is indisputable

that the rights of the Plaintiff have been violated by the

Government who in thus acting are bound to indemnify him by

the payment of damages in consequence of the injury done him.

For these reasons the Judgment of the court below confirmed the

appellants [the Government] to pay the costs.

The amount of damages was thereupon fixed by arbitration, but

M. de Queirod, not being able to obtain satisfaction applied to the

Courts to enforce the award. In the Court of first Instance he

succeeded, but the Supreme Court reversed its own former

judgement and decided that nothing was due to M. de Queirod.271

To further his claim, Reuter added a note to the letter which he had

previously enclosed to one of his earlier letters in April 1905. The note was entitled,

“the Claim Against the Brazilian Government”, as mentioned earlier. It relayed the

270 Harding to Larcom, 25 April 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

271 Reuter to Grey, 8 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

97

history of the dispute, gave the details of the concession, and the names of the

Brazilian jurists who stood against the second judgement of the Supreme Court, as

discussed above. In the note Reuter mentioned the opinion of Señor Ruy Barbosa,

“one of the greatest Brazilian legists”. Based on Reuter’s account, Barbosa

expressed in a long speech in the Federal Senate that the Supreme Court had

enacted a miscarriage of justice.272

Then, in order to convince the Foreign Office that he had no other redress to

the situation, Reuter stated:

…I have no remedy at my disposal. I cannot go to the Courts with

a case in which the Supreme Court has already given judgement.

Consequently I am powerless, personally, to obtain redress.273

Furthermore, Reuter implied that the involvement of the British Foreign Office in

the matter was also the wish of the Brazilian Foreign Office. He claimed that Baron

de Rio Branco, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, desired a request from

the British Foreign Office for a solution:

On the other hand, however, I am given to understand, and have

been categorically so informed by persons of high position in

Brazil, that the Brazilian Government are desirous of settling the

matter once and for all, but they want ‘a golden bridge’ extended

to them. On 27th ultimo, my representative cabled me as follows:

‘Baron de Rio Branco est bienveillant, mais desire pour

solution une demande du Foreign Office’.”274

Finally, Reuter stated his request which was that “His Majesty’s Minister at Rio de

Janeiro be instructed to support my representative and to inform the Brazilian

Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Foreign Office would like to see the injury

redressed and the matter settled”.275

272 Reuter to Grey, 8 June 1906, FO 371/12.

273 Ibid.

274 Ibid.

275 Ibid.

98

Reuter’s letter also shows that he had sought the support of the French

Foreign Office before the British:

In conclusion I would say that I am given to understand, that the

British Minister is not convinced of the necessity for diplomatic

action, and I believe that this is due to the following circumstance.

When M. Guyon went to Brazil for me last year he took with him

a letter of introduction from M. Delcassé [then Minister for

Foreign Affairs] to M. Decrais, the French Minister in Brazil. On

one occasion M. Decrais called in the legal adviser to the French

legation to discuss the question with M. Guyon. Mr. Lowther was

present at this interview at which the lawyer stated that he was of

the opinion that we had a bad case. It was only subsequently

discovered that this gentleman had acted as arbitrator on behalf of

the Government in the second arbitration case.276

In the Foreign Office minutes regarding Reuter’s letter, Lowther’s and Harding’s

opinion about this case and their influence on the decision of the Foreign Office

were noted: “…we have been hitherto reluctant to press a case which both M.

Lowther and Sir Harding have pronounced to be speculative and very dubious”.277

Reuter received a response from Sir Eldon Gorst, Assistant Under-Secretary

for Foreign Affairs on behalf of Sir Edward Grey, who explained to Reuter that the

British Foreign Office could only give official support to a British subject and that

the decision taken on this matter by the Brazilian court concerned M. Saxe de

Queirod, a citizen of Brazil:

With reference to your contention that a miscarriage of justice has,

in this instance taken place, I am to point out that before this can

be made the ground of diplomatic intervention by H.M.

Representative it must be shown that the victim of such a

miscarriage was a British subject. In April 1905, however, when

you forwarded the memorandum setting forth the facts of the case

it was not brought to the knowledge of the Secretary of State that

it was only so recently as January 16th of that year that you had

become the owner of the larger portion of M. de Queirod’s claim.

The victim therefore of the decision of the Brazilian Courts...was

a Brazilian citizen.278

276 Ibid.

277 Minutes, 9 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

278 Gorst to Reuter, 18 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

99

As a result, Reuter would only be given unofficial support, “and in these circles

H.M. Minister at Rio cannot be authorized to do more than give you such unofficial

help as would be given to any British subject who had entered into an unfortunate

commercial speculation”.279

In Foreign Office inner correspondences, Reuter’s case was defined as a

speculation until a final decision was made and Reuter was informed by Gorst.

Clearly, Gorst wanted to underline the fact that the British Foreign Office did not

wish to be involved in such a matter and to make Reuter understand that any further

effort to convince the Foreign Office would be useless. Another significant point in

Gorst’s letter was his comments on “the Claim against the Brazilian Government”.

In the document, Reuter very carefully avoided the information regarding the date

when he took over the concession. When Reuter sent this memorandum to the

Foreign Office for the first time, in 1905, more than a year before Gorst’s letter, he

did not indicate when the majority of M. de Queirod’s rights were transferred to

him and it was only after the investigations of the Foreign Office that it was

discovered. By reminding him of the first time the memorandum was sent to the

Foreign Office, Gorst was implying to Reuter that he had hidden the true nature of

the matter from the Foreign Office on purpose. Gorst’s statements on “the Claim

against the Brazilian Government” made Reuter drop his claim to British

government official support.

Reuter responded the next day, acknowledging that he understood “why the

Foreign Office cannot issue instructions to His Majesty’s Minister at Rio to take

official action in the matter, as regards M. de Queirod’s assignment of his claim” to

him. Nevertheless, he demanded the unofficial support mentioned in Gorst’s letter

279 Gorst to Reuter, 18 June 1906, FO 371/12.

100

“trusting that my representative at Rio may still enjoy the advantage of Sir H.

Dering’s unofficial help”.280

However, Sir Henry Dering, Minister to Brazil did not want to have anything

to do with Reuter’s case. Dering first arranged to meet Baron Rio de Branco, the

Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and later presented M. Guyon to him as part

of the unofficial help promised by the British Foreign Office to Reuter. However,

Dering had been alerted about this concession and warned the British Foreign

Office before the meeting between Guyon and Branco took place. He informed the

Foreign Office about his discussions with the French Minister and expressed his

concerns to Gorst in a private letter:

Baron Reuter and others have evidently taken up this claim as a

speculation; in the original concession, [a] Brazilian citizen of the

name of Queirod having failed in this attempt to extract

compensation for a very doubtful claim from the Brazilian

Government, has asked about this claim to any firm who would

take it up British firms in Rio…and now Baron Reuter seems to

wish to put pressure on foreign governments back up his

speculation. The French Government has absolutely declined to

back M. Guyon in any way…281

In his letter Dering also stated that he had made an appointment with the Minister

for Foreign Affairs but M. Guyon had asked him to postpone it for a week or ten

days, but then he did not hear back from him. Dering suspected the reason for this

postponement was M. Guyon’s desire to find something which would put pressure

on the British government, to force them to be on his side against the Brazilian

government:

I asked and obtained permission from Baron de Rio Branco to

present M. Guyon to him, and informed that gentlemen of the fact.

I warned him at the same time that my part of the business ended

there and that I knew the Minister for Foreign affairs would at

280 Reuter to Gorst, 19 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

281 Dering to Gorst, 28 May1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

101

once refer him to the judicial authorities of the country, stating he,

as Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not concerned in the matter,

the Supreme Tribunal having decided against the claim.

I cannot but think that M. Guyon’s silence since he last saw

me means that he is endeavouring to bring further pressure to bear

on H.M. Government to take a more active part in pushing this

very doubtful claim…282

Finally, on 27 May 1906, Monsieur Guyon, who had already addressed

himself in writing to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was presented to

him in person.283 Guyon asked Branco “to bring his influence to bear upon the

judges of the Supreme Court to reconsider the verdict which had already been

delivered against his claim”.284 Dering summarized the meeting of Guyon and

Branco as follows:

Monsieur Guyon recapitulated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

the arguments in his favour…and Baron do Rio Branco said in

reply, firstly that the matter did not concern his Department, but

those of Finance and Public Works, before whom all the

documents had been laid; that he had neither the power nor the

intention of attempting to influence judicial decisions arrived at by

Judges of this country; and that he finally declined to enter into

the merits or demerits of the case, unless officially applied to by

his own Minister or the Representative of Great Britain.285

Branco further underlined that he had no intention in interfering with a judicial

matter:

That gentleman then remarked to Baron do Rio Branco that both

the German and Italian capitalists had recently been paid

compensation in an exactly similar case. ‘That was perfectly

correct,’ rejoined Baron de Branco, ‘but in neither case through

my intervention. Both these parties proved their claim before the

judicial authorities of this country and received the amount

awarded to them such was the only and proper course to be

pursued.’286

282 Dering to Gorst, 28 May 1906, FO 371/12.

283 Ibid.

284 Ibid.

285 Ibid.

286 Ibid.

102

Following this despatch, Dering sent another one the very next day, on 29 May

1906; this time he laid down his opinion on what should be done next with regards

to the concession. His letter indicates that on this matter there was strong

cooperation between the French and British Legations in Brazil. Dering

summarized the French Legation’s experience of the case:

Monsieur Decrais, after a careful examination of the statements

submitted to him, came to the conclusion that no French interests

were really engaged in the case, which had all the appearance of a

speculative cession of the claims of a Brazilian Concessionaire to

third parties for a consideration.

He further reported to the French Government that it had

come to his knowledge that the original Brazilian

Concessionaries, evidently doubtful of the validity of their claim

for compensation, had hawked it about in the market and amongst

others, offered it to an English firm who, considering it was not of

a character to reflect any credit on them, declined to have

anything to do with it, and it has now been taken up by M. Reuter,

whose agent Monsieur Guyon is.287

Dering then stated that Decrais’ decision “to have nothing to do with so doubtful a

claim, and declining to receive Monsieur Guyon anymore was approved by the

French Government” and added that Monsieur Decrais allowed him to read his

report to the French Government “recording his opinion as to the inadvisability of

their supporting a case of this doubtful nature”. Dering, on stating that he agreed

with this report, was advised to follow the same path as the French Legation:

Under the above circumstances, I venture to ask your authority to

take up the same line as has been laid down by the French

Government for the conduct of their Representative and to inform

Monsieur Guyon that His Majesty’s Government does not

consider that his claim is one which they could authorize His

Majesty’s Legation to support. The effect of this would be to

place the parties interested in the same position, as pointed out to

Monsieur Guyon by Baron de Rio Branco, as ordinary claimants

to whom all judicial resources in this country were open, and who

must act through their legal advisers.288

287 Dering to Gorst, 29 May 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

288 Dering to Gorst, 28 May 1906, FO 371/12.

103

After this second despatch of Dering, Hurst wrote in the minutes of the

Foreign Office:

From Sir H. Dering’s despatch no: 30 it appears that he has

presented M. Guyon to the Brazilian Minister for F.A., but that the

latter took his stand on the fact that the claimants had not been

successful in proving their claim before the courts and would do

nothing for them.

From this later desp. [no: 31] it would appear that Baron de

Rio Branco is quite justified in taking up this attitude and that the

claim is bad. It therefore seems necessary to inform Baron de

Reuter that further reports from H.M. Minister have convinced the

Secretary of State that the case is not one which calls for any

further interaction on the part of H.M. Minister Representative.

This will no doubt bring Baron de Reuter to this office with

protests, and demands for explanations, which it will be

impossible to gratify; but it is presumed this must be faced as Sir

H. Dering cannot continue to give even his unofficial assistance in

this matter.

At the same time we might communicate briefly to Baron de

Reuter the fact that M. Guyon was presented and the result of the

interview with the Minister for F.A.289

In July 1906, Dering was informed by Sir Eric Barrington, Assistant Under-

Secretary for Foreign Affairs that his concerns on the matter reported in his

despatch had been evaluated and it had been decided that “the case is one to which

the Government cannot give their support and no further assistance in therefore

called for by our Legation in the matter”.290

The final official response to Reuter does not exist in the archive but we

have a drafted copy from 2 July 1906. From the draft it seems that the British

Foreign Office was preparing a letter which explained in length M. Guyon’s visit to

Branco, based on Dering’s report on their meeting. The draft also has Sir Edward

Grey’s note, suggesting the addition of the following sentence to the letter: “after

full consideration of all the [facts] of the case, Sir E. Grey is of the opinion that the

289 Minutes by Hurst, 23 June 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

290 Barrington to Dering, draft letter, 2 July 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906,

NA.

104

case is not one which calls for any further intervention on the part of H.M.

Representative at Rio”.291 Therefore, the existing documents suggest that the British

Foreign Office decided not to provide Reuter with either official or unofficial

support in this case, and any other correspondence between Reuter and the Foreign

Office on this matter does not exist. Baron George de Reuter’s attempt to interfere

with the judicial processes and court decisions of a foreign country, by means of the

British Foreign Office, had failed as Baron de Rio Branco, the Brazilian Minister of

Foreign Affairs, denied his support in influencing judicial authorities, and the

British Foreign Office remained reluctant to push the Brazilian government to pay

any compensation to Reuter. However, in the case of the Rexer Arms Company

Limited dispute, as we shall now see, the British Foreign Office supported the

company without even feeling the need to examine the original agreement text.

The manufacturing and selling of arms was another business area for Baron

George de Reuter; he was the Chairman of the Rexer Arms Company Limited.

According to Reuter, the purpose of the company, which was registered in March

1905, was “to acquire patents for an automatic machine gun, and to manufacture

and sell these guns”.292 The company bought the patents “from Mr. H. de Morgan

Snell who purchased them [subject to the payment of Royalties] from the Dansk

Rekylriffel Syndikat”.293 Reuter maintained that by acquiring the patents, the Rexer

Arms Company was entitled to the following:

(1) the English Company has exclusive rights as against the

Danish throughout the whole of the British Empire, (2) the Danish

Company has such rights as can be acquired by patents in some

European countries and the United States, (3) a large part of the

world is open to both the English and Danish Companies, and

ordinary commercial competition may take place in all such

291 Draft letter to Reuter, 2 July 1906, 2 July 1906, FO 371/12, file no: 652, no: 19740, 9 June 1906.

292 Reuter, “The Rexer Arms Co., Ltd.,” FO 371/35, file no. 18870, no: 18871, 1 June 1906.

293 Reuter, “Rexer Arms,” FO 371/35.

105

places. In China, for instance, there are no patent rights, and the

English Company and the Danes have equal rights in regard to

trading in that country, subject, however, to the proviso that if the

English Company manufacture in England they have to pay

Royalties to the Danish Company on all guns sold.294

Because Reuter did not submit the actual patent agreement, its terms were

unknown, leaving the Foreign Office to rely on Reuter’s interpretation. In 1906, the

Rexer Arms Company experienced a problem with the Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat

with regards to selling arms in China. Reuter summarized the reason for the conflict

and requested the help of the British Foreign Office:

The Russian Minister in conformity with instructions from the

Danish Foreign Office has informed the Board of Foreign Affairs

[the Wai Wu Pu] that I am not entitled to sell Rexer guns in

China. I have appealed and have received instructions from the

British Minister who advises me to appeal to the Foreign Office to

cable him to inform the Board of Foreign Affairs that I am entitled

to sell the Company’s guns and to appoint agents in China. I

cannot do anything without this…

Guns similar to those made by this Company are also made

in the Danish Arsenal and sold by a Danish Company called the

Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat, who, however, own no rights under

which they can interfere with this Company carrying on its

business in China.295

In the later part of his letter, Reuter asked the British Foreign Office to

instruct the British Minister in Pekin “to protest against the action of the Russian

Minister in prejudicing this Company’s rights” and to inform the Chinese Board of

Foreign Affairs that his company and its agent, Colonel O’Sullivan, R.E., had the

right to sell the company’s guns and appoint agents in China.296

According to Reuter the core of the problem was that:

…the guns sold by the Danish Company are manufactured in the

Royal Danish Arsenal and the Danish Company have taken

advantage of this fact to obtain diplomatic interference by the

Danish Foreign Office, with the result that the Russian Minister at

294 Ibid.

295 Reuter to Grey, FO 371/35, file no: 18870, no: 18870, 1 June 1906.

296 Reuter to Grey, 1 June 1906, FO 371/35.

106

Pekin has informed the Wai-wu-pu that the Danish Company have

rights in that country which supersede the established rights of

British subjects to carry on their business in the Chinese Empire,

greatly to the prejudice of the Rexer Arms Company.297

Without any further investigations, which it had carried out concerning the rest of

the Reuter family’s complaints regarding their foreign investments, the British

Foreign Office instantly acted in this matter because of a British and Russian

conflict of interest over China. Rivalry between the two empires for power in the

Far East had worked well for the Rexer Arms Company and its chairman, Baron

George de Reuter. The following day Reuter was informed “that a telegram has

been despatched to Mr. Carnegie giving him the substance of the information

contained in your communication; and instructing him to inform the Chinese

Government that they should pay no attention to an attempt to injure the Company

by trade rivals whose proper remedy if they have any cause of action lies in the

appropriate courts of law”.298

As instructed, Lancelot D. Carnegie wrote to His Highness Prince Ch’ing on

2 June 1906 and asked the Chinese Government to “disregard the attempt which has

been made to injure the Company’s business, as the Danish Company, if they have

any ground for complaint, can always seek a remedy in the proper manner by suing

the British Company in the Courts”.299 The response given to Carnegie by the Wai

Wu Pu sheds light on the course of events:

H.E. the Russian Minister represented some time ago to the Board

that this quick-firing gun was a Danish patent, and that the Rexer

Arms Company subsequently became empowered under a formal

agreement to sell these guns in Great Britain and British Colonies,

but this agreement arrived at between the Danish manufacturers

and the Company conferred upon the former no authority to sell in

China. M. Pokotiloff represented that the British Co. was not

297 Reuter, “Rexer Arms,” FO 371/35.

298 Barrington to Reuter, 2 June 1906, FO 371/35, file no: 18870, no:18870, 1 June 1906.

299 Carnegie to the Wai Wu Pu, 2 June 1906, FO 371/35, file no: 18870, no: 25899, 30 July 1906.

107

observing the conditions of the agreement in sending these guns to

China and in offering them for trial and sale to the High

Commissioner for Northern Ports, through their agent Colonel

O’Sullivan. He therefore requested us to notify all the Provincial

Authorities in this sense, in order to stop this improper attempt of

the British C. to sell the guns in China.300

The Board then communicated with Yuan Shih-k’ai, a government official, who

was of the opinion that China had the right to buy goods from any country she

wished and if the Danish company had a complaint, it needed to bring an action

against the British company in the British courts. Carnegie was also informed that a

response along these lines had been addressed to the Russian Minister.301

On 28 August 1906, the British Foreign Office received a letter from the

solicitors of Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat claiming that the Rexer Arms Company

was not entitled to sell arms except in the territory of the British Empire and that the

British Foreign Office was mistaken in this matter:

…His Majesty’s British Legation in Pekin has been informed by

the Foreign Office in London that an English Company, the Rexer

Arms Company Limited, has the right to sell the Rexer Gun and

its Accessories in China, and that this intimation has been

conveyed to [the] Wai Wu Pu in Pekin. If this is the case we think

such information must have been given under a misapprehension

inasmuch as the Rexer Arms Company Limited is only entitled to

the patents for Great Britain its Colonies and India, the patent

rights for the rest of the World being the property of our clients.

We should, therefore, be obliged if you would ensure that such

steps should be taken as may be necessary to contradict the

statements already made, which we may add are inflicting serious

loss and inconvenience to our clients.302

It was decided by the Foreign Office to repeat the answer given to the Russian

Minister at Peking by the Chinese Government:

…if the contention of your clients the Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat

and Captain Schouboe of Copenhagen is correct viz: that the

300 Wai Wu Pu to Carnegie, FO 371/35, file no. 18870, no: 25899, 30 July 1906.

301 Wai Wu Pu to Carnegie, FO 371/35.

302 Stephenson, Harwood and Company to Sir Edward Grey, 27 August 1906, FO 371/35

file no: 18870, no: 29311, 28 August 1906.

108

Rexer Arms Company Limited are only entitled to the patents of

the Rexer Gun etc, for Great Britain its colonies and India and that

the patent rights for the rest of the world are the property of your

clients, the proper course for the latter would be to bring an action

against the Rexer Arms Company in the British Courts in China

for the protection of their interests.303

The solicitors responded that they were aware of their client’s rights to “apply to the

proper Courts in China for the protection of their interests if necessary” and

explained that the reason they had addressed a letter to the Foreign Office was that

their client:

…had been informed that His Majesty’s Legation in Pekin had

received an intimation from the Foreign Office in London that the

Rexer Arms Company Limited had the right to sell the Rexer Gun

and it accessories in China, and had conveyed this intimation to

the Wai Wu Pu in Pekin. It is obvious that such an intimation, if

given, would have been in effect to pre-judge the question not yet

brought before the Court in China, much less decided by them, as

to who had, or had not, the right to sell the Rexer Gun and its

accessories in China, and we can, therefore, hardly believe that the

Foreign Office in London has taken this step. We observe,

however, that in your letter of the 3rd September you do not state

that our information is incorrect, and we shall, therefore, be glad if

you will kindly let us know this is the case. Should, however, our

information be correct, we must ask you in fairness to our clients,

to notify the Wai Wu Pu through the same channel that the

question of the Rexer Arms Company’s right to sell the gun in

China has not yet been decided before any competent Court

there.304

In its response, the Foreign Office backed the Rexer Arms Company by denying

Stephenson, Harwood and Company’s demands:

Sir E. Grey gathers from your letter that you are an English firm

of Solicitors representing in this country a private Danish

Company and he regrets that in the circumstances he is unable to

discuss with you the action taken by His Majesty’s Representative

at Peking in the matter. If your clients have any complaint to make

against the action of His Majesty’s Government or their accredited

303 Foreign Office to Stephenson, Harwood and Company, FO 371/35 f. 18870, no: 29311,

August 28, 1906.

304 Stephenson, Harwood and Company, 28 November 1906, FO 371/35, file no: 40028,

file: 18870, 28 November 1906.

109

Representative in China it should be made through the proper

international channel, viz: the Danish Government.305

Around the same time as Baron George de Reuter established the Rexer Arms

Company, he also set up the Korean Waterworks Limited, becoming its Chairmsan,

and took over the Seoul Waterworks Concession. Although in completely different

fields, the Baron’s investments in foreign countries were compatible with British

strategic interests.

Baron George de Reuter established the Korean Waterworks Limited “to

acquire a concession [dated 9 December 1903] granted by the Imperial Korean

Government to Messrs. Collbran & Bostwick, empowering them to establish a

water supply for the City of Seoul”.306 The transfer of the concession from Messrs.

Collbran and Bostwick to the Korean Waterworks Limited took place on 6 August

1906. Construction began during the latter part of 1906 and was completed on 1

August 1908. Reuter’s complaint was that: “since that date the Company has been

in a position to supply water to the inhabitants; but, unfortunately, their operations

have been, up to the present, seriously curtailed by the fact that the old system of

supplying water from the native wells has been allowed to remain in force”.307 He

further claimed that the very reason the concession had been granted in the first

place was to end this impure water supply system and, under the terms of the

concession, the company was entitled to complete control of the water supply of

Seoul. Reuter requested the British Foreign Office to instruct the Acting British

305 Campbell to Stephenson, Harwood and Company, 10 December 1906, FO 371/35, file

no: 40028, file: 18870, 28 November 1906.

306 Baron George de Reuter to Beilby F. Alston, 15 February 1909, FO 371/645, file no: 4557, file:

4557, 1 February 1909.

307 Reuter to Alston, 15 February 1909, FO 371/645.

110

Consul-General to make representations for the forcible suppression of competition

with the Korean Waterworks Company Limited.308

After investigating the matter, the Foreign Office reached the following

conclusion: “it appears to Sir E. Grey open to doubt whether the Korean

Government had in view the closing of the wells already existing in Seoul when

they granted the concession; it is more probable that the intention was merely to

promise not to allow a competing water Company to come into the field”. Reuter

was given a detailed explanation of the office’s decision:

It is not possible always to enforce technical rights granted by a

Government constituted such as that of Korea was in 1903

without consultation with the chief parties whose interests are

likely to be affected by the establishment of a new regime. It is

understood that there are a good many wells in Seoul within the

grounds of private residences, but that the general population buys

its water from carriers who bring it from public wells. This water,

though no doubt not up to European standards of purity, is

probably no worse than the water used in most Oriental cities.

Though there may not be any difficulty in persuading the people

to drink the Company’s water, which comes from the river, there

would certainly be some dissatisfaction if they found that they

have to pay more for it than they had been accustomed to pay for

a quality of water with which they were quite contented.309

The foreign office also told Reuter the possible outcomes of forced

suppression of competition with the Korean Waterworks Company

Limited, and suggested a policy to solve its problems with the water supply

market:

Again, difficulty is likely to arise with the water carriers, who

form a strongly organised guild. They appear to be a turbulent

class, and all come from the same part of the country, a fact which

adds to their power of combination; and it seems not improbable

that a sudden prohibition of their use of the wells would lead to a

riot and to damage being done to the Company’s reservoir and

other property. In any case it seems open to great doubt whether it

308 Ibid.

309 F.A. Campbell to Baron George de Reuter, 11 February 1909, FO 371/645, file no: 4557, file:

4557, 1 February 1909.

111

would be justifiable to put an end to their competition by force, or,

indeed, that a precedent for such a demand could be found in

similar cases in other parts of the world, such as China or India.

The natural course seems to be to bring them to terms by

distributing the Company’s water at less than they charge, and so

gradually induce them to take service with the Company as

carriers of water from the hydrants.310

Despite Reuter presenting the case as if the concession covered all parts of Seoul,

the British government found out that the area agreed on was only the Japanese

municipality. The Foreign Office underlined this fact to demonstrate that Reuter’s

desire to become sole water supplier in Seoul was an impossibility:

…that body is only concerned with the municipal affairs of that

part of the city in which the Japanese chiefly reside, and has

nothing to do with the greater part of the town. The agreement

with them to which you refer only relates to the water supply in

the Japanese quarter and was no doubt intended to prevent friction

arising in connection with the location of hydrants, the repair of

pipes and roads, the assessment of houses for a water rate, the

collection of it, and the like. It is doubtful whether the Japanese

municipal authorities are in a way bound to procure the

discontinuance of the use of wells, even within the Japanese

quarter, but even if they did so the main part of the problem viz:

the supply of water to the reminder of the town, would remain

untouched.311

Certainly, it was not the response Reuter was expecting. As in the case of the

concession to build twenty agricultural villages in Brazil, Reuter had hidden facts

from the British Foreign Office to manipulate it into putting pressure on a foreign

government.

Examining the investment schemes of the Reuter family demonstrates that

they were not restricted to a branch or field of work but, rather, their perceived

profitability was the decisive factor. Both the Reuter Concession in Persia and the

Greek Railway Concession demonstrate how news can become a precious

310 Campbell to Reuter, 11 February 1909, FO 371/645.

311 Campbell to Reuter, 11 Feb 1909, FO 371/645.

112

commodity in the hands of news agency owners, enabling them to stand by the

great powers and take part in forming and implementing policies. Members of the

Reuter family inserted themselves as formidable figures into the great power

politics of the late nineteenth century, and impacted policy making both

domestically and internationally. The rising influence of the family exhibited “the

growing wealth and power of service capitalism after 1850”.312 While the Reuter

Concession caused public unrest in Persia and endangered the Shah’s crown shortly

after it was granted, it had also been a source of tension between the Russian and

British empires for years, until the signing of the Bank Concession in 1889. In the

case of the Greek Railway Concession, which was granted to the Eastern Railway

Syndicate Limited, a company of Baron Herbert de Reuter, Frédéric-Émile

Erlanger, Havas’ owner, and Jules Gouin, Baron George de Reuter attempted to

direct British policy with regards to the Ottoman Empire. He tried to convince the

British government to force the Sublime Porte to accept the Piraeus–Larissa railway

line’s junction with the Ottoman railway system. Then, when Crete’s declaration of

independence became an obstacle, he created a policy, sought approval from the

British government, and pursued the role of mediator. He even conspired against

Greece and the Ottoman Empire at the same time by suggesting to the British

Foreign Office the leasing of Suda Bay, a strategically important harbor in Crete, to

Britain to convince the government to work for the unification of Crete with

Greece. Furthermore, during the times he had disagreements with the Greek

government, he requested the British Empire’s support against it.

The two concessions described herein offer an insight into great-power

politics prior to the First World War, and demonstrate the role powerful investors,

312 P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2015 (London: Routledge, 2016), 55.

113

like the Reuter family, played as actors alongside conventional nation-states. This

dissertation contributes to previous studies on British imperialism by exploring the

rising power of investors after 1850, and their influence on policy making before

the First World War. Moreover, the incidents that took place around the Reuter

Concession, the Greek Railway Concession, the agricultural village formation

concession, the Rexer Arms Company dispute, and the Seoul Waterworks

Concession exemplify the strong connections a news agency owner and his family

members in business had with their imperial governments, exposing their

dependency on their home governments while pursuing their business interests in

foreign states.

114

CHAPTER IV

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Contemporary challenges in world politics, technology, economy, and

society made suppliers of news significant for the Ottoman Empire. To preserve the

empire, policies that promoted centralization was pursued for centuries. Improving

transportation and communication systems was part of this centralization policy.

However, because these technologies arrived to the empire several years after its

European counterparts founded, established and extended these systems, the

Ottoman Empire became depended on foreign news agencies in supplying news.

Finding their news biased and in favor of their home governments, the Ottomans

first tried to win them over by means of allowances and privileges without much of

a success.

115

4.1. Decentralization and an Overview of Centralization Policy in

the Ottoman Empire

The three major developments that took place during the sixteenth century

had a great impact on the Ottoman Empire. In the sixteen century the Ottoman

Empire reached its limits of expansion. With the Western overseas discoveries and

expansions, new trade routes began to be used by the Europeans, causing drastic

decline in the empire’s income from foreign trade. Furthermore, flow of excessive

silver to the Ottoman Empire from America caused devaluation and inflation which

distressed large sections of the population. While excessive silver decreased the

value of silver akçe and asper, the empire’s currency, the value of gold raised. This

enabled the European traders to export raw materials in larger quantities which led

to decline of local industries in the Ottoman Empire, incline of European imports,

and loss of state revenues.313

The third decisive development was the collapse of the old Ottoman agrarian

system.314 The provincial governors had undermined central authority from the

sixteenth century onwards by building their own armed forces comprised of sekbansarica

(Anatolian mercenaries) and levend (vagrant reaya) troops, and taxing the

reaya (lower class) illegally.315 Reluctant to drastically change the traditional

governing system, the sultans pursued some policies to undermine the provincial

governments, which eventually caused the rise of the ayan (local notables) in the

provinces. To control the power of governors, the sultans increased the influence of

313 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968),

21-29.

314 Ibid., 30.

315 Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration,” in Studies in

Eighteenth Century Islamic History, ed. Thomas Naff (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University

Press, 1977), 27.

116

kadis and defterdars, the other two administrators in the provinces. However, kadis

often sought help from the ayan against the provincial governors, causing them to

be more influential. Another policy was empowering muhassils (tax collectors) by

assigning khass as mukataas. The duty to collect these new revenues was given to

muhassils, undermining the power of provincial governors. However, the ayan

gradually started to become muhassils, using the post as a stepping stone for

governorship. The length of time a governor could remain in a province was

regulated and reduced to one or two years, whereas the local ayan continued to

remain in the same place, maintaining their influence. Furthermore, in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many sancaks (districts) in Anatolia were

assigned as arpalık (large estates) to high officials in Istanbul, or to commanders of

frontier fortresses. They appointed mütesellims (authorized agents) from among

local ayan to administer these lands on their behalf. From the seventeenth century

onwards, all these changes caused the rise of local ayan, suppressing the power of

governors.316 In the eighteenth century, the post became hereditary among certain

families in several regions of the empire. The objective of the ayan-mütessellims in

pursuing the post was:

…to hold permanently in their hands the mukataas or the sources

of revenue which the state had farmed out by iltizam and to

consolidate their control and usufruct on these resources located in

their districts. The realization of these objectives was facilitated

by the conversion of mukataas into malikanes, that is, life-time

leases on the revenue sources of the tax farm. The fundamental

issue underlying the political strife among the provincial ayan was

invariably the matter of collecting, in the name of the state, the

revenues of mukataas and such other taxes as cizye (poll tax) and

avariz (emergency tax).317

316 Ibid., 27–32.

317 Ibid., 33.

117

In the eighteenth century, and with a couple of exceptional cases in the previous

century, ayan who were members of the reaya were appointed to the post of paşas

(higher-ranking official.318 While imperial elites of the center lost their power in

provincial governance, individuals and families in provinces throughout the

Ottoman Empire, consolidated power, gained wealth and formed reginal zones of

influence.319

Finally, under the rule of Selim III and with the efforts of the grand vizir

Koca Yusef Paşa, by a firman (royal decree) issued in April 1786, ayanship was

abolished and it was declared that anyone seeking ayanship would be prosecuted.

All the duties of the ayan were assigned to the şehir-kethudası (city administrator).

In this way, the empire tried to restore central authority in the provinces as the

powerful ayan families were replaced by kethudas with humble origins and little

power.320

Mahmud II, who had ascended the throne with the help of an ayan, Alemdar

Mustafa Paşa, was forced to sign an agreement with the ayan in October 1808

through the initiative of Mustafa Paşa, whom the sultan appointed as sadrazam

(prime minister). With this agreement, the ayan declared their loyalty to the

imperial center and their ultimate suppression was postponed. After the sadrazam

was killed in an uprising on 16 November 1808, Mahmud II started to subdue the

ayan. Hastening the process, especially after 1812, the sultan managed to undermine

their power in most of Anatolia and the European territories of the empire.321

318 Ibid., 40.

319 Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of

Revolutions (Stanford: Stanford Universtiy Press, 2016), 67.

320 Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization.” 50–51.

321 Nesimi Yazıcı, “Posta Nezaretinin Kuruluşu,” in Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı!: Osmanlı

Devleti’nde Modern Haberleşme ve Ulaştırma Teknikleri, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (İstanbul: İslam

Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 1995), 28.

118

By the mid-nineteenth century, the empire was still trying to regain control

of its lands. During the Tanzimat (Auspicious Reorganization), the Land Law of

1858 (Arazi Kanunnamesi) was issued with the purpose of consolidating state

authority over imperial lands, which had changed hands illegally over the centuries.

While the law changed the categorization of land ownership into private property

(mülk), state property (miri), foundation lands (vakıf), communal or public land

(metruk) and idle or barren land (mevat), all previous taxes on land were replaced

by a ten percent tithe cultivation tax. A new Cadastral Regulation was formed to

enforce the land law, requiring individuals and institutions to prove their ownership

through legal documents before they could obtain a new ownership deed (tapu

senedi). Though the state tried to regain its control over its lands through this new

law and regulation, it paved the way to the expansion of private ownership as, once

ownership was proved, it was easier than it had been to rent lands to others and

leave them to heirs.322

Disrupted briefly in 1807 with Selim III’s removal from the throne, the

reforms to restore central authority were relaunched under the rule of Mahmud II,

especially after the destruction of the janissary corps in 1826 in the ‘Auspicious

Incident’, as part of central authority’s restoration efforts. One such development

was founding an official newspaper. In the nineteenth century the rulers started to

nurture a growing awareness of publicity. In 1831, Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of

Events) began to be published with Sultan Mahmud II’s order to back up reforms,

expressing the empire’s desire to reach out to its subjects, as “for the first time a

322 Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire, 243. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the

Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 114-5.

119

government newspaper supported the effort with appropriate propaganda”.323 From

then onwards, the press flourished, especially during the Tanzimat period (1839–

1876):

In 1866, there were at least 43 papers published in Istanbul in

various languages, of which four were in French, one in German,

one in Italian and one in English. In the provinces, journals were

published in both Ottoman Turkish and the local languages. During

this period, certain newspapers became privately owned and

featured more criticism of ideological positions and of practiced

governance. By the time Abdülhamit II assumed power in 1876, the

number of newspapers published only in Istanbul had reached 47:

13 were in Turkish, one in Arabic, nine in Greek, three in

Bulgarian, nine in Armenian, two in Hebrew, two in French and

English, and one in German.324

Starting with the declaration of the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane on 3 November

1839, modifying the reforms of Mahmud II, the Tanzimat created a centralized

government with bureaucrats, memurs. Their ranks, titles and salaries were strictly

defined in “Tanzimat Bureaucracy.”325 Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II, believing

that change within the state was only possible through secular education, tried to

establish a secular school system. For this purpose and to satisfy the needs of the

state, Rüşdiye (adolescence) schools were established by Mahmud II, providing an

education for students who wished to go on to the military technical schools after

graduating from mekteps, elementary schools. He also established some higher

technical academies while resurrecting and expanding others. However, the number

of schools and students was limited. The lack of funding, buildings and teachers

323 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2008), 63.

324 Stefano Taglia, “The Intellectual’s Dilemma: The Writings of Ahmet Riza and Mehmet

Sabahettin on Reform and the Future of the Ottoman Empire” (PhD diss., London: SOAS University

of London, 2012), 69.

325 Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, “Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtı.” In Genel Türk Tarihi

Cilt 7. Edited by Hasan Celâl Güzel and Ali Birinci (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 493.

120

slowed down the process until after the Crimean War. Only then, was the expansion

of secular military and civilian school systems accelerated.326

Ministry of Public Education (Maarif-i Umûmiye Nezareti) was founded in

1857, and in 1869, the Regulation for Public Education (Maarif-i Umumiye

Nizamnamesi) was issued, systemizing public education.327 With the regulation,

elementary education became compulsory for all children. Also, villages with at

least 500 houses were to have a minimum of one Rüştiye, while towns and cities

were required to have one for every 500 households, and one Idadi school (high

school) for every 1000 households.328 Developments in education and a rise in the

literacy rate contributed to the power of the newspapers.

In terms of communications, a new postal system was introduced in 1823

with a route between Istanbul and Izmir. By 1856, there were routes to other major

cities in the empire as well. Only the roads used for the postage service were in a

reasonable condition.329 On 23 September 1840, the Ministry of Postage was

founded along the lines of European postage services.330 It took years for the

Ottoman Empire to have its first telegraph line, and it was for military purposes.

The first telegraph line, which arrived around the same time as the steam railway

engine, was laid by Great Britain, who joined the Crimean War with France on the

side of the Ottoman Empire. It was a submarine telegraph line between Varna and

Crimea, the longest submarine line of its time, 340 miles in length, and started

operating in 1855. The empire’s first railway line began running in 1856 between

Cairo and Alexandria, followed by the Izmir–Aydin line the same year, when the

326 Shaw and Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, 47-106.

327 Selçuk Akşin Somel, Osmanlı’da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi (1839-1908): İslâmlaşma, Otokrasi ve

Disiplin (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 27.

328 Shaw and Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, 108.

108.

329 Ibid., 119–20.

330 Yazıcı, “Posta Nezaretinin Kuruluşu,” 42.

121

world’s first railway line, in England, was thirty-one years old.331 The arrival of the

telegraph system in the empire, as well as other contemporary communication

methods, was due to the desire of Ottoman statesmen to empower the imperial

center and ensure the preservation of the empire.

4.2. History of Telegraphy in the Ottoman Empire

The first attempt to introduce the electric telegraph to the empire was in

1839. Mellen Chamberlain, Samuel F.B. Morse’s agent, arrived in Istanbul to give a

demonstration at the Sublime Porte. However, it could not take place because of

Chamberlain’s accidental death. The next attempt was in 1847;332 John Lawrence

Smith accomplished a successful demonstration to Sultan Abdülmecid. The setting

and the sultan’s opinion on the innovation was as follows:

Smith set up a short line between the main entrance and a

reception room of the Beglerbey, the sultan’s favorite summer

palace on the Bosporus, and made a grand show of demonstrating

the telegraphy to the sultan. The sultan was so impressed that he

had the demonstration repeated with full ceremony before the

officials of his government the next day. Delighted by the

invention, he awarded Morse a diamond-studded decoration and a

berȃt, an official acknowledgement and recognition of

excellence.333

It took almost another decade before a telegraph line was constructed in the

empire. The alliance between France, Britain and the Ottoman Empire against

Russia, in the Crimean War, required a fast flow of information from the Crimea to

331 Roderic Davison, “The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire,” in Essays in

Ottoman and Turkish History 1774-1923: The Impact of the West (Austin: University of Texas Press,

1990), 133–35.

332 Yakup Bektas, “The Sultan’s Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-

1880,” Technology and Culture, vol. 41(2000): 669–71.

333 Ibid., 671.

122

the state capitals and between their capitals. At the start of the war, a message from

the Crimea to London took at least five days: “two days from the Crimea to Varna

by steamer, and three further days on horseback from there to Bucharest, the nearest

point that had been connected to the European telegraph network through the

Austrian lines”.334

As mentioned earlier, it was Britain who laid the first telegraph lines in the

Ottoman Empire in 1854, connecting Balaclava in the Crimea with Varna. Shortly

afterwards, the British laid another line connecting Varna with Istanbul. Then, in

the spring of 1855, the French built a line connecting Varna with Bucharest. At the

time of construction, the Ottoman Empire could only contribute by providing poles

and labor, and ensuring the security of the lines. The engineers were French and

British, and the wire, the insulators and the Morse instruments were imports.335 In

1854, the Ottoman government formed a commission to evaluate offers for building

telegraph lines in Ottoman territory.336 The proposals of Monsieur De la Rue and

Monsieur Blaque to build the Istanbul–Edirne–Şumnu line and the Edirne–Filibe–

Sofya and Niş line were chosen. The contract required the French technicians to

train Ottoman subjects regarding telegraph jobs. On 14 September 1855, the first

telegram was sent from Istanbul to Paris and London, addressing the Ottoman

ambassadors. For the first time, Istanbul was connected to European capital cities

through the telegraph.337

Mustafa Efendi and Vuliç Efendi were the first to receive training in

telegraphy by French specialists, followed by several others. Both were civil

servants in the Translation Bureau. Within a few years, Turkish operators and

334 Davison, “Electric Telegraph,” 135.

335 Ibid., 135.

336 Kaçar, “Telgraf İşletmesi,” 49.

337 Davison, “Electric Telegraph,” 136.

123

directors were appointed to the telegraph stations. Because most of the telegraph

staff were required to speak French, the majority of them were recruited from the

Translation Bureau.338 In 1856, Mustafa Efendi and Vuliç Efendi, based at the

Edirne office, formulated an Ottoman-Turkish version of Morse code, and sent the

first Turkish telegram from Edirne to Istanbul on the 3rd of May. Thereafter, the

usage of Turkish spread throughout the Ottoman telegraph system.339

The General Directorate of Telegraphs was established in 1855, and

Billurîzade Mehmed Efendi was appointed on 29 March 1855 as its first director.340

He was followed respectively by Davud Efendi, Franko Efendi, Arif Efendi, Kamil

Bey, Diran Efendi, Aleko Efendi, Agop Efendi, Diran Efendi (second time), Agaton

Efendi and Feyzi Bey.341 After functioning under the beylikçi (head) of the imperial

divan (intelligence agency) for over a decade, in 1871, the directorate was

transformed into a ministry and unified with the postal services, during Feyzi Bey’s

administration.342

Technical education on telegraphy began to be taught formally in 1861, with

the foundation of the Fünun-i Telgrafiye Mektebi (School of Telegraphic Science),

a two-year program for telegraphic technical instruction. However, it had periods of

closure, during one of which the Galatasaray Lycée and the Darüşşafaka introduced

courses in telegraphy. Although the Galatasaray ceased giving these courses shortly

after, the Darüşşafaka continued to give training and its graduates were appointed to

posts in the telegraph system.343 By 1870, the Ottoman Empire possessed the

338 Bektaş, “Sultan’s Messenger,” 687–88.

339 Davison, “Electric Telegraph,” 150.

340 Ibid., 141.

341 Kaçar, “Telgraf İşletmesi,” 50–1.

342 Davison, “ElectricTelegraph,” 141.

343 Ibid., 143.

124

necessary cadre to engineer and operate the system.344 As an indication of

telegraphy’s importance for the empire, between 1883 and 1891, one or two

students a year, graduates of the Darüşşafaka who were employed at the ministry,

were sent to higher-education establishments in Paris.345

In 1865, the Ottoman telegraph network joined the Indo–European

submarine line, forming the first direct telegraphic communication between India

and Europe.346 The Ottoman telegraph network continued to expand throughout the

reigns of Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid II. By 1877, the Ottoman Empire had the

eighth largest telegraph system in the world;347 it consisted of “6,490 kilometers of

lines in 1863, 13,750 kilometers in 1866, 25,137 kilometers in 1869, and 36,640

kilometers in 1904”.348

The policy to introduce and extend the empire’s telegraph system was a

continuation of the sultans’ efforts to empower central control since the end of the

eighteenth century. The telegraph was a useful device for Abdülhamid II who

wanted to have absolute control over his subjects. Abdülhamid’s view on ruling was

that:

…the strict application of law could also provide the foundations

for autocracy, which should not be confused with the Islamic

concept of despotism (Istibdād/İstibdad) or with modern

dictatorships. Superimposing the Islamic principle of justice on

this notion of a legal autocracy, he created an authoritarian regime

that he believed to be the antithesis of absolutism.349

Abdülhamid II had a secret police organization in the palace under his control.

These spies and informants were appointed to every governmental department to

344 Bektaş, “Sultan’s Messenger,” 690.

345 Davison, “Electric Telegraph,” 143.

346 Bektaş, “Sultan’s Messenger,” 686.

347 Ibid., 669.

348 Davison, “Electric Telegraph,” 138.

349 Hanioğlu, Brief History, 123.

125

report on individual bureaucrats in memorandums. Based on these reports they were

promoted, dismissed or imprisoned.350 With a widespread telegraph system,

Abdülhamid could receive information promptly from every corner of his empire

and, for this reason, he actively promoted the telegraph network. The length of the

land lines reached up to 49,716 kilometers and underwater lines to 621 kilometers

in 1904,351 because:

His internal network of spies and secret agents depended mostly

on telegraphic correspondence. Their reports were sent directly to

Yildiz Palace, ….Pashas were dismissed or transferred in response

to public telegraphic petitions.352

Between 1882 and 1904, the number of telegrams sent increased from

around one million to three million. The telegraph, which was viewed as a tool to

consolidate the power of Ottoman central authority, was later used during the

preparations of the Young Turk Revolution, and then contributed to the foundation

of the Turkish Republic by its crucial role in the Turkish War of Independence.

When the Allies occupied Constantinople on 16 March 1920, they

appropriated all government agencies and telegraph offices. The next day, Mustafa

Kemal sent an encrypted message to the head directors of the postal and telegraph

services to stop communication with Constantinople. Immediately, the Postage and

Telegraphs Office was established in Ankara with Edip Bey appointed its director.

After the opening of the Turkish Parliamentary Assembly on 23 April 1920, the

office was placed under the Home Office. Later, it became a directorate, and Sırrı

Bey, an Izmit deputy, was appointed as its general director on 20 May1920.353

350 Shaw and Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, 214.

351 Ibid., 228.

352 Bektaş, “The Sultan’s Messenger,” 695.

353 Tanju Demir, Türkiye’de Posta Telgraf ve Telofon Teşkilatının Tarihsel Gelişimi (1840-1920)

(Ankara: Ptt Genel Müdürlüğü), 220–21.

126

Furthermore, the Anadolu Agency was established on 6 April 1920 to counter the

propaganda efforts of the Havas-Reuter-Turkish Agency.

4.3. The Empire’s Endeavor to Establish a Telegraph Agency

From the second half of the nineteenth century until the first third of the

twentieth century, Reuters, Havas and Wolff’s made agreements with each other

which defined the structure of the news market: oligopolistic and hierarchical, with

Reuters, Havas and Wolff’s at the top, cooperating with national news agencies.354

The three European news agencies mainly had the right to distribute news in their

ascribed territories, which were determined by agreements, but prohibited from

selling news in another’s. They were also allowed to gather news from the ascribed

territories of another using their own agents if they wished so long as they did not

sell it to local subscribers and news agencies. Not all territories were exclusive;

there were also shared territories which belonged to two or all of the three European

agencies.

In this news market, the local agencies had an exclusive right to the news of

the three major news agencies, but were restricted from selling its local news to any

other agency than the one major European agency with which it had signed an

agreement.355 The association, which eventually had around thirty members,

became known by several names, such as the League of Allied Agencies (les

Agences Alliées), the World League of Press Associations, the National Agencies

354 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Global News Agencies,” in The Globalization of News, 26.

355 Terhi Rantanen, “The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets,” in The Globalization of

News, 35.

127

Alliances, the Grand Alliance of Agencies or the Ring Combination.356 For some

scholars, such as Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Armand Mattelart, it was a ‘cartel’, and

its influence on world opinion was taken advantage of by governments to serve

their imperial interests.357

The first agreement between Reuters, Havas and Wolff’s was made in 1856

in which they agreed to exchange the latest quotations and market prices between

themselves.358 With the second contract made on 18 July 1859, the agencies agreed

to mutually exchange political news, which meant that each agency was to gather

news in its assigned territory and then share it with the other two. The territories

were distributed based on the territorial proximity and the sphere of political

influence of each agency’s home government. In the 1860s, the three news agencies

realized the insufficiency of the agreement as there were territories left

‘unexploited’.359 They were in control of the information markets in Europe and

were aiming to expand their operations beyond the continent.360

Therefore, on 17 January 1870, the three agencies signed an agreement

which carved out the world between the three of them. The 1870 agreement not

only defined the nature of the international news market in the nineteenth century

and the first third of the twentieth century, but also affected the scope of agency

operations even after the cartel came to an end in 1934.361 With the agreement,

Reuters took the British Empire, China, Japan and the Straits Settlements around

Singapore; Havas took France and its colonies, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Latin

356 Daya Kishan Thussu, International Communication: Continuity and Change (London: Hodder

Arnold, 2006), 20.

357 Ibid.

358 Storey, Reuters’ Century, 8.

359 Silberstein-Loeb, International Distribution, 199.

360 Thussu, International Communication, 20.

361 Jonathan Fenby, The International News Services: A Twentieth Century Fund Report (New York:

Schocken Books, 1986), 35–51.

128

America; and lastly the Continental was granted Germany, Russia and Scandinavia,

and it had to pay Havas and Reuters part of its revenue for receiving their

services.362

To satisfy the demand of the Constantinople stock market, in 1862, the

Levant Herald started to use Reuters’ telegrams. Later, other newspapers followed.

Based on an agreement between Reuters and Havas, in 1866, the latter took over the

subscribers in Constantinople.363 Shortly afterwards, Reuters’ Constantinople office

was established in the first half of 1869.364 The balance sheet of the company from

1869 shows that as of 31st December, the preliminary expenses of the office were

766 pounds, 7 cents and 7 dimes.365

With a treaty between Havas, Reuters and the Continental in 1871, the

Ottoman Empire became part of Havas’ area of operation, whereas in Egypt,

Reuters and Havas shared the right to distribute news, reflecting both British and

French foreign interests. However, soon afterwards, in 1874, with Disraeli’s return

to power, British foreign policy became more aggressive, which influenced the

1876 treaty between Havas and Reuters. The connection between this contract and

the domestic policies of the governments was depicted as follows:

His [Disraeli] dramatic purchase of the Khedive’s shares in the

Suez Canal made closer relations with Egypt essential and

inevitable; while, further east, he centered everything on the

bolstering-up of Turkey. The new political orientation set the pace

for the two news agencies. The British and the French struggle for

influence in both Turkey and Egypt was from now onwards

echoed by competition between Reuters and Havas.366

362 Ibid., 36.

363 Orhan Koloğlu, Havas-Reuter'den Anadolu Ajansı'na (Ankara: Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği

Yayınları, 1994), 9.

364 Board Meeting Minutes, 17 November 1869, from the Minute Book (1868–1872), 1/883502, LN

288, RA.

365 Balance Sheet, 31 December 1869, as part of an annual report prepared to be presented at the

Sixth Ordinary General Meeting of the Shareholders, 13 April 1870, from the Annual Reports 1865–

1914, 1/870501, LN 52, RA.

366 Storey, Reuters’ Century, 94.

129

With the 1876 contract, Reuters received the British Empire; Havas took the

Iberian Peninsula, Latin America and the Maghreb (Northwest Africa); and, lastly,

Wolff’s agency received parts of Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Reuters and

Havas shared Belgium, North America and the Antilles, and received a twenty-five

percent reimbursement from Germany. All three agencies shared the exploitation of

Austria and Switzerland. Havas was to contribute 400 pounds to cover the expenses

of the American service, while Egypt and the other non-reserved territories were to

be neutral.367

Remarkably, the Ottoman Empire had a unique standing in the agreement.

While the empire was assigned as the exclusive territory of Havas, Reuters’

correspondent was allowed to transmit political news to the newspapers of

Constantinople from territories that were not reserved by Havas, if it was done “for

an interest of an important political order”368, and was granted the right to have

relations with the local newspapers for political deeds, as put down in Article 6:

Turkey will be exclusively exploited by the Agence Havas from

the financial and political point of view. However, for an interest

of high political order, Reuter's Telegram Company may, at the

end of one year, establish there a correspondent, of whom the

attributions, in that which concerns the exploitation of Turkey,

will be born[e], in all cases, at the remittance of the newspapers of

Constantinople, of political news originating in territories other

than those reserved to the company Havas, Laffite and Co.369

The new contract reflected British and French interests over the Ottoman Empire.

The weakened empire:

…became the central question of European diplomacy. All the

European powers vied for influence in the snake-pit that was the

Turkish capital.…Because of the growing influence of the press to

the pursuit of political objectives abroad, and because the agencies

367 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 190.

368 Ibid., 204.

369 Ibid., 191.

130

were becoming ever-more naked proxies of their respective

foreign ministries, the treaty sanctioned a loophole in the system

of exclusive spheres of influence.370

Sigmund Engländer was the correspondent assigned to Constantinople to

take advantage of this loophole. However, he was to abuse it to such an extent that

it became a source of dispute between Havas and Reuters. Engländer arrived for the

first time to the imperial capital to report on the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878,

and remained there until 1888.371 He tried to convince Reuters to service

Constantinople. Engländer not only supplied Reuters with information, but also

Henry Layard, the British Ambassador to Constantinople, foreign missions and the

Turkish press, an act which was against the terms of the treaty. Engländer provided

Layard with copies of his reports and in return, Layard covered some of the costs of

Engländer’s information gathering: one of Engländer’s anonymous informants was

on the payroll of the British embassy at the rate of 50 pounds per month.372

Another violation of the agreement carried out by Engländer was to

distribute news not only from London but also from Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg,

Alexandria and Turkey. Moreover, Reuters was supplying Engländer with news of

England and India, news which it did not provide to Havas-Constantinople. In a

letter of complaint, Havas wrote to Reuters:

To you, it is as if our treaty did not exist. You have the right to

communicate in Turkey only news originating in territories

belonging to you: you distribute the news of all countries. You

have the right only to transmit them to the newspapers of

Constantinople: you transmit them to ministries, to embassies, to

everyone. There are twenty letters which we have addressed to

you on this subject: nothing is done about it.373

370 Ibid.

371 Read, Power of News, 31.

372 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,”, 203.

373 Ibid., 208.

131

Reuters’ tactic to convince Havas that Engländer was acting on his own initiative

did not work as the agency also tried to persuade Havas to exploit Turkey at the

same time. Havas rejected this offer. Engländer stopped giving news to the Turkish

press in the winter of 1880–1881, which only lasted until the spring. After then

Reuters ceased supplying Havas-Constantinople with news from London once

again. The problem was to be resolved only after Engländer’s departure from

Constantinople.374

In 1883, W.H.G. Werndel was sent to Constantinople from Egypt to become

Engländer’s assistant. Engländer started to train Werndel to take his place. Werndel

explained the efforts of Engländer, and why it was important to provide a news

service in Constantinople:

Besides the news-service for London, Dr. Engländer insisted on

publishing a news-service in Constantinople notwithstanding the

fact that Turkey came within the bounds of activity of the Havas

Agency for the propagation of news locally. There were, I believe,

protests from Havas, but these were overcome finally by our news

being published under the name of Dr. Engländer, the name

‘Reuter’ not appearing. Although this service of telegrams was a

restricted one, and entailed a loss financially, nevertheless, it

proved of value as a means of propaganda besides enhancing our

moral position and prestige in this part of the world. To give an

instance of the value people attached to our news, whenever any

big question was agitating public opinion in Europe, I may recall

the many visits we used to receive in our small office in

Constantinople enquiring whether we had any special information

regarding the question then engaging the attention of the Great

Powers. Dr. Engländer was naturally proud of his achievements in

that respect, especially after his successful struggle with the

headquarters in London, convincing the latter of the utility and

value to the Company of a service of news to Constantinople.375

Werndel’s account also mentions the Ottoman Empire’s displeasure with

Engländer:

374 Ibid.

375 Werndel to Sir Roderick Jones, 21 February 1919, 1/014090, LN 797, RA.

132

He was of a hospitable disposition, kept an open house in

Constantinople, had many friends, but possessed enemies also

chief among whom were no less personages than the late Sultan

Abd-ul-Hamid and the late Baron de Calice, a gentle old

gentleman, who for a quarter of a century, occupied the post of

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Turkey a record in the

diplomatic annals of the now defunct Monarch. On several

occasions, Abd-ul-Hamid asked for Engländer’s expulsion from

Turkey, on the grounds that he was a dangerous political intriguer,

but without success.376

The Ottoman Empire’s distaste of Reuters’ news, which was constantly mentioned

in official correspondences, will be discussed later in the chapter.

When Engländer departed from Constantinople, Werndel became the chief

correspondent of Reuters in the Ottoman Empire and remained so for the next

twenty-five years. Sir Roderick Jones, general manager of Reuters (1916–1941),

described Werndel’s close relationship with the foreign diplomats and British

ambassadors in Constantinople:

The Turkish capital in those days was a nest of diplomatic,

political, and financial intrigue, and Werndel its best informed,

very sagacious, and most upright observer. He had lived there for

twenty-five years, had travelled much through the Ottoman

Empire and the Balkans, spoke Turkish like a Turk, and also was

completely at his ease in the Bulgarian and other neighboring

tongues and dialects. Rightly looking upon him as a specialist and

an authority, the Heads of diplomatic missions to the Porte

cultivated his acquaintance and drew upon his knowledge and

advice. Newly appointed ambassadors from Britain invariably

summoned him into conference the moment they arrived. The

position he occupied, by reason of his ability and his proven

integrity, was exclusive and enviable.377

Jones described him also as “the friend, confidant and unofficial counselor of

successive representatives of the Crown” along with Sir Edward Buck, Reuters’

376 Ibid.

377 Sir Roderick Jones, A Life in Reuters (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), 86.

133

representative in India, and David Rees, Reuters’ manager in Egypt (1884-1914)

and Gerald Delany, the local manager in Cairo.378

At the end of 1888, Werndel was joined by Fergus Ferguson.379 Until World

War I, Ferguson was employed mostly in the Balkans. Both Werndel and Ferguson

worked as war correspondents in Macedonia and Palestine, and as correspondents to

the League of Nations. They served Reuters for nearly fifty years. Werndel and

Ferguson’s influence on the press up to World War I is depicted thus:

…Reuters’ foreign correspondents were first allowed to add

political comments (if clearly shown as such) to their political

news. It was due to the intelligence, initiative and political tact of

such reporters as Werndel and Ferguson that the Press soon

accepted, and often relied upon, Reuters’ development into a

‘vicarious newspaper’.380

Reuters did not manage to take over the territories of the Ottoman Empire

from Havas. However, by an agreement with Havas on 21 May 1889, it did succeed

in reducing Havas’ influence, which alarmed the French Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Havas and Reuters agreed that Havas and the Correspondenz-Bureau would

share the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Havas gave its subscription list to the newly

established Agence de Constantinople and withdrew from Constantinople.

Montebello, French Ambassador to Constantinople, stated his concerns about the

new agency:

I must insist…upon the interest which attends, from the point of

view of French interests in the country, the fact that the

telegraphic news from abroad continues to be published by the

intermediary of a French agency. The succession of the Agence

Havas in Turkey will be inherited by a company composed of

Germans, Austrians, Italians and Englishmen. Naturally the

embassy will have for the future no power over an agency directed

by political adversaries who seek to spread to the public, news of

an anti-French tendency. The Sultan and the Porte, who are so

378 Ibid., 283.

379 Storey, Reuters’ Century, 100.

380 Ibid., 101.

134

easily roused by the telegrams sent from Europe, will be

constantly under unfavorable impressions from rumors propagated

with the intention of injuring us.381

At the request of Spuller, the French Foreign Minister, Havas decided to keep an

agent of its own in Constantinople to send news from the empire. The agent’s duty

was not restricted to sending news to France but he also had to be in constant

contact with the French ambassador.382

The Agence de Constantinople began operations on 1 October 1889. When

the agreement was renewed in 1898, the empire continued to be the joint territory of

Havas and the Correspondenz-Bureau, and remained so by a two-party treaty,

signed on 28 February 1900, between the Correspondenz-Bureau and Havas-

Reuters-Continental. The new ten-year treaty, the last one before World War I, was

signed between 8 and 22 July 1909. What was significant about it was that under

Article 16, “if a receiving agency refused to incorporate in its service certain

dispatches of political importance to the sending agency, the sender had the right to

insist that a certain quantity of such reports be distributed to the press within an

ally’s reserved territories”, and such dispatches were to carry the word ‘Tractatus’

to distinguish them from the recipient agency’s regular service.383 Although one of

the reasons for the news agencies to sign such cooperation agreements was to

reduce their costs by not keeping a correspondent in every country at all times, the

empire’s importance in contemporary politics, and the desire of the imperial

governments of these agencies to have an impact on the Ottoman administration and

public, caused Havas and Reuters to have correspondents of their own in

Constantinople.

381 Nalbach, “Ring Combination,” 320.

382 Ibid., 321.

383 Ibid., 558.

135

Abdülhamid II used telegraphy to consolidate his power as such technology

allowed him to communicate with his spies and civil servants all over the empire.

He also wished to control the flow of information through telegraphic wires. In

order to present a positive image of the Ottoman state, especially in Europe,

throughout his reign Abdülhamid II tried to influence the news disseminated by

domestic and foreign newspapers, journals and the news agencies. The importance

he gave to the foreign press and the way in which both himself and the empire were

presented abroad can be observed through newspaper cuttings from his reign

preserved in the archives.

There was a strict censorship regime under Abdülhamid II’s rule. Hanioğlu,

describing censorship during his reign as “one of the strictest in modern times”,384

stated that Ottoman journalists wrote about “nonpolitical issues unless instructed to

criticize the foreign governments”.385 Besides strict censorship, he also tried to

influence the news by providing newspapers, journals, news agencies and

journalists with allowances and privileges. For those European journals which

accepted such inducements, articles to be published were prepared by subjects of

the sultan emphasizing “Ottoman progress under the far-sighted leadership of

Abdülhamid II, an Ottoman Peter the Great, who was taking the Tanzimat reforms

to new horizons”.386 As well as promoting the image of the sultan and the empire,

the press was also financed for the purpose of counter propaganda. For example, to

specifically counter British propaganda after the circulation of the pamphlet The

Bulgarian Horrors, written by the British Liberal party’s leader, Gladstone, the

Ottoman Empire financed and printed Paik-i Islam, a publication in Urdu and

384 Hanioğlu, Brief History, 125.

385 Ibid., 126.

386 Ibid., 128.

136

Arabic, printed by the imperial presses in Constantinople to influence and mobilize

Indian Muslims.387

Reuters and Havas were among the news agencies which were provided

with subsidies and privileges. However, the sultan was not able to prevent these

international news agencies from making news “in favor of their own respective

governments”, “false” and “against the Ottoman Empire” as described in Ottoman

official documents. Realizing every European country had a telegraphic news

agency, and unable to reach a satisfying conclusion from its policy to win over

news sources and place them under the empire’s service by a variety of offerings,

from the final decades of the nineteenth century the Porte considered establishing an

Ottoman telegraphic news service in order to present a positive image abroad.

The gains experienced by the international news agencies in having

connections with their domestic and foreign governments have been explained in

Chapter I. However, an additional, much stronger financial interest was disclosed in

Chapter II: the managers, owners and stockholders of the agencies were financiers,

businessmen and bankers who had investments outside the news business. The

investments of the Reuter family were investigated as a case study in order to

expose these interests.

Reuters’ managers and their family members had investments in several

sectors in multiple countries. They sought the support of the British Foreign Office

whenever they were in opposition to local governments. In some cases, members of

the family took the liberty of suggesting policies to the British Foreign Office. The

interaction between the parties regarding an investment could last for years,

387 Derinğil, Well-Protected Domains, 149.

137

involving many correspondence exchanges, sometimes so many as to fill volumes,

as with the Reuter Concession in Persia.

On 26 February 1878, Baron Herbert de Reuter proposed an agreement to

the Sublime Porte.388 Later that year, in December, Baron Herbert de Reuter were to

defend the Reuters’ news against the Ottoman government who condemned

Reuters’ news service in Constantinople for being “inaccurate and

untrustworthy”389 In his statements he underlined the agency’s objectivity: “I need

hardly assure you that our chief desire and preoccupation is to serve the public with

absolutely authentic and impartial information, and each and every representative of

the Company has received the most stringent instructions to conform strictly to this

essential principle”, and “with regard to the suggestion of the Sublime Porte, that in

order to ensure accuracy we should submit our messages to the Imperial Embassy

[London] before publication, permit me to explain that such a measure would be

utterly impracticable and would necessarily immediately compromise the

independence of the agency”.390 In 1882, only four years later, the very same Baron

Herbert de Reuter proposed to the Sublime Porte an agreement which consisted of

publicising statements of the Ottoman government.391 The company made the same

offer to the British and Japanese governments in 1894, as discussed in Chapter I,

and once again to the Ottoman Empire in 1895.

The agreement, which had both public and secret articles, was presented in

1882 by Ferguson, Reuters’ Constantinople representative, and promised to publish

388 HR.SFR.3 260/52 26 February1878, Presidency of Republic of Turkey Department of State

Archives (hereafter cited as BOA).

389 HR.SFR.3 262/41 2 December 1878, BOA.

390 HR.SFR.3 262/41 2 December 1878.

391 Y.EE. 43/152 1300 S 29 (9 January 1883).

138

statements of the Sublime Porte in Europe within a day. The statements of the

empire were to be communicated to Indian newspapers as well.392

Reuters’ proposal is significant in that it shows the desire of Ottoman

statesmen to make agreements or arrangements with news agencies. During his final

and brief period of service as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (30 November until 3

December 1882), Safvet Paşa prepared a memorandum on the Reuters agreement.

In his memorandum, he stated that all German newspapers were affiliated to the

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were being paid a couple of million franks

annually. He also declared that British newspapers were independent and were not

bound to the British government by contract, and that they expressed liberal,

conservative and radical views. He mentioned that in Vienna, while most of the

newspapers expressed the views of the government, only a couple of them were

independent, and in Italy some of them were independent and some were not.

According to Safvet Paşa, Russian newspapers were under the influence of the state,

but in terms of news regarding foreign states, they were independent. He stated that

French newspapers used to be under the control of press administration, to some

degree, during the times of the emperor, but now they were completely free and

were expressing the views of the parties they were supporting, both in domestic and

foreign politics.

Safvet Paşa went on to say that even if millions of akçes were spent, it still

would not be possible for the Ottoman Empire to have the foreign press on its side.

He claimed this was the case because the European states were of the opinion that

the empire would never implement reforms, as it had not done so up until this point

in time. Because of this general notion among the European states, the press of even

392 Y.EE. 43/152 1300 S 29 (9 January 1883).

139

those who desired the continuance and prosperity of the empire were forced to

express views in accord with this de facto view. He stated that undoubtedly, when

reforms started to take place, public opinion would change step by step, leading to a

change in the expressions of the foreign press. He claimed an instrument was

needed with which to announce the Sultan’s efforts made on behalf of the happiness

of his subjects.

Safvet Paşa’s solution was to negotiate with Havas and Reuters. He implied

that these agencies should be provided with privileges and subsidies. The Sublime

Porte would telegraph the measures and practices of the government to its London

and Paris embassies, which would then communicate these to the agencies’

administrations. The texts would be prepared by the Sublime Porte and sent to these

embassies on a daily basis. As well as this, different texts, ready for publishing,

would be prepared for every other newspaper with which the government had an

agreement and sent to these newspapers by post. He underlined that the

dissemination of telegrams transmitted to Havas and Reuters would not be limited

to newspapers in Paris and London, for these agencies could certainly promise to

distribute them in Berlin, Vienna and Rome. In this way, the points of view and

practices of the government would reach all the states within a day. He went on to

say that even though this would all cost a couple of thousand liras annually, the

other states were shouldering similar costs for the same purpose.393 In summary,

Safvet Paşa was convinced that the negative opinions of the European states with

regards to the Ottoman Empire were only temporary and would change as the

reforms progressed. He also advised that Havas and Reuters could be outlets to

express Abdülhamid II’s practices. As stated by Hanioğlu, Ottoman statesmen were

393 Y.EE. 44/149 1300 S 29 (9 January 1883).

140

trying to promote the image of Abdülhamid and his empire through news which

emphasized Ottoman progress under the sultan’s leadership.

Some of the payments made to the domestic and foreign press, journalists

and news agencies throughout Abdülhamid II’s reign will be listed here to give an

example of the Ottoman Empire’s policy. To begin with, Havas had been on the

empire’s payroll from as early as 1888.394 The parties had an agreement, possibly

regarding the distribution by Havas of the news given to him by the empire. The

service Havas provided the empire with was referred to, by its general manager, as

“the duty we took over to preserve the empire’s policy”.395

In 1894, the highest monthly payments were made to Levand Herald (8,333

guruş), Le Moniteur Oriental (5,633 guruş), Servet-i Fünun (3,240), Sabah (3,000)

and finally to Havas agency bulletins (21,666). The rest of the payments went to

Servet (1,000), Saʻâdet (3,000), Istanbul (2,000), Emakinüʻs-sıhha (2,000),

Manzûme-i Efkâr (1,500), Osmanische Post (2,000), Punc (500), Ceride-i Şerifiye

(500), Resimli (500), Korrespondant (Correspondenz) (300), Memoryal Diplomatik

(2,166), Orient (866), Revue de l’Orient (1,300) and an agent of some German

newspapers (paid by the Berlin Embassy) (1,650). The list was prepared to cut

payments of some of these. These journals, agencies and journalists continued to

spread news unfavorable to the empire, despite their allowances. By cutting their

payments, it was planned to use the money saved to cover the expense of defending

the empire’s position and reputation in foreign press. It was decided to cut the

allowances of twenty newspapers, agencies and correspondents.396

394 YPRK.TKM. 13/ 8 1305 Z 29 (6 September 1883).

395 YPRK.TKM. 13/8 1305 Z 29 (6 September 1883).

396 Y.A. RES. 71/29 5 August 1894.

141

On 17 September 1894, the activities of Reuters were banned in the Ottoman

Empire. It was realized that the source of information disseminated against the

empire was the agency. The telegram, which resulted in the publication by the

journal Matin, had been sent from Constantinople by Reuters. It was also decided to

condemn the publication and ban any foreign newspapers which published this

news item.397

However, shortly afterwards, in 1895, the Ottoman Empire negotiated and

signed an agreement with Reuters. Based on the empire’s account, in January 1895,

Werndel, Reuters’ Constantinople representative, approached the Sublime Port and

offered the agency’s services. The Sublime Port was in favor of this offer, in

principal, as it believed that it was in need of an institution with the ability to

repudiate news which had been distributed widely for some time against the empire,

and propagate positive news instead. Since the agency expressed its willingness to

take on the role, and its proposal was regarded to be in line with the interests of the

state, the Sublime Porte decided to accept the agency’s terms. The terms in question

were: an amount (800 pounds) to be paid as an annual subscription to

Correspondenz for the publication of bulletins (as stated earlier, because of an

agreement between the international news agencies, Havas and Correspondenz were

conducting a joint operation in the Ottoman Empire under the name Agence de

Constantinople) printed in English and German, and that the agency be able to

telegraph its messages from Istanbul to London free of charge and with priority.398

The fact that the agency concluded agreements with the British, Japanese

and Ottoman governments around the same time, and that it offered its services to

British and Ottoman governments, as indicated in the official documents of both the

397 BEO. 3625/211851 1327 B 30 (17 August 1909).

398 Y.PRK. BŞK. 39/61, 1312 Ş 03 (29 January 1895).

142

empires, strongly suggests that in 1894 and 1895, the company was systematically

in pursuit of concluding agreements with governments. Moreover, Reuters probably

also had the aim of putting the Correspondenz back on the allowance list.

On 11 November 1895, Raf’et, Grand Vizier, Saʻid, Head of the State

Council, and Tevfik, Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented their opinions on

preventing the spread of news against the Ottoman Empire to the sultan. In the

document, the agreement with Reuters was mentioned as well. It was stated that,

although those European newspapers which had criticized the empire were banned

from entering the state, it was impossible to prevent the arrival of papers that came

via the foreign postal services. Furthermore, complaints against these newspapers

had been made either through embassies or telegraph agencies, but with little

success. Those made through embassies were not very effective as they were

regarded as the official statements of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, providing

some correspondents and agencies, such as Havas and Reuters, with an allowance

was the advised solution of the Grand Vizier, the Head of the State Council and the

Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was claimed that through correspondents and

telegraph agencies, the state could force European newspapers to write what it

wanted. It was stated that with approximately 5,000 lira annually, it would be

possible to win over the most influential correspondents, in other words, Havas and

Reuters. In the document, it was furthermore stated that, in actual fact, Reuters’

agency had already been won over. The sultan approved the allowance worth 5,000

lira.399

As a result, an agreement was concluded with Havas. In 1897 and 1898, the

Sublime Port paid 12,000 francs annually to the agency. However, in June 1898 the

399 I.HR. 349/25 1313 Ca 23 (11 November 1895).

143

contract was renewed for 45,000 francs, which was then cancelled by the Sublime

Porte. Although the empire renegotiated the price and managed to reach an

agreement of between 15,000 and 20,000 francs, the general manager of Havas

refused to accept this deal.400 Having cancelled the allowances of Havas and others

in 1894 in order to save money to conduct a campaign against unfavorable

publications, very soon the Ottoman statesmen realized that keeping Havas and

Reuters on the payroll would have been more efficient.

Despite this, by 1907 the Sublime Porte was back to feeling resentment

against Reuters, as well as other foreign newspapers. In January 1907, it

investigated all the correspondents of foreign newspapers and agencies in

Constantinople. In the list prepared by the domestic press administration, the names

of the companies and of the correspondents, where they lived, their salaries, the

people they were close with, especially the names of the Ottoman Empire’s civil

servants they befriended, their personality and the nature of the news they made

were given. The list began with the telegraphic agencies; for example, for Reuters’

correspondents the following information was given:

Reuters Agency: its director is called Werndel. He resides in

Beyoğlu, Tepebaşı, in apartment number 14. His salary is 90

English liras. He is close friends with Nuri Bey, foreign

correspondence officer. They are in constant contact. This man

has an assistant named Ferguson. His salary is 20 liras. The news

he writes is unacceptable.401

There were reports concerning the correspondents of British, German, Austrian,

French and Italian newspapers, and those who worked for more than one

newspaper. The British newspapers’ correspondents on the list were from The

Times, Standard, Daily News, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian and the

400 BEO. 1145/85844 1316 S 01 (20 June 1898).

401 YPRK. DH. 13/92 1324 Z 16 (30 January 1907).

144

Independent. In his report, Kemal Bey, domestic press director, was critical of their

works.402

In March 1907, the annual payments made to the press by the administrative

offices were declared to the Imperial Council. Based on the document, in 1905, the

total amount of subsidies for the Konstantinople (referring to the Agence de

Constaninople), the Nationale, the Forine agencies and the Levand Herald was

62,000 francs. However, the Konstantinople’s subsidy was ceased earlier in 1907

due to its dissemination of displeasing news. Furthermore, the amount of annual

payments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to newspapers in Constantinople

and abroad was 443,278 guruş, whereas the annual payment made by the Ministry

of the Interior to the press in Constantinople and elsewhere was 348,990 guruş. The

annual amount paid to telegraph agencies by the empire was 62,000 francs.403 The

names of the newspapers and the amount of subsidies paid by the Ministry of the

Interior were: Servet-i Fünûn (Constantinople) (2,340 guruş), Sabah

(Constantinople) (5,950 guruş), İkdâm (Constantinople) (4,250 guruş), Hanımlara

Mahsus Gazete (Constantinople) (2,550 guruş), Polavedifski Galasi (Plovdiv)

(2,550 guruş), Sergoski and Setik (Sofia) (311 guruş) (the subsidies for these two

newspapers were sent to Major Hilmi Bey, Second Secretary of the Bulgarian

Commissariat by means of the Ottoman Bank; the transaction was made by the

treasury on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior), El-posta (Egypt) (930 guruş)

(ceased), El-mahrûse (Egypt) (2,125 guruş) (ceased) and Gayret (Plovdiv) (1,275

guruş) (from 1903 no payments were made). The British reporter Mr. Norman was

also on the list of the Ministry of the Interior with a payment of 6,800 guruş.

402 YPRK. DH. 13/92 1324 Z 16 (30 January 1907).

403 Y.A. HUS 509/61 1325 M 21 (6 March 1907).

145

The annual payments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to

newspapers in Constantinople were: Saʻâdet (6,000 guruş), Levand Herald (72,244

guruş), Le Moniteur Oriental (48,844 guruş), Handesblat (24,000 guruş), Manzûmei

Efkâr (13,005 guruş), Punç (13,005 guruş), Cerîde-i Şarkiye (867 guruş) and

İstanbul (20,400 guruş), making 260,208 guruş in total. The annual payments made

to the foreign press that were ceased by an order on 9 January 1905 were: some

newspapers in Paris (the names were not specified) (127,800 guruş), Memoryal

Diplomatik (Paris) (18,786 guruş), Revu de l’Orient (Budapest) (11,280 guruş) and

Le Figaro (Paris) (96,000 guruş). The total amount was 253,866 guruş.404

Establishing a news agency in the Ottoman Empire similar to the foreign

news agencies was a matter of concern to Abdülhamid II, as well as the CUP. The

existing archival documents demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire had the intention

of establishing an imperial news service of some sort, at least since 1878, and

despite the regime change, investigations for the project continued. The conclusions

reached were mentioned at a parliamentary discussion on 25 April 1911.

On 17 April 1878, Mehmed Esad Safvet Paşa, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

informed Ahmed Aarifi Paşa, the Paris Ambassador, that the government wished to

found an imperial news service and charged him to negotiate the subject with the

Havas agency. Aarifi Paşa was also provided with articles to negotiate under the

title “Project de l’agence télégraphique Ottomane”. On 17 May 1878, Aarifi Paşa

reported that he was engaged in discussions with the Havas agency to negotiate an

agreement for an information service that the imperial government proposed to

found in the empire. Aarifi Paşa’s correspondence was accompanied by the report

of François Noguis, whom he hired to follow the negotiations, and a draft

404 Y.A. HUS 509/61 1325 M 21 (6 March 1907).

146

convention that Monsieur Lebey also forwarded to Monsieur Chatau, the Havas

agent in Constantinople, in response to the Sublime Port’s initial offer. The duration

of the agreement was to be from 1 June 1878 to 31 May 1888.405 In the end, the

parties were unable to agree during the final negotiations of the “Project du

government Impérial de fonder une agence télégraphique Ottomane”, as referred to

in the correspondence.406

In the draft convention, it was stated that the name of the agency that was to

be created would be determined later. Yet, it was referred to as the Agency of

Constantinople (Agence de Constantinople).407. One third of it was to belong to the

Ottoman government and two-thirds to Havas, Laffite and Co.408 The Agence de

Constantinople, however, was not established between Havas and the Ottoman

government, but after a renewed tripartite agreement between Havas, Reuters and

the Correspondenz-Bureau on 21 May 1889.

A document from 1903 sheds light on why the Ottoman Empire wished to

establish an Ottoman telegraph agency the empire was desperately looking for an

outlet with which to express and explain itself. In the document, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs depicted the inability of the Ottoman Empire to protest against the

news published concerning the Bulgarian issue. Almost none of the empire’s

protestations submitted to the foreign press and news agents in Constantinople were

published in European newspapers. It was stated that the efforts of the empire to

respond to Bulgarian claims about the Ottoman military campaign and expose the

destruction done by the Bulgarian bands were being wasted, for the empire did not

have its own news agency while all the European states, even the Principality of

405 HR. ID. 1699/59 17 April 1878.

406 HR. ID. 1699/61 19 July 1878.

407 HR.ID 1699/59 17 April 1878.

408 Ibid.

147

Bulgaria, had such an agency, thus, forcing the empire to use foreign agencies that

were either ignoring their protests completely or reshaping them. The ministry’s

advice to remedy this situation was to establish a news agency. However, the

Ottoman agency could not be established because of the empire’s financial state of

affairs.409

Despite this, the Ottoman Empire’s attempts, under the rule of Abdülhamid

II, to found a news agency continued. In 1906, the Foreign Press Directorate

advised declarations to be made through embassies or by other means until an

Ottoman agency was established, as both the Agence de Constantinople and the

Agence Nationale did not publish in the government’s favor, leaving no other

channel to disseminate the Sublime Porte’s statements. It was stated that the Agence

de Constantinople distributed news conflicting with the interests of the empire.410

A couple of months later, despite its previous warnings, the Sublime Porte

believed that the Agence de Constantinople was still acting unfavorably towards the

empire. It decided to cut the company’s allowance, which at this point had been

paid for sixteen years, and take away its exemption from telegram costs for one

hundred words daily. Madam Grosser, the manager of the company, claimed that

the displeasing news had been disseminated while she was away in Germany for a

family matter. She ensured the Sublime Porte that such a mistake would never take

place again and asked for a restoration of the company’s privileges. She promised

that she would dedicate all her work towards the interests of the sultan and the

empire, and claimed that she constantly served the empire by transferring the

statements of the Ottoman Empire to other European agencies with which the

Agence de Constantinople had relations. She underlined that she was ready to

409 BEO. 2178/163311 1321 B 04 (26 September 1903).

410 BEO. 2867/214987 1324 M 01 (25 February 1906).

148

perform her duty more perfectly than before. However, her assurances was not

found reliable on the grounds that the company had already previously been warned

to no avail.411

In 1908, Abdülhamid II was forced by an uprising organized by the CUP to

issue a proclamation on July 24, ordering the convocation and election of

parliament in conformity with the constitution, transforming the regime into a

constitutional monarchy. To help organize the revolution, the CUP had smuggled in

propaganda material through Greece and foreign post offices in the empire, and

distributed them throughout its provinces and capital. Moreover, it mobilized the

officers in the Ottoman army, especially in Salonica. One of these officers, Major

Niyazi, commander of the Resna Battalion, and a hundred soldiers joined a group of

armed civilians of around eight hundred on July 3, which started the events leading

to the revolution. The rebellion spread to all the Third Army Corps, then to the

Second Army Corps at Edirne and to forces in Izmir. News of the rebellion became

publicly known in the early morning of July 23 in Salonica. The CUP spread the

word from there throughout Macedonia, instantly, by means of telegraphic

communication over which they enjoyed complete control. The same day, on behalf

of the CUP, Major Enver Bey announced the establishment of a constitutional

regime to the European press by telegram.412

Knowing the power of the press and information dissemination, the CUP

relaunched the project to found a telegraph agency in August 1908. On 27

December 1908, Tevfik Paşa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent dispatches to the

Ottoman embassies regarding the project of founding an unofficial telegraphic

411 BEO. 2886/216385 1324 C 15 (16 August 1906).

412 Kansu, Revolution of 1908, 73–101.

149

agency in Constantinople.413 It was stated that the imperial government had the

desire to found an unofficial Ottoman telegraphic agency, like the telegraphic

services of other states. They were asked to inform the ministry about the news

agencies in the countries they resided, and under what conditions the unofficial

agencies were established.414

On 6 January 1909, in response to Tevfik Paşa’s letter, Rifaat Paşa, Ottoman

Ambassador in London, stated that an official telegraphic agency did not exist in

London. He claimed that the Reuters agency served the British government through

its unofficial communications. It was not an official agency, and the government

was not responsible for its telegrams. Furthermore, he stated that, in his opinion, the

Ottoman government needed to have an agency like Reuters, not an official one. He

mentioned that having an official agency would be like subjecting the press to prior

censorship. He advised them that by having an unofficial agency, the Sublime Porte

could launch telegrams frequently without taking any responsibility, and that it

could only do this through unofficial means. He added that asking Reuters, which

was an excellent news agency in Europe, to set up a regular service in

Constantinople would serve this purpose. In return for its service, Rifaat Paşa

suggested the imperial government could grant the agency a subvention for its

expenses. He stated that if the government were to agree, he could ask Reuters what

its conditions would be to set up such a service.415

The Ottoman ambassador in Rome informed the Sublime Porte that the

major telegraph agencies of Europe were part of a league and its members were

required to exchange their dispatches and the information they received.

413 HR. SFR 3. 586/ 60 27 December 1908.

414 Ibid.

415 HR. SFR 3. 586/60 27 December 1908.

150

Furthermore, Hakky Bey stated that the Ottoman government could establish an

unofficial agency but the agency founded needed to join this ‘league’ to be able to

communicate the news to the other agencies and receive information from them.416

Rifaat Paşa’s comments about Reuters possibly motivated the Ottoman

government to consider signing an agreement with the Reuters agency in April

1909. The agreement was prepared originally in French, had seven articles, and an

additional four secret articles. In the first article, the Reuters agency promised to

disseminate all news that the Sublime Porte regarded as necessary to major

European, American and Indian newspapers, and telegraph agencies. Similarly, it

promised to telegraph at its own expense the same information to the Havas agency.

In the next article, the Sublime Porte promised to provide the Reuters’

representative in Constantinople with information and diplomatic papers that would

be distributed. The Ottoman government was to charge an officer with the duty of

communicating this sort of information to the agency. In the third article, the

Sublime Porte permitted the transmission, free of telegraphic fees, of official

documents that it would give to Reuters. Also, in terms of its own telegrams, the

Reuters agency could transmit one hundred words daily for free between

Constantinople and London, and Constantinople and Bombay. Furthermore, if the

agency were to set up a telegraphic service within the Ottoman Empire, it could

transmit one hundred words daily for free. In article four, it was stated that if the

Ottoman government were to give fifteen percent discount on telegraphic

transmissions, then the Reuters agency would transmit the information it received

from British and American businesses to India, China and Austria through the

Ottoman state. In article five, Reuters was to cover the expenses of transmitting the

416 HR.İD. 1700/26 27 December 1908.

151

Sublime Porte’s announcements to its own agents and representatives in Europe and

America. In return for this, the Sublime Porte promised to pay a yearly subvention

of 15,000 francs. Also, Reuters was to pay the Sublime Porte’s officer using this

subvention.417 Under article six, the Sublime Porte reserved the right to suspend the

communications of the agency. Lastly, the convention was to last for three years

and if one of the parties wished to end it before this term, three months’ notice had

to be given. 418

The convention also had four secret articles. Article one stated that the

Reuters agency was to introduce the Sublime Porte’s agent to members of

parliament, ministers, foreign agents and press directors in Britain. The Sublime

Porte’s agent would be known as Reuters’ agent so as not to appear suspicious and

to be able to continue his duty of serving the Sublime Porte in the following ways:

influencing parliamentary discussions, sending corrections to newspapers, inserting

into all of Reuters’ dispatches to German and Austrian newspapers the news that the

Sublime Porte wished to have disseminated all around the world, expressing the

views of the Ottoman government in the British papers as telegrammed by the

government, evaluating the news planned to be sent to the Sublime Porte, and

inserting news into Reuters’ dispatches which would serve the Sublime Porte’s

interests and be distributed around the world by the agency. In article two, because

the Reuters agency was the only one which serviced Indian newspapers, and had

offices in all the cities of India, China, Persia and Austria, it promised to use its

ability to disseminate news for the Ottoman government in these places. It was

stated that its news service in India was of utmost importance for the government.

In the third secret article of the convention, the Ottoman government demanded that

417 Y.EE. 41/161 1327 R 06 (27 April 1909).

418 Ibid.

152

Reuters inform it about all news published in the newspapers of every country. The

Sublime Porte’s agent within Reuters was to report it to the Ottoman Ministry of

Foreign Affairs weekly. It was underlined that knowing the opinions of the agents

and others in Britain would be useful for the ministry. In the fourth article, it was

stated that as Reuters was providing financial services to the major banks, the

agency would be beneficial for the administration and finance of the Sublime Porte.

Furthermore, it was underlined that the Reuters agency would regard it as its duty to

serve the Ottoman government all around the world.419

The way the secret convention was worded gives the impression that Reuters

was trying to convince the Sublime Porte of its usefulness. The clauses on

disseminating news to serve the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and announcing

the official opinion of the empire in disguise, are especially similar to the articles in

the secret agreement made between Reuters and the British government in 1894.

The content of the secret articles suggests that they were prepared by the Ottoman

government, as they were tailored around the foreign policy interests of the empire.

It is not known if this agreement with the Reuters agency was finalized; however,

the fact that only four months later, the government was investigating new

prospects, suggests otherwise. Salih Gürcü possibly informed about the Ottoman

government’s search to establish a formal or semi-formal agency applied for a

permit to found a semi-formal agency in the imperial capital in June 1909.

419 Y.EE. 41/162 1327 R 06 (27 April 1909).

153

CHAPTER VI

THE OTTOMAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY (AGENCE

TELEGRAPHIQUE OTTOMANE) AND ITS SUCCESSORS:

L’AGENCE MILLI (THE NATIONAL OTTOMAN

TELEGRAPH AGENCY), LA TURQUIE AND L’AGENCE

ORIENTALE D’INFORMATIONS

The Ottoman Empire’s endeavour to establish an agency of its own to resist

European imperialism, empower the imperial centre and overcome the empire’s

image problem to preserve the empire, reached to an end in 1911 with the

transformation of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency into a semi-formal agency. It was

Salih Gürcü who managed to convince the Ottoman government to change his

agency to a semi-formal one.

On 25 June 1909, Salih Gürcü, the owner of La Turquie Nouvelle, a Parisian

journal, made an application to establish the Gürcü Agency in Constantinople.420 In

his application, he stated his desire to make the Gürcü Agency the semiformal news

420 BEO. 3625/271851 1327 B 30 (17 August 1909).

154

agency of the Ottoman Empire and asked for a subvention to make this possible. He

underlined the non-existence of any news agency owned or directed by an Ottoman

within the Ottoman state or abroad, and stated that all the agencies which had

representatives in Constantinople were owned by German and French companies.

Gürcü mentioned that he believed an Ottoman news agency would serve the

Ottoman government and state well, and discussed his reasons for saying so. He

argued that the Ottoman government was neither able to receive accurate world

news on a daily basis nor information from its own capital, provinces and abroad by

telegraphy. He described the purpose of the agency as providing the main Ottoman

provinces and towns, such as Salonika, Izmir, Beirut, Yafa, Syria, Adana, Mersin,

Bagdad and Aleppo, with daily news, collecting or disseminating important

information in these places, and making use of it in order to promote the unity and

eternity of the Ottoman state. He underlined the political importance of the agency

he planned to establish. He stated that some agencies distributed news against the

Ottoman state, as it served their own interests, and that the Ottoman government

lacked a semiformal agency with which to express its opinions on any subject or to

refute rumors. Declarations made by the embassies were usually ignored. Gürcü

claimed that while preserving its independence, the Gürcü Agency would be proud

to disseminate semiformal statements of the government. He stated that his agency

would be able to accomplish this by means of contracts signed with Havas, Wolff’s,

Reuters and other agencies, and also through La Turquie Nouvelle, which he owned

and directed. He underlined that his journal would also be at the disposal of the

Ottoman government, and that with 50,000 copies published daily, La Turquie

Nouvelle was an asset that would certainly be appreciated by the government.421

421 Ibid.

155

Gürcü pointed out that, like the semiformal agencies in Europe, his agency

could not exist without the support of the government, and that any agency would

have difficulty in performing its duty without its costs being covered by a

subvention. For this reason, he asked permission to be allowed to send 200 words

daily in dispatches to foreign countries and an infinite number of words within the

Ottoman territory free of charge, in return for his services to the government and

state.422

Rifaat Paşa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was of the opinion that the Ottoman

Empire could benefit from such an agency. He stated that the ministry was in favor

of a reduction in telegraph prices for words sent abroad, but that the decision

needed to be made by the Ministry of the Interior, in cooperation with the postal and

telegraphy administration.423 Gürcü’s request was not accepted by the Parliamentary

Assembly as presented. The agency would not be allowed to telegraph 200 words to

foreign states, free of charge, daily. Instead, it could telegraph daily, fifty out of

every hundred words free of charge, and fifty to one hundred words in dispatches

only with the governmental fee. The agency would be obliged to pay the full charge

for telegraphy within Ottoman territory. It was decided to try out the Gürcü Agency

for a month, if Gürcü were to find these terms agreeable.424 The Ministry of Finance

was notified on 16 September 1909 that Gürcü had agreed to the terms.425. The

agency’s work during the trial month must have satisfied the government for the

same concession continued to be renewed. It was renewed for the last time on 12

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid.

424 Ibid.

425 BEO 3717/278740 1328 S 29 (3 September 1325).

156

March 1910 for another six months, by order of the Council of Ministers (Meclis-i

Mahsûse-i Vükela).426

After establishing the Gürcü Agency, Salih Gürcü founded the Ottoman

Telegraph Agency in August 1909.427 On 6 September 1909, it was announced in

Yeni Asir that a company called the Ottoman Telegraph Agency (Agence

Télégraphique Ottomane) had been set up with a headquarters in Constantinople,

and offices in other important centers.428 The address of its headquarters was 8, Rue

Kabristan 8 Péra (near Pera Palace).429 The agency signed an agreement with the

Ottoman government on 14 August 1909. The parties of the convention were Salih

Gürcü, director-owner of l’Agence Télégraphique Ottomane, and Azarian Effendi,

Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The convention had five

articles. Article one outlined the agency’s obligations: “Salih Gürcü undertakes to

transmit to all its correspondents the telegrams or communications, elaborated or

inspired by the Imperial Government, and featuring news, falsifications,

rectifications, articles or correspondence, and lastly official or unofficial

communications”.430 Under this article, Gürcü promised to circulate news given to

him by the Ottoman government, as well as publish its protests regarding the

circulation of false news. This article resembled the first article of the agreement the

empire and Reuters negotiated together in April 1909, in which the agency

promised to disseminate all news that the Sublime Porte regarded as necessary to

major European, American and Indian newspapers and telegraph agencies, as well

as the Havas agency.

426 MV. 137/103 1328 S 27 (3 July 1325).

427 HR.ID. 1700/32 14 August 1909.

428 Yeni Asır, “Osmanlı Telgraf Ajansı,” no. 1662, Şu’ûn-I Muhtelife (06.09.1909), 3.

429 HR.SFR.4 841/89 25 November 1909.

430 HR.ID. 1700/32 14 August 1909.

157

In the following clause, Gürcü undertook “to transmit at his own expense,

without being entitled to any reimbursement, those so-called communications which

include telegrams, up to a maximum of 250 words per month, regardless of the city

to which the telegrams are addressed”.431 It was also stated in the first article that

“M. Salih B. Gourdji, further assumed the obligation to write in a manner favorable

to the interests of the Imperial Government, the telegrams that he services, as well

as to verify the authenticity of all the new ones he will publish”. This clause

resembled the second article of the secret agreement Reuters signed with the British

Empire in 1894, stating “that the Company shall do its best to verify at the Foreign

Office all doubtful telegrams prior to publication so as to prevent the mischief

arising from the circulation of false news”. In the agreement’s last article Gürcü

made “a commitment to publish if possible on the day or at the latest the following

day, the communications of the Imperial Government in his daily bulletins”.432

Articles two and three discussed telegraph fees. In article two, it was stated

that:

…to compensate the obligations mentioned, the Imperial

Government grants Salih B. Gourdji on the telegrams he will

exchange with his correspondents abroad, a free 50 words per day

on average, additionally, the full amount of tax that is owed to the

administration of the telegraphs and posts on the telegrams

exchanged between Salih B. Gourdji and abroad up to 50 to 100

words per day on average.

In article three, Gürcü was obliged to pay “the prices of the telegrams that he will

exchange with his correspondents established in the Ottoman Empire or his offices,

and correspondents among each other”. 433

431 Ibid.

432 Ibid.

433 Ibid.

158

Article four stated that “in the event that the Imperial Government finds that

the terms of the present arrangement have not been observed by M. Salih B.Gourdji,

it will have the right to consider it null and void”. Article five declared that the

present arrangement was valid for seven months from 14 August 1909, renewable

every year in the event of continuing agreement between the contracting parties,

and that the agreement text would be prepared in duplicate at Constantinople on 14

August 1909.434

After signing the agreement with the Ottoman Empire, Gürcü started to act

as if the Ottoman Telegraph Agency was the official news agency of the empire,

and tried to receive deductions on telegraphy fees from foreign governments by

means of the Ottoman embassies. In his letter to the Ottoman representative in

Sofia, on 16 October 1909, Gürcü wrote: “I have the honour to inform you that by

virtue of an agreement with the imperial Ottoman Government, we have just created

an ottoman telegraph agency”. In his letter, Gürcü asked the ambassador, as though

the agency were an official institution, to recommend someone trustworthy to work

as the agency’s Sofia correspondent, and also to intercede with the authorities of the

country to grant the agency a fifty percent discount on telegraph rates.435

It was brought to the attention of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs

that many of its officials had received a letter from the Ottoman Telegraph Agency

composed as if the agency had official status.436 In its letter dated 25 November

1909 to Assim Bey, Ambassador in Sofia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated

that it had been informed that the newly founded Ottoman Telegraph Agency had

sent a circular to most of the Ottoman representatives abroad, making various

434 Ibid.

435 HR.SFR.4 841/89 19 October 1909.

436 Ibid.

159

proposals. It warned that the agency had no connection with the Ottoman

government, that it had only been given tax reductions because of the government’s

desire to support indigenous businesses, and that the agency was no more official

than any other agency like it:

Il nous revient que l'agence télégraphique ottomane, nouvellement

fondée a adressé une circulaire à la plupart de nos Représentants à

l'étranger, pour leur faire diverses propositions. La façon doute la

circulaire est rédigée, prête à cette agence un caractère officieux.

Je suis à préciser, pour votre gouverne, que l'agence

ottomane n'a aucenne attache avec le gouvernement. Désireux de

favoriser les entreprises indigènes nous nous sommes fornés à lui

accorder des réductions sur la taxe télégraphique. Mais l’agence

Ottomane n’est pas plus officielle un officieuse que les autres

bureaux similaires établis eu Turquie.437

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed Assim Bey to inform the other

representatives of the empire that the agency had neither an official nor unofficial

connection with the government.438

A year after the formation of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, Salih Gürcü

and Hüseyin Tosun submitted an application to the Ottoman government, sometime

in September or October 1910, to establish a semiformal agency. Gürcü and

Tosun’s argument in their application for a permit was similar to Gürcü’s one

regarding the Gürcü Agency. They argued that all governments now had their own

agencies, due to the necessity of contemporary politics. They claimed that because

the Ottoman Empire lacked such an agency, these foreign agencies were able to

circulate news against the Ottoman government that served the interests of their

governments. They added that without such an agency, the Ottoman state would not

437 Ibid. It comes to us that the ottoman telegraphic agency, newly formed, has sent a circular to the

majority of our representatives abroad, to make them different kinds of offers. The way the circular

is presented gives the agency an official character. I would like to clarify for your government that

the Ottoman agency has no connection with the government wanting to favor domestic enterprises,

we have given them a reduction in the telegraphic tax. But the Ottoman agency is no more official

than any other similar office established in Turkey.

438 Ibid.

160

have the means to defend its interests by denying untruthful news propagated by the

foreign press. As this had a negative impact on foreign policy, they requested

permission to establish a semiformal agency, like the European agencies, which

would disseminate world news daily throughout the Ottoman Empire, facilitate

constant and fast communication between the capital and provinces, distribute

favorable imperial news abroad, repudiate any false information spread by the

European press and, moreover, the agency would not telegraph political dispatches

without the supervision of a civil servant selected by the Ottoman government. To

be able to finance this semiformal news agency, they asked for some sort of

allowance and subvention, underlining that this was a necessity.439

The Directorate of Public Communication (Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-ı

Umumiye Dairesi), Ministry of the Interior, presented the report of Fazli Necip Bey,

head of the Domestic Press Directorate, on foreign press directorates and agencies

on 13 October 1910, and declared its opinion to the Sadrazam regarding Salih

Gürcü and Hüseyin Tosun’s application on 7 November 1910.440

After his visit to the press directorates in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest and

Sofia, Fazli Necip Bey realized that the telegraph agencies, established under

European press directorates, were performing important duties. Therefore, in his

report, he advised establishing a telegraph agency under the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. He recommended setting up a commission with members from the Ministry

of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a civil servant from the Postage

and Telegraphy Directorate in order to decide on such issues as to whether the

439 DH. ID 79/ 3 1328 Za 07 (10 November 1910).

440 Ibid.

161

agency would be under the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.441

On 7 November 1910, the Ministry of the Interior declared itself to be in

favor of the formation of such an agency.442 On the 10th November 1910, Fazli

Necip Bey was given the duty of representing the Domestic Press Directorate,

Ministry of the Interior, in the commission to be formed for negotiations between

the telegraph agency to be established and the domestic and foreign press

directorates.443 Later, the commission’s findings were referred to by Necip Bey

during the parliamentary discussion on 4 April 1911.444 The Council of Ministers’

Proceeding, dated 7 December 1910, gives details of the concessions granted to the

newly established Ottoman Telegraph Agency. The subject matter to be discussed

referred to Salih Gürcü and Hüseyin Tosun’s application thus: “[to] establish a

semiformal agency, like the European agencies, which would disseminate world

news daily throughout the Ottoman Empire, facilitate constant and fast

communication between the capital and provinces, distribute favorable imperial

news abroad, repudiate any false news spread by the European press, and not

telegraph political dispatches without the supervision of a civil servant selected by

the Ottoman government”.445 The proceeding stated that previously the agency had

been given the concession to telegraph abroad one hundred words for free. With the

permit dated 11 November 1910, the number of words it could telegraph without a

fee was raised to 300. Also, at home, the agency would be permitted to telegraph

600 words without a fee. It was decided to renew this permit for six more months

441 Ibid.

442 Ibid.

443 Ibid.

444 Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre:1, Cilt: 5, İçtima Senesi:3, İnikad: 72, 22.03. 1327.

445 MV. 147/1 1328 Z 04 (7 December 1910).

162

with the condition that it would cease when the new agency was established.446

Furthermore, it was decided that the permit for the new semiformal agency would

be prepared in such a manner that the agency would not have to pay governmental

tax, except the fees due to foreign governments and companies447

Establishing a semiformal agency was not proposed to parliament; instead,

providing the new agency with fee exemptions was brought before parliament on 4

April 1911.448 It was worded thus: “[the] exemption of the telegraph agency, which

was considered necessary to establish along semiformal lines, from telegraphy fees

for up to 150 words daily to certain centers within Ottoman territory”. 449 On 25

April 1911, the bill was discussed and passed by parliament, and then directed to

the senate four days later.450

Fazlı Necip Bey gave a speech on behalf of the government at the

parliament hearing on the necessity of establishing a news agency. He stated that

the government needed to form a telegraph agency for the welfare of the state. He

mentioned that every foreign country had their own telegraph agency which they

supported. He underlined that these telegraph agencies were performing great

services, in both domestic and international politics, for their states, adding that they

only looked after their own interests. He claimed that an agency in service to the

empire would inform the state about the publications of the foreign press,

concerning the Ottoman Empire, in pursuit of the empire’s best interests. Moreover,

he stated that the empire would be able to inform the world correctly regarding any

controversial incident before it had been written about by the world press.

446 Ibid.

447 Ibid.

448 Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre:1, Cilt: 5, İçtima Senesi:3, İnikad: 72, 22.03. 1327.

449 Ibid.

450 BEO. 3858/289293 16 S 1329 (16 February 1911).

163

Otherwise, if the empire had to wait until the arrival of foreign newspapers to

Constantinople to learn about such a news item, it would be too late to repudiate the

false information, as it would already have spread, damaging the empire’s image, as

had happened before. Therefore, the agency would be performing a valuable duty

for the government. Furthermore, he mentioned the necessity of having such an

agency in order to keep informed the distant provinces within the empire. He

underlined that such places were learning about events up to a month later and that

the government wanted to find a means to inform their distant territories instantly,

to “awaken the homeland”. He stated that if there was a telegraph agency in the

provinces, the number of newspapers would increase as this agency would only sell

information to the newspapers and perhaps to government offices. He mentioned

that the government desired this agency to have branch offices in 150 centers and be

exempt from telegraphy fees for dispatches of up to 150 words, which it would send

to these 150 centers. He claimed that the exemption would be beneficial for the

government as the Telegraph Ministry would be circulating telegraph dispatches

from one branch office to another, as it had been advised to do by the commission.

451

Ibrahim Efendi, an İpek deputy in support of the tax exemption, outlined the

shortcomings of the empire and the inability of the state to receive up-to-date

information, even within its own territories, and inform the world about incidents

taking place within its borders. He stated that the empire was only able to receive

news from Shkodra fifteen days after publication, and that the empire only realized

untruthful news had been disseminated in the European press after its newspapers

had arrived in the capital and been translated. He further stated that it must have

451 Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre:1, Cilt: 5, İçtima Senesi:3, İnikad: 85, 12.04. 1327, 525–

26.

164

been a European agency that had reported the news in such an untruthful manner,

following its own interests through agents sent to Shkodra specifically for this

purpose. He went on to say that “regrettably such things have not been the custom

in our country. Everything was banned under the rule of the previous government,

and it did not wish to have anyone informed about anything. It is not harmful for

people to know about incidents at home and abroad. And it may be beneficial.

Therefore, we should accept this legislative proposal.”452

İsmail Sıtkı Bey, an Aydin deputy, criticized the fact that the establishment

of a semiformal agency had not been proposed to parliament. He argued that the

government should have brought the subject before parliament, as the legislation on

establishing a semiformal agency had to be investigated by parliament, and the

exemption of telegraphy fees could have been part of this legislative proposal.

Another point in his speech was that it was not indicated in the legislative proposal

which agency would enjoy this exemption, and how many and which centers were

to receive telegraphic news. He underlined that although Fazlı Necip Bey had talked

about 150 provincial centers, this information was not included in the text of the

legislative proposal. Also, he stated that the agency should be founded first and then

the fee exemption issue could be discussed.453

In response to İsmail Sıtki Bey’s criticism and statement that the exemption

should be given after the foundation of the agency, Fazlı Necip Bey claimed that the

foreign agencies were part of a union, and that only an agency with semiformal

status could join this union. He stated that for any agency to be involved it was

necessary to be able to receive news from other parts of the world, as the agencies

452 Ibid.

453 Ibid., 527.

165

did not have agents in every country but exchanged news amongst themselves. He

claimed that if a fee exemption was not given and the agency did not have the

appearance of a semiformal agency, then it would not be able to sign contracts with

the European telegraph agencies.454

The information Fazlı Necip Bey gave about this union was incorrect. There

were agreements between the news agencies and the world was partitioned amongst

the major European agencies, which then undertook agreements with local agencies.

However, being a semiformal agency was not the precondition to being part of this

system; on the contrary, the major European agencies were receiving subsidies from

their home governments in secrecy, trying to appear as independent news agencies.

Fazlı Necip Bey’s speech demonstrates the purpose of the government in

establishing a semiformal telegraph agency: saving the empire’s image, spreading

information in the best interests of the empire, receiving world news promptly, and

sending and receiving information from the empire’s provinces.

By 31 July 1911, the Ottoman Telegraph Agency still did not have

semiformal status. The concession awarded to the agency, in the form of fee

exemptions for a duration of six months for telegrams that would be sent abroad,

with the condition of expiration on the foundation of a new agency, was renewed in

a Council of Ministers’ session on 31 July 1911. The concession had previously

been extended for two months and the council’s decision was announced to the

Ministry of Finance on 22 March 1911. The council agreed to extend it for another

three months.455

The Ottoman Telegraph Agency became the semiformal news agency of the

Ottoman Empire in the second half of 1911. Although the empire now had its own

454 Ibid.

455 MV. 155/1 1329 Ş 04 (11 August 1910).

166

agency, the CUP administration continued to reward news agency representatives

working in its territory in order to win them over, as in the Hamidian era. In early

1914, Ferguson, the Reuters’ Constantinople agent who recently had become the

director of Reuters’ Egypt office, was awarded a third-degree Ottoman order for

being a friend of the state.456 The Ottoman Telegraph Agency finally became a

semiformal agency after Gürcü’s relentless efforts; however, he was only able to

enjoy this achievement for a short period. He was removed from its administration

in October 1914, shortly before the Ottoman Empire joined World War I. It was

claimed that Gürcü lost his position in the agency’s administration because he was

pro-French; however, British intelligence reports suggest that he was removed

because of his dishonesty and lack of work ethics.457

Gürcü became a reporter with the Milli Agency (the National Ottoman

Telegraph Agency), successor of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, at which time he

started getting in touch with the British government. Despite being relieved of his

duties from the Ottoman Telegraph Agency’s administration, the Ottoman

government continued to have suspicions of Gürcü’s loyalties, and with good cause.

He contacted the British government, first in 1915, while working as the National

Ottoman Telegraph Agency’s reporter in Switzerland and, later, in 1919, offering

his services both times in return for his demands being fulfilled. In 1917, he

traveled to Paris, in secrecy, most probably to meet with a foreign state’s

representative.

456 DH. KMS. 10/12 1332 S 12 (10 January 1914).

457 P.P.G. Intelligence Department Cairo to Arthur Henry McMahon, 14 January 1916, FO 371/2492,

file no: 191093, no: 191093, 14 December 1915, NA.

167

On 8 December 1915, Gürcü approached the British Minister in Berne,

Grant Duff, on the question of a separate peace treaty with Turkey. Duff

summarized the interview between himself and Gürcü as follows:

He was of opinion that Turkey would be disposed to make a

separate peace if the Entente Powers would let the Ottoman

Government have reasonable terms. There was a very strong

feeling at Constantinople and generally in Turkey against the

German domination and he was quite certain that Talaat Bey, who

was by far the most powerful person in the Ottoman Empire,

would not be obdurate if properly approached. He was in constant

touch with him.

There were two weapons, beyond reasonable terms of peace,

which England might use with effect:-

1. A treaty to transfer the position of Caliph to one of the

Mussulman Sovereigns under British or French influence. He

mentioned the Sultan of Morocco, Bey of Tunis, Sultan of Egypt,

etc.

2. An energetic anti-German propaganda in Mohammedan

countries, Egypt, Northern Indis, etc.458

On receipt of Duff’s letter, the Foreign Office consulted Mr. Fitzmaurice

and formed an opinion on the subject. The statements of Mr. Fitzmaurice were

noted in the Foreign Office minutes as follows:

I knew Salih Bey Gourji, who is a Jew from Bagdad, when he was

“Directeur” of the Agence Ottomane which enabled him to send

30,000 words [?] per day within the Ottoman Empire. In this

capacity he used to disseminate an auspicious flow of anti-British

news, principally about England’s alleged designs on

Mesopotamia, Arabia, etc.

His suggestion that England should threaten to transfer the

Caliphate to Egypt sounds insidious.

It is doubtful how far Gourji is now entitled to speak on

behalf of the governing body at Constantinople. Apart from such

difficulties as the latest phase of the Armenian Question and the

likely demand of the Turks for the complete evacuation of the

Basra region, one of the obvious objections to Gourji’s suggestion

of [?] for a separate peace is that the matter may be unacceptable

to Russia and lead to sow distrust as discussion between England

and Russia, the constant aim of Turco-German workings in Sevres

as Turkey entered the war by an attack on Russia, perhaps any

458 Duff to Sir Edward Grey, 8 December 1915, FO 371/2492, file no: 191093, no: 191093, 14

December 1915, NA.

168

overtures for peace would more properly be addressed to that

Power.

The Turks look on life through military spectacles and have

been drawn into the German orbit owning to their belief in the

superiority of the German military machine. When they see the [?]

or [?] defeat of the latter, they will be more anxious than at

present to make peace on terms agreeable to the allies. Further if

the Germans appear in any considerable force at Constantinople,

the Turks will begin to visualize the German ‘King Storer’ and a

[?] will thereby be given to any tendencies to seek peace on

reasonable terms.459

Gürcüi’s suggestions “that H.M.G. should transfer the Caliphate to Egypt” was

found “insidious” by Sir Edward Grey, “whereas his other proposals recall in a

suspicious manner the several attempts of the Committee of Union and Progress to

sow disaccord between Great Britain and Russia”.460

Duff was instructed not to have any more contact with Salih Gürcü on the

following grounds:

For the present it would appear prudent to reply to all such

advances, the bona fides of which is open to doubt, to the effect

that Turkey having begun the war by an attack upon Russia, it

should be to that Power, and not her Allies, that any peace

overtures should be addressed.

Moreover, it is probable that until the glamour of the

military successes of the German armies has to some extent

become clouded, and until the danger of the German domination

in Turkey has more fully been realised, it will be difficult to

obtain from Turkey any conditions such as the actual superiority

of the allies will entitle them to expect.461

Arthur Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, was also informed

about Salih Gürcü’s interview with the British Minister in Berne. McMahon

consulted the Intelligence Department about Gürcü and formed the following

opinion, based on his record in the Intelligence Department:

From his record, he does not appear to be a very desirable

intermediary and his communications should probably be

459 Minutes, 22 December 1915, FO 371/2492, file no: 191093, no: 191093, 14 December 1915.

460 Grey to Duff, 26 December 1915, FO 371/2492, file no: 191093, no: 191093, 14 December 1915.

461 Grey to Duff, 26 December 1915, FO 371/2492.

169

accepted with caution. Any unauthorized intervention in the

question of the Caliphate tends to be dangerous, and a deal on the

lines suggested by Gourdji would probably involve the question of

Constantinople. Thus his proposals may conceivably have been

made with a view to causing friction between England and Russia.

Our enemies would doubtless spare no intrigue to promote discord

between ourselves and Russia regarding Constantinople, as they

would between ourselves and France in connection with Syria and

the Arabs.462

Moreover, McMahon enclosed this report with the letter he wrote to Sir

Edward Grey. The report included striking details about Gürcü and the Ottoman

Telegraph Agency. The British Foreign Office report stated that the Ottoman

government was paying the Ottoman Telegraph Agency large amounts of

subvention: “Salih Gurji first became known at Constantinople in 1910, when he

founded the ‘Agence Ottomane’, a telegraphic Agency subventioned by the

Ottoman Government to the extent of £T 30,000 or £T 40,000 a year.”463

According to the report: “The news published by the Agency reflected the

views of the then Government, which was in the hands of the Committee of Union

and Progress. It was mendacious and ‘tenacious’ lost few chances in attacking

Russia and had an occasional dig at England. France was generally let off with faint

commendation this doubtless in anticipation of financial favours to come, but when

the 1910 Loan fell through, she was subjected to severe criticism.” The report

mentions the objections that took place regarding Gürcü being in charge of the

agency and claims that the objections took place because, “the concession, for such

it was, of a lucrative ‘enterprise de publicité’, to a little known Hebrew provoked

462 McMahon to Grey, 18 January 1916, FO 371/2771, file no: 16374, no: 16374, 26 January 1916.

463 P.P.G., Intelligence Department Cairo to McMahon, 14 January 1916, FO 371/2492, file no:

191093, no: 191093, 14 December 1915.

170

some comment at the time but was easily explained”.464 It was stated that the reason

Gourdji became the director of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency was because:

…the Committee of Union and Progress, or rather its extreme

Judaco-Turkish wing, took care to find posts for its most trusted

supporters which were not particularly brilliant, in the opinion of

the uninformed public, but were in reality of great importance.

Thus the Press Bureau fell to the Salonike Donmé FAZLI

NEJIB, the Secret Service to Azmy Bey, with Samuel Eff., a Jew

of Seres, as his second in command, the Gendarmerie to Ghalib

Bey, etc., etc. Gurji was believed to have been selected on account

of his good knowledge of French from among several Jewish

candidates for the post of proprietor of this ‘Semi-official

Agency’. He survived the Kiamil Régime, and on the return to

power of the Committee became, to judge from the publications of

his Agency, more hostile to Great Britain and Russia than

before.465

In order to underline his untruthfulness and unreliability it was also depicted that:

In the summer of 1914, Salih Gurji was blackballed by the

‘British Club de Constantinople’ on account of the belief that he

would make his membership a cloak for espionage, and the

knowledge that he had (a) repeated confidential conversations

with French journalists to his Government. (b) Assisted Turks and

Germans in an anti-British propaganda among the Moslems and

Jews at Adana, Aleppo, Baghdad, etc.466

The report also explained why Gourji lost his position in the agency:

When the European War broke out Salih got into trouble,

according to his account, through his French sympathies, but

according to others, on account of the discovery that, ever anxious

to turn an honest or dishonest penny, he had sold information

prior to its official publication in a form which would please the

authorities to French or Italian journalists.467

The transformation of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency into the National

Agency was depicted thus:

The ‘Agence Ottomane’ was said to have been deprived of its

subvention and brought to an untimely end: in reality the ‘Agence

Milli’ (National Agency), which took its place, was the same

464 P.P.G, Intelligence Department Cairo to McMahon, 14 January 1916, FO 371/2492.

465 Intelligence Department to McMahon, FO 371/2492.

466 Ibid.

467 Ibid.

171

Agency under another title, Gurji ceased to be ‘director’ but

retained his financial interest in the business, and his friends, to

whom he had given jobs in the Agency, kept their places in the

‘Milli’, which became openly pro-German and anti-Ally.468

The report also stated that “Gurji has been used by Talaat often enough. One doubts

whether he has any great influence over him whatever.”469

A record from 1917 shows that the Ottoman Empire was suspicious of

Gourdji for it documents that the government was investigating his travels. In 1917,

the Ottoman government found out that he had traveled to Paris. Halîl Bey, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, investigated the matter and presented his findings to

Talʻat Bey, the Minister of the Interior. In the memorandum, it was stated that

although Salih Gürcü’s wife mentioned that her husband traveled to the United

States as a reporter, after an investigation it was realized that he had traveled to

Paris instead. The memorandum mentioned that it did not make sense for an

Ottoman citizen to travel to the United States at that time, and the fact that he did

not apply for the necessary papers for traveling to this country verified the account

that he in fact had traveled to France. It was also stated that even if it was true that

he had traveled to the United States, he would still have needed to take the boat

from France.470

Later, in 1919, Salih Gürcü Bey reappeared in the British Foreign Office

records. He offered one of the members of the Eastern Department of the Foreign

Office the opportunity to cooperate with the British Empire by spreading British

propaganda in Arab lands through establishing a pro-British news agency in

Palestine. Gürcü’s offer and Chaim Weizmann (Zionist politician and future

president of Israel)’s request for information about him led to several

468 Ibid.

469 Ibid.

470 HR.SYS. 2267/47 20 January 1917.

172

communications within the Foreign Office in order to decide what his true political

standing was. By making this offer, not only did Gürcü intend to align with the

victors of the war, and enjoy a new source of income through a news agency that

would be funded by the British government, but he also hoped to take over

L’agence de Turquie, which was partners with Reuters and Havas, with the claim

that the Milli Agency had been illegally confiscated from him. As will be discussed

further in Chapter V, on 9 February 1919, the Milli Agency’s name was changed to

L’agence de Turquie and it became under the control of the French and British

governments through Havas and Reuters.

In his meeting with one of the officials of the Eastern Department, Gürcü

stated that he was originally from Baghdad and that his family had lived there for

centuries. He explained that he had left Constantinople because of the climate,

which was too hot for him, and that he “went to America where he held some 65

pro ally meetings”.471 He emphasized his Arabic origins to convince the Foreign

Office that his scheme to establish a pro-British agency would succeed:

Since the war he had thought of engaging in commerce, but at Dr.

Weizmann’s entreaty he was prepared to give this up to undertake

to run a pro-British news-agency in Palestine which would also

make every endeavor to harmonize Arab and Jewish views in

Palestine and Syria.

He maintained that his Arab origin would be of tremendous

assistance in his work. His agency was to be worked in

conjunction with Reuter’s in London, with whom he would have a

representative.

He also pointed out that his pre-war dealings with the Turks

had given him an insight into their politics and intrigues which

would enable him to combat them successfully. (Minutes of a

Conversation of Salih Gourdji Bey with a member of the Eastern

Department, 9 July 1919)

471 Minutes of a conversation between Salih Gourdji Bey and a member of the Eastern Department,

9 July 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no: 98473, 5 July 1919.

173

Moreover, Gürcü communicated a memorandum to Sir Louis Mallet on 17

June 1919, explaining the reason for his misfortune and including his demands from

the British Foreign Office, perhaps in return for establishing a pro-British news

agency. Disagreement between him and the CUP was outlined thus:

Salih Bey Gourdji, founder-owner of the Telegraphic Turkish

Agency of Constantinople, was expelled from his agency and

threatened with imprisonment and death in 1914 because of his

hostility for the participation of Turkey in the war. Salih Bey

published in September 1914 a brochure: ‘Why Turkey should not

ally with Germany’ and a pamphlet against Talat and Enver. For

these reasons, he had to flee Istanbul. 472

He claimed that even after leaving the Ottoman Empire, he continued to pursue the

ideals of the Allies. Thinking that being a Zionist would help him to convince

Britain to entrust him with the establishment of a news agency in Palestine:

For five years, he devoted himself in body and soul to serve the

cause of the Allies and notably for English interests.

He returned from America where he held 65 conferences

with pro-Ally propaganda for two and a half years.

Mr. Gourdji has been a member of the Zionist party for

more than fifteen years.473

Gürcü reminded Mallet that the Turkish government had breached the

convention signed between them, perhaps to imply that it could be used against the

Turkish government when and if necessary:

Following the injustice that he suffered for five years because of

the attitude of the Talat government towards him, and as the

Convention between the Turkish government and Salih Bey

Gourdji that was signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had

been violated, Salih Bey reserves his right to take a legal action

against the Sublime Porte.474

He demanded the following from the British Foreign Office:

472 Minutes, 9 July 1919, FO 371/2771.

473 Ibid.

474 Ibid.

174

1) A sequestration/trustee to be put on the assets and the fortune of

Hussein Tossoun Bey, a director of ex-agency Milli, agent of Talat,

who in 1914, overtly threatened Salih Bey with assassination.

2) He demands that the Turkish government recognize Salih Bey as

the legitimate owner of the Agency, currently functioning in

Istanbul under the name ‘Agence de Turquie’ [Agency of Turkey].

3) Selim Bey Gourdji, who is currently in Istanbul, and brother of

Salih Gourdji Bey to be appointed by the Sublime Porte as the

general manager of the Agence de Turquie of which the revenues

will be placed under his control and transferred to a bank, until

Salih Bey himself asserts his rights in Istanbul. 475

In his correspondence to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Mr. Arthur Balfour stated

the opinion of Sir Mallet on Gürcü and his offer:

In Sir L. Mallet’s opinion, Salih Bey Gourdji is a clever man with

a considerable knowledge of the inner workings of Turkish

politics. Sir L. Mallet further considers that he was opposed to the

war and was not persona grata to the C.U.P. for which reason he

was replaced as director of the Agence Ottomane. During the war

he lectured in America, and Sir L. Mallet has seen reports of his

lectures attacking the C.U.P. For these reasons it may be impolitic

entirely to disregard the claim put forward in his memorandum or

to offend him, as he is likely to be useful to His Majesty’s

Government or the reverse whichever course offered him the

greatest advantage. It is therefore suggested for Lord Curzon’s

consideration that a copy of Salih Bey Gourdji’s memorandum

should be sent to Constantinople, and that Admiral Calthorpe

should be informed of the facts as stated above and that there is a

possibility of his employment by the Zionist Organisation at

Damascus.

It might be proposed to Admiral Calthorpe that in the

circumstances no harm could be done by giving him unofficial

assistance or, at any rate, by creating the impression of so doing,

but that it should be left to Admiral Calthorpe’s discretion to

decide what action, if any, should be taken in the matter.476.

On 16 June 1919, Mr. Balfour sent a telegram to Admiral Calthorpe, High

Commissioner in Constantinople, and stated that “in Sir Louis Mallet’s recollection

the agency was strongly pro-Ally and Salih Bey so convinced an opponent of the

pro-German policy that he was forced to fly from Constantinople, in consequence

475 Ibid.

476 Balfour to Curzon, 4 July 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no: 98473, 5 July 1919.

175

of his outspoken hostility to Germany and the C.U.P.”477 and he requested Admiral

Calthorpe to ask Mr. Ryan to confirm this information. The High Commissioner

disproved the information on Gürcü:

Mr. Ryan has no personal knowledge of Salih Gourdji. I cannot

discover that he was strongly pro-Ally or that he was openly

identified with opposition to C.U.P.

‘Agence Ottomane’, which he started in 1909, was the

subsidized and semi-official mouth-piece of Government, and he

remained in charge of it until October 1914 when he was got rid

of and the Agency reorganized under the name of Milli or

national. When in Europe later on he acted as a correspondent for

the Milli Agency but the connection was eventually severed.

Salih is a Jew from Baghdad. The impression I get is that he

was mildly displeasing to C.U.P. but ready enough to serve them;

mildly Zionist and ‘opportunist’.478

On receiving Admiral Calthorpe’s telegram, the Foreign Office warned Mr.

Weizmann about Gürcü by rephrasing Calthorpe’s statements and ended the letter

by underlining that:

Salih Guourdji is a Jewish native of Baghdad. He has never been a

persona grata to the Commission of Union of Progress but was

ready enough to serve them, and may be described as mildly

Zionist, but above all an opportunist.479

The High Commissioner’s telegram also informed him that Gürcü lost his position

as director of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency in October 1914, that the name of the

agency was then changed to ‘Milli’, and that Gürcü subsequently became the

correspondent of the Milli Agency.480

Notes in the foreign office minutes reflect the officers’ distrust of Gürcü:

“The idea of H.M.G. pandering to a Turkish adventurer through fear of what might

result from his possible displeasure does not appeal to me, nor, judging by his

477 Balfour to Somerset Arthur Gouch Calthorpe, 16 June 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no:

98473, 5 July 1919.

478 Calthorpe to Balfour, 28 June 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no: 98473, 5 July 1919.

479 Foreign Office to Weizman, 14 July 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no: 98473, 5

July 1919.

480 Calthorpe to Balfour, 28 June 1919, FO 371/2771.

176

telegram to Mr. Balfour does it seem likely to appeal to Admiral Calthorpe. His

requests too seem to me preposterous.”481 “So far as I remember this man, he is of

no influence and a [?] who is much more likely to work against us than for us.”482

Gürcü tried to take advantage of the contemporary political situation to take back

the administration of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, secure compensation, and

find himself a new source of income by collaborating with the British Empire.

The semi-formal Ottoman Telegraph Agency was a product of a long lasting

scheme that had been pursued since 1878. However, it only lasted for three years.

Because the Ottoman government started to regard its founder and director Salih

Gürcü as untrustworthy. The British documents suggest that the Ottoman Empire

was correct in its decision to expulse him from the agency’s administration. Gürcü

shortly offered his services to the British Empire. The Ottoman Telegraph Agency

was transformed to l’agence Milli and it operated under a new director, Hüseyin

Tosun during World War I. After the Allies’ occupation l’agence Milli was

transformed to La Turquie and then to l’agence Orientale d’informations.

6.1. l’Agence Milli (The National Ottoman Telegraph Agency)

On 15 November 1914, after the removal of Salih Gürcü, the duty of

transforming and administering the agency fell to Hüseyin Tosun, who was

Erzurum Deputy at the time.483 Tosun became the Ottoman Telegraph Agency’s

481 O.A.S, 7 July 1919, FO 371/2771, file no: 98473, no: 98473, 5 July 1919.

482 W.S.S. Ibid.

483 BEO. 4332/324854 1333 S 27 (14 January 1915).

177

director.484 By March 1915, the Ottoman Telegraph Agency was replaced by the

National Ottoman Telegraph Agency (the Milli Agency).485

The previous contract with the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, which was

signed during Gürcü’s administration, was terminated. In the new contract, signed

on 15 November 1914, the agency’s services were outlined as follows: to

disseminate and announce every type of formal and informal, domestic and foreign,

political and economic view of the empire, to be a mediator for all published

statements of the government offices, and to serve the empire’s interests. To be able

to perform these duties it was decided that the agency had to be in regular contact

with the state offices and receive suitable information from them for publishing.

Those statements of the gravest importance were to be given directly to the

agency’s directorate by the Press Directorate.486 All state offices were informed

about this decision and were instructed to initiate relations with the agency with this

in mind. 487

There is more information available regarding Tosun compared to Gürcü.

Hüseyin Tosun Bey, who was one of the founders of the Ottoman Telegraph

Agency and the Founder-Director of the National Ottoman Telegraph Agency, was

from a Circassia family that settled in the Manyas region during the 1864 Circassian

exile. He was a dedicated CUP member, studied at the military academy and

became an officer. He was imprisoned at Taşkışla during the reign of Abdülhamid

484 Ibid.

485 BEO. 4344/325785 1333 Ca 02 (17 April 1915).

486 BEO. 4332/324854 1333 S 27 (14 January 1915).

487 BEO. 2886/216385 1324 C 15 (7 July 1906).

178

II for taking part in the revolutionary movement.488 In 1896, he was appointed as a

French teacher to the Tripoli Military Junior High School as a place of exile.489

According to Abdullah Cevdet, during his three-year stay, Hüseyin Tosun

helped government opponents to escape and supported their financially distressed

families. Abdullah Cevdet was among those whom he helped to escape. Tosun,

along with Pietro Suvalle, arranged Cevdet’s escape to Tunisia by sailing boat.490

Tosun finally managed to escape from his place of exile, traveled to Paris,

and got in touch with the Young Turks.491 In 1902, he took part in the first Young

Turk congress as a Circassian delegate with his friend, the military doctor

Circassian Kemal Bey. He became one of the founders of the League of Private

Initiative and Decentralization (Teşebbüsü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti),

which was established under the leadership of Prince Sabahaddin after the

congress.492

With the deportation of Abdullah Cevdet from Switzerland, Hüseyin Tosun

left Paris and moved to Switzerland to take over the İçtihad Mecmuası.493 He

remained the director throughout 1904.494 He also took part in the publishing of the

Terakki newspaper in Paris. In 1907, at the second Young Turk congress, as well as

at the second congress of the Ottoman Liberals in Paris, Tosun supported the idea of

‘decentralization’, along with Prince Sabahaddin.495

488 Nart Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde İz Bırakan Çerkesler (İzmir: Neşa Ofset Ambalaj, 2010), 295.

489 Abdullah Cevdet, “Hüseyin Tosun’u Gaybettik,” İçtihad (15 January 1930): 5322.

490 Cevdet, “Hüseyin Tosun’u Gaybettik,” 5323.

491 Hüsamettin Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2011), 76.

492 Kozok, İz Bırakan Çerkesler, 296.

493 Orhan Türkdoğan, “Hüseyin Tosun: Bir İhtilalcinin Profili,” Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları (Feb.

1987): 72.

494 Türkdoğan, “Hüseyin Tosun,” 72.

495 Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde, 296.

179

With the help and directives of the CUP, Tosun arrived in Caucasia

disguised as a Russian subject, crossed the border and entered Erzurum.496 In order

to hide his true identity, he opened a store in the city.497 He became a prominent

member of the CUP’s Erzurum branch.498 He was in charge of the distribution of

illegal publications in the Eastern provinces. Revolutionary publications, such as the

letters, documents and newspapers which crossed the border with the help of the

Kars Post Office manager, Çarpan, were first passed on to the Erzurum Post Office

manager. From there, they were distributed to cities, such as Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır,

Muş and Erzincan, by Hüseyin Tosun and Hüsamettin Ertürk. Mechveret and Şurayı

Ümmet were among these publications.499 Tosun was receiving instructions from

Ahmet Rıza Bey and Doktor Bahaeddin Şakir Bey.500

On 25 November 1907, Hüseyin Tosun was arrested along with several

others for taking part in revolutionary propaganda. They were accused of being

members of the CUP, an illegal organization. The arrests continued over the

following days and the number of people arrested for taking part in the Erzurum

uprisings of 1906 and 1907 against newly introduced taxation reached one hundred

and seventy.501 While under arrest, Hüseyin Tosun was severely tortured,502 like the

rest of the prisoners.503

The government issued a case against them for attempting to overthrow the

regime. The trials started on 28 January 1908 in Erzurum with Judge Salim Bey

preceding. The defendants were accused of killing police officers, wounding

496 Ertürk, İki Devrin, 76.

497 Cevdet, “Hüseyin Tosun’u Gaybettik,” 5323.

498 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 67.

499 Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, 66–67.

500 Ertürk, İki Devrin, 76.

501 Ertürk, İki Devrin, 84–85.

502 Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde, 297.

503 Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, 84–85.

180

Governor Mehmed Ata Bey, trying to abolish the Şahsi Vergi and Hayvanat-ı

Ehliye Rüsumu, trying to overthrow the regime by agitating in favor of a

parliamentary regime, and distributing illegal publications, revolutionary

newspapers and bulletins, for this purpose. The trials ended on 10 February 1908.

By order of the government, Hüseyin Tosun was sent to Istanbul Jail to serve his

sentence.504 He was released from prison with the help of his relative Hüseyin Kadri

Bey, who was a highly influential member of the CUP.505

After the declaration of the Second Parliamentary Regime, he was elected

Erzurum Deputy. He served in the parliament as an independent deputy from 18

April to 5 August 1912, and from 1914 to 1918.506

Hüseyin Tosun became one of the founding members of the board of the

Köylü Bilgi Cemiyeti, which was established on 21 April 1330 (4 May 1914) in

İstanbul, Cağaloğlu. Information about this society is scarce: it was a subsidiary

organ of the CUP, founded to connect the CUP and the peasants. The society solely

dealt with publications.507

In 1911, after the attack of the Italians, Hüseyin Tosun went to Tripoli and

took part in the mobilization of people.508 He worked for the Special Organization

(Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) as the director of the Africa and Tripoli Branch.509 He was

504 Ibid., 86–8.

505 Kozok, İz Bırakan Çerkesler, 297.

506 Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, “İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler: 1908-1918,”

Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, nos. 4–5 (1976): 278.

507 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi (İstanbul:

İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 501.

508 Kozok, İz Bırakan Çerkesler, 297.

509 This information is only available in Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 3:

İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000),

342. Though, Tosun was in fact residing in Tripoli at the time.

181

imprisoned by the Italians and taken to Rome. After his return to İstanbul, he was

appointed as the manager of the Ottoman Telegraph Agency.510

In February 1919, Hüseyin Tosun Bey was arrested by Tevfik Paşa’s

government and sent to Bekirağa Division prison.511 His brother, Mehmet Reşit

Bey, committed suicide in İstanbul to avoid being put on trial.512 He was one of the

founders of the İttihad-i Osmani Committee, which was established in İstanbul by

students of the Military Medical School (Tıbbiye-i Şahane).513

In May 1919, Admiral Richard Webb, deputy of the British High

Commissioner, made a list of prisoners who would be exiled to Malta with priority.

They were regarded as “the most dangerous criminals” by the British High

Commission. The list consisted of fifty-nine people, including Hüseyin Tosun. On

19 May 1919, while submitting the list to General George Milne, Admiral Webb

made a change and put a star next to the names of nineteen people to underline their

importance. Hüseyin Tosun Bey was among these nineteen, with the crime of

disturbing the peace.514

On 28 May 1919, the SS Princess Ena Malta disembarked from İstanbul

with seventy-eight exiles to travel to Malta. Hüseyin Tosun Bey was among the

sixty-seven captives from Bekirağa Division prison. The other eleven exiles were

the parliamentarians of the South-Western Caucasian Republic (Cenubî Garbi

Kafkas Cumhuriyeti). The exiles were regrouped into three by Admiral Calthorpe:

twelve former ministers or politicians, forty-one former ministers, politicians,

governors or lower-ranking civil servants, and fourteen officers. While traveling to

510 Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde, 297.

511 Bilal N. Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 57–58.

512 Türkdoğan, Bir İhtilalcinin Portresi, 71.

513 Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler Cilt 1, 51.

514 Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri , 96–97.

182

Malta, on 29 May 1919, the ship visited Limnos Island and dropped off twelve

exiles from the first group at Port Mudros. Hüseyin Tosun Bey was one of them.

The exiles were imprisoned there for almost four months until they were taken to

Malta on 21 September 1919. In Admiral Calthorpe’s report to Lord Curzon on 31

May 1919, Hüseyin Tosun Bey’s number was written down as 2765 and his reason

for exile was stated as disturbing the peace and mistreating the Armenians.

Moreover, he was described as Erzurum Deputy, and the owner and administrator

of the National Telegraph Agency.515

It was agreed by the Treaty of London, signed on 16 March 1921, that sixtyfour

exiles from Malta would be set free in exchange for twenty-two British war

captives. However, the British were reluctant to release the exiles because of the

recent attack of the Greeks on the Turks at the Bursa and Uşak fronts, hoping for a

Greek victory. The defeat of the Greeks at the Second Battle of İnönü undermined

the hopes of the British. In order to secure the freedom of the twenty-two British

captives, on 13 April 1921, the British government ordered Lord Plumer, the

Governor of Malta, to release only forty of the sixty-four exiles, agreed to be freed

in the treaty. They were to be transferred to Italy.516

Hüseyin Kadri Bey was on the list of exiles to be released and transferred to

Italy on 30 April 1921.517 He changed places with Hüseyin Tosun Bey, who was

sick, by taking advantage of the name resemblance.518 Hüseyin Kadri Bey arrived in

İstanbul on 30 October 1921, a month later, with the last group of exiles.519 Hüseyin

515 Ibid., 97–108.

516 Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, 355–67.

517 Ibid., 369.

518 Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde, 298.

519 Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, 398.

183

Tosun Bey died in İstanbul on 7 January 1930 due to prostate cancer, in poverty,

unable to cover his medical expenses.520

6.2. La Turquie

Baron Herbert de Reuter committed suicide on 18 April 1915.521 After his

death, under Roderick Jones’ leadership, the shares of the Reuters were bought by

the British government. In 1916, the company was reconstructed and became

Reuters Limited. This new Reuters, with a manager (Roderick Jones) who was a

chief executive and Director of Propaganda in the Ministry of Information, and a

director (John Buchan) who was the Director of Intelligence at the same ministry,

serving the official propaganda efforts of the British government both within and

outside its territory, signed an agreement with the Milli Agency to ease the Ally

occupation of Anatolia. On 9 February 1919, only three months after the occupation

of Constantinople, Reuters signed an agreement with Havas and the Milli Agency to

distribute news in Turkish territory under the name La Turquie-Havas-Reuter.

The official signing of the contract took place on 15 April 1920, between

Mr. Werndel, the representative of Reuters Limited in Constantinople, M. Mothu,

the representative of l’Agence Havas in Constantinople, and Mehmet Ali Bey,

Minister of the Interior and concessionary of l’Agence La Turquie.522

520 Kozok, Osmanlı Tarihinde, 298.

521 Read, Power of News, 126.

522 Treaty of Cession (English Translation), 23 October 1922, 1/8715629, LN 247, 24 October 1922,

RA.

184

6.3. l’Agence Orientale d’Informations

On 24 October 1922, almost two weeks after the signing of the Armistice of

Mudanya, the Treaty of Cession was signed between the following parties: Havas

was represented by Andre Meynot, one of its delegated administrators, Reuters was

represented by Samuel Carey Clements, manager secretary, Salih Gürcü, Proprietor-

Director of l’Agence Telegraphique Ottomane, and Alemdar Zade Munir Hairi,

Director of the Bureau d’Informations Orientales. Munir Hairi was also the agent of

the National Agency in Constantinople, while he was serving at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs as mektoubdji (secretary general).523 The treaty foresaw the

establishment of l’Agence Orientale d’Informations before 28 February 1923.

Furthermore, the services of La Turquie-Havas-Reuter were to be carried on under

the name of l’Agence Orientale d’Informations after the cancellation of the contract

with La Turquie.

Salih Gourdji and Munir Hairi, who were named as nominated directors of

the new agency in the main text of the second treaty which listed their rights and

obligations, now with an annexation to the treaty’s second paragraph of Article V,

were to share their title and influence with two others, Ferguson and Mothu.

L’Agence Orientale d’Informations never came to life. Reuters ended up

signing an agreement with the Anatolian Agency, which was founded on 6 April

1920, to counter British and French propaganda in Anatolia during the Turkish War

of Independence. Having disseminated news against Turkish forces and the Ankara

government throughout the war by means of La Turquie, which was operating in

partnership with Havas and Reuters, the British and French governments envisioned

523 “Le Presse Française et les agences d’informations en Turquie,” Les Nouvelles D’Orient:

Organce des Intérêts Français en Turquie, 17 October 1895, 3.

185

this contract on defeat of the Greek forces so as not to lose their propaganda

weapon in Anatolia, especially before the signing of a peace treaty. This is signified

by the contract’s date, 24 October 1922, only two weeks after the Armistice of

Mudanya. Now that Mehmet Ali Bey, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior and

concessionary of La Turquie, no longer had any influence, the British and French

governments thought that they could appoint others to preserve an agency in

Anatolia which served their interests. It has already been discussed above that the

British government did not find Salih Gürcü reliable. However, under pressure to

conclude a contract immediately with the expectation that its validity would be

accepted by, or forced upon, the new Turkish government, the British government

appointed Salih Gürcü as one of the directors of the new agency. Gürcü’s claims to

the Ottoman Telegraph Agency, discussed above, might well have been convenient

to the British government as it could declare that this new agency, l’Agence

Orientale d’Informations, was the Ottoman Telegraph Agency’s successor, which

had been confiscated unlawfully from Gürcü by the CUP. Therefore, Gürcü had

ownership rights to the Ottoman Telegraph Agency and its successors. He was

addressed as Proprietor-Director of the Agence Telegraphique Ottomane in the

contract.

186

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Initiated by Havas, Wolff’s and Reuters, news agencies flourished

throughout the nineteenth century and their influence accelerated. The news agency

owners and stockholders took advantage of this power by increasing profits and

investments abroad. These three European news agencies established close relations

with the various governments of their day. In this way they were able to reduce

costs and maximize profits, as well as having access to official information prior to

others. Apart from these general benefits resulting from their close contact with the

governments, they were also able to access a vast imperial news market and defy

any competition by using their relationships with their own imperial governments.

It is revealed in this dissertation that owners and stockholders of news

agencies had investments in other sectors as well. They treated the news as a

commodity, and the news business like any other area of investment. They were

merely investors who wanted to increase their incomes and wealth. For this purpose

they tried to influence governmental policies, manipulate empires, and take

advantage of conflicts between empires like in the cases of the Persian Concession

187

and the Greek Railway Concession. The Reuter family’s investments have been

used as a case study to highlight the activities of capitalist investors in the

developing parts of the world during the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries. The family’s rising influence also signified the rise of a new class from

the service sector in the British Empire.

The Ottoman Empire, which since the eighteenth century had been in pursuit

of consolidating power within the imperial centre and preserving the empire,

regarded telegraphic communication and agencies as instruments in achieving this

purpose. Therefore, it gave the utmost importance to establishing and extending the

system and forming the necessary cadres. Telegraphic communication facilitated

receiving and sending information throughout its lands, which were being ravaged

by wars, uprisings, banditry, and the disloyalty of its provincial representatives. The

findings of the dissertation suggest that controlling foreign news agencies was

important for the Ottoman Empire in order to influence public opinion at home and

abroad. The information disseminated by foreign news agencies travelling

throughout its lands was challenging the central authority and the empire’s

territorial integrity, which became evident in the frequent uprisings and later in the

regime change of 1908. Moreover, during the nineteenth century the empire had a

problem with the image it was portraying to the rest of the world, especially Europe,

which seriously challenged its existence. To fight the imperial aspirations of the

European powers, which attempted to influence Ottoman and European public

opinion, the Ottoman Empire tried to put Havas, Reuters and Wolff’s under its

control by using financial incentives. However, this plan did not succeed as the

agencies promised to work for any and every country that paid them which was

revealed by the dissertation's research in the Ottoman Archive, Reuters Archive, the

188

United Kingdom National Archives, Grand National Assembly of Turkey Archives,

and Churchill Archive.

By combining primary sources from five archives in two countries, the

dissertation discloses that the Ottoman Empire regarded the news agencies as

instruments to have an impact on domestic and foreign public opinion. First, it had

the policy to gain control of the major European news agencies by financial means.

Shortly, the Ottoman statesmen tailored another policy, establishing an imperial

news agency. They conducted research on European news agencies to understand

how they were operating and the traits the imperial news agency had to possess.

From Abdülhamid II’s reign onwards, Ottoman statesmen attempted to establish an

agency serving only the empire’s interests. The idea was never abandoned and the

plan not even interrupted by the regime change in 1908. The Ottoman Telegraph

Agency, founded in 1909 by Salih Gürcü, became the empire’s semi-formal news

agency in 1911, and served the empire by announcing its official declarations and

denials, and countering foreign propaganda spread both at home and abroad on the

eve of World War I. It was replaced by l’Agence Milli in 1914, shortly after the

start of the war. Demonstrating the importance of the agencies at the time in

disseminating news, the Allies put the successors of the Ottoman Telegraph

Agency, La Turquie, and l’Agence Orientale d’Informations, under their control.

189

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