513

 ROLE OF GUNPOWDER AND FIREARMS IN THE DECLINE OF
THE OTTOMAN AND MUGHAL EMPIRES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey for granting me YLSY scholarship to pursue PhD in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), under the Indian Studies Programme and opened the doors of India and Indian academia for me.
The scholarship gave an opportunity to meet my supervisor Professor Aswini Kumar Mohapatra. I would like to thank Professor Mohapatra whose encouragement, guidance and support throughout the period of my thesis enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject. Without his suggestion and inspiration, this research would not have been possible for me.
I would like to thank Professor Mehmet Yaşar Ertaş and Professor Arif Bilgin for their support and encouragement to travel to India. I am also thankful to the faculty of the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies, JNU for their support during the course work of the PhD programme.
In India, I feel privileged to have met Professor Mohammad Sadiq, a Turkish expert and a former faculty at JNU. His fluent Turkish, enthusiasm for Turkey and Turkish language deeply influenced me. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Suraiya Faroqhi, Professor Irfan Habib and Professor Feroz Ahmad for their scholarly contributions to my work.
I would like to offer my gratitude to the ambassadors of Turkey in India, Dr. Burak Akçapar and Şakir Özkan Torunlar for their help and support during my stay in Delhi.
The staff at the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi University, Aligarh Muslim University, Teen Murti, Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR), Andhra Pradesh State Archives in Hyderabad, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Library in Bihar, Directorate of State Archives in West Bengal and Ottoman Archives in Turkey deserves due acknowledgment for their support in helping me collect my data. I thank them for the same.
The PhD journey has been an interesting journey for me with its own highs and lows, but I am fortunate have found support and encouragement in many of my friends like Belal, Ashish, Sharvender, Naman, Shashi, Priyadarshi, Zeba, Ikhlaq, Ankita, Prem and Farah. A whole-heartedly thanks goes to Devender Kumar and M. M. Waseem for being always there for me in all ups and downs (both personal and professional) with their kind heart and intelligent mind.
Last but not the least; I would like to thank my parents with all my heart, as they have always supported my decisions and stood by whatever the consequences. This journey would have been impossible without one person whose presence I cherish in my life: my beloved wife Yasemin. A big thank you for all you have done for me and most importantly taking care of our son Doğukan, and making this journey memorable.

CONTENTS
DECLARATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FIGURES AND TABLES
CHAPTER – I
INTRODUCTION ……………….………………………………………... 1-36
World System and Dependency…………………………………………………2
Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire………………...4
Literature Review………………………………………………………………27
Structure of Study………………………………………………………………34
CHAPTER – II
USE OF FIREARMS IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN AND MUGHAL WARFARE……………………………………………………………….. 37-68
Prominent Battles of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century…………………40
Battle of Chaldiran, 1514……………………………………………………….42
Battle of Marjdabik, 1516………………………………………………………46
Battle of Ridaniyye, 1517………………………………………………………48
Battle of Mohacs, 1526…………………………………………………………51
Selected Battles of the Mughal Empire in the 16th Century…………………….53
First Battle of Panipat, 1526……………………………………………………54
Battle of Khanwa, 1527………………………………………………………...60
Siege of Ranthambor Fort, 1568………………………………………………..63
Battle of Tukaroi, 1575…………………………………………………………66
CHAPTER – III
PRODUCTION, USE AND DIFFUSION OF THE FIREARM WEAPONS IN THE MUGHAL AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES …………………. 69-116
Debates on the Discovery of Gunpowder………………………………………71
Production of Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mughal Empire ………………..76
Mughal Artillery………………………………………………………………..81
Mughal Infantry ………………………………………………………………..89
Production of Firearms in the Ottoman Empire ………………………………..95
Types of Ordnances of the Ottoman Empire ………………………………….103
Diffusion of Firearms Across the Borders by the Ottomans ………………….112
CHAPTER – IV
ROLE OF FIREARMS IN THE DECLINE OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE ……..……………………………………………………………………....117-179
Rebellions of Armed Peasantry and Decentralisation in the Mughal Empire…...119
Rebellions of Different Groups…………………………………………………126
Rebellions in North India……………………………………………………….129
Rebellions in South India……………………………………………………….131
Afghan and Portuguese Rebellions …………………………………………….132
Weakness of the Mughal Army ………………………………………………...136
British Military Power in India…………………………………………………145
Locals in British Army………………………………………………………….150
Saltpetre Production of EIC ……………………………………………………153
Battle of Karnal, 1739 ………………………………………………………….158
Batte of St. Thome, 1746 ……………………………………………………….165
Battle of Plassey, 1757 …………………………………………………………167
Battle of Buxar, 1764 …………………………………………………………..172
CHAPTER – V
ROLE OF FIREARMS IN THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ………….………………………………………………………………….180-223
Use of Firearms in Celali Rebellions and Banditry Activities ………………….182
The Rise of West and Ottomans’ Response ……………………………………190
Gunpowder Production in the Ottoman Empire ………………………………..206
Standardisation of Military Structure…………………………………………...209
From Core to Periphery ………………………………………………………...210
Battle of Petrovaradin and loss of Belgrade, 1716-1718………………………..215
Battle of Bhaganva, 1735……………………………………………………….217
Battle of Kagul, 1770 …………………………………………………………..221
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………….... 224-230
REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………… 231-259
FIGURE AND TABLES
Figure – 1.1: Wallerstein’s World System Theory …………………………………….3
Figure – 2. 1: Artwork of the Battle of Chaldiran at the Chehel Sotoun Pavilion in Isfahan ………………………………………………………………………………. 46
Figure – 2.2: Map of Mamluk Sultanate………………………………………………50
Figure – 2.3: Ottoman Army at the Battle of Mohacs, an Ottoman Miniature..............52
Figure – 2.4: First Battle of Panipat (1526). There are two different types of field artillery, two wheels and four wheels along with heavy cavalry …………………….58
Figure – 2.5: On the right side Mughal army armed with field artillery against Rana’s army………………………………………………………………………………..…62
Figure – 2.6: Heavy artillery of Mughal army situated on the hill. Besides it is visible that bullocks were dragging artilleries up to hill………………………………………65
Figure – 3.1: The earliest known written description of the formula for gunpowder, from the Chinese Wujing Zongyao military manuscript that was compiled by 1044 during the Song Dynasty of China………………………………………….………...73
Figure – 3.2: Earliest depiction of a European cannon from Walter de Milemete, De Nobilitatibus, sapientii et prudentiis regum……………………………………...…...74
Figure – 3.3: The Hussite Wagenburg - an old sketch from the 15th century…………..75
Figure – 3.4: Malik-i-Maidan at Bijapur Fort in India………………………………...78
Figure – 3.5: Cannons carried by four wheels and two wheels……………………....86
Figure – 3.6: Huge Mughal artillery drawn by bullocks and elephants……………….88
Figure – 3.7: Officer of the Mughal Army with large Matchlock……………………90
Figure – 3.8: Basic mechanisms of Matchlock…………….………………………….93
Table 3.1: Percentages of saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal in formulae for gunpowder..94
Figure – 3.9: Bronze cannon of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror……………………….96
Figure – 3.10: Tophane-i Amire in İstanbul…………………………...……………...99
Figure – 3.11: A wrought iron cannon captured from Mamluks. Dated to the 16th century….…………………………………………………………………………...104
Table 3.2: Composition of Ottoman bronze cannons………………………...……...105
Figure – 3.12: Bronze cannon casting techniques in the Ottoman and western European in the 16th century……………………………..……………………………………..106
Figure – 3.13: Flintlock Trench Rifle (Metris Tüfeği)……………………………….110
Figure – 4.1: A Bairagi (left) a Mewati (right) carrying musket……………...……...127
Figure – 4.2: British Light six-pounder gun…………...…………………...………..141
Figure – 4.3: A diagram of the Battle of Karnal……………………………………...162
Figure – 4.4: A plan of the Battle of Plassey, fought 23 June 1757 by Col. Robert Clive, against the Nawab of Bengal. Depiction of the battlefield, with explanations of troop movements………………………………………………………………………….169
Figure – 4.5: Sketch of the Battle of Buxar, 1764………………………...………….175
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
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India and societies in West Asia share a long history of economic interaction and cultural exchanges. Much of their interaction took place via Silk Route and maritime routes. In medieval period, this interaction grew rapidly with the Islamic conquest of India from the northern frontiers. The Turkish dynasties originating from Central Asia conquered large part of India with the aim of settlement, which added a new dimension to the relationship between them. Of the relations that developed between West Asia and India, one of the most important was between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire.
There are salient similarities between the two great Islamic Empires of the medieval period. Not only were the founders of the Ottoman Empire in West Asia and the Mughal Empire in South Asia of the similar ethnic, linguistic and religious background, but also the two Empires were Islamic in character and multi-lingual and multi-cultural in nature. The Ottoman and Mughal Empires were among the greatest and determining world powers in the 16th and 17th centuries. Their borders, frontiers were always in danger, inside the land the revolt of different groups was inevitable. Even if there was no actual rebellion or threat from inside and outside of the empires, they had to raise and maintain a large army for any eventuality.
The introduction and heavily use of gunpowder and firearms in battlefields changed the destiny of the Ottomans and Mughals. Although their adaptation process of firearms was faster than others in the beginning, they failed to respond to the rapid military revolution taking place in the Europe due to a variety of factors. Much of the available literature provides useful insights into understanding the inter-related factors accounting for the rise and fall of the two Empires under study. What is, however, missing so far is a comprehensive study of the role of the gunpowder and firearms both in the initial military success and the subsequent failure of the Ottoman and Mughal empires due to the absence of military modernization in both the cases, contributing to the loss of the prowess and leverage they had as compared to the European powers.
Although gunpowder and firearms had an effective role in the rise of both Empires especially during the 16th century, these became one of the key features to account for their decline. Their decline can be divided into two periods with first from the 17th century and the second, in the 18th century lasting till their end. In the first period, because of the diffusion of the firearms among people, both empires struggled with
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internal problems created by peasants carrying handguns, which caused decentralisation problems. The armed peasants either involved in banditry activities or were employed by local chiefs in the Indian subcontinent, pashas or local notables in the borders of the Ottoman Empire, and thereby becoming new power centres in the provinces. During this period, though the two Empires were strong enough to deal with these kinds of problems, they consumed much of the revenue, manpower and efforts where directed over a period of time to contain internal resistance which, in turn, contributed to the weakening of these empires. During second period in the 18th century these two Empires faced entrenchments by militarily strong European powers with access effective fırearm technology. These external powers became a raison d'etre towards ending the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire.
It needs to be highlighted that the European militaries in the beginning could not withstand Asian armies of Ottomans and Mughals – “gunpowder empires”. Afterwards it was the military technological advancements that became one of reasons behind the “rise of west”, which transformed the very standing of the European armies in the battlefield. The Europeans adopted new military equipment including firearms and mastered the battlefields tactics and strategies adjusted to these advanced weaponries. This contributed to the shift of power from “gunpowder empires” to the Europeans marking the “the rise of the west”.
World System and Dependency
While this is obvious that the rise and fall of any empire, state, sultanate or kingdom cannot be defined with single reason, but encompasses multiple factors entwined to each other. This study attempts to explore one such reason as the use of gunpowder and firearms, and their role in the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire. An attempt is made to contextualise these factors within the broader propositions of the world system theory and dependency theory. The world system theory “is a power hierarchy between core and periphery in which powerful and wealthy “core” societies dominate and exploit weak and poor “peripheral” societies. (…) the so-called “advanced” or “developed” countries constitute the core, while the “less developed” countries are in the periphery.”1 According to Wallerstein, after 1750 the Ottomans and
1 Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, “World-Systems Analysis”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21 (1995), p. 389.
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Indian subcontinent “were incorporated into the ongoing set of linked productive processes of the capitalist world-economy” as being periphery.2 His dates correspond to the time when Ottomans and the Mughals needed or depended on the European technology to improve their military technology.
Figure – 1.1: Wallerstein’s World System Theory.
In the context of dependency theory, the study aims to explore the reasons for Ottomans and Mughals for failing to establish their own indigenous army industry to meet their demand. How did these two empires change from self-reliance in 16th century to dependence in the 18th century on Europeans technology. After the military revolution in Europe, the out-dated weapons, tactics and strategies lagged of Ottomans and Mughals failed to stand the power of new weaponry of Europeans. Thus, their status shifted from the core to the periphery. They will be used to contextualise the research and build a narrative of contribution of gunpowder and firearms in the rise and fall of the empires under investigation.
2 Immannuel Wallerstein, Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s, California: California University Press, 2011, p. 137.
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Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire
The interaction between these two empires was heavily based on show of force in political arena and the transfer of military technology in the beginning of 16th century, which it will be majorly discussed in this chapter. To begin with, the year 1526 was marked by the two historical turning points that eventually contributed to the ascendancy of Turks. One is the name of Ottoman Turks in Europe, and other Mughal Empire in India. On 29 August 1526, the Ottoman army under the control of Suleiman the Magnificent defeated Hungarian army at the battle of Mohacs and conquered Hungary. This event marked the beginning of the long supremacy to the Ottoman Empire in Europe. From here we find the birth of the idea that Turks cannot be removed from Europe in the popular memory. In the same year on 21 April 1526 in a distant land a new empire was established by Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur by defeating the Afghan King İbrahim Lodi at the First Battle of Panipat. In the end of the battle, Babur decided to stay in India and adopt the conquered land as his new home. These two specific events added to the precise victory for the Turks and also led to further spread of Islamdom in the 16th century. Gunpowder and firearms were the main weaponry used in these battles and had a great role to play in the success of the Ottomans and Mughals. Thanks to the advent of modern technique of gunpowder and firearms, the region from Hungary onwards to Bengal were also labelled as the “gunpowder empires”, this classification includes the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire.
Before Mughal Empire was established by Babur, the Ottoman Empire had built firm relations with Indian dynasties mainly based on military aspects. Several Ottoman Turks talented as gunners, artillerymen and musketeers were employed by the Sultanate of Gujarat. Those men held fief or governed towns for many years. Even after the collapse of Gujarat Sultanate there were more than 3,000 Turks in Gujarat Army.3 Ottoman admiral Sidi Ali Reis also became a bridge between the Ottomans and the Gujarat Sultanate. In order to seek help, the Sultan of Gujarat, Bahadur Shah (attacked by Portuguese and Mughal Emperor Humayun) sent an ambassador to Istanbul in 1536.
3 Naimur Rahman Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations (A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748), Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1989, p. 11.
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In response, Ottoman Sultan Suleiman extended his support by sending his admiral Sidi Ali Reis to India.4
Apart from the Sultanate of Gujarat, the Bahmani Kingdom of Deccan (South India) also established close relations with Ottoman Turks. For instance, following the ‘Battle of Adoni’ between Bahmani Sultan Muhammed Shah Bahmani and Raja of Vijayanagar in 1368, Bahmani Sultan captured 300 gun-carriages as war booty. He also collected a train of artillery and put them under the command of Mukarrab Khan who attached Ottoman Turks and Europeans skilled in the art of gunnery.5 Sultan Muhammad Shah Bahmani II was another ruler who made attempts to establish a firm relationship and solidarity with the Ottomans. He sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed, the Conqueror by referring him as the Khalifa of Islam. In return, Ottoman sultan sent his ambassador to India with the same considerations.6
The Ottoman and Mughal relations can be traced back from Babur’s period (1526). The conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids turned Ottomans’ attention on the east border of Safavids where Mughals and Uzbeks dominated. The first Mughal Emperor Babur was an ambitious and a wise statesman; he was well aware of the defeat of Safavids and the conquest of the Egypt by the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Ottoman battle tactic of ‘chaining carts’ together and positioning matchlock men and artillery behind these in the battle of Panipat was one of the main indirect evidence for interaction between the Ottomans and Mughals.7 Not to forget, even the chief commanders like Mustafa Rumi Khan and Ustad Ali Quli in the military service of Babur were also Ottoman Turks.
In the following years, the circumstance began to change with the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. He realised that the firearm technology of the Ottoman Empire did not answer the new technological developments compared to Europeans that had better
4 Seydi Ali Reis, Mir’at-ül Memalik Ülkelerin Aynası [The Mirror of Countries], Translated by Necdet Akyıldız, Istanbul 1975, p. 22-23.
5 Romesh C. Butalia, the Evolution of the Artillery in India from the Battle of Plassey to the Revolt of 1857, New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1998, p. 29.
6 Haroon Khan Sherwani, the Bahmanis of the Deccan an Objective Study, Hyderabad: Mannager of Publications, 1953, p. 327.
7 Zahiru’din Muhammad Babur Padshah Ghazi, Babur Nama (Memoirs of Babur), Translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge, Delhi 2014, p. 468-469. (hereafter Babur Nama).
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quality of weapons and well-disciplined armies.8 Thus, he began to employ European engineers in the Mughal army. Although this reduced the effect of Turks in the Mughal army, with the expansion of Mughal dominion through south India the number of Turks in the army increased due to the fact that many Ottomans Turks were in South Indian armies. According to observation of Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was in the mission of Sultan Mahmud I to Muhammed Shah in 1744, many Ottomans were employed in Mughal army and were favourites in the Mughal army.9
In his work on how gunpowder technology changed the course of battles in the modern era polities across the Europe and Asia, Kenneth Chase highlights some similarities between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire. Both Empires that ruled large populations relied on infantry armed with muskets and cannons. Besides, he states that Ottomans and Mughals shared same weapons, tactics and even exchanged military trainers.10 Even though there appeared no direct connection between the two Empires, as the above stated evidences show there were many indirect ways of connections developing between the Ottomans and the Mughals since Babur’s reign. As a result, it can be said that the seeds of this military relations were initiated in Babur Shah’s period.
The lack of diplomatic relationship between the Ottomans and the Mughals had a lot to do with the neighbourhood politics during 16th century. While the Ottoman Empire (Sunni dominated) had good relations with Uzbeks (also Sunni dominated), it was in acrimonious relations with the Safavids (Shia dominated). On the contrary, Mughals had good relations with the Safavids while they fought Uzbeks for the dominance over Central Asia. This had an indirect complication, a crucial bone of contention, which could have held back the Ottomans and the Mughals from pursuing better relations directly. Furthermore, Babur saw Shah Ismael I of Safavid Empire as his natural ally against Uzbeks and therefore would have refrained pursuing any relation with Ottomans at the expense of Safavids.
After the unexpected death of Babur in 1530, his son Humayun became the new ruler of nascent Mughal Empire. The power struggle between Mughals, the Afghans and
8 Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, the Administration of the Mughal Empire, Delhi: Low Price Publications, 2010, p. 254.
9 İsmet Miroğlu, “Hindistan Hakkında XVIII. Yüzyılda Yazılmış Küçük Bir Eser,” [A Small Work Written about India in the 18th Century], Tarih Dergisi, 34, 1984, p. 552.
10 Kenneth Chase, Firearms A Global History to 1700, Cambridge 2003, p. 122, 133.
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Gujarat Sultanate over India occupied a place in the foreign affairs of the Ottoman Empire and hence the exchange of embassies between Indian rulers with Istanbul began. The death of Babur encouraged the Afghans to get back their lost territory in India. In this connection, Burhan Beg, the son of Sikandar Beg, fled to Istanbul to seek military aid against Humayun. It was however considered unnecessary and expensive campaign by Sultan Suleiman who refused any help. Meanwhile, Bahadur Shah, Sultan of Gujarat, had sent an ambassador to Istanbul against the activities of Humayun and Portuguese.11 Within this context, it can be argued that even though Suleiman I and Humayun did not have any direct contact, Sultan Suleiman I desisted from aiding the adversaries of Mughal ruler Humayun.
While Babur had serious of victories by using firearms along with Ottoman warfare methods, Humayun failed to held North Indian territories against Sher Shah Suri of the Afghan Suri Empire. He lost two important battles, at Chausa in 1539 and at Kannauj in 1540, against Sher Shah Suri. It is important to flag here that Sher Shah also used the Ottoman military technology and technical know-how by employing Hoca Ahmed Rumi, an Ottoman cannoner and engineer. Hoca Ahmed Rumi cast bronze darbzan (cannon) in Ottoman style during 1541-1543 that Sher Shah utilised in battles against Humayun.12 After losing the Battles of Chausa and Kannauj, Humayun was forced to exile by Sher Shah Suri. Humayun did not seek any direct assistance from the Ottomans, but closely watched over their changing dynamics.13 Sidi Ali Reis also played a facilitating role in the relations between these two Empires. Whenever Humayun was informed of Reis’ visit to the Mughal territories, Bairam Khan, a trusted commander of the Mughals, was sent to receive him. Reis was so warmly received in Mughal court that he was offered some territories to govern which he kindly rejected.14 Humayun sent a letter to Suleiman with Sidi Ali Reis with the following words:
11 Joseph de Hammer, “Memoir on the Diplomatic Relations between the Courts of Dehli and Constantinople in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1829), p. 462.
12 Gabor Agoston, “Avrupa-Asya Arasında Teknolojik Diyalog ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Barut Çağı’nda Askeri Teknoloji ve Uzmanlık” [The Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue Between Europe and Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age], Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç, İstanbul 2015, p. 166. Those darbzan looked like the Ottoman style which cast in 1560s. It was easy to carry and cast them. They threw 150gram balls. Their length approximately 1.32-1.54, weight 54-56 kg.
13 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 14.
14 Gul-badan Begam, The History of Humâyûn (Humâyûn Nama), Translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge, New Delhi 1990, p. 52.
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“It occurred to me on this occasion, that by this opportunity the chains of friendship and union might be linked, and the ties of attachment drawn closer. Therefore, the pearls of good faith have been arranged on the string of friendship, and the rabies of attachment set in the line of true harmony, to be presented in this letter by these servants belonging to the spheres of your majesty. It is hoped and expected, that also on your part the gates of mutual communication will be opened by the keys of attachment, and the channels of correspondence will not be closed; and that in this manner the foundation of the towering fabric of union will be strengthened and kept free from decay.”15
Moreover, persuaded by Sidi Ali Reis’s laudatory about the Ottoman Empire’s successes, Humayun replied to Reis that “surely the only man worthy to bear the title of Padishah is the ruler of Turkey, he alone and no one else in all the world.” These words of Humayun which came from his lack of self-confidence were not echoed by subsequent rulers from the Mughal dynasty.16 It may be argued that his exiled life was the reason why he voiced these accolades on the Ottomans. The words of Humayun reflecting his desires to establish mutual relations with the Ottomans could not be realised due to his unexpected death. When Akbar ascended to the throne, the new Mughal dynast did not prioritise his relations with the Ottomans that Humayun was seeking to due to the following reasons: Firstly, he was busy with the protection and stabilising his fragile rule. Humayun re-established Mughal rule in India in 1555 after defeating Sikandar Shah Suri in the ‘Battle of Sirhind’ which faced crisis within a year as he died an accidental death in 1556. In prevailing circumstances, the young Akbar could come up against an Afghan or another groups’ rebellion against his rule, so he prioritised the internal issues. Secondly, Ottomans did not send any diplomatic mission in response to the letter sent by Humanyun via Sidi Ali Reis.17
The most important crisis was on the pilgrimage of royal ladies of Mughal dynasty. When Gulbadan Begam and other ladies started their journey to the holy land of Mecca and Medina accompanied by large number of servants, including Muhammad Baqi Khan Kuka, and Rumi Khan of Aleppo, who was old-time Mughal trustee having
15 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 477. Hammer references this letter to Akbar the Great, but Sidi Ali Reis mentions that he was given this letter by Humayun short while ago his death. Sidi Ali Reis, ibid, p. 79-81.
16 Bamber Gascoigne, the Great Mughals, London 1971, p. 68-70.
17 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 17.
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previously worked as Babur’s artillery officer.18 This large pilgrimage delegation of Mughals changed the demographics of Mecca, leading to scarcity in resources, infrastructure and creating security problems for the local Meccans. Thus, local governors applied to Ottoman Sultan, who was the sovereign and protector of Holy cities of Islam, to take some measures. Thereupon, the Ottoman Sultan launched some farmans to the governors of the region about sending back the pilgrims immediately to their respective places after their hajj pilgrimage.19 These royal family members (ladies) distributed alms sent by Akbar in the Haram al-Sharif which attracted large number of people to collect the same thereby overcrowding the holy places. Moreover, the unacceptable speeches of those ladies forced the Ottomans to take this decision.20 Besides, some of those peoples who had come from India to collect the alms stayed there also got involved in unlawful activities. Following the Ottoman farmans, Sheriff of Mecca was commanded to ban the distribution of alms sent by Akbar in the city and sent to all people back to India even if they wanted to stay.21 Furthermore, Ottoman Sultan wanted them (including royal ladies) to be sent back to India by taking appropriate measures when they completed their Hajj.22 After having spent three and a half years in Arabia, Gulbadan and her companions returned to Fatehpur Sikri in March 1582.23
This behaviour of Ottoman Sultan was perceived by Akbar as the humiliation of Mughal royal family prompting him not only to end all relations with the Ottomans but follow anti-Ottoman policies thereafter. Firstly, he attempted to send a diplomatic mission to Spanish King Philip II in 1582, but the ambassadors were unable to sail to Lisbon and so returned to the court. Akbar also tried reach out to the Persians and Uzbeks against the Ottomans. However, the Uzbeks decided to be loyal their traditional alliance Ottomans.24
The second effort of Akbar against the Ottoman Empire was in 1587. This is evidenced from the official Ottoman document written by Vizier Hasan Pasha, governor of Yemen
18 Gul-Badan Begam, ibid, p. 71.
19 A.{DVNSMHM.d... 35, 229/240; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 35, 229/241; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 43/107.
20 A.{DVNSMHM.d... 39/471.
21 A.{DVNSMHM.d... / 43/336 and A.{DVNSMHM.d... 43/107.
22 A.{DVNSMHM.d... 39/349; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 39/471; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 43/336; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 43/107.
23 Gul-Badan Begam, ibid, p. 72, 75.
24 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 20-21.
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to the Sublime Porte. This letter refers to the spy sent to India. According to his report, Akbar forged an alliance with the Portuguese to attack the port of Yemen. Therefore, Hasan Pasha wanted thirty galleys (Kadırga) from the Ottoman government to resist any attack of Mughal and Portuguese alliance.25
The era of Emperor Akbar was the beginning of deterioration of relations between Mughals with the Ottoman Empire. After Akbar’s death in 1605, his son Mirza Nur-ud-din Beig Muhammad Khan Salim ascended to the Mughal throne, and continued his father’s policies of low key but impaired relations with the Ottomans. In order to show his sovereignty and power and not even draw any resemblance by name to the Ottoman Sultans Selim I (1515-1520) and Selim II (1566-1574), the new king Salim changed his name to Jahangir (Conqueror of the world).26
According to Jahangir’s memoir Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî, a person named Aqam Haji, hailing from Mavaraunnehr, came to Mughal Royal Court at Agra and introduced himself as the ambassador of the Ottoman Empire in 1608. Jahangir’s approach to this ambassador foreshadowed the unsuccessful attempts for establishing diplomatic relations. Jahangir while writing about Aqam Haji notes that “looking to his circumstances and his proceedings none of the servants of the Court believed in his being an ambassador.” Therefore, Jahangir did not pay any attention to this ambassador and subsequently expulsed him from the royal court.27
The eastern border of the Ottoman Empire with the Safavid’s witnessed frequent hostility. Prompting the Ottoman government to improve its relations with the Mughals, especially during the Ottoman-Safavid war (1603-1618). Ottoman Sultan Ahmet I sent his ambassador to Mughal court to request the Mughals to not assist the Safavids. However, the Ottomon ambassador was abased by the Mughal royal court. Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to the Mughal Court (1615-1619), while writing about this incident notes: “he (Jahangir) gave him very harsh entertainment; made him Salem to the ground; and, as soon as he was dismissed, sent the Persian (Safavids) ten Leckes
25 A.{DVNSMHM.d... 62/457.
26 The Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî or Memoirs of Jâhangîr, Vol. I, Translated by Alexander Rogers, Edited by Henry Beveridge, Delhi 2017, p. 2.
27 The Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî, p. 144-145.
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of Rupias (Lakh of Rupees)”.28 It is important to highlight that the antipathy between Ottomans and Mughals and to advantage over each other was historically grounded that dated back to the Battle of Ankara, in 1402, which occurred between Timur the Lame and Bayezid the Thunderbolt. Jahangir was the first Mughal emperor who proudly reminisced about this battle in his memoire wherein his ancestor Timur defeated Sultan Bayezid.29
When the Safavids concluded an armistice with the Ottoman government in 1618, Shah Abbas turned his attention to the eastern border and captured Qandahar from the Mughals in 1622. This unexpected policy of Shah Abbas brought an end to the Mughal-Safavid relations and Jahangir sought allies against Safavids to get revenge. In this direction, he firstly sent an envoy to Uzbek ruler Imam Quli Khan.30 He then dispatched an ambassador to the Ottoman sultan and suggested Ottomans take on Safavids (from their west border). In the letter, Jahangir stressed that he was ready to send 180.000 soldiers.31 However, Jahangir could not pursue the alliance with Ottomans as his internal situation became precarious due to the rebellion by his son Khurram Shah (who called himself Shah Jahan –King of the World). Jahangir eventually died in 1627, but before that he had attempted to organise an alliance of Mughal, Uzbek and Ottomans against Safavids. It may be thus argued that the foundation of the relations between Ottoman’s and Mughal’s was laid by Jahangir.
In the first years of his reign, Shah Jahan faced some difficulties to stabilise his rule because some sections of the soldiers were asking for one of the five sons (his cousins) of Danial Mizra as the new Mughal ruler. Shah Jahan ordered to execute the five princes to eliminate this threat. One prince Baisungur Mirza successfully escaped from execution and took refuge in Istanbul while seeking Ottoman assistance to dethrone his cousin Shah Jahan. Yet, according to Ottoman chronicler Naima Mustafa Efendi, Sultan
28 The Embassy of Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul 1615-1619, edited by William Foster, vol. I, London 1899, p. 113.
29 The Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî, p. 144-145.
30 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 25.
31 Mehmet Fatih Gökçek, IV. Murâd’ın Bağdâd’ı fethine dair iki eser: Nûri Ibrâhîm, Fetihnâme-i Bağdâd – Kâdı-Zâde Ahmed Çelebi, Fetihnâme-i Bağdâd (Transkripsiyon – Değerlendirme) [Two Works on the Conquest of Baghdad by Murad IV: Nûri Ibrâhîm, Fetihnâme-i Bağdâd – Kâdı-Zâde Ahmed Çelebi, Fetihnâme-i Bağdâd (Transcription – Evaluation)], Marmara University, Institute of Turkic Studies, Department of Turkish History, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul 2013, p. 161.
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Murad IV abstained to help Baisungur Mirza because of latter’s uncouth behaviour in the Ottoman court as also due to nascent but cordial relations with Shah Jahan.32
After overcoming all internal threats to secure and stabilise his throne, Shah Jahan started planning to recapture Qandahar from Safavids. To this effect, he sought Ottoman assistance, Mir Zarif was tasked to reach out the Ottoman court. Mir Zarif embarked on the English ship named “Michaell” from Sind on 13 February 1638 which arrived in Mocha (Yemen) on 16 June 1638.33 In the meantime, Ottoman Sultan Murad IV arrived to Mosul with his army to take Baghdad from Safavids. When Mir Zarif arrived in Jidda with Shah Jahan’s letter and rich gifts, his arrival was reported to Sultan Murad IV through Egypt governor Afrasiab Oglu.34 Sultan Murad IV “urgently” sought Mir Zarif’s presence through a farman.35 The ambassador presented Shah Jahan’s letter in an emerald plate with other precious gifts in a ceremony that witnessed reciprocal praises being invoked for both rulers. Murad IV said following words while handing back the letter to vizier asked: “how is my brother Sultan of India, is his condition fine? And you are also welcome.”36 During the ceremony, an incident transpired wherein Mir Zarif brought a shield covered with elephant ear and rhino skin and exaggerated that neither a sword nor a bullet (Tufang) could put a hole in it. Upon hearing these words, Ottoman Sultan Murad IV shot the shield and the Ottoman tufang was able to pierce it easily. This incidence is reflective of the fact that Ottoman firearms were stronger than Mughals’ firearms.37 According to another Ottoman chronicler, the shield was hanged on the door of the sultan of India.38
The conversation continued in Grand Vizier’s office and the following day, the letter had been translated and read to Sultan, where Shah Jahan emphasised about his conquests in Deccan, India. With these conquests, Shah Jahan secured the southern borders of his empire and intended to exile Redheads (Kizilbash, Shia) by conquering
32 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Naîmâ (Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn Fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn) [History of Naima], vol. II, Edited by Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara 2007, p. 786.
33 The English Factories in India 1637-1641, Oxford 1912, p. 101-102.
34 Naima, ibid, vol. II, p. 880.
35 Gökçek, ibid, p. 194.
36 Gökçek, ibid, p. 196.
37 Naima, ibid, vol. II, p. 880. 944.
38 Nermin Yıldırım, Kara Çelebi-zâde Abdülaziz Efendi’nin Zafername Adlı Eseri (Tarihçe-i Feth-i Revan ve Bağdad) Tahlil ve Metin [Abdülaziz Efendi’s Zafername (History of th Conquest of Revan and Baghdad) Analysis and Text], Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Institute of Social Science, Department of Medieval Era History, Unpublished Master Thesis, Istanbul 2005, p. 35.
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Qandahar and Khorasan. He also hoped that Murad IV would vanquish redheads by capturing their provinces in Iraq, Baghdad, Erivan and Azerbaijan. Besides, the Mughal emperor informed that the rulers of Transoxiana and Balkh (Uzbeks) would also move on Safavids.39 Murad IV ordered to give an appropriate answer to Shah Jahan and he asked Mir Zarif to stay in Mosul until he took it from Safavids, so he could send him back with the news of the conquer of Baghdad.40
After recapturing Baghdad, ambassador Mir Zarif through Silahdar Pasha while thanking the Sultan Murad IV for the pleasant reciprocation requested he be allowed to visit the shrines of Imam-i-Azam Abu Hanifa and Abdul Qadir Jilani in Baghdad, a request entertained by the Ottoman ruler instantly.41 Arslan Agha was dispatched to India together with the Mughal ambassador Mir Zarif in 1639.42 Agha’s mission can be followed in Mughal documents and chronicles. The two ambassadors travelled to Sind (Thatta) from Basra via the ship Michaell – the same ship Mir Zarif had embarked from Sindh to Yemen.43 When Arslan Agha landed to Sind, Shah Jahan was in Kashmir, who asked the ambassador be brought to Kashmir as well. 44 In 1640, Arslan Agha reached Kashmir and presented the letter of Murad IV to Shah Jahan. However, Shah Jahan did not approve off the written language and address from of the letter as the same had an egoistic touch and structure to it.45 Arslan Agha was presented many rich gifts and 15.000 rupees by Shah Jahan46 and allowed to attend all court ceremonies. Agha stayed in India until he learnt of the death of Murad IV and accession of Ibrahim I to the Ottoman throne.47 It is understood from Badshah Nama that Shah Jahan did not give any letter and gifts to Arslan Agha for new Sultan in order to show his displeasure because of the written language of Ottoman’s letter.48
On the other hand, the vizier of Shah Jahan sent a letter to the Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha of the Ottoman Empire. The letter was translated by Ottoman historian Hammer
39 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 478-479.
40 Gökçek, ibid, p. 197.
41 Gökçek, ibid, p. 298.
42 Naima, ibid, vol. II, p. 904; Yıldırım, ibid, p. 49.
43 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 28.
44 Khâfî Khan, the Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, vol. I, Edited by Maulavi Kabir Al-Din Ahmad, Calcutta 1869, p. 575; Abdul Hamid Lahori, Padshahnama (1592-1638; 1638-1648), Vol. II, Translated by Hamid Afaq Siddiqi, Delhi 2010, p. 187. (hereafter Padshahnama).
45 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 29.
46 Padshahnama, vol. II, p. 216, 197.
47 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 480-482.
48 Padshahnama, vol. II, p. 218.
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in his work and, it reflects vividly the rivalry between the Ottomans and the Mughals. The epistle of Vizier mentioned how Arslan Agha was welcomed by different governors in different provinces with distinguished honours from his arrival in Sind to Mughal court in order to show Mughal attitude towards envoys. Shah Jahan was named as “khan of the times”, “shetimser of the world” and “the shadow of God”. However, vizier criticised the Murad IV’s letter to Shah Jahan in the following words:
“When the letter was submitted for inspection of the secretaries of state, it appeared that amongst the servants of your glorious court, and amongst its secretaries, there was nobody acquainted with ceremonials of ancient Sultans, and the modes of cultivating the friendship of great monarchs, particularly of this imperial family.”49
The Mughal vizier continued acclaiming about Mughal grandeur in his letter by describing the vast territorial boundaries of the Mughal Empire that extended from Ghazni, Qandahar, Kabulistan in the north and northwest, Bengal in the east, and Deccan in the south and of Mughal army’s countless troops, elephants and other military equipment. The vizier pointed that Ottoman secretaries were ignorant and did not know the diplomatic language while addressing such a big empire. Through the end of the epistle, vizier said that “for the reason above specified, no royal letters have been written, neither was there occasion for presents, nor anyone who should accompany them.” He lastly explained the main reason for the mission of Mir Zarif as purchasing Arab horses for the Mughal Empire. The vizier finishes the letter with the return of Arslan Agha by saying what kinds of gifts were submitted to him.50
Ottoman Grand Vizier, Mustafa Pasha sent a letter to the vizier of Shah Jahan that mentioned the conquest of Baghdad by Murad IV and his death after a while. The argument between the two monarchs continued with this letter. Mustafa Pasha tried to emphasise the superiority of the Ottomans over Mughals as he writes: “Every one of the Sultans and Khakans of the Ottoman family is seated on the throne of Solomon” ... “Since God has created the world, was never seen such a king and lord”…“Shah of the World” and “refuge of the world.51 Mustafa Pasha did not remain unresponsive to the territorial expansion of the Mughal Empire as stated in letter of Vizier of Shah Jahan
49 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 480.
50 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 481-482.
51 Feridun Bey, Mecmua-i Münşeat-i Feridun Bey, Vol. II, Takvimhane-yi Âmire 1848-1858, p. 153-155.
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by stating that: “if the numerous provinces of the mighty Ottoman empire were here to be enumerated, their list would not be contained within the boundaries of this letter.”52
Evliya Chelebi, an Ottoman traveller, mentioned an incident about Mughals. After the conquest of Baghdad, the Indian ambassador urged Sultan Murad IV to grant permission to cover Holy Kaba (a cloth material is used to cover the sanctum sanatorium of Mecca), for that year, so Murad IV replied angrily that if Sultan of India wants to do a good work, he could invite homeless Indian people living in the Ottoman Empire borders to India. This letter was also sent to India via Bekir Agha. The language and reaction of Murad IV in this letter could be another reason for the broken relations between Shah Jahan and the Ottomans.53
After the letter of Mustafa Pasha, Shah Jahan ignored it and desisted from sending any return following envoy. However, his son Dara Shikoh sent a letter to the vizier Mustafa Pasha with his trusted man Mulla Shauqi. In the letter, Dara Shikoh did not mention what he wanted and instead wrote, “be pleased to what he has to say; and may the gates of correspondence be opened by his return”. The answer of grand vizier did not give any clue about the main topic.54
In the end of this mission exchange and with the capture of Qandahar by the Mughals, Shah Jahan succeeded in his aim by weakening Shah Abbas II. Now, Safavids, being neutralised ceased to be any threat for the Mughals and therefore Shah Jahan started focusing on Central Asia as his new project. The reason for this aim is described by Abdul Hamid Lahori in Badshah Nama in following words:
“From the beginning of his reign, the emperor’s heart beaten up the conquest of Balkh and Badakhsan, which were ancestral territories of his house, and were the keys to the acquisition of Samarkand, the home and capital of his great ancestor, Timur Sahib Qiran Sani.”55
The campaigns of Shah Jahan towards central Asia especially on Uzbeks was also partly influenced by the bloody civil war between Nazar Muhammed Khan, the Uzbek
52 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 484.
53 Evliya Çelebi, Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi [Travelogue of Evliya Çelebi in Today’s Turkish], vol. 4/2, Prepared by Seyit Ali Kahraman and Yücel Dağlı, Istanbul 2010, p. 554-555.
54 Hammer, “ibid”, p. 485-486. According to Hammer, Dara Shukoh wanted Ottomans’ assistance to asscend the throne, p. 469.
55 Padshahnama, vol. II, p. 482.
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Khanate and his son Abdul Aziz Khan which brought a new perspective towards the Ottomans.
Ottoman government could not be unconcerned with these developments and Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV sent Seyyid Muhyiddin as an ambassador to Shah Jahan in 1649. Seyyid Muhyiddin was firstly welcomed with honours by the governors of Surat, Burhanpur, Mandu and Malwa.56 He was taken to the royal court of Shah Jahan on 22 September 1651 wherein he presented the letter of Mehmed IV to the Mughal emperor.57 In the letter, Mehmed IV stated the importance of peace in Muslim lands. The clashes in Uzbek land due to power struggle between Nazar Muhammed Khan and his son Abdul Aziz Khan led to a bloody civil war. Therefore, the Ottoman sultan requested Shah Jahan to reconcile the conflict as a mediator. Shah Jahan replied in his letter to Mehmed IV that the Mughal court had already sent two advisory letters the Uzbeks to stop the civil war. Mehmed IV wanted Shah Jahan to protect Muslims in Central Asia. At the end of the letter the Ottoman sultan invoked Islam to seek Mughal intervention as Mehmed IV wrote ‘if he acts in this way, he would officiate his religious duty’.58
Shah Jahan realised the importance of being in alliance with the Ottomans against Safavids, and therefore he sent Sayyid Haji Mehmed to Istanbul. Upon arrival on Istanbul on 19 June 1653, the Mughal envoy was so warmly received that according to one Ottoman chronicler, Naima, no ambassador before Sayyid Haji Mehmed had been shown any respect like him. When the envoy came before Ottoman Sultan, he presented Shah Jahan’s letter and precious gifts, a crest with a big diamond, a sword and a dagger which all were estimated 300.000 guruş.59
In the letter, he stated that the cruel acts of Nazar Muhammed caused a revolt among Uzbeks and his son Abzul Aziz Khan also joined the rebellion. Meanwhile, the Almans took advantage in the region and plundered both Badakhsan and Balkh and caused harm to the inhabitants. Beside the Almans also damaged many places of worship and
56 Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, vol. I, p. 703. Khafi Khan also says Muhyiddin was grandson of Seyh Abdul Qadir Geylani.
57 Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, vol. I, p. 707-708.
58 Münşeat, vol. II, p. 355-357.
59 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Naîmâ (Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn Fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn) [History of Naima], vol. III, Edited by Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara 2007, p. 1484.
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insulted the Muslims. Because of this lawlessness in the region, Shah Jahan sent his army to restore peace in the region.60
The Ottoman court wrote a letter for Shah Jahan and submitted it to the Mughal envoy Sayyid Mehmed with an emerald-hilled dagger, 20 maidens, a horse and about 90 purses trappings. Besides these, the ambassador was also presented with 6.000 gold coins and a horse. It was mandatory that an envoy must accompany Sayyid Mehmed back to India, who could be an Ulema, secretary, or a businessman with eloquent or refined manners according to Ottoman state’s rule. However, Zulfiqar Agha who was the brother of vizier Salih Pasha, aspired to be envoy for this duty by offering all expenses of journey from his pocket. Although he was not qualified for this kind of duty, the main reason why he was chosen was his offer for expenses of the journey. Zulfiqar Agha and Sayyid Mehmed travelled together to Hejaz where Sayyid Mehmed went to Yemen while Zulfiqar Agha continued to India via Basra.61
Just like previous Ottoman envoys, when Zulfiqar Agha arrived in Mughal lands, Shah Jahan ordered his governors to give him 12,000 rupees62 and Mughal local governors took care of him with Shah Jahan’s farman during his further journey to the Mughal court. He reached the Mughal court on 6 April 1654 and was warmly welcomed by Shah Jahan who took the letter from his hands directly.63 Similarly, Inayat Khan gave many details about how Ottoman ambassador Zulfiqar Agha was welcomed by Mughals and presented with lavish gifts.64 Detailed information about the letter were given by Ahmed Feridun’s work Münşeat’is-Selatin. According to this, Mehmed IV sent his goodwill to Shah Jahan for providing information about the chaos in central Asia. In the conclusion the Ottoman sultan desired to pursue mutually beneficial relations.65
60 M. Athar Ali, “the Objectives Behind the Mughal Expedition into Balkh and Badakhshan 1646-47”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 29/1, p. 165-166.
61 Naima, ibid, vol. III, p. 1484-1486.
62 Shah Jahan Nama, p. 494. Besides this order, he was given 5.000 rupees by Sazawar Khan at Sultanpur, 12.000 in cash and goods by prince Muhammed Aurangzeb’s exchequer at Burhanpur, 5.000 by Muhammed Mirak at Ujjain, 12.000 by Sa’adat Khan from exchequer and 3.000 from his pocket at Akbarabad.
63 Shah Jahan Nama, p. 496-497.
64 Shah Jahan Nama, p. 499-500. According to Inayat Khan, when Zulfiqar Agha reached the port of Qaiqada (?), he left for Mecca to perform Hajj and sent his baggage with a vessel. Yet, the ship hit a reef and sunk in a hurricane, so he lost almost all his properties given by Mughals. Shah Jahan Nama, p. 510.
65 Münşeat, vol. II, p. 355-357.
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Zulfiqar Agha spent six months in Mughal court and then he was dispatched with a number of gifts on August 1654. Along with Agha, Qaim Beg was chosen to go to Istanbul as Mughal ambassador.66 When Qaim Beg arrived in Scutari on 11 May 1656, he was hosted at a notable’s house in the square of Doğancılar, Istanbul. He was accepted to the sublime port after four days later and he submitted shah Jahan’s letter with rich gifts carried by 250 servants.67
In the letter Shah Jahan sought cooperation in three domains from the Ottoman Sultan; first, a military aid to take Qandahar from Safavids; second a permission to build a mosque in Mecca for Indian pilgrims; and third, an architect for the construction of the tomb. The Ottoman government accepted only the last request and an architect was sent to India.68
As return envoy Maanzade Husein Agha, Kapucubashi in Ottoman administration, was nominated by the sultan with presents and the answer of the letter brought by Qaim Beg. After 3 months, 21-30 August 1656, Qaim Beg departed to India through Aleppo while Maanzade Husein preferred to go via Basra.69 Although Indian envoys were cordially welcomed by Sublime Porte during Shah Jahan’s period, Qaim Beg was killed by the governor of Aleppo because of some personal issues. Thus, Maanzade Husein Agha had to continue his mission to India alone and arrived in Surat in November 1657.70
At the time when Maanzade Husein landed in India, Shah Jahan was down with illness and the royal court was faced with an internal battle amongst the four sons of Mughal emperor for the throne. Prince Murad Baksh declared himself as the emperor of India in Gujarat,71 and he welcomed Maanzade but did not allow him to go to Shahjahanabad. Maanzade and his 20 men were given valuable gifts and send back to Istanbul.72
66 Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, vol. I, p. 731.
67 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Naîmâ (Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn Fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn) [Historyof Naima], vol. IV, Edited by Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara 2007, p. 1670-1671.
68 Joseph von Hammer, Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. X, p. 260.
69 Nazire Karaçay Türkal, Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Zeyl-i Fezleke, Marmara University, Institute of Turkic Studies, Department of Turkish History, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul 2012, p. 65; Naima, vol. IV, p. 1691.
70 Karaçay, ibid, p. 187-188; Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 37.
71 Futuhat -i- Alamgiri, p. 10.
72 Naima, vol. IV, 1833-1834.
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Aurangzeb was able to sit on the Peacock Throne although Dara Shikoh, the eldest son of Shah Jahan, was appointed heir apparent. When Aurangzeb ascended the throne, ambassadors including Uzbek ruler Quli Khan, Sheriff of Mecca, king of Yemen, and King of Ethiopia came to congratulate him.73 Although the Sublime Porte did not send any direct communication to the Mughal court, Husein Pasha, the ruler of Basra sent a diplomatic mission to Aurangzeb under Qasim Agha in January 1661.74 It can be seen from the records of the English Factories in India 1661-1664 that Aurangzeb dispatched a return ambassador to Husein Pasha.75 The chief of Musketeers Budaq Beg arrived Mughal court as ambassador of Shah Abbas II in February 1661.76
Ottoman Empire was the only empire which did not send any mission to Aurangzeb for his coronation. The reason for this was not stated in any Ottoman or Mughal contemporary chroniclers. Unlike Shah Jahan and Mehmed IV’s affable relation, in the first years of Aurangzeb period, the Ottoman sultans and Aurangzeb did not exchange ambassadors even though it was much needed due to political issues in Central Asia and Persia. There could be multiple possibilities behind this lack of correspondence between the two empires. Firstly, when Ottoman ambassador Maanzade Husein Agha went to India, he was welcomed by Murad Baksh who signed himself as king in Gujarat. This occurrence might have caused close relations between Murad Baksh and the Ottomans. Another reason could be the previous correspondences between Dara Shikoh and Ottoman grand vizier. There was also a rumour mentioned by Bernier that Prince Shah Shuja escaped to Istanbul after losing the war of succession and he obtained financial assistance from the Ottoman Empire to capture Kabul.77 It seems that the Ottomans had contact with three sons of Shah Jahan except Aurangzeb. Lastly, it can be said that the Ottoman court established good relations with Shah Jahan till the end of his reign, but the deposing and arrest of Shah Jahan by Aurangzeb might have led to hostile attitude on the part of Ottomans towards Aurangzeb. In fact, Mughal Chief Justice refused to read a khutba in the name of Aurangzeb by emphasising “in the life-
73 Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, vol. I, p. 296-297; Niccolao Manucci, Memoirs of the Mogul Court, Edited By Michale Edwards, p. 77-79.
74 Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb Northern India, 1658-1681, vol. III, Calcutta 1921, p. 118-119.
75 William Foster, the English Factories in India 1661-1664, Oxford 1923, p. 101.
76 Munshi Muhammed Kazım bin Muhammed Ameen, Alamgir Nama, Calcutta 1868, p. 607-608.
77 François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire A.D. 1656-1668, Oxford 1916, p. 113.
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time of father the reading of the Khutba in the name of his son is not permissible in the Shariat.”78
As return ambassador for Shah Abbas II, Tarbiyat Khan, the governor of Multan, was dispatched to Persia on 2 November 1663. However, this diplomatic visit did not meet the expectation of Aurangzeb, and on the contrary, the Mughal and Safavid relations changed for the worse. Although he was warmly welcomed by Shah Abbas II, after the ceremony, the Safavid ruler humiliated Mughal ambassador Tarbiyat Khan through his arrogant behaviour.79 Shah Abbas II also sent a letter to Aurangzeb and threatened him of invading India because of Mughal emperor’s attitude towards people and weak rule in India. These occurrences in the Safavids court and the letter brought by Tarbiyat Khan were the reason behind the broken relations.80 After three years, Tarbiyat Khan reached Agra in September 1666. According to Khafi Khan’s Muntakh al Lubab, the problem also had started because of Tarbiyat Khan’s behaviour in the court of Shah Abbas II that went against the traditional norms. Consequently, Aurangzeb reduced Khan’s mansab rank and foreclosed him from the Mughal court. Khafi Khan’s account, however, lacks what has transpired in the Safavid royal court between Shah Abbas II and Tarbiyat Khan.81
Speculating a possible danger of war with Safavids, Aurangzeb intended to send a mission to Istanbul led by Shah Khwaja.82 The underlying explanation for this decision was to disturb Safavids from their western borders by the Ottomans in case of Safavids` attack on Mughal territories. Thus, they could reduce the effect of Safavids in the region. However, the death of Shah Abbas II brought an end to possibility of war and finally Aurangzeb gave up the idea to dispatch a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman court.83
Another issue in Aurangzeb’s period related to the Ottoman Empire was the matter of refuge of Husein Pasha, the governor of Basra, at Mughal court in July 1669. Because
78 Futuhat-i- Alamgiri, p. 55.
79 Manucci, ibid, p. 84-86.
80 Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, vol. III, p. 109-111.
81 Anees Jahan Syed, Aurangzeb in Muntakhab-al Lubab, Bombay 1977, p. 234.
82 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 62.
83 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Osmanlı Padişahı II. Süleyman’ın Gurkanlı Padişahı I. Alemgir (Evrengzib)’e Mektubu [the Letter of Ottoman Sultan Suleiman II to Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb], Belleten, XIV/54, Ankara 1950, p. 271.
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of his anti-Ottoman activities in Basra, he had taken asylum at Mughal court and was cordially welcomed by Aurangzeb. He and his son Yahya Pasha were given mansab rank.84
The initiative for establishing close Ottoman-Mughal relations in Aurangzeb period came from the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman II by sending Ahmed Agha in 1689 to the Mughal court. Approximately 30 years after Aurangzeb’s coronation, the Ottomans sent a mission to the Mughal Court. Certain historical developments in the Ottoman Empire would accounted for the exchange in Ottoman policy towards Aurangzeb. Ottomans and Mughals had established relations because of Safavids and Uzbeks generally, but in this time neither Safavids nor Uzbeks were in the scene. The main reason was the unsuccessful siege of Vienna by the Ottomans in 1683. When the Ottomans failed to capture Vienna, the Christian coalition consisted of Austria, Poland, Vatican, German, Venice and Russia defeated the Ottoman army and began to take Ottoman territories in Balkans, Athens, Belgrade, Bosnia, and Wallachia among others. This disaster caused a havoc in the Ottoman administration and society which was already struggling with famine. This failure and its effects forced the Ottomans to look for help of the Mughal Empire, was at its peak both politically and economically.
Aurangzeb was busy in Deccan when he was informed about Ottoman envoy.85 He ordered the subadars of provinces that “they should accord him a warm welcome, treat him with due respect and honour and escort him safely through their respective territories”.86 The letter was full of quotation from the Quran and the Hadith (Prophet’s words). He informed Aurangzeb about the collaboration of Christian powers and their attack on Islamic territories. In order to protect those Muslims, Suleiman II solicited Aurangzeb’s assistance.87 It is possible that Sultan Suleiman II sought financial aid from Aurangzeb instead of military assistance since the Ottoman firearm technology was superior to Mughals. Besides, it was not easy to send soldiers to this long distance. Moreover, Ottoman economy was passing through a period of stagnation towards the end of the 17th century because of burden of long lasting wars and internal disturbances. In this case, the Ottoman government needed money to afford war budget and the
84 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 63-64.
85 Satish Chandra, Medieval India from Sultanat to the Mughals (1526-1748), vol. 2, New Delhi 2003, p. 340-341.
86 Futuhat -i- Alamgiri, p. 242.
87 Bayur, “Osmanlı Padişahı II. Süleyman’ın …”, p. 276-285.
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expenditure of its soldiers. A European traveller, Niccolao Manucci, in Mughal court stated this event in his his book Storia do Mogor:
“in 1689, there came an ambassador from the Grand Seignor to ask help in money from Aurangzeb, explaining to him the danger to which his king was exposed from the Christians. Aurangzeb sent him nine lakhs od rupees, making excuses for no greater help.”88
Whether it was the same letter or not the Ottoman sultan’s request from Aurangzeb was described by Talboys Wheeler with following word.
“the religious zeal of Aurangzeb seems to have reached the ears of the sultan of Turkey. Both were Sunnis. The sultan wrote to Aurangzeb begging him to forbid his subjects from selling saltpetre to Christians as it was often burnt for the destruction of good Mohammedans. Aurangzeb issued necessary prohibition, and the English lost for a while their saltpetre trade at Patna.”89
After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the war of succession among his three sons broke out.90 Bahadur Shah (1707-1712) succeeded to the throne, but he did not spend much effort to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottomans as his father did.91 Jahandar Shah became the emperor of the Mughal Empire after the death of Bahadur Shah by removing his rivals in 1712. His reign was too short to change Mughal’s diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. He was dethroned by his nephew Farrukshiyar with the help of Sayyid Brothers.92
Meanwhile, Ahmed III had ascended to the throne in the Ottoman Empire in 1703. Further, the Sublime port under pressure internally as well as externally due to territorial losses to rising European powers through treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 was unable to pursue missions with the Mughal court. During those years, the Ottomans tried to recover territories of the empire. Eventually, the Ottoman army defeated
88 Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India 1653-1708, vol. II, Translated by William Irvine, London 1907, p. 461. According to Manucci the name of Ottoman ambassador was Ahmed Agha. When Aurangzeb was told the loss of the Ottoman Empire that was recognised the most powerful Islamic empire, he had to accept strength of European Powers.
89 J. Talboys Wheeler, Early Records of British India: A History of the English Settlements in India, London 1878, p. 162.
90 John F. Richards, the Mughal Empire (the Cambridge History of India) 1-5, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 253-254.
91 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 69.
92 William Irvine, Later Mughals, vol. I, 1707-1720, edited by J. Sarkar, Calcutta 1922, p. 198-258.
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Russian Char in Prut in 1711, and with this, the Ottoman Empire began to regain its lost reputation after the unsuccessful siege of Vienna from the Europeans.
When Farrukshiyar became the emperor of the Mughal Empire, he was faced with legacy problem same as Aurangzeb. He executed his uncle to be the ruler of India, which never happened before Mughal history. Most importantly, he did not want himself to be a puppet king because of Sayyid Brothers who were very influential in Mughal court. Recognition from foreign empires and states could make his position stronger. Thus, he changed the Mughal’s diplomatic approach towards the Ottoman Empire and sent an envoy to Istanbul.
Farrukshiyar’s letter recorded in the Ottoman archives started with the importance of friendship among rulers. Then, he emphasised his victories in Bengal against Chagatai clan and capturing of Akbarabad. In the letter he stated, ‘the time of his accession to the throne as Shahjahanabad as 14 April 1712.93 It was interesting that the Sublime Port did not send return embassy, but only a letter was given to Mughal envoy, Haji Ni’az Beg.94 In his letter, Sultan Ahmed III congratulated him for the victories in Deccan and Bengal and his accession to the throne. Sultan also mentioned his campaigns to Venice and Austria and wanted Mughal emperor’s prayers by invoking jihad (holy war).95
There could be two reasons for this behaviour of the Ottomans. Firstly, the Ottoman government did not approve the way that Farrukshiyar kept the throne by executing his uncle. Because Ahmed III had abolished the Ottoman state rule that allowed killing Ottoman princes each other for the accession to the throne. Secondly, the Ottomans were in war on their western borders with Austria and Venice and hence, unable to prepare a return ambassador for India.
During Farrukshiyar’s reign neither the Ottoman nor Mughal chroniclers reported any diplomatic correspondence. In any case, Farrukshiyar’s reign did not last long and he was succeeded by Muhammed Shah in 1719. The reign of Muhammed Shah (1719-1748) was marked by improvement in Ottoman-Mughal relationships. For instance, the envoy of Uzbeks, Allahverdi Beg, came to the Mughal court in 1723. He was supposed to go to holy cities of Mecca and Medina for pilgrimage after his diplomatic duty.
93 A. {DVNSNMH.d… 6/238, p. 390-393.
94 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 72.
95 A. {DVNSNMH.d… 6/239, p. 393-397.
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Muhammed Shah thought of his journey as a chance to establish good relations with the Ottomans and gave him a letter to submit to Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III.96
Ottoman-Mughal relations were mostly shaped by Iranian monarchs as they became collaborators against Safavids. When Nadir Shah defeated Muhammed Shah and recaptured Qandahar from Mughals,97 he added an article that restricted the exchange of embassies and correspondences with the Ottoman Empire in the agreement.98 Thus, Nadir Shah could focus on the Ottoman relations by removing Mughal menace and its collaboration with the Ottomans. After his victory over the Mughals, Nadir Shah informed the Sublime Porte by sending valuable gifts and letter which full of praise to Ottoman Sultan.99 Upon this, Ottoman sultan sent a letter that complimented the Nadir Shah for his Indian campaign and thanking for gifts.100
These correspondences and attempts to establish friendship could not avoid the conditions, which led to the Ottoman-Persian war (1743-1746). At the core was the requests made by Nadir Shah to the Ottomans and the rejection of the same by the Sublime Porte. When the war between the two rival empires started, Muhammed Shah found an opportunity to take revenge from Nadir Shah and sent his envoy Sayyid Ataullah to the Sublime Porte.101 Apart from this letter, Sayyid Ataullah also wrote a letter to the Sultan while he was in Istanbul. The purpose was to prevent an Ottoman-Persian peace because Nadir Shah could attack India again. Muhammed Shah pointed out that Nadir Shah began to build new ships in the port of Ebu Shehr in the Basra Gulf that afforded Safavid Shah an opportunity to bring warriors from Bengal to Arabian Peninsula to attack Ottomans and capture Mecca, Medina, Damascus and Egypt. Lastly, the Mughal ruler warned the Sultan against Nadir Shah due to the fact that they experienced deceit in India.102
96 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 74-75.
97 BOA, HAT, 5/160; BOA, HAT, 6/184.
98 F. Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri [Ottoman Ambassadors and Sefaretnames], Ankara 1968, p. 82-83.
99 BOA, HAT, 4/134.
100 I. Mahmud-Nadir Şah Mektublaşmaları 3 Numaralı Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defteri ( Transkripsiyon / Tıpkıbasım) [The Correspondence between Mahmud I and Nadir Shah, Nâme-i Hümâyûn Records numbered 3 (Transcript / Facsimile)], İstanbul 2014, p. 102-106.
101 Süleyman İzzî, Tarih-i İzzi [History of İzzi], 1755, p. 29.
102 Y. Hikmet Bayur, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Nadir Şah Afşar’la Barış Yapmasını Önlemek Amacını Güden Bir Gurkanlı Denemesi” [A Mughal Attempt to Prevent the Ottoman Empire to Make Peace with Nadir Shah Afshar], Belleten, 49/XIII, January 1949, p. 92-95.
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In the letter, Muhammed Shah mentioned about what Nadir Shah did in India after the Battle of Karnal (1739) and Nadir`s intention on the Ottoman Empire. Muhammed Shah requested to attack on Iran from western by the Ottomans and his request was accepted by the Sublime Porte.103 Thus, the Ottoman government sent Mehmed Salim Efendi, an official of the Finance Department (Maliye Tezkirecisi), with Sayyid Ataullah as return envoy to forge stronger ties between the two Islamic empires through Damascus and Jiddah.104 Mehmed Salim Efendi and Sayyid Ataullah Efendi were given letter separately. In these letters, the main emphasis was on the friendship, mutual aids and maintenance of relations.105 Mehmed Salim Efendi went to India with Yağlıkçı Yusuf Agha and his son Mehmed Emin Efendi. However, once in India, the ambassador became sick and eventually died. The mission was completed by Yusuf Agha, who stayed in India for about 6 years.106
The main reason for the warm diplomatic relations in this period between the Mughals and the Ottomans was the rise of Persian power in the region. When Shah Abbas defeated Mughals and entered India, the next step would be the Ottomans’ territories. The request of Shah Abbas from the Ottoman government and its rejection brought these two empires into the battlefield. Apart from these, Abbas’s attempt to collaborate with Russia107 against the Ottoman Empire made the Ottoman-Mughal alliance a necessity.
Yusuf Agha completed his mission successfully and returned to Istanbul with Muhammed Shah’s letter along with many valuable gifts in March 1750.108 He brought two letters from India, one of them was the Muhammed Shah’s response to the letter109 and the second one was sent by Nizam-ul Mulk to sultan. First letter contained the death of Mehmed Salim Efendi, the shared Islamic sect of two empires and the importance of friendship against enemies.110 The second letter started with full praise of the sultan
103 Şem’dânî zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi Mür’i’t-Tevârih, vol. I, edited by Münir Aktepe, Istanbul 1976, p. 114.
104 BOA, C.HR., 186/9251.
105 Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, p. 81-82.
106 Miroğlu, “ibid”, p. 541. Mehmed Emin Efendi wrote a travel book about India when he returned back. İt took Sultan Mahmud I’s attention, so Mehmed Emin Efendi got a fame and many years later he became grand vizier.
107 BOA, HAT., 812/37244.
108 Aktepe, ibid, vol. I, p. 153-154.
109 BOA, Name-i Hümayun, vol. VIII, p. 310-312.
110 BOA, Name-i Hümayun, vol. VIII, p. 307-309.
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such as “protector of the land of the faithful” and “defender of the Shariat.” Then, Nizam proposed to sultan to invade Safavid territories, which was facing internal crisis following the death of Nadir Shah. In fact, death of Nadir Shah presented them an opportunity to spread Sunni Islam throughout the Persian lands.111 It is likely that the Ottoman government ignored this proposal because they made an agreement with Safavids in 1746 and brought an end to the Ottoman-Persian War. After these correspondences, there is no record of diplomatic relations between the Mughals and Ottomans.
As a consequence, before Mughal emperor Humayun sent his first letter to the Ottoman sultan in 1555, both sides were aware of each other through people like Sidi Ali Reis, Ustad Ali Quli, and Mustafa Rumi Khan previously. The first period of the relation was carried out with the transfer of military technology. Then, with Akbar the Great both empires began to fight in political arena. Until 1748 many times diplomatic missions and letters were exchanged between Sultans and Viziers of the two empires due to different reasons. It is for sure that Safavids were at the centre of Ottoman-Mughal diplomatic relations due to Persian’s geographical and religious status. When Sultan Selim I proved his superiority against Safavids by defeating Shah Ismail, thanks to the effective use of his artillery in the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, Shah Ismail and his successors took lesson from this defeat and began to improve their military in terms of firearm technology. The same war drew also Babur’s attention as he began to employ Ottoman originated commanders Ustad Ali Quli, and Mustafa Rumi Khan as commanders of firearm sections, which made Mughals a new power in India. Thus, the conflict of interest in the West Asia, Central Asia and India made complex triangle unfolding in the axis of the Ottoman, Mughal and Safavids Empires labelled around the politics of so-called ‘gunpowder empires’ until European powers emerged and affected their external policies.
The Shia Safavids territories happened to be between the Ottoman and Mughal Empires that professed Sunni Islam majorly. Hence, establishing an alliance against Safavids seemed a usual consequence, but the Mughals supported Safavids against the Ottomans both economically and diplomatically until Shah Abbas captured Qandahar from the
111 Y. Hikmet Bayur, “Nadir Şah Afşar’ın Ölümünden sonra Osmanlı Devleti’ni Iran’ı İstilaya kışkırtmak İçin Yapılan İki Deneme” [Two Attempts to Incite the Ottoman Empire to Invade Iran After Nadir Shah Afshar’s Death,], Belleten, 46/XII, April 1948, p. 407-410.
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Mughal Empire in 1622. This radical decision of Shah Abbas brought an alteration in the policy of Jahangir who dispatched his envoy to the Ottomans to make an alliance against Safavids. Nevertheless, Ottoman-Mughal relations were full of ups and downs even after this incident since there were egotism and clash of superiority complexes in between them.
The decline of Persian power in the region after the death of Shah Abbas II in 1666 brought new angle to the Ottoman and Mughal relations. It was the growing influence of European powers on the Ottoman Empire that made the Ottomans seek economic assistance from the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. During period, the basic argument in emperors’ letters was the aggression of European powers on the Muslim ruled lands. After a short time, Persians got their power again with Nadir Shah, so the Ottoman and Mughal Empires began to exchange missions to take some measures against him. Nevertheless, the Ottoman and Persian agreement in 1746, the assassination of Nadir Shah and the death of Muhammed Shah respectively brought an end the Ottoman-Mughal relations. Following events, there was no exchange of the missions between two sides, which meant the end of their diplomatic relations.
Literature Review
There are many contemporary works that provide valuable insight about the military system, structure, equipment of the Mughal Empire. This study is aimed to use every information available in the Mughal chronicles. The first chronicle is the Baburnama112 written by Za’iruddin Muhammad Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire. According to this account, Babur was familiar with firearms before he came to northern India plains. Babur describes how he defeated his rivals by using firearms effectively at the First Battle of Panipat and the Battle of Khanwa with the help of two Ottoman gun masters, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi.
The second prominent chronicle is Ain-i Akbar of Abu’l Fazl. He was the grand vizier of Mughal emperor Akbar. Abu’l Fazl not only narrated the military structure of the Mughal Empire, but also showed how Akbar’s enthusiast to manufacturing cannons and handguns. He described firearms as “wonderful locks for protecting the august
112 Zahiru’din Muhammad Babur Padshah Ghazi, Babur Nama (Memoirs of Babur), Translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge, Delhi 2014.
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edifice of the state, and befitting keys for the doors of conquest.” Those words of him demonstrates the importance of firearms for the Mughal authority. In his work, it is seen that Mughals achieved many improvements in firearms technology under Akbar’s reign. He has categorised the ranks of the guns and payment of gun bearers.113
Another significant chronicler of Akbar’s reign was Abdul-Qadir Ibn-i-Muluk Shah known as Al-Badaoni. His work Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh is divided into three volumes with a different narrative style. In the second volume of the text, he has narrated the events of the first forty years of Akbar. Thus, it can be followed how Akbar used the gunpowder and firearm technology in his campaigns.
The chronicles written during the reigns of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb gave valuable information about the military system and the weapons of the Mughals both during their campaigns and battles. The first work on the military history and weaponry of the Mughal Empire is Abdul Hamid Lahori’s Badshahnama comprising the first twenty years of Shahjahan’s reign. In his account Lahori has given detailed information of rebellions during Shahjahan’s reign. Through these rebellions, we can see that which kind of firearms were used by the Mughal army as well as by the rebel groups.114 Since he was too old to continue his work, his trusted pupil Mohammad Waris completed the last portion of Badshahnama. Waris gives the history of last ten years of Shahjahan’s reign.115
Another primary source for the Mughals’ military structure, campaigns, and war tools is Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan which comprises thirty years of Shahjahan’s reign.116 The work of Muhammad Salih Kambo “Amal-i-Salih” or “Shah Jahan Namah” is a detailed history of Shahjahan’s reign.
The reign of Aurangzeb was the turning point of the Mughal history since he spent most of his life and treasure of the Mughal Empire in the campaigns. Thus, many chronicles
113 Abu’l Fazl, Ain-i Akbar, Translated by H. Blochmann, vol. 1, Calcutta 1873, p. 116. (hereafter Ain-i Akbar).
114 Abdul Hamid Lahori, Padshahnama (1592-1638; 1638-1648), Vol. 1-2, Translated by Hamid Afaq Siddiqi, Delhi 2010. (hereafter Padshahnama).
115 Mohammad Waris Badshahnama, Translated by Ishrat Husain Ansari, Hamid Afaq Qureshi and al-Taimi al Siddiqi, Delhi 2017. (hereafter Badshahnama).
116 The Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan: An Abridged History of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, compiled by his Loyal Librarian: the Nineteenth-century Manuscript Translation of A. R. Fuller, Edited by W. E. Begley and Z. A. Desai, Delhi 1990. (hereafter Shah Jahan Nama).
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have described in details about his campaigns, army, and battles. One of these work belonged to Ishwar Das Nagar who was Hindu historiographer of Aurangzeb. He was either an eyewitness to the events or got the information from the Qazi. In his book Futuhat-i-Alamgiri, he mentions not only the suppression of the Marathas, the Jats, the Rathors, the Satnamis and other groups’ rebellions, but also deals with the war of succession among Shahjahan sons. He describes the battles and military campaigns of the Mughals in his book, which helps to understand both military technology of the Mughal empire and which kind of weapons manufactured.117
Another significant chronicle of Aurangzeb reign is Saqi Must’ad Khan’s Maasir-i-Alamgiri. Starting from the war of succession Khan describes the events occurred during the reign of Aurangzeb. In the book, it can be found many details about the campaigns of Aurangzeb in India. Thus, the military organisation, structure and the deployment of war tools in his battles and sieges could be found.118
Shahnama Munavvar Kalam of Shiv Das Lakhnawi deals with the political history of the Mughal Empire. Shiv Das Lakhnawi was in the service of some high rank people and he found opportunity to narrate the military activities by referring to the movements of the artillery, sieges and conduct of negotiating war and peace.119
A great number of the Persian records of Mughal documents are preserved in Andhra Pradesh State Archives which they cover entire Deccan’s political, economic, agricultural, and military aspects. These documents mainly belong to the reigns of Shah Jahan (1628-1658) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707). The English summaries of mentioned Mughal documents of Shah Jahan period120 and Aurangzeb period121 have been translated and published by Andhra Pradesh State Archives.
Among the research works on the military of the Mughal Empire, the pioneer study was done by William Irvine. In his book The Army of the Indian Moghuls he gave pure
117 Ishwardas Nagar, Futuhat-i-Alamgiri, Translated by Tasneem Ahmad, Delhi 2009. (hereafter Futuhat-i-Alamgiri).
118 Saqi Must’ad Khan, Maasir-i-‘Alamgiri, a History of the Emperor Auranzib-Alamgir (Reign 1658-1707 AD), Translated by Jadunath Sarkar, New Delhi 1986. (hereafter Maasir-i-‘Alamgiri).
119 Shiv Das Lakhnawi, Shahnama Munawwar Kalam, Translated by Syed Hasan Askari, Patna 1980. (hereafter Munawwar Kalam).
120 Selected Documents of Shah Jahan's Reign, Edited and Annotated by Yusuf Husain Khan and others, Hyderabad 1950.
121 Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign: 1659-1706, Edited by Yusuf Husain Khan, Hyderabad 1958.
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information on the Mughal battle tactics, operations, war tools, equipment, personnel, and logistics rather than substantive analysis. However, it has to be mentioned that when we think about the time of the work, the ideas of Irvine about the Mughal army reflects the colonial approach of British. As he stated the Mughal army “was a body of mercenaries, men who served only for what they could get, and ready at any moment, when things went badly, to desert or transfer themselves to a higher bidder.”122
The Indian Scholar Sir Jadunath Sarkar discussed the noticeable battles of Indian history in his Military History of India published in 1960. Predominantly, he has provided valuable ideas about the wars of the Mughals starting from Babur’s reign. The structure, strategies, armours, and orders of Mughal army during these battles were described. As he noted, he did not mentioned rebellions, riots, siege and naval warfare.123
Raj Kumar Phul in his work Armies of the Great Mughals (1526-1707) published in 1978 gave information about the military system of the Mughals. He followed the footprints of William Irvine’s work in terms of encyclopaedically listing the facts. However, the use of anecdotes, and limited analysing the arguments gave his work a more academic structure than Irvine’s book.124 In their books Major Gautam Sharma, Indian Army Through the Ages (1966),125 and H. C. Kar, Military History of India (1980) deals with the Indian armies from ancient times and they only gave a part for the Mughal army and it structure and organisation.126
The book Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army published by Abdul Aziz in 1942 has mainly dealt with the Mansabdari System. The work had lack of enlightenment on the organization of the Mughal army.127 Starting from the Mughal military system, M. K. Zaman dealt with the Mughal artillery with all aspect in his work Mughal Artillery published in 1982.128
122 William Irvine, the Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration, New Delhi 1962, p. 297.
123 Jadunath Sarkar, Military History of India, Calcutta 1960.
124 Raj Kumar Phul, Armies of the Great Mughals (1526-1707), New Delhi 1978.
125 Major Gautam Sharma, Indian Army Through the Ages, Bombay 1966.
126 H. C. Kar, Military History of India, Calcutta 1980.
127 Abdul Aziz, Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army, Delhi 2016.
128 M. K. Zaman, Mughal Artillery, Delhi 1983.
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In his book “Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India”, Iqtidar Alam Khan examines all aspects of gunpowder and firearm technology in medieval India by using Persian, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi primary sources along with the travel books of Europeans. He critically scrutinises when and how the gunpowder reached to Indian subcontinent. He examines the contribution of European and Ottoman engineers to the Mughal Empire in terms of improvement of firearm technology. Then, he discusses the nature and improvement of handguns among different Indian groups in the Mughal Empire. Through these understandings, he examined the role of the matchlock musket in the centralisation and decentralisation of Mughal authority.129
The Mughal Strategy of War is another valuable study for the Mughal military history. Its authors Sabahuddin and Shukla attempted to explain the art of war and military understanding of the Mughals, which make this study exclusive among others in its nature. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, they gave information about the battle order, battle ground, war council, conducting of a battle, tricks and strength of the Mughal army in the light of contemporary sources. The second part deals with the offensive and defensive characteristic structure of the Mughal army, and which kind of constructions or ways were practised by the Mughal army during the battles.130
In the Art of Medieval War in Medieval India, Jagadish Narayan Sarkar states that “the book is not an encyclopaedia of all information relating to medieval Indian warfare. It is just modest beginning in the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed work on the Art of Medieval War in Medieval India.” Thus, he explains the basic and main military policy and military institutions of medieval Indian armies along with the nature of the art of War in Medieval India. He deals with the armours, strategies, and branches of the armies. Unlike other studies, he attempts to give ideas about the navies of medieval Indian empires. Besides, he also examines military morality of ancient and medieval India and laws of Islam in Muslim states in India.131
The book of Jos Gommans Mughal Warfare Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700 underlines the importance of ecology of the Indian subcontinent in studying the military structure of the Mughal Empire. According to Gommans, arid zone in the north West and monsoon in the northeast required different types of military
129 Iqtidar Alam Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms Warfare in Medieval India, New Delhi 2004.
130 Abdul Sabahuddin and Rajshree Shukla, the Mughal Strategy of War, Delhi 2003.
131 Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, the Art of Medieval War in Medieval India, Delhi 1984.
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formation: sedentary army and nomadic army. Gommans explains how Mughals combined them effectively. He has also highlighted the contrasting the military and social ethos of between Ghazis and Sadus, Mirzas and Rajputs. The book also discusses their motivation during the war by Gommans. Rich supplies of the Indian continent to meet the needs of the Mughal army. The distinctive feature of the book is that Gommans attempts to explain the background of Mughal warfare rather than battles and tactics. In the firearms context, Gommans argues that at the beginning, Mughals were capable of manufacturing good quality of firearms and were successful in their deployment in the battlefields. Then, he explains factors looking to the failure of production of firearms unlike Europeans. Lastly, the comparison of Mughals with Safavids and the Ottomans in the chapters gives ideas about other “Islamic gunpowder empires” as well.132 In addition to above studies and chronicles, the accounts of two prominent travellers François Bernier133 and Manucci134 provide valuable information about the Mughal military organisation and structure along with the guns of the army, campaigns, battles etc.
A comprehensive study about the military structure and battle order of the Ottoman Empire is found in Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları, Cebeci, Topcu, Top Arabacıları, Humbaracı, Lağımcı Ocakları ve Kapukulu Süvarileri written by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı in two volumes. His work covers mainly the 15th and 16th centuries Ottoman army. He has given a detailed information about Household troops and its subdivisions, Armoury, artillery, sarpers, etc. then the cavalry unit of household troops was dealt with by the author. In the end of the book, he has furnished some pictures of household troops.135
The book Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş is composed of articles of Ottoman historian Feridun Emecen and published in 2010. The book is divided into two main sections “strategies and firearms” and “battles”. It analyses with Ottomans’ battles, war tactics and strategies from the beginning till the end of 17th century. Apart from this, with the
132 Jos Gommans Mughal Warfare Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700, London 2002.
133 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire AD 1656-1668, Edited by Vincent A. Smith, Delhi 2008.
134 Niccolao Manucci, A Pepys of Mogul India 1653-1708 being an Abridged edition of the “Storia do Mogor” of Niccolao Manucci, Translated by William Irvine, New Delhi 1991.
135 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları, Cebeci, Topcu, Top Arabacıları, Humbaracı, Lağımcı Ocakları ve Kapukulu Süvarileri, vol II, Ankara 1988.
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invention of gunpowder, the increasing popularity of firearms and its use by the Ottomans at the battlefields are discussed by comparing with the European powers. In the second section, Emecen has explained how the Ottomans used and developed their tactics and strategies according to firearms during some certain battles (Battles of Kosovo, Niğbolu, Mercidabık, Ridaniyye and Mohacs) rather than the reasons and results of them.136
In his book Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, the general work on the Ottoman military history, Rhoads Murphey reassesses the historical truism about the Ottoman Empire in the context of Ottoman military affairs in 1500-1700. In the first three chapters, after a brief overview on the western and eastern political context, he has dealt with the technological, economical, physical and environmental constraints on the Ottoman warfare along with the military manpower and military spending. In the chapter 4 to 7, he explains the military operations of the Ottoman Empire in terms of troops movement and army transport, provisioning of the army. Murphy has also explained the Ottoman methods of warfare which, include experience, practice, motivational and physiological aspects. In the last two parts (Chapter 8-9), he evaluates the effects of war after the battles and the influence of war on the Ottoman economy and society.137
The book of Hungarian scholar, Gabor Agoston, Guns for the Sultan’s Army provides useful insights about the weapon industry and technology of the Ottoman Empire. The book is based on archival documents and primary sources of the Ottoman Empire. Agoston begins by explaining the history of gunpowder and firearm technology in the Ottoman empire and their deployment in the battlefields. Moreover, he analyses the weights, measures, and ingredients of the weapons by using data from Ottoman archive. In the second chapter, he emphasises the superior position of the Ottomans in military technology over European powers until the end of 17th century. The salient point of the book is that “Islamic conservation” did not have any place in the Ottoman Empire since they were keen to adopt new developments in weaponry in Europe.138
136 Feridun Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş [War in the Ottoman Classical Era], İstanbul 2014.
137 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, London 1999.
138 Gabor Agoston, Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge 2005.
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In his two articles, Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700139 and the Socio- Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East,140 Halil İnalcık argues how the changing land revenues system that caused emergence of new local powers, and increasing demand in taxes and its permanency caused the social disorder through the empire. In this circumstance, he emphasises the role of firearms and its dissemination among peasants.
There are many Ottoman chronicles that provide useful and reliable information about the military structure, system, organisation, warfare, campaigns and other military related issues. Topçular Katibi Abdulkadir Efendi is one of such leading Ottoman chronicler.141 In his book, apart from the campaigns that he attended, he dealt with the cannons, the artillery section, and the ammunition situation of the Ottoman army.142 Peçeylu İbrahim143 and Mustafa Naima Efendi144 are other chroniclers who have narrated Ottoman campaigns, battles and military structure in their equally eminent books.
Structure of the Study
The introduction and heavily use of gunpowder and firearms in battlefields changed the destiny of the Ottomans and Mughals. Although their adaptation process of firearms was faster than others in the beginning, they could not respond to the rapid military revolution taking place in the Europe due to a variety of factors. Much of the available literature reviewed above provide useful insights into understanding the inter-related factors accounting for the rise and fall of the two Empires under study. What is, however, missing so far is a comprehensive study of the role of the gunpowder and firearms both in the initial military success and the subsequent failure of the Ottoman and Mughal empires due to the absence of military modernisation in both the cases, contributing to the loss of the prowess and leverage they had as compared to the European powers.
139 Halil İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1700”, Archivum Ottomanicum, vol. VI, 1980, pp. 283-337.
140 Halil Inalcik, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East,” War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, Edited by V. Parry and M. E. Yapp, London 1975.
141 Topcular Katibi Abdulkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi [History of Topcular Katibi Abdulkadir (Kadri) Efendi], Prepared by Ziya Yılmazer, Ankara 2003.
142 Ziya Yılmazer, “Topçular Katibi Abdulkadir Efendi”, DİA, Vol. I, İstanbul 1988, p. 234.
143 Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, Peçevi Tarihi [History of Peçevi], Prepared by Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, Ankara 181.
144 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Naîmâ (Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn Fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn) [History of Naima], vol. I-II, Edited by Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara 2007.
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The main objective of this study is to analyse the history of gunpowder weapons and the two empires to further their military hardware. The extent for which the effects of modern European military would account for the military prowess of these empires and correspondingly, the decline of the Mughal and Ottoman Empires. the study is based on the following hypothesis: ‘The inferior quality of gunpowder and firearms used by the Ottoman and Mughal army accounted for the decline of the two Empires.’
Accordingly, the study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter of the thesis introduces the broader contours of this work. In the second chapter, the role of gunpowder and firearms in the rise of these empires is being analysed through a case study of some specific battles. The chapter also analyses the thesis of “gunpowder empires” and how it came in usage with respect to these empires.
The third chapter of the thesis analyses the production and diffusion of firearms in these empires. The chapter tries to answer the dependency of these empires on the European technology and how things transformed from self-reliance in the 16th century onwards. Towards the end the chapter utilises world system theory of the Wallerstein to analyse the role of the Ottoman Empire in the transmission of its technology to Asia being a core power.
The fourth chapter discusses the diffusion of firearms among the peasants which created a decentralisation process because of armed peasants’ rebellions. The chapter details peasant rebellions affected the Mughal central administration and steps taken by the Mughals to deal with the periphery. Besides, the factors inhabiting the process of military modernisation which, in turn, contributed to the decline of the Mughal Empire are analysed. It also explains how Mughal Empire transformed from core to periphery for the European powers as the technological stagnancy set in the empire through some prominent battles that Mughals fought with Europeans.
The fifth chapter deliberates on the rebellions within the Ottoman Empire and their effects on decentralisation process. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the quality of gunpowder and firearms used by the Ottoman Empire against the European frontiers. Like the previous chapter this also analyses how the Ottomans shifted from being a core in the 16th century to periphery power status in the 18th century. In the last
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part, the defeats of Ottoman army due to the lack of technological improvements will be explained through some certain battles.
The last chapter of the thesis concludes the study and gives a summary of the findings and also test the research hypothesis. The thesis uses case study approach and its analytical method. The work has relied on most of the primary sources in both Turkey for Ottomans and India for Mughals apart from secondary source-materials in different forms.
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CHAPTER 2
USE OF FIREARMS
IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN AND MUGHAL WARFARE
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Throughout history many empires and kingdoms were established after their decisive victories against other states or empires. When a new state was established, the defeated states would be relegated to the pages of the history. While the destiny of India and Mughals was being scripted in Panipat, the Turks starting in north-western parts of Anatolia started scribbling the destiny of the Balkans and the Turks and the broader region.145 The fate of empires’ has sometimes depended on one war in their entire history, which made it important for the rulers to sustain well-equipped armies all the time. The growth of empires depended on the ability of the ruler as well as the weapons of army. With the technological advancement in the style of warfare and armoury in the age of gunpowder, states needed cannons, strong fortification, trained infantry with handguns in order to sustain their military power. The states, which achieved the technological improvement, militarily dominated the battlefield. The Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids were thought to have achieved noticeable military successes by employing newly enhanced firearms such as musket and cannon in warfare. Especially, the Ottomans and Mughals at the beginning used Central Asian steppe warfare tactics that relied on cavalry warfare. However, they were successful to combine firearms with cavalry, which assured them the advantage in the battlefield over their opponents.
Before we delineate the battles, which gave rise to the Mughals and the Ottomans, it is analytically useful to examine the concept of “the gunpowder empires hypothesis”. The hypothesis was firstly used by Russian Historian V. V. Barthold,146 which was, however, developed by Marshall Hodgson in the third volume of his famous book Venture of Islam wherein he labelled the Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids as “gunpowder empires”. Hodgson asserts that the use of firearms created major political changes in the Islamic world from the mid-15th century. A well-organised central power which could afford firearms had the edge over the local garrisons and power. Thus,
145 The battle of Koyunhisarı in other words Bafeus Battle in 27 July 1302 between the Ottoman forces and Byzantium ended with the Ottomans’ victory. It is thought by some eminent scholars like Halil Inalcık that after this battle, the Ottoman Empire was established since through this battle the Ottomans got prestige and so many people participated them. Those people thought the Ottomans’ territories as a new life area. Among those people there were politicians from the Seljukid Empires, warriors, traders, religious men and people who wanted to escape from Mongol pressure to new conquered territories. Halil İnalcık, “Tarih: Sadece Tarihten İbaret Midir?” [History: Is it Just a History?], Osmanlı Tarihini Yeniden Yazmak, Kuruluş, [Rewriting Ottoman History, Foundation], Ed. Elif Ayla, İstanbul 2010, p. 64-65.
146 Douglas E. Streusand, the Formation of the Mughal Empire, New Delhi 1989, p. 11.
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firearms had a role in creation and sustenance of the political structure of Islamic empires – the Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids during the 16th century.147
William H. McNeill, apart from Hodgson, also points out that the centralised regimes got their power from the use of firearms, especially artillery. McNeill supports the gunpowder empire hypothesis by adding Japanese and Muscovites into this frame. He, however, argues that due to unfavourable conditions of transportation of cannons and mortars in interior territories of empire, the “imperial consolidation” of the Mughals “remained precarious”.148 Iqtidar Alam Khan has contended that firearms, especially cannons, helped the Mughals to establish their hegemony in Northern India plains at the beginning, from where they expanded their borders to the large parts of the subcontinent. Besides gunpowder and firearms were significant factors in the creation of the centralised bureaucracy.149 David Ayalon stresses in his book Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom a Challange to a Mediaeval Society that the traditional cavalry army of Mamluks was defeated by the Ottoman army which was more innovative in terms of gunpowder and firearms in two battles respectively.150
The above-mentioned works on the “gunpowder empire hypothesis” have been criticised by a number of scholars. Douglas E. Streusand argued that Hodgson and McNeill’s explanation of the “gunpowder empires hypothesis” was inadequate or inaccurate. According to Streusand, the title should refer “empires in the gunpowder era”, not “empires created by gunpowder weapons”.151 He also emphasised the importance of mounted archery along with the firearms.152 Jos Gommans seconded Streusand’s arguments on the importance of firearms with the combination of warhorse.153 Stephan Dale points out that although firearms had crucial role in Ottoman
147 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, Venture of Islam: the Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times, vol. 3, Chicago 1977.
148 William H. McNeill, the Pursuit of Power, Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, Chicago 1982, p. 95-98; William H. McNeill, the Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800, Washington 1989.
149 Iqtidar Alam Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms Warfare in Medieval India, New Delhi 2004.
150 David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom a Challange to a Mediaeval Society, London 1956.
151 Douglas E. Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, Philadephia 2011, p. 3.
152 Streusand, Formation of the Mughal Empire, p. 53.
153 “…that gunpowder weaponry required or facilitated a different, perhaps even more centralized political organization, it is also my contention that, until the late eighteenth century, warhorses were more, or at least equally important in exercising imperial control, at least along the empires’ most dangerous, arid frontiers.” Jos Gommans, “Warhorse and Post-Nomadic Empire in Asia, c. 1000-1800”, Journal of Global History, (2007) 2, p. 3.
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victories, they were not effectively applied in the Mughal and Safavids.154 In the Mughal context, Christopher Duffy contends that the siege warfare of Mughals did not bring any considerable changes in the structure of forts.155 Irfan Habib also discusses the same while noting:
artillery was not the decisive arm of their army and they were never able to employ it successfully against really strong forts. Their real strength lay in cavalry and it was in battle in the open field, in rapid movements.156
Despite the criticisms against the gunpowder empire hypothesis, it is obvious that the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire saved the day with the effective use of firearms in their decisive battles such as 1514 Chaldiran, 1516 Marjdabık, 1517 Ridaniyya, 1526 Mohacs, 1526 Panipat, 1527 Khanwa, and 1575 Tukaroi.
Prominent Battles of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century
The exact date about the introduction of firearms by the Ottomans in their military is debatable. This is because most of the Ottoman chronicles were written from the second half of 15th century, which have given contested information about the type and name of guns used by Ottoman army in the 14th-century battles. Most importantly, the terminology is also another problem; for instance, the Turkish word “top” was used for both the shots of cannon and the cannon itself which makes it confusing to determine the subject of the matter in certain cases. According to the works by David Ayalon and Djurdjica Petrovic, there are two possibilities including how and when the Ottomans got acquainted with firearms. In the first, it was through Balkans from the west where the gunpowder and firearms were known from the second half of the 14th century.157 Besides, Petrovic has also declared that Ottomans obtained firearms through Venetian and Genoese merchants. The main trade zone of these two Italian city-states, Venice and Genoa, along the Mediterranean and the Black Sea coasts, where mostly under the control of the Ottomans. Therefore, it is likely that the Ottomans acquired gunpowder
154 Stephen F. Dale, the Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, Cambridge 2010, p. 6.
155 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare the Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660, Hampshire 1979, p. 228-229.
156 Irfan Habib, the Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707, New Delhi 2014, p. 364.
157 Djurdjica Petrovic, “Fire-arms in the Balkans on the Eve of and After the Ottoman Conquests of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”, War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, Ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, London 1975, p. 169-172.
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and firearm weapons from these merchants.158 The other possibility is that it was from the Mamluks in the east. David Ayalon in his study mentions that Mamluks used artillery prominently in 1389-1390 battles, and after that they became common in Mamluks army.159 In the light of this inference, it can be argued that the Ottomans might have used firearms in the end of the 14th century.
Even though Timur won the battle of Ankara in 1402 over Ottoman sultan Bayezid, the Thunderbolt, it was followed by interregnum as four sons of Bayezid fought for the throne. Despite having reorganised after years of infighting, the Ottomans lost territories subsequently within a short span of time. During this period from 1402 to 1453, the Ottomans used firearms in siege warfares happened in 1422, 1424, 1430, 1440, 1446, 1448, 1450 and finally in 1453 at the siege of Constantinople.160 It is a fact that the largest cannons of Mehmed the Conqueror had played a crucial role at the siege of Constantinople. Especially cannons cast by Turkish gun master Saruca and Hungarian gun master Orban were arrayed in a line in front of the fortification walls. Those cannons were able to strongly damage the well-protected Constantinople walls that it became a challenge for the defenders to plug those holes. Mehmed the Conqueror realised the values of firearms after the conquest and did not hesitate to hire Christians artillerists in his army. He equipped his infantry soldiers known as Janissaries with handguns.
Although the exact date of Ottomans first usage of firearms remains uncertain, the reign of Mehmet the Conqueror was a turning point in the Ottoman history. He gained an unquestionable power with the conquest of Constantinople. During his reign, he accomplished successful raids into Balkan territories and took most of the cities, which were the hubs of gunpowder and firearms production with skilled craftsmen and rich mines. It is thus safe to conclude that the Ottomans had a long history of obtaining, developing and use of gunpowder and firearms.
Lastly, it can be said that the early forms of firearms were not so efficient in the battles in terms of their war-winning potential. They were used by small units of the army such as in 1402 Ankara Battle, which the Ottomans could not bear against Timur’s elephants
158 Petrovic, “ibid”, p. 176-177.
159 Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 2.
160 V. J. Parry, Barud”, EI, Vol 1, Leiden 1986, p. 1061.
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and cavalry.161 However, the Ottomans became successful in the use of firearms in the battles of Chaldiran, Marjdabik, Ridaniya and Mohac. The success of the Ottoman firearms was described by a Dalmatian soldier to the Ottoman ministry with the following words;
None of us would have run away from attacks with the lance and sword blows, for we know these people (the Ottomans). They are not better horsemen than we are, and they are not braver than we are, that we should fear them. The only thing which does harm to us is these firearms and these bullets and these cannons which, if you fired at mountains with them, would wipe out the mountains.162
Battle of Chaldiran, 1514
When Safavids led by Shah Ismail, legitimatising itself on Shia sectarian identity of Islam, emerged as a new power from the Persian territories, Ottoman sultan Bayezid II thought that the struggle of Ismail was against Dulgadiroglu in Diyarbakir and Kurdish states of the region. However, his son Selim I, the governor of Trabzon, realised the aim of Shah Ismail and made an attempt to warn his father about Ismail’s activities and Qizilbash question.163 Meanwhile, Shah Ismail had defeated in 1510 the Uzbek leader Shaibani Khan who was an ally of the Ottoman Empire in the east and sent the straw-filled skin of the head of Shaibani Khan to Bayezid to inform about Safavid victory.164 Moreover, Shah Ismail got an opportunity to strengthen his position in Anatolia due to the fight between sons of Bayezid II, Selim and Ahmed. Shah Ismail’s follower Shahqulu planned and raised an uprising by taking support of Qizilbash and Ottoman sipahis. They became powerful in a short time and weakened the Ottoman power in Anatolia by defeating Beylerbegi. Finally, Ottoman grand vizier Khadim Ali Pasha defeated Shahqulu and his supporters.165
When Selim I came to power with the support of janissaries, a war with Shah Ismail was inevitable. Upon the insulting letter and gifts of the Ustajlu Muhammad Khan,
161 Gabor Agoston, “Behind the Turkish War Machine: Gunpowder Technology and War Industry in the Ottoman Empire, 1450-1700”, The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment, Ed. Brett D. Steele and Tamera Dorland, Cambridge 2005, p. 103.
162 Kenneth Chase, Firearms A Global History to 1700, Cambridge 2003, p. 105.
163 Ebru Boyar, “Ottoman Expansion in the East”, Cambridge History of Turkey: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 14531603, Ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet, Cambridge 2013, p. 103.
164 Hasan Rumlu, Ahsanu’t Tawarikh, Edited by C. N. Seddon, Baroda 1931, p. 54-55.
165 Adel Allouche, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555), Berlin 1983, p. 94-95.
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governor of Diyarbakir and the ruinous campaign of Nur Ali Khalifa Rumlu in Anatolia, Selim I declared war on Shah Ismail.166 During his march towards the east, Sultan Selim I provoked Shah Ismail with his letters to come to the battlefield because of Qizilbash supporters in his army and Anatolia. Sultan Selim I was careful of any Shia uprising within his territory as he pursued Shah Ismail and so left behind around 40,000 soldiers between Sivas and Kayseri region to checkmate any dissent.167
There are different opinions in the contemporary sources about the number of troops of armies. There is no doubt that Ottomans were stronger in terms of artillery compared to Safavids. In the light of Ottoman documents, Gabor Agoston shows that the distribution of the household troops in 1514 campaign was as follows; 10,065 Janissaries, 1640 sipahi, 1,758 silahdar, 1,864 cavalries, 378 armorers, 293 artillery gunners, 334 gun carriages.168 Apart from this, Agoston also estimates the number of provincial army which is approximately 60,000 to 70,000 men.169 Ghulam Sarwar states that the Safavid army comprised about 40,000 men with the participation of the governors of Diyarbakr, Erzincan and Arabia Iraq. The governors of Balkh, Hirat and Qayin could not attend to the Shah Ismail against Ottomans, as they were engaged in defending the north-eastern part of the Empire from the Uzbek attacks.170
Safavids had enjoyed a very high level of military success. Shah Ismail had never lost any battle with a reputation of being an invincible commander who led his army from the front. The Safavid army consisted of cavalry dominating the battlefield at that period. The main strength of the Ottoman army was also due to its well-trained and well-equipped Janissary infantry who were using firearms and were equipped with 500 field artillery.171 It may be thus contended there was a classic encounter between a heroic and individualist Safavids army and effectively modern professional army equipped with firearms of Ottomans. While the Ottomans had firearms, Safavids were familiar with the use of artillery. However, the latter considered them unmanly and
166 Hasan Rumlu, ibid, p. 68.
167 Mustafa Çetin Varlık, “Çaldıran Savaşı”, [Battle of Chaldiran], DİA, Vol. 8, Ankara 1993, p. 193.
168 Gabor Agoston, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç [Military Power and Strategy in the Ottoman Empire], Trns. Fatih Çalışır, İstanbul 2012, p. 177-178.
169 Gabor Agoston, “War-Winning Weapons? On the Decisiveness of Ottoman Firearms from the Siege of Constantinople (1453) to the Battle of Mohács (1526)”, Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 39 (2013), p. 135.
170 Ghulam Sarwar, History of Shâh Ismâ’îl Safawi, New York 1975, p. 78-80.
171 H. Erdem Çıpa, the Making of Selim Succession, Legitimacy, and Memory in the Early Modern Ottoman World, Indiana University Press, Indiana 2017, p. 5.
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cowardly.172 Besides, the gunners of Safavids were inexperienced. However, there is no source, which mentions about the use of firearms in the Safavid camp in Chaldiran battle.173
In Chaldiran, the Ottoman army was divided into 3 sections as it was their traditional tactical order. Left wing was controlled by governor of Rumelia Hasan Pasha and Rumelian soldiers; in right wing Anatolian governor Hadim Sinan Pasha, Anatolian notables and their soldiers; and in the centre of army Sultan Selim grounded himself.174 The most important move was to use Wagenburg or wagon laager tactic.175 According to this tactic, carts were tied with chains and soldiers were situated behind them; soldiers who used tufang (rifle) were also protected with camels and other stuff. Between these carts janissaries and artillery were positioned.176
When Shah Ismail saw Ottoman army’s order, he gave up to attack the centre of the Ottoman army. He divided his army into two sections and commanded the right wing in order to attack the Ottomans’ left wing. The right wing was led by Ustaclu and he attacked the Ottomans’ left wing. At the beginning of the battle, Safavids’s swift cavalries gained the upper hand with a quick attack, but it was here the superiority of Ottomans’ firearms emerged. Hadim Sinan Pasha especially used artillery very diligently. When Ustaclu with all force under his command attacked Pasha, the Ottoman governor and commander ordered his artillerymen to wait patiently. When Ustaclu and his soldiers entered in the firing range of cannons, Ottomans’ cannons started firing from behind the carts beating Ustaclu decisively with most of his soldiers dead.177
Meanwhile, Shah Ismail had outbraved the Ottomans’ left wing killing a number of Ottoman commanders. When sultan Selim I realised the weakness of left wing, he sent
172 R. M. Savory, Barud”, EI, vol. I, Leiden 1986, p. 1066-1067.
173 Agoston, “War-Winning Weapons?”, p. 136.
174 Süleyman Lokmancı, Solakzade Tarihi’nin Tahlili ve Metin Tenkidi [Analysis and Text Criticism of the History of Solakzade], Unpublished PhD thesis, Atatürk University, Institute of Social Sciences, History Department, Erzurum 2015, p. 463-464.
175 This tactic came from Hussite in Bohemia in central Europe. It was adopted by Hungarian and used against the Ottomans in the middle fifteenth century. Then, the Ottomans learnt this war tactic and adopted it in their military structure under the name “tabur cengi.” With the extensive use of cannons and muskets by the Ottoman army, the tactic became irreplaceable in the battlefields for the Ottomans. Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 32.
176 Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, Müneccimbaşı Tarihi, [History of Müneccimbaşı], vol. 2, Translated by İsmail Erünsal, İstanbul 1974, p. 462.
177 Müneccimbaşı, vol. 2, p. 463.
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janissaries who carried muskets as reinforcements which stopped the advance of Shah Ismail. The main reason why the left wing lost easily was due to the inability of the Azap soldiers to move behind the cannons swiftly thereby restraining timely firing of the canons. This disharmony gave advantage to Shah Ismail.178 In the end, he made an attempt to attack the Ottoman centre, but the fire of Ottoman artillery cut his way and stopped him in reaching behind the chained carts. In other words, Safavids cavalry failed to penetrate the Ottoman wagons line. The arrival of the right wing of the Ottoman army, Shah Ismail could not bear Ottoman attack and escaped from the battlefield. In short, Ottomans achieved victory due to the effective employment of firearms.179
Even though the Safavid army even though had more advantages like not being fatigued, being close to supply lines, powerful cavalry and so chose to battle in the field, the Ottomans’ firearms proved too strong to stand up to.180 Hasan Rumlu defines the Ottoman firearms with the following words:
At the time of battle they strengthen their army with guns and chains, making thus a strong fortress to protect themselves. And within it the gunmen fire guns and cannon and muskets, and over the cannon in the form of a dragon they place big and small mortars. And they have such skill and power in firing their guns that they can hit the indivisible atom a mile away.181
Salamon Schweigger, who travelled the Ottoman Empire during 1578-1581, narrated that “if the cannons of Turks did not become more efficient, Iranians would defeat them.”182 Likewise, Venetian Ambassador Caterino Zeno emphasised the importance of Ottoman firearms in the battle of Chaldiran.183
178 Yaşar Yücel and Ali Sevim, Klasik Dönemin Üç Hükümdarı Fatih Yavuz Kanuni [The Three Rulers of the Classical Era Fatih Yavuz Kanuni], Ankara 1991, p. 122.
179 Sarwar, ibid, p. 81.
180 Mehmet Tanju Akad, Türk Tarihinin Yönünü Değiştiren Savaşlar-I, Kara Savaşları, Hun İmparatorluğu’ndan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na [Wars that Changed the Direction of Turkish History – I, Land Wars, from the Hun Empire to the Ottoman Empire], İstanbul 2018, p. 64.
181 Hasan Rumlu, ibid, p. 68.
182 Salamon Schweigger, Sultanlar Kentine Yolculuk 1578-1581 [Journey to the City of Sultans 1578-1581], Translated by Türkis Noyan, İstanbul 2004, p. 177.
183 Uzun Hasan-Fatih Mücadelesi Döneminde Doğu’da Venedik Elçileri Caterino Zeno ve Ambrogio Contarini’nin Seyahatnâmeleri [Travelogues of the Venetian Ambassadors Caterino Zeno and Ambrogio Contarini in the East during the Battle of Uzun Hasan-Fatih], Translated by Tufan Gündüz, İstanbul 2006, p. 63-64.
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Figure – 2. 1: Artwork of the Battle of Chaldiran at the Chehel Sotoun Pavilion in Isfahan.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chaldiran#/media/File:A_painting_in_Chehel_Sotoun1.jpg
Ottoman Sultan Selim I decisively defeated the Safavid army with the help of his wagon laager tactic and firearms. The course of battle reflected the imbalance between two armies. Since the Ottomans chained the carts together and positioned musketeers behind them, the swift cavalry of Safavids was unable to break through this barrier, so the Ottoman infantry could easily load their guns. Though Shah Ismail escaped from the battlefield, the war not only soiled his military reputation but also rendered him unable to lead an army afterwards as he lost most of his top commanders. Later on, when Ottomans shifted their attention to south on Mamluks, Safavids stopped their territorial expansion.
Battle of Marjdabik, 1516
The victory that came after the decisive battle at Chaldiran against Safavis concerned Mamluks as sultan Selim shifted his attention to the east Anatolia where Mamluks controlled some cities. The conflict between Ottoman and Mamluks could be dated to the end of the 15th century. The main reasons behind the conflict were the situation of Dulkadirs and Selim’s aim to control the holy land and trade routes.184 Upon these
184 Feridun Emecen, “Mercidabık Muharebesi” [Battle of Marjdabik], DİA, vol. 29, Ankara 2004, p. 175.
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occurrences, Selim I directed his army to south through Mamluks including 100 to 150 cannons and about 2,000 matchlock men.185 It was also reported by a Venetian council in Alexandria that Sultan al-Ghawri left Cairo with 15,000 Mamluks and awlad al-nas along with 25 to 30 cannons.186
The contemporary chronicles emphasised the use of the wagon laager tactic along with the firearms. Safavid cavalry was not able to push Ottomans back due to the “strong fortress”. As explained above, the cavalry of Mamluk’s faced the same problem as did the Safavids to break through the Ottoman wagon fortress.187
Just like Safavids, Mamluks were also familiar with the use of firearms, especially in siege warfare. When Kansu al-Ghawri came to power, he started the process of casting cannons which had never been employed before in the Mamluks history. Although Sultan Kansu al-Ghawri ordered casting cannons at a large scale and established cannon foundries, his huge artilleries were not used against the Ottomans in the battle of Marjdabik and Ridaniya since they were sent to the coastal areas like Alexandria, for fortification against Ottomans’ naval attacks.188
Ottoman and Mamluk armies met at Marjdabik, north of Aleppo, on 24 August 1516. In the centre of the Ottoman army, Sultan Selim I and Grand vizier Sinan Pasha situated along with janissaries. In front of them, chained wagons were placed just like small fortress and cannons were lined. Thus, Ottoman army’s centre was protected from swift attack of Mamluk cavalry; in the right wing the Anatolian governor Zeynel Pasha and in the left wing Rumeli governor Küçük Sinan Pasha took their positions. In Mamluk army the left wing was controlled by Aleppo governor Hayir Beg, the right wing by Damascus governor Sibay and in the centre Kansu al Ghawri managed the army.189
The battle started with the attack of Mamluks from both sides. At the first scene, Mamluks gained upper hand and Selim had to send his reinforcements to balance the battle. The Mamluk superiority in hand-to-hand battle lasted until Selim gave command
185 Agoston, “War-Winning Weapons?”, p. 135.
186 Robert Irwin, “Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Sultanate Reconsidered”, the Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, Edited by Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni, Leiden 2004, p. 133.
187 Irwin, “ibid”, p. 137.
188 David Ayalon, “Barud”, EI, vol. 1, Leiden 1986, p. 1059.
189 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 149.
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to his armed janissaries and cannoners. As the Mamluk soldiers entered the shooting range of Ottoman cannons and matchlocks, the Ottoman use of firearms demoralised the Mamluks, creating chaos in its army that led to desertion of many of its soldiers from the battlefront while commanders like Kansu al Ghawri were killed.190
The victory came with the help of firearms to the Ottomans. In the first stage it was obvious that Ottomans were about to lose the battle. According to venetian, Rhodian and Ottoman accounts, until Ottomans used the firearms the loss of the Ottoman soldiers were approximately 15000 while Mamluks 500 to 1000.191 Mamluk soldiers were good in cavalry attack, so they thought to destroy the Ottoman line easily. However, the tactic and technology that Ottomans used was new to them. This was mentioned in a contemporary chronicle with following words:
“nobody can stand up to firearms”, “who can face these devastating firearms?”, “we cannot resist the Ottoman army and its great numbers and firearms”, “nothing has been able to disperse them (Mamluks) but these firearms they (Ottomans) shoot with. A man does not notice anything until he is suddenly hit by it, without knowing from what direction it has come upon him”, “every cannon killed some fifty or sixty or a hundred people until that steppe resembled a slaughter-house from the blood” and “most of them (Mamluks) were killed by cannon and arquebus.”192
Battle of Ridaniyye, 1517
After the defeat of Mamluk army and Kansu al Ghawri’s death, the Mumluk amirs elected Tumanbay as the new Mamluk Sultan in Egypt. Tumanbay thought that Selim I could continue his march towards Cairo and therefore he sent Ganberdi Gazali to Gaza to stop him. However, Gazali could not resist the Ottomans and returned back to Cairo. This victory removed the hesitation of Selim who marched towards Cairo through Sinai desert. On his part, Sultan Selim was fortunate as it rained thereby easing the mobilisation of his cavalcade by taking care of the water needs of his soldiers in the desert and easy carriage of heavy canons in the sand.193
190 Emin Aysan, Muzaffer Kan, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi: Osmanlı Devri Yavuz Sultan Selim’in Mısır Seferi Mercidabık (1516) ve Ridaniye (1517) Meydan Muharebeleri [History of Turkish Armed Forces: in Ottoman Period, Yavuz Sultan Selim’s Egypt Expedition Mercidabık (1516) and Ridaniye (1517) Battles], Ankara, 1990, p. 97-99.
191 Irwin, “ibid”, p. 137.
192 Ayalon, ibid, p. 88-89.
193 Feridun Emecen, “Ridaniye Savaşı” [Battle of Ridaniyye], DİA, Vol. 35, İstanbul 2008, p. 87.
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Even though the Ottoman army reached Egypt after a long march of about four months and Bedouins` attacks, Tumanbay avoided another battle against the Ottomans and so chose a defensive tactic. He ordered to dig trenches from al-Mukaddem Mountain to Nile river and positioned cannons there. Thus, Tumanbay expected to surprise Selim I with these cannons, which were hidden in sands and trenches and give the Ottomans a taste of their own medicine.
Before the battle of Ridaniyye Sultan Selim I was informed by his agents that Mamluk Sultan Tumanbay had brought approximately 200 cannons from Egypt and Alexandria castles and put those cannons in front of their army. Thus, when Ottoman soldiers would attack, Mamluks could easily hold them.194 Aware of the risks, Selim I consulted people who knew the region and changed his battle plan and attack strategy. When the Ottoman army came to battlefield called Birket’l-Hacc, Grand vizier Sinan Pasha was in centre, Anatolia governor Mustapha Pasha was in right wing and Rumelia governor Küçük Sinan Pasha was in left wing. Surprisingly, at the same night Sultan Selim took some distinguished cavalries and turned around of al-Mukaddem Mountain in order to encircle the Mamluk army from behind.195
Due to the fact that the Ottomans knew the Mamluk strategy, at the beginning of the war, they marched in good order. Surprisingly, they changed their direction to al-Mukaddem Mountain before they got within the range of Mamluk cannons. This unexpected manoeuvre of the Ottoman army confused Mamluks who could not react to this new situation. Mamluk soldiers tried to adjust their position according to the Ottomans by coming out from their trenches. However, the Mamluk soldiers could not use their cannons against them. This tactic made the left wing of Mamluk army vulnerable to the light artillery and muskets of Ottoman army, so the left wing was dispersed by Ottoman firearms.196 After fighting 7 to 8 hours in the battlefield, the Ottoman army defeated Mamluk’s right wing thanks to Rumelian cavalry and consequently the Mamluk army at the centre also collapsed. The Ottoman army won the Ridaniyya battle with the organised attack of artillery, muskets and cavalry in the same time.
194 Müneccimbaşı, vol. 2, p. 484.
195 Selahattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, Ankara 1969, p. 166.
196 Müneccimbaşı, vol. 2, p. 484.
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Figure – 2.2: Map of Mamluk Sultanate.
Source: http://epicworldhistory.blogspot.com/2012/06/mamluk-dynasties-in-egypt.html
Tumanbay realised the loss of the battle and withdrew into Cairo with his amirs. He collected soldiers consisting Arabs and Cerkes to attack the Ottoman army. He entered Cairo and closed the city doors by killing Ottoman soldiers. When Selim I learned about this, he sent his commanders after Tumanbay and the war lasted three days. Then, Selim I marched through city with Janissaries who destroyed conquered enemy city with tufangs and small cannons. According to a contemporary chronicler, Müneccimbaşı, approximately 60,000 people died in this second battle.197
197 Müneccimbaşı Tarihi, vol. 2, p. 486-487.
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The successful expeditions of Selim I turned the Ottoman State into a large Asian empire. The fall of the Mamluks and conquest of Egypt brought the Ottomans control over important trade routes. He returned to Istanbul with an abundant treasure. After Selim’s death in 1520, his son and successor Suleiman the Magnificent consolidated Ottoman control in the areas where his father had captured in the east. Military and tactical abilities of Sultan Selim I and military prowess powered by firearms on the battlefields of Chaldiran, Marjdabik and Ridaniya doubled the geographical expanse of the Ottoman Empire. It can also be argued that those battles show the military weakness of the Ottoman cavalry since it was the firearms that were decisive factors in their victories.
Battle of Mohacs, 1526
The rivalry in Europe between Charles V and Francis I gave an opportunity to the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman who conquered Belgrad in 1521, and Rhodos in 1522. Political occurrences in Europe made a campaign mandatory for the Ottomans on Hungaria. Thus, on 21 April 1526 Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent began his march.
The number of Ottoman army outnumbered the Hungarians as having 60,000-70,000 soldiers. Besides, there was a big gap in terms of firearms which they possessed. According to Gabor Agoston, Hungarian army consisted of 16,000 cavalry, 16,000 infantry armed with handguns, 85 cannons, 600 smaller handguns.198 On the other hand, according to an inventory from the Ottoman archive, Ottomans had 150 to 200 larger cannons, 4060 handguns (1000 were in good quality) and 3,000,000 projectiles.199
198 Agoston, “War-Winning Weapons?”, p. 140.
199 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 213-216; TSMA, D 9633.
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Figure – 2.3: Ottoman Army at the Battle of Mohacs, an Ottoman Miniature.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moh%C3%A1cs#/media/File:1526-Suleiman_the_Magnificent_and_the_Battle_of_Mohacs-Hunername-large.jpg
Ottoman army was in its classical order, in the centre Sultan with Janissaries, in the right Anatolian governor Behram Pasha and in the left Rumelia governor with grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha. Vanguard was Bali Beg and reguard was Husrev Beg. However, when the war council met, the governor of Semendire, Bali Beg suggested another battle order since he had experienced fighting against Hungarians for many years. According to his plan, Janissaries had to stand behind cannons chained each other, left and right wings went extreme sides.200 Before all Ottoman army arrived to battlefield,
200 Yücel and Sevim, ibid, p. 162-163.
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Hungarians fired their artillery on the Ottomans’ left wing. Due to the low range of their artillery, the attack did not damage Ottoman soldiers as Hungarian had planned. Then, Hungarian light cavalry attacked on the left wing, which let them retreat behind the chained wagons where darbzens (cannons) situated. Meanwhile, heavy cavalry and infantry of Hungarians also moved forward. However, the Hungarian soldiers were not able to pierce the chained wagons and that moment 300 cannons were fired on the Hungarian soldiers.201 At this point, their continuous fire, which could be volley fire technique202, destroyed Hungarian soldiers. Although they fought bravely, they could not access beyond the carts and suffered from Janissaries’ volley fire.203 In the end of battle, Hungarian soldiers escaped through the marsh and almost all foundered.204
With this victory, the Ottoman army went to Buda without any obstacle. Since the Christian population had left the city, Jewish Yasef submitted the keys of the city to Sultan Suleiman.205 In the battle of Mohacs, the superiority of firearms and disciplined infantry became prominent. In this battle, Ottoman cannons did not have a big role, but janissaries volley fire behind the chained wagons and cannons became a decisive factor. The battle of Mohacs was a significant point for European 16th century history. The two superior power of the time, the Ottomans and the Habsburg, designed the future of east and central Europe.
Selected Battles of the Mughal Empire in the 16th Century
Throughout history, India was known as the land of spices, but this subcontinent was faced with innumerable battles for supremacy amongst a large number of rulers both big and small. India was targeted by foreign invaders from north like Arabs, Persians, Turks, Mongols and Afghans, from south via sea by Portuguese, Dutch, British and French. Within the territory, there emerged the Marathas, the Rajputs and the Sikhs as local powers. As a result, india was witness to episodic conflicts and wars. This
201 Peçevi Tarihi, p. 86-88.
202 Tonio Andrade, the Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History, Princeton 2016, p. 148.
203 Agoston, “War-Winning Weapons?”, p. 142; Günhan Börekçi “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire during the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of Origins,” AOH, 59, 4 (2006), pp. 430-431.
204 Peçevi Tarihi, p. 73.
205 Yaşar Yücel, Muhteşem Kanuni Ile 46 Yil [46 Years with Magnificient Kanuni], Ankara 1991, p. 32.
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occurrence made a special warfare in India. There are countless references, books, and documents that deal with the tactics, strategies and weapons in different periods.
The Mughal Empire was one of the strongest in Indian history and its dominance changed the course of the entire sub-continent. When they entered the Indian territories, they met with resistance in almost every region. Afghans, Rajputs and other groups stood in the Mughals’ way. The establishment and expansion of the Mughal Empire can be divided into two major tendencies. First, the gunpowder technology gave superiority to the Mughals. Secondly, warhorse or cavalry power inherited from Central Asia played an important role. The combination of these two war instruments on the battlefields gave unstoppable power to the Mughals even though they were less in numbers as compared to rivals.
The founder of Mughal Empire Zahiriddun Muhammed Babur was a Chagatai Turk. After his father’s unexpected death, he accessed the throne at Ferghana at the age of 12. After having consolidated his throne, he aimed to capture Samarqand which was his ancestor Timur’s capital city. However, the biggest obstacle to achieve this goal was Uzbek Ruler Shaibani Khan. Although Babur captured Samarqand three times, he could not protect it. He was forced to leave Samarqand as well as Transoxiana by Shaibani Khan after which he settled in Kabul with his kinsmen. From Kabul, Babur raided north India many times, where Afghan ruler Sultan Ibrahim Lodi governed. The entry of Babur into north India plains created a third party to Afghan-Rajput rivalry.
First Battle of Panipat, 1526
In his famous book On War, Carl von Clausewitz states that “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.”206 These words explain the reasons behind the success of Babur who defeated his enemies in his pitch battles by combining firearms and mounted archers called Pincer Movement. When Babur arrived in Panipat, only a few miles away from Delhi, with approximately 12,000 cavalries in April 1526, he had a well organised army with firearms and battle experience. The strategy of Babur in this battle was to avoid a battle in the open ground, since his army was too small when compared to Lodi’s army which
206 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Oxford 2007, p. 74.
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consisted of more than 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 war elephants.207 Although Babur’s army was not large, it was equipped with firearms produced and controlled by two talented men, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi who had come from the Ottoman Empire. It was not known when they entered into Babur’s service, but in Baburnama, Babur mentioned that Ustad Ali Quli was in Bajaur in 1519.208 However, as Babur informed it was the first time that he learnt about the gunpowder weaponry technology when he was with Husain Mirza, the Timurid ruler of Herat.
Beside the firearms, Babur kept his soldiers battle-ready every time in a strict discipline and the soldiers of Babur were very effective in the use of bow and arrows which had deadly effect on the enemy.209 Last but not least, due to the fact that Babur spent his life in the battlefield, he got remarkable experiences about wars, tactics and strategies. It may be thus contended that Babur was not only a person who brought firearms into Indian battlefields but was also an effective military commander who knew tactics and strategies of the war very well.
Although Babur had become successful with a small army in Samarkand against Uzbeks,210 the battle of Panipat was his last chance to further his military ambitions or else be stuck in Kabul since Uzeks were pursuing him from the northern side.211 As being a good commander, Babur examined the Lodi’s army carefully and Panipat was selected as the battlefield by war council because of its strategic location. Babur who aimed to protect his army from right and left flanks, deployed his army at the east of the Panipat town. Hence, the right flank of the army was protected by Panipat town and its suburbs. The left flank of the army was guarded by digging ditches and branches of
207 Babur Nama, p. 470.
208 Babur Nama, p. 368. The memoir of Babur Shah was the biggest source for the First Battle of Panipat. However, there is a handicap that the records that gave information between 1520 and 1525 were lost, so it is hard to find information about the preparations for the expedition. Besides, we cannot know when and how Ustad Ali Quli met with Babur and their firearms.
209 Harjeet Singh, Cannon Versus Elephants: The Battles of Panipat, New Delhi 2011, p. 40.
210 Babur took Semerkant by infiltrating with a night attack with 240 men. Ishwari Prasad, A Short History of Muslim Rule in India, Allahabad 1931, p. 294.
211 When Ottoman Sultan Selim I defeated Shah Ismail at the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, Babur lost his most important alliance. The defeat of Shah Ismail gave rise to Uzbeks again in Central Asia and Babur had to leave to Maveraunnehr region because of not chance against rising Uzbek power. Aside from this occurrence, when he made alliance with Shia leader Shah Ismail, he lost his prestige in the eye of Sunni people of Central Asia. Those people had trusted Babur against Uzbek threat and supported him many times. When he captured and settled in Kabul, he targeted India in the east. India was the last option which could expand his territories. In other words, he could not with the loss of the battle at Panipat.
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trees.212 Because of this strategy Babur’s army became secure from any possible attack of the Afghan troops from the flanks and the rear.
After the protection of two flanks, Babur focused on guarding the front of the army. He ordered every soldier to gather carts (araba) and in this way 700 carts were collected. Then, he gave command Ustad Ali Quli to arrange the carts according to Rumi fashion. These 700 carts were joined together by using ropes of raw hide instead of chains. Each wagon turned into a miniature fortress. Besides, it was also fixed 5 or 6 mantles between every two carts where the matchlockmen (infantry) were to stand and fire.213 Lastly, a number of gaps were left between carts to allow 100-200 horsemen to attack on Afghan soldiers when needed. Sheltering his matchlockmen by using such wagons was essential as the matchlocks needed long reloading time. In the final stage, Babur’s army was aligned in a way that the light cavalry was deployed up the front. Behind them in the centre, advance guard, matchlockmen and cannons protected by tied carts and archers, in the left wing, and the right wing. In the back, Babur with centre army and iltmish both sides of centre, created a rear-guard to protect the camp. As last, he deployed light cavalry units at the extreme right and left flanks as outflanking parties. He arrayed Red Wali and Malik Qasim of Baba Qashqa with their soldiers at the turning-party of right flank. Qaa-quzi, Abu’l- Muhammed the lance-player, Shaikh Jamal Barin’s Shaikh Ali, Mahndi and Tingri-birdi Bashaghi Mughul were put at the left flank.214 Thus, it can be said that the strategy of Babur was both defensive and offensive.
When Babur completed the battle arrangement in Panipat, the next step was to provoke Ibrahim Lodi to attack on him as he chose a defensive tactic. Babur waited seven or eight days in Panipat and several skirmishes were initiated against Lodi’s army, but Lodi did not move out from his camp. Then, Babur sent 5000 soldiers for a night attack on Lodi’s camp by taking suggestions of some local men. Although the mission failed because of the dark night, which caused disharmony amongst the soldiers,215 Babur achieved his objectives since the unsuccessful attempt provoked Lodi to attack on Babur’s army.
212 Babur Nama, p. 469.
213 Babur Nama, p. 468-468. This tactic was used by Ottoman Sultan Selim I in the battle of Chaldiran.
214 Babur Nama, p. 473.
215 Babur Nama, p. 471.
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Babur states in Babur Nama that Ibrahim Lodi was an inexperienced person who did not even spy on the enemy’s strategies. Besides, the infantry was equipped with a sword and was not effective against the mounted archers.216 Before Lodhi began his march against Babur, he did not feel the need to take military intelligence even though he waited almost one week. Once the Afghan ruler advanced into the battlefield with his 100,000 men and 1,000 war elephants, he realised that the front of Babur’s army was very narrow. However, it was late to stop the march and organize his army to the Babur’s battle array, so he lost the advantage of a shock attack on Babur. Reluctantly, he had to advance forward. When Lodi’s army came to closer, the matchlock men of Babur shot and killed at close range the Afghan troops, whereas cannons caused havoc for Lodi’s elephants which crashed Lodi’s troops under feet. As panic arose amongst Lodi’s soldiers, Babur implemented the Tulghma tactic applied by Sheibani Khan against him in Central Asia. According to this plan, quick cavalries, who were deployed at the extreme right and left flanks, were wheeled around with bow and arrows from both flanks to gather Afghan army to the centre. Hence, all Lodi’s troops and elephants became an open target for the matchlokmen, artilleries and archers. Ustad Ali Quli made good discharge of firing shots; Mustafa Rumi the commissary for his part made excellent discharge of zarb-zan shots from the left hand of the centre, writes Babur. Lodi was killed in the battlefield and his army suffered devastating losses by noon.
It was the first time such cannons were involved in Indian warfare and began to dominate the field. The voice of those cannons frightened Lodi’s elephants that caused chaos in the battlefront for the Lodhi’s army. Those elements gave a decisive victory to Babur at Panipat which laid the foundation of Mughal empire in India. The emergence of this new empire was based on Babur’s military supremacy and successes in the North Indian plains, which has the most fertile lands in the subcontinent. With the capture of the territories from Punjab to Bihar, Babur was also able to carry out his campaigns logistically.
216 Kaushik Roy, Warfare in pre-British India 1500 BCE to 1740 CE, Routledge 2015, p. 123.
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Figure – 2.4: First Battle of Panipat (1526). There are two different types of field artillery, two wheels and four wheels along with heavy cavalry.
Source: https://medium.com/indian-defence/first-battle-of-panipat-1526-f8fd3c548d3a
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The first battle of Panipat holds significance in the military history of India and the Mughals. Firstly, the Mughal Empire was established after this battle wherein the role of gunpowder weaponry was extremely decisive. It needs to be highlighted that the gunpowder and firearms were used in Indian sub-continent before Babur arrived.217 However, many historians credit Babur as the first person who effectively used gunpowder and firearms in a battlefield to achieve military dominance against his rivals. The combination of cavalry warfare, wagon laager tactic and firearms was achieved by his Turkish gunners in his army successfully. Since these skilled soldiers learnt these tactics from the Ottomans, they integrated easily to Babur’s army. The reason is that Babur’s army was ready to accept this because he was using cavalry warfare in Central Asia. The army of Babur was a typically Central Asian nomad comprising a good cavalry branch. Thus, it was easy to adopt the gunpowder weaponry into its army since Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi knew how to do it.
The victory in Panipat gave confidence, determination and wealth to Babur to take control over Delhi and Agra where some forts like Biana did not yield to him. When he seized the treasure of Lodi, he ordered to cast a large mortar to capture Biana fort. In his memoire Baburnama, Babur described the process by following words:
round the mortar-mould he had had eight furnaces made in which were the molten materials. From below each furnace a channel went direct to the mould. When he opened the furnace-holes on our arrival, the molten metal poured like water through all these channels into the mould. After awhile and before the mould was full, the flow stopped from one furnace after another. Ustad Ali Quli must have made some miscalculation either as to the furnaces or the materials.218
It seems that Ustad Ali Quli was not successful in his first attempt, but Babur supported him by giving the honour to continue his work. This shows how important were the
217 Muhammad Shah Bahmani, the Sultan of Bahmani Kingdom, captured 300 gun carriages at the battle of Adoni which happened between Vijayanagara Empire and Bahmani Kingdom in 1368. Besides, after ten months later Adoni battle the commaner of Muhammad Shah, Mukarrab Khan was given those cannons and he used them against Vijayanagara Empire. Butalia, ibid, p. 29. According to Richard M. Eaton, just before Babur Shah came to India, the Sultan of Bijaur Kingdom Adil Shah could not use his firearms against the cavalry of Vijayanagara King Krishna Raya in the battle of Raichur in 1520 even though he was very strong in terms of firearms. He had to leave approximately 400 cannon and 900 gun carriages in the battlefield. Richard M. Eaton, ‘Kiss My Foot’, Said the King: Firearms, Diplomacy, and the Battle for Raichur, 1520”, Modern Asian Studies, 43/1, 2009, pp. 289-313.
218 Babur Nama, p. 536.
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firearms for him to sustain his achievements. Babur took note of the training of cannons and matchlocks by following them eagerly.
Battle of Khanwa, 1527
After the battle of Panipat and decadence of Afghan dominance, next challenge for Babur was to take on Rajput king Rana Sanga. In this regard the battle of Khanwa was a turning point for Babur’s future in India and equally an opportunity to prove his leadership. However, it was not easy to wage a battle against Rana Sanga who was an experienced soldier in comparison to Ibrahim Lodi. The Rajput king fought many battles during his early ages and lost one of his eyes in the battlefield. The biggest challenges for Babur were the Rajput valour, predictions of astrologers, the departure of some of his begs (commanders), huge Rajput army and successful skirmishes of Rajput vanguards against the Mughals. Despite all these disadvantages, the weapons, which Babur possessed, the mortars and matchlocks, decided the fate of the battle.
Although Babur and Rana Sanga had established good relations against their common enemy Ibrahim Lodi initially, the decision of Babur to stay in India brought them into open conflict. Babur left Agra to meet a confederacy of Rajput kings headed by Rana Sanga in a battle and entrenched himself near Sikri. During his advance many skirmishes took place between two groups and Mughal army suffered at the hands of Rajputs. The Rajputs were so successful in their attacks on the Mughal vanguards that the Mughal camp was alarmed to be in battle order. The powerful attacks of Rajput soldiers discouraged Babur’s troops, which forced him to relook his strategies in order to reassure and embolden his soldiers.219
Babur did every arrangement step by step in order to ensure his victory. He guarded his camp by fortifying them from every position. Just like at Panipat, he lashed the gun-carriages (carts) and chained them together at a distance of seven or eight yards so as to shield his front. Mustafa Rumi was ordered to make those carts in the Rumi style and positioned artillery and musketeers behind them tactfully. Mustafa Rumi won the confidence of Babur with his military skills, and so Babur appointed him to the right
219 William Erksine, A History of India under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur, Baber and Humayun, vol. 1, Londra 1854, p. 465-466.
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wing where Humayun was situated.220 The gunpowder master Ustad Ali Quli used a different method. Wherever the carts did not reach, Khurasani and Hindustani spadesmen and miners dug ditches in front of the army for double protection. The most remarkable feature of his preparation was wheeled wooden tripods.221 These tripods that could be trundled in every direction provided both protections to the soldiers as well as accurate firing opportunity. All these arrangements were completed fully in 20 to 25 days, during which time the army was secured within the trenches.222
It was on 13 March 1527 that Babur advanced towards the plains of Khanwa with his carts and wheeled tripods by arraying the army in right, left and centre. Ustad Ali Quli and his matchlockmen moved in an order behind them. When the army arrived at the battlefield near Khanwa, Babur gave a speech to the army to bolster their morale.223 As at Panipat, the Mughal army was less in number compared to Rana Sanga’s army.224
The battle started on 17 March 1527 when Babur was informed about the advance of Rana who arranged his army in a defensive manner. In the centre Babur commanded the army. Chin Timur Sultan helped Babur in the right-hand of centre while Alauddin Alam Khan positioned at the left-hand of the centre. Most importantly, gun-carriage carts were placed in one line in the front and Ustad Ali Quli was positioned there with his mortar and wheeled tripods, Mustafa Rumi was sent to the right wing of the front by Babur. Humayun commanded the right wing and Sayyid Mahdi Khwaja situated in the left wing. For the tulghma tactic (the flank movement or Pincer movement) Babur chose his trusted men Malik Qasim, Mumin Ataka and Rustem Turkman.225 When Rajput army began its march towards Mughals, they encountered well-protected line with firearms. The mortar which was cast by Ustad Ali Quli six months ago crushed Rajput line by throwing huge stones and the deadly shots of matchlockmen behind carts and tripods caused Rajputs to change their direction through the flanks.226 The left wing
220 L. F. Rushbrook William, An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century, New Delhi 1900, p. 146; Babur Nama, p. 550.
221 Stanley Lane-Poole, Babar, New Delhi 2015, p. 177.
222 Erkinsen, ibid, p. 466.
223 Babur Nama, p. 557-558.
224 Babur Shah summarises the contributions in terms of horsemen thus: Rana Sangram Singh's own troops - 1,00,000; Salah al-Diny -- 30,000; Rawal Uday Singh of Bagar-12,000; Medini Rai - 12,000; Hasan Khan of Mewat- 12,000; Bar Mal of ldr- 4,000; Narpat Hara- 7,000; Satrvi of Kutch - 6,000; Dharam Deo - 4,000; Bir Singh Deo - 4,000 and Mahmud Khan - I0,000. Babur Nama, p. 562.
225 Babur Nama, p. 565-568.
226 Sarkar, Military History of India, s. 61.
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of Rajputs was retreated by the right wing of Mughals with the use of gunfire for which the Rajputs were not prepared to deal with. Mustafa Rumi brought the carts forward and defeated most of the Rajputs with the fire of matchlock and strengthened his trusted men waiting at the rear for tulghma tactic.227
Figure – 2.5: On the right side the Mughal army armed with field artillery against Rana’s army.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khanwa#/media/File:Babur%E2%80%99s_army_in_battle_against_the_army_of_Rana_Sanga_at.jpg
227 Babur Nama, p. 568-569.
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Although Rajputs were pushed back till their centre, they recovered and attacked again on Mughals. Upon this, Babur dispatched reinforcements to the fighting soldiers. In the left wing of Mughal army, there was a harsh fight with Rajput’s right wing. Rajputs were so successful that the tulghma tactic was not completed and Babur’s soldiers had to withdraw back to their position. Due to its weakness and less number of soldiers, Babur sent soldiers from centre to meet Rajput soldiers.228 In the centre of the right wing Mustafa Rumi fought bravely and had “carts brought forward and broke the ranks of pagans with matchlock and culverin.”229
Attacks of heavy cavalry from the wings, the discharge of arrows by fast-moving cavalry from the rear (the Tulghma tactic) and the successful shot of cannons and matchlockmen brought a disruption into the Rajput army. Upon this Babur made his final advance by releasing his special royal corps behind the carts.230 In this final advance Ustad Ali Quli played a key role, which Babur describes in his words as “such stones Ustad Ali Quli discharged at the iron-clad fortress of the pagan ranks and by this discharge of stones, and abundance of culverins and matchlocks destroyed many of the builded bodies of the pagans.”231
The use of firearm weapons at the battle of Khanwa brought a precise victory over Rajputs. Many Rajput commanders and chiefs of tribes were killed by matchlock shots. Rajput army could not resist against this military technology of the Mughals and lost battle. Babur consolidated his presence in India with this battle and most of north India became part of his growing empire. However, his early death stopped the consolidation process of the Mughals in north India.
Siege of Ranthambor Fort, 1568
According to contemporary chronicles Tabaqat-i Akbari, the campaign for Ranthambor Fort began from Delhi with the arrival of Emperor Akbar on 21 December 1568.232 The
228 Sarkar, Military History of India, p. 60.
229 Babur Nama, p. 569
230 Pratyay Nath, Mughal Warfare, 1495-1613: Modalities, Logistics and Geography, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Centre for Historical Studies, Unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, New Delhi 2010, p. 123.
231 Babur Nama, p. 570-571.
232 Khwajah Nizamuddin Ahmad, the Tabaqat-i-Akbari, Translated by Brajendranath De, Vol. 2, Calcutta 1996, p. 352. (hereafter Tabaqat-i-Akbari).
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siege was remarkable for the first time in Indian history as engineers, workers and artillery were used in a significant way against fortification to reach behind the walls.
Surjan Hara, the ruler of the fort at the time of Akbar siege, prepared the fort for war by strengthening and provisioning in various ways. Besides, Hara relied on the location of the fort which was not easily reachable. When Akbar arrived at Ranthambor Fort, he inspected it by going to the top of the hill with his special courtiers. In consequence Akbar ordered to corner the fort from all sides which Abu’l Fazl described was such that “egress and ingress were so blocked that for the garrison that the wind could not enter.” Most importantly, cannons were located at different places and the fort was shout by cannons.233
Such a place was not easy to capture, so Sabats were constructed and were carried forward through the castle under the command of Qasim Khan and Todor Mal. After a great workforce of carpenters, stone-cutters and smiths, the sabats raised the valley of Ran.234 On the other hand, Umdat-ul-Mulk Muhammad Qasim who was the chief of artillery and navy was appointed to dig tunnels leading into the fort.235 Akbar was aware of the well-protected fort and decided to use the hill of Ran as a firing range. Thus, the disadvantage situation was turned into an advantage by Akbar. He ordered his 15 cannons (zarb-zans) to be dragged to the top of the hill. This was never attempted and imagined by other besiegers of Ranthambor Fort. Each of these cannons were so heavy that it required two hundred pairs of oxen to pull them out from one place to other. Approximately five hundred kahars (palanquin bearers) carried those cannons to the top of the hill of Ran and they were placed opposite to the fort successfully.236
233 Abu’l Fazl, Akbarnama, Vol. 2, Translated by H. Beveridge, Delhi 1989, p. 491. (hereafter Akbarnama).
234 Akbarnama, vol. 2, p. 493-494; Abd-ul-Qadir Bin Maluk Shah (Al-Badaoni), Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, vol. 2, Translated by W. H. Lowe, Calcutta 1884, p. 111. (hereafter Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh).
235 Muhammad Arif Qandhari, Tarikh-i Akbar, New Delhi 1993, p. 155.
236 Tabaqat-i Akbari, vol. 2, p. 354; Akbarnama, vol. 2, p. 493-494; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, vol. 2, p. 111.
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Figure – 2.6: Heavy artillery of Mughal army situated on the hill. Besides it is visible that bullocks were dragging artilleries up to hill.
Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Ranthambore_(1568)#/media/File:Bullocks_dragging_siege-guns_up_hill_during_the_attack_on_Ranthambhor_Fort.jpg
When these cannons (zarb-zans), which could fire stones weighing 60 mans and a bullet of 30 mans, were fired, these caused breaches in several places and demolished buildings within the fort.237 Although the conquest of the fort seemed very tough because of its strength but the determination of Akbar to capture the fort proved equally strong who was supported by the efficient cannons which created damages at walls and panic amongst the fort residents. In this case, there was no other way for Surjan Hara except to initiate negotiations with Akbar. Hara sent his sons named Duda and Bhoj to
237 Akbarnama, vol. 2, p. 494.
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Akbar to offer the submission of the fort. Finally, the fort was taken by Akbar on March 1596 and Surjan Hara was permitted to leave the fort with all his family.238
Battle of Tukaroi, 1575
Under the rule of Emperor Akbar, Mughals began to take control of northern India. He expanded his dominion from Delhi to Agra and through Oudh and Jaunpur. Then, he went to north-eastern part towards Bihar and Bengal. These provinces were being ruled by the Afghan Karrani dynasty at the time of Akbar’s march. Unlike his father Sulaiman Karrani, Daud Karrani rejected Akbar’s dominion by declaring his independence.239 Thus, Akbar decided to send an army on him led by Munim Khan, also called Khan-i Khanan.240
Munim Khan applied wagon laager tactic at the battle just like Babur. He mounted the mortars and the light guns on carts and arranged them in a row in front of the army.241 When Mughal army came to the battlefront, Alam Khan led the archers towards the Afghan army and withdrew with the command of Munim Khan who was angry because of this unexpected attack of Alam Khan.242 When Gujar Khan who led the Afghan vanguard advanced the war elephants into the battlefield, Munim Khan ordered the musketeers and the field artillery, which were stationed behind the entrenchment to open fire. Due to the heavy fire “some of renowned elephants, which were advancing turned tail and some of the veteran leaders of the Afghans were mown down by cannonade.”243
The Afghan army could not handle the superiority of firearms. Although Gujar Khan attacked Mughal vanguard, advance reserve and centre respectively, he could not save the day due to the efforts of Mughal mounted archers, and hence forcing Daud Karrani to accept the defeat. The Mughal army took the upper-hand and controlled Bengal territory. In this battle Mughals used Babur’s wagon laager tactic by abandoning
238 Tabaqat-i Akbari, vol. 2, p. 355; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, vol. 2, p. 111.
239 Although some people urged him about his aggressive policy towards the Mughals, his strength army and richness encouraged him. According to a contemporary account he had 40,000 cavalry, 3,300 war elephants, 20,000 pieces of ordnance and 140,000 infantry, consisting of muskeeters, matchlockmen, rocketers and archers. Ghulam Hussain Salim, Riyaz-s-Salatin (A History of Bengal), Translated by Abdus Salam, Delhi 2009, p. 154.
240 Sarkar, Military History of India, p. 70.
241 Tabaqat-i Akbari, p. 464.
242 Akbarnama, vol. 2, p. 176.
243 Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, p. 196-197.
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tulghma tactic. The strong cannon and musket fires gave advantage to the Mughals against elephants also.244
To sum up, while the Ottomans were keen to adopt firearms from the beginning, Mamluk and Safavids did not adopted firearms on a large scale and labelled these as unmanly and cowardly weapons and so neglected. However, it is another fact that due to their geographical proximity with the Balkans and Europe, the Ottomans had learnt and developed firearm weapons before other Muslim empires. Besides, the on-going conflicts with Serbs, Bosnians, Greeks, and Hungarians gave Ottomans an opportunity to develop its firearm weapon technology. In the above battles, although there were other factors, which helped the Ottomans such as numerical superiority, successful logistic system, and combination of firearms with cavalry and tactical mistakes of the enemies, the superiority of firearms over the enemies largely contributed to the victories of the Ottomans.
On the same line with the Ottomans, Mughal emperors Babur and Akbar were also willing to use gunpowder and firearm weapons. On his own, Babur employed two Ottoman gun-masters, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi. These two men not only brought the production of firearms to the Mughal Empire, but they taught the tactical and strategic use of these weapons. It was their ambitious and technological interest of the time that led to the defeat of contemporary Indian rulers with the help of matchlocks and cannons. Both empires changed the course of battle strategies by adopting firearms to their armies. Especially in India war elephants lost their importance against firearm weapons.
Another attention grabbing matter in those battles was the combination of cavalry power with artillery. Vast Asia steppe required cavalry system for fast movement through the enemy lines. Therefore, mounted archers were the main backbone of the Asian and Asian centric armies such as the Ottomans and the Mughals. During early periods, it is also said that mounted archers were more advantageous and useful than
244 The war was described by Ghulan Hussain Salim;
“When the signal to assault the fort was given,
From both sides a hundred guns and muskets roared.
From the booming of the thundering guns, and their smoke,
Like unto the sable cloud wherein in thundering angel dwells,
From the shower of cannon-balls, like the hau,
Gushed in amidst those armies a deluge of destruction.” Salim, Riyaz-s-Salatin, p. 157.
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musketry and artillery on the battlefield with their accurate and lethal weapons, bows and arrows. As argued in this chapter, the Ottomans and Mughals defeated their enemies with the help of effective use of firearms along with the cavalry power. It is thus obvious that during those periods, both the Empires did not abandon their main army structure and maintained it by combining with light artillery and musketeers.
Ever since Marshall G.S. Hodgson’s path-breaking work, scholars have periodically attempted to unify the study of Muslim-ruled empires that governed much of the world during the early modern era. Intermittently characterised as ‘gunpowder empires’, the Ottoman, Mughal and Safavid empires have thus long evoked the interest in comparative historical works, especially those recently commissioned to fill a considerable gap in texts available for undergraduate students of world history.
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CHAPTER 3
PRODUCTION, USE AND DIFFUSION OF THE FIREARM WEAPONS
IN THE MUGHAL AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES
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Since the beginning of human life, human beings have been struggling among themselves and nature at the same time. Initially, the struggle was more of existential nature than the latter dynamics of war. For the defence and attack situations in primitive life, people used their hands to overcome others, and then gradually began to throw stones and use sticks to scare away and beat their enemies. The first major change came with the discovery of metals, which made weapons stronger, durable and destructive in relation to previously used tools. With gradual evolution in both the collective social behaviour of the humans as well as simultaneous upgraded weapons system, the nature of common fights was transformed to full-fledged wars. Thus, communities and groups, which possessed and used these metal weapons effectively had advantages over other adversarial or competitive groups, which lacked these. The weapons emerged as one of the significant parameters that contributed to the rise and fall of empires, kingdoms, and states throughout many centuries.
The second major change in conventional warfare came with the discovery of gunpowder that transformed the very nature of empires, kingdoms, states and their engagements with others. Empires that supported their engineers, artisans, scientists, mathematicians, and physicians were able to adapt to the gunpowder and firearms technology more rapidly which provided them strategic dominance in the battlefields in relation to others that remained indifferent to these. This strategic advancement and comprehensive use of firearms won these empiral wars and dominance. The scientific innovation in firearms technology reached its height with the invention of nuclear weapons.
The extensive use of weapons by groups against others with the mutually exclusive objectives of limiting one other brought to fore the term like “war”. What is war? Why people declare war upon each other? The basic explanation to this phenomenon remains that peoples’ have historically conflicted with others through simple scuffles over basic food and water resources, which transformed into the major fights and wars for territory, precious things like gold, silver, diamonds, mines, fields, ports, strategic locations, and to impose their ideologies to maintain their hegemony. Therefore, the nature of these conflicts transformed from simple scuffles to the major wars that made and broke empires.
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The significant point which emerged from the study of battles makes one reflect over questions like how and why some armies had advantages over other? Since human beings realised the importance of war, it became an art with military structure by having distinction at various levels like in style, tactics, strategy, armours, weaponry which has been explicated by thinkers and strategists like Sun Tzu in ‘Art of War’, Machiavelli in ‘Prince’ and Clausewitz in ‘On War’. Innovations in military weaponry, skills and tactics made empires overall string and powerful enough to establish their control, subjugation, oppression and rule over the others.
Wars should not only be studied to measure the inflicted pain and suffering but also in terms of how the cultures of fighting empires engaged with each other leading to a different kind of acculturation. For example, wars played a significant role in the transmission of military technology across empires and states. Whenever one empire or a kingdom developed a new weapon that proved significant in battlefield, it made others eager to acquire same weaponry technology to modernise and strengthen their armies. Therefore, through this process arms modernisation became a priority for empires and interestingly it was the battlefields only that became reasons for the transmission of military technology.
Debates on the Discovery of Gunpowder
The discovery of gunpowder was one of the factors, which affected the destiny of empires. People would wonder about the origin, invention and inventor of the unpowered. One school of research believes that it were the Taoist alchemists in China who discovered it while searching for elixirs of life immortality.245 Though some scholars believed ancient Hindus in India, an ancient civilisation, were conscious of the gunpowder manufacturing technology, this proposition suffers from lack of any valid sources. The abundance of saltpetre in Bengal and of sulphur in Sind246 has revealed
245 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5 (7), Cambridge 1986, p. 7. One of the first studies about the invention of gunpowder was done by Wang Ling. He assets that the two important components of gunpowder, saltpetre and sulphur, were mentioned in the ancient Chinese texts. Following centuries, it was developed and used at wars among the Chinese dynasties. See for details; Wang Ling, “On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms in China”, The History of Science Society, Vol. 37(3/4), 1947, p. 177-178. For more detailed another study about the invention and use of gunpowder in China; L. Carrington Goodrich ve Fêng Chia-shêng, “the Early Development of Firearms in China”, The History of Science Society, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jan., 1946), pp. 114-123.
246 Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South India, Cambridge 2012, p. 185. On the other hand, according to Henry Wilkinson, the gunpowder might be discovered via the primeval method of cooking by means of wood-fire on India and China soils in which were rich in terms of saltpetre.
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another thesis, which described that ancient Hindus were aware of gunpowder and its making. John Beckmann247 and Gustav Oppert248 supported this proposition on the basis of two Sanskrit works called Nitiprakasika249 and Sukra-Niti.250 However, Kaushik Roy does not accept these two texts as original and challenges their thesis.251 On the other hand, Roy argues that Hindus of early medieval India were conscious of agnichurna (saltpetre) and gunpowder, so they used these elements for firing pyrotechnical devices like bans (rockets).252 In any case, the comprehensive researches done by Wang Ling, Joseph Needham, L. Carrington Goodrich and Fêng Chia-shêng show that the gunpowder was first discovered in China. Moreover, in linguistic aspect, gunpowder was described as “Chinese snow” by an Andalusian botanist and Arabs, and as “Chinese salt” by Iranians.253 However, this does not overrule the fact that Indians were unaware of gunpowder. Ancient Indian epics such as Ramayana and Mahabharta mention Agneyastra (firearm), which was used in the ancient times. As Indian subcontinent was under foreign rule for more than thousand years, these Indian innovations did not get due credit since local history seemed to be relegated to the margins
Henry Wilkinson, Engines of War - Or, Historical and Experimental Observations on Ancient and Modern Warlike Machines and Implements, Including the Manufacture of Guns, Gunpowder, and Swords with Remarks on Bronze, Iron, Steel, London 1841, p. 136.
247 John Beckmann, A History of Inventions, Discoveries, and Origins, Vol. 2, London 1872, p. 505-506.
248 Gustav Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organisation, and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus, with Special Reference to Gunpowder and Firearms, Mssrs. Higginbotham & Co., Madras 1880, p. 44-45, 60-61.
249 Vaishampayana, Nitiprakasika, Ed. Gustav Oppert, Mssrs. Higginbotham & Co., Madras 1882, p. 9-11.
250 The Sacred Books of the Hindus Sukra-Niti-Sara, Translated by. Benoy Kumar, Allahabad 1913, p. 235-237.
251 Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South India, Cambridge 2012, p. 186-187. He considers that the chapters about gunpowder and firearms in Nitiprakasika was added later in it. On the one hand, he argues that the author of Sukra-Niti was unknown and there is no any mention about the ancient and medieval sources, so it might be written in 17th and 18th centuries.
252 Kaushik Roy, “Introduction”, Warfare and Politics in South Asia from Ancient to Modern Times, Edited by Kaushik Roy, Delhi 2011, p. 23.
253 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, Translated by Michael Jonas, New York 1984, p. 139.
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Figure – 3.1: The earliest known written description of the formula for gunpowder, from the Chinese Wujing Zongyao military manuscript that was compiled by 1044 during the Song Dynasty of China.
Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_gunpowder#/media/File:Chinese_Gunpowder_Formula.JPG
It is believed that the Mongols spread the gunpowder around the world. As Mongols were good horse riders and effective battlefield fighters, they were not so effective to capture the forts and walled cities via their horses. They were thus interested in anything that would help in demolishing the enemy defensive fortifications. Consequently, they took along gunpowder weapons wherever they went. The conquest of China by Mongols between 1205 and 1279 opened a new path for the course of the war. They learned and used projectiles (fire-arrows) thrown by means of gunpowder from a tube made of bamboo, wood, iron or bronze during their siege battles. They brought this new war technology from Asia to Europe.254
254 William H. McNeill, the Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800, Washington 1989, p. 3.
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Figure – 3.2: Earliest depiction of a European cannon from Walter de Milemete, De Nobilitatibus, sapientii et prudentiis regum.
Source: https://alchetron.com/Walter-de-Milemete#demo
Chinese referred to gunpowder as “fire-drug” and used it in different ways, both in military and non-military means. In contrast, European starting using it for its explosive and propelled qualities in warfare.255 In Europe, the gunpowder was firstly described in 1242 by Roger Bacon in his book De mirabili potestate artis et naturae. In fact, Albertus Magnus mentioned about gunpowder in his book Opus de mirabilibus in 1265. Afterwards, German priest Konstantin Berthold Anklitzen also known Berthold Schwarz threw a bullet by using gunpowder in 1313. It is estimated that the first use of cannon256 was in during the Hundred Years’ Wars between the French and the British. The king of England Edward III used cannon in the Crecy-en-Pontieu battle in 1346 for the first time.257 The next development came with Hussites. Since those of cannons were heavy, it was not easy to carry those to the battlefield as they lacked portability.
255 Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History, Princeton 2016, p. 76.
256 The word cannon is originated from Greek “kanun” and Latin “canna” with the means of “tube”. According to Contamine, its first appearence was in a Florentine document dated on 11th February 1326. Contamine, ibid, p. 139.
257 Zeki Tez, Patlayıcı, Silah ve Savaş Tekniğinin Kültürel Tarihi [the Cultural History of Explosive, Weapon and War Technique], Istanbul 2010, p. 32-33. Cannons were less determinant factors in the battles of medieval age. They were used to menace the enemy rather than undamaging. For example, the Duke of Burgundy Charles the Bold trusted his archers more than cannoners. Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge Savaş Tarihi [Cambridge War History], Translated by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, Istanbul 2014, p. 115.
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Thus, states did not prefer to use big cannons on the battlefield until Hussites mounted them on wagons in 1420.258 Moreover, a new innovation was introduced to battlefields by Hussite commander Jan Zizka. He used those wagons to protect his army, so they became mobile fortresses, which helped Hussites in their victories.259
Figure – 3.3: The Hussite Wagenburg - an old sketch from the 15th century.
Source: https://weaponsandwarfare.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/hussites.jpg
258 Helen J. Nicholson, Medieval Warfare theory and Practice of War in Europe 300-1500, China 2004, p. 97.
259 Cathal J. Nolan, “Wagenburg”, the Age of Wars of Religion, 1000-1650 an Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization, Vol. 2, Wesport 2006, p. 901.
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In sum, the gunpowder was discovered in China, spread by Mongols and developed by Europeans. Next, gunpowder and firearms were used by the Ottomans and the Mughals very successfully who dominated the battlefields in the 16th century. Finally, the Ottomans played a key role in the diffusion of firearms to Africa, Asia and the Indian subcontinent. This chapter discusses the production, improvement and diffusion of gunpowder and firearm weapons in the Ottoman and Mughal Empires.
Production of Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mughal Empire
The introduction of firearms to Indian subcontinent has a long history. Besides the idea of gunpowder discovery in Indian subcontinent as explicated in previous section, there were also three main routes from where the firearms could have entered the subcontinent. One was through northern India from Central Asia and Iran where these weapons were already present.260 The second was the maritime route between India and China in the east coast of India and through land route from Assam region.261 The third route was through western coast used by Portuguese. When the first Portuguese sailors arrived the South Indian coast, they realised that the gunpowder and firearms had been already known by inhabitants. However, as soon they realised from the Indian masters that their idea about the firearms were not much as they had. Two Italian masters Joâo Maria and Piero Antonio came under the rule of Zamorin of Calcutta in 1503 by leaving Portuguese king. They cast many well-qualified cannons and raised many craftsmen until they were killed in an upheaval. In 1505, four Venetians arrived Malabar coast. They cast cannons perfectly and the casting know-how became popular in south India after that time. Portuguese commander Afonso de Albuqurque established a powerful Canon Foundry (Karkhana) when he captured Goa in 1510, but it was stated that the cannons produced in this foundry could not be used by Bijapur camp effectively. Another Portuguese gun master Joao Vicente was able to cast big cannons between
260 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 18. The Mongol had learnt how to use the gunpowder as a war tool from Chinese during their campaigns. Then they brought this new war technology wherever they went. Therefore, it is likely that the gunpowder was brought India by means of Mongols.
261 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 22. Khan states that the name of gunpowder was mentioned in the list of products coming from China to Calcutta in 1419. According to the study of Chowdhury and Chattopadhyay, the earliest reference to the use of cannon could be dated to Bengal Sultan Husein Shah in the early years of 16th century. Apart from this, in 1406, Chinese traveller Mahau mentioned about the guns in Bengal. It is understood from this information that firearms were introduced to eastern India before Babur arrived. Ziauddin Chowdhury Pranab K. Chattopadhyay, “Cannons of Chittagong University Museum: New Studies on the Artillery of Shah Jahan”, Warfare and Politics in South Asia from Ancient to Modern Times, Edited by Kaushik Roy, Delhi 2011, p. 145-146.
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1509 and 1546 in Goa and Cochin.262 Especially, South Indian rulers had more advanced technology and became expert on manufacturing gunpowder and cannon casting on account of the contact with outsiders.
There are some shreds of evidence about when gunpowder and firearms were introduced in India. From the beginning of 14th century onwards, there is frequent mention of the use of gunpowder and firearms in South India. After the battle between Bahmani Sultan Muhammed Shah Bahmani and Raja of Vijayanagar in 1368, Bahmani Sultan captured 300 gun-carriages as war booty. He also collected a train of artillery and gave them under the command of Mukarrab Khan who engaged Ottoman Turks and Europeans skilled in the art of gunnery.263 Moreover, it is a well-known fact that the largest cannon of the world named Malik-i-Maidan was cast in India by a Turk master. As Bhimsen stressed Malik-i-Maidan had no rival in terms of size.264 When emperor Akbar conquered the fort of Surat, he saw some large cannons. Those pieces of ordnances were sent by Ottoman sultan Suleiman against Portuguese to Gujarat which were left behind on the river bank. During the building of Surat, Khudawand Khan Wazir brought them into the fort. However, Akbar ordered these to be transferred to the fortress of Agra.265 Apart from these, as informed by Ottoman archival documents, the Ottoman government demanded that the cannons left in Calicut by Sidi Ali Reis due to harsh weather conditions be returned.266
262; Ahsan Jan Qaisar, the Indian Response to European Technology and Culture (AD 1498-1707), Delhi 1998, s. 46-47; R. S. Whiteway, the Rise of Portuguese Power in India 1497-1550, London 1899, p. 37; C. R. Boxer, “Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th-18th Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 38, 2 (208), 1965, p. 158-159.
263 Butalia, ibid, p. 29.
264 When Aurangzeb captured Malik-i Maidan, he ordered to engrave on it following words: “the emperor Alamgir Ghazi who is the king of monarchs who gave proper justice and seized the empires of the kings, captured Bijapur and in order to find out the date of conquest, his fortune said, ‘he captured the cannon entitled Malik-i Maidan’.” English Translation of Tarikh-i-Dilkasha (Memoirs of Bhimsen Relating to Aurangzib’s Deccan Campaigns), Edited by V. G. Khobrekar, Bombay 1972, p. 157. Malik-i Maidan was five and a half cubits in length and its weight was four and one four maunds. It could throw a ball weighing two and half maunds. Futuhat-ı Alamgiri, p. 176. Ferishta’s History of Deccan from the First Mahummedan Conquests, Vol 2, Translated by Jonathan Scott, London 1794, p. 72.
265 Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, p. 149-150.
266 A.{DVNSMHM.d... / 7 – 659.
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Figure – 3.4: Malik-i-Maidan at Bijapur Fort in India. Alloy composition: copper 80,43%, tin 19,57%.
However, Iqtidar Alam Khan has claimed that the word kanam-i rad (literally thunder-bow) used in Persian texts in the 15th century indicates that before Babur arrived in the northern India plains, firearms were used by some of the Indian rulers.267 However, Jos Gommans argues that gunpowder and firearms were introduced to India in the 16th century. The reason why he does not accept Khan’s claims is related to true guns, which he means a bullet or cannonball propelled by means of gunpowder.268 Whether there were true guns or not it has been shown that gunpowder and firearms reached India before Mughals. However, the first and effective use of firearms was found authoritatively by Mughals during the First Battle of Panipat wherein zarb-zan (light cannon), top-i frengi, kazan (mortars heavy cannons) were employed.269
The Mughal Empire had a military character given that every high official in the administration held a military position as well. The Mughals used a combination of Indian, Afghan and Turk military tactics to develop their own military doctrine which
267 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 42-44.
268 Gommans, ibid, p. 146.
269 Babur Nama, p. 473-474.
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was perfected by Akbar who spent most of his resources to strengthen his empire by means of administrative and military reforms. He changed the nature of his empire from a military aristocracy to a state administrated by civil services.270 The institutionalisation of the Mughal Empire reached its zenith during Akbar period. Especially, the introduction of Mansabdari system was the first step for a well-equipped standing army. In this respect, there was a interpenetrate relation between mansabdari system and army.271 The main duty of mansabdars was the maintenance of cavalry contingents.272 The reason why the technological developments flourished during Akbar’s period could be explained by the fact he himself nurtured special military interest. As noted by Abu’l Fazl, Akbar from “his majesty, from his practical knowledge, has invented a wheel, by the motion of which sixteen barrels may be cleaned in a very short time.”273 He not only recruited people who were masters in firearm technology but also provided them with every support needed to manufacture and innovate in this military technology.
In the Mughal administration structure, the emperors had supreme authority and were commanders of the army just like Ottomans, Safavids and Uzbeks. However, the entire military administration was under the control of Mir Bakshi. He was responsible for updating the lists of all mansabdars at the court and provinces, recruitment of personnel and attendance record of personnel for the campaigns.274 Mir Bakshi not only organised the army administration of army, but also established the firearms manufacturing factories. The imperial department called Karkhana had a key role in the sphere of the household, military and fiscal set up of the empire and the industrial progress of territories.275 In the karkhanas, arms and ammunition were manufactured for both the army and the use of emperors. Karkhanas were places where weapons were manufactured, tested and stored. The attempts of Akbar resulted in the development of gun technology and the Mughal artisans manufactured portable and reassemble pieces. One of the outstanding developments was the production of mobile pieces mounted on wheeled carriages, so that the enemy could be surprised.276 Apart from state karkhanas,
270 Bamber Gascoigne, the Great Moghuls, London 1971, p. 105.
271 Aziz, ibid, p. 1.
272 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 364.
273 Ain-i Akbar, p. 115.
274 Sri Ram Sharma, Mughal Government and Administration, Bombay 1951, p. 89.
275 Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, the Administration of the Mughal Empire, Delhi 2010, p. 59.
276 R. K. Saxena, “Medieval Arms and Armours”, History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilisation, Vol. 10/3, p. 324.
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Mughal royal family members like Shah Jahan, Dara Shikoh, Aurangzeb, Jahan Ara Begum among others also patronised karkhanas for their requirements. Those karkhanas were given under the control of nobles and skilled artisans were employed.277
Karkhanas, which encompassed art and craft, produced articles for Mughal emperors, nobles and merchants in capital cities of Delhi, Agra and other provinces. The Karkhana was a kind of governmental institute where new techniques and designs were adopted to improve the quality and diversification of firearms and therefore worked under the supervision of central administration. Among all karkhanas, the artillery had special attention of the Mughal court, so it was attached to the palace. The court did not leave it in the hands of mansabdars, but gave these to their command.278 Karkhanas were established in many places of Mughal territories like Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Gujarat, Agra, Banaras, etc. There were some branches related to military area, Shuturkhana for camel swivel (shuturnal) and camel barrel (zamburak), Suratkhana for military maps, Silekhana for army products/workshop, Barudkhana for gunpowder and Topkhana for cannon.279 Consequently, under Akbar’s supervision, with the establishment of karkhanas producing weapons related to gunpowder and firearms through the Mughal Empire, Mughals manufactured a great number of artillery, rifle, musket and other types of firearms.280
Besides, Mughal emperors also tried to employ the best workmen from within the country and abroad in their Karkhanas. Therefore, in the Mughal army, the firearms were generally managed by foreigners like Turks, Persians, Portuguese, French, and British. In the first years of the Mughal empire, many masters in firearm technology were Ottoman Turks and Persians. Even though the early gun makers of the Mughal Empire mainly originated from Ottoman Turkish, however these skills were gradually picked up by Indians. In the following years, once Akbar expanded his territorial control through Gujarat, Mughals came into contact with Portuguese which influenced the Mughal army considerably. As the Mughal Empire expanded to Bengal during Akbar’s
277 Abhay Kumar Singh, Modern World System and Indian Proto-Industrialization: Bengal 1650-1800, Vol. 1, New Delhi 2006, p. 142-143.
278 Qureshi, ibid, p. 60.
279 Sumbul Halim Khan, Art and Craft Workshops Under the Mughals a Study of Jaipur Karkhanas, New Delhi 2015, p. 4-8.
280 Zaman, ibid, p. 3.
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period, European were recruited in army who began to dominate the Mughal artillery. Especially, after the Thirty Years’ War in Europe ended, many soldiers were disbanded from the British and French armies. These out of job soldiers arrived in Indian subcontinent to take military jobs, and eventually came to hold senior positions in the Mughal artillery.281 Thus, many masterpieces of workmanship worked in different parts of the Mughal Empire in Karkhanas.
The European artillerymen used to receive monthly payment of 200 rupees, but during Aurangzeb’s rule it was brought down to 32 rupees a month.282 According to Abu’l Fazl, Akbar, who himself acquired both practical and theoretical military knowledge, recruited artisans with fixed salaries by paying special attention to masters and workmen. Importantly those masters taught Indian people about the manufacturing of firearms.283
The Mughal army consisted of cavalry, infantry, artillery, war elephants, and navy. Cavalry was the most important branch in the Mughal army due to inheriting Central Asia military power. The cavalry unit was the heart of the Mughal army. It consisted of three contingents. The first one was mansabdars who had to bring to the battlefield a designated number of soldiers according to their swar ranks. The second contingent was feudatory princes who were in the service of Mughal authority. The last contingent was Ahdis, or gentlemen troopers who were serving directly to the emperors.284 The respected part of infantry was musketeers. The artillery was generally used in siege warfare, but Babur Shah used them in open battlefields as well. The elephantry was the heart of typical Indian armies from ancient times. Navy heavily consisted of small war boats for campaigns in Bihar and Bengal.
Mughal Artillery
In the Mughal Empire, the artillery branch was named Topkhana. Top is a Turkish term and khana is the house. The term was most probably introduced by Turkish officers from the Ottoman Empire. The main aim of the Topkhana was to manufacture cannons and keep them ready when the army needed. The Topkhana was divided into four
281 Kar, ibid, p. 353.
282 William Irvine, the Army of the Indian Moghuls, p. 153-154.
283 Ain-i Akbar, p. 109-112.
284 Sharma, Mughal Government, p. 140.
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sections; manufacturing department, magazine and ordnance, field artillery in actual use, and guns used in fortresses. Khan Saman or Lord Steward was responsible for the first two while Mir Atish was in charge of the last two.285 The Mughal emperor Akbar reorganised the administration structure of artillery and gave responsibility to Khan Saman and Mir Atish. Khan Saman was the highest minister directing the affairs in the royal karkhana and the imperial household. He gave reports twice a year about production, utilised and required materials.286 Mir Atish was a commander, recruiting officer and the chief of ordnance authority. The name Mir Atish itself is a Turkish term that means the head of artillery. His duty was confined with the administration and command of the artillery in the battlefield.287
There were some officers who helped Mir Atish such as daroghah and mushrif. Daroghah performed executive duties while mushrif worked as an accountant.288 The postion and respect commanded by Mir Atish could be gauged by the fact that the Mughal emperors have mentioned his contribution in their memories. For example Jahangir mentioned his mir atish Patr Das who was given the title of Raja Bikramajit and ordered him to keep ready 50.000 light guns and 3.000 gun carriages in the arsenal.289 The positions related to firearms were Golandaz, Degandaz, Banadaz. The Golandaz is referred to the “ball-thrower”. It was not certain that how many golandaz were attached to each gun in the campaigns. Degandaz was referred to “pot-thrower” who were in charge of either mortar or hand grenades. Banandaz was rocket-thrower.290
The expansion of the Mughal empire during Akbar’s reign caused difficulty to manage artillery from the Mughal centre. In the early periods of Babur Shah and Humayun, the Mughal empire was not very large, so these emperors could bring their heavy artillery wherever they went. For example, when Ustad Ali Quli cast the huge cannon called deg-e-ghazi at Agra, it was carried to use at the Battle of Khanwa in 1527. With the expansion of the Mughal empire during Akbar’s reign, the Mughal forces, however, required those of weapons in provinces both for the security of the provinces against
285 Sarkar, the Art of War, p. 138.
286 Tripta Verma, Karkhanas under the Mughals from Akbar to Aurangzeb a Study in Economic Development, Delhi 1994, p. 42. For more details about Khansaman which was designated in the Dastur, see Verma, ibid, p. 46-47.
287 Zaman, ibid, p. 9.
288 Qureshi, ibid, p. 129.
289 The Tuzuk-i Jahangiri or Memoirs of Jahangir, translated by Alexander Rogers, Edited by Henry Beveridge, vol. 1, Delhi 2017, p. 22-23.
290 Irvine, ibid, p. 158-159.
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the external enemies as well as the control of its population. Bernier states that since Mughals were considered foreigners in Indian subcontinent and therefore faced hostilities. In order to maintain their sovereignty against powerful domestic rulers and other external threats, they had to maintain a strong and large army even in peace times.291 Thus, the artillery was managed by dividing it into two groups as Royal Artillery in the centre of the Mughal Empire and the provincial one.292 The Royal Artillery pieces were very effective in mobile operations and comprised of light pieces that accompanied the emperor all the time during his march.293 When the army stopped, the light artillery was placed around the royal tents.294 According to Irvine, it was also called the Artillery of the Stirrup, Topkhana-i-Jinsi, Topkhana-i-Rezah, Topkhana-i-Jilau or Topkhana-i-Jambishi.295
Although Turks and European influenced the development of Indian artillery, there were many different types of light artillery and unique innovations peculiar to Indian subcontinent, which can be referred as the Indianisation of firearms. Mardum-Kash (men-drawn) or narnal was smaller and lighter cannons that were carried by single men.296 Apart from these, there were also other cannons called Burji-Shikans (Breakers of Tower) which were situated on bastions of forts due to their heaviness. Fil-kash were dragged by elephants on a carriage, Gau-Kashs were drawn by oxen.297 The ban or rocket was one of the most used weapons by armies in the subcontinent during the 17th century which was believed to have come from China through sea route. It was a wooden or bamboo stick propelled by gunpowder in a cylinder attached to the stick.298 These were 15 to 25 cm in length and 5 to 8 cm in diameter.299
Mughals recruited Afghans (from Bengal) who were expert in the use of ban (rocket).300 Gajnal was a kind of small gun mounted on elephants. Two guns could be put
291 Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, p 209.
292 Phul, ibid, p. 91.
293 “It consisted of fifty or sixty small field pieces, all of brass; each piece mounted on a well-made and handsomely painted carriage (…) the carriage, with the driver, was drawn by two fine horses, and attended by a third horse, led by an assistant driver as a relay. (…) the light artillery is always intendent to be near King’s person and on that account takes the name of artillery of the stirrup.” Bernier, ibid, p. 218.
294 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, p. 63.
295 Irvine, ibid, p. 133-134.
296 Ain-i Akbar, Vol. 1, p. 113.
297 R. Balasubramaniam, Marvels of Indian Iron Through the Ages, New Delhi 2008, p. 123-124.
298 İrfan Habib, Technology in Medieval India C. 650-1750, Delhi 2013, p. 90.
299 Gommans, Mughal Warfare, p. 146.
300 Kaushik Roy, Military Manpower, Armies and Warfare in South Asia, London 2013, p. 60.
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sometimes on the same elephants back. There was another type of gajnal, which was dismounted while it was used.301 The quick move of a large number of light cannons from one place to another during the battle was a crucial factor. Thus, Iqtidar Alam Khan puts shaturnal (Camel Gunners) in a very important position in the Mughal army. These were more effective than cannons mounted on carriages despite their constrains.302 The other type of cannons nali, hathnali, zamburak, dhamaka, ramchangi, tobra, ghurnali, banduq, shahin, and rahkula. Nali was an iron gun barrel that had three types, small nali, bachadar and small subtle. Zambur or zamburak was a light cannon mounted on camel back with a pivot. While sturnali had advantages for moving different directions, Zamburaks were deployed in front of the Mughal army.303 Dhamaka was a kind of field-piece, Ramchangi was a light field-piece or a small gun, Ghurnali was a small gun mounted on the back of the horse,304 and Rahkula was a small gun dragged by bullocks.305
The heavy artillery was drawn by a pair of oxen and elephants. A group of engineers were responsible for handling heavy guns.306 Having big cannons represented Mughal superiority. Artillery would march in front of the army.307 The first Mughal gun foundry was established by Babur after the victory of Panipat. Babur describes in his memoir the founding of a cannon at Agra under the control of Ustad Ali Quli with following words:
when all the furnaces and materials were ready, he sent a person to me and, on Monday the 15th of the month, we went to see the mortar cast. round the mortar-mould he had had eight furnaces made in which were the molten materials. From below each furnace, a channel went direct to the mould. When he opened the furnace-holes on our arrival, the molten metal poured like water through all these channels into the mould. (…) the mould was left a day or two to cool; when it was opened, Ustad Ali Quli with great delight sent to say, the stone-chamber (tash-
301 Ain-i Akbar, Vol. 1, p. 113; Phul, ibid, p. 93.
302 Iqtidar Alam Khan, “Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case”, Social Scientist, Vol. 33, No. 3/4 (Mar. - Apr., 2005), p. 58.
303 Khan, Arts Crafts, p. 73. “Zamburaks are long swivels with one or two pound balls. Two of them are carried fastened upon the saddle of a camel; and when they are brought into play, the camel is, as usual, made to kneel on the ground; but to prevent his rising, each leg is fastened, bent at it is, with cord, and the animal remains immoviable.” Irvine, ibid, p. 136-137.
304 Saxena, Karkhanas, p. 35.
305 Saxena, “Medieval Arms and Armour”, p. 325.
306 U. N. Day, the Mughal Government AD 1556-1707, New Delhi 1994, p. 148.
307 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, vol. 2, p. 62.
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awi) is without defect; to cast the powder-compartment (daru-khana) is easy. He got the stone-chamber out and told of a body of men to accoutre it, while he busied himself with casting the powder-compartment.308
According to this description, there lacks information about the technical details like the metallurgical structure of the cannon, and that the stone chamber and powder chamber were done separately and assembled later. Most likely, Ali Quli did not have strong enough bellows to fire up a furnace.309
Based on Baburnama, it may be surmised that the guns designated as Kazans by Babur were made of brass/bronze which could throw a stone to 1600 meter.310 The exact number of Babur’s zarbzan and kazan is not certain. Yet, they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. With the affluent of India, both money and sources, his son Humayun had 700 zarbzans which discharged a ball of 5000 mithkals (appx. 18.21 kg) weight at the Battle of Kanauj in 1540.311 Mughals not only increased the number of their artillery but also improved the range of a cannon. While Babur’s zarbzans reached 1219 meters away, Humayun’s mortars could hit anything visible at the distance of a parasang about 5.6 km.312
Although Akbar used heavy cannons during the sieges of Chitor (1568) and Ranthambor (1570), the main factors in his battles were the mounted archers supported by light artillery and musketeers. The use of heavy artillery felt into disuse during Aurangzeb’s period because of his campaigns to the forts located the hilly regions of Deccan and swift Maratha light cavalry.313 In his journey to South India, Manucci gave an idea about artilleries. In the forts, there were some pieces of 20 to 25 feet long artillery. Their calibre was so large that a big man can easily get inside.314 Therefore, because of this it is said that there was no advantage against these.
Studying a war history requires visual resources apart from documents. When we examine the miniature which describes the First Battle of Panipat, we can see two
308 Babur Nama, p. 536-537.
309 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 61.
310 Babur Nama, p. 537.
311 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, Translated by E. Denison, London 1895, p. 474. (hereafter Tarikh-i Rashidi).
312 Tarikh-i Rashidi, p. 474.
313 Khan, “Indian Case”, p. 56.
314 Niccolao Manucci, A Pepys of Mogul India 1653-1708 being an Abridged edition of the “Storia do Mogor” of Niccolao Manucci, Translated by William Irvine, New Delhi 1991, p. 259.
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different types of artilleries. In the first type, cannons were mounted on two-wheeled carriages; in the second type, they were mounted on four-wheeled carriages
Figure – 3.5: Cannons carried by four wheels and two wheels.
Source: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Mughal_artillery
In India, both bronze/brass and iron cannons were manufactured in the 16th century. Especially, with the Portuguese influence, the number of shorter, wrought iron barrels, and metal projectiles for field guns increased. On one hand, the siege artillery remained bronze or brass.315 French traveller Bernier observes that small cannons produced by Mughals were mostly of brass.316 On the other hand, Iqtidar Alam Khan alleges that despite its cheap production, Indian rulers preferred Turkish experts who cast bronze cannons.317 Casting iron cannons was cheaper and enduring than bronze. Due to the deficiency in bellows in India, Indian rulers hired European experts to establish
315 Peter A. Lorge, the Asian Military Revolution from Gunpowder to the Bomb, New York 2008, p. 121-122.
316 Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, p. 218.
317 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 78.
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European style foundries.318 Aurangzeb gave his attention to European engineers in terms of military technology. When English traveller Richards Bell, an expert in casting cannon, arrived at Mughal court, Aurangzeb ordered commander Sayyid Khan to provide him all required resources including gold, money, brass, copper and personnel to start working in a foundry.319 The chemical analysis of a Mughal cannons shows the following composition: copper 87.72%, zinc 10.32%, tin 1.83% and remaining portion 0.13% was iron. This composition of cannons was made in order to get strength and elasticity.320
The forge-welded iron cannons were manufactured in Europe even before the 16th century. Mons Meg in Edinburg and Dulle Griel in Belgium are samples of this technology.321 In time, the emergence of cast bronze cannons brought the end of forge-welded iron cannons in Europe.322 By the end of the 17th century, the heavy guns were outdated due to their lack of mobilisation and accuracy problem.323 The introduction of forge-welded iron cannons by Europeans in the 16th century influenced the design of Indian cannons. However, in the Indian subcontinent, although the bronze cannons had an advantage in terms of quality, the forge-welded iron cannons maintained their fame because of the skilfulness of Indian blacksmiths. Iqbal Ghani Khan states this situation that “(…) the absence of casting technology was overcome by remarkable development in forging techniques by the Indian artisans. It was due to their ability to regulate the carbon content or hardness of steel that the Indian artisans were able to forge iron objects of varying hardness and flexibility.”324 According to Balasubramaniam, there is no other place in the world that had forge-welded iron cannons than India subcontinent. He studied many types of these cannons in different parts of India.325
318 Kaushik Roy, “Technology Transfer and the Evolution of Ordnance Establishment in Brtish-India: 1639-1856”, Indian Journal of History of Science, 44/3, (2009), p. 413.
319 Sir Richard Carnac Temple, “the Travels of Richard Bell (and John Campbell) in the East Indies, Persia, and Palestine 1654-1670”, The Indian Antiquary, Journal of Oriental Research, Edited by Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Vol. XXXV, Bombay 1906, p. 203.
320 Zaman, ibid, p. 21.
321 Dulle Griet is 5.01metres long with a bore of 0.64 of a metre and Mons Meg is 4.04 metres long with a bore of 0.5 metres. Nicholson, ibid, p. 97. In order to describe those big guns, the term “bombard” was generally used.
322 Balasubramaniam, ibid, p. 115.
323 Habib, Technology, p. 92.
324 Iqbal Ghani Khan, Metallurgy in Medieval India—the Case of the Iron Cannon”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 45 (1984), p. 465-466.
325 R. Balasubramaniam, “Azdaha Paikar – the Composite Iron-Bronze Cannon at Musa Burj of Golconda Fort”, Indian Journal of History of Science, 40.3 (2005), pp. 389-408; R. Balasubramaniam, “Fath Raihbar – the Massive Bronze Cannon at, Petla Burj of Golconda Fort”, Indian Journal of History
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Figure – 3.6: Huge Mughal artillery drawn by bullocks and elephants.
Source: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Mughal_artillery
of Science, 40.3 (2005), pp. 409- 429; R. Balasubramaniam and Pranab K. Chattopadhyay, “Zafarbaksh – the Composite of Mughal Cannon of Aurangzeb at Fort William in Kolkata”, Indian Journal of History of Science, 42.2 (2007), pp. 205-221; D. Neff and R. Balasubramaniam, “Bhavan Sankar - The Forge-Welded Iron Cannon at Jhansi Fort”, Indian Journal of History of Science, 40.3 (2005), pp. 349-369.
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In Mughal India, all kinds of firearms were manufactured and used on a substantial scale. Starting from Babur’s reign, firearm weapons, artillery and matchlock, were situated in the centre of Mughal army, since it was one of the main factors of centralisation of the empire. Its production was under the direct control of emperors and they encouraged the artisans to improve the firearm weapons technology in terms of quality and diversity of pieces.326 The first Mughal emperor Babur Shah was keen to use firearm weapons in his battles making him pay special attention to these. In this direction, he employed two Ottoman gun masters Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi. There is no clarity about when and how they met Babur Shah. Not only were they the masters of these guns but were also the battlefield commanders. Akbar was the main ruler to centralise the Mughal empire and it was under his reign that the firearm technology gained importance. However, the development and effective use of artillery was achieved by Aurangzeb during his Deccan campaigns which required improvement in the artillery and other firearms, a feat carried out by Ottoman Turks and Europeans.327 Along with this, the hilly place of Deccan made mandatory the use of artillery in the region for siege warfare.
Mughal Infantry
In the Mughal army, the infantry was made up of matchlockmen, archers, mewatis, swordsmen, wrestlers, macebearers, porters, and chelas (slaves). The matchlockmen also called banduqchis were the most important soldier category in the infantry branch.328 The exact period of introduction of handguns in the Indian subcontinent is not clear. Yet, their history cannot be separated from the artillery. It is possible that the early form of handguns were the miniatures of cannons, without having a trigger. According to two Jain illustrations, the handguns arrived in India in the 15th century.329 The first reference about handguns of the Mughals is dated to Babur’s tufangchis at Bajaur in 1519.330 Thus, we come across the effective use of handguns by the
326 Sarkar, Art of War, p. 136.
327 Aziz, ibid, p. 215.
328 B. R. Verma and S. R. Bakshi, Foundation of Mughal Empire, New Delhi 2005, p. 141.
329 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 44.
330 “as the Bajauris had never before seen matchlocks (tufang) they at first took no care about them, inded they made fun when they heard the report and answered it by unseemly gestures. On that day Ustad Ali Quli shot at and brought down five men with his matchlock; Wali the treasurer, for his part, brought down two; other matchlockmen were also very active in firing and did well, shooting through shield, through cuirass, through kusaru, and bringing down one man after another. Perhaps 7, 8, or 10 Bajauris had fallen to the matchlock-fire before night”. Babur Nama, p. 368-369.
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Vijayanagara army at Raichur in 1520.331 The next effective use of handguns was in the First Battle of Panipat in 1526. The musketeers were situated behind the carts to protect them from the cavalry attacks as well as elephantry and allow them to refill their muskets. These examples prove that battlefields in the Indian subcontinent began to see the musketeers.
Figure – 3.7: Officer of the Mughal Army with large Matchlock.
Source: https://in.pinterest.com/pin/572872015098402608/
331 Eaton, ibid, p. 301.
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People who were talented in using musket were trained in the Mughal empire as well as in other Indian states. Many of these people were recruited from the societies specialised in foot-archery. Those people helped the cavalry unit during battle by shooting on enemies from a certain place.332 Matchlockmen in the Mughal army came from different parts of India. They were generally recruited from Kanauj, Lucknow and its neighbourhood, and so were referred as Kanojias. They were paid double than the ordinary foot soldiers.333 Besides, people from other regions like Bhograi and Kasijora in Jalewas Sarkar of Orissa, Bundelkhand, Karnataka,334 and Buxar were expert handgun users.335 Persian Muslims and Indo Muslims from Rohela and Afghan Muslim clans were in high number in the handgun branch.336 When Babur entered Indian territories, he had 1200 handguns with him. In time the number of musketeers increased in India. Sher Shah who defeated Humayun had 25,000 musketeers in his army.337
The number of matchlockmen, banduqchis, were 12,000 in Akbar’s time which increased to 40,000 in Shah Jahan’s 20th regnal year.338 They were classified into five different ranks, but it was reduced to three by Aurangzeb by changing some rules about the musketeers.339 Musketeers could be divided into two main sections as captain of musketeers (mir-dash) and ordinary musketeers. The first group had four grades and they were paid 300, 280, 270, and 260 dams per month salary respectively. The ordinary musketeers were paid 250 to 120 dams per month during Akbar reign.340 The musketeers were placed under the command of nobles when appointed to a regular military campaign.341 In other words, musketeers were employed by the central Mughal authority and were paid their stipends from the central treasury.
In any case, being a musketeer was precious in the eyes of the Mughal emperors from the beginning. One example was that Babur honoured his three musketeers in 1528.
332 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 165.
333 Sharma, Mughal Government, p. 146.
334 Roy, Military Manpower, p. 60.
335 Rafi Ahmad Alavi, Studies in the History of Medieval Deccan, Delhi 1977, p. 30.
336 Sarkar, Military History, p. 153.
337 Lorge, ibid, p. 123.
338 Aziz, ibid, p. 204-205.
339 Saxena, “Medieval Arms and Armour”, p. 315.
340 Shireen Moosvi, the Economy of the Mughal Empire c. 1595 A Statistical Study, New Delhi 1987, p. 228. The salary of matchlockmen was between Rs. 4 and Rs. 6 per month. Their salary did not change in time. If a matchlockman was paid Rs. 4 for his early carrier, he got the same salary until his retirement. Alavi, ibid, p. 30.
341 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 150.
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Another important skill and branch which was introduced by the Ottomans to the Mughal Empire were the mounted musketeers. The skill of firing a musket from horseback was learnt by the Ottomans from their European rivals. These skilful soldiers helped Mughals supress many rebellions like in Rathor in 1678-1680. However, this new format was maintained only by a small unit of Rumi musketeers, which shows it was a limited military branch. They were able to fire when they dismounted, which though seems disadvantageous during the battle, but were useful against rebels’ hit and run tactic thereby proving its effectiveness.342 According to Lahori, during the reign of Shah Jahan, mounted musketeers added along with the food musketeers and their number was 7000.343
The remarkable technological improvement about handguns in India was through the production of matchlock with the wrought-iron barrel. It was cheaper and lighter than those of brass.344 Just like his interest in the artillery pieces and their manufacturing, the production of handguns flourished during Akbar’s reign. Abu’l Fazl explains that Akbar invented a technique which strengthened the gun-barrel by twisting a flattened the iron, so the roll was elongated. These pieces did not join edge to edge, but overlapped with one another. Then, these both twisted, strengthened and heated iron pieces were drawn around an iron rod to create a barrel. It is likely that the barrel would not have weak joints, so it would resist high explosive pressure.345 Akbar’s scientist Fathullah Shirazi introduced a machine for cleaning gun barrels, a portable cannon and a gun consisting of seventeen barrels.346Although there was no description about its mechanism, it is possible that a single match was attached with their priming-pans, so they could shot one after another in quick-fire.
The words of Abu’l Fazl about handguns show their technological importance as he writes that “from the practical knowledge of his majesty, guns are now made in such a manner that they can be fired off, without a match, by a slight movement of the cock.”347 However, he does not draw a picture of how the cock worked without the match and
342 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 153-155.
343 Padshahnama (1638-1648), Vol. 2, p. 290.
344 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 133.
345 Ain-i Akbar, p. 113.
346 M. A. Alvi and Abdur Rahman, Fathullah Shirazi: A Sixteenth-Century Indian Scientist, New Delhi 1968, p. 4-13.
347 Ain-i Akbar, p. 113.
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ignited the gunpowder in the pinning-pan.348 Contrastingly it could be either a flint-lock or a wheel-lock, which was invented in Europe in 1520.349
The barrels of matchlock in Akbar’s period were 66 inches and 41 inches. These could be carried by single men. These men had a prong or tripod to place their matchlock on them to fire.350 Throughout the Mughal Empire, the use of matchlock was higher in comparison to flintlock. As Fitzclance said:
the flintlock, an introduction of the Europeans, is far from being general, and, I may even say, is never employed by the natives: though Telingas, armed and disciplined after our manner, in the services of Scindiah and Holkar, make use of it. Some good flintlocks are, however, made at Lahore.351
Figure – 3.8: Basic mechanisms of Matchlock.
Source: J. R. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, Conway Maritime Press, London 2003, p. 159.
348 Irfan Habib, “Akbar and Technology”, Akbar and His India, Edited by Irfan Habib, Delhi 1997, p. 143.
349 Cathal J. Nolan, “Wheel lock”, the Age of Wars of Religion, 1000-1650 an Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization, Vol. 2, Wesport 2006, p. 936.
350 Irvine, ibid, p. 103-104.
351 George Augustus Frederick Fitzclarence, Journal of a Route Across India, Through Egypt to England in the Latter End of the Year 1817, and the Beginning of 1818, New Delhi 1999, p. 256.
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Another factory related to firearms was Silehkhana (the Arsenal). It dealt with the manufacturing, maintainence and repairing of the weapons. It was separated into two sections Silehkhana Huzuri which was for emperors and nobles while Silehkhana was for the local inhabitants. Arrow, bow, matchlock rifle, straight blade, lance were produced in Silehkhana.352
From the 13th century onwards, there were many different formulae for gunpowder. The ideal proportion for gunpowder was considered as 74.64 % saltpetre, 11.85 % sulphur, 13.51 % charcoal, and it was succeeded by engineers at the end of the 15th century as the table shows below.
Table 3. 1: Percentages of saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal in formulae for gunpowder.
Source: Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, Translated by Michael Jonas, New York 1984, p. 196.
352 Khan, Art and Craft Workshops, p. 64.
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All the same, it is worth arguing the efficacy of gunpowder is not related to its composition, but its homogeneity, fineness and the rapidity. Having sources of gunpowder was the main aim of these empires. India had also extensive saltpetre sources mainly manufactured at Agra and Ahmadabad, Orissa, Bihar and Bengal. The need for saltpetre of the Mughal army was supplied from Agra while other places met the demand of French, Dutch and British.353 This made Indian subcontinent as the largest producer and exporter of saltpetre for European countries until the 19th century. The use of gunpowder increased when Mughals established Barudkarkhanas as regular producing centres, notably in Bihar, Awadh, Punjab, Ajmer and Coromandel Coasts.354 Besides, Mughals also imported sulphur from Afghanistan, Persia and Europe.
It is thus arguable that firearms did not enter the Indian subcontinent with the Mughals. Before Mughals introduced them to the north Indian territories, Southern Indian rulers had used firearm technology through foreign experts especially in Deccan. Undoubtedly, the Mughal emperors encouraged the artisans for manufacturing of firearms from the Babur’s period. The relations between Babur and Mustafa Rumi and Ali Quli, and the interest of Akbar for gunpowder and firearms underline the importance of the firearms for the Mughal emperors. Moreover, the importance of firearms for Mughals could be gauged from the fact that Akbar left behind cannons, muskets, lead for the shot, gunpowder and other munition of war valued around Rs. 85,75,971.355
Production of Firearms in the Ottoman Empire
The exact date when cannons were introduced to the Ottoman Empire is a debatable question. Given the fact that most of the Ottoman chronicles were written from the second half of the 15th century, it is possible that they give incomplete information about the used guns in 14th-century battles. Most importantly, the terminology is also another problem; for instance, the Turkish word “top” was used for both the shots of cannon and the cannon itself which makes it confusing to determine the subject of the matter in certain cases.356 There are thus different opinions about the first use of
353 Vijay K. Seth, the Story of Indian Manufacturing Encounters with the Mughal and British Empires (1498-1947), Singapore 2018, p. 51-52.
354 Gommans, Mughal Warfare, p. 149.
355 Moosvi, ibid, p. 245.
356 Agoston, “Behind the Turkish War Machine”, p. 103.
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cannons by the Ottomans. Serbian contingents could have introduced the firearms while fighting for the Ottomans in 1386 against Karamanids.357 Then, they used cannon against the crusade union of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Albania in the battle of Kossovo in 1389.358
Figure – 3.9: Bronze cannon of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror.
In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire attracted many Western travellers seeking knowledge about Eastern societies. Many of them have indicated in their travel books about European cannon founders, artillerists who worked for Ottomans. Although foreign artisans played a crucial role in the early history and advancement of the Ottoman casting technology, their contributions should not be exaggerated since Ottoman founders were equally contributing to the casting technology. For example, Saruca Pasha was ordered by Mehmet the Conqueror to cast 300 kantar copper cannon
357 Gabor Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery and European Military Technology in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 47 (1/2), 1994, p. 22. It is obvious that the land where Serbians lived was a bridge between the Ottomans and European states. Once Serbian learnt the production of gunpowder and firearms technology from European states, they transmitted this technology to the Ottomans.
358 Carlo M. Cipollo, Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Invention and the Early Phases of European Expansion 1400-1700, New York 1965, p. 90. Uzunçarşılı also stated the same by referring to Ottoman chronicler Neşri. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları, …, p. 35.
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for the siege of Constantinople.359 Furthermore, the casting of ordnance was an international business that many military foreign technicians were employed by other European empires too. In 1389, after the battle of Kossovo, the Ottomans took control of Serbia. A few years later the Gluhavica iron mine came under the control of Ottomans which paved way for Ottoman Turks and Serbs to work together.360 One of the well-known artisans was Master Orban, a Hungarian, who served emperor Mehmet by casting large cannons during the siege of Constantinople in 1453.361 Besides, Jorge of Nurnberg was also an important figure in the Ottoman service.362 In addition, Jews and Marranos who were expelled from Spain worked as cannon founders and artillerymen. However, the biggest contribution was from Balkanian, German, and Hungarian artillerymen, cannon founders and miners in terms of the adoption and diffusion of western firearms technology in the Ottoman Empire during the 15th century.363
The answer to the question of how the Ottomans became successful in casting cannons dates to the period of Sultan Mehmet. Most of his campaigns were through the Balkans where feudal lords, local governors resided in castles. Therefore, Mehmet required good quality cannons and cannon makers in his army.364 Every siege was an experiment for him to enhance the cannon casting technology. On the other hand, because of the expansion of the Ottomans through the Balkans, Balkan states had to develop the firearm technology to defeat Ottomans. The development of firearms in the Balkan states influenced Ottomans. These occurrences earned benefits for both sides. While Ottomans learned about firearms and their use, Balkan states had to enhance their firearm weapons to encounter Ottoman attacks. Summarily, it can be said that the development of firearms in Balkans and the Ottomans went parallel to each other and so the role of Balkans in the development of firearms in the Ottoman Empire cannot be underestimated. There was one difference that Ottomans cast their cannons very large
359 Cihan Çimen, Anonim Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (Kuruluştan 892/1487’ye Kadar) [Anonymous Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (From the Establishment to 892/1487), Unpublished Master Thesis, Marmara University, Turkic Studies Institute, History Department, Istanbul 2006, p. 92.
360 Halil Inalcık, “Diffusion of Fire-arms”, p. 174.
361 Agoston, “Behind the Turkish War Machine”, p. 106. The cannon cast by Orban was only fired seven times in a day.
362 During Ottomans raids into Balkans he was captured and was brought to Istanbul to serve Mehmet II, after 20 years service, he escaped with the help of Christians. Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 28.
363 Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 29.
364 Aydüz, “Mehmed the Conqueror and Fire-Arms Technology”, the Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation, Philosophy, Science and Institutions, Vol. 3, Ed. Kemal Çiçek, Ankara 2000, p. 746.
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compared to Balkans.365 After the death of Mehmet II, his son Bayezid II became the new sultan of the Ottoman Empire who also showed interest in firearm technology. Bayezid II especially realised the importance of firearms during long wars with Mamluks between 1485 and 1491 as he could not get any definite success. Upon this failure, he decided to reorganise the Ottoman army by increasing the use of firearms.366
The adoption of firearms by the Ottoman army was not enough for military campaigns unless they manufactured and enhanced the firearms. It was thus necessary to establish the weapon and ammunition factories and streamline the production transportation. This was among the main reasons why the production of gunpowder and firearms was controlled by the central Ottoman government. On the other hand, European states managed the production of cannon through the private sector.367 The requirement of cannon and artillery was ensured in three ways. The first way was the tophanes in Istanbul and other provinces; second mobile cannon casting; and third war booty.368
The firearms technology of the Ottoman Empire was institutionalised and reached its zenith with the establishment of Tophane-i Amire (the Imperial State Cannon Foundry) by Mehmet II in Istanbul to manufacture cannons and cannonballs.369 The debatable question about the Tophane-i Amire remains whether Ottomans inherited these from Byzantium or Genoese or built indigenously.370 In any case, it was one of the first
365 İnalcık, “Diffusion of Fire-arms”, p. 190-191.
366 Halil Inalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Klasik Çağ (1300-1600) [The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (1300-1600)], Translated by Ruşen Sezer, İstanbul 2003, p. 36.
367 Gabor Agoston, “Early Modern Ottoman and European Gunpowder Technology”, Multicultural science in the Ottoman Empire, 2003, p. 17-18.
368 In the Ottoman Empire, the required materials for the manufacturing of the ordnances came from other parts of the empire to Istanbul. Apart from that, the Ottomans established manufacturing factories nearby ore deposits inside the empire for easy transportation of the ordnances. The presence of the ordnances in the provinces gave opportunity to protect them from any attack of hostile countries. Casting of cannons during the campaigns and sieges was vital factor for the Ottoman army when they faced the difficulties of the transportation of the ordnances. Lastly, capturing of enemies’ ordnances after a decisive victory on them provided the Ottomans both the chance to catch the new technological developments in war materials and new ordnances for the Armoury.
369 Fevzi Yılmaz, “Fatih Sultan Mehmet Dönemi Topları ve Değişen Üretim Paradigması” [Guns During Sultan Mehmet the Conquer and Changing Production Paradigms], FSM Scholarly Studies Journal of Humanites and Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 2014, p. 220-222. It was a golden period that all kind of huge ordnances of iron and bronze and first howitzer were cast. Abdülkadir Özcan, “Ottoman Military Organisation”, the Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation, Philosophy, Science and Institutions, Vol. 3, Ed. Kemal Çiçek, Ankara 2000, p. 720.
370 In his comprehensive study on Tophane-i Amire, Salim Aydüz argues that Tophane-i Amire was built by Mehmet the Conqueror during the reconstruction process of Istanbul. According to him the only person who claimed it was a Byzantium construction was Hafız Hüseyin Ayvansarayi (Dead. 1787). Apart from him, there is no other contemporary supporting him. Salim Aydüz, Tophâne-i Âmire ve Top Döküm Teknolojisi [Tophâne-i Âmire and Cannon Casting Technology], Ankara 2006, p. 85. On the
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cannon foundries in late medieval age to be built and operated by a central government. With the help of strong financial backing, the empire was able to produce hundreds of cannons and cannonballs annually.371 After Sultan Mehmet’s death, his son Bayezid II expanded the factory by adding accommodations for workers. In the reign of Suleiman, Tophane-i Amire, requiring high maintenance, was replaced by a newly one which consisted of some outbuildings; foundry, barracks, storehouse, vault and practice house.372
Figure – 3.10: Tophane-i Amire in İstanbul.
The people who worked in the Tophane-i Amire were called Topçular or Rihtegan-i Top, (the artillerists). Their job included the casting of cannons and their maintenance in the war.373 Due to the lack of archival materials, the establishment of Topçu Ocağı does not go beyond the prediction. It is estimated that it was established at the beginning
other hand, Gabor Agoston alleges that it was not built by sultan Mehmet since he did not mention it in the reconstruction of Istanbul done by him. Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 25.
371 Gabor Agoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800”, Journal of World History, 2014, p. 101.
372 M. S. Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapısı”, [Ottoman Economic Structure], Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi [History of Ottoman State and its Civilization], Vol. I, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Istanbul 1994, p. 620.
373 Parry, “Barud”, p. 1061.
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of the 15th century after the formation of Janissary corp.374 The noteworthy point is that since cannons were hard to transport, the Ottomans built cannon foundries across to strategical points of the empire and near mineral deposits. The main places were cannon foundries were built included Belgrade, Buda, Scurati in Europa; Bilecik, Van Kigi and some others in Anatolia.375 The musket and pistol were mainly manufactured in Istanbul, where Tüfenkhane-i Amire was located. Besides Istanbul, these were produced at Anatolia, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Damascus, Baghdad and Balkans as well.376
The Ottoman adminstration was well-organised and so sought to reform its institution of army as well. Since the transportation of cannons into the battlefield had big importance, the Ottomans upon this realisation established Top Arabacıları Corp (the Artillery Carriers) for the transportation of big cannons and munitions. This was done by yaya and müsellem in Anatolia while yürük and evlad-ı fatihan engaged in Rumelia.377 Just like other corps, the exact date of its founding is also not known. In the decrees of Mehmet II, though there is a mention of cannon corps, but there is no information regarding Top Arabacıları Corps. According to Uzunçarşılı, the barracks of this corp were around Tophane, Ahırkapı and Şehremini. Since the first cannons were produced in small size, it was easy to carry them to the battlefield with oxen, mules, camels. The Ottomans did not need any wagon (car-araba) until the big cannons were cast.378 These transporters were settled both at İstanbul and in the provincial fortresses and were part of Janissaries. Wagons were produced according to the size and weight of cannons. The resources for the production came from Balkans, Croatia, Wallachia, Greece etc.379 Apart from land transportation, the Ottomans used Danube River to transport the siege artilleries, field guns and supplies required in Hungarian campaigns.380
Gunpowder was one of the most significant instruments in the successful expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In his letter to Sultan Murat III, Yemişçi Hasan Pasha emphasised
374 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 37.
375 Mücteba Ilgürel, “Fire Arms in the Ottoman State”, the Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation, Philosophy, Science and Institutions, Vol. 3, Ed. Kemal Çiçek, Ankara 2000, p. 729.
376 Aysel Çötelioğlu, Askeri Müze Osmanli Dönemi Ateşli Silahlar Kataloğu, [Military Museum Ottoman Period Firearms Catalog], İstanbul 2001, p. 17.
377 Mücteba Ilgürel, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Ateşli Silahlar” [Firearms in the Ottoman Empire], Osmanlı, Vol. 6, Ankara 1999, p. 607.
378 Uzunçarşılı, ibid, p. 97.
379 Uzunçarşılı, ibid, p. 99-100.
380 Parry, “Barud”, p. 1062.
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that the Ottoman government had to prepare the gunpowder provision a year early to campaigns. It cannot be compared to anything else. If the required gunpowder was not on time, it cannot be replaced with anything even money. The defence of castles and warfare required gunpowder.381 In the beginning, the production of gunpowder was maintained by Cebeci Ocağı (Armour Corp). With the territorial expansion, the Ottoman army needed more and regular gunpowder supplement. Thus, the management and production of gunpowder was controlled by Baruthane-i Amire (Gunpowder Works) where gunpowder was produced.382 Moreover, it was strictly forbidden to sell or export it to merchants. Before a campaign started, authorities controlled powder stocks studiously and orders were sent to powder mills to increase the production of necessary materials.383
The Ottoman Empire possessed raw materials for gunpowder such as saltpetre, sulphur, and charcoal within its territories including in Anatolia, Iraq, Balkans and Egypt. This allowed the empire to establish a number of gunpowder mills throughout its territories to make maximum supply of gunpowder available to itself. The first gunpowder factory of the Ottoman Empire was established during the reign of Mehmet II in Istanbul in the name of Atmeydani Baruthanesi. Following years, many factories were established in different parts of Istanbul like Kağıthane, Okmeydanı, Şehremini and Azadlu. Besides these many more were built in Gallipoli, Thessalonica, Buda, Izmir, Bor, Timişoara, and in West Asia and North Africa region like Baghdad, and Cairo to provide military requirements in a short time.384 The organisation of the gunpowder supplementary through the empire aimed to ensure easy access to it and prevented any short supply in the battlefields.385
Manufacturing gunpowder requires three main components, which include saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal. Pre-modern empires and states used black powder consisting of
381 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Tarihine Aid Belgeler Telhisler (1597-1607) [Telhises Belong to the Ottoman History (1597-1607], Istanbul 1970, p. 19-20.
382 Zafer Gölen, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Baruthâne-i Âmire (XVIII. Yüzyıl) [Gunpowder Works in the Ottoman Empire (18th Century)], Ankara 2006, p. 28-29.
383 Gabor Agoston, “Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian Campaigns of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, Turcica, Vol. 25, 1993, p. 83-84.
384 Gölen, ibid, p. 3-23.
385 Ibrahim Sezgin, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki Baruthaneler ve Barut İmalatı” [Gunpowder Works and Gunpowder Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire], Türkler, vol. 10, Ed. H. Celal Güzel, et all, Ankara 2002, p. 145-150.
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75 per cent saltpetre, 12.5 per cent charcoal and 12.5 per cent sulphur. Having sources of powder was the main aim of these empires.386 Saltpetre is the material which is used in gunpowder making in significant proportions and was referred as “the mother of gunpowder” by David Cressy.387 Saltpetre is very sensitive to oxygen and must be pure in order to get necessary chemical reaction, which therefore makes its processing a slow. The Ottoman Empire obtained most of the saltpetre from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Inner Anatolia and Balkans.388 Due to its abundance in Anatolia, the Ottomans manufactured the gunpowder mainly in Anatolian cities.389 Another component of gunpowder is sulphur which was not as readily available to Ottomans as was saltpetre. Although it as found around Erciş, Ahlat and Lut Lake, most of it was imported thereby making it the only element to be transported from different regions to the mills.390 Unlike sulphur, charcoal, the third constituent of gunpowder, could be easily produced in the Ottoman Empire due to rich forest resources. It was generally made of trees such as willow, elm, poplar and hazel.391 Though European General Montecuccoli claimed Ottoman gunpowder as “excellent” in quality, Gabor Agoston has contested this by arguing that this cannot be generalised by depending on these examples, and instead need to be studied from archival documents to arrive at a clear explanation.392
The other corps that were busy with the gunpowder and firearms in the Ottoman Empire can be listed as cebeci, lağımcı, and humbaracı. Cebecis (the Armourers) were responsible for the protection, transportation of the weapons of Janissaries such as tufang, sword, gunpowder etc. They brought all necessary war tools to the battlefield and distributed them to Janissaries. After the war ended, they collected and repaired them.393 They stayed both in Istanbul, in Cebehane-i Amire (Armory) and provincial castles.394 Humbaracıs, the bombardiers, were related with Cebeci and Artillery corps and were generally timar holders whose main concern was the production and use of
386 Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapısı”, p. 624.
387 David Cressy, Saltpeter: the Mother of Gunpowder, Oxford 2013.
388 Gölen, ibid, p. 135-136.
389 Ümit Koç, “Klasik Dönem Anadolu Sanayii Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme (1500-1605)” [An Evaluation on Classical Era Anatolian Industry (1500-1605)], Türkler [Turks], vol. 10, Ed. H. Celal Güzel, et all, Ankara 2002, p. 771-772.
390 Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapısı”, p. 624.
391 Gölen, ibid, p. 142.
392 Agoston, “Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army”, p. 87-88.
393 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlılarda Devlet Teşkilatı ve Sosyal Yapı [State Organization and Social Structure in the Ottomans in the 14th – 17th Centuries], Ankara 1991, p. 44; Uzunçarşılı, ibid, p. 3-5.
394 Abdülkadir Özcan, “Ottoman Military Organisation”, p. 720.
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grenades, bombs and artificial fire.395 Lağımcıs, the sappers, were experts in demolishing castles. They opened holes under the castles and blasted those by using gunpowder. The science of the work was abandoned and so in time the corps deteriorated because of recruiting people who were later on not skilled.396
As noted, the Ottoman was an army-based empire and the extraction and production of minerals assumed great significance. The manufacture of weapon and ammunition, extracting saltpetre and production of gunpowder were therefore under the control of the central administration. It was evident from how the mineraly rich territories were taken from timar and joined to sultan’s territories. The places such as the Imperial Cannon Foundry, Armoury, Gunpowder Works and Arsenal were established mainly in Istanbul and near ore deposits to meet Ottoman army’s demands. These factors put Istanbul at the centre of Ottoman weapons industry.397 Minerals were sent to relevant manufacturing units either in pure or processed forms. Iron and copper were sent to Tophane-i Amire (the Imperial Cannon Foundry) to cast cannon and cannonball, and to Cebehane-i Amire (Armoury) to manufacture bullet, cannonball, pickaxe, shovel, and nail, crude iron was sent to Tersane-i Amire (Arsenal) for shipbuilding, saltpetre and sulphur were sent to Baruthane-i Amire (Gunpowder Works) to produce gunpowder.398 The Ottomans started investing in firearm technology in strategic areas and thus were able to capture Balkans, Anatolia, East Europe, Crimea, Arab Peninsula and Northern Africa. In sum, the early centralisation of the Ottoman weapon industry was the main instrument for military success against others.
Types of Ordnances of the Ottoman Empire
Cannons and artilleries in the Ottoman Empire could be made of either iron or bronze. Iron ordnances could be made in any place because it did not require a building and industrial process. There are varied making process of iron ordnances, which can be categorised in two main types: wrought iron cannons and cast-iron cannons. One way of wrought iron cannon is that a tube of large diameter was heated and welded into a crude tube which was then forged with a big hammer and attached to each other. In
395 Parry, “Barud”, p. 1062; Özcan, “Ottoman Military Organisation”, p. 721.
396 Uzunçarşılı, ibid, p. 131-133.
397 Agoston, “Early Modern Ottoman”, p. 17-18.
398 Mustafa Altunbay, “Klasik Dönemde Osmanlı’da Madencilik” [Mining in the Ottoman Empire in the Classical Period], Türkler [Turks], Vol. 10, Ed. H. Celal Güzel, et all, Ankara 2002, p. 796-797.
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another manner, the tubes were strengthened by thick iron hoops. Apart from wrought iron cannon, there were cast-iron cannons. This required high temperature and coal to melt iron.399 However, iron cannons had a disadvantage because these burst without any warning. When a small fracture emerged, it quickly spread and would cause death of soldiers standing around it. Cipolla states that wrought iron guns were made in the 16th century, and were thought to be an inferior type of artillery.400
Figure – 3.11: A wrought iron cannon captured from Mamluks. Dated to the 16th century.
Making of iron cannon in the Ottoman Empire began at the end of 15th century, but according to Aydüz, there is no record of making this type of cannons from the mid of 16th century.401 Most probably, due to its complex, hard and expensive process, Ottomans gave importance to the making of bronze cannons. Bronze ordnances were made of the mixture of copper and tin. The ideal combination was 90 % copper and 10
399 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 319-320.
400 Cipolla, ibid, p. 24.
401 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 321.
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% tin.402 As the table is shown below, till the end of the 17th century the Ottomans used the ideal composition in bronze cannons.
Table 3.2: Composition of Ottoman bronze cannons.
Source: Agoston, “Early Modern Ottoman”, p. 24.
Copper is the basic raw material for making of bronze ordnance that came from Copper mines, which was abundant in the Ottoman Empire’s borders. The copper was heavily supplied from Anatolia. Due to these copper mines, the Ottomans were able to cast in high numbers of cannons. The copper and tin were extremely expensive which made the making of bronze ordnance costly. However, the Ottomans were lucky about having copper mines, unlike Europeans. This is one of the explanations of how the Ottomans became superior in the battlefield against Europeans. Moreover, except tin, the Ottomans did not face any difficulty in obtaining any minerals.403 They obtained tin through European merchants allowing them to cast strong bronze ordnances. The geographical situation gave the Ottomans an easy access to raw materials, copper and tin. While the Europeans produced iron ordnances, the Eastern and Asian empires used the mixture of copper and zinc. When the quality of European and Ottoman ordnances were compared, the Ottomans performed better.404 Generally, the Ottomans cast this
402 Tez, ibid, p. 183.
403 However, because of long wars with Safavids in 1578-1590 and Habsburg 1593-1606, the Ottomans needed more war materials, so they purchased from British and Dutch merchants. Parry, “Barud”, p. 1063.
404 Aydüz Tophane-i Amire, p. 332-333.
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type of ordnance during campaigns. In 1438, the time of Murat II, bronze ordnances were cast in the battlefield and used during the siege.405
Bronze is hard and durable metal, which can resist the powerful explosions. They bulged before they failed that protected soldiers from an unexpected burst.406 Besides, it is also durable against weather conditions for many years. Most importantly, they could be melted and recast again. For instance, the bronze ordnance that was cast in the reign of Mehmet in 1478 was melted after a hundred years later and three new bronze cannons were recast.407
Figure – 3.12: Bronze cannon casting techniques in the Ottoman and western European in the 16th century
Source: Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p. 311.
405 Uzunçarşılı, ibid, p. 58.
406 Balasubramaniam, Marvels of Indian Iron, p. 130.
407 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 333.
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The Ottomans adopted and cast several types of cannons from the smallest to the biggest sizes. The biggest cannon in the Ottoman literature was designated as balyemez. In the Ottoman Empire, different size ordnances were produced and they were named under different names, şayka, balyemez, kolomborna, zarbzen, bacaluşka etc. Evliya Çelebi gave details about their size as follow: five şayka equals to twenty balyemez, twenty-five kolomborna and hundred şahi darbzen.408
The first record about şayka dates to 1517 and 1519. There are two different lists, which demonstrate the produced ordnances. In these lists eight şaykas 4.40 cm, six şaykas 3.96 cm were cast.409 They threw different size balls.410 The şaykas were also long guns and so unique that it was hard to find a skilled artisan to cut cannonballs for it.411 Balyemez were used by Ottomans for both the attack and defence412 of castles from 16th century to 19th centuries.413 Ottomans sometimes used iron for making balyemez.414 Evliya Çelebi gives some valuable information about balyemez and writes: “30 okka iron ball throwing pieces called Lankoz, 40 okka iron ball throwing pieces Zalim, 50 okka iron ball throwing pieces Kıran, and lastly 60 okka iron ball throwing pieces Sademat.” 415
Another type of ordnance called bacaluşka416 was mainly used in siege warfare.417 The date when Ottomans used bacaluşka is also not clearly known, but suffice to note that these were well-known in the Mediterranean in 16th century. These were able to throw
408 Evliya Çelebi, Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Istanbul [Travelogue of Evliya Çelebi in Today’s Turkish: İstanbul], Prepared by Seyit Ali Kahraman and Yücel Dağlı, Vol. 1 Book 2, Istanbul 2008, p. 397.
409 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 346.
410 A.{DVNSMHM.d. 5/566 in an order written in order to determine the war tools of Budin Castle and other castles around, it was mentioned 22, 18, 16, 14 and 11 vukiyye cannons.
411 Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 37.
412 5 pieces balyemez were ordered to send to Akkirman Castle for its protection C. AS.162/7152 and C. AS. 160/7068; 32 balyemez for the protection of Yergöğü Castle C. AS. 489/20407; castles located in Black sea strait 10 balyemez C. AS. 522/21793.
413 Evliya Çelebi mentions that in the Maiden’s Tower in the middle of Marmara Sea there were hundred balyemez which did not give any entrance for enemies. Evliya Çelebi, Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Istanbul [Travelogue of Evliya Çelebi in Today’s Turkish: İstanbul], Prepared by Seyit Ali Kahraman and Yücel Dağlı, vol. 1, Book 1, Istanbul 2008, p. 29.
414 C.AS. 802/34028; C. AS. 65 3067; C. AS. 467 19481.
415 Evliya Çelebi, Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Podgoriçe – İştib – Vidin – Peçoy - Budin, Üstürgon [Estergon] – Ciğerdelen – Macaristan – Öziçe – Taşlıca – Dobra – Venedik – Mostar - Kanije [Travelogue of Evliya Çelebi in Today’s Turkish], Prepared by Seyit Ali Kahraman and Yücel Dağlı, vol. 2, 6. Book, Istanbul 2010, p. 422.
416 Because it was not a Turkish term, it was recorded under different names in the Ottoman archival document like, baciliska, bacaluşka, badaluşka, badoluşka, bedoluşka etc.
417 A.{DVNSMHM.d. 5/1427. although the Ottoman army had 66 pieces bacaluşka, it was not enough to capture Göle Castle. A.{DVNSMHM.d. 5/1428 and A.{DVNSMHM.d. 5/1429.
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13 kg to 28 kg stone or copper balls418 and were made of hooped wrought-iron or cast of bronze of which some even exceeded 10 tons in weight.419 Kanon, whose name was derived from the French word “cannon” threw balls between 5kg to 13kg.420 Kolomborna, the first samples of Kolomborna was seen in the beginning of the 15th century. This gun was a kind of matchlock named “couleuvrin” and their length was approximately two meters. Though these could be carried by hand, but were usually put on a mounting. However, these were upgraded and afterwards used both in siege warfare and battlefield.421 There were different sizes of kolomborna which threw different size balls.422
Prangı was the small size gun. Due to its usefulness and portability, Ottomans began to produce these from the beginning. However, there is no detailed information about their length, weight and diameter in the Ottoman archival sources. These type of guns could be categorised as big rifle tufang. They were used in the sieges of Constantinople in 1453 and Belgrade in 1456. Guns designated as Şakaloz were smaller than Prangı and very similar to tufang. Although şakaloz was defined as tufang, but due to its weight of around 36 kg and carried by wagons, they were accepted as a kind of cannon. Mortars were generally light, muzzle-loaded and consisting of a smooth-bore tube. During the siege of Constantinople, they were used to submerge the Venetian and Byzantium ships.423
According to the Ottoman sources, there were guns called as zarbzen or zarbuzan which were smaller than Bacaluşka and divided into three types as şahi (big), miyane (medium) and small zarbzen. Although some zarbzens exceeded the size of small these small guns, these were easily carried by on one horse and thereby giving an edge in the battlefield, such as Mohacs in 1526, Szigetvar in 1566 and campaigns in Hungarian 1596.424 Just like big ordnances, the dates of first use of muskets by Ottomans is not
418 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 361. For Budin Campaign the Ottoman army had 16 vukiyye threw 2 bacaluşka,14 vukıyye atar 4 bacaluşka ve 11 vukıyye atar 4 bacaluşka A.{DVNSMHM.d. 5/1709.
419 Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 37-38.
420 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 367.
421 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 369.
422 Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, p. 42.
423 Aydüz, Tophane-i Amire, p. 392-403
424 Agoston, “Ottoman Artillery”, 40-41.
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clear.425 The first official records about muskets have dated to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. However, there are multiple claims about its usage in 1421, 1430, 1442-1444. After these dates, many soldiers with tufang were tasked with the defence of castles in Balkans. These tufangs were likely to be şakaloz or heavy hand-carried cannons. It is interesting that the Ottomans used European terminology to describe firearms like cannon artillery while they used Persian terminology, Tüfek, Tüfenk in order to describe the musket.426
During these first years, tufangs were generally used in siege warfare. According to sources, in the castles of Üsküp, Novobrdo, Peşave and Güvercinlik, both Christian soldiers and janissaries were placed with their tufangs. Over time, these were upgraded and increased in production and became main weapon in the battlefields. In his campaigns inside Europe Suleiman had 12,000 janissaries and approximately 9,000 of them carried tufangs.427 It is worth mentioning that the Ottomans not only imported tufang but they also manufactured it in their factories in İstanbul, Damascus, Algeria and Cairo where a number of foreign artisans were employed.428 Therefore, Ottomans’ tufang had a distinctive structure from others. In his work based on Ottoman archival documents, Feridun Emecen claimed that Ottomans tufangs were smaller and lighter compared to European muskets. The length of long tufang was nearly 110-115 cm and the length of short tufang was nearly 88-92 cm. On the other, European muskets were about 120-150 cm.429
The first tufang samples of the Islamic world date back to Ottoman Empire. The first tufang called metris tüfeği, were used at bastions. Because of their long barrel and heavy structure, they were fired by taking support from a place. They were muzzle-loaded and threw stone balls. They were fired from a certain distance with the help of a match.430 Over time, it was developed and flint and capsule mechanism was used and were carried by more than one person.431 Handguns designated as karabina were smaller than Metris
425 Chase highlights that there is a slight difference between terms harquebus and musket. Harquebus were used in the late 15th century, muskets in the early 16th century. Besides, muskets were heavier and more powerful. Chase, ibid, p. 24.
426 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 36-5-36.
427 Gabor Agoston, “Tüfek” [Rifle], DİA, Vol. 41, Istanbul 2012, p. 460.
428 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 40.
429 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 42.
430 Tez, ibid, p. 181.
431 Çötelioğlu, ibid, p. 14.
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Tüfeği and bigger than a pistol. Like a funnel, their barrel widens through the muzzle, where they were loaded. Their mechanism also consisted of flintlock and capsule.432
Figure – 3.13: Flintlock Trench Rifle (Metris Tüfeği).
432 Tez, ibid, p. 181; Çötelioğlu, ibid, p. 14.
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Ejderhan was another type of handgun that its muzzle of which resembles a dragon head. It was generally used in 16th and 17th centuries with matchlock and flintlock fire systems. The tufang carried by foot soldiers was designated as Piyade Tüfeği. It is generally longer than 100 cm and every kind of firing systems were used.433 Flinta was a musket that the cavalries could carry on their shoulders. These type of handguns were enhanced after the flintlock musket and this is where from its name was derived from.434 Barring these well-known tufangs, there were different varieties of tufangs such as Cezayiri (Algeria), Frengi (Western), Rumi, Istanbuli (Ottoman), Macari, Macari Zemberekli (Hungary), Alaman (German) and Moton.435
It can be said that arquebuses were the first type of handguns, but it had many drawbacks, especially in rainy weathers, overheat and accuracy problem. Besides, they were dangerous for the men who carried them due to explotion. Then, musket evolved from the arquebuses. The first musket firing mechanism was the matchlock, then whellock, and lastly flintlock,436 and it was used in tufangs. It was generally filled from the muzzle and fired by matchlock. For this type of tufang, firstly gunpowder was filled and squeezed with stone or small iron pieces. Then, a burning match is put in an “s” shaped serpentine to ensure hitting the touch-hole. When the trigger is pushed, the burning match comes inside the touch-hole which is full of gunpowder. Thus, gunpowder threw the pieces.437 It was observed that the firing process of a matchlock took much time. Moreover, in the rainy and windy weathers, soldiers were unable to fire these. Thus, continuous investigations brought a new type of firing systems called wheel-lock and flintlock musket at the end of the 16th century.
Another type of firing mechanism was wheel-lock. The primitive wheel-lock mechanism appeared around 1505. Then, it was used in Sytria, in Austria in 1515 and in the Holy Roman Empire in the 1520s. Its working process is described by C. Nolan as:
a small steel wheel was wound and locked in place against a piece of pyrite. Powered by a spring, the release of the trigger spun the wheel to cause friction and raise
433 Çötelioğlu, ibid, p. 14.
434 Tez, ibid, p. 181.
435 Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş, p. 43.
436 Robin Cross, 50 Events You Really Need to Know History of War, London 2012, p. 73.
437 Çötelioğlu, ibid, p. 12.
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sparks from the pyrite that ignited fine powder in the pan, which in turn set off the main charge in the breech that fired the projectile from the gun.438
When the flintlock mechanism appeared the wheel-lock was gradually abandoned. The drawbacks of matchlock and wheel lock mechanisms forced engineers to find a new mechanism for muskets. Thus, they introduced the flintlock mechanism. The early samples of flintlock emerged in Florence and Sweden around 1547 and became popular by the 1660s in Europe.439 In this mechanism, “the flint and steel” approach is used. Basically, if a flint stone was stroke to an iron or steel pieces, the spark is created. For firing a flintlock musket, a flint stone is replaced on the hammer which accelerates it. When the trigger is pulled, the flint stone which is on the hammer strikes the frizzen, which is iron or steel piece, so the spark appears. These sparks drop in the pan containing gunpowder which ignited to help charge of the bullets.440 In all mechanism, the guns were loaded from the muzzle and they had only firing possibility. Then, they had to be cleaned up.
To sum up, early use of firearms contributed to the rise of Ottomans. However, the institutionalisation of the production, transportation of firearms was the another reason why Ottomans became a gunpowder empire.
Diffusion of Firearms Across the Borders by the Ottomans
The Ottomans were part of the diffusion of military technology in early modern times of weapons though European experts and historians claimed that the Ottoman Empire needed and depended on European know-how. Istanbul was the main military technological location where Turkish, Greek, Persian, Armenian, Bosnian, Serbian, Hungarian, Italian, and German artisans, blacksmith, miners and sappers worked together. Due to this the Ottomans became the centre of transmission of gunpowder and firearms technology to the West Asia and South India. The experts of the Ottoman Empire were sent to Turkistan, Crimean Khanates, Sultanate of Ache in Sumatra and Babur’s Mughal India. These experts had a substantial role in the diffusion of firearms technology and the Rumi methods of warfare in Mughal Empire.441
438 Nolan, “Wheel lock”, p. 936.
439 Cathal J. Nolan, ibid, p. 300.
440 Çötelioğlu, ibid, p. 12.
441 Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 194.
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After the Ottomans came to acquire the European military technology, they played a direct role in the diffusion of same in Asia and Africa by sending its navies, commanders and artisans.442 Besides, in an indirect role, some Ottoman citizens such as Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi, were employed by the local rulers to utilise their expertise. These masters and their families continued to serve their kings like the services of Ustad Ali Quli’s sons to Humayun. At the Battle of Kanauj, the command of the guns was given to Muhammad Khan Rumi, to the son of Ustad Ali Quli, to Ustad Ahmad Rumi and Husain Khalifa.443
When Portuguese expanded their rule over Indian Ocean territories, the Muslim rulers of the region were not able to fight them and their superior navy. Mamluks, Sheriff of Mecca, Ethiopian Muslim leader Sultan Ahmet Gran, Sultan of Gujarat, and Sultan of Atche appealed the Ottoman Empire for military aid. First of all, Mamluk Sultan Kansu al Ghawri sought the Ottomans’ military assistance in the beginning of the 16th century. Upon his request, the Ottoman sultan sent his captains Mehmet b. Abdallah and Selman Reis as the captain of the fleet at Suez respectively. While Selman Reis was in the region, Sheriff of Mecca requested him not to leave the region because of Portuguese’ pressure and attacks on Mecca and Medina. He successfully defended the region with the help of fleet equipped with firearms.444 In the following years, Sultan Ahmed Gran, the Muslim ruler of Abyssinia, who obtained 900 musketeers defeated the Christian ruler of Abyssinia supported by 400 armed Portuguese soldiers thanks to Ottomans’ assistance.445 On the other hand, it should be stressed that Ahmed Gran conquered Ethiopia with the help of 200 Turkish harquebusiers.446
The Ottoman Empire took its place in the region since Ottoman sultans considered themselves as the caliph of the Muslim, or protector of Muslims. The governor of Habesh and Jeddah informed the sublime port that if a navy and forts were not supplied in Aden and Suez, the condition of the Ottomans and Muslims could worsen due to
442 Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 111.
443 Tarikh-i-Rashidi, p. 475.
444 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 202-203. John F. Guilmartin Jr., Galleons and Galleys, London 2002, p. 83.
445 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 203-204.
446 Merid W. Aregay, “A Reappraisal of the Impact of Firearms in the History of Warfare in Ethiopia (c. 1500-1800)”, Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 14 (January 1980), p. 103; Ahmet Kavas “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Müslüman Harar Emirliğiyle Münasebetleri ve Hristiyan Habeşistan (Etiyopya) İmparatorluğu ile Yakınlaşmasına Etkisi” [Relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Muslim Harar Emirate and its Impact on the Convergence with the Christian Ethiopian Empire], Pax Ottomana: Studies in Memoriam, Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç, Kemal Çiçek (haz.), Haarlem: Sota; Ankara 2001, pp. 443-465.
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Portuguese incursions.447 The presence of Ottomans in the Indian Ocean concerned Portuguese commander Albuquerque saying that “the Rumes are coming, menaced me at every step” in his letter dated 1 April 1512 to the king of Portugal. In his second letter in 1513 he wrote about the Ottomans’ attacks as:
I hold it to be free from doubt that if fortress be built in Diu and Calicut (as I trust in Our Lord they will be), when once they have been well fortified, if a thousand of the Sultan’s ships were to make their places could be brought again under his dominion.448
The effects of the Ottoman military technology could be found in India during the same time. Many Ottoman soldiers, gunners, gun makers, seamen were in India bearing the name of Rumi or Rumlu.449 The firearm technology of the Ottoman Empire reached the Indian subcontinent through two routes. The first one was from north by land, and second was through sea to Deccan.450 Especially, first Mughal emperor Babur defeated his rivals in India thanks to two Ottoman military specialists, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi. While Ali Quli was successful in casting large cannons, Mustafa Rumi played key role in Babur’s battles with his guns and tufangchis. They applied the famous Ottoman war tactic called Destur-i Rumi at Panipat (1526) and Khanwa (1527).451
Another Ottoman citizen who left a mark in India as well as in Central Asia was Seydi Ali Reis. He overcame difficulties created by local rulers, governors and bandits with his less than 150 tufeng-endaz (riflemen). Thus, he was offered to stay by local rulers.452 Ottomans military technology found a place in the Central Asia as well. When Sidi Ali Reis went to Central Asia, he was requested by the Uzbeks to change their brass muskets with his iron barrel matchlocks.453 Sultan Suleiman sent 300 Janissaries and cannons to Uzbeks. Those soldiers were named Rumi and they did remarkable action in terms of firearm technology and its use.454 The ruler of Bukhara and Samarkand
447 A.{DVNSMHM.d... / 48 – 977.
448 Sir William Wilson Hunter, A History of British India, Vol. 1, Delhi 1972, p. 124, 136.
449 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 204.
450 Balasubramaniam, Marvels of Indian Iron, p. 112.
451 Salih Özbaran, Ottoman Expansion towards the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century, Istanbul 2009, p. 280.
452 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 205; Seydi Ali Reis, ibid, p. 58-59.
453 Seydi Ali Reis, ibid, p. 94.
454 A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi [Today’s Turkili (Turkestan) and Recent History], Vol. 1, İstanbul 1981, p. 134-135.
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Abdulbaki Khan requested some tufang and zarbzan by sending his envoy to the Ottoman Empire. Upon his request the vizier Yemişçi Hasan Paşa offered him to give 20 tufang not any zarbzan.455
If an Ottoman fleet with a sufficient number of arms is sent, I can guarantee to draw these infidels out of the region altogether. It is requested that you send us artillery of the types bacaluska, hawai and şayka to demolish the Portuguese fortresses and allow us to buy horses, copper and all kind of arms in such provinces of yours as Egypt, the Yemen, Jidda and Aden in all seasons (…) the eight artillerymen whom you have sent previously arrived here and are as precious as mountains of jewels to us.456
Upon this letter sent by Atche Sultan to the Ottoman Sultan, Ottoman sultan sent his commander Kurdoglu Hızır with some artillerymen in 1567. Ottoman sultan allowed the Sultan of Atche to hire Ottoman soldiers in Egypt, but due to tough winter condition, only two ships carrying 500 Turkish gun-founders, gunners and engineers along with a number of heavy bronze artillery and other war tools could sail through Atche.457 Those artisans made 200 bronze cannons in Sumatra for the sultan of Atche.458 With the help of the Ottomans, the sultan of Atche become a local sea power and restored the traditional trade route with the Gujarati merchants.459
The quality of Ottoman rifle in east Asia occupied a remarkable place. When Chinese Ming dynasty realised the technological superiority of Japan rifle, they began the research about the handgun technology of Japan, Europe and the Ottomans. Thus in the end of 16th century, they published five volume book called Shen qi pu wherein it was emphasised that the shot of Ottoman rifle is one of the strongest. It was the only rifle that could resist against Japan rifles.460
455 Orhonlu, ibid, p. 79-80
456 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 206. Razaulhak Şah, “Açi Padişahı Sultan Alaeddin’in Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’a Mektubu” [Letter from Sultan Alaeddin, the Sultan of Achi to Suleiman the Magnificent], Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol. 8/9, 1967, p. 386-388.
457 Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1600, vol. 1, Cambridge 1997, p. 329; A.{DVNSMHM.d...7/233; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 7/234; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 7/236; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 7/238.
458 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 206.
459 Guilmartin, Galleons and Galleys, p. 83.
460 Kazuka Sawai, “Japon Teknolojisine Karşı: XVI. Yüzyılda Doğu Asya’da Osmanlı Tüfeğinin Yeri” [Against Japanese Technology: The Place of Ottoman Rifle in East Asia in the 18th Century], Eskiçağ’dan Modern Çağ’a Ordular – Oluşum, Teşkilat ve İşlev [Armies from Ancient to Modern Age - Formation, Organization and Function], Ed. Feridun Emecen, İstanbul 2008, p. 341-354.
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It seems that firearms were developed in Europe and European nations used them to dominate other powers in the world, especially, in Asia and Africa. When these powers met the European firearms, in order to rebut these attacks, they required to obtain either same military technology or through other means. In those conditions the Ottomans became first options for them. The Ottomans not only send military aid but also sent artisans, artillerymen and gunners to teach them firearm technology. It is so obvious that this occurrence gave the Ottomans prestige among Muslim states. Thus, in many different geographies, the Turkish military terms like Rumi, Destur-i Rumi, Rumlu, Top, Araba could be seen. Ottoman citizens Selman Reis, Seydi Ali Reis, Rumi Khan, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi left a mark in those countries.
To sum up, Ottoman and Mughal empires from the very beginning accorded a significant attention to the production of gunpowder firearms and so established a number of karkhanas for the same. The two empires deployed these technologically advanced and wide range of weapons to different branches of their armies and developed tactics and strategies were according to these guns. Though foreign experts played an important role in the production line of these weapons, however, their role should not be exaggerated as Ottoman and Mughal engineers successfully adopted to these new technologies. Important to note here is that these empires used their raw material sources judiciously and not to extend dependence on external sources which could have worked against empire interests in times of conflicts with external actors. While the production of firearm weapons (dealt in Chapter III) and their use at the battlefields (dealt in chapter II) highlighted how and why the two empires established their dominance over their usage, the next chapter will make an attempt to deconstruct how these very weapons contributed in the decline of ottoman and Mughal empires through some important battles.
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CHAPTER 4
ROLE OF FIREARMS IN THE DECLINE OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE
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In explaining the decline of the Mughal Empire, historians have mainly framed in the economic and political features. However, what has been either overlooked or understudied by historians is the role of technology, especially in the military sphere. During the 17th century, Europeans also faced the above mentioned problems,461 but they overcame those by the use of technological advancements. For instance, they were able to build big and durable ships which allowed them to explore new territories and settle their people there. Another major development by Europeans occurred in military technology. Though Ottoman and Mughal empires manufactured all kinds of firearms in their karkhanas and topkhanas in the 16th and 17th centuries, it was not enough to dominate the battlefield in the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast, the technological development in European factories in military aspect gave them advantage over Mughals in the battlefields. This chapter is devoted to the comprehensive analyses of the function of firearms as the key determinant in the progressive decline of the Mughal Empire and corresponding rise of western powers in the Indian subcontinent.
The appearance of different kind of handguns in the Ottoman and Mughal Empires created a paradoxical situation in their history. On the one hand, these empires used the matchlocks and flintlocks as effective weapons to overcome local resistances, accomplish other military operations and help the centralisation of the empire. On the other hand, the dissemination of the handguns among local people gave power both to the nobles and local chiefs in the provinces who hired those people as guards and peasants to resist central army and authority during land revenue collection.
The medieval armies of central Asian steppes were heavily based on cavalry power. In these armies many warlords attended campaigns in support of sultan. The Ottomans in West Asia and North Africa region, Balkans and East Europe, the Mughals in India used this power to capture and dominate their regions. Apart from cavalry, their main military power came from old Turk land revenue system called “iqta”. This was formed in the Ottoman Empire as Timar System; in the Mughal Empire as Mansabdari System which worked towards the centralisation of these two empires. However, towards the
461 In Europe, many men recruited from people who lived in the mountains, the towns and war-zone itself. Those men had the same hard conditions like Ottoman and Mughal populations, who were bankrupted. Parker, Military Revolution, p. 47.
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end of the 16th century, handguns spread among the people who lived in countryside, which contributed to the growth of local resistance against centralisation.
Rebellions of Armed Peasantry and Decentralisation of the Mughal Empire
The victory in the Second Battle of Panipat in 1556 resulted in a new challenge for Akbar. It was hard to take of the control of Central Asia and Oxus River due to strong Safavid Empire and the reestablishment of Uzbek domination in the region. He realised that focusing on northern and other parts of India would be better for him. Therefore, he aimed to integrate the Hindu chiefs, Muslim nobles and Afghans into his rule by launching Mansabdari system. He created a poly-ethnic army unit and brought them under an imperial umbrella. Although some chieftains thought this system as a threat to their independence, Akbar crushed their revolt and improved the central authority in India.462 Centralisation of Mughal Empire necessitated limitation of the power of chieftains. Thus, the Mughal authority offered them mansabs (ranks) and integrated them closely into the central administrative system so that they could manage the society and maintain collection of revenue. Whether civil or military the Mughal servants were enrolled as mansabdars. As the rule, mansabdars had to raise soldiers and brought their contingents to the campaign when required. The number of their soldiers was determined by their mansab (rank). All these mansabdars had foot soldiers called piyada-ha-i dakhli and one fourth of these soldiers were to be musketeers. In this perspective, it can be said that the Mughal Empire depended on the mansabdars’ support.
The iqta was one of the popular land revenue systems in Delhi Sultanate. This system was developed in Mughal era by Akbar known as Jagir System. In this system, the arable and cultivated areas were divided into two as Khalsa and Jagir. The revenues from Khalsa lands belonged to the imperial treasury while Jagir was given to the jagirdars in the lieu of their salary.463 With the Jagirdari System, Akbar reduced the burden of land revenue collection. If a jagirdar collected more revenue from the tract, he had to pay it to the central treasury. A jagir holding mansabdar collected both his salary and the salary of his contingents from the given area. In 1690, there were total 11456 mansabdars in the Mughal Empire and 7999 of them were paid cash. Remained
462 Roy, Military Manpower, p. 55.
463 Sharma, Mughal Government, p. 81.
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3457 mansabdars held jagirs.464 In other words, mansabdars were public servants who were paid a salary as cash or jagir during their services.
Abu’l Fazl was very close to Mughal court and had comprehensive knowledge of military structure. From his works it can be observed that musketeers were part of royal household.465 In other words, they were directly controlled by the emperor himself to avoid any security vulnerability that could arise from giving control of musketeers to either mansabdars or nobles. Apart from this, we also learn from Abu’l Fazl that the salaries of musketeers were paid from the central treasury.466 These attempts were milestones in terms of the centralisation of the Mughal Empire. Thus Mughals prevented any resistance both in centre and in provinces by controlling the soldiers who had firearms thereby establishing stability and unity in most of the Indian subcontinent. People maintained their cultural and economic life without any intervention. Historian Malik contended “… the Mughal state satisfied all the requirements of an integrated and centralised political entity, a sovereign state, during seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.”467
However, the nature of the Mughal Empire began to change with time. There emerged revolts by peasants and nobles against Mughal authority. The reasons of upheavals within the empire during the 17th and 18th centuries are highly debatable and approached by different historians. When the British controlled almost all India, the British historians blamed Aurangzeb’s religious policy for the decline of Mughals. Indian historians Sir Jadunath Sarkar has also ascribed religious persecution of Jats, Sikhs and Rajputs by Aurangzeb as a reason for Mughal decline.468 William Irvine in his book about the history of Mughals in the 18th century Mughals titled Later Mughals has
464 Sharma, Mughal Government, p. 116-117.
465 Ain-i Akbar, vol. 1, p. 109.
466 Ain-i Akbar, vol. 1, p. 116.
467 Z. U. Malik, “The Core and the Periphery: A Contribution to the Debate on the Eighteenth Century”, Social Scientist, Vol. 18, No. 11/12 (Nov. - Dec., 1990), p. 8.
468 Sir Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, Vol. 3, Calcutta 1921, p. 290-311. The theory of the religious policy of Sarkar about Aurangzeb is responded by R. P. Rana that Jats did not belong to any particular religious’ tradition. R. P. Rana, the Rise of Jat Power in Medieval India c. 1665-1735 Rebels to Rulers, Delhi 2006, p. 122. Similarly, Robert C. Hallissey criticises the Sarkar’s idea and did not except the Rajput rebellion a Hindu-Muslim confrontation. Robert C. Hallissey, the Rajput Rebellion against Aurangzeb a Study of the Mughal Empire in Seventeenth-Century India, London 1977, p. 84-89.
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emphasised the weaknesses of the Mughal emperors’ character was reason for the decline of the Mughal Empire.469
In the middle of the 20th century onwards, Indian historians associated with Aligarh Muslim University began to write about decline of the Mughal Empire. Among those historians, Satish Chandra has highlighted that the degeneration and ineffective working of Mughal institutions, especially the functioning the administrative system, resulted in the decline of the Mughal authority. He writes “the existence of the Mughal empire itself depended, in a very large measure, on the proper working of this institution”.470 He explained two aspects of reasons behind the decline. One is the oppression of jagirdars and nobles over the peasants in the 18th century. This situation also provided a breeding ground for the second aspect which is the division of nobles in the Mughal court.471 Unlike previous historians, Chandra showed that this growing factionalism was not because of religion but because of personal relations. M. Athar Ali elaborated the ideas of Satish Chandra by stating that “the scarcity of paibaqi land made the routine working of the jagirdars’ system impossible”. This makes it evident that there more officers to be waiting to be jagirdars thereby increasing factionalism within.472 Athar Ali also underlines what he calls “cultural failure” and contends that the Islamic political formations were inadequate to modernise or revolutionise the armies of the Mughals although they had positive reaction for adopting and inventing new firearm weapon technology.473
Another major thesis was propounded by Irfan Habib in his book “Agrarian Crisis.” The existence of famine and drought due to natural disastrous lowered the land productivity. The gap between the actual production and the revenue demand of jagirdars brought problems for the peasants. The pressure of jagirdars to get more revenue from peasants ruined the agricultural life of the Mughal Empire. Peasants either had to leave the territory or fight against jagirdars. Because of ill-fated officials and natural disasters, people fled their territories which decreased both production as well
469 William Irvine, Later Mughals.
470 Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court 1707 - 1740, New Delhi 1972, p. XV.
471 Chandra, Parties and Politics.
472 M. Athar Ali, the Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, Aligarh 1970, p. 93.
473 M. Athar Ali, “the Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1975), pp. 385-396.
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as revenue. The resources for the contingents fell and Mughal military structure and army began to lose its power to control the Indian subcontinent.474
It may be thus argued that except religious and racial reasons, the main basis for the rebellions against Mughal authority were administrative inefficacy and agrarian problems. The ineffectiveness of the local governors in the protection of peasants and society from the excessive revenue demand and collection paralyzed the Mughal authority over the Indian society. Those who did leave their territory chose armed resistance against the authority. The growing number of homeless and starving peasants made up of the armed group roaming the peripheries of empire. These groups were organised by zamindars and became large bands even armies. Thus, zamindars resisted against Mughal authority and got the chance to extend their territories.475 During this period a new term “zamindarisation” emerged.476
Conversely, when the tax collectors of the Mughal Empire could not get expected revenue from the peasants, they oppressed and enslaved them to be sold to generate and meet revenue requirements.477 According to R. P. Rana, because of this issues, Jat peasants began to support their ambitious zamindars to get rid of this pressure.478 The deterioration of the Jagir system was among the reason why Jats rebelled against Mughals. When jagirdars held their jagirs, they aimed to take all money from the peasants in a year as there was no possibility for them to get the same jagir next year. On the other hand, if the peasants could not pay their taxes, they were severely punished. Although the Mughals tried to take some precautions, it was not enough to protect the peasants. Thus, peasants were left two options with either they sold their woman, children and cattle, or they run away from their home.479 The lack of productivity made peasants dependent on moneylenders. Yet, moneylenders were unwilling to give loans to peasants without a guarantor due to uncertainties. They preferred to give loans to Amber chiefs to protect them from plundering rides of zamindars.480
474 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 364-378.
475 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 389.
476 Gommans, Mughal Warfare, p. 20.
477 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 370.
478 Rana, ibid, p. 143.
479 Girish Chandra Dwivedi, the Jats their role in the Mughal Empire, New Delhi 2003, p. 18-19.
480 Rana, ibid, p. 100.
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The new nobles demanded mansab from the Mughal court, but it was hard to allow them new mansabs. The expenditure of campaigns especially in Deccan affected Mughals and mansabdars economically. The lavish campaigns of Aurangzeb through Deccani warlords not only pressured empire treasury but also destroyed the loyalty of the mansabdars to the central authority with their declining salaries.481 At that stage, the increasing zamindari share and the growing economic problems made zamindari revolts inevitable at the end of the 17th century and Mughal authority was shaken in Deccan as well as in other places. The reduction of the share of the nobles coming from the agricultural production triggered a social and economic crisis.
Moreover, the Mughal peasantry struggled through many famines and droughts starting from Akbar’s reign. The worst famine in the Mughal history occurred between 1630 and 1632, which left approximately 3 million people dead. Therefore, peasants were brought from other areas to settle them in vacant lands. These calamities appeared in the following years and made deep pains in the memories of local people.482 Between 1686 and 1690 the Indian subcontinent went through severe drought and famine which changed the basic structure of society from 1690-1700.483 The society especially peasants and artisans had to leave their houses.484 Unfortunately, the biggest impact came from the imperial officers who illegally collected money from the peasants by means of their personal forces.485
It is obvious that the Mughal authority in India relied on the effective use of gunpowder and firearms until the first half of the 18th century. This brought unity and centralisation to the empire with its diverse population. The increasing diffusion and use of the handguns and skills relating to its production among common people gave rise to the rebellion of local chiefs and peasants against Mughal troops, especially due to collecting land revenue. The pressure of official tax collectors on peasants forced them to refuse to pay land revenue and rebelled against the central authority. Those of villages and areas were called as mawas and zor-talab by the Mughals.486
481 Gommans, Mughal Warfare, p. 77.
482 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 112-122.
483 J. F. Richards and V. N. Rao, “Banditry in Mughal India: Historical and Folk Perceptions”, the Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. XVII (1), 1980, p. 97.
484 Rana, ibid, p. 96.
485 Richards and Rao, “Banditry”, p. 97; Rana, ibid, p. 98-99. The Subedar of Ajmer, Nuriddin Ali Khan harassed the peasants and took money from them illegally.
486 Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 379.
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In his remarkable book Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, Dirk Kolff states that before the British colonial rule, the Indian subcontinent had a big potential for the military labour market. Most of the peasants were also able to use firearm weapons. Since majority did not have horses, they were recruited as infantry and musketeers by various chiefs, rajas, bandit chiefs, and local rulers, which created conditions conducive to rebellion and resistance.
The examination of these incidents raises the question of how these peasants had access to muskets. The early forms of handguns were very simple that any blacksmith could produce with his primitive tools. Therefore, people could obtain these weapons easily even though the local military commanders (faujdars) tried to stop blacksmiths from manufacturing muskets.487 The easy access to muskets by Indian peasants and zamindars created a security problem in the provinces. In the Mughal Empire, the production of a musket was very cheap as Abu’l Fazl recorded it was only half a rupee per piece.488 According to Iqtidar Alam Khan, the weapons could be a primitive form of muskets without any “lock” mechanism dropped to priming-pan to create fire by pushing a trigger. He also estimates that these weapons could be wrought-iron barrels forged by a simple and less costly method.489 However, contemporary Italian traveller Manucci described a peasant from Agra using matchlock behind slight walls surrounding their villages.490 It should be kept in mind that even these primitive forms of the guns in the possession of rebel groups were lethal than swords, bow and arrows and therefore a deterrent factor for the Mughal soldiers. Besides, as Manucci has argued when those people defended themselves from “slight walls”, it increased the effectiveness of firearms against Mughal forces.
The dissemination and large scale use of musket required Mughals to take some measures to contain the problems. First, they did not produce muskets for the market, and secondly, they tried to prevent the musket skilled people to go under the command of rebellious chiefs. One of the steps taken by Mughals to suppress the rebellions during the 17th century was the creation of corps of mounted-musketeers which however proved unsuccessful majorly to contain the situation. In the long term, this disturbance
487 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 7, 180.
488 Ain-i Akbar, Vol. 1, p. 112.
489 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 164.
490 Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India 1653-1708, Vol. 1, Translated by William Irvine, London 1907, p. 134.
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combined with the rise of Marathas, the problems with Jagirdari System, the lack of qualified production and foreign incursions contributed to the steady decline and rapid disintegration of the Mughal Empire.491
The Mughal court increasingly became concerned with the acquiring of skills and growing fighting capacity of these opponents and rebels. In order to enhance striking power of musketeers, and suppress and take control over armed groups in the provinces, the barqandaz, a corps of mounted musketeers, was established and the branch was used effectively against the rebels during the reign of Shah Jahan.492 Those soldiers were mainly recruited from the Ottomans and most probably they brought the flintlock musket to the Mughals, which were suitable to fire on horseback.493 According to Manucci, Mughal foot soldiers and the horse squadrons were separated in the army. The mounted soldiers had carbines, pistols, and swords.494 Their ability of shooting from horseback was considered as true “mirza”.495 However, the adoption of flintlock and use of it from the horseback did not find widespread acceptance since its production was not organised by the Mughal court. The reason was that mansabdari system did not give opportunity such a centralised organisation in the periphery.496
The light cannons mounted on carriages and matchlocks contributed to the expansion and centralisation of the Mughal Empire. However, Mughal started to equip themselves with musket and many groups who specialised in musketry opposed all part of the sub-continent from the beginning of the 17th century. The main reason for this was the increasing market for the service of musketry to the Mughal army, local chiefs and private person. They took musketry as a profession and thus, the use of muskets began spreading. The rapid diffusion of muskets inside the Mughal territories during the first half of the 17th century created two major problems including making local control and the collection of land revenue difficult.497 In this connection, Iqtidar Alam Khan discusses the diffusion of musket among ordinary villagers during the first half of 17th
491 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 181-182.
492 Abdul Hamid Lahori, Padshahnama (1592-1638), Vol. 1, Translated by Hamid Afaq Siddiqi, Delhi 2010, p. 86.
493 Iqtidar Alam Khan, “the Indian Response to Firearms, 1300-1750”, Gunpowder, Explosives and the State: A Technological History, Ed. Brenda J. Buchanan, Cornwall 2006, p. 62.
494 Manucci, ibid, Vol. 2, p. 115.
495 Roy, Military Manpower, p. 67.
496 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 155.
497 Khan, “Indian Case”, p. 60.
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century creating problems for the centralisation of the Mughal Empire. People with muskets on a mass scale used their weapons to resist the Mughal authority in many parts of Mughal tracts. People did not yield easily to pay their taxes without at least one fight.498 During these fights, the handguns and firearms came into prominence and helping more acts of rebellions and fights.
There were many groups and communities in Indian subcontinent that specialised in musketry. They were employed by local chiefs and rebel groups. Its increasing demand created a job opportunity for a section of population for military service as profession. The Mughals did not try the monopolisation of weapon production and ownership. Instead, they encouraged the firearms production and merchandised the military personal since the Mughal government guaranteed the security in all manners. However, it became hard to protect local peasants when the transformation took place from the second half of the 17th century.499 When Aurangzeb realised the drawbacks of the diffusion of handguns among peasants, he and his successors launched orders to prevent local blacksmiths to produce handguns in their workshops.500
Rebellions of Different Groups
In Indian subcontinent, there were many communities specialised in the use of musket and firearms. Those groups were recruited by the Mughals or other Indian rulers during wars. It could be seen that these groups fought for the Mughals or against the Mughals. One of these was Baksariyas.501 Jats were a warrior race that they were easily accustomed to manufacture weapons and to train militarily.502 Another group Ghurcharh or Ghurcharhkhas was cavalry clad in armour and carrying muskets. The entire equipment was their personal property.503 Apart from these two groups, in the 17th century, other clans specialising in musket usage began to appear such Bahelias, Bhadurias, Narnaulis504 and Banua a class of Paiks of Orissa. The Paiks were also another group that pursued bloody battles against the Mughals. They are divided into 3
498 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p.165-180.
499 Andrea Hintze, the Mughal Empire and Its Decline, Suffolk 1997, p. 269.
500 Khan, “the Indian Response to Firearms”, p. 62.
501 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 166.
502 Dwivedi, ibid, p. 20.
503 Hon. W. Egerton, an Illustrated Handbook of Indian Arms, London 1880, p. 128.
504 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 167.
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classes: Pahris, Banua and Dhenkeyas. Among these Banuas were armed with matchlock.505
Figure – 4.1: A Bairagi (left) a Mewati (right) carrying musket.
Source: Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 171-172.
The communities that revolted against Mughals were Bhattis, Bairagis, Baluchis and the Sikhs. Among these groups, Bairaqis were armed Hindu devotees of God Vishnu and led by Mahants. They were faithful disciples called chelas. Most of those chelas were slave boys whose poor families sold them to the yogis in the ashrams.506 According to Pattinger’s observation, Beluchis were soldiers carry a matchlock along with other war tools. They could hit a small bird from 60 yards while riding a full gallop. They were very good in the use of matchlock.507 Purbias were another group that served in the Gujarat army around 1535. They settled in Gujarat and Malwa and specialised in firearms. They offered their service to the highest bidders. When Akbar sieged the fort
505 Egerton, ibid, p. 107.
506 Roy, Military Manpower, p. 67.
507 Egerton, ibid, p. 129. “the Beloochee soldier carries a matchlock, sword, spear, dagger, and shield, besides a number of powder flasks, priming horns and pouches. They are all capital marksmen. They get their arms from Persia, Khorassan, and Hindostan, their spears from Sinde. At Khelat there is an armoury belonging to the Khan, but the workmanship in clumsy. In firing at a mark I am assured they can hit a mark six inches square when riding at full galop, and they kill small birds with a single ball at 60 yards. They are equally good shots with a Snider carbine.”
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of Chittor, it is highly possible that a group of men who used firearms were Purbias.508 Bundelas who were Rajputs specialised in the use of firearms.509 In the rebellion of Khan-i Jahan, for instance, they played a crucial role against the Mughal army.510 It should be stressed that though guns and cannons were mostly manufactured at Agra and Delhi, the Rajputs had learnt the technique of firearms production with the help of Mughal experts. In short, the use of ordnance and handguns became common among Rajputs.511
Almost all matchlockmen in Mughal army serving in the Deccan were Rajputs from Baksar. They were in an important place during the campaigns of Aurangzeb in Deccan. Moreover, Baksariyas and Bundhelas were regular matchlockmen in the Mughal army. Apart from that, 4,000 musketeers of the troops of the subahdar of Gujarat in 1730-31 were from Buksar and Arabia.512 It draws the attention of F. Richards that the full time troops of zamindars were more skilled in terms of firearms and tactics than armed peasantry, the village warriors. This was a step towards a military professionalism.513
Bairagis were a sect called Satnamis. They were not subdued easily, as Khafi Khan contends, they possessed arms and weapons. Khafi Khan describes satnamis with following words:
“there is a group of Hindu mendicants, known as Satnamis, who are also called Mundiyas. They consist of some four or five thousand householders in the pargana of Narnaul and Mewat. (…) if anyone should want to impose tyranny and oppression upon them, in a display of courage or authority, they will not tolerate it; and most of them bear arms and weapons.”514
The revolt of Satnamis was brought to an end by a large Mughal army, even they fought bravely as if they acted in the great war of Mahabharata.515 Jats were another group
508 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 167.
509 Eagerton, ibid, p. 107.
510 Padshahnama, Vol. 1, p. 94-95.
511 R. K. Saxena, the Army of the Rajputs (a Study of 18th century Rajputana), Udaipur 1989, p. 198.
512 Dirk H. A. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy the Ethno History of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850, Cambridge 1990, p. 171.
513 J. F. Richards, “Warriors and the State in Early Modern India”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2004, p. 395.
514 Quoted from Habib, the Agrarian System, p. 395.
515 Maasir-i-‘Alamgiri, p. 72.
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rebelled against the Mughals, particularly in North India plains where many skirmishes, military confrontations took place between them.
These rebelled groups sometimes were hired by merchants to escort them during their journeys. They were, however, insufficient to protect their caravans. Between Faridabad and Hodal road, a caravan of merchants having 1300 carts was escorted by 1000 matchlockmen. When they arrived about 2 kurohs to Hodal, the caravan was attacked by a band of robbers, bandits, and the 1000 matchlockmen chose to run away instead of fighting.516
Rebellions in North India
In the Mughal Empire, some territories were described as “mawas” or rebellious territory. The peasant in these regions refused to pay taxes without a fight when Mughals demanded it. The struggle with the Mughal authority increased the demand for musket by the peasants, so they began to obtain muskets or any handguns. Even though there were no defiant hereditary chiefs in those mawas, the peasants from particular castes or tribes would hardly pay land revenues without a fight. Over time, under pressure from the Mughal authorities, the peasants relented or in other circumstances the leaders of very rebel group would be appointed as zamindars.517
In his study, Muzaffar Alam has contended that not all groups in North India rose against Mughals, but their armed resistance emerged as a serious threat to the Mughal authority. The Mughals sent faujdars of the sarkars with heavy artillery to break their fortresses.518 During Jat rebellion Mughal commanders struggled to break the strengthened forts of Jat commanders especially Churaman. Raja Jai Sing Sawai was unable to take the fort of Thun during 20 months since its four sides were sky-high ramparts encircled with a ditch. It was so strong that even cannon shots could not penetrate its walls easily.519 At that stage, the Mughal court tried its best and one big
516 Shiv Das Lakhnawi, Shahnama Munawwar Kalam, Translated by Syed Hasan Askari, Patna 1980, p. 21.
517 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 165.
518 Muzaffar Alam, “Aspects of Agrarian Uprising in North India in the Early Eighteen Century”, 18th Century India, Edited by Seema Alavi, New Delhi 2002, p. 86.
519 Shahnama Munawar Kalam, p. 19-23.
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cannon were allotted520 along with three maunds of gunpowder, 150 maunds of lead and 500 arrows.521 Despite this Raja Jai Sing was unable to capture the fort and in consequence, Charuman was allotted a higher rank. The second expedition to Thun was done under the command of Raja Jai Sing again. He was given one big cannon, 100 big dhagla(?), 500 lead and gunpowder from the imperial topkhana.522
During the rebellion of Gopal Singh in the vicinity of Gwalior in the fort of Andhrakh, the imperial Mughal army used mining of the ground apart from heavy artillery situated around the fort. While Jats prevented the first attempt, another tunnel to the foot of the fortress was dug up and blown with gunpowder. In this way, the Mughals took over the fort and finished the rebellion.523
When Rana Raj Sing fortified the Chittor Fort thereby violating imperial orders, Aurangzeb sent his commander Ali Khan Bahadur with 7,000 horsemen along with artilleries and matchlockmen. The advance of the Mughal army made Rana Raj Singh leave the fort of Chittor.524 The numerical strength and presence of firearms in the Mughal army dissuaded the rebelled forces. The making of wrought-iron cannon and handguns through a cheap way increased the military strength. This also helped them to defence their forts located in the hilly terrains.525 The rebel Rajput army not only lost the battle against Mughals at Nadal, but Rana Raj Singh also lost his life. Upon these circumstances, Durga Das and his companions followed guerrilla warfare against Mughals since they realised the superiority of Mughal army in an open battle.526 The Mughal army suppressed the revolt of Rana Raj Sing strongly.
The use of firearms by rebel commanders like Jagat Singh forced the Mughal army to take the control of their forts. When Said Khan was dispatched by Murad Bakhsh to conquer the fort of Mau, Jagat Singh took defence by strengthening it with cannons and 2000 musketeers.527 Besides they also built strong walls with a hole for firing their
520 Muhammad Hadi Kamwar Khan, Tazkirat us-Salatin Chaghta: A Mughal Chronicle of Post-Aurangzeb Period 1707-1724, Translated by Muzaffar Alam, Aligarh 1980, p. 225. (hereafter Tazkirat us-Salatin Chaghta)
521 Tazkirat us-Salatin Chaghta, p. 227.
522 Tazkirat us-Salatin Chaghta, p. 344.
523 Futuhat -i- Alamgiri, p. 228-229.
524 Futuhat -i- Alamgiri, p. 129.
525 Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 103.
526 V. Sarup Bhargava, Marwar and the Mughal Emperors (A. D. 1526-1748), Delhi 1966, p. 131.
527 Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan, p. 282.
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muskets.528 When Mughal army failed to prevail, a deal was cut to restore the mansab of Jagat Singh.529
Another revolt in the Mughal Empire took place in the villages of Rewara, Chandrakha and Sarkhud in 1669. As chronicler Must’ad Khan stated the rebels fought bravely with their bows and muskets up to noon, but they were unable to resist beyond that. Two weeks later, the rebel leader Tilpat Gokla Jat killed Abdunnabi Khan and plundered pargana of Sadabad. Hasan Ali Khan had a crucial role in the suppress of this revolt. He was given 2000 barqandaz troops, 1000 archers, 1000 musketeers, 1000 rocketmen, 25 pieces of cannon, 1000 belder and 1000 taberdar.530 In the Banaras region, the revolt of Mahabat Khan and other zamindars of Azamgarh was suppressed by Saadat Khan, Burhan’ul-Mulk who used artillery against them.531
Rebellions in South India
In southern India, with the conquest of Golkonda by Aurangzeb in 1686-1687, the regional dynamics changed. When Aurangzeb completed the conquest of the south India, Deccan, he allotted the chiefs, elites and nobles of the region mansabs to assimilate them. However, the increasing number of elites resulted in the shortage of jagir. The king of Golkonda was replaced as a Mughal governor, the Telugu warriors returned to their local territory since they were not employed as military commanders or soldiers. Apart from this, famine, drought, long-lasting wars and sieges were among the reasons of upheavals in the south India between 1690-1700. In the following years, the Mughal presence in the Deccan was undermined by political disorder. The local aristocracy and Mughal officers were faced with an unpredictable future. As a result, the strong Mughal image suffered and Mughal governors in the region demoralised. Just like other parts of India, Mughal governors, commanders, disobeyed the orders, illegally collected money from the peasants and established their forces. The weak control mechanism or the decentralisation of the Mughal rule in the southern India gave rise to people who were either officials of Mughals or hereditary dominance in Telugu society.532
528 Padshahnama, vol. 2, p. 264.
529 Banarsi Prasad Saxena, History of Shahjahan of Dihli, Allahabad 1932, p. 101-102.
530 Maasir-i-‘Alamgiri, p. 58.
531 Alam, “Aspect of Agrarian Uprisings”, p. 96.
532 Richards and Rao, “Banditry”, p. 96-98.
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Besides these groups, the rebelled chiefs also recognised the importance of firearms and began acquiring and using against Mughals. The activities of Telugu Chief Papadu in the South India forced the Mughal authorities to take care of him. However, Papadu chose resistance and began to fortify a fort at Shahpur with stone and mortars. Moreover, he and his companies acquired a stock of artillery. In time, he extended his territorial area and importantly he employed 700 horsemen who all had double chambered muskets which could fire twice without reloading. This technological superiority troubled Mughal soldiers in the region. After a long fight with Mughal army, his followers deserted him and also his gunpowder stock exhausted. He tried his chance by escaping, but was captured and executed.533
Afghan and Portuguese Rebellions
Some rebellions in the Mughal Empire were instigated by the governors. During the reign of Shah Jahan there were four major rebellions led by people associated with Jahangir. One of these rebellions was led by Kamal-ud-din b. Shaikh Rukn-ud-din Ruhelah. He was mansab holder with the title of Sher Khani during the reign of Jahangir. He started his rebellion by convincing Afghan tribes from the bank of river Attock till the environs of Kabul and initiated the rebellion from Peshawar. When Sa’eed Khan was informed about the rebellion, he marched to Peshwar. Although Khan wanted to attack rebel groups, he was advised to wait and establish local alliances. He first decided to go out and fight rebels from one direction, but soon realised his army was not strong enough to protect the fort from all sides, where rebels were stationed. Therefore, he decided to stay put within the fort and “whatever places the opponents became overcrowded, the battlement of that side was strengthened with the Tifangchiyan (Musketeers).” With this tactic, Khan was able to put the rebellion to rest.534
After rainy season was over, the Mughal forces began their march on Bai Nizamiyahs, the Afghans Muqarrab Khan and Bahlol, apart from other vexed people. The Mughal army, under the control of Azam Khan, pursued the rebels and achieved victory in many battles by means of firearms. During his campaign, many of rebel forces changed sides again realising the strength and effective tactics of Mughal army led by Azam khan
533 Richards and Rao, “Banditry”, p. 102-108.
534 Padshahnama, vol. 1, p. 81-82.
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were no match. In the following days, the Mughal army reached at Mauza Tilangi, where its ramparts were strengthened with bans (rocket) and muskets. However, Azam Khan captured it in one Pahar (3 hours) with his royal artillery and matchlockmen.535 During this rebellion, the Mughal army encountered some forts that were strengthened with muskets, cannons and rockets especially at the siege of the forts of Mansurgarh536 and Dharur.537 The long fight exhausted rebel Khan Jahan Lodi as he lost his sons, relatives and companions and expressed his feelings to the followers in the following words:
I have become weary of this perishable life, from the weightiness of all of which there is no other distress and bashfulness. Till the way and door of escape is open, everyone who desires to go, he should depart in whatever direction he can.538
Upon listening to his words some people continued to stay with him and fought last battle against Mughal army. He, along with his sons Aziz, Aaimal and the Afghan followers, lost the battle and were killed by Madho Singh.539 The effective use of the firearms by the Mughal imperial army during this war with Khan-i Jahan and his followers decided the fate of the war.
Another problem that Mughals had to struggle with was Hugli. For the purpose of trade, some Portuguese merchants requested a territory for their commercial activities in Bengal. In time, they began to build strong houses which were fortified with cannons and matchlockmen and the number of European increased rapidly in a short span of time.540 They took the control of trade as well as local people. Not only did they convert locals to Christianity but also enslaved them. This situation disturbed the Mughal court and Qasim Khan was appointed as subedar of the region. When Qasim Khan arrived at the Portuguese colony, his advance was resisted by Portuguese with their 6000-7000 matchlockmen from the fort. However, the sheer strength of the Mughal army proved
535 Padshahnama, vol. 1, p. 86-96.
536 (…) strengthened the fort with cannons and muskets and other offensive equipment for waging battle and defending the fort. Padshahnama, vol. 1, p. 92.
537 (…) Sidi Salam Abyssinian and his father and reliable brothers, who guarded the fort, fired the rockets, cannons and muskets. Padshahnama, vol. 1, p. 96.
538 Padshahnama, vol. 1, p.
539 Padshahnama, vol. 1, p. 100.
540 Aniruddha Ray, Adventurers, Landowners and Rebels Bengal c. 1575 – c. 1715, New Delhi 1998, p. 105.
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too much for the Portuguese resistance and the territory was taken back in three and half months.541
Even though the rebellion of Jats, Sikhs and Rathors were suppressed by Mughals, these events damaged the imperial prestige of the Mughals and encouraged the opposition.542 Starting from the second half of the 17th century, Mughals were unable to maintain the social balance and justice among its people which encouraged many rebellions from different groups. Towards the end of the 18th century, the situation still continued with small towns being fortified with mud walls and defended by peasants armed with worn-out matchlocks. Those people were successful to hold the towns for months.543 According to Indian historian Roy, since there are “no rivers flowing in a north-south direction” and “most flowing east-west”, the river transportation of military personal and weaponry from the centre to the periphery was tedious. This delayed march of empire forces from Delhi provided the local rebel leaders enough time to mobilise resources and establish allies against the Mughals.544
During the 18th century, the primary disadvantage for the Mughal army was that of raising of soldiers by jagirdars, which caused loyalty problem. Mughals recognised the detrimental sides of peasants equipped with handguns since they were hired by local rulers and zamindars who rebelled against the Mughal authority. Although Mughals pressurised peasants not to work for local rulers and zamindars, they failed to restrict the dissemination of handguns not only in peripheries like Orissa and Deccan, but also in the centre like Delhi and Agra. However, the Mughal nobles were keen to employ musketeers and artillery person and tried their best to achieve their aims through two ways. On one hand, they started obtaining firearms themselves, on the other, they pressurised the centre to attach musketeers in their armies.545 Many regional centres in Mughal Empire produced and developed the war materials. All large villages in Awadh manufactured their own saltpetre and matchlock as late as 1830.546 Interestingly, the Rajas and zamindars who could afford to buy firearm weapons fought off the tax
541 Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan, p. 87; Padshahnama, vol 1, 438.
542 Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 27.
543 Kolff, ibid, p. 7.
544 Kaushik Roy, Military Transition in Early Modern Asia, 1400-1750: Cavalry, Guns, Government and Ships, London 2014, p. 189.
545 Khan, “the Indian Response to Firearms”, p. 62.
546 C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars, North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770-1870, New Delhi 2012, p. 63.
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demands of the Mughals. They also diverted revenues away from the central treasury and invested in their armies by purchasing European weapons and employing European military/firearm experts. It should not be forgotten that the easy access to the new weapons and employing foreign experts for training of their forces enabled the local governors to resist the centre Mughal government.547
The agrarian uprisings in different regions deepened the crisis and opened a path to the decline of the Mughal Empire. In the beginning, the diffusion of firearms helped the centralisation of the Mughal empire, but then these also brought the collapse of the Mughal central authority thereby helping British expand their rule. A number of studies pertaining to these uprisings reveal that resistance of armed peasants cannot be taken as a small protest. For them, it was the matter of existence and so fought hard.
Due to highly militarised groups in the boundaries of the Mughal Empire, it caused a sharp-edged rural resistance. Since those of groups were expert firearms users, it became difficult for Mughal army to suppress them. In this kind of structure, the Mughals even in their strongest era could not have monopolised the use of firearms by peasants. In comparsion, the British colonial regime was different as they succeeded in disarming rebel peasants and restricted access to firearms to zamindars and peasants.548
The strong authority of the Mughal Empire did not allow any rebellious governors to form their dynastical rules. With the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, many different power centres emerged in the Indian subcontinent like nawabs of Oudh, Rajputs, Sikhs, Rohillas, Jats, Marathas, Afghans, British etc.549 The Mughal authority began to lose its control over the periphery at the beginning of the 18th century with the formation of independent states in Hyderabad in 1725 and Bengal in 1740. Their independent status grew due to the intervention of European powers. Although Mughals controlled periphery in the 17th century with force, in the 18th century it was not possible to integrate periphery with the core. The British colonial power took the advantage of the absence of a strong centralised authority. However, had Mughals retained centralised strength it would have been difficult for the British to make inroads into its territories. Before examining the battles of the Mughals in terms of firearm technology
547 Hintze, ibid, p. 270.
548 J. F. Richards, “Warriors and the State”, p. 397-398.
549 Rattan Amol Singh Sidhu, the European Military Adventurers in India with Special Reference to col. James Skiner, CB, 2002, p. 13-14.
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and its effect in the battles against British, French and Persian, it is important to highlight the weaknesses of the Mughal army and what British did to control India.
Weakness of the Mughal Army
The Mughals were a dominant power till the end of Aurangzeb era. Afterwards, the start of their gradual loss of power, there was no single power in the Indian subcontinent. There were many regional and Europeans powers. Among these, the British were able to establish their domination over others because of its military superiority. The era of Aurangzeb is believed to be the peak of the Mughal Empire, but it was also the beginning of the decline of the empire. Since he was a strong ruler, he was able to suppress any attack of his rivals for any upheaval of nobles. With the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire lost central authority and factionalisms grew within the royal court. While Aurangzeb’s expensive Deccan campaigns weakened the imperial treasure contributing to the Mughal inability to improve their firearms, spectacular development of firearms in Europe proved to be effective in determining the military outcome. firearms in Europe was not very effective, but the development process of them was spectacular. In about 150 years, they developed firearm technology and changed the course of battles by manufacturing huge quantity of artillery and handguns cheaply and quickly. The transition from cavalry to firearms was not rapid in Mughal army. Cavalry remained the strongest part of Mughal army in the battlefields, but the developing and growing effect of the firearm technology showed its difference.
What are the reasons that made Europeans more successful in the military technology than Mughals and other Indian native powers can be explained from the words of Ibn Khaldun’s “geography is destiny.” India, since antiquity, faced many threats from the northern frontiers, where people were nomads and mainly used cavalry power.550 When the gunpowder and firearms began to occupy the battlefields, they did not use and develop firearm technology since the early firearms were not efficient against mounted archers and cavalry power. This is the main reason how Babur became successful in his
550 The argument which was established by British imperialist historians to prove British superiority over other nations was the climate factor. According to this idea (or theory), Indian people lost and were ruled by Turks who came from colder climate of Central Asia, similarly, British also came from a colder climate and there was no any chance to gain a victory for British, so the climate was the destiny of Indian people to be ruled by people coming from colder climates. Satish Chandra, Social Change and Development in Medieval Indian History, New Delhi 2017, p. 23-24.
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wars in India who had come to India with not only cavalry power but also firearms, cannons. Likewise, the European powers arrived at the Indian shores with firearms from the beginning. They placed their firearms in the core of their armies, while Indian armies relied on cavalry along with swords, lances, bows, arrows, and ineffective auxiliary fire.551
Developments from the 16th century in technological and organisational areas in European armies brought them one step forward vis-à-vis Asian armies. Among these developments were organisational including uniformed soldiers, regular payment of troops, and military education and train of soldiers. In firearm technology flintlock muskets became common and infantry was supported by field artillery. In tactical manner, battalions, regiments and brigades improved the capacity of infantry on the battlefield. Thus, the infantry-artillery combination became stronger than cavalry.552 The main military branch in European armies was infantry. When firearms began to diffuse in Europe, they were equipped with firearms and continuously improved. Thus, they became pioneer in the production of firearms.
On the contrary, firearms arrived India around the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century. It seems that the use of firearms spread slowly in India, or the local rulers in Indian subcontinent did not use these since being considered as the “arms for cowards” like Safavids, Mamluks and European Knights. Over time, the local rulers became eager to learn and use firearms in the battlefields. Since foreigners were experts and specialists in the firearm technology, they were mainly recruited by the Indian rulers. At the beginning, Ottoman Turks and then Europeans were employed as gunmen, commanders and manufacturers. The engagement between foreigners and Indians led to the exchange of technology from each other.
The exchange of technology was a slow and steady process. Firstly, it needed to overcome social, political and institutional difficulties and therefore required radical decisions. Besides, there were issues related to aspects like what technical skills were to be exchanged and denied respectively. In the Indian context, British and French would transfer their military practices and weaponry to local rulers to check each other.
551 G. J. Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India”, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), p. 438-439.
552 Kaushik Roy, “Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849”, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), p. 652-653.
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Interestingly, private European arms traders, during this time, also plunged in to transfer “western military technology” to local Indian rulers. Besides, a great number of itinerant European mercenary soldiers in Indian subcontinent taught Indian soldiers how to use those of western weapons effectively.553 As Egerton notes, in many parts of India, the Indian artisans and engineers were successful to imitate the European arms.554 With the French and British establishing their hegemony in southern India, the military influenced native Indian rulers a great deal. The resultant emulation of western military practices by local rulers brought “military revolution” in the Indian sub-continent with the recruitment of European experts in the late of the 18th century. According to Bryant, the Indian rulers, however, failed to use firearms in synchronised way with the infantry whose role was not improved in comparison to artillery.555
Some scholars have contended that the Mughals did not take firearm technology seriously. For instance, C. R. Boxer notes that Indian rulers used artillery for their status more than military purposes.556 Likewise, Keene has observed that the gunners of the Mughal Empire were mainly European, but Aurangzeb replaced them by Muslims.557 This put a stop to the induction of developing European military technology, which eventually led to the decay of the Mughal firearm technology. However, these assertions seem to be misplaced because Aurangzeb only reduced the salary of gun makers while still being ready to utilise the knowledge of European gun makers. Aurangzeb requested Richard Bell, the British traveller, to cast cannons for Mughal army and was eventually offered a post in the military service given his expertise.558 As seen in the previous chapter, Mughals remained open to new ideas, which reflected in their army given how they firstly welcomed Ottoman engineers and soldiers in their ranks and afterwards the Europeans.559
553 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 433.
554 Egerton, ibid, p. 63.
555 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 442.
556 C. R. Boxer, “Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th – 18th Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 38, No. 2 (208) (Dec. 1965), p. 156-172.
557 Henry George Keene, A Sketch of the History of Hindustan: From the First Muslim Conquest to the Fall of the Mughol Empire, London 1885, p. 245.
558 Sir Richard Carnac Temple, “the Travels of Richard Bell (and John Campbell) in the East Indies, Persia, and Palestine 1654-1670”, The Indian Antiquary, Journal of Oriental Research, Edited by Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Vol. XXXV, Bombay 1906, p. 203-210.
559 Qureshi, ibid, p. 254.
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First of all, the Mughals realised the necessity of new technology, so they reassessed their own military warfare and adopted new technical, economic, and material improvements. Eugiana in his comparative study has argued that the North American Indians learnt quickly the usage of firearms from Europeans, but were not successful to learn the manufacturing technology of firearms as their tribal life was not suitable to adopt this new technology. Contrastingly, in the Indian subcontinent, people had a strong background in such kind of developments in the level of economic, technical and social sectors.560 The only disadvantage for Mughal army was that it was powerful in open battles whereas most of local Indian resistance came from forts or through guerrilla warfare.
In any case, the Mughals committed some mistakes. While Babur Shah, the Mughal empire founder, came to Indian subcontinent with strong cavalry power and firearms, his successors were slow to adopt and upgrade the firearm technology into Mughal army as they did not face much resistance from local rulers. Even light cavalry of Mughals was sufficient for Rajputs, Marathas, Afghans etc., however, when British emerged as a military player in the Indian subcontinent after the second half of 18th century, Mughals could not stand to Britishers. As the British became a formidable actor in the Indian subcontinent, it was too late for Mughals to reorganise their army to meet challenges from European military standards.561
It is possible the firearm technology and its manufacturing affected the metal-related industries as well. The metal melting in India was done in inadequate furnaces which varied from place to place. According to the quality of ore deposit and local features, a furnace in Indian subcontinent worked approximately 8-10 months a year, producing 20-30 tonnes of iron. The data shows that for casting heavy cannons in India, a furnace was to work around the year. In contrast, in the late 16th century English blast furnaces were able to produce 200 tonnes of Iron a year.562 The firearm master of Aurangzeb, Richard Bell, provided this information and so built eight moulds and a furnace, which contained 250 tonnes of metal, eight cannons and four mortars.563 It appears that the production of ordnances developed since Babur’s period. When Ustad Ali Quli cast his
560 Eugenia Vanina, Urban Crafts and Craftsmen in Medieval India (Thirteenth-eighteenth centuries), New Delhi 2004, p. 52.
561 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 442.
562 Vanina, ibid, p. 53.
563 Temple, “the Travels of Richard Bell”, p. 203.
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big mortar, he used 8 furnaces to cast one cannon. In Aurangzeb’s period, Bell’s furnace cast 12 pieces of ordnances. This raises questions about the capacity of these furnaces to manufacture necessary war tools for the Mughal army. Though these weapons were used for many years, it was difficult to meet the demands of the growing army. The metal most probably came to Karkhanas from local furnaces as well as different parts of the Indian subcontinent. When the metal was not enough, idols from Hindu temples were used.564
There are two different views that need attention. While describing Mughal matchlockmen, Bernier emphasised that “the Mughal cavalry discharged their arrows with astonishing quickness and a horseman shooting six times before a musketeer can fire twice.”565 It is thus evident that the time for reloading could be longer as Kenneth Chase described in 28 steps.
after firing his musket, a soldier had to (1) hold the gun up with his left hand, (2) remove the match from the lock with his right hand, (3) put the end of the match back in his left hand, (4) blow any sparks out of the priming pan, (5) put priming powder in the pan, (6) shut the pan, (7) shake any powder off the lid of the pan, (8) blow any remaining powder off the lid of the pan, (9) pick up the gun in both hands, (10) transfer the gun to his left side, ( 11 ) open a flask with his right hand, (12) insert the powder and bullet into the muzzle, (13) draw the ramrod out of the stock, (14) adjust his grip on the ramrod, (15) ram home the bullet and powder, (16) pull out the ramrod, (17) adjust his grip on the ramrod, (18) return the ramrod to the stock, (19) hold the gun up with his left hand, (20) grasp the gun with his right hand, (21) transfer the gun to his right side, (22) take one end of the match in his right hand, (23) blow on the match, (24) insert the match in the lock, (25) adjust the match in the lock, (26) blow on the match again, and (27) level the gun, before he could finally (28) pull the trigger again.566
In brief, one of the main drawbacks with a musket was its long firing process. Once a soldier fired his musket, he had to follow 28 steps to refill and fire his musket, a difficult process for a cavalry unit on horseback. The second problem was its accuracy. These two drawbacks caused restriction of cannon and muskets in siege and infantry warfare.
564 Vanina, ibid, p. 53.
565 Bernier, ibid, p. 48.
566 Chase, ibid, p. 25.
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The Indian musket barrel was mainly made with spiral rather than longitudinal welds. These were stronger and less possible to burst and so could take larger gunpowder charge. Besides, these were able to shot twice just like European muskets.567 At time, the matchlock muskets were replaced by the lighter and more rapid firing flintlock muskets. These new weapons were ignited by a spark created through hitting a flint on steel. Besides, the frequency of firing improved with the introduction of the cartridge. It was introduced by Swedes in 1696, and became prevalent in the armies of French, Dutch and British by 1700s.568 However, Egerton emphasised that there was no change in the process of manufacturing matchlock since Akbar’s time.569
Figure – 4.2: British Light six-pounder gun.
Source: http://www.militaryheritage.com/caseshot.htm
The continuous improvement of artillery in Europe made it a decisive factor at the battlefields. The main development was the spread of blast furnace in Western Europe in the 16th century. It became possible to produce cast iron cannons quickly. With the spread of cast-iron cannons, the European powers began to use these instead of heavy
567 Rosen, ibid, p. 15.
568 Roy, “Technology Transfer”, p. 412.
569 Egerton, ibid, p. 63.
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bronze artillery. Also, the cast-iron cannons could be manufactured cheaper than bronze and wrought iron cannons. In India, as discussed in the previous chapter, the lack of ability to produce cast iron resulted in the manufacturing of wrought iron cannons, which were joined by thick bread rings. Thus, the cannons became too heavy to be brought to the battlefields. According to Rosen Indian steel was better than the British one since the ore of Iron was easily available in India, so the steel making techniques improved in India. Moreover, the Indian brass was also better than British brass, which gave an opportunity to manufacture better artillery barrels. However, in terms of bronze quality British bronze was better than Indian bronze.570
Rosen claims that the failure of the Mughals against European cannot be explained by differing levels of iron, steel or weapon technology since Mughals were equal to Europeans.571 It partly could be true, but the heavy Mughal artillery, which was carried by elephants was not effective against mobile swift field cannons of the British. Although the barrel quality of muskets of Mughals could be better, however, these lagged behind British flintlock musket in terms of technology. Mughals were too slow to adopt flintlock musket, which fired quickly, and the use of infantry. Their field artillery and cannons were also poor compared to Europeans. The backwardness in the military technology and methods of warfare resulted into serious defeat against external powers.572 Under these circumstances, Mughals had to invest in new firearm technology and reorganise its entire military structure. From the recruitment of soldiers, their equipment and payment required a good reorganisation. Moreover, with the use of new firearm weapons such as flintlock muskets, it became necessary to train all brigands, contingences in a strict discipline. Since the simultaneous use of cannons and musket -volley fire- created more damage on enemy, it needed effective training.573
Fitzclarence has written about the conditions of Indian armies in the 19th century in a detailed manner. He states that the artillery used by Indians was an iron cylinder. Though the artillerymen were good, they were unaware of the shells despite being used since Akbar’s time. Same was the case with rockets which although in usage from early times were not upgraded in time and were rendered ineffective by the 19th century.
570 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power India and Its Armies, New Delhi, 1996, p. 14.
571 Rosen, ibid, p. 108, 165-166.
572 Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 38.
573 Hintze, ibid, p. 270.
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Moreover, he observed that the matchlocks used by Indian soldiers were of the time of Akbar that were no match to flintlock muskets of Europeans. He emphasised, “no improvement of any kind appears to have taken place in the art of war from the time of Akbar to the middle of the 18th century.”574 It seems that neither Mughals nor other local rulers were successful in integrating the western military technology and art of war with the traditional Indian warfare due to conceptual, institutional, economic and political failures.575
The Indian armies not only lacked major artillery, but the existing artillerymen also lacked the required training. They were few princes who had foundries that could manufacture European quality cannons. Mainly those cannons were too heavy making it difficult to transport those to the battlefield usually through hundreds of elephants and bullocks. It may be noted that those heavy cannons were chained together as part of war strategy since Babur’s victory at Panipat.576
The Mughal and British armies were though numerically advantaged towards Mughals, it was the British who proved strong in the battlefield. The Dutch East India Company representative in Delhi observed, “if this army were trained after the European model, it could conquer the whole world. However, there is no order; each commander does as he pleases.”577 The Mughal army, which had its own structure, could never defeat British in any pitch battle where British advantaged itself and succeeded. Although Mughal army was strengthened and artillery given importance, it remained unwieldy, ineffectively served and poorly integrated with cavalry power.578 In the following years, the Mughal court failed to pay the salaries of the artillerymen for six years579, a possible reason that brought down the morale of the Mughal soldiers.
The question emerges about how and why was the Mughal army ineffective against the British? The first reason was the structure of the Mughal army wherein different branches had different purposes without any coordination. Their artillery was used for
574 George Augustus Frederic Fitzclarence, Journal of a Route across India, through Egypt to England in the latter end of the year 1817, and the beginning of 1818, New Delhi 1999, p. 255-256.
575 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 656.
576 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 458-459.
577 William Dalrymple and Anita Anand, Kohinoor the Story of the World’s Most Infamous Diamond, New Delhi 2016, p. 48.
578 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 436.
579 Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 99.
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sieges, heavy cavalry for the attack, and light cavalry and firepower for skirmishing.580 Since the Mughal army consisted of different contingents from different sources (regional, chiefs, mercenaries, household troops), it was hard to integrate a tactic and strategic variation doctrine. It was also highly difficult to effect reforms in such a diverse army. Contrastly, the British army was characterised in high quality. The uniformity was the main character of the British army, which reached in high standards during the 18th century. The Mughal army was the agglomeration of mercenaries gathered by chiefs and sent to the battlefield. Those people took sides with whoever paid better without any hesitation.
It was obvious that after firearms dominated battlefields, infantry and its training became more important. Empires in Europe began to train their soldiers in strict discipline and continuous training for the effective use of firearms. Thus, armies were able to coordinate against enemy’s attack. However, the Mughals could not change the military structure and loyalty problems of chieftains, warlords and nobles. Moreover, the combining army lacked tactical manoeuvre, no uniformity in dress, hierarchy problems and poor equipment were among this weakness. Thus, they maintained a temporary army-style while the British established permanent Sepoy army. The Mughal army proved its weakness against trained and armed with matchlock armies.581
If we look at Mughals from the perspective of dependency theory, even though the Mughals required technical assistance from the Ottomans and Europeans, they did not take much assistance from Ottomans and Europeans till the 18th century. The main reasons were due to the special interest of Akbar in military technology and abundant raw materials in Indian subcontinent. This shows that Mughals were also self-sufficient in military technology and production due to the availability of raw material in India. The military technology which they had was more than enough to defeat native Indian rulers. Moreover, India had a unique structure for the art of war and weapon diversity. Although Ottoman Turks were mainly hired by the Mughals for the purpose of military, the native Indians were proficient in the art of war and gun making. Following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the empire, however, began to disintegrate, which affected military technology and access to raw materials. The outdated Mughal weapons and
580 Rohan D’souza, “Crisis before the Fall: Some Speculations on the Decline of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals”, Social Scientist, Vol. 30, No. 9/10 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), p. 21.
581 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 657.
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tactics did not work against the invaders especially Nader Shah and British. Even though the Mughal army outnumbered the British, the technological superiority of East Indian Company’s (hereafter EIC) army and its superior firepower gave them edge accounting for the Mughal defeat.
In any case, the question that arises is how much assistance Mughals got from the foreign experts? In the initial years of the Mughal empire, the Ottoman Turks played a key role in the diffusion of firearm technology in the empire. Based on this situation, the Ottomans could be thought as a core power in the mentioned period that transferred its military technology to the semi-periphery (Mughal empire) and periphery. However, the military revolution in Europe brought a stagnation and decline in the Ottoman military technology, which made the Ottomans very slow in enhancing their technology. Hence, Ottoman empire became semi-periphery and periphery respectively. The decline in the Ottoman military technology resulted in the hire of European masters by the Mughals. In the Indian subcontinent, the centre of core power for the Mughals and other native Indian rulers shifted to Europeans especially French and British. However, the dependence on the European military technology brought problems for the Mughals. Due to long distance it was not easy for the Mughals to send their engineers to Europe to learn the European technology first hand. Secondly, the European masters were not willing to apply their technology in the Mughal army.582 Moreover, after the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire underwent an irreversible process of disintegration, which undermined the prospects reforms in military technology. Eventually, a series of decisive defeats (Karnal, St Thome, Plassey and Buxar) rendered the Mughal rulers puppet of EIC without any need for developing their own military technology.
British Military Power in India
Europeans began to settle in India firstly as simple traders, but increased their sphere of influence and expanded their territories throughout the subcontinent. It is a well-
582 “They (Mughals) realised that their “experts” were not giving much away by way of major technological knowledge. In fact, by the close of the 17th century, these experts grew even more reticent about disclosing technological information due to the fear of social ostracization as well as legal action which was becoming increasingly evident in the west. Later this desire to isolate technology from the Indians became a part of the official colonial policy.” Ghani Khan, “Metallurgy in Medieval India”, p. 468.
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known fact that the British achieved military superiority over the Mughals and other Indian rulers in terms of artillery, organised, well-trained infantry with muskets and deployment of firearms. As Kaushik Roy has argued the British colonialism in South Asia was mainly aided by their superior military technology since the British had regularised and systemised their military production by establishing factories, magazines and arsenals.583
From the beginning, the main aim of EIC was to have a permanent trade centre from where they could extend their commercial activities in Indian subcontinent while strengthening their position against rivals. In 1608, William Hawkins reached the Mughal court as being a representative of the EIC. He was warmly welcomed by the court and held an assignment to collect revenue for the state. More importantly, he got permission to open the trade centre at Surat, but the strong Portuguese presence in the Mughal court nullified the gains of British. In order to have trade privileges in India, the British tried to eliminate the Portuguese by the strong performance of Middleton and Best. Their attempts worked and in 1613 the EIC was again permitted to open trade centre at Surat along with Ahmadabad, Cambaya and Goa.584
The EIC was not satisfied with their gains from Mughals. Therefore, King James despatched Sir Thomas Roe as an ambassador to the Mughal court. Roe’s mission was to secure more trade privileges and EIC’s position, get a residence in the capital, and diminish Portuguese influence. In the beginning, Thomas Roe was not welcomed at Surat, but was able to secure EIC interests in following years. Before he left India in 1619, he obtained reasonable privileges from Mughal emperor for the EIC. Those privileges were to trade free, to have houses, to govern themselves and to raise arms when they were out of the city.585 With this work of Thomas Roe, the British influence gained traction in Indian subcontinent. British merchants began to purchase the Indian goods like cotton, silk, indigo, precious stones, spices, iron, copper, tin and saltpetre etc. from the local areas themselves.
In time, Portuguese hegemony in the west of India ended with British Safavid collusion in 1622. British navy defeated Portuguese and Hormuz was taken by Safavids.
583 Kaushik Roy, “Technology Transfer and the Evolution of Ordnance Establishment in British-India: 1639-1856”, Indian Journal of History of Science, 44.3 (2009), p. 412.
584 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, the Rise and Fall of the East India Company, Berlin 1955, p. 113.
585 Mukherjee, ibid, p. 114-115.
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However, with the collapse of Safavids in 1722, Persia’s influence in the region receded and British assumed a prominent role in the waters on the west coast of India as well.586
In the following decade, the British expanded their influence through south India to Masulipatam, Armagaon and Madras where they built fortified factories.587 Then, they began to establish factories in the eastern part of the Indian subcontinent to Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. British arrived in Bengal in 1633 for trade purposes, and with time began to establish trade centres at Hugli, Casimbazar and Patna. Next, the British set on to fortify their settlements and trained, disciplined soldiers for their defence to broke dependency on native official for a profitable trade.588
As the British realised the importance of Indian subcontinent for their trade, their operations were concentrating in India itself. Firstly, they sought permission (by pressuring Bengal viceroy) to fortify Calcutta, where Fort William was situated. In 1687, they regulated administration and were given authority by King James to make peace and war in India. The next step for the British was to defy the Mughal authority in western India. However, in the 17th-century European armies were not effective against Mughal armies, so their expansion was halted by Aurangzeb. He issued orders to expel the British and confiscate their property. Furthermore, as a precaution measure, Aurangzeb sent an army to Madras, which defeated British ambitious.589 After a long struggle and loss of some places, Aurangzeb decided to maintain trade relations with the British that eventually paved the way for the British entry into Bengal. By the beginning of the 18th century, new settlements with walls and bastions took shape in the eastern region.590 Meanwhile the British had taken more precautions by improving their army in India that subsequently brought an end to the Mughal power in the Indian subcontinent.
Although the European way of warfare was not enough to meet the warfare and ecology of India, the EIC was able to dominate the subcontinent by utilizing certain requirements for Indian warfare. The question that emerges is how the British able to
586 Mohse M. Milani, “Iran’s Post-Cold War Policy in the Persian Gulf”, International Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, After the Gulf War (Spring 1994), p. 329.
587 Mukherjee, ibid, p. 116-117.
588 Michael Edwardes, the Battle of Plassey, London 1963, p. 17.
589 Sir Alfred Lyall, the Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India, vol. 1-2, New Delhi 1999, p. 49-50.
590 Edwardes, ibid, p. 18-19.
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accomplish the control of Indian subcontinent although Indian rulers had numerical strength. This can be answered with multiple explanations. Infantry, light cannon, flintlock musket, battler order and control of saltpetre. In the Indian context, though infantry was weak against cavalry power, well-armed and well-organised infantry could defeat the enemy’s cavalry. If infantry units were trained under discipline for some time to act in harmony, they could be effective. This training not only included the use of weapons but also obeying the rule and staying in a discipline in the battlefields. This is evident in the wars between the Mughal and British wars.
The main military power of the British during that time was made up of infantry and firearms. There was no cavalry power of British in their early battles and so more emphasis was on infantry and firearms. In European armies by 1700 flintlock musket had replaced matchlock musket. Thus, the firing capacity and efficiency of the army’s increased. The most significant advantage of flintlock musket was that it could be used even in wet weather. The flintlock musket was used in the latter half of the 17th century whereas the Indian armies continued to use matchlock musket till the 1750s.591
Although Indian armies had good cavalry and enjoyed its superiority over enemies, British flintlock musket became stronger for close combat with the adding of bayonet and trenches. The invention of the cartridge, which is a metallic device that contains gunpowder and bullet, resulted in quick firing technology. The increase of firing frequency of musket gave the British advantage over Indian cavalry and infantry.592 Fitzclarence explains that though Indian soldiers were braver than the British, the introduction of the artificial courage by British took the upper hand. This courage appeared through a disciplined army with the combination of firearm weapons. In fact, the use of quick-firing of flintlock muskets and field pieces provided the British soldiers their striking superiority over Indian armies.593
The infantry was the core of EIC’s army, but in time, the artillery became an important component that played a crucial role in the British expansion in south India.594 On the contrary, the Mughals army maintained cavalry power as its core component. The rise of infantry with firearms beyond trenches and bayonets brought changes in the cavalry
591 Cross, ibid, p. 74.
592 Amar Farooqui, the Establishment of British Rule 1757-1813, New Delhi 2014, p. 19-20.
593 Fitzclarence, ibid, p. 252-253.
594 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 435.
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unit. The cavalry also began to be armed with firearms thereby becoming mobile firepower. In the beginning, cavalry used arquebus then, wheel-lock musket came out and so they started to carry loaded firearms while riding. These changes, doubtless gave an added advantage over enemy.595
The biggest advantage and critical role of British artillery in the battlefield was to provide a cover to its infantry from the numerically strong enemy.596 British used engineers and sappers with heavy ordnances to capture forts of Indian rulers. The fort of Hathras was taken with the help off 44 mortars. In Satara, a fort was taken by big howitzers. Seogarh Fort, which had no road and was located on a hill, was captured with the help of big mortars. The British used their technology to capture forts quickly.597
The success of the British army in India depended on the supply of adequate firearms from the court in Britain. In the letter, the officers in Fort William requested the court “not to fail to comply with our indent of last season for 6000 bayonets and flints of at least 200,000.”598 Subsequently, it was observed that to protect British profits and strengthen its army, the court responded by sending brass pieces of cannon prs 6-20, prs 12-20, prs 18-20, prs 24-10 and vowed that “a well-appointed artillery will conduce to this grand object”.599 Court also sent 20 six-pounders guns and 50 chest of small arms to India,600 which was requested from company officers by letter dated 30 March 1767.601 “In addition to the guns with the park, each battalion of infantry was equipped with two six-pounders or three-pounders, worked by the men of the regiment, assisted by native officers and lascars from the artillery.”602
595 Michael Howard, War in European History, Norwich 1976, p. 34.
596 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 457-458.
597 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 656.
598 Fort William – India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto 1764-1766, Vol. 4, Edited by C. S. Srinivasachari, Delhi 1962, p. 259 (27 September 1764).
599 Fort William – India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto 1767-1769, Vol. 5, Edited by Narendra Krishna Sinha, Delhi 1949, p. 503 (2 February 1769).
600 Sinha, ibid, p. 41-42 (20 November 1767).
601 In addition to our indent for military stores we request you will be pleased to send out six light brass 24 pounder guns of the new construction. Sinha, ibid, p. 312.
602 E. Buckle, Memoir of the Service of the Bengal Artillery, from the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time with Some Account of Its Internal Organization, Edited by J. W. Kaye, London 1852, p. 28.
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Locals in the British Army
The affluent Indian subcontinent attracted attention throughout history. Many adventurers, traders, sailors desired to reach and benefit from its wealth. The East Indian Company (EIC) began trading peacefully at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta since the early 1600s. After the 18th century, they, however, developed ambitious dream in political, military and fiscal arena to dominate the region for securing its interests. In this direction, EIC established small armies at each settlement. Those of armies were trained, disciplined and structured along with European armies. They also aimed to make those armies capable of fighting across the Indian subcontinent in support of its allies.
British came to India as traders and settled in a few places new coastal area. Since they carried products, goods to and from England and the capacity of the ship were limited, they could not both convince the European soldiers to come to or bring them to India. They also lacked resources to raise a large army locally. For establishing its hegemony over the Indian subcontinent, a trained army of European standards was required. To this end, EIC found a way by establishing Sepoy army consisted of Indian mercenaries. EIC found it easy to recruit those Indians who were both militarised and armed in their militias. EIC offered them, especially north-western people, to be part of their militias even though they lacked proper military training.603
After the British established their first factory at Surat, they conducted their business with the help of soldiers, guns, forts and treaties. The political structure of India, the continuous civil wars among local chiefs, regional warlords forced the British to establish an army to protect their trade profit and settlements. In this way, the Sepoy army emerged. In India, the EIC firstly built a small navy to secure its trade centres. They also had big naval forces in the Arabian Sea.604 In time, they had soldiers and weapons in their settlements. For example, in 1628, on the Coromandel Coast, with 12 guns, 28 infantrymen were trained as artillerymen. In Bengal in 17th century, it was increased to 250, besides they had also 21 cannons, 2 gunners. In Bombay, in 1661, 400
603 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 438.
604 Anirudh Deshpande, “Limitations of Military Technology: Naval Warfare on the West Coast, 1650-1800”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 17 (Apr. 25, 1992), p. 901.
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royal troops were sent for protection. In 1668, the first European Regiment of Bombay Fusiliers was formed.605
EIC tried to establish an army that could fight in every condition of Indian geography. They organised a special unit consisting of young Indian men. Those troops were trained in jungle warfare, street fighting and night attacks.606 According to Fitzclarence, the Rajput armies consisted of cavalries became the best infantry of the British army.607 The first regular battalion of Bengal Sepoy was established at Calcutta in 1757. From this date, the Bengal army grew so quickly and successfully that it took the attention of the company directors in London. The autonomous development of the Bengal army on the periphery of the empire could be considered a “military revolution.”608 Robert Clive was to be considered as the real founder of the Indian army of the EIC. He did not have any difficulty to merchandise troops from India since people were looking for job. He took this advantage of Indian human source and appointed European experts and officers to command. He, thus, formed the first Bengal Native Infantry, called “Lal Paltan or Red Regiment.”609
The foundation of a permanent artillery corps by British was in 1716 and it was renamed as Royal Regiment of Artillery in 1727. Over 14 years later in 1741, the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich was established in order to teach gunnery and engineering.610 The company had taken an important step with the appointment of Sir Robert Barker to the rank of Colonel and Major Munro to strengthen the British artillery corps in India.611 British began to have regular troops in the Indian subcontinent. In 1755, Madras had the strongest artillery corps. In 1757, every artillery corps of EIC consisted of six-pounders and two howitzers along with 100 British artillerymen. The strength of EIC increased with the arrival of Royal Artillery and Royal infantry to the Indian
605 Major Madan Paul Singh, Indian Army under the East Indian Company, New Delhi 976, p. 2-3.
606 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 453.
607 Fitzclarence, ibid, p. 251.
608 Kolff, ibid, p. 178; Amiya Barat, the Bengal Native Infantry: Its Organisation and Discipline, 1796-1852, Calcutta 1962, p. 27.
609 Singh, ibid, p. 6.
610 Corelli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970 A Military, Political and Social Survey, London 1970, p. 178.
611 The particular objection against complying with Capt. Jennings’s application for a majority “that we never before had Field Officer in the Corps of Artillery,” being now removed by the appointment of Sir Robert Barker to the rank of Colonel and Major Munro, having also warmly requested his promotion in addition to the former recommendation in his favour, we have thought it unnecessary to wait for your answer to our representation on this subject and have accordingly appointed him a major.” Srinivasachari, ibid, p. 321 (11 March 1765).
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subcontinent.612 In a short time, the Sepoy army grew into many battalions and strengthened with cavalry and artillery. As we learn from Arthur Broome, the ordnance with the Company of artillery appears to have consisted of light six-pounders and two howitzers, forming a battery or field train as it was then termed, at eight light pieces. Besides, mortars and heavy guns were also supplied from magazines established at the headquarters of each brigade.613
By 1783, the EIC had an army more than one hundred thousand troops, of which 90 per cent were Sepoy.614 The mutiny became a possibility for the British administration and British military system in India. Therefore, the territories and army of the East Indian Company were transferred to the Crown under a Viceroy. The number of Sepoys was reduced to 120,000 by 1864. Moreover, the European soldiers in the East Indian Company were inducted into British army.615
The most logical movement of British in India was to pay their Indian soldiers’ salary regularly unlike the French. At the first level, EIC secured its military and political presence, and then it became ambitious to annex more and more territory for profit.616 Rosen says that the recruitment of the Sepoy army began with their separation from society and transformation into professional troops who were loyal to their commanders. As a result, their military skills and performance improved.617 Another important difference between EIC and Mughals was the troops of army. EIC generally recruited people from urban areas for infantry units unlike Indian rulers who had soldiers with peasant background. Hence, when the army was introduced to firearms usage, the British had advantage as their soldiers were familiar with new technological developments.618
As a result, the EIC, however, suffered from three problems: less numbers, insufficient good quality cavalry and poor logistic. Despite these limitations, they could improve or make more useful their less number of soldiers by training and enhancing in firearms.619
612 Singh, ibid, p. 5-6.
613 Arthur Broome, History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army, vol. 1, Calcutta 1850, p. 535.
614 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 452.
615 Tapan Mohan Chatterji, the Road to Plassey, Calcutta 1960, p. 292.
616 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 656.
617 Rosen, ibid, p. 175.
618 Roy, Military Synthesis”, p. 684-685.
619 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 468.
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British were willing to increase the number of their Indian soldiers compared to Indian rulers. The next step for EIC was to enhance the quality of Sepoys’ weapons. Sepoys joined or were recruited by EIC with their private outmoded muskets. Eventually, London decided to arm the Sepoys with same weapons as given to their European counterparts.620 All these led Robert Clive to suggest that each battalion should be composed of equal number of Hindu and Muslim subjects in the Sepoy army and a rivalry must be encouraged between them.621
Saltpetre Production of EIC
With the military revolution in Europe, tactical innovations were made around firearm weapons. The logistics of ammunition and their affordable price became vital for empires. Saltpetre was one of the significant materials needed for producing gunpowder. This was realised by the Stuart dynasty in England, which encouraged EIC to find alternative sources of saltpetre. In search for saltpetre, the British merchants found Indian saltpetre market in Agra where local traders and manufacturers used to sell the saltpetre to Mughal army.622
India had developed the infrastructure for gunpowder technology including processing of saltpetre a century before Europe.623 The Mughals understood the importance of saltpetre since Akbar’s time and encouraged its production and use. This interest also could be traced to Sher Shah Suri who was keen to produce and use firearms. Mughals began to control the production of saltpetre from Jahangir’s era.624
The main part of saltpetre was obtained from Bihar. The main composition of gunpowder is saltpetre (75%), sulphur (10%) and charcoal (15%). Among these materials Indian subcontinent had abundant supply of saltpetre in Orissa, Ganga Valley, Patna and Bengal.625 The production of saltpetre requires special conditions such as hot and humid area. Since India, especially Bihar, had the suitable environment, Indian
620 Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare”, p. 453.
621 Kolff, ibid, p. 19-79; Barat, ibid, p. 27.
622 James W. Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade, the Military Revolution, and the Rise of Britain as a Global Superpower”, the Historian, 71 (3), 2009, p. 518.
623 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 513.
624 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 517-518.
625 Roy, “Technology Transfer”, p. 415.
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saltpetre was of high quality. Besides environmental conditions, cheap workforce, easy transportation were also key factors.626
When Portuguese were driven away from Indian markets, the Dutch and British took over. They majorly focused on saltpetre sources in Bihar. In the following decades, the British began to take political role by improving its military power. The militarisation by trade company (EIC) and their superiority over native rulers resulted in British supremacy in Indian subcontinent in military, political and economic terms. After the battle of Plassey in 1757 and the defeat of Mughals at the Buxar in 1764, British took control of India. When EIC secured its position, they controlled and monopolised the saltpetre trade.627 The demand for gunpowder after improvement of firearm technology and its diffusion at the battlefields made saltpetre valuable on the market. Thus, European states aimed to regulate its production and prices. In this direction, East Indian companies had crucial role in saltpetre trade. The first European country entered in saltpetre trade in India was Portuguese followed by the Dutch628 and finally, British via East Indian Company.629
In this case, British had upper hand over others since they controlled the trade of saltpetre along with the metallurgy industry in the India. Those two important occurrences gave British unlimited ammunition supply.630 Because the saltpetre production was important for British crown, “the Crown required it to sell a stipulated amount of saltpetre in England every year at fixed rates.”631
Bengal became the major investment area for the company and turned the EIC the largest supplier among the companies.632 Bengal was the main centre for saltpetre supply for British armies at Bombay and at Fort St. George.633 One of the main centres for production of Saltpetre was Patna which became world’s largest affordable saltpetre
626 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 511.
627 Jata Shankar Jha, “Early European Trading Companies in Bihar”, Comprehensive History of Bihar, Vol. 3, edited by Ananta Lal Thakur, Patna 1976, p. 1-71.
628 When the Dutch tried to monopolise it, they failed in 1756. Fort William – India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto 1757-1759, Vol. 2, Edited by H. N. Sinha, Delhi 1957, p. LI.
629 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 508.
630 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 544-545.
631 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 534.
632 Tirthankar Roy, An Economic History of Early Modern India, New Delhi 2017, p. 81.
633 Fort William – India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto 1748-1756, Vol. 1, Edited by K. K. Datta, Delhi p. 7 (19 December 1753).
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producing city during the 17th and 18th centuries both for Indian and for global markets. Moreover, Indian saltpetre represented 70 per cent of world requirements. Having control over these sources made British an important power in the world. On the other hand, the European powers, which were the centres of military revolution tried to gain a share from Bihar saltpetre trade.634 The letter dated 24 February 1747/1748 under the control of Lieutenant George Male, it revealed that 13716 maunds saltpetre and 86 barrels were taken from Patna.635 In the letter dated 4 February 1750/1751, it was noted that the company had purchased total 16.000 maunds saltpetre.636
After the battle of Plassey, Clive sought privileges from Mir Jafar, Nawab of Bengal, which granted the company an exclusive perwanah for the purchase of saltpetre. Under the new terms the Company paid Nawab 15,000 Rs to Ramnarain 10,000 Rs and 20,000 mounds saltpetre for the personal use of Nawab.637 Nawab Mir Jafar allowed the company to purchase saltpetre produced at Sylhat and Purnea on 7 December 1763 after company helped him against Mir Qasim.638 Afterwards EIC also requested a parwanah from Nawab Mir Qasim to purchase all saltpetre in the Purnea, who disallowed it as he needed it for his own business. There emerged problems in the production level of saltpetre in Bihar and so the company wanted to take a parwanah for producing and purchasing all the saltpetre as well.639
British were also ambitious to secure their monopoly in the region since saltpetre was assuming importance. The supply of raw materials for British factories became a major concern of EIC. However, it was solved by Clive by imposing company monopoly on the trade in saltpetre in 1758. Moreover, the British traders of EIC were exempted from paying taxes to local governors. Also, the Indian traders were not allowed to buy saltpetre from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.640 British allowed their Indian alliances to produce saltpetre in 1760s.641 In the letter from the Court dated 11 November 1757, it was stated that “we must depend upon your care for forwarding the necessary proportion, as the demand for saltpetre is very great and the company are by their
634 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 535-536, 542.
635 Datta, ibid, p. 273 (24 February 1747/1748).
636 Datta, ibid, p. 476 (4 February 1750/1751).
637 Sinha, ibid, p. 339 (31 December 1758).
638 Calender of Persian Correspondence, 1759-1767, vol. 1, New Delhi 1970, p. 256.
639 Calender of Persian Correspondence, 1759-1767, vol. 1, New Delhi 1970, p. 148.
640 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 684.
641 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 533.
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charter obliged and do now actually deliver to the Government five hundred tons a year.”642 In their letter from the court of Directors of the EIC in London, it was requested to full all Coast and Bay ships with saltpetre.643 The following letter dated 19 December 1753, started that every ship could carry 50 or 40 tons of saltpetre.644 Moreover, in another letter, it was requested that 5 Coast and Bay ships could carry 750 tonnes with each of 150 tonnes capacity.645 Even during the times of famine the production on trade on saltpetre kept on increasing.
It is obvious that with the introduction of firearms to the battlefields, the stock of gunpowder became vital for the armies and therefore demanding its supply is quick and easy.646 The EIC built a gunpowder mill at Bombay in 1669 and in a couple of years its production increased 2,000 barrels. The main feature of this gunpowder was that it was considered better than the European gunpowder in terms of quality.647 Another gunpowder mill was built in Madras, but it was not self-sufficient for British in the Fort St. George till 1690.648 In a letter dated 1 April 1760 from the Court, it is highlighted that the council of Fort William in Bengal required gunpowder from England. Due to its impossibility, the Court in England sent two people skilled in the whole manufacture of gunpowder.649 Thus they tried to solve stock problem by employing experts from even England.
J. Z. Holwell in his letter to the court emphasised on the insufficient gunpowder and firearms as “(…) we had not powder sufficient, and that we had, not good, that we had hardly any shells fitted, or fuzes fitted to them, that there was hardly a carriage that would bear a gun, that the 50 fine cannon you sent out three years ago, 18 and 24 pounders, lay neglected under your walls, and that we were deficient in almost every kind of military stores (…).”650
642 Sinha, ibid, p. 50 (11 November 1757).
643 Datta, ibid, p. 3 (28 November 1753).
644 Datta, ibid, p. 7.
645 Datta, ibid, p. 21 (23 January 1754).
646 Frey, “the Indian Saltpeter Trade”, p. 510.
647 Roy, “Technology Transfer”, p. 417.
648 Roy, “Technology Transfer”, p. 418.
649 Fort William – India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto 1760-1763, Vol. 3, Edited by R. R. Sethi, Delhi 1968, p. 20 (1 April 1760).
650 Datta, ibid, p. 1067 (30 November 11756).
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Thus, the EIC presidencies in India realised that buying saltpetre in India as cheaper than importing it.
Copper
Iron
Steel
Gunpowder
Presidency of Fort William
252
70
-
300
Presidency of fort St. George
165
70
5
500
Presidency of fort Marlbrough
-
15
5
200
Source: Sethi, ibid, p. 163-164 (17 December 1762).
Another letter that dated one year later
Copper
Iron
steel
gunpowder
Presidency of fort william
130
100
-
500
Presidency of fort St. George
70
100
5
200 whole
400 half
Presidency of fort Marlbrough
-
50
5
100
Source: Sethi, ibid, p. 233-234 (30 December 1763).
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Already it was discussed how the saltpetre had a role in the British successes in India over French and other native powers from the letter of Select committee to the court which notes:
“the plenty of money and provisions which we can at all times supply the gentlemen of Madras will enable them to carry on and of their designs whereas the total want the French are in of both (…) over and above this want of money we are well assured there is a great scarcity of gunpowder among them (…) we have the whole of saltpetre in our hands.”651
Battle of Karnal, 1739
After Babur Shah invaded northern India plains, there was no other prominent threat to the Mughals. Mughals and Persians had a friendly relation in the northern borders of Mughal territory. Even during difficult times of Babur and Humayun, Safavids became their biggest supporters. During the reign of Aurangzeb and at the zenith of Mughal rule in India, the Mughal Empire had a strong image in the mind of its rivals who wouldn’t dare to declare war against them. However, after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, the Mughal Empire suffered both internally as well as externally. The first and humiliating external defeat came on northwest frontier with Persians under Nader Shah invading Delhi in the first half of 18th century. Nader Shah not only took the wealth of Delhi and Mughal’s treasury, but also made Mughals vulnerable against other attacks.
Mughals were conscious about the possible threat coming from northeast frontier, where naturally India was vulnerable to attack from Persian and Central Asian armies. Therefore, steps were taken to guard Mughal borders from any attack and invasion. Firstly, diplomatic means were adopted to keep hostile combination of Iranian and Central Asian powers away. Secondly, Kabul was strengthened in terms of administration. Thirdly, they provided economic assistance to the population in Afghanistan and tribal regions. In order to maintain this policy, trusted and talented nobles were appointed as governor of Kabul with large armies.
When Nader Shah launched a war against the Mughals, Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahore, arranged a defensive position by mounting big pieces of artillery on the bank of Ravi. The resistance of Zakariya Khan could not last as no assistance from Delhi
651 Sinha, ibid, p. 390-391.
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came and eventually had to surrender to Nader Shah. After the fall of Lahore, Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah had to decide on war. Nader Shah on the other tried to reason with Muhammad Shah and wrote that his main aim was to punish Afghans, who were their mutual enemies. Also, Nader Shah reminded Mughal king of his political behaviour towards him by not sending any answer to his last three envoys while warning about the result of war.652
Nader Shah left Lahore on 26 January 1739 marched through Sirhind, Raja Sarai, Ambala, Shahabad, Thanesar and Sarai Azimabad, which was 12 miles away from Karnal.653 When he had marched from Persia, he had 80,000 troops but had to leave some of the troops midway to garrison the forts and cities.654 The detailed information about Nader Shah’s army can be obtained from Jonas Hanway’s account. He says that there were 12,000 jazzayirchis, who were foot soldiers, well-clothed and carried heavy muskets with wide bores, and 40,000 ordinary musketeers in his army.655 As Axworthy outlined, there is no evidence that Nader Shah benefited from any military assistance from foreign engineers or artillerists. Furthermore, the handguns that Nader’s troops used like jazayir and zamburak, had no any connection in western armies of the same period.656 It can be said that Nader Shah never fought against a European army, so the power of his firearms against European firearms, tactics and battle norms could not go beyond estimation.
The number of troops of the Mughal army given by Persian sources is highly exaggerated. The secretary of Nader Shah stated Mughal troops as three hundred thousand, 2000 elephants, and 3000 artilleries. Rustam Ali said two hundred thousand horses, innumerable foot, 1500 elephant and many guns. Ghulam Ali said five hundred thousand horse and foot, 8000 pieces artillery.657 However, the number of effective soldiers in the Mughal army did not exceed 75,000.658
652 Irvine, Later Mughals, vol. 2, p. 332-333.
653 P. K. Gosh, “The Battle of Karnal-1739”, Select Battles in Indian History (From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D.), Vol. 2, Eds. Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shive Nandan Misra, Delhi 2002, p. 410.
654 Jadunath Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, New Delhi 2019, p. 33.
655 Jonas Hanway, An Historical Account of the British Trade Over the Caspian Sea, vol. 1, London 1753, p. 252.
656 Michael Axworthy, “The Army of Nader Shah”, Iranian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5 (Dec., 2007), p. 644.
657 Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, p. 33.
658 G. S. Cheema, the Forgotten Mughals: A History of the Later Emperors of the House of Babar (1707-1857), New Delhi 2017, p. 194.
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In Indian armies, Muslims and Rajputs were familiar and trained in firearms. The valuable musketeers of Mughal army in 17th century were the Hindus of Buxar, the Bundelas, Karnatakis and Bachelias. The great majority of the Mughal army did not prefer to fight with muskets. Moreover, although it was rule to bring their portable light artillery to the battlefield, they did not carry them to Karnal. Persian soldiers formed best cavalry units, and good archers who could shoot on horseback while moving. Thus, Mughals could not bear against both fire power and cavalry attack of Persians. Besides Nader Shah used camel with naphta (fire), which scared away Mughal war elephants thereby destroying Mughal defence lines.659
Muhammad Shah chose a defensive strategy of covering his army with the help of dense forest from the north, with the town of Karnal from south and Ali Mardan canal from the front line. The camp was also surrounded with 5000 gun carriages. At the centre, was situated the Emperor and in front of him, Niazmul Mulk and Sadat Khan. On the right were Khan Dauran, Muzaffar Khan, Ali Hamed Khan, Shahdad Khan and Khan Zuman Khan. On the left was Kummir o’din Khan, Azim Allah Khan, Jani Khan and Seyd Neaz Khan.660
After having detailed information about Mughal army and the condition of the battle ground from his spies, Nader Shah decided to avoid a frontal attack. He preferred to wait at east of Karnal city, with its abundant water supply of Jamuna river. Moreover, it was possible to cut the communication of the Mughals with Delhi by seizing Panipat.661 Meanwhile, with the attack of 6000 forces of Nader Shah on Saadat Khan’s baggage, Saadat Khan decided to launch attack on the Persian raiders and rescue his camp followers. The war council, including emperor Muhammad Shah, advised him to wait due to exhausted soldiers of the army, but he went against advice and launched an attack on Nader’s forces.662
It was not only Saadat Khan who made tactical mistakes. Under a difficult battlefıeld situation, Khan sought help from other commanders and was responded by Khan-i Dauran who entered the battlefield with just 8000 cavalries and no artillery. In consequence, Saadat Khan’s troops and Khan-i Dauran’s cavalry could not resist
659 Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, p. 48-49.
660 James Fraiser, the History of Nadir Shah, Delhi 1973, p. 152-153.
661 Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, p. 36.
662 P. M. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, London 1915, p. 353.
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against strong firepower of Nader Shah who had drawn a line of light shaturnals in the line of the Mughals advances. In other words, “arrows cannot fight bullets.”663 The mistakes of Saadat Khan can be explained in Clausewitz’s words as tactical initiatives that can rarely be expanded into a major victory, but a strategic one often brought the whole war to an end at a stroke.664
Nader Shah was both surprised and elated about the march of the Awadh forces since the Mughal army came out from “its strongly entrenched position.” Thus, successful manoeuvres of the Persian army brought him the victory. Nader Shah hurriedly organised his army into the battle array. He firstly guarded his camp with a strong division and took the command of the vanguard of Persian army. He allotted his son Nasrullah to command the centre with distinguished warriors and powerful artillery. The left wing was placed under the charge of Fath Ali and Lutf Ali Afshar, while the right wing was under the charge of Tahmasb Quli Jalayir. Besides, he also divided his 3000 best troops into three parts for ambush.665
The Persian army was strengthened with firearms apart from cavalry and artillery. Those of artillery mostly carried of Jazair, which had a long musket of swivel guns, seven or eight feets in length apart from Zamburaks, which were long swivel charging one or two pounds balls.666 A great number of Nader Shah’s army consisted of men equipped with firearms, thousands of swivel gunners. Those of soldiers were trained very strictly and their fire control was of European type. Those with swivel guns were placed in a row on the ground to counter Mughal soldiers. The rapid fire of this type arrangement did not give any chance to Mughals.667 Though arming his cavalry with firearms was difficult for him, his infantry showed substantial improvement and resolve to use firearms. He put a special interest on his musketeers who began to improve their reloading speed and targeting abilities and were so promoted in ranks of army.668
The centre of the Mughal army commanded by Khan-i Dauran was under the heavy fire of the Persian swivel guns and were pressurised heavily. The peril of the Mughal army
663 Cheema, ibid, p. 194-195.
664 Clausewitz, ibid, p. 163.
665 Gosh, “ibid”, p. 412.
666 Gosh, “ibid”, p. 412.
667 Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, p. 48.
668 Axworthy, “ibid”, p. 638.
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against Persian firearms was described by Abdul Karim as “arrows cannot answer bullets.”669 The Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah showed no further resistance after the defeat. He and Nader Shah entered Delhi together. However, a false report that Nader Shah was dead created a rebel ambiance and several troops of Nader Shah and his troops looted the wealth of Delhi from all classes.670
Figure – 4.3: A diagram of the Battle of Karnal.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Karnal_battle_based_on_Axworthy%27s_interpretation.jpg
What did Nader Shah do better than the Mughals and how did he improve his army in the use of firearms are important queries that need to be answered. This could be explained in two ways. The first one was the desire of Safavid Shahs for enhancing
669 Gosh, “ibid”, p. 413; Irvine, Later Mughals, vol. 2, p. 347.
670 J. B. Harrison, “India in the Muslim Period”, The Oxford History of India, vol. 3, New Delhi 1976, p. 436-437.
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firearm technology since their main rival Ottomans were good at it. Thus, Nader Shah inherited a growing firearm technology in Safavid Iran. Secondly, Nader Shah was a musketeer in the service of Safavids on the north eastern frontier of Khorasan.671 All these circumstances gave Nader Shah a good opportunity to improve firearms. However, according to Hanway, the handguns of Persian infantry were ill-tempered and mostly matchlock and could not bear a quick fire.672
The reason behind the defeat of Mughals at the battle of Karnal was due to their outclassed weapons and tactics along with bad military coordination. At the battle of Karnal, a great number of Nader Shah’s troops were equipped with firearms. Those men were well-disciplined like European standards in terms of tactical understanding. They were ready with their fuelled firearms for volley fire, which had deadly effect on enemy. Unlike Mughals, Nader Shah had very better control and organisation of his ordinary soldiers. Besides, they kept also their swivel guns ready for action by planting them on the ground. The Persian army fought cleverly and left on chance for Mughals to launch counter attack or respond effectively. Mughal soldiers were ineffective in their use of firearms. They not only fought with muskets, but were also unsuccessful in carrying cannons into the battlefield. Moreover, the guns that Mughals army carried were old, cumbrous, slow and inaccurate in comparison to Persians.673 As Clausewitz has stated, a prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources. However, Muhammad Shah did not prepare himself and his army to battle with Nader Shah.674
The situation of Mughal emperors after the invasion of Delhi by Nader Shah was like “the emperor with no clothes.” In economic term, Nader Shah and his followers drained the wealth of Mughal Empire. Delhi was turned into ruins because of Persian soldiers, the prices increased so high that even it was hard to find a food grain. In political term, the authority of the Mughal emperor had already precarious due to the factional infighting. Inside the Mughal court, as Alam stated, the battle against the Persian invaders in Karnal was lost before it actually started. Two nobles, Samsam-ud-Daulah and Burhan’ul-Mulk entered the fray while Nizam’ul-Mulk, the wazir and the entire
671 Axworthy, “ibid”, p. 638.
672 Hanway, ibid, p. 253.
673 Gosh, “ibid”, p. 415.
674 Clausewitz, ibid, p. 134.
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“Turani” group preferred to stay away. And the emperor, the supreme commander, was a mere helpless onlooker.”675 Consequently, it can be argued that after Aurangzeb the Mughal emperors became puppets in the hands of two groups: Turanis and Persians. Their power struggle weakened the empire and the role of Mughal emperors, which was on display in the battle of Karnal.
Although the attack of Nader Shah on Mughal fronts was not confirmed, Saadat Khan launched ill prepared Mughal forces on Persians. However, this shows how Mughal army and its management lost. The lack of confidence of a supreme commander was also one of main problems for Mughals. It should be remembered that Babur Shah had waited many days in his stronghold and forced Lodi to come and attack him. He was conscious about his power and intelligent enough not to take a risk and commanded his army by knowing its strength despite possessing firearms. On the contrary, later Mughals were not only incompetent commanders, but also failed to upgrade their weapon technology. Moreover, they were weak in terms of the art of war and tactics. Thus, Nader Shah benefited from the all mistakes and failures of the Mughals. Not only he used effectively his firearms, but also organised his army in a better tactical positions.
The aftermath of battle of Karnal and destruction of Delhi by Persian troops forced a realisation for the reorganisation of the central army. The raising of the new army started with ten thousand cavalry and infantry who were paid Rs. 50 monthly.676 Although the military power of the Mughals was not entirely destroyed, it never recovered again to the desired levels. Moreover, the loss of Peacock Throne to Iranians reduced the prestige of Mughals and showed the weakness of the empire to the enemies. Nader Shah took along 130 accountants, 300 masons, 200 blacksmiths, 200carpenters, and 100 stone cutters to Iran. It was not only treasure of Mughals but also the human resources that Nader Shah took along.677 This made it hard for the Mughals to recover from the deteriorating state of finances. In 1752, Mughal emperor ceded Multan and
675 Muzaffar Alam, the Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-1748, New Delhi 2013, p. 52.
676 Alam, the Crisis of Empire, p. 53.
677 Faraz Anjum, “Nadir Shah’s Invasion of India and Fall of the Mughul Empire”, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. LIII (January-March 2005), p. 106.
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Lahore to Ahmed Shah Durrani without any armed resistance. The disintegration of empire was rapid after the invasion of Nader Shah.678
Following his victory over the Mughals, Nader Shah sent a letter to Ottoman sultan Mahmud I via traders. In the letter Nader Shah said that the two armies met at Karnal, his army killed 40-50,000 Mughal soldiers and all Mughal treasures were captured. The Mughal emperor hid in a secure castle, but he understood there was no way to win after his commanders were surrendered. Since Mughals’ ancestors came from Timur (Guregen), Nader Shah spared Mughal emperor’s life.679
Batte of St. Thome, 1746
John Keay says in his book that:
the success of European powers in engrossing the world’s trade had had the unfortunate side effect of multiplying and internationalizing their interminable squabbles if an incident off the coast of Cuba could determine postures in European war it followed that wherever else the European rivals found themselves in close proximity the same hostile postures would be likely to prevail.680
The same was in India between British and French. When the British and French war began in the Carnatic region, the Mughal nawab of Arcot Anwaruddin tried to bring neutrality in the region. He demanded Madras to hand over to him, but Dupleix did not listen his words. After that, Anwaruddin sent his son Mahfuz Khan with a 10,000 forces consisted of cavalry. French had 500-600 European soldiers and 500-600 native Indian soldiers. On the other hand, Mahfuz Khan had numerical advantage of soldiers. At the beginning of the war Mahfuz sieged the city and cut the water supply. Although Lieutenant Duval chose a defensive strategy, he could not be successful. Then, he preferred to attack on Mahfuz with the support of artillery fire. Thus, the technological gap between Indians and Europeans became prevalent. Duval’s artillery badly affected the cavalry of Mahfuz Khan making the effect of firearms a determinant factor. The Mughals, their vassals/governors and other Indian states though possessed artillery and firearms; however, their guns were old which risked bursting when fired. Thus, they
678 Malik, “ibid”, p. 14.
679 3 Numaralı Name-i Humayun Defteri …, p. 95-96.
680 John Keay, the Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company, London 1993, p. 271.
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preferred them to discharge in a long period (once in 15 minutes at least). On the contrary, Europeans had good firearms compared to Mughals and their vassal states.681 They could charge their artillery and handguns quickly that demoralised Mughal cavalry. They could fire five or six times in a minute which affected the morale of Mughal soldiers badly. When they recognised the superiority of Europeans’ firearms, they escaped from battlefield without a fight.682
However, this defeat did not stop Mahfuz Khan who sought revenge from French and therefore marched to the town of St. Thome and strengthened his position there. Meanwhile, French force of 230 Europeans and 700 Sepoys approached him under the command of Paradis. Both sides had drawbacks, but in terms of firearm technology Indians suffered more than French. During the combat, the firearms of Mahfuz Khan’s army could not cause expectable harm on French army. Instead, the French troops were successful in delivering a volley of fire, as a result of which Indian troops could not resist against the continuous unaccustomed fire technique and retreated into the town by leaving their guns.683
The victory of Paradis had a special place in European history in India. Orme has noted “it was now more than a century since any of European nations had gained a decisive advantage in war against the officers of the great Moghul.”684 The battle of St. Thome was the first battle that wherein a European army defeated Mughal army over hundred years. This decisive victory showed the superiority of European military technology and development. In the battlefield, firearms of French became major point although Mughal forces outnumbered them. It gave French moral competence for the future wars. Since Mughals and their governors/officers paid less attention for improvement of the artillery, they failed at the battle of St. Thome twice at Madras and Adyar River respectively. In short, the effective use of artillery by skilful French commanders and soldiers brought them victory over numerically strong Indian armies. Thus, artillery and firearms proved their importance in the favour of Europeans.
681 A. S. Pandey, “the Carnatic Wars – 1746-1763”, Select Battles in Indian History (From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D.), Vol. 2, Eds. Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shive Nandan Misra, Delhi 2002, p. 427.
682 Colonel G. B. Malleson, then Decisive Battles of India from 1746 to 1849 Inclusive, New Delhi 2016, p. 10-12.
683 Malleson, ibid, p. 14.
684 Robert Orme, A History of Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan: from the year MDCCXLV to Which is Prefixed a Dissertation on the Establishments made by Mohamedan Conquerors in Indostan, Madras, New Delhi 1861, p. 77.
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Battle of Plassey, 1757
After the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire went into a period of stagnation after which disintegration process began. The distance places (periphery) from the centre became more or less autonomous. One of those provinces was Bengal, which was ruled by Murshid Ali Quli. However, he was dethroned by Alivardi Khan in 1740.685 When he came to power, the EIC penetration in Bengal was gradually increasing through British merchants. Alivardi Khan was conscious of European intentions in Mughal territories and so warned Sirajuddaulah just before he died.686
Alivardi Khan was succeeded by his grandson Sirajuddaulah who tried to strengthen his position in Bengal. When Sirajuddaulah came to power, he faced the Anglo-French crisis in his region. While French was fortifying their settlement at Chandernagore and at Hugli, British also strengthened their defence at the Fort William at Calcutta. Since their activities in the Mughal territory were prohibited, Sirajuddaulah warned them to not do so. Upon his order, British continued to their activities and he drove them out of Calcutta in June 1756.687 After the loss of Casimbazar and Calcutta to Sirajuddaulah, British council in Madras decided to send some ships carrying guns to Bengal.688
Clive chose not to leave any chance and so tried to win people around Sirajuddaulah to make him weak at the battlefield. In this direction, he offered Mir Jafar, a brother-in-law of Alivardi Khan, to be a nawab of Bengal. Since Akbar’s period, the nawabs of Bengal were Muslim nobles. The person for Sirajuddaulah’s place as Nawab of Bengal should be a Muslim so that people do not react against him. This person was to be easily
685 Farooqi, the Establishment of British Rule, p. 8.
686 “My life has been a life of war and stratagem: for what have fought, to what have my councils tended, but to secure you, my son, a quiet succession to my subadari? My fears for you have for many days robbed me of sleep. I perceived who had power to give you trouble after I am gone hence… keep in view the power the European nations have in the country. This fear I would also have freed you from if God had lengthened my days. – the work, my son must now be yours. Their wars and politics in the Telingana country [South India] should keep you waking. On pretence of private contests between their kings they have seized and divided the country of the King [the Moghals] and the goods of his people between them. Think not to weaken all three together [the English, French, and the Dutch]. The power of the English is great; … reduce them first; the others will give you little trouble, when you have reduced them. Suffer them not, my son, to have fortifications or soldiers: if you do the country is not yours.” Mukherjee, ibid, p. 144.
687 Farooqi, the Establishment of British Rule, p. 9.
688 The Kent 64 guns, the Cumberland 70 guns, the Tyger 60 guns, the Salisbury 50 guns, the Bridgewater 20 guns and the Blaze as a fireship. Edwardes, the battle of Plassey, p. 77; 528 artilleries, 109 artillerymen, 940 Sepoys. Sinha, ibid, p. 177.
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controlled by British and should be ambitious. Within these conditions, Clive decided on Mir Jafar who accepted all offers without thinking its consequences.689
In the battle of Plassey, Clive had 2400 men consisting of 250 troops from 39th regiment, 570 Madras European Infantry, 1200 Madras Sepoy, 230 Bengal European infantry, 70 civilian volunteers and some detail of Artillery.690 As we learn from Kolff, most of the Sepoy soldiers of EIC were Baksariyas in Bengal who fought under the command of Clive in 1757. Besides, the rural society in Bhopur and Awadh regions were also Sepoys of EIC.691
Nawab Sirajuddaulah advanced with 60,000 infantries, 40,000 cavalries, 50 war elephants, and 30 large calibre guns. On the other, the British army consisted of 711 European soldiers, 100 gunners, 1300 Indian Sepoys, and 14 six-pounders.692 In the battle of Plassey, Sirajuddaulah had 20,000 Rajput musketeers as well.693 The Mughal successor princes had paid armies especially park of artillery, but there was no discipline in terms of European sense.
When Clive was informed that 6000 of the Nawab’s troops were three miles away from him, he ordered 200 Europeans, 300 Sepoys along with 2 field pieces to occupy Plassey House and around Plassey Grove. In the north, Sirajuddaulah and his army camped, which had 35,000 infantrymen who were untrained, undisciplined with inferior quality of arms. His cavalry consisted of 15,000 men who were mostly; Pathans. Moreover, the artillery of Sirajuddaulah was also impressive being 53 large-calibre field pieces. Moreover, there were 40 or 50 Frenchmen under the command of M. de St. Frais.694 Clive took his position at Plassey House, his headquarter, with 500 men along with 2 guns and controlled the battle from the roof of Plassey House. The rest of the army was stationed at the edge of the grove with 8 guns in front.695
689 Chatterji, ibid, p. 130-131.
690 Singh, ibid, p. 6.
691 Kolff, ibid, p. 171.
692 Chatterji, ibid, p. 116.
693 Kolff, ibid, p. 174.
694 Edwardes, ibid, p. 142-143.
695 Percival Spear, Master of Bengal Clive and His India, London 1975, p. 89.
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Figure – 4.4: A plan of the Battle of Plassey, fought 23 June 1757 by Col. Robert Clive, against the Nawab of Bengal. Depiction of the battlefield, with explanations of troop movements.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Plassey#/media/File:Plassey1757max.jpg
The war began with the fire of St. Frais and his men upon the British line, but the British counter-fire kept them at a distance.696 The cannonade began at around 8 AM in the morning. Sirajuddaulah’s heavy guns outmanoeuvred the light British guns. forcing Clive to withdraw his soldiers to the shelter of the bank where he decided to stay in defence and planned to attack at night.697 Clive’s intention was to draw Sirajuddaulah’s soldiers away from their entrenchments. Due to the artillery fire, however, the Sirajuddaulah’s troops and cannons failed to resist despite their attempts.698
After the artillery fire, wherein British were overmatched, Clive withdrew his troops into the shelter from where he fired his artilleries. His aim most probably was to wait
696 Henry Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, the Beginning of Empire, London 1967, p. 134.
697 Spear, ibid, p. 90.
698 Edwardes, ibid, p. 146.
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in the grove till night and attack on the entrenchment in night. However, heavy rainfall699 changed battle situation. While British covered their ammunition and weaponry, Sirajuddaulah did not take any caution and his army found his ammunition soaked and useless. As Clive stated Sirajuddaulah could take an opportunity with his cavalry to defeat British, but continuing fire of British, even in the rain, prevented such a situation. During rain, which lasted half an hour, Sirajuddaulah’s army could not fire a single shoot.700
Since Indians presumed British would face some protection problem of ammunition, their cavalry began attacks on British but were repulsed by heavy fire. Not only did they fail in attacks but also lost Mir Madan, only loyal man of Sirajuddaulah, in the cannon shot wounds.701 Mir Madan’s guns were not efficient to inflict the expected damage on the troops sheltering below the trees. On the contrary, the guns of British firing from embrasures created significant damages. The guns under the control of French were not usable as expected since gunpowder became wet. However, British were well prepared in all aspects and protected their guns, magazines and powder by covering the weaponry. Thus, when Mughals and French were suffering from ineffective use of firearms, British continued firing.702 Those circumstances and events proved the superiority of British army in terms of gun technology, warfare knowledge over French and Mughals. Besides, during war Sirajuddaulah made several attempts to bring out his cannons, but as Clive said his advanced field pieces were enough to send them back.703
The cannonade continued for a while, but Indian soldiers lost their morale. When Clive returned to Plassey House to change his clothes,704 Major Kirkpatrick advanced towards French and drove them back from the tank. Although Clive was not satisfied with this move, as he could not withdraw the soldiers, ordered rest of the soldiers to support. When the cavalry of Sirajuddaulah tried to charge, they were pushed back with
699 Henry George Keene, History of India from the Earliest Time to the Present Day, vol. 1, London 1893, p. 203.
700 Edwardes, ibid, p. 145-146.
701 Spear, ibid, p. 90.
702 M. S. Naravane, Battles of Medieval India [AD 1295-1850], New Delhi 1996, p. 51.
703 Sinha, ibid, p. 231 (26 July 1757).
704 Spear, ibid, p. 91.
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the heavy fire of EIC’s artillery.705 Thus, this last move of British brought the end of war and forced Sirajuddaulah to flight to Murshidabad.
The battle of Plassey was the beginning of the long association of British regular army with India. The victory of Clive over Sirajud Daulah opened whole northern India to British conquest.706 The British traders not only gained importance in the India, but also occupied territories to establish their towns. As the time passed, the Mughals began to lose their power in Bengal. The second half of 18th century was the turning point for British, Mughals and Indians. The small Bengal became the place where the British sowed the seeds of British Empire. The Plassey was the cornerstone of British supremacy in India. Bengal was one of the subahs of the Mughal emperor.
Although Clive had the victory due to his artilleries, he did not think them as enough as for the future. There were two defects to the firearms supplied from England. Firstly, these were not produced well and were ill-finished. Secondly, the steal of firearms was not suitable for the extreme tempered of climate in India. Thus, starting from Clive, the British complained and requested better quality of weapons and experts on iron-founders.707
At the same night of his victory, Clive penned down the following for Charles Watson and gentlemen of the Committee of Fort William:
this morning at one o’clock we arrived at Placis Grove and early in the morning the Nabob’s whole army appeared in sight and cannonade us for several hours, and about noon returned to a very strong camp in sight, lately Roydoolub’s, upon which we advanced and stormed the Nabob’s camp, which we have taken with all his cannon and pursued him six miles, being no at Doudpoor and shall proceed for Muxadavad tomorrow. Meer Jaffeir, Roydolub, and Luttee Cawn gave us no other assistance than standing neutral. They are with me with a large force. Meer Muddun and five hundred horse are killed and three elephants. Our loss is trifling, not above twenty Europeans killed and wounded.708
705 Kaushik Roy, War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849, New York 2011, p. 40.
706 Barnett, ibid, p. 201.
707 Nandalal Chatterji, Clive as an Administrator, Allahabad 1955, p. 77-79.
708 Edwardes, ibid, p. 148-149.
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The battle of Plassey was thus the first significant occasion for the EIC troops in terms of defeating a native army commanded by one of the biggest provincial rulers of the Mughals.
Battle of Buxar, 1764
After the battle of Plassey, Mir Jafar became the masnad of Bengal. However, zamindars and officers from Bihar raised their voice against British supremacy and many of them organised an alliance. The EIC extended its power through Bihar and subjugate them. The British diplomacy proved its superiority by joining of Ram Narayan to British side and the rebellion was not possible to continue.709
After Clive left India for London in 1760, the weakness of Mir Jafar as a ruler appeared, so he was removed by his son-in-law Mir Qasim as nawab of Bengal.710 When Mir Qasim came to power, he tried to strengthen the government, but some incidents made his position anti-British. Upon his volte-face, the English council again declared Mir Jafar as the Nawab of Bengal. Mir Jafar defeated Mir Qasim at the battle of Suti and Giria in 1763. The defeat made him anxious and he massacred the British prisoners which created a new scenario in the region. Mir Qasim cooperated with Nawab of Oudh and Mughal Emperor Shah Alam.711
The activities of Mir Qasim and British attitudes made the war inevitable. At Patna, Mir Qasim and Ellis, the chief of British factory, did not cooperate and Ellis attacked Patna and captured it. Then, Mir Qasim dispatched his troops and recaptured city by prisoning Ellis. Then, British sent an army under the command of Major Adams and reached Kata on 16 July 1763. He was joined by Mir Jafar and Lieutenant Gleen. After 4 hours battle, Gleen won the victory.712
On 19 July 1763, another battle was fought and Major Adams defeated Mohammad Taqi Khan’s army even though they showed courage against British firearms with cavalry power. At the battle, Taqi Khan was shot dead by a bullet in his head. The defeated army took position at Motijheel, but were still nursing the defeats of Aji and
709 Shree Govind Mishra, History of Bihar 1740-1772, New Delhi 1970, p. 53-54.
710 Hugh Murray, History of British India, London 1860, p. 332.
711 Mishra, ibid, p. 56-72.
712 Fauzia Zareen Abbas, “the Battle of Buxar – 1764”, Select Battles in Indian History (From Earliest Times to 2000 A.D.), Vol. 2, Eds. Kiran Kumar Thaplyal and Shive Nandan Misra, Delhi 2002, p. 482.
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Katwa and so joined Mir Qasim’s army at Suti. The battle was fought at Suti that ended with British victory. In the battle, Mir Qasim used his best troops, the brigade of Samru and Markar, along with cavalry power of Asadullah and rocketmen of Mir Nasir Khan, totalling 28,000 including 8,000 cavalries. This army was supported by artillery, which was under the control of Europeans and Eurasians. The battle began with the discharge of artillery of two sides, and then the advance of infantry. Afterwards, Asadullah broke the left wing of British with cavalry. Meanwhile, Badruddin Khan captured two British guns and caused confusion. Mir Nasir Khan attacked on front of British with rocket men. At this point of battle left wing, reserve and centre were in trouble. A successful attack on right wing of British army could finish the battle. However, Sher Ali Khan was not successful. Later on, Major Adams recovered the situation and recaptured two of his guns by defeating Badruddin. Thus, Major Adams saved the day. British captured 17 cannons and 150 boats. Mir Qasim’s troops withdrew to Udhwanala.713 Udhwanala was well-protected both by natural topography and Mir Qasim’s 4,000 soldiers trained in European style, strengthened with artillery. However, a few British troops entered and opened the gate for the rest of British army. Major Adams defeated Mir Qasim and captured over 100 cannons. Further, Major Adams captured Patna and Mir Qasim left Bihar.714
At the time of defeat, Mir Qasim had sought help from Shuja Daulah through his agent. They met at Allahabad and Shuja Daulah was impressed by the order, well-armed and artillery of Mir Qasim’s army. The ambitions of Mir Qasim to remove British and unexpected growth of British convinced Shuja Daulah to expel the British, who had firstly come to India as traders, but gradually captured the richest cities of Indian subcontinent. Predictably, Shuja Daulah warned British not to involve in political activities and restrict their engagements to commerce else would invite war on them.715
The British army commanded by Munro at Buxar was consisted of 1,000 Europeans, 7,000 Sepoys and 28 guns whereas Mughal army was nearly 50,000 troops supported by strong artillery.716 The army was so numerous, as which Ghulam Hussain described as “an inundation, and moved like the bilious of sea.” However, it was an ungovernable
713 Abbas, “ibid”, p. 482-484.
714 Abbas, “ibid”, p. 484-485.
715 Abbas, “ibid”, p. 486.
716 Channa Wickremesekera, ‘Best Black Troops in the World’ British Perceptions and the Making of the Sepoy 1746-1805, New Delhi 2002, p. 135-136.
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army due to less order and discipline amongst the troops. They were not accustomed to command and behaved like a troop of highway men by killing, murdering and plundering each other.717 The main power of Shuja Daulah and his allies consisted of cavalry power.718 Besides, the artillery of trained Sumroo soldiers was managed by renegade European gunners.719
The battle plan was described by Seir Mutaqherin as following:
that to wage war with the English, according to the method customary in India, would not answer any good purpose. That whenever those strangers should be left at liberty to range themselves in battle array, according to their own rules, with their field pieces properly stationed, and their Talingas upon the wings, so few as a thousand of them would always prove an overmatch for an army of fifty thousand Hindostanies. (…) vazir’s made of war far was by skirmishers and his soldiers were inured to that custom, it would be more advantageous to leave the heavy baggage, with the greater port of the troops, in the camp where they were; and with a choice body of picked men, horse and foot, to advance on the enemy, amongst whom divisions had already crept so far, that they thought only of a retreat. That now was the time fall at once unexpectedly upon them before they had prepared for their march. If we succeed in breaking their ranks (…) and in disturbing their battle array, victory is ours, and success has crowned our design.720
Munro formed his army in two lines. In the centre of first line was situated the Bengal and Bombay European regiments and Royal troops and marines. These European soldiers were flanked by two battalions of Sepoy from two sides, and each Sepoy battalions had two pieces of artillery. The second line consisted of remaining Bengal European regiment. Similarly, these soldiers were flanked by four Sepoy battalions and artillery. Munro placed the grenadiers of the Bengal European regiment and cavalry between two lines.721
717 Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, the Seir Mutaqherin or Review of Modern Times: Being an History of India Containing in General the Reigns of the Seven Last Emperors of Hindostan, Vol. 3, Delhi 1990, p. 526.
718 Srinivasachari, ibid, p. 256 (27 September 1764).
719 Wickremesekera, ibid, p. 136.
720 The Seir Mutaqherin, p. 526-527.
721 Wickremesekera, ibid, p. 136.
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Figure – 4.5: Sketch of the Battle of Buxar, 1764.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Buxar#/media/File:Battle_of_Buxar_-Crown_and_company-_Arthur_Edward_Mainwaring_pg.144.jpg
The battle started with the advance of Shuja Daulah to centre by opening fire from heavy guns. Although Munro gave the order to advance, the morass in front of his arm’s left flank caused problem due to the heavy fire from Nawab’s guns and rockets.722 The company forces and Indian forces continued to battle under heavy artillery fire. Shuja Daulah meanwhile ordered his cavalry to charge on right flank of the British forces and perish the British soldiers.723 If they were not successful in this plan, they were to kill some soldiers, destroy their carriages, render their cannons useless, and cut off their lagers.724 Upon this manoeuvre of Shuja Daulah, Munro sent a battalion of Sepoys from the first line of right flank, but they were beaten by the Mughal forces. Next, Munro detached another Sepoy battalion from the second line of his army for support. After two hours of firefighting the Sepoys got upper hand against the Mughal forces.725
722 Malleson, ibid, p. 202-203
723 Amar Farooqui, Zafar and the Raj Anglo-Mughal Delhi c. 1800-1850, Haryana 2013, p. 9.
724 The Seir Mutaqherin, p. 527.
725 Wickremesekera, ibid, p. 137-138.
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Meanwhile, the cavalry of Shuja Daulah had charged on British left flank to penetrate two lines, but suffered under heavy fire and were repulsed with heavy causalities and loss of the entire baggage.726 With the order of Munro, Bengal Europeans, Royal troops and Sepoys drew off Mughal cavalry and captured the grove. With the advance of British army, the field pieces of British came within the killing range of the Mughal line. Except Sumroo and Medoc (trained infantry soldiers) the remaining Mughal soldiers could not bear British firepower and retreated from the battlefield.727 The tactical mistake of Shuja Daulah and effective volley fire of British infantry decided the war. With the last advance, General Munro defeated and pushed Mughal army by 12 noon, and won the day.728
The letter sent by Fort William to the court described the defeat of Shuja Daulah at Buxar as: “he is dispossessed of the principal part of the country he held, and his forces will never, I hope, make head again with any effect.”729 With the battle of Buxar, the Mughal emperor not only lost his prestige but also fell into the British hands. They got easy charters from the Mughals making them strongest economic and military power in Indian subcontinent.730 The Mughal army left the camp with about 150 pieces of cannon after loss of battle of Buxar.731
In the aftermath of the battle of Buxar in 1764, Shuja Daulah had taken serious steps in composition and organisation of his army since the inefficient performance of the Awadh cavalry forces. Thus, he began to organise a peasant army like Clive’s small boy of infantry troops in European style, Lal Paltan.732 Shuja was warned by Imadu’l Mulk and Ahmad Khan about the Mughal gentlemen troops not to trust them. Thus, he recruited professional troops except Mughal military system along with organising artillery branch. He also benefited from the service knowledge of Europeans.733
After being defeated by British infantry, Daulah realised the superiority and importance of infantry to cavalry. He copied the European arms and armaments and then focused
726 Sir Penderel Moon, the British Conquest and Dominion of India, vol. 1, New Delhi 1999, p. 113.
727 Wickremesekera, ibid, p. 138.
728 Malleson, ibid, p. 204-205; Roy, War, Culture and Society, p. 41.
729 Srinivasachari, ibid, p. 324 (14 March 1765).
730 Mukherjee, ibid, p. 155.
731 Srinivasachari, ibid, p. 263 (26 November 1764).
732 Seema Alavi, the Sepoy and the Company, Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830, New Delhi 1995, p. 19.
733 Alavi, the Sepoy and the Company, p. 19-20.
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on firearm technology. He was personally interested in artillery and had 29 pieces of cannon mounted on carriages with screws. Besides, he had also cannons that some of them exceeding a six-pounder were cast by natives. Moreover, he aimed to have light pieces off artillery. On the other hand, he also established a foundry for manufacturing small arms nearby his palace. The sipahi’s firelocks were copied from English model and 150-200 pieces were produced in a month.734 The battle of Buxar gave opportunity to assets the merits of European and Mughal fighting methodology, technology and organisation between field forces.735 However, all these attempts of the Shuja Daula and the Mughals were not sufficient enough to yield desired results against the British army.
In the 17th century European armies were not effective against Mughal armies. In 1686 and 1688 British tried two expeditions in Bengal but failed to make any gains. After the mid of the 18th century, the scene began to change against Mughals. In 1757 at Plassey and onwards, the Mughals could not bear against them in Bengal and Bihar.736 Why did it take long time for the Mughals to use lighter field artillery like British is an important query. This was mainly related to the warfare method in Indian subcontinent. During Aurangzeb era all adversaries of the Mughals stood in the fortress. They were defenders while Mughals were attackers. As it looked in the Aurangzeb’s campaigns, it seems almost all were siege warfare. Thus, Mughals did not require light artillery since they did not face open field battles. The Mughal army required huge siege artillery to destroy the walls. Besides, the mass produce of wrought iron guns and inability to adopt flintlock guns for the infantry caused a technical inferiority against European powers.737
The military revolution in Europe raised the cost of wars that mercantilism and growing native state had to challenge.738 The Mughals and other Indian powers did not pay adequate attention to produce iron guns. On the contrary, EIC systemised the production of firearms and its supply to its forces by establishing Western style of arsenals throughout Indian subcontinent. For political survival, forces with musket and cannons were necessary. However, it was expensive to maintain these kinds of
734 Alavi, the Sepoy and the Company, p. 23-24.
735 G. J. Bryant, the Emergence of British Power in India 1600-1784 A Grand Strategic Interpretation, Woodbridge 2013, p. 176.
736 Roy, “Military Synthesis”, p. 654-655.
737 Kaushik Roy, “Historiographical Survey of the Writings on Indian Military History”, Approaches to History Essays in Indian Historiography, Edited by Sabyasachi Bhat Tacharya, New Delhi 2015, p. 124.
738 Deshpande, “ibid”, p. 900.
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forces.739 Kleinschmidt has contended that due to European penetration in the non-European regions through private trading companies, the member of those companies highly invested in military personal and equipment in order to protect their profit and trade. Their high investment in military area affected the local empires in terms of economic burden since they had to improve their war materials and armies as well. Similarly, the investment of EIC in India forced Mughals to protect their areas.740
With this the battles became costlier and lethal. To afford its cost, mercantilism became a major doctrine in Europe. The empires had to afford the war and military technology budget. The continuous development of European armies made the battles more lethal in the 18th century, but the effectiveness of Indian armies at the battlefield did not show the same reaction. Moreover, the British army behaved offensively in every part of India by attacking upon the numerous, but irregular armies of Indian powers.741
Another reason was the importance of cavalry which comes from India’s ancient past. Having a horse symbolised the status, valour and power. Hence, Mughals aimed to obtain best horses from Afghanistan, Iran and Ottoman territories. This understanding and their origin from Central Asia, where cavalry was considered as main power, increased the importance of cavalry power in the Mughal army. Besides, the fighting skill of a cavalry was aimed to be perfected.742 The cavalry, however, remained conservative since it did not adopt the new technology like Wheelock and flintlock muskets. Unlike EIC cavalry branch, Mughal cavalry was equipped with matchlocks.743
It is evident that wherever Indians made improvement in their military technology, they were able to defeat British power/European powers in the subcontinent. One of the striking examples for this was Tipu Sultan. He organised his army according to western style and for the first time in the history used rockets very efficiently. Thus, he defeated British in two battles. British army under the control of Colonel Arthur Wellesley defeated Tipu Sultan’s army and took his capital Seringapatam by killing Tipu Sultan. Although Tipu Sultan sought help against British expansion in India, he could not be
739 Bayly, ibid, p. 65.
740 Harald Kleinschmidt, “Using the Guns: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms”, the Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 3, (Jul. 1999), p. 624.
741 Srinivasachari, ibid, p. 257 (27 September 1764).
742 Seema Alavi, the Sepoy and the Company, p. 13.
743 Roy, “Technology Transfer”, p. 414.
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successful. After the threat of Tipu Sultan was eliminated, the Indian subcontinent gradually came under the complete British military power.744 It may be thus concluded with the words of Butalia “(…) the final issues as to who was to rule was always decided in the field of battle by a clash of arms. In fact, the history of India has largely been influenced by the military factor.”745
744 Emre Yürük, “Seeking an Ally against British Expansion in India: Tipu Sultan’s Mission to the Ottoman Empire”, American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Vol. 18, No. 418, 2018, pp. 86-91.
745 Butalia, ibid, p. 329.
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CHAPTER 5
ROLE OF FIREARMS IN THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
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From the 16th century onwards, especially during the 17th century, the powerful Ottoman Empire underwent major changes spanning across social, political, administrative and economic sphere. These changes, according to some historians, led to a series of internal revolts undermining the Ottoman authority that culminated in its decline as reflected in its territorial shrinkage since the 18th century. Among these rebellions, the Celali revolt in Anatolia was the first such serious threat for the Ottomans. The use of the handguns in those rebellions had a major role in the emergence, growth, sustenance, and deepening of the crisis.
Ottoman historians have examined the reasons behind these revolts assuming that these were majorly related to the global and internal happenings. The gradual decline of the empire was firstly realised by its contemporary statesmen and historiographers such as Koçi Bey,746 Hasan Kafi Akhisari747 and Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali748 in their advice books (nasihatname). According to their analysis, the disorders in administrative structure resulted in economic and military failures. They suggested that the preservation of old state regulations according to the sultan Suleiman I’s era – 100 years back from their times- could bring the old glorious days back again. However, their suggestions were rendered inadequate in the face of European renaissance and reformation.
Fernand Braudel, one of the pioneer academicians of Annales School, while analysing the crisis of 16th century labelled the increase of the population of the Mediterranean region as one of the main reasons.749 The archival records, in fact, reveal that population in the Ottoman territories doubled, which made the resources insufficient the Ottoman peoples and thereby created pressure on resources.750 With the extensive use of Ottoman archival documents, Mustafa Akdağ emphasised on the economic breakdown due to devaluation in akçe (the currency of the Ottoman Empire). According to Akdağ, the emergence of levends, celali rebels and sekbans was due to general economic crisis
746 Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risalesi [Tractate of the Koci Bey], Prepared by Zuhuri Danışman, Istanbul 1972.
747 Hasan Kafi Akhisari, Alemin Nizamı için Hikmetli Yöntemler, Usûlü’l-Hikem fî Nizâmi’l-Âlem [Philosophical Principles Concerning the Order of the World], Translated by Asım Cüneyd Köksal, Istanbul 2018.
748 Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, Siyaset Sanatı – Nushatü’s-Selatin [Counsel of Sultans], Translated by Faris Çerçi, İstanbul 2015.
749 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II, Translated from French by Sian Reynolds, Vol. 1-2, California 1995.
750 M. A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600, London 1972.
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in the Ottoman Empire. This ineffectiveness forced people to migrate towards big cities. When people, especially youth left their villages, they either joined madrasahs or got involved in crimes in towns and cities or roamed around the countryside to look for plunders.751 People equipped with firearms were called Celalis, Sekbans or Levends and their role in the decentralisation of empire cannot be underestimated. In this context, a new term called levendization752 came into the discipline similar to zamindarisation in Indian subcontinent as discussed in previous chapter.
American historian Sam White in his book The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire attributes the decline of empire to the what he called “Little Ice Age” in the 16th century, when economic depression triggered by famine and droughts froze the revenues of the state. He has detailed the relations between peasants, land revenue, climate change, natural disastrous and crisis. The growing land revenue of governors and timar holders forced the peasants to migrate to other places similar as Mughal peasants.753 The famine was so harsh that the Ottoman government banned the sale of grain from Rumelia (European part of the Ottoman Empire) to Anatolia because of requirements of central army as well as the growing population of cities like Istanbul. According to some sources, even the ambassador of the British had to buy his bread with an issued paper.754
Many such studies have identified variety of factor contributing to the outbreak of the rebellions, but what has not been adequately explained is the use of firearms, which characterised these revolts in terms of duration, participation and resistance. Concomitantly, the response and precaution of government, cost of expeditions on rebel groups, and restless environment for peasants made the recovery of the Ottoman Empire difficult.
Use of Firearms in Celali Rebellions and Banditry Activities
In the Ottoman Empire, a reaya (an Ottoman citizen) irrespective of religious denomination was strictly disallowed to possess any weapons. Moreover, during peace
751 Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası [Fight of the Turkish People for Peace and Harmony], Ankara 1975.
752 İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 285.
753 Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, Cambridge 2011.
754 Mustafa Akdağ, “Celali İsyanlarında Büyük Kaçgunluk 1603-1606” [Great Flight in the Celali Rebellions 1603-1606], AÜDTCFD, 2(2), 1964, p. 2.
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times, the Ottoman government stored all kind of arms in cebehane (depot of arms) under the control of cebecibaşı (the head of the depot). In this regard, the Ottoman government took special measures to prevent people from getting firearms as those were recognised as dangerous.755 It is evident from Ottoman archival documents that this strict rule was periodically monitored. It was, however, impossible in large empire to both dissuade its citizens from possessing arms as well as protecting all in changing circumstances. Therefore, the reaya began to have firearms especially tufang to protect themselves.756 As Halil Inalcık has argued, in the beginning, the use of tufang was not popular among Turks who lived in Anatolia. It became widespread amongst non-Muslim population in Balkan regions, Druzes in Lebanon, Arab, Kurd, Georgian etc. The increase in banditry activities in Balkans, Anatolia and east Asia was related with the diffusion of tufangs among the reaya.757 First of all, it can be said that the prohibition of the bearing guns gained importance when the Safavids danger appeared. The kızılbaş (red-head, the follower of Shia sect of Islam) from Anatolia had close relations with Safavid Shias, and those people were obtaining tufang (rifle).758
Similar to the Mughal Empire, the access to firearms, especially tufang, was very easy and cheap compared to the price of an average horse. Its price was around 300 and 600 akçe.759 Moreover, as we observed from archival documents, some ploughmen manufactured tufangs in their own shops, after which government ordered them to work in tüfek karhanesi (tufang manufacturing factory) for the empire.760 However, those people were always under survelliance of state officer in order to prevent them from selling these tufangs to outside of the factory.761 The easy access and cheap price of firearms became one of the main instruments for the disorders and banditry activities in the Ottoman territories as people desired to be a soldiers to get e revenue or job.762
755 A.{DVNSMHM.d... 10, 544; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 12, 848; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 26, 925; A.{DVNSMHM.d... 19, 311.
756 Mücteba Ilgürel, “İl Erleri Hakkında” [About City Soldiers], Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, 12, İstanbul, 1998, p. 128.
757 Inalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 201.
758 Inalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 195.
759 According to another study the price of a tufang was between three and five kurush which equals to the half price of a horse. Efkan Uzun, “Osmanlı Ülkesinde Görülen İsyan ve Eşkıyalık Olayları Karşısında Alınan Bazı Tedbirler Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme” [An Evaluation of Some Measures Taken Against the Rebellion and Banditry in the Ottoman Country], TÜBAR, 25, 2009, p. 194.
760 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 1889.
761 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 1997. This document mentions about the appointment of Ahmed, Ali, İskender and Süleyman for the manufacture of tufang in the tufang manufacturing factory in the trust of yayabaşı.
762 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 197-198.
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Interestingly, peasants started to give up being farmers and armed themselves by selling their agricultural implements.763 Thus, the use of tufang became popular amongst the Ottoman citizens despite state prohibition by 1570.764
The diffusion of arms and how that created rebellions within the Ottoman territory is best described by the rebellion of Prince Bayezid. It is generally agreed that Prince Bayezid’s rebellion in 1559 was the main reason behind the spread of tufangs amongst the Ottoman citizens. To get an upper hand against his brother prince Selim, he gathered around 30,000 workless and landless young people who were struggling economically. Among these soldiers, he also recruited men equipped with handguns and constituted them under the name of Tüfengciyan.765 Those Ottoman youths who were named as çift bozan reaya or yiğits joined prince Bayezid’s rebel to get an income. Thus, with the accession of Bayezid to the throne, these youths were promised to be made Janissaries. Being a Janissary was a better option for those landless and workless people since they got their salary from the central treasury permanently.766 Therefore, to get this privilege, they supported Bayezid during the civil war and tufang was the main weapon they possessed.
The rebellion of prince Bayezid and the quick diffusion of handguns in Anatolia created a security situation within empire since the end of the 16th century onwards the Ottoman society witnessed suhte rebellions. The main actors of these revolts and disturbance were Turkish students who were getting education in madrasahs especially at the places where Turcoman (Muslim Turks) lived.767 However, the biggest disadvantage for these students was scarce job opportunities, which forced many of these students to banditry activities like plundering of villages, kidnapping girls, and killing people thereby creating a general disorder between 1560 and 1570 with their handguns. They roamed around in groups. In an order from the centre administration it was noted that between the towns of Ladik and Sonisa, 200 suhtes terrorized peoples.768 To contain this, the Ottoman government began to arm tımarlı sipahis who were generally cavalries.
763 Mücteba ilgürel, “Celali Isyanları” [Celali Rebellions], DİA, vol. VII, İstanbul 1993, p. 255.
764 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 197.
765 ilgürel, “Celali Isyanları”, p. 255.
766 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 196-197. Şerafettin Turan, “Şehzade Bayezid” [Prince Bayezid], DİA, vol. V, Istanbul 1992, p. 230
767 Mustafa Akdağ, “Medreseli İsyanları” [Rebellions of Madrasah Students], İÜİFM, 1-4, İstanbul, 1949, pp. 361-387.
768 A.{DVNSMHM.d. 7, 1709.
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Moreover, the reaya was also permitted to have tufang for self-defence.769 However, their activities forced Anatolian peasants to leave their villages, which caused a decrease in production level and tax revenue.
After the rebellion of Prince Bayezid, it is interesting to note that the Ottomans employed the professional handgun users amongst the armed people. The long wars with Habsburg were full of surprise for the Ottoman Empire due to firearms equipped Hapsburg soldiers. The Ottomans realised the ineffectiveness of the cavalry power in the western battlefields as well as the importance of infantry unit armed with firearms. During the long period of wars on the western frontiers between 1593 and 1606 and after witnessing new style of European warfare relying on the use of handguns, it required new military group of people for Ottomans. Many Ottoman commanders reported the central administration about the inefficiency of Ottoman timarli sipahi forces armed with traditional weapons of bow, arrow, lance, and sword against Austrian musketeers. In fact, Commanders urged that paid soldiers, equipped with firearms be sent to the battlefront. Despite their negative conduct earlier, the state employed these for the war and eventually became an important part of empire. In order to meet this deficiency, the Ottoman government hired new infantry units under the name of sekban (hereafter this term will be used for the soldier who carried rifle), levend, azep or gönüllü.770 For example, in an edict to the judge of Sofia it was demanded that the soldiers who were professional handlers of tufang and bow be sent to join the central army.771 Similarly, local notables, pashas, beg were ordered to attend the Ottoman campaigns with their armed soldiers.772 At the same time, the Safavid existence on the eastern border forced the Ottoman government to focus on the east. Lastly, the expansion of the empire stopped and the holding of the existing territories became harder since larger infantry armies required growing resources.
769 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 197.
770 Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 288. Grand Vizier says: “The enemy troops consist mostly of infantry armed with muskets. while the Muslim soldiers are mostly of the cavalry. Also, among our infantry there are very few men skilled in the use of the muskets which causes us great difficulties both in. field battles and in siege.” In 1605, the Grand Vizier requested a special order from the Sultan commanding Mehmed Beg, the governor of Menteshe, “to come to the Hungarian campaign with a large group of tüfenk-endaz sekbans (sekbans equipped with muskets) Quoted from Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 288.
771 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 12, 1076.
772 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 201.
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As explained above, the new recruitment system provided a job opportunity for the landless and jobless Ottoman peasants and youths. They began to leave their villages to be soldiers. It worked mutually for both sides with Ottoman administration getting soldiers and the armed groups getting soldiery jobs. The problem, however, started when the long wars were over. The armed soldiers were released from the army and looked for new job opportunities with their handguns in the services of pashas, begs or nobles. According to Karen Barkey, the banditry in the Ottoman Empire was an artificial social construction, as these groups were gathered by societal elites for their social elite group interests.773 If this was not possible, then, they turned into banditry and brigand activities. Their pressure on peasants deepened the economic and social crisis in the Ottoman Empire. Their activities were in the countryside where peasants and their villages were defenceless.
The released sekbans were gathered and controlled by bölükbaşı, their commanders. This situation led to the emergence of powerful leaders who created havoc in Anatolia in 1595-1610. This was named as Celali Rebellions in the Ottoman terminology. Their activities not only affected the life of peasants, villagers, but also shook the authority of the Ottoman Empire.774 The soldiers who brought chaos in Anatolia were known as Celali. Many peasants left their territories and sought refuge in fortified cities or fled to big cities such as Istanbul, Damascus, and Crimea etc. This period was named as Büyük Kaçgun (Big Flight) in the Ottoman history.
When reaya got concerned about the banditry activities, complaints were made to the Istanbul to pressurise government to issue ferman to have handguns for self-protection. Upon growing requests, Ottoman sultan Murad III had to issue a ferman (edict) allowing the peasants in Anatolia to possess handguns for self-defence against bandits and other dangers. Thus, many people in Anatolian villages had handguns by either allowance or unauthorised. However, peasant misused this freeness by not allowing taxmen into their villages, and even incited tumult, forcing the government to find ways to restrict the possession of handguns.775 Ottoman archival documents show that an
773 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats the Ottoman Route to State Centralization, New York 1994, p. 142.
774 İnalcık, “Diffusion”, p. 201.
775 Mustafa Akdağ, “Celali Fetreti” [Interregnum of Celali], AÜDTCFD, 16 (1-2), Ankara 1958, p. 74.
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order seeking to restrict arms amongst people was passed from centre to provinces776 even as Sublime Porte asked for collection of tufangs from suhtes, levends and peasants, and submitting these to the Ottoman officials.777 Except for Janissaries, sipahis or officers, nobody was allowed to have handguns.778 The Ottoman government supplied these tufangs to its army.779 This is manifested by the happenings in Koyulhisar region. Though there were no tufangs in the hands of Ottoman soldiers at the fort, the town residents possessed high quality ones. When this information reached Ottoman government, it was ordered to collect these tufang from the peasants and then given to soldiers at the fort.780
When celali rebellions and other banditry activities emerged in Anatolia, the Ottoman forces failed to secure the cities and villages since they were sent to the battlefront on the western frontiers. Their absence from the cities encouraged people having firearms especially tufangs. Upon this lack of authority, the Ottoman government decided to establish il erleri (city soldiers) institution in order to protect the villages and cities from these rebel groups. Il erleri consisted of soldiers between 10 to 150 and the head of them was called yiğitbaşı.781 Even though it was a state force, the Ottoman authority never allowed them full authority to even possess these weapons permanently and were to work under the witness of a Muslim judge. For instance, in the Yalak Mountain area, a place nearby Istanbul, as the bandits began to harm peasants and passengers, the Ottoman government launched an edict that Yiğitbaşı Mustafa and peasants from other villages were allowed to use handguns in trust of the judge of Iznik during their fight with the bandits.782
The Ottoman court faced much brigandage in a different part of the empire. In Damascus, Hashim involved in some crimes with his accomplices and took shelter from Durzi society. When the Ottoman forces came to take him, a person named Şerafeddin fought against Ottomans and was captured. In order to rescue Şerafeddin, approximately 1,000 of his partisans revolted against Ottoman forces. In the end, the
776 A.{DVNSMHM.d..7, 1355. according to the order dated 3 May 1568 (H. 6 Zilkade 1568) the rule about the prohibition of having tufang by reaya will remain in force.
777 The collection of tufangs of suhtes, levends and reayas in Amasya A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 1740.
778 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 1709.
779 Uzun, “ibid”, p. 196.
780 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 452.
781 İlgürel, “İlerleri”, p. 128-129.
782 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 12, 148.
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Ottoman court ordered to take their tufangs and disallowed them to have handguns further.783 According to another Ottoman state document, in the village of Ayn-i Dare in the town of Cerd in Beirut, the peasants refused to pay their taxes and attacked the house of the officer with their “enhanced tufang.” The report noted that if no measures were taken against these people, they could create more havoc in the future. The same document reports that in the Muayyed village in Nablus, there was a shelter of bandits who blocked the road of Safed, Leccun, Gaza and Jerusalem.784 The tufangs in the hands of Durzi society were collected with the help of Damascus Governor and judge of Beirut and submitted to the Fort of Damascus.785
These small bandit groups gathered around ambitious men. The first Celali leader among these men was Karayazıcı, who was in the service of Halep governor. When he was dismissed and rendered jobless, he attended the vagrant bands and with time became their leader. The jobless soldiers who fought in the European battlefields joined his band with their handguns. Thus, he became an outstanding factor for the jobless soldiers in the periphery and started their revolt against the Ottoman government by vandalising and plundering the villages, towns and cities. When Karayazıcı came to the front of the fort of Urfa, the city could not bear his attacks and yield to him,786 but they were defeated by Ottoman army eventually.787 After he died, his brother Deli Hasan (Hasan the mad) became the leader of Celalis. The Ottoman government chose the bargain instead of fighting him upon his request. His demand was accepted by the government and he was sent to Rumelia to fight against European armies.788 His agreement with the Ottoman government did not make Tahvil Ahmet and other celalis pleasant who therefore continued with their rebellion. Meanwhile, Kalenderoğlu Mehmet who was also in the service of the Ottoman Empire revolted against Ottoman Empire with his celalis.789
The most dangerous Celali rebellion occurred in West Asia region, mainly in Damascus, Trablussam and Aleppo by Canbolatoğlu with the support of Durzi leader Ma’anoğlu Fahreddin. He defeated Ottoman army and began to behave as an
783 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 5, 1091.
784 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 5, 565.
785 A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 7, 400.
786 Uzun, “ibid”, p. 204, 206.
787 Mustafa Akdağ, Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası…, p. 386-388
788 ilgürel, “Celali İsyanları”, p. 254.
789 Mücteba ilgürel, “Kalenderoğlu Mehmed”, DİA, Vol. 24, Ankara, 2003, p. 256-257.
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independent ruler of the region by establishing the same army institution as the Ottomans. His musketeers were around 16,700 along with cavalry power. He even established an alliance with Toscana ruler as well as other European rulers. He then fought Ottoman army with his 30,000 musketeers, but was defeated by Murad Pasha and Rumelia governor Tiryaki Hasan Pasha. He sought pardon from Ottoman government and was eventually appointed as the governor of Temeşvar. However, he was executed by Kuyucu Murad Pasha.790 The celali and banditry activities in Anatolia continued until Kuyucu Murad Pasha took the control of Anatolia by force.
In addition, the Ottoman history also witnessed the rebellion by one pasha. Abaza Mehmet Pasha who was the loyal servant of the Ottoman Empire revolted by asserting the suicide of Ottoman sultan Osman II by Janissaries in the military coup d’état. He also used armed soldiers in his army and created chaos in Anatolia. Before Abaza Mehmet Pasha attacked the castle of Ankara in 1623, the ammunition in the castle was recorded in 1621. According to this record apart from other ammunition, there were 69 old tufang, 98 new tufang, four small cannons, four şahi cannon and 35 kantar gunpowder. It is possible that in two years the Ottoman centre sent other ammunitions to the castle also. It was, however, not enough to defend a castle, Abaza Mehmet Pasha was unable to capture the inner part of the castle of Ankara with his 2,000 men.791
During rebellion, the handguns played an important role. They hired soldiers with handguns as much as possible. The number of soldiers equipped with firearms cannot be underestimated due to the creation of disturbance in the Ottoman Empire. Canbulatoğlu had more than 30,000, and Kalenderoğlu had about 10,000 soldiers equipped with tufang. Moreover, they also had cannons in their army. For instance, Kalenderoğlu used cannons in the siege of Amasya and Tokat; Abaza Mehmet Pasha deployed them while sieging Kayseri. Abaza Hasan Pasha used cannons against the Ottoman army in the battle of Ilgin.792
Due to the growing need of infantry equipped with firearms during the long-lasting wars with European powers, the Ottoman government found the way by employing
790 William J. Griswold, Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan: 1591 – 1611 [The Great Anatolian Rebellion: 1591 – 1611], Translated by Ülkün Tansel, İstanbul 2000, p. 87-126; Mücteba İlgürel, “Canbolatoğulları”, DİA, Vol. 7, Istanbul 1993, p. 144-145.
791 Uzun, “ibid”, p. 204.
792 Uzun, “ibid”, p. 194-195.
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armed peasants into the army. At the end of battles, they were released from the army and they went to Anatolia. The increase in number of local elites in provincial areas also created decentralisation problem in taxation.793 The emergence of armed peasant groups in the provinces and their recruitment by ambitious local rulers or local notables contributed to the decentralisation of the Ottoman Empire.794 At the beginning, the Ottoman sultans were strong and they had firm control over resources, army and local elites. However, it was shaken by rebellions and long wars of the 18th century. The local notables flourished in the eyalet (states) with the deterioration of the land system.
As discussed in the proceding chapter, the increasing share of mansabdars made zamindari status attractive for ambitious people in Mughal India. In order to maintain its power, the Mughals also adapted themselves to changing circumstance by increasing the zamindari share of the army. Thus, zamindars became stronger. These two similar occurrences brought the terms zamindarisation for the Mughal Empire. Likewise, levendisation in the Ottoman Empire had the same effect in terms of decentralisation.795 With the diffusion of firearms among peasants, both the empires began to spend their efforts and money to suppress them. The dissemination of firearms caused economic strain as well. People not only refuse to pay their taxes without a fight, but also the pressure and activities of armed bandits forced them to leave their territories, leading to decrease cultivation. Ottomans were able to suppress those revolts, but it was hard for them to encounter the developing European military technology, which is called “Military Revolution.”
Rise of West and Ottomans’ Response
The term military revolution was first used by Swedish historian Michael Roberts in 1955. He stated four changes in art of war, between 1560-1660, revolution in tactics, rapid increase in army size, and revolution in strategy in order to bring large armies in action, increased impact of war on society, cost damage, challenges, and burden.796 After Roberts, the most influential military revolution thesis was stated by Geoffrey
793 Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 An Empire Besieged, New York 2007, p. 130.
794 Halil Inalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration”, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History, Edited by Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, Carbondale, 1977, pp. 27-52.
795 Gommans, Mughal Warfare, p. 80.
796 Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660--a Myth?”, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), p. 195-196.
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Parker who modified and extended Robert’s military revolution thesis. Parker puts the gunpowder, firearms and military technology in his thesis and claims the appearance of new type of defence fortification called trace italienne. With the invention and advent of powerful siege guns in the 15th century, they became capable of destroying the walls of towns, as stated by Machiavelli no wall exists, however; thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days. However, as Parker stated military architects designed new fort systems which were able to defence cities against cannon fire. It was called “trace italienne” fortifications with low, but thick walls. However, the cost of the new fortification system was high, therefore trace italienne spread slowly. For example, the Republic of Sienna fell due to embarking upon fortification programme. Those developments required growth in the size of armies. Parker concludes with his reaffirmation: “only military resilience and technological innovation – especially the capital shi infantry firepower and the artillery fortress: the three vital components of the military revolution of the sixteenth century – allowed the West to make the most of its smaller resources in order to resist and, eventually, to expand to global dominance.”797 Thus, governments that were skilful in terms of supplying cannons and trace italianne strengthened their power and facilitated the emergence of centralised states.798
The military revolution in the Europe gave them advantage on the battlefields. The weapons became lighter and it was easy for soldiers to carry these. The range of muskets and cannons increased. Moreover, they were able to destroy shields of soldiers. In the 16th century a musket approximately was 8-10 kg, in 17th century it reduced to 4-5 kg, so even cavalry could carry muskets.799 Parker adds in his military revolution thesis the ocean-going naval technology. This technology along with superior cannon and artillery gave European states opportunity to establish their hegemony over non-European territories such as America, South Asia, and Africa. This can be labelled as “the rise of west.”800 William R. Thompson contended that military superiority would not have be adequate for regional supremacy “without Europeans’ ability to cultivate
797 Parker, Military Revolution, p. 176.
798 Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 5.
799 Inalcık, Osmanlı ve Avrupa: Osmanlı Devleti’nin Avrupa Tarihindeki Yeri [Ottoman and Europe: The Place of Ottoman Empire in European History], Istanbul 2017, p. 217.
800 Parker, Military Revolution, p. 82-114.
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local allies and their ability to manipulate weakness and vulnerabilities of indigenous political structures against their non-European opponents.”801
The janissary corps of the Ottomans was established in the end of 14th century and it was the first permanent army after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Janissaries were trained and not allowed to do business since they were paid from the central treasury. Due to its coordination, ability to use firearms and discipline, Europeans perceived janissaries to be undefeatable. However, the dynamics changed and the Ottoman army was affected. Janissaries began to engage in trade and the wars became their second concern. Moreover, unemployed villagers, young generation became janissary. Although the number of the janissary increased, they were making crowd at the battlefields. In the case of late payment or strength of European armies, they left the battlefields. Most importantly, since they were not trained regularly and not taught to use the same firearms, it was very hard to expect successful tactical and strategic manoeuvres from them.802 It is thus held that there was a reverse trend between European and Ottoman armies in terms of professionalization in military area.
During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans were still one of the biggest world powers, and could stand against European armies even though it was becoming gradually difficult for them. Especially, the long lasting wars with both Habsburgs and Safavids exhausted the Ottoman Empire. Among those battles, between 1593-1606, the 13 years wars were the turning point for the military revolution in Europe. Till that time, Ottomans had dominated battlefields in European frontiers by means of Janissaries, who were infantry armed with muskets and timarli sipahi cavalry power using old traditional weapons, bows, arrows, lance, swords etc. However, they faced with European cavalry using heavy swords, long range muskets and short pistol in 1593-1606 wars.803 This change was realised by Ottoman commanders at the battlefields as they urgently requested for reinforcements of those soldiers who were able to use firearms by writing to the sublime port.804 Hammer, for instance, claims that the Battle of Haçova was the last decisive victory for the Ottomans after which decline
801 William R. Thompson, “The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the World System”, Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), p. 150.
802 Gültekin Yıldız, “Kara Kuvvetleri” [Lannd Forces], Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi: Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri 1792-1918 [Ottoman Military History: Land, Navy and Air Force 1792 – 191], Edited by Gültekin Yıldız, İstanbul 2017, p. 58.
803 İnalcık, Osmanlı ve Avrupa, p. 219.
804 Orhonlu, ibid, p. 98.
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started. The lack of skilful officers in administration and the black fate of the empire, deterioration brought an end for the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Ottomans, Germans achieved many developments in military area including weapons, tactics, and organisation during Thirty Years’ War. The Turkish artillery was unwieldly, ill-served compared to German even though it was innumerable.805
When European states began to improve their military power, called military revolution as discussed above, Ottomans were able to handle the issues in the first period of the revolutions. During this period, Ottomans even had better arms compared to their adversaries according to some researchers. Gabor Agoston does not support Eurocentric approach to the Ottomans about technology. He emphasised on the chemical analyses of the Ottoman’s gunpowder and cannons, which he proved that it did not change from 1464 to 1706. He also stated that Ottomans did not stick to the idea “extreme conservatism of Islam” as Eurocentric historians said. He strictly emphasised that Ottomans kept pace with European military technology.806 According to him, the problem was institutional and not technological. Also, he praises the Ottoman firearms quality. Agoston showed that till the 18th century Ottomans were self-sufficient and the alloy of the Ottoman bronze cannons were almost similar from the beginning and equal to European cannons.807 Besides, Europeans had also the advantage of better order, and efficient supply system.808 Although he accepts that the Ottoman ordnance was far below that of their rivals adjustment ability, hiring European experts, having abundant human and natural sources helped the Ottoman to reduce the gap for a short time. However, it became very difficult to follow technological improvements of European armament industry. Agoston thus argues that “by the time the competitive European war industry was not only qualitatively but also quantitatively superior, the Ottoman Empire could no longer caught up.”809 The age of military revolution and aftermath caused “long wars” which lasted many years810 and was a drawback for Ottomans who were based and organised on Timar system.
805 Hammer, ibid, p. 39-40.
806 Agoston, “Early Modern Ottoman”, p. 14.
807 Agoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation”, p. 104-105.
808 Agoston, “Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power”, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 140.
809 Agoston, “Habsburgs and Ottomans”, p. 138-139.
810 Parker, Military Revolution, p. 43.
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The quality of Ottoman gunpowder and firearms was however criticised by its own subjects in the 17th century. Ottoman historian Naima mentioned the bad quality of gunpowder in the siege of Baghdad in 1630. Similarly, Hüseyin Hezarfen criticised the Ottoman gunpowder that it destroyed the muzzle of cannons, and did not have good range for the cannonballs.811 As the studies revealed the quality of the Ottoman musket was not inferior in the 17th century. They were instead capable of long range than Austrian muskets. However, in 18th century, when the Ottomans used matchlock muskets, European had shifted to flintlock musket already.812
There are two views about the quality of Ottoman guns. Some scholars have described those as poor quality, huge and unyielding pieces compared to European firearms which were smaller and mobile pieces. For example, as chronicled by Karaçelebizade Abdulaziz, the Ottomans had so big cannons that it was not easy to carry those to the battlefield. When Sultan Murad IV campaigned on Baghdad on 1638, the transportation of cannons was discussed in Divan (Council). Grand vizier and other statesmen offered that the transportation should be via rivers since buffalos could perish while pulling canons. Then, 20 cannons were prepared in Baghdad and sent via Euphrates and Tigris to battlefield in 20 days.813
The Ottomans preferred huge and heavy guns, which was, however, hard to transport for sieges during the 17th century. In contrast, Europeans had begun to produce swift mobile field artillery. Less than 200 years ago the same weapons were praised by adversaries of the Ottomans, but the same weapons were considered as useless by European commanders such as Rimonda Montecuccoli. After his Habsburg army defeated the Ottomans at the battle of St. Gothard in 1664, he said:
this enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is awkward to move and it requires too much time to reload and site. Furthermore, it consumes a great amount of powder, besides cracking and breaking the wheels and carriages
811 Rhoads Murphey, “Osmanlıların Batı Teknolojisini Benimsemedeki Tutumları: Efrenci Teknisyenlerin Sivil ve Askeri Uygulamalardaki Rolü” [Attitudes of Ottomans in Adopting Western Technology: The Role of Efrenci Technicians in Civil and Military Applications], Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar Yeni Görüşler [Influence of Ottomans from Some Technological Innovations Developed in the West], Edited by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Istanbul 1992, p. 13.
812 Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries”, Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), p. 196.
813 Yıldırım, Kara Çelebi-zâde Abdülaziz Efendi, p. 35-36.
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and even the ramparts on which it is placed … our artillery is more handy and more efficient and here resides our advantage over the cannon of Turks.814
This battle shows the weakness of the Ottoman army towards German, Austria and Hungarian army’s although it was numerically superior. For Hammer, the Ottoman soldiers lacked military discipline after the reign of Suleiman.815
The domestic production of firearms and ammunition of the Ottoman Empire cannot be underestimated, but it can be criticised in terms of production of heavy, big ordnances. These weapons did not give advantage to the Ottoman army against Europeans armed with rapid fire cannons in mobile field battles. The size of the Ottoman cannons became another level of discussion. When the Austrian captured Ottoman cannons at Orsovo in 1738, they could take only 40 pieces out of 50 pieces due to their heavy weight.816
During the 16th century, Ottoman firepower superiority was the source of concern for Habsburg. The captain general in upper Hungary Lazarus Freiherr von Schmendi advised the emperor to employ Italian and Spanish arquebusiers against janissaries armed with musket. Those advices were not underestimated by Hapsburg and they modernised their army with firearms. Through end of the century, the number of infantry armed with musket in Hapsburg army increased and during the long lasting wars with the Ottomans between 1593 and 1606 they put resistance against the Ottomans.817
The ineffectiveness of the Ottoman firearms was realised by the Ottoman commanders fighting on the European frontiers and they urged the sublime port to take serious steps. In 1601, Austrian were not able to capture the Fort of Kanije as they had to withdraw their soldiers. During the retreat, they left 42 cannons and gunpowder stocks behind them. The Ottoman Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha examined the cannons and he realised their differences from the Ottomans’. He sent them to the Sublime Port along with letter, in which urged the Sultan about their better quality.818 As an Ottoman
814 Grant, “ibid”, p. 191.
815 Hammer, ibid, p. 39.
816 Grant, “ibid”, p. 192.
817 Gabor Agoston, “Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe, 1550–1750: The Ottoman – Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation”, European Warfare, 1350-1750, Edited by Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, Cambridge 2010, p. 125.
818 Orhonlu, ibid, p. 45.
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observer from Bosnia pointed out the European armies “invented hand guns and cannon, that is to say several types of handguns and cannons and they used them excessively”.819
The military, administrative and economic developments of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries got into a reverse trend. Most importantly, the Ottoman Empire was highly centralised with state controlling sources and army during that period. However, the two main branches of the Ottoman army, janissaries who were infantry and provincial forces who were cavalry deteriorated. This resulted in the loss of Ottoman army’s power and sultan’s authority. Nevertheless, the most important negative effect appeared in the production of weapons and ammunition.820
Another reason why Ottoman military technology got into a stagnation was explained by Agoston. He stated that most of the Ottoman gunners, miners, and bombardiers were dead by the end of the 17th century, so Ottomans could not update/improve their warfare methods and military skills.821 The weakness of the Ottoman Empire can be understood from wars they lost to the Europeans. The development in military technology changed the tactic and strategies at the battlefields. In this condition, the superiority of European firearms over the Ottomans was proved.
It is obvious that when the importance and success of cavalry warfare reduced on the battlefields, Ottomans and Mughals began to weaken inevitably. As Gould pointed out the presence of an army equipped with musket was essential to success.822 The emergence of the Ottoman Empire as a strong power with its military, administrative and economic developments forced their mighty rival Habsburg to strength their military structure and economy. Habsburg’s strengthened their out-dated forts by employing famous trace italienne techniques to guard against Ottoman expansion.823
819 Parry, “ibid”, p. 228.
820 Gabor Agoston, “The Ottoman Wars and the Changing Balance of Power Along the Danube in the Early Eighteenth Century”, The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, Edited by Charles W. Ingrao, Jovan Pesalj, and Nikola Samardzic, Indiana 2011 p. 94.
821 Gabor Agoston, the Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue between Europe and Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age”, Science between Europe and Asia Historical Studies on the Transmission, Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge, Edited by Feza Günergun and Dhruv Raina, Dordrecht 2011, p. 32.
822 Andrew G. Gould, “Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), p. 497.
823 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 94-95.
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Against the increased military strength of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans responded by improving their firepower with more infantry using musket.824
Apart from the economic, politic, administrative aspects, the role of superior European military technology and effective manufacturing network is also considered as the main reason for the Ottoman decline. The most effective changes were the development of boring cannon, the shift from matchlock musket to flintlock musket and lightening of field guns and carriages. Inalcık and Quataert stated that the decline of the Ottoman Empire “was as much the outcome of western Europe’s modern economic system as of superior European military technology.”825 Also Bernard Lewis noted:
the Ottomans found it more and more difficult to keep up with the rapidly advancing western technological innovations, and in the course of eighteen century the Ottoman Empire, itself far ahead of the rest of the Islamic world, fell decisively behind Europe in virtually all art of war.826
While Ottomans possessed well-organised, permanent army supported by good logistic system. The first aim of the Ottomans was to manufacture their weapons in their military foundries. However, the long-lasting wars and increasing demand for the weapons and ammunition required the import of new war materials. The developing weapon industry of Germans and its successful use by Austrian army against the Ottomans changed the destiny of the Ottoman Empire in European frontiers. Ottomans lagged behind the developing military technology.827 The Ottoman statesmen realised the importance of military revolution and it consequences occurred in Europe. Therefore, they wanted to take some significant measures to strength the Ottoman army, but they failed to take desired steps due to the critical economic condition. The Ottomans began to lose their territories starting from 1699 onwards, which also meant the loss of raw material sources for the army. The weak economy and reducing tax incomes were big obstacles for the Ottoman to renew its army as they desired. When the Ottomans came across firearms, they were successful in copying, enhancing and using these in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. However, they did not catch the European
824 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 97.
825 Halil Inalcık, “the Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600”, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600, Vol. 1, Edited by Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, Cambridge 1997, p. 22.
826 Bernard Lewis, the Muslim Discovery of Europe, New York 2001, p. 226.
827 İnalcık, Osmanlı ve Avrupa, p. 220.
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technological innovations. Interestingly, the effect of firearm weapons was situated in the centre of warfare with the armed infantry.
Ottomans had the capacity of manufacturing of their firearm weapons within the borders of the empire. They did not really need any foreign source of supply. The strong logistic network gave them advantage against Europeans. However, this situation was not advantageous in the long run as it might hinder the adoption of new technologies and so the Ottomans maintained their traditional military practices.828 However, the Ottomans lost this advantage when military, economic and administrative reforms occurred in Europe. They supplied arms and ammunition to their armies successfully. As a result, European states surpassed the Ottomans in the logistic, military know-how, military technology, tactics and strategy, administrative and economic areas.829
Just like other institutions, it was inevitable for the Ottomans to reorganise its military according to developing technology of the 18th and 19th centuries. Especially timar system began to lose its importance due to long lasting wars. Similarly, janissary corps began to lose its relevance due to its traditional boundaries. The decay of the Ottoman army required new regulations and Ottoman sultans took some steps in this directions. At the beginning Osman II tried to reduce the effect of janissary, but he was murdered by them at the beginning of the 17th century. During the 17th century Ottomans could manage the battles in Europe and Persian frontiers, but the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683 and following 16 years wars against European exhausted the Ottoman economically, military as well in its prestigious.
During the long wars, Ottomans benefited from European mercenaries, who were skilled in the use of muskets, firearm weapons and tactics. In 1596, 250 Christian soldiers fled to the Ottoman camp and offered their service to the sultan. In 1600, unpaid French and Wallachian mercenaries of Papa came under the service of the Sultan. In 1601, Italian mercenaries fled to the Ottoman camp and served till the end of battles. In order to stop these kinds of betrayals, many mutineers were killed, but 400-500 mercenaries escaped to the Ottoman territories. Ottomans then paid them four times what they had received early.830
828 Agoston, “Behind the War Machine”, p. 124.
829 Agoston, “Early Modern Europe”, p. 20.
830 Agoston, “Behind the War Machine”, p. 108.
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At the same, Ottomans also followed the new technological developments in four ways during the 18th and 19th centuries. The first and the most common way was to hire European experts who brought their experience to the Ottoman army. Second was through buying of weapons with huge amount of money from Europeans. Third was to send its own personnel to European countries to receive technological expertise in European schools or armies. Beside these ways, the geographical proximity was an advantage for the Ottomans which allowed them to follow new military technology of European armies. Since the Ottomans fought with those of European armies, they could learn from how the other side fought with new weapons. The capture of European weapons also gave opportunity to the Ottomans to analyse and copy them.831
The central and east European territories were the main interaction areas between the Ottomans and European powers. In terms of military technology transfer, both sides learnt their military skills, tactics, strategies and technology. Especially, Ottomans were good imitators in terms of copying the firearm weapons of Europeans. When the Ottomans conquered the Balkan territories, they learnt mining technology and organisation, ship-building, gun casting technologies. As Agoston has observed after the conquest of the forts from Europeans, the Ottomans used their weapons to fortify the forts.832
The Ottomans were aware of the development of European military technology through their attaché’s as well. They sent reports to the Sublime Porte about the new technological developments, battles, which kind of weapons were used at the battles, and battle tactics etc.833 The Ottoman commanders in the European frontiers gave less idea about their rivals by systemising their available sources, military strengths and weakness. Besides, lack of Ottoman war academies was big obstacle for investigation of the European armies.834
The other way of transition of the Western military technology was through the translation of the related books such as Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban’s treaties on
831 Birol Çetin, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Askeri Teknolojinin Takibi (1700-1900)” [Tracking of Military Technology in the Ottoman Empire (1700-1900)], Türkler [Turks], Vol. 13, Edited by Hasan Celal Güzel and at all, Ankara 2002, p. 813.
832 Agoston, “Behind the War Machine”, p. 113.
833 Çetin, “Askeri Teknolojinin Takibi”, p. 817-818.
834 Agoston, “Ottoman – Habsburg Rivalry”, p. 132.
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warfare, sieges and mines. Many of the books were translated from the 1790s onwards for the students who were trained in newly opened military schools.835 Selim III started the reform in the army, and collected new military science written in Europe and Ottomans studied those books very thoroughly. Finally, they applied those systems to the Ottoman Empire. According to a report, a book mentioned how to reform gunpowder mills and systemise those which took the attention of Ottomans. Moreover, the translation of books related with the production of firearms and ways to make gunpowder in Europe was also reported in the report.836
Trade had a significant role in the dissemination of military technology. Both Ottoman and European rulers forbade the export of arms, ammunition and war materials, but the traders did not stop to maintain their trade. In this direction, many European academicians described the Ottomans as dependents of European imported weapons and war materials. Rhoads Murphey states that “it was neither inferior technology nor inferior tactics which brought about the lessening in the Ottomans’ ability to wage war, but their supply situation.”837 However, when Gabor Agoston has tried to explain the gunpowder imports and domestic production of the Ottoman Empire by using Ottoman archival documents, he has stated that the domestic gunpowder production still met the Ottoman demand until the mid of the18th century.838
In sum, Ottomans tried to follow European military technology as much as possible through different channels. However, it maintained with limited success because when Ottomans engaged with European military technology, they already had begun to lose big territories which supplied raw materials for the Ottoman army consumption. The loss of territory for Ottomans meant loss of raw materials. Besides, economic depression in the empire also forced them to reform the army according to new technological standards.
The Ottomans were willing to learn latest weapon technology from Europeans, but they lagged behind them. The European technicians were hired to follow Europeans’
835 Agoston, “Technological Dialogue”, p. 34.
836 Çetin, “Askeri Teknolojinin Takibi”, p. 815.
837 Agoston, “Behind the War Machine”, p. 113-114.
838 Agoston, “Behind the War Machine”, p. 118.
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developments and to maintain information transfer from Europe.839 The people who were employed to transfer western technology to the Ottoman Empire were named as Taife-i Efrenciyan.
Developments in European military system and alteration in war duration did not remain unanswered by Ottoman administration and were responded through process of various reorganisations. The Ottoman Sultan and statesmen were willing to follow new military technology of European armies. Their attempts to adopt those technologies in the Ottoman army were prevented by old-fashioned people and their notably supporters, janissaries. Within these constraints, they achieved some progress during the 18th and 19th centuries.
One of the important periods in the Ottoman Empire was Tulip Era, 1718-1730, when attempts were made to redefine the imperial identity. Many developments were achieved in this period such as the establishment of press, translation projects of western books in technical area etc. During this period, the valuable offer came from Huguenot representative in Istanbul, De Rochefort. He proposed the establishment of a military technician corps in the Ottoman army according to modern military methods. Since Huguenots had a developed system in the recruitment and grooming of ablest military officers, the proposal could help Ottomans to handle with the future problems. However, the Ottoman government rejected the proposal so as to avoid friction with the traditional allies.840
Ibrahim Muteferrika warned the Ottoman authorities in his book about developments in European armies. He noted that there were good orders of western armies in terms of balanced proportions of infantry, cavalry, and dragoons along with good cooperation among them. Moreover, he emphasised the importance of the training methods, discipline, military regulations and laws, military intelligence, geometric, uniform and volley fire technique for continuous fire. However, Ottomans did not show any willing to adoption of these new developments in the western and Russian armies. Therefore,
839 Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Osmanlıların Batı’da Gelişen Bazı Teknolojik Yeniliklerden Etkilenmeleri” [Influence of Ottomans from Some Technological Innovations Developed in the West], Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar Yeni Görüşler [Influence of Ottomans from Some Technological Innovations Developed in the West], Edited by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Istanbul 1992, p. 126.
840 Virginia H. Aksan, “Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the late Eighteenth Century”, Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts, Istanbul 2004, p. 44-46.
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when Ottoman soldiers went to western frontiers to fight those of armies, they felt the lack of those developments, which then accounted for their repeated defeats at the hands of western armies.841 Like what Muteferrika said at the beginning of 18th century, General Franz Kinsky described the same towards the end of century in 1780 noting that the Ottoman army’s weakness was lack of artillery support and a synchronisation between infantry and cavalry branches.842
While the Ottoman Empire was a threat to the European powers, some European generals, commanders, and statesmen observed the military strength of the Ottomans to find out its weakness and means to defeat it. Among all works, Luigi F. Marsigli who fought against the Ottoman around 1680-1690s described the Ottoman army in detail. His observations and information were systemised and taught to engineers and officers in military academies.843 Marsigli claimed that “it is not valour, numbers or wealth that they (the Ottomans) lack; it is order, discipline and technique.”844 The Grand Vizier Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha in the end of the 17th century, Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha in 1728 and Halil Hamid Pasha in 1768 made attempts to reform the janissary corps, but failed due to janissary pressure. Selim III also made great efforts to reform the army.845
For instance, Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) hired Comte de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha) to reorganise Bombardier Corps. Grand vizier provided Humbaracı Ahmet Pasha training grounds, barracks and a workshop for new corp. Ahmet Pasha organised and trained the corps according to French and Austrian methods that he learned when in their service. With the advice of Ahmet Pasha, the Ottoman government reformed its military structures.846
The second noted European expert who organised Ottoman army was Baron de Tott. He tried to reform Artillery Corps. The main contribution of Baron de Tott was on the
841 Agoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500-1800”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 12, 2 (2011), p. 318.
842 Yıldız, “Kara Kuvvetleri”, p. 62-63.
843 Agoston, “Ottoman – Habsburg Rivalry”, p. 132.
844 Agoston, “Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826”, p. 143.
845 Abdulkadir Özcan, “Osmanlı Devleti Askeri Teşkilatı” [Military Organization of the Ottoman Empire], Hunlardan Günümüze Türk Askeri Kültürü Tarih, Strateji, İstihbarat, Teşkilat, Teknoloji [Turkish Military Culture from Huns to the Present History, Strategy, Intelligence, Organization, Technology], Edited by A. Sefa Özkaya, İstanbul 2019, p. 359.
846 Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of Gazis, vol. 1, Cambridge 2000, p. 241.
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tactical abilities and making suitable the Ottoman fire power to the new Ottoman military structure.847 Choiseul-Gouffier was another person, who helped in the modernisation of Ottoman artillery and trained Ottoman soldiers in contemporary tactics and strategies. However, his efforts came to end because of 1777-1788 Austro/Russo and Ottoman wars.848
The hired European gun masters and engineers became successful in their job at cannon foundry, so Ottomans kept high their motivation by paying their salaries regularly or by increasing it. For example, French master Mösyö Serviye was recruited to reform Industry School.849 Also, German steel master Mösyö Schung was successful and his contract was extended by increasing his salary.850
Starting from the beginning of the 18th century, all the suggestion and warning of people were not obeyed by the Ottomans. The interesting point was that Ottomans did not open corps, which trained officers in western-style warfare till the Tanzimat Era.851 They did not establish any military and technical schools according to European standards until 1770s. In 1772, the first Ottoman school offering military engineering and related sciences were the Artillery School. It was followed by the mathematical school in 1775, which was renamed as Engineering School in 1781. Both schools were established with the assistance of Baron de Tott.852
The most important thing in the battlefield was to keep order against heavy fire of musket and artillery. The army had to retreat and attack simultaneously according to position of the enemy. The combination and syncretisation of infantry with quick and swift artillery became crucial. To make this combination useful, armies needed educated commanders and generals. They had to know about physic, math, the work mechanism of firearms, how to get a fort, how to establish a bridge quickly on the rivers, how many soldiers could manoeuvre in the battlefield etc. All of these required technical understanding and ability.853
847 Çetin, “ibid”, p. 813.
848 Virginia H. Aksan, “Choiseul Gouffier at the Porte, 1784-1792”, Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts, Istanbul 2004, p. 64-65.
849 Y. MTV. 64/10. (3/12/1309).
850 Y. MTV. 307/220. (2/2/1326).
851 Agoston, “Military Transformation”, p. 315.
852 Agoston, “Military Transformation”, p. 315.
853 Yıldız, “Kara Kuvvetleri”, p. 64.
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The new technique achieved by French general Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval created standardisation of the calibres, carriages and the equipment of artillery. With new technique, it penetrated long ranges with less powder charges. The barrel began to be get thinner and lighter with the reduction of powder. This also removed the burst and cracking risks. Moreover, the addition of double bracket carriage increased the manoeuvrability of the artillery. All those new developments in the artillery increased the rate of artillery fire.854
As an Ottoman statesman stated, the weight and size of Ottoman quick fire guns was about 486 kg, which made it almost two times heavier than western models. British quick fire guns were 282.2 kg while Habsburg quick fire guns weighed 295 kg. Besides, Ottomans also had the gun carriage problem and recruited foreign experts to solve this problem since an empty gun carriage weighed around 322.6kg.855
The obvious deficiency was the variety of cannon pieces of the Ottomans. They had many different artillery types that could not catch the standardisation compared to western artillery. The first Ottoman experience of the Gribeauval system was during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774. The Ottoman government believed the quick fire of Russian artillery in the battle of Kartal (Kagul) in 1770 was the reason behind their defeat. The Ottomans found the solution by training new body of gunners in quick firing with light pieces. Sürat Topçuları Ocağı (the Quick-fire Artillery Corps) was established as a branch of Artillery corps. This corps maintained its functions in Istanbul and Bosnia and manufactured iron, copper and bronze cannons.856 By following Gribeauval system, Quick artillery corps became major Ottoman artillery corps. Afterwards at the end of 1787-1792 Russo-Ottoman war, Selim III made serious attempts to reform the army.857
The Ottoman reformers had expected that the Gribeuval reforms would increase the mobility of their artillery, but it did not work as expected. For Şakul there were some
854 Kahraman Şakul, “General Observations on the Ottoman Military Industry, 1774-1839: Problems of Organization and Standardization”, Science between Europe and Asia Historical Studies on the Transmission, Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge, Edited by Feza Günergun and Dhruv Raina, Dordrecht 2011, p. 41; Jeff Kinard, Artillery an Illustrated History of Its Impact, California 2007, p. 150-152.
855 Şakul, “General Observations”, p. 49.
856 Özcan, “Osmanlı Devleti Askeri Teşkilatı”, p. 363.
857 Şakul, “General Observations”, p. 42.
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problems like metallurgical, technological, and organisational responsible for failure of Gribeauval reforms. The quality of raw materials especially copper was not the same in all parts of the empire, so Ottomans had to use low quality copper in some cases. The quality of projectiles was also a reason as complained by British officer Frederich Koehler who was responsible to reinforce Gallipoli against French attack in 1799. Moreover, Ottoman steels were cast in very poor quality, scattered after leaving muzzle. Lastly, organisational problems in military plants, the clash between the old system beneficiary and new system supporters raised the tension among French and Ottoman gun manufacturers, who were fearful of losing their job.858
With new regulations in artillery corps the standardisation of the calibre became an important concern for the Ottomans. As Şakul stated, based on Ottoman archival documents, the first Ottoman regulation was dated 4 March 1805.859 In 1830, another attempt was made for the standardisation of artillery. During this period, Prussia became a new partner which advised sublime Porte to replace balyemez artillery of 3- çap (378kg) by 1.5 çap (297-324kg) quick fire gun due to quick fire gun’s inferiority in terms of range and penetration power compared to Europeans. However, Ottomans were not willing to leave quick fire guns since their easy transportation, which was better for Ottoman roads. However towards end the Ottomans replaced the quick fire guns with balyemez artillery.860
The 18th century battlefields were hard for the Ottoman soldiers because of inadequate gunpowder, weak weaponry, financial problems, and lack of effective leadership, order, discipline and techniques. These problems were realised by Ottoman officers and a reform process was initiated in the army. The first and most important attempt to develop Ottoman army was done by Selim III with the launch of Nizam-i Cedid (new order). With the bad experience of Osman II who lost his life at the hands of Janissaries earlier in his attempts to modernise the army, Selim III treaded carefully by taking his statesmen into confidence. He was suggested with three ideas. The first was the returning back to Suleiman the magnificent’s era which was empire’s most powerful era. Second was to renovate the military in total as per European standards. Third was
858 Şakul, “General Observations”, p. 50-52.
859 Şakul, “General Observations”, p. 43. According to regulation the calibers of the field artillery set as five (9-, 7-, 5-, 3-, 1,5- çap; 11.6, 8.98, 6.41, 3.85, and 1.92).
860 Şakul, “General Observations”, p. 45.
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to maintain traditional army but also supplement it through another European standard army. Amongst these suggestions, Selim III chose the last one. After the feasibility, the new army was organised in Levent as Istanbul Nizam-i Cedid Corps in 1792. The Janissary Corps remained, but Humbaracı, Lağımcı and Topçu corps were aimed to enhance according to the new military technological developments.861
Selim III imported new machinery for imperial Cannon Foundry from Britain and France as he realised the importance of modernisation of the firearms and ammunition after long observing western technology.862 The cannon foundries and rifle works were modernised with the assistance of British and French engineers.863 Just like other military issues and backwardness, Selim III issued direction Janissaries to be armed with new types of European weapons and ammunitions. In this direction, a new musket factory was built at Leven Ciftlik. The attempts of Selim III reached a level where it was hard to distinguish between European and Ottoman weapons.864 The reformist plans of Selim III, however, met with resistance by people who believed traditional Ottoman army was better. The “new model army” of Selim III was dissolved by Janissaries and he was deposed and killed.865
Gunpowder Production in the Ottoman Empire
Historians consider the discovery of gunpowder along with printing as the most important inventions of the middle ages. Many European historians like Hume, Adam Smith and Hallam believed that “gunpowder blasted the feudal strongholds and the idea of their owners.” Johan Huizinga claimed that “rebirth of the human spirit dates from the discovery of firearms.”866
As noted above, Ottomans were self-sufficient in terms of production of gunpowder. However, the loss of Sultan’s power affected the production of weapons, ammunitions negatively. In the 17th century, Ottoman gunpowder mills manufactured approximately
861 Musa Çadırcı, “Yenileşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Ordusu” [Ottoman Army in the Reformation Process], Türkler [Turks], Vol. 13, Edited by Hasan Celal Güzel and at all, Ankara 2002, p. 804; Virginia Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires”, Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts, Istanbul 2004, p. 108.
862 Grant, “ibid”, p. 193.
863 Shaw, Empire of Gazis, p. 263.
864 Grant, “ibid”, p. 198.
865 Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 204-205.
866 J. R. Hale, “Gunpowder and the Renaissance an Essay in the History of Ideas”, Renaissance War Studies, London 1983, p. 389-390.
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761 to 1307 tonnes of powder annually. This amount sharply decreased to 169 tonnes by the second half of the 18th century and thereby Ottomans lost self-sufficiency in gunpowder.867 Datas highlight a decrease in the production levels of gunpowder within the empire territory.868
The disadvantage of non-battle years was pointed out by Mahmud Raif Efendi, who was an algebra and geometry teacher in Mühendishane (Engineer School). He contended that due to 30 years of peace (1739-1768), Baruthane (gunpowder mills) became an ordinary office and lost its reputation and produced worst quality.869 Since the Ottomans continued using old formula of making gunpowder in the 18th century, the Ottomans gunpowder quality turned so worse that it became only good for ceremonial cannon-shots.870 Since it lost military purpose, the Sublime Porte started importing it from European states which had disadvantages in untimely and difficult supply line.871
Starting from 1695, increasing duration of battles required more gunpowder, a condition compounded by the loss of territories. Towards the end of the 18th century the Ottomans were therefore forced to import gunpowder from Europe.872 Ottomans afterwards adopted the British method of gunpowder preparation although it was believed that Ottomans manufactured better gunpowder than Europeans. However, Ottomans needed European technology in time and they found solution by hiring foreign experts.873
In the second half of the 18th century, Ottomans felt the shortage and quality problem of gunpowder especially in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774. In the following years the same problems were observed during another war of 1787-1792. After the catastrophic results of these two wars, Ottomans reorganised and modernised gunpowder mills throughout the empire. The production level and the quality of
867 Agoston, “Ottoman – Habsburg Rivalry”, p. 131.
868 Altuğ Murat Köktaş and Ali Gökhan Gölçek, “Endüstri Devrimi ve Osmanli İmparatorluğu: Askeri Fabrikalaşma Örneği” [Industrial Revolution and Ottoman Empire: Example of Military Fabrication], Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 9(4), November 2016; p. 101.
869 Ihsanoğlu, “Osmanlıların Batı’da Gelişen Bazı Teknolojik Yeniliklerden Etkilenmeleri”, p. 127.
870 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 28-29.
871 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 28-29.
872 Agoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation”, p. 107.
873 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period and Early Contacts with European Science and Technology”, Transfer of Modern Science Technology to the Muslim World, Edited by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Istanbul 1992, p. 28.
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gunpowder increased more than Dutch and British gunpowder’s level. Most importantly, new hydraulic gunpowder mills were established.874
For the production of gunpowder, when Sultan Selim III realised the weakness of gunpowder mills and low quality of gunpowder, he ordered to reorganise the Istanbul Azadlı powder mill according to European standards. Ottoman archival documents reveal that Selim III hired a French expert named Françesko to produce good quality and more gunpowder. He gave all requirements to build two wheels working with water power and animal powers.875 Despite all positive expectations, Françesko could not build those wheels which were broken during test stage. His mistakes were found by an Armenian Ottoman citizen Arakul Dadyan and fixed in better way.876 However, Ottoman government gave another chance to Françesko to share his knowledge with Ottomans working in the Gelibolu and Thessalonica Gunpowder Mills.877
Through the end of the 18th century, modernisation attempts were done by Tevkii Ali Raik Efendi in 1794. Then, Şerif Efendi renewed the Bakırköy Gunpowder Mill along with British expert. The construction of new gunpowder mill called Azadlı increased the production and quality of the Ottoman Empire and after 1795, the domestic production of gunpowder of the Ottoman Empire became sufficient for the army.878 The new methods and technology applied in the Ottoman gunpowder mills gave good results. After the new powder mill, Ottomans produced around 1000 tonnes per year and same quality as produced in Europe.879 Mahmud Raif Efendi explained the development in following words:
we have reached such an excellent state that one ounce (30,5gram) of the new gunpowder is eight times more powerful than the old one. We no longer need the foreigners; our warehouses are filled with sufficient supplies to use in the battlefields. We have even started to export them.880
874 Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 199.
875 Hatt-ı Humayun, 206/10820 (29.12.1212).
876 Mehmed Tanju Akad, Bir Savaş Nasıl Kaybedilir? Selçuklu, Osmanlı Tarihinde Askeri Hatalar, [How to Lose a War? Military Mistakes in Seljuk and Ottoman History], İstanbul 2009, p. 131.
877 BOA, C. AS. 1046/45970.
878 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III, 1789-1807, Cambridge 1971, p. 142-144.
879 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 29.
880 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 29.
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Standardisation of Military Structure
Before the 18th century and their encounters with European powers, Ottomans held an upper hand over others. However, the dynamics changed in the 18th century and gradually Russian and Habsburg began to defeat the Ottoman armies, which prompted the Ottomans to attempt modernisation of their army along European lines. The first reforms mainly concentrated on technological aspects, which, however, yielded limited results. Ottomans needed to take holistic measures including logistic, tactical, economical and academic to achieve success. Firstly, with the establishment of war academies, many engineers were educated in physics, chemises, and metallurgy. They used their knowledge in the production of new technological weapons. Above all, the army organisation, war method, and other military necessities on the battlefield became more scientific.881
Ottomans, however, failed to plan in terms of establishing the ministry of war. Systemization and bureaucratisation of military in Europe led to the establishment of War Ministers that were responsible for improvements of weapons, clothes of soldiers, the supply of weapons, training of soldiers, and food arrangement. Because of War Ministries, new technological improvements were happening in all military aspects. From the head of army to the ordinary soldiers and officers there was harmony. Their trained and educated soldiers and officers were better than Ottoman officers in terms of military science knowledge. Besides, Ottomans were also not successful in adjusting their military personnel and tactics to the new warfare in Europe.882 The problem of Ottoman military’s modernisation programme was also its lack of continuity and persistence. This was manifested by how Ottomans converted the old foundries erected by Baron de Tott in Hasköy to manufacture rapid fire cannon for assembling old-style muskets and bullets after Tott left.883
However, the Ottomans were not lucky in this reform process. In Selim III period, the achievements could not be concluded due to Napoleon Bonaporte’s unexpected attack
881 Fatih Yeşil, “Mühendis ve Tarihçi: Askeri Tarihçilikte Disiplinlerarasılık ve Asker-Sivil Diyaloğu” [Engineer and Historian: Interdisciplinary and Military-Civil Dialogue in Military Historiography], Osmanlı Askeri Tarihini Araştırmak: Yeni Kaynaklar, Yeni Yaklaşımlar [Researching Ottoman Military History: New Sources, New Approaches], Edited by Cevat Şayin ve Gültekin Yıldız, İstanbul 2012, p. 24-25.
882 Agoston, “Ottoman – Habsburg Rivalry”, p. 133.
883 Grant, “ibid”, p. 193.
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on Egypt. Since engineers were French, they had to leave Ottoman territories, thereby undoing all Ottoman investments and rendering projects incomplete.884 This was however not the only reason behind failure of reforms. As Parker says “westernisation of war also required replication of the economic and social structures and infrastructures, in particular the machinery of resource-mobilisation and modern finance, on which the new techniques depended.”885
Industrialisation attempts of Ottoman Empire in the 18th century followed two ways. Maintaining the old technology and production style while establishing new industrial zones according to European standards. The first steps were taken for the army. Since industrial revolution, the production level of Europeans reached high level, it became different for the Ottomans to catch up. Firstly, the native accumulation of capital was not enough to establish and enhance the new industrial areas. Ottomans had to imitate and copy the European technology through different channels. Consequently, in the end, in order to cope with European powers at the battlefields, Ottomans became dependent on European technology. In this period, in order to afford the battles, Ottoman Empire had to change its land system from timar to iltizam then malikhane. Landlords or local notables began to rent territories from the Ottoman government in return for cash. The revenue colleted from local notables was used to finance the wars and not to start an industrialisation period. The condition worsened in the 19th century forcing the Ottomans to invite foreign capital to the country, which in turn, led to mounting debt from Europeans.
As evident from the above analyses, Ottomans realised that their traditional methods of warfare and its technology were not sufficient to the defeats against European armies and Russia and therefore, the need for the reorganisation of army in the western fashion.
From Core to Periphery
Soviet politician Leon Trotsky stated that “war is the locomotive of history.” Wars provide humankind different experiences including destructive memories, tears, fears
884 Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, “15-19. Yüzyıllar Arasında İstanbul’da İmalathane ve Fabrikalar” [Manufacturing & Factories in Istanbul between 15th and 19th Centuries], Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar Yeni Görüşler [Ottomans and Western Technology: New Research New Perspectives], Edited by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Istanbul 1992, p. 67.
885 Parker, Military Revolution, p. 174.
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etc. and technological improvements. The 16th, 17th and 18th centuries were full of wars, which were different from previous wars in terms of duration, technology and destructiveness. All nations required better arms and ammunition for protection, which made researches to work for the improvement of technology. This new trend increased the importance of raw materials, which gave rise to mercantilism. This trend also required strong treasury which could only be afforded by strong central governments. As long as those governments controlled taxation and production of firearms, they progressed and united, which became a precursor to the emergence of nation states. As Krause has emphasised “only rich states were capable of bearing the enormous cost of the new warfare. They were eventually to eliminate the independent cities.”886
There were two important factors in the 18th and 19th centuries that changed the nature of European societies. The first one was the political-administrative structure in France and England, and the second was related to the development of capitalism in England. With the changes in economic system, the bourgeoisie became a main actor by dominating the world markets. By late the 16th century the centre of production and innovation shifted to England. The growth of British army industry went parallel with their military and political rise. Apart from British, low countries like Italy, Germany and Sweden became producers of firearms in good quality and quantity. The first tier countries became the main exporters of the arms. Then, there emerged second tier states like France, Russia and Spain. The arms industry enjoyed significance in these states with encouragement from their governments. However, the countries and regions such as Portugal, Ottoman Empire and India failed to upgrade their technologies. Third tier producers continued to emulate with much effort the European states.887
As Agoston has claimed, the quality of Ottoman cannons was equal to those of Europeans till the end of the 17th century. Apparently, the Ottomans followed western military technology through experts hired from Europe and also by translating the literature on military technology.888 However, the situation began to change gradually from the 18th century. The transferring of guns from the West was not sufficient to follow the European states, which gradually widened the gap in the long term and made
886 Krause, ibid, p. 36.
887 Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, Cambridge 2006, p. 39-48.
888 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 27.
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the situation difficult for Ottomans. As Ihsanoglu has aptly put it, “the assimilation of the system of war, which changed as a whole in connection with the technical and tactical fields was difficult.” With the change in the nature of wars, the Ottomans encountered new problems with the core of its army and timar system out-dated and wars lasting long years.889
According to Murphey, there were two reasons behind failure of Ottomans to follow the European technical developments. One was when European states established central authority (centralisation), they limited/restricted the flow of information. This interestingly was the period when Ottoman Empire began to lose its control over periphery (decentralisation). The second reason was the decrease in the obtaining necessary materials due to weather conditions and European mercantilist approach.890 Both these factors contributed to a decline in the Ottoman military power since the firearm weapons became weak compared to Europeans.
Starting from beginning, the states made considerable efforts to hide their new technological developments in their armies by prohibiting the weapons and raw materials. The rise of Islamic empires and their threats to western countries forced popes and Christians rulers to prohibit any export of strategic war materials. However, there still were ready to sell armaments and war materials to the Ottoman Empire, especially in the western frontiers to make big profits.891 In the 19th century, it was, however, observed that European powers did not apply any restriction to the Ottoman Empire. For example, after the abolishment of Janissary Corps, Ottomans purchased many materials from Europeans, which turned the Ottoman Empire dependent on European technology while losing its self-sufficiency.892 Moreover, with the spread of American weapons across the world, the Ottoman Empire became the biggest customer for them.893
889 İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period”, p. 27-28.
890 Murphey, “Osmanlıların Batı Teknolojisini Benimsemedeki Tutumları”, p. 8-9.
891 Agoston, “Merces Prohibitae”, p. 180-181.
892 Edward C. Clark, “Osmanlı Sanayi Devrimi” [Ottoman Industrial Revolution], Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi: Yeni Araştırmalar Yeni Görüşler [Ottomans and Western Technology: New Research New Perspectives], Edited by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Istanbul 1992, p. 43-44.
893 Jonathan A. Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism, Cambridge 2007, p. 15.
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The industrial revolution, which started in England and spread to other European countries, changed the socio-economic structure of Europe. Thus, they began to look for new markets for increasing demands. The industrialisation began with textile industry, and continued with mechanisation. This also affected the military industry positively and with the European powers being core, they began to exploit the periphery. According to Wallerstein, the Ottoman Empire was outside the capitalist world economy at beginning, but was incorporated into it by Europeans gradually. In other words, “the Ottoman Empire was no longer a world-empire, but simply one more state located within the boundaries of the capitalist world economy.”894 Wallerstein contends that the capitalist European world economy absorbed Russia, the Ottoman Empire, India, West Africa and other peripheral zones in the period of 1750-1873.895 What caused this incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world system was its requirement of improved European technology, which was necessary to avoid political domination of the European states. However, this integration resulted in perphalisation of the empire. Now, the core became European countries. The more they depended on European technology, the more it integrated into world system.
According to neo-Marxist theorist Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory, the world is divided into three types of countries; Core, Periphery and Semi Periphery. The core countries are the dominant capitalist countries. They exploit periphery and semi-periphery countries in terms of raw materials, and human power. Their main power comes from their strong military. Beyond this basic explanation of world system theory, the history manifests that the core countries do not always remain core and changed according to different factors and many empires came and went. Ottoman and Mughal empires were the two influential empire during the 16th century. They militarily dominated their region and used their own sources. Nevertheless, they lost their power against rising European empires from the 18th century.
As far as dependency theory was considered, it is obvious that the Ottoman Empire was self-sufficient in military aspects till the end of the 17th century. Although there were Europeans experts in the manufacturing industry, Ottomans were successfully producing gunpowder and casting cannons. However, the dependency of the Ottomans
894 Immanuel Wallerstein, “the Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-economy: Some Questions for Research”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter, 1979), p. 389, 391.
895 Wallerstein, “ibid”, p. 392.
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to European military technology increased during the 18th century. The continuous developments in artillery and handguns, the functional military academies that trained commanders, securing raw materials from other parts of the world contributed to the rise of western countries. During the 18th century, Ottomans needed European experts, tacticians for their foundries and academies. The loss of the territories caused the loss of raw material sources. Technologically, Ottomans needed standardisation in their artillery, which came from Europe. Ottoman soldiers were required to adopt themselves to new tactical, strategic battles, combats, adopt to new firearms as well as the management of infantry and cavalry units. This is why European experts were important for them.
The dependency cannot be restricted with the amount of imported materials. Agoston shows that though Ottomans bought war materials from British during the 16th and 17th centuries. However, they were still self-sufficient in terms of supplying war materials. This situation is also supported by the contemporary documents. However, until the introduction of many wide-ranging and economic reforms of European countries, the Ottomans handled with the supply of war materials. In terms of the higher quality of the weapons of Europeans, war industry, military technology and know-how, finance, bureaucracy, scientific infrastructure and state patronage they enjoyed upper hand over Ottomans.896
It is generally believed that the corruption in the Ottoman military system began in the era of Suleiman the magnificent with the violation of laws and orders. From that time Ottomans tried to take precautions in reorganising the military system. The year 1699 was disastrous for Ottomans, but they recovered quickly from this situation and defeated their adversaries in Prut in 1711 and Austro-Russo war 1736-1739. After the Belgrade treaty in 1739, Ottomans did not enhance its military technology as expected. Meanwhile, Austria, Russia and Prussia were developing their army in terms of technological, tactical, strategic manner and discipline. Moreover, since they continued to fight each other or other powers, they found opportunities to enhance and to try their military technology. On the other hand, from the Belgrade treaty in 1739 to 1768 Ottomans followed a peace era, and did not fight in a single battle. They were neither
896 Gabor Agoston, “Merces Prohibitae: The Anglo-Ottoman Trade in War Materials and the Dependence Theory”, Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie, Anno 20 (81), Nr. 1, the Ottomans and the Sea (2001), p. 191.
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involved in Austria wars (1740-48) nor in seven year wars (1756-1763). These 30 years were enough to initiate stagnancy in the military industry. When Ottomans returned to European battlefields, they faced with difficulties against new European weapons and strategies.897 As Ottomans did not fight 1740-46 War of the Austrian Succession and 1756-1763 Seven Years’ War, they could not adopt to the new developments in military technology as Russia did.898 Jeremy Black maintains “the warfare of 1740-62 was a period of testing, (…) It led to a determination to replace what had been found inadequate, and a drive to ensure that armies (and societies) were in a better state for future conflicts.”899
Battle of Petrovaradin and Loss of Belgrade, 1716-1718
The Ottoman army had a remarkable success at the battle of Venice in 1715 as they fought at one battlefield. That success encouraged them to stage an attack on Petrovaradin controlled by the Habsburgs in 1716. Habsburgs war tactics, skills and techniques inflicted heavy losses on the Ottoman army by its famous Commander Prince Eugen at the Petrovaradin Battle. The costly war not only made the Ottomans lose its Grand Vizier, a great number of soldiers and its military base at this battle feld but also the loss of huge weaponry, military equipments and most importantly its prestige among the world powers.
The imperial army led by Eugene de Savoy was around 70,000, and gathered at Futak on the left of Danube River. On the other hand, Ottoman army was under the command of Grand vizier Damad Ali Pasha and was gathered on the right bank of Danube River.900 The Habsburg army was well positioned in the battle area. At the left side there was marshal and at the right side there were hilly places. Eugene strategically
897 Mehmet Mert Sunar, “Yeniçeri Ocağı’nın Kısa Bir Tarihçesi” [A Brief History of Janissary Corp], Hunlardan Günümüze Türk Askeri Kültürü Tarih, Strateji, İstihbarat, Teşkilat, Teknoloji [Turkish Military Culture from Huns to the Present History, Strategy, Intelligence, Organization, Technology], Edited by A. Sefa Özkaya, İstanbul 2019, p. 591.
898 Sunar, “ibid”, p. 591.
899 Jeremy Black, “Revolutionary and Napoleonic Warfare”, European Warfare 1453-1815, Edited by Jeremy Black, New York 1999, p. 225.
900 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 103
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made a good decision. The Ottomans had only light field pieces with them and heavy pieces were brought late to the army camp.901
The Ottoman army consisted of 40,000 janissaries and 30,000 provincial troops not including Tatars and Wallachian forces and 50,000 other forces, which totalled to 120,000.902 The Grand Vizier chose a defensive place and ordered army’s position be strengthened with wagons. After the end of the first skirmishes between vanguards of the two armies, both sides credited themselves as victorious. However the disproportionate loss of 8,000 Habsburg soldiers against 3,000 Ottoman soldiers gave Ottomans a moral advantage.903 The two army’s came to battlefield and war began with the artillery fire of the Ottomans on the infantry defended trenches made by Surmeli Ali Pasha previously.904 After Ottomans’ heavy fire, Euguene decided to attack the Ottomans on 5 August 1716. The aim of Eugene was to take out janissaries from their trenches starting from the left wing. Meanwhile, janissaries had attacked habsburg’s right wing, but successful counter attack of imperial army’s cavalry led by Janos Palffy stopped the Ottomans. Although janissaries fought bravely, the imperial army pushed them back by five kilometres.905 During the war, Habsburg infantry also stopped Ottoman cavalry from helping Janissaries. Habsburg army protected its order that became a defining reason for defeat of Ottomans.906
This victory encouraged Eugene to besiege Temesvar, a strong Ottoman fortress in the region. After 43 days siege, he was able to capture the fort and began to make preparations for next year’s campaign on Belgrade. In 1717, he marched towards Belgrade with 100,000 men along with 100 field guns and siege artilleries. Ottomans were 30,000 soldiers and 600 cannons in the city. However, until the Ottoman army came to help under the command of Grand Vizier Haci Halil Pasha, Hapsburg had severely bombarded the city. The Ottoman army according to contemporary sources was not well-disciplined and well-trained compared to Hapsburg army. Since Halil Pasha was aware of it, he decided against engaging Eugene’s army in open battlefield.
901 Hakan Karagöz, Petervaradin Muharebesinde (1716) Habsburgların Osmanlılardan Ele Geçirdiği Silahlar Ve Harp Teçhizatı” [Weapons and War Equipment Seized by Habsburgs from the Ottomans in the Battle of Petervaradin (1716)], Tarih Dergisi, Sayı 59 (2014 / 1), İstanbul 2014, p. 86.
902 Karagöz, “Petervaradin Muharebesinde”, p. 110.
903 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. 4/1, Ankara 2011, p. 117.
904 Karagöz, “Petervaradin Muharebesinde”, p. 86.
905 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 104.
906 Karagöz, “Petervaradin Muharebesinde”, p. 86-87.
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He chose opening heavy artillery fire on the Christian forces from both the city and Ottoman field army. Eugene’s strategic manoeuvre saved the imperialist army from the firepower of the Ottomans. He decided to attack Ottoman army and was able to capture the city and Grand Vizier’s camp as well.907 “The Turkish outposts were negligent; the discipline of their whole army was lax; they had slept in careless confidence; they woke to panic confusion; and when once the Christian columns were within their works, the greater part of them fled without even attempting resistance.”908 Eventually, in 1718 two sides signed the Peace of Passarowitz and Austria was given Banat, Wallachia and northern Serbia including Belgrade.909
In the battle of Petrovaradin, Habsburg armies were better trained compared to the Ottoman army. As being president of the Court War Council (1703-1736), Eugene of Savoy put huge efforts to reform and train Habsburg armies. On the contrary, Ottomans seemed less capable of adjusting their military personnel and tactics to the changed nature of warfare. This weakness of the Ottoman army was also realised by Ottoman observers and they urged the Sublime Port to developing European military technology.910
Battle of Bhaganva, 1735
As mentioned in previous chapter, Nader Shah was an ordinary person, but he proved himself in military tactics and strategies in a short time. What made him successful was his personal interest for firearms, especially to handguns called jazayir. He established a good unit of jazayirchis infantry and it became most trusted branch in his army. He attended many battles as Commander and lost only one battle, which was against the Ottomans. However, he quickly recovered his position and took revenge from Ottomans. In his victory over Ottoman Empire the prominent factors were effective use of gunpowder weapons, tactical and strategical superiority.
The first three decades were problematic for the Ottoman Empire on the European frontiers. They lost many territories as well as reputation, money, and able commander cum statesmen in the battlefields. On the contrary, the same period was marked the rise
907 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 104-105.
908 Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p. 102.
909 Jeremy Black, European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660-1815, New York 2007, p. 67.
910 Agoston, “Changing Balance of Powers”, p. 105-106.
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of Nader Shah in Persian territories. His successful campaigns and suppress of landlords gave him a glorious reputation. Also, he gathered many warlords under his command. The condition of the Ottoman Empire encouraged him to attack Ottomans. In this direction, he wanted to capture Baghdad from Ottomans which had strategic and geopolitical importance in the region. When Nader Shah strengthened his position in Persia, he besieged Baghdad. However, Topal Osman Pasha defeated Nader Shah at the battle of Ducum who had to escape to Hamadan and Kermanshah.911 After the defeat, Nader Shah’s first aim was to keep high morale and loyalty of his remaining soldiers, who lost their possession and weapons. Therefore, he intended to return and fight Topal Osman Pasha before the defeat in Baghdad could spread.912
Although Nader Shah faced the revolt of Mohammed Khan Baluch in Iran, he continued his march on Topal Osman Pasha and reached the Plain of Lailan by the 24 October 1733. The first skirmish between two armies was indecisive. While Ottoman soldiers withdrew within the walls of Kırkuk, Nader marched towards north-east to Surdash. Meanwhile, he was informed by his scouts that 12,000 Ottoman soldiers were marching towards him. Nader Shah quickly made a war plan and positioned his soldiers above the Ottoman soldiers in the Aq Darband valley. He sent his veteran jazayirchi infantries, who were armed with heavy calibre muskets.913
For two hours the two armies kept up a duel of musketry at close range. After that, the Persian army came forward and broke Ottoman centre. Then, the attacks from the flanks by Nader Shah’s soldiers caused a panic in Ottoman army. When Topal Osman Pasha lost his life with the musket balls, Ottoman soldiers ran to their camp and abandoned their artilleries. Nader Shah ordered to pour heavy fire on fugitive. In this battle Ottomans lost 20,000 soldiers.914 Upon decisive victory of Nader Shah, Ahmet Pasha sent his words to him to open negotiation. They agreed a treaty on 19th December 1733 and peace was established.915
911 Abdurrahman Ateş, Avşarlı Nadir Şah ve Döneminde Osmanlı-Iran Mücadeleleri [Ottoman-Iranian Conflicts in the Period of Afsharli Nadir Shah], Süleyman Demirel University, Institute of Socia Sciences, History Department, Unpublished PhD thesis, Isparta 2001, p. 85-90.
912 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 137-138.
913 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah a Critical Study Based Mainy Upon Contemporary Sources, London 1938, p. 73.
914 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 141.
915 Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 75.
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In a short time, Nader Shah defeated Ottomans and supressed the rebellion of Mohammad Khan Baluch. This not only gave him prestige but also an opportunity to stabilise his position politically. His next aim was to remove Ottoman forces from Persian territories. Meanwhile he received two missions from Ottomans and Russians. While Ottomans intended to make peace with Nader Shah, Russians aimed to convince him for a new war against the Ottoman Empire.916 The Russian diplomat Golitzin was very experienced and played very crucial role to convince Nader Shah to attack Ottomans.917 Whether Russian’s offer was there or not, Nader Shah’s intention was to attack Ottomans. By claiming that the Ottomans did not keep the terms of peace made with Ahmet Pasha previously in December, he launched war against the Ottoman Empire by marching on Shamokhi. He defeated Ottoman forces and besieged Ganja on 1734. Meanwhile, he had Russian’s support.918
In the siege of Ganja, Nader Shah followed very aggressive way. He bombarded city with his cannons fiercely, but the siege artilleries of the Ottomans outgunned Nader’s in terms of number, weight of shot and shot range. He tried his chance by digging several mines and tunnels to explode the walls with gunpowder. However, Ottomans responded quickly and he could not achieve his intention. Due to the weakness of Nader’s firearms against Ottoman siege artilleries, Russians sent engineers and four bombardiers with some heavy siege artilleries.919
The reason why Ottomans were successful in siege warfare against Persia was that thy got experience during their European warfare. At that time, Europeans accomplished many achievements in the science of siege warfare. Ottomans also hired French engineer and military architect Vauban who was expert in siege warfare. Thus, Ottomans were experienced and trained in the siege warfare. Consequently, Nader Shah equipped a large army with firearm weapons, and trained his soldiers to use them on the battlefield effectively. Thus, Nader Shah’s aim was to bring Ottomans in an open battlefield. However, since Koprulu Abdullah Pasha knew the superiority of Persian firearms at the battlefield, he did not bring his army out.920
916 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 145.
917 Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 81-82.
918 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 145-146.
919 Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 85.
920 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 147-149.
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After some time, Nader Shah marched towards Yerevan, where Ottomans held it. Upon Nader’s threat, Abdullah Pasha began his march with 50,000 cavalries, 30,000 Janissaries and 40 cannons. The news was received by Nader Shah that Abdullah Pasha had crossed Akhurian River (Arpaçay Nehri). This was the opportunity that Nader Shah desired and so he marched as soon as possible to encounter Ottoman army with his advance guard.921
The two armies encountered in the afternoon. Nader Shah sent some of his hiding soldiers in wood and valley. He also charged on the Ottomans with 3,000 men from the hill, where Persians camped overnight. These men called Jazayirchis were reliable and the most trusted unit of Nader’s army. Jazayirchis were ordered to attack from small hill, where Abdullah Pasha deployed his artilleries. The capture of Ottoman artilleries by Persians created havoc and Ottoman soldiers began to leave their positions. Since the artillery was considered the main strength of the Ottoman army, their loss demoralised the Ottoman troops.922
Meanwhile, another unit of Persian army had attacked on the left wing and the centre of Ottoman army to capture Ottoman artilleries. Thus, Nader Shah neutralised Ottoman artillery. Then his cannons supported by 500 or more zamburaks began to pour heavy fire on the Ottoman centre, where the strongest unit was situated. When the Ottoman soldiers flew from the battlefield, Nader Shah ordered his cavalry and his hiding troops to attack Ottoman soldiers. In the end, Nader Shah won a decisive victory and many Ottoman commanders lost their lives.923
Axworthy describes Nader’s victory by underlining on the role of firearms with following words:
he defeated the Ottomans with a much smaller force: it seems the main Persian army never made contact. The numbers of the Ottoman army were as much an impediment as a strength. Their unwieldy bodies of troops were slow to manoeuvre and the small, trained, cohesive bands of Persians always had the initiative. Once again, the key had been firepower (…). The Ottoman guns had fired only two or three times, but the Persian cannon had fired 300 balls or more. Nader had achieved
921 Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 87-88.
922 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 151-152.
923 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 152.
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superiority in artillery by his pre-emptive action against the Turkish cannon; enabling him thereafter to gun down the Ottomans with his own artillery and zanburaks without opposition.924
Battle of Kagul, 1770
Starting from Tsar Petro I, the Russians aimed to capture southern Ottoman territories to reach seas. In this context, they attacked Ottomans from Balkans, Caucasus, and north of black sea region. This aggressive policy of the Russian concerned Ottomans, but they needed to take precautions both militarily and politically. Ottomans aimed to establish an alliance with Prussian, which however did not come to realisation. The military revolution was not effective compared to Russians, who enhanced their army according to modern requirements.
When empress of Russia Catherina II came to power, she followed an aggressive policy over Ottomans. She involved in Ottomans domestic issues in Georgia and Balkans and provoked these societies against Ottoman rule. In 1763, when king of Poland August II died, Catherina II supported Paniatovsky as new king of Poland and she became successful in 1764. Although this issue was protested by the Ottomans and European states, the Sublime Porte warned the Crimea Khan, Begs of Wallachia and Bogdan to not involve in this election.925
However, with oppositions against Paniatovsky, Russians requested help from the Ottomans in return of Podolia. The Sublime Porte found himself in the middle of occurrences due to the supports of French and Crimean Khan against Russia’s sufficive policy and the pressure of some Ottoman statesmen who wanted to get rid of passive policy.926 Muhsinzade Mehmet Pasha, who served army on European frontiers, urged Sublime Porte to not declare war against Russia due to weak defence positions and the poor condition of the Ottoman army, but was dismissed from duty of Grand Vizier.927 This shows the corrupted stat mechanism of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, when we look at the Russian army, the order and discipline in the Russian army was at high level.
924 Axworthy, the Sword of Persia, p. 153.
925 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. 4/1, p. 356-359.
926 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. 4/1, p. 365.
927 Yuzo Nagata, “Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa”, DİA, vol. 31, İstanbul 2006, p. 49.
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Manoeuvre capability of infantry, cavalry and artillery increased and bayonet became essential part of handguns in close fight.
Russian army began its march on 22 March 1769. When they besieged Hotin Castle, Ottoman soldiers defeated them. Upon this victory, the Ottomans thought that Russians would not attack again and decided to go out for plunder. In this point, one of the weakness of the Ottoman army appeared. Commander of the castle Vizier Hüseyin Pasha did not allow them to leave the fort, but he was killed by soldiers. Russians thought this was an opportunity to take castle, but were defeated with the help of subsidiary powers of the Ottoman army. Though Ottomans were victorious, but it also showed the ill-discipline of the army.928
The two unsuccessful besiege attempts demoralised Russian soldiers, but they did not give up easily and tried for third time with the order of the Catherina II. Ottoman commander Abaza Mehmet Pasha began to march with Canikli Ali Pasha. The two armies fought in Izvance in July 1769. In order to bring Ottoman soldiers in their artillery range, Russian soldiers pretended withdrawing. Russians managed to convince Ottomans and when Ottomans entered the fire range of Russian artillery, many soldiers lost their lives and remaining part had to take shelter in the castle of Khotin. However, Russians again had to retreat with the arrival of the Ottoman powers. Nevertheless, in the following days Russians took over fort with their superior artillery power.929
In the battle of Kagul, Ottomans faced order problem and lack of leadership ability of commanders along with better quality weapons. When Ottoman soldiers crossed Danube River, they encountered Russian army that was following Tatar forces. Russians firstly were surprised when they saw the Ottoman army consisted of more than 100,000 soldiers. Russian commander Ruzmanov defended himself with only 18,000 soldiers who were trained effectively. That was the place where Russian army was badly defeated by Baltacı Mehmet Pasha in 1711 therefore; Ruzmanov did not want to face with same destiny. However, the Ottoman commander did not use the number advantage against Russians and ordered to dig trenches of more than three times. Russian soldiers were armed with good quality weapons and they were in an
928 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. 4/1, p. 375-377.
929 Karagöz, Canikli Ali Paşa, Unpublished PhD thesis, Ondokuz Mayıs University, Institute of Social Sciences, History Department, Samsun 1998, p. 31-34.
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order. When the battle began, the Russian soldiers put up resistance, but after five hours later, Ruzmanov realised that his army was going to weaken slowly. He decided to attack with their rifles to protect his army. The attack of Russians surprised Ottoman soldiers and they began to run into trenches.930 The importance of firearms at this battle has been highlighted by Jeremy Black as “the columns relied on firepower to repel Turkish assaults and included mobile light artillery. A major role was also played by bayonet charges: firepower was followed by hand-to-hand fighting.”931
The 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman Wars ended with defeats for Ottomans. Two confrontations in these long wars deserve attention in terms of military technology, tactical and strategical differences. The first one was the siege of Hotin in 1769 and the second was the battle of Kagul in 1770.932 With the growing Russian threat for its Eastern policy, the French government decided to help the Ottomans to strengthen their army against Russia. A couple of French officers reinforced some major Ottoman fortress (Khotin, Ozi), gun foundries and naval arsenal.933
The loss of battle of Kagul was not only based on lack of leadership, inferior quality of weapons, tactical and strategical mistakes but also on the Ottoman government’s mistakes. It became clear that as Aksan asserted, Ottoman army shifted from professional army to “volunteer”, militia-based army. It was totally unprepared for any campaigns.934 Further, when the war between Ottomans and Russians broke out, the Ottomans were not battle-ready. The Ottoman commanders were not experienced in military information, technic, tactic and strategy. What Russians did to defeat the Ottomans was firstly the tactical innovation of infantry fire along with mobile field artillery and apply of infantry squares. Thus, it seemed that although Ottoman heavy guns were able to defend Ottoman strongholds, they were weak in the field against lighter and swift Russian cannons. Grant credits the reasons for the reluctance of Ottomans to introduce lighter field artillery to their requirements of maintaining siege warfare in Eastern Europe, where huge siege artilleries was necessary.935
930 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi [Ottoman History], vol. 4/1, p. 386-387.
931 Black, European Warfare, p. 102.
932 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p. 149.
933 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p. 186-206.
934 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p. 134.
935 Grant, “ibid”, p. 194.
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Conclusion
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There are some inventions that have affected the destiny of humankind. Invention of fire gave better food and protection from wild animals; invention of wheel brought easy transportation; stirrup allowed control of horses, which helped both in the battlefields and transportation. Of the inventions in the domain of battlefield armoury, gunpowder emerged as a decisive usage. After the discovery of gunpowder by Chinese chemists, it was spread by the Mongols and advanced by the Europeans as a potent weapon. When it began to be used with cannons and handguns, it played key role in the lifecycle of empires. Of the empires that used it efficiently and became the masters of the battlefields were the Ottoman Empire in West Asia and the Mughal Empire in India.
The close relations between the West Asian civilisations and Indian subcontinent are dated to antiquity. While economic, commercial and politic relations became the cornerstone of their interactions, the conquest of the Indian subcontinent by the Turkish origin dynasts added a new dimension to this. The Ottoman and Mughal empires were both established by the Turkish origin dynast with these playing a leading role in their West Asian and Indian subcontinent geographical spheres respectively. Though their bilateral political relations were fluctuating, both manifested similarities on the lines of ethnic, linguistic, religious, multilingual and multi-cultural backgrounds.
The one striking similarity that these two empires was in their military spheres with both successfully adopting to and employing the firearm weapons at the battlefields leading to their respective geographical dominations and inviting epithets like gunpowder empires from many scholars. These empires achieved superiority not only in the open battlefield warfare, but also mastered the siege warfare. Ottomans defeated Safavids in the battle of Chaldiran, Mamluks in the battles of Marjdabik and Ridaniyye and Hungarians at the battle of Mohacs in the beginning of the 16th century. Similarly, Mughals gained victory at the battles of Panipat, Khanwa and became successful in the capture of the forts of Ranthambore and Chittor. However, it has to be highlighted that these two armies still depended on the cavalry power. Thus, they combined firearm weapons with the cavalry powers.
The present study has attempted to explain why the Ottomans and the Mughals were keen to develop their firearm technology. These never remained conservative to use the European style weaponry, with scholars like Gabor Agoston and Rhoads Murphey emphasising that the “Islamic conservatism” did not take place in the Ottoman and
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Mughal armies. Ottoman sultans starting from Mehmet the Conqueror showed special attention in the firearm technology and established many foundries and factories within the boundaries of the empire. Likewise, emperor Akbar was also keen to employ the firearm technology just like his grandfather Babur Shah. Not only did Akbar support the artisans and opened new foundries, but worked towards indigenising the new war materials for the Mughal army. Their desire and ambitious bid to acquire the gunpowder and firearm resulted in many important developments. These two empires responded to the requirements of their regions by manufacturing new weapons. Whereas Mughals used firearms on the back of camels (shaturnal) and elephants (gajnal). Ottomans established permanent standing army called Janissary trained to use the firearm weapons. It is thus safe to conclude that initially these empires did not depend on the European firearm technology since they manufactured firearm weapons in their factories by indigenous ways and engineers.
It has been highlighted that the European powers could not stand against Asian armies during the 16th and 17th centuries. Portuguese and British were defeated by Aurangzeb. The main reason for that situation was the easy access to the raw materials for the manufacturing of firearm weapons. Brass, iron and steel of Mughal India were better than European standards, and they could also control the saltpetre production in Patna, Bihar. On the one hand, Ottomans controlled Egypt, North Africa, Mediterrenian, Black Sea, Mesopotamia and Balkans where raw materials for firearm weapons were abundant. These opportunities gave them superiority to handle the Europeans. However, the loss of the control of the raw material ores to the Europeans made the Mughal strengths against the British precarious.
The two empires also faced the difficulties created by firearm weapons. The main problems were continuity of the fire frequency, preservation of gunpowder from the rain and humidity, and the logistics and transportation of the cannons to the battlefields. Since the cannons and handguns began to occupy battlefields, the superiority of cavalry powers was still required at the battlefields. Firing a musket took 28 steps that in this time a cavalry with a bow and arrow could deliver many times. Secondly, due to the heavy nature of the cannons, their transportation to the battlefront difficult especially if there lacked river communication and required animal force coupled with the human efforts.
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The Ottomans and the Mughals became two successful empires with integrated firearm weapons within their armies that were effectively employed at the battlefields. Some historians have labelled these as “gunpowder empires” and with their dominance especially during 16th century became core powers. They not only dominated battlefields, but also controlled trade routes such as Silk Road and Spice Road and huge populations. This was made possible by their powerful militaries with their strengths amplified by the firearm weapons. However, geographical discoveries and industrial revolution resulted in large scale modernisation in European armies. The competition and wars amongst European countries accelerated the improvement of firearm technology. Thus, the core shifted from “gunpowder empires” to “the rise of the west.”
In the context of the Ottoman and the Mughal empires, the development in the military technology required to be sustainable to protect their centralised structure and against European military superiority. Though the two empires tried to improve their technology, some internal factors such as rebellion, lack of money to afford army, corruption, fight among nobles proved to be big obstacles. Moreover, the fast-paced advancements in the European military technologies became hard for the declining empire to compete. Both of these empires failed to use the advantage their territories afforded them like Mughals possessing abundant raw materials for making the firearms and gunpowder and Ottomans being in close vicinity of the Europeans and still unable to follow the military modernisation.
It appears that the Ottomans and the Mughals were able to cope with revolts by the local nobles, mansabdars, bandits and other groups due to different reasons, as described by scholars and highlighted in the relevant sections in this study, during 16th and the 17th centuries. This study has focused on the role of the firearms only in those internal rebellions in these two empires. First of all, this study has highlighted that both the Ottoman and Mughals could manufacture firearm weapons in their primitive counters although the central authority maintained this facility. Besides, the training the usage of muskets was easier than the use of bow and arrow since it did not require much efforts and therefore peasants, bandits easily acquired these skills. The possession of the firearm weapons, therefore, provided an opportunity to these people and were so hired by the local notables, merchants and travellers. Besides, they also got involved in banditry activities by gathering around strong leaders. Their banditry activities and employment by local rulers contributed towards the decentralisation of these empires
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and the notables emerged as new power centres in the periphery. The firearms played an important role in these rebellions. Firstly, these helped in the creation of an organised unit of armed peasants with their efficiency strengthening the power of bandit leaders and local rulers. These provided them with increased power to both strike the enemies and hold on to their defences especially in the mountainous terrains and walled cities. While the centralised and organised state structure of the Ottoman and Mughal empires were enough to contain these kinds of rebellions, the sustained engagements in these internal problems led to the decline of their capacities to fight external adversaries, in this case Europeans.
The biggest challenge for these empires came from the Western countries. European Powers experienced succesive revolutions including transforming all aspects of their societies including militaries. The technological advancements revolutionised the military structure of European powers leading to their organisational improvements as well including the induction of educated officers, uniforms and regularly cash payment. The weakness of the Ottomans’ firearms began to appears from the 17th century with the information of commanders in the western frontiers. Those commanders urged the centre about improved military technology and ineffectiveness of the Ottoman arms through letters. The crisis deepened and 18th and 19th century’s that made the 20th century a nightmare for the Ottomans and Mughals.
Due to the military weakness of the Indian armies British controlled the Indian subcontinent. This paved the way for the British to gain leverage by exploiting Indian wealthy. Similarly, they took benefit from the ottomans’ military weakness after ottomans lost many battles against European powers in European frontiers. British occupied slowly the critical regions of the ottoman empire. These successful attempts and initiatives of the British were the result of their military superiority which made Europeans the core of the firearms with East India Company controlling the salpetre trade.
Another reason related to the gunpowder and firearms role in the decline of these two empires was the organisational structure of the Mughal and Ottoman armies. It is well known fact that the main branch of these armies was cavalry which came from their Turkish inheritance. For centuries the Turks developed the skills of effective cavalry becoming successful at the battlefields against infantry-based armies. Moreover, they
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combined successfully firearm weapons with their cavalry. On the contrary, European armies had mainly infantry-based tradition from the beginning. The first type of muskets and arquebus lead to infantry a stalemate since their time-consuming techniques for firing and reloading. The skilled mounted archers of the period could discharge an arrow both longer distance and quicker. When the European powers, however, enhanced their firearm technology, they began to dominate battlefields and the importance of infantry increased.
3 and 4 chapters of this study make an attempt to highlight the fact that the Europeans not only enhanced their military technology, they also improved their military tactics and strategies according to the firearm weapons. At many battles, although Ottoman and Mughal armies outnumbered their enemies, they were unable to defeat them. When we examined the 18th century battles of the Mughals and Ottomans, their technological inferiority contributed significantly to their battlefield defeats. The rapid and swift artillery of the European armies gave advantage against their armies. Lastly, the striking point at the battles was the trained and disciplined infantry.
Not only did the European powers defeat the Ottomans and the Mughals, but the Persians under the command of Nader Shah also achieved precise victories against the Ottomans and Mughals. Nader Shah’s battles with the Mughals and the Ottomans manifested to the weakness of the firearms quality and technological inferiority of the Ottomans and Mughals. Nader Shah was a soldier, who himself used musket (jazayir) realised the importance of firearm weapons in the battlefields. He reformed the Persian army along with firearms and made jazayirchis main branch of his army. They were well-trained and ordered and well-educated in tactical and strategical manners. In his battles with the Ottomans and Mughals, the superiority of his firearms was the main reason behind his success.
Dependency of these empires on the European military technology appeared highly in the 18th century. Unlike the Ottomans, the Mughals had geographical disadvantage to follow European technology. The Mughals hired Europeans and benefited from their experiences at the battlefields. The connection with European military engineers was very weak compared to the Ottomans. Many Europeans experts offered their service to the Ottomans and Ottomans had chance to choose better experts. However, the same did not hold true for the Mughals. Like Richard Bell, Aurangzeb was not willing to
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leave him from the Mughal service since he was successful in casting cannon. Ottomans also used to send their people to learn about new technological developments, but Mughals did not have this opportunity since the journey took many years. They were thus mainly depended on Europeans assistance. Especially, French were keen to help Mughals due to growing British effect in the subcontinent.
The study has also argued that both the Ottomans and the Mughals could not be able to develop their military technology and systemisation. Upon this, they failed to resist the European powers, which achieved military revolution, at the battlefields. This study reveals that the Ottomans tried their best to catch European revolution despite the rejection of janissaries. It was a hard process which cost the Ottoman sultans Osman II and Selim III their lives. The Mughals also faced interior problems such as competition among nobles, clans and families. They were focused on eliminating each other that the French, Dutch and British gained power in the subcontinent. Moreover, some strong rulers behaved autonomously in their areas making it difficult for these empires, especially Mughals to foresee this reality.
In the context of world system theory and dependency theory, the Ottomans and the Mughals were not much dependent on European technology at the beginning. Although they secured know-how of the European firearm production through European engineers, the role of these foreign engineers should not be exaggerated because of the fact that their engineers were also successful in terms of firearm production during the 15th,16th and 17th centuries. It is thus argued that both the empires became “core power” in their region and dominated battlefields. However, they failed to respond to the developing European military technology and their firearm weapons consequently became inferior and outmoded compared to Europeans. Thus, they slowly became “periphery” of the European nations in the 18th century onwards. This transformation in the military technology led to a series of defeats at the battlefields, which was discussed in the chapters 4 and 5. On the whole, the findings of the study validate the hypothesis that ‘the inferior quality of gunpowder and firearms used by the Ottoman and Mughal army accounted for the decline of the two Empires.’
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