604

The prime objective of this thesis is to probe into the House of Ma,n(1516-1697) (also
known as Ma,nids in English, and Ma,anogulları, ,Al-i Ma,n, Beni Ma,n in Turkish
and Arabic), a Southern Syrian-based Druze (Duruz, Duruzi ta-ifesi) power-holding
family, as a case study in the context of Istanbul-periphery relations and political
struggles. In light of new historical findings of Ottomanists in the Ottoman archives,
this investigation, phase by phase, sifts through the Ma,nids’ involvement with the
Ottoman Empire. In particular, I focus on Fakhr al-Din ibn Ma,n(Fakhr al-Din
II) (1572-1635), who was the most well-known local Druze leader of Southern Syria
and Lebanon, and, in a broader context, the Druze rebellions (1516-1697). The
focal point of the thesis is how the Ottoman Empire pragmatically utilized policies,
including the process of bargaining and negotiation, to consolidate its imperial control
over the Eastern Mediterranean. Equally significantly, the thesis explores the
position of Fakhr al-Din ibn Ma,n in the context of the Jelali movement. Through a
micro case study comparing Fakhr al-Din ibn Ma,n’s rebellion with that of Janbulat
,Ali Pasha (1606), a Kurdish rebel based in Northern Syria, I address parallels and
dissimilarities between the two. Last but not least, the thesis scrutinizes Ottoman
perceptions of the periphery, and the Druze in particular.
iv

Bu tezin temel amacı, Güney Suriye merkezli yerel iktidar sahibi Dürzi (Duruz,
Düruzi ta-ifesi) bir aile olan Ma,an Hanedanını (1516-1697) (Ma,anogulları, ,Al-i
Ma,n, Beni Ma,n olarak da bilinir), Istanbul-tasra iliskileri ve siyasi mücadeleleri
baglamında örnek bir olay incelemesi olarak arastırmaktır. Bu çalısma, son nesil
Osmanlı tarihçilerinin tespit ettigi arsiv kaynakları aracılıgıyla saglanan yeni tarihsel
bulgular ısıgında Ma,anogullarının Osmanlı Imparatorlugu ile olan iliskisini
asama asama inceliyor. Özellikle, Güney Suriye ve Lübnan’ın en çok tanınmıs yerel
Dürzi lideri olan Ma,anoglu Fahreddin’e (1572-1635) ve daha genis baglamda Dürzi
isyanlarına (1516-1697) odaklanarak Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nun tasra üzerindeki
emperyal denetimini saglamlastırmak için pazarlık ve müzakere süreci de dahil olmak
üzere politikalarını pragmatik sekilde nasıl kullandıgı arastırılmıstır. Aynı derecede
önemli olarak, tez, Ma,anoglu Fahreddin’in konumunu Celali hareketi kapsamında
anlamlandırmaya çalısmaktadır. Fahreddin ibn Ma,n isyanını, Kuzey Suriye bölgesinde
Kürt bir isyancı olan Canbolatoglu ,Ali Pasa isyanıyla (1606) karsılastırarak,
aralarındaki paralelliklere ve uyusmazlıklara deginilmistir. Son olarak, tez, Osmanlı
merkezinin tasra ve özellikle Dürzileri algılamasını irdelemektedir.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and above all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Assoc. Prof.
Tülay Artan. Without her academic assistance and constructive advice, I would not
have produced this investigation.
I would like to deeply thank Ismail Kıyıcı for assisting me with the tables in the
thesis.
I would like to deeply thank Emir Rıza, Bardia Moghtader and Rizwan Jahangir for
providing me with their great support in the process of compiling my inquiry in the
Latex format. made a lot of sacrifices when I engaged in the process of
writing the master’s thesis. Finally, I would like to deeply thank you who has a significant place in my life. She has not refrained from furnishing her
generous support since we got to know each other.
vi
Dedicated to

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Objective of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3. Layout of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. OTTOMAN HEGEMONY IN THE GREATER SYRIA. . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.0.1. Ottoman Domination in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.0.2. Ottoman Administrative Regulations in the Region: Province
of Damascus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.0.3. Middle Eastern Geography, Religious Minorities and Druzes . . 44
3.1. Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase I (1516-1590) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1.1. A Peripheral “Nuisance”: The Early Ma,nids and the Druze
Rebellions (1516-1697) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2. Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase II (1590-1635) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1. The Birth of the Ma,nid Domination: Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n
(1572-1635) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2. The Fall of the Ma,nid Domination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3. Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase III (1635-1697) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1. Mulhim Ma,n (d. 1658) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.2. Ah.mad Ma,n (d. 1697). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4. A JEL ¯ AL¯I OR NOT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
viii
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1. The Genealogy of Ma,n Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 2.1. Classification Trial of Early Modern Ottoman Rebellions
(1450-1700) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 3.1. Administrative Divisions (Sanjaks) of the Damascus
Province (1520-1565) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 3.2. Administrative Structure of Ottoman Syria (1521-1740) 43
Table 4.1. The Genealogy of the Janbul¯at. Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. The Sh¯uf Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 3.1. Province of Damascus in 16th Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
xi
A NOTE ON THE UTILIZATION OF THE TRANSLITERATION
In this investigation, for Arabic and Ottoman Turkish words, I have utilized the
transliteration rules in the framework of the IJMES Transliteration System.
xii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective of the Thesis
The Ma,nids1 (Table 1.1) were a Syrian-based Druze (Dur¯uz, Dür¯uz¯ı t.¯a -ifesi) powerholding
family. There were several other ascendant families in Southern Syria and
Lebanon in the High Middle Ages (11th and 13th centuries), and one of whom were
Tan¯ukhids. The Ma,nids ascended over the Tan¯ukhids and assumed the leadership
of the Druze in the region.2 Naturally, the Sh¯uf region (Figure 1.1), the epicenter
of Ma,nid power, came into prominence.3 The Ma,nids allied with the Shih¯abs,
another local family, which enabled the Ma,nids to later become a local power.4 In
the Maml¯uk period, members of the Ma,n family were bestowed -am¯ırship (a military
post)5. After the Ottoman conquest of Syria, relations between the Ma,nids and
Ottoman administrations would continue until 1697.
To this day, the Ma,nids, having been a subject of much scholarly research and
also myth-making, have not lost their popularity. This popularity is largely due
to the Ma,nids’ epitomizing a microhistory that can be directly attached to the
1At first glance, the family name of Ma,n(based in Jabal al-Sh¯uf, later known as Jabal al-Ma,n and then
Jabal Lubn¯an) and the Ma,¯an region in Jordan might bring to mind a historical connection. However, upon
my inquiry, Prof. Stefan Winter pointed out that there is no link between them. Email communication
with Winter, Aug 11, 2021, 10:36 PM: “There is no link between the town in Jordan and the Ma,n family.
Both words of course come from the same Arabic root, but that doesn’t mean very much. The Lebanese
Ma,ns, at least according to one 16th-century Arabic source, are in fact of Kurdish origin, and Fakhr al-
D¯ın Ma,n still kept in touch with extended family in the Kurdish regions of Anatolia, so it’s very unlikely
there is a link with Ma,¯an.” The origins of the house of Ma,n remains unclear, what is related about
it by the traditional Lebanese historians being without foundation. The first Ma,n whose historicity is
proven was Fakhr al-D¯ın ,Uthm¯an b. al-H. ¯adjdj Y¯unis who died in 912/1506: Kamal Salibi, “Ma,n,” The
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1991): 343-344.
2Philip K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion (New York: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 21-22.
3Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650 (Beirut: American University of
Beirut, 1985), 67.
4M. Cavid Baysun, “Ma,n,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 268.
5Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
1
macrohistory, something that makes them exclusive. In addition to that, we see that
as a research topic, the Ma,nids are open to the multidimensional approaches and
perspectives, meaning that a researcher can probe deeply into them in terms of many
contexts. Since the 1970s, the topic received well deserved attention in academic
research published in English and Turkish over those that have been carried out in
French and Arabic. My research, too, is limited to the secondary sources published
in English and Turkish.
First among those Ottomanists is Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, recognized as a foremost
authority on the history of Greater Syria in Ottoman times. In his 1985 book,
he principally delves into the history of six dynasties in Ottoman Syria including
Ma,ns, Sayf¯as, H.
arf¯ushes, Tur¯ab¯ays, Furaykhs, Q¯ans.¯uhs. He treats these regional
powers in the context of the rural politics of Bil¯ad al-Sh¯am (Greater Syria) during
the late 16th and early 17th centuries.6 He points out that his book does not provide
an overall picture of the region, meaning that novel investigations are necessary.7 In
a later study, Abu-Husayn elaborates on the Early Modern Druze history in the light
of documents from the Ottoman Registers of Important Affairs (Mühimme Defterleri).
8 As a compilation of a wealth of select primary sources, this study bears a
great importance for future students of the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean.
In this thesis, I rely heavily both on the archival documents uncovered by Abdul-
Rahim Abu-Husayn, but also, more importantly, on his interpretations, assessments,
and conclusions.
Abu-Husayn also published many articles on the subject. One of these articles
pertains to the long-drawn out Druze rebellions.9 A couple of others focus on Ah.mad
ibn Ma,n, the last member of the Ma,nids.10 Another article deals with the 17th
6For Greater Syria: Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber, eds., Syria and Bilad Al-Sham under Ottoman Rule:
Essay in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeg (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010).
7Abu-Husayn, 1-10. See also: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, review of “Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships
in Syria, 1575-1650,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies (April 1989): 131-135; Jon E. Mandaville,
review of “Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650,” The American Historical
Review (June 1986): 712–713; Jørgen S. Nielsen, review of “Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial
Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650,” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
(1986): 105; William Ochsenwald, review of “Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships in Syria,
1575-1650,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (1987): 371-372.
8Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul: Ottoman Lebanon and the Druze Emirate (London,
New York: Centre For Lebanese Studies In Association With I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004), 1-10. The series
of “Registers of Important Affairs”, where the decisions of the Ottoman Imperial Council were recorded,
are kept in the Cumhurbaskanlıgı Arsivi (Basbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi), Istanbul. Two hundred and sixtythree
registers are catalogued as Mühimme Defterleri (MD): Suraiya Faroqhi, “Mühimme Defterleri,” The
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 7 (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1993): 470-472.
9Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion: The Druzes and The Ottomans, 1516-1697,” Archivum
Ottomanicum, no. 19 (2001): 165-191.
10Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Unknown Career of Ahmad Ma,n (1667-1697),” Archivum Ottomanicum
17 (1999): 241-247.
2
century Druze history.11 He also wrote on the genealogy of the Ma,nids,12 a critical
reappraisal of the 1585 event,13 and on administrative affairs in Ottoman Syria in
the 16th and 17th centuries.14
Kamal S. Salibi, the mentor of Abu-Husayn and one of the most esteemed and
world-renowned scholars of Lebanon, gives us a general framework in reference to
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in his encyclopaedia entry.15 Unlike other scholars, what is
significant in his academic work is that Salibi, in the context of relations between
Istanbul and the Syrian littoral, gives us partial clues into processes of bargaining
and negotiation. He produced a large number of books on the Levant and published
many articles, some of which are germane to regional elements in Lebanon, and
which included the genealogy of the Ma,nids.16
In another encyclopaedia entry, Feridun Emecen points out how Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn
Ma,n carved out an extraordinary political and military career by deftly manipulating
the once-in-a-lifetime opportunities in his lifetime.17 Furthermore, he argues
that it is inappropriate to characterize the Ma,nid Dynasty/House as an independent
dynasty as is often the case in Western historiography. As a matter of fact, the
family members, courtesy of the Ottoman governments, successively governed a sanjak,
one of the fundamental administrative units in the Ottoman Empire. Decades
earlier, M. Cavid Baysun provided an abridged account of the general history of
the Ma,n family in his encyclopaedia entry.18 Unlike later Ottomanists in Turkey,
including Emecen, Baysun made insightful comments on the early history of the
family. He gives insight into the relations of Istanbul and the Druzes; and he hints
at the regional policies that the Ottoman governments pursued, which had, thus far,
been overlooked. Also, in the 1940s, during the early Republican period in Turkey,
11Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “Khalidi on Fakh al-D¯ın Apology as History,” Al-Abh. ¯ath 41 (1993): 3-15.
12Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Korkm¯az Question: A Maronite Historian’s Plea for Ma,nid Legitimacy,”
Al-Abh. ¯ath 34 (1986): 3-11.
13Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Ottoman Invasion of the Sh¯uf in 1585: A Reconsideration,” Al-Abh. ¯ath
33 (1985): 13-21.
14Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria during the 16th and 17th
Centuries: The Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, no.
4 (November 1992): 665-675.
15Kamal Salibi, “Fak
¯
h¯r
al-D
¯
ın,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 2
(
Leiden, The Netherlands:
Brill, 1991): 749-751.
16Kamal Salibi, “The Secret of the House of Ma,n,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4, no. 3
(July 1973): 272-287.
17Feridun Emecen, “Fahreddin, Ma,noglu,” TDVIA, vol. 12 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1995): 80-82. See
also, J. Deny and M. Kunt, “Sand
¯
j¯
ak. ,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 9 (Leiden, The
Netherlands: Brill, 1997): 11-13.
18M. Cavid Baysun, “Ma,n,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1955): 268-272.
3
he was, perhaps, the first historian who made a detailed analysis on the Ma,nids.
Stefan Winter scrutinizes Shiite communities in Ottoman Syria, particularly the
H.
arf¯ushes and the H.
am¯adas.19 Winter emphasizes that the Ottoman government,
contrary to popular belief, did not pursue the deliberate persecution policies against
the Shiites in general. On the contrary, the Empire pragmatically opted to cooperate
with the Shiite communities in Syria by granting them the mültezimships unless
they were unable to serve Ottomans’ regional interests. Immediately after, they
were replaced by their regional counterparts, a strategy that the Empire established
to control geographically far-off regions. Winter hints that Ottoman administrations
implemented similar regional policies when dealing with the Ma,nids. Later, in an
encyclopaedia entry, Winter draws attention to research which assesses Fakhr al-D¯ın
Ma,n as an ,ay¯an.20
Apart from the abovementioned academic studies on the political history of the dynasty,
there are also thematically different historial treatments. For example, Hafez
Chehab sifts through extant portraits of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s life, scrutinizing
details to find his most realistic biographical sketch.21 Alessandro Olsaretti probes
into the close liaison between Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n and the Medicis in first three
decades of the 17th century.22 He mainly deals with commercial and diplomatic
issues from a more extensive framework in the Mediterranean Basin. He also specifies
how Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n procured regional power in that period of time.
Shimizu Yasuhisa investigates the activities of local notables, including Fakhr al-
D¯ın ibn Ma,n in Southern Syria in the framework of iltiz¯am system.23 In addition
to that, he does not neglect have a closer look at the village-level iltiz¯am contracts.
Massoud Daher hones in on the local leadership that had great impacts on the for-
19Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 1-6, 176-180. See also: Faruk Yaslıçimen, review of “Stefan Winter, The Shiites of
Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788,” Insight Turkey (Winter 2011): 201-204; Pascal Abidor, review
of “Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788,” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies
(2012): 505-510; James Grehan, review of “Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule,
1516–1788,” H-Levant, H-Net Reviews (September 2015): 1-3; James A. Reilly, review of “Stefan Winter,
The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788,” Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Morgenländischen
Gesellschaft (2013): 246-247.
20Stefan Winter, “Fakhr al-D¯ın Ma,n,” Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, vol. 2015-4 (Leiden, The Netherlands:
Brill, 2015): 127-129.
21Hafez Chehab, “Reconstructing the Medici Portrait of Fakhr al-Din al-Ma,ani,” Muqarnas 11 (1994):
117-124.
22Alessandro Olsaretti, “Trade, Diplomacy and State Formation in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Fakhr
al-D¯ın II, the Sublime Porte and the Court of Tuscany” (Master’s Thesis, McGill University, 2005), 4,
9-18, 135-139.
23Shimizu Yasuhisa, “Practices of Tax Farming under the Ottoman Empire in Damascus Province,” In Tax
Farm Register of Damascus Province in the Seventeenth Century: Archival and Historical Studies, eds.
Nagata Yuzo, Miura Toru and Shimizu Yasuhisa (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2006), 23-52.
4
mation of the modern Lebanon.24 He brings also Lebaneseness into the forefront.
Ted J. Gorton provides biographical details with special reference to Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n (1572-1635).25 He stresses Fakhr al-D¯ın ’s sojourn to Florence, Sicily and
Naples between 1613 and 1618. Sandra A. Scham principally mentions Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n’s ambitious building program in Lebanon, after her brief but personally
influential sojourn to Italy.26 She also points out that he synthesized the Late Renaissance
Italian architecture (Tuscan style) and vernacular architecture of Lebanon
by patronizing architectural projects, including a palace. This palace signifies his
political ambitions for regional independence and transcendency.
In the scholarship on the family and its most prominent member, it was the strikingly
different approaches to the Ma,nids’ relationships with the central and provincial
Ottoman administrations, identifying Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n either as a Jel¯al¯ı rebel
or not, which has attracted my curiosity. Hence, I was driven to explore the 17th
century rebellions in the provinces. There are several historians who have defined
the theoretical boundaries of my inquiry into Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.27
Mustafa Akdag takes the first significant step by classifying some Ottoman rebellions
in the Early Modern period according to whether they were integration-oriented
into the Ottoman imperial system or not. Thereafter, William J. Griswold solidifies
Akdag’s arguments through the case of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha (1606), a rebellion
that epitomizes the category of non-integration-oriented rebellions. Griswold briefly
points out that Fakhr al-D¯ın, too, had the intention of founding a state in Syria
–hence identifies the Ma,nid leader, too, into the category of non-integration-oriented
rebels.28
Akdag’s arguments paved the way for Karen Barkey’s arguments as well. As an
24Massoud Daher, “The Lebanese Leadership at the Beginning of the Ottoman Period: A Case Study of the
Ma,n Family,” In Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq,
eds. Peter Slugget and Stefan Winter (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 323-345.
25Ted J. Gorton, Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici (Northampton and Massachusetts:
Olive Branch Press, 2014), xiii-xvii. See also: Karl K. Barbir, review of “Ted J. Gorton,
Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici,” Review of Middle East Studies 49, no.
2 (August 2015): 194-196; Ingrid D. Rowland, review of “Ted J. Gorton, Renaissance Emir: A Druze
Warlord at the Court of the Medici,” Common Knowledge 22 no. 2 (2016): 319.
26Sandra A. Scham, “The Legacy of Fakhreddine II—Renaissance Prince of Mount Lebanon,” Journal of
Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies 3, no. 4 (2015): 428-438.
27In Chapter I, I explore the secondary literature on Ottoman rebellions in the framework of our context.
Therefore, I briefly explain the related theoretical approaches here.
28“. . . That Ali’s plan for a state had real possibilities of success proved attractive to his Syrian colleague,
Ma,noglu Fahreddin, whose headquarters lay south in Beirut. A decade after Ali Pasha’s execution, Fahreddin
followed the same pattern — and succeeded to the point that some historians assert the Ma,noglu experience
established the foundations of the modern state of Lebanon. . . ”; “The possibility of a separate state
in Syria, so vainly sought by Canbuladoglu Ali Pasha, grew in the mind of Fahreddin. . . ”; “The armies
of Canbuladoglu Ali Pasha of Aleppo, followed close on by Ma,noglu Fahreddin, attempted to establish a
state with the aid of European money and arms. . . ”: William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion
1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix-xxii, 155, 217.
5
expert in comparative historical and political sociology, with special attention to
the structure of state-“society” relations, Barkey repeats that the Ottoman administrations
appointed the rebels as either sanjak-bey or beylerbeyi according to the
perceived threat that they posed. Perhaps most significantly, Barkey points out
that the Ottoman Empire was quite accomplished in coping with rebellions, and
was able to integrate rebels into its imperial system with pragmatic policies such as
bargaining and negotiations. In other words, appointment of threatening figures to
high-ranking positions in the central administration was one of many policies that
the Ottomans utilized to govern far away regions of the Empire. Dina Khoury, a
historian specializing on early modern Ottoman Arab provinces, demonstrates how
Ottoman administrations effectively employed the regional dynamics in Southern
Syria and Lebanon to its own benefit. Last but not least, Oktay Özel, an Ottomanist
studying demographic changes, fiscal-economic crises and social movements in
the 17th century, emphasizes the dimension of violence in the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions –as a
condition of the “17th Century Crisis” that impelled the Ottoman administrations
to carry out pragmatic policies.
As for more general inclinations in academic literature, most Arab scholars who
have researched the Ma,nids brought Lebanese national identity and Lebaneseness
into the forefront. With some exceptions, scholars have conceptualized the topic
within the framework of nationalism, which hinders us from a critical assessment of
Early Modern Ottoman Lebanese history. Unlike Abu-Husayn, most do not refer
to Ottoman narrative sources at all or do not go beyond utilizing them to a certain
extent –let alone diversify them. Furthermore, they insufficiently utilize Ottoman
archival evidence, including the Registers of Important Affairs, into their work. This
situation precludes us from identifying carefully the relations and struggles between
the Ottoman administrations and the power-holders in Sidon and the Ottoman
imperial perception vis-à-vis the Ma,nids and the Druze community.
Considering the state of scholarship today, it is clear that research on the Ma,nids
and on the rebellion of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n (d. 1635) is still scanty. It is impossible
to encounter any investigation on Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature
analyzing Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n as a rebel. Almost nothing, with the exception of
William J. Griswold’s and Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn’s brief comments, has been
written to posit the rebellion of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in the context of Ottoman
rebellions and how we should approach him in the context of Jel¯al¯ı ones. Whereas
Griswold and Abu-Husayn argue that Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was not a Jel¯al¯ı rebel29
, Ottomanists such as Hathaway and Masters claim the opposite, but do not dwell on
29William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag,
1983), xix-xxii, 155, 217; Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 87.
6
a lenghty discussion.30 The thesis sets out with the aim of discussing the argument
whether Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was a Jel¯al¯ı or not.
At first glance, to question whether Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was a Jel¯al¯ı or not
may sound as a pointless exercise. It has, however, the potential to set forth,
state and describe Ottoman bargaining and negotiation policies which undoubtedly
played a huge role in the endurance of the Empire. It is important to understand
varying interpretations in the post-1970s Ottoman historiography of the actions of a
rebellious -am¯ır on the Eastern Mediterranean. This exercise promises to be useful
in the future studies of Ottoman center-periphery relations. It also sheds light into
the greater picture about the “decline” and “collapse”, and the “longevity” of the
Ottoman Empire.
I adopt terminology coined by Birol Gündogdu in his article “Problems in the Interpretations
of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and
Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and
1821”. The terms “semi-idealized approach” and “restricted approach” are based on
Gündogdu’s arguments.31 The “semi-idealized approach” is based on the argument
that the Ottoman Empire practiced bargaining and negotiating with peripheral elements
which challenged its authority. Meanwhile, the “restricted approach” hangs
on the argument that a rebellion should be investigated through case studies.32
In this study, in which I emphasize the perspective of the Ottoman governments
vis-à-vis the periphery, my investigation seeks answers as to where we can situate
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s rebellion within the framework of the Early Modern
30“. . . Jelali governors emerged not only in Anatolia but in the Arab provinces as well. . . Fakhr al-Din fits
the pattern of the Jelali governor. . .Later in his reign, Murad IV was less tolerant of Jelali governors and
their equivalents. . . ”: Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule: 1516-1800
(London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 70-71; “. . . it is not at all clear that he had ambitions to found
a nation. Significantly, he never claimed the title of sultan, being content with the traditional title of emir
bestowed on the dominant Druze chieftain. Not daring to dream of independence, Fakhr al-Din sought to
play various local competitors against one another while he deftly balanced the interests of the Ottoman
state against those of various European parties were interested in gaining influence and trade in the eastern
Mediterranean. . . ”: Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire (New York:
Facts on File, 2009), 344.
31Birol Gündogdu, “Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period:
An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821,”
Osmanlı Arastırmaları 51 (2018): 482-484. Gündogdu, in his revisionist article, principally divides the existing
“dominant perspectives” about the historiography about Ottoman rebellions between 1550 and 1821
into three parts: (i) the traditional approach, (ii) the idealized approach and (iii) the restricted approach.
The first approach is based on the concept of the “decline paradigm”. According to this perspective, the
Ottoman Empire dwindled in its imperial competence in dealing with challenges resulting from rebellions
unlike its counterparts in Europe. The second approach is predicated on the argument that the Empire was
much more accomplished and rather moderate than we have thought by entering into negotiations unlike
its counterparts in Europe. Gündogdu argues that the Ottoman governemts were not hesitant to utilize all
sorts of bargaining methods to strengthen their loose ties over the periphery. In response to the Empire’s
conciliatory stance, the periphery was becoming willing to be reintegrated into the Ottoman imperial system
instead of dragging the process out. In other words, it was a reciprocal rather than one-sided condition
or relationship. Thirdly, the restricted approach presents the complex and multidimensional essence of the
rebellions at issue. It includes more limited assumptions in itself; hence being called, “restricted”.
32Gündogdu, 482-485.
7
Ottoman rebellions. Was he a Jel¯al¯ı? Does this rebellion have any differentiating
feature(s) from its Early Modern Ottoman counterparts? If so, what was/were
it/they? Is it possible to categorize Fakhr al-D¯ın ’s rebellion as a separatist insubordination
in terms of its characteristic features? Why or why not? What kinds
of control mechanisms and the strategic maneuvers did the Ottoman governments
utilize against the House of Ma,n? How did the Ottomans employ local dynamics
to establish and consolidate their control over the regions remote from the capital
and in Early Modern Lebanon in particular? Did orthodox and heterodox doctrines
have any influence on the relationships between the Ottoman administrations and
the Druzes? Why or why not? What does the Ma,nid dynasty’s activities in the
region make sense for the Ottoman Middle Eastern geography in the Early Modern
period? This is perhaps one of the most significant questions which challenges the
decline paradigm. Considering the case study of the House of Ma,n, was the Ottoman
Empire as successful as its European counterparts with regard to coping with
the rebellions/periphery challenging its authority? All of these questions, which set
the ground for my inquiry, will be the focal point of this thesis.
1.2 Primary Sources
The scholars have based their investigations of the Ma,nids mostly on Arabic and
Italian sources. When employing the Ottoman archival sources, such as the Registers
of Important Affairs, scholars have generally underutilized the diversity of
documentation, and mostly neglected narrative sources such as the T¯ar¯ıh-i Sel¯anik¯ı
(History of Sel¯anik¯ı written by Sel¯anik¯ı Mus.t.af¯a Efendi)33 , the T¯ar¯ıh-i Na,im¯a (History
of Na,im¯a written by Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a)34 and the T¯ar¯ıh-i Fez
¯
leke (History of
Fez
¯
leke written by K¯atib Chelebi) –all of which I utilize in my thesis, albeit in very
limited fashion, in so far as to answer my primary questions, and only reference
to secondary literature which have already explored the chronicles in question.35
Likewise, there are several other Ottoman chronicles, produced at the capital, that
still await to be explored extensively –included are theH.
asan Bey-Z¯ade T¯ar¯ıhi (His-
33Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Selânikî Mustafa Efendi Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595), vol. 1, ed.
Mehmet Ipsirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999).
34Mustafa Naîmâ, Târih-i Na,îmâ, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli (Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınları, 2007).
35Katip Çelebi, Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)], vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin
(Istanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2016).
8
tory ofH.
assan Bey-Z¯ade written byH.
assan Bey-Z¯ade Ah.med Pasha (d. 1636-37)36,
the Zübdetü’t-Tev¯ar¯ıh (Mus.t.
afa S¯af¯ı),37 the Topçular K¯atibi ,Abdü’l-K. adir Efendi
T¯ar¯ıhi (History of Topçular K¯atibi ,Abd al-Q¯adir Efendi).38 “Koçi Bey Ris¯aleleri”
(the Book of Advice) are among the narrative sources that I have encountered in
the secondary literature and utilized in a limited way.39
Apart from the chronicles mentioned, no investigation has been conducted using the
telh¯ıs.es, the summaries of orders/decrees about major events presented by the Grand
Vizier to the sultan. A single register located at the Topkapı Palace, composing of
29 folios or 58 pages in total, written in the Naskh¯ı script, presents interesting
documents.40 By delving deeply into those telh¯ıs.es which bring the Ma,nids into the
forefront, I intend to make a modest contribution to the existing body of literature.41
Moreover, I make use of Ottoman documents from several different archival fonds
which have not been discussed before.42 Documents emanating from the various offices
of the Ottoman government not only reveal the relations and struggles between
the Ottoman administrations and the Ma,nids, but also give us a definite notion as
to how we can situate Fakhr al-D¯ın ’s rebellion in the framework of Early Modern
Ottoman rebellions.
Apart from the narrative and archival sources that I have mentioned above, I consulted
the already published documents from the Registers of Public Affairs (The
Documents of the Ottoman Umur-i Mühimme Defteri)43 on Early Modern Lebanon,
the Registers of Important Affairs (Mühimme Defterleri) with special reference to
Palestine,44 a number of unpublished master’s theses which analyze the registers
36Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa, Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-Kaynak
Tenkidi), vol. 2, ed. Sevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004).
37Mustafa Sâfî, Mustafa Sâfî’nin Zübdetü’t-Tevârîh’i Çuhadar, vol. 2, ed. Ibrahim Hakkı (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003).
38Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir Efendi, Topçular Kâtibi ,Abdülkâdir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil),
vol. 1, ed. Ziya Yılmazer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003).
39Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risaleleri, ed. Seda Çakmakcıoglu (Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2007).
40Single register, previously at Topkapı Palace, BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 3a, 12a, 13a-b, 18b. This primary
source has not been employed before in the context of Istanbul-Syrian littoral relations and struggles.
41Pál Fodor, “Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier: Changes in The Ottoman Ruling Elite and The
Formation of The Grand Vizieral Telh

is.,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47, no. 1/2
(1994): 67.
42BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 7/400, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 31/801,
BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 33/761, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 40/536, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 46/854,
BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 44/337, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/321, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/354,
BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/436.
43Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul.
44Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the
9
in question45 and the one dated to 1646.46 Furthermore, a master’s thesis which
analyze registers of complaint (,At¯ık. Sik¯ayet Defteri)47 in the 17th century. Hence,
this study differs from prior studies because of the diversity of the primary sources
it has located.
As I examine Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s rebellion in the context of the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions,
I did not embark on an exhausting investigation of the local religious groups (Durzis,
Marunis or the Qizilb¯ashes),48 or systems of tax collecting,49 or agrarian power
relations and peasants, or rebellions named after pretenders (düzme), janissaryartisans
and mountaineers. Likewise, this study chose not delve into the discussion
of terms and concepts such as fitna, vak. ,a, bagy, isyan, ihtilal and many others,
usually translated into English as uprising, rebellion, revolt, incident etc.50
1.3 Layout of the Thesis
In the next chapter, I engage with the works of scholars whose approaches and
perspectives enable me to establish the theoretical framework of my thesis in the
context of ongoing historical debates in reference to the Early Modern Ottoman
rebellion literature.
In the Chapter 3, I delve into relations and struggles in the Eastern Mediterranean
Mühimme Defteri (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).
45The related master’s theses are as follows: H. Muharrem Bostancı, “19 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (Tahlil-
Metin)” (Master’s Thesis, Istanbul University, 2002); Yasemin Aydın, “27 Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin
Transkripsiyonu ve Degerlendirilmesi (s. 280-408)” (Master’s Thesis, Atatürk University, 2014); Murat
Alanoglu, “86 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri’nin Özetli Transkripsiyonu ve Degerlendirilmesi” (Master’s Thesis,
Atatürk University, 2010).
46Basbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 91 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (H. 1056) (Özet - Çeviri
Yazı - Tıpkıbasım) (Istanbul: Osmanlı Arsivi Daire Baskanlıgı Yayınları, 2015).
47Mesut Demir, “1686-1687 (h. 1097-1098) Tarihli Atik Sikâyet Defteri’nin Transkripsiyon ve Degerlendirilmesi”
(Master’s Thesis, Marmara University, 2010).
48Salih Akyel and Zülküf Simsek, “Klasik Kaynaklara Göre XVI. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devletinde Meydana
Gelen Kızılbas Ayaklanmaları,” Journal of History School, no. 19 (September 2014): 111-148.
49Hamit Çetin, “Osmanlı Devletinde Meydana Gelen Vergi Isyanları,” Hukuk ve Iktisat Arastırmaları Dergisi
10, no. 1 (2018): 18-34.
50A. Mevhibe Cosar and Emre Türkmen, “Bir ‘Kavram Alanı’ Belirlemesi: Devrim, Ihtilal, Isyan,” In
Zamanın Izleri: Ilkeler, Ideolojiler ve Isyanlar, ed. Temel Öztürk (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi
Yayınları, 2017), 11-28. See also: Mustafa Çagrıcı, “Fitne,” TDVIA, vol. 13 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları,
1996): 156-159; Ali Safak, “Bagy,” TDVIA, vol. 4 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1991): 451-452; Meliksah
Aydın, “Islam Hukukuna Göre Isyan (Bagy) Suçu ve Cezası,” Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi
23 (2015): 49-77.
10
in light of a concept that has been recently referred to as Ottoman pragmatism.51 I
investigate how the Ottoman Empire pragmatically carried out control mechanisms
and peripheral policies such as bargaining and negotiation in the 17th century in an
attempt to control its outlying sanjaks or provinces (beylerbeylik). What kinds of
strategies did the Empire have recourse in Southern Syria and Lebanon where the
House of Ma,n/the Ma,nids were intensely active?
In the Chapter 4, I explore how and where we can position the rebellion of Fakhr
al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in the context of the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. In other words, the matter of
whether he was a Jel¯al¯ı will constitute the prime theme of the chapter. I scrutinize
the issue in a detailed way by comparing it with that of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha’s
rebellion, which demonstrates strikingly similar patterns and was closely intertwined
with that Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s to further test my arguments. Moreover, I seek
answer(s) as to where we can situate the Ma,nid rebellion in a broader framework
of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.
51Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon, 1-6, 176-180.
11
Table 1.1 The Genealogy of Ma,n Family
Note 1: Sources: Philip K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People and Religion (New York: BiblioBazaar,
2007), 22; Kamal Salibi, “The Secret of the House of Ma,n,” International Journal
of Middle East Studies 4, no. 3 (July 1973): 272-287; Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Korkm¯az
Question: A Maronite Historian’s Plea for Ma,nid Legitimacy,” Al-Abh. ¯ath 34 (1986): 3-11; Alexander
Hourani, New Documents on the History of Mount Lebanon and Arabistan in the 10th and 11th
Centuries H. (Beirut, 2010), 915-942, 1169.
12
Figure 1.1 The Sh¯uf Region
Source: Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 32.
13
2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Even though the Ma,nids have been investigated from several aspects, we see that
the relations between Istanbul and the Druze power-holders in the Syrian littoral has
not been studied in the context of the Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature.
As demonstrated by primary and secondary sources, notably by Barkey and Özel on
the 17th century rebellions, the Ottoman Empire actively pursued a set of effective
and pragmatic peripheral policies in order to strengthen its damaged imperial control
over regions geographically remote from the capital. Although administrative
courses or principles of action were often realistic and flexible in far away regions
throughout the centuries, the 17th century conduct was still exclusive. In this period,
the Empire had to cope with numerous rebellions in a wide geography along with
highly acute and profound social, economic and cultural transformation processes;
and within this context, pragmatic policies employed to deal with the rebellions took
on a new meaning. Fortunately, a useful number of recent studies, both general and
specific, have brought out new dimensions to the rebellion literature, and shed light
on pragmatic policies, enabling younger generations of scholars to articulate and
comprehend general patterns and dynamics of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.
This chapter aims to examine the historiography of the rebellions produced by
prominent Ottomanists, and to point out the problems related to approaches and
conspicuous contributions in the field.52 I set out to review the leading studies
of a few scholars to present a general framework and to contextualize the major
arguments of the thesis in a chronological way. In particular, I probe into Celâlî
Isyanları: (1550-1603) by Mustafa Akdag [1963]; Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik
Kavgası & “Celali Isyanları” also by Mustafa Akdag [1975]; The Great Anatolian
Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611 by William J. Griswold [1983]; Bandits and Bureaucrats:
The Ottoman Route to State Centralization by Karen Barkey [1994]; The
52Gündogdu exclusively discusses the complex and intricate nature of the rebellions between 1550 and 1821.
He presents various approaches to Ottoman rebellions, including those of Robert Olson and Jane Hathaway:
Birol Gündogdu, “Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period:
An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821,”
Osmanlı Arastırmaları 51 (2018): 459, 462, 471, 474, 484-485.
14
Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Powerholders: An Analysis of the Historiography
by Dina Rizk Khoury [2006]; and The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700
by Oktay Özel [2012].
One extensive study of the Early Modern Ottoman rebellions, inadvertently known
as the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions (1550-1603), was first introduced by Mustafa Akdag. The
Jel¯al¯ı rebellions were basically Anatolia-based uprisings which took place against the
Ottoman central administrations in the 16th and 17th centuries.53 While he acknowledges
that the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions were particularly “Anatolian Rebellions”, he prefers
to identify them as “struggles of the Jel¯al¯ı ” (known as also “Cel¯al¯ı Müc¯adelesi”).54
Instead of utilizing the term “rebellion”, Mustafa Akdag advocates that “struggle”
was more appropriate to define this historical phenomenon. If one explores
the pre-17th century Ottoman narrative sources, principally the Vak. ¯ayi ,n¯ames (the
chronicles) says Akdag (without specifying or referring to one), one can clearly see
that any rebellion or a series of rebellions, which had different characteristics from
one another and broke out among the Muslim subjects (re,¯ay¯a), was called “Jel¯al¯ı”.55
Furthermore, according to Akdag, the Anatolian Rebellions were not restricted to
the first half of the 16th century and the first decade of the 17th century. Rather, they
were a historical phenomenon that continued well into the 18th and 19th centuries.56
The term “Jel¯al¯ı” primarily originated from Bozok. lu Sheikh Jal¯al who rebelled
against the Ottoman central administration in 1519 in Tokat, and Jel¯al¯ı simply
meant those who had a connection with him.57 Interestingly, this utilization started
to take on a new meaning and character during the reign of Meh.med III (1595-
1603).58 Muslim subjects made a habit of describing particular uprisings as the
“Jel¯al¯ı rebellions” already at the time of theK.arayaziji Rebellion59 (1598), the first
53Mücteba Ilgürel, “Celâlî isyanları,” TDVIA, vol. 7 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 252.
54Mustafa Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları: (1550-1603) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), vii.
55Akdag, 1-2.
56For the discussion of “struggles of the Jel¯al¯ı”, the “Anatolian Rebellions” and equally significantly, “a span
of almost three centuries, that is, 17th, 18th and even 19th centuries”: Akdag, vii.
57Ilgürel, loc.cit.
58The reign of Meh.
med III (1595-1603), a period that presaged dynastic and political crises, including the
practice of fratricide, was one of the most critical periods in Ottoman history inasmuch as it betokened the
gruelling transformation process that the Empire withstood. His reign coincided not only with the highly
intensive, abiding and insurmountable wars in the East and the West but also with the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions.
For an introductory information about the general conditions in that period of time: Feridun Emecen,
“Mehmed III,” TDVIA, vol. 28 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2003): 407-413.
59Mücteba Ilgürel, “Karayazıcı Abdülhalim,” TDVIA, vol. 24 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2001): 482-483;
Meryem Kaçan Erdogan, “Karayazıcı Isyanı,” Eskisehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 4,
no. 2 (December 2003): 56-65; Mustafa Akdag, “Kara-Yazıcı,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6 (Istanbul: Milli
Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 339-343; Anna S. Tveritinova, Türkiye’de Karayazıcı Deli Hasan Isyanı (1593-
1603), trans. A. Inan (Istanbul: Aya Kitap, 2006), 35-114. See also: Anna S. Tveritinova, “Vosslanie Kara
15
great Jel¯al¯ı rebellion.60 If one scrutinizes vak. ¯ayi ,n¯ames, however, for the pre-16th
century rebellions such as the Bozok. lu Sheikh Jal¯al, Baba Z.
ünn¯un and K.
alender
Sh¯ah rebellions, one sees that the term “Jel¯al¯ı” was no longer employed since they
had fundamentally distinctive characteristics. Mustafa Akdag makes an interesting
terminological distinction, similar to that of the vak. ¯ayi ,n¯ames.61 While characterizing
the religious ideology-based uprisings as “rebellion”, he describes the Jel¯al¯ı
phenomenon as a “struggle” on account of their typical differences from the ideologically
motivated ones. These two types of uprisings were quite distinct from one
another in terms of their natures and objectives. The former, the religious ideologybased
rebellions, essentially set its sights on the destruction of the Ottoman Empire
through the support of a mass of Shiite/Alawi people. On the other hand, the latter,
the struggles with the imperial administrations, were motivated by self-interest
rather than ravaging the imperial and political existence of both the Empire and
the dynasty. According to Mustafa Akdag, socio-economic factors were determinant
in Jel¯al¯ıs’ actions. Hence, the rebels did not hesitate to change sides for the
sake of their own interests.62 Historiographically speaking, Akdag argues that the
K.
arayaziji Rebellion (1598) was thought to be a starting point for the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions
(However, several Vak. ¯ayi ,n¯ames point out to the year 1596, two years earlier
than the uprising). In other words, he argues that they began in the 1550s, but
reached a decisive turning point in the last decade of the 16th century.63 Akdag
employs the term “Interregnum of the Jel¯al¯ı” (also known as Cel¯al¯ı Fetreti).64 According
to him, this period began with the siege of Eger of 159665 and then gained
acceleration over time in the first decade of the 17th century. Afterwards, he draws
a clear division of period of hardships into two major phases: the first was a seven
Yazıdji-Deli Hasan v Turtsii: Türkiye’de Karayazın Deli-Hasan Isyanı,” Tarih Arastırmaları Dergisi 1, no.
1 (Mayıs 1963): 297-309; Abdülkadir Özcan, “Altı Bölük,” TDVIA, vol. 2 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları,
1989): 531; Mücteba Ilgürel, “Il Erleri,” TDVIA, vol. 22 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000): 59-61; Mücteba
Ilgürel, “Il Erleri Hakkında,” Güneydogu Avrupa Arastırmaları Dergisi 12 (December 2010): 125-140; Yücel
Özkaya, “Kaymakam,” TDVIA, vol. 25 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2002): 84-85.
60Akdag, op.cit, 1.
61Akdag, 1-2. Mustafa Akdag essentially refers to the vak. ¯ayi ,n¯ames as primary sources, yet does not give
specific examples.
62Akdag, 1-3.
63Akdag, 1-2.
64Mustafa Akdag, “Celâlî Fetreti: A. 1596 Sırasında Osmanlı Devletinin Umumî Durumu 1- Iran ve Avusturya
Harblerinin Uzamasından Dogan Hosnutsuzluk,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi
Dergisi 16, no. 1-2 (1958): 62.
65Géza Dávid, “Egri,” TDVIA, vol. 10 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1994): 489-491; V. J. Parry, “Egri,” The
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 689-691; M. Tayyib
Gökbilgin, “Egri,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 4 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 196-198; Mehmet
Ipsirli, “Beylerbeyi,” TDVIA, vol. 6 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992): 69-74.
16
year-period (1596-1603), while the second was a six year-period (1604-1610).66 In
spite of the shortness of these time periods, the Empire, perhaps, went through
one of its challenging times and agonizing transformation processes. According to
Akdag, a major feature of Interregnum of the Jel¯al¯ı was that impoverished villagers
were led into the process of sekb¯anization by fierce pillaging of the rural areas.67
As a consequence of this illegally uninterrupted military infringement, the Sekb¯ans
displaced a slew of people, leading to large masses of people to emigrate from rural
to urban areas and thus to the destruction of the rural economy. Their contraventional
acts were not restricted only to such acts; the villages and even the biggest
residential areas, such as towns and cities, sternly suffered from the Sekb¯ans’ attack.
According to Akdag, this phase started in the year 1603, which referred to the
Ottoman government’s imperial compromise with DeliH.
assan,68 who had a consanguineous
relation withK.
arayaziji ,Abd al-H. al¯ım. The year 1604 became a decisive
turning point, referring to the second phase (1604-1610), also known as the “Great
66Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 2.
67Akdag, 2-3. Abdülkadir Özcan, “Sekban,” TDVIA, vol. 36 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2009): 326-328;
M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Sekbân,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 10 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997):
325-327; Virginia H. Aksan, “Segb¯an,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Supplement, vol. 12
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2004): 713-714; Kemal Beydilli, “Yeniçeri,” TDVIA, vol. 43 (Istanbul:
TDV Yayınları, 2013): 450-462; Abdülkadir Özcan, “Devsirme,” TDVIA, vol. 9 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları,
1994): 254-257; Bernard Lewis, “D¯ıw¯an-ı Hum¯ay¯un,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 2
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 337-339; Mehmet Ipsirli, “Kapı Halkı,” TDVIA, vol. 24 (Istanbul:
TDV Yayınları, 2001): 343-344.
68William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag,
1983), 39-46; Mustafa Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzensizlik Kavgası & “Celali Isyanları” (Istanbul:
Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013), 23, 372-377. See also: Ercan Gümüs, Tarihçi ve Asi: 16. Yüzyıl Celali
Isyanları’nın Osmanlı Tarih Yazımına Yansıması (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2018), 80-86,
161-178. For the involvement of the members of the Crimean Khanate such as Meh. med-Giray and Sahin-
Giray in the rebellion of Deli H.
assan: Vasiliy D. Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlıgı (Istanbul:
Selenge Yayınları, 2016), 278-301; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Hasan Pasa,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 5/1
(Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 325-329; Branislav Djurdjev, “Bosna,” The Encyclopaedia of
Islam, New Edition, vol. 1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1986): 1261-1275.
17
Flight”69 (BüyükK.
açgun or Büyük Fir¯ar¯ı).70
As Mustafa Akdag focused on the social and economic motives of the rebellions,
he particularized some foundations within a wide array of agricultural, industrial
and fiscal determinants along with maladministration. According to him, each had
an indelible stamp not only on the deepening crisis but also on the subsequent
popular protests and disturbances.71 In other words, he endeavours to explain
the breakdown of the Ottoman system through these determinants, signalling that
the Ottoman Empire could not adapt to the changing conditions from the 16th
century onwards.72 To him, the extant economic climate was not restricted only
to the Ottoman realm. Instead, it was an economic downturn extending to a more
wide-ranging geographical area, namely the Mediterranean Basin.73 Mustafa Akdag
advocates that since the Empire was unable to cope with the peripheral elements
defying its authority, it opted bargaining and negotiating with them. He evaluates
this as a weakness and claims that the rebellions at the time were an indication
of a decline.74 He states that while European modernization took off in the 1650s,
the Ottomans failed to keep up. That is to say, he advocates that the Ottoman
decline began in the 16th century.75 It needs to be added here that Mustafa Akdag
conducted his research in an academic environment where there was no criticism of
69Mustafa Akdag specifies that the period of the Great Flight (1604-1610) (also known as “Cel¯a-yı Vat.an”)
perhaps constituted the most terrifying stage of the Jel¯al¯ı Rebellions. After analyzing the general economic
conditions of this critical six year-period in detail, he demonstrates how devastated were the Central
Anatolian, Southeastern Anatolian, and Aegean regions. He enumerates the fundamental reasons of the
revolts as such: (i) over-taxation imposed by the imperial treasury and dirlik-holders; (ii) the intolerable
financial burdens of various other taxes; (iii) a serious deterioration in the living conditions of almost totally
poverty-stricken peasants originating from the widespread usury practiced by the state functionaries and
the leading local notables engaging in business; and (iv) the emergence of the great çiftliks as well as the
severe and frequent attacks of the sekb¯ans, levends, and s¯uhtes. Ultimately, all of these factors compelled
the whole slew of peasants to emigrate en masse, resulting in a dramatic decline in agricultural production
and tax revenues. They migrated to the relatively safeguarded cities/towns, the forestlands/highlands,
and the Eastern vil¯ayets of the Empire: Mustafa Akdag, “Celali Isyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk (1603-
1606),” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Arastırmaları Dergisi 2,
no. 2-3 (1964): 1-51; Mücteba Ilgürel, “Celâ-yi Vatan,” TDVIA, vol. 7 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993):
238-240. See also: Hrand D. Andreasyan, “Celâlîlerden Kaçan Anadolu Halkının Geri Gönderilmesi,” In
Ord. Prof. Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarsılı’ya Armagan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 45-53;
Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the
Ottoman Empire 1560–1660 (Leiden, New York, Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1996), 246-306; David F. Burg, A
World History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts, and Riots from Antiquity to
the Present (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 189; Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013); Mustafa Alkan, “Softa,” TDVIA, vol. 37 (Istanbul: TDV
Yayınları, 2009): 342-343.
70Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 2-3.
71Gündogdu, op.cit., 460
72Gündogdu, 463.
73Gündogdu, 461.
74Mustafa Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali Isyanları" (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi,
1975), 482-488.
75Gündogdu, op.cit., 460-461, 463-465; Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 44-48, 68-72.
18
the Ottoman decline paradigm.
Mustafa Akdag specifies two different kinds of insubordinations, but opts to focus on
only one, that is, the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions which, he claims, were bounded by the recognition
of the Ottoman imperial legitimacy as opposed to the religious ideology-based
rebellions which were separatist. After stating his major principles and approaches
with respect to this discussion, he emphatically states his intention to explore the
time period between 1550 and 1603 and to narrate these “struggles”.76
After a decade or so, Mustafa Akdag appears again with an unheeded sub-argument,
a certain part of which is directly related to my research. In his book entitled
“Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali Isyanları"” [1975]77, which
was essentially a more sophisticated version of his preceding work entitled Celâlî
Isyanları (1550-1603) [1963], he furnishes us with significant minutiae of the Jel¯al¯ı
rebellions.
Akdag, in his later study, takes a very orthodox approach to the suppression of the
Jel¯al¯ı rebellions by the Ottoman governments. He assesses the imperial stance that
the Empire adopted and the policies that it formulated for these authority-violators
who dared its imperial authority in a very conservative and reductive way. According
to him, the Ottoman trajectory of integration of the rebels was predominantly based
on bargaining, which was clearly a concession and “an obvious sign of decline.”
Furthermore, he advocates that as the Ottoman state was unable to put down these
rebellions, it entered into a process of negotiation; therefore, he principally sees
such policies of the Empire as an absolute weakness.78 From his academic stance,
we clearly see that Akdag contextualizes this sub-argument within the framework of
the decline paradigm. Later, William J. Griswold also pursued this line. Later still,
Karen Barkey, however, reevaluated and reformulated this approach and offered us
a fresh point of view.
What is exactly germane to my research is what Mustafa Akdag points out about the
suppression of the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions by the Ottoman governments. Akdag indicates
that the Ottoman governments designated the Jel¯al¯ı rebels either as a sanjak-bey
or a beylerbeyi according to circumstances, and this situation definitively depended
on how perilous these authority-violators were. Considering the local dynamics, the
76Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 1-3; Gündogdu, loc.cit.
77Both the preface and a blurb on the back cover of Mustafa Akdag’s “Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik
Kavgası & "Celali Isyanları"” claims that the book is a more elaborated version of the studies that he had
produced so far and encompasses significant details as well as some disregarded sub-arguments: Akdag,
Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, 9.
78Mustafa Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, 482-488.
19
governments generally appointed a Jel¯al¯ı rebel to either his own home town or a surrounding
sanjak, recognizing him very well; however, if the insubordinates were much
tougher than previously believed, the governments, then, masterfully employed the
integration policy and assigned them to a beylerbeyi in a remote province. In this
way, the process of establishment and then the consolidation of their impaired imperial
rules over the periphery became easier.79 The central government, says Akdag,
appointed K.
arayaziji, K.
alenderoghli Meh. med, Neslioghli, K.
ınalıoghli, Erz¯ade and
Yularkasti to Amasya-Çorum, Ankara, Hamid (Isparta), Afyonkarahisar, Kırsehir
and Kastamonu, respectively, as sancakbeyis. Likewise, it designated Deli H.
assan,
T.
av¯ıl Meh. med, andK.
arak. as Ah.med to Bosnia, Shahrizor (Iraq) and Çıldır, respectively,
as beylerbeyis.80
The direct relevance of this sub-argument with my research is that the adopted
policies were restricted not only to the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. The Ottoman governments
utilized similar kinds of integration policies against separatist rebels as well. There
were, nevertheless, exceptions. To exemplify, when having a close look at the rebellions
of both Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha and Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in Syria, we can clearly
see that the Ottoman administrations employed the same strategies for these two
rebellions, both of which had the same characteristics (and qualify to be separatist
rebellions).
Exactly two decades after, Mustafa Akdag’s approach and perspectives in reference
to the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions took on a more comprehensive, advanced, and quite distinct
dimension through the contributions of William J. Griswold. Griswold broadens
the theoretical purview of the prevailing discussion through his own interpretations.
Notwithstanding having dissimilar opinions on a few central arguments propounded
by Akdag, he primarily validates Akdag’s orthodox approach as well as brings some
new concepts to the discussion.
At the outset, in his book entitled “The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-
1611 [1983]”, Griswold specifies that three elemental determinants paralyzed the
Ottoman imperial rule: the gradual dysfunctions in the t¯ım¯ar system over time;
the lack of leadership qualification and governmental skills of the sultans; and the
ruinous impacts of the price revolution in Europe. He adds that population increase
and the alterations in climatic conditions should not be underestimated, and these
elements may consequently have determined the course of rebellions.81
79Akdag, 483-487.
80Akdag, 484.
81William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag,
1983), xix. Griswold introduced themes such as “the general conditions in the early 17th century Ottoman
20
Griswold begins by stating that he will set out a comprehensive investigation of the
Jel¯al¯ı rebellions from a political perspective. More specifically, with his own words,
he conceptualizes this as “Jel¯al¯ı’s internal Ottoman and interregional relations”.82
He acknowledges the Battle of Mezokeresztes (1596) as a watershed moment like
Mustafa Akdag earlier (and Oktay Özel much later). However, he marks the end of
the rebellions in 1609, referring to the construction date of the Sult.¯an Ah.med Mosque
(also known as the Blue Mosque), which is accepted as a harbinger of the end of
the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions on account of its symbolic significance. This interpretation
leads to a dating which differs from that of Akdag and, later, Oktay Özel. While
Mustafa Akdag accepts 1603 as a final year for the rebellions, Oktay Özel proposed
1700. Thus, opinions greatly differ among scholars in terms of the time interval. It
seems to me that Özel’s proposal of 1700, based on the findings in current secondary
literature, is much more appropriate for the final years of the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions.
Griswold presents a highly interesting title, “The Great Anatolian Rebellion”, to
his study as he narrowed down the vast geographical domains of the empire into a
restricted one in order to identify the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. This approach is of utmost
importance as he is the first scholar to clearly draw and strongly underline a particular
geographical boundary to probe into the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. Even though it is
not highlighted, the focus of Mustafa Akdag, too, is Anatolia.
According to William J. Griswold, the Jel¯al¯ı rebels had no intention other than the
wish to be integrated into the Ottoman imperial system. They solely sought their
own self-interests, primarily based on economic concerns, by fighting with their unmistakeable
military forces against the well-armed Ottoman military forces. In other
words, they were quite far from a state of mind aiming to establish an independent
state. In this way, he lays absolute emphasis on both the non-separatist nature of
the Jel¯al¯ıs and the significance of the advancements in military technology.83 We
clearly see that he takes the same academic stance as Mustafa Akdag, and, to some
extent, Oktay Özel joins the two much later. However, while Griswold considers
Y¯usuf Pasha as the last great Jel¯al¯ı,84 Oktay Özel identifies Yegen ,Osm¯an Pasha
as the last Jel¯al¯ı rebel.85
Empire as well as the turn of the century,” ”the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions,” and “the separatist rebellions” in the
preface of his book.
82Griswold, xx.
83Griswold, xx-xxi.
84Griswold, 206.
85Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700,” In The Ottoman World, ed. Christine
Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 191.
21
Perhaps one of Griswold’s most paramount points with regard to the early modern
Ottoman rebellion literature is the existence of separatist rebellions setting their
sights on tearing the Empire down. These were primarily the rebellions of Janbul¯at.
,Al¯ı Pasha and, to use Griswold’s own words, his “Syrian” colleague Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n. He compares the two rebellions to one another and brings a new and
radical dimension to the discussion.86
In addition to the essential points that he specifies as above, it is also possible
to read between the lines. To exemplify, he points out that the primary reason
behind debilitating the political unity in Ottoman Anatolia was the battles against
the Safavids;87 this is why he attributes crucial importance to the Ottoman–Safavid
Wars of 1578–1590/1603-1612 and 1603–1618.88 After providing a summary account
of the general situation until the early 17th century, he indicates that the Empire
became a static power by losing its dynamic identity as a consequence of pyrrhic
victories.89 From this point of view, we clearly see that Griswold is fundamentally a
declinist scholar like Mustafa Akdag; however, Oktay Özel, advocating anti-declinist
arguments, is in sharp contrast to both.
As for Griswold’s attitude towards the Ottoman centers’ reactions and the strategy
that they utilized against any element challenging its authority, he absolutely
assesses the Ottoman way of integrating the peripheral forces into their imperial
body as a weakness. To put it differently, he acknowledges that due to the Empire’s
incapability of managing these kinds of authority-violators, the Empire entered into
a process of bargaining and negotiation, and he places it in the context of the decline
86See footnote 28 above.
87Griswold, op.cit, 1.
88For more information on the Ottoman-Safavid Wars: Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in
the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2011):
697-699. See also: Serafettin Turan, “Lala Mustafa Pasa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar,” Belleten XXII,
no. 88 (1958): 551-593; Bekir Kütükoglu, “Tahmasp I,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 11 (Istanbul: Milli
Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 637-647; Ahmet Türk, “The Crimean Khanate under The Reign of Gazi Giray
II” (Master’s Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000), 14-19; Rudi Matthee, “The Ottoman-Safavid War of 986-
998/1578-90: Motives and Causes,” International Journal of Turkish Studies vol. 20, no: 1-2 (2014):
1-20; Peter Jackson and Lawrence Lockhart, The Cambridge History of Iran: The Timurid and Safavid
Periods vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 262-278; Maeda Hirotake, “The Forced
Migrations and Reorganisation of the Regional Order in the Caucasus by Safavid Iran: Preconditions and
Developments Described by Fazli Khuzani,” In Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its
Neighboring Worlds, eds. O. Ieda and T. Uyama, Sapporo, Slavic Research Centre (Hokkaido University,
2004), 237-271; Christian H. Heller, “Great Power Competition in the Age of Islam. Contemporary Lessons
from the Ottoman–Safavid Rivalry,” MCU Journal vol. 9, no. 2 (2018): 22-43; Martin Sicker, The Islamic
World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (USA:
Praeger Publishers, 2001), 1-19; Remzi Kılıç, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı-Iran Siyasî Antlasmaları
(Istanbul: Tez Yayınları, 2001), 85-173; Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire
(London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Bekir Kütükoglu, Osmanlı - Iran Siyasi Münasebetleri (1578-
1612) (Istanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993); M. Fahrettin Kırzıoglu, Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas Elleri’ni
Fethi (1451-1590) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998).
89Griswold, loc.cit.
22
paradigm.90
After a decade or so, in opposition to the traditional Ottomanists, such as Mustafa
Akdag and William J. Griswold, Karen Barkey casts an unprecedented light on the
Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. With an understanding based on historical sociology, Barkey deftly
synthesizes some major historical arguments inherited from Ottomanists before her,
and to a certain extent, reformulates these contentions within a highly original
context (i.e. the process of state formation and state centralization).
Although this approach has later been subjected to criticism, I chose to follow her
analyses of the 17th Century Crisis in Europe. She also argues that the general
pattern of state-society conflicts, predominantly prevalent in the Western European
states, has been the model for the state formations, and paths to non-Western
state formation has been neglected.91 This is a valuable framework of discussion,
promising to reveal on alternative modernities in the context of state’s barganing
and negotion policy, a major instrument of Ottomans’ dealing with the rebels.
In her book entitled “Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization
[1994]”, Barkey principally scrutinizes the issue of how the Ottoman
Empire was transformed in the early modern period. She pursues the argument
by making comparisons with the Western mode of state-formation and particularly
with the case of France, which has been taken as a universal pattern for the
rest of the world, including the Ottoman Empire. According to this approach, the
ideal Western trajectory of state formation is fundamentally predicated upon conflict(
s) between the state and society. More precisely, different social classes, such
as peasants and elites/aristocrats, who differ from one another on account of their
grievously damaged class interests, begin cooperating against it, and rebelled against
the state. They brought the very existence of the state almost to the brink of being
torn down.92
Barkey first discusses Western European developments in general and then brings
the French case into the forefront in her work.93 The Western European states
needed both military conscription and financial resources in order to maintain their
armies’ continuity and success in wars. For this purpose, she says, they felt the need
90Griswold, 1-59.
91Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1994), 1.
92Barkey, 229-230. See also: Çaglar Keyder, review of “Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The
Ottoman Route to State Centralization,” American Journal of Sociology (July 1995): 249-251; Fatma
Müge Göçek and Esra Özyürek, review of “Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route
to State Centralization,” The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin (Fall 1996): 75-79.
93Barkey, op.cit., 1-23, 229-242.
23
to make direct and intense intervention on those factors threatening the resources
of the society, which would be damaging not only the peasants’ interests but also
the regional autonomy of the elites. Barkey shows that when confronted with such
threats, the peasants and the elites cooperated with one another94 and this cooperation
led to anti-tax and anti-state rebellions in the 17th century.95 Consequently,
the authorities of the Western European states violently reacted to such popular
protests and rebellions.96 As Barkey points out, the same was valid for France during
the period of consolidation.97 The majority of the rebellions were staged by the
peasants who collaborated with the nobles, as both of those social groups were at
the risk of being greatly damaged by the state’s centralist inclinations.
Barkey also illustrates how Western European states set out to strengthen their
authority over the society through some other mechanisms. Louis XIII, for example,
took a significant step in centralizing France by castigating the duelings and the
employment of firearms. Thus, he diminished the influence of the nobles in France.
Additionally, France, having a feudal structure, found an opportunity to centralize
more through the functionaries appointed by the state in the 17th century. On
the other hand, the Ottoman Empire, remarks Barkey, managed to centralize by
bargaining with the peripheral elements defying its authority. This signifies that
there were different paths to centralize.98
While they did not hesitate to suppress the opposition, at times, the authorities of
the Western European states, too, opted to conduct negotiations with the elites.
Barkey discusses that the Ottoman Empire, in contrast, took advantage of such
conflicts time and again and resorted to negotiations and bargaining. That is to say,
the violent supression was not the first option for the Ottomans, thus the Empire
managed to eliminate the opposition challenging its imperial authority pragmatically.
99
In the last two decades, many other historians, including the Ottomanists, have
94Charles Tilly, Coercion Capital and European States AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990),
99-103; Barkey, op.cit., 4.
95These are the English Civil War (1642–1651), the Fronde (1648-1653), revolt in Naples (1647) and French
intervention of Catalonia (1640s). Perez Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660, vol. 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 36-37; Roland Mousnier, “The Fronde,” In Preconditions of Revolution
in Early Modern Europe, eds. Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1970), 131-159.
96Barkey, op.cit., 1.
97Barkey, 11.
98Barkey, 1-2, 4, 11.
99Charles Tilly, 101-103; Barkey, op.cit., 2.
24
brought the non-Western trajectories of state centralization to discussion, and advocated
that the employment of the Western forms of state consolidation are far
from being adequate to explain the experiences of the remainder of the World.100 In
comparison, explorations of class structure in Ottoman society are totally neglected.
The definitions and relationships of social classes, the way that they perceived one
another as well as the control mechanism(s) that the Empire developed and deployed
remain unexplored, and its ordinary subjects, re,¯ay¯a, was almost definitively
disparate from the social structure in the Western world. Barkey’s discussion of
the t¯ım¯ar system, which I summarized below, sheds light on the provincial elites
and those they were in control of. In her discussion of the central and peripheral
power-holders, it is acknowledged that the patrimonial Ottoman Empire did not recognize
any possible power other than itself between the appointed landowner (t¯ım¯arlı
sip¯ah¯ı), having only land tenure, and its subject. This is why it did not absolutely
permit the flourishing of any possible local power which would challenge its authority.
The empire, having the absolute authority on the land (m¯ır¯ı ar¯az¯ı), rendered
the t¯ım¯ar system non-hereditary, which explains the preclusion of the t¯ım¯arlı sip¯ah¯ı
who had a high potential to turn into an aristocratic structure.101 This situation
resulted not only in the Ottoman adoption of stringent centralization policies but
also in the interception of any aristocratic structures to develop in the Empire.102
The other fundamental aspect of this structure is the presence of the written
code, cushioning the subject from the abuse of any t¯ım¯arlı sip¯ah¯ıs or provincial
elites/governors and regulating the relationships between the re,¯ay¯a and the central
administrations at the local level. In other words, it is a kind of assurance for the
Empire’s subjects. In addition to the t¯ım¯arlı sip¯ah¯ıs, such a contract holds also
true for the provincial elites in some cases – for those who had limited authority
over subjects and had no right to demand forced labor from them; it was not possible
for them to contravene the boundary rigorously drawn between the subject
and themselves. If they did otherwise, any individual subject had a chance to gripe
100There is a huge literature on alternative modernities and state-formation in Europe. For a quantitative
documentation of this process and empirical analysis of its determinants see: K. Kıvanç Karaman and
Sevket Pamuk, “Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic
Structure, and Political Regime,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013): 603-626.
Karaman and Pamuk who compile “a new and comprehensive tax revenues dataset, review the patterns of
fiscal capacity across the continent through the early modern era, examine and categorize various threads
in the literature, and empirically investigate alternative hypotheses,” argue that “warfare tended to have
a greater impact on state-building under representative regimes in more urban economies, and under
authoritarian regimes in more rural economies.”
101Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nda Çiftçi Sınıfların Hukuki Statüsü,” Ülkü 10, no. 56
(October, 1937): 147-159. Barkan argues that the Ottoman t¯ım¯ar system was not patrimonial, indicating
that it was not hereditary and that there was no sign of a structure that places strength in the hands of
a small, privileged ruling class, the aristocrats. Moreover, he argues that Ottoman subject peasants were
not serfs, by which he means that they were free, contrary to their counterparts in the Western world.
102Mehmet Emin Sen and Mehmet Ali Türkmenoglu, “Avrupa Feodalitesi ile Osmanlı Tımar Sistemi Üzerine
Bir Mukayese,” International Journal of Social Science 5, no. 4 (2012): 200.
25
about the exploitative and arbitrary acts of the sip¯ah¯ıs or any other elements of the
provincial elites, by resorting to a q¯adi’s court or writing a petition to the D¯ıv¯an-ı
Hum¯ay¯un.103
Further, Barkey points to the rotational (mün¯avebeli) appointment of the provincial
elites, a strategy that the centre primarily utilized to obstruct any possible cooperation
that would forge between them and the local elements, that is, peasants; in
this way, it became decidedly very difficult for them to rebel against the Empire and
the governments rendered both elements dependent on itself.104 Therefore, Barkey
remarks, the peasant rebellions did not occur in the Ottoman Empire unlike the
Western European states.
In order to divide and rule, the Empire laid the appropriate groundwork for the elites
endeavouring to attain high posts and maximum economic profit both in Istanbul
and the periphery; in this way, the Ottoman administrations impeded any possible
alliances that could be directed to themselves by taking advantage of intra-elite
conflicts.105 Taking all these into consideration, Barkey premediates that while
the Western world followed feudal patterns, the Ottoman Empire pursued much
more stringent centralized ones and bore a resemblance to the Chinese and Russian
cases.106
According to Barkey, as the Empire blocked the possibility of any defiance of authority
and refusal to obey orders that could be led by both elites and peasants,
the banditry became the leading resistance to the Empire; however, the Empire
also contrived to surmount this fundamental problem since it essentially incorporated
these bandits, that is, the Jel¯al¯ı rebels, into its imperial body through “deals,
bargains, and patronage”, to use her own words.107 By deploying very efficacious
manipulative strategies, the Empire was able to consolidate its central authority and
grant them a chance to reintegrate into its imperial system: “the Ottoman Empire
presents itself as the sole center for rewards and privileges”.108
Barkey concludes that the Ottoman Empire became centralized in the 17th century
through the exercise of a series of complex mechanisms of incorporation and strategic
103Halil Inalcık, “Timar,” TDVIA, vol. 41 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2012): 170.
104Barkey, op.cit., x.
105Barkey, 234-235.
106Barkey, 9.
107Gündogdu, op.cit., 470.
108Barkey, op.cit, 13.
26
maneuvers that it wittingly and astutely devised, and then, managed to transform
itself by adaptive imperial policies considering the changing conditions of the world
in that period of time.109 Hence, Barkey establishes that she is absolutely antideclinist,
unlike Akdag and Griswold.
In addition to the Ottomanists whose approaches and perspectives that I reviewed
with regard to the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions so far, Dina Khoury, who essentially delves
into the early modern power-holders in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Middle
East, provides a stimulating insight into the relationships between Istanbul and
the provincial elites progressively arising in the periphery. She investigates when
these symbiotic ties commenced and how they evolved during the 17th and 18th centuries.
Dina Khoury analyzes the notion of ,ay¯an in detail and provides significant
clarifications, including the fluid nature of the ,ay¯an. All in all, Khoury is also an
anti-declinist.
With a special emphasis on the grievous crisis period in her book chapter entitled
“The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders: an Analysis of the Historiography”,
Khoury specifies that political, military and fiscal determinants as well
as a set of rebellions that the Ottoman Empire confronted in the 17th century, compelled
it to significantly modify its style of provincial administration. A century
later, the Empire revamped its imperial organization in the periphery one more and
systematized the exercise of tax-farming to attain possible economic resources.110
From the 18th century onwards, she says, the bond between Istanbul and the peripheral
elements, the local power-holders (the “provincial elite”), turned out to be
much more problematic, but the Ottoman state managed to carry on this highly
complex partnership –until the 19th century. Khoury remarks that, for all their serious
threats/acts overshadowing the imperial image of the state, the power-holders
mostly proved to be loyal. She questions and ruminates on how the Empire contrived
a way of contending with this situation. In fact, she partially answers her
own question, inasmuch as she points out that the Empire had “resources and political
capital to suppress and co-opt” the peripheral elements in the early modern
period.111 As we shall see in the third chapter, I should also definitively add a series
of complex mechanisms of incorporation and manipulative strategies devised by the
Empire.
109Barkey, ix-xii.
110Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders: an Analysis of the Historiography,”
In The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 135.
111Khoury., 136.
27
The other fundamental aspect of the continuous struggle is the fact that the peripheral
figures began to construct not only political but also military identities on top of
their preexisting local ones on the provincial level. As a result of the provincial postholders’
occupation of high positions in the peripheries through illicit acquisitions,
they found chances to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system; in this way, as
Khoury points out, they rendered the Empire’s sovereignty “localized” during the
closing years of the 18th century. Even though this process has always been assessed
by traditional Ottomanists as a “decentralization”, some evaluate this development
from a quite different angle. According to them, including Khoury, what happened
in the provinces was principally the exact replication of the Ottoman political culture
at the peripheral level; in other words, the local authority-violators experienced
the provincial version of the imperial culture.112
The other prime facet of “recentralization”, Khoury continues to argue, is that the
process of systematic Ottoman infiltration and penetration into target territories,
including the Middle Eastern region, predominantly hinged on strategic alliances,
expediting the establishment and consolidation of imperial control over the territories.
Given adequate control of these societies, having a rich ethnic composition or
divergent elements in a particular territory, we can grasp why the Empire was not
naturally hesitant to cooperate with the local elements, notwithstanding the known
disadvantages. The Empire, therefore, employed a set of control mechanisms, varying
from region to region.113 To give a specific example, the Empire made use of
cut-throat contention between local families, such as the Sayf¯as and theH.
arf¯ushes in
Lebanon and played them off against each other.114 We see that, at this point, the
remoteness to the imperial capital is a primary determinant. Khoury, in this regard,
points out that while the Empire could easily reach regions closer to Istanbul, such
as Anatolian province constituting the core element of the Ottoman realm, this was
not possible for Mount Lebanon (also known as Jabal Lubn¯an), the Southern parts
of Anatolia, and Arab provinces that were geographically much more far-flung from
the capital.115
It should also be noted that in the 17th century Venetian naval forces in the Eastern
Mediterranean were much more intrusive, while the Ottomans were not as effective
as they used to be and the sea routes and the ports on the Syrian littoral were not
112Khoury, 136-137.
113Khoury, 137.
114Khoury, 141.
115Khoury, 137.
28
as safe as before.116 Naturally, this situation directly affected Ottoman access and
intervention in the region.
Khoury finds the nature of the Ottoman peripheral policies highly volatile, more
precisely at the time of rebellions. In spite of being aware of the significance of
working in collaboration with these power-holders, the Empire, at the same time,
knew the fragility of these relationships. For this reason, perhaps, the Ottoman
Empire formulated, as Khoury stated, both the “policy of accommodation” and
“policy of repression”.117 The Ottoman trajectory of peripheral policies proceeded
from the conditions of that period of time, not in the heat of the moment. The
local elements, being aware of their power and influence that mainly originated
from the erratic nature of the conditions, on the other hand, efficaciously exploited
opportunities to enter into a process of negotiation within the framework of certain
demarcation. 118
The traditional form of administration in the periphery was not at all times exercised
in the same manner in every part of the Ottoman realm. Whereas Anatolia, and
the Balkan regions were subject to the t¯ım¯ar system, the overwhelming majority
of the Middle East, including Egypt, Basra, and Syria, pursued disparate patterns.
Most significantly, the local rural figures/elements would come to be deliberately
embodied into the Ottoman imperial system over time.119
Regarding the case of Mosul, Dina R. Khoury states that the Empire successfully
deployed some strategies, including cooperating with local elements through the iltiz
¯am system to maintain its authority and earn its legitimacy in the periphery. In
this way, the possibility that local elements turned into local intermediaries increasing.
120
When the Ottoman government commenced the sale of offices and tax-revenues of
the iltiz¯am system from the closing years of the 16th century onwards, it culminated
in a grievous erosion in the traditional style of administration; local elements
took advantage of these changing conditions, and in the 18th century, decentralization
of both “military mobilization and tax collection” strengthened their position
116Selvinaz Mete, “The Ottoman Empire as Reflected to the Relazione of the Bailo Giorgio Giustinian: 1620-
1627” (Master’s Thesis, Fatih University, 2012), 29-30.
117Khoury, op.cit, 138.
118Khoury, 139.
119Khoury, 139-140.
120Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 213-215.
29
further.121
The systematic changes incrementally attenuated the power of the provincial governors.
For this reason, the janissaries and the local figures appeared as authorityviolators
in the major provincial cities over time. Khoury explores how much the
military elements in the peripheries actually affected the imperial provinces and the
seriousness of the situation.122 According to her, the intense military activities of
the Ottoman governments accelerated the process of the militarization of the rural
parts of the Empire. In addition, whereas some of them engaged in economic
activities, others, mostly their leaders turned into a local elite over time.123 This
situation obliged the Empire to seriously tackle newly arising peripheral elements in
the provinces. Firstly, the Ottoman governments strove to extend the prerogatives
of the governors at the provincial level and then enabled the local elites to benefit
from the m¯alik¯ane system, a lifetime version of the iltiz¯am system. Consequently,
the Empire throve regarding its local policies as a result of the cooperation with the
local elites remaining loyal to the Empire. At the end of the process, the Empire
succeeded in incorporating these local figures into its imperial body by a set of local
policies that it had employed.124
While Barkey and Khoury explored center-periphery relations in the context of their
research agendas, some other historians made analyses with regard to state structures,
within the framework of general debates but directly related to the Ottoman
central authority’s control mechanisms over the periphery. Samuel N. Eisenstadt,
for example, known for investigating the political systems of the empires, compares
some centralized and bureaucratic empires, including Ottoman, Roman and Spanish
ones.125 Specifically, he points out that unlike the Spanish, the Ottomans had much
more in common with their Roman counterparts. To him, just like the Romans, the
Ottomans employed a province (ey¯alet) system, but theirs were much more sophisticated
in terms of bureaucratic organization, indicating that the Ottomans deployed
similar strategies to keep a large mass of people living in the periphery under their
control. In addition to these, the Ottomans endeavoured to tightly integrate a large
mass of people in different parts of the Ottoman realm, that is, in the periphery
into the Empire through t¯ım¯ar and muk. ¯at.a,a systems.126 Likewise, William Mc-
121Khoury, The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders, 140.
122Khoury, 141.
123Khoury, 145.
124Khoury, 142-143.
125Samuel N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: Free Press, 1963), 4-5.
126Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference
30
Neil, a pioneer in the field of world history, analyzes the process whereby the thinly
occupied grasslands of southeastern Europe were incorporated into the social bodies
of three great empires, the Ottoman, the Austrian, and the Russian, and also
underscores the significance of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He points out that the
Ottomans fell within the category of Gunpowder Empires. To him, the fact that
the Ottomans adopted and employed advanced military technology necessitated a
serious and effective bureaucratic structure. Naturally, this situation enabled the
Ottoman central authorities to have control over local powers in the periphery.127
A review of wide-ranging scholarship on world-wide center-periphery debates is not
possible here because of my limited knowledge in the field.128 Regarding more specific
Ottoman-oriented center-periphery debates, the impetus has come from the works
of sociologists, political scientists and historians such as Serif Mardin, Metin Heper
and Albert Hourani and mostly in the context of the late Ottoman history.129 An
exceptional study on early modern Ottoman history is Oktay Özel’s The Collapse of
Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643 where he asks the questions
Did the “seventeenth-century crisis” visit the Ottoman Empire? How can we situate
the explosion of rural violence and the rebellions of the turn of the seventeenth
century in the Anatolian countryside?130
More than four decades after Mustafa Akdag, Oktay Özel offers far-reaching perspectives
on the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions and center-periphery relations. Having different
views on the few fundamental arguments put forward by Akdag, he first clarifies
Akdag’s orthodox approach in explaining the nature of Ottoman rebellions. In his
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 28-31, 144-148.
127William H. McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800 (Chicago: UCP, 1964); idem, “The Ottoman
Empire in World History,” In Melet¯emata St¯e Mn¯em¯e Basileiou [Vasileiou] Laourda: Essays in Memory of
Basil Laourdas, ed. Louisa B. Laourda (Athens: L. B. Laourda, 1975), 374-385 (reprint: “Dünya Tarihinde
Osmanlı Imparatorlugu”, In Osmanlı ve Dünya , ed. Mustafa Armagan (Istanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2000), 60-
68. Yahya Koç also make some comments on these general debates. For more information: Yahya Koç,
“Sayda Eyaleti’nde Osmanlı Iktidarı ve Yerel Güçler (1700-1775)” (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul University,
2018), 16-20.
128For a recent review of the secondary literature: Rikard Waelenius, “Core and Periphery in the Early
ModernWorld System: A Time-Space Appropriation Assessment,” In Methods in World History: A Critical
Approach, eds. Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal, and Maria Wallenberg Bondesson (Lund: Nordic Academic
Press, 2016), 185-225.
129Serif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus 102, no. 1 (1973):
169-190; Metin Heper, “Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the
Nineteenth Century,” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique
1, no. 1 (1980): 81-105; Albert Hourani, The Emergence of The Modern Middle East (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 40-42. For the Balkans as the periphery: Frederick
Anscombe, “Continuities in Ottoman Centre–Periphery Relations, 1787–1915,” In The Frontiers of the
Ottoman World, ed. Andrew Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 235-252. For a review
of center-periphery relations prior to the Tanzimat: Jens Hanssen, “Practices of Integration: Center-
Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire,” In The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in
the Late Ottoman Empire, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (Beirut: Ergon Verlag
Würzburg in Kommission, 2002), 49-74.
130Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643 (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
31
book chapter entitled “The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700”, Özel
conveys modern historiography’s latest perspectives and approaches centered on the
agonizing crisis period (referring to the turn of the 17th century), correlating with
the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. Even though principal focuses of scholarly attention have revolved
around matters based on socio-economic and demographic characteristics in
the “classical” period, the metamorphosis that the empire and its ordinary subjects
underwent acutely together as well as climatic changes have also been debated recently.
Özel reevaluates factors which have been long addressed in parallel with new
findings. He outlines why the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions had such a destructive character and
explores their violence dimension as well as the primary reasons behind them.131 He
also lays stress on the inadequacy of political factors to explain the phenomenon at
issue, as opposed to other parameters.
Similar to Akdag, Oktay Özel points out that the Ottoman fiscal system/structure
at the turn of the century began to be adversely affected by both internal and
external factors. The Ottoman governments, therefore, pursued devaluation and
debasement-based policies to rectify the problems. However, these policies directly
triggered several riots which essentially embodied the salaried troops in Istanbul, and
economic conditions of thek.
apık. ulu soldiers,132 which was exponentially exacerbated
during the Ottomans’ Thirty Years War (1578–1611).133
The provincial cavalries also known as t¯ım¯arlı sip¯ah¯ıs, says Özel, were fiercely affected
by these policies. However, the problems were not confined only to these.
T¯ım¯arlı sip¯ah¯ıs were also greatly affected because of the serious alterations in both
financial and administrative structures with regard to the long-standing redistribution
policies in the Empire. They were progressively subrogated by those of the
k.
apık. ulu origin, which means that there existed a high number of extremely displeased
and indignant sip¯ah¯ıs in Anatolia.134 Both military elements, the major
components of the main Ottoman army, increasingly started to engage in such illegal
activities such as brigandage, intensifying the violence in many parts of the
Ottoman realm at the turn of the century.
According to Özel, economic and demographic drivers were also as paramount as
131Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence,” 184.
132Özel, 184-185.
133The Ottomans’ Thirty YearsWar (1578–1611) is principally a denomination that Gábor Ágoston frequently
employes in almost all of his academic works.
134Özel, op.cit., 185. Oktay Özel utilizes the term “the reign of violence” to accentuate the obliterating
character and dimension of the violence of the Jel¯al¯ı Rebellions and specifies that they profoundly left
their marks on the 17th century. For more information: Özel, 184-202.
32
political and military factors.135 Despite its advantages, the population growth in
the 16th century gave rise to a “surplus” mass of people, exceeding the availability
of plots of arable lands; in this way, population pressure, leading to a grievous
subsistence crisis, came into existence.136 As a consequence, a large mass of people
endeavoured to find a means of livelihood.
When the peasants and other soldier-brigands intensely began to accumulate under
the sway of provincial governors, the violence became more and more destructive.
As most Ottomanists have agreed, Özel argues that the most explosive and ferocious
moment was shortly after the Ottoman-Habsburg Long War of 1593-1606; most of
the primary sources confirm that a large number of soldiers either evaded the battle
or sent substitutes into the battle.137 To give a specific example, as a consequence
of the military roll-call, it was realized that a multitudinous number of soldiers including
janissaries and almost 30,000 sip¯ah¯ıs, were absent and fled to Anatolia.138
In this way, the militarization of the urban areas accelerated and the Jel¯al¯ı terror
aggravated the situation much more. Oktay Özel suggests that the Long War was of
utmost importance in terms of escalating violence and the devastating effects of the
Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. Mustafa Akdag, at this point, merely advocates that the desertions
in the war did not initiate the rebellions.139 Otherwise, he, too, had acknowledged
that the disasters in the post-war period strikingly spiked. Both Ottomanists more
or less share the same opinions with reference to the primary reasons behind these
rebellions, but the latter puts a great emphasis on the violent and destructive character
of the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions as well as the rebellions’ transformative effects. These
rebellions paved the way for an incremental termination of both the t¯ım¯ar andk.
ul
systems, the primary and long-standing imperial institutions. While the iltiz¯am system140
gradually superseded the t¯ım¯ar system, the latter lost its significance over
135Özel, 186.
136Özel, 187.
137Özel, 188.
138Özel, 189.
139Akdag, Celâlî Fetreti, 63.
140Mehmet Genç, “Iltizam,” TDVIA, vol. 22 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000): 154-158; Mustafa Akdag,
“Timar Rejiminin Bozulusu,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi vol. 3, no. 4
(1945): 419-431; G. David and P. Fodor, “Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army
From the Early Sixteenth to the End of the Seventeenth Century,” Eurasian Studies vol. 4, no. 2 (2005):
157-188; Joseph E. Matuz, “Contributions to the Ottoman Institution of the Iltizam,” Osmanlı Arastırmaları
vol. 11, no. 11 (1991): 237-249; Murat Çizakça, “Taxfarming and Financial Decentralization in
the Ottoman Economy, 1520-1697,” The Journal of European Economic History vol. 13, no. 22 (1993):
219-250; Linda T. Darling, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?,” Journal of European
Economic History vol. 26, no. 1 (1997): 157-179; Ariel Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited:
“Privatization” and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Politics & Society
vol. 21, no. 4 (1993): 393-423; Eftal Batmaz, “Iltizam Sisteminin XVIII. Yüzyıldaki Boyutları,” Tarih
Arastırmaları Dergisi vol. 18, no. 29 (1996): 39-50.
33
time. In this way, serious modifications occurred in the Empire militarily, administratively,
and financially.141
Both Ottomanists agree on the utilization of the term “Jel¯al¯ı ”. They acknowledge
that the re,¯ay¯a denominated almost every insubordination as Jel¯al¯ı. Oktay Özel,
simply points out that this situation must have stemmed from the fact that all
insubordinations having different features were seen as almost the same in terms of
their dimension of violence and obliterating nature.142
In addition to these, when a wide array of primary and secondary sources is taken
into consideration, Özel specifies that the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions were a much more protracted
phenomenon than previously believed and that recent academic studies also
corroborate this statement.143 Hence, the time period of his article clearly refers to
the time interval between 1550 and 1700. This also demonstrates that he stretches
the time frame put forward by Mustafa Akdag [(1596-1603) and (1604-1610)] since
he indicates that the second stage of the Jel¯al¯ıs was sparked by the rebellion of Abaza
Meh.med Pasha144 in 1623. To Özel, the last stage terminates with the rebellion of
Yegen ,Osm¯an Pasha, the last Jel¯al¯ı rebel.145
xxx
Below, I will discuss the theoretical boundaries of my inquiry based on what I have
reviewed so far in order to contextualize my arguments in the next chapters. I will,
in this context, formulate the theoretical body of my thesis by pointing out those
historians’ approaches and perspectives that I have agreed and repudiated.
First of all, Mustafa Akdag’s discussion on the way that we ponder on the categorization
of the rebellions in general, making principal distinctions among those
breaking out in various period of times in the “Ottoman realm” in terms of their
features, merits praise. More precisely, if we are to have a closer look at his way of
141Özel, op.cit., 195.
142Özel, 198.
143Özel, 191.
144Mücteba Ilgürel, “Abaza Pasa,” TDVIA, vol. 1 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1988): 11-12; Cl. Huart, “¯Ab¯aza
Pas
¯
h¯
a,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1986): 4; Hrand
D. Andreasyan, “Abaza Mehmed Pasa,” Tarih Dergisi 17, no. 22 (1967): 131 – 142; Gabriel Piterberg,
“The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasa. Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth
Century,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 8, no. 1–2 (2002): 13-24.
145Özel, “The Reign of Violence,” 184, 190-191. Songül Çolak, “Macaristan Serdârlıgında Bir Eskıya: Yegen
Osman Pasa,” In Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Eskıyalık ve Terör, eds. Osman Köse (Samsun: Samsun Ilkadım
Belediyesi, 2017): 121-134; Ali Karatay, “Tuna Boylarında Alacalı Bir Savasçı: Yegen Osman Pasa,”
In Uluslararası Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Çorum Sempozyumu (Çorum: Çorum Belediyesi Yayınları,
November 2007): 263-275; Abdülkadir Özcan, “Bölük,” TDVIA, vol. 6 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992):
324-325.
34
classifications, we find that he essentially distinguishes the rebellions according to
whether they were integration-oriented, meaning that rebels intented integration in
the Ottoman imperial system. To give a specific example, while the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions
scrambled to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system, the religious ideologybased
rebellions had no intention other than establishing a fully independent state.
In other words, if we are to employ the sub-umbrella terms, we see that whereas
the first one was principally integration-oriented insubordinations, the latter was
non-integration-oriented ones. When viewed from this aspect, Akdag has a leading
role in term of enabling us to both comprehend the nature of the rebellions much
better and to easily categorize them.
William J. Griswold widens both the conceptual and theoretical scope of the extant
discussion since he not only deploys the term “Great Anatolian Rebellion” in order to
properly describe the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions but also emphasizes the existence of separatist
rebellions such as Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha and Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n which were not
ideology-based. If we are to analyze his standpoint, we see that he has a primarily
“geography-based” approach to the matter of rebellions, as we see in his book’s
title. This perspective is of paramount importance in that I think that it might
afford Ottomanists a helpful hint to coin the broad umbrella term, enabling them
to classify the whole rebellions, which had different characteristics in a much more
detailed way. Nevertheless, his denomination, the “Great Anatolian Rebellion”, falls
short of explaining the Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.
There were many insubordinations that erupted in various geographical regions of
the Ottoman realm and were completely divergent from one another in terms of their
basic features, ranging from the religious ideology-based motives, to the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions,
the separatist rebellions (having no ideology), the rebellion(s) by governorgeneral(
s) in the province(s) and Istanbul-based rebellions (theK.
apık. ulu rebellions,
namely, the Janissary and the Sip¯ah¯ı rebellions). Their multiple, sometimes overlapping
characteristics bring along the difficulties to classify and probe into them in
detail. However, at this point, Akdag and Griswold give partial clues and opportunities
to develop a term unifying these rebellions under a superordinate term.
I will argue that when we endeavour to classify the rebellions (with respect to whatever
their motives and causes were), our litmus test, at the outset, should be whether
they were integration-oriented or not. We should firstly determine whether the rebels
associated with any rebellion aimed to be included in the Ottoman imperial system
or they had other expectations.
Griswold restricted the extensive geographical area of the Empire to a relatively
smaller region in order one to characterize describe the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions much better
35
through the term “Great Anatolian Rebellion”. However, in the case of Ma,nids (and
many other rebellious families in the Balkans and the Middle East), we need to develop
a more comprehensive term in order to both refer to the vast geographical area
that hosted many different rebellions and to gather these rebellions along with their
divergent natures under a single roof. Naturally, the most appropriate term should
be the “Ottoman Rebellions”. In other words, as it was the case in the expression the
“Ottoman realm”, if we emphatically ascribe a “geographical” connotation to this
adjective and differentiate it from its other connotations currently employed, we can
coin the superordinate term, that is, a broader umbrella term (defining all the rebellions
that erupted in various geographical regions of the Empire), which has not
been propounded by any Ottomanist in the context of the Early Modern Ottoman
rebellion literature (see Table 2.1). This will help the insurrections, ranging from
civil disobediences to revolutions (unrest, anarchy, riot, uprising, mutiny, sedition,
coup, coup d’état and the like) to be easily classified and identified according to
their Ottoman characteristics. This denomination might also enable them to look
at the rebellions in a more extensive framework. Furthermore, it might be possible
to utilize the term “Great Ottoman Rebellions” to comprehend the Early Modern
Ottoman rebellions in the context of the transformation process in the 17th century.
Another reason why I have made such a classification is that I would like to place
my case study, the House of Ma,n, in this broad framework and to demonstrate its
applicability.
Karen Barkey’s significant argument that the Ottoman Empire displayed the great
competence to integrate the rebellions challenging its authority into its imperial system
through some manipulative mechanisms, such as “deals, bargains, and patronage”,
is an argument that she inherited from earlier scholars (Akdag and Griswold)
and reformulated, which constitutes the main pillar of my research. I will fundamentally
demonstrate these imperial control mechanisms through a particular case,
that is, the House of Ma,n in the chapters below. I will attempt to prove how much
the Ottomans were successful in employing these pragmatist policies.
However, this does not mean that I totally agree with all of Barkey’s arguments. For
example, she points out that Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha was the “only Jel¯al¯ı rebel” who had
separatist tendencies.146 I will rather follow the footsteps of those Ottomanists who
differentiate between those rebels who had an intention to gain indepedence from
the Empire and those who did not. Hence, Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha was not a Jel¯al¯ı,
since he was a separatist, that is, he was a non-integration-oriented rebel unlike his
Jel¯al¯ı counterparts. Barkey also ignores Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in the context of
146Barkey, op.cit., 186.
36
non-integration-oriented rebellions even though one of her consultants, Griswold,
had briefly pointed out that Fakhr al-D¯ın also had the intention of founding a state
in Syria.147 Another point that I disagree with her is that she claims that the Empire
transformed itself in the 17th century “thanks to these mechanisms”; however, these
were just astute strategic maneuvers that the Empire pragmatically performed both
before and after, and particularly in the 17th century.
Considering that political, military, fiscal, demographic and socio-economic turmoil
coexisted, I agree with Oktay Özel with respect to the uses of extreme violence
during the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. Escalating violent protests in the core lands of the
Empire in the 17th century had a considerable influence on the Ottoman governments
to pursue a set of pragmatic policies (varying from region to region) such as
“frequent” recourse to “deals, bargains, and patronage”148 in order to incorporate
defiant peripheral elements into their imperial body. I will argue that these were
one of the most effective ways to cope with the peripheral elements in a cut-throat
environment. We see that the “reign of violence” (Özel’s concept, perhaps, one of
the perfect denominations identifying the century) did not give the Ottomans any
elbow room particularly in the 17th century. For this reason, within the framework
of the transformation process in the 17th century, Özel’s conceptual approach and
perspective constitute one of the most significant theoretical points that solidifies
the mainstays of my investigation.
I also agree with Dina Khoury’s description of the imperial policies that the Ottomans
carried out in the Middle East, specifically speaking, the policies towards
Lebanon, a part of the Greater Syria. In my inquiry, how the Empire efficaciously
utilized regional dynamics in Lebanon in favor of the center will be explored. The
primary sources that I have employed confirm Khoury’s arguments.
147Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, xix-xxii, 155, 217.
148Gündogdu, loc. cit.
37
Table 2.1 Classification Trial of Early Modern Ottoman Rebellions (1450-1700)
Note 1: I prepared the related table according to the extant approaches and perspectives with
regard to the Early Modern Ottoman Rebellions (1450-1700). I arranged the table, fundamentally
a “trial”, in an attempt to easily categorize the rebellions and to facilitate their careful
and critical scrutinies. Sources: Mustafa Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları: (1550-1603) (Ankara: Ankara
Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), 1-2, 243-250; William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion
1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix-xxii, 155, 206, 217; Birol Gündogdu,
“Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An
Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and
1821,” Osmanlı Arastırmaları 51 (2018): 460-461, 463-465; Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence:
The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700,” In The Ottoman World, ed. Christine Woodhead (London and New
York: Routledge, 2012), 184-202.
38
3. OTTOMAN HEGEMONY IN THE GREATER SYRIA
3.0.1 Ottoman Domination in the Middle East
When Sel¯ım I (r. 1512-1520) put up his Ot¯ag-ı Hüm¯ay¯un (Imperial Tent) in Üsküdar,
locals made a good guess as to where the sultan was headed: he was going to assail
either the Safavids to the east or the Maml¯uks to the southeast. On the way to Iran,
Sel¯ım I made his way into Maml¯uk Syria, to conquer the Maml¯uk Sultanate.149
As Sel¯ım I arrived in the region with his army, Y¯unus Beg, the governor of the
province of Antep under the Maml¯uks, changed sides and assisted the Ottoman
army in northern Syria. The Maml¯uk sultan, al-Ashraf Q¯ans.¯uh al-Ghawr¯ı (r. 1501-
1516), meanwhile, arrived in Marj D¯abiq. Shortly after the outbreak of the battle,
when prominent Maml¯uk n¯a’ibs, J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı (d. 1521)150 and Kh¯a-ir Beg
(d. 1522) fled from the batttle ground. Maml¯uks were defeated in a few hours.151
Sel¯ım I conquered Aleppo, and made his way to Damascus (S¯am). He captured
Hama (H. am¯a), Homs (H. ums.), and Tripoli (T. ar¯abulus) on the way to Damascus.152
Not long after, Damascus was conquered.
After a while, Sel¯ım I dispatched H¯adım Sin¯an Pasha (d. 1517) to Gaza to gather
military intelligence with respect to the Maml¯uks in Egypt. Meanwhile, al-Ashraf
T.
¯um¯anb¯ay II (r. 1516-1517), new Maml¯uk sultan, sent J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı to Gaza,
149Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule: 1516-1800 (London and New
York: Routledge, 2008), 39.
150In 1518, J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı, who was a Maml¯uk -am¯ır, offered his services to the Ottoman Empire as a
beylerbey of Damascus. However, shortly after Sel¯ım I’s death in 1520, J¯anbird¯ı rebelled against Ottoman
authorities to establish an independent state. See also: Feridun Emecen, “Canbirdi Gazâlî,” TDVIA, vol. 7
(Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 141-143; Osama M. Abu Nahel, “The Mamluk Jan Bardi al-Ghazali and
the Ottoman Sultanate: A New Historical Outlook,” Journal of Islamic Research 31, no. 2 (2020): 394-
415; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Sah Ismail ve Canberdi Gazali Isyanı,” trans. Mahmut H. Sakiroglu,
Erdem 5, no. 13 (January 1989): 227-237.
151Enver Çakar, “XVI. Yüzyılda Sam Beylerbeyiliginin Idarî Taksimatı,” Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler
Dergisi 13, no. 1 (2003): 354.
152Çakar, 355.
39
where a battle broke out that resulted in the debacle of J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı. The
Ottomans established their hold over both Gaza and Palestine.153 They brought
Safad (S. afad), Nablus (N¯abulus), Jerusalem (al-Quds), and Ajlun (,Ajl¯un) under
their control in the final months of 1516.154 Notwithstanding the series of victories
in the region, the Ottomans wavered in conquering Egypt.155 Nevertheless, they set
about seizing its control by taking account of the risks.
After the victory in Gaza, Sel¯ım I permitted al-Ashraf T.
¯um¯anb¯ay II to remain
as a beylerbey (governor-general) of Egypt provided he stroke coins and had the
Friday sermon (also known as khut.bah) read in the Sultan’s name. Upon al-Ashraf
T.
¯um¯anb¯ay II’s refusal of the Ottoman’s offer, Sel¯ım I attacked Egypt by crossing the
Sinai Desert and defeated the Egyptian Maml¯uks in the Battle of R¯ıd¯aniya (1517).156
Subsequently,157 the Ottomans completed a significant part of the conquests of the
Middle East. After Sel¯ım I’s death, the Ottomans continued their expansion into
the East, South and North (North Africa) of the Middle East.158
3.0.2 Ottoman Administrative Regulations in the Region: Province of
Damascus
As the Ottomans began their conquest of what is now called the Middle East, they
arranged administrative zones in some parts of Bil¯ad al-Sh¯am (Greater Syria).159
Sel¯ım I rendered Aintab and Malatya as a sanjak even before the Battle of Marj
153Halil Inalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye & Osmanlı Imparatorlugu Üzerine Arastırmalar – I (Istanbul: Türkiye Is
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 142.
154Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarsılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2 (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011), 287.
155Inalcık, loc. cit.
156Inalcık., 142-143.
157For more information about the Ottoman administration in Egypt: Seyyid Muhammed es Seyyid Mahmud,
XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyâleti (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1990), 46-71.
158Bruce Masters, in his book, describes the process of the Ottomans’ rapid expansion into the Middle East in
a detailed manner. For more information: Bruce Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918:
A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São
Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 20-37. For more information about the
Arab lands that were under the Ottoman control in the post-Sel¯ım I period: Peter Malcolm Holt, Egypt and
the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922, A Political History (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966),
46-57; Vladimir Borisovich Lutsky, Modern History of the Arab Countries (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1969), 9-37.
159Bil¯ad al-Sh¯am, also known as Greater Syria, was a historical region referring to the territory that encompasses
modern-day Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. Dimashk. constituted one of the most significant
settlements of the said region. After a while, it was replaced by the name “Damascus” (S¯am) that had
originally referred to the entire Syria in the Arabic sources. For more information: Cengiz Tomar and S.
Tufan Buzpınar, “Sam,” TDVIA, vol. 38 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2010): 311; 315-320; Henri Lammens,
“Suriye,” Islam Ansiklopedisi , vol. 11 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997): 51-66.
40
D¯abiq.160 Shortly after the Ottoman capture of northern and central Syria in the
post-1516 period, he organized also Aleppo (H. alab), Hama (H. am¯a), Homs (H. ums.)
and Tripoli (T. ar¯abulus) as a sanjak.161 In addition to these, Sel¯ım I turned Damascus
into a beylerbeyilik (also known as vil¯ayet, or province) and allowed J¯anbird¯ı
al-Ghaz¯al¯ı to govern the province of Damascus (S¯am Ey¯aleti) as beylerbeyi (governorgeneral)
(Figure 3.1).
From the modifications in the administrative structure of Ottoman Syria, it is understood
that Sel¯ım I endeavoured to rein the bedouins in and to encourage the
local populace to become accustomed to the newly established Ottoman rule in the
region through J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı’s established reputation. We see that the same
situation also held good for Kh¯a-ir Beg, familiar to the region. For this reason, he
was permitted to stay as a beylerbeyi in Egypt.
Figure 3.1 Province of Damascus in 16th Century
Source: Enver Çakar, “XVI. Yüzyılda Sam Beylerbeyiliginin Idarî Taksimatı,” Fırat Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 13, no. 1 (2003): 374.
160Çakar, op.cit., 355-356.
161Çakar, 356.
41
Consequently, the Ottomans organized two separate ey¯alets as provinces of Damascus
(S¯am = ,Arab) and Egypt in the region.162 Moreover, two years after the Battle
of Marj D¯abiq, they established finance offices (defterd¯arlık) for ,Arab and ,Ajam
provinces to administer the fiscal affairs of the region, which happens to be the third
defterd¯arlık founded after those of defterd¯arlıks of Rumelia and Anatolia.163
Table 3.1 Administrative Divisions (Sanjaks) of the Damascus Province
(1520-1565)
Sources: Kürsat Çelik, “Osmanlı Hâkimiyetinde Beyrut (1839-1918)” (PhD Dissertation, Fırat
University, 2010), 20.
Province of Damascus that was called Ey¯alet-i ,Arab and Ey¯alet-i S¯am consisted
of 13 sanjaks (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. respectively) and 47 k.
az¯a-s according to
the Q¯an¯un-n¯ame issued in 1522 during the reign of Suleym¯an I (1520-1566).164 In
addition to these, there were 31k.
az¯a-s in the Arab regions (Diy¯ar-ı ,Arab) including
Egypt and theH.
ej¯az in the same year.
162Çakar, 356.
163Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarsılı, Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teskilâtı (Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih
Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 327.
164Enver Çakar, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Kanun-nâmesine Göre 1522 Yılında Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nun
Idarî Taksimatı,” Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 12, no. 1 (2002): 266-267, 281.
42
Table 3.2 Administrative Structure of Ottoman Syria (1521-1740)
Sources: Kenan Ziya Tas, “Suriye’nin (Sam) Osmanlı Hâkimiyetindeki Idari Yapısı,” Tarih
Incelemeleri Dergisi 15 (2000): 84.
43
More specifically, in 1522, the sanjak of Damascus comprised six k.
az¯a-s such as
Mahr¯use-i S¯am, Ba,albek, Beyr¯ut, S.
ayda, Kerek-N¯uh and K.
¯ar¯a; and a year later,
the same sanjak had 19 n¯ah. iyes.165 These n¯ah. iyes were: Ba,albek, Beyr¯ut, Cürdi
Beyr¯ut, Cubbetü’l-,Ass¯al ve’l-K. ¯ar¯a, D¯ar¯an¯ı ve’l-Bill¯an, el-Metn, Garb-i Beyr¯ut,
G¯ut.a ve’l-Merc,H.
amm¯are and S¯ufü’l-Bey¯ad,H.
avr¯an, Kisrev¯an, Kerek-N¯uh. , Cizz¯ın
and S¯ufü’l-Harr¯ad¯ın, S.
ayda, S¯uf Ibn Ma,an, Sa,ra and Ik. l¯ımü’z-Zeb¯ıb, V¯ad¯ıü’l-
,Acem, V¯ad¯ıü’t-Taym and H¯ula, Zebed¯an¯ı and V¯ad¯ı Berad¯a.166
We see that the province of Damascus encompassed a wide range of territory. The
Ottomans, considering the regional dynamics of the Middle East, firstly organized
the province of Aleppo in 1549, and later the province of Tripoli in 1579, to consolidate
their imperial control over the regions geographically far-off from Istanbul.
3.0.3 Middle Eastern Geography, Religious Minorities and Druzes
As the geographical features of the Middle East region determined the Ottoman
relations and struggles with peripheral elements to a certain extent, the physical
geography of the Middle East have a special place in the context of this thesis.
Extending to North Africa, the Middle East has a number of deserts, including the
S.
ah. ¯ar¯a, which is still considered the world’s largest desert. Others are the Arabian,
the Syrian and the Sinai deserts. The region is not restricted only to these four
deserts. It is also home to three great and voluminous rivers giving life to a wide
range of territory such as the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates. Last but not
least, the mountain ranges, particularly those in central and southwestern Syria and
Lebanon, played a pivotal role in our context. The Zagros and the Taurus are the
largest mountain ranges, the Jabal al-Nusayriyya, the Jabal Druze, Mount Lebanon,
and the Anti-Lebanon and the Shouf Mountains are other smaller mountain systems.
When the Ottomans conquested the Middle East, they encountered the various
settled, nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, a considerable number of which lived in
the high mountains. These included Arabs, Kurds, Persians, and Turcomans along
with the religious minorities including Alawis, Christians, Jews, Shiites (Ismaili,
165Enver Çakar, “XVI. Yüzyılda Sam Beylerbeyiliginin Idarî Taksimatı,” 366.
166English versions of the n¯ah. iyes take place in the first two pages behind the front cover of Bakhit’s book.
These are as follows: Ba,labakk, Bayr¯ut, Jurd Bayr¯ut, Jubbat al-,Ass¯al wa al-Q¯ar¯a, D¯ar¯an¯ı wa al-Bill¯an,
al-Matn, Gharb Bayr¯ut, Gh¯ut.a wa al-Marj,H.
amm¯ara and Sh¯uf al-Bay¯ad,H.
awr¯an, Kisraw¯an, Karak N¯uh. ,
Jızz¯ın and Sh¯uf al-Har¯ad¯ın, S.
ayd¯a, Sh¯uf Ibn Ma,n, al-Sha,ra and Iql¯ım Zab¯ıb, W¯ad¯ı al-,Ajam, W¯ad¯ı al-
Taym and al-H¯ula, Zabad¯an¯ı and W¯ad¯ı Barad. For more information: Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of
Damascus, 0-i. In this region, the Druzes, Alawis, Christians and Maronites lived together. The Maronites
predominantly lived in Kisraw¯an and Batr¯un.
44
Twelver and Zaydi Shiites) and Yazidis.167 Certainly, there were also the Druzes168,
who were one of the most significant ethno-religious groups living in the highlands
in the region. The mountainous regions played a considerably important role in
defining the relationships between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes.
As the Ottomans began consolidating their administrative power, they strove to establish
a master-servant relationship with the local peoples, particularly the Druzes.
Enduring Druze resistance in Lebanon and Southern Syria against Ottoman rule
paved the way for almost two centuries of tension between Istanbul and the Syrian
littoral.
3.1 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase I (1516-1590)
3.1.1 A Peripheral “Nuisance”: The Early Ma,nids and the Druze Rebellions
(1516-1697)
As we stive to analyze the Druze rebellions, we see not the Druze community’s
continued rebelliousness but the local activities of the leading Druze figures. The
Ma,nids assumed the leadership of the Druze community together with several other
families.169 Nevertheless, the Ma,nids were the most pre-eminent Druze family.
Their high status drove them to a position that went hand-in-hand with the Druze
rebellions.
In his illuminating 2001 article, Abu-Husayn probes into the Druze rebellions and
167Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 25-34.
168Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, 33. In his book, Philip K. Hitti, offers an abridged account of the general
history of the Druze community. He conveys the various discussions with reference to the racial origins of
the Druzes in a detailed way, which has not still lost its currency until recently. Ultimately, based on the
movements of migration to Southern Syria and Lebanon, religious vocabulary and the ethnic backgrounds
of the missionaries, he draws a conclusion that the Druzes were strongly connected to both the Persians and
a considerable number of people that were Persianized: Philip K. Hitti, The Origins of the Druze People
and Religion (New York: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 21-37. In his article, M. C. Sehabeddin Tekindag, also delves
deeply into the discussion with regard to the ethnic background of the Druzes: M. C. Tekindag, “Dürzî
Tarihine Dâir Notlar,” I.Ü.E.F. Tarih Dergisi 7, no. 10 (September 1954): 143-156. M. C. Sihabeddin
Tekindag and M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, in their encyclopedia entries, furnish us a lengthy account of the
general history of the Druzes from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century: M. C. Sihabeddin Tekindag
and M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Dürzîler,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997):
665-680. From a religious studies standpoint, Tan points out how the Druze sect emerged, developed and
spread while outlining the religious understanding and principals of the Druzes. Additionally, he describes
the social values and norms of the Druze community: Muzaffer Tan, “Geçmisten Günümüze Dürzîlik,” e-
Makâlât Mezhep Arastırmaları Dergisi 5/2 (2012): 61-82; Aytekin Senzeybek, “Dürziligin Tesekkül Süreci,”
e-Makâlât Mezhep Arastırmaları Dergisi 8/1 (2015): 87-133; Ahmet Baglıoglu, Orta Dogu Siyasi Tarihinde
Dürziler (Elazıg: Fırat Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2006), 1-27; Aydın Çelik, Fâtımîler Devleti Tarihi (909-1171)
(Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2018), 251-292.
169Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 13.
45
determines the period between 1516-1697 as the period of their insubordinations.170
I examine Abu-Husayn’s proposed time period, but in three intervals in accordance
with new evidence provided by the Ottoman archival sources, including the
Mühimme Registers. I chose to analyze the period in question (1516-1697) in three
consecutive intervals, 1516-1590, 1590-1635 and 1635-1697.
First interval, 1516-1590 refers to the Early Ma,nids and their relations with the
Druze rebels and their rebellions. It begins in 1516, a year indicating the start of
Ottoman conquests in the Middle East and continues until 1590, when Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n emerged as the leader of the Druze community.171 The second phase,
1590-1635 principally covers Fakhr al-D¯ın’s regional activities and policies together
with relationships with both the central Ottoman and provincial administrations.
The final phase, 1635-1697 elaborates on the regional activities and policies of other
members of Ma,nids following Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s death in 1635. In this period,
Ah.mad Ma,n, the last male member of the Ma,nids, appears as the most prominent
Druze figure.
In the conventional historiography of early modern Lebanon, the relationships between
the Ottoman administrations and Druzes have generally been portrayed as
cordial. More specifically, the Druze rebels and the Druze chiefs in particular, were
depicted as having being generously rewarded with important positions and with
honours and titles.172
Some historians endeavoured to legitimate the abovementioned historical assertion
through a suspicious historical event that is said to have occurred immediately after
the Ottoman conquest of Damascus. It is claimed that when Sel¯ım I was in Damascus,
he allegedly entertained the local chieftains, among whom was Fakhr al-D¯ın I,
who had the control of Sh¯uf, and later, the sultan bestowed him “the title of -am¯ır
al-barr (Lord of the Land)”, which meant that Sel¯ım I acknowledged Fakhr al-D¯ın I
as a master of all pre-eminent local figures in the Druze Mountain.173 Fakhr al-D¯ın
I remained in power until his assassination in 1544, and then Qorqm¯az took his
father’s position.174
170Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 165-191.
171Abu-Husayn specifies that Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n took over the position of muqaddam from his father
around 1590: Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 74.
172Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 14.
173Salibi, “Fak
¯
h¯
r al-D¯ın,” 749.
174Salibi, stating this suspicious historical event that has been accepted in the traditional historiography,
clarifies that Fakhr al-D¯ın I had already deceased in 1506, a decade prior to Ottoman domination in the
Middle East. That is to say, he specifies that this historical event was invalid in the modern historiography:
Salibi, “The Secret of the House of Ma’n,” 277.
46
Shortly after establishing themselves in the Middle East and Syria, Ottoman administrators
had to deal with a number of confrontations, including the rebellions
of J¯anbird¯ı Al-Ghaz¯al¯ı (1521) and Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha (1606). Furthermore, there
were the bedouin tribes which pursued anti-Ottoman policies on a local level. The
Ottomans managed to eliminate those elements which openly questioned their authority.
These insurrections generally had a transient nature. But it was not true
for the Druzes, who were going to rebel in the course of more than a hundred and
fifty years. This situation not only alarmed Ottoman administrations and their
functionaries in the provinces but also directly influenced the relations between the
two parties, namely, Ottoman central administrations and the Druzes.175
As far as we know, in 1518, the first critical incident of insurrection in which several
leading Druze figures, including three members of the Ma,nids, took place.176
When the Ottoman administration detected that some -am¯ırs, such as Zayn al-D¯ın
, Suleim¯an, and Qorqm¯az177 took part in rebellion of Muhammad Ibn al-H. anash,178
an -am¯ır of al-Bik.¯a, (that is the elongated plain commonly called the Bekaa, which
lies between the mountains of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon at a mean altitude of 1,000
metres), the insurrection was violently crushed and Muhammad Ibn al-H. anash was
eliminated. The Ma,nid -am¯ırs narrowly evaded sharing Ibn al-H. anash’s fate and
were fined a great amount of gold coins by Ottoman authorities.179
What makes this incident significant and unique is not only the Ma,nids’ collaboration
with Ibn al-H. anash, but also the Venetian’s surveillance of the region, a
situation that would portend the imminent Venetian intervention.180 As a matter
of fact, two years after Ibn al-H. anash’s rebellion, the Venetians would launch a failed
attack on Beirut.181
Five years after the Ma,nids’ involvement in the rebellion of Ibn al-H. anash, in 1523,
the Ottoman administration took a military action against the Druzes for the first
175Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 165-166.
176Abu-Husayn, 167.
177Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 76.
178Tekindag has discussed the regional activities of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanash and gives some interesting
information with reference to Ibn al-Hanash’s rebellion: M. C. Sehabeddin Tekindag, “Bik. â- Emîri Nâsır
Ad-Dîn Muhammad Ibn Al-Hanas’a Dâir Bir Vesîka,” Tarih Dergisi 12 (2011): 107-116; Muhammad
Adnan al-Bakhit, “The Role of the H.
anash Family and the Tasks Assigned to It in the Countryside of
Dimashq al-Sh¯am, 790/1388–976/1568; A Documentary Study” In Land Tenure and Social Transformation
in the Middle East, ed. T. Khalidi (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1984), 257-289.
179Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 167.
180Abu-Husayn, 167-168.
181Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 14-15.
47
time.182 Hürrem Pasha, in his capacity as the beylerbey of Damascus, assaulted
“Sh¯uf al-Hayt.¯ı”183 and came back to Damascus by bringing “four loads of Druze
heads”184 with him along with religiously significant books that they captured, which
was a situation that instigated the open hostilities between the Ottoman administrations
and the Druze people and determined the course of their future struggles.
He burned down the “village of B¯ar¯uk” together with other “43 villages” to ashes.185
Subsequently, the Ottoman administration entrusted functionaries with the task of
ensuring the regional security, specifically in Sh¯uf, and these officials were killed
by vengeance-seeking Druzes. The Ottoman administration then ordered Hürrem
Pasha to reattack in 1524.186 As a consequence of his bloody assault, “another
30 village”187 were burned down and pillaged and a large number of people were
captured.188 On top of that, Hürrem Pasha brought another “three loads of Druze
heads”189 with him and returned to Damascus in the same year.190 Meanwhile,
the ,ulem¯a adopted a hostile attitude towards the Druze people, which is testified
through the fatw¯as and poems composed at the time.
Several decades would elapse until the post-1550 period, and then there was another
series of Druze rebellions (which would be spanning almost two centuries) and would
bring the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes to an
unbearable peak. This period is clearly reflected in a number of Ottoman archival
sources. The new orders and decrees (h.
ükms) from the Registers of Important Affairs
(Mühimme Defterleri) form the bases of Abu-Husayn’s arguments about the early
modern Druze rebellions.
Instead of narrating these h.
ükms, which focus primarily on Druze rebellions, I explore
them chronologically and individually. The documents in question enable us
to see the perspective of the Ottoman governments vis-à-vis the Druze but also to
see how defiant the Druze were to Ottoman imperial orders dispatched. The documents
also show that the rebels were able to obtain a great number of muskets in
182Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 76-77.
183Abu-Husayn, 77.
184Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 164.
185Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.; Bakhit, loc.cit.
186Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
187Bakhit, op.cit., 165.
188Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
189Bakhit, loc.cit.
190Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
48
the region.
As far as we know, the initial critical event that triggered the insurrection was the
hanging of Y¯unus Ma,n by the Ottoman administration on a date that we do not
know. More specifically, he was one of the ancestors of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n,
the most well-known leader of the Ma,nids.191 Abu-Husayn remarks that the said
incident was related to the subsequent rebellions that took place in Southern Syria192
as we shall see below. If we take a close look at these subsequent rebellions through
the elevenh.
ükms, in addition to those uncovered and discussed by Abu-Husayn, it
is easy to see that his statements are quite convincing. Theh.
ükms that I would like
to bring to attention are as follows:
On 22 Rab¯ı, Al-- ¯Akhir (Rab¯ı, Al-Th¯an¯ı), 975/26 October 1567, the Ottoman sultan
pointed out that the sanjak-bey of Bayr¯ut came to Istanbul and demanded a firman
from him to confiscate muskets that muqaddams possessed193 and diffused among
their people, re,¯ay¯a, referring to the Druze community. Afterwards, he orders those
to assist the afore-mentioned sanjak-bey to disarm whoever possessed muskets and
deliver them to the Damascus fortress (S¯amK.
al ,ası) after collecting them.194
On 7 Shaww¯al, 978/4 March 1571, the Ottoman sultan stated, in preparation for his
campaign in Cyprus, that his orders for an adequate supply of archers (k.
avv¯as) in the
district of Bayr¯ut (k.
az¯a--yı Beyr¯ut) was only partially fulfilled. Some local figures
in the western n¯ah. iye (a subdivision of thek.
az¯a-) of Beyr¯ut, such as Sharaf ad-D¯ın,
muqaddam Sayf ad-D¯ın, Badr al-D¯ın and muqaddam Q¯a-it B¯ay did not dispatch a
single person. They had been obligated to provide the requested 175, 47, 108 and
63k.
avv¯ases, respectively. The sultan criticized -am¯ır Mans.¯ur, another muqaddam,
owing to the fact that he gathered 50k.
avv¯ases from the Muslim community despite
not formally being commissioned for this task and then, took away them to Cyprus
for the conquest. The sultan added that every muqaddam thwarted the sanjak
subashis and k.
¯ad. i n¯a -ibs from carrying out their offical duties in the n¯ah. iyes that
they controlled. Furthermore, he suggested that they possessed more than 10.000
muskets. Thereafter, the sultan ordered the provincial governor of Damascus to
provide the remaining k.avv¯ases needed and to fine the h¯anes who were liability to
furnish and transferk.avv¯ases if they did not arrive. Finally, the sultan orderedk.
¯ad. is
191Abu-Husayn, “The Korkm¯az Question,” 9-10.
192Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 171.
193The term “muqaddam” in Arabic has a terminologically a wide array of definitions in the Middle Ages and
the Early Modern period. Among others, it also denoted a leader. It fundamentally refers to a local leader
in our context. Norman A. Stillman, “Muqaddam,” Encyclopedia of Jews in The Islamic World, vol. 3
(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010): 492-493.
194BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 7/400.
49
to flawlessly assist the men of Mans.¯ur in affording and transferring thek.
avv¯ases.195
A little over a year later, on 16 Rab¯ı, Al-- ¯Akhir (Rab¯ı, Al-Th¯an¯ı), 980/26 August
1572, the Ottoman sultan specified that the Druze community possessed copious
numbers of muskets in Damascus and its surrounding areas. Consequently, he ordered
the provincial governor of Damascus to appoint functionaries who would confiscate
any muskets, whether belonging to the Druze community or other Arabs and,
to deliver them to Istanbul without delay.196
On 26 Dh¯u Al-Qa,dah 983/26 February 1576, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that
the provincial governor of Damascus sent a letter to Istanbul, which informed the
sultan that, a large number of muskets that the Druze community possessed have
to be collected for the state (m¯ır¯ı). The sultan added that the previous provincial
governor also collected some muskets. He ordered if the Druze community or anyone
possessed muskets, those, too, should be collected for the state under the beylerbey
of Damascus’s watch until they could be delivered to Istanbul. Moreover, the sultan
ordered the beylerbey to collect the muskets from both sheikhs and muqaddams, and
also instructed that 1-2 muskets from each h¯ane be collected through the practice
of ,av¯ariz. He added if the Druze community opposed these directives, he ordered
the beylerbey to not hesitate in utilizing military support from Dh¯u al-Qadr and
Aleppo, where the Ottoman administration dispatched a related imperial decree to
vanquish any resistance.197
In anotherh.
ükm, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that Cafer Pasha, the provincial
governor of Damascus, sent him a letter with reference to the Druze community’s
abundant number of muskets. Sheikhes and muqaddams were invited to help to
confiscate 1-2 muskets from each h¯ane through the practice of ,av¯ariz. He ordered
the provincial governor of Aleppo to assist Cafer Pasha by appointing functionaries
from not only -am¯ırs, zu,am¯a - and sip¯ah¯ıs, but also the officials from umer¯a - and
then, to dispatch them to him so that Cafer Pasha could vanquish the villains.198
Over a year later, on 27 Rajab, 985/10 October 1577, the sultan noted that sheikhs
and muqaddams of the Druze community, in conjunction with more than 2000
bandits musketeers, assaulted the h

av¯as.s.-ı hum¯ay¯un villages, murdered approximately
25-30 persons in eachk.
arye, pillaged the properties and livestock, and inter-
195BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.
196H. Muharrem Bostancı, “19 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (Tahlil-Metin)” (Master’s Thesis, Istanbul University,
2002), 487-488.
197Yasemin Aydın, “27 Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin Transkripsiyonu ve Degerlendirilmesi (s. 280-408)”
(Master’s Thesis, Atatürk University, 2014), 122.
198Aydın, 123.
50
cepted wayfarers. He added that the Ma,nids and the Shih¯abs, including a certain
Mümerredd¯ın (“á     
KYË@QÜØ ?”) and Bezo (“ðQ    K. ?”) committed mass murder. The sultan
had retrospectively reminded that the rebels (t.¯a-ife) had been dealt with and
their muskets had been dispatched to Istanbul. He ordered the provincial governor
of Damascus to confiscate muskets belonging to rebels and loyal Ottomans and
have them dispatched to Istanbul. Those responsible for k.
atl-i nüf¯us and plunder
of properties (˙g¯aret-i emv¯al) were to be vanquished in accordance with the imperial
decree. From his statements, we evidently see that the sultan wanted the beylerbey
to punish the rebels as a warning or deterrent to others.199
Not long thereafter, on 6 Muh. arram, 986/15 March 1578, the Ottoman sultan ordered
the provincial governor of Damascus to exile Saleh (S.
¯alih. ), who held a large
ze¯amet in Damascus, to Cyprus after he sold muskets to the Druze community.
However, considering some unignorable services ofS.
¯alih. , the sultan granted him the
opportunity to remain in Damascus, nevertheless, this situation did not hold the
sultan back from ordering the beylerbey to exileS.
¯alih. to Cyprus.200
On 4 Ramad. ¯an, 987/25 October 1579, the Ottoman sultan stated that the Qaysis
(Red Flag, K.
ızıl Bayrak. lu), the Yamanis (White Flag, ¯ Ak. Bayrak. lu) and the Druze
had large numbers of muskets in T.
ar¯abulus and those who went to the port of
T.
ar¯abulus,S.
ayd¯a and Bayr¯ut sold muskets to the t.¯a -ife for high prices. Thereafter,
the sultan ordered that the provincial governor of T.
ar¯abulus have the said ports
checked through some persons to capture the muskets of those who traded in firearm,
and to confiscate the muskets that the t.¯a -ife possessed.201
On 11S.
afar, 990/7 March 1582, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that the Druze were
still being provided with muskets, a great variety of guns and ammunition as well
as items as significant as the other guns. He also outlined that some leading figures
who arrived the port of Acre (,Akk¯a) surreptitiously sold the muskets which fell into
the category of guns, which were repeatedly issued in imperial decrees forbidding
such activities. Thereafter, the sultan ordered the bey ofS.
afad and thek.
¯ad. i of Acre
to have the ships checked by some trustworthy persons, to confiscate the muskets
and to vanquish those who defied the orders (. . . it.¯a ,at-i emr eylemeyenlerin serle
h.
ak. larından gelesiz. . . ).202
A year later, on 26S.
afar, 991/21 March 1583, the Ottoman sultan specified that the
199BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 31/801.
200BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 33/761.
201BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 40/536.
202BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 46/854.
51
Druze employed guns and muskets (. . . yar¯ak. ve tüfengk.
ullanub. . . ), brought about
disorder (. . . fes¯ad-u sen¯a ,at üzre olub. . . ) and did not obey the shar¯ı ,ah (. . . ser ,-
i serife it.¯a ,at etmedikleri. . . ). Consequently, the sultan ordered Cafer, who was
responsible for security ofT.
ar¯abulus province, and the localk.
¯ad. is to warn t.¯a-ife not
to utilize guns and muskets and to confiscate the firearms that they possessed. The
sultan ordered them to vanquish those who refused.203
If we are to take a closer look at these h.
ükms, we can, albeit only partly, see the
Ottoman administrations’ perception vis-à-vis the Druze community. In the h.
ükm
from 7 Shaww¯al, 978/4 March 1571, the Ottoman administration pointed out that
the majority of the population of Gürün (“      áËðQ» /     à
ðQ»?”) district, being Druze,
were infidel (. . . eh¯al¯ısinin eks
¯
er¯ı “k¯afir” olub. . . ).204 At first glance, this Ottoman
imperial statement might make no sense to some of us. However, it may also hint
at the Ottoman perception of the periphery. If we consider the Ottomans’ claim
to be the sole and dominant representative of the Orthodox Islam (Sunni Islam)
and their strict religious principles along with their centralist inclinations, it can be
suggested that the Ottoman administrations took a dim view of the unruly acts of
the Druzes. The Druze were openly disobedient to the Ottoman authority. They
obtained large numbers of muskets, did not pay obligatory taxes, and obstructed
functionaries who were in charge of collecting taxes. Their faith decidedly did not
comply with the Ottomans’ faith, which provoked open hostility and a deep sense of
alienation between the Ottoman administrations and the Druze community. In the
sameh.
ükm, the Ottoman administration utilized an expression “hınz¯ır”205 (treacherous
in English) and implied that the Druze were a dangerous and treacherous
community that could not be trusted (. . . lah. m-ı hınz¯ırlık idüb. . . )206 by referring
to their openly defiant activities in the region.207 Secondly, it is possible to view
this description, lah. m-ı hınz¯ır208 in terms of a religious connotation. The Ottomans
were primarily monotheistic, that is, Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the Druze
community had many religious principles that completely clashed with those of the
Ottomans. The Druze people, for example, accepted al-H. ¯akim bi-Amr All¯ah (r.
203BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 44/337.
204BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.
205In Kubbealtı Lugatı, the word “hınz¯ır” in Turkish principally has two meanings: (1) domuz, that is, pig
in English and (2) h¯a -in, or one who did treachery in English: Ilhan Ayverdi, Asırlar Boyu Târihî Seyri
Içinde Misalli Büyük Türkçe Sözlük (Kubbealtı Lugatı) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları-Kubbealtı, 2011): 502.
206Based on the definitions of the abovementioned word in the dictionary, we can translate “lah. m-ı hınz¯ırlık
idüb” into both Turkish and English as domuzluk/h¯a -inlik etmek and to do treachery.
207BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.
208In Kubbealtı Lugatı, the phrase “lah. m-ı hınz¯ır” in both Turkish and English means domuz eti, that is,
pork meat.
52
996-1021), a Fatimid caliph, as a God and Hamza ibn ,Al¯ı, a vizier of al-H. ¯akim, as a
prophet. They believed in taqammus. and tajalli (transmigration and theophany).209
Their religious principles led them to be perceived as the most sinister heretics in the
eyes of the Ottomans. Apart from those outlined above, it is also possible to see the
various statements that hinted at the Ottoman perception of the periphery in the
h.
ükms of other Registers of Important Affairs.210 We can assume from the abovementioned
statements that the differences in the religious principles had a crucial
role in influencing the struggles between the Ottoman administrators and the Druze
and shaping the Ottoman imperial perception vis-à-vis the periphery, in the name
of the Druze community. Consequently, we see that Ottoman administrations, for
the most part, associated the Druze community with heresy over expressions such
as “k¯afir and lah. m-ı hınz¯ır”.
There are clear indicators as to why the Druze were disinclined to readily accept
Ottoman rule. First of all, as pointed above, the Druze community was associated
with heresy over expressions such as “k¯afir and lah. m-ı hınz¯ır”, and considered to
be infidels by both the Ottoman administrations and the foremost Sunni religious
figures ever since the Ottomans started to dominate Greater Syria. Accordingly, this
made the Druzes felt insecure, which drove them to a state of incessant protests and
rebellion against Ottoman administrations. Secondly, Ottomans’ restrictive regional
trade policies was a destructive blow to the commercial and economic welfare of the
Druzes in the region.211 These impelled them to clandestinely cooperate with the
Venetians. Last but not least, the characteristic features of the Druze community,212
the topographical challenges of the mountain ranges in the region, and the easy
accesses to fire-arms, were other significant determinants that gave rise to Druze
rebellions.213
Undoubtedly, the matter of access to firearms (tüfeng), an indispensable component
of an early modern rebellion, raises a key question. Considering the large number of
209Mustafa Öz, “Dürzîlik,” TDVIA, vol. 10 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1994): 39-48.
210Theseh.
ükms are M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 46, No. 30b and M.D. 49, No. 110: Abu-Husayn, The View from
Istanbul, 24-25, 30, 31-32.
211Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 178.
212Zinkeisen makes interesting comparisons on this matter. He points out that the Mardaites, who he accepts
as the ancestors of the Druze people, bore striking resemblances to the Shqiptars (an ethnic denomination
that the Albanians gave themselves) who protected the freedom of the Christendom from the Ottomans
would-be Islamic despotism. According to him, the Mardaites, settled in mid south-western Greater Syria
by the Byzantine emperors, who functioned as a protective shield against Arab and Turkish assaults. He
implies that the same situation held for the Druze. Zinkeisen implies that the Druze were a tough warrior
and refractory community like their ancestors. In this way, we can see that he alludes to the characteristic
features of the Druze community: Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu Tarihi, vol. 4
(Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011): 55-56.
213Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.
53
muskets provided in the region, instead of the question “who” - the question “which
state(s) did furnish muskets for the Druze community?” stands out. It was the
Venetians.214
When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453, they continued to extend
their territorial acquisitions in Southeastern Europe, the Aegean and Black Seas,
which resulting in Venice losing trading stations. Naturally, this situation seriously
affected the Venetians’ extant commercial networks. As a consequence, they were
concentrated on their commercial activities in both Egypt and Syria. This meant
the Venetians would create a monopoly in the region, and Bayr¯ut would become
prominent seaport.215 However, half a century later, Sel¯ım I conquered significant
parts of the Middle East, including Syria and Egypt. This reduced Venetian commercial
activities and, on the local level, their beneficiaries, who included the Druze
community. It was not a coincidence that some Druze figures took part in Ibn
al-H. anash’ rebellion (1518) and the Venetians’ assault of Bayr¯ut in 1520.
From the 16th century onwards, the Venetians started to furnishing the Druzes with
a great number of muskets from Cyprus, a Venetian base.216 Through the h.
ükms
listed above we can see that diffusion of the tüfengs was one of the primary reasons
for the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes.217
What disturbed Ottoman administrations was the proliferation of muskets in the
region. Ottoman administrations had extremely stringent principles about not permitting
the re,¯ay¯a, the ordinary subjects, to utilize firearms. This rule held for
“even the derbendci re,¯ay¯a”218 (derbendji). Particularly, the Qizilb¯ash activities in
the 16th century prompted the Ottomans to periodically inspect whether the re,¯ay¯a
possessed muskets and adhered strictly to imperial decrees or not. The fact that
possessing the large number of muskets could engender disturbances and enable brigandry
and could inflame violence, played a prominent role in the Ottomans’ rigid
policy.219 This is why, the Ottomans were keen on disarming their re,¯ay¯as without
214Ibid.
215Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 17.
216Abu-Husayn, 17-18.
217Apart from those that I have utilized in this thesis, the h.
ükms in regard to a large number of musket
acquisition, the rapid proliferation and diffusion of the muskets among the Druze people are also seen in
M.D. 26, No. 101, M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 5, No. 1091, M.D. 26, No. 488, M.D. 27, No. 686, M.D. 46, No.
30b, M.D. 46, No. 518, M.D. 42, No. 273 and M.D. 49, No. 443: Abu-Husayn, 24-33.
218Halil Inalcık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East,” In War,
Technology and Society in the Middle East, eds. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University
Press, 1975), 195.
219Ibid.
54
discriminating against any region in the Empire. To give a specific example, the
case of Kayseri proves that the Ottomans were quite determined to keep the re,¯ay¯a
in check through musket-controls in the first quarter of the 17th century.220
It is understood that the Ottoman administrations’ disturbances concerning muskets
was not solely focused on the Druze. These policies applied to other communities,
such as Arabs, Christians living in Rumelia, Georgians, Kurds, Lazi and Turks living
in Asia Minor, who seem to have possessed a great number of muskets.221 We can
also add the Bedouins to this list in that they were as active as other communities
with regard to the muskets.222 To make a long story short, the prohibitions were
precautions that were taken by the Ottomans in the potential event of internal
security concerns.
The other significant factor was that the Druze did not punctually pay their taxes
and also seriously delayed the total sum that they were obligated to pay. To top
it all off, they made the process of collecting the taxes unbearable for the officials
appointed by the Ottoman administrations, a process including also the acquisition
of muskets that greatly aggravated the struggles between the Ottoman administrations
and the Druzes. The seriousness of the process was also demonstrated through
the considerable number of theh.
ükms in the Mühimme Registers.223
These issues were not special to the first phase of Ottoman rule in Syria. As Fakhr
al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n (1572-1635), Ah.mad Ma,n (d. 1697) and their regional activities
overwhelmingly dominated the second and third periods respectively, with the issues
relating to the possession of muskets and tax evasion remained in the background
almost until the closing of the 17th century. For example, in a h.
ükm dated 25
Sha,b¯an, 1056/6 October 1646, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that Sha,b¯an, a
functionary in S.
afad, sent a letter to Istanbul saying that subjects living in S.
afad
did not pay their taxes, resisted collection efforts. Thereafter, the sultan ordered
220Ronald C. Jennings, “Firearms, Bandits and Gun-Control: Some Evidence on Ottoman Policy towards
Firearms in the Possession of Reaya from Judicial Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627,” Archivum Ottomanicum
6 (1980): 339-358.
221Inalcık, op.cit., 201. Mücteba Ilgürel, “Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nda Atesli Silahların Yayılısı,” Tarih Dergisi
(2011): 301-318.
222Uriel Heyd affords us a number of unanalyzed h.
ükms that treats the Bedouins in the context of both
their rebellions and problems of musket acquisitions. These are M.D. 33, No. 316, M.D. 36, No. 798,
M.D. 7, No. 34, M.D. 46, No. 518 and M.D. 44, No. 393, respectively: Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents
on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the Mühimme Defteri (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), 81-83; 87-89.
223The h.
ükms in regard to this matter are M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 26, No. 488, M.D. 29, No. 70, M.D. 46,
No. 30b, M.D. 46, No. 518, M.D. 52, No. 969: Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 24-31, 33-34. The rigid attitudes of
the Ottoman administrations with reference to the policy of collecting the taxes were not restricted to the
Druze community. We see that the Ottoman administrations bluntly and sometimes menacingly warned
the beys, thek.
¯ad. is, the defterd¯ars and the beylerbeys with regard to carefully executing their duties. These
h.
ükms are M.D. 7, No. 384, M.D. 23, No. 724, M.D. 26, No. 39, M.D. 31, No. 690, M.D. 6, No. 78, M.D.
3, No. 1659 and M.D. 59, No. 178: Heyd, op.cit., 118-125.
55
that the tax collector (mütesellim) of Damascus collect the said taxes.224 Apart from
this, we also encounter a considerable number ofh.
ükms that completes the existing
general picture of the Druze rebellions (1516-1697).
Some of theh.
ükms compiled in the Mühimme Registers in the period of 1516-1590
furnish critical historical data concerning the Ma,nids. In one of those h.
ükms, the
sultan stressed that Qorqm¯az ibn Ma,n (d. 1585), who was the father of Fakhr al-
D¯ın ibn Ma,n, was the worst and the most dangerous rebel among his counterparts.
Moreover, the sultan bluntly stated that Qorqm¯az ibn Ma,n incited disorder.225
The Ma,nids were perceived by the Ottoman administrations as the most threatening
local family who had damaged the Ottomans’ regional authority. For the
Ottoman administrations, the Druze rebellions had been far from controllable. The
remoteness of the region from the imperial capital had a significant role in this.
Naturally, this drove Ottoman administrators to embark on the punitive military
actions or made administrative arrangements.
Ottoman administrators planned a military action against the Druze community
in 1574.226 The following h.
ükm details the military operation: On 1 Jum¯ad¯a Al-
- ¯Akhirah (Jum¯ad¯a Al-Th¯an¯ı), 982/18 September 1574, the Ottoman sultan pointed
out that the beylerbey of Damascus sent a detailed letter regarding the precaution
and provision against the Druze community who were in the vicinity of the sanjak of
T.
ar¯abulus, along the seaside and the mountain slope. The t.¯a -ife wandered through
and around the mountains. The sultan specified that the beylerbey stated in case
that the Druze were assaulted by the sea, they would climb the mountain(s) and,
at this exact point, a military force who utilized the muskets would be deployed.
Moreover, he also stated when the grand vizier, Sin¯an Pasha, reached with the
Ottoman imperial navy, they would arrive that side to vanquish the t.¯a -ife-i mezb¯ure.
However, the sultan ordered the beylerbey to prepare and to provide an adequate
amount of grain from the areas around the seaport of T.
r¯ablus and, to bring it to
the seaport of T.
r¯ablus until the aforesaid grand vizier would arrive. The sultan
ordered that the grand vizier to lead the janissaries bearing muskets along the coast
when the battle began, whereupon they should climb the mountain along with the
infantry to capture and vanquish the Druze.227
224Basbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 91 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (H. 1056) (Özet - Çeviri
Yazı - Tıpkıbasım) (Istanbul: Osmanlı Arsivi Daire Baskanlıgı Yayınları, 2015), 239.
225The relatedh.
ükm is M.D. 46, No. 30b: Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 30.
226Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 172-173.
227BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 26/614.
56
Though the abovementionedh.
ükm, dated 1574, offers precise details with regard to
the intended military operation, we do not know whether it was executed or not.
Abu-Husayn points out that the local sources are silent with regard to this planned
expedition.228 Moreover, he adds that even if the expedition had occurred, this
military action - on the Ottoman administration’s part - fell far short of the aims
of eliminating the Druze problem. He corroborates his argument by explaining the
Druze’s regional activities that followed.229
Approximately a decade after the intended expedition, in 1585, the Ottoman administration
embarked on a large-scaled military operation against the Druze. The
Druze campaign of 1585 (known as Dür¯uz¯ı muh. ¯arebesi) has a prominent place not
only in the context of struggles with the Syrian littoral but also in the Ottoman
administration’s perception of the Druze. It also casts light on the Early Modern
history of the Ottoman Bil¯ad al-Sh¯am, Greater Syria.230 Notwithstanding its mainspring
had been ascribed to the robbery of a tribute in the traditional historiography
until the 1980s231, the Druze campaign of 1585, which we can also interpret as the
sharpest one among all the military expeditions mounted against the long-drawnout
Druze rebellions, was fundamentally the upshot of the cumulative effects of the
Druze’s anti-Ottoman activities for almost 70 years such as their having smuggled
muskets and avoided tax payments.232 The process left the Ottoman administrations
with no choice except to conduct military operations and making the regional
arrangements on the administrative level.
As a consequence of the Druze campaign of 1585, D¯am¯ad Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasha (d.
228Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 173.
229Abu-Husayn, “The Ottoman Invasion of the Sh¯uf,” 19-20.
230Abu-Husayn, 13.
231Ibid. See also: Kamal Salibi, “Fak
¯
h¯
r al-D¯ın,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 2 (Leiden, The
Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 749. Before presenting his counter argument in a detail with regard to the matter
of J¯un ,Akk¯ar, Abu-Husayn provides a part of the extant traditional narrative with a slightly different
version. He points out that the tribute was securely transported to Istanbul by sea. The rapine of the tribute
in J¯un ,Akk¯ar in no way transpired. He corroborates his argument by adducing the adequate historical
evidence from the contemporary primary sources including the T¯ar¯ıh-i Sel¯anik¯ı (History of Sel¯anik¯ı). He
stresses that the root cause of the Druze campaign of 1585 was not the plunder of the tribute in J¯un ,Akk¯ar.
According to him, the fundamental reason behind the Druze campaign of 1585 were that the Druze people
held a great number of muskets and did not pay their taxes: Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Selânikî Mustafa
Efendi Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595), vol. 1, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1999), 159-160. Apart from Sel¯anik¯ı Mus.t.
af¯a Effendi,H.
assan Bey-Z¯ade Ah.med Pasha (d. 1636-
37), another Ottoman chronicler, verifies that the tribute was safely conveyed from Egypt to Istanbul. He
states the related process in that way: “. . . Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasa-yı kisver-güs¯a. . . v¯al¯ı-i vil¯ayet-i Mıs.ır olub. . . t.¯a -ifei
Dür¯uz¯ı üzerine hüc¯um. . . ve ma,dûm eyledükden soñra. . .K.
apud¯an Kılıc ,Al¯ı Pasa. . . Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasa’yı
r¯akib-i mer¯akib-i bah. riyye idüb. . . Mıs.ır haz¯ınesini. . .k.
adırgalara tah.m¯ıl idüb. . .D¯arü’l-hil¯afe Istanbul’a
getürdi. . . ” : Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa, Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-
Kaynak Tenkidi), vol. 2, ed. Sevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004), 321-322.
232Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.
57
1601),233 a beylerbey of Egypt, managed to disarm the Druze community and to
collect the taxes required, albeit with great difficulty.234 H.
assan Bey-Z¯ade Ah.med
Pasha (d. 1636-37), a member of the imperial chancery, a finance official and historian,
hinted that Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasha delivered the taxes after returning to Istanbul.235
Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasha also captured a considerable number of leading local Druze figures
from Mount Lebanon.236 Qorqm¯az ibn Ma,n, father of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n, died
during the campaign of 1585.237
Ottoman endeavours to bring the region under their absolute control were not restricted
to military action. Later, the Ottoman administration implemented a number
of administrative arrangements following military intervention. The Ottoman
administration established the province of Druze (known as vil¯ayet-i Dür¯uz), subsequently
to be called the province of S.
ayda, to consolidate its imperial control over
the Druze community in the region.238 We can see this administrative regulation
through ah.
ükm dated 28 Jum¯ad¯a Al--Awwal (Jum¯ad¯a Al-- ¯Ul¯a), 993/28 May 1585.
In thish.
ükm, the Ottoman sultan ordered Mus.t.
af¯a, one of the functionaries at the
court, to govern the vil¯ayets captured from the cursed Druzes (Dür¯uz¯ı mel¯a,¯ın) and
the Ma,nids owing to his services and usefulness. This meant that the governorgeneralship
(beylerbeyilik) of province of Druze (Dür¯uz/Dür¯uz¯ı beylerbeyligi) was
conferred on Mus.t.
af¯a.239
For all the regional arrangements on the administrative level, the province of Druze
did not live long. However, this situation did not hold the Ottoman administrations
back from making other administrative regulations in the region in the subsequent
periods.240
The Druze campaign of 1585 brought the tangible rewards of victory. In the postcampaign
period, we see that the Ottoman administration granted those who fought
against the Druze people rewards, including appointments from beylerbeyilik or
233In his chronicle, K¯atib Chelebi (1609-1657) provides a potted biography of D¯am¯ad Ibr¯ah¯ım Pasha: Katip
Çelebi, Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)], vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin (Istanbul:
Çamlıca Basım, 2016), 233.
234Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 21.
235Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa, Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Pasa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-Kaynak
Tenkidi), vol. 2, ed. Sevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004), 322.
236Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.
237Abu-Husayn, 13.
238Abu-Husayn, “The Long Rebellion,” 180.
239BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/321.
240Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.
58
sanjak-beyilik to ze,¯amet/t¯ım¯ar. Promotions to higher ranks, salary increases, retirements
(tek. ¯a,üd), and promotions to military or administrative positions were
also among these imperial rewards. One of the most interesting points in the aforementioned
h.
ükms are the promotions within the military class.241 These imperial
grants, too, were reflected in theh.
ükms in question.
As for the imperial perception of the Ottoman administration at the time, we see no
differences compared to the preceding examples. In fact, when critically analyzing
the h.
ükms, we encounter more stern expressions in them. We have some h.
ükms
mentioned above that corroborate this statement. To give specific examples, in two
h.
ükms, both of which are reward-themed, the Ottoman administration utilized the
expressions “ılgar” or “Dür¯uz¯ı ılgarları”242 (incursion(s) made into an adversary’s
territory) and it granted some rewards to those who demonstrated the usefulnesses
in the Druze incursion(s), that is, in the Druze campaign of 1585.243 From the
abovementioned imperial statements, we can see that the Ottoman administration
identified the Druze not only as infidels but also as enemy. The prime reason why we
infer such a meaning from these expressions is the definition of the term in theh.ükms.
This is why, the Ottoman administrations must have perceived the Druze community
as a kind of adversary, which explicitly displays both the Ottoman perception of
Druze. Differences in religious beliefs must have also played a paramount role in such
a perception of what transpired in the region ever since the Ottomans conquested
Greater Syria.
When all what scrutinized thus far is taken into account, we can comfortably point
out that the Druze people were perhaps one of the most challenging communities
or ethno-religious groups in the periphery. From the 1510s onwards, the Ottomans
continually strove to disarm the Druze and to collect the taxes that the Druze community
was obliged to pay. For this reason, the process of disarmament and of
241If we are to have a close look at the Ottoman archive, we see that there are a large number of h.
ükms
(more than 100) with special reference to rewards offered for those who participated the Druze campaign
of 1585. As it is not possible to cite all theseh.
ükms here, I have classified them according to their subjects
and I have demonstrated only oneh.
ükm from each subject. In this way, I have thought that I can furnish
the readers with the further interestingh.
ükms from many different subjects. Theh.
ükms in regard to this
matter are M.D. 50, No. 265, No. 305, No. 314, No. 321, No. 342, No. 354, No. 362, No. 423, No. 436,
No. 439, No. 466, No. 477, No. 522, No. 529, No. 635, No. 696, No. 870, No. 905, No. 923, No. 957,
No. 1015, No. 1145, respectively. In addition to these, Abu-Husayn provides us with other h.
ükms of a
complementary nature with regard to this matter. These are M.D. 50, No. 121-123, No. 307, No. 310,
No. 329, No. 332, No. 426, No. 428, No. 430, No. 432, No. 443, No. 445, No. 449, p. 85/No. 462, No.
521, No. 552, No. 610, No. 617, No. 654, No. 657, No. 659, No. 660, No. 667, No. 678, No. 685, No.
713-714, No. 719/719, No. 725, No. 735, No. 761, No. 763-764, No. 766, No. 768-769, No. 797-799, No.
818, No. 828, No. 972, No. 975, No. 978, No. 995, No. 1000-1001, No. 1003-1008, No. 1014, No. 1020,
No. 1030, No. 1068, No. 1080: Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 175-189.
242In the Kubbealtı Lugatı, the word “ılgar” in Turkish has one meaning in the framework of our context and
it means akın, hüc¯um, that is, raid or incursion made into an adversary’s territory in English: Ayverdi,
Asırlar Boyu Târihî Seyri Içinde Misalli, 526.
243BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/354 and 436.
59
collecting the taxes, both of which influenced the struggles between the Ottoman
administrations and the Druzes, became a prime concern for the Ottoman administrations.
We should not forget that the ongoing struggles were fundamentally
a conflict between the centralizing Ottoman state (at least until the closing years
of the 16th century) and the periphery, which opposed the centralist policies and
wished to act autonomously and to live under no custody. If we are to consider
anti-Ottoman activities of the Druze community in Southern Syria and Lebanon, it
is no wonder that almost all Ottoman administrations perceived the Druze people
as a great “nuisance”. As mentioned earlier, the phase of 1516-1590, was only a part
of these age-old struggles that would proceed until the end of the 17th century.
3.2 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase II (1590-1635)
3.2.1 The Birth of the Ma,nid Domination: Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n (1572-
1635)
Around 1590, when Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n took over the position of muqaddam from
his father, he became a central figure of the region of Sh¯uf. As he aspired to promote
himself in a regionally ascendant position in Southern Syria from the very beginning,
he commenced forming a set of regional alliances there and strengthened his
military forces. He also pursued a conciliatory policy with the Ottoman provincial
administrations244, especially with the provincial authorities in the ey¯alet of Damascus.
245 Fakhr al-D¯ın endeavoured to achieve his regional objectives by paying the
taxes that he was obliged to pay on time. He, moreover, was lavish with his presents
towards the authorities, which evidently reveals what kind of path that he followed
in his relationships with the Ottoman provincial administrations. The relationship
between Fakhr al-D¯ın and Mur¯ad Pasha (d. 1611, also known asK.
uyucu Mur¯ad)246
perfectly epitomizes the way that he was connected with the Ottoman administrations.
K.
uyucu Mur¯ad Pasha, before becoming a grand vizier years between 1606
and 1611, was appointed either as a sanjak-bey or a beylerbeyi to major administrative
centers. His appointment to Damascus in 1594 and his grandviziership in 1606
244Although Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n had such a policy, his real intention was known by the high-ranking
statesmen such as Koçi Bey (d. 1650). In his ris¯ales, Koçi Bey mentions himself as such: “. . . ve Ma,an oglı
dahi s.¯uret-i it.¯a,atle bir ,¯as.i olub. . . ” : Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risaleleri, ed. Seda Çakmakcıoglu (Istanbul:
Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2007), 66, 233.
245Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 80-81.
246Ömer Isbilir, “Kuyucu Murad Pasa,” TDVIA, vol. 26 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2002): 507-508.
60
allowed Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n to find the opportunities to pursue his plans.247
As soon as Mur¯ad Pasha was designated to govern the ey¯alet of Damascus, Fakhr
al-D¯ın immediately took action and strove to win the Pasha’s good will.248 In
this context, Fakhr al-D¯ın was granted the prerogative of governing the sanjak of
Sidon, a situation which demonstrated that he was quite accomplished in conciliatory
policy. In this way, he was elevated to a higher position, that is, to the rank of
sanjak-bey from muqaddamship, which marked a watershed in his political career.
The cordial relationships between the two figures were particularly of paramount
importance since they directly determined the course of the relations and struggles
between the Ottoman administrations and Ma,nids. To put it differently, friendly
relations enabled Fakhr al-D¯ın to evade a military encounter with the Ottoman central
administrations for a long time, which explicitly indicates the dynamics of these
struggles. The other prime reason for the continuation of the cordial relationships
was that Fakhr al-D¯ın was also unquestionably lavish with bribery.249
This naturally brought along the abuse of these friendly relations by Fakhr al-D¯ın.
Between 1594-95, he endeavoured to eliminate the Furaykhs, one of his adversaries,
by manipulating the good will of the Pasha. This was within the framework of
his regional interests, and also served the Ottoman interests in Southern Syria.250
Likewise, Fakhr al-D¯ın and the Ottoman administration moved in concert in the
case of Y¯usuf ibn Sayf¯a in 1598 as part of the common regional interests. This collaboration
evidently demonstrates that the Ottoman administration pragmatically
cooperated with regional elements, the Ma,nids in our case, until their local interests,
particularly in Southern Syria, were fulfilled.251 In this way, while the Ottoman
administrations found an opportunity to tighten their imperial control over the geographically
far-off region, Fakhr al-D¯ın was able to diffuse his regionally limited
power into a more extended area. Their mutual interests led each to support the
other’s position.
Fakhr al-D¯ın’s regional activities along with his considerable military potential in
the region gradually enabled him to be accepted as a central local figure in the eyes
of the Ottoman administrations.252 That his zone of influence spread to the sanjak
247Ibid.
248Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 81.
249Ibid.
250Abu-Husayn, 81-83.
251Abu-Husayn, 83.
252Ibid.
61
of S.
afad253 in 1602 demonstrates how influential he was, which administratively
means that the Druze community and Shi,ites in the region were under his jurisdiction.
254 Considering his appointment to S.
afad, the Ottoman administration must
have contemplated that Fakhr al-D¯ın would manage to keep the regional elements
including the Shi,ites under the control, a situation that served the regional interests
of the Ottoman Empire.255
Such an agreement, a reciprocal relationship binding each of two parties equally,
constituted the backbone of the relations between the Ottoman administrations
and the Ma,nids.256 However, it should be underscored that these agreements did
not primarily have a pattern of consistency. The maintenance of such a relationship
primarily depended on the fact that the Ottoman regional interests were to be
fulfilled to a considerable extent.
Perhaps, the most significant determinants that gave Fakhr al-D¯ın some elbow room
in Southern Syria were the Ottoman–Habsburg Long War of 1593–1606, and the
Ottoman–Safavid War of 1603–1612 and 1603–1618. The Ottoman central preoccupation
with two fronts in both West and East naturally did hold the Ottoman
administrations back from taking the preventive measures against Fakhr al-D¯ın’s
regional activities that were undermining the Ottoman imperial authority in the
region. Equally significantly, the Ottoman administrations had to connive at his regional
acts to a certain extent because of the conditions of that time.257 Hence, this
situation naturally enabled Fakhr al-D¯ın to start to act semi-autonomously in the
region that he governed. He established a military force known as sekb¯ans and gave
importance to the fortification of the region, which was noticed by the Ottoman
253Ibid.
254Ibid.
255Ibid., 84.
256The Ottoman central administrations established reciprocal relations with the regional elements, one of
which was the Ma,nids since the Empire dominated Greater Syria. Generally speaking, the Ottoman
administrations made every endeavour to obtain taxes, and control the region, and wanted the periphery to
fulfill its obligations including the financial ones; however, the Ottoman administrations, to a considerable
extent, managed to do so through local elements or figures, the Ma,nids and Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n,
in our case. In this way, the Empire was able to collect taxes and tighten its imperial control over the
periphery, Southern Syria and Lebanon, which were the Ottoman regional interests. As for the regional
elements, they were able to act more freely in their regions and make economic gains through iltiz¯am
contracts. Moreover, they even had a chance to hold administrative posts. In short, the reciprocal
relations and the maintenance of these relationships principally depended on the fact that the Ottoman
local interests were to be fulfilled to a considerable extent. At this point, in his chronicle, Topçular K¯atibi
,Abdü’l-K. adir Efendi furnishes with very precious information with special reference to the obligations of
the periphery. He points out these obligations as such: “. . .Ma,an-oglu her g¯ah ta,y¯ın olunan haz¯ıne[y]i
¯ Asit¯ane’ye gönderüp. . . Ma,an-oglu’na m¯ır¯ı haz¯ıne t.alebi içün ¯ademler gönderdiler. . .Ma,an-oglu. . . m¯ır¯ı
akça[y]ı haz¯ıneye tesl¯ım etdügünde. . .Ma,an-oglu ve Seyf-oglu. . . ,is.y¯an eden. . . bir ferdk.
omayup. . . sak.¯ıleri
der-bend edüp. . . ekserin. . . gönderirlerdi. . .Ma,an-oglu’nun haz¯ınesin cem,ine k.
apucu-bası gönderdiler. . . ”
: Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir Efendi, Topçular Kâtibi ,Abdülkâdir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil),
vol. 1, ed. Ziya Yılmazer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 180, 387, 512-513, 560.
257Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
62
administrations at once. That Fakhr al-D¯ın was lavish with bribery towards the
high-ranking statesmen was also another significant determinant, which helped him
to gradually become a local power.258
Another perfect opportunity for Fakhr al-D¯ın emerged when Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha
rebelled against the Ottoman imperial authority in 1606. Fakhr al-D¯ın collaborated
with ,Al¯ı Pasha259 by looking after his regional and personal interests, including the
position of his adversary, -am¯ır Y¯usuf ibn Sayf¯a.260
Driving force behind Fakhr al-D¯ın’s acts was not only the concern of strictly guarding
the region. He also principally aimed at extending his zone of influence in the
region, and this was directly to the detriment of the Ottoman regional authority
and interests. In fact, he would be successful in his regional ambitions and take
control of both Bayr¯ut and Kisraw¯an – a success that demonstrated that he took
advantages against Y¯usuf ibn Sayf¯a in power struggles in the region.261
As soon as the Ottoman administration entrusted K.
uyucu Mur¯ad Pasha the task
of putting down the rebellion of ,Al¯ı Pasha, Fakhr al-D¯ın, who joined the rebellion
shortly after Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha won a victory against Y¯usuf Sayf¯a, who was commanded
to assist with the repression of the rebellion. However, Fakhr al-D¯ın, in a
similar way to his local counterparts, remained silent against the imperial orders.
Shortly after the defeat of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha, he immediately dispatched a large
amount of money to Mur¯ad Pasha to be able to compensate his wrong doing what
he had done before.262
As Fakhr al-D¯ın and Mur¯ad Pasha had friendly relations, his collaboration with
Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha did not pose any serious problem between them. Fakhr al-D¯ın
continued to have control over Kisraw¯an.263 Most significantly, he enabled his son,
258Ibid.
259Generally speaking, apart from T¯ar¯ıh-i Na,im¯a (History of Na,im¯a), the Ottoman chronicles hardly mention
the matter of Fakhr al-D¯ın’s involvement in the rebellion of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha. Even Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a
(1655-1716) makes a mention of this event only in a short paragraph. He states the related process as such:
“. . . Menk. ¯uldür ki serd¯ar Canpol¯ad-oglu ile k.
ıt¯al eyledikte Ma,an-oglu Fahredd¯ın dahi cümle Ben¯ı-kelbi ve
Dürz¯ı ,askeri ile Canpol¯ad k.
olunda idi. Ba,de’l-inhiz¯am Fahredd¯ın çöle fir¯ar edip anda Sak. if K.
al,asında
k.
ar¯ar eyledi. . . ” : Mustafa Naîmâ, Târih-i Na,îmâ, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 336.
260Abu-Husayn, loc.cit. For more information about the regional cooperation of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n
with Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “The Revolt of Ali Pasha Janbulad (1605-1607) in the
Contemporary Arabic Sources and its Significance,” In VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan
Bildiriler, 11-15 Ekim 1976, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983): 1523-1529.
261Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 85.
262Ibid.
263Abu-Husayn, 86-87.
63
,Al¯ı, to be granted the prerogative of governing the sanjak of Sidon-Bayr¯ut264 as
well as Ghaz¯ır,265 a situation that meant that Fakhr al-D¯ın thoroughly established
himself in the region.
However, when K.
uyucu Mur¯ad Pasha died in 1611, the fast-growing political and
military career of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n abruptly deteriorated. Nas.¯uh. Pasha (d.
1614)266, whose growing antipathy towards Fakhr al-D¯ın was noted, was then promoted
as the grand vizier.267 Hence, Fakhr al-D¯ın’s relations with the Ottoman
central administration became much more difficult.
Fakhr al-D¯ın set out to pursue existing relationships with the Ottoman central
administration. More precisely, he immediately sent a large amount of money to
the grand vizier, yet the reaction of Nas.¯uh. Pasha was not what he had expected.268
Nas.¯uh. Pasha commanded Fakhr al-D¯ın to disband the sekb¯ans at his disposal and
to surrender some fortresses in the region. Elimination of Y¯unus al-H. arf¯ush was
also among these orders. However, Fakhr al-D¯ın in no way took heed of what he
had been said.269 He dispatched a military force to protect both Y¯unus al-H. arf¯ush
and Ah.mad Shih¯ab againstH.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha (d. 1632)270, Muh. ¯afiz. of Damascus,
who was intending to eliminate them. Nevertheless, Fakhr al-D¯ın performed what
he had not been ordered. Upon the orders of Nas.¯uh. Pasha, Fakhr al-D¯ın dispatched
a large amount of money to the grand vizier.271
At this point, the Ottoman central administration made a new provincial appointment
and granted the prerogative of governing of the sanjaks of N¯abulus, ,Ajl¯un and
264Abu-Husayn, 87.
265Ibid. In 1607, the Ottoman central administration did not punish Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n by killing him
or dismissing him from sanjak-beyship despite his involvement in the rebellion of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha
– which obviously made him a rebel. On the contrary, Istanbul allowed him to continue to hold the
sanjak of S.
afad. Fakhr al-D¯ın received pardon thanks to his amicable relationship with Mur¯ad Pasha.
However, it seems that the Ottoman administration preferred to pragmatically cooperate with him within
the framework of its integration policies and regional interests. Istanbul presumably did not find him as
dangerous as Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha (who was appointed as beylerbey to Temesvar and sent far away.) Akdag
gives interesting information with regard to Ottoman integration policies: Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve
Düzenlik Kavgası, 482-488; Mücteba Ilgürel, “Canbolatogulları,” TDVIA, vol. 7 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları,
1993): 145.
266M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Nasûh Pasa,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 9 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı, 1997):
121-127.
267Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
268Abu-Husayn, 87-88. In his chronicle, Ah.mad al-Kh¯alid¯ı gives information with regard to historical events
between the 1610s and 1623/24: Abu-Husayn, “Khalidi on Fakh al-D¯ın Apology,” 3-15.
269Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 88.
270Orhan F. Köprülü, “Hâfız Ahmed Pasa,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 5/1 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı,
1997): 71-77.
271Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.
64
Karak to Farr¯ukh Beg. This appointment aimed to balance the regional influence of
Fakhr al-D¯ın along with Ibn Q¯ans.¯uh. It is understood that the Ottoman administration
closely watched the region and took administrative actions according to the
changing dynamics in the region in order to be able to tighten its control.272
Meanwhile, Fakhr al-D¯ın did not restrict himself only to his anti-Ottoman activities
in Southern Syria. He, at the same time, entered into an agreement with Tuscany
in a period when the Ottoman administration turned its attention to the region.273
His cooperation with the Medicis meant that Fakhr al-D¯ın’s revolt evolved into a
non-integration-oriented rebellion.
The tension in the region increased when Fakhr al-D¯ın backedH.
amd¯an Q¯ans.¯uh and
sheikh ,Amr Ibn Jabr upon the appointment of Farr¯ukh Beg by the Ottoman central
administration. Notwithstanding managing to restore their former position in the
region at the end, he could not evade from the imperial reactions of the Ottoman
central administration. As a consequence of Fakhr al-D¯ın’s abovementioned anti-
Ottoman policies in Southern Syria, Nas.¯uh. Pasha entrusted the task of punishing
Fakhr al-D¯ın to H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha.274 Thereupon, Ah.med Pasha instigated the
military confrontation275 between Fakhr al-D¯ın and the Ottoman administration.
Fakhr al-D¯ın followed same patterns of relationships once more. More specifically,
he not only took some military measures in the region but also dispatched his representatives
to the authorities at the provincial level. In addition to these, he proposed
sending a large amount of money toH.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha, who would decline to take
it, later,276 which evidently indicates the dynamics of the relations between the Ottoman
administrations and the Ma,nids. H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha advanced towards the
Sh¯uf region in 1613. The Ottoman fleet, too, was part of this military movement.277
272Ibid.
273Abu-Husayn, 89.
274Abu-Husayn, 90-91.
275The military expedition of 1613 was the first military confrontation between the Ma,nids and the Ottoman
administrations. Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a specifies that Fakhr al-D¯ın either postponed or did not fulfill his financial
obligations. He also emphasizes that Fakhr al-D¯ın intensely fortified the region against the Ottoman
administrations and he had more than 1000 sekb¯ans from the Druze community (Dür¯uz¯ı t.¯a-ifesi), which
were some of the determinants that gave rise to the expedition of 1613. Thereupon, H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha
embarked on military intervention in 1613: Mustafa Naîmâ, Târih-i Na,îmâ, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 410-412. Similary, Mus.t.
afa S¯af¯ı and K¯atib Chelebi (1609-
1657) touch on the same points: Mustafa Sâfî, Mustafa Sâfî’nin Zübdetü’t-Tevârîh’i, vol. 2, ed. Ibrahim
Hakkı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 311-316. Katip Çelebi, Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı
Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)], vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin (Istanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2016), 465-468.
276Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 92.
277At this point, Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a provides us with a quite interesting information with regard to this event.
He points out that Meh.med Pasha, aK.
apud¯an Pasha at that time, arrived atS.
ayd¯a and Bayr¯ut since Fakhr
al-D¯ın followed anti-Ottoman policies in the region and did not fulfill his financial responsibilities. He states
the process as such: “. . . Meh.med Pasa. . . donanma ile. . .S.
ayd¯a ve Beyr¯ut c¯aniblerine inip. . .Ma,an-oglu
65
Although every precaution was taken against the possibility of Fakhr al-D¯ın’s flight,
he managed to reach Tuscany.
The military expedition of 1613 furnishes us with the significant details with special
reference to these struggles.278 A considerable number of local figures, including
Y¯unus al-H. arf¯ush, the Sayf¯as, the Shih¯abs, the Tur¯ab¯ays and Ibn Q¯ans.¯uh joined
the military operation of 1613 led byH.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha,279 This operation shows
that, when necessary, the Ottoman administrations and the peripheral elements
could closely cooperate with one another against other regional elements.
Another significant detail with regard to the military expedition of 1613 is that it
provides us with interesting details about negotiation and bargaining. For example,
when the expedition started under the leadership of H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha, some
fortresses in the Sh¯uf region were either captured or demolished.280 In addition to
that, the Ottoman administration dispatched the military forces of some beylerbeys
and pashas to the region. Thereupon, -am¯ır Y¯unus Ma,n (d. 1633), the brother of
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n, pleaded with H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha not to punish him and
dispatched his mother to him. Moreover, he pointed out that if the military forces
withdrew from the region, he would remit 300.000 quruses to the imperial treasury
and surrender the fortresses of both Shaq¯ıf and B¯any¯as to the pasha.
At this exact point, telh¯ıs.es, not only provide information about regional politics, but
also demonstrate processes of bargaining and negotiation between Y¯unus Ma,n and
H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha.281 Thereupon,H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha agreed to these conditions
by considering that the capture of the rest of the fortresses would take approximately
more than a year owing to the upcoming winter conditions. At this point, it is
specified in the telh¯ıs.es that the Ma,nids would surrender the sum of money and the
fortresses to the Ottoman central administration within a month.
tevessü, ile ba,zı k.
ıl¯a,-ı h.
as.¯ıne bin¯a- edip. . . vere geldigi emv¯ali nok. s.¯an üzre ve vak. tinden soñra vermek
s.adedinde olup. . . Pasa. . . ele getirmek s.adedinde oldugu Ma,an-oglu’nun. . . ” : Mustafa Naîmâ, Târih-i
Na,îmâ, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 390. Apart from
Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a, Mus.t.
afa S¯af¯ı (d. 1616), a yet another Ottoman chronicler, also mentions the same
process: Mustafa Sâfî, Mustafa Sâfî’nin Zübdetü’t-Tevârîh’i, vol. 2, ed. Ibrahim Hakkı (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 140-142.
278Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 93.
279Ibid. Apart from the local figures, some sanjak-beys in Anatolia were also summoned to participate in the
military expedition of 1613. The telh¯ıs. compilation gives interesting information with regard to those who
were rewarded for their participation: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 13a.
280BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 3a.
281“. . .K.
arındasım (Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n) ,¯as.i olub gitdi ise biz ,¯as.i degilüz anıñ gün¯ah ile bize cez¯a- olunursa
emr-ü ferm¯an sa,¯adetlü ve devletlü p¯adis¯ahındır. . .z
¯
ikr olunan ,asker geri döndürülürse haz¯ıne-i ,¯amireye
üç kere yüz biñ gurus tesl¯ım etdigimizden m¯a-,ad¯a. . . Sek¯ıf k.
al,asıyla B¯any¯as k.
al,asın dahi bosaldub size
tesl¯ım idelüm. . . bir aya degin mühlet isteriz. . . ”
66
Ma,nids’ continuous anti-Ottoman policies overshadowed the empire’s authority and
control over the region. Therefore, H.
¯afız. Ah.med Pasha’s military intervention in
Sh¯uf was absolutely necessary and extremely important. The sultan’s correspondence
with the grandvizier sheds light on the background of this expedition.282 At
the same time, the Ottoman administration entered into the process of bargaining
and negotiation with the Ma,nids. Both sides were willing to negotiate with each
other, a situation which demonstrably displays that the process of the bargaining
and negotiation was reciprocal rather than one-sided. Thus, while the Ottoman
central administration, albeit partly, was able to tighten its control over the region
with the military support of other local figures, the Ma,nids narrowly evaded total
destruction.
The military potential of Fakhr al-D¯ın in the region needs to be explored. He was
able to threaten not only the local figures but also the provincial forces thanks to
the sekb¯an forces that he had stationed in Southern Syria. However, these sekb¯ans,
including H.
ussein Yaziji were also changing sides between Fakhr al-D¯ın and the
Ottoman administration.283 Taking advantage of the struggles between the Ottoman
administration and the Ma,nids, H.
ussein Yaziji was able to obtain the prerogative
of governing the sanjak of S.
afad in the absence of Fakhr al-D¯ın, a situation which
evidently shows that these struggles were multilayered and much more intricate.
A year later, in 1614, the Ottoman central administration had to embark on another
administrative arrangement in the region. Beirut,S.
afad and Sidon were united and
became a beylerbeyilik. The Ottoman administration appointed H.
asan Pasha as a
beylerbey.284 Such an arrangement was meant to enable H.
asan Pasha to control
the Druze community.285 But beylerbeyilik did not prove to be operational and the
Ma,nids were reestablished once again as the local administrators by the central
government.286
One of the most deciding elements favour of the Ottomans was when the administrations
implemented the iltiz¯am system in the region.287 The prime reason why
282Afterwards, the Ottoman army would take control of the fortresses in the region: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013,
fol. 13a, 18b.
283Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 94-95.
284Ünal Taskın, Osmanlı Idaresinde Safed (1516-1600) (Elazıg: Fırat Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2011), 59. The
Telh¯ıs. compilation provides interesting information with regard to the appointment ofH.
asan Pasha to the
newly formed beylerbeyilik: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 12a.
285Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 171.
286Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 97.
287Prof. Stefan Winter, upon my inquiry, pointed out that the historians do not have enough of information
with regard to this matter: “. . . To the best of my knowledge, there was no real iltiz¯am in the region before
67
it was critical is that the iltiz¯am contracts enabled the Ma,nids (at the individual
level, Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n) to greatly extend their influence in the region. From
the viewpoint of the central administrations, some members of the Ma,nids, particularly
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n, assumed some local responsibilities.288 The cities
that the Ma,nids were highly influential wereS.
afad,S.
ayd¯a, Bayr¯ut, ,Ajl¯un, Ghazza,
N¯abulus, Tadmur; they also had control of geographical regions such as Biq¯a,, Sh¯uf
al-Bay¯ad,H.
amm¯ara, Ba,labakk, Karak N¯uh. ,H.
awl¯a, Sha,r¯a.289
Yasuhisa shows that the first known iltiz¯am contract was concluded in 1618, a year
that indicates the termination of Fakhr al-D¯ın’s self-exile. The others were made in
1623 and 1633, respectively. The interesting point was that the Ma,nids sometimes
offered a large amount of money to obtain the contracts. The Ottoman administrations
also demanded tax revenues to be increased before negotiating for the next
round of contracts. Generally speaking, the Ma,nids accepted the conditions laid
down by Istanbul.290 That is to say, both sides moved within the framework of their
regional interests and had mutual relationships. After the battle of ,Anjar (1623)
and the defeat of Ottoman provincial forces led by Mus.t.
af¯a Pasha, the governor of
Damascus, against local families, such as theH.
arf¯ushes and the Sayf¯as led by Fakhr
al-D¯ın, the Ma,nid leader, managed to get hold of iltiz¯am rights. Fakhr al-D¯ın was
evidently at the peak of his political and military career and he had the opportunity
to put pressure on theH.
arf¯ushes until his fall in 1633 through the iltiz¯am rights given
by the Ottoman administrations.291 However, when Fakhr al-D¯ın was defeated in
1633 by Küçük Ah.med Pasha (d. 1636), the Ma,nids naturally lost the privileges of
holding the iltiz¯am contract. Thereupon, the Ottoman central administration firstly
granted some rights to ,Abd al-Kar¯ım Aga, one of the men of Ah.med Pasha, and
then to other local families such as the Shih¯abs and the H.
arf¯ushes.292 This is yet
another demonstration of the Ottoman central administrations’ pragmatical coopthe
Ottomans-the main reason being there was no real money or even much of a commodity trade economy
before the 16th century. So before the Ottomans, power was often left to local notables who controlled an
area in return for providing some military service, but not in return for taxes. But we don’t have a huge
amount of information in this regard. As far as I know, however, iltiz¯am never appears in Maml¯uk sources
for Syria. . . ” Email communication with Winter, Aug 11, 2021, 10:36 PM.
288The liabilities allocated to the Ma,nids were to properly collect taxes, to handle the pilgrimage affairs
and to fund the janissaries in the region. They were also responsible for dispatching tax revenues to the
Ottoman central administrations. Apart from these, the Ma,nids were entrusted with the task of providing
security in the region. As it is seen, there were reciprocal relationships between Istanbul and the Syrian
littoral: Shimizu Yasuhisa, “Practices of Tax Farming under the Ottoman Empire in Damascus Province,”
In Tax Farm Register of Damascus Province in the Seventeenth Century: Archival and Historical Studies,
eds. Nagata Yuzo, Miura Toru and Shimizu Yasuhisa (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2006), 24-32.
289Yasuhisa, 24.
290Yasuhisa, 25.
291Yasuhisa, 25-27.
292Yasuhisa, 28.
68
eration with local families, if necessary –that is, when the local families in question
were unable to serve the Ottoman regional interests, the center could replace them
with their other regional powers.
During Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s stay in Italy for five years (1613-1618), the regional
opposition against the Ma,nid leadership in Southern Syria and Lebanon mainly
came from the Druze community, the Shi,ites and then the H.
arf¯ushes. Such challenges
continued even after 1618, the year that Fakhr al-D¯ın returned and brought
the oppositions of local power groups, including the Sayf¯as, under the control.293
He immediately started to extend his sphere of influence in the region, to the detriment
of the Sayf¯as. Following Y¯usuf Sayf¯a’s death in 1625, Fakhr al-D¯ın accelerated
his expansionist policies in the area.294 It should be emphasized that the most
significant event was the battle of ,Anjar in 1623 in this period.
3.2.2 The Fall of the Ma,nid Domination
Until his fall in 1633, Fakhr al-D¯ın carefully carried out a conciliatory policy with the
high-ranking Ottoman statesmen not only in the central but also in the provincial
administrations. The preoccupation of the Ottomans with the Eastern provinces
enabled him to move much more freely in his region.295 As the Ottoman administrations
and Ma,nids cooperated with each other, he managed to establish himself
in Southern Syria and Lebanon. However, his career and strenghtened position in
the region was endangered with the termination of the Ottoman preoccupation with
the Eastern front. When the Ottomans solved the Safavid problem in the East, they
found an opportunity to turn their attention to Fakhr al-D¯ın. The Ottoman central
administration dispatched an army led by Küçük Ah.med Pasha (d. 1636) to the
region. Fakhr al-D¯ın, together with some family members and his two sons, Mas,¯ud
and H.
ussein, was captured in a cave after a battle in 1633.296 Thereafter, Ah.med
Pasha sent them to the imperial capital. Following Murad IV’ (r. 1623-1640) order,
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was decapitated and his son, Mas,¯ud was killed in 1635. Only
H.
ussein’s life was spared, and he came to hold a significant post as a munejjim-bashi
293Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 95-97, 100-118.
294Abu-Husayn, 110-111.
295Abu-Husayn, 124.
296At this point, Mus.t.
af¯a Na,im¯a affords a quite interesting information with special reference to the process
of the capture of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n: Mustafa Naîmâ, Târih-i Na,îmâ, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet Ipsirli
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 761-763. See also: Hrand Der Andreasyan, Polonyalı
Simeon’un Seyahatnâmesi (1608-1619) (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 218-222; Abu-Husayn, op.cit.
124-126.
69
in the palace.297 Thus, the Ottoman central administration eliminated one of the
most challenging notables of Southern Syria and Lebanon.
It appears that Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n punctually fulfilled his financial obligations
and deliberately adopted a conciliatory policy with the Ottoman statesmen and
resorted to presents and bribery in order to have good relationship with the Ottoman
dignitaries since the very beginning. He, moreover, pursued his regional policies in
accord with the continuously changing political structure in the Ottoman central
administration and managed to be part of the Ottoman administrative system as
a sanjak-bey. He is understood to have cooperated with the Ottoman offices in the
administration of iltiz¯am contracts and collecting taxes from local revenue sources.
He was, therefore, able not only to spread his zone of influence but also to establish
control over other local families in the region. He managed to create an appropriate
environment to realize his regional ambitions. If it is considered from the viewpoint
of the central administrations, Istanbul intentionally and pragmatically collaborated
with Fakhr al-D¯ın in that the Ottoman central administrations had also regional
interests such as extracting tax revenues in the region and strengthening their control
over there. Moreover, when necessary, they did not hesitate to bargain and negotiate
with a local who often abused their authority, rebelled and fought ferociously at the
battle ground. Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n carried out anti-Ottoman policies, and even
received the support of foreign states. This, as suggested by a number of historians
before, makes him essentially a non-integration-oriented rebel.
It should be emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was dealing with the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions,
and an overall violence wave in Anatolia at the time. Meanwhile, the Ottoman
central administrations were preoccupied not only with domestic problems in Istanbul
but also with several long wars such as the Ottoman–Habsburg Long War of
1593–1606, the Ottoman–Safavid Wars of 1603–1612 and 1603–1618. This is why,
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was allowed to maintain his regional activities until the Ottoman
central administration dealt a heavy blow to him in 1633. The 1590-1635
phase, during which I analyzed the reciprocal relationships between Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n and the Ottoman central administrations was only the second part of these
age-old struggles that would continue until the end of the 17th century.
297Abu-Husayn, 126-127.
70
3.3 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase III (1635-1697)
3.3.1 Mulhim Ma,n (d. 1658)
Shortly after the elimination of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in 1635 by the Ottoman
central administration, Mulhim Ma,n (d. 1658) assumed the regional leadership of
the Ma,nids. He was the most significant local figure left from the Ma,nids in the
region. His son,H.
ussein Ma,n lived in the imperial capital as a munejjim-bashi.298
Despite what happened between 1590 and 1635, the Ottoman central administrations
pragmatically continued to collaborate with the member(s) of the Ma,nids.
As a matter of fact, Istanbul granted the prerogative of being mültezim to Mulhim
Ma,n. More specifically, the central administration approved his establishment in
Sh¯uf, Gharb, Jurd, Matn and Kisraw¯an.299
Some regional disturbances, such as banditry or interception of wayfarers and Muslim
pilgrims continued during the leadership of Mulhim Ma,n.300 Moreover, Mulhim
Ma,n, too, followed some anti-Ottoman policies. He joined other local families in
seizing both Bayr¯ut andS.
ayd¯a.301
The most significant event in the Mulhim period was his 1642 defeat of Mus.t.
af¯a
Pasha, the beylerbey of Damascus. However, albeit the 1642 incident, it is argued
that he was generally loyal to the imperial authority. When he died in 1658, Ah.mad
(d. 1697) and Qorqm¯az (d. 1662), the sons of Mulhim Ma,n, became the prominent
figures in the region.302 However, their leadership claims were strongly reacted by
the Druze communities supported by the Ottoman central administration. During
this internal strife, Qorqm¯az died in 1662, making way to Ah.mad Ma,n to become
the most significant local figure of the Ma,nids until his death in 1697.
Another significant event that Abu-Husayn draws our attention is that, once again,
Ottoman central administration had recourse to some administrative arrangements
in the region. In 1660, in order to tightly cement its imperial authority over the
Druze community, Istanbul transformed the sanjaks of Sidon-Bayr¯ut andS.
afad into
298Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 21.
299Ibid.
300Murat Alanoglu, “86 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri’nin Özetli Transkripsiyonu ve Degerlendirilmesi” (Master’s
Thesis, Atatürk University, 2010), 121-122, 210-211.
301Alanoglu, 205-206, 209-210.
302Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 21-22.
71
an ey¯alet of Sidon.303 This shift was strongly reacted by the Druze people. In 1667,
when Ah.mad Ma,n became the leader of the Ma,nids, another phase of struggle
would continue until his death in 1697, began.
3.3.2 Ah.mad Ma,n (d. 1697)
Together with the death of Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n in 1635, Ma,nid leadership in the
region was significantly challenged. The Ottoman central administration had Fakhr
al-D¯ın killed since he endangered the territorial integrity of the Empire. Nevertheless,
this situation did not hold Istanbul back from pragmatically cooperating with
the later Ma,nids. When Ah.mad Ma,n (d. 1697) shouldered the leadership of the
Ma,nids, like his predecessors, he held the mültezimship of almost the same areas
and same revenue sources in the region until 1697.304
Relations between 1667 and 1697 should be evaluated in the context of the Ottoman-
Habsburg War of 1683-1699.305 From 1689 onwards, the Ottoman central administrations
intensively started to dispatch orders in order to provide a certain number
of military forces to the governors in the periphery, including the ones in Damascus
and Tripoli along with the officials in Syria. This applied also for Ah.mad Ma,n.306
One of the “Register of Complaints” (,At¯ık. Sik¯ayet Defteri), dated 1686-1687, furnishes
with an order which the Sultan demanded provisions and military force (500
musketeers) from Ah.mad Ma,n during the Hungarian campaign.307
As far as is known, Ah.mad Ma,n did not fulfill these imperial orders sent from
Istanbul and did not obey the imperial authority. In 1691, the Ottoman central
administration dispatched another order to Ah.mad Ma,n and asked him to help the
officials put down the Qizilb¯ash elements in the region. Four years later, in 1695,
another order was sent to him.308 Ah.mad Ma,n did not pay attention to any of
these imperial orders. Although Istanbul got the upper hand for a while, a second
rebellion broke out in the region in support of Ah.mad Ma,n.
303Ibid.
304Abu-Husayn, “The Unknown Career of Ahmad Ma,n,” 241-242.
305Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 23.
306Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 242-243.
307Mesut Demir, “1686-1687 (h. 1097-1098) Tarihli Atik Sikâyet Defteri’nin Transkripsiyon ve Degerlendirilmesi”
(Master’s Thesis, Marmara University, 2010), 428.
308Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 243.
72
Finally, the Ottoman central administration announced Ah.mad Ma,n a rebel in 1695,
and then decided to eliminate him.309 Thereafter, Istanbul established M¯us¯a ,Alam
al-D¯ın in the region and handed over to him the areas that were under the control of
Ah.mad Ma,n. In the meantime, Ah.mad Ma,n took refuge with the Shih¯abs. In the
subsequent years, Ah.mad Ma,n attempted to seize the region that was now under the
control of M¯us¯a ,Alam al-D¯ın together with the support of the Shih¯abs, eventuating
the removal of M¯us¯a ,Alam al-D¯ın in the region. Thereupon, the Ottoman central
administration ordered the reestablishment of M¯us¯a ,Alam al-D¯ın in the region and
the capture of Ah.mad Ma,n, which meant that the leadership of Ah.mad Ma,n, that
is, the Ma,nid leadership in the region was no longer approved by the Ottoman
administration.310 This struggle continued until the death of Ah.mad Ma,n in 1697
and the Ottoman central administration established the Shih¯ab dynasty in the region
over the Ma,nids.311 This is a continuation of a policy that Istanbul cooperated
with the local families until the regional elements were unable to serve its regional
interests.
It can be stated that the Ottoman central administrations also continued to pursue
their pragmatic peripheral policies in the period of 1635-1697. The governments in
Istanbul entrusted the administration of the tax-farms (iltiz¯ams) to the leading local
figures in the region; hence these local figures collected the state taxes and made
payments in fixed installments as mültezims, keeping a part of the tax revenue for
their own use. The iltiz¯am system included the farming of land and urban taxes,
the production of certain goods (such as wine, salt, or senna) and the provision
of certain services. Finally, when Istanbul understood that it could not no longer
cooperate with the Ma,nids, it decided to replace the Ma,nids with another local
element, that is, the Shih¯ab dynasty (1697-1842), a Sunnite local family.
309Abu-Husayn, 244-245.
310Abu-Husayn, 245-246.
311Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, “The Shihab Succession (1697): A Reconsideration,” Archive Orientalni, Supplementa
VIII (1998): 9.
73
4. A JEL ¯ AL¯I OR NOT?
In this chapter, I analyze whether Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s rebellion fits broader categories
of insurrection when compared with the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. Was Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n a Jel¯al¯ı? Did this rebellion have different feature(s) from its early modern
counterparts? If so, what was/were this/these? Furthermore, is it possible to assert
the related rebellion as a separatist insubordination in terms of its characteristic
feature(s)? Why or why was it not? Another prime objective of this chapter asks:
how can we frame this rebellion in a wider framework of Ottoman rebellions in early
modernity? I will explore these questions by reflecting on another contemporary
Syrian rebellion led by Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha, which was interlocked and shared the
similar patterns.312
The contemporary Ottoman and Arab sources identify the Janbul¯at.313 family (Table
2.1.) as ethnically Kurdish.314 The ancestor of the Janbul¯at.s was Q¯asim whose
preceding family members before him are unknown due to the scarcity of historical
sources.315 The family began to rise to prominence after his son, Janbul¯at. ibn
Q¯asim316 (also known as al-Kurdi).317 First of all, Janbul¯at., who spent considerable
part of his life at the Ottoman Court, purged northern Syria of elements, which
312Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” In An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire, 1300-1914, eds. Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 417.
313The name “Janbul¯at.” principally composes of two Persian words: “c¯an” and “p¯ul¯ad”, which means “soul of
steel”: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “The Revolt of Ali Pasha Janbulad (1605-1607) in the Contemporary Arabic
Sources and its Significance,” In VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, 11-15 Ekim 1976,
vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983): 1515.
314Philippe Rondot, “D
¯
j¯
¯anbul¯at.,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands:
Brill, 1991): 443, Rafeq, loc. cit. In addition to that, it has been said that the family had connection
with the Ayy¯ub¯ıds. The Janbul¯at.s settled in the northern Syria, what is today known as Kilis and its
surroundings in the 16th century.
315Mücteba Ilgürel, “Canbolatogulları,” TDVIA, vol. 7 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 144.
316Rafeq, op.cit., 1516.
317William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag,
1983), 86.
74
challenged Ottoman authority and was of great service to conquest of Cyprus in
1571. However, his services did not end there. He also helped quashed the rebellion
of the Son of ,Ulyan in Basra.318 Thereupon, some sanjaks in the northern Syria,
including A,zaz, Kilis and Ma,arrat al-Nu,man,319 were generously granted to him
by the Ottoman government.320
When Janbul¯at. ibn Q¯asim died in Kilis a year after the conquest of Cyprus in
1572,321 H.
ussein Pasha, one of his four sons, inherited his father’s sanjak of Kilis
courtesy of the Ottoman government. Unlike his brothers who had been granted
t¯ım¯ars by the Empire, upon his elevation to the post of sanjak-bey,322 he was met
with strong reaction of his brother, H.
ab¯ıb. Consequently, H.
ussein Pasha had to
alternately govern Kilis withH.
ab¯ıb until his brother’s death.323 H.
ussein Pasha, in
return for what had been granted by the Empire thus far, fulfilled his duties by
assisting the Ottoman administration in the Ottoman–Safavid War of 1578-1590
and he was promoted to a higher post in Aleppo later.
Thereafter, we see that the tensions incrementally rose. To give specific examples,
the sanjak of Kilis, for unknown reasons, was transferred fromH.
ussein Pasha to a
person known as Suleim¯an the Giant.324 Additionally, H.
ussein Pasha, on account
of his heavy debts, was imprisoned in Aleppo by the Ottoman administration, who
wanted to reduce his growing power in the region. Once out of prison, H.
ussein
Pasha immediately came back Kilis and displaced Suleim¯an the Giant with the aid
of sekb¯ans. Thereupon, Ottoman administrators accepted that Kilis had changed
hands. The Empire toleratedH.
ussein’s illegal seizure of Kilis on the condition that
he did not instigate regional troubles and assume his financial liabilities such as
paying taxes.325
The existing tension elevated much more when conflicts between H.
ussein ibn Janbul
¯at. and Nas.¯uh. Pasha, the governor of Aleppo, broke out. The clash started after
318Ilgürel, loc. cit. See also: Ibrahim Metin Kunt, “An Ottoman Imperial Campaign: Suppressing the Marsh
Arabs, Central Power and Peripheral Rebellion in the 1560s,” Osmanlı Arastırmaları 43 (2014): 1-18;
Abdurrahman Sagırlı, “Cezâyir-i Irâk-ı Arab veya Sattü’l-Arab’ın Fethi - Ulyanoglu Seferi - 1565-1571,”
Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 41 (2005): 43-94.
319Rafeq, loc. cit.
320Griswold, loc. cit.
321M.C. Sahâbeddin Tekindag, “Canbulat,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanlıgı,
1997): 22.
322Ilgürel, loc. cit.
323Rafeq, loc. cit.
324Griswold, op.cit., 87.
325Griswold., 87-88.
75
the janissaries oppressed the people in Damascus. Thereupon, the Ottoman government
ordered H.
ussein Pasha to assist Nas.¯uh. Pasha militarily in an attempt to
put down this insurrection. He dispatched a sizable military force under the command
of his nephew, Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha (also known as Canbol¯at.oglu ,Al¯ı Pasa
in the Turkish historiography) who subjugated the Damascene janissaries. Even
if a few janissary insubordinations recurred, the unrest was ultimately wiped out
with the close cooperation ofH.
ussein Pasha and Nas.¯uh. Pasha.326 Yet, shortly after
suppressing the insubordinations of the Damascene janissaries with assistance of
H.
ussein ibn Janbul¯at., Nas.¯uh. Pasha realized that the forces that were highly strong
and effective under the command of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha were only a small portion
ofH.
ussein Pasha’s extant military forces. And, he explicitly saw thatH.
ussein
Pasha was the potential threat to the very existence of the Empire. For this reason,
he attackedH.
ussein ibn Janbul¯at. in Kilis.327 When Cigalaz¯ade Y¯usuf Sin¯an Pasha
nominatedH.
ussein Pasha for the governorship for Aleppo, Nas.¯uh. Pasha objected on
the grounds that an -am¯ır, according to the law, could not be appointed to a higher
post such as an ey¯alet. It was also probable that the Ottoman government would
not confirm the related order that had been already given.328 Nas.¯uh. Pasha refused
to hand over Aleppo toH.
ussein Pasha. Though Nas.¯uh. Pasha resisted relinquishing
the city, H.
ussein ibn Janbul¯at., after a three-month siege, managed to capture the
city through the intervention of a q¯adi in Aleppo.329
H.
ussein Pasha was able to obtain the city on the condition that he would provide
five-thousand soldiers to Cigalaz¯ade Y¯usuf Sin¯an Pasha and remit a large amount
of gold pieces to the Ottoman administration. Thanks to the supports of Sin¯an
Pasha,H.
ussein Pasha took the city. Not long after,H.
ussein ibn Janbul¯at. was duly
summoned to the Ottoman-Safavid War with his forces – a situation that was a
matter of life or death for the serd¯ar-ı ekrem,330 Sin¯an Pasha. H.
ussein Pasha was
executed in Van for his tardiness at the orders of the serd¯ar, who had already been
vanquished in battle.331
326Rafeq, op.cit., 1516-1517.
327Griswold, op.cit., 94-95.
328Griswold., 95-96.
329Ilgürel, loc. cit.
330The term “serd¯ar” derives from Persian, ser meaning “head” and d¯ar “one who holds or possesses.” It means
a person who is ahead, a leader/head or a guide. Historically, the term was extensively employed by Turks,
but later, the Arabs, moreover, utilized it and they ascribed a military connotation to the term. Serd¯ar-ı
ekrem, only one of the employments of the word “serd¯ar”, was a title bestowed upon a grandvizier by a
sultan himself in the event that the sultan did not lead the army in a war. In this way, the grandvizier held
the title of “commander-in-chief” and had many privileges granted to himself at his disposal: Abdülkadir
Özcan, “Serdar,” TDVIA, vol. 36 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2009): 551-552.
331Rafeq, op.cit., 1517.
76
As soon as the news of his uncle’s death reached Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha, the sanjakbey
of Kilis at the time, seized control of Aleppo and started to extend his zone of
influence into Syria in 1606. The Ottoman administration, considering the internal
and external problems such as wars with Safavids and Habsburgs, and the Jel¯al¯ı
rebellions, elevated Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha to the higher post in ey¯alet of Aleppo. The
Ottoman government failed, however, to supress his rebellion.332
Afterward, ,Al¯ı Pasha would ally himself with Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n, who was the
bitter enemy of -am¯ır Y¯usuf. He attacked his adversary, -am¯ır Y¯usuf ibn Sayf¯a,
an Ottoman governor to the South, and defeated -am¯ır Y¯usuf inH.
am¯a. The allies
exerted their control over the region with their joint military forces and occupied
many areas to the South. ,Al¯ı Pasha laid siege to Tripoli.333 However, after extracting
a large amount of money from -am¯ır Y¯usuf and normalizing the relationships
with him through intermarriage, ,Al¯ı advanced on Aleppo where he would win two
more victories.334
Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha emerged as a very serious threat to the Empire. He declared his
independence soon after the territorial expansion. Firstly, he seized the treasury in
Aleppo and established an army that was almost exactly modeled on the Ottoman
army, being composed of both infantry and cavalry. His acts did not stop there. He
also had his name read in the Friday sermons (also known as khut.bah) and coined
money with his name, all of which indicated his posturing of being a ruler. To add,
he established connections not only with Tuscany, which strove to replace Venice in
the East Mediterranean trade, but also other European states.
Shortly after the Treaty of Zvitsa Torok in 1606, when tasked with putting down
the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions breaking out in many other parts of Anatolia, K.
uyucu Mur¯ad
Pasha advanced on Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha the following year. In Oruç Ovası where
the main conflicts transpired between Mur¯ad Pasha and ,Al¯ı Pasha backed by his
joint ally, Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n, Ottoman forces claimed a decisive victory.335
While ,Al¯ı Pasha firstly fled to Kilis and then Aleppo, Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n ran
away with his forces and later, went to Shaqif fortress. Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha knew
that the only way to be forgiven for what he had done was to go immediately
to Istanbul and apologize to Sultan Ah.med I (r. 1603-1617). Shortly after, the
Ottoman administration promoted him to Temesvar (also known as Tımısvar), in
332Ilgürel, loc. cit.
333Rafeq, op.cit., 1523-1524.
334Ilgürel, loc. cit.
335Ilgürel., 144-145.
77
what is modern-day Romania, as a beylerbeyi. When encountering troubles with
both the janissaries and the local people, he fled to Belgrade. Consequently,K.
uyucu
Mur¯ad Pasha ordered his execution in 1611.336
If you analyze all aspects of the brief account of the Janbul¯at. family that I have
provided thus far, it is self-evident that the insubordination of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha
was fundamentally a non-integration-oriented rebellion. Unlike the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions
whose prime motivations were to be integrated into the Ottoman imperial system,
,Al¯ı Pasha over-eagerly wanted to establish his own state, meaning that his rebellion
was completely disconnected from the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions. He announced his
independence. He created an army modeled after the Ottoman army. He utilized
the khut.bah as a way of declaring his separatism. He stroke coins in his name.337
He also cooperated with Tuscany and made connections with other European countries.
338 That is to say, he refused to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system by
what he had done. This is why, Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha demonstrates a stark contrast
with the Jel¯al¯ıs, meaning that he was absolutely not a Jel¯al¯ı or he could not be a
Jel¯al¯ı.
The main reason why I highlight such a statement is that Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha has
been portrayed as only separatist Jel¯al¯ı and the last Jel¯al¯ı rebel in some master’s
theses particularly by some researchers who have widely ignored the latest secondary
sources but also opted to employ outdated ones in their scholarship.339
336Ilgürel, 145. Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Facts
on File, 2009): 295-296; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu Tarihi, vol. 3-4 (Istanbul:
Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011): 475-477, 59-60; Nicolea Jorga, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu Tarihi, vol. 3 (Istanbul:
Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2009): 356, 358-359; Sinasi Çolakoglu, Kilis Tarihi Üzerine Deneme (Ankara:
Kilis Kültür Dernegi Yayınları, 1995), 23-51; Avukat Kilisli Kadri, Kilis Tarihi (Istanbul: Bürhaneddin
Matbaası, 1932).
337Both practices were the clear manifestations of announcing one’s absolute sovereignty over the common
people, the re,¯ay¯a and they gave a one the right of royal privileges. These practices were not restricted
only to them. In addition, Ot¯ag, t¯ug, davul, the mehter band, sorguç, which were ritual and symbolic
sources of legitimacy were also other royal indications. Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty:
Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800 (London, England: Continuum
UK, 2008): 71-72. As the symbols were of paramount importance in demonstrating one’s imperial
claims and enhancing one’s imperial stature, the rulers of the first Turkish-Islamic states not only gave
great significance to utilizing them but also invariably had recourse to the titulary grants of the Abb¯as¯ıd
caliphs in an attempt to further cement their sovereignty. The Ottomans had inherited the aforesaid
symbols/practices from their predecessors: Ihsan Arslan, “Ilk Türk-Islâm Devletlerinde Hükümdarlık ve
Hakimiyet Sembolleri,” EKEV Akademi Dergisi 51 (2012): 73-92.
338Ilgürel, op.cit., 144.
339To give a specific example, in his master’s thesis entitled “Celali Isyanları Örneginde Canbuladoglu Ali
Pasa Isyanı”, Süleyman Dural insistently specifies that Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha was only a Jel¯al¯ı rebel who
intended to establish an independent state. He also argues that ,Al¯ı Pasha was the last great Jel¯al¯ı.
Dural’s main arguments were probably predicated on Barkey’s arguments, and perhaps rests on an error
in translation of “Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization”. Whereas Karen
Barkey, in her own words, states that “. . . the only Jel¯al¯ı rebel leader who “could be seen” as a potential state
maker was Canbol¯at.oglu ,Al¯ı Pasha of northern Syria. . . ” in her original book, the same sentence is exactly
translated as “. . . the only Jel¯al¯ı leader who had a potential to establish a state was Canbol¯at.oglu ,Al¯ı Pasha
of northern Syria. . . ” in the Turkish translation of her book (the exact equivalent of the latter statement is
the sentence “. . . Devlet kurma potansiyeli tasıyan tek cel¯ali lideri Kuzey Suriyeli Canbol¯at.oglu ,Al¯ı Pasha
78
Based on the primary and secondary sources that I have employed thus far, I suggest
that Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n was equally not a Jel¯al¯ı or he could not be a Jel¯al¯ı.
The pattern that Fakhr al-D¯ın followed was not dissimilar from ,Al¯ı Pasha’s, as I
have previously pointed out in Chapter 3. Judging by Fakhr al-D¯ın’s actions, he
is in sharp contrast with the Jel¯al¯ıs. Just like ,Al¯ı Pasha, Fakhr al-D¯ın actively
collaborated with foreign countries, particularly, Tuscany. Yet, there was one particular
dissimilarity between them. Fakhr al-D¯ın had a long-standing relationship
with Tuscany than his Syrian counterpart, ,Al¯ı Pasha, had. For this reason, just like
the rebellion of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha, we see that the insubordination of Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n also was principally the non-integration-oriented rebellion. What led me
to this conclusion is firstly his ambitious regional anti-Ottoman activities, policies,
and equally significantly, the case of Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha’s rebellion itself. Last but
not least, if we are to position Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n’s rebellion in the broader
framework of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions, we explicitly see that his rebellion
was one of the separatist rebellions that had no ideology, as opposed to the religious
rebellions breaking out in the Early Modern period. In other words, whereas the
religious rebellions not only had ideologies but were also separatist, Fakhr al-D¯ın
ibn Ma,n’s rebellion had no particular ideology compared with other Early Modern
separatist rebellions such as J¯anbird¯ı al-Ghaz¯al¯ı (1521), H¯a-in Ah.med Pasha (1524)
and Janbul¯at. ,Al¯ı Pasha (1606).
idi. . . ”). While Karen Barkey eschews utilizing a definite statement (she employs the modal “could”),
Dural unintentionally utilizes a more certain and misleading statement that derives from the mistake in
the Turkish translation version of the book, a situation that directly affects the extant main arguments
defended: Süleyman Dural, “Celali Isyanları Örneginde Canbuladoglu Ali Pasa Isyanı” (Master’s Thesis,
Mustafa Kemal University, 2011), i, iii-iv, 6, 25-27, 32, 42, 74, 76, 78, 98; Karen Barkey, Bandits and
Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1994), 186; Karen Barkey, Eskıyalar ve Devlet: Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezilesmesi, trans. Zeynep
Altok (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 192. Based on the ongoing researches about the Jel¯al¯ı
rebellions, Oktay Özel emphatically specifies that the Jel¯al¯ı rebellions were a more drawn out phenomenon
than previously accepted. He points out that the last Jel¯al¯ı rebel was Yegen ,Osm¯an Pasha. From
this viewpoint, it could be argued that Barkey misinterprets the last Jel¯al¯ı: Oktay Özel, “The Reign of
Violence,” 191; Similarly, Hüseyin Demirtas, too, makes the same mistake: Hüseyin Demirtas, “Celali
Isyanları ve Canboladoglu Ali Pasa Isyanının Karsılastırılması” (Master’s Thesis, Gaziantep University,
2018), i-ii, 1-2, 70-72, 75-77, 83.
79
Table 4.1 The Genealogy of the Janbul¯at. Family
Note 1: The related table is prepared according to the genealogical chart inserted at the end of
Abdul-Karim Rafeq’s article. Source: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “The Revolt of Ali Pasha,” 1534.
80
5. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
In this investigation, I have endeavoured to probe into the Ma,nids in the context of
approximately hundred and eighty years of relations and struggles (1516-1697) that I
divided into three phases: 1516-1590, 1590-1635 and 1635-1697. With the conquest
of a part of the Middle East in the 1510s, the Ottomans encountered the Druze
people in Southern Syria and Lebanon, one of the most refractory communities
within the empire. The Ottoman administrations strove to disarm the Druze people
who had obtained a large number of muskets from the Venetians, and to collect the
taxes until the end of the 16th century. However, the Druze people overreacted to the
Ottoman domination by persistent rebelling and pursued anti-Ottoman activities
in the region. Consequently, in the first phase of the struggles (1516-1590), the
Ottomans resorted to administrative arrangements and the military interventions
to control the Druze people, who had the close relationships with the Ma,nids in
the region.
The Druze rebellions continued until the last decade of the 17th century. When
Fakhr al-D¯ın ibn Ma,n took over the muqaddamship from his father in 1590, the
relations between the Ottoman administrations and the Ma,nids started to take
a different form. The Ottoman administrations began to deal with local figures
instead of communities. Fakhr al-D¯ın followed a conciliatory policy with Ottoman
dignitaries and found a place for himself within the Ottoman administrative system
as a sanjak-bey. Moreover, he became part of the iltiz¯am system through the iltiz¯am
contracts, which enabled him to achieve his regional policies to a certain extent.
On the other hand, Ottoman administrations pragmatically cooperated with him
through the iltiz¯am, for they aimed to collect taxes and to further establish their
control over the periphery. That Fakhr al-D¯ın abused his position and cooperated
with Tuscany makes him a non-integration-oriented rebel instead of a Jel¯al¯ı. The
Ottoman administrations captured Fakhr al-D¯ın later and executed him in 1635. His
elimination signified the termination of the second phase of these struggles (1590-
1635).
81
After Fakhr al-D¯ın’s death, the Ottoman administrations maintained their pragmatic
policies towards the Ma,nids between 1635 and 1697. The center furnished
Mulhim Ma,n and Ah.mad Ma,n with tax-farms, demonstrating that pattern of the
relations did not change. However, the anti-Ottoman policies of Ah.mad Ma,n led
Istanbul to prefer to cooperate with the Shih¯ab dynasty. The shift from the Ma,nids
to the Shih¯abs demonstrates that the Ottoman administrations carried out policies
in a realistic way to protect their regional interests. It also signifies that the termination
of the third phase of these struggles (1635-1697).
The Ottoman primary sources indicate that the Ottoman administrations perceived
the Druze people as heretics. It can be argued that orthodox and heterodox doctrines
had a considerable effect on the relations between the Ottoman administrations and
the Druzes. However, unless the Druzes did not rebel against the Ottoman administrations,
the differences in the religious principles did not hold the Ottoman
administrations back from pursuing the pragmatic policies against the Druzes. Last
but not least, the Ma,nids and their local activities demonstrates that the Ottoman
Empire did not have a strict control over Southern Syria and Lebanon unlike Anatolia
and Balkans, which constituted the core lands of the Empire. Therefore, Istanbul
resorted to control mechanisms and strategic maneuvers to solidify its control over
the periphery. The Ottoman Empire was considerably accomplished in handling
rebellions and peripheral elements, as it was the case of the Ma,nids.
82
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