ANADOLU SELÇUKLU DEVLETİ: 549

The Islamization of Turkish Nationalism in Cold War

“The Islamization of Turkish Nationalism in Cold War Turkey, ABCD–ABF6”
Muhammed Baykal, Master’s Candidate at the Atatü rk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 5655
Professor M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Thesis Advisor
This thesis explores the relationship between the far-right Turkish nationalism
and Islam between ABCD, when Alparslan Türkeş entered multiparty
politics, and ABF6, when the coup d’état which subsequently led to
the closing of his political party took place. The main question that drives
this work is, how has the far–right Turkish nationalism, which included a
signi1icant, if not dominant presence of secular nationalists in ABCD,
turned into an ideology that championed the Turkish-Islamic synthesis
as of ABF6? The convergences, divergences and exchanges between nationalism
and Islamism are presented within an intellectual history
framework. A variety of primary sources, such as nationalist political
magazines, memoires, books, and election campaign materials were
used. Three overarching arguments are reached by their analysis. First,
Islamic themes have been increasingly abundant in nationalist ideology;
a signi1icantly Islamized nationalism, especially among the youth has
come into existence as the dominant strand in far-right by ABF6. Second,
the Turkish-Islamic synthesis has had an uneasy nature despite nationalists’
attempts to reconcile the two, causing constant tension. Third, Tü -
rkeş’s approach to religion was an instrumentalist one; the main function
of Islam in his ideology was as a source of high morality, which he considered
necessary for national development.
5b,666 words
vii
ODzet
“Soğuk Savaş Türkiyesinde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin IYslamlaşması,

Boğaziçi U^ niversitesi Atatü rk IYlkeleri ve IYnkılap Tarihi Enstitü sü
Profesö r M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Tez Danışmanı
Bu tez, Alparslan Türkeş'in çok partili siyasete girdiği ABCD yılı ile partisinin
kapatılmasına yol açan darbenin gerçekleştiği ABF6 yılları arasında
uç sağ Türk milliyetçiliği ile IYslam arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir.
Çalışma, “ABCD'te baskın olmasa bile kaydadeğer bir seküler milliyetçi
grubu barındıran uç sağ Türk milliyetçiliği, ABF6'den itibaren nasıl Türk-
IYslam sentezini savunan bir ideolojiye dönüşmüştür?” sorusunun etrafında
şekillenmektedir. Milliyetçilik ve IYslamcılık arasındaki ortaklıklar,
ayrılıklar ve değişimler entelektüel tarih çerçevesi içinde sunulmaktadır.
Milliyetçi siyasi dergiler, hatıralar, kitaplar ve seçim kampanyası materyalleri
gibi çeşitli birincil kaynaklar kullanılmıştır. Bu materyalin analizi
tezin bü tününde işlenen üç argümanı ortaya çıkarmaktadır. IYlk olarak, IYslami
temalar milliyetçi ideolojide giderek artmış; ABF6'e gelindiğinde
özellikle gençler arasında önemli ölçüde IYslamlaşmış bir milliyetçilik uç
sağda baskın kol olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. IYkinci olarak, Tü rk-IYslam sentezi,
milliyetçilerin bu ikisini uzlaştırma girişimlerine rağmen gerilim arz
eden bir yapıya sahip olmuş, bu da sü rekli uyuşmazlıklar doğurmuştur.
U^çü ncü olarak, Türkeş'in dine yaklaşımının araçsal olduğ u ve IYslam'ın
onun ideolojisindeki ana işlevinin, ulusal kalkınma için zorunlu bir unsur
saydığ ı yü ksek ahlaka kaynaklık etmek olduğu gözlenmiştir.
5b.666 kelime

7 CONCLUSION <2
BIBLIOGRAPHY <>
xii
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AP Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
CKMP Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Milliet Partisi (Republican Peasant
Nation Party)
MBK Millı̂ Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee)
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MNP Millı̂ Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MSP Millı̂ Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
MTTB Milli Tü rk Talebe Birliğ i (National Union of Turkish Students)
TU^ GD Turkey Idealist Youth Magazine (Tü rkiye U^ lkü cü
Gençlik Dergisi)
xiv
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Acknowledgements
This thesis has been written in exceptionally challenging times, and the
fact that it is now completed is thanks to so many people supporting me
over the years. My advisor Asım Karaömerlioğlu has been the one who
enabled this project in the 1irst place by agreeing to the role. His feedback
on drafts and outlines were detailed, helpful and exemplary, in the sense
that it is the sort of guidance I hope to provide my students when the day
comes. Finally, his tolerance and understanding during personally challenging
times for me were crucial for the completion of this thesis. IYlker
Aytü rk, whose mentorship has nurtured my academic curiosity and
shaped my research interests, has been the source of inspiration for this
project as well. His habit of pointing to gaps in the literature that were in
thesis/dissertation-sizes during his undergraduate courses gave me a lot
of research ideas. In this case, what started as an attempt to trace and
make sense of the changes in Dokuz Işık grew into this thesis. Additionally,
the unlimited access he graciously granted me to his personal library
allowed me to reach many of the primary documents that make up the
backbone of this thesis very easily. Ramazan Hakkı O^ztan agreed to be a
part of the jury in an unusually short notice and provided highly useful
suggestions that helped me improve the text, for both of which I am grateful.
There is so many people to thank within our beloved Institute. First, I
should thank the three people who facilitate everything for us, institute
secretaries Dilek Tecirli, Kadriye Tamtekin and institute staff Leyla Kılıç,
they are the trio that keep the ATA operation running smoothly. Tracy
Maria Lord provided extensive commentaries and suggestions throughout
the early phases of this work and made sure I knew that she was always
available for feedback on the text. Her constant support and encouragement
enabled me to meet some initial deadlines, make progress and
stay optimistic.
Although not directly related to this thesis, I would like to mention
some fond memories of classes at the Institute. Umut Türem’s sociology
and political economy classes were among the most enjoyable for me,
xvi
serving as a way of connecting with my social sciences past in an humanities
environment. Cengiz Kırlı’s lecture on historiography was comprised
of the type of re1ined narrative that I keep 1inding myself remembering
in admiration. If any basis-forming course could be judged
substantial and lasting, it would be his. Şevket Pamuk’s and Zafer Toprak’s
classes were ones I felt very lucky to attend. Irmak Ertör ran to the
aid of thesis students almost as soon as arriving at Institute, I believe the
workshops she chaired have been bene1icial to all. Asım Karaömerlioğlu’s
course on historical generations has been an unusual, outside-the-box exercise
in macro-level and interdisciplinary thinking that one would not
1ind often. It was, in a way, the bleeding edge of social sciences.
The support of my friends proved invaluable during the last few years.
Our conversations with Doruk clari1ied my mind more than anything
else, I hope to have picked up something from his sharp thinking, which
has always helped me put things in perspective. Orhun and Necati have
been by my side since over a decade now, and our constant exchanges on
any issue feel like we are going through daily life as a virtual triad. My
dear friends from my Bilkent years, Gözde, Gizem and Şimal have also
been of great support, especially when Bilkent nostalgia felt intense in
Istanbul. With my peers at the Ataturk Institute, namely, Batıkan, IYsmail,
Hü lya, Çağatay, Batuhan and Burak, we founded a thesis support group in
the form of a WhatsApp gathering. I think mutual encouragement and
support, especially during the challenges of the pandemic, have played a
signi1icant role in us completing the theses one by one. Finally, I would
like to thank Kelsilyn, whose companionship has helped me stay a1loat
over the last A6 months.
This thesis and my master’s studies at the Atatü rk Institute have been
supported 1inancially by the TÜBİTAK 3344 Yurt İçi Lisansüstü Burs Programı.
Thanks to their generous support, I could focus on my studies
without any 1inancial worries.
Lastly and most importantly, everything I can achieve academically is
thanks to the sacri1ices of two women over the last 5C years and beyond,
my mother IYnci and my grandmother Lut1iye, to whom this work is dedicated.
Their love and support are my greatest fortunes in life.
xvii
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… in so many ways, the story I am about to tell is
about time. And it is about time this story was
told.
– Flick Mcvicker, Bojack Horseman, Season b,
Episode A5
I got into this business because I love stories. They
comfort us, they inspire us, they create a context
for how we experience the world.
– Princess Carolyn, Bojack Horseman, Season b,
Episode A5
A
!
Introduction
n 56 February 56AF, ahead of the general elections in June, the Justice
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and the
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) formed the Public Alliance
(Cumhur IYttifakı), which represented both the marriage between
Turkism/far-right Turkish nationalism and Islamism, and the triumph of
the far-right over the disappearing center-right. Even before the alliance,
an intense discourse based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis dominated
the public sphere.
It has been about a decade that the students of Turkish politics are
wondering about the downfall of the center-right. The demise of the center-
right is a C6-year-old story, when the far-right movements started to
gain ground in the Cold War atmosphere of anticommunism. This thesis
sheds light on the initial phase between ABCD-ABF6, during which the
Turkish far-right entered multiparty politics and rose in popularity. More
speci1ically, the thesis focuses on the Idealist Movement (U^ lkü cü Hareket),
its political party, the MHP, and their relationship with Islam,
which included a constant, tense negotiation and reconciliation. It focuses
on this relationship chie1ly on the ideological level, while also discussing
practical relations between the two groups.
O
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
5
To a certain extent, the thesis provides an exploration of the intellectual
and social roots of today’s Cumhur İttifakı, as contemporary politicians
formed their political consciousness in the ABC6s and ABt6s.1 To exemplify,
former speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, IYsmail
Kahraman, was the president of the largest student organization -a hotbed
of Islamism and to a lesser extent nationalism at the time- Millı ̂ Tü rk
Talebe Birliğ i (MTTB) between ABCt–CB, and the current president of the
Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the head of cultural activities
in the same organization in the early ABt6s. Examples could be increased,
with the common point being that they formed their political belief
systems in an era of rising Islamism and nationalism in response to
an intellectually and at times politically dominant left. Although
Kahraman and Erdoğan speci1ically were not members of the MHP, the
wider current of Turkish-Islamic synthesis and its in1luence went beyond
the con1ines of one political party.
In ABCD, the Turkish nationalist leader Alparslan Türkeş published his
manifesto Dokuz Işık (Nine Lights), a brief description of the nine principles
that were to guide the nationalist movement. Among them was the
principle of Moralism (ahlakçılık), on which he noted: “Turkish morality
will be in line with Turkish traditions, Turkish spirit and the beliefs of the
Turkish nation.”2 In the Moralism section, as well as the rest of the manifesto,
Tü rkeş was not inclined to make references to religion. However,
by the end of the ABt6s, Dokuz Işık, originally a booklet of about 56 pages,
was enlarged to over several hundred pages and held lengthy praises of
Islam. What was initially an acceptance of the ‘reality of religion’ without
a mention of Islam transformed into the inclusion of religion as a de1ining
characteristic of the Turkish nation and the declaration of nationalism
1 This last point is also observed in Alp Yenen, “Legitimate Means of Dying: Contentious
Politics of Martyrdom in the Turkish Civil War (EFGH–EFHJ),” Behemoth EJ, no. E (JNEF):
EO.
2 “… Tü rk ahlâ kı Tü rk geleneklerine, Tü rk ruhuna, Tü rk Milletinin inançlarına uygun
olacaktır.” Alparslan Tü rkeş, Dokuz Işık (IXstanbul: C.K.M.P. Eminönü IXlçesi, EFG[), O.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
q
and Islam as inseparable.3 How has the far–right Turkish nationalism,
which included a signi1icant, if not dominant presence of secular nationalists
in ABCD, turned into an ideology that championed the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis as of ABF6?4 This thesis presents a story of this change,
the uneasy nature of the marriage between nationalism and Islam, and
the nationalists’ attempts to reconcile the two.
§ #.# Literature Survey
As recognized in many of the studies discussed below, research on Turkish
nationalism in the period ABbD-ABF6 is scarce. A thorough analysis of
the MHP brand of nationalism and its Islamization hardly exists. Although
various authors discuss the Islamization of Turkish nationalism in
considerable detail, an analysis based on a close reading of primary
sources of the evolution of Turkish nationalism and its relationship with
the Islamic right between ABCD–ABF6 is not available in the literature. The
convergences, divergences and intellectual exchanges between nationalists
and Islamists are not adequately explored, which is a gap that this
thesis will address.
Aytü rk explains the absence of research in this 1ield primarily by two
biases on behalf of researchers: 1irst, nationalism in general and Turkish
nationalism in particular are not warranted theoretical signi1icance, they
3 Alparslan Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, Genişletilmiş Birinci Baskı (IXstanbul: O` zdem
Kardeşler Matbaası, EF[H), FN, JEG.
4 It should be noted that by the end of the EF[Ns, the Idealists were speaking of the “Tü rk-
IXslam U` lkü sü ” (Turkish-Islamic Ideal) and not a synthesis. The argument was that synthesis
would be between opposites, while Turkishness and Islam were inseparable and
in perfect harmony. Throughout this thesis, I used “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” as an analytical
label to refer to this ideology, this was not how far-right nationalists named their
own stance. See Ali Erken, “Ideological Construction of the Politics of Nationalism in
Turkey: The Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), EFGO–EFHN,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics
JN, no. J (April i, JNEj): JEJ, https://doi.org/EN.ENHN/EiOi[EEi.JNEj.FNFEOF.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
b
are considered “mere rhetoric.”5 Second, Turkish nationalism is considered
to have matured before ABbb6; the theoretical debates of the following
decades were of little political and social consequence, if any.7 However,
Turkish nationalist thought in Cold War Turkey offers a rich
intellectual debate, mainly around the question of Islam.8
In addition to these biases, a preoccupation with the Early Republican
Era on behalf of scholars caused a neglect of the post-WWII period.9 Following
the coup d’état of ABF6, a generation of scholars started reevaluating
the legacy of the Early Republican Era.10 In a way, the social scientists
studying Turkey experienced a ‘cognitive dissonance’ in the early
ABF6s. The existing literature on the Early Republican Era at the time was
hardly critical, and the actions of the ‘Kemalist’ military government did
not align with the favorable picture of Kemalism painted in the literature.
This thesis is the product of a similar ‘cognitive dissonance’ that I experienced
in my early formative years, of being stuck between a supposedly
democratic but increasingly authoritarian movement on the one hand
and scholarship that dates the problems of the Turkish democracy
merely to the Early Republican Era on the other hand. Although this thesis
does not focus on authoritarianism, its starting point has been the
premise that more can be explored about the Turkish democracy and its
shortcomings by studying the period ABbD–ABF6.
The in1luence of Islam on Turkish nationalism remains a topic of ongoing
debate, with some stretching the Islamic in1luence further back
5 IXlker Aytü rk, “Nationalism and Islam in Cold War Turkey, EFjj–GF,” Middle Eastern Studies
ON, no. O (September i, JNEj): GFO, https://doi.org/EN.ENHN/NNJGiJNG.JNEj.FEEE[[.
6 The date refers to the rupture between Kemalists and Turkists following the Racism-
Turanism trials, see Aytü rk, GFO.
7 Aytü rk, GFO.
8 Aytü rk, GFO–FG.
9 IXlker Aytü rk, “Post-Post Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmayı Beklerken,” Birikim, Kasım
JNEO. Aytürk mentions the period EFNH–EFjO as over-studied, though the term Early Republican
Era can be understood as referring to the period EFJi–EFjO, with the latter date
marking the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Turkey.
10 Aytü rk, iO.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
D
than others. In the academic literature, Islam is considered predominantly
as part of Turkish nationalism. Scholars disagree on when the synthesis
between the two started, providing various dates from the ABth
century to even A6th century, in the case of nationalist authors.11 Studies
focusing on the development of Turkish nationalism in general, as opposed
to only the MHP and a Turkist brand of nationalism, tend to trace
the emergence of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis further back, even before
the ABD6s. In opposition, Aytü rk argues that Kemalism and Turanism,
which are two large brands of Turkish nationalism, were devoid of any
signi1icant emphasis on Islam, and the “1irst generation” Turkish nationalists
(AB6F–ABbb) were not religious individuals.12 This thesis con1irms
the latter approach, illustrating that tensions between nationalism and
Islam continued between ABCD–F6.
Scholars agree that between ABCD–CB, there was a rapprochement between
Islam and nationalism, in part due to their common struggle
against communism. In most studies, authors assert that the rapprochement
was a pragmatic move on behalf of Türkeş, carried out to appeal to
a wider electorate. Additionally, scholars agree that the rapprochement
gained momentum in the ABt6s. While the rapprochement with Islam and
its increased pace during the ABt6s are generally agreed upon, disagreements
are based on exactly when this Islamization started, and the extent
of this process in the decades after ABCD. When can one speak of an ‘Islamized’
Turkish nationalism? The late ABt6s or ABF6s? How signi1icant
was the Islamic in1luence? Scholars disagree on whether one can speak
of an Islamization of Turkish nationalism in the ABt6s. While some argue
that the MHP went through Islamization in the ABt6s, others maintain
that until the ABF6s, Islam remained merely on the surface, and was only
truly internalized in the ABF6s by the Idealists. The parties responsible
for the Islamic turn are also debated. Was it Türkeş and the top-down
insertion of religion into the party or was it a bottom-up process which
11 Aytü rk, “Nationalism and Islam in Cold War Turkey, EFjj–GF,” [EJ.
12 Aytü rk, GFi–Fj.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
C
unfolded as the movement widened its base to the religiously oriented
youth from the rural periphery? Some scholars adopt a relatively deterministic
approach by considering the religious shift an inevitable consequence
of either the nationalist struggle against communism or demographic
change and urban migration. Others assert that it was a
calculated attempt on behalf of the party leadership, to appeal to the
Turkish electorate who favored religious themes. Finally, what was the
role of the ascending international Islamist movement? The answers differ,
with varying emphases on the agency of the party leadership and
young nationalists, as well as structural in1luences.
In one of the 1irst studies on the MHP, Landau recognizes a gradual
shift toward Islam which took place despite the absence of a consensus
among the party elite regarding the role of Islam in the MHP.13 Although
occasional references to Islam were made in campaign documents for the
senate elections of ABCC and ABCF, the year ABCB was the breaking point in
the sense that efforts to incorporate Islam into the MHP ideology intensi
1ied and many of Türkeş’s associates left the party in response.14 Landau
cites two reasons for Türkeş’s rapprochement with Islam. First, Islamists
within the party may have pushed Türkeş to a more favorable
position regarding religion.15 Second, he states that in competition with
the TIYP (Labor Party of Turkey) and CKMP (Republican Peasant Nation
Party), conservative parties were dragged into a nationalist rhetoric and
contested the rural voters who were “religiously oriented,” which in turn
may have pulled the CKMP/MHP toward Islam.16
In their introduction to the study analyzing the Idealist Movement
from the coup d’état of ABF6 to ABB6s, Bora and Can discuss the preceding
decades of the MHP. It is noted that nationalism in the two decades preceding
the coup d’état was best characterized by its reaction to the left,
13 Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, Social, Economic and Political Studies
of the Middle East Ej (Leiden: E. J. Brill, EF[j), JGH.
14 Landau, JiE–iJ, JG[–GH, J[i.
15 Landau, JiJ.
16 Landau, JFN.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
t
which was anti-communism.17 As nearly all studies on the MHP do, they
also cite the change of attitude toward Islam in the second half of the
ABC6s.18 Not merely was Islam used to achieve mass appeal, but it was
ideologically instrumentalized as well: Islam was adding strength to
Turkishness and as such it was of secondary importance.19 However, they
add that it would be a “hasty decision” to speak of an Islamization of the
MHP in the ABt6s.20 According to the authors, Islamization remained super
1icial in the ABt6s and Islam in1iltrated the essence of the Idealist
thought only after ABF6.21
Bora and Can consider the importance of doctrine in the MHP base to
be minimal. The Dokuz Işık doctrine is described as synthetic, in the sense
that it was not based on a grassroots ideology but resembled the vision
of the “ruling elite,” with its “authoritarian-statist” themes.22 Accordingly,
all the doctrine could achieve was to contribute to Türkeş’s charisma, by
serving as the proof that he knew the path to development for Turkey.23
Mustafa Çalık’s 1ield study (ABBA), which included interviews with former
MHP members reach the same conclusion: out of AAb people interviewed,
everybody replied they read Tü rkeş’s books, when asked about their favorite
author and book, nobody mentioned Türkeş or any of his books,
Sevinç, Atsız and Serdengeçti made up the top three.24
In a separate study that explores the intertwined character of nationalism,
conservatism and Islamism, Bora notes that in the ABC6s, Turkism
17 Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: GH Eylül’den GKKL’lara Ülkücü Hareket
(IXstanbul: IXletişim Yayınları, EFFE), jG–j[.
18 Bora and Can, jO.
19 Bora and Can, jO.
20 Bora and Can, Hi n. EF.
21 Bora and Can, Jji.
22 Bora and Can, Gj–GO.
23 Bora and Can, GO.
24 Mustafa Çalık, “Siyası̂ Kü ltü r ve Sosyolojinin Bazı Kavramları Açısından MHP Hareketi’nin
Kaynakları ve Gelişimi” (Ankara, Ankara U` niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitü
sü Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Anabilim Dalı, EFFE), HE.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
F
gradually moved to a secondary position in the MHP ideology, while a nationalist-
conservative position grew dominant.25 A nationalist-conservative
rhetoric, which included the reconciliation of Islam and Turkish nationalism,
tied the MHP to the center-right and consequently, to the
masses.26 Additionally, the move of Islamism toward Turkism should be
examined as well as that of Turkism toward Islamism, an analysis of
which illustrates a series of efforts on behalf of Islamists to incorporate
nationalism.27
In a study on Millı̂ Tü rk Talebe Birliğ i (National Turkish Union of Students),
Okutan explores the transformation of the Union from its foundation
in ABAC to ABF6 within the framework of conservatism. Although the
MTTB shifted from nationalism to Islamism over time as implied in the
title (“Bozkurt’tan Kur’an’a” – from the Grey Wolf to the Qur’an), conservative
overtones were present from the very beginning in AB5B.28
Okutan mentions that a Turkish-Islamic synthesis was being debated
as early as ABb6s.29 In the ABC6s, nationalist and Islamist circles found
themselves in convergence, thanks to a united effort against the perceived
danger of communism.30 Tü rkeş’s CKMP/MHP attempted to unite
the right on the basis of a nationalist-conservative ideology, calculating
that the bene1its of gaining the support of religiously-oriented masses
would outweigh the costs of alienating secular-minded Pan-Turkists.31 In
the ABt6s, efforts to win the conservative vote intensi1ied, to the extent
that even Necip Fazıl, a prominent Islamist, praised the MHP.32 Okutan
25 Tanıl Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hâli: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslâmcılık (IXstanbul: Birikim
Yayınları, EFFH), EJH.
26 Bora, EJF.
27 Bora, EJF–jO.
28 Although the Union is founded in EFEG, it remained limited in activity until EFJF. M.
Çağatay Okutan, Bozkurt’tan Kuran’a Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) GKGW-GKXL (IXstanbul:
IXstanbul Bilgi U` niversitesi Yayınları, JNNj), JO.
29 Okutan, EJJ.
30 Okutan, EGO.
31 Okutan, Ejj, EGO, EFH.
32 Okutan, EFH.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
B
notes that this effort had limited success, as Islamic organizations, which
proliferated in the ABC6s, remained distant to the MHP and the AP (Adalet
Partisi) attained the Islamist support, at least initially.33 Later, in the
ABt6s, the MHP’s rapprochement with Islam created con1lict with the MSP
(Millı̂ Selamet Partisi), which occasionally involved violence.34 By the end
of ABt6s, Islamism established itself as a separate and independent movement,
which was even more dominant on the Turkish right than nationalism.
35 Parallel to these developments, an “ideological rupture” occurred
in the MTTB, as the leadership of the Union was won by conservatives in
ABCB, causing a split between the MTTB and the Idealists.36 In ABtD, MTTB
changed its symbol, replacing the Grey Wolf with a book, which referred
to the Quran,37 marking a further split with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis,
and a move toward Islamism.
Koyuncu-Lorasdağ ı argues there were three reasons behind the rapprochement
of Turkish nationalism and Islam between ABbD–ABF6, which
are the importance of Islam for personal identity that was neglected in
the Early Republican Period, political liberalization, and anti-communism.
38 Some authors consider anti-communism a bigger factor, however.
Okutan mentions that Islam was seen as the “antidote” to communism.
39 Agreeing with other authors that the Islamic turn was a
pragmatic move, Yaşlı adds that Turkism alone was not “enough for a war
33 Okutan, EGG.
34 Okutan, EFH.
35 Okutan, EFH-F.
36 Okutan, JNN.
37 Okutan, EFj.
38 Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdağ ı, “On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey:
Sources and Discourses,” in Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey,
ed. Ayşe Kadıoğlu and E. Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, JNEE),
EjG.
39 Okutan, Bozkurt’tan Kuran’a Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) GKGW-GKXL, EOi.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
A6
against communism.”40 Thus, the Islamization of the movement should
be understood as part of the struggle against communism.41 On the other
hand, Erken downplays Tü rkeş’s agency in this process, and attributes
the Islamic turn in the MHP and the subsequent departure of many associates
of Tü rkeş between ABCt–ABtA to the generational con1lict within the
party, which refers to the increasingly visible Islamic leanings of the new
generation.42
The in1luence of Aydınlar Ocağ ı (Intellectuals’ Hearth) in creating and
dispersing the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is a recurrent point of emphasis
in the literature. Aydınlar Ocağı, which was initially named Aydınlar
Klübü (Intellectuals’ Club), had brought together conservative intellectuals,
who in1luenced the Idealist youth.43 In need of arguments in their ideological
confrontation with the socialist left, the Idealist youth turned to
the writings of these intellectuals.44 Koyuncu-Lorasdağı emphasizes the
signi1icance of the organization, describing it as “the most striking attempt
to reconcile Islam and Turkish nationalism” that instilled in the
Turkish-Islamic synthesis “an institutional ground”.45 Taşkın documents
intellectual efforts of the nationalist-conservative elite against the left,
and underlines the special role of the founder of the Intellectuals’ Hearth,
historian IYbrahim Kafesoğlu, who strived to unite nationalist historians
40 Fatih Yaşlı, Kinimiz Dinimizdir: Türkçü Faşizm Üzerine Bir İnceleme (IXstanbul: Yordam
Kitap, JNEj), JEG–EF, EBSCOhost; Fatih Yaşlı, Türkçü Faşizmden “Türk-İslam Ülküsü”ne (IXstanbul:
Yordam Kitap, JNEG), Eji–jj, EBSCOhost; Fatih Yaşlı, Antikomünizm, Ülkücü Hareket,
Türkeş: Türkiye ve Soğuk Savaş (IXstanbul: Yordam Kitap, JNEF), iiO–iG.
41 Yaşlı, Tü rkçü Faşizmden “Tü rk-IXslam U` lkü sü ”ne, EjF–ON, EGF.
42 Ali Erken, “The Construction of Nationalist Politics in Turkey: The MHP: EFGO-EFHN” (PhD
diss., Oxford University, JNEi), Fj, Jjj; Erken, “Ideological Construction of the Politics of
Nationalism in Turkey: The Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), EFGO–EFHN,” JNN–JNj; JEj–
EO.
43 Erken, “The Construction of Nationalist Politics in Turkey: The MHP: EFGO-EFHN,” HN–Hi.
44 Erken, HJ.
45 Koyuncu-Lorasdağ ı, “On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey: Sources and
Discourses,” EjG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
AA
and instill in the state elite their version of a national history.46 Finally,
Uzer attributes the emergence of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis directly
to the Intellectuals’ Hearth, while also pointing out that the synthesis was
hardly straightforward: nationalist intellectuals “were confused about
the relative importance of Islam and Turkishness in the makeup of contemporary
Turkish identity.”47
It should be noted that although discussions and theorizations were
going on among the right-wing elite about Islam and Turkishness, Brockett
(56AA) demonstrates that a “Muslim national identity” was already established
among the public by mid-ABD6s, thanks to provincial newspapers.
48 In his words, “formulated by intellectuals in the ABC6s and ABt6s,
the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was a re1lection of a reality that became
all too apparent between ABbD–ABDb.”49 It can be argued that a social base
that would be susceptible to vote for the far-right parties was already
present by the mid-ABD6s. We can, however, trace the popularization of a
religious national identity at the national level and press, the appearance
of political parties that centered their discourse on this identity, and the
domination of Turkish nationalism by a religious-national identity to the
decades after the ABD6s. In a way, although the seeds were sown long before,
the movement of this identity to the center of Turkish politics took
time, and ABCD–ABF6 was a tumultuous period in terms of the spread of
this identity.
The following commonalities emerge from the present literature.
First, the anticommunism wave and its effect on the crystallization of a
46 Yü ksel Taşkın, Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijansiya: Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme
Karşıtlığına (IXstanbul: IXletişim Yayınları, JNN[), EiO–iG.
47 Umut Uzer, “The Genealogy of Turkish Nationalism: From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative
Nationalism in Turkey,” in Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey,
ed. Ayşe Kadıoğlu and E. Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, JNEE),
EJj, EJG–J[.
48 Gavin D. Brockett, How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk: Provincial Newspapers and the Negotiation
of a Muslim National Identity, Modern Middle East Series JG (Austin: University
of Texas Press, JNEE).
49 Brockett, JJi.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
A5
religious nationalism is agreed upon. Second, there is consensus that initially
Türkeş and his early associates from the military did not have in
mind a signi1icant place for religion in their ideology or policy plans. Tü-
rkeş adopted a different tone and path in the second half of the ABC6s,
which led to a series of break-ups between himself and ex-of1icers around
him from the MBK (Milli Birlik Komitesi). Additionally, an intensi1ication
of Islamic themes, particularly among the Idealist youth is noted, as well
as the contribution of the increasing political violence to this change.
However, an analysis of the Islamic-nationalist discourse that originated
from this young base is missing in the literature. Although the writings of
right-wing academics and ideologues are treated in some detail, how
these ideologies manifested themselves in the political base is not analyzed
substantially, even though Idealist youth had numerous publications
of their own. It is also at this part that this thesis will 1ill a gap.
Assessing the relative weights of agents responsible for said Islamization
has proved much more dif1icult for social scientists than pointing
to its existence and contours. If citing anticommunism as the sole or primary
reason for Islamization is at the one end of the spectrum of perspectives,
attributing it mainly to the new generation of nationalists who
are assumed to be intrinsically religious, is at the other. Factors touched
upon in-between are the calculations and pragmatic moves on behalf of
Tü rkeş, the need for the MHP to contest the far-right vote against the
MNP/MSP and internationally ascending Islamist movements. The conclusions
of this thesis on the issue of causality have been equally inconclusive
as the overall disagreement in the literature. Additionally, the issue
of the place of Islam in Turkish nationalism in general -as opposed to
the far-right branch- has proven controversial; there is no consensus on
since when the two have been in harmony, or where it originated from.
The following chapters, for their part, illustrate that tension has been a
constant in the Islam-nationalism relationship, even at their most harmonious
point in the period covered.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
Aq
§ J.L Methodology
The thesis rests on a variety of primary sources, most of which have not
been analyzed in detail in the academic literature. These include Alparslan
Türkeş’s own publications, most notably different editions of his
Dokuz Işık, his speeches; far-right nationalist magazines that were
aligned with the MHP, mainly Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi (Turkish Idealist
Youth Magazine, TU^GD) (ABt6-ABtA), Ülkücü Kadro (Idealist Cadre)
(ABtC-ABtt) and Birliğe Çağrı (Call to Unity) (ABtB-ABF6), the timelines of
which were useful to illustrate the changes and continuities; memoirs of
Idealists and party members, minutes of party congresses for the
CKMP/MHP, election manifestos and campaign material of the party and
its candidates, as well as their campaign speeches. The use of secondary
sources is limited to works of intellectual and political history as well as
political science that cover the Nationalist Action Party, which include
relatively recent PhD dissertations as well. The thesis itself reads like a
work of intellectual history and to a lesser extent political history. I have
touched upon the social underpinnings of ideological changes and rifts
where it seemed apt to do so, yet not so frequently to qualify it as borrowing
from social history.
§ J.M Organization of chapters
The second chapter is comprised of an overall presentation of the MHP
brand of nationalism, the emotional environment it has born out of and
its relationship with Islam, as well as the secular-conservative break-up
within the movement. Dokuz Işık is especially analyzed at length, the
changes in which are key to understand Islamization in general. Third
chapter investigates the convergences between Islamism and nationalism
in greater detail. The criticism of Early Republican Era, rising anti-
Semitism, the approach to women’s rights and the MHP stance on public
policy areas are documented in this section. The magazine Birliğe Çağrı
is used as an example of the most Islamized form of far-right nationalism
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
Ab
by ABF6. In the fourth chapter, divergences between Islamism and nationalism
are covered, which includes the debates on Tü rkeş and racism. Policy
areas are once more covered to illustrate differences. Finally, the
chapter brie1ly lists some physical altercations between the two groups.
AD
"
MHP and Islam: an Overview
§ L.J Center-right / Far-right: deRinitions
Before moving on to discuss the details of the MHP’s brand of nationalism,
which is referred to throughout this thesis as “far-right,” I should
1irst specify what is meant by this label, as “far-right” is not how nationalists
de1ined themselves. If anything, an archetypical member of the
MHP in the ABt6s, who is well versed in Idealist discourse, would 1ind the
charge of “far-right” offensive. They would argue that they are neither left
nor right, and that they are supporting the authentic order of the Turks.
In my effort to de1ine the far-right, I will 1irst discuss the center-right that
it positions itself in contrast to.
Mert’s (566t) treatment of the Turkish center-right,1 whose academic
popularity as subject of inquiry has fared well behind its political success,
is especially useful to make sense of and situate the far-right as well. According
to Mert, both in Turkey and elsewhere center-right is characterized
by two elements: “liberal economic policies” and “traditional-religious
symbols.”2 In a way, modernization, a process that was novel to the
population, was being implemented in a non-threatening way, wrapped
1 Nuray Mert, Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi (IXstanbul: Selis Kitaplar, JNN[).
2 Mert, EE, JN, iG.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
AC
in popular values.3 Mert implies that for the Turkish center-right, liberal
economic policies were the primary element, and that in the ABt6s they
had to resort to the nationalist and religious discourse of the far-right out
of necessity:
The out1low of right-wing politics beyond the center-right has
caused great problems for center-right politics. The center-right,
which had to formulate policies to establish economic, political,
and social stability, could not act according to intense nationalist
and religious sentiments. However, it could not turn its back on
these sentiments either, as Turkey did not yet have a liberal, urban,
moderate social base that would keep the center-right alive.
Thus, the supporter bases of the center-right and far-right parties
were not that far away from each other. To a large extent, centerright
parties still had to construct their discourse on the cultural
reactions that have developed since the early years of the Republic.
4
Mert points to two premises that are worth underlining for our purposes.
First, the primacy of economic liberalism for the center-right is
emphasized. Although the center-right is committed to preserving national-
religious symbols that are deeply rooted in society, it is not inclined
to constantly rally around these values unless their emphasis
proves crucial to its electoral success. Second, what follows this reasoning
is that the far-right ideologies are based on the primacy of “cultural
3 Mert, EE, JN.
4 “Sağ siyasetin merkezin dışına taşması, Tü rkiye'de merkez sağ politikaları çok ciddi
sıkıntılarla karşı karşıya getirdi. Ekonomik, siyasal, toplumsal her alanda istikrara dayalı
politika yapmak durumunda olan merkez sağ , koyu milliyetçi ve dinci tepkilere dayalı
olarak hareket edemezdi, ancak bu tepkilere sırtını da dönemezdi, zira Tü rkiye'de
henü z, merkez sağ ı ayakta tutacak, liberal, şehirli, ılımlı bir toplumsal zemin mevcut
değ ildi, dolayısı ile, merkez sağ ın arkasındaki toplumsal destek ile koyu sağ partilerin
arkasındaki arasında belirgin bir mesafe yoktu. Merkez sağ partiler, halen, söylemlerini,
büyü k ö lçüde, Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarından itibaren gelişen kü ltü rel tepkileri mobilize
etme ü zerine kurmak durumundaydılar.” Mert, jH.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
At
reactions,” which had their roots in the Early Republican Era. It is precisely
in this context that the far-right category is used in this thesis. To
be far-right meant to prioritize issues of culture before any other concern.
From that perspective, the nation urgently needed the honing of its
morality and identity. Once the authentic order of the society was restored,
development would follow in all areas, it was the degeneration
that had to be 1ixed 1irst. In this framework, the AP was frequently
charged with corruption and hypocrisy, with pretending to care about
national values but doing little to defend them in practice. It should be
noted, however, far-right itself is not an entirely coherent group. It includes
both Islamists and nationalists, whose contrasting positions on
many issues are treated in Chapter b.
§ L.L The contours of the MHP ideology
By the early ABt6s, nationalists5 considered Turkey in the great danger of
collapsing into communist hands and being denationalized. Vivid expressions
of the alarmism are common in the right-wing publications of the
era. To exemplify, Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi opened its pages with
the following remarks in May ABtA:
“From the great Ottoman-Turkish Empire, we have been driven to
and stuck in Anatolia in a few centuries, by losing land that is AC
times the size of current Turkey.
Anatolia is the last piece of land of the Turk. It should be known
that we do not have an inch of land left to lose. We are surrounded
by our historical enemies who are waiting for an opportunity to
5 In the main chapters, for simplicity the term “nationalist” is used to refer to the MHP
branch of Turkish nationalists, if not otherwise quali~ied.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
AF
swallow us. A little hesitation and weakness will whet their appetite.”
6
Although alarmism and a constant feeling of external threat were not
novel in Turkish nationalism, in the ABt6s, nationalists considered themselves
to be also 1ighting a more subtle battle. Writing in the 1irst issue of
TÜGD, IYbrahim Kafesoğlu, a prominent nationalist historian and ideologue
who was also the founder of the Aydınlar Ocağ ı, argued that Turkey’s
spiritual values and national identity were under attack by the communist
regime.7 An editorial article in the following issue speci1ied what
was to be done: after decades of economic, cultural and social slide, the
5Ast century had to be that of “Turkish-Islamic Civilization,” and it was the
task of the nationalists to make this a reality.8
In the MHP ideology, the degeneration of national culture and values
was the primary problem that was to be solved.9 Economic troubles were
temporary and would resolve almost on their own if they could 1ix cultural
backslide.10 What demolished civilizations was not economic challenges
but a lack of belief and morality among the population.11 When
morality and spirituality were damaged, the consequence was a population
that lacked work ethic and respect to property rights.12
6 “Birkaç yü zyıl içersinde [sic] EG Tü rkiye kadar toprak kaybederek ; koca bir imparatorluktan,
Osmanlı – Tü rk IXmparatorluğundan elimizde kala; daha doğ rusu bu topraklara
sü rü le Anadoluya geldik sıkıştık. Anadolu Tü rk’ün son toprak parçasıdır. Kesinlikle
bilinmelidir ki kaybedecek bir karış toprağ ımız kalmamıştır. Dö rt bir yanıız bizi yutmak
için fırsat kollayan tarihı̂ dü şmanlarımızla çevrilidir. Biraz tereddü t ve zaaf bunların
iştahlarını kabartacaktır.” “iN Günde E,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, May EF[E, i.
7 IXbrahim Kafesoğlu, “Tü rk Gencinin Vazifesi,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, September
E, EF[N, j.
8 “iN Günde E,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, October EF[N, i.
9 “iN Günde E,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, February EF[E, i.
10 “iN Günde E,” i.
11 Hü seyin Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Genç Kardeşlerimle Sohbet,” Türkiye Ülkücü
Gençlik Dergisi, October EF[N; “iN Günde E,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, December
EF[N; “iN Günde E,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, March EF[E.
12 Yusuf Ziya IXnan, “Gençlik Sorunu: i,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, March EF[E, EN.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
AB
Contrasting themselves with the two rival systems, capitalism and socialism,
they regarded their ideology to be the third way.13 Capitalism was
an individual form of materialism, and socialism was a collective form,
while the nationalist-conservative ideology accomplished a fusion of materiality
and spirituality.14 Under the in1luence of capitalism and socialism,
they argued, the West was in decline. A civilization devoid of spirituality
failed to “satisfy” their youth and degenerated them.15 Ours,
however, was not sel1ish but based on aiding others, satis1ied the youth
with its material-spiritual balance, and had a vision that would “encompass
all humanity.”16 Regardless of the developmental gap between Turkey
and the West, we carried the greatest potential.
A sense of superiority against other nations, both Muslim nations and
others, was evident in the nationalist thinking. Nationalists regarded
Turks as “the oldest, most honorable and biggest” nation in the world.17
Turkish history was as old as that of humanity, global history was supposed
to have started with Turkish history, and if Turkish history were to
be taken out of it, there would be no worthwhile history left.18 Although
a sense of leadership of the Muslim world was also existent in some circles
of the Islamist camp, nationalists went beyond this notion to proclaim
the status of a literal godsend nation. In turn, they were accused of
tribalism by the Islamists, which was forbidden in Islam.
In sum, the MHP brand of nationalism depicted an almighty nation,
intrinsically great but practically on the verge of collapse. The resulting
dissonance between the theoretical proposition and the present situation
was resolved by accusing and resenting the Westernizing elite and
13 Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Genç Kardeşlerimle Sohbet,” E[.
14 Hü seyin Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Politik Buhran ve Gençlik,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik
Dergisi, December EF[N, EF; Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Genç Kardeşlerimle Sohbet,”
EG–E[.
15 Ali Murad Daryal, “Beklenilen Medeniyet,” Ülkücü Kadro, December EO, EF[G, F–EN.
16 Daryal, F–EN.
17 Hü seyin Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Milli Ruh ve Milliyetçi-Toplumcu Hareket,” Türkiye
Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, January EF[E, JJ.
18 Başaran, JJ.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
56
politicians in power. It was their cultural neglect that ‘poisoned’ new generations
and caused socialist movements to gain ground. Over time, these
criticisms were to reach as far back as Mahmud II, who reigned between
AF6F–AFqB.
§ L.M The mental landscape: ascendant left, missing doctrine
A feeling of weakness vis-à-vis the political left in the ideological/theoretical
sphere underpinned Tü rkeş’s efforts for a “doctrinaire” right.
However, the sense of weakness was existent much before Türkeş was in
the political scene and even on the center-right, as expressed by the
Prime Minister Menderes in ABDB. According to the nationalist academic
Erol Gü ngö r (ABqF–ABFq), it was either ABDt or ABDF when Adnan Menderes
visited Güngör’s mentor and prominent social psychologist Mümtaz
Turhan and told him:
Hocam, we are losing the universities and intellectuals. CHP [Republican
People’s Party] is raising a new generation in universities
just like they did before in People’s Houses. They hinder our
quest for development. We need intellectuals and a young generation
who are excited about and support Turkey's quest for development.
It would be nice if you and scholars like you could write
books on the issue of development.19
19 “Hocam, üniversiteyi, münevverleri (aydınları) kaybediyoruz. CHP üniversitelerde yeni
bir halkevleri nesli yetiştiriyor. Kalkınma davamıza engel oluyorlar. Tü rkiye’nin
kalkınma davasından heyecan duyan, buna destek veren bir gençliğe ve münevverlere
ihtiyacımız var. Siz ve sizin gibi alimlerimiz kalkınma meselesiyle ilgili kitaplar yazsanız
ne kadar iyi olur.” This anecdote is told by journalist Taha Akyol, as he heard it from Erol
Güngö r. Taha Akyol, Hayat Yolunda: Gençler İçin Anılar ve Öneriler (IXstanbul: Milliyet
Yayınları, EFFH), JJ.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
5A
It was after this exchange with the Prime Minister that Mümtaz
Turhan wrote Garplılaşmanın Neresindeyiz? (Where are we in Westernization?).
20 If this dialogue between two professors and the Prime Minister
illustrated the insecurity among the right-wing political and intellectual
elite against the perceived rise of left-wing scholarship and activism,
nationalist journalist and writer Taha Akyol’s own experiences as a conservative
university student show the emotional state of the young rightwing
support base. We shall hear directly from Akyol, who aptly captures
their state of mind at the time:
The sources of intellectual nourishment for us, the right-wing
youth, against the CHP’s intellectual machines were writers such
as Ali Fuat Başgil, Mümtaz Turhan, Peyami Safa, Nurettin Topçu.
Of course, there is also the conservative Anatolian values from
which we emerged...
Despite these intellectual resources, we would feel a weakness
that we could not admit when faced with 'revolutionary' ideas. We
were under the collective pressure of 'progressive' thoughts.
The shift of the 'progressive' youth from Kemalism to Socialism
posed an even greater intellectual challenge for us. We did not
know what to say against new concepts such as 'dialectic', 'imperialism',
'materialist interpretation of history' and 'exploitation.'
When we spoke of 'private enterprise' in a debate we held with
our 'progressive' friends at the Cağaloğlu Student Dormitory,
when the con1lict had not yet turned into violence, we were so
heavily stigmatized for supporting 'exploitation' and 'bourgeoisie'
that we did not mention the 'private enterprise' again.
Honestly, while we were waiting for the bus at the bus stop, the
private vehicles whizzing past us made us very angry too. What
the left called 'bourgeoisie,' we considered 'corruption.'
Some of our 'progressive' friends were talking about the 'proletarian
revolution', some of the 'Second 5t May,' and some of them
20 This is again according to Akyol. Akyol, JJ.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
55
were talking about the slogan 'Army - Youth hand in hand, let's
bring about the revolution.'
Other than the abstract 'nation,' we had neither a 'proletariat,' nor
a 'revolutionary army,' or a 'coup.'
…
The Justice Party, especially with Demirel's election as Leader at
the end of ABCb, kept shouting ‘roads, dams, factories!’ Next to big
words like 'materialist interpretation of history' or 'imperialism'
these seemed so simple, they didn't excite us 'young people!'21
Nowhere else in the nationalist literature are the feeling of weakness and
encirclement by the adversary better expressed. Akyol’s testimony, taken
together with the Menderes anecdote, leads to two conclusions. First,
21 “CHP’nin ~ikir makinaları karşısında biz sağcı gençlerin ~ikrı̂ gıda kaynakları Ali Fuat
Başgil, Mümtaz Turhan, Peyami Safa, Nurettin Topçu gibi yazarlardı. Tabii, bir de içinden
çıktığ ımız muhafazakar anadolu değerleri...
Bu ~ikrı̂ kaynaklarımıza rağmen, ‘devrimci’ ~ikirler karşısında, itiraf edemediğ imiz bir
zaaf hissederdik. ‘IXlerici’ dü şü ncelerin kollektif baskısı altındaydık.
‘IXlerici’ gençliğ in Kemalizm’den Sosyalizm’e kayması, bizi ~ikren daha da sıkıştırmıştı.
‘Diyalektik’ , ‘emperyalizm’ , ‘tarihin materyalist yorumu’ , ‘sömü rü ’ gibi yeni kavramlar
karşısında ne diyeceğ imizi bilemiyorduk.
Henü z çekişmenin şiddete dönü şmediğ i yıllarda Cağaloğlu O` ğ renci Yurdu’nda ‘ilerici’
arkadaşlarımızla yaptığ ımız bir münazarada ‘hususi teşebbü s’ten bahsettiğ imizde, öyle
bir ‘sömü rü ’ ve ‘burjuvazi’ damgası yemiştik ki, bir daha ‘hususi teşebbü s’ü ağzımıza
almadık.
Doğ rusu, durakta otobü s beklerken önümü zden vızlayıp geçen ö zel araçlar bizi de çok
kızdırıyordu. Solun ‘burjuvazi’si, bizim nazarımızda ‘yozlaşmış’tı.
‘IXlerici’ arkadaşlarımızın kimi ‘proleterya devrimi’nden, kimi ‘IXkinci J[ Mayıs’tan, kimi
de ‘Ordu – Gençlik el ele, haydi devrime’ sloganından bahsediyordu.
Bizim soyut ‘millet’ten başka, ne ‘proleterya’mız, ne ‘devrimci ordu’muz ne de
‘darbe’miz vardı.”
“Adalet Partisi, ö zellikle Demirel’in EFGj sonunda Genel Başkan seçilmesiyle, ‘yol, baraj,
fabrika’ diye tutturmuştu! ‘Tarihin materyalist yorumu’ veya ‘emperyalizm’ gibi büyü k
la~ların yanında bunlar çok basit gö zü küyor, biz ‘delikanlılara’ heyecan vermiyordu!”
Akyol, Ji.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
5q
paranoia about impending doom by leftist takeover was not new; counter-
intuitively enough, there was continuity in this regard even from lesspolarized
and divided times. Second, this notion of theoretical inadequacy
in relation to the left was also deeply engrained in the Turkish
right; an urgent need for a right-wing doctrine was felt. Thus, Tü rkeş did
not invent any of these sentiments. He was in1luenced by the same feelings
that Akyol describes, and he built upon these sentiments with skill.
Although to what extent the Islamization of the MHP ideology was
prompted by their 1ight against socialists/communists is controversial,
the ideology itself emerged as a response to Turkish communists. Akyol
recalls that in search of refuge against the ascendant left, nationalist
youngsters felt empowered by the image of Türkeş as the “mighty colonel
of the revolution” (ihtilalin kudretli albayı).22 They were to counter the
left’s anti-imperialist discourse with their nationalism, and the exploitation
discourse with their “communitarianism,” thus a nationalist-communitarianist
(milliyetçi-toplumcu) ideology was born.23 Even the notion
of “revolution” was imported: the nationalist youth was excited upon the
rumors after ABCD that the Colonel was preparing another coup, rejoicing
“We will have our own revolution too!” (Bizim de devrimimiz olacak).24
§ L.U Bringing Islam in
In the de1inition of the concept of nation, nationalists repeatedly included
sharing the same religion as well as the same ancestry.25 They attempted
to theorize religion and nationality as ever-present, essential, and equally
constitutive components of society. Islam was framed as a factor that
22 Akyol, Jj.
23 Akyol, Jj. Toplumculuk is usually translated as communitarianism, though it carries a
different meaning in Turkish, referring to a left-wing economic programme aimed to
remedy social inequality.
24 Akyol, Jj.
25 Mehmet Başaran, “Milliyetçilik ve Devlet,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, September
EF[N, [; Yılmaz Akıncı, “Yok Olanlar,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, May EF[E, Jj.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
5b
both contributed to and conserved the Turkish identity, while Turks who
(were) converted to other religions lost their nationality because of
changing their religion.26 This conclusion was, in a very characteristic
way for nationalists, based on a praise of the pre-Islamic Turks. Since
their way of life was already incredibly like Islam, they did not change in
any signi1icant way in their -voluntary- conversion to Islam.27 It is as
though the conversion was merely an of1icial validation of an already virtuous
culture.
By ABt6, Idealists were already speaking of an order based on the
Turkish-Islamic synthesis. “Türklük gurur ve şuuru, IYslâm ahlâk ve fazileti”
(the Pride and Consciousness of Turkishness and the Morality and
Virtue of Islam) was one of the main slogans of the movement, repeated
numerous times in nationalist publications. Türkeş had started advertising
his doctrine as “the God’s way” (Allah yolu).28
However, in the nationalist doctrine, Islam and Turkism were hardly
on equal footing. To borrow a legal term, Islam carried a negative obligation,
that is, a responsibility of not con1licting with the teachings of Islam.
Beyond avoiding con1lict, nationalists did not take their cues from religion
in the construction of their ideology. If the subject matter was not
morality or culture, such as economic policies or development, there
were virtually no references to Islam.29 What they had to do, in these
cases, was to merely defend their ideology as not con1licting Islam, especially
in response to various accusations of heresy from the religious farright.
When Islamic references found a place in policy areas other than morality
or culture in nationalist writings, they were usually placed at the
26 Adana Tü rkocağ ı, Türklük ve İslâmiyet (Adana: Gü rpınar Basımevi, EFGG), JG, ij.
27 Adana Tü rkocağ ı, JG–JH, iE, ij.
28 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, EH[.
29 There were of course exceptions, see for example Yusuf Ziya IXnan, “Ramazan, Toplum ve
Sosyal Adalet,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, November EO, EF[E, G–[. But these remain
few when compared to articles which are not inspired by religion in their economic and
social arguments.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
5D
end of an article, as a 1inal touch that found some evidence in religious
texts of the argument presented.30 Additionally, the virtues of Islam were
mentioned in response to the leftist critiques of Turkish society. To exemplify,
in order to counter the in1luential leftism of the era, articles on economic
matters or social inequality frequently touched upon the fact that
social equality was already part of Islam, and that Islam was against the
concept of class, be it class dictatorship or a worker-bourgeoisie divide.31
In the capital formation stage of development, the nationalists said they
could not allow social injustice, being “part of a faith and belief system
that gives importance to human dignity.”32 Similarly, when responding to
accusations of individualism from the left, they mentioned that the hajj
and fasting were communitarian forms of worship, reminding one of
their belonging in society.33 Every left-wing value that might have seemed
attractive to the population was countered with an equivalent concept
that existed within the symbolic universe of Muslim Turks.
Even in matters of culture and societal values, Islam was not always
at the forefront. In response to the perceived attacks on national values,
their solution was to “think like a Turk.”34 They highlighted frequently
that “Turks have no friend other than Turks.”35 Although Turks were also
considered as religious, this was but one aspect of the Turkish identity. In
other words, they did not speak of “thinking like a Muslim” or an allegiance
to Muslims of all ethnicities, ummah. When compared to Islamists
that considered all Muslims as brothers, the nationalist view was hardly
in line with the Islamic right.
30 The issues of Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi and Ülkücü Kadro serve as examples in this
regard.
31 Mehmet Bedirhanoğlu, “IXşçi-IXşveren: Sendika Sendikacılık,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik
Dergisi, October EF[E, Ji; IXnan, “Ramazan, Toplum ve Sosyal Adalet,” G–[; Mehmet Ercişli,
“Millı̂ Devlette Malı̂ Yapı,” Ülkücü Kadro, December EO, EF[G, Ei.
32 Ercişli, “Millı̂ Devlette Malı̂ Yapı,” Ei.
33 IXnan, “Ramazan, Toplum ve Sosyal Adalet,” [.
34 Mesut Aras, “Tü rk Gibi Dü şünmedikçe..,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, February EF[E,
EH.
35 Aras, EH.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
5C
Nationalists considered Turks to be godsend to lead Muslims and
prided the Turkish history as spreading the religion and defending it
against Christians. It is usually remarked that “the Turkish nation ... occupy
a very high position in the history of Islam.”36 The 1irst evidence of
this was the “reverence and love” Turks receive in the Islamic world.37
Another frequently cited38 evidence was the verse D:Db in the Quran,
which they believed referred to the Turkish nation:
“O true believers, whoever of you apostatizeth from his religion,
GOD will certainly bring other people to supply his place, whom he
will love, and who will love him (emphasis added); who shall be
humble towards the believers; but severe to the unbelievers: they
shall 1ight for the religion of GOD and shall not fear the obloquy of
the detractor. This is the bounty of GOD, he bestoweth it on whom
he pleaseth: GOD is extensive and wise.”
Thus, Turks were the people God sent in response to increasing apostasy,
who then fought the unbelievers and protected the believers. In addition
to these, another Quranic verse and a hadith39 were regularly cited
to prove the religion-appropriateness of nationalism:
“O mankind, surely, We have created you from a male and a female
and made you tribes and families that you may know each other.
Surely the noblest of you with Allah is the most dutiful of you.
Surely Allah is Knowing, Aware.” (bB:Aq)
““I asked the Prophet: ‘O Messenger of Allah, is it tribalism if a man
loves his people?’ He said: ‘No, rather tribalism is when a man
36 Osman Nuri Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, “Din, Devlet, Millet: Kur’anı Kerim Hizmetindeki Büyük
Millet Tü rk Milleti,” Ülkücü Kadro, December EO, EF[G, F.
37 Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, F.
38 Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, F.
39 Numerous references were made to these two in many nationalist articles and books.
One example is: S. Ahmet Arvasi, “Tü rk Milliyetçiliğ i ve IXslâmiyet,” January E, EF[[, [.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
5t
helps his people to do wrong.’” (Sunan Ibn Majah Vol. D, Book qC,
Hadith qBbB)
The importance of these two sources of legitimacy cannot be overemphasized
as they constituted the backbone of the nationalist defense
against charges of heresy. To exemplify, writing in Birliğe Çağrı in ABtB,
Zeybek argues that God created nations and opposing the reality of nations
would mean “rebellion against the divine will.”40
Islamists, while not contesting the type of patriotism described
above, questioned whether nationalists fell within the boundaries of tribalism
as described in the sources and other religious texts. Even in that
form of patriotism, however, they were quick to point out that anything
worthy of appraisal in Turkishness belonged to or originated in the Islamic
period. In contrast, glorifying the pre-Islamic Turkic society and
culture was indispensable for the nationalists. In a way, they felt insecure
placing too much praise on Islam. When speaking of religion, they could
not help but emphasize that Turks were virtuous and had similar beliefs
and lives to Muslims even before their acceptance of Islam.
One way of countering the Islamist critique was arguing that there is
a Turkish brand of Islam. Osman Nuri Küçükibrahimoğlu, writing in the
beginning of ABtt on Ülkücü Kadro, where he covered religious issues at
every issue, argues that Turks have an understanding of Islam of their
own and that this was not against religion.41 This was primarily a reply
to Islamists, against their accusation that Idealists were atheists who
were even more harmful than communists, which, Küçükibrahimoğlu
thought, was an accusation not in line with Islam.42
Moreover, for nationalists, Islam was not to be understood as a frozen
set of rules. As Idealist economist O^zsoy argued:
40 “ilâhi irâdeye isyân manasını taşır.” Zeybek, “Milli U` lkü ,” Birliğe Çağrı, December O, EF[F,
Ej.
41 Osman Nuri Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, “Din, Devlet, Millet,” Ülkücü Kadro, January E, EF[[, F.
42 Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, F.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
5F
But if we try to abide by the rule that the doors of ijtihad were
closed after Imam-Azam, as the ecmain group says; that's when
the danger of turning Islam into a religion that prevents progress
arises. However, Islam is not a religion against progress, it commands
progress.43
The argument here is a way of bringing Islam in while keeping Islamists
out. Typically, O^zsoy demanded leeway to construct a modern ideology
with a modern economic policy, while also remaining in line with Islam.
Any potential religious opposition that might have insisted on
textual originalism is dismissed as reactionary.
§ L.V Rupture within: secular Turkism vs. Turkish-Islamic synthesis
The in-1ighting among nationalists on the question of Islam started as
early as ABCC. Rıfat Baykal, a close associate of Türkeş from their junta
years, reportedly labelled their ideology as “New Kemalism” which then
led to a controversy between himself and Faruk Akkülah, the head of the
party organization in the southern province of Adana and a theologist,
who Baykal called a “bigot” and a “sharia supporter.”44 In ABCF, antagonized
by the rapprochement with Islam, 1ive ex-of1icers supporting Tü -
rkeş since at least the coup d’état of ABC6 resigned from the party.45 The
biggest rupture happened in ABCB, however. As a result of Türkeş’s overtures
to the Islamic right, more secularly oriented nationalists left the
43 “Amma ecmain grubunun dediğ i gibi IXmam-A…zamdan sonra içtihat kapıları kapanmıştır
hü kmü ne uymağa kalkışırsak ; işte o zaman IXslâmiyeti terakkiye mani bir din durumuna
dü şü rmek tehlikesi başgö sterir. Halbuki IXslâmiyet mani-i terakki bir din değ ildir ve ilerlemeğ
i emreder.” Mü rşid Altaylı, Türk Milliyetçi-Toplumcu Doktrininin Umumi Esasları
(IXstanbul: D.A.S. Dava Yayınları, EFGF), EO.
44 Akyol, Hayat Yolunda: Gençler İçin Anılar ve Öneriler, J[.
45 Erken, “Ideological Construction of the Politics of Nationalism in Turkey: The Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi (MHP), EFGO–EFHN,” JNG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
5B
party after the Congress of ABCB.46 The chief ideologue that championed
a Turkism without Islam was Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (AB6D-ABtD), who also
grew distant of Tü rkeş after ABCB. According to Taha Akyol, the Tü rkeş-
Atsız break-up created “a shocking effect” among the nationalist youth.47
Regardless of his views on religion, Atsız was the most popular author
among nationalist youngsters until the ABt6s.
The split between Atsız and religious nationalists did not necessarily
happen in kinder terms than the Islamist-nationalist debate. Nationalist
economist O^zsoy called the Atsız group “a psychopath minority among
nationalists who say, ‘Islam is degenerating Turkishness, our religion is
shamanism.’”48 He added that “they are driving the Turkish nationalistcommunitarianism
to racism.”49 Meanwhile, Atsız’s criticism and denunciation
of the MHP, its members and now religious ideology and only increased
in the ABt6s.50
Atsız was indeed miles away from the form of synthesis that was
shaping up in the MHP. He could not even imagine a pragmatic right-wing
alliance with the Islamists against communism, let alone subscribing to a
Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The reason he provided was simple, Islamists,
he thought, were part of the political left:
Religionism and ummahism are against or hostile to nationalism,
as they push Turkishness into the background or deny it. In this
respect, religionists, ummahists, and advocates of caliphate cannot
be "right-wing." Ummahists are internationalists as they have
46 Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, JiE–iJ, JG[–GH, J[i.
47 Akyol, Hayat Yolunda: Gençler İçin Anılar ve Öneriler, JG.
48 Altaylı, Türk Milliyetçi-Toplumcu Doktrininin Umumi Esasları, EF.
49 Altaylı, ii.
50 Erken, “Ideological Construction of the Politics of Nationalism in Turkey: The Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi (MHP), EFGO–EFHN,” JEN.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
q6
the idea of an international Islam and have the illusion of dissolving
Turkishness within the Islamic community, and like every internationalist,
they are from the left.51
Atsız warned that one could not exclude non-Muslim Turks from the
Turkish nation52 but he did not completely reject Islam either. Although
he noted that contemporary Turkish religion was “a type of Turkish Islam
that incorporated some practices from our old religion shamanism,” he
did acknowledge Islam as the religion of Turks and that “religion is part
of what makes a nation.”53 He explained the vitality of religion for a nation
as follows:
In the twentieth century, illuminated by positive sciences and
western civilization, we see that civilized nations and societies
wholly embraced religion. Because belief in God, and therefore religion,
is an indispensable spiritual and moral pillar, both for individuals
and for a nation. For this reason, we believe that the religion
of Islam, which constitutes one of the two fundamental
foundations on which today's Turkish world rests, is an inseparable
part of our national existence.54
51 “Dincilik ve siyası̂ ümmetçilik, Tü rklü ğü ikinci plâna itmek veya var saymamak olduğundan
milliyetçiliğe aykırı yahut dü şmandır. Bu bakımdan dinciler, siyası̂ ümmetçiler,
hilâ fetçiler ‘sağcı’ olamazlar. Siyası̂ ümmetçiler, IXslâm beynelmileli dü şü ncesinde olup
Tü rklü ğü IXslâm topluluğu içinde eritmek malihü lyasına kapılmış olduklarından
beynelmilelcidirler ve her beynelmilelci gibi soldurlar” Atsız, Türk Ülküsü, IXlaveli
U`çü ncü Basım (Ankara: Afşın Yayınları, EF[i), OE.
52 Atsız, FE.
53 Atsız, FE.
54 “Yirminci Yü zyıl’da mü sbet ilmin ve batı medeniyetinin ışığ ı altında, medenı̂ milletlerin
ve toplumların dine bü tü n varlıklarıyla sarılmış olduklarını gö rüyoruz. Çü nkü Tanrı
inancı ve dolayısıyla din, fert olarak da, millet olarak da vazgeçilmez mânevı̂ ve ahlâkı̂
büyü k bir dayanaktır. Bu sebeple, bugü nkü Tü rk dünyasının dayandığ ı iki esaslı
temelden birisini teşkil eden IXslâm dininin, millı̂ varlığ ımızın ayrılmaz bir parçası
olduğuna inanıyoruz.” Atsız, ENj.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
qA
It can be inferred from this quote that at the top of the hierarchy of
values stood the ideal of national power. One of the sources of national
power was morality and spirituality, which in turn is inescapably derived
from religion, hence the existence of a ‘reality of religion.’ Next section
will explore how the MHP in general and Tü rkeş in particular inherited
this line of thinking and how, even Türkeş’s most Islamized account of his
ideology does not fall too far away from the framework drawn by Atsız
above.
§ L.X Dokuz Işık: A close look into Tü rkeş’s approach to religion
In terms of the religious shift and the convergences, divergences, and tension
with the Islamists this section will take the form of a replay of the
thesis taken in its entirety, as all the steps described elsewhere are observable
over the lifespan of the text Dokuz Işık. As the main doctrine of
the Idealist movement, Dokuz Işık provides a unique opportunity to observe
Tü rkeş’s stance on religion as well as its change over time.55 As
aforementioned, what started as a AD-page booklet in ABCD expanded into
a manifesto of several hundred pages by the ABt6s, eventually including
an explicit and at length discussion of the virtues of religion in general
and Islam in particular. Initially, Islam was only implicitly mentioned under
the principle of “Moralism” (Ahlakçılık). Explaining what constitutes
“the foundation” (temeller) of their Moralism, Türkeş wrote: “The Turkish
morality will be in line with the Turkish traditions, Turkish spirit and
the beliefs of the Turkish nation.”56 What immediately follows this light
emphasis on religion is telling: “The Turkish morality will never contradict
the laws of nature, it will be founded on principles that are also in
55 Though who authored the book is not clear, we can assume that at the very least, Tü rkeş
scrutinized the content before granting his approval.
56 “Tü rk ahlâkı Tü rk geleneklerine, Tü rk ruhuna, Tü rk Milletinin inançlarına uygun olacaktır.”
Tü rkeş, Dokuz Işık, EFG[, O.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
q5
line with the laws of nature.”57 Thus, Tü rkeş felt the need to emphasize
their allegiance to a form of scientism or positivism even after a slight
mention of spirituality. Under the 1ifth principle of “Scientism,” (IYlimcilik)
the emphasis is repeated that in all matters of conduct “our one and only
guide will be science, natural sciences.”58
Initial writings of Tü rkeş as well as his associates, that is, in the early
to mid-ABC6s, one sees an ideology that resembles a conservative remake
of the original Kemalist project. Writing in ABCD, Türkeş, Baykal and
O^zdağ list a series of principles such as rationalism and liberalism, which,
they argue: “are the principles that must be seriously applied to the development
of our country. We must create a Turkish Renaissance by adding
our own national characteristics.”59 Where then, is Islam in ABCD? Or
when will it appear unmistakably?
As late as ABt5, Dokuz Işık does not count (shared) religion as part of
the de1inition of nation. Tü rkeş de1ines nation as a community with “common
language, ancestry, ideals, culture and history.”60 Although religion
is arguably included in one of these categories, an explicit mention of it
as constitutive of the nation is found only in later editions. Unlike previous
editions, Türkeş does refer to Islam by its name, underlining that “the
source of our path is the Islamic belief and being conscious and proud of
Turkishness.”61 However, Islam is nowhere to be found when Tü rkeş is
complaining of the national education being heavily in1luenced by the
57 “Tü rk ahlâkı hiçbir zaman tabiat kanunlarına aykırı olmayacak, tabiat kanunlarıyla da
bağdaşan bir takım [sic] temellere dayanmış bir ahlâ k olacaktır.” Tü rkeş, O.
58 “Yalnız ve sadece ilmi, mü sbet ilimi önder kabul edeceğ iz.” Tü rkeş, EG.
59 “IXşte yurdumuzun kalkındırılması için ciddiyetle uygulanması gereken ilkeler bunlardır.
Kendi millı̂ ö zelliklerimizi de katarak bir Tü rk Rönesansı yaratmak zorundayız.” Alparslan
Tü rkeş, Rıfat Baykal, and Muzaffer O` zdağ , Bazı Gerçekler (Savunmalar) (Ankara:
Ayyıldız Matbaası, EFGO), j–O.
60 “… ü lkü , tarih, kü ltü r ve soy birliğ i.” Alparslan Tü rkeş, Dokuz Işık (Hamle/Tö re Yayıncılık,
EF[J), i[.
61 “Bu yolun temel kaynağ ı, islâm inancı ve Tü rklü k şu’ur ve gururudur.” Tü rkeş, [G.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
qq
West and hence unnational,62 or when speaking of a kulturkampf underway
in Turkey.63 In a few years’ time, in the “1irst enlarged edition”64 in
ABtF, all of Türkeş’s criticisms against the Turkish modernization, as well
as his conception of Moralism would be encircled by the Crescent, including
Islamic overtones.
Opening the chapter of Moralism in the ABtF edition, the reader is
greeted with a cover comprised of a verse of the Qur’an and a hadith.65 It
is in this section -and references to the importance of morality throughout
the other chapters in this edition- that we discover the place envisioned
for Islam in Türkeş’s nationalism: an instrumentalist approach
that considers religion valuable as a source of morality and discipline.
This is not merely an interpretation of his discourse, as Tü rkeş does not
hide his instrumentalist perspective, explicitly saying in the ABCt Congress
of CKMP that they need a doctrine “that takes into account the reality
of the Muslim Turkish Nation.”66 He considered “a strong morality
and leading a life of high spirituality” as the precondition for all kinds of
progress, be it economic, scienti1ic or cultural, as well as the main factor
that makes or breaks nations, societies and civilizations.67 In his words:
It should also be known that a material development that is not
based on a spiritual foundation would not last long and would not
provide the desired bene1it. Development without spirituality and
nationality, and advancement without morality are not possible;
even if they were, they would be of no value. You see, the development
that we consider is based on foundations of nationalism, idealism,
faith, and morality. The basis of our sincere adherence to
62 Tü rkeş, [i–[j.
63 Tü rkeş, HE–HJ.
64 “Genişletilmiş Birinci Baskı.”
65 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, E[[.
66 Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, Genel Başkan Alparslan Türkeş’in VIII. Büyük Kongreyi
Açış Konuşması (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası A.Ş., EFG[), EE.
67 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, EHN, EH[–FJ, EFj–FO, EF[–FF, JN[–EN, JJG, JiG, jNG–[, jGj,
jF[, OHH.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
qb
the synthesis of the Pride and Consciousness of Turkishness and
the Morality and Virtue of Islam, which is the uni1ication of the
spiritual elements that make up our nation, lies in this fact.68
It was thanks to “high morals” (yüksek bir ahlak) and “spirituality”
(maneviyat) that the society could create individuals who would put the
nation before their own interests.69 Thus, morality is the tool with which
Türkeş hoped to establish the primacy of the community over the individual.
Islam was the inescapable ‘provider’ of this morality and consequently
development and progress. It provided “endless sources and possibilities
of strength” which were to be mobilized for development.70 It is
thus not surprising that Tü rkeş speaks of “grounding the state administration
on the morality of Islam”71 but not on Islam proper.
It should not be inferred from Türkeş’s conception of Islam as source
of morality that he was choosing among a variety of options. Looking to
the West or elsewhere, Tü rkeş saw ‘the reality of religion.’ The potential
hazards of widespread individualism could not be prevented by the police
or gendarmerie.72 According to Tü rkeş, “all states in the world” were
using religion “in the discipline of citizens.”73 All over the world, Tü rkeş
could not spot a society without religion, to believe was a natural need of
68 “Şurası da bilinmelidir ki, manevı̂ bir temel ü zerine oturmayan maddı̂ kalkınma uzun
ömü rlü olmayacak, arzu edilen yararı sağlamayacaktır. Maneviyatsız, milliyetsiz bir
kalkınmanın, ahlâksız bir yü kselmenin imkânı yoktur; imkânı olsa bile değeri yoktur.
IXşte, bizim dü şü ndü ğümü z kalkınma milliyetçilik, ü lkü cü lü k, iman ve ahlâk temelleri
üzerine oturmaktadır. Milletimizi meydana getiren manevı̂ unsurların tam bir â henk
içinde birleşmesi demek olan Tü rklü k Gurur ve Şuû ru ile IXslâm Ahlâ k ve Fazileti
sentezine samimiyetle bağlı olmamızın esası bu gerçekte yatmaktadır.” Alparslan Tü -
rkeş, Milli Doktrin Dokuz Işık (Kutluğ Yayınları, EF[[), EE–EJ.
69 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, EFE–FJ.
70 “Sonsuz kuvvet kaynakları ve imkânları.” Tü rkeş, ONF.
71 “Devlet idaresini IXslâm ahlâkına dayandırma(k)nın …” Tü rkeş, jJi.
72 Tü rkeş, JEN.
73 “Bü tün dünya devletleri, bahusus hristiyan devletler vatandaş terbiyesinde dini birinci
plânda tutarken, …” Tü rkeş, JJG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
qD
humans.74 He observed that the new Western civilization adopted the
morality system of Christianity.75 Islam, already the religion of the nation,
was the natural and inevitable source of morality for Turks.
In his criticism of the national education system and Turkish modernization,
Tü rkeş echoes arguments shared with the Islamic right. The diagnosis
on what caused the Ottoman decline and Islam being the source
of all development emerge as areas of convergence. First, Tü rkeş mentions
that the Western civilization took strength from the Islamic civilization,
76 referring to the Islamic Golden Age which is also considered as the
source of Western Renaissance in Islamist discourses. A logical continuation
of the argument, which Tü rkeş is also quick to arrive at, is the idea
that the Ottoman decline had to do with the state moving away from Islam.
77 He argues that “superstitions” gained ground among the population
as opposed to Islam in its true form, and the state elite overreacted
to this by targeting religion directly.78
The criticism of the Turkish elite or intelligentsia does not stop at this
light mention, however. They are charged with a super1icial imitation of
the West and their ways of life while failing to match the technical advancement
of Western countries, which is a typical accusation that is
found in all strands of the Turkish right from the center-right to Islamists.
Additionally, they are accused of holding Turkish people in contempt,
“considering their way of life, which is based on their religious beliefs,
backward.”79 Tü rkeş echoes these critiques in colorful words:
“Our nation has come to be disgusted from the ‘intellectual’ type
that is characterless, soulless and a free rider. She is longing for a
new generation, a new type of intellectual. This means an intellectual
who is not in con1lict with the Turk and Islam; someone who
74 Tü rkeş, JN[.
75 Tü rkeş, jG.
76 Tü rkeş, EFH–FF.
77 Tü rkeş, JNF.
78 “hurafeler ve bâ tıl inançlar” Tü rkeş, JNF.
79 “dini inançlarına dayalı olarak sü rdü ğü yaşayışını gerilik saymakta” Tü rkeş, iH–iF.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
qC
believes in the necessity of modernizing while remaining a Turk
and a Muslim, and who realizes this aim in his personality.”80
In line with a common Islamist position, Türkeş stretches the start of
this degeneration to AF66:
“In this situation, people realized that the intellectual does not respect
them and is opposing his people, their wishes, beliefs, and
customs; people lost their trust in him, and our nation has divided
into two ways of life, two groups with different opinions. This is
the situation for AtF years, since AF66.”81
A writing-off of the Turkish modernizing elite for two centuries by the
leader of MHP is a remarkable shift. From mid-ABC6s onwards, this type
of cultural critique of the Westernizing intelligentsia as an alien anomaly
spread in frequency, intensity and period covered, from IYnönü and his era
to Early Republican reforms and eventually reaching Tanzimat reforms
of AFqB and their prelude. Moreover, Tü rkeş believed the direst consequences
the elite caused happened to affect the youth. A malign education
curriculum that included no spiritual substance left the youth vulnerable
to ideologies like socialism:
Among the primary factors that paved the way to today’s disorder
is the lack of spiritual beliefs in society. Generations that are unaware
of Turkish customs, distant to spiritual values and disrespectful
to traditions have been the main source of the Turkish nation’s
anxiety regarding her future, and for years those who
80 “Şahsiyetsiz, ruhsuz, bedavacı « aydın » tipinden milletimiz iğ renir duruma gelmiştir. O,
yeni bir neslin, yeni bir mü nevver tipinin hasretini çekmektedir. Bu, Tü rk’e ve IXslâm’a
ters dü şmeyen bir entellektü el demektir; Tü rk kalarak, mü slüman kalarak
çağdaşlaşmanın lüzum ve zaruretine inanmış ve bunu her şeyden önce kendinde
gerçekleştirmiş bir kimse demektir.” Tü rkeş, jFG.
81 “Bu durumda halk baktı ki aydın kendine karşı, istediklerine karşı, inancına, ö rfüne
karşı; aydın kendisini saymıyor; o halkın ona itimadı kalmadı ve milletimiz iki ayrı
yaşayışta, ayrı dü şü ncede gruba bö lü ndü . Bu, EHNN senesinden beri, E[H yıldır böyle.” Tü -
rkeş, OFJ.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
qt
govern the country could not realize this fact. The situation of
youngsters, who have been brought up from the primary school to
the last year of university with an education that is devoid of any
national character, is crystal clear. The crisis of our youth who are
indifferent to matters of family and society, who have no respect
left for the elderly and no compassion for those younger than him,
reminds us of this fact. The pitifulness of imitating the physical
appearance of the West without understanding and learning its
mentality and the pitifulness of those who label people who do not
agree with them as reactionaries, bigots and uncivilized, is the
case in point.82
It was in this context that Tü rkeş called for increasing the weekly
hours of mandatory religion classes to three and adding Qur’an courses
as an elective in all high schools.83 Schools had to be the medium through
which generations faithful to the national culture -of which Islam was a
major part- were to be raised. Only with this ‘human-matter’ which put
the nation before his sel1ish interests did he hope to achieve national development
and prosperity.84
Despite the Islamic overtones all around, it is evident on many occasions
that Tü rkeş is not highly invested in the religious talk. Islam was
82 “Bugün içinde yaşadığımız bozuk durumu hazırlayan sebeplerin başında, toplumdaki
manevı̂ inanç boşluğu gelmektedir. Tü rk tö relerinden habersiz, manevı̂ değerlerden
uzak, geleneklere saygısı kalmamış nesiller, Tü rk Milletinin yarınlara olan
güvensizliğ inin esas kaynağ ı olmuş ve yıllarca memleketi idare eden kişiler bu gerçeğ i
fark edememişlerdir. IXlk mektepten üniversitenin son sınıfına kadar millı̂lik vasfını yitirmiş
bir eğitim ve ö ğ retim ile yetişen gençlerin durumları gö zler önündedir. A… ile ve toplum
münasebetlerinde vurdum duymaz ve büyü ğüne saygısı, kü çü ğüne sevgisi kalmamış,
belli bir inançtan yoksun gençlerimizin içinde bulunduğu bunalım, işte bu
gerçeğ i bizlere açıkça hatırlatmaktadır. Batı zihniyetini anlamaksızın ve ö ğ renmeksizin,
sadece dış gö rünü şünü şeklen taklit etmek ve kendisi gibi dü şünmeyenleri gerici, yobaz,
medeniyetsiz diye nitelendiren kimselerin zavallılığ ı ibret verici bir durumdadır.” Tü -
rkeş, EFN–FE.
83 Tü rkeş, JJG.
84 Tü rkeş, jNE, jNG–[, O[G.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
qF
already the religion of the nation, and it was “the most recently sent, most
advanced and developed religion.”85 Türkeş was trying to appeal both to
religious masses and nationalists with secular tendencies, the constant
emphases on the bene1its and functions of Islam as if it was a developmental
technology is both an outreach campaign and a defensive effort
against nationalists questioning the Islamic turn.
A Turkist concern for the praise of pre-Islamic Turkic societies shows
itself, even in the most ‘Islamized’ version of Dokuz Işık. Tü rkeş argues
that “… the root of a nation is its national history. It is the cultural treasures
and spiritual values it created throughout its life, in thousands of
years.”86 Thus, he refers to and includes the pre-Islamic past as part of
what constitutes the Turkish nation. Similarly, Tü rkeş states that “Turkish
nation … based their moral and spiritual values on the Islamic belief,”
87 implying that already existent moral values gained an Islamic
theme, a commonly observed argument from the nationalist far-right
that emphasizes how virtuous pre-Islamic Turks were. However, although
Tü rkeş counts Islam, national history and “Turkish mores”88 (Tü rk
tö resi) as sources of morality for them, he is ambiguous on what will be
imported from ancient Turkish mores. A discussion of what is or should
be preserved and valued from the pre-Islamic Turkic past is nowhere to
be found, effectively leaving Islam as the sole source of moral values.
In the fairly Islamized version of Dokuz Işık, it is also still possible to
trace tensions between Tü rkeş’s nationalism and Islamism. When speaking
of the origins of Turkish nationalism and objecting pan-Islamist ideologies,
Tü rkeş argues that the Arabs are after their own independence.89
The goal of “Nizam-ı Alem,” establishing God’s order on earth, mentioned
85 “yer yü züne en son gönderilmiş olan en ileri, en iyi gelişmiş bir dindir.” Tü rkeş, JNF.
86 “… milletin kö kleri de kendi millı̂ tarihidir. Kendi binlerce yıllık yaşayışı içinde meydana
getirdiğ i kü ltü r hazineleri, manevi değerleridir.” Tü rkeş, OGE.
87 “Tü rk Milleti … bü tün ahlakı̂, mânevi değerlerini islâm imânı, islâm inancı temeline
oturtmuştur.” Tü rkeş, ONN.
88 Tü rkeş, EFj.
89 Tü rkeş, OF.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
qB
elsewhere in the book, is absent when Tü rkeş is declaring their own main
goal: “Our struggle as Turkish nationalists is to glorify and sustain eternally
the existence of the Turkish nation. There is no other idea or struggle
beyond this.”90 Türkeş reiterates his instrumentalist approach by saying
that a correct evaluation of Islam will “reinvigorate and reaccelerate
Turkishness”91 and goes even further, underlining the primacy of ethnicity:
… Considering Turkishness and Islam as separate or even con1licting
entities is harmful for Turkish nationalism and Islam. … Today
those opposing or denying Turkishness in our country assert that
everything is about religion. People like these are either encaged
by their negligence or they are the servants of those who want to
demolish the Turkish nation.92
Islamists are thus depicted as cooperating with Turks’ foreign enemies.
In a clever manner, Tü rkeş depicts the imaginary enemies as enemies
of Islam primarily. The reason they were attacking the Turks were
because they knew “if the Turk gets stronger, the Muslim gets stronger.”93
Supporting the nationalist cause becomes, in a way, a religious responsibility,
and opposing it harms Islam and Muslims.
In conclusion, it can be argued that Dokuz Işık and its change illustrate
both the tension and rapprochement between Turkish nationalism and
Islam. Initially resembling a secular project, Türkeş’s ideology included
90 “Bizim Tü rk milliyetçileri olarak dâvâmız Tü rk Milletinin varlığ ını yü celtmek ve ebediyen
devam ettirmek dâvasıdır. Bu ~ikrin, bu dâvanın ü stü nde başka hiçbir ~ikir, başka
bir davâ yer alamaz.” Tü rkeş, F[.
91 “Tü rklü ğe yeni bir gü ç ve hız verecektir.” Tü rkeş, EHN.
92 “Tü rklü k ve IXslâmiyeti birbirinden ayrı ve hele birbirine zıt veya birbirine dü şman iki
ayrı varlık gibi gö rmek Tü rk milliyetçiliğ i ve IXslâmiyet için zararlıdır. … Bugü n memleketimizde
Tü rklü ğe cephe alan veya Tü rklü ğü inkâ ra kalkışan bazı kimseler her şeyin
sadece dinden ibaret olduğunu ileriye sürmektedirler. Bu gibiler ya bilgisizlik ve ga~letin
esiri olan kimselerdir veya Tü rk Milletini yıkmak isteyen kö tü emellerin hizmetçisi olanlardır.”
Tü rkeş, EHN.
93 “Tü rk ne kadar kuvvetlenirse, Mü slümanlık da o kadar kuvvet kazanır.” Tü rkeş, JNN.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
b6
more and more Islamic themes from ABCD to ABF6. The relative weights of
the factors that led to this change, such as the anti-communist wave, electoral
politics or urban migration remain open for debate and call for further
research. It is observed that Tü rkeş’s approach to religion was instrumentalist,
the main function of Islam in his ideology was as a source
of morality, which he considered essential for development. Beyond
providing one with ethics, religion did not carry much weight in Dokuz
Işık. All other policy areas were discussed without any reference to religion.
Even the Islamized Dokuz Işık contains criticisms of Islamism, seeing
in its transnational character the potential demolition of the nation.
Finally, tension is present between the nationalist tendency to emphasize
the virtues pre-Islamic Turkic societies and Islamists’ insistence that anything
worthy of appraisal in the Turkish society is to be found in the period
after Islam. Although nationalists held pre-Islamic Turks in high regard,
what traditions were to be imported from those periods remained
unclear.
bA
#
Commonalities in discourse with Islamism
§ M.J Early signs of convergence
“The Republican Peasant Nation Party is the stronghold on which nationalism,
and spiritual and moral foundations are based” declared the CKMP
MP candidate Hikmet Tanyu, in his campaign booklet for the ABCD general
elections.1 He argued that the CKMP was the party to “uproot communism,”
and their focus on the aforementioned principles proved that.2
Tanyu listed a series of campaign promises that addressed Islam: “The
level and quality of the religious education institutions will be determined
according to need.”3 The obstacles for imam hatip graduates to enter
the university would also be removed.4 Tanyu even went further to
suggest that “... it would be of great bene1it to include Islamic religion and
ethics courses in every classroom of secondary and teacher schools,” as
1 Hikmet Tanyu, Kale: İmanın, Ahlâkın, Hakkın ve Hakikatin Kalesi (Afyon: Bozkurt Matbaası,
EFGO), EG.
2 Tanyu, EG.
3 “Dinı̂ ö ğ retim kurumlarının ihtiyaca uygun seviye ve nitelikte hizmet gö rmesi sağlanacaktır.”
Tanyu, G.
4 Tanyu, G–[.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
b5
well as every grade in primary schools.5 Finally, the CKMP called for the
establishment of an “Academy of Islam” (IYslam Akâdemisi).6 These are, of
course, causes that a vast majority of the Islamic right could get behind,
and since there was not yet an Islamist far-right party at the Turkish political
scene, the CKMP had the bene1it of presenting itself as the sole
1ighter for these causes.
Although the argument throughout this thesis underlines the increase
in and intensi1ication of Islamization from ABCD to ABF6, early election
documents such as Tanyu’s booklet suggest that the CKMP under Tü -
rkeş, from the very start, was not a clearly or exclusively secular political
party either. Two nuances may help explain the CKMP’s stand in ABCD.
First, the party was already a coalition of more secular Turkists such as
Rıfat Baykal and Muzaffer O^ zdağ7 and conservatives, with Tü rkeş trying
to strike a balance among various groups, while deliberating on the path
to be taken. Second, there must have been the rural-urban divide. The
CKMP members from relatively small towns had a religious upbringing.
The CKMP candidates who hoped to get elected in smaller cities had to
appeal to a religious electorate, which creates a difference in tone between
Türkeş’s writings at large and campaign documents targeted for a
city like Afyon, a province of half a million inhabitants with tD% living in
the countryside in ABCD.8
5 “... orta ü ğretim [sic] ve ö ğretmen okullarının her sınıfına IXslâm dini ve ahlâ k derslerinin
konulmasında büyü k fayda vardır.” Tanyu, G.
6 Tanyu, [.
7 Baykal and O` zdağ left the party after the Party Congress in EFGF, growing uncomfortable
with the shift to an increasingly Islamic tone. For a summary of the Congress and the
prelude to their departure, see Ferit Salim Sanlı, “Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisinden
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisine Tarihsel Sü reç, IXdeoloji ve Politika(EFGN – EFGF)” (Ankara,
Hacettepe University, JNE[), i[N–[O, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?
key=DPTyuyiwRPq_qvCPSqUBG-uYYHziDUE_pOaciNXX_wZKdxigJCNMYfJXPxVEfsPV.
8 Tü rkiye IXstatistik Kurumu, “EFGO Genel Nü fus Sayımı Veri Tabanı” (Tü rkiye IXstatistik Kurumu,
n.d.), https://archive.is/JNEJN[JEEFEjNN/http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/
rwservlet.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
bq
The “weekly nationalist political newspaper,” (Haftalık Milliyetçi
Siyası ̂ Gazete) Devlet, initially owned and edited by Halil O^ zyıldız and regarded
as the quasi-of1icial newspaper of the MHP, started publication on
t April ABCB, between the 1irst Congress of the MHP under its new name
and the general elections of ABCB, with the slogan “O Turk, come back to
yourself” (ey Türk kendine dö n).
As early as ABCB, criticisms of the Early Republican Era including Atatü
rk’s tenure, especially on the issue of religion, were overtly expressed
in publications oriented toward or run by the MHP. In the 1irst few issues
of Devlet, scholar of theology Yaşar Kutluay argues that the closing of religious
schools in the early years of the Republic only served to spread
unquali1ied religion teachers.9 Kutluay goes even further, arguing that
from AB5b onwards the government attempted to abolish Islam by closing
down religious schools.10 In the following decade after ABCB, these criticisms
were to be voiced in a wider scope and much stronger tone by the
new generation of nationalists.
The reopening of Hagia Sophia as mosque (achieved in 5656), a topic
of Islamist outcry, drew support from the nationalist camp as well. They
didn’t necessarily mince their words either. Turkist poet Arif Nihat Asya,
writing in ABCC, likened the opposers of the reopening to Çandarlı Halil
Pasha the Younger, who, according to him, tried to prevent Mehmed II
from conquering Constantinople.11 He asks, “what would you do, Fatih, if
you were in our shoes?”12 The implication was chilling, as Çandarlı was
executed shortly after the conquest.
§ M.L Criticisms of Turkish modernization
An all-too-common critique shared with the Islamists was against the application
of the principle of laicity in Turkey. The nationalist critique in
9 Yaşar Kutluay, “Tü rkiye’de Din Eğ itimi,” Devlet, April [, EFGF, H.
10 Yaşar Kutluay, “Okullarda Din Eğ itimi ve IXmam Hatip Okulları,” Devlet, April JE, EFGF, H.
11 Arif Nihat Asya, Onlar Bu Dilden Anlar, Politik Eserler E (Ankara: Didakta Yayınları, EF[N).
12 Asya.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
bb
this regard had started with light remarks on “the application” of the
principle of laicity and reached occasional declarations of “being bound
by nothing but divine laws”13 by the Idealist youth by ABF6. Nationalists
considered religion to be of utmost importance in economic development
and education.14 The slide to communism among the youth was blamed
in part on the lack of religion education.15 On Ülkücü Kadro, Cahit Baltacı
argues that a “wrong understanding of laicity” (yanlış laiklik anlayışı)
causes the spiritual aspect of education to be neglected, directing children
toward materialism.16 He added that: “The state can be laic, not the
nation, it is the main duty of the Ministry of Education to give religious
education.”17 Seyyid Ahmed Arvasi went so far as to suggest that there
was no laic state in history, ever.18 Such sentiments brought the nationalist
movement closer with the Islamists, though this ideological convergence
did not result in cooperation but 1ierce electoral competition and
constant, mutual accusations of disingenuousness.
Islamists and nationalists were similar in their evaluation of the Turkish
modernization. An accusation of “taklitçilik,” mimicry of the Western
culture was common.19 The Western-type education stripped the youth
of their own culture and values, making them vulnerable against foreign
in1luence, such as the ideology of communism.20 The root cause of the
current social, political and economic problems was traced as far back as
the Tanzimat reforms, which they thought were carried out by the intel-
13 “U` GD Genel Başkanı Ile Rö portaj,” Birliğe Çağrı, December O, EF[F, EO–EG.
14 Hü seyin Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü ,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, September EF[N,
E[.
15 Başaran, E[.
16 Cahit Baltacı, “Eğ itim: Milli Eğ itim Meselemiz,” Ülkücü Kadro, January E, EF[[, EE.
17 “Millet değ il devlet laik olur, MEB’in yeterli dini bilgi vermesi onun asli vazifesi.” Baltacı,
EE.
18 S. Ahmet Arvasi, “Dinimiz IXslamiyet E,” Ülkücü Kadro, April EO, EF[[, [.
19 Yusuf Ziya IXnan, “Gençlik Sorunu: II,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, February EF[E, EO.
20 IXnan, EO; Osman Turan, “IXlâhiyat Fakü ltesi Kapatılacakmış!,” Devlet, June J, EFGF, EJ.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
bD
lectuals who were under the in1luence of foreign cultures and ideologies.
21 Thus, they were far away from what is authentically “us,” and were
trying to impose upon the Turks the “Christian Western culture.”22
However, it should be noted that the nationalist criticism of the Turkish
modernization was ambiguous. On some instances it included criticisms
of the Atatürk-era, while at others, IYnönü was blamed for moving
away from religion and national values. In the case of the Nationalists Scienti
1ic Seminar in ABCB, which convened leading conservative academics,
the committee refrained from taking a direct aim at Atatürk. Authors only
mentioned that Atatü rk’s name was being used as “a tool of cultural revolution,”
in attacks against religion.23
Both the tone and frequency of their criticism intensi1ied over time
between ABCD–ABF6. In November ABtt, the owner of the Idealist magazine
Ülkücü Kadro Ahmet Karabacak announced that the days of politesse
against perpetrators of Westernization were over:
For a long time, those who ruled our nation destroyed our religion
by saying ‘We are Muslims, but we are not advocates of Sharia,’ our
nation by saying ‘We are Turks but not racist-Turanists,’ and our
culture by saying ‘We were from the East and came from the East.
But we are going to the West.’
…
We are not so merciful as to call those who have ruled Turkey for
two hundred years, with some exceptions, incompetent. People
21 “Elazığ ’daki Genç U` lkü cü lere Yapılan Baskı,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, December
EF[N, O.
22 “Elazığ ’daki Genç U` lkü cü lere Yapılan Baskı.”
23 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler (IXstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, EFGF), Hj.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
bC
who see that those who were our slaves yesterday passed us in
every 1ield will only attribute the title of traitor to these men.24
Although Karabacak associated vague slogans with the demise of the
nation, more detailed and just as wrathful criticisms existed as well. The
leader of the Ülkü Ocakları in May ABF6, Yaşar Yıldırım, identi1ied four factors
that were crucial for a nation, namely culture, politics, economics,
and military, and went on to opine on how each one of these were corrupted
in Turkey:
If we give an example from our own history; the Ottoman Empire,
for the 1irst time, surrendered her culture during the reign of
Mahmud II with the clothing revolution in AF5B; then her economy
with the British Trade Agreement in AFqF, her politics with the
Tanzimat Edict in AFqB, her military with the enlistment of non-
Turkish people in AFDA, and on top of all this, she signed her own
death sentence with the 'Düyûn-ı Umûmiye' in AFD5, which left the
state treasury to foreign control.25
In sum, Idealists saw a period of two hundred years of virtually endless
treason. The cultural degeneration that it accumulated brought the
24 “Uzun zamandan beri milletimizi idare edenler «Mü slümanız, ama şeriatçı değ iliz» diye
dinimizi, «Tü rkü z ama ırkçı-Turancı değ iliz» diye milletimizi, «Doğuluyduk ve Doğudan
geldik. Ama Batı’ya gidiyoruz» diye kü ltü rümü zü tahrip ettiler.”
“Biz, Tü rkiye’yi bazı mü stesnalar dışında, ikiyü z yıldır idare edenlere beceriksiz diyecek
kadar insa~lı değ iliz. Dün birer kö lemiz olanların bizi her sahada geçtiğ ini gö renler, bu
adamlara ancak hain ve satılmış sıfatını yakıştıracaklardır.” Ahmet Karabacak, “IXleri:
Milliyetçiler Arasındaki U` slûp Farklılıkları,” Ülkücü Kadro, November E, EF[[, J.
25 “Kendi tâ rihimizden bir misâ l verecek olursak; Osmanlı IXmparatorluğu ilk defa II.
Mahmut zamanında EHJF yılında kılık kıyâ fet devrimiyle kü ltü rünü , daha sonra
EHiH’deki IXngiliz Ticaret Anlaşmasıyla iktisâdiyatını, EHiF’da Tanzimat Fermânıyla
siyâsetini, EHOE’de Tü rk olmayanların orduya alınmaya başlamasıyla askeriyesini ve
bü tü n bunların ü stü ne EHOJ’de ‘Düyûn-ı Umûmiye’ diye adlandırılan ve devlet hazinesinin
yabancıların eline verilmesiyle idam fermanını kendi eliyle imzalamıştır.” “U` YD
Genel Başkanı Yaşar Yıldırım: Mü cadelemiz Nizâm-ı A… lem’e Kadar Sü recektir,” Birliğe
Çağrı, May G, EFHN, EG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
bt
nation to the brink of collapse -i.e., communist takeover- by ABF6. Although
an emphasis on cultural change and its allegedly devastating effects
are a point of convergence with Islamism, repeated emphases on the
ethnic identity should also be noted; the Idealist was not content with
and did not trust a non-Turk in government or military. Whether they
had converted to Islam or not could merely reduce the degree of suspicion
but was not enough to establish full trust.
!.#.$ Anti-Semitism
While a cultural collapse was observed by Idealists, the hegemony of
Western culture and leftist ideologies remained to be fully explained.
This is where anti-Semitist conspiracies entered the scene. Akyol notes
that against the superiority of the left in the intellectual sphere at the
time, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that considered everything to be a
plot by Jews and freemasons, major events and concepts such as “Renaissance,
Reform, industrialization, rationalism, psychoanalysis, Russian
revolution, Committee of Union and Progress, Turkish foreign policy.”26
An example that con1irms Akyol’s memories of the era is Türk Milliyetçi-
Toplumcu Doktrininin Umumi Esasları (General Principles of the Turkish
Nationalist-Socialist Doctrine) by Mürşid Altaylı, which, according to
Tanıl Bora, was the pen name of an Idealist economist, Mehmet O^zsoy.27
Writing in ABCB, O^ zsoy argued that Jews were the ones deteriorating morality
in the developed Western nations.28 They destroyed the “Christian
sharia” and turned the women of these nations into prostitutes on their
newspapers.29 In less developed countries, they were contributing to the
demise with their press and cinema.30 What is more, theft was allowed in
26 Akyol, Hayat Yolunda: Gençler İçin Anılar ve Öneriler, J[.
27 See footnote n. EN in Tanıl Bora, Cereyanlar: Türkiye’de Siyasî İdeolojiler (IXstanbul:
IXletişim Yayınları, JNE[), JF[.
28 Altaylı, Türk Milliyetçi-Toplumcu Doktrininin Umumi Esasları, GF.
29 Altaylı, GF.
30 Altaylı, GF.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
bF
Jewish faith, and the most useful tool to carry out theft was democracy.31
The author called for the deportation of all Jews, as well as Greeks and
Armenians.32
The difference of anti-Semitism of the Islamic right was that they attributed
the ascendancy of nationalism to Jews as well. In the fourth general
congress of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations,
it was declared in a co-declaration by the MTTB and the
secretariat of the federation that it was necessary to “put a stop to the
International Zionist movement and the racism movement, which are active
among the nations of the world and in1luential especially among the
youth, and which make people slaves to one another.”33 Cenkhan Yılmaz,
an author who published a series of books on Zionism and freemasonry
and closely tied the two together, argued freemasons were attempting to
eradicate Islam in Turkey.34
!.#.# The question of women
While more secular nationalists such as Atsız emphasized the high and
relatively free status of women in Turkic societies,35 as Islamization went
on, the new generation of nationalists started underlining family and
childbearing; women’s value was tied exclusively to these two. Any claims
to individuality apart from the family, on behalf of women, was considered
unnational and against religion. We shall hear from the famous nationalist
writer and ideologue of the Turkish-Islamic “Ideal,” Seyyid Ahmed
Arvasi:
31 Altaylı, Eii.
32 Altaylı, Oi.
33 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hi. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu GW Ekim GKkW - i Aralık GKkk (IXstanbul:
Fatih Gençlik Vakfı Matbaa IXşletmesi, n.d.), JHO.
34 Cenkhan Yılmaz, “Siyonizmin Yan Kuruluşlarından Masonluk II,” Ülkücü Kadro, April EO,
EF[[, Ei–Ej.
35 Atsız, Türk Ülküsü, GH.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
bB
We the Turkish nationalists will discipline our mothers and
daughters according to our national and spiritual values as well as
contemporary needs, above all, we will make them able to carry
out their motherhood successfully, and we will give them a job and
a profession that will not put their motherhood duties in the background.
We will provide social guarantees to the family and
women in line with the historical Turkish-Islamic culture and according
to the needs of the age. We will eliminate the conditions
that separate her from her family.”36
Such was the “sublime woman type.”37Arvasi reiterated that the basis
of Turkish society was family.38 He asserted that bringing up children was
just as valuable work as any other, and that housewives should not be
looked down on.39 Motherhood was thus considered the central role of
women. He charged any potential opposition to his framework with capitalist
and/or communist in1luence, which were responsible for detaching
women from family and bringing about feminism.40 Feminism in turn
led to “the abuse of women and children.”41
The backing of a pro-natal policy and opposition against birth control
marks yet another area of con1luence with the Islamic right. In Dokuz Işık,
Tü rkeş is quoted as saying “... birth control is against both Islam and our
national interests, as well as science.”42 Tü rkeş associates the size of population
with national power and in this vein, he repeatedly mentions his
36 “Biz Tü rk milliyetçileri, analarımızı, kızlarımızı millı̂ ve manevı̂ değerlerimiz içinde ve
çağdaş ihtiyaçlara gö re terbiye edecek, herşeyden önce annelik gö revini başarı ile
yü rü tecek hale getirecek, onu annelik gö revlerini ikinci plâ na itmeyecek bir iş ve meslek
sahibi yapacağ ız. Tarihı̂ Tü rk – IXslâm Kü ltü r çizgisi içinde ve çağın ihtiyaçlarına gö re aileye
ve kadına sosyal garantiler sağlıyacağ ız. Onu ailesinden koparan şartları bertaraf
edeceğ iz.” S. Ahmet Arvasi, “Çağ ımızda Kadının Yeri,” Ülkücü Kadro, February E, EF[[, [.
37 Arvasi, “Tü rk Milliyetçiliğ i ve IXslâmiyet,” [.
38 Arvasi, “Çağ ımızda Kadının Yeri,” G.
39 Arvasi, G–[.
40 Arvasi, G.
41 Arvasi, G.
42 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık, iGE.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
D6
goal of “the Turkey of A66 million” people.43 Consequently, campaigns for
birth control are approached with suspicion of foreign in1luence to keep
Turkey’s power in check.
In the declaration after the Nationalists’ Scienti1ic Seminar in ABCB,
which was led by nationalist academics and ideologues, the civil code is
heavily criticized on three accounts. First, it removed the obligation of
women to live with the parents of their husband.44 Second, although it
deems religious marriages as legitimate, the children born out of these
marriages are not recognized before law and are considered illegitimate.
45 Third, they added that “in terms of origin, the civil code is a product
of Christian civilization.”46 It can be argued that by ABCB, the ideological
basis of religious nationalism already established itself as the
dominant strand in the far-right, and that a substantially religious discourse
was ready to be dispersed to the young generation, who were going
to take it even further.
§ M.M Birliğe Çağrı (_`a`-_`bc): The zenith of Islamization
The magazine Birliğe Çağrı (ABtB–ABF6) (Call for Unity) of the Idealist
youth, which continued for a mere A6 issues between December ABtB and
July ABF6 is a vivid example of the Islamization of the MHP youth and
marks a contrast with the tone and content of the nationalist publications
from ABCD to the early ABt6s. As it was published by the Idealist youth, it
enables the exploration of different degrees of Islamization between generations.
The magazine starts its publication with a picture of the Ka'bah
on the cover, and an editorial titled "The goal is to establish the true order
43 Tü rkeş, Millî Doktrin Dokuz Işık.
44 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, iG.
45 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, iG.
46 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, iG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
DA
of God, and to make the Turk the human architect of this order."47 Their
movement was thus "a divine action."48 "Nizam-ı alem" (world order) and
"ilay-ı kelimetullah" (promoting God's religion) were now, as of ABtB,
catchphrases among the Idealists and were cited as their ultimate goal:
spreading God's word to establish his order.49
Although the MHP-oriented publications had at least one section or
an article devoted to matters of religion on almost every issue, hardly did
the Idealist youth of ABt6 express sentiments of Jihad like their successors
did Ao years later. It should be noted that although this Islamization was
set off by the leadership, it was truly internalized by the young party base
rather than Tü rkeş and his entourage. The youth went even beyond Tü -
rkeş’s original intent, and he ordered the closing down of another Idealist
magazine titled Nizam-ı Alem in ABtB, because they went too far in the
religious direction.50
As for Birliğe Çağrı, when Tü rkeş decided to write the lead article for
the July ABF6 issue, he made no mention of religion or Islam, which stood
in stark contrast to the rest of the magazine. Instead he opined on the
question of Turkish unity, speaking of “bringing all Turks on earth in one
nation, one state and under one 1lag.”51 Although the deputy leader of the
Idealist Path Association (U^lkü Yolu Derneği), Saffet Beştepe reasoned on
the same issue that establishing God’s order requires Turks to be powerful,
which in turn requires unity,52 this detail is only emphasized by a
youth leader and not Türkeş himself.
The approach to Turkish modernism and Early Republican Era turned
to an unmistakable animosity; laicism was explicitly targeted. The young
47 Birliğ e Çağ rı, “Çıkarken: Hedef Allah’ın Nizamını Kurmak,Tü rk’ü Bu Nizamın Beşeri
Mimarı Yapmaktır.,” Birliğe Çağrı, December O, EF[F, J.
48 “ilâhi bir aksiyon” J.
49 J; “Okuyucuya Mektup,” Birliğe Çağrı, December EJ, EF[F, J.
50 Erken, “The Construction of Nationalist Politics in Turkey: The MHP: EFGO-EFHN,” FH.
51 Alparslan Tü rkeş, “Başyazı: Tü rk Birliğ i,” Birliğe Çağrı, July G, EFHN, i.
52 “U` YD Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Saffet Beştepe Ile Sohbet: Biz Tü rk Birliğ ini Nizâm-ı A… lem
Için Mutlaka Varılması Gereken Bir Hedef Olarak Gö rüyoruz,” Birliğe Çağrı, July G, EFHN,
EN–EE.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
D5
Idealist authors of the magazine were speaking of “the purge policy of
revolutionary-western and secularist bureaucrats against Muslims in
Turkey and their representative groups,”53 arguing the Republic was
formed and established at the expense of Muslims and their rights. The
appraisal of Abdülhamid II and the construction of an image around him
as a political genius and nationalist-Islamist hero is also pronounced at
this time.54 They came to consider politics as the struggle of “iman” (faith)
versus “kü fü r” (blasphemy).55 Accordingly, the main slogan of the Idealist
youth has become “Kanımız Aksa da Zafer IYslâmın!” (The Victory Belongs
to Islam Even If Our Blood is to Spill).56
!.!.$ A new generation and their trauma
The intensi1ication of the violent clashes between the leftist and the
nationalist youngsters during the second half of the ABt6s is one of the
factors that explain the increased relevance of religion in the far-right nationalism.
Yenen mentions that according to estimates in the academic
literature, the lowest estimate of the number of dead due to political violence
in the ABt6s is D,666.57 Gourisse, citing Bozarslan, reports the number
as qb for ABtD, and A,BqB for only the 1irst nine months of ABF6.58 In
sum, all estimates point to a drastic increase in the number of victims of
53 “inkilapçı-batıcı ve de laikçi bü rokratların Tü rkiye’deki mü slümanlara ve onların
temsilcisi gruplara karşı gü ttü kleri tas~iye politikası” Mehmet O` zden, “Orta O` ğ retimde
Uygulanan Eğ itim Politikaları ve Bazı Gerçekler,” Birliğe Çağrı, December EJ, EF[F, j.
54 “Baharda Daha Geniş Bir Harekâ t Olacaktır,” Birliğe Çağrı, April E[, EFHN, [.
55 “Günlü k Hayatımızda Şu Hususlara Dikkat Etmeliyiz,” Birliğe Çağrı, December EJ, EF[F,
G.
56 “Baharda Daha Geniş Bir Harekâ t Olacaktır,” EG.
57 Yenen, “Legitimate Means of Dying: Contentious Politics of Martyrdom in the Turkish
Civil War (EFGH–EFHJ),” EO.
58 Benjamin Gourisse, “In the Name of the State. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and
the Genesis of Political Violence during the EF[Ns,” Turkish Studies, JNJE, E–J,
https://doi.org/EN.ENHN/EjGHiHjF.JNJE.EHHOJFO; Hamit Bozarslan, “Le Phénomène
Milicien, Une Composante de La Violence Politique Dans La Turquie Des Années EF[N,”
Turcica, no. iE (EFFF): EHO–Jjj.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
Dq
political violence from ABtD to ABF6. In every issue, Birliğ e Çağ rı included
a page of the list of “martyrs,”59 names and short backgrounds of nationalists
who have been killed in the time frame between the two issues of
the magazine. In such an environment, militants felt the need to make
sense of the deaths of their friends, as well as a constant threat to their
own life which they were willingly risking. Religious sentiments were
ideal to meet that need. An article titled “Breaking Down the Death Barrier”
on Birliğe Çağrı warned Idealists against fearing death, by reminding
that it is to God they were returning and that those who die for God
were the most blessed. The warning against reactions from ordinary people
on the insanity of the risks they were taking is also interesting to note:
Many members of the Muslim Turkish Nation who are negligent
or involved in treachery, with their narrow minds, are calling
those who are 1ighting for the worldwide Turkish-Islamic Order
and who are “fearlessly” walking toward bullets in this 1ight when
needed, “suckers.” And they try to trace the source of “fearlessness”
in “craziness.” After all, how could one run toward death in
vain when they could lead a long life full of pleasure?
People of this sort are either unbelievers or they have no idea of
the word of God.
…
What is making you “run toward bullets” that shocks those around
you, is your madly passion for “God’s Order.” If you believe, with
all your heart, that death is a rebirth and dying for God is the holiest
of rebirths, you will win victories.
…
59 For an analysis of the use of “martyr” in the EF[Ns by the far-right, see Yenen, “Legitimate
Means of Dying: Contentious Politics of Martyrdom in the Turkish Civil War (EFGH–
EFHJ).”
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
Db
Let the negligent speak behind you in vain…60
The tone and content of this quote is typical of all issues of Birliğe
Çağrı. Religion thus emerges as the way to deal with the brutal con1lict
environment Idealists were actively participating in. In case they would
be attracted by the idea of leading a calmer and safer life, they were reminded
that in death lied the biggest prize, blessing of the God. All they
had to do, then, was to turn a deaf ear to the voices of people close to
them who discouraged their militancy and keep 1ighting the good 1ight.
In addition to deaths, imprisonment and torture was common, the
mental toll of which also help explain the passionate way in which they
expressed their religious beliefs. To exemplify, in an article titled “Our
struggle and Prisons” the magazine announced that the concepts of
crime, criminal or punishment are only meaningful for them within an
Islamic framework.61 Thus began a total rejection of the secular system,
re1lected in the words of the president of the Idealist Youth Association,
Hasan Çağlayan: “… all superstitious, human-made systems are our enemy,”
and that the solution was “the surrendering of all social institutions
to God.”62 The arrival point of this Islamized nationalism is in tension
60 “Mü slüman Tü rk Milletinin ga~let, hıyanet içindeki pek çok ferdi, alemşumü l Tü rk-IXslâm
Nizamı için kavga veren ve bu kavgada gerekirse ‘korkusuzca’ kurşunun ü zerine
yü rüyenleri kendi dar mantıklarıyla ‘enayi’ olarak nitelemekte. ‘Korkusuzluğun’
kaynağ ını ise ‘delilikte’ aramakta. O` yle ya, uzun bir hayat, zevk sefa varken, daha genç
bir yaşta ‘pisi pisine’ ö lüme koşulur mu?
Böyleleri ya inançsızdır, ya da Cenab-I Allah (C.C.) ın. bildirdiklerinden haberleri yoktur.
Seni çevrendekileri hayrete dü şü recek şekilde ‘kurşunun ü zerine yü rü ten,’ korkusuzluğun
kaynağ ı ‘Allah Nizâmına’ delicesine tutkunluğundur. Sen ö lümü n yeni bir doğ uş
ve Allah (C.C.) yolunda ö lümü n bu doğuşların en kutlusu olduğuna bü tü n kalbinle iman
ettiğ in müddetçe zaferlerle kucaklaşacaksın.
Varsın ga~iller konuşsunlar…” N.G. IXslâmoğlu, “O` lüm Duvarını Aşmak,” Birliğe Çağrı, December
EJ, EF[F, j–O.
61 “Mü cadelemiz ve Hapishaneler,” Birliğe Çağrı, December O, EF[F, Ej–EO.
62 “Bü tün batıl beşerı̂ sistemler bizim dü şmanımızdır.” “Toplumun bü tün mü esseselerinin
Allah’a teslim olması..” “U` GD Genel Başkanı Ile Röportaj,” EG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
DD
with the original intent of the Idealists in the ABC6s to create a ‘doctrinaire’
political right, which is inevitably a ‘superstitious, human-made
system.’
§ M.U Policy areas
!.&.$ Legal matters
In the period ABCD-ABF6, declarations of secular law as super1icial and null
grew frequent over time. In ABtt, theologist Yümni Sezen (ABqF–) wrote
in Ülkücü Kadro that “The source of law is neither nature nor society. It
can only be Allah.”63 If one were to accept God did not exist, then it meant
total relativism in terms of what is just or unjust.64
In a similar vein, the members of the Nationalists’ Scienti1ic Seminar
in ABCB criticized the Turkish penal code, arguing that it restricted teaching
and learning of Islam, contained no de1inition of secularism which resulted
in arbitrary penalties, and “crimes against morals and honor”
(ahlaka ve namusa karşı suçlar) were not penalized harshly enough.65
They argued that Islam was being punished, and added: “religion is unifying,
secularism is divisive,”66 illustrating strong points of convergence
between the MHP nationalism and Islamism.
!.&.# Economic policy
As late as ABCB, Erbakan, the future leader of a series of Islamist political
parties, was seen as a benign force by the MHP. On the occasion of the
1iercely contested elections of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry of Turkey in ABCB, the nationalist weekly Devlet argues that the
63 Yümni Sezen, “Kendi Kendini Yıpratan Mü esseseler,” Ülkücü Kadro, November E, EF[[, j.
64 Sezen, j.
65 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, jN–jE.
66 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, FE–FJ.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
DC
center-right of Demirel does not want Erbakan to be elected president for
two reasons: that the import traders do not want our national industry
to develop, and that most of Turkey’s imports was controlled by 1irms
belonging to minorities.67 “The real issue” was the struggle between “national
capital” and “non-national” capital.68 Demirel and his Justice Party
was working for the latter, while the MHP and Erbakan strived for the
former.
On the issue of economics, nationalists were 1ighting a battle at two
fronts. On the one hand, they were accused of accommodating capitalists
by the left. On the other, the center-right charged their economic programme
with socialism. They thus emphasized the communitarian aspects
of the Islamic perspective on economics against the left, and the
protection of property rights in Islam, which they are bound by, against
accusations of socialism.
The promise of social equality and justice of the left was one of the
main areas that needed a counterargument for nationalists. Islam came
to the aid in this regard as well, as it has been argued that Islam already
“includes both the right to property and a just distribution of wealth.”69
A series of measures existed in Islam toward this end: Zakat (a compulsory
form of alms), prohibition of gaining money off interest, luxury and
pomposity which encourage investment, trigger economic development
and lead to solidarity instead of class struggle.70
67 “IXç Olaylar • Dü şünceler: Odalar Birliğ i,” Devlet, June J, EFGF, H; “IXç Olaylar • Dü şünceler:
Mü cadelenin Asıl Kaynağ ı,” Devlet, June J, EFGF, H.
68 “IXç Olaylar • Dü şünceler: Mü cadelenin Asıl Kaynağ ı,” H.
69 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EFF.
70 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EFH–JNH.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
Dt
Nationalist author Küçükibrahimoğlu argued that owning property
was “human nature;” communism was in denial against it, while capitalism
made it the ultimate priority.71 Both were wrong, and he presented
the individual-society balance in Islamic economics as follows:
… The Islamic creed does not accept that the wealth and real estate
at their disposal are given to Muslims only for their own
pleasure and needs, therefore, there is no right to spend wealth
with absolute, unconditional freedom. On the contrary, it orders
people to act within the limits de1ined by Allah, the true owner of
all property.
... spending wealth in any way as one sees 1it, the poor being left
without help, and the resulting social imbalances are out of question.
In any case, the goal of Islam is not to set boundaries to right
to property, rather, it aims to keep it legitimate by establishing individual,
familial and societal regulations.
If we remain within religious standards under these beliefs and
feelings, we see that the system that respects and grants the most
sacred status to the right to individual property is to be found only
among the economic, civil, and 1inancial principles of the religion
of Islam, which is the order of Allah.72
71 Osman Nuri Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, “Din Devlet Millet: IXslâmda Ferdi Mü lkiyet Hakkı,”
Ülkücü Kadro, February EO, EF[[, F.
72 “IXslâm akidesi mü slümanlara elleri altındaki servetin ve emlâkin, sadece kendi zevk ve
ihtiyaçları için onlara verildiğ ini, dolayısıyle mutlak bir hü rriyetle tasarruf hakkını
kayıtsız şartsız bir şekilde kendis-ine ait kabul etmez. Aksine, asıl mü lk sahibi Allah'ın
emrettiğ i ö lçü ler içinde hareket edilmesini emreder.
… dilediğ i yolda ve şekilde servet sarfedilmesi, fukaranın yardımsız kalması ve
dolayısıyle sosyal dengesizlikler de mevzuu bahs değ ildir. Zaten IXslâmın hede~i, mü lkiyete
sınır koymak değ il, ferdi, ailevi ve içtimai dü zenlemelerle ve insan yaratılışında
mevcud olan bu hissi meşruiyyet çizgisi içine sokarak orada kalmasını sağlamaktır.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
DF
Against the socialist critique that religion leaves problems of social
inequality to be judged after death, Küçükibrahimoğlu argued that this
was not true, Islam “placed responsibilities on society and state” to remedy
inequalities in wealth distribution.73 The idea that social equality was
‘already’ part of Islam and thus national culture, and that inequality arose
due to these not being applied properly also served an offensive function:
it left the incompetence of centrist governments as the reason of social
inequality and enmity against wealth.
What were, then, these responsibilities of the state to ensure equality,
as de1ined in Islam? Küçükibrahimoğlu provides a signi1icantly communitarian
list of tasks: providing a job to every citizen, ensuring fair salaries
in all sectors, 1inancially supporting the poor and the unable, collecting
Zakat [emphasis added], nationalizing sectors when there is public
interest in doing so (mentions mines because they provide too high profits)
and 1inally instating additional taxes in extraordinary situations.74
The argument that Islam did not carry much weight in the MHP ideology
beyond providing morality is repeated throughout this thesis. The
evidence in this subsection might seem contradictory with the overarching
theme. The appearance of detailed and Islamicized policy discussions
in MHP-oriented publications can be contextualized in two ways. First,
their frequency increases over time, as well as in the writings of the
young party base as opposed to of1icial campaign documents. Second, the
arguments in these articles should not be taken at face value. Küçükibrahimoğlu’s
writing is, for example, from ABtt and a ‘religious matters’ column
on a magazine that was not preoccupied with Islam in the rest of its
Bu iman ve hisler altında dini ö lçü ler içinde kaldıkça, ferdi mü lkiyet hakkına en çok
kudsiyet izafe edilen ve en çok hü rmet gö steren sistemin, Allah nizamı olan IXslâm dininin
iktisadi, mü lkı̂ ve mali esasları arasında mevcud olduğunu gö rüyoruz." Kü çü kibrahimoğlu,
F.
73 Osman Nuri Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, “Din Devlet Millet: IXçtimaı̂ Huzur ve Muvazenenin Dini
Esasları,” Ülkücü Kadro, March E, EF[[, F.
74 Osman Nuri Kü çü kibrahimoğlu, “Din Devlet Millet: IXçtimaı̂ Huzur ve Muvazenenin Dini
Esasları,” Ülkücü Kadro, May E, EF[[, G.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
DB
sections. In a way, there was an isolated space allocated to religion, where
the MHP’s stance was to be proven to be in line with Islam and the reader
was to be educated about Islam in general. Neither Ülkücü Kadro as a political
magazine nor the MHP as a political party seemed concerned with
instilling the responsibility to collect Zakat on the state.
Openly religious policies in all areas could be defended as realistic alternatives
only by the young Idealist at the dawn of ABF6s, a generation
born between mid-ABD6s to mid-ABC6s, who arrived in urban centers for
university education into already extremely polarized campuses and experienced
the height of violent con1lict with the left. Their internalization
of an Islamized nationalism was at Türkeş’s dismay. The split from the
previous generation of relatively more secular nationalism becomes increasingly
evident in the decades that followed, when the leaders of the
Idealist Hearths at the end of ABt6s such as Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu (born ABDb)
or Hasan Çağlayan separated from the MHP to form an even more Islamized
party in ABB5.
!.&.! Foreign policy
The Idealists called for greater cooperation among Islamic nations.
Ülkücü Kadro voiced support for the Palestinian cause, calling for the government
to allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to open an of1ice
in Ankara.75 It should be noted however, these proposals were presented
to maximize national interest and lacked a Jihadist theme. The support
for Palestine was suggested on the grounds that Turkey should support
Arabic causes 1irst to get their support in turn on the Cyprus con1lict.
Just as Islamists opposed Turkey’s membership to the European
Communities on religious grounds, Türkeş also argued against it saying
Turkey would lose its national identity:
... If Turkey is included in such a union, it will lose its cultural identity,
its own belief system, national and spiritual values, and the
75 Babü r O` zbek, “Dışta: Filistin Meselesinin Dünü ve Bugünü ,” Ülkücü Kadro, March E, EF[[,
[.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
C6
Turkish Nation will face the danger of losing its quali1ications as a
nation because of cultural imperialism.
In conclusion, when the issue is taken into consideration from a
political and cultural point of view, we can never support the inclusion
of Turkey as a state among the United States of Christian
Europe and thus jeopardizing our independence, which we
achieved DF years ago with the blood of our saintly martyrs.
…
To sum up, Turkey should not join such an organization that has
no other meaning than an extinction trap for itself. However, she
should establish a partnership with the Islamic States around her
by taking the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as her guide.76
Türkeş’s message for greater Islamic cooperation was taken home by
the Islamist youth. The deployment of Soviet army to Afghanistan
sparked outrage among the Idealist youth, increasing the sense of communist
takeover threat in Turkey as well. They invited members of the
Mujahedeen to Turkey, published their declarations, wrote articles, held
protests and called the Turkish government to action in support.77 One
of the Afghan invitees compared the activities of Afghan communists just
76 “... Bö yle bir birliğin içinde Tü rkiye’nin yer alması halinde kendi kü ltü r benliğini, kendi
inanç sistemini, milli ve manevi değerlerini yitirecek, kü ltü r emperyalizminin neticesinde
Tü rk Milleti millet olma vası~larını kaybetme tehlikesi ile karşı karşıya
gelecektir.
Netice olarak, siyasi ve kü ltü rel açıdan mesele ele alındığ ında, Hristiyan Avrupa Birleşik
Devletlerinin arasında Tü rkiye’nin bir eyalet olarak yer almasını ve böylece OH yıl önce
aziz şehitlerimizin kanları dökü lerek elde ettiğ imiz bağ ımsızlığ ımızın tehlikeye sokulmasına
asla taraftar olamayız.”
“Netice olarak Tü rkiye kendisi için bir yok olma tuzağ ından başka bir anlam taşımayan
böyle bir teşkilata girmemelidir. Ancak Tü rk-IXslâm sentezini kendisine rehber ederek
kendi çevresindeki IXslâm Devletleri ile birlikte bir ortaklık kurmalıdır.” Mehmet Ercişli,
“U` lkü cü Toplumcu Dü zende Tü rkiye: Tü rkiye Ekonomisi,” Ülkücü Kadro, April E, EF[[, EN.
77 “Başyazı: Kahrolsun Sovyet Emperyalizmi!,” Birliğe Çağrı, January EFHN, i; “Afgan IXşgali
Protesto Ediliyor,” Birliğe Çağrı, January i, EFHN, H; “Komünizm Akıttığ ı Kanda Boğulacak!,”
Birliğe Çağrı, July G, EFHN, j–O; “Baharda Daha Geniş Bir Harekâ t Olacaktır,” j–O.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
CA
before Soviet invasion and Turkish communists, concluding that the process
is similar and that Turkey is in danger as well.78 Idealists agreed and
they made it explicit that part of the reason they were organizing protests
against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was “to strike fear into the hearts
of the Muscovite lackeys” in Turkey.79 Since the invasion in Afghanistan
was made possible thanks to collaborators from within, they had to deter
and diminish communists at home to avoid the fate abroad.80
In the case of Iran, however, Idealists were not as enthusiastic about
the Islamic state. Khomeini’s consolidation of power in Iran was taking
place simultaneously with developments in Afghanistan. Although the
magazine did announce that Iranian revolution “could have been the beginning
of an Islamic Renaissance,” they observed it turned into “Khomeini’s
dictatorship.”81 Birliğe Çağrı accused Khomeini of oppressing the
Turkish-speaking people of Iran (for them, Turks proper), and sided with
Shariatmadari (himself a cleric as well).82
78 The invitee was a certain “Mangal Hü seyin,” reportedly from the cultural committee of
the organization Hezbi Islami. “Baharda Daha Geniş Bir Harekâ t Olacaktır,” j–O.
79 “Komünizm Akıttığ ı Kanda Boğulacak!,” j–O.
80 “Komünizm Akıttığ ı Kanda Boğulacak!,” j–O.
81 “Sahte IXslâm Monarşisinden IXslâm Cumhuriyetine,” Birliğe Çağrı, January EFHN, G.
82 “Şah-Humeyni-Şeriatmedari: Yeni IXran Anayasası ve Şeriatmedari,” Birliğe Çağrı, December
EJ, EF[F, H–F.

Cq
$
MHP and Islam: Divergences
§ U.J The theoretical sphere
Lacking an agreement on who constitutes the nation, it was inevitable
that there would be disagreements between Islamists and nationalists.
To begin with, a common Islamist position on nationalism was that it was
a modern and malign invention, while nationalists argued the idea of incompatibility
between nationalism and Islam emerged with the birth of
the Islamist movement in Turkey during WWI.1 They resented a lack of
emphasis on or an outright denial of the Turkish identity in the Islamic
right,2 even though they were natural allies in their struggle against communism.
Following the de1inition of the nation was the debate about which ideology
was natural and which was a modern creation, with the latter labelled
invalid to guide the society. In response to the argument that nationalism
was something very recent and super1icial, nationalist linguist
Necmettin Hacıeminoğlu pointed to AAth century, when a Turkic scholar,
1 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EFE.
2 Hü seyin Başaran, “Mü cadelenin Yönü : Politik Buhran ve Gençlik,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik
Dergisi, October EF[N, EF.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
Cb
Mahmud al-Kashgari said to the Abbasi Caliph in his seminal Dīwān
Lughāt al-Turk that Turks were granted political power by God.3 By the
same token, Arvasi thought history showed that “humans have always existed
in separate circles of culture on earth.”4 “Nations and international
relations” were the constant throughout human history.5
Islamists who were allegedly requesting a theocratic government
were portrayed as belonging to the previous century and as a malign in-
1luence on the youth.6 They were not conscious of the reality of nations,
running after the dream of the caliphate, while the nationalists thought
the only realistic goal would be increased cooperation among Muslim nations.
Thus, Islamists con1licted with “modern civilization.”7 Criticisms of
this nature were common from the mid-ABC6s to early ABt6s but were virtually
nonexistent in the late ABt6s due to a wider and more religious
youth base and an increasingly salient Islamist movement.
Although united in their criticism of Westernization, their explanations
of the Ottoman demise offer insights into the divisions between the
two camps. While Islamists cite “moving away from religion” as the main
cause of decay, nationalists, not denying this, still underline non-Turkish
of1icials and them being non-Turkish causing the decline.8 Whether the
high-ranking bureaucrats were Muslim or not did not matter, the non-
Turk was approached with suspicion, hence the common criticisms of the
Devshirme system.
3 Necmettin Hacıeminoğlu, Milliyetçilik Ülkücülük Aydınlar (Ankara: Tö re-Devlet Yayınevi,
EF[G), iO.
4 “Tarihin basit bir incelemesi dahi bize gö stermektedir ki, yeryü zünde insanlar daima
farklı kü ltü r daireleri durumunda bulunmaktadırlar.” S. Ahmet Arvasi, “IXnsan ve Cemiyet
Gö rü şümü z -j-,” Ülkücü Kadro, November E, EF[[, [.
5 “Kısacası, insanlık tarihinin değ işmez gerçeğ i, daima sahnesinde «mil-letleri ve milletlerarası
ilişkileri» bulundurmasıdır.” Arvasi, [.
6 Mehmet Başaran, “U` lkü ve Doktrin,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, December EF[N, Ei.
7 Başaran, Ei.
8 Mehmet Başaran, “Milliyetçi Toplumcu Işık Altında Tü rkiye’nin Kurtuluş Kavgası,” Türkiye
Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, August EF[N, EO.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
CD
Zeybek argues that the failure of Turkish modernization was due to
Turks moving away from the “national ideal” (milli ülkü) and “imitating
the West” (batı taklitçiliğ i).9 It is interesting to note that writing in ABtB,
Zeybek considers religion to be a central part of the national ideal, a constitutive
part and just as important as the ethnic identity. However, if the
national ideal is “to spread God’s name to establish god’s order”10 the
question of why, for example, the ‘national’ ideals of Saudis and Turks
should be different remains a problem, which in turn leads Idealists to
the notion that Turks are superior and godsend.
In the radio speeches for the ABCC Partial Senate Elections campaign,
most of the CKMP speeches, including that of Tü rkeş, end with “God Bless
the Turks.” (Tanrı Tü rkleri Korusun).11 The use of Tanrı instead of Allah
is an early era habit in the nationalist movement and signals a more secular/
nationalist approach to Islam. Islamists usually ridiculed the use of
Tanrı instead of Allah, counting it also as proof that their nationalist opponents
are not genuine believers. Tü rkeş put the emphasis on morality
and not religion in these election speeches. In contrast, Hikmet Tanyu, a
member of the General Congress of the CKMP, stated that “the reintroduction
of the Hagia Sophia as mosque is long overdue.”12 It is observed
that the degree of emphasis on religion was not uniform among the CKMP
candidates, and that these sorts of 1lirtations with the Islamic right are
present as early as ABCC.
It is commonly asserted that the political power of the MHP was disproportionate
to its vote and number of representatives in the parliament,
as its youth wing was the main actor in the ongoing street clashes
with the left. The Islamist youth who sided with Erbakan’s political parties
mostly tried to steer clear of the ongoing violent con1lict. The MTTB,
9 Zeybek, “Milli U` lkü ,” Ej.
10 Zeybek, Ej.
11 CKMP NİN h. HAZİRAN – GKWW Tarihinde Yapılan Kısmi Senato Seçimleri Münasebetiyle
Yaptığı Radyo Konuşmaları (Ankara: C.K.M.P. Yayınları, n.d.), Ei–EG.
12 “Ayasofya’nın ibadete açtırılacağ ı vaadi çok gecikmiştir.” CKMP NİN h. HAZİRAN – GKWW
Tarihinde Yapılan Kısmi Senato Seçimleri Münasebetiyle Yaptığı Radyo Konuşmaları, GO.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
CC
nation’s largest student organization at the time and in effective Islamist
control from the early ABt6s, declared in ABtC that violent student incidents
did not conform to its principles as a “mode of action.”13 According
to them, the militants on the street have become advocates of "man-made
ideologies."14 MTTB youth directed “their hatred towards the root of superstitious
life.”15
&.$.$ Are you a Muslim or Turk ?irst?
IYskender O^ ksü z (ABbD- ), a Yale educated chemist and a devoted nationalist
writer, took on a very common rhetorical device employed in the Islamic
right against nationalists:
The pan-Islamist will use the Muslim - non-Muslim distinction instead
of the oppressor - oppressed: "Are you on the side of Muslims
or non-Muslims?..." In Turkey, in qB.B million cases out of b6
million, the answer to this question is: "Muslims!" “Then why
don't you join us?”… And a few months later, a type of person who
can compete with communists in hostility to Turkish nationalism
and incitement to sectarianism and regionalism may emerge.16
13 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW (IXstanbul:
Zafer Matbaası, EF[G), O.
14 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, O.
15 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, O.
16 “Siyasi ümmetçi, ezen - ezilen yerine mü slüman - gayri - mü slim ayrımını kullanacaktır:
«Mü slümandan mı, yoksa mü slüman olmayandan mı yanasın?..» Tü rkiye’de bu sorunun
cevabı da jN milyonda iF’F milyon ihtimalle tektir: «Mü slümandan!». «O halde bize
neden katılmıyorsun?»… Ve birkaç ay sonra Tü rk Milliyetçiliğ i’ne dü şmanlıkta, mezhep
ve bö lgecilik kışkırtmacılığ ında komü nistlerle yarış eden bir tip doğabilir.” O` ksü z wrote
using the pen name Ayhan Tuğcugil. Also note the aspiration for a well-de~ined, ~irm
doctrine in the titles of nationalist books, which in this case is “The Turkish Nationalist
Thought System: Theory.” Ayhan Tuğ cugil, Türk Milliyetçiliği Fikir Sistemi: Teori (Ankara:
Tö re-Devlet Yayınevi, EF[[), [i.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
Ct
As exempli1ied here by O^ksüz, nationalists resented the question Islamist
activists directed at potential recruits, which aimed at underplaying
the value of ethnic identity. If both parties were Muslim, why the need
for the Turkist talk? In their effort to build an order based on nothing but
Islam, O^ztürk accused Islamists of trying to form a scholastic order.17 According
to the author, not only Islam did not permit this, but it also meant
“promoting the Catholic mentality under the pretext of Islam.”18 He argued
that scholasticism stood for the opposite of the scienti1ic method; it
was based on anything but observation.19
The reason why the author considered a single Islamic state ideal in
con1lict with Islam itself is that it strived to assimilate various nations
into one; Islam envisioned the “brotherhood of Muslim nations,” not “the
encaging of Islam in a single nationality.”20 It was not a realistic goal either,
with O^ksü z remarking sarcastically that a global Islamic state that
melts nationalities under the single framework of Ummah would only
take “a few thousand years” to form.21
Dündar Taşer, Tü rkeş’s close con1idant and right-hand man, made
similar remarks on Islamist activism in general and MTTB in particular:
“When it was the oldest and strongest student organization, they started
a provocative debate of ‘are you a Turkish-Muslim or a Muslim-Turk.’”22
In one of the most symbolic moments in its history, the MTTB replaced
the grey wolf on its logo with a book which symbolized Qur’an in
December ABtD.23 They argued that all Turkish states in history dropped
pre-Islamic symbols and the grey wolf after adopting Islam.24 It was with
17 Tuğ cugil, EEG.
18 “IXslam kisvesi altında katolik zihniyetini telkin” Tuğ cugil, EEG.
19 Tuğ cugil, ENE–J.
20 See the footnote on Tuğ cugil, EFN–FE.
21 See the footnote on Tuğ cugil, EFN–FE.
22 Dündar Taşer, Mesele, IXkinci Baskı (Ankara: Tö re-Devlet Yayınevi, EF[i), Ji[.
23 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, EGF.
24 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EGF.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
CF
the Westernization in the ABth century that the grey wolf made a comeback,
partly due to the preaching of Turanism by Western turcologists.25
While they were accused of reactionarism, the Islamists thus considered
themselves to be restoring things to their original state.
§ U.L Criticisms against Alparslan Tü rkeş
&.#.$ ”Why isn’t one of the Nine Lights Islam?”
Almost nowhere else is the split between Islamism and Türkeş’s ideology
more clearly observable than the booklet İslâmi Hareket ve Türkeş, authored
by a prominent Islamist lawyer from the Nur movement, Bekir
Berk,26 in the form of an interview conducted by N. Mustafa Polat. It was
published in ABCB and distributed for free with the weekly political newspaper
İttihad. It is a focused and aggregated example of the Islamist critique
of Tü rkeş and warrants a discussion at large.
Berk starts out by distinguishing between “mass parties” (kitle partileri)
and “ideological parties” (ideolojik partiler), assigning the MHP to
the latter category, which, he argues, are dominated by strong leaders.27
The author then starts quoting and analyzing Türkeş’s interviews from
earlier years, especially the period following the coup d’état of ABC6. Tü -
rkeş’s discourse was evidently more secular before his participation in
multiparty politics, and the authors are quick to employ his quotes to argue
that his recent overtures to religious voters is disingenuous. To exemplify,
Türkeş is quoted as mentioning “how the burqa has engulfed the
25 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, EGF.
26 IXslamcı Dergiler Projesi, “Bekir Berk,” IXslamcı Dergiler Projesi, accessed January EN, JNJJ,
https://web.archive.org/web/JNJJNEENEjNEjN/https://katalog.
idp.org.tr/yazarlar/JEG[/bekir-berk.
27 Bekir Berk and N. Mustafa Polat, İslâmi Hareket ve Türkeş (Güneş Matbaası T.A.Ş, EFGF),
[–H.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
CB
country in a 1ire black as night.”28 He reportedly defended that the call to
prayer should be recited in Turkish and the Qur’an should also be read in
Turkish.29 For the authors, these measures amounted to a type of secularism
that would actively intervene in religion, and the reading of Qur’an
primarily in Turkish meant “a desire to paw at the Word of God.”30
On another instance in ABC6, in a conference, Tü rkeş declared they
will “counter Sheikhdom” (Şeyhliğe karşı koyacağ ız), and that the Caliphate
is an outdated and defunct institution.31 He explicitly said we are
on our way “to the Western science and culture.”32 Berk argues that Tü rkeş’s
remarks could not have been instigated by the then President Cemal
Gürsel, as Türkeş continued along the same lines even after getting expelled
from the National Union Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi): in a retraction
he sent to the London Times in ABC5, he denied he “wanted to
build a Turkey based on Islamic principles and culture.”33
Berk turns the attention to ABCD when Tü rkeş was elected leader of
the CKMP and argues that his attitude toward religion did not change.
Just a few months after starting his tenure as the party leader, he accused
the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) of “fueling religiosity” (dindarlığ ı
körüklemek)34. According to Berk, Islam and secularism were con1licting,
a defender of one would be against the other.35 While Tü rkeş kept accusing
those who say, “it’s all about religion” (her şey dinden ibaret) of either
ignorance or malice, Berk reiterated that “it’s all about religion, Islam,
faith, Qur’an. Those who try to demolish the Turkish nation are those
who are attacking religion.”36 Berk, emblematic of Islamism, insists on
28 “Çarşafın nasıl kapkara bir yangın halinde bü tün yurdu sardığ ı” Berk and Polat, EE.
29 Berk and Polat, EJ.
30 “Allah’ın kelâmına pençe atmak isteme.” Berk and Polat, Ej.
31 Berk and Polat, EO.
32 “Batı ilim ve kü ltü rüne” Berk and Polat, EH.
33 “IXslâmi esaslara ve kü ltü re mü stenid bir Tü rkiye kurmak istediğ ini” Berk and Polat, EF.
34 Berk and Polat, JN.
35 Berk and Polat, JE.
36 “Her şey dinden, IXslâmdan, imândan, Kur’andan ibarettir. Tü rk Milletini yıkmaya
çalışanlar dine saldıranlar.” Berk and Polat, JG.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
t6
stemming an ideology directly and solely from religion. In contrast, Tü-
rkeş considers religion as a bundle of principles, some of which could be
utilized to form the basis of his ideology. For the rest of the principles, he
does not recognize any responsibility that goes beyond merely avoiding
their violation.
It is in this context that, for example, Berk is appalled by the idea of
“Imams with a National Ideal” (Millı̂ U^lkü sahibi din adamı), a man of religion
was to preach the same thing regardless of location, his only Ideal
being religion.37 All he saw in Türkeş’s ideology was “the dei1ication of
Society like Gökalp did” instead of a sincere submission to Islam. Nine
Lights doctrine was not “the only third way” to capitalism and communism,
there also stood “the way of Islam.” To him, it was no coincidence
that in the famous nationalist slogan of “the Pride and Consciousness of
Turkishness and the Morality and Virtue of Islam,” Islam came second,
and after all, why was Islam not even one of the B Lights?38 The answer
was clear to Bekir Berk, this was not an Islamic ideology or movement;
its claims of being one were illegitimate and dishonest.
&.#.# FG May HIJK: The never-ending controversy
The disagreements between the Idealists and the Islamic right have not
been limited to the ideological sphere. After Türkeş’s efforts to consolidate
the far-right in one political party failed, with Erbakan founding an
Islamist party, the two movements became bitter rivals, contesting what
was at the time an already limited far-right vote. Thus, defending Tü rkeş
against accusations of racism and of being anti-democratic as well as a
coup-plotter is a recurrent theme in the nationalist writing. As the
CKMP/MHP was dependent on Türkeş’s charisma to be successful, his
record had to be proven clean time and again. In a book written by Tü-
rkeş’s close associates Fuat Uluç and Muzaffer O^ zdağ in ABCD to defend
Türkeş against criticisms, the coup d’état of ABC6 is called “The Reform of
37 Berk and Polat, iG.
38 Berk and Polat, ON, Oi–Oj.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
tA
5t May ABC6,”39 which is a surprisingly positive way of referring to it for a
political party that went for far-right votes. As late as ABCt, Türkeş is still
speaking of “the spirit of 5t May,”40 which indicates that he is referring to
the coup d’état of ABC6 as something that was initially positive that should
have been defended but was later corrupted by the adversaries of nationalist
of1icers.
The implication of Türkeş in the ousting and eventual execution of the
right-wing ‘hero’ Adnan Menderes stirred debate for the remainder of
Türkeş’s life; the matter could not be closed once and for all. Regardless
of the degree of persuasiveness of his explanations of the event, the yoke
of involvement in a coup d’état, not least as the announcer of the declaration
on state radio, has proved impossible to throw off.
&.#.! Racism/tribalism debate
One of the major battlefronts in the contestation for the far-right vote as
well as in the ideological sphere was on whether Tü rkeş and his party is
racist or not. Naturally it is also the area where the most effort was made
to defend Tü rkeş and nationalists. To exemplify, authors of the book in
defense of Türkeş, Uluç and O^zdağ, feel compelled to state that Türkeş’s
de1inition of the nation is not based on ancestry/ethnicity:
“… Everyone who says I am a Turk and is attached to Turkish culture
was included in his sacred nation de1inition. His understanding
of nation was the understanding of Mustafa Kemal – Gökalp.
For Tü rkeş, Turkish nationality is the consciousness of belonging
39 Fuat Uluç and Muzaffer O` zdağ , Alparslan Türkeş (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, EFGO), i.
40 Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, Genel Başkan Alparslan Türkeş’in VIII. Büyük Kongreyi
Açış Konuşması, F–EN.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
t5
to the Turkish Nation. This understanding was unifying, accumulating,
expanding, and uplifting. Tü rkeş was against the understanding
that tied nationality to a single factor and lineage.”41
This, however, runs against Türkeş’s own de1inition in the ABt5 edition
of Dokuz Işık. Although Uluç and O^zdağ underline that he considered everybody
who identi1ied with the Turkish nation and culture as Turks, Tü -
rkeş is on the record as counting “ancestry” (soy) among the factors that
de1ine a nation.
From an Islamist perspective, religion established by far the largest
commonality in Turkey. An MTTB publication argued the case as follows:
When there is an evident brotherhood of Islam that made Abdullahs,
Mehmets, Alis 1ight side by side against the enemy in Karta,
Galicia, Yemen and Çanakkale, one cannot say “blessed is our race”
“everything is for our race.” If we push away the ethnicities that
communists are already trying to separate from us, you guess
what will happen to our homeland. It is ugly to engage in racism,
be it by the majority or minority. Whoever does it is divisive.42
The polity, in this reading, includes a Turkish majority but ultimately
belongs to Muslims, regardless of ethnicity.
The nationalist praise of pre-Islamic Turkic culture was one of the aspects
of their ideology that stood the test of time and Islamization. For
instance, the Nationalists’ Scienti1ic Seminar in ABCB, in its 1inal report,
af1irmed that “in all societies, religious life encompasses morality, language
and art.”43 Yet the authors could not help but add the pre-Islamic
41 “Ben Tü rk’üm diyen, Tü rk kü ltü rüne bağlı herkes onun kutsal millet varlığ ına dahildi.
Millet anlayışı Mustafa Kemal – Gökalp anlayışı idi. Tü rkeş için Tü rk milliyeti, Tü rk Milletine
mensup olma şuuru iki [sic]. Bu anlayış birleştirici, toplayıcı, genişletici ve
yü kseltici idi. Tü rkeş milliyeti bir tek faktö re ve soy’a bağlayan anlayışa karşıydı.” Uluç
and O` zdağ , Alparslan Türkeş, [.
42 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, [J.
43 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EHF.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
tq
Turkish morality was nearly perfect as well: “it is completely based on
humane values.”44 By the same token, Küçükibrahimoğlu, writing in ABtt,
boasted about how fully voluntarily Turks converted to Islam, and contrasted
it with Arabs who tired the Prophet with their hesitancy against
the religion:
It is as if the Turks have always been looking for Islam for centuries.
No ‘religion’ he had tried before satis1ied the conscience of
the Turk. The Turks chose Islam with their clean and free conscience,
without any pressure and they joined this religion in
waves. No nation in history has rushed to a new religion in such
large waves, with such participation. ... The Turk became so integrated
with Islam that the European began to call Islam the ‘religion
of the Turk.’ Later, those who wanted to destroy and disperse
our empire also wanted to alienate us from this supreme religion
by calling Islam the ‘religion of the Arab.’ However, how much
trouble and suffering our great prophet had suffered in making
the Arabs accept this ‘divine religion.’”45
Thus, proving the harmony between the Turks and Islam turned into
simultaneously arguing for the supremacy of Turks over Arabs, both in
adopting and spreading Islam.
What were the common points between Islam and the beliefs of pre-
Islamic Turkic societies? A teacher of religion and morality at the Imam-
44 Milliyetçi Türkiye’ye Doğru: GL-GG Mayıs GKWK’da Yapılan Milliyetçiler İlmî Seminerinde
Varılan Neticeler, EHF.
45 “Tü rkler asırlarca hep IXslâmiyeti aramış gibidirler. Daha önceden denediğ i hiçbir «din»
Tü rk’ü n vicdanını tatmin etmemişti. Tü rkler, herhangi bir baskı altında kalmaksızın
temiz ve hü r vicdanları ile IXslâmiyeti seçtiler ve dalga bu dine katıldılar. Tarihte hiçbir
millet, bu kadar iştivakla, bu kadar büyü k dalgalar halinde yeni bir dine koşmamıştır. ...
Tü rk, IXslâm ile o derece kaynaştı ki, Avrupalı, IXslâmiyet’e «Tü rk’ü n dini» demeye başladı.
Daha sonra imparatorluğumuzu yıkmak ve dağ ıtmak isteyenler de IXslâmiyete «Arab’ın
dini» diyerek bizi bu yü ce dinden soğutmak istemişlerdi. Halbuki yü ce peygamberimiz
bu «ilâhı̂ dini» Arap’lara kabul ettirirken ne kadar zahmet ve ıstırap çekmişti.” S. Ahmet
Arvasi, “Dinimizde IXslâmiyet j,” Ülkücü Kadro, June E, EF[[, [.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
tb
Hatip high school in Adana, Necdet O^zkaya lists the following similarities:
“understanding of life after death,” “the fate of the soul,” “belief in destiny,”
sacri1icing animals for god once a year, the acceptance of war as legitimate
unlike Buddhism, prohibition of laziness, similar laws regulating
family life, prohibition of prostitution and its punishment by death and
granting women a respectable status.46 The differences, such as destiny
being considered as something evil before Islam, were just minutiae.47 As
such, the main reason Turks adopted Islam was religious similarities rather
than being forced militarily or politically.48
In contrast, Islamist ideologues such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek repeatedly
emphasized that “If the goal is Turkishness, it should be known that
Turk is only Turk after having adopted Islam.”49 Necip Fazıl was the most
popular Islamist 1igure who openly endorsed the MHP. Even in his case,
the value granted to the ethnic Turkish identity is ambiguous at best. On
the one hand, Kısakürek considered Turks as the most successful race in
the service of Islam.50 On the other hand, he went on the record saying “if
I must answer the question of racism and tribalism, I would say without
hesitation that I 1ind the world’s most supreme race and tribe in Arabs,
considering the sacred being at its center.”51 Although these remarks
were made in ABtD, around two years before his endorsement of the MHP,
they are still remarkable in the sense that even the most close form of
Islamism to the MHP, is still signi1icantly far away in terms of its perspective
on ethnicity.
46 Adana Tü rkocağ ı, Türklük ve İslâmiyet, J[–JH.
47 Adana Tü rkocağ ı, J[.
48 Adana Tü rkocağ ı, iE.
49 Necip Fazıl Kısakü rek, Hitabeler, Bü tün Eserleri JJ (IXstanbul: Büyü k Doğu Yayınları,
JNEG), JjF.
50 Kısakü rek, [N–[E.
51 Kısakü rek, JjF.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
tD
§ U.M Economic and foreign policy
The Islamist policy of bringing together Muslim nations and replacing alliances
with the Western nations with them was criticized by nationalists
on the grounds that it was simply unrealistic. Taha Akyol spoke against
Erbakan’s proposal that Turkey should reject US aid as follows:
Can we say ‘I don't want’ to the West?
According to Erbakan, this is possible, or even necessary. You accept
"Islamic money", unite with Islamic countries, establish
heavy industry and it's over!
In ABF6, Turkey's minimum import need was worth t billion dollars.
Without importing t billion dollars’ worth of goods, it is not
possible to operate our current industry, let alone heavy industry.
"Islamic money" has a magic name. But oil exporting Islamic countries
are not stupid. They do not give millions of dollars of oil in
exchange for papers that Erbakan will print and write ‘Islamic dinar’
on. Because they need the "dollar" too. They also must import
in exchange for dollars for infrastructure and industrial investments.
Slogans representing the whole nation's ultimate desire, such as
the industrialization of Turkey and getting out of foreign dependency,
are long-term, very long-term solutions. However, Turkey is
currently struggling in a deep, turbulent, swirling river. The
dreams of heavy industry on the other side of the river do not give
anything to Turkey 1luttering in the whirlpool!
When the term ‘short-term solution’ is mentioned, no one can
show any other way than ‘credit’.52
Akyol thus charges Erbakan with con1lating long-term developmental
goals with short term economic solutions. He implies a moral purism on
52 Taha Akyol, GKXL’lerde Türkiye (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, EFHN), JiF–jN.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
tC
behalf of Erbakan that prioritizes with certainty relationships with Islamic
nations over others. Akyol depicts the Muslim nations in question
as more rational and self-interested than Erbakan realizes, arguing that
he is hoping for an aid that is not likely to be offered. The ideological rifts
thus re1lected clearly in matters of foreign policy. Similar to Akyol’s argument,
a former member of the Constitutive Assembly of Turkey after the
coup d’état of ABC6, Abdü lhâ di Toplu pointed to the fact that when even
Arabs could not succeed in forming a united nation, Turkish demands for
an Islamic state were in vain.53 Following the Cyprus con1lict and the Soviet-
Turkish rapprochement due to arms embargoes against Turkey, Necmettin
Erbakan was accused of giving an interview to a leftist periodical
and calling for the establishment of a communist party in Turkey.54 Moreover,
they alleged that Erbakan’s party organizations were not against a
federal solution to the Kurdish problem.55 U^lkü cü Kadro argued that
these illustrated Erbakan’s party to be “founded to divert the Islamic
struggle from its goals.“56
On the Islamic side, the communitarian emphasis on the MHP’s economic
agenda was occasionally criticized as in breach of individual rights
as secured by Islam. In what was an unusual and much less polemical
criticism of the Dokuz Işık, the famous Islamist lawyer Bekir Berk opposed
the principles of köycülük (peasantism) and toplumculuk (communitarianism).
Berk argued, much like a 5Ast century US Republican politician,
that these two principles privileged the society at the expense of
the individual and that this was against the rules of Islam. As this is one
of the rare occasions that the debate spills on the area of political economy,
Berk’s much elaborated argument is worth quoting at length:
Islam does not allow the detachment, the transfer or exile of anyone
from his homeland or his home against his will. Despite this,
53 Abdü lhâdi Toplu, Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Karşıt İdeolojiler (Toplu Yayınları, EF[J), EiN.
54 “Olayların Yorumu,” Ülkücü Kadro, April E, EF[[, i.
55 “Olayların Yorumu,” i.
56 “Olayların Yorumu,” i.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
tt
the 1irst sentence of the “Peasantism” principle of the Nationalist
Action Party consists of an admission that they will act against this
tenet of Islam, by speaking of “coalescing villages into agricultural
towns.”
Islam does not consider sacri1icing the rights of the individual for
the bene1it of the community as the norm. In Islam, no one can be
compelled to renounce his rights in favor of the community. Since
Islam considers the violation of the rights of an individual to be
directed against the whole community, it has found the solution
for protecting the interest of the community in the meticulous
protection of individual rights. Those who say that the interest of
the individual could be sacri1iced for the bene1it of the community
have become, as history has proven, the promoters of oppression.
The systems dominated by those who force the individual to sacri
1ice for the interests of the community have always been systems
of oppression, and the source of the oppression of communism
still lies in this claim. It should not be dif1icult to imagine what
those who adopt communitarianism and describe it as "the view
that all kinds of activities are carried out for the bene1it of society"
will do when they get the opportunity.
…
Apart from this, those who declared that they would establish
family farms with a minimum size of 5D6 decares are not only effectively
establishing communist Kolkhozes, but they are also announcing
that they will abolish the freedoms of movement and
residence of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights they
promised to abide by, and that they will oppose the right to property
and economic liberty that Islam meticulously protects.57
57 “IXslâm, kimseyi yurdundan, evinden, yuvasından koparmayı ve onun isteğ ine rağmen
başka yere nakletmeyi, sürmeyi, tecviz etmemiştir. Buna rağmen Milliyetçi Hareket
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
tF
Berk’s argument is unusual in the sense that what Islamists emphasized
at the time was also primarily about how the capitalist individualism
eroded society. Although individual rights, right to property and economic
liberty were vocally defended as part of the anticommunism wave
of the era, Berk has spoken like a true libertarian, as if Islamic thought is
built upon individual liberties before anything else.
In opposition, nationalist economist O^zsoy argued that most prominent
Islamists were well-to-do and could not empathize with the poor,
hence their support for liberal capitalism58. He likened Islamists and nationalists
who were disinterested in economics to an army that abandons
the base (economics) to communists while dealing with the superstructure
(religion, morality, family),59 which is an interesting, rare, and rarely
Partisinin «Köycü lü k» prensibinin ilk cümlesi, «köyleri tarım kentleri halinde
birleştirmek» ten bahsetmek suretiyle IXslâm’ın bu anlayışına aykırı hareket edeceklerinin
itirafından ibarettir.
IXslâm, ferdin haklarını cemaatin menfaati için feda etmeyi esas kabul etmemiştir. IXslâm’da
kimse kendi iradesinin hilâ fına haklarını cemiyet lehine feragate zorlanamaz. IXslâm,
bir ferde yönelen tecâvü zü , bü tün bir cemaate yönelmiş telâkki ettiğ i için, cemaatin
menfaatinin korunmasının çâ resini ferdlerin haklarının titizlikle korunmasında
görmü ştü r. Cemiyetin menfaati için ferdin menfaati feda edilir diyenler, tarihin şehadetiyle
sabit olduğu ü zere, bu suretle zulümlerin teşvikçisi olmuşlardır. Ferdi, cemiyet
menfaatlerine feda etmeye icbar edenlerin hâkim oldukları sistemler daima zulü m sistemleri
olagelmişlerdir ve hâ len de komünizmin zulmünün menbaı bu iddiadadır. Toplumculuğu
kabul edip, bunu «Her çeşit faaliyetin toplumun yararına olacak şekilde
yü rü tü lmesi gö rü şüdü r» diye tâ rif edenlerin ellerine fırsat geçtiğ i zaman neler yapabileceğ
ini tahmin etmek hiç de gü ç olmasa gerek.”
“Bunun dışında, JON dönümden aşağ ı dü şmeyen aile çiftlikleri kuracaklarını ilân edenler,
yalnız komünist kolhozlarını ihdas etmekle kalmamakta, aynı zamanda ittiba edeceklerini
söyledikleri Birleşmiş Milletler IXnsan Hakları Beyannâmesinin, herkesin
istediğ i yere gidebilme, seyahat edebilme ve yerleşme hü rriyetlerini ortadan
kaldıracaklarını ve IXslâm’ın titizlikle koruduğu ferdı̂ mü lkiyet, serbestiyet esasına da
muhalefet edeceklerini itiraf etmiş olmaktadırlar.” Berk and Polat, İslâmi Hareket ve Türkeş,
OO–OG, OH.
58 Altaylı, Türk Milliyetçi-Toplumcu Doktrininin Umumi Esasları, EG.
59 Altaylı, EG.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
tB
direct use of Marxist concepts. Both sides of the debate borrowed rhetorical
devices, concepts and arguments from other ideologies when
deemed useful.
&.!.$ An alarming transnationalism
Just as nationalists’ de1inition of the natural unit of societal organization
as nations led to them being criticized for tribalism, the Islamist tendency
to seek unity not in ethnicity but religion led to accusations by nationalists
of collaboration with nations hostile to Turkey. One of the most common
accusations against Islamists stemmed from the transnational character
of their ideology, which went beyond and gave little importance to
the ethnic Turkish identity. Thus, nationalists accused them of being supported
by foreigners who aimed to destroy the Turks.60 A sensitivity
against pan-Islamism (ümmetçilik) went beyond Turkish borders and
reached even the West Thrace, where nationalists in Turkey accused
Greeks of supporting pan-Islamism to divide the Turks, stating that madrasa
graduates should not be teachers in Turkish schools in Greece.61 Although
nationalists demanded more place for religion in education, they
advocated a strict government control over religious education, which
would prevent the spread of “primitive, superstitious and submissive”
ideas.62
By the same token, O^zsoy stated that nationalists were “denounced as
in1idels by the sold-out, so-called Muslims who are secretly fed by Saudi
60 Kenan Dikici, “Biz Bize,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, October J, EF[N, O.
61 Ahmet Kayıhan, “Yunan Milli Emniyetçileri Batı Trakya Tü rklerini Nasıl IXmha Ediyor?,”
Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, March [, EF[E, Ej–EG; Ahmet Aydınlı, “Batı Trakya Davasının
Bilinmeyen Yönü : Batı Trakya IXlkokullarından Mezun Olanların Durumları Ne
Olacak?...,” Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, October EF[E, Ej–EO.
62 Necip Aylan, “Milli Eğ itim Problemleri: Maarif Reformunun Esası Gençlik Eğ itimi Olmalıdır,”
Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi, July EF[E, [.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
F6
Arabian ARAMCO oil revenues.”63 Most Islamists were either not ethnic
Turks, or didn’t consider themselves one, which underlay their indifference
to Turkish nationalism.64 And those who identi1ied as Turks “misunderstand
ummahism and become the agents and missionaries of the
mindset that wants to surrender Turkishness to Arab imperialism.”65
For the Islamists, having a universal mindset instead of local was a
source of pride. As the Islamist-dominated MTTB announced in ABtC:
We cannot see the problems of the world as different from our
own problems or our problems from the problems of the world.
Diagnosing Turkey's wounds, this (tawhid youth) arrives at the
same diagnosis for the world as well. For our youth has a universal
view of life.66
Accusations of foreign support went both ways; the Islamists had
their own suspicions against the MHP too. The MTTB argued that the Idealists
reacted to the events of A May ABtt poorly.67 They stated that the
American intelligence could penetrate right-wing groups as well as leftwing,
which implied the Idealists were being drawn into violence as part
of a plot to make Turkey dependent on the US.68 Nationalists were thus
“being putty in the hands of capital and materialism.”69
63 “Suudi Arabistan ARAMCO petrol gelirleri ile gizlice beslenen satılmış mü slüman
mü sveddeleri tarafından … kâ ~ir diye itham edilmektedir.” Altaylı, Türk Milliyetçi-Toplumcu
Doktrininin Umumi Esasları, EO.
64 Altaylı, EO–EG.
65 “IXslam ümmetçiliğ i ~ikrini yanlış anlayarak Tü rklü ğü Arap emperyalizmine peşkeş çekmek
istiyen zihniyetin adeta ajan ve misyoneri durumuna düşmüş…..” Altaylı, EG.
66 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, G.
67 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hi. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu GW Ekim GKkW - i Aralık GKkk, EJN. E May
EF[[ refers to the armed attack during the Workers’ Day celebrations at Taksim Square,
which left dozens dead and hundreds injured, with perpetrators remaining unknown to
this day.
68 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hi. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu GW Ekim GKkW - i Aralık GKkk, EJN.
69 “sermayenin ve materyalizmin oyuncağ ı olanlar” Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem
Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, JGE.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
FA
§ U.U Physical clashes
In the low-intensity civil war atmosphere of the ABt6s, the tense relationship
between the two right-wing movements also turned into skirmishes
on the streets between the politicized youth groups. In a plenary session
of the MTTB, on 6D March ABCt, a 1ight broke out between “Pan-Islamists
and Turanists” (U^mmetçi-Turancı kavgası), with a nationalist by the
name of Hüseyin O^zdemir reportedly getting heavily beaten.70 In another
MTTB congress in Kayseri on 5t April ABCB, members of the Nur movement
and supporters of Türkeş clashed, with AA injured and the congress
postponed.71 Writing a few weeks after and most probably referring to
this last incident, Galip Erdem alleged that t or F nationalist students
were beaten up, with the perpetrators shouting “communists, godless
people!”72 Although Erdem tries to unite the far-right by arguing that ideological
differences are not too signi1icant to harm the practical alliance,
he also charges the Islamists with “animosity towards nationalism on the
pretense of Islamism” (IYslâmcılık perdesi altında milliyetçilik
düşmanlığı).73 In ABtC, MTTB members alleged that they have been attacked
by the Idealists in Erzurum as well as in Konya, in the latter by a
group that had “sticks, chains, brass knuckles and knives” and injured
four MTTB members.74 The President of the student organization argued
these events were prompted by a desire on behalf of Idealists to “conquer
and destroy” them.75
70 Hakan Akpınar, Kurtların Kardeşliği: CKMP’den MHP’ye (GKWh-HLLh) (IXstanbul: Bir Harf
Yayınları, JNNO), OO.
71 Akpınar, O[.
72 Galip Erdem, “Mektuplar: Kont Bernadot Can Çekişiyor,” Devlet, May EJ, EFGF, O.
73 Erdem, O.
74 “Sopalı, zincirli, muştalı ve bıçaklı U` lkü cü bir grup tarafından” Millî Türk Talebe Birliği
hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, JGJ, ijj.
75 Millî Türk Talebe Birliği hn. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu n Ağustos GKkh - GW Ekim GKkW, JGJ.
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
F5
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have set out to understand the place of Islam in the Turkish
far-right nationalism, the continuities, changes, and their constant dialogue
with the Islamic far-right. I hope to have illustrated that a close
reading of the far-right nationalist literature leads to these conclusions:
1irst, any reading of the Turkish nationalism as an ever-harmonious entity
with Islam can be rejected, on the grounds that its Turkist branch was
a movement with strong secularist tendencies at the very least in ABCD, as
well as reservations on Islam even in ABF6. Second, an increase in religious
themes in this brand of Turkish nationalism is evident. The writings
of Türkeş and his associates, when compared what the Idealist youth
has been writing by ABF6, provide a stark contrast on how nationalists
treat Islam. Third and relatedly, this increase in religious themes can accurately
be described as Islamization. There have been scholars that considered
this change in the ABt6s as super1icial, arguing Islamization of this
nationalism took place later in the ABF6s.76 The analysis in this thesis
points to the contrary. By ABF6, the youth-wing internalized the Islamic
discourse, even though party leaders may have had varying degrees of
investment in the same discourse.
Fourth, what lies at the core of Alparslan Türkeş’s understanding of
Islam is that it was a tool to be used in social discipline as a source of the
type of morality that prioritized society -in his case, nation- over the individual.
Religion was a highly valuable and indispensable instrument,
but an instrument, nonetheless. For a variety of reasons, he increased
the emphasis on Islam over time, yet the essence did not change. Fifth
and relatedly, the reasons for the Islamization of far-right nationalism remain
ambiguous to this day and call for further research. A variety of factors
can be cited, such as the MHP’s need to contest the already limited
76 Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: GH Eylül’den GKKL’lara Ülkücü Hareket, Hi n. EF, Jji.
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
Fq
far-right vote, urbanization, and the arrival of a new generation of nationalists,
the political atmosphere following the ABC6 coup d’état which
brought groups previously considered radical to the fore, the effect of the
anti-communist wave and so on. Although all of these are argued for in
the academic literature, there has not been any studies that concentrated
on the relative weights of these factors in detail. Finally, the tension between
Islamism and nationalism was ever-present, even with the most
Islamized generation until that time in ABF6. The primary communities
that they felt belonging to, that is the Ummah versus nation, could only
be reconciled so much. In scenarios where they needed to commit to one
or the other 1irst, Erbakan’s young base and Tü rkeş’s went in opposing
directions.
In the Cold War environment, a profound alarmism underpinned the
MHP ideology. Nationalists observed an ascendant left-wing movement
in Turkey and feared a communist takeover of the regime. As the left was
dominant among the intelligentsia and in campuses, their sense of helplessness
and encirclement only grew. Turkists thought culture and moral
values made or broke societies. In Turkey they saw the culture as already
degenerated and thought it could be only a matter of time before the cultural
demise translates into a total material collapse. In this context, anticommunism
was the main driving force behind their theoretical and
practical efforts.
Nationalists placed great importance on the ‘original’ Turkish culture.
If only it could be practiced among the people, Turkey would rise to the
level of the greatest nation again. In the global scale, they thought of
Turks as bringing civilization to wherever they went and contrasted their
way of occupation with Western colonialism. In the Muslim world, they
prided themselves on spreading Islam over the world even more successfully
than Arabs.
As the nation itself was considered perfect, Turkish political doctrine
had to show superiority vis-à-vis its Western counterparts as well. Thus
came the idea that the Nine Lights doctrine was the ideal blend of materialism
and spiritualism, against capitalism and communism both of
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
Fb
which they thought were malign forms of materialism. The emphasis on
spiritualism was directly tied to religion.
Nationalists have repeatedly included shared religion in their de1initions
of the nation, although this was not ever-present. It was argued that
Islam added power to the Turkish spirit, contributing to their dynamism
and conquests. In turn, they asserted that Turks added the same to the
Muslim world. The most fundamental way by which the MHP nationalists
established superiority in theory was their referral to several verses from
the Qur’an and a few hadiths to argue that the Turks were godsend to
lead the Muslim world. In a way, Islam chose the Turks before the Turks
knew or chose Islam. Part of the reason why they were chosen, then, was
how virtuous the Turkic societies were before adopting Islam, hence the
ease with which conversion took place. Nationalists praised pre-Islamic
Turkish societies repeatedly, constructing an image of a nation that was,
informally, almost Muslim.
As it has been argued throughout in this thesis that religion was
mostly the source of morality in the nationalist vision. It was a natural
and naturally instrumentalized need. Türkeş saw religion in every society,
and the use of religion for discipline purposes in every developed society.
Our lot in this regard was Islam, and the Turkists thought that this
Turkish-Islamic unity was working successfully until Westernization
started. Beyond providing the nation with morals, it suf1iced for the MHP
not to directly contradict religion. This, however, differed both over time
and among generations.
From ABCD to ABF6, the nationalist critique of Turkish modernization
increased in intensity and period covered. While criticisms initially
started with IYnönü ’s tenure, over time these include Atatürk’s era and Atatürk
himself. By ABF6, anybody in power from Murad II onwards, except
for Abdul Hamid II, were severely criticized by the Idealist youth. In fact,
if it were not for the occasional mention of non-Turkish bureaucrats’ ethnicities
as a problem, the Idealist magazine of Birliğe Çağrı (ABtB-ABF6)
could well be identical with its Islamist counterparts in terms of its discourse
on the Early Republican Era and beyond. Idealist youth, for one
I SLAMI ZATION OF TURKI SH NATIONALISM
FD
reason or another, has reached a total rejection of the Westernizing elite
and their premises in a matter of AD years.
The far-right nationalist position on women marked another area of
convergence with Islamism. Coupled with the pro-natalist policy of the
party to raise Turkey’s population to A66 million individuals, the new synthesis
ideology left little room for women in society beyond motherhood
and family. As quoted on section q.5.5, women were considered a group
to be “disciplined” to conform to family norms. Moreover, the civil law
was also cited as something foreign to the Turkish culture.
In the area of economics, nationalists’ efforts were aimed at countering
the socialist programme above all else. They crafted a communitarian
program that was to curb and limit social inequality. However, within the
political right, they found themselves in a position to defend their “communitarianism”
against accusations of socialism. On the question of economics,
Islam and quotes from religious sources have become another
battleground, with nationalists attempting to prove against the left that
religion was not capitalist and included every measure against social inequality,
while criticisms were directed against them from the Islamic
side that their communitarian provisions went beyond the limits of Islam.
In foreign policy, Türkeş went on the record to oppose Turkey’s membership
to the European Community, instead calling for increased cooperation
among the Muslim states. From the ABC6s onwards, he had been
calling for Turkey to become proactive with Islamic states, partly to get
their backing in turn on issues like the one on Cyprus. As the Cold War
era was marked by an ascendant international Islamist militancy against
the Soviet Union, the Idealists were in1luenced by the developments in
Afghanistan and Iran. They voiced enthusiastic support for the Mujahedeen
in Afghanistan, while comparing the communist activity in Afghanistan
with Turkey. In the case of Iran, Idealists were not optimistic about
Khomeini, seeing in him an oppressor of the Turks in Iran.
The main problématique that held apart the two far-right movements
has been the question of what primary signi1ier de1ined the membership
criterion to the polity. In other words, was the Turkish nation comprised
MUHAMMED BAYKAL
FC
of Muslims living within the borders of Turkey, or the Turks, living within
borders or otherwise, who were mostly Muslim? What might initially
seem like a chicken-and-egg situation proved to be anything but trivial.
Nationalists theorized that Turkishness and Islam were in perfect harmony,
in a state that made it impossible to uncouple them. They were
equally important and mutually constitutive elements of the national
identity. Yet there were two problems. First, their discourse, when evaluated
in its totality, did not exemplify the total harmony they theorized.
Second, a signi1icant number of Turkish Muslims did not consider the
ethnic identity as important as the Idealists.
From this original point of divergence, numerous debates, with their
polemics and deadlocks, followed. Islamists accused nationalists of tribalism
and racism, while nationalists charged them with denying the reality
of nations, which God created and made explicit in Islam to begin with.
Tü rkeş was accused of his role in the 5t May ABC6 coup and being complicit
in Adnan Menderes’ execution, an accusation that lasted a lifetime
to defend against. Nationalists found the transnational character of Islamism
threatening and accused them of collaborating with foreigners to
slow down the rise of the nation. Islamists in turn speculated of a Western
support for nationalism in Turkey to drive Muslims away from Islam.
Additionally, the contestation of a limited pool of far-right vote made the
relations between the two parties even more bitter, to the extent that
there have been physical clashes between the two youth groups on a multiplicity
of occasions. All in all, Turkism and Islamism have come so close
to each other, yet remained so far away at the same time.
The academic 1ield on the issue remains fertile for further research.
One of the weaknesses of this study has been that the Islamist arguments
and literature was not covered in detail. A more comprehensive study is
needed for an adequately comparative work. Finally, the factors behind
the changes covered can be studied further to explore their relative importance.
Ft

FB
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