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THE CRIMEAN KHANATE
AND THE CLOSURE OF THE BLACK SEA FRONTIER (1699-1730)

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ABSTRACT
The Crimean Khanate and the Closure of the Black Sea Frontier (1699-1730)
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the European states that agreed to the Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) Treaties forced the Ottoman Empire to accept the transformation of their northern and northwestern frontiers into borders and keep the border societies under tight control to prevent their incursions to the other side of the border. As a result, the Ottomans stipulated to punish raids and plunders against Russia and Poland-Lithuania and enslavement of their peasants. For the Crimean Khanate, that meant the loss of critical income. The frontier’s closure caused the marginalization of the Crimean people who lived in the peripheries, especially the Bucak and the Kuban. They were forced to give up their traditional way of life. The new modus vivendi ignited unrest, a series of revolts starting with the Gazi Giray Rebellion in 1699, which lasted at least until the end of the period focused on this study. Thereupon, the Crimean Khans faced various troubles to rule the Khanate.
This thesis analyzes the reaction of the Crimean frontier people to these developments based on the Ottoman archives as well as Ottoman and Crimean chronicles. The archival sources, mainly mühimme registers and the record of imperial letters, contain a significant amount of information on how these people recalcitrated not to obey the Ottoman orders to fulfill the treaty’s liabilities. Therefore, to contextualize the dissent towards this new conjuncture, this thesis focused on the period from 1699 until the end of Mengli II Giray’s reign in 1730.
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ÖZET
Kırım Hanlığı ve Karadeniz Sınır Bölgesinin Kapatılması (1699-1730)
On sekizinci yüzyılın başında, Karlofça (1699) ve İstanbul (1700) Antlaşmalarının Avrupalı taraf devletleri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunu kuzey ve kuzeybatı sınır bölgelerinin belirli sınırlara dönüşümünü kabul etmek ve sınır topluluklarının sınırların öte tarafına akınlarının önlenmesi için onları sıkı bir şekilde kontrol altına almak zorunda bıraktılar. Sonuç olarak, Osmanlılar Rusya ve Lehistan’a yapılan akınları ve yağmayı ve de bu ülkelerin halklarının köleleştirilmesini cezalandıracağını taahhüt etti. Bu Kırım Hanlığı için kritik bir gelir kaynağının kaybı anlamına gelmekteydi. Böylelikle, sınırların kapatılması uç kesimlerde özellikle Bucak ve Kuban’da yaşayan Kırımlıları ötekileştirdi. Onları geleneksel yaşam biçiminlerinden vazgeçmek zorunda bıraktı. Bu yeni yaşam tarzı huzursuzluğu ve 1699’da Gazi Giray İsyanı ile başlayan ve en azından bu çalışmada odaklanılan dönemin sonuna kadar süren bir isyanlar dizisini tetiklemiştir. Bu nedenle Kırım hanları hanlığı yönetmekte çeşitli sorunlarla karşılaştılar.
Bu tez Kırımlı sınır bölgesi insanlarının bu gelişmelere olan tepkilerini Osmanlı Arşivlerine, Osmanlı ve Kırım kroniklerine dayanarak tahlil etmektedir. Arşiv kaynakları, özellikle mühimme kayıtları ve nâme-i hümâyûn defterleri, bu insanların antlaşmaların yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmek için Osmanlı merkezinden yollanan emirlerine nasıl karşı koydukları üzerine önemli bilgiler içermektedir. Bu açıdan, bu yeni duruma karşı oluşan muhalefeti bağlamında ele almak üzere bu tez 1699 ile başlayan ve 1730’da II. Mengli Giray Han’ın saltanatının bitmesiyle sona eren döneme odaklanmaktadır.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I used to think about how human beings devoted themselves to their researches and concentrated on their studies during periods of crisis, war, and pandemics. Now, I learned the hard way that it is a long row to hoe, but this thesis was completed with the support of many people that I owed thank. First of all, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor Derin Terzioğlu for her endless support and guidance. When I lost my focus in the immense literature, her invaluable instructions enabled me to look at the events from a broader perspective and contextualize my case. It would not be possible to finish this thesis without her revisions and corrections. I owed İsenbike Togan to debt of special gratitude that she made me realize the unique character of the tribal polities, and her recommendations allowed me to understand the linkages between the Crimean Khanate and her Inner Asian counterparts. I have also indebted a thank to Denise Klein that she provided me access to her doctoral dissertation. I am sincerely grateful to Hasan Karataş and Yaşar Tolga Cora since they accepted to be on my thesis defense committee. I am also thankful to Edhem Eldem for his assistance in apprehending the Ottoman Turkish phrases that I had difficulty understanding.
I thank TÜBİTAK that during my graduate studies, I have received the financial support of the TÜBİTAK-BİDEB 2210/A program. I thank my colleagues and friends at Boğaziçi University, Ahmet Yavuz, Evren Çakıl, İsmail Şahin, Emir Karakaya, and Halim Bohari who did not refrain their backings. I also wish to thank my family for their unceasing support during my studies; I am grateful to my father Mustafa Kemal, my mother Fatma, my brother Metin, my sister Özlem, my brother-in-law Emre, and my nephew Alp Egemen to whom I dedicated my thesis.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE CLOSURE OF THE FRONTIER…...…1
1.1 Sources and methodology………………………………………...………5
1.2 Literature review on the history of frontier………………...……...……...8
1.3 Literature review on the nomads of the Ottoman Empire……...…….….21
1.4 Literature review on the closure of the Black Sea frontier……...………27
CHAPTER 2: THE CRIMEAN KHANATE AND THE TREATIES…….....………33
2.1 A brief introduction to the Crimean Khanate…………………………....33
2.2 Nogay migration to the Crimean environs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries…………………………………………………………………..…42
2.3 Developments before the treaties in the Black Sea frontier……………..46
2.4 The Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700)………………….53
CHAPTER 3: FROM KARLOWITZ TO PRUT: A DECADE OF UPHEAVAL….62
3.1 The first reign of Devlet Giray Khan……………………………………62
3.2 From the fourth reign of el-Hac Selim Giray Khan to the Great Northern War………………………………………………………………......………86
3.3 Concluding remarks……………………………………………………..98
CHAPTER 4: THE SHAFT IS BROKEN: THE PERPETUAL RESENTMENT TO
THE FRONTIER’S CLOSURE…………………….……………………….100
4.1 The developments within the northern theater………...………………..100
4.2 The second reign of Devlet Giray Khan (1708-1713): A break for the peace .…...……………….……………….…………….…………..…..…..116
4.3 The second reign of Kaplan Giray Khan (1713-1717)…………………121
4.4 The reign of Saadet Giray Khan (1717-1724)………………….………126
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4.5 The reign of Mengli Giray Khan (1724-1730)…………………………139
4.6 Concluding remarks………………………....…………………………155
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION……………………………………………….……157
5.1 An analysis of the period………………………………...…………….157
5.2 Aftermath……………………..………………………………………..163
APPENDIX A: THE TRANSLITERATED TEXTS OF THE QUOTED OTTOMAN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS………..……………………………..………166
APPENDIX B: MAP OF THE GEOGRAPHY……………………………………172
APPENDIX C: LINEAGE OF THE CRIMEAN KHANS (1699-1730)…………..173
REFERENCES………………………………………………………….…………174
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GLOSSARY
Ahd-nâme-i hümâyûn: Imperial covenant
Atalık: Tutorage for a prince
Baş karaçı: The leader of the karaçı begs
Bina emini: Trustee in charge of construction
Çapul: Raid
Çiftlik: Farm
Kalgay: The first-rank heir apparent in the Crimean Khanate
Karaçı beg: The leaders of the leading Crimean tribes, generally numbered four
Kışlak: Winter quarter
Mirza: Son of a nobleman, this title refers to a person’s attachment to the nobility
Muhafız: Commander of a fort
Mühimme Defteri: Ottoman registers of the important affairs
Mübaşir: Bailiff
Name-i Hümayun Defteri: Ottoman registers of diplomatic documents
Nureddin: The second-rank heir apparent in the Crimean Khanate
Reisülküttab: The head of scribers’ office
Sultan (Crimean context): Male members of the Giray Dynasty
Şirins: The most powerful ruling tribe in the Crimean Khanate
Tıyış: Tribute paid to the Crimean Khanate by other countries
Töre: Customary law
Yarlık: Edict
Yalı Ağalığı: Littoral administration for the Yalı köyleri
Yalı köyleri: The villages along the Dnieper which were belonged to the Khan
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CHRONOLOGY
1667: Treaty of Andrusovo
1671-1678, 1684-1691, 1692-1699, 1703-1705: Reign of Selim I Giray
1678: The Ottoman capture of Chyhyryn
1672: Treaty of Buczacs
1676: Treaty of Zurawno
1681: Treaty of Bahçesaray
1683-1699: Ottoman War with the Holy League
1689: Treaty of Nerchinsk
1699-1702, 1708-1713: Reign of Devlet II Giray
1699: Treaty of Karlowitz
1699-1701: Gazi Giray Rebellion
1700: Treaty of Istanbul
1700-1721: The Great Northern War
1702-1703: Devlet Giray Rebellion
1703: Edirne Incidence
1703-1730: Reign of Sultan Ahmed III
1705-1707: Reign of Gazi III Giray
1707-1708, 1713-1716, 1730-1736: Reign of Kaplan I Giray
1707-1708: Bulavin Uprising
1709: Battle of Poltava
1711: Prut War
1713: Skirmish at Bender
1713: Treaty of Edirne
1714: King Charles XII’s return to Sweden
1714: The beginning of the Ottoman-Venice War
1716: Habsburg Declaration of War on the Ottoman Empire
1716-1717: Reign of Kara Devlet Giray
1717-1724: Reign of Saadet III Giray
1718: Treaty of Passarowitz
1724-1730, 1737-1740: Reign of Mengli II Giray
1726: Cantimur’s flight from Crimea
1727: Treaty of Kiakhta
1729: Baht Giray is killed
1730: Patrona Halil Rebellion
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE CLOSURE OF THE FRONTIER
The Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) prohibited the Crimean khans from demanding tribute from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia. The Ottomans had promised to pacify the Crimean frontier, and all parties that had signed the treaties agreed on the mutual banning of all kinds of hostile activities on the frontier, including cross-border raids, plunders, and enslaving of neighboring peasants. The following decades after the peace, which was to the detriment of the Crimean Khanate, many of the reigning Crimean Khans in this period, the tribal aristocracy, and people from tribal backgrounds presented their displeasure towards the treaties. From Bucak to Kuban region, the Khanate went through a crisis. This thesis analyzes how the frontier people reacted to the closing of the open steppe through a study of Ottoman archival documents and Ottoman and Crimean chronicles about border disputes, local resentments towards the treaties’ articles, unauthorized activities of the Crimean frontier people on the Black Sea frontier, and rebellions. The period from 1699 to 1730 witnessed the gradual expiration of steppe nomadism. At the same time, the Khans’ adherence to the peace estranged them from the tribal aristocracy and paved the way for a gradual weakening of their position, and when they opposed the Ottoman order not to violate the treaties, they faced the risk of dismissal.
Both the loss of tribute and the frontier’s closure for economic purposes put the Crimean Khanate in trouble. The Crimean Peninsula was no longer a suitable shelter for nomads who needed open access to the steppe resources as they had had since the establishment of the Khanate in the 1440s. As the Crimean khans claimed
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succession to the legacy of the Golden Horde, it was contrary to their interests to renounce demanding tribute from these two realms. During the civil war for the Golden Horde’s throne, the peninsula had become a strong power base opposing Sarai of the Great Horde by virtue of offering easy access to the steppe and being a defensible territory. However, the increase in the number of competitors in the Deşt-i Kıpçak during the seventeenth century and the development of military technologies that rendered traditional nomadic warfare ineffective led to the Khanate’s waning from the scene. Thus, the closure of the frontier and the loss of lucrative incomes ignited an unending dissent of many from both the ruling class and the subject against this radical shift in the region. Even if opposition to the treaties had always not been the apparent reason for every problem and rebellion that the Khanate witnessed in this period, the side-effects of the frontier’s closure have lied at the heart of most of them.
As a result, this dramatic change broke the thousand-year-old steppe tradition, and the treaties initiated the process whereby this frontier region located at the westernmost edge of the Eurasian steppes would eventually be integrated into the borders of one of the sedentary bureaucratic empires. It means the steppe came under the control of the sedentary powers, and the nomads started to lose their ascendancy over it. Already during the peace negotiations at the end of the seventeenth century, dissatisfied factions started to voice their opposition. A series of rebellions, many of which were led by a member of the Giray dynasty, found widespread support among the nomadic and semi-sedentarized tribes of the Khanate living in its periphery.
The Ottoman archives provide rich material on the frontier’s closure and the problems that it created in the frontier region. Although many historians contributed to the history of frontiers, the closure of the Eurasian Steppe’s western part (i.e., the
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Black Sea Steppe) from the Crimean and Ottoman perspective has remained untouched except for some studies that mostly relied on secondary sources with limited analysis of chronicles. However, it is required to conduct a detailed research about the eighteenth-century Deşt-i Kıpçak1, especially people of nomadic origin, to evaluate the break in their traditional lifestyle.
This thesis contributes to the literature of frontier history by focusing on the developments right after the Karlowitz Treaty in 1699. In that regard, Abou-El-Haj’s article, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703,” inspired me to examine the ongoing rebellions and debates in the Crimean Khanate under the consideration of discontent towards the treaties. This thesis proposes that the rebellions of Gazi Giray (1699-1701) and Devlet Giray (1702-1703) were not the only instances of this discontent. The Khans, the members of the tribal aristocracy, and the Nogays living in the frontiers continued to show their dissatisfaction with the new modus vivendi by petitioning Istanbul, disobeying the imperial orders, and rebelling. This thesis demonstrates the correlation between the turbulence after the treaties and the emergence of anti-peace sentiments in the Crimean Khanate, relying on Ottoman archival sources and chronicles from Crimean and Ottoman origins. The majority of the Ottoman archival material, which was evaluated in this thesis had not been published before, transliterated by the author for this thesis.
This thesis is comprised of five chapters, including this Introduction. Chapter Two sets the scene by giving a basic history of the Crimean Khanate and introducing the principal actors. It also includes a subchapter that presents a historical outlook on the Eastern European political and military situation covering the Peace of
1 Deşt-i Kıpçak means the Kipchak Steppe and refers to the steppe region from the western end of the Eurasian Steppe to the north of the Caspian Sea. In this thesis, the Black Sea Steppe and Deşt-i Kıpçak are used interchangeably.
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Andrusovo (1667) until the signing of the Karlowitz (1699). The Peace of Andrusovo between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth pushed the Ottomans to switch their passive northern policy to protect their position in the Black Sea, the Ottoman mare clausum. The transformation of the old steppe is rooted in the developments in this interval. For this reason, it is a necessity to evaluate the border disputes and local resistance to the new status-quo after the Karlowitz based on this conjuncture. This chapter also discusses and explains the treaties’ articles binding for the Crimean Khanate. Chapter Three starts with Devlet Giray Khan’s reign in 1699 and discusses the period until the end of Kaplan Giray Khan’s first reign in 1708. During the initial phase, the rebellions of Gazi Giray (1699-1701) and Devlet Giray (1702-1703) posed serious threats to the newly established peace. In 1709, King Charles of Sweden took refuge in the Ottoman Empire after his defeat in Poltava. This development escalated the tension between the Ottomans and the Russians. In that regard, Chapter Four focuses on the before and after of this critical juncture, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1711. This part analyzes the recalcitration and rebellions to understand the extent of dissidence towards the treaties until the dismissal of Mengli II Giray in 1730. Finally, Chapter Five aims to draw a conclusion about the correlation between the developments from 1699 to 1730 and the general opposition to and unease about the treaties.
This introductory chapter consists of three parts. The first part clarifies the sources and methodology of this thesis. The second part is a collation of the studies about the closing of the frontier zones across the globe in the eighteenth century. This part aims to highlight the connections between the demarcation of the Deşt-i Kıpçak in the eighteenth century and similar developments in other frontiers. The third part attempts to understand the nomads in the Ottoman Empire to better
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interpret the developments in the eighteenth century. Finally, the fourth part reviews the literature about the closure of the Black Sea frontier.
1.1 Sources and Methodology
What impact did the closure of the Eurasian steppe have on the frontier societies of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire? What were the underlying reasons for the sequence of rebellions and the official records reporting the border disputes? Is there any correlation between the closure of the steppe frontier and the early eighteenth-century rebellions in the Crimean hinterland? To answer these questions, one needs to analyze the concurrent developments at the other edges of the frontier regions. Subsequently, to grasp the developments within a defined geography, Eastern Europe, a historical outlook is required for this thesis. Following these two tenets, this thesis draws on archival records to shed light on how the people who inhabited the Black Sea frontier reacted to the closure of this frontier.
The Ottoman archives contain rich material related to the developments, problems, and issues that occurred after the enactment of the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700). First and foremost are Mühimme records (Registers of the Important Affairs), which contain copies of all the imperial orders that were prepared at the Imperial Court and which were then approved by the sultan. The edicts in these records shed light on the problems that emerged following the prohibition of mobility and the aggression to the other side. The rebellions are the preeminent indicators to understand the demands of the dissent groups. Moreover, the only way to challenge the central authority was not armed resistance. There is an outstanding number of documents referring to the frontier societies’ recalcitration. The documents portray unauthorized commercial relations, mutual aggressions
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contrarian to the center, and imperial orders to command the border’s efficient control.
The nâme-i hümâyûn collection, which contains copies of diplomatic documents sent from the Porte to other sovereign powers, is another resource to evaluate the Porte’s attitude towards the developments at its northern frontier since the collection includes Porte’s diplomatic correspondences with the contracting states and the Crimean Khanate. During this turbulent period, the Ottomans warned almost all the ascending khans to abide by the treaties and to protect the borders from the incursions of tribes. The treaties supervised the establishment of commissions in case of disturbance on the borders to prevent an outbreak of war. Therefore, there are examples of letters to show goodwill for the protection of the agreement. In addition, these letters include requests for recompensation of the losses that were incurred during the unsanctioned frontier raids.
Crimean and Ottoman chronicles are also essential sources for this thesis and are used not only to complement the information found in the archival sources but also to shed light on the perspectives of some of the contemporary and near-contemporary actors. An especially important chronicle is Tarih-i Mehmed Giray (History of Mehmed Giray). The importance of this chronicle stems from the fact that it was written by a member of the Crimean royal house who lived in time of many of the events he narrated. This chronicle covers the period from the Siege of Vienna in 1683 until the Edirne Incident (1703). Seyyid Mehmed Rıza was another historian focusing on the history of the Khanate in the eighteenth century. He was the kadı-asker (military justice) of the Khanate during Mengli Giray II’s reign. His work Es-sebü’s-seyyâr fî ahbâr-i mülûku’t-Tatar (Seven planets in the narratives of the Tatar kings) starts from Creation and ends in 1737. Since the author was a high
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official and became a close friend of the Khan, his narrative also gives us insight into the perspective of Crimean courtly circles. Abdülgaffar Kırımî was a nobleman from the Şirin tribe and served in several critical positions within the Khanate. His history Umdetü’l-ahbâr (The pillar of the narrative) similarly covers the period from Creation until 1743. He was the kadı of the Şirin tribe during the outbreak of the rebellion in 1724. Even this information suffices to make his history an indispensable resource for this research.2
Halim Giray was another historian from the Giray dynasty, yet, when he completed his history in 1812, the Khanate had already collapsed. Notwithstanding, his history Gülbün-i Hânân (Rosary of the Khans) offers a general history of the Khanate from the reign of Hacı Giray Khan until the reign of the last Crimean ruler Şahin Giray. His narrative was built on earlier chronicles and oral traditions, and it is the only history that was written in the early nineteenth century which is included in this research. This source enables us to see how Crimeans evaluated the eighteenth-century events after the dust had settled.
The early eighteenth-century Ottoman chronicles Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa’s Nusretnâme (Book of Victory), Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (Anonymous Ottoman History), which an unknown author wrote, Defterdâr Sarı Mehmed Paşa’s Zübde-i Vekayiât (Essence of the Events), the history of Râşid, the history of Çelebizâde İsmail Asım Efendi, and the history of Uşşakizâde are among the reference guides of this research. The Ottoman chronicles give us a chance to grasp the Ottoman perspective about the developments in Crimea and its environs. The authors were
2 For the English version of the titles of Crimean and Ottoman Histories’ Denise Klein’s translation is adopted. For further information about the Crimean histories see Denise Klein, “Historiography and Historical Culture in the Crimean Khanate (16th–18th Century)” (PhD diss., Universität Konstanz, 2014), 114-134; see also Denise Klein, “Tatar and Ottoman History Writing: The Case of the Nogay Rebellion (1699–1701),” in The Crimean Khanate between East and West (15th - 18th Century), ed. Denise Klein (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012).
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from the upper echelons of the Ottoman imperial administration and embraced the general tendencies which the Porte adopted. Thus, at some points, there are critical differences between the Ottoman and Crimean chronicles in the narratives. Besides that, the Ottoman histories are helpful to follow the developments in the other parts of the empire which influenced Crimean affairs.
Archival documents and chronicles divulge a substantial bulk of information about the developments after the treaties. On several occasions, the sources contradict each other or offer different perspectives on the events. In the light of the variations in the sources, one of my concerns in this thesis will be to establish a reliable historical narrative detailing the turn of events in chronological order. This narrative will start in 1699, the year of the Karlowitz Treaty, and end in 1730, which is the year Mengli II Giray Khan lost his throne for the second time. While 1699 is a reasonable date, to begin with, to stop the research in 1730 is, in a sense, arbitrary. The grievances did not disappear suddenly after this date. There were still rebellions but focusing on a longer period would have made it difficult to examine the developments in detail.
1.2 Literature review on the history of frontier
The Eurasian Steppes stretches from the eastern end of the Asian continent until the Black Sea Steppe in the west. This huge landmass was the home of numerous ethnic steppe people and was under the control of tribal polities for thousands of years. However, somehow starting with the early modernity, the Eurasian steppes became the frontier of the sedentary empires who get involved in the steppes' affairs via a kind of proxy war. In that regard, it is crucial to evaluate the literature on how the
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steppes turned into closed borders for further analysis of the developments within the Black Sea steppe.
Before the discussion on the history of frontier, clarifying the terms will be meaningful. Prescott asserts that “in political geography,” “frontier” can identify two things; it might refer to the region in-between “states” or the region separating the populated part of a state from its unsettled part. To forestall a possible misconception about the nature of frontier, some geographers describe border zones as “frontier” while referring to the linear separations as “boundaries.”3 Boeck distinguishes between frontiers and boundaries by indicating that frontiers are unsteady and mutable and emerge from various groups’ “interactions,” “whereas borders are created by states.”4 This thesis adopts this distinction and discerns frontiers from borders based on this understanding. This conception indicates the difference and relative wideness of frontiers compared to borders, and frontier zones, boundary regions, or border areas refer to the same phenomenon.
Frontier history has usually drawn historians’ attention since these regions witnessed confrontations between states and various groups. Interestingly, frontier zones also allowed room for considerable commercial, cultural, social, and political interaction among different communities and carried different characteristics than their central region.5 Nevertheless, as consequence of improvements in military technology to control vast regions, combined with developments in cartography, led to the frontiers’ disappearance.6 This turning point in the frontiers’ history affected the frontier societies and forced them to accept the new status quo.
3 John R. V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 33-34.
4 Brian J. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 16.
5 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 16-17.
6 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 58-59.
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Frederick Jackson Turner claims that a major factor that “distinguished” American institutions from European ones were the formative influence of the Western frontier region on the former. Their continuous expansion into untamed regions and the incorporation of these lands into the “civilized” world distinguished the Americans.7 The European frontier was a protected borderland that hosted significant populations, whereas the American frontier passed through empty lands. In the beginning, the Atlantic Coast was the frontier of Europe. However, by advancing into the wildlands, the frontier people adapted themselves to the region’s harsh requirements and became more American.8 According to Turner, just as the Mediterranean had once helped the ancient Greeks to experience different things than their custom offered, the frontier did the same for the Americans. The frontier enabled people to flee the control of central powers and replace the old traditions with new ones.9 Prescott also accepts the frontiers’ role in allowing people to abstain from liabilities assigned by states, so usually, outlaws and vagabonds inhabited these regions.10 For instance, the enactment of the serfdom directed the Russian peasants to seek freedom at the newly seized frontiers during Ivan the Terrible’s reign. “Ivan’s Oprichnina,” attacks of the Crimeans, and natural disasters accelerated this flight to the frontier, which the central authority could not control.11 These regions also acted as an escape venue for nomadic societies to move away from the control of sedentary powers. Therefore, it is understandable why state authorities became keen to demarcate the frontier and assert their power over it.12
7 Turner, Frederick Jackson, The Frontier in American History (New York: Open Road Media, 2015), 2.
8 Turner, The Frontier in American History, 2.
9 Turner, The Frontier in American History, 19.
10 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 58.; Joseph L. Wieczynski, The Russian Frontier: The Impact of Borderlands upon the Course of Early Russian History (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 67.
11 Wieczynski, The Russian Frontier, 50.
12 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 67.
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Perdue asserts that the closure of “the great frontier,” that is to say, the Eurasian Steppes, was a more critical event than the closure of the North American frontier. According to Perdue, the closing of “the great frontier” disempowered the pastoral nomads, who had been the most significant rival to agricultural society since 2000 BCE.13 The pastoral economy had limited resources and required constant raiding and hunting activities against neighboring communities to sustain itself. In that regard, Di Cosmo states that “the vulnerability and poverty of nomadic economy was at the root of endemic, low-level violence and chronic instability of nomadic societies.”14
Similarly, Perdue specifies that the steppe resources were not sufficient to support the requirements of imperial establishments. The victorious ones needed to rely on external revenues from “trade, tribute, and plunder.”15 Nevertheless, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were critical points for relations between the steppes and the settled regions. The sealing of the open frontier due to both Qing and Romanov expansion restricted the mobility of nomads.16 In addition to this development, the nomadic peoples of the steppes could not compete with the sedentary people in exploiting natural resources. According to Allsen, while the sedentary world benefitted from the introduction of “new plant species,” “there were no new animal species to increase productivity of their [nomads’] herds.”17 Allsen also asserts that as a result of Russian expansion in the Eastern steppes, nomads became commercially dependent on Russia’s frontier forts to exchange their
13 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 10-11.
14 Nicola Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History,” Journal of World History 10, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 14-15.
15 Peter C. Perdue, “Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996): 763.
16 Perdue, China Marches West, 8.
17 Thomas T. Allsen, “Eurasia After the Mongol,” in The Cambridge World History: The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 178.
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products, and they lost their trade revenues. Similarly, the Qing isolated Khalkha from Russian merchants and made them dependent on Qing merchants for exchange. For centuries nomads had allied with merchants to benefit from the wealth generated by the sedentary world, but now the merchants were in alliance with the sedentary world to control the steppes.18
As an instance from the Eastern Eurasian steppes on this aspect, Seonmin Kim reveals the strong commercial relationship between the Jurchen tribes and Ming China. Jurchens were bringing the riches of Manchuria, ginseng, and various sorts of furs to the Ming market for profit. However, Nurhaci, the Qing dynasty’s founding leader, monopolized the market by neutralizing the other competitor tribes. In 1607, he brought commodities in large quantities to the frontier market for exchange. Although this created fiscal difficulty, Ming China paid for these items out of fear of Nurhaci’s aggression. Kim summarizes this situation in the following words: “The Ming managed the markets as a defensive method of pacifying the frontier people, not as an aggressive means of making profits.”19 This policy was not unique to the Ming; establishing commercial links between the center and the frontiers was a traditional method to secure the sedentary world. In western Eurasia, for example, horse trade was critically significant for the Nogays, so Ismail Beg refused to assault Moscow when his brother, Yusuf Beg, offered to do so. Ismail justified himself by reminding his brother that Moscow was the leading trading partner for Ismail, whereas Yusuf’s people were trading in Bukhara, so in case of war with Moscow, he and his people would be ruined.20
18 Allsen, “Eurasia After the Mongol,” 176-177.
19 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636-1912 (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 34-35.
20 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: the Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 2010), 26-27.
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As part of Eurasia, the power relations in the Black Sea frontier were not different from that of the eastern one, and economic transactions generated an important venue for political ties. Alexander Halenko stresses the relative importance and vitality of the commercial relations between the Ottomans and Ukrainians. The Ukrainians continued to enjoy “commercial immunities” until the “de jure” recognition of Russian authority in the region by “the convention of 1741” after the Treaty of Belgrade. Simultaneously, Russia was striving to integrate Ukraine into the Russian market. Starting in the 1720’s Russia ended the “free trade” in the region, banned the transaction of some feedstock, proposed the use of Russian currency, and very interestingly ceased to pay the Cossacks “in silver” in order to avoid entrance of Russian silver into the Crimean economy.21 Orest Subtelny also draws attention to the significance of trade relations. He refers to the strong commercial ties between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars as one reason for Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s alignment with the Tatars and Ottomans against Russia. The friendly environment was a must for Zaporozhians since they depended on Crimea and the Ottoman world for armament and salt.22 Interestingly enough, although the Cossacks had usually hostile relations with the Tatars when they needed to protect their political autonomy against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or later the Russian Empire, they headed towards the south.23 Therefore, it is meaningful that Russia wanted to cut both the commercial and political links of the frontier people to close the border zone effectively.
21 Alexander Halenko, “Towards the Character of Ottoman Policy in the Northern Black Sea Region After the Treaty of Belgrade,” Oriente Moderno, 18, no. 79 (1999): 110.
22 Orest Subtelny, “The Ukrainian-Crimean Treaty of 1711,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3, no. 4 (1979): 810.
23 Subtelny, “The Ukrainian-Crimean Treaty”, 809.
14
The Cossacks’ allegiance to the Ottomans remained as leverage for the Hetmanate to protect their autonomy against Russia. Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky allied with the Crimeans and then accepted Ottoman suzerainty in 1651. Although Khmelnytsky changed his side and entered the Russian protectorate in 1654, he continued his relations with the Ottomans and justified himself to them by claiming that alliance with the Russians was merely a strategic move.24 Since the Cossacks were a frontier society, with this policy, the Hetman tried to balance his suzerains’ power to secure his people’s interests. Nevertheless, the closure of the frontier shrank the political maneuvering area for these people. In 1689, with the help of “Jesuit translators,” the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed between Russia and Qing China. As the Treaty demarcated the frontier, Russia wanted to have better commercial relations with China to sell fur and receive Chinese products. China, in return, would prevent a possible alliance between the Mongol groups and Russia. Thus, Hostetler states that the Treaty restricted the frontier groups’ chance “to play one power off against the other.”25
Military innovations also accelerated the Russian expansion in the steppe while Russia was recruiting loyal nomads to protect its borders from steppe raiders. However, Allsen underlines other components of both Russia and Qing’s successes. These were gunpowder and the closing of the gap in horse breeding between sedentary and nomadic powers. Historically, nomads had outshone agricultural society in horse breeding, contributing to their mobility and supremacy on the battlefield. However, by the seventeenth century, sedentary powers had succeeded in
24 Victor Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine In and Out of Ottoman Orbit, 1648–1681,” in The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 138.
25 Laura Hostetler, “Imperial Competition in Eurasia: Russia and China,” in Cambridge World History: The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE , vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 303.
15
breeding enough horses to fight against the steppe warriors.26 McNeill underlines the development of efficient infantry divisions in combats with the cavalries. If the artillery backed these regiments, they would not only resist the cavalries but annihilate them.27 İnalcık stresses that Russians and Poles had no chance to invade the south until a suitable logistical system was created to pass the steppe. The Cossacks were the factor that brought about the groundbreaking transformation in this struggle. The utilization of gunpowder and the material backing of Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy made them able to resist and withstand against the Tatars.28 The Cossack bands were sailing into the sea via estuaries flow into the Black Sea by using unique vessels, called şayka in Turkish, to raid and plunder the Ottoman and Tatar settlements. The whole littoral of Ottoman mare clausum was under threat when the Cossacks were freely navigating in the Black Sea. In 1624, the Cossacks even reached Istanbul and plundered the settlements on the Black Sea coast. İnalcık underscores that the Khotyn (Hotin in Turkish) campaign of 1621, supporting Hetman Khmelnityski and the Chyhyryn (Çehrin in Turkish) Campaign were Ottoman reactions to the aggressions of the Cossacks and aimed to neutralize them.29
In the central part of the Eurasian steppes, significant developments occurred in the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1679, a significant nomadic power emerged after the Dzunghars’ leader, Galdan, controlled the Muslim-inhabited oases of Turkestan. The expansion of the Dzunghars on the frontiers of northern Mongolia generated a threat for the Qing. With the religious motivation provided by Buddhism,
26 Allsen, “Eurasia After the Mongol”, 172.
27 William H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800: a Study of Eastward Movement in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 128.
28 İnalcık, “Struggle for East-European Empire 1400-1700.” 432.
29 Halil İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017), 199-206.
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the Dzunghars could draw the Mongols under Qing control to their side.30 After the Dzunghar dominated the Khalkha region in the 1680s, the Qing wanted to negotiate with the Tsar to avoid a Russo-Dzungharian alliance against China. In return for the Russians’ commercial rights, the Amur region dispute was settled because a peaceful frontier was vital for both parties.31 Simultaneously, the Qing’s subjugation of the Eastern Mongols and Russia’s colonization of northern Eurasia made the two empires neighboring countries. Since both powers were in strife to transform their frontier regions into regular territories within well-delineated borders, border disputes emerged at certain points. The Qing wanted to terminate the land dispute with Russia, and thus in 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed. The Qing seized the Amur basin while Russia secured the southern edge of Siberia. By the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727, the border effectively closed for the migration of nomadic tribes, so for the first time, the way from the forest region of Siberia to the Southern steppes was closed. Already, both empires were aiming to terminate the nomadic life of the local tribes.32
The northern Mongols, the Khalkha people, were also in the Qing zone of influence. Perdue underlines that the empire succeeded in controlling Eastern Mongolia so that the Khalkha people, who accepted the emperor’s ascendancy, conceded him the right to “allocate pasturelands among themselves, levy troops and horses.” In return, these people received “honorary titles,” a chance to enter Manchu nobility, food, and merchandise. Perdue asserts that it was a strategic sedentarization policy. He also claims that while people might have gone to the steppes to escape
30 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), 281-282.
31 Hostetler, “Imperial Competition”, 303.
32 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 99.
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from increasing Chinese or Dzunghar power, this was becoming more challenging since increasing populations did not match the prairie’s capabilities. Therefore, the Qing welcomed many nomadic soldiers whose provision was depleted.33
Nancy Kollman asserts that extreme weather events associated with the “Little Ice Age” during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century pushed the Russian peasants to the south to find more feasible lands to cultivate. The harsh climatic conditions had caused outstanding grievances and motivated the Russian expansion into more productive and milder regions.34 Following the trends in early modern western Europe, Russia also adopted “mercantilist” policies to accumulate more productive resources, land, and more people.35 In that regard, Kollman points out that a significant turning point occurred in European and Eurasian history when the Holy Roman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, and Russia succeeded in seizing control of the steppe, stopping “slave raids,” establishing full control over commerce, and transforming the prairies into farmlands.36
McNeill proposes similar ideas in his book, which focuses on the European steppe frontier. The successful expansion of Russia and Austria into their respective frontier in the eighteenth century put an end to “steppe nomadism,” which has given a unique character to Danubian and Pontic Europe for thousands of years. The difficulty to defend the frontier and the expected agricultural taxation from the new settlements encouraged both Russia and Austria to colonize the frontier.37 In the 1740s, there were still unsettled territories between Russian Ukraine and Crimean
33 Perdue, “Military Mobilization”, 774-775.
34 Nancy Shields Kollmann, The Russian Empire 1450-1801 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27-28; For the reasons of peasant flux to the Don region in the second half of the 17th century see Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 209.
35 Kollman, The Russian Empire, 38.
36 Kollman, The Russian Empire, 57.
37 McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 182-185.
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lands. However, they had already shrunk and been demarcated for the future usage of agricultural production.38 Predictably, the people of the steppe challenged the demarcation of borders between these states. Drawing borders in the middle of the old steppe and expecting the submission of the nomads in the region generated grievances. At this point, McNeill indicates an essential difference between American and Russian colonization of the frontier. Russia required enforcing its full-fledged power capacity to terminate nomad power. However, in the United States and the other almost uninhabited colonial acquisition of Europe in other continents, there was no threaded power to resist colonial expansion.39
Since frontiers had historically been areas of confrontation between rival states, it had been a long-standing policy of states to settle nomads, seminomads, or other warlike people in these regions to create a military buffer zone against others. Serhii Plokhy asserts that Cossackdom was one of the results emanating from the open steppe frontier, which divided the Eastern European peasants from the tribal people of the Eurasian steppes. Plokhy defines the whole Eurasian steppes as extending from the mouth of the Danube to the Pacific shore. As a result of the wideness of the open steppe, each central state had developed various tactics against the possible dangers generated from the frontier. China had built “a great fortified wall,” while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy relied on “a system of fortified towns” against aggressive movements from the other side of the frontier. Later these people were called with a Turkic name, Cossacks.40
Gradually, the open steppe from above the Crimean peninsula became home for the migrants and fugitives who escaped from the regions under the control of the
38 McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 178.
39 McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 201.
40 Serhij M. Plochij, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 1.
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Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Muscovite Tsardom. These people contributed assistance to the frontier’s defense by creating a buffer zone against the Tatar raids. For example, Russia did not request the extradition of the soldiers who had deserted to the Cossacks during a supplementary campaign against Ottoman aggression against the Cossack capital in 1649 because the deserters would assist the frontier’s security during the troubled times.41 The Cossacks played an instrumental role in the gradual conquest of the steppe. They enjoyed relative independence from the central powers until the closure of the open steppe in the eighteenth century. Once the biggest threat to Russian colonization, the Crimean Khanate was pacified; the Cossacks also got their share of Russian centralization and were abolished at the end of the eighteenth century.42
To return to the discussion of the Cossacks’ role as protectors of the frontier, Witzenrath makes a slightly different argument than Plokhy. Since the Cossacks were a helpful but hazardous tool to secure advancement, Russia decided to create fortifications along the frontier against the Crimean and Nogay raids in 1635. Slowly, these fortified regions provided a suitable environment for new settlers and forced the nomadic groups, which were roaming around to settle by dividing their region.43 The Cossacks’ flight to the Black Sea frontier also demonstrates the frontier’s nature as a fleeing point for the people who have grievances.
James Forsyth’s research on Siberia offers some clues about the troubles that emerged from the colonization of the steppes. In the Southern Urals, Kazakhs,
41 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 58.
42 Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion, 1.
43 Christoph Witzenrath, Cossacks and the Russian Empire: 1598-1725: Manipulation, Rebellion and Expansion into Siberia (Milton Park: Routledge, 2007), 25-26.; Boeck underscores that the establishment of Belgograd Line in the 17th century, successfully prevented Tatar raids and started the Russian control over the territories. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 23; for more information about the development of the Russian fortified frontier line see also Brian L. Davies, Warfare, State and the Society in the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 78-95.
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Bashkirs, and Oirats were standing against Russian expansion. In the early eighteenth century, Bashkirs informed the Tsar by petitioning about the Russian peasants who damaged their pasture lands and forests. Bashkirs were also attacking and plundering the Russian settlements. Sometimes, the Russian Empire manipulated another nomadic group, the Kalmyks, to suppress the Bashkir insurgency, but these alliances were not always trustworthy. The Russian fortification from Yaik to the Volga starting with the 1730s isolated the Bashkirs and rendered them lack the support of their ally, the Kazakhs. In the face of the Dzungarian threat, Middle and Lesser Kazakh Hordes accepted Russian supremacy in the first half of the eighteenth century.44 On the Eurasian Steppe from the Pacific to the Black Sea hinterland, the pastoral nomadism started to wane, and the people whose ancestors were all nomads had to cope with a broad seated challenge to their traditional lifestyles. Khodarkovsky remarks that the “historians of the sedentary societies” paid little attention to the small-scale “frontier raids” since the great wars and seizure of a piece of land were central for the settled people. However, these raids were vital for the nomadic communities for whom animal husbandry was of paramount importance.45 Based on Khodarkovsky’s point, we can assume that it is important for frontier studies not to take for granted the biases of the center towards frontier and peripheries. In that regard, this thesis also attempts to evaluate the Black Sea frontier by putting it in the center and show its dynamics were quite different from that of the central administrations.
44 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 117-119.
45 Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 30.
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1.3 Literature review on nomads of the Ottoman Empire
The Crimean Khanate as the vassal of the Ottomans had been highly influenced by the developments in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Sultans appointed and dismissed Crimean khans, took hostage some of the male members of the Giray dynasty. They established direct rule over the Crimean littoral and economically incorporated the peninsula into the Ottoman market. Vis-à-vis increasing Ottoman presence, the Crimean Khanate had been forced to share the control in her hinterland, especially in Bucak and Özi regions at the south of Dnieper River. As indicated in Chapter Two, these regions welcomed the Nogay migrants and reshaped the region’s demography. The nomad migrants entered into a system ruled both by the Ottomans and the Crimeans. This share in administration can be traced in the documents analyzed in this thesis. By the Karlowitz Treaty, these people would have various problems and frequently challenge the Ottoman and Crimean rule. In that regard, it is important to evaluate the literature on the Ottoman policies towards the nomads in other parts of the empire. It contributes to contextualizing the Ottoman policies for the Halil Pasha Yurdu Nogays because the region was part of the Ottoman system as it was located under the Khanate’s sphere of influence.
After the Mongolian Empire’s dissolution in the fourteenth century, political disintegration had occurred, and this process is called “retribalization” by Togan. At a later stage, retribalization ended up with the emergence of “regional empires.” The Asian regional empires of the early modern period succeeded in subjugating tribes and making them accept central authority. Therefore, they coexisted for a while in contrast with the general opinion that they are mutually exclusive.46 Togan underlines that assigning new tribes to the new frontier zones and settling nomads in
46 İsenbike Togan, “Evolution of Tribal Polities in the Regional Empires of Asia,” Проблемы Востоковедения 78 (2017): 21-26.
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the frontier were typical for the steppe-based polities. However, the “institutional subordination” of nomadic groups to the state and the establishment of ties between the center and periphery are idiosyncratic for Qing China and the Ottomans. Only the Ottomans succeeded in institutionalizing pastoral nomads’ subordination. It was comparable to the Qing dynasty’s practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.47
In Qing China, tribal groups were organized under noble families that received territorial rights, but they lacked the power to expand their boundaries. Eventually, tribes became dependent on Qing China. Togan asserts that in a general perspective, the picture was more or less similar for the Ottomans. The Ottomans initiated a subordination policy for tribes employing “social, economic, political forces.” Nevertheless, those who want political independence merged with the tribes in Iran and aided the formation of the Safavid state. The most striking part of the narrative is the peripheralization of the regions, which are vital for forming an imperial organization. Hence, even if in the earlier phases of the empire, nomads could form rival organizations to the central authority, they lost their ability because of the peripheralization of their bases. Retribalization was the spinning out of the people from the power spheres of central authority and forming a new tribal organization in the steppes. Thus, the regions where “retribalization was possible” were peripheralized due to changes in the trade routes. Ottoman Eastern Anatolia and Mongolia were examples of such places. Therefore, tribes lost their chance to trade surplus and became more dependent on the central authority.48 In a sense, Crimea might be a useful example of this conception. The closure of the frontier and Russian
47 İsenbike Togan, “Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms,” Journal of Peasant Studies 18, no. 3-4 (1991): 189.
48 İsenbike Togan, “Evolution of Tribal Polities in the Regional Empires of Asia,” Проблемы Востоковедения 78 (2017): 21-26.
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domination over the trade routes restricted the Khanate’s revenues. The absence of a base for retribalization prevented discontented people from forming a severe threat to the center. Gradually, the remnants of the nomadic tribes of Eurasia merged into sedentary societies and waned from the scene.
Regarding the Ottoman case, Reşat Kasaba asserts that the frontier people had assisted the Ottomans in enlarging their power sphere by preparing the region for further Ottoman invasions. Sometimes, they had captured a region by themselves, and the Ottoman institutions had come after.49 These groups were also helpful for the empire to secure the required livestock for military encampments. Tribes were also assigned to protect the frontier zones and bridges.50 They were essential for logistical activities; they undertook the transportation of goods and agricultural outputs crucial for the military. They also contributed to the communication of the center with the provinces.51 In that regard, Kasaba criticizes the view that the Ottomans had diminished the role of nomadic tribesmen in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He argues that the Ottoman Empire started to forcibly settle its tribes only at the end of the eighteenth century. Before this century, the empire’s sedentarization policies were not aiming directly to end “nomadism” but “to punish unruly tribes” or increase a particular region’s population.52
Barkey claims that the Ottoman state attempted to settle nomads and the nomads’ flight from the state, but she does not define the period.53 According to Kasaba, besides some particular examples, this was only relevant after the
49 Kasaba Reşat, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2010), 8.
50 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 34.
51 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 20.
52 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 29.
53 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats (Cornell University Press, 1994), 115.
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seventeenth century to control the frontier regions as the peace treaties necessitated.54 At this point, Barkey approaches the early sedentarization instances as a part of a central government’s general policy towards nomads 55; however, Kasaba evaluates these earlier practices as a means of pacification of recalcitrant tribes. Nevertheless, Barkey also highlights that the state did not aim for the “complete” extermination of tribal structure because, through “bargaining” and complicated relationship with the state, nomadic groups were undertaking critical works, especially in the military.56 In a way, the steppe people served as watchmen and active defenders of the frontiers, and the Crimean khans supported the Ottoman army with their famed cavalries.
Although inclusive settlement policies were absent in the Ottoman state at the time, Hütteroth’s article displays that a considerable number of Anatolian nomads settled during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.57 Hütteroth also points out an important feature of the migrations in the Ottoman Empire; he says that
Relations between people and their natural environment in Ottoman times were characterised by a double shift: from the seventeenth century onward the main settlement areas were first moved from the plains to the mountains and later, from the nineteenth century onward, they returned to the plains.58
However, according to him, the abandonment of lowlands in Ottoman Europe originated from the devastation of war. In the Asian part, the reason was the insecurity generated by nomads and vagabonds who menaced the production.59 As indicated in Oktay Özel’s study, the long-lasting wars against the Safavids (1578-90) Habsburgs (1593-1606) destabilized the empire and caused frequent payment failures for soldiers. Meanwhile, the increase in population during the sixteenth century has
54 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 52.
55 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 117.
56 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 121.
57 Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20-21.
58 Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” 42.
59 Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” 35.
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created a mass incapable of holding a job or a sufficient amount of land. Under these circumstances, Anatolia and northern Syria portrayed the celali rebellions formed by deserters and dissatisfied peasants. Finally, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the instability and insecurity in the rural areas led the great migration, known as the Büyük Kaçgun, to fortified regions or cities and devastated the countryside settlements. As a result of this demographic shift, some recently sedentarized lapsed back into nomadism.60
Sam White draws attention to the “Little Ice Age” as a prominent reason for the celali revolts at the end of the sixteenth century.61 He claims that the increasing trend in population in the earlier fifteenth century, thanks to steady weather conditions, was reversed with the climatic changes that last long and devastating agricultural production.62 By taking advantage of the turbulence in the early seventeenth century, the nomads also made havoc on the sedentary people.63 As mentioned above, Kollman asserted that the extremely harsh weather conditions pushed the Russians to seek warmer lands in the south. As indicated in Chapter Two, the Nogays would also face droughts and famines and took refuge in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. Although Hütteroth approaches with a suspicion that the change in climate affected the rebellions in the Mediterranean64, the weather condition seemingly played a critical role in the migration of masses.
60 Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c. 1550-1700 ,” in The Ottoman World, ed. Christine Woodhead (Routledge, 2013), pp. 184-202; Sam White comments similarly on the role of population increase as the preliminary of the seventeenth century crisis and rebellions. Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 75-77.
61 White, The Climate of Rebellion, 1, 19, 125, 163, 224-225.
62 White, The Climate of Rebellion, 139.
63 White underlines that the nomads were also vulnerable to the natural conditions; so their destructions over the settled people should be read under this framework. White, The Climate of Rebellion, 237-243.
64 Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” 21-22.
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In this discussion, Cengiz Orhonlu shows that the Ottoman iskân policy underwent a critical change starting with 1691. The Ottomans attempted to settle the nomads in the deserted and exhausted regions of Anatolia and Syria. The aim was to revive agricultural production, end the conflicts between settled and nomad people. Orhonlu draws attention that this policy also intended to prevent the nomads’ blending into the rebels.65 Hütteroth cites Wallachia and Moldovia as the places where the settlement in the plains was interrupted in the seventeenth century.66 In that regard, the Halil Pasha Yurdu region, a vacant territory in the Bucak at the fringe of Moldovia, was given to the Nogay migrants in the second half of the seventeenth century. Although the Nogays’ settlement occurred a couple of decades before the critical change in the iskân policy, the Ottoman program to settle the Nogays in the region carries similar aims like the iskân policy that Orhonlu underlined. The Nogays would stabilize the region, increase the Ottoman control and production there. However, the policy created several problems because of the animosities between the Moldovian and Nogay people later on, especially after the Treaty of Karlowitz.
Hülya Canbakal underscores an “overlap between the tribal territories and the distribution of seyyidship claims” registered in the “Nakibüleşraf Defterleri (Registers of the Marshal of the Descendants of the Prophet).” She claims that the centralist policies, such as the augmentation of agriculture, “marginalization” of tribal leaders, and “forced settlements,” estranged the tribal people. Therefore, these difficulties became part of the circumstances for incrementing the numbers of claimants in the
65 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskân Teşebbüsü (1691-1696) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1963), 5.
66 Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” 28.
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.67 She cites that most of the seyyids in the Özi Province, the main component of the Ottoman northern frontier, succeeded in keeping their claims while many seyyids lost their title in the other parts of the empire during the inspections in the second half of the seventeenth century.68 Since the relative importance of the north increased for the Ottomans after the Russian entrance into the Black Sea frontier, the state might have avoided upsetting the Özi seyyids; many of them had probably received the title in return for their subordination. As Barkey highlighted the complex relationships between the state and the nomads based on bargaining, it is apparent that the Ottomans exchanged the seyyid title for the fealty of the nomads. As in the previous subchapter, the Qing Empire attempted to buy the Mongols’ subordination by ascending them to the Manchu nobility. Although the thing that the nomads wanted to obtain had changed, it is interesting to see the centrality of bargaining for the administration of nomads between the eastern-most and western-most ends of Eurasian steppes. As an example of a bargain in the Crimean context, the tribal aristocracy forced the Ottomans to dismiss Kara Devlet Giray and enthrone Saadet Giray in 1717 to receive their military support against the Habsburgs.
1.4 Literature review on the closure of the Black Sea frontier
According to Strohmeyer, before the Treaty of Karlowitz, the border zones were not clearly delineated, and both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs laid claim over Hungary and Transylvania. Strohmeyer remarks on an essential change that the Treaty of Karlowitz brought. It was the commission of demarcation that aimed to
67 Hülya Canbakal, “The Ottoman State and Descendants of the Prophet in Anatolia and the Balkans (c.1500-1700),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 52 (2009), 562
68 Canbakal, “The Ottoman State and Descendants of the Prophet,” 549-550.
28
establish clear borders in place of the frontier zones.69 At this point, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk reminds us that the clear demarcation of the frontier did not emerge all of a sudden with the Treaty Karlowitz. The Ottomans had accepted linear borders at some regions where the population density was high, such as Dalmatia, Moldovia, and some eastern provinces bordering the Safavids before the Treaty.70 Kołodziejczyk points out another significant issue; even after the Karlowitz, the clearly defined borders coexisted with open frontiers between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He underlines that the Polish crown intentionally left the eastern part of the frontier unidentified since Poland-Lithuania aimed to re-establish control over the Zaporozhian Cossacks.71 Boeck stresses that the prohibition of raiding and the demarcation of the borders separating Russia and the Ottoman Empire paved the way for the annihilation of the Eurasian Steppe that bolstered these polities at their rise. The eighteenth-century policies of reducing the extent of the no man’s land through the steppe’s colonization and restricting the free movement of nomads led to the gradual demise of the nomadic tribes in this region.72 Whether the defined borders abruptly replaced the frontiers in the Black Sea Steppes or not at the turn of the eighteenth century, we may assume that the most detrimental development brought by the treaties was the increasing control over the open steppes restricts the steppe’s autonomy.
Abou-El-Haj underlines that the ghazi tradition was a fundamental tenet for the early Ottomans’ further advancement into the enemy zones similar to the
69Arno Strohmeyer, “The Symbolic Making of the Peace of Carlowitz: The Border Crossing of Count Wolfgang IV of Oettingen-Wallerstein during His Mission as Imperial Grand Ambassador to the Sublime Porte (1699–1701),” in The Treaties of Carlowitz (1699) Antecedents, Course and Consequences, ed. Colin Heywood and Ivan Parvev (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 222.
70 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk , “Between Universalistic Claims and Reality: Ottoman Frontiers in the Early Modern Period,” in The Ottoman World, ed. Christine Woodhead (Routledge, 2013), 208.
71 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk , “Between Universalistic Claims and Reality,” 211.
72 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 10.
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Crimean and Nogay Tatars. Although the Ottomans established more institutionalized relations with their neighbors, the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian parts of the boundary were open for the frontier societies by the end of the seventeenth century.73 At this point, Abou-El-Haj asserts that
For the peace treaties, with their boundary clauses, created both ideological and practical dilemmas for the incumbent Sultan and Ottoman leadership. The negotiated agreements of 1699 and 1700 implied in their territorial delimitations at least two modern principles of international law: acceptance of a political boundary and adherence to the concept of the inviolability of the territory of a sovereign state.74
Therefore, the Ottomans encountered these two fundamental problems in the aftermath of the treaties. According to Abou-El-Haj, these new conditions of international politics meant the closure of the frontier, and it was against the Ottomans’ “raison d’etre.” 75 He also underlines that the treaties’ conditions caused the shift in the Bucak people’s “mode of life and livelihoods” that were closely attached to the raiding activities against the opposite side of the border. Thus, it ignited the resentment of the frontier societies, especially the Nogays in his case.76
In that regard, Denise Klein underlines that the Ottoman recuperated from the problems thanks to the post-war tranquility, but the Crimean Khanate faced several difficulties in this period. Klein remarks that;
…the Crimean Tatars continued struggling with economic hardship and political instability. With the Treaty of Karlowitz, they had lost some of their most important sources of income: the annual payments from Russia and Poland-Lithuania and the right to raid neighboring territories. Moreover, the pasturelands of the nomadic tribes north of the Black Sea dwindled more and more as Slavic settlers moved south.
73 Rifaat A. Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89, no. 3 (1969): 469.
74 Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1969). "The Formal Closure,” 468.
75 Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1969). "The Formal Closure,” 469-475.
76 Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1969). "The Formal Closure,” 471.
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Therefore, the author adds that in the eighteenth century, the khans faced several difficulties in checking the acts of their people, which endanger the treaties. 77
Virginia Aksan remarks that two principles became dominant in the post-1699 Ottoman borderland policies. Firstly, the Ottomans focused on retrieving the frontier forts, destroying hostile fortresses along the Belgrad-Azov line, and enacting a fortification policy to strengthen its position in the frontier. The establishment of the Açu Fort in the Kuban, the Kal‘a-i Cedîd or Yeni Kale78 (New Castle) on the Kerch Strait, the Temrük Fort in Taman Peninsula demonstrates Aksan’s claim. Secondly, the Ottoman bureaucracy attempted to pretend the new conditions of the peace, namely reconciliation for disputes and well-defined borders, as new ways of religious war. Aksan also embraces the idea that it was against the raison d’etre of the empire. Nevertheless, the rebels of 1703 disdained the effort to improve the empire’s image.79 Thus, the treaties with the “infidels” created a legitimacy problem and ignited “protest and rebellion.” In that regard, it was a challenge to control the frontier groups, which had been previously encouraged to protect the border by generating constant threats against the enemies.80 Başer underlines that the post-war upheaval’s underlying reason along the Commonwealth’s frontiers was the Ottomans’ “centralization” attempts to avoid future conflicts.81
77 Denise Klein, “Historiography and Historical Culture in the Crimean Khanate (16th–18th Century),” 17.
78 Both the words “cedîd” and “yeni” mean new; the first one is Arabic origin and the second one Turkish. The Ottoman documents used both versions to refer to the fort.
79 Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern History 3, no. 2 (1999): 123; For the Porte’s justification of the Treaty with non-Muslims see Rifa 'at Ali Abou-El-Haj. "Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peace Making: The Karlowitz Case" 51, no. 1 (1974): 131-137; For the construction of the forts see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 2.
80 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 27.
81 Alper Başer, “Conflicting Legitimacies in the Triangle of the Noghay Hordes, Crimean Khanate, and Ottoman Empire,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 36, no. 1/2 (2019): 112.
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The questioning of the changes in the terminology for the borders and borderlands pre and post Karlowitz periods might reveal the transformation of the Ottoman perception of the frontier. Colin Heywood states that Turner’s evaluation of “the American frontier as ‘the outer edge of the wave- the meeting point between savagery and civilisation’” is fundamentally similar to the Ottoman approach to the people of the “biladü’l-küfr,” the “lands of unbelief.” He draws attention to the presence of the distinction between the linear and zonal boundaries in the Ottoman language. The former one was called “sınır or hudûd” whereas the open frontiers called “uç.” The uç was the terminus of the darü’l-Islam, namely the “abode of Islam” and the beginning of the darü’l-harb, meaning “the abode of war.” Thus, Heywood underlines that the uç resembles “the earlier Islamic thugur.”82 The thugur itself was in use at least as late as the early eighteenth century, as available on one occasion in chapter four. Nevertheless, in the archival documents which are analyzed in this thesis, the usage of sınır and hudûd outnumbered thugur or serhadd-i mansûre in English, “the ever-victorious frontier.” It is dangerous to claim the Ottomans left the previous perception and fully embraced the linear borders after the treaties. Serhadd-i mansûre took place in the Edirne Treaty (1713) and in the hüccet (title-deed), which was issued for the border demarcation after the Belgrad Treaty (1739). However, there is no mention of serhadd-i mansûre in the Istanbul Treaty (1700); instead, serhadd-i İslamiyye was used.
Evliya Çelebi referred to the Or Kapı as the beginning of the border zone (“ibtidâ-i serhadd-i hisâr-ı Or”), whereas the Doğan and Şahinkirman castles on the
82 Heywood transliterated darü’l-Islam as dâr al-Islâm, but the Arabic possessive constructions were written as the former’s transliteration in this thesis. Therefore, the transliterated words in his article are written coherently to the transliteration, which is applied in this thesis. He also referred uç as uj, but the former is more proper for Turkish pronunciation. Colin Heywood, “The Frontier in Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths ,” in Frontiers in Question Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700, ed. Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 233-234.
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Dnieper and Azov as the “intihâ-i serhadd”, namely the end of it.83 Mehmed Giray remarked that the Akkirman Nogays asked for permission not to join the campaign against the Habsburgs since their province was already the border zone.84 In that regard, right before the treaties, both the accounts proved the Black Sea frontier was a serhadd, in other words, a border zone. In the treaties with the Russians in the first half of the eighteenth century, usages of hudûd exceed serhadd, and this might denote the closure of the frontier. Even so, these documents are the Ottoman copies that were open to its authors’ manipulation to pen the agreement in a more pro-Ottoman manner. Also, it is challenging to determine whether the scribes of the eighteenth century referred to the same thing with hudûd and serhadd-i mansûre as their counterparts in the previous centuries did.
However, to find a convincing answer for the change in frontier terminology, one needs to conduct in-depth research on Ottoman archives, chronicles, all available sources covering before and after the Karlowitz and Istanbul Treaties. Although in this part, it is attempted to understand whether there was a transformation in Ottoman perception, this painstaking task exceeds the scope of this thesis.
83 Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, ed. Yücel Dağlı, Ali Seyit Kahraman, and Robert Dankoff, vol. 7 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011), 189; 196; 330.
84 “Bizim vilâyetimiz serhadd-i İslâmdur.” Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 43.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CRIMEAN KHANATE AND THE TREATIES
2.1 A brief introduction to the Crimean Khanate
The Crimean Khanate succeeded in gaining its independence from the Golden Horde in the 1440s. Hacı Giray Khan became the first Crimean Khan after receiving the support of the powerful tribes, most importantly, the Şirins. The death of Hacı Giray started an interregnum period because of the struggle of his descendants for the Crimean throne. The leader of the Şirins, Eminek Mirza, appealed for Ottoman support to enthrone Mengli Giray as the successor of Hacı Giray Khan. After a couple of years, Mengli Giray succeeded in ascending to the throne with Ottoman assistance. Meanwhile, the Ottomans conquered Caffa, most of the Crimean littoral, and later Azov (Azak in Turkish) from Genoa and established dominance over the Khanate in 1475.85 The conquered part of the peninsula was put under direct Ottoman rule, and Kefe Eyaleti (Province of Caffa) was established.86
The Crimean Peninsula tied to the Deşt-i Kıpçak through a very narrow isthmus named as Or Kapı or Ferahkerman, which is known today as Perekop. The mountainous region that dominated the south of the peninsula increased the annual precipitation and created humid weather tolerating agriculture. As a result, people from various ethnic groups have settled in this region since antiquity. However, the northern part was the steppe region similar to that of outside the isthmus and suitable
85 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, 4-6; For the first correspondences between the Crimean Khanate and the Ottomans see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivindeki Altınordu, Kırım Ve Türkistan Hanlarına Ait Yarlık Ve Bitikler (İstanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1940).
86 For the details of the Ottoman dominance over the Crimean Peninsula see V. D. Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı (Istanbul: Selenge, 2016), 174-201; and also, İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, 49-80.
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for pastoralists.87 The capital of the Khanate, Bahçesaray, was located in a river valley in the central south. Akmescit (Simferopol) was the seat of the kalgay (the first rank heir apparent of Khan) and significant city at a four-hour distance from the capital, as Evliya Çelebi told. Gözleve (Yevpatoriya), Balıklava, Mangup, Karasubazar, Caffa, Sudak, and Kerch were some of the leading settlements.88
In addition to the Crimean Peninsula, the Khanate’s hinterland stretched from Moldovia to Circassia in the east-west direction and the southern part of the Deşt-i Kıpçak. However, the increasing Ottoman control over the western littoral of the Black Sea restricted the Khans’ authority there. The Caffa, Sudak, and Mangup ports were Ottoman possessions. The Ottomans also established a castle at the estuary of the Dnieper River in the sixteenth century, known as Özi Kalesi.89 Bronevskiy, a Polish nobleman who visited Crimea in the sixteenth century as the envoy of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, underlined that the Özi and Akkirman Tatars and Tatars who lived under Ottoman domain such as Dobruca joined the Khans’ campaigns according to the sultan’s decree.90 In the rear of the Taman Peninsula, many of the Circassian tribes were the vassals of the Khans. However, they frequently posed a challenge to the Khanate, whereas some tribes developed close relations with the Girays. For example, they often undertook the atalık (tutorage for a prince) mission of Giray Sultans and gained prestige and wealth when the candidate whom they raised enthroned. Smirnov claims that the Besleney tribe was referred to
87 Ethem Feyzi Gözaydın, Kırım: Kırım Türklerinin Yerleşme Ve Göçleri (İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1948), 9-16; Williams, “The Ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars,” 330-331.
88 Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, vol. 7, 209-255; For a detailed historical reconstruction of Crimean Karasubazar see Zeynep Özdem, Kırım Karasubazar'da Sosyo-Ekonomik Hayat: (17. yüzyıl Sonlarından, 18. yüzyıl Ortalarında Kadar) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010); and see also Sergei G. Bocharov, “Karasubazar: Historical Topography of the City of the Crimean Khanate in the 16th-18th Centuries,” Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences, 2020, pp. 4-16, doi.org/10.17516/1997-1370-0567.
89 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 17.
90 Martin Bronevskiy, Kırım, trans. Kemal Ortaylı (Ankara: Ege Matbaası, 1970), 56.
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as such because they succeeded in receiving this mission generally that beslemek also means raising in Turkish.91
The Ottomans started to appoint and dismiss khans, usually by reconciliation with the tribal aristocracy. Nevertheless, İnalcık underlines that in real terms, the Khanate entered the Ottoman protectorate when it failed to compete with the Muscovite Tsardom to capture Astrakhan and Kazan in the sixteenth century.92 The sphere of influence of the Khanate reached its zenith when Sahib Giray and Safa Giray enthroned as the Khan of Kazan. However, Sahib Giray Khan was killed in 1551, and then the Crimean Khanate failed to prevent the Muscovite seizure of the Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1554.93
The Crimean Khans were not powerful enough to concentrate the power at the center because their armies consisted of tribal soldiers. The Ottomans also did not want mighty khans who might have challenged the Ottoman authority over the region. Conspicuously, Sahib I Giray Khan (1532-1551) lost his throne when he attempted to enthrone his brother Devlet Giray as the Khan of Kazan. The Ottomans sent his brother, Devlet, to the Crimea but not as the Khan of Kazan but of Crimea. Therefore, Sahip Giray’s attempts to reform the Khanate following the Ottoman example and spreading his power within the former Golden Horden realm were watered down.94
As indicated above, the tribal aristocracy played a crucial role in the politics of the Khanate. The Crimean Khanate was fundamentally a tribal confederation in which the karaçı beys represented the interests of the powerful tribes. There were four karaçıs; although their relative importance changed over time, the most
91 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 222-223.
92 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 80.
93 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 112-114.
94 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 96-104.
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prestigious tribe was the Şirins, who had helped bring Ottoman suzerainty over the Khanate in the fifteenth century.95 In the sixteenth century, the Mangıts or Mansuroğlu tribe was also placed in the karaçı protocol. They were from the Nogays, living in the area stretching from the Yaik River to the Dniester, and Sahib I Giray Khan had settled them in the peninsula.96
These aristocratic families possessed vast territories in Crimea and did not pay taxes to the Khans for the usufruct. Instead, they were in charge of providing troops and military supplies to the Crimean army.97 The Crimean khans needed karaçıs’ close cooperation and support because the Khanate’s army was an aggregation of tribal warriors. A khan’s legitimacy was closely connected to his success in protecting the tribe’s interest within the autonomy that the Ottomans defined. Additionally, the Khan was responsible for providing occasions for the tribes to raid and plunder the enemy countries.98 However, since the treaties prohibited such aggressions, the Khan had trouble controlling the vassals, karaçı begs, and the Nogays and more rebellions occurred in this period.99 Besides the tribal forces, the Ottomans supported the Khans with a small military unit.100
The Ottoman suzerainty did not remain limited to politics but also influenced the vernacular language. As a result, the Oghuz Turkic became dominant in the
95 On the details of the Crimean karaçı beys see, Halil İnalcık, “The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3, no. 4 (1979): pp. 445-466; Beatrice Forbes Manz, “The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466-1532,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2, no. 3 (September 1978): pp. 282-309; Muzaffer Ürekli, Kırım Hanlığının Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Himâyesinde Yükselişi (1441-1569) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştıma Enstitüsü, 1989), 77-79; for a general outlook of the tribal aristocracy in the Mongol World see, Uli Schamiloglu, “The Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde” (PhD diss., University of Columbia, 1986).
96 Ürekli, Kırım Hanlığının Kuruluşu, 77-79.
97 Gözaydın, Kırım, 36-37.
98 Davis, Warfare, State and Society, 23.
99 Królikowska-Jedlińska, Law and Division of Power, X.
100 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 25.
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accents of the Crimean Tatars living in the southern parts of the peninsula. Whereas the Kipchak Turkic was more prevalent in the northern steppe region. For example, Evliya Çelebi stated that the Crimean language was comprehensible despite several differences in accent. However, according to him, the speakers of the Nogay language, there were twelve dialects of it as he claimed, could only communicate with translators among themselves.101
It was not only the language that distinguishes the inhabitants of the Crimea from the steppe people, Nogays. The Crimean Tatars shared the peninsula with various groups, especially Greeks, Crimean Karaites, Armenians, and Anatolian Turks. It is significant to underline that the Crimean Tatars who inhabited the coastal regions of the peninsula differed economically from the people living in the steppes under Crimean control. The southern part allowed the flourishment of sedentary life while the nomad populations dominated the northern plains of Crimea.102 Martin Bronevskiy notes that the Crimeans who inhabited the peninsula’s steppe region were heading north out of Crimea, leaving their earthen houses and packaging their properties into carts in April and setting their tents there. Then, they were returning to their winter quarters in the peninsula when the weather got cold in October. The majority of the Tatars were cultivating their lands and harvesting hay for winter.103 Although animal husbandry was the indispensable production sector for the Khanate, the arable lowlands in the Crimean littoral drew numerous Tatars to break their carts
101 Probably Evliya Çelebi referred all the Turkic societies when he noted on the Nogays. Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, vol. 7, 239; Klein, “Historiography and Historical Culture in the Crimean Khanate,” 24-25.
102 Williams, “The Ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars,” 332-334; 340; Carlos E. Cordova, Crimea and the Black Sea: an Environmental History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 140; The arrival of the Anatolian Turks dated back before to the Ottomans and started during the thirteenth century Anatolian Seljuks. For the details see Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 33-48.
103 Martin Bronevskiy, Kırım, trans. Kemal Ortaylı (Ankara: Ege Matbaası, 1970), 11-12.
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and settle by the fourteenth century.104 The Khans motivated the cultivation of land, so grain became one of the export products of the Crimeans to the Ottoman Empire. Viticulture, horticulture, and apiculture were also prominent. In addition, salt marshes (tuzla in Turkish) generated lucrative income for the Khanate.105 Thousands of tons of salt were being produced from nearly a hundred salt marshes in the peninsula.106 Evliya Çelebi mentions Or Tuzlası and refers Gözleve Tuzlası as a great salt marsh.107
Nevertheless, sometimes it is difficult to determine to what extent the settled and nomad communities of Crimea were different from each other because the peninsula was not close to the newcomers totally as Sahib Giray settled a group of Nogays in there. The early eighteenth-century Ottoman documents referred to the Tatars who settled before the arrival of the Nogay migrants in the last quarter of the seventeenth century as Bucak Tatars and referred to the new migrants as the Bucak Nogays. Although the latter group was also in charge of paying taxes directly to the Ottomans, it seems that these societies diverged from each other economically or culturally. Most probably, the Nogay migrants did not completely sedentarize as they arrived in the Bucak. As indicated below, the documents cite the establishments of Kışlaks, which was a necessity for the seminomads.108
104 Gözaydın, Kırım, 48; Evliya Çelebi narrates the settlement of Nogays in Akkirman as they broke their carts and became peasants. Alper Başer explains that Evliya Çelebi pointed out the Nogays’ abandonment of the nomadic way of life by using the phrase of breaking their carts. Alper Başer, “Bucak Tatarları (1550-1700),” (PhD diss., Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi, 2010), 144-145.
105 Martin Bronevskiy, Kırım, trans. Kemal Ortaylı (Ankara: Ege Matbaası, 1970), 38; Cordova, Crimea and the Black Sea, 140.
106 M. Tanagöz, Kırım Sanayii, 233, quoted in Gözaydın, Kırım, 47.
107 Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, vol. 7, 209; 212.
108 Orhonlu highlights that there was a difference between nomads and societies which moves from a particular place to another. He cites the latter in the Ottoman context as konar-göçer; this word translated as seminomad in this thesis. Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskân Teşebbüsü, 8.
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The tıyış, a tribute which was paid by the Muscovite Tsardom and the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Khanate, was a significant revenue. In addition to the Khan, the kalgay, nureddin (the second rank heir apparent of Khan)109, baş karaçı, and the other grandees also received tributes from these two countries. As well, the spoils and slaves which were seized through the raids to the neighboring lands contributed to the Khanate’s economy. The Khanate also levied custom duties for the Muscovite merchants. For the Khanate’s economy, internal sources also took an important place. The nomads were paying taxes for every household, as the vineyards, cultivated lands, water mills, and salt marshes were taxed.110 Krolikoswka remarks that the taxation in the Khanate was rooted in the amalgamation of the “Islamic, Mongol, and Ottoman solutions.” Based on Islamic law, taxes such as öşr (tithe) and jizya; according to Mongol traditions tamga and şişlik (the Crimean customary sheep tax); and following the Ottoman example, “extraordinary taxes” similar to the avarız were levied.111
As the Crimean Khanate was the keystone of the Ottoman dominium over the Black Sea, the northern steppe was vital for the Khanate. Since the north of the peninsula was not appropriate for agriculture, the roaming nomads relied mostly on slaves, which they seized from the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian domains112 twice a year.113 Maria Ivanics’s article also reveals the significance and extent of the slave
109 The position of nureddin emerged during the reign of Mehmed Giray (1577-1584) when he failed to appoint his son, Saadet Giray, as the kalgay. Instead, he appointed Saadet Giray as the second rank heir apparent. For further information see Muzaffer Ürekli, Kırım Hanlığının Kuruluşu.
110 Ürekli, Kırım Hanlığının Kuruluşu, 84-85; 91-92; For the discussion on the etimology of tıyış see Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 269-271.
111 Natalia Krolikoswka, “The Law Factor in Ottoman-Crimean Tatar Relations in the Early Modern Period,” in Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors, ed. Jeroen Duindam et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 184-189.
112 Maria Ivanics, “Enslavement, Slave Labour and Treatment of Captives in the Crimean Khanate ,” in Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Early Fifteenth–Early Eighteenth Centuries), ed. Geza David and Pal Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2007),193.
113In the history of Sahib Giray khan the timing of raid: “Ol dem Han hazretleri beglere eytdü ki, ‘Ey serverler! Bu vilayetde akınun iki vakti vardur: Biri orak zamanı ve biri kış eyyamıdır.’”. Remmal Hoca, Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han, ed. Özalp Gökbilgin (Ankara: Baylan Matbaası, 1973), 46; For the
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trade for the Khanate. It was a very profitable source of income. The Crimeans defeated the Transylvanians while the latter was returning from an offensive against the Commonwealth in 1657. Thus, the Transylvanian nobility was obliged to pay tremendous sums of money to the slaveholders for captives who had fallen into the hands of the Crimean army. 66 captives were released in return for “65,531 thalers,” and with the ransoms of Janos Kemeny and Ferenc Kornis, who were commanders of the army, the sum reached “201,531 thalers, or 102,265 golden florins”114. Ivanics calculates that the probable total amount that the Crimeans earned only from the Transylvanian ransoms whose names were known was almost equal to the principality’s annual payment to the Porte ahead of 1658. Including the captives whose names are unknown, she claims that nearly “170,000 golden florins” might have been paid to the Tatars in sum.115 The Tatars were not the only agents in this lucrative commerce. In the Don frontier, both Cossacks and Tatars were dependent on each other in the slave trade.116 In 1686, the ransom income that the Cossacks received from 200 ordinary Tatar captives was substantially higher than the Russian financial support, 5,000 rubles.117
Nevertheless, the Crimean Khanate was not the inventor of the Black Sea slave trade. Fisher remarks on the usage of slaves from the Black Sea Steppe in the marine vessels in the Roman and Byzantine Empires. The Principality of Kievan Rus was also providing slaves to Germany and the Middle East, and in general, the slaves
general living conditions of the slaves from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the Crimean Khanate see Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska, “Social Status, Living Conditions, and Religiosity of Slaves from the Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Crimean Khanate in the 17th Century,” in Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kölelik: Ticaret, Esaret, Yaşam, ed. Zübeyde Güneş Yağcı, Fırat Yaşa, and Dilek İnan (İstanbul: Tezkire, 2017), pp. 269-296.
114 Maria Ivanics, “Enslavement, Slave Labour and Treatment of Captives”, 216.
115 Maria Ivanics, “Enslavement, Slave Labour and Treatment of Captives”, 217.
116 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 42.
117 The ransom of an adult male was about ninety rubles. Also, since there is scarce evidence related to the trade’s extent, Boeck underlines that 1686 should not be counted as the best or the worst year for the Cossacks. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 50.
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were of Slavic origin. The commercial relations between Crimea’s Italian emporiums and the Mongol Empire institutionalized this trade, and it was also a critical slave market for the Mamluks. The number of slaves was sold via Crimea numbered thousands in the fifteenth century.118
Brian Davis claims that the Ottomans’ conquest of the Crimean littoral decreased the Khanates’ income out of the grain trade. Thus, it pushed the Crimeans to revive the slave trade started by the Italians.119 The seventeenth century leaves us with a highly complex situation in which both the Tatars and the Cossacks were raiding each other’s domains by forming multiple alliances. Therefore, the assaults were reciprocal and harmed the peasants of both sides.120 Fisher claims that during the Petrine Period (1682-1725), Polish and Russian slaves’ purchases and sales were precluded. Although archival documents show the continuation of the slave trade in small numbers, the number of slaves from these regions radically decreased. This was a great success for Russia and Poland because they had had to pay ransom for their subjects at very high rates.121 Canbakal and Filiztekin’s study on the slaves in Bursa reveals the reverberations of this development in the Ottoman Empire. They remark that;
Since it was the west Eurasian supply that shrank, particularly after the Russian expansion in the north, the price of west Eurasian slaves continued rising, and that of women peaked in 1820–1840, when Russia captured Georgia and Circassia and came to control all traffic from Circassia.
They underline that the price of slaves showed an increase in the first two decades of the eighteenth century; however, the increase in slaves of African origin reversed this
118 Although there was no Germany at the time, Fisher uses this definition; probably, he referred to the region that is controlled by Germany today. Alan Fisher, A Precarious Balance: Conflict, Trade, and Diplomacy on the Russian-Ottoman Frontier (Istanbul: Isis, 1999), 27-29.
119 Brian Davis, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23.
120 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 45.
121 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 41; Boeck also underlines that until Peter I’s reign, the frontier clashes were not central administrations’ main issues. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 52.
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trend from then on. Besides this development, interestingly later the price of slaves was on the decline despite the decreasing supply. The authors comment that this might be originated from a change in the people’s frame of mind on having slaves.122 On the one hand, even though the land at the north of Khanate constituted a preeminent role for the slave trade, there were slaves in Crimea from various ethnic backgrounds. Özdem highlights that in Karasubazar, there were Bosnian, Persian, Circassian, Austrian, Moldovian, and Kalmyk slaves in addition to the Russians.123
2.2 Nogay migration to the Crimean environs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
The Nogays at the periphery of the Crimean peninsula was one of the most efficient deterrents against Russian colonization in the open steppe.124 As their service was valuable, the Khanate struggled to control them and channel the outcoming Nogay migration, which started after the Russian capture of the lower Don region in 1554. İsmail Mirza, the Russian-backed leader of the Nogays, killed Yusuf Mirza in an internal struggle for power in 1555. The supporters of Yusuf Mirza continued the strife, and because of the 1557-58 drought, they had no other choice besides migration to the environs of Crimea. Devlet Giray Khan settled them in the Azov and Kuban regions and left one of his sons as their controller; these groups were named Küçük Nogay Ulusu (Lesser Nogay Horde).
122 Hülya Canbakal and Alpay Filiztekin, “Slavery and Decline of Slave-Ownership in Ottoman Bursa 1460–1880,” International Labor and Working-Class History 97 (2020): 67-71.
123 Özdem, Kırım Karasubazar'da Sosyo-Ekonomik Hayat, 103.
124 Alpargu, Nogaylar, 92-93.
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The partition of Nogays in the Lower Don region decreased the population density and paved the way for Russian dominance.125 Besides, the Cossacks and by the seventeenth century, Kalmyks created pressure over the Khanate’s frontier. The Kalmyk attacks left the Nogays of the Lower Don powerless, and the Crimean khans partially settled the Nogay tribes along the Danube and Kuban’s estuary.126 The settlement of the Nogays along the Western bank of Özi against the Dnieper Cossacks, starting in the 1570s, left the Lower Don vulnerable to Don Cossacks’ raids.127
The sixteenth-century Cossack attacks rendered the Ottoman settlements defenseless, so the Bucak Tatars became the indispensable part of protecting the northern cities such as Akkirman and Bender.128 In the first half of the seventeenth century, under Kantemir Mirza’s leadership, the Bucak Tatars played a critical role in Crimean affairs.129 However, the newcomer Nogay population emerged as a problem for the Khanate’s authority. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk remarks that the Nogay and Kalmyk influxes into Eastern Europe put the region in disarray in the seventeenth century. The Nogays submitted to the Khan; however, when they showed centrifugal tendencies as happened in Kantemir Mirza’s case or when they joined the rebellions, they threatened the Khan’s authority.130 İnalcık underlines that after Kantemir mirza, the Ottomans attempted to enlarge their control over Nogays to restrict the Khan’s power.131 For example, Evliya Çelebi writes that in 1666, the Ottoman Sultan ordered Mehmed Giray Khan to deport the Nogays to Crimea.
125 Kurat, Türkiye ve İdil boyu (1569 Astarhan Seferi, Ten-İdil Kanalı ve XVI-XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Rus Münasebetleri), 63; For the details of this turbulent period see also Mehmet Alpargu, Nogaylar (İstanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 2007), 58-68.
126 Kurat, IV-XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri, 281-289.
127 Kurat, IV-XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri, 243-244
128 Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 62.
129 Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 108-109.
130 Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 184.
131 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 19.
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However, then these groups submitted to the Ottomans and left nomadism and settled. When the Khan heard this development, he enacted the previous order and deported them, resulting in his dismissal from office.132 Brian Glyn Williams also notes for the Nogays who took refuge in the Crimean Peninsula that “The Nogais in this way became a vital ethnic component in the Crimea, but they tended to be looked down upon by the Tat Tatars of the Crimea’s south who spoke a more Oghuz-dominated language.”133 In that regard, the Nogays’ arrival might have upset the balance which was favored by the existing tribes.
Başer asserts that Orakoğlu, Mamayoğlu, and Or Mehmedoğulları tribes had started to settle Bucak by the mid-seventeenth century. Halil Pasha, the chamberlain, surveyed the empty lands in the north and northeastern parts of Akkirman, Kilia, İsmail, and Bender for them; thus, the region of Halil Pasha Yurdu emerged. It stretched from the Dniester to Ialpug (Yalpug or Yalpuh in Turkish) River, reaching the Valul Lui Traian in the north and the Danube Estuary in the south. The Ottomans also restricted the region’s relationship with the Crimean Khanate and ordered the tribesmen not to obey the Khan’s yarlıks (edict) to call for war without the approval of the Ottoman Sultan. The tribes promised to pay 10,000 esedi guruş annually to protect the region against the Cossacks and Kalmyks, and not to harm the Moldavian subjects. The conflicts between the Nogays and the Moldavians would be one of the post-war problems. After the Prut War (1711), the Nogays succeeded in capturing a region that could be traversed in 32 hours vertically and in two hours horizontally
132 Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, vol. 7, 260; Başer, “Bucak Tatarları”, 143-144.
133 Williams explains Tat as the successors of the non-Turkic Crimean inhabitants on the coastal region who became Turkicized and Islamicized later on. Williams, “The Ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars,” 339; For the Tats see also Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâme, vol. 7, 230.
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from Moldovia, and the new region was called iki saatlik arazi, namely the two-hour territory. 134
Simultaneously after the settlement of these tribes, in 1667, the Ottomans lifted the Yalı Ağalığı (littoral administration), which was the institution used by the Khanate to control Bucak. It was reinstated under the control of the governor of Özi in 1676, and the Khan received the right to appoint the Yalı Ağası.135 However, Başer claims that this solution aimed to check the Khanate’s control over the region. During the war (1683-1699), the need for Crimean recruits paved the way for the establishment of Bucak Seraskerliği (commandership) to undertake the mission by a Giray Sultan.136
A register from 8 December 1700 shows that the Nogays were still taking refuge within the Ottoman territories. The Ottomans decided to provide ulufe (quarterly salary) to the leaders of the Yedisan Nogays, who had come shortly before. According to the Ottoman document, the decision was taken because “it is a duty of religion and state to win their hearts in any manner possible.” Therefore, the Ottomans assigned them salaries to be paid with the ulufes of the Kala-i Cedid soldiers.137 These Nogays were probably the Nogays who escaped from Kalmyk authority and took refuge in the Kuban near the newly built Ottoman fort, Açu.138 In that regard, the continuous Nogay influx made it difficult for the Ottomans to abide by the Treaty’s commitments. In February 1701, the Kalmyks executed a surprise
134 Başer, “Bucak Tatarları”, 148-150; Tahsin Gemil, “Yeni Belgelere Göre ‘Halil Paşa Yurdu’ Ve ‘İki Saat‘lik Arazi,” in IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi, vol. II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1981), 1015-1016; Feridun Emecen, “Halil Paşa Yurdu,” in TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1997), pp. 326-327.
135 Başer, “Bucak Tatarları”, 155.
136 Başer, “Bucak Tatarları”, 215.
137 “Her vechle kulûblerin imâle der-i zimmet-i hidmet-i dîn ü devlet olmağla.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Ali Emiri Mustafa II (AE.SMST.II), No. 2, Gömlek No. 139.
138 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 612-613; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 536.
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attack against the Yedisan Nogays while Kaplan Giray was among them as the commander of Circassia. The ambush was successfully repelled, but these developments showed that the border had not been stabilized despite the Treaty.139 Firstly, the newcomers caused trouble with the people who had usufructuary rights to the neighboring lands. Secondly, the forcefully relocated tribes would probably have wanted to take revenge on their former foes on the opposite side of the border; in this case, these were the Kalmyks. The documents presented hereinbelow clarify these problems and reveal how the frontier’s closure dislodges the balances.
2.3 Developments before the treaties in the Black Sea frontier
An obedient Crimea was the key to Ottoman control over the Black Sea. However, further Ottoman expansion into the steppes was unprofitable since the region had a harsh climate and was underpopulated. Instead of establishing direct control over this region, the Ottomans collaborated with the Crimeans to assert their influence over the Black Sea steppe. Victor Ostapchuk stresses that the Ottomans’ close relationship with the people of the steppes and incessant raids to the north restrained the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovite access to the Black Sea littoral. According to Ostapchuk, Crimea acted as an active buffer zone, and the Ottomans followed a defensive policy in this region. Volga-Astrakhan (1569) and Khotyn (1621) military expeditions demonstrated that advancement to the north was full of drawbacks.140 Similarly, Ingrao and Yılmaz claim that attacking Poland and Russia would have brought few achievements to the Ottomans in the seventeenth century because the region was scarcely populated. When the Ottomans seized control of the
139 Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr Fî Ahbâr-ı Mülûki't-Tatar (İnceleme-Tenkitli Metin), ed. Yavuz Söylemez (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2020), 349-351.
140 Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine,” 125-126.
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Black Sea basin, further conquest was less profitable for the policymakers, so they followed a defensive policy in the Black Sea to secure the coastline with castles.141
Poland-Lithuania was successful against Russia during the period known as the Time of Troubles (1598-1613). However, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Commonwealth was almost totally invaded by foreign forces, namely the Russian and Swedish armies. Thus, the balance of power among the parties broke down, and the Muscovite Tsardom successfully turned itself into a multiethnic empire through the seizure of the entire Siberia. Moreover, the truce of Andrusovo ended the long-lasting series of wars between Russia and Poland in 1667 and strengthened the Russians’ hands, and the status-quo that the Ottomans wanted to pursue deteriorated on behalf of Russia. Russia received an advanced position in Ukraine as the protector of the Cossacks, which opened the way for disputes between Russians, Crimeans, and Ottomans.142 From the Russian perspective, incessant Tatar raids were threatening the newly acquired southern frontier’s agricultural colonization.
Petro Doroshenko, the Hetman of Right bank143 Cossacks, was of the opinion that the alliance with the Crimean Khan and the Ottoman Sultan would be more proper to protect the autonomy of the hetmanate rather than the Russian and Polish protectorates. At the beginning of 1666, he declared his alliance with the Crimeans and requested the Polish forces’ evacuation from Ukraine. The Ottoman involvement in this theater generated a threat for both Poland-Lithuania and Russia. They decided
141Charles Ingrao and Yasir Yılmaz, “Ottoman vs. Habsburg: Motives and Priorities,” in Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople 1699-1829, ed. Plamen Mitev et al. (Berlin: LIT, 2010), 8.
142 C. Bickford O'brien, “Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai,” Russian Review 12, no. 4 (1953): p. 260.
143 Ukrainian territories remaining in the western side of Dnieper (Özi in Turkish) River called Right Bank while the other side was named as Left Bank.
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to end the prolonged war, and the Peace of Andrusovo was concluded in January 1667. The Treaty officialized the partition of the Cossackdom, and Left Bank Ukraine was placed under Russian sovereignty, while the Right Bank was given the Commonwealth.144 This development triggered the Ottomans to act against the Commonwealth to capture Podolia, and later the conquest of Chyhyryn was also the result of these changes in the northern borderland.145 Ostapchuk underlines that the Peace of Andrusovo led the Ottomans to attach greater importance to the region. The Treaty divided Ukraine, disregarding the Cossack interests. Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth agreed on mutual collaboration against the Ottomans in the Andrusovo.146 In return for his allegiance to the Porte, Hetman Doroshenko stipulated his people be spared from attacks and enslavement by the Ottoman and the Crimean forces.147
Mücteba İlgürel remarks that Sultan Mehmed IV paid particular attention to the developments in Ukraine and led the campaign against the Commonwealth even though he usually avoided joining military expeditions. The Ottomans realized the growing Russian threat on the northern frontier; however, the region’s remoteness decreased the Ottoman control over Ukraine.148 The Ottomans declared war on Poland to prevent a possible Russo-Polish unification against the Ottomans. After the Ottoman victory, in 1672, the Treaty of Buczacs (Bucaş in Turkish) was concluded with Poland during the reign of Michael Wisniowiecki (r. 1669–1673). The Ottomans seized control of Podolia, located between Dnieper (Özi in Turkish) and
144 Davies, Warfare, State and Society, 150-151.
145 Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska, Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate (1532-1774): with Special Reference to the Reign of Murad Giray (1678-1683) (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 39-40.
146 Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine,” 139.
147 Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine,” 141.
148 Mücteba İlgürel, “Osmanlı-Ukrayna Münasebetlerinin Başlaması ,” Belleten LX, no. 227 (1996): pp. 155-164.
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Dniester (Turla in Turkish). It brought absolute control of the Black Sea coastline to the Ottomans. The Treaty was also stipulated an annual payment to the Porte. However, the next king Jan Sobieski (r. 1674-1696), did not accept the stipulations and violated the Buczacs Treaty. In a coalition with the Russian empire, they attacked the Ottomans.
Since the war with Sweden would have meant a two-front war, the Poles were forced to accept reconciliation, and the Treaty of Zurawno (İzvança in Turkish) was signed in 1676. However, Hetman Petro Doroshenko was forced to give up former claims over the region when the Russians sieged Chyhyryn in 1674. To restore the Ottoman suzerainty in the Hetmanate, in 1677, the grand vizier Köprülü Kara Mustafa Pasha charged Melek Ahmed Pasha and Selim I Giray Khan to reconquer the capital to seat the son of Bohdan Hymelnytsky, Yuri Hymelnytsky, as new Hetman. Despite the initial failure, a second army led by the grand vizier himself captured the capital a year later, in 1678. The Treaty of Bahçesaray (1681) ended the war. It was negotiated between Russians and Crimeans, and then the Treaty was ratified in 1682 by the Ottomans.149 The Treaty recognized Russian authority in the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Ottoman presence in the Right Bank. The Tsar would continue to pay tribute to the Khan, and the region in between Bug and Dnieper rivers would be under no one’s control.150
Traditionally, the Crimean Khans had had considerable influence over the Ottoman northern foreign policy. Therefore, the Crimeans were not welcoming Ottoman involvement in the political affairs of the Crimean hinterland. Alan Fisher claims that the Khanate’s diplomatic relations with its northern neighbors were
149 O’Brien, “Russia and Turkey,” 260-268.
150 O’Brien, “Russia and Turkey,” 265.; For the developments in the Ottoman northern frontier in the late seventeenth century see also McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 143.
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independent of the Ottomans as Cossack Hetmanate conducted independent diplomacy with Istanbul from the Russian oversight. The Girays and the clan leaders conducted with foreign powers mostly a diplomatic framework, and it was independent of “Muscovite-Ottoman and Polish-Ottoman interests.”151
However, by the end of the seventeenth century, Crimean agency over the Ottoman northern policy started to be diminished. When the Ottomans seized Podolia, a hub for Tatar raids from the Commonwealth and the Ottomans concluded the treaties of Buczacs (1672) and Zurawno (1676) directly with the Commonwealth. It damaged the Crimean Khans’ prestige, who had established diplomatic relations with their northwestern neighbors independently.152 The failed 1683 campaign created a turning point for the Ottomans’ European international relations, and the Porte preferred a more active northern policy than before. The Bahçesaray Treaty (1681) was negotiated and concluded between the Khanate and the Tsardom; then, the final draft was sent to the Ottomans. It was ratified in 1682. Therefore, Murad Giray (r. 1678-1683) became the last ruler who controls the Ottoman-Moscow relationship and whom the Muscovite Tsardom paid tıyış.153
Metin Kunt underscores a critical development in the Ottoman northern frontier policy in the second half of the seventeenth century. Around the 1650s, Rakoczi, the Transylvania’s Prince, started to act independently and posed a threat to the Ottoman defensive frontier. He attempted to seize the Polish-Lithuanian throne and led a campaign to the Commonwealth. Soon after, the Ottomans pacified the
151 Alan W. Fisher, “Azov in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge 21, no. 2 (1973): 170.; O’Brien, “Russia, and Turkey,” 265; There are abundant evidence for the diplomatic correspondences. See for the examples, Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga Dair Bolgan Yarlıglar Ve Hatlar: (1520-1742 Kırım Tatarcasıyla Yarlıklar Ve Mektuplar) (Çankaya, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2017).
152 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 187.
153 Królikowska-Jedlińska, Law and Division of Power, IX
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secessionist Transilvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, established a new eyalet (province) at the frontier of Transilvania, Yanova. Similarly, when the Podolia seized, another new eyalet, Kamaniçe, which was directly administrated from Istanbul, was established. Kunt claims that this policy might have been the initial step of integrating the vassal principalities into the direct Ottoman control. Simultaneously, the Ottoman presence in Kamaniçe would probably lead to the better inclusion of the Crimean Khanate into Ottoman politics. Nevertheless, this policy failed because of losing these regions during the Long War (1683-1699).154
Furthermore, Halim Giray claims that since Murad Giray insulted a Muscovite envoy, Russians started to conduct diplomacy with the Ottomans through Bender governor for a while, and they established direct relations from then on.155 As indicated above, the Ottomans started to follow a more active Northern policy than before, and as Kunt stressed, maybe they were planning to annex the autonomous parts of the empire. Therefore, the waning of the Crimean agency in Ottoman politics might be evaluated under these circumstances. In this respect, Murad Giray’s reign portrayed groundbreaking changes during the Khanate’s history. By the eighteenth century, the position of the Khan would be damaged in the system also because of recalcitrant tribes and unending revolts.
Two years after the Bahçesaray Treaty, the Ottomans marched against the Habsburgs, yet this resulted in a disastrous failure. After the Ottomans were defeated
154 Metin Kunt, “17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine Bir Yorum,” Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi: Hümaniter Bilimler 4-5 (1976-1977): 111-116.; McNeill proposes a similar claim that the Ottoman Northern campaign into Ukraine contributed to the Crimeans adoption to the Ottoman military structure. McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800, 144.
155 “Murâd Giray zamânına kadar Rusya elçileri, Devlet-i ‘Aliyye ile görilecek işlerini dâima Kırım Hanlarının delâletiyle yapardılar. Murâd Giray ise Rusya tarafından gelen bir elçiye hakâret etdiginden, bundan böyle Rusya hükûmeti maslahatını Bender vâlileriyle görmüş, daha sonra togruda togruya Osmanlı Devletiyle bizzat müzâkereye girişebilmişdir.” Halim Giray, Gülbün-i Hânân, ed. İbrahim Gültekin (Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019), 119; Seyyid Mehmed Rıza also verifies this and probably Halim Giray cited this information from the author. Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, Es-Seb’üs-Seyyar, 206.
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in Vienna in 1683, Russians joined the Holy League against the Ottomans. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk underscores the attempts of the Poles to persuade the Crimeans to be neutral in the war, but since Selim I Giray Khan delayed his answer, they extended the invitation to the Russians instead.156 The Russian involvement in the war was detrimental to the protection of Crimea. Since their motherland was threatened, Crimean soldiers’ motivation to participate in the Ottoman war with the Habsburgs radically decreased.157
Until a decade after it participated in the war, Russia could not seize a tangible achievement. Several attempts to capture Azov remained inconclusive. In August 1695, the Crimean Lower Dnieper fortresses Gazikerman, Nusretkerman, Mubarekkerman, and Şahkerman fell into the Russians; however, the Russian army failed to capture Azov.158 In 1696, despite the unsuccessful attempts beforehand, the Russians captured Azov with the support of the fleet. The fleet was built in the Don River to cut the logistic connections of Azov.159 As the navy blockade the city, it also eased the transportation of provisions and ammunition. The Russian Empire grasped a chance for further advancement along the Black Sea littoral; however, the Black Sea navigation was still impossible for Russian since the Kerch strait was under
156 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th-18th Century): a Study of Peace Treaties Followed by an Annotated Documents (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 191.; Kolodziejczyk also underlines that the Poles were not willing to ally with Russia because that would mean Poland’s final compliance of the Russian acquisition over the formerly lost Polish territories. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 209; For a detailed research on the Second Vienna Campaign of 1683 see Kahraman Şakul, II. Viyana Kuşatması: Yedi Başlı Ejderin Fendi (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2021).
157The Crimean army showed reluctance to pursue the war on the western front, and several times the soldiers left the Khan alone to return to Crimea. The tribal leaders and his son Kalgay Devlet Giray left Selim Giray Khan with his retinue in Vidin. İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, 308.
158 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, 308.
159 For the details of the Russian campaigns see Kiril Kochegarov, “From the ‘Eternal Peace’ to the Treaty of Carlowitz: Relations between Russia, the Sublime Porte and the Crimean Khanate (1686–1699)” in The Treaties of Carlowitz (1699) Antecedents, Course and Consequences, ed. Colin Heywood and Ivan Parvey (Leiden, Brill, 2020), 186-201.
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Ottoman control.160 Subsequent failure at Zenta in 1697 forced the Ottomans to accept peace negotiations.161
2.4 The Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700)
In the 1690s, the Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate started to seek reconciliation. In 1693, Poland-Lithuania requested northern Moldavia and the restoration of the lands it lost in 1672. However, the negotiations were interrupted, and it took years to conclude peace between the parties.162 Although Russia’s best option would be to subordinate the Crimean Khanate during the government of Golitsyn, its aim in joining the Holy League had been to pacify the Crimean Khanate, end the annual tribute to Crimea, and prevent offenses originating from the south. In 1689, after two failed expeditions against Crimea, Golitsyn and Princess Sofia lost the government, and the Naryskins ascended to power. The new government attempted to conclude the war with the Crimean Khanate by abolishing the traditional payment or gift to the Khanate and captives’ restitution without compensation. The inner circles of the Khanate did not accept the conditions, and the demands were watered down.163
In 1693-94, the Naryskin government was about to accept the conditions of the Treaty of Bahçesaray (1681), just before Tsar Peter took real power and besieged Azov and captured the Ottoman strongholds along the Lower Dnieper.164 As mentioned above, Azov fell to the Russians in 1696. Russia was eager to continue
160 Brian J. Boeck, “When Peter I Was Forced to Settle for Less: Coerced Labor and Resistance in a Failed Russian Colony (1695–1711)”, The Journal of Modern History 80, no.3 (September 2008): 487-488.
161 For the details of the battles before the Treaty of Karlowitz see Akdes Nimet Kurat and John Selwyn Bromley, “The Retreat of the Turks, 1683–1730,” The New Cambridge Modern History, 1970, pp. 608-647.
162 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 193-194.
163 Kochegarov, “From the ‘Eternal Peace’ to the Treaty of Carlowitz”, 192-194.
164 Kochegarov, “From the ‘Eternal Peace’ to the Treaty of Carlowitz”, 195.
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the war while the other three powers were devastated and sought reconciliation.165 During the peace negotiations, the Russian plenipotentiaries demanded Kerch as compensation for their losses in addition to their acquisitions along the Dnieper and Azov. The Ottomans rejected this offer, and both sides contented themselves with the extension of the truce for future negotiations. In January 1699, the Ottomans made peace with the Habsburgs, Poland-Lithuania and the Republic of Venice in Karlowitz without concluding peace with Russia. Soon, Russia realized that she could not make the Ottomans accept excessive demands without the Holy League’s support, and the Treaty of Istanbul (1700) was signed.166 Russia agreed to return the castles on the Dnieper River. However, the Ottomans stipulated not to fortify these regions again and accepted Russian control over Azov and its hinterland.167
The imperial letter which was sent to Devlet Giray to inform him about the clauses of the Karlowitz displays the Ottomans’ concessions regarding the region;
The soldiers deployed in the Kamanietz Fortress, which was within the Commonwealth’s previous border before the two wars, will evacuate from there, and my Exalted State (Devlet-i Aliyye) renounces its claims over entire the fortress, and from now on Podolia and Ukraine provinces. Then, dismiss The Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks, appointed and seated in Moldovia.168
Thus, the Ottoman Empire gave up its achievements within Ukraine and lost a critical corner, Kamanietz, to protect the Black Sea littoral. Although the Ottomans had successfully defended the fortress against the Polish sieges and “uti possidetis”
165 Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 24.
166 Kochegarov, “From the ‘Eternal Peace’ to the Treaty of Carlowitz”, 196-197; For the peace negotiations see Uşşâkîzâde es-Seyyid İbrâhîm Hasîb Efendi, Uşşâkîzâde Târihi, ed. Raşit Gündoğdu (Istanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2005), 355-369; For an evaluation over the eighteenth century Russo-Turkish relations see İlber Ortaylı, “18 Yüzyıl Türk-Rus İlişkileri,” in Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadî Ve Sosyal Değişim: Makaleler 1 (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000), pp. 377-386.
167 Numan Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 1700 - 1834 (Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 2019), 45; The articles of the Karlowitz Treaty is also available in the Ottoman chronicles for a contemporary record of the treaties with the Habsburgs, the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Venice see Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 653-672.
168 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNHM], No.5, Gömlek No. 138, for the transliteration of the quote see Appendix A, 1.
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was the precondition of the negotiations by the Karlowitz, the Ottomans agreed to give back the Right-Bank Ukraine and Podolia to the Poles in return for Northern Moldavia.169 Moreover, during the war, Bucak and other Tatar people left their residences and entered the Moldavian territory. According to the Ottomans, they forcibly built çiftliks (farm) and kışlaks (winter quarter). Therefore, the Ottomans stipulated to return them to their former residences, which would turn into one of the post-war period’s problems.170
The fate of the Crimean Khanate constituted one of the substantial issues during the negotiations. In this regard, the fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth clauses of the Treaty of Karlowitz signed between the Ottomans and the Commonwealth stresses the Crimean Khanate and Tatars’ position. The fourth clause secure the Commonwealth from the Tatar incursions into its borders, enslavement of its subjects, and stealing of their animals. The Ottomans stipulated to warn viziers, governors, the Crimean Khan, kalgay sultan, nureddin sultan, the Moldavian Voivode to promulgate the decision. Anyone who contravenes the Treaty would be punished to dissuade others from doing the same misdeed, and stolen property would be returned. The Ottomans also promised the Commonwealth that officeholders who fail to prevent people from violating the Treaty would be dismissed or even executed.171
The fifth clause recognizes the Commonwealth’s independence. On this basis, the Ottomans and their subjects were to abstain from demanding tribute or tax from the Commonwealth. Thus, the Crimean Khanate lost the right to receive tribute
169 Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 194; Kurat and Bromley, “The Retreat of the Turks,” 626-627.
170 BOA, A.DVNSNHM, No.5, Gömlek No. 138.
171 Numan Yekeler et al., Yoldaki elçi: Osmanlı'dan günümüze Türk-Leh ilişkileri (İstanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2014), 188.
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which they claimed was their right as the successors of the Golden Horde. The sixth clause made the presence of Tatar tribes in Moldovia illegal by stating that these tribes deserted from their former yurts in Bucak, which was indicated in the previous ahdnâme-i hümâyûn (imperial covenant) and harmed the locals. Therefore, these people were supposed to leave Moldovia and return to their former place of residence. In the ninth clause, the Ottomans promised the manumission of the prisoners of war in return for a fixed compensation. This clause also clarifies that the Polish people enslaved after the Treaty was concluded would be returned without any payment, and the people who come to save the captives would be protected.172
The Treaty of Istanbul was concluded on 24 July 1700 (h. 26 Muharrem 1111). The eighth, ninth, and eleventh articles are about the Crimean Khanate. The eighth article stipulates that the Cossacks and Moscow’s other vassals were not to attack Crimea, Taman, and the borderlands of Islam (serhadd-i İslâm). In the same clause, the Ottomans underlined that since the Crimean khans, kalgays, nureddins, all the sultans, and in a general sense, the army were Ottoman vassals, they were also to observe the stipulations. Therefore, the Crimean groups must avoid harming the cities under the sovereignty of Tsar and the Cossack settlements along the Dnieper, Don (in Turkish Ten), and other rivers. Like the Karlowitz Treaty, the Crimeans were warned not to cross the boundary and enslave the Tsar’s subjects and steal their animals.173 The fourth clause of the Treaty of Istanbul stipulated that officials who were lax about people who violated the Treaty would be punished. Furthermore, the Khanate lost the right to demand tribute from the Muscovite Tsardom on the grounds
172 Yekeler et al., Yoldaki elçi, 188-189.
173 The Treaty stresses that “… Çar-ı müşârun-ileyhin cümle sınurları üzerine az çok asker ile varmayıp ve teaddî ve tecâvüz eylemeyip ve esîr almayıp ve davarların sürmeyip…” Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 46; For the record of the Istanbul Treaty (1700) in the chronicle see Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 692-698.
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that the latter was an independent state, and the Crimeans were warned not to seek pretexts for such claims any longer.174
The ninth clause of the Istanbul Treaty addressed the situation of the slaves enslaved before and after the Treaty, likewise the Karlowitz. The slaves, who had been captured before the Treaty, were to be quickly manumitted. This clause made it illegal to seize the Tsar’s subjects and stipulated that if they were ever captured, they were to be manumitted without any payment. Whenever illegally enslaved people were found in Crimea, Bucak, Kuban, and other parts of the empire, they were to be returned. The eleventh clause stipulated what was to be done in the case of a possible disagreement between the Crimeans and the Cossacks. If the conflict reaches a fever pitch, the parties should communicate to protect the peace.175
The most significant clause of the Treaty of Karlowitz prohibited the Crimean and Bucak Tatars from demanding tribute from both the Commonwealth and Russia and formers’ aggressive move to the opposite sides of the border for enslavement and plunder. The inner circles of the Khanate did not welcome the stipulations of the Treaty since the frontier region was previously the hunting ground of the Khanate. However, now the Crimeans lost both their chance to raid to extract revenue and were surrounded by hostile solid powerholders. Moreover, the Crimean Khans lost their role as the intermediary in the Ottomans’ relations with the Northern states since the Treaty rendered the Russian Tsar equal to the Ottoman Sultan.176 Before
174 “…Moskov Çarlığı müstakıl devlet olmağla bu âna değin Kırım Hânı ve Kırımluya beher sene verdiği vergiyi vermek gerek güzeşte ve gerek hâlâ ve gerek ba‘de'l-yevm Çar-ı müşârun-ileyh ve haleflerinin deruhdeleri olmaya. Ammâ Kırım Hânı ve Kırımlu ve gayri Tatar tâifesi bundan sonra vergi mutâlebesi ve gayri dürlü illet ü bahâne ile sulh u salâha mugâyir işde olmayıp sulhu mer‘î tutalar.” Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 47.
175 Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 47.
176 Kochegarov, “From the ‘Eternal Peace’ to the Treaty of Carlowitz”, 196.
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this, the Ottomans avoid direct relations with the Russians as they did in the Treaty of Edirne (1682).
The Karlowitz and Istanbul Treaties also paved the way for the transformation of the office of reisü’l-küttâb (the head of the scriber’s office) into the foreign affairs office. In the same direction, with the rise in the importance of diplomacy, reisü’l-küttâbs enhanced their efficiency in Ottoman politics.177 The Ottomans had forced to leave the one-sided diplomacy after the defeat and accept the European norms of diplomacy. Ahıshalı remarks that the success of Reisü’l-küttâb Rami Mehmed Efendi during the Karlowitz negotiations sealed the competence of this office in the international relations. Therefore, in the second half of the nineteenth century, this office would turn into the hariciye nezâreti (ministry of foreign affairs).178
2.5 The Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire after the treaties
İnalcık remarks that the Treaty of Istanbul (1700) ratified the Khanate’s collapse and reduced it to an insignificant state that would be easily eliminated.179 The entire Ottoman and Crimean presence around the Black Sea was put under Russian threat. The Treaty started rendered the Ottoman Sultan equal to the Russian Tsar and established a direct relationship. That meant the end of Crimean control over the Ottoman Northern diplomacy.180 The peace was a humiliation for the Crimean Khanate, and Devlet Giray explicitly stressed his dissatisfaction to the grand vizier
177 Christoph K. Neumann, “Political and Diplomatic Developments,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54.
178 Recep Ahıshalı, “Reîsülküttâb,” in TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2007), pp. 546-549.
179 İnalcık, Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 337-338.
180 Halil İnalcık, “Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature,” in Kırım Hanlığı Üzerine Araştırmalar (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017), 462.
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Daltaban Mustafa Pasha as indicated below. Mehmed Giray also criticized the return of Kamaniçe to Poland, an infidel nation, and described it as an inauspicious event because it was Muslim soil with many mosques.181 Seyyid Muhammed Rıza narrates that Şehbâz Giray returned to Circassia, where he was killed under the pretext of hunting to get rid of the warmongers’ complaints about the peace. However, the author criticizes the opposition to peace by referring to the economic difficulties and recruitment problems to continue the war.182
Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was about to witness radical changes. The long-lasting incumbency of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi’s “nepotism” and holding the reins of the government were blocking the roads of promoting the officials who were not under his patronage. The post-war economic depression deepened the dissent against him and his influence over Sultan Mustafa II, who moved away from the capital, Istanbul, and started to reside in Edirne for a while. The Padishah’s move to Edirne was justified on the grounds that the city was nearer to the border zone and its geographic proximity to the contracting states, but the aim was to avoid Istanbul’s jobless soldiers and unhappy officials. Under these circumstances, a broad opposition block of dissatisfied officials, soldiers, and commoners emerged against the government. Therefore, the rebels advanced upon Edirne in 1703, right after the appeasement of the revolt in the Khanate in early 1703. They killed Feyzullah Efendi, dethroned Sultan Mustafa, and seated Sultan Ahmed III to the Ottoman throne.183 Abou-El-Haj underlines that the ulema issued four fatwas to demonstrate the incompetence of Sultan Mustafa; the fourth one was about his approval for the
181 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray”, 117.
182 Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, Es-Seb’üs-Seyyar, 331.
183 Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Te İstanbul, 1984), 4-5; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 36-37; Kurat and Bromley, “The Retreat of the Turks,” 629.
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Treaties of 1699 and 1700 and his retraction from the traditional Ottoman ideology by ratifying “the final closure of the frontier.”184
Even during the peace negotiation at Karlowitz, the Polish-Lithuanian plenipotentiaries declared that the annual money they used to give to the Crimean Khanate to avoid Tatar raids violates the sovereignty of their country. Therefore, the Ottomans should prevent this practice. If the Ottomans cannot succeed in doing this, they should expel the Tatars from the peninsula.185 Darius Kolodziejczyk asserts that the Crimeans approached the “voluntary gift,” which was sent by Poland, as the annual payment from an inferior polity than the Khanate.186 The Nogay rebellions in the Bucak in the first years of the eighteenth century with the support of some members of the Giray household and the Crimean envoys’ unhappy attitude towards the Treaty best demonstrates the grievances of the frontier societies.187
Azov’s inability to revive after the Russians’ destruction in the early eighteenth century is a good indicator of the vital importance of raiding activities for the Khanate and its population. Azov served as a commercial and diplomatic meeting point for both the Ottomans and the Russians until the interruption of Russia’s peaceful relationship with the Ottomans and the fall of Azov to Russians during the reign of Peter the Great. Although the Ottomans managed to recapture the region since the slave raid against the northern regions was abolished, the city could not revive again.188 Nevertheless, the Cossack-Crimean Treaty of 1711 shows that the Khanate still wanted to pursue the raiding economy under Cossack’s protection. The Zaporozhian Cossacks stipulated the Zaporozhian population’s immunity. Still,
184 Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion, 72.
185 Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 87, no. 4 (1967): 508.
186 Kolodziejcyk, “Between the Splendor of Barocco,” 678
187 Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure”, 469-475
188 Fisher, “Azov in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, 171-172.
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Subtelny writes that “Orlyk realized, however, that the Tatar appetite for booty and iasyr had to be satisfied in some way…”, so Philip Orlyk consented to the enslavement of the people of “the Muscovite slobodas” if and only if these people challenge to his Hetmanate.189
189 Subtelny defines the Muscovite Slobodas as such “sparsely settled territories in what is now the Eastern Ukraine, which, although colonized by a predominantly Ukrainian population, were under Russian jurisdiction.” Subtelny, “The Ukrainian-Crimean Treaty,” 813.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM KARLOWITZ TO PRUT: A DECADE OF UPHEAVAL
The series of long wars fought between the Ottomans, and the Holy League rendered the belligerents exhausted and keen for peace except for the Russians. The Golitsyn government’s unsuccessful incursions into the Crimean Peninsula steered the Russians to secure their eastern frontier with Qing China, and the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed in 1689, a decade before the Karlowitz. 190 Ironically, the Crimeans’ success in blocking the Russian army caused the frontier’s closure at the Eurasian Steppe’s eastern-most edge. At the end of the seventeenth century, successive defeats made the Ottomans accept the peace and the closure of the Black Sea frontier to free access by the nomads and cross-border offenses. Now, the sedentary powers gained dominion over the self-ordained steppe people. Boeck stresses that even the kurgans, which were the representation of nomads’ might, would be used as the demarcated steppe’s landmarks from then on.191
3.1 The first reign of Devlet Giray Khan
Mehmed Giray introduces Devlet II Giray Khan (r. 1699-1702 and 1709-1713) as a ghazi padishah, who killed infidels with his bare hand and enslaved people. However, in the end, he got into trouble because of the Crimean begs.192 Whether Devlet Giray was a valiant khan or not, Mehmed Giray’s representation of him as such is significant to understand the stance of Devlet Giray during this turbulent period. He ascended the throne after his father Selim Giray’s abdication at the
190 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, 192.
191 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 10.
192 Uğur Demir transliterated the history of Mehmed Giray Khan in his thesis. Uğur Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)” (Master’s thesis, Marmara University, 2006), 106.
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beginning of 1699, right after the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz.193 At first, he faced severe internal problems: the homicide of his Kalgay and brother Şehbaz Giray and the insubordination of his other brother Gazi Giray. Although he succeeded in overcoming these initial obstacles to his authority, he fell into the position of rebel from the Ottoman point of view, and his first reign ended in 1702.
His first challenge was the Nogays’ deportation from the frontier region. The history of Mehmed Giray stresses that the Khan, six months after his ascension, gathered the army and moved to Akkirman in the middle of the winter. Nobody understood the reason for the maneuver; however, it was soon understood that Reisü’l-küttâb Rami Mehmed Pasha accepted Poland’s request for the evacuation of the Nogays from their place of residence on account of their pillaging and raiding of Polish territories. Although the clauses of the Treaty make no mention of the evacuation of Nogays from the Akkirman province, Mehmed Giray stated in this manner. The Khan and Nogays encountered in front of the Cankerman fortress.194 Nogays resisted the decision and attacked the Khan’s army, and since they outnumbered the Khan’s forces, they forced the Khan to agree to a truce.195
Mehmed Giray underlines Orakoğlu and Or Mehmedoğlu196 as the two most prominent tribes of Nogays that influenced the other smaller ones. Carim Mirza and Beg Arslan Mirza were the leaders of the opposition. Then, the mirzas established farms in the villages of Akkirman and drew Moldavian people to work there.
193 Seyyid Muhammed Rıza states that Selim Giray’s abdication was to take the responsibility of the Karlowitz. Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’-Seyyâr, 332.
194 Cankerman is the other name of the Özi fortress which is located on the estuary of the Dnieper River. The region was under the Crimean control until the Bogdan campaign of Sultan Suleiman I in 1538. Temel Öztürk, “Özü,” in TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2007), pp. 546-549.
195 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray”, 107-108.
196 In the transliteration, Demir chooses to latinize this tribe as Urm Mehmemoğlu; some sources pronounce the name as Ormembedoğlu; however, in the archival documents, it is prevalent in the form of Or Mehmedoğlu. Thus, in this thesis, this form is used.
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Furthermore, the Nogays started to attack the Akkirman Tatars and raided their properties.197 This shows that Mehmed Giray differentiated the Tatars who inhabited the region from the Nogay people who moved into the Ottoman domains in the northeast Black Sea region because of the instability in their former homeland, the Lower Volga.
After narrating the upheaval, Mehmed Giray refers to the hostility between Devlet Giray Khan and his brother and Kalgay Şehbaz Giray. When Devlet Giray had ascended to the throne, he had objected to the Ottomans’ appointment of Şehbaz Giray as the Kalgay. He had pleaded that while there is Saadet Giray, an elder brother, it is not a proper decision. Nevertheless, his request was rejected, and his objection drove a wedge between the two brothers. Şehbaz Giray was the commander-in-chief (serdar) of Circassia. The brothers’ disagreement deepened when Şehbaz Giray rebuffed the command of Devlet Giray about the Circassians. Şehbaz Giray reminded the Khan that he ascended to the post thanks to the Ottoman Sultan’s favor, just like the Khan. Soon after the animosity was revealed, a group of Circassians assassinated the Kalgay. It was during Devlet Giray’s first campaign against the unruly Bucak Nogays in October 1699. 198
3.1.1 The first infringement of the Treaty: The Gazi Giray rebellion
The conclusion of the war did not end the hostilities among the parties. Gazi Giray Sultan, the Nureddin, and the Serasker of the Bucak continued his incursion into the Commonwealth’s border by leading the Bucak Nogays despite the Treaty. However,
197 Carim Mirza should be the same person in Kırımî’s work as Cavim Mirza. Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray”, 108-109.
198 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray”, 110-111; Seyyid Muhammed Rıza claims that the murder happened because of the Saadet Giray’s incitement since he did not get over the assignment of his younger brother as the Kalgay. Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 339-340; Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 413.
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Seyyid Muhammed Rıza underlined that Gazi Giray did not see the declaration of the peace himself, and the Nogays conceived him to take advantage of the ambiguity.199 Abdülgaffar Kırımî states that Gazi Giray grew up among the Orak and Mamayoğlu tribes of Bucak. The notables of the Orakoğlu tribe, Urusoğlu Bey Arslan Mirza and Kasım oğlu Cavim Mirza accompanied Gazi Giray in the raid into Poland. They returned with numerous slaves and spoils, which of course, violated the clauses of the Karlowitz. Devlet Giray Khan ordered them to return the captives and the pillaged properties and reminded them of the Treaty, but Gazi Giray’s followers interpreted this as the Khan’s jealousy.200
As the Treaty’s guarantor, the Ottomans warned Devlet Giray Khan to prevent these illegal acts according to an entry in the mühimme registers dated from the first ten days (evâil) of Şevval 1110 (April 1699).201 The document starts with a quick reminder of the Treaty and warns the Crimeans and Tatars not to carry on with their prohibited customs, namely incursion and pillage. This reminder would be a recurring feature of the Ottoman Padishah’s letters to the Crimean Khans during this unique period after the Treaty. Then, the document raises the issue of Gazi Giray in these words;
…and while the implementation of the clauses of the peace is a requirement of the reputation and honor of my rule, previously we heard that Gazi Giray Sultan, who was responsible for Bucak, was in cahoots with the Nogays and acting on his own unreasonable initiative and without an imperial order dared to pillage the Polish lands and enslave her subjects and raid their properties in violation of the agreement. Thus, find whoever was enslaved and whatever was taken during this raid. Gather them in a place to be sent back to their
199 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 332.
200 Derya Derin transliterated Abdülgaffar Kırımî’s history, Umdetü’t-Tevârih in her master’s thesis. Derya Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi”, (Master’s Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2003), 392-393.
201 In Ottoman registers, scribes have frequently preferred to give the date without indicating the record’s exact day. Instead, they give an interval by dividing the month into three parts; the first ten days were named as evâil, the following ten days were named as evâsıt, the last ten days of a month were named as evâhir.
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owners and their country. For their protection, assign mirzas who can be trusted by the state.202
Although Gazi Giray was forced to abide by the order and release the slaves, this disturbed the Nogays. The same document indicates that the people who took part in the raids were made responsible for returning the slaves and properties to the Commonwealth. However, the Bucak people proposed to take away the slaves to Jassy (Yaş in Turkish) and wanted the Moldavian prince to be responsible for the mission from then on. Their excuse was their weakness since their income was coming from gaza (holy war), and it had radically decreased. However, the letter rigidly refused the offer by reminding them that the Prince was not a partner during the incursions. The document asserts that the offer was made only to deflect blame on the Prince since the Bucak people intended to hide some of the spoils for themselves.203 As the document reveals, the Ottomans turned a deaf ear to the complaints of the frontier people. This stance would ignite a prolonged series of rebellions and insubordination of the frontier people in this part of the Ottoman realm.
Another document from Ramadan 1110 (March 1699), a couple of days before the previous document, indicates that the Özi governor Yusuf Pasha is also informed about the Treaty;
One of the articles of the peace concluded with the Poles, concerns preventing the Ottoman military groups and especially the Tatar community from attacking Polish subjects, trespassing their borders, enslaving them, and driving away their livestock in any manner or with any pretext. The viziers, governors, the Crimean Khan, Kalgay, Nureddin, and the other sultans, the Moldavian Voivode, are warned explicitly by imperial orders to protect the borders’ order and to police the requirements of the reconciliation carefully. They must not harm the Polish subjects by enslaving them or taking their livestock or in any other way. If after investigation, anyone is found to cause
202 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 5, Gömlek No. 140, for the transliterated text see Appendic A, 2.
203 BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 5, Gömlek No. 140.; In the same month and the same collection, there is another register of the imperial letter to be sent Devlet Giray Khan, and their contents resemble. BOA, A.DVNSNHM, No. 5, Gömlek No. 138.
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disturbances insurrection by violating the Treaty, punish him as a deterrent to others. Return the raided properties to their owners.204
This passage stresses that the state set the alarm bells for the officials along the northern borders. Subsequently, the document informs Yusuf Pasha about Gazi Giray’s raids and orders him to find the captives and return them as the Treaty stipulates. In this aspect, this order resembles the order sent to Devlet Giray Khan, but it shows that although the Khan was ordained to do what is necessary, the captives had not been sent back yet. Therefore, Yusuf Pasha was charged with this issue by moving to the Bucak region. Then the register orders him to consult the Khan but work separately;
The Crimean Khan Devlet Giray, may his greatness continue, is also commissioned. When [you] arrive there, counsel and negotiate with him and fulfill the duty. However, do not await the Khan and move separately and hold the slaves before they scatter and make an effort to liberate them.205
Despite the passing five months, another register from the imperial letter collection dated August 1699 shows that some of the captives in the hands of the Nogays did not return.206 Devlet Giray Khan was again tasked to liberate the captives and punish the responsible ones, but it was not easy to find the captives and force the tribal orders to give these people back. Therefore, the reason to emphasize the separate work might be the uncertainty of Khan’s stance. As it indicated, the slaves still were not liberated, and the Khanate’s discontent towards the Treaty was apparent. Probably, the Ottomans did not want to leave the fate of the Treaty’s protection to the Crimeans’ mercy and attempted to get involved in the process directly.
In September 1699, the governor of Özi, Yusuf Pasha was commissioned to liberate the Polish merchants whom the Nogays had captured. The merchants had come there for commercial purposes. The Nogay brigands had killed some of them
204 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 110, Gömlek No. 2907, for the transliterated text see Appendix A, 3.
205 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 110, Gömlek No. 2907, for the transliterated text see Appendix A, 4.
206 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNHM], No. 5, Gömlek No. 148.
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and captured the others, and extorted their properties. The governor’s mission was to liberate the captives and charge the killed merchants’ blood money from the guilty parties. The Sultan reminded the governor that this incident was absolutely against the imperial agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the punishment of those bandits was one of the most significant duties (ehemm-i mehâmmdan olmağla). The stolen properties would also be found and handed over from the brigands to return to their owners. Kaplan Giray Sultan, who was in charge of Bucak, was assigned for this operation, and the Ottoman Sultan ordered the governor to communicate and collaborate with him.207 Apparently, Gazi Giray was removed from the Bucak region after his unauthorized raid against the other side of the border. However, the Nogays were still recalcitrant against the conditions of the Treaty. As in the previous case, the Ottomans assigned Yusuf Pasha to a mission, and it might also originate from the Ottoman unconfidence in the Crimeans’ commitment to peace. As the Ottomans strictly aimed to avoid any possibility of conflict with the former foes, the frontier people’s distress would be neglected, and the region turned into a hotspot.
After the murder of Kalgay Şehbaz Giray, Saadet Giray became the Kalgay and their other brother, Gazi Giray, became the Nureddin and the commander-in-chief of Circassia. Since the brothers were estranged, Gazi Giray felt suspicious about the assassination and investigated the event. He arrested some Circassians for the interrogation. These people confessed that they had killed the Kalgay upon the order of Saadet Giray. Upon this, Gazi Giray returned to Crimea and wanted to learn whether the Khan was aware of the murder’s instigator. He asked this to one of the Şirin mirzas, Cantimur, and he slandered the Khan that was aware, and even he
207 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 111, Gömlek No. 406.
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might intend to kill Gazi Giray. Cantimur mirza advised him to be careful. Thus, Gazi Giray ran away from Crimea and moved to Akkirman. The Nogays welcomed him willingly. Mehmed Giray narrates that they decided to protect Gazi Giray against Devlet Giray since the Khan attempted to deport them.208 Raşid claims that Devlet Giray Khan incited the assassination of the Kalgay since Şehbaz Giray was a reputed warrior and won the Ottomans’ approval. In his narrative, some of the Nogay people influenced Gazi Giray not to stay in Circassia. They conducted raids opposing the Treaty and returned to Bucak with various slaves and booties.209 It is important to note that Abdulgaffar Kırımî did not specify the murder of Şehbaz Giray as the reason for Gazi Giray’s rebellion. According to his narrative, Şehbaz Giray was killed before this event happened, and the rebellion started when Devlet Giray ordered the captives’ return. He also evaluates Devlet Giray’s first unsuccessful campaign against Bucak to end the rebellion of Gazi Giray, not to deport the Nogays from there.210
The leader of Şirins, Öktimur Mirza, also joined the Nogay insurgency. There was an ongoing hostility between Şirin notables, Öktimur, and Kadir Şah, Selim Giray Khan’s nephew. One day, Öktimur beat Kadir Şah Mirza, which caused the Khan’s sorrow, and the Khan ordered to catch Öktimur.211 Seyyid Muhammed Rıza
208 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 118-120; Abdulgaffar Kırımî gives additional information about the origin of the hostility between the brothers. Selim Giray Khan valued above Şehbaz Giray from his other sons, and they consented to the leader of the Circassian Besteni tribe, Temur Bolad oğlu Daverbek, to kill Şehbaz Giray. According to Kırımî, Şehbaz Giray was killed in Hijri 1109 (1697/1698); however, this information contradicts with the other chronicles. Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi”, 386; Defterdar and Uşşakizâde also indicates that Devlet Giray Khan incited the murder of Şehbaz Giray. Thus, Gazi Giray rebelled against him. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 703; Uşşâkîzâde es-Seyyid İbrâhîm Hasîb Efendi, Uşşâkîzâde Târihi, 450; According to a mühimme record cited by Uzunçarşılı, Gazi Giray rebelled since he was offended since Saadet Giray’s ascendance to the capacity of kalgay instead of him. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 12; For the detailed historiographical analysis see also, Klein, “Tatar and Ottoman History Writing.”
209 Abdülkadir Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli: Râşid Mehmed Efendi Ve Çelebizâde İsmaîl Âsım Efendi (1071-1141 / 1660-1729) (İstanbul: Klasik, 2013), 594.
210 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 395.
211 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 121.
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names this mirza as Oraktemir and gives additional information that he also caused some problems during Selim Giray’s reign. Since he had a powerful tribe and numerous followers, the Khan abstained from punishing him.212
Nevertheless, this time Öktimur fled from Crimea and took refuge in Murad Giray Khan (r. 1678-1683)’s eldest son in Rumeli. When Öktimur heard about the upheaval of the Nogays, he sided with them. He impressed the Nogays to petition the removal of Devlet Giray from office. Then, the Nogays informed Istanbul that they did not want Devlet Giray as the Khan since he wanted to deport them. The Nogays emphasized that they thought of themselves as Muslim and accepted the Sharia (Islamic law); they asked whom they had harmed.213 Muhammed Rıza indicates that they also requested to be under the jurisdiction of an independent Khan or an Ottoman governor-general, independent from the Crimean Khanate.214 The Ottomans deceived the Nogays by falsely promising that the Khan would be deposed. Nevertheless, Devlet Giray gathered his army, including the Nogay soldiers who resided in a place in Circassia called Cihan Sadak and campaigned to the Bucak region in January 1701.215 The Circassian Nogays’ siding with the Khan against their brethren, and the most preeminent tribal leader, Öktimur’s support to the rebels, leave us with a very complex picture.
The Nogays understood that they could not succeed against the army, hanged out the white flag, and appealed for mercy. Devlet Giray accepted their offer; however, the Nogays fled from the battlefield near the Dnieper. Thus, the Khan
212 Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 336.
213 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 121.
214 Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 347.
215 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 122-125; Kırımî calls these Nogays as Yediçekioğulları. Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 395; Seyyid Muhammed Rıza refers them as Yaman Sadak Nogays, and dates the Khan’s campaign Hijri 4 Şaban 1112. Rıza, Es-seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 348-349.
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became wrathful, moved to the Akkirman region, and allowed the raiding of the properties of the Nogays. The Nogay families faced severe persecutions, and Mehmed Giray asserts that the Nogay people had not been exposed to such an insult since Chinggis Khan’s time.216 Kırımî claims that the Akkirman peasants in the rebellious army defected by reminding them they were not Nogays when the Khan’s army campaigned for Bucak. The families of Cavim Mirza and Beg Arslan Mirza were deported to Crimea. 217 This misbehavior to the Nogay families might have contributed to the region’s ensuing opposition and rebellions. After a while, the Nogay rebels left Gazi Giray and the commanders in the steppe region and returned to Akkirman. Gazi Giray and the leftovers of the rebels moved to Chyhyryn.
Nevertheless, they could not stay there for a long time and appealed for mercy and returned to Crimea. The Ottomans ordered Gazi Giray to be sent to them. Gazi Giray was imprisoned in the Kapuarası (imperial prison) for eighteen days in Edirne and then exiled to Rhodes.218 Silahdâr claims that the Ottomans deceived Gazi Giray with various promises, including appointment as the Khan. The Nogays submitted to the order, evacuated from the Bucak Region, and moved to Crimea’s environs. They also stipulated to pay an annual sum of 30,000 akçes to the treasury and give military support when needed.219 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa narrates that
216 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 127-128.
217 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 131; Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 395-398; In Gülbün-i Hanân, Halim Giray does not give details of the Gazi Giray Rebellion and summarizes the narratives of Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr and Umdetü’t-Tevârih. Halim Giray, Gülbün-i Hânân, ed. İbrahim Gültekin (Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019), 126-127.
218 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 131-134; An archival document indicates that Gazi Giray appealed for mercy to the Khan; “Gâzî Giray ancak iki üç yüz kadar adamla Aksuya gelüb anlar dahi peyderpey taraf-ı hânîlerine ‘avd ü iyâb üzere olmağla.” This information clarifies how the Gazi Giray rebellion ended. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 5, Gömlek No. 195.
219 Mehmet Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme: Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1133/1695-1721),” (Phd dissertation, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2001), 505; In the history of Raşid, Gazi Giray did not return to Crimea, but applied to Yusuf Pasha, governor of Özi for the mercy. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 594; Defterdar remarks that Gazi Giray called back by the Ottomans, and he came to Edirne, and then exiled to Rhodes. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 705.
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the Nogays appealed for mercy and promised to follow the Ottoman Padishah’s and the Crimean Khan’s orders. They consented not to attack the opposite side of the border. The Nogay people who occupied the Moldavian territory would return to their previous place of residence in the Halil Pasha Yurdu and would pay both the öşür and ağnam (land and cattle taxes) to the Ottoman treasury. The Nogays also stipulated to embrace the Islamic law by denouncing the töre (customary law), which was identified as illegitimate. Thus, the Ottomans assigned two kadıs (the Islamic judge) to the Or Mehmedoğlu and Orakoğlu tribes.220
Uşşâkîzâde remarks more than the other chroniclers that the Ottoman Sultan sent several petitions to build mosques, madrasas, schools (mesâcid ü medâris ve mektebler) and settle ulema and fukahâ (canonists) in the places where the Bucak people sojourn.221 In that case, enforcing the Islamic law on the people of the frontier was meant to increase the central authority in the region. Once, as the Gazi Giray Khan II attempted to lay the ağnam tax on the Crimeans, it faced internal opposition in 1609, he was forced to abolish this tax.222 Thus, the enforcement of the ağnam tax instead of the şişlik (the Crimean customary tax on sheep)223 labels the Khanate’s loss of power in the region.
220 The name of Or Mehmedoğlu is transcripted as Urmeys in the Defterdar’s history and as Urmiyet in Raşid. There are many addressings to the Or Mehmedoğlu tribe in the documents and the histories as indicated in the previous footnote. Since Or Mehmedoğlu and Urmiyet are phonetically resembling, The chronicles were probably referring to the Or Mehmedoğlu tribe. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 704; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 595; Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1969). "The Formal Closure,” 471; Denise Klein remarks that the Ottoman chronicles provide an agenda of reestablishing tranquility in disorders such as the Nogay rebellion. Lessening the financial impositions, increasing the religious awareness, and implementing the Sharia were the tools to cope with these kind of rebellious people. Klein, “Historiography”, 136.
221 Uşşâkîzâde es-Seyyid İbrâhîm Hasîb Efendi, Uşşâkîzâde Târihi, 452; Hüseyin Göcen’s study shows that the Ottoman attempts to increase the religious presence in the Halil Pasha Yurdu were rooted in “the idea of religious reform” which was applied “not only the settled Tatars in the Halil Pasha region, but also the people in the Balkans and other regions.” Hüseyin Göcen, “An Attempt at Confessionalization and Social Disciplining in the Reign of Mustafa II (1695–1703)” (Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2020), 122-124.
222 Halil İnalcık, “Kırım Hanlığı Kadı Sicilleri Bulundu,” Belleten 60 (April 1996): 174-176.
223 Krolikoswka, “The Law Factor in Ottoman-Crimean Tatar Relations,” 188.
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With Öktimur Mirza having escaped to Rumeli, his foe, Kadir Şah Mirza advised the Khan to petition the Ottomans to arrest Öktimur.224 A mühimme record from April 1701 (h. Zilkâde 1112) addresses the officials of Edirne and Yanbolu to arrest Rektimur Mirza
It has been reported that Rektemür, one of the Şirin begs in Crimea, does not mind his own business and always engages in lawlessness and brigandage. When he [Rektemür] heard that Devlet Giray Han, who is currently reigning as the Crimean Khan (may his reign last), intended to capture and punish him with the assistance of the ulema, the righteous, and mirzas of Crimea, he escaped. A firman has been issued to arrest him when he arrives in Yanbolu. He has blended into the people of Nogay and incited all kinds of unrest…225
Given the resemblance between the stories of Rektemür and Öktimur, it is reasonable to think that Rektemür, who was the subject of this order, was actually Öktimur. Probably, a scribal error lay behind this confusion.
It is noteworthy that Mehmed Giray describes the Nogays negatively and underlines their insubordination to Islamic law. According to his narrative, the Nogays deserved this end because they were mistreating powerless people and enslaving the Muslims. On one occasion, a poor Tatar sued a Nogay mirza because the latter cut his ear and beard. The Khan decreed the retaliation of the loss according to Islamic law; however, the mirzas objected by claiming that they were above the poor ordinary people (fukarâ).226
Although the rebellion was suppressed without putting up a fight, the Khan reported to the Ottomans that it is not possible to put the Nogays right if the Bey Mirza oğlu and Kan Mirza oğlu tribes were not unmingled from them. The Sultan approved the Khan’s plan to displace the tribes mentioned above by saying that;
The removal and separation of this group of troublemakers from the Nogays will help suppress disorder; in addition, it will leave no room for their
224 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 134.
225 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No.111, Gömlek No. 1881, for the transliteration of the quote see appendix A, 5.
226 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray”, 129.
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complaints that they are too populous for the Halil Pasha Yurdu because of the natural increase of their population. Thus, this receives our permission.227
In the document, the Ottoman Sultan assigned the Özi governor Yusuf Pasha to assist the Khan for this mission and reminded him to levy the unpaid taxes of the Nogays. The Sultan also ordered the complete separation of the Nogays from the Bucak people and terminating Nogay control over the Moldavian peasants. Some of these peasants were working in the plantations and winter quarters, which the Nogays had established. The Ottomans boldly underlined that even if the structures belonged to Giray sultans, namely the dynasty’s male members, these would be demolished.228 Therefore, this decision shows parallelism with the Ottoman’s centralization policy and restricts the Crimean intervention in the region’s affairs.
An imperial letter from August 1701 stresses that Devlet Giray Khan heralded the end of the disorder. The Ottoman Sultan expressed his pleasure about the Khan’s success. According to the document, the Khan had prohibited the Nogay incursions into Moldavia, settled them in the Halil Pasha Yurdu, and separated them from the Bucak people. Therefore, it gives us a clue about the difference between the formerly settled Bucak Tatars’ obedience and the region’s latecomer Nogays. Also, the Khan exiled only the troublemakers to Crimea and put the affairs right. The Sultan appreciated the success and rewarded the Khan and the Kalgay with various gifts. Since the problem was solved, the Sultan reminded the Khan there is no need to stay in Bucak and ordered the Khan to return to Crimea by leaving the region’s affairs to the Özi governor Yusuf Pasha. Although the Sultan commanded the Khan to return after advising every matter to the governor by courtesy, it made apparent that the region’s precise control belonged to the Ottomans.229
227 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No.5, Gömlek No. 195, for the transliteration of the quote see Appendix A, 6.
228 BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 5, Gömlek No. 195.
229 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH], No.5, Gömlek No. 204.
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In December 1701, the Mutasarrıf (governor) of Kılburun Mürteza Beg received an imperial letter to block the passage of the Nogays from the Crimean side to the opposite direction; if it is not permitted. Devlet Giray Khan exiled them there due to the Treaty. However, it was heard from Istanbul that the Mutasarrıf was permitting them to come over to the gateways and ports. In this regard, the letter rigorously precluded Mürteza Beg from repeating to permit the Nogays; otherwise, his excuses would not be regarded.230 The exiled tribes were the presiders of the last disorder within the Bucak region. Their return might have contributed to the ignition of the rebellion and the disturbance of the peace. However, it was complicated to close the frontier and subjugate the steppe societies within a defined border.
The exiled tribes rendered the scapegoats of the rebellion, but they were not the dissatisfied faction. The Nogays and the Moldavian people were still attacking and harming each other. Thereupon, an Islamic court (meclîs-i şer‘iat ve’d-dîn) was established in the Debbağ Bridge under the jurisdiction of the kadı of İsmail Geçidi. In the same month, December 1701, the Nogay mirzas from Or Mehmedoğlu, Orakoğlu, and Mamay tribes and the Bucak people’s deputies faced the deputies of the Moldavians. The Nogays blamed the Moldavians for assaulting fifty Nogay villages, enslaving two-thousand Nogay people, bringing them to the abode of war (dârü’l-harbe intikâl), and stealing their properties. The Moldavians also accused the Nogays of the same offenses. The court arbitrated between the parties and convinced them to leave the accusations. The Porte again assigned Özi governor vizier Yusuf Pasha and kadı of Babadağı to enforce the court’s decision and inform the capital about the latest developments.231 Although the document does not give detailed information on the reason for the conflict, Nogay’s evacuation might have
230 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 112, Gömlek No. 250.
231 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 112, Gömlek No. 238.
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contributed to it. On the one hand, raiding and plundering were not the habits that only belongs to the Nogays or Tatars; as seen in this example, another frontier society, Moldavians, committed this crime.
3.1.2 The Rebellion of Devlet Giray Khan
Devlet Giray Khan sent an envoy to the Porte to warn about the growing Russian power on the border. Mehmed Giray narrates that the Khan sent a letter informing the grand vizier Daltaban Mustafa Pasha about the Russians’ establishing a new fortress twelve hours away from Crimea, within the Crimeans’ pastureland. According to the narrative, the stronghold was piled with ammunition of thousands of carts, and the Russians deployed 20,000 soldiers in it. The Russians also fortified Azov and built a great fleet in Don River. They claimed that if the Ottomans did not allow them to raid Russia in the winter, they would lose Crimea. Otherwise, they would be forced to leave Crimea since they could not resist a Russian attack from the sea.232
Nevertheless, the envoy complained about the Russians by saying, “They have not even paid the tribute they had been previously paying.”233 Thus, with these words, they discredited themselves in the eyes of the Ottoman officials. The Ottomans evaluated the Crimeans’ reproaches as a struggle to violate the agreement and receive tribute from the Russians. Therefore, when the Ottomans asked about this issue to the Russian ambassador, the latter succeeded in convincing the Ottomans that the fortress was established to protect the Russian merchants against the Cossacks.234
232 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 151.
233 “Selefde bize viregeldükleri hazînelerin dahı virmediler” Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 151.
234 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 151-152.; The History of Raşid stresses that the castle is built to protect the Potkalı Cossacks (Dnieper Cossacks), Russia’s ally. The warships that the Crimeans were
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The Anonymous Ottoman History evaluates the issue in a similar manner as Mehmed Giray. It stresses that Tatars have nothing to do with agriculture, and their only income channel is pillage and plunder. Thus they were annoyed by the peace with the Commonwealth and Russia and created rumors about the rising Russian threat. According to the Anonymous Ottoman History, the Ottoman inspectors confuted the Tatars’ claims.235 In the narrative of Kırımî, the establishment of the Russian fortification in the vicinity of Crimea also takes place. He writes that the Russians built a fortress named Kamanike (Kamenka or Kamenny Zaton) five hours above Gazikerman and fifteen hours away from the Or Kapı. The Crimeans reported this development to the Ottomans, and an instigator was sent to verify the information. However, the Russians bribed him, and he bent the truth. Kırımî claims that the Ottoman officials were aware of the great fortress beside the Ottoman Sultan, but they lied because of the Russian bribe and avoided going on a campaign.236
In that regard, a letter conveying similar apprehension among the Crimeans and informing the Ottoman government of a possible threat from the North arrived in the Sultan’s court in December 1699 (h. Receb 1111). The petition bearing İbrahim bin Mehmed’s signature addresses the Padishah to inform about the borderlands’ developments. It stresses that
My felicitous Sultan, if a question be asked about the developments along the Bucak borderland, [it should be known that] when previously men came from Poland with the news that the Poles have been amassing many soldiers, we sent two decent men who are reasonable and knew the region’s affairs and
complaining about was there before the Treaty, and the Russian side claims that they were unable to sail the ships back, even they offered to sell them to the Ottomans. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 626; In the Anonymous Ottoman History, the Russian ambassador claims that the castle is built for defensive reasons since the Potkalı Cossacks are their enemy. Abdülkadir Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 201; In the chronicle of Defterdar, the ambassador claimed that the castle was built to protect the Cossacks. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 759.
235 Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 200; Defterdar’s history contains similar comments about the Crimeans. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 757-758.
236 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 398-399.
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verified it. The king of Poland gathering many soldiers and sent Sich Cossacks under his suzerainty to the assistance of the king of Moscow, and even he is preparing soldiers to campaign against Crimea.237
İbrahim bin Mehmed also claims that the Moldavian Prince sent the Polish crown friendly letters, and he warns the Sultan to make preparations for war.
Dimitrie Cantemir verifies the arrival of the document in Receb 1111 (December/January 1699-1700); the Tatars reported the increasing Russian preparations for war. Cantemir’s history includes more detail than the Ottoman chronicles. Kıblelizâde, the nephew of the grand vizier Amcazâde Hüseyin Pasha, was sent as the instigator to the borderline. Hüseyin Pasha enjoined his nephew to visit him after returning before presenting the report to the Sultan. Kıblelizâde witnessed the increasing number of Russian ships in Voronezh and Azov and the unexpected fortification of the Taganrog. However, Hüseyin Pasha commended him for falsifying the truth because if it came in sight, there would be more fierce war than before. Cantemir claims that Devlet Giray Khan succeeded in informing the Padishah about the deception of Kıblelizâde. Thereupon, both Kıblelizâde and then his uncle were dismissed from office.238 Anonymous Ottoman History claims that Kıblelizâde was executed with condemnation of his attendance in a coalition against Sultan Mustafa II.239
Meanwhile, the Porte received petitions and complaints about the Russian threat continuously. It is not easy to determine the chronology of these complaints
237 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı [TS.MA.e], No. 878, Gömlek No. 43, for the transliteration of the quote see Appendix A, 7.
238 Dimitrie Cantemir, The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire, trans. Nicolas Tindal (London: Knapton, 1784), 428-430.
239 Kıblelizâde Ali brought a calendar from Egypt dating the dethronement of Sultan Mustafa II, enthronement of Sultan Ahmed III, depositions of Şeyhülislam and Hüseyin Pasha, but Ali was illiterate and allowed the palace officials to read it. Thus, the Sultan heard the calender and ordered his execution. The grand vizier Hüseyin Pasha succeeded in making the Sultan pardon his nephew, but after a while someone accused him by working with people who are opposing to the Sultan. Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 277-278.
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since the chronicles abstain from giving details. For example, the document is from December 1699, but Kıblelizade was executed in 1702.240
At the end of the previous document, it is interesting that the author establishes this critical sentence about the Bucak region’s economic situation; “My Sultan, if the situation of this region from another perspective is asked, it is apparent that [your] feeble subjects really need purveyance. The everlasting firman is my felicitous Sultan’s [prerogative].”241 The document does not give information about who İbrahim bin Mehmed is, but he justifies his petition as the religious duty of a person who lives in the borderland. As stressed in the previous document, the Nogays claimed that their income is diminished since war-making was the source of their living. Similarly, the petitioner, İbrahim bin Mehmed, claims that the Bucak people require cereals. As the Bahçesaray Treaty (1681) stipulated, Russia ordered the Cossacks communities not to raid the Ottoman and Crimean domains. Thus, they met with difficulties to reach basic needs. They continued to send petitions to Moscow about their financial problems during the following four years since they could not seize spoils.242 Therefore, these hints contribute to the bigger picture of why the frontier people showed opposition to the frontier’s closure. It is also possible that the petition exaggerated the threat to return to the war conditions for raiding and pillaging the opposite side of the border.
Furthermore, the border incursions were not an ex parte action that was undertaken only by the Tatars. Despite the truce, the Cossack bands still generated trouble for the people living on the frontier and the Black Sea littoral. Kılburun
240 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 607.
241“…benim sultânım bu cânibin sâ’ir ahvâlinden sû’al buyurulursa bu cânibde olan fukarâ kulları zahîre husûsunda gâyet ile ihtiyâcları oldukları mukarrerdir bâkî fermân sa‘âdetlü sultânımındır.” BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 878, Gömlek No. 43.
242 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 87.
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Sancakbeyi (district governor) Mürtaza Bey’s letter displays how the Don Cossacks, under Russian suzerainty, threatened Ottoman control. It dates to 9 December 1699, when Russia and the Ottoman Empire had not yet signed the Treaty of Istanbul (1700).
Heretofore, when the Don Cossacks’ boats, which had sailed to the sea, came to the Dnieper Strait, they were met by the five boats which were in Özi, and the fight lasted from midnight to morning. Thirty of the Özi ghazis were martyred, and thirty of them were wounded. It was reported to the excellency that the accursed ones found an opportunity to escape by entering into the straits. Two days after the accursed ones’ escape, messengers and letters were sent to the two great Hetmans and the Hetman of Sich. This band sailed from Azov, raided many of the protected domains of the Padishah, enslaved Muslims, and went to their islands. Now, it is proper for you to refuse them when they arrive and take the captives forcibly to send here; thus, we will also report your efforts to protect the peace to the state. Otherwise, if they are protected and receive shelter, they will disturb the peace, which has been preserved for all this time. You should take care of this and prevail over them.243
Governor Mürteza Bey informs the Porte how he wrote to the Right-bank Cossacks under the Commonwealth’s suzerainty while the Don Cossacks were under Russian control. As it is seen, the hetmans were warned based on the newborn fragile peace. The most remarking part of this document shows that the Don Cossacks’ attacks continued even after the truce with Russia, so it made the Crimean’s suspenseful letters informing about the possibility of a Russo-Polish joint attack meaningful.
Silahdar also emphasizes the economic crisis that originated from the frontier’s closure. Since the cessation of the Russian tribute of 90.000 guruşes and the prohibition of the raid against Russia forced Tatars were forced to spend the previous savings for four years, and nothing was left; thus, they became impoverished (“dört seneden beru elde olan eşyâların bütün yiyip fakirü’l-hâl olduklarından”). The Russians fortified the border extending from Circassia until the Cossack domains in the Dnieper. Thereupon, the Tatars requested Devlet Giray Khan
243 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi Evrakı [TS.MA.e], No. 687, Gömlek No. 17, for the transliteration of the quote see Appendix A, 8.
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to allow them to destroy the Russian fortifications. However, the Crimean ulema objected to any action without the permission of the Ottomans. In the Nusretnâme, it is revealed how the Russian fortifications and military supply lines underturned Crimea’s advantageous defensive position for the steppe societies. The Crimean envoy reminded the Ottoman officials that Moscow was at a two months distance from Crimea, and the Crimeans could cut the supply lines of the Russian army in the open steppe and block their movement by burning all the edible vegetation on their way to Crimea. The establishment of frontier encampments enhanced the Russian army’s logistic support, threatened the peninsula, and tied the Crimeans’ hands.244
Nevertheless, the previous grand vizier Hüseyin Pasha and the Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi were keen to protect the peace. Since the Tatars could not convince the Şeyhülislam about the Russian threat, they reckoned on the new hawkish grand vizier, Daltaban Mustafa Pasha.245 In his letter to the grand vizier Daltaban Mustafa Pasha, Devlet Giray Khan complained about the previous government, by saying “[They] did not let us take part in the peace [negotiations]. I implored that at least a blind Tatar from among us be with you, but they did not accept, and they betrayed us utterly.”246 This sentence shows that the Crimeans felt offended because of the Ottomans’ negligence and the Treaties’ inconvenient stipulations. On the one hand, the government of Daltaban remained under the influence of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. The grand vizier secretly contacted the Khan and the Crimean tribal leaders and commended them for gathering all the Crimean soldiers in Bucak.247 Thus, the
244 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 555.
245 Evan Brown Ames, “The Isolationist Stance of the Ottoman Empire 1700-1711,” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1972), 102-103.
246 “Sulha bizi karışdırmadılar, bir kör Tatar olsun bari tarafımızdan içinizde bulunsun deyü rica ide gördüm, kabul itmeyüp bize külli ihânet eylediler.” Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 555.
247 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 555-556; Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 203, Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 18-19; Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1969). "The Formal Closure,” 474-475.
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grand vizier might have a chance to wage the Northern campaign and diminish the power of the Şeyhülislam.
Though Reisü’l-küttâb Rami Mehmed Efendi informed Feyzullah Efendi about the grand vizier’s plan. Şeyhülislam convinced Sultan Mustafa II to depose Devlet Giray Khan to intimidate the Khan’s supporters.248 After four months of incumbency, the grand vizier Daltaban Mustafa Pasha was executed on 25 January 1703, and Rami Mehmed Pasha, the Ottoman plenipotentiary at the Karlowitz’s negotiations, became the grand vizier.249 The execution of Daltaban gave offense to the people who opposed the Karlowitz. A couple of months later, a general rebellion would erupt because of nepotism and the Şeyhülislam’s excessive control over the government. The rebels would take revenge for Daltaban and kill Feyzullah Efendi.250
Silahdar also comments that Feyzullah Efendi’s influence upon the Sultan diminished the viziers’ power.251 In that regard, Mehmed Giray claims that Daltaban Mustafa Pasha attempted to assassinate Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi and his son in a banquet. When the şeyhülislam was informed about his plan, he complained to Sultan Mustafa II by claiming that Daltaban provoked the Crimeans and Nogays and was planning to dethrone the Sultan and annihilate him.252
Dimitrie Cantemir gives more detail about the developments that Mustafa Pasha was furious about the peacemakers at Karlowitz. Thus, Daltaban Mustafa Pasha adamantly accused Rami Mehmed Pasha and Alexander Mavrocordato of
248 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 556.
249 Abdülkadir Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 193-196; Raşid approaches the issue from a similar perspective and adds the words of Devlet Giray that he was informing the Crimeans about the support of the grand vizier to receive their support. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 629.
250 Ames, “The Isolationist Stance,” 110-111.
251 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 562-563.
252 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 157.
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treachery. According to the grand vizier, there was no reason to conclude peace with exhausted enemies, and it was pointless to cede the Kamanietz Fortress, which was impregnable for the foes. Therefore, Mehmed Pasha convinced the Şeyhülislam that the grand vizier was planning to dismiss all the Treaty’s contributors, even the Sultan. Cantemir narrates the rest of the event, similar to Mehmed Giray.253 As a hardliner, Mustafa Pasha aimed to restore the Empire’s dignity by force, and he attempted to seize effective power; however, his and Devlet Giray’s plans collapsed. Thus, the Ottomans evaded the first real challenge to the frontier’s closure. However, this new status quo would continue to generate problems for the Crimeans, and the frontier people would show their dissatisfaction at every opportunity.
The Porte assigned Selim Giray Khan as the Khan for the fourth time; however, the Crimean notables pledged loyalty to Devlet Giray since the Ottomans did not believe their words. Therefore, the Khan sent the Kalgay Saadet Giray to Akkirman to seek the support of the Nogays, and he succeeded.254 The Kalgay informed the vizier Yusuf Pasha, the commander of Özi Fortress, about his arrival to Bucak to inform him about the circumstances in Crimea. In his letter to the Kalgay, Yusuf Pasha indicated that his coming to Bucak was redundant since he could inform the Ottomans from Crimea, and his move with many soldiers might lead to disorder in the region.255 Since the dismissed Kalgay could not achieve his aim by threats, he attacked Ismail with the support of the Nogays. However, as the result of the fierce
253 Cantemir, The History, 414-422.
254 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 154-157.
255 Unlike the history of Mehmed Giray, the Anonymous Ottoman History and the Defterdar’s chronicle indicate that the Kalgay Saadet Giray came Bucak before he and Devlet Giray Khan deposed from the office. Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 200; The histories of Defterdar and Raşid follows a similar chronology with Mehmed Giray that the rebellion started after the removal of Devlet Giray from the office. According to his narrative, during the siege of İsmail, Devlet Giray led the troops himself. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 760-761; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 627.
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resistance of Yusuf Pasha, they were repelled. Then, they raided the farms of the Ottoman notables.256
In December 1702, an emân-nâme (amnesty letter) issued permission for the exiled Nogays to return to their previous residences. The exiled tribes sent petitions to the Sultan for mercy. They promised to pay öşür and ağnam taxes, serve in governmental duties, apply the Sharia and leave the töre, avoid attacking any place according to the Treaty, not ask for fees from the transiting merchants, not to build additional çiftliks and kışlaks outside their territory, and hand over those who violate the Treaty to government officials themselves. However, their pardon was meaningful in terms of timing. The document contains crucial information about the development within the region;
While they [the exiled Nogays] were obeying the official assigned from the Exalted State and not behaving unproperly, Saadet Giray came to Bucak from Crimea with some troops; he made them seal the petition, including some issues but definitely did not do this.257
Before this document in the same month, the Özi governor Yusuf Pasha received an imperial letter about Devlet Giray Khan’s and the Kalgay Saadet Giray’s dismissals. The Kalgay was harming the locals, and thus, he was ordered to return. However, instead of insubordination to the command, the document claims that “[Saadet Giray] made the Nogays unwillingly seal the petition, which was written according to his own mind.”258 These two documents demonstrate that Devlet Giray Khan and the Kalgay Saadet Giray estranged some of the Nogays from themselves. Their severe persecution and exile to Crimea after the suppression of the rebellion led by Gazi Giray contributed to this fact. Anyhow it is interesting why the Ottomans pardoned
256 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 154-157; Özcan, ed., Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 202.
257 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 112, Gömlek No. 1515, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 9.
258 “Kendi muktezâ-yı hevâsına göre tahrîr itdirdügi mahzarı Nogaylu tâ’ifesine kerhen mühürledüb.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 112, Gömlek No. 1517.
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them to return their domains. The answer should have been balancing the power of the rebellious dismissed Khan and his brother. In a way, the Nogays would take their revenge by leaving the leaders alone against the Ottomans.
Another mühimme register, which dates to the same month, December 1702, also enlightens the local people’s attitude towards the rebellion. The Sultan reminds the Özi Governor Yusuf Pasha about the dismissal of the Khan and Kalgay again. The Kalgay had been called to Istanbul. If he resists this order, the Sultan gave the governor the right to cross the opposite side of the Dnieper to arrest the Kalgay. The document deems it to be “of the utmost importance that he be severed from the Bucak and Nogay people.”259 In the same document, the Sultan commands Yusuf Pasha to put an end to “his (Saadet Giray’s) harm among these Muslims in any way possible.”260 Both the sentences show how the Ottoman perception of the locals changed in the course of this rebellion. Only two years before, the Nogays were the people who had convinced Gazi Giray to conduct unauthorized actions. However, now the Kalgay was seen as trying to stir up the region to create a base for his movement. The Nogays and Bucak, the people, were people to be saved from his misguided actions.
Devlet Giray also could not find the Crimean mirzas’ support as he expected. Mufti of Caffa issued a fatwa which declares that if anyone supports the dismissed Khan, that person will have abandoned the religion.261 Thus, Devlet Giray admitted defeat and fled to Circassia. The Nogay rebellion subsided, but the Ottoman army
259 “…anın Bucaklu ve Nogaylu üzerinden def‘i elzem olmağla.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 112, Gömlek No. 1527.
260 “…mezbûrın mazarratını ol müslümanların üzerlerinden bi-eyyi-hâl def‘.” BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 1527.
261 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,”559; Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 764; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 630.
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spent the winter in the region and punished the rebels in this way.262 In a nutshell, two unsuccessful rebellions exacted a heavy cost on the Nogays and probably estranged the relationship between the Bucak Nogays and both the Ottomans and the Crimeans.
3.2 From the Fourth Reign of el-Hac Selim Giray Khan to the Great Northern War
Selim Giray’s arrival to İsmail appeased the dissent, and he established his fourth reign by entering Crimea. Gazi Giray who was in Rhodes as an exile was invited to be appointed as the Kalgay of his father. His younger brother, Kaplan Giray, became the Nureddin. However, their father’s last reign would not last long because of his advanced age, and also, he was suffering from podagra that restricted his movement. Interestingly, in his short reign, he sent a letter to warn the Ottomans about the growing Russian threat on the North like his dismissed son.263 The repetitive reports on the same issue demonstrate how the Crimeans took the Russian threat seriously.
Selim Giray’s letter to the Left-bank Cossacks’ (Barabaş Kazağı in Turkish)264 Hetman in 1704 shows that the Hetman requested the return of the slaves and horses Kuban Tatars had seized. The Khan responded to the Hetman by saying that while the Kalgay Sultan was working to find the raiders, the Don Cossacks and the Kalmyks never returned captives and horses seized from the Kuban Tatars. The Khan also informed the Hetman about the recent offenses against the Crimeans;
262 Demir, “Târîh-i Mehmed Giray,” 154-157; Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 373; Another Crimean chronicle Umdetü’l-Ahbâr follows a similar pattern with the Mehmed Giray’s history, but it also narrates that Devlet Giray came to Akkirman and made a deal with Orak Mamay and Or Mehmetoğlu tribes. Then, they raided the Moldavian towns, and the author did not say anything about the plunder of the Ottoman properties. Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 400-401.
263 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekaiyât, 838, 842-843; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 726-727; Uşşâkîzâde es-Seyyid İbrâhîm Hasîb Efendi, Uşşâkîzâde Târihi, 730.
264 The Cossacks who inhabited the Left-Bank of the Dnieper was called as Barabaş Kazakları. Sereda, Osmanlı-Ukrayna Bozkır Serhatti, 79.
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In the Or countryside, someone killed five of our men recently, stole a fair amount of horses and brought them to the Don, then stole eighty horses again. And now, they stole eight hundred horses and murdered some of our men, but we could not receive information about who did that.265
When the Cossacks were questioned about this, they accused the Kalmyks. Thus, the Khan reproached the Hetman by reminding him that the Kalmyks were under the control of their king. The Khan also claims that the Crimeans punished the Cossacks under their suzerainty and committed cross-border offenses.266
When he died in 1704, Gazi Giray became the Khan, and the new Khan made Kaplan Giray the Kalgay. In Hijri 1117 (1705/1706), the Bucak Nogays attempted to eliminate the Khan’s authority in the region. Kutluk Temir and Kart Mirza convinced the Özi Governor Yusuf Pasha to transmit this offer to the Ottomans. Their attempt failed, and Yusuf Pasha was dismissed from office, but soon he succeeded in restoring his position as the Özi governor, which upset the Khan.267 It is worth evaluating why the Nogays, who supported Gazi Giray only five years ago, wanted to diminish his authority. The most persuasive answer is the estrangements of the Nogays from the Crimean administration because of the severe persecutions.
A year later, the Russians reported the disturbance in the Kuban borderland because of the Nogays. The Ottomans warned Gazi Giray Khan to take action against them. The Khan ordered the Kalgay Kaplan Giray to end this problem, but he did not take action. Seyyid Muhammed Rıza attributes this to the conspiracy of the grand vizier Çorlulu Ali Pasha. The previous grand vizier Baltacı Mehmed supported Gazi Giray, but Ali Pasha did not favor him and sought a pretext for his dismissal. He kept
265 “…keçenlerde Or taşrasından beş adamımız öldürüp bir mikdar at Ten tarafına ketürmişler ve sonra seksen yılkı dahı aldılar. Ve şimdi , Or Kapusından sekiz yüz yılkı alup ve birkaç adamımızı katl edüp ketmişler; ancak kim oldugı haberin aldugımız yokdur.” Atasoy, ed., Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga Dair Bolgan Yarlıglar Ve Hatlar, 684.
266 Atasoy, ed., Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga Dair Bolgan Yarlıglar Ve Hatlar, 684.
267 Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 391-392.
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the Khan’s vizier Mustafa on his side. Mustafa Ağa complained in the Porte about the Khan’s failures; thus, Gazi Giray was deposed.268 The significance of this event for his thesis is how the frontier administration influenced the Khanate’s destiny. Only a decade before, when the Crimean Khan had been commissioned to turn the frontiers into a battle zone and provide a constant flow of slaves to the capital, now doing the same brought his dismissal.269
After Gazi Giray Khan’s dismissal in 1707, Kaplan Giray became the new Khan. He pursued this title until his defeat against the Circassians in 1708. Kaplan Giray decided to campaign against the Circassians to take revenge on Şehbaz Giray. According to Smirnov, this was the apparent cause, but the real reason was to return a group of Circassians who had fled from their residences. The loss of the tax income from these people was unacceptable during such a financially difficult period.270 Królikowska-Jedlińska underlines that the treaties paved the way for excessive exploitation of Circassians.271 Silahdâr, in his history, reveals that the Khan ordered the Circassians to send 3000 slaves; it was ten times more than the traditional tribute of 300 slaves to the ascending Khan. The Circassian chieftains emphasized that although the change of throne occurred every fifteen to twenty years, the change frequency decreased to almost a year. Also, most of the Circassians had become Muslim, which rendered them in a difficult position to find enough slaves. The Khan disregarded their response and campaigned against them. The Crimeans were utterly
268 Rıza, Es-Seb‘ü’s-Seyyâr, 395-397; Raşid and Silahdâr remark that Gazi Giray was deposed because his laxness to prevent the Nogays and Tatars’ border offenses. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 777; Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme”, 691
269 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 445-446.
270 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 448.
271 Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska, “The Role of Circassian Slaves in the Foreign and Domestic Policy of the Crimean Khanate in the Early Modern Period,” in Slaves and Slave Agency in the Ottoman Empire (Göttingen, Niedersachs: V&R Unipress, 2020), 357-358.
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defeated, and the army suffered heavy casualties.272 The criminalization of the border offenses prompted the Crimeans to increase their focus on their vassals. The Nogay’s petition to the Ottomans to eliminate the Khan’s authority and the Circassians’ opposition to the unjustified demands resulted from this development.
A Crimean Hebrew chronicle, Debar Śepatayim, contains a critical narrative about the Kinjal Battle (1708), in which the Crimean forces under Kaplan Giray were defeated. Kırgok Beg was the “Grand Prince-Vali of Kabarda.” He refused his brothers’ “shares and their rights” on the government, which was brought by their “customs.” Therefore, his brother Ali Sultan Beg and all of his brothers appealed to Kaplan Giray Khan and sued Kırgok for his misdeed. Uşşakizade narrates the story like Debar Śepatayim but cites the little brother as Oşizi and the elder one Kurgok. The Khan offered Kırgok to establish a joint rule with his brother. The Khan called Kırgok to hear their trial. Nevertheless, both the chronicles tell that he refused Khan’s offer. All in all, the Khan gathered a great army. The governor of the Ottoman possession in the peninsula, Murtaza Pasha, joined the Khan’s army heading to Circassia. Kırgok Beg escaped to the Elbruz Mount with his people. As the Ottoman and Crimean chronicles indicated, the Circassians caught the Crimeans unawares and inflicted heavy damages to the Crimean grandee in the army. Even a Crimean Sultan, Sahib Giray, and Murtaza Pasha were captured, but then they were released. Kaplan Giray returned to Crimea and attempted to gather a second army,
272 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 709-710; Raşid indicates that the Circassians were punishing the guilties by handing them to the Khan as ayıblık. Kabarda Circassians could not bear to the the Kaplan Giray administration because of the suppression, and escaped to the Elbruz Mountain. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 799-800; For more information about the enslavement of the Circassians see Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska, “The Role of Circassian Slaves in the Foreign and Domestic Policy of the Crimean Khanate in the Early Modern Period,” in Slaves and Slave Agency in the Ottoman Empire (Göttingen, Niedersachs: V&R Unipress, 2020), pp. 355-369.
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but the people were reluctant to fulfill the Khan’s plan. Meanwhile, the imperial order that removed Kaplan Giray arrived, and Devlet Giray became the Khan.273
3.2.1 The Struggle for the Scant Resources
A register from May 1703 sheds light on the deterioration of the land subdivision systems in the Bucak Region. The tax collectors of the Nogays attempted to collect the taxes of an estate located within the previous border of the Yalı Köyleri (littoral villages) of Bucak. Therefore, the Özi governor and the kadı of the Nogay tribes were informed about the circumstances. The Ottomans commanded the governor to demarcate the border of the Yalı Köyleri according to the previous borders.274 In Russia, the “cadastral surveys” in the aftermath of the Treaty would also fuel the Cossacks’ dissent.275 Russia’s integration of the Cossack territory was a recent phenomenon, while the Bucak region had been Ottoman territory for more than a hundred years. However, it was the Nogay influx that necessitated the reorientation of the land allocation. In that regard, the parallelisms between the two empires’ problems despite the differences in domestic politics demonstrate how the Deşt-i Kıpçak or Black Sea Steppe’s demarcation repressed the wandering societies.
Another register from December 1707 shows that the Nogays and some Tatar groups still had their farms and residences within the Moldavian territory. It was
273 Debar Śepatayim is a Crimean chronicle covering the events of 1681-1730. It was written in Hebrew based on Muslim sources. Only some of its parts were translated by Dan Shapira into English, so this thesis has restricted access to the whole text because of the language barriers. In that regard, its name is not indicated among the sources in the introductory chapter. Dan Shapira, “A New Source of Information on Circassians, Kabarda and the Kinjal Battle in the Early 18th Century: A Hebrew Chronicle from the Crimean Khanate,” Kafkasya Calışmaları - Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / Journal of Caucasian Studies 5, no. 10 (May 2020): 273-281; Uşşâkîzâde es-Seyyid İbrâhîm Hasîb Efendi, Uşşâkîzâde Târihi, 955-957; For the imperial order which was sent to Murtaza Pasha see Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2599.
274 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 114, Gömlek No. 571.
275 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 159-165.
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against the Treaty of Karlowitz; besides, it was generating considerable trouble for the Principality. The document stresses that;
The Nogays and certain Tatar tribes established çiftliks and kışlaks in the territories extending from Bucak until the Prut River within the Moldavian territory. When some of the jizya-paying Moldavian peasants took shelter and hid in these kışlaks and çiftliks and took refuge in their owners, they escaped the control of the Moldavian voivodes and no longer paid jizya and other taxes, so the taxes which fell to their shares were imposed on other peasants. Unable to bear this burden, the remaining peasants dispersed, and many villages and settlements in this land became deserted.276
It also reminds the Özi Governor that the Porte decreed the Nogays and Tatars’ evacuation from the Moldavian territory. The attempt seemingly remained obsolete because it probably contradicted the interest of some members of Girays. The Moldavian peasants were also sheltered in a kışlak that Azimet Giray Sultan built. It was under the control of a Tatar from Yanbolu at the time. Nevertheless, the Ottomans ordered the Özi Governor to demolish these structures, return the Moldavian peasants to their voivodes, and deport all the Tatars and Nogays out of Moldovia.277
The Tatars and Nogays were employing slaves in the fields and farms.278 However, the criminalization of enslavement should have decreased their agricultural income as it decreased the income from the slave trade. Therefore, there was a strong correlation between the Tatars’ increasing necessity for labor and the Moldavian villagers’ flight from their settlements. The closure of the frontier for the Crimeans’ economic achievements triggered another problem in another country as the domino effect. The decrease of the revenue from the slave trade steered the Nogays towards agriculture. The region gained critical importance for Istanbul’s provisioning in the
276 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 1968, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 10.
277 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek. 1968.
278 Davis, Warfare, State and Society, 23; Özdem, Kırım Karasubazar'da Sosyo-Ekonomik Hayat, 100-101.
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second half of the eighteenth century. The establishment of Hocabey (contemporary Odessa) as an entrepot demonstrates this economic boom. Başer claims that the Crimean Khans suppressed the Nogays to get their share of this new revenue channel.279 There was a tight competition between the Nogays and the Crimeans as there was with the Moldavians. It was fueling the parties’ estrangements and frequent rebellions.
The register from March 1708, three months later, contains the Özi Governor’s reply to the order. He reported that the Tatars claimed that the land had been allocated previously by Halil Pasha from the demesne (arâzî-i mîriyye). However, all the markers had become indistinct, and a land survey was required. Thereupon, the Sultan ordered to determine the borders between the Halil Pasha Yurdu and Moldovia. The Tatars who inhabited the Moldavian territory must have been deported as decreed in the previous order.280 However, there were the kışlaks of the gentry, most notably the Balbozan, which was established by previous Grand Vizier Köprülü Mustafa Pasha and the Azimet Giray’s kışlak. Özi Governor Yusuf Pasha suspended the order stressing their demolition because of contradictory statements of the Moldavians. The Sultan commanded him to demolish all the establishments within the Moldavian territory regardless of their owners.281 In this respect, the Ottomans wanted to keep the Tatar tribes within a defined territory out of the frontier region.
In some instances, the tribes’ natural population increase rendered the allocated land insufficient. A register from March 1708 indicates that the Özi Governor informed the Porte about the insufficiency of the land for Beymirza, Kadı,
279 Başer, “Conflicting Legitimacies,” 114-115; Sereda, Osmanlı-Ukrayna Bozkır Serhatti, 51-53.
280 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2310.
281 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2311
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and Kanmirza oğulları tribes. These were deported to Crimea after the suppression of the Gazi Giray rebellion and then pardoned. At the time, the total number of their dwellings reached 1500; if we assume a household consists of five persons, on average, their population should have been about 7500. The Ottomans dedicated them a Bender premise known as Özi Kırı on the other side of the Dniester River (Turla Nehri in Turkish), near the Kuchurgan River (Sarı Su Nehri in Turkish). Their affairs would be under the control of the Crimean Khan as before.282
3.2.2 The fate of the slaves in the first decade of the closed frontier
As the Treaty prohibited the enslavement of the parties’ subjects and restricted the cross-border movements, the investigation of the origin of the slaves would become one of the issues that caused much work for the Ottoman officials. The mühimme register from the first days of May 1703 stresses that;
It is decreed to Özi Governor Vizier Yusuf Pasha that when the previous Khan sent the çiftlik kethüdâsı (farm chamberlain) Ramazan to Poland because of the peace negotiations, some of the Nogay and Bucak Tatars went for commercial purposes with horses and other goods and returned recently. They brought 30 people from the Russian peasants who resided in Ukrainian villages and sold them as slaves. You, the aforenamed vizier, when you interrogate the capturer Tatars and the peasants above, it is stressed that the Hetman, whom the Polish King sent with troops, enslaved the Russian peasants, at the hand of the merchants, because of their rebellions, then sold them to the Tatars in return what purchased. Thus, [you] became doubtful whether it is legal to buy and sell the infidel peasants whom infidels enslaved within their country when they do not submit a document from the Hetman as in the present case. If it is legal, you stressed that it is proper to repeatedly sell them to the merchants to avoid their presence among Nogay and Bucak people. When a fatwa is requested upon this issue, it is legal that the infidels’ ownership, who have a community within the darü’l-harb, on the other infidels who were attacked and enslaved. Therefore, it is legal to sell them to others, and you are aforenamed vizier; it is written to sell these slaves repeatedly to the merchants in a way you decide and transport them to another region.283
282 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2313.
283 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 114, Gömlek No. 601, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 11; Fatma Sel Turhan also mentions this document see Fatma Sel Turhan, 18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı'da Savaş Esirleri (Istanbul: Vadi , 2018), 60.
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This document demonstrates that the Ottomans aimed to enact the Treaty. However, the clauses’ execution necessitated experience on the region and the officials’ commitment to the Porte’s decision. As indicated in the previous documents, Yusuf Pasha charged many tall orders. This document shows how he took his job seriously, but his successes in supervising the frontier’s affairs should have diminished the Khanate’s autonomy over their vassals.
Despite all the promises not to conduct raids against the opposite side of the borders, it was challenging for an early modern empire to control the frontier people. In October 1706, Emekdâr (veteran janissary) Mustafa was appointed as the Ottoman mediator to solve the dispute between the Crimean and Russian sides. The Russian ambassador for the Ottomans complained that the Nogay and Kuban peoples were infringing the treaty by raiding the Russian lands and capturing Russian peasants along the Azov and some other borderland regions. Initially, the Ottomans sent Kapucıbaşı (chamberlain) Mehmet to the region. He went to near the Açu commander Hüseyin Pasha and sent letters to Azov and Kirman to exchange the properties taken by both sides. Thereupon, the Russians also sent officials for negotiation. However, the attempts to liberate the captives and restore the properties remained aborted because some got lost. Also, the parties were denying that they had taken slaves or goods. After some dispute, the Ottoman officials succeeded in liberating only 142 Cossacks, returning 130 cattle and 18 horses. Thus, the parties gave themselves temessüks (receipt).284 The Russian sources show that in 1705, despite the difficulties, Hasan Pasha succeeded in returning 119 captives, and the negotiations under the Kapucıbaşı Mehmed could not end the disputes. The archival sources give similar information.285
284 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 599.
285 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 154.
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Nevertheless, in his letter to the Ottomans, Gazi Giray Khan complained about the Russian raids against the Nogays and Ferahkerman and an incalculable amount of stolen properties. When the Ottoman Sultan said to the Russian ambassador that;
[You] claimed that the Tatars captured many people and cattle, whereas the Tatars responded that Azov and Kirman’s people took more than that from them. Since that time, many of the taken properties were wasted. Thus, for both parties, it is impossible to return all the losses. However, the parties should return the existing people, cattle, and properties by showing goodwill and patch things up. 286
The ambassador asserted that he was not the deputy for the Treaty, but his brother, the commander of Azov, was. Therefore, he referred this issue to him. Herein, Emekdâr Mustafa was appointed to exchange the captured people and the stolen properties by contacting the Russian official and meeting in an appropriate place. The Sultan highlighted his mission to protect the peace and appease the complaints of the frontier people.287
Boeck undertook pioneering research on Russian archival sources on border disputes. He similarly concluded that it was difficult to return the properties mainly because of the incompatibility of the statements. Since diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were their infancy, the parties’ frontier castles, namely Azov and Açu, lacked translators. From 1701 to 1705, in two cases, the Russians punished the offenders who stole and raided the Crimean subjects. According to Boeck, this was merely window dressing. On the one hand, when the Russians enquired Hasan Pasha why the Turkish side showed laxness in punishing the offenders, he responded that the Cossacks were ransoming the Tatar raiders,
286 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 599, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 12.
287 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 599.
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whom they captured, so the raiders continuously attempted to make up their losses and attacked the opposite side of the border.288
In January 1708, Açu Muhâfızı (custodian) Hasan Pasha was adamantly warned because he failed to control the passageways to Azov. The Russian officials from Azov came to Açu due to the temessük about the returned Cossacks. A merchant from the Cossacks bought a carload commodity, nearly fifty bows, and a musket and then returned to Azov. When the Ottoman Sultan questioned Hasan Pasha, he reported this event. However, his report did not satisfy the Sultan since there were only two passages, the Kertmelü River and Kara Kuban, and these should have been under his control. It was illegal to allow people from Azov without a document (sened) as it was indicated in the hüccet of the border demarcation, so according to the Sultan, Hasan Pasha was trying to cover up his mistake. The Pasha was warned to be more careful and threatened with the death penalty if such a thing would happen again.289
To the south of Açu fortress, in Taman and Temrük, another problem emerged. A group of officials secretly got involved in the slave trade, although their mission was to prevent it. In June 1708, the Vizier Mehmed Pasha, the muhâfız of Kale-i Cedid, received an imperial letter. It underlined that although the enslavement of Russia’s subjects after the Treaty and the freemen of the Circassians was illegal, some recalcitrants practiced it all the same. They even enslaved the free Circassians and wangled them into society. In that regard, the Sultan ordered him to “summon such slaves with their owners, interrogate them and learn whether they are from
288 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 150-152.
289 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2059.
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freemen if they are Circassian; if they are Muscovite, whether they were enslaved before the peace or not.”290
Then, the document indicates that Dergâh-ı Mu‘allâ janissaries of Taman and Temrük, in the vicinity of the Kale-i Cedid, were warned not to permit slaves to be sold before it was clear that their trading was not illegal. However, while the Temrük slave dealers obeyed the order and came to Taman, the slave-holders of Taman, all of whom were janissaries, provoked the people with the support of the kadı and the pashas. They opposed the departure of the slaves and their owners for Kale-i Cedid. In that regard, Mehmed Pasha was commissioned to punish the kadı and the Pasha and to intern them in the Kale-i Cedid.291 A register from August 1708 shows that Kaplan Giray released them during his campaign against the Circassians, but the Ottomans only allowed the release of the kadı.292 In November 1708, the Pasha would also be released.293 Probably, this was not an exceptional case; in 1688, 34 of 49 civil officials of Caffa meddled in the slave trade. The situation was not so much different on the Russian side of the border.294 Therefore, as an early modern empire with limited means to control the remote outskirts of the Empire, extirpating the old frontier customs was exceedingly hard for the Ottomans, in particular, when the Empire was relying on these officials to execute the order.
290 “Ol makûle üserâyı eshâbı ile yanına getürdüb Çerkes ise ahrârdan mıdır Moskovlu ise sulhden evvel mi ahz olunmuşdur yohusa sonra mı tecessüs ve tefahhus…” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2637.
291 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2637.
292 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 115, Gömlek No. 2831.
293 The apostil of this document dates the release of the Pasha. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2637.
294 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 69.
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3.3 Concluding remarks
From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Prut Campaign, the Ottoman Empire abstained from involvement in any war. All the rival powers were in severe internal and external struggles, but the Ottomans did not take advantage of this opportunity. Evan Brown Ames correlates this policy to the Ottoman internal problems but also objects to the general tendency to explain this policy solely by the Ottoman war exhaustion that “would be valid only for a period of approximately three years.”295 Financial problems and then the Edirne Rebellion had shaken the stability of the Empire. Sultan Ahmed III’s focus on protecting his reign and “obsession with vengeance” against people who resist his order rendered him avoidant from following an active international policy.296 Ames also underlines that the Ottomans abstained from war since they were on the opinion of that the Habsburgs could easily cease their wars with the other European powers.297 On the one hand, the increasing commercial links with Europe served the Empire’s various interest groups and the officials who profited from “agricultural production.”298
On the other hand, to protect the peace, the Ottomans increased efforts to tightly control the frontier societies. The recalcitrant tribes were exiled, kadıs were appointed to constitute a direct link between the center and the frontier, and the Nogays were forced to leave the töre, where they had been independent of Ottoman jurisdiction. The increasing Ottoman presence in the orbits of the Crimea decreased the Khanate’s authority over its subjects. Denise Klein draws attention to the difference between the evaluation of the Gazi Giray rebellion by the Ottoman chroniclers and Mehmed Giray. While the Ottomans emphasized the negative impact
295 Ames, “The Isolationist Stance,” 131.
296 Ames, “The Isolationist Stance,” 146.
297 Ames, “The Isolationist Stance,” 158.
298 Ames, “The Isolationist Stance,” 154.
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of the Crimean on the Empire, Mehmed Giray claimed that these resulted because of the Ottoman policies that hurt Crimean interests.299
Furthermore, while peace was strengthening the Ottoman economy, the Khanate faced a financial crisis. It lacked external revenues, trade, tribute, and plunder, which were indispensable for its economy. These difficulties steered the Khanate to extract more revenues from their vassals. The Bucak rebellions and the struggles to win independence from the Khanate; the Circassians’ refusal to meet the unjustified demands were direct results of the Khanate’s policies to save the day. The vassal communities’ heavy burden fueled their aggression against their neighbors, as in the Nogay-Moldavian competition for the land. However, these developments escalated the tension along the frontiers, and the problems would reverberate in the following decades.
299 Klein, “Historiography,” 138.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SHAFT IS BROKEN:
THE PERPETUAL RESENTMENT TO THE FRONTIER’S CLOSURE
In the early years after the Istanbul Peace (1700), a German slave ran away from his Nogay mirza and took refuge in Russian Azov. Mirza’s attendants followed him until there and requested the Azov officials to hand him to them in accordance with the ancient custom of the Tatars and Don Cossacks. However, the Russians underlined that the escaped captive was now under the Tsar’s jurisdiction since he passed the nonvisible border to the south of Azov.300 As indicated in the previous chapter, this was not the only instance that proved the frontier’s closure, and it would not be the last.
4.1 The developments within the northern theater
The beginning of the eighteenth century witnessed momentous developments. The Great War between the Ottomans and the League (1683-1699) ended, and new clashes erupted in other parts of Europe. While the Spanish Succession War (1702-1713) occupied Western European powers’ agenda, the Eastern part of the continent was shattered by the Great Northern War (1700-1721). The Ottomans’ absolute objection to the Russian vessels’ navigation in the Black Sea deflected Tsar Peter’s attention to the Baltic littoral.301 Young Charles XII’s inauguration to the throne whetted the rival powers’ appetite to seize the opportunity and declare war on the
300 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 143-144.
301 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Prut Seferi Ve Barışı 1123 (1711), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1951), 44-45; For the Ottoman rejection of Russian vessels’ free navigation in the Black Sea see also Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 141.
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Swedish Empire. Russia, Denmark, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth created a new league against the Swedes.
However, Charles abruptly averted the initial aggressions and neutralized Denmark in August 1700. In November, Swedes defeated the Russian army in front of the Narva fortress and relieved it from the Russian siege. To protect Sweden from future attacks, Charles decided to replace August II, the King of Poland-Lithuania, with a pro-Swedish administration. A “satellite” Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would allow the Swedish Empire to extend its “hinterland” far beyond the Baltic Coasts.302 A series of wars with Sweden, Russia, and the Tatars in the second half of the seventeenth century and the Thirteen-Years’ War had weakened the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In that regard, Tsar Peter I’ support for August (r.1697-1733) in the Polish-Lithuanian Crown elections paved the way for Russian domination over the Commonwealth.303After a long series of wars, Charles succeeded in making August renounce the throne and accept Stanisław Leszczyński’s inauguration. Charles’ campaigns in the Commonwealth gave Russia enough time to reorganize the army and recruit foreign military experts.304
When the Swedes turned their face to Russia, they faced fierce resistance, and their logistic connection with the mainland was severed. Therefore, they were forced to retreat towards Ukraine, where they expected to receive Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s support. Mazepa defected to the Swedish protection in 1708. However, the Russians increased their control over the Cossacks and placed the Hetmanate under the administration of the “Kiev Province.”305 The Cossacks were not pleased with the
302 LeDonne, John. "Poltava and the Geopolitics of Western Eurasia." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 31, no. 1/4 (2009): 184.
303 LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 22.
304 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 59-62; John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004), 38-39; Gündoğdu, “Uşşâkizâde Târîhi,” 276-277.
305 LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 70.
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increasing Russian presence within their domain. Kamenny Zaton or Kamenka fortress had already caused the Cossacks’ anger.306 As stressed in the previous chapter, the Russian ambassador responded to the Ottoman questioning about the Russian fortifications along the borders by claiming that it was because of the unruly Cossacks. In a way, the ambassador was not being entirely dishonest while trying to convince the Ottomans that the fortification did not carry the goal of aggression towards them.
The relation between the Don Cossacks and the Russian Empire was also tense thanks to the Petrine reforms. Many peasants from the Russian defensive lines were escaping to the Don region to hide among the Cossacks. When the central authority ordered the Hetmanate to return the “fugitives,” the Cossacks were reluctant to fulfill this order.307 As the Astrakhan Revolt of 1705 and the Bashkir Revolt of 1708 revealed widespread dissent towards the new Russian administration, the Don Cossacks were also under pressure.308 There were several disputes between the Cossacks and the Russian authorities over the natural resources’ usage right within the Don region. Under these circumstances, in 1707, the Cossack brigade under Kondratii Bulavin killed Iurii Dolgorukii, whom the Tsar charged with locating the fugitive peasants and resettling them in their former locations. This murder ignited the Bulavin upraising, which would arouse the Don Host and cause thousands to rebel. Even though it could not materialize, they requested the Zaporozhian Host’s support against the Russians. After he succeeded in capturing Don Host’s capital, Cherkassk, Bulavin attempted to create a “united frontier under
306 Soloviev, History of Russia: Peter I in Triumph and Tragedy 1707-1717 Poltava, the Pruth, Domestic Issues, trans. Lindsey A.J. Hughes, vol. 28 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 2007), 16; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 213.
307 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 174-175.
308 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 141-143.
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Ottoman patronage.” He even penned a letter to the Kuban Cossacks to inform Hasan Pasha (probably the Açu governor) about his intention. However, for Peter’s luck, the Ottomans decided not to disturb the peace.309
While the Russo-Swedish conflict was continuing, one of Russia’s biggest nightmares was waging a two-front war in the case of Ottoman involvement in the Northern War. Soloviev indicates that the Russians were searching for Ottoman captives to free them to buy the Ottomans’ neutrality. Meanwhile, the Ottomans ordered the Tatars not to attack the Russians, despite Russia’s weakness because of both the war with Sweden and the Bulavin Rebellion.310 However, Raşid states that the Cossacks under the Russian authority were harming Ottoman subjects; they were attacking the merchants on roads, raiding villages, and enslaving the people on the Bender and Özi frontiers. When the Ottoman officials demanded their return, the Russians replied that they were committed to the Treaty, but they gave the war with Sweden as an excuse. They sent the Ottoman officials back with a bare apology and undertook the punishment of the guilty parties. Thus, Yusuf Pasha, governor of Özi, reported to the grand vizier Çorlulu Ali Pasha that there is no difference between peace and war with Russia. According to the grand vizier, war with Russia was not an option. Instead, he offered to establish a closer relationship with Russia’s enemy, Sweden.311
Russia suppressed the Bulavin rebellion severely, and in some regions, only one-fifteenth of the population survived. Some remaining rebels under Ignat Nekrasov took refuge in the Kuban region. While Seyyid Muhammed indicates that they were only 2000 people, Raşid gives the number as 8000. Kaplan Giray settled
309 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 178-180.
310 Soloviev, History of Russia, 69-70.
311 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 818.
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them in Han Tepesi, which was at a six-hour distance from the Temrük Fortress. The Nekrasov followers conducted several revenge raids on their former homeland with the Nogays. According to Raşid, Kaplan Giray’s embrace of the Cossacks in violation of the Treaty resulted in his dismissal.312 However, the imperial letter sent to Devlet Giray in February 1710 described the Cossacks who sheltered in between Perekop Isthmus and Özi region as victims, and commended their protection since it did not entail violation of the Treaty.313 This difference between the two accounts might originate from the increase in anti-Russian sentiments in Ottoman foreign policy.
Smirnov interprets Kaplan Giray’s decision to accept the Cossack fugitives to use them as auxiliary forces against the Circassians at the hands of whom the Khan had faced severe defeat.314 Boeck states that “Historians have tended to ignore the fact that in the final stages of the rebellion, Bulavin articulated a vision of Cossacks and nomads, Muslims and true Orthodox Christians fighting in unison to save the steppe from Russian encroachment.” Therefore, Kaplan Giray might have wanted to contribute to Bulavin’s aim to restore the old steppe’s customs by gathering the discontented people because of Russian colonization.315 It shows that the fortification, in a sense, the open steppe’s closure for unauthorized movement, led to similar feelings on both sides of the frontier. However, after the Bulavin revolt, starting with Hetman Emelianov, the hetmanate became the representative of the Tsar instead of the community’s “elected” delegate.316
312 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 183-185; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 778-780; Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 402.
313 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri [A.DVNSNHM], No. 6, Gömlek No. 113.
314 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 450
315 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 172.
316 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 207.
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Regarding the Russian defensive lines, LeDonne states that “these lines divided the nomadic world by corralling individual tribes within a definite space” and the forts in these divided areas were the mainstays in which the Russian newcomers bore to claim the land under the nomad’s rule. These forts struck an aggressive stance as they were protecting the Russian heartland. Thus, these paved the way for the Russians by blocking the nomadic people’s entry because it was impossible for settlements in the open steppe to withstand against the steppe nomads. The Russians paid fundamental attention to change the disappointing result of their campaigns against the Crimean Khanate on the southern front.317 Tsar Peter created frontier militias from the dwellers of Southern Russia and held them responsible for the protection of the border zone.318 He also diverted a tremendous workforce to repair Azov and create a naval base at Taganrog.319 As a response, the Ottomans built the Açu Fortress at the estuary of the Kuban River to quell further Russian expansionism to the south.320 To block Russian navigation in the Black Sea, constructing a new fortress on the Kerch Strait, Kal‘a-i Cedîd or Yeni Kale, started in 1703 in Akıntı Burnu.321 Özi Fortress at the mouth of Dnieper was also strengthened.322
On the other hand, the Cossacks disintegrated; some remained loyal to Russia and inconvenienced the Swedes. Despite all the difficulties, Charles dedicated
317 LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 48.
318 Ferguson D. Alan , “Russian Landmilitia and Austrian Militärgrenze,” Südost Forschungen: Munchen 13 (January 1, 1954), 139.
319 For the details of the grandiose Russian initiative see Boeck, “When Peter I Was Forced to Settle for Less”, 485-514.
320 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 536.
321 Bekir Gökpınar, “Rusya'ya Karşı Osmanlı Devleti'nin Karadeniz'de Tahkimat Faaliyetleri: Yenikale İnşaatı (1702-1707),” Pamukkale University Journal of Social Sciences Institute 38 (2020): 43; The letter sent to Gazi Giray Khan orders him to appoint one of the Crimean Sultans to arrange the material supply fort he construction. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 6, Gömlek No.54.
322 Caroline Finkel and Victor Ostapchuk, “Outpost of Empire: An Appraisal of Ottoman Building Registers as Sources for the Archeology and Construction History of the Black Sea Fortress of Özı̇,” Muqarnas Online 22, no. 1 (2005): 166.
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himself to a victory against Russia and pursued his campaign. In 1709, the Swedish army was defeated in Poltava, and Charles fled to the Özi fortress and took refuge under the Ottomans.323 The fleeing Cossacks under Mazepa’s suzerainty numbered 12000 and took shelter within the Kardaşım Ormanı under the Crimeans’ control.324
Thereupon, Tsar Peter immediately informed the Ottomans about his victory against Charles and objected to the Swedes’ asylum in the Ottoman territory because it was a violation of the Treaty. Hence, the Russians requested the Ottomans not to harbor Charles and hand over Hetman Mazepa, who had also escaped to the Ottomans after the Poltava defeat.325 However, the Ottomans refused Russian demands because they thought that it would have hurt their reputation to turn down a sovereign who had sought refuge in their lands. At the same time, the Russian troops’ border transgressed the Ottoman border while chasing the Swedish soldiers.326 Simultaneously, the Swedish party was in strive to drag the Ottomans into the Great Northern War. It is rumored that Charles joked by saying that “we would send an ambassador to the Ottomans, but it was our destiny to come personally.”327
323 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 64-69; For the Battle of Poltava (1709) see Soloviev, History of Russia, 82-91; Although most Zaporozhian Cossacks remained faithful to the Tsar’s authority after the tergiversation of Mazepa, the increasing Russian presence in Ukraine rendered the Cossacks uneasy. There was a rumor that the Tsar planned to depart all the Ukrainians to the far provinces; Nusretnâme summarizes the Northern War and claims that King Charles took refuge in the Ottoman Empire while he attempted to conquer Europe. Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme” 718-720; Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi” 403-404; For the Russian ambassadors petition to expulse King Charles see Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 822-823; Soloviev, History of Russia, 135-136.
324 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 822; The Cossacks who allied with the Crimeans called as Kardeş (Brother in Turkish), so the Ottomans started to called the region where the refugee Cossacks settled in the Dnieper Delta as Kardaşım Ormanı. Sereda, Osmanlı-Ukrayna Bozkır Serhatti, 79-80.
325 For the latinized version of the letter see Kurat, Prut Seferi, 115-117.
326 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 828-829, Kurat, Prut Seferi, 118.
327 “Biz Devlet-i Aliyye’ye elçi gönderecektik. Meğer kendimiz gelmek kısmet imiş!” Ahmed Refik, Memâlik-i Osmaniye'de Demirbaş Şarl, ed. Bülent Arı (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2015), 73; Ahmet Refik’s work contains a significant amount of archival documents about the stay of King Charles in the Ottoman Empire.
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Soloviev indicates that based on Tolstoy’s records, the Russian ambassador to Istanbul showed that the Crimean Khan had informed the Porte about Hetman Mazepa’s proposal for military support against the Russians. In return for that, the Hetman would toll the annual payment to the Khanate, as the Russians paid before the Karlowitz Treaty, and demolish the Kamenny Zaton fort. Even the King of Poland, Stanislaw, whom King Charles enthroned, would compensate for the unpaid Russian tributes to the Khanate; similarly, Sweden would also give precious presents to buy the Khanate’s friendship. However, the Ottomans were keen to protect the peace, unlike the Crimean Khanate.328 The Russian ambassador Peter Tolstoy expressed in his letter that he was obliged to pay a significant amount of money to the Ottomans to leave the Swedes’ cry for help in the war unanswered.329 Kurat and Bromley remarks that the grand vizier’s “obstinate neutrality saved Russia from disaster in 1708-1709.”330
In 1709, the Ottomans dismissed the Moldovian Hospodar Mihai Racovita because of his espionage on behalf of the Russians. He had informed the Russians that the Swedes and the Cossacks were spending winter in Moldovian villages. The Russians ambushed the refugees and killed many of them.331 In March 1710, when some Russian soldiers and Kalmyks in the army violated the Ottoman border to find Swedes, they killed twenty people and stole nearly two thousand cattle.332
328 Soloviev, History of Russia, 71; the Zaporozhian Cossacks were against the Kamenny Zaton and Samara forts since these restricted their authonomy. Soloviev, History of Russsia, 77.
329 Soloviev, History of Russia, 144.
330 Kurat and Bromley, “The Retreat of the Turks,” 630.
331 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 722-723; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 824-825.
332 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 169-170; The Russians applied the Kalmyks’ military support in the other war theaters. For example, they were at the scene during the battles with the Swedes. Soloviev, History of Russia, 12; Raşid states that the Russians and the Kalmyks violated the Crimean border. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 84; The Kalmyks played a critical role for the supression of both Astrakhan Revolt of 1705-1706 and the Baskir Revolt of 1708. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 141-142.
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In January 1710, the peace between the Ottomans and Russians was renewed. In February of the same year, Devlet Giray Khan received notification of peace renewal with Russia. Sultan Ahmed stated that it was an overdue renewal, which should have been done when he had ascended the throne, but the Russian Tsar apologized for the delay since he struggled with the Swedes and requested to renew the peace.333 Considering his appeal to Sultan Ahmed seven years after his enthronement, Tsar Peter postponed his irredentist plans in the southern frontier for a while to prevent an Ottoman-Swedish joint attack.
However, after a year of intense diplomacy, the Russian attempts to seize the King remained inconclusive. In July 1710, in his letter to Sultan Ahmed III, Tsar Peter consented to three-thousand Ottoman troops’ accompanying King Charles on his return to Sweden. However, he warned the Ottomans not to send an army to protect the King; that had been one of the options the Ottomans had discussed. The Tsar accused the Crimean Khan of supporting the Cossacks, both the Mazepa’s and Nekrasov’s parties, to attack the Russian borders. According to the letter, the Tatars had also raided two Russian villages.334 Nekrasov had also fled to the Ottoman territory in Caucasia after the failed rebellion.335
For the sake of regional balance, both a fragile and a powerful Commonwealth was detrimental. A powerful one could threaten the Ottoman vassals and the Crimean steppes. A weak one could not stand against Russian expansionism. The increasing Russian presence in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a clear danger for the Ottomans.336 As a result of the officials’ reports and the frontier
333 BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 113; Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 723-724.
334 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 154-157; For King Charles’ asylum within the Ottoman Empire and the Russian efforts to receive the king see also Soloviev, History of Russia, 146-149.
335 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 185.
336 LeDonne, Poltava and the Geopolitics of Western Eurasia, 185.
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peoples’ petitions, the Ottomans realized the Russian threat on their borders and decided to prepare for war. Devlet Giray Khan was invited to Istanbul to be consulted. He explicitly expressed that the Russian’s ultimate goal was Istanbul; thus, if the Ottomans would do nothing to stop the Russians, Crimea would be quickly lost, and the Ottomans would also lose the Balkans quickly since the Christian subjects of the Empire were supporting the Tsar.337 Kurat highlights that the anti-Russian stance of Devlet Giray Khan increased the existing Ottoman animosity towards Russia.338 In 1711, Devlet Giray Khan entered into a military alliance with Pylyp Orlyk, who succeeded Ivan Mazepa in 1709 as the fugitive Cossacks’ leader. As a pact of non-aggression, the agreement provided the Cossacks with immunity from future Crimean offenses. The Cossacks agreed on the Crimeans’ right to raid the “Muscovite Slobodas” if the region’s people did not accept Orlyk’s authority. According to Subtelny, it was to avert the Tatar offenses against the Zaporozhian lands.339
In consequence of his importance in this war, Devlet Giray succeeded in deposing both Yusuf Pasha, the Bender guardian at the time, and Moldovian Prince Nikolas Mavrokordatos appointed against the Khan’s wishes during his stay in Istanbul. Yusuf Pasha was already the rival of the grand vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha.340 Thus, Devlet Giray took revenge on Yusuf Pasha, who had successfully defended İsmail when Saadet Giray assaulted during Devlet Giray’s rebellion. During the reign of Gazi Giray (1705-1707), Yusuf Pasha had also supported the
337 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 844-845.
338 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 733-735; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 164; For the detailed the Ottoman casus belli see Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 735-738; on the same issue see also Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 844-847.
339 Subtelny, “The Ukrainian-Crimean Treaty,” 808-813.
340 Silahdar and Raşid speak highly of Yusuf Pasha, responsible for the Özi Province for fifteen years and Bender’s fortification for three years. Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 738-739; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 847; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 177.
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Bucak Nogay’s separatist tendencies towards the Crimean Khanate and passed on their petitions asking to break off from the Khanate and to be subjected only to the Ottomans. In that regard, his dismissal aimed to lessen the Ottoman pressure on the Khanate for central control of the frontiers.
The Ottoman army marched to the north under the command of the grand vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha in March 1711. However, the Tsar provoked the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and summoned them to support the Russians. This policy bore fruit to a certain extent, and the Moldovan Voivode Dimitrie Cantemir sided with the Russian Empire. In return for the subordination of Cantemir, Peter guaranteed him to leave the Moldovan throne for his descendants.341 Kurat claims that the Bucak Tatar’s attacks on the Moldovians eased the Tsar’s anti-Ottoman propaganda during the Prut war.342
When the Ottomans heard about Cantemir’s treason, Cantemir’s predecessor, Nicholas Maurocordato, was appointed to the post.343 Dimitrie Cantemir’s defection to the Russians rendered the Ottomans suspicious about the loyalty of the local nobles of the Danubian Principalities. Thus, the Ottomans started to appoint the Hospodars of both Wallachia and Moldovia from the Phanariot elites.344 Virginia Aksan interprets this policy as “attempt at centralisation” by decreasing the
341 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 276; Soloviev, History of Russia, 165-166; For the covenant issued by Tsar Peter I to secure certain rights for Moldovia see Kurat, Prut Seferi, 332-336; LeDonne states that the Russians aimed to turn the Danubian Principalities into step stone to reach the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 41; The Wallachian Voivode Constantin Brâncoveanu promised the Russians to support them secretly, but he was more cautious than Cantemir, and since he did not openly side with the Russians, he kept his position after the war. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 74; Dimitrie Cantemir was also an significant musician of his era and contributed to Ottoman music by recording the compositions with his musical notation. Eugenie Popescu-Judetz, “Kantemiroğlu (Dimitrie Cantemir),” in TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2001), pp. 322-323.
342 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 323.
343 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 283.
344 The assistance of the people from the Phanariot elite during the Karlowitz negotiations gained them fame and put them in a prestigious position. For more information about the formation and nature of the Phanariots see Christine M. Philliou, Biography of an Empire : Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution (Berkerley: University of California Press, 2010), 28-59.
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principalities’ autonomous positions.345 Metin Kunt also underlined that the Ottomans planned to integrate its northern vassals to the core provinces of the Empire in the seventeenth century’s last decades. With a quarter-century delay, the Ottomans enacted a reshaped centralization policy.
The Kuban and Nogay people also received an invitation from the Tsar to submit to his rule. Interestingly, in this letter, Peter claimed that the Russians did not want to violate the peace; thus, when Gazi Giray, who fled because of the Ottoman Sultan and Crimean Khan’s injustice, requested “to enter in Russian subordination with the Bucak Horde’s encouragement,” Russia did not accept him.346 As indicated in the previous chapter, Gazi Giray could not stay in Chyhyryn for a long time and appealed for mercy from the Ottoman Sultan. It is doubtful whether he sought Russian protection or not. The Tsar’s claim must have aimed to acclimatize the Nogay people to Russian protection seeing that even a member from the Giray Dynasty had requested this. However, the Bucak Nogays supported the Ottoman army during the Prut River Campaign. For example, a former rebel Cavim Mirza conducted successful attacks against the Russians and brought two Russian soldiers to the Ottoman camp to receive information about their situation.347 Vis-a-vis the Russian espionage activities, Sweden and the Crimean Khanate published declarations that crystalize their aim in this war. The declaration, issued by Kalgay Mehmed Giray, stresses that their aim is not to harm the locals but to protect the freedom of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Cossacks against Russia.348
345 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 29.
346 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 238-240.
347 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 416. Kurat, Prut Seferi, 398.
348 İlber Ortaylı draws attention that this declaration is an important document to evaluate the Khanate’s diplomatic autonomy. İlber Ortaylı, “Kırım Hanlığı’nın Ocak 1711 Tarihli Bir Üniversali,”
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On 20 July 1711, the Ottoman army surrounded the Russians on the Prut River Bank and cut their ties with the outside world.349 Under these circumstances, the Russians offered to initiate peace negotiations.350 It is critical to underline that King Charles refused Baltacı Mehmed Pasha’s invitation to go to the Ottoman camp to discuss the battle plan, and this drove a wedge between the King and the grand vizier.351 On the one hand, Sultan Ahmed III enjoined Baltacı Mehmed to give weight to Devlet Giray Khan’s advice, but as indicated in Kurat’s work, the Ottoman senior officials, including the grand vizier, underestimated the Khan. They even mocked him, saying that “the infidel with a kalpak came, the infidel with a kalpak left.”352 The Ottoman senior officials disapproved of Devlet Giray Khan’s objection to the peace offering.353 At this point, the Ottomans and the Russians concluded the Prut Treaty (1711), ignoring both the Crimean and Swedish parties’ interests. Kurat states that it is noteworthy that the Ottomans neglected the Crimeans despite their meticulous efforts to disempower the Tsar’s Army.354 This stance probably fueled the rebellious sentiments among the Crimeans, especially the tribal aristocracy and Crimean people living in the frontier.
in Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadî Ve Sosyal Değişim: Makaleler 1 (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000), 365-368.
349 The author of Umdetü’l-Ahbâr, Abdülgaffar Kırımî was in the Crimean Army during the Pruth War; thus, his account allows to reconstruct the battlefield through the first-hand source. Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 415-422; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 476; For the details of the war and maneuvers see Kurat, Prut Seferi, 474-491; see also Soloviev, History of Russia, 162-175; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 93-98.
350 Kurat explains these process relying on both the Ottoman and the European accounts. Kurat, Prut Seferi, 493-510; For the negotiations see also Soloviev, History of Russia, 175-178; For a short contemporary description of the Prut War see Gündoğdu, “Uşşâkizâde Târîhi,” 609; see also Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 856-859; For a first-hand account of the war see Yeniçeri Katibi Hasan, Prut Seferi'ni Beyanımdır, ed. Hakan Yıldız (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2008), 30-64.
351 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 291-292.
352 “Kalpaklı gavur geldi, kalpaklı gavur gitti.” Kurat, Prut Seferi, 501. Kalpak is a cap that is widely common among the people of Turkic origin and the Caucasia.
353 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 423-424.
354 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 521.
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With the Prut Peace, the Ottomans retook Azov, and the Russians promised to demolish the Kamenny Zaton fortress, which threatened the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the fortresses along the Dnieper River. The Russians also promised not to intervene in Polish internal affairs and to end their authority over the Right Bank Cossacks. These conditions were astonishingly mild, considering that the Russian army was irredeemably surrounded.355 McNeill explains the Ottomans' decision by their reluctance to spend the Empire’s resources on worthless lands and using them instead to recover their lost provinces from Venice and Austria.356 It was ironic for the Ottomans that while the peace negotiation was continuing, the İbrail Castle surrendered to a Russian division in return to protect dwellers from the Russians. However, many people were enslaved, mistreated, and the city was plundered.357 The Prut Convention did not end the conflict quickly; in September 1711, the Russo-Kalmyk forces with some Circassian auxiliaries assaulted the Kuban region and massacred nearly 17,000, and enslaved more than 20,000 Nogays. In this four-day massacre, the Kalmyks seized 2,000 camels, nearly 40,000 horses, 190,000 cattle, and 220,000 sheep.358
In August, Devlet Giray Khan and King Charles sent letters that criticized the grand vizier for his failure in the negotiations.359 Furthermore, the Ottomans lost the leverage to enforce the Russians to fulfill the entailments of the covenant. The Russians’ evacuation from the forts took several months that rendered Baltacı Mehmed Pasha in a difficult position and strengthened the opposition against him.
355Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 97; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 526-534; Kurat discusses under what circumstances the Ottoman officials lightened the Peace conditions. For the details see Kurat, Prut Seferi, 541-556.
356 McNeill, European Steppe Frontier, 170.
357 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 860; LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 77; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 537-540; Hasan, Prut Seferi'ni Beyanımdır, 28-29.
358 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi”, 431; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 580-581; The numbers of the Nogays’ losses were indicated in Khodarkovsky, he cited these figures from the Kalmyks’ report. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 148-149.
359 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 645-649.
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When Kamenny Zaton and Samara fortresses were demolished, it is narrated that the Tatars were blessed since these fortifications were blocking their raids and restricting their pastoral lands.360
However, Tsar Peter ordered his men not to hand over Azov and Taganrog and to recall the Russian soldiers within Poland until the Swedish King returned to his country.361 Under these circumstances, the grand vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha was dismissed from office in November 1711.362 The war restarted in 1712 to capture Azov; thus, the Russians evacuated the fort.363 However, there were still Russian troops deployed in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thereupon, Sultan Ahmed III declared war again Russia in November 1712. The tense relations and intermittent conflicts between the two empires lasted until the Edirne Treaty of 1713.364 According to the treaty, the Russians promised to withdraw from the Commonwealth, guaranteed King Charles’s return to Sweden, and promised not to interfere with Zaporozhians. It was underlined that there would be no further fort establishment between Azov and Taganrog. Besides the geopolitical developments, the Treaty of Edirne prohibited cross-border offenses for both sides, like the Istanbul Treaty (1700).365
In 1714, a joint committee started to negotiate to demarcate the border. The Russian commission offered to take the natural barriers as boundary markers. The Ottomans objected by saying that the Tatars would claim all the land to themselves if there were no landmarks. The border was determined by forming five mounds per 5-
360 Kurat, Prut Seferi, 669-670.
361 Soloviev, History of Russia, 18; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 865.
362 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme”, 751; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 861-864; Gündoğdu, “Uşşâkizâde Târîhi”, 617.
363 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme”, Kurat, Prut Seferi, 701.
364For a detailed narrative of this period see Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme” 754-762; Gündoğdu, “Uşşâkizâde Târîhi”, 622-623; Soloviev, History of Russia, 201; Kurat, Prut Seferi, 701.
365 Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 154-158; Soloviev, History of Russia, 192.
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6 hours distance. It was not an easy task to demarcate the frontier, especially in the vicinity of Azov, since there had never been a border there before. Overlapping claims over the same region, differences in geographical naming, and inadequacy of the translators made the process even harder. Finally, in July 1714, the commission settled the border from the Dnieper to Azov and erected landmarks at particular intervals.366
In 1713, a conflict erupted between the Swedish refugee and the Ottoman and Crimean troops who aimed to implement the imperial order to return the King. Charles’ forces resisted for a couple of days but could not prevent the King from being captured during the struggle; even Charles himself was injured. This inauspicious event caused the dismissal of Devlet Giray Khan and Bender Muhafızı İzmirli İsmail Pasha because of their imprudence.367 Raşid and the Crimean historian, Kırımî reveals that the Ottoman Sultan ordered the Khan and the Bender commander to convince the King to return to Sweden; if not, they threatened to use force. However, when the adverse scenario happened, the Ottomans, to get rid of the dishonor, executed the Bender commander and dismissed Devlet Giray Khan.368 Finally, King Charles decided to return in 1714 and, via Wien, arrived in Sweden.369 Thus, the trouble for the Ottomans had been solved.
The Prut Campaign enabled the Ottomans to reimpose their authority in Azov, but the new peace did not mean a u-turn to the steppe’s old customs. In the
366 Tatiana Bazarova, “The Process of Establishing the Border between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the Peace Treaty of Adrianople (1713),” in Bordering Early Modern Europe (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015), 129-130; Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 233-234; For the official record of the demarcation see Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 164-167.
367 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 777-779.
368 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 441-442; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 877-878.
369 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme”, 815-816; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 890-891.
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case of a border infringement, the officials would still be responsible for reporting and claiming compensation for the losses.370
4.2 The second reign of Devlet Giray Khan (1708-1713): A break for the peace
Following Kaplan Giray Khan’s defeat to unruly Circassians, Devlet Giray Khan ascended to the throne for the second time in 1708. Debar Śepatayim claims that Sultan Ahmed III and the Valide Sultan did not want him to be the Khan since “he caused the death” of Sultan Mustafa II. Despite their will, the Grand Vizier Çorlulu Ali Pasha appointed him as the Khan.371 It is hard to believe the grand vizier dared such an action. However, the author probably aimed to remark the dissatisfaction of the 1703 rebels because of the execution of Daltaban Mustafa Pasha, who advised the Khan to revolt. Abdülgaffar Kırımî underlines that his most significant achievement was to conduct gaza against the “enemy of the religion,” Moscow. The Don Cossacks who had taken refuge with the Ottomans also joined the Crimeans in the combats. According to the author, the successful raids against the Russians lifted the Crimeans’ morale, which had been devastated by the defeat in Circassia.372 Uşşakizade also noted that a Crimean Sultan brought eighty captives to Istanbul.373
Nevertheless, until the war officially started in autumn 1710, the Tatar incursions to the Russian border were still violating the Treaty. A document from 21 November 1709 indicates that the Russian ambassador demanded the return of the Russian slaves, who were on sale in Istanbul. The Cossacks had enslaved them before the peace, and the merchants bought and brought them to Istanbul. The
370 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 232.
371 Shapira, “A New Source of Information on Circassians, Kabarda and the Kinjal Battle in the Early 18th Century”, 281-282.
372 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 413-414.
373 Gündoğdu, “Uşşâkizâde Târîhi,” 599-600.
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Ottoman Sultan warned the commanders of Kale-i Cedîd and Caffa to prevent the occurrence of a similar event again since it violated the peace conditions and hurt the merchants because they were obliged to emancipate captives for free. In the document, the commanders were unambivalently ordered to “inform them that if when the vessels arriving at and leaving Kale-i Cedid are inspected and if any Russian slaves are found on them, their vessels will be confiscated as punishment for disobeying my order and perpetrating malicious acts.”374
In 1712, the Ottomans planned to punish the Kalmyk’s “massacre” against the Nogays and decided to dispatch an army. The Kazakhs and the Bukharans agreed on a mutual attack against the Kalmyks with the Ottomans. Khodarkovsky reports that since they received the Ottoman consent, the Kazakh and Karakalpak forays against the Kalmyks intensified.375 Kırımî states that since the Russians delayed the return of Azov, the campaign lasted longer than it should have. Thus, even though Azov had been restored, Devlet Giray Khan secretly ordered the Kuban people to raid the frontier to compensate for the prolonged campaign expenditures. In February 1713, the band decided to raid the Don River Basin; however, Ignat Nekrasov advised to enter the central provinces to seize more since the main army was at the northern front. Although the garrison troops and the Kalmyks resisted the raiding band, they returned with numerous slaves and spoils. When they returned, they learned about the dismissal of Devlet Giray Khan.376
374 “Kal‘a-i Cedîd’e gelüb giden sefâîn yoklandırılub içinde Moskov esîrleri bulunursa emr-i şerîfime ‘adem-i itâ‘at ile böyle habâisete cesâret eyledikleri içün sefîneleri mîrî içün girift olunacağını ifhâm idüb.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 116, Gömlek No. 1109.
375 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 151-152.
376 In the text, the name of Ignat Nekrasov transcribed as Ağnat. Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 433-440.
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4.2.1 The frontier on the eve of the Prut war
As discussed in Chapter 2, the peripheral zones of Crimea sheltered thousands of Nogay migrants. On top of it, the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) had criminalized the nomads’ movement and restricted them to a defined territory. Although it is doubtful to what extent the central powers controlled the frontier people efficiently, these agreements were the first step in the waning of the Eurasian steppe culture. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman-Crimean frontier was destabilized.
In March 1709, the Özi governor received an ordinance to protect the Yalı Köyleri. The document informs us that these villages, located on the Dniester Riverside in the Akkirman Province, had been the Crimean Khans’ property since their conquest. Although there had been no external intervention with them until recent times, Devlet Giray Khan informed that Bender Mutasarrıfı, Nogay Mirzas, and others had started to attack the people’s agricultural products, vineyards, orchards, and beehives for four or five years. They even harmed the people and caused their misery. In that regard, the Ottoman Sultan charged the Özi governor to prevent the attacks since Bender Sanjak was part of Özi province.377 In the previous chapter, another document from 1703 showed that the Yalı Köyleri needed a cadastral survey, and even the tax-collector responsible for the taxes of the Nogays attempted to collect these villages’ taxes. Therefore, the Ottoman officials’ attempts at Yalı Köyleri might have been related to the decrease in Khan’s power within his domain. The Nogays’ daring to attack the Khan’s property might be interpreted as both the result of severe competition for the limited resources in the frontier and a
377 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No.116, Gömlek No. 374.
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punitive act against the Khan’s prestige because of the tense relationship between the parties.
In June 1709, Yusuf Pasha, the Özi Governor, received an order about the Nogays’ settlement in his province. The Sultan reminds the Pasha about the previous order to settle the Nogays, for whom the Halil Pasha Yurdu’s resources did not suffice, in the Özi pasturelands. However, Akkirman Mukataa’s (revenue source) administrator reported that “Seven hundred peasants from the Akkirman Mukataa with their leader, Çavum Mirza, crossed the Dniester River and settled near the Bender Castle; thus, they caused a decrease in the aforementioned taxfarm’s revenues.” The Sultan ordered that if it becomes apparent that the peasants who had moved to and settled in these regions were from the Akkirman Mukataa, they must return to their former residence except the previously allowed Nogays.378 Çavum Mirza was probably Cavim Mirza, who had shown successes in the Prut Campaign.
In August 1709, the mirzas and elders of the Bey Mirza branch from the Orakoğlı tribe, which were settled in the Özi pasturelands since they did not have sufficient land in Halil Pasha, appealed to Devlet Giray Khan to allow them to return to their former lands in the southern side of the Dniester. As indicated in the document, they asserted that “since the place, where they are settled now, is not suitable for residing, they are not calm and tranquil as they used to be in their
378 “Akkirman mukâta‘ası kurâsı re‘âyâsından yedi yüz mikdârı re‘âyâ kalkub Nogaylunun başları olan Çavum mîrzâ ile nehr-i Turlayı karşu yakaya ‘ubûr ve Bender kal‘asının karşusunda tavattun idüb mukâta‘a-i merkûme mahsulüne kesr ü noksân terettübüne bâ‘is olduğun.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Dahiliye [C.DH], No. 32, Gömlek No. 1559; This document is the mühimme register of the document. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 116, Gömlek No. 588; This document is transliterated by the Ottoman Archives; however, they read Bey Mirza as Yimuza and ‘ubûr as Haydar. Ünal Uğur and Kemal Gurulkan, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Hanlığı, Crimean Khanate in Ottoman Documents (İstanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2013), 115.
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previous dwelling.” The Ottomans approved their request.379 Oddly, only one and a half years before, during Kaplan Giray’s reign, the Bey Mirza people had demanded to migrate from the Halil Pasha since the land did not meet the increasing needs of the tribes. We may assume that the new region was challenging, or the population pressure on the Halil Pasha was relieved a little bit by the migration. Thus, Bey Mirza might have wanted to use the opportunity to fill the empty lands of two other clans, Kan and Kadı Mirza. Nevertheless, this development displays the frontier’s fluidity and the presence of dissatisfied tribes in the frontiers.
In January 1710, a conflict erupted among the tribes that settled in the Halil Pasha Yurdu. The Sultan instructed the Crimean Khan to punish the culprits. The document stresses that
Kel Mehmed of the Nayman tribe, and Yusuf and Tin Ahmed of Koñrat tribe from the Nogay tribes that were settled previously in the Halil Pasha Yurdu with some mirzas who support their cause and Tatars who are their nökers attacked to Nayman tribe, killed five of their men, set fire to their yurts, and seized the aforementioned tribe’s belongings at their gates and fields.380
Afterward, the Sultan says that he ordered Yusuf Pasha, the Özi Governor, to punish this evil act. The Pasha remitted the issue to the Yalı Ağası to set things right. Although there were four dangerous mirzas responsible for the event, it was understood that the Yalı Ağası was unable to arrest them. Thus, the Sultan assigned the Crimean Khan to deport them to Crimea, return the stolen goods to their owners, and provide security to the victims.381
In the same month, Özi Governor received a letter stressing the same issue. Additionally, the letter shows that the Nayman branch was part of the Or
379 “Hâlâ sâkin oldukları mahal nüfûs ve emvallerine ikâmete münâsib olmamağın mukaddem olan meskenlerinde olduğı gibi râhat ve asude olmayub…” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 116, Gömlek No. 920.
380 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 6, Gömlek No. 114, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 13.
381 BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 114; This issue is also stressed in the register of the letter, dated February/March 1710, sent to Devlet Giray to herald the renewal of the peace with Russia. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 113.
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Mehmedoğlu tribe. The Mutasarrıf of Tırhala, Mustafa, had forced the culprits to give back the stolen goods; the troubled region was on the way of Mustafa to reach his kışlak in İsakçı. However, when he left there, the aggressors attacked again, raided the Kara Nayman village and some other villages that belonged to the Nayman people. The document underlines that unless the four hazardous men, Yusuf and Tin Ahmed from Koñrat, Topal Ahmed from Zagan?, and Hüsrev from Tokuzlar, are deported, they would not abstain from harming the victim tribe. Thus, the governor commanded to assist the Crimean Khan in this issue.382
All these documents demonstrate instability in the frontier. While the Bey Mirza branch requested to return to the Halil Pasha Yurdu, the region was in turmoil. Probably, they could not find what they wanted except on the opposite side of the Dniester. Everybody took their share from this upheaval, which impacted even the Khan’s properties, the Yalı villages. On the eve of the Prut Campaign, the border was still closed for external resources, so the Halil Pasha inhabitants fell into severe competition for the limited possessions.
4.3 The second reign of Kaplan Giray Khan (1713-1717)
Kaplan Giray’s second reign started with the Crimean discontent towards the Treaty of Edirne (1713). Silahdar underlines that despite the Ottoman Sultan’s order to stop the cross-border offenses, the Tatars raided the region until Astrakhan. The Russians and Cherkassk (Kirman or Çerkes Kirman in Turkish) Cossacks demanded the Azov commander, vizier Boşnak Receb Pasha to return the captives. Thereupon, the
382 In the apostil of the document, dates 14 March 1710, it is stated that since this imperial order returns, its register is erased. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 116, Gömlek No. 1273.
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governor of Erzurum, vizier Tellak Ali Pasha, attacked the raiders since they violated the imperial order. However, the Azov janissaries went out and challenged the Pasha’s interference by saying, “We earn our living from the Tatars’ spoils; in these frontiers, the imperial order is non-binding.”383 The janissaries defeated the Pasha’s forces, bought the captives from the Tatars, and returned to Azov. Thereupon, Azov’s deputy janissary officer was exiled to Gönye and then executed.384 Virginia Aksan underscores that the Ottomans’ growing recruitment of Albanian soldiers in the Morea and Black Sea fortress line caused the estrangement of the people living in the boundaries since the soldiers rarely accounted for their brutal acts.385
In April 1713, vizier İsmail Pasha, who was the Azak Muhafızı but who at the time was in Bender, and some other officials of Bender, İsmail Geçidi, and Akkirman received an imperial letter to free the Cossacks who had been enslaved by the Crimean soldiers during the reign of the former Khan, Devlet Giray. It stresses that
Previous to this, while it is prohibited to enslave the Cossacks (Barabaş and Potkallu) who submitted by taking refuge under the benevolent shadow of my eternal Exalted State, the Tatar soldiers, who were sent by the former Crimean Khan Devlet Giray to catch tongues (enemy soldiers used to procure information), captured some of the aforementioned subordinated Cossacks to enslave. Moreover, since it is reported that they were Barabaş from Bender and Potkallu from Kardaşım Ormanı, by no means does their enslavement have my imperial consent. Take them from whoever owns them, and I decree the emancipation of the slaves with the assistance of the Hetman of Barabaş.386
The document does not mention whether the Cossacks were captured during the war with Russia or during the conflict related to arrest of King Charles. The soldiers
383 Bizim geçinmemiz Tatarın ganimetiyledir bu serhaddlerde fermân tutulmaz. Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 800; Fatma Sel Turhan shows that a janissary from Caffa who violated the treaty and enslaved the Cossacks punished with jail in 1702. Turhan, 18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı'da Savaş Esirleri, 59.
384 Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 800.
385 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 84.
386 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Ali Emiri Ahmed III [AE.SAMD.III], No. 172, Gömlek No. 16831, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 14.
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might have enslaved the Cossacks by violating the imperial order, or since this order was written after the Skirmish at Bender, they might have thought of them as an enemy since their ally, Swedish King, was in combat with the Ottoman-Crimean forces.
On the one hand, Baht Giray, Devlet Giray Khan’s son, revolted in Circassia after his father’s dismissal. The former Nureddin Bahadır Giray also joined the rebels. Baht Giray succeeded in receiving the supports of the Nogay tribes, which had dissent towards the Khan; he also killed the tribal leaders, who resisted joining his cause. Kaplan Giray Khan sent Mengli Giray to suppress the rebels, and numerous rebels were slaughtered.387 A record from December 1713 shows that Kaplan Giray Khan reported that Bahadır Giray escaped to his farm in Silivri secretly after he provoked the Nogays. Thereupon, Istanbul kaimmakam was ordered to arrest and exile Bahadır to Rhodes, where Devlet Giray, his father, was.388 In 1715, some of the Kuban Tatars went to Cherkassk and offered to be Russian subject since they suffered from the misdeeds of Baht Giray. Their request was denied in order not to harm the treaty; the age of the open steppe had ended already.389
Seyyid Muhammed Rıza expressed that Mengli Giray punished Orak Mirza, Arslan Bey, Sümenec, and Yusuf, defined as the trouble’s origin with “the sword of the sharia.” Nevertheless, he could not punish Baht Giray since Mengli Giray was called back to Crimea in the absence of the Khan, who had left the peninsula to discuss the war against Austria.390 Thus, Baht Giray’s rebellion in the Kuban region was not coincidental. There was growing Crimean dissent towards the Khanate, and
387 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 462.
388 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Hariciye [C.HR], No. 22, Gömlek No. 1054.
389 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 236-237.
390 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 408.
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the Crimean Khans were unable to meet the frontier people’s demands.391 In such an atmosphere, Baht Giray succeeded in finding bases for his cause, and he continued to be a headache for the Khanate until the Circassians killed him in 1729.
Despite the Edirne Treaty (1713), the Ottomans and Russia’s problems were still on the table. In 1716, the Russian ambassador visited Istanbul to deliver the Tsar’s message. The message was about the Russian troops’ passage in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the skirmish against the Ayuka Khan’s Kalmyks, the Tatars’ control over the Gazi Kirman pass, and the dispatching of a Russian ambassador to the Ottoman capital. The Ottomans opposed the Russian troops’ entrance to Polish soil and rejected the presence of a Russian ambassador since both were against the 1713 Treaty. The document stated several times that traditionally, the Crimean Khan had been responsible for the affairs related to the Tatars, Nogays, and Cossacks. Therefore, the Ottomans threatened Russia that the Khan was overseeing the Russian movements in Poland. The Gazi Kirman pass was left to the Cossacks, and the Ottomans promised to deal with the issue and secure the merchants’ passage. The Sultan also reminded that the Kalgay returned the goods that two rebellious Crimean sultans had captured. The document probably referred to Baht Giray and Bahadır Giray and stated that both had been punished, whereas the Russian side refused to return the people and the goods which had been seized from the Tatars in the redoubts along the Don River.392
The document contains important information about the punitive raid of the Nogays against the Russians. This must have been the raid of February 1713 that the Kırımî described because, as the Russians claimed, the raiding party consisted of the
391 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 470-471.
392 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 6, Gömlek No. 224; Silahdar date the arrival of the Russian ambassador to 14 May 1716. Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 845.
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Tatars, Nogays, and the Cossacks, and the brigade moved as far as Kazan thereabouts. The ambassador demanded the return of the stolen goods from the Ayuka Khan’s subject, Yanboluk and Kazan Tatars, and the Russians. The Ottomans responded to this by stating the following:
On the issue of the Yanboluk people, the aforementioned community is a nomadic people who come and go wherever they want with the Kalmyk Khan Ayuka. Furthermore, Ayuka Khan is subordinated to nobody; he is from the communities whose envoy comes and goes independently. They never stay peaceful and keep attacking the Nogays; thus, the Nogays’ response to them is only to take revenge. In addition, the Kalmyk issue is not covered by the Treaty’s articles.
Since Azov had been restored and the Russian was ambassador expulsed from Istanbul, probably Russia was in an unfavorable position from the Ottoman point of view. The Sultan asserted that the Kalgay Sultan was about to conclude peace with the Kalmyks at the time. This expression displays that the Ottomans did not recognize the Russian suzerainty over the Kalmyks.393 Although Russia approached the Kalmyks as vassals but for the Kalmyks, it was more of a military alliance. Despite Russia’s pressure to annul diplomatic relations, the Kalmyks continued to send envoys to other powers to secure their position.394 The community referred to as Yanboluk is probably Cemboyluk Nogays because of the phonetic change of the letter y as c in Kıpchak Turkic. This group will take on the stage during the Baht Giray-Kalmyk joint attack later on.
Since the Ottoman Empire sealed the northern frontier with the Edirne Treaty in 1713, it turned its face to the south to recover the Peloponnesus. In 1714, the Ottomans declared war on Venice and successfully captured much of the peninsula in 1715. However, the Habsburgs renewed their military alliance with Venice and were involved in the war in 1716. Despite the acquisitions against Russia and
393 BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 224, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 15.
394 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 59; 66-67.
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Venice, the war with Habsburgs turned into a disaster after series of defeats. Thus, in 1718, the Ottomans agreed to sign The Treaty of Passarowitz, which ceded Timişoara (Temeşvar in Turkish), Belgrade, and Oltenia to the Habsburgs and restored the Ottoman control of Peloponnesus.395 The Passarowitz was similar in characteristic to the Treaties of Karlowitz, Istanbul, and Edirne in that it also contained clauses on the return of the slaves.396
In autumn 1716, Kaplan Giray was dismissed from office since he did not come to the Ottoman army’s assistance during the Battle of Petrovaradin. Kaplan Giray lost prestige when he failed to force Russia to pay annual tribute during the peace negotiations after the Prut War. Thus, the Khan could not convince the Crimeans to fight against the Austrians for the Ottomans.397 In this campaign, the Ottomans lost Timișoara and Belgrade, and the grand vizier Silahdar Pasha was killed. Kara Devlet Giray Khan was assigned as the Khan; however, the Crimean Karaçı beys and notables objected to the new Khan since he was not from Selim Giray Khan’s lineage. Since the Ottomans needed immediate Crimean support in the continuing war, the Sultan dismissed the unrecognized Khan and appointed Saadet Giray to the Khanate.398
4.4 The reign of Saadet Giray Khan (1717-1724)
Saadet Giray’s reign portrayed critical developments within the Black Sea frontier. Crimean control over Circassia loosened, Baht Giray was roaming in the Kuban and
395 Nikola Samardžić, “The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718: An Introduction,” in The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, ed. Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samardžić, and Jovan Pešalj (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2011), 13-16; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 98-102.
396 Turhan, 18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı'da Savaş Esirleri, 65-74.
397 Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı,; 409; 464.
398 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 444-447.; Topal, “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Nusretnâme,” 867-868, Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1054.
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with the Kalmyks devastating the Crimean frontier, and Cantimur, the leader of the Şirins, revolted against Saadet Giray. Meanwhile, by the 1720s, the collapse of the Safavids motivated the Russians to push the frontier to the South. The Russian aim was to capture Azerbaijan and then control the Ottoman Christian reaya in Caucasia; the Georgians and the Armenians.399 The Ottomans also captured the northern part of Iran, so the Ottomans and Russia encountered in inner Caucasia. To avoid a military struggle, they agreed on the limits of their acquisition and signed a treaty in 1724.400 All these developments hindered the stabilization of the frontier and turned the region into a time bomb.
4.4.1 The Circassian campaign
When Saadet Giray Khan ascended to the throne, Circassia was about to be out of the Khanate’s hands, and Baht Giray was still not sentenced.401 After the Habsburg War ended, in 1132 (1719/1720), the Khan asked the Ottomans’ permission to wage war against the Circassians, and his request was accepted.402 He sent his son Salih Giray, trained by Circassian Hataguzukoğlu Muhammed, to the region. Salih Giray reported that his atalık and most Circassian notables, except Kaytukaoğulları and Bey Mirzaoğulları, were on the Crimeans’ side. If an army was sent there, it would succeed in neutralizing them. Saadet Giray led his troops to Circassia; however, his efforts remained fruitless since Kaytukaoğulları convinced the other Circassians that accepting the Khan’s authority would mean the whole society’s enslavement. The
399 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 166.
400 Akbulut presents an in-depth analysis of the Ottoman-Russian competition for the suzerainty over Iran. Mehmet Yılmaz Akbulut, The Scramble for Iran: Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Engagements during the Afghan Occupation of Iran, 1722-1729 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık Ticaret A.Ş., 2017), 50-87; The plenipotentiaries of the parties signed the Treaty in June 1724, but the official document of the Treaty dates January 1725. Yekeler et al., Osmanlı-Rus antlaşmaları, 177-181; For an evaluation of the period see Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 172-203.
401 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 412.
402 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1181.
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Circassians fled to the Kaşka Mountain, and the Khan assigned Devlet Giray’s son Baht Giray to punish them, yet this attempt yielded no result. The subservient Circassian nobles provided the Khan some slaves, and he returned to Crimea.403
Significantly, Kırımî writes that the Khan assigned Baht Giray against the Circassians, but according to Es-Sebü’s-Seyyâr, to arrest Baht Giray was one of the aims of the campaign.404 Debar Śepatayim also cites that the unruly Circassian tribes allied with Baht Giray when Saadet Giray landed on Circassia to neutralize them. Baht Giray requested the Circassian princes and nobles to come to his side to conclude the alliance; however, when the grandees arrived, he chained them up and sent them to Saadet Giray.405 On 17 September 1717, the Russian ambassador complained about Baht Giray’s border offenses and requested his punishment. Raşid underlined that since Baht Giray had escaped from the army and had no particular place to stay, he had to be persuaded to renounce the revolt.406 Thus, the Khan might have bought Baht Giray’s subordination to strengthen the Khanate’s hand against the Circassians, who had handed the Crimeans a heavy defeat before.
On the other hand, while Saadet Giray Khan attempted to increase his authority in Circassia, the Nogays found an opportunity to stir up the Bucak region. A mühimme register from October/November 1720 reports that the Nogays had committed some infamies since the Yalı Ağası went to the Circassian Campaign with the Khan and his deputy could not control them. The deputy of Yalı Ağası and İbrahim Pasha, the Muhafız of Bender, were ordered to increase their efforts to get
403 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 448-449; Saadet Giray Khan refers to the escape of the Circassians to the highlands. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 7, Gömlek No. 13.
404 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 412.
405 Dan Shapira, “A New Source of Information on Circassians, Kabarda and the Kinjal Battle in the Early 18th Century,” 287-288.
406 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1152.
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the region under control. A letter was also sent to Saadet Giray Khan to inform him of the developments, and the letter reached him when he was on the mount of Elbrus. A note written in the margins of the letter in the sultan’s hand, states that the Khan complained a lot about İbrahim Pasha. According to the note, the complaints seemed plausible, and if they are correct, the Pasha should be warned.407 Unfortunately, the document does not give further information about why the Khan complained about the Pasha, but it gives the impression of friction between the Khan and the Ottoman official.
A year before, in January 1719, upon Saadet Giray Khan’s request, the Nogays mirzas who had been exiled to Crimea were allowed to return to their residences in Bucak, and they were pardoned.408 In August 1719, a mühimme register demonstrated the continuity of the border dispute between the Moldovians and the Bucak Nogays. Despite the Nogays’ presence within the Moldovian territory, during the Prut War’s turbulent period, the Nogay people took advantage of the Moldovians’ revolt against the Ottomans and registered a thirty-two-hour length and two-hour width Moldovian region in their name. The document states that the register, which they somehow made accepted by the Defterhâne (registry), is abolished since the region belongs to the Moldovians. The document reminds us that while the Nogays were settled in the Halil Pasha Yurdu in 1666/1667, the Nogays’ activities in Moldovia are redundant. It also led to a decrease in tax incomes since some of the Moldovian peasants hid in the Nogays’ çiftliks and kışlaks. As the Principality are barely recovering after the revolt and the war, it would accelerate the Moldovians’ estrangement from the Ottoman administration. In that regard, except
407 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Ali Emiri Ahmed III [AE.SAMD.III], No. 232, Gömlek No. 22187.
408 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 127, Gömlek No. 1326.
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Nureddin İslam Giray’s çiftliks, Abdi Pasha, the Muhafız of Khotyn, was ordered to demolish all the Nogay çiftliks and kışlaks in Moldovia.409
In October 1719, Abdi Pasha received an altered version of the order. After it reminding him of a previous order to resettle the Nogays in the Halil Pasha Yurdu, he was told that the region was not sufficient for the people. If the Nogays were to be evacuated, they would be forced to scatter to the open steppe, and the Bender border would become deserted. Saadet Giray Khan, vizier Ahmed Pasha, the former Muhafız of Bender, and Bender’s people had petitioned, warning that these circumstances would pose many problems. In that regard, Abdi Pasha was commanded not to enact the previous order about restoring the Moldovian possession over the territory and give the region to the Nogays.410 It is not explicitly stated why the Nogays’ scattering to the steppe would cause several problems; probably, it would ignite new border frictions between the Ottomans and the Russians. Furthermore, a sparsely populated frontier would render the Ottoman possession in the north more vulnerable against Russian expansion.
Tahsin Gemil states that the Moldovian voivoides attempted to expel the Nogays from the Moldovian borders several times. In 1714, Nicholas Maurocordato succeeded in convincing the Porte to return the territory to Moldovia; however, his efforts remained inconclusive since he was appointed as the Wallachian Voivode. The report sent to Abdi Paşa in 1721 reveals that the Tatars exceeded even the two-hour territory they gained after the Prut War in 1711. Therefore, Voivode Mihail Racovita demanded the expulsion of the Nogays, and although Istanbul also accepted his petition, the Nogays continued to live in the region. Besides, the Ottomans continued to approach this new territory as part of Moldavia, and the Nogays paid
409 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 129, Gömlek No. 307.
410 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 129, Gömlek No. 499.
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taxes to the Voivode.411 As the document stressed, the Ottomans thought that if the Nogays were expelled from the border, it would create a vacuum detrimental for the defense. On the other hand, they were prohibited from plundering the opposite side of the border. Since the region was inadequate for the Nogays, the Ottomans should have adjusted the relation between the two Ottoman vassals. The Nogays’ expansion to Moldovia was probably less dangerous for the Ottomans than the Nogay’s attacks on Russia.
4.4.2 The crisis on the return of slaves
Although a new Khan ascended to the throne one more time, after the dismissal of Devlet Giray, Baht Giray was still a trouble for the frontier security. A document from October 1717 shows that he provoked the Kuban Nogays to join his forces. They attacked the Russian settlement named Toprak Kal‘a (means earthen castle in Turkish) and enslaved its people. The Beglerbegi of Caffa and the official in charge of Açu Sanjak ordered to find the slaves and return them to the Russians. The order explicitly underlined that if even one of these captives crosses the Ottoman border or is sold, the officials will be punished severely (eşedd-i ‘ukûbet).412
Another mühimme record from again October 1717 indicates an unauthorized slave trade route via the Özi Passage. The Sultan’s letter addressing Ahmed Pasha, who possessed Kılburun Sanjak in return for his service as the custodian of Özi Fortress, stresses:
Some people send slaves to the Crimean Khan through the Özi Passage since while it has been ordered by the current Khan Saadet Giray Khan (may his greatness continue) not to permit the passage of people who do not have a document (sened), news has come that similar sorts of people are again crossing to the Crimean side without document. When my noble order arrives, except people heading Crimea due to official reasons, do not allow
411 Gemil, “Yeni Belgelere Göre ‘Halil Paşa Yurdu’ Ve ‘İki Saat‘lik Arazi,” 1017-1018.
412 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 126, Gömlek No. 678.
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those wanting to go to Crime with slaves to cross the Özi pass unless they have a document given by the aforementioned Khan. 413
The Ottomans attempted to control the mobility within the frontier region through control over the passages. Even though turning the river banks’ passages into checkpoints seems efficient to control the movement within vast geography, it was challenging to render the frontier people accustomed to the new regulations.
A year later, in October 1718, the Ottomans were still trying to return the slaves who had been brought to Crimea by Baht Giray. The Sultan ordered civil and military officials in Azov to inspect Azov and the region around it to find any enslaved Russian peasants. If any Russian slave is found in someone’s possession, whoever he is, they must be seized. The captives had to be handed to the officer of Cherkassk in return for a receipt (temessük) indicating the number of returned captives. The Sultan warned his frontier officials to be more watchful to prevent the emergence of any violation of the Treaty with Russia.414 Azov’s Muhafız İbrahim Pasha probably could not fulfill this duty; hence he received a similar letter again in June 1719 to find the captives in Azov’s vicinity.415
The Ottomans did not attempt to mobilize only the Ottoman frontier officers. The imperial letter that heralds Saadet Giray Khan’s retaining his throne in June 1718 shows that the Khan was also ordered to find the Russian slaves that Baht had Giray enslaved. The Ottoman Sultan expected the Khan to hand over the slaves to the Kapucıbaşı who brought the letter, and the Mübaşir (bailiff) Mehmed who had been assigned before.416 It is noteworthy that the Khan was not allowed to establish a
413 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 126, Gömlek No. 680, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 16.
414 The document indicates that the found captives should be handed to Kirman officer. This should refer to Çerkes Kirman which is the Turkish name of Cherkassk. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 127, Gömlek No. 1036.
415 In this document Ahmed Pasha was ordered to handing over the slaves to Çerkes Kirman. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 129, Gömlek No. 128.
416 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 6, Gömlek No. 267.
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direct link with the Russians for the return of the slaves. Instead, the Ottoman officials would undertake this duty.
In August 1719, Saadet Giray Khan sent a letter to report the latest developments within his domain. The Russians complained that the Zaporozhians who inhabited the Dnieper River under the Ottomans’ control stole something from the Russian domain. The Ottoman Mübaşir Derviş Mehmed Ağa was also present in the court with the Crimean notables. The Cossacks denied the Russian claims; thus, the trial lasted for twelve days with quarrels. At this point, the Khan underlined that he heard a guilty Cossack named Gnati Sarat before this. One hundred twenty-three head cattle were confiscated from the Cossack, secured in a proper place, and he was jailed. Then, Derviş Mehmed Ağa’s inquisition succeeded in making the Cossacks accept the stolen commodities. Thereupon, 380 horses and 310 cattle were handed over to the Russians, and in return, they received a temessük. It is interesting that the Cossacks also promised to dress for 38 men from top to toe. The reason for it is not indicated in the letter, but it was probably to compensate for the expenses of the Russian officials. In the last sentences of the letter, Saadet Giray underlines that he remitted everything to Derviş Ali Ağa since he had extensive knowledge about Crimea, the Nogays, and the Circassians. He also claims that he did not make any mistake in his service to the Ottoman Sultan.417 By stating that his intention was probably to secure his position from the intrigues in the capital.
Ahmed Pasha, the Muhafız of Yeni Kal‘a and Mutasarrıf of Caffa, received a letter in June 1719 informing him that there had been problems with the Russian captives’ return. The previous commander of Yeni Kal‘a, Hasan, had failed to obey
417 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 7, Gömlek No. 13; The transcription of the letter is available in Oleksandr Sereda, XVII.–XVIII. Yüzyıl Belgelerinde Osmanlı-Ukrayna Diplomasisi (Kiev-İstanbul: Ukrayna Milli Bilim Akademisi Agatangel Krimskiy Şarkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü-İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 2018), 94-100.
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the imperial order to gather the slaves. Thus, the order was repeated, and then, he saved only six of them. The remaining ones had dispersed. Furthermore, Hasan had informed a couple of people who had been involved in the slave trade before, so he made these people escape from arrest. Thereupon, he was dismissed from the office. In that regard, Ahmed Pasha commanded to apply the Peace Treaty articles, avoid its violation, secure the border, and find the remaining captives enslaved by Baht Giray’s band.418 Ahmed Pasha was reminded of the fate of Hasan and warned not to dare this sort of corruption. These documents demonstrate that the frontier people challenged the Ottomans’ attempt to close the open steppe. The mühimme records are full of instances of orders that were not obeyed by frontier officials. In some cases, the orders may have exceeded the officials’ capacity; in other cases, the officials must have personally benefitted from the violation of the border. As the Azov janissaries stated above, the imperial edicts were not valid within the frontier regions yet.
A mühimme record dating to August/September 1722 indicates that a retired Miralem (a high Ottoman official), Mustafa, was appointed as mübaşir to accompany the Russian envoy heading to the border to inspect the problems in the frontier region. The first problem was the joint attacks by the Don Cossacks and the Kalmyks against the Nogays. They plundered the region in front of the Perekop Isthmus twice, and Saadet Giray Khan sent the lists of stolen commodities to Istanbul. The second and third issues were the detainment of a Circassian leader in Terek castle by the Russians and Topal Yovan (Ivan the Lame)’s attacks on Ottoman merchants. These issues are stated in the document as such;
Previously, İslam Beg from the Kabardian notables was invited to Terek Castle with the pretext of discussion, and the Muscovites detained him in
418 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 129, Gömlek No. 442.
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violation of the Treaty. The Khan reported that he was kept as a captive in this castle. [Then] merchants from my protected realm, Caffa, Karasu, and Taman heading to the Kumyk realm with fifty-four carts full of goods worth two hundred keses, were attacked by a Cossack called Topal Yovan, who is a vassal of the Tsar, acting in consort with the Don River Kalmyks in the rural area of Kuban River where the Karanuk River and Kumu River meet. A fight ensued, and [aggressors] took all the goods and commodities and they killed all the people whom they captured alive in addition to those whom they martyred during the attack.419
When the Ottomans reported these violations, the Tsar stated that he had not known of İslam Beg’s detainment and he wrote an order for release. Mübaşir Mehmed Ağa would meet in the border area with the Russian commissars whom the Tsar appointed to return the stolen goods. There would be a trial based on sharia by means of the Crimean Khan.
As the fourth issue, the document states:
Since the Nogay people gather bittern and falcon nestlings from the bird nests in the empty wilderness between the Muscovite Realm and the Kuban River Bank, this time while eight Nogays were coming back after they had gathered bittern and falcon nestlings, the Great Cossacks, who are vassals of the Tsar, attacked them in a place named as Sal while the Nogays were unaware. It has been heard that sixteen of them were captured; two of them escaped and reported the event.420
Mübaşir Mehmed was tasked with the emancipation of the enslaved Nogays, wherever they were. After these issues were settled, if the Russian commissars claimed that the Sultan’s subjects harmed the Russians other than the issue of Baht Giray, the Sultan commanded him to solve the disagreements again in a trial based on sharia, following the Treaty’s articles with the agency of the Crimean Khan. After the Istanbul Treaty (1700), it became a profitable business for the Cossacks to catch the Nogays who violated the Russian border to sell them for ransom. However, based on a Russian archival document, Boeck stated that “whenever those Tatars were
419 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 130, Gömlek No. 1240, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 17, İsmail Bülbül also cites this document, athough he does not mention the details. İsmail Bülbül, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Kuban Boyunda Siyaset, Etnik Yapı Ve İktisat,” Vakanüvis-Uluslarası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 2 (2017): 107.
420 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 130, Gömlek No. 1240, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 18.
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“caught in the act of destruction or banditry, they call themselves ‘good people’ who are just hunting birds and beasts. But of course they come to engage in felony.”421 From the Russian point of view, these Tatars were there to raid the region, but the Cossacks might have wanted to have more captives and violated the Ottoman border, and enslaved the bird gathering Tatars as indicated in the previous register. Furthermore, this document is important to see how commoners on the frontiers were influenced by the decisions taken by their centers. For the Nogays, although gathering nestlings from open steppes was probably a simple and normal thing, in the age of closed frontiers, it turned into an interstate matter.
A month later, in October 1722, Sultan Ahmed sent a letter to the Russian Tsar about the frontier conflicts. The Don Cossacks were harming the Nogays, the Circassians, and Zaporozhians. Thus, Mustafa Ağa joined the returning Russian envoy to deliver the record book of the plundered properties. Moreover, the document indicates that after Topal Yovan’s raid was reported to the Russians, the Muhafız of Azov Vizier Mehmed Pasha reported that the Cossacks from Cherkassk walked around the Azov Fortress, enslaved the Muslims within the Ottoman border, and stole their commodities. The Kuban Tatars were the people who were the worst affected by the Cossacks’ aggressions. However, Mehmed Pasha warned the Cherkassk commander a couple of times by reminding him that these acts violated the Treaty; he disregarded these warnings and continued to harm the Ottoman subjects. The Sultan also complained about the Russian troops’ provocation of the Circassians, who are loyal to the Ottomans, against the Ottomans, it was reported by the Khan and the Ottoman frontier officers. In that regard, in the last part of the letter, the Sultan diplomatically warns the Tsar to fulfill the Treaty’s obligations. The
421 Boeck, Imperial Boundaries, 145.
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Sultan claimed that he met the requirements of the Treaty’s terms and ordered the Crimean Khan and the frontier officer to apply the Treaty.422
4.4.3 The Cantimur rebellion and the abdication of Saadet Giray Khan
In 1136 of the hegira calendar (1723/1724), Saadet Giray’s reign witnessed one of the most important events of the eighteenth-century Crimean Khanate, the Cantimur Rebellion. The Şirins’ insubordination to the Khan’s authority was detrimental for the Khanate, as Kara Devlet Giray had failed to sustain tribal support for his cause and lost the throne in 1717. In the sixteenth century, the Şirins’ leader, Agysh Bey, addressing the Crimean Khan, said that “Are there not two shafts to a cart? The right shaft is my lord the khan, and the left shaft am I, with my brothers and children.”423 Togan underlines that this “analogy” had been present in the steppe people’s collective memory, at least from the time of Chinggis Khan. Chinggis Khan had expressed similar words to Ong Khan, to whom Chinggis Khan had been subject for a while. He said that if the shaft of the cart is broken, it will be unable to move. The cart symbolizes society; one of its power bases’ collapse means its decay.424 Therefore, Cantimur’s disobedience meant that the Crimean Khanate turned into a cart with a broken shaft.
Kırımî refers to a matter of honor as the cause of the uprising. Er Mirza Ağa married the daughter of Ahmed Şah Beg, the leader of Argın tribe, although she had been Kutlu Şah Mirza’s fiancee. Thereupon, Kutlu Şah complained to Saadet Giray
422 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 7, Gömlek No. 35.
423 Beatrice Forbes Manz, “The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466-1532,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2, no. 3 (September 1978): 283.
424 İsenbike Togan, “Altınordu Çözülürken; Kırım'a Giden Yol,” in Türk-Rus İlişkilerin 500 Yıl, 1491-1992 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 47-48; For the Chinggis Khan’s words see also Urgunge Onon, tran., The Secret History of the Mongols: The History and the Life of Chinggis Khan (Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 153.
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about the misdeed of Er Mirza. The Khan decreed that if the bride marries a person other than Kutlu Şah, he will be punished. Kutlu Şah was favored by the Khan since he was the son of a former nöker (servant of khan) and vizier of the Khan, Subhan Gazi Ağazâde Murad Şah Ağa. However, Er Mirza appealed to the Şirins’ leader, el-Hac Cantimur Mirza, to protect him from the Khan’s injustice. When Saadet Giray heard about his appeal to the Şirins, he ordered his execution. Despite the petitions of his forgiving, the Khan remained firm. 425 Meanwhile, a mob from the Cantimur’s party raided the Yediler people’s houses, who left the opposition. Şirin leaders were not aware of this, they returned the stolen goods, but discontent was escalating day by day. Finally, Saadet Giray left his throne in 1724.426
When the Yedisan and Cemboyluk Nogays escaped from Kalmyk control and migrated to the Kuban in 1699/1700, the relative power of the Khanate’s old aristocracy, the Şirins and the Mangıts, decreased.427 In the history of Çelebizâde, Cantimur was dissatisfied with his share from the previous Circassian campaign. He was also offended because of the rise of a nobleman from Şirins, Murtaza Mirza, who had become the groom of the Girays, and gained much fame.428 Halim Giray
425 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi”, 450-452; In the Çelebizâde Tarihi this issue is narrated differently, and the Khan decided to marry off the bride to another person; namely, neither Kutlu Şah nor Er Mirza could not succeed in their causes. Tarih-i Çelebizâde is also known as the Tarih-i Raşid Zeyli, namely addendum for the Raşid’s History. In that regard, his history is published with the History of Raşid. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1417-1419.
426 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 450-452; On this subject, Smirnov give reference to a source that he named as Muhtasar Tarih. Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 475-476; The translator of Smirnov’s book expresses that they could not find the book that Smirnov calls Muhtasar Tarih. Since the storyline of this source overlaps with the Umdetü’t-Tevarih, these two might be the same. There is also another possibility that the Muhtasar Tarih is Hurremî Çelebi’s history, known as Çelebi Akay Tarihi. Arslan Giray Khan (1748-1756;1767) ordered Hurremi Çelebi to simplify the Es-Sebü’s-Seyyâr since the work was written with a pompous language. Although Hurremi Çelebi summarized the Es-Sebü’s-Seyyâr for the events until 1702, from then on, he benefitted from the Umdetü’t-Tevârih. For further information see Uğur Demir, “İhmal Edilen Bir Kırım Hanlığı Kaynağı: Çelebi Akay Târîhi,” Crimean Historical Review 1 (2017).
427 Alper Başer, “Kırım Hanlığı Tarihinde Mangıt Kabilesi,” in Doğu Avrupa Türk Mirasının Son Kalesi Kırım, ed. Yücel Öztürk (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2015), 94.
428 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1417.
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also underscores that this event was only a trigger for existing dissatisfaction. The Şirin mirzas and some other Crimean nobles rose against Saadet Giray since they could not receive a share from the booty captured during the previous Circassian campaign. Kalgay Safa Giray and the Crimean ulema also supported the rebellious mirzas, and they demanded the Khan to renounce the throne. Thereupon, he left his throne, went to Bucak, and reported the circumstances to Istanbul.429 As cited in the previous chapter, Cantimur Mirza fueled the rebellion of Gazi Giray. Nearly twenty later, as the leader of the Şirins, he led the mutiny against the Khan himself.
4.5 The reign of Mengli Giray Khan (1724-1730)
Mengli Giray Khan ascended to the throne during the continuous upheaval in 1724. To win the heart of rebels, he appointed Kemal Ağa as the vizier and Abdüssamed Ağa as the kadı-asker who were the leading figures of the rebellion. Simultaneously, the Khan was planning to weaken the opposition by dividing the Şirin clan. When the Khan succeeded in driving a wedge between Cantimur, and the other Şirin notables, Gazi Şah and Sefer Gazi mirzas, some people emerged who sued Cantimur because of his party’s raids during the rebellion. The mufti of Caffa Ebussuud Efendi would conduct the trial, but Cantimur’s party objected to him because of his close relations with Murtaza Mirza, an enemy of the rebels. Although Mengli Giray Khan appeased their hesitance towards Ebussud, the Khan called him to Bahçesaray secretly. When they asked the reason for the mufti’s visit, the Khan claimed that he was an uninvited guest, and according to the customs, he should have been hosted. At the same time, the Khan decreed that all the Crimean notables gather at a Friday council on 4 August 1726. In the meantime, the Khan appointed Kalgay Safa Giray as the
429 Halim Giray, Gülbün-i Hânân, 141; Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 414-416.
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commander of the Crimean army, heading to Iran as the Ottoman auxiliary. Thus, the rebels became bereft of an important ally.430
4.5.1 Cantimur collaborates with Baht Giray: The inflammation of the rebellion
Cantimur came to the council with great fear; however, he was informed about the preparations against him. Thereupon, Cantimur Mirza, Kemal Ağa, and Kantemüroğlu Muhammed Giray Mirza, with their retinues, planned to flee from Crimea to take refuge under Baht Giray in the Kuban. An entry in the register from August 1725 indicates that Mustafa Pasha, the Muhafız of Azov, was ordered to arrest and jail Cantimur and his fellow, Kemal. Mustafa Pasha was told that when someone appealed to Mengli Giray Khan to sue Cantimur. The Khan called him for a trial, but he left the call unanswered. Thereupon, the Khan ordered his arrest, and he escaped from Crimea.431
Kırımî narrates that even though Azov’s janissaries were warned not to allow the passage of Cantimur’s party to the Kuban region, the latter deceived the janissaries by claiming that they were also Bektashis like the janissaries, and crossed the river. Salih Giray was appointed to punish the fugitives and killed some of them, and Baht Giray placed the survivors among the Shapsugs (Şapsığ in Turkish), Natukhajs (Netukaç or Natuhay in Turkish), and Çusin tribes and stayed there for three years. Baht Giray himself hid among the Kalmyks and some other places.432
430 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 454-458; Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 418.
431 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 132, Gömlek No. 1284; Seyyid Muhammed Rıza dates this event to July 1726. Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 421; For a summary of the developments see Bülbül, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Kuban Boyunda Siyaset, Etnik Yapı Ve İktisat,” 78-80.
432 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 458-461; In the Çelebizâde Tarihi, Cantimur convinced Baht Giray to revoke his subordination and the janissaries were prohibited to intervene the Crimean internal affairs. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1473-1474; Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 423.
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Interestingly, Baht Giray had been the commander of the Crimean-Kuban soldiers against the Kalmyks, and brought Yedisan and Cemboyluk Nogays back to their residence in the Kuban region. In 1717, he allied with the Kalmyk Khan Ayuka after he rebelled against the Crimean Khan. Ayuka Khan agreed to support Baht Giray “against his rivals in the Kuban,” while Baht Giray guaranteed to restore Kalmyk's authority over Yedisan and Cemboyluk Nogays, who were saved from the Kalmyks a while before.433
An archival document from December stated that Cantimur and Baht Giray failed to take support of the Nogays and Circassians in the Kuban Region. The people sided with Salih Giray Sultan, and the rebels attempted to cross the river near Azov with a band of nearly three to four hundred men. They aimed to arrive in Crimea and find more people for the rebellion. At this point, the Ottoman Sultan thanked vizier Mustafa Pasha for his successful control of the passages and blocking the rebels’ heading to Crimea. Most of the rebels sided with Salih Giray, and Cantimur and Baht Giray were forced to escape with 60 men to the Kaşka Mountain. It seems the janissaries learned that Cantimur was not Bektashi as they were. In this document, differently from the previous one, it is underlined that Cantimur and Baht Giray were sentenced to death penalty since their apostasy had become apparent.434
Some followers of Cantimur Mirza were part of the Ottoman campaign in Iran. Kara Devlet and Yalı Ağası Cırcır Mehmed were supporting Cantimur and they were with former Kalgay Safa Giray in the way of Buzeyir (Büzeyir in Azerbaijani
433 Khodarkovsky confused with the names of the Crimean Khans, and cited that Baht Giray rebelled after his father, Kara Devlet Giray, was dismissed. However, Baht Giray was the son of Devlet Giray Khan (r. 1699-1702, 1709-13) and the Ottomans appointed Kara Devlet Giray (r. 1716-17), who was another person, instead of Kaplan Giray Khan (r. 1707-1708, 1713-1716, 1730-1736). Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 160-161.
434 “…küfr ü irtidâ‘ya şer‘ân bâîs ve zâhir olmağla kendünün ‘avenesinin izâle-i vücûd-ı habâset-alûdlarına fetvâ-yı şerîfe virilan Şirin Begi-i sâbık Cantimur-ı makhûr…” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 133, Gömlek No. 179.
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Turkish). When they heard of his flight in Kara Hisâr-ı Şarkî (contemporary Şebinkarahisar), they deserted the army and headed to Crimea via the sea route. Mustafa Pasha was also ordered to block their entrance and arrest them if they reach there. Baht Giray lost his position as one of the prestigious Crimean Sultans, as Cantimur, Azimet Beg, Nogay Ağaoğulları faced the deprivation of being Crimean (Kırımlıkdan ihrâc). The Ottoman Sultan listed the rebellion leaders and decreed their punishment based on sharia; the remaining ones who did not deserve execution would be confined to penal servitude.435 Kalgay Safa Giray, who was at the Iran campaign, was exiled to the island of Chios (Sakız Adası in Turkish), and Adil Giray took his position.436
Çelebizâde claims that Cantimur prevented the implementation of the imperial orders, mistreated the mirzas, who had resisted supporting him for a long time, and he acted against the sharia. Cantimur had been trying to provoke the Crimeans to revolt against the Ottomans for forty years. Therefore, all the frontier commanders received letters to arrest him.437 Ottoman archival documents approach the issue from the same perspective; they state that Cantimur habitually engaged in all kinds of brigandage in contravention of the sharia (hilâf-ı şer‘-i şerîf envâı‘ şekâvet ‘adet-i müstemirresi olub).438 Although this Ottoman narrative seems to legitimize the punishment of a recalcitrant nobleman, it reveals that the second-most powerful group of the peninsula was against the Ottoman’s policies. Probably, the most critical problem for the dissident groups was the frontier’s closure, and that should have decreased their economic and political power dramatically. Also, the Kalmyks replaced Crimeans and Nogays in the lucrative horse trade with Russia by
435 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 179.
436 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 425.
437 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1468-1469.
438 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 132, Gömlek No. 1284.
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the mid-1600s.439 In such an atmosphere, the Crimean people were deprived of the income channels that they traditionally had. Murtaza Mirza might have posed a challenge to Cantimur since he was also a Şirin nobleman. In that regard, Cantimur’s recalcitration looks like a reaction to allocating the scant resources within the Khanate.
From Devlet Giray’s dismissal, Baht Giray was one of the obstacles against the Khanate’s authority in the Kuban region. He developed close relations with the Kalmyks and benefitted from the Khanate’s every weakness. Khodarkovsky underscores that since the Kalmyks faced several internal problems, some of their leaders discussed leaving their place of residence, and the Kuban as a new shelter was on the table. Khodarkovsky shows that Baht Giray called the Kalmyks to the Kuban and to bring Yedisan and Cemboyluk people back with themselves. Because of their troubles, they only sent 2000 soldiers to Baht Giray’s help. Soon, these forces returned because of the civil strife in the region and the oncoming Ottoman soldiers.440
In 1726, the Kalmyks provided Baht Giray 7000 soldiers, and they started to foray into the Kuban.441 An imperial order recorded in the mühimme register from November 1726 orders the janissaries in the frontier garrisons to prepare for war and join Kalgay Adil Giray’s army. The mühimme register of November 1726 contains a copy of the letter sent to vizier İbşir Hüseyin Pasha, the Muhafız of Yeni Kal‘a (i.e., Kale-i Cedîd). This letter demonstrates Baht Giray’s close relations with the Kalmyks,
Baht Giray left the vanquished Cantimur, went to Kuban, gathered around him numerous Kalmyk bandits, and started to attack the surrounding areas. Thus, the Khan mentioned above tasked the eldest of the sultans Kalgay Adil
439 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 28.
440 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 185.
441 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 189-190.
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Giray (may God continue his greatness) to punish them with the Crimean, Bucak, Kuban, Potkalı Cossacks, and many soldiers from different military divisions.442
The janissaries of Caffa, Ribat, and Kerch were ordered to follow the Khan’s order; if he ordered them to accompany the Kalgay, they would join his forces. Similar commands were issued for the officers of the other frontier forts, namely for Özi, Bender, Taman, Temrük, Açu, and Soğucak. The alarming of all the frontier garrisons shows that Baht Giray had amassed sufficient power to threaten the Ottoman-Crimean authority.
The Porte warned the Russians to control the Kalmyks; if not, the Ottomans would set the Crimeans free to respond to the Kalmyks. Although Russia first warned the Kalmyks not to violate the Treaty, she also invited Baht Giray to be a “Russian subject” covertly. Since raiding both sides of the frontier was more profitable than raiding one, Baht Giray refused the offer and plundered the Russian territories with the Kalmyks. There was a threat of unification of all the hordes, the Bashkirs, Karakalpak, Kazakh, and Kalmyks, against Russia from Russia’s perspective.443
A letter dated October/November 1726, which was sent to the trustee in charge of construction (binâ emini) in Soğucak Fortress, Mehmed, gives information about Cantimur’s hiding among the Shapsugs. Although nobody accepted Cantimur and Baht Giray because of their wretchedness and misery, they appealed to Shapsug Abkhaz in the Soğucak District of the Abkhazian Province, and Shapsugs accepted them. It is also mentioned that when Cantimur defected to Baht Giray, the Nogays
442 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 133, Gömlek No. 1254, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 19; Even the mutasarrıf of Ohri Sanjak was ordered to join the Crimean army against Baht Giray. Ünal Uğur and Kemal Gurulkan, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Hanlığı: Crimean Khanate in Ottoman Documents (İstanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2013), 127.
443 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 190-192.
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did not welcome his presence, and Cantimur was forced to send his family to Şagapke, a place in the vicinity of Soğucak. At this point, the Sultan states that he knows the trust between Mehmed, the trustee in charge of construction, and Kanpulad Beg of the Shapsughs who had sheltered Cantimur, so Mehmed was ordered to convince them to hand over Cantimur by using his relations with Kanpulad. If Mehmed could succeed in this mission, he would receive the title of Kapucıbaşı, and Kanpulad would be bestowed whatever he wants.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman Sultan warned the Shapsugs by declaring that:
If this issue is not ended easily, the merchants and Abkhaz tradesmen who bring clothes, tools, salt, and other commodities to the Abkhaz province from the Ottoman ports on the Black Sea and do business there will be prohibited to go back and will be jailed.
In the following spring, numerous Ottoman soldiers by sea, the Crimean and Kuban soldiers overland, would attack the Shapsugs. In case such a scenario unraveled, the Sultan threatened the Shapsugs with enslaving their people and conquering their province. Mehmed and Kanpulad would be considered rebels.444
A month later, in December 1726, a letter was sent directly to Shapsug, Natukhaj, and Bastıoğlu tribes to hand over Cantimur to the Crimean Sultan, who had been appointed for this issue. If they failed to do this, the letter warned them with the menaces stated in the letter sent to the Soğucak construction official.445 In June 1727, Shapsugs and the tribes mentioned above received a threatening letter from the Porte. It seems that the Ottoman center did not send troops to punish the Shapsugs in the spring, although Cantimur was still among them. The Porte stipulated to lift the embargo and allow the merchants to continue trade between the
444 In the documents, the Shapsugs were referred to as Abkhazian Shapsugs in Soğucak, the Abkhazian Province, but the Shapsug was a Circassian tribe. It’s vague that the author of the document was unaware of this or wanted to differentiate the Shapsugs from another branch of Shapsugs sojourned out of the Abkhazian Province. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 133, Gömlek No. 1264, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 20.
445 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 133, Gömlek No. 1266.
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Ottoman ports and their country.446 Salih Giray and Hacı Giray attempted to assassinate Cantimur Mirza when Shapsugs left their settlement for war with the Abkhazians. However, it did not succeed, and Baht Giray sent Cantimur to the Kalmyk Khan Cheren-Donduk (Çeren Dûndûk in Turkish).447
In October 1727, Mehmed, the trustee in charge of construction, was declared a traitor in charge of his assistance to Abkhazs and Kanpulad in their brigandage (hıyânet misüllü şekâvet ve tuğyânlarına i‘âne). The document gives background information about Mehmed’s disgrace that is significant to understand what was going on in this part of the frontier. People of Taman, Temrük, and Kızıltaş petitioned to Istanbul about their vulnerability to the attacks since their settlements were on the seafront. To control the passage between their region and Abkhaz’s country, Soğucak Fort had been built. However, on 12 August 1727, a group of Abkhazian brigands with eight boats and more than 300 men raided Adıçûn village in the region. The brigands enslaved 30 people and loaded one of the boats with salt, and escaped when the people of the other villages came Adıçûn’s help. İslam, the mütesellim (tax-collector and district governor) of Taman, chased them with some soldiers, sank one of the boats, and captured and killed some of the crew. The raiders withdrew to a place near Şagapke. Mehmed of Soğucak provided them with a boat to escape from there since he had close relations with the Abkhazians.
This was not the first misdeed of Mehmed; once Abdullah Pasha, a naval officer and tasked with the construction of Soğucak Fort, had sent a middleman to the Nogays to buy fourteen tubes of butter. They had loaded the butter to the boats and headed to Soğucak via the Kuban River. Since it was prohibited to pass out to
446 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 353.
447 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 461-462.
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sea from the river, the mütesellim of Taman and castle wardens of Kızıltaş controlled the boat and aimed to steer to the Taman port for the customs transactions. Mehmed’s treasurer showed up during this event and took seven of the butter tubes forcefully from the Taman officers and brought them to Soğucak. Then, Mehmed, his treasurer, and Kanpulad gathered their forces together, ambushed Kızıltaş, and took the boat from the Ottoman officers. The document underlines that this event had revealed his malignancy since he had dared to damage an Ottoman frontier fortification. Thus, vizier İbşir Hüseyin Pasha was ordered to arrest Mehmed and his treasurer and confine them in the fort.448 It is noteworthy that the Ottoman center faced difficulties controlling civil and military officials, as was the case in the previous chapter.
Although the document does not cite Cantimur and Baht Giray, this turbulence in the north-western Black Sea was probably closely related to the ongoing rebellion. The only commodity named in the document was salt, an indispensable ingredient for preserving food. The ambush took place in August when agricultural people are preparing their stocks for winter. Salt was also a strategic substance for animal husbandry. That year, the Ottomans imposed an embargo on these people to capture Cantimur and left them saltless. Therefore, the people of the Taman Peninsula with the saltern probably became the target of the Shapsugs.449 The Ottoman Porte attempted to control the Shapsugs with carrot and stick and we see that how an embargo on a critical material impacted people’s life. Moreover, there was probably an ongoing smuggling network under the supervision of the officers.
448 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 726.
449 İsmail Bülbül also interprets Shapsugs’ ambush in this way; however, he read the name of the village which the Shapsugs ambushed as “Edincik”. The village’s name is read as “ادیچون ” by the author of this thesis, so it is transliterated as “Adıçûn”. If the last letter is “ق” it might be transliterated as “Adıçok”, but even in this case, letter “ن” is absent in the word to be read as “Edincik”. İsmail Bülbül, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Kuban Boyunda Siyaset, Etnik Yapı Ve İktisat,” 86-87.
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Mehmed of Soğucak’s success in taking the tribal support to protect Abdullah Pasha’s interest proves its presence. In that regard, this document opened a window to find clues about the circumstances aftermath of the frontier’s official closure.
On the one hand, as indicated on many occasions, raiding other settlements and enslaving their residents was not unusual for frontier societies. A letter which was sent to vizier İbşir İbrahim Pasha and the kadis of Caffa, Taman, and Temrük in August 1727 informs us about the enslavement of free Ottoman subjects. The slave traders of Caffa, Taman, and Temrük had been trading free people and prisoners of war. Other than these people, the Dagestan (Dağıstan in Turkish) and Kumyk (Kumuk in Turkish) brigands were harming the people of Tiflis province, which was under Ottoman control. The document puts it thus:
Since bandits who come mostly from Dagestan and Kumyk are close to the province of Tiflis, they have ambushed and enslaved, both openly and secretly, the jizya-paying Georgian and Armenian subjects and Muslims who have been living there for a long time. They have sent them via the land route to the Nogays in Temrük, Taman, Yeni Kal‘a, Caffa, and Crimea, and they have been sold them there. Many of the aforementioned slaves escaped from their owners and came to you claiming they are free.450
Some slaves successfully proved that they were Muslim via witnesses from the Tiflis province. In contrast, some of them could not prove that they were Muslims and returned to their owners. Furthermore, these brigands were also attacking, enslaving Russian peasants, and selling them in the aforementioned Ottoman frontier cities in violation of the Treaty (hilâf-ı musâlaha). In that regard, İbrahim Pasha was ordered to inspect the issue and solve it in accordance with the sharia.451
In June 1729, a letter was sent to the Crimean notables announcing the Sultan’s approval of Gazi Şah Mirza’s election as the leader of the Şirins. Although it repeats the information related to the rebellious attitude of Cantimur and narrates his
450 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 582, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 21.
451 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 582.
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flight from Crimea, it also contains critical information that adds to our knowledge about the discontent. Between the lines, it is mentioned that “He [Cantimur] made it a practice that even during the campaigns, he provoked the bandits who followed him, took along the Tatars with insurrection and went back, before the return of Islam’s soldiers.”452 The document informs us that Azimet Beg Oğulları and Nogay Ağa Oğulları supported him in the uprising, and Murad Giray was with his brother Baht Giray. The Sultan states that there was no reason for the Crimeans to be concerned about the rebels anymore. However, to avoid their revenge, they were prohibited from entering Crimea. A Muslim scholar, Abdüssamed, who was from Cantimur’s retinue, was found guilty of having supported the rebellion, and even his brothers were prohibited from holding any office in the learned establishment.453 As a religious figure, Abdüssamed had probably helped to legitimate Cantimur’s cause, and he had been in the group who had delivered the petition for the dismissal of Saadet Giray.454 Since even his brothers were thrown out of the ulema stratum, we may assume that he had played a critical role in support of Cantimur’s uprising.
4.5.2 The Adil Giray rebellion
While Cantimur and Baht Giray’s rebellion was continuing, Kalgay Adil Giray joined the Bucak Nogays and started his rebellion after he was removed from his position. Only a year before, he had been a commander leading his soldiers to suppress the Cantimur rebellion, but now he was a rebel himself. His case is a good example of the volatility of the frontier dynamics during this early stage of the
452 “Seferlerde dahi hevâsına tâbi‘ eşkıyâyı tahrik ve ‘asker-i İslâmın ‘avdetinden mukaddem ‘asker-i Tatarı ihtilâl ile yanına alub girüye firâr eylemek ‘adet-i müstemirresi olub.” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 135, Gömlek No. 1223.
453 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 135, Gömlek No. 1223.
454 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 416.
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frontier’s closure. Çelebizade cites that Mengli Giray Khan ordered Kalgay Adil Giray to lead the Crimean army, which was assigned to Isfahan and Hamadan, but he refused to fulfill his duty. Thus, the Khan replaced him with Nureddin Selamet Giray in September 1727.455
The Bucak Nogays received a letter from the Ottomans in November/December 1727 to end their rebellion. The Nogays demanded the dismissal of Mengli Giray Khan and the enthronement of Kaplan Giray for the third time. Sultan Ahmed interpreted this demand as an explicit denial of his authority to appoint and dismiss the Crimean Khans. In the document, it is stressed that:
It is a prerogative of my caliphate to dismiss and change the Crimean khan. It has been 260 years since the people of Crimea pledged allegiance to my deceased and glorious ancestor, Ghazi Sultan Mehmed Khan the Father of Conquest (may God Almighty make him reside in the chambers of Heaven) and since they submitted to my Exalted State. [From then] until the present time, they have been persevering for the greatness of our state and exerting themselves along the borders in the service of religion and my Exalted State.456
The Sultan attempted to legitimize his power among the Crimeans by referring to the Şirin’s leader Eminek Mirza’s appeal to Sultan Mehmed II to support Mengli Giray I against Nur Devlet. In case of the malpractice of a Crimean Khan, the Crimean community petitions to the Ottoman Sultan this situation, and the Sultan replaces him with someone from the Giray Dynasty.
However, the Sultan underscores that the Bucak Nogays were settled in this region only 50 to 60 years ago, following the permission of the Crimean Khan and the Ottoman Sultan. In that regard, the Bucak Nogays accepted a Crimean sultan and
455 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1584; Seyyid Muhammed Rıza dates the dismissal of Adil Giray to February/March 1728. Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 426; Debar Śepatayim tells that Mengli Giray Khan ordered Adil Giray to campaign to the Abkhazians, however, he refused since both were appointed by the Ottomans. Shapira, “A New Source of Information on Circassians, Kabarda and the Kinjal Battle in the Early 18th Century”, 288.
456 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 862, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 22.
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sent a letter to the Sultan via the Muhafız of Bender. They declared that they do not want Mengli Giray and demanded Kaplan Giray’s enthronement, “although there is no previous example for their interference with the affairs related to the Crimean Khans.”457 The Sultan stressed that he inquired about Mengli Giray Khan among the Crimean notables, and they consented to his reign since he did not violate the sharia and did not commit any oppression. Therefore the Sultan admonished them to end the rebellion and said:
If you obey my order, which is obligatory to obey, disperse your gathering contrary to the sharia, send the aforementioned sultan to his çiftlik, return to your places of residence, and those of you who were evicted Moldovia may go back to your former yurts with my benevolent permission, there will not be any condemnation of you from my Exalted State.458
We learn from between the lines that there were Nogays who had been forced to evacuate Moldovia. That means that the problem of Halil Pasha Yurdu was still occupying the frontier’s agenda. A couple of months before the rebellion, in July 1727, they had been ordered to leave Moldovia, but the Halil Pasha Yurdu was not sufficient for all the Nogays. Therefore, the Nogays appealed to the Khan, so İsmail Geçidi and Akkirman officials were entrusted with their settlement in the empty places next to the Halil Pasha Yurdu.459 Çelebizade also underlines that the Nogays revolted because they resented their banishment from Moldovia.460 Furthermore, the Sultan threatened the rebels by sending his troops from Istanbul to Bucak.461 A fatwa from Behçetü’l-fetâvâ, the collection of Şeyhülislam Yenişehirli Abdullah Efendi (1718-1730)’s fatwas, deliver an opinion on the situation of the Bucak Nogays who
457 “Kırım Hanlarına müte‘allik umûra bir vechle müdâhaleleri mesbûkü’l-emsâl olmuş değil iken…” BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862.
458 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862, for the transliteration see Appendix A, 23.
459 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 520; Çelebizâde Tarihi refers the issue similar to the document. Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1571.
460 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1616.
461 BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862.
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commits the misdeeds aforementioned in the previous mühimme register. The şeyhülislam remarked that “All of them [the rebellious Bucak Nogays] became mutinous and if they insist on their rebellion and disorder, they must be executed.”462
Adil Giray also received a similar letter ordering him to give up the rebellion and return to his farm in Yanbolu.463 In a letter sent to Mengli Giray, the Sultan underlines that he permitted Mengli to stay in power and ordered him not to harm the insurgents if they submit to the Sultan’s order and leave the uprising.464 Nevertheless, the letters did not change the stance of the Bucak Nogays and Adil Giray. Several entries in the mühimme register from December 1727, nearly ten days after the letter sent to the Nogays, commanders of mainly the frontier forts to mobilize their troops to suppress the rebels. An order sent to the officials, and the people of İsmail Geçidi instructed them to prepare all the men who were able to fight since the region’s security was shattered, and the people were in fear of being raided. It also informs that Adil Giray did not go directly to his farm since he resented his dismissal and went to the Nogays and formed a rebellion. He also refused the imperial order three times, which demands his appeasement. Copies of the order were also sent to the civil and military personnel of Kili, Akkirman, Khotyn, Özi Silistre, Niğbolu, Çirmen, Kırkkilisa, Vize, Yeni Kal‘a, and the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldovia.465 The Ottoman Sultan mobilized almost all the Balkan troops as he threatened Adil Giray.
462 “Cümlesi bâğîler olup cemiyet ve fesadlarında ısrar ederlerse kıtâlleri lâzım olur.” Şeyhülislam Yenişehirli Abdullah Efendi, Behçetü’l-Fetâvâ, ed. Süleyman Kaya et al. (İstanbul: Klasik, 2011), 211-212.
463 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d], No. 134, Gömlek No. 863.
464 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 7, Gömlek No. 89; Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1616.
465 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Ali Emiri Ahmed III [AE.SAMD.III], No. 67, Gömlek No. 6754; a similar register of the letter is present in Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Hariciye [C.HR], No. 32, Gömlek No. 1556; For the letter which was sent to the Muhafız of Yeni Kal‘a see Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Ali Emiri Ahmed III [AE.SAMD.III], No. 115, Gömlek No. 11361.
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When the Khan campaigned against Adil Giray’s forces, the latter quickly left the resistance and appealed for mercy. Some Nogay leaders escaped to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; thus, the uprising ended. In March 1728, the rebels agreed to pay their taxes, as well as a thousand kese fine if they commit any crimes; they also agreed not to shelter the fugitive Nogays.466 However, in 1729, the Moldovian Voivode Grigore Ghica II succeeded in expelling the Nogays even from the two-hour territory with the help of Mengli Giray II. After the dismissal of Mengli Giray, the Nogays would receive the right to settle in the region and other Moldovian territories by paying taxes to the Moldovian Voivode. Nevertheless, the struggles between the Nogays and the Moldovians continued until the Ottoman lost Bucak in 1812.467
Adil Giray’s rebellion caused a power vacuum in the Kuban region. It was an opportunity for Baht Giray to control the region. As mentioned above, to receive the Kalmyks’ support, he offered to give the administration of the Yedisan Nogays in Kuban. However, only the Kutay Kıpçak tribe from Yediçekioğlu and the Nevruzoğlu tribe from Kusayoğlu obeyed Baht Giray, and the majority remained loyal to the Khanate. At the same time, since the Adil Giray Rebellion came to a quick end, the Kalgay and Ali Paşa, the Muhafız of Özi, moved to Kuban. Their arrival forced Baht Giray to escape to the mountain range. Although Raşid states that the Shapsugs expelled Cantimur due to the embargo and fear of conflict, Kırımî cites that Baht Giray transferred Cantimur to the Kalmyk Khan after a failed assassination attempt against Cantimur. Later on, Baht Giray went to Kalgay Sultan and appealed for mercy. He promised not to provoke the Nogays and the Circassians and not to
466 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1618.
467 Gemil, “Yeni Belgelere Göre ‘Halil Paşa Yurdu’,” 1019-1020; Feridun Emecen, “Osmanlılar Ve Kuzey Karadeniz Stepleri,” in Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset, ed. Adem Koçal (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 251.
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shelter Cantimur again; consequently, he was pardoned. Finally, the Kalmyks evacuated the region, and this threat disappeared.468 Seyyid Muhammed Rıza writes that it was heard that the Circassians killed Baht Giray.469 A Russian account reports that the Circassians killed Baht Giray in 1729 when the Kalmyks attempted to empower him in the Kuban.470
Çelebizade points out a significant problem about the Nogay tribes in the Kuban region. Later the Yedisan and Cemboyluk Nogays came to the region from the Volga (İtil in Turkish). Since they committed misdeeds following Baht Giray, they headed to the Volga, but the Nureddin convinced them to return and settled them near Crimea. It was also because they did not have good relations with the natives of Kuban, Kusayoğlu, and Circassian communities. On the one hand, the Kalmyks were raiding and bringing them to the Volga Region occasionally.471 This instance is valuable to understand the pressure over the frontier people within the shrinking border zones. Not only they were fighting against the central powers to save the open steppe, but they were also forced to undertake a fierce struggle with the other frontier communities to survive.
In 1730, the Patrona Halil Rebellion ended the reign of Sultan Ahmed III. The rebels caused the dismissal of Mengli Giray Khan, and Kaplan Giray ascended to the throne for the third and last time. Kırımî underlines that Kaplan Giray Khan decided to follow a favorable policy to terminate resentment among the notables and even
468 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1629-1630; Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” 461-462; Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı, 478-480.
469 Rıza, Es-Seb'ü's-Seyyâr, 428; For the depiction of the combat in which Baht Giray was killed see Shapira, “A New Source of Information on Circassians, Kabarda and the Kinjal Battle in the Early 18th Century,” 292-293.
470 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 192.
471 Özcan et al., eds., Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli, 1630.
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invited Cantimur Mirza to Crimea from the Limnos Island, where he had been living in exile.472
4.6 Concluding remarks
“Oh my Adil, it is not a piece of paper; it is an imperial decree/ It is something terrible/ I would say my Adil/[but I] am not willing to say.”473 These verses depict the arrival of the Ottoman call for war against the Safavids—from the Nogay mourning for Kalgay Adil Giray Sultan, whom the Safavids captured and executed in 1577.474 One hundred fifty years later, in 1727, another Kalgay Adil Giray refused to go to an Ottoman campaign against Iran and started a rebellion in Bucak. A decade before, Sultan Ahmed had appointed Kara Devlet Giray as the Crimean Khan since the descendants of Selim Giray Khan I had defaulted to bring the Crimeans to the Ottomans' assistance. Nevertheless, the Crimean tribal aristocracy did not accept Kara Devlet and forced the Ottomans to select a Khan from Selim Giray’s lineage.
The Ottomans failed in analyzing the perception of the Crimean tribal order and the Nogays. The Ottoman development of a northern policy that did not take into consideration the interests of these people not only alienated them from Istanbul but also decreased the power of the Khans in the system. To appease the dissent led by Cantimur, Mengli Giray Khan followed a divide-and-rule tactic. He was wise enough to understand that his power would not be enough to stand against the whole
472 Derin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbârına (Umdetü’t-Tevârih) Göre Kırım Tarihi”, 462-465.
473 Ay Adilim, kâğıt tuvıl, hat eken/Katı kelgen zat eken./Aytar edim, Adilim/ Aytpaga avızım barmaydı. Mustafa Yıldız, Nogay Halk Yırları, (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2010), 210.
474 For the life of Adil Giray Sultan see Alper Başer and Gülay Karadağ Çınar, “Kırım'dan İran'a Bir Cengizli Hanzadesi: Adil Giray Sultan ,” Alevilik Araştırmaları Dergisi The Journal of Alevi Studies 4 (December 2012): pp. 149-163.
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aristocracy. On the one hand, the Ottomans were trying to pull the Crimean cart whose shaft was broken by the frontier’s closure.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 An analysis of the period
As discussed in Chapter 1, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the sedentary empires corralled the steppe from all quarters and started to impinge its societies. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and Karlowitz (1699) were the demonstrations of the these empire’s eager to end the openness of the Eurasian Steppes. Therefore, this period was the first phase of the gradual disappearance of the age-old nomadism in the Eurasian Steppes that stretched from Manchuria to Eastern Europe. The Crimean Khanate at the westernmost edge of this vast geography was one of the last representatives of the polities in which nomads played a pivotal role. A notable number of Tatars in the Crimean peninsula had become sedentarized over time, but the Khanate’s actual strength relied on nomadic and semi-nomadic people. They made use of the endless prairie, bred different kinds of livestock, and rendered it possible for the Khanate to monetize the potential of the steppe. They were also the backbone of the Khan’s army and a formidable impediment to Russian expansion towards the South.
The emergence of armed vagabonds who became known as Cossacks at the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Muscovite Tsardom contested the nomad supremacy over the steppes. In that regard, cross-border offenses, raids, plunders, and enslavements of peasants became chronic for the people who inhabited both sides of the frontier. Although these conflicts slowed down the colonization of the open pastures, they constituted a significant income channel for the steppe dwellers; Crimean Tatars, Cossacks, and later on, the
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Kalmyks. Furthermore, it is interesting to see even in the early modernity steppe were allowing the huge population movements as in the case of the westward migration of the Kalmyks and Nogays. In that regard, the Treaties of Karlowitz and Istanbul demarcated the steppe, once open for free access of the nomads and people who wanted to walk away from the areas under central control. The treaties also criminalized border incursions and erased the frontier regions, at least on paper.
From the Ottoman perspective, it was difficult to avoid the permeability of the frontiers, and the region was quite remote from the center. Additionally, the Ottoman frontier officers and officials collaborated with the slave dealers and smugglers to receive a share from this lucrative income channel. The case of Mehmed, trustee of construction at Soğucak, and Azov’s janissaries who opposed the imperial order to return slaves demonstrate the extent to which local administrators were unwilling to give up the open nature of the frontier. The frontier had its unique interest groups whose concerns highly differed from that of the center. Peace might have meant prosperity for people who inhabited the core areas, whereas most probably, it did not mean the same thing for the dwellers of the Black Sea frontier. Nevertheless, despite this fact, the Ottomans succeeded in returning quite a significant number of slaves and stolen goods.
The decisive decay of the steppe would take nearly a hundred more years, but the closure of the frontier immediately took effect with the Gazi Giray Rebellion in 1699. The Bucak Nogays raided the Polish realms under the leadership of a resentful Giray Sultan. Devlet Giray Khan suppressed the rebellion, but nearly a year later, he and his Kalgay Saadet Giray became rebels when he was putting the plan of Daltaban Mustafa Pasha to declare war on Russia in action bypassing the dominant pacifist faction in the Ottoman center. Interestingly, the Ottoman Porte appointed all
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three of these once rebellious Girays as the Crimean Khan. Maybe, the Ottomans tolerated them since they appealed for mercy. Nevertheless, there was no infinite option for the Khanate because the Crimeans approved nobody other than those from Selim Giray’s lineage. As the sources presented, Selim, Kaplan, and Mengli Giray Khans did not challenge the Ottoman orders and the treaties; we see that general unrest was rooted in the tribal order and erupted as rebellions on several occasions. During the reign of Kaplan Giray, the karaçıs were not supportive of the Ottomans against the Habsburgs. The reign of Mengli Giray witnessed two serious rebellions, which were fueled by the tribal order. However, it is difficult to claim all the components of the Khanate amassed and revolted to the treaties altogether. When Gazi Giray rebelled, the Bucak Nogays supported him, but the same group did not support Devlet Giray in his revolt; even the dwellers of the peninsula did not. Cantimur could not mobilize the whole Şirin tribe in the revolt against Mengli Giray but allied with Baht Giray. Thus, it shows that even if a group had resentment, the personal interests and linkages were quite decisive in the formation of these recalcitrations.
Krolikowska claims that Devlet Giray abdicated the throne in 1702 not to recalcitrate against the Ottomans, although he received the support of his people. According to the author, despite the Ottomans’ disapproval, Mehmed III Giray succeeded in ruling the Khanate in the 1620s. In that regard, she claims that there must have been a breaking point in the “second half of the seventeenth century,” which changed the character of Ottoman-Crimean relations and rendered the Khans more submissive to the Ottoman rule but when it altered is still undetermined.475 The
475 Natalia Królikowska, “Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth–Eighteenth Centuries),” in The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries , ed. Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 63-65.
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true breaking point was the signing of the treaties closing the frontier. First of all, Devlet Giray attempted to put up a struggle against the Ottomans; however, as indicated in the third chapter, the Nogays withdrew their backing, which they had promised. Secondly, the Khan estranged himself from his vassals while fulfilling the duties assigned by the Ottoman Sultan, such as punishment for disobedience and returning the spoils. For example, the Bucak Nogays were exposed to severe persecution during his reign. Krolikowska also underlines that the adherence of the Khans to the Ottoman orders rendered the Tatars resentful. Gazi Giray Khan also faced a similar fate when the Bucak Nogays, who had once supported his cause in the rebellion, appealed to Yusuf Pasha to establish direct Ottoman control over the region. In 1724, Saadet Giray did not even dare to struggle when his vassals gathered under the leadership of Cantimur against him. Thirdly, during the war with Venice and the Habsburgs (1714-1718), the Ottomans were forced to consent to the Crimean tribal aristocracy’s will and deposed Kara Devlet Giray and appointed Saadet Giray to draw them to the war. Also, as Krolikowska cites, the Crimeans could push the Ottomans to dismiss a Khan, as they did against Kara Devlet. Therefore, it seems contradictory to argue that Devlet Giray left the struggle despite the support of the Crimeans.
Thus, the stances of the actors in Crimean politics, mainly the Ottoman Porte, the Khan, karaçı begs, and the vassal tribes at the outskirts altered according to their contradicting interest and power in time. However, it is apparent that the treaties restricted the Khans’ power and weakened the subordination of the components to the Khanate. That is why Mengli II Giray followed a divide and rule policy against his vassals to diffuse the tension. At this point, it should be boldly underlined that even though the closure of the Black Sea frontier might not have always been the
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direct reason for the unrest and rebellions in the presented period, it generated several side effects that had been contributed to the discontent. Firstly, it decreased the total revenue of the Khanate and opened the way for severe competition for the limited resources among the components of the polity. Secondly, when a Khans remained to stick to the Ottoman center’s orders not to violate the treaties, the tribal aristocracy and the Nogays alienated from the Khan. Thirdly, in the reverse case, if a Khan followed the interest of the tribes and adopted a warlike policy as Devlet Giray did in 1702, he took the Ottomans’ anger on himself. This dichotomy stuck the Crimean Khans in a gridlock that shrunk their political power.
On the one hand, Bucak and Kuban turned into shelters for disappointed Girays and Crimean grandees since the Ottomans turned a deaf ear to their complaints and problems. Baht Giray and Cantimur found a base in Kuban, and the Bucak Nogays welcomed Adil Giray. On the other hand, the people who could not acquiesce to the restrictions of the Treaties embarked on a quest for a savior to bring back the open steppe, as Bulavin aimed to achieve. In such an atmosphere, the Khans were forced to apply a gentle administration to hold together their vassals while carrying out the Treaties’ obligations. Therefore, Ottoman-Crimean relations experienced a radical change when the Crimeans lost control of the steppes as well as their prestigious position as mediators of the Ottomans’ northern policy.
Another reason that undermined the power of the Khans was their excessive exploitation of vassals to make up for their loss of income from tribute, raids, and plunders. The Circassians lost their zeal to be subjects of the Khanate when the Crimeans attempted to compensate for what they lost by the Treaties from them. In the West, Nogays of the Halil Pasha Yurdu started to settle in the Moldovan territory since their land was not sufficient anymore. They were also prevented from raiding
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and extracting revenue from the other side of the border. Thus, the Khanate and its vassals were locked within a defined territory with limited resources. As Sam White presented in his study, Ottoman Anatolia and Syria witnessed a settled-nomad conflict because of the early seventeenth-century instabilities, in a way, the conflicts between the settled Moldovians and semi-nomad Nogays in the early eighteenth century was most probably rooted in the post-war turbulence of the frontier region.
Unfortunately, the sources analyzed in this thesis do not include explicit information about the stance of the agricultural-settled Crimean society in this turbulence. Self-sufficient Crimean villagers were probably not keen on waging war since that meant an additional tax load for them. However, the Crimean agrarian elite and the landholders from the tribal background were not happy with the cessation of the slave flow because they relied on slave labor to cultivate the land. Similarly, the urban dwellers and merchants should have been dissatisfied with the new modus vivendi since the Crimean entrepots lost their zeal because of the same reason. The situation of eighteenth-century Crimea is well fitted in İsenbike Togan’s peripheralization definition; the treaties rendered the Khanate lacked external revenue, which was indispensable for steppe societies, and disabled the Crimeans to recover and threaten the Russian Empire.
Moreover, the continuous southward Russian expansion threatened even what remained in the Crimean Tatars’ hands. Therefore, the unending dissent and challenging the Khans’ authority became chronic for the Crimean Khanate by 1699. The nineteenth-century historian Halim Giray comments, pointing to the upheaval led by Cantimur, while all the Russian grandees were supporting Peter and Katerina
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in the struggles against the Khanate, the Crimeans were struggling with one another because of their ignorance.476
5.2 Aftermath
This thesis has discussed the developments that took place after the Karlowitz Treaty of 1699 until the end of Mengli Giray Khan’s reign in 1730. However, as stressed previously, this date was not the end of every problem brought by the frontier’s closure for free access of nomads and criminalization of cross-border offenses. The period portrayed the initial reactions to the Treaties bending the thousand-years steppe tradition. In this part, only some hints were shared to demonstrate the continuation of the resentment of the frontier societies.
Kaplan Giray Khan ascended to the throne after the dismissal of Mengli Giray Khan in 1730. However, his reign kept the northern borderland a hotspot because of disputes in succession after the Polish King August’s death. A document from November/December 1732 informs us that the Ottomans were uneasy because of the Russian attempts to enthrone August’s son and turn the succession into a hereditary one. Four points attract our attention; the first is Sultan Mahmud’s (1730-1754) praise for the Khan since he adhered to the Peace Treaty and the second is the Russian attack on Circassia. Thirdly, Sultan Mahmud commanded the Khan to be on full alert vis-a-vis the Russian moves, and fourthly the Khan was ordered to make sure that the Crimean soldiers did not take even one step beyond the Russian and Polish borders.477
The record of the Turkish translation of Tsarina’s letter from February 1736 presents us with the ongoing debates between the parties. The Russian soldiers
476 Halim Giray, Gülbün-i Hânân, 142-143.
477 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 7, Gömlek No. 225.
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violated the Crimean border, but according to the Tsarina, the Khan and Tatars encroached on the Russian border first, and the Russian move was a punitive action to drive them out of the Russian border. She also claims that the Russian soldiers in the borderlands had been assigned for the issues in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; they had returned to their winter quarters and had no concern with the Ottomans.478
In November 1747, the Kyiv Commander sent a letter to the Crimean Khan about the Nogays’ border incursion. Because of the drought, the Nogays did not have enough grass for their animals, crossed to the Russian side, and harassed the Koşavi Cossacks who hunted around the Azov Sea. When the Russian officials warned them to return, they replied that the region belongs to the Crimean Khanate. Therefore, the commander requested the Khan to draw the Nogays back from the Russian domain. The Khan replied to his claim by requesting to return the Cossacks who had settled in the Ottoman territories.479
In 1748, people from the Yedisan Nogays, who were the people of Ak Mehmed Mirza, stole a herd of wild horses from the Koşavi Cossacks, who were the subjects of Russia, in Garde. The Crimean Khan ordered the Serasker of Bucak Hacı Giray Sultan to gather the horses and give them back. The temessük issued by the Garde polygon commander (poligon begi) and Koşavi chargeman (barutçı) shows that Hacı Giray succeeded in returning the horses and the Cossacks withdrew from the lawsuit.480
In 1756, an internal turmoil emerged in the Yedisan Horde, the region beyond the Dnieper from Bucak. Khan Halim Giray and the Crimean sultans, in charge of
478 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Hariciye [C.HR], No. 154, Gömlek No. 7685.
479 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Hariciye [C.HR], No. 96, Gömlek No. 4800.
480 The present place of Garde could not be located. Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Name-i Hümayun Defterleri [A.DVNSNMH.d], No. 2, Gömlek No. 88.
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the region, failed to control the course of events, and the Giray claimants to the throne, Hacı and Kırım Girays, manipulated the disgruntled Nogays to pave the way for Halim Giray’s dismissal. Then, in 1757, a severe drought caused a grain shortage in Istanbul and the Crimean Peninsula, so the Khan pushed the people of Özi Kırı and Bucak to send grains for the provisioning of Crimea. In such an atmosphere, Hacı and Kırım Girays incited the Nogays to raid Moldovia. The rebellion ended when the Ottomans appointed Kırım Giray as the Crimean Khan under the condition that to return the raided properties and restore the grain flow from the region to Istanbul.481 Although the actors were different, the scenario was more or less the same as the previous rebellions of Gazi, Devlet, and Baht Girays.
Will Smiley’s study shows that the issue of the border between the Ottomans and the Russians continued to be on the table through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For instance, the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774 contains an article to return the deserted subjects to their country that the grand vizier instructed the Moldovian Voivode to solve a problem of fugitive according to the Treaty. However, it is still difficult to claim that the Black Sea frontier was controlled and closed totally. In the early nineteenth century, numerous Russian peasants escaped to the Ottoman domain but returned to Russia based on the treaties.482 The treaties of Karlowitz and Istanbul were the first footsteps of age-old and intricate affairs in closing the open steppes which in each encounter, the parties developed and detailed the clauses of the treaties for border control.
481 İsmail Bülbül, “Yedisan-Bucak Nogaylarının 1756 Ve 1758 İsyanları,” Türk Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi / Journal of Turkish History Researches 1, no. 1 (2016): 74-113.
482 Will Smiley, “The Burdens of Subjecthood: The Ottoman State, Russian Fugitives and Interimperial Law 1774-1869,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46, no. 1 (2014): 76-77.
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APPENDIX A
THE TRANSLITERATED TEXTS
OF THE QUOTED ARCHIVAL OTTOMAN DOCUMENTS
1. BOA, A.DVNSNHM, No.5, Gömlek No. 138
“…iki cenkden evvel Leh vilâyetinin sınur-ı kadîmîsi dâhilinde olan Kamaniçe kal‘ası içünde olan ‘askeri ihrâc ve tahliye olunmağla bütün kâle ve ba‘de’l-yevm Podolya ve Ukranya vilâyetlerinden Devlet-i ‘Aliyyem tarafından bir dürlü ‘alâka olmaya ve sonra nasb olunub Boğdan içinde oturan Ukranya Kazağı hetmanı ref‘ oluna.”
2. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 5, Gömlek No. 140
“…ve bu sulh u salâhın şerâîtini ri‘âyet lâzıme-i ‘ırz u nâmûs-ı saltanatımdan iken Bucak tarafına me’mûr olan Gazi Giray Sultân Nogaylu ile yekdil olub bilâ-fermân kendi rey-i sahîfine ittibâ‘ ile Leh memleketi içine çapul idüb re‘âyâsını esir ve istirkâk ve eşyâlarını nehb ü gâret idüb hilâf-ı ‘ahd ü peymân bu şekil harekete cesâret eyledüği bundan akdem mesmû‘-ı hümâyûnumuz oldukda ol çapulda alınan üserâ ve eşyâ her ne ise buldurılub bir yerde cem‘ ve üzerlerine mu‘temed-i ‘aliyye mîrzâlar ta‘yîn ve eshâb ve evtânlarına gönderilüb…”
3. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 110, Gömlek No. 2907
“Lehlü ile olan mevâdd-ı sulhden birisi Devlet-i ‘Aliye’ye tâbi‘ olan esnâf-ı ‘asker bâ-husûs tavâîf-i Tatar bir dürlü ‘illet ve bahâne ve mutâlebe ile Leh re‘âyâsına ta‘addî ve sınurlarına tecâvüz eylemek ve esîr ve tavar sürmek ve aher vechle zarar eylemeğe kâdir olmaya vüzerâ ve beglerbegleri ve Kırım hanı ve kağılgayı ve nûre’d-dîni ve sâ’ir sultânlara ve Boğdan voyvodasına sarâhaten evâmir-i şerîfe ile tenbîh ve te’kîd oluna ki sınurların nizâmını ve bu barışıklık levâzımını kemâl-i ihtimâm ile ri‘âyet ve sıyânet eyleyeler esîr almağla ve hayvânât sürmekle ve gayri vechle Leh re‘âyâsına zarar eylemeyüb sulh u salâhın şerâ’itine muhâlefet ile ihtilâle bâ‘is olanları teftîş idüb zâhir oldukda aher mûceb-i ‘ibret içün haklarından geleler ve gasb olunan eşyâ dahi her ne ise buldurılub sâhiblerine redd oluna.”
4. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 110, Gömlek No. 2907
“Kırım Hanı Devlet Giray Han dâmet me‘âlihu dahi me’mûr olmuşdur ol tarafa vardıkda anınla müşâvere ve müzâkere idüb bu emr-i mühimmi yerine getüresin amâ sen han-ı müşârünileyhe müterakîb483 olmayub ayru varub üserâ tağılmadan ellerinden alub istihlâsına sa‘y eyleyesin.”
483 The word should have been written as “müterâkib”, but in the documente it was written as in the transliterated form.
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5. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No.111, Gömlek No. 1881
“Bundan akdem Kırım’da Şirin beylerinden olan Rektemür kendü hâlinde olmayub dâ’imâ şenâ‘at ve şekâvet üzere olmağla bil-fi‘il Kırım hanı olan Devlet Giray Han (dâmet me‘âlihu)ya Kırım’da olan ‘ulemâ ve sulehâ ve mirzayân ma‘rifetiyle ahz olunub hakkından gelmek üzere niyet eyledikleri haber olmağla firâr ve Yanbolu’ya geldiği şefâh-ı ‘ilâm eyledikde ahz olunmak ferman olunmuşdur Nogaylu taifesi içine girüb dürlü dürlü itti‘az-ı fitneye bâdî olub…”
6. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No.5, Gömlek No. 195
“Ol makûle müfsidini Nogaylu içinden ihrâc ve ib‘âd ve kat‘-ı ‘urûk ve fesâdı müstetbi‘ olunduğundan gayri biraz eyyâmdan berü tevâlüd ü tenâsül ile mütekâsir oldukları hasebiyle Halîl Paşa Yurduna sığmaz olduk deyü îrâd eyledikleri ‘illet ve bahâneleri mündefi‘ olmağla müsâ‘ade-i ‘aliyye-i mülûkânemiz olmağın.”
7. BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 878, Gömlek No. 43
“Benim sa‘âdetlü sultânım Bucak serhadd-i ahvâl-i havâdîsden su’âl buyurulur ise bundan mukaddem Lih vilâyetinden gelan adamlar Lihlünün ‘azim ‘asker tedâriki vardır deyü haber virmeleri ile iki eyüce söz anlar ve ol tarafların ahvâline vukuf adamlar göndermiş idük iyle haber getürmüşler dirsin Lih kıralunun ‘azîm ‘asker tedâriki olub ve kendü zabtında olan ‘Adâ Kazağını Moskova kralına yardım virüb ve ol dahi ‘azîm ‘asker tedârik idüb Kırım üzerine hareketde olduğın…”
8. BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 687, Gömlek No. 17
“Bundan akdem deryaya çıkan Ten Kazağının şaykaları Özi Boğazına uğrayub geldiklerinde Özi’de olan beş kayık ile karşularına çıkub gice nısfında sabâha dek cenk olunub Özi gâzîlerinden otuz[dan]484 ziyâde şehîd ve otuz mikdârı mecrûh olub ol mahalden melâ‘în-i hâsırîn fırsat bulub içerü ve boğaza kaçub geldikleri hâlde sa‘âdetlerine ‘arzi‘lâm olunmuş idi melâ‘în-i mezbûrdan geçüb gitdiklerinden iki gün sonra iki büyük hetmanına ve Ada hetmanına mektûblar yazub adam gönderilmiş idi bu firâk Azakdan çıkub bu kadar mahrûse-i pâdişâhî-i gâret ve ümmet-i muhammedi esîr idüb adalarına toğru gitdiler imdi sizlerden lâyık ve lâzım olan budur ki vardıklarında kabûl itmeyüb ellerinde olan esîrleri darben ve kahren alub bu cânibe gönderesin ki biz dahi sizin sulhe ıslâh-ı ri‘âyet ve etdiğiniz hizmetin vukû‘ı üzere der-i devlet-medâra ‘arz i‘lâm idelim yohsa bunlar ruhsat virüb oturacak ve turacak yer virilürse bu denlü zamândan berü istihkâm üzere olan sulha bir halel irişdirmege sebeb olurlar bunları kayırub haklarından gelmeniz lâzımdandır.”
484 In the document, the word of “otuz” is followed by letter “ه” but in the context, it is more proper to read as otuz[dan].
168
9. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 1515
“Cânib-i Devlet-i ‘Aliyyemden üzerlerine ta‘yîn olunan zâbitlerine itâ‘at idüb bir dürlü nâ-sezâ ve nâ-ma‘kûl hareketleri yoğ iken Kırım tarafından biraz ‘askerleriyle Sa‘âdet Giray Sultân Bucağa gelüb ve ba‘zı ahvali485 mütezammin bunlara mahzar-ı mühür idüb kat‘â sun‘ları olmayub.”
10. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 1968
“Boğdan memleketinin hudûdı dâhilinde olub Bucak tarafından nehr-i Prut’a varınca vâki‘ arâzîde tevâîf-i Nogay ve sâ’ir kabâ’il-i Tatardan ba‘zıları kışlak ve çiftlikler ihdâs itmeleriyle cizye-güzâr Boğdan re‘âyâsından ba‘zılara varub zikr olunan kışlak ve çiftliklerde tavattun ve ihtifâ‘ ve eshâbına istitâr ve ilticâ ile Boğdan voyvodalarına itâ‘ate ve cizye ve sâ’ir tekâlifi virmeyüb anların cizye ve harâclarına düşen tekâlîf dahi sâ’ir re‘âyâ üzerine tahmîl olunmağla ‘adem-i istitâ‘atlerinden nâşî perâkende ve perişân ve memleketi-i merkûmenin nice nevâhî ve kurâsı dahi ‘an er-ra‘iyya kalub.”
11. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 114, Gömlek No. 601
“Özi Vâlisi Vezîr Yûsuf Paşa’ya hüküm ki Han-ı sâbık Bucak tarafında çiftlik kethüdâsı Ramazân nâm kimesneyi musâlahat zımnında Leh vilâyetine gönderdikde Nogay ve Bucak Tatarından ba‘zıları ticâret içün bârgir ve gayri emti‘a ile bile gidüb hâlâ geldiklerinden Leh memleketi nevâhisinde Ukrayna’da mütemekkin Rus re‘âyâsından otuz nefer nüfûs bile getürüb esîrleri olmak üzere bey‘ ü ferâ‘ eylediklerinde sen ki vezîr müşârünileyhsin mesfûrlara vâzi‘ü’l-yed olan Tatarları ve zikr olunan re‘âyâyı getürdüb sû’âl eyledikden tâcir-i merkûmede olan Rus re‘âyâsının ‘isyânlarından nâşî Leh kralı tarafından ‘asker ile üzerlerine ta‘yîn olunan Hetman-ı mezbûrları esîr eyledikden sonra Tatarlardan iştirâ eyledikleri eşyâ bahâsîçün virdiler deyü tekarrür ve hetmandan bu vech üzere mühürlü kâğıd ibrâz eylemeyüb iken bu makûle keferenin kendü memleketlerinde istirkâk eyledikleri kefere re‘âyâsının bey‘ ü şirâsı meşrû‘ mıdır değil midir deyü iştibâh ve meşrû‘ olduğı sûretde Nogaylu ve Bucaklu içinde bulmamak içün cümlesi def‘eten tüccâra bey‘ ve diyâr-ı ahere nakl olunmak münâsib olduğını kâ’imen ile i‘lâm eyledüğin ecilden husûs-ı mezbûr istiftâ olundukda mene‘a sâhib olan kefere dârü’l-harbde birbirleri üzerlerine istîlâ ve ahz ve takyîd itdükleri üserâlara mâlik olub ve ahire bey‘ ü şirâsı meşrû‘ olmağla vezîr-i müşârünileyhsin münâsib gördüğün vech üzere istirkâk olunan mesfûrların cümlesinin def‘eten tüccâra bey‘ ve bu tarîk-ile diyâr-ı ahere nakl eylemen içün yazılmışdır.”
12. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 599
“Tatar tâ’ifesi Azaklu ve Kirmânludan bu kadar âdem ü tavâr aldı deyü iddi‘â idersiz tâ’ife-i Tatar ise Azaklu ve Kirmânlu bizden aldıkları dahi ziyadedir deyü cevâb iderler ol zamânda bu ana gelince alınan nesnelerin zâyi‘ ve telef oluşı çokdur ve iki
485 In the document, “ا” letter is absent right after the letter “و”, so it is transliterated as “ahval” instead of “ahvâl”.
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tarafda külliyet ile istirdâd mümkün değildir ancak tarafeynden hüsn-i muvâfakat ile âdemden ve tavâr ve eşyadan mevcûde bulunanlar eshâbına redd olunub ıslâh-ı zâtü’l-beyn olunmaludur.”
13. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 114
“bundan akdem Halîl Paşa Yurduna îvâ ve iskân olunan kabâ’il-i Nogaydan Nayman ‘aşîretinden Kel Mehmed ve Koñrat ‘aşîretinden Yusuf ve Tin Ahmed nâm mîrzâlar hevâlarına tâbi‘ sâ’ir mîrzâlar ve nökerleri olan Tatarlar ile ittifâk ve Nayman ‘aşîretini basub beş nefer âdemlerin katl ve yurdların ihrâk ve ‘aşîret-i mezbûrenin kapularında ve tarlalarında olan terekelerin gasben zabt idüb…”
14. BOA, AE.SAMD.III, No. 172, Gömlek No. 16831
“Bundan akdem Devlet-i ‘Aliyye-i ebed-peyvendimin sâye-i himâyetine ilticâ idüb itâ‘at u inkıyâd üzere olan Barabaş ve Potkalluların seby ü istirkâkları memnû‘atdan iken sâbıkan Kırım Hanı olan Devlet Giray Han tarafından dil ahz içün irsâl olunan Tatar ‘askeri vech-i meşrûh üzere itâ‘at u inkıyâd üzere olan Barabaş ve Potkallulardan bir mikdârını esîr olmak üzere ahz idüb ve hâlâ Bender’de olan Barabaşlu ve Kardaşım ormanında olan Potkallulardan oldukları haber virilmeleriyle ol makûlelerin istirkâklarına kat‘an rızâ-yı hümâyûnum olmayub her kimin yeddinde bulunurlar ise ‘ale’l-hâl ahz ve Bender’de olan Barabaş hetmânı ma‘rifetiyle sebyleri tahliye olunmak fermânım olub.”
15. BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 224
“Yanboluk halkı mâddesi ise tâ’ife-i merkûme Kalmuk hanı Ayuka Han ile bile konub göçici ve diledikleri mahalle gidüb gelici bir kavim olub ve Ayuka Han kimesnenin zîr-i hükûmetinde olmayub müstakillen elçisi gelür gider tâ’ifedendir ve dâ’imâ kendü hâllerinde turmayub Nogaylu tarafına îsâl mazarrâtından hâlî olmamalarıyla Nogaylunun dahi Kalmuk üzerine varması mücerred ahz-i intikâm içün olduğundan mâ‘adâ Kalmuk husûsı şerâît-i musâlahaya dâhil olan mevâddan değildir.”
16. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 126, Gömlek No. 680
“Özi Geçidinden ba‘zı kimesneler Kırım hanına esîr göndermeleriyle mâdâmki cenâb-ı emâret-me’âb eyâlet-nisâb sa‘âdet-iktisâb hâlâ Kırım Hanı olan Sa‘âdet Giray Han (dâmet- me‘âlihu) tarafından senedi olmayanı ‘ubûr itdirilmemek içün han-ı müşârünileyh tarafından sana tevcîh ve sipâriş olunmuşiken yine ol makûleler bilâ sened Kırım cânibine ‘ubûr itdirildiği istimâ‘ olmağla imdi işbu emr-i şerîfim vusûlünde fîmâba‘d Kırım cânibine menzil ile gidenlerden mâ‘adâ ol makûle üserâ ile Kırım cânibine gitmek murâd idenleri mâdâm ki han-ı müşârünileyhin taraflarından yedlerinde senedleri olmadıkça Özi Geçidinden karşu yakaya ‘ubûr itdirmeyüb.”
170
17. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 130, Gömlek No. 1240
“Bundan akdem Kabartay ekâbirinden İslâm Beg Moskovlu tarafından mükâleme bahânesiyle da‘vet ve Terek Kal‘asında habs itmeleriyle hilâf-ı şurût-ı musâlaha han kal‘a-i merkûmede mahbûs olduğun han-ı müşârünileyh tarafından i‘lâm olunub memâlik-i mahrûsetü’l-mesâlikimden ve derîn-i Kefe ve Karasu ve Taman bâzargânları elli dört ‘arabaya iki yüz keselikden mütecâviz emti‘a ve eşyâ tahmîl ve ticâret ile Kumuk memleketi tarafına revâne olub giderler iken nehr-i Kuban taşrasında Karanuk nâm suyun nehr-i Kumuya vâsıl olduğı mahalle nüzûllerinde çar-ı müşârünileyhe tâbi‘ Topal Yovan nâm Kazak nehr-i Ten Kalmuğıyla ma‘an mahall-i merkûme üzerlerine gelüb cenk ü kitâl ve bi’l-cümle emvâl u eşyâları nehy ü gâret ve esnâ-yı cenkde müşehhiden fevt olanlarından gayri hayyen ahz eylediklerini dahi bi’l-külliye katl itmeleriyle.”
18. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 130, Gömlek No. 1240
“Moskov memleketi ile nehr-i Kuban sâhili ‘arz-ı hâli olan sahrâlardan Nogaylu tâ’ifesi kuş yuvalarından balaban ve toğan yavrısı aldıklarından bu def‘a dahi ol sekiz ‘aded Nogaylu mahall-i mezbûrda balaban ve toğan yavrısı düşürüb gelür iken Sal nâm mahalle nüzûllerinde çar-ı müşârünileyhe tâbi‘ bir Büyük Kazak üzerlerine gelüb ‘alâ gafle basub on altı nefer Nogaylu ele düşüb ve iki neferi firâr ve gelüb haber virdikleri dahi i‘lâm olmağla.”
19. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 1254
“Baht Giray Cantimur-ı makhûrun yanından ayrılub Kuban tarafına varub vâfir Kalmuk eşkıyâsını başına cem‘ ve etrâf u eknâfa îsâl-i haşarata tasaddî itmekle eşkıyâ-yı merkûmenın kahr u tedmîrleri içün han-ı müşârünileyh tarafından halefü’s-selâtînü’l-‘azâm hâlâ Kalgay olan ‘Adil Giray (dâme ‘uluvvuhu) Kırım ve Bucak ve Kuban ve Potkalı Kazakları ve sâ’ir tevâ’if-i ‘askeriyeden ‘asâkir-i mevfûre ile me’mûr olunmağla.”
20. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 1264
“…eger bu iş suhûletle husûle gelmeyecek olursa mâlik-i mahrûsemden ve Kara Deniz iskelelerinden Abaza vilâyetine esvâb ve alât ve tuz ve sâ’îr me’kûlat ve malzeme gönderüb alışveriş iden tüccâr ve Abaza bâzargânları gelişden ile Abaza vilâyetine gitmekden men‘ ve ahz ü habs olunduktan…”
21. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 582
“Tiflis eyâletinden dahi ra‘iyyet ile cizye kabûl iden Gürci ve Ermeni re‘âyâlarından ve ehl-i İslâmdan olub kadîmî ol havâlîde tavattun idenlerden ekseriyyet Dağıstan ve Kumuk eşkıyâsı eyâlet-i mezkûreye mülâsık olmak takrîbi ile serren ve ‘alenen buldukları mahallerde basub esîr idüb berren Nogay içinde Temrük ve Taman ve
171
Yeni Kal‘a ve Kefe ve Kırım taraflarına gönderüb fürûht itmeleriyle üserâ-yı merkûmenin nicesi eshâbı yeddinden firâr ve hürlük iddi‘âsıyla tarafına varmağın.”
22. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862
“Kırım Hanlarının ‘azl ü tasyîrleri cenâb-ı hilâfet-meâbıma mahsûs olmağla Kırım ahâlisi merhûm ve mağfiret-nişân cedd-i emâcidim Ebû’l-feth Gâzî Sultân Mehmed Han (eskenehu Allah-u te‘âlâ fî gurefi’l-cenân) hazretlerine bî‘at ve taraf-ı itâ‘at-i Devlet-i ‘Aliyyemi zîver-i gerdun-i486 ‘ubûdiyyet ideli iki yüz altmış seneden berü hâzırda uluvv-ı devletimizle da‘iyyesine müdâvemet ve sugurlarda487 sarf-ı taviyyet ile dîn ü devlet-i ‘aliyyem hidmetinde bezl ü say‘ ü kudret ide gelmeleriyle.”
23. BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862.
“Fermân-ı vâcibü’l-imtisâlime itâ‘at ve imtisâl iderseniz hilâf-ı şer‘ olan cem‘iyyetinizi tağıdub ve sultân-ı mûmâileyhi fermânım olan çiftliğine irsâl ve her biriniz yerlü yerinize ve Boğdan toprağından ref‘ olunanlar dahi merâhim-i şefkat-perver-i mülûkânemde bu def‘a emr-i şerîfimle müsâ‘ade-i hümâyûnum olduğı üzere kadîmî yurdlarınıza girü giderseniz taraf-ı Devlet-i ‘Aliyyemden bir dürlü mu’aheze olunmaz.”
486 In this word, the letter “و” is absent after the letter “د”, so it is transliterated as “gerdun” instead of “gerdûn”.
487 The word lacks the letter “و” after the letter “غ” so it is transliterated as “sugur” instead of “sugûr”.
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APPENDIX B
MAP OF THE GEOGRAPHY
This map is drawn by the author by relying on the maps included in the following sources; M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi (1451-1590) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998); Kurat, Prut Seferi; Boeck, Imperial Boundaries. The rivers (except the Dnieper River) were approximately drawn to concretize them on the map, in that regard that they might not overlap with their exact geographic location. The base map is received from Google, “Google Maps.” Accessed June 2021.
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APPENDIX C
LINEAGE OF THE CRIMEAN KHANS (1699-1730)
Selim I Giray Khan
Selim I Giray Khan
(r. 1671
(r. 1671--78, 168478, 1684--91, 91, 16921692--99, 170299, 1702--04) 04)
Devlet II Giray Khan
Devlet II Giray Khan (r. 1699(r. 1699--1702, 17081702, 1708--13)13)
Baht Giray Sultan
Baht Giray Sultan
Gazi III Giray Khan (r.
Gazi III Giray Khan (r. 17041704--07)07)
Kaplan I Giray Khan
Kaplan I Giray Khan (r. 1707(r. 1707--08, 171308, 1713--16, 16, 17301730--36)36)
Saadet III Giray Khan
Saadet III Giray Khan (r. 1717(r. 1717--24)24)
Mengli II Giray Khan
Mengli II Giray Khan (r. 1724(r. 1724--30, 173730, 1737--40)40)
Selamet Giray Khan
Selamet Giray Khan
(r. 1608
(r. 1608--10)10)
Adil Giray Sultan
Adil Giray Sultan
[Kara] Devlet III Giray
[Kara] Devlet III Giray Khan (r. 1716Khan (r. 1716--17)17)
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REFERENCES
PRIMARY SOURCES
Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archaives)
Ali Emiri Mustafa II
BOA, AE.SMST.II, No. 2, Gömlek No. 139.
Ali Emiri Ahmed III
BOA, AE.SAMD.III, No. 67, Gömlek No. 6754.
BOA, AE.SAMD.III, No. 115, Gömlek No. 11361.
BOA, AE.SAMD.III, No. 172, Gömlek No. 16831.
BOA, AE.SAMD.III, No. 232, Gömlek No. 22187.
Cevdet Dahiliye
BOA, C.DH, No. 32, Gömlek No. 1559.
Cevdet Hariciye
BOA, C.HR, No. 22, Gömlek No. 1054.
BOA, C.HR, No. 32, Gömlek No. 1556.
BOA, C.HR, No. 154, Gömlek No. 7685.
BOA, C.HR, No. 96, Gömlek No. 4800.
Mühimme Defterleri
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 110, Gömlek No. 2907.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 111, Gömlek No. 406.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No.111, Gömlek No. 1881.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 238.
BOA, .DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 250.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 1515.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 1517.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 112, Gömlek No. 1527.
175
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 114, Gömlek No. 571.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 114, Gömlek No. 601.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 599.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 1968.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2059.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No.. 2310.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2311.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2313.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2599.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2637.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 115, Gömlek No. 2831.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 116, Gömlek No. 1109.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 116, Gömlek No. 374.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 116, Gömlek No. 588.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 116, Gömlek No. 920.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 116, Gömlek No. 1273.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 126, Gömlek No. 678.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 126, Gömlek No. 680.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 127, Gömlek No. 1036.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 127, Gömlek No. 1326.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 129, Gömlek No. 128.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 129, Gömlek No. 307.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 129, Gömlek No. 499.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 129, Gömlek No. 442.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 130, Gömlek No. 1240.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 132, Gömlek No. 1284.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 179.
176
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 1254.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 1264.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 133, Gömlek No. 1266.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 353.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 520.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 582.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 726.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 862.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 134, Gömlek No. 863.
BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d, No. 135, Gömlek No. 1223.
Nâme-i Hümâyûn Defterleri
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 2, Gömlek No. 88.
BOA, A.DVNSNHM, No.5, Gömlek No. 138.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 5, Gömlek No. 140.
BOA, A.DVNSNHM, No. 5, Gömlek No. 148.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 5, Gömlek No. 195.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH, No.5, Gömlek No. 204.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH, No.6, Gömlek No. 54.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH, No.6, Gömlek No. 113.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH, No.6, Gömlek No. 114.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH, No.6, Gömlek No. 267.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 6, Gömlek No. 224.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 7, Gömlek No. 13.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 7, Gömlek No. 35.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 7, Gömlek No. 89.
BOA, A.DVNSNMH.d, No. 7, Gömlek No. 225.
177
Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Evrakı
BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 878, Gömlek No. 43.
BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 687, Gömlek No. 17.
178
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