433

In the course of writing the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya from 1960 to 1991 the encouragements of different individuals and institutions
have important place. Their priceless encouragements have helped for the proficient
proceeding of this research work.
From this point of view, first and foremost I have to express my deepest gratitude to my
research advisor, Associate Professor Turgut SUBAŞI, who read and re-read the paper
and forward me constructive comments, advises and criticisms for my success. There is
also additional reasons for extending my gratitude to Associate Professor Turgut
SUBAŞI: this includes he helped me in guiding and giving particular attention during
time of deep anxiety in the course of the research work through sharing his experiences.
Even more essential was his patience and commitments to make my research work more
readable and comprehensive. I am really proud and grateful to have him as my
supervisor and to mention myself as one of his students.
I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Arif BİLGİN for his helpful
suggestions, hospitality and positive attitudes in every stapes of my communication
with him. I would also like to thank Associate Professor Zeynel Abidin KILINÇ for his
constructive comments and suggestions in my research work. Additionally, my
appreciation and thankfulness goes to Associate Professor Fikrettin YAVUZ for his
constructive comments and directions during the progress of the research work.
Furthermore, my deep appreciation goes to Professor Mehmet Yaşar Ertaş, Professor
Enis Şahin, Associate Professor Mustafa Sarı, Professor Ali Balcı and Assistant
Professor Antonios Vratimos for sharing me from their deep academic experiences.
During the hardship and challenge of the study, the sprite behind my strength was my
family. So, I would like to thank my father, Adem Yimer Mohammed, and my mother,
Debre Gobeze, for their limitless support from my childhood to present. The
encouragement and love of my wife, Kidist Chanyalew, and our children, Kidus and
Mariyamawit, has also been the moving force behind my academic achievements in the
past five years. I would also like to extend my appreciation and thanks to my friend
Sewale Belachew for his support and motivation in every step of the research work.
On the other hand, in the course of writing this dissertation the researcher has visited
different libraries and archive centers and come across different primary and secondary
sources. Against this background, I am grateful to expresses my appreciation to workers
of the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA), Institute of Ethiopian
Studies (IES), and Sakarya University Library for their cooperation during data
collection and library reading.

June 2021
i
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................iv
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................vi
ÖZET ............................................................................................................................. vii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER ONE: FOUNDATION OF THE TRILATERAL POLITICAL
RELATIONS .................................................................................................................. 14
1.1. General Historical Survey about the Foundation of the Trilateral Political Relations
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991) ...................................................... 14
1.1.1. Irredentism and Territorial Claim ................................................................... 16
1.1.2. The Issue of Self-determination vs. Territorial Integrity ............................... 21
1.1.3. Military Influence and Significance of the Disputed Territories.................... 30
1.1.4. Hegemonic Competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and Extra
Continental Power Involvement ............................................................................... 34
1.2. The Somalia Nationalism and Unification Activity ................................................. 44
1.3. The Rejuvenation of the Somali Nationalism and Territorial Claim........................ 50
1.4. The Response of Ethiopia for the Growth of Anti-Ethiopia Somali Nationalism .... 59
1.5. The Reaction of Kenya to the Growth of Somali Territorial Claim in the NFD ...... 63
CHAPTER TWO: THE ETHIO-SOMALIA STRESSFUL RELATIONS (1960-
1991) ................................................................................................................................ 70
2.1. The Ethio-Somalia Relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdulah (1960-
1967) ................................................................................................................................ 73
2.2. The Era of Détente (1968-1969) ............................................................................... 89
2.3. The Era of the First Phase of General Barry‘s Rule and Conflicting Perceptions
(1970-1974) ..................................................................................................................... 96
2.4. The Era of Dissension and Open War (1975-1978) ............................................... 101
2.4.1. Factors that Hindered Barry‘s Anticipation to Declare All-Out War against
Ethiopia as fast as he Planned ................................................................................ 107
2.4.2. Project Reconciliation .................................................................................. 110
ii
2.4.3. The Ogaden War (1977-1978) ..................................................................... 114
2.5. Post Ogaden War Diplomatic Efforts to Iron out the Ethio-Somalia Dispute (1979-
1991) .............................................................................................................................. 121
CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHIOPIA-KENYA COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
(1960-1991) ................................................................................................................... 133
3.1. National Survival and Security Issues for the Ethio-Kenya Cooperative
Interaction ...................................................................................................................... 136
3.2. The 1963 Defense Pact ........................................................................................... 138
3.3. The 1974 Regime Change in Ethiopia and its Impact on the Ethio-Kenyan Security
Cooperation ................................................................................................................... 151
3.4. Ethio-Kenya Cooperation during the Ogaden War (1977-1978) ........................... 155
3.5. The 1978 Regime Change in Kenya and its Aftermath on the Ethio-Kenyan
Security Cooperation ..................................................................................................... 162
3.6. Peaceful Boundary Diplomacy for the Cooperative Relations between Ethiopia and
Kenya ............................................................................................................................. 175
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOMALIA-KENYA HOSTILE AND STRESSFUL
RELATIONS (1960-1991) ........................................................................................... 186
4.1. Early Diplomacy and Conflicting Postures (1960-1963) ....................................... 188
4.2. The Shifta Installment in the Light of the Kenya-Somalia Hostile Relations (1964-
1967) .............................................................................................................................. 197
4.2.1. Peace Accords during the Shifta Episode ..................................................... 210
4.3. The Kenya-Somalia Rapprochement during the Egal-Sharmarke Era (1967-
1969) .............................................................................................................................. 218
4.4. The Post Detente Era of Distrust and Uncertainty (1970-1980) ............................ 225
4.4.1. The Phase of Uncertainty and Vexed Peace (1970-1973) ............................ 226
4.4.2. Security Threat and the Crises of War (1974-1980) .................................... 232
4.5. The Era of Reconciliation and Rapprochement between Somalia and Kenya (1981-
1991) .............................................................................................................................. 237
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 246
iii
MAPS ............................................................................................................................ 253
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................ 259
APPENDIXES .............................................................................................................. 271
RESUME ...................................................................................................................... 298
iv
ACRONYMS
ANZUS : Australia, New Zealand and United States
AOI : Africa Orientale Italiana
BBC : British Broadcasting Corporation
DFSS : Democratic Front for the Salivation of Somalia
EDU : Ethiopian Democratic Union
ELF : Eritrean Liberation Front
ENALA : Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency
EPLF : Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front
EPRDF : Ethiopian people‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front
i.e. : in other words
IES : Institute of Ethiopian Studies
IGADD : Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
HoA : Horn of Africa
KADU : Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU : Kenya African National Union
NFD : Northern Frontier District
NFDLF : Northern Frontier District Liberation Front
NFDP : Northern Frontier Democratic Party
NPPNU : Northern Province Peoples‘ National Union
NPPPP : Northern Province People‘s Progressive Party
NPUA : Northern Province United Association
NSLF : North Somalia Liberation Front
OAU : Organization of African Union
OET : Occupied Enemy Territory
OLF : Oromo Liberation Front
OPU : Oromo Political Union
PMAC : Provisional Military Administrative Council‘s
PoWs : Prisoners of Wars
SALF : Somalia Abo Liberation Front
SDLF : Somalia Democratic Liberation Front
SICP : Somalia Independent Constitutional Party
v
SNL : Somali National League
SNM : Somalia National Movement
SPF : Somalia Patriotic Front
SRSP : Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSDF : Somalia Salivation Democratic Front
SSRA : South Somalia Refugees Association
SWP : Somalia Workers Party
SYC : Somalia Youth Club
SYL : Somalia Youth League
TPLF : Tigrayan People‘s Liberation Fronts
UN : United Nations
UNO : United Nations Organization
UOSA : United Ogaden Somali Association
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WSLF : Western Somali Liberation Front
WW II : World War Second
vi
Sakarya University
Institute of Social Sciences Abstract of Thesis
Master Degree Ph.D.
Title of Thesis: The Trilateral Political Relations Between Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya (1960-1991)

(main body) + 27(app)
Department: History
The purpose of this study is to investigate and give a more complete picture about the nature of the
trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya from 1960 to 1991 based on
unrevised Ethiopian, Somalia and Kenyan sources. Additionally, efforts are made to present the
dynamics of the foreign policy approaches of the three countries between 1960 and 1991. Moreover,
the study tried to trace the nature of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and
Kenya (1960-1991) based on the dynamics of regional, continental and extra-continental course of
events. Additionally, the study assessed the dynamics of the complex realities of the hostility and/or
cooperation between the three countries from 1960 to 1991 based on the pan-Somalia irredentism.
Thereby, through tracing the historical processes that had characterized the trilateral political relations
between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya; in this study, it is understood that issues such as irredentism,
hegemonic competation, conflicting interests between territorial integrity and self-determination
contrive the hostility or cooperation amid the three nations. In addition, the issue of insurgency and
counter-insurgency, global actors‘ interference and headstrong diplomatic approach has complicated
the trilateral political relations between the three Horn countries from 1960 to1991. Accordingly,
throughout the period covered by this study the Ethiopia-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia relations
were hostile and distrustful while the Ethiopia-Kenya relations had symbolized cooperative.
In the process of examination, archival materials from the Ethiopian National Archive and Library
Agency (ENALA) are extensively employed. Moreover, manuscripts and secondary literatures are
used after being critically evaluated in relation with archival sources.The critically evaluated primary
and secondary sources are objectively and analytically interpreted. I hope the study helps to understand
the modern diplomatic history between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.
ABSTRACT
Keywords: Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Relations, Political
vii
Sakarya Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Özeti
Yüksek Lisans Doktora
Tezin Başlığı: The Trilateral Political Relations Between Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya (1960-1991)

Anabilim Dalı: Tarih
Bu çalışmada, 1960-1991 yılları arasında, Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkilerin
doğası ve niteliği, adı geçen ülkelerin arşiv kaynakları çerçevesinde, ele alınarak incelenmektedir.
Ayrıca, 1960-1991 yılları arasında üç ülkenin dış politika yaklaşımlarının dinamiklerini ortaya koymak
için de çaba sarf edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, üç ülke arasındaki düşmanca ve/veya işbirlikçi siyasi
ilişkileri gerekçelendiren olayların seyri de değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışmada, bölgesel,
kıtasal ve kıta dışı olayların dinamiklerine dayanarak, Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya (1960-1991)
arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkilerin doğasını n izleri de takip edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Ek olarak bu
çalışma da, 1960'tan 1991'e kadar üç ülke arasındaki düşmanlık ve/veya işbirliğinin karmaşık
gerçekliklerinin dinamikleri, Somali birliği ve Somali milliyetçiliğinin yayılmacılığı perspektifi
çerçevesinde ele alınarak değerlendirilmektedir.
Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkileri karakterize eden tarihsel süreçlerin izleri
takip edildiğinde, yayılmacı milliyetçilik, hegemonik rekabet, toprak bütünlüğü ve kendi kaderini tayin
etme hakkı arasındaki çatışan çıkarlar gibi konuların, bu üç ulus arasındaki düşmanlık veya işbirliğine
zemin hazırladığını, böylece bu çalışma ortaya koymaktadır. Buna ek olarak, isyan ve isyanla
mücadele etme meselesi, küresel aktörlerin müdahalesi ve inatçı diplomatik yaklaşım, 1960'tan 1991'e
kadar Afrika‘nın bu üç Boynuz ülkesi arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkileri daha da karmaşık bir hale
getirmiştir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışmanın kapsadığı dönem boyunca Etiyopya-Somali ve Kenya-Somali
ilişkileri daha düşmanca ve güvensizken, Etiyopya-Kenya ilişkileri daha işbirlikçi bir yapıyı sembolize
ediyordu.
Bu çalışmada, Etiyopya Ulusal Arşiv ve Kütüphane Ajansı'ndan (ENALA) elde edilen arşiv
materyalleri kapsamlı bir şekilde kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca yazma eserler ve ikinci el kaynaklar, arşiv
kaynaklarıyla ilişkilendirilerek, eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirildikten sonra kullanılmıştır. Eleştirel
olarak değerlendirilen birinci el ve ikinci el kaynaklar objektif ve analitik olarak yorumlanmıştır.
Umarım bu çalışma Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki modern diplomasi tarihini daha iyi
anlamaya yardımcı olur.
ÖZET
Anahtar Kelimeler: Etiyopya, Somali, Kenya, İlişkiler, Siyasi
1
INTRODUCTION
The Main Question
The turbulent political developments in the region of the Horn of Africa (HoA) during
the second half of the twentieth century comparatively bank on the complex trilateral
political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Geographically the HoA is
located on the northeastern part of the African continent facing the Red Sea in the east,
the Indian Ocean in the southeast and the Nile basin in the west. The region is inhabited
by an intriguing mosaic of people and cultures with a complex political interaction.1 The
HoA is also stated as ―a hub of communication in connection with Africa, Asia, and
Europe‖.2 Ordinarily, the key states of the HoA encompass countries such as Ethiopia,
Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Eretria.3 Following the epoch of colonial
independence, frictions that stemmed from border issues, hegemonic power
competition, and irredentist nationalism was common in the region of the Horn. One
incredible political reality about the region of the Horn is that no matter how weak or
strong as well as no matter how near or distant or no matter how big or small, a country
is active and influential on the politics of the neighboring governments. Consequently,
the political situations among the Horn countries were inextricably intertwined with the
political situation of their neighboring states. This complex nature of the political affairs
in the region forced countries of the HoA to endorse different kinds of alliances and
counter-alliances among each other as well as with continental and extra-continental
powers.4
In this study, it is intended to answer questions such as: On the postcolonial political
relations of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle, what factors had laid the foundation
and shaped the trilateral political relations between the three countries. How security
factor, the issue of insurgency and counter-insurgency, hegemonic competition, and the
1Berouk Mesfin, ―The Horn of Africa Security Complex,‖ in Regional Security in the post-Cold War
Horn of Africa, eds. Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (2011), p.3.
2Liang Gencheng, ―U. S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa,‖ Northeast African Studies Vol. 6, No. 1/2
(Michigan State University Press, 1984), P.41; Mesfin, p.3.
3 Kidist Mulugeta, ―The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security: The Case of
Ethiopia,‖ Horn of Africa Security Dialog (2014), p.9.
4Mesfin, p.3; Danfulani S. A, ―Regional Security and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Somalian
Reconstruction After the Cold War,‖ Journal of International Studies Vol.36, No.1 (January 1, 1999),
p.37.
2
issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity determines the trilateral political
relations and enabled to create hostile political front between the Ethiopia-Somalia and
Kenya-Somalia fronts and cooperative front between Ethiopia and Kenya. Meaning,
how the course of events together with factors such as self-determination, territorial
integrity, irredentism, security threat, subversion and counter-subversion, external
powers intervention, hegemonic competition, etc. determined the dynamics of the
hostile and/or cooperative relationships between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from
1960 to 1991. How and why the Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia relations became
hostile and stressful while the Ethiopia-Kenya relation was cooperative in the process of
the trilateral political relations between the three nations from 1960-1991? And how the
dynamics of the Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya inter-state hostile and/or cooperative
political relationship between 1960 and 1991 looks like? In light of this, the thesis is
motivated by the intention of creating a concrete base to understand historical moments
that shaped the three countries political relations.
In order to answer questions, the political and historical framework of the regional rival
states such as the Ethiopia-Somalia political front and the Kenya-Somalia political front
as well as the regional complimentary scenario between the Kenya-Ethiopia political
front is examined in line with the consideration of the idea of historical change and
continuity dynamics of the courses of events together with other determinant factors
mentioned above.
Correspondingly, in this study, it is realized that the national, regional, sub-regional,
continental and extra-continental historical and political course of events together with
the political reality of the Horn region in the second half of the 20th century such as,
among others, the pan-Somali irredentist nationalism, the issue of self-determination vs.
territorial integrity, infiltration of subversive groups, insurgency and counterinsurgency,
competition for the establishment of geopolitical regional hegemonic power
and extra-continental power interference that irrefutably synchronized with the nature of
the trilateral political relations between the three countries under the state of crises and
distrust had laid the ground to shape the hostile and/or cooperative trilateral political
relationship between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, 1960-1991.
3
Against this background, the situation of distrust, crisis, and aggressive diplomatic
campaign that stemmed from the above mentioned factors laid the basement for the
creation of hostile political front between the Ethiopia-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia
fronts. Correspondingly, the peaceful boundary diplomacy, security alignment,
geopolitical cooperation, and joint cross-border planning had helped to create
cooperative front between Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, the stubborn political
approach between the hostile political front (i.e. Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia
fronts) and the development of the cooperative political scenario by the Ethiopia-Kenya
front to isolate Somalia from regional and continental politics together with the cold war
era extra continental powers involvement intertwined with issues like the pan-Somali
irredentist nationalism, the issue of self-determination vs. territorial integrity, infiltration
of subversive groups, insurgency and counterinsurgency, competition for the
establishment of regional hegemonic power, etc. results or leads to a long diplomatic
battle between the three countries.
On the other hand, in this study, there are four main chapters. Accordingly, chapter one
deals with the general survey of the foundation and background historical contexts for
the trilateral political relations. It has also tried to survey determinant elements that laid
the foundation in the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.
Apparently, the first chapter tries to assess the root for the Somalia territorial claim; the
response of Ethiopia to the Somalia territorial claim; and the reaction of Kenya to the
the Somalia territorial claim.
In the first chapter, it is intended to answer questions like what factors laid the
foundation and determined the background political reality for the inter-state hostile or
cooperative political interactions in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle from 1960 to
1991. How and why, irredentist type of demography and territorial claim; the issue of
territorial integrity vs. self-determination; the issue of security; the issue of subversive
and counter-subversive activities; military influence and the economic significance of
the disputed territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and;
hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers
involvement laid the background and determined the dynamics of the trilateral political
relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya between 1960 and 1991. Furthermore,
4
how the issue of the Somali nationalism laid the background for the trilateral relations
of the three countries is also discussed in this chapter.
In the first chapter it is realized that the background political reality and the foundation
for the hostile or cooperative Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya trilateral political relations in the
second half of the 20th century involves the following interrelated elements: i) the issue
of irredentism and territorial claim; ii) the issue of territorial integrity vs. selfdetermination;
iii) the issue of security together with subversive and counter-subversive
activities; iv) military influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories
on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya; v) hegemonic competition
between Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers involvement; vi) the Somali
nationalism and unification activity and; vii) the issue of colonial boundary also helped
to crystalize the background historical context of the trilateral political relations
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Likewise, the language, cultural and religious
similarity among the Somalis had helped to develop a common goal and to advocate the
issue of greater Somalia through uniting the Somali speaking community of the Horn
region. The dynamics of these factors had shaped the trilateral political relations of the
three countries.
The second chapter deals with the stressful Ethiopia-Somalia relations between 1960
and 1991. In this chapter, the dynamics of the hostile political relations between
Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991 is discussed. The discussion of the Ethio-
Somalia relations are done by dividing it into five major eras: i) relations during the era
of Osman Aden Abdulah, (1960-1967); ii) relations during the era of détente (1968-
1969); iii) relations during the era of the first phase of General Barry‘s rule and
conflicting perceptions (1970-1974); iv) relations during the era of dissension and open
war (1975-1978) and; v) relations during the post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign,
rapprochement, and efforts to iron out the Ethio-Somalia dispute (1979-1991).
Therefore, here it is planned to analyze in some detail about the dynamics of the
historical contexts of the hostile political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from
1960 to 1991. While undertaking the examination of the Ethio-Somalia relations the
reaction of Kenya to the hostile interaction of the Ethiopia-Somalia political front is
considered.
5
In chapter two it is intended to answer questions like how and why stressful and hostile
political and historical rhetoric developed between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to
1991. How the course of events shaped the stressful and hostile relations between
Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period of this study. How Ethiopia and Somalia
reacted to the factors and course of events that challenged their relationship. Apparently,
how Kenya was reacted to the hostile and stressful relations between Ethiopia and
Somalia is also a focus in point in this chapter.
In chapter two, it is understood that the inherent hostile political and historical rhetoric
between Ethiopia and Somalia was emanated from the policy of the conflicting interest
of irredentism plus territorial aggrandizement vs. territorial integrity. The policy of
insurgency and counter-insurgency and the shift of Ethiopia‘s policy from appeasement
to destabilization were also the other factors for their hostile relations. The policy of an
aggressive extensive diplomacy campaign on both side to win the trump cards on
continental and extra continental powers together with hegemonic competition also had
a role on the hostile relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. The other points in focus
for the turbulent and stressful relations of the two countries stemmed from the intrastate
political condition in the polarized tribal political reality of Somalia and the ethnic
affiliated political reality in Ethiopia.
In the Ethio-Somalia hostile political relationship, Kenya sided with Ethiopia against
Somalia. Regarding the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya against Somalia, it is
believed that one of the reasons for the cooperation was emanated from the common
interest of maintaining territorial integrity from the irredentist policy of Somalia.
The third chapter deals with the Ethio-Kenya cooperative relations between 1960 and
1991. In this chapter, the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya is discussed
from the points that shaped the two countries cooperative relations such as, among
others, security, peaceful boundary diplomacy, geopolitical proximity, and joint crossborder
planning which were strengthened by the presence of elements such as: i) The
common stand and position by Ethiopia and Kenya against the irredentist policy of
Somalia; ii) the determination of Ethiopia and Kenya to fundamental principles such as
collective security, non-alignment, collaboration, and peace; iii) the presence of similar
pro-west ideological set up by both countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) particularly with
6
the U.S.A up until 1974; iv) the similar feature of personal diplomacy employed by
President Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase and; v) the shared objectives and policy
approaches employed by Addis Ababa and Nairobi in international organizations such
as the UN and OAU. While undertaking the examination of the Ethio-Kenya
cooperation, the reaction of Somalia to the cooperative interactions of the Ethiopia-
Kenyan political front will be considered.
In chapter three it is intended to answer questions like how cooperative political
relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was evolved or how peaceful boundary
diplomacy, historical, political, security, and geopolitical factors determined the
cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya (1960 and 1991). Apparently, how
Somalia reacted to the political cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya is also a point
in focus during the discussion of the Ethiopia and Kenya relations.
In the third chapter, it is realized that historical factors like the support of Ethiopia to
Kenya during the Mau Mau anti-colonial resistance movement and the support of Kenya
to the Ethiopian patriots during the 1935 Italian aggression helped the two countries to
develop a sense of cooperation in the early age. Concomitantly, in the political arena,
the pro-west political outlook of both Ethiopia and Kenya up until 1974 and the
common stand of both countries in the OAU to maintain colonial boundary as legal
boundary of the post-colonial Africa had also helped the two countries to develop
cooperative political front (pair). Likewise, the common stand against the irredentist
policy of Somalia to secure their territorial integrity had also helped Ethiopia and Kenya
to cooperate against ‗common enemy‘, Somalia. Therefore, the issue of the Ethio-Kenya
security alignment that stemmed from the threat of the pan-Somali nationalism and
irredentism had an important place for the cooperation of the two states. Regarding
geopolitical factor, both Ethiopia and Kenya are found in the HoA sharing common
boundaries plus Kenya is one of the outlets to the sea to Ethiopia. The peaceful
boundary diplomacy and the joint cross-border planning between Ethiopia and Kenya
had also played a role in the development of a cooperative front between the two
countries. All along the Ethio-Kenya cooperation, it is vital to note that, even if it did
not yield fruit, the authority of Somalia tried to weaken the Ethio-Kenyan cooperation
7
through isolating Kenya from cooperating with Ethiopia by showing positive gesture to
Nairobi.
The last chapter deals with the Somalia-Kenya political relations between 1960 and
1991. In this chapter, the hostile political relation between Somalia and Kenya is
discussed by dividing it into four major eras: the era of unpleasant diplomacy,
insurgency, and counterinsurgency (1960-67); the era of reconciliation and relative
peace (1967-1969); the post détente era of reciprocal distrust (1970-1980) and; the era
of reconciliation and rapprochement (1981-91). While undertaking the examination, the
reaction of Ethiopia to the interaction of the Somalia-Kenyan hostile political front will
be considered.
The fourth chapter intended to answer questions like how hostile political relations and
distrust developed between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and
1991. How Ethiopia reacted to the hostility and distrustful relations between Kenya and
Somalia.
In the fourth chapter, it is realized that the territorial claim of Somalia over the
northeastern territories of Kenya; the involvement of Somalia on the shifta (bandit) war
against Kenya; the destabilization efforts of Somalia against Kenya or the vise verse;
the issue of irredentism; the issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity; the
efforts of Kenya to isolate Somalia by signing an agreement of cooperation with
Ethiopia in 1963 can be taken as the foundation for the distrust and hostile political
relations between Kenya and Somalia from 1960 to1991. On the other side, in the
process of the Somalia-Kenya hostile and distrustful relations the Ethiopian authority
cooperated with Kenya. This was partly stemmed from Addis Ababa‘s interest to isolate
Mogadishu from the regional and continental political diplomacy as well as to maintain
Ethiopia‘s hegemonic political position on the Horn region.
Objective of the Study
This research aims to examine the process and the nature of the trilateral political
relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991. The study intended
to examine the way course of events together with factors such as security, selfdetermination,
territorial integrity, irredentism, territorial assertion, insurgency, counter8
insurgency, colonial boundary, hegemonic competition etc. determined the trilateral
political relations and gave ways for the creation of hostile or cooperative political pairs
(fronts) between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, 1960-1991. In other word, the study
aims to discuss the dynamics of the political hostility and/or cooperation between the
three countries from 1960 to 1991. Meaning, the study intended to assess the dynamics
of the complex realities of the Ethio-Somalia hostile relations and the reaction of Kenya
on the Ethio-Somalia political hostility; the Ethio-Kenyan cooperative relations and the
reaction of Somalia on the Ethio-Kenyan political cooperation and; the Somalia-Kenyan
hostile and distrustful relations and the reaction of Ethiopia for the distrustful and
hostility between Somalia and Kenya. It is also one of the researcher‘s objectives to
reveal how the irredentist policy approach of Somalia map out the relationship between
the Ethio-Somalia and Somalia-Kenya hostile fronts as well as the Ethio-Kenya
cooperative front. The role of course of events together with dynamics like political
competitions and rivalries, major wars, miner conflicts, formation of fronts, change of
regime, foreign policy approach, external super powers intervention etc. on shaping the
relationship of the three countries are examined on the study. Moreover, by tracing the
historical processes that have characterized the trilateral political relations between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991), the aim of the thesis is not only to proffer
lessons from the past. The thesis is also motivated by the intention of creating concrete
base to understand the past historical moment.
The study also examined how and why the boundary assertion and the issue of security
contributed in shaping the nature of the trilateral political relationship between the three
Horn countries. To answer the questions, the hostility, distrust and cooperation of the
rival fronts (i.e. the Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e.
Ethio-Kenya) is examined in line with the consideration of the idea of historical change
and continuity dynamics of the course of events.
In short, the aims of the study are: i) to survey the general foundation of contributing
factors for the development of the Ethio-Somalia hostile front, the Ethio-Kenya
cooperative front, and the Somalia-Kenya hostile front in the trilateral political relations
of the three countries from 1960 to 1991; ii) to show the dynamics of the Ethio-Somalia
hostile political relations and the reaction of Kenya for the Ethio-Somalia hostile
9
political relations; iii) to show the dynamics of the Ethio-Kenya cooperative political
relations and the reaction of Somalia for the Ethio-Kenya cooperative relations, and; iv)
to show the dynamics of the Somalia-Kenya distrustful and hostile political relations
and the reaction of Ethiopia for the Somalia-Kenya hostile relations.
Importance of the Study
In the proposition of thesis writing, the original value such as scientific quality,
difference, and innovation, how to solve the deficiencies or what kind of solution to the
problem or what kind of original methodological/conceptual contributions to the related
science have its own significance. Accordingly, the original value of this thesis is that
there is no independent study on the field of history of the mentioned period and the
relevant period has not been studied in the context of evaluating the historical dynamics
or nature of the political relationship of the three countries based on the issue of how
factors such as self-determination, territorial integrity, irredentism, territorial assertion,
insurgency, counter-insurgency, artificial colonial boundary, hegemonic competition,
etc. map out the relations of the three countries. Besides, the dynamics of the complex
realities of the hostile or cooperative political realities of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya
are discussed in the study.
Moreover, how the irredentist policy of Somalia vis-a-vis the post-colonial colonial
boundary politics and its influence on the relationship of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya
(1960-1991) not well studied before and this study tries to fill this gap. Moreover,
although other studies and pieces of literature give information about changes of
regimes and ideology of political administration during the period covered by this study,
they did not address the question how and why this change of regime and political
ideology map out the nature, dynamics, process and approach of political relations
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Therefore, this study attempts to present an
important analysis and interpretation in the context of cause and effect relations of
course of events in relation to the relationship of the three countries on the bases of
filling the above-stated gaps based on analytical interpretation of primary and secondary
sources.
10
Method
In this study, the author employed a qualitative research method by an analytical
interpretive approach to analyze and argue primary and secondary sources. So, in the
study analytical interpretive approach is applied. Accordingly, the obtained primary and
secondary data are analytically interpreted to reveal the trilateral political relations
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991 after being subjected to
evaluation, reevaluation, criticism, and analysis. This is mainly because ―like good
detectives, historians are critical of their sources and cross-check them for reliability‖.5
Additionally, in the study, primary and secondary sources that explain the course of
events to map out the nature and dynamics of the relations of the three countries
necessitate an analytical and interpretive historical approach. During interpretation,
objectivity is also important to achieve the aim we have foreseen in the thesis.
On the other hand, the complex nature of the political reality of the three Horn countries
that this study mainly bank on needs critical evaluation to develop common
understanding from polarized pieces of literatures and attitudes of scholars. This would
be mainly true by critically and analytically evaluating and reevaluating literatures by
different scholars, and government propaganda actions based on compering and
counter-comparing it with other manuscripts, archival, and secondary literatures. The
study also tries to work on revealing the trilateral political relations of the three
countries that share a common geographical region and boundaries. This can be true
through an examination of the hostile political relations between Somalia and its
neighbors- Ethiopia and Kenya. Concomitantly, the cooperative and flattering nature of
the political relations between Kenya and Ethiopia are also examined analytically.
As to foreign relation, ―every foreign relation exercise is believed to have two guiding
principles- securing one‘s own interests and being part of the wider international
community‖.6 Hence, when a country involves in a foreign relation, it is apparent that
the primary aim is to safeguard its strategic national interest and to achieve goals within
its international relations milieu. So, the approach of foreign relations among countries
5Reinhardt University, ―Some Good Advice on the Writing of a Competent History Paper,‖ (2015),
accessed June 20, 2019, https://blogs.reinhardt.edu/history/more-from-hamilton/.
6Belete Belachew Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956-1991,‖ (PhD dissertation, Addis Ababa
University, 2012), P.4.
11
might be systematically arranged in an inside-out manner while interacting with
corresponding countries in different fields.7 So, the inter-state trilateral political
relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya could be considered along the same
line.
In the same light, the concept of trilateral relations is also to devise the triangular
relationship of the conceptual member countries of a region or sub-region. In a
historical study some of the practical elements that can be researched on the concept of
trilateral relations range from economic issues to political issues as well as from
strategic issues to military issues. Sometimes trilateral relations may be formed by two
partners against their common enemies. The U.S-South Korean security partnership and
alliance against North Korea can be taken as a case in point for this kind of trilateral
relationship or the China-Soviet alliance against U.S.A during the first cold war era or
the alliance between U.S.A and China against U.S.S.R during the second cold war era
can also be taken as a case to demonstrate this case.8
In the study of countries trilateral relations, the second type of triangle may occur when
three countries agree to form a strategic alliance. One of the good examples for such
kind of triangular relationship was the 1951 Australia, U.S, and New Zealand security
agreement (i.e. ANZUS treaty), which was signed to defend the security of the pacific
against the expansion of Japan and against the expansion of communism in the
geographically isolated two nations (namely Australia and New Zealand).9
The third type of trilateral cooperation may occur under the situation of power
imbalance to balance the unilateral domination of world power by forming an informal
triangular axis to use it whenever necessary like the case of the Russia-China-India
triangle. Member nations of such a triangle may not bound by a formidable treaty. Its
main target is discouraging or preventing a unilateral decision-making ability of
7Ibid.
8Chintamani Mahapatra, ―India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor,‖ Indian Foreign Affairs Journal
Vol.6, No.4 (2011), pp.407-408; see also Feng Shaolei, “China-U.S-Russia Trilateral Relations Under the
Context of International Configuration in Transition,‖ Valdai Discussion Club (East China Normal
University, 2010), pp.3-28, https://valdaiclub.com/files/11433/.
9Mahapatra, p.407; Andrew Kelly, ―ANZUS Negotiations,‖ in ANZUS and the Early Cold War: Strategy
and Diplomacy between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1945-1956, ed. Andrew Kelly
(Open Book Publishers, 2018), pp.89-90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5zfv3m.9.
12
superpowers.10 The last but not the least type of trilateral relations is that when an
external power tries to resolve the conflict and hostility between two countries, like, for
instance, the case of U.S involvement to resolve the issue of Palestine and Israel.11
In this respect, the trilateral political relation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya
(1960-1991) was based on common regional and local objectives by Ethiopia and
Kenya against ‗common enemy‘, Somalia.
The Topic of the Study
The present study is working on the scope of researching the history of the complex
dynamics and realities of the trilateral political relations of the three Horn countries-
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991) based on analytical interpretation of primary
and secondary sources.
In the study, the year 1960 is crucial because the year is considered as the ―year of
African‖ that many African countries got their independence including Somalia.12 In
addition, 1960 is chosen as a landmark and/or as a beginning period of this study
because it was in this year that Somalia became independent and its modern postindependent
relations with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya started.13 It was also in this
year that the irredentist approach of Somalia laid its base in the country as a legal
question with an independent state mind setup. As far as 1991 is concerned, it was in
this year that the despotic rulers of Ethiopia and Somalia collapsed.14 At the same time,
it was in 1991 that the northern part of Somali called Somaliland declared its breakaway
(secession) from Somalia.15
Against this background, in the study, based on the historical dynamics of their
relationship the three countries political relations are categorized into three fronts like
10Mahapatra, pp.407-408.
11Ibid.
12Benjamin Talton, ―1960s Africa in Historical Perspective: An Introduction,‖ Journal of Black Studies
43(1) (2012), p.4.
13Anthony S. Reyner, ―Somalia: The Problems of Independence,‖ Middle East Journal Vol. 14, No. 3
(Summer, 1960), p.247.
14Patrick Gilkes, ―Wars in the Horn of Africa and the dismantling of the Somali State,‖ Cadernos de
Estudos Africanos Vol 2 (June 2002), p.2.
15Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor and et al, ―Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence,‖ Review
of African Political Economy Vol. 30, No. 97 (Sep., 2003), p.455.
13
the Somalia-Ethiopia and the Somalia-Kenya political fronts - labeled as hostile
political fronts in their political relationship. On the other corner, there is the Ethiopia-
Kenya front which had cooperation and collaboration against their ‗common enemy‘,
Somalia, and labeled (characterized) as a cooperative political front. The dynamics of
historical relationships among these three major fronts will be discussed in-depth in the
upcoming chapters.
14
CHAPTER ONE: FOUNDATION OF THE TRILATERAL
POLITICAL RELATIONS
1.1. General Historical Survey about the Foundation of the Trilateral Political
Relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991)
One of the difficulty and challenging points on reconstructing the history of the trilateral
political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, in their political interactions,
is creating balanced interpretation from polarized attitudes and understandings of
divergent works of literature, political analysts, historians, and other scholars. The other
significant point that needs to be treated well during the reconstruction of the trilateral
political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya is the intricate nature of the
politics of the HoA. Meaning, it is imperative to understand the real composition of the
political relationship among countries of the region. Understanding the real composition
of the Horn region‘s political dynamics helps to refrain from feeding and magnifying
individual and government propaganda campaigns during the reconstruction of the three
countries‘ political relations. Apparently, during reconstruction and investigation of
facts, it is also important to understand the political and the socio-economic dynamics of
the HoA in particular and the changing reality of the world in the cold war politics to
minimize the risk of polarized interpretation.
During the period painted under this study, concerning the approach to the global
diplomatic market, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia used to use their playing cards that
enabled them to profit more. Accordingly, in its diplomatic relations with the
neighboring states in particular and the rest of the world at large, Ethiopia tried to use its
unique nature of being not colonized. The other cards for Ethiopia were its strategic plus
key location and long history of political domination in the Horn region and its cultural
values. The political acceptance of Ethiopia in the politics of Africa and its active role
on the establishment of the OAU has also used as trump card in its diplomatic relations
with the outside world.16
16Dustin Dehéz, ―Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region?,‖ BISA Annual Conference
(December 2008), p.5; V. S. Yagya, “Ethiopia and its Neighbors: An Evolution of Relations, 1974-1989,‖
Northeast African Studies Vol. 12, No. 2/3 (Michigan State University Press, 1990), p.108.
15
The Somalia authorities used to use the strategic location and geopolitical significance
of the country as a means to attract and influence continental and extra-continental
powers against its hostile neighbors. Its membership to the Arab League had also helped
Somalia to get diplomatic advantage on the Arab world better than Ethiopia and Kenya.
The homogeneity of Somalia in terms of language and religion was also the other trump
card in the move to build the pan-Somali movement where its ultimate goal was to
influence its regional contenders- Ethiopia and Kenya. On its part, Kenya tried to use
its influential role on the OAU and its economic primacy in the region of the Horn as a
means to pull the regional and continental issues to its own advantage.17
In this chapter, it is intended to conduct a general survey on questions such as, among
others, what factors laid the foundation and determined the background political reality
for the inter-state political interactions in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle from
1960 to 1991. How and why the issue of irredentist type of demography and territorial
claim; the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; the issue of subversive
activity; the issue of military influence and the economic significance of the disputed
territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and; the issue of
extra continental powers involvement laid the foundation for the trilateral hostile and/or
cooperative political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to
1991. Likewise, in this chapter, it is also intended to conduct a general survey on how
the issue of the Somali nationalism and irredentism laid the background for the hostile
and/or cooperative trilateral relationship between the three countries in the second half
of the 20th century.
In the case of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle, issues like self-determination vs.
territorial integrity, irredentism, nationalism, security threat, insurgency, counterinsurgency,
secessionist movements and hegemonic competitions are considered as the
figurehead determinant factors and as a foundation for the development of either hostile
or cooperative relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya in their postcolonial
inter-state political relations.18 So, the postcolonial hostile and/or cooperative political
17Mulugeta, p.9; Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Super Power
Involvement (Australia: Australian National University, 1978), pp.16-17.
18Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency, Addis Ababa (hereafter, ENALA), Harar District,
17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina
16
relationship between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya was mapped out by the factors
mentioned above. In this respect, it is realized that the foundation and background
historical context for the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya cannot be well understood without understanding the following determinant
factors where the foundation for the hostile or cooperative trilateral relations between
the three countries was laid.
Thus, as a foundation and means of determinant to the nature of the hostile fronts (i.e.
the Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e. Ethio-Kenya) the
available archival and secondary literatures largely emphasizes on course of events
together with the following elements: (i) the issue of irredentism and territorial claim;
(ii) the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; (iii) the issue of security in
relation to subversive and counter-subversive activities; (iv) the issue of military
influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories on the border area
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya; (v) the issue of hegemonic competition between
Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers involvement; (vi) the issue of the
Somali nationalism and unification activity and; (vii) the issue of recognizing colonial
boundaries as a legal boundary for the newly freed African states.
1.1.1. Irredentism and Territorial Claim
Contrary to the reality understood by the large mass of the society, the presence of
colonial powers on the lands of Africa and the boundary delaminated and/or demarcated
by colonizers were not in line with the African ethno national considerations. Rather,
the European colonizers employed street line boundaries that separate one ethno
national group into two or more sovereign nations in terms of administration.19
It is apparent that during the post-colonial era, African leaders accepted the colonial
boundary as a legal boundary for the newly independent African states. At that moment,
despite the rule was applied for the entire Africa, some African countries namely:
Somalia, Ghana, Morocco, and Togo rejected the proposal and started an irredentist
Zemecha Memiriya), (August 26, 1978); Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout: Boundary
Politics and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Haan Publishing, 2000), pp.18-25.
19Douglas Woodwell, Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.99.
17
assertion. Against this background, in the Horn region, Somalia became the figurehead
advocator of irredentism. This was done mainly to gain the predominantly Somali
inhabiting areas in the region. This approach of Somalia highly disturbed neighboring
countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, where a large number of Somali inhabited. In the
mean time, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the irredentist approach of Somalia with
territorial aggrandizement under the banner of self-determination. Thereby, Ethiopia
and Kenya rejected Somalia‘s quest for irredentism because once the issue is opened it
will be difficult to manage the same kind of interrogations in the region of the Horn in
particular and in the entire Africa in general.20
On the other hand, when we evaluate and compare the situation of the whole Africa in
terms of inter-state relations during the cold war era, the continent was one of the stable
regions of the world. However, there was one major exception in the continent where
the east-west cold war era ideological war was boiling; that was the case of the region of
the HoA. The cold war era superpowers rivalry was very high in the region. The
situation in turn affected the relations among the Horn countries. One of the factors that
contributed a favorable ground for the cold war era entanglement in the region was the
territorial dispute among Horn countries on the basis of irredentist assertion.21
Regarding the challenge of the Somali irredentist movement against Ethiopia and Kenya
using the cold war political makeup as a shield, a letter found at the Ethiopian National
Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) stated the following:
የእንግሉዝ ሶማላ ግዛት ወይም ሶማላሊንድ ፐሮቴክቶሬት የሚሇዉን ስም ይዛ ከብዙ ዘመናት ጀምሮ
በእንግሉዝ መንግሥት የቀኝ አገዛዝ ስር ስትተዳደር የቆየችዉ ሶማላ ባሇፈዉ ሳምንት ማሇት በሰኔ 19/52
ዓ-ም ነፃነቱዋን አግኝታ የራሷን መንግስት ማቋቋምን... በፃፍነው ደብዳቢያችን አስታዉቀንዎ ቆይተናሌ።
አሁን ደግሞ የምንጠብቀዉ በዚሁ ሳምንት ይህም በሰኔ 24/52 ዓ-ም ሙለ ነፃነቱዋን አግኝታ የራስዋን
መንግስት ሇማቋቋም የምትዘጋጀዉን የኢጣሉያን ሶማሉ ወይም በተባበሩት መንግስታት ሞግዚትነት ስር
የምትተዳደረዉ ሶማሉያ እየተባሇች የምትጠራዉን ክፍሇ ግዛት ነዉ። ...የእንግሉዝ ሶማላ የነበረችዉና
የኢጣሉያ ሶማላ በዚሁ ሶማሉያ ነፃነቷን በምታዉጂበት በሰኔ 24/52 ዓም አንድነት ተዋህደዉ የተባበረዉ
ሶማሉያ ሪፐብሉክ (United Somalia Republic) የሚባሌ መንግስት እንደሚያቋቁሙ እርግጠኛ
ሆኑዋሌ። ይህም ሁለ ሲታይ ከዛሬ አስራአምት ዓመት ወዲህ በታዋቂው ቪቨንና በእንግሉዝ መንግስት
አሳሳቢነትና ገፊነት የተፈጠረዉ የሶማሉ ናሲዪናሉዝም መንፈስ አንድ አይነተኛ የሆነ ምዕራፍ ሊይ ሇመድረስ
20Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.18-22, 49-58.
21Woodwell, p.99.
18
ችለዋሌ ማሇት ነዉ።...የሁሇቱ ሶማሉዋች ነፃ መዉጣትና በይበሌጥም ሁሇቱ ተቀሊቅሇዉ አንድ መሆን
ሇአገራችን በተሇይም ሇኦጋዴን ክፍሇ ግዛት ሰሊምና ፀጥታ ጠንቅ እንደሆነ የሚወድ አይሆንም።...ሁሇቱ
ሶማላዎች የመንግስታቸዉን ገጸ ወደ ምዕራባዊያን ወይም ወደ ምስራቃዊያን በማዘንበሌ የሚፈሌጉትን ሁለ
ሇማግኘት ጊዜ እንደማይፈጅባቸዉ የታወቀ ነዉ። ከዚህም በሊይ[በሀይማኖት] ስም ተከናንቦ በአፍሪካ ቀንድ
ሊይ ሲያንዣብብ የሚታየዉ የናስር ፖሇቲካ ሇሶማላዎች አንድ እርዳታ እንደሚያተርፍ አይጠረጠርም። ይህ
ሁለ ሲታሰብ በእኛና በሁሇቱ ሶማላዎች በተሇይም በኢጣሉያ ሶማሉያ መካከሌ ያሇዉ የወሰን ክርክር
እንዲሁም ከእንግሉዝ ሶማላ ጋር በግጦሽ ባሇዉ ቂም ምክንያት ከሁሇቱ ሶማላዎች ፀጥታን እናገኛሇን ብሇን
የምንጠብቅ ብንሆን ስህተት ሳይሆን አይቀርም።22
A rough translation:
As we noticed you in our previous letter the British Somaliland got its
independence from the British colonial rule on June 19/1952 [June 26/1960].
Besides, in June 24/1952 [July 1/60] the Italian Somaliland is going to gain its
independence from the Italian colonial rule. Similarly, on the independence day of
the Italian Somaliland, June 24/1952 [July 1/1960], the establishment of the United
Somalia Republic will be declared. When we look at this all development, the
policy of the Somali nationalism, which was advocated by the British foreign
minister Bevin some fifteen years ago, has reached a remarkable stage. The
independence of the two Somalia and the establishment of the Somalia Republic
will be a big threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia. Particularly, the challenge
will be higher to the district of Ogaden. It is vital also to note that the authority
Somalia Republic will disturb the security and peace of the entire Ethiopia and the
district of Ogaden using the east-west cold war political platform as a means and/or
leverage to get support. Besides, the Republic of Somalia has a chance to challenge
the security of Ethiopia using Nasir‘s policy on the Horn of Africa.
The quote obtained from a letter at the Ethiopian National Archive and Library agency
(ENALA) clearly reflects the challenge of the cold war era global superpowers and
regional actors‘ involvement on the politics of the Horn and its contribution in laying
the foundation for the irredentist advocacy of Somalia. The quote also reflects the fear
of the Ethiopian authority about the further development of the Somalia irredentism
using the east-west cold war political platform as a means to get support.
22ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02A, from Balambaras Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to
Dejazmach Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar) (June 30, 1960).
19
Thus, throughout the period between 1960 and 1991, when we evaluate how the pan-
Somali irredentist approach affected the relationship between the hostile fronts (i.e. the
Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e. Ethio-Kenya), the
presence of minority Somalis under foreign jurisdictions laid the foundation for the
irredentist movements. On its other side, the presence of Somali irredentism laid the
foundation for cooperation and collaboration between Ethiopia and Kenyan against the
common enemy.23
Besides, it is necessary to understand that the Somali irredentism was one of the factors
that had helped Ethiopia and Kenya to maintain their security cooperation in the face of
ideological disparity during the period between 1974 and 1991. Meaning, in the mid-
1970s Ethiopia and Kenya were expected to be major cold war era rival states in the
HoA. The speculation was stemmed from the ideological disparity between the two
countries following the downfall of Emperor Hailesilase I of Ethiopia (September 12,
1974). However, in the face of ideological disparity Ethiopia and Kenya continued their
bilateral cooperation. This shows that irredentist nationalism in the HoA eclipsed
(surpassed) ideological similarity and/or disparity in creating a security front.24
On the other hand, in the period between 1960 and 1991, the Somali irredentism against
Ethiopia and Kenya employed strategies that range from aggressive diplomatic
campaign to infiltration of military factions and from agitation of diaspora rebellion to
minor confrontation on border areas. But, when we look the general skeleton of the
irredentist activity of Somalia by dividing through different periods, in the period
between 1960 and 1967 Somalia employed an aggressive foreign policy to promote its
irredentist assertion. However, the level and intensity of Somalia‘s aggressive foreign
policy considerably declined after the removal of President Osman in 1967. From 1967
to 1969 the new Somalia leadership under Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal and President
Sharmarke soften the irredentist pan-Somali movement. This period was accepted as the
period of détente. Thereby, during the period of détente, diaspora rebellion, aggressive
23Woodwell, pp. 100-101.
24Woodwell, p.101 &118; Ogenga Otunnu, ―Factors Affecting the Treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and
Somali Refugees in Kenya: A Historical Overview,‖ Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees (November
1, 1992), pp.23-24, https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21678.
20
foreign policy and infiltration of shifta (Somali insurgents) towards Ethiopia and Kenya
declined to a considerable extent.25
In the relations of the Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia triangle, the period between 1970 and
1982 was taken as the period of the climax of Somali irredentism.26 It was at this stage
that Somalia officially declared the full-scale Ogaden war (1977-1978) against
Ethiopia.27 Regarding the Somalia-Kenyan political front, even if there was no all-out
war war there was extensive hostile propaganda advocacy. The activity of insurgency
and counter-insurgency to execute irredentism was also the other feature that laid the
ground in making the Kenya-Somali pair to see in a wary eye. Consequently, the period
between 1970 and 1982 was taken as a period of reciprocated distrust for the Kenya-
Somalia political front.28
On the contrary, the relationship of the Kenya-Ethiopia political front proved its
strength as an all-season relation keeping constant their ideological disparity throughout
the period between 1974 and 1991. Here it is vital to note that the issue of the Somalia
irredentism and territorial claims were some of the backups for the all-season
cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya.29
On the 1980s the Somalia authority relatively declined from advocating the pan-Somali
irredentism and busy organizing the disorganized clan-based internal politics. During
this stage, the Somalia irredentism comparatively weakened and the Somalia authorities
reduced the voice of claiming territory from neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.
It was also at this stage that the Somalia authorities call for rapprochement with Kenya
and to renounce its territorial claim unequivocally on the NFD of Kenya. The Somalia
authority had also tried to employ the policy of rapprochement against Ethiopia during
this stage. Nonetheless, the mixed message and/or inconsistency by the authorities of
25ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign
Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978); ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02,
From Fitawurari Amiro Silase Abebe (Enderase or People‘s Representative) to Eshetu Geda (Public
Security Vice Minister) (July 14, 1960); Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallou, pp.115-116; Woodwell,
pp.104,107-108, 110.
26Woodwell, p.113.
27Gebru Tareke, ―The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,‖ The International Journal of African
Historical Studies Vol.33, No.3 (2000), p.636.
28Woodwell, p.104.
29Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long Standing Relation,‖ (December 1979).
21
Somalia undermined the rapprochement project. The continuation of the infiltration of
insurgent groups against Ethiopia was the other point that hindered the rapprochement
policy of Mogadishu towards Addis Ababa.30
1.1.2. The Issue of Self-determination vs. Territorial Integrity
The issue of self-determination (endorsed by Somalia) vs. the paragon of territorial
integrity and noninterference (endorsed by Kenya and Ethiopia) can also be taken as the
other determinant element in molding the foundation of the trilateral political reality
between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.
In the process of its call for self-determination, Somalia used to assert that its people
were under neighboring countries jurisdiction because of the random and unreasonable
frontier making during colonial era. To unite the so-called lost territories the Somalia
authorities tried to use international principles known as the rights to self-determination
as a stepping stone.31
On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the UN principle of selfdetermination
with the anticolonial efforts and asked the Somalia authority to renounce
its territorial claim unequivocally and immediately.32 Simultaneously, the Kenya-
Ethiopia political front tried to depict the activities of Somalia as illegal by inferring to
the principles of international agreements in the UN and OAU charters. The depiction
against Somalia was emanated from the UN and OAU principles such as ―the
inviolability of state frontiers‖.33 The Somalia authorities, for their part, had tried to
undermine the primary association of the issue of self-determination with European
colonization by asserting Ethiopia as an African ―colonialist‖ state.34
For that matter, Somalia tried to use the UN charter as evidence to substantiate its
argument on self-determination against the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya. On the May
30Woodwell, pp.104, 109-113.
31Oduogo Cyprine Onyango, ―Kenya-Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and
Political Factors Contributing to the Cooperation, 1963-1991‖ (MA Thesis in International Relation at
University of Nairobi, 1995), pp. 97-98.
32Woodwell, p.103.
33Daniel Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute,‖ Journal of International
Conference of African Development Archives (Western Michigan University, 2007), p.7.
34ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign
Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978); Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-
Somalia,‖ p.14.
22
1963 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, for instance, President Osman of Somalia claimed
that his government was asking self-determination for the Somalis in neighboring states
based on the principles of the UN charter.35 But, here it is vital to note that the
presentation of the UN charter as evidence by Somalia was stemmed from the mistaken
interpretation of the principles of the UN in a way that go with Somalia‘s interest.
Concerning Somalia‘s depiction of Ethiopia as a colonial ruler the charter of the UN had
never portrayed Ethiopia as a colonial authority, rather, the UN code accepted Ethiopia
as an African state that had never been under colonial rule in the continent next to
Liberia. Somalia had also recurrently asserted that the charter of OAU contradicts with
the principles of the UN on the issue of self-determination.36
In fact, the OAU principle which give prime concern for maintaining colonial boundary
as a legal boundary of the decolonized Africa largely ―provided plenty of rhetorical
fodder‖37 to the Kenyan and Ethiopian assertion on Mogadishu as invader and violator
of the principles of the OAU charter. As a result, the question of Somalia for the rights
to self-determination was frequently engulfed by Article III of the OAU charter. Article
III of the charter states that ―respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
state‖, ―non-interference in the affairs of states‖, and ―Unreserved condemnation of…
subversive activities on the part of neighboring states‖.38 Against this background, the
clash and controversies on the international principles concerning the issue of selfdetermination
vs. territorial integrity and noninterference leads to a long diplomatic
battle between the three countries throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.39
Here it is vital to note that the diplomatic campaigns of the Somalia authority for selfdetermination
began before Somalia got its full independence in 1960. During the Afro-
Asian People‘s Solidarity Conference that was held in Cairo, Egypt, on December 1957,
for instance, the issue of Somalia‘s independence and self-determination was discussed.
The participants of the conference acknowledged the struggle of Somalia for
independence and the right to self-determination. Nonetheless, the resolution of the
35Orobola Fasehun, ―Nigeria and the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict: A Case Study of Continuity in Nigerian
Foreign Policy,‖ Africa Spectrum Vol. 17, No. 2 (Sage Publications, Ltd, 1982), p.186.
36Samuel M. Makinda, ―Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa,‖ Third World Quarterly Vol.
4, No. 1 (1982), p.96.
37Woodwell, p.103.
38 Ibid.
39Ibid.
23
conference did not explicitly explain the extent of the right to self-determination which
can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. The resolution can be interpreted as
recognition for the unity of all Somalia inhabited territories of the Horn region and/or
the creation of Greater Somalia. The less explicit approach of the December 1957 Cairo
resolution on the issue of the right to self-determination was taken as an ―implying
support‖ for Somalia.40 This can be considered as a diplomatic success for the then
Somalia authorities.
Under other conditions, during the first conference of independent African states that
was held in Ghana, Accra, between the 15th of April and 22nd of April, 1958 Prime
Minister Nkrumah of Ghana synopsized the necessity of respecting the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of each other. Likewise, participants of the conference
(namely, Ghana, Ethiopia, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Tunisia, Liberia, Libya, and
Morocco)41 reflected a notion that ―far less compromising on the general questions of
boundary and the reunification of national groups divided by colonialism‖.42
On the other hand, the December 1958 All African Peoples Conference reflected a
contradictory notion from the April 1958 Accra conference on the issue of the colonial
boundary, which separates one ethnic group into two or more administrative
jurisdiction.43 Accordingly, the December 1958 conference castigated and condemned
the artificial colonial boundary that separates an ethnic group into different
governmental zones. The conference also requested independent African states to find
the long-lasting answer (way out) to the complication.44 The notion reflected on the
conference was a great leap forward for the interest of Somalia to further propagate the
issue of self-determination.
In 1959 Ahmmed Issa, the president of the Somalia Youth Club (SYC) or later called
the Somalia Youth League (SYL), stated that ―the Somali people from a single
language, they inhabit a vast territory which in its turn constitutes a well-defined
geographical unit. All must know that the government of Somalia will strive its utmost
40Otunnu, p.22.
41Carol A. Johnson, ―Conferences of Independent African States,‖ International Organization Vol.16,
No. 2 (1962), p.426, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300011152.
42Otunnu, p.22.
43 Ibid.
44Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.199.
24
with the legal and the peaceful means which are its democratic prerogative to attain this
end‖.45
Nonetheless, following the official inauguration of the OAU in 1963 the swinging selfdetermination
and boundary issue ended with the approbation of maintaining colonial
boundary as a legal boundary of independent African states.46 Thus, the existing
dictation of the illegality of artificial colonial frontiers was gradually eroded on the eye
of the OAU. African leaders also agreed to keep the artificial colonial frontiers as a
legal frontier for Africa.47 The other section of the African principals had also
recognized the artificial colonial frontiers as a legal boundary of the independent Africa
because they believed that the opening up of the issue would lead the continent to
endless security problems and balkanization. Thus, preserving the status quo of the
colonial boundary got the upper hand. Subsequently, the self-determination question of
Somalia over Ogaden (in Ethiopia), the NFD (in Kenya), and Afar and Isa (in Djibouti)
became illegal and law-breaking.48
However, Somalia did not accept the argument of the OAU and invoked on the issue of
self-determination aggressively with the psychology of an independent state.
Accordingly, the cornerstone and primary concern of the Somalia‘s foreign policy
became ensuring the self-determination right of the minority Somalis in Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Djibouti. This idea was clearly endorsed on article 6 sub article 4 of the
Somalia‘s constitution that was promulgated in July 1960. The article reads ―the Somali
Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali
territories‖.49
In the same vein, the issue of self-determination became the center of their speech for
the higher Somalia officials. For instance, on one of his press statement Premier
Hussein said the following about the self-determination of the Somali minorities outside
Somalia:
45Onyango, p.96.
46Otunnu, pp.22-23.
47Peter Woodward, ―Relations between Neighboring States in Northeast Africa,‖ Journal of Modern
African Studies Vol.22, No.2 (1984), p.274.
48Otunnu, pp.22-23; Woodward, p.274.
49ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene
(Director of Public Service at district of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Onyango, pp. 97-98.
25
…the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still
under foreign rule will continue to be prime consideration of my government
during its term of office. The government‘s policy will be to intensify our activities
of enlightening would opinion of the righteousness of the Somali case.50
Apparently, in his speech Mr. Hussein added that ―…until the Somali people, a nation
bound by the strongest links of race, tradition, culture, language and religion are allowed to
achieve their unity with their motherland Somalia in the exercise of their right to selfdetermination,
the border problems in the Horn of Africa would not be solved.‖51
In the 1963 OAU summit of independent African states, the representatives of Somalia
also expressed the necessity of endorsing self-determination to unify the Somali people
that are divided by artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries. The representative of
Somalia argued to take the case of the Somali minority in Ethiopia and Kenya as unique
by asserting linguistic, cultural, and religious reasons as bases of his argument for the
uniqueness of the case.52 On the same summit, as a response for the growing rhetoric of
self-determination by the Somalia authority the Kenyan representative said that ―the
principle of self-determination has relevance [only] where foreign domination is at
issue‖.53 Besides, Jomo Kenyatta underlined the importance of pan-Africanism, which
was a hot issue during the era that preaches about the ideals of the oneness of Africa
keeping constant diversity of national identity under a common pan-African continental
identity.54 At other time, after the removal of Sharmarke from power in 1964, the new
prime minister of Somalia Republic, Abdirazak Haji Hussein, on his first press
conference mentioned that ―…the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the
Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be the prime consideration of
his government during its term of office‖.55 This shows that the issue of selfdetermination
which was a prime concern during the Sharmarke-Osman era (1960-
1964) continued to remain a prime concern during the Hussein-Osman era (1964-1967)
too.
50Onyango, p.98.
51Ibid.
52Woodwell, p.105; Onyango, pp.96-97.
53Woodwell, p.105.
54Ibid.
55Onyango, p.98.
26
At other diplomatic efforts to ensure self-determination, the government of Osman-
Sharmarke invited the leader of KANU-Jomo Kenyatta and that of KADU-Mr. Ngala in
July and August 1962 respectively to discuss the future fate of the NFD and to lobby
about the self-determination right of the Somali inhabitants at the NFD. On the diner
program that was arranged to Kenyatta the then president of Somalia, Aden Abdela
Osman, said the following about the matter of self-determination: ―The principle of selfdetermination,
when used properly to unify and enlarge an existing state with a view
towards its absorption in a federal system of government is neither balkanization nor
fragmentation‖.56 Osman added that the implementation of self-determination would
help to promote the idea of pan-Africanism and enables to build a stable Africa.57
To strengthen and underline the idea forwarded by President Aden the then Prime
Minister of Somalia, Dr. Sharmarke, also said that ―…our hope is that the principle of
self-determination will be fully respected and applied to the inhabitants of the NFD… It
has been applied in recent years to Togo, the Cameroons and elsewhere, and there are
valid reasons why it should be applied to the NFD‖.58 However, most of the diplomatic
efforts of the Somalia authorities to ensure self-determination to the Somali minorities
in Ethiopia and Kenya were not fruitful. This unfruitful diplomatic interaction laid the
base for the hostile political approach between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front.
The Somalia authorities also tried to lobby and use the international organizations to
support the self-determination agenda. Nonetheless, in the 1964 meeting, the OAU
officially recognized colonial boundaries as the legitimate boundary for Africa. On the
conference African leads agreed ―to respect the borders existing on their achievement of
national independence‖.59 Consequently, opposing the stand of the OAU the Parliament
of Somalia passed the following notion ―both our peoples and territories have been
unjustly and brutally partitioned, and they are being denied the basic and inalienable
56Ibid, p.111.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Fasehun, P.187.
27
right to self-determination…Neither walls nor weapons can even permanently separate a
family or nation‖.60
On the other hand, during the period of detent (1968-1969), even if the Somalia
authorities became softer on other issues the Egal-Sharmarke government followed the
same rhetoric to the matter of self-determination like their predecessors. In fact, the
Egal-Sharmarke government reduced armed militia infiltration and instigation of the
Somali diaspora rebellion against Kenya and Ethiopia. The leaders of Somalia during
the détente era had also tried to focus on the diplomatic road to solve the problem and to
unify Somalia. However, concerning the issue of self-determination the Egal-Sharmarke
government had cultivated the same attitude like their predecessors. Later, the relatively
peaceful move of the Egal-Sharmarke government was aborted following the October
21, 1969 coup (the October revolution).61
The government of Said Barry (r.1969-1991) that came to power following the 1969
bloodless coup (the October revolution) employed strategies that range from aggressive
diplomacy to subversive actions and from infiltration of shifta (Somali bandit
insurgents) to a full-scale military invention to influence the self-determination efforts
of his government against Ethiopia and Kenya.62 Here again it is vital to note that like
his predecessors, Barry‘s foreign policy was relayed on ensuring the self-determination
efforts of the Somalis who found themselves on foreign administration. On one of his
public speeches to show his unwavering stand, for instance, Barry said the following
about self-determination ―the policy of the revolution towards the parts of our country
occupied by foreign powers, is that our people should be allowed peaceful selfdetermination,
to gain their freedom‖.63 This approach of Barry further complicated the
hostility between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front. On the other side, the Somalia‘s
approach towards self-determination further strengthened the cooperation of the Ethio-
Kenya front.
60 Korwa G. Adar, ―The Significance of the Legal Principle of ‗territorial Integrity‘ as the Modal
Determinant of Relations : A Case Study of Kenya‘s Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983‖
(1986), p.151.
61Onyango, pp.99-100.
62 Paul Watson, ―Arms and Aggression in the Horn of Africa,‖ Journal of International Affairs Vol. 40,
No. 1 (Published by: Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, 1986), P.160.
63 Onyango, p.136.
28
The contemporary of Said Barry in Ethiopia, Let. Col. Mengistu Hailemariam, who
came to power through the 12 September 1974 coup d'etat, repeatedly condemned the
self-determination advocacy of the Somalia authorities. Mengistu associate the selfdetermination
rhetorics of Somalia with expansionism and territorial aggrandization.
For instance, during his visit to Kenya in December 1980, while explaining about the
aggressive policy and self-determination scheme of Somalia, President Mengistu, said
that ―the country‘s policy is a serious danger to Africa and the world peace‖.64
Moreover, President Arap Moi of Kenya, who came to power in 1978, criticized the
self-determination campaign of Mogadishu. Moi had associated the self-determination
policy of Somalia with an expansionist project against Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.65
Moreover, at different international stage, the Ethio-Kenyan front advocated the
principles of the right to self-determination cannot have predominance over the
principles of the right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference on the
internal affairs of states.
On the other side, to undermine the self-determination question and territorial claim of
Said Barry and his predecessors the Ethiopian authorities had tried to argue that its
boundary with Somalia was internationally recognized since 1897. As an example,
Ethiopians tried to remind the following agreements to the Somalia authorities: First,
following the battle of Adwa in 1896 the government of Ethiopia under Emperor
Menelik II (r.1889-1913) signed a boundary agreement with Queen Victoria on 28 July,
1897. Second, on 16 June, 1908, Italy and Ethiopia ratified the 1897 boundary treaty
that delaminate the boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian Somaliland. Third, when
Ethiopia became member of the League of Nations in 1923 its boundary with its
neighboring colonial powers was registered based on the boundary treaties signed with
colonialists. Fourth, the League of Nations tried to solve the 1934 boundary dispute
between Ethiopia and Italy by using the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian treaty as a reference.66 So,
on the basis of the above premises the Ethiopian officialdom tried to argue that the
64 Ibid, pp.181-182.
65 Ibid, p.182.
66ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From the Governorate of Harar District to Kegnazmach Demise
Tefera (Governor of Kebridahar District) (January 13, 1961); Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-
Somalia,‖ pp.13.
29
territory of Ogaden is a sovereign land of Ethiopia. Besides, the Ethiopian authority
argued that the action of the League of Nations by implication reflects that Ogaden is an
integral part of Ethiopia and the self-determination question of Somalia Republic was a
violation to the territorial integrity of the sovereign state.
Fifth, when Ethiopia was registered as a founding member of the United Nations in
1945 the boundary treaties signed between Ethiopia and neighboring colonial powers
were registered as a legal document. Sixth, when the UN General Assembly approved
the trusteeship agreement in December 1950 it confirmed that ―the boundary between
Somalia and Ethiopia shall be those fixed by international agreements‖. Seventh, the
1964 Cairo accord ensured the inviolability of the colonial boundary of a state by any
means. Last but not the least which was used by the Ethiopian authorities to undermine
the self-determination campaign of Somalia was the support of the OAU heads of states
during the 1981 Nairobi summit. In the Nairobi summit the African heads of states
affirmed the 1980 recommendations of the Legos Good Office Commotion, which was
established to see the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.67
As a response to the argument of Ethiopia, the Somalia authorities asserted that the
question of self-determination has nothing to do with the colonial agreement that
Ethiopia signed with Europeans. The Somali politicians also tried to assert that the
question is about the inalienable right to self-determination, which is stated in article
103 of the UN charter. In addition, the Somalia authority time and again supposed that
since the Somalia government was not part of the agreement it should not be obliged to
accept agreements between colonial powers and Ethiopia. Regarding the resolution of
the OAU and Non-Aligned, Somalia had also claimed that since the representatives of
Somalia showed their reservation on the resolutions of the OAU and Non-Aligned,
Somalia is not expected to be governed by those resolutions.68
67Ibid.
68John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (New York, 1964), pp.7-20; I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of
Somalia: Nation and Sate in the Horn of Africa (London, 1980), pp.18-30; Kendie, ―Towards Resolving
the Ethiopia-Somalia,‖ p.14.
30
Ethiopians continued their counter-argument asserting that ―since there was no state in
history that holds the name ‗Somalia‘ before 1960, they could not have taken land from
a non-existent entity‖.69
Moreover, the Ethio-Kenyan front tried to challenge the claim of Somalia by referring
to the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, article 62 (a) of the Vienna convention on the
law of treaties, which provides that ―A fundamental change of circumstances which has
occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which are not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty, if the treaty establishes a boundary‖.70
Against this background, the farfetched difference of understanding of the principle of
self-determination and territorial integrity between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front
laid the foundation for the complicated political relations amid the three countries
throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.
1.1.3. Military Influence and Significance of the Disputed Territories
The other important point that can be taken as a determinant factor in laying the
foundation and in shaping the frictional relationship between the Somalia-Kenya and
the Somalia-Ethiopia political fronts from 1960 to 1991 was the role of the military on
the foreign policy direction of Somalia. During the period of the civilian administration
of Somalia (1960-1969) the military had an undeniable influence on the foreign policy
directives of Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. Later during the era of the military
domination of the politics of Somalia (1969-1991), the role of the military on the
politics of Somalia became at its height. Particularly during the period from 1969 up to
1978, the role of the military on internal and foreign policy decision making of Somalia
was very high. As a result, there was a belief within the military of Somalia that the
self-determination question of the Somali diaspora would get solution through military
action. The matter was further worsened by the recurrent discontent and rebellions of
the Somali diaspora living in Ethiopia and Kenya. So, the militant move of the Somalia
69Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,‖ p.14.
70Ibid, p.14.
31
military was one of those elements that laid the foundation for the deteriorated relations
between Somalia and the Kenya-Ethiopia front.71
However, the militant maneuver of the military to solve the boundary problem of
Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya considerably reduced following the defeat of Somalia
by Ethiopia at the battle of Ogaden in 1978.72
Some literatures and scholars try to associate the rise of the role of the military in the
decision making of the Somalia politics from 1969 to 1978 solely with the personal
interests of Barry. But ―the rise of the military on decision making should be viewed as
more than simply a reflection of the policies of Barry. Rather, it is clear that Barry was,
himself, subject to the influence of other military leaders from below‖.73 Thereby, the
domination of the military on the foreign policy decision making of Somalia in the
1960s and 1970s led the country to a full-scale war with Ethiopia in 1964 as well as
between 1977 and 1978. Besides, the militant move of Somalia led to the proliferation
of shifta war with Kenya from 1963 to1967. These wars and hostilities determined the
later period political and economic life of Somalia. Therefore, the rise of the Somalia
military influence in internal and foreign policy decision making laid the foundation and
shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-
1991).74
The economic and political conditions in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia as a whole and
the rebel region of Ogaden and the NFD in particular also had its own share in
determining the relationship of the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia political
fronts. For instance, the relatively poor economic and political condition at the Ogaden
region instigated the Somalis in the region to ask for self-determination and succession
from Ethiopia throughout the period of this study, 1960-1991. On the other hand, the
Somali rebellion which was at its height in the NFD of Kenya in the 1960s relatively
began to decline in the 1970s and 1980s. This was partly because of the improvement of
71 Woodwell, pp.125-126.
72Ibid, p.109.
73 Ibid, 120.
74ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene
(Director of Public Service at District of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Håkan Wiberg, ―The Horn of Africa,‖
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sage Publications, Ltd., 1979), p.190; see also Woodwell,
pp.99-128.
32
the economic and political conditions in the neglected district (i.e. the NFD) in
particular and in Kenya as a whole. Therefore, unlike Ethiopia the economic
development in Kenya during the period covered by this study comparatively helped to
mute the Somali rebellions in Kenya. Similarly, the political system in Kenya became
relatively more participatory and inclusive than the Barry military system and the
Ethiopian political seat up. As a result, the Somali rebellion relatively declined in the
NFD in 1970s and 1980s. The decline of the Somali discontent and violent resistance
movement in the NFD in the 1970s and 1980s helped the Kenyan authorities to work for
a relative normalization of its relationship with Somalia Republic in the 1980s.75
However, most of the normalization activities were not that much productive because of
lack of clear understanding between the two nations on controversial issues such as
irredentism, self-determination and territorial integrity.
In fact, the irredentist claim and violent Somali rebellions were declined in the NFD not
mainly because the military government of Barry changed its irredentist policy. Rather,
as mentioned above the consecutive economic growth in Kenya in 1970s, which
coincided with the coming to power of the military government in Somalia, subsided the
violent Somali rebellion in the NFD and reduced the acceptance of the irredentist
advocacy of Barry at the NFD. This lack of interest from the Kenyan Somali for violent
approach somehow diluted the aggressive irredentist move and question of selfdetermination
by Barry‘s government over the NFD.76 However, sometimes to trigger
anger among the inhabitants of the NFD Barry tried to infiltrate shifta warriors as a
destabilization act to influence the issue of self-determination.
Regarding the conception of the likely advantageous position of the Kenyan Somali
that inhabits in the NFD vs. the Ethiopian Somali that inhabits in Ogaden district, the
following idea was suggested by Woodwell: ―…the Somalis of the northeastern
province have not been subject to the same degree of humiliation as have the Somalis in
the Ogaden. Many Somalis in Kenya feel they can become Kenyan citizens and gain
from their citizenship. In the Ogaden most Somalis feel that under Ethiopian
75Woodwell, pp.119-123.
76Ibid.
33
suzerainty…‖.77 This helps us to understand that the hostile political relation between
the Ethio-Somalia fronts was more complicated than the hostile political relations
between the Kenya-Somalia fronts.
On the other hand, when we compare the NFD (in Kenya) and Ogaden (in Ethiopia)
from the point of natural resources, unlike the NFD, the Ogaden region has large scale
natural gas and oil. The discovery of gas and oil at Ogaden comparatively complicated
the territorial claims of the Somalia authorities over Ogaden. The discovery of these
natural resources together with the rigid political approach utilized by both Ethiopia and
Somalia complicated the relationship between the two nations. Here it is vital to note
that the discovery of natural gas and oil at Ogaden was disclosed by an American
company called Tenneco in 1972. The event added extra fuel to the existing tension
between Ethiopia and Somalia. Even though the Somalia authority did not express their
territorial claim over Ogaden was based on economic interests, it is apparent that the
discovery of oil and natural gas in the region further complicated the relations of
Somalia and Ethiopia. The discovery of gas and oil had also pushed the two parties to
follow a rigid political approach by neglecting the spirit of détente which was
flourishing during the Egal-Sharmarke era. In addition, scholars like Woodwell assert
that unlike the Somalia-Kenya political front the discovery of gas and oil in Ogaden had
more complicated the relationship between the Ethiopia-Somali political front that
ended with a full-scale war on the second half of 1970s.78 Or then, the Somalia
officialdom well understood that the annexation of Ogaden that covers one-fifth of
Ethiopia would contribute to make Somalia a regional hegemon. In relation to this idea,
Tom Farer in his book called War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm
stated that ―Somalia‘s acquisition of Ethiopia‘s southern provinces promised to alter
permanently the Horn‘s indigenous balance of power‖.79
Thus, the territorial claim from the side of Somalia on the eastern provinces of Ethiopia
(i.e. Ogaden) and the other territories in the Horn region namely the NFD and the
French Somaliland (Djibouti) had an ulterior motive beyond ensuring the self-
77Ibid, p.121.
78Tom Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm (New York, 1979), pp.118-119; see
also Woodwell, pp.99-128.
79Woodwell, p.121.
34
determination right. The ulterior motives were economic interest and to become a
regional hegemon through territorial aggrandizement either through incursion and
relentless Somali mutiny or shifta infiltration.80 This ulterior motive of Somalia and the
head strong political approach of Ethiopia and Kenya against Somalia‘s move laid the
foundation for the complicated diplomatic relations between Somalia and the Ethiopia-
Kenya political front.
1.1.4. Hegemonic Competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and Extra
Continental Power Involvement
The interest of Somalia Republic to become a new hegemonic power in the region of
the HoA and the interest of Ethiopia to maintain itself as a hegemonic power of the
Horn region can also be taken as the other factor that shaped the post-colonial political
relationship amid Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. To ensure the motive of being a
regional hegemon the three countries entered into unpleasant diplomatic campaigns and
competition. The three states had also tried to establish their own front and alignment
one-another.
Againest this background, Ethiopia and Kenya formed an alignment under the common
agenda of maintaining the status quo of territorial integrity and protecting their territory
from the irredentist claim of Somalia. The Somalia authorities had tried to counterchallenge
the concept of territorial integrity with the other sensitive international
principle named self-determination to the Somali minorities under foreign jurisdiction.81
In order to strengthen its move to build hegemonic power, the Somalia officials had also
used multiple contexts such as identity constrictions, ethnic affiliation, and religious
affiliation together with socio-cultural and politico-cultural issues. For instance, in order
to deconstruct the acceptance of Ethiopia in the regional, continental, and international
politics and to undermine the regional hegemonic role of Ethiopia, the Somalia officials
had tried to portray the action of Ethiopia as a ―black-on-black colonialism‖.82 In the
same vein, Kenya was portrayed as violent and illegal administrator of the NFD. This
80Onyango, pp.100-101; Ruth Iyob, ―Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of
Africa,‖ Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.31, No.2 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.258-
263.
81Iyob, p.263.
82 Ibid, p.261.
35
move of Somalia was against the interest of its immediate neighbors, Ethiopia and
Kenya. Consequently, to counterbalance the assertion of Somalia and to maintain their
political position in the region, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the claim of Somalia with
irredentism, and territorial aggrandizement. Moreover, the Kenya-Ethiopia political
front tried to justify the wrong activities of Somalia against the stability and order of the
Horn region. Similarly, the Kenya-Ethiopia front depicted the move of Somalia as a
―Pandora‘s Box‖ for the post-colonial Africa if opened would inevitably lead to the
balkanization of the continent.83
Under other conditions, to further strengthen the discourse of the so called Greater
Somalia in the region of the Horn the Somalia officialdoms had tried to employ the
metaphor of ―savage-victim-saver‖. This was done to portray Somalia as a ―saver‖. The
authority of Somalia had used to portray itself as the only eligible authority to safeguard
all Somali speaking inhabitants of the Horn from Ethiopia and Kenya- nations which
had been depicted as ―savage‖ and illegal administrators of Ogaden and the NFD
respectively. Concomitantly, the Somali speaking communities in the neighboring
Ethiopia, Kenyan, and Djibouti had been portrayed by the authority of Somalia as
―victim‖. This approach of Somalia is the same with the human right approach of
Makau Mutua that he explained explicitly on his well-known book entitled Human
Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique84.These all maneuvers by the officialdom of
Somalia were for the aggrandizement of power and to raise their acceptance in the
hearts of the Somalis at home and abroad. Besides, the maneuvers were basically
stemmed from the ambition to emerge winner in its regional hegemonic competition
with Ethiopia and Kenya and to establish a hegemonic Greater Somalia in the region of
the Horn.
For insistence, following his nomination as prime minister of Somalia in 1967 Ibrahim
Egal forwarded a speech that portrayed his government as a ―saver‖ or ―liberator‖ and
the Ethiopia-Kenya political front was depicted as an illegal administrator or in a term
83ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Iyob, pp.258 & 261; see also Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele, ―Foreign Powers and Militarism
in the Horn of Africa,‖ Review of African Political Economy: Part I, No. 30 (Taylor and Francis
Publisher, 1984), pp.10-15.
84Makau Mutua, Human Rights : A Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2002), pp.10-38.
36
of human right metaphor as ―savage‖. In the speech, the Somalis that inhabits outside of
Somalia was depicted as ―victim‖ of the illegal administration. His speech reads:
…the Republics foreign policy cannot be separated from the Somalis under foreign
rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya and France cannot ignore the Somali lands
they occupy…Somali unification, as set forth in the constitution, meant the uniting
of Somalis of their own free will, after they had achieved independence, my
government is ready achieve that end.85
This speech reflects the distance the Somalia authority traveled to create victimhood
mentality on the Somali minorities living in the neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Djibouti as well as the way they presented the Somalia government as liberator of the
minority groups from ‗foreign rule‘.
Another time, after his coming to power in 1969, Barry also continued leveling the
Somalis outside the administration of the Republic as if under the harassment of foreign
rule and presented his government as a liberator of the Somali minorities under foreign
rule. His speech reads that ―Although only two parts of the Somali territories have
achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a
possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of
our country‖.86
Therefore, to get the support of the Somalis inside and outside Somalia as well as to
radiate its influence and order beyond its administrative jurisdiction the Republic of
Somalia had used to conceptualize and tried to depict the Somali inhabitants outside
Somalia with the rhetoric of ―victim‖ that lost their basic rights and dignity. This act of
Somalia complicated its political interaction with neighboring countries and laid the
foundation for its hostile political relations with the Ethio-Kenyan front.
Likewise, the maneuver of the officialdom of Somalia Republic in organizing the
Somali rebellions to destabilize Ethiopia and Kenya was also the other foundation for
the complicated hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.
Rebellions were done under the banner of unification with the so-called ‗motherland‘ by
85Onyango, p.99.
86Onyango; p.100; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.
37
promoting the right to self-determination as a threshold for the movement.87 To promote
rebellion and to depict Somalia as a sole liberator, electronic and print Medias,
international stages and conferences were used as a means.88 All of these efforts by
Somalia were partly emanated from the ambition of consolidating its domestic power
and to radiate its influence and order beyond its boundary to regional, continental and
international level. Besides, Somalia needed the establishment of Greater Somalia to
further norms and rules of the political order in its own interest by neutralizing and
minimizing the role of the already existing hegemon in the Horn region, Ethiopia.
Moreover, the action of Somalia was stemmed from the ambition to undermine the postcolonial
emerging economic and political hegemon of the Horn region, Kenya.89
The shifta war in the NFD between 1964 and 1967 against Kenya and the infiltration of
destabilizing faction groups against Ethiopia at different times had partly had the same
base. In a tit for tat approach Ethiopia and Kenya on their part tried to give moral and
material support to opposition groups of Somalia to maintain the status quo.90 This
aggressive and undiplomatic approach on both sides laid the basement for animosity and
escalated the hostile political relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan political
front throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.
There were also other factors that helped to escalate the regional hegemonic power
competition in the HoA. One of these factors was the change of global actors following
WW II. Thereby, as a result of the intensification of an independent movement
following WW II many African countries became independent in the subsequent years.
This event paved the way for the newly emerged global powers- U.S.A and U.S.S.R to
substitute the existing global and colonial powers namely Great Britain and France in
the Horn region. Those newly emerged global powers had also began to play a cold war
politics to get the upper hand one-another on the geo-politically strategic region of the
HoA in collaboration with loyal regional hegemonic powers. The Horn region regional
powers had also worked hard to attract global powers by their side. Here it is vital to
87Woodwell, p.101.
88 Onyango, pp.116 & 133.
89 ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Zeleke Beyene to Ministry of Interior Affairs
(August 26, 1978); see also Iyob, p.260-271.
90ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign
Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978).
38
note that the motive of the regional powers to attract global powers was stemmed from
the ambition to emerge as a sole regional hegemonic power. The global powers also
actively involved in the regional politics of the Horn to get strategic power base. The
stiff competition of global powers to have strategic power base in the Horn region was
mainly because of the geo-political significance and proximity of the region to the oil
rich Arabian Peninsula and gulf region. The presence of the important water ways like
the, Gulf of Aden, Red sea and Suzie canal were also the other reasons that increased
the strategic significance of the Horn region.91
The other factor that escalated the regional power competition amid the Somalia-
Ethiopia hostile political front and Kenya as a security ally of Ethiopia was the strategic
water of the Red sea. Here it is vital to note that except Ethiopia all countries that
surrounded the Red Sea such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, and
Somalia identified themselves with the Arab/ Islamic world. On the other side, Ethiopia
identified itself as a ―Christian traditionalist‖. The identification of Ethiopia as the
―Christian traditionalist‖ had helped Somalia to marginalize Ethiopia and to get extra
support from continental and extra continental powers that oppose Ethiopia‘s supremacy
in the Red Sea region. The situation also helped Somalia to build its power and order in
the region to counterbalance Ethiopia‘s political activities.92
Therefore, an effort to establish regional hegemonic power and to establish an order that
radiates beyond an administrative jurisdiction was the other elements that laid the
foundation and partly shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia,
and Kenya from 1960 to1991.
The other important point that shaped the trilateral relations between Ethiopia, Somalia,
and Kenya was the security narrations between the three countries. Things like the
outcome of border conflict, insurgency threat, Somalia irredentism, security alignment,
military aid, arms competition, hegemonic rivalry, mistrust, uncertainties, and Somali
91ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, ―Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes‖ (March 1969);
―Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes‖ (October 1961); Joseph Kimani, ―Strategy for the Horn of
Africa,‖ U.S. Army College (1993), p.1-2.
92ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, ―Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes‖ (March 1969);
―Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes‖ (October 1961); Joseph Kimani, ―Strategy for the Horn of
Africa,‖ U.S. Army College (1993), p.1-2; Alice A. Adanalian, ―The Horn of Africa,‖ World Affairs Vol.
131, No. 1 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1968), p.38.
39
rebellions contributed to the security narration. The intra-state relations of the peripheral
regions of Ogaden and the NFD with the central government of Ethiopia and Kenya
respectively had also helped to the rise of security questions and instability in the
region.93
While the Somalia officialdoms tried to argue that both their people and territory were
unjustly and brutally partitioned and agonized, the camp of Kenya and Ethiopia on their
part tried to counterbalance the assertion of Somalia by echoing that their security was
under interrogation because of the policy of Somalia‘s territorial aggrandizement and
irredentism. Consequently, all the three countries exported the regional issues to
continental and extra continental powers to get diplomatic and military support under
the banner of securing their people and territory. Nonetheless, the involvement of extra
continental and continental powers did not bring any tangible solution to the problem.
Rather, the involvement of continental and extra continental powers further complicated
the issue within the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia political triangle and paved the way for an
easy internationalization of the matter. Against this background, the course of events
that laid the foundation for animosity and helped for the easy internationalization of the
issue between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia were: (i) the cold war politics in which
superpowers of both camps were looking for a strategic partner and military base on one
of the geopolitically significant Horn countries94 and; (ii) lack of agreement, consensus,
and interest in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle to solve their problem by
continental organization, OAU. For instance, in most cases, while Ethiopia and Kenya
preferred a continental organization, the OAU, to see their cases, the Somalia
officialdom desired the complication to be seen by the UN.95 This lack of consensus and
lack of trust one on the other had paved the way and laid the foundation for the
escalation of hostility and easy internationalization of the issue between the three
countries.
93ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene
(Director of Public Service at district of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Hussein A. Mahmoud, ―Seeking
Citizenship on the Border: Kenya Somalia, the Uncertainty of Belonging, and Public Sphere Interactions‖
(Edgerton University, 2008), p.9.
94 ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and intervention in the Horn of Africa, Monthly Review Press
(New York,1981), pp.129-130, see also Woodwell, pp.99-128.
95Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.95-96.
40
On the same line, following its independence the authority of Kenya strengthen its
relation with Ethiopia as a strategy to box the irredentist Somalia officialdom. In the
security tie, Kenya wanted to play the Ethiopian card by signing a strategic alliance with
Ethiopia to overcome the security threat from Somalia.96 On their part, the Somalia
officialdoms tried to create a strong relation with continental powers such as Egypt. In
addition to the continental power, the Somalia authorities also tried to play the card of
extra continental powers such as the Soviet Union until the Soviet switched to the
Ethiopian side in 1978. Besides, the Somalia issue brought, Iran, and Pakistan to the
play. Western states like the U.S.A, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany
were also actively involved in one or other ways on the affairs of the Ethiopia-Somalia-
Kenya triangle. So, the multifaceted cooperation and competition among different
regional, continental and extra continental powers and their support complicated and
laid the foundation for the relations of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya political triangle.97
Among the extra continental actors that played a role in the relations of the three
countries, the U.S was the first. In the 1960s U.S.A was an important security alley and
an active provider of material, advisory and military support to Ethiopia. U.S.A was
also opposing the territorial claim of Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. To reverse
the mindset of the U.S.A the Somalia delegates including Prime Minister Sharmarke
repeatedly visited Washington. However, they did not get the support of the U.S.A. This
unfriendly practice of Washington pushed the Somalia officialdoms to look for the
socialist east and Soviet Russia as strategic ally. As a result, Soviet Russia became one
of the major military and economic aid providers for Somalia. However, following the
downfall of Emperor Hailesilase I (1974), Ethiopia and Somalia switched their side.
Accordingly, Ethiopia became pro-east (socialist state) and Somalia became pro-west.
At the same time, Russia became the main security ally of Ethiopia substituting the
U.S.A. Under other conditions, since 1978 the Somalia officialdoms also substituted
U.S.A in place of Russia as main security ally. The strategic port of Berbera was also
taken from Soviet Russia and transferred to U.S.A as a reward. In all periods of this
study, Kenya remains the same being a pro-west nation.Yet, paradoxically and unusual
to the cold war era norm of political alignment the capitalist and pro-west Kenya
96 Adanalian, p.40.
97 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp. 137& 149; Otunnu, pp.23-24.
41
continued its security alliance with the pro-east and socialist Ethiopia.98 So, the cold war
security alliance and counter alliance also complicated and laid the foundation for the
hostile and/or cooperative trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.
On the other hand, following the end of the shifta war in 1967, the Somalia-Kenya
relations had taken a new shape. Particularly the coming to power of Ibrahim Egal and
Sharmarke as a prime minister and president of Somalia respectively (1967) created
peaceful cooperation between the two nations.99 Yet, given the peaceful interaction,
considering Somalia as a security threat by the Kenya-Ethiopia political front remained
unchanged.
Later following the coming to power of Barry (1969) Somalia tried to isolate Kenya
from Ethiopia by showing a positive gesture to the Kenyan government. Nonetheless,
the Kenyan officialdom continued their security distrust and misgiving towards Somalia
because the Kenyan Officialdoms supposed that the peace gesture of Somalia was to
divide and dilute the Ethio-Kenyan security relations. Here it is vital to note that while
the government of Barry tried to soften its relations with Kenya, he was working
actively in subversive actions and advocating anti-Ethiopian propaganda and diplomatic
campaign. In the process of this all dynamics, Kenya offered strong diplomatic support
to its regional security ally, Ethiopia.100 For instance, during the 1973 OAU summit, the
then vice president of Kenya mentioned the following: ―Kenya cannot be party to
opening up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states…Kenya cannot and
shall not recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its
sister country‖.101
The rise of the Somali nationalism was also partly taken as the foundation and as an
important point on the trilateral political environment of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya
98 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment
and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa,‖ The journal of Modern African Studies
Vol.36, No.4 (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.625-631; Donald Patterson, ―Ethiopia Abandoned?
An American Perspective,‖ International Affairs Vol.62, No. 4 (1986), pp.627-631.
99Harry E. Colestock, ―The Somali Boundary: Dispute and Functional Evolution‖ (MA Research Paper,
Michigan State University, 1972), p.45.
100 Woodwell, p.108.
101Adar, p.245.
42
triangle and on the security narration of the Horn region in a multitude of ways. First, on
the basis of the language, religious, and cultural similarity the Somalia nationalist
employed a pan-Somali project to bring all the Somali inhabiting territories of the HoA
under one government. Nonetheless, the pan-Somali nationalism project had faced
opposition from neighboring countries. The opposition was stemmed from the assertion
that the pan-Somali nationalism was against the security and territorial integrity of
neighboring countries. Second, the intersection of pan-Somali nationalist advocacy and
Somalia‘s irredentism with the cold war politics further complicated the political
environment between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya in particular and the politics of the
HoA in general.102 Consequently, the Kenya-Ethiopia camp on one side and the pan-
Somali nationalist camp on the other side relentlessly sow resentment one on the other
backed by their east-west security and strategic allies.
Looking at the unchanged desire to unite the so-called ‗lost territories‘ by the pan-
Somali nationalist leaders of Somalia, the government of Kenya and Ethiopia took the
move of Somalia as a big security threat to their territorial integrity. Consequently, the
Ethiopia-Kenyan political front revised the 1963 bilateral treaty of security and
friendship in 1980 and 1987.103 Somalia on its part continued to woo the Kenyan
officialdom aiming to bring Nairobi on her side to weaken the Ethio-Kenyan security
cooperation.
Through the passage of time, the non-diplomatic action of the Somalia officialdoms
together with the strategic move of the Ethiopia-Kenya political front worsened
Somalia‘s relations with continental and extra continental powers and isolated
Mogadishu from international and African politics. For instance, the speech made by
President Osman Abdalla in the 1963 inaugural meeting of OAU advocating the
necessity of creating Greater Somalia poorly accepted by many member states. Besides,
when all the thirty members of the OAU signed and recognized colonial boundary as a
102ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Harvard University Press, 1963), p.23-25; I.M Lewis, ―Pan-
Africanism and Pan-Somalism,‖ The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1963),
pp.151-153.
103Peter Kagwanja, ―Moi Left an Indelible Mark in Kenya‘s Foreign Policy,‖ Nation (March 18, 2020),
https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/moi-left-an-indelible-mark-in-kenya-s-foreign-policy-
248912; Woodwell, p.117.
43
legal boundary of the newly independent African countries, the reservation of Somalia
under the leadership of Abdalla also faced objection by member states.104
To recover from the diplomatic isolation, although the Somalia administrative organs
who attended their education in western countries namely Britain and Italy tried
rapprochement with the west for economic and military aid in the first half of the 1960s,
the west were reluctant to the bid. For instance, as stated before Somalia send a high
ranking diplomatic staff to U.S.A at the end of November 1962 looking economic and
military aid under the leadership of the then Prime Minister of Somalia, Sharmarke. But,
U.S.A refused the military aid. Yet, rather than sending the delegate with an empty
hand, the Kennedy administration sent back Sharmarke with more promise and small
economic assistance of 14.2 million dollars. Here it is vital to note that during the
period, the government of Kennedy was not bold enough to send the Somalia delegate
with empty hand because if U.S.A sent Sharmarke empty hand, Somalia would
increasingly pro-Soviet. Under other conditions, Washington afraid that providing
military aid to Somalia would cause distrust and confrontation between the U.S and its
old ally in the HoA, Ethiopia. Apparently, before the visit of Prime Minister Sharmarke
to Washington, Ethiopia reputedly noticed the government of the U.S about the security
challenge from Somalia. The other pro-Washington Horn country, Kenya, was also
closely looking the activities of Somalia. Consequently, rather than providing enough
aid the Kennedy administration tried to convince Sharmarke about the danger of the
Somalia‘s irredentist policy. This event further eroded the trust of Somalia on the west
on the area of security aid and turned its face to the east.105 The situation had also laid
the foundation for the complication of the trilateral political relations between the three
countries together with their east-west security allies.
Afterward, the incident of March 1963 further deteriorated the trust of Somalia to
consider the west as strategic and security ally. In this year, Britain officially and legally
declared the NFD as one part of Kenya. It is vital to note here that 62 percent of the
inhabitants of the NFD were Somali. The decline of the relationship between the west
and Somalia was taken as a good opportunity by the Soviets to present itself as an
104Onyango, pp.118, 120 & 131; Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet,‖
p.633.
105Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet,‖ pp. 612 & 628.
44
honest strategic security ally. The motive of the Soviets was to rent a strategic base at
the HoA as a counterbalance to the U.S power base at Kgnew, in Asmara, Eritrea.
Looking at the green light from Moscow the government of Osman Abdela approached
the Soviets. To this end, in 1963 $30 million Soviet-Somali military agreement was
signed between Moscow and Mogadishu. In return, Moscow got a military base at
Berbera.106 Consequently, as the 1955 Egypt-Czechoslovakian arms agreement
triggered arms and cold war competition in the Middle East, the Moscow-Mogadishu
arms pact also had the same effect on the region of the HoA.107
The complete joining of Mogadishu to the side of Moscow and the establishment of the
Soviet power base at Berbera increased the strategic significance of Kagnew to the
U.S.A. As a result, Ethiopia asked additional aid from U.S.A asserting insecurity and
Washington was forced to abandon its neutrality position on the Somalia-Ethiopia and
Somalia-Kenya border conflict. Consequently, the U.S military support to Ethiopia
increased. The increment of the U.S aid to Ethiopia helped the latter‘s victory during the
1964 war against Somalia. Subsequently, the sizeable economic and military aid poured
by the Soviet Union and the United States raised the tense relationship between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and laid the foundation for heightening the condition of
security volatility in the Horn region.108
Therefore, security aid, security alignment, arms competition, etc. with the involvement
of regional, continental and extra continental powers had also laid the foundation and
shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960
to 9191.
1.2. The Somalia Nationalism and Unification Activity
Unlike most African countries south of the Sahara, Somalis have homogeneous cultural,
historical, religious, and linguistic background. As a result, Somalis have a strong sense
of belongingness to each other. Despite the homogenous nature and strong sense of
belongingness among the Somali people, the Somali inhabiting territories in the Horn
106Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet,‖ pp.631 & 637 ; Peter Schwab,
―Cold War on the Horn of Africa,‖ African Affairs Vol.77, Issue, 306 (1978), p.12.
107 Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet,‖ p.641.
108Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.18-20; Schwab, p.12; Lefebvre, ―The United States, Ethiopia and
the 1963 Somali Soviet,‖ p. 641; Woodwell, p.8.
45
were under five administrative jurisdictions. The division of the Somali national at five
administrative jurisdictions triggered the Pan-Somali nationalist movement to liberate
the Somalis from foreign rule and to unify the disintegrated Somali inhabiting territories
of the HoA under a single authority.109
Based on developments, change and dynamics of activities, the evolution of the pan-
Somali nationalism can be divided in to four major phases. Accordingly, the first phases
of the pan-Somali nationalism can be stated as the phase of resistance (1898-1920).
During this phase the pan-Somali nationalism under the leadership of Said Mohammad
Abdal Hassan launched a resistance attack against imperial powers that controlled the
Somali inhabiting lands in the HoA. The second phase of the pan-Somali movement
was the era of a relative silence or lull (1921-1940). During this stage the pan-Somali
nationalist movement was comparatively declined and the resistance was reduced to a
tactic named surprise attack. This was happened following the death and defeat of
Abdal Hassan in 1920110 at the Dervish111 war. The third phase was a stage of ―micro‖
nationalism in the dynamics of the pan-Somali nationalist movement (1941-1959).
During this stage, the greater Somali scheme had began to grow on the mind of the
Somali nationalists. Besides, during this phase, the SYL was established as a figurehead
moving spirit in the advocacy of greater Somalia scheme. The fourth or the last phase of
the pan-Somali nationalist movement was the stage of ―macro‖ nationalist movement
(1960-1991). During this phase, the conceptualization of the greater Somalia scheme
reached at its highest stage in the mind of the nationalists with an independent state
mind setup. The issue of Greater Somalia scheme was also introduced in Somalia as a
figurehead foreign policy direction of the state during this phase. It was at this stage that
the hostility and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front reached
at its climax.112
109Hassan A. Mirreh, Review of Review of Somali Nationalism, by Saadia Touval, The Journal of Modern
African Studies Vol. 2, no. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp.130-132.
110Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia Border Problem 1941-
2014 (Printed in U.S.A, 2015), p.15.
111Dervish is a term used to use to indicate Muslim warriors and followers of Mehdi in Sudan and the
term is applied to the followers of Said Mohammad Abdal Hassan in Somalia. Abdal Hassean used the
term to create unity among his followers under the sense of Muslim brotherhood (Touval, Somali
Nationalism, p.58).
112Thompson, p.15.
46
Under other conditions, keeping constant the homogeneity of cultural, linguistic and
religious background, the tribal-based hostile political interactions among the Somali
tribal groups challenged the development of the Somali political nationalism to the
expected higher stage. Particularly the tribe, sub-tribe, clan, sub-clan based traditional
governance system several times challenged the growth of the pan–Somali nationalism.
In the traditional governance system clan heads were taken as a responsible organ for
the general welfare and security of a tribe.113 This traditional clan based division was
plotted by neighboring hostile countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya in particular) to
weaken the internal unity and pan-Somali nationalist movements of Somalia during the
post 1960 eras. Subversive activities to weaken the internal unity of Somalia through
plotting the traditional clan based animosity within the different clans of Somalia114
complicated and laid the foundation for the unfriendly relations between Somalia and
the Ethio-Kenyan front throughout the period covered by this study.
Moreover, in the traditional Somali administrative system, before the partition of their
grazing lands by colonial powers (i.e. France, Britain, and Italy) an individual‘s
devotion was for the tribe or clan that he/she belongs. This was mainly because in the
traditional political structure of Somalia it was the clan or tribe that provided security
during emergence. In addition, before the arrival of imperial powers, there was no
autonomous single political unit that had acceptance by all clans. Rather, sometimes
clans were looked in a wary eye under the sense of hostility.115
The practice of the partition of the land of Somalia by colonial powers undermined the
clan and tribal structural system and paved the way for the emergence of centralized
administration. The situation partly helped the Somali nationalists to promote the
necessity of creating a sense of unity among tribal groups for the establishment of a
single centralized administration. Thus, the territorial partition of the Somali grazing
areas by imperial powers can be taken as threshold in triggering the Somali nationalism
in the early 1900s. However, the extreme fanatic move of the pan-Somali nationalism
had also laid the foundation for the hostility between Somalia and neighboring states
such as Ethiopia and Kenyan. Against this background, between 1900 and 1920 the
113Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism,‖ pp. 147-148.
114 Yihun, ―Ethiopia In African Politics,‖ p.103.
115 Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism,‖ pp. 147-148.
47
famous Somali nationalist Said Mohammad Abdal Hassan (Mad Mullah) was among
those figurehead personalities in organizing resistance movements through coordinating
the north and south Somali tribal groups against foreign rulers‘ presence in the Somali
inhabiting lands of the Horn region.116
It is vital to note here that Said Muhammad Abdal Hassen was born in April 1864 at a
place called Dulbahante, which is found on the eastern portion of the British
Somaliland. He attended religious education and became an assistant for his religious
teacher at an early age. He won the religious title ‗sheik‘ at the age of nineteen and
became much more dedicated his life for religion.117
Qualities like public speaking capacity, magnetic personality, and ruthlessness for his
adversary, steady and unshakeable determination enabled Said Mohammad Abdal
Hassen to get many followers as well as to be admired and deep-rooted in the mind,
blood and hearts of many Somalis down to present.118
As mentioned by different scholars the moment that instigated and fired the patriotic or
nationalist feeling of Abdal Hassen was the moment that one day he met a boy who was
attending his lesson at mission school. Abdal Hassen asked the boy‘s name, to the
surprise of Abdal Hassen the boy responded his name ‗John Abdillahi‘. It was this event
that faired the nationalist or patriotic feeling of Abdal Hassen and forced him to begin
preparation to reunify all Somalis against colonizers. During his materialization of the
movement, Abdal Hassen over and over advocated that the moves of colonizers were to
affect the long-standing religious faith of the Somali people.119
So, to inspire the patriotic and nationalist feeling of the Somali people as well as to
aggrandize his power by uniting all the Somali speaking communities that were divided
by the tradition of clan-based political system, Abdal Hassen widely employed religion
as a primary means.120
116 Ibid.
117 Lewis, A Modern History, p.65.
118Ibid, p.82.
119 Ibid, p.67.
120John P. Slight, ―British and Somali Views of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan‘s Jihad, 1899–1920,‖
Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies Vol. 10 (2010), p.25.
48
Abdel Hassen had also argued the necessity of declaring a holy war or jihad against the
infidels or the colonial powers. Thereby, he began collecting weapons and recruiting
men from different clans. The ambition of Abdal Hassen was ultimately to create a
unified and centralized government in Somalia. This move of Abdal Hassen reawakened
the nationalism of the Somali people, which was hibernated for centuries because of the
traditional tribal political system. Accordingly, different tribal leaders gave their words
to support Abdal Hassen‘s nationalist movement to liberate Somalia and its people from
external political domination. Particularly, the northern Somali tribal groups willingly
surrendered to the ideology of Abdal Hassen and showed their commitment to attain his
goal. In return, they strongly wished to see a territorially integrated Somalia by
removing colonial jurisdiction from their land. Apparently, different tribal leaders and
groups gave support for Abdal Hassen demanding for the return of the indigenous
Somali justice and security system that was jeopardized by the presence of outside
rules.121
Besides, Abdal Hassen worked to widen the scope of his support against Somalia‘s rule
by imperial powers (i.e. Britain, France and Italy) through establishing good
relationship with Turkey and Germany, which were the belligerents of the allied power
during the First World War.122
Subsequently, backed by different clans and his loyal supporters Abdel Hassen fought
the Dervish war against imperialists between 1900 and 1920. Nonetheless, the religious
based nationalist movement that was established by Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen was
declined and collapsed in 1920 without scoring significant contribution.123
Some of the reasons for the failure of Abdal Hassen‘s movement were the following:
First, Abdal Hassen did not arrange his successor while he was in power. Rather, after
acquiring the support of many Somali tribal leaders Abdal Hassen became a dictator.
Second, Abdal Hassen was not successful in establishing a theocratic state as he wished.
Third, his followers were not in a position to understand the real nature of ideology
advocated by Abdal Hassen. Fourth, Abdal Hassen tried to employ Islamic law from
121 Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.52-60.
122 Thompson, p.16.
123 Touval, Somali Nationalism, p.58.
49
end to end neglecting the traditional law and justice system of the Somali people. This
situation in turn affected and undermined the acceptance of Abdal Hassen by the large
mass of the Somali people. Fifth, the civil wars had also contributed for the low esteem
of Abdal Hassen‘s pan-Somali nationalism. Sixth, to strengthen his power Abdal
Hassen employed the tactic of divided and rule through creating hostility among
different Somali tribal groups.124
Yet, keeping constant its collapse without scoring significant achievement, Said
Mohammed Abdal Hassen‘s plan to bring the Somali inhabited land of the Horn under
one government was considered as a good beginning and remarkable success for the
later period pan-Somali nationalist movements. On the other side, the pan-Somali
nationalist movement by Abdal Hassen was considered important in the dynamics of the
pan-Somali nationalism. This is true because after the movement that had made by
Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Ilgazi (literally called ‗Gragn‘125) there was no tradition to generate
a unified national political movement in Somalia like the case of Said Mohammed
Abdal Hassen‘s pan-Somali nationalist movement.126 While explaining the achievement
of Abdal Hassen‘s nationalist movement, I. M. Lewis, stated that ―what is remarkable is
not that this collapsed with his death, but that he ever succeeded in establishing it at
all‖.127
On the other hand, during the counter-response to the Dervish war or to Abdal Hassen‘s
pan-Somali nationalist movement (1900-1920) the British rule able to control large
areas in the hinterland of Somalia. Likewise, the nationalist movement of Abdal Hassen
had contributed to surge the cooperation between Britain and Ethiopia to withstand the
Dervish war and to weaken the pan-Somali movement headed by Abdal Hassen. This
Anglo-Ethiopian cooperation had also enabled Ethiopia to strengthen its position over
Ogaden considerably.128
124 Lewis, A Modern History, pp.81-85; Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.59-60.
125An Imam who had tried to establish a unified political system through unifying Djibouti, Somalia, and
some parts of the former Abyssinia or the present-day Ethiopia in the 16th Century in collaboration with
the Ottoman.
126 Lewis, A Modern History, pp.81-82.
127 Ibid, p.81.
128 Ibid, pp.90-91; see also Ali Khalif Galaydh, ―Instability in the Horn,‖ Harvard International Review
Vol. 5, No. 6 (Published by Harvard International Review, 1983), p.11-14.
50
The death of Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen in 1920 at the age of fifty-six temporarily
weakened the pan-Somali nationalism. However, the foundation he had laid strikingly
contributed for the establishment of the Somali Youth Club (SYC) in 1943, which was
the figurehead advocator of the pan-Somali nationalism and greater Somalia concept in
the second half of the 20th century.129 Thus, Abdal Hassen‘s pan-Somali nationalism
was among those elements that laid the foundation for the second half of the 20th
century complicated hostile and/or cooperative relations amid the Ethiopia-Somalia-
Kenya triangle by laying the basement for the inflexible and fanatic pan-Somali
nationalism in the mind of the Somali people.
1.3. The Rejuvenation of the Somali Nationalism and Territorial Claim
In the Second World War east African campaign, which was also called the Abyssinian
campaign (between June 1940 and November 1941), the Somali inhabiting territories of
the Horn region became under the colonial administration of the Italian East Africa
(Africa Orientale Italiana) (AOI) for seven months. It was in August 1940 that the
British Somaliland was officially taken and incorporated to the Italian East African
administration. Afterwards, the Italian sowed the seeds of political unification for all
Somali inhabiting territories in the HoA.130 Thereby, the political unification advocacy
of the Italian colonial ruler about the Somali inhabiting territories in the Horn region
partly helped for the post WW II era pan-Somali irredentist advocacy by the Somali
nationalists. The situation in turn complicated and laid the foundation for the complex
trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.
Later, when the British regained the British East Africa colonies from the Italian
belligerents in 1941, all the Somali inhabiting territories in the HoA except the French
Somaliland became under the British rule. After the liberation, the British administered
the territory under the title of Occupied Enemy Territory (OET).131
So, one of the blessings that WW II brought for the Somali inhabitants of the HoA was
the unification of the four out of the five Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn region
129 Lewis, A Modern History, p.80; Touval, Somali Nationalism, p.86.
130 Tibebe Eshete, ―The Root Causes of Political Problems in Ogaden, 1942-1960,‖ Northeast African
Studies Vol.13, No.1 (Michigan State University Press, 1991), pp.9-10.
131Ibid, p.10.
51
under British rule with the title of OET. The loose unification that lifted the artificial
boundary helped the Somali national to move from one region to others without
restriction. To a greater degree, it assisted to trigger a sense of unity, oneness, and
nationalism among many Somalis. The loose unification had also helped the Somalis to
exchange ideas. The situation correspondingly instigated the Somali political elites to
think about the establishment of a single and centralized political entity by uniting all
the Somali inhabiting lands of the Horn region. Likewise, the event fired the patriotic
sentiments of the Somali youth and ultimately contributed to the birth of the SYL in
1946 in southern Somalia at Mogadishu.132 Wherefore, the unification philosophy
advocated by the British ruler under the title of OET further fired the pan-Somali
irredentist movement and caused the increment of territorial demand from Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Djibouti. The situation had also laid the foundation for the second half of
the 20th century hostile and distrustful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan
front.
The SYC, which was founded in 1943, was one of the results of the British rule over
Somalia. The club had thirteen members. Among whom we can mark ardent advocators
of the Somali irredentism like Abdulkadir Sheik Squawadiin and Yassin Haji Osman
Sharmarke, who were the first president and general secretary of the club respectively.
When the SYC transformed into a political party with the name SYL in 1946, Haji
Mohammed Hassein was elected as a president. Concomitantly, Yasin Haji Osman
Sharmarke and Abdulahi Issa were elected as secretary and deputy secretary
respectively. Three major things were among the center of the movement for the
members of the SYL. The first was avoiding tribal-based discrimination and favoritism.
The second was respecting the principle of the club and equality among members. The
third was working for the unification and scheme of Greater Somalia.133 To enforce this,
the movement had the following oath during the membership:
I swear by Almighty God that I will not take any action against any Somali. In
trouble I promise to help the Somali. I will become the brother of all other
members. I will not reveal the name of my tribe. In matters of marriage I will not
132Lewis, A Modern History, pp.116-118; Eshete, p. 17.
133Abdi Ismail Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats: Aden A. Osman and Abdirazak H. Hussen (Indiana
University Press, 2016), p.40; Eshete, p.17.
52
discriminate between the Somali tribes and the Midgan, Yibirh, Yaha and
Tomals.134
It is also vital to note that during its establishment at southern Somalia, in Mogadishu,
the mobilizations of supporters for the SYL was not as smooth as expected. Particularly
the northern Somalis showed some reservations. In fact, the inhabitants of the British
Somaliland (northern Somalia) were always enthusiastic about the union of the Somali
inhabiting lands but they showed reservation to the call of the SYL fearing the repetition
of the atrocity and autocratic system that they had experienced during the era of Said
Mohammad Abdal Hassen (1900-1920). Nonetheless, later the only recognized political
party in British Somaliland (northern Somalia) named the Somali National League
(SNL), which was established in 1935 and developed into fully-grown party in 1951,
had successfully convinced the tribes of northern Somalia to collaborate with the
SYL.135
After securing the support of different Somali tribal groups including the northern
Somali, the SYL had tried to regulate the relationship of the divided and often hostile
clans by introducing a modern nationalist movement with the following five major
goals. First, the SYL had sought to create a sense of belongingness, brotherhood, and
unity among the Somalis that inhabited under different administrative units. In order to
do so, the SYL tried to teach tribal leaders and their followers about the harmful
practice of prejudices and discrimination that triggered hostility among tribal groups.
Second, the SYL had prepared an extensive propaganda campaign to boost the
nationalist aspiration of the youth and elderly people. Third, the SYL had worked to
increase the awareness of the youth about the importance of modern education and
civilization. Fourth, the SYL plod away at establishing a legal system to regulate
prejudice and derogatory practices that endanger the unity and strength of Somalia.
Fifth, to record the socio-cultural, socio-economic and political activities of the Somali
people, the SYL had used to run to improve the Ismaniya or Osmaniya script.136 So, the
134 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.40.
135Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism,‖ pp.148-149; Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.103-104.
136Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism, p.149; Lewis, A Modern History, p.123; S. Pilaszewicz and W. Tyloch.,
Literatures in African Languages: Theoretical Issues and Sample Surveys, edt. by B. W. Andrzejewski,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.53. According to Pitaszewicz and Tyloch, the
Ismaniya (Osmaniya) script was first emerged in 1920s by a person called Isman Yusuf Kenadid. The
53
growth and strength of the SYL together with its philosophy of Greater Somalia laid the
foundation and complicated the relations of Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya during
the post-colonial ear.
Concomitantly, the SNL which was formed in 1935 and had promoted into a wellestablished
and well-developed party on the British dominated side of northern Somalia
in 1951 solemnly promised on programs such as: first, to unify the Somali inhabiting
territories of the HoA under the umbrella of single and centralized Somali
administrative jurisdiction by lifting their embracement under British, Italian, French,
and Ethiopian rules. The second program was to toil for the general flourishment of the
Somali people by switching the state of fanaticism and foe among different tribes to the
state of brotherhood and belongingness. The third was to invigorate the intensification
of coexistence and modernization. The fourth was to act jointly and pull together with
any regional, continental and extra-continental actors that had a positive outlook for the
general welfare of the Somali people and to create Greater Somalia.137 The cooperative
move of the SNL and the SYL to attain the scheme of Greater Somalia by unifying the
Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, British Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland was
considerably successful in 1960 when the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland
had unified to create Somalia Republic. But, the further move of the SYL to unify the
Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya laid the foundation for hostility and distrust between
Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.
Here again it is vital to note that in all their way to create Greater Somalia the Somali
nationalists got encouragement from Egypt. Particularly the ―Islamic content‖ campaign
of Egypt instigated not only the Somali nationalists in Somalia but also other Muslims
in Ethiopia, Kenya, and other areas. The Ethiopian authorities were following the
growth of the Somali nationalism in a wary eye. This was not only because it claims
one-fifth of Ethiopia but also the secession of the Somali inhabiting territory was
considered as a bad example for the multi-ethnic state‘s (i.e. Ethiopia‘s) political
script consists of nineteen consonant and eight vowel letters. Following the SYL designed to use it as an
official script of Somalia, the Ismaniya script become much more dominant. Consequently, in the 1960s
many historical, political, social, economic etc. activities in Somalia were written with the Ismaniya
script. However, the introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1972 undermined the use of Ismaniya script
(Andrzejewski, Pilaszewicz and Tyloch, eds., Literatures in African Languages, p.53).
137 Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism,‖ pp. 148-149.
54
environment.138 So, the involvement of Egypt plus other Middle East countries such as
Saudi Arabia and Iran had also contributed for the growth of the irredentist movement
of the Somalia and laid the foundation for the development of hostile and distrustful
relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan political front.
The other important development for the rebirth of the Somali nationalist movement,
which laid the foundation and challenged the trilateral political relations between
Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, during the post-WW II era, was the proposal of the then
British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, to unify all the Somali inhabiting territories of
the Horn region under single administration. The Argument in the proposal read, ―We
proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia,
if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads
should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a
real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory‖.139 Additionally,
in order to reduce the opposition from the imperial Ethiopia the British presented the
following concessions to Ethiopia: ―a) Ethiopian sovereignty fully recognized in any
future negotiation; b) Flying of Ethiopian flag; c) Right to passage Harar-Jijiga-Gojjar
and Dire Dawa-Aisha and; d) Administrator of Reserved areas to be appointed jointly
by [Her Majesty] H.M.G and the Emperor‖.140 In spite of the proposal, the Ethiopian
authority unequivocally opposed the idea of Ernest Bevin asserting his vow was against
the interest of its people and the territorial integrity of the country. Nonetheless, to the
surprise of Ethiopia, the British authority had helped the Somali nationalists to form the
SYL as a threshold to attain the goal of unification.141
Bevin presented the proposal of creating a united Somalia in 1946 at Paris ministerial
meeting of the four major powers of the day (United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, U.S.A.,
and France). On this ministerial meeting, each power had presented its views. For
instance, the representative of France proposed the return of the Italian Somaliland to
Italy. The representative of the Soviet reflected a motion that had the same version with
the French colleague. The U.S representative on its part forwarded a notion that the
138 Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.137-140.
139IES, 2175, From foreign office to Addis Ababa, 6th June 1946.
140IES, 2175, Ogaden Reserved area issues, Telegrams Nos 695 and 696.
141ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.41-42.
55
Somali inhabited areas of the Horn region to be administered jointly by the four powers
(i.e. U.K, U.S.A, France, and Soviet Russia) as a trusteeship territory. These divergent
scenarios on the Paris ministerial meeting hindered the proposal of Bevin on the issue of
creating a united Somalia. Nonetheless, the proposal of Bevin had further increased the
irredentist aspirations of the Somali people at home and laid the foundation for the
complicated trilateral relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya during the postcolonial
ear.142
Under other condition, three years after the complete defeat of Italy in WW II a
commission that consists of the four major powers (i.e. Britain, France, Soviet Russia,
and the U.S.A) were sent to survey the interest and wishes of the inhabitants of the
Italian Somaliland about their political future. Accordingly, in 1948 the commissions
from the above mentioned four powers had visited different parts of southern Somalia to
evaluate the motion of the people. In their assessment the commission found that
keeping constant the existence of opposition groups such as ‗the Conferenca‘, which
support the restoration of the Italian rule, the majority of the Somali unanimously
supported the SYL. Nonetheless, the French and Soviet commissions report was in
favor of returning Italian Somaliland to Italy.143 Commissions from French and Soviet
had asserted the following reasons for their verdict: commission from French asserted
that ―in the course of its inquiry the Commission has observed that the interference of
the League [SYL] in tribal matters often gave rise to protests and troubles‖144. The
Soviet commission, on its part, affirmed that ―the program prepared by the Somali
Youth League is a primitive document, has many contradictions and cannot be
considered serious‖.145
On the other hand, on their report, the U.K, and U.S.A commissioners asserted that most
of the territories were in favor of being governed by the four powers joint trusteeship
(i.e. France, Soviet, U.K, and U.S.A) until the full independence of Somalia, which was
planned after ten years. Meaning, the U.K and U.S.A commissions claimed that the
people were interested to be under the rule of the four powers joint trusteeship rather
142 ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.41-43.
143 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.46, Lewis, A Modern History, pp.124-125.
144 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.46.
145 Ibid.
56
than returning to the Italian rule. The U.K and U.S.A commissions had also reported
about the objection of the people against the Ethiopian administration over the Ogaden
region.146 However, later the French-Soviet idea got acceptance. The acceptance of the
French-Soviet proposal leads to the return of southern Somalia to Italy as a trusteeship
territory. Thereby, the incident became the beginning of the disintegration of the OET.
As mentioned before the formation of OET was considered as a good beginning for the
creation of Greater Somalia by the Somali nationalists. The notion reflected by the
French and Soviet commissions was also taken as a good opportunity by Ethiopia to
free Ogaden and the Haude from the heavy domination of the U.K. Likewise, the
French-Soviet notion had helped to weaken the move of Bevin and the SYL to create
Greeter Somalia. However, the idea of Bevin and OET had remained permanent on the
mind of the Somali irredentists to create their dream nation state called Greater Somalia.
Against this background, the dynamics discussed above had laid the foundation for the
unhealthy relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front during the post 1960
eras.
Subsequently, in 1949, despite the opposition of the central committee members of the
SYL, the United Nations General Assembly declared the return of the Italian
Somaliland to Italy as a trusteeship territory for ten years. Accordingly, the British had
also transferred the territory called the Italian Somaliland to Italy in April 1, 1950. This
event separated one part of Somalia which was under the British OET since 1941. The
situation was taken as a big drawback for the Somali nationalists because the separation
of Italian Somaliland from the relatively loose unification had a bad implication for
their move to establish Greater Somalia. For the surprise of the Somali nationalists
Ethiopia also asked the return of the Haud grazing land147 and Ogaden148.
146 Ibid, p.47.
147ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From Dejazmachi Kifle Erigetu to Germame Neway
(Governor of Jijiga District) (December 19, 1960); Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, pp.50-51; Eshete,
p.16.
148Ogaden was one of the bases of communications, logistics and army training center for Britain during
WW II. Nonetheless, now the reason no longer work since WW II was officially ended and the issue of
OET was no longer supported. Consequently, for the fulfillment of the 1942 and 1944 agreement with
Ethiopia the British agreed to return Ogaden on July 24, 1948. But the actual transfer was come in 1949.
However, the region of Haud was remained under the British rule until 1954. But the military
administration was replaced by civil administration (Eshete, p.12 & 16).
57
The central committee of the SYL had presented its objection to the UN member
countries about the return of the Italian Somaliland to Italian administration by writing
the following moving letter:
We beseech you, in the name of Justice and Reason, to lend us a sympathetic
hearing and to heed to our request for the betterment and progress of the Somali
people. We state clearly and emphatically that we do not desire the return to the
Italian Government in our country, and we are certain that our people will not
acquiesce in Italian return to our soil, in any form or guise whatsoever. We have
stated, over and over again, in our various memoranda to the Four Power
Commission of Investigation and to the Secretariat of the UNO, the various reasons
why we still maintain our objections to an Italian Administration in Somalia. The
record of Italian misdeeds, crimes, tortures, massacres, racial discrimination and
economic subjugation are only too vivid as we still suffer from the deep wounds
occasioned by the 50 years of ―civilization‖ undertaken in Somalia by the Italian
Government and its great people. We beg you, therefore, to decide the future status
of our country, not in the light of sordid bargaining, bickering and bartering but in
the light of Justice to our wishes and desires. We urge you, in the name of
Almighty God, not to hand us over to the beast from which we were freed at long
last. [We hope you do not] fail us, but rather justify the confidence we place in you.
Long live the United Nations‘ Organization.149
In 1954, to the worst of the Somali nationalists, the British officialdom transferred the
Haud and ―Reserved area‖150 to Ethiopia. Consequently, the relatively loose territorial
integrity that was seen in Somalia between 1941 and 1948 by the British authority under
the title of OET ended in 1954 following the transfer of the Haud to Ethiopia.
Subsequently, opposing the action the Somali nationalists and political elites had
employed continuous demonstration. Sometimes the opposition developed to the extent
149 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.49-50.
150It is a ―term which came into use after the liberation of Abyssinia from the Italians in 1941 and which
received formal sanction in the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty‖ (D. J. Latham Brown, ―The Ethiopia-Somaliland
Frontier Dispute,‖ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 5, No. 2 (Cambridge
University Press, 1956), p.252).
58
of an armed guerrilla resistance movement,151 which was common in the relations
between Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period covered by this study, 1960-1991.
Moreover, the Somali pastoralists that cross to Ethiopia looking for pasture and water
began to settle permanently on the controversial areas claiming that the territory is their
own. Regarding the situation exchange of letter between the Ethiopian ministry of
interior and governorate general of Harar (Dejazimachi Kifile Agertu) clearly reflects
the following about the controversy:
የኢትዬጲያ ንጉሰ ነገስትና የእንግሉዝ መንግሥት እንደ አዉሮፓ አቆጣጠር በ1954ዓም ባደረጉት ስምምነት
መሠረት ሇግጦሽ ብቻ ከእንግሉዝ ፕሮቴክቶሬት ወደ ንጉሠ ነገሥቱ መንግሥት ግዛት የሚገቡት የሶማላ
ጎሣዎች ሇመቆየት የሚፈቀድሊቸዉ የገቡበትን ዘመን የግጦሽ ወራት ጠብቀዉ መመሇስን እንጂ ከዓመት
ዓመት በኢትዬጲያ ግዛት ዉሥጥ እንዲኖሩ አሌነበረም ። አሁን ግን አንዳንዶቹ ጎሳዋች የግጦሹን ወራት
አሳሌፈዉ መክረማቸዊ ስሇታወቀ በየዘመኑ የግጦሽ ወራት ካሳሇፉ በኋሊ ወደመጡበት እንዲመሇሱ
ሇማድረግ በሁሇቱ መንግታት መሐከሌ የተፈረመዉን ዉሌ ማሥከበር ስሇሆነ ከእግሉዝ ፕሮቴክቶሬት ግዛት
ሇዚሁ ሇግጦሹ ወራት የመጡ የሶማላ ጎሳዋች በየዘመኑ የግጦሹን ወራት ካሳሇፉ በኃሊ እስፍራቸዉ
እንዲመሇሱ ማድረግ ተገቢ ነዉ።152
A rough translation:
The 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement allows the seasonal movement of the Somali
pastoralist communities to Ethiopia for pasture and water. The agreement explicitly
states that the Somalia pastoralist communities are expected to stay in Ethiopia
only for the grazing season. Meaning, at the end of the grazing season the
pastoralist communities are expected to return to Somalia or British protectorate.
However, some pastoralists are not returning to Somalia even after the end of the
grazing season. So, since it is necessary to respect the Anglo-Ethiopian accord
pastoralists should return back to the British protectorate at the end of grazing
season.
The quote reflects that the transfer of the Hude grazing land in the 1954 Anglo-
Ethiopian accord disappointed the Somali nationalists and laid the foundation for the
post-colonial hostile Ethio-Somalia relations. The transfer of the Haud and the reserved
151ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Lema Gutema (Governor of Harar District) to
Ministry of Interior (August 26, 1978); Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, The collapse of Somalia State: The
Impact of Colonial Legacy (Haan Publishing, 1996), p.54; Eshete, p.19; Paul B. Henze, Layers of time: A
history of Ethiopia (New York, 2000), p.261.
152 ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02A, From Ministry of Interior to Dejazmachi Kifle Ageritu
(Governorate General of Harar District), ―Grazing Issue‖ (1960).
59
area had also helped the SYL to unify the protest of the urban and pastoral population.
Apparently, the SYL had asked for the abrogation of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian
agreement towards the Haud and reserve area. Representatives of the SYL had also
asserted that transferring the Haud and reserve area on the basses of the 1897 Anglo-
Ethiopian agreement was treachery and contradicts the Anglo-Somali chief‘s pact
between 1884 and 1886.153 So, the lack of consensus and disagreement on the territorial
limit of the Somali inhabited land together with the growth of the Somali nationalism
had laid the foundation for the post-colonial hostile relations between Somalia and the
Ethio-Kenyan front.
1.4. The Response of Ethiopia for the Growth of Anti-Ethiopia Somali Nationalism
The anti-Ethiopian sentiment which was exhibited during the Italian and British period
of dominancy of the Somali inhabited territory of the Horn further strengthened during
the post-independent period in an organized manner. The anti-Ethiopian sentiment and
the aggressive reaction of Ethiopia in turn complicated and laid the foundation for the
hostile political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia during the post-colonial era.
For instance, the Geri-Jarso154 Somali under the leadership of Garad Ali and Garad
Yusuf attacked Ethiopians that lived at a village called Qocher. At other time motivated
by their success at Qocher and because of the absence of any corrective action from the
government of Somalia the Geri-Jarso Somali launched a similar attack against the
inhabitants at Gursum, which is located some thirty kilometers from Qocher.
Consequently, hundreds of Ethiopians were killed and the town of Gursum was burnet
to ashes.155 During the 1950s, the Somali nationalist intensified anti-Ethiopian
sentiments under the slogan of ―Somali Hanolato Ethiopia Hadimto‖ in other words
―long live Somalia, death to Ethiopia‖.156
To settle the popular unrest and to defuse the tension the Emperor of Ethiopia arranged
a tour to Ogaden in 1957. During his tour, the Emperor discussed with the Ogaden
chiefs and promised the intensification of facilities on the areas of education, health, and
153ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From the Governorate of Harar District to Kegnazmachi
Demise Tefera (Governor of Kebridahar District) (January 13, 1961); Eshete, p.22.
154 Geri-Jarso is located some thirty-seven kilometers from Jijiga (Eshete, p.11).
155 Eshete, pp.11-12.
156 Ibid, p.17.
60
transportation. The Emperor‘s visit to Ogaden somehow helped to calm down the
opposition movements but not served as an ending solution. Second, the Ethiopian
officialdom divided the Ogaden district into two administrative zones called the
Qebridahar district (in the south) and the Jijiga district (in the north). This division was
done in 1959. Afterward, the district of Qebridahar was given to Fitawurari Demisew
Tefera, who was the governor of the Ogaden district before the division. The district of
Jijiga was given to Germame Neway, who was one of the well-educated Ethiopian
during the time and pioneer of the 1960 coup attempt.157
The third action was stationing security force at strategic points to control the
insurgency activity of Somalia nationalists. Besides, the Ethiopian authority had worked
hard on plotting the sharp divisions of the Somali nationalists on the two major tribal
lines, Hawiye and Darod. Meaning, Ethiopia tried to create a rift on the SYL using the
Hawiye-Darod competition. For example, in the process of the 1958 election, Ethiopia
favored the Hawuiye.158 However, the involvement of Ethiopia on the internal affairs of
Somalia as a response to the anti-Ethiopia sentiment complicated the Ethio-Somalia
relations and laid the foundation for the two nations hostile political relations.
The fourth action was the invitation of the SYL leaders to Addis Ababa. In so doing, a
diplomatic staff under the leadership of Aden Abdala Osman, who was the president of
the transitional government of the trusteeship legislative house as well as Abdullahi Issa
(Hawye), who was the prime minister of the trusteeship authority, arrived at Addis
Ababa in 1957. The visit had helped to minimize the anti-Ethiopia propaganda
campaign for a short time. But the 1957 agreement did not totally halt the propaganda
campaign on both sides, which could be considered as one of the foundations of the
hostile relations between the two countries.159
Side by side, as a response to the anti-Ethiopia sentiment from Somalia, Ethiopia tried
to further its collaboration with other Horn countries such as Kenya which experienced
the same threat from the Somali nationalists. Concomitantly, Ethiopia worked to
strengthen its diplomacy with the newly independent African states to isolate Somalia
157 ENALA, Harar 1.2.18.07, in the ―the speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to Ogaden‖
(1957); Eshete, p.24.
158Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.103.
159Ibid, p.106.
61
from African politics. Besides, Ethiopia engaged in strengthening its internal stability
and integrity. The diplomatic positions of Ethiopia at regional, continental and extra
continental affairs were also reevaluated. 160
On the other hand, Ethiopia had tried to work on getting the loyalties of the Ethiopian
Somalis. Particularly, the authority of Ethiopia worked to isolate the Ogaden Somali
from the influence of the Somali nationalism through employing different mechanisms.
For instance, a letter written from Blambarsa Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to
Dejazimach Kifle Erigetu (governor of Harar) states the following about the plan of
Ethiopia as a solution to free the Ogaden Somali from involving in the Somali
nationalist movement:
ሁሇቱ ሶማላዎች በዛሬው ሁኔታቸዉ ሆነ ወይም ወደፊት በሚደረጁበት ወቅት...የእኛን
ኢትዪጲያዉያዉያኖቹን ኦጋዴኖች በሌዩ ሌዩ ፖሇቲካና ፕሮፓጋንዳ በጊዜ ብዛት ሇማነሳሳት...መሳሪያ ሆነዉ
የሚገኙ ቀደምም ሆነ ወደፊትም ሆነዉ የሚገኙ በእንግሉዝ ሶማላ በኩሌ የኢሣቅና የዱሌበሃንቲ ጎሣዎች
በኢጣሉያ በኩሌ የመጀርታን የመሩሃንና የሃዉያ ጎሣዎች ናቸዉ።...እንግዲህ ይህ ከሆነ የሁሇቱን ሶማላዎች
መንግስት ሇመቃወምና ሇማሰናከሌ የምንችሇዉ: ሀ) ከሊይ ሇስብከት መሣሪያዎች የሚሆኑ ናቸዉ ስንሌ
የጠቀስናቸዉ ጎሣዎች በምንም ምክኒያት ቢሆን ከኦጋዴኖቹ ክፍሌ ጋር እንዳይገናኙ ጥብቅ የሆነ
መቆጣጠሪያ ማዘጋጀት፣ ሇ) በእነኚሁ በተጠቀሱት ጎሣዎች ከኦጋዴኖቹ የተሇየ መሌክ ያሇዉ ያስተዳደር
ሥርአት አቁሞ ማሥተዳደርና ማሥፈፀም፣ ሐ) የኦጋዴኖቹን ወገኖች በኢኮኖሚያቸዉ በኩሌ እየፋፉ
እንዲሄዱ በማድረግ ብቻ ይመስሇግኛሌ።161
A rough translation:
The Somali nationalists on British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland are working
to instigate the Ogaden tribe to develop a sense of resentment against our
government. The Somali nationalists used to use Isak, Dulmahanti, Majertan,
Meruhan and Hawuye tribes as a means to reach their indoctrination and
propaganda to the Ogaden tribe. So, in order to undermine the belligerent
indoctrination and propaganda work of the Somali nationalist against Ogaden, the
following actions are expected be employed by our government: i) intruding the
movement of Isak, Dulmahanti, Majertan, Meruhan and Hawuye tribes to the
district inhabited by the Ogaden tribe; ii) introducing a different style of
160ENALA, Somalia, 17.2.260.03, Memo on the Ethio-Somalia Relation (October17, 1969); Touval,
Somali Nationalism, p.140; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.115.
161ENALA, Ogaden District 17.1.7.25.02A, from Balambaras Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to
Dejazmachi Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar) (June 30, 1960).
62
administration on the above-mentioned tribes that hinders their interaction with the
Ogaden tribe and; iii) creating a good economic platform that would benefit the
Ogaden tribe more than the other tribes.
On the other hand, following the gradual growth of the capacity and acceptance of the
Somali nationalism and territorial claim on the eye of western powers, Ethiopia had
reconsidered its pro-west policy. As a pro-west state, Ethiopia had participated in the
Korean War on the side of the U.S camp. Ethiopia had also provided a military base and
radio post to the U.S.A at Kagnew radio station. Concomitantly, Ethiopia contributed
peacekeeping forces at different times to the United Nations. Keeping constant these all
things Ethiopia did not trust the west. This distrust was not without reason but emanated
from previous experience of the country on the 1936 Italian invasion of Ethiopia. It is
apparent that following the 1936 aggression, Emperor Hailesilase went to the League of
Nations to appeal the territorial violation of Italy against Ethiopia. Nonetheless, rather
than punishing Italy for its illegal act the UN passed an armed embargo on both Italy
and Ethiopia. The armed embargo was more agonizing for Ethiopia that imports fair
arms from abroad. Under other conditions, following WW II the Policy of Great Britain
towards Somalia was changed and insisted on the establishment of Greater Somali. In
February 1959, for instance, despite Ethiopia‘s objection the U.S.A supported the
proposal presented by Britain to unite British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. These
events eroded the faith of Ethiopia on the west.162
Subsequently, Ethiopia tried to take different measures. The first was approaching the
eastern bloc. Accordingly, in 1959 the Emperor of Ethiopia visited Moscow for two
reasons: i) to weaken the support that the Somali nationalists was gating from the
Soviet; ii) to send a clear message to the United States for its collaboration with Great
Britain on the issue of the unification of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.
In the same vein, Ethiopia also tried to reconsider its policy towards China. Particularly,
on a vote about the admission of China to the United Nation until 1958 Ethiopia sided
162ENALA, Embassies and Diplomatic missions Great Britain, 1.2.76.03, British Embassy, Addis Ababa,
February 14, 1959; Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.140-141.
63
with U.S.A against China. However, in 1959 Ethiopia took the side of abstinence. Later,
in 1960 Ethiopia voted supporting China.163
To minimize the distrust and ambiguity on the side of Ethiopia, in 1957 the U.K
officialdom gave their promise of abandonment to their plan over the issue of Greater
Somalia.164 However, the Ethiopian authority did not trust the words of the U.K. Rather;
Ethiopia asserted its suspicion over the underground activity of the U.K authority for the
scheme of Greater Somalia.165 Under other occasions, following the 1959 Anglo-
American resolution to unify British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland, the British
envoy, G.W. Furlonge, worked to convince the Ethiopian authority about the
abandonment of the Greater Somalia scheme.166 But the suspicion of Ethiopia over the
U.K remained unchanged and continued on the upcoming brief periods. So, the distrust
of Ethiopia on the role of western powers (i.e. U.K and U.S.A) on the scheme of Greater
Somalia and the lack of close and open heart discussion by the Ethiopian and Somalia
political elites on the issue contributed in laying the foundation for the hostility between
Ethiopia and Somalia during the post-colonial era.
1.5. The Reaction of Kenya to the Growth of Somali Territorial Claim in the NFD
To better apprehend the foundation and the dynamics of the Somali nationalism in the
NFD of Kenya as well as to take in the sense of evil between Somalia and Kenya there
were important elements that should be contemplated for the inception of this vitriolic
situation. The genesis or foundation of the conflict between Kenya and Somalia goes
back to the colonial era. At the beginning of the 20th century the British colonial
superintendents of East Africa determined to expand the territory of their colony in
Kenya towards the Northeastern semi-arid region. There were three motivating factors
for this: (i) Britain wanted to establish a buffer zone against the Italian Somaliland and
Ethiopia; (ii) Britain wanted to discourage and intercept the imperial government of
163ENALA, Somalia, 17.2.260.03, Memo on the Ethio-Somalia Relation (October17, 1969); Touval,
Somali Nationalism, pp.140-141.
164The scheme of ―Greater Somalia‖ by the U.K was partly stemmed from the plan to incorporate Somalia
with the political association called the British Commonwealth (Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖
p.105).
165Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.105.
166ENALA, Embassies and Diplomatic Missions, Great Britain, 1.2.76.03, From G.W. Furlonge to Mr.
Wangat (British Embassy at Addis Ababa) (February 14, 1959).
64
Ethiopia under Menelik II (r.1889-1913) from sizing Gabra and Boran and; (iii) Britain
wanted to halt the south and south-westward extension of Somali.167
To execute and engineer the policy, the colonial administrative border between the
Italian Somaliland and the British colony of Kenya was redrawn. Subsequently, the
Somalis were restricted from passing the Oromo-Somali line. The restriction, in turn,
triggered conflict between the British colonial officers and the Somali that lacked
enthusiasm for the new policy. In 1926 as a response to the resistance movement the
colonial power promulgated a decree that put the NFD under ―closed district‖.168 The
ruthless decree gave an extra ordinary right for the colonial officials to deal with
resistance groups in the NFD. Later another decree was propagated under the title of
―special district ordinance‖.169 This decree inflicted curtailment on the movement to or
from the NFD. Likewise, the excruciating decree limited the socio-political and
economic interaction and integration of the NFD inhabitants against the rest of the
region. This agonizing isolation enforced the NFD to have different colonial experience
from the rest of Kenya, which pushed the inhabitants of the NFD to demand secession
from Kenya during the post-colonial era.170 The situation in turn laid the foundation for
the Somalia-Kenya hostile and distrustful relations.
On the other hand, regarding the synchronization of the colonial and post-colonial
experiences of the NFD a writer named Hannah Whittaker stated the following:
The progressive application of the 1902 Outlying District Ordinance, the 1926
Closed District Ordinance, and the 1934 Special District Administration Act had
established a legal framework that attempted to regulate northern Kenya in
response to widespread inter-clan warfare. Nonresident travel to the NFD was
restricted, and ‗tribal areas‘ were established for each of the resident communities
living there. Any violation of the Special District Administration Act was
punishable by either a livestock confiscation or a prison sentence. Trespassing into
the grazing area of a neighboring clan section was punished by a stock seizure of
between ten and fifty per cent of the herd of the accused. In the 1960s, stock was
167A.A Castagno, ―The Somali-Kenya Controversy: Implications for the Future,‖ Journal of Modern
African Studies Vol.2, No.2 (1964), p.169.
168 Otunnu, p. 21.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
65
confiscated from individuals who grazed their animals in illegal grazing zones, or
if they were found beyond the limits of a village during curfew hours: when a
police patrol found one hundred head of cattle being grazed by Borana herdsmen in
a prescribed area, they were all arrested and the cattle seized.171
The use of curfew orders by the Kenyan government also reflected colonial
movement restrictions. Curfews were used by the colonial administration to
prevent isolated instances of civil disobedience from escalating into a serious
security threat. By the end of December 1963, curfews were regularly enforced in
town and settled areas, and were justified as a means to facilitate police and army
operations that were in fruition. During 1964 and 1965, curfews were in constant
application in township and settled areas. In Eastern Region by the later stages of
1966, curfews were in force throughout the entire districts of Marsabit and Isiolo.
Under a curfew order, residents of the affected area were required to remain within
the premises at which they normally resided between the hours of 6.30 pm and 6.30
am. Anyone found outside between these times was considered subversive.172
The long quote above enables us to understand the isolated administrative order applied
in the NFD unlike other districts of Kenya. So, the implementation of a recurrent curfew
and isolated administration in the NFD laid the foundation for the inhabitants of the
NFD to consider itself as a separate entity. As a result, when the post-Colonial Kenyan
ruler tried to preach the unity of the different regions of Kenya the issue of the NFD
became a problem and conflicted them with the Somali nationalists at Mogadishu and
inside the NFD. So, the isolated and separate colonial experience of the NFD from the
rest of Kenyan regions was one of the foundations for the hostile relations between
Somalia and Kenya during the post-colonial ear.
The pan-Somali nationalist movement widely reached to the NFD or the preset day
North-Eastern Province of Kenya, in the 1940s.173 However, as stated above the pan-
Somali wave in the NFD was not that much active throughout the 1940s and 1950s
because of the relative economic and political isolation of the NFD from the other
171Hannah Whittaker, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Kenya, A Social History of the Shifta
Conflict, c.1963-1968 (Brill, 2015), p.97.
172 Ibid, p.98.
173 Touval, Somali Nationalism, p.148.
66
Somali inhabited areas of the region.174 The other factor that hindered the pan-Somali
nationalist political activity in the NFD was the 1948 declaration of the British colonial
administrator that outlawed the establishment and active participation of political
organizations in the NFD. After transforming itself into a full-fledged political party at
the end of 1946, the SYL began a relentless trial to revitalize the nationalist movement
of Somalia in the HoA.175 To further strengthen this move the party opened one of its
branch offices in the NFD. Nonetheless, the branch office of the SYL at the NFD of
Kenya was closed in 1948 by the British as a response for the development of anti-
British sentiments. Here it is vital to note that the anti-British sentiment was intensified
at different pocket areas of the continent following the end of World War II side by side
with the flourishment of African nationalism.176
In 1960 the authority of Britain lifted the ban that restricted political activities in the
NFD. Even some officialdom in the circle of British administration showed their
support for the secession of the NFD to create Greater Somalia. For instance, in 1960
the former chief secretary of Kenya, Richard Turnbull, who had an accumulated
experience on working in the NFD, stated that ―the Somali area might well in the future,
with a large part of the Northern Province, become part of Greater Somalia.‖177
Apparently, in 1960 when the British lifted the ban political organizations reopened
their branch office at the NFD and began an advocacy work on the issue of selfdetermination
to unite the Somali inhabitants of the NFD with their kinsmen in Somalia
Republic. To facilitate the move, political parties such as the Northern Province
People‘s Progressive Party (NPPPP)178 and the Northern Frontier Democratic Party
(NFDP) with its head office at Garisa were officially established. The SYL also opened
its branch office in the NFD in 1960. Subsequently, like those other branch office of the
SYL in Ogaden (Ethiopia) and French Somaliland (Djibouti), the NFD of Kenya branch
office too began organizing different kinds of political movements.179 The movement
174 Otunnu, p. 21.
175 Lewis, ―Pan-Africanism,‖ p. 149.
176Touval, Somali Nationalism, pp.148-149; Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of Somalia, pp.58-60.
177 Whittaker, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, p.41.
178Mario I. Aguilar, ―Writing Biographies of Boorana: Social History at the Time of Kenya‘s
Independence,‖ Journal of History in Africa Vol.23 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.356.
179 Adar, pp. 79 & 81.
67
ranges from nonviolent demonstration to guerilla resistance as well as from diplomatic
campaign to infiltration of shifta (bandit).
On the other side, apart from KANU and KADU, parties such as the Northern Province
Peoples‘ National Union (NPPNU), the [Oromo] Political Union (OPU), and the United
Ogaden Somali Association (UOSA) were also established to counterbalance and
undermine the secessionist idea of the Somali nationalist parties in the NFD.180
To promote the movement of unification and to legalize their assertion the officialdom
of the Somalia Republic declared a notion in November 1961at the national assembly of
the Republic. The notion mainly focuses on the commitment of the Somalia Republic to
unite the NFD, Ogaden and other Somali inhabited areas of the Horn region with the
new Republic.181 In 1962 at the Kenyan conference of Lancaster House in London the
representatives of the NFD presented an opinion that showed the desire of the
inhabitants of the NFD to unite with Somalia. Nonetheless, the view reflected by the
delegates of the NFD faced strong objection by the delegates of KADU and KANU.
Even some representatives of KANU said that if the Kenyan-Somalis are not interested
to be under Kenyan officialdom, they can go back to Somalia. KANU and KADU
leaders had also tried to create a political link with each other to undermine the move of
the SYL to secede the NFD of Kenya.182
The most surprising paradox during this conference was that when the delegates of
KANU and KADU were requesting the implementation of the self-determination rights
for Kenya‘s full independence from the British rule, they objected the same kind of
request by the NFD representatives. Ethiopia on its part put pressure on Britain
unequivocally opposing the idea of secession by the representatives of the NFD and
showed her sympathy for Kenya. Ethiopia asserted that the secessionist idea was a bad
example and would lead to the balkanization of the continent. In order to calm down the
tension, the colonial secretary of the United Kingdom, Reginald Maulding, promised for
the establishment of an independent commission to study the interest of the residents of
the NFD. Accordingly, a survey was done in October 1962. The survey of the
180 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.101; Adar, p.81.
181 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.100.
182 Castagno, pp.176-177.
68
commission reflected that the majority of the inhabitants of the NFD favored union with
Somalia. However, in March 1963 the British officialdom declared the NFD as part of
Kenya.183
There were two factors that pushed Britain to reverse the public opinion: (i) pressure
from the government of Ethiopia and; (ii) the agreement between Britain and KANU
leaders on the issue of white colonists in Kenya.184
So, the decision of 1963 was one of the segments that laid the foundation and further
complicated the issue of territorial assertion over the NFD as well as the hostility of the
Somalia-Kenyan front. To reverse the 1963 decision the Somalia political elites and
officialdoms unequivocally objected to the action of Britain and extensively engaged on
the diplomatic campaigns. Concomitantly, Somalia officially declared interruption of
diplomacy with Great Britain. On the other corner, the Somali nationalists declared a
shifta (bandit) war against Kenya that stayed up to 1967. Greater numbers of the NFD
residents also turndown to the new borderline. Kenya on its part declared a state of
emergency that remained for five years to settle the fragile security and political
situation on the NFD. Simultaneously, to deter the unpleasant situation the security
forces of Kenya responded brutally against nationalists, who advocate territorial claim
over the respective region. The action taken by Kenyan security further complicated the
hostility between the two countries. The security broke the rights of civilians and
massacred more than 2,000 Somalis only during the era of the shifta war.185
Eventually, the pan-Somali nationalism and its enthusiastic followers movement put
Kenya and Ethiopia under the state of challenge from the outset and forced to sign an
agreement of security cooperation against the so called ‗common enemy‘ (Somalia) in
1963. Somalia strongly objected to the security alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya
claiming this kind of alignment could affect the balance of power in Africa and
undermine the idea of African unity.186 However, the Ethio-Kenya front did not want to
compromise their security cooperation despite the opposition of Somalia. So, the
183 Otunnu, p.22.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid, pp.22-23.
186Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.9-10 & 80; Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent
Africa (Harvard University Press, 1972), p.222.
69
security alignment and counter alignment together with the head strong political
approach were the other elements that laid the foundation for the hostile or cooperative
relations amid the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle during the period covered by this
study.
70
CHAPTER TWO: THE ETHIO-SOMALIA STRESSFUL
RELATIONS (1960-1991)
In this chapter, it is intended to answer questions like how and why stressful and hostile
political and historical rhetoric between Ethiopia and Somalia was developed from 1960
to 1991. Apparently, how the course of events shaped the stressful and hostile relations
between Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period between 1960 and 1991is
considered. Seemingly, how Ethiopia and Somalia reacted to the course of events and
factors that shaped their relationship is well-thought-out in this chapter. In addition, how
Kenya was reacted to the hostile and stressful relations between Ethiopia and Somalia is
also a focus in point in this chapter.
It is realized that the inherent hostile political and historical rhetoric between Ethiopia
and Somalia was emanated from the policy of the conflicting interest over irredentism,
self-determination, and territorial integrity; the policy of insurgency and
counterinsurgency on both sides; the shift of policy from appeasement to destabilization
in Ethiopia; and the policy of an extensive diplomacy campaign to win the trump cards
on continental and extra continental powers together with the hegemonic competition.
The other points in focus for the turbulent and stressful relations between the two
countries were stemmed from the intra-state political condition in the polarized tribal
political reality of Somalia and the ethnic affiliated political reality in Ethiopia. All
along the dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia hostile relations, Kenya had played on the
side of Ethiopia against the moves of Somalia. Regarding the cooperation between
Ethiopia and Kenya, it is believed that their cooperation was stemmed from the common
interest of maintaining territorial integrity, security, and survival as a nation and fighting
the irredentist policy of Somalia.
Here it is vital to understand that naturally, in terms of geographical scope, Ethiopia and
Somalia are countries that pat on the back (praise) to each other. As a result, ―Each is
poorer without the other, just as each is richer with the other‖.187 This is not without
reason but Somalia is one of the natural providers of outlet to the sea to Ethiopia via its
187Mesfin Wolde Mariam, ―The Background of the Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary Dispute,‖ The Journal of
Modern African Studies Vol. 2, No.2 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.189.
71
3000 kilometers long coastline that starched between the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden. As a matter of fact, Ethiopia is the only country of the hinterland of Somalia that
needs a port service. So, Somalia can use the opportunity to build its economy by
renting its harbors to its only hinterland neighbor, Ethiopia. On the other hand, Genale
(or Juba) and Wabishebele revers are the only immutable source of water for the arid
and semi-arid land of Somalia. The origin of these two revers is from the Arsi-Bale
highlands of Ethiopia. Besides, the pastoralist community of Somalia crosses every year
to Ethiopia looking for pasture and water for their cattle. Accordingly, as Ethiopia has a
demand for an outlet to the sea via ports in Somalia like Zaila and Berbera; it is also true
that the only permanent source of water for the pastoralist communities of Somalia is
Ethiopia. The seasonal crossing of the Somali pastoral communities in the search for
grazing land can also be taken as the other fact that show the interdependence of the two
neighboring countries. However, the employment of the unrealistic political
philosophies such as irredentism, territorial aggrandizement, hegemonic competition,
rigid diplomatic approach, etc. jeopardized the natural interdependence or marriage
between the two Horn countries and put them under the state of hostility for so many
years.188
On the other hand, despite the existence of natural interdependence between Ethiopia
and Somalia, the territorial assertion over Ogaden and Haud grazing lands hardly
pushed forward the hostility of the two neighboring states.189 Concerning the historical
background of Ogaden and the Haud grazing area, it is presumed that before their
expansion to the southern, western and southwestern directions the Somalis were
formerly inhabited around the Gulf of Aden and Zaila‘s eastern coastal region.
However, gradually maybe because of the increment of population and shortage of
pastoral land and water for their livestocks the early inhabitants of Somalis at the Gulf
of Aden and eastern coast of Zaila expanded in different directions. It is also supposed
that as a result of the Somali popular expansion, the Oromo pastoralist communities
were not in a position to withstand the repeated assaults of the Somali pastoralist groups
and subsequently withdrawn towards the southwestern direction. For example, authors
188 Ibid, pp.189-190.
189Nigusu Adem YIMER and Philipp O. AMOUR, ―Madaha Djalelo: A Pustule on the Negotiation of the
Anglo-Franco-Ethiopian (Somaliland) Boundary Trijunction, 1933-1934,‖ Social Sciences Studies
Journal Vol.6, Issue 62 (2020), p.2069.
72
like Mesfin Wolde Mariam assert that some 150 years ago Zaila was inhabited by the
non-Somali community. Besides, the author argued that perhaps on the basis of the
above evidence the Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden region and the ex-British
Somaliland are late arrivals and their settlement on the region can be taken as late
experience.190
Moreover, there is also assertion and belief on the side of the Ethiopian officialdoms
that typically there was no country that holds (use) the name Somalia before the
establishment of Somalia Republic in 1960. So, the problem that flourished during the
post-independence of the Somalia was not a problem between the people of Ethiopia
and Somalia. Rather, the hostile approach between the two naturally complementary
and interdependent states was stemmed from the disputing interests over selfdetermination
and territorial integrity, hegemonic competitions, external power
interference, insurgency, and counter-insurgency.191
On the other hand, the defeat of Italy by the united forces of Great Britain and Ethiopia
in 1941 and the subsequent formation of a territory called Occupied Enemy Territory
(OET) by the British contributed to the post-independent hostile and stressful relations
between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. As clearly stated on chapter one, the OET
contains the ex-British Somaliland, ex-Italian Somaliland, the region of Ogaden, and the
NFD. The other reason that escalated the post-independent hostile relations between
Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and
Somalia‘s political groups to create Greater Somalia. Particularly, the over-ambitious
advocacy and vow of the SYL and its members to unit all the Somali inhabiting regions
of the Horn under one government raised up the hostility and further complicated the
relations of Somalia with neighboring countries.192
It is also apparent that the bases of the argument to unify all the Somali inhabiting lands
under a single government was notably stemmed from the belief that since the Somalis
in the Republic of Somalia are the majority, the minority Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya
and French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti) should unify with Somalia for language,
190Wolde Mariam, p.194.
191Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.34; Kendie,
―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,‖ p.14.
192 Wolde Mariam, p.212.
73
religious and cultural justifications. To this end, Somalia advocated the application of
the right to self-determination to the minority Somalis inhabiting in the abovementioned
countries. Yet, Kenya and Ethiopia being the victim of colonial legacy
rebuffed Somalia‘s idea of self-determination and extraordinarily showed their need for
the legalization of colonial boundary and territorial integrity of independent African
countries.193
That being the case, in this chapter the hostile political and historical rhetoric of the
Ethiopia-Somalia relations and the reaction of Kenya on the two nations hostile
relationship between 1960 and 1991 can be discussed through dividing it into five major
eras: i) the Ethio-Somalia relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdulah (1960-
1967); ii) the era of détente (1968-1969); iii) the era of the first phase of General
Barry‘s rule and Conflicting Perceptions (1970-1974); iv) the era of dissension and open
war (1975-1978) and; v) Post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign, rapprochement, and
efforts to iron out the Ethio-Somalia dispute (1979-1991). Therefore, in this chapter, it
is planned to analyze in some detail about the dynamics of the historical contexts of the
political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991. While undertaking
the examination of the Ethio-Somalia political relations, the reaction of Kenya to the
interaction of the Ethio-Somalia hostile relations will be considered.
2.1. The Ethio-Somalia Relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdulah (1960-
1967)
It was following the end of WW II that the Ethiopian authority began to closely watch
political activities and developments inside the ex-British and ex-Italian Somaliland.
The imperial government of Ethiopia had organized a distinct and particular unit within
the ministry of foreign affairs to closely supervise and analyze developments in
Somalia. This was done to rearrange the policy approach and diplomatic activities in the
process of the two countries‘ relations. Apparently, the Ethiopian authority tried to
micromanage the political developments in Somalia to the advantage of Ethiopia.194
193 Ibid, p.214.
194 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.102.
74
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the political involvement of Ethiopia in
Somalia‘s internal politics was partly done by scrutinizing the political division within
the SYL. Notably, the hostile tribal approach among the Somali tribal groups helped
Ethiopia to penetrate easily to the internal political life of Somalia. Remarkably the
Darod and Hawiye tribal division helped for imperial Ethiopia to step in into the
political system of the SYL easily. So, to widen the political upheaval and trouble
within the SYL the imperial government relentlessly supported the Hawiye tribal groups
that had a relatively lesser hostile attitude towards Ethiopia.195
The Somali nationalist on their part extensively employed diplomatic campaigns against
Ethiopia at a different level. In their diplomatic campaign, they tried to magnify and
portray Ethiopia as expansionist and as an obstacle for the self-determination rights of
the Somalis in Ogaden. Newspapers in Mogadishu also publish issues that depict
Ethiopia as an obstacle for the unification of Somalia. As a result, the attitude of
resentment toward Ethiopia disseminated in a rampant way among the Somali speaking
community of the Horn region.196
The anti-Ethiopia advocacy and campaign gradually intensified and overwhelmed the
Ethiopian Somali inhabiting regions of Haud and Ogaden. As a result, defections of
civil servants became normal in these regions. The growth of the pro irredentist civil
servant and defections of civil servants in the Ogaden region alarmed the Ethiopian
government about the urgency of the case to find possible short term and long term
solutions.197
Subsequently, the then Emperor of Ethiopia, Hailesilase I, visited Ogaden from
December 3-8, 1957 and promised to fulfill different facilities such as road, schools and
health centers. Besides, Ethiopia planned to further strengthen bilateral relationships
with countries such as Kenya that had the same policy approach with Ethiopia towards
195 Ibid, p.103.
196ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) (May 1973); see also Samuel M., ―Conflict and the Superpowers in
the Horn of Africa,‖ Third World Quarterly Vol. 4, No. 1 (Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1982), p.96.
197ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and
Somalia‖ (1977).
75
the anti-irredentist policy on Somalia.198 During his visit to Ogaden from December 3-8,
1957, Emperor Hailesilase I forwarded the following speech to calm down the
opposition:
ታማኝ ዜጋችን የሆነውን የኦጋዴንን አዉራጃ ሕዝብ ሇመጎብኘትና ችግሩንም በቦታዉ ሊይ ተገኝተን
ሇማቃሇሌ ካሰብንሇት ብዙ ጊዜ መሆኑን ታዉቃሊችሁ። ይህንኑ ምክንያት አድርገን ዛሬ በመካከሊችሁ ስንገኝ
በዚያ በአስቸጋሪዉ ዘመን በ1936 ዓ-ም ከኢትዪጲያዉያን ወንድሞቻችሁ ጋር በመሳተፍ ስሇአገራችሁ
ነፃነትና ስሇ ንጉሠ ነገሥታቸዉ ክብር ደማቸዉን ያፈሰሱትን የኦጋዴን ጀግኖች
እናስታዉሳቸዋሇን።...የኢትዪጲያ መንግስት አስተዳደር በአገሩ ሊይ ተመሌሶ ከተቋቋመ ወዲህ በኦጋዴን
ሕዝብ ኑሮ ሊይ ያሇዉ ችግር እንዲመረመርና እንዲጠና አድርገን ሇአገሩ ሕዝብ ሌማትና የኑሮ እድገት
የታቀደዉ አሳብ በጥንቃቄ ተጠንቶ ከቀረበሌን በኋሊ: ፩ኛ) ሌጆቻችሁ በትምሕርት ተኮትኩተዉ
የመንግስታቸዉ ድጋፍ በመሆን አገራቸዉን አስጠቅመዉና ራሳቸዉንም ጠቅመዉ እናንተን ወሊጆቻቸዉንም
ሇመርዳት እንዲችለ በየወረዳዉ ደምበኛ ትምህርት ቤቶች እንዲቋቋሙሊችሁ፣ ፪ኛ) የሕዝቡ ጤና ከተዉሳክ
ሉጠበቅ እንዲችሌ ደምበኛ ሆስፒታልችና ዲስፔንስሪዎች በየአዉራጃዉና በየወረዳዉ እንዲሰሩሊችሁ፣ ፫ኛ)
በአገሩ ሊይ የዉሀ ችግር መኖሩን ስሊወቅን ሇናንተም ሆነ ሇከብቶቻችሁ ጠቃሚ በሆኑ ቦታዎች ሊይ ዉሀ
ተቆፍሮ እንዲወጣሊችሁ ሇዚህ ሁለ ሥራ ስምንት ሚሉዪን ብር ከግምጃቤታችን ወጪ ሆኖ በሥራ ሊይ
እንዲዉሌ ፈቅደናሌ።199
A rough translation:
As you all know our plan to visit the people and the district of Ogaden was on our
program for a long time. Accordingly, during our presence in the middle of the
Ogaden people, we remember and respect the Ogaden patriots who lost their lives
for the sovereignty of their country and for the respect of their Emperor, during the
1936 Italian invasion…After the reestablishment of the new Ethiopian government
[1941], we made a study on the life of the Ogaden people and we plan to do the
following development projects: i) to make your children build themselves on
education and help their country we ordered the construction of schools in every
district of Ogaden; ii) to promote the health facilities of Ogaden we ordered the
construction of hospitals and health centers at different districts of Ogaden and; iii)
to reduce the problem of water we ordered the extraction of water for you and your
cattle. For these projects, we allocated eight million Ethiopian birrs.
198ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict
and Somalia‖ (1977); ENALA, Harar 1.2.18.07, ―The speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to
Ogaden‖ (1957).
199ENALA, Harar, 1.2.18.07, ―The speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to Ogaden‖ (1957).
76
On the other hand, parallel to hostile propaganda campaigns the Somalia authority
began a military assault. Notably beginning from August 1958 the law breaking and
crime across the two countries border increased dramatically. In the same year, the
military of Somalia tried to capture the Ethiopian military camp at Dollo which is in the
hinterland of Ethiopia at the Bale region. The event obliged the imperial government to
deploy additional military force in the district. Side by side, the Ethiopian authority
unilaterally claimed the demarcation of the frontier between the ex-Italian Somaliland
and Ethiopia that made the boundary ―from Greenwich 48‘ east longitude and 8‘ north
latitude to the junction of the Genale-Dawa Rivers‖.200
Meanwhile, Somalia‘s insurgency infiltration and the military assault continued in a
higher degree and size. Concomitantly, the involvement of the United Arab Republic
(Egypt), Saudi Arabia, and Iran on the side of Somalia increased the fearfulness of
Ethiopia.201
On the other hand, to calm down the problem through the diplomatic window between
December 3 and 8, 1957 the Emperor of Ethiopia invited Adan Abdullah Osman, the
leader of the Somali National Assembly and Abdullahi Issa the prime minister of the
trusteeship administrative. This visit might be taken as the first official diplomatic
contact at a higher level administrative staffs between the two countries before the
official independence and inauguration of the Somalia Republic (July 1, 1960). In their
visit the leaders and diplomatic staffs of the trusteeship territory gave an assurance that
the people of Somalia have a high-spirit to live in cooperation, peace, and friendship
with neighboring Ethiopia. Concomitantly, the delegate of the trusteeship promised to
stop the anti-Ethiopia propaganda campaign that was spreading in Somalia. Besides,
they vowed to solve problems through dialogue.202 Nonetheless, keeping constant the
goodwill of the two sides to promote peaceful and progressive diplomatic ties the
diplomatic talk failed to be achieved.
200ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and
Somalia‖ (1977); see also Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.110.
201ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Issue of Security in the District of Harar‖ (August 26,
1978); Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ―Iran‘s Scramble for Sub-Saharan Africa,‖ Insight Turkey Vol. 21, No. 1
(Published by: SET VAKFI İktisadi İşletmesi, SETA VAKFI, 2019), pp.133-134.
202 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.94.
77
In 1959, for instance, regarding the devotion of the Somali people and his party for the
issue of the Greater Somalia scheme, Abdulahi Issa, one of the key participant during
the December 3-8, 1957 Addis Ababa bilateral negotiation and the then president and
prime minister of the SYL and trusteeship territory said the following:
The Somali people form a single language; they inhabit a vast territory which in its
turn constitutes a well-defined geographical unit. All must know that the
government of Somalia will strive its utmost with the legal and peaceful means
which are its democratic prerogative to attain this end.203
This shows that in the face of different kinds of vows during the December 3-8, 1957
bilateral diplomatic talk, there was no ideological shift in reality in terms of achieving
the Greater Somalia concept on the side of Somalia, which in turn affected the initiation
of the friendly gesture on the side of Ethiopia.
On August 30, 1959, to the flabbergast of Ethiopia, at the Mogadishu pan-Somali
conference, the members of the conference declared that the border of the new Greater
Somalia would enlarge as far deep inside to the hinterland of Ethiopia up to the
highlands of Ethiopia. On the following year on March 29, 1960, a few months before
Somalia got full independence; the representatives of Somalia in the trusteeship
administration proclaimed a decree that notifies the creation of Greater Somalia would
be their primary goal. Subsequently, the full independence of Somalia was declared
officially on July 1, 1960 through the union of ex-British Somaliland and ex-Italian
Somaliland. Yet, Somalia had believed that the unification was not completed because
the new Republic still felt to unify the other Somali inhabiting lands in regions such as
the eastern frontier of Ethiopia notably Haud and Ogaden; the NFD of Kenya and;
French Somaliland (the present-day Djibouti).204
Apparently, on its constitution which was promulgated in July 1960, in article 6 (4), the
new Republic of Somalia ensured the commitment of the Republic to unite the Somali
inhabiting territories of the Horn region by any means including negotiation and legal
ways. To show its determination on the maneuver to create Greater Somalia, the new
government of Somalia propagated a five-pointed star emblem national flag that every
203 Onyango, p.96.
204Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.86; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.116.
78
stare symbolized one Somalia inhabiting territory of the Horn region. The representation
of the stars on the emblem of the flag also helped to evoke the strong belief of the
Somali nationalists and statesman that one day all the Somali inhabiting territories of
the Horn might come under the umbrella of a solitary nation-state. The stars on the
emblem of the national flag of Somalia had also used as a tool to propagate the
unhappiness of the Somali people to the international community about the artificial
colonial boundary that undermined the unification of the Somali speaking people of the
Horn region under a single administration.205
Following the establishment of Somalia as an independent nation (July 1, 1960) the
cornerstone of its foreign policy became the unification of the Somali people. In line
with this, for instance, on September 15, 1960, on his speech at Hargeisa, the then prime
minister of Somalia (i.e. Sharmarke) showed the primary goal of his government was to
reunify the so-called the Somalia inhabiting territories. Concomitantly, Sharmarke
underlined that the occupation of the reserved district and the land of Haud by Ethiopia
was not acceptable in the eye of the Somalia government.206 Afterward, the army of
Somalia launched assaults against Ethiopia from November 23 to December 29, 1960,
at areas such as Hodaye, Eilig, Disegaro, and Danot.207
On the other hand, the government of Somalia tried to familiarize a strategy of
infiltrating insurgents by helping and organizing the Somali inhabitants in Ogaden.
Accordingly, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was formed on June 16,
1963, at Hodayo, in Ethiopia. The WSLF started its opposition by propagating a violent
rebellion and condemning Ethiopian administration in Ogaden and demanding selfdetermination.
The Ethiopian authority tried to respond to the activity of Somalia in
Ogaden region through strengthening the conventional administration at the center.
During the period, the rebellious action of the WSLF coincided with the shifta war in
205ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict
and Somalia‖ (1977); see also Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.117.
206 Onyango, p.92; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.118.
207 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.118.
79
Kenya that in turn had helped the two countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) to work together
against the common enemy and common problem.208
In other occasion, on November 8, 1961, during the visit of the Somalia‘s ministry of
defense to Egypt, the minister said the following in the press relies at Cairo ―thanks to
the assistance of UAR, his country had a strong national army; and, in case of failure of
the boundary talks with Ethiopia, Somalia would invoke the might of its army to occupy
the contested area‖.209 The speech of the defense minister further aggravated the tension
between the two countries.210 The event had also helped to strengthen the Ethio-Kenyan
security cooperation for common complication.
In the same year (1961) the Ethiopian Emperor condemned the anti-Ethiopia
propaganda and unlawful provocative actions circulated by the authority of Soamlia.
The Emperor asserted that the move of Somalia denies the established law or legal
institutional right of Ethiopia for territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Emperor
added that such kind of move if remain the same, might affect the friendly gesture and
relationship that Ethiopia showed to Somalia. Besides, the Emperor asserted that for the
drive of maintaining its territorial integrity Ethiopia may reconsider its foreign policy
towards Somalia. In his warning, the Emperor had also stated that ―…those who had
attempted to violet the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, the consequences would be most
regrettable both in the interest of peace, of the region and of African unity‖.211
Furthermore, the Emperor asserted that the false rhetoric fodder of the act of Somalia
towards Ethiopia was laid during the colonial and trusteeship administrative era.
Regarding this rhetoric fodder the Emperor said that ―…the problems created and
deliberately left unsolved by this period would yield to solution if, and only if, the
Somalia leaders were willing to disabuse from their thinking any attempts to re-enact
208 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict
and Somalia‖ (1977); ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister
of Interior) to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.91-92;
Gregory Jaynes, ―Ogaden War Producing Little but Refugees,‖ The New York Times (November 18,
1979), p.22, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/18/archives/ogaden-war-producing-little-but-refugeesdeaths-
are-put-at-60000.html.
209 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.118.
210 Ibid.
211 Onyango, p.140.
80
the episodes of the now-discarded regimes.‖212 In his speech the Emperor also reflected
that his government‘s readiness to solve the problem through diplomatic talk. But in his
argument the Emperor underlined that his authority never permits Somalia to take an
inch of land from Ethiopia.213
Later, in May 1961, at the Monrovia conference, the issue of Ethiopia and Somalia
border dispute was discussed. Even if the presentation of the Ethiopia-Somalia border
issue helped the conflicting parties to get an opportunity for discussion it did not yield
fruit and had not helped to improve relationships.214
Subsequently, in August 1961, the imperial government of Ethiopia changed the
administrative division of the disputed district, Ogaden. Accordingly, the former single
administrative sub-province (awuraja) organization and ten districts (wereda)
management structure of the Ogaden district was changed into four sub-provinces
(namely, Welwel and Warder, Degahabur, Qebridehar, and Qelafo) and twenty-three
districts. The reason given during the time was for the simplification of the
administrative system in the district. But, in reality, it was an action forwarded by the
central government to control the rampant intensification of irredentist outlook as well
as to undermine the circulation of the anti-Ethiopia understanding throughout the
region.215
Concomitantly, the Ethiopian authorities look ways to approach opposition groups at
Mogadishu and Hargeisa using the legation of Ethiopia at Mogadishu as a means
(instrument). On December 12, 1961, the Somalia Independent Constitutional Party
(SICP) petition to the government of Somalia asserting the unfair economic and power
division between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, for instance, was taken as a good
opportunity by the Ethiopian authority to interfere into Somalia‘s internal politics. In the
meantime, the then Ethiopian ambassador in Somalia, Ahadu Sabure, approached the
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.94.
215 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.120.
81
leader of the SICP party, Mohamed Ahmed Bafo, and later redirected Mohamed Ahmed
to Addis Ababa for more discussion.216
Likewise, the December 1961 coup attempt and rebellion by the northern Somali army
generals asserting the unfair economic and political division between the north and
south Somalia considered by the Ethiopian as a threshold to influence the authority of
Somalia. The officialdom of Somalia and its nearest ally, Egypt, associated the coup
plot with Ethiopia. In the meantime, to further benefit from the situation in Somalia the
government of Ethiopia opened a consulate in Hargeisa side by side to its main legation
at Mogadishu.217
Under other conditions, on October 27, 1962, the government of Osman-Sharmarke
rearranged the cabinet of Somalia. On this rearrangement, the leader of the Somalia
National League (SNL) party members did not get important consideration.
Subsequently, one of the leaders of SNL, Ibrahim Egal, showed his opposition. The
situation was taken as an additional attribute by the Ethiopian authority to further widen
the rift among the authorities of Somalia. In the meantime, the Ethiopian authority tried
to approach Ibrahim Egal and his party SNL to work together against the government of
Somalia. In the end, Egal and his party promised to work against the government of
Aden Abdela Osman but in return, Egal asked to discuss in-depth about the issue with
higher officials of Ethiopia. As a result, the Ethiopian Embassy in Somalia facilitated
situations for Egal to meet officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a place
called Hartshek (a border town in eastern Ethiopia) in mid-February 1963. In the
meeting Egal and his team demanded the following: i) base and office either at Addis
Ababa or Harar to facilitate their political programs; ii) Egal had also demanded the
Ethiopian officialdom to support the financial deficiency for the would-be independent
northern Somalia (Hargeisa); iii) to have free access of grazing for their people; iv) to
accesses a free anti-Mogadishu propaganda broadcast via Radio Ethiopia and; v) to get
216 Ibid, p.121.
217 Ibid.
82
technical, financial and army aid. Afterward, the Ethiopian authority tried to support the
SNL as per their demand on the discussion at Hartshek.218
On the other hand, the May 1963 OAU inaugural meeting at Addis Ababa, created one
more ground for diplomatic discussion between the monarchial Ethiopia and the vibrant
nationalist Osman-Sharmarke governments. Nonetheless, the non-accommodating
political thoughts of the two governments again aborted the diplomatic talk to solve the
complication between the two countries. Rather, on the May 1963 inaugural summit the
first president of Somalia, Aden Osman, blatantly reflected about the unwavering
commitment of his government to lode the union of all Somali inhabiting lands under a
single authority. In his speech, the President added that in the state of disunity because
of artificial colonial boundary Somalia would not be the auspice in strengthening
African unity while around one and half million of its people are under foreign rule by
Ethiopia, Kenya, and French.219
Concomitantly, on the May 1963 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, regarding the Somali
inhabiting land at Ethiopia (Haud and Ogaden) President Aden stated the following:
… it is not our wish, at this time to go deeply into the Somali territorial dispute
with our host country Ethiopia. We shall simply summarize our stand on this
matter by saying that, Ethiopia has taken possession on large portion of Somali
territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants… Let there
be no misunderstanding about our intentions. The Somalia government has no
ambitions or claims for territorial aggrandizement. At the same time, the people of
the Republic cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren.
The Somalia government, therefore, must press for self-determination for the
inhabitants of the Somali areas adjacent to the Somali Republic. Self-determination
is a cornerstone of the United Nations charter, to which we all subscribe. If the
Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to express their will freely, the
government of the Republic pledges itself to accept the verdict.220
218ENALA, Ogaden District 17.1.7.25.02A, Reta Amirosilase Abebe to Eshete Geda (Minister of Public
Security) (July 1961); Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp. 122-123.
219Hoskyns, p.33.
220Onyango, pp.131-132.
83
While reacting to the position of Aden Abdela Osman‘s speech on the 1963 OAU
inaugural summit at Addis Ababa, the Prime minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habteweled,
stated that:
If the map of Africa were to be re-drawn on religious, racial and linguistic grounds,
then the Somali Republic would not even exist because there is no record in history
either of a Somali State or a Somali Nation.... It should therefore be the interest of
all Africans now to respect the frontiers drawn on the maps by the former
colonialists whether they are bad or good and Somalia should do the same. This is
because, if countries moved into Somalia's direction, then even the Ethiopians
would have claims to make on the same basis as Somalia, and for more on
historical and geographical reasons.... The policy of Ethiopia, while never allowing
an inch of her territory to be given up, had been: non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of every state, a
peaceful settlement of all disputes on the established basis, co-operation between
African brother states in all fields economic, cultural, and social, and to work
actively for African unity.221
Following the May 1963 OAU summit the military attack and the anti-Ethiopia
propaganda campaign had increased in intensity and scale. For instance, after the anti-
Ethiopian speech by Prime Minister Sharmarke in August 1963, around sixty-five
armed confrontations were seen between the two neighboring states from September
1963 to January 1964. The skirmish causes significant humanitarian and material
disaster. Subsequently, the Ethiopian authority tried to organize advanced intelligence
subdivision on the eastern part of the country at the district of Hararge for two reasons:
i) to study and closely watch the activity of Somalia on the border area, and ii) to
intensify a counter anti-Somalia advocacy magnifying the clan-based division and
economic problem in Somalia. However, the reaction of Ethiopia did not stop the
military assault. For example, on October 11, 1963, the Jijiga police camp was attacked;
on October 12, 1963, and November 22, 1963, Dabagoryale and Hargele, respectively,
were attacked by the army of Somalia.222
221Ibid, p.41.
222ENALA, Hararge District, 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.124-125.
84
Subsequently, opposing the aggressive action of Somalia, the Ethiopian ministry of
foreign affairs arranged a press release on November 14, 1963. The press release
strongly condemned the military incursion and the Greater Somalia scheme.
Furthermore, the press statement tried to undermine the move of Somalia asserting the
obligation of respecting the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference
on the internal affairs of other states.223
Later, when the army of Somalia attacked Togowuchale on February 7, 1964, the
tolerance of the imperial government of Ethiopia ended and started taking major actions
like i) putting the disputed district of Ogaden under the command of the army; ii)
increasing the military, financial and technical assistance for the northern Somalia
opposition groups; iii) declaration of a state of emergency in Ogaden region; iv)
increasing the contact with the government of Kenya which had the same interest with
Ethiopia regarding the irredentist move of Somalia and; v) interception of the free entry
and free exit of the Somali pastoral communities by closing the frontier.224
The declaration of the law of emergency and the growth of guerrilla activities in the
border area and the hinterland of Ethiopia prompted for the outbreak of a full-scale war
in January 1964. Afterward, the case between Ethiopia and Somalia became an issue in
the OAU. On February 12, 1964, Ethiopia, for instance, asked for the OAU council of
minister‘s extraordinary emergency session to look at the military incursion by the army
of Somalia.225
Subsequently, relentless efforts were employed to solve the issue by the continental
organization, OAU. Accordingly, the mater of the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute
presented at the Dar el Salam (Tanzania) second extraordinary meetings of the council
of ministers which was done from February 12-15, 1964. The Dar el Salaam
extraordinary ministerial meeting requested parties in the conflict: i) to declare a ceasefire
promptly without any precondition; ii) to find peaceful solution for their problem on
the basis of Article 3 and paragraph 4 of the charters of OAU by entertaining the idea of
223 Hoskyns, p.19.
224 Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Yihun,
―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.125-126.
225Yagya, ―Ethiopia and its Neighbors‖ p.111; Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.95.
85
conciliation and arbitration; iii) the session of Dar el Salam also presented a call for all
African countries to find solution for the problem of Ethiopia-Somalia frontier dispute
and to influence the conflicting parties to stop hostile propaganda campaign and; iv) the
session agreed to reconsider the boundary case of Somalia and Ethiopia on the program
of the upcoming February 24, 1964, extraordinary African ministerial meeting at
Nigeria, Legos. Concomitantly, the Dar el Salam ministerial meeting demanded the two
parties to stop appealing the mater to extra-continental organizations, such as the UN,
since their mater was under process by the continental organization, OAU.226
Nonetheless, the authorities of Somalia were not happy to accept the bid and the then
Foreign Minister of Somalia, Abdulahi Issa, asserted that the action of bandits (shiftas)
in the Somali inhabited regions of Ethiopia was because of the repression, unlawful rule
and suppression of Ethiopia against the Somalis under its jurisdiction. Abdulahi Issa
added that ways of solving the problem is not through false fully charging Somalia
rather through allowing the right to self-determination to the Somali inhabitants in
Ethiopia.227
As a response to the assertion of Foreign the Minister, Abdulahi Issa, the Ethiopian
Foreign Minister, Ketema Yifru, stated the following:
...the policy being pursued by the Republic of Somalia is indirect violation of the
fundamental principles governing relations between states embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations. It is a direct and a clear violation of principles embodied in
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity namely, the respect of sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each state; noninterference in the internal affairs of other
states and the sovereign equality of all member states.228
Under other conditions, the then secretary for the UN General Assembly, U Thant, also
supported the idea of OAU asserting that disputes in Africa should first be observed and
examined by OAU before it reached the UN Security Council. However, the authority
of Somalia was not happy with the view of U Thant because as stated before Somalia
226Adar, pp. 144-145; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.95-96; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖
pp.127-128; Zdenek Červenka, ―The Settlement of Disputes Among Members of the Organisation of
African Unity,‖ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and LatinAmerica
Vol. 7, No. 2 (1974), P.124.
227 Onyango, p.132; Hoskyns, p.56.
228 Onyango, p.143.
86
was afraid of the discrimination and bias by the OAU in investigating the genesis to the
dispute.229
On the other hand, both governments of Ethiopia (i.e. the imperial and military Dergu)
and its figurehead regional ally, Kenya, preferred the OAU than the UN to see their case
with Somalia. Concomitantly the Ethiopian and Kenyan officialdom demanded the
OAU to investigate the political origin (genesis) of the boundary disputes to find an
ending solution for the problem. But, Somalia was not interested to involve in a wider
discussion asserting the matter should be resolved through allowing the selfdetermination
rights of the disputed territory.230 In the meantime, the UN Security
Council embraced a decision regarding the jurisdiction of OAU in resolving African
disputes. The resolution states that ―the unity of Africa requires the solution to all
disputes between Member States be sought first within the Organization of African
Unity‖.231
In support of the idea reflected by the UN the then Emperor of Ethiopia, Hailesilase I,
also said that:
…we have repeatedly asserted that African problems must now be settled by
Africans. Unless this problem is solved within the African context we will have
taken a step backward and a severe blow will have been dealt to the cause of
African Unity. We ask your support Ethiopia‘s request.232
On other occasions, on February 24, 1964, in a press release while asked about the
taking part of the UN Security Council to answer the matter between Ethiopia and
Somalia the Emperor tried to show his compulsion by emphasizing that the issue of
Africa should get solution by OAU.233
Afterward, the OAU council of ministerial meeting was arranged at Lagos, Nigeria,
from February 24-29, 1964 to see the boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The Legos ministerial session: i) presented a call for both Ethiopia and Somalia to begin
229 Touval, The Boundary Politics, p.213; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.96.
230 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.96.
231 Ibid, p.97.
232 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.126.
233 Ibid, pp.126-127.
87
an open diplomatic discussion on the bases of article 3, paragraph 3 of the OAU chapter
to look peaceful solution for their complication. Likewise, the Legos ministerial
meeting requested the conflicting parties to keep up the cease-fire as well as to hold
back from any kind of antagonistic propaganda advocacy that affects the cease-fire; ii)
requested the government of Ethiopia and Somalia to employ an open discussion and
negotiation as per the direction presented on the OAU charter on Article 3 Paragraph 4
and; iii) requested both parties to work relentlessly to the full execution of the resolution
and notify their progress on the upcoming sessions of OAU heads of states and
governments.234
Later, between March 24 and 30, 1964 under the leadership of Sudan‘s president
General Ibrahim Abboud, Ethiopia and Somalia came to face to face diplomatic talk at
Sudan‘s capital, Khartoum. Both countries were represented by their foreign ministers.
Accordingly, the Ethiopian delegate was led by Ketema Yifru and his contemporary
Abdullahi Issa led the delegate of Somalia. The negotiation at Khartoum was
unbelievably fruitful and the two parties agreed to work on issues like i) to declare a
cease-fire; ii) to pull out their army from the frontier from 10 kilometers to 15
kilometers between April 6 and 16, 1964; iii) agreed to form a commission that controls
the withdrawal of military forces; iv) agreed to stop hostile propaganda advocacy and;
v) agreed to reinitiate a boundary negotiation before the coming session of OAU heads
of states and governments.235
Despite the treaty of Khartoum, Somalia tried to play a cold war era gam approaching
the Marxist-Leninist USSR not because the ideology was suitable for Somalia but for
the mere goal of getting arms from the USSR and other socialist bloc countries.
Afterward, USSR showed its commitment by arming around sixty-thousand Somali
solders and promising a three million dollar arms deal. The news was very bad to the
Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities that put them in anxiety. Later, on the November
1964, Cairo Non-Alignment conference, the Emperor of Ethiopia tried to make an
234Onyango, p.133; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.127; Adekunle Ajala, ―The Nature of African
Boundaries,‖ Africa Spectrum Vol. 18, No. 2 (1983), p.185.
235Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.97.
88
informal diplomatic talk with President Aden Abdallah Osman. But the diplomatic talk
failed to yield fruit.236
On the other hand, as a response to the move of Somalia, the Ethiopian authority tried to
build around two hundred thousand armies. Concomitantly, the Ethiopian authority tried
to strengthen the 1963 Ethiopia-Kenya bilateral military cooperation. Furthermore,
Ethiopia tried to benefit from its position on the pan African solidarity to enforce major
principles of the OAU charter such as territorial integrity. The Ethiopian authority had
also tried to neutralize those pro-Somali neighboring countries such as the Sudan by
remembering their own separatist problem in southern Sudan.237
Under other conditions, when the Ethiopian authority well understood that the readiness
of Somalia was very low to solve the boundary dispute based on the Dar el Salaam and
Legos accord it tried to counter balance the move of Somalia by further plotting the
internal issue of Mogadishu from 1965-67. Accordingly, the first tactic that was used by
the Ethiopian authority was strengthening opposition parties and groups that had
negative set of thought for the government of Osman. Particularly, following the
invasion of Tog-Wuchale by the army of Somalia, the Ethiopian government increased
its arms, material and financial support to SNL and other opposition groups in Somalia.
While providing support, Ethiopia‘s plan, was either to bring regime change in Somalia
or to weaken the government of Somalia.238
Moreover, to widen the discontent between northern Somalia (Hargeisa) and southern
Somalia (Mogadishu) the Ethiopian authority had helped for the establishment of a new
party named North Somalia Liberation Movement (NSLF) which was under the indirect
administration of the Ethiopian representatives at Harar governorate general. The head
office of NSLF was at Jijiga.239
Apparently, a political organization named the South Somalia Refugees Association
(SSRA) was established to disrupt the government of Somalia in the southern direction
236Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,‖ p.9; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.129.
237Daniel D. Kendie, ―Toward Northeast African Cooperation: Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Disputes,‖
Northeast African Studies, New Series Vol. 10, No. 2 (Michigan State University Press, 2003), p.77.
238 Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Yihun,
―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.129-131.
239 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.131.
89
of the country. The main office of SSRA became at the district of Kelafo, under the
close supervision of the Ethiopian government at the governorate general of Harar.240
Beside the destabilization efforts, the Ethiopian imperial authority stationed two welltrained
commando armies along the Ethio-Somalia frontier. The first commando was
stationed at Jigiga under the director of the tenth army division and the other commando
stationed at Kebridehar under the commandment of the ninth infantry army. This was
done to crash Somalia backed insurgent groups. Simultaneously, between 1965 and
1967 the Ethiopian authorities widely used the media broadcast as a means to frustrate
the government of Somalia. The broadcast was streamed in the Somali language. The
media propaganda campaign yields some fruit and the officialdom of Somalia asked the
Ethiopian Embassy at Mogadishu to stop the media propaganda and to resume a
diplomatic talk.241
2.2. The Era of Détente (1968-1969)
As stated above during the first six to seven years after the establishment of Somalia
Republic (1960), the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia was accompanied by
aggressive diplomacy, exasperating propaganda advocacy, insurgency and counterinsurgency
activities, and armed incursions.242
During the pre-détente era, the embodiment of the policy of aggressive diplomacy from
the said of Ethiopia was emanated from: i) the undivided attention of checking the
irredentist move of Somalia; ii) to maintain the territorial status quo; iii) and to maintain
its hegemonic position in the region. The government of Somalia on its part employed
aggressive policy approach against Ethiopia and Kenya for two reasons: i) to attain the
age-old dream of Greater Somalia scheme and; ii) to emerge as a sole regional hegemon
by annexing one-fifth of the Ethiopian and one-fifth of the Kenyan territories. Here it is
vital to note that, unlike in Kenya the provocative propaganda advocacy of Somalia
against Ethiopia was higher comparatively. This was mainly for the following two
reasons: i) the tribal tie (connection) in the Somali inhabiting region of Ogaden was
relatively higher than the tribal tie at the NFD; ii) the second reason was because of the
240 Ibid, p.133.
241 Ibid, pp.133-134.
242ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Colestock, p.54.
90
religious identity differences between the predominantly ‗Christian Ethiopia‘ and
‗Muslim Somalia‘.243 For instance, while explaining the thought of Somalia, Douglas
stated quoting I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar‘s book named Pastoral Democracy244:
Somali nationalist aims to tend to be associated with the idea of Muslim solidarity
opposed to Christian government. This aspect of Christian influence in inspiring
nationalism aspirations is particularly strong in what Somali regard as the
imperialist policies of the Ethiopian government.245
On the other side, the imperial government of Ethiopia, under the rule of Emperor
Hailesilase I, preferred to associate itself or Ethiopia with Christian tradition and unsure
about the prospect Muslim influence on Ethiopia. Nonetheless, later following the
coming to power of the military junta into the Ethiopian politics (1974) even if the
religious aspects of the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia declined its impact for the
later period of interaction was not minimal.246
In 1967, the Osman-Sharmarke era (1960-1964) and the Osman-Hussein era (1964-
1967) of aggressive diplomacy and provocative foreign policy in Somalia was replaced
by the Sharmarke-Egal era (1967-1969) of détente. The Sharmarke-Egal administration
tried to shift the foreign policy of Somalia from hostile diplomacy to detente by
normalizing the antagonistic interaction of Somalia with neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya
and French Somaliland (Djibouti) through a new conciliation foreign policy
approach.247
The breakthrough of the new foreign policy of détente affected the internal politics of
Sharmarke-Egal administration and the policy did not get support from the Somali
people. The local community revolted and depicted the move of Egal‘s administration
as a betrayal (sell-out) because the new policy approach deviated from the former
hardline approach. Besides, the new policy of détente under Egal worked in softening
and normalizing the Somalia‘s relations with the so-called ‗enemies‘ of Somalia (i.e.
243 Saadia Touval, ―The Organization of African Unity and African Borders,‖ International Organization
Vol. 21, No. 1 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp.111-112; Woodwell, p.111; Colestock, p.54.
244I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1999).
245 Woodwell, p.111.
246 Ibid, p.111.
247 Colestock, pp.43 & 59.
91
Ethiopia, and Kenya).248 As a defense to his new policy approach and to undermine the
opposition Egal stated the following:
[…] What my government seeks to do is to foster an atmosphere of good will
wherein it will be possible to negotiate at a round-table conference an equitable
solution for the problems of these people without exposing them to the scourge of
war. I am therefore surprised that there are elements who would like, for some
other ulterior motives, to make people believe that there has been a compromise on
principle and a sell-out at Kinshasa, Addis Ababa and Arusha. Is it sell-out to
persuade Kenya to leave the people of NFD in peace whilst still accepting to
negotiate at the conference table the future of these people? Is it a sell-out to
persuade Kenya to expose conditions in the area to the examination of a Three-
State Working Committee?249
So, how and why the Sharmarke-Egal government ignored the hardline of their
predecessors and normalized the relations of Somalia with neighboring states (i.e.
Ethiopia and Kenya) by employing the policy of détente?
At the beginning of the Sharmarke-Egal administration, President Sharmarke intended
to follow the foot of his predecessors by employing the hardline and provocative foreign
policy approach against neighboring states. Nonetheless, Egal refused to follow the
hardline foreign policy approach and tried to divert the attitude of Sharmarke to the
policy of détente and conciliation. At last, Sharmarke showed a willingness to employ
the new foreign policy approach.250
However, when we say that the Sharmarke-Egal administration introduced a new
foreign policy approach called détente and conciliation against neighboring states
(Ethiopia and Kenya), it does not mean that the Sharmarke-Egal government totally
abandoned Somalia‘s age-old dream to unify the Somali inhabiting lands under a single
authority. Rather, the new approach preferred to follow diplomatic channels to address
the problem using international and continental organizations such as the UN and OAU.
Likewise, the Sharmarke-Egal administration tried to ascertain a new way of bilateral
248Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November 1967), p.22386;
Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.116.
249Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.117.
250Colestock, p.43.
92
diplomatic talks and accommodation with neighboring states instead of a hostile
approach to attain the idea of unifying Somalia. 251
One of the factors that instigated Somalia to follow a path of détente was the diplomatic
isolation that the country encountered because of its provocative and aggressive policy.
Likewise, the front created by Ethiopia and Kenya against the so-called ‗common
enemy‘ (i.e. Somalia) also created political and economic burdens on Somalia. In
addition, the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya restricted the free movement of the
Somali pastoral communities by closing their frontiers. Particularly, the closing of
frontiers was a problem on the general wellbeing and economy of the nomadic
community around the border area.252
The other event that pushed Somalia to think sensibly about the old hardline (i.e.
aggressive approach) was the blockage of the strategic way, Suez Canal, in 1967
following the Arab-Israeli war. As a result of the obstruction of the waterway, the Horn
countries including Soamlia faced economic problems. But, what makes the case of
Somalia distinct was that the economic burden that came from the obstruction of the
waterway overlapped with the regional diplomatic isolation. As a result, the authority of
Somalia easily felt the burden and forced to introduce a more pragmatic approach
towards its hostile neighbors.253
The conciliation and pragmatic policy from the side of Somalia got positive responses
from different directions. Particularly, Ethiopia and Kenya that expend a considerable
amount of wealth and manpower on the anti-shifta (bandit) action considered the move
of Somalia as a big step forward. The new policy of Somalia also increased the
anticipation of Ethiopia and Kenya that one day Somalia will accept the status quo of
colonial boundary. 254
When we come to extra-continental power, the USA and Great Britain appreciated the
new policy of détente by Somalia. The USA and Great Britain supported the approach
of détente to use it for their advantage. Meaning, they anticipate the détente might
251 Onyango, p.99.
252 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.122-123.
253Ibid.
254 Ibid, p.123.
93
undermine the role and influence of the Soviets on the Horn region. For instance, after
the official declaration of the policy of détente as a policy priority by Egal, at the OAU
summit at Kinshasa, Washington arranged an urgent visit to Somalia by its vice
president Hubeert Humphrey. Washington did this to boost the morale of the
Sharmarke-Egal‘s government.255
The Soviet Union on its part was not against the policy of détente. Rather, in the face of
its tie with Somalia the Soviet tried their best to approach and to woo the other pro-west
Horn countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to accept Marxism-Leninism. So, beyond
the interest of the Sharmarke-Egal government the positive attitude of extra-continental
antagonistic cold war superpowers also helped the functionalization of the policy of
détente. Regarding this issue, referring to Saadia Touval, Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe,
stated that ―the complementary perceptions by the parties of the circumstances and
options faced by them, and the willingness and ability to take reciprocal steps toward
their common goal of disengagement, resulted in a détente‖.256
On the other hand, the OAU as a continental machine that helped to give rise and
facilitate the policy of détente between Somalia and its neighboring states was pleasant
on the development. It was during the September 1967 OAU summit at Kinshasa that
the Prime Minister of Somalia, Egal, disclosed the new policy approach of his country
against neighboring hostile states-Ethiopia and Kenya.257
The introduction of détente by Egal to solve the problem through a face-to-face
discussion with neighboring powers at the Kinshasa summit created a sense of hope on
the government of Emperor Hailesilase and Jomo Kenyatta to alleviate their problem
with Somalia peacefully. Subsequently, three consecutive diplomatic discussions were
arranged between Ethiopia and Somalia. The first was in September 1967 at Addis
Ababa, the second in February 1968 at Mogadishu, and the last in September 1968 at
Addis Ababa. These diplomatic talks were conducted at the prime minister and foreign
minister level.258
255 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, pp.196-197; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.125.
256 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.125-126.
257 Ibid, p.125.
258 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.137.
94
At the first meeting which was held at Addis Ababa from September 19 to 21, 1967
both Ethiopia and Soamlia showed their initiation and faithfulness to implement the
March 1964 Khartoum agreement and the October 1965 Accra accord. Among other
things, the two countries delegate at Addis Ababa reached on consensus to stop hostile
propaganda advocacy, to resume diplomatic talk and to stop unlawful harassment of
nationalities of one country living on the administrative system of the other. Besides,
the two countries agreed to exchange materials that were confiscated during the time of
war and to stop the infiltration of shifta. Accordingly, between November 23 and 30
1967, the Ethiopia and Somalia diplomatic staff at the level of ambassadors meet at
Addis Ababa to apply the September agreement. Afterward, remarkable progress was
seen in the relations between the two countries, for instance, the intensity of insurgent
infiltration was decreased; boundary clashes were reduced and; properties confiscated
during war times were returned. Accordingly, on October 26, 1967 Ethiopia and
Somalia exchanged the aircraft snatched during the time of war.259
The other meeting between Somalia and Ethiopia for open negotiation was held at
Mogadishu from February 5 to 8 1968. At this meeting, the representatives of Ethiopia
led by the foreign minister presented a precondition that demands Somalia to dissolve
all anti-Ethiopian institutions that had a base in Somalia. Ethiopia insisted the issue of
dissolving all anti-Ethiopian groups in Somali to lift the state of emergency which was
declared in the Somali inhabiting regions of Ethiopia since 1964. However, both parties
were not in a position to reach an agreement on this issue. As a result, the delegate tried
to discuss other matters like the establishment of a special joint committee that could
work on the improvement of the two countries‘ relationship. The special committee was
also insisted to meet every month to report the progress of discussions. Besides, the
delegates tried to reach on consensus to further implement the September Addis Ababa
agreement by further exchanging the remaining confiscated properties under the control
of each state. Later after long discussions, Ethiopia partially opened its border to the
259 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.128; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.138.
95
trader and pastoralists at some specific points such as Ferfer, Tog Wuchale, and
Enguha.260
To further strengthen the two countries relations Prime Minister Egal visited Addis
Ababa from September 1 to 5, 1968. At this meeting, the progress of the two countries‘
relations was evaluated. Besides, the two parties tried to evaluate the development of
the preceding years‘ agreement concerning the exchange of property and stopping
hostile propaganda. Concomitantly, the two sides signed additional agreements on
issues such as not to involve directly or indirectly on subversive activities. The authority
of Ethiopia agreed to provide permission of flight to and from Somalia on the Ethiopian
air space and to lift the emergency law along the frontier of the two countries. Besides,
Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to work together on the areas of telecommunication, trade
and cultural matters. Subsequently, the air traffic accord was signed on February 22,
1969; the telecommunication accord was signed on 24 February 1969 and; the trade
accord was signed on March 31, 1969.261
However, later the suspension of the emergency law created the opportunity for those
anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia to destabilize Ethiopia which in turn affected the
relative détente between Ethiopia and Somalia. The act of the insurgent groups had also
created distrust between Somalia and Ethiopia. Particularly, the Ethiopian officialdom
questioned the commitment of Somalia towards the consecutive agreements signed
between the two countries at Addis Ababa and Mogadishu between 1967 and 1968.262
Besides, there were three major factors that had negative impact on the detent between
Ethiopia and Somalia: i) lack of commitment from both Ethiopia and Soamlia to stop
the activity of insurgent groups; ii) even if the Sharmarke-Egal administration rejected a
hardline foreign policy approach against Ethiopia, it did not officially renounced the
Greater Somalia scheme and; iii) the political platform in Somalia was changed before
260ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978).
261 Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.129; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.141-142.
262 ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.142.
96
the proper implementation of 1967-1968 agreements. Meaning, the 1969 coup d'état
under the leadership of Said Barry removed the Sharmarke-Egal administration.263
Accordingly, the coming to power of Major General Mohammed Said Barry on October
21, 1969 became the beginning of the end of hope by the authority of Ethiopia and
Kenya on the effectiveness of the policy of détente. After his coming to power through
the 1969 coup d'état, even if, Barry gave his word to Ethiopia and Kenya about the
continuation of the policy of détente the implementation was gradually declined.
Afterward, in place of détente Barry reintroduced the hardline approach to unify the
Somali inhabiting territory of the Horn region and to create Greater Somalia by force of
the army.264
2.3. The Era of the First Phase of General Barry’s Rule and Conflicting
Perceptions (1970-1974)
In October 15, 1969 President Sharmarke was assassinated at the northern district of
Somalia at a place called Las Anod by his security guard. Subsequently, Prime Minister
Egal was imprisoned. The western-oriented parliamentary democracy in Somalia was
failed and substituted by ―scientific socialism‖. In the mean time, the military started to
play a clandestine role in the politics of Somalia. The pan-Somali nationalism that
demands territories from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti had also increased. The new
Somali government under Barry had also started searching friends and allies that
support the scheme of Greater Somalia. So, the coming to power of the military under
the leadership of General Said Barry (October 21, 1969) brought a new era of political
relations between Somalia and neighboring countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya).265
Here it is vital to note that at the beginning the government of Barry promised both
Ethiopia and Kenya to follow the Sharmarke-Egal policy of détente. Barry had also
reflected its observance to strengthen the friendly relations and to respect the agreement
signed by the Sharmarke-Egal administration including the 1967 Kinshasa
memorandum. Despite their suspicion of the words of Barry was very high, the
263Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.126.
264 Ibid, pp.126-127.
265 Mohamed Osman Omer, The Road to Zero Somalia’s Self-Distraction (HAAN Associates, London,
1992), pp.91-95.
97
government of Ethiopia and Kenya welcomed the new military government. The
Ethiopia-Kenya pair had also tried to influence the policy approach of Barry‘s
government by showing friendly gesture.266 However, Barry‘s moderate and friendly
gesture was not from heart.
In fact, there were two reasons for Barry‘s moderate political approach during his
coming to power. These were: i) to consolidate his internal power and; ii) to
institutionalize the October revolution. However, the initial moderate political approach
employed by Barry was not long-lasting and gradually vaporized. Accordingly, in the
face of his promise to continue the policy of détente the military government of Barry
returned to the hardline foreign policy approach against Ethiopia and Kenya.267 For
instance, after his coming to the post of Presidency, Barry made the following speech
about the Somali inhabiting lands outside Somalia:
Although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence
so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a possibility in the same way as
we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country… To the
Somali people independence was always synonymous with unity. The consistent
struggle of the Somali people seems to surprise our enemies. They do not realize
that the Somali people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing their freedom…The
liberation struggle was always part of the ordinary life of the Somali men, and how
long it takes him, he will never forget the stage of the struggle remaining.268
The irregular and varying foreign policy approach of Barry, together with, the increment
of illegal cross-border immigration and infiltration of insurgent groups alarmed the
Ethiopian authority to follow a new approach against the government of Barry.
Afterward, in order to check the illegal cross-border immigration, Ethiopia had
strengthened the boundary security and allowed exit and entry to and from Somalia only
via Togowuchale, Dabagoryale, Ferfer and Dudub.269
266 Selassie, pp.116-117; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.143.
267Omer, The Road to Zero, p.164.
268Onyango, p.100; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.
269ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978).
98
Over time minor armed clashes also began to recur here and there between the
government of Barry and Ethiopia. A case in point, in November 1970, the troops of
Somalia and the troops of Ethiopia clashed at a place called Wedeberis. Likewise, to
weaken the government of Ethiopia, the government of Barry had supported anti-
Ethiopian opposition groups such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Barry himself
confirmed this issue during his speech in Libya. Moreover, the government of Somalia
tried to infiltrate insurgent groups using seasonal immigrant pastoralist groups as a
shield. In return, the Ethiopian authority warned the authority of Barry either to disarm
the seasonal pastoralist immigrants or to stop sending seasonal pastoralists to
Ethiopia.270
Subsequently, under the auspices of OAU, a new diplomatic discussion was arranged
between Ethiopia and Somalia. Accordingly, the first meeting between General Barry
and Emperor Hailesilase was arranged during the eighth summit of OAU on June 23,
1971, which was held at Addis Ababa. During their discussion, the delegates of Somalia
under its foreign minister required Ethiopia to relinquish the Ogaden region to Somalia.
The Ethiopian authority under its foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, unequivocally noticed
Somalia that Ethiopia would never give an inch of its territory to Somalia. In turn,
Ethiopia forwarded the following proposal: i) to reinitiate a boundary discussion
between the two countries and; ii) the necessity of thinking about the possibility of
creating a confederation between Ethiopia and Somalia without violating the de facto
functioning boundary.271 The authority of Kenya also showed their support for the
argument of Ethiopia against Somalia on the February 13, 1971 Ethiopia-Kenya
consultative committee meeting which was held at Nairobi.272
In the meantime, the insurgency activity and assault of Somalia against Ethiopia were
increased in intensity from time to time. In December 1971, for instance, the men of
Somalia attacked Dollo. In April 1973 the troops of Somalia attacked Bangual, which is
some 25 kilometers east of Dollo. At the same moment, the imperial government of
Ethiopia wrote a warning letter to Barry to withdraw his troops from the occupied
270Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.145-146.
271Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p. 126-127; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.146-147.
272ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, From Legese Wudu (Minister
D‘état of the Ministry of Administration) to Litunent General Nega Hailesilase (governor General of
Sadama) (May 21,1971).
99
territory. Then the government of Barry pulled out its troops from the occupied
territory.273
Later, on the tenth jubilee of the OAU summit at Addis Ababa from May 27 to 28, 1973
Somalia proposed that the Ethio-Somalia territorial dispute be included in the agenda. In
the summit, Somalia had also accused Ethiopia‘s militarization activity along the
border. Afterward, the summit proposed the two countries to solve their problem
through negotiation. The 10th OAU summit had also established a Good Office
Commission that consisted of Nigeria, Liberia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Senegal, Sudan,
Lesotho, and Mauritania to monitor the matter and to reflect it on the next summit. The
commission was under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian President.274
However, the claim and accusations of one on the other continued and the tension on the
border area also increased. The rise of tension between the two countries frightened the
Good Office Commission and the commission tried to persuade General Barry and
Emperor Hailesilase to get peaceful solution for the problem. But peaceful solution was
just a dream without mutual trust. Rather, both authorities employed themselves on
relentless allegation one on the other. Concomitantly, during the first meeting of the
Good Office Commission, which was held at Algiers in September 1973 Ethiopia
clearly noticed that the idea of territorial secession was not acceptable.275
In the same manner, supporting the argument of Ethiopia the vice president of Kenya
stated the following on the 1973 tenth OAU summit:
Kenya cannot be party to opening up issues concerning territorial claims against
sister states. Kenya does not have and will not make any territorial claims on any of
her neighbors; and in the same spirit Kenya cannot and shall not recognize or even
consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister country.276
Apparently, the Good Office Commission meeting at Algiers proposed the two
countries to withdraw their army from the border between 50 kilometers and 70
273ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.147-148.
274 Fasehun, p.189.
275 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.150.
276 Adar, p.245.
100
kilometers. In return, the commission had also proposed to deploy the army of the
commission members on the demilitarized region. However, the proposal of the Good
Office Commission by its chairperson Yakubu Gowon did not get acceptance by the
Ethiopian authority. Ethiopia became angry on the commission for its consideration of
Ethiopia with the same eye with ‗perpetrator‘ Somalia that rejected the UN and OAU
principles such as territorial integrity and non-interference on the affair of a sovereign
state. Emperor Hailesilase of Ethiopia also noticed the Good Office Commission that
his government would be open to accept the proposal of the commission if and only if
Somalia renounced its territorial assertion against Ethiopia.277 But the commission was
not in a position to take substitutive action to implement its decisions because the
commission was assigned "to normalise relations between the two countries by trying to
reduce tension‖.278
In the process of the Good Office Commission to settle the dispute between Somalia
and Ethiopia; the 1974 Ethiopian revolution breakout and Ethiopia became under
political turmoil and disorder. Subsequently, the border issues with Somalia became
secondary in the politics of Ethiopia. The situation also was taken as a good opportunity
by the authority of Somalia to influence Ethiopia by strengthening the destabilization
activities. Likewise, the Ethiopian diplomatic staffs and Ethiopian citizens in Somalia
brutally treated. The Ethiopian embassy at Mogadishu had also proposed the restoration
of the emergency law on the Somali inhabiting lands and closing frontiers against the
seasonal Somali pastoralists as a counter-response for the destabilization action of
Somalia. However, before the realization of the emergency law, the imperial
government of Ethiopia was removed from power on September 12, 1974, and the
military junta took the rule.279 The subsequent foreign relations of Ethiopia took a new
form using Marxism-Leninism as a figurehead political philosophy for Ethiopia.
277 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.151.
278 Fasehun, p.190.
279ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p. 140-141, Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖
p.153.
101
2.4. The Era of Dissension and Open War (1975-1978)
Following the removal of the imperial government by the military junta in 1974 the
political havoc in Ethiopia reach at its peak. Using this opportunity the government of
Barry intensified its pressure to annex Ogaden from Ethiopia by force of arms. Besides,
Somalia actively engaged in providing arms support and military bases for different
opposition groups who came from Ogaden, Eritrea, Afar, Bale, etc. to make busy the
Ethiopian authority with internal issues. These all actions of Somalia were to prepare
favorable platform to invade Ethiopia. A study report in Ethiopia by the collaboration of
the public intelligence and the information center of the military in December 1976
(Tahsas 1968) mentioned that there were different indicators that showed the readiness
of Somalia to declare all-out war against Ethiopia.280
According to the December 1976 report, the first thing that showed the move of
Somalia to declare all-out war against Ethiopia was seen on the extensive propaganda
campaign by the officials of Somalia through electronic and print medias at Mogadishu
against Ethiopia by depicting Ethiopia as an ―African colonialist‖. Ethiopia tried to
approach the authority of Somalia aiming to get a peaceful solution for the problem.
However, the problem between the two countries was not in a position to get a peaceful
solution because of the headstrong political and diplomatic approach followed by
Somalia. The active involvement of external powers on the internal politics of Ethiopia
and Somalia had also contributed in hindering the peaceful approach to iron out the
complication.281
The December 1976 report also stated that the insurgent infiltration of Somalia against
Ethiopia was extensive in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country at areas such
as Bale, Sidamo, Harar, Ogaden, and Ausa. For that matter, infiltrations of insurgent
factions were applied before the outbreak of the actual war for the following three
reasons: i) to make busy and weaken the regular army of Ethiopia by infiltrating a small
number of shifta warrior with minor costs. Simultaneously, through shifta war the
280ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District
17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia‖ (1978).
281ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
102
authority of Somalia intended to gather information about the strength and general
performances of the Ethiopian army; ii) the other reason that instigated the authority of
Somalia to involve on the infiltration of shifta warriors were to annex Djibouti by
making busy the authority and army of Ethiopia on shifta war. On November 20, 1975,
for instance, around six faction groups of shifta warrior from the northern town of
Somalia, Hargeisa, penetrated into the territory of Ethiopia up to 100 miles. On the
fight, more than twenty shifta warriors were killed and the remaining retreated to
Somalia and; iii) the other reason to declare a shifta insurgent attack against Ethiopia
stem from the interest to weaken the economy of Ethiopia.282
The second indicator that showed Somalia‘s preparedness to all-out war against
Ethiopia was the military capacity building of Somalia. Especially since 1972 Somalia
was strengthening itself with Modern and sophisticated weapons. For instance, in terms
of solders, within five years (between 1972 and 1976) Somalia‘s force escalated from
15,000 to 30,000. Likewise, between 1973 and 1976 nearly ¾ or around 90% of
Somalia‘s ground force was organized in mechanized way. Besides, new mechanized
military bases were established in different areas such as Hudur, Galkayu and Lasanod
fronts. Regarding the air force, during the 1970s, Somalia‘s strength was among the
leading in the Sub-Saharan African countries. The Somalia air force had also owned a
sophisticated radar system.283
The third factor that could be taken as an indicator of Somalia‘s readiness for all-out
war against Ethiopia was its military training and exercise in a way that looks like actual
warfare. From November 20 to 26, 1975, for instance, at a place called Worsek, which
is some 50 to 60 kilometers from Mogadishu there was military training and exercise by
the army of Somalia that looks like actual fighting. This military exercise was
accompanied by MiG 17 and MiG 21 helicopter fighter jets. In addition, in 1976 at a
place called Deynelu, which is located near to Mogadishu there was the same kind of
military training and exercise by the army of Somalia. In December 1976 there was also
an extensive ground forces military exercise from Beledeweni (one of the Somalia
282ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District
17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia‖ (1978).
283 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
103
towns near to Ethiopia border) and Galakayu up to the northern front. Moreover, the
Somalia military forces were highly engaged in military exploration on the border area
between Ethiopia and Somalia. The military exploration was taken as a preliminary
study of the environment to move to all-out war. This action of Somalia, on the other
hand, made Kenya to approach more to Ethiopia because the move of Somalia against
Ethiopia was taken by the Kenyan authority as a dress rehearsal that would happen
against Kenya.284
The fourth point that showed Somalia‘s preparation for all-out war against Ethiopia was
the recurrent and unexpected minor attacks against Ethiopia by infiltrating insurgent
groups at different strategic fronts. Moreover, in order to weaken the power of the
Ethiopian administrative hierarchy with internal power struggle the authority of Somalia
involved in aiding different liberation fronts‘ such as, among others, the Ogaden
Liberation Front (OLF); the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); and the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF). Somalia had also involved in aiding opposition groups in Afar.285
Additionally, in the mid-1970s the following factors instigated the authority of Somalia
to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia: i) the internal instability of Ethiopia because
of the domestic civil war under the slogan of whit terror (advocated by opposition
groups of the government) and red terror (propagated by the government of Ethiopia);
ii) the havoc in the northern part of Ethiopia by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
where reached at its height during the period and; iii) the armed resistance movement in
northwestern Ethiopia by the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).286
Particularly, the political and military tension of Ethiopia with the ELF was taken as a
glorious opportunity by the government of Somalia because one of the strategies
employed by Barry was creating internal division in the country. To reverse the
challenge in the northern front the lion share of the Ethiopian army was moved to the
northern front to fight against the ELF. The move of the largest number of Ethiopia‘s
army to the northern front was considered as a good opportunity by Barry to infiltrate
284 Ibid.
285ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District
17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia‖ (1978).
286 Ibid.
104
more insurgent factions and to open minor and major incursions against Ethiopia.
Moreover, the war in Eritrea had also influenced the economy of Ethiopia and the
economic problem was taken as an additional impute for Somalia‘s dream to open fullscale
war against Ethiopia. On top of this, during the period, except the third division
army that stationed at Ogaden, there was no substitute to support the third division army
if a war would break out with Somalia. The authority of Barry well aware the above
stated gaps and highly needed to open full-scale war against Ethiopia to annex
Ogaden.287
On the other side, the civil war between Ethiopia and the ELF deteriorated the
diplomatic tie and relations of Ethiopia with Arab countries. This was mainly because
during the era most Arab countries such as Saudi Arabiya and Egypt provided material,
arms, and technical support to the ELP to free the Red sea from Ethiopian influence. So,
the authority of the Somalia well conscious about Ethiopia‘s diplomatic situation with
the Arab countries and tried to use it as a leverage to alienate Ogaden from Ethiopia.
The deterioration of Ethiopia‘s diplomatic ties with the Arab countries had also helped
Somalia to get more economic and military aid from Arab states. Likewise, the
resistance movement in the region of Awusa by the Afar fighting groups was also
considered by the authority of Somalia as a good opportunity to turn the advantage to
the side of Somalia by intensifying the destabilization activities in Ethiopia using both
internal opposition groups and Somali insurgent groups. 288
On the other hand, the military junta that came to power in Ethiopia in 1974 under the
banner of Marxism-Leninism was immersed under the state of ideological, economic,
political, and social turmoil. Likewise, following the removal of the feudal system in
Ethiopia in 1974 there were internal class struggles; there were also struggles on the
basis of ethnic identity; there were struggles on the basis of religious background as
well as unhealthy struggle on the basis of ideological disparity at different levels. These
multifaceted internal divisions and struggles in Ethiopia had instigated Barry to consider
287 Ibid.
288ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
105
Ethiopia as a weak state that neither solve its domastic havoc nor could resist the might
of his army. Thereby, Barry preferred war rather than diplomacy.289
The other point in focus that instigated the authority of Barry to choose war rather than
diplomacy to solve the problem of Somalia with Ethiopia was the temporary absence of
any cold war superpower behind the new military government of Ethiopia. This was
true because while the old feudal system removed from power in Ethiopia in 1974, the
ally of the Ethiopian feudal system, U.S.A, stopped aiding Ethiopia. In the meantime,
despite the acceptance of Marxism-Leninism, the new military junta did not get the full
support of the Soviet. As a result, the new military junta remained alone without
acquiring a strong ally either from the eastern bloc or the western bloc. In other word,
keeping constant the internal political division and political havoc in Ethiopia, the lack
of strong support from Ethiopia‘s foreign ally had also motivated Barry to choose war
as a solution to the problem between the two countries.290
Here it is vital to note that during the period, three major factors hindered U.S.A to give
military assistance and protection to Ethiopia. First, following the Vietnam War (1955-
1975) U.S.A preferred reservation rathen than supporting and engaging in protection
activities. As a result, in some countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa U.S.A was
not on its place while its ally demand help. The same was true to the case of United
State‘s withdrawal of support and protection to Ethiopia.291
The second factor that hindered U.S.A to support Ethiopia was that U.S.A did not have
a vital economic interest in Ethiopia. Thereby, since U.S.A was not in a position to lose
economic, trade, oil or other minerals from Ethiopia it was not interested to fight on the
side of Ethiopia against Somalia, which was backed by major allies of Washington such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, etc. For that matter, the figurehead interest of the U.S.A in
Ethiopia, Kagnew Radio Station, which was used to supervise the Middle East, lost its
289ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of
Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
290ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
291ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of
Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
106
previous importance in the 1970s because of technological development and the
renewal of the U.S relations with Egypt following the death of Nassir.292
The third fact in point that deteriorated the U.S support to Ethiopia was the shift of
political ideology in Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism. This was true mainly because most
of the top officials of the new system were advocators of Marxist Leninist ideology.
Subsequently, U.S.A tried to replace the Marxist-Leninist officials by a new moderate
group but failed to achieve it. As a result, U.S withdrew its protection and support to
Ethiopia. The government of Barry that was closely following the dynamics in Ethiopia
well aware that Ethiopia lost the support from U.S.A without substituting it with other
power to fill the gap. So, Barry was motivated to use the opportunity to take Ogaden by
force of arms.293
On top of this, in order to get upper hands in regional politics, Barry had also tried to
employ a policy to isolate Ethiopia from regional politics. This policy was mainly
intended to isolate Ethiopia from its main regional security ally, Kenya. Especially the
1963 military agreement between Ethiopia and Kenya highly disturbed Somalia.
However, following the regime change in Ethiopia (September 12, 1974) Somalia tried
to approach the authority of Kenya to weaken the Addis Ababa-Nairobi axis. Against
this background, Kenya and Somalia signed accords on the areas of trade, cultural
exchange, and free movement of people. These accords were signed at the level of
leaders, diplomats, and mayors.294
The rapprochement of Somalia and Kenya had two main aims: i) as stated above
Somalia was intended to approach Kenya to isolate Ethiopia from the regional politics
and to weaken the acceptance of Ethiopia at regional diplomacy using Kenya as a tool
and; ii) the other factor that pushed Somalia to approach Kenya was to use the
diplomatic acceptance of Jomo Kenyatta at OAU and in African diplomacy. On the
other side, Kenya accepted the agreement proposal from Somalia because of the change
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
107
of regime and ideology in Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism. So, Kenya was suspicious on
the New Leftist Ethiopian government in respecting the interest of Kenya.295
2.4.1. Factors that Hindered Barry’s Anticipation to Declare All-Out War against
Ethiopia as fast as he Planned
Despite the active involvement of Somalia on the destabilization activities of Ethiopia,
the authorities of Somalia did not succeed to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia as
fast as they projected. The possible reasons that hindered the anticipated projection of
Somalia to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia in the mid-1970 were the internal
problems of Somalia such as, among others, political, social and economic. In this
regard, the first domestic problem that hindered the anticipation of Barry was the mid-
1970s severe drought that hit Somalia from late 1974 up to May 1975. The mid-1970
Somalia drought had alsso triggered economic and humanitarian crises that affected a
third or quarter of the total population of the country. In terms of economy, the mid-
1970 drought had a big impact on the pastoral communities of the country that highly
depend on traditional animal husbandry and agriculture.296
The second factor that delayed Barry‘s move to invade Ethiopia was the internal
political problem and division in Mogadishu. In the political realm or domain of Barry‘s
government, there was political distrust and disappointment from different tribal groups.
For instance, northern Somalia or literally called British Somaliland or Somaliland,
where largely inhabited by the Isak tribe, demands to secede from Somalia. As a result,
authorities in northern Somalia were not interested to implement policies, strategies,
rules and agendas that were introduced and promulgated by the central government at
Mogadishu. Consequently, there were recurrent minor clashes between the army of
Barry and military groups of northern Somalia, who were largely supported by
Ethiopia.297
The implementation of the ideology of communism under the banner of scientific
socialism had also affected the relations of Barry with the predominantly Muslim
295 Ibid.
296Basil Davidson, Review of ABAAR: The Somali Drought, by I.M. Lewis, Review of African Political
Economy Vol.6 (Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1976), p.110.
297ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
108
population of Somalia. Moreover, in Somalia, there were problems between the
advocators of Marxism-Leninism and the moderate pro-west groups. These internal
political divisions in Somalia reduced the speed of Barry to invade and incorporate the
Somali inhabiting lands under Ethiopia‘s jurisdiction. Subsequently, the newly
established military government of Ethiopia got enough time to counterbalance the
move of Barry‘s government against Ethiopia by shifting its policy towards Somalia
from appeasement to a more aggressive policy of subversion.298
The third element that delayed the move of Barry to invade Ethiopia was the influence
of Arab countries. From the sub-Saharan African countries Somalia is one of the
members of the Arab League and when the Arab League made Somalia its member in
1973, one of the expectations was to liberate Somalia from the influence of Soviet
Union oriented Marxist-Leninist political thought. However, the authority of Said Barry
was not in a position to reject the Marxist-Leninist ideology, rather, the government of
Barry began arresting individuals and groups that oppose the political thought of his
government. Particularly the punishment of Barry on religious teachers that oppose
Marxism-Leninism disappointed some Arab countries such as Saudi. It is apparent that
the surrounding Arab countries worried about the superpower cold war competition
over the strategic passage of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions. The worry of the
surrounding Arab states emanated from security reason that the power competition
might trigger war between superpowers. As a result, Barry delayed the war with
Ethiopia first to secure full support from different Arab countries such as Saudi.299
The fourth factor that can be taken as an obstacle for the fast move of Barry to declare
war against Ethiopia and to annex the Somali inhabiting land from Ethiopia was
stemmed from the refusal of Barry‘s nearest ally, the Soviet Union. During the period,
the Soviet Union dominated different sectors within the government of Barry from the
office of the president to the lowest administrative hierarchy as an advisor and technical
supporter. Thereby, the influence of Soviet in the government of Barry made Somalia as
a Soviet satellite state in the HoA. In the same vein, until the interruption of their
298 Ibid.
299ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of
Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
109
relationship on November 13, 1977, the lion share of the external economic and military
support to Barry‘s government came from Moscow. Since it was under a state of
ideological competition with the west to expand Marxism-Leninism to East African
countries including Ethiopia the Soviet was not interested to see Barry fighting with
Ethiopia with the weapons donated by the Soviet Russia. Rather, the Soviet tried to
lobby both Ethiopia and Somalia to stop the rivalry and to follow scientific socialism.300
On the other hand, Soviet Russia had also worried that the invasion of Somalia against
Ethiopia with the weapons donated by the Soviet would affect the acceptance and
popularity of the ideology advocated by Soviet Russia and its ally states. As a result, to
the surprise of Barry, Moscow go to the extent of giving sharp warning not to invade
Ethiopia and in the case of violation of the order, the Soviet threatened to stop or
remove its support to the government of Barry. This position of the Soviet created a
period of ―no peace no war‖ for some time between the two hostile neighboring states
of the Horn region (i.e. Ethiopia and Somalia). So, the warning of Soviet Russia was
successful in delaying the move of Barry to invade Ethiopia because the authority of
Barry, which was highly dependent on Moscow, was not bold enough to go to war
against Ethiopia violating the warning of the Soviets.301
On the other hand, politically, Somalia was one of the active members of the OAU and
UN and afraid of the international agreements that she signed on the UN and OAU
charters that strongly oppose the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of
member states. So, international law by itself had its own share in delaying Barry‘s plan
to invade Ethiopia.302
The fifth point that delayed the move of Somalia to invade Ethiopia in the mid-1970s
was, even though, Somalia got different kinds of weapons either through purchase or
donation there was lack of trained manpower to manipulate and use the weapons. The
300 ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of Ogaden and
intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
301ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, ―A general study report about the security of
Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia‖ (December 20, 1976).
302 Ibid.
110
training of manpower took some time and delayed its fast move to all-out war against
Ethiopia.303
The last but not the least element that delayed the move of Somalia to declare war
against Ethiopia was the lack of confidence from the Somalia high ranking army
officials on organizational and psychological readiness within the army to declare allout
war against Ethiopia. For instance, the capacity of providing ammunition to the war
fronts was believed insufficient by military expertise because of lack of vehicles as well
as resources to be transported. Likewise, from the total number of armed tanks, onefourth
was not giving function because of lack of spare parts. The hot climatic condition
of the area also, to some extent, exposed weapons and tanks for technical problems and
hindered them to give the expected service.304 The cumulative effect of the above
points, in turn, delayed the move of Barry to attack Ethiopia and the authority of
Ethiopia got time to prepare for the war.
2.4.2. Project Reconciliation
When Barry‘s plan to invade Ethiopia was delayed by the above-mentioned factors he
introduced a new destabilization plan against Ethiopia. Accordingly, to frustrate the
technocrats of Ethiopia, the authority of Somalia in collaboration with internal
opposition groups employed kidnapping government experts at different levels. The
kidnapping and sometimes killing of government officials were high at the Ogaden
region in particular. There were also confiscation and burning of properties of
politicians, police officials, ordinary members of the community, and other civil
servants.305
So, how the Ethiopian authority tried to react to the destabilization and insurgency
activities of Barry? The Ethiopian authority tried to counterbalance the new disruption
policy of Barry through introducing a new approach called ―Project Reconciliation‖ on
March 18, 1976. Accordingly, Ethiopia shifted its policy approach towards Somalia
from the policy of contentment and appeasement to the policy of disruption and
destabilization. Initially, the authority of Dergu tried their best to resolve the problem
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
111
with Somalia in diplomatic ways. Meaning, the military government of Ethiopia, Dergu,
first tried to employ a diplomatic means for the problem with Somalia because as stated
above the new military government in Ethiopia was busy fighting internal opposition
groups such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Western Somalia Liberation
Front (WSLF), the Somalia Abo Liberation Front (SALF), the Tigrayan People‘s
Liberation Fronts (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Apparently, the
Ethiopian authority was not ready to go to war with the government of Said Barry
before settling the internal problems. As a result, in January 1976 peace talk was
arranged at Addis Ababa between General Teferi Benti, the chairman of Dergu, and
General Said Barry. The peace talk was arranged looking peaceful solution for the
problem.306
In the January 1976 peace talks between General Teferi and General Barry, the former
raised the issue of a confederation between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the same tone,
Teferi asked the restoration of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level; the
restoration of a fighter jet that was crashed in Somalia during the time of training and;
the removal of the provocative propaganda from the foreign diplomacy of Somalia that
depict Ethiopia as ―black colonialist‖. While Barry showed the readiness to rebuild
relations with Ethiopia, he ignored Ethiopia‘s proposals on the areas of formation of
confederation, restoration of the Ethiopian fighter jet that crashed in Somalia. Barry also
did not show positive attitude to avoid the wrong depiction of Ethiopia as ―colonialist‖.
From the disinterested gesture of Barry on the progress of the peace talk the Ethiopian
authority well understood the interest of Somaia to give solution for the question of
Ogaden by force of the army. Later, by mid-1976 the government of Barry began
stationing its army on the border area between the two countries, particularly, at Degob,
in Qabradahar district.307
Subsequently, before going to all-out war against Somalia, the Ethiopian authority tried
to strengthen and further follow up on the implementation and effectiveness of the
March 1976 project reconciliation against the government Somalia. The March 1976
306ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02, ―Project Reconciliation‖ (March 18, 1976);
Paul B. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1991), p.143.
307Belete Belachew Yihun, ―Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from
―Containment‖ to ―Destabilization,‖ 1977–1991,‖ Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol. 8, No. 4
(2014), p.679.
112
project reconciliation was a strategy prepared to counterbalance the subversive activity
of Barry against Ethiopia by employing the same tactic to destabilize the government of
Somalia by supporting and organizing different groups that had different ideological,
political, and tribal background with Barry. Project reconciliation was a program which
was planned eather to weaken or to remove the government of Barry and to substitute
him with other moderate government that would accept the territorial integrity of
Ethiopia and other neighboring states, such as Kenya. In the policy of project
reconciliation, the authority of Ethiopia had also involved Kenya whenever necessary.
308
Project reconciliation was organized with eight committee members that were directly
answerable to the head of the state (president of the country). The committee was
chaired by the foreign minister of the country. The other members of the committee
were the minister of defense, the minister of the interior affair, the director of
intelligence office, the director of public security, the director of the central cabinet of
the country, the director of border region development office, the director of African
affairs, and the vice director of the African affairs.309
The committee members of project reconciliation enrolled a meeting once in a week at
the office of the minister of foreign affairs and try to evaluate the development of the
project. The general membership of the project employed a general meeting every six
months to evaluate the development and to correct and improve some of the principles
of the project based on the dynamics of interactions between Ethiopia and Somalia. For
that matter, one of the segments of project reconciliation was giving financial support
for the opposition groups of Barry‘s government. The financial support was released
with the joint permission of the minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and
minister of interior. Once the fund was released the usage of the financial support by
Barry‘s opposition groups was supervised by the committee of the project. In addition,
during financial, material and armament aid the general condition of opposition factions
and their link with other countries and organizations outside Ethiopia was also
investigated in depth. In the same token, during recruiting members and providing
308ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary, 17.2.26.8.02, ―Project Reconciliation‖ (March 18, 1976).
309 Ibid.
113
support, project reconciliation highly worked in differentiating political immigrants,
insurgent spy groups of Barry, and civilian immigrants. After differentiating the
political immigrants from the civil one and the spy, the project worked on giving
political indoctrination and military training. After that, the trained insurgent groups
infiltrated back home as political and military factions against the government of Barry.
Particularly the rapprochement of Ethiopia to the northern Somalia rebel groups helped
to divert the attention of Said Barry from Ethiopia to its own internal problem.310
Apparently, the committee members of the project agreed to open office and training
center in Ethiopia to train opposition groups of Barry extensively. The training was
helpful to the Somalia opposition groups to understand how to open a propaganda
campaign against the government of Barry. The project had also worked on instigating
political division within Somalia by magnifying the tribal division, ideological
difference, and economic discrepancy among the Somali. Likewise, whenever necessary
and possible the project had also invited and involved Kenya as a supporter of the
project in marginalizing and destabilizing the government of Barry.311
On the other hand, based on the principle of project reconciliation, those opposition
groups that got support from Ethiopia had also had a responsibility to help Ethiopia in
giving information about the situation and activity of the ELF and the army of Somalia.
During the implementation of project reconciliation, the Ethiopian authority had
established a mechanism of strict follow-up and intelligence work against the Somalia
opposition groups that got support from Ethiopia. This was done to avoid the negative
counter impact of the project against Ethiopia and to made opposition groups under the
control of Ethiopia.312
In addition to project reconciliation, it is vital to remark again that in January 1976
rapprochement platform was arranged to solve the boundary and political problem
between the two countries. During the period, as stated above, Barry was invited to
310ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary, 17.2.26.8.02, ―Project Reconciliation‖ (March 18, 1976);
ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978).
311ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02―Project Reconciliation‖ (March 18, 1976);
ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978).
312 ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02, ―Project Reconciliation‖ (March 18, 1976).
114
Addis Ababa by General Teferi Banti. But the rapprochement project was failed
because of the lack of interest on the side of Barry. The other factor that halted the
January 1976 accord was lack of readiness on both sides to bring into practice their
words on some of the issues they agreed like the resumption of diplomatic discussion.
After that, during the visit of the higher Ethiopian delegates under the leadership of
Colonel Mengistu to Soviet Russia on May 4, 1977 the Russian authority proposed the
idea of a diplomatic solution for the boundary problem between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Subsequently, the Ethiopian delegate at Moscow accepted the peace proposal from
Russia in principle but presented a precondition that rapprochement with Somalia would
be true if and only if Somalia became ready to renounce its territorial claim over
Ogaden and respect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.313
At other time, in May 1977, the Cuban President Fidel Castro tried to settle the problem
between Colonel Menigistu Hailemariyam and General Barry at the port city of Aden,
in south Yemen. In this meeting, Abdul Fattah Ismael, the leader of the leading party of
South Yemen, was also involved as a negotiator together with President Castro. During
the progress of the negotiation talk both Ethiopia and Somalia failed to show flexibility
concerning Ogaden. Particularly Barry showed his readiness to take Ogaden through
military might. On its part, Ethiopia also strongly condemned and rejected the territorial
claim of Somalia.314 Consequently, the May 1977 peace talks at Aden was aborted. At
the end of the Aden peace talk General Barry remarked Colonel Mengistu ―to have a
nice war‖.315 The incident at Aden cleared all parties in the negotiation the inevitability
of full-scale war between Ethiopia and Somalia.
2.4.3. The Ogaden War (1977-1978)
A few days after the Aden meeting Somalia attacked the Ethio-Djibouti railway in May
1977 and began extensive military settlement along the border between the two
countries. Ethiopia accused the action of Somalia‘s military stationing along the border
on the fourteenth OAU summit at Libreville, Gabon, that held from July 2 to 5, 1977.
313Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.157; Colin Legum, Bill Lee, William F. Lee, and Zdenek
Cervenka, The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis, (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1979), p. 51;
Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.679; Addis Zemen, ―Colonel Mengistu‘s State Visit to Soviet
Russia‖ (May 4, 1977).
314Selassie, p.111; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.158.
315Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.158.
115
Besides, in the summit, Ethiopia noticed the continuation of the subversive action of
Somalia on the eastern and southern parts of Ethiopia. On its part, Somalia denied
Ethiopia‘s accusation and strengthened its territorial assertion over Ogaden. Finally, the
government of Barry declared a full-scale war against Ethiopia on July 23, 1977. The
invasion was accompanied by aircraft and tanks. Ethiopia immediately appealed and
disclosed the issue to the OAU and the UN to condemn and stop the invasion of
Somalia on Ethiopia. Besides, Ethiopia insisted on the UN and OAU to denounce the
illegality of the irredentist move of the government of Barry that was working to
undermine the territorial integrity of multinational Ethiopia.316
On the other hand, the Ethiopian authority ordered its diplomats at different parts of the
world to disseminate the issue of the illegal invasion of Somalia over Ethiopia to the
international community. In addition, diplomats were ordered to report the reaction they
got from the international community. In the meantime, Ethiopia requested the OAU to
call for an emergency meeting of the council of ministers of the OAU. Keeping constant
these all activities of Ethiopia, the government of Somalia denied the allegation of
Ethiopia and Barry asserted that the war was between Western Somalia Liberation Front
(WSLF) and Ethiopia.317 Barry also states that ―although his Government provided
'moral, political and diplomatic support' to the guerrilla group, known as the Western
Somali Liberation Front [WSLF], Somalia did not and would not give the rebels
weapons or training‖.318 Apparently, when the Somalia minister of interior, Abdilkastm
Salad Hassan, asked about the source of the downed MIG‘s and broken tanks that has
the Somalia mark in Ogaden he stated that ―We don't give them tanks or airplanes
because we don't have enough for ourselves‖.319 This systematic retreat by Barry was
done to escape from the criticisms, and pressure of international organizations.
Somalia had also appealed to the UN to interfere and resolve the territorial controversy
between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, the Ethiopian authorities were not happy with
316ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp. 158-159.
317ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); John Darnton, ―In Ogaden War, Exaggeration as Weapon,‖ The New York Times
(February 25, 1978), p.5; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.159.
318Pranay B. Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks with Ethiopia,‖ The New York Times (June 30, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/30/world/somalia-calls-for-talks-with-ethiopia.html, Section A, p.3.
319Darnton, ―In Ogaden War,‖ p.5.
116
the appeal of Somalia to the UN because during the time the major western powers in
the UN such as U.S.A, Britain, France, and Italy did not have good relation with
Ethiopia. The poor relation of Ethiopia with the above mentioned western powers was
emanated from the change of side by the Ethiopian authority from the western line of
the political approach to the Marxist-Leninist line.320
Consequently, Ethiopia refused Barry‘s proposal that invite the intervention of the UN
Security Council to see the boundary issue between Ethiopia and Somalia. In return,
Ethiopia proposed to resolve the boundary problem by the continental organization,
OAU. Subsequently, the OAU recalled the Good Offices Commission at Libreville,
Gabon, from August 5 to 8, 1977. The Good Office Commission at Libreville decided
the conflicting parties (i.e. Ethiopia and Somalia) to respect the 1964 Cairo declaration
and the principles of the OAU charter.321 According to the Cairo declaration, the
existing colonial boundaries of the Africa nationals are honored and respected as the
boundaries of the newly independent African countries.322
In addition, the Good Offices Commission called the two parties to end hostile relations
and to respect the territorial integrity of each other. The commission also condemned
the involvement of extra continental powers such as Cuba and Soviet Russia on the side
of Ethiopia as well as the U.S.A, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt on the
side of Somalia. Yet, the recommendations of the Good Offices Commission were not
implemented by both parties.323
In September 1977, the army of Somalia made its deepest penetration into the territory
of Ethiopia and controlled one of the strategically important towns of the Ogaden
region, Jijiga. Subsequently, the Ethiopian authority decided to interrupt the diplomatic
efforts and give up the diplomatic process to resolve the problems between the two
countries. Eventually, Ethiopia ordered the evacuation of Somalia‘s diplomatic staffs
from Addis Ababa within forty-eight hours. This situation further complicated the issue
320Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.160-161.
321ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister of Interior) to
Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Fasehun, P.191; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.161.
322Donna R. Jackson, ―The Ogaden War and the Demise of Détente,‖ The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 632 (2010), p.28.
323Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (Yale University Press, 2009),
p.204; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.161.
117
of the two countries. In the meantime, Ethiopia strengthened its military deployment on
the border area. The Ethiopian authority had also tried to strengthen the intelligence
work and motivated the people of Ethiopia to defend their country from foreign
enemies. The propaganda wing was also given the task of portraying the action of
Somalia as an irredentist and expansionist action.324
On the other hand, in November 1977, the authority of Somalia declared the
interruption of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Russia which was
signed in 1971. The interruption was done for two reasons: i) to gather approval at home
(at domestic level) and to get support from its international allies that requested Barry to
stop relation with the Soviet and; ii) to show the opposition of Somalia for the growing
relationship between Ethiopia and Soviet Russia. The action of Somalia switched the
table to the advantage of Ethiopia because the Soviet together with its ally Cuba had
started to deliver unlimited military, logistic, technical and financial support to
Ethiopia.325
When the Soviets switched side to Ethiopia the balance of the strength of the army was
also shifted to Ethiopia. For instance, in its February 25, 1978 edition The New York
Times reported that there were more than 3,000 Cuban and Soviet military personals in
Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. But from this number Ethiopia used to confirm only
450. To narrow military and logistic delivery gap, even if, Somalia managed to get
support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran the heavy support and involvement that
came to Ethiopia from the Cuban troops and Soviet Russian enabled Ethiopia to break
and crash and eventually clear all forces of Somalia from the territory of Ethiopia.
Ultimately, even if, Barry denied the presence of his army on the land of Ethiopia at the
beginning of the Ogaden war, on March 9, 1978 Barry officially declared the
withdrawal of all forces of Somalia from Ethiopia. The defeat of Barry at the battle of
Ogaden highly affected his legacy and political acceptance at home. Yet, on the other
324ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister of Interior) to
Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Michael T. Kaufman, ―Ethiopian Diplomat Says Somalia Gains,‖
The New York Times (August 10, 1977), p.8, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/10/archives/ethiopiandiplomat-
says-somalia-gains-wide-sweep-by-enemy-is.html; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖
pp.161-162.
325Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p. 28989; Darnton, ―In
Ogaden War,‖ p.5; Woodwell, p.115.
118
side, the political acceptance of Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia boosted.326 The
authorities of Kenya, which were an active participant on the side of Ethiopia during the
Ogaden war, got pleased for the victory of Ethiopia. For instance, President Moi of
Kenya paid a state visit to Ethiopia in 1979 and expressed his countries sense of
belongingness to the Ogaden war victims in the following way: ―To sacrifice oneself in
the defense of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is an extremely noble and
honorable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep love for one's country and its
future‖.327
Consequently, shortly after the end of the Ogaden war, the domestic politics of Somalia
became under the state of crisis because of the growth of opposition against Barry from
different corners. The domestic opposition against Barry after the battle of Ogaden was
expressed in the following three ways: First, dissatisfied military officials plotted an
unsuccessful coup attempt against Barry in April 1978. The coup maker accused Barry
in abuse of his power and sending tribes to fight and die during the Ogaden war other
than Barry‘s own tribe (Marehan). Running an absolute dictatorship and poor
management at the Ogaden war was also the other accusation of the coup maker against
Barry. The April coup attempt was organized by the military officials under the
orchestration of Colonel Muhammed Sheikh, who was the leader of the air force. The
authority of Somalia accused the extended hands of Ethiopia for the coup plot. The
April 1978 coup plot was reversed by the loyal army from the tribe which Barry
belongs. But the coup plot subsequently triggered clan-based conflict and ―civil war‖ in
Somalia. Thus, even though the April coup attempt was unsuccessful, it laid the ground
for the later era clan oriented internal confrontation and power competition in
Somalia.328
The second way of domestic opposition against Barry‘s administration following the
Ogaden war was expressed in the defection of government officials from their posts at
different levels. In the defection process ambassadors and diplomats at different
326Woodwell, p.115; Darnton, ―In Ogaden War,‖ p.5; Paul Henze, Rebel and Separatists in Ethiopia:
Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985), p.56.
327Adar, p.247.
328David D. Laitin, ―The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History,‖ The
Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 17, No. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.95; Woodwell,
p.115; Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation‖ (December 1979).
119
countries as well as higher government officials working at domestic governmental
hierarchy and military officials were involved. For instance, Hussein Dualeh, Somalia‘s
ambassador to Kenya defected in 1978. Abdullahi En Loye defected in 1980 while
serving as Somalia‘s ambassador in Djibouti. In 1980, Somalia‘s ambassador to the
U.S.A, Mohammed Warsame Ali defected. This defection of ambassadors and
diplomats put the government and foreign diplomacy of Barry under apprehension.
Later those prominent political figures that defected and flied Somalia established their
own political parties abroad to struggle Barry and the Ethiopian authority tried to use
these groups against Barry‘s Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP).329
The third way of opposition that further complicated and aggravated the domestic
political situation of Barry‘s government during the post-Ogaden war was the
emergence of different political organizations to topple Barry using armed forces. Some
of these organizations were the Somalia National Movement (SNM); the Somalia
Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF); the Somalia Workers Party (SWP) and; the
Somalia Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF). Particularly the interaction of Ethiopia
with the SSDF and SNM was very remarkable.330
Here, it is vital to note that the SSDF was formed in 1979. It was led by Lieutenant
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was participated in the unsuccessful coup
attempt of April 1978. Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was also the commander of
Somalia‘s army during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and he commanded the Somalian army
during Somalia‘s occupation of the town of Jijiga. The other important personality that
worked in SSDF was Dr. Hussen Ali Mirah, who served as minister of education. Still,
there were other individuals that had a role within the SSDF such as Dr. Mussa Farah
and Mustapha Ali Nur who were the ambassadors of Somalia in Egypt and broadcast
worker at BBC (the British Broadcasting Corporation) respectively.331
In 1981 the SSDF incorporated and united with two other opposition parties- the
Somalia Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF) and the Somali Workers Party (SWP) to
form a new party called Democratic Front for the Salivation of Somalia (DFSS).
329Harry Ododa, ―Somalia‘s Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden war of 1977-78,‖
Middle Eastern Studies Vol.21, No.3 (Taylor and Francis Publisher, 1985), pp.285-286.
330Ibid, p.186.
331Ododa, p.186; Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Somalia, Vol. 33 (April 1987), p.35042.
120
Somalia National Movement (SNM) which was reorganized in April 1981 in London
and largely dominated by members from the Issaq clan was also the other dominant
opposition party against Barry. The first chairman of SNM was Ahmed Mohammed
Khalid, who was a businessman that actively participated in the Somalia politics since
decolonization and finally became the founder and leader of SNM. Sheikh Yusuf
Sheikh Ali Madar was the vice-chairperson of SNM. There were also other prominent
figures that involved in SNM like Hassan Adan Wadadi, who was Somalia‘s
ambassador to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Ahmed Ismael Abdi who was
Somalia‘s minister of planning from 1965 to 1967 can also be taken as an important
figure in the movement of SNM. So, Ethiopia in collaboration with Kenya tried to
approach these important figures to weaken the government of Barry and to establish a
government that would accept the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Kenya. The
initiation of Kenya to involve on the support of anti-Barry opposition groups were
stemmed from the re-emergence of Mogadishu based shifta activities in the NFD
between 1980 and1981.332
On the other hand, opposition groups against the government of Barry began
propaganda broadcasts, diplomatic campaigns, and guerrilla operations based on the
financial, military and material aid they got from Ethiopia, Kenya and other countries
that had ill relations with Barry. Particularly the guerrilla activity increased following
the rejection of the recommendations of the OAU Good Office Commission by Barry in
1980.333
To avert the propaganda campaign and guerrilla operations the government of Barry
reacted in different ways. These includes: i) arranging and organizing the same kind of
guerrilla activity against Ethiopia; ii) the second reaction of Barry was organizing
diplomatic campaigns against Ethiopia in a new form; iii) the last action of Barry to
settle internal opposition and to undermine the destabilization activity of Ethiopia
332Ododa, p.286; Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Somalia, Vol. 33 (April 1987), p.35042; Adar,
p.113.
333Ododa, p.287.
121
against his government was done through promulgating a new constitution, declaration
of a state of emergency and shaking up his cabinet.334
On the other hand, Barry tried to address his remarks of dialogue of the real sincerity
with Ethiopia to solve the issue between the two nations. Yet, the Ethiopian authority
did not trust the proposal of Barry because Ethiopia suspected the peace proposal of
Barry was stemmed from ulterior motive to buy time to abort the growing political
opposition from groups such as SNM and SSDF. Likewise, the Ethiopian authority
believed that the peace proposal of Barry was emanated to get enough time to recover
the economic problem and to reorganize the army. In the meantime, the Ethiopian
authority proposed that if the peace talk was from his heart let Barry first renounce his
territorial claim over Ethiopia and recognize the territorial integrity of Ethiopia
unconditionally.335 Yet, Barry failed to do this and the peace proposal was aborted.
2.5. Post Ogaden War Diplomatic Efforts to Iron out the Ethio-Somalia Dispute
(1979-1991)
Concerning the unilateral efforts to resolve the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia,
there were attempts by countries such as Italy, Uganda, and Madagascar. However, the
mediation efforts were not fruitful because of i) the reluctance of the Ethiopian authority
for peace talks following the victory of the Ogaden war; ii) the preconditions presented
by Ethiopia such as unequivocal territorial recognition from Somalia and; iii) the
unwavering stand of Somalia over Ogaden. Additionally, the demand for Ethiopia to get
compensation for the damage during the Ogaden war had also became a serious obstacle
to find solution to the problem between the two countries. Consequently, the unilateral
efforts of the above mentioned countries to settle the problem became vain.336
Afterward, rather than working and accepting conditions by the Ethiopian authority the
government of Barry preferred to open an extensive diplomatic campaign to isolate and
ostracize Ethiopia from the international community. Accordingly, Somalia
disseminated its diplomatic staffs to different corners and fronts of the world. In relation
to the African front, Somalia tried to approach pro-west countries. On its diplomatic
334Ibid, p.288.
335Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.170-172.
336 Ibid, pp.165-166.
122
campaign on the western front, the Somalia authority tried to magnify the human right
violation and unlawful persecution by the Government of Colonel Mengistu. The
authority of Somalia argued that the unconstitutional act of Mengistu‘s government was
backed by Soviet Russia and Cuba. On the front of the Arab states, Barry tried to use
Somalia‘s membership to the Arab League as leverage to get their belongingness to the
issue of Somalia. The diplomatic campaign to Arab countries was done by sending high
ranking diplomatic staffs under the leadership of ministers. For instance, in May 1979
Omar Arteh Ghalib, who was minister for presidential affairs, visited North Yemen,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. On his visit
Omar called for the need to join efforts against the expansion of communism and
unlawful treatment of peoples including the Somali inhabitants in Ethiopia by the
government of Colonel Mengistu.337
In the same vein, in 1979 President Barry himself visited Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt. The three months tour
of Barry to the Arab world enabled him to win economic and military support on one
side and diplomatic victory against Ethiopia on the other side. Apart the military and
economic significance, the tour of Barry to different Arab countries also brought a
statement of support for Somalia‘s stand to Ogaden and other Somali inhabited lands of
the HoA. For instance, the Islamic conference which was held in the city of Taif, in
Saudi Arabia, in 1981 publicized a resolution that supports the position of Barry over
Ogaden. In response to Barry‘s extensive diplomatic campaign, Ethiopia and Kenya
signed the 1979 treaty of friendship and cooperation.338
During the post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign, the government of Barry had also
gone to the extent of approaching countries like Libya. Here it is vital to remind that the
relation between Libya and Barry was complicated because of the support of Libya to
the government of Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. However, in 1978 President Barry
and Omer Arteh (minister for presidential affairs) visited Libya and tried to soften the
tight diplomatic relations between the two countries. This rapprochement by Barry was
planned to make Libya the collaborator of President Barry and to weaken the diplomatic
337ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, ―The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern
Ethiopia‖ (1978); African Contemporary Records (1978-79), p.386.
338Ododa, pp.292-293; African Contemporary Recordes (1978-79), p.386; Adar, p.176.
123
and material support of Libya to Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the tripartite treaty of friendship
that was signed between Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya in August 1981 retriggered
the hostility between Somalia and Libya. As a result, the rapprochement project of
Barry against Libya failed.339
On the other hand, President Barry was successful in his diplomatic campaign on some
communist countries such as China, North Korea, and Romania. For instance, Barry
invited diplomats from China to visit Mogadishu in 1980 and in the coming year (i.e. in
1981) the diplomatic staff of Barry visited Peking. In the visit, the two countries‘
representatives reflected the idea of strengthening their friendly relations and to
collaborate on the economic and political field. The two sides also condemned the
Soviet intervention on the issue of the countries of the HoA. The friendly reaction of
China was taken as a diplomatic victory for Barry‘s diplomatic campaign on one side
but on the other the action of Barry pushed Soviet and its allies to further attach with
Ethiopia.340
As part of its diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia after the Ogaden war, the
government of President Barry had also tried to strengthen its relationship with the
U.S.A. Accordingly, following the withdrawal of Somalia from the Ogaden war, in
March 1978, the assistant secretary of the U.S on African affairs, Richard Moose, was
invited to Mogadishu to discuss the bilateral relations of the two countries. In the
following year, in December 1979, the government of U.S.A sent its commission to see
the Berbera naval base that was offered by Barry in return for the military and economic
aid. During the period, U.S.A was highly in need of naval facility basis on the coast of
the Gulf of Aden to fill the geopolitical gap on the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, in
August 1980 President Barry signed a military agreement with the U.S.A. As a result of
this agreement, Somalia got $93 million in aid. In May 1981 President Barry made a
private trip to U.S.A and later in March 1981 he made an official trip to the U.S.A.
However, even if, the government of Barry was successful in gating additional military
339Ododa, p.293.
340 Ibid, pp.293-294.
124
and economic aid the response of the U.S in claiming Ogaden as part of Somalia was
not as successful as his expectation.341
As a result, some political elites claimed that the diplomatic relations between U.S.A
and Somalia during the period was accompanied by suspicion of each other. For
instance, in 1981 the minister of information of Somalia mentioned the following about
the relations of the U.S.A and Somalia: ―our relations are like those between two
countries that want to have relations, but are still suspicious of each other‖.342
On the other hand, in 1980 Britain gave two million pounds in economic aid for
Somalia but reserved to give military aid because the government of Kenya had
condemned and campaigned strongly among western countries against providing
military aid to the government of Barry. For instance, in 1978 the then vice president of
Kenya Danel Arap Moi together with other Kenyan delegates undertook a tour to
different western countries including U.S.A and Britain in order to lobby them against
providing military aid to the government of Barry. The lobby of Mio and his diplomatic
staff was somehow successful in some western countries such as Britain and U.S.A.343
On the same way in 1980 France and Italy also gave $20 million and $8.5 million
economic aid respectively to the government of Barry. West Germany also provided
$75 million economic aid for the government of Barry in 1981. The aid from different
countries enabled the government of Barry to rebuild the economy of Somalia which
was harmed during the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. But it was not easy for
Barry to rebuild the military.344
On the other hand, as part of its diplomatic campaign, in the post-Ogaden war, Barry
also had undertaken an extensive tour to West African countries. Some of the West
African countries that were included on the 1981 west African tour of Barry were
Nigeria, Benin, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gambia, Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal.345
341 Ibid.
342Ibid, 295.
343Ododa, pp.290 & 295.
344Ibid, p.295.
345Ibid, p.292.
125
On top of this, Barry had also tried to approach socialist countries, which had strong ties
with Ethiopia. Barry‘s plan on socialist states was either to drag them to his side or to
lobby them to reconcile him with Ethiopia. Some of those socialist countries under the
target of Barry were the government of Ali Nassir Mohammad of South Yemen; the
government of Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar; the government of Chadli Benjedid of
Algeria and; the government of Democratic Republic of Germany. During his
rapprochement, Barry asked these governments to pave the way for the reconciliation of
Somalia with Ethiopia. Yet, the above stated socialist governments replied Barry to
accept the preconditions of Ethiopia without any reservation before the beginning of the
reconciliation process.346
On the other hand, during the post-Ogaden war, Barry had also promulgated a new
constitution for Somalia in 1979. However, Barry‘s new constitution clearly showed
that Barry‘s approach towards the irredentist policy of his government was not changed.
Accordingly, even if the new constitution muted the direct involvement of the
government of Somalia in uniting the Somali inhabiting areas, it ‗reaffirmed‘ the
support of the Somalia government for the coming together of all Somalis under one
government. For instance, article 16 of the 1979 new constitution expressed the
following as a relevant clue about the stand of the Somalia government regarding the
Somali inhabitants of the neighboring countries347: ―The Somali Democratic Republic,
adopting peaceful and legal means, shall support the liberation of Somali territories
under Colonial rule and shall encourage the unity of the Somali people through their
own free will‖.348 This article indicates the unwavering stand of Somalia on its policy of
irredentism. This unwavering stand of Somalia in turn helped to strengthen the Ethio-
Kenyan cooperation while it weakened the diplomatic solution for Somalia‘s problem
with its neighbors.
On the other hand, following the Ogaden war the Somalia authority desired to resume
talks with Ethiopia by proposing the case to be seen by the UN. But, Ethiopia more
capitalized on the importance of regional organization in solving the problem between
the two countries. Consequently, the mandate of solving the problem was transferred to
346Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.166.
347Ododa, p.289; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.166.
348Ododa, p.289.
126
the OAU Good Offices Commission and the commission arranged a peace deal to see
the problem between the two countries.349
Accordingly, following the August 1977 peace deal arrangement by the OAU Good
Office Commission at Libreville, Gabon, the commission tried to arrange another peace
deal between the two countries in March 1978, in April 1978, in July 1978, in June
1980 and in August 1980. The OAU Good Office Commission under the chairmanship
of Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo arranged a meeting and summit at ministerial level to
see the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia from March 16 to 19, 1978 at Nigeria,
Legos. The Ethiopian authority accepted the call of the OAU Good Office Commission
in principle but tactically rejected from involving in the meeting claiming a shortage of
time for preparation. One of the reasons presented by Ethiopia to postpone the call of
the Good Office Commission was the arrival of delegates from different countries to
Ethiopia. But the tactical rejection of the meeting by Ethiopia was not only because of
the lack of enough time to prepare for the meeting. Rather, the victory it scored over
Somalia at the battle of Ogaden had also contributed to the reluctance of the Ethiopian
authority to the call of the Good Office Commission. Later, the OAU Good Office
Commission transferred the meeting at ministerial level to be held at Legos in April
1978. Yet, this meeting was also failed because of its frustration to ―convene
altogether‖.350
Subsequently, the chairperson of the Good Office Commission, General Obasanjo,
raised the issue of the two countries by presenting peaceful reconciliation as a solution
to iron out the two countries‘ frontier complication on the 15th OAU summit held in
Khartoum from July 18-22, 1978.351 Besides, the assembly of heads of state and
government at the Khartoum summit ―APPEALS to the two sister States, Ethiopia and
Somalia to desist from using the mass media and public forums to fan feelings of
hostility towards each other‖.352 The Somalia authority rejected the recommendation of
Obasanjo claiming Obasanjo‘s imbalance treatment between the two countries. Ethiopia
349Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.162-163.
350Africa Portal, ―The 14th OAU Summit Conference at Libreville, Gabon‖ (June/July 1977); Yihun,
―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.163-164.
351Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.164.
352OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG)/Res.90 (XV), Assembly of Heads of States and
Government Fifteenth Ordinary Session, Khartoum, Sudan (July 18-22, 1978).
127
on its part accepted the recommendation of Obasanjo in principle. But, Ethiopian
marked that it would resist accepting the call of the OAU Good Office Commission if
Somalia refused to accept the recommendation of the commission.353
Later, on June 1980 during the 35th meeting of the OAU council of ministers which was
held at Freetown, Sierra Lion, the issue of resolving the Ethio-Somalia conflict was
discussed by the chairperson of the OAU Good Office Commission President Alhaji
Shehu Shagari of Nigeria. The chairman called the eight representatives of the Good
Office Commission members to see the case again. But this time the commission
proposed the removal of the representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia from the meeting.
Afterward, the Ethiopian authority strongly objected the proposal of President Shagari
because Ethiopia was afraid of the unfair or biased recommendation by the committee
with the absence of the Ethiopian representatives. This suspicion of Ethiopia mainly
derived from the recent speech of Nigerian foreign minister in favor of Somalia.
Consequently, the June 1980 peace deal proposal of the OAU Good Office Commission
was postponed once again.354
Subsequently, after critical discussion with the parties in conflict, the OAU Good Office
Communion decided to call a meeting of council of the minister of the Committee of
Good Office Commission. This meeting was held from August 18 to 20 1980 at Legos.
Then, based on the principle on the charter of OAU, the commission decided ―that the
disputed region of Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopia‖.355 In addition, the
commission recommended the two countries to end hostility and resume diplomatic
relations. The Good Office Commission also mentioned that the ground that enabled the
commission to pass such kind of decision was the principle of OAU charter which
support noninterference on the internal affairs of a member state; respecting the national
integrity of member state; respecting the independence of member state; respecting
member states frontier that acquired during independence and; noninvolvement on
destabilizing activities of a member state. The decision of the OAU Good Office
Commission was taken as a good diplomatic victory by the Ethiopian authority.
353 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.164.
354 Fasehun, P.192; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.167.
355 Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.167.
128
Afterward, Ethiopia disseminated the recommendations of the Good Office Commission
to the UN and other countries.356
But, the authority of Somalia unequivocally showed their objection to the decision of
the OAU Good Office Commission. When Somalia opposed the decision of the
commission, Ethiopia further strengthened its subversive activity against Somalia to
influence it to accept the decision of the Commission.357
In the same vein, in 1981, at the 18th ordinary meeting of the OAU, which was held at
Nairobi, Kenya, from June 24 to 27, 1981 the ―OAU adopted the report of the Good
Office Commission‖358 and recommendations. The Somalia authority objected to the
adoption of the Good Office Commission‘s recommendations.359
Despite his objection to the recommendations of the Good Office Commission, on an
interview that he gave in English, President Barry, stated that ''We need cooperation
with Ethiopia in a brotherly way,''… ''Now is the time to find a way out. After our long,
long struggle, there should now be reflection.''360 Apparently, on the same interview
Barry, stated that ―he would 'greatly welcome' initiatives from any of the Western
powers, the United Nations and other African and Arab countries to get the process
going for negotiations with Ethiopia‖.361
On the other hand, the January 1986 Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and
Development (IGADD) inaugural summit at Djibouti, which was held following the
1986 re-election of Barry as president of Somalia for additional seven years, paved an
important step in creating opportunity to discuss and resolve the problem between
Ethiopia and Somalia. The January 1986 talk between Colonel Mengistu and General
Barry was facilitated by President Hassen Guled Abtidon of Djibouti. During the
summit, the head of governments of the two countries was agreed to establish an ad-hoc
committee at the ministerial level to study the basic problem of the two countries from
minor issues to major issues including the frontier question. This was considered a big
356 Ibid, pp.168-169.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid, p.168.
359 Ibid, p.169.
360 Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks,‖ p.3.
361 Ibid.
129
step forward to solve the problem between the two countries. Accordingly, the first adhoc
ministerial committee meeting was held at Addis Ababa from May 6 to 9, 1986.
The second meeting was held at Mogadishu from August 23-26, 1986. The third
meeting of the two countries ministerial ad-hoc committee was conducted again at
Addis Ababa from April 1 to 3, 1987.362
Following the January 1986 Djibouti agreement between Barry and Mengistu to form an
ad-hoc ministerial committee, the Ethiopian authority tried to evaluate the truthfulness
of Somalia‘s peace initiative. This was done because experts in Ethiopia suspected that
the peace initiative of Somalia was temporary just to buy time in order to curtail the
growing insurgency action against the government of Barry by SNM and SSDF.
Likewise, experts claimed that the reason that pushed the government of Barry to
normalize relations with Ethiopia was the growing economic problem in Somalia. So, in
order to benefit from the unstable situation of Somalia, the Ethiopian team led by
Foreign Minister Lt. Col. Goshu Wolde agreed to made the ad-hoc ministerial
diplomatic talk on matters such as border issue, exchange of war prisoners, halting
insurgency activity, halting hostile propaganda advocacy, and reinitiating diplomatic
activity.363
Somalia on its part preferred to begin the ad-hoc diplomatic talk from minor issues like
to build courage, stopping hostile propaganda advocacy, reinitiating diplomatic relations
and exchange of prisoners of wars (POWs). In the mean time, Somalia tried to push the
issue of boundary from the table of diplomatic talk. The refusal of Somalia to discuss
the issue of boundary on the three consecutive ad-hoc ministerial diplomatic talks
disappointed the Ethiopian authority. As a result, the then foreign minister of Ethiopia,
Birhanu Bayeh, on a press statement expressed the sadness of his government for the
unsuccessful move of the two countries ad-hoc committee to reach on any conclusive
agreement on border issue. As stated by the foreign minister (Birihanu), the ground
cause for the ineffectiveness of the ad-hoc committee to reach on conclusive agreement
362Sally Healy, ―Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD‘s Contribution to Regional
Security,‖ Crisis States Working Papers No.2 (2009), P.3; Keesing‘s Contemporary Archive, Somalia
Vol.33 (April, 1987), p.35042.
363Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.172-173.
130
on the boundary issue was stemmed from the interests of the delegates of Somalia to
give priority on subordinate (tangential) issues than the border issue.364
Later, in March 1988, Mengistu and Barry again met at Djibouti with the invitation of
Barry. Despite the two leaders‘ discussion for three days from March 20 to 22, 1988 the
situation was not changed on the subject of boundary demarcation. Afterward, the then
president of Ethiopia, Colonel Mengistu, forwarded the idea of no need for a further
meeting of the two countries‘ ad-hoc ministerial committee. However, the fourth ad-hoc
ministerial meeting was arranged at Mogadishu in April 1988. During the fourth ad-hoc
meeting the issue of the boundary was purposely excluded from the listed agendas.
Subsequently, the two countries reached an agreement on the following three matters i)
the ad-hoc ministerial committee agreed that the agreement was signed based on the
guidelines and principles of the OAU charter.365 Here it is vital to note that, the
acceptance of the idea of the ‗principles of the OAU charter‘ by the authority of
Somalia and the signing of the agreement based on ―the reference to the OAU
principles, particularly of the clause dealing with national integrity and sovereignty‖366
was considered as good progress by the Ethiopian and taken as a change of stands on
the side of Somalia. Because this action of the Somalia was considered as an indirect
acceptance of the 1964 Cairo declaration; ii) the other point of agreement was to
withdrew troops up to 15 kilometers from the frontier; iii) the final point of agreement
was to exchange prisoners of wars and detained persons. The April 1988 agreement was
considered as both diplomatic and legal success for Ethiopia mainly for the indirect
recognition of the principles and charters of OAU by Somalia. The Kenyan also took
the development positively.367
Then, based on the normalization agreement the process to exchange prisoners of wars
began immediately. On top of this, following the April 1988 Mogadishu agreement the
two countries‘ diplomatic correspondence reinitiated instantly. Besides, the weekly
flight of the Ethiopian airline to Mogadishu was resumed. To encourage the
364Kessing‘s Record of World Events, ―Presidential Elections, Government Changes, Budget Foreign
Relations, Activities of Opposition Movements,‖ Kessing’s World News Archives Volume 33 (1987), p.4;
Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.172-173.
365Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ pp.175.
366Ibid, pp.176.
367Ibid, pp.175-176.
131
normalization activity Ethiopia has also ordered the shutdown of the SSDF and the
SNM radio which was also called Radio Halgan or Radio Kulmis. The government of
Mengistu also tried to show its faithfulness to the April 1988 agreement by gathering
together the leaders of the SSDF and the heavy weapons owned by the group.368
Barry on his part withdrew the support for the anti-Ethiopian opposition groups such as
the WSLF, the EPLF, the ELF and the Somalia Abbo Liberation Front (SALF). This
move of Barry was taken as a good step forward by the authority of Ethiopia and
Kenya. However, Barry faced opposition internally for his action. Particularly, the
action taken by Barry against the WSLF disappointed the inhabitants of western
Somalia and many of them considered the action of Barry as a betrayal to the Somali
people. As a result, the incident of April 1988 was believed and hypothetically noticed
that the start of the culmination of Barry‘s rule in Somalia.369
Nonetheless, the temporarily interrupted destabilization activity between the two
countries soon resumed and both parties began allegation one on the other for violation
of the April 1988 Mogadishu agreement. Subsequently, in May 1989 Somalia opened
another phase of diplomatic campaign charging Ethiopia for restarting its support to
anti-Somalia opposition groups such as SNM, SSDF, and the Somalia Patriotic Front
(SPF). The victory of the SNM against the army of Barry in mid-1989 further
complicated the relations of Ethiopia and Somalia.370
Later, in September 1989 the foreign minister of Ethiopia (Berhanu Bayeh) discussed
with the foreign minister of Somalia Dr. Jama Barre on the 44th meeting of the General
Assembly. In their discussion, the two foreign ministers agreed to respect the April
1988 accord. But looking at the political turmoil in Somalia the authority of Ethiopia
was not interested to stop the destabilization activity. Rather, Ethiopia preferred the road
of destabilization to remove the government of Barry from power. For instance, in
October 1990 the second cooperative follow up committee meeting in Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa ended without fruitful results. Later the outbreak of civil war in Mogadishu in
December 1990 and the subsequent fail of the government of Barry to manage the civil
368Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.172-173.
369Ibid, p.173.
370Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p.181.
132
war officially indicated the end of Barry‘s era as well as the end of the unpleasant
diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Subsequently, in 1991 Ali Mahdi
Mohammed (the leader of a party named United Somalia Congress) declared himself as
the interim government of Somalia that led him to confront with Mohamed Farah Aidid.
Mogadishu was divided by the army of Mahdi and Farah. Besides, Somalia was divided
by leaders of different clan-based opposition groups. For instance, Northern Somalia
(present day Somaliland) became under the rule of the Issaq clan; Mogadishu and its
surrounding became under the domination of the Hawiye clan; Southern part of Somalia
became under the domination of the Somalia Patriotic Front (SPF) and Ogaden clan.371
As a result, ―Ethiopia had successfully attained its policy of destabilizing and
weakening Somalia‖.372
Keeping constant all the above dynamics, the boundary issue between Ethiopia and
Somalia failed to get a solution. As a result, the boundary between Ethiopia and
Southern Somalia (Italian Somaliland) remains without being demarcated until this day.
Therefore, the irredentist approach of Somalia which is considered as a security threat
by Ethiopia is not yet permanently alleviated and might recur at some point in the
future.
371Eva M. Bruchhaus and Monika M. Sommer, Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make
Sense of Conflict (Berlin: LIT, 2008), p.29; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p. 184.
372Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics,‖ p. 186.
133
CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHIOPIA-KENYA COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS (1960-1991)
In this chapter it is intended to answer questions like how the cooperation between
Ethiopia and Kenya evolved or how and what historical, political, security and
geopolitical factors determine the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya
from1960 to1991. Likewise, how Somalia reacted to the cooperation between Ethiopia
and Kenya is also a point in focus during the discussion of the Ethio-Kenya political
relations.
It is understood that historical factors like the support of Ethiopia to Kenya during the
Kenyan Mau Mau anti-colonial movement and the support of Kenya to the Ethiopian
patriots during the 1935 Italian aggression of Ethiopia helped the two countries to
develop sense of cooperation in the early age. Concomitantly, in the political field the
pro-west political outlook of both Ethiopia and Kenya up until 1974 and the common
stands of both countries in OAU in relation to maintain colonial boundary and territorial
integrity had also helped the two states to develop cooperative front. Likewise, the
common stand of the two states against the irredentist policy of Somalia to secure their
territorial integrity also helped Ethiopia and Kenya to cooperate against the ‗common
enemy‘, Somalia. Therefore, one of the common standing points for the cooperation
between Ethiopia and Kenya was the issue of security that emanated from the irredentist
political thought of Somalia. Regarding geopolitical factor both Ethiopia and Kenya are
found in the HoA sharing common peaceful boundaries as well as Kenya is one of the
outlets to the sea to Ethiopia through Mombasa port. Under other conditions, even if it
was not yield fruit the authority of Somalia had tried to isolate Kenya from cooperating
with Ethiopia by showing positive gesture to Kenya. While undertaking the examination
of the Ethiopia-Kenya political relation, the reaction of Somalia to the cooperation of
the Ethio-Kenyan political front is considered in this chapter.
Taking in to consideration the shadow against their territorial integrity from the
common enemy, the cooperative political relations between Ethiopia and Kenya
between 1960 and 1991 is not something unexpected that creates the feeling of mild
astonishment or shock. During the period covered by this study, the relationship that
was existed between Ethiopia and Kenya was conditioned by shared regional and local
134
issues. Concomitantly, the materialization of anti-colonialism together with the common
stands of the two countries in encouraging the unity of Africa as well as the alike
political position and role of the two countries in various international organizations
also helped to strengthen the two states cooperative relationship. Moreover, the
adherence of the two countries for territorial integrity of post independent Africa,
accepting colonial boundaries as a legal boundary of the newly independent Africa as
well as advocating the concept of peaceful coexistence and reciprocal support cemented
the relationship of the two countries with unwavering base.373
That being the case, as historical and political examinations of the two countries
indicated during the second half of the twentieth century, despite divergent or distinct
colonial experience, ideological differences and change of administrators the two
countries relationship remained unchanged. As stated before, for this unwavering
historical and political relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya the issue of security,
peaceful boundary diplomacy, personal diplomacy, and historical reasons had key
positions. When we come to the matter of security as a means and factor for the
cooperation of the two states, it was largely emanated from the territorial assertion or
irredentism of Somalia over Ethiopia and Kenya. Concerning the peaceful boundary
diplomacy and geopolitical factor, both Ethiopia and Kenya are part of the HoA region
sharing a peaceful border. Thereby, the relative peaceful boundary helped the two states
to promote cooperative interaction than the hostile one. Likewise, Kenya is one of the
countries in the region of the Horn that give an outlet to the sea to Ethiopia. There was
also trade and security interdependence between Ethiopia and Kenya. Thus, these
interdependences had helped the two countries to cooperate one-another.374
The other historical condition that had helped for the growth of the later period twine
together relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was the cooperation of the two
countries during the 1935 Italian aggression over Ethiopia. Accordingly, during the
unlawful aggression of Italy over Ethiopia, the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta,
unequivocally condemned the action of Italy and employed a political campaign against
the action of Italy. Likewise, during the era, many patriots from Ethiopia flied to Kenya
373Kassa Miheret, ―A Survey of Ethio-Kenyan Relations‖ (Addis Ababa University Department of
Scientific Communism, 1989), p.1.
374 Onyango, pp.194-195.
135
to get military bass and training. The Kenyans also helped the Ethiopian patriots by
providing several training camps that had remarkable contributed to resist and launch a
guerrilla resistance against the fascist forces in Ethiopia.375
From the perspective of political culture both Ethiopia and Kenya had a common
position in OAU, UN, and non-aligned movement on issues such as territorial integrity,
sovereignty of state and non-interference on affairs of the other state. Likewise, Ethiopia
and Kenya clearly showed their position against the racist apartheid regime in South
Africa. These common positions between Ethiopia and Kenya had originated from the
mutual security threat and challenges against their territorial integrity that in turn helped
to strengthen their relationship.376
On the other hand, the similar pro-west ideological advocacy by the government of
President Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase I together with the consensus of the
two states to maintain the statuesque on the area of colonial boundary helped to promote
the multifaceted cooperation between the two states. Keeping constant all the point
stated above, the personal diplomacy of the two countries heads of states (i.e. Jomo
Kenyatta of Kenya and Hailesilase I of Ethiopia) had also a notable role in the
institutionalization of the relationship of the two countries.377
Therefore, during the period covered by this study, the cooperative relations between
Ethiopia and Kenya was shaped by the issues of security, peaceful boundary diplomacy,
joint cross border planning and geopolitical proximity which were strengthened by the
presence of elements such as: i) The common stand and position by Ethiopia and Kenya
against the irredentist policy of Somalia and the advocacy of Greater Somalia scheme;
ii) the determination of Ethiopia and Kenya to the fundamental principles such as
collective security, non-alignment, collaboration (détente) and peace; iii) the presence of
similar pro-west ideological setup by both countries, particularly with the U.S.A up
until 1974; iv) the similar feature of personal diplomacy employed by President
375 Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation‖ (December 1979); Miheret, p.2.
376 Tena Betiru, ―Ethio-Kenya Border Relation‖ (Addis Ababa University, 1989), p.8; Miheret, p.7.
377 Miheret, p.7.
136
Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase and; v) the shared objectives and policy approach
employed by both countries in international organizations such as the UN and OAU.378
3.1. National Survival and Security Issues for the Ethio-Kenya Cooperative
Interaction
The close relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1960s, 1970s up to
1980s was accompanied by different course of events that helps the two countries to
develop a joint position. At the back of geographical, historical, political, natural,
cultural and social conditions that can be taken as conceivable factors for the
relationship of the two states, there was a consequential conditions for the growth of
trustful relations between the two countries that derived from issue of the security of the
two countries.379
One of the matter that helped to strengthen the security cooperation of the two countries
relation was the historical reality in the mid-20th century or before during the Kenyan
colonial resistance movement against the British rule. During the anticolonial resistance
movement, Ethiopia was one of the countries that respond quickly for the call of the
Kenyan patriot by providing practical assistance to overcome Kenya from the yoke of
colonization. The anti-colonial assistance and cooperation had helped to develop sense
of trust and collaboration between the two countries during the upcoming later eras.380
The dynamics of change and continuity of the national, regional, sub-regional,
continental and extra-continental political and historical situations that threaten the
national status of Ethiopia and Kenya had also helped to promote the common position
between Kenya and Ethiopia which was tasted under different conditions. The situation
had also helped for the development of security cooperation of the two countries that
derives from a common desire for survival. For instance, after the official inauguration
of the establishment of the Republic of Somalia in 1960 by the unification of the British
Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland the authority of Somalia stated that the foreign
policy of Somalia would mainly focus on uniting the Somali inhabited regions of the
378 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
379 Betiru, p.8; Miheret, p.7.
380Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation‖ (December 1979); Betiru, p.8;
Miheret, p.7.
137
Horn region under one rule. In order to legitimatize this idea the new constitution of
Somalia which was promulgated in 1960 on its Article 6 (4) stats that; ―the Somali
Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali
territories‖.381 This advocacy of Somalia in turn triggered sense of insecurity on the
neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya where a large number of Somali speaking community
inhabited and lead them to look a cooperation front against Somalia.
In the 1962 Lancaster House Conference at London where the representative of
delegates of the NFD proposed the idea of secession, which was against the interest of
KADU and KANU, Ethiopia showed its support for Kenya by putting pressure on the
authority of Britain opposing the idea of secession. During the period, Ethiopia tried to
convince the government of Britain not to allow the secessionist proposal asserting the
idea was bad example that would balkanize the continent of Africa.382 This tactical
support of Ethiopia to Kenya had helped for the later era security cooperation of the two
countries.
The Ethio-Kenyan security bond more strengthened and got diplomatic feature
following the formal independence of Kenya from the colonial rule of Britain. One of
the issues that helped the two countries to strengthen their relationship during the postcolonial
era was the growth of threat against their national status and survival. So, the
common threat triggered the matter of security cooperation amid the two states.
However, this does not mean that there was no relationship between the two states
before this time.383
Therefore, the common position and cooperation which was created between Ethiopia
and Kenya throughout the period of this study is emanated from the meeting of national
interests. At last the shared interest between Ethiopia and Kenya together with the
security threat that related with the growth of irredentist approach of Somalia and the
growth of continental and extra continental powers support to Somalia‘s idea of
381Onyango, p.157.
382Castagno, pp.176-177; Otunnu, pp.21-22.
383Miheret, p.2.
138
irredentism leads the two countries to sign the July 13, 1963 treaty of defense and
security co-operation at Addis Ababa.384
3.2. The 1963 Defense Pact
The 1963 mutual defense agreement was signed with the aim of stopping the irredentist
campaign of Somalia and to send message to the supporters of the idea of Somalia‘s
irredentist political approach which was posed against the entire Somali inhabited lands
of the Horn region in general and Ethiopia and Kenya in particular. The bilateral
security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya, which was true by the efforts of the
personal diplomacy of Hailesilase I and Jomo Kenyatta, soon attracted the focus of
regional and continental powers. Particularly, the officialdom of Somalia unequivocally
condemned the bilateral security accord asserting that the accord would bring security
challenge to Somalia in particular and the integrity of Africa at large.385
The July 1963 mutual defense agreement set out that the two countries would organize a
shared and collective armed heads of personals. Likewise, the defense pact was
committed to the idea of territorial integrity and political independence of the two states.
The signatories of the pact had also underlined that the purpose of the agreement was
not intertwined with any ulterior motive but maintaining the peace and security of the
two nations. Concomitantly, the pact necessitated the creation of joint front during time
of external attack from third party against their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Accordingly, the 1963 pact affirmed that an attack and challenge on the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of one country would be considered as an attack on the other.
In the agreement, it was also referred that the one that abrogate its rights are offenders
and answerable for the wrong.386
To undertake armed personnel discussion and to further discuss on the defense pact the
Ethiopian minister of defense, Major General Iyasu Mengesha, made a state visit to
Kenya, Nairobi, from December 28 to 29 1963. On General Mengesha‘s visit the two
countries talked about the implementation of the defense pact. On his press statement at
384Miheret, p.3; Tony Oweke, ―Kenyan Foreign Policy During the Kenyatta and Moi Administrations: A
Role Theory Analysis‖ (Masters Thesis, International Relations at Universiteit Leiden, 2019), P.8.
385Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Ethiopia, Volume 9 (December, 1963), p. 19809; Miheret,
pp. 4-5; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, 2001, p.28.
386Oduogo, p.159.
139
Nairobi airport, Major General Mengesha mentioned that the military build-up of
Mogadishu by training around 20,000 solders was stemmed from the territorial
aggrandizement policy of Somalia to create a greater Somalia. Besides, in the press
statement Major General Mengesha stated that ―Somalia claims both to the Northern
Frontier District [NFD] of Kenya and to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and at the
―nuisance raids‖ being carried out in these areas by armed bands from Somalis‖.387
The 1963 mutual defense pact put in to implementation during the 1964 Somalia
invasion against Kenya and Ethiopia. Later, in December 27, 1964 the mutual defense
pact was revised. At this time the signatories of the pact presented the memorandum of
the agreement to the OAU and asked the following four major obligatory conditions to
avert conflict with Somalia: i) unequivocally and unconditionally renouncing any
territorial claim by the authority of Somalia against Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti
(French Somaliland); ii) Somalia to be governed by the principles of OAU and UN; iii)
Somalia to follow the principle of non-use of force to avert the problems and to be
governed by international agreements and; iv) enforcing Somalia to pay sufficient
compensation for the war damage against Ethiopia.388
As mentioned above, there is no doubt that the institutionalization of the bilateral
security alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya was the result of the personal diplomacy
of the leaders of the two countries. In fact, the personal diplomacy of the heads of states
of the two countries was more flamed by the common mutual interests on both sides.
Here, it is vital to note that in the politics of Kenya, having a security alliance with one
of the regional political powers (i.e. Ethiopia) was considered as an important back up
to counter-defend threats from other powers in the region such as Somalia. Likewise,
the security alliance with Ethiopia was taken as an advantage for the newly independent
Kenya to get enough time to strengthen its security and armed forces using the security
alliance with Ethiopia as a shelled and shadow for any external threats. The other point
in focus that instigated Kenya to approach more with Ethiopia was the fright of the
recurrence of the question of the ten miles coastal land that runs from Kipini (north) to
Ruvuma River (south). It is apparent that the ten miles coastal strip which was under the
387Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Ethiopia, Volume 9 (December, 1963), p. 19809.
388 Miheret, p.3.
140
rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar had desired an autonomous rule which in turn would
made Kenya a landlocked country. As a result, Kenyatta and his party KANU as well as
others became against the idea of giving autonomy for the coastal land that would
undermine Kenya‘s access to the sea. That being the case, the threat on the coastal strip
had also pushed the newly independent Kenya to strengthen its security alliance with
Ethiopia, which had the same kind of challenge from the Eritrean People‘s Liberation
Front (EPLF) that was active in the northern Ethiopia during the period.389
On the other hand, Ethiopia desired the security alliance with Kenya to isolate Somalia
from the regional and continental politics by using the political acceptance of Jomo
Kenyatta on the regional and continental politics. The mutual security alliance with
Kenya was also taken worth to prevent the authority of Kenya to promote anti-Ethiopia
thesis on the controversial boundary issue at Gedaduma and Goduma walls. Moreover,
the security pact was taken positively to promote the defense mechanism of the region
aiming to normalize the changing nature of challenges on the area of security in the
Horn region of Africa.
In the meantime, the authority of Somalia unequivocally opposed the 1963 mutual
defense pact between Ethiopia and Kenya and opened an extensive propaganda
campaign against the mutual defense pact. During its opposition, the government of
Somalia argued that:
We regret this agreement which breaks the Organization of African Unity Charter
to which Kenya and Ethiopia are parties... The Somalia government has no
alternative but to regard this agreement between the two neighboring countries
with whom it has a border dispute as intended to endanger, harm and threaten the
peace of its territory.390
From the objection of Somalia against the move of the Ethio-Kenyan front on the above
quote we can understand that the 1963 mutual defense pact between Ethiopia and Kenya
that stemmed from the irredentist policy and security challenges from Somalia
complicated the relationship between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.
389John M. Mwaruvie, ―The Ten Miles Coastal Strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land
Question at Kenyan Coat,‖ International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol.1, No.20 (2011),
pp.176-182.
390Onyango, p.159.
141
However, the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya defended that their alliance was signed
not to hurt any third party. Rather, the signatories of the defense pact claimed that the
security alliance was crucial for the peace and stability of the Horn region. Likewise, the
signatory of the pact declared that the mutual defense pact was signed not aiming to
threaten the sovereignty, internal security and national status of any African or non-
African states. But, the pact was signed in line with article 51 of the UN charter and the
principles of OAU, aiming to made it effective if and only if during the time that the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the contracting powers are in question by any
other third party.391
Nonetheless, the authority of Somalia was not in a position to accept the assertion by the
Ethio-Kenya political front. As a result, the political tension between Somalia and the
Ethio-Kenya political front had grown and complicated more. Subsequently, as a
response to the Ethio-Kenya security alliance the authority of Somalia tried to
strengthen its destabilizing efforts on Kenya and Ethiopia by helping and infiltrating
shifta (bandit) warrior groups. Apparently, the officialdom of Somalia had also
employed full scale war against Ethiopia in 1964. During the 1964 Ethio-Somalia war,
Kenya helped Ethiopia by sharing intelligence information, material and moral
assistances. In return, Ethiopia had also forwarded the same kind of assistances to its
regional security ally, Kenya, on the shifta war (1964-1967) in the NFD.392
Moreover, the Ethio-Kenya front showed their unwavering security coordination when
the Somalia authority proposed a demilitarized zone in February 9, 1964 along the
conflicting areas of Somalia with Ethiopia and Somalia with Kenya. It is believed that
this request of Somalia was stemmed from the aim of internationalizing the regional
matter. In their suggestion to demilitarize the conflicting zones the authority of Somalia
requested the international observers to see the frontier matter between Ethiopia-
Somalia and Kenya-Somalia. In the proposal, the Somalia officialdom gave priority to
the supervision of the UN Security Council. But, at the OAU council of ministerial
meeting, in Tanzania, Dar-el-salaam, the Kenya-Ethiopia front rejected the proposal of
391Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; see also
Oduogo, p.160.
392Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Miheret,
pp.3-4.
142
Somalia that requests international observer to see the case under the supervision of the
UN Security council. In return, the Kenya-Ethiopia front proposed the matter to be seen
by the OAU. However, Somalia rejected the proposal of the Ethiopia-Kenya front
referring its fear that the OAU may pass unjust decision that threatens the interests of
Somalia.393
At the end, the diplomatic influence of President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor
Hailesilase of Ethiopia on the then African politics together with the shared principle of
the OAU, where capitalized on continental problems should be first seen by continental
organization, undermined the demand of Somalia to transfer the matter to the UN
Security Council. Thereby, the then Secretary General of UN, U Thant, had also
supported the idea of the Ethiopia-Kenya front. U Thant proposed that continental
organization, OAU, should first see the interstate security and boundary problems
between Somalia and the Ethiopia-Kenya front before reaching to the UN. Soon UN
introduced a proclamation that states ―the unity of Africa requires the solution to all
disputes between member states be sought first within the Organization of African
Unity‖.394
Subsequently, the coordinated move of the Ethio-Kenya front forced Somalia to
postpone its appeal to the UN to see the case. In addition, the coordinated diplomatic
front and move between Ethiopia and Kenya had also paved the way for the gradual
isolation of Somalia from regional and continental politics.395
Besides, Emperor Hailesilase made a state visit to Kenya in June 9, 1964, during the
Emperor‘s visit, the officialdoms of Ethiopia and Kenya had reasserted the commitment
of their governments to strengthen the bilateral security cooperation to defend their
territories from external assault. For instance, while the then president of Kenya, Jomo
Kenyatta, speaks on the People‘s Representatives of Kenya with the presence of
Emperor Hailesilase, he (Kenyatta) indicated that ―above all we must resist our common
393Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.95-97.
394Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.97.
395Ibid, p.98.
143
enemies not only those who war against us with guns and other weapons but, also the
more insidious opponents of disease, ignorance, poverty and illiteracy‖.396
Subsequently, the mutual security pact and cooperative diplomatic strategic and tactical
move of the Ethiopia-Kenya front forced Somalia to reconsider its policy. Accordingly,
in the mid-1965, Somalia tried to review its policy with regards to neighboring countries
such as Ethiopia and Kenya. The reviewed policy of Somalia under president Adan
Abdulah Osman towards neighboring states was given to the then new prime minister of
Somalia, Abdirisaq Haji Husein, who came to power in September 1964 replacing
Sharmarke.397
Based on the reviewed policy, while Somalia tried to normalize its relations with
Ethiopia, the authority of Ethiopia was under the state of apprehension. The
apprehension from the authority of Ethiopia was stemmed from the commitment of the
new Somalia prime minister to build the military of Somalia with the help of the Soviet
bloc and the Arab countries. As a result, the expected result was not seen on improving
the relations of Ethiopia and Somalia. Subsequently, the government of Adan Abdulah
Osman turned its face towards Kenya. In the process of approaching Kenya, President
Adan promised to stop the irredentist policy of Somalia against Kenya. In return the
government of Adan demanded Kenya to grant or acknowledge Somalia‘s ―interest in
the welfare and destiny of the Somali people in Kenya‖.398 This normalization policy
proposal of Somalia against Kenya was stemmed from the following three reasons: i) to
isolate Kenya from Ethiopia and to abort the 1963 bilateral mutual defense pact; ii) to
weaken the Kenya-Ethiopian security and diplomatic bond in the regional and
continental politics and; iii) as a political tactic to attack Ethiopia and Kenya at different
time by cracking their security bond.399
That being the case, in its move to drag Kenya on its side and to get the full heart of
Jomo Kenyatta the authority of Somalia sent Julius Nyerere, the then president of
Tanzania, to create a platform for discussion between heads of states of the two
396Onyango, p.160.
397Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.112.
398Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.113.
399Touval, The Boundary Politics, p.224; Yihun, ―Ethiopia in African Politics‖, p.129; Issa-Salwe, The
Cold War Fallout, pp.112-113.
144
countries. Afterwards, Nyerere invited the heads of states of Kenya and Somalia to
Arusha on the date of Tanzanian independent anniversary, on December 9, 1965. But,
President Kenyatta did not go to Arusha calming that he was preparing for the
independent anniversary of Kenya. In lieu the then foreign minister of Kenya (Joseph
Murumbi) and minister of education (Mbiyu Konainge) discussed with the delegates of
Somalia at Arusha. After returning home the two Kenyan ministers convinced Kenyatta
to go to Arusha and meet Adan Abdalah Osman. As a result, second round discussion
between Kenya and Somalia was prepared at Arusha, but this time the discussion was at
the level of heads of states of the two countries. 400
During the progress of its discussion with Kenyatta at Arusha, the government of Adan
Abdalah proposed the following three agendas: i) the authority of Somalia would
decline its irredentist policy against Kenya; ii) the authority of Kenya would accept
Mogadishu‘s ―interest in the welfare and destiny of the Somali people in Kenya‖401 and;
iii) the authority of both government would show their willingness to find answers for
the complications between the two states. The government of Kenya accepted the
proposals of Adan in principle. But, Kenya worried about the truthfulness of Somalia‘s
position. The anxiety of Kenya was mainly stemmed from the point that if the position
of Somalia was a tactic to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia it would be hard for Kenya to
lose its strong ally, Ethiopia, in case of recurrence of hostility with Somalia.
Subsequently, in order to attest the reliability and faithfulness of the Somalia‘s move the
authority of Kenya demanded Somalia to denounce and castigate the shifta war against
Kenya publically and remove its support to shifta warriors. Nonetheless, Somalia was
not ready to accept the proposal of Kenya. As a result, the tactical policy review by
Adan Abdalah to isolate neighboring Kenya from Ethiopia and to weaken the mutual
defense pact concluded without yielding significant fruit.402
In replay, when the authority of Somalia understood the failerity of their desire to secure
Somalia‘s demand through normalizing relations with Kenya and Ethiopia, they shifted
their efforts by approaching more to the Arab states and Muslim countries that
supported the ideology of Somalia. Subsequently, the positive approach of Somalia with
400Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.113.
401 Ibid.
402 Touval, The Boundary Politics, p.223-224; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.112-114.
145
the Arab states and Muslim countries enabled Somalia to host the 1965 Organization of
the Islamic Conference at Mogadishu. The government of Osman-Hussen took the
matter as a good opportunity for Somalia to get the focus and the heart of the Muslim
countries about the Somali inhabited lands in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (the then
French Somaliland). As desired by the authority of Somalia the delegates of the
organization of Islamic conference at Mogadishu passed pro-Somalia resolution about
the Somali inhabited territories in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.403Accordingly, in the
resolution the participants of the congress:
i) fully support the law full rights of Somalia in realizing the unity of its lands and
request France, Ethiopia and Kenya to the Somali people and the occupied parts the
right of self-determination in accordance with the UN charter, the OAU charter and
that of Human rights; ii) condemns the acts of mass extermination and the brutal
atrocities committed by Ethiopia and Kenya forced against peaceful unarmed
Muslims; iii) requests the government of Ethiopia, Kenya and France to release all
political and civil Muslim detainees.404
At the end of the conference, to the surprise of the Ethiopia-Kenya front the general
secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference stated that ―we have
unanimously agreed that the Somali people should come under a single government and
party that God would make it easy for the Somalis to achieve their unification‖. 405
Overwhelmed by the success of the conference and filled with more confidence Prime
Minister Hussen made a speech that showed the position and foreign policy approach of
his government concerning the issue of Greater Somalia scheme. Hussen stated that:
The desire of all the Somalis to re-unite their people in their own homeland and to
live under one national flag is not a desire that has been promoted by the actions of
any one man or by any given group, but one which springs spontaneously from the
hearts of all Somalis wherever they may be. In advocating the cause for re-united
403Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, pp.165-166; Adar, pp.153-154.
404Adar, p.153.
405Ibid, pp.153-154.
146
Somalia, the Somali Government is simply giving expression to the general will of
the Somali nation. This, in fact, is one of the Government's first mandates.406
Despite the resolution was not binding against Ethiopia and Kenya it was taken as a big
diplomatic victory for Somalia to show its show force that endorsed Somalia‘s ideology.
On the other side, the solidarity showed by the Muslim countries was taken as a good
signal for the upcoming security challenge towards the Ethiopia-Kenya front. The
situation had also reflected to the Ethiopia-Kenya front about the distance that the
Muslim countries traveled to support and advocate the ideology of Somalia in public. In
replay, rather than kneeling down for the resolution of the congress the Ethiopia-
Kenyan pair worked to strengthen their security bond. Accordingly, the Ethiopia-Kenya
front arranged a meeting to discuss about the general development about their security
cooperation at the level of defense minister at Addis Ababa on July 15, 1966.407
On July 15, 1966 the consultative committee of the mutual defense pact met at Addis
Ababa to discuss on their cooperation. In the meeting Kenya was represented by its
minister of defense, Dr. Mungai. During the meeting, the two countries representatives
renewed their promise to stand together against any anti-Kenya and anti-Ethiopia
nationalist movement as well as against the shifta warriors who were sponsored by the
government of Somalia. In the meeting the head of the Kenyan delegate, Dr. Mungai,
argued the significance of the two countries cooperation to promote their security and to
undermine the move of the shifta insurgent groups. Likewise, the delegate of the two
countries reflected their governments‘ readiness to counter any party or group that
demand territory or advocate territorial aggrandizement. The delegates of the two
countries had also mentioned that an act to threaten the territorial integrity and
statehood status of their respective countries would cause ―tougher measures‖ to the
perpetrator or offender.408
In March 1967 the Ethiopian delegates under the leadership of Ketema Yifru made a
state visit to Kenya. When the Ethiopian delegate arrived at Nairobi under the
406Ibid, p.154.
407Onyango, pp.160-161; African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.3 (London, 1966), p.568;
Adar, pp.154-155.
408Onyango, pp.160-161; see also African Research Bulletin , African Research Ltd., London, Vol.3
(1966), p.568.
147
leadership of the then Ethiopian foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, one of the points that
was given due emphasis was the issue of strengthening the security cooperation between
the two states. In the meeting the two countries representatives headed by foreign
ministers asserted that the principal aim of the talk was to further their security
cooperation. Beside the security cooperation, delegates of the two states had also
discussed on matters such as defense,
international phenomenon, strengthening the economic cooperation and communication
lines between the two countries.409
Later in October 1967 similar attitude and arguments were reflected during President
Kenyatta‘s state visit to Ethiopia. On the dinner prepared for his respect during the date
of his arrival at Addis Ababa, President Kenyatta indicated the necessity of further
stepping up the cooperation between the two states. Likewise, in his speech president
Kenyatta said that ―his government would never allow Somalia to take an inch of
Kenya‘s territory‖.410
On the last day of Kenyatta‘s seven days state visit in Ethiopia, the heads of the two
states issued a joint press release. In the press release the heads of the two states focused
on the necessity of respecting the principles of OAU to overcome border disputes
among member countries. Likewise, the two heads of states duly emphasized the
necessity of member states to accept and respect borders that they got during
independence.411 This shows that territorial integrity was one of those major security
challenges for the two states during the period that laid the ground for the two countries
to create cooperative front.
On the other hand, Kenyatta‘s state visit to Ethiopia was coincided with the change of
leadership in Somalia that resulted in the adoption of the policy of détente by Somalia.
This was happen in 1967 when the government of Osman-Hussen was replaced by
Sharmarke-Egal. Afterwards, the new Sharmarke-Egal‘s government introduced the
policy of détente against neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya. In recognition for the move
of the new Somalia leadership, in his speech at the dinner program prepared for his
409Onyango, p.202.
410Onyango, p.161; see also African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.4 (London), p.837.
411Ibid.
148
highness, Kenyatta stated that the new government at Mogadishu under the captainship
of Sharmarke-Egal was taking positive stapes to normalize Somalia‘s border dispute
with Ethiopia and Kenya.412
Thereby, Détente, which can be taken as one of the fruits of the event of the 1967
presidential election in Somalia that brought change or shift of leadership from Osman-
Hussen to Sharmarke-Egal, was also brought tactical foreign policy reforms in Somalia.
So, the Sharmarke-Egal‘s government introduced détente as a policy approach to
reunify the Somali inhabited lands under one authority without going to war. This
means as explained by Egal ―[Somalis] shall continue to put pressure on those countries
to this end through diplomatic channels and through the appropriate organs of such
international bodies as the UN and the OAU‖.413
Thus, the Sharmarke-Egal‘s policy of détente urged and believed that the realization of
the pan-Somali movement would be true through compromise and diplomatic ways
rather than employing provocative and forceful actions against neighbors.
The tactical change and foreign policy reform in Somalia towards neighboring Ethiopia
and Kenya was taken as a good step forward by the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front.
The policy reform brought the end of shifta insurgency and the decline of major border
conflicts between Somalia and neighboring states. Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya
lifted the state of emergency law on their respective Somali inhabited lands.414
The occasion of decline of significant border conflicts, provocative propaganda
campaign and infiltration of insurgency during the era of detente (1967-1969) made the
Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to relax somehow on making the issue of Somalia
irredentism as a major security threat for their sovereignty. The implementation of
détente had also brought a comparative peace to the HoA.415 Keeping constant this all
developments, the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front followed every activity of Somalia
closely and did not completely overlook to strengthen their security cooperation. This
was mainly because, even if, the Sharmarke-Egal authority declared the policy of
412Onyango, p.161; Woodwell, p.118.
413Adar, p.161.
414Adar, p.161; Kendie, ―Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,‖ p.23.
415Colestock, p.46.
149
détente the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front did not fully trusted the position and
promise of Somalia.
Later, in 1969 the relative peace and relaxation of tension between Somalia and
neighboring states began to deteriorate once again because of the coming to power of
the military junta after the October Somalia revolution. In the face of his promise to
continue the policy of détente on his coming to power, Barry ignored the policy of
détente and began to indorse the policy of irredentism. The policy shift once again made
the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to close together more than ever for common
agenda, security.416
In particular, the more militant advocacy by Radio Mogadishu to unify all the Somali
inhabited lands became a good alarm more than ever and helped as a threshold to
promote the convergence of the Ethiopia-Kenyan interest on the area of securing their
country from the new threat of Somalia under Barry and his allies. For instance, in its
program, Radio Mogadishu over and over circlets the speech of Barry. The speech
states that ―although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their
independence so far, the liberation of the remaining parts is quite a possibility in the
same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country‖.417
At other occasion Radio Mogadishu engaged on warmongering activity using the
following speech of Barry:
To the Somali people independence was always synonymous with unity. The
consistent struggle of the Somali people seems to surprise our enemies. They do
not realize that the Somali people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing their
freedom…The liberation struggle was always part of the ordinary life of the Somali
man, and however long it takes him; he will never forget the stage of the struggle
remaining.418
This move of Somalia clearly reflects the shift of the policy of Somalia towards
Ethiopia and Kenya from détente towards the line of old order to unify Somalia through
force of action. The force of action ranged from miner border conflict, intensifying
416Woodwell, p.118; Colestock, p.46-47.
417Adar, p.173; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.
418Ibid.
150
destabilizing efforts through infiltration of insurgent groups, supporting and organizing
shifta fighting groups to full scale war. In fact, this shift of policy was expected by the
Ethiopia and Kenya cooperative front which were looking every move of Somalia in a
wary eye. So, Ethiopia and Kenya were not surprised with the shift of the policy
approach by Somalia following the October Revolution. Afterwards, Ethiopia and
Kenya began to use the situation as a tool to strengthen their security cooperation in
particular by revising their mutual defense pact in 1979 and 1987.419
That being the case, at the beginning of 1970s beyond regime change and shift of policy
in Somalia there were other factors that helped to strengthen the security cooperation
between Ethiopia and Kenya. These factors were: i) the large scale arms building of the
new military government of Somalia with the Soviet military aid; ii) unlike Ethiopia and
Kenya the membership of Somalia to the Arab League in 1973 helped Somalia to get
more political, military, moral and material support from the Arab and Muslim countries
and urged the Ethiopia-Kenyan front to evaluate their security cooperation in depth; iii)
the report of the discovery of gas and oil at the eastern region of Ethiopia, which was
claimed by Somalia, and Somalia‘s new and extensive military camping around the
border region had also urged Ethiopia to further strengthen its security bond with Kenya
and; iv) the recurrence of the provocative diplomatic campaign of Mogadishu to the
idea of Greater Somalia scheme and the warmongering policy signals of the new
military government under Barry also instigated the Ethiopia-Kenya front to renew their
security cooperation.420
However, later, the outbreak of the 1974 popular revaluation in Ethiopia and the
subsequent removal of Emperor Hailesilase from power put Ethiopia under military rule
that devoted for the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This in turn created an ideological
rift between the Ethiopia-Kenyan cooperative front that in reverse caused a temporary
cool down to the security cooperation between the newly communist Ethiopia and the
pro-west Kenya.421
419Volker Matthies, ―The Horn of Africa and International Relations,‖ Verlag Weltarchiv Vol. 09, Iss. 12
(Hamburg, 1974), p.387.
420Matthies, p.387.
421Miheret, p.8.
151
3.3. The 1974 Regime Change in Ethiopia and its Impact on the Ethio-Kenyan
Security Cooperation
The February 1974 Ethiopian popular revolution, demanding regime change, and the
subsequent removal of Emperor Hailesilase in September 1974 brought considerable
influence on the Ethiopia-Kenya security cooperation. As noted at the beginning of this
chapter the personal diplomacy between Emperor Hailesilase and President Kenyatta
had its own role for the growth of the two states security cooperation. Yet, the removal
of Emperor Hailesilase from power by the military junta named Dergue in September
12, 1974 was a bad news for Kenya and the Kenyan authority showed a sort of
resentment to the new revolutionary government in Ethiopia. Particularly, the socialist
oriented advocacy of the new revolutionary government considered by the pro-west
Kenyan as a likely challenge for the cooperative statuesque between the two nations.422
The other point worth mentioning for the cooling down of the two countries security
cooperation was the Provisional Military Administrative Council‘s (PMAC‘s)
commitment to approach socialist countries such as Soviet Russia and Cuba seeking
economic and military support under the principle of proletarian internationalism. The
move of PMAC disappointed Ethiopia‘s long time and strong regional security ally,
Kenya. On the other hand, the unstable situation in Ethiopia following the 1974
revolution was accompanied by class struggle, secessionist problem in northern
Ethiopia by the ELF and the recurrent insurgency and military incursions from Somalia.
The situation partly halted the new military government in Ethiopia to focus on
smoothening and normalizing the cooling relation with Kenya. As a result of the above
mentioned points, the periodic security meeting at ministerial level between the two
states stopped temporarily. In fact, the shift of focus and approach to the eastern bloc in
Ethiopia, which was emanated from internal class struggle and external secessionist
challenge, was negatively interpreted and considered as betrayal by Kenyan and led to a
temporary cooling of the security cooperation between the two states.423
422James Dakin, ―Somalia: Irredentism in the Horn of Africa,‖ New Zealand International Review Vol. 3,
No. 3 (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p.27; Miheret, p.8.
423Miheret, p.9.
152
Concomitantly, while the National Democratic Revolution program was introduced on
April 21, 1976, it became evident that the authority of the military junta was in earnest
to employ ideological shift as per the policy of Marxism-Leninism. The policy
statement and political program declared that socialism is the foundation for the
political philosophy of Dergue. Later, the Ethiopian press association, on December 29,
1976, officially announced that the military junta, Dergue, would be restructured and
recognized through the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Subsequently, many spectators
forecasted that the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation would not continue. Particularly,
on the eye of most observers it was assumed that Kenya would officially decline its
security cooperation with Ethiopia.424
However, contrary to the perception of many observers, despite the temporary cooling
of relationship, Ethiopia and Kenya were not in a position to totally halt their security
cooperation. So as to give special emphasis to the point, the friendly foreign policy
approach explanation given by the new military junta towards Kenya helped the Kenyan
authority to hope good security cooperation with Ethiopia with the absence of Emperor
Hailesilase‘s administration. Moreover, while declaring its foreign policy, the military
junta announced to be guided by the three major principles of non-aligned nations,
namely: i) respect for peace, justice and equality; ii) non- involvement to the internal
issues of others and; iii) national independence and national unity.425
Likewise, the military government included in its foreign policy program to establish
collaborative relationship with sister countries in Africa and beyond. In its focused
consideration to promote good relationship with adjoining countries, the program also
showed the readiness of the military junta to respect and implement the principles of
UN and OAU. As a result, despite ideological differences and temporary cooling of
cooperation the correlation between the two countries once again revived.426
So, despite ideological difference Kenya was not in a position to withdraw itself from
the security cooperation with Ethiopia. The following five rationales can be taken as a
ground for this. First, the deeply implanted security suspicion and challenge of the
424Onyango, p.168; Miheret, p.9.
425Miheret, p.12; Adar, p.275.
426Miheret, p.12.
153
Somalia irredentism against Kenya was considered by the authority of Kenya more
threatening for the nationhood states of their country than the ideological difference
with Ethiopia. It was also believed by the Kenyan officialdom that the ideological
challenge from the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia would not be immediate and not that
much serious comparing it with the danger of Somalia expansionism. In fact, as a prowest
state and as an American ally the suspicion and worry of Kenya towards the
expansion of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the surrounding neighboring states
including Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania was not totally fades out. But, the Kenyan
authority did not have any illusion that the Somalia irredentist threat was more
dangerous than the Marxist-Leninist ideological challenge.427
Second, during the moment, with the exception of Ethiopia and to some degree with
Sudan the relation of Kenya with the other neighboring states was considerably
declined. For instance, in the early 1976 Kenya was on the verge of war with the
Ugandan absolute ruler, Idi Amin, who attempted to conquer the western portion of
Kenya forcefully. Amin was mainly motivated for the action by the armament that he
got from the Soviet Union. There was also an observation that Idi Amin‘s territorial
claim from Kenya was intentionally introduced to create promising ground for Somalia
to invade the NFD by redirecting the focus of Kenya from northeastern front to the
west. The year 1976 was also acknowledged as a watershed in the relationship between
Kenya and Tanzania. At the end, the hostile relations between the pro-west Kenya and
the socialist Tanzania leads to the shutting down of borders of the two states at the
beginning of 1977. Concomitantly, the relation of Kenya with its old hostile state,
Somalia, reached at its brink since 1967. So, the hostile relations between Kenya and
neighboring countries hindered Kenya to worsen its security cooperation with
Ethiopia.428
Third, with regard to population size, military strength and military hardware Ethiopia
was exceedingly stronger than Kenya. In its security cooperation with Ethiopia, for that
reason, Kenya earns more advantage than Ethiopia. Fourth, the authority of Kenya also
afraid that if Kenya rejected Ethiopia without securing another strong regional ally, it
427Samuel M. Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya‘s Role in the
Somali-Ethiopian Dispute,‖ African Studies Association of Australia and Pacific (1982), p.10.
428Ibid.
154
would be hard for Kenya to withstand attacks from neighboring anti-Kenya groups such
as Somalia. Even the United States which had strong attachment with Kenya in the area
of security assistance was very far from Kenya in terms of geography that might not
much helpful for Kenya in an urgent situation. Concomitantly, America‘s nearby
security partners such as Saudi Arabia and Iran (under the jurisdiction of Shah) were
under the state of deteriorated relations with Kenya because of the formers‘ alignment
with Somalia. Kenya‘s persistent attachment and support to Ethiopia had also
contributed its stake in worsening the relations of Kenya with nearby U.S security
partners (i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia).429 Therefore, Kenya refrained from deteriorating
its relations with Ethiopia because the Kenyan authority well aware that keeping
constant their ideological disparity the right country to cooperate to benefit during
urgent situation was Ethiopia.
The last but not the least is, despite the relationship between Soviet and Somalia was
declining in the 1976 and 1977 still the authority of Soviet had a big stake in
influencing the politics of Somalia. Therefore, the authority of Kenya suspected that the
complete rejection of Ethiopia might instigate the latter to normaize relations with
Somalia with the mediation efforts of Soviet that would put Kenya under the state of
complete isolation from regional politics.430 Thereby, based on points stated above it is
possible to argue that the issue of national security was given more value by Kenya than
ideological difference to create security cooperation with neighboring Ethiopia.
On the other hand, using the temporary cooling of the Ethiopia and Kenya mutual
security cooperation as a leverage as well as the internal instability and class struggle in
Ethiopia, as opportunity, the government of Somalia under the leadership of Barry
declared a full scale war over Ethiopia in 1977. In this way, the 1977-78 Ogaden war
broke out. Kenya showed its strong and potent cooperation to Ethiopia throughout the
war. Kenya had also become one of the figurehead African countries that condemned
429Makinda, p.10; John Creed and Kenneth Menkhaus, ―The Rise of Saudi Regional power and The
Foreign Policy of Northeast Africa,‖ Northeast African Studies Vol. 8, No. 2/3 (Michigan State
University Press, 1986), p.14.
430Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.11; Adar, p.275.
155
the action of Somalia and showed its support to the Marxist-Leninist regime of
Dergue.431
3.4. Ethio-Kenya Cooperation during the Ogaden War (1977-1978)
Any kind of conflictual relations between Ethiopia and Somalia had a room on the
political perception of Kenya. Ethiopia on its part also sees the political activities of
Somalia against Kenya in a wary eye. In the Kenya‘s prospect and national security
platform any kind of threat against Ethiopia with the sense to create Greater Somalia
was conditioned as big security challenge on the national integrity of Kenya sooner or
later. On the same line, Kenyan‘s unlimited support to Ethiopia stemmed from the
insight that a little success of Somalia over Ethiopia, by any means, on its move to
create Greater Somalia would trigger higher energy to Somalia‘s irredentist aspiration.
Accordingly, since the fundamental reason for the Ogaden war was stemmed from the
ambition of creating Greater Somalia by annexing the Somali inhabited lands in
Ethiopia, the authority of Kenya unequivocally and straight away condemned the action
of Somalia and provided their full support to Ethiopia.432
So, the first act that was followed by the Ethiopia-Kenya front during the Ogaden war
was to cooperate each other against their common enemy based on the 1963 mutual
defense pact.433
In order to show its worry for the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia Ogaden war a radio
broadcast in Kenya with the name ―Radio Nairobi‖, on September 26, 1977 stated that:
Somalia‘s expansionism is unacceptable; Somalia is an aggressor both in word and
deed; she has invaded Ethiopia militarily and lays claim to large chunks of Kenyan
territory; her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they
will set the continent (of Africa) and the world aflame.434
431Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 1978), p.28992; Onyango, pp.164-
165.
432Jiri Valenta, ―Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lesson,‖ Journal of
International Affairs Vol.34, No.2 (Soviet- American Competition in the Third World, 1980), p.354-355.
433David D. Laitin, ―Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective,‖Africa Today Vol. 23, No. 2
(Indiana University Press, 1976), p.36; Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.1.
434Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.2.
156
Besides, during the Ogaden war, the intelligence office of Kenya tried to help the
Ethiopian military by providing intelligence report about the military activities of
Somalia on the southern part of the country near the border to Kenya. The intelligence
report of Kenya helped the Ethiopian high military command in different ways.435
Furthermore, in 1978, when the Ogaden war reached at its peak and the Somalia
authority damaged the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway that connect Ethiopia to the outlet,
the government of Kenya showed their support by allowing the Mombasa port for free
of charge. This agreement between the two countries was reached at the ministerial
meeting held at the city of Nazerth, in Ethiopia. On this meeting, the aggression and
expansionist policy of Somalia was also condemned.436
Consequently, in the course of the Ogaden war, despite their opposition to the idea of
Marxism-Leninism, the authority of Kenya had allowed Soviet Russia to transport
military hardware and Cuban soldiers via the Kenyan port of Mombasa to help Ethiopia.
In the meantime, the minister of foreign affairs for Kenya made a visit to Addis Ababa
in March 1978. On his Addis Ababa visit, Kenya‘s Foreign Minister stated the
commitment of the authority of Kenya to support the brothers and sisters of Ethiopia in
their fight against territorial aggrandizement by the Somali expansionist.437
Concomitantly, to show his good wish for the victory of Ethiopia in the war, Foreign
Minister Munyua Waiyaki stated that:
Kenyans are over-joyed by your victory and just as your struggle was our struggle,
so, we now feel that your success is our success. Kenyans stand is not merely
concerned with defending the principle of territorial integrity, but more so with
defending the integrity of the Organization of African Unity…Kenya is ready to
jointly destroy anyone who wishes to annex territory.438
At the end of Waiyaki‘s visit at Addis Ababa, a joint press release by the Ethiopian
representative and Foreign Minister Waiyaki was given. In the press release both the
435Miheret, p.13.
436Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 1978), p.28992; Miheret, p.13.
437Peter J. Schraeder and Jerel A. Rosati, ―Policy Dilemmas in the Horn of Africa: Contradictions in the
U.S- Somalia Relationship,‖ Northeast African Studies Vol.9, No.3 (Michigan State University Press,
1987), p.38; Miheret, p.13; Makinda , ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.7.
438Onyango, p.166.
157
Ethiopian and Kenyan representatives passed the following messages to Somalia: i) they
addressed the authority of Somalia to relinquish its territorial demand instantly and
unambiguously; ii) they addressed Somalia to give credence and respect to the
proposition of UN and OAU regarding the issue of ―non-interference‖ to the affairs of
member states.439
Moreover, on his home coming, Waiyaki proposed his suggestion to the government of
Kenya to strengthen Kenya‘s material and moral support to Ethiopia. Likewise, Waiyaki
suggested the Kenyan authority to take a lesson from Ethiopia and to make Kenya on
the state of preparedness for any kind of external challenge.440
As a response for the Kenya‘s support to Ethiopia, during the Ogaden war, the authority
of Mogadishu organized insurgency groups against Kenya. For instance, in 1977 a large
number of Somalia insurgent groups, estimated around 3,000, attacked a boundary
police station in the northeastern territory of Kenya. Nonetheless, the action of Somalia
did not hinder Kenya to continue its logistics and military support to Ethiopia. The
logistic aid from Kenya was usually vehicles together with possible operators.441
The other way that Kenya showed its cooperation with Ethiopia during the Ogaden war
was by doing a diplomatic campaign against countries such as Saudi, Egypt, Iran, etc.
that provide military equipment to Somalia. Accordingly, one of the diplomatic wings
of Kenya played a remarkable role in the Middle East sates to undermine the military
support to Somalia. Especially, the authority of Kenya was highly worried that the
government of Iran was supporting Somalia with armament supplied by the United
States and the UK. Additionally, Nairobi was concerned with the statement of the then
Iranian monarch, Mohammad Reza, who stated that Iran would not remain silent on the
moment of external attack against Somalia. As a result, the foreign minister of Kenya,
Waiyaki, noticed Iran not to intervene in the domestic issues of Africa. Against this
background, in January 1978 the then Kenyan Foreign Minister, Waiyaki, discussed
with the Iranian Ambassador at Nairobi to stop Iran‘s military aid to Somalia. In order
to cool down the rising tension the ambassador of Iran at Nairobi, Ahmad Tavakoli,
439Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 26,1978), p.28992; Adar, p.247.
440Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 26,1978), p.28992; Onyango, p.166.
441Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.8.
158
asserted that the policy of Iran in the Horn region was wrongly understood by Kenya. In
his explanation ambassador Tavakoli stated that Iran did not interfered in the affair of
Africa rather Tehran proposed peaceful solution for the problem between Somalia and
its neighboring states (i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti).442
In the meantime, while the government of Somalia faced a remarkable defeat at the
Ogaden war, the authority of Kenya suspected that Barry might launch an attack against
the NFD of Kenya using arms obtained from Tehran to divert the growing criticism
against his administration at Mogadishu. But, ambassador Tavakoli complained the
circulation of the news that Mogadishu might attack Nairobi with the arms from Tehran.
Additionally, Tavakoli stated that beyond humanitarian aid there was no military supply
to Mogadishu from Tehran and the ambassador advised Nairobi to be more serous on
the arms supply from Russia to Ethiopia. Furthermore, ambassador Tavakoli warned
that his country would sever its diplomatic relations with Kenya if Nairobi continued
with such groundless allegations.443
Concurrently, ambassador Tavakoli approached the then Kenyan Attorney-General
Charles Njonjo to create a platform to meet with Vice President Moi. Since Iran was
one of the major sources of oil for Kenya, the attorney-general promised to arrange a
platform for discussion between Tavakoli and Moi. Afterward, the government of
Kenya decided to send Vice President Moi and Attorney-General Njonjo to talk with the
Shah on the matter. However, while Moi and Njionjo were preparing to travel to
Tehran, the foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Ali, announced that Iran had severed
relation with Kenya asserting the latter‘s groundless blame over Tehran on the Ogaden
war. Subsequently, the relation between Kenya and Iran was worsened and the embassy
of Iran at Nairobi was closed on February 1978.444
442Levin Opiyo, ―Somalia-Ethiopia War Forced Kenya and Iran to Sever Ties,‖ Nation (January 18, 2020)
https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/somalia-ethiopia-war-forced-kenya-and-iran-to-sever-ties-
242142.
443 Ibid.
444Patrick Gilkes, Revolution and Military Strategy: The Ethiopian Army in the Ogaden and in Eritrea,
1974–84, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies Vol. 2, eds. Bahru
Zewde, Richard Pankhurst, and Taddese Beyene (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis
Ababa University, 1994), pp.725-726; Opiyo, ―Somalia-Ethiopia War‖; Makinda, ―Conflict and
Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.8.
159
Likewise, the government of Kenya under its foreign minister, Waiyaki, sent a message
to Saudi Arabia to stop its military aid to Somalia. On his explanation to Saudi Arabia,
Waiyaki stated that ―we don‘t want Saudis to pay for guns which in the present climate
in the Horn of Africa could be turned against us‖.445 Afterwards, for a more detail
discussion with Saudi Arabia the then vice president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, went to
Riyadh. Despite it failed to yield fruit, on his visit to Riyadh, Moi tried to convince
Saudi to stop its military aid to Somalia.446
On its other effort to support Ethiopia and to show their faithfulness to the mutual
security pact between the two states, which was signed in 1963; Kenya interrupted the
Egyptian cargo plane that transport armaments and ammunitions of different kind
containing around two hundred artilleries for Mogadishu, on February 15, 1978. The
Egyptian authority responded by seizing two Kenyan farer planes till the homecoming
of the interrupted plane.447 In addition, the authority of Kenya showed its objection
against the involvement of Egypt on the Ogaden war on the following way:
By supplying Somalia with arms, Egypt is encouraging continued conflict in the
Horn of Africa.... One would expect Egypt to be interested in continued peace in
the area for her own national interests. ...by continuing to support a poor nation
whose leading quality is aggression, Egypt is not only failing in her duties as a
leading African nation, but it is also undermining her own interests in the area.448
Under other condition, it is evident that after the official declaration of Marxism-
Leninism in Ethiopia the relationship between Ethiopia and western countries were
more deteriorated. As a result, during the Ogaden war, the authority of United States
promised Somalia to provide military aid. In its move to support Somalia the
government of U.S.A did not choose to go alone rather United States preferred the
strategy to support Somalia in the name of western bloc in cooperation with Britain,
France, Italy, and West Germany. In addition, from non-western countries United States
discussed with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iran to channel the military aid to
445 Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” p.8.
446Ibid.
447The New York Times, ―Ethiopia Accuses Egypt‖ (February 17, 1978), Section A, p.3,
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/02/17/archives/ethiopia-accuses-egypt-little-more-than-gesture.html;
Miheret, p.13.
448Onyango, p.174.
160
Somalia against its military move to invade Ethiopia. For insistence, in July 2, 1977 the
spokesperson of the state department of U.S asserted that Britain, France, and West
Germany showed their willingness to provide military aid to Somalia in principle.
Afterwards, 60 French manufactured ―AMX 33 tanks‖ arrived to Mogadishu through
Saudi Arabia. West Germany also sent $18 million in the name of economic aid. UK
already delivered military aid to Mogadishu before the escalation of tension in the
region. Afterward, the Ethiopian ambassador to Washington, Ayelew Mandefro,
notified that the decision by the U.S to supply military hardware to Somalia would be a
very great mistake. Ambassador Mandefro had also criticized President Carter for not
denouncing Somalia‘s action in Ogaden. Apparently, to deter the flow of military aid to
Somalia from western countries a diplomatic tour was arranged by Kenya under the
leadership of the then Kenyan Vise President Moi.449
In their diplomatic campaign to undermine the aggressive move of Somalia over the
Ethiopian territory, Ogaden, and to deter western military aid to Somalia the Kenyan
diplomatic staffs started their tour to western countries under the leadership of Moi in
March 1978. One of the destination of Moi and his staffs was U.S.A. In his discussion
with President Carter, Moi strongly argued against the aggressive move of Somalia
alongside the Ethiopian territory at Ogaden. Likewise, Moi tried to convince President
Carter about the consequence of helping Somalia with military equipment until Somalia
relinquishes its policy of Greater Somalia scheme. Afterwards, President Carter
promised Moi to retain an arms restriction on Somali.450
Concomitantly, on its move to London, Moi tried to argue the British Prime Minister,
James Callaghan, on the same way that he had done to President Carter. Afterwards,
Moi got military aid and similar promise from Callaghan. Additionally, like President
Jimmy Carter, the British Prime Minister too promised to reconsider the armament issue
of Somalia critically.451
449The New York Times, ―U.S., Allies to Meet on Ogaden War‖ (January 21, 1978), p.3,
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/21/archives/us-allies-to-meet-on-ogaden-war.html; Issa-Salwe, The
Cold War Fallout, p.98; Onyango, p.170.
450Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p.28992; Ododa, p.172.
451Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p.28992.
161
Subsequently, on August 14, 1978 the diplomatic tour of Moi and his twelve delegates
began to yield fruit in United States. On this date, the secretary of state of United States,
R. Moose, noticed to the Somalia Ambassador at Washington DC about the temporary
postponement of the armament aid for Somalia until his government evacuated from
Ogaden. Some week‘s later president Carter also stated the following:
…before the United States would be ready to discuss providing economic aid or
selling defensive weapons to Somalia, there would have to be a tangible
withdrawal of Somalia forces from the Ogaden and the renewed commitment not to
dishonor the boundaries of Ethiopia or Kenya.452
This shows that the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya helped the two
countries to develop common stand in Ogaden war despite their ideological difference.
Concomitantly, it reflects the role Kenya played during the Ogaden war through
elucidating the ramification of providing military to Kenya‘s hostile states.
Ethiopia on its part had written an objection letter to western and Middle East countries
in February 1977 to stop their military aid to Somalia. Some of those countries that
received the objection letter were the U.S.A, the U.K, West Germany, France, Saudi
Arabia and Iran. The Ethiopian officialdom even strike back the military aid by West
Germany to Somalia by way of sending back the Ambassador of West Germany in
Addis Ababa. Ethiopia also showed its grievances towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia by
naming them as an ―agents of international imperialism‖.453
So, Ethiopia under President Mengistu and Kenya under President Kenyatta showed
their common fear and coordination in Ogaden war against Somalia because of their
common desire for territorial integrity and to maintain the existing statuesque on
boundary in the Horn of African. Likewise, both Kenyatta and Mengistu did not need to
see Somalia with stronger military power because of the policy of Greater Somalia
scheme which was a policy at the expense of the territory of one-fifth of Ethiopia, onefifth
of Kenya and Djibouti. However, later, in August 1978, change of leadership
452Onyango, p.173.
453Ibid, pp.174-175.
162
occurred in Kenya. Accordingly, President Jomo Kenyatta was replaced by Vice
President Daniel Arap Moi.454
3.5. The 1978 Regime Change in Kenya and its Aftermath on the Ethio-Kenyan
Security Cooperation
On August 22, 1978 the first president of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, was died.
Subsequently, the vice president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, became the president of
Kenya. However, regardless of change of leadership the authorities of Kenya declared
their policy of security cooperation with Ethiopia. In return, the Ethiopian officialdom
had also accepted the continuation of the statuesque between the two states with an open
heart. As a result, the August 1978 change of leadership in Kenya did not bring major
challenges on the cooperation between the two countries. Even, Moi‘s coming to power
identified as the time of further normalization and revitalization of the bilateral security
cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. Beside security cooperation, following Moi‘s
coming to power the two states promised to create more relevant and significant
improvement on the area of stable political environment. Furthermore, despite the
concept is out of the scope of this study, economic and cultural relations between the
two states were worked to be more serious and consequential during the ear of Moi. Moi
even declared that his government will follow the footstep of his predecessor‘s policy to
strengthen the relation of the two states. For instance, after being president, Moi made
his first presidential diplomatic tour to Ethiopia between January 29 and 31, 1979.
Moi‘s visit to Ethiopia further consolidated the relations between the two states.455
On his state visit to Ethiopia, Moi went along with his minister of foreign affairs,
minister of power and communication, minister of commerce and industry, minister of
attorney general, minister of work, and minister of internal affairs. During his arrival at
454Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relations,‖ (December 1979); The New York
Times, ―A President in the Shadow of a Legend: Daniel Arap Moi‖ (November 20, 1978), Section A,
p.14, https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/20/archives/a-president-in-the-shadow-of-a-legend-man-in-thenews.
html; Onyango, p.175.
455Vincent B. Khapoya, ―Kenya under Moi: Continuity or Change?,‖ Africa Today Vol. 27, No. 1
(Indiana University Press, 1980), p.25; Miheret, p.12.
163
Addis Ababa, Colonel Mengistu welcomed Moi and his delegates and prepared a dinner
program for Moi‘s respect.456
On the dinner program Moi stated the following regarding Somalia‘s territorial assertion
over Ethiopia and Kenya:
To sacrifice oneself in the defense of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is
an extremely noble and honorable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep
love for one's country and its future. As you all know, Kenya and Ethiopia are
opposed to any territorial claims by Somalia. Our two countries are committed to
uphold and respect the charters and decisions of the international organizations. We
attach great significance to the sanctity of borders of African states as obtained at
the time of their political independence.... None respect of this resolution would
constitute a serious backward step for the entire continent, just at a time when
unity, co-operation and positive neighborliness are desperately needed for the
development of every African country.457
The statement of Moi on the dinner program address the thought of his government‘s
commitment to further strengthen the security cooperation between the two countries
for common desire, which includes security, territorial integrity and maintaining
colonial boundary as a legal boundary of post independent Africa.
Furthermore, on the dinner program Moi asserted that:
The excellent relations that exist between Ethiopia and Kenya started long before
Kenya‘s independence… Kenya and Ethiopia share a long, well recognized and
peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and
cooperation…we are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims
must be avoided at all cost. In the past, Kenya has extended her hand of
cooperation to all our brothers and sisters on our continent regardless of their
political ideologies.458
This expression of Moi indicates that his government‘s readiness to continue the
security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, he tried to associate that
456Addis Zemen, ―The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relations‖ (December 1979); Onyango, p.176.
457Onyango, p.176.
458Adar, p.248.
164
the security cooperation between the two states was not something that built with a
single night for a temporary interest. Rather, the cooperation between the two countries
had a historical base that stretch out to the colonial era or before. As well as the message
of Moi showed that, even, the boundary issue and the cold war ideological differences
did not deter the security and other kinds of cooperation between the two states.
On the dinner prepared for the honors of Moi, Colonel Mengistu also argued that the
security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya had historical roots. On the dinner
program, Mengistu also stated that the readiness of Ethiopia to stand by the side of
Kenya for any kind of attack which threaten the territorial integrity and nationhood
status of the country. Likewise, Mengistu promised Moi that Ethiopia would never be
an observer for any kind of request that came from the officialdom of Kenya. On his
speech, Mengistu similarly noted the authority of Mogadishu to denounce its policy of
territorial aggrandizement against Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti unconditionally.
Regarding the territorial aggrandizement policy of Mogadishu, he stated that ―our two
countries will not hesitate from jointly confronting any and all attempts being made by
the expansionist government in Mogadishu towards the realization of the futile dream of
the so called Greater Somalia‖.459
On January 31, 1979, at the conclusion of President Moi‘s state visit in Ethiopia an
agreement called protocol of amity and cooperation was signed between President Moi
and Colonel Mengistu. The protocol consisted twelve articles that many of it focused on
the commitment of the two states on the area of safeguarding the territorial integrity and
inviolability of the territory of the two states. Concomitantly, the agreement of amity
and cooperation focused on continuing collaboration and working together on the
political, diplomatic, military and economic issues. The January 31 protocol between
the two countries was normally called ―Ethiopia-Kenya Treaty of Cooperation‖.460
The first article of the January 31, 1979 Ethiopia-Kenya pact discuss about the peace
and enduring friendship between the two states. On the second article the pact
elaborates about the commitment of the two states to build up amity and order based on
459Onyango, p.177; see also African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.16 (London, 1979),
p.5117.
460Miheret, p.14, see also Ododa, p.290.
165
the principles of respecting reciprocal interests, collaboration, give-and-take, as well as
impartiality. Likewise, the second article assess about the issue of inalienability of
borders, non-interference on the affairs of each other, mutual respect for autonomy and
territorial integrity of both states.461
Under other condition, on its article six the January 31 pact argued on the necessity of
the two countries cooperation on the areas of diplomacy, military and political fields in
order to secure their interests on the area of territorial integrity, unity and inability of
their boundaries. In order to safeguard their interests, the two states had also agreed to
exchange information and conduct regular discussion on issues of common interests.462
Likewise, Ethiopia and Kenya reached an agreement for the flourishment of lasting
peace on the region of the Horn and demanded Somalia to carry out at least the
following four orders:
i) that Somalia must unconditionally renounce claims on the territories of Kenya,
Ethiopia and Djibouti and declare null and void all instruments asserting such
claims; ii) that Somalia must openly and solemnly declare its acceptance of the
principles and decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African
Unity, governing inter-state relations including the principles of the inviolability of
state frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; iii) that
Somalia should declare that it would scrupulously respect international agreements
as well as the principles of non-use of force in the settlement of disputes; and iv)
that Somalia should pay prompt and adequate reparations for the war damages
inflicted on Ethiopia during the Ogaden war of 1977 -78.463
On the other hand, on the January 31 ―Ethiopia-Kenya treaty of cooperation‖, the two
states agreed to settle the tribal conflict that recurrently occurred among tribal groups of
the two countries in the border areas. The agreement vowed to solve borderland tribal
conflicts in a peaceful manner and to halt those perpetrators, who tried to undermine the
peaceful relation of the two states.464 Likewise, in the treaty of January 31, Ethiopia and
461Mimeographed from two Documents in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign affairs (1977), p.6; Miheret,
p.14.
462 Ibid.
463Onyango, p.179.
464Miheret, p.14.
166
Kenya agreed to promote their cooperation on the areas of development of tourism and
protection of wildlife as well as strengthening cooperation on the areas of culture,
science, mass media, education, transport, trade and economy.465
Apparently, on his three days stay at Addis Ababa, Moi and Mengistu agreed to further
strengthen the long-established amicable relations between the two countries on the
basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial unity.
Furthermore, the leaders of the two countries vowed to work together for the respect of
the principles of territorial integrity as guaranteed by the charters of the UN and the
OAU. Seemingly, both Mengistu and Moi were agreed to deal with the hostility from
Somalia that aimed to break away portions of lands from Ethiopia and Kenya. In the
January 31, 1979 agreement, Moi and Mengistu had also showed their strong adherence
to promote the friendship of the two countries and to provide better life for their people.
There was also agreement between the two countries to further strengthen the issue of
non-interference on the domestic subjects of one-another. In fact, as stated before, there
was major political and ideological shift in Ethiopia in the second half of the 1970. But,
Kenya had never tried to interfere in the affair of Ethiopia to influence the ―trend of
events‖ in Ethiopia to the interest of Kenya. The same was true on the side of Ethiopia
during a regime change in Kenya in 1978. This clearly reflects that the two countries did
not interfere on the affairs of one-another.466
On the other hand, on September 1979, Saudi Arabia, which was instrumental in
separating Somalia from Soviet Union, began a new project to separate Kenya from its
security cooperation with Ethiopia. It was highly believed that this action of Saudi
Arabia was backed by the United States. As a strong ally of the United States, Saudi
Arabia, actively involved on the politics of the Horn partly to undermine the influence
of the Soviet in the region and partly to create its sphere of influence in the region of the
Horn and the Red Sea region. Therefore, very likely, with the recommendation of the
United States, in September 1979, Saudi Arabia tried to mediate the disagreement
between Somalia and Kenya by calling President Moi and President Barry to the city of
465Ibid, p.15.
466United States Joint Publication Research Service, Translation on Sub-Saharan Africa, No.2064-2073
(14
February,1979),p.33,source:https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=DlxEAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcove
r&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
167
Taif for three days discussion. Nonetheless, the efforts of Saudi were not successful
because Moi insisted the unconditional renouncement of Somalia over its territorial
claim on Kenya. Thereby, this state of affair indicated us even if ideological similarity
between countries during the cold war era had its own role for the close attachment of
countries; it did not work for the case of Horn region. This is true mainly because the
issue of national security threat that stemmed from irredentist political thought
surpassed the issue of ideological likeness to create front and cooperation in the region
of the Horn.467
Even if the authorities of Somalia faced a big defeat at the battle of Ogaden (1977-78)
and encountered great economic problem, they were not in a position to change their
foreign policy towards the unification scheme of the Somali inhabited lands in the Horn
region. Accordingly, the authority of Somalia that faced defeat on the face to face battle
returned back to the customary insurgency activity in 1980. As a result, many people
including government officials were killed by the infiltrated insurgent militias in areas
namely Ogaden and NFD. The authority of Ethiopia and Kenya believed that Somalia
was behind the insurgency attacks.468
Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya arranged a consultative committee conference at the
Kenyan city of Mombasa on March 24, 1980. In the meeting, the two nations were
represented by their foreign ministers. Accordingly, the Ethiopian delegates were under
the leadership of Foreign Minister Feleke Giorgis and the delegates of the Kenyan
counterpart were under the headman ship of Dr. Robert Ouko.469
On the March 24 consultative committee conference, the Ethiopian foreign minister
strongly condemned the recurrence of the shifta insurgency attack against Ethiopia and
Kenya. Simultaneously, he asserted the importance of Somalia‘s withdrawal from
arming and financing insurgent groups. Likewise, the Ethiopian foreign minister
insisted the Somalia authority to respect the OAU principles of Uti Possidetis as well as
unconditional renouncement of territorial claim. On the other hand, the foreign minister
of Kenya criticized the reactivation of shifta infiltration by the authority of Somalia. He
467Ododa, p.290; Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.11; Makinda ―Conflict and the
Superpowers in the Horn,‖ p.98.
468Makinda ―Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn,‖ p.97; Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks,‖ p.3.
469Onyango, pp.179-180.
168
had also noted the authority of Somalia about the readiness of Kenya to establish a
friendly government with Somalia in a case the latter renounces its territorial assertion
against neighboring states.470
So, yet again, after the Ogaden war Somalia‘s disloyalty to the OAU principles and its
disrespect to the principle of Uti Possidetis as well as Somalia‘s provocative and
threatening approach to unify the Somali inhabited lands still helped Ethiopia and
Kenya to maintain their security cooperation, to challenge the irredentist move of
Somalia, to secure their territorial integrity and to maintain the power balance and
hegemonic statuesque of the Horn region. Therefore, the issue of security was a
common desire between Ethiopia and Kenya that brought them together and cemented
the two states relations even after Somalia‘s defeat at Ogaden war. However, the
condemnation of Ethiopia and Kenya against the insurgency action of Somalia at the
level of foreign ministers did not get any room on the eyes of Somalia officialdom.
Rather, the Somalia backed insurgency militia killed district officer and other civilian at
a place called Garisa, in Kenya‘s NFD. The same kind of recurrent insurgency attack
was also registered in Ethiopian‘s Ogaden region during the same period. Subsequently,
in order to discuss the recurrent Somalia sponsored insurgency attacks and other
diplomatic issues, Colonel Mengistu arrived at Nairobi on December 1, 1980 for four
days official state visit.471
On his arrival Colonel Mengistu was welcomed by President Moi. On a joint press
release with President Arap Moi, Colonel Mengistu strongly condemned the action of
Somalia‘s shifta infiltration against Ethiopia and Kenya. Concomitantly, as usual,
Mengistu insisted Somalia to renounce its territorial claim and irredentist policy against
neighboring states unconditionally. Mengistu had also condemned the military aid and
the military presence of the United States at Mogadishu. What was irony with the
criticism of Mengistu was that the main military donor of Ethiopia‘s regional security
ally, Kenya, was the leader of the capitalist bloc, United States. But, Menigistu did not
want to remember this issue while showing friendly gesture to Kenya. Rather, he
preferred to condemn recklessly the military presence of the capitalist bloc on the then
470Ibid.
471Addis Zemen, ―Colonel Mengistu‘s State Visit to Kenya‖ (December 1-4, 1980); Makinda ―Conflict
and the Superpowers in the Horn,‖ p.98.
169
common enemy of the two nations, Somalia. Reciprocally, the ―Rusophobia‖ of Kenya
over Russia was ignored by Kenya while Russia was the main military donor for
Ethiopia. This was one of the unique features of cold war in the African Horn.472 In
addition, Mengistu detailed that:
…the arrogant government of Somalia has no desire to learn from history. The
country's policy is a serious danger to Africa and to World peace. Somalia has
opted to be an agent of imperialism. We must therefore exert every effort to
counter such sinister moves in our region as they constitute a direct threat to our
existence and sovereignty....Somalia should renounce her claims on Kenya's and
Ethiopia's territories unconditionally.473
On the other hand, President Moi stated the action of Somalia insurgency actions as
―barbaric‖ that threaten the security and general wellbeing of the inhabitants of the
Horn. The guerrilla warfare and insurgency action of Somalia was also expressed as an
obstacle for the promotion of regional solidarity among the Horn countries. Likewise,
Moi accused Somalia for the absence of peaceful and cooperative political environment
among countries of the Horn region. He had also criticized the OAU for its weakness to
get a lasting peace for the problem of the region. Side by side, Moi asserted the security
cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was not designed to threaten the sovereignty
of any third party rather it was designed to maintain the territorial integrity and ensuring
lasting security of the people of the two countries from any perpetrators.474
The joint communiqué by the leaders of the two states affirms that security reason that
emanated from the Somalia irredentism had triggered the cooperative political approach
between Ethiopia and Kenya. What is unique on the two countries security cooperation
was the divergent ideological thought they follow because of cold war super power
rivalry in the region did not deter the cooperation of the two countries.
472Linda Gwada Oketch, Decision Making Models and Kenya's Foreign Policy: 1964-2002: An Empirical
Assessment of the Kenyatta and Moi Administrations (Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014), p.76;
Addis Zemen, ―Colonel Mengistu‘s State Visit to Kenya‖; Makinda ―Conflict and the Superpowers in the
Horn,‖ p.98.
473Onyango, pp. 181-182; see also African Contemporary Record, In Africa Publishing Company Vol. 13
(New York and London, 1981), p.194.
474Addis Zemen, ―Colonel Mengistu‘s State Visit to Kenya‖; Onyango, p.182.
170
Ultimately, on the joint communiqué, the heads of governments of the two countries
agreed on the following three issues regarding the Somalia irredentism and infiltration
of insurgents: i) formal rejection of territorial claim from Somalia against neighboring
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti; ii) insisted Somalia to accept the 1964 Cairo declaration
and to accept colonial frontiers as a legal frontiers of post-colonial Africa and; iii) nonintervention
on inside issues of other countries as well as avoiding forceful actions on
the relation of other states.475
Following the proceeding of the joint press release by the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative
front, the authority of Somalia objected the accusation of Somalia by the two heads of
governments. Afterwards, the Somalia authority passed an emergency call for the
Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia to discuss on the issue of the Ethiopia-
Kenya joint press release. In the meeting, the authority of Somalia reflected the idea that
Somalia would never be kneel down and retreat back from its policy of uniting the
Somalia inhabited lands for external opposition. Moreover, the Supreme Revolutionary
Council members criticized the Kenyan authorities lining on the same front with
Ethiopia. They stated that: ―What is really surprising is how easily Kenya fell prey into
[Ethiopian] intrigues, and subsequently create in her country unwarranted instability and
chaos and at the same time invite enmity from the Somali government and people which
hitherto had not existed‖.476
Subsequently, in its press release the Supreme Revolutionary Council insisted the
Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to disavow (renounce) their accusation and criticism
against the government of Somalia.477 Concomitantly, the minister of social and
political affairs for Somalia had criticized the joint press release by the Ethiopia-Kenya
front. The person argued that while the authority of Kenya are providing military base
facilities for the United States at Kenyan port of Mombasa, the engagement of Kenya on
propaganda campaign supporting Ethiopia against the cooperation between Somalia and
United States does not give sense anymore. Furthermore, the Somalia minister for social
and political affairs stated that the Kenya and Somalia boundary problems over the NFD
475Onyango, p.183.
476Adar, p.176; see also Somali National News Agency, ―Abyssinian-Kenyan Communiqué Condemned,‖
Daily News Bulletin (Mogadishu, December 8, 1980), p.1.
477Ibid.
171
should get solution based on Article 3 of the principle of OAU rather than engaging on
unnecessary propaganda campaign that further complicate the matter.478 President Barry
on his part asserted that ―Somalia does not have any acute disputes with Kenya
whatsoever but are images and reflections of the past European colonialism‖.479
However, Barry accused Ethiopia for the deteriorated relationship between Kenya and
Somalia. In Barry‘s argument, the false message and portray from Ethiopia was the case
for the weak relationship between Somalia and Kenya.480
This approach of Somalia using appeasing expressions towards Kenya shows the
former‘s interest of rapprochement with Kenya. The rapprochement scheme was aiming
to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia to undermine the security cooperation between the two
nations. So, the appeasing words of Barry over Kenya were stemmed from Somalia‘s
unfolding desire to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia and to weaken the two countries
security cooperation.
On the other hand, in the 1981 OAU summit at Nairobi, Moi and Barry gave a joint
communiqué to improve their relationship. On the joint press release by Moi and Barry,
the two leaders asserted the importance of rapprochement to improve the two countries
relations and for the welfare of the two countries people. Some spectators surprised with
the move of Kenya because as stated above on the OAU Good Office Commission‘s
report about the Ogaden war at the Nairobi summit, Kenya showed its strong sense of
support to Ethiopia but within few days Kenya reflected another gesture approaching
Somalia.481 And many onlookers asked how this could happen.
Here are some of the expected reasons that had instigated Kenya to approach Somalia in
1981. The first reason for the initiation of Kenya‘s rapprochement with Somalia might
be stemmed from the influence of United States on Moi to create peace on its two major
allies on the African Horn. It is apparent that the tension between Kenya and Somalia,
which were strong allies of the United States during the period, was considered as a big
drawback on the eye of United States. Therefore, United States worked and initiated
rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia to reduce the tension amid its ally states in
478Adar, pp.176-177.
479Ibid, p.177.
480Ibid.
481Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ pp.11-12.
172
the Horn region. As stated on the previous discussion, despite its failerity, in 1979
United States had worked to create sense of rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia
with the help of Saudi Arabia. For instance, once the Assistant Secretary of States for
the affairs of Africa named Mr. William Harrop stated that:
Kenya has retained its mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia despite growing concern
over the Soviet and Cuban presence there. Recently, Kenya‘s concerns over
Somalia have appeared somewhat abated. Kenya has indicated that an increase in
U.S influence in Somalia might have a positive influence on Somali policy towards
Kenya.482
This statement of Mr. Harrop clearly shows the orchestrator of the rapprochement
project between Kenya and Somalia was the United States.
The second reason in focus for the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia was
emanated from the ―Russopobia‖ thought in Kenya. As stated on the earlier discussion,
one of the reason for the cooperation been Ethiopia and Kenya during the imperial era
(i.e. in Ethiopia) was the common pro-west thought between Emperor Hailesilase and
Jomo Kenyatta. Thereby, the same was true for the case of rapprochement between the
pro-west Somalia and pro-west Kenya in 1981. The third reason for the rapprochement
between Kenya and Somalia in 1981 was stemmed from change of the Somalia
authority‘s frame of mind towards Kenya but not to Ethiopia.483 For instance, on his
statement on one press release in 1981 Barry stated that ''Somalia is not seeking any
territorial gain from Kenya''. ''We are for accommodation. We are not seeking any
territory from Kenya''.484 On the same discussion Barry stated that the case of Ogaden is
different from the matter in Kenya that the authority of Somalia would never stop
insisting self-determination right for the people of Ogaden.485
However, some authority of Kenya did not like the rapprochement of Kenya with
Somalia and demanded the government of Moi to keep the issue of rapprochement with
Somalia with high reservation and doubt. These groups of the Kenyan politician
reminded the government of Moi to consider the case of rapprochement with Somalia
482Ibid, p.13.
483Ibid, p.12.
484Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks,‖ p.3.
485Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.12.
173
associating the now and again on and off political approach of Somalia by quoting the
détente and afterward era political activities of Somalia as a good example. Likewise,
these groups had marked the word of the previous prime minister of Somalia; Egal that
states the foreign policy of Somalia was to ―stand [with] one leg ready for war and with
the other ready for peace‖.486
The incident of rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia was perceived by different
spectators as if Kenya abandoned the mutual security pact with Ethiopia and sided with
Somalia. Nonetheless, there speculation was wrong because despite its rapprochement
with Somalia the authority of Kenya did not abandoned their mutual security
cooperation with Ethiopia. For instance, in January 1983 the Ethiopia-Kenya
Consultative Summit was held at the city of Mombasa. In the meeting, the issues of
security between the two countries as well as the boundary matter between the two
states were discussed.487
Moreover, despite its rapprochement with Somalia, in March 1983 the Kenyan
authorities sided with Ethiopia to condemn the military aid from western countries
including France, Britain, Italy, and United States to Somalia. On their criticism against
Somalia, President Moi and President Mengistu asserted that the military aid to Somalia
from any external powers might trigger security threat against the Horn countries.488
This shows that the rapprochement policy of Kenya towards Somalia did not hurt the
mutual security pact and the statuesque of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya.
On the other hand, in July 1984, President Moi visited Somalia. Moi‘s visit to
Mogadishu was the first in the history of the two countries at the level of head of state
since colonial independence. In his discussion with Barry; Moi argued the importance
of narrowing the gap between the two countries and to leave the past unhealthy
interaction for history and historian. Additionally, Barry showed a positive gesture to
build a new peaceful political environment that would attract economic, political, social
and cultural development in African Horn. Moi‘s state visit to Somalia urged many
observers to speculate again that the candle of the Ethiopia and Kenya mutual security
486Ibid.
487Onyango, p.207.
488Ibid, p.184.
174
alliance was blowing out. Nonetheless, Moi‘s involvement on the tenth jubilee of
Dergu‘s coming to power, in September 1984, and the subsequent discussion between
Moi and Mengistu about security cooperation and other political matters affirmed the
continuation of the Ethiopia-Kenya front‘s security cooperation.489
On the other insight, the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia had its own
interest on both countries. The authorities of Kenya want to approach Somalia to
influence the irredentist foreign policy of Somalia through positive interstate
interaction. Likewise, Kenya‘s rapprochement was stemmed from the interest of Kenya
to pull Somalia near towards Ethiopia. Under other condition, Somalia‘s rapprochement
policy towards Kenya was emanated from the former‘s interest to isolate Kenya from
cooperating with Ethiopia and to weaken the security cooperation between Ethiopia and
Kenya.490
Therefore, Kenya‘s rapprochement with Somalia was not with the intension to abandon
its mutual security cooperation with Ethiopia. Rather, the intension of Kenya was to
influence the irredentist move of Somalia by showing positive political and diplomatic
gesture to Somalia. For instance, in October 1987 the government of Ethiopia and
Kenya Consultative Committee summit held at Addis Abba. In the conference, as
unusual, the Ethiopia and Kenya delegates condemned the irredentist policy approach of
Somalia against neighboring states and promised to strengthen their security
cooperation. The participants of the summit as usual insisted Somalia to follow and
fully accept the principles of OAU and UN. Concomitantly, the summit presented a call
for international community to stop arming Somalia.491
This marks that as far as Somalia continued with its irredentist policy and refused to
renounce its territorial claim from Ethiopia and Kenya; the two countries cooperative
security alliance would not stop by the policy of rapprochement or any other tactics or
strategies.
489African Contemporary Record, African Publishing Company Vol.17 (New York and London, 1985),
p.276b; see also Onyango, p.208.
490Samuel M. Makinda, Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa (London, 1987), p.48; Onyango,
p.208.
491 Daily Nation, Nirobi, October 13, 1987, p.3.
175
Later, the year 1991 again marked change of leadership in Ethiopia. Even though the
military government of Mengistu Hailemariyam was replaced by the Ethiopian people‘s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) under the leadership of Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi in June 1991, the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was
not interrupted. For instance, President Moi paid state visit to Ethiopia on November 19,
1991 to meet the new Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. In his discussion with
Meles, Moi asserted that his happening at Addis Abba would further strengthen the
cooperation of the two states on different matters including security. Meles, on his part
argued that the long-established cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya will
strengthen more than ever and attain more success for the future.492
At the end of Moi‘s visit the heads of states of the two countries held a joint press
release. On the joint communiqué, both governments marked the commitment of their
administration to work jointly to avert any thereat that could challenge the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of their governments.493
Therefore, the discussion held above shows that despite change of leaderships,
ideological differences, and external pressures the mutual security front between the two
countries continued in unwavering manner. Additionally, the two states cooperation
deepened and cemented from time to time and scored success over success. This all
things were because of the irredentist policy of Somalia and its demand to assign itself
as a sole regional hegemonic power by taking one-fifth of the land of Ethiopia and
Kenya, which was considered as a big security challenge by the two states. Thereby, the
question of survival and statehood status of the two multinational stats, Ethiopia and
Kenya, was one of the primary resons for the flattering relations between the two
nations.
3.6. Peaceful Boundary Diplomacy for the Cooperative Relations between Ethiopia
and Kenya
Ethiopia and Kenya have around 860 KM common frontier line. Except some
conflicting strip of lands such as Gedaduma and Goduma wells the remaining frontier
492Onyango, p.185; Kagwanja, ―Moi Left an Indelible Mark‖.
493 Ibid.
176
between the two states was delineated on paper in the 1907 agreement between the
Kenyan colonial master (Britain) and Emperor Menelik II. Concerning the controversial
strip of lands, Gedaduma and Goduma, along the frontiers of the two states the
boundary commission of Ethiopia and England presented a report in 1957. But, the
authority of Ethiopia declined to accept the proposal of England to solve the issue of
boundary problem on Goduma and Gedaduma. Later, after the full independence of
Kenya the controversial boundary diplomacy between the two states on the issue of
Gedaduma and Goduma was solved by the joint efforts of Emperor Hailesilase and
President Kenyatta in 1970. According to the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement,
the controversial territory of Gedaduma was given to Ethiopia in exchange Kenya got
Goduma wells. In the agreement, Kenya tribes and Ethiopia tribes including their
livestooks was allowed to continue enjoying watering rights to a considerable degree.
The peaceful settlement of boundary helped for the development of peaceful boundary
relation between two states. The presence of peaceful boundary in reverse helped for the
promotion of cooperative relation between the two states despite ideological differences
during the cold war era.494
On the other side, it is believed that the authority of Kenya gave recognition for
Ethiopia to control Gedaduma wells during the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement
mainly because of the recurrent threat of Somalia against one-fifth of the land of Kenya
in the NFD. So, the authority of Kenya preferred to avoid boundary dispute on two
fronts. Therefore, avoiding boundary dispute on two fronts was one of the reasons that
pushed Kenya to easily submit Gedaduma to Ethiopia. In return, Ethiopia, which also
had the same kind of boundary challenge from Somalia, gave the recognition of
Goduma wells to Kenya. The second reason that instigated Kenya and Ethiopia to avoid
confrontation over their boundary was to play exemplary role for the Somalia
authorities by solving their boundary problem peacefully. The third reason that
instigated Kenya and Ethiopia to addressee their boundary problem peacefully was to
show the attainability of the 1964 Cairo declaration that conditions in case of
494Francis Nguendi Ikome, ―The Inviolability of Africa‘s Colonial Boundaries: The Case of the Bakassi
Peninsula,‖ Institute for Global Dialogue No. 47 (2004), p.23; ENALA, General issues on the Ethiopia-
Kenya boundary, 17.2.14.01, from British Embassy (Addis Ababa) to Mammo Tadesse (Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs) (September 28, 1962); ENALA, General issues on the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary,
17.2.14.01, Proces-verbal, the first meeting of the mixed commission drawn from the Kenya and Ethiopia
governments to discuss the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary, July 13th, 1963; Miheret, p.2.
177
disagreement to accept colonial boundary as a legal boundary of post independent
Africa the disputing parties can settle their boundary problem through peaceful
diplomacy. So, Ethiopia and Kenya, which were among the figurehead commentators in
supporting the 1964 Cairo agreement, solved their boundary problem peacefully in
order to be taken as a model for other African countries which had the same kind of
problems. The fourth reason that motivated Ethiopia and Kenya to solve their boundary
problem peacefully was to play a game of peaceful boundary diplomacy and to radiate
their influence in the politics of OAU and to use the opportunity to promote themselves
as a loyal implementer and guard of the OAU principles such as fraternity and
regulating problems peacefully.495
For instance, on its introductory part the July, 1970 Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty,
which has 16 articles, specified the following reason that instigated them to sign this
agreement:
…Wishing to offer the brotherly people of Africa a stimulating example, in the
application of fundamental principles of fraternity. As laid down in the charter of
the organization of African Union have resolved and agreed to conceive treaty
determining the boundary between the two countries and regulating certain matters
pertaining.496
The basis of all the above stated elements and the fundamental reason that instigated
Ethiopia and Kenya to employ peaceful boundary was in order to promote their
cooperation and not to risk their cooperative front for small strips of lands. So, the
promotion of peaceful boundary diplomacy for whatever reason, in return, helped the
two countries to build an all season cooperative front in the African Horn.
Following the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement between Emperor Hailesilase and
President Kenyatta, the two leaders issued a joint press release at the end of
Hailesilase‘s stay in Kenya, from June 10-13, 1970. On the press release, Hailesilase
detailed the peaceful boundary understanding between Kenya and Ethiopia as a victory
495Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ―Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of
Africa,‖ Middle East Journal Vol. 50, No. 3 (Middle East Institute, 1996), p.391-392; Donna R. Jackson,
―The Carter Administration and Somalia,‖ Diplomatic History Vol. 31, No. 4 (Oxford University Press,
2007), p.707; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.27; Betiru, p. 14.
496Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers,
1979), p.2.
178
to further strengthen the two countries friendly disposition, cooperation, harmony and
comprehension. The Emperor had also expressed his confidence that the peaceful
boundary diplomacy would help to promote the security and other kinds of cooperation
between the two states. After his homecoming, Hailesilase had also asserted that the
peaceful boundary demarcation agreement would promote truthful, amicable and
cooperative relations between the two states.497
On the other hand, after the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement, President Kenyatta
stated that the agreement had a big historical value in promoting peace and cooperation
between the two states as well as in serving as a model for other African states which
had the same kind of problem. Kenyatta had also underscored that the boundary
diplomacy and demarcation agreement as a good progress for the prospect peace of the
two nations. Besides, Kenyatta argued that the boundary demarcation agreement as a
good indicator of the mutual understanding and good friendly disposition between the
two states.498 In fact, the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement between Ethiopia and
Kenya was one of the factors that helped the two countries to promote cooperative
relations.
Under other conditions, after signing the 1970 boundary agreement the two countries
gradually understood the necessity of organizing an organ or council that would manage
and promote the peaceful boundary interaction to further the cooperative relations
between the two states. So, both Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a council under the
name of the Ethiopia-Kenyan joint border administrator or commissioner. Accordingly,
the organ of border commissioner or border issue administrator was formed in 1970 at a
meeting held at border town called Moyale. The boundary administrator committee was
given a responsibility to further promote the cooperative relations of the two states
using the peaceful boundary interaction as a base.499
Against this background, since its establishment at the Moyale conference of 1970, the
boundary administrative committee was organized extensively at different levels to the
scale of both counters regional administrations around frontier areas. After its
497Addis Zemen, ―Colonel Mengistu‘s State Visit to Kenya‖; Onyango, p.198.
498Onyango, p.199.
499Betiru, p.15.
179
establishment, in fact, the boundary committee contributed a lot in solving problems
that arise at different areas and regulated frontier problems peacefully that in reverse
helped the cooperative interactions between the two states. Furthermore, the boundary
administrative council or the boundary commission helped the cooperation between
Ethiopia and Kenya by assessing and researching the development of the two countries
boundary diplomacy through arranging different meetings at different level. Whenever
things became above their control, the boundary commission had the right to ask
assistance from their respective central government. In this way, the boundary
administration council of Ethiopia and Kenya helped to promote peaceful boundary
diplomacy between the two nations.500
On the other hand, however, there were problems that had challenged the peaceful
boundary diplomacy. These problems and challenges were stemmed from ineffective
implementation of the 1970 boundary agreement by both nations. It is true that Ethiopia
and Kenya played an exemplary role in solving their boundary problem peacefully and
implemented most of the resolutions in the agreement. But, there were some issues that
were not fully implemented with full heart on both sides. Among issues which were not
fully implemented and then challenged the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the
two states was the matter of traditional trans-border raids.501
The issue of inter-state cross border raids which were committed by different clans and
tribal groups from Ethiopia and Kenya living along the frontier areas of the two states
was one of the recurrent challenges for the peaceful boundary diplomacy of the two
states. Even if the issue was not promoted to the higher stage of diplomatic problem, the
cross border ride repeatedly challenged the peaceful boundary relations of the two
nations. For instance, on February 13, 1966 at the summit of peoples representatives of
Kenya one of the member of the parliament with the name E. D. Godana asserted that
between October 22 and November 20 more than 90 Kenyan were killed at a place
called Marsabit by raiders from Ethiopia. Then, E. D. Godana asked the Kenyan
government to break diplomatic contact with Ethiopia calming Ethiopian was number
500Ibid.
501ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, From Legese Wudu (Minister
D‘état of the Ministry of Administration) to Litunent General Nega Hailesilase (governor General of
Sidamo) (May 21,1971).
180
one enemy of Kenya in the region. However, the then minister of internal affairs for
Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, answered to the question of D. Godana that the raid across the
border of Ethiopia and Kenya was not stemmed from the hostile approach or relation of
the two nations. Rather, Moi asserted, the raid was stemmed from the traditional
hostility among tribal groups living along the frontiers of the two nations. In addition,
Moi argued that the Ethiopian authorities were equally showing concern like the case in
Kenya to manage and control the matter. He had also detailed that there was no reason
that the Kenyan authority to stop diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.502 Similarly, even
after the 1970 boundary agreement, the same kind of cross border raid by hostile clans
continued to challenge the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two nations.503
Subsequently, in order to avert the cross border raids that recurrently challenged the two
countries peaceful boundary relation, the authority of the two nations promoted a law of
gun registration for tribal groups living along the frontiers of the two nations.
Accordingly, on February 13, 1971 the Ethiopia-Kenya consultative committee meeting
held at Nairobi. On the meeting, the committee discussed about the transboundary
conflict among different tribes of the two nations. On this meeting, Article 9 of the
procès-verbal of the consultative committee agreed that tribal groups along the
Ethiopia-Kenya border should register their guns. In the light of this, the gun
registration responsibility was given to the concerned or respective authorities of the
two countries administration along the border regions of the two nations.504
The registration of guns was required because despite the existence of peaceful relation
between Ethiopia and Kenya, there were recurrent cross border raid by different tribes
of the two countries. Therefore, the two countries consultative council afraid the
continuation of the clan based cross border raids might affect the peaceful and
cooperative relations between the two countries. Later, at the end of the February 13,
1971 meeting at Nairobi, the consultative council agreed to meet on June 8, 1971 at
502Onyango, p.197; Nathanial Gronewold, ―Pan-African News Wire: Africa Drought Endangers
Millions,‖ Pan-African News Wire (blog) (July 5, 2011),
http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2011/07/africa-drought-endangers-millions.html.
503Betiru, p.27.
504ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, ―Ethiopia and Kenya border
Security‖ (1971).
181
Addis Ababa to discuss the progress of the two countries boundary diplomacy including
the gun registration and cross border raids.505
In the same vein, in 1971, Ethiopia and Kenya discussed the development of the cross
border raids along the border areas of the two nations and signed the Nairobi treaty. The
1971 Nairobi agreement stated the following four points regarding the role of the Ethio-
Kenya security guards around the frontier areas of the two nations. In the treaty, the
security guards of the two countries had given the responsibility of i) protecting citizens
of both countries from employing on the traditional activity of cross border raids and
murders; ii) protecting the peaceful seasonal cross border mobility of pastoral
communities looking for water and grazing lands; iii) creating awareness to their
respective citizens inhabiting along the border areas about the border limit of each states
and; iv) abstaining itself from taking inhuman and illegal actions on those people who
cross the border instinctively or loosing directions or sense of negligence. In case of
illegal crossing of border, the security guard of each country allowed to treat the illegal
people through the legal agreement signed by the two countries without violating the
basic rights of the people.506
The treaty discussed above shows the commitment of the authority of the two states to
maintain the peaceful boundary diplomacy which had significant contribution for the
development of cooperative political front between the two countries.
Despite Ethiopia and Kenya had been and continued to be a good cooperative neighbor
with peaceful boundary relation, the traditional border raids by different clans carried on
along the frontiers of the two states continued to challenge the frontier security between
the two countries. For instance, in 1973 the issue of cross border raids again discussed
in the parliament of Kenya. Some representatives of the Kenyan parliament accused
Ethiopia for the raids. This accusation happened a year after the Ethiopian authorities
complained Kenya for the same issue at the 1972 boundary commission meeting of the
two countries at the western Ethiopian town, Awasa.507 It was over and over asserted by
505 Ibid.
506ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, A17.2.14.03, ―Proces-verbal on the Ethiopia-
Kenya boundary talks‖ (May 30, 1971).
507ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, B17.2.14.03, Gamo Gofa Governorate
General Police to Dejazmach Amirosilase Abeba (Governor of Gamo Gofa District) (October 6, 1973).
182
the tribes of the two nations that dispute over the pasture lands and restrictions of
movements along the border areas were some of the factors for the tribal clashes. In the
light of this, the authorities of the two nations noted that ―the territorial boundary is
purely for administrative purpose and it doesn‘t restrict movement of anybody‖.508 Yet,
the problem was not defused.
Subsequently, the recurrent cross border raids between tribal groups of the two states
was widely discussed on the fifth consultative boundary commissioners meeting held at
Tika, Kenya between August 7 and 11, 1975. At the meeting, the representatives of the
two countries agreed to create a platform to bring representatives of tribal groups of
both sides to discuss and solve their problem peacefully. The issue of negotiating the
hostile tribal groups was stemmed from the intension of solving the recurrent cross
border raids between the two states. Nonetheless, the peace deal did not bring lasting
peace for the problem. In this regard, after the Tika boundary commissions consultative
meeting and the peace initiation program among tribal groups from both countries, the
cross border raids recurred once again with a short time of silence. For instance, on
September 1, 1975 it was reported that around 1000 cross border raiders, who were
from the member of tribal groups called Hamer, from Ethiopia, crossed to Kenya and
opened fair against the Kenyan police forces and wounded three Kenyan police. After
that, the raider robed around 6000 cattle and 1000 goats. On the other side, the same
kind of raid was done by tribal groups from Kenya against Ethiopian citizens.509
Nonetheless, the tribal based hostility approach among tribal groups of the two states
did not affect the peaceful boundary relation between the two countries. Rather, at the
meeting of the Tika joint council of boundary commission, Ethiopia and Kenya had
agreed to strengthen their security cooperation by allowing a radio communication
between the police forces of the two countries to halt the traditional tribal based cross
508ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Minutes of the Kenya/Ethiopia
Boundary Reconciliation Meeting Held at the Old Todenyang Police Post on 30th, 31st August and 1st
September, 1973.
509ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Colonel Taye Mulat (Gamo Gofa
Province police Director) to Director of the police force at Addis Ababa, ―General Security Report on
Ethiopia-Kenya Frontiers‖ (April 22, 1975); Balambaras Jarso Haleke (Governor of Moyale District) to
Borena Province (April 24, 1975); Fitawurari Haile Bira (Vise Minister of Interior) to Ministry of Interior
(September 19, 1975); Taye Reta (Vise Minister of Boundary Administration) to Fitawurari Haile Bira
(Vise Governor of Gamo Goga District) (September 15, 1974).
183
border raids. After the meeting, for instance, the authority of Kenya stated that ―the
competent authorities of the Republic of Kenya have authorized the use of 5700KHZ
frequency for radio communication between the Kenya and Ethiopian police stations
along the common border‖.510 This shows that despite the presence of traditional cross
border hostile tribal raids, there was peaceful boundary relations between the two
countries at the level of government that helped for the promotion of cooperative
relations between the two states.
The other point in focus during the fifth joint boundary council meeting at Tika was the
issue of Dawa River. The river is originated from Southern Ethiopia, Yirgachefe.
According to the 1970 boundary agreement, the Dawa River was used as a boundary
demarcating reference line between Ethiopia and Kenya for about 200KM. In the 1970
agreement, both countries agreed not to use the river without the permission of oneanother.
But, in the 1973 joint boundary commission investigation trip to see the
situation of the two countries boundary pillars, the Ethiopian delegates identified that
Kenya was using water from Dawa River for irrigation at places like Mandera and
Ramu without notifying Ethiopia. Then after, the Ethiopian representatives at the joint
boundary council meeting, at Tika, raised the issue of using Dawa River for irrigation
by the Kenyan. But, Kenya denied the accusation. Rather, Kenya argued that the
pipelines from Dawa River to Mandera and Ramu were installed for daily consumptions
of the inhabitants of the Mandera and Ramu. However, despite Kenya had no
established legal right to use the water of Dawa River without Ethiopia‘s recognition,
the issue was temporarily delayed to discuss the matter on more detail by organizing
special commission to conduct study and report about the issue.511
But, here, it is vital to note that the opposition of Ethiopia over the usage of Dawa River
for irrigation by the Kenyan side was not stemmed from hostile boundary relation
between the two states. Rather, the opposition of Ethiopia emanated from the challenge
that the continuation of using the river for irrigation might cause shortage of water
during the arid season for Ethiopian citizens inhabiting from Melka Sedi to Melka Softu
510ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments frontier security issues, 17.2.14.02, From Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Nairobi to Imperial Ethiopian Embassy (March 6, 1974).
511ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Andargachew Abegaz (Boundary
Council Political Expert), ―Notes on Mandera Meeting‖ (May 7, 1974).
184
areas. In addition, the opposition of Ethiopia over Kenya‘s action stemmed from the
apprehension of Ethiopia that the silence would cost more to stop the move of Kenya on
Dawa River for the future. Nonetheless, Ethiopia did not want to go to aggressive
diplomacy to stop the move of Kenya. Rather, Ethiopia proposed the establishment of a
joint commission from both countries to study the issue of Dawa River. This move
helped the two states to continue peaceful boundary relation and promote the
cooperation of the two neighboring states.512
In view of this, unlike with Somalia, the officialdom of Ethiopia and Kenya did not
have hostile frontier relationship at list at the level of government. So, on the sixth joint
boundary council meeting, which was held at Dire Dewa, Ethiopia, in 1976 the two
countries agreed to further strengthen the peaceful boundary relationship between the
two countries. But, like those previous joint boundary commissions consultative
summit, the sixth summit‘s discussion was also overshadowed by the issue of the
traditional cross border tribal raids.513
Concomitantly, the boundary council meeting which was held at Addis Ababa in the
same year, 1976, as well as the continuous meetings which were conducted by the two
countries at the levels of heads of states and ministers was productive and fruitful in
creating peaceful boundary relations between the two states. For instance, during his
January 1979 visit to Addis Ababa, President Moi indicated that the working together of
the two states to solve the boundary issue peacefully helped for the development of
flattering relations amid them. Additionaly, Moi remarked the significance of the
recognition of colonial boundary as a legal boundary and the recognition and
implementation of the principles of international organizations (i.e. OAU and UN) to
ensure peaceful boundary relation between the two nations. He also argued that the
recognition of the OAU and the UN resolutions had helped to promote good
neighborliness and cooperation between the two states. At the end of the 1979 Moi‘s
state visit in Ethiopia, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the
two countries. Afterward, the border administration council meeting was held at
512ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary , B17.2.14.02, Getahun Tesema (Minister) to
Mr. Asefa Mengesha (Minister D‘état for National Water Resources) (September 12, 1974).
513ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Boundary Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Sidama District Administrative Office
to the General Director of Police at Addis Ababa, ―Ethiopia and Kenya Frontier Administration‖ (April
22, 1976).
185
Nakuru, Kenya in 1979. Later, in March 1980 the 28th joint ministerial meeting of
Ethiopia and Kenya was held at Mombasa, Kenya. Likewise, in 1981 the Ethiopia-
Kenya consultative committee meeting was held at Awasa, Ethiopia. The 1981 meeting
discussed on the matter of the continued challenge of cross border raids. In this meeting,
the council agreed to solve the problem by increasing the security forces along the
frontiers. In the same way, in 1983 and afterward years until the inception of 1990s
different meetings were held to halt the traditional cross border raids.514 These all
meetings and boundary discussions had helped to promote the peaceful boundary
diplomacy and cooperation between the two countries.
514Miheret, p.15.
186
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOMALIA-KENYA HOSTILE AND
STRESSFUL RELATIONS (1960-1991)
The presence of a significant number of the Somali speaking communities in the NFD
of Kenya together with the rise of the Somali nationalism challenged the territorial
integrity of Kenya like the case in Ethiopia. The hostile and stressful political
interactions between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991
was part of the unpleasant relationships of the HoA countries that stemmed from the
Somali‘s secessionist movement and Somalia‘s territorial claim from neighboring states
including Kenya. Furthermore, the Somalia-Kenya unpleasant relations was stemmed
from issues such as, among others, the pan-Somali irredentist movement, external
powers involvement, conflicting demand for self-determination vs. territorial integrity,
insurgency and counter insurgency activities, and head strong diplomatic approach amid
the two nations.
In decades following all the way to WW II, the question of establishing Greater Somalia
became the figurehead issues among the Somali nationalists and their parties. In the
light of this, the SYL and the Northern Province People‘s Progressive Party (NPPPP)
were among those ardent advocators of the greater Somalia subject in the Kenyan NFD.
One of the targets of the supporters of the greater Somalia concept was to annex the
NFD of Kenya either through employing peaceful self-determination or through means
of destabilizing Kenya by infiltrating shifta warriors.
The NFD of Kenya or at present named the North-eastern province of Kenya covers
one-fifth of the entire territory of Kenya. The NFD comprises six administrative subdistricts
namely, Wajar, Garisa, Mandera, Mersabit, Isolo, and Moyale that were
populated by the pastoral communities of Somali, Gabra, Rendille, and Boran.
Approximately sixty percent of the residents of the NFD are ethnic Somali. There have
also been ethnic Oromo populations in the NFD, who constitute the highest number in
Ethiopia. Apparently, most of the indwellers of the NFD led a mobile and unsettled life
on the arid and semi-arid climate of the NFD. Up until 1940s, the British colonial rulers
employed an isolated colonial administration in the NFD. This had been done by the
British colonial rulers for security and economic reasons. The NFD is not as such
attractive and suitable for agricultural contractors. As a result, the colonial
187
administrators categorized the region as non-profitable for investment. Thereby, the
protectorete of the NFD was used as a buffer zone from neighboring governments such
as the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. In 1926 the military rule of the British colonial
power declared the NFD as a closed district. In 1934 the NFD was classified as a special
district. Despite the Somali nationalism grow stronger in other Somali inhabiting
territories of the HoA in the 1940s and 1950s; the isolation of the NFD hindered the
blooming of the same experience in the district until 1960. In 1960 the British
colonizing power removed the restriction of political dispensation in the districat.515
By 1960, following the lifting of the ban on the activity of political polity in the NFD,
the Somali residents of the NFD massively supported the scheme of greater Somalia and
showed their unlimited support to the Northern Province People‘s Progressive Party
(NPPPP), which was the predominant and prominent party in the district. NPPPP was
the leading proponent of the greater Somalia scheme throughout the region.
Nonetheless, the demand of the NPPPP and its supporters to come together with
Somalia contradicted with the interest of parties in Kenya such as KADU and KANU
that believes the NFD as one of Kenya‘s territories. As a result, in the action of
decolonization activity both the Somalia and Kenya political elites and nationalists
advocated and conceptualized for their followers about ―their own privileged
conceptions of the nation-state and portrayed competing visions as illegitimate‖.516
Besides, they tried to project their advocacy of nationalism in accordance with the post
WWII geopolitical mode of the international system.517
Against this background, this chapter helps to figure out more about the historical
dynamics and process of the Somalia and Kenya hostile and stressful relations between
1960 and 1991 through dividing into four main sections. The first section examines the
dynamics of hostility between Somalia and Kenya from 1960 to 1967, which is labeled
as the era of unpleasant diplomacy, insurgency and counter-insurgency. The second
section deals with the era of reconciliation and relative peace between Kenya and
Somalia from 1968 to 1969. The third section examines about the era of distrust
515John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Zed Books, 1990), p.182.
516Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P Rotich, Kenya after 50:
Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones (Macmillan Publisher, 2016), pp.65-66.
517Ibid.
188
between Kenya and Somalia from 1970 to 1980. The last section explore about the era
of reconciliation and rapprochement between the two nations from 1981 to 1991. In the
process of discussing the Kenya-Somalia relations on the above four sections the
reaction of Ethiopia is also considered.
In this chapter it is intended to answer questions like how hostile political relations and
distrust developed between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and
1991. How Ethiopia reacted to the hostility and distrustful relations between Kenya and
Somalia.
In the light of this, it is realized that the territorial claim of Somalia over the
northeastern territories of Kenya; the involvement of Somalia on the shifta (bandit) war
against Kenya; the destabilization efforts of Somalia against Kenya or the vise verse;
the issue of irredentism; the issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity; the
efforts of Kenya to isolate Somalia by signing an agreement of cooperation with
Ethiopia in 1963 can be taken as the bases for the distrust and hostile manner of political
relations amid Kenya and Somalia, 1960-1991. On the other side, it is believed that the
Ethiopian authority cooperated with Kenya to isolate Somalia from the regional and
continental political diplomacy.
4.1. Early Diplomacy and Conflicting Postures (1960-1963)
The Kenya-Somalia relations throughout the period between 1960 and 1991 was far less
pleasant and more of hostile and stressful. This was partly because of the irredentist
movement in Somalia and the secessionist assertion by the Somalis over the NFD of
Kenya. The attitude of the Somalia authorities to unify all the Somali speaking
communities across the Horn region under a single flag had been among the triggering
factors for the hostility, cynicism and distrust amid Kenya and Somalia. Makinda
argued that the demand of self-determination by the minority Somalis in the
neighboring countries and the unification agenda of all Somalis under a single
government was the corner stone of the Somalia authority‘s foreign policy since its
189
independence in June 1960 up to 1991, which in turn had worsened the hostility of
Somalia with Kenya and Ethiopia.518
The pan-Somali wave that reached at its height following the independence of Somalia
was accompanied by the lifting of the ban by the British colonial rule on the movement
of political organizations in the NFD. The lifting of the ban opened a good opportunity
for the Somali inhabitants in the NFD to express their wish fearlessly. Political parties
such as the SYL and the NPPPP had also begun an active campaign in the region. The
change of the British policy over the NFD and the opening of the political field invited
Somalia to involve actively on the politics of the NFD. Besides, Somalia developed a
good hope on its move to unify the NFD with Somalia Republic through employing
peaceful self-determination. Apparently, the authority of Somalia was hopeful that the
British rule will accept the peaceful self-determination proposal of Somalia to decide
the subject of the NFD. In view of this, in November 1961, to use the opportunity of the
opened political platform in the NFD, the supreme national assembly of Somalia issued
a resolution that requests the union of the NFD of Kenya with Somalia. However, the
demand of the Somalia national assembly faced a strong opposition from the Kenyan
political parties such as KANU and KADU.519
In order to cool down the growing demand of the pan-Somali nationalists on the
creation of the greater Somalia, the issue of East African Federation was suggested by
Jomo Kenyata and the Ethiopian authorities. In the proposal, it was believed that the
unity of Somalia would be accomplished through the establishment of the East African
Federation. However, Somalia demanded the self-determination of all the Somali
inhabiting regions of the Horn region as a prerequisite to accept the proposal of East
African Federation or to accept any reform in the existing political order of the
region.520
518Samuel Makinda, ―Kenya‘s Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict,‖ Working Paper No. 55 (Strategic
and Defense Studies Centre, Australia, 1982), p.2; ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02,
March 18, 1976.
519Mohammed Farah, ―From Ethnic Response to clan Identity: A Study of State penetration among the
Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern Kenya,‖ (Uppsala Stockholm: Academiae Ubsaliensis
distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), p.38.
520David E. Kromm, ―Irridentism in Africa: The Somalia-Kenya Boundary Dispute,‖ Transactions of the
Kansas Academy of Science Vol.70, No.3 (Publisher of Kansas Academy of Science, 1967), p.362.
190
In the meantime, Somalia requested the authority of Britain to ensure the selfdetermination
right of the inhabitants of the NFD.521 The demand of Somalia to ensure
the self-determination right of the inhabitants of the NFD, for instance, was reflected on
one of the public statements of President Osman. His public speech reads:
With regard to the Somalis in Kenya, the view of the Somalia Republic is that the
future of the NFD remains one for final settlement by the British government
before Kenya achieves independence. It believes that the British should apply the
principle of self-determination to the Somalis in the NFD, permitting them to
become a part of the Somali Republic.522
The above speech of President Osman reflects the trusts of the authority of Somalia on
the British to apply the principle of self-determination for the Somali inhabitants in the
NFD and to end the complication in the district.
However, the government of Britain advised the authority of Somalia to talk up on the
subject with the Kenyan nationalist leaders.523 Afterwards, in July and August 1962,
Somalia offered invitation to the heads of the two big parties in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta
of KANU and Ronald Ngala of KADU respectively to Mogadishu. On their discussion
with President Osman, both Kenyatta and Ngala strongly opposed the idea of selfdetermination
and secession of the NFD.524 For instance, on a dinner prepared for his
honor Kenyatta stated that ―the NFD problem was a domestic Kenyan affair in which
Somalia was not to interfere‖.525 The argument of Kenyatta that asserted the issue of the
NFD as the sole concern of Kenya was not easy to be accepted by the Somalia
authority. As a result, in reaction to Kenyatta‘s speech the then prime minister of
Somalia, Sharmarke, responded in a similar language asserting ―…any external
opposition to Somali reunification is considered as interference in the domestic affairs
of the Somali people‖.526
Moreover, in reaction to the speech of Kenyatta, President Osman on his part stated the
following:
521Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.100.
522Onyango, p.111.
523Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.100.
524Laitin, ―Somali Territorial Claims,‖ p.31; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.101.
525Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.101; see also Touval, The Boundary Politics, pp.213-214.
526Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.101.
191
The principle of self-determination, when used properly to unify and enlarge an
existing state with a view towards its absorption in a federal system of government
is neither balkanization nor fragmentation. It is a major contribution to unity and
stability, and is totally consistent with the concept of pan-Africanism.527
President Osman also continued to explain that not only the Somalia inhabitants at the
NFD in Kenya but also the Somalis across the Horn region including in Ethiopia and
Djibouti are longing to unite with the Somalia Republic. We in this Republic are also in
the same attitude dreaming the unification of all the Somalis across the Horn region.528
KADU‘s President, Ngala, on his part implied that he would be ready for an open
exchange of ideas based on the findings of the commission. However, Ngala ―left little
hope that he would agree to anything less than a regional form of government based on
the existing boundaries‖.529
Yet again, in 1962, the representatives of the NFD had demanded to unite with Somalia
at the Kenya constitutional conference held at Lancaster House in London between
February and April. In the conference the eight Somali representatives of the NFD
insisted a self-determination plebiscite under the supervision of the UN. The
incorporation of the NFD‘s representatives to involve on the negotiation of the Kenyan
political independence at the Lancaster House looked like giving accreditation and
legitimacy for the secessionist question of the inhabitants of the NFD. In the light of
this, the demand of the NFD representatives faced a strong objection from KANU and
KADU representatives in the meeting. Even some representatives of KANU suggested
that the NFD is part of Kenya and if the Kenyan-Somalis are not interested to be under
the Kenyan administration they can leave the land and go to Somalia. Ethiopia on its
part supported the views of the Kenyan leaders and put pressure on Britain. Ethiopia
argued that allowing the secession of the NFD could be a bad example for Africa that
527Adar, p.136.
528Ibid, p.5.
529Castagno, p.177.
192
would lead to the balkanization of the continent. For that matter, this view of Ethiopia
increased its cross-border incursions with Somalia.530
Subsequently, the colonial secretory of Britain, Reginald Maudling, rejected the
Lancaster House proposal of the NFD representatives that desire to conduct a
referendum under the regulation and monitoring of the UN. However, in order to
hamper the escalated issue temporarily and to appease the authority of Somalia, in
October 1962, the British colonial rule assigned a commission to determine the future
desires of the residents of the NFD.531
In this light, on October 22, 1962, the commission started its survey at the NFD under
the leadership of a Nigerian judge and Canadian general. The commission came back to
Nairobi on November 15 surveying the public opinion in the NFD. As reported by the
survey of the commission, three opinions were observed dominant: i) the first group of
opinion was categorized as pro-Somali (secessionist); ii) the second group of opinion
was pro-Kenya (unionist) and; iii) the third group is categorized as neutral (undecided).
In the survey, the Somali inhabitants‘ at all six administrative areas of the NFD fevered
union with Somalia. The Muslim Boran communities at Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir,
Mandera, and Moyale administrative regions undisputedly supported union with
Somalia. The Rendille community that covers almost half of the inhabitants of Marsabit
administrative region had also supported union with Somalia.532
On the other hand, the non-Muslim Oromo of Isiolo, the non-Muslim Borana of Isiolo,
the non-Muslim Boran of Moyale, the Riverine community of Garissa and the Gabbra
community at Marsabit strongly advocated and supported the pro-Kenyan idea.
Particularly, the non-Muslim Boran, Burji, and Gabra minority groups at Marsabit
strongly objected the cessation of the NFD. From the six administrative divisions of the
NFD the home for the highest number of pro-Kenyan view was at Marsabit. Besides,
Marsabit was the center for the pro-Kenyan party in the NFD that was named the
Northern Province United Association (NPUA). Most of the members of NPUA were
530Hannah Alice Whittaker, ―The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta Conflict in Kenya, c. 1963-8,‖
The Journal of African History Vol. 53, No. 3 (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.392; Castagno,
pp.176-177; Otunnu, pp.21-22.
531Colestock, p.62.
532Castagno, pp.178-179.
193
minority and non-Muslim inhabitants of the NFD. The pro-Kenyan affection for the
minority inhabitants of the NFD was stemmed from the fear of the Somali domination
and to safeguard their minority concern on areas like local trade, which was under their
control. The non-Muslim Gelubba community that had a kind of relations with the
Oromo remained neutral. However, there were some Gelubba that biased for the
Somali. From the survey of the commission, it is understood that the division of the pro-
Somali and pro-Kenya looks like a division between the non-Muslim and Muslim,
rather than on ethnic line. For instance, even if the Boran and Gabbra have a close
cultural and linguistic relations with their co-tribesmen in Ethiopia, neither of them
showed any interest to be united with Ethiopia.533
In December 1962, the member of commissioners disclosed that all the six districts of
the NFD fevered to unite with Somalia. In light of this, Somalia announced that 88
percent of the inhabitants of the NFD demanded unification with Somalia. However,
paradoxically, in March 1963 the British colonial rule declared the NFD as the seventh
district of Kenya.534
Besides, after the official publication of the commission‘s report in December 1962, the
government of Britain introduced an administrative division for the NFD. Given this,
districts like Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir were reorganized under the North-eastern
region. The Somalis at Isiolo, the Muslim Boran communities at Isiolo, and Moyale
were placed under eastern region. This was done in order to weaken the anti-Kenya
resistance movements in the NFD. The authority of Somalia strongly objected the
administrative division in the NFD and urged the government of Britain to consider the
self-determination subject of the NFD as rapidly as possible. The absence of any clear
response either from the British or from the Kenyan escalated the tension in the district
and Somalia noticed that it could not take any responsibility ―for what might happen in
the N.F.D‖.535
Here it is important to mark the mistake of the British government in handling the
secessionist idea of the Somali nationalists in the Horn of Africa in general and in the
533Whittaker, ―The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta,‖ p.397; Castagno, pp.178-179.
534Kromm, p.362.
535Castagno, p.180.
194
NFD in particular. The British government conducted a plebiscite to decide the prospect
political fate of the inhabitants of the NFD. Nevertheless, the British refused to
recognize the outcome of the 1962 referendum. The situation was considered as betrayal
by the authority of Somalia and the inhabitants of the NFD that strongly desired to join
Somalia. The consequence leads to a widespread economic and political complication in
the region of the Horn and the NFD. Likewise, the rejection of the outcome of the
referendum resulted in the development of distrust and dubiety political environment
between the Kenyan government and the pastoral society of the NFD. The situation had
also heralded the beginning of the worst guerilla resistance straggle which was called
shifta war that costs the life of many thousands.536 Regarding the situation, Schlee
marked that:
To hold a referendum and then to act contrary to its results was asking for trouble:
trouble not for the British who withdrew but for the Kenyans who took over.
Because of the referendum central Kenyans knew exactly what to think about the
northern Kenyans and war was the immediate result. Guerilla actions of varying
intensity flared throughout the decade. This was the so-called shifta emergency,
derived from the Amharic word for ‗bandit‘.537
Later, in August 1963 the authority of Britain and Somalia conducted a discussion at
Rome about the finding of the commission over the NFD. However, the British
government persisted on the same position. In the progress of their discussion, the
British delegate over and over asserted that ―…her Majesty‘s government will take no
unilateral decision involving a change in the frontiers of Kenya‖.538
The situation remarked the defeat of Somalia‘s diplomatic attempt with the British
government to unify the Somalis in the NFD with Somalia through the code of selfdetermination.
On the other hand, Kenya was a head of the game in their drive to get the
heart of Britain to maintain the NFD as part of Kenya. In this light, Britain‘s former idea
536Hussein A., p.7.
537Günther Schlee, Identities on the Move – Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya, 1st Edition
(Münster: Gideon S. Were Press, 2000), p.51.
538Adar, p.234.
195
to establish greater Somalia in the 1940s had been eroded and despaired through the
passage of time and replaced by strengthening the territorial unity of Kenya.539
The disregard of the British authority to the finding of the commission was stemmed
from the following three reasons; i) pressure from the government of Ethiopia; ii) the
agreement between Britain and KANU officials on the issue of the white settlers in
Kenya and; iii) in the circle of most African states the case of Kenya had stronger
support than the case of Somalia.540
Subsequently, on March 18, 1963 Somalia officially severed its diplomatic interaction
with Britain. However, on the other side of the coin, Somalia continued its attempt to
convince the authority of Kenya to allow the self-determination right for the inhabitants
of the NFD. But, the Kenyan leaders were not in a position to give space for the claim
of Somalia. As a result, the hostility and distrust between Somalia and Kenya grow
higher more than ever before. The Somalia authority began involving on an aggressive
diplomacy and violent actions to achieve their claim which was denied through
negotiations. For instance, the shifta guerrilla groups backed by the Somalia
government seriously challenged the creation of an ―effective boundary‖ by the
government of Kenya. The shifta rebel groups were organized in bands that range
between fifteen and thirty solders. The shifta rebel regularly launched their subversive
trans-boundary attack at night on strategic governmental organizations such as police
posts, administrative posts, and government conveys. Besides, whenever suitable the
shifta men attack government officials and supporters of governments.541
In the midst of the sporadic protest conflicts were occurred between the pro-Kenya and
pro-Somalia inhabitants at the NFD and at Nairobi. A number of Somali protestors were
killed by the Kenyan police. Several others including the chairman of the NPPPP, Alex
Kholkholle, and other members of the party were arrested. In the meantime, Somalia
warned Britain to remove its support for Kenya against the pro-Somalia groups in the
NFD. In the core of the growing opposition the government of Kenya declared state of
emergency on the NFD and closed its border with Somalia. Besides, Kenya restricted
539Colestock, p.33.
540Otunnu, p.22.
541Kromm, p.363; J. Drysdale, ―Somali Frontier Problems,‖ World Today: Chatham House Review
Vol.20, No.1 (1964), p.2.
196
nonessential travel to and from the NFD. President Kenyatta also stated that ―Kenya
would not give an inch [of land] and that the Somalis could pack up their camels and
leave‖.542
On the flip side, even though the authority of Somalia recurrently rejected the
accusation of Kenya, it had provided military and material aid to the anti-Kenyan shifta
bands in the NFD. The armament and ammunition for the shifta bands in the NFD
totally originated from Somalia. The support of Somalia for the shifta guerrilla groups
in the NFD also includes radio campaign through the ―voice of Somalia radio in
Mogadishu‖. The radio campaign motivated the guerrilla movement in the NFD while it
hinders the authority of Kenya to build an ―effective boundary‖.543
In January 1962, at the all African people‘s conference held in Nigeria, Legos, the
Prime Minister of Somalia, Ali Shermarke, suggested the union of the Somalia minority
at Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti with Somalia. However, the suggestion of Ali
Shermarke did not get acceptance by the majority of the delegates.544
So, the greatest hostility that escalated in the ―immediate week‖ of the declaration of the
NFD as an integral part of Kenya continued to be the center of the problem for three
decades on the bases of the conflicting interests of the principles of self-determination
and territorial integrity which were advocated by Somalia and Kenya respectively. In
May 1963, at the commencement of the OAU at Addis Ababa, President Osman of
Somalia tried to address the problem at the NFD and Ogaden districts. In his speech,
President Osman argued that the agitation and instability at the NFD and Ogaden
districts would only crystalize in the case of answering the self-determination demands
of the Somali people in those districts. The Kenyan delegate condemned the recurrent
territorial claim and self-determination proposal of Somalia.545 The objection of the
Kenyan commission or envoy reads: ―the principle of self-determination has relevance
542Castagno, p.180.
543Colestock, p.62-63.
544Castagno, p.182.
545Farah, p.84; Adar, p.101.
197
where foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial
disintegration by dissident citizens‖.546
The representative of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habitewelid, supported the arguments of the
Kenyan delegate and stated that ―a brother State' should have felt it necessary 'to exhibit
in public our petty differences' and thus injure the dream of African unity‖.547 The
representative of Mali, Modibo Keita, also protested the idea of President Osman and
demanded representatives in the conference to maintain the colonial frontiers of Africa
as a legitimate and authorized frontier.548
In light of this, the May 1963 African Heads of States conference was one of the early
occasions that showed the decline of the Somalia‘s idea of greater Somalia. Besides, the
conference helped to isolate Somalia‘s idea and position about colonial boundary and
pan-Africanism from the other African countries. The conference also reflects the
influential position of Kenya and Ethiopia on African affairs more than Somalia
Republic.
4.2. The Shifta Installment in the Light of the Kenya-Somalia Hostile Relations
(1964-1967)
The northeast African region, where shifting of frontier lines were one of the norms of
the administrations of the area for centuries, began to experience a fixed frontier line
following the coming of colonial powers to the region. The presence of shifting frontier
line put into confrontation different local chiefs before the arrival of European powers.
Despite the magnitude was considerably declined, the confrontation was continued in
the 19th century and afterward eras even among colonial powers. The implementation
of strait line colonial boundaries together with unfixed frontier matters during colonial
era leave behind its legacies of confrontation for the post-colonial era African heads.
One of the best examples of the frontier controversies of the HoA that stemmed from
the legacy of the colonial period was the Kenya-Somalia frontier dispute over the NFD.
As it was mentioned on the previous chapters, the authority of Somalia recurrently
argued that the issue of frontier disagreement over the NFD was not merely drowning
546Adar, pp.101-102.
547Castagno, p.182.
548Ibid.
198
line on the map or placing borderline pillars on the ground. Rather, Somalia asserted
that the issue is about deciding the destiny of the Somali kinsmen that have the same
linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds but under different jurisdictions.549
Even if the Kenya-Somalia boundary complication has its own unique characteristics,
the major source of complication for both the Ethio-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia
boundary problem was common; one among the others was the Somali irredentism.
Meaning matters that affected the Ethio-Somalia‘s relations in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s also affected the Kenya-Somalia relations in the same period.550 Thus, the
Somalia irredentist movement to secede the NFD of Kenya was one of the elements that
laid the ground for the birth of the shifta movement in the NFD.
The word shifta is originally copied from Ge‘ze and commonly used in the Ethiopian
Amharic language which has a meaning equivalent to bandit or the one who led his
lives through banditry. The word shifta has a pejorative representation in Kenya and
largely used for the insurgent groups in the NFD. Some of the groups in Ethiopia that
used to use the name shifta were a rebel fighters or guerilla fighters that fight and
challenge the authority of existing governments. A good example of those shifta that
challenge the authority of existing government was Kassa Hailu of Quara (later renamed
Emperor Tewodros II after his coronation), who laid the foundation for the modern
unification of Ethiopia in 1855.551
In the 1950s the word shifta represents a group of gungs that frequently ride and steal
livestock along the Ethio-Kenyan frontiers. Later, in 1960s Ethiopia and Kenya began to
use the term shifta to describe those insurgency and rebel Somali fighting groups that
demand territory from Ethiopia and Kenya. Although the authority of Somalia under its
spokesperson rejected the use of the word shifta and tried to substitute it with ―freedom
fighters‖ and ―Somali nationalist‖, yet the word remained unchanged. Through the
549Thompson, p.11.
550Ibid.
551Donald Crummey, ed., Banditry, Rebellion, & Social Protest in Africa (London : Portsmouth, N.H:
Heinemann, 1986), PP.133-135; Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, p.1.
199
passage of time, however, the Somalia ministers and Somalia‘s spokes men had also
begun to use the word shifta to refer the rebel groups and insurgents.552
Therefore, the shifta insurgent in the Kenya-Somalia relations is about the guerilla
resistance movement that launches irregular attack against the Kenyan army, police, and
civilian villagers in the NFD. The shifta attack was launched using the feeble and ill
vigilant frontier between Kenya and Somalia. As mentioned before, the spirit behind the
shifta movement in the NFD was the government of Somalia with the aim of creating
greater Somalia through seceding the NFD from Kenya, Ogaden from Ethiopia, and
Djibouti from the rule of France. The most successful and active period on the guerilla
resistance of the shifta over the Kenyan NFD was from the beginning of 1964 to the end
of 1967. But the shifta guerilla movement in the NFD was fluctuated based on political
situation between Somalia and Kenya in particular and the Horn region in general.553
The shifta installment over the NFD of Kenya officially inaugurated following the
official declaration of the predominant Somali inhabiting land in the northeastern Kenya
(i.e. the NFD) as the seventh district of Kenya. The first shifta operation was conducted
against the Rhamu police post on November 1963. Later, on December 25, 1963 a
group of shifta gangs about fifty in number attacked Galole police poste. As a result of
the attack, three Kenyan and one shifta gangs were died. Concomitantly, the shifta
warriors terrorized the inhabitants of the NFD. With the growth of instability in the
NFD the degree of violence started to spread to other regions of Kenya.554
In order to reduce and halt the recurrent shifta assaults in the NFD, the authority and
political elites of Kenya introduced and proposed several action plans. Some of the five
major action plans introduced by the government and parliamentary representatives of
Kenya were the following.
The first official response of the Kenyan authority towards the shifta insurrectionary
attack came in December 25, 1963 when Jomo Kenyatta declared a state of emergency
on the NFD. The state of emergency was declared after conducting an emergency
552Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, p.51.
553Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (Yale University Press, 2011), p. 30;
Thompson, p.11.
554Thompson, p.11.
200
cabinet meeting at Nairobi. In the emergency law five miles restricted zone was
declared along the Somalia-Kenya frontier. In fact, in 1966 the restricted zone was
increased from five miles to fifteen miles. The expansion of the restricted zone along
the Kenya-Somalia frontier was required because of the rise of the shifta assault during
the period. According to the emergency law, any person found in the prohibited zone
without the essential allowance was allowed to arrest. A person arrested on the
prohibited zone detained for 28 days without any question and trial. In the same vein,
the emergency law authorized the security forces in the NFD to use firearms and any
necessary measures if individual failed to respect the order of the security force. The
security force had also got the right to search, catch, and explore the vehicles,
properties, and houses of suspected individuals without warrant. Moreover, the
government of Kenya deployed its army in the NFD in a fight against the shifta
mutineers. Afterward, the Kenyan army and police forces started a patrol work to
destroy the shifta camps in the prohibited zone of the NFD and along the Kenya-
Somalia border.555
In spite of the declaration of the five mile emergency zone over the Kenya-Somalia
frontier, the government of Kenyatta did not get the approval of the emergency law by
the Kenyan Peoples Representatives. Thereby, in order to approve the emergency law
the Kenyan Peoples Representatives was called for an emergency session on December
31, 1963. While explaining the severity of the shifta situation in the NFD, Kenyatta
stated that:
Since the 13th November, when the Shifta gangsters commenced their activities,
there have been thirty-three separate incidents involving the use of firearms.
During that time three civilians have been killed and eighteen wounded: security
forces have lost two killed and fourteen wounded. The attackers are well organized,
demonstrating great ruthlessness, good tactics and strategy. More disquieting has
been the free use of automatic weapons by Shifta, a sure sign that a mastermind is
behind the attacks. Figures in my possession show that about 2,000 Shiftas are
believed to be based mainly in Somalia, and about 700 are operating within the
North-Eastern Region. Of these, however, it is estimated that only 150 are in
possession of arms. It would be a dereliction of duty for our Government to stand
555Whittaker, ―The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta‖, P.403, Adar, p.104.
201
by and let the situation slide while the majority of peaceful citizens continue to be
intimidated, terrorized, maimed, and, in some cases, deprived of life.556
The above statement from Kenyatta reflects the active involvement of Somalia on the
shifta operation against the Kenya‘s NFD.
In the parliamentary debate one member of the parliament dealing with the emergency
law and the general matter of the NFD and the active involvement of the government of
Somalia stated the following:
People who talk of African unity must accept the integrity of the sovereign states in
Africa first. The Kenya leaders should not sit with the Somalia leaders in
conferences unless they are prepared to listen and respect the sovereignty and
integrity of Kenya‘s territorial boundaries. Until the five stars on the flag of the
Somalia Republic are redused to [two] we will not have peace in the NorthEastern
Region.557
The above argument of the parliamentary representative reflects that Somalia was the
mastermind for the unrest in the NFD. The argument of the representative also indicates
that for the permanent peace in the NFD Somalia‘s renouncement of its territorial
assertion over the NFD was taken remarkable.
However, in the parliamentary debate the representatives of KADU under the leadership
of Mr. Ngala refused to accept the emergency law in the NFD. In the light of this, in the
senate, the KADU held 39 percent of the seats. According to the Kenyan constitution,
the emergency law should get the support of 65 percent of each house (i.e. the House of
Representatives and the senate) to pass. The expected majority was easily won in the
House of Representatives, but it was very difficult for the government of Kenyatta to
won the essential majority in the senate because the seats of KADU in the senate were
39 percent. KADU was not disposed to support the emergency law because, primarily,
the government of Kenyatta was not consulted opposition parties while issuing the
emergency law. Besides, the representatives of KADU argued that the central
556Qouted in Tompson, p.111; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly,
House of Representatives, Official Report, Vol. II (December 31, 1963), Col. 8- 9.
557Adar, p.236; Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of Representatives,
Official Report Vol. II (December 31, 1963), p. 147.
202
government did not efficiently use the power of the government already in hands before
declaring emergency law.558 Subsequently, on December 31, 1963 the Kenyan minister
of justice and constitutional affair, Mboya, tried to convince the opposition party
members to support the emergency law. In his argument Mboya said that:
Let nobody be deceived that if this Motion is not passed there will be no State of
Emergency; there will still be a State of Emergency. Then you will have no one to
blame but yourselves. The world will know that the people who first made it
impossible for the Kenya Constitution to work were the Opposition and not the
Government… My own view is that it is wrong to be forced to live outside the
Constitution, . . .but I also know that as a Government we have a responsibility…to
safeguard human lives, property and the integrity of this country's boundaries, and
that responsibility is supreme. . .this Government must act and, I hope, Mr.
Speaker, with the full support of the Senate. . .559
The dramatic speech of Mboya indicates the determination of the ruling government to
continue with the state of emergency at the NFD even with the absence of the
opposition parties‘ support. Despite the efforts of Mboya and other supporters of the
government, the morning session of the parliament ended without yielding satisfactory
fruit. However, in the afternoon session agreement was reached between KADU‘s
leader Mr. Ngala and the government after efforts of serious consultation and opposition
groups finally changed position and welcomed the emergency law at the NFD.560
Despite the declaration of the emergency law and regular patrol by the Kenyan army in
the shifta suspected zones, in February 1964 the shifta warrior launched a serious of
operation against civilians and the Kenyan security forces at places like Wajir, Mandera,
and Garissa. The disaster on both the Somalia backed shifta warriors and the Kenyan
security and civilian was high. The shifta warrior usually attack police stations, army
convoys, police patrols, Kenyan security forces, civilians and villagers without
protection. Besides, the shifta warriors used to target anti-secessionist ethnic groups in
558J. H. Proctor, ―The Role of the Senate in the Kenyan Political System,‖ Parliamentary Affairs XVIII,
no. 4 (May 1, 1964), p.409.
559Proctor, ―The Role of the Senate,‖ pp.409-410; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates,
National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, Vol. II, cols. 32 (December 31, 1963), p.
34.
560Proctor, ―The Role of the Senate,‖ p.410.
203
the NFD such as the, Turkana, Meru, Pokomo, Samburu, Oromo, ―some Borans and
Rendille‖.561
In the same year (i.e. 1964), in one of his public speech the Prime Minister of Somalia,
Abdurezak Hussen, added an inflammatory speech that annoyed the Kenyan authority.
In his speech Hussen stated that ―in regard to the dispute with Kenya over the Somalia
territory of the NFD, my government affirms that the only acceptable solution is one
that takes into account the wishes of the inhabitants or the area‖.562
The second action taken by the government of Kenyatta to undermine the movement of
the Shifta rebel groups in the NFD was in the form of offering a general amnesty to the
shifta combatants if they relinquished their resistance movement in an orderly fashion.
The declaration of amnesty for the shifta rebel groups was officially issued by the
government of Kenyatta on December 12, 1964. Following the proclamation of the
general amnesty nearly 100 former shifta rebel fighters peacefully surrendered in early
1965. Besides, as part of the amnesty package Kenya freed people, who were arrested
for involving in the shifta rebel network. For that matter, the decision to release the
detained shifta rebel fighters came true after the two hundred NFD Somali elders and
delegates‘ public diplomacy proposal was accepted by the Government of Kenyatta.563
The third suggestion that was circulated by the member of the Kenyan parliament to
undermine the shifta movement in the NFD was to Africanize the Kenyan army and
civilian administration in the NFD. It was believed that the former administration of the
British in the NFD encouraged referendum and secessionist advocacy in the district. So,
after the independence of Kenya the parliament suggested the government of Kenya to
Africanize the civil servants and military of the NFD in particular and the whole Kenya
at large. Thus, one of the actions taken by Kenya to reduce the challenges of the shifta
rebel groups was to Africanize the civil servants and the military at the NFD. In fact,
561Thompson, p.112.
562Adar, pp.148-149.
563Adar, p.105.
204
this suggestion had got acceptance by the Kenyan government barely even and
gradually implemented.564
The fourth action which was employed by the government of Kenyatta to reduce the
shifta insurgency action was through issuing identification card for the inhabitants of the
NFD. The proposal of identification card was introduced to differentiate the ―normal‖
and ―loyal‖ Somali residents of the NFD from the shifta rebel groups. On the basis of
the new policy, all inhabitants of the NFD were ordered to register and take an
identification card from July 1 to 31, 1966. Accordingly, the registration was conducted
with the specified schedule. Subsequently, those who failed to show identification card
were arrested and put to jail. Besides, when an individual arrested without identification
card there was investigation weather the individual had loyalty for other country or
not.565
The fifth action introduced by the authority of Kenya to halt the shifta rebel movement
was through introducing forced villagization scheme in the NFD in June 1966. Formerly
the majority of the inhabitants in the NFD were living in a scattered manner because of
their pastoralist way of life. However, after the introduction of the villagization scheme
all people that inhabit in the NFD were required to live in a village designed by the
government under the protection of guardsman. The government of Kenyatta introduced
the villagiztion scheme to facilitate the military operation against the shifta rebel groups
in the district. Besides, government intended to win the hearts of the inhabitants of the
NFD through introducing village development programs such as education, social, and
health services. Thus, the villagization scheme helped the government of Kenya in two
ways. First, the villagization scheme helped the government to easily control the NFD.
It also helped for an easy counter-insurgency action against the shifta insurgent groups.
Second, the villagization project helped for an easy implementation of social reforms.566
Even if, villagization was a fashion during the postcolonial era in Africa and used as a
tool for social reforms and development, the case in the NFD of Kenya was mainly
564Adar, p.105; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of
Representatives, Official Report, Vol. III (July, 1964), cols. 802-804.
565Adar, p.106.
566Hannah Whittaker, ―Forced Villagization during the Shifta Conflict in Kenya, ca. 1963–1968,‖ The
International Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 45, No. 3 (Boston University African Studies
Center, 2012), p. 343.
205
introduced to fight the shifta rebel group by concentrating the inhabitants of the district
at specified villages that were under the protection of government security guards.
Meaning, the villagization program in the NFD was issued to halt the militant
secessionist movement of the shifta fighting groups in the NFD. As a result, the
inhabitants of the NFD perceived the villagization scheme not as a means of social
reform and blessing, rather, the scheme was considered by the local Somali as a curse
that negatively threaten their traditional pastoral way of life.567
However, despite the employment of different actions by the Kenyan authority the
shifta insurgency attacks were continued. Apparently, the growth of the shifta attack
against Kenya and the recognition of the Kenyan authority on the technical, tactical,
military and material support of Somalia to the shifta fighters worsened the Somalia-
Kenya relations. As a result, both sides actively involved on aggressive propaganda
advocacies that reflected their respective belief and stance about the shifta warriors. The
hostile propaganda advocacy on both sides, in turn, laid the foundation to the rise of the
political temperature of the Horn region. In its process of pro-shifta movement, the
Somalia broadcasts, for instance, worked to encourage more shifta incursions against
Kenya, Ethiopia and the French Somaliland (Djibouti). At the same time the broadcasts
of Somalia condemn the anti-shifta actions from Kenya, Ethiopia and the French (as a
ruler of Djibouti). In the same vein, every stape of political activities in Kenya and
Ethiopia was taken seriously by the Somalia broadcasts and presented in a way that
helps the shifta guerilla fighters. For instance, when Kenya scheduled to conduct an
election for regional assembly in 1964, the Somalia broadcasts strongly advocated the
NFD inhabitants to boycott the election describing the region is part of Somalia.568 As a
result, the Kenyan state minister, who was in charge of the NFD issue, during the
period, stated that ―the Kenyan Government was aware that the shifta campaign was
merely part of a bigger campaign that had been going on in the Ogaden [eastern part of
Ethiopia] for many months‖.569
As the intensity and frequency of the shifta attack against Kenya rose the probability
and prospect for peaceful diplomatic solution for the problem became complicated and
567Whittaker, ―Forced Villagization,‖ p.345.
568Branch, p.27; Thompson, p.118.
569Thompson, p.118.
206
narrow in percentage. On the other hand, the February 3, 1964 state visit of the Chinese
prime minister, Chou en Lai, to Somalia and his statement ―Africa was ‗ripe for
revolution‖570 used by the Somalia authority and broadcasts to further internationalize
the propaganda advocacy against Kenya and Ethiopia through associating the speech of
the Chinese Premier with the Somali inhabiting regions movement in the Horn of
Africa. The first east African country that strongly condemned the speech of Chou en
Lai was Kenya. Even some politicians from Kenya and Ethiopia questioned what kind
of ―revolution‖ that Mr. Lai had in his mind and criticized the speech of Lai as a nonresponsible
interference and act in the African affairs. Besides, the presence of the
Chinese prints on some of the weapons that were cared by the shifta warriors raised the
suspicion of the Kenyan politicians about the involvement of China in the complication
of the Shifta affairs in the Kenyan‘s NFD.571
In order to further boil the issue President Aden Abdulah Osman presented the
following speech on the dinner prepared for the honor of Prime Minister Lai. President
Osman‘s speech reads:
Conscious of the goodwill and fraternal relations that exist between our two
countries, the Somali people and its Government are confident that the difficulties
that at present beset Somalia with its immediate neighbors over border and
territorial disputes are well and sympathetically understood by the Government of
the CPR like so many other pressing problems that confront newly emergent
African and Asian countries, these border and territorial disputes are a legacy from
the arbitrary dismemberment of territories and of the partition of populations
brutally carried out while they were under the imperialist and colonial domination.
These issues can only be realistically solved if the parties now concerned are
prepared to face up to them with a spirit of goodwill and common sense. In this
respect the Somali Government has declared on innumerable occasions that with
regard to such disputes it is fully prepared to hold bilateral discussions or accept
mediation under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. Furthermore,
my Government abides by the principle that such problems should be solved by
peaceful means only. The sooner such issues are equitably dealt with, the sooner
can the Governments devote their full attention and resources to eradicating
570Ibid, 120.
571Ibid.
207
hunger, disease and illiteracy and provide a higher standard of living for their
people.572
This mixed and uncertain expression or attitude that partly transmit warlike solution and
partly peaceful solution for the problem between Somalia and neighboring states from
its date of independence to the 1977 Ogaden war and post-Ogaden war eras was a
common features of Somalia‘s and neighboring states politics.
The internal politics of Somalia was also not without complication during its post
independent period. In this light, Somalia‘s internal political problem was as complex as
the situation in Ethiopia and Kenya. Particularly the tribal based divisions between
northern and southern Somalia had enabled the Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities to
easily penetrate to the domestic political state of Somalia to plot the tribal based
divisions. Besides, the Kenyan and Ethiopian broadcasts usually followed the footsteps
of their respective leaders to magnify the tribal based political differences and conflicts
in Somalia to boil the political instability of the country. For instance, following the
May 1964 general election in Somalia, the Kenyan broadcasts opened a propaganda
campaign that criticize Radio Mogadishu and the government for ―spreading lies‖ and
intimidating the interests of different groups in the process of the election. Besides, the
Kenyan broadcast accused Radio Mogadishu for spreading false information about the
role of the Kenyan and the British army in the counter shifta war at the NFD.573
Apparently, in their propaganda campaign the Kenya and Somalia broadcasts and their
respective governments had divergent and contesting perceptions about the role of the
shifta combatants in the NFD. As noted in the above discussions, the Somalia authority
and broadcasts usually portrayed the shifta as ―nationalists‖ and freedom fighters while
the Kenyan authority and broadcasts accepted the activities of the shifta warriors as
―irresponsible‖, ―armed bandits‖, ―gangsters‖, and ―Murderers‖. This contesting
position and headstrong approach on both sides recurrently halted and affected the
diplomatic rapprochement move to solve the boundary complications amid the two
nations in the 1960s and 1970s. Besides, Kenya argued that the glorification of the
572Thompson, p.120.
573Thompson, p.121.
208
shifta fighting groups as ―nationalist‖ and ―freedom fighters‖ would further complicate
the war with the Somalia backed shifta insurgent groups.574
At other occasion while preparation for the OAU council of ministerial meeting was in
progress at the level of foreign ministers to discuss the Ethio-Somalia armed
confrontation and the east African arms conflict on February 11, 1964, Radio
Mogadishu was advocating a program named ―the needs of the Somali people‖ that was
prepared to propagate a jihad against the NFD of Kenya to elevate the confrontation to a
religious war. The person that prepared the Radio program whose name is Ishmail
Muhammed Ali charged and blamed Kenya for ―elimination… en masse of the Somali
people of the NFD‖.575 So, such kind of allegation and counter allegation by both parties
(i.e. Somalia and Kenya) complicated and worsened the political and diplomatic climate
of the Kenya-Somalia relations during the shifta period.
In August 1964, Somalia began to comment on another domestic matter of Kenya. This
time the Somalia authority and broadcasts were worked to widen the internal political
disagreement in Kenya. Particularly, the Somalia authority and broadcasts tried to plot
the disagreement between Mr. Ngala of KADU and Mr. Kenyatta of KANU. In its
advocacy, Somalia accused Kenyatta‘s move to establish a single party system in
Kenya. The idea of Somalia had also got a room on the side of Mr. Ngala‘s party,
KADU. However, Ethiopia tried to defend the idea of single party advocacy circulated
by the Somalia authorities against the government of Kenyatta. In its argument to
defend the Kenyan single party dominancy, Ethiopia stated that ―there were African
countries which did not need the one-party system but that the majority follow the
system bequeathed to them by their former colonizers‖.576
Regarding the accusation of the government of Kenyatta to form a single party state the
Ethiopian authority added its defense against the government of Kenyatta the following
way:
574Mengo Sichilongo, ―International Law and the Development of the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia Dispute‖
(MA Thesis, McGill University, 1974), p.135.
575Thompson, p.122.
576Ibid, pp.122-123.
209
…it is following the system left behind by the British … In all African countries,
the people united into a single family of brothers in time of national calamity…It is
proper, too, that in time of peace all should become united, a single army drawing
its strength from one center only. Mr. Jomo Kenyatta‘s proposal is one which
rejects political parties based on tribal groupings, which have harmful political
effects on a country.577
The Ethiopian comment against Somalia‘s accusation over Kenya‘s one-party state was
clear when we reconsider by retrospect to the March 30, 1964 Somalia election. There
was tribal based controversy during the pre-election and post-election periods. For
instance, two days before the election date there was crises at one of the stronghold of
opposition, Dusa Mareb. As a result of the crisis, government forces opened fire and
killed thirteen and twenty two more were wounded and several others were arrested. So,
Ethiopia worked to defend Kenya by remembering Somalia‘s own one party dominant
system. In fact, ―…Somalia and that repeated violence of this kind had marred
Somalia‘s elections since its inception as a state indicating a lack of confidence in the
government in the National Assembly‖.578
Following the 1964 national election Prime Minister Sharmarke was replaced by
Hussen. Once appointed as Prime Minister Hussen stated that he and his party, the SYL,
will continue to work for the unification of all the Somali inhabiting territories with
Somalia. Particularly, Hussen‘s good approach with Muslim countries and the
subsequent recognition from Muslim countries to Somalia to host the sixth world
Islamic conference further worsened the Kenya-Somalia hostile relations. In the
congress Somalia got strong sympathy from countries that involved in the congress.579
At the Mogadishu Islamic congress the minister of state for Somalia, Sheikh
Mohammed Farah, stated that three Somali inhabiting areas were under the yoke of ―the
worst Christian imperialism‖.580 As per the explanation of Farah the three Somali
inhabiting areas under the dominance of the ―Christian‖ rule were the NFD of Kenya,
the Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, and Djibouti under the French colonial rule.581
577Ibid, p.123.
578Ibid, p.123.
579Samatar, Africa‘s First Democrats, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.
580Thompson, p.124.
581Samatar, Africa‘s First Democrats, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.
210
Apparently, Farah also tried to argue the 1963 Ethio-Kenyan defense pact as a pact by
―Christian imperialist countries‖582 in the region. The speech of Mohammed Farah
further flamed hostility between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.583
On the other hand, while the Somalia authority recurrently criticized and charged the
British for its involvement in supporting the anti-shifta war, the Kenyan authority on its
part opposed and accused the involvement of the Chinese and Soviet Russia for
supporting to the secessionist and expansionist policy of Somalia. In 1964, despite the
fact that Soviet Russia‘s arming of Somalia was an ―open secret‖ the Soviet ambassador
to Kenya, Vladimir Lavrov, denied the matter. On his speech at Nairobi on March 10,
1964, Ambassador Lavrov criticized Kenya for the ―false stories‖ and ―false allegation‖
about the Soviet‘s arms supply for Somalia. However, in his speech the Ambassador
had also admired the Kenyan people as ―industrious and heroic‖ while criticizing the so
called untruthful dissemination of information about the Soviet Russia‘s arms supply to
Somalia. Nonetheless, to the surprise of Ambassador Lavrov, a few months after his
denial of arms supply to Somali, Prime Minister Abdirezak Hussen of Somalia stated
the gratefulness of his government for the unlimited military equipment and armament
support from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). In his speech, Prime
Minister Hussen added that ―our special thanks go to the Soviet Union which gives us
major military assistance‖.584 Therefore, the involvement of extra-continental and
continental powers on the affairs of Kenya and Somalia had its own share for the tied
and unhealthy relationship amid Somalia and Kenya on the question of the NFD during
the shifta episode.
4.2.1. Peace Accords during the Shifta Episode
In1964, at the second OAU extra-ordinary meeting of the council of ministers, which
was held at Dar-el-Salam; Kenya required the OAU emergency ministerial session to
see the case between Kenya and Somalia. For that matter, the Dar-el-Salam emergency
session was fundamentally arranged to address the frontier conflict between Ethiopia
and Somalia. But, Kenya sought to use the platform expecting the ministerial meeting to
582Thompson, p.124.
583Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.
584Thompson, p.127.
211
condemn the involvement of Somalia over the internal affairs of Kenya. Somalia on its
part accepted the request of the Dar-el-Salam forum after the UN returned back its
allegation against neighboring states (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya). While returning back
Somalia‘s allegation, the UN advised the case between Somalia and its neighbors to be
considered first by the continental organization, OAU. The Dar-el-Salam forum was one
of those forums that helped the OAU and its member countries to understand the level
of the frontier dispute and hostility between the Kenya-Somalia pair and the Ethio-
Somalia pair. So, the Dar-el-Salam ministerial forum advised Kenya and Somalia to act
according to paragraph IV of Article III of the OAU charter, which states ―peaceful
settlement‖ of disagreement and avoiding ―propaganda‖ and ―provocative‖ stances.585
At other time, the Kenya-Somalia border disagreement included at the Legos ordinary
session of Ministers held between February 24 and 29, 1964. The Legos forum advised
the conflicting parties (i.e. Kenya and Somalia in this case) to solve their problem
through open negotiation. Besides, the Legos forum demanded the importance of
conflicting parties to respect paragraph III of Article III of the OAU charter586 that give
priority to ―respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and for
its inalienable right to independent existence‖.587
Apparently, the Legos Ministerial forum advised Kenya and Somalia to avoid acts that
would trigger confrontation or endanger the chance of nonviolent settlement of the
boundary question amid the two countries. The Legos ministerial summit had also
advised the authorities of Kenya and Somalia to start an open and direct discussion as
soon as possible on the basis of Paragraph III of Article III of the OAU charter. Besides,
the ministerial meeting at Legos proposed Kenya and Somalia to find peaceful and
lasting answer for their complications. And the ministers called the two nations to
abstain from doing inflammatory actions that would aggravate their hostility and
jeopardize peaceful co-existence. The forum also highly warned that the continuation of
such kind of regrettable incident between the two nations may aggravate hostility. In
light of this, the ministerial meeting had requested the two nations to present the result
of their discussion on the upcoming OAU heads of states meeting in Egypt Cairo in July
585Ibid, pp.132-133.
586Hoskyns, p.62; Thompson, p.133.
587Thompson, p.133.
212
1964. Even if the Logos ministerial negotiation platform to solve the Kenya and
Somalia problem did not score an immediate impact on diluting the problem, it had
helped as a good starting-point for the future negotiation and rapprochement between
the two countries. So, the action of OAU ministerial meeting at Legos was instrumental
to initiate negotiations between Kenya and Somalia.588
In the Cairo summit, the heads of African states adopted a resolution that declares ―all
member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of
national independence‖.589
However, Somalia declared that the Cairo resolution was against its interest and refused
to be bound by it. The parliament of Somalia also stated that the Cairo resolution would
never be binding in any way for Somalia. The prime minister of Somalia, Abdirazak
Hussen, also asserted that the Cairo resolution did not consider existing frontier dispute
between Somalia and its neighboring states. In the light of this, Abdirazak blamed the
OAU heads of states resolution at Cairo as an agonizing that undermined the people‘s
right to self-determination.590 On the other side, the Kenyan authority strongly
condemned the refusal of Somalia to acknowledge the Cairo resolution. For instance, on
October 6, 1964 the parliament of Kenya argued that Mogadishu‘s refusal of the Cairo
resolution was a direct move of Somalia ―to boost the morale of the shifta‖.591 On the
same day the Kenyan people‘s representatives passed the following notion:
In the view of the Somali disrespect for the resolution adopted in the O.A.U.
conference at Cairo on frontiers existing on independence and in view of the
continuity of the state of affairs in the North-Eastern Region of Kenya, this House
urged the Kenyan Government to seek, as soon as possible, with the Somalia
Government, an amicable settlement of the North-Eastern disputes.592
Subsequently, the hostility and propaganda advocacy between Kenya and Somalia
escalated more than ever. The allegation of Nairobi over Mogadishu‘s encouragement
of the shifta attack also became hot. Besides, the declaration of the Somalia authority,
588Stephen John Wright, ―The Foreign Policy of Kenya 1963-1978‖ (PhD dissertationat London School of
Economics and Political Science, n.d, p), p.146; Hoskyns, pp.60-62.
589Thompson, p.134.
590Selassie, p.105; Thompson, p.134.
591Thompson, p.135.
592Ibid.
213
on July 6, 1964, on the commitment of Somalia to unify all the Somali inhabiting areas
of the Horn region by ―legal and peaceful means‖593 clearly reflects the gap of the
unsolved complication between Somalia and Kenya over the issue of the NFD.
On September 18, 1964, the Somalia‘s minister of information, Yusuf Adan Bowkhaw,
was at Nairobi to take part on the OAU ―Congo conciliation commission‖ that Jomo
Kenyatta was the chairmanship of the commission. On the Congo commission‘s
meeting at Nairobi, the representatives of Somalia showed their willingness to talk
about the border dispute if presented on the table. However, after a few days, on
September 25, 1964 the prime minister of Somalia, Abdirezak, demanded the right of
the Somali people under foreign jurisdiction.594
Later, in December 1965 with the initiative of President Nyerere the authorities of
Kenya and Somalia agreed to discuss their frontier dispute at Arusha, Tanzania. In the
1965 Arusha meeting the authority of Kenya presented four major points as a
precondition to overcome the dispute with Somalia. The four major preconditions were:
i) the authority of Somalia should condemn the rebel fighters activity at the NFD; ii) the
authority of Somalia should stop arming and aiding the shifta rebel groups at the NFD
in any ways; iii) the authority of Somalia should stop anti-Kenya hostile propaganda
advocacy that boost the morale of the shifta militant factions and; iv) the authority of
Somalia should brief its army to assist the security of Kenya along the frontier in the
fight against the shifta militant groups. Be that as it may, the government of Somalia
flatly rejected the preconditions of Kenya. As a result, the discussion ended without
scoring important development because of the headstrong position of Somalia on its
territorial claim while Kenya refuse to compromise its passion on the issue of the
preconditions. After the Arusha meeting, both countries blamed each other for the
decline of the negotiation and the tension between the two nations increased.595
Yet again, in 1967, at the OAU Kinshasa summit President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia
together with Nyerere of Tanzania and Obote of Uganda initiated a discussion to solve
the boundary problem between Kenya and Somalia as well as Ethiopia and Somalia. At
593Ibid, p.136.
594Ibid.
595Mengo Sichilongo, p.136; see also Africa Research Bulletin: Africa Research Ltd. (London, December
1965), p. 426.
214
the Kinshasa summit, as usual, the OAU suggested Kenya and Somalia to discuss their
boundary problem peacefully and to solve it according to the principles in OAU charter.
The Kinshasa summit was comparatively successful in helping Kenya and Somalia to
narrow their differences and to halt and to negotiate about the raising boundary tension
amid the two nations. The Kinshasa summit was also considered as an important
development for the Kenya-Somalia détente and for the Ethio-Somalia moderation of
antagonisms. During the Kinshasa summit, the personal diplomacy of President Kaunda
was important for the Kenya-Somalia rapprochement and for easing of the Ethio-
Somalia frontier tensions.596
Against this background, during the Kinshasa summit, September 11-14, 1967, both
Kenya and Somalia agreed for rapprochement and chartered or set up a declaration that
would help to advance negotiate on conflicting issues. In the conference, Kenya was
constituted by Vice-President Daniel Arap Moi while Somalia was constituted by Prime
Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. The Kenya-Somalia declaration at the Kinshasa
summit reads:
i) both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other‘s sovereignty
and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of article III of the OAU charter;
ii) the two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding
differences between them in the sprit paragraph 4 of article III of the OAU
charters; iii) the two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace
and security on both sides of the boundary by preventing destruction to ensure
maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the boundary by preventing
distraction of human life and property; iv) the Governments have agreed to refrain
from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and press
against each other.597
The declaration reflects that there was a good understanding between Kenya and
Somalia at the Kinshasa summit. Prior to the Kinshasa summit Kenya was not open to
negotiate on the issue of the NFD because Kenya claimed the NFD issue was an internal
596OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government
meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967); Thompson,
p.141.
597OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government
meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967).
215
affair. For instance, the 1964 Cairo and the 1965 Arusha rapprochement between the
two countries were failed because of the two nations‘ headstrong diplomatic approach
on the issue of the NFD. However, in the Kinshasa summit Somalia on its part became
more flexible and agreed to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kenya.
After the Kinshasa summit, in a simultaneous press statement put out at Mogadishu and
Addis Ababa on September 22, 1967, the authorities of the Ethiopia-Kenya pair on the
one side and Somalia on the other decided to eliminate any kind of apprehensions
against one-another. This was vowed because like the Kenya-Somalia case the Ethiopia-
Somalia authorities had also reached on a general understanding to form a joint military
command to scrutinize grievances from either side. The joint commission was also
given a responsibility to promote cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia. For the
evaluation of the developments on the cooperation, the two countries administrative
authorities of the joint commission were agreed to meet quarterly. In the light of this,
the development at Kinshasa summit was considered a big step forward to normalize the
hostile relations of Somalia with the Ethio-Kenyan pairs.598
After the Kinshasa summit, Kenya and Somalia met at Arusha, Tanzania, on October
28, 1967, to further improve and consolidate their relationship. The Arusha
rapprochement platform was arranged by President Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of
Tanzania. At Arusha, President Kenyatta of Kenya and Prime Minister Egal of Somalia
signed the following memorandum of understanding:
i) both Governments will exert all efforts and do their utmost to create good
neighborly relations between Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the OAU
charter; ii) the two governments agree that the interests of the people of Kenya and
Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries;
iii) they therefore reaffirm their adherence to the declaration of the OAU
conference at Kinshasa.599
In addition, on article four at the Arusha memorandum of understanding while
promising to further strengthen their amicable relations and to give solution for their
frontier dispute, both Kenya and Somalia agreed to:
598Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386.
599Thompson, pp.143-144; see also Adar, p.163.
216
a) the maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing
distraction of human life and property; b) refrain from conducting hostile
propaganda through mass media such as radio and the press against each other and
encourage propaganda which promotes the development and continuance of
friendly relations between the two countries; c) the gradual suspension of any
emergency regulations imposed on either side of the border; d) the reopening of
diplomatic relations between the two countries; e) the consideration of measures
encouraging the development of economic and trade relations; f) appoint a working
committee consisting of Somalia, Kenya, and Zambia, which will meet periodically
to review the implementation by Somalia and Kenya of the points agreed in this
document and also to examine ways and means of bringing out a satisfactory
solution to major and minor differences between Kenya and Somalia.600
The Arusha agreement and memorandum of understanding clearly reflect the
commitment and readiness of both Kenya and Somalia to solve their problem over the
NFD peacefully. But the memorandum of understanding at Arusha did not say anything
about the 1964 OAU Cairo resolution. So, one of the gaps of the Arusha memorandum
of understanding is that it did not say anything about the fundamental principle of the
1964 Cairo resolution, which is a time bomb on the relations of Somalia with Kenya
and Ethiopia. Keeping all the other things constant, after the Arusha accord, President
Kaunda of Zambia, who was the figurehead acting mediator in the meeting stated that
the Arusha accord was a good example that would show the capability of African to
solve their problems by continental institutional capacity without the involvement and
support of international institutions, which are dominated by global political actors.601
However, after the Arusha accord the Egal-Sharmarke government faced strong
criticism and opposition at home from the Somali political elites and ordinary citizens.
Some elites even called the agreement to ―sell out‖ the interest of the Somali public.
Particularly, the maneuver of the Egal-Sharmarke government to respect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Kenya was considered as a betrayal of the interest of the
Somali people.602 For instance, on November 14, 1967 the former Somalia prime
600Thompson, p.144.
601Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386.
602Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386;
Adar pp.63-164.
217
minister and secretary of the SYL, Abdirezak Hussen, explained the Arusha accord as
―a grave threat to the peace and security of the country [Somalia]‖.603 Subsequently, the
central council of the SYL met in undisclosed conference and reached on consensus to
remove Prime Minister Egal from his membership of the SYL.604
While defending its position in the agreements, the Egal-Sharmarke government tried to
argue that the Kinshasa declaration and the memorandum of understanding at Arusha
would help Somalia in multitude ways. It interpreted that the acceptance of Kenya and
Ethiopia about the existence of boundary dispute and their readiness to settle the
disagreement in a peaceful manner was a success by the Egal-Sharmarke
administration.605This interpretation was stemmed from the Arusha memorandum of
understanding Article 4(f) that proposed to ―appoint a working committee consisting of
Somalia, Kenya, and Zambia, which will meet periodically to review the
implementation by Somalia and Kenya of the points agreed in this document… between
Kenya and Somalia.‖606 Besides, the Egal-Sharmarke government asserted that the
readiness of Kenya and Ethiopia to consider Somalia to ―have a say by way of
consultation in the affairs and administration‖607 of the Somali inhabited lands under
their jurisdictions (i.e. the NFD and Ogaden) was taken as a good step forward.608
Nonetheless, the Egal-Sharmarke interpretation of the 1967 agreement with Ethiopia (at
Addis Ababa) and Kenya (at Kinshasa and Arusha) did not go with the existing policy
of the SYL, which Egal and Sharmarke is member. So, the interpretation of the
Kinshasa and Arusha agreements as peerless for the interest of Somalia was stemmed
from the interest to use it for local consumption and to dilute the hot opposition at
home. Apparently, the positive portrayal of the agreement was presented ―to give itself
freedom of action‖609 and to soften the hot popular protest.
603Adar, p.163.
604Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386;
Adar p.164.
605Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.121.
606Thompson, p.144.
607Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.121.
608 Ibid.
609Ibid, pp.121-122.
218
In the opposition movement, particularly, Article I of the Kinshasa declaration which
states ―both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other‘s
sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the OAU
charter‖610 faced strong opposition from the Somali political elites and people. In its
argument to the opposition, the Egal-Sharmarke administration defended that the above
statement from the Kinshasa declaration give sense and go with the interests of Somalia
―since Somalia had already accepted this principle by its signing at the United
Nations‖.611
But, later the conflict in the party was solved after a reconciliation committee was
organized including the former president of Somalia, Aden Abdelah Osman. After that,
Prime Minister Egal‘s notion of rapprochement and détente with neighboring Kenya
and Ethiopia got recognition on the parliament of Somalia.612
Here it is important to note that before the notion of rapprochement and détente was
accepted by the Somalia National Assembly, there were two motions in the parliament.
The first motion demands the immediate and unreserved declaration of the Arusha
accord as null and void. The second motion presented a call for the implementation of
the Arusha accord. Eventually, the second motion was passed with 89 supports, 1
opposition and 4 abstentions.613
4.3. The Kenya-Somalia Rapprochement during the Egal-Sharmarke Era (1967-
1969)
After his nomination as the Prime Minister of Somalia, unlike his predecessors, Egal
lunched a policy that paved the way for a regional cooperation between Somalia,
Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Furthermore, Egal worked to restore
relationship between Somalia and the UK, which was severed in 1963 following the
transfer of the NFD to Kenya. The authority of Egal had also worked to reduce the
dominant position of the Soviet on the politics of Somalia by approaching the western
powers. For instance, Egal tried to include western trained police officials on the
610OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government
meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967).
611Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p.122.
612Adar p.164.
613Ibid.
219
security platform of Somalia to counterbalance the dominant position of the Soviet on
the security layout of Somalia.614
Apparently, following the signing of the historic memorandum of understanding
between President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Egal at Tanzania, Arusha on October
28, 1967, the Kenya-Somalia relations entered to the episode of rapprochement and
détente. From the side of Somalia the new era of rapprochement was considered as face
saving device to recover from the long years of destruction during the era of the shifta
war with Kenya and Ethiopia. The Egal-Sharmarke administration had also remarked
that the former hard-line approach to unify the Somali inhabiting lands of the Horn
region harmed the diplomatic position of Somalia on the eye of continental and extracontinental
powers. As a result, the Egal-Sharmarke administration desired to replace
the hard-line approach with a new approach which was named détente or sometimes
called rapprochement. The loss of the major supporters of the idea of greater Somalia
because of the Arab-Israeli war also instigated the Egal-Sharmarke government to
replace the hard-line policy with a new attitude.615
The economic difficulties in which the new government of Somalia encountered had
also obliged the authority of Somalia to soften the hard-line diplomacy of the country
against neighboring nations. Particularly, the closing of border by Kenya and Ethiopia
highly affected the pastoral economy of Somalia. For that matter, the closing of borders
disturbed the trade interaction of Somali with its neighboring countries. Apparently, the
economic pressure was worsened by the closure of the Suzie Canal in 1967.616 The
aggregate effects of these all dynamics forced the Egal-Sharmarke rule to follow soft
line diplomacy against neighboring states.
Given this, the propaganda aggression of Radio Mogadishu against Kenya and Ethiopia
ceased following the introduction of détente by Egal. While clarifying his policy against
Ethiopia and Kenya on August 8, 1967 Egal stated the following:
614Radoslave A. Yordanov, ―Soviet Involvement in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1947-1991‖ (PhD
dissertationat, University of Oxford, 2012), pp.111-112.
615Colestock, pp.43-44.
616Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, pp.122-123; Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ p.152.
220
We do not wish to annex the territory of any state whatever nor to expand into such
territory. We do intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign
domination, in order that they may attain sovereign independent status through the
process of self-determination.617
The expression of Egal indicates that the Egal-Sharmarke administration well
understood the difference between the provocative expansionist policy of Somalia and
the ‗real‘ line of action that would help the Somalis under foreign jurisdictions in whch
struggling for the right to self-determination.
At other time while explaining his foreign policy approach to the SYL Egal stated the
following about the NFD:
Our policy toward the NFD, we elicited an admission first that the case was open to
debate, and secondly that until such time as a fully negotiated settlement could be
reached we could have a say in its affairs and its welfare. It cannot be denied that
the NFD was formerly nothing but a hunting-ground for our Somali brothers who
were considered synonymous with wild game, and that today it is an open and free
country where anyone of us may cross over fearlessly. We will not compromise the
religion, the lives and the property of our Somali brothers in the NFD who now
lead a peaceful existence.618
The above quote reflects that while the authority of Egal did not completely reckless on
the issue of the NFD, it preferred the peaceful and diplomatic line to solve the
complication at the NFD with Kenya.
Apparently, the Egal-Sharmarke administration probably evaluated the invalidity of the
hard-line approach to create greater Somalia and tried to see the peaceful rapprochement
and non-violent approach as a means to attain the Greater Somalia scheme. On the side
of Kenya, the Egal-sharmarke peaceful rapprochement policy was taken positively
because Kenya was tired of the financial burden for the counter-shifta and counterinsurgency
operations. Besides, unlike his Somali predecessors, Egal was a pan-
Africanist leader that believes in the unity of East Africa and in the formation of
617Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ pp.152-153.
618Adar, p.166.
221
federation among countries of the region.619 For instance, once while explaining the
relationship of his country with Kenya, Egal stated that the collaboration that was
prevailing at both the lower and higher levels enabled him to hope that ―it could
possibly lead to a federation of the two countries.‖620 Such kind of metaphysics was a
glorious opportunity for Kenya and other Horn countries to end the boundary
complication with Somalia without jeopardizing the peace, strength, stability,
steadfastness, and achievements of countries in the region. The rapprochement and
détente scheme had also helped Kenya to reduce the counter provocative international
diplomatic campaign in a bid to the territorial claim of Somalia against Kenya‘s NFD.
So, the rapprochement policy of Somalia was a good opportunity to herald peaceful
Kenya-Somalia relationship. For that matter, the situation was more than welcome for
Kenya. Accordingly, on October 30, 1967, when Humphrey Slade officially announced
the Arusha memorandum of understanding between the two nations, both President
Kenyatta and Premiere Egal forwarded their appreciation and gratefulness for the
mediation efforts of President Kaunda of Zambia.621
In the efforts of improving and strengthening the rapprochement scheme both countries
were agreed to increase economic cooperation. In the same vein, political cooperation
and relaxation of the free movement of people was also agreed. The two nations had
also vowed to solve their complications from minor and small issues to the major ones.
In the process of rapprochement the two countries authorities were agreed to establish a
committee that would work to promote the cooperation of the two countries. The
committee was consisted representatives from both sides (i.e. Kenya and Somalia) with
the chairmanship of Zambia. Here, Zambia was chosen as a chairman of the joint
committee because it was president Kaunda of Zambia that facilitated the
rapprochement of the two nations by arranging the Kinshasa and Arusha accords. In the
procedure, the committee was given the responsibility of evaluating the development of
the relationships between the two countries. Besides, the joint committee was given the
619Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ p.153; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p. 116.
620Adar, p.167.
621Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), p. 22386;
Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ p.153; Issa-Salwe, The Cold War Fallout, p. 116; see also Africa Research
Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural) Vol.5, No.11 (1968), p. 1233.
222
task of evaluating the implementation of the Arusha accord and generating immediate
solution for minor problems between the two nations.622
The Egal-Sharmarke policy of rapprochement vis-à-vis Kenya and Ethiopia clearly
shows the shift of the foreign policy approach of Somalia towards countries bordering
it. But this does not mean that the Egal-Sharmarke administration totally abandoned the
greater Somalia scheme. Rather, the only change is a shift of approach from provocative
and hard-line politics to peaceful and legal approach. For instance, once in a public
speech following his nomination as the Prime Minister of Somalia, Egal stated that ―the
Republic‘s foreign policy could not be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule.
Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya, and France could not ignore the Somali lands they
occupied‖.623
Apparently, on his speech Egal argued that the new rapprochement policy of Somalia
towards Ethiopia and Kenya would not introduced to ignore the Somali inhabiting
territories under foreign countries occupation. He added that the new diplomatic
approach was intended to the self-determination right of the Somalis under foreign rule
through peaceful and legal ways.624 So, regarding the pan-Somali advocacy the only
difference between the Egal-Sharmarke foreign policy approaches from their
predecessors was a shift from a policy of confrontation, provocative and hard-line
diplomacy to peaceful one. In this light, in its fundamental principle and position the
Egal-Sharmarke administration had the same with their predecessors towards the issue
of pan-Somalism. In the philosophy of pan-Somalism any land inhabited by the Somali
is accepted as part of Soamlia.625
In its scheme of pan-Somalism the Egal-Sharmarke administration largely emphasized
on creating peaceful diplomatic pressure on neighboring countries such as Kenya and
Ethiopia to allow the self-determination right of the Somalis under their jurisdiction. In
employing the diplomatic channel to influence neighboring countries, the Egal-
Sharmarke authority planned to use international organs such as the UN and OAU. As
622Thompson, p.148.
623Adar, p.161; see also Africa Research Bulletin: Africa Research Ltd. Vol.4, No.8 (London, 1967),
p.837.
624 Ibid.
625 Adar,p.161.
223
stated above, this action of the Egal-Sharmarke administration reflects the change of the
former policy of Somalia to influence neighboring countries through infiltration of
insurgency as an ultimate solution for the frontier complication.626
The abrupt change of policy by Somalia was followed by a period of relative calmness
and normalization of diplomatic contacts between Somalia and Kenya. Accordingly, in
1968 the atmosphere of diplomatic and trade contact between Kenya and Somalia
started to refresh. For instance, at the end of January 1968 President Kenyatta forwarded
a forgiving and forgetting speech towards the pre-Arusha relationship of the two
countries. The speech of Kenyatta reads that ―it is a matter of history that our relations
in the past were tense. We have now embarked on a new era of friendship,
understanding and co-operation‖.627
The rapprochement scheme had also paved ways to herald state visits by heads of states
and ministers of the respective nations. For instance, in July 1968 President Sharmarke
and Premier Egal made a state visit to Kenya. On the progress of their discussion at
Nirobi, the leaders of the two countries talked to further improve the rapprochement
scheme and the diplomatic contacts amid the two countries. The two leaders had also
reached on consent to promote their partnership on the area of trade and cultural
exchanges. Against this background, the livestock business across the border of the two
countries agreed to resume. Kenya also showed willingness to free the Somali people
who were arrested during the time of the emergency law and those who fled the country
were also got amnesty to return back. Apparently, during their presence at Nairobi,
President Sharmarke and Premier Egal discussed with the NFD representatives of the
Somali people.628
Subsequently, over the coming one year the condition of the NFD improved very much
and President Kenyatta‘s confidence on the building of a territorially integrated Kenya
through breaking those ethnic affiliated banditry groups increased. The emergency law
at the NFD also softens gradually and completely removed in October 1969.629
626 Hoskyns, p.79.
627 Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ p.156.
628Adar, p.165; see also Touval, The Boundary Politics, pp. 232-233.
629Wright, ―The Foreign Policy,‖ p.156.
224
In the meantime, in 1969, general parliamentary election was conducted in Somalia. In
the election the SYL won 73 seats out of the total 123 seats of parliament.630 Following
the 1969 parliamentary election President Sharmarke re-nominated Egal as the prime
minister of Somalia. On his speech while explaining one of the reasons for the renomination
of Egal as a prime minister, President Sharmarke argued that the renomination
of Egal was to give chance for Egal to implement his policy of détente to
solve the self-determination question of the Somalis under foreign rule. Apparently,
Sharmarke stated that the re-nomination of Egal was to give chance for the new
approach of Egal to improve the relationship of Somalia with adjacent countries in
particular and the whole Africa at large. After the re-nomination, Egal on his part stated
that his policy of détente to solve the boundary complications through peaceful
negotiation would continue in an organized and advanced manner. Besides, Egal
mentioned his hope to solve the self-determination questions of the Somali under
foreign jurisdictions through amicability and reason based negotiations.631
Moreover, during his presentation of the new cabinet to the parliament Egal stated the
following about the policy of his government towards the NFD:
The essence of the Somali problem is the desire of a people to participate in the
spirit of the age old and the post-colonial aspirations of Africans everywhere to
decide their own destiny. Here are people who find themselves denied the
fundamental right of self-determination to link their date, their lives and their
destinies with wherever they saw their interests, their traditions and their ethnical
origins. I have also realized that these points cannot be adequately conveyed to our
neighbors except in an atmosphere in each other, of trust between our leaders and
in the closeness of enduring friendlier ties.632
From the above quote we can understand the strong metaphysics of Egal to solve the
complication between Somalia and neighboring states. Apparently, the above speech of
Egal reflects the belief of his government that the question of self-determination at the
NFD and elsewhere would get answer through effective implementation of the détente
or rapprochement scheme.
630Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p.201.
631Adar, p.167.
632Ibid, p.168.
225
Accordingly, on his second term of office as prime minister of Somalia, Egal stated that
during his first term of office the awareness and importance of détente was well
introduced and understanding was created. On his second term of office Egal ―seek the
implementation… the crux of which would be direct negotiation on the right of the
people to self-determination‖.633
However, before the practical implementation of the second phase of détente by the
government of Egal-Sharmarke, the October 1969 coup removed them from power. As
a result, the efforts of the Egal-Sharmarke authority to ensure the self-determination
question and boundary dispute through the policy of détente failed. Subsequently, the
military junta under the leadership of Barry introduced its hardline approach to pursue
the pan-Somali scheme.634
4.4. The Post Detente Era of Distrust and Uncertainty (1970-1980)
Political incidents in Somalia or Kenya usually had its own impact and implication on
the policy direction and relations of Somalia and Kenya. The military coup at Somalia
on October 21, 1969 and the removal of the civilian government in Mogadishu by
assassinating President Sharmarke and imprisoning Prime Minister Egal had dashed the
peace hope between the two countries. The situation also put an end the efforts of
rapprochement and détente that was built by civilian politicians to solve the selfdetermination
interrogations of the Somali minorities under foreign jurisdictions (i.e.
Kenya, Ethiopia, and French). The Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities highly worried that
the takeover would likely endanger the politically and diplomatically courageous efforts
launched by the Egal-Sharmarke administration to calm Somalia‘s irredentist
complication. As a result, both Kenya and Ethiopia were unhappy on what was
happening at Mogadishu. Apparently, they were skeptical about the continuation of the
policy of détente by the new military junta. Seemingly, there were an extensive
international question wither the new military rule would respect the Arusha
memorandum of understanding or not. Kenya on its part was enthusiastic to know the
attitude of the military government towards the Arusha accord. President Kenyatta
expressed the situation in Somalia as an untimely occurrence that would be hard to fill
633Ibid, p.168.
634Lewis, A Modern History, p.207; Adar, pp.168-169.
226
the gap. Later, the coup Revolutionary council that composed of the army and the police
force declared over Radio Mogadishu that the new military rule would ―respect all
treaties and agreements with friendly countries…maintain a policy of non-alignment,
self-determination, and non-interference‖.635
However, despite the promise of the new military rule the Kenyan authority strongly
suspected that the pre Egal-Sharmarke era of the Somali expansionist politics may
restore again. Apparently, the Ethio-Kenyan pair reawakened suspicion that the newmilitary
rule‘s willingness to further experiment the principle of détente and
rapprochement. After a few days the leaders of the coup maker, General Said Barry,
called the Kenyan ambassador to Mogadishu and asked the support and recognition of
Nairobi to the new regime at Mogadishu.636
Against this background, in the dynamics of the Kenya-Somalia political relations from
1970 to 1980, there were two major phases: first, it was the phase of uncertainty and
vexed peace, 1970-1973. The second was continued allegation of security threat and the
crises of war, 1974-1980.
4.4.1. The Phase of Uncertainty and Vexed Peace (1970-1973)
The era of détente and rapprochement which was heralded following the Arusha accord
paved the way for the development of a relative peace hope amid Kenya and Somalia.
However, the peace hope became under interrogation and the probability of dashing the
peace hope raised when the Egal-Sharmarke administration replaced by the military
junta under the rule of Said Barry. Particularly, the absence of a clear policy direction
from the side of the new government about the so called ―missing-lands‖ worried the
authority of Kenya. This was true because despite the new government‘s indication to
solve the boundary complication through peaceful manner, there was no clearly outlined
approach regarding what was the meaning of peaceful manner on the eye of the new
military rule. The situation created a cloud of uncertainty at Kenya. However, rather
than clarifying the cloud of uncertainty on the subject, the authority of Barry spent the
first five years on solidifying his power. In the process of solidification of power, Barry
635Director of Inteligence and Research, ―Somalia Military Coup‖ (October 21, 1969), pp.1-2.
636Thompson, p.167-168.
227
and his group worked on clarifying about the new metaphysics of ―scientific socialism‖,
building up the military of Somalia and establishing his political party.637
Apparently, even if, there were no clear reflection on the Arusha accord, the new
Somalia authority mirrored their unhappiness with the existing status quo. The
dissatisfaction gesture from the new military rule signaled the authority of Kenya to
assume the inevitability of border adjustment quests from Somalia on the upcoming
years. In addition, Kenya well aware that the new authority of Somalia was
downplaying the boundary issue to direct its efforts in solidifying its power internally.
In the light of this, the lesser advocacy of the boundary issue and the ―missing-land‖ by
the government of Barry contributed in creating a less tense atmosphere of diplomatic
relations amid Kenya and Somalia up to the mid-1970s. But, here it is vital to note that
the less tense atmosphere of diplomatic relations does not mean there was no mutual
distrust and suspicions between the two countries.638
Moreover, during the first few years of ascending to the leadership the government of
Barry put the greater Somalia scheme in a ―cold storage‖. However, the strategy of the
new Somalia authority to unify the Somali inhabiting lands under foreign jurisdiction
was continued to operate ―in the shadow of the external image‖.639
On the other hand, in the process of undermining the image of the former civilian
administration the new military junta had portrayed the Egal-Sharmarke government as
reactionary and broker of imperialism. Besides, the civilian government under the Egal-
Sharmarke rule was depicted as corrupted and obstacle for the Somali unification
scheme. In order to present himself and the October Revolution as the guardian of the
Somali unification scheme, for instance, in one of his public speech in 1970 Barry stated
that despite the continuation of friendly relations with neighboring countries, yet no any
final agreement was reached on major disputing subjects. In his speech, Barry added
that the new revolutionary administration would find ways to settle the complication in
637Samuel Makinda,―Superpower Involvement in the Horn of Africa, 1974-1982‖ (PhD dissertation,
Australian National University, 1985), p.21; Tompson, p.168.
638Thompson, p.169.
639Ibid, p.170.
228
a way that benefits the interests of the Somali people based on the principles and ideals
of OAU.640
At other time the chairman of the supreme revolutionary council underscored that:
We shall no longer content ourselves with diplomatic and hypocritical statement of
our neighbors. We shall bring to the round-table conference concrete and bold
proposals that touch the crux of our disputes with our neighbors aimed at creating
prosperity, progress and everlasting peace in the Horn of Africa.641
From the quote we can understand that at the beginning of its rule in Somalia the new
revolutionary administration while supporting the concept of unification through
hardline approach on one leg, it showed its concern to solve the problem in a friendly
manner with the other.
On the other hand, the above statement by Barry, the chairman of the revolutionary
council, was considered by Kenya as a precondition to restore the hardline irredentist
move of Somalia. However, the embassy of Somalia at Nairobi worked to explain that
the situation in Somalia was not against the interest of Kenya and advised the authority
of Kenya to avoid suspicions on the former. It looks that the authority of Somalia and
Kenya preferred to play a ―cat and mouse‖ game rather than discussing their feeling.
Particularly the downplay by the new military rule in Somalia to lay/set dormant the
boundary matter increased the uncertainty and suspicions of Kenya. Moreover, the
restoration of propaganda advocacy by Radio Mogadishu and its announcement of
support to the new military rule to unify the three lost Somali territories (i.e. Ogaden,
the NFD, and Djibouti) signaled the inevitability of the restoration of the Somali
irredentism against the Kenya-Ethiopia pair.642
Later, in one of his speeches, Barry mentioned that ―we want to declare war on all
colonialists whose minds are indoctrinated with imperialist ambitions over other
peoples, whether in our midst or abroad‖.643
640Adar, 170; Director of Inteligence and Research, ―Somalia Military Coup‖ (October 21, 1969), pp.1-3.
641Adar, 170.
642Thompson, p.176.
643Ibid, p.177.
229
This speech of Barry further worried the Kenyan authority about the future diplomatic
move of the new military government. Even if it was not clear that the speech was a part
of the strategies or an emotional feeling of the supreme revolutionary council chairman,
Said Barry, it was not taken easily by the Kenyan. In this light, the officialdom of
Nairobi accepted the statements of Barry as a serious implication of the future.
Apparently, when the new military regime in Somalia began sponsoring the ELF rebel
groups the atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty more escalated in Kenya against the
new military regime.644
At other time, in July 1, 1970 at the tenth jubilee of Somalia‘s independent, Barry
forwarded a message about the ―lost-lands‖. On his speech Barry advised the Kenyan
and Ethiopian authorities to answer the interrogations of the Somalis under their
jurisdictions. Apparently, Barry added the necessity of the coming together and
discussions of the three countries to activate the disputes existed between them. In his
further explanation, Barry stated that the dispute was ―colonial creation‖ to create
barriers of understanding between Somalia and neighboring African brothers. In the
same vein, Barry advised and suggested to stop ―killing each other‖.645 In the light of
this speech, Barry tried to forward a hint about his foreign policy approach towards the
―missing-land‖. Hence, the call of Barry for discussion between Somalia and
neighboring countries were interpreted by some onlookers as a pointer for the unilateral
abrogation of the Kenya-Somalia accord at Arusha, Tanzania.646
Against this background, in June 1971 the foreign minister of Somalia forwarded the
following speech on the relationship between Somalia and its neighboring countries.
The speech reads:
Although at the time of the 21 October Revolution our relations with neighboring
countries were friendly, we had not at that time reached any settlement concerning
our disputes with them. The result of this is that our people living in the border
regions are still in a situation of anxiety and worry concerning their security. The
Revolutionary Government of the day in conformity with its original proclamation
644Ibid.
645Ibid, p.181.
646Ibid, p.183.
230
intends to settle these disputes in a responsible manner and in conformity with the
OAU charter.647
In the above speech the reference of the foreign minister about the Somali inhabitants
around the border area clearly reflects the gradual restoration of the border issue to the
frontline diplomacy by the new military rule. This shows that through the passage of
time the interest of Kenya to normalize the relationship of the two countries was
challenged by the shift of policy by the new military junta in Somalia from détente
approach to a hard-line approach.
Afterwards, on November 19, 1971, in order to cool down the rising temperature of the
boundary issue by Somalia, the foreign minister of Kenya, Dr. Mungai, presented his
suggestion to the governments of Somalia and Kenya. In his suggestion, Dr. Mungai
advised both Somalia and Kenya to refrain escalating hostility and tension, which hurts
the good neighborly relations of the two countries. Mungai also added that provocative
and hostile propaganda advocacy would be a big drawback in the process of
normalizing the relationship of the two countries. Furthermore, Mungai advised the
importance of enhancing economic and trade relations between the two countries.
Apparently, in order to develop the confidence of one on the other, the foreign minister
advised ―a constant and continuous exchange of information [between the two
countries] on a very friendly and diplomatic basis‖.648 However, the process of
normalizing the two countries relationship was not advanced as expected before. Rather,
gradually the détente was replaced by uneasy peace and the military rule in Somalia
gradually dragged to the activity of the resurgences of shifta activities.
Additionally, the support of the government of Cuba to the authority of Somalia on
August 17, 1972 by acknowledging the unification demands of the Somali inhabitants in
Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti gave additional rhetoric leverage for the government of
Barry to revive the traditional irredentism, which was denied and avoided by the Egal-
Sharmarke era of détente.649
647Ibid, p.186.
648Thompson, p.188.
649Yordanov, p.218.
231
In the meantime, in November 1972 officials at the NFD informed the government of
Kenya about the revival of shifta activities on the coastal areas of the NFD. Later, in
March 1973 Kenya‘s attorney-general, Charles Njonjo, explained to the parliament of
Kenya about the prospect revival of the shifta insurgency activities in the NFD. While
explaining the bill to the parliament, the attorney-general stated that Somalia was at
―…the verge of a shifta resurgence claiming part of Kenya as its own land‖.650 The
attorney-general‘s explanation to the parliament clearly reflects the unwelcoming
development of the Kenya-Somalia relationship. A comparative shifta insurgency
revival was also observed along the Ethiopia-Somalia borders. As a result, Emperor
Hailesilase of Ethiopia and President Kenyatta of Kenya agreed for ―urgent
reconnaissance by their land and air forces in the frontier zone‖651 to halt the reviving
shifta insurgency activities, which were sponsored by Somalia.
Furthermore, the preoccupation of Somalia on military buildup also pushed Kenya and
Ethiopia to arms race with Somalia. For instance, in order to advance its defense
capacity in 1973, Patrick Keatly, who was correspondent of the Guardian, reported the
discussion between ―Kenya and the British Military Defense in London for the purchase
of aircraft to meet the challenge of Russian MIGs‖.652
Apparently, to send a plain message and to undermine the growing demands of
Somalia‘s interest to hard-line approach, at the tenth OAU summit at Addis Ababa in
May 1973, the Vice President of Kenya stated that ―Kenya cannot be party to opening
up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states. Kenya…cannot and shall not
recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister
country‖.653
In the above quote the Vise President of Kenya forwarded message in a veiled language
about the unwelcoming revival of irredentist approach on the post détente relations of
Somalia with adjacent countries.
650Thompson, p.191.
651Thompson, p.192.
652Ibid, p.191.
653Adar, p.245.
232
Barry‘s speech on October 21, 1973 on the territorial issue also escalated the
temperature of the boundary controversy of the Horn region. The speech of Barry reads
that ―we have already said that we shall never give up the Somali cause. It is not
possible for us to give it up…what we want from you is to free our people, whom you
are colonizing, from colonialism‖.654
The speech of Barry on October 21, 1973 seems a clear message for neighboring
countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia that either to fulfill the aspirations of Somalia or
face the outcomes. The trajectory of such kind of speeches from higher government
officials of Somalia and the activity of propaganda campaign from Radio Mogadishu
increased throughout the upcoming years up to the end of the era of the Ogaden war.
4.4.2. Security Threat and the Crises of War (1974-1980)
In 1974, the government of Somalia embarked on an extensive propaganda and
diplomatic strategies to attain its ambitious expansionist plan. The 1974 aggressive
move of the authority of Somalia towards the hard-line irredentist approach was
stemmed from Somalia‘s believe that Kenya would withdraw itself from the security
cooperation with Ethiopia. As stated on chapter three, Somalia was ambitious to deter
the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership through magnifying the image of the ideological
difference between the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya).655
In the 1974 OAU summit, which was held at Mogadishu, the unskilled diplomatic
maneuver of Somalia was seen. In the summit, the dissemination of provocative
literature at the conference hall to impose Somalia‘s expansionist and irredentist policy
on neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti disappointed member states. In the
literature, which was disseminated at the conference hall, Somalia accused Ethiopia and
Kenya for illegal administration of the Somali inhabiting lands under their jurisdiction.
The authority of Kenya and Ethiopia objected the action of Somalia by asserting the
summit was arranged to promote the solidarity of Africa. The objection of Kenya and
Ethiopia was also echoed by other African states in the conference hall. The African
delegates also blamed Barry for the poor action on a conference hosted by his country.
654Thompson, p.194.
655Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.10.
233
Delegates in the conference had also stated that the action of Mogadishu was
unwelcoming tactic for the future solidarity of Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia tried to draw
the focus of the summit to their own advantage by criticizing the offensive literature and
arguing that the tactic of Somalia hinders the amicable and coordinated works of the
OAU.656
In the same year (1974), the government of Said Barry signed an accord named ―treaty
of cooperation and friendship‖ with the Soviet‘s president, Nikolai Podgorny. In this
way, Somalia became the first sub-Saharan African state to sign an accord of friendship
and cooperation with the Soviet. Subsequently, the Soviet started to train and equip
Somalia‘s army.657 The action of Somalia was considered as a threat by the authority of
Kenya. Thereby, Kenya began to strengthen its frontier security with Somalia.
Furthermore, the winning of Somalia‘s president, Said Barry, to the chairmanship of the
OAU in 1974 and his trial to benefit from the position to enhance Somalia‘s interest
against Kenya and Ethiopia further complicated the relationship amid Somalia and
Kenya. During his stay as the chairmanship of the OAU, even if not successful, Barry
tried to appoint the foreign minister of Somalia as the secretary general of the OAU.658
Later, in the mid-1970s, while working for the greater Somalia scheme, Barry actively
involved in supporting the Mogadishu based anti-Kenya opposition groups that demand
the secession of the NFD from Kenya. This activity of Barry together with the growth of
guerilla attack against Kenya using factions supported by Somalia further eroded the
relationship between Somalia and Kenya between 1975 and 1976.659
The outbreak of the Ogaden war in 1977 further deteriorated the stressful relations
between Kenya and Somalia. As mentioned on chapter two, the Ogaden war was fought
because the government of Somalia claims Ogaden, a large starch of hot desert on the
eastern parts of Ethiopia. The government of Kenya strongly condemned the military
action of Mogadishu against Addis Ababa because Nairobi considered the action of
Mogadishu over Ogaden as a dress rehearsal against its own case in the NFD. Meaning
―Since Somalia has a similar though more muted territorial claim on the
656Tompson, p.196; Makinda, ―Supper Power Involvement,‖ P.23.
657Makinda, ―Supper Power Involvement,‖ P.5.
658Farer, pp. 100-103.
659Makinda, ―Supper Power Involvement,‖ pp. 27&35.
234
northern…Kenya, the Kenyans are following the strife between their northern neighbors
with increasing anxiety‖.660
The strong opposition of Kenya against the military action of Somalia largely stemmed
from the expansionism policy of Somalia against neighboring states. During the course
of the Ogaden war the Somalia Embassy at Nairobi also caught by the Kenyan police
while recruiting ethnic Somalis living in Kenya to provide military service in the
Somalia defense force. The authority of Kenya strongly objected the action of the
Somalia Embassy at Nairobi because someday the force might be used ―to fight against
Kenya‖.661
While the calamities of the Ogaden war escalated the tension in the region of the HoA,
the shifta insurgent groups tried to plot the unstable regional situation to renew the
violent shifta war in the NFD of Kenya. As a result, the parliament of Kenya and the
public strongly objected the shifta activities in the NFD. The authority of Kenya also
unequivocally accused the regime of Barry for the death of four civilian and two
security men by the violent shifta action in the NFD. In the same vein, the authority of
Kenya accused the government of Barry for assaulting the frontier post with 3,000 to
10,000 men. The authority of Somalia rejected the allegation of Kenya ―but sent a
delegation to Kenya to establish a bilateral border commission‖.662
In the meantime, Vice President Daniel Arap Moi stated that ―the Government planned
to register all Kenyan Somalis and expel those found to have sympathies with Somalia.
He said Kenya could not tolerate subversives among its citizens‖.663 In the same manner
Kenya‘s foreign minister, Waiyaki, on his return from the UN summit in New York
noticed the authority of Somalia that his government ―would not tolerate interference on
its northern border‖.664 Furthermore, President Kenyatta on his part stated that ―Somalia
should renounce its claims on territory in Northeastern Kenya‖665 In addition, Kenyatta
660John Darnton Special to The New York Times, ―Kenya‐Somalia Ties Are Becoming Worse,‖ The New
York Times (October 23, 1977), p.8 https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/23/archives/kenyasomalia-tiesare-
becoming-worse-mogidishus-conflict-with.html.
661Ibid.
662Donovan C. Chau, ―At the Crossroads of Cultures? A Historic and Strategic Examination of Kenya-
Somalia Relations,‖ The Journal of the Middle East and Africa Vol.1, No.1 (2010), p.75.
663Darnton Special to The New York Times, ―Kenya‐Somalia Ties,‖ p.8.
664Ibid.
665Adar p.246.
235
mentioned that his government had hoped that the 1967 Arusha accord would solve the
contest between the two countries but it is astonishing to see the Somalia authority
circulating a false territorial claim over Kenya and other neighboring countries.
Apparently, in October 1977 President Kenyatta forwarded the following message:
External threats were created by aggression and subversion mounted by the Somali
Republic against the Government and people of Kenya. . . . My Government will
continue to be vigilant at all times. One clear thing about the Republic of Kenya is
that our national integrity must be defended at all costs.666
On the other hand, on his state visit to Addis Ababa in March 1978 the Kenya‘s foreign
minister, Waiyaki, showed the solidarity and strong support of his country to Ethiopia
against Somalia‘s invasion over Ogaden. On his speech at Addis Ababa, Waiyaki
underlined that Kenya would never accept and tolerate any military action to challenge
the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. On the top of this, on a joint press statement
foreign minister Waiyaki and his Ethiopian counterpart Feleke Gedle-Giorgis demanded
the government of Somalia ―to renounce all claims to the territories of Ethiopia, Kenya
and Djibouti and that Somalia must openly declare its acceptance of all UN and OAU
principles and decisions governing interstate relations including the principle of noninterference
in the internal affairs of other countries‖.667 Once Kenya showed its
solidarity with Ethiopia the relationship between Kenya and Somalia became one of the
worst after the coming to power of Barry. Moreover, the firm relationship between
Ethiopia and Kenya clearly showed the unsuccessful attempts of Barry‘s policy to
isolate Kenya from Ethiopia in a desire to made Kenya neutral on the Ogaden war.668
On the other hand, when Moi took the precedential position of Kenya in 1978, he
promised to strengthen the anti-irredentist policy of Kenya against Somalia. Apparently,
Moi promised to further strengthen his countries cooperation with Ethiopia.669
On the top of this, on a dinner prepared for his honor at Addis Ababa in 1979 while
explaining his government‘s solidarity with Ethiopia and objecting the territorial claim
of Somalia, Moi stated that:
666Ibid.
667Ibid, p.247.
668Tompson p.220.
669Khapoya, pp.25-26.
236
The excellent relations that exist between Ethiopia and Kenya started long before
Kenya's independence. . . . Kenya and Ethiopiar share a long, well recognised and
peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and
cooperation. . . . We are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial
claims must be avoided at all cost. In the past, Kenya has extended her hand of
cooperation to all our brothers and sisters on our continent regardless of their
political ideologies.670
The above statement of Moi reflects that the change of leadership in Kenya did not
affect sense of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya against the common ―enemy‖
of the time, Somalia. In addition, the speech confirms that the territorial assertion of
Somalia against neighboring states was one of the main elements for the hostile and
stressful relations between Somalia against Kenya and other neighboring states of the
HoA.
On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Ogaden war during the period between 1978
and 1980, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia was marked with persistent
tension and recurrent plot of shifta attack against the NFD of Kenya. This was partly
stemmed from the disappointment of Mogadishu on Nairobi because of the latter‘s
material, diplomatic and moral support to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war.671
However, beginning from the inception of 1980s up to the end of the decade the
stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia showed a comparative improvement.
But, this does not mean that the strategic and security partnership amid Ethiopia and
Kenya was weakened. Rather, after the Ogaden war the strategic partnership amid
Ethiopia and Kenya reaffirmed.
Some of the factors that contributed for the improvement of the stressful relations
between Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s were the following:
1) the ideological reorientation of Somalia away from the socialist camp; 2) the
diminishment of Somali military capacity and subsequent inability to pose a threat
to its neighbors; 3) the clear preference of the Somali population of the [NFD] to
remain part of a now economically vibrant Kenyan state, …; and 4) the eruption of
670Adar, p.248.
671ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02; Tompson, p.232.
237
civil strife in Somalia, which prompted Barre to seek outside pledges of support or,
at the very least, nonintervention. Furthermore, the fracturing of the Somali nation
and descent into tribalism that characterized the 1980s brought a final and decisive
end to the nationalist pressures within society that had constrained Somali
executives from pursuing more conciliatory foreign policies.672
The de-escalation of stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s helped
at least to discourage the outbreak of all-out war between the two countries.
Furthermore, unlike with Ethiopia the de-escalation of stress with Kenya helped for the
decline of shifta insurgency attack against Kenya in the 1980s. The situation also
opened the opportunity for the rapprochements of the heads of states and ministers of
Kenya and Somalia.
4.5. The Era of Reconciliation and Rapprochement between Somalia and Kenya
(1981-1991)
Since the inception of 1980s the Somalia-Kenya relations oscillated between positive
and negative uncertain impressions. Ultimately the two nations worked to normalize it.
In the process of normalizing the two countries relations different domestic, regional
and global factors had been challenging the advancement of rapprochement and
normalization. The divergent interests of global powers together with other smaller and
emerging powers interests in the Gulf and Middle East regions had partly complicated
the normalization and rapprochement scheme amid the two nations.673
In the process of rapprochement and normalizing the tie between Kenya and Somalia
the role of Saudi Arabia is arguably high. Saudi Arabia which was one of the key
players for the separation of Mogadishu from the Soviet influence had also tried to play
the same role to separate Nairobi from Addis Ababa. But, later Saudi became a key state
in the rapprochement of Kenya and Somalia. According to Makinda, the scheme of
normalizing the tie between Kenya and Somalia was started with the mediation of
Riyadh immediately after the end of the Ogaden war. The intension of Saudi Arabia to
normalize the relations of Kenya and Somalia was quite possibly stemmed from the
following possible reasons. First, it was intended in order to radiate the dominant
672Woodwell, p.109.
673Tompson, p.247.
238
position of Saudi on the Red sea and the HoA regional politics. Second, as one of the
devoted allies of the United States in the region, Riyadh wants to show its loyalty to
Washington by creating rapprochement platform for the two allies of the United States
in the Horn region that were hostile to each other. Third, it was intended to isolate the
pro-west Kenya from the pro-Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia.674 Accordingly, in the
progression of the Saudi lead rapprochement scheme, President Moi of Kenya and
President Barry of Somalia were invited to Riyadh in January 1979. In the process of
the rapprochement discussion, the authorities of Nairobi presented a request for
Mogadishu to ―unconditionally‖ renounce its territorial claim from Kenya. However,
the authority of Mogadishu declined the proposal of Nairobi.675
Subsequently, in early December 1980 Colonel Mengistu Hailemariyam of Ethiopia
arrived at Nairobi for a state visit. On a joint press statement at Nairobi, President Moi
and Colonel Mengistu presented a call to Mogadishu to renounce its territorial claim
―publically and unconditionally‖.676 Apparently, the heads of the two states
unequivocally objected the ―expansionist‖ policy of Somalia and insisted Mogadishu to
respect the ―inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states‖.677 The authority of Mogadishu was not happy with the joint communiqué by
Mengistu and Moi. In this sense, Mogadishu sees the joint communiqué as provocative
that threaten the growing peace in the region. Furthermore, perhaps as a response to
Mengistu‘s state visit and to the joint communiqué, the Mogadishu sponsored shifta
attack was observed in the NFD of Kenya.678
But, gradually beginning from 1981the normalization tie and rapprochement activities
between Somalia and Kenya showed a good progress. For instance, immediately after
the June 1981 OAU summit at Nairobi, President Moi and President Barry issued a joint
press statement to normalize the relationship between the two countries. In their press
statement the heads of the two countries affirmed the commitment of their government
to promote the normalization scheme between the two countries. Furthermore, the joint
674Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.11; Samuel M. Makinda, ―From Quiet
Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy,‖ Third World Quarterly Vol. 5, No. 2 (Taylor
& Francis, Ltd., 1983), p.316.
675Tompson, p.248.
676Ibid, p.249.
677Ibid.
678Addar, p.248; Tompson, p.249.
239
press release remarked the dedication of the two nations to promote the general welfare,
cooperation and understanding of the people of the two countries.679 Apparently, in an
interview after the 1981 Nairobi OAU summit, Barry marked that ―Somalia was seeking
‗accommodation‘ with Kenya, with whom Somalia has had a border dispute for many
years‖.680 In his speech, Barry added that ―Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain
from Kenya‖.681
The following are some of the reasons for the rapprochement between Kenya and
Somalia in the 1980s. First, in the process of the two nations‘ normalization and
rapprochement, in the 1980s, it has been suggested that the non-hostile atmosphere
advocacy and support by western nations such as the United States, Britain, and West
Germany deserve acknowledgment.682 For instance, in 1980, both Kenya and Somalia
allowed the United States a military facility in their respected territories. In return,
Washington supplied development aid and military equipment to Kenya and Somalia. In
the light of this, since Washington was providing military training and development aid
to Somalia and Kenya, she did not seek to see its allies fighting with the weapon
supplied by America. Rather, Washington in collaboration with regional and western
allies worked to normalize the relations between Kenya and Somalia. On the top of this,
Washington had a plan to normalize the Kenya-Somalia relations to create a chain of
alignment with the other pro-Washington states in the Northeastern Africa and the Gulf
regions such as Egypt, the Sudan, and Oman to weaken the influence of the Soviet in
the region. Meaning, America‘s interest for the normalization and rapprochement of
Somalia and Kenya in the 1980s was stemmed from the following two simple reasons:
i) to create anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist-Leninist line in the HoA by establishing
Washington led order in the region that consists of Somalia, Kenya, the Sudan, Egypt,
Oman, and Saudi Arabia and; ii) to crack the activity of the pro-Soviet groups in the
region and to create balancing power for the pro-Marxist-Leninist states (i.e. Ethiopia,
South Yemen, and Libya). Particularly, the authority of America was well aware that
the continuation of the Ethiopia-Kenyan security cooperation would quite possibly
679Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.12; Woodwell, p.109; Adar, p.248.
680 Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks,‖ p.3.
681Ibid.
682Alan Cowell, ―Somalia‘s Double Trouble as a Client State,‖ The New York Times (November 1, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/01/weekinreview/somalia-s-double-trouble-as-a-client-state.html.
240
shake the pro-west bloc and alignment in the HoA. So, America and its allies in the
region worked in the region to separate Kenya from Ethiopia through normalizing the
Kenya-Somalia relations.683
Second, it is believed that the Kenya-Somalia rapprochement and normalization process
in the 1980s showed some promising progress because of the latter‘s shift of stands
towards the NFD of Kenya. The shift of attitude was clearly seen on the 1981
statements of Barry that reads ―Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain from
Kenya‖.684 In a similar manner, Somalia‘s minister of political and social affairs stated
that his government does not have any territorial assertion over Kenya. He added that
the issue of the NFD is the internal matter of Kenya and the NFD residents, which the
authority of Nairobi is expected to find solution for the complication in mutual
coordination with the residents of the NFD.685 Apparently, President Barry stated that
―Somalia does not have any acute dispute with Kenya what so ever but all are images
and reflections of the past European colonialism‖.686 At other time, in 1981 after
conducting meeting at ministerial level at Nairobi the information minister of Somalia
asserted that ―although there had been misunderstanding before, it was important at the
moment to cooperate and work together in good neighborliness‖.687
The statements of Barry and his ministers at the inception of 1980s clearly witness the
interests of Mogadishu to normalize relations with Nairobi. Furthermore, the above
expressions by President Barry and his higher officials can be taken as a concrete mark
for the shift of Somalia‘s self-determination and territorial aggrandizement policy
towards the matter of the NFD of Kenya.
This shift of attitude at Mogadishu was because of the diplomatic isolation that Somalia
encountered in African diplomatic platform of the time. It is apparent that the
diplomatic isolation was stemmed from the irredentist policy of Somalia that claim
territory from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.688 Thereby, the government of Barry
683Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ pp.12-13; Makinda, ―From Quiet Diplomacy to
Cold War,‖ p.315.
684Gupte, ―Somalia Calls for Talks,‖ p.3.
685Adar, p.177.
686Said Barry Quoted at Adar, p.177.
687Adar, p.177.
688Ibid, 248.
241
worked to normalize its relations with Kenya at least to minimize the diplomatic
pressure on Mogadishu on African politics, which Ethiopia and Kenya have a more
influential position. The third reason that facilitated the 1980s normalization and
rapprochement process between Kenya and Somalia was the skepticism of Kenya over
the soviet domination of the politics of the HoA. Although Kenya did not worsen
relations with the pro-Soviet Ethiopia, the switch of alignment by Mogadishu from pro-
Soviet to pro-west soundly helped for the progression of rapprochement amid Kenya
and Somalia.689 The fourth reason is that there was shift of mental outlook among the
Somali inhabitants of the NFD to remain as part of Kenya. The shift of viewpoint by the
Somali residents of the NFD was stemmed from the interest to benefit from the
emerging and popping up economic growth in Kenya. Meaning, the consistent
economic development in Kenya helped to reduce the opposition movements of the
Somali residents of the NFD which in turn contributed for the rapprochement of
Mogadishu and Nairobi in the 1980s. Apparently, the political system of Nairobi which
was relatively participatory than that of Mogadishu had also contributed in muting anti-
Kenya discontent in the NFD that in turn helped the two countries rapprochement
activity.690
The last but not the least reason that facilitated the rapprochement process between
Somalia and Kenya was the latter‘s interest to benefit from the market of Mogadishu.
Given the deterioration and collapse of the East African Community in 1977 the market
of Kenya in Tanzania and Uganda was declined. In this light, Kenya needs to cover its
declining market by expanding its market to Somalia and other neighboring states such
as Ruanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Zaire, Ethiopia, and Some Middle East countries.691
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the collapse of the East African community (i.e.
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) instigated Nairobi to look the market of Somalia for its
goods, which in turn helped the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia.
Furthermore, the pivotal role of the Kenyan Somalis descent general in aborting the
August 1, 1982 attempted coup by the Kenyan air force against the administration of
Moi had also helped the Kenyan authority to develop good attitude towards the Kenyan
689Makinda, ―From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War,‖ p.317.
690Woodwell, p.120.
691Makinda, ―Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,‖ p.14.
242
Somalis. The situation also helped to further strengthen the rapprochement process
between Mogadishu and Nairobi.692
On the other hand, in the process of normalizing their relations with Kenya the authority
of Somalia used to blame Ethiopia for the poor relationship between Kenya and
Somalia. For instance, in 1982 on his public speech Barry presented Ethiopia as a
scapegoat for the hostile relations between his country and Kenya. The speech of Barry
reads, ―For a long time we had been trying to reach good understanding with our
neighbors, Kenya, but Abyssinia [Ethiopia] intrigues and hostile tactics had been
blocking the way to good understanding and neighborliness between Somalia and
Kenya‖.693 At other time Barry argued that ―Ethiopia tried many times to deteriorate the
good friendly relations between SDR and Kenya Republic by false and cheap
propaganda‖.694
This clearly suggests that during the 1980s unlike with Ethiopia the foreign policy of
Somalia towards Kenya was changed. However, despite the change of foreign policy
from the side of Mogadishu and the progression of the normalization and
rapprochement, the Kenya‘s policy towards the doctrine of territorial integrity and
expansionism of Somalia remain unchanged. For instance, in 1983 Kenya together with
Ethiopia once again issued a joint press statement that criticizes the expansionism of
Somalia. In the joint press statement the two nations ―…reaffirmed their commitment to
preserving their territorial integrity and sanctity of boundaries as enshrined in the OAU
and the UN charters‖.695 The joint communiqué was not seen positively by the authority
of Somalia.
Later, in 1984, as a part to further deepening the rapprochement and normalization
process of the two nations, President Moi arrived at Mogadishu for a state visit. The
presence of Moi at Mogadishu was historical because it was Moi who visited Somalia
for the first time at the level of head of state after the full independence of Kenya from
the British rule. The presence of Moi at Mogadishu was considered as a signal for the
further warming of rapprochement between the two nations because a decade or two
692Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence (New York, 2012), p.376; Woodwell, p.109.
693Said Barry Quoted in Adar, p.178.
694Said Barry Quoted in Adar, p.177.
695Adar, p.211.
243
decades ago such kind of relationship was unimaginable amid Somalia and Kenya.
Subsequently, Kenya and Somalia signed a bilateral accord to ensure the peace and
security of the shared border between the two nations. As an outcome for the
rapprochement process and the peace accord between the two countries, around 300
Kenya Somalis were returned to their residents in the NFD. The Northern Frontier
District Liberation Front (NFDLF) had also shut down its offices at Somalia and came
back to Kenya following the amnesty declaration by the government of Kenya.696
Furthermore, ―by the end of 1984, Somalia had agreed to disavow any further claims to
Kenyan territory‖.697
During the period between 1984 and 1986, unlike with Ethiopia, the rapprochement and
peaceful relations between Kenya and Somalia was more developed. In so doing, the
insurgency and shifta attack against Kenya was dramatically declined. The tension
around the shared border areas between the two countries had also by far improved.698
To show the good progression of the two countries normalization activities, in 1985
Barry asserted that ―with the exception of Ethiopia, we greatly value the good relations
which exist between Somalia and Kenya‖.699 On May 23, 1986, the active support of the
Kenyan doctors for the severe car accident on President Barry, until he moved to Saudi
Arabia for additional treatments, had also helped to further build the rapprochement and
normalization scheme between the two countries. After the recovery of Barry from the
car accident the authority of Mogadishu presented credit for the contribution of the
Kenyan medical doctors in saving the life of the President.700
On the other hand, despite the warm rapprochement and normalization process, the
foreign policy of Kenya towards the territorial claim of Somalia against neighboring
countries such as Ethiopia and Djibouti remained unchanged. For instance, in 1987
Kenya in collaboration with Ethiopia issued a joint press release that condemned the
insurgency activity of Somalia against the Ethiopia‘s Ogaden region. In the press
statement, the Ethiopia-Kenya front objected the challenge of Somalia to the territorial
696Chau, pp.76-77; Woodwell, pp.109-110.
697Woodwell, p.109.
698Tompson, p.249.
699Adar, p.273.
700Tompson, p.249.
244
integrity of neighboring states. Furthermore, in the press statement the Kenyan authority
asserted that the subversive activities of Somalia against the Ogaden region were not a
challenge only for Ethiopia but also for Kenya. The joint press statement also called
Somalia to stop arming the Somali insurgent factions against neighboring states.701
The press statement reflects that the rapprochement and normalization process between
Kenya and Somalia did not deter the security cooperation which was signed between
Ethiopia and Kenya in 1963. Apparently, it looks that the rapprochement and
normalization scheme between Kenya and Somalia was directly or indirectly gloomed
by the continuation of the subversive and destabilization actions amid Mogadishu and
Addis Ababa.
The period between 1989 and 1990 was a period of crisis and instability in the internal
politics of Somalia. Said Barry was highly challenged by the internal opposition groups.
As a result, the voice of Mogadishu‘s territorial claim from neighboring countries
dramatically declined. During this period, the view of Kenya towards Said Barry‘s
administration was dramatically improved because of the total decline of Mogadishu‘s
territorial assertion over the NFD of Kenya. As a result, the authority of Nairobi more
approached to Mogadishu‘s administration. Even some sources claim that Nairobi
engaged on the affair of Somalia to the extent of supporting Barry‘s administration with
armament on his struggle with the internal opposition.702 This was done by Nairobi
probably to maintain the weak and submissive administration of Barry.
Finally, the government of Barry was removed from power in January 1991 through
violent internal opposition and armed struggle.703 In general, the year 1991 is significant
for the Ethiopia-Kenya front not only because of the end of Said Barry‘s administration
in Somalia but also because it marks the end of an organized territorial assertion from
Mogadishu against Kenya, Ethiopia and other neighboring states. On the other side, the
year 1991 was bad because Somalia was divided among different tribal based warlords
and Somaliland officially declared its succession from Mogadishu. On the top of this,
the country (Somalia) fell into unending civil war, anarchy, brutality, and violence as
701Woodwell, p.118; Onyango, p.184.
702Woodwell, p.110.
703Chau, p.77.
245
there was no organized political party or military power to replace the administration of
Said Barry, which is yet to be bridged.
246
CONCLUSION
In the 2nd half of the 20th century the dynamics of the political relations between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya was shaped due to the pan-Somali irredentist movement;
the conflicting interests of self-determination vs. territorial integrity; infiltration of
insurgency groups; competitions for the establishment of geopolitical regional hegemon
together with the cold war politics and extra-continental powers interference.
Furthermore, it is believed that the national, regional, sub-regional, continental, and
extra-continental historical and political course of events together with the political
reality of the Horn of Africa in the second half of the 20th century such as diaspora
rebellions; the issue of aggressive diplomacy and hard line approach to problems; the
issue of insurgency and counter insurgency; hegemonic competitions and unhealthy
diplomatic campaign that irrefutably synchronized with the hostile and/or cooperative
nature of the trilateral political relations between the three countries under the state of
crisis and distrust laid the foundation for the trilateral political relations between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.
In the dynamics of the three countries trilateral political relations from 1960 to 1991, the
issue of aggressive diplomatic campaign, agitation of subversions and counter
subversions; and the shifta (bandit) war to enforce the greater Somalia scheme had also
contributed in creating the platform of hostile political front between Ethiopia vs.
Somalia and Kenya vs. Somalia.
On the other hand, it is understood that the relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya
was conditioned by shared regional and local issues such as security, peaceful boundary
diplomacy, geopolitical proximity, the common Somalia problem, cross-border
partnerships and cross-border joint planning helped for the development of cooperative
relations amid the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) during the period addressed
by this study.
The support of Ethiopia to the Kenyan patriots during the Kenyan Mau Mau anticolonial
resistance movement together with the Kenyan support to the Ethiopian
patriotic movements against the 1935 Italian aggression of Ethiopia had also helped to
develop sense of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. The common stand of
247
Ethiopia and Kenya in the OAU towards maintaining the colonial boundary as a legal
boundary of the post independent African states had also further strengthened the
Nairobi Addis Ababa cooperation. Yet, the stand of the Ethiopia-Kenya front towards
the colonial boundary disappointed Somalia and then the authority of Mogadishu time
and again presented their objection against the attitude of Ethiopia and Kenya.
Apparently, the materialization of anti-colonialism together with the common stands of
the two countries in various international organizations had also helped to enhance the
Addis Ababa-Nairobi cooperative relations.
Yet again, unlike Somalia, the adherence of Ethiopia and Kenya for the territorial
integrity of the post independent Africa through accepting colonial boundaries as a legal
boundary of the newly independent states cemented the relationship of the two countries
(i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) with unwavering base.
Therefore, throughout the period covered by this study, unlike Somalia, the dynamics of
examinations of historical and political events between Ethiopia and Kenya reflects that
despite divergent and/or distinct colonial experience, ideological differences, and
change of regime and/or leaderships the two countries cooperative relationship
remained unchanged.
On the other hand, the Ethiopia and Somalia relations reflects that despite repeated
negotiation to normalize their relationship and/or despite the fact that the two countries
are compliment to each other, their relations remained hostile throughout the period
between 1960 and 1991. In the process of the Ethiopia-Somalia hostile relations Kenya
used to side with Ethiopia.
It is apparent that Somalia is one of the natural providers of outlet to the sea to Ethiopia
via its 3000 kilometers long coast line that starched between the Indian Ocean and Gulf
of Aden. As a matter of fact Ethiopia is the only country of the hinterland of Somalia
that needs a port service. On the other hand, Genale (or Juba) and Wabishebele revers
are the only immutable source of water for the arid and semi-arid land of Somalia. The
origin of these two revers is from the Arsi-Bale highlands of Ethiopia. Besides, the
pastoralist community of Somalia cross border every year to Ethiopia looking for
pasture and water for their cattle‘s. However, in the face of this natural interdependence
248
Ethiopia and Somalia had hostile political relations all along the period coverd by this
study, 1960-1991. In the light of this, it is noted that the employment of the unrealistic
political philosophy such as irredentism, territorial aggrandizement, hegemonic
competition, insurgency, counter-insurgency, headstrong diplomatic approach,
conflicting interests on the concept of territorial integrity and self-determination etc.
jeopardized the natural interdependence or marriage between the two Horn countries
and put them under the state of hostility for so many years. Particularly, the territorial
assertion over Ogaden and Haud grazing lands by Somalia hardly pushed forward the
hostility of the two neighboring states. Besides, the hostile approach between the two
naturally complementary and interdependent states was stemmed from the hegemonic
comptitions, external power interference, and nationalist agitation.
On the other hand, the defeat of Italy by the united forces of Great Britain and Ethiopia
in 1941 and the subsequent formation of a territory called ―occupied enemy territory‖
by the British contributed for the post independent hostile and stressful relation between
Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. The ―occupied enemy territory‖ contains the ex-British
Somaliland, ex-Italian Somaliland, the region of Ogaden, and the NFD.
The other reason that escalated the post independent hostile relations between Somalia
and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and the
Somali nationalists to create greater Somalia. Particularly the over ambitious advocacy
and vow of the Somali Youth League (SYL) and its members to unit all the Somali
inhabiting regions of the Horn under one government to create greater Somalia
increased the hostility and further complicated the relations of Somalia with
neighboring countries.
The rigid advocacy of Somalia for the application of the right to self-determination to
the minority Somali inhabitants in Ethiopia and Kenya together with the
uncompromising nature of Ethiopia and Kenya on the issue of territorial integrity had
also complicated the trilateral political relations between the three countries. In light of
this, to create pressure on Ethiopia and Kenya about the issue of self-determination the
government of Somalia tried to use the local Somali inhabitants under the
administration of Ethiopia and Kenya as a threshold. Against this background, the
government of Somalia tried to familiarize a strategy of infiltrating insurgents by
249
helping and organizing the Somali inhabitants in Ogaden and the NFD. The strategic
support introduced from Somalia had also included helping for the formation of the
local resistance groups in Ogaden and the NFD. For instance, the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) was established on July16, 1963 at Hodayo, Ethiopia.
Subsequently, the WSLF started its opposition by propagating a violent rebellion
condemning the Ethiopian administration in Ogaden and demanding self-determination.
Ethiopia and Kenya asserted that the moves of Somalia were against the established law
or legal institutional right of their countries for territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense pact in 1963 in order to halt
the activity of Somalia. On the July 1963 Ethio-Kenya mutual defense agreement, one
of the ideas that the contracting parties showed commitment was the idea of territorial
integrity and political sovereignty of the two nations. Thereby, the hardline and
uncompromising approach from both sides, in turn, worsened the trilateral political
relations of the three Horn nations.
In the light of this, the disagreement of Somalia with the Ethio-Kenya front on the issue
of self-determination and territorial integrity led to an extended insurgency and counter
insurgency activities that later escalated into all-out war in 1964 and 1977-78. Besides,
the stressful and hostile situation led to a long diplomatic battle between the three
countries.
Therefore, those findings made us to argue and testify that the conflicting interest
between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front on the issue of self-determination and
territorial integrity contributed for the development of hostile and stressful relations
between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front from 1960 to 1991.
Further findings shows that the issue of irredentism had also contributed for the hostile
and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front. It was supposed and
inferred that Somalia always aims at containing the Northern Frontier District of Kenya
(NFD) and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia, however, strongly
objects to Somalia's claims. As stated before, it is apparent that the claim of Somalia
over the NFD and Ogaden was stemmed from similarity of language and culture
between the inhabitants of the NFD and Ogaden with the people of Somalia. However,
the persistent and unchanging partnerships to protect their territories from Somalia's
250
irredentist claims by Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
successfully challenged the irredentist move of Somalia. In view of this, the cooperative
anti-irredentist position was maintained by Emperor Haileselessie I, Mengitsu
Hailemariam and Meles Zenawi all of Ethiopia and Presidents, Kenyatta and Moi of
Kenya.
Other finding shows that the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency had also
contributed for the hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya
front. It was noticed that the activity of insurgency and counter insurgency grow
between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front following the full independence of Somalia
in1960. In the same vein, the involvement of the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Saudi
Arabia, and Iran on the side of Somalia supporting the irredentist approach and
insurgency actions increased the fearfulness of Ethiopia and Kenya in advance. But, the
activities of insurgency and counter insurgency between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya
front were not uniform throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. For instance, it is
noted that during the era of Osman-Sharmarke (1960-64) and Osman-Hassen (1965-67),
the activities of Shifta insurgency and counter insurgency were high. After that, during
the era of détente and/or during Sharmarke-Egal era (1967-69), the activities of
insurgency and counter insurgency between Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Kenya and
Somalia were low. In the same token, it was noted that throughout the Barry regime
(1969-91) the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency allegation amid Ethiopia and
Somalia as well as between Somalia and Kenya was high. In the light of this, in the
period between 1977 and 1978 the insurgency and counter insurgency activities
between Ethiopia and Somalia grow to full scale war. In the war, western powers
including USA supported Somalia. In addition, it is noted that most Arab League
member states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq etc. supported Somalia.
Ethiopia got support from Kenya, Russia, Cuba, Libya, etc. Therefore, in the study it
was tasted that the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency between Somalia and the
Ethio-Kenya front contributed for the development of hostile and stressful relations
between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.
Aggressive diplomatic campaign also contributed to the hostile and stressful relations
between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front. In this sense, it was observed that
251
following the full independence of Somalia in 1960 the Ethiopian authority tried to
micromanage the political developments in Somalia to the advantage of Ethiopia.
Accordingly, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the political involvement of Ethiopia
in Somalia‘s internal politics was partly done by scrutinizing the political divisions
within Somali. Notably the hostile tribal approach among the Somali tribal groups
helped Ethiopia to penetrate easily to the internal political life of Somalia.
The Somali nationalists on their part extensively employed diplomatic campaign against
Ethiopia and Kenya at different level. In their diplomatic campaign they tried to
magnify and portray Ethiopia as expansionist and ―colonizer‖ that unlawfully occupies
the territory of Somalia. Following the foot stapes of the advocacy of the Somali
nationalists, newspapers in Mogadishu used to publish issues that depict Ethiopia as
jealousy and obstacle for the unification of Somalia. As a result, the attitude of
resentment toward Ethiopia disseminated in a rampant way among the Somali speaking
communities of the Horn region. The Ethiopian side also depicted and securitized
Somalia as a threat for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Kenya.
Against this background, the 1964 OAU summit at Dar el Salam (Tanzania) insisted
Ethiopia and Somalia to stop hostile propaganda campaign. But, the hostile and
aggressive diplomatic campaign continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The other vital point that was tested in this study is that as a response to the
destabilization efforts and aggressive diplomatic campaign of Somalia on Ethiopia the
latter shifted its policy approach towards Somalia from the policy of contentment and
appeasement to the policy of disruption and destabilization in 1976. The new policy of
Ethiopia had a name called ―Project Reconciliation‖. This destabilization policy was
employed against Somalia until the downfall of Barry regime in 1991. Therefore, in the
study it was tasted that the issue of aggressive diplomatic campaign between Somalia
and the Ethio-Kenyan front contributed for the development of hostile and stressful
relations between the two fronts.
The other reason that escalated the post independent hostile relations between Somalia
and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and Somalia
political groups to create greater Somalia. Particularly the over ambitious advocacy and
252
vow of the SYL and its members to unit all the Somali inhabiting regions of the Horn
under one government to create greater Somalia increased the hostility and further
complicated the relations of Somalia with neighboring countries.
In the case of the Somalia-Kenya relations in the 1980s, despite the fact that the
common passion of the Ethio-Kenya front against the irredentist claim of Somalia was
unchanged, the rapprochement and normalization process between Kenya and Somalia
relatively reduced the two countries unsympathetic relations.
Eventually, in January 1991 the government of Said Barry was toppled through violent
internal opposition and armed struggle. The year 1991 is significant for the Ethiopia-
Kenya front not only because of the end of Said Barry‘s administration in Somalia but
also because it marks the end of an organized territorial assertion from Mogadishu
against Kenya and Ethiopia. But, in the same light, the removal of Said Barry caused
unending civil war and power vacuum in Somalia, a gap that is yet to be bridged.
253
MAPS
Map 1: Shows the Boundary Proposal of Kenya and Ethiopia during the Process of Negotiation.
Source: ENALA, 17.2.14.01
254
Map 2: A Sketch Map that shows the Directions and Geography of Insurgency Resistance Movement in
Ogaden Region in 1970s. The arrow sign shows the directions of the Somali insurgents. The star sign
remarks the Ethiopian forces resistance to insurgents.
Source: ENALA, 17.2.268.03A
255
Map 3: A Sketch Map that shows the Strategic Site of Ethiopian Army in the Fight against Insurgency
Resistance Movements in Ogaden Region.
Source: ENALA, 1.2.18.07
256
Map 4: A map that shows the Boundary of the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland with
Ethiopia. Apparently, this map shows the position of the 9th (Worder), 10th (Kebridahar), and 11th
(Degahabur) military brigades of the Ethiopian army in the Ogaden region.
Source: ENALA, 1.2.19.03
257
Map 5: The Controversial Ogaden District. The Map Shows the Grazing Lands, Main Towns and other
Significant Geographical Settings in the District.
Source: ENALA, 17.1.7.25.03
258
Map 6: The Controversial NFD
Source: Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, p.4.
259
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APPENDIXES
Appendix I: Minutes of the Kenya/Ethiopia Boundary Reconciliation Meeting Held at the Old
Todenyang Police Post on 30th, 31st August and 1st September, 1973
272
Appendix I Continued
273
Appendix I Continued
274
Appendix I Continued
275
Appendix I Continued
276
Appendix I Continued
277
Appendix II: Ethiopian Affair as Seen by Foreign Eyes, 7th October 1961
278
Appendix III: A Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nairobi, 6th March 1974
279
Appendix IV: British Embassy, Addis Ababa, 14th February 1959
280
Appendix IV Continued
281
Appendix V: A Letter from the British Embassy, Addis Ababa, about the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary
Demarcation, 28th September 1962
282
Appendix V Continued
283
Appendix VI: Proces-Verbal on the First Meeting of the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 13th
July 1963
284
Appendix VI Continued
285
Appendix VI Continued
286
Appendix VII: A Letter from the Imperial Government of Ethiopia to Dejazmach Kifle Erigetu
(Governor of Harar District), 30th June 1960
287
Appendix VII Continued
288
Appendix VIII: A Letter to Dejazmach Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar District) about Grazing Land
Controversies
289
Appendix IX: A Letter from Getahun Tesema to Zewude Gebire Hiwot (Governore of Sidama District),
12th September 1974
290
Appendix IX Continued
291
Appendix X: A letter from Lema Gutema (Commander) to Ethiopian Ministry of Interior, 11th November
1978
292
Appendix X Continued
293
Appendix X Continued
294
Appendix XI: A Letter from Colonel Legese Wolde Maryam to Lieutenant Colonel Zeleke Beyene about
the Somalia Aggregation on Ogaden, 17th July 1978
295
Appendix XI Continued
296
Appendix XII: Telegram Nos. 695 and 696 on the Ogaden and Haud Grazing Area
297
Appendix XIII: Telegram No. 168 from Foreign Office to Addis Ababa, 5th June 1946
298
RESUME
The author of this dissertation graduated his first degree and master‘s degree from
Jimma University in 2006 and 2015 respectively. His research interest is diplomatic
history, political history, and ethnographic history of the region of the Horn of Africa.