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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE KURIL ISLANDS FOR JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY

ABSTRACT
The Strategic Importance of the Kuril Islands for Japan’s National Security
This thesis was written on the strategic importance of the Northern Territories, for which Japan and Russia did not sign the peace treaty that would end the Second World War. Claiming that the four islands of the Kuril Islands chain, Habomai, Kunashir, Shikotan and, Etorofu, which are close to Japan, are connected to Hokkaido, which is in the northernmost part of Japan, and claiming that they are unjustly occupied, Japan demands the return of these islands to itself. This study, which deals with the military, economic and, political-strategic importance of these islands, which cause mutual conflict, has examined the effects of the Northern Region on Japan's national security. As a result of the study, it has been revealed that the economic potential of the islands is high and that it can benefit Japan, but it is not of high importance in terms of military security.
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ÖZET
Kuril Adalarının Japonya’nın Ulusal Güvenliği İçin Önemi
Bu tez, Japonya ve Rusya’nın uğrunda İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nı bitirecek barış antlaşmasını imzalamadığı Kuzey Bölgesi’nin stratejik önemi üzerine yazılmıştır. Kuril Adaları zincirinin Japonya’ya yakın olan dört adanın Habomai, Kunashir, Shikotan ve Etorofu adalarının Japonya’nın en kuzeyinde yer alan Hokkaido’ya bağlı olduğu iddiası ve haksız yere işgal edildiğini öne süren Japonya, bu adaların kendisine iade edilmesini Rusya’dan talep etmektedir. Karşılıklı anlaşmazlığa neden olan bu adaların askeri, ekonomik ve politik açıdan stratejik öneminin ele alındığı bu çalışma Kuzey Bölgesi’nin Japonya’nın ulusal güvenliğine olan etkilerini incelemiştir. Yapılan çalışma sonucunda adaların ekonomik potansiyelinin yüksek olduğu, Japonya’ya fayda sağlayabileceğini ancak askeri güvenlik açısından yüksek derecede bir önem arz etmediği ortaya koyulmuştur.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Research question, approaches, and sources ..................................................... 3
1.2 Literature review ............................................................................................... 5
1.3 Structure of thesis .............................................................................................. 9
CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................................. 11
FEATURES AND THE HISTORY OF THE KURIL ISLANDS ............................. 11
2.1 About the Kuril Islands ................................................................................... 12
2.2 Geography ....................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Marine ecology................................................................................................ 15
2.4 Terrestrial ecology .......................................................................................... 17
2.5 Islands and volcanoes ...................................................................................... 18
2.6 The Ainu on the islands .................................................................................. 19
2.7 History ............................................................................................................. 21
2.8 The strategic value of the islands .................................................................... 23
CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................................................. 27
JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND ROLE OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES .................................................................................................. 27
3.1 Birth of the National Police Reserve, core of the post-war Japanese Army ... 28
3.2 The gradual rise of the SDF towards 1990s .................................................... 31
3.3 The SDF role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations ............................ 35
3.4 Japanese national security under the US – Japan security treaties.................. 38
3.6 The Northern Territories in the defense papers of Japan ................................ 45
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3.7 Security trajectory under Abe Shinzo changing or shifting? .......................... 45
CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................................................. 50
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE KURIL ISLANDS BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA AFTER 1945 ............................................................................................... 50
4.1 Post-World War II and Stalin period .............................................................. 51
4.2 The Khrushchev period: towards a diplomatic normalization ........................ 53
4.3 The Soviet-Japanese joint declaration, Brezhnev, and the stagnant years ...... 55
4.4 The Gorbachev and Yeltsin years: creative destruction and reconstruction ... 61
4.5 The Putin period: emerging relations and future perspectives ........................ 67
CHAPTER 5 .............................................................................................................. 82
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 82
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................ 88
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 120
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the strategic importance of the Kuril Islands for Japan’s national security policy and its contribution to regional security in East Asia from the Cold War period to the present. Japan, as an underrated security actor despite being a regional and global power, remained largely neglected as a security actor. Japan has demonstrated signs of increased security activity in the early 1990s. The changing security environment after the fall of the Soviet Union ended the bipolar world order, giving chance to rise of new actors in the East Asia. Despite its constitution, Japan’s participation in the Gulf War with pressure from the US, then sending Self Defense Forces overseas for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations were the signs of revitalizing Japanese military resurgence.1
While maintaining the status quo with Russia, because of the Northern Territories, which is the main reason for the absence of the Peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union to end the Second World War, the role of Japan Self Defense Forces became significant in the US politics. As a result of the containment policy of the Soviet Union, Japan as a forward base to the Communist world should have a strong military force to withstand attacks and help the US forces. Under the nuclear umbrella of the US, SDF forces slowly began building up their military capabilities to answer protecting its territory since the withdrawal of the US ground troops from Japan on June 6, 1957.2
1 Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda, 204.
2 Kusunoki, The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, 104.
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In the 21st Century, Japan faced the rise of China in economic and military power. Chinese military build-up and growing confidence in territorial matters as well as growing concerns through successful North Korean nuclear missile tests and additionally, the unpredictability of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s reckless missile tests is keeping Japan on the edge. Russia on the other hand, remains relatively in a calmer position concerning China and North Korea, modernizing its army, scaling down in numbers yet increasing its military spending and capabilities. Thus, Russia remains a concern that needs to be carefully watched for Japanese national security policies.3
With the gradual rise and modernization, the SDF has faced constitutional restrain and public opposition since the very beginning. The Constitution came into force on May 3, 1947, after World War II. In its text, Japan formally renounced its sovereignty to participate in the war, intending to establish an international peace based on justice and order. This article occupied every security-related issue especially, the period between 1950 and early 1960s.4 Previously mentioned Russian, Chinese, and North Korean threats, however, allowed SDF improvements in domestic policies. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s personal effort to bolster SDF and while pursuing personal diplomacy with Vladimir Putin was balancing the power politics in the region and finding common ground regarding the Northern Territories issue.
3 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2018,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Full_1130.pdf.
4 Ibid, 98; Asia For Educators, “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm. ; Chinen, “Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and the Use of Procedural and Substantive Heuristics for Consensus,” 75-76.
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In the end, this thesis argues that the strategic value of the Northern Territories for both countries not only differs but also changes over time. The islands have economic and military importance for Russia. Although, the value for Japan was mostly economic during the Cold war period because of the US protection. However, shifting through the multipolar world increased the importance of Japan’s Self Defense Forces. Therefore, the military-strategic importance of the Islands for Japan become clear.
1.1 Research question, approaches, and sources
This thesis will investigate the evolution of Japanese security politics through the Northern Territories dispute. My main motivation to research this issue from the security perspective is caused by the fact that Japan and Russia still have not signed a peace treaty because of the Northern Territories and both parties technically have been continuing the Second World War. In this respect, my thoughts about the Northern Territories will be focused on the importance of the military and economic-strategic value of these islands. Russia in the early 2000s solved or achieved significant progress over border disputes with either the post-Soviet countries or countries like China, Norway, or Finland as mentioned in following chapters in the thesis. My main research question is:
 To what extent the Northern Territories are important in Japan's military and economic-security policies?
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While searching for the answer to this question, other security-related questions arose. The question of while Japan's national security trajectory is nourished under the US nuclear and material protection, how long Japan can sustain pacifism in the multipolar world needs to be answered while digging into the questions regarding East Asian security.
As an approach, this thesis will employ interlinked approaches, a combination of historical and international relations, political economy, and security studies approach.
The first conceptual approach of the thesis was based on history. The Japanese security agenda started from the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 through the present. This historical perspective provides a vantage point from which to map the full trajectory of Japan's security policy.
The second approach that is related to the thesis derives from international relations, political economy, and security studies which seeks to analyze the security agenda of Japan. This will embrace military, economic, and environmental security dimensions.
In this thesis, I will use the terms the Asia Pacific, East Asia, and the Far East as a geographical approach. To explain these terms, the Asia Pacific term legitimizes the inclusion of countries such as the USA, Australia, and New Zealand in regional affairs. On the other hand, East Asia points out a more restrictive geographical approach, excluding countries like the USA and Australia from East Asia affairs. I will use the East Asia term to indicate China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and
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Russia (Russian Far East or Russian Pacific). The term the Far East used to describe these countries is Eurocentric and historically dated.5
Sources used in the thesis are primary and secondary. In primary sources, government documents, memoirs, newspapers, books, and research articles were used. As for secondary sources translated articles and books, reports, and reviews were utilized.
1.2 Literature review
Conceptions of security definitions, actors, issues, and approaches are capable of varying across historical and geographical contexts.6 During the Cold War, a realist conception of security was dominant among academics and policymakers. As in the traditional paradigm and agenda, security referred to the defense of the nation/sovereign state from external military threats. In the late 1980s and 1990s, alternative security concepts reemerged in the mainstream security agenda. Hence, the context of security has become more complex interlinked paradigms, actors, issues, and definitions. So, security is to a degree an undefined term.7 Also, it is broad and multidisciplined in nature.8 The term of security has varied definitions from paradigm to paradigm. It is contested and notoriously slippery to nail down.9 For my purpose, security is defined as actions prioritizing human prosperity against all forms of threats. The main security issues regarding the Northern Territories are military, economic, and environmental. Military security defined as imposing violent
5 McDougall, Asia Pacific in World Politics, 6-7.
6 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 1-32.
7 Tate, Report on the Security Industry Training.
8 Smith, et al., Security Science the Theory and Practice of Security, 20.
9 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 16.
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military threats designed to deliberate and destructive actions aiming at the welfare of all security actors.10 The principal actors of the military-security dimension are usually states/sovereign nations. However, individuals and societal groups like ethnic guerillas, organized crime rings, and big conglomerates are gaining access to the technology inflicting military-grade damage and threaten more civilians than military casualties. They become actors in the dimensions of military security. Economic security is described as threats against one’s economic welfare that occurred from the dynamics of economic activities. Economic welfare threats range from access to basic human needs to more complex topics of macro and microeconomic practices.11 Economic security considerations as well as other aspects of security influence the fate of all security actors and are interrelated. References to basic human needs provide the implication that individuals are the committed referents of the economic and military aspects of security. It can be said that economic activities and changes have the result of integration and disintegration in terms of security.12 Environmental security is defined as a threat to the welfare that results from the rapid changes and devastation of the natural environment that humankind depends on for survival. Therefore, to some analysts, the security of the environment represents the ultimate security.13 Thus, the greatest challenge to the survival of the human race is the sustainability of the habitat.14 Environmental disasters consist of natural and human made. Apparently, these two types of disasters have common causation and consequences for human welfare. The natural environmental threat refers to the
10 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 167-191.
11 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 237.
12 Camilleri, The Asia-Pacific in the Post-Hegemonic World, 180-208.
13 Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability.
14 Cox, Multilateralism and World Order.
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events that take place largely as a result of habitat phenomena. These include natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, landslides. All these natural calamities occur without or insignificant human interference. On the other hand, human-induced environmental threats not only tend to increase the impact of natural disasters but also create irreversible outcomes.15 The depletion of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources, pollution of land, sea, air, and alteration of ecosystems by human interference produce the most dangerous environmental threat.16 Japan has been experiencing environmental disasters in its most extreme versions due to its location including, radioactive pollutions. Powerful earthquakes, rain seasons, landslides, typhoons, and fallout from the Second World War and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant radiation leak that occurred on 11 March 2011 threatens Japan’s environmental security in the long term.
Japan as a security actor has received minimal attention in International Relations (IR) and security studies. Japan is not the appropriate country for traditional security studies. Although some have tried to fit Japan into the traditional realist or liberal dichotomies,17 it is the “abnormality18” of Japan that exposes deficiencies of the traditional paradigm.
15 Elliot, Environmental Security, 157-176.
16 Wirth, Globalizing the Environment, 198-216.
17 Katzenstein, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” 153-158.
18 Soeya et al., Introduction: What Is a “Normal Country,” 8-9.
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Soeya explains Japan’s efforts to be a “normal” country through a human-centered security strategy and the Japanese aim to be part of the international community through contribution to the securitization efforts.19 Yet, the “normalization” of Japan in East Asia has not been studied fairly but more typically studies have focused on bilateral alliance with China20 and the US.21
In the military security area, Japan has been perceived as a passive actor. Japanese people’s antimilitaristic/pacifist sentiments supported this view.22 In addition to that, Japanese governments’ full compliance to the US security policies in the region and enjoying the US security guarantees for the external threats strengthen this view.23 However, other neighbors have the suspicion of the past actions of Japan and, Japan has the intention of becoming a pre-war Imperial state by slowly building up its military capabilities, and by doing that, raising tensions in East Asia.24 Still, others have a vision for Japan as a “normal” military power acting in more productive ways in regional and international security. It is a way that requires a more proactive attitude against the new security environment, respecting the domestic and international laws, and using balanced military power.25 Japanese security politics entered a new phase especially, after the 2015 legislation26 which is enabling that the Japanese forces could fight overseas, and, this new phase will
19 Soeya, A ‘normal’ middle power: interpreting Changes in Japanese security policy in the 1990s and after, 72-94.
20 Wang, Chinese Discourse on Japan as a “Normal Country”; Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China Since 1989.
21 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift; Green et al., The U.S.-Japan Alliance; Nishihara, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges; Osius, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Why It Matters.
22 Katzenstein et al., “Japan’s National Security,” 153-158.
23 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism; Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations.
24 Johnson, Blowback, The Costs and Consequences of the American Empire; DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement.
25 Hosoya, Security Politics in Japan.
26 Ibid.
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continue and Japan will increase its presence overseas in training with not only with the US, but also other friendly states (Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, India) , participating in the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, providing aid and disaster relief via the Self Defense Forces to promote regional and international security.27
On the other hand, Japan’s role as a major economic power in East Asia security employed an alternative route for regional stability through official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of economic activities. For some, Japan is characterized as “ODA great power”28 and “civilian great power” because of giving economic aids as a foreign policy tool.29 Even though Japan gave tremendous economic assistance, its effectiveness has been questioned and few are within the security framework.30 Despite Japan’s constant expression of comprehensive security and the role of economic power, few studies look at the military, economic, and environmental dimensions of Japan’s security policy.31
1.3 Structure of thesis
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the thesis giving an outline to understand the Japanese security trajectory. Chapter 2 provides geographic and historical information concentrating on the main features of the Kuril Islands including the value of the Northern Territories regarding the economic and military security of Japan. Chapter 3 focuses on the Japanese view of national
27 Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance.
28 Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order,” 58-74.
29Fukushima, Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a Japanese Foreign Policy Tool.
30 Yasumoto, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy; Orr, The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power.
31 Chapman et al., Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security; Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda.
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security and SDF (Self Defense Forces) the role within the evolving nature of US-Japan relations. Chapter 4 employs the historical approach to explain Soviet and Japanese negotiations over the Northern Territories and the question of impending peace treaties. Lastly, Chapter 5 evaluates the overall trajectory of Japan’s security policies in terms of the strategic benefits of the Northern Territories.
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CHAPTER 2
FEATURES AND THE HISTORY OF THE KURIL ISLANDS
Assessment of an island or a territory requires comprehensive work. Since the security has multi-dimensions (military, environmental, economic, etc.), every aspect of that particular territory must be evaluated diligently. In this chapter, I will give common information about the Kuril Islands along with the more detailed geological, ecological, and as well as the historical background of the islands. Hence, this chapter will provide essential information about the strategic value of the island chain.
Fig. 1 Map of the Kuril Islands chain
Source: researchgate.net
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Fig. 2 Map of the North Pacific Ocean
Source: gisreportsonline.com
2.1 About the Kuril Islands
The Kuril Islands (Кури́льские острова́, Kuril'skie ostrova) in the Sakhalin Oblast region of the Russian Federation is a chain of over 50 major islands spanning about 1,300 km northeast from Hokkaidō, Japan, to Kamchatka, Russia, bordered by the Sea of Okhotsk to the west and the Pacific Ocean to the east.
The Kuril Islands are known in Japanese as the Chishima Islands (千島列島 / Chishima rettō, literally, Thousand Islands Archipelago), also known as the Kuriru Islands (クリル列島 / Kuriru rettō, literally, Kuril Archipelago).
The area of the Kuril Islands ranges from 5 to 3,200 square kilometers, distributed in an isolated manner toward the center, and the climate ranges from north to south. The northern and southern island groups tend to be larger than the central region. The northern and central islands are covered with tundra, while the southern islands are home to a mixed forest (spruce, larch) and grass. Although located in the mid-latitudes, the Kuril Islands experienced sub-polar conditions in winter due to strong northwest winds forced by the Upper Siberia and Lower
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Aleutian Islands. At the end of winter, sea ice covers about one-third of the Sea of Okhotsk. In today's climate, it usually reaches the southern Kuril Islands from the west. From November to March, there is no ice in the headwind sea area and heavy snowfall is common. Summer is characterized by heavy fog and a gentle south wind.32
2.2 Geography
The Kuril Islands form part of the ring of tectonic instability encircling the Pacific Ocean referred to as the Pacific Ring of Fire.33 The islands themselves are summits of stratovolcanoes that are a direct result of the subduction of the Pacific Plate under the Okhotsk Plate, which forms the Kuril Trench some 200 km east of the islands.34
The islands are divided into three sub-groups that are separated by deep (up to 2,000 m) straits: The Northern Kuril Islands (Shumshu to Shiashkotan) are separated from the Central Kuril Islands (Matua to Simushir) by the Krusentern Strait. The Central Kuril Islands are, in turn, separated from the Southern Kuril Islands (Chirpoy to Kunashir) by the Boussole Strait.
The chain has approximately 100 volcanoes, some 35 of which are active, and many hot springs and fumaroles. There is frequent seismic activity, including an earthquake of magnitude 8.3 recorded on November 15, 2006, which resulted in tsunami waves up to 1.75 m reaching the California coast at Crescent City. The waves even reached almost 1.5 m at Kahului, Hawaii, which shows the severity of
32 The Kuril Biocomplexity Project, “About the Kurils,” https://depts.washington.edu/ikip/KBPpublic/AboutKurils/index.shtml.
33 USGS, What is the “Ring of Fire,”? https://pubs.usgs.gov/publications/text/fire.html.
34 The Kuril Biocomplexity Project, “Geologic History,” https://depts.washington.edu/ikip/KBPpublic/AboutKurils/GeologicHistory.shtml.
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the earthquake. The November 15 earthquake is the largest earthquake to have occurred in the central Kuril Islands since the early twentieth century.35
The climate of the island is generally harsh, long, cold, and stormy winters and short, infamous foggy summers. The average rainfall is 760-1,000 mm, and most of it snows from the end of September to the beginning of June.
Chains vary from temperate to sub-arctic climate types, resulting in plant covers ranging from the northern tundra to the lush green pepper and larch forests of the larger southern islands. The highest altitudes on the island are Alaid Volcano (highest point 2339m) on Atlasov Island at the northern end of the chain and the Sakhalin region and Tyatya volcano (1819m) on Kunashir Island at the southern end.
The island's landscape types and habitats include many types of beaches and rocky shores, cliffs, wide rivers, and rapid gravel flows, forests, grasslands, alpine tundra, craters, and peat bogs. Soils are generally productive because ash is periodically heavily enriched by the excrement of incoming seaweed, resulting in higher concentrations of sea salt. However, many of the steep, unconsolidated slopes are susceptible to landslides, and new volcanic activity has the potential to completely obliterate the landscape.
35 USGS, M 8.3 Kuril Islands, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/usp000exfn/executive.
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2.3 Marine ecology
Due to the location of the edge of the Pacific shelf and the confluence of the gyre of the Sea of Okhotsk and the south-facing Oyashio, the waters surrounding the Kuril Islands are the most productive waters in the North Pacific and support a wide range of abundant marine life.36
Invertebrates: The vast kelp layer around almost every island provides an important habitat for sea urchins, various mollusks, crabs, shrimp, sea slugs, and other invertebrates and related predators. Many types of squid provide a major component of the diet of many small marine mammals and birds along the chain.37
Fish: Further offshore, walleye pollock, Pacific cod, mackerel, flounder, sardines, tuna, and several species of flatfish are of the greatest commercial importance. Several salmon species, notably pink and sockeye, spawn on some of the larger islands and local rivers. In the southern region, lake minnow, pacific redfin, and bleeker fish could be found as well.38
Pinnipeds: The Kuril Islands are home to two species of eared seal, the Steller sea lion and northern fur seal, both of which aggregate on several smaller islands along the chain in the summer to form several of the largest reproductive rookeries in Russia. Most of the estimated 5,500 pinnipeds inhabiting the southern Kurile Islands-Hokkaido region are currently concentrated in the waters around Kunashir and the Small Kurile Chain where their main rookeries, habitats, and breeding grounds are found.39 A distinct Kuril island subspecies of the harbor seal (Phoca vitulina
36 Fitzhugh et al., “Archaeological Paleobiogeography in the Russian Far East,”114.
37 International Kuril Island Project, “Biodiversity of the Kuril Archipelago,” https://www.burkemuseum.org/static/okhotskia/ikip/Results/reports/nsf/94report.htm.
38 Ibid.
39 McGinley, South Sakhalin-Kurile Mixed Forests, https://editors.eol.org/eoearth/wiki/South_Sakhalin-Kurile_mixed_forests.
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Kurilensis), a subspecies of sea otter (Enhydra lutris kurilensis), and Largha are also abundant.40
Pinnipeds were an important harvest target for the indigenous peoples of the Kuril Islands, both in food and in materials such as skin and bones. Long-term variability in the extent and distribution of human settlements along the Kuril Islands is probably a trace of pointed areas. Historically, Seal was heavily fur-exploited in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, sea otters appear to have disappeared before commercial hunting in the 18th and 19th centuries. No records of otter hunting around Hokkaido were found during that period. The pointed population of the Kuril Islands, which has essentially had no additional harvest since the 1960s, appears to be of considerable health and in some cases expanded. As anthropogenic habitat disturbances increase, it is less likely that stable sea otter habitats will be built in coastal waters and Hokkaido. A notable example is the now extinct Japanese sea lion, sometimes known in the Kuril Islands.
Scientists from the United States, Japan, and Russia conducted a survey completed in July of 2001 to collect biological data on the distribution of the sea lions on the Kuril and Iony Islands. A total of 4,897 Steller sea lions age 1+ years old and 1,896 pups were counted on all rookeries in the Kuril Islands.41
Sea otters were exploited very heavily for their pelts in the nineteenth century until such harvest was halted by an international treaty in 1911. Indeed, the pursuit of the valuable otter pelts drove the expansion of the Russians onto the islands and much of the Japanese interest. Their numbers consequently decreased rapidly.
40 Ibid.
41 Burkanov, “Steller Sea Lion Survey on Kuril and Iony Islands, Russia,” https://archive.fisheries.noaa.gov/afsc/Quarterly/ond2001/feature.htm.
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A near-total ban on harvest since the early twentieth century has allowed the species to recover and they are now reasonably abundant throughout the chain.
Cetaceans: The most abundant of the whales, dolphins, and porpoises in the Kuril Islands include orcas, bottlenose dolphins, Risso's dolphins, harbor, and Dall's porpoises. Baird's, Bryde's, and Cuvier's beaked whales, killer whales, fin whales, and sperm whales are also observed.
Seabirds: The Kuril Islands are home to many millions of seabirds, including northern fulmars, tufted puffins, murres, kittiwakes, guillemots, auklets, petrels, gulls, cormorants, and quail. On many of the smaller islands in summer, where terrestrial predators are absent, virtually every possibly hummock, cliff niche, or under boulder is occupied by a nesting bird. Birds with restricted range include the spotted redshank (Tringa erythropus), Japanese Robin (Erithacus akahige), Bull-headed Strike (Lanius bucephalus), and the Forest Wagtail (Motacilla lutea).42
2.4 Terrestrial ecology
The composition of terrestrial species on the Kuril Islands is dominated by Asian mainland taxa via migration from Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands and by Kamchatkan taxa from the North. While highly diverse, there is a relatively low level of endemism.
Due to the small size and isolation of the central island, red foxes and arctic foxes for the fur trade were introduced in the 1880s, but few major land mammals. The bulk of the terrestrial mammal biomass is taken up by rodents, many introduced in historical times. The largest southernmost and northernmost islands are inhabited
42 McGinley, South Sakhalin-Kurile Mixed Forests.
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by brown bears, foxes, martens, and shrews. Some species of deer are found on the more southerly islands. Among terrestrial birds, ravens, peregrine falcons, some wrens, wagtails, and Vestper bats are also common.
2.5 Islands and volcanoes
While in Russian sources the islands are mentioned for the first time in 1646, the earliest detailed information about them was provided by the explorer Vladimir Atlasov in 1697. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Kuril Islands were explored by Danila Antsiferov, I. Kozyrevsky, Ivan Yevreinov, Fyodor Luzhin, Martin Shpanberg, Adam Johann von Krusenstern, Vasily Golovnin, and Henry James Snow43.
Table 1. List of Main Islands
Name (alternative names given in parentheses are mainly in Russian)
Area (km2)
Population
Shimushu (Shumshu)
3504 km2
20
Oyakoba (Atlasov Island)
150 km2
0
Paramushiro (Paramushir)
2053 km2
2540
Shirinki (Antsiferov Island)
7 km2
0
Makanrushiri (Makanrushi)
50 km2
0
Onnekotan (Onekotan)
425 km2
0
Harumokotan (Kharimkotan)
70 km2
0
Ekaruma (Ekarma)
30 km2
0
Chirinkotan (Chirinkotan)
6 km2
0
Shashukotan (Shiashkotan)
122 km2
0
Raykoke (Raikoke)
4.6 km2
0
Matsuwa (Matua)
52 km2
0
Rasuwa (Rasshua)
67 km2
0
Ushishiri (Ushishir)
5 km2
0
Ketoi (Ketoy)
73 km2
0
Shimushiru (Simushir)
360 km2
0
Buroton (Broutona)
7 km2
0
Chirinhoi (Chirpoy)
21 km2
0
Burato-Chiripoi (Brat Chirpoyev)
16 km2
0
Uruppu (Urup)
1450 km2
0
Etorofu (Iturup)
3280 km2
6602
Kunashiri (Kunashir)
1499 km2
7800
Shikotan
264.13 km2
2440
Habomai Rocks, including Shibotsu (Seleni), Taraku, Yuri, Akiyuri, Suisho, Zelioni (Kaigara), Oodoke and Moeshiri
97.7 km2
28
Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp
43 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 7-8-11.
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Table 2. List of Volcanoes in the Kuril Islands
Northern Kurils
Central Kurils
Southern Kurils
Alaid
Raikoke
Kolokol Group
Ebeko
Sarychev Peak
Tri Sestry
Vernadskii Ridge
Rasshua
Rudakov
Chikurachki
Srednii
Ivao Group
Lomonosov Group
Ushishur
Demon
Karpinsky Group
Ketoi
Medvezhia
Fuss Peak
Urataman
Golets-Tornyi Group
Shirinki
Prevo Peak
Chirip
Nemo Peak
Zavaritzki Caldera
Baransky
Tao-Rusyr Caldera
Goriaschaia Sopka
Grozny Group
Harimkotan
Milne
Bogatyr Ridge
Sinarka
Astonupuri
Kuntomintar
Lvinaya Past
Ekarma
Berutarube
Chirinkotan
Tiatia
Smirnov
Mendeleev
Golovnin
Source: https://www.volcanodiscovery.com/kuriles/central-kuriles.html
2.6 The Ainu on the islands
The Ainu are a group of indigenous people traditionally inhabiting their homeland of Ainu Moshir (meaning the land where the Ainu live), which consists of southern Sakhalin, Hokkaido, the Tohoku region of Honshu (the main island of Japan), and all of the Kuril Islands.44
The Ainu, living on numerous islands in the Okhotsk region had become the centerpiece of people in the Okhotsk region between the expanding nation-states of Russia in the north and Japan in the south in the mid-nineteenth century. Caught between two expanding powers, many Ainu had to leave their customs, lifestyle, religion, and, even their diet. The Ainu have animistic religion, women tattoo their
44 The Foundation for Ainu Culture, “Ainu Culture,” https://ainu-upopoy.jp/en/ainu-culture/.
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mouth and forearm, hunting and fishing as their main occupation and, eat their food cooked. 45 In this respect, the Ainu differs from Japanese and Russian customs.
The Russo-Japanese treaties greatly affected Ainu living in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. The Treaty of Shimoda (1855) impeded the Kuril Ainu’s use of trade routes extending to Kamchatka for food and goods. The Shimoda Treaty split the Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan at the Etorofu Strait, thus forcing the Ainu to adapt to the new situation and limited their trade. Twenty years later, the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875) was signed between Japan and Russia for exchanging Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan gained control over the whole Kuril Islands chain; Russia gained control over the Sakhalin peninsula. The Ainu were living on the Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were to be given three years to decide their country of residence46 and, some of them living in the northernmost islands were forcibly relocated to Hokkaido by Japan because of the security concerns due to the Russian-speaking, Orthodox Christian, partly Russified Ainu.47
The Ainu today are mostly assimilated between Japan and Russia and their population along with their cultural elements are decaying. According to `the Survey on the Ainu Living Conditions’ conducted in 2013 by the Hokkaido Government, the surveyed Ainu population in Hokkaido is 16,786 in 66 municipalities. The Hokkaido Government reached individuals who deemed to succeed the Ainu blood in the local community, or those living with descendants of the Ainu through marriage, adoption, and so forth, and counted only those who identify themselves as the Ainu.48 In
45 Akanko Ainu Kotan, “Ainu Culture and Ainu People,” https://www.akanainu.jp/en/culture-people.
46 Harrison, Japan’s Northern Frontier, 171-175.
47 Harrison, The Indigenous Ainu of Japan at the Time of the Aland Settlement, 96.
48 Ainu Association of Hokkaido, “Actual Living Conditions of the Hokkaido Ainu,” https://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/english/life.html.
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Russia, people who identify themselves as Ainu are only 109 according to the Russian census in 201049 and all of them are living in Kamchatka territory. All of them were forcibly repatriated after the Soviet Union captured the Kuril Islands in 1945 and treated them as Japanese subjects.50
2.7 History
The Kuril Islands first came under Japanese administration in the fifteenth century during the early Edo period of Japan, in the form of claims by the Matsumae clan, and play an important role in the development of the islands. It is believed that the Japanese knew of the northern islands 370 years ago, as the initial explorations were of the southernmost parts of the islands. However, trade between these islands and Ezo (Hokkaidō) existed long before then. On "Shōhō Onkuko Ezu," a map of Japan made by the Tokugawa shogunate, in 1644, there are 39 large and small islands shown northeast of the Shiretoko peninsula and Cape Nosappu. In 1698 V. Atlasov discovered the island which was later named in his honor.
Russia began to advance into the Kurils in the early eighteenth century. Although the Russians often sent expedition parties for research and hunted sea otters, they never went south of Uruppu island. This was because the Edo Shogunate controlled islands south of Etorofu and had guards stationed on those islands to prevent incursions by foreigners. In 1738-1739 M. Shpanberg had mapped the Kuril Islands for the first time and S. Krasheninnikov had written a description of nature found there.
49 Sinelschikova, “Who are the Ainu and why do authorities still deny their existence?,” https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/330576-who-are-ainu-people.
50 Ibid.
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In 1811, Captain Golovnin and his crew, who stopped at Kunashir during their hydrographic survey, were captured by retainers of the Nambu clan and sent to the Matsumae authorities. Because a Japanese seaman, Takataya Kahei, was also captured by a Russian vessel near Kunashiri, Japan and Russia entered into negotiations to establish the border between the two countries in 1813.
The Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation was concluded in 1855, and the border was established between Etorofu and Uruppu. This border confirmed that Japanese territory stretched south from Etorofu and Russian territory stretched north of Uruppu. Sakhalin remained a place where people from both countries could live. In 1875, both parties signed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, whereas Japan relinquished all its rights in Sakhalin in exchange for the Russian cession of all its rights in the Kuriles to Japan.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Gunji Shigetada, a retired Japanese military man and local settler in Shumshu, led an invading party to the Kamchatka coast. Russia sent reinforcements to the area to capture this coastal area. Following the war, Japan received fishing rights in Russian waters as part of the Russo-Japanese fisheries agreement until 1945.
During their armed intervention in Siberia 1918–1925, Japanese forces from the northern Kurils, along with the United States and European forces, occupied southern Kamchatka. Japanese vessels made naval strikes against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.
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The Soviet Union reclaimed the South of Sakhalin and the Kuriles by force at the end of World War II through the Treaty of San Francisco, but Japan maintains a claim to the four southernmost islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai rocks, together called the Northern Territories since they are not the part of the Kuril Islands chain.51
2.8 The strategic value of the islands
The strategic value of the Islands diverges in economic, military areas. Economic and military terms provide two different perspectives on the strategic values of the Islands. In an economic sense, the Islands have ample fishery opportunities. Thus, fisheries are the staple diet in Japanese cuisine. Therefore, reversion of the Northern Territories would ensure Japan’s food security. In addition to economic benefits, new territories will increase the territorial waters of Japan. This would allow Japan to expand its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) area which would grant benefits from marine sources as mining of rare minerals, fishing, oil & gas research, and energy production from wind and water.52
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Northern Territories Issue,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html.
52 Watanabe, “Journal of Human Security Studies,” 59-60.
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Fig. 3 EEZ of Japan, Russia, and overlapping claims of the Northern Territories
Source: https://www.marineregions.org
The strategic value in terms of military strategy transformed throughout the developments in technology and political tensions between Japan and Russia. During the Cold War period, the military-strategic value of the Islands was significant because the Sea of Okhotsk provides a sanctuary for Russian long-range missiles.53 Another advantage is making the Russian Navy’s accessibility to the Pacific easier. However, the development of Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) reduced the military strategic value of the Island chain's function as a protective belt. For Japan, the military-strategic value of the Northern Territories has offensive and defensive benefits. In terms of offensive benefits, the four islands would be as a forward operation base and, will have a sudden strike capability with ground troops and fighter jets, allowing Japan to gain air superiority over the Kuril Island chain in a short time. As in defensive benefits, the islands are suitable for installing anti-ship,
53 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 144.
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anti-ballistic and, SAM (surface-to-air) missile systems. These systems will provide hundreds of kilometers of cover area for any approaching threats. In addition to missile protection systems, the early warning systems and air surveillance will provide effective protection over any possible threats from Russia or North Korea.
Rare earth minerals, which are beneficial for high-tech military usage, were found in extinct volcanoes and the perimeter of the erupted volcanoes.54
Fig. 4 Mineral deposits and fishing zone map
Source: (Valencia, 1991)
54 Valencia, Southern Kurile Islands/Northern Territories Resource Potential, GeoJournal, 227.
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In Etorofu, Rhenium was discovered in 1994. Rhenium is among the rarest metals on Earth.55 It does not occur uncombined in nature or as a compound in a mineable mineral species. It is, however, widely spread throughout the Earth’s crust to the extent of about 0.001 parts per million.56 These minerals have a broad range of usage. They are being used from everyday commercial use as kitchen utilities to automobiles to very sophisticated state-of-the-art stealth fighter jets, precision-guided missiles, night vision goggles, satellites, microchips and, radar systems.57 Another research puts rare earth minerals trails in Kipyaschiy creek, Baransky volcano in Etorofu Island. According to research, during fluids/surface water interaction we see fractionation of rare-earth elements as indicators of changing physicochemical parameters of the creek.58
In short, the positive outcome for the reversion of the Northern Territories to Japan would grant economic benefits. In terms of economic security and food security, the Islands bring more profits. In the following chapter, I will discuss the military-security aspect of the Northern Territories by looking into the Self Defense Forces' role in Japan’s defense and discuss possible strategic gains when the Northern Territories reverted to Japan.
55 Royal Society of Chemistry, “Rhenium,” https://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/75/rhenium.
56 Korzhlnsky et al., “Discovery of Rhenium mineral at Kudriavy volcano,” 51.
57 Voncken, The Rare Earth Elements: An Introduction, 1-3.
58 Bragin et al., “Fractionation of Rare-Earth Elements in Surface Streams of Baransky Volcano (Etorofu, Southern Kuriles),” 45-48.
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CHAPTER 3
JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND ROLE OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES
As a result of unconditional surrender to the allied forces, post-war Japan was prohibited to maintain an army and her security would be provided by the United States. However, the power vacuums that occurred after World War II and the bipolarity that came with Cold War dynamics created a necessity for the rearmament of Japan. In this chapter, the evolution of Japan’s national security policies and the birth of the Self Defense Forces will be examined, regarding the strategic value of the Northern Territories. In addition, Japan’s response to the changing security environment and challenging dynamics, which threatens the status quo in East Asia region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the Chinese military will be investigated while considering Japan’s military capability and its disputed territory with China. Japan’s efforts to adopt these changes in domestic and international environment albeit, the question of revision and modernization of the Self Defense Forces to keep Japanese presence in the Northern Territories and military-strategic benefits of the Northern Territories will be evaluated.
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3.1 Birth of the National Police Reserve, core of the post-war Japanese Army
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that,
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”59
The above statement was written into the postwar Japanese constitution by the American officials who supervised the occupation of Japan. This constitution is sometimes called the "MacArthur Constitution," because General Douglas MacArthur, commander of all Allied forces in the Pacific, guided its writing. The United States fought and occupied Japan primarily to certify that it would not go to war again, and Article 9 was written to guarantee this. In 1947, General MacArthur envisaged a postwar Japan that would remain disarmed and would be handled by the new United Nations.60
However, MacArthur’s vision of an unarmed Japan was short-lived because of the rapid changes in the international scene. American wartime ally Chiang Kai-shek was defeated in 1949 against communists in China led by Mao Zedong and he had to flee Taiwan. Another ally Soviet Union became a threat to democracies by supporting communists and exporting communist ideas in war-torn poor countries. Thereupon, in 1950 a war in Korea broke out. The Socialist state above the 38th parallel by Kim Il-sung, started an invasion to capture the whole Korean peninsula to become the sole legitimate government. Supported by both Soviet Union and China,
59 Government of Japan, “The Constitution of Japan” https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html.
60 Asia For Educators, “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm#top.
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North Korean forces swiftly occupied most of Korea. The UN forces, which %90 of the total personnel provided by the United States, entered the war to halt North Korean aggression. Hence, the US occupation forces stationed in Japan became crucial for supplying the war in Korea.
Therefore, the US decided to establish a Japanese police force to maintain domestic security. On July 8, 1950, General MacArthur wrote a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida and authorized the formation of 75000-man National Police Reserve (NPR).61 This police force was furnished with entirely American equipment, including heavy guns, vehicles, even soldier fatigues. However, NPR's operating style looked like an army but, the Japanese constitution explicitly prohibits rearmament, John Foster Dulles who was a prominent figure in the State Department, and several top-ranking American and Japanese officials adopted a clandestine way of operating the NPR. American military officers were responsible for creating a viable Japanese fighting force that was placed under the cover of the Civil Affairs Section Annex, to suggest a civilian mission. The instructions given by Colonel Frank Kowalski, chief of staff for Major General William Shepard, the commander of CASA, to the first American officer assigned to a camp of new NPR recruits absurdly illustrate the secrecy and duplicity by which the NPR became a de facto Japanese army:
You will be the only one in the camp who will know that you are organizing an infantry battalion. Others, of course, will suspect it. But only you will know. As far as the Japanese are concerned, and that applies to all Japanese, the governor, the police and the NPR [recruits themselves]—you are organizing a police reserve. The Constitution of Japan prohibits an army. You will not call the men soldiers, and you will not call the officers by any military ranks. The men are policemen and the officers will be
61 Schonberger, Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952, 250-254.
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superintendents. If you ever see a tank it isn't a tank, it's a special vehicle. You can call a truck a truck.62
The Korean War accelerated the naval rearmament of Japan as well. The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), founded in April 1948 with twenty-eight small patrol-type vessels, was modeled after the U.S. Coast Guard, its duties legally limited to non-military tasks. With the outbreak of the Korean War, MacArthur authorized an increase of eight thousand in the number of MSA personnel, and plans were made to increase the number and tonnage of ships and remove restrictions on speed and armament. Even before the buildup could be completed, a dramatic, but secret, demonstration of the MSA’s transformation into a naval unit occurred. By the desires of the U.S. Navy, Prime Minister Yoshida reluctantly decided in early October 1950 to authorize forty-six Japanese minesweeping units for duty off Korean waters.63
The issue of increasing rearmament was taken into consideration by the American and Japanese governments when the Advisor to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, met with Prime Minister Yoshida in Japan to negotiate a peace treaty in January and February 1951. In these meetings, Dulles pursued rearmament as a concrete “contribution” Japan could make to the Free World. The discussion proceeded with difficulty as Yoshida took an unreceptive position throughout the negotiations. Ultimately, the Japanese government confirmed that it intended to begin rearming and signed a security treaty with the United States that included the provision of military bases, and the Americans presented Japan with a generous peace treaty. In negotiations stretching through the San Francisco Peace Conference in September and ending in late February 1952, a security framework between the
62 Ibid.
63 Graham, Japan’s Sea Line Security, 1940-2004, 99.
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two countries that consist of the peace treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the US-Japan Administrative Agreement was agreed. The issue of rearmament was decided to be handled later. In October 1952, the NPR was reformed as the National Safety Force (NSF) and was placed under the NSA along with the Coastal Safety Force. The mission of the NSA was “to manage and administer the forces that act when necessary in special circumstances to maintain our nation’s peace and order and protect lives and property; to do the administrative work by this and to provide administrative support for guarding and rescues at sea.” As such, there was no major change from the mission of the NPR. However, as the phrase “supplement the National Rural Police and local police” had been removed, the role of the NSF and Safety Security Forces as forces acting in response to situations unable to be handled by the general policy was made clear.64 On July 1, 1954, the NPR was reorganized into the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, and the Air Self-Defense Force and the Defense Agency were created.
3.2 The gradual rise of the SDF towards 1990s
Japan’s Self Defense Forces, or Jieitai in Japanese, was created in 1954. Since then its mission scope and capabilities have gradually increased. The SDF was a continuation of the NPR and NSF, however, its mission and constitutional restrains contradicted the early years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, changing security environment in the international scene enabled the SDF to dispatch overseas, humanitarian assistance, disaster reliefs, and UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) around the world.
64 Kusunoki, The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, 1945–1960, 79-82.
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Early years of the SDF, the US pressure for increasing SDF capabilities was met by Japanese resistance. The Yoshida government was following more independent rearmament policy against the US requests due to the anticipated economic burden on the Japanese economy. The US concern about communist activity in the region also felt the need for rapid strengthening of Japan’s defenses within “the scale politically possible.” In this vision, expansion of Japan’s ground forces was urgently needed, and it was necessary and possible for the Japanese government to expand its forces to 150,000 in 1952 and 300,000 in 1953.
In comparison, the Yoshida government’s near-term aim was to slowly build “military force” by continuing to strengthen policing. He felt that maintaining a force of 300,000 men was clearly beyond the means of the Japanese economy as well as impossible to cover up under a pretext of “maintaining public order”.65 In the end, the Yoshida government decided that increasing personnel number to 110,000 is the most convenient option in fiscal terms.66
On November 15, 1953, then-Vice President Nixon addressed the American-Japan Society in Tokyo. The speech emphasized the importance of U.S.-Japan relations in the post-war period, Japan’s rearmament especially after the Communist takeover of China, and the ideology’s specter over Korea and Indochina. Nixon’s speech addressed the consensus in Washington back in the day and made public negotiations about the rearmament of Japan.
I had the opportunity to inspect some of the National Safety Forces here in Japan. They are in every respect excellent forces, well led, well trained, good men from top to bottom. It must be admitted that the primary responsibility for Japan’s defense must rest upon Japan and the Japanese people... The nation’s economic capabilities have been sapped by the war through which it
65 Kusunoki, The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force, 80-81.
66 Ibid.
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has gone, but it is essential, if Japan is to survive as a free and independent nation, that we recognize frankly that its defense forces must be increased eventually to an adequate level... There are those who say the United States is taking a very inconsistent position about the rearmament of Japan. They might say: In 1946 who was it that insisted Japan disarm? . . . it was at the insistence of the United States that Japan disarmed. Now if disarmament was right in 1946, why is it wrong in 1953? And if it was right in in 1946 and wrong in 1953, why doesn’t the United States admit for once it made a mistake? I’m going to do something I think perhaps ought to be done more by people in public life. I'm going to admit right here that the United States did make a mistake in 1946.67
In the 1960s, the legitimacy of the SDF, which was weak in terms of constitutionally, was questioned and met protests throughout the country. The Anpo protests, which were a series of protests against the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, which was a revision of the 1952 Security Treaty that enables the US to maintain their military bases on Japanese soil. This generated a fear in Japanese society that the US would lead Japan into an unwanted war. The unpredictable threats of the cold war and the nuclear brinkmanship of the 1950s sent regular ripples of anxiety through Japanese society each time the instability of its position was exposed. Support for neutrality, as opposed to an alliance with the U.S., grew stronger through the 1950s. In 1950, 22% of those polled supported neutrality, with 55% supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 1953, the figures were 38% and 35% respectively, and by 1959 support for neutrality had risen to 50%, while only 26% of respondents supported the military alliance. In 1960, on the eve of the Anpo protests, 59% supported neutrality and only 14% expressed support for the military alliance.68 In the meantime, LDP and the Police forces pressured Prime Minister Kishi for the idea
67 Movroydis, “Vice President Nixon on the Future of U.S.-Japan Relations,” https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2018/10/vice-president-nixon-future-u-s-japan-relations/.
68 Jesty, “Tokyo 1960: Days of Rage & Grief,” https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/tokyo_1960/anp2_essay01.html.
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of using the SDF to quell protests. However, seniors from the Defense Agency and the Police forces General Director opposed this proposal.69 In the end, using the SDF against its people while in its development phase was not a politically good call, said the Defense Agency officials.70
In the 1970s and 80s, the SDF keep a low profile in the Japanese public, whose anti-militarism was quite strong given the catastrophic destruction of the War and the negative view of pre-war militarist authoritarian governments.71 The changing security environment in Asia and the US involvement in Vietnam War made it essential to modernize its equipment. The biggest issue of the SDF during this period was to find recruits. Young men preferred to work in companies during the high growth period. Despite aggressive recruitment efforts, the number of applicants for the GSDF fell to 89,000 in 1963 and 69,000 in 1964, from 150,000 in 1962.72 However, the security environment of the Post-Cold War and 21st Century compelled Japan to rethink SDF modernization and overcome legislation constraints to turn SDF into a “normal” army.
69 Kusunoki, The Early Years of the SDF, 112-114.
70 Ibid.
71 Yoshida, “Historiography of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan,” https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/document/historiography-asia-pacific-war-japan.html
72 Ibid, 139.
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3.3 The SDF role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
The major change in the SDF history started with the Gulf War. The US-led coalition forces waged war against Iraq in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The US President George H. W. Bush pressured the Japanese to participate in the war. During a meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu on September 29, 1990, President Bush reportedly requested that the SDF provide background support, transportation, and medical assistance. The government's various measures in response demonstrated that legislative constraints were preventing Japan from dealing effectively with the situation.
The Peacekeeping Law was adopted through deliberate political compromise. Japan faces formidable pressure to play a more prominent role in international media, especially the United Nations. Although the government of Japan paid $13 billion to support coalition forces, it encountered harsh criticisms from the international community for failing to send military personnel to the Gulf.73 The Japanese people thus began to realize that their nation could not fulfill its expected international role through financial contributions alone. Domestically, the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had been studying the potential of Japanese participation in UN operations for some time and had been waiting for the perfect time to do so. Opposition parties, led by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the Japanese public, on the other hand, remained cautious of the government's efforts to increase their country's role.74 The Japanese
73 Friedman, “Baker Asks Japan to Broaden Role,” https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/12/world/baker-asks-japan-to-broaden-role.html.
74 Shibata, “Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation and Recent Developments in U.N. Operations,” 309-310.
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public has generally opposed any expansion of the SDF and has closely monitored government policy concerning foreign security in general and the SDF's involvement in particular. After the Gulf War, however, Japan's domestic political environment changed dramatically.
On April 24, 1991, after the Gulf War, the Japanese government decided to send SDF marine minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in response to a request from the United States.75 This time the Japanese government found the solution as a very broadening interpretation of an SDF law (Article 99) which authorizes SDF forces to allow mine removal actions.76 The government defended the constitutionality of the mission because a formal cease-fire had been in effect and that the purpose of the mission - to dispose of abandoned mines.77
On June 15, 1992, the Japanese Diet' adopted the Law Concerning Cooperation in U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Operations (Peacekeeping Law). The law, which came into force on August 10 of that year, amended the Self-Defense Forces Law to allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in U.N. peacekeeping activities. The law also stipulates that Japan's peacekeeping operations, etc. shall be carried out in accordance with the five principles.
75 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan's Response to the Post-Gulf Crisis Problems,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-3.htm.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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1. Agreements on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
2. Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements be satisfied again in a short term, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments.
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.78
After the PKO law was enacted, the SDF was dispatched to different UN missions around the world. Participation to the missions done in four areas: PKOs, Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, International Humanitarian Relief, and International Election Observation.
78 Government of Japan, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/cooperation/cooperation.html.
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Self Defense Forces were dispatched to international peace cooperation assignments in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Golan Heights, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, Sudan, Nepal, and more countries through 1992-2019.79 The scope of operations were humanitarian reliefs, election observations, material, and education aid, and counter-piracy operations.
3.4 Japanese national security under the US – Japan security treaties
Since the formation of NPR, United States continuously requested Japan to increase the SDF personnel capacity. Indeed, it is ironic that Japan which was unarmed by the US in the first place then was demanded to rearm the country. Nevertheless, the Japanese compelled these requests but not in a way that Americans desired. Japanese industrial output had surpassed that of its wartime output, and the yearly increase in GDP had continued since.80 From this point of view, Japanese reluctance to increase SDF unit numbers and close relation with the US protectionism was preferred. While the US forces stationed in Japan protect against external threats and ease the economic burden of the Japanese defense budget, this money would be easily distributed into education or raising the living standards of Japanese people. Japan-US security relations over the years have been revised against changing security environment.
79 Government of Japan, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/result/years.html.
80 Hunter-Chester, Creating Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force, 1945-2015: A Sword Well
Made, 138.
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In May 1957, Japan established the Basic Policy for National Defense:
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded on democratic principles.
To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles;
1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the public’s love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan’s security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation’s resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.81
An important point to note here, in the basic principles, is the Japanese government’s emphasis on Japan-US security treaty dynamics. Following Japan-US security guidelines over the years underlines the same argument.
In the first guideline, as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the
81 Government of Japan, “Basis of Defense Policy,” https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/index.html#:~:text=The%20"Basic%20Policy%20on%20National,and%20the%20Japan-U.S.%20security.
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administration of Japan would be dangerous to its peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger by its constitutional provisions and processes.”82 The Treaty confirms US reliance over external security threats.
The Japan-US defense cooperation guideline approved on November 28, 1978, by the National Defense Council and Cabinet. The guideline focused on problems that might occur where Japan to come under direct attack or when a threat existed; geopolitical problems that could exert an important influence on Japan’s national security; and other issues, such as bilateral exercises and drills.83
In 1997, the new Japan-US defense cooperation guideline was published. These Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.84 Through the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, a document was created to offer an effective context for building and maintaining a reliable relationship and to guide the policy for roles and missions between the two nations. The 1997 Guidelines were created not only for the implementation of forces for the conduct of operations during an armed attack against Japan, but, unlike the 1978 predecessor, the 1997 version also provided a
82 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
83 Elridge, The GSDF During the Cold War Years, 1960–1989, 163.
84 Japan Ministry of Defense, “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/19970923.pdf.
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framework for the relationship to strengthen during normal, peacetime conditions, and also, and perhaps most significantly, it addressed other emergencies such as humanitarian assistance and the emerging threat of low-intensity conflicts threatening Japan.85
On April 27, 2015, the two governments announced the latest version of The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Outline of the guideline emphasizes Japan-US security cooperation like the previous agreements but, the scope of bilateral relations has deepened along with the technological advancements and emergence of regional powers such as China and North Korea.
The guideline addresses new security concerns that have emerged in the region. These include the increased provocation from North Korea and its ballistic missile threat, the wider geographic spread of terrorism, challenges to the existing international set of norms and rules, and the appearance of space and cyberspace as operational domains with security implications. Moreover, the Guidelines refer to China’s assertive claims and rapid military growth, unresolved territorial issues in the region (Japan, Russia, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines). The updated Guidelines enhance Japan-US defense cooperation. They create a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, deepen operational coordination, and strengthen the bilateral planning process. The document emphasizes the defensive nature of all Japanese military actions which to take place must meet strict restrictive conditions.
85 Ibid.
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The Guidelines also allow Japan and the U.S. to coordinate to help other nations. This cooperation with partners provides a foundation for peace, security, stability, and prosperity. Helping other nations’ defense organizations, in turn, bolsters the security of the U.S. and Japan.
Areas of support to other nations include Peace Keeping Operations, Counter-piracy, maritime security, Humanitarian Assistance, military medicine, and the improvement of defense institutions.
The Guidelines specify the strictly defensive nature of Japanese military action to counter threats to its survival or liberty and acknowledge strong constraints upon Japanese use of force while highlighting the primordial indispensable role of diplomacy in all international interaction.
Furthermore, they allow for Japan to be a provider of security by helping like-minded nations to improve their security posture and ensuring Japanese assistance to U.S. defense activity in the region. As the Guidelines themselves state: “In an increasingly interconnected world, the U.S. and Japan will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”86
In comparison with the previous guidelines, Japan-US security cooperation over the years has become stronger than ever. Both countries’ interests in the East Asia region enhance interdependence and the execution of mutual beneficiary policies become a must. The US presence in the East Asia during the Cold War period was a serious deterrent force. However, recent developments in missile
86 Japan Ministry of Defense, “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf.
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technologies, the Chinese rapid economic and military advancement, Russian modernization of military, infrastructure, and expeditions in East Siberia and the Arctic obliged the US to improve the JSDF. Thereby, the scope of the JSDF’s mission description has evolved. The JSDF has more advanced weapons, aircraft, missile systems than most of the countries around the world. This military equipment includes 5th generation F-35 fighter jets, Patriot PAC-3 SAM systems, Aegis Ashore anti-BMDs, and several early warning aircraft, cargo helicopters, and frigates, tanks, howitzers.87 Japan spends only 1% of its total GDP on defense expenditures since the SDF’s establishment.88 Although the number seems to be low, the US dollar equivalent of 1% is $52 billion in 2020,89 which makes Japan the 9th country in the world in terms of defense expenditures.90 This trend did not change with when Abe Shinzo’s policies to improve the military capabilities of the SDF.
87 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Introduction to the Equipment of
the Japan Self-Defense Forces,” https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku/soubiseisakugijutu/introduction2020_en.pdf.
88 The World Bank, “Military expenditure (% of GDP) – Japan,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=JP.
89 Kelly, “Japan sets record $52 billion military budget with stealth jets, long-range missiles,” https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-defence-budget-idUSKBN28V03X.
90 Szmigiera, “Countries with the highest military spending 2020,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/.
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Fig. 5 Military spending of Japan in 2019
Source: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2020
Fig. 6 Japanese interceptions of Russian aircrafts
Source: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2020
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3.6 The Northern Territories in the defense papers of Japan
On December 4, 2013, the National Security Council was established, to provide a forum that will undertake strategic discussions on various national security issues regularly and as necessary under the Prime Minister with strong political leadership.
Annual reports starting from 2014 and until 2020, closely monitored any developments in the Northern Territories. Each report emphasizes the Northern Territories' situation as occupied and stating the return of the islands as soon as possible.91 Apart from that, the overall content of the reports demonstrates numbers of Russian violations of Japanese airspace, Russian deployment of troops to the Islands, annual Russian military drills which were focusing on anti-landing operations against the hypothetical enemy, and placement of surface to ship missile systems, long-range strategic bomber aircraft activities, and strategic importance of Sea of Okhotsk as a bastion for long-range missile launching platforms.92
3.7 Security trajectory under Abe Shinzo changing or shifting?
Japanese security policies have improved through Abe Shinzo’s government. In his first election in 2006, which was lasted only a year, Abe managed to transform Defense Agency into a full ministry status.93 Then, in his second term in 2012, Abe spent most of his political energy to boost stagnating Japanese economy and bolster SDF capabilities through constitutional reforms and governmental institutions.94
91 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2014,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html.
92 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2015,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html.
93 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “About Ministry,” https://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/.
94 Akimoto, The Abe doctrine, 10-11.
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His proactive contribution to peace discourse is based on international cooperation. The policy of proactive contribution to peace refers that, Japan’s proactive contribution to regional and international peace and stability. This includes global issues, such as poverty, climate change, global environmental issues, disaster risk reduction, water and sanitation, health, education, agriculture, and women’s issues.
In 2013, a National Security Strategy (NSS) was approved by the Cabinet and, the National Security Council (NSC) was established by Abe. The NSS represents Japan’s basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy based on a long-term view of its national interests. The NSS specifies, as Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security, and Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan. Based on the NSS, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will develop a highly effective joint defense force, strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations, and advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. At the same time, the MOD will actively promote bilateral and multilateral
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security cooperation with other countries, while strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, in close coordination with Japan’s foreign policy.95
In 2014, Abe decided to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese constitution which restrains Japan’s right to collective self-defense with the allies. This would enable Japan the Self Defense Forces to come to the aid of, and defend, an ally under attack, whereas the previous interpretation of the constitution was strictly pacifist and allowed for the force to be used only in absolute self-defense. This legislation sparked controversy in Japan. The image of the colonial past and the US existence on Japanese soil is risking Japanese security according to the protestors consisting of students, ordinary citizens, the Democratic Party of Japan and, the Japan Communist Party.96 In addition to the revision of pacifist constitution concerns, the opposition expressed concerns that the belief of military aggression will rise if Article 9 is revised.97
So why did Japan need new security legislation? Briefly, the security environment around Japan in 2014 was delicate regarding military tensions over Russian investments to improve the infrastructure of Kuril Islands, modernization of defense units stationed in the Islands, and provocative visits by minister-level politicians threaten status quo in the Northern Territories. On the other hand, the rapid military growth of China and the assertive manner in the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands, increasing Japanese airspace violations caused unbalance in the region.98 Moreover, the unpredictability of North Korea over the nuclear weapons
95 Government of Japan, “NSS,” https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/basis/strategy/index.html.
96 Smith, “Japan’s Diet Uproar,” https://www.cfr.org/blog/japans-diet-uproar.
97 Hosoya, Security Politics in Japan, 27-36.
98 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2014,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-1-3_web_1031.pdf.
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issue keeps Japan on edge.99 In the light of these developments and debates in the Diet, on 19 September 2015, the new security legislation became law. In this strategic context, Prime Minister Abe has upgraded Japan’s foreign and security policy, based on the proactive contribution to peace policy.
Overall, in my opinion, Abe’s security policies were aimed at necessary actions that must take to re-balance the power in the region. In retrospect, protection of the US alone was enough to be a deterrent factor unlike mid-2010. Abe’s vision to revitalizing the Self Defense Forces serves the purpose of balancing power in the region. Therefore, strengthening the US-Japan security cooperation helps not only the US but also Japanese interests. In my opinion, so far, Japan was the weak partner in the US-Japan security relationship. Unlike the Cold War period, changing power shifts in the region allowed Japan to follow more independent security policies. This enabled Japan to become an almost equal partner in this intertwined security relationship. That being said, Japan’s national security policy is shifting through a “normal” country trajectory rather than a dependent country over the defense of her interests and strategic goals in the region, disputed areas such as the Senkaku Islands, and Northern Territories.
From a military-strategic perspective, the SDF’s ongoing trajectory backed with the 2015 legislation, will strongly benefit from the reversion of the Northern Territories. New bases in the four islands will increase both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the SDF and enable the SDF to operate more effectively and swiftly against the threats from; Russia, China, and North Korea. In a scenario where
99 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2014,” https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html.
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the US asks to help from Japan against the mentioned countries in the previous sentence, Japan will be in a better position in defense and offense because of the anti-ship, anti-air and, anti-missile systems for the defense, air force, ground troops and, other assault elements for the offense located in the Northern Territories.
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE KURIL ISLANDS BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA AFTER 1945
The narrative and survey of the political events, ideas, people, organizations, movements, along with diplomatic history over the Kuril Islands dispute have ebbed and flowed like any other regional dispute in East Asia. Like other bilateral problems in the region, the Northern Territories problem had turned into multilateral post-World War II world issue.
This chapter will focus on the political history of the Kuril Islands, for most of Japan-USSR (and Russia) relations over the years. Sub-sections of this chapter will take Soviet and Russian leaders’ administrations as a starting point since Japanese Prime Ministers relatively short tenure compared to that of Soviet/Russian leaders. The chapter will discuss the policy changes over the Kuril Islands has been caused mostly by Soviet/Russian leaders, which have absolute power to change the direction of the country’s domestic/foreign policies over the military and economic-strategic value of the Islands.
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4.1 Post-World War II and Stalin period
After Japan’s surrender in 1945, the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union did not exist until the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration.100 In this decade, hostilities had ended.101 Yet, there had been no peace treaty nor a step towards normalization. It was the time that both countries were still at war in terms of international law. Describing this decade as “a relationship without a relation” would not be an exaggeration. 102
In this dormant decade, the Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47 and 1948-54), played a major role in outlining post-war Japan’s future path. His policies knowns as the Yoshida Doctrine emphasized the rapid recovery of the domestic economy while relying on the US military for security and full concentration only on the economy for becoming a world power. The Yoshida Doctrine composed fundamental policy for Japan’s foreign policy.
At the same time, Stalin’s attempts to expand the Soviet occupation zone to Hokkaido and attempts to influence the Allied Administration for Japan were thwarted by MacArthur and Truman. Moreover, Yoshida Shigeru’s opinions and comments during pre-war times described a harmonious relationship with the US and other western countries that should be maintained.
100 Content of the document was ending the state of war, restoration of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Japan, Soviet support for Japan’s UN membership, and renouncement of war reparation claims.
101 The World and Japan Database, “Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan,” https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19561019.D1E.html.
102 Kimura, “The Kurillian Knot”, 57.
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In his Memoirs, Yoshida comments on his visit to West Germany in 1954:
I found myself in complete agreement with West Germany's leaders as to the proper attitude to be adopted towards the Communist bloc. Since the United States and the Soviet Union, the two major Powers, are in opposition to each other, one supported by a group of free countries, the other by satellite Communist nations, the only logical policy for both West Germany and Japan to adopt in foreign affairs is co-operation with the United States and the group of free nations.103
In the end, Japan’s shifting into the US bloc and unproductive Soviet efforts for this period resulted in the Soviet Union’s refusal to sign San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. This decision was criticized by Nikita Khrushchev, who called it a blunder, which is a term used in chess, in his memoirs. Despite the long citation, it is an important statement and describes the era of Stalin’s deadlock diplomacy:
However, we have to give the Americans some credit. When the protocol of the peace treaty with Japan was drafted, there was a place reserved for our signature. Our interests were totally taken care of there. All we had to do was sign, and everything would have fallen into place; we would have gotten everything we were promised. We would also have restored peaceful relations with Japan and been able to send representatives of our diplomatic service to Tokyo.
We should have signed. I don’t know why we didn’t. Perhaps it was vanity or pride. But primarily it was that Stalin had an exaggerated idea of what he could do and what his influence was on the United States. He took the bit in his mouth and refused to sign the treaty. I think his logic worked like this: If we signed the treaty, we would be recognizing the fact— perfectly obvious to any thinking man—that the United States had suffered the main losses from Japanese treachery and borne the principal burden in crushing Japan (although the interests of England, Holland, and other European colonial countries were also affected). Stalin didn’t want to do that. There was no question that the Americans gave us the back of their hand, refusing to recognize our contribution to the extent that they should have. Still, we should have taken a sober view of events. If we compare what we contributed with what the United States contributed to the defeat of Japan, then we have to recognize that we did even less in the war against Japan than the Americans and British did to defeat Hitler’s Germany.104
103 Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, 111.
104 Schechter, Luchkov, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, 83.
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4.2 The Khrushchev period: towards a diplomatic normalization
Stalin’s death in 1953 had given the chance to repair Soviet-Japanese relations for both parties. The first attempt to establish diplomatic ties came from the Soviets in 1955. However, the period between Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s election as Soviet Party leader was not easy due to power struggle within Stalin’s lieutenants and ideological differences between party elite which is Stalin style socialism in the USSR or a more realistic approach of peaceful co-existence which Khrushchev had to belong in the latter. Until Khrushchev solidified his position, he had to deal with Beria, Malenkov and ultimately eliminated them in the party administration. On the other hand, he elevated his allies into Presidium and many regional officials whom he worked with him in Ukraine and Moscow.
In February 1956, the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev gave a shocking speech to the delegates. Known as a “secret speech”, Khrushchev strongly criticized the Stalinist policies of repression, torture, forced false confessions. He condemned “the cult of personality”, and the Soviet unpreparedness of the Nazi invasion. For hours, the delegates were stunned, listened to Khrushchev’s denouncement of the Stalinist era, and solidification his position against political rivals by this masterstroke speech.105 It was a turning point in the Soviet Union and as well as the Communist movement in the world.
105 Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 387-392.
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Soviet foreign policy was affected by Khrushchev’s bold actions as well, and the certain events that occurred that time had helped him to execute his peaceful co-existence strategy. The first one was the Korean War, the parties agreed on an armistice in 1953 just three months after Stalin’s death. The second one was the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1954 as an answer to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and strengthen the communist alliance. The third and the most impactful one was the development of the ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). This was a major achievement to balance the power gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. Khrushchev was aware of the unbalanced power between two sides, and that one might get destroyed inevitably in a nuclear war. But now his country had the same level of destructive power. Therefore, Khrushchev endorsed a mutually assured destruction strategy and used this as deterrence leverage.
Nonetheless, Khrushchev could manage to soften the Soviet diplomacy which had a paranoia of foreign invasion due to relative power weaknesses. Khrushchev traveled and attended summits in Europe with the Western countries, established diplomatic relations with West Germany, returned a naval base to Finland as a condition for renewing their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Ultimately, Khrushchev approached Japan for normalizing relations. In February 1955 Khrushchev gave a letter to Prime Minister Bulganin to deliver his counterpart in Japan Hatoyama, stating that “Either in Moscow or Tokyo, Whichever Japan Prefers, let’s start talks straight away.”106
106 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 70.
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On the other hand, the environment was suitable for Japan to open a diplomatic channel with the Soviets. At that time, Liberal Democrat Party leader Ichiro Hatoyama won the elections and replaced Yoshida Shigeru as prime minister. On January 22, 1955, in his first policy speech after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama declared, “We intend to coordinate our policies to allow us to establish relations with countries with whom we have thus far been unable to share diplomatic ties.”107 This statement illustrates that Hatoyama’s approach against the Soviets was neutral, including other communist countries, China and North Korea. Nevertheless, it was the Soviet Union that was changing its diplomatic strategy and Khrushchev did not miss this opportunity.
4.3 The Soviet-Japanese joint declaration, Brezhnev, and The stagnant years
Soviet-Japanese normalization talks come to a conclusion on October 19, 1956 in Moscow. However, the period until the Joint Declaration signed, negotiations were fierce and stalled many times because of the Northern Territories issue. The main problem over the signing a peace treaty was the Northern Territories and the status of these islands. For that reason, the first round of talking in London stalled over the territorial issue. Later on, the first offer came from the Soviets. Yakov Malik, who had been Soviet ambassador to Japan proposed to Shunichi Matsumoto by saying that the Soviet Union might handover Habomais and Shikotan to Japan.108 Matsumoto asked guidance about this proposal and Tokyo responded that Kunashiri and Etorofu islands must be included in order to solve this territorial problem.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid, 70-71.
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After having failed two rounds of negotiations, it was decided that they continue the Third round in Moscow. However, both parties had not come to a conclusion over the addition of the Kunashiri and Etorofu islands in the proposal. Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu contacted with Tokyo stating that the Soviets threatened to break off the negotiations and that there was nothing left but accept Soviet terms. Prime Minister Hatoyama and his cabinet rejected this proposal. In his memoirs Shigemitsu wrote, “Although I myself was ready to take all the responsibility, I was prevented by Tokyo from making a decision.”109
Yet again the talks were suspended, on August 19, 1956, Shigemitsu explained current situation to the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles while on an international summit about Suez Canal crisis. The answer of Dulles was quite harsh, almost like a “threat” that if Japan agrees Soviet proposal as they stated and left Kunashiri and Etorofu islands, the United States “might” reconsider their plans to returning Okinawa to Japan.110
Early years of the Cold war, Communist and Socialist movements were supported by Soviet Union. Post-Japanese and French colonies either become a communist states or leftist movements significantly increased. The US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s domino depiction in 1954111 about spreading of Communism in the world had been an issue believed to be prevented since the Truman era. Plans and doctrines for curb communist ideology like Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and influential people’s efforts in the US foreign policy like George
109 Shigemitsu, Zoku Shigemitsu Mamoru Shuki, 796.
110 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 42.
111 Foreign Relations of the United States, “Foreign Relations of the United States,1952-1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/pg_1281.
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F. Kennan articulated the policy of containment continued by John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson respectively after Eisenhower. In this sense, “threat” of Dulles was not contradicted with United States’ foreign policy. If the strategic islands were ceded to Soviet Union in order to sign peace treaty that could damage the containment policy. The proximity of the islands to Japan and possibilities to establishment of military facilities e.g. ICMB platforms and naval ports might endanger the US presence in Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. Moreover, Soviet influence and sympathy might be prospected after signing the peace treaty and strengthen communist appeal in Japan.
Ultimately, Hatoyama decided that his personal effort would be needed in order to normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Otherwise his only chance to long-waited hope of normalizing would fail during his administration. He sent Shunichi Matsumoto ahead to secure the agreement with Soviets. Then, repeated negotiations and traded letters between Matsumoto and First Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko included the sentence, “The Japanese government assumes that negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue will continue after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries” (see Appendix no. 1 and 2).
Finally, after fierce debates and negotiations over the status of the islands, and Soviet requests to remove the clause “including territorial question” from the declaration text, the Japanese delegation thought that negotiations over peace treaty would continue and inevitably cover the territorial issues as well as border demarcation. In addition to that, the letters exchanged between Matsumoto and Gromyko were made public. However, Japanese delegations’ judgement and agreement for the removal of those phrases did not help the Japanese claims. It
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created the foundation to Soviet governments claims about there was no territorial problem continued until Gorbachev’s progressive movements.
On 19, 1956, the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration was signed in Moscow. It was ratified by the both Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Japanese Diet. This was the highest-level legal document between Soviet Union and Japan. However, this document was not a peace treaty as stated in Article 9 of the joint declaration and clearly states that negotiations over the territorial problem would continue. Same article states, “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to hand over to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (see Appendix no. 3).
There is no doubt that, the joint declaration was a monumental mark in Soviet-Japanese relations after the World War II. Though, it was not a peace treaty and concluded territorial problems, it made the hostilities cease and opened a path for normal diplomatic relations, embassies and consulates established in both countries. For nearly twenty years, Soviet-Japanese relations entered a static phase in terms of relations.
The most important and apparent the reason of this static phase was the Japan-US Security Treaty which was revised in 1960. The first security treaty between United States and Japan was signed right after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which the Soviets refused to sign.
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In spite of this event, in January 1960, the Soviet government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government. The context of the memorandum stated discontent of Soviet Union about revised security treaty between Japan and the US (see Appendix no. 4). Thus, Soviet Union unilaterally suspended the return of Habomai and Shikotan islands after signing the peace treaty which had been agreed on 1956 Joint Declaration. On the other hand, the Japanese government sent a countering memorandum which states, “The Government of Japan cannot approve of the Soviet attempt to attach new conditions for the provisions of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue and thereby to change the contents of the Declaration.” (see Appendix no. 5).
Nevertheless, Khrushchev’s overreaction about the revised security treaty between Japan and the US, and suspension of a legal document’s only one specific article 9 of the Joint Declaration112, which had been ratified by both states’ highest organs, it clearly was a diplomatic mistake. However, this criticism did not bring forward until Gorbachev’s election. Nonetheless, Khrushchev’s motive behind this memorandum was the product of the Cold War like Dulles did in 1956. It was a move against the US containment policy and entire Kuril chain including Habomai and Shikotan is a gateway to Kamchatka peninsula and ice-free lands. Therefore, any chance to break this containment and keep a path open is crucial. Moreover, it is impossible to consider return any of these islands while activity of the US military increased in Japan due to the revised security treaty.
112 See Appendix no. 3.
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After Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev became the leader of the Soviet Union on October 14,1964. Until Gorbachev’s appearance in 1985, bilateral relations between Japan and Soviet Union had been dormant with one exception of Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s visit to Moscow in 1967. The meeting agenda was, global and bilateral affairs relevant to both countries, fisheries right, scientific and technical cooperation on fisheries were signed.113 Although, positive developments had been achieved, the Northern Territories issue remained unresolved again. Despite the positive spin in the relations, both countries were at the different sides in the field, thus, no compromises were given by both parties on the territorial problem.
Nevertheless, certain international developments granted Japan for opportunities to improving her relations with her neighbors particularly, China and the Soviet Union. In addition, the Sino-Soviet rift and Sino-US détente allowed Japan to increase her already growing economy and repair her relations both diplomatic and economic sense.
The first opportunity came when Sino-Soviet rift went further than exchanging letters and statements about socialist ideological differences. In 1969, border clashes started between China and Soviet Union in Ussuri River over Damansky (Zhenbao) Island (Northeast China). The result of clashes fostered China’s fear against the Soviet Union and pushed China to improve relations with the United States.
On the other hand, the United States had sensed China’s concern against the Soviets, and under the US President Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger provided the base of rapprochement in 1971. Meanwhile, Japan, which her
113 Streltsov, Shimotomai, A History of Russo-Japanese Relations, 424-425.
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politics had been in tandem with the United States, followed the US-China rapprochement, and the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed on September 27, 1972, in Beijing. This restored diplomatic relations with the PRC and allowed several economic agreements and solved WWII issues. Six years later the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China was signed on August 12, 1978. This agreement and peace treaty enabled Japanese businessman to expand their business to China as well as counter the Soviet Union by balancing power. In addition, China’s Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach and flexibility secured Japanese Chinese relations in positive trend even the US-China détente deteriorated due to Vietnam War.
On November 10, 1982, Brezhnev died and until Gorbachev, Japanese governments faced the reality of Soviet gerontocracy. The Andropov (November 1982-February 1985) and Chernenko (February 1984-March 1985) governments were short-lived and in terms of the Northern Territories issue, both governments did not change their stances significantly that of Brezhnev years.
4.4 The Gorbachev and Yeltsin years: creative destruction and reconstruction
On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After relatively weak Soviet leaders, Gorbachev came up with a doctrine called “new political thinking”. His bold actions, supported by his glasnost (transparent, openness) and perestroika (reform) policies were the crucial points to observe changing Soviet foreign policy.
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Gorbachev’s proactive solution-oriented actions dramatically improved Soviet Union’s relations with the world. He pulled back the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, restored diplomatic relations with China, established diplomatic relations with South Korea, he also played roles in the liberation of Eastern Europe, unification of West and East Germany, and made agreements with the US to ban some of the strategic nuclear missiles and reduction of arms.
Japan, on the other hand, could count as failed because of Gorbachev’s successful foreign policy. For the solution of the Northern Territories problem, Japan could not progress much while Gorbachev’s foreign policy actions. Apart from the Northern Territories issue, Japanese-Soviet relations certainly improved in a positive direction compared with their predecessors. Before Gorbachev, Soviet Union’s perception was exceptionally unpopular with the Japanese people. The major reason was the Northern Territories issue. The other reasons were shooting down Korean plane KAL 007, Defection of Viktor Belenko, who had been a MiG 25 pilot, to Japan in 1976. In 1985 just after Gorbachev came to power, the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office conducted a public opinion survey, 83.7 percent of respondents had negative and only 8.6 percent positive opinions towards the Soviet Union. But another survey, in October 1991, numbers were 69.5 percent and 25.4 percent respectively. Though, significant positive change had arose but, still, a large number of Japanese people looked unfavorably towards the Soviet Union.114
114 Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, “Survey on public opinion concerning foreign policy.”, Tokyo, 1993.
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Soviet President Gorbachev visited Japan from 16 to 19 April 1991, 18 years after Tanaka’s visit to Moscow. The third big wave of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement came when the Cold War of the post-war era was coming close to its end. The opportunity at this time was created by the then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan in January 1986. The visit reopened the Foreign Ministerial talks after an eight-year interval and reopened the Peace Treaty Negotiations after a ten-year interval since 1976. After more than five years of deviations, a Soviet-Japanese Meeting finally took place for the first time on Japanese soil. Concerning a peace treaty and the territorial issue, the Joint Communiqué was announced as the result of the summit (see Appendix no 6).
The Joint Communiqué had plausible points for Japan. Firstly, the Soviet Union accepted that a territorial dispute existed, unlike Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko years. The first paragraph of Article 4 of the communiqué states, “…including the issue of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the positions of …Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.” Thus, the Soviet government acknowledges territorial dispute exists and abandons the “territorial dispute had resolved and no longer exists” policy. Secondly, the previously cited sentence states four islands, not two islands which allows Japan to reaffirm her claims concerning all four islands for negotiations. Thirdly, the Soviet proposal to initiate a visa-free program to Japanese visits to disputed islands and encouraged them to start mutually beneficial economic activities in the disputed region put a positive spin on the bilateral relations.
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Lastly, the Soviet proposal of reducing military troops in the area which had been placed during the 1978 Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty was the most welcomed promise from the Soviets. In military-strategic terms, in the 1990s submarine-launched missiles were came into service and the ability to reach any North American targets from the northern coasts of Russia reduced the need for a protected East Asia missile base and the Kuril Islands as an outer barrier.115 The reduced military-strategic value of these islands for the Soviets strengthened Japan’s demands for returning the islands.
The next visit to Japan from the Soviet Union was made by Boris Yeltsin, who had unclear views about the Northern Territories issue. As a Supreme Soviet deputy from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), he insisted to Gorbachev not making any concessions during his visit to Japan in 1991. However, before this visit, his unofficial visit to Japan in 1990, as an RSFSR deputy, he announced a five-stage proposal for resolving the territorial issue. According to Yeltsin’s announcement, the first stage is acknowledging the Northern Territories dispute officially. The second stage is demilitarizing the islands. The third stage is creating a free economic zone. The fourth stage is signing a peace treaty and the final stage is to leave future generations to designate their destiny as in joint administration, reversion to Japan, or independence.116 The fourth stage of the announcement, signing the peace treaty, could be interpreted in two different ways in the context of the announcement. Firstly, signing a peace treaty before designating a certain border between Japan and the Soviet Union might indicate that there was no
115 Jukes, Northern Territories, and the Aland Experience, 62.
116 Kaczynski, “The Kuril Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan,” 79. ; Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 103.
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intention to return any of the islands. Secondly, Yeltsin appears not to have had full knowledge of how international treaties work because a peace treaty is an ultimate document that determines territorial borders.
In August 1991, Yeltsin became the de facto leader of the USSR after the failed coup d’état which was executed by a conservative Communist clique in the Communist Party and the military just a couple of months before the USSR dissolves. On November 16, 1991, Yeltsin delivered the “Letter to the Russian People” (see Appendix no. 7 for full text) in which he wrote,
“One of the problems we will have to resolve in the near future is reaching a final post-War settlement in our relations with Japan. I am convinced that from the Russian point of view, it would be unforgivable to continue to endure a situation where relations with Japan remain practically frozen because of the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries.”117
The next visit from Yeltsin to Japan was in 1993, but this time as the first elected President of the Russian Federation. The Tokyo Declaration, which was to be approved by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa, was verbally agreed upon before the visit. Essentially, the issues discussed at this time were the same as those discussed during Gorbachev’s visit in 1991. The first issue was regarding the Russian Federation as successor to the Soviet Union and the status of previous agreements that had been signed, including the 1956 Joint Declaration. The second was the islands, not only Habomai and Shikotan but, Kunashiri and Etoforofu as well, as the object of conciliation. Ultimately, it ended up, more or less, with the confirmation of what had already been determined under Gorbachev.118
117 See Appendix no. 7 for full text.
118 See Appendix no. 8 for full text.
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During the following years, Japan-Russia relations were in a positive atmosphere and, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto’s initiatives brought relations with Russia more than one dimension. The Northern Territories problem remained but, various agreements had been made, such as Japanese fishing vessels activity around the Northern Territories119 and Japan allowed Russian citizens to visa-free120 entry during emergency times, and Russia allowed Japanese citizens, which had lived in the islands, and their relatives to visit the islands visa-free.121
On November 12, 1998, the Moscow Declaration was signed by Yeltsin and Obuchi, who was the successor of Hashimoto. The essence of the Russian proposal was to conclude two treaties. The first would designate the four islands as a special legal district comprising a joint legislature. The second treaty would delineate the frontier and as such, would constitute a peace treaty. Initially, however, there was some confusion because it was not clear whether the first or second treaty was the actual peace treaty. But even, when the confusion lifted, the Japanese side was not ready to treat this proposal as the basis for a future agreement.
In return, previous diplomatic developments after 1993 happened to have disappeared and, the Northern Territories issue remained unresolved again.
119 See Appendix no. 9.
120 See Appendix no. 10.
121 See Appendix no. 11.
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4.5 The Putin period: emerging relations and future perspectives
Vladimir Putin was elected as president on March 26, 2000. Before the elections, Boris Yeltsin’s health conditions were ailing and he was very unpopular in the Russian public, amid corruption claims and the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Upon his resignation, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as acting President.
Vladimir Putin acted only four months as President but his successful military campaign against Chechen separatists consolidated his place in the Russian public and made his first official visit to Japan on September 3-5, 2000 after winning the presidential elections. During the visit, Putin did not take a proactive attitude to conclude a peace treaty or negotiate the situation of the Northern Territories. The Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan, which was aimed to conclude a peace treaty by 2000, clearly failed. However, both parties agreed to improve bilateral relations on strategic and geopolitical matters, as well as cooperation in fishing operations, humanitarian assistance, and joint economic activities on the disputed islands and establishment of various committees and sub-committees on demarcation, economic activities, status, and free travel rights of the people living on the Northern Territories.122
Putin’s reluctance for concluding a peace treaty in his first official visit might be interpreted as his background and status in the Russian Federation. With his background as an FSB officer (former KGB) and newly elected President, he approached the situation extra carefully and waited until gathering all the critical data about relations with Japan while not putting his Presidency in jeopardy. Therefore, he decided to maintain the status quo until fully grasping the environment he was in.
122 See Appendix no. 12.
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Putin’s policy also refers to the reason for my explaining the political history of the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories through this chapter mainly focusing on Soviet/Russian leaders rather than Japanese politicians, except for Abe Shinzo following in this chapter. Another reason is, all Soviet/Russian leaders had served longer than Japanese leaders. Because of that, all the Soviet leaders followed a kind of “restart” policy in their time. They did not completely abandon their predecessors' signs of progress but, to put their mark on the track, they started negotiations in similar phases. Vladimir Putin was not an exception to this policy.123 Consequently, Putin’s passive attitude in his first official visit could be summarized as collecting information and determine the strategy for which kind of policy would adopt for the future.
On 25 March 2001, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and President Vladimir Putin met in Irkutsk. The two leaders had an in-depth exchange of views regarding peace treaty issues based on the points agreed in the statement on the issue of a peace treaty signed on 5 September 2000.
In this summit, both parties agreed to further negotiations regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty on the basis of documents adopted thus far, including the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, the 1973 Japan-Soviet Joint Communique, the 1991 Japan-Soviet Joint Communique, the 1993 Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations, the Moscow Declaration on Building a Creative Partnership between Japan and the Russian Federation, the 2000 Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Issue of a Peace Treaty, and this Statement (Irkutsk);
123 Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations, 175.
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- Confirmed that the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration is a basic legal document that established the starting point in the negotiation process for the conclusion of a peace treaty following the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries;
- Based on this confirmation, agreed to promote future negotiations to achieve complete normalization of Japan-Russia relations by means of concluding a peace treaty through the solution of issues concerning the attribution of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, on the basis of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations;
- Agreed to activate negotiations and to decide at the earliest possible date a concrete direction for progress toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, aiming to reach a solution acceptable to both sides;
- Confirmed to continue cooperation surrounding the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai aimed at improving the environment for the early conclusion of a peace treaty.124
With the Irkutsk Statement, the negotiations phase started again by referring 1956 Joint Declaration as a basic legal document that established the starting point in the negotiation proves. In the Joint Declaration, the smaller islands (Habomai and Shikotan) were agreed to be handed over to Japan. Thus, Vladimir Putin’s confirmation of the 1956 Joint Declaration validity could mean that a two-phase negotiation is a favorable way for Russia. Giving up the two smaller islands, which is only seven percent of the disputed land area, in exchange for the peace treaty then negotiating sovereignty over the other two islands is no doubt a compromise that
124 MOFA, “Irkutsk Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/pmv0103/state.html.
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Russia could approve. Nonetheless, even though the two-phased talk approach seems like the fastest way to conclude the territorial dispute, inevitably it raised doubts and questions from the Japanese side. The most obvious concern is that the question of Russia’s will to continue to negotiate the other two bigger islands. In this scenario, Russia would complete the first phase of the talks and fulfill the obligations according to the 1956 Joint Declaration as expected yet, they stalemate as much as possible the second phase of the talks and this might end up the Japanese side recover only two of the smaller islands. Amid these developments, political turmoil occurred in Japan. Mori’s public approval rating fallen dramatically 9% after an allegation of bribery and fundraising scandals in Mori’s Cabinet and in April 2001 Yoshiro Mori resigned.125
In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi took over the prime minister's office after Yoshiro Mori. Shortly after, Koizumi left the two-phase solution approach and returned the old “all four islands must be taken at once” policy.126 The new foreign minister Tanaka Makiko started the 1973 agreement would be the starting point for the negotiations. On Russia, Tanaka’s philosophy was fixated on the idea of what her father, Tanaka Kakuei, did in negotiating with Brezhnev, discounting all progress achieved since 1973.127 Her policy on the Northern Territories clashed with Suzuki Muneo, an LDP politician with a strong influence in the Foreign Ministry, evolved a political turmoil. In the end, this turmoil resulted in Koizumi’s decision to relieve Tanaka of her post, which sparked a backlash among top Foreign Ministry officials,
125 AP News, “Poll: Support for Mori Plunges,” https://apnews.com/article/2b2c1bd73749fdeb0cb53c48ffdb9029.
126 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Policy Speech By Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
to the 151st Session of the Diet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/0507policyspeech_e.html.
127 Streltsov, Shimotomai, A History of Russo-Japanese Relations, 522.
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who feared Suzuki’s disproportionate power on foreign policy matters and decided to cut down his influence, including on Russian policy. Suzuki, along with two other key officials, Sato Masaru and Kazuhiko Togo were removed from their posts in the foreign ministry. Then Sato and Suzuki were arrested on charges relating to the misused money.128 These sudden policy changes certainly had an enormous negative impact on Japan-Russia relations over the Kuril Islands. The positive momentum gained on the Irkutsk dramatically stopped and responded with outrage by the Russian side.129
Needless to say, the Northern Territories issue once again remained unresolved by neither Russia nor the United States’ interference but the Japanese themselves. The Irkutsk policy collapsed within the foreign ministry. When Koizumi visited Russia in 2003, to repair the situation, agreeing to a wide-ranging action plan, he did not add anything on the substance of sovereignty negotiations but restating previous statements. The year 2005 could be an important opportunity because of the 150th anniversary of the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia (1855). However, Putin’s visit in 2005 came at minimum in relations, when no agreement could be pursued about how to advance territorial negotiations.130
128 Togo, “Negotiations between Japan and USSR/Russia on the Northern Territories: Lessons for the Abe-Putin Renewal of Talks,” http://www.theasanforum.org/negotiations-between-japan-and-ussrrussia-on-the-northern-territories-lessons-for-the-abe-putin-renewal-of-talks/.
129 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 119-122.
130 Togo, “Negotiations between Japan and USSR/Russia on the Northern Territories: Lessons for the Abe-Putin Renewal of Talks,” http://www.theasanforum.org/negotiations-between-japan-and-ussrrussia-on-the-northern-territories-lessons-for-the-abe-putin-renewal-of-talks/.
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Vladimir Putin’s reelection with an overwhelming 71 percent of votes on March 2004 gave the signals that Russian foreign policy would be different from his first term.
First of all, Putin’s policy methods have changed. In his first tenure, he showed utmost effort to avoid any unnecessary risks to jeopardize his position in Russia. But, in the minds of the Japanese, different prospects arose. Their question was whether his minimum risk approach would continue in his second tenure. But some events displayed that Putin’s second term was unusual from the first administration. And this case, the Northern Territories, deteriorated negotiations. Another event that impacted undesirably over the bilateral relations and territorial negotiations was the 2003 Iraq War.
On the international scene, the United States announced a military campaign, referred to as, the War on Terror, after the 9/11 attacks. First in Afghanistan, later in Iraq, United States declared war on these countries to extradite Osama bin Laden who was the perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks and disarm the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) respectively.
However, the Japanese involvement in the 2003 Iraq War, even though only for the humanitarian and reconstructive role of the Self Defense Forces, did not end up well for relations with Russia. The US claimed that Iraqi WMD production programs pose a dangerous threat. But, the pieces of evidence for supporting these claims were found ambiguous and, the UN Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which authorized the resumption of weapons inspections and promised "serious consequences" for non-compliance. In March 2003, Security Council members France and Russia made clear that they did
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not consider these consequences to include the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government.131
The Japanese decision to participate in the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), or, often referred to as the coalition forces, and leaving two-phase approach and requesting the four islands as batches deepened the rift between Japan and Russia. Moreover, Russian statements about the territorial dispute changed profoundly to give a no-compromise policy. On September 27, 2005, Vladimir Putin made a statement in a television program regarding the Northern Territories. He stated, “Regarding the negotiation process with Japan over the four Kurile Islands, they are Russian sovereign territory, and this is fixed in international law. This is one of the results of World War Two. We have nothing to discuss on this particular point.”132 Before this statement, in August, Russian regional authorities approved a blueprint on how to develop the Kuril Islands in 2007-2015. According to the blueprint, boosting the social and economic development and raising the living standards of the residents are aimed by heavily investing in strategic areas such as transportation, infrastructure, and military defense capabilities. Herman Gref, who was Minister of Economic Development and Trade, said, “The Kuril Islands undoubtedly remain a strategic territory for Russia.” Following this statement, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov suggested that improving infrastructure and building new ports and airports to increase regions economic abilities.133
131 BBC News, “France threatens rival UN Iraq draft,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2364203.stm ; The Guardian, “Russia and France Threaten to Use Veto,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/10/iraq.politics1.
132 Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, “President’s Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Nation,” http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23190.
133 The Jamestown Foundation, “Russia Moves to Develop and Repopulate Kuril Islands,” https://jamestown.org/program/russia-moves-to-develop-and-repopulate-the-kuril-islands/.
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Meanwhile in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s growing control over Russia had become more visible than ever. He started with Russia’s strategic and main income source, which is the energy sector. The infamous Yukos incident was the most obvious work of Putin’s strongman policy. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the owner of Yukos Oil Company, challenged Vladimir Putin as a political rival and opposition. Moreover, the company did an oil and gas pipeline agreement with China which Putin disapproved. Eventually, Khodorkovsky and numerous executives were arrested for tax fraud allegations, and the company were nationalized and divided into state-owned oil companies.134 Putin’s colossal control over the country enabled him to quell domestic opposition and gave the freedom to make deals even for the most sensitive issues like border and territorial issues of Russia. The topic of the most hardline opposition that would be encountered in any country would elude without major damage under Putin’s administration. Putin eliminated possible opposition using nationalistic and chauvinist sentiments against him and has made several border agreements as the main successor of the Soviet Union’s legacy. Aside from the Northern Territories dispute with Japan, Russia has made border disputes with Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and, China. Each case has a singular outcome based on geopolitics and national interests. The biggest achievement was the border agreement with China which was ended over forty years of dispute. China was granted control over Tarabarov Island (Yinlong Island), Zhenbao Island, and around 50% of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island (Heixiazi Island) Northeast China. Series of agreements were signed in 1991, 1997, and finally, on
134 Judah. Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin. Yale University Press, 2013.
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October 14, 2004, the final agreement was signed by using a 50-50 formula which is sharing land area equally.135 The same formula was used with Kazakhstan.136 The case of Latvia was resolved in 2007 after the first agreement was signed in 1997 and Russia gained land by this agreement.137 The case of Estonia is not resolved despite the agreement signed in 2014, both parties did not ratify the agreement due to new Estonian requests.138 The cases of Georgia and Ukraine however, led to conflicts. In 2008 Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized by Russia as independent states. Then, in 2014 Crimea was annexed amid political turmoil in Ukraine and pro-Russian protests captured parliament of Crimea. Then, pro-Russian Sergey Aksyonov government was established in Crimea that conducted the Crimean status referendum and the declaration of Crimea's independence on 16 March 2014. Russia formally incorporated Crimea as two federal subjects of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014.139
On the other hand, Japan lost the window of opportunity in this period. Vladimir Putin’s high influence in domestic politics and proactive attempts to settle all around Russian borders was not 100 percent successful. Yet, it was enough to put relations in the right direction to a conclusion. Russia usually followed mutual compromise, the 50-50 policy, as a solution. According to this scenario, the total land area of the Northern Territories is 5000 km2 (the Habomais 95, Shikotan 251,
135 Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People's Republic of China, “China and Russia Issue a Joint Statement, Declaring the Trend of the Boundary Line between the Two Countries Has Been Completely Determined,” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t165266.shtml.
136 The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Russia-Kazakhstan Relations” http://www.rfembassy.kz/eng/lm/dvustoronnie_otnosheniya/rossiya-kazakhstan/.
137 Sheeter, “Latvia, Russia Sign Border Deal,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6498049.stm.
138 Levinsson, Claes. "The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes—The Case of Estonia, Latvia, and Russia." Connections 5, no. 2 (2006): 98-110.
139 Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
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Kunashiri 1490, and Etorofu 3168 km2 respectively) and, if Japan agreed to share a land area of islands according to 50-50 ratio, Japan would have the Habomais, Shikotan, and Kunashiri, plus approximately 20 percent of Etorofu.140 However, this option of possible settlement did not come up to the agenda by the Japanese government.
Abe Shinzo returned to power in December 2012, making it a foreign policy priority to improve relations with Russia. In March 2012 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that “we really want to permanently close this territorial problem with Japan, and we want to do so in a way that is acceptable for both countries.” Putin who is a black belt judoka (judo practitioner) portrayed this outcome as being a hikiwake, which is a judo term for the draw. He also underlined the 1956 Joint Declaration validity and the Russian will to transfer two smaller islands after signing a peace treaty. He continued by giving another judo reference: “When I become president, we will gather our foreign minister on one side and the Japanese minister on the other and give them a command—hajime (start).141
Following these developments, Abe Shinzo made his official visit to Russia in April 2013. After a decade of chilled relations, a positive spin in bilateral relations emerged. To fulfill his aim, Abe has met with Putin 25 times until the start of 2019. Contrary to his predecessors, Abe followed close personal diplomacy with Putin. He mentioned Putin as “a man keeping his promises” and someone “is dear to me as a partner.” It is possible that Abe genuinely does admire the Russian strongman, yet the main reason for his emphasis on this personal relationship is the belief that Putin
140 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Information about the Northern Territories,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/rss/northern/page1we_000017.html.
141 Ibid.
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has the power and political will to make a territorial deal. This is based on the understanding that only a popular Russian leader with clear nationalist credentials could force through territorial concessions against domestic opposition as mentioned in previous paragraphs.142
The positive momentum in relations continued even after Russian Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev visited Etorofu Island in 2015. During his visit, Medvedev inspected the island’s new airport, seaport, and a fish processing factory. In addition, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that it had not received any official protest notes from Japan for this visit.143 To pursue his “new approach” Abe’s pragmatist policies avoided overreaction and keeping on the positive momentum continue.
The Abe government has worked to encourage a breakthrough by fostering economic cooperation. In addition to setting the framework for a resolution to the territorial conflict through increased political connections. The economy is the sector where Japan has the most to offer Russia in terms of investment and technology transfers. Aware of this, Abe proposed an eight-point economic cooperation plan in May 2016 intending to increase bilateral trade and give Russia a taste of what could be accomplished if a peace treaty were signed. The eight points are:
1. Extending healthy life expectancies
2. Developing comfortable and clean cities that are easy to live and work in
3. Expanding fundamentally exchange and cooperation between medium-sized and small companies
142 Brown. "Abe's Russia Policy: All Cultivation and No Fruit." Asia Policy 26, no. 1 (2019): 148-155.
143 RT. “Moscow officials 'have always and will continue to' visit Russian Kuril Islands – PM,” https://www.rt.com/russia/313133-medvedev-kuril-islands-japan/.
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4. Cooperating on energy
5. Promoting industrial diversification and enhancing productivity in Russia
6. Developing industries and export bases in the Russian Far East
7. Cooperating on cutting-edge technologies
8. Expanding people-to-people interactions144
Annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Medvedev’s visit to Etorofu slowed the momentum. Nevertheless, Abe insisted to promote his economic cooperation policies. For the past three years, Russia has hosted the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, as well as participating in the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in May 2018. Hiroshige Seko, his minister of economy, trade, and industry, was also named minister for economic cooperation with Russia.
However, the scale of policies was too insignificant to be symbolic and exert any influence among the Russian public. Thereby, Abe foresaw the building tension in East Asia and suggested deepening cooperation with Russia especially in energy and security matters in the 2013 National Security Strategy paper.145
Thus, Abe Shinzo employed the second branch of the “new approach”. Big energy deals in Russian Far East and Arctic region. Japan’s constant energy need and Russia’s need to diversify its customer base are more lucrative and significant advantages for both countries. Abe stated: “Energy is one of the important foundations of Japanese-Russian economic cooperation... After the powerful natural disasters of 2011, Japanese purchases of fuel increased, leading to rises in the
144 Discuss Japan, “A New Step Forward to “Regions for Japan-Russia Cooperation” — results and challenges from the Japan-Russia summit,” https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/diplomacy/pt20180111235955.html.
145 Government of Japan, National Security Strategy.
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external trade deficit. The urgent task for our economy became to reduce the expense of fuel purchases, primarily liquefied natural gas. Japanese-Russian energy cooperation is important from the point of view of reducing fuel costs and diversifying the sources of supply. I consider it important to expand mutually beneficial cooperation in the building of LNG facilities, in the development of deposits, and extraction.”146 Japan has two joint ventures with Russian state-owned oil firms, the Sakhalin 2 and Arctic LNG 2, and planning to invest in a third LNG project as well.147 Indeed these projects are important for Abe’s groundwork, but so far they did not give any concrete results regarding the Northern Territories issue.
The third branch of Abe’s new approach is security. The argument here is, changing the balance of power in the East Asia might induce Japan and Russia to be more cooperative in security matters. Japanese claim is coming from a very straight realist approach, China’s rapid growth and military spending is a serious security threat and it threatens regional security.148 As stated in the 2013 National Security Strategy paper “…in order to overcome national security challenges and achieve
national security objectives… Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative
relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone.”149 Possible allies to contain China is Vietnam and the Philippines which both countries have territorial disputes with China, and an additional candidate might be India as a rising global power for counterbalance efforts. Therefore, Russia
146 Brown. "Abe's Russia Policy: All Cultivation and No Fruit." Asia Policy 26, no. 1 (2019): 148-155.
147 Hanafusa. “Japan and Russia set to launch $9bn LNG project in Far East,” https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Japan-and-Russia-set-to-launch-9bn-LNG-project-in-Far-East.
148 Rajagopalan. “Asian Military Spending: A Sign of Worsening Security Environment,” https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/asian-military-spending-a-sign-of-worsening-security-environment/
149 Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, 14.
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could be an important contributor to Abe’s groundwork strategy. He emphasized the mutual interests of both countries’ security cooperation and explicitly acknowledged the importance of partnership as a realistic answer to China’s assertive stance in the region.150
However, the Japanese argument is overly one-sided and needs to be explained from the Russian point of view to understand the possibility of Abe Shinzo’s prophecies. First of all, the Russian and Chinese partnership is growing stronger since the 2001 Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation. Secondly, both countries enjoyed mutual growing trade over the years and annual trade volumes reached up to $110 billion in 2019.151 Two countries are showing close relations and supportive decisions at United Nations, most recently in the annexation of Crimea and the Syrian civil war. Moreover, Russia and China are the founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Albeit, the fact that both countries fought against the Japanese Empire in World War II and, both of the countries are in consensus about the consequences the war. Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine is one of the highlighting incidents reminding China to keep reminding historic alliance with Russia. In this respect, Russia – China relations look almost perfect on the look, however, there are mixed feelings that Russian authorities did not express explicitly but demonstrating that they are receptive against Japan’s invitation on security cooperation and power balancing in the East Asia.152 Nevertheless, Abe Shinzo’s efforts on deepening security and economic relations
150 Ibid. 14-26.
151 Russia Briefing. “Russia-China Bilateral Trade Hit US$110 Billion in 2019 – What Is China Buying?,” https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-china-bilateral-trade-hit-us-110-billion-2019-china-buying.html/.
152 Reuters. “Japan, Russia agree to cooperate on security as China rises,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-russia-idUSBRE9A102G20131102.
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with Russia are not futile, yet, it is not enough for Russia to abandon China. Russia would extend relations with Japan to some extent, but they pursue their agenda which is balancing Japan and China. Overall, Abe planted seeds in regard for the Northern Territories is long term policy but, it is unlikely to get any fruit in a short term.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The objective of this thesis is to outline and evaluate the strategic substance of the Northern Territories through Japanese national security policies and their significance in the East Asia from the Cold War era to the present. It began by outlining an introduction to explaining the purpose of this thesis. Then, it clarified the reason behind this research and captured conceptual approaches.
The following in Chapter 2 showed that, overall characters of the Kuril Islands. Demonstrated the economic value of the Islands in rare earth minerals and fisheries, it put forward the economic and food security aspect of the Northern Territories for Japan.
Chapter 3 looked at the trajectory and effectiveness of Japan’s security policies through the US-Japan security cooperation guidelines, modernization of SDF, and Abe Shinzo’s proactive security policies. Abe’s policies of reorganizing and creating new security apparatuses in the Japanese state significantly contributed to Japan’s future security policies. New Defense Ministry, National Security Council, and National Security Strategies, as well as defense papers, were published. In this trajectory Japan’s military security is toward becoming a “normal” state, that is using its military capabilities to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. The Northern Territories will increase the defensive and offensive military capabilities of the SDF in the region. Increasing tensions in the East Asia are mainly caused by China and North Korea. Unlike the other two, Russia remains a strong player in the region carefully be watched as stated in the Defense Papers of Japan. Japanese power-
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balancing efforts under the US nuclear umbrella became more significant in the East Asian security policies.
Chapter 4 began with the political history of the disputed territories between the Soviet Union, then its successor Russian Federation. Starting from the post-war period without diplomatic relations established, through the positive relations towards leader changes in the Soviet Union and Joint Declaration until the US intervention in the peak of the Cold War period. Continuing sections of the chapter detailed the policy changes over the leader changes in the Soviet Union. In every leader change, negotiations over the Northern Territories and peace treaty talks started over. Through the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Russian Federation approaches to a solution were intensified. However, the US-Japan cooperation over the war on terror, 2003 Iraq War, and Japanese military resurgence put the Northern Territories issue in the background. In the mid of 2010s however the Japanese approach to the Northern Territories and the peace, treaty negotiations were ignited again. Unlike 20 years ago, this time Japanese started the initiative due to reforming its SDF and showing efforts to emerged security threats from China and North Korea.
What circumstances prevent the Northern Territories dispute to resolve?
Japan and Russia have been unable to resolve the Northern Territories dispute and manage to conclude a peace treaty more than seventy years since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, this abnormal situation grabs attention in international affairs, but it still needs to explain why the negotiations have failed to reach common ground over the years. I will discuss the three reasons why Japan and Russia have not been solved this dispute.
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The first and the most important reason as this thesis investigate is the strategic value of the islands. So far, the value of the islands for both countries not only differ but also changes over time.
From Japan’s perspective, the importance of the islands has increased since the Cold war. Sovereignty over the islands will provide extra energy and food resources along with the military benefits.
On the other hand, the value of the islands for Russia is military-strategic and economic during the Cold war. Until the 1970s the islands had low strategic importance but, in 1976 during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, the Soviet declaration of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone emphasizes the value of the fishery industry. The fishery itself is not the main drive force of the Soviets' refusal to return the islands, however. In fact, technological advancements in the long-range missiles made the islands crucial in 1978. When the Russian SLBMs reached the range of hitting the US from Sea the of Okhotsk the islands were militarized by Russia. However, the range of the SLBMs went further, the islands’ strategic status reverted to its pre-1978 status. Nevertheless, the island's strategic value is on the increase since the Arctic sea route has become more accessible due to global warming. The Kuril Islands have an important geo-economic utility. Through the prism of geo-economics, Prime Minister Medvedev reflected Stalin's argument that the strategic importance of the sovereignty of the Kuril Islands is "the gateway to the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region" to improve mobility and freedom of commercial and military forces, passenger ships to the Pacific Ocean. As Russia continues to build and modernize the Pacific coast ports and develop its Arctic routes, control of all the Kuril Islands becomes increasingly important. With its
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potential for tourist and commercial activities, since 2014, an airport and hotel have been built in Etorofu.153
The second reason is the low diplomatic priority of the dispute. Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia have not often engaged in high foreign-policy diplomatic relations. During the Cold war, the US as one pole of the bipolar world took Japan under her protective umbrella. Consequently, Japan was in the same bloc with the US and Japanese governments believed that reconstruction and development of Japan could be achieved only when the alliance with the US is continued.
For the Soviet Union, the priority of Japan in terms of diplomatic importance was very low. In the end, the core of all international disputes revolved around the US-Soviet rivalry at some point. However, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the dissonance between Washington and Moscow have significantly disappeared. Moreover, towards the multi-polar world, Japan’s foreign policy in East Asian security started to track more independently, kind of a mediator between the US, China, and Russia.154 This strategy will increase the scale of diplomatic relations with Russia and might trigger the need for urgent resolution in the Northern Territories dispute.
The third reason is the dominating domestic politics of both countries. Both countries did not have long-term policies toward each other even after the Cold war. As a result, both countries lack consistent policies and framed their territorial dispute politics in the context of their domestic political scene.
153 Diesen, “The Geoeconomics of the Russian-Japanese Territorial Dispute,” 604.
154 Hatoyama, “US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role,” 7-19.
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For Japan, the lifetime of the governments tends to be extremely short and constantly changing ministers and bureaucrats making it tougher for developing a consistent policy. Most of the developments (JSDF capabilities, economic and, increasing diplomatic relations with Russia) concerning the Northern Territories happened during Koizumi and Abe tenures which lasted five and nine years (consecutive eight years) respectively.
Similarly, Russia seems to have no long-term policy toward Japan. For Soviet/Russian politicians Japan is in the last place after the West.155 When the relations with the West settled, then Russian politicians turn their attention to Japan for improving relations. Another element shaping Russian domestic politics is the very strong nationalistic sentiments of the Russian people. A poll was conducted in 2019 with residents of the Shikotan, Kunashir, and Etorofu. According to the poll, 98% of the resident do not want to transfer the islands to Japan.156 Another poll demonstrates 77% of Russians oppose transferring the island to Japan and “any hint that the islands will be given to Japan causes, as a rule, outrage in society,” Valery Fyodorov, the head of Russian Public Opinion Research Center, said in comments about the survey.157 The mindset of the military officers and nationalists cannot be changed easily and these groups will likely oppose any possibility to transfer of the islands in the near future.
155 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, 141-142.
156 ВЦИОМ (VTsIOM), “Kuril İnhabitants on the Territorial Belonging of Their “Lesser Motherland,” https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1630.
157 The Moscow Times, “77% of Russians Oppose Ceding Kuril Islands to Japan, Poll Says,” https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/28/77-percent-russians-oppose-ceding-kuril-islands-japan-poll-says-a64302.
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In conclusion, the Northern Territories provide military and economic value for Japan and Russia. The economic value of the Islands for both of the countries since the post-Cold war has not changed. Rich fishing grounds and the opportunity of the mining of the rare earth elements emphasize the economic value of the Island. The military value of the Islands for Russia is important due to the ability to control the Kuril Islands and encircling the Sea of Okhotsk and, protection of the Arctic route. On the other hand, Japan as a rising security actor in the region, the military value of the Northern Territories for Japan increased after the Cold war and will increase in the near future.
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APPENDIX
Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia
Preface
This compendium has been jointly prepared by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan and of the Russian Federation with the aim of helping the people of Japan and Russia to obtain an objective view of the "territorial issue" between Japan and Russia.158
As a result of the Japanese advance from the South onto the Kurile Islands and the Russian advance from the North by the middle of the 19th century, a Japanese-Russian border emerged between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. This border was legally established by the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia of February 7, 1855. The treaty peacefully established that the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai were Japanese territory, and that the islands to the north or Uruppu were Russian territory.
According to the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands of May 7, 1875, the islands from Uruppu to Shumshu were peacefully ceded by Russia to Japan in exchange for the concession of Japanese rights to the island of Sakhalin.
158 I provided all the information for the Appendix section from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The link is https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/index.html. Additionally, Hiroshi Kimura’s book The Kurillian Knot has a similar Appendix section that includes the rest of the documents.
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With the signing of the Treaty on Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia on June 8, 1895, the Treaty of 1855 became invalid, but at the same time, the validity of the Treaty of 1875 was reaffirmed.
According to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia of September 5, 1905, Russia ceded that part of the island of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel North to Japan. In light of Japanese and Russian documents from this period, it is obvious that from the time that Japanese-Russian diplomatic relations were established in 1855, the title to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai was never held in doubt by Russia.
In the Convention on Fundamental Principles for Relations between Japan and the USSR of January 20, 1925 that announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union agreed that the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 would remain in force.
The Joint Declaration of the US and the UK of August 14, 1941 (the Atlantic Charter), which the Soviet Union acceded to on September 24, 1941, stated that the US and Great Britain "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other" and that "they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."
The Cairo Declaration of the US, the UK and China of November 27, 1943, which the Soviet Union acceded to on August 8, 1945, stated that the "Allies covet no gains for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion". At the same time the Declaration stated that the Allies' goal was particularly to drive Japan from "the territories which she has taken by violence and greed."
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The Yalta Agreement of the Three Great Powers (the USSR, the US and the UK) of February 11, 1945 stipulated as one of the conditions for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan: "the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union." The Soviet Union maintained that the Yalta Agreement provided legal confirmation of the transfer of the Kurile Islands to the USSR, including the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai. Japan's position is that the Yalta Agreement is not the final determination on the territorial issue and that Japan, which is not party to this Agreement, is neither legally nor politically bound by its provisions.
The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which the Soviet Union acceded to on August 8, 1945, stated that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration be carried out" and that "Japanese sovereignty be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as the Allies would determine." On August 15, 1945 Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered.
In the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR of April 13, 1941, the parties had an obligation to mutually respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability. The Pact also stated that it would remain in force for five years and that if neither of the contracting parties denounced it a year before its date of expiration, it be considered to be automatically extended for the next five years.
After the Soviet Union announced its intention to denounce the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945, the Pact was to have become invalid on April 25, 1946. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 9, 1945.
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From late August to early September 1945, the Soviet Union occupied the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai. After that, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of February 2, 1946, these islands were incorporated into the then Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan of September 8, 1951 provides for Japan's renunciation of rights, titles and claims to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin. However, the Treaty did not determine, to which state these territories to belong. The Soviet Union did not sign this treaty.
The question of the limits of the Kurile Islands that were renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was mentioned, for example, in a statement by K. Nishimura, Director of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, in the Japanese Parliament on October 19, 1951, and in a statement by Mr. K. Morishita, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in the Japanese Parliament on February 11, 1956, as well as in an Aide-Memoire from the Department of State of the US, which was one of the drafters of the Treaty, to the Government of Japan dated September 7, 1956.
As the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, separate negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty were conducted between Japan and the Soviet Union. However, because of differences in the positions of the two sides over the territorial clause of the treaty, an agreement was not reached.
An exchange of letters between Mr. S. Matsumoto, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Government of Japan, and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, on September 29, 1956, showed that the two sides agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue, after the reestablishment of diplomatic
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relations between the two countries. This exchange of letters also paved the way for the reestablishment of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations and the signing of a Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR.
The Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR of October 19, 1956 ended the state of war and reestablished diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. In the Joint Declaration, Japan and the USSR agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations, and the USSR also agreed to hand over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty. The Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR was ratified by the Japanese Parliament on December 5, 1956, and by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 8, 1956. Instruments of ratification were exchanged in Tokyo on December 12, 1956.
In 1960, in connection with the conclusion of the new Japanese-US Security Treaty, the Soviet Union stated that the return of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan would be conditional upon the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory. In response, the Government of Japan raised the objection that the terms of the Joint Declaration between Japan and the USSR could not be changed unilaterally, because it was an international agreement that had been ratified by the Parliaments of both countries.
The Soviet side later asserted that the territorial issue in Japanese-Soviet relations had been resolved as a result of World War II and such an issue did not exist.
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The Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué of October 10, 1973, issued at the conclusion of the summit in Moscow, noted that "the settlement of unresolved problems left over since World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty will contribute to the establishment of truly good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries."
The Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué of April 18, 1991, issued at the conclusion of the summit in Tokyo, stated that both sides had conducted negotiations "on a whole range of issues pertaining to the preparation and the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR, including the problem of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the positions of both sides on the issue as to where the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu belong." The Communiqué also stressed the importance of accelerating the work on the conclusion of a peace treaty.
After the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991 and Japan's recognition of the Russian Federation as the state with the continuity from the USSR, the negotiations on a peace treaty which were conducted between Japan and the USSR, have been continuing between Japan and the Russian Federation.
Both sides are firmly committed to a common understanding of the need to resolve the territorial issue on the basis of "law and justice."
In November 1991 Mr. B. N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, in his letter to the Russian people, indicated the need to reach a final postwar settlement in relations with Japan and noted that attention would be paid to the interests of the inhabitants of the said islands. The Government of Japan has also declared its
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intention to respect fully the human rights, interests and wishes of the Russians who now live on the islands, in the course of the resolution of the territorial issue.
This compendium, offered to readers of Japan and Russia, contains principal Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Soviet documents pertaining to the territorial demarcation between the two countries as well as a series of other documents and materials relevant to the given issue.
September 1992
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
1. Letter from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Japanese Government, S. Matsumoto, to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko (1956)
Excellency,
I have the honor to refer to the letter of Prime Minister Hatoyama of September 11, 1956 and the reply of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of September 13, 1956, and to announce the following:
The Government of Japan is ready to enter into negotiations in Moscow on the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations without the conclusion of a peace treaty at this time, as it was noted in the letter of Prime Minister Hatoyama as referred to above. At the same time the Japanese Government thinks that after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations as a result of these negotiations, it is quite
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desirable that Japanese-Soviet relations develop even further on the basis of a formal peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue.
With regard to this, the Japanese Government assumes that negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue will continue after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.
In entering into negotiations according to the letter of Prime Minister Hatoyama, I should be grateful if the Soviet Government would also confirm beforehand that it shares the same intention.
I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
S. Matsumoto
Plenipotentiary Representative of
the Japanese Government
His Excellency
Mr. A.A. Gromyko
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
2. Letter from the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko, to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Government of Japan, S. Matsumoto (1956)
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter of September 29, 1956, which reads as follows:
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[Japanese Note Item 1 above]
I have further the honor to inform you on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Soviet Government accepts the view of the Japanese Government referred to above and announces its agreement to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue, after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations.
I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
A.A. Gromyko
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
His Excellency
Mr. S. Matsumoto
Plenipotentiary Representative of
the Japanese Government
3. Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR (1956)
9. Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of Japan, agrees to hand over to Japan the
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Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
(Signed on October 19, 1956 in Moscow. Ratified on December 7, 1956. The exchange of instruments of ratification took place on December 12, 1956, in Tokyo.)
4. Memorandum from the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan (1960)
But the Soviet Union certainly cannot ignore such a step as Japan's conclusion of a new military treaty which undermines the basis for peace in the East Asia and creates obstacles to the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. A new situation has formed in relation to the fact that this treaty actually deprives Japan of independence and that foreign troops stationed in Japan as a result of Japan's surrender remain on Japanese territory. This situation makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to fulfill its promises to return the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan.
It is because the Soviet Government met Japan's wishes and took into consideration the interests of Japan and the peace-loving intentions expressed by the Japanese Government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that it agreed to hand over such islands to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty.
But since the new military treaty signed by the Japanese Government is directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Government cannot contribute to extending the territory available to foreign troops by handing over such islands to Japan.
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Thus, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to declare that the islands of Habomai and Shikotan will be handed over to Japan, as was stated in the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956, only if all foreign troops are withdrawn from Japan and a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty is signed.
5. Memorandum from the Japanese Government to the Soviet Government (1960)
The Government of Japan considers it necessary to lay out the position of Japan with regard to the memorandum which was handed to Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Kadowaki by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko on January 27 and which refers to Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America which has been recently signed.
...It is extremely incomprehensible that in its latest memorandum, the Soviet Government is connecting the issue of the revised Japan-US Security Treaty with the issue of handing over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. As regards the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, the Joint Declaration by Japan and the Soviet Union states the following clearly: "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of Japan, agrees to hand over to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
This Joint Declaration is an international agreement regulating the foundations of the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is an official international document which has been ratified by the highest organs of both countries. It is needless to say that the contents of this solemn international undertaking cannot be changed unilaterally. Moreover, since the current Japan-U.S.
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Security Treaty which is valid indefinitely already existed and foreign troops were present in Japan when the Joint Declaration by Japan and Soviet Union was signed, it must be said that the Declaration was signed on the basis of these facts. Consequently, there is no reason that the agreements in the Joint Declaration should be affected in any way.
The Government of Japan cannot approve of the Soviet attempt to attach new conditions for the provisions of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue and thereby to change the contents of the Declaration. Our country will keep insisting on the reversion not only of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan but also of the other islands which are inherent parts of Japanese territory.
6. Japanese-Soviet Joint Communique (1991)
1. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics paid an Official Visit to Japan from April 16 through April 19, 1991, at the invitation of the Government of Japan. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was accompanied by Minister for Foreign Affairs A.A. Bessmertnykh of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other government officials.
2. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mrs. Gorbachev had an audience with Their Imperial Highnesses The Emperor and The Empress of Japan in the Imperial Palace on April 16.
3. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had frank and constructive discussions with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan on issues between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
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including the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and on major international issues of mutual interest. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invited Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan to pay an Official Visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This invitation was gratefully accepted. The details of the visit are to be arranged through diplomatic channels.
4. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan and President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held an in-depth and thorough negotiations on a whole range of issues relating to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the issue of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the positions of both sides on the attribution of the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.
The joint work done previously - particularly the negotiations at the highest level - has made it possible to confirm a series of conceptual understandings: that the peace treaty should be the document marking the final resolution of war-related issues, including the territorial issue that it should pave the way for long-term Japan-USSR relations on the basis of friendship, and that it should not infringe upon either side's security.
The Soviet side proposed that measures be taken in the near future to expand exchanges between residents of Japan and residents of the aforementioned islands, to establish a simplified visa-free framework for visits by the Japanese to these islands, to initiate joint, mutually beneficial economic activities in that region, and to reduce the Soviet military forces stationed on these islands. The Japanese side stated its intention to consult on these questions in the future.
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As well as emphasizing the primary importance of accelerating work to conclude the preparations for a peace treaty, the Prime Minister and the President expressed their firm resolve to make constructive and vigorous efforts to this end taking advantage of all positive elements that have been built up in bilateral negotiations in the years since Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly proclaimed an end to the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations in l956.
At the same time, they recognized that the development of constructive cooperation between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the adjacent Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, is advisable in an atmosphere of good-neighborliness, mutual benefit, and trust. Cooperation should take place in trade-economic, scientific-technological, and political spheres as well as in social, cultural, educational, tourism, and sports realms through free and wide-ranging exchanges between the citizens of the two countries.
7. Letter from the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, to the Russian People (1991)
Dear compatriots!
Having received your appeal in which you express your concern about the destiny of the Southern Kuriles, I consider it my duty to clarify the position of the Government of the Russian Federation.
I fully agree with you in that the current generation of Russians is not responsible for the political "adventurism" of the former leaders of our country. At the same time an
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obvious obligation of the new Russian leadership is to look for ways of resolving problems which we inherited from the policies of previous eras, and which stand in the way of developing normal relations between Russia and the international community today. In the end, the future of a new democratic Russia as a member of the international community, and its international authority depends on how fast we manage to overcome the difficult heritage of the past, accept the norms of the international community, and thus make legality, justice and strict adherence to the principles of international law the criteria of its policy.
One of the problems we will have to resolve in the near future is reaching a final post-War settlement in our relations with Japan. I am convinced that from the Russian point of view, it would be unforgivable to continue to endure a situation where relations with Japan remain practically frozen because of the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries.
It is well-known that the main obstacle to the conclusion of this treaty is the issue of the demarcation of borders between Russia and Japan. This problem has a long history, and it has lately attracted broad attention and provoked diverse feelings among citizens of Russia. In approaching this issue, we will be guided by the principles of justice and humanism, and we will firmly defend the interests and dignity of Russians including those of the inhabitants of the Southern Kuriles. I assure you that no inhabitant of the Southern Kuriles will see their future ruined. Their socio-economic and property interests will be fully provided for taking into account the emerging historical realities.
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The initial principle for any agreement with Japan will be to ensure the well-being of our one and indivisible Fatherland. Being the first democratically elected President of Russia in history, I assure you that the Russian public will be fully informed of the intentions and plans of its government in a timely manner.
I sincerely hope for your understanding and support.
B. Yeltsin
8. Tokyo Declaration On Japan-Russia Relations (October 1993)
The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation,
Based upon the recognition that, with the end of the Cold War, the world is moving away from the structure of confrontation towards cooperation which will open new vistas for advances in international cooperation on both global and regional levels as well as in bilateral relations between different countries, and that this is creating favorable conditions for the full normalization of the Japan-Russia bilateral relations,
Declaring that Japan and the Russian Federation share the universal values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for fundamental human rights,
Recalling that the promotion of market economy and free trade contributes to the prosperity of the economies of both countries and to the sound development of the global economy,
Believing firmly that the success of the reforms under way in the Russian Federation is of decisive importance for building a new world political and economic order,
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Affirming the importance of building the relations between the two countries in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter,
Determined that Japan and the Russian Federation should work together on the basis of the spirit of international cooperation, overcoming the legacy of totalitarianism, to build a new international order and to normalize their bilateral relations fully,
Declare the following:
1. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation share the recognition that the democratic and economic reforms under way in the Russian Federation are of tremendous significance not only for the people of the Russian Federation but also for the entire world. They are also of the view that the Russian Federation's successful transition to a true market economy and its smooth integration into the democratic international community are indispensable factors for increasing stability in the world and making the process of forming a new international order irreversible.
In this regard, the Prime Minister of Japan conveyed to the President of the Russian Federation the following message from the leaders of the G7 countries and the representatives of the European Community:
"We regret that the armed clash in Moscow which was provoked by the supporters of the former parliament resulted in many victims. We nevertheless welcome the fact that the situation has ended and law and order is being restored including respect of human rights.
We reconfirm that our support remains unchanged for democratic reform and economic reform pursued by President Yeltsin. We strongly hope that a truly democratic society which reflects the will of the people will be born through free and
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fair election of the new parliament with broad participation of the people and that reform will be further promoted."
2. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, sharing the recognition that the difficult legacies of the past in the relations between the two countries must be overcome, have undertaken serious negotiations on the issue of where the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai belong. Both sides agree that negotiations towards an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of this issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on the documents produced with the two countries' agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice should continue, and that the relations between the two countries should thus be fully normalized. In this regard, the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation confirm that the Russian Federation is the State retaining continuing identity with the Soviet Union and that all treaties and other international agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be applied between Japan and the Russian Federation.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation recall that a constructive dialogue has taken place in the Peace Treaty Working Group between the two countries, and that one of the fruits thereof has been the joint publication in September 1992 of the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation agree to take a series of measures aimed at increased mutual understanding, including further facilitation of mutual visits between the current residents of the aforementioned islands and the residents of Japan that have been conducted within the framework agreed upon between the two countries.
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3. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, convinced that expanded political dialogue is a beneficial and effective means to promote Japan-Russia relations, agree to continue, deepen, and develop political dialogue through regular mutual visits at the levels of the Heads of State and Government, the Ministers and the Vice-Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
4. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, based on the common principles of freedom and openness, share the recognition on the potential for remarkable development which the Asia-Pacific region may demonstrate in the world in the 21st century. Both sides confirm the significance of the Russian Federation's becoming an active and constructive partner in the region by implementing the principles of law and justice to further contribute to the development of political and economic relations among the countries in this region. They also share the recognition that the full normalization of the relations between Japan and the Russian Federation, both of which play important roles in the Asia-Pacific region, is of essential importance, in the context of making this region a region of peace and stability as well as a place for developing economic cooperation based on free trading system open to all countries and regions, including the Russian Federation.
The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, based on their shared recognition of the need for promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, confirm the importance of dialogue between the authorities of their two governments on a wide range of issues including security, and agree to further activate such exchanges.
5. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation welcome the progress thus far achieved in the area of arms control and disarmament, confirm
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the need for faithful implementation thereof, and share the recognition that it is important to further promote such a process and to make it irreversible.
Both sides share the recognition that the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the ensuing storage, control and disposal of fissile materials have an important bearing on the security of the entire world and confirm their intention to cooperate in these areas. Furthermore, both sides confirm that the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes raises a grave concern on a global scale, particularly due to its effects on the environment of the neighboring countries and agree to consult closely through the Japan-Russia Joint Working Group to consider this problem further.
Both sides welcome the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Paris in January 1993 and express their expectation for as many countries as possible joining the Convention and thereby contributing to peace and stability of the world. Both sides also agree to cooperate closely for effectively securing non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related material and components, and technologies and knowledge, as well as for promoting increased transparency in transfers of conventional weapons.
6. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation note the ongoing deliberations at the United Nations on such issues as how the United Nations should function and be structured, so that it can play a central role in maintaining and creating a new world peace while adapting itself to the changing international circumstances, and agree to engage in common efforts to enhance the authority of the United Nations by further activating the contributions by both countries to the United Nations' efforts for solving global and regional problems.
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In Tokyo, 13 October 1993
Prime Minister of Japan
Morihiro Hosokawa
President of the Russian Federation
B.N. Yeltsin
9. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation on some matters of cooperation in the field of fishing operations for marine living resources (February 1998)
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),
Hoping to promote the development and enhancement of good neighborliness between Japan and the Russian Federation,
Aiming to further develop and enhance the traditional and mutually beneficial relations between both countries in the field of fisheries, including relations based on the Agreement on Mutual Relations in the Field of Fisheries off the coast of Both Countries between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Tokyo on 7 December 1984, and the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Fisheries, signed in Moscow on 12 May 1985,
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Based on the principles stipulated in the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations signed on 13 October 1993, and the Declaration on the Future Prospects of Relations in the Fields of Trade and Economy as well as Science and Technology between Japan and the Russian Federation,
Attaching importance to further promotion of cooperation for the conservation, rational utilization and reproduction of living resources (including cooperation for the protection of the marine environment),
Hoping to establish the patterns of the operations of a temporary nature carried out on a commercial basis by Japanese fishing vessels in the waters stipulated in this Agreement, and the conservation, rational utilization and reproduction of living resources in the said waters,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall cooperate so that operations for living resources carried out by Japanese fishing vessels will be conducted in waters delineated by the geodetic connecting the points of latitude and longitude in the sequence, indicated in the annexed table, around the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, and shall also cooperate for the conservation, rational utilization and reproduction of living resources in the said waters.
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Article 2
1. Operations for living resources carried out by Japanese fishing vessels in the waters stipulated in Article 1 above shall be implemented in accordance with a memorandum of understanding agreed each year between organizations from respective countries and confirmed through mutual notification by the Parties via the diplomatic channels.
2. Through the exchange of official diplomatic documents, the Parties shall mutually notify their recognition of arrangements between organizations from respective countries referred to in paragraph 1 above as the memorandum of understanding referred to in Paragraph 1 above.
3. The Government of Japan, in conjunction with fishing operations, preservation and reproduction of living resources, shall take measures within the scope of laws and regulations of Japan to ensure that payment is made in accordance with this Agreement and the memorandum of understanding referred to in paragraph 1 above by the Japanese organizations referred to in paragraph 1 above.
Article 3
Where a mutual interest exists, the Parties shall endeavor to develop cooperation in the field of fisheries in general between the two countries, including exchange of information concerning trends in the market price of fishing products, and fishing product processing.
The Parties, where appropriate, shall encourage the development of mutual cooperation between organizations and corporations of both countries in the field of fisheries within the scope of their respective relevant laws and regulations of the respective countries.
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Article 4
The Parties shall hold consultations, at a time to be mutually agreed upon, in principle, once a year, on issues related to the implementation of this Agreement.
Article 5
The Parties, where appropriate, shall promote contact between their relevant organizations, including the Fisheries Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, the Maritime Safety Agency of the Ministry of Transport of Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Russian Federation, and the National Border Guard Agency of the Russian Federation.
Article 6
Nothing in this Agreement, nor any activities conducted in accordance with this Agreement, nor any measures taken to implement this Agreement nor any activities or measures related there to shall be deemed as to prejudice the positions or views of any Party with respect to any issues of their mutual relations.
Article 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties mutually notify via the diplomatic channels that they have completed their respective necessary domestic legal procedures for the Agreement's entry into force, and shall remain in force for a period of three years unless either Party notifies in writing to the other Party at least six months before the date on which it intends to terminate this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be automatically extended for further year unless, after a period of three years, from the date of its entry into force, either Party notifies in writing to the other Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement at least six months before the expiration of this Agreement.
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DONE in duplicate in the Japanese and Russian languages, both equally authentic, 21 February 1998 in Moscow.
For the Government of Japan
For the Government of the Russian Federation
10. Note Verbale presented by the Embassy of Japan in the Russian Federation regarding visits without visas to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai aimed at providing emergency humanitarian assistance
(18 September 1998)
The Embassy of Japan in the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and has the honor to refer to the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations of 13 October 1993, which states the agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation to take a series of measures aimed at increasing mutual understanding, including further facilitating mutual visits between Japanese citizens and the residents of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai (hereafter referred to as "the Islands"); the exchange of letters of 14 October 1991 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding visits to the Islands by Japanese citizens and visits to regions of Japan by the residents of the Islands; and the Note Verbale of 20 April 1993 exchanged between the Embassy of Japan in the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding partial revision and addition of procedures for the above-mentioned visits; and to
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inform that visits to the Islands by Japanese citizens and visits to regions of Japan by the residents of the Islands with the aim of implementing emergency humanitarian assistance including that in emergency situations such as occurrences of threats to the lives and health of people, and technical cooperation related to such assistance, will be implemented by the procedures provided in the above-mentioned exchange of letters and the Note Verbale.
Visits and cooperation carried out in accordance with these procedures must not be deemed as to prejudice the legal positions of either side regarding any issue pertaining to such visits and cooperation.
The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation the assurances of its highest consideration.
11. Note Verbale presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan regarding the framework, streamlined to the maximum extent possible, for visits to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai by Japanese nationals who are former residents and members of their families (2 September 1999)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan and has the honor to confirm that it has received from the said Embassy the Note Verbale No. 138 of 2 September 1999, which states the following:
"The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and has the honor to inform that the Russian Federation, referring to Part I, Clause 2 of the Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership between the Russian Federation and Japan,
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signed by President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin and Prime Minister of Japan Keizo Obuchi on 13 November 1998, in regarding to the agreement in principle, stipulated in the said clause, concerning the implementation of the so-called free visits, streamlined to the maximum extent possible, to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai (hereinafter referred to as "the Islands") by Japanese nationals who are former residents and members of their families, and noting the existing system and procedures for visits to the Islands by Japanese citizens and visits by the residents of the Islands to regions of Japan provided in the Correspondence of 14 October 1991 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as "the Correspondence"), and the Note Verbale of 20 April 1993 exchanged between the Embassy of Japan in the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as "the exchanged Note Verbale"), is prepared to take necessary measures in accordance with the procedures attached to this Note Verbale to ensure that visits to the Islands by Japanese nationals who are former residents and members of their families, are implemented by framework of visits, streamlined to the maximum extent possible.
1. (1) Visits to the Islands will be carried out by groups without passports or visas, based on identification materials and inserts for multiple visits (hereinafter referred to as "IDs" and "inserts"), and the required attachments (visiting group name list and visit itinerary). Visiting groups may be accompanied by central or local authorities (no more than two people) and doctors and interpreters.
(2) The program that stipulates the basic provision regarding group visits will be adjusted annually at the conference stipulated in Part 2. Clause (2) of the Correspondence.
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The program that stipulates details regarding individual visits will be determined in accordance with Part 2. Clause (2) of the Correspondence.
2. This framework will be implemented in accordance with the following conditions:
(1) This framework does not in any way exert influence on the framework of visits to the Islands provided in the Correspondence and the exchanged Note Verbale, and the framework of visits to gravesites provided in the mutually appropriate Note Verbale of 2 July 1986.
(2) Visits within this framework should not be deemed as to prejudice the legal positions of either side regarding any issue pertaining to such visits.
3. The Government of the Russian Federation states that it is prepared to hold discussion with the Government of Japan regarding any issue arising in regard to the application of this framework, including the circumstance of implementing this framework and possibility for its improvement.
Should the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, representing the Government of Japan, affirm its consent to the above-mentioned contents, this Note Verbale and a reply to this Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan with contents identical to those of this Note Verbale will constitute a mutual understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Japan regarding the implementation of cooperation under the conditions described in this Note Verbale.
The Embassy of the Russian Federation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan the assurances of its highest consideration."
116
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, representing the Government of Japan, has the honor to inform its consent through this Note Verbale to the taking of the necessary measures described in the Note Verbale from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan.
Procedures Attached to the Note Verbale No. 138 of 2 September 1999
from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan
Procedures for visits to the Islands by Japanese nationals
who are former residents and members of their families
I. General Provisions
1. Japanese nationals who are former residents and members of their families means Japanese nationals and their spouses and children, who resided on the Islands during the period until the end of 1945.
2. The Japanese side will submit to the Russian side each year through diplomatic channels a list of the names (including former domiciles on the Islands) of Japanese nationals who are former residents and members of their families.
3. Visits will be carried out, based on IDs, inserts and the required attachments (visiting group name list and visit itinerary).
4. The Government of Japan will prepare IDs. The form and the items to be included on them will be agreed upon with the Russian side separately.
5. Inserts for multiple visits will be issued by the appropriate organization in Japan, after printing the items provided in Clause 3. of the exchanged Note Verbale.
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II. Advance Procedures
1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan will inform the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan via a Note Verbale no less than, in principle, two weeks prior to the scheduled visit start date, regarding the items provided in Part 1., Clause (1) of the exchanged Note Verbale and the pass point for entry and exit procedures.
2. The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan will inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan via a Note Verbale, regarding the advisability of reception of participants in the visiting groups indicated in the Note Verbale.
III. Entry and Exit Procedures.
1. The leader of the visiting group will carry the list of names of the members comprising the visiting group and will hand it to the Russian side upon the visiting group's arrival at the pass point.
The members comprising the visiting group will carry IDs and inserts.
2. The Russian side will make an appropriate entry on the inserts attached to the IDs at the items of entry into and exit from the pass point by the visiting group.
IDs valid for multiple visits will be returned along with their inserts to those carrying such IDs.
12. Japan-Russia Cooperation Program on the Development of Joint Economic Activities in the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai (September 2000)
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ryozo Kato, and Deputy Minister for foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, A. P. Losyukov, served as joint Chairs in a
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subcommittee on Joint Economic Activities in the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, established in accordance with Clause 2 of the Moscow Declaration of 13 November 1998 on Establishing a Creative Partnership between Japan and the Russian Federation, with the aim of elucidating what Joint Economic Activities could be implemented on the above-mentioned islands, based on the work conducted within the framework of the said subcommittee, confirm the following:
1. The gradual development of Joint Economic Activities in the islands will be advanced to strengthen mutual understanding and trust between Japan and the Russian Federation in this region, to create a favorable environment for the advancement of the negotiations between the two countries on a peace treaty, and to improve the overall atmosphere in the Japan-Russia relations.
2. Both sides consider as a possible form of future Joint Economic Activities cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including the reproduction and aquaculture of marine living resources, and fishery operations processing.
3. As a means of putting Joint Economic Activities on track, based on the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation on some matters of cooperation in the filed of fishing operations for marine living resources, signed on 21 February 1998 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), it is appropriate for purpose to realize cooperation in the areas relating to the reproduction of marine living resources in the islands. Currently, this joint work may encompass, as a possible form, the cultivation of sea urchin roe and shellfish.
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4. Japan-Russia cooperation in the area of reproduction of marine living resources will be implemented in accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement.
Joint Economic Activities in the areas of reproduction of marine living resources will be implemented in the sea areas, specified in the annex of the Agreement.
The progress of this cooperation will be reviewed in the meetings of a subcommittee on Joint Economic Activities. With regard to the issue of the swift formulation of a document pertaining to the cultivation of sea urchin roe and shellfish, active study will be continued in working groups within the framework of this subcommittee.
5. Cooperation in the areas of reproduction of marine living resources within the framework of this program should not be deemed as to prejudice the legal positions of either side in any related issues.
4 September 2000, Tokyo
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Ryozo Kato
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs A. P. Losyukov
of the Russian Federation
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