511

 On the Roads: Transportation and Question of
Logistics during the National Struggle (1919-1922)


Declaration of Originality
The intellectual content of this thesis, which has been written by me and
for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has
not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other
examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased
and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the
admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the
conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly
acknowledged herein.

Uğurcan Acar, Master’s Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2022
Assistant Professor Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, Thesis Advisor
This study presents a narrative on road and railway transportation in the
years of the National Struggle regarding the transportation legacy from
the Ottoman Empire to Anatolia. In addition to great technological revolutions
in the field of transportation in the 19th century, the state directly
participated in road construction works during the Tanzimat period.
Moreover, in this century, the transformation of the nature of war that
necessitated the movement of more resources within the country increased
the importance of the transportation factor in the context of the
war power. Financial and military difficulties in the last period of the Empire
prevented the formation of a developed transportation network
within the country. Weapons and ammunition freight to the Western
Front during the National Struggle took place under challenging conditions
and extraordinary measures.

viii
ix
To my mother and father
x
xi
Table of Contents
List of Tables xvi
List of Figures xvi
Glossary of Non-English Terms xvi
Abbreviations and Acronyms xvii
Acknowledgements xix
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 7
2.1 Developments in Transportation 7
2.2 Transportation in the Ottoman Empire 11
3 ON ROAD REGULATIONS AND PLANS IN THE LATE OTTOMAN 35
3.1 Short History of Road 36
3.2 Tanzimat Regulations regarding Roads and Transportation 38
3.3 Overview of the Roads in Anatolia 50
4 ON TRANSPORTATION DURING THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE 57
4.1 Ministry of Public Works and Accounting of Roadmaking 58
4.2 From the Particular Road to the State Road 64
4.3 Military Transportation 69
5 ADMINISTERING THE ANATOLIAN RAILWAYS DURING THE NATIONAL
STRUGGLE 83
5.1 Ministry of Public Works and Accounting of Roadmaking 89
5.2 The State of the Lines and the Establishment of the New Administration
91
6 CONCLUSION 109
APPENDICES
A Road Map of Turkey, 1921 113
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
xii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Shipping tonnage entering Anatolian ports 15
Table 3.1 The classification of roads in the 1869 regulation 44
Table 3.2 Road investments, million piasters 51
Table 3.3 Length of şose roads by provinces 52
Table 3.4 Means of transportation in Anatolia, 1920s 55
Table 4.1 Accrued and impounded means of transport according
to National Orders 82
List of Figures
Figure 3.1 Şose roads and railways in Anatolia, 1918 54
Figure 4.1 The routes of dispatching activities 78
Figure 5.1 Anatolian railway network and lines controlled during
the war 88
Glossary of Non-English Terms
Şose Macadamized Road
xiii
Abbreviations and Acronyms
TBMM Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük
Millet Meclisi)
TİH Turkish Independence War (Türk İstiklal Harbi)
xiv
xv
Acknowledgements
After my M.A. in economics, I wanted to do a master's in social sciences.
Atatürk Institute, of which I am glad to be a member, has provided this in
the best way.
I would like to thank my advisor Ramazan Hakkı Öztan for his deep
understanding, patience, and trust in me. Without his encouragement, I
might not have been able to start and finish my study. I would also like to
thank jury members Asım Karaömerlioğlu and Ufuk Adak. Their criticisms
and suggestions were perfectly valid and appropriate.
I would like to thank Seyfettin Gürsel, Ozan Bakış, and all my colleagues
from the Center for Economic and Social Research at Bahçeşehir
University (BETAM), where I have been a research assistant since 2017.
They never made things difficult for me.
Leman Meral Ünal, Emir Küçük, and Fuat Öztürk, whom I met through
Atatürk Institute, have been friends of mine. Thank you all; I do not doubt
they will be successful researchers.
I would like to salute my professors Ümit Şenesen, Tolga Kaya, and
Ahmet Atıl Aşıcı for their unwavering support since my days at İTÜ, and
all friends of the Friday Team.
Finally, I would like to thank my mother and father. Even though they
sometimes questioned why I was dealing with « these things », they never
lacked their respect and support for me. I owe my mother and father a
debt of gratitude.
NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations
with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax,
and style of this thesis.
xvi
1
1
Introduction
he absence of roads and the terrible condition of the existing roads
had been the bleeding wound of the Anatolian geography. This
wound, one of the main reasons for Anatolia's economic backwardness,
revealed itself most severely way during the days of the national struggle
and came to a level that almost caused the loss of the war. Putting a strong
army against the Greek forces advancing in Western Anatolia would only
be possible by transferring weapons, ammunition, and even food supplies
from various regions of Anatolia to the Western front. In Anatolia,
where tons of materials can be shipped from east to west in just a few
days in today’s transportation infrastructure and vehicles, such shipments
were continuing for months a century ago. After all, the transportation
speed in Anatolia was, at most, the speed of the coachman walking
next to his animal. That was the highest speed because the Anatolian
roads, many of which were certainly not roads by modern standards, allowed
passage only after the rains had stopped and the puddles had dried
up. In the days when the Anatolian resistance struggled to stay alive, the
quality of transportation was the same as it was centuries ago.
However, 150 years before the national struggle, there was a revolution
in roadmaking with the MacAdam technique. Similarly, steam power
had started a great transportation revolution on land after water transportation.
The steam-powered locomotive and its wagons revolutionized
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U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
2
land transport in terms of speed and capacity that the previous generation
could not even imagine. Fifty years before the national struggle, the
German state was able to send approximately 250 thousand soldiers with
their equipment to the Austrian border in just 10 days.1 In the 1920s Anatolia,
weapon and ammunition freight from the Eastern front to the
Western front took 6 months. While transportation opportunities in Europe
were taking firm steps towards achieving market and price union,
wheat shipment could not be provided even between two neighboring
provinces in Anatolia due to transportation barriers (men-i mürur) that
posed a risk of famine. In short, despite the technological revolution in
transportation, Anatolia's transportation facilities had not changed much
during the national struggle.
If we exclude the limited contribution of the railways, transportation
and haulage activities were the same in the years of the national struggle
as they were centuries ago. However, why was this so? This question cannot
be answered simply by photographing war days. In order to create a
narrative from the photographs of those days, it was necessary to go on a
journey in the past. It was necessary to go to the 1869 regulation to fully
understand the law proposals submitted by the representatives to
change the legal status of roads. In order to better understand the absence
of roads that caused the journeys in Anatolia to take months, a time
travel to the 19th century had to be made. It was necessary to go back to
the days when the railways came to Anatolia in order to understand the
causes of the non-Muslim personnel problem in the railways during the
days of the national struggle. Here, the second and third chapters serve
this purpose. The second chapter offers a panoramic view of the transportation
possibilities in the Ottoman Empire. The third chapter focuses
on post-Tanzimat occupations on road transportation. Because road construction
works had a very exceptional place among the public works reforms
shaped by the Tanzimat. During this period, Ottoman bureaucrats
made arrangements and prepared plans to create a transportation infrastructure
and network in the empire. I refer to these in chapter three.
1 Aysal, “Osmanlı ve Yunan Demiryollarının,” 342-343.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
3
In Ottoman historiography, the railways have an overwhelming
weight in the studies in the field of transportation. The international
character of the railways in the struggle for the influence of the great
powers in the empire and the political economy of railways have a wide
place in Ottoman historiography. Similarly, the place of steamships in the
increasing international trade has been studied extensively. On the other
hand, Ottoman history studies neglected or overlooked roads.2 The third
chapter deals with the road issues in the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the
only reason why I included such a chapter is not that this issue is neglected
in the literature but that the National Assembly that carried out
the national struggle took over the Ottoman roads and road law, so looking
at the road works in the Tanzimat period helps us for a better understanding
the state of transportation during the national struggle. Indeed,
the classification of roads, frequently mentioned in the national assembly,
the necessity of working in road construction, the road tax, and the
need to centrally plan the roads take their source from this period.
Thus, this thesis study provided continuity between the transportation
legacy of the 19th century and the transportation activities in the
national struggle and tried to present a better narrative than the existing
studies about transportation in Anatolia during the days of the national
struggle.
There are studies on the transportation dimension of the national
struggle. Many theses have been written in Turkish on this subject.3 The
vast logistical problem that the national powers had to solve is exciting
as a research topic. This topic has found its place as a separate volume
2 In this regard, Özkan's historiographical criticisms are quite valid and appropriate. See:
Özkan, “A Road in Rebellion,” 16-51.
3 See, for example: Ezer, Feyzullah. “Batı Cephesi’nin İkmal ve İaşesi (1919-1922).” PhD
diss. Fırat University, 2004; Ataman, M. Günal. “Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Levazım İkmal Faaliyetleri.”
MA thesis. Hacettepe University, 2007; Şahin, Mustafa. “Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda
Ulaştırma Hizmetleri.” MA thesis. Dokuz Eylül University, 1999.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
4
under the title of "Administrative Activities" in the “Turkish War of Independence”
book series prepared by the Turkish General Staff.4 The book
covers the military logistics and transportation activities carried out during
the war comprehensively based on the history of war archives. Studies
dealing with transportation activities in the national struggle are
mostly the repetition of the archive documents of this book. This repetition
is inevitable in a way because there is no other primary source on
the subject. The fourth chapter of this study suffers from a similar problem.
On the other hand, my relevant chapter in this study differs from
other studies in that it also includes discussions about the roads of the
period in the parliamentary minutes. Discussions on various roads in the
parliamentary minutes contain essential information about the economic
life of the period. My chapter also makes a unique contribution by
examining the legal legislation on which military transports were based.
The fifth chapter of the study focuses on the railway administration,
whose management was undertaken by the national powers during the
national struggle. The narrative in this chapter is supported by the discussions
in the parliamentary minutes as well as secondary sources. The
forest resources, which the national government offered to the warweary
people in order to meet their needs, such as shelter and fuel, and
to create an economic resource for themselves, were also provided for
the use of trains as fuel. I believe that my study has made some original
contributions regarding the fuel problem in this chapter.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note the word preferences in this
study. I use the word transportation to include all activities on the roads
(or paths, seas, and rivers). All activities of traveling, carrying, dispatching,
delivering, transferring, conveying, or shipping are part of transportation.
Another important note concerns the word "road." Today, when
we say "road," we think of structures that modern transportation vehicles
can pass over.5 The connotation of the word “road” is very recent, so it is
4 In 1978, the name of the unit that prepared the book changed to ATASE which is the
well-known name among history of war researchers.
5 See for a similar discussion: Lay, Road Technology, 11
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
5
helpful to make a distinction. For example, before the 19th century, the
routes on which the caravans traveled were not roads but paths or trails
that resembled roads thanks to the continuous traffic on them, and I do
not call them “roads.” In this study, the routes that I call “roads” are not
formed naturally, but they are structures that have been constructed, although
this construction process is simple. Similarly, if the sources used
the expression "şose" for an Ottoman road, I adhered to that expression.
Maybe it could be called macadamized way instead of şose, but I did not
prefer it.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
6
7
2
An Overview of Transportation in the Ottoman Empire
n this chapter, I examine the transportation possibilities in the Ottoman
Empire, with more emphasis on Anatolia and its surroundings
and the late Ottoman era. This chapter aims to reveal the types of transportation
in the Ottoman Empire, their characteristics, and their constraints.
In the first subsection, there is a summary of the 19th century’s
great revolutions in transportation in the world. The following subsections
summarize the modes of transportation in Ottoman geography.
However, the “roads” are not within the scope of this chapter because, as
stated in the next chapter, it is more appropriate to examine the developments
in the field of the road as a separate chapter in this study.
§ 2.1 Developments in Transportation
Transportation had a very stable appearance all over the world until
the technical revolution brought about by the steam engine's invention at
the end of the 18th century. Until this technical revolution, land transportation
in most of the world was determined by the speed of the carter
I
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
8
walking beside his horse or mule,1 and water transportation was the only
feasible means of transporting goods in bulk since it was both much
cheaper2 and faster than land transportation. Even the smallest boats of
the period could carry 200 times the load by the best land transportation
method. A typical sailing merchant ship, very small by modern standards,
could carry 50-100 tons of cargo with a crew of only 6 people.3 However,
there were great uncertainties in sea transportation due to weather conditions
and sea flows. The 900-mile journey between Istanbul and Venice
could take 15 or 80 days, depending on wind direction. Steam engines
came to the rescue of water transportation from this uncertainty. Steamships
could take off from sea flows and winds, which gave stability to sea
voyages by clarifying departure and arrival times.4 Of course, sailboats
were not quickly withdrawn from commercial life.
Fourteen percent of total sea cargo was transported by sailboats in
1840 and 49 percent in 1870. In the last years of the century, this rate
dropped to 25 percent.5 Steamships began to appear in the Ottoman middle
east in the 1820s. Similar to world trade, steamships did not suddenly
replace sailing ships in Ottoman trade. In the 1860s, the number of sailboats
arriving in the port of Istanbul was four times the number of steamships.
By 1900, only 5% of the ships that came to the capital were sailboats.
Steam engines contributed to the tonnage as well as the time
stability of the ships. These ships could carry an average of 1000 tons of
1 Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution, 9.
2 The transportation cost of shipping a good from London to Galata was almost equal to
the transportation cost required to transport the same good from Galata to Beyoğlu
(Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 209). It was cheaper to bring coal 3000 miles from England
by sea shipment than to carry it 30 miles overland (Issawi, Middle East and North
Africa, 44).
3 The carrying capacity of camels varies according to the breed of the camel, but assuming
that a camel carries 200 kilograms, a typical sailing merchant ship, then, could carry
250-500 camel load. As we will see, only one railroad car would have a capacity of 125
camel loads.
4 Quataert, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1922, 181-182.
5 Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 74-75.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
9
cargo. This is an extraordinary capacity in comparison to sailboats. However,
the steam engine revolution did not produce any appreciable advances
in the speed of water transportation.6 In 1851, a steamship from
Liverpool could reach New York in 10-11 days. The real revolution in
speed was made possible by steam locomotives on the land.7
As a matter of fact, significant advances had been made in roads,
horse-drawn carriages, and postal services before the railway revolution.
The London-Glasgow journey, which took 10-12 days in the middle of the
18th century, was reduced to 62 hours at the beginning of the 19th century,
and in 1833, the postal service between Paris and Strasbourg took
36 hours, meaning the postal service operated with a daily range of about
300 kilometers. Despite this, the conditions for carrying passengers and
goods on land were inadequate and extremely expensive. In 1830 there
were only 50-65 kilometers of railway in the world, the longest being between
Liverpool and Manchester. By 1850, there were nearly 40 thousand
kilometers of railways.8 The size of the investments flowed to the
6 Quataert, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1922, 182.
7 Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 69. In fact, marine transportation is still slower than air
and land transportation. Today, the sea travel between Liverpool and New York takes 6-
7 days.
8 Until the middle of the 19th century, railways were rare outside England. Hobsbawm
attributes the fantastic increase in railways to the fortunate conjuncture in England. At
the beginning of the 19th century, England was carrying out 90 percent of the world
coal production with 10 million tons. The coal industry had stimulated railway construction
between the mine site and the embarkation point. The first modern railway
was the line from the coalfield in Durham to the coast. The railway had emerged as the
most passionate innovation of the industrial revolution. Otherwise, the capital invested
to the railways would yield less than 4 percent interest per year. The railway, which
found its place in the imagination of ordinary people and in the poems of intellectuals,
became the passion of businessmen and investors, despite its low return. Of course, the
effect of the large capital accumulated in this was undeniable. The return on foreign
investment and lending were both minimal and uncertain. With the effect of the conjuncture,
the railway became a sponge that absorbs large capital accumulations and
capital goods such as iron and steel. In this respect, the railways were the second leading
sector of the industrial revolution after the cotton product sector. See: Hobsbawm, The
Age of Revolution, 42-47.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
10
railways reached 240 million pounds. This breakthrough in railways in
England spread to other parts of the world at different speeds. The first
railway line operating in the Ottoman land, excluding Egypt, was the
Köstence-Boğazköy line opened in 1860. The first railway line to operate
in Anatolia was the İzmir-Aydın line, which was opened in 1866. In 1880,
Britain's rail iron and steel exports quadrupled their level in 1850, while
machinery exports increased 10 times over the same period.9 By 1880,
there were nearly 3 million wagons and 100,000 locomotives pulling
them. 2 billion trips were made per year by train: 72 percent of these took
place in Europe and 20 percent in North America.10 In the third quarter
of the 19th century, the volume of goods and people transported by railways
had increased 10 times that of marine transportation. However, except
for Europe and North America, the main railways had a function that
complemented the international maritime transport network. Goods to
be transported by ships to the industrial and urban regions of the world
were carried by railways to the ports from production places.11 The developing
world economy stimulated the construction of railways, and
with the railways connecting the inner regions to the ports, world markets
deepened, and international trade increased.
Transportation in Anatolia, like in the rest of the world, had a longue
duree character until steam power came into play. In fact, 200 years later,
during the Turkish War of Independence, the transportation speed in Anatolia
mostly depended on the speed of animals. In this section, we try to
provide information about transportation in the Ottoman lands by giving
more weight to transportation in Anatolia and its nearby regions. Trade
activities reveal the form and nature of transportation activities and infrastructure
in Anatolia because they are the dominant factor determining
the form and quality of transportation. Old and new roads and means
of transport come together around trade. Those who built railways in An-
9 Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 54.
10 Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 26-28.
11 Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 70-72.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
11
atolia followed the roads used by caravans for centuries. The three caravan
routes running north from Thrace are today railways. The first railways
built in Anatolia, Aydın-İzmir, and İzmir-Kasaba, and the Anatolian
and Adana railways built after them, also followed the routes used by the
caravans.12
The Empire exhibited a new mindset in public works with the Tanzimat
Edict. Many regulations and works related to roads were made during
these years. Therefore, we examine the road issue following the Tanzimat
edict in the next section.
§ 2.2 Transportation in the Ottoman Empire
2.2.1 Water Transportation
Transportation by water was the only realistic means of long-haul and
bulk shipments before steam power was used on land. However, the Empire
suffered from a lack of navigable rivers unlike Europe where transportation
by river and canal was highly developed.13 Even though the Ottoman
empire had a long coastline, it was never a naval superpower like
Great Britain; It was a land power in every era.
2.2.1.1 River transportation
In Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq, regular transportation was possible only
on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Although transportation was possible
in rivers such as Menderes at different times, this was inconsistent. In the
Euphrates, seasonal water level changes made transportation difficult. In
addition, the traffic on the Euphrates and Tigris was unsafe, as the empire
had difficulties maintaining security in the region after the 17th century.
14 The Euphrates and Tigris rivers played an important role in the
12 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 820.
13 Ponting, Dünya Tarihi, 623.
14 Faroqhi, “Crises and Change,” 483.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
12
Indian and Basra trade entry into Anatolia. The goods in the ships entering
Basra were coming to Birecik (Urfa region) by river ships, and from
there, they were going to Aleppo, Iskenderun, Tripoli, and other ports by
camel caravans. The journey on the river took 15-16 days. Commercial
goods coming to Birecik by caravans from Aleppo were also sent to Baghdad
by ships. There was a shipbuilding site in Birecik, and according to
the documents, there were 300 ships there in 1565. In cases where shipbuilding
was risky due to the scarcity or abundance of water in Birecik,
timber was sent to Basra, and ships were built there. Apart from shipbuilding,
the entire timber supply of the Basra region was provided in
this way. The grain requirement of the region was delivered from Raqqa,
Diyarbakir, and Mosul via Birecik since wheat and barley cultivation in
Baghdad and the Basra region was difficult.15 On the Tigris, the current
was one-way, so it was not as convenient as the Euphrates to operate a
ship, but it was possible to transport with keleks. After the keleks arrived
at their destination, they were cut into timber or transported back up the
river on hired camels. For example, keleks, transported to Baghdad for the
needs of the army in 1726-1727, were sent back to Diyarbakir with 2000
camels. It was also a problem that the river arcs were filled with stones,
sand, and earth due to heavy rains. Nine hundred people worked for 40
days to clean the arcs in the villages of Baghdad every year.16
The first attempts to operate steamships on the Euphrates and Tigris
rivers were made by the British officer Chesney who got the privilege of
operating a steamboat on these rivers in 1834 and started navigating
with 2 steamboats brought from England and assembled in Birecik. How-
15 Orhonlu, Şehircilik ve Ulaşım, 117-120; 128-131.
16 Orhonlu, Şehircilik ve Ulaşım, 124-127. For detailed information on shipping on the Euphrates
and Tigris and keleks, see: Taştemir, “Klasik Devirde Osmanlı’da,” 22-23; Taş,
“Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Fırat ve Dicle Nehirlerinde Kelek İle Ulaşım,” 413-419.
Quataert also mentions that the current on Tigris was unidirectional. He states that
when keleks arrived at their destination, they were dismantled, and their timbers were
sold. See: Quataert, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1922, 183.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
13
ever, Chesney's attempt was unsuccessful, and 4 British steamships belonging
to the East India Company engaged in freight and passenger
transportation along the Tigris and Euphrates, as well as the Karun River
on the Iranian side between 1839-1842. The Lynch brothers17 who
worked with Chesney, on the other hand, established an agency in Baghdad
in 1840 and received a concession to operate two steamships on the
Euphrates in 1841. Meanwhile, some Ottoman pashas also attempted to
operate ferries on the Tigris. The first notable activities took place when
Mithat Pasha, who did important work in river transportation during his
governorship of the Danube, was the governor of Baghdad. Mithat Pasha
considered the river transportation in the region in the context of the increasing
influence of the state in the Arabian Peninsula. For this purpose,
he tried to establish a ferry fleet that could compete with British companies
and established new companies to rival the British Lynch company.
With the departure of Mithat Pasha from the governorship, the operations
were interrupted. During the reign of Abdülhamit, in 1904, the Hamidiye
Ferries Administration started its operations between Basra and
Baghdad with 2 ferries and 4 barges in response to the Lynch company's
2 ferries. The ferries, which could carry 230 tons of cargo18 and 250 passengers,
could speed up to 12 knots. Ferries operating on the Tigris could
travel from Baghdad to Basra in 3 days and from Basra to Baghdad in 5
days. By 1912, there were three large companies operating ferries between
Baghdad and Basra. While the company of the Ottoman State carried
60 thousand passengers and 37 thousand tons of cargo in 1912, its
biggest rival, Lynch Company, carried 35 thousand passengers and 60
thousand tons of cargo.19 The figures reveal that steamships had great
effects on trade and mobility in social life in the region.
17 The Lynch brothers were pioneers of British imperialism in the region. They had established
a strong monopoly in the Tigris and Euphrates basins and led the British opposition
to the Baghdad railway. See: Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 81-82.
18 For comparison, Orhonlu states that a kelek could carry 50 tays or 6.5 tons. See: Orhonlu,
Şehircilik ve Ulaşım, 131.
19 Hut, “Buharlı Gemiler Çağında,” 131-137.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
14
Another navigable river was the Danube. However, the rocky area
called Demirkapı Strait was blocking the river, allowing only small boats
to pass. Even as late as 1856, more than half of the transportation on the
Danube was done by rowing boats. Only the east of this rocky area was
suitable for shipping. The middle part of the river was used for military
purposes.20 Regular ferry services on the Danube started during the governorship
of Mithat Pasha. The expeditions, which started with two ferries,
increased to 7 ferries in 1869. In the period of İdare-i Mahsusa, the
number increased to 9. The company also had freighters carrying grain.
Austria's Lloyd company and some Russian companies were also operating
passenger, freight, and postal services on the Danube.21
Steamships also operated in the Meriç River for a while. At the beginning
of 1870, 600 thousand pounds of grain were transported on the
river. However, with the opening of the railway in 1873, river transportation
lost its importance. The river's water level had decreased a lot because
of rice production, and after the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878),
boating and shipping were prohibited in the river. 22
The only waterway other than the seas used during the National
Struggle is Lake Eğirdir. During the preparations for the Great Offensive,
the shipments that were unloaded to the Akşehir station of the Konya
railway line were brought to the pier in the lake and were transported to
the north, behind the forces of the western front, by tugboat and barges.23
2.2.1.2 Sea transportation
Steam power revolutionized sea transportation before land transportation.
Of course, the sailboats did not suddenly leave the seas. In fact,
although the share of sailboats in tonnage decreased at the end of the
19th century, the number of Ottoman sailboats and crews employed on
20 Faroqhi, “Crises and Change,” 483-484.
21 Hut, “Buharlı Gemiler Çağında,” 139.
22 Hacısalihoğlu, “Meriç Nehri,” 288.
23 TİH, Vol 2, Section 6, Book 1, 244.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
15
these increased. Between 1879 and 1914, the tonnage of Ottoman sailboats
increased from 164 thousand to 202 thousand tons. 529 sailboats
arrived in Mersin in 1897, and 626 sailboats in 1906. At the end of the
1880s, 8,000 sailing ships entered Trabzon every year. 24 Steam power
increased the tonnage of ships tremendously. While the tonnage of ships
arriving in Istanbul was between 130 and 530 tons in the 1830s, the average
tonnage increased to 1250 tons at the end of the century. Similarly,
the average tonnage of ships touching at Trabzon increased eight times
between 1830 and 1880, reaching 1005 tons. With the increasing tonnage
of the ships, the volumes in the ports rose to extraordinary levels. 25
Table 2.1 below shows the total tonnages that entered the important
ports of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia over the years.
Table 2.1 Shipping tonnage entering Anatolian ports
1830 1860 1890 1913
İstanbul - - 800 4000
İzmir 100 600 1600 2200
Trabzon 15 120 500 -
Source: Issawi, Middle East and North Africa, 48.
European shipping had dominated the Mediterranean since the 11th
century. Thus, it is unsurprising that 90 percent of the traffic in Ottoman
ports was in the hands of European companies in 1914.26 While the share
of Ottoman ships decreased, their cargo volumes increased thanks to the
extraordinarily increased volume. However, Ottoman ports were in a
primitive condition despite the increase in volume and number of ships.
While cranes were used to unload and embark goods in European ports,
things continued in an old-fashioned way in Ottoman ports: Weather permitting,
ships anchored offshore, unloaded their cargo onto the lighters,
and the lighters took them to patchy sheds on the shore. Except for Istan-
24 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 801-802.
25 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 799-800.
26 Issawi, Middle East and North Africa, 45; Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 800.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
16
bul, there were no natural harbors. Many of the ports suffered from neglect
and silting. For example, in Trabzon, sand brought by the sea could
cause ships to run aground. In ports like Bartın, the sand brought by the
rivers rendered the port useless. As in Beirut's case, the harbor's depth
could also prevent large ships from berthing. The ships rarely visited the
Ottoman ports during the winter because they had no safe shelters and
breakwaters. Since the middle of the 19th century, efforts were made to
modernize the ports, but these were limited to the ports of Thessaloniki,
Izmir, Istanbul and Beirut.27
After the arrival of the railway to the port of Thessaloniki, a dock of
1800 meters was built, and then the trains were allowed to unload their
cargo directly to the ship. With the construction between 1867 and 1875
in Izmir port, a 4-kilometer quay and 32 hectares of dock space were
built. At the end of the 19th century, new quays were built by the French
company at the port of Istanbul, thus increasing the traffic by 50 percent
in 10 years. In 1894, an 800-meter quay and 21 hectares of dock space
were built in Beirut. Despite these improvements, foreign traders complained
of delays and inadequacy of warehouses.28
2.2.2 Overland transportation
Road construction and maintenance in Ottoman Empire should be divided
into war and peace periods. One of the important pillars of great
logistical preparation of a campaign was the maintenance, repair, and
cleaning of the roads and bridges that the army would pass through.29
The official institution of the transportation organization in the Ottoman
Empire was menzil (stage). Although the stages were established for
27 Yıldız, Deniz Ticareti, 115-116; Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 802; Issawi, Middle East
and North Africa, 48.
28 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 802.
29 For an example of the maintenance of roads during campaign preparations, see: Yıldız,
Haydi Osmanlı Sefere, 27-34; 107-117.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
17
communication, their duties were expanded over time, and responsibilities
such as the supply and transportation of the army during the campaign
were added.30 The early Ottoman logistics organization had a rather
intricate structure that fascinated the Europeans. It was strictly
forbidden for the army to make any loot or free purchases along the way.
In practice, however, the places where the armies passed were damaged,
and the tax resources were decreasing. The solution of the people was to
leave their homeland and flee. During the Iran campaign in 1579, for example,
the army had to change its marching route because the villagers
on the route of Ankara fled and dispersed.31
In the empire's early period, the state's role in road construction activities
was minor. The state took care of the roads reaching the capital;
the road of Istanbul-Edirne especially was constantly being repaired. The
opening, maintenance, and repair of roads in the countryside were left to
the villagers on the route. Some roads were built by the rich and philanthropists.
It would be helpful to mention the early institutions of the Ottoman
road system here, as they also played a role in the smooth continuation
of the caravan trade. These were derbendçilik, köprücülük,
gemicilik and kaldırımcılık. Derbendçiler were responsible for ensuring
road and crossing safety, working as a kind of rural gendarme, and repairing
roads where necessary. Kaldırımcılar were organized like other
tradesmen, settled in cities and towns, and went out when road construction
was necessary. To make roads, these road builders used to hammer
stones vertically into the embankment, which had been leveled before. In
the 16th and 17th centuries, the cost of stones used for road construction
was one-third of all costs. However, in the 19th century, this share increased
to fifty percent due to the increasing stone prices, and more rubble
stones were used. Gemiciler were providing the crossing of the rivers
where bridges could not be built, and they were ensuring the maintenance,
repair and preservation of the bridges. People working in these
institutions were exempt from some taxes in return for their services.32
30 Taştemir, “Klasik Devirde Osmanlı’da,” 29-30.
31 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, 137-138.
32 Orhonlu, Şehircilik ve Ulaşım, 27-30, 46, 70.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
18
Road transportation in the empire was twofold. Wheeled vehicles
and, accordingly, horses were dominant in the European states. In the Anatolian
and Arab provinces, on the other hand, wheelless vehicles, that is,
camels were dominant.33 Of course, horses, donkeys and mules were also
used for close distances in Anatolia. However, the strength, endurance,
and carrying capacity of camels were the reason for preference. Thanks
to its ability to tolerate increased body temperature, the camel could
travel long distances with little water and feed. In addition, the cost of
raising camels was low, as they could be fed with bushes and trees instead
of grassland.34 These features made camels the best option for long-haul
trade in Anatolia. Shipment by wagon was not suitable for Anatolia's poor
and neglected roads; the loads on them were getting more damaged during
the journey.35 Moreover, one person was required to operate a
wheeled vehicle; but the same person could control 6 camels. While there
was a risk of cars breaking down on the road, there was no such risk for
camels.36 Thus, the reason such wheeled vehicles were not preferred in
Anatolia was not because they were unknown but because of material
conditions, geography, and the state of roads.37
Transportation on land was quite expensive, and freight charges for
many goods exceeded their production costs. For this reason, the goods
33 Quataert, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1922, 184-186.
34 In addition to trade and travel, the camel had many uses. It was used in rural areas of
Egypt for plowing, digging, and cleaning debris and mud. Its manure was used to increase
agricultural production and as an energy source in regions where there was no
firewood. Camel owners in Anatolia were very knowledgeable in hybrid camel production
for different purposes. The single-humped hybrid Turcoman camel was preferred
for its strength and durability. See: İnal, “One-Humped History,” 59-61.
35 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 837.
36 Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 77. The authors state that the Turks
who migrated from Central Asia had a highly developed car technology. Turks could
hitch camels to the carriage just like horses. See: Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve
Karayolu,” 79-80.
37 İnal, “One-Humped History,” 65. Wheeled vehicles were brought to Anatolia that time
by Circassian refugees, after the collapse of the Roman empire. (Quataert, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu 1700-1922, 186).
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
19
which were "low bulk and high value" were preferred in land transportation.
Agricultural products of Anatolia were mostly not subject to longhaul
trade. For example, at the end of the 19th century, the price doubled
when grain was transported from Erzurum, a fertile grain region, to Trabzon
port (314 kilometers), the closest export point. Though there was
probably no need for such transport to Trabzon at that time because
American flours had begun to enter the Black Sea ports for a while.
Similarly, wheat transported from Ankara to Istanbul (361 kilometers)
increased the price by 3.5 times. Istanbul's wheat and flour supply
was mainly supplied from Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Thrace, and
only a small part was supplied from Samsun and Mersin ports.38 In 1857,
it had been claimed that a good was sold 7 times its cost in Izmir. In the
same year, it was written that the crop was not harvested due to the high
caravan prices and that the warehouses were full of the products of the
previous two years.39 This effect of transportation costs on prices forced
the inner regions of Anatolia to the subsistence level of agriculture, not
more. The railways changed that to some extent: By reducing transportation
costs, railways allowed the inner regions, which previously produced
only their own subsistence, to produce for the market and the uncultivated
lands to participate in agriculture. Thus, total production in Anatolia
increased over time. The railway caused the caravan transport to be
organized with a different strategy, as seen in subsection 2.2.2.3.
The road construction policy in the empire consisted mainly of local
administrators activating the opportunities in their own administrative
region, depending on military and commercial rationales. This policy
worked properly when the empire was strong. However, since the middle
of the 16th century, due to the deterioration of the classical Ottoman order,
financial problems, abolition of the tımar-holding system, and
38 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 141-144. This would slowly change after the Anatolian
Railways started operating in 1892. See also on camel transportation: Öztürk,
“Demiryollarının Gelişimi,” 11-17
39 İnal, “One-Humped History,” 66.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
20
changes in trade routes, this policy was dissolved, and the land transportation
network consisted of many neglected and broken roads. In the
18th century, land transportation was utterly inadequate.40 Since the
middle of the 19th century, the empire tried to improve land transportation
with the Tanzimat policies.
2.2.2.1 On the caravan’s trade and routes
International trade routes, which gained great importance during the
Pax Mongolica period, made Asia Minor one of the essential routes of
world trade and brought great prosperity.41 By the 17th century, Aleppo,
Bursa's rival a century ago, had become the most important silk export
center in the Levant. The revenue flowing from the customs of Aleppo to
Istanbul had reached record levels. By the end of the century, the rival of
Bursa and Aleppo was İzmir. By taking advantage of the direct trade,
thanks to the capitulations, to prolong the cheap sea passage and, thanks
to its sheltered harbor against pirates and the sea, İzmir attracted merchants,
primarily British and Dutch. Five or six Iranian caravans pass
through the Tabriz-Yerevan-Kars-Erzurum-Tokat-Ankara-Afyon-İzmir
route every year; by 1670, 3,000 of the 22,000 bales of silk produced in
Iran were reaching Izmir for export. In 1671, Aleppo was now in fourth
place for the French, after Izmir, Alexandria, and Sidon. This trade was on
the verge of Ottoman-Iranian relations. Fortunately, Selim I's full embargo
on Iranian raw silk, and about 100 years later, the efforts of the
Persian shah to shift the direction of the silk trade from Ottoman lands to
the Indian Ocean were not continued by his successors. However, although
the silk trade was partially saved, by 1630, the spice trade had left
the Ottoman lands.42
The 16th century witnessed the shift of the center of gravity of European
trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean. Behind this
process, which was expressed as the fading of the Mediterranean in Faruk
40 Kaynak, “Osmanlı Demiryollarına Bir Bakış,” 66-67. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 818.
41 İnalcık, “An Economic and Social History,” 219-222.
42 İnalcık, “An Economic and Social History,” 219-230.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
21
Tabak’s work, there was a three-layered process that overlapped, complemented
each other, and had different durations. The first was the Little
Ice Age, which lasted from the 1550s to the 1870s. This climatic event
has turned agriculture into an inconvenient and unpredictable endeavor
in bottom lands in the Mediterranean with its humidity, cold weather,
drought, and uncertain rain regime. Floods and swamps have emptied
plains in the Mediterranean. The commercial grain center has shifted further
north to the Baltic region. The second layer, which started in 1590
and lasted until around 1815, was the intervention and transformation
of the Netherlands and then Great Britain, as a rising hegemonic power,
in the division of labor in the world economy in line with their own needs
and possibilities. The third layer was the 17th-century crisis that followed
a demographic slowdown between 1650 and 1750, which reduced
demand for available labor and grain.43 In the Ottoman Empire, this process
was experienced much more severely. The pressure on Ottoman resources,
which increased with the increase in population, intensified
with the inflationary pressures of the period. Ottoman finance was
shaken to its roots between 1556 and 1625. The shock of the Little Ice
Age on Anatolian agriculture and the Celali revolts in the early 17th century
devastated Anatolia. A severe security problem arose on the Anatolian
roads.44
Faruqhi focuses on 4 main crossroads discussing the caravan routes
in the 17th century: Istanbul, Edirne, Aleppo, and Cairo. There were 3 important
routes connecting Istanbul to the caravan cities of Anatolia.
These were the paths known as the right, middle and left arm.45 The right
arm connecting Istanbul to Aleppo and Damascus was also known as the
pilgrimage route. The route goes around the edge of the Central Anatolian
steppe, enters the Çukurova plain, then turns to Aleppo from near
the Mediterranean or continues to Damascus. The main warehouses
43 Tabak, The waning of the Mediterranean, passim.
44 White, The Climate of Rebellion, passim.
45 For very detailed explanations of these paths, see: Taeschner, Osmanlı Kaynaklarına
Göre Anadolu Yol Ağı, passim.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
22
close to the border regions of Iranian trade were Erzurum and Diyarbakir.
However, Erzurum was almost completely deserted due to the Ottoman-
Persian wars in the 16th century. On the other hand, Diyarbakir was
connected to Istanbul in quite roundabout ways. Aleppo was a meeting
point for caravan routes going long distances. A widely used caravan
route also followed the Euphrates from Aleppo to Baghdad. Aleppo was
also connected to the sea routes in the Mediterranean via the bay of Iskenderun
and Payas.46
In the 18th century, 4 large caravans continued to travel between
Aleppo and Istanbul a year. Silk fabrics from Bursa, Tokat, and Amasya
were distributed over Aleppo to the Syrian region; 25 percent of them
continued to Egypt. As a result of the transition from silk weaving to cotton
weaving, trade in Iran declined drastically in this century. In parallel
with this, the port of Iskenderun left its place to the more southern ports
of Syria.47
2.2.2.2 Railways
Quataert notes that the Ottoman Empire entered the railway age late:
there was no railroad in the empire by 1850. On the other hand, railway
lines were built even in 2nd class European countries. There were 1357
kilometers of railways in Austria-Hungary, 600 kilometers in Italy, and
less than 100 kilometers in Spain.48 When railway construction started
in the empire after the Crimean war, there were lines of 16000 kilometers
in Britain, 11000 kilometers in Germany, 9000 kilometers in France, and
49000 kilometers in the United States.49 In fact, Bab-ı Ali was aware of
the economic and military benefits of the railways. If railways were constructed,
production would be delivered quickly, easily, and cheaply to
other regions. They would also provide export revenue as transportation
46 Faruqhi, “Crises and Change,” 612-614.
47 McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans,” 730-734.
48 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 804.
49 Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları, 96.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
23
costs would decrease. In the case of riot, turmoil or war, soldiers would
be quickly transferred to regions and fronts.50
At the beginning of this chapter, we briefly mentioned the elements
that encourage railway investments in Great Britain. First of all, a tremendous
amount of wealth had accumulated there. The stimulating effect of
railway construction on other industries, especially iron-steel and coal,
also supported construction activities. Moreover, the shrinking economic
environment after the Napoleonic wars made foreign investment and
lending activities uncertain and risky; thus, existing capital flowed to domestic
railways. In other words, railways emerged as a result of economic
development and formed the basis of the second run of the industrial revolution
in developed countries. However, in undeveloped countries, the
conditions were different. First, there was no accumulated capital in
these countries, and second, their level of development did not have the
potential to make the invested capital profitable in the short run. For this
reason, in undeveloped countries, the railway requested the support of
the state until it enriched the routes it crossed and its revenues could
cover the operating costs. This was the case not only in the Ottoman Empire
but also in China and Latin American states. On the other hand, Russia
was a different example: more than half of the railways there were
built with state money.51
We need to divide the lines in Anatolia into two: the Western Anatolia
and the Anatolian-Baghdad line. The privilege of the first line in Anatolia,
the İzmir-Aydın line, was granted in 1856 and opened in 1866. It was not
without reason that the first rails were laid in this region in Anatolia. Izmir
stood out as an important export point in the early 18th century. The
region had become an important and fast-growing inhabited by European
merchants who met Asian commodities there. The trade value of
50 Özdemir, Mütareke ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın, 2-3. Quataert refers to a memorandum of the
Tanzimat Assembly dated 1854; although it was emphasized in the memorandum that
agricultural resources would increase, he finds it noteworthy that the issue of encouraging
industry was not mentioned. See: Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 806.
51 Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 77-78.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
24
İzmir, 53 million francs in 1839, increased to 120 million francs in 1855.
Therefore, the construction of a railway in the region was economically
rational. However, that was not always enough. The capitalist country
needed to gain influence and give itself an advantage in the colonial race
of the century.52 The fact that the region was located on the shortest India
road was the driving force for the British to build a railway in Anatolia.
The granting of the first railway concessions in the Empire to Great Britain
was also synonymous with the beginning of the first debt relations
with Great Britain. In addition, they were unrivaled on the world political
and economic scene until the 1870s. Indeed, Britain's search for a
shortcut to India seems to have been very decisive in constructing this
line. As a matter of fact, after the British dominated the Suez Canal, they
were not interested in both the extension of the Izmir-Aydin line and the
construction of railways in Iraq and Basra.53 The Izmir-Kasaba line in
Western Anatolia was also built by the British. When these two lines are
52 To ask that question in here is highly legitimate: Were the interests of the capitalist and
the country to which capitalist subjected one and the same? This is a very difficult question
to answer. We can say that during the period we examined, perhaps no foreign capital
acted without the knowledge and permission of its government. Because a large
amount of capital was in need of the protection of its own government in the country it
went to. So, for the period and the examples that we're looking at, we can consider these
two as one and the same. However, for example, while German capitalists were building
Anatolian railways, chancellor Bismarck warned Deutsche Bank officials that the capital
owners were accepting the risk by embarking on the business of building railways in
Anatolia. Because Bismarck did not want to get involved in the Near East problem and
did not want the government to be dragged into an imperialist policy in Anatolia because
of its German capital. As a matter of fact, this is what happened in Africa. But the
German King Wilhelm II was completely opposed; he wanted to open up to the Middle
East through Anatolia. Bismarck was dismissed in 1890. See: Earle, Bağdat Demir ve
Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 45-47.
53 Kaynak, “Osmanlı Demiryollarına Bir Bakış,” 68-73. Kaynak cites İsmet İnönü's statement
"The Aydın line started in 1856 as the Basra line and India road before the Suez
Canal was opened" (p. 72). Özdemir also draws attention to India in the British government's
interest in railways in Anatolia. He states that railways in Anatolia lost their importance
for the British after the canal was taken over by England in 1875 and Cyprus
in 1878 (Özdemir, Mütareke ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın, 7-8).
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
25
examined, it is seen that they form a tree-shaped pattern extending from
the export port to the hinterland, just like in the colonial countries.54
In the construction and operation of the railways in the Ottoman
lands, the influence policies of the great powers and their competition
with each other had also decisive. In addition to the Western Anatolian
lines, the British also had a short but important Adana-Mersin line. Moreover,
the Haydarpasa-Izmit line, which the Ottomans built in 1871, was
rented by the British before being sold for 6 million francs to a group established
by Deutsche Bank in 1888. Cairo-Alexandria, Constanta-Chernova,
and Ruse-Varna lines were also constructed by the British. The Izmir-
Kasaba line was purchased by the French in 1894. The French and
Germans tried to buy the Izmir-Aydın line, but these attempts were unsuccessful.
After Britain lost its interest in Anatolia, having captured Suez
Canal, the French-German competition manifested itself, and after each
concession given to the Germans, the French also grabbed the concession
from Bab-ı Ali. For example, after the Germans were given the Eskisehir-
Konya concession, the French were given the privilege of extending the
Izmir-Kasaba line to Afyon.
The story of the Anatolian and Baghdad railways is slightly different.
First of all, this line was built for potential markets, not existing ones as
in Western Anatolia's case. In addition, the administrative and military
goals of the Ottoman Empire were also effective in this line. The main
motivation of Germany was a terrestrial expansion in line with its imperial
goals. That was an inevitable consequence of its economic development.
The German Empire became an industrial state and increasingly
needed raw materials and markets. The rapidly increasing population increased
the demand for agricultural products, and the measures to increase
agricultural production within the country were insufficient. The
fertile lands of historic Mesopotamia exalted the appetite of the Germans.
They had entered the colonial race late, capturing some places in Africa
and Asia that were left over from other great powers and were not very
54 Kaynak, “Osmanlı Demiryollarına Bir Bakış,” 73; Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve
Karayolu,” 103
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
26
fertile. In addition, the German naval force was in the shadow of the British
naval force, and keeping the seaways open in a possible conflict was
very difficult. For this reason, the only solution was to establish an economic
alliance system in central Europe and include the Near East. Beyond
the Bosphorus, plenty of oil, mines, cotton, and lands were waiting
to be cultivated.55
The political and military aspects of the Anatolian Baghdad railways
seem to have priority over the economic aspects for the Ottomans. Once
united with the capital, the empire would be able to strengthen government
power in remote provinces such as Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.
Thus, in these provinces, the people who were not coming to the army
and often rebelling against the central government, compulsory military
service would be enforced. The war mobilization would also modernize
as troop movements became easier. Perhaps the most important thing for
Abdulhamid II was combining the Baghdad railway with the Hejaz railway
and strengthening his caliphate on the Muslim subjects. The railway
would also play a major role in the provision of Istanbul. The share of
Anatolian wheat production that came to Istanbul before the Anatolian
railway was only two percent. The government was spending 1 million
liras (approximately 4 million dollars) a year on flour and wheat imports
for Istanbul.56
In 1886 and 1888, the Ministry of Public Works proposed to the British
who operated the Haydarpaşa-İzmit line to extend it to Ankara. Sir
Cincent Caillard, the chairman of the board of directors of the Debts Administration,
tried to establish a British-American partnership for this
project, but the initiatives failed. As a result, a partnership established by
Deutsche Bank was granted a concession covering both the operation of
the Haydarpasa-Izmit line and the extension of the line to Ankara. The
financial group, led by Deutsche Bank, also acquired shares in the Eastern
Railways and owned a 1500 kilometers line in the Balkans. With a very
fast construction activity, the Germans laid rails to Ankara, and the first
55 Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 49-56; Kaynak, “Osmanlı Demiryollarına Bir
Bakış,” 76.
56 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 143, 151.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
27
train arrived in Ankara in January 1893. As a reward for this rapid construction,
the Sultan gave the same group a 444 kilometers line concession
from Eskişehir to Konya. This line was completed in 1896, and the
first train arrived in Konya.57
Earle claims that while the Germans were granted the Ankara line
concession, the government stipulated that this line should be extended
to Baghdad via Samsun-Sivas-Diyarbakir in the future. However, no attempt
was made in this regard after the Ankara section was completed.
According to him, the reason for this was that the Russians strongly opposed
railway construction in North Anatolia. Indeed, the Russian delegate
in Istanbul threatenedly informed Bab-ı Ali that the extension of the
Anatolian railway to Mosul via Ankara and Eastern Anatolia was a strategic
danger for his own Caucasus borders. Upon this, the route was
changed from Ankara-Kayseri-Diyarbakir-Mosul to Konya-Adana-
Aleppo-Mosul.58 On this topic, Quataert states that the railway passed
through the Eskişehir-Konya region for strategic and military reasons as
the reason for not extending the Izmit-Ankara line to the efficient and
relatively densely populated region around Sivas. He even states that this
had concerned the capitalists that would build the railway and that the
government overcame this concern with the mileage guarantee system.59
Quataert does not mention the Russians in this regard, whereas according
to the Black Sea Treaty in 1900 if the Turks wanted to build a railway
in North and East Anatolia, they would give this job to either Russian citizens
or a company that the Tsar deemed appropriate.60
In the Syrian region, the first railway line, Jaffa-Jerusalem, was built
with the French capital in 1891. Damascus was connected to the fertile
wheat lands of Havran in 1894. This line was also connected to the export
port of Beirut. In 1906, Aleppo was annexed to Tripoli. The railway net-
57 Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 34-37.
58 Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 34-38, 136.
59 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 814; Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 142-143.
60 Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 136-137.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
28
work in Syria was denser in terms of area and population than in Anatolia.
However, these lines could not be connected to each other to establish
a common network because there were 3 different gauges.61 This brings
to mind the colonial network that the British built in India. Britain had
kept the gauges standard width on the main lines connecting the ports to
the raw material sources in India. However, the gauges varied on the lines
in domestic transportation. In other words, domestic trade was intentionally
undermined while export and import goods could reach their
destination without any transfer. Delivering coal from a coal-rich region
of India to a neighboring region right next to it was more expensive than
importing coal from Britain.62 Based on this example, it can be argued
that France may have built railways in Syria with a similar colonial approach.
In Anatolia, only the gauge of the Bursa-Mudanya line differed from
other lines. However, we cannot say that domestic trade has been integrated
and a common market has been established in Anatolia. Because
even though Anatolia attained railways, the road network was terrible for
the whole country. Barriers to transportation (men-i mürur) could not be
eliminated. We will discuss this in the next chapter.
It is certain that railways contribute to production in Anatolia, but it
is difficult to measure how much of the increase in production comes
from railways alone. Pamuk states that general agricultural production
doubled in Northern Greece, Thrace, and Anatolia between 1860-1914.63
The study of the Kasaba, which examined Western Anatolia, shows that
the production volume in Western Anatolia increased 4 times between
1845 and 1876. If we start the time interval with the opening of the Izmir-
Aydin railway, we find that the production volume increased approximately
twice between 1866 and 1876.64 Moreover, while agricultural
taxes increased by 63 percent in the whole empire between 1889-1911,
61 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 808.
62 Kurmuş, Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, 66.
63 Pamuk, “Osmanlı Tarımında,” 5.
64 Kasaba, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 80-81.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
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Eldem shows that agricultural taxes increased by 114 percent in the regions
where the railways pass through.65 Anatolian railways strengthened
economic relations between Istanbul and Anatolia. While the share
of Anatolia in wheat that came to Istanbul in 1889 was 2 percent, this
share increased to 25 percent in 1896, and in the following years, it increased
to 90 percent if the wheat harvest in Anatolia was not bad. On
the other hand, the transportation of flour was limited because the lack
of steam mills in Anatolia prevented the production of high-quality flour
preferred by Istanbul. The railroads made transportation very cheap.66
In the following subsection, we refer to the price competition of railways
between camels. Railways, both in the construction and operation process,
which consistently employed more than 10,000 workers, put much
money on the market through wages, and triggered the increase in demand.
Thanks to the Hejaz railway, a pilgrim's journey from Damascus to
Medina fell from 1200 francs to 200 francs. Export volume and export
revenues increased. The export volume on all lines except Jaffa-Jerusalem
and Mudanya-Bursa lines exceeded the import volume.67
The effect of the railways on the military field emerged in the war
with Greece in 1897. A work examining the war of 1897, written in 1898
by Staff Senior Captain Osman Senai Bey, sheds light on the importance
of railways in the battle. Accordingly, the Ottoman army dispatched a total
of 386 trains troops to the front from February to June, with a maximum
of 5 trains per day. However, this capacity was undoubtedly very
low compared to Europe. The Germans, for instance, sent corps to the
front in 1866 with 40 trains a day in 8 days, and the daily capacity increased
to 120 trains in 1871. In the war of 1866, the Germans dispatched
197,000 infantry, 55,000 cavalries, 503 firearms, and cannons to
the Austrian border in just 16 days, thanks to 5 railway lines in the direction
of the battlefield. In the war of 1871, she was able to dispatch 350
thousand of people to his region in just 10 days.68
65 Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları, 93-94
66 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 151, 155-156.
67 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 812-815
68 Aysal, “Osmanlı ve Yunan Demiryollarının,” 332, 342-343.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
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2.2.2.3 Coexistence of caravans and railways
After the start of train services to Ankara and Konya, the caravans
running parallel to the railway route reduced their prices. On the Ankara-
Izmit route, the price of a ton per kilometer, 1.44 piasters in 1889, decreased
to 0.65 piasters a ton-kilometer in 1896. On the Konya-İzmir
route, the price, which was 1.47 piasters, decreased to 1.01 piasters. Initially,
the company overlooked the price flexibility of the caravans and
prepared a simple tariff. Accordingly, a ton of grain would be transported
at 0.55 piasters per kilometer. However, in this case, the 486 kilometers
of Ankara-Izmit haul was 12 percent more expensive than the 361 kilometers
of caravan haul. In 1892, the company updated its tariffs and reduced
the freight price between Ankara and Haydarpaşa to 0.26 piasters,
60 percent less than the lowest caravan price. The price then fell to 0.18
piasters. On the Konya line, wheat was transported at 0.18 piasters and
barley at 0.21 piasters a ton-kilometers. During these years, all goods
were transported on the farmer's rail in the United States at 1.2 cents, or
about 0.17 cents. In addition, the company started to apply special discounts
if the entire railroad car was filled. The discount was even greater
with commitments of 100 cars at a time or 1,000 cars throughout the
season. These moves of the company completely changed the operation
of the caravans. Instead of competing with the railway in the Ankara part,
the caravans turned into carriers that fed the railway line, bringing grain
to the stations.69
The company also tried to persuade local merchants in regions far
from the railway line, such as Kayseri, Yozgat, Ereğli, and Karaman, to
abandon caravan transport. For example, it provided discounts of up to
40-60 percent to traders in Kayseri. However, these attempts were unsuccessful
because the total cost of sending the product to the station by
camel and then to Haydarpaşa by train was more expensive than sending
69 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 144-145. The price on “granger railroads” in the US was
1.2 cents a ton-mile which was about 0.17 piasters.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
31
the product directly to the ports by camel. Two-thirds of Yozgat's agricultural
products continued to go to Samsun with camels. 60-70 percent of
the Kayseri crop continued to follow the Mersin route. The share of agencies
established to attract local traders in remote production centers in
the annual total tonnage could not exceed 5 percent. The company could
also not achieve what it wanted in the Konya section. At first glance, the
0.18 piasters tariff between Konya and Haydarpaşa may seem much
cheaper than the 0.7-1.0 piasters caravan tariff, but Konya's distance to
the Mediterranean ports was one-third of the distance between Konya
and Haydarpaşa. In addition, the Istanbul market was completely new
and unknown for the merchants in the Konya region, who found higher
selling prices in the south and were afraid of competition in Istanbul.
Therefore, the merchants of Konya mostly stayed loyal to their old routes.
Anatolian railways suffered from the absence of branch lines in both the
Konya and Ankara sections. There were only two branch lines of 9 and 10
kilometers, respectively, extending to Adapazarı and Kütahya.70 Even as
late as 1905, 1000 camels lined up at Ankara station to unload their
cargo.71
Anatolian railways were also in competition with their Izmir-based
rivals. The line in the hands of the French was from Izmir to Afyon, where
Anatolian railways also had a station. However, Afyon was 66 kilometers
closer to Izmir compared to Istanbul, and the Izmir-Kasaba line carried
two-thirds of Afyon's trade. The Anatolian Railways Company opened
cheaper tariffs to Istanbul in order to prevent the products of Central Anatolia
from going to Izmir, and this caused a price war. This price war
ended with the agreement in 1899, and it was decided to combine these
two lines in Afyon.72
In the Aegean region, camels continued to exist for a long time after
the railroads operated. Because the products still had to be brought to
70 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 146-148.
71 Kasaba, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 65.
72 Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 147; Earle, Bağdat Demir ve Petrol Yolu Savaşı, 38, 58-
60.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
32
the stations by caravans.73 In 1872, about 10 thousand camels were employed
to transport goods to two railway lines in the Aegean region.74
Railways also attracted camels from nearby areas. Shortly after the Izmir-
Kasaba line was built, it attracted 50 percent of the camel traffic on the
Gediz plain.75 Camel owners were mostly nomadic tribes. The service
they offered gave them a kind of autonomy.76 However, the fusion of old
and new modes of transportation in the region was quite tense. In the
struggle between the Aydın line and the camel owners, the parties had
advanced to agreeing with the bandits in order to sabotage each other's
work. The rivalry was resolved in 1888 with the compensation payment
of the railway company to the camel owners, and the railways and the
caravans established a complementary transportation system.77
This chapter mentioned transportation in the Ottoman Empire in
general terms. This chapter gives us important clues about Anatolia's
transportation mode and possibilities of where the National Struggle
would take place. It is possible to summarize them as follows.
73 Kasaba, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 65. Quataert notes a tremendous
increase in the number of animals in the hinterland of Izmir (Osmanlı İmparatorluğu
1700-1922, 189-190). Railroads had also increased the demand for animals in Europe
and America; more goods mean more traffic. While there were 350 thousand horses in
the cities in 1830 in England, this number reached 1.2 million in 1900. 90 percent of the
transportation in the city was provided by horses (Ponting, Dünya Tarihi, 625). Three
quarters of the grain transported on Anatolian railways was exported to Europe, and
most of it consisted of barley. The barley of the beers in England and Germany was exported
from Derince (Quataert, “Limited Revolution,” 149). Most likely, the barleys sent
from Anatolia was used to feed the increasing numbers of animals in Europe.
74 Kasaba, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 85.
75 Kaynak, “Osmanlı Demiryollarına Bir Bakış,” 73.
76 Kasaba, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 85. Before the railways, the influence
of the camel drivers on the producer was quite strong, because they were taking
the producer's goods off to the market and selling them on a commission. Moreover,
they were lending money at interest to small producers (Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba
Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 103).
77 Kıray, Örgütleşemeyen Kent, 14-15.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
33
The empire was unlucky in terms of water transportation. There was
no river with regular water transportation in Anatolia. As a matter of fact,
the only lake utilized in the national struggle was Eğirdir lake.
The biggest ports of the empire in Anatolia were Istanbul and Izmir.
With the increasing trade volume in these ports, new docks and warehouses
were built. The ports of the Black Sea coast used in the National
Struggle did not have docks; they were small and unprotected. Mersin
port, which would be the window of the National Struggle to the world,
was also very modest compared to Istanbul and Izmir.
While wheeled vehicles were standard in the European part of the
empire, animal transportation was dominant in Anatolia. Camel caravans
did long-distance trade and travel. The reason for this was not that the
car was unknown but that the Anatolian geography and conditions were
more suitable for the camel.
The railway network was far from forming a central transportation
network throughout the empire. The Western Anatolian railways were
designed similarly to the colony type, enabling the transportation of agricultural
products to the port of Izmir. For the British, the search for a
shortcut to India was also decisive for the importance of the railways in
the region. As a matter of fact, when the British completely dominated
Suez, their interest in Anatolia decreased. The Anatolian-Baghdad railways,
on the other hand, were a combination of Germany's desire to
reach the Middle East and the Ottoman's desire to reach the remote Arab
region and the holy lands. The line could not reach east of Ankara because
of the fierce opposition of the Russians.
Railways did not abolish the old mode of transportation with pack animals;
on the contrary, the old and new transportation methods supported
each other despite the competition in the early times.
Although the railways in Anatolia were similar to the colonial type,
they differed from those in India and Syria. Since the lines in India and
Syria have different gauges, connecting them was impossible. On the
other hand, the Western Anatolian and Anatolian-Baghdad railways have
the same gauges, and in 1899, these lines were connected in Afyon.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
34
35
3
On Road Regulations and Plans in the Late Ottoman
n the previous section, I sketched out the developments in transportation
across the Ottoman lands. Operations on roads in the Empire
need to be examined as a separate section, however. There are several
reasons for this. The first and most important reason, as we will see in
the next section, is that transportation activities were carried out mainly
on land during the years of the National Struggle. The government in Ankara
needed soldiers and ammunition to be delivered to it from all over
Anatolia to create a strong army on the western front. The vast majority
of these shipments were made on land. For this reason, it would be helpful
to look at the developments related to roadmaking in the 19th century,
which formed the basis of the road transportation system in those years.
The second reason is this: while the railways only opened specific routes
to transportation and goods shipment, the roads were the main initiator
of the expansion of these services in the country.1 The third reason is the
direct participation of the state in this field. The Ottoman Empire, independently
of the private sector apart from a few small examples, became
more involved in this area after the Tanzimat, albeit later than its European
counterparts. All of the regulations in this era form the basis of the
measures taken by the Ankara government regarding roads and transportation
in those years. This chapter, which starts with a short road history
and mentions some important Tanzimat era documents related to
1 İlkin & Tekeli, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 63.
I
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
36
roadmaking and road network plans, ends with an overview of the roads
in Anatolia.
§ 3.1 Short History of Road
The Romans built important main roads in both Europe and Anatolia.
Their roads, made with quite advanced technology, continued to exist for
a long time. However, after the Romans left the scene around AD 500,
their technical knowledge in road construction disappeared for about
1000 years. In addition, the new political order that emerged after the
collapse of the Roman administration did not need advanced roads to
connect countries or cities, and the roads deteriorated over time. As a result,
car transportation in the Romans was replaced by animal backs. Humanity
was, in a sense, sunk in the mud. With the disintegration of feudalism
and gradually leaving its place to more centralized states
triggered by the increasing volume of trade, road construction, and
maintenance activities started again. In the beginning, road works were
left to local administrations and organizations, but when this method did
not give good results, road construction works were centralized. For example,
in France in the 16th century, taxes started to be collected from
the roads. A public works organization was established at the end of the
16th century. In 1663, the road obligation was brought to the people. In
the 17th century, more than 1 million francs were spent annually on constructing
and maintaining roads in France. In 1716, the Ministry of Public
Works was established, which forms the basis of what it is today. In order
to meet the increasing need for engineers, a higher engineering school
was opened in 1747. In the middle of the 18th century, the money spent
on roads amounted to 3-4 million francs. In the Napoleonic period, this
figure increased to 28 million francs in 1804 and 50 million francs in
1812.2
2 Abisel, Fransada Münakalât Siyaseti, 77-80; Lay, Road Technology, 14.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
37
At the beginning of the 19th century, great progress was made in
roadmaking techniques. Scottish engineer MacAdam developed a construction
technique that goes by his name. MacAdam understood that
water was the road's worst enemy being that the water accumulating underground
after the rains reduced the strength of the topsoil and caused
collapses. As the roads deteriorated, the water that could not be removed
was filling the road with mud. MacAdam's solution was to make the path
slightly higher than the existing floor and slope sideways to allow water
to flow through. He used small, crushed stones, which would be well interlocked,
as a building material. The custom of the Romans in roadmaking
was to have a solid foundation. MacAdam, on the other hand, emphasized
drainage and the road's surface. The surface obtained by running a
roller over the small and crushed stones directed the rainwater to the
ditches on both sides of the road without penetrating the foundation.
Thus, both the cost of road construction and the mud were prevented. By
1830 MacAdam's method had spread to France, Russia, Austria, and
North America.3 In the Ottoman Empire, the word "şose," the French
equivalent, was used for such roads. The term is first encountered in the
construction of the Bursa-Mudanya, Bursa-Gemlik and Trabzon-Erzurum
roads, which were started to be built in 1850.4
The demands arising from the nature of the state and the increasing
transportation and communication demands of the production system
necessitated a better transportation infrastructure. Both road vehicles
and construction have been produced as a market good in countries
where capitalism has developed.5 It is not without reason that the road
agenda in the Ottoman Empire intensified with the Tanzimat. The two
main reasons are the state's efforts towards centralization and penetration
of the market economy into the empire.
3 Lay, Road Technology, 20; Abisel, Fransada Münakalât Siyaseti, 21-22; Bridges, Kara
Ulaştırma Tarihi, 67-68. Tekeli and İlkin examined the history of road transportation in
7 periods. See: Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 67-76.
4 Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 109.
5 Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 70-72.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
38
§ 3.2 Tanzimat Regulations regarding Roads and Transportation
In the Ottoman Empire, road construction works with a new understanding
and technology started after the Tanzimat. It was stated in the
Gülhane Edict of 1839 and the Islahat Edict of 1856 that public works and
road construction would be handled. In 1838, during the ministry of Mustafa
Reşit Pasha, an Agriculture and Industry Commission was established
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop agriculture, trade,
craftsmanship, and art, the welfare of the people, and the development of
the country. The commission would be able to exchange information with
people from home and abroad to achieve its objectives. Interestingly, the
commission was within the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
According to Şerif Mardin, the minister Mustafa Reşit Pasha influenced
the commission's establishment; the idea of such a commission in Pasha
must have been formed in 1834 during his duty in Paris as the embassy.
Decisions taken by the commission were also recorded in Turkish and
French.6 The commission's name was changed to the Meclis-i Umur-u
Nafia in the same year. It is seen that there was a constant change in the
name of the institutions in the infancy of the new era. First, the Ministry
of Commerce was established in 1839, and the Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia was
attached to it. The Ministry of Agriculture was established in 1846, and
the two ministries were merged in the same year. The merged ministries
were renamed the Ministry of Trade and Public Works in 1850. In the
following period, they sometimes separated and sometimes merged.7
6 Akyıldız, Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında, 258; Cited by Tekeli and İlkin, “İmar Kavramının
Gelişimi,” 5, The French influence is clearly seen in the relevant regulations of this period.
We will mention them when appropriate. The name of the institution that was created
was actually expressed with “assembly/meclis”. Tekeli and İlkin states that the
words "assembly" of that period should be considered as the equivalent of today's word
of “commission.”
7 Akyıldız, Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında, 260-263; İlkin and Tekeli, “İmar Kavramının
Gelişimi,” 6-7.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
39
Akyıldız states that the Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia deviated from its
founding purpose, as incompetent persons were employed in it. He also
adds that the commission's purpose was unclear; the issues related to
public works and construction were going to the Meclis-i Tanzimat. However,
public works required expertise, and Meclis-i Tanzimat had much to
do. Upon this, the Meclis-i Maabir (Council of Road and Bridge) was established
in 1857 under the Meclis-i Nafia in order to carry out construction
activities such as roads, bridges, canals, and buildings in the country.
Shortly after this new commission, the Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia was abolished.
8 Moreover, trade, agriculture, and nafia affairs were handled by the
same administrative unit after being gathered in a single ministry, the
Trade Ministry, which caused none to be done properly.9
Since the results obtained from the Gulhane Edict to 1845 were not
satisfactory, two people from each state were called to Istanbul, and
meetings were held. As a result of these meetings, Reconstruction Commissions
were established and sent to the provinces, and they were asked
to do research on the development of their provinces. As a result of their
7-8 months of work, the commissions, which determined the problems
of the people in the cities and villages in the provinces, sent their reports
to Istanbul. Based on these reports, a program was prepared in which
priority was given to roads, bridges, and waterways. This program was
the predecessor of the public works programs that would be prepared in
the following years. Bursa-Gemlik and Trabzon-Erzurum roads were
within the scope of this program. However, it was stated in the program
that the necessary expenses for the projects would be provided from the
provinces' tax revenues and the foundations' revenues. Both for this reason
and because there was not yet a developed state organization in this
field, the projects had been dragged out.10
In the Ottoman Empire, the road system in Anatolia was organized
according to caravan transportation and animal transportation. The only
8 Akyıldız, Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında, 263-265.
9 Akyıldız, Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında, 144.
10 İlkin and Tekeli, “İmar Kavramının Gelişimi,” 5-6.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
40
engineering structures that could be seen on the routes were bridges. Until
the 18th century, cars were very rare on the routes among cities. The
only car in Anatolia at that time was the oxcart which continued to exist
in Anatolia until the middle of the 20th century. There are some reasons
for this. First, these tools were cheap, and the villagers could make them
themselves, adjusting their size to suit their animals. It could pass the
corners easily and be used on all kinds of roads as it was less immersed
in the mud.11 At the beginning of the 20th century, oxcart was tried to be
banned by stating that they were causing great damage to the roads.
While the province of Trabzon decided to ban it, the province of Erzurum
did not take a decision by stating that no vehicle other than an oxcart
could operate in rainy weather, especially in swampy areas. In the province
of Ankara, it was proposed not to collect road money from wagons
(four-wheeled cars) but take 1 piaster road money from oxcarts to reduce
their use. It was also proposed to give an interest-free loan from Ziraat
Bank so that the farmer could buy a four-wheeled car. In Kastamonu, the
farmers stated that they were devastated because they could not
transport their products and asked for the ban to be lifted as soon as possible.
During the First World War, the Ministry of War also wanted these
vehicles to be banned because they destroyed the roads.12 A similar discussion
about oxcarts took place during the years of the national struggle.
Some deputies stated that oxcart should be banned for the same reasons.
However, in the Turkish War of Independence, the oxcart had an exceptional
place. After the war was won, it was even proposed to erect an oxcart
statue on the square where the assembly was located in Ankara.13
In the empire, four-wheeled cars were more common in Rumelia. This
is because the state has given special importance to the road known as
Istanbul Street and maintained it regularly. Cars began to appear in Istanbul
in the 17th century. Apart from the cars in the service of the Palace,
and pashas, there was a four-wheeled cart pulled by two oxen called koçu.
These were mostly used by women. It was also possible to see these
11 İlkin and Tekeli, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 80-81.
12 Duysak, “Osmanlı Devleti Karayolları,” 46-47.
13 TBMMZC, Vol 23, 187: 27.09.1922.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
41
springless, uncomfortable, backward technology vehicles on Istanbul
Street. By 1751, there were 665 koçu cars in Istanbul. Koçu drivers were
organized like other tradesmen, and koçus could be kept for rent.
In the 18th century, besides cannon carts, cars were also used in the
army to transport goods. There were 30 thousand cars in the army on a
campaign in this century. The 19th century was a period when the car
became widespread in all classes and regions of society with different
functions. Mahmud II was the first sultan to always ride a car instead of a
horse. A regulation arranging the activities of coachmen in the city was
enacted in 1826. At the end of the century, companies that rented cars
were established. While slow cars like koçu were withdrawn from urban
transportation, faster spring cars took their place. In the 1890s, there
were 5727 cars in the Erzurum province and 3000 cars in the Elazig and
Adana provinces. On the other hand, cars had not yet entered Baghdad
and Mosul. By the end of the 19th century, spring cars became the standard
means of transportation in Anatolia.14
The world economy was in a depression in the last quarter of the 19th
century. The crisis in 1873 stopped capital imports, and this caused financially
vulnerable countries to go bankrupt. The Ottoman Empire declared
a moratorium in 1876. The process led to the establishment of the
Public Debt Administration in 1881. In 8 countries of Latin America, Liberia,
and Egypt, debts were rescheduled under new conditions.15 The
export of capital to the Ottoman Empire resumed only after 1881. It is
also possible to follow this conjuncture of the capital from the construction
dates of the railways. After the first lines in Western Anatolia started
in 1866-67, it was required to wait nearly 20 years both for the addition
of new lines to them and for the construction of Anatolian railways. The
Izmir-Kasaba line reached Alaşehir in 1886 (the concession of this line
was granted in 1872) and reached Afyon in 1896. The extension of the
line from Manisa station to the north, towards Soma and Bandırma, took
14 İlkin and Tekeli, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 83-103.
15 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 773.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
42
place in 1890. Similarly, the İzmir-Aydın line was able to start its eastward
expansion after 1880.16 As we will see, the acceleration of road construction
in the empire coincides with after 1881.
Thus, the demands arising from the centralization efforts in the empire,
the demands increased by trade and social mobility, and the widespread
use of the car and its transformations necessitated strengthening
the overland transportation infrastructure. Anatolia was very poor in
terms of waterways. The route of the railways was clear and fixed. Roads
became important. In the remainder of the section, I refer to important
regulations and plans related to road transportation and the state of the
road network in the Ottoman Empire.
3.2.1 The 1869 Roads and Bridges Regulation
Before this regulation, a document (ilmühaber) was published in
1839 to make the inner-city roads in Istanbul suitable for car transportation.
This document classified the inner-city roads in various widths, determined
the height of the buildings to be built on the sides of the roads,
stated that no dead-end street could be built, and stipulated that the
roads should be in accordance with geometrical principles. It was followed
by the Buildings (Ebniye) Regulation of 1848, which loosened the
rules a little compared to the previous certificates issued for Istanbul. In
1863, the Roads (Turuk) and Buildings Regulations were enacted for all
urban roads. In 1882, this regulation was replaced by the Buildings Law.
These regulations, enacted to put urban roads in order, were applied
mainly in the planning after the fires.17
The first regulation for roads between cities was the 1861 regulation
called “Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i Şâhâne Yollarının Tanzîm ve Tesviyesi
Hakkında Nizâmnâme.” However, this regulation had some deficiencies
16 For a list of lines' concession and construction dates see: Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun
İktisadi Şartları, 104.
17 İlkin and Tekeli, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 107-108.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
43
during its implementation, such as the workload of engineers, the recruitment
of workers, the construction of district (kaza) roads, and the
collection of taxes (bedel). When an annex made in 1867 was not a solution
in order to solve deficiencies, the Roads and Bridges Regulation
(Turuk-u Maabir Nizamnamesi) was issued in 1869.18
Berksan considers the Roads and Bridges Regulation as the cornerstone
of the Turkish roads administration.19 The regulation was divided
into 4 parts: a) classification of roads, b) use of obliged workers, c) construction
styles of roads, and d) maintenance and repair of roads. Tekeli
and İlkin, while citing the İzmir-Aydın railway as an example of a colonial
type of transportation attempt, they define the regulation as oriented towards
national interests. The İzmir-Aydın line consists of the port and
the railway connecting it to its hinterland in the form of a tree. The European
powers dictated railway routes in a way that would serve to connect
their spheres of influence in the empire, and they avoided forming a network
in the empire by connecting them. This prevented the integration
of the internal market in the empire. In this context, the regulation aimed
at realizing the road construction with local sources, which is not attractive
to foreigners.20 According to them, the regulation documents the
transition from caravan to car in transportation technology in the Ottoman
Empire, although the caravans would keep their existence for a long
time; because the road standards of the regulation and the examination
of the construction technique show that it was made for car transportation.
The car started to be used as a mail car and intercity transportation
vehicle when the postal route between Istanbul and Izmit was built in
1834.21
18 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 109, 117.
19 Berksan, Yol Davamız, 11. Berksan gives the date of this regulation as 1866. İlkin and
Tekeli follows him. However, the date should be 1869. Çetin’s inquiry bases on the
Meclis-i Mahsus, Düstûr, and Takvim-i Vekayi and giving the date as 1869. (Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan
Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 118). Eldem (1994) also gives the date as 1869 (p.
188).
20 Tekeli and İlkin, “Türkiye’de Demiryolu Öncelikli,” 372-373.
21 Tekeli and İlkin, “Türkiye’de Demiryolu Öncelikli,” 375.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
44
According to the regulation, the roads were divided into four types,
and the standards were determined for each. Table 3.1 shows the classification
of roads.
Table 3.1 The classification of roads in the 1869 regulation
Type Explanation
Width (meter)
Road Roadside Total
1.Sultan's
roads
Major avenues from vilayet
centers to the capital, ports and
railways
7.00 2.00 9.00
2.Vilyet's
roads
Avenues in vilayet and elviye
centers
5.50 1.50 7.00
3.Sancak's
roads
Inter-kaza roads and sancak
roads from the kaza to major avenues,
railways and ports
4.50 1.00 5.50
4.Kaza's
roads
Village roads that are not for
cars
0.00 0.00 3.00
Source: Berksan, Yol Davamız, 13
While the first- and second-class roads were turuk-u umumi, state
roads, the third- and fourth-class roads were turuk-u hususi, province
roads. While the responsibility of making and repairing the state roads
was with the central government, the responsibility for the particular
roads was left to the local administration.22 Berksan draws attention to
the centrality of the Roads and Bridges Administration by emphasizing
that the class of roads could only be changed by law. Neither the general
manager, nor the minister or the grand vizier could change the class of a
road; this was only possible with the law.23 The detail in the regulation
22 In France, with a regulation dated 1776, roads were divided into four classes according
to their width and importance. With a regulation dated 1811, roads were divided into
two as state roads and particular roads, with the responsibilities of the state and local
administrations, respectively (Abisel, Fransada Münakalât Siyaseti, 80).
23 Berksan, Yol Davamız, 56. For this reason, in the 1st TBMM, law proposals were frequently
given by the deputies to change various particular roads to state roads. While
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
45
that the governors had to have the annual road programs approved by
the center also shows the centralist approach of the administration. However,
central control was only at the level of control of planning because
road construction must be organized in a decentralized manner due to
technological constraints.24
According to the regulation, everyone between the ages of 16 and 60
would work physically for 20 days in five years, or pay a tax, or employ
animals for road construction. Religious functionaries, school teachers,
soldiers, and polices were exempted from this obligation. These drudgery-
type obligations are feudal institutions. Governors such as Mithat Pasha
and Halil Rıfat Pasha had important roads built using these feudal
social relations.25 This type of road tax was inspired by the French law of
1836.26 With the regulation in 1890, the cash payment method was
started. According to this, the people, either themselves or the person
they hired, would participate in roadworks 4 days a year, or they would
pay 12 piasters, that is, three piasters per day. 27
We can consider a circular sent to the vilayets on road construction in
1881 and a description o n the repair and preservation of roads published
in 1887 as annexes to the 1869 regulation.28 Over the years, the
failure to achieve the desired results in the construction of new roads and
the maintenance and repair of existing roads, complaints from the provinces,
irregularities, and corruption in the construction works necessitated
the issuance of a new regulation, General Instruction 0f Roads and
Bridges (Turuk-u Maâbir Talimat-ı Umumiyesi) in 1898. This regulation,
the particular roads were repaired and reconstructed from the provincial budget, the
state roads were repaired and reconstructed from the central budget. The provinces
could not allocate funds for the construction and maintenance of the roads and demanded
this from the parliament.
24 Tekeli and İlkin, “Türkiye’de Demiryolu Öncelikli,” 375.
25 Tekeli and İlkin, “Türkiye’de Demiryolu Öncelikli,” 375.
26 Tekeli and İlkin, “Türkiye’de Demiryolu Öncelikli,” 375, citing Daniel Boutet ,“Yol
Tekniğinin Bugünkü Durumu,” (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, 1949), 14-30.
27 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 162.
28 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 133-34, 142-45.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
46
which was the most comprehensive regulation prepared in this field,
would remain in force until the end of the empire. 29 İlkin ve Tekeli states
that this instruction documented that the Empire reached a new stage in
road construction by adopting MacAdam's way of roadmaking.30 Although
the 1869 regulation was a step forward in terms of scope and details,
road construction and repairs were subject to long bureaucratic
processes. Issues were transferred from the provincial councils to the
ministry and the relevant council. The matters that were decided there
would be reported to the governors, they would convene the administrative
councils and reassess the issue, inform the governors of the decisions
taken, and they would convey this to the district governor. Given the
transportation and communication facilities at that time, it took a long
time to get the work done.31
3.2.2 The 1880 Report of Hasan Fehmi Pasha, The Minister of Public
Works
Before Hasan Fehmi Pasha's report, there was another report prepared
by Kolonel Malinowski in 1856. In this report, Malinowski made a
list of the roads to be built in the Ottoman country for military and commercial
purposes. He stated that 590 hours in Anatolia and 422 hours in
Rumelia should be made, but he did not discuss their technical features
and financing. The 136-hour road from Izmir, passing through Ankara,
Yozgat, Tokat and reaching Sivas, and the 82-hour road from Konya to
Kayseri and Sivas are among the roads he recommended.32
Hasan Fehmi Pasha's report in 1880 is much more comprehensive
than Malinowski’s. This detailed public works report is in the nature of a
development plan that includes roads, railways, ports and piers, and
29 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 145-146.
30 Tekeli and İlkin, “Araba Teknolojisi ve Karayolu,” 115.
31 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 127-128.
32 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 186-188.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
47
lands to be dried and irrigated. Pasha discussed the financing of the projects
and made estimations about the costs of the projects and the revenues
that could be obtained. Pasha is aware that the existence of public
works is a prerequisite for increasing national income. Contrary to popular
belief, he said, roads are not built and developed after economic activity
and abundance of income; instead, the regularity of roads and ease
of transportation increase national income by accelerating economic activities.
He complained about the lack of interest in public works, indifference,
and missed opportunities. Roads facilitate military operations
and transportation, help maintain the security and order of the country,
and develop feelings of trust and loyalty between the administration and
the people. Pasha discussed three methods for financing. The first was to
meet the expenditures from the state treasury. He did not recommend
this method because both the Ottoman experience and the experience of
other countries had shown that it was harmful because in this method,
works that cost 10 cents increase to 80-100 cents. In any case, the public
works budget was insufficient to carry out these projects. The second
method was to cover the capital by the state and the workforce through
forced labor. He said it was impossible to create large works with compulsory
workers. He also said that money would come out of the treasury
to purchase tools, equipment, and raw materials in this method. The third
method is to apply to foreign capital owners, which the Pasha believes is
the only solution. However, he thinks that not a profit guarantee but facilitation
and freedom of work would be enough to attract foreign capital.
33
He suggested 14 roads in various parts of Anatolia. The estimated
construction cost of these roads, with a total length of 2535 kilometers,
is approximately 1.7 million Ottoman liras. On average, the cost of a 1-
kilometer road was 669 liras.34 While the competent governors implemented
some of the roads mentioned by the Pasha in some provinces, no
work was done in some regions.35
33 Hayri Mutluçağ, “Kalkınma Planı I,” 6-11.
34 Hayri Mutluçağ, “Kalkınma Planı II,” 11-18.
35 Çetin, “Tanzimat’tan Meşrutiyet’e Karayolu,” 188-189.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
48
Şose roads, which were 900 kilometers long in 1881, increased to
10,400 kilometers in 1888. This eight-year was the period in which the
most roads were built in the empire. Total şose road length increased to
13,800 kilometers in 1898 and 17,400 in 1908.36 If we look at the speed
of road construction, approximately 1,200 kilometers of şose per year
was built between 1881 and 1888, while yearly average of şose construction
was 340 kilometers between 1889 and 1898 and about 400 kilometers
between 1899 and 1908. İlkin and Tekeli give the state's road construction
capacity as 1000 kilometers of completed and 400 kilometers
of uncompleted şose per year from 1881 to 1889. As the reason for the
decline in the following years, they say that due to the low quality of the
roads built in the previous years, they mostly deal with repairs and improvements
in these years. The annual new road construction capacity
for the years 1906-1907 was 350 kilometers of new şose, 300 kilometers
of leveling (tesviye-i turabiye), and 700 kilometers of repairs. It was assumed
that the system had a capacity of 500 kilometers of new road construction
and 800 kilometers of repair per year on the eve of the 1908
public work plan.37
3.2.3 The 1908 Public Work Plan
The 1908 plan was similar to Hasan Fehmi Pasha's plan. It was also
technically similar, although it was prepared 26 years later.38
Ilkin and Tekeli consider the program in the context of the modernity
project. Infrastructure programs determine how and in what way the imperial
economy will be connected to the world capitalist system and reveal
the spatial indicators of peripheralization. In addition, such infrastructure
programs reveal the increasing public responsibilities of the
36 Tekeli and İlkin, “Nâfıa Programları ve Teknoloji,” 159.
37 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 182.
38 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 212.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
49
state and the requirement of establishing a rational bureaucracy in the
context of modernity.39
The government aimed, with the plan, to transport crops to the country
and world markets in order to develop agriculture. For this, şoses, railways,
ports, and river transportation would be made. The plan foresees
the establishment of industry in the country and the provision of import
substitution in this way, thanks to agriculture's development and income
increase.40 With an 8-year plan, it aimed to build a road network of
30,000 kilometers. Although this network consists of Sultan’s and Vilayet
roads, another network of 15,000 kilometers was considered for the kaza
roads, but this second network was not included in the program due to
budget constraints. The construction cost of the 30,000 kilometers road
network was calculated as 9.6 million liras. For this purpose, the allowance
of 400.000 liras allocated for roads every year would be increased
to 1.2 million liras. However, the road tax collected from the people was
insufficient for this allowance. The bodily working obligation was abandoned
in France, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the Ottoman Empire,
only 10-12 percent of the road tax was provided by bodily working obligation.
Road taxes and 5 percent of the vilayet of Rumeli revenue allocated
to road construction covered only a quarter of the 1.2 million required.
Therefore, it was necessary to allocate resources from the
government budget.41 In addition to costs, there was also a shortage of
engineers. There were only 136 engineers in the empire, which spread
over a very wide geography at that time. For comparison, Romania, which
has a much smaller area, had more than 1000 engineers then.42 In the
budget negotiations of 1910, the Minister of Public Works said that the
number of students in the engineering school would be increased to 500
39 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 176
40 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 178-179.
41 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 182-83.
42 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 203-204.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
50
and that 10 students would be sent to Europe. In 1911, the School of Science
Officers was opened.43
There were major problems in the financing of the plan. A borrowing
of approximately 4 million liras was considered for the constructions in
1909-1911, but it could not pass in the Meclis-i Mebusan. Upon this, the
Ministry took the initiative to have the roads that need to be built immediately
by contractors in return for a 10-year road tax.44
Although serious efforts were made to implement it, the plan could
not be implemented due to the first Tripoli (1911-1912), then the Balkan
Wars (1912-1913), and finally the First World War (1914-1918).45
§ 3.3 Overview of the Roads in Anatolia
The first şose roads after the Tanzimat were started with the Bursa-
Mudanya, Bursa-Gemlik, and Trabzon-Erzurum road constructions in
1850. While the construction of the first two roads of 35 kilometers was
completed in 1865, the road of Trabzon-Erzurum of 314 kilometers was
completed in 1872. The Crimean War had a great impact on the late completion
of these roads.46 In addition, there was no experience in road construction
at this early date, and important regulations such as working
43 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 210.
44 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 201-203.
45 Tekeli and İlkin, “1908 Tarihli,” 213.
46 Yılmaz, 51. Yılmaz's work is based on the reports prepared by Colonel Mircher, who
served in the French Eastern Army during the Crimean War and was assigned to investigate
the region after the war. Since it was a very difficult region in terms of geography
and climate, this road was built piece by piece. Mircher, who was surprised that no arrangement
or maintenance was made on this road, where 80 thousand pack animals
pass annually due to the Trabzon-Iran trade, stated that the road could only be used by
mules in its current state, and that it was essential to repair the road in a way that would
preserve its caravan route character, taking into account the financial situation of the
Ottoman Empire (Yilmaz, “Trabzon Erzurum Yolu,” passim). Quataert also emphasizes
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
51
obligations on roadmaking had not been realized. The real breakthrough
in roadmaking began in 1881 when there were only 900 kilometers of
şose roads. The road network increased rapidly with the increase in the
money spent on roadmaking after 1881. Road investments after 1881 are
given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Road investments, million piasters47
Year Spending Year Spending
1881 5.4 1892 24.1
1882 22.8 1893 30.0
1883 62.3 1894 22.6
1884 72.2 1895 28.9
1885 81.8 1896 22.3
1886 79.6 1897 28.1
1887 45.4 1907 31.5
1888 35.3 1911 53.6
1889 58.6 1912 117.4
1890 11.9 1916 10.8
1891 20.7
Source: Duran, “Karayolu Ulaşımındaki Gelişmeler,” 486.
As seen in the table, road investment increased until 1885, then decreased,
and it exceeded the 1885 level only in 1912. It is understood that
the implementation of the 1908 plan was accelerated in 1912. According
to the statistical yearbook of the empire for 1897, there were 14300 kilometers
of şose in the entire empire in 1897, of which 10160 kilometers
were within the borders of Turkey. Their distribution by province is as in
Table 3.3.
that the road built between Trabzon and Tabriz in 1860 was very bad, so that the merchants
continued to use the old road (Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 818).
47 Statistics start from 1881 because the first statistical yearbook of the empire belongs to
1897 and observations in there start from 1881.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
52
Table 3.3 Length of şose roads by provinces
Provinces Kilometers
İstanbul, Edirne, İzmit 819.5
Bursa 1302.3
Aydın 971.5
Ankara 1311.9
Konya 485.5
Adana 559.8
Sivas 1827.6
Trabzon, Erzurum 815.6
Diyarbakır 340.8
Kastamonu 579.9
Bitlis, Van 85.9
Source: Güran, Osmanlı Devleti’nin ilk istatistik yıllığı: 1897, 285.
It is not clear how many kilometers were left from the Ottoman Empire
to the TBMM. According to Müderrisoğlu, 9711 kilometers of the Ottoman
road, which totaled 48900 kilometers, was within the borders of
the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli).48 Of these 9711 kilometers, 3477 kilometers
needed improvement, 3283 kilometers were in constant need of
maintenance, and 3026 kilometers needed reconstruction. Berksan
states the remaining road amount as 18335 kilometers, of which 13885
kilometers needed maintenance, and 4450 kilometers was graded earth
road.49 On the other hand, at the beginning of 1921, the Deputy of Public
Works, Ömer Lütfi Bey, stated that there were 6-7 thousand kilometers
of state roads and twice as many particular roads under his responsibility.
50 Therefore, there probably were 18-20 thousand kilometers of road.
A record of the public work commission in June 1922 states that the total
of state and particular roads was 27 thousand kilometers. In the same
record, it was stated that there were 38 thousand kilometers of state
48 Müderrisoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın Mali Kaynakları, 82.
49 Berksan, Yol Davamız, 59.
50 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 217.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
53
roads and 648 thousand kilometers of particular roads in France, which
was rich in railways, in 1910.51
The quality of the roads was inferior when compared to European
countries. European travelers who visited Ottoman lands before the 19th
century often mentioned the bad roads of Anatolia and the Balkans.52
Similar narratives continued afterward. In their memoirs, Frunze53 and
Aralov,54 who were trying to reach Ankara during the national struggle,
could not pass without mentioning the terrible condition of the roads.
During the Balkan wars, it was understood that the roads specified in the
maps as suitable for şose and car crossing were not even natural roads.55
In World War I, roads were unsuitable for motor vehicles that came with
the Germans. Even in the most developed areas, the bridges were not
strong enough to withstand the weight of the guns. Liman von Sanders
says, “Many of the roads seen on the map in Turkey lacked most of the
qualifications required in road construction.” He states that the 130 kilometers
road between Burdur and Antalya had already ceased to be a road
but turned into a path according to German standards.56 Before the First
World War, when we look to the East, there was a developed road network
around it with a railway network extending from the north to Baku
in the Russian lands, including Kars, and reaching Sarıkamış with interconnections,
while there was only Trabzon-Erzurum road in Ottoman Anatolia.
Other roads around were paths that had lost their qualifications as
roads.57 A view of the transportation network in Anatolia at the beginning
of the National Struggle is given in Figure 3.1 below. The sparseness
of the şoses in Anatolia and the absence of a şose extending from eastern
Anatolia to Central Anatolia is noteworthy.
51 TBMMZC, Vol 21, 8.
52 Ekin, “Klasik Dönemde,” 389.
53 Frunze, Türkiye Anıları, 14; 78.
54 Aralov, Türkiye Anıları, 81.
55 Kayam and Tokdemir, “Osmanlı Kara Ulaşımı,” 122. Citing Beliğ, “Balkan Harbinde
Mürettep 4. Kolordunun Harekatı”, 14.
56 Liman von Sanders, Türkiye’de 5 Yıl, 133-134.
57 Kayam and Tokdemir, “Osmanlı Kara Ulaşımı,” 124; 138.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
54
Figure 3.1 Şose roads and railways in Anatolia, 1918 Source: Eldem, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları, 26658
58 Eldem shows only şose roads. On the other hand, the road map of 1921 prepared by the
Turkish General Staff includes roads that were simpler and poorer than the şoses (see
Appendix A). I find Eldem's map more coherent. Because, for example, the şose between
Antalya and Burdur road, which Limon Van Sanders evaluated it as a path, not a şose, is
shown on the map of the Turkish General Staff, but not on Eldem's map.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
55
Finally, Table 3.4 shows the capacity and daily range of transportation
vehicles in Anatolia. At the beginning of the national struggle, the number
of motor vehicles was very few. There was no motor transport unit in the
army in 1919. Of the 1000 automobiles in the country, 800 were in Istanbul,
and nearly 100 were in Izmir. The remaining 100 cars were in different
parts of Anatolia.59 Military transportation was based entirely on animal
vehicles. However, after the Ankara Agreement with the French,
trucks were purchased from them. 140 of French trucks were in service
on the Western Front in July 1922, and that reached 240 in August
1922.60 Moreover, buses in Anatolia existed only between Kayseri and Sivas.
An American Aid Organization, which was founded to help Armenian
women and children, was operating a bus between Kayseri and Sivas in
1919.61
Table 3.4 Means of transportation in Anatolia, 1920s
Vehicle
Bearing Capacity Daily Range
(Kilogram) (Kilometer)
Tumbrel (two-wheel) 100-150 15-20
Horse cart (one-horse & two-wheel) 180-200 25
Horse cart (two-horse & four-wheel) 300-400 30-40
Bullock cart (two-bullock & four-wheel) 350-400 25
Pack train (hinny or horse) 70-75 25
Camel 120-150 25
Donkey 50-60 20-25
Van 1500-2000 200
Truck 3000-5000 180
Truck with trailer 5000-10000 150
Source: TİH, vol. 7, 193.
59 Çavdar, Milli Mücadele’ye Başlarken, 83.
60 TİH, Vol. 2, Section 6, Book 2, 300, 305.
61 Müderrisoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşının Mali Kaynakları, 84.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
56
57
4
On Transportation during the National Struggle
he Third Term Ottoman Assembly, which came to power with the
1914 elections, was dissolved by Sultan Mehmet Vahidettin on 21
December 1918, after the war was lost and the Committee of Union and
Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) was removed from the administration.
The way the Entente powers implemented the armistice, and especially
the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks, triggered the local congress
processes, and the efforts to unite them in a single national structure with
the Amasya Circular and Sivas Congress created a new focus of power in
Anatolia. The election of delegates for the Fourth Term Ottoman Assembly
resulted in the victory of this new focus of power. Mustafa Kemal was
also elected to this assembly as an Erzurum delegate, but he did not go to
Istanbul. Because he advocated the need for the fourth term Ottoman
deputies to convene in Anatolia, referring to the French who moved their
assembly to Versailles in 1871 and the German assembly gathered in
Weimar in February 1919, but he could not be approved. However, after
the assembly in Istanbul was raided by the British on March 16, 1920,
and some of the delegates were exiled to Malta, the Representative Committee
called for a meeting in Ankara. As a result of this call, the Ankara
Convention, which can be considered an expanded form of the Sivas Congress,
was convened, and the election process was started. The de facto
convention was transformed into the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
T
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
58
(TBMM hereafter) and a council of ministers was formed.1 Thereafter, the
national government attempted to establish its own sovereignty in Anatolia
and established its own administrative order in the regions under
its control.
Although the first aim of the national government was to defeat the
invaders militarily and expel them from Anatolia, it also worked under
the roof of the parliament for the daily and sometimes even medium and
long-term affairs of the country. In this respect, the Ministry of Public
Works, which would devote most of its work to road construction and
repair, was established within the new government. In the first part of
this chapter, I evaluate the roadmaking and maintenance discussions in
the TBMM during the national struggle. Then I address the negotiations
on transferring some roads to the class of state roads. Finally, I focus on
military transports.
§ 4.1 Ministry of Public Works and Accounting of Roadmaking
In the government program of the first council of ministers of the TBMM,
it was stated that the main roads, which were necessary for the economic
life of the country and whose construction had not started, would not be
made due to the war conditions, but that the existing roads and bridges
would be repaired in a way allowing for going and coming. In addition,
measures would be taken to extend the Ankara-Sivas railway to Yahşihan.
2 The reason for this very limited program of the Ministry of Public
Works was due to the limited budget.
After the establishment of the new government, state revenues
were tried to be managed by the Ministry of Finance. It was ensured that
the taxes, which were more than half of the state revenues, were collected
by the Debt Administration as before, but they were given to the newly
1 Akın, TBMM Devleti, 41-48.
2 TBMMZC, Vol 1, 241: 09.05.1920. This was the only government program presented to
the general assembly.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
59
established Ministry of Finance. The Debt Administration, which collected
the tithe of the big cities and the ağnam (livestock) tax of the Aydın
province in return for its receipt from the state, had established a vast
administrative network throughout the country. As a result of the negotiations
with the Ankara representative of the Debt Administration, Ali
Cavit Bey, it was agreed that the taxes collected would be given to the new
government, the expenses of the administration would be covered by the
new government, and the debts would be settled after the peace.3 A legitimate
question here is how and why this administration, whose managers
were the nationals of the Entente States, accepted this issue. It is
simply because this agreement was also in the interest of the Debt Administration.
The institution did not have military power, although it had
a developed administrative organization throughout the country. In other
words, as long as the National government did not allow it, collecting
taxes from Anatolia was not possible. On the other hand, with this agreement,
the national government acknowledged the existence of the Debt
Administration and did not reject Ottoman debts, and guaranteed the receivables
of foreigners.
Since it was impossible to prepare a budget in a short time, a period
began when revenues were collected and expenditures were made on behalf
of the public without a budget law. With its circular in May 1920, the
Ministry of Finance declared that government departments could spend,
provided that they did not exceed the previous year's expenditures. In
order to overcome the financial and legal problems of collecting taxes and
spending without a budget law, first a six-month advance payment law
and then two more advance payment laws were issued until February 28,
1921. For this reason, the first budget law of the national government
was a kind of enumeration of the spending made before.4 Budgets could
not be made for 1921 and 1922, and advance payment laws would manage
expenditures.
3 Dabağ, Hasan Fehmi Ataç, 84.
4 Akın, “TBMM’nin ilk bütçe yasası,” 2-3.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
60
The budget of the Ministry of Public Works in 1920 was 620 thousand
liras which were approximately 1 percent of the total budget of 63 million
liras. The fact that the budget of the ministry was so low, and most of the
allowance was going to civil servants' salaries, even brought up the idea
of transforming the Ministry of Public Works into a directorate and connecting
it to the Ministry of Economy.5 Indeed, it was not easy to build
new roads and even maintain existing roads with this budget. The budget
negotiations in February 1921 were the scene of various debates, and
delegates from all over Anatolia complained about the roads in their regions.
For example, Şebinkarahisar delegate Mustafa Bey said:
We have been giving money for these roads for many years. However,
this money is spent around Istanbul and in the regions where
the railway is located. Out-of-sight areas are never taken into account.
(…) A car, even a mule, cannot operate between Karahisar
and (…) Our roads, which have been state roads for a long time,
have never been hit with a pickaxe.6
Similarly, Erzurum delegate Hüseyin Avni Bey said:
“The most important duty of the government is to introduce itself
to the villagers. Our villager pays for the road, but cars break down
on the roads. If you ask the peasant about the government's foreign
affairs, he will say I do not know. He will say I pay for the road;
I look at the road; If every road is like this, woe to me for giving
money!”7
It is possible to increase these examples. However, we have to look at the
accounting of road construction and repair. However, before starting the
accounting of roadmaking, it is helpful to remind the classification of
roads in the country.
5 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 209-210.
6 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 215-216.
7 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 216.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
61
In the previous chapter, we mentioned that the Ottoman roads were divided
into state roads (turuk-u umumiye) and particular roads (turuk-u
hususiye). While the general budget covered the construction and
maintenance costs of state roads, the construction and maintenance of
particular roads were covered by the local budget.8 Road taxes were collected
by local administrations and included in local budgets, but as we
see on the following pages, road tax revenues were not as much as delegates
had thought. There is no doubt that the circumstances the country
had been in for years had derogated the local budgets just like the general
budget. Local administrations could not build new roads in the regions
under their responsibility and could not maintain the existing ones. For
this reason, law proposals were made to transfer many particular roads
to state road status during the period we examined. Because as we mentioned
in the previous chapter, this change could only be made by the
parliament by law.
According to the Minister of Public Works, Ömer Lütfi Bey, the construction
of a 1-kilometer new şose, excluding bridges, costs between 5
and 7 thousand liras. On the other hand, the annual maintenance cost of
the 1-kilometer şose was about a thousand liras. In other words, with the
1920 budget of the Ministry of Public Works, only 100 kilometers of new
road could be constructed, or 500-600 kilometers of them could be repaired.
Again, in the words of the minister, the existing roads were not
built with money but with the governors of the period having the people
work.9 We have witnessed many times the rapid deterioration of newly
built roads. The need for constant maintenance of the roads was related
to the low quality of the roads. Labor battalions or locals were mostly
8 For example, the road of Silifke-Karaman was thought to be a state road and 8-10 thousand
liras were spent from the ministry's budget for its repair. However, when it was
understood that the road was a particular road, the work stopped. The problem was
overcome by converting the road to state road. See: TBMMZC, Vol 8, 210-214.
9 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 217: 14.02.1921. In a committee report of almost the same days, it was
stated that 1-kilometer road on steep terrain costed 10 thousand liras, and on flat land
5-6 thousand liras. See: TBMMZC, Vol 8, 272.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
62
supposed to the construction of the roads, and high-quality labor could
not be expected from them. However, road construction was a job that
required technical knowledge. Thus, a committee report of June 1922 in
the TBMM drew attention to the technical and scientific aspects of road
construction with reference to the International Road Congress and official
British reports in 1913, which emphasized the need for good engineers
and professionally trained labor.10
How much were the road taxes that the delegates talked about? In
June 1922, the proposal to change the road tax law was discussed. During
those meetings, the Ministry of Public Works shared a table of the 1921
road tax realizations for 32 regions. According to this table, the road tax
collected in 6 provinces and 26 sanjaks was 151 million piasters or approximately
1.5 million liras.11 If we use the figures given by the minister
for road construction and repair cost, 300 kilometers of new roads could
be built, or 1500 kilometers of roads could be repaired with 1.5 million
liras.
In addition, the road taxes were updated in February 1921 because prices
and wages had increased considerably during and after the First World
War, and the maximum daily price of 10 piasters, specified in the previous
law, was not enough.12 Before this update, for example, an annual
road tax of 24 thousand liras was collected in Ankara province.13 In 1921,
the road tax collected in Ankara was 83 thousand liras. All these calculations
conclude that there was no capital accumulation to undertake large
infrastructure investments in the country.
Moreover, the amount of money in circulation was insufficient to realize
this. Ünal calculates that there were 20-22 million liras in circulation
in 1920, excluding the amounts of money in the Ottoman Bank, Debt
Administration, Monopoly of Tobacco, and various government offices.
Considering the population of 10-12 million at that time, he states that
10 TMMZC, Vol 21, 9: 24.06.1922.
11 TMMZC, Vol 21, 7: 24.06.1922.
12 Düstur, Array 3, Vol 1, 227-228: 21.02.1921.
13 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 272: 17.02.1921.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
63
there were only 2-2.5 liras per person.14 Akın, on the other hand, based
on the 1918 budget discussions, states that there were 138 million liras
in circulation, at least half of which was in banks in Istanbul.15 As Eldem
states, the service system dominated the economy then, and monetization
was very limited.16 The service system that dominates the economy
manifested itself most clearly in the National Obligations. We address this
in the last section.
In 1921, the Ministry of Public Works did not have a budget. We learn
this from the discussion on the road of Diyarbakır-Ergani, which was an
endless story. In February 1921, Diyarbakır delegate Kadri Ahmet Bey
gave a parliamentary question about why the road of Diyarbakır-Ergani
was not repaired.17 In March 1921, with another parliamentary question,
he stated that there was still no work on the road that was said to be interested
in 1921 during the 1920 budget negotiations.18 In its reply, the
Minister said that 15 thousand liras had been put into the 1921 budget
for the repair of this road and that the work would begin after the approval
of the budget.19 However, in November 1921, Kadri Ahmet Bey
asked again about the same road and how much money was spent on the
construction and repair of this road from the Public Works budget.20 In
the answer given by the Minister, it was stated that the budget of 1920
had to be taken as a basis for the year 1921, and with a second budget,
300 thousand liras was put in the Public Works budget for the construction
and repair of the roads, but even 100 thousand liras of this money
could not be taken, and the remaining 200 thousand money liras spent
on other expenses by the Ministry of Finance. He eventually confessed
14 Ünal, “Milli Mücadelede Ekonomik Durum,” 961.
15 Akın, “TBMM’nin ilk bütçe yasası,” 4.
16 Eldem, “Cihan Harbinin ve İstiklal Savaşının,” 373.
17 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 224.
18 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 101.
19 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 215
20 TBMMZC, Vol 14, 11.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
64
that the work of the Ministry of Public Works was limited to repairing
only six roads connecting Anatolia to the sea due to the limited budget.21
§ 4.2 From the particular road to the state road: “Turuk-u
umumiye meyanına ithal”
As I mentioned above, the conversion of particular roads to state roads
was only possible with the law, and during the period we examined, law
proposals were given for many roads. Since those who submitted the law
proposals were generally the delegates of the region where the road to
be converted was located, they gave important information about the situation
and economic life of the region during the negotiations. For this
reason, I find it helpful to include these proposals here.
4.2.1 The road of Ankara-Kastamonu-İnebolu
İnebolu was an important port during the national struggle. Weapons,
ammunition, and other materials smuggled from Istanbul were unloaded
in İnebolu and transported to Ankara by road. Russian aid was coming to
Trabzon and sent from there to other ports, including İnebolu. The Eastern
and Elcezire front aids to Trabzon were following the same route. The
Council of Ministers itself requested22 the general assembly of TBMM in
December 1920 to give the needed money for the repair of the road of
Ankara-İnebolu.23 The economic importance of this 345-kilometer-long
road was emphasized in the committee record. Accordingly, the road that
connected Anatolia to the Black Sea contained outlets that could provide
export and import; therefore, the road had to be suitable for car traffic.
21 TBMMZC, Vol 14, 48-50.
22 As we noted since the 1920 budget had not been prepared yet, expenditures were made
in this way. The 1920 budget would be issued at the end of the fiscal year and would be
like a record of the expenditures made. Budgets would not be issued for the years 1921
and 1922.
23 TBMMZC, Vol 5, 322.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
65
Nearly 250 thousand liras were required to repair and fortify the road,
but 66 thousand liras were requested to be added to the 34 thousand liras24
previously given. As a result of the negotiations, not 66 thousand
liras, but 16 thousand liras were given to the Ministry of Public Works to
be spent on repairing the road. Amasya delegate Ömer Lütfi Bey (who
would be the second Minister of Public Works) drew attention to the road
of Samsun during the negotiations. According to his information, the east
of Ankara was sending its exports to Samsun via Çorum and Havza. He
stated that 400 cars were going to and returning from Samsun every day
carrying 200 tons of commercial goods. However, he said that because
the roads were devastated, a sack of flour transported to Samsun for 1.5
liras in the summer cost 3 liras in the winter, and the farmers paid the
difference.25 Soon, he made a proposal for the repair of the road of Samsun-
Havza-Amasya-Yozgat.26 In June 1921, Mersin deputy Salahattin Bey
also submitted a proposal for the repair of the road of Samsun-Havza.27
However, issues related to the road of Samsun did not come to the parliament's
agenda.
4.2.2 The road of Merzifon-Çorum-Çalatlı
A law draft was sent from the Council of Ministers in January 1921 to
change the status of this road into the state road.28 In the response of the
relevant committees, it was stated that with the repair of the road, the
roads of Sivas-Ankara and Sivas-Samsun would merge and that the goods
in those regions could be transported to Samsun, and it was deemed appropriate
to change the status of the road into state road, including it in
the general budget by doing so, and to give an allocation of 100 thousand
24 It is not clear when this money was given. It may belong to the time of the Meclis-i Mebusan.
25 TBMMZC, Vol 6, 302-305; 309; 329.
26 TBMMZC, Vol 6, 333.
27 TBMMZC, Vol 10, 419.
28 TBMMZC, Vol 7, 373.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
66
liras.29 In May, the law was accepted by the general assembly of the parliament.
30
4.2.3 The road of Ordu-Sivas
In February 1921, a law proposal was given by Trabzon delegate Recai
Bey to change the status of this road into the state road. The proposal
stated that the road connected Sivas to Ordu with a shorter distance and
the only outlet of the surrounding region was the port of Ordu (Vona).
Moreover, the people were ready to work on repair31 aside from the liability
arising from the road tax law (Tarik Bedeli Nakdisi Kanunu).32 In its
reply, the Ministry of Public Works agreed with the importance of the
road and stated that the road could be changed to the status of the state
road and be upgraded to a şose with 700 thousand liras. However, he also
stated that the road could be repaired with the help of the provincial
budget staying on the status of the particular road.33 Recai Bey, who made
the proposal, emphasized the importance of roads in developing economic
life and emphasized that the port of Ordu was a natural and quiet
port, and unlike the ports of İnebolu and Samsun, it was suitable for the
coming and going of commercial ships during the stormy times of the
Black Sea. As a result of the negotiations, the road was changed into the
state road, and a budget of 50 thousand liras was given for its repair. The
Minister of Public Works, Ömer Lütfi Bey, drew attention to the fact that
29 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 215.
30 TBMMZC, Vol 10, 281-283.
31 The liva center of Ordu had a population of 160 thousand and there were 360 villages
around. It is understood that the people of Ordu had collected 60 thousand liras in time
and sent them to the government so that their city could become a liva. Similarly, when
Tunalı Hilmi Bey was the district governor there, the people had collected 2500 liras for
the telephone. For this road work, they had have already bought 2000 thousand pickaxes.
The people of Ordu also had wanted to establish a car company that could travel
between Ordu and Sivas in 2 days. See TBMMZC, Vol 10, 177-180.
32 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 81.
33 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 397-398.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
67
the provinces were collecting the road taxes, but they were being repaired
by the general budget.34
4.2.4 The road of Ereğli-Ankara
The law proposal changing the road's status into the state road, submitted
by Bolu delegate Dr. Fuad Bey and his friends in March 192135, was
accepted by the Proposal (Layiha) Committee and discussed in the general
assembly. The road following the Ereğli-Devrek-Gerede-Yabanabat-
Ankara route was shorter than the road of İnebolu-Ankara and partially
constructed. The distance between İstanbul and İnebolu was 240 nautical
miles, and the length of the current road of İnebolu-Ankara was 310
kilometers. However, the distance between Istanbul and Ereğli was 105
nautical miles, and the length of the road proposed to be changed into the
state road was 265 kilometers. There were many manufacturing workshops
on the route, which was also free from natural constraints. Since
Ilgazdagi was closed in winter, the road of Inebolu was being disrupted,
and the port of Inebolu could not operate during wave and windy times.
Besides, since Bolu was utterly forested, its land was unsuitable for agriculture.
Anatolia, on the other hand, was deforested but suitable for agriculture.
Due to the inconvenient roads, forest resources in Bolu and coal
resources in Zonguldak could not be sent to Anatolia, and barley and
wheat in Anatolia could not be sent to the Black Sea coast. There was a
salient difference in barley and wheat prices between Anatolia and the
Black Sea Region. As a result, European flour was being consumed in the
Black Sea region.36 The Ministry of Public Works agreed with the advantages
of the route and stated that the şose road could be constructed
in five years, costing 1.2 million liras, but the budget was insufficient for
34 TBMMZC, Vol 10, 177-180.
35 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 216.
36 Remember that a similar discussion was made for the construction of Anatolian railways.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
68
this construction. The proposal sent to the budget committee did not
come to the general assembly again.37
4.2.5 The roads of Taşucu-Silifke-Mut-Karaman and Afyon-Sandıklı-
Dinar
Negotiations for changing the status of these two roads into the state
road were held simultaneously. Since the general assembly agreed that
these roads were close to the coasts and were essential both economically
and militarily, the law proposals were accepted. During the negotiations,
an exciting case emerged in terms of showing the difference between
state roads and particular roads. About 10 thousand liras had been
spent to repair the roads of Silifke and Karaman, but when it was understood
that the road was not a state road, the payments stopped, and the
workers did not receive their remaining money. The money should have
been spent from the provincial budget, not the general budget. Changing
the status of the road into the state road with the proposal of the law
would both correct the wrong expenditure of money, and the remaining
debts would be paid from the relevant articles of the Ministry of Public
Works budget. Discharging this debt appeared necessary, as contractors
had complained of not getting their money on time while doing business
with the government. It was emphasized that these payments had to be
made not to shake the trust of the contractors in the government.38
4.2.6 The road of Kars-Ardahan-Borçka-Hopa
In March 1921, Lazistan delegate Esad Bey submitted a law proposal to
change the status of the road into the state road. The relevant committee
emphasized that the only outlet of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin was the port
of Hopa after Batum was left to Georgia and stated that the changing of
the status was necessary both economically and for winning the hearts
of the people of Elviye-i Selase, who had been in a difficult situation until
37 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 413-414; TBMM ZC Vol 10, 337, 426-427
38 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 210-214.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
69
that time. It has been stated that with a 40 kilometers reconstruction on
the road, some of which was already paved, the roads of Trabzon-Hopa
and Erzurum-Erzincan and the eastern roads would be merged and completed.
In addition, since the Eastern Front would give a laborer battalion
of 400 people for help, the committee recommended that the issue be
discussed in the general assembly. Committee member İsmail Suphi Bey
pointed out the economic importance of the road by stating that although
the salt was 7 piasters in Hopa, it was half a lira in the inner regions because
of lacking the road. The proposal was accepted at the general assembly.
39
Besides the roads mentioned above, law and repair proposals for
some other roads were given; but these were not concluded during the
first parliamentary term. For Antalya-Burdur,40 Kulp-Muş,41 Salihli-
Borlu-Demirci-Simav,42 Bozöyük-Bilecik,43 Rize-Erzurum,44 Sinop-Boyobat,
45 Tercan-Erzincan-Sivas,46 Alanya-Bozkır,47 Erzincan-Gümüşhane,48
Elazığ-Dersim-Erzincan,49 Yarangüme-Muğla50 roads, the proposals were
given, but either it was not found appropriate by the commission or the
commission's response was not delivered to the general assembly.
§ 4.3 The military transportation
As Kayam and Tokdemir emphasized, transportation activities are a critical
factor of war power; this factor creates a binding constraint on the
39 TBMMZC, Vol 18, 52; TBMMZC, Vol 19, 120-121, 126-129.
40 It was a road started by the Italians from the Antalya port area. TBMMZC, Vol 5, 246.
41 TBMMZC, Vol 6, 173.
42 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 37.
43 TBMMZC, Vol 8, 66, 194.
44 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 170, 446; TBMMZC, Vol 10, 337.
45 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 279.
46 TBMMZC, Vol 15, 219-220.
47 TBMMZC, Vol 27, 249-250.
48 TBMMZC, Vol 27, 455-456.
49 TBMMZC, Vol 28, 35.
50 TBMMZC, Vol 10, 337.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
70
combination and use of other factors, such as soldiers and weapons. The
mode of warfare in which armies faced each other on battlefields or certain
front lines underwent a major change with the expansion of its space
since the middle of the 19th century and took on a form that required
more intense resource transfer between regions. The biggest problem in
the wars that the Ottoman Empire joined since the middle of the 19th
century was the inadequacy of the transportation infrastructure and
means of transportation. The Ottoman Empire was at a level that we can
say adequate in terms of human and weapon factors, even in the last war
it joined. However, it was extremely deprived of the transportation factor
that would enable these factors to be brought together and used effectively.
51 At the beginning of the National Struggle, besides the transportation
factor, the human and weapon factors were also insufficient.
4.3.1 Organization of the military transportation
In an ordinary war, there is a domestic supply base from which needs are
sent in a planned way on the lines extending toward the fronts. However,
in the national struggle, supply and transportation were reversed. Needs
were sent from Elcezire, the Eastern front, and occupied Istanbul to Ankara.
There was an Expeditionary Regulation (Seferiye Nizamnamesi)
dated 1916 and other regulations and directives regarding logistics principles.
52 However, at the beginning of the national struggle, since the new
administrative institutions of the Ankara government did not properly
function, logistics support activities could not be carried out as stipulated
by the regulations and directives, and there was complete chaos in supply
and transportation activities. All the supplies found were being sent to
Ankara without any classification.53 After the government was formed in
May 1920, the main routes for the army's supply were determined, and a
new stage (menzil) organization started to be established. In November
51 Kayam and Tokdemir, “Savaşın Zayıf Halkası,” passim.
52 TİH, vol. 7, 213-214.
53 TİH, vol. 7, 276.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
71
1920, the organization was expanded, and the Sivas Stage Inspectorate
(Menzil Müfettişliği) and the Kayseri, Malatya, Pınarbaşı, and Suşehri Line
Commands (Hat Komutanlığı) were established under its command. Line
commands had to establish stage point commands or mansions at 20-30
kilometers intervals. The Stage Line Commands were responsible for
providing and speeding up the handling and transportation within their
regions, feeding and sheltering the troops passing through their regions,
repairing the roads in their regions with their own means, and arranging
the security on the roads.54
The stage organization was not timely for the conditions of the national
struggle. Therefore, in January 1921, the General Directorate of
Shipping and Transport (Sevkiyat ve Nakliyat Umum Müdürlüğü) was established
under the Ministry of National Defense, and the range organization
was subordinated to it. The aim was to transfer materials from the
East, South, and Istanbul to the western front and use the roads more efficiently.
When the new organization was established, line and point commands
affiliated with it were also settled.55
It is not possible to know the total number of vehicles used in transportation
services during the National Struggle. Because apart from the
vehicles under the command of the stage and line commands affiliated
with the General Directorate of Shipment and Transport, the armies and
other stages also had their own means of transportation. Citizens with
means of transportation could also be included in these services by leasing.
Moreover, by the Law of National Obligations, everyone who had a
vehicle was obliged to participate in transport activities. Therefore, it is
impossible to know the total number of transportation vehicles and their
total load capacity. The load capacity of the stages and lines affiliated with
the General Directorate of Shipment and Transport was approximately
1700 tons. However, this was just the tip of the iceberg. Because the Dinar
Stage Region Inspectorate, for example, had a total of 431 tumbrels in 9
different tumbrel branches, 448 camels in 5 different camel branches,
54 TİH, vol. 7, 236-239.
55 TİH, vol. 7, 240-244.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
72
and a total of 952 donkeys in 7 different donkey branches. If we consider
the figures in Table 3.4, the capacity of the transportation vehicles under
the command of the Dinar Stage Region Inspectorate was approximately
155 tons.
Similarly, there were 17 tumbrel and 6 camel branches under the
command of the Aziziye Line Command. The carrying capacity of these
branches, which has a total of 650 tumbrels and 770 camels, was approximately
180 tons. Considering that there were many organizations, such
as Dinar and Aziziye, the extraordinary size of transportation and logistics
emerges. In the following subsection, this complex logistics is discussed
in another dimension.
4.3.2 Dispatching weapons and ammunition to the Western Front
Greek forces occupied Izmir on 15 May 1919. The Representative Committee,
formed with the Sivas Congress in September of the same year,
came to Ankara at the end of 1919. After the British occupied Istanbul
and dissolved the Ottoman parliament on March 16, 1920, the Grand National
Assembly was opened in Ankara on April 23, 1920, and Ankara became
the center of the resistance movement. In the spring and summer
of 1920, the Greek forces marched in Western Anatolia and occupied the
regions of Manisa, Turgutlu, Aydın, Ayvalık, Balıkesir, Uşak, and Bursa.
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Alexandropol, which ended the Eastern front,
was signed on September 20, 1920. The Greek forces, which were
stopped by the Battles of İnönü in January and March 1921, captured
Afyon, Kütahya and Eskişehir with the attack in July, and the national
forces withdrew to the east of the Sakarya River. As a result of the uninterrupted
battle between August 23 and September 13, 1921, the Greek
advance was halted, and a status quo began on the Western front that
would last for about a year. Meanwhile, with the agreement signed with
France in October, the Southern front was also closed. In fact, since it was
understood from the very beginning that the war would take place on the
Western front, logistics activities were also mobilized in this direction.
The Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War, and the Armistice
of Mudros was signed in October 1918. After the agreement, the
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
73
Entente Powers downsized the Ottoman army, and the weapons and ammunition,
considered excessive by them, were collected and stored in Istanbul,
Izmit, and Gallipoli. Some of the weapons and ammunition were
destroyed. More than 650 thousand infantry rifles, more than 3 thousand
heavy machine guns, and about 1000 heavy cannons were taken from the
army, and only about 120,000 rifles, 1300 heavy machine guns, and less
than 100 heavy cannons remained in Anatolia. Apart from these, many
war equipment and supplies were also confiscated, and the army was deprived
of its combat power. The remaining weapons and ammunition
were only enough for one or two field battles. However, in order to fight,
the army needed 2 thousand heavy machine guns and 700 cannons in
addition to 300 thousand private soldiers and 300 thousand rifles at the
front. Moreover, there had to be 150,000 soldiers and 150,000 rifles in
the hinterland. It was necessary, for this reason, to collect the weapons
and ammunition scattered in different sectors of Anatolia on the fighting
fronts, particularly the western front, to start the production of ordnances
that could be domestically manufactured and to purchase them
from neutral countries and to smuggle the weapons and ammunition
stocked in Istanbul by the Entente Powers and bring them to Anatolia. In
addition, recruiting activities had to be undertaken, as there were initially
27 thousand of private soldiers and 1700 officers on the western
front.56 Therefore, excellent logistics and large-scaled transportation organization
were required.
The weapons and ammunition needs of the Western front were met
from four sources: those smuggled from Istanbul, those sent from the
Southern front, those sent from the Eastern front, and Soviet-Russian aid.
It was attempted to smuggle weapons and ammunition from Istanbul
in the early stage of the national struggle. Secret groups affiliated with
the General Staff were formed for this smuggling. The most well-known
of these groups was the Felah.57 All materials smuggled from Istanbul58
56 TİH, vol. 7, 96-98.
57 TİH, vol. 7, 97-98.
58 For the list of material smuggled from Istanbul see: TİH, Vol. 7, Chart 8 (no page number).
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
74
were initially sent to İnebolu by sea by boat, barge, and motorboats. Later
on, as a result of the intelligence search, agreements were made with
French and Italian shipping companies. In this way, it was possible to dispatch
many weapons and ammunition to Anatolian ports. The Entente
Powers must have been aware of these activities, so they were shelling
İnebolu from time to time.59 The aid sent from İstanbul and unloaded to
İnebolu was reaching Ankara following the road of İnebolu-KastamonuÇankırı-
Kalecik-Ankara. Another route from Istanbul was the Karamürsel
and Yalova piers by sea from the Golden Horn. The materials unloaded
at the piers were reaching Ankara following the roads of İzmit-Adapazarı-
Hendek-Düzce-Bolu-Gerede-Ankara or İzmit-Geyve-60Nallıhan-Beypazarı-
Ayaş-Ankara.61
One of the supply sources of the Ankara government was the 13th
Corps in Diyarbakir, which was in a relatively stable situation in the conditions
of that day to be able to send aid. As early as March 1920, the 13th
Corps was asked to report on its weapons and ammunition and to prepare
to send its excess to the western corps. It was requested that the
vehicles of the people of the region be used for transportation. Due to the
lack of transportation vehicles and money, not many weapons and ammunition
were dispatched from the 13th Corps until mid-April. It is also
understood that although there were some trucks, there was no gasoline
supply.62 At the end of April, after the order declaring the urgency, the
59 TİH, vol. 7, 102, 112.
60 Since Geyve was on the transit route of the railway and telegraph lines and was the
transit point for possible forces to come through Istanbul, Kuvayi Milliye had captured
this place by the order of the Representative Committee before the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey opened. See for details: Arslan, “Milli Mücadele Döneminde Yolların,”
236-239.
61 Erat, “Kullanılan Yollar,” 224, citing Hergüner, Denizciliğimizin Kurtuluş Savaşındaki
Yeri, 138; TİH, vol. 7, 414.
62 TİH, vol. 7, 57-59.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
75
unit's vehicles and car branch of the 5th Division in Mardin also participated
in the transportation. In addition to the transport battalions, vehicles
were rented, and donkey and camel branches were used.63
The weapons and ammunition that the Southern front had taken out
of Diyarbakir and its surroundings to be sent to the Western front were
gathered in Malatya and transferred to Sivas. From Sivas, they were following
either the roads of Sivas-Kayseri-Yahşihan or the Sivas-Yozgat-
Yahşihan.64 Mules used for transportation could go and return between
Diyarbakır and Sivas in a month and between Diyarbakır and Malatya in
15 days. The front was on a large area (including Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakir,
Bitlis, Siirt, Silvan, Muş, Palu, and Elazığ), and weapons and ammunition
depots were scattered in the region. In addition, the region was mountainous,
roadless, and lacked means of transport.65
After the battle was over on the Eastern front, the excess weapons and
ammunition were sent to the West. However, dispatching was facing
problems due to harsh winter conditions and the mountains that were
not allowing cars to pass. Thus, transportation activities were quite complex.
Civilian vehicles were used, but due to the inadequacy of the financial
condition, the vehicle owners could not be given cash in advance; instead,
a payment document was given to be paid later. Although there was
a motorized car branch with eight cars between Bayburt and Trabzon,
the road was unsuitable for automobile passage due to winter conditions.
In April 1921, the first batch of weapons sent from the eastern front
reached Ankara. In other words, while the Battles of İnönü were taking
place, the weapons and ammunition sent by the Eastern front were still
on the road.66 The patrols of the enemy ships in the Black Sea were preventing
the transportation of weapons and ammunition, which had been
sent from the Eastern front and had reached Trabzon and Samsun by
63 TİH, vol. 7, 94-95.
64 TİH, vol. 7, 413.
65 TİH, vol. 7, 247-248, 395, 413.
66 TİH, vol. 7, 251-262.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
76
sea.67 After the Kütahya-Eskişehir battles, the aid from the Eastern front
became even more critical because a lot of weapons and ammunition
were consumed in these battles.68 Weapons and ammunition sent from
the Eastern Front to the Western Front reached Ankara in four directions.
The first of these was the road of Kars-Erzurum-Karabıyık-Aşkale-Bayburt-
Gümüşhane-Trabzon. Aids were transferring from Trabzon to Samsun,
Sinop, and İnebolu by sea, and they were reaching Ankara by following
the roads of Samsun-Çorum-Yozgat-Yahşihan and İnebolu-
Kastamonu-Sungurlu-Kalecik-Ankara. The second route was the road of
Kars-Erzurum-Karabıyık-Aşkale-Bayburt-Kelkit-Alucra-Suşehri-Sivas,
and the third was the road of Kars-Erzurum-Karabıyık-Tercan-Erzincan-
Refahiye-Suşehri-Sivas. The fourth route was using the Kars-Tbilisi-Batumi
railway. Weapons and ammunition coming to Batumi were shipped
to Trabzon by sea and from there to Samsun, Sinop, and İnebolu ports.
This last one was designed to alleviate the transportation density on the
road of Erzurum-Trabzon.69
During the national struggle, the Ankara government tried to get help
from Russia in addition to domestic weapon and ammunition resources.
The common enemy had brought the two countries closer. In a letter to
Lenin in April 1920, Mustafa Kemal asked for money, weapon, ammunition,
and war equipment. In June, Çiçerin responded positively to the letter.
Immediately after, Osman Bey, the delegate of Lazistan, was sent to
Russia. Although the Van and Bitlis problem stagnated the relations, the
Moscow Agreement was signed on March 16, 1921. Due to the bombardment
of the Russian shores by the French warships, sea transportation
was disrupted, and the first batch of aid started to arrive in the autumn
months.70 Russian aid was coming from Tuapse to Trabzon by sea, and
67 TİH, vol. 7, 311.
68 TİH, vol. 7, 336.
69 TİH, vol. 7, 414.
70 TİH, vol. 7, 113-114.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
77
they were being sent to the ports of İnebolu and Sinop.71 Three steamboats
and two gunboats under the command of the Naval Detachment
Command and barges and boats rented from the public were used. However,
there were disruptions due to the state-owned sea vehicles worn
out and the difficulties in the supply of coal. Until May 1921, a small number
of guns and ammunition had arrived in Trabzon, and it only gained
momentum after May.72 After the Moscow Agreement, aid was sent via
Tuapse-Tbilisi-Batumi, and they were sent from there to the port of
İnebolu and Sinop by sea.73
The map below (Figure 4.1) provides a representation of the routes
used to send weapons and ammunition from different parts of Anatolia.
All routes have been tried to be shown on the map. However, not all
routes were of similar intensities. For example, the ports of Samsun and
Sinop were used much less than İnebolu because the activities of the
Greek gangs in the region continued until after the Sakarya Battle.
Karamürsel and Yalova piers, which were used for material smuggled
from Istanbul, were also not used after the arrival of the Greek forces in
the region.74
71 In fact, it was desired to unload directly to Samsun or İnebolu. However, cargos were
generally unloading to Trabzon in order not to keep the aid waiting in Tuapse due to
difficulties in providing sea vehicles. However, there were aids coming directly to
İnebolu and even to the port of Ünye. TİH, vol. 7, 265-267.
72 TİH, vol. 7, 262-265.
73 TİH, vol. 7, 313-315.
74 Müderrisoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın Mali Kaynakları, 390-391.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
78
Figure 4.1 The routes of dispatching activities. Note: I would like to thank
Master Architect Özge Subaşı who made this map.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
79
4.3.3 Legal basis of people’s participation in the military transportation
Although the armies had their own transport units and vehicles, these
were insufficient. This made it necessary for the army to seize the means
of transportation belonging to the people. The Tanzimat Edict had
banned drudgery, and this was repeated in the Islahat edict. In addition,
both the Kanun-i Esasi, which was made in 1876 and the 1921 constitution
made by the parliament in Ankara also preserved this provision.
Therefore, if the vehicles in the hands of the public were to be used or the
public was to be obligated to transportation, it had to be in the form of a
legal obligation. The opposite situation, that is, both gratuitous seizure
and free employment of the people, would cause the people to hide their
means of transport and further decrease their support for wars.
The TBMM had nearly half a century of constitutional experience in
its trunk. The laws, decisions, and regulations of the previous parliaments
were inherited by the TBMM. As well as making new laws, the
TBMM changed, repealed, or made additions to previous laws when necessary.
The Law on the Procurement of Transport Vehicles was one of
them.75 The law of 1889 regulated how the transportation vehicles in the
hands of the people, which the army might need, would be seized in case
of a declaration of mobilization by the sultan. The law in question was
75 The law in question was sometimes referred to as the "Law on the Procurement of
Transport Vehicles" and sometimes as the "Military Transport Vehicles Law" by the deputies.
It is the law of 1889 “Procurement of Military Transport Vehicles” referred to in
both statements. See for the law: Düstur, Array 1, Vol 6, 430-44: 27.08.1889.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
80
also applied during the period of national struggle.76 The law distributes
the costs of confiscated transportation vehicles to the people of the relevant
kaza by the local government in proportion to their wealth, and the
vehicle owner was paid in this way. After the people paid their share, they
would get a receipt showing this, and the receipt would be deducted from
their tax.77 In this way, the vehicle owner would be given the vehicle price
immediately, and the liability would be shared among all the people of
the region. On the other hand, there was no mention of a service obligation
regulating the public's participation in transportation activities in
this law. Similarly, the War Obligations law enacted before the First World
War states that all necessary materials can be seized by the commissions,
but it did not impose a service obligation. The National Obligations issued
before the Battle of the Sakarya, on the other hand, specified the materials
to be confiscated in detail and brought free transportation services
within specific criteria.78 Therefore, the legal basis for the participation
of military transportation vehicles and the public in transportation activities
during the national struggle was formed by the War Obligations, Law
of Procurement of Military Transport Vehicles, and the National Obligations.
Before the National Obligation orders, if the owners of transportation
vehicles participated in transportation activities, they were paid a
fee.
4.3.4 The role of National Obligations
In June 1921, the firepower of the Western Front consisted of 47 thousand
rifles, 326 heavy machine guns, 210 light machine guns, and 137
various cannons. In contrast, the Greek forces had 57 thousand rifles, 750
76 TBMMZC, Vol 22, 486: 04.09.1922. Minister of National Defense, Kazım Pasha, stated
that the 100-kilometer transportation obligation introduced by the National Obligations
Law was abandoned in April 1922, but the provision of the old law regarding the
supplying of transportation vehicles to the army continued to be implemented.
77 Düstur, Array 1, Vol 5, 432, article 8.
78 Cemal Avcı, “Tekalif-i Harbiye ile Tekalif-i Milliye,” 11.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
81
heavy machine guns, 2204 light machine guns, and 197 various cannons.
Twelve thousand of the rifles coming from İnebolu had reached the Western
Front at the beginning of July, and at least the number of rifles was
balanced.79 The army of the TBMM was defeated by losing most of its ammunition
in the Battle of Kütahya and Eskişehir. After the battle, the
weapon stock of the Western Front had decreased to 25 thousand.80 As
of the end of July, the army began to withdraw to the east of the Sakarya
river in order to encounter the advancing Greek forces in a more advantageous
position. At this stage, the most critical phase of the war was being
because the Greek forces had arrived in Polatlı and were preparing to
attack Ankara.
Mustafa Kemal, who took the head of the army as the Commander-in-
Chief, gave a series of orders under the title of National Obligations on 7-
8 August 1921, using his legislative power. In the tenth of these orders, it
was stated that 20 percent of all transportation vehicles would be seized.
The fifth article, on the other hand, obliged the owners of transportation
vehicles to transport 100 kilometers of army equipment every month.
The National Obligations orders were issued under the most critical conditions,
and in a very short time the orders began to be collected. During
the period from the beginning of the withdrawal to the east of the Sakarya
river to the Greek offensive on August 23, the necessary weapons were
supplied, and the front force was increased to 54 thousand rifles and 825
machine guns. In addition, 32 thousand of animals were under the command
of the front.81
The National Obligation orders played a very critical role in the supply
of food, weapons, and ammunition on the Western Front both in the
20-day period until the Sakarya Battle and during the 22 days of the battle.
The amount of food collected from the people according to the orders
was large enough to feed 100,000 people and 30,000 animals for 20-30
79 TİH, vol. 7, 327-328.
80 TİH, vol. 7, 371-374. The provision of the army was also at a critical level. At the end of
August, 4 days of bread and 10 days of food were left.
81 TİH, vol 7, 375.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
82
days.82 In accordance with the tenth order, it was requested to collect 20
percent of the vehicles in the region of the military boards of the fourth,
fifth, and tenth Corps. The number of vehicles collected in these regions,
corresponding to 20 percent, is shown in the table below.
Table 4.1 Accrued and impounded means of transport according to National
Orders
Vehicle 20% Impounded
Ox and cow car 2518 2362
Tumbrel 20599 14738
Spring cart 47 34
Ox and cow 56031 38434
Donkey 28357 17522
Harness and saddle beast 3427 2072
Pack train and hinny 6081 3975
Camel 3240 2334
Horse cart (with two-horse) 573 396
Horse cart (with one-horse) 25 20
Source: TİH, vol 7, 369.
The monetary value of the vehicles collected was close to 3.3 million
liras. In accordance with the orders, no money was given for the collected
materials, but kuruşlu senet was given to their owners to be paid in the
future.83 Most of these were paid in cash and a small part in treasury
bonds until 1929. 4.3 million of these payments, which amounted to 6
million liras in total, were paid in 1923.84 The payments of the seized
goods during the Balkan Wars and the First World War were also tried to
be paid after the national struggle.85
82 TİH, vol 7, 368.
83 TİH, vol 7, 369.
84 Tural, “Tekalif-i Milliye (Halka Borcu Kalmayan Devlet),” 558.
85 Tezcan, Tekalif-i Harbiye ve Tekalif-i Milliye, 17; 147.
83
5
Administering the Anatolian Railways during the
National Struggle
he administration of the railways during the national struggle was a
very challenging task. The opposition to non-Muslims exaggerated by the
war made this task very difficult. There was a stratification among railway
workers in terms of religion and ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire.
The highest-ranking, executive part of the workers were European, while
Ottoman Christians were in the middle-stage ranks. Muslims, on the
other hand, worked in unqualified jobs in the lowest positions. The foreign
capital that built the lines had created the boards of directors and
essential management positions from Europeans. In this very new area,
where the Ottomans did not know the technology, it was necessary to use
European personnel during the establishment phases. However, although
there were Ottomans who gained experience and trained in railway
management in the following years, Ottomans were not employed in
high-ranking administration positions. Wages paid to Europeans for the
same work were also 50 percent higher than those paid to the Ottomans.1
1 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” 931.
T
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
84
The Haydarpaşa-İzmit line was built by the state between 1871-1873
and operated by the state until 1880. However, there was no trace of this
experiment from 40-50 years ago. There were very few people in Anatolia
among the personnel of the Hejaz railways, as well. Indeed, they had
worked in construction works, not in administration. The main problem
in the national struggle, on the other hand, was administration.2
Then, why were not Turkish and Muslim civil servants trained in the
field of administration? In fact, this issue was mentioned in an article
published in Basiret Newspaper in 1874. However, more concrete initiatives
began after the Balkan wars. Although it was requested to establish
a railway battalion in the army in 1887, this battalion could only be
formed in 1900 for the construction and operation of the Hejaz railway.
The claims that almost all of the personnel in the Rumelian railways was
composed of Greeks in the Balkan wars caused the railways to not be
used effectively, accelerated the initiatives. In 1913, a similar railway
school in Lausanne was wanted to be opened in Konya in order to train
ticket agents, clerks, and conductors. This attempt failed because teachers
could not be found, and instead, 3 graduates of Galatasaray High
School were sent to Lausanne for education. The issue came up again in
1914 for the better operation of the Hejaz railway, and it was planned to
open a 4-year school in Uşak, which would take 50 students every year.
However, this attempt did not come to fruition. During the First World
War, lines in Western Anatolia were impounded when the concessionaire
companies in and around Izmir caused difficulties in the mobilization
plans of the Ottoman Army. A railway military unit was sent to İzmir to
operate the impounded lines. In 1915, a railway school was opened in
İzmir under the directorship of the troop commander, İskender Bey.
Forty students in the first semester and 300 people in the second semester
graduated from this school, the first two semesters of which were like
a 6-month course. In the same year, a school was opened in Istanbul, and
a total of 800 people were educated in these two schools until the end of
2 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 3-4.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
85
the First World War. These Muslim workpeople, who were distributed to
the lines, were dismissed by the Entente Powers on February 1, 1919, after
the Armistice of Mudros.3 Although some of them were assigned to
Anatolia during the War of Independence, as we will see, not all of them
could be reached, and the personnel problem would continue throughout
the war. During the national struggle, a railway school was wanted to be
opened, but this school would only be opened in Konya after the war.
With the 15th article of the Armistice of Mudros, the Entente Powers
had the right to occupy, use and place their own officials on all railways.
The Germans working on the lines were immediately sent to their
hometowns. In the early days of the armistice, there was not much difficulty
in the operation of the railways because Entente powers wanted the
soldiers to be discharged as soon as possible in accordance with the
ceasefire. However, from the beginning of 1919, the Entente powers began
to occupy the railway directorates and stations for absolute control.
This caused the positive atmosphere created after the armistice to dissipate
rapidly. The government and bureaucracy in Istanbul stated that it
was accepted that the Entente States would take control of the railways
according to the ceasefire agreement, and therefore, incoming occupation
applications should have been facilitated. The Entente powers invaded
the lines one by one and placed troops there.
On the other hand, in May 1919, while he was still in Havza as the
9th Army inspector, Mustafa Kemal sent an order to the 3rd, 15th, and
20th Corps command posts stating that if the Entente Forces advanced
within the country, they would be actively opposed with weapons. Meanwhile,
some local armed forces had attacked the railways. Kuvayi Milliye
forces attacked trains and stations and blew up bridges to cut off Entente
powers' transportation. The explosion of the bridges prevented the invasion
movements from extending into Anatolia. For instance, the blowing
up of the bridge between Çiftehan and Ulukışla in March 1920 prevented
the French from hanging in. Some bridges in Bilecik, between Manisa and
Afyon, and between Ankara and Eskişehir were also blown up by the
3 Özdemir, “Şimendifer Mektebi,” 67-72.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
86
Kuvayi Milliye. In the face of the occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920,
the Representative Committee immediately took some measures. According
to these measures, the Geyve Strait would be occupied by national
forces, the railway bridge in the region would be destroyed, the
railway lines and materials in Anatolia would be seized, and the Entente
powers on the line would be removed. As a result, the British forces in
Eskişehir withdrew, and the control in Geyve passed into the hands of the
national forces. On March 23, 1920, the British withdrew from the lines
outside Arifiye-Haydarpaşa, and the French from Konya and Pozantı.
While the British were withdrawing, they took some officers, 13 locomotives,
and 100 wagons along with 20 thousand liras in the safe and destroyed
the Lefke-Sakarya bridge. The French also dismantled the materials
of the 4-5 kilometers line section between Çiftehan and Pozantı. On
March 23, the 20th Corps4 Command issued an order specifying how the
existing lines would be operated. In this order, it was stated that the Anatolian
and Baghdad railway companies would operate under the supervision
of the military authorities, that their financial affairs would not be
interfered with, and that the company employees would carry out their
duties in safety, regardless of nationality and religion. It was also reported
that Vasfi Bey, Ankara-Sivas Narrow Line Construction and Operations
Manager, was appointed as an additional duty to the Anatolian
Railways Military Inspectorate and was sent to Eskişehir to establish an
operation commission there.5
From this stage on, the problem was operating the existing railway
line, whose connections with the centers of Haydarpaşa and Aleppo were
cut off. Ankara was a supply base during the national struggle. The supply
of the western front was carried out along the Ankara-Eskişehir line.
However, due to the fall of Kütahya, Afyon, and Eskişehir in July 1921, the
connection between the Ankara side of the line and the Konya side was
cut. In order to transfer the supplies coming from the Konya line to the
4 Until the parliament was opened, the de facto power on behalf of the Representative
Committee in Ankara was the 20th Corps.
5 Arslan, “Milli Mücadele Döneminde,” 234-238; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk,
3-5; Erkin, Hatırat, 193-194; Özdemir, Mütareke ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın, 34; 41; 49-53
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
87
Ankara line, a light railway line was planned to be built from Azarıköy to
Piribeyli at the beginning of 1922. This line, which was opened in June
1922, was about 50 kilometers and had a daily carrying capacity of 800
tons. The materials reaching Piribeyli by this line were transported to Polatlı
by the vehicles of the menzil line.6
The map below provides an approximate depiction of the railway
network used by the national government during the war. While the region
between the red lines was in the hands of the national government
at the beginning of the war, the controlled region was shrunk back to the
east of the blue lines after the summer of 1921. After the Ankara Agreement
was signed with the French in October 1921, the parts to the west
of the green line, including Mersin and İskenderun, were put into the service
of the national government. The line shown with dashed lines is the
Azarıköy-Piribeyli light railway line. In the continuation of this chapter,
we first examine the establishment of the new administration and then
the challenges faced by the new administration.
6 For Azarıköy-Piribeyli light railway line, see: Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk,
119-131.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
88
Figure 5.1 Anatolian railway network and lines controlled during the war
Source: Map source is Özdemir, Mütareke ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın
Başlangıcında, 159. The colored lines on the map belong to me.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
89
§ 5.1 The state of the lines and the establishment of the new
administration
Military Inspector Vasfi Bey came into the office in Eskişehir on 25
March 1920. Station Command was opened at Ankara, Eskişehir, Bilecik,
Afyon, Konya, and Ulukışla stations. According to Vasfi Bey's first report
on March 25, 15 large locomotives were operating with coal, two large
and three small locomotives operating with oil, and five large locomotives
operating with oil were being repaired in the factory in Eskişehir. In
addition to the 15 coal and 8 oil locomotives, there were 717 pieces of
several wagons. If two trains were moved between the sections daily, 620
wagons would have been used, and the rest would have been regularly
repaired. In the same report, it was also expressed that there were 2750
tons of coal in different warehouses, in addition to 4800 cubic meters of
oil stored in Eskişehir and Bilecik warehouses, and trains could be operated
until January 1921 with these fuels. It was reported that the grease
and oil required for the maintenance of the wagons were sufficient for 15
months. There was no demand for the transportation of commercial
goods rather than grain between Ankara and Eskişehir; passengers were
also few. In his report, Vasfi Bey also indicated that the civil servants'
identities and “opinions” of the civil servants were investigated; those
from minorities were not associate with foreign states, and they were
good at their jobs and worked of their own will.7 One of the most significant
difficulties faced by the railroad administration during the war was
the “irrational anger” towards non-Muslim personnel. We will address
this issue in subsection 5.2.1.
It was emphasized in the command issued on 23 March 1920 that the
lines' responsibility belonged to the company, and an operating commission
responsible to both the government and the company was established.
On the other hand, on April 13, with the approval of the Representative
Committee, the salaries of the employees working in the
7 TİH vol 7, 197-198; Erkin, Hatırat, 197; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 5-6.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
90
railways were requested from the company headquarters in Haydarpaşa,
but no response was given to this request. This shows that there was not
any connection between the company headquarters and Anatolia. With
the decision on 18 July 1920, the lines were impounded based on article
26 of the concession agreement.8 On 16 July 1920, Colonel Behiç Bey, who
had previously worked on the Thessaloniki-Istanbul railway line, was appointed
as the manager of the new administration.9 His first title was the
Operations Manager, but then it was changed to the General Manager of
Anatolian Railways. Behiç Bey specified that it was compulsory to expand
the realm of authority of the administration towards the Baghdad Railways
section, taking into account the possibility of transporting wood
from Pozantı and utilizing the construction materials in the Taurus
8 Erkin, Hatırat, 193-194. It is understood that there was also a decision by Council of
Ministers dated 19 July 1920. According to that decision, the income and expenses of
the railway administration would be included in the government budget as an attached
budget, and all materials and tools of the company would be confiscated on behalf of
the treasury. This meant acquiring property beyond the impoundment of the lines.
Behiç Bey opposed the acquisition of property of the lines in the report he sent to the
Ministry of Public Works and stated that it was more appropriate to operate it temporarily.
However, the Ministry of Public Works repeated that the lines were confiscated.
Then, at a meeting in Ankara attended by Behiç Bey, Mustafa Kemal and some ministers,
Mustafa Kemal informed Behiç Bey that the line was only impounded, and that the confiscation
of the line was abandoned. However, no new decision was made that changed
the old decision of 19 July (Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 10-11 and TİH, vol
7, 199). On the other hand, during the parliamentary meetings, Minister of Public Works
İsmail Fazıl Pasha, while informing the delegates about the railways, stated that due to
the absence of the concessionaire, the government seized the railways as owner, interfering
with its finances (See: TBMMZC, Vol 3, 391: 21.08.1920). But we know that the
line was not nationalized, and the revenues and expenses of the lines were not included
in the ministry's budget during the war.
9 Behiç Erkin served as the Guard Inspector for the Istanbul-Thessaloniki Junction Line
between 1904-1908, and as Military Inspector for the Istanbul-Thessaloniki Junction
Line between 1910-1912. During the First World War, he wrote "History, Use and Organization
of the Railway in terms of Military Service" which is a unique Turkish work
in railway field. He met with Mustafa Kemal in 1907 and they became close friends and
corresponded each other’s frequently. See: Dinç, Behiç Erkin, 14-24.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
91
Mountains and also considering the possibility of opening the Mersin
road in the future. Thereupon, the Ministry of Public Works took over the
administration of the Baghdad Railway Administration and the Baghdad
Line Construction Company on 11 August. On August 26, the government-
controlled part of the Afyon-Uşak line was given to the new administration,
and the administration was renamed the General Directorate of
Anadolu-Baghdad and Afyon-Uşak Railways and Bağdat Construction
Company. Thus, all railways in the regions where the national government
ruled (except for the Ankara-Yahşihan narrow line, Aydın line, some
parts of the İzmir-Kasaba line, and the Eruzurum-Sarıkamış narrow line)
were gathered under the command of the new administration. The length
of the lines under the responsibility of the administration was approximately
1067 kilometers.10
§ 5.2 The challenges encountered by the new administration
A new administration was organized, but there were still many problems.
The whole order of the line was a total mess. In particular, the Greeks'
attack on Bursa and the riots in the Kocaeli peninsula disrupted the operation
of the line. All the essential documents for the administration
were left in Haydarpaşa. Since non-Muslim officials were in fear due to
the attitudes against them, there were some defects in their administrative
work. The financial situation was not good because military shipping
costs could not be received. The supply of coal and oil was at stake. Many
10 TİH, vol 7, 197-198; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 11-12. The Greek forces,
who occupied İzmir and its surroundings on May 15, 1919, expanded the occupation in
the spring and summer of 1920, and Bandırma, Mudanya, Bursa, Izmit and Uşak were
occupied. The Greek forces taken Gediz and Simav as well and were quite close to Afyon
and Eskişehir. After the Greeks occupied a large part of Western Anatolia, the remaining
railway line was approximately 1067 kilometers: Osmaneli-Eskişehir (118 kilometers),
Eskişehir-Ankara (268 kilometers), Eskişehir-Konya (434 kilometers), Alayunt-
Kütahya (10 kilometers) and Konya-Ulukışla (237 kilometers).
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
92
officers and individuals were interfering with the administration and
breaking the lines' operation.11 We closely examine these problems in the
following subsections.
5.2.1 Non-Muslim staff and language problem
At the beginning of the national struggle, the number of muslim workers
in all Anatolian lines was 1598. There were 459 Ottoman Greeks, 403 Ottoman
Armenians, 6 Ottoman Jews, 17 Greeks, and 31 workers from various
European and Balkan states. There was not any muslim in the movement
department.12 As a result of the occupations in Anatolia, fervent
xenophobia prevailed not only among the people but also in the army and
the parliament. In the face of this hazy and dangerous environment, it
was notably challenging to protect the non-muslim personnel, who were
most in critical positions in the railways, and thus to ensure the operation
of the lines. When the lines were impounded, Military Inspector Vasfi Bey
pointed out in his report that there were not "malicious” ones among the
non-Muslim personnel. The British forces could only take 20 personnel
with them when they were withdrawing from Eskişehir. Also, during the
Konya mutiny, some non-muslim workers performed courage and helpfulness.
The mechanic Hristo Aslanyadis and his two firemen dared to put
the train in the line of fire, and the telegrapher Leonyadis readily reported
the insurrection to the administration. Two non-Muslim personnel
were injured during the events. It had not been seen that Kolaro, who
did not go with the British, was brought to the factory directorate by Vasfi
Bey, and was stated to be a Greek national by the Western Front Police
Organization, had any sabotage and neglect of duty. Although these examples
do not prove the unconditional loyalty of non-Muslim personnel,
they reveal that they fulfill the requirements of their duties.13
Before establishing the regular army, Kuvayi Milliye guerillas frequently
attacked non-muslim railway workers. Between Osmaneli
11 Erkin, Hatırat, 199.
12 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 17.
13 Erkin, Hatırat, 197; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 22-23.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
93
(Lefke) and Adapazarı, four station officers and a doctor had been killed,
and three road watchmen had disappeared with their families. The dead
bodies of two of the Akhisar station officers had been found in the town.
The houses of 11 of the civil servants in Eskişehir, along with their belongings,
had been seized by the gangs, and four workshop workers had
disappeared. In addition to murders and residential occupations, non-
Muslim personnel had been frequently investigated and detained. The
bridge construction officer, Italian Martiyano, and the bridge expert,
Marko, had been killed by the paramilitary forces of Gök Bayrak. These
people had been deemed worthy of an award by the Western Front Command
for repairing the Lefke Bridge in a short time, which the British destroyed
while they were withdrawing. In order to prevent such incidents
that intensified between Lefke and Adapazarı, Behiç Bey met with Ali
Fuat Pasha, the commander of the Western Front. After the meeting, an
order dated 21 July 1920 was issued, and copies of this order were hung
in the stations. In this order, it was notified that some of the railway officers
were Christian citizens, they were guaranteed to work with integrity,
they were promised the safety of their honor, property, and life, and it
was stated that everyone was obliged to keep this promise.14
Non-Muslim personnel working in the railway administration were
also on the parliament's agenda. The delegates agreed that the non-Muslim
personnel should have been dismissed and that the station officers
and machinists should not have been Greeks and Armenians. They also
shared some anecdotes on this matter. For example, Esat Bey, the delegate
of Lazistan, claims that Christian officers did many evil things in the
transportation of trains during the Balkan wars. He narrated that a train,
in which he was also included, had escaped at the last moment from colliding
with another train at the station because the station clerk had not
give notice to the relevant unit. Hamdi Namık Bey and Mustafa Necati Bey
reminded the school that was opened in Izmir to train civil servants to be
employed in the railways during the First World War and suggested finding
the people who studied there. They also suggested opening a similar
14 Erkin, Hatırat, 199; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 14-17.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
94
school and training mechanics, guards, and station clerks with a 3-month
training. The Minister of Public Works, İsmail Fazıl Pasha, said:
This situation makes my heart ache. Today, we use Armenian and
Greek, who are our enemies. This has disturbed my sleep many
times and caused my irritability... If it were a random Muslim officer,
conductor, guard, or a simple civil servant, it would be no
problem. However, they must also be able to perform important
tasks. For example, there is a Greek official named Koralı. This
man is the workshop clerk responsible for repairing all the trains.
He is a very good mechanic but a traitor as far as his dexterity. I
am telling you frankly, I will change them now, but I cannot find
people to replace them. You say there was a school; it educated
many people. I searched but could not find them.15
Indeed, at that time, advertisements were given in Ankara, Eskişehir and
Konya newspapers for the recruitment of Muslim railway officers, but
this attempt did not yield any results.16 Behiç Erkin, on the other hand,
describes the situation as follows in his memoirs:
In Ankara, the deceased İsmail Fazıl Pasha was imbued with Christian
officials in Ankara; then he came to Eskişehir, talked to me,
and agreed with me, but the problem started again when he came
back to Ankara. It was a never-ending problem.17
According to Behiç Bey, if these expert Christian officials were dismissed,
they would inevitably encounter significant accidents, or they would be
obligated to stop operating the railway. He stated that some ministers
told him without hesitation that all non-Muslim civil servants should be
fired so that even the operation of trains could be sacrificed.18
After Behiç Bey left the office in February 1921, Christian personnel in
crucial positions were dismissed, novices were hired instead, accidents
15 TBMMZC, Vol 3, 392-393: 21.08.1920
16 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 22.
17 Erkin, Hatırat, 201.
18 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 21.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
95
occurred one after another, and the order in the railways was disturbed.
In July of the same year, things got even worse when Eskişehir fell into
the hands of the Greek forces. The withdrawal from Eskişehir was poorly
managed, and many railway materials were left behind. Worse still, non-
Muslim workers were also left in Eskişehir. Ömer Lütfi Bey, who took on
the duty of Minister of Public Works after İsmail Fazıl Pasha, was obliged
to take Kaldis Efendi back to work, whom he had formerly dismissed.19
After Ömer Lütfi Bey was forced to resign in November, Behiç Bey returned
to duty. The reinstatement of specialist Christian staff was among
the conditions he offered for re-acceptance.20 However, in this second period
of Behiç Bey, due to the fall of Eskişehir, the administrative center
was moved to Konya, and the arrival of Christian officials in Konya caused
many rumors. Konya delegate Hoca Vehbi Efendi was among those who
started the rumors, bearing hostility to Behiç Bey. He presented a list of
non-Muslims employed in the administration to Mustafa Kemal, who
came to Konya and asserted that Behiç Bey had hidden a Christian staff
member in his house.21 Behiç Bey acted more carefully during that time
to prevent gossip and attacks against non-Muslim personnel. He put Muslim
officers between Konya and the front.22 He visited the president of
the Independence Court in Konya and said:
Soon, Christian officials will come here, and rumors will spread
about them; I beg you, do not listen to them. You see the state of
the railways, doing my job in peace depends on the wellness of
officers.23
In April 1922, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to Behiç Bey with the
list that Vehbi Efendi had mediated to deliver. In this telegram, Mustafa
Kemal stated that the most crucial criterion in the selection of railway
officers was expertise and experience, but that the condition of complete
19 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 60-62.
20 Erkin, Hatırat, 217.
21 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 63-67.
22 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 68.
23 Erkin, Hatırat, 220.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
96
trust required by the war must also be met, so it was the basic rule to
employ Turkish officers and asked for information on the subject. In the
answer given, it was stated that only 99 of the 2000 personnel, half of
whom were civil servants, were not Muslim, 2 non-experts, and 3 more
people who did not speak Turkish were dismissed, and they would be
more meticulous in this regard from now on.24 Thus, in the railways,
where approximately 1000 Christian civil servants worked in 1920, this
number decreased to 100 by 1922. Discussions on non-Muslim personnel
continued after the war ended. At the end of 1922, Minister of Public
Works Feyzi Bey gave the "good news" that the share of non-Muslim
workers on the line had decreased to 3 percent and that the Anatolian-
Baghdad railway line had become a completely Muslim institution.25
The fierce opposition to the non-Muslim personnel also manifested in
the language used in the railways. Because the language that dominates
the railways was French, it was thought this was the main reason for the
absence of Turks in management. The Ottomans' contact with the Western
world was in French; the Ottoman intellectuals and ruling class knew
French. The French influence was clear in the arrangements made with
the Tanzimat; we have revealed this in the road regulations in the second
chapter. Therefore, it is not without reason that the language used in railways
and other institutions with foreign capital was French. The dominant
language in the German-owned Anatolian railways was also French,
although they sometimes tried to substitute German language.
On the other hand, the efforts to translate the language used in the
railways into Turkish had a history of 20 years. Article 34 of the Baghdad
railway concession agreement dated 1902 stated that the company
would communicate with government offices in Turkish. The regulation
extended this condition to other railway administrations, foreign partnership
companies, and internal transactions and communications was
made in 1916. In the law, the railways were given a time until 10 July
1919, 8 months before the national forces would impound the railways,
24 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 80-81.
25 TBMMZC, Vol 25, 328: 11.12.1922.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
97
to realize this arrangement. However, it is clear that no attempt was not
made in this regard. The national government's orders for the Turkishization
of the language were based on this 1916 law.26
Ömer Lütfi Bey, during his ministry of Public Works, wanted telegraph
communications to be made in Turkish to start Turkishization in the railways.
He was of the opinion that almost all Christian civil servants were
literate in Turkish, so it was not difficult for them to get used to this
change quickly. Behiç Bey, after stating that he expressed the first idea for
changing the language in the railways to Turkish in 1909, and that he explained
this important problem in the book he wrote, said:
However, I am in no way inclined to add to the current difficulties
of replacing telegraph communications. Because all responsibility
for train movements is based on communication. In times of crisis,
this responsibility cannot be settled. Trying to realize this purpose,
which can be applied more easily in the future, may cause
big accidents, God forbid.27
After the fall of Eskişehir and the non-Muslim personnel left there, the
Ministry of Public Works, considering them to have fled to the enemy
side, ordered Muslims to be replaced and to use Turkish on the railways.
In the report he gave after his return to the office in December 1921,
Behiç Bey stated that no one could read the regulations in French, so all
the calculations at the stations were wrong. Despite the fact that the stations
have switched to Turkish, no Turkish tariff had been sent for six
months.28 Behiç Bey says in his memoirs:
During the life or death struggle of the homeland, the applause of
the former Minister of Public Works, Ömer Lütfi Bey, by claiming
that he ensured that the railways operate in Turkish, was nothing
26 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 86-89.
27 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 81-82.
28 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 69, 83-84.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
98
but populism29, and Ömer Lütfi Bey's patronage made the railways
this miserable. There were 1000 pages of regulations, instructions,
and tables to be translated into Turkish. We tried to do
these as well, but it took time.30
Mihail Frunze, who came to Turkey at the head of the Soviet-Russian delegation
in November 1921, met the Soviet diplomat Aralov in Samsun
during his return in January 1922, and he told him with great anger about
the Greek corpses he encountered on the roadsides. Frunze, who did not
doubt that the imperialists were responsible for these massacres, asked
Aralov to tell Mustafa Kemal what he saw, and he reminded Aralov that:
To not hurt national feelings, it is necessary to talk about these issues
very cautiously. Remember Lenin's warning that insulted national
feelings are a terrible disease.31
5.2.2 Fuel problem
Another big challenge the railway administration faced was fuel. Although
trains could be run with wood, the best was to use coal, as more
wood must be burned for the same amount of energy.32 In addition, wood
must be thoroughly dried before use.33 Production in Ereğli, the only coal
29 The original expression is “avâm-firiblik”. The word, whose literal translation is folkhunting,
can be translated as “populism” as it is used in modern political science.
30 Erkin, Hatırat, 224.
31 Aralov, Türkiye Anıları, 35-36.
32 In a telegram sent to the Ministry of Public Works, the railway administration stated
that 1 wagon of coal was equivalent to 6 wagons of wood. According to another telegram,
it was stated that the daily need was 100 tons of coal or 250 tons of wood (Gürel,
Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 102; 104). Therefore, at that time, wood and coal balance
in locomotives was 1/6 by volume, while it was 2/5 by weight.
33 The green (wet) wood was damaging the locomotives. Since it could not burn with a
good efficiency, the trains were stuck on the slope and the journeys were lengthening
out 2-3 times. In addition, locomotives were requiring long maintenance after the journey
(Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 113).
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
99
basin of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, recorded a tremendous
decrease,34 and wood was mainly used as fuel in the railways
during and after the war. The demobilization of the Ottoman army after
the armistice created heavy traffic on the lines, and there was no longer
any coal in the warehouses of the railway company in November 1919.
The price of coal increased from 14 liras to 18 liras, from which the state
bought 2000 tons of coal. At the same time, there were great difficulties
in the supply of wood. Due to the demobilization of the Ottoman army as
per the armistice, the railway units were also demobilized. Since there
were no labor battalions in charge of supplying wood to the railway site,
the supply of wood was tried to be done by the contractors, and the attempt
was not successful due to the lack of money. Shipment of the wood
in the warehouses to the points of need was impossible due to the current
density and confusion. The inability of the trains to run due to lack of fuel
caused indignation and anger at the stations. In some regions, the trees,
poles, and even the doors of the houses in the station and its surroundings
were used as fuel. The Adana-Nusaybin line was operated with coal
purchased from the British, and the demobilized soldiers were transported
to their hometowns. A new alternative for fuel was developed in
February 1921. Modifications were made in the fuel room of the locomotive
machines, making the trains possible to operate with the oil at hand,
and this change was applied to 7 machines.35
On March 23, 1920, the lines were impounded by the Representative
Committee. The first report on the railways stated that there were 2750
tons of coal in various warehouses and 4800 cubic meters of oil in
34 The production, which exceeded 1 million tons in 1912, decreased to 150 thousand tons
during the First World War, but then reached half a million tons in 1920 (Ok, “From
Wood to Coal,” 150-151; Kara, “Ereğli Kömür Havzası,” 245-247).
35 Özdemir, Mütareke ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın, 81-88. After the parliament was established,
İsmail Fazıl Pasha, the first Minister of Public Works of the national government, in his
answer to a question, mentioned a fuel called “paküra”, which he described as “a kind of
frozen mine state of petroleum gas” in Baku. According to the information he gave, the
fuel room was covered with bricks and a chimney was added to make it workable with
paküra. The Minister also stated that the British's interest in Baku stemmed from the
paküra. TBMMZC, Vol 2, 5-6: 22.05.1920.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
100
Eskişehir and Bilecik warehouses. However, with the summer months,
the advance of the Greek forces in Western Anatolia accelerated, and at
the same time, rebellions against the national forces began in regions
such as Adapazarı. The increase in military shipments caused the fuel in
the warehouses to run out quickly. The Minister of Public Works said to
the delegates on August 21, 1920:
Anatolian Railways is asking for 40 thousand liras for fuel. I had
promised you before that the fuel at hand would manage until
March if nothing extraordinary happens. However, it did not happen…
We are going to run trains with wood from now on.36
In those days, the national government was not able to ensure coal
supply by extracting from the mines in various places and transferring to
the railway lines. The Ministry of Public Works did not have a budget for
coal mining. There were no mine masters and workers to work in the
mine. The proximity of some mines to the front made it impossible to
benefit from them. Work had just begun at the mine in the Seyitömer region
of Kütahya. A small amount of coal, 8 tons per day, was being extracted
by the soldiers from the mine in the Oturak area. Since the mine
in Yalvaç was behind the rock, coal extraction and transportation would
cost 30 liras per ton. It was not easy to benefit from the mines in the short
term.37
The inability to use the mines revealed the need to rely on forests. In
fact, during the national struggle, forests were offered to the use of the
army as a fuel for transportation, as well as to the use of the people as an
economic resource. It would be helpful to address this issue here. The
war situation in Anatolia for many years had devastated many settlements
and caused great migration movements. Large quantities of timber
were needed to rebuild towns, for the peasants to build houses and use
36 TBMMZC, Vol 4, 391.
37 TBMMZC, Vol 6, 443-445: 20.12.1920; TBMMZC, Vol 7, 357-358: 24.01.1921.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
101
as firewood.38 Under normal conditions, the stamped trees shown by forest
officers could be cut according to law, but the Ministry of Economy
acted laxly in this regard during the national struggle. It allowed the trees
to be cut for trains for 2 months.39 In order for the people to cut the forests
freely, Minister of Economy Celal Bey said:
In our investigation, I saw that some difficulties were raised to the
villagers (to cut timber from the forests). I was convinced that
these were unnecessary things that stemmed from the mentality
of ensuring a strict centralization procedure in the country. Although
the law of the forest is valid, I gave orders to the administrations
by telegraph to abolish this treatment, which only puts
the needs of the people in trouble and threatens, and to allow the
villagers to work freely. In this way, I did not make any record of
the supply of fuel. Additionally, I present a Coppice Law proposal.
If the assembly accepts this, we will have ensured the right of the
villagers to cut wood and benefit from their income and put it in a
valid form.40
The Coppice Law that the Minister mentioned is controversial. As the
reason for the law proposal, it was stated that the 5th article of the Forest
Law could not meet the villagers' needs and that issues such as license
38 In this regard, many law proposals were submitted to the parliament since the first day.
For example, see the proposals submitted in the parliament in April 1920 for exemption
from forest tax for timber to be cut for the reconstruction of Erzincan and Burdur:
TBMMZC, Vol 1, 222, 267, 316, 353. For the proposal to allow the people of Uluborlu to
cut timber for free, see: TBMMZC, Vol 4, 386. For the proposal given in the parliament
for fire survivors in Sinop, Antalya and Maraş to cut free timber from forests, see:
TBMMZC, Vol 7, 350; TBMMZC, Vol 8, 36. In order to respond to all of these demands, a
law was enacted in the middle of 1922. Accordingly, free timber could be cut from forests
for the repair or reconstruction of dwellings, schools, temples and orphanages
damaged by natural disasters or by rebellion and war. See: Düstur, Array 3, Vol 3 ,87-88:
18.06.1922.
39 Upon a question, the Minister of Public Works stated that the Ministry of Economy had
allowed the cutting of trees for 2 months due to the shortage of wood in the trains. See:
TBMMZC, Vol 6, 443-445: 20.12.1920.
40 TBMMZC, Vol 4, 322-323: 25.09.1920.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
102
and cutting procedures put the villagers in a difficult situation. According
to the Coppice Law, those dealing with forestry and households in villages
adjacent to large forests with a maximum distance of 20 kilometers
would benefit from a maximum of 18 decares of forest in line with their
needs. The villagers could benefit from these forests to meet their simple
daily needs, such as timber and firewood, and they would be exempt from
tax if they sold the firewood in the marketplaces. According to the Minister
of Economy Celal Bey, it was understood from the available statistics
that there were 7 million hectares of state forest, and it was calculated
that 2 hectares could be allocated to each household to receive up to 10
tons of wood per year. Although there were minor criticisms about the
law proposal, it was welcomed in the parliament. For example, the delegate
of Izmit, Hamdi Namık Bey, said:
Gentlemants, today is one of our happiest days. Because today I
understand with the following law that there is a government that
would like to serve the people. No law has ever been made so beneficial
to the public.41
The Coppice Law, which the parliament passed in October 1920, was
declared in March 1921 and entered into force.42 However, after the war
ended, Gaziantep Deputy Yasin Bey asked the Ministry of Economy about
the issue that the Coppice Law was not declared and the people could not
benefit from the law. Mahmud Esad Bey, the Minister of Economy of the
period, stated that the law was announced everywhere, but in some regions,
the public could not benefit because civil servants from the Ministry
of Public Works and Economy and local officials could not be appointed.
He also added:
41 TBMMZC, Vol 4, 522.
42 Düstur, Array 3, Vol 1, 97-98: 11.10.1920. Discussions about the law in the parliamentary
minutes are not available after the second article of the law.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
103
I want to take this opportunity to say that I did not find the Coppice
Law successful in protecting forests and found it very dangerous.
I consider the abolition of this law necessary… I think that if
the Coppice Law is implemented, our forests will be destroyed
everywhere.43
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate where this law was applied. Yalçın
Küçük claims that the Coppice Law was enacted to gain the support of the
peasant population, even though the new government knew that the forests
would be destroyed. According to him, after the war ended, the law
was repealed because there was no need for public support.44 The forest
was the only economic resource that the Ankara government could give
to the people in the national struggle. The operation of locomotives also
depended on forest resources. Here we may return to the fuel problem in
trains.
In his report dated 15 July 1920, Behiç Bey stated that there was very
little coal left, the oil was only enough for 300 train services (estimated
1.5 months), and 1000 cubic meters of wood purchased for 7 thousand
liras could not be paid for. He asked the administration for 40 thousand
liras for fuel. In the meantime, starting from November 1920, a wood contract
was signed with 2 contractors for 3 months, and it was stated in the
contract that the administration would resolve the forest tax. The Ministry
of Economy stated that there was no military activity that would require
the illegal cutting of wood and wanted to take the manager of the
administration to court, considering the timber cut by the contractors as
illegal. Behiç Bey said:
I do not know the reason and wisdom, but these woods, which
were bought to manage military transport, were so severely pursued
by forest officials that there was no such activity in this country.
Despite this, we continued to store the woods. It is a thousand
43 TBMMZC, Vol 27, 56-57: 29.01.1923.
44 Küçük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 21-25.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
104
cubic meters of wood that was able to provide the shipment of the
Battle of İnönü.
While the railways could buy coal for less than 5 liras and tax-free when
the administration was in the company's control, the new administration
had to pay 25 liras in advance for wood in those days.45 There was intense
forest destruction in the areas close to the front, while forest officials of
the Ministry of Economy were making difficulties for the railway administration.
İzmit delegate Hamdi Bey stated with regret that he saw during
his visit to Konya that the forests of Kütahya and Bilecik had been destroyed
and that the trees sent to the stations were centuries old and
green.46 During the İnönü Battles, although a small amount of coal was
extracted from various mines, it was clear that the mines could not be
utilized due to distance, war conditions, and transportation difficulties.
Ömer Lütfi Bey, the Minister of Public Works at that time, underlined the
need to open the waterway of one of the ports as a condition of giving up
wood and that Zonguldak coal should be bought and stored in this way.47
Well, could not Zonguldak coal be brought by road from the very beginning?
This was probably not possible in practice. In theory, transportation
from Ereğli to Ankara could be achieved by long, winding, and bad
roads, but as we show in the previous sections, transportation costs were
enormous in road haulage. It is normal for the government not to incur
such an expense while there is huge forest stock. It was impossible to
transport coal, shipped between 8-13 liras per ton by sea, even to Istanbul
or Ankara by road. On the other hand, the government imposed a tax
of 2 to 3 liras per ton of exported coal to benefit economically from the
coal of the Ereğli basin. In this way, the government tried to earn 3-4
thousand liras per day from Ereğli coal, which has an average export capacity
of 1500 tons per day.48
45 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 31-32, 34, 50-53; Erkin, Hatırat, 207.
46 TBMMZC, Vol 6, 443: 20.12.1920.
47 TBMMZC, Vol 9, 239: 26.03.1921.
48 TBMMZC, Vol 3, 237-249: 15.08.1920.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
105
The development that relieved the railway administration to a certain
extent was the signing of the Ankara Agreement with the French on October
20, 1921, and thus the opening of the Mersin road. By establishing
communication with the lively markets of Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin, the
coals offered for sale by the traders and manufacturers in these areas
were found. For example, 250 tons of coal was purchased from a merchant
in Mersin in January 1922. At the same time, 500 tons of coal were
borrowed from the French. Behiç Bey said in his memoirs: "While meeting
with the Ministry of Public Works to bring coal from Zonguldak, I also
supplied more or less coal from Mersin and Adana, as I borrowed from a
French company. When the first coal wagon arrived in Konya, it was a
feast day for us and especially for the machinists.”49 Some attempts were
made through the Red Crescent's (Kızılay) vice-president, Hamid Bey, in
Istanbul to ensure that coal from Ereğli was brought. Henry Franklin-
Bouillon stated that the Greeks could not attack in any way when Ereğli
coal was transported to Mersin by French ships, and an officer from the
French Ship Partnership in Mersin went to Istanbul for this job. The Ministry
of Public Works reported that 4 thousand tons (later increased to 8
thousand tons) of coal were purchased from the Zonguldak Ottoman Coal
Company at the cost of 15.5 liras per ton (including the shipping fee) to
be delivered to the railway in Mersin and 1750 tons were on their way to
Mersin port. Despite these developments, there were problems in the
transportation of Ereğli coal to Mersin. The Greeks seized a Frenchflagged
ship, and the ship was taken to the Greek port of Piraeus. The
Italians seized another ship carrying 2675 tons of coal, and coal was sold
in Istanbul.
On the other hand, in March 1922, 2 coal ships were unloaded to Mersin
port with 30 thousand liras given by the Ministry of Finance. At the
same time, a coal ship from Zonguldak reached Mersin. 1276 tons of
Ereğli coal came to Mersin on behalf of the Ottoman Bank with a Frenchflagged
ship. With another French-flagged ship, 2500 tons of coal reached
49 Erkin, Hatırat, 223.
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
106
Mersin. The daily coal requirement of the railways was 100 tons at that
time. The report given in May 1922 stated that if the coal at hand were
mixed with wood, it would be enough for 4-5 months.50
The good relations established with the French after the Ankara
Agreement (1921) was not limited to the coal supply. 5 locomotives and
100 wagons with a monthly rent of 7 thousand liras were rented from
them. In the part of the line after Pozantı, the authority was on the French
soldiers. In this region, a 50 percent discount was applied to the transports
to be made for the railway administration. More importantly, a
large number of weapons, clothing, and animals were transported for the
needs of the army from the Iskenderun region, which was not under the
control of the national government at that time.51 Before the Mersin road
was opened, the port of Antalya was the gateway to Anatolia from the
Mediterranean. However, although train materials purchased from Italy
entered the port of Antalya, most of these materials remained on the
roads. Because, as we always emphasize, road transport was very difficult
due to the terrible state of the roads. The war conditions made it completely
impossible. There was no vehicle to take materials from Polatlı to
Konya, and shipping from Ankara to Konya was more expensive than ordering
them from Istanbul or Europe.52
5.2.3 Financial problems
The financial difficulties experienced during the national struggle
were strongly felt in the railways. There was very little commercial goods
transportation on the railways, which could only cover a small part of the
expenses. The policy of one-third price in military transports continued,
but all military transports were made on credit because the Ministry of
National Defense did not give any money to the railways. In February
50 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 96-97; 101-106.
51 Erkin, Hatırat, 236. Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 94; 120.
52 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 108-112; 118.
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
107
1922, the debt of the Ministry of National Defense to the railways increased
to 2 million liras.53 Due to the guarantee given at the time of the
company, the railways’ deficits were covered by the state. On the other
hand, the money sent to the railway administration via some state offices
during the national struggle could not be collected. In addition, cannon
wedges were made for the army in the factories of the railways, but a fee
could not be collected for them either.
When the British forces withdrew from Eskişehir, they took the 20
thousand liras in the safe. The first capital of the railway administration,
whose safe was completely empty, was 16 thousand liras in total, 10 thousand
liras provided by Eskişehir Property Directorate, 1 thousand liras
by Kütahya and 5 thousand liras by Niğde. In his report dated 26 July,
Behiç Bey stated that 130 thousand liras was needed per month for fuel
and requested 150 thousand liras to be given as an advance for one
month's fuel, repairs, salaries, and material supply. After the fall of Bursa,
the transportation of trade goods between Bursa and Alaşehir ended, and
the administration was in a position to be unable to pay its salary payments.
Behiç Bey had requested that the tariffs specified in the company's
concession agreement be increased 6 times.54 Because during the
years of the First World War, there was considerable inflation in the Ottoman
country, and the cost of living index had increased by 14 times.55
In the note he gave to the Western Front Commander Ali Fuat Pasha
in October 1920, Behiç Bey stated that the monthly expenses were 200
thousand liras, the deficit in August was 130 thousand liras, and the debts
of September and October were 300 thousand liras. On the other hand,
an advance of 16 thousand liras, which was given beforehand in August,
was enacted, and laws were made to provide 96 thousand liras for the
53 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 95.
54 Erkin, Hatırat, 198; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 7; 31. The 6-fold increase
in the tariff was made in April 1921 with the law numbered 110. See: Düstur, Array 3,
Vol 2, 27: 09.04.1921.
55 The index was for İstanbul and calculated by the Debt Administration (Toprak, Türkiye’de
Milli İktisat, 514).
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
108
salaries and expenses of the Baghdad line and 145 thousand liras for the
salaries and expenses of the Anatolian line.56
At the beginning of 1921, 24 thousand liras, sent to Isparta by the
Ministry of Finance to be given to the railway administration were confiscated
by the Southern Front Command, and the money was sent to the
12th Corps. Although requested, this money could not be received.57
Cases like this have happened frequently. For example, in February 1922,
the Ministry of Finance transferred 55 thousand liras to Silifke, Aksaray,
Burdur, Menteşe, and Muğla to be given to the railway administration, but
these funds did not reach the administration. Konya Revenue Office did
not give 10 thousand liras sent from Silifke. After the end of the French
occupation, a train was operated for the return of the local people to
Adana, but the cost of 7600 liras was not given, either. Similarly, 100 thousand
liras, which were sent to the Adana Reji Directorate to be given to
the railways administration, did not reach the administration.58 At the
same time, the salaries of civil servants had not been paid for 7-8
months.59
The Ministry of Finance, which did not accept its 1920 debts and did
not pay its 1921 debts yet, was to pay the debts arising from military
transports regularly every month, according to the decision of the Council
of Ministers in March and announced in May. Despite this decision, any
financial payment was not made. After Hasan Fehmi Bey became the Minister
of Finance, he promised that he would pay 30 thousand liras every
month regularly, but then he said that he could not give any money and
stated that the administration had to talk to the Ministry of National Defense
for the debts arising from military transports.60 In any case, Hasan
Fehmi Bey's fiscal policy was of "money is only for oily bullet and sharp
bayonet."61
56 Düstur, Array 3, Vol 1, 52-53. Law Number 12, 13 and 14.
57 Erkin, Hatırat, 207; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 51.
58 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 94-96; 110.
59 Erkin, Hatırat, 217; Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 94.
60 Gürel, Kurtuluş Savaşında Demiryolculuk, 96-99; 104.
61 Dabağ, Hasan Fehmi Ataç, 86.
109
6
Conclusion
his study presents a narrative of road and railway transportation in
the years of the National Struggle, considering the transportation
legacy from the Ottoman Empire to Anatolia. Transportation activities
witnessed great revolutions in the 19th century. The Macadam technique
partly allowed road transportation to get rid of the mud. Steam power
increased sea transportation volume and gave sea transportation great
stability. Steam-powered locomotives on land have tremendously increased
the mobility of goods and people. All these developments in
transportation in the 19th century helped provide the road infrastructure
required by the great economic transformation of the age. This
change in transportation infrastructure and vehicles had an impact on
the military aspect in the changing form of warfare since the middle of
the 19th century. When the old type of wars, field or frontal, was replaced
by total wars that required resource participation of large regions, the
transportation factor became a factor that increased its weight in the war
power compared to the past.
Compared to its contemporaries, the Ottoman Empire entered the
railway age late. Moreover, just one decade after the first railroads were
laid, the empire officially went bankrupt and had to relinquish control of
the vast majority of its revenues to an administration made up of repre-
T
U Ğ U R C A N A C A R
110
sentatives of foreign creditors. In such a bottleneck, making transportation
infrastructure investments that required large amounts of capital
was difficult. In fact, railways were built that would increase the flow of
economic goods and open the inner regions of the country to international
markets. However, the emergence of a common transportation network
within the country that would also meet the military needs could
not be achieved. The road issue, its military and economic importance
recognized even in early times, could not be solved despite many plans,
and the men-i mürur could not be eliminated. World War I, on the other
hand, consumed the transportation resources as well as all the resources
of the empire. While the roads completely lost their transport quality due
to lack of care, there were significant losses in the animal stock. Under
these conditions, Anatolia entered another war: the National Struggle.
With the rapid advance of the Greek forces in Western Anatolia, the
Ankara government, which lacked the most economically productive region,
tried to finance the war under challenging conditions. Deprived of
all war power factors, the national forces tried to quickly bring together
these factors, scattered in different Anatolia regions. However, there was
a fundamental limitation in front of it: Anatolia's roads that were neglected
and lost their transportation feature to a large extent.
It was impossible to build new roads and maintain existing ones due
to the limited budget revenues and the state of war. Local budgets were
collecting road tax, but this income was too few, contrary to delegates’
belief. Despite everything, the deputies worked in the parliament to improve
the roads in their regions.
War materials sendings from all over Anatolia to support the Western
Front took months and followed many different routes. With the fall of
Kütahya, Eskişehir, and Afyon, railway transportation between the Konya
and Ankara sections of the crescent-shaped railway network was interrupted.
The army was using the Law of Procurement of Military
Transport Vehicles and the War Obligations inherited from the Ottoman
parliament for the supply of transportation vehicles. When the army retreated
to the east of Sakarya in the summer of 1921, M. Kemal issued a
O N TR A N S P ORTAT IO N
111
series of orders under National Obligations by using his law-making authority.
One of these orders was the participation of the public in
transport activities without pay. With this measure taken at the most critical
stage of the war, the Greek forces were stopped in Sakarya. The army,
which increased its combat power with the slow arrival of war materials
on the roads, was able to start the offensive that would end the war a year
later.
In this study, I examined transportation activities from different perspectives
during the years of national struggle. I faced many different issues
while doing my research. Because transportation activities touch on
many issues such as people, animals, natural resources, environmental
factors, technology, economy, and law. This inevitably increases the details.
But, these details can sometimes open the door to new studies. That
is why I find it helpful to touch on a few details before I finish. The first of
these is the forest issue, which can be dealt with in the context of environmental
history. The war years seem to have had a devastating effect
on forest resources. The 39th law of the TBMM, the Coppice Law, is directly
related to this issue. It may be worth investigating in which regions
the law was applied and whether there were significant environmental
impacts due to lumbering in these regions. Moreover, the existence of
similar practices in other countries and other wars can be investigated. A
second possible research subject could be the relations between the national
government and the Debt Administration during the war. Even in
the books that research the economy of the national struggle, the subject
is not emphasized much. It is expected that there had constant communication
between the parties, but there is no detailed information on this
subject. Finally, researching the transportation activities of the Greek
side during the war might be an integral part of this study.
112
113
Appendix A Road Map of Turkey, 1921
Source: TİH, Vol 7, Map 2 (no page).
114
115
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