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 ISTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE PROGRAMS
CULTURAL STUDIES MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAM
THE MILITARIST PRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL TURKISH CITIZEN WITHIN THE CULTURE OF ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY

I’ve always had my intentions on writing a study that attempted to explain an element pertaining to the foundations of who or what we are as a society, we as in the contemporary denizens who call Asia Minor home as the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, lands that were continuously inhabited for millennia as home to a great number of cultures and civilizations that both dictated the course of history and merely played its part alike, where the history of civilization goes as far back as history itself can go. It was my belief that by attempting explain such an element I would be able to shine a light on the collective consciousness of the modern Turkish citizen and perhaps be able to provide clues, however subtle or overt they may be, as to why we, as a collective, think and decide on the things we think and decide on pertaining to matters about the social, cultural and political circumstances surrounding us. Thus, initially guided by the sources closest to me in proximity, particularly Ahmet Hamdi Akseki’s educational book for the military Askere Din Kitabı, I arrived at the conclusion that mass education was a good place to start my research. When I began to see how Askere Din Kitabı wasn’t only an education book for religious and military affairs but a guide to personal, social and cultural life at large as well, the narrative of the construction of the new kind of national citizen within the new Turkish Republic following its War of Independence and subsequent revolution started to unfold before me. That lifelong (and post-mortem, as a matter of fact) process of construction and production of the new national citizen forms the backbone of my study while it elaborates on the religious framework provided by our socio-cultural traditions, narratives, rules and regulations, lines of thought and peculiarities that have formed throughout the centuries to provide for a medium where the production of the new national citizen takes place.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE. ................................................................................................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT. ................................................................................................................ v
ÖZET. ........................................................................................................................ vii
INTRODUCTION: MODERNIZATION WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY .................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER ONE: BIRTH, FAMILY & OBEDIENCE. ........................................... 8
CHAPTER TWO: ADULTHOOD, MILITARY SERVICE & MASS EDUCATION............................................................................................................. 13
CHAPTER THREE: CULTURE OF DEATH & THE RELIGION OF MARTYRDOM ......................................................................................................... 23
CHAPTER FOUR: THE VIRTUE OF MARTYRDOM ....................................... 28
CHAPTER FIVE: IMMORTALITY & CONTINUITY ....................................... 32
CHAPTER SIX: REMEMBERANCE: FUNERALS & MONUMENTS ............. 36
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 40
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 42
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ABSTRACT
In the early stages of the Turkish Republic a newfound need appeared to redefine and reproduce Turkish society, who formerly consisted of mere subjects of the emperor, as “citizens” in the wake of the Turkish Revolution that brought about changes to many aspects of personal, social and cultural life. This thesis takes on the perspective of the individual citizen and chronologically studies how the newly anointed Turkish citizen is produced by the nation state machinery from birth: first within the family unit in infancy (baba ocağı), then with military education during conscription in matters both religious, military, and pertaining to social, cultural and individual life in adulthood (peygamber ocağı), with the culture of martyrdom in death, and finally with monuments, cemeteries, funerals and the nation’s collective memory post-mortem, and how this system consolidates itself with the public through the usage of a framework consisting of religious sensibilities, traditions, sources and narratives. The new militarist-nationalist order trains its citizens in accordance with the new militarist-nationalist ideology and its newfound demands and requirements perceived to be critical to the survivability and continuity of the nation (albeit, despite the new order establishing the positive sciences and secularism as its foundation, it doesn’t stray from traditional Islamic epistemology that bases itself in absolutism and obedience rather than positivism and secularism, the former values having become intrinsic to the makeup of the Turkish nation during its historical process spanning centuries). In order to display this, the thesis first takes a look at the sources of the epistemological break between East and West that brought forth the Islamic narrative based on adherence and absolutism and at the standing of this narrative in Turkish history and society between the Tanzimat period and the early republican years. It later shows that even though the Turkish Revolution affiliated itself with secular and positivist ideals it never truly broke from the realm of the religious narrative and epistemology that had been present in the fabric of its society for a long time, perhaps knowingly so in order to make use of this
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system as a tool of authority and education by regulating most, if not all personal and socio-cultural relationships of the individual citizen with this epistemology and narrative from birth until after death.
Keywords: 1) Islamic Epistemology 2) Militarist-Nationalist Complex 3) Mandatory
Conscription 4) Obedience 5) Martyrdom
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ÖZET
Cumhuriyetin erken dönemlerinde Türk Devrimi’nin getirdiği toplumsal, bireysel ve kültürel hayatın her alanını düzenleyecek nitelikte olan yenilikler ve devrimler neticesinde eski imparatorluk düzeninde kul statüsünde olan Türk toplumunun “vatandaş” olarak yeniden tanımlanması ve üretimi ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu tez, bu sürece bireysel bir perspektiften bakarak bu yeni vatandaşlık statüsüne sahip bireyin doğduğu andan itibaren kronolojik bir şekilde bebeklik ve çocukluğunun aile kurumu (baba ocağı) ile, gençlik ve yetişkinliğinin zorunlu askerlik (peygamber ocağı) ve burada gördüğü askerlik ve hayat bilgisi eğitimi ile, ölümünün şehadet mertebesi ile, hatta ölümden sonrasının ve bireyin hatırasının ise şehit cenazeleri, anıtlar, mezarlıklar ve toplumsal hafıza ile nasıl düzenlendiğini ve bu sistemin toplum nezdinde dini değerler, kaynaklar, bağlamlar ve söylemler kullanılarak nasıl pekiştirildiğini inceliyor. Yeni militarist-milliyetçi düzen, vatandaşlarını bu militer-milliyetçi ideoloji doğrultusunda ortaya çıkan ve devletin güvenliği ve sürekliliği açısından kritik önem taşıdığını algıladığı yeni ihtiyaçlarına uygun olarak (pozitif bilim ve sekülerizmi arkasına aldığını iddia etse de Türk toplumunun sosyo- kültürel mayasına yüzyıllar içerisinde işlenmiş olan ve epistemolojik olarak pozitif bilim ve sekülerizm yerine mutlaklık ve itaat üzerine kurulu İslami epistemolojinin parametrelerini kıramadan) yetiştiriyor. Tez, bunu göstermek için önce Batı düşüncesinin aksine İslami epistemolojide mutlaklık ve itaat bazlı söylemin ortaya çıktığı epistemolojik kırılmanın tarihsel kaynağına ve bu söylemin Tanzimat ile cumhuriyetin erken yılları arasındaki pozisyonuna bakıyor. Daha sonra, her ne kadar Türk Devrimi’nin laiklik ve pozitif bilim ilkelerine dayandığını iddia etse bile bu yeni militer-milliyetçi düzenin ve devrimlerinin toplum nezdinde uzun süredir yer alan dini epistemoloji ve söylemlerin dışına çıkamadığını, belki de bunları bir eğitim ve otorite mekanizması olarak kullanmak adına bilerek çıkmadığını ortaya koymak amacıyla yeni vatandaş olan bireylerin hayatlarının ilk evresinden son evresine, ardından da
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ölümlerinin ve hatıralarının bu dini arkaplan ile desteklenerek ve pekiştirilerek nasıl düzenlendiğini gösteriyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: 1) İslami Epistemoloji 2) Militer-Milliyetçi Sistem 3) Zorunlu Askerlik 4) İtaat 5) Şehadet
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INTRODUCTION: MODERNIZATION IN THE PARAMETERS OF ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Through the centuries preceding and following the Renaissance, Western Europe was home to numerous changes and processes that were philosophical, cultural, scientific, artistic, social, economic and political in nature and often went hand in hand with each other. It can be argued that a focal point of these changes were the works of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) for his studies and critique of the humane and worldly philosophy of Aristotle and the consequent prominence of scholasticism in Western Europe in the 12th century. As Kishlansky, Geary and O’Brian write in Civilization in the West, this approach argues that all problems, including those relating to religion and faith, can be solved by one’s faculty of reason that was bestowed to man by God. Humanism, fed by ancient culture and scholastic ideals places the human faculty of reason and the perfection of the individual at its center rather than the absolute dominion of God. This individualistic approach is further popularized by the advent of perspective first found in Italian art appearing with the Renaissance in the 1420s. In 1517, Marthin Luther asserts sola fide1 and sola scriptura2 and claims that the individual can attain freedom before the Catholic Church; in the 1540’s, Nicolaus Copernicus formulates the theory of a universe centered around the sun, instead of the strictly geocentric traditional Catholic view and defines an individualistic perspective and exposes the fallibility of the Church; Francis Bacon puts forward the scientific method as a means of induction and observation based on experiment and inductive reasoning; in 1637 René Descartes claims that man can only be certain of his existence as a “thinking mind”; rationalist philosopher Immanuel Kant separates knowledge and faith from each other completely. With scientific, technological, economic and socio- political circumstances rapidly changing in parallel to the changes in intellectual
1 (all translations by Mehmet Yusuf Işık unless specified otherwise) By faith alone.
2 By scripture alone.
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understanding where human reason is elevated before God and humanity is stepped away from religious dogma and as characterized in Voltaire’s fight against religious superstition and tyranny, Western Europe arrived at the Age of Enlightenment where a new, secular worldview became widespread. (Kishlansky, Geary & O’Brien).
While in the West secular change, the journey of the individual to be emancipated from religious authority as well as from state authority which was seen as the shadow of God’s sovereignty on earth was starting to take place from the 12th century onwards, at the same time an introverted period of rejecting rational thought in favor of religious ideals and knowledge in madrasas was ongoing in the Islamic world, certainly exacerbated by historical traumas such as the Crusades, civil and religious strife, or the utter devastation wrought in the Islamic world by the Mongol invasion in subsequent years. Contrary to the epistemology forming the basis of Western culture, Islamic and Ottoman epistemology define knowledge as bestowed, absolute, inalterable, abstract and unquestionable. This apriorist, absolutist epistemology based on the infallibility and unquestionability of the source material of all knowledge, the direct word of God the Quran, prioritizes Aristotelian deductive reasoning over induction and obedience over reason. This worldview that is based on an epistemological foundation that completely disregards empiricism perpetually requires the guidance of a guardian figure of absolutist authority: God, the sultan, the state and the father, all of which are rolled into a singular package within the nationalist-militarist framework of the young Turkish Republic, rather than the guidance of a free-thinking mind and critical thinking and the individualistic perspective.
As expressed by Jale Parla, the source of knowledge in Islamic epistemology are şer-î, or naklî sciences3 laying their foundations on the Quran: Kelam4 relays the text of the Quran, fıkıh5 dictates the application of the Quran’s commandment in public
3 Naklî ilimler
4 The word of God
5 Islamic law
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life. In time tefsir6 appears to respond to the need to understand the Quran, and hadiths and sunnah to understand the sayings and the actions of the Prophet. These şer-î/naklî sciences are defined as consisting of undoubtable, unquestionable and absolute truths. The theoretical and practical sciences of morality, politics, theology, natural sciences, mathematics et cetera on the other hand are aklî sciences7. The questions asked by post- Enlightenment philosophy are considered to fall under this domain of aklî sciences and as sophistry and false truths. Islamic and Ottoman thinkers were unable to ask these questions, even if they did, they did so in order to falsify their premises.
The onset of a modernization period for the Ottoman Empire and the Tanzimat Reforms did little to nothing to change this deeply rooted and dominant epistemology, culture and worldview. As Parla writes, according to Tanzimat period writer Ahmet Mithat philosophy does not lead to the truth; it is linked to the principle of Westerners of “falsifying” and “shaming” each other. Hikmet, on the other hand, is thinking on and researching the nature of being and of the universe under the light and commandments of the Quran. According to Parla, Ahmet Mithat proposed that conclusions only recently discovered by the modern sciences of the 19th century were already present in the Quran thirteen centuries ago and uses several Quranic verses in the attempt to prove this proposal. The indication of this is that the Quran had retained its authority as an absolute and true text even over a thousand years later in 1895, during a period of modernization and Westernization no less. This epistemological limitation of the Tanzimat period is one of its most interesting qualities, especially when it is considered as a period of modernization. It can be considered that far more effort was spent to justify these epistemological constraints brought to new regulations and rules that were described as modernizing for them to be in line with hadiths and Quranic verses within the dominant framework of Islamic epistemology than to actually implement the articles of the process of modernization. Despite its modernizing quality, the Tanzimat
6 hermeneutics
7 Aklî ilimler
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did not bring forth a foundational dilemma in the Ottoman cultural space between the norms of the East and the West; it merely admired and on occasion integrated, rather than outright adopting the new cultural phenomenon that arose upon the meeting between the fundamentally opposite epistemologies of East and West – it never attempted to honestly abandon old religious and cultural values that it held dear neither did it accomplish a successful and natural synthesis of the old and the new. What it did bring forth was a select, curated blend; a limited rapprochement to the West constrained only within the strict parameters of Islamic epistemology and culture. The redefinition of select modernist values in the framework of traditional cultural norms served only to strengthen the old ways of thought, morality and law on the foundations of Islamic epistemology. Likewise, Islamic epistemology continued to be the basis of education and to define its borders and limitations in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period. Ideally, this education was to be an education that watchfully and reluctantly included only parts of Western culture but still gave no ground to doubt, questioning and critical thinking and did not problematize ontological and metaphysical issues and was fully conducted in line with Islamic principles (Parla 12-45). As this thesis argues, the early Republican era masterfully continued this approach by integrating and aligning these principles in more than a pragmatic fashion with the newfound needs for the strength and perpetual continuity of the new militarist-nationalist state complex that was birthed in the climactic crucible of an existential war and the permanent commitment, adoration and adherence of its new, impoverished citizens.
Therefore, it is doubtful that in the Republican period an epistemological break was sincerely intended, but even if that were the case, the strength of the continuity of traditional Islamic culture in the practical lives of the general Turkish public, who mostly consisted of undereducated and frequently illiterate peasants not well versed in the positive sciences, would prevent this break from fully taking place. The absolutist worldview of Islamic culture in the moral and cultural space of the society that was to be the new citizenry of the new republic was retained during its modernization process with the vast majority of the public. As pointed out by Murat Belge in Tarihi Gelişme
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Süreci İçinde Aydınlar, the segment of the population that started and largely supported societal change starting from the Tanzimat period were bureaucrats. Likewise, in the Republican period as well, the “enlightened bureaucrats” took up the task of bringing about societal change with a top-down approach (Belge 126). This change that was enforced by the will of the official state authority that was in the hands of these same bureaucrats especially after the founding of the Republic represents the new state’s officially endorsed ideology. According to Şerif Mardin in 19. ve 20. yüzyıllarda Osmanlı’da ve Türkiye’de İslam, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that Ottoman reformists who were in prominent positions in the state apparatus had established de facto control over the governing body of the Empire and even absolutist sultans like Abdulhamid II had to concede to and acknowledge this institutional shift. More importantly, positions occupied by members of the ulema up until and during the Tanzimat period were suddenly beginning to fill with secular state workers and the functions and structure of these positions deviated as a result, which left the ulema concerned with their newfound change of status in the administrative and legal sphere (Mardin 44).
Hagopian writes in The Phenomenon of Revolution that peaceful cultural revolutions with a top-down approach often tend to be extremely nationalistic in nature and are primarily focused on the nation building aspect of it (Hagopian 8). Meanwhile, violent revolutions by the elite classes of the population, palace revolutions, or factional revolutions can be more radical with farther reaching social, political and cultural consequences (Hagopian 6-7). It can be argued that the Turkish Revolution contains elements from both, as the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Empire and the following Turkish Independence War brought about an acute and violent break from the old imperial order that was perceived to have betrayed its subjects in siding with the Allies of World War I in dividing the homeland and from the by this point largely symbolic but still prominent authority of the sultan, while the subsequent Turkish Revolution featured immense societal, cultural and political changes for the urban areas and the far reaching corners of the Republic alike, even
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though as this thesis argues, these changes were done both intentionally and unintentionally (as the revolutionaries themselves were inevitably born into the narrative of Islamic epistemology) in strict accordance with and heavily supported by the sensibilities, narratives, and rules and regulations of traditional Islamic culture and epistemology. The fact that the segment of the population that brought about these changes and professed to be their guardian as well as their harbinger was not only bureaucratic in nature but also heavily militaristic, consisting of educated and high- ranking members of the military hierarchy who were often former members of the old Ottoman military order and veterans of the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence meant that the state authority and apparatus of the newly founded Turkish Republic also came to be inherently militaristic. Murat Belge writes in Militarist Modernleşme that the military class attained this level of prominence and authority and was institutionalized particularly following the Second Constitutional Era as can be exemplified in the increasingly assertive rule of the Committee of Union and Progress in the lead up to and during the First World War (Belge 170). Consequently, it would not be a stretch to say that the Turkish War of Independence was fought and the application of the principles of the following Turkish revolution was dictated by a large number of former or contemporary sympathizers of socio-cultural, political and military ideologies at least adjacent or similar to those of the former CUP, if not dictated by its former members outright. This continuity all but ensured the militaristic foundations of the Turkish Republic and the warlike culture of its state apparatus without further significant and sincere reform.
In the 1930’s, the second decade of the Republic, a relatively totalitarian order was present that stifled varied and diverse representation, identified the state with the ruling party, and controlled many, if not all aspects of social and cultural public life. As can be seen from this state of affairs, the official Kemalist state ideology endorsing a Westernizing and Enlightening approach and basing its foundations on laicism and positivism did not necessarily provide much avenue for rational thought, individualistic perspective and free will, and caused the transformation of the official state authority
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into THE absolute authority in the likeness of God under the influence of the deeply rooted epistemological basis of Islamic culture that had been present in the socio- cultural and political fabric of Turkish society for many centuries and not only survived but was adapted to and integrated into the wave of Westernization that started with the Tanzimat period and radicalized with the socio-cultural, political, religious and economic reforms of the early Republic.
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CHAPTER ONE
BIRTH, FAMILY & OBEDIENCE
In the militarist-nationalist framework of the modern Turkish nation state the nation is a “soldier millet”: every Turk is said to be born a soldier8 in a common saying. Thus, obedience, the central tenet of the military, is also a very prominent virtue among civil society. Akseki, in his Askere Din Kitabı, conflates obedience of individuals to the civil and military authority with the sacred authority of a higher power in God and the Prophet Muhammad. The duties of the citizen towards the state are seen as one and the same as religious commandments and the fulfillment of these duties is defined as absolute obedience to the commandments of God which Islam strictly requires. According to Akseki: “To summarize we can say that paying your taxes, obeying the law and your superiors, responding with enthusiasm when called into arms and dying when commanded to do so are among our responsibilities to the state. This is owed by the entirety of us. God Almighty has commanded as much in the Holy Quran” (Akseki 205). Indeed, it is commanded in the Quran to show abolsute adherence to authority: “O believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. Should you disagree on anything, then refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you
˹truly˺ believe in Allah and the Last Day. This is the best and fairest resolution” (Surah An-Nisa 59).
The roots of this understanding of the culture of obedience lie as much in the traditional national Turkish family as traditional Islamic epistemology. Obedience to the authority of the father is of the utmost importance in the building of a civil citizenry with a militarist-nationalist identity: this same fatherly dynamic also remains in place for different authority figures such as the teacher, commander, or most importantly the
8 Her Türk asker doğar
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state. By also being associated with the sacred, religious authority of God and the Prophet, this dynamic between the citizen and the father figure becomes absolute.
Family is the baba ocağı, the father’s hearth. As with the connotations of the word “hearth”, baba ocağı is a place where the individual is warmed, protected, embraced, matured, and molded in the first stages of their life, as well as punished by the fatherly authority upon a transgression in adherence. This nurturing and subservient relationship is sanctified in the hadith of the Prophet: “Obedience to one’s father is obedience to God as rebellion against one’s father is rebellion against God”. If circumcision is the chronologically considered to be the first step into manhood, military service in the asker ocağı, the soldier’s hearth, is considered to be the second. This requirement is so great that according to Ahmed Hamdi Akseki in the Askere Din Kitabı, “The Prophet has commanded to immediately respond when called for military service. It is owed by us all to willfully and joyfully obey this command […] Those that run from this sacred duty have disobeyed their Prophet and their God” (Akseki 209). “The punishment of those […] who scatter away when under arms is terrible. This punishment is outlined in the military penal code and will be applied upon the capture of the deserters. But in addition, there exists another punishment they will suffer in the afterlife. Almighty God has commanded that all who attempt to escape when called to arms will suffer a painful wrath” (Akseki 210). In the soldier’s hearth, the fatherly figure towards whom absolute obedience is to be shown is the commanding officer. Here, young adult boys mature and are molded into men in the soldier’s hearth and are delivered back to civil society as decent, matured citizens. The highest ranking and most celebrating commander of all is considered to be the Prophet Muhammad who had been a party to many battles in 23 years and injured in many of them in defense of the faith. This is the reason the soldier’s hearth is also called peygamber ocağı, the prophet’s hearth. Here, obedience towards the commanders and those of higher rank is considered equal to obedience towards the Prophet and is the biggest duty of any soldier who’s a part of the asker ocağı. As Akseki further adds, God commands obedience to Himself, the Prophet and one’s superiors, and according to the Prophet “Those who
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obey their superiors have obeyed myself; likewise, those who have disobeyed their superiors have also disobeyed me.” Thus, it is considered that an obedient soldier who performs his duties well and without question will be rewarded both in this world and the afterlife, as a disobedient soldier will likewise suffer its consequences in be punished in both worlds. It is encouraged for the soldier to disregard their faculties of critical, independent thought in favor of absolute obedience, and thinking is regarded as the duty of the superior officers: officers are tasked with thinking and ordering, and the soldier with executing. According to Akseki, a soldier must be obedient enough to joyfully march into battle at a moment’s notice and be prepared and willing to die on the order of his superior (Akseki 212). Religiosity’s source, Akseki writes, is absolute obedience to authority even in circumstances where it is contrary to what logic or courage would dictate. Akseki relays that while arms, ammunition and other material resources are certainly crucial assets to 9, an army with weak religiosity would be unable to be sufficiently powerful to fulfill its duties. He offers the Turkish War of Independence as an example of a conflict where the soldiers’ religiosity and valor prevailed over overwhelming material and numerical disadvantage. In addition, conflicts within the national histography involving the Prophet and his stories of heroism in battle are told as examples of the sort of obedience and valor that strengthen the religiosity of the soldier. The source of this valor and religiosity is presented as one’s obedience to and strong faith in God, for God is the ultimate commander and leader whose authority would grant courage and spiritual strength to the soldiers who are in absolute adherence and obedience to it, giving them the resolve to overcome even the fear of the death. Akseki continues that bravery and resolve are considered among the high virtues of Islamic tradition and that an army that depends on God for its courage and charges the enemy yelling “Allah, Allah!” would certainly defeat any adversary. The Prophet is said to have referred to brave soldiers as “the swords of God”
9 Maneviyat
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and Akseki writes that the Turkish soldier has attained this honor by fighting with conviction in God and the Prophet in his heart (Akseki 218-222).
Ahmet Hamdi Akseki relates that in addition military training, officers must train their soldiers in how to live moral, social lives and motivate them to be honest and hardworking, with religious education being the cornerstone of this training (Akseki 131). Officers and commanders must enforce certain parameters that observed various aspects of life and present these with religious references as God’s will and the prophet Muhammad’s advice, the Sunnah, and expect their troops to obey them, as the background and social coding of individuals raised in an Islamic culture that stifles questioning in favor of adherence and obedience are already susceptible to this socio- militaristic education supplemented by a religious context and epistemology. With these, it is aimed for religious education to strengthen both the soldiers’ morality, religiosity and spirituality, in addition to shaping their perspectives on matters relating to the material world in terms of world view and behavior in accordance with Islamic creed and ultimately being good, productive members of their nation. This education includes matters surrounding both public and personal relationships as well. The husband-wife dynamic, the relationship with one’s siblings and obedience to one’s parents are taught within the state approved parameters of the national narrative that is imbued with and supported by religious sentiment, texts and Islamic epistemology. The nationalist-militarist modern nation state defines the family unit as the most basic block of the nation. The education of the generations of masses who would shape Turkish society in alignment with the state approved national ideology is defined to begin in the aile ocağı (family hearth) under the auspices and authority of the father, hence the reason the family hearth is also defined as the father’s hearth. The continuation of this patriarchal culture is important in the militarist societal structure. The first step of the identity building mechanism is the family unit and in traditional Islamic culture, obedience to the authority of the father, the family’s chief, within the family unit, “the father’s hearth”, is a primary element in the construction of the identity of the citizen of the militarist society. According to Akseki, the family unit where the individual first
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learns of love and respect for his homeland and nation carries a sacred quality through the bond of marriage. The reis (chief) of the family is the father/husband, and the woman who is bonded to the husband through the sanctity of marriage acknowledges and obeys him as such. Akseki points out that: “The Prophet has said that paradise lies beneath the feet of mothers and also that obedience to one’s father is obedience to God” (Akseki 196-200). As such, the modern Turkish nation state educates its militarist- nationalist society in absolute obedience to authority starting from the family unit with support from religious rules, texts and references.
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CHAPTER TWO
ADULTHOOD, MILITARY SERVICE & MASS EDUCATION
Ayşe Gül Altınay writes that mandatory military service introduces the male portion of the populace to modern, militaristic discipline and helps shape the people’s national identity and the ideal citizen (Altınay 220). The experience of military service of male citizens contributes to their perception of a nation living in a predetermined, sovereign and confined space and the feeling of existing as a singular unit. From grade school onwards military service educates the male citizen not only in the matters of warfare and security but also in matters pertaining to civilian daily life and in subjects relevant to shaping him into a productive member of his nation and family (Altınay 223). While the militarist-nationalist complex of the nation state transforms its young adult men into the ideal “national citizen” through military service mandatory conscription, according to Altınay, the citizen-soldier is also trained and disciplined as a cog in the machine of a strict and wide hierarchy, and also forms feelings of attachment and belonging to faraway lands in his country that he may have never laid eyes upon (Altınay 225). As Murat Belge writes in Militarist Modernleşme, military discipline is the element that is more intimidating than the death that potentially awaits the soldier and compels him to willingly walk towards mortal danger (Belge 729). Belge relays that Fredrick the Great puts it succinctly: “A soldier must fear his own commanding officer more than he fears the enemy army.” Senior Captain Refik Soykut also touches on discipline: “At the head of the magnanimity of the soul and spiritual qualifications is discipline. Yes, only and only discipline; because discipline means obedience” (Ordu Saati Konuşmaları I 197). General Sadri Karakoyunlu similarly explain that the officer “must decay his power of will and faculties of reason and thinking in order to command him to death” (Ordu Saati Konuşmaları I 199).
According to Altınay, the concept of mandatory military service was not always an entirely accepted and wholly adopted practice culturally or politically, especially in
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the initial years of republicanism. The idea of every Turk being born a soldier and the mythification of the “army millet” discourse played an important role in persuading the Turkish public to the necessity of mandatory military service: militarism, being warlike, and being member of the armed forces were redefined as cultural/national/ethnic qualities (Altınay 255).
The militarist-nationalist “army millet” discourse within the context of national existence and the protection of the motherland, as Güven Gürkan Öztan details, naturalizes and normalizes the “duty” of mandatory military service in the nation’s collective memory and culture. In the socio-cultural fabric of Turkey two important milestones of manhood are circumcision and the duty of military service. The boy who steps into the early stages of manhood after his circumcision matures and grows up into a man during his military service, getting to know “real life” and stepping into manhood in the rough conditions of the masculine mass accommodation of people in similarly undesirable conditions and the “civilization” of the barracks. In this process the young uniformed-masculine learns unquestioned obedience to absolute authority and is “disciplined into manhood” by his superior officers, and he learns the knowledge and courage required of him to fulfill his sacred duty of protecting his motherland, nation and family, finally returning to civil life with “an educated head, body and unshakeable faith” (Öztan 88-89).
Although the army existed as a secular institution and as the guardians of secularism at the founding of the Republic, the preconceived assumption that everybody belonged to Sunni Muslim creed made it easier to articulate religious values and traditions within the context of military service. As outlined by Kamil Çoştu’s research in his book regarding religious education in the military from the Ottoman period until today, religious education is kept at least adjacent to, and even more frequently made to function as an integral element of the military curriculum during the modernization efforts that started in the late imperial era during the 1800’s and continued well into the 19th century. On the contrary, instead of any kind of secularization in pursuit of a positivist ideal of modernization, religious education
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started to be taught as its own separate branch in military academia for the first time during the modernization period. Furthermore, religious discourse and language were further integrated into not only military education on an official level but also into militaristic institutions beyond that, exemplified in Mahmud II’s choice in naming his new soldier caste to take the place of the disgraced Janissaries “Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye”, the victorious soldiers of Muhammad. From the year 1826 onwards, “ilm-i hâl”s, catechisms on basic Islamic teachings were frequently distributed amongst the military caste based on the Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye edict, sergeants would often have their soldiers study Islamic texts and perform prayer, while the position of ordu şeyhi was diversified into tabur imamı, and alay müftüsü to provide for the religious education and morale of troops in accordance with the same edict until 1945. In 1950, a new rank fulfilling similar duties, moral subayı, was introduced as part of Turkey's NATO integration process. (Çoştu, 1926’dan 1945’e Askerin Din Eğitimi ve Din Dersi Kitapları) A. Hamdi Akseki’s Askere Din Kitabı carries immense importance in this matter as a religious education book for the military first published in 1925 by the order of Fevzi Çakmak, whose letter signed “Mareşal Fevzi” that was sent to the Directorate of Religious Affairs is present within the foreword of the book. In this letter, Fevzi Çakmak requests that while there are a lot of books and resources in existence for the religious education of troops, a new book should be prepared that contains concise and clear language for easier understanding and better readability for the purposes of shaping and strengthening the morale, spirituality and religiosity of the military from top to bottom. He additionally requests that hadiths and verses that would motivate the troops into working and laboring to be written on boards that were to be placed in classrooms and military academies. Therefore, Askere Din Kitabı, written by vice president to the Director of Religious Affairs A. Hamdi Akseki, was distributed among the military. A reprinted and simplified version of the book written by Prof. Dr. Talat Koçyiğit was published in 1976 and the book has been republished numerous times until the present day by the order of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (Akseki, 2-16).
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A particularly important aspect of the civilizing mission of the army was its efforts to teach soldiers the Turkish language and to read and write. According to Murat Belge, the armed forces took on a similar, parallel role to the Ministry of Education in the early years of the Republic when literacy was at its lowest. It considered as its mission to educate the often village born citizen-soldiers in literacy and grade school subjects in addition to education in military affairs (Belge 184). It is important here to note the effectiveness of the policy of mandatory conscription in creating and spreading a militarist ideology among the public. The reason the entirety of the male populace is expected to go through the asker ocağı is both training in firearms and other military matters and also in discipline. The purpose of this education in terms of both its methods and its content is for the male population to understand and internalize this discipline and the absoluteness of the military hierarchy, in addition to teaching “the absolute importance of the military” as a “necessity of citizenship” to young men (Akseki 183-186).
The importance of military service in nationalizing the modernizing Turkish language is also well apparent during the initial years of the creation of the Turkish nation state. For this end, mandatory military service is constructed as a service that is capable of reaching the entirety of the male population, and as Altınay relays from Mevlüt Bozdemir’s “Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisileri (Relations of Politics and the Army)”, a new archetype of national citizen with its own national language, culture and creed is created through the efforts of the Turkish Armed Forces during the nationalization process of the young republic. The army also takes on the task of distributing the newly written national historiography to the general public in order for its narrative to earn any substantial meaning and teaches the nation’s ideological history directly to effectively half the nation’s population (Altınay 226-227). In addition, “Ali” Schools were founded to improve the literacy rates of undereducated soldiers before their term of military service and remained functional well into the 1970’s. Large numbers of Kurdish soldiers from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey were taught the Turkish language through mandatory military service and many hailing from the far, rural
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reaches of Turkey were educated in “how to sit and stand, hold a fork and what cinema is” (Altınay 227-229). The class inequality and poverty of these conditions especially in the east and southeast of Turkey was perfectly apparent to the members of the military. As Altınay quotes from Nadire Mater: “I didn’t see any sons of rich men, they only bring poor folk here […] Sons of laborers, villagers... all of whom were the same.” “You use the same toilets; you sleep and awaken in the same filthy smelling barracks. There, you are not Ali, not Mehmet, not your father’s son, not a high school or university graduate. The people there are in their most basic, naked state” (Altınay 236- 237). In such a state, citizens no longer constitute autonomous and separate individuals, they are “Mehmetçik”, little Muhammads in identical uniforms who are to be returned to civil life as ideal citizens of the nation and to identify themselves with the army and state within the context of the militarist-nationalist nation state.
This importance placed upon literacy is present in Akseki’s Askere Din Kitabı as well, where literacy and learning are glorified using religious frameworks and references inserted into the nationalist-militarist narrative. “The very first verse revealed to our Prophet in the Quran commands him to read. For this reason, our faith has necessitated each and every one of its adherents to learn how to read, for in order to discipline the soul, our minds must be sharpened by knowledge” (Akseki 191). Akseki writes for the troops that the Prophet placed such great importance on literacy that he and his companions would separate literate prisoners of war from the illiterate and promise their release on the condition that they teach at least 10 illiterate Muslims how to read and write, and Akseki continues that because of the importance placed by Islam on literacy it is considered a form of worship to get educated and educate the illiterate (Akseki 191). In the asker/peygamber ocağı, the commander is the imam, the hodja, and the teacher all at the same time. Akseki’s book has Hasan Çavuş, the book’s representative stand-in for the ideal male national citizen, frequently lead his fellow troops in prayer and worship and work hard to teach them how to read and write. He teaches the alphabet to the average soldier in a span of 6 months, and has them read useful books of education and the Quran along with prayers to be said during namaz.
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Hasan also encourages the troops under his command to write frequently to their families back home where they would return with newfound knowledge that they would then teach to those around them in civil life (Akseki 190-191). Akseki praises being an educator and the values of teaching, defining them as a sacred authority that the Turkish villager would gladly adhere to, and would love and respect their teachers. In turn it is said that the Turkish villager would love and embrace the ones who would teach them of the affairs of the state, of mathematics and language, and of the Quran and namaz.
Akseki writes that matters pertaining to the health and well-being of the individuals belonging to a nation, which is the basis of the nation state, are also of great importance and must be included as a part of the education of the soldier. According to Akseki the strength of a nation is dependent on the strength of the individuals that form the family unit which in turn forms the nation: “The greatest source of strength for our homeland and our nation is the Turkish villager […] For this reason the better we protect this source, the more durable, stronger and honorable our nation will become […] Because of this we must keep our villagers safe from all kinds of sickness and disease, especially cholera, the plague, typhoid, typhus and syphilis” (Akseki 179). It is once again said to be important that conscripts, effectively the entirety of the nation’s male population, share their health education with the public, the Turkish villager, upon their return to civilian life. Akseki again relies on religious teachings and the Islamic religion as a basis for this education and heavily refers to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet in order to retain the adherence of the public to the rules and virtues of being a proper and productive Turkish citizen as established in Akseki’s book: “In his prayers our Prophet asked for strength of faith along with good health. In this manner, the science of health comes before the science of religion10” (Akseki 179). It is imperative that the individuals that form the nation protect themselves from all kinds of sickness and disease and work towards the improvement and maturity of the body
10 Sağlık ilmi & din ilmi
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as well as the soul, most importantly for the reason that one needs to be healthy and well in order to be able to fulfill their duties to God, then to themselves, their families, their homeland and their nation to the best of their capacity (Akseki 178). According to Akseki, the rules that constitute the citizen and the conscript’s relationship with their health and well-being are defined by God and those that stray from following these rules are rightfully punished with sickness, with the most important of these rules being hygiene, or cleanliness. Because the germs that cause sickness reside mostly in unclean places it is advised for one to keep himself, his dwelling and his village clean (Akseki 99). Akseki furthers that visiting the doctor upon being struck by disease is also a command from God when approached from this perspective and encourages the ill to obey the advice of their doctor and then pray to God for recovery: “Whichever disease God has given He has provided the cure also” (Akseki 101). Infectious diseases in particular are given religious context as to why they should be avoided: God gives sickness to those who do not avoid it, therefore it is a strict rule that the ill do not spread their illness and the spread of disease be prevented: “The Prophet has said: ‘Should you be aware that the plague has struck in a land refrain from traveling there. If it strikes in the land you’re in, do not go elsewhere as if you’re fleeing’” (Akseki 100), this saying highlighting the importance of quarantining. The importance of leaving a contaminated location only after being vaccinated, treated and healed with the doctor’s permission is advised and supported by words attributed to the Prophet. Akseki also relays a conversation between a lieutenant and his troops gathered in front of him. The lieutenant first speaks of war, and then brings the conversation to the topic of Islam. He tells his soldiers that ablution is an absolutely necessary requirement of prayer and all other methods of hygiene are also required by the faith: “My soldier sons, Islam is the religion of cleanliness […] Muslims are clean on the inside and the outside and in what they eat and drink […] Namaz, a requirement of one’s servitude to God demands being clean” (Akseki 128). “Our Prophet had commanded both his army and civilians to cleanse themselves with water and had spoken many times of personal hygiene and that of the environment” (Akseki 130).
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As Akseki writes for the conscripts, Islam commands its adherents to fulfill their duties to their nafs, among which are protecting the health and well-being of the body and the soul, taking care of and strengthening the body and maturing and disciplining taming the soul. This way, a man will attain a strong faith, a good heart, and good morals and will be able to perform his duty to God and His creations to the best of his abilities (Akseki 187-188). This recalls the body-soul-virtue relationship in Platonic philosophy where the individual obtains the true knowledge he needs to perfect his body and soul and to possess virtue through reason and the machinations of free thinking, whereas for the Turkish citizen and soldier true knowledge, virtue and their true source is the word of God: the Quran. The Turkish soldier has no need for free thinking to obtain true knowledge, rather he is encouraged to adhere to and obey the authority of his commander and the nation state he represents which is sanctified through the discourse of Islamic tradition and epistemology imbued within the nationalist-militarist complex that constitutes the founding of the modern Turkish State. “[…] On one hand our religion commands us to rely our faith on strong principles and on the other hand […] to use our head with the right knowledge and to adorn our heart with good habits and temperament. Because the real cause of all sickness in the world, material or spiritual, is either ignorance or not knowing what one thinks he knows well […] So to possess true knowledge is a necessity for both the physical world and the afterlife” (Akseki 188). The eudaimonia of the virtuous individual who attains this status by the functions of their reason and free thinking in Platonic philosophy is attainable to the Turkish soldier by obeying the national authority which is the shadow of celestial authority and through this serving his God, homeland, nation and family as an ideal Turkish citizen.
Akseki also touches on vices in his book, drinking and gambling in particular are mentioned and explicitly demonized. The bodily, mental and neurological damage caused by alcohol addiction is detailed along with medical information from doctors and the harm caused by alcoholics to themselves, their families and their surroundings is explained, drunkenness and alcoholism being defined as personal and societal
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catastrophes. Islamic views on alcohol are illustrated to the troops as they are heavily encouraged to refrain from the devils of alcoholism. Because Islam forbids all that causes one’s self bodily harm it is considered here that refraining from alcohol is an important religious duty: “Our Prophet encourages all believers to abstain from drink, for he has said that it is the mother of all evil […] No one can deny the evils of alcohol known to all and rather talk about its benefit […] None should heed the words of such a drunkard, because oftentimes it is these friends and loved ones that would lead you, who has never taken a sip in his life, astray” (Akseki 183). Therefore, Akseki relays, Islam has forbidden alcohol and views it as a trick of the devil to turn people on one another and lead them away from the faith. Furthermore, he writes that “Drugs that corrupt our lineage and our faith and reduce our population such as opium and hashish are considered by Islam to be haram and forbidden” (Akseki 180-184). Akseki defines gambling as catastrophic as well and strongly advises soldiers to stay away from it. When defining gambling, like with drinking and drug use, as a moral problem he uses religious narrative to do so: “God Almighty has condemned gambling along with drinking and has declared them haram and He has commanded that they are works of the devil […] (Gambling) too clouds the mind […] shuts down the hearth of the family, costs the individual his property, life, faith, as well as his honor and dignity” (Akseki 185). “For this reason all Muslims must stay away from this scourge and […] make sure to help that others do as well” (Akseki 186). In order to ensure total adherence and obedience to these rules regarding drinking, drug use and gambling Akseki again refers to and quotes the Quran to complete the integration of religious narrative and sentiment into the nationalist-military complex: “O believers! Intoxicants, gambling, idols, and drawing lots for decisions are all evil of Satan’s handiwork. So, shun them so that you may be successful” (Surah Al-Ma'idah 90). The next verse on the same surah similarly warns of these dangers and advises abstinence on these vices: “Satan’s plan is to stir up hostility and hatred between you with intoxicants and gambling and to prevent you from remembering Allah and praying. Will you not then abstain?” (Surah al-Ma'idah 91).
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In short, according to the absolutist world view of the traditional Turkish public that is rooted in Islamic epistemology, the culture of absolute obedience that exists in both overt and subtle manners throughout the layers of society is one of the cornerstones of the ideal societal order in the Turkish nation state. Education is seen as the duty of not only the regular citizen but particularly that of the soldier who is expected to better himself during his military service in both worldly and spiritual matters in order to become the ideal citizen to the Turkish state and also to share the contents of their education with their families and surroundings in civilian life. It is also apparent that Akseki, representing the state, uses religious terminology and a sense of spiritual and sacred obligation derived from the epistemology of the Islamic religion that is a building block of traditional Turkish society to compel the public to adhere to the values of the republic and follow in its footsteps to become its ideal citizens.
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CHAPTER THREE
CULTURE OF DEATH & RELIGION OF MARTYRDOM
The military class and the army played a founding role in the construction of Turkey as a modern nation state and in this process placed a significant importance upon the relationship of army-state-citizen. As displayed by Şafak Aytaç in her article “Şehitlik ve Türkiye’de Militarizmin Yeniden Üretimi: 1990-1999 (The Reproduction of Martyrdom and Militarism in Turkey: 1990-1999), it is considered critical for the fighting capability of a modern nation state as well as for its legitimacy that not only the military, but regular citizens brought together into the army with mandatory conscription also agree to fight and potentially be killed in service of the nation state. Those in command of the Turkish Military are proponents of this perspective, thus in this context the phenomenon of martyrdom in Turkey emerges as a crossroads between the nation state, war, and the traditional religious beliefs of citizens, but it is not enough to fully explain martyrdom and nationalism purely through a state centric approach. Within the context of the traditions, needs, demands and interests of the common citizenry, nationalism is a relationship of belonging between the state and the citizen and a status of inclusion within a nation and its homeland. This new bond also brings with itself the willingness to die for the sake of the motherland and for sacred, national values. Without this bond, it would not be possible for the virtue of martyrdom to hold any real meaning in the eyes of the common people and any longevity no matter how strongly endorsed by the state apparatus as long as the citizens remain unwilling to participate in its culture. This willingness of its people to die for one's homeland is achieved exactly through the assimilation of religion and Islamic epistemology, meaning that the modern Turkish nation state absorbs the theological roots of the culture of martyrdom rather than rejecting it and identifies it with its own cultural and political foundations and existence (Aykaç 156).
When considering the militarism-nationalism-religion axis in the context of war, martyrdom and the nation state, Şafak Aykaç’s article titled “Şehitlik ve Türkiye’de Militarizmin Yeniden Üretimi: 1990-1999 (The Reproduction of
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Martyrdom and Militarism in Turkey: 1990-1999) is highly useful. The text problematizes militarism not only as a contemporary and ongoing concept on the basis of war and troops but also as a tool for administration and control within the context of societal and political relations. Aykaç reads the cult status of martyrdom as a process of producing a kind of militarism that includes the willful and active participation of the civilian citizenry in the event of a military conflict faced by the state and the citizen (Aykaç 142). In this process, militarism is articulated by nationalism and religion. As Aykaç relays from Charles Tilly, war is a founding block of the nation state (Aykaç 144). The construction of the modern nation state and its continued existence works through its capability for waging war, and as quoted from Carl Schmitt, a necessary component of constituting a state as a substantial political union is its possession of jus belli (Aykaç 144); the nation state should reserve the right to demand its citizens to make war and to kill and die in its name. During the process of building a modern nation state, militaristic institutions also modernize and the presence of a standing force consisting of armed civilians and the procedure of mandatory conscription are established (Aykaç 145). Military service, defined as fighting and dying for the nation state, is defined as both a duty and a right. (T.C. Anayasası, 1982, Md. 72).
This duty is reserved for the male portion of the population, and the women are assigned supportive roles behind the lines and with the duty of raising new, selfless generations of young men in order to recirculate and ensure the continuity of this ideo- socio-cultural narrative. Life within the modern nation state sanctified through the integration of religious values and Islamic epistemology is seen more akin to a gift than a right, and the modern citizen should earn this gift within their gender roles determined by the militarist-nationalist framework. As written by Aykaç, the role of the national male and the national female have different predetermined responsibilities to the nation state. The man should be ready and willing to die for his homeland during his military service and education. This service is expected to both transform him into a model citizen of the modern nation state but also “raise” and nurture the male citizen to manhood. In the same vein as the man would defend the bearer of honor and virtue, the
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woman, the homeland, culturally coded as female, would be defended by the army. The male citizen in military service would have to be willing to die for both the female citizen and the motherland to whom he belongs. The female citizen, on the other hand, would motivate the man as his wife or mother to do his duty to his nation and be honored by his martyrdom. Especially being the mother of a martyr is a station of highest honor socially and religiously for the common woman within the social construct of Turkey (Aykaç 155).
Within the constantly reproduced ideologic and socio-cultural medium where the militarism-nationalism complex is integrated, citizens who would risk their lives by fighting are made to identify with war, the army and the state. The new nationalist- militarist ideology, according to Aykaç, successfully builds the equation that the state equals the citizen equals the army. Next, military deaths are rendered acceptable in the public perception (Aykaç 147). To accomplish this, death is constructed as a potential repayment of the citizen’s debt to the societal order they have been living in so far. It is accepted that every citizen is able to live within the nation only through the sacrifice of a portion of its populace that oftentimes equals death, and that he should serve in the same manner and make the same sacrifices for the sake of future generations, potentially paying this debt with his life (Aykaç 148).
Sacrificing one’s life for the betterment of the nation state’s sacred national values is regarded as a noble virtue in the state’s militarist-nationalist discourse. As Aykaç writes, the primary target audience for this discourse and lesson in virtue is the lowest segment of the military: the common soldier. The common soldier is representative of the largest class in society by sheer number: the underdeveloped common people with low quality of life and high sensitivities for nationalism and religion. For this reason, when martyrdom becomes the virtue of the common soldier, it would also become the virtue of that nation at wide (Aykaç 162).
Before the advent of nationalism, the Islamic faith served as a fraternal bond between individuals to create an association that is the ummah. Martyrdom in the modern sense of the word, on the other hand, is based neither solely on this religious
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fraternal framework nor relies on absolute adherence to an authority or institution like the king or the padishah. According to Şafak Aykaç, martyrdom earns its modern meaning through the unique and peculiar relationship between nationalism and the nation state and the citizen. The unifying quality of Islam in terms of ethnicity, language, and political boundaries that goes beyond nationality is redrawn in a national framework in accordance with the needs of modern nationalism, and the culture of martyrdom is transformed through the lens of the homeland-nation perspective. The legitimacy and acceptance of this culture does not stem from its continual reproduction by the state apparatus as a propagandist item, but from its mass acceptance by the citizens that constitute the nation as a response to the perceived needs of the public who provides it with wholesale and active blessing and support. Nationalism depends on the claim that the nation is everlasting and eternal, constantly in a state of soul searching within the narrative of its past. For this reason, symbols and sentimentalities often particularly religious in nature regarding the narrative of the past such as concepts, icons, myths and heroisms are reproduced and reused within the framework of the modern nationalist axis of the homeland-nation-state (Aykaç 152-153).
This brings the issue back to the main question at hand: the function of religion and its adjacent ideo-socio-cultural elements in the secular and militarist nation building movement that was the Turkish Revolution. When war, the capability to wage it, and mandatory conscription are considered as some of the founding blocks of the nation state and the inevitability of war and the death and destruction it brings are considered it is easy to deduce a pragmatic bond between martyrdom and militarism and perceive martyrdom as a tool to provide soldiers and citizens with the motivation and willingness to die for their homeland, but this seemingly unlikely connection between a secular, positivist, and modernist national movement with a modern society and the concept of martyrdom which is defined as a religious concept within a religious discourse seems to go beyond mere pragmatism. Religious context and the concept of martyrdom are painted in a secular color when being adapted into the framework of the modern nation state, or invoking Hobsbawm who Aykaç takes inspiration from,
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“invented traditions” are dressed up in the familiar clothing of the old in order to garner mass public acceptance (Aykaç 153). In the modern nation state, martyrdom retains its meaning as someone who sacrifices their life for a certain belief or cause that is considered sacred, but the source of this belief is altered. The soldier commits his sacrifice not directly in the name of religion and God but rather in the name of the state and the nation, the modern nation state replaces religion as the main basis of martyrdom and the state’s laws and those in power replace the command and word of God.
Aykaş points out how this transformation is present in Rousseau’s Social Contract: when the nation state tells its citizen that the course of action for the longevity of the state is for the citizen die, the citizen is no longer able to carry out judgement or have an opinion on the conflict and the bodily danger these circumstances entail. It is considered that because the state allows its citizens to live their lives safely within its boundaries, human life is regarded not as a right of nature but rather a conditional gift of the state to its citizens (Aykaç 154). Aykaç relays from Rousseau that every state, within its own sovereign space combines the love of God with the love of the law and the state into a “civil religion” and teaches its citizens complete adherence and that serving the state is synonymous with serving God, the protector of the state. “This is a form of theocracy wherein there is no fatwa other than that of the king and no priests other than the rulers. Dying for one’s homeland is martyrdom, and breaking the law is heresy” (Aykaç 155).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE VIRTUE OF MARTYRDOM
A good example of the understanding of cohabitation between the frameworks of nationalism, militarism and religion is once again A. Hamdi Akseki’s Askere Din Kitabı. The religious teachings in Akseki’s educational book begin with the sacredness of the homeland: “Our prophet has commanded that one’s love for his homeland is borne of faith.”, “The name of Allah and the homeland are inseparable on the soldier’s tongue. He cries “Allah, Allah!” and charges the enemy.” “[…] the honor of the soldier and the glory of Turkishness […] there’s no reneging on national honor and glory even in the face of death” (Akseki 18).
Akseki’s book conflates the practices of being a soldier with sacred religious tasks and even prioritizes military service ahead of all the other pillars of Islam: “As our prophet tells us in a hadith, one of the most important requirements of Islam is jihad, fighting against the enemy, for which one needs to be a soldier. Should this requirement go unfulfilled, it isn’t possible to truly fulfill any of the other requirements. For these reasons the esteem of a soldier is very high in our faith. It is owed by all to perform their military service when their time comes and learn the art of war.” (Akseki 210). “The soldier is the armed power that guards our homeland, our life, our honor and dignity and is prepared to lay down his life for this cause. No matter how big an effort any citizen can spend in the name of the homeland and the nation it would still pale in comparison to military service […] for being a soldier is the tax of life and blood, and for this reason it is a most blessed duty. One who loves his God, prophey, homeland and nation, who knows the value of decency and honor will gladly serve as a soldier […] The esteem of a soldier is high in our faith. If the soldier is killed, he is a şehit, if he survives, he is a gazi” (Akseki 209).
In Akseki’s view, the protection of the homeland, faith, decency and honor are only possible through military service. According to Akseki: “In the Quran, the soldier’s training and manners are farz […] For a soldier to be training is considered a great worship.” (Akseki 215) “No enemy can stand before a well-trained and well-
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mannered soldier, who is learned in fighting, and is as prepared as he can be with firearms and ammunition, and has put his faith in Allah […] charging the enemy with cries of “Allah, Allah!” (Akseki 105). Despite powerful motivations such as protecting the nations life, honor and dignity, fate and reliance on God is still made very prominent: “The rest is left to Allah and that is destiny” (Akseki 93).
Akseki, relying on the words of the prophet Muhammad, defines military service as a requirement of the faith, and the standard practices of a soldier such as drilling, patrolling, and competency with firearms as forms of worship: “Our prophet has commanded (Akseki 216): that being on watch for the enemy for a night is more pious than a thousand days of nightly prayers and fasting during the day […] Should he die on watch, the rızık bestowed upon the martyr is eternal and is given to him until the day of judgement: he will be spared the agony of the grave, will be exempt from questioning, and will arise from the grave as a martyr on judgement day” (Akseki 217).
In Akseki’s Askere Din Kitabı, the saying attributed to the prophet Muhammad “Ones love for their homeland is borne of faith” (Akseki 18) is the personal motto of the heroic Turkish villager Hasan Çavuş who sometimes reads Askere Din Kitabı to his friends and occasionally fulfills the duties of an imam to lead them in prayer. He identifies his mother with the homeland and swears to protect his homeland’s honor like he protects the honor of his mother. He lives for “the name of Allah, the faith, the homeland and military honor, the glory of Turkishness, and to die in the name of the homeland” (Akseki 18). At the beginning of his book, Akseki positions the embodiment of the trinity of religion-militarism-nationalism at the center of the basic character of the Turkish soldier. Immediately afterwards, he places this same character at the center of Turkish society by identifying its characteristics with those of his mother and father by way of Hasan Çavuş. The desire to be a soldier in Hasan Çavuş is said to have originated in the crib with his mother’s lullabies (Akseki 19): “May God protect our flowery hills from being scattered by enemy cannons! May God protect our green fields from being trampled by enemy horses, and our pure waters from being tainted by enemy boots. Protect us from the enemy bayonet striking into the heart of
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the homeland, the womb of our mother and the bloodening of our young, o’ God!” (Akseki 19). Hasan’s mother wishes him to pay his dues to his nation by either being a gazi or şehit in the name of religious values (that definitively includes the concept of the homeland): “I pray for you to become a martyr and serve the homeland! […] to be a good son and servant for the house guarded for centuries by your grandfathers” (Akseki 19).
His father implores him to be overjoyed at his military service, obey his superiors, guard his weapon which is the nations sacred trust with his life, use his ammunition well, do justice to the tax paid by his mother and father, and to always be brave in the face of danger: “Go on my brave boy! Always be prepared for battle. God is always with you” (Akseki 20). Portrayed as a veteran of the Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, Hasan’s father bestows a great deal of advice on him: “My son, I raised you for this day. You are not my own, but of this homeland […] Do not let your courage, willingness to sacrifice and your heroism falter. […] do not bring shame to your ancestor, your father […] Our faith commands: the highest station is that of a martyr, and afterwards that of a gazi. Our house would be blessed if you achieved either of these honors. And should you fall as a martyr for your state and your nation […] the spirits of our ancestors would be filled with joy” (Akseki 20). He reminds Hasan of God’s command in the Quran: “Do not proclaim those who have fallen in the path of God as deceased, for they are alive but you merely do not know it” (Akseki 21).
Upon meeting him, Hasan Çavuş’s superior readily commends Hasan’s parents for their national, religious, and militaristic sensibilities and gives him further advice: “So should be any mother and father who proclaims to be a Turk, and to be a Muslim […] The greatest strength a soldier can possess is by turning his ear towards his commander’s orders and his heart towards the mercy and grace of God. Thus, our holy book the Quran has told that such an army composed of brave, patient, obedient soldiers with their hearts open to God will be victorious against enemies who are magnitudes
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larger”. The commander repeats the prophet Muhammad’s words: “Paradise is beneath the shade of the sword” (Akseki 21).
It was intended by the Turkish State that the duty to die for one’s homeland should the situation call for it is instilled in the soldier-citizenry through the glorification of the virtue and station of martyrdom and to provide the people with a sacred and colossal motivation, and more importantly burdening them with this responsibility to make war and die in the nation’s name. These religious justifications are reproduced within the nationalist-militarist framework to appeal to the traditional and cultural sensibilities of the population in order for them to internalize these duties and responsibilities, while in the process providing guidance on how the soldier- citizenry should conduct themselves in both peace and war time to best meet these standards.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMMORTALITY & CONTINUITY
Martyrdom in the Islamic faith means laying down one’s life on the path of Allah, attaining “immortality” in the process. In other words, the concept of martyrdom in the Islamic faith is a station that glorifies and sanctifies a death attained through battle waged in the name of a sacred aspiration and it renders the martyr as immortal before the eyes of the ummah and the citizenry. In this context, the soldiers and civilians are made to expect and accept death in combat. The militarist-nationalist discourse glorifies death in the context of martyrdom so much that it become a sacrifice that is widely accepted by public opinion. In fact, A. Hamdi Akseki writes that the prophet Muhammad, despite being a prophet, himself wished that he could rise again and again only to become a martyr each time (Akseki 301). Religious discourse bestows immortality as a reward for this immense sacrifice: “The fact that what is called death occurs only on the body and not the spirit must be acknowledged by all who believe in God. Death comes only for the flesh, not the soul” (Akseki 300). In the Quran, martyrs are not considered as deceased and are rewarded and placed in a prestigious and select position in paradise by God’s side:
“Let those who would sacrifice this life for the Hereafter fight in the cause of Allah. And whoever fights in Allah’s cause - whether they achieve martyrdom or victory - We will honor them with a great reward” (Surah An-Nisa 74). “Never say that those martyred in the cause of Allah are dead - in fact, they are alive! But you do not
perceive it” (Surah Al-Baqara 154). “Should you be martyred or die in the cause of Allah, then His forgiveness and mercy are far better than whatever ˹wealth˺ those
˹who stay behind˺ accumulate” (Surah Ali ‘Imran 157). “Never think of those martyred in the cause of Allah as dead. In fact, they are alive with their Lord, well provided for” (169). “[…] rejoicing in Allah’s bounties and being delighted for those yet to join them. There will be no fear for them, nor will they grieve” (170).
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Akseki continues: “Martyrdom is only one station below that of the Prophet, in other words, martyrdom is the is the highest of stations following that our Prophet himself” (Akseki 300). “Of course, we may not comprehend the heights of this station living in this temporary world. In order to reach this understanding, we must become martyrs ourselves” (Akseki 301). This shows that therefore, the public is expected to accept that they would achieve immortality upon committing the sacrifice of dying for their motherland and in the path of God, even when they cannot fully understand the makings of this concept.
In the modern Turkish nation state, the status of martyrdom and immortality attained by the citizen is beyond the constrains of the citizen’s personal space and identity: it is connected to the continuity and eternal nature of the state itself. Paradoxically, the citizen subject to the state “dies to become immortal”, just like how death in martyrdom is paradoxically present at the foundation of the idea of the eternal continuation of the nation and state. Nurettin Topçu writes in his book Şehit, as quoted by Şafak Aykaç: “Everywhere the great nations are those that give their lives in the name of freedom and the truth." "Who are those that were martyred in Korea? Who are we? The martyr is not an individual: he is the spirit and the will of a nation contained within an individual. From his place of burial, he gifts us eternity and the will to live” (Aykaç 160). The soldier-citizen sacrificing his life without hesitation and in absolute obedience and loyalty to the state is seen as the guarantor of that nation's status of immortality. Nations and states born out of war are perceived to be elevated on the shoulders of soldiers dying in combat, and are in constant need of a mass of male citizens prepared to die for the continued existence of the nation and state (Aykaç 160). Also for this end, female citizens who are tasked with bringing into life new candidates of martyrdom and supporting them accomplish their assigned part within the cultural framework where religious references and epistemology are integrated with this militarist-nationalist context.
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The nation’s existence and future that depend on its martyred citizens of today, along with its past that is rooted in its nameless martyrs are considered to be sacred and take their places within the militarist-nationalist framework. As relayed by Aykaç, nationalism compiles a long list of martyrs stretching deep into the past. It writes its national history in accordance with a chronology of wars and innately prefers to extend this list of martyrs. An example to this is the encyclopedic list written by the Ministry of Defense composed of five volumes titled Şehitlerimiz.11 The book lists a record of fallen troops collected from archives that are chronologically ordered as from The Russo-Ottoman War, Greco-Turkish War, Italo-Ottoman War (Trablusgarp), The Balkan Wars, First World War, War of Independence, The Korean War, Cyprus and finally internal conflicts. The variety in the causes, times, and belligerents of these wars elevate the culture of martyrdom to timelessness, giving it a trans-historical quality from the perspective of the public. It is presented as if the all these conflicts had been waged for one homeland, one state, and one nation and all martyrs had been killed for this one singular, continuous set of sacred ideals. Through this it is ensured that citizens feel that they owe a debt to past martyrs and should always be at the ready to sacrifice their lives just the same in the name of the sacred values of the nation state (Aykaç 161). This debt is effectively defined as a “blood tax” that fulfills the nation states requirement for material resources one of which being the body and life of the citizen by ensuring his participation in the war machine of the state as fuel to its fire. The citizens’ conformity with this system is accomplished with a process of lifelong education within militarist-nationalist culture and society in which these citizens are born and raised. The glorification of the religious culture of martyrdom within the militarist-nationalist framework is one of the key parts of this education (Aykaç 158). This way, it is ensured that citizens are willing and able to willingly provide their “blood tax” by sacrificing their lives.
11 Our Martyrs
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A powerful link is established between the remembrance and immortality of a nation’s martyrs and the continuity of the nation state. Akeski once again relies on religious concepts that appeal to the traditional sensibilities of Turkish society and on Islamic epistemology by encouraging the public to believe in the immortality of its martyrs and the rewards that await them in the afterlife, invoking parts from the Quran. The nationalist-militarist establishment uses the names of those that have sacrificed their lives for its cause and defines its historiography with a series of conflicts to convince its citizens to willingly fall in defense of national ideals.
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CHAPTER SIX REMEMBRANCE: FUNERALS & MONUMENTS
According to Aykaç, the virtue of martyrdom which is attained by giving up one’s life in the name of sacred, national values such as the homeland, the nation and the state is embellished by the events and circumstances of the time period: this means that periodic political discourses like those of the Balkan Wars, World War I and the struggle for existence and independence of the early Turkish Republic in her War of Independence, along with the Korean War against communists and the invasion of Cyprus to the detriment of old adversaries, the Greeks, all contribute in their ways to the discourse of the virtue of martyrdom in the public consciousness (Aykaç 163). Aykaç adds the operations and skirmishes particularly in the nineties conducted in the name of national security under the umbrella of the “the Kurdish question” and the fight against terror to this list of conflicts waged for sacred, national values, as the concepts of nationalism, militarism and martyrdom are most often defined through the lens of this conflict in the contemporary period.
During this period in the 1990’s, the concept of martyrdom through a nationalist and militarist lens was popularized particularly through Turkey’s Kurdish conflict and one of the avenues of expression of this culture and the public acceptance of this state of conflict is evident in the construction of a large number of military cemeteries, memorials and monuments that are shaped into tangible, sacred places of not only mourning but a sort of nationalist worship12 (Aykaç 166). The public is encouraged and willing to travel to these sites on appropriate days of the year (such as March 18th
12 10 of the memorials (şehitlik) built during this time include: Çanakkale Şehitliği, Çanakkale Yahya Çavuş Şehitliği, Kütahya Dumlupınar Kurtulus Savaşı Şehitliği, Çanakkale 57. Alay Şehitliği, Afyon Büyük Taarruz Şehitliği, Afyon Yüzbaşı Agâh Efendi Şehitliği, Edirne Balkan Şehitliği, Adana
Pozantı Çamalan Birinci Dünya Savaşı Şehitliği, Çanakkale Sığındere Sargı Yeri Şehitliği, Afyon Çiğiltepe Şehitliği.
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Şehitler Günü, “Day of Martyrs”) and participate in ritualistic cultural events that are organized by state or public actors, this whole process being reminiscent of a nationalist pilgrimage. Events such as these that are held regularly and are attended en masse serve to keep martyrdom contemporary and constantly emphasize to the citizens national unity and their national duties. Each citizen is encouraged by both the public and the state to visit and see these sites at least once in their lifetimes, again, reminiscent of a pilgrimage, and to internalize the virtues of martyrdom and the connotations of the national symbols surrounding them. Even children participate in this process as schools frequently organize commemorative trips to these national monuments and memorials. This “martyrdom tourism” serves to heavily contribute to the reproduction of the discourse of martyrdom and in turn the culture of nationalism-militarism. According to Şafak Aykaç, the cognizance of a national identity and memory is instilled in addition to personal identities and values upon the “modern individual” who has no firsthand experience of war, through the virtue of martyrdom that takes shape in these sacred national sites such as monuments and war memorials. With this, the modern individual and new generations who have developed a national memory acquire a familial relationship with the fallen soldiers that they never knew and are made to feel as a part of a community with historical continuity and equate the fate of the sovereign state to their own (Aykaç 169).
Aykaç relays from David Cook how the concept of martyrdom is made tangible: martyrdom exists in a space where faith and faithlessness meet, and has a role in constructing some core equations such as the line that is drawn between two belief systems such as ally-enemy and the standards of behavior and discourse constructed for the faithful that are displayed in the public space through the image of the martyr’s sacrifice and his fallen body. The abstract concept of martyrdom derived from verses and hadiths become evidenced in a substantial, tangible manner (Aykaç 149). With the widely attended “şehit funerals” of the 1990’s, the citizens’ relationship with war and its political purposes acquires a public domain and meaning. The Turkish soldiers fallen in the conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK are afforded official
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military funerals and memorials in national cemeteries, and Aykaç writes that the new particular of these funerals and their increasingly public and ceremonial nature is their attendance by the masses who bear no personal or distant relation to the dead. These funerals frequently feature the glory and honor of martyrdom and sideline the true horrors of war while replacing the thought of it with emotions of anger and hatred directed towards the enemies of the state. The sacrifices of these martyrs who are sons, husbands and fathers, are publicly adopted and nationalized in these funerals, and the abstract "reward” of immortality for the fallen is substantiated in the eyes of the public. The martyrs are applauded for their bravery and sacrifice and the enemies of the state are cursed with commonplace slogans: “şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez!”13, “kahrolsun PKK!”14, “ordu millet el ele!”15 (Aykaç 170-172). The attendance of high- ranking members of protocol and the chain of command, according to Aykaç, adds to the funerals an official layer and acknowledgment of the fallen martyr by the militarist- nationalist state apparatus. The lamentations of the mother of the martyr: “I am the mother of a martyr; I will not be crying. My heart is full of resentment, hatred and rage for the traitors to this country”, that of his wife: “I wish to continue where my husband left off, I beg of you, take me into service”, and that of the father: “May our homeland and nation live long, and the Turkish flag wave in the sky. May one of each of my five sons sacrifice their lives for the motherland” indicate the transformation of the sacrifice of the martyr into that of the whole family and community. The family members who bear the pride of being relatives of the martyr and put significant importance in this virtue are the crux of this ritual and they henceforth take their most honorable stations among the highest of citizens (Aykaç 173).
In short, martyr funerals serve to legitimize the privilege and right of the Turkish Armed Forces to send members of society to die as soldiers and the concept of war itself. At the same time, the abstract virtues of the culture of nationalism-militarism
13 “Martyrs are immortal, the homeland indivisible!”
14 “Curse the PKK!”
15 “Army and nation, hand in hand!”
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and of the sacred status of martyrdom attain real substance during the funeral ceremony and rituals from the perspective of the public and this ideology reproduces itself as long as these traditions hold.
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is laid bare how the new Turkish nation state was able to engineer its new citizenry, formerly mere subjects of the sultan, in the image of the ideal citizen of the new militarist-nationalist state complex that was born with the Turkish War of Independence, and did so by redefining religious narratives, traditions, sensibilities and cultural items that had been ingrained in the socio-cultural fabric of the Turkish public centuries before nationalism and republicanism. It can be said that like with the old imperial order, this system indeed also breeds a relationship of submission and adherence between the official authority and the public, but unlike the old imperial order this relationship is cleverly turned consensual with the draping of the new ideals of obedience and service to the state that exist in accordance with the new found needs of the Turkish nation state with the old trappings of religious ideology. The authority of the father, the commander, the state (devlet baba) and God exist within the same part of the consciousness of this religious framework and this culture of adherence is preserved for the entire lifetime of the citizen, initially upon birth in the national family unit (as seen in Askere Din Kitabı with Hasan Çavuş with his mother’s lullabies heard in the crib), followed by education on the matters of personal and social relationships, war, religion and general education in mandatory military service (where the men are expected to carry their teachings into civilian life in order to both uphold these values themselves for all time and to teach others in their vicinity about the things they’d learned during their service), followed by in death with the glorification of the culture of martyrdom and the martyr’s esteemed position within the ideology of the militarist- nationalist state, as well as the establishment of the link between the duty of martyrdom with the continuity of the state, finally concluded post-mortem with the solidification of this ideology in the social consciousness with public funerals of martyrs and the construction of and the culture surrounding military cemeteries, memorials and monuments. This lifelong education is supported by an encompassing network of Quranic verses and religious narratives, rules and traditions already ingrained in the
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fabric of the Turkish populace for centuries and presenting the needs and requirements of the state in the likeness of the needs and requirements of the faith as well as the authority of the state (therefore of the father, the teacher, and the commander) in the likeness of the authority of God.
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