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PRESS AND POLITICS: TANİN IN THE BALKAN WARS
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

Bu tez, Balkan Savaşları‟nın İttihad ve Terakki ile yakın ilişki içerisinde olan Tanin gazetesindeki yerini tartışıyor. 31 Ocak 1913‟ten 15 Kasım 1913‟e kadar olan süre zarfında Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın yazılarına dayanarak, bu tez önemli Tanin yazarlarını da içeren Osmanlı yönetici elitinin Avrupa karşısındaki askeri ve siyasi tehditlerine karşı savunma ve günü kurtarmaya (idare-i maslahatçılık) dayalı Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyetine sahip olduklarını savunuyor. Buna ek olarak tez ayrıca yönetici elitin Osmanlı‟yı Avrupa‟daki güç hiyerarşisi içerisinde nereye konumlandırdığını ve bu elitin Balkanlar‟daki statükoya askeri, siyasi ve entelektüel olarak karşı gelmek yerine, bu statükoyu muhafaza etme arzusunu gösteriyor. Bunu yaparak, bu tez Osmanlı/Türk tarih yazımında Balkan Savaşları‟nın ulus devlete giden yolda bir dönüm noktası olduğu ve yönetici elitin imparatorluğun kaçınılmaz sonunun geldiğine inandığı yönündeki kalıplaşmış ve doğru kabul edilen görüşlerine karşı çıkıyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Edirne Meselesi, Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti, Osmanlı Öz Algısı, Balkan Savaşları, Tanin

I am very thankful t, my thesis supervisor, for this thesis. As my mentor, last two years she guided me to study about this topic. Whenever I needed help for writings and reading in this process, she always welcomed me and gave a lot of useful instructions to be better. She has broadened my horizons about the late Ottoman history, and she has enabled me to approach to the secondary literature from a critical perspective. Therefore, she taught me how a historian should be.
I am deeply indebted to my helpful and intellectual friend Çağatay Balkaya. Since my undergraduate years, he has contributed my essays and homework with discussions we had. Further, I want to thank for his patience and encouragement during the writing process of this. I am also grateful to my thesis committee members professors Ş.Akile Zorlu Durukan, from the Department of History at the Middle East Technical University and Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, from the Department of the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History in Boğaziçi University, for their valuable comments on my thesis.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLAGIARISM ............................................................................................................ iii
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iv
ÖZ ............................................................................................................................... vi
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................ viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ ix
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
1.1. The Place of the Balkan Wars in Modern Ottoman and Turkish History-writing ...................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. The Historical Outline ..................................................................................... 10
2. TANIN AND POLITICS ........................................................................................ 14
2.1. Tanin and the CUP .......................................................................................... 16
2.2. Tanin in the Balkan Wars (31 January 1913- 15 November 1913) ................ 23
2.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 31
3. THE LATE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL MINDSET IN TANİN (1913) .................... 32
3.1. The Components of the Late Ottoman Imperial Mindset ............................... 34
3.2. The Edirne Question ....................................................................................... 44
3.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 53
4. EUROPEAN POLITICS AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE
BALKAN WARS ................................................................................................ 54
4.1. The Ottoman Self-Perception in the Balkan Wars .......................................... 56
4.2. The Central Role of the Ottoman Empire in European Politics ...................... 66
4.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 70
5. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 71
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 74
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APPENDICES
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET .......................................................... 85
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU .......................................... 95
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2. 1. Tanin, 18 Kanun-i sani 1328 / 31 January 1913. .................................... 16
Figure 3. 1. The map of Edirne and Marmara region, published in Tanin on 1 Temmuz 1329 / 14 July 1913. ................................................................ 45
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the coverage of the Balkan Wars in Tanin newspaper which was generally associated with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to explore the imperial mindset of the Ottoman ruling elite within the context of the Balkan Wars which profoundly threatened the Ottoman Empire‟s core components such as the conception of vatan (fatherland) and the physical existence of Istanbul, the Ottoman capital which was the center of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, this thesis further examines how the Ottoman ruling elite perceived the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the European Great Powers and the neighboring Balkan states and the place of the Ottoman Empire in European politics. By doing so, this thesis further questions two major normative tropes which dominate the discussion of the Balkan Wars in the history of the Ottoman Empire: the first one is that the Balkan Wars caused the direct transition from the empire to the Turkish nation-state and second one is that after the Balkan Wars, the collapse of the empire was inevitable and imminent.
Choosing Tanin as the core of this study should not be a surprise. The leading authors of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid (Yalçın) (1875-1957) and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı (1876-1913), and the owner of the newspaper Hüseyin Kazım Kadri (1870-1934) were the members of the CUP and were a part of the Ottoman ruling elite in the period between 1908 and 1913. All of them were the deputies representing the CUP in the Ottoman Parliament and were influential within the CUP. As a result, Tanin established a close relationship with the CUP leaders and even sometimes the newspaper was used as the mouthpiece of the CUP leaders. Due to this close association between Tanin and the CUP, the coverage of the Balkan Wars in Tanin, particularly after the Bab-ı Ali Baskını (The Raid on the Sublime Porte) on 23
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January 1913 when the CUP leadership fully took the control of the government, provides invaluable source material to answer the questions posed above.
On 31 January 1913, a week after the Bab-ı Ali Baskını, Hüseyin Cahid reopened Tanin which was closed by the former government due to the criticism against the Kamil Paşa government. The newspaper immediately set to cover the news about the Balkan Wars and published editorials and articles about the different aspects of the war. The Balkan Wars maintained its centrality for Tanin until 15 November 1913, one day after the Treaty of Athens with Greece, when Hüseyin Cahid heralded the end of the Balkan Wars with his article: “İş Başına!” (Let‟s go to work!), signaling the normalization within the empire and returning to reforms and internal politics.1
As for the structure of thesis, this thesis was made up of five chapters. The Chapter 1, “Introduction”, discusses the place of the Balkan Wars in modern Ottoman and Turkish history-writing and provides a brief historical outline of the period covered in this thesis. The Chapter 2, “Tanin and Politics”, discusses the historical background of Tanin until 1914 and its relationship with the CUP and provides information about the leading authors of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. The Chapter 3, “The Late Ottoman Imperial Mindset”, explores the mindset of the ruling elite who aimed to ensure survival of the state and the status quo by focusing on Tanin’s coverage of the Edirne Question during the Balkan Wars. The Chapter 4, “European Politics and the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars”, investigates how the Ottoman ruling elite perceived the Ottoman Empire in the face of the Great Powers and the Balkan states and how the Ottoman ruling elite saw the place of the Ottoman Empire within European politics. The Chapter 5, “Conclusion”, discusses whether the Ottoman ruling elite sustained the late Ottoman imperial mindset and preserved the idea of empire during Balkan Wars.
1.1. The Place of the Balkan Wars in Modern Ottoman and Turkish History-writing
The modern academic literature on the place of the Balkan Wars in Ottoman and Turkish history is divided into three categories. In the first category, the scholars
1 “İş Başına!”, Tanin, 2 Teşrin--i sani 1329 / 15 November 1913, p. 1.
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defend strictly that the Balkan Wars gave birth to Turkish nationalism. The works on the Balkan Wars are generally based on well-circulated tropes which in essence portrayed the Balkan Wars as „the‟ turning point for the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. For some, The Balkan Wars were the unofficial date of the death of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of a Turkish nation-state. According to them, the CUP took a stance against Ottomanism after the defeat in the Balkan Wars and started to pursue a nationalist project to establish a homogenous Turkish nation-state in Anatolia. In the second category, there are those who argued that secular Ottomanism died in the Balkan Wars and they, instead, supported the idea that the Ottoman ruling elite reinterpreted Ottomanism from the perspective of Islam. In the third category, the scholars claim that the Ottoman ruling elite did not embrace Turkish nationalism and the elite, in fact, preserved the idea of Ottomanism. At the same time, these scholars argue that various ideas and tendencies coexisted in that period, so according to these scholars, there was not a direct intellectual or political transition from the empire to the nation-state between 1912 and 1922.
The most well-known member of the first category is Erik Jan Zürcher. He, in his book The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, discusses that in appearance, the Young Turks defended the idea of “Unity of the Elements”, but in reality, after the 1908 Revolution, they became disappointed with this concept, but it is debatable whether they embraced Turkish nationalism, or they were affected by a Muslim Ottoman proto-nationalism before 1908 or not.2 Zürcher approaches to the CUP and the period between 1908 and 1918, with a priori accepted view claiming that the CUP leaders had already formed an idea of transforming the empire into a Turkish nation state. Similarly, according to Zafer Toprak, the Balkan Wars was the declaration of the death of Ottomanism and the CUP relied upon Anatolia and Turks in Anatolia.3 It can be understood from Zürcher and Toprak that the CUP had a strong tendency towards Turkish nationalism and even searched for an opportunity to take action to materialize its nationalist project. So, the Balkan Wars provided both opportunity and justification for this project. This justification was based on that since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims and Turks in the empire
2 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 69.
3 Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Ekonomi ve Toplum (1908--1950): Milli İktisat--Milli Burjuvazi (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), p. 4.
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became majority. Feroz Ahmad too argued a similar view and he claimed that the Ottoman ruling elite gave up the policy of Ottomanism and emphasized nationalism because the Turks became the majority in the Ottoman Empire.4 Likewise, Kemal Karpat claimed that after the Balkan Wars, according to the ruling elite, the survival of the state was depended on the Turkish core which constituted the backbone of the state.5 These and similar views reinforced the trope that the collapse of the empire was inevitable. Çağlar Keyder even expressed in this view very black and white terms: “Indeed the disintegration of the empire had become inevitable after 1913. The conjuncture, within which diverse elements of the imperial mosaic rallied around the liberal platform as a possible toward a Nationalitatenstaat, had passed.”6 The view was a teleological approach that arguing that the nation-state was the final result of the Balkan Wars.
On the other hand, when we look at the works of scholars like Erol Köroğlu, not only the ruling elite but also common people showed sympathy for Turkish nationalism because of the greatest effect of the defeat of the Balkan Wars on national identity.7 This view first took root in Mustafa Aksakal‟s book first published in 2008, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War, and relevant chapter is entitled “The intellectual and emotional climate after the Balkan Wars”8 Later, Aksakal published an article based heavily on this chapter and the introduction of the already published book.9 By using Habil Adem‟s book Londra Konferansı’ndaki Meselelerden: Anadolu’da Türkiye Yaşayacak mı? (One of the Matters at the London Conference: Will Turkey Survive in Anatolia?) as his main source for that period, Mustafa Aksakal argues that “Habil Adem‟s work offers a valuable window into the contemporary intellectual and emotional world of
4 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908--1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 154.
5 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 349.
6 Çağlar Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire”, in After Empire Multiethnic Societies and Nation--Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Colorado: Westview, 1997), p. 41.
7 Erol Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey During World War I (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 47.
8 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 19--42.
9 Mustafa Aksakal, “: Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War”, Diplomacy and Statecraft 15:3 (2010), pp. 507--544.
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the Turkish-Ottoman elite.”10 However, Habil Adem‟s real identity is a source of contention and whose motives for such publications are questionable. His real name was Naci İsmail and he published his books and articles in guise of translating the works of scholars in Europe to discuss his ideas freely due to the political climate of the period.11 Even, because of this book, he was warned by Talat Paşa and later, he had to move Italy.12 According to Aksakal, as a result of the Balkan Wars, Habil Adem stressed need for unity and common action among the Turkish political and intellectual elite and the Anatolian Turks and defended a clear break with the Ottoman imperial past by defending the idea that the territories that were not predominantly populated by Turks should be separated from the state.13 However, building an argument for returning to Turkish nation or nationalism on Habil Adem‟s book is problematic, as he was not an influential thinker of the period within the ruling elite and the CUP. Even though his career was parallel with the CUP‟s political rise and fall, it is debatable whether he was actually a unionist or not.14 Therefore, Aksakal takes a writer with secondary importance as his reference point and draws a big picture as if Habil Adem was a central figure in the CUP and among the ruling elite. Contrary to Mustafa Aksakal who made use of a fairly unknown work as the focal point of his argument, Bünyamin Kocaoğlu focused on Hüseyin Cahid, one of the most influential intellectuals at that period, but he, too, could not avoid reproducing the same narrative centering around the trope that after the Balkan Wars, the CUP turned its face to Anatolia.15 It is, therefore, not surprising that he read and analyzed Tanin with the preconceived idea that the inevitable end of the empire was a matter of time.
It is understood that in general, scholars who were proponents of the thesis for Turkish nationalism approach the sources with an axiom that the Young Turks were strictly nationalist and wanted to establish a nation-state. However, some authors‟ use of sources, like Mustafa Aksakal, is questionable, because Aksakal
10 Aksakal, “Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War”, p. 522.
11 Mustafa Şahin and Yaşar Akyol, “Habil Âdem ya da Nam--ı Diğer Naci İsmail (Pelister) Hakkında”, in Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi (November 1994), p. 8.
12 Şahin and Akyol, “Habil Âdem ya da Nam--ı Diğer Naci İsmail (Pelister) Hakkında”, p. 7.
13 Aksakal, Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, p. 521.
14 Şahin and Akyol, “Habil Âdem ya da Nam--ı Diğer Naci İsmail (Pelister) Hakkında”, p. 10.
15 Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, “Balkan Savaşlarının İttihat ve Terakki Politikalarına Etkisi”, History Studies 5:1 (2013), p. 253.
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overrated some people who were not very well known such as Habil Adem. Therefore, he gave importance to Habil Adem‟s book as if Habil Adem was the prominent member of the ruling elite and reflected the voice of the CUP. By contrast, these arguments overshadowed what the ruling elite really thought about the war and the empire.
Apart from modern historians, official Turkish histography developed in early republican period also represented the Balkan Wars as a political event which triggered the homogenization of Anatolia and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Büşra Ersanlı argued that the official historiography of the Early Turkish Republic was based on six assumptions and one of them was revolutionary break.16 She argued that “a revolutionary break therefore became necessary, politically as well as culturally.”17 Therefore, in order to establish a nation-state and create collective conscience among citizens of the newly founded state, the republican elite focused only on the cutting all ties with the Ottoman past and over time, the Balkan Wars became a corner stone for this historiography. Consequently, the period between the Balkan Wars and the foundation of the Turkish Republic was seen through the lens of Turkish nationalism which assumed that all the Ottoman ruling elite had accepted that the death of the empire was near and inevitable, and they had agreed to establish a Turkish state based in Anatolia. Apart from the Turkish official historiography which aims to distance itself from the Ottoman past, in the academic literature on the topic, there are works written with a tendency towards such a teleological approach.
Apart from academic literature on the Balkan Wars, there are many works about Tanin newspaper. These works are generally made up of the unpublished masters and doctoral theses.18 The main point of these works is that almost all of
16 Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline”, in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 116.
17 Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline,” p. 121.
18 See İbrahim Sakarya, “Tanin Gazetesine Göre İkinci Balkan Savaşı Sonrasından I.Dünya Savaşı Başlangıcına Kadar Balkanlar”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2007; İlhan Karaoğlu, “Tanin Gazetesi İnceleme ve Seçilmiş Metinler (1--300 Sayılar)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gaziosmanpaşa University, 2011; Ufuk Sezgin, “Tanin Gazetesi İnceleme ve Seçilmiş Metinler (301--500 Sayılar)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gaziosmanpaşa University, 2013; Fatma Çakır, “Hüseyin Cahid‟in Tanin‟deki Makalelerine Göre 31 Mart Olayı”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Karadeniz Teknik University, 2014; Emrah Sert, “Tanin Gazetesinin Penceresinden Osmanlı İç
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them are based on the descriptive narration of political events and even, some of them are only the transliteration of excerpts from Tanin. Therefore, rather than being argumentative, these works do not bring a new understandings and perspective to the academic literature, and they repeated the official historiography and Turkish nationalism paradigm.
In this first category, nationalism was not limited to Turkish nationalism. Ottoman- Muslim nationalism is also used as an explanatory tool. For example, Erik Jan Zürcher proclaims that “the Balkan Wars put to rest any hopes of achieving “Unity of the Elements” (İttihad-ı Anasır)” and Ottoman-Muslim nationalism became the main ideology of the state between 1912 and 1922 and the CUP tried to consolidate the Ottoman-Muslim consciousness.19 Eyal Ginio followed the same line with Zürcher and he claims that with the Balkan Wars, the expiration date of secular Ottomanism came and many Ottoman soldiers had lost their morale on battlefront and so, they needed a new collective identity.20 This new collective identity was carved out from Muslim elements in the empire, as the Ottoman contemporaries complained that non-Muslim soldiers deserted battlefields and after that, such authors began to perceive its non-Muslim subjects as the enemy within.21 Y. Doğan Çetinkaya furthered this argument and tried to prove that the Ottoman Empire excluded non-Muslims from the empire during the Balkan Wars and treated non-Muslims like they were enemy of the state.22 As a result, he claimed that “native Greeks, Bulgarians and other non-Muslims became the focus of the rising Turkish/Muslim nationalism.”23
Siyaseti (1908--1909)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Eskişehir Osmangazi University, 2018; Ahmet Ali Gazel, “Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) Bey‟in Siyasi Hayatı (1908--1913)”, Unpublished Ph D. Thesis, Atatürk University, 2000.
19 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, p. 93.
20 Eyal Ginio, the Ottoman Culture of Defeat: the Balkan Wars and their Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 92.
21 Ginio, the Ottoman Culture of Defeat: the Balkan Wars and their Aftermath, p. 105.
22 Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Atrocity Propaganda and the Nationalization of the Masses in the Ottoman Empire”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 46:4 (2014), p. 764. See also Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Illustrated Atrocity: The stigmatisation of Non--Muslims through Images in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars”, Journal of Modern European History 12:4 (2014), p. 461 and pp. 464--465.
23 Çetinkaya, “Illustrated Atrocity”, p. 465.
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Conversely, despite presented as an alternative to Turkish nationalism, Ottoman Muslim nationalism does not provide sufficient explanation to enlighten the uncertainty of the period of transformation from empire to nation state. All scholars mentioned above approach the Ottoman empire anachronistically and accepted its “inevitable end” before its fall. The Ottoman Empire was still alive and there were still some paths to travel for the survival of the empire.
The second category of scholars agreed that the Balkan Wars were the end of secular Ottomanism, but instead of opting for a kind of nationalism, whether Turkish or Muslim, they argued that the ruling elite tended to establish a close relationship with Arabs for the survival of the empire. While Hasan Kayalı said that after the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman ruling elite was prone to reinterpreting Ottomanism from the perspective of Islamism, Alp Yenen claimed that there were many intellectuals envisioning a Turco-Arab empire based on federalism and decentralization.24 According to Kayalı, due to the loss of lands in the Balkans, Muslims in the Ottoman Empire demographically began to dominate the state and Islam started to play an important role in the ideology of the CUP, so secular Ottomanism ceased to exist in the mindset of the Ottoman ruling elite.25 Kayalı further pointed out that Von der Goltz, the German Marshall who served in the Ottoman War College (Harbiye Mektebi) and was respected by the army officers within the CUP, in the Neue Freie Presse, on 18 May 1913, proposed the Austro-Hungarian model for the Ottoman Empire and Arabs, but this idea was criticized by Ahmed Ferid (Tek), the former deputy for Kütahya at that period.26 However, during the Balkan Wars, some people like Mahmud Şevket Paşa considered the moving the capital of the empire from İstanbul to Aleppo to solve the problem of estrangement of Arab elite from the government, but this view was not welcomed by the CUP and they did not support this idea.27 Such debates did not take place in the leading articles of Tanin, and this means that these debates were not circulated widely in the ruling elite of the CUP.
24 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908--1918 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), p. 103. and see also, Alp Yenen, “Envisioning Turco--Arab Co--Existence between Empire and Nationalism”, Die Welt Des Islams 61:1 (2021), p. 72.
25 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 103.
26 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 99.
27 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 100.
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Finally, according to Kayalı, even though some reforms were made by the government to fulfill demands of proponents of decentralists among the Arabs, its aim was to appease the decentralization movement.28 While Kayalı questioned the sincerity of the CUP leaders about a Turco-Arab state, Alp Yenen defended that after the defeats in the Balkan Wars, many Arab and Ottoman intellectuals like Muhammad Kurd Ali and Cenab Şahabettin turned their faces to a Turco-Arab empire and they began to put forward the Austro-Hungarian model for guaranteeing the survival of the Ottoman Empire 29 However, in order to show that such ideas were discussed across Europe, Yenen, too, focused on Von der Goltz‟s advice for an Austro-Hungarian Empire model and the relocation of the Ottoman capital to Turco-Arab borderlands.30
It should be noted that Ottoman-Muslim nationalism proposed by Zürcher was different from Islamic Ottomanism suggested by Hasan Kayalı. Ottoman-Muslim nationalism was based on “ethnicizing of nation” and the religious identity became an identity maker.31 At the same time, this nationalism represented both Ottomans and Muslims. In fact, this kind of nationalism excluded non-Muslims in the empire and Muslims outside empire.32 By contrast, the reinterpretation of Islam while maintaining the idea of Ottomanism meant only making the role of Islam and Caliphate more prominent in the ideology of the state to prevent the separation of non-Turkish Muslims from the empire.33
The scholars in the third category rejected the clear-cut tropes based on the rise of Turkish or Muslim nationalism or the Islamist reinterpretation of Ottomanism in relation to the Balkan Wars. Instead, they argue that although the Balkan Wars led many discussions about the empire and its future, this did not either lead to clear-cut ideological choices or cause the rejection of the multi-religious composition of the empire. Ebru Boyar, in her article “Impact of the Balkan Wars on Ottoman History Writing: Searching for a Soul”, counters the tropes based on the rising of Turkish
28 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 101.
29 Yenen, “Envisioning Turco--Arab Co--Existence between Empire and Nationalism,” pp. 72--73.
30 Yenen, “Envisioning Turco--Arab Co--Existence between Empire and Nationalism”, p. 79.
31 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, p. 195 and p. 230.
32 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, p. 230.
33 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 103.
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nationalism after the Balkan Wars and argues that the Balkan Wars did not cause a turning point in Turkish nationalism or caused any ideological break, conversely it created a psychological trauma in the Ottomans to face the loss of the wars and they tried to analyze the reasons of this unexpected and humiliating defeat.34 Similarly, she, in her chapter “Nations and Nationalism in the Late Ottoman Empire”, maintained her ideas that the defeats in Balkan Wars did not give birth to the construction of Turkism as the dominant ideology but rather unleashed a multitude of different intellectual response.35 Likewise, Ramazan Hakkı Öztan criticized scholars of the late Ottoman period that they approach to the late Ottoman period from the teleologic perspective as they see the collapse of the empire inevitable and they argue that the defeat in the Balkan Wars was a turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire, because the Ottoman ruling elite abandoned the idea of the empire and began to embrace Turkish nationalism.36 By using primary sources such as pamphlets and books published during and after the Balkan Wars, Öztan demonstrated that the transition from the empire to the nation-state was a messy process.37 So, Öztan and Boyar show the existence of different ideas and fluidity of current thoughts within intellectual climate during the period between 1912 and 1922.
1.2. The Historical Outline
The cause of Balkan War was the Macedonian Question. On 30 September 1912, the Great Powers declared that they, namely Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Italy and Germany), would discuss the reforms that were to be imposed on Macedonia.38 On 2 October 1912, the Balkan Alliance (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro) demanded that the Ottoman state should implement reforms under the supervision of the Great Powers and representatives of
34 Ebru Boyar, “The Impact of the Balkan Wars on Ottoman History Writing: Searching for a Soul”, Middle East Critique 23:2 (2014), p. 151.
35 Ebru Boyar, "Nations and Nationalisms in the Late Ottoman Empire", Ebru Boyar, "Nations and Nationalisms in the Late Ottoman Empire", in The Cambridge History of in The Cambridge History of Nationhood and Nationalism. Volume II Nationalism’s Fields of Interaction, Nationhood and Nationalism. Volume II Nationalism’s Fields of Interaction, ed. Cathie Carmichael, ed. Cathie Carmichael, Mahthew D'Auria and Aviel Roshwald (Cambridge: Cambridge UMahthew D'Auria and Aviel Roshwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), p. 23.niversity Press, 2023), p. 23.
36 Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, “Point of No Return? Prospects of Empire After the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912--1913)”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 50:1 (2018), pp. 65--66.
37 Öztan, “Point of No Return? Prospects of Empire After the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912--1913)”, p. 68.
38 Aykut Kansu, Politics in Post--Revolutionary Turkey: 1908--1913 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), p. 417.
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the four Balkan states, in return, on 6 October 1912, the Ottoman government agreed with this proposal partially, in fact, it supported the implementation of the reforms, but did not want the intervention of the Great Powers and it put forward that the Ottoman Empire would plan the reforms according to the measures taken by the European Reform Commission for the Reorganization of the Eastern Rumelian Administration which was established in 1880 with the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin.39 Upon rejection of this demand, the war broke out on 8 October 1912 with the attack of Montenegro to the Ottoman state as Montenegrin troops crossed the border and took Bijelo Polje in the Sanjak of İpek and moved towards Berane.40 On 18 October 1912, the other members of the Balkan Alliance; Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia joined the war against the Ottoman Empire.41 This Balkan Alliance was consisted of four Balkan states, firstly, with the Russian support, on 7 march 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia reached an agreement, later Greece signed a treaty with Bulgaria in Sofia on May 1912 and looked for an agreement with Serbia and Montenegro during the summer of 1912, and finally, on 27 September 1912, Montenegro and Serbia came to an agreement against the Ottoman Empire, so the Balkan Alliance was completed.42 Unexpectedly, the forces of the Balkan alliances advanced rapidly into the Ottoman lands and except for Ioannina (Yanya), Scutari (İşkodra) and Edirne and they captured almost all Ottoman lands in Europe.43 Even, Bulgarian forces advanced towards Istanbul, but they were stopped at the Çatalca Line, which was the outskirts of the capital city.44 As the Great Powers concerned about a possible Russo-Austria conflict, they intervened and an armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states, on 3 December 1912.45 For this reason, two peace conferences were held separately at St James‟s Palace in London.46 The first
39 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908--1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 116.
40 Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des etats balcaniques jusqu’a 1924 (Paris: Librairie Universitaire J. Gamber, 1925), p. 475.
41 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. 2: Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 97.
42 Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11--13.
43 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 171.
44 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (Routledge: London, 1993), p. 37.
45 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 171.
46 Douglas Dakin, “The Diplomacy of the Great Wars and the Balkan States, 1908--1914”, Balkan Studies 3:2 (1962), p. 357.
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conference was among the ambassadors of the (Süfera Konferansı) Great Britain, Austria, Russia, France, Germany and Italy to discuss the Albanian Question, the situation in the Aegean Islands and the Edirne Question and was convened on 12 December 1912.47 During this conference, the Great Powers stated that status quo would not be imposed and the debates about the future boundaries in the region were left to the Balkan states.48 The second conference was between the belligerents, i.e. the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire, and it was gathered on 16 December 1912 to demarcate the borders after the Balkan Alliance‟s victory over the Ottoman Empire and to decide the fate of Aegean Islands.49 The Balkan states wanted the Ottoman Empire to abandon Edirne and the Aegean Islands and the Ottomans refused this offer and so, on 6 January 1913, this conference was suspended.
On 17 January 1913, the Great Powers gave an ultimatum to the Porte, the Kamil Paşa government, and this ultimatum declared that if the Ottoman Empire accepted to surrender Edirne to Bulgaria and to leave the Question of the Aegean Islands to the Great Powers, the Muslim interests in Edirne would be protected and the Islands that were ceded to Greece would not pose a threat to the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire.50 On 22 January, Kamil Paşa gathered the consultative assembly to discuss whether the Ottoman Empire should accept the conditions of this ultimatum or not. Kamil Pasha tended to accept the surrender of Edirne to Bulgaria, and this caused the coup d‟état of 23 January, namely the Bab-ı Ali Baskını and thanks to which, the CUP took control of the government. Because of that, on 3 February 1913, the armistice was ended, and the war was re-started.51 Although the CUP took the total control of the government with the pretext of saving Edirne which was under the Bulgarian siege since late October 1912, the city only fell to the Bulgarians on 26 March 1913.52
With the enforcement of the Great Powers, the Treaty of London was signed on 30 May 1913. The Treaty of London brought an end to the war between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire.53 According to this treaty, the border between
47 Dakin, “The Diplomacy of the Great Wars and the Balkan States, 1908--1914”, p. 357.
48 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 520.
49 Dakin, “The Diplomacy of the Great Wars and the Balkan States, 1908--1914”, p. 357.
50 Dakin, “The Diplomacy of the Great Wars and the Balkan States, 1908--1914”, p. 359.
51 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 38.
52 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 173.
53 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, p. 101.
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the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria was the Enez-Midye Line, so the Ottomans accepted to cede all lands from the west of this line to Bulgaria and also, all the Aegean Islands, except Bozcaada and Gökçeada, were left to Greece.54 However, after the signing of the treaty, the problem of division of Macedonia remained unsolved and continued to be a bone of contention between the Balkan states.55 Because of the establishment of independent Albania with the Treaty of London, Greece and Serbia could not have the lands that they expected to annex, so they turned their face to Macedonia to compensate their losses.56 As a result of this, the Second Balkan War broke out a month later. On 29/30 June 1913, Bulgaria began a military attack on its former allies.57 The CUP government saw this as an opportunity to recover Edirne which was under the Bulgarian occupation and the Ottoman army entered into Edirne without firing a shot on 23 July 1913.58 After several defeats in Vidin against Serbia and Romania, the Bulgarians were forced to offer an armistice to other the Balkan states on 31 July 1913 and on 10 August 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed between the former Balkan states.59 On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was not invited to this conference in Bucharest and the former Balkan allies reached separate agreements with the empire. The Ottomans signed the Treaty of Istanbul with Bulgaria on 29 September 1913, the Treaty of Athens with Greece on 14 November 1913 and the Treaty of Istanbul with Serbia on 14 March 1914.60 At the end of the Balkan Wars, while the Ottoman Empire managed to keep Edirne and Kırklareli, it lost all Macedonia and Albania. During the war, according to Edward Jackson, total amount of the Ottoman casualties was approximately 125.000 including people who died of diseases.61 However, at the same time, number of Muslims that were forced to migrate into the Ottoman Empire during and after the Balkan Wars (1912-1920) was about 413.922.62
54 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, pp. 101--102.
55 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, p. 102.
56 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. 2: Twentieth Century, p. 99.
57 Dakin, “The Diplomacy of the Great Wars and the Balkan States, 1908--1914”, p. 365.
58 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, p. 119.
59 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, pp. 122--123.
60 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 173.
61 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912--1913 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), p. 329.
62 Justin McCharthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821--1922 (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), p. 163.
14
CHAPTER 2
TANIN AND POLITICS
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought the liberty to the Ottoman press like to all segments of the Ottoman society. This heralded the end of Abdülhamid II‟s despotism, and many people celebrated re-proclaiming of the Constitution of 1876 in the streets. These celebrations were reflected in press. Hüseyin Cahid and Abdullah Zühtü‟s articles, who was a friend of Hüseyin Cahid and a journalist who worked for Sabah and later İkdam newspapers before the Constitutional Period, were combined under the title of “Oh!” (O!) and were published in İkdam newspaper which was a prominent newspaper before and after the Constitutional Period, owned by Ahmet Cevdet.63 With the motivation of disseminating ideas freely, many people began to embark on journalism which caused the press boom at that period. Therefore, it can be inferred from this fact that main drive behind this boom was the Hamidian regime and its restrictions on the press and removal of these prohibitions gave birth to a popular reaction in the form of newspaper production.64 Even though this popular reaction was considered by some as a sign of democracy, others like Server İskit argued that the unlimited press freedom was not liberty but caused anarchy.65 Because of the removal of censorship, at the beginning, many newspapers were founded. According to Orhan Koloğlu, the number of people who applied for
63 Alpay Kabacalı, Türk Basınında Demokrasi (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999), p. 55; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, ed. Rauf Mutluay (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p. 189; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, ed. Rauf Mutluay (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p. 33; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p. 4; Ömer Faruk Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1982), p. 21; Hilmi Bengi, Gazeteci, Siyasetçi ve Fikir Adamı Olarak Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000), p. 42.
64 Erol A. F. Baykal, The Ottoman Press (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 59.
65 Kabacalı, Türk Basınında Demokrasi, p. 56. See also, Server R. İskit, Türkiye’de Neşriyat Hareketleri Tarihine Bir Bakış (Ankara: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2000), p. 91.
15
newspaper permits increased six times more than the Hamidian period.66 However, apart from publishing articles and news and disseminating ideas easily, the press boom paved the way of development of the press as private entrepreneurship in the form of publications. All in all, it was a business.
This desire of setting up newspaper was not limited to Istanbul. After the revolution, many shrewd entrepreneurs established printing houses for Greek, Armenian and Turkish in Anatolia until late 1908, so this resulted in flourishing media organs which were representatives of every idea.67 As a result, it can be said that the removal of censorship and the emergence of private printing houses independent from the palace heralded a new period of journalism. This was the opinion journalism (fikir gazeteciliği) and thanks to this type of journalism, political discussions on administration and expression of ideas about state and government gained importance and again became prevalent in newspapers.68 Thanks to the re-proclamation of the constitution, the competition within press flourished, because newspapers and writers were able to cut their connections with the palace which provided newspapers with funds before the Constitutional Period, but when the subsidization of palace was removed, the demand and circulation became essential for the survival of newspapers.69 Therefore, drawing attention of readers was the main purpose of newspapers. The best way to attract readers‟ attention was of course politics. Generally, newspapers began to represent interests of each political party and became „voice of each political party‟ to reach to readers. Hence, newspapers secured their benefits by bonding itself with a political party in order to achieve the circulation that was intended so that these newspapers‟ owners could afford printing costs. Abdullah Zühtü‟s membership to the CUP to compete with Tanin to gain prestige for his newspaper, Yeni Gazete can be a good example of this kind of attitude.70 Therefore, different from the Hamidian era, newspapers became arena for debate of the political ideas and creating public opinion to draw attention of readers.
66 Orhan Koloğlu, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Basın (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 54.
67 Koloğlu, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Basın (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 54.
68 Baykal, The Ottoman Press, pp. 164--165.
69 Baykal, The Ottoman Press, pp. 164--165.
70 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 45.
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Tanin newspaper emerged under these circumstances. As Hüseyin Cahid put it, Tanin was the child of the Constitutional Period.71 Tanin was arisen from political debates and political rivalries at that period and thus became popular within the Ottoman Empire. Without Tanin, the political environment of the Constitutional Period cannot be easily understood.
2.1. Tanin and the CUP
Figure 2. 1. Tanin, 18 Kanun-i sani 1328 / 31 January 1913.
A few days after the revolution, Hüseyin Kazım Kadri proposed Hüseyin Cahid to take a part in printing a new daily newspaper with Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915), who was a prominent poet in the Hamidian Period and the editor-in-chief of Servet-i Fünun from 1896 to 1900.72 Hüseyin Kazım Kadri was the son of the governor of Trabzon, Kadri Paşa and was a friend of Tevfik Fikret and Hüseyin Cahid. While Hüseyin Cahid and Tevfik Fikret were writing for Servet-i Fünün, Hüseyin Kazım Kadri visited the printing house and later these three eminent people became friends.73 Servet-i Fünun was a literary center and well-known for its westernism and modernism in literature and its role in developing of community of New Literature (Edebiyat-ı Cedide).74 The first issue of Tanin was published on 1 August 1908 and Hüseyin Kazım Kadri was the director of the newspaper (müdür), Hüseyin Cahid was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper (sermuharrir) and Tevfik
71 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 238. See also, Bengi, Gazeteci, Siyasetçi ve Fikir Adamı Olarak Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, p. 51.
72 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 44. Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 189--190; Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını, p. 64 and p. 138. Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 21--22; M. Nuri İnuğur, Basın ve Yayın Tarihi (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2002), p. 308; M. Nuri İnuğur, Türk Basınında “İz” Bırakanlar (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1988), p. 95.
73 Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, Meşrutiyet’ten Cumhuriyet’e Hatıralarım: İstanbul, Trabzon, Selanik, Suriye, ed. İsmail Kara (İstanbul: Dergâh, 2018), pp. 101--105. Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 133--137.
74 Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını, pp. 57--58.
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Fikret was the concession owner (imtiyaz sahibi) and the responsible director (mesul müdürü) of the newspaper.75
After a while, respectively on 27 December 1908, and on 13 February 1909, Tevfik Fikret and Hüseyin Kazım Kadri left the newspaper and henceforth Tanin newspaper was identified with Hüseyin Cahid and on 30 January 1914, Hüseyin Cahid, too, cut his connection with Tanin by selling the newspaper to the CUP.76 Writing team of the newspaper were made up of Muhittin (Birgen) (1885-1951), who was the manager of Tanin and an old student of Hüseyin Cahid from Vefa High School and a member of the CUP, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, who was a member of the CUP and worked as a journalist for İkdam before the Constitutional Period and became a deputy from the CUP after the revolution, Mehmed Ali Tevfik (1889-1941), who was a writer for Genç Kalemler, a journal associated with Turkish nationalism and was one the founders of Türk Ocağı (Turkish Heart), İsmail Müştak (Mayokan) (1882-1938), who was a secretary of the Sultan Abdülhamid II between 1902 and 1908 (mabeyn katibi), Falih Rıfkı (Atay) (1894-1971), who was a member of the CUP and began his journalism career with Tanin and later he became one of the most influential journalists in the Early Turkish Republic, Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa (1879-1915), who was a member of the CUP and also, a son-in-law of Ottoman royal family, married with Behiye Sultan, granddaughter of Murad V.77 It is clear that the newspaper and the CUP had a close and intimate relationship with each other and also, Tanin had an ideological link with the CUP.
Actually, since foundation of the newspaper, this connection could be seen. After printing the first issue, Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, and was also a member of the CUP and later became a deputy from the CUP, told to Hüseyin Cahid that the CUP wanted Tanin to publish the party‟s statements until the CUP set up its own political newspaper. Despite the fact that Hüseyin Cahid countered this idea by claiming that
75 Devlet Arşivleri, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul (hereafter BOA), ZB, 324--32, 15 Temmuz 1324 / 28 July, 1908.
76 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 282. See also, Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını, p. 139; Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 22; Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 191; Bengi, Gazeteci, Siyasetçi ve Fikir Adamı Olarak Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, pp. 47--48.
77 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 191. See also, M. Nuri İnuğur, Basın ve Yayın Tarihi, p. 308; Hüseyin Özdemir, Demokrasi Tarihimizde İttihad ve Terakkili Yıllar: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey’in Penceresinden (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2016), p. 33; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanin Gazetesi Başmakaleleri: 1 Ağustos 1908-- 13 Nisan 1909, ed. Kudret Emiroğlu (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2022), p. 24.
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Tanin was an independent newspaper, the party‟s statements continued to be issued on Tanin even after Şura-yı Ümmet, which was organ of the CUP since 1902, was reprinted as a media organ of the CUP after the Young Turk Revolution.78 According to Hüseyin Cahid as revealed in his memoirs Siyasal Anılar, first published by Fikir Hareketleri, Yedigün as “Meşrutiyet Hatıratları” in 1930s and later by Halkçı in 1955 and finally published by İş Bankası Yayınları in 2000, because of printing the CUP‟s official statements, the view that Tanin was the organ of the CUP became prevalent.79 This impression was strengthened day by day when Hüseyin Cahid became a party member and the deputy from the CUP and later, took office in the Public Debt Administration.80 However, another reason behind this impression was that Hüseyin Cahid was a close friend of the prominent and influential members of the CUP such as Talat Paşa who was the minister of interior and Mehmed Cavid Bey who was the finance minister. Mehmed Cavid Bey was Hüseyin Cahid‟s friend since Mekteb-i Mülkiye (the School for Civil Servants) and even, with his encouragement and support, Hüseyin Cahid accepted the office in the Public Debt Administration.81 But this does not mean that Tanin was „officially‟ linked to the CUP. Even though Ahmed Emin (Yalman), in his memoirs Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, confirmed Hüseyin Cahid‟s influence within the CUP, he mentioned, in his book based on his Ph.D. thesis in Columbia University in 1914, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press, Yalman underlined that “Tanin had voluntarily taken side with the Committee.”82 This interpretation defended indirectly Hüseyin Cahid‟s claim, because Hüseyin Cahid declared that he was on his own and independent, but due to the fact that he defended the CUP with commitment, Tanin was the organ of the CUP in the eyes of its readers.83 So, it can be inferred that even though Hüseyin Cahid rejected the direct official connection between the CUP and Tanin, they had a symbiotic relationship with each other and
78 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 44. See also, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt I: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi 1908--1918 (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), p. 33.
79 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 45.
80 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 223. See also, Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını, p. 139.
81 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 223.
82 Ahmet Emin (Yalman), The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press (New York: Columbia University, 1914), p. 97. See also, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim: Cilt 1, ed. Erol Şadi Erdinç (İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret AŞ, 1997), p. 569.
83 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 45.
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he was prone to protect the interests of the CUP in political arena. So, it cannot be said that Tanin was independent from the CUP completely. Tanin newspaper was neither the official organ of the CUP nor exactly free from the CUP.
Although there was a symbiotic relationship between the CUP and Tanin, this should not be understood that Tanin and the CUP moved always together. As mentioned earlier, Tanin‟s ideological link to the CUP became strengthened day by day. Sometimes, the leaders of the CUP thought differently from Tanin and felt resentment about some news and articles appeared in this newspaper. In fact, the newspaper did not always take side with the CUP. This was very clear in 1913. After the Bab-ı Ali Baskını on 23 January 1913, the CUP ascended to government as only power and now all authority was in the hands of members of the CUP. However, after the Balkan Wars and the assassination of Grand Vezir Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Hüseyin Cahid began to criticize the CUP, because he could not see any attempts for reforms which Hüseyin Cahid expected from the CUP despite the fact that the CUP run the government without opposition. He even added that being a party member did not mean that the party members had no right to criticize the party and they could criticize the party in terms of points which were not contradictory to the party program.84 Similarly the CUP leadership, too, annoyed about these criticisms and thought that these articles and news could cause a friction within people and interrupt the working of the government freely.85 For this reason, especially after the publication of such criticisms on municipality and some ministers in October and November 1913, Ziya Gökalp, who was one of the most influential intellectuals at that period and a member of the Central Committee in the CUP, and Kara Kemal, who was a prominent figure within the CUP and a member of the Central Committee in the CUP, visited Tanin headquarters and tried to persuade Hüseyin Cahid not to write this kind of articles.86
Also, there was another important event to show the tension between the CUP and Tanin. Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa published a series of articles under the title of “Ordu ve Gençlik” (The Army and The Youth) in Tanin. On 14 September 1913, the article of Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa about rejuvenating of the army and criticizing
84 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 267.
85 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 283.
86 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 283.
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the old cadres in the army irritated the government and Tanin had been closed approximately for three weeks. Only on 7 October 1913, the newspaper was reopened.87 These examples show that Tanin was not an official and direct organ of the CUP, because in some cases, the newspaper countered the deeds of the government and did not abstain from criticizing the party. That is why the articles in Tanin got reactions from the CUP and even, the newspaper was shut down by the CUP itself. It was not until 30 January 1914, when Tanin was sold to the CUP, that Tanin was the official organ of the CUP.
This perception that Tanin was the organ of the CUP, however, has already been spread to foreign offices, embassies and consulates. There were many reports of the Foreign Office of Great Britain showing the perceived connection between Tanin and the CUP. The British ambassador and foreign officers in İstanbul followed the Ottoman press closely and carefully to learn what the Ottoman public opinion thought and how the Ottoman government would act. Before the Bab-ı Ali Baskını on 23 January 1913, the CUP was in opposition because of coup d‟état of 1912 made by League of Savior Officers (Halaskar Zabitan Grubu) after the elections of 1912 and “ the Grand Cabinet” (Büyük Kabine), formed on 21 July 1912, was in power.88 During the First Balkan War, the British diplomatic corps in the Ottoman Empire followed press, including Tanin.89 On 25 November 1912, in the days when the First Balkan War was fiercely going on, Sir Gerald Lowther, the British ambassador in İstanbul, sent a telegraph to Sir Edward Grey, the minister of foreign affairs for Great Britain. There Lowther wrote that Tanin, which was the organ of the CUP, published articles criticizing the government and so, the newspaper was suppressed.90 Silencing Tanin newspaper as an oppositional press by the government was newsworthy, because this meant that even though Tanin was not official organ of the CUP in reality, foreign observes accepted Tanin as organ of the CUP, so they followed the
87 Falih Rıfkı Atay, İmparatorluğun Batış Yılları (İstanbul: Pozitif, 2021), p. 97. See also, Ahmet Ali Gazel, “Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) Bey‟in Siyasi Hayatı (1908--1913)”, Unpublished Ph D. Thesis, Atatürk University, 2000, p. 308.
88 Kansu, Politics in Post--Revolutionary Turkey: 1908--1913, pp. 384 and p. 396.
89 The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), FO 424/236, Further Correspondence Respecting the Turkish War, Part III, December 1912 (London: Printed fort he Use of Foreign Office, July 1913), p. 20.
90 TNA, FO 424/236, Further Correspondence Respecting the Turkish War, Part III, December 1912, p. 20.
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articles of Tanin to hear „voice‟ of the CUP. Therefore, this misperception that Tanin was directly linked to the CUP became consolidated.
Similarly, according to Hüseyin Cahid, the foreign press used the articles and news items from Tanin and there was a general understanding in the foreign press, too, that Tanin was an organ of the CUP.91 Particularly, after the Bab-ı Ali Baskını, Tanin became more important, because then it was considered the „voice‟ of the ruling elite. As reported by Tanin, on 4 July 1913, a Russian newspaper used an article published in Tanin. This article was about the demands of the Ottoman Empire from Bulgaria. According to the article in Tanin, by taking advantage of the situation into which Bulgaria fell [the Second Balkan War], the Ottoman Empire demanded that the Bulgarians should evacuate the Shores of Marmara and renunciate war indemnity during the London Conference.92 The Russian newspaper further claimed that the Russian ambassador in İstanbul approached to the Ottoman grand vezir enquiring about the article published in Tanin.93 The response of the grand vezir, reported by the Russian newspaper, shows why the foreign newspapers and diplomats in İstanbul needed to watch Tanin‟s publications carefully: “The majority of the government approves the opinion in Tanin’s publication and the aforementioned publication and the opinion of the government are in agreement with each other.”94 This example shows that in some cases, Tanin shared common views with the ruling elite and in the eyes of foreigners, this increased Tanin’s importance.
Another reason strengthening the perception that Tanin was the organ of the CUP was circulation figures. Tanin‟s circulation was parallel with the CUP‟s political rise and fall. Even though there are not trustworthy figures about Tanin’s circulation figures, journalists such as Ahmed Emin and Hüseyin Cahid provided some insight. According to Ahmed Emin, before the Counter-Revolution of 1909, 31 Mart Vakası, Tanin had sold 7.000 copies daily, but when the CUP‟s popularity declined, the circulation of Tanin, too, decreased as low as 4.000 copies per day.95 Hüseyin Cahid, in his memoirs, mentioned that before the 31 Mart Vakası, Tanin had
91 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 188.
92 “Türkiye‟nin Mutalebat--ı Cedidesi”, Tanin, 21 Haziran 1329 / 4 July 1913, p.2.
93 “Türkiye‟nin Mutalebat--ı Cedidesi”, p. 2.
94 “Türkiye‟nin Mutalebat--ı Cedidesi”, p. 2; “Aza--yı hükümetin ekseriyetile (Tanin)‟in neşriyatındaki fikri tasvip ettiklerini ve neşriyat--ı mezkure ile efkâr--ı hükümetin yekdiğerine muvafık olduğunu söylemiştir.”
95 Ahmet Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p. 131.
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already become a well-established newspaper and gained importance within the society, even the newspaper was moved to a larger building and a new printing press was bought.96 After 31 March Vakası, and the plunder of Tanin headquarters which was attacked by opponents of the CUP, the circulation of the newspaper reached 28.000.97 Due to the poor quality of the newspaper, this figure decreased to 10.000 and with the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911, the circulation of Tanin doubled.98 The political climate in the country therefore affected the popularity of Tanin directly. This, to certain extent, shows what motivated the newspaper buyers.
This political character of Tanin inevitably made the newspaper a political target, too. This can be seen during the downfall of the CUP. The circulation numbers of Tanin increased during the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911, but due to the removal of the CUP from the government and dissolution of the parliament by the pressure of League of Savior Officers (Halaskar Zabitan Grubu), Tanin lost many readers.99 For this reason, Tanin and its leading authors, Hüseyin Cahid, became vulnerable and the newspaper lost its popularity and political support. When Hüseyin Cahid published an article entitled “Daima Kabine” (Always the Cabinet), on 25 August 1912, criticized the ruling party, Liberal Entente Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) that the party had lack of concern for the state, Hüseyin Cahid irritated the government and on 3 September, the government closed Tanin which continued to be published under the different names such as Cenin and later, Senin.100 Furthermore, Hüseyin Cahid was put on trial by the court-martial and imprisoned for a month, on 5 September 1912.101 It can be inferred that in order to survive, Tanin needed the CUP and its political power. When the newspaper lost this backing, it was subjected to suppression and plunder. Therefore, this necessity further reinforced the image that Tanin was the official organ of the CUP. As a result of this, to regain its importance again, Tanin should have to wait until the Bab-ı Ali Baskını.
96 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 110.
97 Ahmet Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p. 132.
98 Ahmet Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p. 132.
99 Ahmet Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p. 132.
100 Kansu, Politics in Post--Revolutionary Turkey: 1908--1913, p. 412 and p. 416.
101 BOA, DH.SYS, 57--2-- 32, 22 Eylül 1328/ 5 October 1913.
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2.2. Tanin in the Balkan Wars (31 January 1913- 15 November 1913)
Since the summer of 1912, the atmosphere was gloomy for both Tanin newspaper and the CUP. Tanin and the CUP were in opposition against the Liberal Entente Party in government since August 1912 and because of that, Tanin and Hüseyin Cahid were exposed to pressure from the government and to top it all off, the Macedonia Crisis blew up in the Balkans and the Balkan Wars officially started on 17 October 1912. Hüseyin Cahid, in his memoirs, wrote that when the war broke out, he avoided internal political opposition, but again his newspaper was closed by the government and Tanin was printed under the name of Cenin after 13 October 1912.102 Meantime, the war increased its vehemence, and the Ottoman Empire was caught unprepared. The news of defeats reached to İstanbul from every front. Having heard that Abdülhamid II, dethroned after 31 Mart Vakası and exiled to Salonica, was sent to İstanbul in the face of possibility of the fall of Salonica to Greeks and Bulgarians, Hüseyin Cahid broke his silence and claimed that Abdülhamid II should be moved to somewhere in Anatolia, so the newspaper was again suspended and this time Tanin was published under the name of Senin on 21 October 1912, subsequently Tanin became Hak.103 At the same time, because of his closeness to Great Britain, Kamil Paşa was appointed to the grand vezirate and this produced abortive results to win the support of Great Powers, especially Great Britain.104 This appointment annoyed the CUP, because Kamil Paşa was strictly against the CUP, even he was known as the enemy of the CUP. Hüseyin Cahid harshly criticized this appointment in Hak newspaper on 30 October 1912, and thus, again, newspaper was suspended by the government, one day later, Hüseyin Cahid published Renin.105
On the other hand, in the course of war, the defeated Ottoman army retreated behind Çatalca Line and the Bulgarians started to march towards İstanbul slowly.106 For this reason, some of the CUP members like Hacı Adil Bey and Musa Kazım went to the palace and asked for the replacement of Nazım Paşa, the minister of war, with Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who was the former minister of war and chief of action
102 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 244.
103 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 244.
104 Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908--1914, p. 113.
105 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 245. See also, Kabacalı, Türk Basınında Demokrasi, p. 80.
106 Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908--1914, pp. 113--114.
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army. (Hareket Ordusu).107 Similarly, Hüseyin Cahid, too, suggested the appointment of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as the minister of war on 9 November 1912 and due to this reason, this time, newspaper was closed completely.108 After these events, a witch-hunt began against the prominent members of the CUP and many of them, including Hüseyin Cahid, Mehmed Cavid Bey and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, escaped to Vienna.109
Without a formidable opposition, The Kamil Paşa government accepted the armistice on 3 December 1912 and the peace negotiations began in London. By 22 January 1913, the rumors were circulated that the Kamil Paşa government was ready to surrender Edirne to Bulgarians. For this reason, the Bab-ı Ali Baskını, initiated by Enver Paşa and Talat Paşa who were the prominent members of the CUP, occurred on 23 January 1913 and the CUP took control of the Ottoman government. The aim of the CUP was not to give up Edirne and the Aegean Islands under any condition.110 On 30 January 1913, the CUP made a last offer to the Great Powers to leave the lands on the right bank of the Meriç River and accepted that Question of Aegean Islands would be left to the Great Powers.111 One day later, Hüseyin Cahid returned from Vienna and reopened Tanin and started to defend the CUP.
From 31 January 1913 to 15 November 1913, one day after the Treaty of Athens, Tanin, with an interval between 14 September 1913 and 7 October 1913, due to the fact that Tanin was closed due to Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa‟s article, was published regularly. With some exceptions, between 31 January 1913 and 15 November 1913, the newspaper was published in six pages. In the first two columns of the first page, there was a leading author‟s article and main issues on current affairs such as the Balkan Wars and the Edirne Incident were printed in big size. On the first and second pages, Tanin published much news from the European press and the news agencies to show what Europeans thought about the Ottoman state. Besides news, political articles, and opinion columns, there were cultural articles on topics such as literature and history which appeared on third and fourth pages. At the same
107 Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Görüp İşittiklerim (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2021), p. 86.
108 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 245.
109 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 25. See also, Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 246.
110 Kansu, Politics in Post--Revolutionary Turkey: 1908--1913, p. 439.
111 Kansu, Politics in Post--Revolutionary Turkey: 1908--1913, pp. 440--441.
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pages, also, Tanin focused on internal affairs such as municipalities and ministries. As for the fifth and sixth pages, Tanin, again, reported daily events briefly. Also, these pages used for advertisements and announcements. In this period, leading intellectuals of the period, such as Mehmed Ali Tevfik, Falih Rıkfı and Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa, contributed to the newspaper. Among these names, there were two important journalist whose writings became the leading articles of Tanin in the period under consideration. These were Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı.
Hüseyin Cahid was born in Balıkesir on 7 December 1875 and because of his father‟s civil service, he lived in Serez between 1883 and 1888 and he finished secondary school there.112 When Hüseyin Cahid was 13 years old, he moved to İstanbul and İstanbul had a great impact on his education and writing career.113 In 1891, he began his writing career with an article entitled “Ahmet Paşa Cami” (Ahmet Paşa Mosque) and published in Servet-i Fünun.114 His first major job in press was to write articles in Mektep, which was published by Kitapçı Karabet, whose real name was Karabet Keşişyan, a well-known Armenian publisher.115 Mektep was a weekly journal and due to the conflicts between writers and Karabet, it ceased.116 In order to revive this journal again, Hüseyin Cahid and his friends from Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Mehmed Cavid Bey, Ahmet Şuayip and Hasan Tahsin, started to print this journal in 1896 and during this time, he became a friend with Mehmed Rauf who later became an eminent novelist in Turkish literature, but after a while, because of a disagreement with Karabet, they gave up writing for this journal.117 At the same time, through Mehmed Rauf, Hüseyin Cahid published his story “Röneka” in Servet-i Fünun in September 1896.118
Hüseyin Cahid started to write articles about science in Tarik, which was a venerable journal, but this attempt was short-lived, because the newspaper went
112 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 7. See also, Kocabaşoğlu, “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını, p. 138; Bengi, Gazeteci, Siyasetçi ve Fikir Adamı Olarak Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, pp. 10--11; Suat Hizarcı, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1957), p. 1.
113 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 23.
114 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 12.
115 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 12. See also, Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 71.
116 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 71.
117 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 72.
118 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 14. See also, Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 87--88.
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bankrupt and later, Hüseyin Cahid went to work for Sabah, a popular daily newspaper of the Hamidian era, which was owned by Mihran Efendi and there, Hüseyin Cahid met Abdullah Zühtü.119 In 1900, the writers of Sabah and İkdam went on a strike because of getting low salaries, and they decided to start a newspaper called Saadet.120 One of these writers were Babanzade İsmail Hakkı who was a journalist for İkdam, there Hüseyin Cahid met with Babanzade İsmail Hakkı and thus became friends.121 At the same time, Hüseyin Cahid became one of the prominent figures of Servet-i Fünun and after Tevfik Fikret‟s resignation, Hüseyin Cahid was appointed as the manager of the magazine and he continued this job until 1901, when he published an article “Edebiyat ve Hukuk” (Literature and Law) which caused the closure of the magazine by the Ottoman government.122 Even though Servet-i Fünun was reopened, it only focused on science and in 1904, Hüseyin Cahid cut his link with Servet-i Fünun.123 From that period to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Hüseyin Cahid focused on Turkish grammar and dictionary and published a grammar book called Türkçe Sarf ve Nahiv (Turkish Grammar and Syntax).124 After the revolution, Hüseyin Cahid, again, started journalism and at the beginning, he wrote in İkdam for a few days in a week until the foundation of Tanin.
Another important figure of Tanin in 1913 was Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. He was born in Baghdad in 1876 and was from one of the most important Kurdish families, Babans of Süleymaniye.125 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was a student at Mekteb-i Mülkiye, but because of his opposition to Abdülhamid II, he was dismissed from the school and he completed his university education at the Law School (Hukuk Mektebi) in 1902.126 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı began journalism in İkdam newspaper
119 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 99--100 and pp. 113--114.
120 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 127--128.
121 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 127--128.
122 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 18. See also, Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 170--173.
123 Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, p. 18.
124 Bengi, Gazeteci, Siyasetçi ve Fikir Adamı Olarak Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, p. 30. See also, Huyugüzel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’ın Hayatı, Hikâye ve Romanları Üzerinde Bir Araştırma, pp. 19--20.
125 Özdemir, Demokrasi Tarihimizde İttihad ve Terakkili Yıllar: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey’in Penceresinden, p. 27. See also, Faysal Mayak, “Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın Tanin’de Yayımlanmış Makalelerine Göre Osmanlı Devleti ve Dış Politika (1911)”, The Journal of International Social Research 3:11 (2010), p. 421; Davut Hut, “II.Meşrutiyet Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Entelektüeli: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı (1876--1913)”, in Tarihimizden Portreler Osmanlı Kimliği, ed. Zekeriya Kurşun and Haydar Çoruh (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Afrika Araştırmacıları Derneği, 2013), p. 105.
126 Özdemir, Demokrasi Tarihimizde İttihad ve Terakkili Yıllar: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey’in Penceresinden, p. 31.
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and during the strike because of getting low salaries, he met Hüseyin Cahid.127 Later, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı returned to İkdam and wrote articles until the revolution. After the revolution, there emerged a conflict between Ahmed Cevdet and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, because his articles were published unsigned and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı reacted to the owner of the newspaper, Ahmed Cevdet.128 Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı resigned from İkdam as a reaction of the publication of the unsigned articles.129 Shortly after, Tanin newspaper was founded and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı started to write there and this continued until his death on 25 December 1913. When Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was elected as a deputy from the CUP in December 1908, he travelled from Beirut to Kuwait and he published his views in Tanin and later, these articles were collected as a book and published under the title of Irak Mektupları (The Letters from Iraq). 130 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı generally focused on foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire in Tanin, and in CUP, he was accepted as expert on foreign affairs.131 Even though Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was one of the most influential members in the CUP, he never entered into the Central Committee of the CUP.132 However, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı generally tried to guide the CUP with his writings in Tanin. For this reason, he was the second leading author in the newspaper after Hüseyin Cahid and he became close friend of Hüseyin Cahid.133 According to Hüseyin Cahid, they served for ideal of freedom and progress like “fraternal pens” in Tanin.134 Similarly, during the Balkan Wars especially from 31 January 13 to 15 November 1913, they constituted the backbone of Tanin as always.
After the return of Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı from Vienna, their first job was to legitimize the Bab-ı Ali Baskını. Hüseyin Cahid began to
127 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 127--128.
128 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 189.
129 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, p. 189.
130 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Beyrut’tan Kuveyt’e Irak Mektupları, ed. Murat Çulcu (İstanbul: Büke Yayıncılık, 2002).
131 Mayak, “Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın Tanin’de Yayımlanmış Makalelerine Göre Osmanlı Devleti ve Dış Politika (1911)”, p. 422. See also, Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908--1914, p. 92.
132 Mayak, “Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın Tanin’de Yayımlanmış Makalelerine Göre Osmanlı Devleti ve Dış Politika (1911)”, p. 422.
133 Özdemir, Demokrasi Tarihimizde İttihad ve Terakkili Yıllar: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey’in Penceresinden, p. 35.
134 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanıdıklarım, ed. Göktürk Ömer Çakır (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2020), p. 205.
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publish Tanin for the first time since November 1912. On 31 January 1913, he wrote an article “Felaket Karşısında” (In the Face of Disaster). He described the CUP as an enlightened power (kuvve-i münevvere) which wanted “to live in its own country”.135 The CUP further proved its conviction to stay in its own lands as a response to those who declared that “the Turks were now dead”. These further claimed that the Turks now did not have any capability to feel humiliation and to understand the love for fatherland (vatan).136 With the takeover of the government, the CUP demonstrated the sign of life and claimed that the Ottomans would not surrender easily. So, according to him, the CUP, to certain extent, protected the honor of fatherland (vatan). 137 Therefore, for Hüseyin Cahid, this coup d‟état was legitimate, because the CUP tried to rescue the empire. Hüseyin Cahid continued that the CUP shouldered the responsibility of the government not because it pursued its desire for revenge or was after individual interests, but because it aimed to save interests of fatherland (vatan) from this catastrophe, i.e., the Balkan War.138
Shortly afterwards, Hüseyin Cahid, who was afraid of any possibility that the old internal conflicts could resurface, or a new animosity could emerge, gave up writing articles in Tanin. The leading articles were written by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı.139 From 3 February 1913 to 9 August 1913, Hüseyin Cahid did not publish any articles except “Tazminat Hülyası” (The Dream of Indemnity), published on 4 March 1913. Throughout this period, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was the leading writer of Tanin. At this period, the cabinet was divided into two groups; one group, under the leadership of grand vezir Mahmud Şevket Paşa, wanted to make a peace with the Balkan states and the other one, consisted of Şükrü Bey, the minister of education, and Adil Bey, the interior minister, wanted to continue the war.140 Even though the CUP took control of the government, the cabinet was not consisted of only the
135“Felaket Karşısında”, Tanin, 18 Kanun--i Sani 1328 / 31 January 1913, p. 1: “Türkler artık ölmüştür, Türkler‟de hakareti hissedecek, vatan muhabbetini anlayacak kabiliyet kalmamıştır diyenlere karşı memleketinde yaşamak isteyen ve istediğini ispat eden bir kuvve--i münevverenin mevcut olduğu meydana çıkıyordu.”
136 Felaket Karşısında”, Tanin, p. 1.
137 “Felaket Karşısında”, Tanin, p. 1: “…Vatanın, haysiyet ve namusunu kısmen istirdat ettiğini görmekten mütevellit…”
138 “Felaket Karşısında”, Tanin, p. 1: “İttihad ve Terakki reis--i idareye hırs--ı cah tesiriyle yahut ahz--ı intikam hırsıyla gelmiyor. (…) Yalnız şu felaketten vatan için mümkün olduğu kadar çok menafi kurtarmak emeliyle bu mesuliyet--i azimenin altına giriyordu.”
139 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, pp. 260--261.
140 Mahmut Şevket Paşa, Harbiye Nazırı Sadrazam Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın Günlüğü, ed. Adem Sarıgöl (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2001), pp. 17--18.
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member of the CUP. Because of that, there emerged a conflict within the cabinet. In general, the members of the cabinet who were at the same time the members of the CUP were proponent of the war, but members of the cabinet who did not take place in the CUP like Mahmud Şevket Paşa wanted peace. There was also the Central Committee of the CUP. They were not members of the cabinet, but also sometimes, they had an impact on government‟s decisions. Therefore, this created a dichotomy between the government and the CUP. By referring to the CUP here, this meant the Central Committee of the CUP, not the government itself. One of the members of this circle was Talat Paşa. According to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the CUP, was the proponent of war. With the encouragement of Talat Paşa, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article entitled “Na-be-Mevsim Sulh Şayiaları” (Ill-timed Peace Rumours) in Tanin on 12 February 1913.141 Upon the visit of İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, former grand vezir, to Great Britain, there emerged some rumors that the Ottomans wanted to make peace. For this reason, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı objected the claim that İbrahim Hakkı Pasha visited to London for discussing about peace and he continued that while the CUP, encouraged the Ottoman nation to be patient and self-sacrificing, this kind of fake news demotivated people, because the nation was prepared for resistance which might probably last very long.142 Because of this article, Grand Vezir Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the main proponent of peace, warned Babanzade İsmail Hakkı who opposed to the peace negotiations.143 Thanks to this article, the CUP tried to influence the public opinion towards the continuing the war and at the same time, the CUP wanted to pressure on the proponents of peace within the cabinet to continue the war, because the CUP came to power for saving Edirne and if the government accepted the peace without resistance three weeks after the Bab-ı Ali Baskını, this could deal a blow to the prestige and legitimacy of the CUP. Because of this, war should continue. After this friction, Tanin and the grand vezir
141 Mahmut Şevket Paşa, Harbiye Nazırı Sadrazam Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın Günlüğü, pp. 21--22.
142 “Na--be--Mevsim Sulh Şayiaları”, Tanin, 30 Kanun--i Sani 1329 / 12 February 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, ed. Hüseyin Özdemir (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2020), p. 1485: “Sulh şayiaları, ateş--i intikam ile cayır cayır yanan yanmakta olan Osmanlı vatanperverlerinin yüreğini cidden dağ--dar etmek itibarıyla da dahilen icra--yı su--i tesir etti… (…) Halbuki müdafaa--i milliye bütün millete bir hayat--ı cedid nefhetmek üzere teşekkül etmiş, bütün milleti ihtimal ki pek uzun sürecek bir mukavemet için ayaklandırıyor.”
143 Mahmut Şevket Paşa, Harbiye Nazırı Sadrazam Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın Günlüğü, p. 22.
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did not contradict again and sometimes, Mahmud Şevket Paşa met with Hüseyin Cahid to explain the political situation in the country.144
When Edirne fell to the Bulgarians on 26 March 1913, the CUP had to accept the view of the proponents of peace in the cabinet. Apart from the peace negotiations in London, also in Paris, a financial conference was convened to determine the share of public debts that the Balkan states had to pay.145 So, Hüseyin Cahid went to Paris as a deputy in the Public Debt Administration and until the recovery of Edirne, he was abroad.146 Meantime, in the empire, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was assassinated on 11 June 1913 by the opponents of the CUP and government and the CUP gained power completely, because now the new cabinet was heavily consisted of the members of the CUP. Said Halim Paşa who was a member of the Central Committtee of the CUP was appointed as the grand vezir and Talat Paşa who was also a prominent figure in the CUP became the interior minister.
In the Balkans, too, there was a turmoil. The Balkan Alliance was dissolved, and the Second Balkan War broke out on 29/30 June 1913. This meant that the Ottoman Empire had a chance to recover Edirne from Bulgarians, but the government was divided into two groups again. The first group was under the leadership of Talat Paşa wanted to march on Edirne and the second group was under the leadership of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, the minister of war, who was worried about a European intervention. In order to persuade the members of the government and to prepare people for a campaign on Edirne, Talat Paşa needed Tanin. After a deadlock in a cabinet meeting, Talat Paşa wanted Tanin to publish an article to pressure the government for marching on Edirne by creating a favorable public opinion towards the military action.147 According to Falih Rıfkı, Babanzade wrote an article and later told to Falih Rıfkı that the cabinet would meet to decide about a military movement about Edirne, but if the cabinet decided for a military action accepted to march, Talat Paşa would provide another topic for the leading article.148 However, that day, the cabinet did not come to an agreement. The day after, the article “Vaziyyet-i Hazıra”
144 Mahmut Şevket Paşa, Harbiye Nazırı Sadrazam Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın Günlüğü, pp. 144--145.
145 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 266.
146 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p. 267.
147 Atay, İmparatorluğun Batış Yılları, p. 75. See also, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (İstanbul: Pozitif, 2017), pp. 27--28.
148 Atay, İmparatorluğun Batış Yılları, p. 75.
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(The Current Situation) was published on 20 July 1913 to encourage the government to take a military action against the Bulgarians in Edirne.149 This unsigned article was in fact written by Falih Rıfkı and this was his first leading article.150 One day later, the Ottoman army marched on Edirne and recovered it from the Bulgarians.151 Even though Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was the leading author at that period, in Tanin, from 2 July 1913 to 9 August 1913, the leading articles were published unsigned. It is, however, clear that with a few exceptions, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was the writer of these.
After the recovery of Edirne, Hüseyin Cahid returned to the Ottoman Empire and began to write articles in Tanin from 9 August 1913 to 15 November 1913 interchangeably with Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. Hüseyin Cahid started to criticize the CUP about internal politics, so he sometimes wrote articles under the rubric of three stars. Therefore, Hüseyin Cahid was the one who heralded the end of the Balkan Wars with his leading article “İş Başına” (Let‟s Go to Work) on 15 November 1913, one day after the Treaty of Athens.
2.3. Conclusion
This special relationship of Tanin with the CUP, as explained above, makes analysis of its coverage during the Balkan Wars, especially from 31 January to 15 November 1913, an essential tool to understand the ruling elite‟s mindset in that period. This special relationship became very important in particular during the period when the CUP got the full political power with the Bab-ı Ali Baskını. Hence, aware of its position, Tanin, in particular his main writers, Hüseyin Cahid, and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı set to use the newspaper as a platform to shape the Ottoman public opinion and they gave messages to foreigners and tried to influence international public opinion.
149 Atay, İmparatorluğun Batış Yılları, p. 75.
150 “Vaziyyet--i Hazıra”, Tanin, 7 Temmuz 1329 / 20 July 1913, p.1.
151 Atay, İmparatorluğun Batış Yılları, p. 75.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LATE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL MINDSET IN TANİN (1913)
Today, the conditions are favorable. Let‟s benefit from these conditions [ which occurred with the abolition of the Treaty of London, 30 May 1913]. Tomorrow, if the time comes for benefitting from other opportunities, we will not neglect them, either.152
As the above brief quotation from an unsigned editorial of Tanin, possibly by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey, dated 6 July 1913 indicated that there was a constant tendency among the Ottoman ruling elite of using every rising opportunity to ensure the survival of the state rather than designing grand strategies or developing plans for future.
From the 19th century onwards, the main aim of the ruling elite was to keep the empire together. For this reason, they embraced a kind of governance which could be described in Ottoman Turkish as “idare-i maslahatçılık”, which perhaps can be translated into English as ad hoc administration. This kind of administration was done on day-to-day basis and according to changing circumstances, political attitudes of the ruling elite could change daily as well. In order to gain political and economic advantages, the ruling elite was open to negotiation and watched for every opportunity to benefit from. According to this understanding of administration, the main aim was to save the day and protect the status quo, without endangering the existing borders and order of the state by taking any risks. This kind of understanding inevitably necessitated a conservative attitude towards both external and internal politics as evidenced by an article published a few months after the recovery of Edirne, in Tanin, on 27 October 1913. This article published under the rubric of three
152 “Harbe Karşı Vaziyyetimiz”, Tanin, 23 Haziran 1329 / 6 July 1913, p.1: “Bugün vaziyet buna müsaittir. Bu müsaideden istifade edelim. Yarın başka şeylerden istifade etmek zamanı gelirse onları da ihmal etmeyiz.”
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stars was probably written by Hüseyin Cahid. There the author warns that “putting present in danger for a bright but suspicious future is a path which does not conform with states made up of different nations, elements and religions.”153
“States made up of different nations, elements and religions”, in fact, denotes the notion of empire. But the question what „empire‟ meant for those writing in Tanin in 1913 could not be understood through the prism of today‟s nation-state perspective which is based on nationalism. Unlike the multinational structure of the empire, for nationalism, the ideal state is the nation state and the aim of nationalism is to close the gap between power and culture, state and nation, because according to nationalism, only states where rulers and ruled share the same culture are legitimate.154 For this reason, states are main catalyst to create culturally homogenous nations within borders which are transformed into artificial boundaries to encompass various ethnic and religious groups and linguistic cleavages.155 In doing so, nation-states conduct and control people and relations by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area as well as power was identified with place rather than social relations.156 Therefore, nation-states are based on territorially well-defined and constructed political geography which have fixed and demarcated borders and a common nation sharing common culture and language.157 As a result, a well-defined territory and a homogeneous nation sine quo non for a nation-state.
Contrary to the concept of a nation-state, an empire is a state without fixed borders, as an empire only recognizes itself as a state which currently dominates a territory and can dominate any territory in future and due to that reason, an empire is unlimited and unbounded until it covers the entire world, thus an empire is not static, but dynamic which has no fixed borders, and it is supposed to change through time,
153 “Avusturya Sefirinin Beyanatı”, Tanin, 31 Teşrin--i evvel 1329 / 27 October 1913, p.1: “Mevcud--ı hazırı parlak fakat şüpheli atiler uğrunda tehlikeye koymak akvam ve anasır ve edyan--ı muhtelifeden mürekkep devletlere tevafuk etmeyen bir meslektir.”
154 Krishan Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 20--21.
155 R.J. Johnston, David B. Knight and Eleonore Kofman, “Nationalism, Self--Determination and the World Political Map: An Introduction”, in Nationalism, Self--Determination and Political Geography, eds. R.J. Johnston, David B. Knight and Elonore Kofman (London: Routledge,1988), p. 17; James Anderson, “Nationalist Ideology and Territory”, in Nationalism, Self Determination and Political Geography, p. 33.
156 Johnston, Knight and Kofman, “Nationalism, Self--Determination and the World Political Map: An Introduction”, p. 16.
157 Behlül Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 4.
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such as rising and falling.158 For this reason, an empire can adapt itself to conditions which change constantly. However, an empire acknowledges only societies and for it, other states are nothing more than societies, because according to an empire, there is only one state in the world and it is itself.159 Therefore, an empire attributes universality and cosmopolitanism to itself and an empire sees all people as its subjects and it is entitled to have and rule all various ethnicities and religious groups regardless of any borders. Because of that, by definition, an empire is a multicultural entity.160 So, multicultural means diversities and flexibilities in implementation of policies and an empire has to look after differences within societies, because unlike a nation-state, the basis of an empire is universality and cosmopolitanism, and empire is not limited by only a common nation which shares same culture, traditions and language and fixed borders. As a result, this universality and cosmopolitanism paved the way, for an empire, of being elastic and flexible in terms of governance.
Like all empires, the Ottoman Empire, too, had cosmopolitan nature and it claimed universality, especially after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. At its peak, between the 15th and the 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was expansionist and superior to European states, but the idea of empire began to change because of severe defeats in the 18th century.
3.1. The Components of the Late Ottoman Imperial Mindset
From the 19th century onwards, the Ottoman empire lost its power in European politics. This led to the development of a new way of thinking among the Ottoman ruling elite. This new way of thinking may be defined as „the late Ottoman imperial mindset‟, which was a combination of idare-i maslahatçılık and an Ottoman idea of an empire.161 Although it was based on the idea of empire, hence imperial, this mindset was shaped by defensive concerns. Its aim was to keep the empire stable and intact as well as to protect its territorial integrity. Due to this, the late Ottoman
158 James Alexander, “Empire as a Subject for Philosophy”, Philosophy 94:2 (2019), p. 253.
159 Alexander, “Empire as a Subject for Philosophy”, p. 250.
160 Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, p. 3.
161 For the discussion of the Ottoman Imperial mind-set in relation to the concepts of nation-state, nationalism and centralization and decentralization, see Ebru Boyar, "Nations and Nationalisms in the Late Ottoman Empire", in The Cambridge History of Nationhood and Nationalism. Volume II Nationalism’s Fields of Interaction, ed. Cathie Carmichael, Mahthew D'Auria and Aviel Roshwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 24-42.
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imperial mindset was shaped according to realpolitik of the period. When the Ottomans saw an opportunity, they did not shy away from proceeding and playing an active role in taking advantage of the situation. Similarly, they did not feel resentment about retreating and giving concessions to the Great Powers when the Ottoman Empire was in dire straits in the face of them.
The late Ottoman imperial mindset had four major components, which are also evident in the writings of Tanin. These were the understanding of vatan, the fluid identities, flexibility of borders, and the imperial capital Istanbul as the centre of gravity.
Vatan means national homeland (fatherland, motherland, patrie) which links people with territory and transforms imagined borders into a physical homeland for people.162 During the late Ottoman period, Ottoman intellectuals attempted to define and describe where the homeland was. One of the most famous intellectuals of this period, Namık Kemal was the leading ideologue of the Young Ottomans who were made up of a few young people took positon against the despotism of Tanzimat paşas, Keçecizade Fuat Paşa and Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa.163 He was known as the poet of fatherland and freedom (vatan ve hürriyet şairi), because he popularized the words of fatherland (vatan) and freedom (hürriyet) and extended their usage to give a larger meaning to them.164 For example, vatan meant a piece of land into which people was born, but with Namık Kemal, the word of vatan began to refer not only to a geographical unit but also to an emotional bond.165 On 3 July 1872 in İbret, which was the organ of the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal published an article “İmtizac-ı Akvam” (The Fusion of Peoples) and he argued that having various ethnicities and religious groups prevented the fusion of peoples and thanks to vatan which was a “şekl-i mevhum”, an imagined or fictional entity, European countries such as Spain, France, and Germany which were made up of various ethnicities and religious groups
162 Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey, p. 1.
163 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, trans. Ahmet Kuyaş (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2018), p. 275.
164 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 326.
165 Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 327.
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could be merged into each other.166 In fact, according to Namık Kemal, the concept of vatan was abstract and intangible, where the Ottoman vatan began and ended was not determined in terms of geographical area. This understanding of vatan was idealized in Namık Kemal‟s article “Vatan” (Fatherland) in İbret. He argued that “vatan” was not made up of imagined lines drawn by a clerk, but it was a sacred idea that was consisted of noble feelings like nation (millet in modern term), liberty, brotherhood, reverence to ancestors, love of family.167 This approach suggests that the loyalty to a vatan was not based on a well-defined territory. According to Namık Kemal, a territory was nothing more than artificial lines without emotional bonds.
In the 20th century, Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity began to emerge in the intellectual climate of the Ottoman Empire and the major proponent of Turkish nationalism based on ethnic nationalism came generally from the outside of the Ottoman Empire like Russia such as Hüseyinzade Ali (Turan), Ahmed Agayev and Yusuf Akçura. One of the most famous Turkish nationalists among them was Yusuf Akçura. He was against both Ottomanism and Islamism and he argued that Ottomanism and Islamism could not hold the Ottoman Empire together and due to that reason, these ideologies should be replaced by Turkism based on ethnic nationalism.168 His most influential work “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Political Ways) was printed in Cairo, in 1904, by the newspaper Turk which was under the direction of Ali Kemal and this article became the manifesto of Turkish ethnic nationalism.169 However, intellectuals like Ali Kemal, who was an exile in Egypt because of his opposition to Abdülhamid II and was a prominent journalist for İkdam, did not embrace ethnic nationalism of Yusuf Akçura and he defended Ottomanism fervently by saying that it is impossible to separate Turk from Islam, Islam from Turk, Turk and Islam from Ottomanness, Ottomanness from Turk and Islam.170 Therefore, it is understood that the understanding of ethnic nationalism began to be known among intellectuals, but still the most of the Ottoman intellectuals preferred Ottomanism to ethnic nationalism and they thought that the Ottoman Empire based on ethnic
166 Namık Kemal, Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, ed. Mustafa Nihat Özön (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1938), pp. 81--82.
167 Namık Kemal, Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, p. 265.
168 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, p. 391.
169 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, p. 389.
170 Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz--ı Siyaset, ed. Recep Duymaz (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1995), p. 41.
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nationalism could not live long enough and such nationalism could cause the complete division of the empire.
Ziya Gökalp, too, was one of them. According to Şerif Mardin, after Namık Kemal, he was the second important modern Turkish political theorist.171 Ziya Gökalp, known as the father of Turkish nationalism in Turkey, focused on the cultural identity of Turks and his nationalism based on culture and language, so he defended that if all Turks united above all political parties and social thoughts, the unity of Islam and completeness of Ottomanness would be secured.172 Therefore, it seems that he saw Turkish nationalism as part of Islam and Ottomanism and he did not think replacing Ottomanism and Islamism with Turkish nationalism contrary to Akçura. Besides his intellectual prominence, Ziya Gökalp was a member of the Central Committee in the CUP and became influential in politics after the 1908 Revolution.173
As for his understanding of vatan, Ziya Gökalp, too, shared the similar views about vatan with Namık Kemal. In 1913 and 1914, in Türk Yurdu, he wrote a series of articles which were later published in a book form in 1918 under the title of Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Being Turkified, Islamicized and Modernized).174 Like Namık Kemal, he described vatan as an ideal and an abstract entity. According to Ziya Gökalp, in “Türk Milleti ve Turan” (The Turkish „Nation‟ and Turan), Turan was the ideal homeland (mefkurevi vatan) of the Turks to unite its people.175 He, however, did not provide a strict definition of this Turkish homeland with fixed borders. For him, Turan was not a place of which borders were demarcated. It encompassed only Turkish people and whoever declared that “I am a Turk”, he/she belonged to this ideal homeland named “Turan.”
At the same period, there was another person who was contemporary of Ziya Gökalp and he was Sati‟ al-Husri coming from Arab origin and one of the most influential intellectuals of the period. During the Balkan Wars, he organized a conference on the defense of vatan to awaken the love of fatherland in the empire.
171 Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 286.
172 Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876--1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), p. 34. See also, Ziya Gökalp, “Türklüğün Başına Gelenler”, in Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, ed. Zeynep Aytop (İstanbul: Karbon Kitaplar, 2018), p. 45; Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, p. 374.
173 Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876--1924, p. 14.
174 Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity, p. 53.
175 Ziya Gökalp, “Türk Milleti ve Turan”, p. 67.
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Later, these conferences were published in a book form with the title of Vatan İçin Beş Konferans (Five Conferences for the Vatan).176 Since Sati‟ al-Husri believed that emotional identification with a territory led to progress and solidarity in Europe, he suggested to find a motivating symbol to awaken patriotism within the Ottoman Empire, such as a national flag, and a national anthem.177 Rather than being a territory where people lived in or were born, al-Husri used vatan in a broader meaning and according to him, the spiritual element provided this extended fatherland with loyalty.178 Consequently, it can be understood that on its own, a territory could not produce loyalty to a fatherland and encourage the love for a vatan. There should be emotional connections and common experiences to provide a link with between people and a territory to turn a piece of land into a vatan. For this reason, he argued that the devotion to vatan should be based on the common Ottoman state and the common history, rather than language and ethnicity as there were many ethnic and linguistic groups in the Ottoman Empire.179
The second component of the late Ottoman imperial mindset was fluid identities. Like all empires, the Ottoman Empire, too, was multinational in character, so this means that the Ottoman Empire had included various identities. Even though the ruling family of the empire was Muslim and Turk, according to Heath Lowry, in 14th and 15th centuries, the Ottoman state melted Muslim and local Christian populations into a pot in Bithynia (the region between southern eastern Marmara and western Black Sea) to work together for spreading the Ottoman banner in the Balkans and later in Central and Eastern Anatolia.180 Therefore, while the empire was flourishing between the 14th and the 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire began to include largely non-Turkish Muslim and non-Muslim elements like Armenians, Jews and Greeks and Arabs and as a result of this, it cannot be said that Ottomans were
176 Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey, p. 56.
177 William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ Al--Husri (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 35. See also, Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey, p. 57.
178 Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ Al--Husri, p. 36.
179 Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey, p. 57.
180 Heath W. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 132--133.
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exclusively Turkic and Islamic in character.181 Also term “Ottoman” (Osmanlı), too, did not represent a distinct identity, nation or people, but it was a political term referring to the members of the administrative class serving the state and the Ottoman sultan.182 Similarly, this ruling class was an amalgam of Muslim populations that included some Christians converted to Islam regardless of their ethnic identity, thus Turks, too, one of these ethnicities ruled by this class.183
The “Ottoman” transformed into a signifier of a common identity in the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). At that period, in order to keep the empire‟s territorial integrity and political stability at the face of the internal uprisings, the Ottoman state elite developed a kind of ideology, Ottomanism, which was imperial supranationalism including various national and religious communities.184 Ottomanism did not aim the national assimilation of ethnic groups. Ottomanism was based on equality of all imperial subjects regardless of their ethnic and religious diversities, and what mattered was their allegiance to the House of Osman and the Sultanate.185
Ottomanism engulfed the idea of multiple identities. Because of this, the sense of belonging among the Ottoman elite, particularly the Turkish speaking ones, was not fixed and sole. This demonstrates that national consciousness based on ethnic identity did not develop within the empire, and these Turkish speaking Ottoman elite could not simply base their political identities on a single nationality. This can be clearly seen in Ziya Gökalp‟s article “Üç Cereyan” (Three Currents of Thought), which he published during the Balkan Wars, on 20 March 1913, in Türk Yurdu. He argued that the current of Turkishness (Türkçülük cereyanı) was the strongest supporter of Ottomanism. Let alone being an opponent of Ottomanism, Turkishness was the basis of Islamism and Ottomanism against cosmopolitanism which he explained as an uncritical acceptance of Western culture at the expense of
181 Colin imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300--1650 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1--2.
182 Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300--1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 74.
183 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 4.
184 Alexander Vezenkov, “Reconcilitation of the Spirits and Fusion of the Interests. „Ottomanism‟ as an Identity”, in We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern Europe ed. Diana Mishkova (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), p. 65. See also, Carter V. Findley, “The Advent of Ideology in the Middle East (Part I)”, Studia Islamica 55 (1982), p. 165.
185 Joseph G. Rahme, “Namık Kemal‟s Constitutional Ottomanism and Non--Muslims,” Islam and Christian--Muslim Relations 10:1 (1999), p. 24.
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traditional values.186 This view indicates that being Ottoman, Muslim and Turk was inextricable and he did not try to attempt to separate these identities from each other. On the contrary, he showed that these identities complemented each other. As long as Turkishness was strong, the Ottoman state and Ottomanism could survive.
Furthermore, the understanding of Ottoman imperial identity as a fluid one surfaces in the writings of Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, he worked for Tanin, but sometimes he published articles in Kürd Teavün ve Terakki newspaper which was the organ of the Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Committee of Mutual Assistance and Progress for Kurds), which was connected to the CUP and was founded on 19 September 1908 to represent Kurds and their demands.187 On 5 December 1908, in the first issue of the newspaper, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article “Kürtler ve Kürdistan” (Kurds and Kurdistan) and he declared that the Kurdish nation began to show sign of life and described Kurds as Muslim above all, later without doubt and absolutely Ottoman and secondarily Kurd who worked for its national goal without separating itself from the Ottoman society.188 For him, these three identities were not contradictory with each other and did not cause a fragmentation within the society. He saw Ottomanness as a supra-identity and under this supranational ideology of Ottomanism, Kurds could preserve their own national identity and Kurds were both Kurdish and Ottomans. Further, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı did not separate his own religious and „national‟ identity and he emphasized his Islamic identity, too.
These fluid identities could be seen among non-Muslims, too especially Ottoman Greeks. A new independent Greek state was founded in 1830. This caused a fluid identity among Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, there was a new nation state that they shared same culture and language, but on the other hand, there was the Ottoman Empire where they mostly lived and had economic benefits. During the second half of the 19th century, the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun in 1839, read by Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşid Paşa and the Islahat Fermanı in 1856 were
186 Ziya Gökalp,” Üç Cereyan”, p. 13. See also, Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (New Jersey: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 74.
187 Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt I: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi 1908--1918, pp. 404--405. See also, Ayhan Işık, “Osmanlı Dönemi Kürt Basını”, Kürt Tarihi (Ağustos--Eylül 2018), p. 45; Kabacalı, Türk Basınında Demokrasi, p. 58.
188 Kabacalı, Türk Basınında Demokrasi, pp. 58--59.
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proclaimed. Thanks to the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun, all subjects became equal before law regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Mixed courts were established in 1840 to deal with commercial cases between Muslims and non-Muslims.189 With the Islahat Fermanı of 1856, these equalities were consolidated in education, administration of justice, public employment, military service and taxation.190 Later, military service would transform into “bedel-i askeriyye”, the payment to buy out of military service, for non-Muslims who did not want to join the army. According to Richard Clogg, thanks to these reforms, the Ottoman Greeks began to regain their economic influence which was lost during the Greek Revolt between 1821 and 1829 and an immigration from the Greek state to the Ottoman Empire began.191 Therefore, during the second half of the 19th century, Greek population increased in Western Anatolia and even one Greek minister complained that many Greeks moved to the Ottoman Empire to work and this could cause a loss of feeling of nationality.192 It is understood that despite of the existence of two different states, national identities have not been crystallized yet and people were able to choose their belongingness according to circumstances.
This cannot be better summarized in the writings of Hüseyin Cahid in Tanin. Hüseyin Cahid discussed the concept of fluid identities in his article “Anasır-ı Osmaniye” (The Ottoman Elements), published, on 30 August 1908, a month after the 1908 Revolution He claimed that Greeks, too, were content with the new administration and he added that a Greek came to him and said that among the people of the Ottoman state, in respect of trade and crafts, Greeks were the most competent, because of that reason, being an Ottoman subject was more useful economically than being a subject of modern Greece.193 This demonstrates that political identities were not simply bound to ethnicity or religion. Although Greeks in
189 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856--1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 27 and p. 44.
190 Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856--1876, p. 55.
191 Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire”, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publisher, 1982), pp. 195--196.
192 Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 195.
193 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanin Gazetesi Başmakaleleri: 1 Ağustos 1908-- 13 Nisan 1909, p. 102: “Türkiye‟nin faaliyet--i sınai ve ticariyesi son derecede tevessü edecektir. Türklerin bu şeylerde pek kabiliyetleri yoktur. Bulgarlar ise daha ziyade çiftçi kavimlerdir. Ticaret ve zanaat cihetinde en hazırlıklı Rumlardır. Onun için bundan sonra Osmanlı kalmak bizim için Yunan tabiyetinde bulunmaktan faydalıdır.”
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the Ottoman Empire had their independent nation-state based on ethnicity, for their economic benefits, they preferred to live in the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman subjects.
The third component of the late Ottoman imperial mindset appeared clearly in Tanin was the understanding of flexibility of imperial borders. To some extent, fluidity of border was related to the understanding of vatan which primarily, determined the borders of the Ottoman state, as it was not limited to a well-defined territory, it was abstract, and it was based on the idea that keeping the state together was the ultimate goal, so the lands described as vatan tended to change. Since the understanding of vatan changed constantly from time to time and people to people, talking about static and clearly demarcated borders like in nation-states is not possible in relation to the Ottoman Empire.194 For example, during the tumultuous years of 1913-1914, while Ziya Gökalp described vatan as the ideal homeland “Turan” including all Turks, Sati‟ al Husri defended the idea that loyalty to a fatherland should rely upon a common history and a common state, which was the Ottoman Empire.195 It can be inferred that term vatan had no one meaning and it was shaped according to political situation. The Ottoman elite‟s understanding of vatan was based on pragmatism and realpolitik as the main aim was to keep the empire together at least for those wrote for Tanin in 1913. This mindset cannot be seen better than in the article of Hüseyin Cahid “Kim Kime Muhtaç?” (Who Needs Whom?). During the peace negotiations with Bulgaria, on 6 September 1913, Hüseyin Cahid defended in Tanin that “Between two countries sharing common borders, in order to secure a permanent friendship in the future, it is necessary to make sacrifices of accepting a few kilometers more or less in the question of demarcation of borders.”196 For Hüseyin Cahid, therefore, the main aim was not to keep the Ottoman borders fully intact but to make sure to create a political climate which would ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire, which was not of course a nation-state. For this reason, the borders were open to negotiation to save the day, and so ruling elite could offer a part of the Ottoman Empire to a foreign state in order
194 Ebru Boyar, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), p. 125.
195 Gökalp, “Türk Milleti ve Turan”, p. 67. See also, Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey, p. 57.
196 “Kim Kime Muhtaç“, Tanin, 24 Ağustos, 1329/ 6 September 1913, p. 1: “…Hem hudut iki memleket arasında istikbalde daimi bir dostluk temini için birkaç kilometre fazla yahut eksik bir hudut tayini meselesinde fedakarlık etmek lazımdır…”
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to gain political benefit. In 1915, Enver Paşa‟s proposal offering Kırklareli to Bulgaria in return for the Bulgarian entry into the war on the Ottoman side in 1915 clearly summarizes this relationship between the flexibility of borders and the understanding of vatan.197
The fourth component of the late Ottoman imperial mindset was the centrality of Istanbul. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II told to the Venetian traveler, Giacomo de‟ Languschi that there should one world empire, having one faith and one sovereignty and to realize this ambition, the best place was İstanbul.198 Like other empires in past, this conversation represents the “political solipsism” of the Ottoman Empire. The “political solipsism” is the basis of an empire, meaning that there is only one state which exists and has the right to rule.199 So, this idea of empire was materialized in Istanbul. It was the capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire and so, the Ottomans saw themselves as heirs to the Romans as well as they began to assert that the Ottoman Empire was a world empire and universal.200 As long as the Ottomans held Istanbul as the capital city, they would preserve this universal empire. For this reason, in the 19th century, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, one of the most famous grand vezirs of the Tanzimat Period with Keçecizade Fuat Paşa and Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa regarded Istanbul as one of the “four pillars of the State (Dört Rükn-i Devlet), other threes respectively, Islam, maintenance of House of Osman and protection of Haram al-Haramayn.”201
On the other hand, rather than its symbolic importance in the empire, Istanbul was also a strategic center. Since the foundation of the Ottoman state, the Ottomans turned their faces to the Balkans and Europe and the conquest of Constantinople became a peak point of this strategy.202 Thanks to its hinterland, İstanbul connected two lands, Anatolia and the Balkans and controlled the Straits.203 With the control of İstanbul, the Ottomans secured their presence in the Balkans and Europe.
197 Boyar, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans, p. 126.
198 Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, p. 90.
199 Alexander, “Empire as a Subject for Philosophy”, pp. 251--252.
200 Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, pp. 90--91.
201 Selim Deringil, ”Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876--1908)”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 23/3 (1991 ), p. 346.
202 Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, p. 83.
203 Daniel Goffman, the Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 13.
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Losing İstanbul, therefore, would be a catastrophe for the empire both symbolically and strategically. Losing Istanbul meant the destruction of the idea of empire and universality, and the removal of the Ottomans from Europe and returning to Asia. After the Treaty of İstanbul with Bulgarians, on 7 October 1913, Hüseyin Cahid, in his article “Sulh” (Peace), published in Tanin, underlined the importance of the security of Istanbul. He claimed that if the border between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire were set to be the Enez-Midye Line, which was determined with the Treaty of London, on 30 May 1913, accepting the surrender of Edirne to Bulgaria, the days of Istanbul would have been numbered due to the Bulgarian threat and the Ottoman state would have been hopeless and helpless and would not even have had a significance as an Asian government, let alone as a European one.204 It is understood that Istanbul was sine quo non for the survival of the Ottoman state. Moreover, without Istanbul, the state could not be seen as a European state. If the Ottomans continued to keep Istanbul safely, then there was a hope to survive in the Balkans and Europe.
In conclusion, those four components of the late Ottoman imperial mindset, the understanding of vatan, fluid identities, flexibility of borders and the holding Istanbul, are instrumental to understand the coverage of the Balkan Wars in Tanin in 1913.
3.2. The Edirne Question
Edirne was the second capital of the Ottoman Empire, and it had a strategic importance for the defense of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace. For this reason, the Edirne Question was one of the most important problems to be solved between the belligerents during the Balkan Wars and therefore, took an important place in newspapers‟ columns and Tanin was one of these newspapers. There were many news and articles by Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı about this topic in Tanin. Those materials can give us clues about how the late Ottoman imperial mindset was in the period when Edirne was lost and recovered. By focusing on the
204 ”Sulh“, Tanin, 24 Eylül 1329/ 7 October 1913, p.1: ”…İstanbul‟daki ömrü madud bir hale gelen, aciz ve nümidinin en son derecesi içinde, zelil ve mütevekkil, her şeyi kabul eden bir devlet--i Osmaniyye‟nin değil Avrupa devleti sıfatıyla hatta bir Asya hükümeti halinde bile hiçbir ehemmiyeti olamazdı.”
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case of Edirne from the perspective of Tanin, this section will seek to understand how the late Ottoman imperial mindset was displayed.
Figure 3. 1. The map of Edirne and Marmara region, published in Tanin on 1 Temmuz 1329 / 14 July 1913.
When the war broke out on 8 October 1912, the Bulgarian forces advanced into eastward rapidly and within a month, they besieged Edirne and the city fell to the Bulgarians on 26 March 1913.205 After a series of defeats, the Ottoman government asked for an armistice on 3 December 1913 while the Bulgarians were marching towards the Çatalca Line, which was on the outskirts of Istanbul. that caused fear within the Ottoman state.206 Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, the chief secretary to sultan (mabeyn başkatibi) at that period, in his memoirs Görüp İşittiklerim, (What I Saw and Heard) wrote how people in the Palace took alarm when they heard the sounds of bombardment in Çatalca Line. At the same time, Kamil Paşa was worried about the consequences of the battle there, and during the cabinet meeting he said that as a result of a battle on the Çatalca Line, there was a possibility of the total collapse of the Ottoman army and even “God forbid” (maazallah), the enemy could enter “the seat of the sultanate” (payitaht), resulting in “very deplorable and
205 Ezel Kural Shaw and Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808--1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 294.
206 Kural Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808--1975, p. 295.
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calamitous conditions.”207 In the course of the ceasefire, the rumors about reaching an agreement with the Bulgarians in respect of surrendering Edirne to the Bulgarians were circulated and this was presented as the reason of the Bab-ı Ali Baskını. Although the CUP, now in power, followed an aggressive policy to end the siege of Edirne, these efforts produced abortive results and Edirne was fallen to the Bulgarians on 26 March 1913 that sealed the end of the First Balkan War.208 A few days later, on 31 March 1913, the Ottoman government accepted the peace negotiations for a treaty which were signed on 30 May 1913 in London. So, the west of the Enez-Midye Line was surrendered to Bulgaria meaning that Edirne, the second capital of the empire, was lost to the enemy.209
After a while, the CUP had a chance for the recovery of Edirne, because the Balkan allies did not reach an agreement among themselves to share the spoils of the war in Macedonia and on 29/30 June, the Second Balkan War began with the attack of Bulgarians on Serbia and Greece.210 Even though, as explained earlier, the Ottoman government was divided into two groups; the first one was supporting the recovery of Edirne and the second one was hesitant to march on Edirne because of a political crisis, the first group gained majority in the cabinet and on 21 July 1913, the Ottoman army began to march on Edirne and on 23 July 1913, the recovery of Edirne was completed.211 After the end of Second Balkan War on 10 August 1913 between the Balkan states, Bulgaria and Ottoman state began negotiations and with the Treaty of Istanbul of 29 September 1913 between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, the recovery of Edirne was finalized.212
The Edirne Question was one of the major subjects which was continuously covered by Tanin. On 31 January 1913, Tanin was reopened after its closure on 11 November 1912, instigated by Hüseyin Cahid‟s criticism of to the Kamil Paşa cabinet. From that date to 15 November 1913, both Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı explored and discussed the Edirne Question in detail.
207 Türkgeldi, Görüp İşittiklerim, p. 88 and pp. 102--103.
208 Ginio, the Ottoman Culture of Defeat, p. 60.
209 BOA, HR. SYS, 2962--4, 17 Mayıs 1329 / 30 May 1913.
210 Ginio, the Ottoman Culture of Defeat, p. 63.
211 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat (1913--1922), ed. Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (İstanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2021), pp. 90--91.
212 Ginio, the Ottoman Culture of Defeat, p. 64.
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The Tanin coverage of the Edirne Question began on 31 January 1913 with the peace negotiations about partitioning of Edirne. Some news about this proposed partition was published in Tanin under the title of “Balkan Muharebesi: Bir Günde İki Hadise-i Mühimme” (The Balkan War: Two Important Events in a Day). In this news, Tanin published a copy of the note given to the Great Powers on 30 January 1913. According to this note, the Ottoman government, to demonstrate its commitment to peace, proposed to divide Edirne into two parts, taking Meriç (the Maritsa River), running through the mid of the city, as the border line between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, western part of Edirne to Bulgaria and eastern part of Edirne to the Ottoman Empire.213 Later, the newspaper claimed that thanks to this note, the Ottoman government now could accept all kinds of negotiations as long as the conditions put on the table were acceptable to the Ottomans, and so the government also showed its desire for peace.214 It is understood that for Tanin and the government, the division of Edirne was open to negotiation and also, this division was agreeable to the Ottoman Empire, because the Ottomans would continue to keep Edirne despite of the surrender of its western part. In this way, the CUP would maintain its claim in the eyes of the Ottoman public opinion that the CUP as the government did not give up Edirne and tried to save the Ottoman lands as much as possible. This flexible understanding of vatan and borders can be seen better in Hüseyin Cahid‟s article “Bugün” (Today), published on 3 February 1913. According to Hüseyin Cahid, the main reason that the Ottoman Empire insisted on preserving Edirne was nothing more than worrying about its vital interest i.e. keeping İstanbul safe, and the Bulgaria‟s insistence on having Edirne was perceived as a preparation for the invasion of Istanbul.215 For this reason, even though the Ottoman government divided Edirne in the way it would not pose a threat to the Bulgaria, the Bulgarians
213 “Balkan Muharebesi: Bir Günde İki Hadise--i Mühimme”, Tanin, 18 Kanun--i Sani, 1328/ 31 January 1913, p. 1: “…Hükümet-- i Osmaniyye musalahanesinin son bir burhanı ibraz etmiş olmak için Edirne şehrinin Meriç‟in sahil--i yesarındaki kısmını alıkoyarak sahil--i yemininde bulunan kısmı hakkında devletlerin reyine havale--i keyfiyet etmeğe meyyaldir.”
214 “Balkan Muharebesi: Bir Günde İki Hadise--i Mühimme”, Tanin, p.1: “Şayan--ı kabul noktalar üzerinde cereyan etmek şartıyla her türlü müzakeratı kabul edebileceğini göstermek suretiyle ne derecede itilafperver olduğunu ispat eylemiştir.”
215 “Bugün”,Tanin, 21 Kanun--i Sani, 1328/ 3 February 1913, p. 1: “Edirne‟yi ele geçirmek için ısrarları ancak İstanbul istilasına şimdiden hazırlanmaktan başka bir maksada atıf olunamaz. (…) Osmanlılar‟ın Edirne‟yi muhafazada ısrarları menafi--i hayatiyelerini muhafaza endişesinden başka bir sebepten neşet etmediği…”
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did not accept this proposal.216 Before the CUP took the total reins of the government, it promised to recover Edirne, but it is clear that pragmatism and realpolitik prevailed. The CUP understood that at this stage, the recovery of whole Edirne was impossible. On the other hand, if Edirne was surrendered to Bulgaria, Istanbul would be in danger, and this meant that maintenance of the empire would be in dire straits. Due to that reason, at least, the Ottoman government offered the partitioning of Edirne in order not to harm both the interests of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. As a result, it can be said that the understanding of “vatan” was vague for the Ottomans. When the interest was in question, Ottomans flexed their borders according to the political situation, because in their mind, vatan was not well-defined in terms of border and territory and the only aim was to keep the survival of state. For this reason, they did not avoid giving any concessions to other states. For example, in the same article, Hüseyin Cahid suggested that if the Bulgarians concerned about Edirne in terms of economic benefits, the Ottomans would have arranged the tariffs in favor of Bulgaria.217 Probably, this offer was Hüseyin Cahid‟s own idea and he searched an alternative to persuade the Bulgarian side for accepting the partition of Edirne in return for economic incentives. According to Hüseyin Cahid, this could have solved the impasse over Edirne, but the Bulgarians were too ambitious and insatiable.218 But, main thing here is that for the interest of the state, Hüseyin Cahid, with ease, found a new way to give different concessions to save the day. Therefore, this example shows the Ottoman idare-i maslahatçılık as appeared in Tanin. This concessive attitude did not work, and the armistice was suspended, and the war re-started and continued until the fall of Edirne to the Bulgarian army.
Edirne was surrendered to Bulgaria on 26 March 1913. The surrender of the city was important in respect of the defense of İstanbul rather than itself. As Babanzade İsmail Hakkı put it out frankly in his article “Edirne Sukut Etti, Fakat Manen Yükseldi” (Edirne Fell but has Risen Spiritually) published in Tanin, on 29
216 “Bugün”, Tanin,p. 1: ”…Edirne‟nin tarafımızdan teklif edildiği veçhile bizde kalmasında Bulgaristan‟a karşı hiçbir mana--yı tehdit mutazammın değildir.”
217 “Bugün”, Tanin, p. 1: “…Bulgarlar Edirne‟yi ele geçirmekten bazı menafi--i iktisadiyye bekliyorlarsa gümrük tarifelerinin tanziminde buna da bir çare bulunabilirdi.”
218 “Bugün”, Tanin, p. 1: “Bulgarlar‟ın inatları ancak hiçbir şeyle doymak bilmez bir hırs ve bişuurun tezahüratından başka bir şey değildir.”
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March 1913, three days after the fall of Edirne. He argued that the fall of the city would not affect “our political situation” unless the defense of the Çatalca Line was broken.219 Actually, Çatalca means Istanbul. If the Bulgarians managed to pass through the Çatalca Line, they would have captured Istanbul. For this reason, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, in his article “Edirne‟nin Sukutundan Sonra” (After the Fall of Edirne), published on 30 March 1913, warned the Ottoman authorities that they should make sure to get “a frontier possible to defend” (kabil-i müdafaa bir hudut) for ensuring the security of Istanbul.220 As the second capital city of the empire, Edirne was an important city symbolically, but for the survival of the Ottoman state, Istanbul was essential. The Ottoman elite could tolerate losing any piece of land as long as this land was not Istanbul. That is why Tanin writers were quick to rationalize the loss of Edirne without changing their abstract conception of vatan.
From 26 March 1913 to the Second Balkan War, 29/30 June 1913, the situation in Edirne did not change. When the Second Balkan War broke out among the Balkan allies, the Ottoman government saw this opportunity for the recovery of Edirne. In an unsigned article, probably written by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Bulgaristan‟a Karşı Vaziyyetimiz” (Ours Position vis-à-vis Bulgaria), published on 11 July 1913, almost two weeks after the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, the author explained the Ottoman mentality which was also evident in the quotation given at the beginning of this chapter. According to Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the most important problem between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire was territory and according to the Treaty of London, Bulgarians should have left the Marmara Basin as soon as possible, but constantly, they delayed it.221 Therefore, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı saw the Second Balkan War as an opportunity to solve this problem rapidly and he declared that if the Ottoman state did not want to miss opportunities that
219 “Edirne Sukut Etti, Fakat Manen Yükseldi”, Tanin, 16 Mart, 1329/ 29 March 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, ed. Hüseyin Özdemir (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2020), p. 1593: “Herhalde Edirne‟nin sukutu siyaseten vaziyetimize tesir etmeyecektir. (…) Çatalca‟daki hatt--ı müdafaamız kırılmadıkça…”
220 “Edirne‟nin Sukutundan Sonra”, Tanin, 17 Mart 1329/ 30 March 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1595: “Bize hiç olmazsa kabil--i müdafaa bir hudut verilmesi lazımdır. (...) Karaağaç, Lüleburgaz, Vize hatlarının terki İstanbul caddesinin düşmanlara daima açık bulundurulması demektir.”
221 “Bulgaristan‟a Karşı Vaziyyetimiz”, Tanin, 28 Haziran 1329 / 11 July 1913, p. 1: “Devlet--i Osmaniyye Marmara havzasını en seri ve kati vesait ile tahliye ettirdikten sonra mesail--i saireyi de süratle hal ve tesviye etmek mecburiyetindedir.”
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appeared, it had to move towards its target.222 This view reflects another characteristic of the late Ottoman imperial mindset, and it is that although the Ottomans did not challenge the status quo, when an opportunity arose, they did not hesitate to take the advantage of the situation to gain their territories back.
One week after Romania‟s declaration of war against Bulgaria, on 19 July 1913, the Ottoman government, with Talat Paşa‟s initiative, issued a circular for exceeding the Enez-Midye Line and marching on Edirne and the Ottoman Empire reassured that the army would not exceed the right of Meriç including the western part of Edirne.223 On 21 July 1913, the army began to march on Edirne under the command of Enver Paşa and on 23 July 1913, Edirne became an Ottoman land again.224 After the recovery of Edirne, Tanin tried to explain and legitimize why the Ottoman army campaigned against Bulgaria. On 28 July 1913 in an unsigned article titled “Bulgaristan Hudud-ı Kadimesi” (The Ancient Border of Bulgaria), which was possibly written by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı appeared in Tanin. The author claimed that European newspapers such as moderate liberal Journal de Debats, the most influential newspaper in France then and the German newspaper, like Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, warned that if the Ottoman army went beyond Meriç, this could lead to the European intervention, but he gave assurances to his readers (presumably both the Ottoman and European ones) that “The Ottoman state had abandoned the path of conquest for a long time ago” and he added that even the recovery of a small part of the lost lands resulted in outburst and wrath among Europeans, so it would be insanity to leave moderate policies of the Ottoman state.225 It is clear that what really mattered for the Ottoman elite was the protection of the status quo and their aim was not to follow irredentist policies. For this reason, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı further explained the reason for the recovery of Edirne that as the Ottoman state wanted to survive, the army had to march on Edirne, because the Enez-Midye Line left such a
222 “Bulgaristan‟a Karşı Vaziyyetimiz”, p. 1: “…Devlet--i Osmaniyye zuhur eden vesileleri elden kaçırmak istemiyorsa Mösyö Naçoviç‟in cevabını, talimatında vüsat veya mahdudiyyeti asla düşünmeyip doğru maksadına yürümelidir.”
223 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat (1913--1922), p. 93.
224 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912--1913: Prelude to the First World War, p. 119.
225 “Bulgaristan Hudud--ı Kadimesi”, Tanin, 10 Temmuz1329/ 28 July 1913, p. 1: ”…Devlet--i Osmaniyye fütuhat mesleğini çoktan bırakmıştır. Fütuhat şöyle dursun daha dün kendi bayrağının saye--i refetine iltica etmiş olan memleketlerin pek cüz‟i bir kısmını istirdada kıyam etmesi bile hakkında bu derece müthiş bir feveran ve gazap tevlid ettiğini bilen bir devletin mütevazıane meslekten inhiraf etmesi cinnet olur.”
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narrow space for the Ottomans that it would “strangle us”.226 However, according to the author, another reason for the recovery was to have a neighbor that had a tendency towards shaping the border between two countries in favor of its interests and this neighbor was greedy and avaricious.227 It is understood that Ottoman state prioritized the border security and the defense of the lands remained in the Ottoman hands, especially Istanbul. Because the Enez-Midye Line was not suitable for a formidable defense strategy and the Ottomans were afraid of the Bulgarian ambitions over İstanbul, so the Ottoman army had to march on Edirne to establish a better defensive line against aggressive Bulgarians. This demonstrates that the Ottoman ruling elite did not plan to pursue a policy of “Reconquista” of the Balkans, but the elite acted in conformity with the defensive mindset.
The survival of the Ottoman state necessitated having territories in Europe, which is necessary for the defense of İstanbul. Before the Ottoman army‟s offensive against the Bulgarian occupying forces in Edirne, in another unsigned article, possibly written by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Nokta-i Nazarımız” (Our Point of View), published on 18 July 1913, the author questioned the effectiveness of the Enez-Midye Line for ensuring the security of İstanbul which was under the Bulgarian threat. He further argued that this border might be sufficient provided that Bulgarians were “peaceful” (ahdperver) and “sincere” (samimi).228 Hüseyin Cahid, too, reflected the need of strengthening the defense of Edirne. During the peace negotiations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, in his article published on 7 September 1913, “Bulgarlar‟ın Teklifi” (The Bulgarian Offer), Hüseyin Cahid declared that “what we need is to have a strong Edirne which could defend us in a real and serious manner against a Bulgarian attack and confer on us the right of having a voice in the Balkans.”229 All in all, Edirne was indispensable for İstanbul,
226 “Bulgaristan Hudud--ı Kadimesi”, p. 1: ”…Yaşamak istiyoruz. (…) Bize bırakılmak istenilen hatt--ı hudud dimağımızı sıkacak, nefesimizi boğacak derecede dardı. Bu kadar dar bir sahada yaşamak imkansızlığını akl--ı selim teslim eder.”
227 “Bulgaristan Hudud--ı Kadimesi”, p. 1: “Hududu daima kendi lehinde bir şekle ifrağ etmeye mütemayil olan bir tama‟kar ve haris komşumuz olur ise…”
228 “Nokta--i Nazarımız”, Tanin, 5 Temmuz 1329/ 18 July 1913, p. 1: “…Bu esbaba bir de payitahtımızın selameti cihetini ilave etmelidir. Enez--Midye hatt--ı mevhumunun payitahtın selametini nasıl temin edeceği cay--i sualdir. Komşumuz ahdperver, samimi olsa belki bu hudutla iktifa olunabilir.”
229 “Bulgarlar‟ın Teklifi”, Tanin, 25 Ağustos 1329/ 7 September 1913, p. 1: ”…Bize lazım olan bir Bulgar tecavüzüne karşı bizi ciddi ve hakiki surette müdafaa edebilecek ve Balkanlar‟da bize bir hakk--ı kelam bahşedecek kuvvetli bir Edirne‟dir.”
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because keeping Edirne meant that İstanbul and the Ottoman state were safe. This can be summarized in Claude Farrère‟s article “Edirne Türk Kalmalıdır” (Edirne Should Remain Turkish). Claude Farrére was a French writer and known as „a friend of Turks by the Ottoman press. This article from Gil Blas, a French journal, was published in Turkish by Tanin on 16 August 1913. Farrére declared that “Edirne is the heart and the fortress of İstanbul and the one owns Edirne owns İstanbul, so owning Istanbul and the Straits meant having the Balkans.”230
The coverage of the recovery of Edirne in Tanin also provided clues about the late Ottoman imperial mindset in terms of fluidity of identities. On 30 August 1913, after the recovery of Edirne and during the peace negotiations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman state, an unsigned article entitled “Edirne‟nin Kıymeti” (The Worth of Edirne) was published in Tanin. The author described Edirne as an ideal (mefkure) for not only people living in these lands, namely the Ottoman Empire, but also for “pure” Muslims living in China, India and even in Albania.231 By doing so, the author linked “Edirne”, a part of the Ottoman vatan, to other Muslims living outside the empire spiritually. Therefore, according to the author, Edirne could belong to the Ottoman vatan, but on large scale, this city was part of Muslim identity. Furthermore, Hüseyin Cahid, on 9 August 1913 described the Edirne Question as a confrontation between Islam and Christianity in his article entitled “Avrupa Karşısında Edirne Meselesi” (The Edirne Question in the Face of Europe). He claimed that the aim of Russia and Bulgaria was to gain a victory over the Islamic World by cutting Edirne, “a Muslim and Turkish province”, off from the Ottoman vatan.232 As this brief quotation indicates that according to author, Turkishness and Islam became inextricably linked with each other For this reason, belonging to Turkish and Islamic identity did not cause a conflict and fragmentation within the Ottoman Empire, even sometimes these identities could be interchangeable.
230 “Edirne Türk Kalmalıdır”, Tanin, 3 Ağustos 1329/ 16 August 1913, p. 1: “… Edirne İstanbul‟un kalbidir, kalesidir. Edirne‟ye malik olan İstanbul‟a da malik olur. (…) İstanbul ve boğazlara malik olan Balkanlar‟a da sahip demektir.”
231 “Edirne‟nin Kıymeti”, Tanin, 17 Ağustos 1329/ 30 August 1913, p. 1: “…Vatandan, Osmanlı bayrağının dalgalandığı mübarek topraklardan. (…) Bugün yalnız bu toprakta oturanlar için değil Hint‟te, Çin‟de, Hatta Arnavutluk‟taki özü pak Müslümanlara mefkure olan…”
232 “Avrupa Karşısında Edirne Meselesi”, Tanin, 27 Temmuz 1329/9 August 1913, p. 1: “[Edirne meselesi] Bizim fikrimizce bu Müslümanlık ve Hristiyanlık meselesinden başka bir şey değildir. (…) Edirne‟yi Osmanlı vatanından koparmakta takip olunan maksadın Slav alemine ait bir hakk--ı istihsalden ziyade Müslümanlık alemi üzerinde muzafferiyet ihraz etmek. (…) Edirne vilayeti Müslümandır ve Türk‟tür. “
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In that sense, this supra-identity and multiple identities can be seen in non-Muslims as well. On 7 August 1913, a Turkish translation of an article “Edirne ve Devletler” (Edirne and the States) by “H. Philouze” published firstly in the French newspaper Le Radical which was the organ of radical and radical socialists in France. The author was in Edirne on 15 May 1913, and he met one of the Armenian notables of the city. This person told him that “We are Armenians, but we are Turks as much as a pure Turk and we would solve our conflicts between us. We are forced to accept the Bulgarian yoke, but we will always remain Turks.”233 By translating and publishing this article, Tanin tried to show that as a characteristic of the Ottoman Empire, various nations and religious groups preserved their identities under the supra-identity of Ottomanness/Turkishness, so this did not cause the renunciation of the other identities. At the same time, Tanin used this article to make an anti-Bulgarian propaganda by showing that the different religious and ethnic groups preferred the Ottoman Empire to Bulgaria and the people coming from different ethnicities and religions could belong to various identities and maintain their religious and ethnic identities freely in the Ottoman state, unlike in Bulgaria.
3.3. Conclusion
From the beginning of 19th century, the Ottoman ruling elite increasingly became concerned about the survival of the state. As a result, they prioritized the survival of state as they understood within a mindset which shaped their approach to political events which threatened the empire. This mindset, and encapsulated in the phrase, the late Ottoman imperial mindset revealed itself on the pages of Tanin especially in the heydays of the Balkan Wars. The loss and recovery of Edirne became a real test case to explore the late Ottoman imperial mindset in Tanin. And it shows that for the writers of Tanin, too, the major concern was the survival of the state rather than adopting new ideologies, new strategies, which would replace Ottomanism or the multinational and multireligious character of the Ottoman Empire.
233 “Avrupa Matbuatı: Edirne ve Devletler”, Tanin, 25 Temmuz 1329/ 7 August 1913, p. 2: “…Biz Ermeni‟yiz, fakat en ala bir Türk kadar Türk‟üz. (…) Biz Bulgar boyunduruğunu bi‟z--zarur kabul ediyoruz. Ama daima Türk kalacağız!”
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CHAPTER 4
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE BALKAN WARS
Throughout the Balkan Wars, in Tanin, many articles and news items about the Great Powers and their attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire and the war were published. These pieces do not simply provide information about the day-to-day events of the period, but also they are instrumental to help us to understand how the Ottoman elite perceived the Ottoman Empire in the hierarchical order of European politics vis-à-vis the European Great Powers and the „little‟ Balkan states In this chapter, thus, the Ottoman self-perception during the Balkan Wars, based on the close reading of the articles, in particularly written by Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, published in Tanin from 31 January 1913 to 15 November 1913, will be investigated.
Foreign affairs took an important place in Tanin’s columns from the establishment of the newspaper in 1908. According to Ahmed Emin (Yalman), between April 1909 and October 1911 the news and articles about Ottoman foreign policy and World politics occupied approximately 15 percent of the content of Tanin.234 During the Balkan Wars, it is clear that foreign affairs and the war occupied many pages of the newspaper. Even in the issues consulted for this thesis, two or three columns in a first second page were allocated for news items and articles from European press and this section was called “Avrupa Matbuatı.” (The European Press). Articles and news items about the Ottoman Empire appeared in various European newspapers with different political perspectives and ideologies and from various countries, such as French Journal des Debats, Le Matin and Le Radical, British the Times, Germany Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Austro-Hungarian
234 Ahmet Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p. 121.
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Neue Freie Presse and Russian Novoye Vremya and were translated into Turkish and published.
The major and original discussions about the Ottoman foreign policy issues, of course, were conducted by Tanin’s own writers, Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. Because Tanin newspaper had a close and symbiotic relationship with the CUP, these articles were followed by European embassies as well as other European representatives. Therefore, these articles were written not only for Ottoman subjects, but also for European audience and due to this reason, some articles and news included concerns about giving messages to Europe and creating a positive public opinion there.
One of these articles was Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟s, “Limanımızdaki Sefain-i Harbiye” (The Warships in Our Harbor) published on 13 March 1913. This article was about the Great Powers‟ warships in İstanbul. Because Tanin was perceived as an „organ‟ of the CUP, this article was carefully reported by the European diplomatic missions, especially by the British ones. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı harshly criticized the Great Powers‟ warships anchored in the waters of İstanbul for four months. He wrote that four months ago, these warships arrived İstanbul upon the lies that Christians in İstanbul would be massacred, and he claimed that, before the Çatalca Battle in November 1912 “the well-known factories of lies and distortions put forward thousand ridiculous stories about massacring Christians.”235 For this reason, in order to save Christians in İstanbul, the Great Powers sent warships to there. However, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı rejected these rumors about the Christian massacres and asked these ships to leave.236
Sir Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador in İstanbul, reported to Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, about this article and he commented that Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟s tone here was “flippant” and “sarcastic”.237 Lowther then set to explain the context of this article to Grey. According to Lowther, four months
235 “Limanımızdaki Sefain--i Harbiye”, Tanin, 28 Şubat 1328/13 March 1913, p.1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1553: “Gemiler İstanbul‟da Hristiyanlar katliam edilecek gibi eracifin neşri üzerine gelmişti… (…) Malum olan ekazib ve eracif fabrikaları Çatalca Muharebesi‟nden evvel ortaya bin türlü türrehat çıkarmışlar…”
236 ” Limanımızdaki Sefain--i Harbiye”, p.1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1554: “Sefain--i harbiyenin i‟zamında bir maksad-- ı hakiki-- i medeniyet varsa onların yeri İstanbul değil, bin türlü mezalim ve şenaatlere cevelangah olan Rumeli sahilleridir.”
237 TNA, FO 424/243, Further Correspondence Respecting the Turkish War, Part VI, March 1913 (London: Printed for the Use of Foreign Office, January 1914), p. 223.
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earlier “these thousand lies” originated from the CUP itself and the ambassador further claimed that by spreading these lies, the CUP aimed to internationalize the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states to avoid a direct settlement between the two.238 When the CUP took power, some of the members of the CUP wanted these ships to leave, as they thought that these ships could be the vehicles of a direct European intervention rather than mediators between the Ottoman state and its Balkan neighbors.239 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, hence voicing the worries of these CUP members, wrote that these news were fake and the Ottomans did not attack on any Christians during the process, so these ships were not required anymore.240 While Lowther‟s report sheds light over the British perception of the CUP rule, it also demonstrates that Tanin was read and discussed in foreign diplomatic circles and the articles of leading authors such as Babanzade İsmail Hakkı were considered as the publications of the CUP.
4.1. The Ottoman Self-Perception in the Balkan Wars
The bitterness in Monsieur Asquith‟s [the British prime minister] and Lord Morley‟s [deputy in the British Parliament] speeches resemble a benevolent father‟s anger and exasperation about preventing his son from the pursuits which have unknown consequences.241
A few days before the publication of this article on 2 August 1913, Mr Asquith, the British prime minister, Lord Morley, a deputy in the British Parliament, and Monsieur Oackland, the permanent undersecretary of foreign ministry made speeches in the British Parliament about the Ottoman Empire‟s recovery of Edirne despite signing of the Treaty of London which fixed border as the Enez-Midye Line
238 TNA, FO 424/243, Further Correspondence Respecting the Turkish War, Part VI, March 1913, p. 223.
239 TNA, FO 424/243, Further Correspondence Respecting the Turkish War, Part VI, March 1913, p. 223.
240 “Limanımızdaki Sefain--i Harbiye”, p.1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1553: “Şu hâlde bir vehme binaen getirilmiş farz etmeye mecbur olduğumuz bu toplu, tüfekli muhafızların, muhafaza olunacak bir şey kalmayınca geldikleri gibi gitmeleri izzet--i nefs--i Osmaniye muvafık bir suret--i hal olur.”
241 “İngiltere Mehafil--i Resmiyesinde İtidal Emareleri”, Tanin, 20 Temmuz 1329 / 2 August, 1913, p. 1.: “Gayet şefik bir pederin oğlunu mechulü‟l-- avakıb işlerden men hususundaki hiddet ve şiddeti ne ise Mösyö Asquith ile Lord Morley‟in nutuklarındaki acılık da odur.”
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and excluded Edirne from the Ottoman Empire.242 In these speeches, Great Britain warned the Ottoman state that Great Britain did not plan to launch separate operations (hareket-i münferide) against the Ottoman Empire, but if new military operations were started against the Ottomans because of abandoning this treaty, the British would not protect the Ottoman Empire.243
This warning was reported in an unsigned editorial written after the recovery of Edirne, possibly by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı. It seems that the author a priori accepted the superiority of Great Britain and the need for the patronage of Great Britain to hold Edirne, because other states could launch military attack on the empire. Therefore, in order to survive, the Ottoman Empire needed a Great Power, especially Great Britain. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı narrated the session in the British Parliament about Balkan Wars by making an analogy between a father and his son. The author perceived the attitude of the British towards the Ottomans was superior and considered the British figure as a father protecting his child.
From 1774 onwards, with the territorial losses to the Russian Empire during the War of 1768-1774, the “Eastern Question” emerged in European politics and by the time of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman state was the source of competition between the European states.244 By the end of the 18th century, it became clear that the Ottomans could not successfully fight alone against the European Great Powers and the only foreign policy tool that the Ottoman ruling elite could use was diplomacy.245 Therefore, the Ottomans had to accept their inferior political position in the face of the West and embrace idare-i maslahatçılık, the term explained in the previous chapter, to keep the empire together vis-à-vis the European states. The Ottomans, thus, tried to avoid conflicts with European powers and also, they abstained from taking a side and forming direct alliances with one of the Great Powers against another and wanted to maintain the status quo.246 To put it bluntly, the Ottoman Empire was no longer one of the dominant actors in European politics.
242 “İngiltere Mehafil--i Resmiyesinde İtidal Emareleri”, p. 1.
243 “İngiltere Mehafil--i Resmiyesinde İtidal Emareleri”, p. 1: “İngiltere hükümeti hiçbir hareket--i münferide teklif etmedi. Ancak devlet--i Osmaniyeyi hareket--i cebriyye--i vakıasından dolayı duçar olacağı avakıba karşı himaye edemeyecektir.”
244 Christoph K. Neumann, “Political and Diplomatic Developments”, in The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 57.
245 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 12.
246 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, p. 14.
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Thanks to the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which was signed after the Crimean War between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire and its allies, Great Britain, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia. The Ottoman Empire was invited to attend to the Concert of Europe which was perceived by the Ottomans as a symbol that showed that the Ottoman state became a European power. The Ottoman Empire, however, was subordinated to the Great Powers, because they guaranteed integrity and independence of the empire.247 As a result, without the patronage of the Great Powers, the days of the Ottoman Empire would have been numbered. By the late 19th and early 20th century, the Great Powers were divided into two groups; the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy) and this established a new balance of power among them. This, however, created difficulties for the Ottoman state, as Great Britain and France became allies with Russia against Germany, so for the Ottoman state, this entente made difficult to win the support of Great Britain and France against Russia, especially during the Balkan Wars.248 For this reason, when the Ottomans confronted with the Balkan Alliance supported by Russia which was made up of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, in the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire could not reach an agreement with France and Great Britain to become allies.249 Cemal Paşa, the İstanbul Guardian (İstanbul Muhafızı) at that period and was prominent figure in the CUP, mentioned this situation disappointedly in his memoirs that France and Great Britain could have saved the Ottomans from the Balkan Wars, but they avoided to do so.250
The 19th century was the age of nation-state and nationalism and the Ottomans failed to understand the developments well in its Balkan region.251 Firstly, the Serbians rebelled against the Ottoman rule and gained autonomy in 1829 and later, Greece became an independent state with the help of the European powers in 1830.252 Later, Serbia and Bulgaria gained independence respectively in 1878 and 1908. Since the Ottoman understanding of state-society relations was based on
247 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, p. 20.
248 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, p. 24.
249 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, p. 25.
250 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, p. 55.
251 François Georgeon, Sultan Abdülhamid, trans. Ali Berktay (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), pp. 24--25.
252 Georgeon, Sultan Abdülhamid, p. 25.
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paternalism meaning that state was a father figure to its subjects, the Ottoman ruling elite saw the uprisings and revolts as acts of disobedience as a result of “şımarmak” (spoilt by indulgence).253 By using the term “şımarmak”, the Ottomans remarked that these Balkan nations were like children and hence inferior vis-à-vis the Ottoman state.
From the 19th century onwards, the Ottomans dealt with two major concerns in European politics: the balance of power politics associated with the “Eastern Question” and Balkan nationalism which led to irredentist movements. In the face of these two major concerns, the Ottomans perceived themselves inferior to the Great Powers, but superior to the Balkan nations and states in the hierarchy of European politics. This Ottoman self-perception was clearly revealed during the Balkan Wars, and Tanin authors, particularly Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı discussed and explained these concerns in their writings published between 31 January 1913 and 15 November 1913. In these articles, one can easily see the Ottoman self-perception in relation to the Great Powers and Balkan nation states.
On 7 February 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article “Osmanlı Ordusuna Bir Tahkir” (A Contempt of the Ottoman Army) about the speech of General Mihail Savov, The commander in chief of the Bulgarian army. According to the summary provided by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the general claimed that the Ottoman army was a compilation of nomads and declared that “they should expel the Turks to the other side of the sea [the Aegean Sea]”, i.e., Asia.254 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı found this speech arrogant and resentfully questioned: “Did the Ottoman army downfall to such extent that it would hear out these insults?” The main important thing here was the attitude of Bulgarians towards the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarians who the Ottomans perceived inferior to themselves, dared to insult the Ottoman army as nomads and humiliated the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı confessed that this humiliation was more painful than the
253 Boyar, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans, pp. 47--48.
254 “Osmanlı Ordusuna Bir Tahkir”, Tanin, Kanun--ı Sani 1328 / 7 February, 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p.1472: “Düşmanın mukavemetini kırmak için onu tekrar yere sermek, alelacele toplanmış ve her şeyden mahrum göçebe ve kabilelerini dağıtmak, kendisini yıkmak ve meydan--ı harpte şerait--i sulhiyemizi onlara yazdırmak mecburiyetindeyiz. Türkleri denizin ötesine kovmalıdır.”
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defeat itself.255 Savov‟s words were a blow to the Ottoman honor, because it showed the weakness of the Ottoman state and army in the face of Bulgaria which was under the Ottoman rule until recently. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire did not deserve this indignity, because it saw itself superior to Bulgaria and this kind of speeches annoyed the Ottoman elite. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı finished his article by saying that the Ottoman army was charged with “the sacred duty of cleaning this insult with either its own blood or its enemy‟s blood.”256
Similarly, on 8 February 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published another article entitled “Ne Günlere Kaldık!” (What‟s the World Coming to!) in Tanin on the account of another speech, this time from Romania. Take Ionnesco, the Romanian interior minister, declared that “Turkey‟s survival was a necessity.”257 This benevolent declaration was not pleasing for Babanzade İsmail Hakkı as he saw this as a reflection of a condescending attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. İsmail Hakkı claimed that through the centuries, Romania was under the control of the Ottoman state and now, Romania reached to a position where it could attempt to be a patron of “its former master.”258 He even bewailed vehemently how the grand Ottoman Empire fell into its current state and he asked, “Has the honor and dignity of the Ottomans collapse such an extent?” It is understood that he felt resentment about situation in which the Ottoman state was, because of its former imperial subjects and this resulted in hurting the Ottoman imperial pride. For this reason, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was angry how the Ottoman state lost its superiority over its former subjects, and these subjects almost caught up with the Ottomans.
The Ottoman elite, further, compared the empire with the Balkan states in terms of the relations with the Great Powers. On 13 February 1913, in the height of the ongoing war, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı criticized the coverage of the Balkan Wars in the French press in his article “Fransa Matbuatı ve Harb-i Hazır” (The French
255 “Osmanlı Ordusuna Bir Tahkir” p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1473: “Düşman bizi yalnız mağlup etmekle iktifa etmedi. Mağlubiyetten daha acı olmak üzere bizi tahkir ediyor.”
256 “Osmanlı Ordusuna Bir Tahkir” p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1473: “…Ordumuz bu hakareti ya kendi ya düşmanının kanıyla temizlemek vazife--i mukaddesesiyle mükelleftir.”
257 “Ne Günlere Kaldık!”, Tanin, 26 Kanun--ı Sani 1328 / 8 February, 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1474:” …Şeref ve haysiyet--i Osmaniyye bu derece iflas mı etti?”
258 “Ne Günlere Kaldık!”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1474: “Asırlarca zir--i idaremizde bulunan bir memleket, sevk--i kader ilca--yı ahval ile şimdi evvelki efendisinin hamiliği sıfatını takınacak bir mevkie gelmiş.”
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Press and the Current War). He wrote that in order to establish relations with “parvenu” (türedi) governments [i.e., the Balkan governments] which appeared recently, France offended a nation which was its close friend throughout the centuries.259 It can be seen that some people in France preferred these Balkan states to the Ottoman Empire despite the fact that France and the Ottoman Empire had old and close links. According to Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “for the sake of little Balkan governments” (Balkan hükümet-i sagiresi uğruna). France further sacrificed its strong and moral ties with the East.260 By using the term “East” (Şark), Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, said that France was not only linked with Syrian Christians, but also linked with Muslims in the East. However, Muslims in the East were considerably familiar with French culture and ideas.261 In the East, French culture and language were prevalent and Muslims imported many ideas from French culture, even French language became lingua franca.262 It can be inferred from that France had an important sphere of influence in the East. For this reason, the author gave a message to France that Ottomans and Muslims in the East had a sympathy towards French culture and language, so if France continued to oppose the Ottomans in the Balkans, they would break their moral ties with the people of the East. At the same time, the author warned France that because of its attitude towards the Ottoman Empire, France could lose all its sympathies in the East where French culture rooted in.
Apart from destroying its moral ties with the Ottomans, France also endangered its economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. On 15 February 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı remarked in his article “Türkiye Küçülürse Fransa Müstefid Olur Mu?” (Will France Profit if Turkey Gets Smaller?) that the capitulations given
259 “Fransa Matbuatı ve Harb--i Hazır”, Tanin, 31 Kanun--ı Sani 1328 / 13 February 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1486: “Zira daha dün zuhur eden birkaç türedi hükümetle tesis edilecek bir münasebet için asırlardan beri kendisiyle samimi surette dostluk edilen bir millet gücendiriliyor.‟
260 “Fransa Matbuatı ve Harb--i Hazır”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1487--1488: “Fransa bu son Balkan Muharebesi‟ne kadar Şark‟a, Şark‟ın kalbine bu suretle hâkim olmuştu. Şimdi birdenbire asırlardan beri takarrür ve teessüs etmiş bu manevi hükümranlığı yine bu aynı Fransa kendisiyle manen irtibatları hiç mesabesinde olan Balkan hükümat--ı sagiresi uğruna feda ediyor.”
261 “Fransa Matbuatı ve Harb--i Hazır”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1487: “Fransa‟nın miras-- ı a‟sar olan Şark‟taki te‟sirat-- ı fikriye ve maneviyesi bil--farz yalnız Suriye‟de ve Suriye‟deki gayr--ı müslimler üzerindedir. Bilhassa Müslümanların Fransa efkarına olan irtibatları, Fransa‟dan olan müktesebatı malumdur.”
262 “Fransa Matbuatı ve Harb--i Hazır”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1487: “Fransızca muamelat--ı resmiyeyi bile geçmiş. Adeta beyne‟l-- anasır bir nevi Esperanto derecesini bulmuştur.”
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by the Ottomans to France were so important for the economic interests of France that neither Romania nor Bulgaria would give such concessions to the French as these two states did not have a positive attitude towards granting capitulations. So if the Ottoman state was to get smaller, the Ottoman lands over which the French had legal and economic rights based on the capitulations would get smaller, too.263 In this way, the author tried to give a message to France and he wanted to say that the Ottoman state always favored the French economic interests and if the Ottoman state continued to lose its territories to the Balkan governments, the French economic privileges would be declined, too. However, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı further compared the Balkan states‟ national economic policies with the Ottoman Empire‟s, and concluded that the Ottoman Empire had a strong commitment to capital (sermaye taahhüdü) and protected the interests of foreigners, while the Balkan states embraced independence of finance of the state (istiklal-i mali-i devlet) and he questioned that in which situation the investor felt secure?264 Thanks to its liberal economy and capitulations, the Ottoman Empire promised to protect the economic benefits of France in the empire, so Babanzade İsmail Hakkı implied that France should consider its economic interests in the empire and should support the Ottomans against the Balkan states again, as the Ottoman Empire was more a profitable ally than the Balkan states in terms of economic interests.
Furthermore, there was a general frustration among the Tanin authors about the Great Powers‟ lack of will to protect the status-quo which they imposed in the Balkans. In an unsigned article, “Edirne‟nin İstirdadı ve Avrupa” (The Recovery of Edirne and Europe), probably by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, published on 25 July 1913, the author underlined that while the Ottoman Empire did not challenge the decisions taken by the Great Powers regarding the status quo in the Balkans, its Balkan neighbors challenged this set status-quo. Even during the Balkan Wars, Great
263 “Türkiye Küçülürse Fransa Müstefid Olur mu?”, Tanin, 2 Şubat 1329 / 15 February 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1491: “Uhud--ı atikanın ecanibe bahşettiği imtiyazat, elbette mühim bir menfaat teşkil eder. Türkiye‟de ne kadar ecanib varsa birer sefir ve şehbender gibi haiz--i istiklal ve tebaadan ziyade hukuka nail bulunuyorlar. Devlet--i Osmaniyye küçülüverince işte bu intifa‟ın dairesi de o derece küçülür.”
264 “Türkiye Küçülürse Fransa Müstefid Olur mu?”, Tanin, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1492: “Bu sermaye taahhüdatına ve ecanibe karşı himayetkar olan bir devlet arazisinde kalırsa mı sermayedarlar emin ve müstefit olur, yoksa nüfuz ve istiklal--i mali--i devlet fikrini bihakkın anlayan ve takdir eden bir devlet arazisinde mi?”
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Britain openly and strictly warned the Balkan states not to challenge the existing status quo, but they did not pay any attention to this warning.265
However, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı disappointedly pointed out that this tolerance was not for the Ottomans. The Ottomans did not disrespect Great Britain, and they did not disobey the treaty that they signed with the Great Britain [i.e. Treaty of London] and also, they did not possess their neighbor‟s lands, but still the Ottoman state was subjected to reprimands [about the recovery of Edirne].266 It can be said that the Ottoman state had to accept its inferior political position in the face of Britain. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, accepting the Ottoman subjugation to the Great Powers, revealed the hypocrisy of Great Britain and explained that Great Britain overlooked and tolerated the Balkan states‟ disobedience, but even though Ottoman state was docile was docile in the face of Great Britain, it was subjected to condemnation and threats, and it had to act obediently in its relations with Europe.
Babanzade İsmail Hakkı further complained that the Ottoman and the Balkan states were treated like children by the Great Powers, but when the Balkan states acted “spoilt” (şımarık), they were treated kindly.267 He further reacted to this: “although the Ottomans always gave ear to advice and were subjected to insults by the spoilt (şımarık) Balkan states, the Ottomans were punished with reprimands and threats.”268
Politically, the Ottoman elite perceived that the Great Powers were hierarchically on the top of European power politics while the Balkan states were at the bottom of this order. The Ottomans located themselves at the middle of this hierarchy. This perception of the hierarchy of European power politics directed Tanin and its writers, therefore, to display their displeasure fiercely when the authorities of the Balkan states used belittling and patronizing tone in regard the
265 “Edirne‟nin istirdadı ve Avrupa”, Tanin, 12 Temmuz 1329 / 25 July, 1913, p. 1: “İngiltere son muharebede düvel--i müttefikanın statükoyu ihlal edemeyeceklerini katiyyen ihtar ettiği halde kendisini dinlemediler.”
266 “Edirne‟nin istirdadı ve Avrupa”, p. 1.: “Biz ise İngiltere‟ye ne hürmetsizlik ettik ne onunla münakid bir ahidnameyi çiğnedik. Ne tama‟karlık ediyoruz ne komşumuzun malına göz dikiyoruz.”
267 “Edirne‟nin istirdadı ve Avrupa”, p. 1: “Size müstakil bir devlet gibi değil çocuk gibi muamele edilir, diyecekler. Peki Balkan hükümetleri de aynı halde… Onlara da çocuk muamelesi edildi. Fakat onlar şımarıklık gösterince nevazişlere müstağrak oluyorlar.”
268 “Edirne‟nin istirdadı ve Avrupa”, p. 1: “Biz bilakis hep nasihat dinlediğimiz şu şımarık çocuklardan hakarete duçar olduğumuz halde yine tekdire, tehdide, tedibe biz müstahak oluyoruz.”
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Ottomans and the Ottoman military performance in the ongoing war and the Great Powers‟ disregard of the Ottoman importance in European politics.
Apart from the political and military comparisons with the Balkan states, the Ottomans also claimed that they were more civilized than the Balkan nations, especially the Bulgarians. A month after the fall of Edirne, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article called “Edirne Vahşetleri” (The Edirne Atrocities) in Tanin, on 22 April 1913. Here, he claimed that the Bulgarian soldiers were not any different from “blood-thirsty animals” (hayvanat-ı müfterise). They searched all Muslim houses with the pretext of searching for deserters, and they plundered the properties and goods of people and there was no honor (namus) was left untouched from the attack and no chastity (ırz) that was left unviolated.269 For Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the Bulgarians were nothing more than a few barbarians. Nonetheless, these atrocities and massacres increasingly continued. After the beginning of the Second Balkan War, on 9 July 1913, an unsigned article “Bulgarlar‟ın Mezalim-i Cedidesi” (New Bulgarian Atrocities), probably written by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, was published. According to Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, if there were only one nation in the world which was “addicted to killing” (“da‟ü‟l- katle (massacromanie) müptela"), it was the Bulgarian nation. It continued its atrocities as “a bloody curtain” covered its eyes, and Bulgaria was not able to see its national interests. Instead, it increased its atrocities and abolished the “incomplete” Treaty of London.270 This discussion reveals that at least during the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarians were represented as bloodthirsty and unreliable savages, who killed innocent local people. So, the Bulgarians, because of their inhuman actions, too, were not equal to the Ottomans.
Two weeks later, on 22 July 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article “Mukayese: Balkan Medeniyeti- Osmanlı Medeniyeti” (A Comparison: The Balkan Civilization-the Ottoman Civilization). He argued that while the Bulgarians insulted the Ottomans by calling them as Asians and nomads and described
269 “Edirne Vahşetleri”, Tanin, 9 Nisan 1329 / April 22 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1647: “O sırada hayvanat--ı müfteriseden hiç de farkı olmayan askerine ne yaptırdıysa yaptı. (…) Tertip ettiği on bin kişilik bir kuvve--i askeriye ile asker firarisi aramak mazeret--i zahirisi ile ne kadar Müslüman hanesi varsa cümlesini taharri ettirdi. Ne kadar mal varsa yağma ettirdi. (…) Ve nihayet taarruzdan masun hiçbir namus hetk edilmedik hiçbir ırz bırakmadı.”
270 “Bulgarlar‟ın Mezalim--i Cedidesi”, Tanin, 26 Haziran 1329 / 9 July 1913, p. 1: “Dünyada –– tabir--i mazur görülsün-- da‟ü‟l-- katle (massacromanie) müptela olmuş bir kavim varsa o da Bulgarlar‟dır. (…) Bulgaristan gözlerini kapayan hunin perdeden dolayı menfaatini görmekte izhar--ı aciz ederek zulmünü teşdid ve natamam kalmış ahitnameyi pa--mal ediyor.”
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themselves as the leader of the civilization and humanity vis-à-vis the Ottomans who were the invaders of the Balkans, in reality the Ottoman army did not stoop to killing children and raping women and the Ottoman soldiers showed merit of humanity, which could be rarely seen even in the most civilized nations. Further the Ottomans did not try to take revenge from those people who had collaborated with the enemy to ruin the Muslims despite the fact that Ottomans had the right to do so.271 When compared to the Bulgarians, the Ottomans gave importance to the values of civilization and had no sense of revenge against those who had allied with the enemy, but the Bulgarians had no mercy and like bandits, they massacred people easily even though they described themselves as civilized. Thus, according to Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the Bulgarians were hypocrites and did not represent the values of civilization. However, only hypocrites were not the Bulgarians, but also the Europeans. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı criticized the Europeans that while they tolerated the Bulgarian massacres, they could not tolerate Ottomans for a minute when Ottomans took an offensive military action to recover Edirne, an action which was essential for the Ottomans.272 This article in fact contained a message for Europeans and indicated that the real uncivilized and savage people were not the Ottomans, but the Bulgarians who committed many war crimes and despite this, the European powers supported them
As a result, the Ottoman perception of the Bulgarians in respect to civilization cannot be summarized better than in Hüseyin Cahid‟s writings. On 8 September 1913, during the peace negotiations with Bulgaria, Hüseyin Cahid, in his article “Bulgarlar Ne İstiyorlar!” (What do the Bulgarians Want?), claimed that “today the Bulgarians were excluded from the family of humanity and civilization.” He further
271 “Mukayese: Balkan Medeniyeti--Osmanlı Medeniyeti”, Tanin, 9 Temmuz 1329 / 22 July 1913, p. 1: “Asyani ve göçebe diye Osmanlı kavmini tahkir eden, kendisine insaniyet ve medeniyetin pişvası süsünü veren Bulgar kavminin istilası… (…) işte bu kıpkızıl neticeye müncer oldu. (…) Osmanlı ordusu çocukları kurşuna dizmek, kadınların ırzına tasallut etmek gibi fazihalara katiyyen tenezzül etmedi. (…) Düşmanla ittifak eden düşmana mukaddematü‟l--ceyş lik eyleyen, düşmanla beraber Müslümanları mahv ve ifna eyleyen bunca hainler gözü önünde durduğu halde en meşru olan hakk--ı teeddini istimal etmemek ve en tabii olan intikamını ahza çalışmamak gibi en mütemeddin bir kavimde bile nadir görülebilen hasail--i insaniyetperverane gösterdi.”
272 “Mukayese: Balkan Medeniyeti--Osmanlı Medeniyeti”, p. 1. “Bulgar mezalimini 7--8 ay meskûtane geçirmeğe tahammül eden Avrupa bizim en ufak bir hareket--i tecavüzkaranemize--mukteziyat--ı askeriyeden tevellüt etmiş olsa dahi--bir dakika tahammül edemez.”
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described the Bulgarians as “creatures” that should be rooted out from the earth in the name of civilization and humanity. 273
4.2. The Central Role of the Ottoman Empire in European Politics
In short, a new scene of the [play of] the Balkan tragedy [the Second Balkan War] is about to be displayed. We are not only the audience of this tragedy, but also the characters and that‟s why we are excitedly waiting for the opening of the curtain.274
By taking this quotation from Tanin, which was published by Babanzade İsmail Hakkı on 28 May 1913, into consideration, it could be seen that the Ottoman ruling elite‟s thoughts about how the Ottoman Empire could not be separated from the Balkan events as, the Ottoman state was inextricably linked to the Balkan affairs, and so the Ottoman ruling elite looked for an opportunity to take advantage of the situation not to abandon the Balkan lands.
The Balkan region was the heart of the empire. Even about 100 years before the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire expanded towards Edirne and the Balkan lands.275 According to Heath Lowry, from the very beginning of the state, the aim of the Ottomans was to move westwards, namely the Balkans, and after the consolidation of the state in the 16th century, the Ottoman state turned its face to Anatolia and the heartlands of the Islamic World.276 For this reason, it can be said that Ottoman Empire was a Balkan and European state, because until the last days of the empire, the Ottomans involved in the Balkan and European politics.277 Therefore, for the Ottomans, abandoning the Balkan lands and turning to Anatolia could not be accepted. When we look at the writings of Hüseyin Cahid and
273 “Bulgarlar Ne İstiyorlar!”, Tanin, 26 Ağustos 1329 / 8 September 1913, p. 1: “Bugün Bulgarlar insaniyet ve medeniyet ailesinden hariçte kalmışlardır. Yabani bir memlekete ilk defa yerleşenler orada rahat çalışabilmek için kurtların, yılanların köklerini kazımağa çalışırlar. İşte Bulgarlar insaniyet ve medeniyet namına böyle kökleri kazınacak, haritadan vücutları kaldırılacak mahlukattır.”
274 “Balkanlarda Harp İhtimali”, Tanin, 15 Mayıs 1329/ 28 May 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1733: “Hülasa Balkan hailesinin yeni bir perdesi oynanmak üzeredir. Biz bu hailenin yalnız seyircisi değil, aynı zamanda eşhasındanız ve onun için kemal--i heyecan ve tehalükle perdenin açılmasını bekliyoruz.”
275 Georgeon, Sultan Abdülhamid, p. 25.
276 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 96.
277 Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700--1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 2--3.
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Babanzade İsmail Hakkı in Tanin, 31 January 1913 onwards, it can be seen how the ruling elite perceived the Ottoman state as the center of European politics in this period.
The day before the Treaty of London, on 29 May 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article “Avrupa Bıktı” (Europe Fed up). According to him, the collapse of the “immense” (koca) Ottoman Empire would cause a storm in Europe. Already, the disintegration of the Ottoman Balkans triggered serious regional problems such as the Albanian Question between Serbia/Russia and Austria, the Edirne Question between Bulgaria and the Ottoman state. A possibility of a new war among these problems was the most dangerous for European peace.278 Actually, it is understood that the Ottoman retreat from the Balkan lands created a power vacuum which could not be filled by other Balkan states and indeed this caused a serious conflict among the Balkan states over the division of Ottoman lands which resulted in a fierce competition among these states and the destruction of peace.
This competition can be seen in Macedonia. On 9 June 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı published an article “Menba-ı Nifak: Makedonya” (The Source of Discord: Macedonia). He explained that the Ottoman authority in Macedonia harbored all inter conflicts among different nations, but now the Serbians could not be a friend of the Bulgarians and the Bulgarians could not be a friend of the Greeks in Macedonia and the members of the Balkan Alliance could not share these lands among themselves, which of course led to a new war.279 Because of the impossibility of the division of Macedonia, Europe would just understood that the Macedonian Question was not solved with the Ottoman withdrawal from the region.280 At the same time, each little government was a representative of interest and a “vanguard force” (mukaddemetü’l- ceyş) of a Great Power and if these states were to enter war
278 “Avrupa Bıktı”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1734: “… Şimdiye kadar Avrupa‟yı tefrikaya uğratan tehlikelerin hepsinden mühim diğer bir tehlike baş göstermeye başladı. Bu tehlike ise müttefikler arasında harbin hemen hemen muhakkak denilecek bir raddeye gelmiş olmasıdır.”
279 “Menba--ı Nifak: Makedonya”, Tanin, 27 Mayıs 1329 / 9 June 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1761--1762: “Devlet--i Osmaniyye‟nin aylardan beri orada nüfuz ve hakimiyet--i fiiliyesi münkatı oldu. Bununla beraber Sırp Bulgar‟ın, Bulgar Yunan‟ın dostu olamadı. Bilakis rekabetlerin, muhasedelerin üzerine bir puşide--i himayekar hizmetini gören hakimiyet--i Osmaniyye kalkınca bu hisler bütün had ve keskin şekliyle tezahür etti. Dünkü müttefikler Devlet--i Osmaniyye‟den kopardıkları bu hisseyi bir türlü aralarında paylaşamıyorlar.”
280 “Menba--ı Nifak: Makedonya”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1762: “Devlet--i Osmaniyye Makedonya‟dan çıkmış, fakat Makedonya meselesi yine kapanmamış olacaktır.”
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among themselves, this situation would increase a risk of a general war (harb-i umumi) in Europe.281 Therefore, Europe did not wish a new war among the Balkan nations, because there was a clash of interests among them. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy were against the expansion of Serbia in Adriatic, on the other hand, France supported Greek‟s interests in Aegean and Adriatic, at the same time, Russia supported Slavs in the Balkans, so this clash of interests could cause a war among the Great Powers.282 Consequently, for Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was necessary for the balance of power in the Balkans and Europe.
Earlier, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, on 23 February 1913, in his article “Balkan Balkanlılarındır” (The Balkans Belong to the Balkan People). put it bluntly that the Balkan states followed a policy based on the “policy of nationality” (kavmiyet siyaseti), but for the Balkan Peninsula, this policy was “absolutely inappropriate” (“tamamen gayr-ı müsaid”).283 In another article published on 15 March 1913, “Makedonya Makedonyalılarındır” (Macedonia Belongs to Macedonians), Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, remarked why the principle of nationalism could not be implemented in the Balkan region and especially, in Macedonia. According to him, many religions and ethnicities were mixed in Macedonia and because of this reason, the separation from the Ottoman state and the partition of the land among the Balkan states could not give birth to anything other than a “permanent tragedy” (“feryad-ı daimi”).284 For this reason, the power vacuum left by the Ottoman Empire broke the political balance and created instability in the region and brought the destruction for the people living there. Effects of the Ottoman retreat from Macedonia was summarized well in Hüseyin Cahid‟s article “Makedonya Ahvali” (the Affairs of Macedonia), published in Tanin, on 11 October 1913. He ironically summarized this
281 “Menba--ı Nifak: Makedonya”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1763: “Şimdi her biri bir devlet--i muazzamanın nev--umma çığırtkanı, mukaddimaetü‟l-- ceyşi olan bu küçük hükümetler, yek diğeriyle tutuşurlarsa acaba Avrupa‟da harb--i umumi ihtimalatı daha çok artmış olmaz mı?”
282 Igor Despot, Savaşan Tarafların Gözüyle Balkan Savaşları Algılar ve Yorumlar, trans. Mete Tunçay (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2020), pp. 154--158.
283 “Balkan Balkanlılarındır”, Tanin, 10 Şubat 1328 / 23 February 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1511: “Bu nokta--i nazardan tetkik--i mesele edilince Balkan şibh--i ceziresinin bu mesleğin tatbikine tamamen gayr--ı müsait olduğu tezahür etmez mi?”
284 “Makedonya Makedonyalılarındır”, Tanin, 2 Mart 1329 / 15 March 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1558: “Akvam ve anasır ve edyan orada birbirine o kadar karışmıştır ki herhangi bir tefrik ve taksim--i arzi, tefrik ve taksim edilen hisseler üzerinde bir feryad--ı daimiden başka bir şey tevlit etmez.”
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situation in Macedonia: “Christians who were freed from captivity with the retreat of Turks from Macedonia, since then, were never at ease.285
The presence of the Ottoman Empire in the region was necessary not only for the Balkan states, but also for the Great Powers, because the Great Powers, too, tried to extend their sphere of influence in the region and each supported various Balkan states against the other Great Powers, hereby creating the clash of interests among them. For instance, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, in his article “Avusturya ve Slavlar” (Austria and Slavs), published on 29 June 1913, one day before the beginning of the Second Balkan War, explained the competition among the Great Powers in detail. While Russia upheld the Bulgarians, the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to promote the Serbians.286 At the beginning, the Austro-Hungarian Empire which included people speaking Serbian did not want a Serbian state to develop and flourish but as Russia began to favor Bulgaria against Serbia, for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbia was not a threat anymore, so it tried to benefit from the Serbian hostility against Bulgaria and Russia.287 For this reason, Austria thought of replacing the Ottoman Empire with Serbia for balance of power in the Balkans.288
Babanzade İsmail Hakkı criticized this policy of Austria and suggested that with a little help, Ottoman state could be “a balancing power” (kuvvet-i muvazene), a power which was more effective than before, in the Balkans which were in chaos and politics changed every day.289 For this reason, if the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was conservative in terms of external and internal affairs, supported “the little
285 “Makedonya Ahvali”, Tanin, 28 Eylül 1329 / 11 October 1913, p. 1: “Türkler‟in Makedonya‟dan çekilmesiyle esaretten kurtulan Hristiyanlar bir türlü rahata nail olamadı.”
286 “Avusturya ve Slavlar”, Tanin, 16 Haziran 1329/ 29 June, 1913, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1805: “Rusya‟nın dümeni Bulgaristan‟a doğru kırması üzerine Avusturya ve Macaristan‟ın da Sırbistan‟a doğru yelken açmaya başladığı hissediliyor.”
287 “Avusturya ve Slavlar”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1806: “Avusturya bilhassa Sırp lisanıyla mütekellim tebaaya kesretle malik olduğu için Sırbistan‟ın büyümesine, Sırbistan‟ın ati için bir tehlike teşkil etmesine mâni olmak istiyordu. (…) Sırbistan, müttefiki olan Bulgarlarla hamisi olan Rusya‟dan da darbe yiyecek vaziyet--i elimeye gelince Avusturya‟ya meydan okuyacak, Avusturya‟ya düşmanlık edecek mahiyeti hiç olmazsa şu sıralarda kaybetmiş oldu. Bundan dolayı Avusturya ve Macaristan rical--i siyasiyyesi Rusya‟ya karşı hasıl olması tabii olan kızgınlık hissinden istifade etmek istiyor.”
288 “Avusturya ve Slavlar”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1807: “Şimdi bu kuvvet mahvolduğu için onun yerine başka bir kuvvet ikamesini düşünüyor.”
289 “Avusturya ve Slavlar”, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1807: “Fakat biz burada da henüz çiğ kalmış bir meslek görüyoruz. Devlet--i Osmaniyye biraz yardım ve biraz hayır--hahlık neticesinde eskisinden ziyade bir kuvvet, bir kuvvet--i muvazene olabilir. Balkanlar şimdi (kaos) halindedir. Yirmi dört saatte bir tebdil--i hüviyet ve vaziyet eden bir uzviyet--i siyasiyeye, uzun vade ile bir irtibat husule getirmeye imkân yoktur.”
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governments” which had volatile politics, this would harm its interests.290 However, unlike the “little” Balkan states, the Ottoman Empire, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had strong commitment for keeping status quo. In the face of the competition was necessary for the sake of balance of power in the region.
4.3. Conclusion
The Ottoman self-perception in relation to Europe revealed in Tanin in the period under study shows that within the European power relations, the Ottomans a priori accepted the superiority of the Great Powers as well as the status quo, set up in the Balkans by them. Tanin authors emphasized the Ottoman strong commitment to status quo which was continuously challenged by the Balkan states. The Tanin authors, hence, set to demonstrate how the Ottoman state was an important political actor in European politics, who would continue to be a balancing power in Europe, while the belligerent “little” Balkan states were the major actors which threatened the order in Europe.
290 “Avusturya ve Slavlar”, Tanin, p. 1. See also, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin Yazıları II, p. 1807: “Avusturya ve Macaristan gibi siyaset--i dahiliye ve hariciyesi muhafazakâr olan bir devletin her gün bir takallüb ve istikamete tabi olan küçük hükümatın arkasına takılması kendisi için fayda yerine zarar getireceğine şüphe yoktur.”
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
No, we do not change our ideas, but the events change, and it is duty of a newspaper to express an opinion according to the events. It cannot be imagined that a newspaper cannot be affected by this change when time and situation change every hour.291
Babanzade İsmail Hakkı wrote these sentences above on 12 July 1913, in an article entitled “Bulgaristan Mağlubiyeti- Romanya‟nın İlan-ı Harbi” (The Defeat of Bulgaria- Romania‟s Declaration of War)”. In this article, he defended that the Ottoman army should march towards the Marmara Sea Basin including the Enez-Midye Line that should have been evacuated by the Bulgarians according to the Treaty of London which stipulated the Bulgarian withdrawal from this region. He further encouraged the army to recover Edirne which was under the Bulgarian occupation since March 1913. However, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a few days earlier, on 6 July 1913, in his article “Harbe Karşı Vaziyyetimiz (Our Situation in the War)”, had a very different tone. Criticized for his writings as they were considered of making “more warmongering and noise than necessary” (“lüzumundan ziyade cenkcuyane ve gürültülü”) by “the circle of oblivious and heedless.” (muhit-i naim ve gafletzedemizin) who, presumably, were in particular the anti-war members of the Ottoman cabinet, İsmail Hakkı kept his views about a possible military action against Bulgaria to himself.292 Although Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was not happy, still for
291 “Bulgaristan‟ın Mağlubiyeti-- Romanya‟nın İlam--ı Harbi”, Tanin, 29 Haziran 1329 / 12 July 1913, p. 1: “Hayır, biz fikrimizi değiştirmiyor, vukuat değişiyor ve vukuata göre fikir yürütmek bir gazetenin vazifesidir. Hal ve mevki saatte bir değişince gazete makalelerinin bu tebeddülattan müteessir olmaması mutasavver değildir.”
292 “Harbe Karşı Vaziyyetimiz”, 23 Haziran 1329 / 6 July 1913, p. 1: “Fakat defaatle bu mesailde yazdığımız makaleleri lüzumundan ziyade cenkcuyane ve gürültülü telakki eden muhit--i naim ve gafletzedemizin böyle bir kat‟i tavsiyeyi şimdiki halde hazıma gayr--i müsait olduğunu bildiğimizden şimdilik bu derece kat‟i ve makul hatt--ı hareketi uzun uzadıya tafsil ve teşrihten sarf--ı nazar edeceğiz.”
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political purposes, he felt obliged not to voice his views. Until right time, he should wait to express his ideas frankly.
Once the military environment changed in favor of the Ottomans, due to the Romanian attack on Bulgaria on 10 July 1913, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was ready to push his ideas that the Ottoman army should direct its attention to recover Edirne. This quick change of heart was apparently criticized by some, so as a response to these criticisms, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı wrote sentences above. This approach of Babanzade İsmail Hakkı shows that the late Ottoman imperial mindset shaped his views. Why Babanzade did not have a problem to shift his day-to-day ideas on political and military matters was related to the fact that in essence what mattered for him, was the survival of the Ottoman Empire and hence changing his views, if necessary daily, to serve the main aim of the survival of the state was normal Babanzade İsmail Hakkı was not alone in this and, as discussed in Chapter 2, Tanin which was very close to the CUP was a very prominent platform to bring forward the discussions on such matters.
The late Ottoman imperial mindset as discussed in Chapter 3, is an important guide to analyze the coverage of the Balkan Wars in Tanin as this mindset clearly apparent in the articles and news which discussed the ongoing Balkan Wars and the place of the Ottoman Empire in European politics as well as in the Ottoman self-perception. What underlined the late Ottoman imperial mindset was that it was very much designed to make sure the survival of the Ottoman Empire. Despite being imperial, this mindset was not expansionist, but instead was based on a defensive attitude and idare-i maslahatçılık to save the day in the face of political and military threats so the main aim of this mindset was to protect the status quo, hence, to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and to keep the pillars of the Ottoman state intact. Therefore, as was shown in the section on the Edirne Question, the discussions about the loss and later the recovery of Edirne in Tanin, mainly by its leading authors, Hüseyin Cahid and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, reflected this mindset of the ruling elite very clearly. Indeed, the Ottoman ruling elite of the period did not pursue a different pathway from their predecessors by introducing nationalist or revisionist ideas which would necessitate the total change of the Ottoman imperial mindset which was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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As for the place of the Ottoman Empire in European politics and the Ottoman self-perception during the Balkan Wars, shown in Chapter 4, the Tanin writers, who were very close to the CUP government which took the control of the state after the (Babıali Baskını) on 23 January 1913, did not challenge the status quo imposed on the Balkans by the Great Powers. They accepted the hierarchy of power in European politics according to which the Great Powers were superior to the Ottoman Empire within the European power relations and the Ottomans needed their patronage for the survival of their state. On the other hand, for the Ottoman ruling elite, the newly formed Balkan nation states, which were considered by the Ottomans as their inferior in the hierarchy of power in Europe, challenged this status quo and so these Balkan states became the major threat to the European peace and order, which was already established on the fragile balance of power.
Apart from the above conclusions, the close reading of Tanin between January and November 1913 provides important material that necessitate to rethink the well-circulated tropes which presented the clear-cut historical axioms about the late Ottoman Empire: after the Balkan Wars, the Turkish nation-state was the ultimate goal of the ruling elite and inevitable collapse of empire. In fact, at least in 1913, in the hardest days of the Balkan Wars, even in the darkest moments after the fall of Edirne to the Bulgarians, Tanin writers did not abandon the idea of a multinational and multireligious empire and attempt to develop alternative political projects about the future of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, it becomes clear that 1913 was not a date of a revolutionary break or a turning point in the late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican history in terms of the development of a nationalist-either Turkish or Muslim- ideology that guided the CUP. As shown throughout this thesis that the Ottoman ruling elite, was adamant to preserve the status quo and so to keep the Ottoman Empire alive. As a result, rather than looking for different ideologies and grand future plans, the Ottomans tried to keep what is left of the state within an imperial framework.
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UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS
Çakır, Fatma, “Hüseyin Cahid‟in Tanin‟deki Makalelerine Göre 31 Mart Olayı”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Karadeniz Teknik University, 2014.
Gazel, Ahmet Ali, “Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) Bey‟in Siyasi Hayatı (1908--1913)”, Unpublished Ph D. Thesis, Atatürk University, 2000.
Karaoğlu, İlhan, “Tanin Gazetesi İnceleme ve Seçilmiş Metinler (1--300 Sayılar)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gaziosmanpaşa University, 2011.
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Sakarya, İbrahim, “Tanin Gazetesine Göre İkinci Balkan Savaşı Sonrasından I.Dünya Savaşı Başlangıcına Kadar Balkanlar”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2007.
Sert, Emrah, “Tanin Gazetesinin Penceresinden Osmanlı İç Siyaseti (1908--1909)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Eskişehir Osmangazi University, 2018.
Sezgin, Ufuk, “Tanin Gazetesi İnceleme ve Seçilmiş Metinler (301-500 Sayılar)”, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Gaziosmanpaşa University, 2013.
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APPENDICES
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET
Bu tez, Balkan Savaşları‟nın Tanin gazetesinde nasıl ele alındığını, yani diğer bir manada, Balkan Savaşları‟nı Tanin gazetesinin yazarlarının penceresinden inceliyor. Bu yazarlar ise Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟dır. Bu yazarların, Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Tanin gazetesinde yazdıkları yazılara ve haberlere odaklanarak, bu tez yönetici elitin 19. yüzyılın başından itibaren Avrupa‟nın askeri ve siyasi tehditlerine karşı imparatorluğu ayakta tutmak ve dağılmasını önlemek için geliştirdiği savunma odaklı ve günü kurtarmak için idare-i maslahatçılık siyasetine dayanan “Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti”nin Balkan Savaşları esnasında devam ettiğini ortaya koyuyor. Buna ek olarak bu tez yönetici elitin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nu, yani kendilerini, Avrupa ve Balkan devletleri karşısında hiyerarşik olarak nasıl konumlayıp algıladıklarını ve Osmanlı devletinin Avrupa ve Balkan siyasetindeki rolünün nasıl hala önemini koruduğunu irdeliyor. Böyle yaparak, bu tez ikincil kaynaklarda yaygın olarak doğru kabul edilen ve klişe haline gelen Balkan Savaşları‟nın Geç Osmanlı ve Erken Türkiye Cumhuriyeti açısından bir dönüm noktası olduğu, Balkan Savaşları esnasında yönetici elitin imparatorluk fikrinden vazgeçtiği ve yönetici elitin Anadolu‟da Türk milletine dayanan bir ulus devlete geçmeye karar verip Türk milliyetçiliğini benimsediği ve yönetici elitin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nun sonunun kaçınılmaz olarak geldiğine inandığı görüşlerinin ne derece doğru olduğunu ve gerçeği yansıttığını sorguluyor ve tartışıyor.
Tanin gazetesi bu tezin omurgasını oluşturur. Bu tezde Tanin gazetesinin seçilme amacı gazetenin başyazar kadrosunun, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı (1876-1913), Hüseyin Cahid (1875-1957), ve sahibinin Hüseyin Kazım Kadri (1870-1934), önde gelen İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC) üyeleri ve önde gelenlerinden olmalarıdır. Bu sayılan isimlerden her biri 1908 ve 1913 yılları arasında İTC‟den
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milletvekili olmuş ve yönetici elit içerisinde yer almışlardır. Bundan dolayı Tanin gazetesi İTC ile her zaman yakın ilişki içerisinde olmuş ve hatta bazı zamanlar partinin sözcülüğünü bile yapmıştır. Bu yüzden, Balkan Savaşları esnasında İTC‟deki yönetici elitin sesini ve düşüncelerini duymak için, Tanin çok önemli ve faydalı belgeler sunuyor.
Özellikle, Bab- Ali Baskını sonrası, 23 Ocak 1913, İTC tek başına güç haline geldiği ve hükümette söz sahibi olduğu için Tanin gazetesinin önemi daha da artmıştır. Bunun için, tezde gazetenin 31 Ocak 1913, yani Bab-ı Ali Baskını‟ndan bir hafta sonrası, ile 15 Kasım 1913, Balkan Savaşları‟nı bitiren Atina Antlaşması‟ndan bir gün sonrası, arasındaki yayınlarına bakılmıştır. Hüseyin Cahid, Kasım 1912‟de Kâmil Paşa hükümeti tarafından kapatılan Tanin‟i, 31 Ocak 1913‟te tekrardan yayına hazırlar ve hızlı bir şekilde İTC hükümetini meşrulaştırmaya ve Balkan Savaşları ile ilgili yazılar yayımlamaya başlar. Gazete, 15 Kasım 1913‟e kadar, 14 Eylül‟de Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa‟nın ordu hakkında yazdığı makalesi yüzünden kapatılmasının dışında, kesintisiz bir şekilde çıkmıştır.
Gazetenin yapısından bahsetmek gerekirse, genellikle 6 sayfa şeklinde çıkan gazetenin ilk sayfasında başyazarın köşe yazısı vardır. Bu köşe yazısı genellikle ilk iki sütunu kaplar ve güncel iç politika ve dış politika ile ilgilidir. Yine gazetenin ilk sayfalarında Balkan Savaşları boyunca savaştaki cepheler ve Edirne ve Arnavutluk sorunu ile ilgili manşetler ve haberler vardır. Bunun dışında ilk iki sayfada Avrupa ajanslarından ve gazetelerinden de Avrupalıların Osmanlı devleti hakkında ne düşündüğünü öğrenmek için haberler ve makaleler yer almaktadır. 3. ve 4. sayfalar genellikle iç politika, belediyeler ve bakanlıklardaki gelişmeler ile ilgili haberlere ve makalelere ayrılmıştır. Aynı zamanda bu sayfalarda kültürel, edebi ve tarihi yazılar da yayımlanmıştır. 5. sayfa ise yine günlük haberlerin ve son olayların kısa bir özetini vermektedir. Son sayfa ise, genellikle ilanlardan ve reklamlardan oluşmaktaydı.
Tezin yapısına gelirsek, bu tez 5 bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm; “Giriş” bölümüdür. Bu bölüm araştırma sorusunun ne olduğunu ortaya koymakta ve Balkan Savaşları dönemi hakkında genel bir kronolojik bilgi de vermektedir. İkinci bölüm “Tanin ve Siyaset” başlığı altında oluşturulmuştur. Bu bölümde, 1908 ve 1914 yılları arasında, Tanin gazetesinin ve başyazarlarının, Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade
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İsmail Hakkı, İTC ile arasındaki ilişkinin boyutu ve Tanin‟in hangi dönem içerisinde doğduğu anlatılıyor. Üçüncü bölümün “Tanin (1913)‟de Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti”dir. Bu bölümde bu Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti‟nin Balkan Savaşları esnasında da sürüp sürmediğini Tanin gazetesinin Edirne Meselesi üzerine yazdığı yazılar üzerinden tartışılmıştır. Dördüncü bölüm “Balkan Savaşları‟nda Avrupa Siyaseti ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu” başlığı altında toplanmıştır. Bu bölümde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟ndaki yönetici elitin Avrupa güç hiyerarşisi içinde imparatorluğu nasıl konumlandırdığı irdeleniyor. Bunun yanı sıra, yönetici elit gözünde imparatorluğun hala Avrupa siyasetinde merkezi rolü olup olmadığı sorgulanıyor. Beşinci ve son bölüm ise; “Sonuç” kısmından oluşuyor. Bu kısımda da araştırma sonunda gerçekten de yönetici elitin Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti‟ni devam ettirip ettirmediği ve imparatorluk fikrini muhafaza edip etmediklerini, ayrıca yönetici elitin aklında bir Türk veya Müslüman milliyetçiliğine dönüş, imparatorluğun kaçınılmaz bir şekilde sonunun geldiği düşüncesi ve imparatorluktan ulus devlet fikrine geçiş var mıydı argümanları tartışılıyor.
Bu tezin bölümlerini detaylıca incelemeden önce, bu yayınları içeren dönemi, yani Balkan Savaşları‟nı, kuşbakışı bir şekilde anlatmak gerekir. Balkan Savaşları‟nın asıl sebebi Makedonya Sorunu‟dur. 30 Eylül 1912‟de Düvel-i Muazzama‟nın Makedonya‟da yapılacak reformlar ile ilgili toplanma kararı alması bir domino etkisi yaratmıştır. 2 Ekim 1912 tarihinde, aynı şekilde Balkan müttefikleri reform konusunda Osmanlı devletine talepler de bulunmuştur. Bu Balkan müttefikleri Bulgaristan, Yunanistan, Sırbistan ve Karadağ devletlerinden oluşur. Bu ittifak Mart ayında Bulgaristan ve Sırbistan‟ın anlaşmasıyla oluşmaya başlamış, daha sonra Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan‟ın uzlaşmasıyla devam etmiş en sonunda da Eylül ayında, Sırbistan ve Karadağ devletlerinin anlaşmaya varmasıyla oluşmuştur. Bu müttefik devletler, 2 Ekim 1912 tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟ndan reformların Düvel-i Muazzama‟nın ve dört Balkan devletinin temsilcilerinin gözetiminde yapılmasını istemiştir. Osmanlı hükümeti bu teklife reformları yapacağını, fakat bu reformların 1878‟deki Berlin Antlaşması ile 1880 yılında kurulan Doğu Rumeli İdaresi‟nin yeniden organizasyonu için Avrupa Reform Komisyonu‟nun aldığı önlemlere göre yapılacağını söylemiştir, çünkü Osmanlı devleti olası bir dış müdahaleden korkmuş ve kendi iç işlerine karışılmaması için reformların yabancı
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devletlerin temsilcilerinin gözetimi altında yapılması fikrine karşı çıkmıştır. Bunun üzerine, 8 Ekim 1913 tarihinde Karadağ Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nun sınırlarını geçmiş ve savaş ilan etmiştir. 18 Ekim 1913‟te ise diğer üç Balkan devleti de Osmanlı devletine karşı Karadağ‟ın yanında savaşa girmiştir. Böylelikle, resmi olarak Balkan Savaşı başlamıştır. Osmanlı devleti savaşa hazırlıksız yakalandığı için İşkodra, Yanya ve Edirne haricinde Balkanlar‟daki tüm topraklarını bir ay gibi kısa bir sürede kaybetmiştir. Buna ek olarak Bulgarlar, İstanbul‟a doğru yürümeye başlamış ve Osmanlı orduları Çatalca hattına kadar geri çekilmiştir. Birer birer yenilgi haberleri gelince de Kâmil Paşa hükümeti ateşkes ve müzakere isteğini Balkan devletlerine iletmiştir. 3 Aralık 1913 günü, iki taraf da ateşkesi imzalamıştır ve bu durumda, Londra‟da iki farklı konferans toplanmasına karar verilmiştir. Bu konferanslardan birincisi Süfera Konferansı denilen ve Düvel-i Muazzama‟nın elçilerinin bir araya gelip Arnavutluk, Ege Adaları ve Edirne meselelerini tartıştığı konferans, ikincisi ise, savaşan devletlerin kendi aralarındaki sınırları ve toprak paylaşımlarını belirlemek üzere toplandıkları konferanstır. Düvel-i Muazzama Londra‟daki Süfera Konferansı‟nda statükonun geçersiz olduğunu ve toprak paylaşımının Balkan devletlerine bırakıldığını da belirtmiştir. Ama savaşan taraflar arasında anlaşmazlık çıkınca 6 Ocak 1913 tarihinde görüşmeler askıya alınmıştır, çünkü Osmanlı devleti Balkan devletlerinin Osmanlı devletinin Edirne‟yi ve Ege Adaları‟nı Balkan devletlerine terk etmesi için yaptığı teklifi reddetmiştir.
17 Ocak 1913 günü, Düvel-i Muazzama Osmanlı devletine Edirne‟yi Bulgaristan‟a ve Ege Adaları‟nı, Osmanlı‟nın Asya kıtasındaki topraklarını tehdit etmeyecek şekilde, Yunanistan‟a bırakması için bir ültimatom verdi. 22 Ocak 1913‟te Kâmil Paşa bu ültimatomun durumunu tartışmak için danışma meclisini topladı. Kâmil Paşa‟nın bu teklifi kabul etmeye meyilli olduğu anlaşılınca, 23 Ocak 1913 günü Enver ve Talat paşalar önderliğinde İTC Bab-ı Ali Baskını‟nı gerçekleştirdi ve hükümetin kontrolünü eline aldı. Sonrasında da 3 Şubat 1913 tarihinde ateşkes sona erdi ve savaş tekrar başladı. İTC Edirne‟yi kurtarmak iddiasında bulunmasına ve bu amaçla iktidara geldiğini vurgulamasına rağmen, Edirne Bulgaristan‟a direnemedi ve 26 Mart 1913 günü Edirne Bulgarlara teslim oldu.
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Edirne‟nin düşmesi ile birlikte Osmanlı devletinin savaşmak için bir nedeni de kalmamış oluyordu. Buna ek olarak Düvel-i Muazzama da bu savaşın artık çok fazla uzaması taraftarı değildi ve barış antlaşması için iki tarafı da teşvik etti. Nihayet, 30 Mayıs 1913 günü, Balkan devletleri ve Osmanlı devleti arasında Londra Antlaşması imzalandı. Antlaşmaya göre, Osmanlı devleti Enez-Midye Hattı‟nın batısında kalan tüm topraklarından feragat etti. Ayrıca, Bozcada ve Gökçeada hariç tüm Ege Adaları‟nı da Yunanistan‟a bırakmayı kabul etti. Fakat bir problem vardı. O da Makedonya‟nın paylaşımı hala tam olarak netleşmemişti ve bu sorun Balkan müttefikleri arasında tartışma konusu olmaya devam etti. Nitekim, bu anlaşmazlık ve sürtüşme İkinci Balkan Savaşı‟na sebep oldu. Bulgarların aslan payını almasının sonucunda Yunanistan ve Sırbistan buna içerlemişti ve bunun sonucunda, Bulgaristan‟a karşı ittifak oluşturdular. Böylelikle, 29/30 Haziran 1913 tarihinde Bulgaristan eski müttefiklerine ateş açtı ve İkinci Balkan Savaşı patlak verdi. Aynı zamanda bu savaş Osmanlı için de bir fırsat doğurdu. Bulgaristan batıdaki düşmanlarına odaklanmışken Osmanlı devleti Edirne‟yi almak için Bulgarlar üzerine yürümeye karar verdi. 23 Temmuz 1913‟te Enver Paşa komutasında Osmanlı ordusu tek bir kurşun atmadan Edirne‟yi Bulgarlardan kurtardı. Bu arada, Bulgaristan batı cephesinde de Sırbistan‟a karşı birkaç yenilgi aldıktan sonra eski müttefiklerine ateşkes teklifinde bulundu ve 10 Ağustos 1913 tarihinde taraflar arasında Bükreş Antlaşması imzalandı, fakat Osmanlı devleti bu konferansa davet edilmediğinden, Balkan devletleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile ayrı ayrı antlaşma imzalamak zorunda kaldılar. Osmanlı devleti ilk önce 29 Eylül 1913‟te Bulgaristan ile İstanbul Antlaşmasını, daha sonra 14 Kasım 1914‟te Yunanistan ile Atina Antlaşmasını ve son olarak, 14 Mart 1914 senesinde de Sırbistan ile İstanbul Antlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Böylece, yaklaşık bir buçuk sene süren Balkan Savaşları sona erdi. Bu savaşların sonucunda, Osmanlı devleti Edirne ve Kırklareli‟yi bir şekilde elinde tutmayı başarsa da onların dışındaki tüm Balkan topraklarını kaybetti. Ayrıca savaşın insani boyutu da Osmanlı devleti için bir felaketle sonuçlandı Savaş esnasında hastalıktan ölenleri de dahil edersek, yaklaşık 125 bin insan öldü ve 400 bin Müslüman ise savaş zamanı ve sonrasında Osmanlı devletine göç etmeye zorlandı.
Tarihi olaylarla ilgili genel bir fikir verdikten sonra bu tez, 2. Bölümde Tanin gazetesinin tarihi ve İTC ile ne kadar yakın olduğunu anlatıyor. Öncelikle
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aralarındaki ilişkiyi anlamak için Tanin gazetesinin doğduğu ortamı iyi bilmek gerektiğinden bahsediyor. 1908 Jön Türk Devrimi‟nden sonra, basın ve yayın o döneme kadar hiç olmadığı kadar özgürleşmiş hatta kimilerine göre bu anarşiye bile sebep olmuştur. Devrimden sonra birçok yeni gazete ve dergi yayımlanmıştır ve bu da tekrardan politik fikirlerin, tartışmaların önem kazanmasına sebep oldu. Bu da II. Abdülhamid devrinde rafa kalkan fikir gazeteciliğinin tekrardan basın yayın hayatına hâkim olmasına yol açtı. Bununla birlikte, gazetecilikte artık saray yardımları kesildiği için tüm gazete ve dergiler okuyucuyu bir şekilde kendilerine çekmeye çalıştılar. Böylece, geniş kitlelere ulaşabilen siyasi partilerle de organik ilişkiler kurmaya başladılar. İşte Tanin gazetesi böyle bir dönemde doğdu. Hüseyin Cahid ilk seçimlerde İTC‟den milletvekili oldu ve İTC‟nin çıkarlarını savunmaya başladı. Lakin, bu gazetenin cemiyetin resmi organı olduğu anlamına gelmiyordu. Tanin 1914‟te İTC‟ye satıldıktan sonra cemiyetin resmi organı haline gelmiştir. 1908 ve 1913 yılları arasında, Hüseyin Cahid, ve Tanin gazetesi, İTC ile samimi ilişkiler kurmuş, bir manada yönetici elitin halka ulaşan sesi olmuştur. Bundandır ki birçok yabancı diplomat da bu gazeteyi partinin resmi bir organı sanma yanılgısına düşmüştür. Sonuçta, yabancı basın ve diplomatlar da Tanin‟in yazdığı ve söylediği her şeyi dikkatle takip etmiştir. Özetle, gazete resmi organ olmamasına rağmen, halkın ve yabancıların gözünde İTC cemiyetinin sesi olarak kabul edilmiş ve popülerliğini de böyle kazanmıştır. Bab-ı Ali Baskını sonrasında Tanin çok daha fazla önem kazanmıştır, çünkü o günden sonra hükümette İTC söz sahibi olmaya başlamıştır. Gerçi, İTC hükümetin kontrolünü alsa bile kabine üyelerinden bazıları, Mahmud Şevket Paşa gibi, İTC üyesi değildi. Ancak Mahmud Şevket Paşa suikastından sonra İTC tamamen hükümetin iplerini eline aldı. Böylelikle, Hüseyin Cahid, Bab-ı Ali Baskını‟ndan bir hafta sonra, Kasım 1912‟de kaçtığı Viyana‟dan İstanbul‟a dönmüş, Tanin‟i 31 Ocak 1913 tarihinde tekrardan açarak, İTC‟nin yaptığı darbeyi meşrulaştırmaya ve savunmaya başlamıştır. Hüseyin Cahid‟in dışında, bu dönemde etkili bir başka yazar daha vardı o da Babanzade İsmail Hakkı idi. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı da İTC üyesiydi ve yine Hüseyin Cahid gibi İTC‟den milletvekiliydi ve yönetici elit arasında yer alıyordu. Hüseyin Cahid‟in Düyun-ı Umumiye vekilliği sırasında yurtdışında bulunurken, özellikle Şubat 1913 ve Temmuz 1913 arası, gazetenin başyazıları Babanzade İsmail Hakkı tarafından
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yazılmıştır. Bu tarihten itibaren 9 Ağustos 1913‟e kadar yazılar imzasız çıkmıştır, fakat 2. Bölümde Falih Rıfkı‟nın anılarında gösterildiği gibi o yazıların da büyük çoğunluğu Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟ya aittir.
9 Ağustos 1913 tarihinden sonra başyazılar birkaç istisna hariç tekrardan Hüseyin Cahid tarafından yazılmaya başlanmış ve İTC ile görüş ayrılıkları da bu dönemde başlamıştır. Hüseyin Cahid Edirne alındıktan sonra yurtdışındaki görevinden dönmüş ve hükümeti ve partiyi gerekli reformların yapılmadığı konusunda eleştirmeye başlamıştır. İTC bundan memnun olmamış ve İTC ileri gelenleri Hüseyin Cahid‟e telkinlerde bulunmuşlardır. Aynı şekilde, gazetenin yazarlarından Vicdani Hafız Hakkı Paşa da orduda reform gerekliliği üzerine yazdığı yazılarla şimşekleri üzerine çekmiş ve gazetenin 14 Eylül 1913 tarihinde yaklaşık 3 hafta boyunca kapatılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Tanin gazetesi her ne kadar İTC ile yakın ilişkide olsa da her zaman partinin ve onun hükümetinin kararlarını onaylamamış ve resmi bir parti organı olmamıştır. Tanin ancak ve ancak 30 Ocak 1914 günü Hüseyin Cahid‟in gazeteyi İTC‟ye satmasıyla resmi bir parti organı haline gelmiştir.
3.bölümde bahsedildiği gibi bu süreçte Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın Tanin‟deki yazıları, özellikle Edirne meselesi üzerine, Osmanlı yönetici elitinin düşüncelerine ışık tutmuştur ve bu yazılarda yönetici elitin Balkan Savaşları esnasında da imparatorluk fikrini muhafaza ettiği ve Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyetini de hala sürdürdüğü görülmüştür. Bu zihniyet, 19.yüzyılın başında, Osmanlı devletinin Avrupa siyasi ve askeri tehditlerine karşı imparatorluğu ayakta tutmak ve dağılmasını engellemek için savunmaya ve günü kurtarma siyasetine (idare-i maslahatçılık) dayanıyordu. Ayrıca bu zihniyeti tamamlayan dört bileşen vardı. Birincisi; vatan algısı, ikincisi katı şekilde çizilmemiş esnek sınır anlayışı, üçüncüsü akışkan kimlikler ve dördüncü ise İstanbul‟u başkent olarak elinde tutma arzusu. Tanin yazarları ve o dönemdeki yönetici elit için vatan kavramı manevi ve soyut bir ideali temsil ediyordu. Bu hiçbir şekilde sınırları belli olan bir siyasi coğrafyaya dayanmıyor, aksine vatan tanımlarında duygusal bağ ve ortak geçmişe önem veriliyordu. Bu yüzden vatan tanımı ve sınırları siyasi durumlara göre değişiyordu. Bu da bizi ikinci bileşen olan esnek sınır anlayışına götürüyor. Vatan kavramı değişken, belirsiz ve soyut olduğundan, sınırlar da siyasi durumun ihtiyacına ve aciliyetine göre değişebilirdi. Bundan dolayı da İstanbul hariç neredeyse tüm
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topraklar mübadeleye ve müzakereye açık oluyordu. Bu da daha esnek yönetim ve amaca sebep oluyordu. Üçüncü bileşen de kimliklerin akışkan olması. Osmanlı devleti Tanzimat‟ın ilanı sonrası imparatorluğun dağılmasını önlemek için ulus-üstü bir kimlik geliştirdi ve bu kimlik de “Osmanlılık”tı. Bu sayede, birçok farklı etnik ve dini gruplar kendilerini Osmanlılık kimliğine bağlayarak etnik ve dini kimliklerini muhafaza edebilecekti. Bu da kimliklerde akışkanlığa yol açtı. Bir etnik grup hem kendi dini kimliklerine hem etnik kimliklerine hem de “Osmanlılık” kimliğine sahipti. Böylelikle, imparatorluğun çok dinli ve çok kültürlü özelliği sayesinde, birden fazla kimliklere haiz olabiliyorlardı ve bu ne devlet ne de kendileri için bir sorun teşkil ediyordu. Yani, bir imparatorluk fikri altında bir insanın birden fazla kimliğe sahip olması normaldi. Örneğin, bazı Yunanlar Yunanistan kurulduktan sonra Yunan tebaası olmak yerine yine Osmanlı tebaası olarak kalmayı tercih ettiler. Aynı şekilde imparatorluktaki Türkler de hem etnik kimliklerini muhafaza ediyor hem de kendilerini İslam kimliği altında tanımlıyorlardı. Sonuç olarak birden fazla kimliklere sahip olmak ve bu kimlik akışkanlığı imparatorluk fikrinin olmazsa olmazıydı. Dördüncü bileşen ise İstanbul‟u başkent olarak elde tutmaktı. Çünkü Mustafa Reşid Paşa‟nın da belirttiği gibi, İstanbul Dört Rükn-i Devlet‟ten biridir. Diğer üçü ise sırasıyla; İslam Hilafeti, Haram‟ül- Harameyn‟in muhafazası ve Osmanlı Hanedanının varlığını sürdürmesi. Yani, İstanbul‟un elde tutulması demek bir manada da devletin ayakta durması demekti. O yüzden İstanbul‟un kaybedilmesi ihtimali bile devletin varlığına bir tehditti.
3. Bölümde anlatıldığı gibi, Tanin‟deki Edirne Sorunu ile ilgili yayınlara bakıldığında yazarların, Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı ve sonuçta yönetici elitlerin, kendi zihinlerinde hala bir imparatorluk fikrini içerdiklerini ve bu “Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti”nin bileşenlerini hala kendi zihinlerinde korudukları görülüyor. Yani Balkan Savaşları‟nın Türk veya Müslüman milliyetçiliğine dönüş aşamasında bir dönüm noktası olduğu fikri bu bağlamda çürütülmüş oluyor.
Yönetici elit yeni ideolojiler ve stratejiler geliştirmek yerine, statükonun muhafazasına çalışmıştır. 4. Bölümde de gösterildiği gibi, Avrupa ve Balkan siyasetinde her zaman statükoya bağlı kalmaya çalıştılar. 19. yüzyılın başından beri Osmanlı devleti Düvel-i Muazzama karşısında kendini daha aşağı bir konumda
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görüyordu ve yönetici elit de onların patronajı olmadan Osmanlı devletinin varlığını sürdürebileceğine inanmıyordu. Bununla birlikte, Osmanlı devletinin kendinden ayrılıp devlet kuran Balkan milletlerine karşı kendini konumlandırması ise üstenciydi. Osmanlı devleti Balkan devletlerini şımarık çocuklar diye tanımlıyordu. Tanin gazetesinin Balkan Savaşları‟ndaki yayınlarının gösterdiği gibi, Osmanlı devleti kendisini hem medeniyet hem de Düvel-i Muazzama ile ilişkiler konusunda Balkan devletleri ile kıyaslıyor ve Avrupa için Osmanlı devletinin daha önemli olduğunu vurguluyordu. Ayrıca Bulgar mezalimini örnek göstererek, Bulgarların ne kadar vahşi ve Osmanlı devletinin ne kadar medeni olduğunu belirtiyordu. Böylece, yönetici elit kendini Balkan devletlerine karşı daha üst konumda görüyordu. Bu yüzden, Osmanlı devleti Balkan Savaşları esnasında bu statükoyu korumaya çalışıyor ve bu statükoyu darmadağın ettiği için de Balkan devletlerini suçluyor ve onları Avrupa‟ya şikâyet ediyordu ve Avrupa‟nın huzur ve selameti için statükonun sürdürülmesinin şart olduğunu söylüyordu.
Bu da 4.Bölümde anlatıldığı gibi, Hüseyin Cahid ve Babanzade İsmail Hakkı‟nın Tanin‟deki yazıları gösteriyor ki yönetici elit Osmanlı devletinin hala Avrupa ve Balkan siyasetinde merkezi bir rolde olduğunu ve bunu Avrupa‟nın selameti ve huzuru için sürdürmesi gerektiğini düşünüyordu. Ayrıca Osmanlı devletinin nasıl bir güç dengesi olduğunu da Makedonya Sorunu ile birlikte açıklıyordu. Osmanlı devletinin Balkan topraklarından çekilmesi, özellikle Makedonya‟dan çekilmesi, ile Balkan devletlerinin milliyetçi politikalar takip etmelerinden dolayı Makedonya‟yı paylaşma konusunda nasıl birbirlerine düştüğünden bahseder ve her bir Avrupa devletinin Balkanlar‟daki çıkarlarını temsil eden Balkan devletlerinin birbirine düşmesini de Avrupa‟da selametin bozulacağı şeklinde yorumluyordu. Yönetici elite göre, Osmanlı devletinin oralardan çekilmesi kaosa sebebiyet vermiş ve bu yüzden de İkinci Balkan Savaşı ile birlikte Avrupa‟da da genel bir savaş olma ihtimali artmıştır. İşte bundan dolayı, yönetici elite göre, Osmanlı‟nın Balkanlar‟da bir güç dengesi unsuru olması elzemdir, çünkü yönetici elitin verdiği mesaj şudur: Eğer Osmanlı burada bir güç dengesi olmazsa ve bu statüko devam etmezse yalnız Balkanlar değil aynı zamanda Avrupa‟nın da huzuru bozulur. O yüzden yönetici elite göre, Osmanlı‟nın bu bölgedeki merkezi rolü sürmelidir. Sonuç olarak, yönetici elit bir zihniyet değişikliğinden ziyade, Balkan
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Savaşları esnasında her zaman var olan durumu, yani statükoyu savunmayı tercih etmiştir.
5.bölümde, yani “Sonuç” kısmında, bu tezin ortaya koyduğu bulgular tartışılıyor. Burada asıl nokta Balkan Savaşları‟nın bir devrimsel kopuş veya bir dönüm noktası olmamasıdır. Bu önermeyle birlikte, genelde akademide ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti resmi tarihinde Balkan Savaşları‟nı Türk veya Müslüman milliyetçiliğine ve Türk ulus devletine geçişte bir kırılma noktası olduğu görüşü Tanin gazetesindeki yazılar göz önüne alındığında gerçeği yansıtmadığı ortaya koyulmuştur. Aksine, yazılara baktığımızda, yönetici elitin zihninde bir imparatorluk fikrinin devam ettiğini ve 19.yüzyılın başlarından beri Avrupa tehdidine karşı savunmacı bir tavır olan ve günü kurtarma siyasetine dayanan “Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluk Zihniyeti”ni hala sürdürdükleri görülüyordu. Bu da demektir ki, bu bulgular aynı zamanda, yönetici elitin imparatorluğun yakın zamanda kaçınılmaz bir şekilde sonunun geldiği inancını taşımadığını da ortaya koyuyor. Aslında bu çıkarımlardan sonra anlaşılıyor ki, yönetici elitin tek düşüncesi Osmanlı devletinin varlığını sürdürmesidir. Bu yüzden de farklı ve büyük stratejiler belirlemek yerine, var olan durumu korumayı, yani statükoyu sürdürmeyi, istediler. Bunun sonucunda da imparatorluk fikri çerçevesinde bu savaştan geriye ellerinde ne kaldıysa onu muhafaza etmeyi amaçladılar.
Sonuç olarak bu tez, Tanin gazetesi yoluyla, Balkan Savaşları esnasında 31 Ocak 1913‟ten 15 Kasım 1913‟e kadar olan dönemdeki yönetici elitin düşüncelerine ışık tutuyor ve akademik dünyada ve resmi tarihte doğru kabul edilen ve basmakalıplaşmış düşüncelerin ne kadar da tarihi gerçekliklerle zıt düştüğünü ve gerçekleri yansıtmadığını gösteriyor.
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B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU
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