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In memory of my grandparents.
MISSILES AND BUREAUCRATS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE MAKING OF
The crucial turn in conducting foreign policy with the election of Ronald Reagan has been a determinant factor in the late Cold War period. This thesis centers on the role of the foreign policymaking process and its agencies from SALT II of 1979 to the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 and examines the American diplomatic affairs during the Reagan administration with the Soviets and the allies in the Atlantic world by emphasizing nuclear security and arms race as a nexus within these triangular affairs of US, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. The fundamental argument this thesis illustrates is that policymakers of the Reagan administration germinated and followed a twofold nuclear policy agenda, mainly derived from the incompetence of the predecessor administrations and the realities of foreign affairs with Western Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s within the context of potential nuclear catastrophe, and asserts how this security strategy shaped American diplomacy from the missile crisis of 1977, which augmented the perils of nuclear catastrophe, to the negotiations in late 1985 and 1986 that declined tensions and ultimately underpinned the desire for peace at the end of the decade.
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Key Words: American diplomacy, Atlantic alliance, Cold War, nuclear weapons, the 1980s
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ÖZET
FÜZELER VE BÜROKRATLAR: REAGAN YÖNETİMİ VE İKİ YÖNLÜ GÜVENLİK DİPLOMASİSİNİN OLUŞTURULMASI

Ronald Reagan'ın seçilmesiyle birlikte dış politikanın yürütülmesinde yaşanan kritik dönemeç, Soğuk Savaş'ın son dönemlerinde belirleyici bir faktör olmuştur. Bu tez, 1979 yılındaki Stratejik Silahların Sınırlandırılması Görüşmeleri’nden 1986 Reykjavik Zirvesi'ne kadar dış politika yapım sürecinin ve kurumlarının rolüne odaklanmakta ve Reagan yönetiminin, Sovyetler ve Atlantik dünyasındaki müttefiklerle Amerikan diplomatik ilişkilerini, nükleer güvenlik ve silahlanma yarışını, ABD, Batı Avrupa ve Sovyetler Birliği üçgeni içinde bir bağlantı noktası olarak vurgulayarak incelemektedir. Bu tezin ortaya koyduğu temel argüman, Reagan yönetiminin politika yapıcılarının, esasen önceki yönetimlerin yetersizliklerinden ve 1980'lerde Batı Avrupa ve Sovyetler Birliği ile dış ilişkilerin potansiyel nükleer felaket bağlamındaki gerçeklerinden kaynaklanan iki yönlü bir nükleer politika gündemini filizlendirip takip etmesi, ve bu güvenlik stratejisinin, nükleer felaket tehlikesini artıran 1977’de Sovyetler’in yeni füzeleri yerleştirmesinden 1985-1986 yıllarında gerilimi azaltan ve nihayetinde, barış arzusunu destekleyen müzakerelerin başlamasına kadar Amerikan diplomasisini nasıl şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymasıdır.
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerikan diplomasisi, Atlantik İttifak, Soğuk Savaş, nükleer silahlar, 1980ler
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Kenneth Weisbrode, who had been my mentor in expanding my vision and approach to the study of history since my junior year. His valuable support and guidance throughout my writing process assisted me a lot for a better piece of work. I also want to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Owen Miller for expanding my knowledge of American history with his historical enthusiasm and unique classes which contributed to my knowledge profoundly and encouraged me to pursue advanced studies. Assist. Prof. Dr. Luca Zavagno deserves a prominent mention here for being a scholar who taught me different centuries and different histories, and I will not forget his continuous friendly manners since I took his courses on Byzantine history. I want to express my sincere gratitude to my family. They have always supported me regardless of the path I took in my life. I also want to thank my close friend Alp Çıbıklı who helped and supported me more than I have ever asked for throughout the entire writing process despite being in New York and dealing with his doctoral studies. Also, the staff at Bilkent Library had always been kind enough to assist me with my multiple material requests, which were helpful in writing this thesis.
Lastly, but most importantly, I want to thank my beloved Elif for being with me every moment since I began this journey. Her endless support, sympathy, and precious presence were the greatest gifts I had, particularly during the times I struggled. I am deeply grateful for the love and patience she always shows me and for encouraging me on this road. I only wish to see the beautiful days that we will spend together. Thank you, sweetheart.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... iii
ÖZET .................................................................................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................... vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................. viii
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. x
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 1
1.1 Background and Objectives ....................................................................... 1
1.2 Sources and Methodology ........................................................................ 4
CHAPTER II: NUCLEAR RACE FROM EISENHOWER TO REAGAN .......... 11
2.1 Eisenhower Period and Diffusion of Nuclear Threat .............................. 11
2.2 Kennedy, Johnson and Rising of Concerns ............................................ 15
2.3 Nixon, Ford, Détente, and SALT ............................................................ 22
2.4 Restructuring SALT and Arms Race in Carter Era ................................ 27
CHAPTER III: REAGAN ON STAGE: NEW ENTOURAGE, NEW POLICIES AND NUCLEAR DEBATE, 1981-1982 ............................................................ 36
3.1 Military Buildup Rejuvenated, Arms Control Revisited ........................ 36
3.2 Atlantic Alliance and The Establishment of Diplomatic Liaison .......... 42
3.3 New Proposals and New Rounds ........................................................... 46
3.4 Negotiations for Securing the Ultimate Goal of Peace .......................... 48
3.5 Prolonging Two-Pronged Approach ...................................................... 55
CHAPTER IV: CONTEMPLATING PEACE: DEPLOYMENTS, ELECTIONS, AND ENGAGEMENTS, 1983-1984 ................................................................. 59
4.1 Reiterating Intentions on Nuclear Stalemate ........................................ 59
4.2 Announcement of SDI: A New Phase .................................................... 62
4.3 Friends, Foes, and Incidents .................................................................. 67
4.4 Soviets Depart for Home ........................................................................ 73
4.5 The Aftermath of Decision ......................................................................77
4.6 Endeavors for Reengagement ................................................................ 82
CHAPTER V: HAPPY THANKSGIVING, COMRADES: BREAKTHROUGHS IN GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK, 1985-1986 ................................................... 86
5.1 Conducting Nuclear Diplomacy and New Soviet Leadership ................ 86
5.2 Inclinations and Preparations for Summit .............................................91
5.3 The Meeting of Opposite Poles .............................................................. 97
5.4 Keeping the Momentum Upward ......................................................... 101
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5.5 Genesis in Reykjavik: The Roller-Coaster Parley ................................ 106
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 112
BIBLIOGRPAHY ............................................................................................ 118
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACDA – Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ALCM – Air-Launched Cruise Missile
DPC – Defense Planning Committee
ERW – Enhanced Radiation Warhead
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
MRBM – Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
NAC – North Atlantic Council
NPG – Nuclear Planning Group
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM – Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SWP – Strategic Weapons Program
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Objectives
The nuclear race has been a primary determinant in shaping and regulating international affairs. Since the 1950s, it escalated to a level that prominently powerful nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, became engaged in development of nuclear programs as a component of being a power influential in determining security affairs. Although the American nuclear monopoly was shattered after Soviets’ successful atomic bombing test in 1949, it ignited an everlasting confrontation regarding the production and development of nuclear arsenal, and this, through incremental increases, persevered throughout the Cold War period. In essence, since the Eisenhower administration, this nuclear dispute turned out to be a crucial pillar in American foreign and military policy as they embarked on initiatives to discuss a solution to halt and ultimately terminate perils that emerged out of this confrontation. The abrupt rise of nuclear strategy and armament reprisal made into governmental agendas primarily because of the size of the potential worldwide menace yet evolved into a witnessing potential of nuclear destruction which led to a policy update such as Mutually Assured Destruction – MAD –, a strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union acquired in the 1960s which allows each side to have strategic forces to repel the first strike.1 The importance of
1 Gerard H. Clarfield and William M. Wiecek, Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States. 1940-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 258-260.
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nuclear weapons owes its reputation to the crises in the 1960s since they forced each superpower to put restraints on possible undesirable nuclear outbreaks while asserting that adopted policies of MAD and deterrence were not adept at preventing an escalation that would leave Americans, and even the Soviets, in the middle of global nuclear strife.2 Despite the presence of such policies, an ambiguity on each side, nonetheless, retained at a culminated level, particularly for the Soviet side because their military leaders evaluated that deterrence should not be implemented, and they were always remaining on the traditional area of nuclear strategy where the primary purpose was to win upcoming wars.3
This position was nearly unchanged throughout the 1960s and in early 1970s while the United States, under the Nixon administration, had undergone a critical transformation of foreign policy in pursuit of détente. While the development of nuclear programs continued, the emphasis on détente heavily undermined the benefits nuclear weapons provided as a benchmark in dealing with the Soviets and appeasing the perturbation that the allies had in Western Europe. Although the process for first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – SALT I – appeared to be a promising turning point in nuclear armament, the disproportion in the number of nuclear arsenals – constant development of the Soviets versus the relative decline of the Americans – did clandestinely avert progress on impending disarmament negotiations. Throughout the first two years of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the administration exerted much in persuading the Soviets to sit down at the
2 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 140-144.
3 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press,1981), 257-259.
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arms control table, which led to SALT II in 1979 while engaging the most extensive nuclear program since 1950 and this dichotomy witnessed the absence of support from the American people and the Congress as the administration was not able to prevent Soviet infiltration in other parts of the world which resuscitated exigency for retaining nuclear diplomacy.4 It was under the Reagan administration that American diplomatic and military missions bolstered in a way to function as a dual strategy that would primarily obliterate the possibility of nuclear war while not neglecting components of nuclear development for national security as it had proved to be an indispensable cornerstone in Cold War affairs. From the outset, Reagan himself opposed to nuclear war scenario due to common sense, and for him “it must never be fought” because no nation would survive and win such a cataclysmic adventure which was a simple vision for him, the actual question remaining “How to prevent it?”5
In this study, I attempt to explore the American statecraft approach to nuclear weapons under the Reagan administration to illustrate the foundation of double-edged diplomacy, mainly in the fields of official negotiations and national security, that functioned to shield the Atlantic partnership through its military component NATO because the Western European allies benefited from détente and to put pressure on the Soviets towards an idea that the sole option was to conclude a binding agreement on nuclear weapons that would essentially exterminate trepidation it amassed in
4 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 84.
5 Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 19.
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previous three decades and that would lead to peace in the 1980s. Throughout the research, I follow a chronological path that unravels designated foreign policy actions between 1979 and 1986 that led to interactions with Atlantic alliance and Soviet Union on the determination and willingness to cooperate and reconcile on the basis of a collective security that became a prerequisite for more amicable international affairs. Additionally, this perspective illuminates that the Reagan administration, although embarked on advancement of national defense and military capabilities at the outset, had a priority to progress toward arms control agreements that would enable nations to eliminate destructive nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in world politics and proceed with necessary policies which would solidify peace at the center of Cold War relations as it had evolved to be the cornerstone the administration in five years.
1.2 Sources and Methodology
This thesis primarily relies on American archival and official documents, such as Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Annual Reports by the Department of Defense, Foreign Policy Current Documents published by the Department of State, National Security Archives papers, and NATO Materials from Division of Public Diplomacy to convey an accurate description of the project. The availability of such sources allowed the researcher to comprehend the state of question placed on the thesis. Since this thesis focuses on American foreign policy and statecraft within the context of nuclear diplomacy in the late twentieth century, these sources were vital for acquiring profound information about the topic.
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Public Papers of the Presidents give extensive information regarding the perception of American presidents and their administrations towards nuclear rivalry and disarmament efforts while simultaneously explicating military and defense policies each administration had previously conducted in accordance with evolving diplomatic affairs with the Soviet Union and allies in Western Europe. A series of contributive documents, Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress, were critical materials in thoroughly assessing the origins of American security policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s and their implementations in foreign missions, while Foreign Policy Current Documents are substantial volumes that contain a detailed vision of American diplomatic approach to armament and nuclear race and its impact shaping the affairs with other countries.
The access to digitalized National Security Archives and declassified Reagan Collection in the CIA’s official reading room provided to illuminate how the administrations had been instructed for their diplomatic and security missions while offering a military aspect that would contribute to the structure of the thesis.
In order to obtain comprehensive historical knowledge about American affairs with the Atlantic alliance, the nations in Western Europe, I have used official Communiques through NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division which, from the outset, enriched the scope of the thesis by linking nuclear diplomacy as a critical nexus in partnership relations, particularly between 1979 and 1986.
One of the propulsive forces that encouraged me to pursue this topic was the presence of a large number of memoirs and autobiographies. Indeed,
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the period I have examined contains abundant personal narratives of those including the Presidents Jimmy Carter6 and Ronald Reagan7 and of those who had been appointed to bureaucratic missions such as Secretaries of State Cyrus Vance,8 Alexander Haig,9 and George Shultz,10, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,11, national security advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski,12 and Robert C. McFarlane,13, prominent Arms Control Negotiators Paul Nitze14 and Edward L. Rowny,15 Kenneth Adelman16 who was the director of Arms Control and Disarmement Agency, and other White House cabinet officials that had an eyewitness to the role of nuclear weapons and arms race in diplomatic and foreign affairs.
The immense of secondary sources regarding these issues and topics had been helpful and practical in presenting the argument thoroughly. One of the essential books was by Ronald Powaski17, dealing with the American administrations and their nuclear policies since the 1940s, giving a detailed
6 Jimmy Carter. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York and Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982.
7 Ronald Reagan. An American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.
8 Cyrus Roberts Vance. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
9 Alexander M. Haig. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984.
10 George P. Shultz. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993.
11 Caspar W. Weinberger. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books, 1990.
12 Zbigniew Brzezinski. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983.
13 Robert C. McFarlane. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994.
14 Paul H. Nitze. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.
15 Edward L. Rowny. It Takes One to Tango. Washington and New York: Brassey's, 1992.
16 Kenneth L. Adelman. The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summitry-A Skeptic's Account. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. And Ken Adelman. Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War. New York: Broadside Books, 2014.
17 Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
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depiction of the arms race of the Cold War. Similarly, John Newhouse18 narrates the history of nuclear race and disarmament in his book to illustrate how and to what degree those weapons were influential for American policymakers and Cold War history. Don Oberdofer’s book19 focuses on the late twentieth century between the United States and the Soviet Union, mainly focuses on the Reagan administration, and elaborates on nuclear race and arms control initiatives that were determinant in bilateral affairs. Raymond Garthoff’s exhaustive and well-researched works20 on American-Soviet relations not only cover the nuclear debacle but also extends the scope of the issue with its reflections in the Atlantic alliance. William Cromwell21 and Jonathan Dean22 published on the transatlantic partnership and explored how defense and military policies were crucially influential fields in which a compromise could not be expected. Additionally, there have been recent studies on nuclear history and Reagan’s era. Susan Colbourn’s new book concentrates on the role of missiles stationed in Europe that caused major opposition in the continent and states that American nuclear power prevailed over Soviet conventional forces and this power pervaded throughout Western Europe in the form of deterrence, yet, American shift to diplomatic negotiations with tactical nuclear and conventional forces led Europeans to disentangle hopes from the nuclear umbrella. This changed in
18 John Newhouse. The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars. London: Michael Joseph, 1989.
19 Don Oberdorfer. From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
20 Raymond L. Garthoff. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. Raymond L. Garthoff. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994.
21 William C. Cromwell. The United States and the European Pillar: The Strained Alliance. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
22 Jonathan Dean. Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.
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the 1980s through Reagan’s commitment to arms control negotiations, but Colbourn defends that it was Gorbachev’s dedication and vision that solidified cohesion within the Atlantic alliance.23 William Inboden’s extensive account, which was published at the end of 2022, does not confine the theme to solely arms control or nuclear race. However, it underlines that the Reagan administration’s security strategy contained a perspective that would surrender Soviets through diplomatic talks and shrink nuclear threat. Moreover, for Inboden, Reagan’s vision of modernization of defense, economic reforms, emphasis on political and religious freedom, and termination of nuclear race were the preconditions that affected Gorbachev and made him approach his vision of a peaceful world.24 Although there are many mutual points in the recent publications, nonetheless, these did not portrait a triangular theme that centers the Reagan administration’s commitment to eradicate this threat collectively, including the Soviet Union and delves into its relations with the Soviet Union and Western allies simultaneously within the scope of nuclear confrontation and arms control process in the late Cold War period.
This thesis centers on the role of the policymaking process and its agencies from SALT II of 1979 to the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, dates I classify as utmost importance within the context of my work, and examines the U.S. affairs with the Soviets and the allies in the Atlantic world by emphasizing nuclear security as a nexus within these triangular affairs. I have intentionally confined the periodization into a seven-year period to depict
23 Susan Colbourn. Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022.
24 William Inboden. The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink. New York: Dutton, 2022.
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alterations between major historical summits of the late Cold War, as described. The state of question I placed on it accentuates an American twofold agenda in the 1980s, mainly derived from the incapabilities of the predecessor administrations and the realities of foreign affairs within the context of potential nuclear catastrophe, and attempts to assay how this security strategy shaped American diplomacy and led to the beginning of a precise détente which referred to peace. This thesis follows a basic chronology. Chapter 1 gives background on sources, methodology, objectives and central argument of the thesis. Chapter 2 concentrates on the origins of nuclear weapons and arms race in American statecraft and in its diplomatic channels with the Western allies and the Soviet Union from 1950s to the SALT II agreement of 1979. Chapter 3 tells the advent of the Reagan administration, new approaches to nuclear affairs, and focuses on the relations between the Atlantic alliance, including consents and dissents and new policies in dealing with the Soviet Union. Chapter 4 investigates the Reagan administration’s objectives and principles on nuclear race amalgamated with concerns in Western Europe, ponders tumultuous US-USSR bilateral nuclear pandemonium with crucial elections influential in the imminent negotiations. Chapter 5 analyzes nuclear confrontation and peace, a new form of détente, at the international level, and elucidates an account of bureaucratic-level discussions to ignite major diplomatic initiatives on nuclear arms race in Gorbachev’s first two years. The study concludes by giving an overview of the significant transformation of nuclear arms race, mainly between 1979 and 1986, and by illustrating how conducting a two-pronged plan in this period secured the beginning of peaceful progress to be followed by multiple summits in the late 1980s.
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The chief aim of this study has been to contribute to the Cold War historiography of the 1980s with an alternative image where American power had been restored and used to obtain a preliminary phase of a peaceful setting through the elimination of the daunting theme of nuclear confrontation. This was done by including nations and alliances of the East – West division and their approaches, cooperative or against, toward the evolving aspects and policies of the Reagan administration in arms control field, and it followed a triangular perspective, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western European countries, in order to illustrate two dimensions that the Reagan leadership pursued; preserving the alliance and persuading the Soviets in arms control negotiations. Moreover, the period this study covers, from 1979-1980 when mutual U.S. – USSR trust decreased to 1986 when it rose to the level of maximum effort for reaching an accord on this complicated issue, grants it a unique position among the bulk of the works in this period because it recounts Reagan administration’s neglected mentality of achieving a peaceful world with official archival documents and through detailed narratives of people who had an eyewitness to these incidents in the first place.
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CHAPTER II
NUCLEAR RACE FROM EISENHOWER TO REAGAN
When we get to the point, as we one day will, that both sides know that in any outbreak of general hostilities, regardless of the element of surprise, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete, possibly we will have sense enough to meet at the conference table with the understanding that the era of armaments has ended and the human race must conform its actions to this truth or die.
Dwight Eisenhower
2.1 Eisenhower Period and Diffusion of Nuclear Threat
The calamitous bombing of Japan in August 1945 was not only a critical incident that was one of the factors leading to the end of the Second World War but also paved the way for imminent technological developments conducted by major powers, in particular in the field of military rivalry primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union after dismantling former alliances. One of the most critical subdivisions of that military rivalry contains the rise of nuclear capabilities of nations starting from the 1950s. The possession and in-case-usage of such devices occupied a major portion of American foreign and defense affairs, given the uncertainties and anxieties regarding counter-use of them by the adversary, the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration became the first team of bureaucrats to realize the fundamental necessity to possess such instruments as a component of a superpower. After he assumed office, the administration embarked on a significant reprisal program in order to alleviate nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and to acquire strategic superiority through developing similar defense devices an in 1954, after successful testing results, the Eisenhower
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administration authorized impending nuclear projects to accompany American military strength, which began with the development of a missile called Atlas, the very first ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile, and later progressed with MRBMs – medium-range ballistic missiles, Thor and Jupiter, to serve the Air Force and the Army respectively.25 There were two underlying premises of the Eisenhower administration’s initiatives; the Korean War and linked to that is the cost of the conventional forces. First, the aftermath of the Korean expedition precisely illustrated that the possession of nuclear stockpiles circumvents burdensome costs and ultimate casualties of the war. Through this way, the administration classified the nuclear program as a robust deterrent policy in the 1950s that would shrink the vast amount of money conveyed in order to retain conventional military capabilities and allowed Eisenhower to carry out one of his campaign promises; cutting taxes by decreasing defense expenditures.26 This propulsive force attached nuclear weapons into the American foreign policy agenda at a very early phase and solidified its stance within transatlantic affairs in the nascent Cold War atmosphere.
The administration accentuated that the alliance, NATO, also requires a collective defense mechanism against Soviet Union and the perils of communism. The successful integration of new tactical nuclear weapons into American strategic arsenal proved to be an affordable alternative, and as Secretary of State John F. Dulles stated, these were capable of demolishing
25 Ronald E. Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 36.
26 James Tobin, “The Eisenhower Economy and National Security,” in Eisenhower As President, ed. Dean Albertson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), 137. and Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 62.
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enemy’s military targets and facilities. This later moved beyond the Atlantic and in late 1954, NATO partners concurred that these new nuclear weapons, such as gravity bombs and missiles, should be added to alliance’s defense plans, yet these would not be the fundamental devices in defending Western Europe.27 Indeed, it depicts the discrepancy between how the United States and Western European allies consider the Russian threat in accordance with their principles and policies because the foundational spirit of such partnership stemmed from the mutual foe, the Soviets, and due to historical proximity and geopolitics, Western European actors would be vigilant about their security.28 Thus, in this case, NATO became an indispensable military alliance for political perturbation that Europe witnessed primarily because it essentially provided the well-known nuclear umbrella with the Americans being the prominent actor of this concept for the sake of Atlantic rapport. Nevertheless, such an umbrella was not alone successful in appeasing European solicitude owing to the reception of nuclear weapons within the scope of NATO and its predicament, and the underlying premise for this was that the American strategic capabilities were on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, distant from potential attack or even pressure.29 This, hence, became a determinant factor in shaping US-European relations since Western European countries, disregarding former belligerencies and highlighting collective defense concerns, became germane to American priorities and diplomacy in this field.
27 Powaski, The Entangling Alliance, 37-38.
28 Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 86-87.
29 Gregory F. Treverton, Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), 25.
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In the late 1950s, the military and nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union transformed into another phase, leaving the avowals behind as the development of advanced nuclear weaponry and armament began to consolidate not only these bilateral relations but also the course of the impending eras. The deployment of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles by the Soviets, around six hundred at that time, was against the target Europe, not the United States.30 Yet, it was adequate to bestir the Atlantic alliance, and it provided a basis for the previous assessments of the Western allies on the collective military and nuclear programs to be orchestrated against the Soviet Union. For instance, the 1954 joint military report led by the UK government conveyed to the allies calculated the potential aggression and took countermeasures by stating the importance of NATO’s vital Article 5 in the event of “atomic warfare” while politically exerting to persuade national authorities to participate in this defense plan if such an incident occurs.31 Another official report indicated that the United States would be the major support in the case of a potential nuclear confrontation at the end of the decade and American emphasis on strategic posture is of primary importance for individual and collective security of countries pertaining to this partnership.32 These evidences laid the foundations of incremental American involvement in allied security in the 1950s and ascertained that nuclear diplomacy would be an imperative section of conducting foreign affairs. Furthermore, the possession of strategic nuclear weapons that would ensure
30 Christopher Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 28.
31 Capabilities Study Allied Command Europe. 2 Sep 1954. NATO Military Planning Collection. Call Number: DEFE 6/26. Public Record Office (PRO), Kew/London.
32 The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength. 3 Sep 1954. NATO Military Planning Collection. Call Number: DEFE 6/26. Public Record Office (PRO), Kew/London.
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a superior military posture to the United States should not be an unheeded issue since the Soviets, too, had constantly been investing in their nuclear stocks and rearmament in line with their foreign policy goals. The late 1950s remarks a milestone in nuclear development when the Soviets launched Sputnik along with their first ICBM which appalled the United States for two reasons; the absence of nuclear equipment that can compete with adversary’s and anxiety that made United States as a territory Soviets can assail with their strategic missiles.33 The reprisal by the United States was to deploy the aforementioned missiles, Thor and Jupiter, that were capable of targeting and reaching the Soviet Union, and before 1960, they were deployed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Italy with total number of 105 missiles which functioned as a precursor for Khrushchev’s decision to station new missiles in Cuba in order to balance numbers between two adversaries.34
2.2 Kennedy, Johnson and Rising of Concerns
The 1960s were a turbulent period for nuclear rivalry, perhaps times when weapons occupied the overwhelming majority of foreign relations with actors replaced. Prior to his election, President John Kennedy harshly criticized the Eisenhower administration for performing inadequate actions by phrasing it as “the missile gap” when the Soviets were heavily investing in their national security and missile systems. Yet, it turned out to be a vital domestic political tool for the upcoming elections to consolidate people with this rhetoric which became successful despite the margins of difference that
33 Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 9.
34 Ibid., 9-10.
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allowed him to win elections.35 This policy was designated to circumvent, as Kennedy and his entourage remarked, the Soviet military superiority, which, indeed, was possessed by the United States in terms of scientific and technical capabilities. The nuclear advancement of the Soviets, according to Khrushchev, was falling behind the United States, but they held MRBMs – medium-range ballistic missiles – mainly targeted toward Europe, and Khrushchev’s plan to move some of them to one location across ninety miles away from American coast shaped the course of impending incidents and actions worldwide.36 Under such circumstances, the Kennedy administration undoubtedly witnessed pressure and criticism as a single missile could demolish one of the major cities in the southeastern part.37 This led to the formation of a military plan “naval quarantine” that essentially followed the dismantling of missiles from Cuba in return for dismantling those located in Turkey after reciprocal letter traffic between Kennedy and Khrushchev, which also included warnings not to invade Cuba.38 The issue was relatively solved when U.S. agreed to remove missiles in Turkey as part of the deal while the Soviet side concurred not to deploy further missiles in Cuba. The fundamental issue emerged on this question, and in general on nuclear relations, was the amount of superiority that two superpowers consider adequate in order to reinforce a political position based on continuous strife.39
35 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 191-192.
36 Ibid., 203.
37 Ibid., 204.
38 Ibid., 205-207.
39 Michael Krepon, Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 30.
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It is not, however, difficult to assay that confrontation between the two camps had been conducted in line with simultaneous negotiations regarding the testing and use of nuclear weapons. While these crises were of utmost importance, there were preliminary initiatives that envisaged to assuage perils in the nuclear arena, easing the tensions if possible. Indeed, at the beginning of 1961, the Kennedy administration was in search of opportunities that would relieve tensions when they appointed a disarmament negotiator to discuss possibilities of reaching an accord that would avert nuclear war.40 Moreover, the administration, through Kennedy’s personal directives and suggestions, was able to persuade the Congress for the establishment of ACDA – Arms Control and Disarmament Agency – with its director giving briefings to the President and Secretary of State as this branch’s purpose was to inject arms control policies into government’s agenda and to provide presidential control over these policies.41 Perhaps, the very first comprehensive agreement on the issue of nuclear rivalry was the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which was a series of negotiations seldom became stagnant owing to the Cuban missile crisis and unfavorable proposals parties conveyed. The suggestion for the continuation of talks on disarmament was later raised by British Prime Minister Macmillan with the invitation of the Soviet side. Although preliminary proposals of the American team were rejected instantly, a trilateral deal, was made covering outer space, underwater, and atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.42 Yet, the primary reason for signing such an agreement remained nugatory because there were
40 Bernard J. Firestone, “Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,” in John F. Kennedy and Europe, eds. Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 77.
41 Ibid., 79.
42 Ibid., 87-89.
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attempts to expand American defense and nuclear capabilities simultaneously. For instance, between 1961 and 1964, defense policies were reshaped, and expenditure rose by thirteen percent, which the Congress approved for the purpose of enhancing employment and businesses, and this rise was adequate to undergird nuclear warehouses by adding more submarines and Minuteman missiles.43 When the Soviets also implemented similar policies and developments akin to the adversary, this perplexed the issue of nuclear weapons in the following two decades.44
Lyndon Johnson, after he assumed office, engaged in multiple foreign policy issues that led him and his administration to delve into nuclear confrontation and its place in American diplomacy despite social skepticism regarding the nation’s progress after the assassination of John F. Kennedy.45 More than any other subject, his and his administration’s style of conducting foreign relations in the aftermath of a major missile crisis was a conundrum, and indeed, it was equivocal. In early 1964, Lyndon Johnson propounded in his address that two superpowers should take actions to limit strategic and nuclear weapons and go beyond that by reducing the development and production of equipment that were components of this process.46 His ex parte attempt to shrink the uranium production by forty percent later became reciprocal when Khrushchev ordered to terminate development of two nuclear reactors containing plutonium.47 Johnson’s subsequent offer
43 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 490.
44 Bernard J. Firestone, “Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,” 93.
45 Robert Dallek, Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 145.
46 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 124.
47 Ibid., 124.
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called for “freeze on nuclear launch vehicles, whether offensive or defensive”, led to an agreement with the Soviets at first, yet, it was not appealing to the adversary since the prospective plan omitted American nuclear facilities located in Western Europe that can launch a potential attack on Soviet territories, and such a vague freeze would have induced loss of military power in nuclear race.48 While President Johnson articulated such intentions and put them into practice in foreign affairs, he, nonetheless, fervently advocated for requirements of solid defense and military affairs, and he particularly was adamant about the possession of missiles and air force.49 Although this was a political and ideological consequence of American involvement in Vietnamese bedlam, it undoubtedly contributed to the nuclear race while enhancing national security.
The Johnson administration, nonetheless, was adept at taking necessary actions for arms race which steadily became an integral part of foreign relations with allies in Europe and the Soviets. In the winter of 1967, a proper set of discussions were held in a U.N. General Assembly session between the United States and the Soviet Union after exchanging letters between President Johnson and Premier Aleksei Kosygin.50 The meeting covered various discussion topics such as Six Day War and Vietnam, and lastly, nuclear nonproliferation, which both sides foresaw a “headway” regarding the problem although no actual commitments were made and Kosygin’s prerequisite for arms talks was solving issues in Vietnam and the
48 Ibid., 125.
49 Waldo Heinrichs, “Lyndon B. Johnson: Change and Continuity,” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, eds. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28-29.
50 Dallek, Lyndon B. Johnson, 287.
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Middle East.51 Moreover, bilateral meeting in Glassboro Summit in 1967 ascertained the mutual interests through reciprocal intentions to halt rampant nuclear competition in a more collective and comprehensive plan which, in the following year, led to the emergence of Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by two major powers and other fifty nine countries.52 The line for a dialogue was left open. On the other side of the ocean, the NATO alliance was in jeopardy since French leader De Gaulle withdrew from the integrated military command structures of NATO, and one of the reasons that persisted for him was that American vulnerability to a nuclear attack by the Soviets and the concept of “nuclear umbrella” was not, henceforth, plausible.53 This was a major predicament for the alliance as it had effortlessly shattered diplomatic assurances that all partners gave acquiescence to and led other countries, particularly the Western European nations, to approach the partnership with aloofness. However, the following year, a proposal formed by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel set the standards for allied policies for intervening years by emphasizing its military and political strength. In terms of the foundational military aspect, it proposed a more rigid solidarity and defense systems while exerting to ensure détente in accordance with Western political ethos.54 The latter was a promotion of progress with the East – the communist bloc – and a tool to surmount political problems within the
51 Ibid., 289.
52 Gordon R. Weihmiller, “U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Lessons Learned,” in U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Roosevelt through Carter, ed. John W. McDonald (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), 129.
53 Frédéric Bozo. “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1964-1968),” Contemporary European History 7, no. 3 (1998): 344-348.
54 Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Harmel Report (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1968), 5.
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alliance, as this plan had been ratified by all partners, including France.55 The report additionally served for the purpose of Western European involvement in the bipartite arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the allies were solicitous of American commitment to protect the continent in the likelihood of an attack.56 This initiative quickly turned into an alliance policy and illustrated a new era of nuclear and defense structure by including the Eastern bloc into arms reduction talks while solidifying its organizational place in the making of extensive negotiations and possibly agreements regarding this issue.57 It was, indeed, a sign of hope considering superpowers and their diplomatic actions trying to solve these issues tête-à-tête as in the spring of 1968, President Johnson did not renounce his intentions to terminate prospective Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – SALT– with the Soviet side.58 The Soviets, on the other hand, considered possession of adequate defense capabilities to sit on the table and discuss strategic talks, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin confirmed these plans to the Johnson administration in August 1968. The prospective plan was to meet at a summit at the end of September yet a major crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only after a day of Dobrynin’s visit, hampered possible deal regarding the nuclear weapons and strategic armament.59 These incidents were, in a sense, the precursors of future
55 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 48.
56 Ibid., 49.
57 Ibid., 50.
58 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 125.
59 Ibid., 126.
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security diplomacy and its conduct as the following decade contained more intensity on nuclear talks than ever.
2.3 Nixon, Ford, Détente, and SALT
Antecedent initiatives of the Johnson administration regarding nuclear and arms negotiations process, nonetheless, relatively persisted in the Nixon’s foreign affairs agenda. From the outset, the Nixon administration designated a “sufficiency” in defense and military forces, despite articulating the opposite in his campaign, and such an evolvement in diplomatic terms indicated that the President and his aides abandoned the rhetoric of parity between two superpowers in the nuclear and conventional forces.60 Replacing superiority with sufficiency was a hallmark at the beginning of the decade since there were attempts to ease tensions with foes, the Soviet Union, and China, and such a profound change would, as they envisaged, contribute to the idea of détente. A French word first used politically by one German newspaper to report the British monarch’s visit,61 détente became the cornerstone of the foreign agenda of the early 1970s for the Nixon administration and, more broadly, for the Atlantic alliance. One month after his inauguration, Nixon traveled to Europe to share new diplomatic objectives with the partners, particularly in the nuclear and defense programs and asserted how détente would function for the Atlantic alliance by germinating “less fear” in world affairs.62 This new crux determined the impending plans of national and allied securities and paved the way for an
60 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 183.
61 Michael B. Froman, The Development of the Idea of Détente: Coming to Terms (London: Macmillan, 1991), 2.
62 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 185-186.
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accord on nuclear confrontation. However, while the Nixon administration was underlining such programs, the Soviet side, although they too seemed avid on this issue, had already aggrandized their nuclear stockpiles since the Cuban crisis, and their ICBMs and SLBMs approximately quadrupled by the end of the 1960s.63 Although the Americans were still advantageous mainly in the precision of their missiles, the Soviet build-up was a perturbation since their missiles were substantial in size and their payload capacities could easily surmount those that Americans possessed.64 Under such circumstances, the awareness of both sides that they have the capacity, perhaps no intention, to destroy the other through nuclear debacle induced a more extensive emphasis on détente and its quest for an international concord to halt potential disasters.
When the Nixon administration embarked on its foreign policy revolution and détente, one of the major obstacles was how to conclude an agreement with the Soviets on nuclear armament. The heritage they had was President Johnson’s emphasis on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which did not become a priority in the new administration because they were cognizant of the fact that more substantial agreement was required in order to achieve promised goals. A series of discussions were mostly between Nixon’s National Security Advisor, later the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Bureaucratic manners persisted until the spring of 1971 when two sides agreed upon a deal that put limits on offensive strategic weapons and ABM programs consecutively,
63 Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy Under Brezhnev and Andropov (London: Michael Joseph, 1983), 40.
64 Richard A. Moss, Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 62-63.
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which laid the foundations of a binding agreement, SALT I.65 In the spring of 1972, Nixon and his auxiliary Kissinger visited Moscow to finalize accumulated negotiations on arms control. The treaty, in essence, put restraints on the progress of anti-ballistic missiles – ABMs – while freezing the current arsenal of ICBMs and SLBMs launchers whether they were in production or operational use66 , but it did not indicate limits on bombers, long-range and fighter ones, located in Western Europe that can attack Soviet territories.67 SALT I was designed to last for five years, and its purpose was principally not to disregard rampant weapons strife that played a vital role in a nuclear attack, and through suspension of additional build-up, it asserted to maintain the nuclear status quo until a consensus on a new agreement has been reached.68 Despite these promising steps, the divergence between the two sides persevered since they comprehended and valued the SALT in line with their own particular ideological and political patterns. Although the agreement and, in general, détente appeared to be a promising glow of international affairs in the 1970s that the world was eager to witness, there were faltering aspects regarding the SALT process and its consequences. The major criticism was on the new defense policy direction of the United States with the Nixon administration as it, through arms negotiations, considered shrinking commitments to the Atlantic alliance while maintaining a leadership position through historical criteria of the nuclear umbrella.69
65 Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 264.
66 McCormick, America's Half-Century, 170.
67 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 322.
68 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 202.
69 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO United, NATO Divided: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 67.
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Another criticism echoed from Capitol Hill. Although the Congress was mainly against additional military buildup owing to Vietnam, some conservatives such as Senator Henry Jackson and Ronald Reagan warned and apprised the administration that the Soviets were availing détente and those neglected loopholes in the agreement contributed to their armament at a rapid pace.70 Nonetheless, the emphasis on détente both by the Nixon administration and Soviet leader Brezhnev retained as in the summer of 1973, two leaders met in Washington to expand the scope of disarmament policies that would set the standards for the end or elimination of nuclear rivalry yet ideological barriers remained to be pivotal obstacles.
In the aftermath of the Watergate case that brought opprobrium to the Nixon administration, Vice President Gerald Ford assumed office with relatively little emphasis on nuclear race and its correlation with foreign policy; during his administration, the issue had been transferred to the new administration because SALT was inherited as a policy in progress while Ford, thinking extensively regarding nuclear politics, asserted that anything that controls arms race was a necessity for the entire world.71 Additionally, the Congress, while approving the SALT I, appended an amendment to the treaty stating that president should seek further agreements on arms control on the basis of numeric equalities, clandestinely referring to fallacies in SALT I.72 Although President Ford’s and his administration’s priorities were directed at domestic politics and economic recovery, the conduct of foreign
70 Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 70.
71 Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974-1980 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 90.
72 Ibid., 90.
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affairs on nuclear disarmament was of utmost importance as its continuous peril that can incinerate humanity was a sufficient reason to pay attention to this impasse. He and Kissinger exerted to rejuvenate diplomatic actions by concluding a new SALT treaty with the Soviets which would set extensive standards on the restrictions on arms race and would increase the domestic prestige of President Ford en route upcoming presidential elections in 1976.73 His visit to a small town in Siberia called Vladivostok in November 1974 to meet Soviet leader Brezhnev was perhaps the only major contribution during his period regarding disarmament. The negotiations, nonetheless, were influential in laying down preconditions for the upcoming potential SALT II treaty, and this time, relative equality was reached upon the possession of particular nuclear weapons with their criteria to be involved in such an undesirable scenario.74 Each party concurred that strategic vehicles such as submarines and missiles remain below the quota of 2400, and they limit their MIRVs at a maximum number of 1320, which seemed to solve that issue of asymmetry both sides did not ideologically agree upon in SALT I.75 In the aftermath of Vladivostok, President Ford believed that this was a “honest effort” to proceed towards a more comprehensive and solid agreement on arms control, thinking that bargaining with Brezhnev and coming to terms with “give and take” procedures emboldened prospects for SALT II.76 Prior to the 1976 elections, he announced that he would no longer use the word détente and instead, the United States would negotiate with superpowers, the
73 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 283.
74 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 125.
75 Ibid., 125.
76 Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 284.
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Soviet Union and China, to diminish strain by altering its policy to “peace through strength” which would be an appropriate step in the light of tensions in the world.77 When Ford told Kissinger about such an alteration in foreign policy and abandonment of détente, Kissinger replied: “We are undermining détente. Except for Angola, the Soviets, I think, are getting a bum rap.”78
2.4 Restructuring SALT and Arms Race in Carter Era
The 1976 elections resulted in a Democrat victory, heading the former governor of Georgia to the White House. From the outset, although the Carter administration articulated that nuclear capabilities of the nation were roughly on par with the Soviets’, they, nonetheless, stated that Soviet military buildup would persevere and preponderate over American defense and military strength, and due to that, they embarked on a mission to insist that reduction and potential elimination of nuclear weapons would be favorable for the United States and Carter administration.79 However, elimination was a compelling task to achieve and acquire rather than having an accord with the Soviet Union based on strategic equivalence of nuclear weapons since bureaucrats of the two sides were unable to get along with the number of weapons and their destructive features.80 President Carter later indicated that he was eager to conclude an arms control agreement on the basis of stringent measures rather than escalating tensions and jeopardizing
77 Lloyd C. Gardner, A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 200.
78 Kalman, Right Star Rising, 131.
79 “The President’s News Conference”, February 8, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 95.
80 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 69.
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international security.81 His policy team also shared political perspectives akin to that of the President. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ascertained that strong defense for American interests and values, and mutual interests in controlling nuclear race were, indeed, two complementary strategies of the President and his administration.82 Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who had complete opposite views than Vance’s stated that one of the preliminary goals of the administration was to pursue a foreign policy structure based on allied cooperation, Western Europe and Japan, through presidential confidence that would stimulate a broader consensus against Soviet intentions, starting with their military buildup.83 He mentioned that the Carter administration would seek SALT to solidify national posture, which would make détente a more thorough and joint phenomenon.84 President Carter and his aides, in a nutshell, were able to grasp the essence of conducting arms control negotiations vital to American national security and international order. Despite that, their approaches were incongruous with one another. Although Brzezinski and Vance concurred that there had been a high adulation for détente in the last decade in the United States and that there should be a more comprehensive treaty that would succeed SALT I, Vance evaluated a prospective agreement would lead to extensive diplomatic dialogues with the Soviet Union while Brzezinski believed that such deal would be advantageous in order to abate the impetus
81 “Address Before the United Nations General Assembly”, March 17, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 447.
82 Cyrus Roberts Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 28.
83 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), 50.
84 Ibid., 54.
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of their military buildup.85 Furthermore, this buildup was inherited by the Carter administration as the Department of Defense had been publishing detailed reports that the Soviet Union outproduced the United States by giving the example of 7 to 1 ICBM production and will continue to do so in the upcoming years.86 Although the report indicated that the United States must retain strong defense capabilities against such actions, it also pointed out the necessity to acquire an arms control treaty, encompassing allies in Western Europe too, that would diminish the ambiguity on risks and costs of nuclear war and would enhance stability.87
One of the primary goals of the Carter administration was to negotiate for SALT and later for START that would benefit not only the United States but the entire Western alliance, including European partners and Japan, while possessing a strategic posture that would serve the policy of deterrence against the Soviet Union mainly on the nuclear degree.88 With this political purpose, the Carter administration wanted to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union because the early meetings between Secretary of State Vance and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin depicted willingness to work on an agreement that covers mutual interests.89 President Carter assessed the situation promising as he was thrilled that bureaucrats from two sides were able to ignite the process of
85 Ibid., 146-147.
86 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY (Fiscal Year) 1978 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 10, 32, 33.
87 Ibid, 16, 35.
88 S. R. Ashton, In Search of Détente: The Politics of East-West Relations Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 142.
89 “Remarks of the President and the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters”, April 8, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 559-560.
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serious diplomacy on the arms race that would be a significant contribution to global security by replacing confrontation with commitments to curb nuclear perils.90 According to Vance, a new agreement, SALT II, would provide a precise foundation for preserving confidence with the European allies, and although it would not abruptly guarantee mutual restrictions and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, a balanced affair would be unattainable without it.91 The Soviets embraced the necessity of preliminary arms race talks, yet, they were, according to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, aware of the covert intention of the Carter administration, which was to curb current and future nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union while retaining the American defense capabilities in total and fully operational.92 While the Soviets concentrated on the issue with suspicion, Carter reaffirmed that the desired outcomes of SALT II would be in line with “good faith without trick or unfair advantage”, and would exert to achieve assurance of equivalence in terms of nuclear capabilities of the two nations, and would diminish historical tensions.93 Furthermore, he assured that preliminary SALT II negotiation efforts had been sincere and that he would only approve an agreement and present it to Congress only if it protects and defends the rights and policies of the United States.94
90 “Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Arrival at Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia”, April 8, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 603.
91 Vance, Hard Choices, 45.
92 Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 290.
93 “The President’s News Conference”, September 29, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 1690.
94 “Remarks in an Interview With Tom Brokaw of NBC News, Bob Schiefler of CBS News, Robert MacNeil of Public Broadcasting Service, and Barbara Walters of ABC News”, December 28, 1977, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 2192.
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As backdoor diplomatic sessions gained momentum, the emphasis on SALT II began to prevail nuclear confrontation that would entail, according to the Carter administration, an ultimate goal which was to acquire a reciprocal and extensive détente despite the ostensible fact that the affairs were amalgamated with competition and cooperation yet the latter remained preferable for President Carter and his team.95 In an annual report, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown presented to Congress that SALT II agreement would be a measure of equivalency in military capabilities of superpowers while reducing uncertainties regarding nuclear strategies and prospective dangers of such war.96 However, the gradual deployment of SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union targeted toward Europe was a determinant in shaping the American defense posture, at least in a rhetorical way, as Harold Brown, in consultation with Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged that the production of MX missile and its program had to continue for a broader support of military bureaucracy for the SALT II.97 This strategy would not survive if a compromise were given in pursuit of pure détente, which was, at that time, not a favorable policy to follow while the Soviet Union had been pertinacious regarding their missile development and deployments. President Carter did not retreat on this matter since their commitment to retain defense and deterrence simultaneously with the Atlantic Alliance; to advance technologically in response to Soviet buildup, and to include Western European countries to partake in defense expenditures against the Eastern
95 “Question-and-Answer Session With Heinz Lohfeldt of Der Spiegel Magazine”, July 11, 1978, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 1273.
96 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to The Congress on the FY 1980 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 8-9.
97 Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 81-82.
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bloc was unfaltering.98 In January 1979, the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany gathered in Guadalupe, a French overseas island, to discuss such issues and develop a policy that would eliminate the influence of nuclear weapons in world affairs while promoting détente.99 In his memoirs, President Carter explained that his Western European colleagues were primarily concerned with the Soviets’ isolation as they were omitted from Western industries, had to confront the rising influence of China, and thus unable to export their ideologies which could lead them to stage military adventures, including potential nuclear strife, around the world.100 When Carter raised the issue of SS-20s threatening Western Europe, three leaders were reluctant to have American missiles on their soils unless the majority of Western European nations gave acquiescence to such initiatives.101 The summit was rather a confirmation that most allies were relatively on par with a future decision under the condition that if it were to cover multiple territories in order to debar from sole responsibility.
When the two parties had relatively settled their disputes and agreed to conclude SALT II agreement, it was portraited as a hallmark in restraining the nuclear race through reciprocal remise while granting predictability to each side regarding development of strategic weapons. Prior to his departure to Vienna for SALT II, President Carter elaborated that a rejection of the treaty would result in dissipating long-lasting processes and efforts, spending
98 “The President’s News Conference”, November 30, 1978, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 2096.
99 “Remarks to Reporters Following the Conclusion of Meetings Between the President and Western European Leaders”, January 6, 1979, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 17-20.
100 Carter, Keeping Faith, 234.
101 Ibid., 235.
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billions of dollars for this recondite competition, and distrust among allies that the United States could not be dependable which was detrimental to its leadership posture within the Atlantic Alliance.102 In a couple of days, Americans and Soviets signed SALT II, which illustrated that prevention of nuclear escalation was only possible through such treaties and diplomatic dialogue, which made the future competition more predictable, less precarious, and vulnerable.103 Although the Carter administration concurred that arms control and SALT II grant extensive predictability about nuclear affairs, limit strategic competition, and give a capability of monitoring the foe; the Soviet Union, according to the Department of Defense, prevailed by approximately fifty percent in the military effort.104 This was a driving force for the Atlantic Alliance to pursue the advancement of strategic nuclear arsenal and missiles in the aftermath of SALT II and formulate a broader policy to implement in dealing with the Soviets, which entailed a dual-track decision of NATO. The allies agreed upon conducting arms control and reductions in pursuit of détente while emphasizing the necessity to focus on modernization and deployment of nuclear forces, particularly of the Pershing missiles – 1a version – in Western Europe, as a rampart against the continuously rising military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners.105 Although they addressed that SALT II was adequate to
102 “Remarks at the State Democratic Party’s Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Indianapolis, Indiana”, June 2, 1979, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 994.
103 “Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress”, June 18, 1979, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 1088-1089.
104 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to The Congress on the FY 1981 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 3-4.
105 Final Communique - DPC in Ministerial Session. 11-12 December 1979.
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satisfy critical demands of European allies, possession of nuclear missiles capable of contributing to the policy of deterrence was imperative.106 While the deployment was expected to commence in four years, this NATO position was designated to station 464 ground cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.107 The rationale behind the decision was based upon the idea of solidifying European deterrence, which would lead the Soviet Union to reckon that the Atlantic Alliance could aim at striking Soviet territories with these newly installed missile systems, and those missiles were not meant to be stationed as a response to SS-20s of the Soviets; rather they were safeguarding alliance’s survival with the option of adequate weapons in a potential clash.108 This critical step did, however, ramp down after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only a few days later, which altered the scope of arms control perceptions and authenticity of the Soviet intentions regarding diminishing military confrontation. This was a daze for the Carter administration as the President had requested a deferral of SALT II ratification and focus on actual measures to be taken against the Soviet Union.109 President Carter explains in his memoirs that the crisis in Afghanistan was an important holdback, and therefore, the administration decided to leave SALT II to Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the power to prevent or postpone the Senate
106 Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels. 13-14 December 1979.
107 Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman, US-West European Relations During the Reagan Years: The Perspective of West European Publics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) 53.
108 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1986), 68-69.
109 “Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan”, January 4, 1980, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 23.
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decision for it.110 However, the invasion turned bilateral affairs into a stalemate, particularly after Congress blocked the ratification of SALT II.111 Then, a series of sanctions began as the Carter administration hastened military buildup, proposed to increase defense spending by five percent, authorized canceling wheat exports, withdrew athletes from the 1980 Olympic games held in the Soviet Union, and declared the Carter doctrine, a unilateral right to intervene if the Soviets jeopardizes American interests in the Persian Gulf.112 Although they were able to deliver a message to the world that the Soviets were the source of unending conflicts, fomenting crises that hampered the request for permanent peace, which demonstrated itself in arms talks, these series of actions altered the American perspective abruptly. Although he still adhered to the potential of SALT II, and admitted that initiating such a perilous war by relinquishing diplomatic efforts for a nuclear race would bring them irresponsibility, he did not abstain from stating that they would vie nuclear confrontation at a pinch.113 The Carter administration embarked on a mission to publicly announce the rising capabilities of national defense by addressing additional production of MX and Trident missiles and submarines on a competitive basis while blaming the political trend of previous administrations, Nixon and Ford, had for neglecting nation’s defense.114 Reports provided by the Department of Defense
110 Carter, Keeping Faith, 264.
111 “The President’s News Conference”, March 14, 1980, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 488.
112 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 301-302.
113 “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Legion in Boston, Massachusetts”, August 21, 1980, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 1552-1553.
114 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Town Meeting in Torrance, California”, September 22, 1980, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 1871.
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recommended that although that position was welcomed, arms control functions as a complementary component to American military posture.115 Since the ultimate national priority had been to deter nuclear war, and these treaties contributed to that purpose, the emphasis on such initiatives had to be pursued and maintained.116
CHAPTER III
REAGAN ON STAGE: NEW ENTOURAGE, NEW
POLICIES AND NUCLEAR DEBATE, 1981-1982
I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths: deterrents and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace. And let me say I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced.
Ronald Reagan
3.1 Military Buildup Rejuvenated, Arms Control Revisited
The inauguration of President-elect Ronald Reagan was a watershed with a new direction of US foreign and security policies evolved into an immaculate framework for nuclear race and arms control. Prior to his victory, the kernel of his program was based on pursuing a two-pronged pattern that would not neglect the importance of American defense posture while remaining committed to negotiations on arms control and nuclear race, at a pinch, through deterrence. Throughout the previous decade, the Soviets were able to outstrip the Americans in military and defense fields, in particular
115 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to The Congress on the FY 1982 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 27.
116 Ibid., 38, 59.
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with efforts on nuclear programs. Since the Kennedy administration, every administration has witnessed a gradual decline of American superiority or the Soviets’ achievement of reaching parity, which entailed a possibility of Soviet puissance unless the United States commenced taking necessary precautions.117 The new administration did not desist from pursuing arms control negotiations and genuine peace that the Western alliance seeks for, yet it was compelled to formulate a tangible policy that would not only serve for this goal but also for the advancement of non-gimmick national buildup that would push the Soviets towards diplomatic talks. Indeed, Alexander Haig, who was the first Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, explicitly stated in his memoirs that the Reagan administration assumed office with pertinacity to confront military adventurism that the Soviets had been performing throughout the world and with sincere intentions to reengage dialogue with Kremlin towards a progressive peace.118 The underlying reason behind this, as Haig explains, was that the Soviets should consider reconciling with the Atlantic alliance and the U.S. rather than acting against national interests and securities of the Western world.119 Prior to Reagan’s first term, most American policymakers adhered to the idea that the Soviets became the source of menace with their overseas expansion in the Middle East and Central America, yet the substantial threat remained the accumulated Soviet nuclear strength that disturbed Western Europe in line with achieving a broader foreign policy goal of shattering the nexus in the
117 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 6.
118 Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 95.
119 Ibid., 96.
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Atlantic alliance.120 At the beginning of his term, the Reagan administration’s national agenda and diplomatic contact on arms control and nuclear race were of utmost priority. They scrutinized every aspect, action, and potential consequence that could avert unbridled Soviet military developments and pave the way for extensive cooperation instead of confrontation. Initially, the rhetoric of the previous administrations in the arms talks had been abandoned by the President himself and his aides, especially new termination of reduction instead of limitation when referring to agreements.121 Although Reagan acknowledged that his predecessors, notably President Carter, brought the Soviets to the brink of actual reductions, he called on the Soviets to cease their imperialist aggression around the world and show inclination that they were in favor of realistic peace similar to the Western world.122 Thereafter, in April 1981, President Reagan initiated personal diplomacy, in consultation with Alexander Haig and the Department of State, and sent a letter to Soviet leader Brezhnev questioning continuous Soviet buildup over the last decade that adumbrated their intentions on superiority against the United States and ascertaining that appropriate atmosphere did not exist for a US-USSR summit to be held at this early stage.123 In return, Brezhnev responded that he shared the same belief regarding the summit, yet disavowed accusations towards Soviet military and reminded that no nation could dictate to the Soviet Union what to do and what not to do.124 This was a precursor illustrating that upcoming years in Cold War affairs would be in
120 Ibid., 224.
121 “Excerpts From an Interview With Walter Cronkite of CBS News,” March 3, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 194.
122 Ibid., 194.
123 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 271-272.
124 Ibid., 273.
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strained manners. However, the core mindset of President Reagan and his administration was the historical belief that the United States had the destiny to confront tyrannical regimes and promote virtues such as democracy and liberty worldwide125, which contributed to their commitment to peace in the 1980s, unlike the previous version of détente that hastened Soviet military expansion and imperialism.
The Reagan administration embarked on a nuclear mission that would function synchronously, improving national defense and pushing for legitimate reductions. Since the Cuban crisis, American defense expenditure funded through the federal budget had fallen sharply from fifty percent to twenty-three percent in 1979 when SALT II was signed.126 The United States had around 23.000 nuclear warheads while the Soviet Union had around 32.000, and in the ICBM category, the Soviets prevailed with almost 6000 while the U.S. held around 2300 ICBMs.127 One of Reagan’s first actions in office was the approval of a 32.6 billion dollars defense increase and requesting it through Congress in order to execute campaign promises and constitute a groundwork with Congress for impending expenditures.128 In an annual report, the Department of Defense concluded that with the exception of Vietnam, the military buildup was neglected and lost its credible deterrence necessary to contend with international military setting owing to
125 James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 200.
126 Edwin Meese, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 1992), 175.
127 Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 17-18.
128 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 33.
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political dereliction.129 Indeed, besides the economic recovery program, remaking of American defense was a precedence that would lead to reengagement with the Soviets on the basis of nuclear race and arms control, and essentially, they evaluated foreign and security approaches of the 1970s to Cold War relations were the mainspring of America’s depreciated international posture.130 They, in regard to that, put the blame on arms control agreements, particularly SALT I and II, for paving the way for a “window of vulnerability” in land-based forces, let alone restraining them.131 Such a mentality was later reiterated through a broader narrative when President Reagan addressed that the cardinal objective in national security and diplomatic paths was to hamper nuclear pervasion in countries other than the Soviet Union and to work to decrease the motives behind these initiatives through internationally binding treaties that could potentially augment the peril the United States could witness.132 Moreover, a CIA report recommended that there should be an intertwined approach with diplomatic spur and security evaluations against all nations that could be classified as nuclear foes like the Soviets.133 According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, this determination, in a nutshell, defined urgency to reconstruct military strength because the Soviets did not renounce increasing their
129 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to The Congress on the FY 1983 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 9-10.
130 Kenneth A. Oye, “Constrained Confidence and the Evaluation of Reagan Foreign Policy”, in Eagle Resurgent?: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, eds. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald S. Rothchild (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987), 5.
131 Ibid., 28.
132 “Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” July 16, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 630.
133 “Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation,” National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency. April 9, 1981.
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defense efforts without surrendering strategic and nuclear forces.134 Arms control and the 1980s version of détente, on the other hand, mattered simultaneously as Reagan and his aides were uncomfortable with the way détente had been sold to the American public by his predecessors. They accentuated that the West, due to illusions of détente, did not focus on competition with the Soviets and disregarded defense which abated the margin of security.135 Indeed, for most critics of the previous decade, the 1970s, this approach resulted in propounding an alteration in American-Soviet affairs into a zero-sum game in which one party could gain only by making the other lose it.136 The Soviet Union, in return, evaluated détente in a different fashion. Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States for nearly the entire course of the Cold War, classified détente as “missed opportunities” because of the ambiguity in ascertaining whether the nature of bilateral relations was détente or rivalry.137 Moreover, he explained that arms control was filled with reciprocal delusions because each side primarily focused on nuclear havoc, but the absence of discernible motives and objectives germinated a vacillating environment on the basis of distrust and skepticism.138 For Kremlin, as they have reached strategic parity, détente offered invaluable gains such as diminishing the likelihood of nuclear strife,
134 “Address by the Secretary of Defense Weinberger Before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York”, June 17, 1981, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 107-108.
135 Helga Haftendorn, “Toward a Reconstruction of American Strength: A New Era in the Claim to Global Leadership?”, in The Reagan Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strength?, eds. Helga Haftendorn and Jakob Schissler (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 6.
136 Michael Staack, “Security Policy and the Opponents of Détente”, in The Reagan Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strength?, eds. Helga Haftendorn and Jakob Schissler (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 90.
137 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 473.
138 Ibid., 474.
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stabilizing arms race, and expanding trade relations with the West through which Soviet bureaucrats expected to acquire reverence even if the Western alliance did not recognize its legitimacy, Soviets were powerful enough to browbeat.139 This perspective, however, altered in the first half of the 1980s as the Reagan administration persevered to revive national security and strengthen the Western bloc through the Atlantic partnership.
3.2 Atlantic Alliance and The Establishment of Diplomatic Liaison
The allies in Western Europe responded to the coming of new U.S. administration with a consideration that being under the nuclear umbrella brought irreversible obligations. The notion they had varied; the conservative Thatcher government in Britain had nearly similar channels as the new American administration, there was an initial cordiality in West Germany after tumultuous affairs between Chancellor Schmidt and Carter administration, while their joint statement with France after their 37th bilateral summit indicated that they were reluctant to work in accord and confidence with new U.S. administration while reaffirming a robust European diplomatic involvement in strategic Cold War affairs.140 The collective decisions mainly emerged after NATO sessions where they highlighted that the Soviets, although seemed to engage in dialogue, their proposals omitted allied concerns derived from dependence on SS-20s since they have recently increased their nuclear stockpiles with additional 220 launchers for their SS-20 missiles.141 Soviets, according to a NATO report, were also adamant on taking a position that would focus on NATO’s
139 Steele, World Power, 21-22.
140 Arthur Cyr, U.S. Foreign Policy and European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 128.
141 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, West Germany. 7-8 April 1981.
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modernization of missiles as their offer targeted to neutralize alliance’s tactical nuclear forces, which the U.S. had been ardently supporting, yet they did not retreat from their SS-20 missiles targeting Western Europe.142 Nevertheless, the West Europeans were reluctant to overlook recent achievements of Atlantic partnership and were in favor of diplomatic rapprochement to commence by the end of 1981 without distorting the SALT structure.143 The reason why Western European allies seemed eager when the Reagan administration launched a major defense buildup was that they were flustered that they may witness a highly impairing confrontation that could influence the continent, subvert accumulated diplomatic efforts and induce American neutralism owing to European political timidness.144 The allies were reasonable with their apprehension because the Reagan administration, as part of defense expansion, authorized the production of ERW – Enhanced Radiation Warhead – that was designed to function as a deterrent in a probable escalation and to reverse Soviet superiority, and President Reagan indicated that they had no intention to use it or deploy it in Western Europe but to warehouse it as a component of military planning.145 That determination on defense posture was intact, yet President Reagan described that they preferred to call the Soviets for a set of proper negotiations on real arms reductions in a verifiable manner; otherwise, they would stumble into an arms race in which they could not prevail.146 On the other hand, they had
142 Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Rome, Italy. 4-5 May 1981.
143 Final Communique - DPC in Ministerial Session. 12-13 May 1981.
144 Robert McGeehan, “The Atlantic Alliance and the Reagan Administration,” The World Today 37, no. 7/8 (1981): 261.
145 “Transcript of an Interview With President Reagan, Santa Barbara, California,” August 13, 1981, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 129.
146 “Remarks at the Illinois Forum Reception in Chicago,” September 2, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 746.
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to give signs that arms control diplomacy and proper truce were indispensable goals of the administration. Secretary of State Haig remarked that President Reagan, like everyone, possesses global aspiration for a peaceful world bereft of nuclear perturbation and felt disgruntled that former arms control initiatives achieved less than they promised.147 Haig reiterated that the main position the U.S. would take in serious negotiations would be the request for lowest verifiable limits on American and Soviet nuclear forces, and this type of diplomacy, on the basis of verification and predictability, was important in enhancing the security of two blocs by fostering deterrence and was a vital component in maintaining cohesion in the Atlantic partnership.148 One of the initial diplomatic contacts occurred in September between two foreign ministers, Alexander Haig and Andrei Gromyko, which resulted in a joint decision pointing out exigency to resume formal diplomatic negotiations at the end of November in Geneva, and each side appointed a delegation that would discuss proposals on behalf of their governments headed by Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinskiy respectively.149 This looked promising, especially within the framework Atlantic alliance, giving the presumption that the United States did not fully abandon the need for nuclear de-escalation; contrarily, it pushes for more by claiming reductions, not limitations. This strategy evolved in a synchronic fashion with the enlargement of American defense capabilities when Reagan announced SWP – Strategic Weapons Program – that was designed to modernize and reinforce land-based and sea-based
147 “Address by the Secretary of State Haig Before the Foreign Policy Association, New York,” July 14, 1981, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 166.
148 Ibid., 167-170.
149 “Statement Issued by the Department of State, New York,” September 24, 1981, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 176-177.
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missiles through which the administration sought to accomplish deterrent mechanisms for the American people and allies in Western Europe, capacity to respond to an attack with moderate cost, and strategic balance that illustrates perseverance of U.S. in seeking authentic and comprehensive arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union.150 This was a preferred full-scale national security position that was required to conduct so that Soviet bureaucrats could be filled with bewilderment about the American response to their potential attack.151 The underlying premise of such direction was essential on two occasions. First, the Soviets, given their enormous buildup, consider nuclear victory compared to previous decades; therefore, the United States should also retaliate by building up and then expect the Soviets for arms talks.152 Second, ideology was a major component for Reagan as he was committed and motivated to halt communism by acting in accordance with national needs and interests because previous experiences enabled the Reagan administration to conduct actions with strength and force if required.153 Soviet power had to be diminished because they remained to be the only nation that posed the greatest danger to the American people historically and deployed nuclear forces targeting American allies in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Arms reduction talks, thus, were the optimal choice for the United States.
150 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Announcement of the United States Strategic Weapons Program,” October 2, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 878-879.
151 “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”, National Security Decision, Directive 13. October 13, 1981.
152 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon With Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 957.
153 Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 254.
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3.3 New Proposals and New Rounds
On November 18, 1981, prior to the formal commencement of bilateral talks in Geneva, President Reagan announced a proposal of the zero option, which offered that the United States would cancel its pre-planned deployments – emerged from the double-track decision of 1979 as mentioned above – if the Soviets would remove their SS-20 missiles with their replaced SS-4s and SS-5s.154 The offer was primarily targeted at the Soviets within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, and the chief aim evolved to show commitment to the Soviets in arms reductions by decreasing confrontation while supporting Western Europe through leadership in the Atlantic partnership.155 Reagan’s initiative a few days before the opening of Geneva negotiations, which were later called INF talks as the central theme being intermediate nuclear range forces, pointed out that the West was willing to cooperate and engage in a dialogue so long as the Soviets would demonstrate similar intentions. It was also a precise diplomatic and strategic proposal to show the world that despite the Soviet military and nuclear aggression, the United States and Western Europe were in search of potential ways to solve conflicts and issues about the most destructive and concerning portion of the Cold War affairs. There were various opinions within the Reagan administration regarding the zero option. Secretary of State Haig indicated in his memoirs that he had always rejected this flawed offer because it was preposterous to anticipate that the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20
154 “Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons,” November 18, 1981, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 1065.
155 Ibid., 1066-1067.
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missiles with their warheads while the United States promised not to deploy Pershing II missiles which had not begun to build and which induced an altercation in Western Europe since citizens in countries like Britain, West Germany, and Belgium were storming the streets against scheduled American nuclear deployments.156 Secretary of Defense Weinberger, on the contrary, stated that he was pressuring the President to compromise in exchange for a treaty with the Soviet Union with proper verification procedures and to appease anti-nuclear public opinion in the Atlantic alliance that was open to manipulation from the Soviets.157 Weinberger remarks that the overwhelming majority of European demonstrations were not against the SS-20s or continuous Soviet deployments but rather were against American strategic forces that gave Western Europe a major deterrent capability in case of an attack.158 There were, however, concerns about the implementation of zero option among European political circles that the Soviets would not, under any circumstance, give acquiescence to such an offer, and if the emphasis on the option became more influential than expected, this would defer planned deployments of Pershing II missiles which serve for deterrence against SS-20 missiles.159 Indeed, Western European apprehension occurred before the announcement of the zero option. In late October, ministers of member states under the NATO umbrella had stated that they appreciated U.S. leadership in negotiation efforts and modernization initiatives, but they mainly pointed out the necessity to deploy Pershing missiles in a timely manner in order to keep
156 Haig, Caveat, 229. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin also shared this perspective by concluding asymmetry in request: eliminating already existing ones and nonexistent Western missiles. See Dobrynin, In Confidence, 486.
157 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 337-339.
158 Ibid., 337-339.
159 Ibid., 337-339.
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NATO’s credible capability as part of cooperative deterrence policy and give the presumption that the Soviet Union cannot escalate a conflict in Europe with these long-range nuclear forces.160 In another meeting, the allies also elucidated that owing to Soviet aggression and reluctance to cooperate extensively, they would strictly oppose any counter-proposals that explicitly or clandestinely request unilateral reductions on the part of the Atlantic alliance.161 Although the proposal was supported by both Houses of Congress, the Senate, and House of Representatives, allies in Western Europe mainly headed by Britain and West Germany; Soviet leader Brezhnev replied that nobody should expect the Soviet Union to accept this sort of proposal162 because the Soviets’ recent relations with Western Europe, thus with the United States, evolved around continuous military and nuclear development orchestrated by the Kremlin that ultimately gave them political leverage to be employed in rarely existing diplomatic engagements.163
3.4 Negotiations for Securing the Ultimate Goal of Peace
INF negotiations commenced on November 30, 1981, with two parties’ delegations in Geneva. President Reagan’s proposal was the first task U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze offered the Soviet side.164 The American side, as part of a two-pronged strategy, declared the willingness to engage in a dialogue with
160 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland. 20-21 October 1981.
161 Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels. 10-11 December 1981.
162 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 348.
163 William E. Griffith, “The Soviets and Western Europe: An Overview”, in Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Herbert J. Ellison (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 17.
164 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 373.
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a good faith, reminiscent of the Carter era, and would regard Soviet proposals in that sense while availing missile deployment procedures under the NATO consensus as an incentive that brought the Soviets to the Geneva table in a serious manner.165 Although the negotiations were in steady progress, it quickly occupied a major portion of “friend and foe diplomacy” conducted in 1982 and the upcoming years. The Atlantic Alliance favored the zero option, yet bemused by the fact that the Soviet Union replaced their older short-range missiles with SS-22s which nearly covered all territories of NATO’s European portion.166 Brezhnev’s statement on the planned deployment of Pershing missiles in Western Europe, through which the Soviet leader forewarned that retaliation would exist against such a move, was also instigating for the U.S, and the President responded that it was a part of Soviet propaganda to commercialize the American administration and the President as warmonger against Western European audience.167 Despite this, the President was optimistic as he ascribed a meaning to negotiations with an emphasis on concluding an agreement that decreases the risk of nuclear confrontation, contains nuclear dependency, and augments international security without compromising or neglecting defense buildup.168 Indeed, Secretary of State Haig proclaimed that since the administration committed to the policy of deterrence, the importance of competitive buildup was indispensable because it preserved peace for the Atlantic alliance, and
165 “Statement by the Secretary of State Haig,” November 30, 1981, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 184-185.
166 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 23-24 March 1982.
167 “The President’s News Conference,” March 31, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 399-400.
168 Ibid., 399-400.
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perhaps the only component of such policy was to acquire and maintain advantageous military capability that secures this balance by preventing potential surprise attack.169 For the American side, therefore, the ultimate guide to guarantee peace in the West rested upon retaining military balance and engaging in diplomatic talks with confidence. President Reagan preferred the latter and anticipated that achievement in negotiations would easily disentangle affairs with the Soviets from nuclear deterrence to bridling Soviet threat.170 He asserted that the Soviets, instead of utilizing arms control negotiations and accords as tool to halt American defense, should possess similar intentions as the Americans towards global peace that the world aspires to.171 Recapitulating the two-pronged strategy that, in Reagan’s rhetoric, increased stability through reductions while retaining the sufficient nuclear capacity for deterrence as a commitment to national security and the friends in the Atlantic alliance, the President also pointed out the second negotiations, START – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks – which was previously agreed upon yet designated to begin by summer to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads equally and ensure verification for compliance.172 Like Paul Nitze, this task was to be handled by Edward Rowny, who held arms control negotiator positions under three consecutive presidents and had pressed the President from the outset to focus not only on launchers that carry weapons but on the number of weapons that could cause
169 “Address by the Secretary of State Haig Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, Washington D.C.,” April 6, 1982, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 77.
170 “Radio Address to the Nation on Nuclear Weapons,” April 17, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 488.
171 “Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois,” May 9, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 584.
172 Ibid., 584-585.
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destruction.173 These INF and imminent START talks, along with the American discourse, were principally appreciated by the allies in Europe and were classified as realistic approaches to decrease nuclear tensions.174 In return, President Reagan praised the political consensus of European leaders West Germany, Italy, Britain, and Belgium, despite the rise of the peace movement, that the agenda of planned deployments on their territories was the driving force that pushed the Soviets to the negotiation table in Geneva.175
In June 1982, when President Reagan went to Versailles for an economic summit, he was also invited by Britain and West Germany for a parliament speech which he evaluated as a pivotal opportunity to show his commitment to arms reductions path by expressing his feelings that a nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won.176 At the British Parliament, he supported his stance on military buildup and the endorsement of the Atlantic alliance by stating a historical reminder that the United States was superior in the nuclear field in the 1940s and 1950s, which influenced Europe’s map because it would have been different had the Soviets that area under their control.177 Moreover, he chronologically reacquainted American arms control attempts from Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal up to his term to show that the United States had always been and would continue to defend similar
173 Edward L. Rowny, It Takes One to Tango (Washington and New York: Brassey's, 1992), 141.
174 Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Luxembourg. 17-18 May 1982.
175 “Interview With Representatives of Western European Publications,” May 21, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 697.
176 Reagan, An American Life, 554.
177 “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 743.
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objectives by committing to nonproliferation at the international level.178 These positions were designated to signal the incumbent American delegations in INF and START talks that the pressure for arms control seldom outweighed the necessity to launch a full-scale nuclear modernization, yet these two remained intertwined. In the INF discussions, Paul Nitze clarified that his counterpart Kvitsinskiy repeatedly stated that the Soviet side would reject the American proposal that eliminates long-range INF missiles and that proposal, according to the Soviets’ perspective, meant a request for unilateral disarmament.179 Nitze replied that Reagan’s zero option was the backbone of American strategy, and they had no intention to surrender it because it would enervate the fundamental position of political mindset.180 In the START negotiations, on the other hand, U.S. negotiator Edward Rowny, as he asserted in his memoirs, believed that the Soviets could be persuaded under the condition of no public announcement or press statements regarding the negotiations which was the critical issue of nuclear diplomacy.181 Rowny complained to his counterpart Viktor Karpov to prevent such reciprocal leaks for the sake of genuine arms control accord; the Soviets were talking to the Western press in Moscow about differences between Moscow and Washington while the Americans were circulating news that unraveled contrasting perspectives of U.S. government agencies on START which could be detrimental to the nature of diplomatic attempts and presidential intentions for accomplishment in these talks.182 The approach to
178 “Address by President Reagan Before the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament.”, June 17, 1982, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 155.
179 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 377.
180 Ibid., 377.
181 Rowny, It Takes One to Tango, 145.
182 Ibid., 145-146.
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the START, as Rowny explained, was divergent within the administration; the Department of State and Joints Chiefs focused on limiting missiles and warheads in order not to intimidate the Soviets with actual reductions, while the Department of Defense adhered to the position of reduction of those forces to American level since the buildup was at early phase.183 Nonetheless, the President did not abandon the sincere desire embedded in these negotiations because it was required to reduce nuclear levels reciprocally and reduce international public concern if American efforts were accompanied by Soviet seriousness in this historic opportunity.184
Former ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock Jr. propounds that the Soviets were historically inclined to work with the Republicans rather than Democrats owing to their businesslike semblance, less distorted ideology compared to Democrats, surmise that they held the actual power in the United States and active role in Wall Street where that power was central to politics.185 Thus, the Soviets held the presumption that President Reagan, coming from this tradition, could not break his word on American buildup and willingness to compete, which curbed the idea that the Soviets could continue to commit arms race by expanding their nuclear arsenals.186 To appease this, the Soviets evaluated the negotiations as a way to postpone the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe through pervaded anti-American notions with demonstrations while exerting to confound the
183 John Newhouse, The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 351.
184 “Letter to Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,” June 29, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 821-822.
185 Jack F. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), 28.
186 Ibid., 28-29.
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negotiations with proposals which they thought the U.S. would never concur as they valued INF and START more than the Soviets. Indeed, the Reagan administration strove for a tangible accomplishment in these initiatives because a failure would retain the Soviets’ defense in superiority, legitimize their advantage in ICBMs and intermediate-range missiles, and, most importantly, the Soviet leaders would use this nuclear pitfall to acquire political domination over the U.S. at international level.187 Therefore, the Reagan administration was aware of the fact that they had to remain in diplomatic contact with the Soviets by delivering a message that the solution rests in a comprehensive treaty. In September, ministerial discussions took place between Gromyko and the new Secretary of State George Shultz, who replaced Alexander Haig. The primary debate evidently evolved around the INF and the START which two sides explained their position. Although the two parties were not uncomfortable with the nature of bilateral security diplomacy, the Soviet minister Gromyko underlined that the zero option could not be the fundamental theme of the negotiations, echoing what Kvitsinskiy had earlier told to Nitze, depicting the public image of nuclear talks as not so promising.188 After the meeting, Secretary of State Shultz informed the President that Gromyko was trying to be superior with arguments filled with technical explanations and recommended that the future of affairs belonged to them, whether strained or constructive, since the United States was ready for all scenarios.189 Reagan, at first, was optimistic because Gromyko implied that Brezhnev could be in favor of a summit with
187 “Address by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Rostow Before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles,” September 10, 1982, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 175.
188 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 123.
189 Ibid., 123.
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the President, yet, Reagan wanted to see “good deeds” from the Kremlin so that they could collectively cooperate with dialogue and eliminate confrontation.190 After the meeting, Shultz also informed Nitze that the Soviets would not get along with the zero option, which was witnessed firsthand by him. According to Nitze, the Kremlin classified INF discussions as a useful political tool to exacerbate discord in NATO and estrange the United States and its European allies since they were aware that a potential Soviet consent to these proposals would debilitate environmentalist peace movements in Western Europe with their anti-American rhetoric amalgamated with anti-nuclear posture.191
3.5 Prolonging Two-Pronged Approach
President Reagan and his aides were determined to handle two-pronged diplomacy by making it the centerpiece of foreign and security policy because they concluded that what led the Soviet Union to participate in INF and START was the administration’s double-edged orientation.192 Additionally, the Department of Defense indicated in its annual report that deterrence strategy was intact, which contained two significant approaches; maintaining collective defense through NATO and impending deployments.193 President later addressed that the military objectives of the United States, unlike the Soviets’, were settled for global peace devoid of nuclear concern yet had to take necessary measures in that sense because the
190 Reagan, An American Life, 559.
191 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 389.
192 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session via Satellite to Republican Campaign Events,” October 14, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1322.
193 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to The Congress on the FY 1984 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 32.
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Soviets had almost six hundred intermediate-range missiles that were deployed while the United States had, except current Pershing missiles, none owing to their withdrawal from Europe nearly two decades ago.194 Hence, the development and production of missiles was a prerequisite and endorsement for this incentive, and the administration wanted to do so by focusing on new MX missiles under the name of Peacekeeper, notwithstanding the Pentagon had earlier proposed such plans since the beginning of 1981 and were all rejected.195 This, which they had counted upon, caused a quarrel between Congress and the administration due to funding request even though President Reagan’s letter to Congress explained the necessity of having these missiles for deterrence strategy and arms control process.196 Nevertheless, there was no approval of funding for this. Robert McFarlane, who was then the Deputy National Security Advisor, explained in his memoirs that a few senators said that Senate’s and House’s opposition to the MX arose from the absence of trust in Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who was not adept at showing credibility on this important topic while others recommended comprising a group of reputable analysts and researchers for a comprehensive study of this defense initiative because another proposal sent by Weinberger would result in a washout.197 This led to the establishment of a bipartisan commission by the Reagan administration led by Brent Scowcroft, who was a former Air Force officer and national security advisor to Gerald
194 “Address by President Reagan,” November 22, 1982, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 188-189.
195 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 133.
196 “Letter to Members of Congress on Deployment of the MX Missile,” November 22, 1982, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1504.
197 Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 224.
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Ford, to scrutinize potential options for missile basing and further procedures that contribute to nuclear deterrence.198
In late 1982, there was also one critical incident. Soviet leader Brezhnev passed away and was replaced by Yuri Andropov, who initially abstained from using provocative rhetoric by highlighting the value of détente and arms control negotiations with several proposals that were designed to serve this goal.199 Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz had a chance to meet Andropov when they visited Moscow for Brezhnev’s funeral. They suspected that despite the good theoretical intention of Andropov’s proposals, these were aimed at shaping European politics and weakening U.S. progress on deployments if bilateral negotiations collapse.200 According to Dobrynin, Andropov did not yearn for the escalation of military tensions with the United States but thought that President Reagan’s decisions and actions might actually ignite a conflict neither side wanted to experience.201 When Dobrynin and Shultz met after Moscow's visit, they exchanged their leaders’ desire to focus on constructivist diplomacy instead of aggravating the Cold War, which the world had been weary of.202 Indeed, the rest of the world, particularly the allies in Western Europe, showed ambiguous responses to the developments between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within NATO, the consensus was reached upon the implementation of peaceful deterrence, which required strong military capability rested in Europe with assurances that no weapons would be used,
198 Ibid., 224.
199 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 293.
200 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 127.
201 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 519.
202 Ibid., 520.
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with the exception of an attack, since the alliance was not in favor of a fight.203 On the other hand, there have been increased criticisms from Western Europe since the fall of 1982. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, despite underlining the importance of NATO and German-American partnership, harshly confronted unilateral American decisions that paved the way for rising concerns regarding the nuclear war in Europe, complaining about the absence of a joint strategy that does not exacerbate anti-Americanism.204 Furthermore, in deployment-designated countries, most people claimed that American actions and policies had been inclined to spark a conflict instead of encouraging peace by referring to the American desire to impose military superiority over the Soviet Union, relatively indicating what the Soviets had been thinking about the entire process.205 This justifies one of the arguments of annual defense reports, which underscored that the Soviets had been persistent in breaking the bond within NATO’s strategic partnership through propaganda with the aim of dismantling American nuclear and conventional forces from Western Europe that function to discourage the Soviets from launching a nuclear war.206 At the end of the year, Secretary of State Shultz articulated, in a nutshell, that while defense buildup was on the right track, the need for advanced negotiations emerged because the allies in Western Europe were politically stuck between the United States and the Soviet Union, and there had to be an
203 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Brussels. 30 November 1982.
204 Patricia Smith, “The Impact of Post-Cold War Changes on the U.S.-German Relationship”, in Coming in from the Cold War: Changes in U.S.-European Interactions since 1980, eds. Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine Ingebritsen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 109.
205 Smith and Wertman, US-West European Relations During the Reagan Years, 63.
206 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to The Congress on the FY 1984 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 56.
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emphasis on arms control treaties, particularly from the Reagan administration, that would outshine missile deployments planned at the end of 1983.207
CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPLATING PEACE: DEPLOYMENTS,
ELECTIONS, AND ENGAGEMENTS, 1983-1984
Arms control is a field in which it is quite easy to look good and get nowhere, but the truth - for both sides - is that reliable and stabilizing agreements are vastly better than unlimited competition.
McGeorge Bundy
4.1 Reiterating Intentions on Nuclear Stalemate
The year 1983 began with an emphasis on pursuing negotiations with efficient proposals that would increase the importance of discussing security diplomacy with the new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and would potentially avert the concerns in Europe stemmed from planned U.S. deployments by the end of the year. In a radio address, President Reagan remarked that same priority of eliminating nuclear confrontation without endangering or restraining Soviet national interests would be the essential process of the administration which they would conduct in close consultation with NATO allies in Western Europe.208 Although the administration retained this perspective, they did not relinquish the emphasis on reinvigorated American defense that functioned in accordance with foreign policy and also linked to
207 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 160.
208 “Radio Address to the Nation on United States-Soviet Relations and the Vice President’s Trip to Europe,” January 8, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 24.
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Atlantic partnership because the Americans considered NATO as the backbone of perennial European security that the Soviets had been exerting to impair through values of freedom and independence that bind the alliance.209 Vice President Bush indicated that the efforts of the Reagan administration to install peace had been a perpetual stance and would remain on that track because eliminating nuclear weapons, including new ones, centers the American security concern, which, in other words, was a moral position to be followed.210 The American position was formulated on this basis, and this route would stimulate the quest for a comprehensive agreement that would reduce nuclear armaments of superpowers in a realistic manner. After a meeting with Nitze and Rowny, insistence and readiness for serious negotiations were depicted at the behest of President Reagan as the “substantial undertaking” for this generation.211 For this purpose to happen, the Reagan administration notified the Soviet side that they were ready to reconsider proposals and make necessary adjustments to come to terms on the basis of mutual interests, which would solidify the aspirations for peace.212 They wanted Soviets to show deeds, commitments, and sincere words instead of germinating threats against the allies and people
209 “Address by President Reagan Before the American Legion Annual Conference,” February 22, 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 4.
210 “Address by Vice President Bush Before the U.S. Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland,” February 4, 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 110.
211 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Strategic Arms Reduction and Military Deterrence,” January 14, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 51.
212 “Statement on Arms Control and Reduction,” January 21, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 85.
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in the Western world213 and then discuss potential agreements on the principles of significant reductions, equality of rights and limits, and verifiability.214 Official CIA reports and analyses, on the other hand, forewarned the administration that the Soviets might not take such a position because the only objective they maintained was to prevent deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, which would alter nuclear warfare for the benefit of United States as they wanted to retain a dominant position in INF possession and debilitate American relations with allies in Western Europe.215 In Europe, the allies were also in favor of the continuation of American-Soviet negotiations. President Mitterrand, on the anniversary of the German-French partnership treaty, stated that discrepancy among allies would only serve the Soviet goals and defense ties had to be reinforced for European security.216 He also was in favor of NATO’s decision to deploy American missiles in late 1983 unless there was an agreement with the Soviet Union.217 Indeed, the quest for agreement between superpowers was echoed by Vice President Bush during his visit to West Berlin, where he delivered President Reagan’s message to the German audience that he was eager to meet new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov “wherever and whenever he desires” to conclude an agreement that would ban nuclear weapons from this earth.218 Within that scope, the Reagan administration portrayed an outlook that the
213 “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 25, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 109.
214 “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” February 9, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 208.
215 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment: An Intelligence Assessment,” February 1983.
216 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 350.
217 Ibid., 350.
218 Ibid., 350.
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U.S. did not have an imperialist agenda that posed threat or aggression to others while the Soviets had been continuously in an effort to destroy the nexus between the United States and Western Europe that bonded the partnership intact.219 Another significant impact on American stance on Soviet affairs was that the conservative parties in Europe became powerful enough to seize power. Apart from Thatcher's government in the United Kingdom, Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic Union became the chancellor in West Germany in March 1983220 which gave leverage to the Reagan administration dealing with the Soviets since they were able to influence German politics compared to any other allied partner in Western Europe. These incidents, in a sense, had granted the United States great confidence and room for diplomatic maneuvers while contributing to the two-pronged approach they maintained despite ebbs and flows in arms control negotiations.
4.2 Announcement of SDI: A New Phase
In March 1983, President Reagan, indeed, altered the course of international affairs profoundly with his speech declaring the Soviet Union the “Evil Empire” which had the potential to shatter existing dialogue. President Reagan explains in his memoirs that one of the underlying premises of such confrontational rhetoric stemmed from the opposition to military modernization that cost billions of dollars by utilizing American people’s concerns regarding nuclear war and from the influence of freeze
219 “Address by President Reagan Before the American Legion Annual Conference,” February 22, 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 4.
220 Christoph Bertram, “Europe and America in 1983.” Foreign Affairs 62, no. 3 (1983): 617.
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movements that had an impact on Republicans in the Senate.221 Moreover, the essence of Reagan’s speech was that he distinguished the main principles and the features that the Soviets system had and tried to depict that their system was not on par with that of the Western one.222 That changing tone was maintained later with the announcement of a new research program called Strategic Defense Initiative – SDI – which abruptly became the determinant of Cold War relations in the first half of the 1980s. Strategic Defense Initiative was, in theory, a technological shield that included space against missile attacks and was designated to preserve American missiles without embarking on new defensive programs by decreasing strategic vulnerability.223 Getting its sobriquet “Star Wars” from a popular science-fiction movie that delivers a confrontation between evil and good, the SDI emerged as a replacement for the prolonged policy of nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction, and President Reagan believed that advanced technological developments could result in hardware that would prevent enemy missiles.224 This central theme indicated that the Reagan administration, in dealing with the Soviet Union, now entered into a path that would endorse the American quest and diligence that expected human cataclysm would never exist.225 President Reagan later described this new program within the scope of what had been done regarding arms reductions and explained that the Soviet Union, with their latest proposals, would
221 Reagan, An American Life, 568.
222 Ibid., 568.
223 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 76-77.
224 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 25.
225 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 165.
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clandestinely maintain and add on the number of missile warheads while the United States possessed none.226 That Soviet approach of not being able to come up with compelling offers was also a driving force that accumulated since the official commence of arms reduction talks. The SDI caught the attention differently; while most scientists observed that it was based upon an inconsistent presumption that defensive technologies would secure a perpetual advantage over the offensive one, Reagan’s supporters and some of his aides considered that the SDI could preserve American strategic forces in a more effective way, grant technological superiority over the Soviet Union, and perhaps most importantly, desist from the ABM Treaty which sealed reciprocal vulnerability.227
Among Reagan’s team, there were varying conclusions regarding the necessity and the future of this program. Secretary of Defense Weinberger mentioned that he was ready to support such a program since the advocates of the policy of mutually assured destruction were harshly inveighing, and the American people learned with consternation that the country possessed no defense against hostile attacks and missiles from the Soviet Union.228 Department of Defense additionally indicated that the SDI would have the capability to diminish enemy’s confidence, would provide a barrier against unilateral Soviet deployments, and reshape impending offensive missile systems that would emerge in line with agreements providing stability, peace
226 “Remarks Announcing a Proposed Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement,” March 30, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 473.
227 Dana H. Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 72.
228 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 306-307.
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and security.229 Secretary of State Shultz evaluated this major alteration in a skeptical fashion. He considered that simultaneous possession of defensive and offensive systems would lead to destabilization, would gamble vulnerability since the Soviets would classify SDI as an attempt to pulverize their systems, and political endorsement would be problematic owing to absence of technological knowledge of diplomats and bureaucrats.230 For National Security Advisor McFarlane, rather than advertising SDI as a technical research program, its primary value was to function as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the Soviet Union, leverage to change their stance at the arms reduction talks despite the fact that it was not portrayed since President Reagan was eager to make SDI happen at that time.231 For the Soviets, on the other hand, it was a direct threat. The final conclusion was that the United States was considering nuclear war scenarios in which the chances of Soviet reprisal had to be diminished, and Soviet leader Andropov remarked that the United States chose a dangerous path that designated to expand arms confrontation to outer space.232 Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, according to Dobrynin, was not fond of the SDI because it gave the idea that the United States successfully attained technological progress that intimidated the Soviets.233 Moreover, it gave the impression that the United States, although they abstained from it, could launch a first strike that could neutralize Soviet missiles in their grounded position while also defending Soviet retaliatory attacks through SDI, which could grant confidence to
229 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to The Congress on the FY 1985 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 58.
230 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 252.
231 McFarlane, Special Trust, 234.
232 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 534.
233 Ibid., 534.
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American decision-makers that a nuclear victory over the Soviets could be acquired.234 The Strategic Defense Initiative also played a significant role in shaping internal affairs of the Atlantic alliance since Western European nations showed various reactions to President Reagan’s technological aspiration. In France, for instance, President Mitterrand profoundly opposed it by emphasizing that Europe had to pursue its technological initiatives, while German Chancellor Kohl and British Prime Minister Thatcher favored cooperation to a certain extent.235 President Mitterrand also indicated that the SDI could extend the race to space while disentangling the Western stance from the ABM Treaty that they had benefited.236 These fractures within the Alliance, in fact, served the Soviets by creating a room for maneuver that they could blame the Americans for an impasse at the Geneva talks while expecting Western European countries to put pressure on their partner by stimulating anti-American posture.237 Furthermore, the preliminary European reaction to SDI specified that they were skeptical regarding maintaining current arms control atmosphere, let alone making an effort for a comprehensive agreement, and concluded that the ultimate impact of this initiative would be decoupling despite the fact that the SDI supporters asserted that it would lead to success in arms control negotiations and grant more credibility to American nuclear guarantee, an umbrella open for Western Europe.238
234 Michael Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan: America and Its President in the 1980s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 132.
235 Martin J. Hillenbrand, “American Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Alliance,” in Reagan's Leadership and the Atlantic Alliance: Views from Europe and America, ed. Walter Goldstein (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1986), 48.
236 Ibid., 48-49.
237 Ibid., 48-49.
238 Lawrence Freedman, The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma (London: Firethorn Press, 1986), 252.
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4.3 Friends, Foes, and Incidents
On May 3, 1983, Soviet leader Andropov came up with a new proposal limiting their INF warheads to the number that Britain and France had.239 For President Reagan, it was a sign that the Soviets did not completely abandon participation in the universal desire of eliminating nuclear confrontation, yet still needed to hear the same sincere commitments at the negotiations.240 The nascent changing attitude of the Soviets could be attached to the emergence of SDI and the goals that it aimed to achieve, and this attached the program as tool to the arms control negotiations, which remained to be the foremost issue to be settled. In late May, the Western allies gathered in Williamsburg, Virginia, for a G7 Summit. Although the main theme was economy, INF and START talks regarding collective security also occupied a significant portion of the summit. They reiterated the joint will of the Atlantic alliance that they would seek authentic peace and meaningful arms control agreement, evoked the Soviet Union that the Western nations were ready to work on it, and if there would be no intention towards a balanced agreement, planned American deployment in Europe would occur.241 There were two underlying reasons that undergirded American position. First, the wind of conservativism solidified itself with the elections of Helmut Kohl of West Germany and Margaret Thatcher of Britain, which meant that there was an acquiescence, compared to objections, to
239 Dean, Watershed in Europe, 133.
240 “Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues,” May 4, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 636.
241 “Williamsburg Economic Summit Conference Statement on Security Issues,” May 29, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 775.
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American deployments, and second, the stagnant Soviet attitude began to be influential in Western Europe that they would not search for a binding agreement on arms control which relatively reversed the anti-American sentiments that stormed in the last two years.242 In the aftermath of the Williamsburg Summit, Secretary of State Shultz remarked that the hope towards that goal began to lose its prominence since the Soviets, with their one-sided proposals, had taken traces of optimism away despite the crucial changes in American INF and START postures.243 Nonetheless, despite this inertia, the Reagan administration worked to surmount this obstacle with new offers. In consultation with the chief negotiator at the START table, Ed Rowny, and the Scowcroft Commission, President Reagan ordered his team to have flexibility on the number of deployed ballistic missiles which was previously limited to 850.244 The complete effort was to persuade the Soviets that there could be an internationally favorable agreement that could also reshape the frameworks of American deployments in Europe. However, the aforementioned earlier notice by the CIA regarding Soviets’ aim to halt US deployments surfaced quickly, and they insinuated that this could lead negotiations to predicament.245 Such a Soviet attitude reaffirmed the importance of the two-pronged security diplomacy the Reagan administration tried to maintain since deterrence was, in a sense, complementary to the ultimate goal of international peace bereft of nuclear
242 Milles Kahler, “The United States and Western Europe: The Diplomatic Consequences of Mr. Reagan,” in Eagle Resurgent?: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, eds. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald S. Rothchild (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987), 321.
243 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 354.
244 “Remarks Announcing Changes in the United States Position at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,” June 8, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 832-833.
245 Rowny, It Takes One to Tango, 155-156.
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threats. The administration, on every occasion, underlined that the United States did not deviate from the determination to reach a consensus with the Soviet Union through objectives of eliminating INFs, decreasing the level of intercontinental strategic forces, and prohibiting the production and warehousing of chemical weapons, and expected the Soviets to demonstrate similar willingness and sincerity for better progress.246 Simultaneously, the Reagan administration continued to focus on the further development of the MX Peacekeeper missile program, which the Scowcroft Commission suggested deployment of one hundred of them for a more effective deterrence policy and for leverage in nuclear diplomacy.247 President Reagan was in need of a major endorsement for the continuation of these missiles. He sent a letter to the members of the House of Representatives for assistance on the MX program by committing that this step was linked to the results of negotiations and that if agreement occurred, their numbers would be reduced significantly.248 Although the negotiations were in progress, President Reagan decided to steer toward letter diplomacy. He tried to convince Soviet leader Andropov that responsibility belonged to each nation’s desire for a peaceful world, but it also required more active communication not only in arms control but also in other topics such as trade, human rights, and East-West affairs.249 In his response, Andropov requested not to deploy planned NATO missiles while repudiated to discuss other topics that President
246 “Address by Vice President Bush Before the Foreign Policy Society at the Foreign Ministry Press Center, Copenhagen, Denmark,” July 4, 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 428-429.
247 “Radio Address to the Nation on Arms Control and Reduction,” July 16, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1042.
248 “Letter to Members of the House of Representatives on Production of the MX Missile,” July 19, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1060.
249 Reagan, An American Life, 576.
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Reagan remarked in his letter.250 Bilateral relations began to improve relatively on other occasions, such as the lifting of the pipeline exports embargo to the Soviet Union, and the agreement on American grain sales for the next five-year period, yet, the arms control continued to stagger since each side regarded this issue rigorously.251
In August 1983, a group of U.S. Senators from Democrats visited Soviet leader Andropov in Moscow to discuss various topics in American – Soviet relations, arms control being the prioritized theme of the meeting. The American delegation reported that the Soviets gave hints regarding potential responses if the United States would proceed with Pershing II deployments, and Andropov stated that such a decision would cause suspicion and mistrust regarding the negotiations.252 Moreover, the Soviets recapped that they were chafed at President Reagan’s SDI speech that would, in Soviet interpretation, allow developing and deploying anti-ballistic weapons in space, contradicting and violating the ABM Treaty.253 The Senators recommended that the United States had to give full consideration to Soviet proposals if the chief aim was to achieve a good agreement and the quest for arms control opportunities had to be pursued otherwise, each side would be exposed to severe outcomes.254 The Reagan administration had indeed been acting in accordance with such a mentality for a long time and showed persistence that instead of seeking a new era of arms race, they were trying to reverse that phenomenon through a
250 Ibid., 576-577.
251 Walter Lafeber, “The Two – or Three? – Phases of U.S.–Soviet Relations,” in Crisis and Confrontation: Ronald Reagan's Foreign Policy, ed. Morris H. Morley (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988), 28.
252 U.S. Congress, Senate. “Dangerous Stalemate: Superpower Relations in Autumn 1983: A Report of a Delegation of Eight Senators to the Soviet Union to the United States Senate,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1983), 6-7.
253 Ibid., 21.
254 Ibid., 17.
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downward drift.255 They also wanted to see a complete endorsement from Congress in the administration’s quest for strengthened national security with modernization program of MX Peacekeeper while encouraging NATO allies in Western Europe that perseverance and unity had been fundamental principles to deter aggressive Soviet attitudes because the ultimate goal of Atlantic alliance, in the context of arms control, was in the interests of all countries irrespective of their policies toward the Soviet Union.256 These relations, however, did not constantly evolve around such visions but were influenced by external incidents that faced off East and West in a more treacherous fashion. On September 1, 1983, Korean airliner flight KAL 007 headed towards Seoul was shut down by a Soviet interceptor for entering and wandering Soviet airspace and territory.257 The initial reactions to this disaster were paving the way for a more confrontational discourse and, indeed, eased the way for scheduled U.S. deployments in Western Europe. Immediately after the incident, Secretary of State Shultz informed the President that the Soviets thought of it as a commercial airliner which could not be a precise excuse, and if they thought of it as American intelligence aircraft, then it was more serious because it would set back positive American approach towards the Soviets.258 The Soviets, on the other hand, believing that it was a military plane, replied that it was flying over critical military sites, was not on course from Anchorage, Alaska to Japan, and referred to it
255 “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Legion in Seattle, Washington,” August 23, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1190.
256 Ibid., 1191-1192.
257 Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 2-4.
258 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 362-363.
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as a willful provocation.259 In a few days, this issue became a determinant at Foreign Ministers’ conference on European Security held in Madrid, Spain. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko defends in his memoirs that the United States was taking advantage of that crash for their propaganda and orchestrated it at the meeting so that the NATO allies could follow the same policy.260 Secretary of State Shultz reflected in his speech that the Korean incident depicted absolute Soviet cynicism and germinated perils against the Western allies and the United States despite the insistence on decreasing arms level.261 He also unveiled the Reagan administration’s intention that planned deployments in selected European countries would occur unless an agreement was reached by the end of 1983.262 Against the speech by Shultz, which Gromyko classified as hostile, he underlined that, akin to other states’ rights, the Soviet Union also had a right to protect its borders and frontiers as a sovereign nation.263 Gromyko tried to divert the attention from the accident to the other topics in bilateral relations, mainly the arms race, by stating Korean airliner was exaggerated to be the first issue, but it was to forestall nuclear escalation.264 He then continued to put pressure on Shultz and reaffirmed Soviet determination to maintain its part of the mutual commitment to reduce arms escalation yet, forewarned that they would not doze against U.S. plans of new deployments, which would lead to frail peace because the Soviets would respond to such action.265
259 Lafeber, “The Two – or Three? – Phases of U.S.–Soviet Relations,” 28.
260 Gromyko, Memoirs, 297.
261 “Address by the Secretary of State Shultz Before the Concluding Session of the Madrid CSCE Conference,” September 9, 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 436.
262 Ibid., 436.
263 Gromyko, Memoirs, 298.
264 Ibid., 299.
265 Ibid., 300.
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4.4 Soviets Depart for Home
President Reagan understood that the world was on the brink of catastrophe and was in need of comprehensive arms control more than ever because the Soviet military, like in the case of the Korean airliner crash, could make a similar tragic mistake and trigger an unwanted nuclear strife.266 That’s why the administration did not forsake international rhetoric of commitment to peace bereft of high-level nuclear dependency for security purposes. He was in favor of retaining the American posture of good faith at arms control negotiations with minor changes in order to persuade the Soviets that this was the only way to a safer world, as they had also promised previously.267 Furthermore, the United States launched an updated concept for these talks, such as new regulations on global levels, more flexibility at negotiations, and reducing the number of Pershing II and ground-launched missiles.268 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, adumbrated that a new crisis with the U.S. was on the horizon, millions of Communist Party members were told that success in arms control negotiations was unlikely and they had to be prepared for ebbed affairs after American deployments in Europe that directly designated to intimidate the Soviet Union.269 The third actor in this diagram, NATO allies in Western Europe, had tried to remain entangled to American security support. Although there were disturbances regarding the concept, influence, and implementation of the SDI program, contrasting perspectives within governmental circles, and major public
266 Reagan, An American Life, 584.
267 “Address Before the 38th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York,” September 26, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1350.
268 Ibid., 1351.
269 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 64.
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protests to block deployments of Pershing II missiles, France, Britain, West Germany, and Italy still put emphasis on American guarantee under the nuclear umbrella of NATO.270 Smaller European nations, however, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, witnessed a rise of skepticism about the Reagan administration’s security and foreign policy, which decreased confidence and increased ambivalence in the collective security efforts.271 Nevertheless, through NATO initiatives, the Atlantic alliance decided to act in accordance with American program and asserted that the Soviet Union, since they did not terminate their build-up, which induced West to respond to that threat with necessary defense capabilities, had no precise motive to risk backbreaking progress on arms control efforts since the allies committed to reverse, modify and even reduce deployments for the sake of comprehensive agreement that would abate Soviet threat to their countries.272 President Reagan did not abstain from criticizing the Soviets that they constantly posed dangers to NATO countries by threatening Turkey that it could become a nuclear cemetery, and Baltic allies for igniting aggression, and intimidating West Germany that military escalation could rise after deployments.273 Hence, it showed that the United States, although promised not to leave the table, had also kept track of deterrence to defend Europe because there was no alternative to the two-pronged approach.274 Indeed, potential nuclear war scenarios germinated a military exercise called Able Archer to test command
270 Richard C. Eichenberg, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe: Consensus Lost? (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989), 56-58.
271 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 222-223.
272 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Montebello, Quebec, Canada. 27-28 October 1983.
273 “Radio Address to the Nation on Arms Control and Reduction,” October 22, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1497.
274 Ibid., 1498.
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structure and communication procedures among the allies if such war occurs.275 This exercise also included American participation at its full-scale capabilities targeting almost fifty thousand Soviet targets classified as military, industrial, and economical, and a Soviet response, it concluded, would bring the end of civilization.276 In order not to experience such a doomsday, the arms control negotiations were of utmost importance to every participant that showed the same will.
As for the negotiations, each side seemed to compromise but did not deviate from concerns. The U.S. delegation focused on limits on ICBMs, nearly all SS series of Soviets arsenal, yet, tried to omit over four thousand ALCMs that they wanted to maintain or even deploy later while the Soviet side promised to decrease launchers and bombers but attached it to rescinding deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs with limiting ranges of all cruise missiles.277 Although each side updated their proposals afterward, it made little impact on the future of negotiations since they did not compromise regarding their conditions. When Bundestag, West Germany’s federal parliament, voted to authorize deployments in national territories, the Soviets unilaterally terminated arms control negotiations and walked out of the table.278 There were various motives and reasons behind this action. First, the Soviets thought that the United States did not show profound willingness for an acceptable agreement on a joint basis and those stunned West Europeans could lead to reassessment by forcing their ally into a new far-
275 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 65.
276 Ibid., 65.
277 Steve Smith, “START, SDI, and Arms Control,” in Arms Control and European Security, ed. Graeme P. Auton (New York: Praeger, 1989), 43.
278 Smith and Wertman, US-West European Relations During the Reagan Years, 56.
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reaching agreement.279 Second, they tried to take advantage of anti-imperialist rhetoric delivered from Moscow to Western Europe and counted upon peace movements they endorsed which gathered thousands of people but began to evanesce after the deployment decision and mutual security mentality of Atlantic alliance.280 Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin explained that the Politburo had a task to intimidate Europeans through persuasion that the American decision would only serve for rising nuclear menace, and as a retaliation and maintaining military parity, the Soviets concurred to deploy INF missiles in Western parts of the country with other missiles to be deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.281 The Soviets, he goes on, also decided to reverse that order if NATO dismantled those missiles, yet, they knew that the West would not give acquiescence to such a recommendation and that order functioned to keep anti-imperialist public concerns intact.282 On the American side, Shultz explained that the logic behind the deployment decision was to put pressure on the Soviets so that they could consider pulling back their missiles targeting European allies.283 Secretary of Defense Weinberger tells that there were criticisms about the Soviet walkout at home and among the allies because the absence of experience of Reagan and his entourage led to discord with the Soviet position with the irony of demonstrations protesting the American missiles that defended the lives of all in Western Europe instead of Soviet SS-20s that profoundly threatened their way of lives.284 Major disappointment and minor
279 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 1026.
280 Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The Problem of the SS-20 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 139.
281 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 548.
282 Ibid., 549.
283 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 373.
284 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 345-346.
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surprise caught President Reagan in the aftermath of the Soviet decision since the emphasis on nuclear reductions became the top priority for every country, yet, he claimed that the Soviets could consider making a turn since that priority was the underlying premise of the quest for peace.285 Nonetheless, in order to maintain the image of a peacemaker, the United States did not opt to leave the negotiations286 since it could have pulverized the administration’s mentality and efforts that accumulated over nearly three years.
4.5 The Aftermath of Decision
The Soviet decision brought a new approach to nuclear debate in 1984. In fact, they did blame the United States for creating, in Soviet negotiator Kvitsinskiy’s words, delusional progress through equal reductions and zero option until the deployment of missiles in Europe.287 The Reagan administration continued to witness criticisms within the United States and from European allies by those who recommended agreeing upon Soviet offers and reverse deployments, but President Reagan, with some of his aides such as Nitze, thought that accepting Soviet demands would be a mistake since it would result in breaking security promises made for the sake of Atlantic alliance, acknowledging the existing nuclear imbalance that targeted Western Europe and ultimately justifying Soviet abandonment.288 That’s the reason
285 “Statement on Soviet Union Withdrawal From the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions,” November 23, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1624-1625.
286 “Interview With Marvin Stone and Joseph Fromm of U.S. News & World Report,” December 15, 1983, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1717.
287 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 397.
288 Reagan, An American Life, 590.
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why President Reagan did not take an approach akin to what the Soviets did. He exerted to maintain the rhetoric of two-pronged diplomacy to have a constructive and better rapprochement with the Soviet Union and to persuade that the war could only bring ruin and tragedy.289 He also firmly indicated that the United States would never shelve the negotiations because the desire for peace could prevail over differences, and each side could compromise for this goal.290 At the outset of 1984, the American strategy, in a nutshell, was to retain deterrence and diplomacy as a nexus, the cohesion within NATO, and remain prepared for any Soviet request of re-engagement.291 On February 9, 1984, the Soviets witnessed another funeral of leadership, Andropov passed away and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko. The new Soviet leader instantly accused the SDI programs since it would open space for militarization, yet, the Soviets had previously deployed more military satellites in outer space than the United States did, and they were the only nation with functional antisatellite systems.292 In his letter to President Reagan, Chernenko also pointed out the continuous opposition to U.S. deployments that were on track but also offered a new framework for dialogue that would serve for precise, realistic and acceptable proposals on a common ground to overcome nuclear threat.293 American intelligence reports indicated that the ascension of Chernenko showed he could prioritize personal diplomatic efforts, and it could be an incentive to
289 “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 40.
290 Ibid., 42.
291 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 467.
292 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 402.
293 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 81.
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ignite discussions that may lead the Soviets to get closer to a summit.294 Under such conditions, adherence to the principal idea of real arms reductions did not dwindle, and in fact, it went on a parallel track with the emphasis on military modernization as the American side evaluated that sticking with two paths concurrently would force them to consider coming back to the table.295 It was because of this policy that they were unable to prevent deployments in Europe and had to contend with growing responsibility since they were the ones that broke off negotiations.296 Furthermore, the approach that the Reagan administration pursued contained principles such as realism, nonaggression, strength and diplomacy as the ultimate platform that would set the standards for imminent re-engagement for a peaceful world if Chernenko and his new entourage wanted to possess similar intentions.297
Within the Atlantic alliance, European partners had opined differently from each other. The joint decisions remarked that the Soviet walkout induced a significant regret, continuation of Soviet deployments and development of new types of missiles simultaneously existed with the arms control process298 , and they sought to acquire superiority while NATO persevered for deterrence and détente299 unlike its exploited and vague implementation in the previous decade. On national levels, however, the
294 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Views on a Possible Summit Meeting,” 27 February 1984.
295 National Security Decision, Directive No: 137, The White House. “US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984,” 31 March 1984.
296 Ibid.,
297 “Address by President Reagan Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University,” April 6, 1984, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1987), 7-8.
298 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Çeşme, Turkey. 3-4 April 1984.
299 Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Washington. 29-30-31 May 1984.
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approaches were various. West Germany and Helmut Kohl believed that there could be a new opportunity with the new Soviet leadership because arms control process had been indispensable for European security.300 British Prime Minister Thatcher recommended to the Reagan administration to follow reconciliatory policies regarding manners on Eastern affairs, and despite harmful Soviet attitudes and decisions, new businesslike opportunities could occur if the Atlantic alliance earnestly accentuates dialogue.301 Other host country for American missiles, Italy, came up with a proposal similar to that of the Soviets to put pressure on the United States. Prime Minister Bettino Craxi suggested reversing deployments under the condition that the Soviets show a willingness to sit at the table again which President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz rejected in the letters to their counterparts.302 By mid-1984, Reagan and Chernenko kept on exchanging letters, yet, it was evident that it would not pave the way for concrete reorientation of bilateral affairs. However, in June 1984, the Soviets knocked on the door for a set of talks about the prevention of outer space militarization to commence in September, although the United States expected them to return for INF and START negotiations.303 This offer was derived from the fact that SDI continued to pose a threat to the very essence of Soviet defense and nuclear capabilities, and they would venture to eliminate it. Paul Nitze suggested that the Reagan administration could
300 “Remarks by President,” March 5, 1984, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 464-465.
301 Brian White, Britain, Détente, and Changing East-West Relations (London: Routledge, 1992), 146-147.
302 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 475.
303 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to The Congress on the FY 1986 Budget (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 60.
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utilize this proposal as a genesis for other discussions about INF and START.304 In August, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who had not visited the White House since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, began his efforts to reconstruct affairs through his request to meet President Reagan, and when Shultz informed the President, he immediately approved that prospective meeting.305 One of the reasons that Reagan also did not deviate from the emphasis on international peace and elimination of nuclear threat was the upcoming national elections to be held at the end of the year. Since he was adept at using his powerful rhetoric to influence American public, the perception of the Soviet Union was an impetus for reelection. Reagan’s SDI received a good response since sixty-nine percent of Americans thought that it was a good program.306 Approximately half of American society classified the Soviet Union as a foe, seventy-four percent was in profound mistrust that they would not comply with arms control agreement, sixty-three percent concurred with the President’s words about the Soviets – lying, cheating and stealing to pervade communism – and eighty-four percent believed that the Soviet Union constantly tests the U.S. to seek weakness.307 Simultaneously, nearly all Americans, ninety-six percent, confrontation with the Soviets could bring perils as a result of nuclear world, and eighty-five percent stated that war should not be a solution to current disputes.308 Reagan’s continuous criticism of the Soviets that affected the American public, along with an emphasis on regaining American defense, in former ambassador Matlock’s
304 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 402.
305 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 480.
306 Ronald H. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), 34.
307 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 95.
308 Ibid., 95.
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inference, were not relatively made for electoral concerns; instead, it was an attempt to install a base for global arms reduction that would persevere irrespective of whether he would get reelected or not.309 Indeed, this was the mentality of President Reagan and his administration because they did not stop seeking opportunities that would convince the Soviets that returning to the table, practically and realistically, was the only option they could commit to as the United States did not think to harm the Soviet Union.310
4.6 Endeavors for Reengagement
During the address at United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan invited the world for a new beginning on nuclear danger through which political mistrust and concerns had to be eradicated towards a peaceful and stable order.311 Additionally, he made an important offer to the Soviet side that two nations exchange guidelines for five-year military plans and experts for observations in respective military sites to be arranged until the spring of 1985.312 This move was made to show the Soviets that their concerns about the SDI had been a miscomprehension as it would not function in the way that they had imagined and articulated. Although the Soviet Union continued to develop and test new SS-23 missiles, which concerned European allies313 and the meeting with Gromyko was relatively irksome, not retreating from the quest for fulfilling agreement on a reciprocal basis was the central
309 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 78-79.
310 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on a Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,” September 11, 1984, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 1269.
311 “Address to the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York,” September 24, 1984, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 1360.
312 Ibid., 1360.
313 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Stresa, Italy. 11-12 October 1984.
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theme of the Reagan administration. President Reagan concurred with Gromyko’s argument that each side possessed “gigantic piles of nuclear arsenal” that threats international desire for a safer world and the President inferred that they would consider resuming negotiations yet he postponed it until the elections.314 Foreign Minister Gromyko delves into details of the meeting and remarks that the United States had triggered this race since the 1950s and President consistently underlined the necessity of American defense policies that were, in Gromyko’s words, contradictory to public statements about a nuclear-free world.315 President’s continuous attacks and pressures on the Soviet Union were insurmountable as the intention was to align the two nations’ nuclear policy on an agreement favoring the Americans.316 When Reagan and Gromyko privately talked after the meeting, the President mentioned his intention to bury mistrust between two nations which Gromyko also consented yet, Foreign Minister did propound Reagan’s previous harsh statements about his country, stating they had never designated to eradicate order and the way of life in the West unlike the President did such as his address at the British Parliament or the Evil Empire.317 What they differed was that on the one side, Gromyko wanted to have peaceful coexistence318 reminiscent of the previous decade in which Soviet military power prevailed, but on the other side, President’s aspiration was to acquire actual peace instead of détente through which the American leadership functions as a vanguard. Throughout the autumn of 1984, the American goal had been to create tangible progress in arms control and keep
314 Reagan, An American Life, 605.
315 Gromyko, Memoirs, 307.
316 Ibid., 307.
317 Ibid., 309.
318 Ibid., 309.
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the negotiations on track to keep the hopes of peace, which not only these two nations trying to achieve but rests responsibility on the entire world.319 The Soviet concerns on SDI and attaching the deadlock in negotiations to American deployments began to loosen when U.S. experts and bureaucrats explained that they had never considered arming the space yet, they saw that the Soviet solicitude, along with START and INF, could be discussed as the third part of negotiations and made a compromise.320 After his victory in the national elections held in November, Reagan reemphasized his main priority to pursue same goals for arms control. A few days later, Soviet leader Chernenko, knowing that they would be dealing with the same administration for the next four years, sent a letter to Reagan specifying that the Soviet Union was keen on continuing arms talks that promised real reductions and demilitarization of outer space.321 Five days later, National Security Advisor McFarlane announced that two nations agreed to commence negotiations with the goal of concluding reciprocally satisfactory agreements on these issues and two Foreign Ministers were scheduled to meet in January to discuss the agenda of imminent talks.322 It was a relief after a year of ambivalence on nuclear debate. Among the allies, this promised more cooperative East-West relations, which had been important for European nations.323 The Soviet concern about SDI became a major deterrence for the allies. For instance, at Camp David in December 1984, British PM Thatcher
319 “Statement by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adelman Before the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly,” October 25, 1984, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 119, 122.
320 Rowny, It Takes One to Tango, 158.
321 McFarlane, Special Trust, 291.
322 Ibid., 291.
323 “Joint Statement by President Reagan and West German Chancellor Kohl,” November 30, 1984, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 472.
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stated, by rejecting Reagan’s utopic vision of a nuclear-free world, that scientific research should not be neglected, SDI program would maintain balance considering Soviets developments, and achieving a peaceful and secure atmosphere rests upon the reduction of offensive nuclear systems.324 The endorsement from a powerful and ideologically close ally solidified SDI as an indispensable part of prospective negotiations despite the Soviet objections. Furthermore, Thatcher also mentioned Reagan about her encounter with Gorbachev, who was leading the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet legislature. According to her, Gorbachev seemed different than other Soviet politicians, showing signs of cooperation with the West, particularly in the field of arms control, and he was aware of the fact that precise results had to be attained out of negotiations.325 Thatcher only hoped that she was talking to Chernenko’s successor.
324 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 466-468.
325 Ibid., 461-463.
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CHAPTER V
HAPPY THANKSGIVING, COMRADES:
BREAKTHROUGHS IN GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK,
1985-1986
Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades, has the situation in the world been as explosive and hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 80s.
Mikhail Gorbachev
5.1 Conducting Nuclear Diplomacy and New Soviet Leadership
In January 1985, the scheduled meeting between Shultz and Gromyko, despite profound differences, as President Reagan called it, was an essential point in reorientating affairs within the scope of nuclear race and arms control.326 The outcome of resuming negotiations was progressive after a year of inertia. Furthermore, there were also alterations in leading figures of arms control delegations. Max Kampelman was appointed to lead defense and space negotiations, the newly added section per Soviet request, Maynard Glitman to replace Paul Nitze at the INF negotiations, and former Senator John Tower to replace Edward Rowny at the START.327 Glitman was a senior official at the State Department with over thirty years of service, and Tower, with his military background, had been representing Texas in the Senate as a Republican since 1961. This balance between the negotiators also depicts how government agencies, State and Defense, had exerted to be influential in
326 “The President’s News Conference,” January 9, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 23.
327 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 521.
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arms control talks as they seldom had discord. Tower explained that with this new team, the administration underlined the long-standing commitment with this opportunity and attributed political value to the objectives.328 In fact, the chief aim did not deviate and President Reagan explicitly reaffirmed that negotiations with the Soviet Union became vital because it would also serve the benefit of domestic politics by decreasing the need and cost of national security, which the administration consistently faced harsh criticisms of.329 Another critical component of American foreign and national security policy, SDI, retained its status as a military bulwark that, unlike Soviet claims of militarization of space, would assist in demilitarization of nuclear arsenals and Reagan elucidated this to American people so that their domestic support could reinforce their status at the resuscitated negotiations.330 The allies, although seldom showed objections and criticism against the Reagan administration, were delighted to hear the reopening of U.S. – USSR negotiations for security and cohesion within NATO, and some leaders, such as British PM Thatcher, considered this engagement as a driving force for a progressive dialogue for now and future.331 While the emphasis on a peaceful atmosphere was the Western goal, the reliance on deterrence as a component that brought the Soviets back to the table maintained its place in the Reagan administration’s policies. Prior to the official opening of negotiations, President addressed to Congress regarding
328 John Tower, Consequences: A Personal and Political Memoir (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1991), 255.
329 “Inaugural Address,” January 21, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 57.
330 Ibid., 57.
331 “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom,” February 20, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 187-188.
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the defensive program of MX missile that would again function as an indispensable part of arms control process and called members of Congress that this bipartisan act is a prerequisite for success in Geneva that could uphold the U.S. delegation team.332 Along with this anticipation for authorization, the administration felt that they needed effective persuasion on SDI that would expand the scope of credible deterrence vital for the security of the United States and its Western European allies.333 Although allies approached SDI with skepticism, they pragmatically gave acquiescence to the program because their scientific companies benefited and gained profits from research contracts that the Pentagon provided.334 Thus, in early 1985, the Reagan administration, from the outset, picked up the threads of nuclear diplomacy and security affairs with the Soviets and allies with a more resolute and avid attitude in order to accomplish a good deal which had been the foremost priority since 1981.
In March 1985, Soviet leadership again witnessed another demise with Chernenko’s death. Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz visited Moscow for Chernenko’s funeral, and they had an opportunity to meet new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss further routes. They offered Gorbachev a one-on-one summit with President Reagan which would, in their perspectives, might be an impulse for amelioration of superpower relations and progress in arms control talks.335 This was accepted by
332 “Message From President Reagan to the Congress,” March 4, 1985, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1985 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 40-41.
333 “Address by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs McFarlane Before the Overseas Writers Association,” March 7, 1985, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1985 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 49-50.
334 John Palmer, Europe Without America?: The Crisis in Atlantic Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 24.
335 Schweizer, Victory, 243.
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Gorbachev and he claimed that the Soviet leadership now does not have madmen that possess intentions to trigger relations with the United States, unlike previous decades where it did.336 Moreover, he asserted that he would prefer the language of diplomacy, not politics, and would work to get U.S. – USSR relations back to normal channel based on dialogue.337 These statements marked that after dealing with three Soviet leaders who did not employ proper approaches to arms control efforts, the new leadership in Kremlin could be tempted to follow similar goals akin to the Reagan administration, which would be supplemented by further deals and accords on this crucial topic. Indeed, in his first speech as the new leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev supported the idea that an agreement with honest intentions and an equal basis became the precondition of a cherished goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and threat of nuclear war.338 A few days later, Gorbachev publicized his intentions about a summit and simultaneously offered a freeze option for deployment of SS-20s until the end of 1985, which was instantly declined by the Reagan administration since it would grant a significant advantage in favor of the Soviet Union since they had deployed more than the United States did.339 Indeed, this showed how much the Soviets had violated previous arms control deals and justified that they did not terminate deployment of their missiles over the course of the first half of the 1980s while leaving negotiations owing to American deployments in the allied nations in Western Europe. Within a couple of days after Gorbachev’s
336 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 530.
337 Ibid., 532.
338 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Our Course Remains Unchanged: Peace and Progress, in Documents of the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, March 11, 1985 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985), 16-17.
339 Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 201.
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ascension, official diplomatic encounters commenced in Geneva. The Reagan administration granted flexibility to the negotiation stance of delegation teams, yet, the Soviet team continued to loiter talks because they were transferring offers that Moscow had delivered to them and remained within these boundaries.340 For instance, during the first round of START talks, the head of the Soviet delegation, Karpov recapitulated that deployments of Pershing II missiles and President’s stout commitment to SDI potentially altered strategic balance and implied until the Reagan administration withdrew those missiles and abandoned SDI, a new Soviet proposal would not be on the table.341 These initial impressions led to questioning of expected effectiveness of resumed talks; however, the presence of such a diplomatic environment and convincing the Soviets to get back to the table asserted American image was more dedicated to removing nuclear tensions than the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the aforementioned importance of deterrence strategy and the MX missiles program became a substantial benchmark not only for representing confidence and commitment to Western European allies but also for diverting Soviets from political propaganda and an unconstructive approach to responsibility and cooperation in negotiations342 as the only possible option to reduce nuclear tensions. The overall picture, in a nutshell, was to retain a peaceful setting in the West while trying to spur the
340 Max Kampelman, Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a Private Man in Public Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 302.
341 Tower, Consequences, 257-258.
342 “Remarks to Members of Congress During a White House Briefing on the MX Missile and the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” March 25, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 349.
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Soviets that their request and desire for peace also rested upon their willingness to partake in this enterprise.
5.2 Inclinations and Preparations for Summit
The new course of U.S. – USSR affairs had an impact on Western Europe. Although the remnants of anti-American notions did exist, the general phenomenon regarding this new rapport was that outcome would be in favor of the West. In his European tour, President Reagan wanted to see profound support from the allies for arms control talks and SDI343 program so that they could maintain four decades of peace they enjoyed by being part of the Atlantic alliance.344 The American stance had to accompany and assist European allies due to historical ties, principles that bind each nation, and desire to expand genuine peace worldwide, and this is why President Reagan stressed that American intentions were not designed to alter or harm the Soviet system, or pursue ex parte ambitions and advantages but to reach that goal.345 Despite these objectives, on the other hand, Reagan was not that adamant regarding a summit with a Soviet leader. National Security Advisor McFarlane told Shultz that President would not consider a summit outside the United States, an expression Shultz immediately disagreed with. He visited Reagan at the White House to dissuade from his decision by claiming that major possibilities on arms control and human rights became contingent
343 NATO allies did show endorsement to SDI as it increased effective defense mechanism within alliance and went in parallel with policy of deterrence. Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg. 26-27 March 1985.
344 “Toast at the State Dinner in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany,” May 5, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 569.
345 “Address to a Special Session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France,” May 8, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 586.
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upon a summit, thinking that some key officials in the administration who did not want the summit might have influenced him.346 After a comprehensive report prepared by Shultz and State Department that included the necessity of a summit in November and a meeting with Gromyko after the United Nations General Assembly, Reagan concurred with the plan.347 The influence of Shultz later prevailed in presidential statements and Reagan reaffirmed the necessity of a common approach to arms control deal because the United States could not succeed without the consent and presence of the Soviet Union, and vice versa.348 Intelligence reports concluded similar perspectives that Gorbachev realized the necessity for reconciliation with the United States, mainly on arms control, and sought to ease tensions in return for a summit with President Reagan despite the fact that he created a hardline image that insinuated policy alterations should come from the American administration.349 These inferences from bureaucratic circles in the United States stimulated President Reagan to get closer to his optimism of eliminating nuclear weapons, which had to be accompanied by the Soviet leadership. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met Shultz several times to convey the message to Moscow that the U.S. intention to have a summit was a genuine request yet repeated same concerns about SDI and its potential implementation.350 Correspondence among Gorbachev and Soviet officials took a few days for analysis, and on July 1, Ambassador
346 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 566.
347 Ibid., 566.
348 “Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance With Arms Control Agreements,” June 10, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 743-744.
349 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Gorbachev, the New Broom,” June 1985.
350 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 570.
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Dobrynin notified Shultz that the Soviet Union agreed upon a leaders summit between Gorbachev and Reagan to be held on November 19-20, 1985, with a clause of termination of SDI, not its modification.351 It became the first summit that leaders of superpowers met after six years of aloofness since the signing of SALT II in 1979. A few hours later, after this crucial decision, Gorbachev deposed Foreign Minister Gromyko and replaced him with Eduard Shevardnadze, who did not have experience in this field, and this appointment showed that the Soviets were, too, considering a new and flexible approach to relations with the United States devoid of traditional diplomatic thinking.352 McFarlane argued that Politburo used deployments of U.S. missiles and the walkout from the Geneva negotiations at the end of 1983 as a pretext to lay the basis of this bureaucratic shift.353 Nevertheless, this signaled a critical and positive diversion toward prospective November summit between the two leaders.
At the beginning of autumn, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviets were ready to reorient the course of arms control talks with serious proposals in Geneva, which the United States took in a serious manner because it would lay the basis of issues two nations had been eager to surmount.354 This was the same expectation of Gorbachev out of the Geneva Summit; to cultivate a fundamental structure for real dialogue in the upcoming years instead of looking for unilateral obtainments.355 Indeed, after the deployments and SDI
351 Ibid., 571.
352 Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 202.
353 McFarlane, Special Trust, 313.
354 “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s Interview With Time Magazine,” September 3, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1037.
355 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 403.
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program, it took more than a year for Soviets to realize that they had failed in their campaign of blocking those American initiatives yet, Gorbachev and his team would solely focus on SDI in accordance with ABM Treaty of 1972 that defined not to develop, test or deploy such systems356 in the upcoming Geneva Summit primarily to restrain the scope of it in return for agreeing reductions of strategic forces.357 The reason behind this was the Soviet belief that the Reagan administration was trying to regain superiority through adherence to SDI which would make the Soviet system obsolete and allow the U.S. to impose political statements on the Soviet Union.358 While such perceptions existed, Gorbachev, in his letter to Reagan, concurred to the point of eliminating nuclear threat by proposing a moratorium on nuclear tests and a fifty percent reduction.359 This corresponded to the American approach because they expected Soviets to come up with cooperative proposals, and this would make Geneva productive.360 After realizing that Gorbachev’s offers became congruous with the overall U.S. stance, Shultz recommended President that they had to put the greatest emphasis on Geneva since it could be the chance for the ultimate goal of peace, or at least starting point of that goal in the name of American people and allies.361 At the White House, not many people considered this summit of great value; some officials believed that this would only pave the way for defining problems and
356 Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 203.
357 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Gorbachev’s Prospective Course,” September 9, 1985.
358 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Moscow’s View of the Reagan Administration,” September 1985.
359 Reagan, An American Life, 626.
360 “Statement on the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” September 13, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1081.
361 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 575.
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groundwork, not finalizing a major agreement.362 President Reagan believed that it was going to be a gathering of two nations that could start and prevent such a nuclear war, and he preferred the latter.363 In his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, he underlined the absence of rationale not to move beyond boundaries that would brighten future on this matter because such responsibility was contingent upon the attitudes of two nations and leaders.364 Within this context, the United States was cognizant of vital allied support, and therefore, National Security Advisor McFarlane visited Britain and France to secure their commitment to this historic occasion and they repudiated Gorbachev’s offer of another set of negotiations that only included America’s Western European allies.365 In the aftermath of the United Nations General Assembly held on October 24, Reagan gathered four major European nations and leaders of Japan and Canada, and all allies were in full unity and cohesion with the American position in Geneva as Thatcher summed no discord or division between the United States and allies.366 It became, in a broader sense, a chance to diminish the feeling of need for arms and political suspicions between the West and Warsaw Pact nations. Although each side had been eager to retain its own systems despite others’ dislike and opposition, this would not be the underlying premise of nuclear threat
362 Larry Speakes with Robert Pack, Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 124.
363 “The President’s News Conference,” September 17, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1106.
364 “Radio Address to the Nation on the President’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union,” September 28, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1150.
365 McFarlane, Special Trust, 314.
366 Ibid., 314.
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because dissipating it became a duty for humanity.367 In preparations for the summit, McFarlane and Shultz visited Gorbachev in Moscow on November 2, and this is where disagreements over two separate visions occurred. McFarlane underscored that the most heated discussion evolved over SDI and their approach because Gorbachev retaliated that the Soviet Union could build, in response to SDI, additional offensive strategic systems.368 Yet, considering the financial burnout that the Soviets had been witnessing, Gorbachev’s opposition was levelheaded in a way to persuade that arms reduction that would not burden state expenditures was his actual goal to achieve. Shultz also suspected such intentions and reaffirmed Reagan’s desire to find a middle course despite the current state of unsatisfactory affairs so that upcoming progress on any topic or dispute would not be in a difficult manner.369 Although Gorbachev did have a positive response to this, he was preoccupied with his obsession with SDI and called it an illusion that the United States had been persevering with an idea to acquire superiority with technological advancements, violating the ABM treaty and thinking that the Soviet Union could not have an equivalent system to this.370 The debate was so intense that Gorbachev was not fulfilled after Shultz’s counterargument and accentuated that unless each side showed same commitment regarding non-militarization of space, there would be no fifty percent reductions or any convenient outcome out of the Geneva Summit.371 However, this approach would have cost the Soviets more than they imagined because President
367 “Interview With Brian Widlake of the British Broadcasting Corporation,” October 29, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1310.
368 McFarlane, Special Trust, 314.
369 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 590.
370 Ibid., 592.
371 Ibid., 593.
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Reagan, adept at public diplomacy and image, articulated that the Soviet Union came up with a proposal of fifty percent reductions372 which put pressure on them because turning back from this offer would cause ebbing of Soviet image throughout the world on arms reductions as a side that did not want an agreement. Expectations from ongoing negotiations amalgamated with relatively precise results achieved at this summit; Gorbachev indicated that they arrived in Geneva to solve the “acute problem of era” through felicitous proposals,373 while Reagan asserted to have reached a major consensus and breakthrough374 that would ultimately entail a mission for perpetual peace transcending existing Presidency by discarding mutual suspicions and mistrusts persisted for decades.375
5.3 The Meeting of Opposite Poles
After six years, the leaders of two superpowers, in the hopes of removing the biggest threat to humanity, met in Geneva on November 19, which became the fourteenth summit involving American and Soviet leaders since Tehran 1943.376 President Reagan usually advocated changing the course of summit, which had been maintained since the 1950s in which the actual work had been done by specialists and diplomats in line with the summit’s theme, to the one-on-one meeting with the Soviet leader he had
372 “Radio Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” November 2, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1330.
373 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 405.
374 “Address by President Reagan,” November 9, 1985, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1985 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 421.
375 “Address to the Nation on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva,” November 14, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1388.
376 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 140.
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always dreamed about because the absence of authority hindered the actual development in relations.377 He now had the chance to meet, in a sense, an unusual Soviet leader in order to reach objectives that became international goals and that each nation could give acquiescence to. However, the objectives were variable for each leader. Gorbachev was carrying the burden of staggering Soviet economy and promised to launch modernization so that they could compete with the U.S. and other major economic powers, and this required a stable and nonaggressive strategy toward the United States.378 Moreover, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury between 1981 and February 1985 and then White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan argued similarly that the Soviets were spending approximately one-fifth of their GNPs on defense expenditures while the United States maintained that between six and seven percent despite major initiatives, namely SDI.379 Yet, Gorbachev, different from his predecessors, would not consent to any agreement easily and would maintain his objections derived from different interpretations, particularly SDI, as it concerned the Soviets profoundly.380 On the other side, Reagan’s goals were to create personal diplomacy with the Soviet leader, to attain commitment to continuation of arms talks, and to determine outlines of upcoming summit381 and this indicated his intention to get along with Gorbachev by persuading him to follow only option was to reduce, not exacerbate, tensions through an agreement. During the summit, a previously
377 Reagan, An American Life, 634.
378 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Gorbachev’s Position on The Eve of The Summit,” date classified.
379 Donald T. Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 296.
380 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Gorbachev’s Position on The Eve of The Summit,” date classified.
381 Regan, For the Record, 304.
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made Soviet proposal about fifty percent reductions was accepted, and the status of INF missiles, primarily Soviet concern on British and French arsenal, was discussed382, yet, the debate about SDI revealed the core discord on arms control based on different explications of previous nuclear deals. Reagan and his aides believed that SDI could be a proper response to nuclear menace, while Gorbachev classified it as another catastrophe for humanity.383 On the issue, Reagan was trying to persuade his counterpart that fears caused by SDI were irrelevant because it was compatible with ABM Treaty, would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union, would take time to receive practical results on its implementation, and promised to share laboratory and technological facilities with the Soviets once it’s functional.384 Gorbachev, on the other hand, was not satisfied with such an approach as for him, SDI depicted Americans’ distrust and skepticism in nuclear field and it was another form for the prolongation of arms race by including space which the Soviets opposed.385 SDI proved to be a point of disagreement among the leaders. The Soviet side was in search of loopholes and maneuvers that would dissuade the President’s mind but the American side undergirded their stance by raising Soviet ambiguity that they classified SDI as an offensive system and blamed the United States for violating the ABM Treaty, which solely pertains to defensive systems.386
On the second day, after discussions on human rights and other issues, the intense debated evolved around SDI again. Reagan team was in firm
382 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 145.
383 Kenneth L. Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summitry-A Skeptic's Account (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 143.
384 Reagan, An American Life, 636-637.
385 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 407.
386 Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace, 145.
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belief that any retreat from SDI would principally mean turning back to former status in which the Soviets consistently expand their capabilities while the U.S. would lose its gains to be used in diplomatic manners. For Gorbachev, SDI was a source of mistrust the Americans had that the Soviets would eventually attack the United States solely with their nuclear arsenals, and it was implausible that they would show willingness on scientific exchange as they did not even share it with allies in Western Europe.387 Reagan’s response underlined SDI as research program, not a tool to wage war; it was necessary to have that project against rival’s massive arsenal even after fifty percent reductions, and in a nutshell, it was a shield, not a spear.388 The entire debate being in vain, the Geneva Summit was substantial in a sense that each side acknowledged the responsibility of nuclear war that must never be fought,389 not to seek superiority over the others, to implement fifty percent reductions, and continue negotiations in 1986.390 Moreover, such an outcome was satisfactory for the allies as well, and they addressed the willingness to impending reversion or modification of deployments under the condition of reaching an agreement on a verifiable and equitable basis and of continuation of leaders’ determination in advancing affairs through nuclear diplomacy.391 Perhaps the most salient result of the Geneva Summit was the establishment of nascent rapport among the leaders. Reagan forthrightly told his aides that he liked Gorbachev as someone with whom to work within the
387 Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 205.
388 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 148.
389 Reagan, An American Life, 629.
390 “Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva,” November 21, 1985, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1408.
391 Final Communique - DPC in Ministerial Session. 3 December 1985 and Final Communique - NAC Meeting in Ministerial Session in Brussels. 12-13 December 1985.
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next years,392 echoing what Thatcher had observed a year ago. Although Gorbachev stated that trust could not be established in a day, he was relatively convinced by Reagan’s promises assuring what the Soviets chafed at in arms control debate and summed that despite disagreements, mainly SDI, the bottom line was a breakthrough after Geneva.393
5.4 Keeping the Momentum Upward
Geneva Summit of 1985 became the cornerstone of late Cold War affairs within the context of nuclear disarmament because it was a genesis of rapprochement in the critical times when nuclear disquietude accumulated and reached a paramount owing to vagueness and discord that captured international relations. Hopes for 1986 had been restored toward peace because Reagan and Gorbachev showed their assent through which two superpowers constitute an atmosphere so that future generations would not have to contend with the burden and reemergence of this jeopardy.394 Furthermore, both American and Soviet delegations debating on INF, START, and space issues continued their work immediately in closer consultation since they wanted to advance what had been achieved in Geneva, such as a fifty percent reduction and decreasing INF missiles, but also to find options to persuade the other on the critical issue of SDI and eventually that bargaining would avail in the long run.395 In January, new proposals arrived from the Kremlin in which Gorbachev, in addition to a fifty
392 Kampelman, Entering New Worlds, 324.
393 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 411.
394 “New Year’s Messages of President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev,” January 1, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 1-2.
395 “Statement on the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” January 15, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 50.
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percent decrease, offered to extinguish medium-range missiles akin to what Reagan proposed four years ago and to omit the missiles of France and Britain from the INF negotiations.396 This was an attempt to steer the Soviet route in line with changing dynamics and reforms within Gorbachev’s reign, and one of the critical underlying premises of this revised update was economic concerns. Alexander Bessmertnykh, a deputy foreign minister at that time, argued that in the aftermath of Geneva, Gorbachev became cognizant of pressures derived from arms race, and since he wanted to focus on his reforms, such a continuation of that race would be an impediment for the reforms and their future in the country.397 Due to this, his January offer became a turning point in the course of nuclear race of the Cold War and raised expectations that an accord which each nation would sign on this critical disagreement might occur. Secretary Shultz recommended President Reagan not to rebuff the proposal since it included Soviet intentions to comply with the zero option and other points that the administration had contrived over the course of five years.398 However, there were dissidents within the administration, such as Peter Rodman and Richard Perle , mainly from State and Defense departments, stating that the presence of nuclear weapons had been vital to peace Europe enjoyed for four decades, and these weapons defended Europe against the Soviets’ conventional threat because they would be the biggest conventional military in the absence of nuclear race.399 The former head of the ACDA, Eugene Rostow, opposed turning back to the zero option after Gorbachev’s proposal by claiming that eliminating
396 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 156.
397 Schweizer, Victory, 246.
398 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 700.
399 Ibid., 701, 704.
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American INF weapons in Europe and Asia, mainly in Japan, would lead to an augmented vulnerability against Soviets’ nuclear intimidation.400 Secretary of Defense Weinberger was keen on pursuing increased spending through Congress that in order to maintain policies, successful and strong defense was required to possess, tacitly giving the notion that the administration should not recede efforts made previously through MX and other programs despite desirable Soviet proposals.401 Preoccupied with how to proceed further, President Reagan responded to Gorbachev’s offer by welcoming his request for the elimination of INF missiles under the condition that the Soviets also would dismantle their missiles stationed in the Asian continent, not only the ones in Europe, by 1990.402 This was a result of American concern from 1985 when the Soviet Union deployed new offensive SS-25 missile systems to accompany their political rivalry against the West, and if it continued at this pace, they would have more advanced nuclear and strategic weapons by the first half of the 1990s.403 Furthermore, President Reagan had no intention to give up on accumulated efforts on the defense side because it constitutes the backbone of America’s liberty and worldwide peace that brings freedom.404
400 Eugene V. Rostow, A Breakfast for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), 426.
401 “Prepared Statement by the Secretary of Defense Weinberger,” February 5, 1986, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1987), 27.
402 “Statement on the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” February 24, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 248.
403 “Preface by the Secretary of Defense Weinberger to “Soviet Military Power”,” March 1986, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1987), 34.
404 “Statement by the President at Camp David, Maryland,” March 1, 1986, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1987), 36.
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After Reagan’s reply, Secretary Shultz, Paul Nitze, and head of U.S. delegation Max Kampelman evaluated the setting and agreed that until the Soviet Union decided to remove the entire section of their INF missiles, the United States would maintain their missiles located in Europe and if they considered acknowledging American request of verification, it would grant monitoring the Soviet actions more conveniently.405 The American perspective altered profoundly after Geneva as they considered Gorbachev as a man that could change the Soviet system in a way Americans had always wanted, which was approaching toward an agreement on a mutual base and principles.406 In order not to forsake this opportunity, the Reagan administration, as a result of aspirations for peace, added to the fifth round of negotiations the reciprocal opening of research laboratories and facilities to experts in order to swap scientific information, which became more critical in the light of recent progress in affairs.407 It was, in fact, a message to the Soviets that SDI would not be a strategic blackmail but instead would be a policy each nation could facilitate. After this offer, the Soviets approached more one step with their counter-proposals during START talks that they would cut reduce nuclear warheads to eight thousand and abandoned insistent opposition to SDI under the condition that its research would remain strictly to the laboratory.408 Although the second offer was classified as nonnegotiable, their packages, according to Shultz, appeared to become more precise and promising.409 It was a sign that the Soviets became ready to
405 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 709.
406 Ibid., 711.
407 “Statement on the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations,” May 7, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 571.
408 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 718.
409 Ibid., 718.
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bargain by getting closer to earlier guidelines that the Reagan administration and Atlantic Alliance had set forth, such as verification, reduction of missiles, and conventional forces on the European continent.410 On June 19, President Reagan announced that the Soviet delegation came up to ongoing negotiations with sincere proposals, and although these still required alterations, seeing the Soviets making similar efforts would entail a pivotal debate that could be a “turning point” in arms race.411 Moreover, Reagan reiterated his desire to have another summit with concrete offers by the end of 1986 since, during the Geneva Summit, two nations agreed to have it in Washington in 1986 and Moscow in the following year.412 He, thus, had to endorse his good intentions with proper style. In his letter, Reagan proposed to discard the entire arsenal of ballistic missiles, to proceed with researches about defense programs that were designated to be shared after the first goal was achieved, and to abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty by limiting research, tests and other procedures in line with what treaty allows.413 It was sent for the purpose of retaining a persevering approach of “good faith” during talks without compromising SDI and its research output.414 Gorbachev considered this as a move to maintain dialogue that was fabricated, yet, he was aware of the fact that the Americans knew faltering aspects of the Soviet Union, mainly the economy, and they would force him to propound offers
410 Statement on The Ministerial Meeting of The NAC at Halifax, Canada. 29-30 May 1986.
411 “Remarks at the High School Commencement Exercises in Glassboro, New Jersey,” June 19, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 809-810.
412 “Interview With Bruce Drake of the New York Daily News,” July 8, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 933.
413 Reagan, An American Life, 665.
414 “Remarks at a White House Briefing for Republican Student Interns on Soviet-United States Relations,” July 29, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 1019.
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that could correspond to the Reagan administration’s goals in the next summit.415 Nevertheless, maintaining nascent and evolving Soviet perception preponderated over traditional mistrust toward the United States and consequently, Gorbachev addressed that the Soviet Union decided to extend a moratorium on nuclear tests despite military opposition in order not to be confined to theocratic proposals but to take practical actions.416 On September 15, Gorbachev sent a letter that contained multiple criticisms against American policies, but towards the end, rhetoric softened, and Gorbachev suggested having a private personal meeting with President Reagan with the participation of foreign ministers to settle issues he mentioned, mainly arms control, in London or Iceland.417 Reagan preferred Iceland to keep the meeting quiet and unpretentious without the involvement of the Queen and Prime Minister Thatcher.418
5.5 Genesis in Reykjavik: The Roller-Coaster Parley
On September 22, at the Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm with 35 nations from Western and Eastern blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a congruence that risks of abrupt attack in Europe had to be shunned.419 This decision reinforced the idea that the precise and detailed arrangement of the second meeting in Iceland would contribute to the progress in arms control.
415 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 414-415.
416 Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 211.
417 Ken Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War (New York: Broadside Books, 2014), 38-39.
418 Ibid., 39.
419 “Statement on the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,” September 22, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 1233-1234. Also see John Van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, 236.
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The American expectations remained to be nearly the same; arms control being the top priority, followed by regional and bilateral problems, and finally, human rights concerns.420 The place of Reykjavik would be vital for Atlantic Alliance, too. Prior to the summit, Secretary Shultz and Paul Nitze flew to Brussels to give briefings to allied ministers, where they witnessed a considerable amount of criticism owing to the American stance to which Gorbachev would not get closer, and ministers requested more flexibility from the United States in Reykjavik and other impending meetings.421 In Moscow, Gorbachev describes that most people at Politburo were in favor of a summit in Reykjavik that would give the impression that the Soviet Union was also trying to avert another phase of arms race, yet, some at the Foreign Ministry and some from the military opposed to such progress considering their traditional enmity that had stimulated and preserved their lucrative business interests while Geneva negotiators who gained huge salaries through futile debates sought to prolong that process.422 Nonetheless, despite these divergencies, Gorbachev also wanted to exercise public relations by intentionally leaking inside information that the Soviets expected a real breakthrough in halting arms race in order to ponder that the post-summit setting would be less confrontational towards them.423 However, in reality, their awareness was prudent, knowing Reykjavik would be a great chance. Indeed, Anatoly Chernyaev, who became one of the foreign policy advisors to Gorbachev in March 1986, remarked a week before the trip to Reykjavik that
420 “Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Remarks by the President on Soviet-United States Relations,” September 30, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 1295.
421 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 755.
422 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 415-416.
423 Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik, 73-74.
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a failure might cause another arms confrontation in which the Soviets would eventually lose since they had already reached their limits and capabilities.424 In a nutshell, each side set their priorities and agendas before departure to Iceland’s capital; Reagan wanted to uphold SDI and eliminate nuclear weapons, and Gorbachev wanted to uphold Soviet economy and eliminate SDI.425
The second summit began on October 11, 1986, at Hofdi House in Reykjavik with two leaders and foreign ministers. Gorbachev readdressed Reagan’s zero option with modifications that included both nations would withdraw their missiles from Europe, renouncing including British and French INF missiles from debate by portraying it as a concession, and research and tests on space-related issues would be restrained to the laboratory.426 According to Gorbachev, the Americans, notably President Reagan, did not expect such thorough offers, they thought that the proposals might be fraudulent, yet the presence of Secretary Shultz convinced Reagan that Soviet proposals could be acceptable.427 President Reagan wanted to adhere to SDI, stressed its goal of eliminating missiles, and once it reached proper results, the United States would share details with the Soviet Union, which Gorbachev did not believe in.428 According to the director of ACDA, Ken Adelman, by the time of the Reykjavik Summit, SDI was nothing but became a “presidential aspiration,” yet, it occupied a significant portion of arms control talks owing to continued opposition of Soviet leadership, which
424 Ibid., 75.
425 Ibid., 77-78.
426 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 758-759.
427 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 417.
428 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 761.
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justified SDI’s importance against its dissidents.429 Although SDI was a stalemate, there was progress on other issues. About INF missiles, Reagan wanted to limit the Soviets’ missiles stationed in Asia to 100 to equate the right of the United States to deploy them in their national territories, the appropriate one being Alaska, which would also remove approximately ninety percent of Soviet INF missiles from Europe, appeasing European concerns on nuclear risks while undergirding American commitment to Atlantic partnership.430 Moreover, when President Reagan remarked that the United States could not remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe since they became the backbone of deterrence policy that NATO follows in case of an invasion from Warsaw Pact nations that possessed larger conventional forces, Gorbachev offered major reductions in those forces, a gain the Reagan team did not expect to acquire in Reykjavik.431 Nonetheless, the debate was heated when SDI became the central theme. Reagan did not want to renounce SDI because it was a non-nuclear defensive system research program that did not create any jeopardy.432 Gorbachev, on the contrary, analyzed that the United States would use SDI for their tests without guidelines and restrictions despite the Soviet offer of confining it to a laboratory environment and the President’s insistence on SDI was the sole reason that Reykjavik did not constitute achievement or agreement on arms control.433 Indeed, that insistence was the leverage for the Reagan administration to further the process and the promise that Reagan gave to the American people that he would not surrender, while Gorbachev’s venture was to make concessions so
429 Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik, 109.
430 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 765-767.
431 Reagan, An American Life, 677.
432 Ibid., 677.
433 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 418.
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that he could stifle SDI.434 Ultimately, this was the point where the summit broke off and ended with significant signs of progress and one discord.
In the aftermath of Reykjavik, although President Reagan became ambivalent regarding the future of negotiations with Gorbachev because, for him, the absence of agreement was better than a bad agreement, he indicated pressure for the same goal of peace and to remain hopeful for future progress on this issue.435 Moreover, he clarified that the two nations were on the verge of making a historic agreement that would eradicate the threat in ten years, but snafu on SDI made it unattainable.436 Indeed, each side embraced Reykjavik with great importance. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted that owing to mistrust and unpredictability of intentions that captured East and West for years, progress made in Reykjavik was portrayed as a failure, although the two superpowers almost reached an agreement that would completely alter the course of the Cold War.437 For Gorbachev, Reykjavik successfully passed the test that a mutual agreement could be possible so long as the new Soviet leadership, with all its components, sought authentic disarmament, not propaganda that would hamper and prolong the progress.438 Secretary Shultz’s conclusion was that the context and extent of the summit were momentous, and despite specific disagreements, there were many areas two leaders were able to meet a common ground which made
434 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 773.
435 “Address to the Nation on the Meetings With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland,” October 13, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 1370.
436 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Broadcast Journalists on the Meetings in Iceland With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev,” October 14, 1986, in Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986. Book II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 1376.
437 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1991), 88-89.
438 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 420.
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Reykjavik the most salient American-Soviet meeting ever.439 Secretary Weinberger, who was not that eager to have reconcilement like Shultz, underlined that although there was great endorsement among NATO allies for President Reagan in Iceland, the outcome showed that policy of deterrence had to function unless a verifiable agreement was reached, which would diminish dependence on deterrence440 because the Soviets continued to invest in and upgrade their nuclear forces and strategic anti-missile systems.441 For Adelman, the overall theme in Reykjavik made two leaders realize that responsibility and determination to change the course of arms race and nuclear proliferation rested upon them.442
439 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 776.
440 “Interview With the Secretary of Defense Weinberger,” October 23, 1986, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1987), 98.
441 Final Communique - NPG Ministerial Meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland. 21-22 October 1986.
442 Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik, 153.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The nuclear race had been the major component of the Cold War. It incrementally determined the conduct of foreign relations beginning with the 1950s and onwards, and it placed itself as a determinant in superpower relations. During the nascent era of the Cold War, the United States became dominant in nuclear progress with new initiatives, programs, and developments against its foe, the Soviet Union, and had to contend with multiple crises that stemmed from nuclear confrontation. Moreover, the American commitment to the nuclear umbrella, as the leading power of Atlantic partnership since the 1950s, secured a peaceful setting in Western Europe despite the presence of threats posed by the Soviet Union. The accumulated concerns regarding arms race in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis led the two nations to set the standards for less hostile affairs, which paved the way for détente in the following decade. During the 1970s, indeed, détente proved to be a vital bulwark for allies in Western Europe because it diverted Cold War confrontation to other regions, and also it allowed the Soviet Union to focus on their nuclear capabilities to catch and even exceed the United States. Important treaties of SALT I and ABM contributed to the peaceful coexistence process, yet they were inadequate to prevent the Soviet Union from developing and expanding their nuclear arsenals throughout the decade despite the guidelines and restrictions concurred with the treaties. However, the Soviets exploited détente through loopholes in the agreements and commitment to allies’ relatively comfortable position fettered the American administrations. Owing to this, the United
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States witnessed significant holdback, a pendulum of whether to adhere to the principles of détente or launch military retaliation through scientific developments to contain the Soviets.
Arms control became more complicated after 1977 when the Soviets deployed their SS-20 missiles that threatened the West, mainly Europe, and it turned out to be a critical threshold for the future and direction of this confrontation. The efforts to restrain the unbridled Soviet tendency that expands their nuclear capabilities was the underlying premise of SALT II, which remained to be unsatisfactory diplomatic accord due to the Soviets’ ideological expansion throughout the world and became a vain agreement after the invasion of Afghanistan. Although this exacerbated tensions and led the Carter administration to focus on defense and security more than ever, it was inadequate to halt Soviet commitment to nuclear progress that would reshape the race in the 1980s.
When Ronald Reagan assumed office, his primary goals in foreign and security policy were to leave failures of the previous decade behind, mainly détente and military degringolade, and to reinvigorate and restore American position in world affairs. Arms reductions were a major part of, indeed President’s priority, initial goals that the administration had set forth; containing the Soviet Union and expanding the scope of America’s alliances for endorsement in nuclear diplomacy. Although the Reagan administration was opposed to détente, instead of shelving it, they upgraded it to the concept of peace because they were aware of the fact that allies in Western Europe benefited from détente, and this diverted confrontations into other parts of the world. Since the Reagan administration needed support, they remained
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committed to the principles of Atlantic partnership under the nuclear umbrella and deterrence policies. They also, as promised during the campaigns, were emphasizing to enhance neglected American military and defense systems so that they could vie against the Soviet Union that was seeking superiority in the arms race. Rather than escalating tensions, Reagan and his aides wanted to opt for dialogue as a way to restrict the constantly-improving Soviet defense, which would also satisfy the requests of Western European allies and would decrease the effects of anti-nuclear movements in Europe.
In his first year in office, President offered re-engagement with the offer of zero option. This paved the way for opening negotiations with the Soviet Union and, later, constituted a series of INF and START negotiations. The existence of such efforts gave the idea that the United States sincerely searched for enduring peace by eliminating the threat of nuclear war, which Reagan strictly sought. In November 1982, the United States laid the basis of impending policies and approach in arms race that two parallel paths of deterrence and dialogue are prerequisites for perpetual peace bereft of fears of nuclear devastation. Although the central objective remained to be this, constant Soviet adding to their capabilities germinated the notion that they would not strive for similar objectives and negotiations would not yield constructive results. The course of arms race altered when Reagan announced Strategic Defense Initiative, and it alarmed the Soviets and allies that the United States would spark another phase of conflict that contradicted earlier intentions and statements. Given the constant emphasis on defense programs such as MX Peacekeeper, and planned deployments of Pershing II
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missiles in Europe, the reactions were not outlandish. The disharmony and imprecision of negotiations contributed to the progress and concerned the Soviets, who attached the continuation of negotiations to reverse the deployment of Pershing II missiles, yet, for the United States, this was done for the purpose of removing Soviet missiles targeting Europe within the scope of deterrence. The deadlock led the Soviets to leave the table.
Although relations on arms control became abruptly equivocal, channels of re-engagement remained to be open for President Reagan contingent upon similar Soviet intentions with new leader Chernenko. Most diplomats and bureaucrats favored pressuring for talks to find common ground. It was also necessary for the Reagan administration to favor peace and diplomacy since 1984 was the election year. When Chernenko and Reagan exchanged letters that two nations could reorient the state of affairs, each side discussed expectations and concerns regarding the future of arms control. Gromyko had a meeting with Reagan to articulate these, and President did the same. When Reagan was reelected in November, the realization that dialogue had to persevere prevailed over previous disagreements because the Soviets realized they would contend with the same group of people in the next four years.
1985 began with hopes for realist progress for arms control and peace. INF and START debates were to be accompanied by space talks as the Soviets abstained from SDI and wanted to eliminate it. Yet, the central change came due to new Soviet leadership with Gorbachev, who was aware of domestic problems, was willing to reshape the Soviet system, and favored personal correspondence with President Reagan. Moreover, the Soviets were coming
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up with concrete proposals that would make the Reagan administration substantially give consent so that the seriousness could be delivered. The exhausting diplomatic traffic resulted in Geneva Summit that gladdened every nation which supported prospects for agreement on arms race. With proper progress in diminishing nuclear arsenals, it showed that two superpowers had more in common in diplomacy than confrontation. Although two parties did not agree on every issue, mainly SDI, it was a moment of realization that the only option to eliminate nuclear threat was to acquire a proper and binding agreement through reconciliation. The next year followed the same pattern, with delegations continuing their talks while leaders exchanged proposals that were contributing to the process. Each side had its own cards to play with one significant difference; Gorbachev was feeling the burden of the staggering Soviet economy which fueled nuclear developments for years, but it had to be recovered for promised reforms. When two nations gathered in Reykjavik at the invitation of Gorbachev, arms control was improved one step more, with SDI being the only snafu. Yet, after Reykjavik Summit, each leader and most bureaucrats in both countries approached the idea that mutually equal agreement was possible.
The 1980s showed that the Cold War rivalry brought the world to the edge of nuclear catastrophe, which placed a determinant in international affairs. What Reagan and his aides had done initially was to react and oppose former and ongoing policies that were unable to contend with the Soviets, whose nuclear power increased profoundly, and America’s emphasis on military and defense structure declined owing to the implementation of détente which the world needed and also allies in Western Europe benefited
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from. Although the Reagan presidency did not, as a whole, follow a similar pattern of peaceful order such as the examples of Grenada or Iran – Contra Affair, their single concern of nuclear threat was adequate to anticipate that its eradication had been an arduous goal to achieve. Ultimately, the course of two-pronged diplomacy that the Reagan administration employed became a successful policy that kept the allies in Western Europe away from the Soviet nuclear threat while forcing the Soviet political clique that arms control agreement was the only selection to this backbreaking and everlasting nuclear race. Through this, the administration achieved that deterrence had to remain as a commitment under the guidelines of NATO while paving the way for dialogue had to remain as a top priority so that the ultimate goal of peace could be reached.
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