371

 i
TOBACCO SMUGGLING IN THE BLACK-SEA REGION OF THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE 1883-1914

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in
Discipline.
Examining Committee Members:
Prof. Engin Deniz Akarlı ____________________________
(Thesis Advisor)
Assoc. Prof. Abdülhamit Kırmızı ____________________________
Assist. Prof. Filiz Dığıroğlu ____________________________
This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate
School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Istanbul Sehir University:
Date Seal/Signature
iv
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that,
as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material
and results that are not original to this work
First Name, Last Name:
Signature:
v
ABSTRACT
TOBACCO SMUGGLING IN THE BLACK-SEA REGION
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1883-1914
BATMAN, MUSTAFA.
MA, Department of History
Advisor: Prof. Engin Deniz Akarlı
August 2013, 107 pages
This study aims at introducing the tobacco smugglers after the foundation of the
Régie Company. It examines the changes in the tobacco sector after 1883 and
researches the relationship between the increase of smuggling and the Régie
Company.
Ottoman tobacco producers faced a new company, which controlled their
mainstay crop in 1883. The Régie Company was a well-organized administration
controlling the revenues from tobacco. The company also had its own security force
namely kolcu. Kolcus were the keystone to the company’s success to control tobacco
cultivation and gain more money. Tobacco producers and merchants who had
problems with this new system created their own responses. As one of those
responses, number of tobacco smugglers rapidly increased. Many people from
different areas of the economy attended to the smugglers to make more money. In
addition, many farmers were forced into smuggling because of the Régie’s
maltreatment toward them.
The Ottoman government also tried to fix the problems between the company
and the people in tobacco sector, but it did not develop new ideas to change the
situation. The government defined smuggling in a different manner from the
company. While the government accepted the professional tobacco traders who sold
their crops illegally as smugglers, the company designated as smugglers those who
cultivated tobacco without licenses, people who minced tobacco in their homevi
factories, people who sold equipments for home-factories, and people who trafficked
contraband.
Under such a contradictory definition, the Ottoman government did not find a
compromise. The government also did not create a new alternative administration
because of the agreements between the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and the
State. It also used the company as a monetary source and took advances if there were
fiscal problems. The Régie Company continued to control the Ottoman tobacco
sector from 1883 until 1925.
Keywords: Smuggling, The Régie Company, Ottoman Empire.
vii
ÖZ
OSMANLI DEVLETI'NDE KARADENIZ BÖLGESI'NDE
TÜTÜN KAÇAKÇILIĞI 1883-1914
BATMAN, MUSTAFA.
MA, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Deniz Akarlı
Ağustos 2013, 107 sayfa
Bu çalışmanın amacı Reji şirketinin kuruluşundan sonra artan tütün kaçakçılığını
tanımlamaktır. Bu tanımlama için Reji Şirketinin kuruluşundan sonra tütün
sektöründe ortata çıkan değişikliklere ve bu bağlamda artan kaçakçılık ile Reji
şirketinin ilişkisine değinilecektir.
Osmanlı tütün üreticileri 1883 yılında kendi yaşam alanlarını denetleyen bir
yapı ile karşılaştılar. Reji şirketi iyi örgütlenmiş yapısıyla tütün üretiminin ve
ticaretinin belirli kurallar çerçevesinde yapılmasını sağlamaya çalıştı. Şirket ayrıca
tütün üretimi ve ticareti üzerinde etkin denetim sağlamak için kolcu olarak bilinen
silahlı güvenlik güçlerine sahipti. Kolcular şirketin başarısının arkasındaki en önemli
etkenlerden biriydi. Sektörde ki değişikliklerden olumsuz etkilenen, üretici ve tüccar
alternatif yapılanmalar içerisine girerek tütün sektöründe var olmaya devam etti.
Alternatif yapılanmaların bir örneği olarak, ‘kaçakçılık’ bu dönemde oldukça
popüler hale geldi. Farklı toplumsal gruplar daha fazla kazanç elde etmek veya
Reji’nin onları sektör dışına itmesinden dolayı doğrudan kaçakçılığa yöneldi veyahut
kaçakçı olarak kabul edilen toplumsal gruplarla işbirliğine gitti.
Osmanlı hükümeti bu problemi çözmek istese de Reji ile tütün sektörünün
paydaşları arasında bir orta yol bulamadı. Bunun en temel nedeni hükümet ile
Reji’nin kaçakçılık tanımının farklı olmasıydı. Osmanlı Devleti’ne gore, kaçakçılık
şehirler arasında izinsiz ve silahlı şekilde dolaşarak hem güvenlik zaafiyetine neden
olan hem de kaçak ticaret yapan gruplar için kullanılmalıyken, Reji şirketi, izinsiz
viii
üretim yapan çiftçiden, izinsiz satış yapan tüccara kadar bir çok üreticiyi ve tüccarı
kaçakçı olarak kabul etmekte ve Osmanlı hükümeti buna açıkça karşı çıkmaktaydı.
Hükümet, güvenlik zaafiyetine ve bazen de ölümlere neden olan bu grupları ayrıca
eşkiya olarak kabul ederken, Reji şirketi kaçakçı olarak kabul ettiği tüm toplumsal
grupları aynı zamanda eşkiya olarak kabul ederek devlet desteği olmadan
kaçakçılığın dolayısıyla da eşkiyalığın bitirilemeyeceğini iddia ediyordu.
Böyle bir durumda orta yolu bulamayan hükümet, idareyi değiştirecek
alternatif bir yapıyı da daha önceden Duyun-i Umumiye ile imzaladığı
anlaşmalardan dolayı kuramadı. Hükümet ayrıca şirketi maddi krizler karşısında
hızlca avans alabileceği bir kurum olarak görmekteydi ve bu yüzden bir çok
olumsuzluğa göz yummak zorunda kalmıştı. Bu şartlar altında Reji şirketi tütün
sektörünü 1883 yılından 1925 yılına kadar kontrol etmeye devam etti.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tütün Kaçakçılığı, Reji Şirketi, Osmanlı Devleti.
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study owes much to the contributions of variety of people. First, I would like to
express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Engin Deniz Akarlı, for
his invaluable direction and advice throughout this thesis. Without his guidance and
support, it would have been impossible to write this thesis. He is an incredible
example to me of a teacher and advisor who I aspire to become. Apart from his
guidance, support, invaluable direction and comments, I am indebted him because he
edited the English of this thesis. I would also thank to Professor Filiz Dığıroğlu for
her personal comments, criticism, and help. If she did not share some documents
with me and did not write her book, I would never find a way to create a thesis.
I am especially indebted to two professors Professor Abdulhamit Kırmızı and
Professor Coşkun Çakır at Istanbul Sehir University. I feel proud because I was the
assistant of these two exceptional academic scholars who never refused to help me. I
owe a lot to their dedications as professors and mentors.
I am also grateful to Mehmet Genç, Can Nacar, Fehmi Yılmaz, Kent Fielding
Schull, Kudret Emiroğlu, Oktay Gökdemir, Ahmet Yüksel and Cafer Sarıkaya. All
of them encouraged and helped me in this process. They obtained many articles used
in this study. Their analytical and theoretical frameworks were the samples, which I
imitated. Ahmet Özcan also shed light on for my thesis and further academic studies.
Ismail Kayapınar, Hüseyin Kaya, Onur Öner, and Mehmet Akif Berber lend me
hands to read some documents from Ottoman Archives. I would like to thank them
not only for their assistance but also for their friendship, support, and guidance.
David Reed Albachten from the Academic Writing Center read and helped to edit
the language of this study. I also thank him for his patience and help.
The financial support from the The Scientific and Technological Research
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), National Directorship of Supporting Program of
Scientists (BIDEB) made this study possible. I also acknowledge the help of the staff
of Başbakanlık Archive. I thank Sebahattin Bayram from Başbakanlık Archive for
his all support and help. The library of The Center for Islamic Studies (ISAM)
provided many primary and secondary sources that I used in this study. I would like
to thank the staff of ISAM. I count myself very lucky because I benefited to learn
from many exceptional scholars throughout my education. Hence, I would like to
x
thank the Professors at the History Department of Istanbul Sehir University and
Bogazici University. I also thank all members of Bogazici University Social Service
Association (BUSOS)
Last but not least, my family always trusted me. I thank my mother because
she insisted on choosing history. I also thank my father because he is always proud
of me. Whatever I want to do, he supported and encouraged me. Whenever I
stopped, decided to leave the university, their support, encouragement, and love
helped me to continue and carry this study I am forever in their debt. Hence, I
dedicate this study to my father and my mother.
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………...….v
Öz...…………………………………………………………………………………vii
Acknowledgments/Preface………………………………………………………......ix
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………....xi
List Of Tables, Figures, and Maps ……………………………………………...…xiii
Abbreviations Used In Footnotes …………………………………………….........xiv
CHAPTER
1. Introduction
1.1 Outline of Chapters………………….……………………...….….………1
1.2 Introduction………………..………………………….……...….……….. 2
1.3 Research Methodology…………………………..……………….……..... 6
1.4 Literature Review …………………….....……………...…………..…... 13
1.5 Research Background ………………….....……..…………………...…. 18
2. The Effect Of Imperialism
2.1 A Brief History of Ottoman Empire from Tanzimat to the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration ………………………………………….…….. 20
2.2 Tobacco from Tanzimat to the Régie …………………………..…....… 24
2.3 Société de la Régie Co-interésseé des Tabacs del’Empire Ottoman....... 28
2.4 The Relationship between the Régie Company and the State….…….... 34
2.5 The Province of Trabzon ………...…………………………...….……. 42
3. The Illicit Tobacco Trade
3.1 The Definition of Smuggling …………………………………….….... 48
3.2 The Problem of Licenses ………………………………………....…… 51
3.3 The Warehouse Problem …………………………………………….... 55
3.4 Tobacco Smuggling …………………………………….……………... 58
3.5 A Story of an Illicit Tobacco Trader ……………...….…………….… 67
xii
3.6 The Role of Provincial Rulers in the Tobacco Smuggling ………….… 69
3.7 The Régie Police Force …………...………………………………..…. 73
4. Conclusion...……………………………………………………………………. 83
Appendices....………………………………………………………………….…... 87
References...……………………………………………………………………… 101
xiii
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS
Chapter 2
Table 2. 1. Revenue Sharing of Tobacco Monopoly ……………………… 30
Table 2. 2. The Government’s Share From Tobacco ………………...….... 36
Table 2. 3. Trade of The Major Ports of the Province of Trabzon in 1889... 45
Table 2. 4. Statistics about Tobacco Production in the Selected Cities of the
Province of Trabzon in 1909 ……………………………….……………... 47
Table 2. 5. Statistics about the Population, The Number of Farms and The
size of the Farms ...…………..…………………………………………….. 47
Figure 2. 1. The Ottoman Milk Cow ……………………………………… 40
Figure 2. 2. Leaping The Tobacco Régie …………………………………. 42
Figure 2. 3. The Map of Province of Trabzon …………………………...... 43
Chapter 3
Table 3.1. List of Tobacco Smugglers Identified in Niğde ……………….. 62
Table 3.2. Tobacco Revenue of Trabzon, Erzurum, Bitlis, Van …….......... 73
Table 3.3. The Régie Police Force in the Province of Aydın in 1897 …..… 78
Table 3.4. Measures of Tobacco Smuggling in Selected Years ………….. 79
xiv
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES
BOA, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Türkiye
[Prime Minister’s Archives Istanbul, Turkey]
BEO Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası [Document Bureau of the Sublime
Porte]
DH. MKT. Dahiliye Mektubi Kalemi [Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Scribe’s Office]
DH. TMIK. S. Dahiliye Tesrì Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu [Reform
Comission, Internal Ministry]
İ. HUS. İradeler Hususi [Special Decrees]
MV. Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları [Minutes of the Council of
Ministers]
ŞD. Şura-yı Devlet Tasnifi [Council of State]
Y.A. HUS. Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı [Grand Vizier’s Special
Reports, Yıldız Palace]
Y. EE Yıldız Esas Evrakı [Basic Documents, Yıldız Palace]
Y. MTV. Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı [Various Miscellaneous
Reports, Yıldız Palace]
Y. PRK. AZJ. Yıldız Arzuhal ve Jurnaller [Petitions and Spy Reports, Yıldız
Palace
Y. PRK. EŞA. Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve
Ataşemiliterlik [Documents of Embassy, Consulate, and Army
Attaché, Yıldız Palace]

1
CHAPTER I
1. Introduction
1.1. Outline of chapters
The aim of this thesis is to analyze tobacco smuggling in the Black-Sea region of the
Ottoman Empire between 1883-1914. This research consists of four chapters as
structured below:
Chapter 1 covers the research objectives, introduction, literature review, research
methodology, and research background. The introduction includes a brief history of
tobacco in the Ottoman Empire, the articulation of Ottoman economy with the
modern capitalist world system, and its implication for society. The literature review
contains brief critical assessments of the most important books and articles on
tobacco smuggling in late Ottoman history. Research methodology outlines the
historiographical interpretations that inform the studies discussed and points to the
positions adopted in this thesis. Karen Barkey and Eric Hobsbawm’s analyses and
approaches are particularly important in this part. Finally, the research background
focuses on the materials on which the thesis relies and the main questions that the
thesis tries to answer.
Chapter 2 discusses the process that entailed the foundation of the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration (OPDA) and the Régie Company. This chapter
introduces the reader to the conditions that the Ottoman society faced and how these
institutions were established. In addition, it explains the impact of OPDA on the
economy of the Black-Sea region and the changes in the tobacco sector. The chapter
also focuses on the population of the area, the number of areas where tobacco was
grown and the number of people who made a living in the tobacco sector.
Chapter 3 provides a brief survey of smuggling activities, and their effects on
society and politics. The chapter aims at explaining why people turned to
contraband. It also tries to explain the organization of contraband, daily lives of
people involved in contraband, and their relationships with state officials, farmers,
and bandits. In addition, the chapter explores the sale of illegally crops, the routes
smugglers used in Anatolia, and the response of the Régie Company and the
2
government to smugglers. The chapter analyzes the police force of the Régie
Company with emphasis on the company’s policies toward tobacco farmers and
tobacco merchants. Finally, the chapter specifically articulates the social and
political implications of the formal and informal tobacco sector.
Chapter 4 will summarizes the issue and discusses about the selected folk songs
about smugglers. Furthermore it outlines the main findings of the thesis, discusses
their historiographical implications and suggestions about prospects of future researh
on contraband trafficking.
1.2. Introduction
The tobacco plant is of the genus Nicotiana, one of the larger divisions of the family
Solanacea.1 It originated in America and moved to Europe via the geographical
expedition of Christopher Columbus and his compatriots. It was first used as an
ornamental plant and then as medicine. Eventually people began to consume it for
pleasure and to satisfy their addiction. European merchants introduced it to the
Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. Like other empires, the Ottoman Empire
prohibited the use of tobacco after a short time for many economic and religious
reasons. Yet, a fatwa legalized the consumption of tobacco in 1646. The newly
appointed Şeyhul-Islam Bahai Efendi, himself an addict issued the fatwa.2 After that
time, it became a very special and attractive source of revenue for the Empire. The
influence of tobacco over the economy rose day by day and in the nineteenth
century, tobacco was one of the most prominent crops of Ottoman agriculture. The
invention of cigarettes3 and the quality of Ottoman tobacco increased the importance
1 Jordan Goodman, Tobacco in History: The Cultures of Dependence, Routledge, New York
1995, p. 2; Filiz Dığıroğlu, Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları Müşterekü’l-Menfaa Reji Şirketi
Trabzon Reji İdaresi 1883-1914, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv Araştırma Merkezi, İstanbul, 2007,
p. 15.
2 Fehmi Yılmaz, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasi ve Ekonomik Tahlili
1600-1883, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Marmara University, the Institute of Turkic
Studies, İstanbul, 2005, p. 19.
3 For the success of Camel as a mixture of American and Turkish tobacco, see Goodman
p.102.
3
of oriental tobacco in the world-market. For instance, tobacco leaf exports from the
empire increased more than three-fold between 1881 and 1911.4
The ‘oriental’ tobacco or ‘Turkish blend’ as Europeans called it had a better
taste than American tobacco and Europeans turned to Ottoman tobacoo, creating a
rising demand for it. The nineteenth century was the critical for the development of
the tobacco production in the Ottoman territory. Also called “the longest century of
the Empire”, the nineteenth century is one of the most complex eras of Ottoman
history, marked by efforts to respond to the challenges of the modern era and
fundamental social, political, cultural and economic changes. The Ottoman Public
Debt Administration (OPDA) was one of the major organizations that emerged in
this era and had a profound effect on not only state finances but also economic
production patterns in the Empire.
Two words mark late Ottoman history: Chaos and change. These two words
shed light on the attempts of a country requiring to catch up with the new world.
Western Europe dominated the new world. The Ottoman Empire as a traditionalist
structure made an effort to understand and copy the West. The Empire changed its
structure, culturally and socially. International actors dislocated the local ones.
Remarkable shifts took place in its local, socio-economic and cultural structures.5
The traditional state system was updated after European model. 6 In the late
nineteenth century, the people of the Ottoman Empire lived under the combination of
modernity and tradition, which caused a kind of chaos not only in their daily lives
but also in the State. The Public Debt Administration and the Régie Company are
examples of the West European penetration of the Empire. Their establishment
changed life in the rural areas dramatically.
The Public Debt Administration was one of the most effective corporations in
the Hamidian era. After the economic failure of the State, the Ottoman government
4 Can Nacar, Tobacco Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire: Fragmentation, Conflict, and
Collective Struggle, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Binghamton University State
University of New York, the Department of History, New York, 2010, p.1.
5 Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire
(1881-1908) Reactions to European Penetration, New York University Press, New York,
1983, p. 15.
6 Quataert, p. 16.
4
reached an agreement with its creditors to establish the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration in the form of corporation. Its aim was not only to collect revenues
but also to teach the Ottomans how to establish a modern financial system. After its
foundation, OPDA encouraged the formation of few sister companies for the
collections and administration of certain spesific revenues. The Régie Company is
one of these and it had the opportunity to collect the taxes levied on tobacco in the
domestic economy.
Tobacco under the control of the Régie Company’s monopolization
undermined the traditional trade networks and caused turmoil.7 Hence, farmers,
merchants, and soldiers became involved in tobacco smuggling, because tobacco had
an important value. The story of tobacco smuggling in the Ottoman Empire did not
start with the establishment of the Régie Company. According to article three of
Regulations of the Régie Company, the government should help this company to
stop tobacco smuggling. 8 The existence of such an article in the formative
regulations of the Régie Company indicates that tobacco smuggling predated it in the
Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the Régie Company is one of the milestones in the
history of tobacco smuggling. After its foundation, smuggling increased because
tobacco was one of the most appropriate crops to generate cash despite risks. Thus,
the smuggling of tobacco is an important social symbol to understand the ordinary
people even in today as in the days of the Régie. Those who participated in such
enterprises wished themselves and their activities to remain anonymous as much as
they possibly could.9 On the other hand, the Régie Company as a foreign enterprise
gave the smugglers a motive to start an informal trade in the Hamidian era.10 This is
important because in order to evaluate both historical and contemporary
manifestation of smuggling, it is essential to understand the legal regimes of the
place.11
7 Quataert, p. 18.
8 Düstur 1st Tertip, v. IV, Dersaadet 1302 p. 332.
9 Alan L. Karras, Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2010, p. vii.
10 Quataert, p. 19.
11 Karras, p. viii.
5
The informal tobacco trade system is the main subject of this thesis. How did
the “smugglers” organize themselves? How did they find, blend, and sell tobacco?
Why did the farmers cooperate with traffickers of contraband tobacco? What did the
State, the provincial officials and the Régie Company do to prohibit people from
trafficking contraband?
Tobacco smuggling was a contested issue between the Régie Company and
the State. Different interpretations of smuggling were at the root of the issue. Illicit
tobacco traders who were armed and worked together in groups of hundreds of were
popularly called Ayıngacı groups or Barhane in the Empire. The Ottoman Archival
sources indicated that the government considered these people to be bandits because
they caused security problems in the provinces and decreased the revenues of the
State. However, the Ottoman government clearly differentiated smugglers from
those tobacco producers, tobacco merchants, and manufacturers and sellers of
equipment for tobacco production who carried on their activities without receiving
permission from the Régie. According to the Régie agreements, these people were
smugglers and not different from itinerant tobacco peddlars who traveled from place
to place to sell tobacco illegally. The government disagreed with the company and
worked to defend their rights. At the same time, the government agreed with the
definition of the company to the illicit traders as bandits and used its military power
to prevent smuggling and to establish its authority in the provinces. The Régie
Company also supported this idea and argued that smuggling was one of the
preoccupations of bandits in the provinces and the State should prevent smuggling.
In fact, some of the people whom the company labeled as smuggler-bandits were
merchants who sold their products illegally. Since the gendarmes and other Ottoman
military authorities tried to stop them, they caused security problems in many
provinces. Shepherds, bandits, many villagers, and some district governors supported
and assisted tobacco smugglers who resisted the monopolization of the main source
of their livelihood. Since, this situation challenged and undermined the authority of
the government among the people in general, it accepted smugglers as bandits. Yet,
the lack of accord between people and the government and the ineffectiveness of
provincial governors in many instances made it difficult to develop a permanent
solution to the problem of smuggling. More important, central government did not
6
have sufficiently deeply penetration and effective authority in the provinces to forbid
people from trafficking contraband tobacco and similar illegal activities.
1.3. Research Methodology
To write about trafficking of contraband tobacco from the eyes of the tobacco
producers and illicit tobacco traders do not mean to defend, protect, or laud their
activities. It is an effort to define them from a different perspective. For this reason,
the primary purpose of this study is to understand how ‘tobacco smuggling’ worked
in the Black-Sea region of the Ottoman Empire. Social historians of tobacco in the
Ottoman Empire approach the topic in terms of the social conflict they believe it
involved. Interpretation of smuggling as a social reaction to the Régie Company is
dominant in academic discussions of the issue among historians.12 Almost all of the
existing studies focus on the Régie Company, what the State did, what kind of
economic and technological changes occurred, and finally how the people reacted to
these changes and developments. I contend that most of these studies look into
tobacco smuggling as a means to understand the Régie Company. Furthermore, these
studies, in general try to answer why people became smugglers whether they dealt in
salt, tobacco, or another item. No one has tried to explain how ‘smugglers’ organized
themselves, how they obtained tobacco, how they blended different crops, and how
they marketed and sold their items.
The relationship between ‘the smugglers’ and other social groups is another
important problem that remains inadequately addressed. Scholars should try to
explain who the smugglers were. Existing academic works tend to focus on metanarratives
of social history and focus on the relationship between the Régie
Company police force (Kolcu) and the smugglers. They do not shed light on how a
group of smugglers found their guns, the products in which they dealt customers, and
12 For a general discussion about the smuggling activities of tobacco, see Donald Quataert,
Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire 1881-1908: Reactions
to European Economic Penetration New York University Press New-York 1983, p. 13-41.
Filiz Dığıroglu, Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları Müşterekü’l-Menfaa Reji Şirketi Trabzon
Reji İdaresi 1883-1914, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv Araştırma Merkezi, İstanbul 2007, p. 103-
128. Fatma – Suat Doğruel, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Tekel, Tekel Yayınları, Istanbul 2000,
p. 61-107. Oktay Gökdemir, Aydın Vilayeti’nde Tütün Rejisi, Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Dokuz Eylül University, the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History,
İzmir 1994, p. 72-100.
7
who helped them. Furthermore, almost all of the studies argue that the company
established the kolcu system to pursue and arrest illicit tobacco traders. Yet, the
kolcu’s main task was to oppress farmers who cultivated tobacco without permit.
This study aims at addressing these inadequately answered questions and offering a
social and economic history of tobacco smuggling. This effort will also shed light on
daily lives in the rural nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, for a study of tobacco
smuggling in the late Ottoman Empire should help us understand how the rural
population reacted to the ongoing changes around them.
From the State’s and Régie’s point of view the illicit tobacco traders were
bandits. The government commonly used the term müsellah serseri and eşhas-ı
müselleha.13 Two different approaches dominate social science studies on bandits in
the Ottoman Empire. The first one is Eric Hobsbawm’s interpretation of bandits as
social protestors.14 Hobsbawm invented the concept of social bandits in his Primitive
Rebels published in 1959. He elaborated his argument in Bandits published in 1969.
His term social banditry explains bandits as primitive rebels who resisted the
changes that challenged their livelihood. The second approach is Karen Barkey’s
explanation of bandits as local despots.15 It is a response to Hobsbawm’s theses. To
explain what Hobsbawm and Barkey stated, I will compare three Turkish novels
about bandits and smugglers namely Yaşar Kemal’s İnce Memed (Memed, My
Hawk) published in 195516, Kemal Tahir’s Rahmet Yolları Kesti.17 (Rain Closed The
Roads) published in 1957, and Refi' Cevad Ulunay’s Dağlar Kralı Balçıklı Ethem
(also published in 1955).18 All of these novels are written from the perspective of the
bandits. Kemal Tahir and Cevad Ulunay also gave details about the relationship
between bandits and smugglers. Both of them leave the impression that some bandits
supported smugglers just as some bandits were involved in smuggling while still
13 BOA, Y.PRK.DH 14/35, January 3, 1908, Kanunievvel 21, 1323.
14 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, The New Press, New York, 2000.
15 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization,
Cornell University Press, New York, 1994.
16 Yaşar Kemal, Memed, My Hawk, translated by Eduard Roditi, The New York Review of
Book New York 2005, Originally published by Collins and Harvill Press, London, 1961.
17 Kemal Tahir, Rahmet Yolları Kesti, İthaki Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011.
18 Refi’ Cevad Ulunay, Dağlar Kralı Balçıklı Ethem, Arba Yayınları, Istanbul, 1995.
8
others clashed with smugglers. Yaşar Kemal’s protagonist reminds one of Eric
Hobsbawm’s arguments about bandits and Kemal Tahir’s views bring to mind Karen
Barkey’s ideas. In fact, Hobsbawm and Barkey published their work after Kemal
Tahir and Yaşar Kemal published their novels. I argue there are some similarities on
their vantage point to the issue. Kemal Tahir wrote his story in response to Yaşar
Kemal’s representation of bandits as leaders of social resistance against the
landlords.19 As for, Cevad Ulunay’s novel, which is overlooked, it offers alternative
explanation in the definition of the smuggling, bandits, and kolcus.
In Memed, My Hawk, the protagonist Memed, is a farmer. He symbolizes the
peasants who are oppressed by landlords. Memed loves a girl but the landlord also
desires to marry her. Memed and the girl escape from the village. Eventually,
Memed joins the bandits in the mountains and starts to fight against the landlords.
The lord, Abdi Ağa wants to stop him because Memed’s main aim is to change the
mind of peasants.20 In Memed’s opinion, all farmers should have their own lands and
resist landlords toward this end. This motive is similar to those of the social bandits
discussed by Eric Hobsbawm. According to Hobsbawm, rebels in nineteenth-century
empires had primitive characters. They were the voice of local people but harbingers
of the first revolutionaries of the modern era. Memed, My Hawk is the story of such a
rural hero and enemy of landlords. He takes from the rich and gives to the poor. In
other words, he is an Ottoman Robin Hood.
Kemal Tahir’s novel offers a very different picture. He explains bandits as
people filling in the void of authority in local areas where the state authority wavers.
According to Tahir, government authorities, or bandits in the absence of government
authorities, oppressed the peasants. He also explains the relationship between bandits
and bureaucrats. Like Barkey, he sees bandits as toys of urban elites. He also creates
a character that desires to become a famous bandit. According to Tahir, the main aim
of this young man in the novel was to acquire power. Tahir points to the ignorance of
bandits to explain how clever urban elites manipulated them. Tahir gives many clues
about the relationship between smuggling and bandits. His knowledge of the social
history of the late Ottoman Empire enchanted many people, including the owner of
19 Special thanks to Ahmet Özcan for his thought provoking article namely “Eşkiyanın ‘Adi’
Şiddetinin Siyasallığı ve Yasa Yapıcı Mirası”, Kebikeç, no: 34/2012, p. 7-23 and his
guidance to develop my ideas.
20 Özcan, p. 8.
9
this thesis. He gives such details about tobacco smuggling as the people’s desire for
smuggled tobacco and the importance of horses for smugglers. According to him, a
smuggler always chooses the best horse possible and for this reason bandits always
desire to get a smuggler’s horse. Indeed, the tobacco smugglers of the Province of
Trabzon used horses from Canik, because those horses were stronger and sprightlier
than others were.21
Karen Barkey explains bandits similarly.22 According to her, bandits were
pragmatic people who used the gaps in the system and conducted themselves to gain
more power. In this relationship, they unwillingly served the wishes of provincial
elites because they supposed to conduct power. She argued they gained more power
in the provinces when the State lost its control over society. According to Barkey,
Bandits did not come together of their own will; they were brought together
by societal elites for the interests of these elites. Banditry was thus an
artificial social construction that became a threat, was used as a pseudothreat,
or was co-opted into the governing machinery of the state depending
on the needs of the ruling class. Its rebellion did not represent collective
action in the traditional sense since it did not attempt to destroy the social
structure of society; it simply wanted to derive as much utility from society
as possible. It manipulated the interstices of the system, having no
proclaimed ally or enemy and no significant ideology.23
Barkey’s observations on banditry depend on conditions that a long crisis
generated in the Empire in the seventeenth century. Generalizing her ideas about the
bandits to all periods of the Ottoman history would be misleading. Besides, Barkey
appear to reify the State or State elites, who, she holds controlled bandits virtually at
will.
Eric Hobsbawm does not differentiate between peasants and bandits because
he, similar to Yaşar Kemal describes bandits as peasants who rebelled against
authority.
21 Ahmet Yüksel, “Türkiye’de Tütüncülerin Kaçakçılaşma Sürecinde Kolculuğun Baskısını
İki Kolcunun Tercüme-i Halinden Anlama Denemesi”, Kebikeç, no: 34/2012, p. 185-199.
22 Karen Barkey understood Kemal Tahir’s novel as an example of social banditry. See
Barkey, p.180; Özcan, p. 12.
23 Barkey, p. 152.
10
The point about social bandits is that they are peasant outlaws whom the lord
and state regard as criminals but who remain within peasant society, and are
considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for
justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation and in any case as men to be
admired helped and supported.24
Neither Hobsbawm nor Barkey deal with tobacco smugglers as a separate
group. Their perspectives are not very helpful to explain trafficking of contraband
tobacco. Armed smugglers might have bandits but in general, they were more
complex individuals than those that Karen Barkey or Eric Hobsbawm’s
interpretations suggest. For instance, they were not social bandits reacting to
suppression. Many tobacco producers and tobacco merchants criticized smugglers
because they placed a strain on tobacco producers and tobacco merchants. At the
same time, many tobacco producers sold their crops to smugglers to gain more
income. They did not mind dealing with smugglers although they were well aware
that the government and the Régie Company considered tobacco smugglers as
bandits. Tobacco smugglers acted against a monopolistic foreign company but which
was, in a sense, a partner of the Ottoman government. This situation, too adds to the
complexity of the business of tobacco smuggling and of the attitudes of the people
who joined the ranks of tobacco smugglers. Thus many social scientist who build
their arguments according to the two paradigms or approaches indicated above
explain bandits and smuggling sometimes as social revolutionaries and sometimes
not. We should take into consideration a group of smugglers could be bandits,
burglars, or social protestors at the same time. They could simply be farmers as well,
farmers who desired to add to their income and took risks for that end.
Cevad Ulunay’s novel opens a new path for scholars who look for alternative
explanations. In Ulunay’s Dağlar Kralı the main character Balçıklı Ethem is a bandit
who controlled the Asian districts of greater Istanbul’s as well as Gebze and
Çınarcık. He is one of most famous bandits in Istanbul. One of his main aims is to
eliminate the Rum bandits of Şile. One day a man escapes from jail while the
gendarmes are transporting him to prison. He finds Ethem and joins the gang. This
man is very clever and begins to guide Ethem. He becomes a famous bandit in
Istanbul in a short time. After a short time, he decides to change his life and leaves
24 Hobsbawm, p. 20.
11
Istanbul. He takes a nickname, and goes to Bursa and then moves to Konya. He
applies to the Régie Company for a suitable job. The director employs him as kolcu.
The twist here is that he used to protect tobacco smugglers when he was a bandit in
Istanbul. After he joins the Régie Company, he becomes the most dangerous kolcu
for smugglers. He first fights other kolcus because they do not try to prevent
smuggling. He realizes that kolcus co-operated with the smugglers. For instance,
kolcus light a fire on the roads and when smugglers see the light, they change their
way. He informs the company of this situation and the company promotes him to the
position of master kolcu. After that, he becomes the most effective kolcu in the
prevention of smuggling.
Ulunay’s views of bandits and smugglers are different from Yaşar Kemal’s.
Like Kemal Tahir, Ulunay explains bandits as people who oppressed the weak. In
addition, he holds that a bandit’s main urge was to seek power. In his novel, the
bandit who guided Ethem and who helped the smugglers become the most effective
power of the Régie against smugglers. According to him, bandits symbolized the
continuity of the old social structure. They were against the changes in the system. A
bandit should protect and support smugglers, protect some people and destroy others.
However, a kolcu should prohibit people from contraband. Ulunay leaves one with
the impression that whether bandit or kolcu doing one’s job right mattered most.
When this was the case, when a person performed according to the role that was
expected of him, people praised him as mythologized the best of them.25 For this
reason the character of Ulunay who guided Ethem became the subject matter of a
popular myth whether as a bandit or as a kolcu. He was good at whatever his job
was. His story suggest that explaining bandits or smugglers as social protestors or
people who oppress the vulnerable in the society is to save the day. It is not
important if they were social protestors like Robin Hood or tyrants. The important
thing is that they did their job right, true to images associated with that job.
This thesis argues that, these people were not heroes but they also did not
regularly oppress people. Instead of focusing this issue, and creating a Robin Hood
or tyrant from a bandit or a smuggler, this thesis will try to explain how they worked
and why they continued in such an occupation. Smugglers were not homogenous
groups. If we were to adopt the Régie’s perspective, we would recognize that
25 As a similar comparison see Özcan, p.7-25.
12
“smugglers” included a very broad range of people. On the one hand, there were
tobacco producers and owners of tobacco shops who sold their crop without paying
taxes. Likewise, many peasants cultivated and sold tobacco illegally because of the
harsh conditions imposed by the Régie Company. On the other hand, there were also
groups composed of hundreds of people who stored, blended, and sold tobacco
illegally. This thesis differentiates these two different groups of “smugglers” to
explain the reaction of the government and the Régie Company against smuggling.
This study also strives to understand if there was a social protest dimension (and
other motives) to smuggling activities which aimed at making a living
fundamentally.
An examination of the folk songs about smugglers included in Ayıngacı
Türküleri would suggest smugglers were patriots. One can read these songs as an
illustration of the invention of a tradition. For example, Régie kolcus killed five
tobacco smugglers in 1885. These people were from a well-known family in the
village including the ağa (landlord) of the village. After their death, the villagers
created the elegy called Karaşar Zeybeği to lament the death.26 Why the villagers
sing a song for the death of these men? Perhaps the villagers hated Régie kolcus.
Perhaps they wanted to honor these people because they were from an ağa family.
Perhaps, because they were afraid of the ağa’s family and wanted to be on their
better side.27 One can think of other explanations of the villagers’ behavior. Scholars
who believe smugglers were social protestors explain such songs as an expression of
the sadness of villagers in the face of such repressive situations. This school tends to
represent all crimes involving smugglers as a social protest of sorts.28 However,
explaining smuggling activities as social protest does not clarify the issue. I argue
that the songs, rather than the act of smuggling as such, manifest moods of social
protest. People, felt desperate because a foreign monopolistic company controlled a
major source of their livelihood (whether in production and trading) and their
26 Süleyman Şenel, “Ayıngacı Türküleri,” Tütün Kitabı, Emine Gürsoy Naskali, Kitabevi
Istanbul, 2005, p. 365.
27 A verse of the song: Zeybekleri yaylalarda bastılar/Çepkenimi çam dalına astılar/Beş
kardeşi bir tahtada kestiler/Öldürmen Hüseyin’i kıymayın Ali’ye/Kelleleri bahşiş gitti
valiye. Quoted from Süleyman Şenel, “Ayıngacı Türküleri”, Tütün Kitabı, p. 368.
28 Özcan, p. 13.
13
government failed or seemed unable to protect their economic interest. Out of this
desperation, they expressed their protest discursively.
1.4 Literature Review
Social scientists working on Ottoman history do not address the smuggling issue
directly. Scholars who write about the Régie Company or the integration of the
Ottoman Empire into the modern economic systems explain the smuggling issue as a
reaction of the society to changes in traditional economic relationships. Donald
Quataert’s thought-provoking book, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in
the Ottoman Empire 1881-1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration is a
case in point. 29 Quataert’s wrote his book in 1983. It continues to influence
discussions about the Régie Company in the context of the issues of late Ottoman
history. The second chapter of the book is about the Régie Company, smugglers, and
their relationships with the government. Quataert explains the roles of these three
groups. By way of conclusion, he compares the social resistance to tobacco
monopolies in the Ottoman Empire and in Iran. His main argument is the merchants
and ulema supported the popular boycott against the foreign (British) tobacco
monopoly. The boycott forced the government to revoke the agreement that had
created the monopoly but in return for a huge indemnity. The consequent financial
instability further undermined Iran’s sovereignty. According to Quataert, the
Ottoman workers did not have any support from the ulema and merchants and the
resistance to the Régie Company was not as effective as in Iran but this may have
helped avoid direct foreign intervention the deepening of the financial problems and
[further] compromise of Ottoman sovereignty.30
Quataert’s interpretation of contraband traffic is the smuggling of tobacco
increased at the time of the Régie Company because of two factors. First, the Régie
Company was a foreign element in the state. Quataert mentions how Hodja Hasan
agitated the people in Giresun against dealing with a foreign Christian company that
29 For a review of Quataert’s book, see Engin Deniz Akarli (1986). “Review of Donald
Quataert ‘Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908:
Reactions to European Economic Penetration”, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, v. 18, p. 391-393.
30 Quataert, p. 39.
14
the Régie Company was in his discourse.31 Yet, there is no evidence that people
heeded the agitations of this religious man. Quataert does not mention any other
specific example of the projection of smugglers as symbols of popular resistance
against the penetration of foreigners into the tobacco sector. Popular resistance
implies cooperation and organization among the people in general.32 Quataert’s
discussion of smugglers does not provide evidence showing tobacco smugglers were
involved in such a movement.
Quataert’s second argument is that growing tobacco did not bring an
adequate income to farmers because the prices offered by the Régie Company
remained too low and the company did not provide additional facilities such as
storehouses.33 This is an important observation. It explains why a farmer would join
the smugglers or cooperate with them. However, it does not explain the smuggling
networks, which involved not only farmers but also many people from society such
as soldiers, bandits, and even provincial administrative officials in certain places.
Another vital study on smuggling is Filiz Dıgıroglu’s book on the Trabzon
Régie Administration 1883-1914. Her third chapter is on reaction to the Régie’s
practices and its measures against them. It focuses on smuggling and the Régie’s
response to it in Trabzon. She argues that scholars who study tobacco smuggling in
late Ottoman history should first identify the term smuggling. Dığıroglu questions
explanations of tobacco smugglers as social protestors.34 According to her, tobacco
smuggling did not start with the foundation of the Régie Company and for this
reason it would not be possible to explain smuggling in terms of social resistance
against a foreign monopoly. In addition, Dığıroğlu explains the role of tobacco
merchants, provincial rulers and State officials in tobacco smuggling. Like Quataert,
she also argues that smuggling increased because of the Régie’s maltreatment of
tobacco producers and tobacco merchants.
31 Quataert, p. 39.
32 Akarlı, p. 392.
33 Dığıroğlu, p. 70-77.
34 Dığıroğlu, p. 105.
15
Dığıroğlu also holds that the government did not stop tobacco smuggling
because of its provisionist outlook and policies35, using a term first introduced by
Mehmet Genç.36 Mehmet Genç uses the term to describe the policies that the
Ottoman government adopted to assure the provisioning of necessities in urban
centers. According to Dığıroğlu, provisionism reflects a commitment to the basic
wellbeing of society, and it was for this reason that the government protected the
rights of tobacco producers against the company. She argues the basic means of
livelihood for these people was tobacco cultivation and consequently the government
allowed them to sell their crop illegally.37
Dığıroğlu’s argument may appear to be a questionable generalization, but she
implies the company and the State had different approaches to smuggling and
bandits. The company accepted as smugglers those who cultivated tobacco without
the required license. The State argued that, smugglers were those people who
traveled to many cities and villages to sell contraband tobacco. For instance, the
Régie Company tried to remove the crops that were grown without permission in
Yanya in 1904. However, the government argued that the tobacco crops had already
matured and the farmers had begun to blend their crops. If the governor allowed the
uprooting of crops of the farmers would be unable to grow another crop this late in
the season. Hence, the government prevented the Régie Company from ripping out
the tobacco crop grown without permit.38 According to the Régie Company, growing
tobacco without permission was smuggling. Yet, the State held growing tobacco had
to be treated differently from trafficking contraband. It is my contention that,
Dığıroğlu’s point indicated above the State’s commitment to its subjects’ wellbeing
should help explain why it adopted a different position about the meaning of
smuggling compared to the Régie Company, Her point also helps us understand why
the tobacco producers rebuffed the Régie’s low prices and sold their plants to
35 Dığıroğlu, p. 106.
36 According to Mehmet Genç, Ottoman economy based on three pillars namely fiscalism,
traditionalism and provisionism. See Mehmet Genç, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Devlet ve
Ekonomi, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2009.
37 Dığıroğlu, p. 106.
38 Mehmet Temel, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Son Döneminde Tütün Politikası ve Artan Tütün
Kaçakçılığı”, Toplumsal Tarih, April 2001, p. 5-6.
16
someone else. However, we still need to explain the formations of ‘barhane’, which
was the local name of smuggling groups that consisted of hundreds of smugglers and
bandits.
Dığıroğlu’s book is one of the best on smuggling. She gives the names and
activities of the best-known smugglers in Trabzon and explains how the State’s
inactivity diminished their effectiveness in the rural areas.39 Her views about the
pacification of smugglers are similar to the ideas of Karen Barkey40. Barkey notes
the state pacifies/neutralizes bandits in three different ways, namely, by destroying
them, giving them an official position, or playing them against each other. Moreover,
Dığıroğlu makes a distinction between bandits and smugglers in the first part of her
third chapter. She explains the differences between the definition of the State and the
Régie Company of the term bandit. These distinctions are crucial. They help explain
why the State did not accept the Régie Company’s requests to consider tobacco
farmers as smugglers. In addition, Dığıroğlu shows us how modernization developed
along with the centralization of the State.
Oktay Gökdemir’s dissertation also gives crucial data about the Régie
Company, tobacco smugglers, and the position of the government.41 He writes about
the Aydın Régie Administration. He research is based on not only Ottoman archival
sources but also the documents of the Régie Administration and local newspapers.
Hence, he provides new information on such matters as the numbers of kolcus in the
Province of Aydın, the distribution of these people by gender and specialization and
the expenditures of the company for surveillance and security in the selected cities of
the Empire.42 These data help scholars to create an alternative definition about the
Régie kolcus. He also uses the folk songs about tobacco smuggling such as
“Çökertme Türküsü” and tries to explain how people created myths. He tends to
interpret these songs as proof of smuggler’s innocence. However, unlike Dığıroğlu,
he does not try to define the term smuggling. For this reason, while he criticized the
39 Dığıroğlu, p. 108.
40 See Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization,
Cornell University Press, New York, 1997.
41 Oktay Gökdemir, Aydın Vilayeti’nde Tütün Rejisi, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dokuz
Eylül University, the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History, İzmir, 1994.
42 Gökdemir, p. 105, 106.
17
kolcus’ massacres of tobacco producers, he justifies the job smuggling because he
explained all clashes between tobacco producers and the Régie kolcus as the clashes
between smugglers and the security forces.43 Hence, he argues that smuggling was
the only effective way of resistance for tobacco producers to a foreign company that
controlled and restricted their livelihood.44 His interpretation is similar to the
arguments of Quataert and Dığıroğlu. He also discusses the reasons behind
smuggling and argues that the Régie Company’s maltreatment was the main problem
that increased tobacco smuggling. In addition, he focused on the role of the
provincial administrators. According to him, the Régie Company’s success depended
on the assistance of provincial administrators. For example, he explains how tobacco
cultivation was prohibited in the Karput Island because most of the producers sold
their crops to smugglers. 45 Similarly, Dığıroğlu mentions how the authorities
considered the prohibition of tobacco cultivation in Rize. These examples point to
the limitations of the ability of the company and the government to establish and
exert their authority in the country.
Mehmet Kılıç’s master thesis is another study sheds light on smuggling in a
different region of the Empire. 46 He focuses on the importation of tonbaku (waterpipe
tobacco) from Iran into the Ottoman Empire. In his fourth chapter, he tries to
explain the smuggling in Iraq, Yemen, and Hejaz. His main argument is that the
Tonbaku monopoly of Iran affected the attitudes of the Shiite Ulema and merchants.
Their co-operation increased smuggling day by day. He also argues that the state did
not prevent smuggling because it could not pay for the cost of expanding its security
forces. The solution of the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly was to
decrease the price charged for tonbaku in order to compete with smugglers.47 His
study explains the financial and economic background of smuggling. While he
builds well-developed arguments about illicit trade across the Ottoman-Iranian
43 Gökdemir, p. 108.
44 Gökdemir, p. 82.
45 Gökdemir, p. 87.
46 Mehmet Kılıç, Importation of Ottoman Tonbaku From Iran and Its Implications: 1891-
1914, Unpublished Master Thesis, Boğazici University, the Ataturk Institute for Modern
Turkish History, Istanbul, 2008.
47 Kılıç, p. 70.
18
border and in many provinces of the Empire, he skips a careful explanation of the
notions of smuggling and smuggler. Apart from this criticism, his work is a valuable
contribution to the field and helped to the formation of this study.
The ‘Smugglers’ whom the government called “bandits” were a part of the
Ottoman society. Social scientists know little about their organization and how they
conducted their work. The government initiated reforms to westernize its social,
cultural, and economic system. The consequent changes disrupted traditional
structures. Smuggling emerged as a major issue in such an environment. For this
reason, smugglers’ activities were not only a means to earn a livelihood but also a
resistance to the capitalist relations of production.
I choose the term ‘the informal/illicit traders of tobacco’ to describe the
smuggling groups that consisted of hundred of people. The tobacco producers who
lost even the little power they had in the markets and began to look for alternative
opportunities. They began to sell their crops to the smugglers or directly joined the
smuggling groups. The government must have been aware of the tensions and
therefore differentiated tobacco producers who cultivated tobacco without
permission from armed tobacco traders who caused security problems in the Empire.
Tobacco, as a valuable crop, that generated significant income for its producers and
traders. This value may have been the most crucial motivation of people to continue
illicit trade, in tobacco products despite its high risks.
1.5. Research Background
This research is based on primary sources such as Ottoman archival documents and
documents of the Régie Company. There exist hundreds of documents directly refer
to smuggling activities in the Black-Sea region. Reports prepared by senior Ottoman
officials and the Régie Company administrators provide a helpful framework within
which to combine the available information. In addition, oral and written sources
from villages and towns in the Black-Sea region shed light on the everyday life of
ordinary people.
The thesis takes into consideration the relevant secondary sources as well,
such as articles, theses, and books. Various local and international analyses related to
smuggling activities provide statistical information about the number of smugglers
19
and the effects of the socio-political implications. Although there are no books
written on smuggling networks, a number of articles address the topic. Newspapers
and folk songs provide some clues about the paths of smugglers and their effects on
society. Thus, this study is depends on governmental and international reports, oral,
and written local sources, in addition to articles, journals, books, and works related
to the tobacco smuggling in Late Ottoman history.
The main questions that the thesis tries to answer are the following. Who
were the tobacco smugglers in the Black-Sea region? What was the relationship
between the Régie Company, the State, and the local actors? How did the State and
the company react against smuggling? What was the role of Régie kolcu system?
How did smugglers organize themselves? While trying to answer these and similar
questions, I should be able to develop ideas also on historiographical perspective that
can best explain the smugglers’ place in society.
20
CHAPTER II
2. The Effect of Imperialism
2.1. A Brief History from the Tanzimat to the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration
The most important economic process of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
the economic integration of different nations and regions into the capitalist world
system dominated by Western European countries.48 The Ottoman Empire joined
this system in the nineteenth century. During this period, "liberal" notions of
progress dominated worldviews in Europe at large.49 Another feature of the period
was the rise of the centralized modern bureaucratic state systems –as a facilitator of
coordination and economic progress, among other reasons.
The Ottoman State signed free-trade treaties with the major European states
in 1838-41 and initiated a new series of reorganizational reforms known as the
Tanzimat in 1839. The Tanzimat marked the period from 1839 to 1876. Although,
social scientists still discuss when the Tanzimat period ended, 1876 is a reasonable
suggestion because reforms shifted to the Palace from the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali)
in 1876.50 The Tanzimat era saw vital socio-economic developments occurred
although these developments also induced the virtual bankruptcy of the State.51
Nothing obstructed the achievement of the Tanzimat reforms more than insufficient
economic resources.52 The State did not have sufficient tax-income to finance new
48 Emine Kıray, Osmanlı’da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul,
1993, p. 13.
49 Quoted from the MTS 503 Late Ottoman History Lecture Notes of Professor Engin Deniz
Akarlı.
50 Carter V. Findley, “Tanzimat”, The Cambridge History of Turkey, v.4 Turkey in the
Modern World, Reşat Kasaba, Cambrigde University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 11.
51 Findley, p. 60.
52 Carter V. Findley, Turkey Islam Nationalism and Modernity, Yale University Press,
London, 2010, p. 106.
21
reforms.53 The reason for the lack of resources was due to the Ottoman
economic system, 54 which depended on agriculture where productivity level
remained low. In addition, as part of its financial problems, the government could
collect agricultural taxes such as aşar and agnam only irregularly.55
One of the main aims of the Tanzimat Edict was to abolish all monopolies in
the Empire. Although, there were crucial transformations in every age of Ottoman
history, the Tanzimat marked the end of the old-classical regime and the beginning
of a new system. The Tanzimat elite initiated profound changes in most of the
traditional Ottoman practices such as those in taxation, and governance, as well as
the economic structure. However, the re-institutionalization of the state ran into
fiscal problems leading to the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration.
The Ottoman government organization underwent crucial changes in the
nineteenth century. The process began with the efforts to build a new military order
(Nizam-ı Cedid), continued via the elimination of the Janissary corps, and reached a
new turn with the Edict of Tanzimat. The Tanzimat Edict proclaimed the need for
administrative and fiscal change. The emphasis was on streamlining and
strengthening the central government organization. In economic matters, a free
market economy was accepted in general. The edict underlined the need to abolish
all monopolistic (Yed-i Vahid) practices or privileges. 56 The creation of a more
modern central government and a more liberal economy called for large investments.
The Finance Officials tried to find some solutions but all of these were short-range
solutions such as returning to the iltizam system, debasement of coins (tağşiş) and
printing of paper money (kaime).57 In 1854, the Crimean War led to extraordinary
expenditures. The Ottoman leadership looked for new opportunities and borrowed
53 Kıray, p. 15.
54 Edhem Eldem, “Bağımlılık ve Gelişme Arasında Bir Kurum: Osmanlı Bankası” Türkler
Ansiklopedisi, Hasan Celal Güzel & Kemal Çiçek & Salim Koca, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları,
Ankara, 2002, v. 14, p. 416.
55 Eldem, p. 416.
56 Donald Quataert, “Tanzimat Döneminde Ekonominin Temel Problemleri” Tanzimat
Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Halil İnalcık & Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p. 732.
57 Eldem, p. 416.
22
from international money market to close the gap in the treasury. This was the
beginning of foreign debt in the Ottoman Empire.
A country can borrow from abroad in order to combat economic
backwardness but if the original borrowing does not result in the
development of productive capacity at home at sufficient levels to service the
external debt, then the net effect of such external borrowing is unfavorable to
the economy of that country.58
From 1854 to 1874, the State took on fifteen foreign loans but the leaders of
the Tanzimat era did not succeed to increase the productive capacity of the country
at a level commensurate with the ever-rising interest rates of its debts. The economy
and hence government revenue grew but this growth lagged behind the rising
expenditures. Sultan Abdulmecit reluctantly agreed to a government to loan of 5.5
million Ottoman liras in 1854.59 This loan was to finance the war.60 However, the
money was not enough to meet the costs of the war. For this reason, the state
borrowed another large sum from a company, the Rothschild Brothers. This debt was
a turning point in the Ottoman Empire, because the State permitted two foreign
inspectors to check the use of the money.61 This was the initial step in European
involvement in the management of debt payment. The borrowing of money
continued because the economic measures of the Tanzimat era did not create
sufficiently high productive capacity and the economy remained weak. The Ottoman
Empire accepted the foundation of the Ottoman Bank with European help in order to
find creditors that were more suitable and to create a reliable banking and finance
systems. This attempt did not solve all of the fiscal problems, as the state continued
to borrow in order to pay older debts.
58 Engin Deniz Akarlı, The Problem of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary
Deficits in Ottoman Politics Under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions,
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, the Department of Near Eastern
Studies, New-Jersey, May 1976, p. 148. Also see Engin Deniz Akarlı, “Economic Policy
and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey 1876-1909”, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 28 No: 3 1992, p.
443-476.
59 Biltekin Özdemir, Osmanlı Devleti Dış Borçları: 1854-1924 Döneminde Yüzyıl Süren
Boyunduruk, Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 2010, p. 49.
60 Özdemir, p. 50.
61 Özdemir, p. 50.
23
The State deferred the payment on its debts. The Ottoman treasury went
practically bankrupt because it had to pay very high levels of interest in 1876. It was
no longer possible to manage the finance by borrowing new loans. The State was
indebted internally as well. In 1879, it established the Rusum-i Sitte İdaresi to
service its internal debt and put it under the responsibility of the Galata Bankers, the
state’s main internal creditors. This unit administered the revenues from six most
reliable sources namely the taxes from tobacco, salt, stamps, spirits, fisheries, and
silk. This successful arrangement in debt payment inspired the arrangements made to
organize the payment of the state’s external debt. After a series of negotiations, the
government, the representatives of its external creditors (European holders of
Ottoman government bonds) and the Galata bankers agreed to the establishment of
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881. The government put
certain revenue sources, including the six sources indicated above, and their
management under the responsibility of OPDA. A seven-member executive
committee ran OPDA. One member represented the Dutch, Belgian and British
bondholders. Five members represented the French, German, Austrian, Italian and
Ottoman creditors, respectively. The seventh member was assigned to the Ottoman
Bank.62 Thus, the European creditors of the Ottoman government gained the right to
control a significant part of Ottoman tax revenue and to influence the production and
distribution patterns of the sources of these revenues, including the tobacco sector.
Europeans understood that the institutionalization was the basic principle of a
liberal economic system and the Ottoman Empire should improve its technology,
bureaucracy, and finances. Hence, they desired to directly control the revenues.
Having a more suitable and stable market for their products and money to pay for
them would create a win-win situation. This was the history of dependency and
development in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, dependency did not have
necessarily negative consequences. Dependency on European markets also provided
many opportunities for the Ottoman economy.63
62 Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control In The Ottoman Empire, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1929, p. 90.
63 See Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005.
24
In brief, what caused the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration was, not only internal reasons such as the creation of a central system
without a powerful finance branch, and the abolition of monopolies that created less
powerful merchants who could not compete with their Europeans competitors, but
also external reasons such as foreign debt, the great depression and European
interests.
Consequently, a state desiring to westernize its system while abolishing all
monopolies gave the right to manage its main revenues as a monopoly to foreign
creditors. However, the Ottomans saw OPDA as a lesser evil than the establishment
of an international committee that controlled Ottoman resources and finances, as it
was the case in Egypt.64 After that time, OPDA was like a poniard in the Empire’s
chest. If the state rid itself off this poniard, it would die in a short time. However, the
State learned how to live with a poniard in its chest. In fact, OPDA provided some
opportunities to the State. The statistics show, after a short time, OPDA employed
more officials than the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, OPDA, which controlled
more than a quarter of Ottoman revenues, showed the Ottomans how to create a
modern system in financial administration and tax management.
2.2. Tobacco from Tanzimat to the Régie
The history of tobacco production from Tanzimat to the establishment of the Régie
Company reflects the economic and social processes that the state desired to change
in the Tanzimat era. In this part, I will focus on changes in the taxation of tobacco
and the effects of illicit trade on the transformation of the taxation system. The State
tried to establish a State monopoly over tobacco because tobacco’s addictive nature
makes its taxation of rates that yield high revenue possible.
As argued above, one of the main aims of the Tanzimat was to regulate taxes.
There were fixed (maktu) taxes before the Tanzimat.65 After the Tanzimat, the State
changed these fixed taxes with the tithe, -öşür- and tried to collect it regularly. In
addition to the tithe, there were some taxes such as the zer’iyye resmi or the humus
64 Akarlı, p. 184.
65 For the changes in taxation of tobacco before Tanzimat, see Fehmi Yılmaz, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğunda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasi ve Ekonomik Tahlili 1600-1883, Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Marmara University, the Institute of Turkic Studies, İstanbul, 2005.
25
öşür in the 1850’s, but these taxes were not suitable in accordance to the treaties
with the Europeans. Hence, the State abrogated the taxes except tithe but in 1856,
license fee -Ruhsatiye resmi- was added to the tithe.66 Since the Crimean War
destroyed the finances of the State, the State doubled this new tax and requested that
all peasants who grew tobacco to pay it. It was not helpful for the State because the
price of tobacco rapidly increased. More importantly, people turned to smuggling
activities to escape these taxes.
The State established the first tobacco monopoly in 1861-2. The report of
Fuad Pasha is very informative about changes in tobacco related taxes.67 The main
goal of the State was to control and gain money from all processes related to tobacco
in the market. In 1862, Tobacco Regulations (Duhan Nizamnamesi) prohibited the
importation of tobacco and established a state monopoly over tobacco production
and sales. However, the illegal trade of tobacco was not clinched. The government
tried to stop smuggling by controlling the entrance of the cities and countries.68
Another new rule was to dispossess smugglers of tobacco and to reward the people
66 See Fatma-Suat Doğruel, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Tekel, Tekel Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000.
67 BOA DH-İD no: 32866/2, 21 February 1862, 9 September 1278. Quoted from Coşkun
Çakır, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Maliyesi, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001.
“… Devlet-i ‘Aliyyeleri içün mesârıfın açığını kapatmak ve düyûnunu tesviye etmek
zımnında iki memba-yı sahiha müracâ`at etmek lazım gelüb bunun birisi tezyîd-i vâridât ve
diğeri istikrâz maddeleridir. Memâlik-i şâhânelerinde umum vergü şahsa nisbet olundukda
takriben âdem başına kırk beş kuruş düşüb İngiltere’de üç yüz ve Fransa’da iki yüz elli
kuruşdan ziyade olduğu umûr-ı maliyyeden (malumeden) olarak şahıs üzerine ziyade vergü
düşmesi servet-i ahâlinin alâmeti olmağla vergü-yi şahsi az olan yerlerde vergüsü ağır olan
yerlere nisbetle tarh olunmak lazım gelmez ise de memâlik-i şâhânelerinin bazı yerlerinde
vergünün tarh usülü hakkında ıslahat-ı lâzimeye teşebbüs olunmakla beraber ekser
taraflarında bu usul mükemmel bir halde bulunmadığı ya’ni pek çok yerlerde vergünün
mikdarı dûn olduğu cihetle tahammülü olan yerlere âid olmak üzere vergü-yi umûminin
zamâime kabiliyyeti olduğu misillü vâridât-ı öşriyyenin bir çoğu mültezimler ellerinden
kurtarılarak onlara â’îd olan kâr ve temettu ile beraber doğrudan doğruya ahâli üzerine ihâle
kılınmış olduğu ve evrâk-ı sâhiha ve patent gibi her devlette vâridât-ı külliye veren şeylerin
nizâmâtı tecdîd ve ıslâh kılındığı cihetle bunlardan vâridât-ı külliye hâsıl olacağı misillü
mu’ahharan düvel-i mütehâbbe ile müceddeden `akd ve tanzim kılınmış olan mu`âhedât-ı
cedide-yi ticaret iktizaâsınca tütün ve tuz maddeleri yed-i vâhid usulüne girüb bunun
ihtiyacât-ı zaruriyyeden bir şey olmayub sırf sefâhate müte`allik olmasıyla her devlette
bundan vâridât-ı külliye istihsal olunduğu cihetle memâlik-i şâhânelerinde dahi emr-i
zira`ate halel vermeyecek suretle sarfiyât-ı dahiliyyesinde memleketin müsait ve
mütehammil olduğu yolda rüsûmat alınarak ibtidâ-yı emirde düvel-i sâirenin istihsal ettiği
derecede olmaz ise de yine bir külliyatlı âaridat istihsal edeceği ...”
68 Metin Ünal, “Tütünün Dörtyüz Yılı”, Tütün Kitabı, p. 23; Dığıroğlu, p. 22.
26
who reported the smugglers.69 When this attempt did not create the expected revenue
for the State, it gave the tobacco monopoly to a local company under the control of
two Galata bankers namely Zarifi Efendi and Hristaki Efendi.70 The local company
had right to collect tobacco revenues from the many districts of greater Istanbul and
some cities in the Marmara region. Many people including Namık Kemal criticized
this new company,71 but Istanbul Régie Company, did not make the extravagant
profits for which Namık Kemal accused it. Its managers chose to exit the tobacco
sector because they did not gain the expected revenues.72
When the Istanbul Régie Company failed, the officials decided to collect all
tobacco crops in the Rüsumat (Revenues) storehouses and give it to traders after they
paid the tax.73 The first monopoly was established when these attempts did not solve
the problem of contraband trafficking. They created the tobacco monopoly because
the State officials thought that, tobacco smuggling would be prohibited if the State
bought all tobacco crops directly from the producers and sold it to merchants. In
1874, the government promulgated a new regulation to allow everyone who desired
to grow tobacco in the Empire.74 The most important measure that this regulation
introduced was the obligation to put band-rolls on all tobacco packages. Thus, the
69 Dığıroğlu, p. 22, Düstur v. 1 n. 3 p. 364.
70 Haydar Kazgan, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Şirketleşme, Creative Yayıncılık, İstanbul,
1999, p. 106.
71 For a criticism of the Istanbul Regie Administration see Namık Kemal’s article in İbret
v.30/18 October 1872; Mustafa Nihat Özön, Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, Yapı Kredi
Yayınları, Istanbul 1998, p.143-148; İsmail Kara, Nergis Yılmaz Aydoğdu, Namık Kemal
Osmanlı modernleşmesinin meseleleri 1, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 157-162.
“Avrupa tezgahlarında fenn-i hukuk öğretenler; bu ne demek efendim, üç beş kişiden
mürekkep bir şirket teşkil etsin, İstanbul’da ticaretiyle ve tütün çıkan eyalette ziraatiyle
meşgul olan onbinlerce ve belki yüzbinlerce âhrâr-i beşeri hizmetkarlık nâmında olan esâreti
sâhîhâya mecburiyet halinde bulundursun. Tütünü Petro eksin, Mariçe toplasın, Yanko
kurutsun, Manol bohçalasın, Zahari İstanbul’a getirsin, Kostaki ayırsın, Mihail kıysın,
Panayot destelesin; bunların cümlesi mâhsûl-i saylarıyla karınlarını doyurmaya muktedir
olmasın; Zarifi, Hıristaki ellerin sıcak sudan soğuk suya sokmadıkları halde tütün sayesinde
milyonlarca para kazansın. Böyle şeyler hukukun hangi kâ’idesine tevâfuk eder diyorlar...”
Özön, p. 148.
72 Dığıroğlu, p. 26; Kazgan, p. 106.
73 Dığıroğlu, p. 22 notes 60.
74 Kazgan, p. 107; BOA İ.MM no: 2048, 6 July 1873; Doğruel, p. 53.
27
so-called “Band-roll” System began. According to the new regulations, cigarettes
packaged without a band-roll would be treated as smuggled tobacco.75 The Band-roll
system continued for five years until the foundation of the Rüsum-i Sitte (Six
Revenues) Administration. When, the State still could not pay its internal debt to
creditors known as the Galata Bankers, the government offered these creditors to
control the tax revenue from six basic products. Thus, the Rüsum-i Sitte
Administration began to control the taxes on tobacco. Unlike the earlier schemes,
this new arrangement managed to control smuggling and established an efficient
administration that created more suitable and secure market conditions for merchants
and villagers. The producers chose to sell their products officially in order to avoid
the risks of involvement in illicit activities.
According to officials of the Rüsum-i Sitte Administration, smuggling
occurred because the state recognized the right to freedom of growing
tobacco, did not control the areas in which tobacco are grown regularly and
the co-operation between the state officials and smugglers.76
Although the administration succeeded to reduce tobacco smuggling, there
were still large groups of smuggles in the Empire. The administration blamed the
provincial governors for their clandestine co-operation with the smugglers. The State
itself admitted to the corruption of the Ottoman officials. This is why Europeans
desired the foundation of a more powerful and better-organized corporation than the
Rüsum-i Sitte Administration.77
The Rüsum-i Sitte Administration was more successful than the earlier
arrangements concerning the taxation of tobacco sales. However, the lack of
adequate technology prevented it from building as effective a tax system as needed
to make the most of the six revenue sources under its charge. In addition, the lack of
a modern security force and the weakness of central authority in many cities enabled
75 Dığıroğlu, p. 27; BOA İ.MM no: 2048, 6 July 1873; Doğruel, p. 53.
76 Dığıroğlu, p. 29.
77 Many articles that appeared in European newspapers about Ottoman finances backed this
view. As an example of the desire for European control over Turkish finance and for the
success of Rüsum-i Sitte Administration see “A new experiment in Turkish Finance”,
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, October 9 1880, British
Periodicals, p. 452.
28
smuggled to continue to be engaged in contraband trafficking. In 1881, the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration (OPDA) was founded and the Rüsum-i Sitte
Administration was abolished. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration paid all of
the internal debts of the State. Then, the tobacco revenues were put under its control.
The bondholders of OPDA realized the need for more effective control over tobacco
sales in the Ottoman Empire and decided to establish a specialized organization to
control this crop in 1883.78 This Organization was called Société de la Régie Cointerésseé
des Tabacs del’Empire Ottoman (Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları
Müşterekü’l Menfaa Reji Şirketi) or simply, the Régie Company. It controlled nearly
140,000 tobacco farmers planting tobacco on 192,000 decares of land in the Ottoman
Empire.79
2.3. Société de la Régie Co-interésseé des Tabacs del’Empire Ottoman
The Régie Company controlled the tobacco revenue from 1883 to 1925. The Rüsumi
Sitte Administration had showed that the Ottoman Empire had sufficient crops and
raw materials but not enough properly trained people to control and develop this
resource.80 The Ottoman State was poor not because it lacked resources but because
of the mismanagement of its resources.81 Furthermore, the State did not raise enough
78 The Times published the revenues of OPDA from 1881 to 1883 and argued there was not
enough gain from tobacco and salt because of illicit trade. See “The Turkish Debt”, The
Times, Friday, 2 March 1883 p. 3, Issue 30757, column B.
79 Hüseyin Avni Şanda, Yarı Müstemleke Oluş Tarihi, Gözlem Yayınları, Ankara 1932, p.
86; According to Régie General Manager -Lui Ramber-, the square measure of tobacco
farms before the Régie Administration was 152.000 decares. See Hayri Mutluçağ, “Düyun-i
Umumiye ve Reji Soygunu”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, no: 2, p. 37.
80 For a new in European press about the success of Rüsum-i Sitte and demand for a new
tobacco monopoly see “The Financial Question in Turkey”, The Pall Mall Gazette (London,
England), 2 September 1881 Friday, Issue 5154.
Sourced from the British Library Gale Document Number: BB3200370592.
“We know that the six indirect contributions assigned to the Galata Bankers have yielded
under Mr. Hamilton Lang’s able administration nearly one and half million sterling during
the first year’s trial, and that their yield will undoubtedly increase in the future. If this
revenue could be set free for the bondholders by buying out the Galata Bankers, who have
the first lien on it, there would be a certainty of a small but perfectly secured dividend being
obtained on the Ottoman Debt.”
81 Akarlı, p. 146.
29
revenue from its sources because it lacked the infrastructure needed to manage them
as efficiently as possible.82 The success of the Rüsum-i Sitte officials in managing
the revenue sources put under its authority kindled foreign creditors desire to
manage tobacco sales. OPDA took charge of the Rüsum-i Sitte but after a short time,
its directors decided to put the task of controlling the tobacco revenue into the hands
of a new company that would have the required expertise, personnel and technology
to manage and improve the tobacco sector. An agreement was signed to establish the
Régie Company and the Régie Company was officially founded.83 Although the
Régie Administration was formally established in 27 May 1883, it went into action
in 14 April 1884.84 The company had the right to buy, produce and sell tobacco, and
to collect the taxes due on tobacco production in places where the Band-roll system
was enforced, except in Eastern parts of Rumelia.85
The agreement included twenty-nine articles. The first article was about the
founders and creditors of the company. They were the “Credit Anstald from
Vienna”, “Banker S. Bleichröder” and, “The Ottoman Bank and its
collaborators.”86 Article 7 explained what the state would earn from the tobacco
monopoly. The Régie Company would pay 750,000 Ottoman liras to OPDA every
year as a fixed annual fee. After the payment of this fee and the dividend, the rest of
the revenues of the company would be divide among the government, the Régie and
OPDA in accordance with the ratios indicated on the chart below.
82 Akarlı, p. 146.
83 This study will not explain each article in the Régie Company agreement. It only explains
the important articles of the agreement. For the whole parts of the agreement, see Düstur v.
IV, Dersaadet, 1302, p. 332-348.
84 Tiğinçe Oktar, “Osmanlı Devletinde Reji Şirketinin Kurulmasından Sonraki Gelişmeler”,
Tütün Kitabı p. 45; Ramazan Balcı & İbrahim Sırma Memalik-i Osmaniyede Osmanlı
Anonim Şirketleri, Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarih Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, p. 34.
85 Oktar, p. 46.
86 Düstur, v. IV p. 332; Gökdemir, p. 35; Dığıroğlu, p. 32.
30
Table 2. 1. Revenue Sharing of Tobacco Monopoly
Income /lira Ottoman Public Debt
Administration %
Ottoman Empire
%
Régie Company
%
1-500,000 35 30 35
500,000-1,000,000 34 39 27
1,000,000-1,500,000 30 52 18
1,500,000-2,000,000 20 70 10
2,000,000- + 15 75 10
Source: BOA, İ.MM. Nr: 3367 Quoted from Dığıroğlu, p. 34
As explained in the introduction, the State would help the Régie Company to
prohibit tobacco smuggling. However, the Régie would choose the officials whose
job would be to combat smugglers although the Ministry of Finance would designate
their uniforms.87
According to article 11, the main job of the Régie Company was to collect all
taxes in all provinces except the Province of Mount Lebanon (Cebel-i Lübnan) and
Crete.88 Article 14 promulgated two important points related to tobacco farmers:
first, the farmers would have to obtain a license to grow tobacco, and second, a
farmer had to have a farm larger than half decare to be able to obtain license to grow
tobacco.89 Another article concerning the farmers, article 16, stated that, the Régie
Company would build storehouses to keep the tobacco crops of the farmers safe for
two years. The farmers would not pay rent to the Régie Company for the first six
months for this service but do so for each subsequent six months. If the owner of the
products did not sell them in two years, the Régie Company would organize an
auction and if no one desired to buy the product, the Régie Company would buy it.90
If the farmer did not accept the price given by the Régie, two or three referees would
meet to set a new price and the Régie would buy the product at this new price.91
Finally, the company would provide credit without interest to farmers who desired to
87 Düstur, v. IV p. 334 article 7; Gökdemir, p. 36.
88 Mehmet Hakan Sağlam, Osmanlı Borç Yönetimi Duyun-i Umumiyye 1879-1891, Tarih
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 170.
89 Düstur, v. IV p. 334 article 14; Sağlam, p.172.
90 Düstur, v. IV p. 334 article 18; Sağlam, p. 174; Gökdemir, p. 38.
91 Düstur, v. IV p. 334 article 19; Sağlam, p.175; Gökdemir, p. 38.
31
improve their tobacco growing techniques and equipment.92 Another regulation was
prepared soon after to define the mutual responsibilities of the farmers and the Régie
officials.93
According to Edgar Vincent’s report in 1882, which was published by many
European newspapers, the proposed system of tobacco monopoly in the Ottoman
Empire was similar to that of the Régie Company of Italy. There were two key
points for its successful operation. First, the company had to prohibit the growing of
tobacco for personal consumption. Hence, the agreement forbad licenses to farmers
whose field was smaller than half a decare. Second, the company should need
assistance to stop the contraband issue.94 In another report, Mr. Bourkeabout
supported the ideas of Edgar Vincent’s ideas stating “a régie is the only practical
means largely increasing the tobacco revenue, and of successfully combating the
extensive system of contraband which prevails in Turkey”95
In fact, the Ottoman government had begun to implement most of the
measures included in these articles and the Régie’s agreement under the Band-roll
system and the Rüsum-i Sitte Organization. The Régie Company did not invent
them. Likewise, The government had been concerned about improving the farmers’
conditions and the technology available to them if in order to increase its revenue
from the tobacco sector. In short, the traditional ways in the tobacco sector had
already begun to dissolve early in the second half of nineteenth century. There was
continuity between the Tobacco Regulations (Duhan Nizamnamesi) of 1862 and the
agreement that regulated the Régie Company.
The Régie Company, however, established a creative and effective
administration in many provinces of the Empire. It built a factory in Istanbul and
Izmir in 1884 and in Samsun, Aleppo, Adana, Damascus, Beirut, and Manisa shortly
92 Düstur, v. IV p. 334 article 15; Sağlam, p.172; Dığıroğlu, p. 34.
93 This new articulation and its implications will be analyzed in chapter three. For the new
agreement, see Düstur, 1st Tertip, v.1 n.5 p. 696.
94 Mr. Vincent's Report on “The Turkish Debt”, The Times, 30 October 1882 Monday, p. 4,
Issue 30651, column B.
95 Mr. Bourke's Report on “The Turkish Debt Settlement”, The Times, 12 January 1882,
Thursday, p. 7, Issue 30402, col. F. The new also included a brief of the agreement between
the State and the Régie Company.
32
thereafter.96 The Régie Administration established offices where tobacco was grown.
In addition, the company had almost in each district an official whose job was to
oversee the tobacco sector and to report on the smuggling issue. For instance,
according to yearbooks of the Trabzon Province, the Régie Company did not have
any inspector in districts such as Atina, Hopa, Gumuşhane, Çarşamba, Terme, Fatsa
or the villages of Gümüşhane such as Torul, and Şiran in 1892.97 Yet, the annual
report of 1898 indicates the Régie Company employed at least one employee in each
of these places even if there was not a great development on the tobacco sector.98
Evidently, one of the main jobs of the company was to report and to control the
tobacco trade in the State. Hence, the company put its employees in strategic places.
The company established a branch in the Province of Trabzon in 1883. Its
aim was to govern the local tobacco sector. Hence, the provincial headquarters of the
company was not in the center of Trabzon but in the city Canik. The branch had a
director, an accountant and his assistant, cashier, (sandık emini), an appraiser
(muhammin), his two lieutenants (muhammin muavini, muhammin mülazımı) a
storekeeper and his assistant (ambar memuru ve refiki), an agricultural clerk and his
two assistants (ziraat katibi ve muavini), inspector on the commercial warehouse and
two guards working under him (tüccar ambar müfettişi ve 2 muhafızı), and two
clerks for the tithe (aşar katipleri).99 The districts in which there was a tobacco
factory, such as Bafra, also had tobacco experts.100 In 1884, the Régie Company
employed 4,500 people. The number of its workers reached 5,602 in 1887 and 8,800
96 Vedat Eldem Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik, Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1994, p. 77; Melda Yaman Öztürk, Nuray Ertürk Keskin,
“Osmanlı’da Yabancı Yatırımlar Duyun-i Umumiye ve Tütün Rejisi”, Memleket, Siyaset,
Yönetim v. 6 n. 16. 2011, p. 133; As a vital study about the tobacco workers in the Régie
warehouses and factories see Can Nacar, Tobacco Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire:
Fragmentation, Conflict, and Collective Struggle, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation,
Binghamton University State University of New York, the Department of History, New
York, 2010.
97 Salname-i Vilayet-i Trabzon 1310/1892.
98 SVT 1316/1898.
99 SVT, 1322/1904, “Akçaabad Reji Da’iresi” p. 317.
100 SVT, 1322/1904, “Bafra Reji Dairesi” p. 347.
33
in 1889101. There were 13,969 people working for the Tobacco Régie
Company in 1911.102 From 1886 to the end of the Régie’s tobacco monopoly, most
of its employees worked in the Régie Police Force.
The Régie Company became an important and prestigious company.
Transferring to the Régie Company for many officials who worked for The Ottoman
Public Debt Administration and the Ministry of Finance was like a job promotion.103
For instance, the salaries of the Régie’s provincial managers were higher than the
salaries of the many government employees in managerial positions. According to
Nusret’s Tütün Meselesi published in 1910, the salary of first class head managers of
the Régie was between 6,000-7,500 liras; and 4,000-5,500 liras for the second-class
managers.104 Although, Kazgan states that the high-ranking Régie officials received
higher salaries than those of the ministers. Nusret’s statistics and the information in
Namık Kemal and Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil’s memoir, however, suggest that Kazgan’s
statement is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Régie Company
paid high salaries and provided social prestige to its employees, especially to its
managerial personnel. Régie had more than a hundred personnel in high managerial
positions and most of them were foreigners.105
In its first years, the Régie did not gain the expected revenue. The single
most important effect of this situation was the problem of Egypt. Until 1884, there
was an agreement between the Ottoman and Egyptian governments according to
which Egypt would import tobacco only from the Ottoman Empire.106 However,
after the Régie Company was established, two important changes occurred in the
tobacco sector of Egypt. First, 450 private tobacco factories were shut down in the
101 Öztürk, Keskin, p. 143; Quataert, p. 16.
102 See the table in Eldem, p. 141.
103 Kazgan, p. 114.
104 Nusret, Tütün Meselesi, Zaman Matbaası, Selanik 1326, p. 337; Mehmet Akpınar, Reji
İdaresi (1908-1925), Unpublished Master thesis, Karadeniz Technical University, the
Department of History, Trabzon, 1998 p. 60.
105 Kazgan, p. 114.
106 Parvus Efendi, Türkiye’nin Mali Tutsaklığı, edited by Muammer Sencer, May Yayınları,
Istanbul, 1977, p. 159.
34
Ottoman Empire and most of these producers moved their companies to Egypt.107
Second, Egypt, which was one of the best markets for Ottoman tobacco, protested
the foundation of a tobacco monopoly and began to import tobacco from other
countries.108 Hence, the Régie Company did not make the expected revenues from
the exportation of Ottoman tobacco to Egypt, gaining only 90,000 Ottoman liras
instead of 150,000 Ottoman liras from tobacco exports to Egypt in its first year.109
The Company solicited support from the Palace to protest the new tobacco deal
between Egypt and Greece, but the political atmosphere was not suitable to support
the company.110 Nevertheless, the Porte worked on canceling the new deal between
Egypt and Greece because Egypt was one of the most crucial markets for Ottoman
tobacco.111 The Ottoman Public Debt Administration resolved the problem by
accepting the following terms. First, it would provisionally bear 100,000 sterling for
the losses (which were estimated at 210,000 sterlings) that the Régie sustained in
Egypt during the past two years. Second, it would bear one half of the rest of its
losses during the last two years. Finally, it would reduce export duties from ten to
five piastres per oke.112
2.4. The Relationship between the Régie Company and the State
Many people in the Empire viewed the Régie Company as a problem. Many officers
wrote about the need to dissolve the Régie Company and to establish a state
monopoly. In addition, as explained below, many peasants from different provinces
107 A.D Noviçev, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Yarı-Sömürgeleşmesi, Onur Yayınları,
Ankara, 1979, p.89; Donald Quataert gives different numbers for closing factories.
According to him, approximately 300 factories were closed. See Quataert, p. 17.
108 Parvus Efendi p. 159.
109 Kazgan, p. 113.
110 For a new about the Régie’s protest to the new deal between Egypt and Greece see
Liverpool Mercury (Liverpool, England), 23 April 2884, Wednesday, Issue 11320. Sourced
from the British Library, Gale Document Number: Y3204263690.
111 Birmingham Daily Post (Birmingham, England), 28 April 1884, Monday, Issue 8057.
Sourced from the British Library, Gale Document Number: BC3201035078.
112 “The Turkish Tobacco Régie”, The Times, 11 March 1886, Thursday, p. 5, Issue 31704,
column E.
35
sent to Istanbul petitions complaining about the harsh conditions imposed by the
Régie. Neither the state officials, nor the people liked and supported the Régie
Company’s policies. The representative of British bondholders at OPDA, Adam
Block explains the position of the Régie as follows, “the monopoly is not popular …
The Government is much to blame for their indifference, but as in England
smugglers have the sympathy of the people, and the Government cannot but act with
leniency.”113 However, the technological developments introduced by the Régie
helped improve tobacco production and preservation.
The revenues from the tobacco sector increased during the 1900s although
smuggling problem persisted. The company was one of the important resources to
which the Ottoman government could turn to receive an advance in order to deal
with an urgent fiscal problem. The Régie and the State had a shared interest in the
elimination of smuggling because the State took a certain percentage of the returns
of the Régie Company. In addition, as explained above, a certain percentage of the
revenues went to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to pay for foreign debt,
which the government was eager to eliminate as quickly as possible to secure its
future.114 Despite these benefits, the company was the object of continuous criticism
for its monopolistic hold over one of the most important crops in the Empire. Many
people advised alternative solutions instead of a foreign monopoly over tobacco.
According to these people, the losses did not match the gains. For instance, the
revenue from tobacco before the company was 737,466 Ottoman liras in 1882.115
Although, there were developments in the tobacco sector, such as new storehouses,
and possibilities of receiving credit without interest, the revenues of the government
did not increase until 1902.116 The main reason of the stagnation of the revenues was
the problem of infrastructure. The company made investments to develop the
conditions in the sector. Improvements in infrastructure affected revenues positively
113 Quoted from Angelos Chotzidis, “Fighting Contraband in the European Provinces of the
Ottoman Empire (1881-1912): European Bondholders vs Ottoman Smugglers and Peasants”,
presented in the panel namely Greece and The Changing International System in London
School of Economics, London, 3 June 2011, p. 3.
114 Akarlı, p. 185.
115 Parvus Efendi, p. 159.
116 Parvus Efendi, p. 160.
36
after 1902. However, the government’s share from tobacco revenues in 1883-1914
remained lower than the original expectations.
Table 2.2. The Government’s Share from Tobacco117
Year
Government’s
income
(in
Ottoman
liras)
1885-­‐6
650,000
1886-­‐7
688,000
1887-­‐8
700,850
1888-­‐9
732,428
1890-­‐1
738,286
1896-­‐7
701,696
1898-­‐9
700,000
Source: Parvus Efendi, Türkiye’nin Mali Tutsaklığı, edited by Muammer Sencer,
İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1977.
Overall, the State developed an ambivalent attitude toward the Régie
Company. The State sometimes supported the policies of the company in the
provinces but at other times, it supported tobacco producers or illegal tobacco traders
who consisted of a few people. It was an act. The memoirs of Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil,
Lui Ramber, and Hüseyin Kazım Kadri as well as some of Namık Kemal’s letters
give an idea about the State’s views of the Régie Company.118
Lui Ramber became the general manager of the Régie Company in 1900 and
continued to work for the company until 1916.119 Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil and Namık
Kemal also worked for the company. Since these people were employers of the
Régie Company, their main tendency may have been to defend it against criticism.
Nevertheless, when we use their memoirs and letters in conjunction with archival
and other sources, they show us the factors that influenced the State’s attitude
towards the Régie.
From its first years, people had prejudices about the tobacco monopoly. A
letter of Namık Kemal addressing the government in Istanbul illustrates this point.
117 Parvus Efendi, p. 160. The government’s share also included the share of OPDA.
118 For detail information, see Lui Ramber, Abdülhamit Dönemine Ait Gizli Notlar, edited by
Ömer Hakan Özalp, Özgü Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011. Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil, Kırk Yıl, Özgür
Yayınları, İstanbul, 2008. Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyet’e Hatıralarım,
edited by İsmail Kara, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000. Feyziye Abdullah Tansel, Namık
Kemal’in Mektupları, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1986.
119 Ramber, p. 28.
Year
Government’s
income
(in
Ottoman
liras)
1902-­‐4
871,346
1905-­‐6
811,623
1906-­‐7
800,479
1908-­‐9
920,469
1910-­‐11
913,702
1911-­‐12
946,852
1912-­‐13
916,538
37
He talks about the prejudice of the State officials against the Régie employees and
requests the fair trial of a person who worked for the Régie Company.120
According to Ramber, government officials and Other Ottomans turned the
Régie into a scapegoat for the problems they encountered. He recounted that the
Ministry of Finance requested advances frequently and the Régie Company felt
obliged to give advances when the State asked.121 Interestingly, Ramber noted that
while his main concern was to secure the assistance of gendarmes against tobacco
smugglers, even the Minister of Finance smoked smuggled tobacco. He wrote in his
diaries that, the minister smoked this illegal tobacco especially when Ramber
attended official meetings at the Porte.122
Smoking smuggled tobacco had of course symbolic meanings. The minister
of finance desired to show the power of the State but he also desired to use the
smuggling issue as a trump card in the government’s negotiations with the Régie.123
Indeed, as this study explains in Chapter III, the minister was bluffing when he tried
to intimidate the Régie administrator. The control of smuggling tobacco depended on
the government’s ability to maintain law and order in its territories for the sake of
public wellbeing. However, the government did not have sufficient power and means
to fulfill these goals effectively. Hence, the Finance Minister’s attitude was probably
a bluff against the company.
Halid Ziya joined the Régie administrators in meetings with government
officials in his capacity as translator of the Régie. He argues, State officials kept
them waiting for hours for a five-minute session.124 He also states in his diaries that
the State officials and many others who were against the company were working to
build public public support for the liquidation of the Régie Company.125
120 TDV İSAM, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Evrakı, 13/861, 22 Mart 1300.
121 Ramber p. 176, 18 May 1901. “The new Finance Minister requested 200,000 Ottoman
liras as advance”; 28 June 1902, p. 148; 24 April 1903, p. 176.
122 Ramber p. 199, 25 May 1902.
123 For the state’s position against tobacco smugglers, see Chapter III.
124 Uşaklıgil, p. 757.
125 Uşaklıgil, p. 558 “pek aşikar bir hakikat vardı: Saray, hükümet, halk İdarenin ortadan
kaldırılmasını bekliyordu.”
38
The State officials also worked to prevent the integration of the Régie
Company with the common Ottoman people. Two important examples should
illustrate this point. One is the confiscation of Régie goods that had an Ottoman coat
of arms on them because the government did not allow the company to use the
Imperial Insignia (Arma-i Şahane).126 Indeed the State not only blocked the use of
Ottoman coat of arms but also prevented the spread of impressions the Régie was an
Ottoman company. The company wanted to use imperial insignia to prove it was one
of the main parts of the Ottoman government in the hope to win the support of the
people. In addition, the Régie Company produced cigarettes with such brand names
as Ramadan, sacred month for Muslims, to cultivate good relations with the
population. Moreover, the company showed an interest in social problems, as the
second example should illustrate. The Régie Company made efforts to help poor
people in Istanbul. It threw a ballroom party on the Princess Island Prinkipo
(Büyükada) in 1893. The funds raised in the party would be distributed to poor
people. Sultan Abdul Hamid II made an effort to hamper attendance to this party.127
Nadir Özbek emphasizes the Sultan’s reaction to the party because such events
undermined moral values. However, the Sultan’s reaction was probably due also to
his unwillingness to support an activity organized by the Régie Company. Moral
concerns might have been a factor but because the organizer of the event was the
Régie, the Sultan probably became doubly sensitive for the State’s kept nipping the
Régie’s effort to win the support of the public.
The Régie Company kept looking for solutions to smooth its relations with
the public and the State. The Régie administrators stated that the society did not
support the company because of the Ottoman government’s unwillingness to provide
protection. They blamed the State for the lack of support they needed to fulfill the
role conferred upon them.128 One day, the Régie administrators invited Halid Ziya to
126 Ramber, p. 159; Selim Deringil, Simgeden Millete II.Abdulhamid’den Mustafa Kemal’e
Devlet ve Millet, İletişim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2009, p. 73.
127 Nadir Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Sosyal Devlet Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet
1876-1914, İletişim Yayınları, Istanbul 2011, p. 262.
128 For a new about the meeting of Régie Administrators see “The Manchester Guardian
(1828-1900) 15 December 1897” Historical Newspapers: the Guardian (1821-2003) and the
Observer (1791-2003), p. 8.
39
their general meeting. They asked Halid Ziya how they could diminish the hatred of
Muslims against them. Halid Ziya answered the company had to have more Turkish
employees. If they did so, they could solve the problems with the State officers and
the people alike.129
Some state officials kept looking for new opportunities to replace the Régie
Company. The Minister of Internal Affairs prepared a report about how the State
could create a new system instead of the Régie Company. However, according to the
agreements that led to the foundation of the Régie Company, the Ottoman Public
Debt Administration would haved to run the new tobacco monopoly if the Régie was
abolished.130 Moreover, there was not an alternative offer from different companies
to manage the tobacco monopoly. In 1902, the State decided to not abrogate the
Régie Company.131 An American entrepreneur offered a new deal for exclusive
rights to operate tobacco cultivation and sales in the Ottoman Empire on 9 February
1908.132 The offer was better than the Régie Company’s, but the State did not find a
suitable way to accept it. Actually, the Sultan knew that nobody could make much
profit from tobacco if the State did not prevent smuggling. Hence, within six days,
on 3 February 1908, the Sultan sent a memorandum to the provinces asking the
governors to take the necessary measures to obstruct tobacco smuggling.133
After the 1908 coup d-etat, the new assembly also questioned the Régie
Company and searched for the possibility to establish a new office to manage the
tobacco monopoly. 134 Most of the people in the assembly supported the
establishment of a state-run tobacco monopoly. The cartoon “the Ottoman Milk
Cow” below illustrates that the main aim of the government after 1908 was to create
state monopolies over the main sources of tax incomes. The deputies argued that
129 Uşaklıgil, p. 828.
130 Mutluçağ, p. 37.
131 Mutluçağ, p. 39.
132 Hayri Mutluçağ, “Reji İdaresinin Satın Alınması İçin II.Abdulhamid’e Yapılan Rüşvet
Teklifi”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, no. 2, 1967, p. 40.
133 BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 14/35, 3 February 1908, 21 Kanunisani 1323.
134 Mehmet Akpınar, “II.Meşrutiyet Meclisi’nce Reji’nin Sorgulanması”, Osmanlı
Ansiklopedisi v. 3 p. 614.
40
international companies made money from their resources and now it was time for
the state to benefit from its own resources. However, as in the Hamidian Era, the
new regime was in urgent need for cash and turned to the Régie for a substantial
advance to pay the needs of the army during the Balkan Wars.135 The Régie
Company succeeded to extend its rights over the Turkish blend and reached a new
agreement with the State. The Company gave 1,700,000 Turkish liras as advance
with 5% interest to the state in 1913.136 Thus, the company continued to control
Turkish tobacco crops until 1925.
Figure 2. 1. The Ottoman Milk Cow
Source: Palmira Brummet Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary
Press, 1908-1911, Albany: State University of New-York Press, 2000 p. 172.
The discussions above should illustrate the negative attitudes of the
government towards the Régie Company. Chapter III describes the attitudes of
Ottoman society in general towards the Régie Company in order to provide a fuller
135 Cemal Paşa, Hatıralar, prepared by Alpay Kabacalı, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları,
İstanbul, 2010, p. 58. “…Mösyo Weyl, Reji imtiyaz müddetinin 15 yıl daha uzatılması
şartıyla hükümete 1,5000,000 lira borç vereceğini vaat ediyor ve Maliye Nazırı Rıfat Beyle
Dahiliye Nazırı Talat Bey, vekiller heyeti kararı ile bu teklifi kabul ediyorlardı.”
136 Mehmet Akpınar, “Reji Uygulamasına Trabzon Örneği”, Trabzon Tarihi p. 551; Hayri
Sevimay Cumhuriyet’e Girerken Ekonomi, Kazancı Hukuk, İstanbul, 1995, p. 329.
41
picture. The generally partial pictures that scholars and authors draw of the Ottoman
Régie is a hurdle this thesis tries to overcome. According to some memoirs, the main
reason of the increasing tobacco smuggling was clandestine support of the
government.137 It is a not a baseless allegation, but its implications are questionable.
In fact, the political atmosphere was affecting the decisions of the people. The State
is an abstraction of various interacting forces, developments, and individuals. Hence,
it is not possible to expect a fixed, predetermined reaction from the State. In general,
the Ottoman elites’ dislike of the Régie’s monopoly over tobacco was normal
because one of the most reliable sources of government’s revenue was under the
control of foreign investors. The government wanted to stop this but fiscal and other
problems prevented it from achieving this goal.
The comic –Leaping the Tobacco Régie - illustrates this situation. While the
government was discussing the creation of a state monopoly over tobacco in the
Assembly, the Régie’s advance during the Balkan Wars secured the extensions of the
Régie’s tobacco monopoly. The cartoon published in Kalem criticizes this situation
and shows Grand Vizier İbrahim Hakkı Paşa as the athlete hurdling over the Régie’s
tobacco monopoly. 138 However, this dislike in itself does not prove that the
government supported the smugglers. As argued above, rationally speaking, an
increase in the Régie’s revenues would help the Ottomans pay back their foreign
debt and have a free hand to shape their future. Sultan Abdul Hamid’s memorandum
about tobacco smugglers explains this situation best.139 This document will be
analyzed in Chapter III to explain why the State as well disliked tobacco smugglers
and desired to diminish the adverse effect of smuggling on tobacco revenues.
137 Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil also argued that the government helped the smugglers. See
Uşaklıgil, p. 728.
138 Palmira Brummet, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-
1911, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2000, p. 178.
139 BOA.Y.PRK.DH. 14/35, 3 February 1908, 21 Kanunisani 1323. Quoted from
Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri, Klasik Yayınları, Istanbul 2008, p. 238.
42
Figure 2. 2. Leaping the Tobacco Régie
Source: Palmira Brummet Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary
Press, 1908-1911, Albany: State University of New-York Press, 2000 p. 179.
2.5. The Province of Trabzon
Each Ottoman Province was constituted of a group of sub-provinces called –
sancaks-. Each sub-province had its own districts –kazas- and sub-districts –nahiyesand
villages –kura. The main duty of the governor of a province was to oversee the
administration of its sancaks. The officials in charge of sancaks were responsible to
the provincial governor and to the Ministry of Internal Affairs through him. Senior
Bureaucrats of the Ministry of Internal Affairs oversaw the work of governors. He
worked under the Grand Vizier who represented the Sultan and was responsible to
him. The Imperial council led by the Grand Vizier, appointed the governors but with
the Sultan’s approval. The administrative system of Trabzon operated within this
bureaucratic hierarchy.
43
Figure 2.3. The Map of Province of Trabzon
Source: Osmanlı Atlası, XX.Yüzyıl Başları, edited by Rahmi Tekin & Yaşar Baş,
İstanbul: OSAV 2003.
The Province of Trebizond (Trabzon) was in the northeast of the Ottoman
Empire, on the shores of the Black-Sea in the north, and neighboring the Province of
Erzurum on the east, Russia on the northeast, and the Province of Sivas on the south
and the Province of Kastamonu on the west.140 According to the 1892 Almanac of
Trabzon, it included four sancaks namely Trabzon, Canik, Lazistan, and
Gümüşhane. The Sancak of Trabzon was the main sancak of the Province and its
districts were Akçaabad, Giresun, Ordu, and Tirebolu, Of, Sürmene, Görele, and
Vakfıkebir. The kazas of Canik were Samsun, Bafra, Çarşamba, Fatsa, Ünye, and
Terme. Lazistan’s kazas were Rize, Atina, and Hopa. Lastly, Gümüşhane’s kazas
were Şiran, Torul, and Kelkit. The province covered an area 22,558 square
kilometers in 1911.141 Its population was 1,056,293 in 1885, 1,164,827 in 1897,
1,342,778 in 1906, and 1,122,947 in 1914.142 Trabzon was a port city that connected
Erzurum, Bitlis, and other southern provinces to the Black-Sea. In addition, Trabzon
was a gate for foreign and native merchants who did business in Tabriz and Iran or
140 Şakir Şevket, Trabzon Tarihi, prepared by İsmail Hacıfettahoğlu, Trabzon Belediyesi
Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 80.
141 Abdülvahap Hayri, İktisadi Trabzon, prepared by Melek Öksüz, Serander Yayınları,
Trabzon, 2008, p.14.
142 Stanfard Shaw, “The Ottoman Census System and Population”, International Journal of
Middle East Studies, Vol.9 No.3 1978, p. 325-338.
44
in Russia and other parts of the Black Sea region. Trabzon had a sufficiently robust
economy to maintain a steady population. Travelers wrote about the importance of
trade in Trabzon. For example, Baron Julius Von Minutoli who visited Trabzon as a
traveler in 1860 underlined the importance of trade in the city.143 In addition, the
1875 Almanac gives the list of companies engaged in trade between Trabzon and
Istanbul.144 However, after Russia constructed the railways connecting Poti and
Tiflis and the Caucasus and Iran to Europe, and after the establishment of the Suez
Canal, the importance of Trabzon in transit trade decreased.145 Many Europeans
preferred these new routes. The importance of Samsun increased as an alternative
port because Samsun had a more suitable location than Trabzon for products
exported from and imported to Anatolia. In other words, the decline of the Ottoman
Empire’s effectiveness in transit affected Trabzon adversely but the growing
integration of Anatolia into world economy contributed to the rise of Samsun as an
important port. For instance, the almanacs of 1885 indicate that, while Trabzon’s
exports including transit goods coming from Iran totaled to 519,990 Sterling Pounds;
the Samsun’s export amounted to 595,000 Sterling Pounds. In 1890, these numbers
were estimated at 695,155 Sterling Pounds for the port of Trabzon and 1,033,455 for
Samsun.146 Table 2.3 compares the value of trade at major ports of the Province of
Trabzon. The decrease in the volume of regular trade between Tabriz and Trabzon
probably made the Ottoman government slacken the security measures on this routs,
judging by the escalation of illicit trade on it.
143 İlhan Pınar, 19. Yüzyıl Anadolu Şehirleri: Manisa, Edirne, Kütahya, Ankara, Trabzon,
Antalya, Diyarbakır, Konya, İzmir, Akademi Kitabevi, İzmir, 1998, p. 117. “Trabzon is an
important trade center. Ruble plays a crucial role in the trade between Trabzon and Russia.
While, the Austrians, the French and Turks were providing a connection between Istanbul
and Trabzon, the Russians operated the trade between Batumi and Trabzon. Of course
smuggling takes an important part in this trade.”
144 SVT 1875/1296 p.88; The days, the stations and the origin of ships quoted from Kudret
Emiroğlu, Trabzon Vilayet Salnamesi, Trabzon İli ve İlçeleri Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal
Yardımlaşma Vakfı, Ankara, 1993, c. 7, p. 235.
145 A. Üner Turgay, “Port-Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean 1800-1914, Fall, 1993”,
Trabzon in Review, Fernand Braudel Center, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 435-465, p.452.
146 Turgay, p. 453.
45
Table 2. 3. Trade of the Major Ports of the Province of Trabzon in 1889 (in £)
Source: Great Britain, The House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, LXXXV
(1901): 759 Quoted from A. Üner Turgay, Port Cities of the Eastern
Mediterranean147
Tobacco was first cultivated in Akçaabad in the eighteenth century.148
Although, we do not have the evidence to determine the exact starting date of
tobacco cultivation in the province, Bıjişkiyan who was a traveler, reported about
tobacco farms that existed in Trabzon in 1817.149 The tobacco farmers exported
1,200,000 kilograms of tobacco according to Almanacs of 1877 and 1878. Tobacco
production increased to approximately 3,000,000 kilograms in Akçaabad in 1914.150
The Régie Company went into action in Akçaabad on 3 August 1886 and established
warehouses to keep the tobacco produce safe.151
Tobacco was the major cash crop of the Province of Trabzon. Bafra,
Çarşamba, and Akçaabad were the places where tobacco was cultivated intensively.
Tobacco was grown in many other places as well, including Atina, Rize,
147 Quoted from Turgay, pp. 435-465.
148 İbrahim Güler, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Trabzon’un Sosyal ve Ekonomik Durumuna Ait
Tesbitler”, Trabzon Tarihi Sempozyumu Bildirileri: 6-8 Kasım 1998, Kemal Çiçek, Kenan
İnan, Hikmet Öksüz, Abdullah Saydam, Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Trabzon,
2000, p. 327-351, p. 339; Şakir Şevket, p. 87 “Mervidir ki duhân mahsûlü Trabzonca en
evvel işbu nâhîyenin Sera Deresi kâriyesinde icâd olunmuş imiş.”
149 Dığıroğlu, p. 43.
150 Muzaffer Lermioğlu, Akçaabat Tarihi, Kardeşler Basımevi, İstanbul, 1949, p. 18.
151 Lermioğlu, p.19.
46
Gümüşhane, Samsun, and Livane. The Almanac of 1898 indicates that people grew
tobacco on 100,000 decares and estimates the total production to be 10,000,000
kilograms for 1898. Bafra and Samsun produced 6,000,000 kilograms of tobacco.
Akçaabad, Yomra and Maçka grew 4,000,000 kilograms. 152 One-third of the
production was exported and the rest was sold in the internal market.153 In 1909,
tobacco farmers of Trabzon earned approximately 10,000,000 kurushes for
2,855,000 kilograms tobacco and farmers in Samsun and Bafra gained around
58,000,000 kurushes for 5,744,000 kilograms of tobacco. Because, the products of
Bafra were more valuable than Akçaabad and Maçka’s products, tobacco farmers of
Samsun and Bafra received about ten kurushes per kilo while the farmers of Trabzon
gained only three and a half kurushes. However, the farms in Akçaabad and Maçka
were more productive than Bafra according to the statistics of 1909. The table below
shows that the average size of the cultivated area in Samsun was larger than the area
cultivated in Trabzon. This is because while the Régie Company was eager to pay
for development in Samsun, it did not try to improve the farmers’ condition in
Trabzon. The main aim of the company was to improve the yield of farms that were
larger than ten decares. However, the company was unhappy about the productivity
of tobacco fields in both Samsun and Trabzon, because it was lower than the
countrywide average. For this reason, it used the kolcus to control tobacco
cultivation and shopkeepers and tried to increase the cultivation. There were many
complaints of farmers about the Régie Company because of kolcus and Régie’s
attitudes toward them. Chapter III will shed light on these complaints and explain
that farmers cooperated with smugglers or participated in illicit tobacco cultivation
and sales mostly because of the harsh conditions they faced. The statistics in the
almanacs are official numbers based on government records. They exclude smuggled
tobacco. If we added those figures as well, the significance of tobacco for the
Province of Trabzon would be clearer.
152 SVT 1898/1316, p.201; Dığıroğlu, p. 44.
153 SVT 1898/1316, p.201; Dığıroğlu, p. 44.
47
Table 2. 4. Statistics about Tobacco Production in the Selected Cities of the Province of
Trabzon in 1909154
Tobacco
Farms
(Decare)
Tobacco
Production
(Tone)
Tobacco
Price
(Krs) (1000)
Average of
Price/Tone
Yield
Kg/Hectare
Rize 2,500 2 9 3,897 9
Samsun 88,280 5,744 58,206 10,133 708
Trabzon 30,199 2,855 10,012 3,507 1,028
Country-
Wide
523,374 31,237 193,481 6,194 649
Source: Osmanlı Dönemi Tarım İstatistikleri 1909, 1913, 1914 Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi c.3
prepared by Prof. Tevfik Güran
Table 2. 5. Statistics about the Population, The Number of Farms and The size of the
Farms
City Population Cultivated
Area
(Decare)
Farmers
(House)
The
farms
little
than 10
decares
The
Farms
between
10-50
decares
The
farms
more
than 50
decares
Average
size of
the
farms
Rize 158,790 164,240 22,558 18,430 2,986 1,142 7.3
Samsun 257,223 1,002,321 50,101 9,605 29,836 10,660 20
Trabzon 352,944 880,350 54,922 22,081 23,841 9,000 16
Country-
Wide
8,092,400 32,307,801 1,107,815 291,001 535,249 281,575 29.2
Source: Osmanlı Dönemi Tarım İstatistikleri 1909, 1913, 1914 Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi c.3
prepared by Prof. Tevfik Güran, p. 28-29
154 The nation wide section in the table covered the cities of Turkish Republic and not all the
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Also the data were calculated in accordance to the tithe
that is collected from farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture firstly calculated the tobacco
production and then the area that tobacco farms covered. These calculations were based on
the tithe tax. See Güran, p. XVIII
48
CHAPTER III
3. The Illicit Tobacco Trade
3.1. The Definition of Smuggling
This chapter analyzes the concept of crime in late Ottoman Empire. It examines the
attitudes of the people, the government, and the Régie Company towards smugglers
in the Empire. As it will be explained, all of these actors defined the smuggling
according to their own interests and for this reason this chapter will differentiate
these actors as different elements. In addition, the chapter looks into the security
problem in the provinces where the smugglers caused chaos confusion. A discussion
of the role of the Régie police forces (kolcu) and the gendarmerie aims at completing
the picture. Finally, the chapter examines the function of the governors of the
Province of Trabzon. All of these notions should help us understand the role of illicit
tobacco traders in a specific province of the Empire. This chapter also summarizes
the problems between the Régie Company and tobacco farmers in an effort to
establish how the company’s policies affected the people’s choices about joining or
supporting smugglers.155
Nowadays, there is a tendency to study social definition of the concept of
crime in the Ottoman Empire among historians.156 It is the result of watching history
by using a microscope instead of a telescope. In other words, the change in modern
historiography oriented young generations to do research on societies instead of
states. In addition, historians, unlike sociologists, shun meta-narratives. Metanarratives
call for generalizations. However, the postmodern challenge in modern
historiography, showed the need to simplify details to explain some estimations. For
155 The problems between the Régie Company and tobacco farmers were expatiated in the
studies of Fatma-Suat Doğruel, Donald Quataert, Filiz Dığıroğlu, Oktay Gökdemir, Mehmet
Akpınar and many others. Almost all of the archival sources were used in their thesis.
Hence, the events written about the problems between the farmers and Tobacco Régie
mostly quoted from these scholars. This chapter will not focus on these problems. It only
explains problems to show the link between smugglers and farmers.
156 Nadir Özbek, “Tarihyazıcılığında Güvenlik Kurum ve Pratiklerine İlişkin Bir
Değerlendirme”, Jandarma ve Polis Fransız ve Osmanlı Tarihçiliğine Çapraz Bakışlar,
Noémi Levy, Nadir Özbek, Alexandre Tourmarkine, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, Istanbul,
2009, p. 1.
49
this reason, we should not forget that the generalizations in this study are only some
informed guess about the social life in a province of the Empire.
Historians who focus on the security problem, social control of society, and
the concept of crime have studied the police system, and the gendarme, as the state’s
basic means of control, and on the acts of thieves and bandits as examples of crime
and clash within the society.157 However, Ottoman historians have neglected to study
the Régie Police Force, which employed about 7,000 people. Furthermore, no study
focuses directly on illicit tobacco trade as an example of security problem or tobacco
smugglers as actors involved in such problems. There are helpful documents that
refer to tobacco smugglers in the Ottoman Archives. However, scholars who wrote
about smugglers do not try to create a theoretical framework within which to explain
the preoccupation or crimes of these people. Most of the extant studies are
descriptive works. The aim of this chapter is to explain these smugglers in an effort
to shed light on issues of social control and the concepts of crime. In addition, the
chapter analyzes the Régie Police Force from the same vantage points.
To do this, this thesis benefits from the ideas of Michel Foucault about jails,
social control, and the concept of crime but without underestimating the critiques of
Foucault to avoid a Euro-centric view. Foucault’s many arguments do not explain
well the situation in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Foucault’s main aim was to
show how a state constitutes its control over society, but this chapter is interested in
the society’s bypassing of a state’s social control. 158 In other words, this chapter tries
to explain the attitudes of the society instead of the state.
The illegal tobacco trade had become a significant economic activity after a
conflict emerged between the peasants and the Régie Company because the
Company’s policies unwittingly promoted a prolonged illicit trade in the Ottoman
Empire. The company accepted as smuggled tobacco the tobacco that professional
bandits, traded in, was the tobacco that producers cultivated without a license and
tobacco that the producers did not deliver to the warehouses timely. Hence, the
157 For a thought-provoking study about these concepts see Noémi Levy, Alexandre
Tourmarkine, Osmanlı’da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza 18.-20. Yüzyıllar, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,
İstanbul 2007.
158 Özgür Sevgi Göral, “19. Yüzyıl İstanbul’unda Suç, Toplumsal Kontrol ve Hapishaneler
Üzerine Çalışmak”, Osmanlı’da Asayiş Suç ve Ceza 18.-20. Yüzyıllar, Noémi Levy
Alexandre Tourmarkine, Tarih Vakıf Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 21.
50
problem of smuggling in the Empire was not only a security problem. It was also
about the criminalization of certain activities of farmers by a monopoly that
controlled the cultivations and sales of one of their vital crops. For this reason, there
is a connection between these farmers and professional smugglers. Sometimes the
smugglers bought their products or helped them to sell the cultivated tobacco. At the
same time, these professional illicit traders oppressed farmers and threated their lives
because the small trade in which the farmers involved in their villages was also a
problem for their well-organized smuggling system.
Smugglers were armed people (eşhas-ı müsellaha) or armed vagabonds
(müsellah serseri) in the eyes of the State. However, these people did not see their
job as a smuggling activity. They bought and sold their goods in many places like
traders. This was the natural reaction of many local merchants, peasants, some
officers and even some soldiers to the monopolization of merchandise.
Monopolization aimed at increasing government revenues and even improvements in
the production of that merchandise. While the Ottoman Tobacco Régie contributed
to developments in production, it did not make as much profit as estimated because
many farmers chose to sell their crops to smugglers. The reasons behind this
preference were the Régie’s artificially low prices, the warehouse problem, license
problem, and the Régie’s maltreatment of farmers.159
The agreement called Zürrâ’ın Rejiye ve Rejinin Zürrâ`a Karşı Olan Hukuk
ve Vezâifine ve Ahkâmı Cezâiyye Dair Nizamnâme organized the roles of farmers,
tobacco merchants and the Régie Company in December 27, 1886. Yet, most of the
articles of these agreements were not implemented properly. The massacres by Régie
kolcu also increased the sympathy of farmers for illicit traders. Ottoman archival
sources shed light on the reasons why people smuggled. The main criticism that
emerged in these archival materials is the Régie’s attitudes toward farmers.
Moreover, the important studies about this subject addressed the Régie’s attitudes
toward farmers to explain why people smuggled.160
159 For some complaints of the farmers, see BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ no: 27/10; BOA.Y.PRK.AZJ
no: 53/70 BOA.ŞD no: 363/23; BOA.ŞD no: 1849/1; BOA.ŞD no: 1842/7; BOA.ŞD no:
1841/14; BOA.ŞD no: 1841/16; BOA.DH-İD no: 95/76.
160 Three important theses that are written about the Régie Company by Oktay Gökdemir,
Filiz Dığıroğlu, and Mehmet Akpınar also argued the problems between the farmers and the
Régie were main factors of smuggling.
51
3.2. The Problem of License
The keystone of the Régie agreement was article 22. According to it, landless
farmers and farmers who did not have more than half decare of land could not grow
tobacco. The Régie desired to prevent cultivation for personal consumption.161 In
addition, farmers needed to obtain a license to cultivate tobacco every year. The
licenses were valid only for a year.162 The farmers who wanted to continue to
cultivate tobacco next year were required to renew their license. If the farmers
stopped cultivating tobacco, they had to notify the company.163 Régie officers and
kolcus controlled these licenses to find the farms where tobacco was cultivated
without permit. The penalty for unlicensed cultivation was forty Ottoman kurushes
as for each kıyye.164 In addition, the company would confiscate these crops. The
Régie Company did not want to issue licenses to farmers who had a record working
with smugglers and the farmers whose crop was of poor.165
Each Farmer had to write petition for the lands for obtain a license.166 They
had to specialize the borders of their lands. Theoretically speaking, the Régie
Company issued the licenses without a fee but in practice, the farmers had to pay
money to the headmen of the villages and petition-writers. They also paid stampfees.
167
161 Quataert, p. 13.
162 “...Ruhsat tezkeresi yalnız i’tâ olunduğu senenin mahsûlu içün mu’teberdir…” see the
article six in the agreement – Zürrâ’ın Rejiye ve Rejinin Zürrâ`a Karşı Olan Hukuk ve
Vezâifine ve Ahkâmı Cezâiyye Dair Nizamnâme.
163 “Zürrâ’ın Rejiye ve Rejinin Zürrâ`a Karşı Olan Hukuk ve Vezâifine ve Ahkâmı Cezâiyye
Dair Nizamnâme.” (ZRRZKHVACDN) Düstur, 1st Tertip, v.1 no.5, p. 698.
164 Article 42 in the ZRRZKHVACDN
165 BOA, BEO 2043/153162, 1 April 1904, 19 March 1320.
166 “Zürrâ’ zirâ`at ruhsatnâmesini istihsâl etmek içün mevki’ine göre mevsimi zirâ`atin
idrâkından nihâyet bir aya kadar reji memûrine bir numaralı varakaya merbut (1) işaretli
nümûne veçhile bir isti`dânâme i`tâ idecek ve işbu isti`dânâmede duhân mahsûlüne
hasredeceği arâzinin mevki`ini vusa`atini ve mümkün mertebe hudûdunu dahi
gösterecektir.” See the article five in the ZRRZKHVACDN.
52
The rate of literacy was very low in the villages and districts. Farmers, who desired
to cultivate tobacco, needed help to write the petitions to obtain a license and they
paid money to this assistance.168 In addition, the company requested a pecuniary
guarantee or a cosigner who was a well-known person and appointed by community
council, criminal record as well as good conduct from farmers.169 If the farmers
cultivated tobacco without permit in earlier, the company did not give license for
cultivate tobacco to them. The company did not give licenses in a short time, the
farmers who waited for license looked for a solution. Ottoman government argued
that, the company had to respond to license request within eight days.170 If the Régie
Company did not explain the result of the license request in eight days, it would have
to accept the applicant as a licensed cultivator.171 The company mostly refused to
give licenses to tobacco producers in the many districts of Trabzon. Hence, many
farmers from Ordu, Tirebolu, and Giresun migrated to Russia.172
Most of the farmers could not take a license for tobacco cultivation in time
and because of this, their crops were accepted as smuggled tobacco. The Régie
Company wanted to uproot the tobacco that was cultivated without a license. While,
the government wanted the company to give licenses in time173 the provincial
governments intervened to prevent the ripping of tobacco crops in many places,
because the government tried to prevent clashes between the Régie Company and
farmers.174. In addition, because smuggled tobacco caused a decrease in tobacco
167 “Tütün zer` edecek ahali tarafından reji idarelerine verilip oralardan hükûmât-ı
mahalliyeye olunan `arz-ı hallerin derkenarına üçer kuruşluk pul vaz`ı...” in BOA, ŞD 337/6
14 December 1891, quoted from Dığıroğlu p. 62.
168 Nusret, Tütün Meselesi p. 17 “...Osmanlı köylüsü daha okuyup yazmakdan bì-haberdir.
Mesâhe hesâpları dahì yalnız kendince ma`lûm olan bir takım ölçülere istinâd eder. Ale’lekser
köyde öyle muntazâm istida` tânzim edebilecek iktidarda adam bulunmaz. Zavallı
köylü kasabaya gidecek bir `arz-ı halciye beş on kuruş vererek `arz-ı hali yazdıracaktır.”
Gökdemir, p. 62.
169 Talimatname, İstanbul 1311, p. 2.
170 Talimatname, İstanbul 1311, p. 19.
171 BOA, İ.HUS no: 49, 2 August 1895, 21 July 1311.
172 Dığıroğlu, p. 65.
173 BOA, DH.MKT 1531/90, 11 August 1888, 30 July 1304.
53
revenues of the State, the government tried to prevent people from cultivating
tobacco without a license. In other words, the government was a balance-point
between the Régie Company and the farmers. While it requested to the company to
give licenses in time, it also tried to teach farmers how to adapt to the new conditions
in tobacco sector. For instance, Auboyneau who was the director of the company
stated, the government did not help the company to remove the crops of farmers who
did not have licenses. The company would tolerate this situation in Adana and
Ankara but threatened to close its office in Bursa (Hüdavendigar) if the government
did not help the company in a week.175
The provincial governments acted as brokers between the Régie and the
farmers. For example, the Régie Company requested to rip out the tobacco cultivated
without licenses in Akçaabad. However, the government argued, the source of the
problem came from the Régie’s unwillingness to give licenses in time and for this
reason the provincial governments should find the farmers who cultivated tobacco
without license and accepted these crops as legal products.176 Another reason behind
this decision was the premium quality of the tobacco cultivated in Akçaabad. The
government focused on the losses in revenue and stated these people were free to
cultivate tobacco without license but the Régie Company did not have to buy their
crops.177 The government adopted a similar position in many provinces of the
Empire and argued that the Régie should accept the tobacco cultivated without
license as legal or illegal according to the quality of the crop.178 As explained in the
document the government desired to export these crops but it also promoted the
smuggling issue because it did not help the Company to stop the production that was
accepted to be illegal in accordance with the Régie agreements. This attempt also
shows the inability of the provincial governments to control the society.
174 BOA, DH.MKT 2077/104, 5 December 1896, 23 Teşrinisani 1312; BOA, DH.MKT
1714/128, 6 April 1890, 25 March 1306.
175 Dığıroğlu, p. 67.
176 Dığıroğlu, p. 68.
177 BOA, MV no: 35/1, 20 January 1888, 8 Kanunisani 1303.
178 Gökdemir, p. 65.
54
Kadri Bey, the Governor of Trabzon also stated that they worked hard but
failed to prevent smuggling. His solution, too, was to allow the people to cultivate
tobacco in Akçaabad without permission and then to help or force them to export
their crops. This was the only solution of a provincial governor whom the smugglers
and tobacco farmers called “cruel.” The government did not succeed in controlling
its society. Yet, the government worked to prevent clashes between the Régie
Company and the people in the Hamidian era. For this reason, it helped the tobacco
cultivators of Akçaabad and Rize who cultivated tobacco without permission.179
Tobacco farmers did not only consist of people from the lower classes of the
Ottoman society. In many places, the district governors, soldiers, and merchants had
tobacco fields. These people as well faced the problem of license, which tended to be
more complex in many places than it was the case in Akçaabad. For example, the
Régie kolcus ascertained the smuggled tobacco in Arapgir and Elaziz. However, the
district governor did not allow the Régie police forces to take the crop because the
district governor was the owner of the tobacco farms. The company asserted its right
to seize smuggled tobacco but it did not succeed to get these crops. The company
made an effort to gain support from Istanbul against the district governor of
Arapgir.180
The Régie Company delayed the request of licenses because it did not want
to give licenses to all farmers who desired to cultivate tobacco.181 Its main aim was
to keep cultivation and hence production at optimum levels in view of its interests. If
the company gave licenses to all farmers, the production would increase and the
Régie would have to buy all of these crops. The company would have to increase its
capital investments and the companies’ revenues would decrease.182 The Ministry of
Finance also stated that the Régie Company did not try to improve the conditions of
farmers but worked for its own interest.183 In brief, Régie’s attitudes towards farmers
179 There was a similar problem in Rize. For a detail information see Dığıroğlu p. 63.
180 BOA, DH-İD 95-1/56 1912.
181 BOA, ŞD 1841/16 1 October 1887, 19 September 1303, “... ruhsâtnâme virmeyerek
ekserimizi duhân zirâ`atinden mahrûm itmekle...”
182 Ali Karaca, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reji ve Tütün Kaçakçılığında Trabzon Örneği:
Bir Yabancı Sermaye Serüveni”, Tütün Kitabı, p. 70.
55
regarding the license problem promoted the smuggling issue in the Province of
Trabzon. Merchants and professional smugglers bought the tobacco grown without
license. They paid higher prices to farmers than the Régie Company. Farmers who
could sell their crops to them were fortunate.
3.3. The Warehouse Problem
Warehouses were very crucial for tobacco farmers. Farmers cultivated millions of
kilograms of tobacco in a year. Some of this crop was for export and some for the
internal markets. Farmers needed warehouses to keep their tobacco safe and fresh.
The regulation about the mutual responsibilities and rights of the Régie and the
farmers determined the warehouse system. The provincial governments and the
Régie officials would specify when farmers would transport their crops to the
warehouses.184 When farmers were ready to transport their crops, they would report
to Régie officials and the Régie workers or headman of the villages would help
farmers transport their crop.185 According to the Régie agreement, the company
would build warehouses in places that cultivated more than 100,000 kıyyes of
tobacco. However, the farmers protested the Régie Company because it was
unwilling to construct warehouses in places that met this condition. Instead, the
company demanded farmers to transport their crops to the warehouses that already
existed in those districts that were the main centers of tobacco cultivation. The
Régie’s main aim was to decrease its expenditures and to prevent cultivation that
exceeded its demand. Farmers had to transport their crops in a limited time to
locations determined by the company.186 An article in the newspaper Feyz states that
the company confiscated tobacco that delivered to the warehouses late. Furthermore,
183 1322 Senesine aid olarak Reji Muamelatı Hakkında İcra Olunan Teftişatı Natık Müzakere
ve merbut rapor suretidir, Mahmud Bey Matbaası, İstanbul 1326, p. 4. “... Reji Şirketinin
tütün zirâ`atını tahdìd eylemek ve kendi ihtiyâcâtından ziyâde tütün yetiştirilmesini men`
eylemek içün her nev`i tedâbir-i gayri-meşrû`iye tevessül eylediği hükümet-i seniyyece
ma`lûm olmasına mebni ...”
184 Article 20 in the ZRRZKHVACDN.
185 Article 21 in the ZRRZKHVACDN.
186 Akpınar, p. 56.
56
it fined some of these farmers for dealing in smuggled tobacco because they did not
have a license.187
The lack of warehouses caused other problems as well between the farmers
and the Régie Company. While the farmers wanted the construction of warehouses
close to places where tobacco was cultivated, the company built them in cities where
it could sell the crops more efficiently.188 Consequently, the farmers paid more
money to transport their crops to the warehouses. In addition, many farmers
criticized the company because the company did not pay the cost of tobacco crops
upon delivery and kept the crops in warehouses for a long time.189 The government
argued that the farmers cooperated with the smugglers because of these negative
attitudes of the company. For this reason, the government worked to defend the
farmers’ rights and warned the company to stop creating conditions that favored
contraband.
The tobacco farmers of the sub-districts of Kadı in Samsun wanted a
warehouse in order to keep their crops safe. However, the company argued that their
place was not at a distance, more than ten hours away from the nearest tobacco
warehouse in the region and hence rejected the farmers’ request.190 The provincial
government accepted the farmers’ request and wanted the Régie Company to build a
new warehouse.191
The farmers of Kandıra in Izmit also desired a warehouse in 1912 but,
significantly, both the government and the Régie Company rejected their request.
The government stated that these people had transported their crops for about thirty
years to warehouses in Izmit and Sapanca. The company’s monopoly would end in
1914 and for this reason it was unnecessary to ask for a new warehouse.192 This
187 Feyz, 15 Ağustos 1322 p. 2 “.... vakt-i muâyyende Reji ambarlarına indirilmiş tütünlere
kaçak nâzarıyla bakarak hem müsâdere itmekde ve hem de en ağır derecede cezâ-i nâkdì
almakda....”
188 Dığıroğlu, p. 72.
189 BOA, BEO 166043/2214, 14 November 1903, 1 Teşrinisani 1319.
190 BOA, DH.MKT 1387/45; BOA, ŞD 1839/11, 20 February 1887, 8 February 1302;
Dığıroğlu, p. 70.
191 Dığıroğlu, p. 71.
192 BOA, DH-İD 95-2/15, 18 September 1912, 5 September 1322; Akpınar, p. 58.
57
document also showed the desire to end the foreign tobacco monopoly in the
Ottoman Empire.
The problem of licenses and warehouses were the most persistent problems
between the Régie and farmers. In addition, the farmers criticized the low-prices of
the company and the attitudes the Régie officials towards them. For instance, the
farmers of Akçaabad criticized the company due to low prices.193 In fact, the
company did not pay sufficient money for tobacco crops. Parvus Efendi offers data
that indicated how the company paid low prices for tobacco but sold it at high
profits. For instance, while the company paid 10.3 kurushes for one kilogram of
tobacco it sold it 30 kurushes in 1913.194
Another cause of complaint for the farmers involved the experts, who
assessed the tobacco crop to decide the suitable price for it. The farmers of Akçaabad
state that they waited for five months and the company did not send an expert to
assess their crops.195 The farmers of Manisa faced the same problem.196 Despite its
original promise, farmers criticized the company because it did not extend credits to
them without interest. They argued that an Ottoman lira was equal to 109 Ottoman
kurushes. The company paid the farmers in accordance with that calculation. Yet,
when the farmers paid their debts the company accepted an Ottoman lira to be 108
Ottoman kurushes. The Feyz newspaper addressed this problem, telling its readers
that the Régie made unearned gains from this difference in rates and the farmers lost
a part of their earnings. According to the news, the Régie gained 27,410 Ottoman
kurushes from the cultivation of 2,987,709 kg tobacco in Trabzon.197
193 BOA, DH-İD 95/76, 1914 “.... Reji dairesince doksan kuruşa aldığı bir mala bu sene kırkbeş
veya elli kuruş veriyor ve bundan fazlaya kat`iyyen almam diyor ...” Quoted from
Akpınar, p. 54.
194 Parvus Efendi, p. 161.
195 Dığıroğlu, p. 75.
196 Ahenk, 14 December 1895 “…. Beher kıyyesi geçer akçe ancak on iki kuruşa mal
olamayan tütün mahsûlümüzün Reji İdaresince o da “lütfen” denilerek üç dört kuruşa
alınmak istenmesi ve bu kadardan fazla fi’at takdir edilmemesi”... “Biz böyle üç dört kuruşa
mal satacak olursak borçlarımızı ne ile öder nasıl bunun altından kalkar sonra da idâre-i
mâ`işetimizi hangi menbâdan temìn edebiliriz…” Quoted from Gökdemir, p. 71.
197 Akpınar, p.62.
58
Overall, the increase in tobacco cultivation was a problem for the Régie
Company. The Régie Company worked to prevent many people from tobacco
cultivation. The government also did not desire to lose its tax revenue from tobacco
taxes and allowed these people to cultivate tobacco sell it to whomever they desired.
The company tried to decrease its costs and stabilize its revenue. This is because, if
the Régie’s revenue increased, its ration of profit would decrease while the
government’s increased. Hence, the company did not make enough effort to prevent
smugglers and it unwillingly promoted tobacco smuggling within the Empire.198
Under these circumstances, the roles of the Régie police and the state should be redefined.
Smuggling was only the reference point of the company against the State’s
and the society’s criticisms. The company used the state’s inability to control society
to justify its attitude. The company behaved according to its imperialist orientation
and interests while the State did not find any alternative solution to the problems.
3.4. Tobacco Smuggling
The word smuggler will refer to professional itinerant and armed tobacco traders in
this chapter. The Régie’s view of smuggling had different emphases. According to
the Régie, smugglers were cultivators of tobacco without licenses,199 people who
minced tobacco in their home-shops,200 people who sold the equipment used in the
home-shops,201 and people who trafficked contraband.202 All of these acts were of
the nature of a crime against the State. In other words, some of them were criminal
acts of lower class people against the market system while some others were the
professionalization of a criminal act via the monopolization of a mainstay crop.
While this thesis differentiates these two groups in Chapter I, it also argues that the
crimes of these two groups have many connections. Without idealization of the
criminal attitudes of the lower classes, one can argue, based on Ottoman archival
198 For a document of Agop Pasha that argued the company’s attitudes promoted the tobacco
smuggling, see BOA, İ.DH, no: 94682, 10 January 1891, 29 Kanunievvel 1306.
199 Article 44 and 50 in the ZRRZKHVACDN; Dığıroğlu, p. 103.
200 Article 45 in the ZRRZKHVACDN; Dığıroğlu, p. 103.
201 Article 46 in the ZRRZKHVACDN; Dığıroğlu, p. 103.
202 Article 44 in the ZRRZKHVACDN; Dığıroğlu, p. 103.
59
documents that the Régie’s attitudes induced tobacco farmers’ trafficking of
contraband, as already indicated above. Professional smuggler groups differed from
tobacco farmers engaged in illicit tobacco cultivation in that the professional
smugglers harmed not only the government and the Régie Company but also many
villagers, because they plundered many villages and oppressed farmers in order to
acquire their crops. The government used the term –smuggling- for mostly the
people who joined contraband traders. Official documents and officials called them
bandits or wankers. A note of Sultan Abdul Hamid II shows how the State identified
illicit tobacco traders. According to this document, two problems occurred in the
provinces because of smugglers. First, the revenues of the government decreased
because the farmers chose to sell their products to smugglers. Second, the smugglers
caused a security problem in the provinces.203 The Sultan stated that idle and vagrant
groups survived on smuggling important products such as guns, gunpowder, and
tobacco.204
The smuggling in the Ottoman Empire was mostly like a school for
bandits.205 Consequently, the State argued, tobacco smugglers were also bandits of
sorts because they broke the law and harmed the peace in the provinces. As an
example of this argument, the government asked from the provincial rulers to stop
the contraband of the leader of a smuggling group in Bafra. His name was
Tütüncüoğlu Yani. He and his friends broke the peace in Bafra. The government
asked the help of the Régie police force to restore security in Bafra.206
203 BOA, Y.PRK.DH 14/35, 3 January 1908, 21 Kanun-i Sani 1323.
204 BOA, Y.PRK.DH 14/35, 3 January 1908, 21 Kanun-i Sani 1323 “...Anadolu-i şâhâne
vilâyâtında hâsılât-ı inhisâriyenin esbâb-ı tedennìsi herkesçe ma`lûm olduğu üzere bir takım
işsiz güçsüz ve yersiz yurtsuz serserilerin martini tüfenklerini ve derece-i kifâyede mevâdd-ı
nâriyeyi hâmilen çeteler teşkìliyle Bahr-i Siyâh sevâhilinden başlayarak dahil-i vilayete
doğru silah barut dinamit kabilinden eşya-yı memnu ile kaçak tütün nakl ve ticaretini
kendilerine bir mâişet-i gayr-i meşru ittihaz etmelerinden ibarettir...” Quoted from
Abdülhamit Kırmızı, p. 239.
205 Sabri Yetkin, Batı Anadolu’daki Eşkıyalık Olaylarının Yapısal İncelemesi: XIX. Yüzyılın
Son Çeyreğinden Balkan Savaşına, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dokuz Eylül
University, the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, İzmir 1995, p. 99. Also, see
Sabri Yetkin, Ege’de Eşkiyalar, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003.
206 BOA, DH.MKT 2058/99 leaf 1. “Bafra havâlisinden öteden beri `avânesiyle beraber icrâyı
şekâvetle ahâliyi ihdâr ve tütün kaçakçılığı ile de iştigâl itmekde olan eşkiyâdan
Tütüncüoğlu Yani’nin reji kolcuları tarafından sûret-i itlâfına dâir....”
60
Many smugglers dealt in not only tobacco but also salt, gunpowder, and guns.
Smuggling was problem not only in the Black-Sea region. Smugglers sold their
products in almost every city of the Empire.207 In addition, most of the smugglers in
Trabzon were like professional traders who sold tobacco to Anatolian cities and
bought salt from these cities to sell back in Trabzon.
According to the Régie Company, smugglers were bandits. The Régie
Company desired to explain these people as bandits because it did not want to focus
on smugglers without the help of the government. The Régie’s association of
smuggling with banditry implied that there was a security problem in the provinces
and the State should help to provide public security for all people. The company also
considered that the smugglers consisting of 300-500 people caused serious security
problems and the Ottoman army should help the company to prevent the smuggling.
Although, the company argued that the government did not provide support to
prevent smuggling, the situation in the provinces was different. The attitudes of local
governments against smugglers were the main determinant factor in the provinces of
the Empire. In addition to this, although the company looked for support from
government, the Ottoman documents show that the company did not focus on the
prevention of smuggling. The company’s problem was with the tobacco farmers
instead tobacco smugglers. For this reason, the company’s attitudes against society
increased the tobacco smuggling. The government also did not provide security in
the provinces because of not only the lack of enough power of the government, but
also the unwillingness of the government to prevent people from smuggling in
Hamidian era. After the 1908 coup d’état, there was a critical transformation and the
government helped the Régie to prevent smuggling in the provinces, but the effect of
local governors continued to determine the vantage point of the State against the
company and the smugglers.
Tobacco smugglers sold their products in almost all districts of the Empire.
Even in Istanbul, clashes between smugglers and police occurred. Although,
smugglers included many people from different ethnic and religious groups, the
Ottoman archival sources mostly called tobacco smugglers of the Trabzon Province
207 As an example of the smuggling in a different city see İkdam 3 August 1901(?) “Geçen
çarşamba günü Urla’dan altı sa`ât mesâfede deniz üzerinde tütün kaçakçıları ile reji kolcuları
arasında bir müsâdeme vuku`a gelmişdir. Sabahleyin saat dörtde içlerinde tütün bulunan iki
yılkın kimesne rejinin iki kayığa yanaşıb kolcuların reisi kaçak tütünleri teslim talebi etmiş
ise de kaçakçılar bu tâlebe tüfenk atarak cevâb virmişlerdir…”
61
as Laz smugglers. There were also the terms such as Georgian smugglers and
Cherkes smugglers were also used but the so-called Laz smugglers dominated
tobacco smuggling in Anatolia. For instance, although there were many people from
different ethnic groups, the smugglers who were arrested in Niğde were called Laz
smugglers.
62
Table 3.1 List of Tobacco Smugglers Identified in Niğde
City District Neighborhood Name Arrested Or
Fled
# of
People
Trabzon Boztepe Ali, son of
Bekircan
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Argaliya Mithat, son of
Huseyin
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Rankariye Ahmed, son of
Kara Huseyin
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Yomra Vakıf Karabet Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Dimitri, son of
Haralampos
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere İmamkızoğlu
Ali
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Kemal, brother
of Ali
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Tütüncüoğlu Ali Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Ali, son of Kara
Hasan
Arrested in
Niğde
1
Gümüshane Kelkit Hozbirik Dursun or Tosun Arrested in
Niğde
1
Trabzon Boztepe Osman, brother
of Ali
Fled 1
Trabzon Kavak Mehmet Ali Fled 1
Trabzon Kavak Hüseyin and
fellow fighters
Fled 6
Trabzon Mariya İsmail Fled 1
Trabzon Yomra Vakıf Melkun, son of
Menal
Fled 1
Trabzon Çakırlı Horalı Cobanoğlu
Süleyman
Fled 1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Maltul, neighbor
of Dimitri
Fled 1
Trabzon Pulathane Seradere Hüseyin, son of
Malber
Fled 1
Trabzon Pulathane Huzhoron ? Sergeant
Mehmed
Fled 1
Trabzon Divranos Mehmed, son of
Hazval
Fled 1
Trabzon Divranos Osman Fled 1
Trabzon Divranos Kalleman ? Fled 1
Trabzon Divranos Somel Fled 1
Gümüşhane Haşoza Süleyman Fled 1 To
tal
People who were unidentified 25 55
Source: BOA. DH.MKT 1567/78 Leaf 1.
63
The Table 3.1 shed light on certain point about tobacco smugglers. First, the
table 3.1 which gave the names and origins of these people indicated that ten of them
were arrested in Niğde thanks to the great effort of the Governor of Niğde, Efgan
Bey. He learnt who escaped from the clash between the smugglers and the soldiers
after the inquiry. Although there were fifty-five smugglers, the governor identified
only thirty of them.208
The table 3.1 indicates that there were many people from different districts
and different ethnic groups in the band. It is possible that the seed group started its
journey in Seradere and other people joined it when the group arrived other villages.
In addition, most probably, people from the Imamkızoğlu family led the smuggling
group. Ali was one of the famous tobacco smugglers of Trabzon. Although he was
arrested in Niğde, other Ottoman documents and some memoirs as well refer to him
or another Ali from the İmamkızoğlu family. For example in 1909 İmamkızoğlu Ali
and his friends transported their tobacco to Erzurum.209 This document shows us that
the certain people who were known as smugglers did not quit smuggling. Many
people from Imamkızoğlu were arrested in Niğde, Trabzon, and Erzurum but they
continued to sell their products because they did considered their work not an illegal
activity but normal business. Furthermore, it is also possible that such a group was
the composed of different smuggling groups in Trabzon. For instance, according to
the inquiries of arrested smugglers in Niğde, Huseyin from Kavak village had six
men in the group. One can argue that Huseyin was the leader of a small smuggling
group and joined them. Furthermore, the most important clue of the gathering of
different small tobacco smuggling groups is that while the arrested people gave the
names and districts of others, none of them was able to recognize twenty-five people.
More importantly, three smugglers who escaped from Niğde were arrested in the
Province of Ankara.210 It shows us that, these three people were not from Trabzon or
they did not care about the clash and continued tobacco smuggling in other cities of
208 BOA, DH.MKT 1567/78, leaf 4, 13 November 1888, 1 Teşrinisani 1304.
209 BOA, DH.MKT 2767/75, 15 March 1909, 2 March 1325 “Akçaâbadlı İmamoğlu `Ali ve
Yanbâşoğlu Mustafa ile `avânesiyle müsellah kırk-sekiz yük tütünle Gümüşhane’den
Bayburd sancağına giderek oradan da Erzurum cihetine geçecekleri...”
210 BOA, DH.MKT 1567/78 leaf 4, 13 November 1888, 1 Teşrinisani 1304.
64
the Empire. Both of these results imply one conclusion; the State did not have
enough control over Anatolian Peninsula.
When these smugglers were seen in the city of Niğde, the local governor
asked backup force to arrest them. Approximately one hundred cavalries and the
Régie kolcus came from the cities of Adana, Niğde, Kayseri, and Konya.211
However, when these people arrived Niğde, they argued and the smugglers receded
to Kozan. When the governor of Niğde investigated the situation, he learnt the
smugglers were hiding in caves in a village. The village had a Greek Orthodox
population and was famous for hiding bandits.212 The governor went to the caves
with thirty cavalry forces. Laz smugglers succeeded to escape from the governor.
First, they opened fire on the soldiers but after a few hours, they accepted to submit.
There were three rounds of negotiations to determine the conditions of their
surrender. The Laz smugglers agreed to surrender but after dawn. That night the
smugglers escaped. As a result, the local governor captured ten smugglers who were
listed in the table, eight shepherds, eleven rifles, ten poniards, six guns, four swords,
and sixty-one-denks of tobacco.213 The arrest of shepherds indicates that not only
bandits but also shepherds were guides for the Laz smugglers.
This event illustrated that first; the Régie police force and the cavalries called
in from different cities were unwilling to combat smugglers. For this reason, the
kolcus and cavalries argued the smugglers escaped to the mountains of Kozan. The
effort of the provincial governor of Niğde indicates that the government desired to
stop the contraband. Hence, it collected approximately one hundred people from
different cities as quickly as possible. Second, villagers were willing to hide the
smugglers. Although, this village had a reputation for being a bandit safe house, their
help to smugglers indicates that many villagers were willing to open their house to
211 BOA, DH.MKT 1560/78 leaf 1, 2 November 1888, 21 Teşrinievvel 1304 “Tütün
kaçakçıları olan Lazların takibine Konya vilâyetinden vûku` bulan iş`âr üzerine buradan da
kûvve-i zabıta sevk olunduğu evvelce `ârz edilmişti şimdi Niğde mutâsarrıflığından alınan
telgrâfnâmede mezkûr kaçakçılar Niğdeye altı saat mesâfede ka`ìn mağaralarda müttehâz
oldukları halde bizzat üzerlerine varılıb altmış yedi denk tütün ve eslihâlarıyla beraber on
nefer Laz ve sekiz hayvan derdest edildikleri ve bâkiyyesi gece tütünlerini terk ile Kayseriye
firâr ettikleri ve Adana süvârileriyle i`ade olunduğu bildirilmekle `ârz-ı malûmât olunur
fermân fi 21 teşrin-i evvel 304.”
212 BOA, DH.MKT 1567/78, leaf 2-3, 4 November 1888, 23 Teşrinievvel 1304.
213 BOA, DH.MKT 1567/78, leaf 2-3, 4 November 1888, 23 Teşrinievvel 1304.
65
the bandits and smugglers. The caves in Anatolia were like natural homes for
smugglers and bandits. Yet, in many villages, the houses of peasants had a room for
guests. A traveler who travelled around Anatolia stated he stayed with tobacco
traders who had guns in a village of Konya.214 It is possible the people in general
show smugglers as traders who sold tobacco products that were higher quality and
cheaper than the Régie’s. Finally, the effort of the provincial governors to arrest
them purified the role of the provincial governors. While the governors of Niğde and
Trabzon worked to prevent smuggling, the commander of gendarme Faik Bey in
Bolu protected the Laz smugglers who provided tobacco for mineworkers in
Zonguldak and Eregli.215
The illicit tobacco trade was not only the job of professional tobacco
smugglers. The state officials and soldiers also took part in the trafficking of
contraband in many cities. A decree was sent to the provinces to stop these
attitudes.216 The Régie Company stated that, its revenues decreased because of the
attitudes of soldiers and state officials. The decree reminded the provincial officials
that the government was the company’s partner and hence assisting it served the
interest of the state. In addition to unwillingness to assist the efforts to prevent
smuggling, some soldiers took part in contraband trafficking. This situation suggests
that the people in general did not consider tobacco smuggling as a shameful act and
hence the smugglers could go about their business as if there were ordinary vendors.
One of the main tasks of the government was to provide security and order in
the provinces. According to the government and the Régie, tobacco smugglers
caused perturbation wherever they went. One of the major tobacco trade routes
started in Akçaabad and Rize, continued in Sivas, Kayseri, Niğde, Adana, and
reached the Mediterranean Sea. A second route connected Trabzon, Erzincan,
Elazığ, Antep, and reached Aleppo. Laz smugglers caused security problems in these
cities. For example, in 1887, the central government informed the Governor of
Trabzon that armed Laz smugglers used the route from Trabzon to Arapgir and
because the provincial officials did not have sufficient manpower to be able to stop
214 Bela Horvath, 1913 Anadolu, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları İstanbul 2010, p. 53.
215 BOA, BEO 1595/119571, leaf 1, 4 November 1900; 21 Teşrinisani 1316
216 BOA, DH.MKT 913/8, leaf 1, “...memûrin-i hükümetden bâz`ıları .... ahâli ile beraber
kaçak tütün istimâl ve asâkir-i şâhâneden dâhi bir çoğu `inde emsâl eylediklerinden...”
66
the smugglers. The government asked the governor to prevent the armed Laz
smugglers from using that route.217
A third route that the smugglers used connected Trabzon to Iran. Armed Laz
smugglers frequented this route as well. Apart from the first and second routes, the
smugglers went to Erzurum, Van, and Iran via this route. Like other routes, the
smugglers confronted district police and the Régie kolcus in the third route. Several
documents complain about the clashes between the smugglers and the district police.
For instance, sixteen Laz tobacco smugglers clashed with the kolcus and the district
police in Tazegül village of Erzurum in 1884. Since the smugglers killed one of the
district police –Zabtiye İsmail-, the government requested the arrest of these people
as quickly as possible. Smugglers escaped from the village without taking their 830-
kıyyes of tobacco.218 The event occurred one year after the foundation of the Régie
Company. The company hard not completed its restocks in the provinces of the
Empire. Hence, this document indicates that the tobacco smuggling undermined
public security before the establishment of the company.
Illicit traders used the sea routes as well. The Laz smugglers used two
different routes on the Black-Sea. The first one connected Trabzon to Eregli and
Istanbul and the other route connected it to Russia.219 Georgian Smugglers as well
were involved in the illicit tobacco trade in the Black Sea. These people sold guns,
rifles and gunpowder in addition to tobacco.220 The Régie Company bought ships
known as guard ships or police boats to control the Black-sea. Some of the workers
in these boats were Régie kolcus.221 The smugglers did not transport their crops to
the ports. They chose alternative places to carriage their tobacco. Although the
company’s guard ships captured some of the famous illicit traders, it did not succeed
217 BOA, DH.MKT 1397/40 leaf 1, 2 February 1887, 21 Kanuni-sani 1302.
218 BOA, DH.MKT 1346/45 leaf 1, 6 December 1884, 24 Teşrini-sani 1300.
219 As examples of the tobacco smuggling by the sea-route, see BOA, DH.MKT 1429/71;
BOA, DH.MKT 1522/5, 16 June 1888, June 4, 1304.
220 BOA, DH.MKT 545/59, leaf 1, 21 July 1902, 8 July 1318 “Gürcü muhâcirlerinden
Sinoplu Süleyman ve beş nefer arkadaşı Sinoblu Seyyid Reisin kotrâsıyla otuz aded Yunan
martini tüfengi ile bir mikdâr fişengi Akçay iskelesine ihrâç ve Niksâra nâkl ile oradan aldığı
otuz denk kaçak tütün ile kotrâya `avdet eylediği haber verilmesine…”
221 Dığıroğlu, p. 122.
67
to stop trafficking contraband by the sea-route. Namık Kemal stated that smugglers
in Crete and Lesbos Island had certain deceptive tactics. For instance, smugglers
started out in small crafts that did not transport tobacco but attracted the attention of
the attention of the Régie’s ships. As the Régie’s ships pursued them, boats that
carried tobacco took off in different directions to deliver their precious cargo.222
3.5. A Story of an Illicit Tobacco Trader.223
The tobacco smuggling did not end with the Régie Company, as it did not start with
it either. The people of certain villages that had earned reputation for producing
tobacco smugglers continued to be engaged in illicit tobacco traffick. Yusuf was
from such a village. Although nobody knew the exact year of his birth, according to
him, he was born in Artvin in 1923. When he was fifteen he began to sell tobacco in
many cities in the vicinity such as Erzurum, Ardahan, Kars, and Van. He did this job
for about twelve years. Although, the conditions were changed in Turkish Republic,
his story as an example of a trafficker who played a little role in smuggling issue
should help us understand the daily life of a tobacco smuggler, the conditions he
faced, the continuity, and changes in the government’s attitude toward smugglers,
the role of women in smuggling, and the relationship of smugglers with other
villagers and other smugglers.
Yusuf was from a small village called Yukarımaden (Hod-ı Ulya). His family
had come from Caucasia and settled in Yukarımaden and Aşağımaden (Hod-ı Süfla).
Initially his family had settled in Yukarımaden. Yet, after the Russians captured their
village in World War I, most of the family moved to Aşağımaden or cities. Yusuf’s
family moved to Kayseri and returned after the war. They did not have enough fields
for cultivation because of the terrain. Farmers of two Maden villages mainly
cultivated tobacco and corn. Yusuf, of course, did not remember the Régie Company
but he knew much about the many negative events his family experienced after the
foundation of the Régie Company. He learnt from his father that the Régie did not
allow them to cultivate tobacco because their farms were smaller than a decare. His
222Tansel, p. 474.
223 This story depends on the results of oral history study with Yusuf Batman (1926-....).
68
family began to cultivate and sell tobacco illegally. He argued that they were only
farmers trying to make ends meet and survive.
They sold not only their own produce. Since they did not have enough land to
grow tobacco in large quantities in the village, they bought tobacco in the villages of
Rize and Ardanuç as well. Tobacco producers from those villages transported their
crops to a predetermined place usually somewhere in the summer grounds up in the
mountains out of the reach of kolcus. The smuggling groups went there to buy the
produce. Then they returned their village. The second process started in the villages.
It was the stage where women played a major role. They minced and blended
tobacco according to its quality and packaged the products. Then the story of
professional tobacco traders begins. Yusuf was one of them. His adventures shed
light on the situations they faced.
One day, Yusuf and his two friends went to Erzurum to sell tobacco. The
weather was rainy and they had to use the mountain routes to avoid kolcus. When
they arrived the village of their destiny, he realized that their crop had become wet in
the rain. The villagers put them up. They re-dried and blended their products in that
village. During that time, the kolcus came to the village looking for them. According
to Yusuf, a kolcu could easily understand where the smugglers hided. Yet, kolcus
never arrested him thanks to the co-operation of villagers. He told that a tobacco
smuggler never sold his products by going door to door in a village. If someone did
this, nobody would buy tobacco because this might be a tactic of kolcus to find out
who bought smuggled tobacco. Instead, a smuggler directly went to the headman or
ağa of a village. The headmen hosted the smuggler in his home. He called a child
from the village. The child went around all houses in the village to distribute
tobacco. After the villagers bought their need, they paid the child. Finally, the
headman or ağa gave the money to the smuggler after taking his commission.
According to Yusuf, sometimes the smugglers exchanged tobacco for salt or other
vital products that they sold in their village. Otherwise, they took money and
returned home with it.
Yusuf also remembered that a smuggler of their village was terrified when he
saw a kolcu or another smuggling group. Laz smugglers traveled in larger groups
than other and they were not afraid of the kolcus and other Turkish security forces.
In addition, the Laz smugglers had certain villages entirely for themselves. Other
69
smuggling groups avoided these villages because nobody would buy tobacco from
them in these villages that were under the monopoly of Laz smugglers. Furthermore,
other smugglers were afraid of the kolcus because they were dangerous and,
according to Yusuf, they would not wait a court decision to punish a smuggler. If a
kolcu arrested a smuggler, he could easily kill him.
Yusuf’s adventures are part of Turkish history. Smuggling did not end in a
day. Yusuf’s experience gives us an idea about the continuation of the smuggling
issue and how it influenced people’s lives. It also shows us that there were conflicts
between smugglers as well. Yusuf is alive and has been living in Istanbul for the last
twenty-five years. Whenever he hears something about the Régie Company, tobacco
smuggling, and the kolcus, he becomes upset and begins to talk about his memoirs.
He acknowledged that smuggling was illegal but he justifies it by arguing that it was
the only way of survival for many. He takes pride in avoiding arrest by the security
forces, whether the police, kolcu or gendarmes. This feat had made one of the most
famous tobacco smugglers of his village. He holds that people in the village told
many stories about his legendary escaped from the kolcus. His example gives an idea
about how people mythologized the smuggler as they did some bandits.
3.6. The Role of Provincial Governors in the Tobacco Smuggling
The number of tobacco smugglers rapidly increased after the foundation of the Régie
Company and the provincial rulers worked to stop the illicit trade to provide
security. Kadri Bey was one of the famous provincial governors who worked to stop
the illicit tobacco trade within the province. He governed Trabzon eleven years, from
1892 to 1903 without any change in his duty. The Régie Company and the
government supported Kadri Bey against the illicit tobacco traders. His solution to
stop contraband was classified in three ways. First, Kadri Bey desired to prevent
smuggling thanks to his despotic attitudes against smugglers. He did not provide a
fair trial for many people who trafficking contraband. Instead, he used his own ways.
For instance, the most known punishment of Kadri Bey was the method of coffee.
When he interrogated someone, he told his men to serve the guilty a coffee. The
sugar was a code for penalty and if Kadri Bey requested coffee with sugar, he
wanted his men beat the guilty black and blue. The criminals who were beaten were
70
hospitalized and were treated in hospital at least ten days. The affect of beating was
determined in accordance with the rate of sugar in the coffee. If he requested coffee
without sugar, he wanted his men beat the smugglers softly.224 He also exiled some
smugglers to other cities. Many people complained about Kadri Bey to Şakir Pasha
because Kadri Bey exiled them. They argued that Kadri Bey punished them because
they wanted to resolve the problems between the Régie Company and the tobacco
farmers.225
As a second tactic, Kadri Bey sought the help of villagers or other smugglers
to stop contraband in the province. For instances, one day the Imamkızoğlu family of
Akçaabad prepared a barhane which was a tobacco smuggler group and moved on
the Erzurum road. Kadri Bey first warned them and argued the government would
help them to sell their crops at affordable price. However, they rejected the request
and continued smuggling. Kadri Bey, sent word to the villagers of Mesahori that if
they stopped the Imamkızoğlu’s group and bought them in for questioning, they
could confiscate and keep the group’s guns, tobacco, beasts of burden, and money.
Their only job was to bring these smugglers in for questioning. The villagers played
their role and captured Imamkızoğlu and his followers.226
Although Kadri Bey released these smugglers, there are important points in
this story. First, Kadri Bey argued, if they went back, he would help them to sell
their crops at affordable prices. It showed the main problem of these people was they
failed to gain money from tobacco. For this reason, the provincial government
guaranteed the money of their products. Second, because they rejected the proposal,
we can assume these people did not trust the rulers of provinces or they always
gained much more money than the Régie’s offer. The third implication was the role
of villagers in smuggling. Although the village Mesahori was famous for tobacco
smuggling, they accepted the offer of Kadri Bey and captured another smuggling
group. It seems they did the job because of the money, guns, tobacco, and beasts of
burden (which Kadri Bey told them to keep) or because they desired to stop another
smuggling group in the market. The brightest point in the story was the
government’s ability to manipulate a group of villagers who were famous for
224 Ramber, p. 132, Dığıroğlu, p. 90.
225 BOA, ŞD 1848/26, leaf 2, 3 September 1895. Quoted from Dığıroğlu, p. 89.
226 Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, p. 63.
71
smuggling against another illicit tobacco trader group. This was the second solution
of Kadri Bey to stop contraband.
The third and last strategy of Kadri Bey was to give positions to the
smugglers. Although, the government did not desire to choose Régie Kolcus
members from among tobacco smugglers, Kadri Bey, requested the Régie Company
to employ some smugglers as kolcus. He employed smugglers to serve in his own
retinue as well, because these smugglers were reliable and fearless people.227 The
Régie police forces chosen from among smugglers guided the gendarmes in chasing
of tobacco smugglers. More importantly, these former smugglers knew where the
smugglers cultivated or bought it, how they blended it, and which farmers helped
them. For this reason, Kadri Bey wanted the Régie Company to employ some
smugglers as kolcus without hesitation.
Kadri Bey generally did not provide support for the smugglers. In the
Anatolian cities of the Empire, many provincial governors supported smugglers
clandestinely. Kadri Bey worked hard to stop contraband but with partial success. A
letter he wrote in 1899 to the district governor of Akçaabad in response to the
tobacco farmers’ criticism of his policies against illegal tobacco trade provides an
idea about the reasons of his failure.
I will explain what this smuggling is: For eight years we have done
everything to prohibit these people from smuggling ... Some of them were
arrested, some were exiled; we seized their tobacco, guns, and pack animals
… Moreover, some of these people were executed to set an example … None
of these measures stopped people of your district from smuggling. From now
on, we have two choices; we can keep all of these families in jail or we can
exile them. However, taking any of these roads would disrupt the existing
conditions and public good, and probably be unjust as well. So, here is the
result; from now, in every place of your district people are free to cultivate
tobacco. However, they should not be able to sell even an okka of their crops
to the Régie Company, a local trader, or anyone living in the province.
Nobody in Trabzon will buy their tobacco.228
227 As an example of the offer for new jobs to smugglers see Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, p. 63.
228 The Turkish version of Kadri Bey’s answer:
Bu kaçakçılığın ahvâl-i gâribesini biraz daha izâh edeyim: Buraya geldiğim sekiz sene
müddet zârfında bu adamlara karşı ittihâz edilmedik bir şey kalmadı. Her ne yapılmak lazım
ise yapıldı. Tenbìh edildi, tekdìr edildi. Bâz`ıları müddetlerle hapsedildi. Bir takımı sürüldü.
Bir takımı kaçakçılığa giderken tütünleri, silahları zâbt olundu. Bir takımın hayvanları itlâf
olundu. Hatta bir takımı diğerlerine ibret olmak üzere vurdurulup itlâf edildi. Bir takımı
tütün zirâ`atinden men edildi. Bir takımın hâneleri, zâbtiyelerle askerlere konak edildi. Bir
72
This letter is a confession of the government’s inability to control the illicit tobacco
trade. The solution was to prohibit people selling their tobacco. However, because
the provincial government did not succeed to control its own society, Kadri Bey
implied the government would provide social control over this people and for this
reason to work for the prevention of smuggling was akin to running one’s head
against a brick wall. In addition, the punishment in the letter involved all tobacco
farmers in Akçaabad, leaving one with the impression that Kadri Bey thought all
tobacco farmers of Akçaabad attended or supported the tobacco smugglers.
Although Kadri Bey did not succeed to stop illicit trade in the province, he
was successful to diminish the effect of smugglers in Trabzon. After his death, the
revenues of Régie in Trabzon rapidly decreased. Hence, the government and the
Régie Company showed Kadri Bey as a model for other provincial rulers. Sultan
Abdul Hamid II claimed after Kadri Bey, none of the provincial rulers punished the
smugglers. Instead of punishment, most of the rulers praised them and for this reason
the smuggling increased.229
takımı yek diğerine müteselsilen kefil edildi. Bunların hiçbirisinden zerre kadar fâ`ide
olmadı. Şu yazılan bunlar hakkında yapılan mûâmelenin onda biridir. Bunlardan başka bir
çok şeyler yapıldı. Yine asla tesìri görülmedi. Zannedersem bundan sonra da yapılacak bir
şey kalmadı. Bir yapacak var ise o da dün yazılan tahrirâtta beyân olunduğu gibi ya `umûmi
birden çoluk çocuk hâ’ìslere bırakılmak ve yahut olduğu gibi hepsi de başka kazalara nakl-i
hâne edilmektir. Bu iki suretin icrâsı da hâl ve maslâhata ve belki adalete muvâfık değildir.
Onun için mev’zû-u bâhs olan köylerin tütün mahsûlünü bütün serbest bırakmak ve Reji
idaresinden bir okkasını bile aldırmamak tedbìrlerinden başka yapacak birşey yoktur. Bu
karar ve bunu sekiz senelik tecrübesi üzerine kat`iyyen vermiş olduğum bir karardır. Bunun
bozulması mümkün değildir. Eğer Akçaâbat hükümeti kaçakçıların birçok planlarını,
düzenlerini üşenmeyip dinlemeye haves ediyorsa, istediği kadar dinlesin, bir çok beyhûde
müzâkereler etsin. Lakin vilâyet bundan sonra boş söz dinleyemez. Kararını kati` olarak
vermiştir. Ondan dönmez. Verilen kararı tekrar yazayım da biz orasını anlamadık
demesinler. İşte karar budur: Akçaabat’ın Sera ve Ayagorgor deresinde bulunan bütün
köylerin tütün mahsûlü bu günden itibaren serbesttir. Ashâbı bu tütünleri nereye isterlerse
satabilirler. Fakat Reji idaresine satamazlar. Yerli tüccara satamazlar, vilayet dahilinde
bulunan kazalarda, köylerde ahâliye satamazlar, eğer bunu yapmaya cesaret eden olursa
Allah hakkı için pek fenâ mûâmele görecek ve canı yanacaktır. Buraları kendilerine etrafıyla
anlatılsın. İnşallah önümüzdeki zirâ`at zamanı geldiğinde dahi onlarla tekrar konuşacağız.
Vilâyetin bu kararına karşı ellerinden ne gelirse onu yapmakta dâhì serbesttirler. Şikayet
etsinler, hükümete karşı gelsinler, ne isterlerse yapsınlar, vesselam. 6 Teşrinievvel 1315
Vali-i Vilâyet Kadri. Quoted from Kudret Emiroğlu, “Trabzon’da II. Meşrutiyet’te tütün
rejisi ile mücadele”, p. 34-35.
229 BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 14/35, 3 January 1908, 21 Kanun-i Sani 1323 “...Trabzon Vali-yi
esbâkı Kadri Bey’in vefatını muteâkip vilâyet-i mezbure ile Erzurum’da ibtidâ eden işbu
ahvâl-i asayiş-şikenane mütecâsirlerinin bir güna cezaya hedef olmamaları ve bilâkis
73
Table 3.2 Tobacco Revenue of Trabzon, Erzurum, Bitlis, Van230
Year Revenue (Ottoman liras)
1902 102,600
1903 81,700
1904 69,700
1905 66,600
1906 56,800
Source: BOA.Y.PRK.DH 14/35, 3 January 1908. Quoted from Abdülhamit Kırmızı
Abdulhamid’in Valileri, Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi, Klasik Yayınları İstanbul 2008 p. 238
Overall, the government’s definition of smuggling did not show parallelism
with the definition of the company. While the company accepted people as
smugglers who did not behave in accordance with the Régie agreement, the
government differentiated the tobacco farmers and professional illicit tobacco traders
and desired to terminate the harmful effects of tobacco smugglers who were armed
and visited many cities to sell their crop. The Ottoman government relied on its
cavalry and police as well as the Régie police to prevent smuggling. However,
historians debate the role of the Régie kolcus in campaigns against smuggling. This
issue calls for some elaboration.
3.7. The Régie Police Force
The term kolcu precedes the Régie Company. The Ottoman government adapted a
surveillance or kolcu system to prevent smuggling in the provinces before the
establishment of the Régie Company. Although many authors, who wrote about the
Régie kolcu system, explained the regulation of kordon bölükleri as the regulation of
the kolcu system, the kordon bölükleri was different from the kolcu system. The
regulation of kordon bölükleri indicates that the government established this force to
help the Ottoman police in 1886231 and added it to the kolcu system.232 The Régie
kaçakçılık yüzünden pek ziyade müteneffi` olmaları sayeside yevmen-fe-yevmen izdiyad ve
iştidad eylemişdir...” Quoted from Kırmızı, p. 239.
230 The Régie’s revenues did not include the revenues of Canik.
231 Düstur, v. 1 n. 5 p. 733; Halim Alyot Türkiye’de Zabıta: Tarihi Gelişim ve Bugünkü
Durum, E.M.G Polis Akademisi Türk Polis Tarihi Araştırmaları Merkezi, no.1, Ankara
2008, p. 249; Ahmet Yüksel, “Türkiye’de Tütüncülerin Kaçakçılaşma Sürecinde Kolculuğun
74
Company paid their salaries and their main duty was to control and protect the
boundaries of the provinces to prevent smuggling.233 The company also paid for the
guns of the kordon bölükleri.234 It was firstly established in four cities including
Izmir and Istanbul, which have well-developed tobacco markets. The kordon
bölükleri survived until June 27, 1931. The province of Trabzon was not one of these
cities, where the government established a kordon bölük in accordance with the 1886
regulation. Yet, the term -kolcu- was used for the Régie police forces in Trabzon
earlier than 1886.235 Hence, the kordon bölükleri was not part of the Régie kolcus
but they worked with kolcus and gendarmes. The important point in the
establishment of this department is why a government who had its own police and
military forces in addition to the Régie polices forces needed it. The clarification of
this point calls for an explanation of the main role of the kolcus
The main job of the kolcus was to stop contraband, arrest smugglers and
seize smuggled goods. However, the job of kolcus changed after the foundation of
the Régie Company. Each Régie kolcu had a uniform, boot, waterproof coat, cavalry
saber, belt, and badge.236 The kolcus made a group of state officials who inspected
tobacco production. Another duty of the Régie kolcus was to check illicit tobacco
trade, as the kolcus did before the foundation of the Régie. Ottoman archival sources
indicate that the company generally asked for help from the government to capture
professional illicit traders. Company requested help because of two reasons. First,
neither the Régie Company nor the provincial governments had enough manpower to
prevent smuggling, hence obliging them to co-operate against illicit trade. Second,
the company wanted its surveillance force to inspect and control tobacco cultivation
primarily, instead of pursuing contraband trafficker.
Baskısını İki Kolcunun Tercüme-i Halinden Anlama Denemesi”, Kebikeç no.34, Ankara,
2012 pp. 185-199.
232 Alyot, p. 250.
233 Alyot, p. 252.
234 Alyot, p. 251.
235 As an example of a clash between Régie Police forces and tobacco smugglers in Erzurum
see BOA, DH.MKT 1346/46 23 December 1884, 5 Kanunievvel 1300.
236 Régie Co-Interessée Des Tabacs De l’Empire Ottoman, Liste: Constantinople, Galata
1905, p. 15.
75
Many peasants complained about the unacceptable attitudes of the Régie
kolcus. As for the smugglers, they cringed away from the Ottoman soldiers who did
not cooperate with smugglers but not from encountering kolcus. The smugglers
knew that the kolcus were dangerous for only tobacco farmers and shopkeepers.
Although, many soldiers joined directly the smuggling, if a commander of soldiers
refused to collaborate with smugglers, the smugglers only solution was to avoid their
power. The Ottoman archival sources also show that the Régie kolcus did not pursue
tobacco smugglers because once the smugglers exited from the city centers; the
kolcus had little chance to catch them.237 Most of the clashes between the smugglers
and kolcus occurred because the smugglers chanced on the kolcus while they were
passing through a village or district. Apart from these chance meetings, the Régie
kolcus helped the Ottoman troops pursue smugglers because the kolcus lived in the
provinces and knew the terrain, its roads, and villages better than the Ottoman
soldiers.
The government accepted the Régie kolcus as its officials but in general left
their selection to the company within certain conditions. First, a person who desired
to become a kolcu should be a citizen of the Ottoman Empire and should not have a
criminal record. The government wanted the Régie Company to choose people who
were respected and well known in their neighborhood. In view of the tensions
between the Ottoman government and Armenian organizations, the government did
not want the company to hire Armenians as kolcus. This concern is understandable
because the kolcus carried guns and rifles.238 The company did not fully observe
these restrictions. For instance as indicated above the Governor of Trabzon chose
many smugglers to work as Régie kolcu. Furthermore, the company chose
Armenians as Régie kolcus in some districts of Anatolia. When clashes emerged
between Armenian bands and government forces in certain places, the State wanted
to learn the numbers, positions and the role of Armenians who worked as state
officials. Kadri Bey responded to this query by stating that there was an Armenian
kolcu whose name was Hamparsun in Ordu.239 This can be an exception but
237 BOA, DH.MKT 2767/75 leaf 2, 5 June 1908, 22 June 1324.
238 BOA, İ-DH 1295-6/102462, 12 November 1891, 5 Teşrinisani 1307.
239 BOA, Y.PRK.UM 35/126, 6 October 1896, 24 September 1312. Quoted from Süleyman
Bilgin, Ali Mesut Birinci, Sezgin Demircioğlu, Recep Karakaya, Arşiv Belgelerine Göre
76
evidently, the company did not fully abide by the general regulations for the
selection of kolcus. There is no clear evidence of when the Régie kolcus began to
carry arms. In the beginning of the company, the government did not allow them to
use guns. However, after a while they began to use guns. Yet, the government did
not pass a regulation allowing kolcus to bear arms even in 1910.240
The government mostly used its own gendarmes and cavalries instead of
Régie kolcu to stop contraband. It unwillingly deployed its soldiers against tobacco
smugglers. In fact, the government held that the struggle against tobacco smugglers
was not the job of gendarmes or cavalries but of the police and the Régie kolcu in the
provinces. However, the police and Régie kolcu struggled against smuggling only in
the center of districts, villages, and cities. In such a situation, the smugglers used the
ridgeways and succeeded to save their goods. Because the kolcus did not prevent
smuggling the government unwillingly sent its military powers to stop contraband.
After almost all conflicts between Ottoman military powers and smugglers, the
government regretted that this effort deranged the order in the provinces.241 It
repeated its position that the pursuit and arrest of smugglers was a task not for the
Ottoman military but for the gendarmerie and the kolcus.242
Under these circumstances, the company constituted its own police forces.
The kolcus mainly worked in cities, which had many tobacco farms or tobacco
shops. Kolcus rose to higher or better positions in the company according to their
performance and seniority. If a kolcu was successful in his job, he could apply to
work in other departments in the company.243 In addition, the company could move
old kolcus to new departments. The old kolcus could themselves apply for the
transfer to a different department because they were no longer as effective to control
Trabzon’da Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1850-1923, Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları 2007 v. 1
p. 177.
240 BOA, İ.HUS No: 128, 19 June 1910, 6 June 1326 “...zaten kolcuların silâh taşımaya
kanunen selâhiyetleri olmamasıyla devletçe bir çare düşünülmesi muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye
cenâb-ı hilâfetpenâhiden olmağla...” Quoted from Gökdemir, p. 110.
241 BOA, DH.MKT 1565/96, 19 November 1888, 7 Teşrini-sani 1304; BOA, DH.MKT
1800/24 17 January 1891, 5 Kanunisani 1306.
242 BOA, BEO 2178/163300 “...tütün kaçakçılarının derdesti için mû`âveneti askeriye taleb
olunmuş ise de bunların takibi jandarmaya `âid bulunduğundan...”
243 BOA, DH.MKT 131/28, 31 July 1893, 19 July 1309.
77
the tobacco fields and tobacco shops. A case in point is Mahmud Aga. He desired to
transfer to a new department in the company. He had worked for the Régie since
1885. He rose to the rank of master cavalry kolcu and worked as a kolcu until 1923.
He was sixty in 1923 and he was no longer able to work as kolcu because of his age.
He requested to work as a warehouse guard. The company accepted his request and
he began to work as a warehouse guard after he worked as Régie kolcu for thirtyeight
years.244
The company also changed the department of kolcus who were heartthrobs
and popular with the public. For instance, the company changed the department of
Ali Rıza Efendi who worked for the Samsun Régie Company. He was working as a
kolcu, and the company reassigned him to be an agricultural clerk.245 The company
desired to make the most of its personnel. Ali Rıza Efendi was highly respected and
popular among farmers. The company desired to benefit from his popularity to
enhance its authority and good image among the farmers of Alaçam. In many
districts of the Empire, tobacco farmers had many problems with the Régie
Company because of the unsuitable behavior of the kolcus.246 The company wanted
to address these problems by using its personnel effectively.
As an example of the organization of Régie Police Force, the table below
illustrates the numbers and places of kolcus in the Province of Aydın, which had
approximately 1,000 Régie kolcus in 1897.247 The company employed kolcus
effectively. At least four kolcus served on each kolcu team that worked in a district.
The numbers of kolcus increased in accordance with the increase of tobacco
production in the places.248
244 Yüksel, p. 195.
245 Yüksel, p. 197.
246 BOA, DH.MKT 1623/117 the document is about the unsuitable behavior of the Régie
kolcus.
247 Gökdemir, p. 105.
248 For the distribution of Régie Kolcus in Izmir as an example see Gökdemir p. 106.
78
Table 3.3. The Régie Police Force in the Province of Aydın in 1897249
City Position Number
İzmir Master Kolcu 26
On foot 359
Mounted 65
Female Kolcu 37
Inspector 4
Aydın Master Kolcu 9
On foot 54
Mounted 49
Saruhan Master Kolcu 13
On foot 149
Mounted 95
Denizli Master Kolcu 8
On foot 21
Mounted 48
Mentese Master Kolcu 6
On foot 71
Mounted 30
Total 1,044
Source: Cente D’accueil Et de Recherche Des Archives Nationales 207 AQ 318
Quoted from Oktay Gökdemir Aydın Vilayetinde Tütün Rejisi Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Dokuz Eylül University, the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History,
İzmir 1994, p. 105.
The Régie Company raised the idea of expanding the kolcus by increasing
the numbers of kolcus in the provinces of the Empire. The company captured
314,000 kg smuggling tobacco in 1897 by expending 188,000 Ottoman liras for
6,701 Régie kolcus. Although there was an increment in expenses and the number
of kolcus in 1907, the company captured less tobacco than 1897. It spent 252,000
Ottoman liras for more than 6,701 kolcus to seize 221,000 kilograms of tobacco.
Donald Quataert argued that the smuggling increased rapidly from 1894 to 1908 or
the company needed more manpower to control and capture those who smuggled
tobacco.250 Yet, the Régie did not paid much more for kolcus who served in districts
where smugglers were especially active. Instead, it spent significant sums for kolcus
who worked in places where they had a concentration of tobacco shops or tobacco
249 Gökdemir, p. 105. Gökdemir gives the total number of 948. I think this is a
miscalculation because the total numbers of the workers add to 1044.
250 Quataert, p. 22.
79
farms. Hence, one can also argue that the company was successful because it
prevented the cultivation or sale of smuggled tobacco. For this reason the amount of
smuggled tobacco generally decreased year by year.
Table 3.4 Measures of Tobacco Smuggling in Selected Years251
Year Tobacco Seized
(1000s of kgs)
Surveillance
Expenses
(1000s of liras)
Number of
Surveillance
Personnel
(Kolcus)
1896 259 164 6522
1897 314 188 6701
1898 238 208 6343
1899 197 205 6533
1900 211 230
1901 233 237
1902 234 254
1903 212 258
1904 232 255
1905 183 255
1907 221 252
Source: Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the
Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908: Reactions to European Penetration, New York
University Press, New York 1983 p.22
The table above illustrates the nationwide surveillance expenses of Régie
Distribution of the expenses by selected cities can simplify the picture. The company
paid more money for surveillance in Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun, Selanik, and Bursa.
These cities were the main trading centers of the Empire. Furthermore, thousands of
farmers cultivated tobacco in the cities of Izmir, Samsun, and Selanik. The company
paid less money to control tobacco in Trabzon, Aleppo, Kavala, Yanya, Beirut, and
Konya which were the main markets for smuggled tobacco.252
The Régie kolcus engaged in combat with tobacco smugglers in many
cities.253 The definition of their position in the company was to prevent smuggling.
251 The expenses for surveillance, which explained by Quataert, are different from the data
given by Oktay Gökdemir.
252 For the expenses in the cities see Gökdemir, pp. 101-105.
253 Oktay Gökdemir’s dissertation explained the clashes between the Régie kolcus and
tobacco smugglers in the Province of Aydın. Gökdemir collected the news from newspapers
and showed how kolcus tried to prevent smuggling.
80
Yet, as explained above, the Régie interpreted smuggling differently from the State.
Hence, the kolcus mainly checked and controlled the tobacco farmers and tobacco
shops. Most of the clashes between professional illicit tobacco traders and the Régie
kolcus occurred because the kolcus ran into illicit traders. Approximately five to ten
tobacco smugglers were involved in most of these encounters. When a group
consisted of a larger number of armed people, the kolcus asked for help first from
the local police and the gendarmes. If the support they could provide was inadequate
to deal with smugglers, the company requested the help of Ottoman military.
Otherwise, the kolcus controlled focused on farms, houses, and tobacco shops. For
this reason, the company selected not only men but also women as its surveillance
personnel.
The Ottoman government recognized the right of farmers to proceed against
the kolcus if the kolcus behaved against the agreements. For instance, if a Régie
kolcu entered a house to check tobacco products without permission and did not find
any smuggled tobacco, the owner of the house could file a complaint against the
kolcu. In such situations, people in the house often transported their illegally grown
tobacco to their neighbors’ houses. The kolcus needed a search warrant with a clear
date and had to enter a house accompanied by a district officials and gendarmes or
police. 254 Since the government accepted kolcus as government officials, as
indicated above, Nizamiye courts had the authority to hear the cases against Régie
kolcus.255 If there was a clash between farmers and kolcus, farmers had the right of
litigation. For example, a farmer –Cedidoğlu Ali- presented a case against a kolcu
because the kolcu injured him. According to Cedidoğlu Ali, he was working with his
mother in the tobacco fields of Hacı Osman Efendi, when the kolcus came to rip out
the tobacco crops on grounds that it was planted without licenses. Ali tried to explain
that there was a pending application to the government for a suitable solution and the
kolcus and Régie officers should wait for the decision of the provincial government.
However, the kolcus continued to rip out the tobacco crops and because Ali desired
to stop them, Hüseyin stabbed him. In the court, Ali proved his claims with the help
254 BOA, DH.MKT 1739/77, 2 July 1890, 20 June 1306.
255 BOA, BEO 351/26295, leaf 1-2, 16 January 1894, 4 Kanunisani 1309.
81
of five witnesses, although the kolcus rejected his claims.256 The court sentenced
Hüseyin to a week of imprisonment for injuring a farmer and a small fine for court
expense.257
To prevent conflicts between farmers and the Régie kolcus, the government
instructed the Régie that its officers should not rip out the tobacco without the
permission of the government. They should determine the fields in which tobacco
was grown without license and obtain from the government a permit to rip out these
crops. But they should then demand as punishment from the cultivators forty
kurushes for each kıyye of illegally grown tobacco.258 For this reason, in Goleoğlu
Huseyin’s trial, the court blamed Mıgırdâc Efendi, the company’s agricultural clerk
for allowing kolcus to remove tobacco.259
The kolcus had problems with the owners of tobacco shops as well while
controlling the tobacco products in the shops. The government wanted to stop the
kolcus’ harmful behavior and generally protected the shop owners. In addition, the
government expressed its concern that these problems occurred in the center of cities
where the tobacco shops existed and might cause perturbation in the city.260 The
Régie Company sequestrated the goods of the tobacco shops if they carried the
tobacco of farmers who did not have the requisite license to grow tobacco. For
instance, the company accused an owner of a tobacco shop whose name was Dimidi,
for buying 3,660 kilograms of tobacco grown without licenses from eighteen tobacco
farmers. Dimidi rejected the claims and argued that because the farmers did not have
enough warehouses they commended their products to his shop five months ago. The
court heard witnesses who were farmers of the villages such as İlyas, Kara Samsun,
and Körcuma. The court acknowledged Dimidi’s claim.261
256 BOA, ŞD.1842/7 11 November 1899, 29 Teşrinisani 1305.
257 BOA, DH.MKT 131/28 31 July 1893, 19 July 1309.
258 Dığıroğlu p. 107.
259 BOA, ŞD.1842/7 11, November 1899, 29 Teşrinisani 1305.
260 BOA, DH.TMIK.M 8/1, 21 June 1896, 9 June 1312.
261 BOA, ŞD 1841/12, 18 January 1904, 5 Kanunisani 1319.
82
Overall, the kolcus did not pay as much attention to professional illicit traders
because they focused on controlling farmers and tobacco shops. Hence, while the
numbers of farmers who cultivated tobacco without a permit decreased, the numbers
of professional tobacco smugglers increased by the hundreds. The kolcus effectively
prevented farmer from cultivating tobacco for their own consumption or to sell in
their own village. However, the farmers continued to sell tobacco with professional
smuggling groups. The kolcu system forced farmers to join contraband traders.
Although, the main job of kolcus was to pursue and arrest the smugglers who
consisted of hundreds of people the kolcus focused on tobacco farmers and shops as
indicated above. It was for this reason that the government allowed establishment of
the kordon bölükleri. Kolcus and gendarmes did not put an end to professional
tobacco trading in the province of Trabzon. Hence, the provincial governments
turned to the military forces in many cases. Smugglers transported 680 yüks of
tobacco in the Erzurum road alone in three months because the government failed to
stop them.262 The Ottoman government wanted to resolve the problems that emerged
between farmers, shopkeepers and the company but it failed to create an alternative
system because of the lack of manpower and financial hardship in the Empire. Under
these circumstances, the company suppressed hundreds of farmers who cultivated
tobacco in small farms but supported those who had large tobacco fields. These
changes in the sector increased tobacco smuggling in the Ottoman Empire.
262 BOA, DH-İD 124-1/44, 20 December 1908, 7 Kanunuevvel 1324.
83
CHAPTER IV
4. Conclusion
This study has aimed at investigating the tobacco smugglers in the Black-Sea region
of the Ottoman Empire from 1883 to 1914. It tried to shed light on the roles of the
Ottoman government, the provincial officials, the Régie Company, and its security
forces. It examined the tobacco smugglers to understand the changes taking place in
people’s daily lives in the provinces of the Empire.
The Régie Company was one of the reasons for the increase in tobacco
smuggling in the period under survey. After 1883, tobacco producers faced new
conditions as the Régie’s attitudes dislocated traditional relations. Indeed, as this
thesis argued, the Ottoman Empire tried to establish a tobacco monopoly ever since
the enactment of the Duhan Nizamnamesi in 1862. However, the government did not
achieve to create institutions such as warehouses, and credits for farmers for
development in tobacco sector. After the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration, the bondholders argued that they could make more money if they
brought the tobacco sector under the direct control of a specialized sister company.
With such arguments, the Régie Company was established. After its foundation, the
company’s policies gave a new twist to the meaning of smuggling. According to the
Régie Company, all people in the tobacco sector who disobeyed the Régie
agreements were smugglers. This position contributed to the increase of conflicts
between tobacco producers and the Régie Company day by day. Farmer in Trabzon
never understood why the company would persecute them as ‘smuggler’ for growing
tobacco as it suited their interests.
As the sources showed, the company’s main aim was to make money, as
much money as possible. According to Régie agreement, the company would pay
750,000 Ottoman liras to OPDA every year. In addition, the company would also
pay a predetermined share from its revenues.263
The company wanted to increase the revenues in determined Ottoman liras.
To do this, while the Régie was gaining more money, the Ottoman government and
OPDA took fixed shares of the revenue. The Régie Company as a well-organized
administration developed the tobacco sector in some cities such as Bafra, but at the
263 See the table on p. 29
84
same time, it forced many producers to join into the contraband traffickers by
refusing to buy their products. The aim of the company was to make money as much
as possible. To do this, it tried to prevent the decrease in the market price of tobacco.
The company employed kolcus to prevent smuggling but in specific places where
high quality tobacco was cultivated. The kolcus also controlled the tobacco shops in
big cities to prevent them from selling smuggled tobacco.
Although, the main task of the kolcus was to pursue illicit tobacco traders
who caused security problems in the provinces, they did not want to get into a
conflict with these people because the illicit traders were armed and not afraid to kill
kolcus. Instead, kolcus oppressed small tobacco producers and tobacco shopkeepers.
In other words, kolcus were the control mechanism of the company over the means
of production. Therefore, the villagers resisted and mythologized illicit tobacco
traders in folk songs while condemning the kolcus. For instance, a folk song namely
Kolcu Türküsü tells not only the story of smugglers but also shows how people
disliked kolcus.264 Smugglers speak in the song. According to the story, the song was
written after the smugglers killed the masterkolcu. In the first verse, the song gives
the name of masterkolcu and in the last couplet; it tells that they will kill this man.
In fact, as argued above, the Régie Company did not pay much attention to
illicit tobacco traders. It used the smuggling issue as a trump card against the
government. Whenever, the government objected to the company and argued that the
money that came from company was very low, the general director of the Régie
stated that professional smuggling groups were the cause of the decline in the
revenues of the company. For this reason, the government tried to prevent smuggling
with the help of its own security forces. At the same time, the government tried to
safeguards the rights of tobacco producers against the company. However, fiscal
problems prevented the success of measures against contraband. Another reason of
this failure was the assistance of some provincial officials to smugglers. When Kadri
264 Kolcu Türküsü: Vara vara vardığ bağa/Sırtımızı verdik dağa/Kolcubaşı Hacı Ömer
Ağa/Beyler habarınız olsun. / Ankara’dan gider ekin/Yükümüzün bir kefin/İçinizde yok mu
hekim/Beyler habarınız olsun. / İstanbul’dan gelir ipek/Elimizde yağlı tüfek/Biz bu ilden
nasıl gidek/Beyler habarınız olsun./ Üç yük tütün kıyılacak/Ankara’ya
kuyulacaka/Kolcubaşı vurulacak/Beyler habarınız olsun. Quoted from Süleyman Şenel,
“Ayıngacı Türküleri”, Tütün Kitabı, p. 369
85
Bey was the governor of Trabzon, smuggling rapidly decreased because he did not
co-operate with tobacco smugglers.
Finally, the government argued the illicit tobacco traders were bandits of
sorts. According to the government, when the illicit tobacco traders caused death,
attended a clash, or broke the peace in the provinces, the government accepted them
as bandits. The Régie supported this idea and claimed that, tobacco smugglers
should be seen as bandits in all conditions. In this context, this study has indicated
that Karen Barkey and Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of banditry did not adequately
explain smugglers’ situation. Barkey states, when a person became a bandit he no
longer remained a villager. According to Hobsbawm, a bandit was a primitive rebel
from among villagers. The illicit tobacco traders caused security problems in the
provinces. They, too, oppressed villagers while fighting state officials and other
smugglers. However, they were villagers. They lived in the villages of Trabzon and
had the characteristics of villagers. In addition, this study is an attempt to
differentiate an illicit tobacco trader who traveled alone in the villages from barhane.
While the first one of them was the criminal attitudes of the lower class, the second
one was the professionalization in smuggling and banditry. Although, Yusuf was an
example of a smuggler who traveled alone in Anatolia, many myths were created for
the illicit tobacco traders consists of hundreds of people such as the Imamkızoğlu
family.
This study argued that we need a different perspective to explain or interpret
smugglers as bandits. They are mythologized not because the others loved them. The
ordinary people in the provinces were afraid of smuggler but they also admired them
because smugglers made real some of the dreams of the ordinary people. In addition,
-from Weberian perspective- the charismatic leadership of the smuggling groups
affected the society. The villagers hated kolcus, but they did not have enough power
to resist against them. However, when a villager saw kolcus’ fear of the Laz
smugglers, he respected them. For this reason, Barkey’s and Hobsbawm’s arguments
about the bandits do not help to explain the banditry of these people and the attitudes
of others against them.
The thesis also tried to differentiate the actors in smuggling activities. The
illicit tobacco traders’ role was different from a cultivators’ or shopkeepers’ role.
The illicit tobacco traders whom the state accepted them as bandits were not only a
86
threat for the government and the Régie Company but also were a threat for a
villager who joined contraband alone. For this reason, this study tries to create
different explanations of the illicit activities of these actors. However, it was only an
attempt to create a path for further studies.
Overall, this study finished its story in 1914, even before. However, it should
be keep in mind that, the Régie Company’s and kolcus’ role during the World War I,
and the National Struggle is a black hole of Turkish history. This study aims to
create a background for new studies such as the role of the Régie during World War
I, and the National Struggle. In addition to this, even the Régie ended in 1924, the
kolcu system continued for years. This study is also an attempt to create a
background for studies that will be about kolcu system. Scholars who desire to study
these subjects should clarify the roles of kolcus in the Ottoman Empire and the
Turkish Republic to complete the picture. Without conceptualizing the kolcu system,
scholars may not find a suitable way to define smugglers.
As a final sentence, let me add that when the Régie Company ended, illicit
tobacco traders became professional traders who controlled the internal tobacco
market in Anatolia. Tobacco producers who did not deal with the company joined
them. In such a situation, the smuggling continued and the State did not find a
lasting solution to the problem.
87
APPENDICES
BOA, A.DVN.MKL, 28/7 Leaf 14
A Copy of License for Tobacco Cultivation
88
BOA, A.DVN.MKL, 28/7 Leaf 22
A Copy of Transportation License
89
BOA, A.DVN.MKL, 28/7 Leaf 21
A Copy of Warehouse Delivery Form
90
BOA, DH.MKT 1560/81 Leaf 1
A document about the pursue of Laz smugglers
91
BOA, DH.MKT 1429/71
An example of tobacco smuggling by the sea-route
92
The concern of the Porte about the deal between Egypt and Greece
93
The negotiations between The OPDA and the Régie to solve the problem of Egypt.
94
A New about the Régie Company
95
Sir Edgard Vincent’s report on Turkish Finance
96
BOA, DH.MKT.1567/78
The List of Tobacco Smugglers
97
BOA, DH.MKT2754/42
A document about the oppression of people by tobacco smugglers
98
A New about the clash between tobacco smugglers and gendarmes in 1952
99
BOA, DH.MKT 913/8
A document about the role of state official in the smuggling activities
100
BOA, BEO 351/26295
101
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