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ABSTRACT
In this master's thesis, the issue of the Straits, which has become a problem since the end of the 18th century, will be explained. In order to explain the issue comprehensively, the historical development of the Straits Issue will be examined. The Ottoman domination of the Bosphorus region and the beginning of the period of absolute domination will be discussed. The damage to this absolute domination as a result of the war with the Russians at the end of the 18th century and the wars that followed will be examined. The Straits becoming an international problem and the Ottoman alliances with Britain and Russia to protect this region will be discussed. It will also be discussed how internal problem faced by the Ottoman Empire became an external problem. The effect of the Armistice of Mudros, signed by the Ottomans during and after the First World War, on the Straits will be mentioned. The beginning of the National Struggle, the Treaty of Sevres and finally the Treaty of Lausanne will be examined.
Keywords: Istanbul Straits, Çanakkale Straits, Lausanne Agreement, Ottoman Empire
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ÖZET
Bu yüksek lisans tezinde, 18.yy’ın sonlarından itibaren bir sorun haline gelen Boğazlar meselesi anlatılacaktır. Meseleyi iyi anlatmak için Boğazlar Sorunu’nun tarihsel gelişimi incelenecektir. Osmanlı’nın Boğazlar bölgesine hakim olması ve mutlak hakimiyet döneminin başlaması ele alınacak, 18. yy’ın sonlarında Ruslar ile girilen savaş neticesinde bu mutlak hakimiyetin zede alması ve sonrasında yaşanan savaşlar incelenecektir. Boğazların uluslararası bir sorun haline gelmesi ve Osmanlı’nın bu bölgeyi korumak için İngiltere ve Rusya ile girdiği ittifaklara değinilecektir. Ayrıca Osmanlı’nın karşılaştığı iç problemlerin birer dış sorun olması da ele alınacaktır. I. Dünya Savaşı ve sonrasında Osmanlı’nın imzaladığı Mondros Mütarekesi’nin Boğazlar üzerindeki etkisine değinilecektir. Milli Mücadele’nin başlaması, Sevr Antlaşması ve son olarak da Lozan Antlaşması incelenecektir.

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TABLE OF CONTENT
PLAGIARISM PAGE ................................................................................................................. i
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... ii
ÖZET ........................................................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................................................. v
1- INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
2- GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE STRAITS .................................................................. 4
3- THE BEGINNING OF ABSOLUTE OTTOMAN DOMINATION IN THE STRAITS ..... 6
3.1- THE SHAKING OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE STRAITS ........................ 10
3.2- TEMPORARY RESOLUTION OF SHORT TERM UNCERTAINITY ......................... 13
4- FIRST SERIOUS THREAT TO OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNYT IN THE STRAITS; “KÜÇÜK KAYNARCA” ........................................................................................................ 14
4.1-THE INEVITABLE ALLIANCE ...................................................................................... 17
4.2- CHANGING BALANCES IN EUROPE AND THE NEW ALLIANCE; “KALA-I SULTANIYYE” ...................................................................................................................... 19
4.3- GREEK REVOLT AND TREATY OF EDİRNE ............................................................ 22
4.4- MEHMET ALI PASHA REVOLT AND TREATY OF HUNKAR ISKELESI .............. 24
4.5- MEHMET ALI PASHA IS RISING AGAIN .................................................................. 28
5- ENTRY OF STRAITS INTO INTERNATIONAL STATUS; “LONDON CONVENTION OF 1841” .................................................................................................................................. 30
5.1- RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON THE STRAITS, THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE TREATY OF PARIS ............................................................................................................... 33
5.2- RUSSIAN OPPOTUNISM AND THE 1871 LONDON STRAITS CONVENTION ..... 34
5.3- 1876 OTTOMAN RUSSIAN WAR, SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN TREATIES ....... 37
6- WARMING WATERS BEFORE THE GREAT WAR ...................................................... 40
6.1- 1st WORLD WAR............................................................................................................ 41
6.2- ISTANBUL AND STRAITS NEGOTIATION BETWEEN BRITAIN, FRANCE AND RUSSIA ................................................................................................................................... 43
6.3- EPIC CANAKKALE DEFANCE .................................................................................... 44
6.4- RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR, US ENTRY INTO THE WAR, AND WILSON’S PRONCIPLES ..................................................................................................... 46
7- END OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE OF MUDROS.................................................... 47
7.1- THE FIRE OF THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND THE SEVRES PROJECT .......... 50
8- WINNING THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND LAUSANNE ....................................... 60
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 109
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Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 112
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1- INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, the historical examination of the Straits region and the decisions in the Lausanne negotiations will be discussed. The Straits region has been under the control of many civilizations for years. The development of international relations led to the establishment of trade relations between civilizations.
With the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans in 1453, the Straits region was completely under the control of the Turks. From this date on, the passages through the Çanakkale and Istanbul Straits were made with the permission of the Turks.
By the end of the 18th century, a strong competitor emerged over this region. Russia attacked with all its might to dominate this area. With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed after the war, the Straits region was threatened for the first time.
At this time, the Ottoman Empire had weakened greatly. Now she had to find alliances to protect her lands and sovereignty. Britain was another state with interests in the Straits region. However, British interests were not about owning the territory but to keep Russia away from dominating the region.
With the Kala-i Sultaniyye Treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and Britain in 1809, the fate of the Straits region was determined by bilateral agreements for the first time.
From this date on, all the problems faced by the Ottomans were also related to the Bosphorus region. The Ottoman Empire gradually lost its sovereignty in the
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Straits and participated in the First World War. After the heavy agreements signed after the war, the Ottoman lands were occupied.
After the National Struggle Movement, which started under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the new Turkish state was established. This new state participated in the Lausanne negotiations to determine its own destiny. The Straits issue was very important in the Lausanne negotiations.
İsmet Inonu, who represented the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne conference, had fierce arguments with Lord Curzon, the representative of the British, who was the leader of the allies. Another important side of the discussions is the Soviet representative Chicherin.
The discussion of the Straits issue is gathered around 3 main theses as British, Soviet and Turkish theses. The British wanted the Straits to be open to all trade and warships, the disarming around the Straits and the establishment of a commission to regulate the passage of the Straits.
The Soviet thesis advocated complete Turkish sovereignty in the Straits, preventing the passage of warships through the Straits. The Turkish thesis was also a thesis based on the security of the Marmara Sea and Istanbul. In our study, these three theses will be evaluated. Fights between representatives will also be featured. The tactics used by the parties to win the discussions will be mentioned.
There were some problems experienced by the Turkish delegation during the conference. The difficulties experienced by the Turkish side on issues such as prejudice, intelligence weakness and unpreparedness will be discussed. In general, the importance of the Straits issue will be emphasized in the conference. What the Turks faced in Sevres and what they bought in Lausanne regarding the Straits will
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be compared. A general evaluation will be made about the Straits issue in Lausanne, and the gains and problematic items will be interpreted. This situation of the Straits Issue, which is the only issue that endangered the sovereignty of the Turks in Lausanne, will be mentioned.
The Straits issue is the most important issue in Lausanne. When evaluated in terms of the decisions taken in the Treaty of Lausanne, the only issue that harms sovereignty and independence of Turkey is the issue of the straits.
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2- GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE STRAITS
People have interacted with each other for centuries and entered into a number of agreements in order to meet each other's needs. As a result of the growth of the states, the increase in the population and the advancement of transportation opportunities, the need to reach lands at long distances has emerged to meet the existing needs. First of all, the trade of clothes or equipment, including food, started to take place between states.
This interaction, which first started with the land routes due to the existing possibilities, then provided a shorter distance to reach farther places by sea. With the development of maritime trade, states have increased their interactions with each other, increased the exchange of food and raw materials, as well as increasing their cultural interactions over time.
As the scope and importance of interstate commerce gradually increased, conflicts and disputes between states, usually over land borders, have begun to include sea routes. The importance of the sea routes where trade was carried out began to increase vitally. The trade in the seas, which are of vital importance in terms of basic needs such as nutrition and clothing, as well as economically, have brought countries against each other from time to time, and the states that had sea routes have become more advantageous than the others.
The Dardanelles Strait and the Bosphorus Strait, together with the issues mentioned above, appear as two Straits of great importance. Trojans, Athenians, Spartans and Persians until the 3rd century BC, when the Romans came under their rule; after the Roman Emperor Constantine made the old Byzantium, which will be
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named after him, as a center, and especially after the establishment of the Byzantine Empire, the Huns, Avars, Iranians and Arabs, respectively, struggled with each other to take Istanbul and dominate the Bosphorus (Beydilli, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, 1992). Istanbul, indeed, was like a golden key to be an effective power in both the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, giving great superiority and advantage to those who had it.
In terms of geographical situation, the "Bosphorus" is one of the most important sea routes in the world. In international relations, the term “Straits” especially brings to mind the Turkish sea passage. This is enough to show the importance of the Straits worldwide (Mehmet Kayıran, 2017).
The Ottomans, who would change the course of history in another direction, took the stage during this centuries-long conflict and struggle over the Bosphorus and Istanbul. The Ottoman Turks are a tribe that migrated to the southwest after the occupation of Western Turkestan by Genghis Khan (Sander, 2015).
After this migration, they became an “Uç Beyi” in the time of the Seljuks and bordered the "infidels". The position of the Ottomans inevitably put them in a struggle with the Christian world. The 1329 Pelecanon War, like the conquest of Istanbul, is one of the turning points in Byzantine and Ottoman history. After winning this war, the principality took Iznik in 1331 and Izmit six years later. In the meantime, all the small fortresses on the coast, including Gebze and Hereke, fell into the hands of the Ottomans, so that the Turks from the Anatolian side rested on the Bosporus (İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 2014).
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3- THE BEGINNING OF ABSOLUTE OTTOMAN DOMINATION IN THE STRAITS
The Ottoman Empire continued its Policy of Gaza and always gave its priority to the West, that is, to the Christian world. Thanks to this policy, as we mentioned above, they have reached the Straits region. The Ottomans, who seized the control of Çimpe Castle in 1353, began to dominate the Dardanelles. Over time, with the conquest of the Black Sea coast and the protection of the Crimean Khanate, the Black Sea became an Ottoman lake. Now, in a way, it was the turn of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
Although Yıldırım Bayezid and Murad II besieged Istanbul, they could not be successful for various reasons. But even these attempts clearly revealed the ambitions of the Ottomans. The Ottomans were well aware of the importance of the Straits.
For the conquest of Istanbul, where the previous sultans could not succeed, the young Sultan Mehmed II showed his firm will for the capture of Istanbul, despite a strong opposition inside. By 1453, Istanbul seemed like the missing piece of the puzzle in the middle of the Ottoman lands stretching along Anatolia and Rumelia. Byzantium, which is now living its last days, could find herself in a situation like Byzantine giving the city of Thessaloniki to Venice during the war in 1423, and a new political crisis could arise if the Ottomans did not act quickly. For this reason, the conquest of Istanbul was a matter of life and death for the Ottomans (İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 2014).
As part of the preparations for the conquest, Mehmed II had the Rumeli Fortress built opposite the Anatolian Fortress, which was built during the reign of
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Yıldırım Bayezid. Thus, the Ottomans would be able to control all the ship traffic in the Straits and prevent any aid to Byzantium.
The young Sultan, Mehmed II, started the siege on April 6, 1453, after all preparations for the conquest were completed. At the end of the 53-day siege, the city was captured as a result of the general attack on May 29. According to the conditions of the post-conquest period, soldiers were given the right to plunder in the conquered place. After this looting that lasted for 3 days, the young sultan Mehmed II went directly to the Hagia Sophia Church, passing through streets where no people could be seen, and praying there, turning the church into a mosque. He came in front of the pulpit and prayed on the stone of the sacred table in the name of Allah, who bestowed mercy and grace on victory (Jorga, 2009).
The Ottomans finally took Istanbul and took the Black Sea (Istanbul) Strait under their control. With the steps taken during the Mehmet II period, the Black Sea became an Ottoman lake. The Black Sea became an inland lake due to the fall of the cities on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia one by one, and the capture of Trabzon (Jorga, 2009), especially after a difficult journey and 32-day siege in 1461, and the control of Crimea.
By the middle of the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire was in control of the Bosphorus and the entire Black Sea. Undoubtedly, this was a great strength and advantage. However, the Ottomans were not content with this and aimed to establish dominance first in the Aegean and then in the Mediterranean. In the Aegean, which was the first target, the islands of Imbros, Thassos, Lemnos and Lesbos were standing as an important danger. These islands were ruled by the Italian-origin Gattilosio family as a principality. Considering the complaints from the people of the island and
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the surrounding areas at that time, Mehmet II gave instructions to take the island of Imbros first. After the conquest of this island, Thasos, Limnos and Samadrek came under Ottoman rule (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi-1, 2010).
The conquest of these islands undoubtedly led to a strong strengthening of the Ottoman Empire in the Aegean. But for the Ottomans, the Aegean island was still not fully under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans, who took action to take the Island of Lesbos after a short time, captured this island in 1462. Since 1484, it has used its sovereign rights by closing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits to the ships of foreign states. The Black Sea became an inland sea in terms of political, administrative and commercial aspects, and the principle of keeping foreign ships closed to voyages was accepted as the basic rule of Ottoman law and general policy (Acar K. D., 2007).
The most troubled place on this sea was the Island of Rhodes for the Ottomans, who gradually established dominance in the Aegean. The knights, who were dealing with piracy and threatening the merchant ships, and making alliances against the Ottomans, were ruling here (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi-1, 2010).
Suleiman the Magnificent, who had just left the Belgrade expedition, took action for this difficult island, which was besieged during the Mehmet II period but could not be captured. After a very difficult siege, Rhodes was captured. During the siege, the islands of Herke and İlyaki were also captured by Kara Mahmud Pasha. When Rhodes was taken over, the islands of Leros, Symi, Kalymnos, Limonya and the Bodrum, Tahtalı and Aydos Castles on the Anatolian coast passed under Turkish administration (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi-1, 2010).
As a result of all these developments, conquests and expansions, the Ottoman Empire became the state that absolutely ruled the Black Sea and Aegean, Istanbul and
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Dardanelles Straits. No war or commercial ship could pass through the Straits except with the permission of the Ottoman Empire. In this period, full Turkish sovereignty was established over the Straits, and the principle of the closure of the Straits and the Black Sea to foreign trade and warships was taken as a basis in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire and took its place in interstate politics, both de facto and legally (Acar K. D., 2007).
Thus, the period of absolute sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, which can be regarded as the first phase of the Straits issue, began. This order continued until the end of the 18th century. The principle of the Straits and the Black Sea being closed to all foreign trade and warships, with the exceptions granted to merchant ships of some states with such capitulations, which was a unilateral transaction at that time (such as privileges granted to Britain in 1579, privileges granted to Holland in 1612). It continued until 1774 (Şener, 2014).
During the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Venetians were given the right to trade under the Ottoman flag in the Ottoman territorial waters, with a bilateral agreement made with the Venetians. With the trade and friendship treaty signed with France in 1536, the right of free trade with other states in their own territorial waters was recognized. In 1569, the Genoese, Sicilian and Aragon merchant ships were granted the same privileges under the French flag. The same concessions were granted to the ships of the British, Portuguese, Catalonian and Srakuza in 1595, the Netherlands in 1598 and the Germanic Empire in 1616 (Acar K. D., 2007).
These and similar concessions were generally considered as a kind of favor given to the opposing state for political gain. Because at that time the Ottoman Empire was quite powerful and if a state were to obtain such privileges, it could be
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with the permission and grace of the Ottoman Empire. For example, the privilege granted to the French state in 1536 was a step taken to support France, which was a Protestant state, in the sectarian struggle that reached its peak in Europe at that time, and to fuel inter-sectarian conflict. Although these privileges provided political benefits to the state during the Ottoman period, these privileges would turn into something that did nothing but harm to the state as the Ottoman power lost.
3.1- THE SHAKING OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE STRAITS
It can be said that the year 1683 started the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the Ottoman Empire had reached its widest borders. Border conflicts were brewing with Austria, the historical enemy. These problems resulted in the decision to go as far as Vienna after a while. Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha was more influential in this decision than the sultan of the period, Mehmed IV (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi-1, 2010).
As a result, this war ended in disaster and the Ottoman army suffered a heavy defeat. This defeat had a great impact on the Western world. The reputation of the Ottoman Empire, which was called invincible, was shaken, and this gave great impetus to its Western enemies. The Holy Alliance was formed against the Ottomans. At the end of the long war years, which lasted for years and known as the "Great Turkish Wars" in history, the Ottomans had to sign the Treaty of Karlowitz with great territorial losses. At the end of this treaty, as Austria approached the Danube lengths and Venice had captured the Peloponnese peninsula, which constitutes the western end of the Aegean Sea, both military threats and commercial dangers arose for the first time against the Straits (Acar K. D., 2007).
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The Ottomans were no longer in their former power. Not only the West but also the Ottoman Empire had to accept this. In this period, when the Ottoman Empire began to decline rapidly, the most important unfortunate situation was the rapid strengthening of Russia, apart from its internal problems.
Tsar Peter I, known as "Mad" or "Great" in contemporary Ottoman histories, and generally with the nickname "Great", is the real founder and reconstructor who elevated Russia to the imperial stage and carried it into modern times (Beydilli, TDV İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2008).
Tsar Peter I's statement that Russia's becoming a great state would be possible by descending to warm seas forms the basis of the Russians' historical ambitions, the policy of going south. The fact that Peter I emphasized that the shortest and most convenient way for the Russians to reach the warm seas is to establish dominance over the Straits reveals the main goal of the Russians (Acar H. , 2019). Since the difficulties of the Baltic Sea and the Swedish barrier made this way more impossible than the other, Russia focused all its calculations on the Black Sea and the Straits from the 17th century (Demir, 2008). In addition, if it is taken into account that only the Black Sea does not hold ice for Russia, the importance of this sea for Russia will be better understood (Dördüncü, 2001).
Threatening the Straits region will first start with the threat of the Black Sea. Russia, which sees it as a necessity to go to the Mediterranean for new trade routes, raw materials and wealth, will now strive for this goal, produce strategies and force the Ottomans for centuries, from Peter I to the 1st World War and even to the Montreux Convention. One of the methods and propaganda used by Russia to realize its dreams of landing on warm seas is the claim of religious protection. Orthodox
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Russia emerges with the policy of the Ottoman as the savior of the Orthodox Balkan Christians. The patriarch of Istanbul is in secret cooperation with Russia. Western Europe takes a front against the invading power Russia in order not to lose the Ottoman market. Thus, the "Eastern Question" becomes one of the most important issues of world diplomacy (İnalcık, Kuruluş ve İmparatorluk Sürecinde Osmanlı, 2017).
The first concrete step taken by Russia in terms of reaching the Mediterranean and controlling the Straits region was during the "Great Turkish War", which lasted 16 years. The Azov Castle, which was a key place for the conquest of the Black Sea, became the first target of the Russians. The operation began in the summer of 1695. In this long siege, which lasted about 96 years, the Russians decided to withdraw when they received the news that the heir of Crimea, Devlet Giray, would come to the rescue. Due to the disease in the army, they were giving five hundred casualties a day. In this first siege of Azov, Russian casualties were fifty-sixty thousand according to Ottoman sources and thirty thousand according to Western sources (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi 4, 1960).
Tsar Peter I was not one to be discouraged by the failure of the first attempt. He had to capture Azov at all costs. His foresight had discovered that Azov was one of the most important safeguards for the great future of his empire (Zinkeisen, 2011).
Indeed, Peter I showed how much he wanted the Azov Fortress with the measures he took after the unsuccessful siege and his work. Shipyards were built. He brought masters who knew how to build ships. With the strict order and follow-up of Peter I, the villagers in the vicinity cut trees and transported them to the shipyard. Thus, in 1696, he established a navy of 30 ships on the Don River. While Russia was
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preparing to such a degree, the Ottomans did not show the same seriousness. Necessary preparations were not made. Consequently, the Russians won a decisive victory in the second siege. This victory was celebrated with unprecedented enthusiasm in Moscow. With the loss of Azov, the Russians had a place considered the lock of the Black Sea and the first wound had been opened in the Black Sea domination of the Turks (Cezar, Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi 4, 1960). This situation, which was completely opposite to the principle of the "Closed Straits" of the Ottoman Empire, would continue for about 15 years.
3.2- TEMPORARY RESOLUTION OF SHORT TERM UNCERTAINITY
We mentioned that as a result of the "Great Turkish War" that lasted for 16 years, the Ottomans suffered great territorial losses and finally concluded this process with the Treaty of Karlowitz. The agreement process with Russia, which was one of the parties to this war, was difficult. The most important reason why this process took a long time is that the Russians wanted the Kerch Strait, which is the key to the passage from the Azov Fortress to the Black Sea. But this place is in the hands of the Turks. The Ottomans refused this request and left the table. Thereupon, Russia appealed to Austria and Venice and asked for the continuation of the alliance and the war, but it did not receive support. Since he did not want to be alone with the Ottoman Empire, he had to agree. After the capture of the Azov Fortress, Russia, which defeated Sweden in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, thus settled in the Baltic Sea. (Acar K. D., 2007).
King Charles of Sweden, who was defeated by Russia at the end of this war, took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Charles encouraged the Ottomans to fight against
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Russia and was successful in his attempt. Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, who was brought to the position of grand vizier by Ahmet III, declared war on Russia in 1711 (Okkar, 2006).
With the loss of the Azov Castle, the Turkish sovereignty in the Black Sea was in danger. Now, this conflict with the Russians could be an opportunity to solve this problem. With the Prut War, which took place in 1711, the Ottomans won an important victory. With the peace treaty signed at the end of the war, Tsarist Russia agreed to give back all the lands it took from the Ottoman Empire, including the Azov Castle. With the Prut Treaty, the Black Sea and Azov were accepted as the "Turkish Sea", and the principle of the Black Sea being closed to foreign ships continued (Şener, 2014).
4- FIRST SERIOUS THREAT TO OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNYT IN THE STRAITS; “KÜÇÜK KAYNARCA”
The loss of the Azov Fortress and the Russian threat in the Black Sea for 15 years had been the first threat to the Turks about the Straits. After the victory in the Prut War, this situation was restored at the end of the treaty made. There was an atmosphere of peace between the Ottoman Empire and Russia for a long time. This situation broke down with the Russo-Polish war.
After the Russian soldiers entered the Polish lands, the Polish people, afraid of the massacres by the Russians, took refuge in the Ottoman lands. The Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia after the Russians, who followed the Poles, entered the Ottoman lands and massacred some Muslims from the Ottoman subjects along with the Poles (Acar K. D., 2007).
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The war did not go well for the Ottomans. Although the issue of declaration of war was an event for which they were right, the Ottomans entered the war unprepared. The Russians wanted to put the Ottomans in a difficult situation by closing the Bosphorus in Istanbul. Her own navy was also under Ottoman threat in the Black Sea.
The Russians, with the help of the British, took their navy across the Baltic Sea and then through Gibraltar to the Mediterranean. The arrival of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean was entirely with the approval and even assistance of the British government. Britain was supporting Russia at this time and was expecting benefits from a victory of the Russians against the Ottoman Empire (Dördüncü, 2001). This navy burned the Ottoman navy anchored in Çeşme Harbor on July 6, 1770.
The Ottomans suffered a heavy defeat, but the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which was signed after the war, was just as heavy. The Ottoman Empire had to make concessions regarding the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, which it had the sole say for nearly 300 years.
The main articles of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty regarding the Black Sea and the Straits are as follows:
1. Crimea will be independent and Muslims will be dependent on the Caliph for religious reasons. The Ottoman Empire and Russia will not interfere in the election of the Crimean Khan. With the same article, Yeni Kale and Kerch Castle will be abandoned to the Russians, and following the agreement, the Russians will withdraw from the Crimea and other Tatars-owned places and Kuban.
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2. The region between the Ozi and Aksu rivers and the Kilburun Fortress on the edge of Ozi were left to the Russians. In this way, the Aksu River became the border between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.
3. Russia would have the right to have a permanent ambassador in Istanbul.
4. The Russians would come and go to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean with their merchant ships and could stay in the Ottoman rivers.
5. The Russians were going to build a church in Galata like other states.
6. The lands around the Azov Castle were left to Russia. (Okkar, 2006).
The 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian war was a turning point for the Straits Issue. In order to descend to the warm seas, which became the most important policy of the state from the beginning of the 18th century, Russia was almost beginning to reap the rewards of its determination and efforts. For the Ottomans, the heaviest issue in the Küçük Kaynarca treaty was undoubtedly the independence of Crimea. Crimea, which had been under Ottoman protection since the middle of the 15th century, had helped the Ottomans in many wars and was almost an Ottoman outpost in the Black Sea, was no longer under Ottoman influence. Both the Ottoman Empire and Russia knew that the independence issue of Crimea was a temporary situation. If Russia wanted to dominate the Black Sea, it had to dominate the Crimea as well. Indeed, in 1783, Crimea was annexed by the Russians.
Another important article in the treaty regarding the Straits was that Russian merchant ships gained the right to pass through the Straits. As we mentioned before, only the merchant ships of the states allowed by the Ottomans could pass through the Straits. After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottoman Empire had to allow Russian merchant ships. From this date on, we will see that the absolute dominance of the Ottomans on the Straits is gradually disappearing.
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At the end of the 18th century, when the Ottoman dominance over the Black Sea and the Straits was shaken, there was a situation that would relieve her hand a little. When Britain lost its North American colonies, it focused on Indian and Far East colonies, thus, she was afraid that Russia would threaten these colonies by going to the open seas. In order to prevent this, the shortest route to the open seas, namely the Ottoman Empire, which held the Turkish Straits, had to be secured and the Straits closed. From now on, Britain started to defend the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
Having the same interests as Britain in protecting the Straits against the Russian threat was very important for the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline militarily and was far from her former power. Because she had not been successful in her fight against Russia alone in recent years. Although Britain did not actively support in a hot conflict, the fact that she was politically defending the Ottoman Empire on the Straits would reduce the possibilities of war, but at the end of the war she could be protected from heavy articles that would be imposed on her with a possible bad outcome. Russia's attempts to move south from the Balkans increased the strategic importance of Istanbul and the Straits for Britain. The "imperial road" project, which she laid the foundation of by settling in Gibraltar with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, had become the lifeblood of Britain in the last quarter of the 19th century, extending from Suez to Aden and from there to India (Soy, 2015).
4.1-THE INEVITABLE ALLIANCE
Towards the end of the 18th century, another problem arose for the Ottomans. Until 1798, France was the most privileged state in terms of commercial activities in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. On this date, as a result of France's invasion of Egypt
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by landing troops, the privileged situation expanded in favor of Britain (Acar H. , 2019). Egypt was important for France because it would have a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean by blocking its rival Britain, thus controlling the way to India (Dördüncü, 2001).
Once again, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing its disadvantage due to the weakness of the advantage of its geographical position. It was not possible for her to stand alone against France and prevent the invasion. She needed military assistance. The Ottoman Empire was in such a bad situation that it had to seek help from its "traditional enemy", Russia. The Ottoman Empire signed an alliance treaty with Russia on December 23, 1798. The terms of the alliance are designed in two forms, openly and covertly. Some of the important secret articles of this alliance treaty are as follows; (Acar H. , 2019)
- Russia will assist the Ottoman Empire with a war fleet and the Ottoman Empire will allow this fleet to pass through the Straits.
- After the war is over, Russian ships will return to their bases in the Black Sea. But the passage of Russian ships through the Straits during the war will no longer be an excuse for them to claim rights to pass through the Straits.
- The Black Sea will be a closed sea between the two states. Ships that want to enter this sea will be opposed together.
At the end of this treaty, the Ottoman Empire found an ally against France on Egypt, but made an important concession in return. Russia has achieved what it has aimed for a hundred years, albeit with a temporary agreement. For the first time, Russian warships passed through the Straits. Another important secret item is to emphasize that the Black Sea is a Russian and Turkish lake, and that in a possible
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attack against Russia, the Ottomans will close the Straits for Russia. The enemy is not clearly specified in this article. In other words, when a country with good relations with the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia, the Ottoman Empire would protect Russia by closing the Straits. This situation was both a sign of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and a harbinger of what would happen in the next century regarding the Straits. In addition, the rule of “Closing the Straits”, which has been going on for two hundred years and is protected in any case, and which ensures that warships do not pass through the Dardanelles and Istanbul Straits, has been damaged.
In 1805, Russia wanted to renew the alliance agreement signed 7 years ago. On September 24, 1805, a new nine-year treaty was signed. With this treaty, the items of the previous treaty, the closure of the Black Sea and the joint defense of the Straits, were preserved. According to the secret Article 4 of the alliance, Russia could pass its warships through the Straits at any time in order to replace its soldiers in the Republic of the Seven Islands in the Adriatic Sea, which it temporarily held (Acar K. D., 2007).
In the previous treaty, as a result of the French occupation of Egypt, Russian warships could pass to help the Ottoman navy. Since it was a state of war, this could be considered normal. But now, in peacetime, the Russian navy could pass through the Straits whenever it wanted.
4.2- CHANGING BALANCES IN EUROPE AND THE NEW ALLIANCE; “KALA-I SULTANIYYE”
After the 1805 treaty with Russia, a state of war arose between Russia and France. The important victories of France against both the Austrian and Russian armies pushed the Ottomans towards getting closer to France. As a result of diplomatic negotiations, a French ambassador came to Istanbul. The ambassador
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demanded the dismissal of the Wallachian and Moldavian chiefs, who were considered pro-Russian, from the Ottoman Empire, and the closure of the Straits to Russian ships. The Ottomans accepted these requests of the Ambassador despite the alliance she made with Russia (Dördüncü, 2001). The Ottomans did not really allow the passage of the Russian fleet through the Straits. Angered at not being loyal to the alliance, Russia protested this situation. Britain also took the side of Russia and supported it.
The Ottoman's search for an ally that would benefit her the most inevitably led to new diplomatic crises. In this period, the Ottomans suddenly abandoned the treaty with Russia and turned to France, as a result of the effect of the Napoleonic Wars that took place in Europe at that time. Emperor Napoleon's France had become a state of high prestige from the beginning of the war, establishing overwhelming superiority over other European states and winning great victories. Napoleon's defeat of Russia on the battlefield pushed the Ottomans to withdraw from the allied treaty with Russia. The atmosphere at that time was that the balances would change radically in Europe, and the Ottomans wanted to be on the winning and strong side.
Responding to the Ottomans' closure of the Straits to Russian ships, Russia was not satisfied with this and invaded Moldavia to intimidate the Ottoman Empire. Thereupon, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia and prohibited the passage of all kinds of war and commercial ships through the Straits (Acar K. D., 2007).
Britain has been against this from the very beginning. They thought that Napoleon, who took the whole of Europe against him, could not be defeated without the help of Russia. After the Ottomans declared war on Russia, they increased their pressure on Babıali. Britain's offer to the Ottomans to withdraw from the war was not
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accepted. Thereupon, a British fleet under the command of Admiral Dorkwot in February 1807 passed through the Dardanelles and anchored in front of Istanbul (Acar K. D., 2007). This event once again revealed the inadequacy of the defense of the Straits. Despite this attempt, Britain could not get their demands accepted.
Neither the declaration of war by Russia nor the pressures of Britain, would break good relations with Ottoman Empire and France. The rapprochement between France and Russia in 1807 rendered this relationship dysfunctional. In July 1807, the Treaty of Tilzit was signed between the two countries. According to this treaty, Russia recognized the presence of France in the Adriatic Sea. France, on the other hand, supported Russia's demands on Wallachia and Moldavia. With this treaty, France would dominate Western Europe and Russia would dominate Europe (Acar K. D., 2007). This situation led to the rapprochement of the Ottoman Empire and Britain.
The Treaty of Kale-i Sultaniyye was signed on January 5, 1809 with the Ottomans and Britain, who sought a new alliance with the rapprochement of France and Russia. With this treaty, the absolute sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and her sole regulatory authority regarding the Straits and the Black Sea came to an end. With this treaty, the legal regime of the Straits began to be regulated not by unilateral actions of the Ottoman Empire, but by bilateral agreements (Dördüncü, 2001).
With this treaty, Britain broke the pressure of Russia on the Straits. In this treaty, the "old way" of keeping the Straits closed to warships of all states was confirmed, and it was agreed to keep the Straits closed to warships in peacetime from now on (Mehmet Kayıran, 2017). In addition, if France attacked the Ottoman Empire, the British government would protect the coasts of the Ottoman Empire against
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France and would provide weapons and ammunition to the Ottoman forces (Acar H. , 2019).
This treaty was a sign that the conflict between Britain and Russia over the Straits region emerged concretely and that this issue was gradually taking on an international aspect. This bilateral treaty also emphasized the Ottoman's full dominance over the Straits, even though Britain was involved.
4.3- GREEK REVOLT AND TREATY OF EDİRNE
At the beginning of the 19th century, the nationalism movement spread by the French Revolution of 1789 and the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars were dominant in Europe. Napoleon, who expanded the territory of France with the wars he won in a row and was the nightmare of other states, became weaker after the Russian campaign, which was the mistake that changed the course of history, and was sent into exile after heavy defeats. But the atmosphere of confusion and the threat of France continued. For this reason, four states united against France in September 1814 to protect themselves from the effects of the revolution and to redesign European politics; Russia, Britain, Prussia and Austria organized the Congress of Vienna (Erman, 2021). In the congress, they had undertaken to suppress the uprisings that emerged against the order wherever they were in Europe and to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries on this path (Dördüncü, 2001). In addition, despite the great objections of Russia, it was decided to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, even though it did not attend the congress. But by 1821, Europe would overturn these decisions with the Greek revolt in the Peloponnese.
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Russia had already been making some rebellion plans and attempts since the 18th century for the aims it planned to realize on the Ottoman Empire. There had been a Greek revolt attempt before and Russia supported it. This time, a rebellion was organized as a result of much deeper studies and organizations. The rebellion, which started in the Danube region, spread to the whole of the Peloponnese and a large part of continental Greece in a short time (Erman, 2021).
The location of the revolt, between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and in the center of the Straits region, had a great impact on world trade. The big states that organized intensive trade activities on this route had to be involved in this event unavoidably. Alongside Russia, France and Britain supported the revolt. The Ottomans had difficulty suppressing this rebellion and asked for help from the Egyptian governor, Mehmet Ali Pasha. Pasha said that he would be able to suppress the rebellion if he was given the governorships of Peloponnese and Crete. This request was accepted and Mehmet Ali Pasha appointed his son İbrahim Pasha to suppress the rebellion. İbrahim Pasha suppressed the rebellion in a short time with his powerful land and sea army. The Greek movement, which could not achieve success in the military field, had to resort to the help of European powers and diplomatic methods as a way out (Erman, 2021).
As a result of the policies of the Western states on the Eastern Mediterranean in line with their own interests, on July 6, 1827, negotiations between Britain, Russia and France began in London. In these meetings, it was decided to establish an autonomous Greece affiliated to the Ottoman Empire (Dördüncü, 2001).
Even with the support of Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Empire, which failed the rebellion militarily, did not accept this decision imposed by the European
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states for its own interests. On October 20, 1827, the allies consisting of the British, French and Russian navies made a sudden raid on the Ottoman-Egyptian navy, although there was no state of war, and the navy was destroyed (Bostan, 2006). Russia went further and declared war on the Ottoman Empire. As the Russians advanced and occupied Edirne, peace had to be made.
With the Edirne Treaty signed at the end of the war, it was stated that Russian merchant ships would not be interfered with in the passage of the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits and the goods they were carrying. In addition, with this treaty, the Ottoman Empire promised to open the Straits to the merchant ships of all the states with which it was at peace, and thus, the national decision that the Straits were also closed to merchant ships became history (Dördüncü, 2001).
This treaty was of particular importance in terms of the transit regime through the Turkish Straits. The absolute sovereignty or "ancient rule" of the Ottoman Empire in the Straits came to an end with this treaty, and besides the merchant ships of Russia, one of the contracting parties of the treaty, the Straits became open to the merchant ships of all foreign states during peacetime. The opening of the Straits to the merchant ships of foreign states in peacetime became an international obligation with this treaty for the first time (Şener, 2014).
4.4- MEHMET ALI PASHA REVOLT AND TREATY OF HUNKAR ISKELESI
During the Greek revolt, help was sought from the Egyptian governor, Mehmet Ali Pasha, and in return, the pasha asked for the governorship of Peloponnese and Crete. Although Mehmet Ali Pasha did what was asked of him, a Greek state was established as a result. In return, he had to settle for Crete alone. In
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1827, after the Ottoman rejection of Britain, France and Russia's decision for an independent Greek state, the allied navy burned the Ottoman and Egyptian navies in Navarin. When the communication with the Morea was cut off and his army in this region was in a difficult situation, Mehmet Ali signed a treaty with Codrington in Alexandria and withdrew his forces from the Peloponnese without the permission of the Babıali (Kutluoğlu, 2002).
Although he suffered many losses during the suppression of the rebellion, Mehmet Ali Pasha strengthened his reputation in Egypt. Like an independent monarch, he signed treaties with European states on his behalf. In addition, in this war, the modern Egyptian army tried new war tactics and tools, and also got to know the Ottoman army closely (Kocaoğlu, 1995).
Mehmet Ali Pasha, who had an expansionist policy, had been making plans to seize Syria for a long time. The Egyptian army under the command of his son İbrahim Pasha captured Damascus on 15 June 1832 and moved towards Hums (Kış, 2010).
The Ottoman army could not show a presence against the Egyptian army, which had adopted European war technology, and suffered defeats one after another. The Egyptian army, which won a great Egyptian victory in the war in Konya, began to threaten Istanbul. These developments were also closely followed by European states and followed with concern. Because while there was a weak and controllable Ottoman Empire in the Straits region, there was now a more assertive and idealistic Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha. They did not want the powerful Mehmet Ali Pasha to pass under the Ottoman rule.
Mahmut II realized that he could do anything against the threat of Mehmet Ali Pasha and decided to seek help from the European states. First, Britain and France
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were applied, but no positive response was received. Remaining as the only resort, Russia accepted the offer of assistance. Russia agreed to help the Ottomans on the grounds that it would be easy to control a weak state mentioned above.
With the acceptance of the offer of assistance, a Russian war fleet came to the Bosphorus on February 20, 1833, anchored at Hünkar İskelesi and landed nearly 12,000 soldiers. This move caused increased anxiety in European states (Acar K. D., 2007).
Britain and France were involved in the incident and tried to reconcile the two sides. As a result, on May 14, 1833, the Kütahya Compromise was agreed with the governor of Egypt and the threat was temporarily stopped.
According to the agreement, the governorship of Damascus was given to him in addition to the governorships held by Mehmet Ali Pasha. In addition, İbrahim Pasha was given the Governorship of Adana. After the compromise, İbrahim Pasha withdrew his forces from Anatolia. Thereupon, negotiations started between the Ottoman state and Russia, and at the end of these negotiations, the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty was signed with Russia on 8 July 1833 (Acar H. , 2019).
The provisions of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty regarding the Straits and the Black Sea are as follows:
1- It envisaged that the two states made a treaty with only defense concerns and that they would cooperate on security issues.
2- If the events created a situation for the Ottoman Empire to ask for help from Russia, Russia would help the Ottoman Empire by land and sea with a force to be determined between the two sides.
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3- The side asking for help would cover the expenses of the forces that came to help.
4- The term of the treaty was to be 8 years.
The treaty also had a closed clause. Accordingly, since the Russian Emperor knew the difficulties that financial aid to Russia would impose on the Ottoman government in return for the Russian aid provided by this treaty to the Ottoman Empire, if the Ottoman Empire had to meet such a difficulty one day, Russia would not ask for this help from the Ottomans. Babıali would use its political and military power to close the Dardanelles, in line with Russia's interests, instead of helping Russia when necessary under the mutual aid rule, and would not allow any foreign warships to enter through the strait (Okkar, 2006).
As can be seen, as a result of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, Russia gave the Ottomans the task of protecting Russia against other states in case of a possible war in the Straits region, just as in the alliance treaty signed in 1798. The alliance agreement made in 1798 disturbed Britain at that time, and as soon as the agreement was over, she signed the Kala-i Sultaniyye agreement to break this privilege of Russia. At the end of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, Britain became very uncomfortable with this situation. In the war of the great powers in the Straits region for half a century, it was never acceptable for anyone to have greater privileges.
After the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, the western states began to evaluate the success of Russia with this treaty on the Ottoman Empire, especially on the Straits. Immediately after the signing of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, Britain started to work intensively to bring the principle of closure of the Straits back to their former state, that is, to make the principle of closure of the Straits an international obligation.
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British Foreign Minister Palmerston, in his protest note given to Babıali on 26 August 1833, stated that Ottoman-Russian relations could be objected to by other states with the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, and that if Russia made an armed intervention in the Ottoman internal affairs based on this agreement, Britain would act as if such a treaty did not exist and act freely in accordance with its interests. (Dördüncü, 2001).
4.5- MEHMET ALI PASHA IS RISING AGAIN
The war between the Ottoman Empire and its governor, Mehmet Ali Pasha, ended with the intervention of Britain. The Kütahya Treaty signed between them did not satisfy both sides. Sultan Mahmud II intended to punish Mehmet Ali Pasha if he had the opportunity.
In the summer of 1834, uprisings broke out in Syria against İbrahim Pasha. İbrahim Pasha seized everything in order to generate income, as in Egypt. He was forcibly recruiting the Syrian people. The Syrian people were already looking for Ottoman rule. For this reason, they revolted against İbrahim Pasha. When Mahmut II was about to take advantage of this situation and take action, an Albanian revolt broke out and thus the peace between the two sides lasted for another 4-5 years (Armaoğlu, 1997).
In 1839, Mahmut II found the opportunity he was looking for and decided to take action. On June 24, 1839, the Ottoman army under the command of Hafız Ahmet Pasha and the Egyptian army under the command of İbrahim Pasha came face to face in Nizip. In this war, the Ottoman army suffered a heavy defeat. Upon this heavy defeat, his Captain Derya Ahmet Pasha handed over the Ottoman navy to Mehmet Ali Pasha. The Ottomans were experiencing a double disaster.
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Europe was following this war, which flared up again, closely. Although states such as Britain, France and Russia were in conflict over the Ottoman lands and the Straits, they shared almost the same views on the Mehmet Ali Pasha rebellion. The Ottoman Empire was a weak state at that time, and it was easy to put its word on the very important Straits area it controlled. However, in a state where Mehmet Ali Pasha, who was getting stronger and had great ideals, would dominate, they could lose their right to speak in these regions.
In Europe; Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia were closely examining the events. There was talk of holding a conference among themselves to resolve the issue. For this reason, the Istanbul ambassadors of the 5 states, in a joint note they gave to the Babıali on July 27, 1839, stated that the five states agreed with each other on the Eastern Question and asked the Ottoman state not to enter into any negotiations without their support (Armaoğlu, 1997).
This note almost tied the hands of the Ottoman Empire. It was making a possible agreement between the Ottomans and Mehmet Ali impossible. It was also a development that violated the independence of the Ottoman Empire. However, there was nothing that the Babıali could do.
British Foreign Minister Palmerston, in agreement with Russia, Austria and Prussia, held a conference in London on 15 July 1840 to find a solution to the Mehmet Ali problem. The London Conference, on 15 July 1840, adopted and signed two documents (Armaoğlu, 1997).
According to the treaty; Egypt will be given to Mehmet Ali to be passed from father to son. In addition, the borders with the Akka Governorate will be given to Mehmet Ali. If Mehmet Ali did not accept these conditions within ten days, he would
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lose Akka and would have to settle for Egypt only. But if, in the second ten days, he did not accept Egypt to be passed from father to son, then the Ottoman Empire would take back the condition of passing from father to son. Again, according to this year, if Mehmet Ali accepted all these within the first ten days, all the treaties signed by the Ottoman Empire would be valid in these lands and taxes would be collected in the name of the Ottoman Sultan. Only the military and civil expenses of Egypt and the lands given to Mehmet Ali would be covered from these taxes (Armaoğlu, 1997).
These were the articles that the European states decided on and wanted to impose. Knowing that his own potential is higher and determined to continue his expansionist policy, Mehmet Ali rejected this offer. Thereupon, the European states took action. Mehmet Ali, who was in a difficult situation with the intervention from both the sea and the land, agreed to withdraw from Syria and be content with Egypt. With a new compromise made in 1841, this war ended. Now the main issue was the Straits Issue.
5- ENTRY OF STRAITS INTO INTERNATIONAL STATUS; “LONDON CONVENTION OF 1841”
The Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, signed in 1833, was an 8-year treaty. The year 1841 was very important for this. Britain and France wanted to take action against Russia, which gained a great privilege in the Straits Region with this treaty and was threatening the Mediterranean. The second Mehmet Ali rebellion, which broke out in 1839, was also resolved on this date. Now the issue of the Straits Issue had to be settled.
Although the principle of the closure of the Straits to all states, which was the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, was threatened from time to time, it was
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protected especially in the 19th century with the support of Britain. As a result of the alliance with Russia in 1798, Russian warships gained the right to pass through the Straits for the first time and this disturbed the European states. The outbreak of an Ottoman-Russian war close to the end of the treaty and the deterioration between the two countries was a unique opportunity for Britain and the ancient rule was preserved again with the Kala-i Sultaniyye agreement by getting closer to the Ottoman Empire. Now, with the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, Russia was controlling the Straits region for its own benefit and threatening the Mediterranean. Britain wanted to define the principle of closure of the Straits as an international obligation.
Based on the fact that the Hünkar İskelesi Agreement, which had expired for 8 years, would not be renewed, the parties signed an agreement in London on 13 July 1841 that redefined the legal status of the Straits. The Treaty of the Straits, signed in London by Britain, Austria, Russia, France, Prussia and the Ottoman Empire, consisted of four articles. According to this;
-The Ottoman Empire agreed not to let any foreign warships pass through the Straits as long as it was in peace, as it has been doing for a long time. The states of Austria, France, Britain, Prussia and Russia also promised to abide by this decision.
-The Ottoman Empire, as in the past, would be able to allow light warships in the service of friendly state ambassadors to pass through the Straits.
-The Sultan would invite all states that were in friendship with the Ottoman Empire to comply with this treaty.
-The treaty was to be ratified within two months at the latest, and the signatory states were committed to the implementation of the determined conditions (Dördüncü, 2001).
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With the London Straits Convention of 1841, the Straits Issue gained an international status. With this treaty, it was no longer possible to regulate the right of passage through the Straits unilaterally (Acar H. , 2019).
With the London Straits Convention of 1841, Britain prevented Russian warships from entering the Mediterranean through the Straits. In peacetime, she removed the issue of the passage of warships of other states through the Straits from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire and attached it to an international status, thus protecting the security of the "Imperial Road" that provided its connection with India (Mehmet Kayıran, 2017).
The Straits region, which emerged from the domination of bilateral treaties, now gained an international character and actually completely eliminated the absolute sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Although the ancient rule was provided with this treaty, this situation was caused by the efforts of the great states, without the will of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, the Ottoman Empire would have to find an alliance for the Straits Region in the 19th century.
Even though it was realized with the efforts of Britain, the article of the 1841 treaty stipulating the closure of the Straits could be considered a positive article for the Ottomans. Undoubtedly, Russia was the one who suffered from this treaty. The 1833 Hünkar İskelesi Treaty gave important concessions to Russia for its centuries-old ambitions. After 8 years, these were abolished and as the Straits region would be kept closed as an international obligation, Russia was in a way squeezed into the Black Sea.
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5.1- RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON THE STRAITS, THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE TREATY OF PARIS
The negative effects of the London Treaty and the loss of its effectiveness in the Straits angered the Russians. Since then, they have dreamed of attacking the Ottomans and forcibly dominating Istanbul and the Bosphorus region. In fact, until the Treaty of London, Russia was following the policy of keeping the Ottoman Empire alive. During the revolt of Mehmet Ali Pasha, she responded positively to the request for help and provided military assistance. Finally, with the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, she gained great privileges on the Straits region. Now, it had taken an aggressive and hostile stance for the conditions of the Straits Region, which could no longer be determined by bilateral agreements.
Tsar Nicholas I thought that Britain had the greatest say in Europe. He thought that he would achieve his goals very easily if he brought Britain, which had been supporting the Ottomans against him for the last fifty years, to his side by mutual agreement.
Tsar Nicholas I visited Queen Victoria of Britain in June 1844. In the Tsar's negotiations with the British government, the following principles were determined between Britain and Russia: Turkey's existence will be maintained as long as possible. If an unexpected development occurs in Turkey, then Britain and Russia will discuss what they can do “jointly” (Armaoğlu, 1997).
Tsar Nicholas tried to persuade, softly and slowly at first. Over time, he began to reveal his true ambitions by hardening his tongue. He talked about the fact that the Ottoman Empire was a "sick man" that was about to fall apart and told Britain that
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they needed to share this. Russia persisted in persuasion for ten years. After the clear attitude of Britain, this time they went to influence the Ottoman Empire directly. Nicholas sent Prince Alexander Menchikov, who held the ranks of Minister of Naval Affairs and Governor-General of Finland, to Istanbul.
Mençikov gave an ultimatum to the Babıali on May 5, 1853, demanding that the Ottoman Empire sign an alliance with Russia and leave the protection of the Orthodox people in the Ottoman Empire to Russia (Özgür Yıldız, 2012).
When the Ottomans did not accept this offer, Russia declared war and entered Ottoman lands from both the Balkans and the Caucasus. In the meantime, Britain and France joined the war on the side of the Ottoman Empire after the Russian navy made a sudden raid and burned the anchored Ottoman navy in Sinop (Acar K. D., 2007).
On October 8, 1853, Britain sent its navy in front of the Dardanelles through the Bosphorus and sent it to Istanbul. Britain was followed by France (Akbulut, 2014). With the help of the powerful armies and navies of Britain and France, the Ottoman Empire inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. Realizing that it would lose the war, Russia had to ask for peace. With the participation of the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, the Paris Agreement was signed at the end of the negotiations held in Paris on March 30, 1856.
5.2- RUSSIAN OPPOTUNISM AND THE 1871 LONDON STRAITS CONVENTION
The Treaty of Paris was undoubtedly a tremendous treaty for Britain and France. It was emphasized that the 1841 Straits Convention on the closure of the
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Straits was in force, according to Article 10 of the treaty, which was related to the Straits (Armaoğlu, 1997).
According to Article 11, the Black Sea was made neutral and isolated from military service. According to Article 13, warships could not be kept in the Black Sea and the existing shipyards would be destroyed (Armaoğlu, 1997).
Especially with these articles, Russia's descent into the Mediterranean was prevented by the rule of the closure of the Straits, and Russia was imprisoned in the Black Sea due to the fact that warships could not be kept in the Black Sea and the existing shipyards would be destroyed. Russia, which has been taking steps for years with the goal of landing in the Mediterranean and slowly approaching its goal, was now becoming defenceless even in the Black Sea.
Russia, which was extremely disturbed by this situation, found the opportunity it was looking for in 1870. After France left the German-French war in defeat, Russia declared that it did not recognize the parts of the 1856 Paris Agreement related to the Black Sea.
Britain did not look at this attitude of Russia positively. However, upon Germany's support of Russia, Ottoman Vizier Ali Pasha, who could not risk a possible war against the Russians, approached Britain. Thereupon, a conference was held on January 17, 1871, with the participation of the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Austria, Italy, Britain, France and Russia, through Britain (Acar H. , 2019).
According to the London Straits Convention, signed on March 13, 1871 and consisting of 9 articles, both the Ottoman Empire and Russia regained the right to keep warships and open shipyards in the Black Sea. The principle that the Straits are closed to warships in peacetime was repeated. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire
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was given the authority to open the Straits to the warships of friendly and allied states in times of peace when it deemed necessary (Acar K. D., 2007).
Even if there were positive items such as establishing shipyards in the Black Sea and producing warships and opening the Straits to warships of friendly states when deemed necessary, this agreement was against the Ottomans. The greatest threat faced by the Ottoman Empire in the last hundred years was Russia's attempts to open up to the Mediterranean with its policy over the Black Sea. In other words, from the moment the Black Sea ceased to be a Turkish lake, it became a lake of problems for the Ottomans. With the Paris Treaty of 1856, the biggest enemy in the Black Sea was cut off and the Ottomans were relieved in this regard. Now Russia was regaining its old rights and was preparing to take action for its ambitions. Had she been able to strengthen the Ottoman navy and army in the last fifteen years, he would have been able to cope with the big problem, but unfortunately this did not happen.
One of the most important policies followed by Russia against the Ottoman Empire is Panslavism. The term Panslavism began to be used in Western European political circles, especially since the 1870s, and by this, it was meant a movement to ensure the political solidarity of all Slavic tribes under the leadership of Russia (Armaoğlu, 1997).
When the Ottomans dominated the Balkans, like other states of the era, the fact that they did not carry out massacres and population cleansing in the conquered lands and acted with a policy of “İstimalet” that became a scourge after the nationalist movement. The İstimalet Policy implemented by the Ottomans was the rule that the peasants who produced in the conquered areas should stay in their lands and continue to live their language, religion and culture, but pay taxes by producing in return. This
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policy was certainly the most correct and most humane method. Undoubtedly, the Ottomans did the right thing, but then faced great difficulties in the 19th and 20th centuries. She has almost paid the price for being the most humane of any other state in the world.
5.3- 1876 OTTOMAN RUSSIAN WAR, SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN TREATIES
When the Eastern Question began to occupy the European agenda again in the last quarter of the 19th century, the German chancellor Bismarck had a solution; to divide the Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In addition to these countries, Britain could take Egypt and the Aegean islands, and France could take Syria. In fact, Bismarck conveyed his proposal emphasizing the necessity of this sharing to the British government in January and February 1876. However, it was inconclusive due to the uncertainty and indecision about this issue in Britain, especially the British Foreign Minister Lord Derby (Soy, 2015).
The Ottoman's loss of power with each passing year caused European states to make calculations on themselves like vultures. France, which caused Europe to be dragged into chaos in the Napoleonic wars and caused the death of millions of soldiers and civilians, was not part of any disintegration plan after Napoleon was defeated. This state, which brought Europe into such turmoil and destruction, did not show the same treatment as the Ottomans, and they accepted it again with the new administration. However, the Ottoman Empire was always faced with the hostile and divisive attitudes of the European states.
This was the case in 1876 and Bismarck's plan was clear. Britain did not agree with this idea, but did not accept it for its own interests, thinking that it would
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undoubtedly cause greater troubles, not for the Ottoman Empire. Russia's Pan-Slavism policy gave its first fruits in these years. The rebellion, which started in Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 1, 1875, spread to all the Balkans a year later. As a result of this uprising, the European states sent their representatives to Istanbul and convened a conference called the Constantinople Conference (Tersane Konferansı) in December 1876 (Acar H. , 2019).
At the conference, European states asked the Ottoman Empire to expand the territories of Serbia and Montenegro and to grant autonomy to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. When the Ottoman State refused these requests, the conference broke up without result (Acar K. D., 2007).
After the rejection of offers, which would not be accepted not only to the Ottoman Empire, but also to any other state, Russia, using this as an excuse, declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and Russo-Turkish War began in 1877. The real purpose of Russia's starting this war is to establish unconditional domination in the Black Sea, to make this sea a Russian inland sea, and then to keep a weak Ottoman Empire alive for now under Russian influence and patronage, and thus, in a European conflict that may arise, Istanbul and laying the groundwork for capturing the Straits (Acar K. D., 2007).
The war was disastrous for the Ottomans. The Russian army came as far as Istanbul. Gazi Osman Pasha's legendary defense of Pleven was the only thing that was remembered in favor of the Ottomans. At the end of the war, the San Stefano (Yeşilköy) Treaty was signed. While reaffirming the provisions of the 1841 "London Treaty" regarding the Straits, the provision was added to the treaty that the Straits
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would be kept open to neutral merchant ships arriving or departing from Russian ports in peace and war (Şener, 2014).
In other articles of the treaty, the Ottoman presence in Europe was almost ending. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were gaining independence. The "Great Bulgarian Principality" was established, which stretched from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Serbian border and was connected to the Ottoman Empire with the autonomous administration. In the east, Batum, Kars, Ardahan and Doğubeyazıt were left to the Russians (Acar K. D., 2007).
The bad loss of the war and the fact that the treaty signed after it contained very heavy provisions disturbed the European states as well as the Ottomans. It was decided to reconvene to discuss the San Stefano Agreement again in order to stop Russia, which has established a single superiority over the Eastern problem, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. On July 13, 1878, the Berlin conference began with the participation of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the conference, the Berlin Treaty was signed between the states participating in the conference on 13 July 1878. The Berlin Treaty, consisting of sixty-four articles, did not bring about any change in the legal status of the Straits. By referring to the 1871 London Straits Treaty in Article 63 of the Treaty, the principle of the Straits being closed to foreign warships in peacetime, which was determined by the 1841 London Straits Convention, was repeated (Acar K. D., 2007).
With this treaty, the provisions of the 1871 "London Treaty" on the Straits were confirmed and Russia's influence over the Black Sea and the Straits with the "San Stefano Treaty" was broken. From this date until the First World War, the
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regime on the Straits was implemented within the framework of the 1871 "London Agreement" (Şener, 2014).
6- WARMING WATERS BEFORE THE GREAT WAR
At the beginning of the study, we mentioned the importance of trade routes with the globalization of international trade and the sovereignty initiatives that states try to establish on these roads. After the industrial revolution, developed countries quickly adapted to this revolution, and they began to search for raw materials and quickly colonized. When production was enormously higher than before the revolution, countries better grasped the importance of sending these products abroad. With the spread and reliability of maritime trade, maritime trade routes became of great importance.
All the conflicts we have mentioned so far took place in the 19th century. This century was the year when the disintegration accelerated for the Ottoman Empire. Almost all of the Ottoman wars in this century were related to the Bosphorus region in some way. The fact that the Straits region came to such an important position made it very difficult for the Ottoman Empire due to its weak times. After the wars, territorial losses, and the search for alliances, the Ottoman Empire got worse every year, let alone regaining its former power. This situation increased the alliances on the Straits region. She knew that Ottoman power was insufficient. For this reason, he entered into alliances sometimes with Russia and sometimes with Britain. If we do not count the Crimean war, even Britain and Russia, who are often in alliance, have always been in conflict over the Straits.
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At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a period when the group countries that made alliances in Europe became prominent. At the end of the 19th century, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy entered into an alliance. These states, which were slightly behind in colonization compared to Britain and France, aimed to accelerate their search for colonies. By 1907, Britain, France and Russia had entered into an alliance. Thus, there were two groups in Europe as the "Triple Alliance" and the "Triple Entente" and they were rapidly arming.
6.1- 1st WORLD WAR
The Ottoman Empire first defeat against Italy in Tripoli in 1911 and Libya was lost. Shortly after the end of this war, the Balkan Wars, the biggest disaster of the Ottoman Empire, began. With this war, the Balkans, the heart of the Ottoman Empire, are now out of hand. The Empire, which had been constantly losing territory for two hundred years, had now lost almost all of its European lands. The sick man of Europe was now on his deathbed and could die at any moment. In such a situation, a tense atmosphere prevailed in Europe.
The assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir apparent and his wife by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 caused the Alliance and Entente states to declare war on each other. After Austria-Hungary entered the war against Serbia on 28 July 1914, Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August, France on 3 August, and Belgium on 4 August. On August 4, 1914, Britain declared war on Germany in accordance with the agreements. Thus began the struggle that went down in history as World War I (Kuran, 1992).
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Having just come out of the devastating effects of the Balkan wars, the Ottoman Empire found itself on the brink of a more devastating war. All the great powers of Europe gathered as two groups and declared war on each other. It seemed difficult for the Ottomans to stay away from war at that time. The endless desire of Russia, which was a party in the war, on the Straits was known. On the other hand, Britain, which stood in favor of the Ottomans against Russia, which had been pressing the Ottomans for a century, was in alliance with Russia. Europe had accepted that the sick man Ottoman Empire could no longer live and would disintegrate.
The Ottomans were quick to seek alliances. İlber Ortaylı interprets the search for an alliance as follows;
“Russia was in alliance with France and Britain. Even the issue of sharing the Ottoman Empire was discussed in the Reval Negotiation. This is what aroused the young Turkish government. In order to avoid being shared – we should not be blamed – they tried very hard to enter into an alliance with the British and French bloc, but we were rejected just as we are being rejected today. In any case, the disaster in the Balkan War caused a disillusionment in the great states that did not know the Turkish army closely. The understanding that “no good can come from this army and this state” emerged. On the other hand, the German bloc, which was more familiar with the modernization and echelons of the Turkish army, disagreed. They took the Ottoman Empire into alliance and that was the beginning of the end.” (Ortaylı, 2011).
On August 2, 1914, Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a secret treaty. Even the members of the cabinet were unaware of this agreement. When Cemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy of the time, learned about the alliance negotiations that were held in secret from him: “At a time when we could not even reach an
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alliance with the Bulgarians, a powerful empire like Germany offered us an alliance based on the principle of equal law. In any case, it would not be good for the property and the nation to withdraw from this venture, which seems to have a very full profit in the profit and loss negotiation. He was expressing his thoughts (Özçelik, 2009).
On August 10, 1914, the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, who escaped from the British navy in the Mediterranean, entered the Dardanelles and took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. At that time, these two ships had to leave the waters, as the Ottoman Empire was not yet involved in the war and was in a neutral position. The Turkish government said it had purchased these two ships and changed their names to Yavuz and Midilli. These two ships then sailed to the Black Sea and bombarded the Russian ports, and the Ottoman Empire was now involved in the war.
With the entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire closed the Straits Region due to the state of war. The Ottoman Empire also abolished the capitulations, effective from 1 November 1914, by taking advantage of the war environment (Taş, 2018).
6.2- ISTANBUL AND STRAITS NEGOTIATION BETWEEN BRITAIN, FRANCE AND RUSSIA
The Entente Powers knew that the only way to bring aid to their allies, Russia, was the Dardanelles and Istanbul Straits. For this, they will attack to the Ottoman Empire through this regions, and a sea connection with Russia would be established. The Allies began to make war plans on Çanakkale.
While the Allies themselves were forcing the Dardanelles, they suggested that Russia try to enter Istanbul with its fleet. Russia disagreed, citing the incompetence of
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its navy. However, she gave a note to Britain and France on March 4, 1915, as she thought that the seizure of the Straits by Britain and France was dangerous for him. She demanded that the city of Istanbul, the Bosphorus, the western shores of the Marmara and Southern Thrace up to the Midye-Enez line, the lands between the Sakarya river and the Gulf of Izmit up to the border to be determined later, and the islands in the Sea of Marmara be given to her (Okkar, 2006).
Britain and France accepted this offer, which would be an incredible gain for Russia. If the Ottomans were defeated, with this agreement, Russia would achieve the dream of owning the Straits and descending into warm seas, which it had dreamed of for a hundred and fifty years. In addition, Istanbul, which was extremely important for the Orthodox and one of the most important cities in the world, would be left to her.
In addition, some surrounding cities would also belong to Russia. This agreement was perhaps not one that was expected to be accepted. Because all these items would be gains that could carry Russia to great places on the world stage. However, France thought that "Russia's occupation of Istanbul and the Straits would pose a threat to Europe". Also, in such a case, the Black Sea would be a Russian inland sea. In this way, Russia would be able to easily dominate the Near East and the Middle East (Köse, 2019). It is interesting that Britain and France also accepted this agreement. It may have been a decision taken as a result of the enthusiasm and obscurity of the war.
6.3- EPIC CANAKKALE DEFANCE
On January 13, 1915, the British parliament decided to cross the Dardanelles with the war fleet. According to the plan, Çanakkale would be crossed, Istanbul would
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be occupied, and the Ottoman Empire would be shot down from the point of death and destroyed, thus leaving it out of the war. With the withdrawal of the Turks from the war, Germany and Austria-Hungary would be surrounded from the south, and the German bloc would be squeezed and defeated in Central Europe (Acar K. D., 2007).
On February 19, 1915, the Allies attacked the Dardanelles with a large naval fleet. Despite the superior firepower and technological advantage, the Allies could not get what they wanted. Turkish soldiers were making history by trying to use their limited resources wisely and by fighting heroically. The Allies, who could not get what they wanted by sea, had to withdraw with heavy losses. They thought that with a land operation, the course of the war would change and they would defeat the Turks.
On April 25, 1915, they landed on the Arıburnu coast of the Gallipoli peninsula, overlooking the Sea of Islands. The landing could not reach its target as the commander of the 19th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, pushed the enemy back from Conkbayırı. After the British and the Anzacs received reinforcements, they attacked in the Anafartalar region of the peninsula on the night of 6/7 August. Colonel Mustafa Kemal, commander of the Anafartalar group, stopped the British advance on August 9-10 and drove them ashore (Kuran, 1992).
The Ottoman Empire, which was seen as weak and described as a "sick man", managed to stop the Allied navy, which was much superior to itself in terms of technology, both by sea and by land. This war was a war that also changed the fate of the Straits. With the loss of the Dardanelles War, Russia could not receive food and weapons aid. She had to throw away the pre-war agreement with Britain and France that gave him Istanbul and the Straits.
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6.4- RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR, US ENTRY INTO THE WAR, AND WILSON’S PRONCIPLES
There was a communist revolution in Russia in 1917 and she was out of the war. The Entente powers were not much affected by this situation because the United States had entered the war against Germany. The reason behind this decision was the sinking of American merchant ships by German submarines (Kuran, 1992). The President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, sent his historic message to the congress on January 8, 1918, after entering the war, that will go down in history as the “Wilson principles”.
Article 2 of Wilson's 14-point peace proposal "..the seas outside the territorial waters should be fully open to every nation in peace and war, but the partially or completely closed seas should be subject to international agreements and practices." was in the form (Acar K. D., 2007).
The Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, which fit these definitions, were of interest to the Ottomans. The Dardanelles and Istanbul Straits, which are the gateways to these seas, were also in the hands of the Ottomans. The United States of America, which accelerated the course positively on behalf of the Allied Powers by being involved in the war, was giving these messages to the international public about the Straits, which became the biggest problem of the Ottoman Empire for a century. Emphasis was placed on the management of the Straits by an international administration.
The 12th article of Wilson's principles included the statement "..The Dardanelles will be permanently open to the ships of all nations and will be placed under international guarantees". Thus, an official program was put forward for the
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opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits and for the arrangement of a peace to be made. Britain had proposed the establishment of a US mandate over the Straits to President Wilson. However, when the USA did not accept the mandate, Britain acted together with France and decided to put the Straits under the administration of the League of Nations (Acar K. D., 2007).
7- END OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE OF MUDROS
The victory of Çanakkale shone like a golden star for the Ottomans throughout the war. In general, the First World War ended with the defeat of the Allied Powers, including the Ottoman Empire. Tripoli, the Balkan wars and now World War I. The Ottomans fought non-stop for the last 7 years and were always defeated. Very important lands of the empire were lost. A great deal of manpower was lost. Especially in the Battle of Çanakkale, many Turkish intellectuals who did not serve in the military, including doctors and engineers, lost their lives. The Ottoman Empire was not only losing its present, it was also losing its future.
After the loss of the war, the Ottoman Empire made intense efforts for peace negotiations. On October 14, a new government was formed under the leadership of Ahmet İzzet Pasha. The Minister of the Navy became Rauf Bey. The first action of the Pasha was British General Townshend, who was captured by the Ottoman forces on the Iraqi front and resided in Büyükada, and was offered to act as an intermediary between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman peace offer was conveyed to Admiral Calthrope, the British fleet commander in front of the Dardanelles (Öztürk, 2005).
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Townshend replied that there was nothing he could more gladly do on the condition that he be released. He added that he hoped to receive a promise from the British that no part of Turkey in Europe or Anatolia would be annexed, provided that the Dardanelles strait was opened and Istanbul became a free port (Jaeschke, 1964).
Naval Minister Rauf Bey was appointed to conduct the armistice negotiations. The Ottoman delegation, which went to the battleship Agamemnon in the Mudros Port of the island of Lemnos, signed the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, after four days of negotiations there.
According to the terms of the armistice, the Straits will be opened and all military fortifications here will be occupied immediately. Thus, the Entente Powers will be able to dominate the Straits and Istanbul without a war. However, a new step has been taken regarding the continuation of the international status of the Straits (Acar H. , 2019).
The Armistice of Mudros was a disastrous treaty for the Ottomans in all aspects. All soldiers would be discharged except those required for security. Again, all warships were to be delivered to the Allied Powers, except for the small ships deemed necessary for security. Except for official use, radio, telegraph and telephone communications would be supervised by Entente officers. All railways and ports owned by the Ottoman Empire would be opened to the Entente forces (Öztürk, 2005).
In particular, Articles 7 and 24 were impositions that were put forward as a preliminary preparation for future invasions. The relevant items are as follows;
Article 7: “The Allies may occupy any important point of dispatch in the event of a situation threatening their security.”
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Article 24: “In the event of unrest in the six Armenian provinces, the Allies retain the right to occupy any part of these provinces.” (Bıyıklıoğlu, 1961).
As you can see, these items are extremely open-ended items. It is not specified what is meant by the said confusion. This means that the Allies will be able to occupy the Ottoman lands whenever they want. It is not a strange situation for the Entente states, which are the winners of the war, to come to the table with such requests. What is surprising is that the Turkish delegation led by Rauf Bey accepted these articles. Throughout history, every state has won and lost wars. At the end of these, various agreements were signed and the defeated parties made big or small concessions. But the acceptance of Articles 7 and 24 is more than a concession. The treaty, which should establish peace after the war, is a treaty that puts the Ottoman lands in danger of invasion every day since the day it was signed, and humiliates the Turkish Nation. The Entente states openly said in these articles that we will occupy your lands, and unfortunately these articles were accepted.
As a matter of fact, the occupation of Mosul by British forces based on Article 7 just a few days after the signing of the armistice showed that the suspicions were not unfounded. Beginning in November 1918, the Entente states, exploiting and violating Articles 7 and 24, embarked on occupation movements all over the country (Öztürk, 2005).
The articles of the Armistice of Mudros regarding the Straits are as follows;
Article 1: “Opening the Dardanelles and Black Sea Straits and ensuring the passage to the Black Sea. Occupation of the Dardanelles and Black Sea Straits fortifications by the Allies.
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Article 2: “The locations of all torpedo fields, torpedo tube positions and other obstacles in Ottoman waters will be shown and assistance will be provided when requested to scan or guide them.
Article 3: “Current information will be given about the existing torpedo positions in the Black Sea.
Article 6: “All war chiefs in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkish forces, with the exception of small ships to be used for police and similar purposes in Ottoman territorial waters, shall be surrendered and interned in Ottoman ports and harbors herein (Bıyıklıoğlu, 1961).
With these articles, the hands of the Ottomans are tied in the seas as well as on land. The issue of the Straits, one of the most important problems faced by the Ottoman Empire in foreign policy since the end of the 18th century, has now reached its peak in negativity. With these articles, only the name of the Ottoman Empire remained in the Straits. After the signing of the treaty, the Allied Powers started their occupation movements. Although it did not pass through the Straits and Mudros, Istanbul was actually occupied. The Allied Powers acted as they wished.
7.1- THE FIRE OF THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND THE SEVRES PROJECT
Based on the 7th and 24th articles of the Mudros Treaty, Istanbul and Izmir were occupied. After the occupations, the great states started to discuss the situation of the Straits. This issue was also discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. The general view was that the Straits region was an international administrative region affiliated to the League of Nations. While these were happening on the side of the
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Entente Powers, there were reactions to the Armistice of Mudros in the Ottoman Empire. The people and the soldiers knew that Articles 7 and 24 were an excuse for occupation. Particularly, the actual occupation of the capital, Istanbul, explained the enemy's ambitions. On May 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal went to Samsun and lit the first fire of rebellion and became the leader of the great Turkish resistance. From now on, we will see that the attitudes and wishes of the Entente states have begun to change as a result of the National Struggle.
To discuss the situation in the Straits, the Allies met at the San Remo Conference on April 14, 1920. The common idea of the participating states was that the Straits region should be an international control area. The Straits region was completely taken from Ottoman rule.
Britain's plan is that three Allied states will control the Straits militarily; and to establish a system in which the passage arrangements will be made by the Straits commission. The basic principle here is to hold the key to these strategic waterways militarily; but not to share this responsibility with an international commission that would include countries other than the Allies. The British effort in this direction will be successful and the Straits Commission will not have a military responsibility (Yurdusev, İstanbul'dan Lozan'a İngiltere'nin Boğazlar Politikası, 2007).
A few weeks after the San Remo meeting, where the Allied powers gave their final shape to Sèvres, and the agreement signed there, on May 11, 1920, the Allied Sèvres draft was submitted to the Ottoman government. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, responded on 25 June 1920 with a very comprehensive and well-founded response document on why it could not be applied. In this document, the Ottoman State expressed very well that the provisions of the Treaty,
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which were tried to be applied to it, were devoid of solid foundations; She underlined that even if he was on the losing side, she was treated worse and more unequally than the others in this cluster (Yurdusev, 1917-1923 Yılları Arasında İngiliz Boğazlar Politikası, 2006).
The Allies, who gave a harsh response to this response of the Ottomans, threatened to expel them from Istanbul. Thereupon, on July 22, 1920, the sultanate council of 43 people gathered in the palace under the presidency of the sultan and discussed the matters of Sèvres. In the sultanate council, it was decided to accept the Treaty of Sèvres with the votes of 42 people, except for Topçu Feriki Rıza Pasha. The Ottoman delegation of three people, consisting of Baghdadli Hadi Pasha, Rıza Tevfik and Reşad Halis Bey, signed the Treaty of Sèvres on Tuesday, August 10, 1920, at 16:00 (Acar K. D., 2007).
This treaty is undoubtedly the most humiliating treaty the Turkish Nation has ever faced. It is in history as a treaty that the Turkish Nation has never accepted. Not applicable.
The articles of the Sevres project related to the Straits are as follows;
Article 37: “The round-trip (transportation) of ships in the Straits covering the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea will be open to all trade and warships, military and commercial aircraft in the future, both in peacetime and in wartime, regardless of flags.
These waters may not be blockaded, no right of war may be exercised, and no hostile action may be taken there, except in the execution of a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations.
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Article 38: “The Ottoman Government accepts that new measures must be taken to ensure the freedom of movement (transportation) stipulated in Article 37, and as a result, to the extent that it concerns itself, it will be called the “Bosphorus Commission” and will be referred to as the “Commission” below authorizes a Commission to control the waters referred to in Article 39.”
Article 39: “The jurisdiction and (authority) area of the Commission shall cover the waters between the entrance of the Dardanelles in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea to 41 and the entrance of the Black Sea in the direction of the Black Sea up to three miles from each of these entrances.”
This authority (authority) may also be exercised on the shore as long as the provisions of this Section are met.
Article 40: “The Commission is entitled to the right of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan (if it ever wishes to join the Commission, and from the day on which it joins) (if it ever becomes a Member of the League of Nations and It shall consist of representatives of Russia, Greece, Romania (starting from the day it became a member of the League of Nations and starting from the day they become a member of the League of Nations) and Turkey and Bulgaria. The Representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Russia will each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey will each have one vote. None of the commission members (commissioners) can be removed from office other than the government that appoints them.”
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Article 42: “The Commission shall exercise the powers conferred on it by this treaty completely independently of the local government. The Commission will have a special flag, a special budget and a unique organization.
Article 43: “The Commission shall be obliged to perform the following tasks, within the limits of its competence set forth in Article 39:
a) Carrying out all the works deemed necessary for the improvement of the passages or the entrances to the ports.
b) Illumination of passages, marking of shallow and dangerous places
c) Inspection of piloting and towing works
d) Inspection of the anchorage of the ships
e) Inspection required to ensure that the regime envisaged in Articles 335 to 344 of Chapter 11 (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of this agreement is applied to the ports of Istanbul and Haydarpaşa.
f) All kinds of inspection works related to the remains of wrecked ships and the salvage of ships and cargoes.
g) Inspection of barges
Article 48: “The Commission shall be authorized to establish a special police force, which it deems necessary, in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the duties entrusted to it by this section. Except for the islands of Limnos, Gökçeada, Samothrace, Bozcaada and Lesbos, this police force shall, to the extent possible, be drawn from the indigenous population of the Straits and Islands region, as provided for in Article 178 of Chapter 5, and placed under the command of foreign police superiors appointed by the commission.
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Article 52: In all matters pertaining to the voyage of ships within the jurisdiction of the Commission, all kinds of ships referred to in Article 37 shall be treated on a level of full equality.
Article 57: “I. Warships of the Warring States may only take and store commune (food) again to such measures as are strictly necessary to enable them to complete their passage through the Straits and arrive at the nearest port; these ships cannot supplement and increase their stores (food) or war equipment in waters under the control of the Commission, or they cannot supplement the number of seafarers. These ships can make absolutely necessary repairs to be fit for solo voyage; repairs should in no way increase the combat power of the ships. The Commission will decide what mandatory repairs are; these repairs should be made as soon as possible.
II. The transit of warships of warring States in waters subject to the control of the Commission should be made as soon as possible and without any stoppages other than those arising from service requirements.
III. The stay of the said warships in ports under the control of the Commission will not exceed 24 hours, except in case of accident. In such a case, these ships will have to leave (the port) as soon as possible. There will always be a period of at least twenty-four hours between the departure of a warship of a warring state from waters subject to the control of the Commission and the departure of a warship of an enemy side.
IV. All other rules relating to the waters subject to the control of the Commission in time of war, and in particular regarding the passage of war equipment and contraband objects sent to the enemies of Turkey, or the re-taking of food in these waters, their needs or repairs shall be determined by the League of Nations.
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Article 59: “No belligerent state, in waters subject to the control of the commission, troops; may not load or unload ammunition or munitions, except in the event of an accident preventing passage; in this case, the transit will need to be completed as quickly as possible.
Article 178: “In order to secure the freedom of the Straits, the High Contracting Parties have decided the following provisions.
1. Within a period of three months starting from the entry into force of this agreement, a zone that includes the shores of the Sea of Marmara and its islands and the shores of the Straits and all structures in the islands of Limnos, Gökçeada, Samothrace, Boazcaada and Lesbos, as defined in Article 179 below, disarming and demolition of stiffened places and batteries will be carried out.
Reconstruction of these structures and similar structures are prohibited in the said region and on the islands. France, Britain and Italy will have the right to prepare to render the existing roads and railways unusable, which can be used to quickly bring the mobile batteries that are prohibited to be placed in the said region and in Limni, Gökçeada, Samothrace and Bozcaada.
The articles of the Treaty of Sèvres, which included very heavy articles for the Turkish Nation in every respect, were also extremely heavy, of course. When Sèvres is examined, it is actually a treaty in which the Ottomans are ignored, treated as if they do not exist, and continue to be threatened from every point of view.
With this treaty, the Straits will be open to war and merchant ships of all states in times of war and peace, and will be administered by the International Straits Commission, which will have broad powers over the Straits (Acar H. , 2019).
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This commission will consist of members to be sent by various states and will work almost like a state. The capital of the state will continue to be Istanbul, but if the Turks do not abide by the articles of the treaty and protect their minority rights, Istanbul will be taken from the Turks and the Straits will be open to the ships of all states even in wartime (Kaştan, 2013).
The honorable soldiers, statesmen and people of all walks of life of the Turkish Nation reacted to this humiliating treaty. Everyone except the Istanbul Government knew that this was unacceptable. Signing and ratifying this treaty was treason. The luck of the Turkish Nation in those days was to have someone like Mustafa Kemal.
Before the Treaty of Sèvres, Mustafa Kemal explained the state of the country in his Nutuk on the first day of his arrival in Samsun, where he would start the resistance;
“I went to Samsun on the nineteenth day of May 1919. The general situation and appearance of the country was as follows: The group of the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War, the Ottoman army was damaged everywhere, a ceasefire agreement was signed with heavy conditions, the nation was tired and poor during the long years of the Great War. Those who dragged the nation and country into the First World War, fearing to save their own lives, fled the country. Vahdettin, who is sitting in the seat of the Sultanate, is looking for despicable measures that he imagines can protect his person and also his throne. The government headed by Damat Ferit Pasha is weak, dishonest and cowardly. Alone, they submit to the will of the Sultan and agree with him in any situation where they can protect themselves.
Weapons and ammunition were taken from the army and are being taken.
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The Allies do not find it necessary to abide by the provisions of the Armistice agreement. Allied navies and soldiers, with a pretext, were in Istanbul, French in Adana province; Urfa, Maraş, Antep are occupied by the British, there are Italian military units in Antalya and Konya, and British soldiers in Merzifon and Samsun. Foreign officers and officers and special agents are operating all over the place. Finally, on May 15, 1919, four days before the date we took as the starting point for our speech, with the approval of the Entente Powers, the Greek army was also deployed to Izmir (Atatürk, 1927).
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sums up the depression and helplessness of the state very well. Like him, there were people from all walks of life who were uncomfortable with this situation, but this thought needed a leader. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk began to lead the Turkish National Struggle with the Amasya Circular, Erzurum and Sivas Congresses in the adventure after his departure to Samsun. Waves of members of the Turkish Nation began to join this movement. Unfortunately, Sultan Vahdettin and the Istanbul government could not grasp the truth and importance of this glorious resistance, and they had the illusion that the homeland would be saved by collaborating with the enemy.
So much so that after the Erzurum congress, the grand vizier, who accused the supporters of the National Struggle under British pressure of being adventurous and putting the state in danger, and saying that the invaders would take over the whole country using the national movement as an excuse, issued an order for the arrest of Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey on 19 July (Küçük, 2005).
The Sultan and the Istanbul government were so blinded that the disgraceful and humiliating conditions of the Mudros Armistice and the fact that some parts of the
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country were actually under occupation are not a danger and evil, but the National Struggle movement is considered as a movement that will put the state in danger. The National Struggle movement, which deals with both the occupying forces and such internal problems, has grown day by day and started to gain success in the way of saving the homeland.
At the last Ottoman Assembly meeting on January 12, 1920, the resolutions of the National Pact were adopted. Article 4 of the National Pact was about Istanbul and the Straits. “The security of the city of Istanbul, the capital of the reign of the Islamic Caliph and the center of the Ottoman Government, and the Sea of Marmara must be protected from all kinds of dangers. Provided that this condition is complied with, the decision to be taken by all relevant states together with us regarding the opening of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Straits to world trade and transportation shall be valid (Acar K. D., 2007).
This view, which is related to the Straits in the National Pact decisions, summarizes the Turkish thesis on the Straits to be discussed in Lausanne. The Turkish delegation will act on this view.
Mustafa Kemal has always been open to some alliance agreements in order to strengthen hands in the National Struggle. For this reason, the Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Aid Agreement was signed with Soviet Russia on 16 March 1921.
Article 5 of the agreement is about the Straits. "The contracting parties, in order to open the Straits to commercial transportation of all nations and to ensure free passage, the determination of the international rules to which the Black Sea and the Straits will be connected, and the unconditional sovereignty of Turkey, and the security of both Turkey and Istanbul, of the decisions it will accept. They jointly agree
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to leave the representatives of the coastal states to the conference to be held in the future.” (Acar K. D., 2007).
This treaty was also an agreement reflecting the Russian wishes. While Russia defended Turkey's sovereignty in the Straits region, it also recognized the National Pact.
8- WINNING THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND LAUSANNE
The epic resistance of the Turkish nation, which lasted for about four years, ended in victory with the Mudanya Armistice Agreement signed after the Battles of Sakarya and Dumlupınar. Since the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was far behind the European states in terms of politics, military and economy. In this, the effect of the empire's dealing with internal revolts with the influence of the nationalist current is quite high. The inability to make the necessary revolutions in order to catch up with the Western world, especially in the military and economic field, and also in the cultural field, put the state in a very weak position.
From now on, the 20th century was seen as quite suitable for the European states to drive the Turks from Europe to Central Asia, which they desired with great enthusiasm after the Second Vienna Campaign. The Balkan Wars meant the dismantling of the heart of the Ottoman Empire, which was a Balkan Empire from its very beginning. Before the devastating effects of these wars were over, the Turks found themselves in the middle of a larger fire. World War I caused the already weak state to fight for another four years on many fronts. The Ottoman Empire suffered heavy human losses both in terms of quantity and quality. The loss of 60-78 thousand soldiers in the Sarıkamış Operation and the fact that many qualified people, especially
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in Çanakkale, were recruited and died in the war are important examples. The loss of the war by the Alliance Front, which included the Ottoman Empire, was the sign of the fact that the struggle for the Turks was not over but had just begun.
The Ottomans lost, but the Armistice of Mudros, which they signed afterwards, was an agreement with very harsh conditions. Articles 7 and 24 of the agreement made Turkish lands open to completely arbitrary invasion. Fears happened and the invasions began. The government of Sultan Vahdettin and Damat Ferit were almost surrendering by making all concessions to the invading British State. The rebellion that Mustafa Kemal Pasha started by going to Samsun became a light of hope for the Turks in the darkness. This struggle, which started under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, succeeded four years later and guaranteed the existence of the Turks in Anatolia.
The Turks won on the field this time, but an important struggle would be in the field of diplomacy. The Turks would undoubtedly give the same struggle they gave on the battlefield at the diplomacy table. The Turkish Grand National Assembly, which won the National Struggle, had to show the Allied states that it was the victorious side that won the war. The Ankara Government was not the Ottoman Empire that entered the First World War and was defeated. It was a new formation that started the National Struggle and won a victory against the Greeks. Although this was the Turkish side's view and position, this was not exactly the case for the Allies. Britain, France and Italy, which we refer to as allies, had occupied Anatolia in accordance with Articles 7 and 24 of the Armistice of Mudros. Each of them was in contact with the Ankara Government. Britain actually occupied the capital, Istanbul. The Allied front, led by Britain, had an extremely angry and vengeful perspective on the Turks from the very beginning.
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British Prime Minister Lloyd George responded on March 19, 1920, to an Indian committee that came to Europe to claim that the Ottoman treaty should not be too heavy after the 1918 settlement and that Istanbul should remain with the Turks; “They prevented us from passing through the Straits, which prolonged the war for two years, even jeopardizing its outcome for a time.” (Bayur, 1974)
The Washington government's entry into the war was highly doubtful if Germany had not miscalculated to engage in relentless submarine warfare, while at the same time proposing an alliance against Mexico and its neighbor, the United States. Even after Russia had become communist and collapsed for the time being, Britain and France would have renounced decisive victory and agreed to a peace treaty. This was what Lloyd George wanted to convey, and he was explaining to the Indian Council that this was one of the reasons for the deadly peace conditions that would be forced on the Turks. However, by doing this, he also stated that the concepts such as "peace of justice" or "the right of nations to choose their own destinies" were only words and that a "peace of revenge and snatching a country" would be achieved. (Bayur, 1974)
These words of the British Prime Minister, before the National Struggle was victorious, summarize the view of the Allies towards the Turks. The Ottoman entry into the war did indeed not only prolong the war for two years, but also caused much more loss of people and money for the Allies. Without the Turks, the war could have ended in a very short time.
In this response dated July 17, 1920, which was published in the newspapers of the time, the argument we are interested in is put forward as follows:
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“The Ottoman Delegates do not seem to have grasped all the harm that Turkey's participation in the war entailed on the world of humanity. Turkey's responsibility is so great that it cannot be measured by the sacrifices required by the Allied victory over the Ottoman armies. By blocking the great sea route for no reason and cutting off the transport of Russia and Romania on the one hand and their allies in the West on the other, Turkey caused at least two years of prolongation of the war and the loss of millions of people and hundreds of billions to the Allies. The compensation Turkey should pay to those who have re-established the independence of the world at the cost of endless losses far exceeds its own ability to pay. (Bayur, 1974)
The same view was defended not only at the level of statesmen but also in newspapers. This shows that the negative atmosphere towards the Turks also spread to the base of the people. Western statesmen undoubtedly shared this view with the strong public support they felt behind them.
Lloyd George, who is extremely hostile to the Turks, says on the inability to prevent the passage of Bulgaria to our side as a result of our Çanakkale victory and therefore the inability to keep the Germany-Turkey transport interrupted: “The Turks had a human treasury just waiting to be equipped to become the world's scariest war machine. We could have cut off communications with the Germans.” (Bayur, 1974)
Lloyd George also makes a confession with the above mentioned statement. He mentions that “the Turks are a magnificent human treasure just waiting to be equipped to become one of the most terrible war machines in the world”. It should be noted that Lloyd George, who easily reflected the anger caused by the prolongation of the war and the much higher losses in every sense, did not remember or did not want to mention that the Turks tried to reach an agreement with the Allies before the
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Germans. Would the Turks have entered the war for sure? It is a subject that is frequently asked by historians and has different theses. If we interpret it at this time, we can come up with scenarios where war can be avoided. However, when we look at that period, the centuries-old Russian threat and also the British, who did not surrender their warships despite their money, may have led the government of that time to take a hasty decision. This topic could be the subject of a long thesis. The point that should be mentioned here is that as a result of all this threat and feeling alone, the Turks first applied to the British. It is unlikely that a state that does not want to remain neutral and enter the war will propose to one of the parties of the war to join the alliance. The British may have rejected this offer due to the great defeat of the Turks in the Balkan wars, but the British should have considered the possibility of the Turks applying to Germany after this rejection. At the end of the war, the British, who said that the Turks were a Great War machine and that they caused great losses by prolonging the war, should have made correct determinations about how this state would affect them in their favor. It is probable that the need to share the disintegrating Ottoman Empire and to dominate the Straits, which was of utmost importance, outweighed. But of course the British will not talk about their own mistakes.
The attitude of the Allies towards the Turks, which we mentioned above, is very important about the course of the Lausanne Conference. This view made itself felt throughout the conference. The Turkish delegation will also have to deal with a treatment as if they started the whole war themselves.
After the Mudanya ceasefire and the allies accepted defeat, the Lloyd George cabinet fell in London and Lord Curzon was appointed as the Foreign Ministry in the Bonar Law cabinet, which was established instead. (Berber Ş. G., 2006) Curzon would be the biggest rival to the Turkish delegation.
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Before the conference, the Treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920 as an example of disaster for the Turks stood. This agreement, which was a disaster for the Turks in every respect, also contained disastrous articles in the Straits Issue. Aside from the freedom of passage through the Straits, the Commission to be established in Sèvres would be a major blow to Turkish sovereignty.
According to the agreement, the Straits will be under the control of a commission to be established by the Allies. This commission is almost a state founded on the straits. Every decision to be taken on behalf of the Straits would come from this commission, legal disputes would be resolved by the consulates, the capitulations would continue, the commission would have its own security organization and police, and even the commission would have its own budget and flag. Turkey has to provide all kinds of facilities to the commission. (Bozkurt, 1998)
In the Treaty of Sèvres, the Allies got everything they wanted and ended the Turkish domination of the straits. Here again, there were diplomats who would dare to insist on the same demands. The Turkish delegation will be responsible for putting this picture into the most profitable agreement for the Turks. Otherwise, if the decisions made about the Straits in Sevres continued to be valid, it would not be possible to talk about Turkish independence and sovereignty.
The first of the issues before the talks was the issue of where the conference would be held. It was necessary to minimize the margin of error in this critical agreement. The Turks came to this position after very difficult struggles and sacrifices. What was won on the field should not have been lost at the table. For this, the choice of location was also important.
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In order to eliminate the communication difficulties between Ankara and the delegation, the Grand National Assembly proposed Izmir as a city symbolizing the victory of Turkey. The British looked at things from a different angle. In a telegram to the War Ministry on 11 October 1922, British High Commissioner Rumbold drew attention to the popular belief that the Turks had won a victory not only against the Greeks but also against all the Allies. “This impression will be strengthened if the conference takes place on Turkish soil. To accept this proposal is to admit that the Turks defeated not only the Greeks, but all their allies. (Demirci, 2015)
There was another reason for Rumbold's refusal of Turkish territory: If this precedent is followed, a Turk can request the presidency of the conference, and the problematic position of the Istanbul government comes to the fore even more strongly. Curzon fully agreed with the important facts expressed by Rumbold, and therefore firmly rejected the idea of convening a peace conference on Turkish soil. Such proposals were absolutely unacceptable because they could hurt the feelings of the Greek president Venizelos. The Turks accepted the neutral city of Lausanne after the assurance that the communication between Lausanne and Ankara would be facilitated as much as possible as a result of the long discussions carried out via telegraph. (Demirci, 2015)
As the British High Commissioner Rumbold determined, convening the conference in a Turkish city, especially in a city that symbolized victory like Izmir, would give the Turks a great psychological advantage in the conference. Most importantly, it would take place between the Turkish delegation and Ankara, and the meetings with critical importance would be made much easier. Another point Rumbold made was that the request for the presidency at the conference was at least
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as important as communication. As we will explain in the following pages, the Turkish delegation will suffer from not being able to chair the conference.
After the location of the conference was determined, it was time to determine the conference delegation. In the negotiations, which were expected to be extremely difficult, it was necessary to choose a person who could strongly defend the Turkish theses. The name of Prime Minister Rauf Bey began to be mentioned as the person who will go to the conference. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was afraid of Rauf Bey's sympathy for the Western states and his readiness to make concessions to them in every field, firmly resisted the sending of Rauf Bey. (Aralov, 2010)
Mustafa Kemal, in his work called Nutuk; “I could not be sure that the committee that Rauf Bey would be chairing would be successful in the issue that is vital for us. He offered to be assigned to İsmet Pasha as a consultant. While expressing my opinion against this proposal, the use of İsmet Pasha as a consultant is limited. If İsmet Pasha becomes the chairman, I also believe that maximum benefit will be achieved.” He made it clear who he wanted to preside over the delegation. (Babaoğlu, Muharebeden Diplomasiye Lozan Konferansı'nda Türk Delegasyon Heyetinin Karşılaştığı Zorluklar, 2019)
Rauf Orbay mentioned in his memoirs; “They wanted me to preside over our delegation of executives going to Lausanne. On the other hand, since the foreign ministers presided over the executive committees of the states that would come before us, I found it convenient for us to employ our Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Bey for this task, as well. However, Yusuf Kemal Bey did not accept this duty, claiming that he could accompany me if I went as president. Thereupon, I recommended İsmet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
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Mustafa Kemal's openly mentioning İsmet Pasha's name and his support of leaving completely turned the arrows towards İsmet Pasha. He was not in favor of Rauf Bey's departure, and as we mentioned in Rauf Bey, he was saying that İsmet Pasha should go instead of him.
İsmet Pasha's thoughts on this matter revealed his reluctance to take part in the delegation: “I did not show much interest in the delegation that would go to Lausanne for the peace conference. There was the Foreign Minister, there was the government. After a great expedition, I was in a very tired state after going through very tense military and political situations with the armistice. The issue of going to a conference was by no means in my mind. … Since Karabekir Pasha made the Gyumri Agreement with the Russians, he considered it essential that he be the chief executive officer if the Russians went to the Lausanne Conference.” (Babaoğlu, 2019)
The fact that the group, especially the opposition wing of the assembly, wanted Rauf Bey, and İsmet Pasha's reluctance to attend the conference increased the uncertainty about the delegation to be elected. Mustafa Kemal's will was still in favor of İsmet Pasha.
It can be said that the lame and complex attitudes of the late Ottoman diplomats towards European states were one of the important issues that played a decisive role in Mustafa Kemal's decision regarding the determination of the head of the delegation who would conduct the Lausanne negotiations. According to him, the Turkish representatives going to the conference had to have some important qualifications. First of all, this delegation had to be people with the power and acumen to realize Turkey's economic and financial independence. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
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European states completely ignored the Ottoman Empire, which they saw as the Sick Man, and from time to time exhibited some behavior out of diplomatic courtesy. E.g; After the Paris Peace Conference, French Prime Minister Clemenceau to Damat Ferit, who came to Paris on 17 June 1919 to present a counter-declaration on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and made a speech at the Council of Ten: "Leave the paper you read to us, you go to the buffet below and rest. We will examine them.” With his words, he showed his reaction that was far from courtesy. This treatment of a statesman was inconsistent with the foreign policy principles of the new Turkish state. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
Recent examples of diplomatic relations were not positive at all, as we mentioned. Although these unfavorable examples are that a state that lost on the field accepts harsh conditions at the table without objection, attitudes and behaviors that can never be accepted have unfortunately been accepted. Thereupon, no resistance was shown to alleviate the harsh conditions. That's the biggest problem. When we look at the last period agreement processes, the attitude of the Ottoman diplomats, ready for all kinds of concessions in front of the European diplomats from the very beginning, dragged the state and the nation into great destruction. The closest examples of this are the Armistice of Mudros and the Treaty of Sèvres. As we have stated, these agreements are agreements that are discussed as a defeated state. When evaluated in this way, of course, a negative result is expected for the Ottoman Empire. However, these agreements are not negative agreements, but disaster agreements. They are agreements that accept unconditional surrender and subordination. The German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, which they fought in the same alliance, were not so humiliated. Since these examples were fresh, the Ankara Government was aware that a mistake made in this period would be irreversible this time. Mustafa
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Kemal Pasha was sure that the person who would not make the Turkish nation fall into this mistake was İsmet Pasha. In this environment, Mustafa Kemal asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Kemal Bey, to resign, paving the way for İsmet Pasha to attend the conference as Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
On October 26, İsmet Pasha was elected as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Council of Ministers determined the delegation that would go to Lausanne on November 2 and presented it to the Parliament for approval. Accordingly, İsmet Pasha was the chief delegate, Health Minister Rıza Nur was the second delegate, and former Minister of Economy Hasan Saka was the delegate. In addition, a very large group of consultants was formed to be prepared for technical issues. After the delegation to Lausanne was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the basis of the policy to be followed in the negotiations held under the roof of the Assembly was also determined. In general, the policy determined within the framework of the National Pact document has been clearly revealed by an instruction given to the Turkish delegation that will go to Lausanne. 14 orders and this three-page directive, dealing with National Borders, Capitulations, the Armenian homeland and the straits, constituted the red lines of the Turkish side at the Lausanne Conference. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
İsmet Inonu, who was elected as the chief delegate on 3 November, stated that they would defend the principles that were determined in the National Pact at the conference and that were included in the treaties signed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly after that, in his speech at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and said: The main ways of litigation are known to the world until now. This is the way that our nation has followed and determined on the path of national desires, which has been explained with the National Pact. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
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İsmet Pasha, who was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of Yusuf Kemal Bey, was chosen as the head of the delegation that would go to Lausanne to defend Turkish rights. Just before the election of the delegation, a move had come from the Allied powers to put the Ankara government in trouble. The Allies invited the Istanbul Government to the Lausanne Conference together with the Ankara Government. The invitation of the Istanbul Government, which had no contribution to the victory and had no action other than acting in the interests of the British, was a nerve-wracking situation. Ankara immediately took action on this issue.
Defense Minister Ahmet Muhtar wrote a letter to the British, French and Italian governments, describing the Istanbul Government as "a political group established in Istanbul that has no legal or political right to define itself as a government". In the special session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, İsmet Pasha opposed the invitation of the Istanbul government on the grounds that this would shake the situation that emerged with the Mudanya Armistice Agreement. The Istanbul government sought to reach an agreement to act jointly with Ankara, acknowledging the role played by Ankara, but without formally ignoring its own position. In a telegram he sent to Mustafa Kemal on October 17, Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha was of the opinion that "the victory ended all kinds of disagreements and dichotomy between Istanbul and Ankara, and therefore national unity was ensured". He proposed to act jointly at the conference and reiterated this in his direct application to the chairman of the parliament on 29 October. Three weeks before the Lausanne conference convened on November 1, the Turkish Grand National Assembly decided that the sultanate had ended, that the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman dynasty according to the Legal Principle, but that the assembly would appoint the caliph and that the Turkish state was the main pillar of the caliphate. He declared that the only
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authority in Turkey was the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, that the people did not recognize any other government, and that the Istanbul government ended on March 16, 1920. (Demirci, 2015)
By acting quickly, the Ankara Government was eliminating a representation problem that was planned to be uncovered. Thus, as of November 3, the Turks were just waiting for the conference to start, with the Ankara Government being the only interlocutor, the location of the conference and the Turkish delegation being determined.
İsmet Pasha, who stayed in Istanbul for two days after being elected as the chief delegate, made a statement at a dinner; He stated that he wanted to reach a conclusion as soon as possible by expressing his desire to ensure peace and that they were abiding by the agreements. The delegation, which stayed in Istanbul for two days, departed from Sirkeci to Lausanne with the Orient Express on Thursday, November 8, but the Turkish delegation, which arrived in Lausanne on the 12th of the month, encountered a bad surprise. According to one view, postponing the conference to 20 November on the grounds of the internal affairs of Britain and Italy; It was a move aimed at gaining time to determine the policy that the Entente States would follow against Turkey before the conference. As can be seen, the Allied Powers did not convey any official information to the Turkish delegation about the postponement of the conference, and from the beginning they gave the first sign of the treatment they would apply to the Turkish side during the conference. (Babaoğlu, Muharebeden Diplomasiye Lozan Konferansı'nda Türk Delegasyon Heyetinin Karşılaştığı Zorluklar, 2019)
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To the conference; The governments of Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Kingdom of Serbo-Croat-Slovenes, Japan participated. The principle of participation of the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea coastal states in the studies related to the Straits has been accepted. (Babaoğlu, 2019) The United States of America also participated in the talks as an observer.
Finally, on 20 November 1922, the conference started with the speech of M. Haab, President of the Swiss Confederation. According to the schedule, Lord Curzon would deliver the second speech, and after the ceremony, the Conference work would begin at Ouchy Castle. Arguing that he should also speak at a meeting where Curzon spoke, İsmet Pasha explained clearly what kind of peace Turkey wanted. (Mehmet Kayıran, 2017)
Although İsmet Pasha was not included in the program at the opening meeting of the Lausanne Conference held at the Mont Benon Casino in Lausanne on November 20, 1922, the speech he made when he came to the podium can be considered as an objection to the oppressive treatment intended to be applied to the Turkish delegation. With this intervention, İsmet Pasha wanted to emphasize that Turkey was equal with other states. At the conference; He showed the sensitivities of the Turkish side by saying, “We have paid attention to the equality conditions (…) we carefully follow the conditions of equality”. According to Joseph Grew, who was in Lausanne as a delegate to the United States of America and would be Turkey's first ambassador, this speech of İsmet Pasha was an extremely unfortunate one. Because since the opening session was of a purely ceremonial nature, if he needed to give a speech, he could be content with thanking the president for his goodwill and Swiss hospitality. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
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İsmet Inonu, who took the podium after Lord Curzon, stated that “Even at this minute, more than a million innocent Turks are still wandering around the plains and highlands of Asia Minor like homeless, breadless and vagrants” and that the Turkish Nation has been fighting with all their being for its Independence for four years and that she was subjected to great injustices. He emphasized that it is now the right of the Turkish Nation to take the respectable place it deserves as an honourable member among the civilized nations of the world. (Acar K. D., 2007)
Even though İsmet Pasha was not in the program, the speech he gave willingly to come to the podium is a tactic to dispel the negative judgment about the lame attitudes of the Turkish diplomats we mentioned before. İsmet Pasha emphasized emphatically in his speech that the Turkish side was victorious and right. Although this unexpected speech was not welcomed by some sections, it was an important message. The message is: The Turkish delegation will not remain passive as before and will defend its right to the end.
The Turkish side also wanted Soviet Russia to be included in the conference. Soviet Russia, with which they had good mutual relations during the War of Independence, could have alleviated the pressure on the side of the Turks, who were alone against the Allies at the conference. The conversations İsmet Pasha had with Soviet diplomat Aralov about Soviet Russia's participation in the conference are illuminating.
On Aralov's question about the Straits, İsmet Pasha; “Our view on the Straits has been stated and declared in the National Pact. We cannot put forward at the conference any greater than the demands stated in the National Pact. At the conference, we will discuss the necessary measures to ensure the security of Istanbul
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and the Marmara Sea. We will work on this issue in connection and contact with the Russian delegates. We have no obligations to anyone without Russia's knowledge." He said. (Aralov, 2010).
The Turkish Government wanted Soviet Russia to attend the conference not as a chief interlocutor, but only as an interlocutor on the Straits Issue. İsmet Pasha explained this situation to Aralov as follows; “Our situation will be more difficult without you, but that's how it should be. We talked about this with Mustafa Kemal. This is our common view. You know Ghazi Mustafa Kemal. He is in favor of eternal friendship with Soviet Russia. We will morally feel that you are with us. Please understand us…” (Aralov, 2010)
Turkey's response to the Soviet Russia's request to participate in the Lausanne Conference contains very cautious expressions. They noted that it is appropriate for Soviet Russia, Georgia and Ukraine to attend only the sessions on the Straits, not on all the issues to be negotiated at the conference. It was emphasized that Turkey resolved the conflicts with Soviet Russia with the Moscow and Kars agreements, whereas at the Lausanne Conference, Turkey would seek ways to sign a peace treaty with the countries with which it was at war. Britain's stance on this issue is very strict. The invitation of Soviet Russia to Lausanne was not welcomed at first, as the fateful partnership of Soviet Russia with Turkey during the War of Independence would create a situation against the Allies at the Lausanne Conference. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
Regarding the invitation of Soviet Russia to the conference, İsmet Pasha says in his memoirs; “With the National Pact, we had already announced to the whole world our view on the status that the straits will be subject to. Since it is a Black Sea country, we found it useful that Russia negotiated the Straits at the Lausanne
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Conference, and we conveyed this view to the allied states. They also considered the presence of these countries reasonable in the decision of the Straits regime, which concerns many countries, and found it justified, and invited Russia to participate in the discussion of this issue. (İnönü, 1987)
For the Allies, a Soviet Russia that would side with the Turks at the conference was a situation that would complicate things. Curzon, upon the suggestion of the British High Commissioner Rumbold in Istanbul, tried to get İsmet Pasha away from the influence of Soviet Russia and tried to enter between Turkey and Soviet Russia, thus aiming to eliminate the possibility of Russian domination over the Straits. In this regard, during a private meeting with İsmet Pasha on 27 November 1922, he warned the Turks not to fall for Soviet views on the Straits issue and talked about the possibility of applying to the West for economic aid in the future. (Berber Ş. G., 2006)
The Turkish side wants the participation of Soviet Russia, but this participation should be limited. The participation of the Russians as one of the main interlocutors in the conference would have distracted the conference from its main topic. The conference that the Turkish government came to save its independence and rights could turn into a purely British-Russian conflict and the Turks might not get what they wanted. İsmet Pasha clearly explained this situation to the Russian diplomat.
The purpose of the Allied Powers, which could not find the opportunity to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres due to its disapproval, was to make the Turks accept the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, within the framework of the historical "Eastern Question". If we define the Lausanne Conference as the final act of the Eastern
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Question, we can better understand the expectations of the parties and the political situation. In İsmet Pasha's words, the conference was actually organized to liquidate the Ottoman Empire, in other words, to share its legacy. Among the controversial issues are the capitulations, the situation of the Straits, Duyun-u ummiye, Mosul, the islands and minorities. One of the most important issues that needs to be resolved is the Straits issue. (Cengiz, 2019)
İsmet Pasha found himself in an extremely difficult situation in Lausanne. Although he represented a victorious state, the allied states wanted to be treated like a defeated state. However, another issue that İsmet Pasha had to deal with was the issue of image. First of all, he had to make the allies accept that he was not a representative of a monarchist movement that wanted to restore the Ottoman Empire to its former power. It is understood from the statement he gave to the press on 16 November that İsmet Pasha made a special effort in this regard. Emphasizing that the new Turkish State does not have a militaristic character, İsmet Pasha also shared that they do not intend to brag about military victories and that they will quickly democratize after the treaty. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
During the conference, the Straits issue was addressed on 4 December 1922 in the Military and Land Commission chaired by Lord Curzon. Curzon wanted İsmet Pasha to express his Turkish view on the Straits, but he stated that he did not intend to explain the Turkish view unless the Pasha listened to the view of the Allies. In the general framework, showing the importance of the Straits for Turkey, he read the fourth article of the National Pact on the Straits and at the same time declared his satisfaction for the presence of Soviet Russia, which he wanted to participate in the negotiations. (Başarır, 2020)
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İsmet Pasha did not want to give his full point of view without knowing what the allies were thinking. He had already realized the Allies' intention to get İsmet Pasha to speak first and then respond accordingly. That's why he wanted the allies to speak first and for him to remain in a position to answer them. Only in this way would it be possible to dominate the negotiation. (Karacan, 2018)
In the opening session of the Straits Question, İsmet Pasha made a statement reiterating the principles stipulated in the National Pact. This did not satisfy Curzon, who described the speech as "half a dozen sentences of ad hoc, general phrases that abstractly reiterate Turkey's sovereignty and favor the commercial use of the Straits, but without suggestions or arguments." (Demirci, 2015)
The Straits Issue in Lausanne was one of the most difficult and long-debated issues. From the 18th century, when the Ottoman Empire weakened and Russia's ambitions to go south began, the Straits Problem turned into a problem that concerns not only the Ottoman Empire, but the whole world. Even though there was a revolution in Russia, the West's view of them as a threat had not changed.
The Straits issue was one of the highly contentious issues that the Land Commission tried to resolve in the Lausanne talks. İsmet Pasha was of the opinion that peace was in the hands of the British. According to him, the British, who had the strongest navy in the world, described the Straits problem as "one of the most important issues". (Berber Ş. G., 2006)
During the Lausanne conference, the negotiations on the transitional regime to be established in the Turkish Straits were mainly gathered around three theses. According to the first thesis, which was defended especially by Britain on behalf of the Allied Powers, the Straits should be demilitarized and disarmed, the passages
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should be arranged by a strait commission, and the passage should be completely free. The second thesis defended by the Soviet Union was that the Straits were closed to warships and the airspace to warplanes and that there should be a definite Turkish sovereignty in this region. The third thesis was put forward by Turkey, and it argued that Turkish sovereignty should be fully established in the region with a limited freedom of passage. (Özersay, 1999)
Presented as the Allies' thesis, it actually represented the will of Britain. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, who chaired the session, put a lot of effort into defending his theses. The British thesis is very close to the articles about the Straits Regime in the Treaty of Sevres. It seems that the fact that the Turks went from a defeated state to a victorious state did not change anything for them. The only common point with the Turkish side was the right of merchant ships to have free passage. Apart from that, the British wanted their warships and planes to be subject to free passage. Prof. Harry Howard says of the British project on the Straits issue: “A deceptive offer of an international agreement that gives the British fleet a territory they can control and advocates the freedom of the straits.” (Howard, 2018)
The activity that Britain was considering to establish on the Straits lacked an important basis, as Greece's attempt to seize the Anatolian coast of the Aegean was unsuccessful. There is no longer an English-affiliated Sultan in Istanbul. In addition to all this, they are faced with a new Turkey that is not dependent on Britain and has demonstrated its power. Therefore, throughout the negotiations, Britain thought that if it could ensure the sovereignty of Greece in the Aegean islands and on the other hand, keep the passage of the Straits under its control within the framework of a Commission, it would put the Straits on a security basis. Britain defended the closure
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of the Straits against the powerful Tsarist Russia, and tried to ensure the freedom of the Straits against the new Soviet regime in Lausanne. (Berber Ş. G., 2006)
The danger of Soviet Russia lies behind the British demand for freedom of passage for warships. Although they declared that they were moving away from the aggressive attitude of the Tsarist period, Soviet Russia continued to be seen as a threat. With the freedom of passage of warships, Britain, which had the most powerful navy in the world, could put great pressure on the Russians both on the straits and in the Black Sea and could keep them under control. At that time, the fact that Soviet Russia had just come out of the civil war and had a weak navy would make this even easier. The reason behind Britain's desire to imprison Russia in the Black Sea was that it wanted to secure the road to India, which was the lifeblood of its empire. (Kaya, 2021)
The disarmament of the Straits and the commission issues were also requests that did not satisfy the Turkish side. The British did not want to think of any possibility that might adversely affect the passage of the Straits region. According to them, both merchant and warships should be able to pass through the Straits whenever they want and without any obstacles. They did not trust the Turks even in the Straits region, which was under Turkish rule, and they intended to take both the security and the transition regime from the Turks as much as possible. This regime was supposed to be complete with demilitarized zones stretching back from both sides of the straits. But France, Britain and Italy would have the right to jointly have troops in these areas. (Tukin, 1999)
Soviet Russia contradicted the British theses on all issues except the freedom of passage for merchant ships. They strictly refused the passage of warships. They
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had the same views as the Turks on the disarmament of the Straits. The Russians wanted full Turkish domination in the Straits. Although this thesis, which was seen as a friendly approach towards the Turks at first glance, strengthened the hand of the Turkish side for a short time during the conference, it was also a suitable view for the interests of the Russians. The speech of the Soviet representative Chicherin on the Soviet Thesis is as follows;
“The delegation of Russia-Ukraine-Georgia on the issue of the Straits considers it necessary to focus on the following views for now; The Black Sea Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles should be free for maritime merchant fleets and non-combat vessels absolutely and without any restrictions. Maintaining peace in the Middle East as well as in the Black Sea, ensuring the security of the Black Sea coasts, and making Istanbul a solid guarantee. This means that both the Black Sea and the Dardanelles straits are permanently closed to warships, armed ships and warplanes of all states except Turkey, both in peace and in war. Soviet Russia and its allies, based on the principle that the Black Sea and the Dardanelles belong to Turkey, insistently demand that the Turkish people establish and protect their sovereign rights in their own lands and waters with the broadest understanding, as they respect the sovereign rights of every nation. In addition, Soviet Russia and its allies believe that the Turkish government can truly protect the Straits and the Sea of Marmara only if it has been given the right to fortify and arm its shores, has a war fleet, and has all the means of warfare necessary for the defence of the Straits and the Sea of Marmara. Closing the straits to warships also complies with the principle of equality among all states. Conversely, keeping the Straits open to warships means favoring the strongest naval state. “Soviet Russia, which aims to protect the working people and strengthen the peace, away from all attacks and war intentions, and from any intention to encroach
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on the freedoms of other nations, cancels all agreements that gave Istanbul to Russia, without asking for any compensation, thus successfully giving Turkey its own existence provides the opportunity for defence. Soviet Russia also saves all the states of the Mediterranean basin from the ambitions of the Tsarist century. (Aralov, 2010)
After Chicherin's speech, Curzon stood up and answered the Russian delegation in a dignified tone: "It is remarkable that this program, mainly aimed at protecting Turkish interests, was put forward by Russia. Listening to their suggestions, I thought that Mr. Chicherin was confused by the roles and was wearing İsmet Pasha's cap. (Demirci, 2015)
Asked whether he accepted Russia's thesis as the Turkish government's, İsmet Pasha's response to Curzon would be of the type that determined Turkey's future relations with Britain and Russia. He would declare that he would also consider other suggestions from the Allies, "which are closely linked to Turkey's sovereign rights and absolute independence." (Demirci, 2015)
İsmet Pasha did not fall into Curzon's trap with this answer and gave a very cautious answer. Curzon was trying to hear the views of the Turkish side from the mouth of İsmet Pasha from the very first moment of the discussions, but İsmet Pasha would not allow this. He wanted to hear the Allies' views first. If İsmet Pasha declared that they accepted the thesis of the Russians in this move of Curzon, the negotiations would have reached a dead end at the beginning. Because the Soviet theses contained definite and radical decisions. The concept of absolute Turkish sovereignty in the Straits was completely opposite to the ideas of the Allies. The Turkish theses, which we will talk about later, were more open-ended and could be discussed. There was a reason why this was so. The Turkish delegation did not see the Straits Issue as a red
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line. If they got into a fight on this issue, this time they could get into a big stalemate on other issues. İsmet Pasha summarizes his view of the Straits Issue in his memoirs as follows;
“I believed that reaching an agreement on the issue of the Straits was one of the essential conditions for reaching peace. I made such a diagnosis. I was trying to reach peace in a definitive way, to tie the Straits issue to a conclusion that would not threaten peace. I was following that as policy.” (İnönü, 1987)
In his speech, the Soviet representative did not pass without mentioning that they had a different attitude from the Tsarist period. There is a similarity between Turkey and Soviet Russia in Lausanne in this respect. Both states are regimes trying to find a new place in the international world. They felt the need to state at every opportunity that they had absolutely rejected the ideas of their successors and had opened a whole new page. Turkey did not want to be treated like the Ottomans and the Soviets did not want to be treated like Tsarist Russia. That is indeed true. Both regimes do not bear much resemblance to their predecessors. However, it will not be easy for these new regimes to be seen by other states as a completely new state.
As the Soviet representative Chicherin mentioned, the issue of keeping the Straits closed was extremely important for the Russians. They were ready to fight with all their might in this matter until the last moment.
The main arguments on which Russia relied on the idea of keeping the straits closed to warships were as follows:
1- The closure of the straits is a way that has been accepted by the states for a long time and is in accordance with the rules of international law.
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2- Closeness preserves peace and ensures equality by creating a barrier between the states facing each other.
3- Openness of the straits breaks the tie in favor of the strongest maritime state
The Allies, on the other hand, tried to refute these evidences of Russia with the claims that the only way in accordance with international law was the opening of the Straits. They argued that closeness was not an equality between states, but on the contrary, it was a way to ensure Russia's superiority in the Black Sea, and that warships had to enter in order to protect merchant ships. (Erdaş, 2015)
The Soviet side emphasizes the harms of warships passing through the straits and disarming, citing Turkey's security. As it can be understood from the British and Soviet theses, the two countries were actually defending the opposite of their policies a century ago. At the beginning of the 19th and 20th centuries, the British had always supported the Turks against Russia, which was threatening the Straits with its strong desire to go south. They defended the principle of the ancient law of the Turks, the closure of the Straits. It was aimed to close the Straits to warships of all countries and to keep the Russian threat away from the Mediterranean so that the Russians would not land in the Mediterranean. At that time, the British also followed a policy that preferred to keep the Ottoman Empire alive by preferring the Straits to be in the hands of a weak Ottoman to the Russians or other threatening elements. In Lausanne, on the other hand, it is seen that the roles have changed. Although not as aggressive as in Sèvres, the British try to keep the Turks away from the Straits to a similar degree. The Russians, on the other hand, advocate for the Turks to be the sole ruler of the Straits. In Curzon's words, the Russian thesis had a purpose: "to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, at the door of which loyal Turks await". (Demirci, 2015)
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Rıza Nur, who was in the delegation of İsmet Pasha in Lausanne, says in his memoirs about the Soviet theses; “The Russians are very worried about the opening of the Straits. Because they are afraid of the British encroachment on the Black Sea coast of Russia. It is none of our business. We will guard Russia. We will spill blood money. It would be stupid of us. Not necessary. Only if it is possible for warships to pass through Istanbul, let it be made in a way that will not harm us.” (Nur, 2003)
Turkey had come to Lausanne to achieve its primary goal: to realize the National Pact, which represents the demands of the National Struggle Movement and forms the basis of all negotiations with the Allied powers. (Demirci, 2015) İsmet Pasha expressed the wishes of the Turkish side regarding the Straits both before and during the conference. We can say that it is an open-ended, interpretable and unclear thesis. The Turks accepted the passage of merchant ships day and night without any restrictions on the regime of passage through the Straits. He proposed a certain limitation on warships. He refused to disarm the straits. İsmet Pasha emphasized that Istanbul and the Straits should be safe. But he also said that this security should depend on an assurance given by other states. The Turkish thesis on the Straits actually showed that this issue was not of primary importance for the Turkish side. It even showed many similarities with the English thesis. Except for the disarmament of the straits, there was hardly any conflict. The emphasis on the Sea of Marmara and the security of Istanbul in the Turkish thesis was remarkable. In order for these regions to be safe, there should not have been a situation such as the disarming of the Straits. Asking for assurance to ensure security was also a request that could be interpreted very differently. Which and what kind of assurance could satisfy the Turkish side? What actions would be taken if the assurance that the Allied side deemed sufficient was not deemed sufficient by the Turkish delegation? It was an inadequate thesis to
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ask this and many other questions. As we have mentioned before, the desire not to interrupt the peace may have outweighed this.
The view of Greece, which is neighbour to the sea of islands, was in the same frame as the Allies. In order not to confuse the business and to prevent Russia's seizure, Venizelos was defending the thesis of bringing Istanbul and the Straits to an international state. (Kitsikis, 1963) The attitude of the United States in the negotiations is different. Despite the efforts of Britain, France and Italy to make America a principal member of the Lausanne Conference, so to speak, America attended the Conference as an observer since it was not at war with the Ottoman Empire. Because there were many issues concerning America's "interests" on the conference agenda, and the "Open Door" principle was the foremost among them. Another issue that America was interested in and gave importance to in Turkey was to ensure the continuation of American schools and other social and religious institutions. (Berber Ş. G., 2006)
The main lines of the 3 theses that clashed during the negotiations on the Straits Issue were like this. The debates were at times extremely violent. İsmet Pasha made it clear from the very beginning that he would not surrender easily and would defend his rights to the end. However, the Turkish side also had certain limits and power. During the conference, the Turkish delegation had to deal with other situations, apart from the discussions in which the theses collided on certain topics. Psychological superiority was the most important weapon in such situations. İsmet Pasha had to resist various games and psychological pressures from the very beginning of the conference.
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Turkey was a country that most valued the concept of equality among the countries represented in Lausanne and emphasized it sensitively. The word “on the basis of equality” was mentioned in almost every correspondence. Thus, Turkey was trying to give the message that even the slightest thought that might occur in the Allies to treat itself differently from other delegations would not be accepted. İsmet Pasha attached great importance to the participation of the Turkish delegation in the conference with the other states on the basis of “the same equality and was not willing to accept any practice that contradicted this principle. Turkey's sensitivity to equality had shown itself before the conference even started, when İsmet Pasha realized that Turkey was placed at the same table with the smaller states, away from the victorious states. He protested this situation, which he thought was a purposeful move, and arranged for a more convenient seating arrangement. (Demirci, 2015)
The biggest disadvantage of the Turkish delegation led by İsmet Pasha during the conference was the issue of communication with Ankara. One of the reasons why the Turkish side suggested Izmir, even before the venue of the conference was determined, was to make communication easier.
Due to incomplete and corrupt telegrams and delays, both parties complained of not getting a timely response. Therefore, İsmet Pasha chose to send direct telegrams to Mustafa Kemal many times to get a quick response for the next session. İsmet Pasha's direct contact with Mustafa Kemal by disabling Rauf Bey caused the damage to İsmet Pasha's position against the Turkish government. (Demirci, 2015)
The claims of Russian diplomat Aralov on this subject are also noteworthy. Aralov; “During the conference, Rauf Bey embarked on a sabotage and deception campaign against İsmet Pasha. He did not answer the questions and telegrams of the
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pasha for a long time, did not report all the information he sent to Mustafa Kemal, distorted his reports, etc. He made İsmet Pasha such that he, as a prime minister, had to bypass Rauf Bey and apply directly to Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a special code.” says. (Aralov, 2010)
In any case, it is clear that there is a communication problem. Many times, İsmet Pasha sent telegrams to ask whether his telegrams had arrived. In a situation where communication with Ankara was so important, this trouble put a lot of pressure on İsmet Pasha and his delegation. The fact that the fate of the entire nation was on their shoulders was putting them too much stress about not making a mistake. The issue of unpreparedness, which we will talk about later, also caused İsmet Pasha to feel the need to consult Ankara constantly. But the problems were not limited to late communication. During the conference, there was a situation that put the Turkish side into great trouble without knowing it, while providing a great advantage to the British. The British were secretly seizing the Turkish telegrams. Captured Turkish telegrams allowed the British to better assess the Turkish position throughout the negotiations. (Demirci, 2015)
By regularly examining Turkish telegrams captured and transferred to the British Foreign Office, Curzon learned of the difficulties faced by Ismet Pasha in Lausanne and the Turkish government in Ankara. Thus, Curzon was well aware of the fact that İsmet Pasha was caught between the conditions that the conference could accept and the wishes of the Ankara government. He also knew how far he could push the issues, because he had firsthand knowledge of when the Turkish delegation could interrupt the negotiations. (Demirci, 2015)
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This situation undoubtedly changed the fate of the conference. Debates of the delegations on topics and articles are in the form of a duel. They try to take advantage by watching each other's vulnerability. They try to identify their weak points and determine their strategies accordingly. The fact that the British seized the correspondence between İsmet Pasha and Ankara gave them a great advantage. İsmet Pasha always appeared to be stubborn and difficult to persuade during the discussions. This made Lord Curzon extremely angry and consumed his patience. If the British had not learned the correspondence by seizing the Turkish telegrams, they could have interpreted İsmet Pasha's stubbornness differently. By seizing the correspondence, the British learned that the Turks were not too rigid about the Straits and that they could make concessions. If they were determined and patient in this matter, the British could get what they wanted. They knew it now. In the event that the telegrams were not captured, İsmet Pasha was more likely to emerge victorious from the discussions and have his wishes accepted. The inconvenience of the conditions of the period and the failure of the Turkish side to take the necessary intelligence measures led to this critical mistake.
On the other hand, the fact that Britain, France and Italy, as the countries organizing the Conference, presided over the commissions where the negotiations would be held, created a negative situation for the Turkish delegation. Also, Massigli, the French clerk appointed for the conference, was a success for the Allies. The following words in the memories of Rıza Nur, the second delegate of the Turkish delegation, clearly revealed the situation of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne: “We have neither preparations, no files, nothing. Some official diplomats like Lord Curzon are here. They have excellent files. What are we going to do? The Council of Ministers gave us an instruction that fits on a palm-sized piece of paper at a meeting.
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In addition, the lack of population statistics, scientific information and documents related to various regions that the Turkish delegation would put forward during the negotiations was felt in Lausanne. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
About the preparations of Rıza Nur Turkish delegation; “The English files must be perfect. We have nothing. However, we had to be more careful than anyone else. For example, what is Thrace in foreign and domestic power of attorney? What is their ethnic and economic status? What happened before and again? What treaties speak of it? There was not a word, not files.” He said. (Nur, 2003)
According to Rıza Nur; the lack of a trained technocrat in the Turkish delegation in economic and financial affairs also created a difficult situation during the negotiations. Among these economic difficulties, our demand for compensation and repairs from Greece also led to negative consequences for us. In addition, İsmet Inonu, as expressed in his memoirs, was deeply saddened by the objection of Cavit Bey, who joined the Turkish delegation as a finance expert, to the Turkish thesis, which envisages the division of the main capital of the debts, about the division of debts remaining from the Ottoman Empire, just as the allies claimed. For a while, the Turkish delegation even thought of accepting the offer of the allies without question, in order not to act as Cavit Bey put forward and not to insist unnecessarily. However, at that time, an expert named Günter, who had come to Lausanne for the Anatolian railways issue, agreed with İsmet Pasha, and the Turkish delegation continued its insistent stance on this issue and got the desired result. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
There was an incident that caused smiles in the session where this meeting was held. While İsmet Pasha was giving statistical information on the population structure of Western Thrace, which he said were the official Turkish figures for 1914, Lord
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Curzon made a speech and in a very official tone, since there were no Turkish state officials in Western Thrace in 1914, this information was not available to the Turks at that time. He stated that he wanted to ask how he collected it. In Grew's words; Upon Curzon's reaction, the Turkish delegation froze. The papers were shuffled, eyebrows knitted, and translations whispered to İsmet Pasha. İsmet Pasha, after consulting with his technical experts and after a while, said that the presented values were compiled in 1913 but published the following year. This statement was met with smiles under the moustache. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
The fact that the Turkish delegation did not make the necessary preparations during the conference was also a major handicap. Above, we have also included the confessional statements of Rıza Nur, the second most important name of the delegation. Regardless of the reason, the necessary information and documents were not collected before such an important conference. There is exactly one month between the Mudanya Armistice Agreement, which officially ended the Turkish war of independence, and the start of the Lausanne Conference. This period is neither long nor short, but it can be considered as a reasonable period of time. As Rıza Nur stated, the British on the other side are fully equipped. When the importance of the agreement to be made for the British and for the Turks is compared, the Turks undoubtedly outweigh. It is the Turkish side that needs to be more ready and equipped. However, when the experience and communication difficulties were added on top of the lack of documents and information, the Turkish delegation was faced with more difficulties than necessary. While evaluating this situation, the effect of past experiences should not be forgotten. Turkish diplomats have lagged behind European diplomats for centuries.
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The issue of the Straits was the debate where the most intense conflicts took place and the nerves were strained. Journalist writer Philip Graves; Negotiations were tough and boring. If the Turks sometimes played with time or waited for the opportune time, as has been said, it was because they rightly expected a collapse on the allied front. If Lord Curzon had been more flexible and had allowed Bonar Law's hesitation over Mosul, this front could have collapsed.” der. (Graves, 1999)
In these discussions, we mentioned that 3 theses collided. English, Soviet and Turkish thesis. The Soviet thesis suggested the state of absolute sovereignty, which even the Turks did not present as a thesis. This attitude of the Soviets saved the Turks from being alone against all the Allies and lightened the burden on İsmet Pasha a little. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, which started from the time of the War of Independence, also showed itself in Lausanne. The fact that the Turks wanted the Soviets to be at the conference in the first place shows this. Both Turkey and Russia have gained certain benefits from this rapprochement and friendship during the national struggle. However, while Turkey sees Russian friendship as a relationship that will continue, although it does not fully trust Russia's intentions, Russia's attitude has created the impression that it can easily abandon this friendship in order to improve relations with the West. (Gürün, 1991)
Historian and writer Süleyman Kocabaş says the following about the Soviets' appearance of Turkish support in Lausanne; "During the Lausanne conference, Soviet Russia went so far as to demand a declaration of war from Turkey to Britain in the face of the British's rejection of the Turkish and Soviet theses. For what reasons did the Soviets want the straits to remain under Turkish rule and that all states be closed to warships? This was largely due to the ideological and world domination struggles between the Communist regime in Russia and the Capitalist regimes in Western
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Europe. “In this period, the Soviet Union had just got rid of the civil wars, and the world revolution expectations were in vain. She was trying to set up the revolution in Russia. The most important aim was to protect the revolution. For this, it was necessary to increase security at the land and sea borders. Britain and France could cross the Black Sea and support the revolutionaries. This support should not be renewed. So, it was necessary to ensure that the warships of the western countries did not pass through the Straits. For this, Turkey's independence and sovereignty had to be asserted and supported. (Kocabaş, 1994)
As we stated while explaining the Soviet theses and supported by other views, the fact that the Soviets supported the Turks was not due to their love for the Turks. They also thought of their own interests. Soviet Russia had just come out of the civil war and was a weak state especially in terms of navy. The fact that the straits were closed meant that they were freer in the Black Sea. The fact that the Soviets were more concerned with their own interests was a situation that İsmet Pasha also understood. The Turkish side had an idea that wanted to adapt to the Western world in general. Being on the same front with the Soviets would have alienated the Turks from the Western world. Political, economic, military, etc. It would have many negative effects. A meeting that İsmet Pasha had with the Soviet representative Chicherin was perhaps the moment when he realized that the Turks should not trust the Soviets. Chicherin expressed the possibility of war after the British rejected the Turkish and Soviet theses and made demands that the Turks would not accept. İsmet Pasha asked him whether the Soviets would support the Turks in the scenario where the conference was interrupted and the war situation re-emerged. Chicherin gave a vague answer to this question, as if we'll see it between the governments later. It is
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possible that İsmet Pasha understood at the end of this speech that he should not fully trust the Soviets.
As soon as the issue of the Straits began to be discussed, the strategies of the parties began to emerge. Lord Curzon, an experienced and formidable diplomat, took his first strategic step by establishing unity among the Allies. Lord Curzon, who did his best to include the issues he believed to be weak among the first issues to be addressed, first brought the question of Turkey's borders in Europe to the Land Commission, of which he was the chairman. Meanwhile, since the alliance between the allies and the initiatives of Lord Curzon was established days before the start of the conference, a de facto allied front was formed against the Turkish delegation during the talks in the commissions. During the conference, the Boundary and Land commission chaired by Lord Curzon convened 26 times, while the second commission of French Barrere met six times and the third commission of Italian Garroni met five times in total. Since Lord Curzon has the authority to set the timetable and meeting schedules to be followed at the conference, the talks on the issues where the Turkish delegation has a strong hand or the support of the Soviets were postponed to later dates. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
In addition, the continuation of the actual occupation of Istanbul and the fact that this occupation was not lifted before the conference is a deliberate situation. The ongoing occupation of Istanbul, which Curzon held as an advantage in the negotiations, had been "a lever that forced the Turkish delegation to accelerate the flow of the conference" for the Allies. Contrary to the war ministry's view that the occupation should be lifted "as quickly as possible", Curzon insisted that it was in Britain's favour, not to evacuate the city until the agreement was signed. “I hope the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs realizes that if the evacuation is completed, the last tool of pressure on the Turks will be gone.” (Demirci, 2015)
Curzon described Britain's tactic as "complicated to execute but simple to mean". First, he tried to get what he wanted by bargaining, otherwise he left the Allies to struggle with negotiations, on the other hand, he either made the situation more complicated or assumed the role of peacekeeping between them. (Demirci, 2015) As a soldier who had always fought at the front, İsmet Pasha naturally lacked diplomatic experience. But he also had a plan and strategy. It would be easier to deal with the British for the solution of the problems if he could come to an agreement with the other states, one by one, except the British.
Turkey's strategy in Lausanne was based on the decisions of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Turkey's view could be summarized in three points: The Ottoman Empire had come to an end, and thus the Treaty of Sèvres and all other treaties signed by the empire were void. The new Turkish state had never been at war with the Allies except Greece, and the peace treaty was truly necessary only for Greece. As for the allies and other states, “The Turkish delegation intended to turn a white page by ignoring the past relations between Turkey and foreign states, apart from the various treaties approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In addition, the Turkish delegation, in the words that İsmet Pasha would later use in his memoirs, would "make maximum use of the differences of opinion between the states and sign separate agreements with them". Initially, the Turkish strategy was to reach separate agreements with the Allies and then fight with Britain. İsmet Pasha was ready to make concessions to the Allies in order to ensure their neutrality, although he did not have real support. But as the negotiations progressed, he had to reconsider his strategy. (Demirci, 2015)
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İsmet Pasha says in his memoirs about his strategy; “At the conference, I followed the policy of first reaching reasonable agreements, solving the problems of all Allies, neutralizing them and fighting the British alone. As the conference progressed, I came to the conclusion that all the allies, except the British, wanted to take advantage of the relationship they had with me to make Turkey accept their own cause with the Ottoman Empire. According to my impression, it is not enough to give the whole of Turkey in order to please each and every one of them. Moreover, they do not have any helpful attitude in our struggle against the British. The benevolent advice of each is that we settle our matters on our own. Whatever I said, they said, you can handle it alone with the British, we can't interfere with it. After I came to this conclusion, I started to think differently about the way things should be done and finally my mind was settled on following a new policy. I saw that in order to reach peace, first of all, it was necessary to make an agreement with the British. Once agreed with the British, the peace talks will be less likely to come to a standstill because of issues with the other allies. This conviction settled in me and this is how I determined my new policy.” (İnönü, 1987)
It was impossible to stray between the Allies and the British or to sign agreements with them without the British knowing. Even before the conference, the British had been successful in establishing unity among the Allies. İsmet Pasha's tactic of signing agreements with other states other than the British is actually based on the disadvantage of loneliness. Although Soviet Russia seemed to be on the side of the Turks, the other side was the dominant side. The Turks were actually on their own because they knew that the Turks would eventually move away from Soviet Russia.
İsmet Pasha says in his memoirs: “Before the conference started, we believed that our already improving relations with France would progress further and that all
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the difficulties would come from Britain. At the beginning of the Lausanne conference, the British government was making every effort to ensure unity among the Allies. This was a move we expected, but in practice, British efforts were more effective than previously thought. (Demirci, 2015)
British attempts to hold the Allies together against the Turks were proceeding successfully. İsmet Pasha could not fully trust the Soviets and could not be on their side. The Straits issue was the most important topic of the conference for the British, along with the Mosul issue, and they maintained their uncompromising stance on this issue. The negotiations were getting longer and the discussions continued in a flaming manner. The main issues that could not be understood were the disarmament of the Straits and the passage of warships. In particular, the disarmament of the Straits was an issue strongly opposed by the Turkish delegation. Because from the first day of the conference, İsmet Pasha emphasized the importance of the security of the Marmara Sea and Istanbul. This was the most important item of the Turkish thesis on the Straits. However, in the scenario where the Straits were disarmed, both the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul would fall into a great security vulnerability. Since the proposal to disarm the Straits also limited the number of soldiers that could be stationed in Istanbul, Turkey would be in a very difficult situation in an attack that could come from there. İsmet Pasha was also aware of this situation. Another issue, the passage of warships, was emphasized with great enthusiasm by the Soviet Russia. The Turks did not think like the Soviets or the British on this issue. This issue could be resolved with certain limitations. The Commission, which was planned to be established, was also required to be responsible only for the transition. Inonu wanted the islands of Imroz, Bozcaada and Semendirek to be under Turkish rule as an element to protect the straits. Guard units should be kept in Istanbul, and military movements should be
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allowed as the zones to be isolated from military service connect the two parts of the country. (Kocabaş, 1994)
İsmet Pasha stated that the commission should not deal with any other problem other than the transition problem, not to interfere in the affairs that fall under the sovereignty of the Turkish state. İsmet Pasha attaches great importance to the provision of political guarantees. Because, by giving up the defense of the straits, Turkey will have to endure an unpredictable sacrifice. States are required to provide guarantees to show that the requested demilitarization will not harm Turkey's security and will not be a source of danger to its existence. (Berber Ş. G., 2013)
İsmet Pasha was considering the possibility of prolonging the discussions and endanger the conference. As time passed, he began to get closer to the British. This is due to the fact that the conference is in endangered and that the Straits issue is not a red line. Russian diplomat Aralov says the following about İsmet Pasha's change of attitude; “The interests of Russia and Turkey were compatible with each other in the Straits issue. Russia was confident that it would provide Turkey's support in this matter, and therefore the Soviet government was naturally surprised that İsmet Pasha agreed to allow warships to pass through the Straits when the Straits issue was first discussed at the conference. With this behavior, İsmet Pasha gave the Entente states the opportunity to engage in hostile behavior towards the Black Sea coast of Russia. Soviet Russia will now feel compelled to reinforce its military forces on the entire Black Sea coast.” (Aralov, 2010)
As we mentioned before, the issue of the Straits was not considered important enough for the Turkish side to endanger the conference. In fact, both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Inonu were aware of the importance of this issue in terms of sovereignty,
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independence and security, considering only the Straits Issue. However, there were many important issues for Turkey in the Lausanne talks. It was necessary to think well and analyze the course of the conference. The Turkish nation had been fighting for 12 years, and for a long time it had caused great destruction both materially and morally. This meant: Turkey cannot afford another war. For this reason, concessions were made in the Straits issue in order not to be in a difficult situation on issues such as the capitulations, Mosul and the debt issue.
The conference was generally in a troubled state. Upon İsmet Pasha's rejection of the agreement text proposed by the Allies on January 31, 1923, the delegations left Lausanne in a hurry and the negotiations came to a breaking point. However, almost all of the items discussed on the Straits Issue were understood.
After the interrupted negotiations were resumed, on May 10, 1923, a murder was committed that turned the whole of Switzerland, and even the whole world, upside down. Upon this incident, telegraph and telephone rooms for reporters in Lausanne Palas were filled to the brim. While Vorovsky, the Russian delegate at the Lausanne Conference, was having dinner at the Cecile Hotel at nine o'clock in the evening, a Swiss citizen named Mauritz Conradi killed him with a gun bullet, and the Russian delegation's press attaché Ahrens and the clerk Dibrilkowsky were also injured. This news spread around the world with lightning speed. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
The murder of Vorovsky not only terrified the foreign delegates in Lausanne, but also raised questions about security. However, just after the incident, General Pelle reported to the delegates of the Turkish delegation that the Armenian committees had plotted an assassination against İsmet Pasha, upon the information he received from Paris. (Babaoğlu, 2019)
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At the end of the Lausanne negotiations, which were extremely contentious, where there were great discussions and which came to the breaking point from time to time, the treaty was signed on July 24, 1923 between the Republic of Turkey, Bulgaria, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia, Greece and the Serbian-Slovenian (Yugoslavia) State. . The Straits Question, which was the first session of the negotiations and determined the course, was accepted in a way close to the British theses because the Turkish side thought about the general course of the negotiations, despite the tensions and disagreements at the beginning. Below are the relevant articles of the Lausanne Straits Convention.
The articles of the Treaty of Lausanne on the Straits Regime are as follows;
Article 1 “The High Contracting Parties have agreed to accept and proclaim the principle of freedom of transit and transit by sea and air in the Dardanelles Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea Strait, which are covered by the general term "Straits" below.
a) In Time of Peace:
Full freedom of passage day and night, regardless of the flag, without any action, no pictures or fees, but within the following constraints regarding the sum of forces.
The greatest force that a state can pass through the Straits to go to the Black Sea will not be greater than the navy of the state, which has the strongest navy among the states with a coast in the Black Sea, in the Black Sea during the transition. However, the states reserve the right to send a naval force to the Black Sea at any time and in any case, not exceeding three ships not exceeding 10,000 tons each.
b) If Turkey is neutral in time of war:
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Full freedom of passage day and night, regardless of the flag, without any action, duty or fee, within the same restrictions as stipulated in article a.
c) If Turkey is a belligerent state in time of war:
Full freedom of passage for neutral warships, without any transaction fees or charges, within the same restrictions as in article a.
Measures to be taken by Turkey in order to prevent enemy ships and aircraft from benefiting from the Straits shall be such that they will not harm the freedom of passage of neutral ships and aircraft.
Limitation of transit times of warships
Warships passing through the Straits in transit shall never stop in the Straits for more than the time required for their passage, including the time necessary for anchoring at night and ensuring the safety of the ship, except in cases of damage or maritime risk.
Demilitarized Territories
Article 4: The regions and islands shown below will be demilitarized.
1) The two shores of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea Strait along the delimited zones as follows.
Dardanelles Strait: The region in the Southeast of a line that starts at a point 4 kilometers to the North East of Cape Bakla in the North-West on the Gallipoli peninsula and Saros Bay, and ends at Kumbağı on the Sea of Marmara and passes through the South of Kavak.
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Black Sea Strait: The region extending to a line drawn 15 kilometers from the East coast of the Black Sea Strait in the East.
The region extending to a line drawn 15 kilometers from the West coast of the Black Sea Strait in the West.
2) All islands of the Sea of Marmara, excluding Emir-Ali Island.
3) Samothrace, Limnos, Imbros, Bozcaada and Rabbit Islands in the Aegean Sea.
Article 6: “Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 8 with respect to Istanbul, there shall be no fortifications, ground artillery facilities, searchlight facilities, submarine-operating vehicles, no military aviation facilities and no naval bases in the demilitarized zones and islands.
There will be no armed forces other than the police and gendarmerie, which will consist of rifles, revolvers, swords and four light machine guns for every 100 people, which are necessary for the maintenance of public order and all kinds of artillery are excluded.
Article 8: “A garrison of at most 12,000 people may be present in the vicinity of the province of Istanbul, including Istanbul, Beyoğlu, Galata, the Islands and adjacent areas, to meet the needs of the capital. A shipyard and a naval base will be available in Istanbul.
Article 9: “If, when war breaks out, Turkey, using the warring state's rights, make changes in the above-mentioned demilitarization status, when there is peace, it will be obliged to reinstate the regime envisaged in this convention.
Article 10: “An International Commission shall be established in Istanbul, as specified in Article 12, and this commission shall be named the “Commission for the Straits”.
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Article 11: “The Commission shall exercise its powers over the waters of the Straits.
Article 12: “The Commission, under the chairmanship of a Turkish representative, shall be composed of representatives of France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Russia and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, as signatory states of this Convention.
If the United States accedes to this convention, it will have the right to have a representative on the commission. The same right shall be reserved under the same conditions for other independent Black Sea riparian states not mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
Article 14: “The Commission shall be tasked with considering whether the provisions concerning the passage of warships and military aircraft, which are the subject of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Annex to Article 2, are duly taken into account.
Article 15: “The Straits Commission shall carry out its duties under the auspices of the League of Nations, and this society shall annually submit a report showing its work, and shall also present all information concerning trade and the voyage of ships.
To this end, the Commission will liaise with the Turkish Government services dealing with the issue of commuting in the Straits.
Article 18: “If a breach of the provisions relating to freedom of transit is committed, or if the freedom of movement of ships in the Straits or the security of the demilitarized zones is jeopardized by an unexpected attack or acts of war, the High Contracting Parties and in any case France, Britain, Italy and Japan will jointly prevent these actions by applying all the measures to be decided by the League of Nations in this regard.
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The Treaty of Lausanne, which is related to the Straits, differs from the conditions imposed in the Treaty of Sèvres, so that a victorious government is at the table, so it is a relatively equal treaty. Before Lausanne, the agreed subject was freedom of passage. Turkey also agreed on this subject only on the condition that the passage of warships be bound to certain rules and borders.
Merchant ships would be able to pass day and night without being subject to any hindrance or restriction in peacetime. The same rules apply to merchant ships during wartime when Turkey is neutral. When Turkey is involved in the war, the merchant ships of neutral states can pass on the condition that they do not help the enemies. Turkey's expectations were already like this. Since the issue of freedom of merchant ships is now an issue that concerns all states, Turkey did not feel the need to request a restriction on this issue. She chose to use his objection rights in more important articles.
The issue of the passage of warships was not as agreed upon as the passage of merchant ships. Although Turkey's theses were not about preventing the passage of warships, they included the application of transit restrictions.
In particular, the thesis of Soviet Russia that the Straits should be under absolute Turkish domination and the theses of the allies were in conflict. As we have mentioned before, Soviet Russia wanted Turkish sovereignty in the Straits, since it was entirely concerned with its own interests. On the other hand, Britain was against it because it had opposing interests. Russia did not want any foreign warships to pass through the Straits in order to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Britain, on the other hand, was advocating the opposite so that Russia would not turn the Black Sea
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into an inland sea. As a result, Turkey did not want to fall victim to bilateral conflicts, so it wanted to have its thesis accepted.
In peacetime, warships weighing no more than three ships and 20000 tons could pass through the Straits. This article was a reasonable article. However, in wartime when Turkey was neutral, warships could pass as they wished. Turkey would not be able to prevent the passage of warships even in a situation that violated its own security. This article is a major blow to Turkey's sovereignty. It is a substance that threatens the security of the Straits, which is definitely to the detriment of Turkey. For example, according to this article, if Russia and Britain were at war, warships would be able to engage in war on the Straits, at the bottom of the country's most important city, Istanbul, and Turkey would not be able to interfere in this. Likewise, in this war, for example, Turkey would comply with the contract and would not interfere with the passage of British warships, and if Russia did not accept the treaty, a possible diplomatic crisis would arise between Turkey and Russia. Unfortunately, this item was accepted. In case of war involving Turkey, neutral ships would be able to pass in accordance with the peacetime provisions.
Perhaps the most troublesome issue of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Straits Convention for Turkey, was the issue of Disarmament of the Straits. Turkey certainly did not want this situation that would endanger the security of Istanbul. As a result, some parts of the Straits were declared as a no-arms zone. A limited number of garrison troops and a shipyard border were brought to Istanbul. Disarming the Straits is definitely a bad article that violates Turkey's sovereignty. It makes Turkey and its important city vulnerable to dangers.
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The issue of demilitarization the Straits is also a situation against sovereign rights. If a threat situation is observed in the Straits region, France, Britain, Italy and Japan will intervene in the situation as determined by the League of Nations. This article, which is crippled in every aspect, makes Turkey vulnerable to threats. The Straits area had already been specified in the disarmament article so that in the event of a serious war, enemy soldiers could easily land. In addition to this nonsense, if there is a serious war situation like this, the Straits Commission will notify the League of Nations, France, Britain, Italy and Japan will take action and intervene. Even in the year 2022, when this study was carried out, when the communication speed was at such high levels, it may take days for the Commission to inform about a possible attack, to determine whether this situation is a threat in the League of Nations, and for the four states mentioned above to take action. A hundred years ago this might take weeks. In these weeks, Turkey may have already fallen into a very negative situation under enemy attack. These articles on the Disarmament of the Straits and the Defence of the Straits make the State of the Republic of Turkey vulnerable to all kinds of dangers that may come from the Straits. The biggest drawback of this assurance system, which was accepted by the Lausanne Straits Convention, would arise if the League of Nations Council could not take a unanimous decision. If a unanimous decision could not be taken, this assurance system would not work. Therefore, the security of the Straits would be endangered. (İnan, 1995)
The issue of the control of the Straits also came to a conclusion with the decision to establish a Commission. The issue of controlling the Straits with a Commission was one of the issues imposed by the Allies in Sèvres. In the Treaty of Sevres, the Commission was like a small state with its own borders and flag, administrative powers and law enforcement. In addition, while states such as the
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USA, Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia had 2 rights each, Turkey would have 1 vote. In Lausanne, the task of the Commission was organized only to supervise the passage of warships. Moreover, in the commission to be chaired by a Turkish representative, Turkey's right to speak became equal, not less, as in Sevres.
The complex provisions of the Straits commission were summarized in Professor Toynbee's "History of the Peace Conference" as follows: "Although the four sites taken from the Sevres project (on both sides of the Istanbul and Dardanelles Straits) were significantly downsized, they would no longer be open to the Allies and would be closed to Turkish forces and demilitarized. Demilitarization was interpreted more against the Allies than against the Turks (including the Aegean islands at the southern entrance of these waterways). Any possible invasion and control of these areas by the Allies was prohibited. Turkey would be able to maintain a garrison of up to 12,000 men in Istanbul so that it could maintain contact with its forces located near Europe and Asia using the demilitarized zone and anchor its navy in this area. The functions and authority of the Straits commission were reduced and placed under the auspices of the League of Nations under the presidency of Turkey. The three European allies and Japan had committed to the security of the demilitarized zone and to resist any action on free passage. Whether this convention protects the interests of the main allied state is left to the discretion of the reader, but it is obvious that it did not solve the Black Sea straits problem. (Berber Ş. G., 2013)
The Treaty of Lausanne was a peace treaty that the Turkish Nation was looking forward to, despite its good and bad articles, which fought non-stop for 10 years and suffered constant losses apart from the National Struggle. The Turkish Nation was extremely tired and exhausted. As a result of this treaty, the Ottoman Empire was erased from the stage of history and a new Turkish Republic was
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established. Long years of wars and defeats led to significant territorial losses of the state. After the Balkan Wars, the state lost the Balkans. All of Europe thought it was time for the "sick man" to die. There were those who claimed that the Turks would now be completely expelled from Europe and sent back to Central Asia. However, despite the fact that the Turkish Nation was devastated and exhausted, under the leadership of the great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, she heroically showed that she could not come to captivity and humiliation, and won her independence with his blood. The Treaty of Lausanne is described as a victory by some and as a defeat by others. Lausanne is neither a victory nor a defeat. It is a good agreement that can be made within the conditions and possibilities. This is a fact that can be seen by those who evaluate history according to its time.
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CONCLUSION
The Istanbul and Dardanelles Straits have always been very important throughout history. The states that dominate these important trade routes have seen its advantages as well as its disadvantages in every time of history.
After the conquest of Istanbul, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits were definitely under Ottoman rule. From this date, between the years 1453-1774, it was not possible for anything to happen in this region without the will of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were deciding the coming and going merchant ships. Only some of the countries she had favored could have this right. There was no possibility of warships entering. However, with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed after the Ottoman-Russian war, which ended in defeat, the will of the Ottoman Empire was damaged for the first time. As a result of the defeat, she had to allow the passage of Russian merchant ships. After this date, things continued to go badly for the Ottoman Empire.
In accordance with the alliance agreement signed with the Russians against the French threat, Russian warships were passing through the Straits for the first time. With the Kala-i Sultaniye agreement signed with Britain in 1809, the issue of the Straits was determined by a bilateral agreement for the first time. Later, with the London Straits Convention of 1841, it was gaining international importance. The 19th century was a century when the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its will over the Straits. As a result of the state's failure to catch up with the era in every field and military failures, concessions were made and undesirable agreements were signed.
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In the 20th century, we see a period when the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. The Tripoli war, the Balkan Wars and the First World War, meanwhile, the Empire was fighting incessantly and suffering heavy defeats. With the Armistice of Mudros signed after the First World War, the Turkish Nation was now ignored. Even her opinion on the Straits was not asked and the region was wanted to be left to international administration. The Treaty of Sèvres, which was imposed and signed by the Ottomans but never implemented, was completely disintegrating the state.
The Turkish Nation was not silent and unresponsive to these insults. Everyone had a spirit of anger and resistance, but these scattered and unaware of each other ideas had no effect. The arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Samsun was the ignition of the fuse for the unification of this spirit. Mustafa Kemal Pasha started the National Struggle movement and organized the Turkish Nation and organized the nationwide resistance. The Turkish Nation's National Struggle with such a great leader resulted in success and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, in which the Turkish Nation was also addressed and treated equally, instead of the peace conditions imposed on the Turkish Nation.
The Straits Issue was also one of the most important issues in Lausanne. British, Turkish and Soviet arguments were the main actors in the debates. The Turkish thesis was based on the National Pact. The agreed issue of passage of merchant ships did not pose a problem. On the other hand, the issues of disarmament and demilitarization of the Straits and the Straits commission gave rise to long discussions. The issues of disarmament and demilitarization of the Straits were unfortunately one of the negative issues of the treaty. These two articles were against the sovereignty and security of the Republic of Turkey. In the event of a possible war
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threat, the enemy could easily land and invade Turkey from the Straits region. In addition, the existence of the Commission itself was a violation of sovereignty. It was unacceptable to have an entity other than the Turkish state in order to control the passage within Turkish territory. Such negative statements continued until 1936. It is a great chance that there was not an attack attempt against Turkey as we mentioned until that year. When it comes to 1936, Turkey will want to discuss the Straits Issue again by making good use of the increasing danger of war and will have the negative items mentioned above removed in Montreux.
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