482

 A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INPUT
IN LATE OTTOMAN COTTON CULTIVATION, 1840–1876

• I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and
documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital
resources, which have been produced or published by another person or
institution;

This thesis examines the role of scientific and technological input as a transformative
and driving force in Ottoman cotton cultivation between 1840 and 1876. These two
entities, with their controversial coexistence, make an alternative view in
historiography demandable. The new cotton production methods and techniques,
emerged in parallel with the perception of science that started to be institutionalised
in the nineteenth century, shaped cotton cultivation and production patterns with a
sense of association rather than a societal understanding. These associations exhibit a
dynamic nature rather than the static structures often encountered in different social
science theories, rendering all human-centred approaches that accept the agent as
exclusively human and based on the world-human duality ineffective. Focusing on
the dynamic partnerships of local and foreign actors/objects that were established,
disintegrated, reunited, and transformed, this thesis explores the structures that
remoulded the Ottoman cotton production process in “non-radical chaotic systems”
created by non-human agents through the combination of scientific and technological
input engendered by various partnerships, not based on a single intermediary, supplydemand,
and a state-centred approach. Thus, especially during the years of the
American Civil War, the agents directing cotton production in the Ottoman Empire
and the networks of these agents become visible. The thesis proposes to evaluate
these non-/human agents under three categories: sensory, entrepreneurial, and
transmitter actors. These actors’ fluid decisions, behaviours, and actions have shaped
and transformed the cotton production process in the late Ottoman era.
v
ÖZET

Tartışmalı birliktelikleriyle bu iki girdi, tarih yazımında alternatif bir bakışı talep
edilebilir kılmaktadır. On dokuzuncu yüzyılda kurumsallaşmaya başlayan bilim
anlayışına paralel olarak ortaya çıkan yeni pamuk üretim usul ve teknikleri, pamuk
yetiştiriciliğini ve üretim kalıplarını bütüncül bir toplumsal anlayıştan ziyade bir
ortaklık anlayışıyla şekillendirmiştir. Bu ortaklıklar, farklı sosyal bilim teorilerinde
sıklıkla karşılaşılan durağan yapılardan ziyade devingen bir doğa sergilemekte, faili
yalnızca insan olarak kabul eden ve dünya-insan ikiliğini temel alan tüm insan
merkezli yaklaşımları etkisiz hale getirmektedir. Yerli ve yabancı
aktörlerin/nesnelerin kurulan, dağılan, yeniden bir araya gelen ve dönüşen devingen
ortaklıklarına odaklanan bu tez, Osmanlı pamuk üretim sürecini dönüştüren yapıları,
tekil failler, arz-talep ve devlet merkezli bir yaklaşımla değil, türlü ortaklıkların
doğurduğu bilimsel ve teknolojik girdinin bir aradalığında rol oynayan insan-dışı
faillerin yarattıkları “radikal olmayan kaotik sistemler” içinde incelemektedir.
Böylece, bilhassa Amerikan İç Savaşı yıllarında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda pamuk
üretimine yön veren failler ve bu faillerin ağları görünür hale gelmektedir. Tez, insan
ve insan olmayan bu failleri üç kategori altında değerlendirmeyi önermektedir. Bu
kategoriler, duyusal, girişimci ve nakilci aktörlerdir. Bu aktörlerin değişken kararları,
davranışları ve eylemleri geç Osmanlı döneminde pamuk üretim sürecini
şekillendirmiş ve dönüştürmüştür.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First of all, I would like to thank Edhem Eldem, whom I regard as a history gourmet
and a school of historiography for every young scholar, especially late Ottoman
historians. Perhaps the most important lesson I learnt from him is that the researcher
should keep a safe distance from the subject s/he is researching. In other words, I
learnt from his works to have the ability to focus on the subject without falling into
excess and understatement. I feel lucky to be able to write a thesis under the
supervision of someone whose writing of history I took as an example and made me
realise the subtleties and pitfalls of Ottoman historiography.
Another school for me is dear Berrak Burçak, whom I see as the unofficial
advisor of this thesis and who has a special place in my life. Since my undergraduate
years at Bilkent University, she has always been with me morally and materially. She
has been a role model and mentor, the guardian of Bilkent cats, and a friend who
comes to my aid whenever I am in difficulty. When I did not believe in myself and
fell into total despair, she continued to believe in me and helped me renew my faith
in myself. No matter how much I thank her here, it will be incomplete.
Bilkent deserves a separate paragraph not because it will always be my first
academic home but also because it has given me a lot. Bilkent Library has been a
lifesaver for me during the whole period of writing my thesis. But what really makes
Bilkent valuable to me and shaped my sense of history is that it hosted and hosts the
late Halil İnalcık and Özer Ergenç, whose conversations I have greatly benefited
from. Far from belittling the empirical tradition of Ottoman historiography, I learnt
from them that I should embrace it firmly, make peace with its shortcomings, and
pursue it with enthusiasm. They made me understand that no matter how many
vii
stylish and beautiful books I read, no matter how fashionable and fancy my ideas, I
would not be able to write a good history if I could not deal with illegible primary
sources and dusty manuscripts. Here, I would also like to thank dear Öykü Terzioğlu
Özer and Abdürrahim Özer, whom I can never repay and express my gratitude
enough for helping me with Ottoman palaeography.
Boğaziçi University, a very different experience following Bilkent, took a
special place in my academic life. Listening to Selçuk Esenbel has always given me
great pleasure. I am fortunate to have taken historiography courses from her that I
cannot take anywhere else in Turkey. Thanks to Yücel Terzibaşoğlu’s seminars, I
learnt that social theories should reveal and explain the forces behind what is said. I
would also like to use this opportunity to thank Yaşar Tolga Cora, who kindly
accepted to take part in my thesis committee.
I owe much gratitude to the Isis Press and Sinan Kuneralp, who were
generous to share with me a primary source I needed, to Yunus Edgü, who provided
a document I requested from the British Library in London, and to Ali Akyıldız, who
answered all my questions in detail and showed me how an ideal academic should
be. I am grateful to dear Özcan Kabakçıoğlu, who came to my rescue for editing
during the final stages of the thesis, in a rushed and unexpected moment, for helping
me reduce the complexity of this rather long and tedious text. I would also like to
thank Adrien Zakar, Akif Ercihan Yerlioğlu, Damon Della Fave, Kate Fleet, Kenneth
Weisbrode, Paul Latimer, Simon Rennie, Seven Ağır, Sven Beckert, Şevket Pamuk,
and Tarık Tansu Yiğit for their various help at different stages of the thesis.
Thanks to Burak Değirmenci for adding meaning to my life with his real
friendship since our high school days, I have not been without news of current
Turkish politics. I would also like to thank my dear friend Bartu Öktem, whom I met
viii
late in my Bilkent years, for being kind enough to listen to the details of my thesis in
every phone call we made during his Tripoli mission days.
Last but certainly not least, I cannot thank Mustafa Türkan enough, the most
intellectual and versatile person I have ever known. He always reminded me that
falling behind schedule is the only reason for force majeure and that force majeure is
death. Without him, I would have felt like a lost aviator in the Sahara Desert. I
cannot imagine anyone else with such an enviable knack for philosophy and with
whom I could argue about a new rationality that would reveal the metaphysical side
of thinking with models. I am grateful for his ruminative companionship and endless
intellectual curiosity.
Finally, I cannot express my gratitude to my family for the everlasting
support they have given me on this unpredictable journey. Here, my mother, who
learnt how to be an inspiring woman from my grandmother, our very dear late Asiye
Hanım, deserves the greatest appreciation. She decided to take a break from enjoying
retirement and become a history student to feel how I feel, and in the process, she
beat breast cancer. With her will to live and strength, she taught me something no
one else could ever teach: to smile even at your worst.
ix
Dedicated to
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1
CHAPTER 2: THE MYTH OF LEAVING NO TRACES BEHIND ....................... 21
2.1 The beginning of localisation of global trends in agronomy ..................... 21
2.2 An experiment in San Stefano, 1847–1851 ............................................... 28
2.3 Searching for resources before the American Civil War .......................... 55
CHAPTER 3: “KING COTTON” IN EXILE TO THE OTTOMAN LANDS ......... 64
3.1 Financial and infrastructural arrangements for cotton cultivation ............ 64
3.2 The role of scientific input ...................................................................... 107
3.3 The role of technological input ............................................................... 129
CHAPTER 4: THE COEXISTENCE PROBLEM OF TWO INPUTS ................... 152
4.1 The chicken-egg dilemma of science and technology ............................. 152
4.2 The relationship of scientific and technological input in practice ........... 160
4.3 Cotton cultivation after the American Civil War .................................... 171
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 188
APPENDIX A: CARENZA’S AYAMAMA DRAINAGE PLAN ......................... 197
APPENDIX B: THE MAP OF THE IZMIR-AYDIN RAILWAY ......................... 198
APPENDIX C: MINARD’S MAP OF COTTON IMPORTS ................................. 199
APPENDIX D: SAMPLE PLOUGHS FROM THE 1863 EXHIBITION .............. 200
APPENDIX E: VEDOVA’S SELF-FEEDER FOR COTTON GINS .................... 201
APPENDIX F: A CARICATURE FROM THE MAGAZINE CEM [DJEM] ........ 202
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 203
xi
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. The Dispatch of Cotton Seeds in the 1860s ................................................ 80
Table 2. Private Investment in Cotton Mills in the 1860s ........................................ 92
Table 3. Cotton Samples Sent to the 1863 Ottoman General Exhibition ............... 140
Table 4. The Values of Cotton Yarns Imported to Turkey from the UK ............... 174
Table 5. The Values of Cotton Manufactures Imported to Turkey from the UK ... 174
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. A diagram showing the actors/objects in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne and beyond .... 54
Figure 2. The different varieties of cotton plants according to their fibres .............. 78
Figure 3. The front-side view of the 1863 Ottoman Exhibition ............................. 136
Figure 4. A tool used in America for hoeing and sprinkling cotton seeds ............. 139
Figure 5. Raw cotton exports from Turkey to the UK, 1862–1866 ........................ 172
Figure 6. Raw cotton exports from Smyrna to the UK, 1860–1869 ....................... 172
Figure 7. Cotton yarns, imported to Turkey from the UK, 1861–1866 .................. 173
Figure 8. Cotton manufactures, imported to Turkey from the UK, 1861–1866 ..... 173
xiii
NOTES ON SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION
In this thesis, proper names of historical figures or place names widely known today
are rendered in their most commonly used forms in modern Turkish for convenience.
A strict transliteration is not preferred here. In this regard, the TDV İslâm
Ansiklopedisi is taken as a basis. If English equivalents of geographical nomenclature
are available, their English versions are preferred instead of the commonly known
Turkish versions, unless necessary. The transliteration system developed by the
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) for Arabic, Persian, and
Turkish is used for all the remaining Ottoman Turkish texts. Since there is no
consonantal distinction between Ottoman Turkish and modern Turkish for the letters
خ and ھ/ه in the IJMES Transliteration System, ḫ for the letter خ has been borrowed
from the transliteration alphabet of the TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi when it comes to
these letters—the letter h continued to be used for ھ/ه . For Arabic or Persian genitive
constructions, the TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi and Kubbealtı Lugatı are taken as a basis
in line with Turkish sound and naming rules. Following The Chicago Manual of
Style, foreign or emphatic terms are italicised only when they first appear.
Abbreviations, such as the Cotton Supply Association (CSA), are likewise indicated
only when they appear first; abbreviated forms are favoured in subsequent uses.
Gregorian equivalents of Hicrī and Rūmī dates are always noted in square brackets.
The implied distinctions between the usages of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey are
mentioned in the main text. Last but not least, unless otherwise stated, all translations
and transliterations in the thesis are my own.
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When writing a story, analysing an object, or constructing a historical narrative, the
first thing to do is determine its boundaries in time and space. Accordingly, when the
areas where cotton cultivation was practised and expanded in the Ottoman lands are
examined, Adana, Aleppo, Aydın, Balıkesir, Brussa (Bursa), Cyprus, Damascus,
Denizli, Edirne, Gallipoli, Monastir (Bitola), Mersin, Salonica (Thessaloníki), Skopje
(Üsküb), and Smyrna (Izmir) come to the fore—rather, there is a predominantly
Rumelian and western Anatolian distribution.1 The enterprises that flourished in
these cities and the social as well as material dynamics of these enterprises, and the
years when new collaborations were made mandatory and global technology
developments concerning cotton manifested in accordance with local conditions, it is
seen that the period of cotton in the nineteenth century mostly corresponds to the
years of the American Civil War (1861–1865). Within these limits, it is essential to
address the central debates in the literature first because they determine the scope of
the thesis. The effects of localised global trends on Ottoman social and economic life
can only be understood when the dynamic structure that is not reflected in the global
production scale is handled with a narrative that does not fix and frame these effects
but follows their marks and traces. Spreading boundaries in question all over the
narrative constrains the study of the agents and their influence. The multifaceted and
1 According to the results of the questionnaires of the British consuls in 1871, the consulates in places,
such as Aleppo, Brussa, Cyprus, Monastir, Salonica, and Smyrna, where cotton production was
carried out, gave the answer that their “commercial” functions predominated. Suez and Alexandria
consulates, who also reported that their commercial aspect was dominant, were excluded from the
scope of the thesis on purpose because they were involved in cotton production in Egypt. Reports
Relative to British Consular Establishments: 1858 & 1871, vol. LX, c. 530, at 53, 83, 90, 146, 151,
188, 206.
2
dynamic structure in cotton production disappears that being the case. To defend this
point of view in the thesis, a narrative moving from general discussions to specific—
from debates in the literature to the practice of scientific and technological input—
will be drawn.
First, one of the reasons why some aspects of this dynamic structure are lost
on the global scale of production is the reductionist approaches of dreary grand
narratives that focus only on values at the economic scale and the domination of
society or capital. Second, in historiographical approaches, especially in commodity
histories, technologies, such as factories, cotton gins, cotton seeds, scientists, and
production, are deconstructed, and the existing knowledge set and scientific activity
are pushed into the spiral of capital and politics. The entire story of the commodity is
reduced to malicious accounts of actors and their socio-economic effects, as in Sven
Beckert’s distinguished work Empire of Cotton: A Global History (2014) or Orhan
Kurmuş’s Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi (1974),2 which is also the first notable
and regional study on this subject in terms of Ottoman history. Considering the
narrowly defined economic structures as well as property relations, such as state
ownership of land and, more generally, the social and economic position of the
state—in some cases, companies and enterprises as well—was assumed to save the
narrative from economic reductionism. Another weakness of these approaches, or at
least some of them, is their concurrent endorsement that (i) economic developments
in the course of history affect social and political developments and (ii) social,
political, and cultural structures can be effective and even determinant on economic
developments. These two contradictory propositions are defended together because
2 As Kurmuş also mentions in the preface of his book, Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, it is an
abbreviated version of his relevant doctoral dissertation translated into Turkish, for which, please see
Kurmuş, “The Role of British Capital in the Economic Development of Western Anatolia,
1850−1913” (PhD diss., SOAS University of London, 1974).
3
scholars want to exhibit neither economic reductionism nor essentialism. In addition,
it is an axiomatic line of reasoning to talk about a capitalist unit because every person
strives for their benefit or profit within the intricate network of economic relations.
Historians who write with a global history approach—just as historians using
theoretical frameworks with a level of universality—also face the danger of
emphasising the common dimensions of the societies they study and of ignoring their
peculiar aspects. In other words, while trying to explain the economic structures and
why and how these structures were transformed, many factors, such as mentality and
climate, are left out of the narrative. This is an escapist attitude that stays away from
the mess of events. These approaches, which hold on to their preferred form of
political truth and assume that power is the most critical variable and driving force
behind events, miss being an alternative to the dominant discourses of the natural and
social sciences. Although traditional social theories, in hackneyed old metanarratives
about “modernisation” within what might be termed an “internalist
paradigm,”3 have been surpassed in explaining historical phenomena internally and
typically analysing them within the boundaries of society, narratives that entirely
transcend these out-of-date trajectories have not been discovered yet. Modern
theories tend to establish certain relationships among factors and to place various
factors in a certain hierarchy in order of priority. It was unfortunate that the
approaches presented as alternatives also faced similar drawbacks. The old narratives
have been turned upside down like a slate and basically the internal dynamics of
societies have been pushed into the background. It is assumed that the social change
is always the result of influences and external parameters powerful than the society
3 Conrad, What Is Global History?, 88.
4
itself. In these approaches where everything is deconstructed, moralism’s narrative of
regimes of power and domination is left out of this deconstruction.4
Going back to the main literature, evaluating the expansion in Turkey’s
cotton production during the American Civil War only as a result of foreign demand,
that is, surrendering to a form of economic reductionism, cause the role of many
actors, networks, and non-/human factors become invisible—in the framework of the
thesis, each of these is considered as an object.5 However, since the discovery of new
collections of documents that will completely change historiography is not a frequent
occurrence, the documents remain in the background, and the genealogy of words
may be brought to the fore. Previously used documents are read and over-read. There
is, of course, the necessity and benefit of theory adjustments and, where necessary,
re-reading the documents. Nevertheless, when this necessity is not meaningful, the
complacency and contentment of not writing the history of great men or avoiding
economic reductionism may eventually give way to a background that adds nothing
to the field. One way of circumventing this paradox is to go after the actors/objects,
assuming that all actors/objects form partnerships in such a way as to put others—
including inanimate objects—into action. This act of pursuit is not done by the
transmission of a force that remains the same as a kind of loyal agent but by
4 A reason for this tendency is that history is perceived as an exclusively constructed structure, and
historians are deemed to be social constructivists. However, any event that started to take place in the
past (t1) and will never end ontologically (t∞) cannot consist of a structure whose essence has been
built. Hence, it is concluded that the historian is not only a social constructivist. Not every reality is
socially constructed. For instance, there is an ontological difference between being sick and being
married. Marriage is a socially constructed reality, whereas illness is not always a socially constructed
reality. History, like all forms of knowledge, has its unamendable aspects. This issue of
unamendability will be discussed later.
5 All actors in the thesis will be discussed under the object category to avoid falling into the worldhuman
dilemma. Anything that cannot be wholly reduced to its components or effects on other things
is an object. When something cannot be reduced entirely to its components and effects, it stands on its
own, so agency ceases to be a solitary human concept. Only in this way can the object become active.
Traditional object approaches are highly Kantian. According to Kant, the object emerges through the
activity of empirical synthesis, that is, by giving unity to the animated representation, in which
imagination is regenerative, with thinking (judgmental verb). Gözkân, Kant’ın Şemsiyesi, 57. Thus,
the agency of the object is left behind the human in advance.
5
examining the transformations unleashed by many contingencies triggered by new
partnerships that follow along the line. A situation can best be understood by
assessing which entities have influence there instead of explaining what these entities
are in advance, and by closely following them and all they do to the utmost.
What, then, does the historian who follows such an approach do differently?
For example, in writing the history of Louis Pasteur’s groundbreaking work in
chemistry and microbiology, to examine all the actors/objects (and agents) involved
in the making of his work, this type of historian includes every scientist who worked
with him in Pasteur’s career, following the experimental tools, chemicals, vaccines,
and serums that Pasteur used in his experiments as well as written sources of the
period and even bank accounts and checks. It turns out that even an object as simple
as a temperature gauge contains many possibilities of action and use that can be
explored. None of these objects plays a role as a passive participant in the narrative.
Thus, the historian realises that something analogous to a symbiosis takes place in the
discipline of history. Not only living cells but also institutions, medals, plant fossils,
railroad tracks, porter’s (ḥammāl) baskets, and historical objects can develop a
symbiosis with other entities. Moreover, unlike most social theories, this symbiosis
does not have to be reciprocal. Interrelationships often play an indispensable role in
the study of history and in the social sciences, which is beyond dispute. On the other
hand, many misrelationships—or false associations—can be avoided when it is
understood through a proposed object-oriented historiography which argues that the
relations are not always reciprocal. In this way, no actor/object or agent is made
indebted to each other for no reason. Object-oriented ontologist and philosopher
Graham Harman evaluates the Greek War of Independence in this context. Even
though this war transformed Lord Byron’s poetry, his poetry did not transform or
6
have an impact on the Greek nation.6 This illustrative example indicates that a
reciprocal relationship is not always necessary for symbiosis. Also, with this
approach, it is evident that the relationship is not just an exchange. Attributes and
effects do not always have to be exchanged. Often in a symbiosis, two objects make
each other obvious, that is, reveal each other’s qualities and effects. In the following
sections, this perspective will play a critical role in addressing the relationship
between all animate and inanimate actors/objects in the Ottoman lands with respect
to cotton cultivation processes.
The approach being discussed here concludes that there are many more
agents than historians and social scientists realise and that non-human agents should
be treated on a more equal footing with human ones in historiography. To such an
extent that history is a field in which even the so-called ‘great men’ are not fixed
entities in the hands of those who try to understand how history feeds on
uncertainties without prejudicing how it transforms. In such a field, the material facts
that tend to keep the great men great are inclined to be hanging in the background;
but instead of disappearing in their own networks, they expose themselves. In other
words, it puts them on a more equal basis with other actors/objects rather than
conferring their greatness on them. The material facts, which are seen as a part of the
networks of relations and examined in the dynamic structure of these networks,
demonstrate that the great men do not always play the leading roles. In some events,
they are often not even in the position to make the final decision or to set things in
motion. In a sense, inanimate actors/objects, such as roads, buildings, contracts,
banknotes, and various technology products, play a (de)stabilising role in the
narrative. In this respect, the ontological state of great men can be compared to the
6 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 112.
7
nearly hundred billion neurons in the human nervous system. Just as there are
various protein molecules with special functions in neurons, these great men were
embedded in objects with different dynamics, no different from the so-called
‘ordinary men’ who had once been regarded as smaller and unimportant than these
great men in the tradition of historiography. Despite being overflowing with the
material opportunities their identities bestowed upon them, these great men could not
maintain their identities and privileges without the structures long considered small
to break down essential nutrients and provide them with energy.
No actor/object is separated from other actors/objects solely due to their
identity. It is the sum of all their qualities and influences that distinguishes
actors/objects from one another. Nonetheless, there will be some qualities and effects
that are overlooked or undetected, and no field of study can exhaust all the qualities
of an actor/object and its relations to the others. For this reason, the existence and
agency of the actor/object will continue to be a dynamic field of research for
historians. Yet, a classification can be made based on the available information to
make the narrative possible. Notwithstanding the fact that this is simplified quite a
bit in a scientific sense, the classification in question is reminiscent of neurons
divided according to their functions: sensory neurons, motor neurons, and
interneurons. First of all, sensory neurons transmit the information they receive from
the environment basically through smell, taste, touch, and sound to the brain. In this
context, the producers and carriers of knowledge in the narrative will be considered
as sensory actors in the scope of the thesis. The information obtained goes through a
scientific and historical synthesis and production process in the hands of sensory
actors—they do not always have to be human. Non-human actors or all objects in a
broad sense should always be kept in mind. Secondly, motor neurons provide
8
movement by controlling the contraction of muscles. The entrepreneurs in the
narrative will be entrepreneurial actors, inspired by the working principle of motor
neurons. Thirdly, transmitter actors will connect sensory actors and entrepreneurial
actors in the narrative, just as interneurons form circuits. Accordingly, the
differences between introverted and extroverted actions—towards domestic and
foreign markets—of both local and global actors/objects will be delineated in the
narrative without being confused with each other.
Although no one doubts the existence of a mind-independent material world,
at least it is hoped so, since this material world and its ontology are not preceded, the
agency of commodities in historical narratives and, above all, their possessions
merely because of their existence are ignored or overlooked. While there is no doubt
that hammers drive nails, ovens bake the dough, theatre decors bring the stage to life,
and seat belts keep people alive during an accident, the narrative is never set up that
way. Even though the fracking method, which enables the extraction of shale gas and
shale oil that could not be extracted before by pumping a certain mixture into layers
thousands of metres below the ground, has occupied American domestic politics for
a while, the aspect of this method that imposes its existence on people is not
discussed in the narrative. While human beings do not even form a quarter of
ontology, it has not been possible to overcome the limitations of the anthropocentric
approach, which has never been questioned or only weakly questioned. It is difficult
to see how non-human things would act in a thought where the action is a priori
intentional, that is, constrained by the actions of humans. When ontological questions
are asked, it turns out that just as humans communicate through sound waves and
writing, dolphins and whales through sonar, and octopuses and other cephalopods
communicate through colour patterns on their skin, machines communicate with
9
energy flows between their mechanical parts. Ontology’s sensitivity to these
differences, expressing what they are and thinking about the different kinds of
machines that exist and their distinguishing features can contribute to historiography.
For example, a historian writing the history of the pen, if s/he considers the pen as a
machine, that is, if s/he thinks about an ontological problem, might ask the following
questions: ‘Did the use of the pen change the bone and muscle or neurological
structure of the human hand? In which historical events did this change play a role?’
Thus, the intricate technology of the machine finds a place for itself in a narrative in
which biological agents swarm. Since it is not reduced to epistemology and its
structure is handled ontologically, it reaches a more equal level with biological
agents in terms of agency. What makes such a narrative important is not only that, as
Jane Bennett puts it in his book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things
(2010), it incorporates non-human forces into the narrative as agents and resists
human narcissistic tendencies.7 More importantly, a historian studying the history of
numeral systems with such an approach may realise that the operation of numbers in
the Roman numeral system complicates operations such as division, multiplication,
algebra, and calculus.
Inspired by contemporary debates on the history and philosophy of science
and technology and the perspectives of speculative realism, such as object-oriented
ontology,8 new realism,9 and Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT),10 this
7 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, xvi.
8 “The world is not the world as manifest to humans; to think a reality beyond our thinking is not
nonsense, but obligatory.” Harman, “On Undermining of Objects,” 26.
9 Maurizio Ferraris explains this approach with the example of water. Even though it is perspicuous
that language, diagrams, and categories are needed to know that water is H2O, the fact that water is
H2O is utterly independent of any human knowledge. So much so that water was H2O even before the
science of chemistry existed, and it will continue to be so even if all humans disappear from the face
of the earth. Ferraris calls this “unamendability,” viz., the highlight of reality. For the continuation of
the related discussion, please see Ferraris, Manifesto of New Realism, 19.
10 Bruno Latour argues in this approach that the researcher can only observe small-scale forms of
interaction experimentally and empirically, so s/he should focus on the dynamics of these interactions,
10
thesis covers the period from the 1840s, with the first model farm (ferme modèle)
established in the Ottoman Empire in 1847, to the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz in
1876.11 It focuses on the interactions of actors/objects and structures that emerged in
cotton cultivation and especially during the years of the American Civil War. Within
the scope of the thesis, based on the ANT’s rather abbreviated slogan “[f]ollow the
actors . . . ,” a narrative that follows the actors/objects and their networks will be
established revolving around the question of ‘which collaborations were found
within the boundaries of cotton cultivation between 1840 and 1876.’12 That being the
case, the narrative will go beyond Bruno Latour’s flat ontology13 and affirm that
phenomena are more than their relationships and effects, based on object-oriented
ontologist Graham Harman. Therefore, an alternative will be put forward to the
perspectives of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches that deal with
phenomena only through their relationships or effects.
In the second chapter, the thesis will investigate the prevailing agricultural
initiatives of the Ottoman government and society, in which local and foreign
actors/objects from all classes and identities played a role accompanied by the
desperate industrialisation move of the state during the years of economic
not on larger structures. For instance, society should not be seen as “a place, a thing, a domain, or a
kind of stuff” but should be comprehended as “a provisional movement of new associations.” Latour,
Reassembling the Social, 238. As stated by Latour, if connections are made between spaces, these
connections need to be made by more “descriptions,” not the quick way, with ubiquitous associations
or “entities,” such as “[s]ociety, [c]apitalism, [e]mpire, [n]orms, [i]ndividualism, [f]ields,” and the
like. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 137.
11 In object-oriented ontology, objects exist independently of human perception, and their existence
cannot be reduced to their effects and components. Thus, man cannot be thought of at the centre of the
universe as they once were, the anthropomorphic philosophy to date should be set aside, and things or
objects that are now accepted to exist/can exist without the human subject should be restored to their
own reality and autonomy. For more elaboration, please see Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology.
12 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 68.
13 It is a discourse of reality that claims all objects, whether imaginary or fictional, have the same
degree of existence as any other object. In line with this approach, no object is more a subject than
another. To rephrase it, anything that can be handled on its own is an object. Because if something
cannot be reduced to its components or effects, either nothing or something remains, which is the
object; in other words, it is called what can be handled on its own.
11
dependence of the British cotton market on the southern United States for the supply
of raw cotton.14 The actors/objects in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi (Agricultural
Training School)15 and the Taʿlīm-ḫāne’s model farm located in the industrial zone
on the Bakırköy-Zeytinburnu line, the relations between the actors/objects, and the
furcations that this project created in the past and future of Ottoman cotton
cultivation will be discussed. In this section, the unstable stance of the Ottoman
Empire is discussed with its project of realising both industrial and agricultural
breakthroughs simultaneously.
In the third chapter, financial and infrastructural as well as scientific and
technological actions will be taken as three different interrelated categories. The
institutions and initiatives to be included in this section will be examined in their
three phases for the purpose of surveying the change of their movements in the
symbiosis. These phases are the maturation phase, the deterioration phase, and the
inactivation phase. Corresponding to this approach, when the survival of an
institution or venture becomes unfeasible for its shareholders, the maturation phase
ends, and the phase of deterioration begins. The last phase is called the phase of
inactivation to bring an alternative to linear and finite narratives. This alternative
approach argues that the loss of effect of something does not necessarily mean that it
is over. The beginning, like the end, cannot be conceived from a fixed point. Any
experience of objective or fictional beings need not necessarily be limited to a human
14 “British cotton manufacturers were seeking an alternative to dependence on the United States,
whose Southern economy was anyway an unsatisfactory market for British manufactures.” Hyam,
Britain’s Imperial Century, 54. In some publications, it was described as the “evil of dependency.” A
Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, The Cotton Supply. A Letter to John Cheetham, Esq.
President of the Manchester Cotton-Supply Association (1861), 3.
15 Although the word taʿlīm-ḫāne does not directly mean school (mekteb), it contains the meaning of a
place where education is received. The term “training” was preferred instead of “practical” because
the training given in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne was not entirely practice-based. However, this discussion is not
very meaningful in an age where taʿlīm-ḫāne is used instead of mekteb, and mekteb is used instead of
taʿlīm-ḫāne, and, of course, standardisation cannot be mentioned under these circumstances.
12
temporal, social, or linguistic structure. Quentin Meillassoux expresses this condition
in opposition to the claim that the laws of nature are necessary (according to him,
they are contingent): “. . . it is in fact not contradictory for nature to obey up to time t
a certain number of physical constancies and to stop obeying them at time t + 1.”16
The identity of institutions will also be problematised in the narrative because
while writing the story of cotton in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the
complicated identity of enterprises puts a heavy burden on the historian’s shoulders.
The complex structure of cotton enterprises can be compared to the corporate
structure of the Bank-ı ʿOѕmānī-i Şāhāne (Imperial Ottoman Bank). Foreignness and
locality are intertwined within this complex configuration.17 Actors who were not
Ottoman subjects were Ottoman enough to be aware of what was happening around
them and even to intervene, but they were also foreign to evaluate them without bias.
In this respect, for the historiography of the period in question, writings of non-
Ottoman actors provide very divergent and, in some regards, much more interesting
information compared to the existing state-based archival documents. However, this
does not mean that they can take the place of state archives on their own. It is a fact
that the Ottoman State Archive (BOA)18 was overlooked by some scholars working
on cotton cultivation in the Ottoman Empire for reasons such as language deficiency
16 Meillassoux and Asimov, Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction, 9.
17 Göktay, “Tarihle Dolu Bir Yaşam: Edhem Eldem,” 4. Eldem also explicates this situation through
the corporate structure of the Ottoman Bank. What is forgotten, according to Eldem, is that the
Ottoman Bank is, first and foremost, a private bank. Before any political concern, it is necessary to
think through “profit maximisation” when evaluating the functioning and policies of the Ottoman
Bank: “Dolayısıyla, Osmanlı Bankası’nı gerçek anlamda Osmanlı hükümetinin emir ve hizmetinde bir
kurum olarak düşünmek ne kadar az gerçekçi ise, Paris ve Londra hükümetlerinin bir maşası olarak
görmek de o denli yanıltıcı olacaktır.” [Therefore, the less realistic it is to think of the Ottoman Bank,
in real terms, as an institution under the command and service of the Ottoman government, it would
be just as misleading to see it as an apparatus of the governments of Paris and London.] Eldem, 135
Yıllık Bir Hazine, 18.
18 The Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive) of Turkey, hereinafter
abbreviated as BOA, although the Prime Ministry State Archives has now been replaced with the
Presidency of State Archives.
13
in Ottoman Turkish.19 When the abundance of documents revealing that complex
structure is not provided, there is a threat of abusive interpretation of the actors’
concern for profit and the value they have added to the Ottoman cities, urban centres,
and towns through their initiatives. Even though this trend has waned, some theories,
such as world-systems theory, which is essentially a non-malicious interpretation,
have been incorporated into these malicious or conspiratorial readings. For example,
a one-sided “imperialist penetration” narrative was derived from foreign initiatives
on cotton production in the Ottoman lands. Nevertheless, a different perspective and
thus new insights are entirely possible by investigating the documents of foreign
actors and the primary sources to be obtained from several state and local archives.
In fact, this situation can be understood more clearly through the example of
symbiosis briefly mentioned in the previous paragraphs. In symbiosis, which is a
biological process, the parasite acquires a new home inside the cell, and when the
cell divides, it also divides. At the same time, the host secures the backing of a
parasite, which does not live there as a mere parasite—for instance, its ability to
process atmospheric oxygen, the deficiency of which can be fatal to the cell.20 This
analogy can be applied not only to the relationship between foreign and local actors
in the Ottoman lands but also to the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and
Britain and France in the Tanẓīmāt (Reorganisation/Reforms) period. The following
footnote for the definition of the “Well Guarded Empire”21 (Memālik-i Maḥrūse, or
more appropriately in English, the Well-Protected Domains) in a news report in the
British press is mischievous in terms of hinting at both the well-known British
19 Within the time frame of this thesis, there are very few academic studies on cotton cultivation in the
Ottoman Empire. When it comes to scientific and technological input in cotton cultivation, the
number decreases even more.
20 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 112.
21 “Turkey. The Great Exhibition in Constantinople,” Public Opinion (27 December 1862): 1118–19.
14
humour and the bilateral relations during the Tanẓīmāt era: “That is, Turkey, or the
Memalik Mahrusé [sic], as the Turks call it, which some may consider as an
unconscious sarcasm on themselves.”22 This witty language aside, establishing a onesided
and static model of relationship creates a meaningless and irrational picture for
both parties.
World-systems theory will also be excluded from the scope of the thesis as
can be deduced from the previous paragraphs, in order to avoid the rough-hewn
approaches mentioned so far, while recognising the historical context and the value it
has added to the literature.23 The major reasons for this exclusion are: the theory’s
defective performance in capturing the dynamics and volatility of capitalism,
exhibiting a form of economic reductionism, and the generalisation of the concept of
capitalism (i.e., “the endless accumulation of capital”) on which it is based, to the
extent that it obscures all historical intricacies and nuances.24 Apart from everything
else, the argument that there are groups, which benefit from the relations that one can
formulate within the framework of the world economy in every state, is nothing more
than a Swiss army knife that adapts to every context. As an additional reason, it can
be argued that world-systems theory prioritises supra-regional and global integration
over social and local dynamics as well as cultural interpretations and considers these
aspects of the issue as of secondary importance. The theory’s secondary emphasis on
the extent to which the integration of markets is itself the product of an asymmetrical
balance of power is inconsistent with the examination of social phenomena selected
in the thesis. Like many other social scientific explanations, the economic
explanation is per se less than the whole it attempts to explain for it is blind to
22 Ibid.
23 For a study using this theory in the context of cotton, please see Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and
the World Economy—The Nineteenth Century (1988).
24 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, 2.
15
everything it does not investigate. It is only a part of the whole, not itself. With such
an approach, which this thesis is against in principle, there is a danger of making the
mistake of seeing Europe, as the only driving force actively shaping world history,
that is, as the mere source of world history. Robert Marks summarises the idea
behind this danger as follows: “Europe acts; the rest of the world responds. Europe
has ‘agency;’ the rest of the world is passive. Europe makes history; the rest of the
world has none until it is brought into contact with Europe. Europe is the center [sic];
the rest of the world is its periphery.”25 In other words, Europe is a superior centre,
while Europeans, as leading actors, can initiate and shape transformation or the socalled
“modernisation” on their own, while others do not have such a capability or,
moreover, a desire. Then, the logical inference follows that the capability and desire
that emerged at some point in history were also part of the imagination and success
of the Europeans.26
In the third chapter, it will also be discussed that scientific and technological
input(s) come to the forefront as the factors that create uncertainty together with nonhuman
actors/objects in the actions of cooperation and dissolution. Consequently, a
more comprehensive narrative will be established rather than the approaches that
have dealt with technology transfer in a passive and dependent way, only through the
eyes and resources of the centre. In that case, how is it possible to treat an actor in
this way? For instance, Hyde Clarke, one of the actors that determined the cotton
production strategy of the Manchester-based Cotton Supply Association (CSA), was
25 Marks, The Origins of the Modern World, 8.
26 Similar problems are noticed in both historians and social scientists, who try to put the period,
society, and geography they study in a narrative exclusively utilising the Western methodologies,
trends, and theories. While it was expected to open new epochs in the study of the social fabric with
the incorporation of Western theoretical debates into Ottoman historiography in an “importsubstitution”
fashion, new problems emerged. For further discussion, please see Eldem, “Osmanlı
Tarihini Türklerden Kurtarmak,” 268–69; Yazıcıoğlu, “Edhem Eldem ile Söyleşi,” 44; and Kurt and
Gürpınar, “Edhem Eldem: Türk Üniversiteleri Hep ‘Milli’ Bahçe İçinde Oynadı,” 286.
16
a “social scientist” and anthropologist. On the other hand, Dr Richard Ford Foote,
one of the founders of the Imperial Medical Society and a member of the British
Literary and Scientific Institution at Pera, was the editor-in-chief of The Levant
Quarterly Review of Literature and Science (1860–1863).27 In both cases, the roles
of actors/objects shaped internally different structures. These internal distinctions of
actors/objects have been largely ignored. A research programme that focuses on the
traces left by actors/objects following their own paths and their activities in creating
and breaking partnerships, rather than focusing on the mere level of analysis and
what kind of groups they are, will make a difference in the contemporary debates of
the history and philosophy of science and technology.
In the fourth chapter, it will be uncovered that the uncertainties examined and
discussed in the third chapter do not muddy the water; on the contrary, any
phenomenon can be analysed more thoroughly when focusing on actors and
networks that bring about these uncertainties. Thus, it will be underlined that when it
comes to the “chicken-egg dilemma,” the correct approach is to make peace with the
confusion that it is impossible to determine the result—science and technology are so
intertwined that they cannot be separated. Furthermore, it will be stated that not only
demand but also factors, such as scientific and technological input, considered within
the scope of uncertainties affect the increase in cotton production during the
American Civil War.
All these point to the central argument of the thesis and conclusion that the
foreign cotton entrepreneurs in the Ottoman Empire, primarily British (but also
including the local ones to a lesser extent), attempted to homogenise the differences
27 Foote, “A Lecture on the Necessity of a Levant Quarterly Journal of Literature, Science, and
General Information,” The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science (July 1860): 1–2.
17
between Egypt, India, the West Indies, and the Ottoman Empire. This tendency to
simplify the cases caused them to neglect the socio-economic and political structure
of the Ottoman Empire as well as non-human aspects and to conceive the social as
only having a share in a commercial commitment. Their attitude was also one of the
main reasons why cotton production in Turkey fell short of expectations. For
example, the CSA argued that cotton production would escalate by solving the
Ottoman Empire’s financial and infrastructural problems to the exclusion of
everything else. This aspect was also frequently discussed in The Journal of the
Society of Arts (1852–1908), a leading social sciences journal of those years.28 In
other words, before analysing the whole structure and conditions of a particular
empire, they first exerted themselves to increase cotton production with a few modest
steps but eventually moved from the consultant and supplier to a much more active
role. For instance, actions that initially consisted of, by and large, sending and
distributing foreign seeds evolved into participating in railway tenders and even
attempts to establish model farms. Their plans, nonetheless, could not go beyond
dealing with financial or infrastructural issues because they did not focus on what
partnerships turned into at the actors’ hands and what methods they used to make
them fit together. In this context, without concentrating on “actors/objects in action,”
it becomes perplexing to comprehend the five primary motives of global
historiography based on Sebastian Conrad: “technology, empire, economy, culture,
and biology.”29 Delving into cotton cultivation only with economic factors gives rise
to mistakes mostly made by foreign actors in cotton enterprises. The disclosure of
complex relationships explains not only the phenomenon under study but also the
local manifestations that follow the phenomenon. Therefore, in the thesis, the
28 “Discussion,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (22 December 1871): 101.
29 Conrad, What Is Global History?, 101.
18
emergence of global cohesion, if any, will be analysed within the framework of
technological change and cross-border interaction.
The problematic that constitutes the main scope of the thesis is the
deficiencies in explaining the propulsive force behind the increase in cotton
production of economic reductionist approaches, that is, the argument that the
production pattern adheres to an utterly parallel course with foreign demand, which
has been merged with cotton production in the Ottoman Empire mostly in the second
half of the nineteenth century. An approach in which actors’/objects’ manoeuvring
capabilities are included in the narrative has not been attempted, and the possibilities
of a narrative in which they exploit the vulnerabilities of the system and try to control
their future have not been questioned. Everything has been seen as the history and
sociology of the finished, but there has been no question of examining the unfinished.
Nevertheless, socio-economic structures and phenomena are not only social
configurations. These structures are neither fixed nor given. All practices involving
structures and phenomena have therefore been produced and existed through the
mobility of actors/objects. The changes that cotton underwent, in this context, were
the product of actions, daily activities, and their modifications.30 Within the
30 Suppose the act of writing the history of the actors’/objects’ mobility is considered as an ontology of
emergence. In that case, it is distinguished that historical events are not just objects frozen in a
specific time period. They can also be defined as emergent entities. Manuel DeLanda, one of the
thinkers of speculative realism and new materialism, describes emergent entities as “assemblages.”
DeLanda establishes four criteria for something to be a real assemblage. While it may seem axiomatic,
it is helpful to enumerate the premises for better understanding. The first criterion is that an emergent
entity has emergent properties. That is, it has properties that its parts do not have. For example, the
Dutch East India Company, as a whole, would be a case of an emergent entity because it has
properties that are not possessed by individual ships, merchants, and so forth. The second criterion for
an emergent entity is downward causation, which implies that an entity has retroactive effects on its
parts. For instance, at the end of the American Civil War, the slavery practice of the South, which was
presented as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the war, became an almost universally unethical
practice—in fact, it was even possible to see its raising implications even at the beginning of the war.
The third criterion is called redundant causation, which suggests that some parts of an emergent entity
are redundant to the whole. For example, the Imperial Cotton Commission employees in Izmir were
awarded medals. A monetary or land award could also be given instead. In addition, a change in parts
does not mean that the whole has changed as well. In other words, changing the reward does not turn
the act of giving the reward into another action. The last criterion is that an emergent entity can
19
boundaries of this problematic, it was asked how the cotton cultivation in the
Ottoman Empire and the upsurge in cotton production followed a parallel course
with foreign demand, whether the Ottoman Empire had a different experience in this
story or had an experience articulated with global processes, and it was
correspondingly asserted that the economic parameters were insufficient to delineate
the cotton production process. It is, in fact, a complicated task to place the Ottoman
Empire in any framework. When it comes to cotton production in this period,
revolving around the history of science and technology rather than economic
parameters as such and seeking the possibilities of the political economy of this story
better explains the parameters of the slight increase in cotton production and why the
expected growth did not actually occur—the nature of the sources shifting the story
into a political-economic trajectory is just another matter. Because when reflecting
on cotton cultivation in the Ottoman Empire, there is no homogeneous mass and
behaviour. Notwithstanding that the discourse dimension of the issue has been
discussed a lot,31 the practical dimension, namely scientific and technological input,
generate new parts. Returning to the example of the American Civil War, the Confederate Flag has
produced a symbol for a few people in the United States today that denotes a “proud past” or
“freedom of expression.” In object-oriented ontology, emergence is the notion that there is a grouping
of entities together such that they form larger compound entities. For a more comprehensive
discussion, please see Young, “Object, Reduction, and Emergence,” 89.
31 The pioneering work on the discourse dimension of the subject is Berrak Burçak’s doctoral
dissertation titled Science, A Remedy for All Ills: Healing ‘The Sick Man of Europe’: A Case for
Ottoman Scientism (2005). In her dissertation, Berrak Burçak attempts to use the concept of scientism
as an umbrella term without unfairly attaching pejorative connotations to it. Even though the sources
used by Burçak to conceptualise the theoretical background of scientism are considered problematic
by many contemporary philosophers of science today, her dissertation is a cornerstone in terms of its
central argumentation and handling of the late Ottoman literati in this context. One of the names who
includes the concept of scientism in his Ottoman historiography is M. Şükrü Hanioğlu. A newspaper
article titled “Din, Bilim, Bilimcilik” (2004) in the Zaman, an article titled “Blueprints for a Future
Society: Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion, and Art” (2005), and his books, A Brief
History of the Late Ottoman Empire (2008) and Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (2011) are the
prominent works of Hanioğlu in which he devotes a place to scientism. Due to Hanioğlu’s reduction
of the concept of scientism to merely a pejorative term, ignoring the discussions in the current
literature—especially the trends in the philosophy of science—and without giving any analytical
definition of scientism, the multi-layered structure of the mind and identity worlds of the late Ottoman
literati on science could not be adequately reflected. Some of the noteworthy studies on the subject are
the doctoral dissertations of Serdar Poyraz’s Science versus Religion: The Influence of European
Materialism on Turkish Thought, 1860–1960 (2010) and Ercüment Asil’s The Pursuit of the Modern
20
has been largely neglected,32 and it has been assumed that there is such a
homogeneity. In addition, the database on which this interpretation is based has so
far been unfruitful, far from systematic, and limited in representation. This thesis,
which examines the aspect of science and technology that had an impact on cotton
cultivation and production in the late Ottoman era, attempts to eliminate the
incompatibility between the sophisticated framework of historiography and the rough
database by contextualising the output and findings in the light of contemporary
debates revolving around the history of science and technology and, in part, the
philosophy of science and technology.
Mind: Popularization of Science, the Development of the Middle Classes, and Religious
Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1880 (2017), and M. Sait Özervarlı’s article titled
Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’s
Religious Thought Against Materialist Scientism (2007). Last but not least, M. Alper Yalçınkaya’s
book, Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, and Society in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman
Empire (2014), which, in a sense, puts a sociological retouch on the bibliographic trajectory of
Burçak’s dissertation, can be given as an example. He touches upon some of the epistemological
problems of the concept of scientism and mentions that there is more than one type of scientism but
prefers to exclude them altogether from his narrative. Nevertheless, in the contemporary literature on
the philosophy of science and technology, although different types of scientism are acknowledged
epistemologically, it is quite possible to identify one (or several) definitions and classifications of
scientism on which most scholars agree. For more detailed studies on the concept of scientism from
the latest philosophy of science literature, please see Pigliucci and Boudry, eds., Science Unlimited?
The Challenges of Scientism (2017); Moti Mizrahi, ed., For and Against Scientism: Science,
Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (2022); and Bunge, “Scientism,” in Doing Science: In the
Light of Philosophy (2016).
32 For a later and one of the rare studies on the subject focusing on the Syrian region, please see
Williams, “Cultivating Empires: Environment, Expertise, and Scientific Agriculture in Late Ottoman
and French Mandate Syria” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2015). Even though its focus is not
directly on cotton cultivation, for an example that deals with whether there was regional capitalist
development/commercialisation of agriculture through the group I define as “entrepreneurial actors”
in the thesis, i.e. merchant families, please see Alff, “Levantine Joint-Stock Companies, Trans-
Mediterranean Partnerships, and Nineteenth-Century Capitalist Development,” (2018).
21
CHAPTER 2
THE MYTH OF LEAVING NO TRACES BEHIND
“In my opinion, the hallmark of the historian is that s/he is a dreamer. As
s/he looks over many documents, s/he begins to imagine the realities to which these
documents belong. The historian’s is unlike any other fantasy.”
— Carter V. Findley, Toplumsal Tarih, 199833
2.1 The beginning of localisation of global trends in agronomy
For a historian who questions how the global trends in modern science and
technology become localised, how the localised global shapes the local, how the
concepts of global and local establish a symbiosis, how new collaborations and
understandings are necessitated, and how all these relate to political economy, the
most accurate commodity is cotton, as many scholars from different fields have
argued. Cotton does not just characterise the nineteenth century or the Industrial
Revolution. It also allows a narrative that makes sense of localised global
developments and does not frame or fix the phenomena that come to life around
these developments but makes their traces and effects able to be discovered. It is
taken for granted that most people do not think of the Ottoman Empire when it
comes to cotton cultivation in the nineteenth century. The prominent reason for this
is that the story of Ottoman cotton cultivation and production is believed to have
started with the American Civil War. Nevertheless, the argument that cotton
cultivation did not leave a significant trace before the American Civil War is a myth.
33 “Fikrimce, tarihçinin alâmet-i fârikası, hayalperest bir insan olmasıdır. Birçok vesikayı seyrederken,
bu vesikaların ait olduğu gerçekleri hayal etmeye başlıyor. Tarihçininki başka herhangi bir fanteziye
benzemez.” Köker, “Tarihçinin Mutfağı—Carter V. Findley: Tarihçiliğin Diyalektiği,” 31.
22
To unravel this myth, this chapter will address the debates revolving around cotton
farming approximately between 1840 and 1860.
Turkey is an excellent case study in this area to construct the narrative
mentioned above—in the scope of the thesis, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey are
generally used in different contexts since the cotton enterprises of the actors in the
centre of the Ottoman Empire (i.e., Turkey), which is meant to be the regions of
western Anatolia and the south-eastern Balkans, are the essential subject matters. The
Ottoman Empire, besides being an agricultural economy, had relatively suitable
lands for growing cotton. However, the amount of cotton produced was small, and its
type was in need of plant breeding. That is why there have been discussions about
serious measures to be taken to grow, improve, and transplant cotton (and its seed),
and new collaborations have been established in this direction.
Ranging from the initiatives and experiences of the government, local and
foreign actors to the machines involved in the cotton cultivation process along with
pamphlets and treatises, different dynamics shed light on how new technologies and
global trends in science were localised in the region. In addition, these experiences
account for how the localised global shaped the local itself. What is more, how
global and local concepts initiate a symbiosis is apprehended by means of them. New
collaborations and understandings find their way into these experiences. The way to
understand how the localised global necessitates new partnerships and insights is
through closer examination of these actors and objects. The resulting dynamic
environment reveals the relationship of all these variables with political economy.
Despite all these, the story of cotton in nineteenth-century Turkey, regardless of the
timeline, has been read and written only through the personal activities of the
actors/experts sent to Turkey, the increasing foreign demand shaping the market
23
conditions, and the publications made mostly in the Ottoman press. Integration
processes and forms have often been tied to a single cause. Whereas, at times and
places where trade relations play a critical role, there have been moments when
global processes and integrations have been accelerated by technological change.34 In
other words, manoeuvrability junctures missed or grabbed remained uncharted
territories of historiography.
In the story of Ottoman cotton cultivation after the 1840s, it is noticed that the
economic, political, and cultural dimensions are inseparable. For example, the
market’s diversion into new territories was not a self-managed process. Multiple
actors, such as bureaucrats at various levels, scientists, experts, traders,
intermediaries, and farmers, played a role in this process. Whoever thinks what s/he
has written is in the palm of their hand is mistaken. Everything as light as cotton
evaporates. Therefore, the path of a narrative based on any commodity will pass not
only through fields but also through parliaments, laboratories—albeit barren or
almost non-existent, at least in the case of cotton cultivation in the Ottoman
Empire—marketplaces, and the like. Political interventions and the so-called cultural
or rather regional preferences will take place in the narrative. Thus, a historian who
studies commodities that are not free from global processes is aware that these
processes do not always follow a specific chronology and network. All of them are
shaped by the authenticity and ingenuity of actors and agents. The meaningful thing
is, then, to be able to ask questions that can compete with the authenticity and
ingenuity of these agents and to fathom how they express themselves.
The cadres, who would implement the mechanisms that would ensure the
establishment of agriculture according to modern methods, were mainly appointed
34 Conrad, What Is Global History?, 108.
24
during the Tanẓīmāt period. In 1838, just a year before the proclamation of the
Gülḫāne Ḫaṭṭ-ı Hümāyūnu (referring to the Imperial Edict of Reorganisation or
Reforms, alias the Tanẓīmāt Fermānı), an Agriculture and Industry Council was
established under the Ḫāriciyye Neẓāreti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).35 The council
seemed to insinuate at the outset that agriculture was not seen as separate from
industry and vice versa. Despite this, whether to give priority to agriculture or
industry would continue to occupy Turkey’s economic agenda until the first years of
the Republic. In an article published in the issue of the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis
(Journal/Chronicle of News/Events) dated 21 Receb 1256 [18 September 1840], it is
mentioned that it will be beneficial for the country to produce essential products,
such as cloth, broadcloth, glass, and sugar, brought from abroad, within the borders
of the empire.36 According to the article, which reflects the political economy of the
period, it is meaningless for a country to try to produce every commodity on its own;
instead, it should be interested in a craft that it is good at and produce in that area (of
specialisation) and import other commodities it needs with what it earns from there:
“Aṣıl tedbīr, kişi meʾlūf oldığı ṣanʿatı ne külliyyen terk ve ne yeñi bir iş īcādından
iḥtirāz itmelidir.” [The main precaution is that one should neither completely
35 The name of the organisation was later changed to the Meclis-i Umūr-ı Nāfiʿa (Board/Council of
Public Works). In 1839, it was attached to this ministry upon the establishment of an independent
Ticāret Neẓāreti (Ministry of Commerce) in order to work on the development of agriculture,
industry, and trade. Güran, “Zirai Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 219.
36 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 6, 21 Receb 1256/18 September 1840, 2. The newspaper is owned by a
British citizen, William Churchill. Churchill not only shared the events that took place in Istanbul and
the empire but also the ideas of the British business world with his readers. According to Churchill,
the Ottomans should have focused primarily on the export of raw materials in commercial life. As
maintained by Şerif Mardin, this approach represented the view of the British industrial class. The
reason behind this outlook was that the Ottomans turned to British goods with the income they would
acquire from the export of grain, and the money from Britain returned to Britain again. For this
reason, Churchill was one of the harshest critics when Ahmed Fethi Pasha defended the
industrialisation of the Ottoman Empire. Mardin, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e İktisadî Düşüncenin
Gelişmesi,” 622. Thus, in the newspaper circle, which was also a sensory actor, one of the transmitter
actors (William Churchill) had a discussion with another sensory actor (Ahmed Fethi Pasha) about the
knowledge in the synthesis and production process.
25
abandon the craft they are accustomed to nor avoid inventing a new job.]37 When it is
reminded that these ideas defended in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis will also be pronounced
by people like Mehmed Câvid Bey38 much later, and they have been particularly
popular among the literates, who have advocated more liberal economic policies in
the Ottoman Empire, the political economy proposed by the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis rather
evokes the ideas circulating in the British Isles. Therefore, it is usual for the article to
draw attention to the products that Turkey has been growing and exporting for
centuries, such as cotton, dried fruits, nuts, and silk, and encourage its readers about
the agriculture of these products. In the article, it is believed that the “necessary
progress” will be achieved in the industry with the income generated from
agriculture as well.39
The subject of another article published in the issue of the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis
dated 1 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1256 [25 December 1840] is the promotion of cotton agriculture in
Turkey. In the article, which talks about the amount of cotton exported from the
United States to Europe, the demand for cotton is presented with the following
sentences to provide incentives: “Hele pamuk ticāreti-çün Avrupa bir çārşūdır ki her
ne-ḳadar gönderilür ise satılur.” [Especially for the cotton trade, Europe is such a
market that no matter how much is sent, it is sold.]40 The Cerīde-i Ḥavādis continued
its publications uninterruptedly, stating that the Ottomans should turn to global
technology trends for the development and spread of agriculture. An article
published in the newspaper comprehensibly states that productive agriculture cannot
37 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 6, 21 Receb 1256/18 September 1840, 3.
38 The political life of Mehmed Câvid Bey started in 1908 and continued intensely until the Great
War. Câvid Bey was one of the most prominent finance ministers (māliyye nāẓırları) and personæ of
the period, and, through the eyes of some foreigners, the only person who grasped (modern)
accounting in Turkey. He believed that the principal economic future of the country would be based
on agriculture. Pirili, “Mehmet Cavit Bey,” 141.
39 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 6, 21 Receb 1256/18 September 1840, 3.
40 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 16, 1 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1256/25 December 1840, 3.
26
be done without the advent of new agricultural tools and equipment.41 In this article,
the success of Europeans in the field of agriculture is attributed to their proper
utilisation of technology and to some scientific applications. Translated articles from
the foreign press may have been published to show that the use of new technologies
in agriculture were also recommended by the Europeans. One possible reason,
among others, for preferring translated publications was that there were not perfectly
sufficient works written in this field in the Ottoman Empire.
In another issue of the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis dated 18 Ṣafer 1257 [11 April 1841],
a translation of an anecdote written in English is published.42 This translation states
that the people engaged in agriculture should keep some of the products they produce
to themselves, sell their product at the current price (revāc/rāʾic), be satisfied with it,
and have sufficient capital for agriculture. The article, which is relevant in terms of
highlighting the importance of the agricultural sector to be able to make a living on
its own, says that if this segment has a certain wealth, they can pay their taxes and
increase their capital to purchase the tools and equipment they need. Another
fundamental aspect of the article is that it points to agriculture as a prerequisite for
industry and trade. Based on the article, a robust agricultural sector is needed for
both factories to function and to sustain commercial life. A second issue articulated
in this period when the necessity of agriculture started to be discussed was how
agriculture should be properly practised. Notable publications on this concern also
41 “. . . zirāʿate lāzım gelen tarla ve ḥayvān ve çift takımı ve toḫum ve ādem lüzūmı kadar mevcūd
olmadıkca ekilecek maḥall ne-ḳadar aʿlā olur ise de yine ekilemez. Bundan başka maṣlaḥatınıñ
kolaylığını mūcib olur. Yeñi īcād olunmuş bir ālāt var ise anı [onu] almadıkca ve vaḳtiyle her ne ise
lāzım olan işini görmedikce gereği gibi zirāʿat idemez . . . .” [. . . unless the field, team of two animals
(with their harness), seeds, and labour required for agriculture are available as much as necessary, [it]
cannot be grown no matter how good the field is to be planted. Other than that, it requires ease of
work. If there is a newly invented tool/machinery, cultivation cannot be done properly without it being
purchased and done whatever is needed . . . .] Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 23, 5 Muḥarrem 1257/27
February 1841, 1.
42 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 29, 18 Ṣafer 1257/11 April 1841, 2–3.
27
find their place in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis. As maintained by the article in the issue of
12 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1258 [23 April 1842], for agriculture: (i) finding suitable soil
conditions and, if necessary, improving the soil and making it more fertile for the
crop to be planted, (ii) clean and fresh seeds, (iii) good tools and equipment, (iv) four
healthy oxen, (v) workers as much as the work to be done, (vi) animal husbandry if
the place is proper and protecting these animals, (vii) the cultivation of specific (or
cash) crops with commercial value, such as cotton and silk, and (viii) knowledgeable
attendants and servants are all needed to sustain the farm.43
The event that Tevfik Güran regarded as one of the most significant
developments with respect to the agricultural bureaucracy of the empire was the
Meclis-i Zirāʿat (Council of Agriculture), which was first established under the
Māliyye Neẓāreti (Ministry of Finance) in 1843 and later attached to the Ticāret
Neẓāreti (Ministry of Commerce).44 The primary duties of this council were to
articulate suggestions by making investigations and research on issues, such as
raising agricultural production, ensuring the balance of foreign trade, and increasing
the income as well as welfare level of the people.45 Members of the Zirāʿat Meclisi
have worked within the scope of these essential duties. For example, Hayrullah
Efendi, who was originally a physician and was appointed to the Zirāʿat Meclisi in
1847, made translations for modern agricultural methods, such as Fenn-i Zirāʿatdan
43 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 83, 12 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1258/23 April 1842, 2. The importance of the points
drawn here for cotton agriculture will be seen in the following sections.
44 Güran, 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 45–46; and Güran, “Zirai Politika ve
Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 219–20. Güran’s narrative, which focuses primarily on institutions, is one of the
classical narratives that underline the significance of structural reforms. The descriptions in Ottoman
agricultural history, by and large, support Güran’s narratives and complement his minor deficiencies.
Therefore, in the thesis, while drawing the general lines of the nineteenth-century Ottoman agrarian
past, the works of Güran were generally used.
45 Ibid.
28
Beyt-i Dihḳānī (1847/1848)46 from Maison rustique du XIXe siècle (1835–1845).47 In
1850, a pamphlet prepared by Evangelibos (or Avangelibos) of Izmir on agriculture
and trade was licensed and helped to be published as well.48
Furthermore, agricultural loans, albeit limited, were provided to the farmers.
This was the reason why the Nāfiʿa Ḫazīnesi (Public Works Treasury) was
established, and between 1843 and 1846, approximately 12.6 million piastres
(ḳurūş/ġurūş) credit was distributed to the farmers. The money collected from the
loans was used for specific demands, such as road construction and bridge repair,
again in line with the farmer’s requests. Even though it was insufficient to meet the
needs of all farmers in the empire, starting from the budget of the 1847–1848 fiscal
year, the Nāfiʿa Meṣārifi (Public Works Spending/Expenses) arrangement began to
take place in the budgets, and the evrāḳ-ı ṣahīḥa vāridātı49 was allocated to this
order.50 All this effort can be considered as a manifestation of the desire to gain
dynamism. The most sincere and concrete step of this desire, especially concerning
cotton, was taken between 1847 and 1851 within the borders of today’s Yeşilköy.
2.2 An experiment in San Stefano, 1847–1851
To observe the accelerated agricultural transformation all over the world in the mid-
1800s, the first place to be visited in the thesis is the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi (cf.
46 Hayrullah Efendi, Fenn-i Zirāʿatdan Beyt-i Dihḳānī, vol. I (1264 [1847/1848]). This two-volume
book was printed in the Ṭabʿ-ḫāne-i ʿĀmire (Imperial Printing House) and sent to the provinces and
sanjaks to be sold in various copies. BOA, C.MF 29/1421, 23 Muḥarrem 1265/19 December 1848. In
another document, it was stated that the printing, distribution, and all other expenses of this translated
work were covered by the treasury. BOA, A.}MKT 238/63, 29 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1265/15 November 1849.
47 Bailly de Merlieux, ed., Maison rustique du XIXe siècle, vol. I (1835); and Ysabeau and Bixio, eds.,
Maison rustique du XIXe siècle, vol. V (1845).
48 BOA, A.}AMD 23/73, 29 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1266/5 November 1850.
49 Güran, “Zirai Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 220. Evrāḳ-ı ṣahīḥa (valid/authentic document[s])
was a cold stamped paper(s) issued for use in documents in order to provide additional income
(vāridāt) for the state during the Tanẓīmāt period—it was used until the stamp (the gummed marginal
paper) was issued in 1873.
50 Ibid.
29
footnote 15) to be established in San Stefano (Ayamama)51 and the agricultural
complex formed by the model farm attached to it. This facility was one of the most
appropriate places to start exploring the reflections of an era in which scientific
developments, new production techniques, and mechanisation, became widespread,
and agricultural relations of production began to take new forms. In addition, various
hopes, failures, and meanderings have existed in this place at the same time. The
commercialisation of agriculture, the increase in the income obtained from the land,
the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, which entered the scene at a time when the benefits of
agricultural investments for the Ottoman Empire were discussed, and the belief that it
would be the pioneer of modern farming methods were all related to the equation that
cotton would enter for the Ottomans during the years of the American Civil War.
In the context of industrialisation and the development of modern agricultural
methods along with agronomy, the members of the Dadian family were also on the
stage as significant actors of the period. Western European entrepreneurs did not
spread the experience of industrialisation of Europe52 in San Stefano thanks to them;
on the contrary, the Dadians realised their own projects with what they learnt in
Europe.53 Foreign actors were not always in the role of direct intermediaries in the
Ottoman Empire, beyond having modern science and technology in these early years.
In other words, Western European states had the experience, knowledge, and
51 The name of the Ayamama farm, which was located in the Ayastefanos (today’s Yeşilköy) region
and belonged to the personal treasury of Sultan Mehmed Reşad, was changed to Mecīdiyye in 1915, in
honour of Sultan Abdülmecid. It is sometimes referred to as “Ayapapa” in archival documents. BOA,
MB.İ 183/11, 13 Şevvāl 1333/4 September 1915.
52 A conscious example of “Europe-centredness” has been demonstrated here. This should not be
confused with “Eurocentrism.” Sebastian Conrad makes the distinction as follows: “To say that
industrialisation happened in England first is not Eurocentric; to assume that it could only have
happened only there is.” Conrad, What Is Global History?, 167.
53 Edward C. Clark asserted that Barutçubaşı Ohannes Dadian, being an Ottoman subject in the 1840s,
was the most experienced actor in industrial management. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial
Revolution,” 70. Apart from the Dadians, there were also private enterprises whose individual efforts
helped develop the industry. For example, Osekhi, who made a living by producing raw as well as
spun cotton from the Dutch genus Gossypium, was given a licence with the thought that it would help
the development of the industry. BOA, A.}MKT 90/50, 6 Şaʿbān 1263/20 July 1847.
30
technology necessary for the establishment of an industrial enterprise. Still, they
were not in all cases the spark and executive of the industrial enterprise in the
Ottoman lands. An industrial complex defined by Edward C. Clark as “a Turkish
Manchester and Leeds, a Turkish Birmingham and Sheffield” on the Bakırköy,
Yeşilköy, Küçükçekmece, and Yedikule line was a project in which the Dadians took
an active role.54 The Dadians appear in this period as both entrepreneurial and
transmitter actors. They were not only the muscles that provided movement in the
industrial complex but also the producers and carriers of knowledge, that is, actors
who introduced and galvanised other entrepreneurs. The foundations of bureaucratic
organs to implement these policies were laid long before the industrial and
agricultural movement, but institutions were not organisms that acted alone; they
always needed actors like the Dadians. In this respect, the relationship between the
Dadians and sensory actors will find its place in the narrative as one of the factors
shaping the project’s fate.
New technology products, machinery, and looms required for the
establishment of factories would be brought from abroad, and new actors from
Europe were needed for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of these
machines. Thus, the network of relationships of the Dadians expanded from
businessmen to engineers, from engineers to masters, and from masters to workers.
Initially, these new actors consisted of the British, but later technical staff were
recruited from the United States, Belgium, France, Italy, and Austria as well.55
Besides the Dadians, other local actors similar to them also became a part of the
54 MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 1:58; and Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution,” 68.
Factories in this region were supported by several subsidies. The most noteworthy of these supports
was the purchase of the production of these factories by the state. Güran, “Tanzimat Döneminde
Devlet Fabrikaları,” 238.
55 Önsoy, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası, 54.
31
intellectual pillar of the industrial movement. Mustafa Efendi, a Hungarian mühtedī
(convert), sent the petition he prepared about a “consumable and industrial school” to
the Ministry of Commerce to be opened in the industrial zone.56 The need for such a
school was typical because foreign employees were paid more money, and problems
were experienced more often with these foreign employees. It was not a sustainable
form of employment. There was a need to transform Ottoman subjects to qualified
workers. The way to do this was to train the workers needed.57 Despite this need, the
school project, which would cover many branches of industry from physics to
chemistry, from chemistry to machinery and mining, could not see the light of day
due to inadequate state capacity. Among the school projects of this period, the Zirāʿat
Taʿlīm-ḫānesi was the only one that could be realised.
One of the names, perhaps the most notable, chosen for the experimental (or
model) farming project in Istanbul was a respected and experienced farmer (rather a
“rancher” because he was also engaged in animal breeding) from South Carolina
named Dr James Bolton Davis.58 The other name was Dr John Lawrence Smith, a
young gentleman who specialised in agricultural chemistry with his education in
56 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 23/43, 25 Ramażān 1266/4 August 1850.
57 For example, due to the lack of an educational institution, four students were sent for internships in
different factories in Europe so that they could work at the Hereke Factory. Students would thus learn
the operation and technical knowledge of these factories and be employed as experienced and wellinformed
workers when they return. It was not preferred for students to learn the job at the Hereke
Factory, which has not yet fully settled, as it would slow things down. In addition, there was a
language barrier between foreign workers there and workers from Ottoman subjects. Therefore, where
no educational institution focused on this type of technical training, the most reasonable solution was
to send students abroad. BOA, HH.d 67, 11 Şevvāl 1265/30 August 1849.
58 For the expert to be brought from the United States, President James Knox Polk was contacted
through a dragoman (interpreter) John Brown, the US Istanbul Ambassador Dabney Smith Carr and
Secretary of State James Buchanan. Allen, et al., “The Cashmere Shall Goat,” The American Cotton
Planter (September 1856): 271; Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 304, 3 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1262/23 October 1846, 1; and
Daniel, “American Influences in the Near East before 1861,” 75. Buchanan wrote a letter to Franklin
H. Elmore of South Carolina to identify two people: “I feel under great obligations to you for your
kindness in undertaking to procure for me the services of suitable persons to improve [and] extend the
cultivation of [c]otton in the dominions of the Sultan of Turkey.” Moore, ed., The Works of James
Buchanan (1909), 7:21. Ultimately, James Bolton Davis and John Lawrence Smith were appointed.
Moore, ed., The Works of James Buchanan (1909), 7:63.
32
Germany and gained fame in this field.59 These two Southerners found their place in
the newspaper columns before they boarded the SS Great Western to go to
Istanbul.60 Newspapers overlooked the detail that the ship first stopped in Izmir, and
then Davis and his entourage departed from there to Istanbul.61 The passengers, who
set off in September, arrived in Dersaʿādet in November and appeared before Sultan
Abdülmecid at 8 o’clock on Monday, 6 November 1846.62 The first impression of
Davis, who attended the banquet of the Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, on the
order of the Sultan, was that the government seemed sincere in this project.63 Davis’s
meeting with Barutçubaşı Ohannes Dadian was about the course of the project. The
59 John Lawrence Smith is a character who can offer a different perspective on discussions about
authentic science in the Ottoman Empire through mineralogy. During his time in the empire, he was
not only interested in agriculture. He demonstrated the use of the first electric telegraph to Sultan
Abdülmecid, studied the mines in the Ottoman lands, discovered two new minerals near Edirne, and
named one of these minerals “Medjidite” in honour of the Sultan. Moreover, he conducted studies on
thermal water resources in western Anatolia, which had never been explored before. Michel, In
Memoriam: J. Lawrence Smith, M. D. (1884), 7. What makes Smith’s life more interesting was that he
was not at all satisfied with his experience in Turkey. Notwithstanding that he had done some
scientific studies, he was disturbed by the fact that his every move was being watched by the Ottoman
government and felt like a bird in a cage. He often states that he is tired of the ignorance and stupidity
of the people around him. To get more details about his life, please see Silliman, Sketch of the Life
and Scientific Work of Dr. John Lawrence Smith (1884), 8.
60 “Cultivation of Cotton in Turkey,” The Leicester Chronicle, 12 September 1846, 1; and “Culture of
Cotton in Turkey,” The Blackburn Standard, 9 September 1846, 1. Contrary to the news, Buchanan
stated in his letter that the two of them could not go at the same time, and that Smith could only get on
the ship on 16 September 1846. Therefore, the information is not certain. Moore, ed., The Works of
James Buchanan (1909), 7:63. Dr Davis also brought his family and brother with him. His brother,
Nathan H. Davis, also helped Dr Davis at the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and received a salary of 1,500
piastres for his service. BOA, D.DRB.MH 990/5, 9 Şaʿbān 1264/11 July 1848; and Strobhart [State
Reporter], Reports of Cases in Equity, Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of South
Carolina, at Charleston, January Term, 1859 and at Columbia, May Term, 1850, 134. Unlike Nathan,
less is known about his wife, Mary Elizabeth Scott, as she does not have an ego-document. There is
no information in the records other than that “she was the most beautiful woman in the region.”
Bolick, A Fairfield Sketchbook, 250.
61 BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16 Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848.
62 “. . . resīde-i dest-i iʿzāz olan işbu teẕkire-i sāmiyye-i āṣaf-āneleri manẓūr-ı meʿālī-neşūr-ı ḥażret-i
şāhāne buyurulmuş ve müşārün-ileyh nāẓır efendi ḥażretleri ber-muʿtād ḥāżır bulunmak üzere elçi-i
mūmā-ileyhiñ ẕikr olunan pamukçılar ile ber-ā-ber işbu Pazartesi güni sāʿat sekiz ḳarārlarında Mābeyn-
i Hümāyūn cānib-i eşrefine ʿazīmetleri müteʿalliḳ ve şeref-ṣudūr buyurulan irāde-i seniyye-i
mülūk-āne īcāb-ı ʿāliyyesinden bulunmuş olmağla ol-bābda emr ü fermān ḥażret-i veliyyü'l-emriñdir .
. . .” [. . . with the said minister and the aforementioned envoy, together with the cotton experts
mentioned, to be present, as is customary, at the Mā-beyn-i Hümāyūn (the flat/office in the palace
where the Sultan performs government affairs and receives deputies and envoys) this Monday around
eight o’clock . . . .] BOA, İ.HR 37/1728, 15 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1262/4 November 1846. The first person Dr
James Bolton Davis met in Istanbul was Barutçubaşı Ohannes Dadian. BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16
Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848.
63 MacFarlane, Kismet, 326.
33
negotiations between Davis and Barutçubaşı Ohannes Dadian were turned into a
lāyiḥa (detailed report; annotated writings, usually given to higher authorities,
expressing opinions and thoughts on a particular issue). The project, which Hüsnü
Efendi, Fabrika-i Hümāyūnlar Nāẓırı (Minister of Imperial Factories), described as
“miѕli nā-mesbūḳ bir eser-i celīl” or an unprecedented illustrious work if
implemented, was presented to the Grand Vizier at the end of 1846.64 After these
meetings, Davis was taken to the model farm, which was in the process of being
established, namely the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi.65 According to the contract made with
him, Davis entered the service of the Ottoman state for the first two years, provided
that he had full authority.66 Agriculture (zirāʿat) and farming (ḥarāѕet) would be
taught with new methods (uṣūl-i cedīde) to students brought from the provinces, and
it was planned that these students would teach and get them to comprehend
agricultural techniques in accordance with modern methods to those who were
engaged in agricultural activities in their homeland.67 In the school to be established,
64 In line with the detailed report presented, “. . . maḥṣūlāt-ı maṭlūbeniñ uṣūl-i zerʿ ve terbiyesiniñ
yoluyle şākirdān ve ʿameleye öğredilmesi . . . ,” [. . . teaching the demanded crops to students and
labourers through the method of planting (seeds) and cultivation . . . ,] theory and practice were
supposed to coexist with each other. In other words, it was not possible to realise modern agriculture
unless acquired theoretical knowledge was transferred to practice. For this reason, it was understood
that for the implementation of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi project, the missing requirements, such as
finding suitable land, arranging this land in accordance with the project, student and worker stock,
technical tools, and administrative reports should be completed as soon as possible. With such a
strategy, not only the transfer of modern production technologies but also the training of people who
would ensure sustainability would come with it. These people, in a sense, would act as envoys or
representatives of the government’s project. BOA, İ.MSM 24/639, 24 Muḥarrem 1263/12 January
1847.
65 After meeting with Davis, Barutçubaşı Ohannes presented a report to government officials
containing his comments about Davis. In this report, Ohannes states that Davis, whom he defines as
“üstād-ı kāmil,” [grand master,] is not only an expert in cotton agriculture, but also in the agriculture
of other cultivated plants, and that he is well-versed in the intricacies of animal breeding. BOA, HH.d
65 [102-a], 21 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1264/19 October 1848; and BOA, İ.MSM 24/639, 24 Muḥarrem 1263/12
January 1847. The decision to open the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi was published in the issue of the
Taḳvīm-i Veḳāyiʿ (Calendar of Events) dated 6 Ṣafer 1263 [24 January 1847]. Ergin, Türkiye Maarif
Tarihi, 2:29.
66 BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16 Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848.
67 Contrary to what was planned, the fact that most of the students came from Istanbul created a
situation contrary to the founding purpose of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi. BOA, İ.DH 241/14635, 16
Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1267/12 October 1851; and “L’année 1847,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 65, 1 January
1848, 1.
34
students who would be brought specifically from cotton-producing regions of the
empire would receive education in the fields of the natural sciences and agricultural
practice. Based on a report published in the Journal de Constantinople (1846–1866),
there were 46 students at the Taʿlīm-ḫāne in San Stefano as of 1849. It was expressed
that half of these students were Muslims and the other half consisted of different
groups of the empire.68 Education was given in Turkish and French, and the syllabus
was as follows: (i) practical and theoretical agriculture (l’agriculture pratique et
théorique), (ii) botany (la botanique), (iii) the veterinary art (l’art vétérinaire), (iv)
the improvement of woolly animals and particularly merino sheep (l’amélioration
des bêtes à laine et particulièrement des moulons mérinos), (v) arithmetic
(l’arithmétique), and (vi) geometry (la géométrie).69 K. Agathon, M. E. Carenza, and
M. K. Istimaradjan were some of the instructors working at the Taʿlīm-ḫāne.
Agathon lectured in both general agriculture and veterinary medicine, apart from
being the director of the Taʿlīm-ḫāne (at that time). Carenza gave lessons in
mathematics, and Istimaradjan taught botany and agricultural practices. At the end of
each semester, students were subjected to a written exam under the supervision of
these instructors.70
The articles in the Journal de Constantinople published in 1848 complain that
agricultural science (la science agricole) has achieved great success in Europe and
68 In another report, it is said that 23 of these students are Muslim, and 23 are Christian. From this, it
is perceived that there are no Jewish students in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne. “Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal
de Constantinople, no. 207, 29 December 1849, 1.
69 “Intérieur. Constantinople. Agriculture. Et examens à l’Institut Agricole de San-Stefano,” Journal
de Constantinople, no. 177, 29 July 1849, 1.
70 At the end of the news, tacitly and politely, the Sultan is invited to the Taʿlīm-ḫāne for next year’s
exams: “Qui sait si, l’an prochain, le Souverain de l’empire, qui aime tant à encourager tous les
établissements qui doivent contribuer au bien-être du pays, n’assistera pas aux examens agricoles pour
mieux stimuler l’ardeur des professeurs et des élèves!” [Who knows if, the next year, the sovereign of
the empire, who likes so much to encourage all the establishments which must contribute to the wellbeing
of the country, will not attend the agricultural examinations to better stimulate the ardour of the
teachers and students!] “Intérieur. Constantinople. Agriculture. Et examens à l’Institut Agricole de
San-Stefano,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 177, 29 July 1849, 1.
35
has not stepped into the Ottoman Empire despite its development.71 As maintained
by the newspaper, model farms should be disseminated so that the current routine
would be replaced by science. The article underlines the urgent need for new
methods of science to be considered.72 There was a kind of agronomic eulogy that
could not be found even in the publications of the CSA, which intensified its
activities after 1860. Unlike the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, the suggestion of the Journal
de Constantinople was that the soldiers should be trained in these model farms and
contribute to the army’s budget by performing farming alongside the military
profession. This peculiar idea of agrarian soldiers was not implemented.73
In spite of the fact that Dr Davis had chosen a plot of land near San Stefano, 9
miles (approx. 14.5 kilometres)74 from Istanbul, for a model farm by examining the
weather tables kept by the missionary Revd Mr Dwight as well as the characters and
capacities of those who would work on the project, the main reason why this place
was chosen for the model farm was its proximity to the Sultan’s cotton factory.75
Another reason was its contiguity to the factories again, but this time to the factories
71 “La science agricole a fait les plus grands progrès en Europe; mais, il faut bien le dire, elle n’a
nullement pénétré dans l’Empire.” [Agricultural science has made the greatest progress in Europe;
but, it must be said, it has by no means penetrated into the empire.] “De l’emploi de la cavalerie dans
les fermes-modèles à créer en Turquie,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 67, 11 January 1848, 1.
72 “Au nombre des moyens qui peuvent faciliter les développements de cette industrie-mère, il faut
compter, sans doute, les nouveaux procédés de la science . . . .” [Among the means which can
facilitate the development of this parent industry, we must doubtless count the new processes of
science . . . .] “Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 113, 4 September 1848, 1.
73 “. . . la création des fermes-modèles combinées avec le concours de la cavalerie . . . .” [. . . the
creation of model farms combined with the assistance of the cavalry . . . .] “L’un pour l’autre,”
Journal de Constantinople, no. 67, 11 January 1848, 2. For another discussion of agrarian military
colonisation, please see “Utilité de colonies militaires en Turquie,” Journal de Constantinople, no.
114, 9 September 1848, 1.
74 Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, 324. Ubicini also claims that the training here is both theoretical and
practical, based on French model farms. This was not unanticipated, considering that students were
sent to France for agricultural education during the reigns of Mahmud II and Abdülmecid.
75 “Cotton Cultivation in Turkey,” The Sunbury Gazette, 23 October 1847, 2. The earliest press
coverage of Dr Davis, as far as can be detected, appeared in The Preston Chronicle and Lancashire
Advertiser. In the news, it was said that studies in cotton culture would be carried out with several
types of cotton seeds to be brought from the United States. “Cotton in Turkey,” The Preston
Chronicle and Lancashire Advertiser, 24 December 1846, 7. Charles MacFarlane reports that the area
is a “swampy hollow” and unsuitable for agriculture. MacFarlane, Kismet, 322.
36
where the Dadians were responsible for their management. Dr Davis was aware that
the area was not the most ideal for cotton farming, but he thought that cotton farming
there was not impossible. So, whatever the root cause, Dr Davis must have seen it as
a challenge that could be overcome. The promises made to him and the fact that the
government had set up the project close to the Zeytinburnu industrial complex must
have fed Davis’s self-confidence. The biggest challenge Dr Davis could imagine
would not be the location of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi. Its location would perhaps
appear as a factor that would rank in the last place among the other problems. The
capital was the biggest challenge in Ottoman agriculture in a broad sense.
A reporter who allegedly spoke frequently with Dr Davis reported to The
Daily National Whig that Dr Davis described the cotton cultivation in the country as
follows: “The only plough used in Turkey is a log, elevated at one end on two
wooden wheels, and a large iron at the lower extremity, and the shovel sometimes,
indeed mostly, wooden.”76 In the opinion of Davis, cotton is pulled in this way, and
its pods or bolls (ḳozas/ġūzes) are cleaned with a tool, such as a two-stringed spring,
but this cotton is not sold and used for any purpose other than candle wicks.77
Considering the fact that Istanbul was not once a cotton-growing centre throughout
its history, and when the climate of the northern Marmara open to terrestrial
influences was compared to the climate of the Aegean and Çukurova regions, which
were more suitable for cotton cultivation, it was not surprising that the cotton grown
76 “From Constantinople,” The Daily National Whig, 18 October 1847, 2. Davis’s mention of the
plough here is relevant in terms of agriculture and technology discussions. The Anatolian peasants call
the plough that Davis tries to describe as “kara saban/karasaban” (primitive plough). On the other
hand, the plough, which was used more frequently in Europe at that time, was called “pulluk” (heavy
German plough or Pflug). The main difference between them is that the kara saban could go to a depth
of 10 centimetres, while the pulluk could go down to a depth of 20-25 centimetres. A peasant using a
kara saban could cultivate three acres of land, and a peasant using a pulluk could cultivate 12 acres of
land in one working day. In addition to this, it was necessary to plough the same land three to four
times with the kara saban in order for the quality of the ploughed soil to be of the same quality as the
pulluk. Güran, 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 85.
77 “From Constantinople,” The Daily National Whig, 18 October 1847, 2.
37
here was of a quality that could only be used for candle wicks. It was also declared in
this newspaper article that the soil was not suitable for cotton farming.78 The cotton
grown in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne would not be of the same quality as cotton grown in South
Carolina, though it would be put on display at the Great Exhibition of 1851 in
London.79 Yet, as stated earlier, Dr Davis did not think so. More accurate from
Davis’s perspective was that the soil was not the most ideal. Because compared to
the variety in South Carolina, no local cotton grown in the world at that time was of
the same quality. Even though Davis did not know that everything would work
against him while undertaking this task, he must have thought that he would benefit
from the advantages of realising such a project on a plot of land close to the palace.
Besides issues such as land as natural actors, the actors that should also be
mentioned in the project were the students expected to operate as some of the
sensory actors in the coming years. Although it was reported in a newspaper article
that five of the students were Turkish, four were Armenian, and one was Greek, it
was articulated in other sources that there were no Greek students.80 It might be
thought that the newspaper did not have a good grasp of the structure and functioning
of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, since it did not mention the plan that these students
would be sent to their hometowns after their education, and instead asserted that the
graduates would continue to work as assistants at the school. A letter was sent to
Hüdâvendigâr (Bursa/Brussa and its surroundings) and Aydın müşīrs (pasha of the
78 “In these efforts he met many obstacles, and with difficulty got the ground which was rather stiff
and covered with grass, in proper order for cotton.” “From Constantinople,” The Daily National Whig,
18 October 1847, 2.
79 Hunt, “The Culture of Cotton in Turkey,” Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine (February 1852): 156–59.
80 “From Constantinople,” The Daily National Whig, 18 October 1847, 2. Another source stated that
the number of Muslim and Armenian students, who were initially equal, changed under the influence
of the Dadians, and that in April 1847, out of 15 students, nine were Armenians and six were
Muslims. MacFarlane, Kismet, 332. Before the opening of the Taʿlīm-ḫāne, there were other
Armenians who were sent abroad for agricultural education; even if the Armenians outnumbered other
nationalities, it stands doubtful how much this is related to the Dadians.
38
highest rank), Varna governor, Izmit muḥaṣṣıl (tax-collector), and Saruhan (today’s
Manisa and its surroundings), and Sérres district governors that the students who
were educated in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi would be sent to their hometowns with a
şehādet-nāme (diploma) from Dr Davis, that they would implement the modern
cotton farming methods they learnt in their hometowns and teach them to their
compatriots.81 The related article also set out that (exotic) cotton seeds would be
given to the graduates, they would expand cotton farming in their hometowns, and
thus cotton would be grown at an affordable price for the Zeytinburnu Basma
Fabrika-i Hümāyūnu (Cotton Printing Factory).82 Furthermore, it was stated in the
document that the land (field), tools-equipment, and animals required for agriculture
would be met from the māl ṣandığı (office of the collector of taxes or a sort of the
local subdivision of treasury).83 For this policy to work, senior officials in the regions
were ordered to ensure whether the students sent were working in accordance with
the instructions.84 The workers, consisting of 16 people in total, brought from Adana,
Aydın, Saruhan, Sérres, and Izmit in groups of three, were given some American
cotton seeds—50 ḳıyyes/oḳḳas (about 64 kilogrammes) for those returning to Adana,
25 ḳıyyes for those returning to other provinces—and instructions describing the
81 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 3/5, 25 Muḥarrem 1264/2 January 1848.
82 “. . . Basma Fabrika-i Hümāyūnı içün fīʾāt-ı münāsebe ile mübāyaʿa olunmak . . . .” [. . . to be
purchased at a favourable price for the Imperial Cotton Printing Factory . . . .] BOA, A.}MKT.MHM
3/5, 25 Muḥarrem 1264/2 January 1848. It should be underlined that these so-called factories were not
factories in the sense understood today. In the following chapters of the thesis, the discussions on the
distinction between factory and facility will be briefly mentioned (cf. footnote 247).
83 “. . . pamuk zerʿi emrinde ʿamele-i merḳūme ḥaḳḳlarında her dürlü muʿāvenetiñ icrāʾsı yaʿnī tarla
ve ḥayvānātı olmayanlara münāsib ve münbit maḥallerde tarla irāʾe ve lüzūmı olan ḥayvānāt ve
levāzımāt-ı sāʾire iʿṭāʾ olunarak meṣārif-i vāḳıʿalarınıñ māl ṣandığından tesviye ve īfāʾsıyle
poliçesiniñ bu-bābına keşīde olunması . . . .” [. . . the execution of all kinds of assistance for the
labourers mentioned in the cotton farming business, that is, giving fields to those who do not have
fields and animals in appropriate and fertile places, and providing the necessary animals and various
required goods, tools, and materials and paying their expenses from the māl ṣandığı, and writing them
into this section of the policy . . . .] BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 3/5, 25 Muḥarrem 1264/2 January 1848.
84 “. . . icrāʾ-yı iḳtiżāʾsına diḳḳat ve mübāderet kılınması iḳtiżāʾ-yı irāde-i seniyye-i cenāb-ı
pādişāhīden olmasıyle . . . .” [. . . as it is required by the order of the supreme Sultan to pay attention
to its execution as necessary and to undertake it immediately . . . .] BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 3/5, 25
Muḥarrem 1264/2 January 1848.
39
intricacies of American cotton cultivation, while they were taking the theoretical and
practical knowledge they learnt in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi to their hometowns.85
Unfortunately, these actors were not followed up, as the Taʿlīm-ḫāne was defined as
a failed project. Therefore, it could not been determined how these actors, who were
crucial since they were sensory actors in cotton production, would benefit from the
American Civil War.
On the other hand, Davis communicated with other sensory actors through
the prominence of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi. The London Morning Chronicle’s
Istanbul correspondent mentioned that he distinguished Davis in the opening speech
of the Mechanics’ Institute in Hasköy in 1847: “There were besides, also Armenian
members present, and some Americans, among whom was Dr Davis, a gentleman
who is director of a model farm which is to be of 4,000-acres extent, in the
neighbourhood.”86 It is of value to note that Davis was also present at such a
meeting. Because while proving once again that Davis was a leading name in
agronomy, the occasion allows all actors to be observed together in action. Among
the attendees of the meeting were John Hague, the manager of the ironworks at the
industrial complex in Zeytinburnu, Edwards Phillips, the manager of the cotton mill,
and 50 British operatives and engineers who were part of the small British colony in
Hasköy.87 The movement of workers from one area to another has played a vital role
in the spread of technology and the type of industry that has taken root in a particular
85 Kırlı, “Ziraat Talimhanesi Muallimi Doktor Davis,” 437. Kırlı contends that the process of
separating the American cotton to be produced here from its seeds will be done in the Cotton Printing
Factory with a particular machine, the so-called “Çin Tezgâhı” (Chinese Workbench), unlike the
domestic cotton. There is a slight error due to the misunderstanding of Ottoman Turkish and the
author’s lack of technical knowledge about cotton fibre production. The machine to be used in the
process of separating the cotton from its seeds is called cotton gin (çırçır), and the process is called
ginning (çırçırlama).
86 “A Mechanic’s Institute in Turkey,” The Farmer and Mechanic (9 September 1847): 437.
87 John Hague is a British engineer famous for his work on pneumatic transfer of power. “Prospective
Changes in Mechanics,” The British and Foreign Review (1838): 685.
40
region. Donald Quataert refers to this situation as follows: “European history is full
of stories of British subjects who went abroad to install, demonstrate, leach, and
manage.”88 Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Âlî Pasha, and Keçecizâde
Mehmed Fu’ad Pasha are among the honorary members of the Mechanics’ Institute,
which also helps to contextualise Davis in Ottoman history, revealing the empire’s
dependence on foreign experts.89 In this period, Istanbul started to gain the character
of an intellectual hub, especially for British experts from many dissimilar fields.
Even though scholars like Kris Manjapra described the “age of experts” as imperial
capitalism’s (sometimes it is called “scientific imperialism” as well) “project” of
turning people into exploitable populations,90 it can be argued that these specialists
brought more benefit than harm to the Ottoman Empire.91 However, it is not possible
to get out of such a vicious debate, as in the benefit-harm dichotomy, unless one
avoids being hasty in affixing any labels while scrutinising the activities of a group
that has hitherto been largely invisible in the literature.
The need for expertise rises in some agricultural products that require special
attention, such as cotton. Under ideal conditions, cotton needs 200 frost-free days,
hot summer air, and 24 inches (60.96 centimetres) of rain during the growing season.
There should be no disease or insect problem as well.92 Thus, non-human actors,
88 Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 9.
89 “A Mechanic’s Institute in Turkey,” The Farmer and Mechanic (9 September 1847): 437; and
“Education in Turkey,” The Young American’s Magazine of Self-Improvement (1847): 312.
90 Manjapra, “The Semiperipheral Hand,” 200.
91 Although many experts had established close relations with the capital, they did not directly or
indirectly participate in the acts and practices of violence in the Ottoman Empire as in the colonial
countries. Foreign experts responded to the need for specialists in cities and rural areas. As the
demand for industrial agriculture increased and the education in this field spread to the grassroots, the
need for these experts diminished over time. Şevket Pamuk also draws a positive picture, stating that
while the share of manufacturing activities declined between 1820 and 1870, rising agricultural
production and specialisation in agriculture, especially on the coastlines, increased the income per
capita by about 0.5% annually and by about 30% in total fifty years between 1820 and 1870. Pamuk,
“The Ottoman Empire,” 1:187. This trend of increase plunged in the crisis environment of the 1870s
and continued to fluctuate almost steadily until the 1900s. Karaman and Pamuk, “Ottoman State
Finances in European Perspective,” 622.
92 Hayter, “Expanding the Cotton Kingdom,” 226.
41
such as climate, precipitation regime, and soil, also participate in the narrative. That
being the case, a narrative exclusively centred on human actors/objects becomes out
of the question. The classification here is made according to Graham Harman’s
object definition (cf. footnotes 5, 8, 11, and 13).93 It can be argued that the biggest
challenge the Taʿlīm-ḫāne faced was financial (mis)management. In the first year
Davis took office, with the modern agricultural activities he carried out and the years
of experience he gained in South Carolina, he achieved a revenue of 151,000 piastres
at the Taʿlīm-ḫāne, while the income obtained at the end of the second year could not
even reach 20,000 piastres.94 There was an urgent need for raw cotton at the factory
in Zeytinburnu, but first, Davis had to gin the cotton. The lack of a sufficient number
of cotton gins was already hampering his work. In addition, the cotton seeds Davis
requested were not delivered to Davis on time. However, it was not the only problem
that hindered him throughout the process. Even in the collection of cotton from the
field, there was a shortage of workers.95 Besides, the expected performance from the
students was not achieved.96 This would initiate a controversy between Davis and the
Ottoman government that would last for a while: Was Davis responsible for such a
dramatic decline after the first year’s success, despite significant expenditures to
remedy infrastructure deficiencies?97
93 For Harman, an object is something that cannot be reduced wholly to its components or its effects
on other things. Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 50. This is the only way to speak without
limiting the objectivity of an object to its connections with people. Otherwise, correlationism, that is,
a plane where it is not possible to talk about the world without people and about people without the
world, and which can only talk about a correlation or harmony between these two, remains in need.
94 Kırlı, “Ziraat Talimhanesi Muallimi Doktor Davis,” 438.
95 MacFarlane, Kismet, 322. Davis’s experience, willy-nilly, recalls the following words of David
Hume: “We cannot reasonably expect, that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a
nation, which is ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected.” Hume, Political Essays, 107.
96 MacFarlane stated that he never saw these students at work during the time he visited the Taʿlīm-
ḫāne, that Davis’s brother Nathan tried to teach English to the students with the help of a dragoman,
and that the students were “smoking pipes at a coffee shop in the village.” MacFarlane, Kismet, 332.
97 BOA, D.DRB.İ 23/11, 22 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1264/28 March 1848.
42
To such an extent that MacFarlane, who shared Davis’s troubles, went one
step further and recognised that Turkey’s agriculture could not be successfully
sustained under the current conditions, and suggested that the entrepreneurs of
European countries establish their own farms and small colonies that would not
disturb the Ottoman government. It was believed that it would be advantageous to
send settlers who would set a good example, as would later be suggested to the
Ottoman government at intervals by the CSA.98 So much so that it may be attempted
to draw an admittedly limited picture of the Ottoman bureaucracy of the period,
based on Davis’s complaints per se. His criticisms revolve around the Dadians’
mismanagement and corruption. For instance, local cotton (i.e., Aydın cotton) was
used for a period in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne.99 As claimed by Davis, this was due to the late
ordering of imported cotton seeds by the Dadians by not showing due diligence. Due
to this delay, when the danger of missing the cotton planting time arose, the Dadians
contacted the governor of Aydın and turned to the local cotton in order not to let
anyone notice the situation and not to curb the cotton planting activities in the
Taʿlīm-ḫāne. However, there were substantial differences between imported cotton
and local cotton. The seeds Davis demanded were among the best in South Carolina
and Georgia. Each pod contained at least six times more cotton fibres than domestic
cotton pods grown in Turkey, and its quality was as superior as its quantity.100
MacFarlane also blamed the Dadians and claimed that they benefited from the
Sultan’s “innocence” not only in raw cotton but also in woollen cloths produced in
the Cotton Printing Factory. According to MacFarlane, woollen cloths brought from
98 MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 1:172.
99 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 5/78, 24 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1264/28 May 1848.
100 MacFarlane, Kismet, 328. Despite such disadvantages of domestic cotton, there were also some
advantages. For example, Ottoman cotton absorbed dye better than American cotton. İnalcık, Türkiye
Tekstil Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, 113.
43
Europe were stripped of their brands and claimed to be the products of the Printing
Factory.101 In the absence of imported cotton, taking shelter in domestic cotton meant
saving the day. Another solution proposed by MacFarlane was quite radical. He
recommended that the Armenians, whom he held to be the source of each and every
problem and the cause of every evil, should have been excluded from the project, the
infrastructure deficiencies should have been corrected, and the farm should have
been exempted from all taxes and fees at least for three years in order to achieve a
more “liberal” development.102
The list of accusations against the Dadians is quite long. According to Davis,
the ploughs recorded in the financial records of 1848 were never actually purchased.
Realising that the ploughs, which were said to have been bought for 12,000 piastres,
were not actually bought, Davis claimed that he learnt about this corruption much
later.103 In another example, he asserted that the books that he requested from
Barutçubaşı (Hoca) Ohannes Dadian for the Taʿlīm-ḫāne students and that would be
imported from Britain were not imported at all. Although Davis requested the books
several times, he was told that the students in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi had not yet
received the training to understand these books. As might be expected, he was
questioning whether Ohannes was qualified to make such a judgement. In a way, he
felt that Ohannes was overstepping his bounds. Davis also doubted that he had
complete autonomy in the running of farm affairs.104 His suspicions may be partially
101 MacFarlane, Kismet, 323.
102 MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 1:174. The first to take MacFarlane’s claims seriously is Ali
Rızâ Seyfi, whose narrative of the Dadians is as harsh as MacFarlane’s. In his two-part article written
in the Cumhuriyet, Seyfi attributes the relative failure of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and factories only
to the Dadians. This article, which is not supported by any primary or secondary source other than
MacFarlane, can also be read as a part of the anti-Ottoman and nationalist literature of the period. For
more detailed information, please see Seyfi, “İmparatorluk Devrinde Sanayileşme Komedisi (I),”
Cumhuriyet, 31 July 1939, 5; and Seyfi, “İmparatorluk Devrinde Sanayileşme Komedisi (II),”
Cumhuriyet, 5 August 1939, 5.
103 Kırlı, “Ziraat Talimhanesi Muallimi Doktor Davis,” 449.
104 Ibid., 450.
44
correct. Since agriculture was taught with new methods in an educational institution
for the first time in the Ottoman Empire, there was a shortage of materials on the
subject. Therefore, the books had to be obtained and translated immediately. Apart
from Davis’s personal efforts, an important book import encountered in the Ottoman
State Archive belongs to October 1850, after Davis’s departure. In this record, it is
seen that six volumes were sent from a book copyrighted in the French Agricultural
School by the Paris Embassy of the Ottoman Empire.105 Nonetheless, there is no note
that these are the books Davis requested. In this respect, it can be assumed that the
problems related to the importation of books disappeared after his departure. In
another anecdote, Davis stated that he sometimes had to spend out of his own pocket
because of such predicaments. Except for the treatises on cotton cultivation for a
particular purpose, he had also some other works translated, namely, pamphlets and
instruction manuals on agronomy in general, “fennī zirāʿat beyānı żımnında resāʾil
ve taʿlīm-nāme-i mütenevviʿalar,” by covering the translation costs out of his own
pocket.106 The other substantial problem was with Davis’s salary. He received a
salary of 26,000 piastres. Considering the wages of 750 to 1,000 piastres for senior
officials who held administrative positions in the Ottoman Empire during the 1840s,
Davis’s salary was very high. This amount must have made the job attractive to him,
but there were occasional setbacks in the payment of his salary.107
It is unclear how much the Dadians were affected by Davis’s complaints,108
but no record of proper investigation or any lawsuit was found against them. Davis
105 BOA, HR.TO 70/86, 7 October 1850.
106 BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16 Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848.
107 According to US sources, his salary was $15,000. Allen, et al., “The Cashmere Shall Goat,” The
American Cotton Planter (September 1856): 271. Delays and disruptions in payments can be easily
tracked from archive documents. Kırlı, “Ziraat Talimhanesi Muallimi Doktor Davis,” 422.
108 For correspondence, please see BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16 Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848; BOA,
HR.TO 145/34, 17 June 1848; BOA, HR.TO 145/35, 15 September 1848; and BOA, HR.TO 145/36,
15 October 1848.
45
must have been justified in his complaints, as he was paid compensation of 576,000
piastres from the Ḫazīne-i Ḫāṣṣa (Imperial Treasury).109 Based on this calculation,
Davis had received the payment of 24,000 piastres for each remaining month of the
contract.110 Receiving a large amount of compensation from the Ottoman state, Davis
asked the statesmen for a new chance and requested a licence to continue cotton
cultivation in the southern regions of Anatolia, where more favourable climatic
conditions prevailed for American cotton seeds, but this request was not accepted in
the end. Therefore, the claim that Davis returned to the United States primarily due
to his health problems was not sufficient on its own.111 Neither Davis’s desire to
work in another region nor his health problems were reflected in the British state and
local archives—as far as I can detect at least.112 Instead, he was said to have been
disturbed by his awful experience and quit the job. Despite all his complaints and
difficulties, Davis was probably satisfied with the salary he received, so he wanted to
continue his work in Turkey for a while. It must be a twist of fate that Davis, whose
request was not fulfilled, was nicknamed “Turkey Jim” in the United States where he
returned after his unpleasant experience in Turkey.113
Another significant actor who is a direct extension of this whole story is
Krikor Agathon, of Armenian origin. He was educated at the renowned Royal
Agronomic Institution of Grignon in France (i.e., l’Institution royale agronomique de
109 Kırlı, “Ziraat Talimhanesi Muallimi Doktor Davis,” 439.
110 Ibid.
111 BOA, A.}MKT 148/51, 16 Şevvāl 1264/15 September 1848. “Failing health and the loss of the
sight in one eye prompted Doctor Davis to return to America for the Turkish climate was against
him.” Bolick, A Fairfield Sketchbook, 250. Even though this information is repeated by other sources,
it should be underlined that A Fairfield Sketchbook contains some inaccurate information about Dr
Davis. For instance, J. S. Bolick highlighted that Davis was appointed to Turkey as the “Minister of
Agriculture” and that he was close friends with Sultan Abdülmecid. It is evident that Davis did not
serve as the Minister of Agriculture. There is no trace of him establishing a close friendship with
Abdülmecid; anyway, how possible such a relationship is, is yet another mystery.
112 TNA, FO 195/290, 20 October 1848. The UK National Archives at Kew, London, hereinafter
abbreviated as TNA.
113 Bolick, A Fairfield Sketchbook, 252.
46
Grignon), and it was requested from Agathon to take the vacant seat under the
administration of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi after Dr Davis.114 Government officials
had unfaltering confidence in Agathon because of the training he had received in
Grignon. If Davis and MacFarlane’s accusations against the Dadians were accurate,
Agathon’s being an Armenian may also have given him an advantage. In the Journal
de Constantinople, some aspects of this still implicit debate were reflected in the
context of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi. With Agathon’s taking the head, that is, with
the strengthening of the hand of the Armenian subjects in the administration in line
with the allegations of Davis and MacFarlane, the news and praise about the Zirāʿat
Taʿlīm-ḫānesi surged in the Journal de Constantinople. For example, in a news
report, it is said that the school has not produced satisfactory results so far, namely
under Davis, that production has been expensive and inefficient, but now the
administration has been handed over to more skilled hands, and real progress has
been made.115 Continuing to work in the Ottoman Empire after Davis’s departure,
John Lawrence Smith was rewarded with a medal for his contribution to the Zirāʿat
Taʿlīm-ḫānesi.116 During the time that Smith continued to serve in the country for a
while without his consent, there was no record of this discussion about the Zirāʿat
114 “M. Agathon, arménien, élève de l’école d’agriculture de Grignon, en France, vient d’être appelé à
la direction de l’école impériale d’agriculture de San-Stefano, en remplacement du docteur Davis,
américain.” [Mr. Agathon, student of the school of agriculture of Grignon, in France, has just been
called to the direction/management of the Imperial School of Agriculture of San-Stefano, replacing Dr
Davis.] “Nouvelles diverses,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 124, 29 October 1848, 2.
115 “Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 207, 29 December 1849, 1.
116 “Muḳaddemā bir müddet Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi’nde müstaḫdem olub muʾaḫḫaren Amerika’ya
ʿavdet itmiş olan Mösyö ا م س یت ھ [Smith’e] bir ʿaded nişān-ı ʿālī iʿṭāʾsı Amerika sefāreti cānibinden
iltimās olunmakda olmasıyle merḳūma dördüncü numerodan bir ḳıṭʿa nişān-ı ẕī-şān ʿināyet ve iḥsān
buyurulması münāsib gibi görünüyor ise de ol-bābda her ne-vechle emr ü fermān-ı meʿālī-ʿunvān-ı
ḥażret-i tāc-dārī şeref-sünūḥ ve ṣudūr buyurulur ise icrāʾ-yı muḳteżā-yı münīfine mübāderet olunacağı
beyānıyle teẕkire.” [It is an official correspondence with the declaration that whatever the Sultan
commands in this regard will be duly executed, though Monsieur Smith, who was a servant in the
Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi for a while and then returned to the United States, was requested by the US
embassy to be given a decoration as an honour, it seems appropriate to bestow a fourth-degree medal
on the person mentioned.] BOA, A.}AMD 16/21, 3 Ṣafer 1266/19 December 1849.
47
Taʿlīm-ḫānesi. It was possible that he remained silent in the debate due his desire to
leave Turkey.
It is noteworthy that a new narrative has been developed in these news
reports. Although the Journal de Constantinople made news supporting the rise of
scientific agriculture when the Taʿlīm-ḫāne was first established, there was no praise
in the Journal de Constantinople exclusively for Davis, who was underlined in
almost every source of the period as one of the most outstanding experts of his time
in this field (agronomy and animal breeding). On the other hand, Davis’s complaints
did not find coverage in any government-funded newspaper column. In this respect,
it can be asserted that Davis has been left entirely alone. Apart from his complaints
about the irregular payment of his salary and the problems he experienced due to not
being an Ottoman subject, Davis, who was confident in himself and his work due to
the education and experience he had, did not remain silent in the face of the
difficulties and corruption that he witnessed and disturbed those who were involved
in the project and who had been subjected to some ugly accusations. So much so that
the Journal de Constantinople articles published after Davis’s departure began to
praise the new officials who took over the project, even though it was not customary
before, disparaged the old studies and presented a new narrative to its readers,
especially to the government. As might be expected, scientific studies were also
carried out after the new administration. Under the direction of the Minister of Trade
and Public Works, Hekim İsmâil Pasha, plans were drawn up by M. E. Carenza to
drain the swamps in Ayamama so that they could be used for agricultural purposes
(see Appendix A for Carenza’s relevant plan).117 Yet, is this new narrative unlikely
to be true? If the new narrative in the Journal de Constantinople is correct, that is, if
117 BOA, HRT.h 687, 26 Ṣafer 1267/31 December 1850.
48
Davis’s work has been surpassed and the project has become more successful than
before, why was the Taʿlīm-ḫāne closed after a very short time? For sake of clarity,
there was no such thing as the disappearance of the need. Such that for the needs of
the Basma Fabrika-i Hümāyūnu in Veliefendi (Zeytinburnu), American cotton seeds
continued to be distributed and planted in appropriate fields in Sérres and Drama.118
If it had succeeded, there was no point in ending cotton cultivation in an area closer
to the factory. This point is one of the most significant rifts in the post-Davisconstructed
narrative.
The most reasonable explanation for the cause of the trouble between the
Dadians and Davis, who seemed to have the most suitable profiles to handle a project
like the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, can be understood through the analysis of a situation
that Edhem Eldem points out. According to Eldem, the Ottoman state has generated a
sector that has become more and more independent from the productive sectors and
fed on them parasitically through protection, control, and intervention, and that this
sector has gradually come to be more and more dominant.119 In other words, some
privileged families, such as the Dadians, who had strong relations with political
interest groups and were intertwined with limited capital, were aware of the
difficulties in industrial or agricultural investments, the immaturity of the markets in
these sectors, and the meagre profits to be made. Moreover, considering the volatility
of all this, namely their insecurity, it was possible that they might have wanted to set
up a gambling table for themselves where the house never lost. Because it did not
make much sense for families like the Dadians to turn to colonial trade that did not
exist anyway or to foreign trade that was relatively limited. Attaching themselves to
the state through structures that served the army or produced for the needs of the
118 BOA, HH.İ 15/39, 9 Şaʿbān 1271/27 April 1855.
119 Eldem, “Osmanlı Devleti ve Fransa” 24.
49
domestic market under the auspices of the state was the most feasible way, both
economically and politically, for families like the Dadians.120 In this context, the
criticism of the British also gains meaning: “The old aristocracy, who were bad
enough without doubt, were gone, and had been succeeded by a bureaucracy
infinitely worse.”121
It was decided to move the school to the Mekteb-i Ṭıbbiyye Neẓāreti
(Ministry of Medical School) first,122 and it was closed after the students studied
there for a while.123 It was recognised that the expenses of the school were heavy on
the budget. In addition, its yield, namely its positive return was low. In fact, it would
be appropriate to maintain that this point played a decisive role in the closure of the
Taʿlīm-ḫāne. Besides, the instructors did not receive salaries for five months when
the school was closed. Finally, their salaries were paid, albeit belatedly.124 A project
that was expected to achieve great success in a short time had thus expired. The
model farm project, seen as a burden that the state treasury could not handle, was
shelved for a while.125 Even though the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and its model farm
120 Donald Quataert also refers to the indifference of the Ottoman elites to commercial life. In
addition, Quataert characterises state factories as facilities that meet the government’s needs rather
than being places that serve economic development. Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology
Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 58–59.
121 171 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) (29 May 1863) cols. 6–148.
122 BOA, İ.MVL 197/6092, 14 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1267/17 January 1851.
123 BOA, A.}AMD 33/70, 29 Muḥarrem 1268/24 November 1851; BOA, A.}AMD 31/97, 14 Ẕi'l-
ḥicce 1267/10 October 1851; and BOA, İ.DH 241/14635, 16 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1267/12 October 1851.
124 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 44/72, 19 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1268/11 March 1852; BOA, İ.MVL 239/8524,
5 Ramażān 1268/23 June 1852; BOA, A.}MKT.MVL 54/17, 20 Ramażān 1268/8 July 1852; and
BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 60/97, 29 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1268/14 October 1852.
125 In 1852, Ion Ionescu de la Brad, one of the instructors of the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, wanted to take
over the management of this place and make the model farm project successful with a scientific effort:
“Établir une exploitation agricole dans un des centres de production, dans le but de montres aux
cultivateurs du pays qu’au moyen de procédés et de méthodes approuvées par l’expérience et la
science on peut réaliser de bien plus grands bénéfices que ceux qu’ils obtiennent actuellement, c’est
contribuer très puisement et très efficacement à l’augmentation de la production de l’Empire.” [. . . by
means of processes and methods approved by experience and science far greater profits can be made
than those which they currently obtain . . . to the increase in the production of the empire.] BOA,
HR.TO 418/4, 20 July 1852. It is unspecified whether Ionescu, who attracted attention with his trip to
Tırhala (Trikala) as well as his scientific studies on the agriculture of this region—some of which
were published in the Journal de Constantinople—may have acquired the uncertain management of
this place despite his ties to Mustafa Reşid Pasha. The school and modern field project that Ionescu
50
near San Stefano were tried to be revived in 1871, it could not be realised. Although
the bylaw of the project was ready, there was no actual attempt to put it into
operation. About six years later, Amasyan Efendi,126 who took part in the preparation
of the envisaged innovations and regulations regarding agriculture, was instructed to
prepare a new report on the necessary changes in agricultural education in the
Ottoman Empire and the grounding of these changes.127 Such a task indicates that the
Ottomans still had difficulties in preparing a road map and did not consider the
previous studies sufficient. A comparison of the nineteenth-century levāʾiḥ (plural of
lāyiḥa) on agricultural education is needed for a more elaborated interpretation. It
coincided with the period of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, in 1878, when Amasyan Efendi
brought the required agricultural school back to the agenda and started to take the
necessary steps in this direction. Amasyan was appointed to the Directorate of
Agriculture after Ahmed Cevdet Pasha became the Minister of Trade, but he could
not become successful in putting his ideas into practice.128 The story of the Zirāʿat
Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, which started in 1847, continued in Halkalı in 1888, though not where
it began.129 That is why the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi was excluded from the cotton
production process after Davis’s departure. In 1888, the Ticāret ve Nāfiʿa Neẓāreti
(Ministry of Trade and Public Works) brought forward a new solution proposal in
desired to establish in Dobruja before the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and submitted through Ahmed Vefik
Efendi was also not accepted. Kaya, “Ion Ionescu de la Brad,” 103; and Kaya, “Searching for
Economic and Administrative Reforms,” 81.
126 It was usual for Amasyan Efendi, who was educated in the well-known agricultural schools in
Versailles and Grignon, to be considered the most suitable candidate for such a task and to take the
vacant post after Davis’s return to his country. The impact of the education that Amasyan Efendi
received can be easily noticed in the lāyiḥa, which was also published in the Zirāʿat Gazetesi three
years after it was presented. In this lāyiḥa, Amasyan states that France is the leading country in
agricultural science (agronomy) and talks about the form of agricultural education in France. Zirāʿat
Gazetesi, no. 1, 17 Şaʿbān 1298/15 July 1881, 98–99.
127 Yıldırım, “Halkalı Ziraat Mektebi’nin Açılış Sürecine Dair Bazı Mülahazalar ve Amasyan
Efendi’nin Layihası,” 271.
128 Ibid., 287.
129 BOA, İ.MMS 78/3427, 21 Şevvāl 1301/14 August 1884.
51
order to spread agricultural reform throughout the empire.130 According to the new
proposal, model or sample fields (champs modèles) would be established instead of
model farms (fermes modèles) all over the empire, and agriculture would be carried
out using the latest agricultural methods utilising up-to-date tools and equipment
brought from Western European countries, such as France and Germany, and in this
way, the efficiency of modern farming methods would be demonstrated to farmers in
practice. Eventually, this solution proposal did not contribute to re-entering the
global cotton market, and the missed opportunity during the American Civil War
could not be obtained again.
There are still questions to be asked. For example, why Abdülmecid, who
was allegedly involved in agriculture, had a farm in Beykoz and spent time there,
never visited the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi?131 A narrative holding up this assertion of
MacFarlane is also available in the Journal de Constantinople. On 6 September
1848, Sultan Abdülmecid visited the iron factory (a fortiori, the ironworks) in
Zeytinburnu and expressed his satisfaction with the work he observed there.
Subsequently, he inspected the Basma-ḫāne (calico-house), and the steam engine in
the Basma-ḫāne was put into operation for the first time in the presence of
Abdülmecid.132 The Sultan halted for a few minutes on the Zeytinburnu-Fatih road to
get information about the powder mills driven by a steam engine, which were built
and assembled in the country by John Hagues and his sons Robert-John and Isaac.
After being greeted by the Dadians and resting for two hours in the Barut-ḫāne
130 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 727/31, 10 Şaʿbān 1310/27 February 1893.
131 MacFarlane, Kismet, 337.
132 When considered together with the complex dynamics of agricultural life, the Basma-ḫāne has a
crucial place in the cotton production process of the empire. The cotton textile manufactures (calicoes)
of this place were first exhibited in the Ticāret-ḫāne-i ʿĀmire (Imperial House of Commerce) and then
at the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London, the first international exhibition attended by the Ottoman
Empire. BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 29/92, 18 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1267/21 March 1851.
52
(gunpowder-mill) in Bakırköy, he visited the assembly workshop. In the workshop
was a 100-horsepower steam engine built by Turkish and Armenian workers under
the direction of Mr Dadian and John Hagues with the assistance of European
craftsmen and workers. Here, it was recognised that besides Boghos Dadian,
Abdülmecid was accompanied by Boghos’s son Arakel. Referring to what the
Journal de Constantinople stated, Abdülmecid gladly followed the machine
demonstrations in the workshop. It probably would not have been expected
otherwise. Then, Ahmed Fethi Pasha presented the foreman of the workshop, Samuel
Wills, to the Sultan. Apart from these people, the assistant manager Robert Hagues
and the second engineer Mr Wilson were among those presented to Abdülmecid. The
newspaper underlined the Sultan’s spoke highly of the establishment as he left here.
It should not be overlooked that Abdülmecid also went to the shipyards during this
short excursion and even spared time for the iron steamer built there under the
direction of Edwards Phillips. While leaving San Stefano, the Sultan passed by the
model farm under the management of Davis and went to Davutpaşa to attend the
noon prayer.133
Is the narrative of owning a farm and being interested in farming, created for
Abdülmecid, a fiction? Could Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who already had a model farm,
be a more influential figure behind the project than Abdülmecid? MacFarlane plainly
sets down that he personally visited Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s çiftlik (estate), that
“several Perotes [Peralı]” told him that it was indeed a “model farm,” and that the
133 “En quittant San-Stefano, le Sultan passa par la ferme-modèle placée sous la direction du docteur
Davies [sic], et se rendit ensuite à Daoud Pacha, pour assister à la prière de midi.” [Leaving San-
Stefano, the Sultan passed through the model farm placed under the direction of Doctor Davies [sic],
and then went to Daoud Pasha, to attend the midday prayer.] “Nouvelles diverses,” Journal de
Constantinople, no. 114, 9 September 1848, 2.
53
Pasha was engaged in French-style scientific agriculture there.134 Could the project,
which was being attempted to be realised in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, be a part of
the vision of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, as MacFarlane puts forward, in addition to the
urgent needs of the industrial zone on the Bakırköy-Zeytinburnu line? Where does
the role of Mustafa Reşid Pasha fit in this network of relations? As is turned out, a
history of any commodity needs nuance. Finding the inspiration for this nuance in
cotton itself is possible. To achieve such a balance, two well-meaning crimes must be
committed: killing the ‘story’ by making the first letter of ‘history’ bold and
embarking on an exhausting journey from general to specific. It is also necessary to
establish and study the relationship networks of agricultural projects during the
Tanẓīmāt era. Lastly, the diagram below (see Figure 1) indicates the actors/objects
playing a role in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and beyond. It supports the main argument
of the thesis, namely that cotton cultivation cannot be reduced to a single cause. The
dynamic relationship of actors/objects problematises such an approach. In addition,
this dynamic relationship reveals a complexity that prevents the events, people, and
relationships affecting cotton agriculture from being presented in a hierarchy. The
dynamic nature of the activities related to cotton agriculture continued in the same
course until the American Civil War.
134 MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 2:381. Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s interest in his model farm is
also a highly complex subject. Although he was a model farm owner, the person who had been
interested in the farm for a long time was a French named François Barreau. MacFarlane tells the
story of this Frenchman in a rather tragic tone. Barreau, who grew up and brought up in the vineyards
of Burgundy, was not content with what he learnt from his family and also received professional
agricultural training. Mustafa Reşid Pasha met Barreau through M. Guizot and was impressed by his
expertise in applied chemistry. Mustafa Reşid promised Barreau 1,000 piastres per month, a nice
house to live in, and that his wishes for agricultural work would be fulfilled. Nonetheless, when he
came to Istanbul, he saw that the promises made were not kept. He was left alone in a secluded farm
outside of Istanbul. To put it another way, “[l]ike Dr. Davis at a later period, he could never get
anything . . . ,” please see MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 2:385–87.
54
Figure 1. A diagram showing the actors/objects in the Taʿlīm-ḫāne and beyond
Taʿlīm-ḫāne students,
instructors, workers, and
Davis’s slaves
Krikor Agathon
M. E. Carenza
M. K. Istimaradjan
Foreign experts
Dr James Bolton Davis
Dr John Lawrence Smith
Barutçubaşı Ohannes
Dadian
Boghos Dadian
Arakel Dadian
Amasyan Efendi
Sultan Abdülmecid
Sultan Abdülaziz
Mustafa Reşid Pasha
Mehmed Emin Âlî Pasha
Keçecizâde Mehmed Fu’ad
Pasha
Musurus Pasha
President James Knox Polk
Dragoman John Brown
US Ambassador to Turkey
Dabney Smith Carr
Secretary of State James
Buchanan
Franklin H. Elmore
Nathan H. Davis
Fabrika-i Hümāyūnlar
Nāẓırı Hüsnü Efendi
Revd Mr Dwight
C. MacFarlane / J. Farley
John Hague
Edwards Phillips
British consuls
British operatives and
engineers
Hekim İsmâil Pasha
Foreign and local cotton
entrepreneurs
American Civil War
Agronomy / other sciences
Cotton seeds / fields
Journal de Constantinople,
Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, and other
newspapers and periodicals
Books on agronomy
Pamphlets / treatises
Syllabi / lectures
San Stefano and its
environment (institutions)
Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi and
model farm
Mekteb-i Ṭıbbiyye Neẓāreti
Basma Fabrika-i
Hümāyūnu
British Literary and
Scientific Institution
Mechanics’ Institute in
Hasköy
Cotton mills / companies
Cotton gins
Other agricultural tools,
equipment, and machines
(primitive/iron ploughs,
fertilisers, tractors,
treshing machines, etc.)
Innovations / patents
Railways / roads / piers
Swamps and drainage
methods
Insects / locusts
Diseases
Climate / geography
Precipitation regime
Soil
Minerals
Structures of bureaucracy
Taxation / finance / credit
Salaries / debt
Exhibitions / experiments
Medals / decorations
Law (decrees, ḥükms, etc.)
Human actors/objects
Non-human actors/objects
55
2.3 Searching for resources before the American Civil War
Although the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi was recorded as a failed project, developments in
cotton cultivation were not utterly shelved until the American Civil War. In an article
published in The New-York Quarterly, it was noted that the government made every
possible effort to promote scientific agriculture and industrial pursuits and that the
problems encountered were caused by the people who undertook the administration
of these actions.135 Tremendous sums have been spent on model farms, cotton fields,
agricultural and other machinery, schools and colleges, but almost all of these efforts
were thwarted by the indifference and greed of the authorities.136 The newspaper,
which portrays a failure, states that faith in the Ottoman Empire in scientific
agriculture and industry has been lost, at least for this generation: “This is the history
of many similar efforts; and it will take at least the period of another generation, if
not longer, before the Osmanlis will acquire the industrial habits and enterprise of the
West.”137 Nevertheless, the newspaper had complete faith in the younger generation
studying in modernising schools if the empire was not interrupted by foreign
intrusion. The fact that western Anatolia and the Balkans were pivotal places for
trade kept this conviction alive—i.e., the land was fertile, subsoil and surface
resources were rich.
By 1850, it was seen that cotton cultivation efforts continued within the
empire, although there was no extra attraction for the Ottomans to grow cotton yet.
For example, in Baghdad, the incentive decision of the Meclis-i Vālā-yı Aḥkām-ı
ʿAdliyye (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) to promote silk, cotton, and
indigo agriculture is noteworthy. It was said that these commodities were in demand
135 “The Ottoman Empire and Its Polity,” The New-York Quarterly (July 1855): 298.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 299.
56
in Indochina, and it would be beneficial to produce these products and send them to
the port of Basra.138 In 1851, the Ottoman Empire participated in the London
World’s Fair, and all they did was not merely show up at this fair. In addition,
developments in agriculture were closely followed.139 Alongside the state, individual
actors continued to be a part of cotton production. One of the sensory actors, Ion
Ionescu, shared his suggestions on how to soar cotton production in Thessaly in his
articles in the Journal de Constantinople. In particular, he pointed out that the soil
was ploughed incorrectly. He stated that agricultural instruments in Europe were
needed in the Ottoman Empire long before the Civil War.140 It was crucial because
the price of cotton in the market is determined by its quality and its quality by two
features. The first of these is the grade of cotton, and the other is its fibre. The grade
is an expression of its colour and cleanliness. In addition, based on Ion Ionescu, one
of the incidents that undermined production was the conflicts between ortakçıs
(sharecroppers), çiftlik (estate)-holders, and subaşıs who run the farms.141 It is
notable that actors, such as Ion Ionescu, wrote articles on cotton production because,
in these years, the American press dealt with the Ottomans’ relationship with science
in a highly contemptuous manner: “They know the instruments of modern science
only as childish toys.”142 However, according to the news of The Charleston Daily
Courier dated 28 January 1852,143 the Ottoman government introduced the cotton
138 “. . . bu-misillü eşyāʾnıñ ise Hindūçīn ( ھندوچ ین ) ṭaraflarında revāc ve iştihārı cihetiyle o-maḳūle
maḥṣūlāt yetişdirildiği ḥālde Baṣra ve-belki daha berülerde olan uzak iskelelere naḳl ü irsālinde
sühūlet ve menfaʿat olacağı . . . .” [. . . there will be convenience and benefit in transporting such
commodities to Basra and perhaps even farther piers, because that type of crop is grown due to its
reputation in Indochina . . . .] BOA, A.}AMD 21/75, 20 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1266/27 October 1850.
139 Önsoy, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i
Osmani,” 195.
140 Hunt, “The Culture of Cotton in Turkey,” Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine (February 1852): 156–59.
141 Kaya, “Ion Ionescu de la Brad,” 108.
142 “Essays, &c., on Theology and General Literature. The Confessions of an Enemy; or, the Unity of
God a Revealed Doctrine,” The Methodist New Connexion Magazine (1853): 9–10.
143 This is the experiment that Charles Issawi sets out in his book based on the reports of the British
consul in 1851. The report corroborates that the experiment was carried out to make Britain less
dependent on the United States for raw cotton imports. Even though the cotton mentioned was not of
57
culture around Damascus in line with modern methods and techniques with the
cotton seeds procured from the United States.144
The London Great Exhibition of 1851 was not the first and not the last
experience in Ottoman efforts to revive agricultural production. Ottoman
representatives, who participated in the International Exhibition (l’Exposition
universelle) opened in Paris in 1855, attempted to prove that they could be an
alternative to Europe if the necessary investment and support were given in
agricultural products, including cotton.145 The principal aim of the empire in
participating in the exhibition was to demonstrate the productivity and potential of
the Ottoman lands, to prove that the Ottoman subjects were skilled and experienced
in the fields of agriculture, industry, and art. The products of 52 cotton producers
were included in the exhibition to represent the Ottoman Empire.146 In the same year,
a small-scale distribution of American cotton seeds began to be cultivated in the
country and subsequently for raw cotton to be processed in the Basma Fabrika-i
Hümāyūnu.147 Although the first crop obtained from the seeds distributed to Edirne
and Aydın provinces as well as Saruhan, Sérres, and Izmit sanjaks (sancaks), no
news was received from the crop afterwards, and it was ordered to investigate this
situation in detail.148
the same quality as in Florida, the British consul was content with the result. A similar experiment
was also conducted in Jaffa, but it was concluded that the cotton grown there was not suitable for
pressing machines in England. Issawi, The Fertile Crescent, 276.
144 “Asia Minor Company (Limited),” The Charleston Daily Courier, 28 January 1852, 2; and The
Weekly National Intelligencer, 27 May 1852, 5. Even if the pre-Civil War moves were not
satisfactory, they might have impacted Mesopotamia to be highlighted as a promising region in the
questionnaires sent by Britain to its consuls in the Ottoman Empire as of 1857. Issawi, The Fertile
Crescent, 276–77.
145 Önsoy, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i
Osmani,” 199.
146 Önsoy, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası, 68. Filibe (today’s Plovdiv in
southern Bulgaria) not only stood out as a remarkable place for cotton, but also the governorship of
Filibe won a medal for its cotton products.
147 BOA, A.}MKT.UM 213/87, 19 Ṣafer 1272/31 October 1855; BOA, HH.İ 15/39, 9 Şaʿbān 1271/27
April 1855; and BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 82/92, 14 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1272/22 January 1856.
148 BOA, HH.İ 17/81, 19 Ṣafer 1272/31 October 1855.
58
Infrastructure works persisted in the Ottoman Empire from the closing of the
Taʿlīm-ḫāne to the beginning of the American Civil War. In the report sent by
Mehmed Emin Âlî Pasha to Istanbul in 1853, it was detailed that the transportation
network of the Aegean region was not sufficiently developed and, therefore, the
transportation cost was high.149 Not only trade and agriculture connoisseurs but also
the ruling class were aware of the need to expand transportation and trade networks
in order to facilitate the circulation of commercial and agricultural products. The
report also mentions the necessity of solving safety problems related to production
and transportation. The situation of the żabṭiyyes (gendarmes/police officers in the
modern sense) in Izmir was expressed as a kind of disarray and this mess was one of
the most urgent problems that needed to be overhauled for the sake of “. . . iʿmār-ı
mülk ve ıṣlāḥ ve teʾmīn-i ḥāl-i tebaʿa emrinde leyl ü nehār maʿrūf ve mebẕūl ve
teʾsīrāt-ı ḫayriyyesine günden güne görülmekde olan farḳ küllī āѕārı şühūd ve ʿudūl
olan iḳdāmāt . . . .” [. . . the difference, which is comprehended and abundantly
known day and night, and whose beneficial effects are seen day by day in the work
of improving and ensuring the development of the country and the state of its
subjects, is the continuous work/efforts, all of which are obvious and fair . . . .]150
The British merchants, who agreed with Âlî Pasha that the difficulties in
transportation prevented the development of trade and agriculture in the region, also
brought up the necessity of building a railway.151 As a result of the diplomatic
relations thus established, the privilege of constructing a railway between Izmir and
Aydın was given to a British company on 23 September 1856.152 A British company
149 BOA, İ.MVL 270/10375, 17 Receb 1269/26 April 1853.
150 BOA, İ.MVL 270/10375, 17 Receb 1269/26 April 1853.
151 Izmir trade, which was 53 million francs in 1839, increased to 120 million francs in 1855. Özgün,
“İzmir ve Artalanında Tarımsal Üretim ve Ticareti,” 36.
152 Kolay, “İzmir-Kasaba ve Uzantısı Demiryolu Hatları,” 23.
59
called Asia Minor Cotton Company (first one) was established in the same year, but
it failed to achieve success and stopped its activity a year later. These years were
times when both successful and unsuccessful projects stood out for British actors.
For example, in 1856, the construction of five new piers by British entrepreneurs
began in Mersin port.153
To deal with such infrastructure works more professionally, an institution was
established in 1858 under the name of the Meclis-i Meʿābir (Council of Transport
and Infrastructure).154 In this period, the issues concerning the solutions to
infrastructure problems were mainly discussed in the Meclis-i Vālā and the Meclis-i
Zirāʿat. A provision in the Tapu Niẓām-nāmesi (Land Title Regulation) of 1859 can
be considered a product of these discussions. In compliance with the provision, if the
vacant lots and barren lands were opened for agriculture, it was decided that the land
would be given to the farmer free of charge by taking a low tribute from these lands
and that a ʿöşür/öşr (tithe) would not be collected from the products obtained from
these lands for a period of one year. The tithe exemption increased to two years in
areas where the soil was stony.155 The tithe regulations specific to cotton will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Even if the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi project was set aside, it should be
underlined that the agricultural reform stirred and the modest infrastructure works in
153 BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 194/49, 15 Muḥarrem 1273/15 September 1856; BOA, A.}MKT.NZD
208/17, 8 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1273/4 January 1857; BOA, A.}AMD 84/29, 29 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1274/10
August 1858; and BOA, İ.MVL 386/16864, 10 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1274/27 December 1857.
However, when it comes to 1872, it is seen that Mersin port had only four piers. BOA, İ.MMS
49/2098, 12 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1294/29 May 1874. While 162 ships visited Mersin in 1844, the number of
them calling at the port shot up to 1,098 in 1875. While the total tonnage of these vessels was 9,234 in
1844, it was 138,975 in 1875. Asker and Arslan, “Küçülen Dünya,” 89.
154 A three-person Zirāʿat Fırḳası (Agricultural Committee) would be formed within the council in
1863, and this special commission would evaluate and decide on the proposals for the development of
agriculture, determine the steps to be taken to encourage the production of (cash) crops with high
commercial value, and compile the statistics on the production and consumption of agricultural and
industrial products. This council reflected the ambivalent economic policy of the Ottomans, which
was partially liberal and partially mercantilist. Güran, “Zirai Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 220.
155 Ibid., 225.
60
the Ottoman Empire were preserved. Because the British industrialists, who procured
a significant part of the raw cotton from the United States, started to discuss how
they could get out of a crisis that might fall if this source was cut off. So much so
that this debate was even reflected in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis as of 1858. According to
the news, (cotton) textile industrialists gathered in Manchester to find a solution to
this predicament and established a company called the Manchester Cotton
Association. The company aimed to undertake the business of growing cotton in
suitable parts of the Ottoman Empire to transplant American cotton. It was
principally intended to reduce the economic dependence of Britain on the United
States. Although the Ottoman provinces had enough conditions to grow good-quality
cotton, the quality of cotton produced outside of regions, such as Egypt, Damascus,
Aleppo, Adana, and Izmir, was in urgent need of improvement, and the quantity was
deficient as well. In addition, breeding studies for cotton plants were also necessary
for these listed regions. For this, free American seeds would be distributed to
Ottoman farmers, and the obtained crop would be purchased by the company in
question at an affordable price. The company, which also took on the transportation
costs, was planning to print one-hundred-thousand copies of a Turkish pamphlet on
cotton production and distribute them to the farmers.156 In the upcoming years, it
would be seen that these moves were implemented, albeit not as planned. What was
momentous here was that the potential to enlarge cotton cultivation was not due to
the American Civil War alone. Turkey was already seen as a unique source of raw
156 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 884, 15 Ramażān 1274/29 April 1858, 1; Hammond, The Cotton Industry,
1:273; and Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 36–37. In parallel with these, it was decided
not to collect customs duty on cotton seeds to be sent by the CSA. BOA, HR.MKT 237/29, 24
Ramażān 1274/8 May 1858. The first cotton planting test of the CSA was carried out in Rhodes and
this experiment using New Orleans cotton seeds was successful. US Congress, House, Executive
Documents: Printed by Order of the House of Representatives During the Third Session of the Thirty-
Seventh Congress. 1862–’63. In Twelve Volumes (1863), 573–74.
61
material long before the war.157 A proof of this was that Thomas Clegg, an
entrepreneurial manufacturer from Manchester, made exploratory tours in the
Ottoman lands as well as in Africa and the Barbary States (today’s Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and partially Libya). The places he deemed suitable for cotton cultivation in
the Ottoman geography were Asia Minor, Thessaly, Macedonia, Syria, Cyprus, along
with Egypt.158
The pre-war opportunity gave the agriculturalists a reason to increase cotton
production in Anatolia and the Balkans. In addition, it had given time to every actor,
large and small, to determine the necessary infrastructure works, legal regulations,
and necessary strategies to escalate cotton production. There were massive
differences between the “industrial rhythm” of Manchester and Lancashire, viz.,
England and the rhythm of the economic life of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the
evolving Anglo-Turkish Convention since 1838—trade volume between England
and Turkey had grown, and Lancashire’s cotton products had gained a considerable
market share—the Tanẓīmāt reform package seemed insufficient for the British.159
Unless these differences were rectified, any plan written and drawn on paper had
little chance of success. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Ottoman Empire
had received its first foreign debt due to the Crimean War (1853–1856) in 1854 and
that the onerous burden of this external debt was on the budget.160 In 1854, when
India had 34 miles (approx. 55 kilometres) of rail, the first rail had not yet been laid
for railway construction in western Anatolia.161 This example of the government’s
157 İnalcık, “Osmanlı Pamuklu Pazarı, Hindistan ve İngiltere,” 51–52.
158 “Culture of Cotton in the Turkish Empire,” The Leeds Mercury, 9 November 1858, 1.
159 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 371. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 128.
160 After two decades of rapid borrowing, a moratorium would have to be declared in 1876. Karaman
and Pamuk, “Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective,” 620.
161 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 128.
62
debt burden and deficiencies in infrastructure revealed that the government often
lacked the power to fully realise its aspirations and intentions.
In 1859, as a result of the negotiations in the Meclis-i Vālā-yı Aḥkām-ı
ʿAdliyye and the Meclis-i Zirāʿat, it was decided to make infrastructure investments
such as building the necessary roads for agricultural and commercial development
along with making the rivers suitable for transportation. On top of that, loans were
granted to the public for the sake of developing agriculture and trade and to make the
distribution between regions and individuals fairer by reducing the tax burden.162 In a
letter written to Musurus Bey, it was stated that the Ottoman Empire could not realise
its true potential in grain and cotton agriculture in this period.163 Problems and
desires were obvious. The ones that would shape the agricultural story of the
Ottoman Empire from now on were the steps to be taken in the chaotic nature of
society and the transforming world of the nineteenth century.
Representing the foreign press in Istanbul, The Levant Herald and the
Journal de Constantinople also made publications in the direction of Britain’s
orientation towards the Ottoman Empire.164 On the eve of the American Civil War,
how Turkey could take advantage of this situation was narrated in an article
published on 1 Receb 1277 [13 January 1861] in the Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis
(Journal/Chronicle of Daily News/Events).165 William Sandford’s article appeared
two issues later on 4 Receb 1277 [16 January 1861].166 Subsequently, in all three
issues of the Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis dated 27 Şaʿbān 1277 [10 March 1861],
162 Güran, “Zirai Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 225.
163 TNA, FO 424/19, 8 August 1861.
164 “Cotton in Turkey,” The Daily Journal, 1 November 1860, 2; and Watts, The Cotton Supply
Association (1871), 52–53. Although the Journal de Constantinople reflected the French point of
view, according to the British, the publications on cotton agriculture were in line with the British.
“Turkey,” The Times, 15 October 1860, 11.
165 Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 54, 1 Receb 1277/13 January 1861, 2.
166 Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 56, 4 Receb 1277/16 January 1861, 1–2.
63
29 Şaʿbān 1277 [12 March 1861], and 3 Ramażān 1277 [14 March 1861], articles on
cotton were published as well.167 Local people used a backward technology
compared to Britain. So, they may not have understood the use of new technologies.
It would not be fair to characterise this narrative as a direct Orientalist approach.
Even though it was a positive development that the articles were published
immediately, that is, the press rolled up its sleeves to guide the literate public; if the
British Vice-Consul Mr Sankey was correct, the reason why cotton was not exported
from Urfa in the late 1850s was that the locals did not understand the separation of
seeds from cotton bolls.168 This meant that it would not be sufficient to eliminate the
infrastructural deficiencies and make legal arrangements to increase cotton
production in the whole country. Even if the dominant actors wanted positive results,
the people’s ignorance of the agricultural conditions and techniques of the period
would affect all the equations they set up. Although it would be stated in the
following years that the state should employ agricultural experts/engineers who
would inform rural farmers and guide them in agrarian enterprises, this would not
occur during the American Civil War. In the pre-Civil War period, the attempts of
the state to develop agricultural knowledge and teach modern agrarian methods were
largely inadequate.
167 Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 93, 27 Şaʿbān 1277/10 March 1861, 1–2; Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i
Ḥavādis, no. 94, 29 Şaʿbān 1277/12 March 1861, 2; and Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 97, 3
Ramażān 1277/14 March 1861, 2.
168 Sankey [Vice-Consul], “Turkey. Orfa. Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Sankey, British Vice-Consul
at Orfa, on the Produce and Trade of the District of Orfa, in Mesopotamia,” in Abstract of Reports on
the Trades of Various Countries and Places, for the Years 1857–58–59. Received by the Board of
Trade (through the Foreign Office), from Her Majesty’s Ministers and Consuls. No. 7 (1860), no.
2579, at 30:489.
64
CHAPTER 3
“KING COTTON” IN EXILE TO THE OTTOMAN LANDS
The American war is still lasting;
Like a terrible nightmare it leans
On the breast of a country, now fasting
For cotton, for work, and for means.
And humanity is calling.169
3.1 Financial and infrastructural arrangements for cotton cultivation
There are voices lost in official documents, inter-institutional correspondence, and
newspaper columns.170 These voices belonged to the cotton workers and their
families who felt the adverse outcomes of the American Civil War and the
depression of Britain’s cotton industry, from the food they ate to the water they
drank. They were sometimes reflected in amateur poems and folk songs. The poem
“The Mill-Hand’s Petition” in the epigraph above, which belonged to an unnamed
cotton worker, was one of the lucky poems that found its place in the newspapers of
169 W. C. [Unknown], “The Mill-Hand’s Petition [Poem],” in The Poetry of the Lancashire Cotton
Famine (1861–65) Project [The University of Exeter] (1866). Colonel Robert L. DeCoin explained
the importance of cotton in 1864: “Of all the agricultural products in the world, cotton holds out the
surest promise of profit and that laughing prosperity which makes the planter’s heart glad, and his
family happy in the enjoyment of plenty.” Hayter, “Expanding the Cotton Kingdom,” 225. Therefore,
“King Cotton,” which brought joy with its presence, became the king of disasters in its absence: “. . .
Cotton is almost the life-blood of the country.” Useful Knowledge Diffusion Society, The British
Almanac of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (1862), 45. It is, in the end, the product
of wealth for some and sheer injustice for others.
170 The news with the closest tone to the poem given in the epigraph was published in The Spectator.
The reaction of the public to the cotton bales brought to Farringdon, where the factories were closed
for a long time, was reflected in the news as follows: “The people, who were previously in the deepest
distress, went out to meet the cotton, the women wept over the bales and kissed them, and finally sang
the doxology over the welcome importation. Imagine cotton becoming poetical, and people
spontaneously raising a Te Deum because asked once more better incident is true as it stands, it would
make a to toil!” The Spectator, no. 1872, 14 May 1864, 553. For statistics on those employed in cotton
mills from 1835 to 1870, please see Evans, The Forging of the Modern State, 521.
65
the period. What made these poems remarkable was that they were so poignant even
to the extent that they made the spiritual aches and pains of literature, with all their
materiality, nothing. Not being able to be adequately nourished and bowing down
when a child asks for something are terrible experiences, and there is no heart that
these terrible things cannot touch, no reality that they cannot make visible. Such a
phenomenon, which cannot be romanticised and aestheticised, is the subject of
poetry because this poverty, which degrades the dignity of the worker and his family,
touches everyone’s hearts through verses or song. These poems, examples of which
were rarely seen in the Ottoman press and literary life, except for war, were brought
to light with The Poetry of the Lancashire Cotton Famine (1861–65), an exemplary
history-from-below project of the University of Exeter.
The main point that makes this project consequential, which demonstrates
how strong the poetry culture was among the workers, is that it points out to the
historian how the workers and their families experienced the Cotton Famine. Such a
possibility can be compared to a “Wellsian machine for looking backwards through
time.”171 Ideas are obtained from official documents, the exhibited narratives are
looked at, and the detective profession is carried out with novel and challenging
questions. However, in these poems, a self-referential reality is most exposed. The
explanation given by official documents to the historian may be wrong or biased, or
the historian may deliberately falsify the explanation. For this reason, the historian
who is more involved with the official documents has a more substantial hand than
the one who does not but also risks being a partner in sin. More precisely, sometimes
the historian may repeat the falsification of documents. Therefore, with poems whose
almost only problem is to get lost in a subjective perspective, it would be best to
171 Collingwood, The Idea of History, 252.
66
enter a highly political subject, such as the American Civil War, with the humility to
accept that it is impossible to avoid repeating the misrepresentation of documents to
a certain extent.
The principal reason for the intensity of emotion and desperation in the
poems about the cotton shortage was that Britain had been dependent on the United
States to supply raw cotton for a long time. The cotton textile industry has been so
crucial to the British economy that some economic historians, such as Joseph A.
Schumpeter, argue that British industrial history can even be reduced to the history
of a single commodity, namely the history of cotton.172 Therefore, the repercussions
of the outbreak of the American Civil War were so dramatic both for employers in
Britain and for those who worked in this sector and took their bread home. Because it
was estimated that there were about four million people whose sustenance depended
on the wheels of the cotton mills, and this corresponded to one-sixth of the
population. For those who would like to have an idea about the place of cotton
production in Britain’s foreign trade, it is sufficient to remind that one-third of its
exports in 1859 were composed of cotton manufactures.173 Just before the start of the
war, that is, at the moments when its footsteps were heard, it was discussed how
Britain would be affected if a war broke out. For example, Andrew Cassels, the
Chairman of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, emphasised in an interview
with Sir Charles Wood that Lancashire’s cotton supply was in danger of being cut off
by events in the United States. Yet, based on the information given by Cassels, 80%
172 Deane, The First Industrial Revolution, 87. There have been stereotypical commodities that are
claimed to have shaped and transformed every century, especially in economic terms. As such, it is
cotton for the nineteenth century, as has been repeatedly mentioned by many: “Who says Industrial
Revolution says cotton.” Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 56.
173 Blanc, Letters on England (1867), 1:72. Britain was not alone in this situation. Although the British
cotton industry took the biggest blow, it should not be forgotten that 75% of cotton spinning
operations in Moscow stopped in 1863 as well. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 248.
67
of cotton imports were made from the United States in 1861.174 Names like John
Bright and Thomas Bazley have also warned businessmen in Lancashire of the
looming danger and encouraged them to seek less costly ways to produce raw cotton
in other regions of the world, such as India, the West Indies, Brazil, and Egypt, to
reduce their dependency.175 With the menace was on the horizon, cotton
manufacturers from Lancashire first formed the CSA in 1857, and three years later,
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Manchester Cotton Company.176
It is not necessary to be a soothsayer to notice such a problem beforehand.
Friedrich List, the renowned political economist of German origin, predicted in his
letter dated 29 July 1827 to a friend that Britain would turn to other source countries
for cotton supply:
Whilst the Southerners destroy the fruits of their labour by self-competition,
it is quite certain that England is looking about for supply to other countries,
standing more under their command than the United States. They intend to
encourage Brazil and other South American states in this business. The
downfall of the Turkish Empire, which in all probability, if not overthrown
from abroad, must sink under its own weight, will moreover bring vast cotton
countries under their suzerainty. In such a case, they probably aim at Egypt
and Minor Asia, not only in this respect but to get the key to the Red Sea and
consequently to East India.177
The return of cotton to its glorious days in the Ottoman Empire coincided with the
decades after 1840, especially when the American Civil War began.178 It was
emphasised in various studies that cotton production in the eighteenth century
174 Harnetty, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” 71. The debate as to whether the supply of new sources
for raw cotton is a necessity goes back to the 1850s; for further details, please see Porter,
“Examination of the Recent Statistics of the Cotton Trade in Great Britain,” Journal of the Statistical
Society of London (1850): 305.
175 Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 36; and Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 54–55.
From 1861 to 1862, Britain’s raw cotton imports from the United States fell from 65% to 4%. Powell,
Losing the Thread, 26.
176 Logan, “India—Britain’s Substitute for American Cotton,” 47.
177 List, Life of Friedrich List and Selections from His Writings, 268.
178 In this period, the consumption of cotton textile manufactures also increased. For the state of cotton
textiles within the context of Ottoman crafts before and in the early nineteenth century, please see
Pamuk, “Osmanlı Zanaatlerinin Yıkılışı,” 77.
68
diminished in the Ottoman Empire until the American Civil War.179 It is said that
there was a different picture in the cotton sector before the Industrial Revolution.
Long existing in the Near East, cotton weaving was a flourishing branch of
manufacture, especially from the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century.
However, with the widespread mechanisation in this branch with the Industrial
Revolution in Europe, mainly in Britain, (Near Eastern and equivalent) cotton fabrics
became manufactured products, not imported.180 Thus, the glorious days were left
behind; moreover, the transfer of new agricultural methods and newly invented
machinery in Europe could not be achieved. This point indicates that the tradition is
most dominant in operation and use of the land. So much so that the agricultural
literature of the early Republican period also connects the existing crop to the fertile
soil.181 Nevertheless, it was underlined that the necessary methods were not used to
increase the yield or prevent the soil from getting tired. The ploughing of the fields
was done with a primitive type of plough requiring simple workmanship. There was
no industrial fertilisation as well.182 This brief portrait of the period demonstrates that
some of the conditions in the eighteenth century partially persisted into the
nineteenth but that this also made current yields unsustainable due to rapidly
developing technology primarily because of the Industrial Revolution.
When it comes to nineteenth-century agricultural techniques that have been
wholly or partially neglected by the Ottoman Empire, although propagandist
language sometimes raises its voice, it is not correct to accuse all early Republican
179 For one of them, please see Farley, The Resources of Turkey, 55. For notes taken by the French
vice-consul on the surge in cotton cultivation in Asia Minor during the American Civil War, please
see Dutemple, En Turquie d’Asie, 270.
180 Genç, “18. Yüzyılda Türkiye’den Fransa’ya Yapılan Pamuklu İhracatı ile İlgili Bir Araştırma
Hakkında Düşünceler,” 152.
181 Turgay, Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 100.
182 Ibid.
69
agricultural literature of presenting an ideological picture. For example, in Türk
Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, it was shown that the same problems were expressed by
including a selection from the newspapers of the period. The fact that this particular
narrative preference of early Republican Turkey sometimes attributed the first cause
of all problems to superstition shows that it preferred an essentialist interpretation of
events as opposed to economic reductionism. But not mentioning superstitions for
fear of appearing essentialist is just as problematic as attributing the first cause of
everything to superstitions. The insistence that the “tools” are indispensable in
agriculture, even in the leading publications of the 1840s, 183 can be presented as
evidence of how primitive the current agriculture was in the geography. Considering
the conditions, the cotton cultivation and production of the Ottoman Empire during
the American Civil War will come to the fore as a test with a general deprivation.
The size and importance of the demand towards the Ottoman Empire should be
understood first to understand the extent of this deprivation.
The cessation of raw cotton exports from the southern United States as a
result of the American Civil War not only caused an upsurge in the prices of both
cotton and cotton products in Britain but also brought along a huge unemployment
problem.184 Thus began a wild race in search of new resources.185 Contrary to
expectations, although there were discussions that such a crisis could break out in
Britain, it was caught unprepared for the crisis.186 Therefore, it is not reasonably
183 Turgay, Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 116.
184 Panza, “Globalisation and the Ottoman Empire,” 74.
185 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 251; and Eldem, “İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin Bir Kesişmesi,” 73.
The Ottoman lands were at the forefront of the geographies where eyes were turned. “Cotton Supply,”
The Journal of Gas Lighting, Water Supply, and Sanitary Improvement (4 June 1861): 381; and “The
Manchester Cotton Supply Association. Annual Report for 1861,” The Merchants’ Magazine and
Commercial Review (November 1861): 473.
186 Jim Powell quotes Leone Levi: “When the fatal contest between the United and Confederated
States of America unfortunately commenced, it found us as unprepared as ever to meet the dire
calamity.” Powell, Losing the Thread, 29.
70
possible for demand to be one of the main actors in cotton production. It is only a
driving force during the crisis. The real actors that played a prominent role during the
crisis were the steps taken before the Cotton Famine erupted. Investments,
technology transfers, scientific research, established networks, and pioneering
initiatives and enterprises were precedents. This section will dig into how when not
only governments but also private enterprises impose unrealistic policies without
taking local dynamics into account, all these result in the failure of private initiatives
and frustration for local people.
Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (Stratford Canning) said in the debates held
in the British Parliament in 1861 that a large part of Turkey’s lands were
quintessential for cotton cultivation.187 It was natural to turn the eyes to the Ottoman
Empire, because the Ottoman geography, namely western Anatolia and Macedonia,
was one of the most crucial cotton import centres for Europe from the twelfth
century to the middle of the eighteenth century.188 The Cerīde-i Ḥavādis also asserts
that no country in the world is as suitable for cotton cultivation as Turkey, yet it
remains derelict, whereas Tırhala (north-western Thessaly), Thessaloníki, and Sérres
in Rumelia, and many localities in Anatolia and Arabia are suitable for cotton
cultivation. It also underlines the weight of the taxes in the country compared to the
United States and explains that the civil war situation there should be taken
advantage of.189 The reality that defiantly stood in the face of all this excitement was
187 164 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) (12 July 1861) cols. 778–89. There is also a geographical point to be noted
in this rich land discourse. Soil-rich and fertile lands are primarily found in alluvial basins and plains,
and they are not very large compared to Turkey’s overall surface area and are scattered around the
country. Sarc, Türkiye Ekonomisinin Genel Esasları, 1:49.
188 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 41. For this reason, there were frequent reports in the foreign press that
Turkey was suitable for cotton cultivation just before and during the American Civil War. “Syria
Available for Cotton Growing.” The Leeds Mercury, 22 September 1860, 7; and “Cotton in Turkey,”
The Liverpool Mercury, 1 November 1861, 1.
189 “Amerika’da esāretiñ laġvıyle şimāl ve cenūb ahālīsi beyninde ṣulḥ u ṣalāḥ teḳarrür iderek her şeyʾ
heyʾet-i aṣliyyesine ricʿat eyleyinceye ḳadar Memālik-i Maḥrūse küllī pamuk ḥuṣūle getürmeğe
başlıyarak tüccār-ı ecnebiyyeden bir çok müşterīler peydā itmesi ve fabrikacıları kendü maḥṣūlātını
71
that Turkey had severe problems to overcome. Due to the compulsory military
service, the men of the Muslim population engaged in agriculture were taken from
their fields and, in a sense, turned into consumers for a long time. In other words, the
already scarce labour force190 was being made harder to come by. As a result of
banditry, the security needed by agriculture could not be provided.191 According to
Gabriel Tarde, trust is essential for taking the first steps in any economic
relationship. Trust, like invention, creates new groupings, covering the economy in a
way that is then validated by repetition.192
The problems of the state in tax collection could not be solved, and the
infrastructure deficiencies could not be eliminated. Most of these infrastructure
deficiencies were related to transportation. Products or crops were reaching
customers, intermediaries, or speculators under arduous conditions. There were no
establishments to provide agricultural education and information to the subjects, and
educated people or experts could not be sent to regions within a systematic state
policy. There were also no credit institutions that could meet the needs of all
istiʿmāle meʾlūf eylemesi lāzımdır.” [Until all things are restored by the abolition of slavery in the
United States and the establishment of peace between the peoples of the North and South, the
Ottoman Empire must begin to produce large quantities of raw cotton, attracting large numbers of
customers from foreign traders and accustoming the manufacturers to using its own crops.] Cerīde-i
Ḥavādis, no. 94, 29 Şaʿbān 1277/12 March 1861, 2.
190 The Guardian also mentions the labour shortage. “Cotton in the Sultan’s Dominions,” The
Guardian, 16 January 1861, 4.
191 René du Parquet, who was hired at the Istanbul branch of the Ottoman Bank, enunciated in the text
that he conveyed his impressions of Istanbul, that there was nothing more pathetic than the situation of
the Turkish peasants. According to Parquet, while the peasants around Izmir could live quite well,
despite cholera and locusts, by planting olive trees, cultivating silkworms, and picking vines called
çavuş, he wrote that the two afflictions that haunted them incessantly condemned them to the most
dreadful poverty. One of these two troubles was the Greek brigand, and the other was the Turkish
soldiers sent after these brigands. Parquet, İstanbul’da Bir Yıl, 35. The reason why the soldiers were a
nuisance to the people was that they were malnourished and could not get a decent salary, so they
engaged in looting and extortion. Parquet, İstanbul’da Bir Yıl, 37. Public order problems are also
found in British records. For example, although regions such as Aleppo were considered suitable for
cotton cultivation, there were security problems due to the lack of the central government, and
numerous complaints were made about this situation. Skene [Consul], “Turkey. Aleppo. Report by
Mr. Consul Skene on the Trade of Aleppo for the Year 1861,” in Commercial Reports Received at the
Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s Consuls between January 1st and June 30th, 1862 (1862), no. 3060,
at 59:345; and Issawi, The Fertile Crescent, 347.
192 Latour and Lépinay, The Science of Passionate Interests, 39.
72
producers. However, since cotton cultivation requires both intensive labour and
technology, it is almost impossible to maintain this business without credit or cash.
Agriculture needs encouragement and protection. During the reign of Abdülmecid,
even though the establishment of the Zirāʿat Neẓāreti (Ministry of Agriculture), the
setting of agricultural directorates, the granting of a small amount of credit to the
farmer, and the formation of an agricultural school and a model farm for the first
time as well as the cultivation of cotton there, no remarkable success has been
achieved.193 This is the most classical framework any historian can draw. It has
become the general tendency of both the press of that period and current academic
studies to highlight the education and infrastructure problems. In order not to obscure
the financial situation, infrastructure problems will be mentioned again by using new
sources. Afterwards, in detail, scientific and technological input with direct and
indirect effects will be discussed.
Infrastructure deficiencies suggested that the Ottoman Empire was a victim of
its colossal landmass and that its economy, transportation, technology, and labour
mobility remained idle being overwhelmed by tremendous distances. Thus, there
were profound asymmetries and inequalities between the regions, and a structure
divided in terms of different development levels began to emerge in the Ottoman
geography. Even though there were many well-suited areas for cotton cultivation and
raw cotton production in the Ottoman Empire, this was the reason why the Aegean
region and the south of the Balkans had come to the fore. This divided structure also
determined the central state practices and the relationship of the central state with the
193 Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1856–1861), 6:286. Nizamettin Turgay cites four
primary reasons that hinder the development of agriculture: (i) farmers’ ignorance, (ii) lack of manual
labour, (iii) lack of working capital, and (iv) lack of means of transportation. Turgay, Türk Ziraat
Tarihine Bir Bakış, 100–105. Turgay prioritises educational problems in the hierarchy he established
in parallel with the education policies of the early Republican era. However, the main argument of this
thesis argues that the complex structure of intertwined problems does not make hierarchy possible.
73
economy and society. Notwithstanding all these, with the encouragement and
guidance of both domestic and foreign actors, the government has taken steps to
increase cotton cultivation in the country. When the remedies for the development of
cotton cultivation written in the statement and appendix of the Meclis-i Meʿābir,
published in 1861, are scrutinised, one can easily see that long studies and
discussions continued for the development of cotton agriculture. A detailed
discussion was held in the Meclis-i Meʿābir about the reasons why imperial cotton
production could not compete with American and Egyptian cotton and the measures
that could be taken to improve cotton cultivation, and all of these were reported. This
statement reflected the Ottoman Empire’s endeavours to revive the production and
export of cotton, which was a pivotal export item until the nineteenth century. Still,
later on, its production and exports declined partly attributable to competition from
American and Egyptian cotton.194
The reasons for the weak market competitiveness of the Ottoman Empire
were discussed, and a detailed problem analysis was tried to be put forward to solve
this situation by underlining that while Egyptian cotton was sold for 110 francs per
bale in Marseille, Izmir cotton was sold for 68 francs. In this framework, a tax would
be determined on real estate and per acre instead of the tithe for a period of ten years
for cotton produced, which was deemed to be the source of servet-i fevḳa'l-ʿāde
(tremendous wealth), no matter what variety of cotton it was. The tithe would not be
taken for a year or two when the unploughed lands were opened for cotton
cultivation. Those who reopened their lands for cotton cultivation would be
exempted from the tithe for five years. Gayr-i mezrūʿ arāżī (land that has not been
cultivated) so far would be exempt from the property tax for five years. The export
194 Güran, 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı Üzerine Araştırmalar, 51.
74
tax would be re-regulated and made more equitable. The roads of villages and towns
would be put in order and repaired. There would be customs exemption for the
import of machinery used in the selection and cleaning of cotton seeds—pamuk
toḥumunuñ tefrīḳ ve taṭhīrine maḫṣūṣ olan makineler. The state would purchase
some samples of these machines. Announcements and pamphlets would be printed
and distributed. Instructions would be sent to the duty officers of the regions
concerned with the proper planting of the selected foreign seeds. Medals or
decorations would be conferred to ‘quality’ cotton growers to encourage them
further. Regional exhibitions would be opened in the areas where cotton was planted,
and awards would be given for the highest-quality cotton. Lastly, evāmir-i şedīde
(strict/firm/severe orders) would be issued immediately to ensure that animals do not
damage the cultivated crops.195
Besides, there is an emphasis on mechanisation. It is underlined that one
person can handle the work of 400 people with the help of steam power in the United
States. Unlike in the United States, there were no commercial banks in the Ottoman
Empire that could be used by agriculturalists for credit opportunities, and industrial
fertilisers were needed in the Balkans and Anatolian geography, which did not have
more fertile lands than the United States or Egypt (the Nile and its basin), which
made a similar yield possible. Regarding cotton cultivation, (scientific) agricultural
knowledge, in the functional sense, was almost non-existent. Due to the ignorance of
the shepherds, precautions had to be taken against the damage their animals were
195 BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13 August 1861. On the execution of the facilities, please
see BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 232/56, 18 Ṣafer 1278/25 August 1861; and “Commercial and
Miscellaneous News,” The Economist, 1 November 1862, 1215. In an article in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis
on cotton cultivation, recommendations were made, such as exempting cotton exports from customs
duty, making it compulsory for the Caucasian immigrants to plant cotton on the lands allocated to
them, abolishing the tax on cotton altogether, or granting exemption from the property tax for ten
years for uncultivated lands suitable for cotton farming. Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 97, 3 Ramażān 1277/15
March 1861, 2; and Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 68.
75
causing to the crops. Primitive agricultural tools and equipment were being used,
there was a shortage of waterways, and the preservation of the harvested crops was
also problematic.196 On top of these, there was a shortage of workers, and the wages
of existing workers were high. The tax issue was discussed at length as well. In the
United States, the taxes on cotton, particularly the export tax, were relatively much
lower, and this comparative (dis)advantage engendered a significant impediment for
the Ottoman Empire. In addition to recurrent complaints about the scourge of the
tithe, the way it was collected, that is, the duly waiting for the mültezim (tax farmer)
to arrive at the field, was damaging the crop.197 Despite this, some bureaucrats were
reluctant to take a step on the tax issue. However, new tax regulations could be more
efficiently endorsed when the cotton trade developed. The benefits from previous
experiments with successful cotton cultivation were suspected to be short-term from
small quantities of cotton.198 The scepticism and prudence in the approach of the
document indicate that the members of the Meclis-i Meʿābir, which mainly consists
196 One of the issues that British newspapers complained about the most was the wrong steps taken by
the peasants when it came to cotton farming. The crop was planted and harvested at the wrong time
and in an inappropriate way. Turgay, Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 136.
197 “ʿÖşrüñ işbu uṣūl-i taḥṣīliyyesi maʿlūmdur-ki maḥṣūlātıñ tabīʿatına göre az-çok aḥvāl-i müteʾessire
īḳāʿ itmeğe müsāʿid oldığından meselā yerli pamuğı toḫum kabukları açılmazdan evvel bir defʿada
cemʿ olunabilecekden mülteziminiñ teʾḫīrātı mülāḥaẓası dahi zerʿine māniʿ-i ḳavī olamaz ise de
Amerika ve Mıṣır pamuklarıyle ḳıyās olunamıyacağı bedīhīdir bunlar à la franca Eylül’den Teşrīn-i
Sānī’ye ḳadar ve Kānūn-ı Sānī’de bile ḥāṣıl olmakda oldığını açılmakda olmasıyle der-ḥāl pamuğı
alınmaz ise yere düşüb çarçabuk fenā bulur.” [It is known that this collection method of the tithe (tax)
is conducive to causing a more or less (negative) effect based on the nature of the crop; for example,
while the local cotton can be harvested/collected at once before the seed pods are opened, the delay of
the tax collector cannot prevent its agriculture, but it is clear that their quality cannot be compared
with the American and Egyptian kinds of cotton, and these are grown from September to November
and even in January, and if the cotton of those whose bolls are opening is not removed immediately,
they will fall to the ground and quickly become putrid.] BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13
August 1861. In an economy mainly based on agriculture, the aʿşār and aġnām taxes constituted a
vital part of the state income. Still, there were frequent collection problems that also caused seasonal
and product-related irregularities. Therefore, it was not easy to regulate these fixed and unreliable
taxes. Eldem, 135 Yıllık Bir Hazine, 25.
198 “. . . maḥāll-i sāʾirede ecnebī pamuğunuñ ḥuṣūli tecrübe ve netīceye tevaḳḳufdur.” [. . . the harvest
of foreign cotton in various places depends on experience and outcomes.] BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6
Ṣafer 1278/13 August 1861. The Ottoman Empire’s reluctance towards tax regulations in the ways the
foreign actors demanded was also seen in some tax changes. In 1864, it was decided to charge an
export tax on raw cotton fibres, not an export tax on cotton bolls. In other words, the Ottoman Empire
somehow maintained its autonomy in tax regulations. BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 303/7, 8 Muḥarrem
1281/13 June 1864.
76
of the so-called experts in the field of agriculture, approach the subject matter more
scientifically than the British actors in the region, contrary to the outdated narrative
of Ottoman bureaucracy and history of science. While many foreign actors generally
fathomed the rules and conditions of cotton cultivation as almost religious creeds and
could not transcend the narrow merchant mentality, the members of the Meclis-i
Meʿābir thought that many variables were not included in the equation.199 This
superficiality was notably embodied in the CSA’s attitude. From this point of view,
importing cotton seeds from abroad along with the improvement of local seeds and
bringing vacant lands into cotton agriculture could be seen as actions in which the
state willingly participated.
The CSA’s plan was pretty straightforward on paper. It was to distribute an
exquisitely detailed planting proposal written on cotton cultivation together with
foreign (exotic) cotton seeds to regions where it expected potential for cotton
production and to encourage local people to cultivate cotton in those places. It was
also interested in technology transfer to the extent that it had the power and
capability to forge new partnerships and collaborate with local actors. Jim Powell
humorously sums up the CSA’s idiosyncratic strategy: “The CSA produced a growyour-
own cotton kit and was granted the use of British consular offices to promulgate
it. There was no shortage of suitable recipients.”200 Even though the CSA’s strategy
199 It should be noted, however, that the statement and its appendix are a repetition of the French
report prepared by Mr (Louis) Tassy. BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13 August 1861. The
developments in this document are shared with the investors more straightforwardly in the founding
news of the Ottoman Cotton Company. The government would waive all the tithe and taxes on the
new lands devoted to cotton cultivation for five years in line with the news. A more moderate tax
would be implemented instead of the tithe. It would allocate financial means to construct (or repair)
the necessary roads and bridges and cooperate with the local people and issue all contracts and other
legal documents free of charge, except for the small stamp duty on paper. Apart from these, attention
is drawn to certain privileges specific to companies. “The Ottoman Cotton Company (Limited),” The
Times, 9 May 1863, 3.
200 Powell, Losing the Thread, 35. The CSA’s guidelines on cotton storage and planting, which Powell
refers to in a cynical language, are also published in the period’s newspapers. “Chronique locale et
faits divers,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1501, 16 March 1861, 3. These instructions included
details on how many centimetres deep the cotton seed should be planted.
77
was sceptical and prudent from time to time, the Ottoman government was one of
these “suitable recipients” as well. Coming back to the CSA, it was in close
communication with the bureaucratic structures of the Ottoman Empire concerning
cotton cultivation and production.
The CSA, relying on its connections and strength, did not have the
opportunity to adequately study the reason for the increase in raw cotton production
in the United States and the decline in other regions of the world. This question was
not brought up with the aftershock of the crisis. Nevertheless, there were profound
differences between other geographies and their social structures—an unfortunate
axiomatic situation that still holds true today. Furthermore, cotton cultivation and
production itself was a complicated agricultural business. Suppose the CSA had been
able to communicate with scientists or experts studying the chemistry of the soil
while developing its strategies for cotton production. In that case, the cotton-growing
soil could be discovered to be nitrogen-poor compared to potassium and phosphorus,
thus requiring more advanced irrigation techniques and industrial fertilisers.
Publications could have been distributed not only on the fight against harmful pest
species but also on invading weed species, and it was acted on the principle that the
same technique was not correct for the preparation of every field. Moreover, it could
have paved the way for the articulation of applied knowledge as well as traditions
into modern scientific studies that were being institutionalised in those years. Instead,
everything has been tried to be reduced into a single formula. The regulations in tax
policies, the improvement of transportation facilities, and the purchase of modern
machinery represent the rough three pillars of this formula.
78
Figure 2. The different varieties of cotton plants according to their fibres201
Although not included in these three pillars, the departure point is, of course,
the distribution of cotton seeds. Some of the regions where cotton seeds were
dispatched, at least once, were as follows, as shown in Table 1 below. Most of these
cotton seeds were American exotic seeds, usually imported from Britain (see Figure
2 above for different types of cotton plants—American varieties have relatively
longer staple lengths in terms of their fibres).202 Along with the government, the CSA
also distributed free American seeds to facilitate cotton cultivation in communication
and cooperation with British speculators and consular staff.203 Domestic and foreign
201 Âbidin, Pamuk: İstihsalden İstihlâke Kadar, 6. The different varieties of cotton plants are shown
according to their staple lengths, numbered one through five [1: Sea Island cotton (Gossypium
barbadense), 2: Egyptian cotton (also associated with Gossypium barbadense), 3: Upland cotton
(Gossypium hirsutum), 4: short-staple Upland cotton, and 5: Asian cotton].
202 New Orleans seed was considered by the government to be better. BOA, İ.HR 203/11664, 2
Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1280/14 November 1863; “Cotton in Turkey,” The Hertford Mercury and Reformer,
20 December 1862, 4; and BOA, İ.DH 531/36835, 21 Receb 1281/20 December 1864. Most of these
seeds were distributed free of charge to the public. “Chronique,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 3292,
22 January 1864, 3. According to the Journal de Constantinople, which shared an article from The
Cotton Supply Reporter, the seed distributed free to the public in 1864 reached 90,000 ḳıyyes (about
115.2 tons). “Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4461, 2 September 1864, 1.
203 “Cotton from Turkey,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 12 December
1863, 8. The reason why American seeds were so preferred was that they yielded better crops than
domestic cotton seeds. In addition, especially New Orleans seeds were more suitable for the soil and
79
entrepreneurs helped smaller farmers who were struggling. From time to time, they
scattered the excess seed in their hands. Newspapers state that they have been
particularly successful in regions such as Macedonia and Izmir. The biggest reason
for this was that the economic life was more vibrant there than in the rest of the
country, and other forces that were difficult to predict and dominate, such as soil
type, climatic conditions, precipitation regime, insects, public order, and the people’s
approach to foreign actors, were relatively under control. This control was sometimes
achieved by effort, sometimes just by chance. From time to time, individual efforts,
such as the initiatives of the Governor of Edirne, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha, came
to the fore. After the successful trials of cotton planting in Edirne, Mehmed Emin
Pasha requested 12 tons of American cotton seeds through Musurus Bey, the
Ottoman Ambassador in London.204 It was a request that cannot be underestimated
for the period of 12 tons of cotton seeds, and his request was immediately fulfilled.
Because of this effort, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha won the appreciation of foreign
actors in the period’s newspapers. Thus, his name entered among the most prominent
local figures. He was perhaps one of the most cited domestic actors for his
achievement during these years.
climate. Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 58. It is also seen that Sea Island cotton is
praised from place to place. BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13 August 1861. Besides, the
length of New Orleans cotton was two and a half to three feet (76.2 to 91.44 centimetres), sometimes
even four to five feet (121.92 to 152.4 centimetres), while the product of the native seed could only
exceed one foot (30.48 centimetres). The native plant yielded 10 to 30 bolls, while the New Orleans
breed yielded up to 50 to 80 bolls. Cheetham, “On the Present Position and Future Prospects of the
Supply of Cotton. Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (27 February
1863): 257–58. For these reasons, this seed was also preferred to the Egyptian cotton seed—viz.
Jumel (or Mahò) cotton. BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 321/69, 28 Receb 1281/27 December 1864.
Nonetheless, this did not mean that no Egyptian cotton seeds were preferred. It is also discerned that
the Egyptian seeds are distributed to the farmer. BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 303/7, 20 Şevvāl 1281/18
March 1865. In the same year, another document mentioning that American seed is better than the
Egyptian one can be regarded as an indication of lack of consistency. BOA, C.İKTS 4/178, 25
Ramażān 1281/21 February 1865.
204 BOA, HR.SFR.3 69/43, 23 October 1862; and “Demand for Cotton Seed for Turkey,” The Dundee
Courier, 19 November 1862, 1. The CSA presented a “medal of honour” to Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin
Pasha for his efforts mentioned above. “Chronique,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4595, 6 February
1865, 2.
80
Table 1. The Dispatch of Cotton Seeds in the 1860s205
Adana Denizli Salonica (Thessaloníki)
Ankara Edirne Silivri
Aydın Gallipoli Skopje
Biga (in Çanakkale) Harput Smyrna (Izmir)
Bosnia and Herzegovina Izmit Syria
Bursa Jerusalem Trablusgarp (Tripolitania)
Crete Karahisar (in Afyon) Viranşehir (in Urfa)
Cyprus Kütahya Yanya (Ioannina)
Damascus Macedonia Yenice-i Karasu (Genisea)
One of the decisions taken to facilitate cotton cultivation was to abolish the
customs duty on the import of machinery to be used in cotton farming, to separate
the cotton from the seed and clean it later.206 The target was not smallholder peasants
205 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 264/31, 6 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/25 May 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 256/79, 4
Ramażān 1279/23 February 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 265/56, 21 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/9 June 1863;
BOA, TŞRBNM 12/53, 3 Şaʿbān 1280/13 January 1864; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 258/43, 8 Şevvāl
1279/29 March 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 293/24, 16 Ramażān 1280/24 February 1864; BOA,
A.}MKT.UM 547/58, 10 Ramażān 1278/11 March 1862; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 247/74, 2
Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1279/25 November 1862; “Cotton Growing in Asiatic Turkey,” The Guardian, 11
June 1864, 5; Issawi, The Fertile Crescent, 276; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 252/92, 24 Receb 1279/15
January 1863; “Cotton Supply Association,” The Guardian, 10 November 1865, 3; BOA,
A.}MKT.MHM 292/93, 9 Ramażān 1280/17 February 1864; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 263/45, 8 Şevvāl
1279/29 March 1863; Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no. 193, 2 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1280/9 May 1864, 1; Moore [Consul],
“Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton. Baghdad, Moossul, Bussorah,
Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Caiffa and Acre. Jerusalem. His Highness Namick Pasha, Governor-General,” in
Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Ottoman Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation;
together with a Summary of Their Replies (1865), no. 3498, at 57:9; BOA, MVL 647/14, 13 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde
1279/2 May 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 255/3, 17 Şaʿbān 1279/7 February 1863; “Cotton from
Turkey,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 12 December 1863, 8; BOA,
A.}MKT.MHM 248/42, 7 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1279/30 November 1862; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 257/32,
13 Ramażān 1279/4 March 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 295/22, 15 Şevvāl 1280/24 March 1864;
Issawi, The Fertile Crescent, 283; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 295/40, 18 Şevvāl 1280/27 March 1864;
BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 352/63, 16 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1282/2 April 1866; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 295/70, 20
Şevvāl 1280/29 March 1864; and BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 293/80, 28 Ramażān 1280/7 March 1864.
206 “. . . fi'l-vāḳiʿ pamuk zirāʿati ḥaḳḳında şāyān buyurulan müsāʿadāt-ı seniyyeye dāʾir tanẓīm ve iʿlān
kılınmış olan beyān-nāmede pamuk toḫumlarına dāʾir bir şeyʾ derc ve taṣrīḥ olunmamış ve bunlarıñ
dahi muʿāfiyyet-i meẕkūre taḥtına dāḫil olması īcāb-ı maṣlaḥatdan bulunmuş oldığından makine ve
edevāt-ı sāʾire misillü bunlarıñ dahi muʿāfiyyet-i meẕkūre tārīḫinden iʿtibāren on sene müddet resm-i
gümrükden muʿāf tutulması ḫuṣūṣunuñ emānet-i müşārün-ileyhāya beyān ve işʿārı teẕkire olunmuş ve
bir de esbāb-ı zirāʿatiñ tervīc ve tekѕīri żımnında ʿale'l-ıṭlāḳ çift ālāt ve edevātından gümrük ve
rüsūmāt-ı sāʾire aḫẕ ve muṭālebe kılınmaması muvāfıḳ-ı ḥāl ve maṣlaḥat görüldüğünden bu ṣūretiñ
dahi başkaca emānet-i müşārün-ileyhāya emr ü işʿarı ve Māliyye Neẓāret-i Celīlesi’ne dahi beyān-ı
ḥāl buyurulması tensīb olunarak evrāḳ-ı merḳūme leffen pīş-gāh-ı ʿālī-i vekālet-penāhīlerine taḳdīm
kılınmış olmağın ol-bābda emr ü fermān ḥażret-i men lehü'l-emriñdir.” [. . . in fact, in the declaration
81
who were primarily dependent on archaic methods and whose productivity was
extremely low. Cotton seeds were also distributed to small landowners and farmers,
who formed the backbone of the agricultural sector, but the removal of the customs
duty on the import of machinery, in particular, was a move that prioritised medium
and large-scale farm owners.207 It was aimed to mobilise the production of marketoriented
agricultural enterprises, which elucidated that the Ottoman Empire was in a
disadvantageous position in the years when cotton production began to increase from
the very beginning.208 Moreover, most of the Anatolian lands stretched out like a
corpse, and there was no agricultural activity on these lands.209
There are many documents on the immediate supply of cotton seeds and the
regions where machinery is needed.210 The foreign press states that this policy has
increased cotton production. For example, while the cotton imported from Izmir was
12,000 bales in 1860, it reached 60,000 bales in 1863. This situation was reflected in
prepared and announced regarding the imperial permission for cotton cultivation, nothing about cotton
seeds was included, and it was deemed appropriate to include them so that machinery and various
equipment should be exempted from customs duty for ten years from the date of the relevant
exemption . . . and also, since it is considered appropriate not to collect customs and various other
taxes on the tools (i.e., a yoke of oxen) and equipment related to the increase and reproduction of the
value of the means of agriculture . . . .] BOA, İ.MVL 485/21969-3, 1 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/20 May 1863;
and Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 34.
207 Yuzo Nagata points out that the boundaries of farms are unclear. For details of the discussion,
please see Nagata, Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 124.
208 In the 1840s, 82% of the cultivated land in Anatolia was smaller than 60 decares (60,000 square
metres). A study conducted on nine villages of Plovdiv, one of the prosperous agricultural regions and
cotton-producing areas of the empire, indicates that the average farm size was around 3.5 hectares
(35,000 square metres) in 1844 and 83% of the cultivated land belonged to small producer farmers.
Güran, Structure economique et sociale d’une region de campagne dans l’Empire ottoman, 67–69;
and Blunt, The People of Turkey (1878), 1:195. According to Reşat Kasaba, in 1869, 81% of the
cultivated land was smaller than 5.4 hectares, that is, less than 60 decares. Compared to the figures
given by Tevfik Güran in the 1840s, the proportion of small farms decreased by 1%. This difference
may also be due to calculation. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 62. McNeill
asserts that agriculture is still done in the form of small-scale businesses today. McNeill, The
Mountains of the Mediterranean World, 25. For a more recent study presenting the newer approach to
farms, please see Aytekin, Üretim, Düzenleme, İsyan: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Toprak Meselesi,
Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük (2022).
209 Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 64. The right to purchase land for
foreigners for the utilisation of these vacant lands was repeatedly mentioned by the CSA. “Cotton
Supply Association,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 6 October 1864, 4.
210 BOA, İ.MVL 485/21969-3, 1 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/20 May 1863. It is ascertained that the machines
needed to clean cotton, along with someone who knows how to use them, were sent even to regions
far from the centre, such as Yemen. BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 265/46, 21 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/9 June 1863.
82
the producers’ income, and the increase in the income was also reflected in the
taxes.211 However, a communication and cooperation network to meet all machinery
needs could not be established between foreign and local actors.212
One of the problems encountered in cotton cultivation by small producers and
medium and large-scale farms was irrigation. Even if the areas with higher soil
quality were met, the production capacity could not reflect its full potential since
cotton needed irrigated agriculture, and irrigation investments such as canals were
minimal. This problem was related to state capacity for the most part.213 Apart from
these, the efforts of Ahmed Vefik Efendi, who was stated to have resolutely pursued
his reform missions in Anatolia, were appreciated. The trust in Ahmed Vefik for the
revival of a few submerged regions was expressed, and his attention was drawn to
these areas.214
Delivery of cotton to ports by primitive modes of transport, such as camels,
horses, mules, two-wheeled oxen, or buffalo carts, was a slow, expensive, and
cumbersome way. Transportation with these animals sometimes became impossible
due to the dire conditions of the roads.215 Beckert describes such situations as
211 “Turkey Benefitting by Cotton Cultivation,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General
Advertiser, 30 August 1864, 4.
212 The Morning Post, 24 September 1862, 6.
213 For example, Christian A. Rassam, the British consul of Mosul, stated in 1863 that government
incentives to grow cotton could not increase local production due to drought and lack of irrigation
resources. Shields, “An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Mosul,” 115. For how the limited
state capacities of economically developing countries were disadvantageous in the nineteenth century,
please see Pamuk, Uneven Centuries, 71; and Teoman and Kaymak, “Commercial Agriculture and
Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century,” 322.
214 “The energy which he displays is exciting [and] the admiration of everyone; and I must draw
attention to his proceedings in Anatolia as a proof of what the intelligence and activity of one man can
achieve.” “Cotton Growing in Turkey,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser,
3 October 1863, 4. Other high-level inspectors, such as Ahmed Vefik Efendi, also worked in Anatolia
and the Balkans. Kaya, “Searching for Economic and Administrative Reforms,” 75.
215 It took about four days by camel from Izmir to Aydın. Akyıldız, Anka’nın Sonbaharı, 16; and
Sandford, “Social Economy: Conditions of Industrial Success. On Cotton Growing in Turkey and
Syria,” The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science (July 1860): 61. Camel transport was
seven times more expensive than rail and river transport. BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13
August 1861.
83
inconsistent with “Lancashire’s industrial rhythm.”216 The disruptions in
transportation in the region, which was rich in resources and suitable for trade,
hindered the development of both trade and agriculture. Therefore, the British, who
wanted to benefit from the mobility of commercial life and agricultural potential in
western Anatolia, undertook the construction of the first railway line in Anatolia.217
Before the construction of the railway, there were 1,061 British merchants who were
dealing with imports and exports in Izmir. One of the British merchants in the city,
Robert Wilkin, and his four friends applied to the Sublime Porte for the concession
of a railway to be built between Izmir and Aydın. Their applications were accepted
with the support of the British Embassy in Istanbul. Since they could not afford such
a large investment, they sold this concession to a group in England. Thus, the
Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aydın was established in 1857.218 It is not
practical to consider railway investments and the agricultural sector apart. In the
newspapers of the period, it is pointed out that investments in many sectors,
especially agriculture, will increase with the railway lines that become widespread
because they provide communication between coastal and inner regions with world
markets.219 Therefore, the privileges of constructing the Izmir-Aydın line in 1856,
the Köstence (Constanța)-Boğazköy (Cernavodă) in 1857, the Rusçuk (Ruse)-Varna
216 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 128. For this reason, the importance of rail and river transport comes to
the fore: “Pamuk ol-ṣūretle alındıkdan soñra cuvāle [çuvala] konılub nehir ve yāḫūd temür-yolı
[demiryolu] ile gemiye taḥmīl olunacak limana naḳl olunması sāʾir yerlerde mechūl olan derecede
sürʿat ve fīʾātıñ ehveniyyeti gibi iki ṣūretle menāfiʿi müstelzim olur.” [After the cotton is bought in
that way, it is put in a sack and transported to the port to be loaded on the ship by river or rail, and
there are two benefits, such as speed and cheapness of price, which are unknown in various places.]
BOA, İ.MVL 451/20162, 6 Ṣafer 1278/13 August 1861.
217 In addition, the region attracts British investors with its abundant underground resources. Kolay,
“İzmir-Kasaba ve Uzantısı Demiryolu Hatları,” 23; and “Cotton in Turkey: (I) On Cotton Growing in
Turkey and Syria by W. Sandford. (II) Railways, Cotton, and Provincial Exhibitions in Asia Minor by
H. Clarke,” The Economist, 11 May 1861, 511. British capital was the largest shareholder of foreign
investment in the 1860s and 1870s. Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 76.
218 Özyüksel, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Nüfuz Mücadelesi, 8.
219 “Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1321, 19 April 1861, 2. Therefore, the
most foreign direct investment, that is, two-thirds of the total foreign direct investment, went to
railway projects. Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire,” 1:181–82.
84
in 1861, and the Izmir-Kasaba (Turgutlu) lines in 1863 were given to British
investors. The Köstence-Boğazköy railway was put into operation on 4 October
1860, the Izmir-Kasaba on 10 January, and the Izmir-Aydın on 1 July 1866 (see
Appendix B).220 Since some of them were expanded after the American Civil War,
they could not be combined with the boom to boost cultivation and production.
In the reports of Isaac Watts, the Secretary of the CSA, the government’s first
step toward infrastructure was also repairing broken roads.221 In the nineteenth
century, the need for road construction and repair increased so much that the actions
taken were never enough. Such that in a report submitted by the Meclis-i Vālā to Âlî
Pasha in 1864, it was written that the improvement of the road network, which
effectively served economic development and public welfare as well as the
expansion of cotton agriculture for two years, turned out to be a very urgent and
general need.222 A similar problem existed for ports as well. Existing ports were not
enough to meet demand and to attract more investors.223 Market and rural-urban
integration and their efficiency levels are not only related to financing. The
topography of Anatolia and the constraints of transportation means both strain the
220 Akyıldız, Anka’nın Sonbaharı, 43. Most of the producer’s earnings were going to the camel
owners. Stephenson points out that when a bridge needs to be repaired, the locals cannot divide the
work among themselves to repair the bridge, and the people do not have enough skills to fix it either.
Stephenson, Railways in Turkey (1859), 37. Based on the news published in this period, special
attention was drawn to the agricultural potential of cotton. For example, in a news report, it was said
that 12,000 bales received from western Anatolia in 1862 reached approximately 60,000 in 1863, and
the expectation for the next season would be 100,000 bales. Thus, future visions were included in the
narrative to attract investors to the region. “Cotton from Turkey,” The Hereford Journal, 24 January
1863, 7. For the map illustrating the Izmir-Aydin Railway, please see BOA, HRT.h 1744, 2 Rebīʿü'lāḫir
1301/31 January 1884.
221 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 56–57.
222 Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861–1876), 7:367. In the same year, in the
instruction given to the directors of agriculture, new provisions were made about giving importance to
cotton cultivation from the seeds of America and Egypt. BOA, İ.MVL 501/22685, 29 Şaʿbān 1280/8
February 1864.
223 So much so that even the port of Istanbul could not keep up with the intensified trade volume. For
instance, even though a ship in the port of Marseille unloaded and filled its cargo in a maximum of
two days thanks to the piers and platforms of the port, this period sometimes took up to a month in
Istanbul. Kazgan, “Fuat Paşa’nın Sultan Abdülaziz’e Sunduğu Şubat 1862 Tarihli 1861 Yılı Bütçe
Gelir ve Giderleri Gerekçesi ve Yorumu,” 176.
85
state’s capacity and make it difficult to establish a robust and centralised state
structure. Besides, geography itself restricts the market integration of its people.224
On 27 January 1864, a cotton traders’ meeting was held in Istanbul, which discussed
the developments and issues in cotton agriculture from the perspective of the social
sciences during those years. Colonel Mesud Bey, who took an active part in the CSA
and Imperial Cotton Commission, was appointed as a commissioner in international
exhibitions attended by the Ottoman Empire, and engaged in cotton production in
Balıkesir, was among those who took the floor at this meeting.225 Mesud Bey is one
of the transmitter actors who have served both the Ottoman Empire and the CSA. In
this meeting, the cotton traders also requested permission from the Grand Vizier to
use patented weighing machines at the customs in order not to waste time during the
export process.226
Needing raw materials for its massive cotton industry, Britain played a role in
cotton cultivation in the Ottoman Empire through its consuls as well.227 To better
224 National Association for the Promotion of Social Science [Great Britain], Transactions of the
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science. Edinburgh Meeting, 1863 (1864), 1; and
Cochran, Pen and Pencil in Asia Minor (1888), 83.
225 The reason for the establishment of this factory, which was actually formed within the body of the
company established under the name of the Ottoman Company Limited and on behalf of Mesud Bey,
was the limitations imposed by the land and property laws in the Ottoman Empire. Even though the
factory was in Mesud Bey’s name, it would not be appropriate to see the factory as Mesud Bey’s
private property. In addition, Mesud Bey’s command of the language and tradition of the people was
expressed as an advantage. In this way, it was pointed out that the resentment and potential aggression
of the local people would be prevented. The enterprise was also exempted from all taxes, except paper
stamp duty. BOA, HR.SFR.3 72/29, 15 January 1863.
226 “Cotton Merchants in Turkey,” The Leicester Chronicle, 20 February 1864, 8. In the British press,
it is stated that the owners of the factory and the board of directors are predominantly in the hands of
the British, and Mesud Bey is mentioned as the general manager of the company established in
Turkey. Local people were also promised that they could participate in commercial life and that their
share would be protected. The company would be able to rent cotton gins to private actors for a fixed
price and would use the port of Bandırma. “The Ottoman Cotton Company (Limited),” The Times, 9
May 1863, 3.
227 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 59–60; “The Great Cotton Question,” The British
Friend: A Monthly Journal (1 March 1861): 70; and Cotton Supply Association, The Third Annual
Report of the Executive Committee, to which is Added a Report of the Proceedings at the Annual
Meeting, Held at the Town Hall, on Friday, May 11th, 1860, and a Review of the Present Position of
the Cotton Trade in Reference to Supply (1860), 8. Quataert points out that a similar role also exists in
the silk technology transfer. Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman
Empire, 56.
86
comprehend the situation of the regions, questionnaires were conducted,
communication was established with local actors and government officials, joint
studies were carried out, and various technology and product transfers were followed
through to eliminate the deficiencies of the regions. For example, Mr Salviati, the
British consular agent in Aydın, informed the British public about the situation in his
territory with a report published in The Monitor newspaper. This report draws
attention to the free distribution of cotton seeds and the increase in mechanisation.
According to the report, production before the American Civil War doubled. The
same report highlights that the local officials control how people plant cotton.228 The
enquiries of the consuls accordingly indicate that they play a role as the sensory,
transmitter, and entrepreneurial actors in cotton cultivation. Since they were at every
stage of production, their range of action was wide and highly functional.
In addition to the consuls, the initiatives of private institutions and actors
were also influential. As stated by an archive document from 1862, there were 81
British businessmen staying in Izmir.229 Even though it is not possible to monitor
each of these actors within the scope of this thesis, these statistics also mean that
some of these businessmen are involved in cotton production as entrepreneurial
actors. The private sector and government cooperation for cotton cultivation also
coincided with this period. The Imperial Cotton Commission was established on 25
September 1862. Colonel Reşad Bey, an Ottoman army officer who served as the
228 “Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 3334, 12 March 1864, 2. Apart from
the British, various actors made efforts to grow cotton in the Ottoman geography. One of them is L.
Carboneri, the Belgian consul of Thessaloníki. Carboneri prepared a detailed report on this subject and
stated that regions, such as Siroz/Serez (Sérres), Zihne (today’s Nea Zichni/Zichna), Drama, and
Pravişte (today’s Eleftheroupoli), came to the fore in the province of Thessaloníki. “Intérieur.
Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 3330, 7 March 1864, 4. In a local example, Emin
Pasha, the Governor of Trabzon, cultivated cotton on his land and helped those who were willing.
“Intérieur. Constantinople,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 3304, 5 February 1864, 2.
229 Bulwer and Russell, “Inclosure in No. 5. The British Residents at Smyrna to Sir H. Bulwer.
Smyrna, March 5, 1862,” in Papers Relative to Applications for Trial by Jury in Civil Cases in Turkey
(1862), no. 3033, at 64:5–6.
87
Imperial Commissioner of the Izmir and Aydın Railway until the permanent
chairman was appointed, was elected as the head of this commission. The
commission’s vice-president was Hyde Clarke, an Englishman from the CSA.
Among the members were the prominent merchants of Izmir: Charlton Whittall,
Frederick LaFontaine, John B. Paterson, Peter Gout, and Thomas Bowen Rees.230
After the government’s initiatives, the most vital steps in the Ottoman Empire were
taken by the work of this commission, which was directed by the CSA.231 As well as
the actions taken by the CSA, the study of the social network of the people working
there would significantly contribute to the historiography of the commercial life of
western Anatolia.232 These domestic and foreign merchant families have had a more
significant say in Izmir with the increasing trade volume. For instance, non-Muslim
230 US Congress, House, Letter of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial
Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1862 (1863),
577. The news about establishing such a commission was made in the Journal de Constantinople in
1861. “Chronique locale et faits divers,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1497, 9 March 1861, 3. The
establishment decision of the commission was taken within the framework of expanding cotton
cultivation in Izmir. BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 435/101, 29 Muḥarrem 1279/27 July 1862; and Taṣvīr-i
Efkār, no. 30, 14 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1279/9 October 1862, 2. Although some of the Imperial Cotton
Commission members and the merchants operating in western Anatolia were of French or Greek
origin, they benefited from the British Parliament’s granting citizenship. The advantages and
superiority of the British in commercial life had an impact on their transition to British citizenship. As
far as can be determined, more than 700 Ottoman subjects from Izmir became British nationals
between 1844 and 1913. Demirbaş, Rees Köşkü, 28–29.
231 US Congress, House, Executive Documents: Printed by Order of the House of Representatives
During the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress. 1862–’63. In Twelve Volumes (1863), 574.
232 SALT Research Archive, Yolande Whittall and Benjamin Perkins, “The Whittall Family from
Worcester in England to the Arrival in Turkey of the Brothers Charlton and James Whittall and the
Descendants of Their Sons,” Genealogy of the Whittall Family of Turkey, AFMWHTBK002, 1967;
and Demirbaş, Rees Köşkü, 59. Charlton Whittall from the Whittall family and his son James Whittall
were two of the strongest actors in the region. For a brief history of the family, please see SALT
Research Archive, Whittall Family, “The Firm. The Commerce of the East and Smyrna. The Growth
of the Firm’s Business.,” Trading in the Levant. Centenary of C. Whittall and Co., Smyrna. 1811–
1911, AFMWHTBK001, 1912. For the list prepared by Kurmuş on the lands purchased by the British
in western Anatolia, please see Kurmuş, Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, 80. For example, according
to this list, A. O. Clarke 72,000 acres; W. G. Maltass 122,592 acres; R. Wilkin 130,228 acres;
Frederick Whittall 18,868 acres; A. Edwards 80,000 acres; H. Abbott 75,472 acres; John P. Paterson
47,000 acres; Asia Minor Cotton Company 36,800 acres; J. Rees 30,000 acres; M. Baltazzi from the
Baltazzi family, who would later establish kinship with some of these families, 82,000 acres; and D.
Baltazzi purchased 247,000 acres of land. Citing the limitations of established research, Kurmuş hints
that these numbers should be higher and estimates the total area to be between 2,400,000 and
2,800,000 acres. For example, the Whittall family is related to the Aliberti, Edwards, Giraud, Icard,
Kramer, LaFontaine, Maltass, Paterson, Pearson, Rees, Tissot, Van Lennep, and Wilkinson families.
88
merchant families who submitted petitions to the government in 1860 demanded the
establishment of a municipal organisation in Izmir in line with the Istanbul model.
Even though Izmir was a municipality established and functioning, foreigners and
non-Muslims were not represented in the municipal council, except for
representatives of religious organisations. In 1864, a rearrangement was made in the
organisational structure of the Izmir municipality in alignment with the wishes of
foreigners and non-Muslims. The establishment of the Izmir Commercial Court in
1862 can also be seen as the success of these merchants.233 The most prominent
initiatives of these actors were the companies they established to proliferate cotton
cultivation in western Anatolia. Examples of these companies are the Asia Minor
Cotton Company,234 the Cotton Bank of Anatolia,235 the Manchester Cotton
Company (under the auspices of the cotton committee in Izmir),236 and the Ottoman
Cotton Company.237
One of the matters that the British consuls frequently brought up in their
reports was the issue of public order.238 It was natural for the British to be stunned by
the anarchy they observed in Turkey because, as Falih Rıfkı Atay puts it, “anarchy is
not something British.”239 One of the most extreme examples that can be given to the
233 Demirbaş, Rees Köşkü, 29.
234 BOA, HR.TO 55/68, 27 August 1863.
235 “The Cotton Supply,” The Times-Picayune, 24 May 1861, 1.
236 “Cotton Growing in Turkey and Syria [from The Levant Quarterly Review],” The Guardian, 25
May 1861, 5.
237 BOA, HR.MKT 455/67, 21 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1280/5 October 1863; and “The Ottoman Cotton
Company (Limited),” The Times, 9 May 1863, 3. These companies controlled not only the purchase
and sale of goods but also each and every stage from production to distribution. Kurmuş,
Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, 96.
238 Threats posed by Turkmen nomads in the Çukurova region were reflected in British consul reports.
Toledano, “Where Have All the Egyptian Fellahin Gone?,” 134; and “La culture du coton en
Turquie,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4706, 17 June 1865, 1.
239 Atay, Taymis Kıyılarında, 37. Therefore, the greatest expectation of the British investor was to
reduce the risk to the capital and protect it. It is underlined that the capital could flow to these lands if
this guarantee were provided. The promises made in the Reform Edict of 1856 point out for the
necessity of doing this. “To the Editor of The Daily News. Cultivation of Cotton in Syria,” The Daily
News, 23 August 1861, 3.
89
security problem is what happened to the British businessman James B. Gout.240
According to the testimony of Robert W. Cumberbatch, the then British consul in
Izmir, in the court records, the first factory of Mr Gout, who had multiple factories in
the region, was attacked by the locals, and the angry crowd burnt down his factory
because its chimney resembled a mosque minaret.241 Except for one individual
example in the footnotes below, the absence of a record of another similar case
suggests that this may be one of those individual events or there may be other
reasons behind the incident. What makes this unfortunate event even more
interesting is that before the factory fire, Gout had distributed the cotton seeds sent
by the manufacturers of London to the local people in the region. Despite the socalled
generosity of Gout, who is not noted to have received any fees or
compensation for this distribution, what happened to him is highly suspicious. For
the cotton seeds distributed, 27 farmers from Aydın also wrote a letter of gratitude to
a journal in Izmir.242 Even though it does not seem plausible for Gout to be attacked
in a place where he was appreciated, there was at least one other isolated incident of
attack like Gout’s account.243 So, was this attack really the product of religious
240 Gout’s name is mentioned as “John Gout” in the list of businessmen who stayed in Izmir in 1862.
Bulwer and Russell, “Inclosure in No. 5. The British Residents at Smyrna to Sir H. Bulwer. Smyrna,
March 5, 1862,” in Papers Relative to Applications for Trial by Jury in Civil Cases in Turkey (1862),
no. 3033, at 64:5–6. His brother, Peter Gout, is a member of the Imperial Cotton Commission for
Smyrna and Anatolia. US Congress, House, Letter of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on
the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September
30, 1862 (1863), 577–78.
241 Kurmuş, “Some Aspects of Handicraft and Industrial Production in Ottoman Anatolia,” 98–99.
According to Kurmuş, Gout became wealthier with raw cotton production in the region during the
American Civil War and increased the number of his factories. He had a total of nine factories and
266 first-class ginning machines working in these factories. To the extent that 7% of the 34,000 bales
of raw cotton imported from Izmir to Britain in 1862, that is, 2,418 bales, belonged only to Gout’s
factories. Gout has managed to increase this share every year. With the end of the war and the decline
of global markets’ cotton supply from the Ottoman Empire, Gout went bankrupt. For the bankruptcy
decision, please see “In Her Britannic Majesty’s Consular Court at Smyrna. The Bankruptcy Act,
1861,” The London Gazette, no. 22978, 9 June 1865, 2987.
242 “Chronique locale et faits divers,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1870, 16 May 1862, 2–3.
243 As maintained by Osman Bayatlı, the Director of the Bergama (Pergamon) Museum, a cotton gin
factory was established on the right side of the Üçkemer Bridge in Bergama (Izmir) in 1875. With the
establishment of this factory, the local people working on the handloom, that is, the workers who
cleaned the leaves by shaking the cotton boll, sorted the cotton with traditional methods, spun the
90
fanaticism or was there another reason behind Gout’s inclusion of a story involving
religious fanaticism in his narrative? Could it be in his best interest to construct such
a narrative? If so, how? To address these questions, it should be checked whether the
incident was documented in the Ottoman court records, a comparative case study
should be made, and further scholarship on the microhistories of the British merchant
families operating in Izmir should be conducted. In another example, a British
merchant who wanted to open a dyeing and printing factory was faced with the
reaction of the guild of printmaking tradesmen, and the central administration
welcomed the guild’s complaint that the factory brought about unfair competition.244
Then, the question to be asked is: If this demand was not met positively, would there
be an attack? Based on the information at hand, it is pure speculation to argue
whether the incident is solely about religious fanaticism. This event can only
strengthen the narrative of the security problem in the region.
Another issue that can be evaluated under the title of public order is that the
civil servants do not act in accordance with the plans of the central government and
sometimes they act on their own. For example, a letter sent from Thessaloníki to the
CSA mentions a trend adopted by Ottoman customs officials that harmed the
country’s overall cotton trade and neutralised measures to encourage cotton planting.
cotton yarn with the spinning wheel, and wove cloth on the loom, complained about this factory to the
local administration. They thought they would lose their earnings because of the factory. When their
complaints were not taken into account, they marched to the government mansion and killed a
government employee named Dericili Hoca with stones and sticks. A group entered the newly built
factory, demolished the walls with pickaxes and shovels, and smashed the goods inside the factory.
Since this tiny event was reported as a massive rebellion, the person who came to suppress the
uprising was Gazi Edhem Pasha. Gazi Edhem Pasha stayed in the region for ten days and took a close
interest in the rebellion. Those who were alleged to have provoked the rioting were sentenced to
prison. After this event, which Osman Bayatlı called the “Bloody Factory,” the factory was rebuilt,
but it did not function and was closed due to the lack of public support. The closed factory also burnt
down after a while. According to Bayatlı, the chimney of this factory, which brought disaster to
Bergama, survived for many years as a “bloody monument.” As could be grasped from the narrative,
this factory was actually a small facility, but it went down in history as proof that local people reacted
to such facilities. Bayatlı, Bergama’da Yakın Tarih Olayları, 82.
244 Kaya, “19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla İzmir Ekonomisinde Süreklilik ve Kırılmalar,” 64.
91
This example, which draws attention to the fact that ad valorem duty, which should
not be taken from cotton seeds and gins, upon the decision of the centre, is taken by
some officials, indicates a deliberate misconduct or unintentional lack of
communication between the centre and the local bureaucracy.245
The subject of factories in question is one of the most challenging issues to
elucidate in the context of the Ottoman Empire. Personal investments escalated with
the cotton boom in the 1860s caused by the American Civil War. Following this
trend, the private investment pattern in cotton mills is approximately as in Table 2
below. It is very complicated to estimate the exact number of these factories. To
construct such metadata, not only domestic sources but also foreign sources must be
comparatively subjected to a relatively long research process. For example,
according to Scherzer, there were 34 factories in Izmir as of 1870.246 It is essential to
compare the physical conditions of these factories with the cotton mills in
Manchester—Cottonopolis, the nineteenth-century appellation for Manchester. When
factories are mentioned in the Ottoman Empire, the factories equivalent to those in
Manchester should not come to mind. It would also have been unusual for factories
identical to those in Manchester to emerge under the ambivalent nature of the
Tanẓīmāt’s industrial policies, that is, in an environment that encourages imports but
restricts exports.247 Some of these factories may consist only of a cotton-spinning
mill, for example. Others should be regarded as smaller facilities compared to the
physical structure of textile mills in Manchester. In addition, building such structures
245 BOA, HR.TO 244/77, 11 October 1868; and “Cotton Supply Association,” The Manchester
Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 24 June 1864, 4. For a study of similar problems raised
by customs officials, please see Frangakis-Syrett, “Implementation of the 1838 Anglo-Turkish
Convention on Izmir’s Trade,” 93.
246 Scherzer, La province de Smyrne (1873), 104.
247 Güran, “Tanzimat Döneminde Devlet Fabrikaları,” 236. Another proof that the definition of factory
is problematic is that a general law regulation, including the operation of factories, was made in 1865.
Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 34.
92
requires tremendous financing. In line with the information given by Issawi, the
construction of a cotton mill in Antakya in 1870 cost £40,000.248
Table 2. Private Investment in Cotton Mills in the 1860s
Location Number Location Number Location Number
Adana249 6 Damascus250 1 Izmit251 2
Antakya252 2 Edirne253 2 Manisa254 2
Aydın255 2 Filibe256 3 Mersin257 1
Balıkesir258 6 Gallipoli259 1 Sérres260 2
Beirut261 1 Haifa262 2 Tarsus263 1
Biga264 1 Istanbul265 1 Thessaloníki266 1
Cyprus267 2 Izmir268 6
248 Issawi, The Fertile Crescent, 379.
249 BOA, İ.MVL 516/23260-7, 19 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/21 September 1864; BOA, C.NF 1/39, 29 Receb
1281/28 December 1864; BOA, HR.MKT 585/98, 3 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1284/2 September 1867;
BOA, İ.ŞD 15/656, 29 Ṣafer 1286/10 June 1869; and BOA, ŞD 2870/52, 3 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1289/1 February
1873.
250 BOA, HR.MKT 603/92, 3 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1284/26 February 1868.
251 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 373/40, 23 Ramażān 1283/29 January 1867; and BOA, HR.MKT 716/61, 3
Receb 1288/18 September 1871.
252 BOA, İ.MVL 569/25579, 19 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1283/25 March 1867; and BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 378/91, 3
Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1283/8 April 1867.
253 BOA, A.}MKT.UM 813/20, 25 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1281/26 October 1864.
254 BOA, İ.MVL 524/23534, 29 Receb 1281/28 December 1864; and BOA, C.İKTS 22/1097, 29
Şaʿbān 1281/27 January 1865.
255 BOA, İ.MVL 504/22829, 3 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1280/10 April 1864; and BOA, ŞD 496/14, 24 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde
1287/15 February 1871.
256 BOA, A.}DVN.MKL 5/8, 25 Muḥarrem 1281/30 June 1864; BOA, BEOAYN.d 454, 29 Rebīʿü'levvel
1281/1 September 1864; and BOA, MVL 487/84, 18 Receb 1282/7 December 1865.
257 BOA, İ.MVL 516/23260-7, 19 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/21 September 1864.
258 BOA, HR.SFR.3 79/20, 25 June 1863; BOA, İ.MVL 516/23256, 16 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/18
September 1864; BOA, HR.TO 242/37, 21 February 1866; BOA, HR.MKT 564/74, 19 Receb 1283/27
November 1866; BOA, İ.MMS 33/1373, 13 Ramażān 1283/19 January 1867; and BOA,
A.}MKT.MHM 373/40, 23 Ramażān 1283/29 January 1867.
259 BOA, HR.MKT 521/21, 11 Ṣafer 1282/6 July 1865.
260 BOA, A.}MKT.UM 806/67, 26 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/28 September 1864; and BOA, İ.MVL
519/23366, 28 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1281/29 October 1864.
261 BOA, A.}MKT.UM 812/76, 24 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1281/25 October 1864.
262 BOA, HR.MKT 509/9, 26 Şaʿbān 1281/24 January 1865.
263 BOA, İ.MVL 516/23260-7, 19 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/21 September 1864.
264 BOA, İ.MVL 524/23530, 28 Receb 1281/27 December 1864.
265 BOA, HR.TO 509/19, 30 September 1867.
266 BOA, ŞD 2006/10, 28 Ṣafer 1292/5 April 1875.
267 BOA, HR.MKT 561/88, 18 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1283/28 October 1866; and BOA, HR.TO 494/106, 1
April 1867.
268 BOA, HR.MKT 420/61, 21 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1279/14 December 1862; BOA, MVL 649/43, 15
Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/3 June 1863; BOA, HR.MKT 471/35, 22 Ramażān 1280/1 March 1864; BOA, İ.MVL
509/22989, 1 Muḥarrem 1281/6 June 1864; BOA, İ.MVL 516/23258, 18 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/20
September 1864; and BOA, HR.MKT 554/3, 29 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1283/11 August 1866.
93
Despite the exploitation of female and child labour in cultivating the land and
harvesting the crops, labour shortage was one of the main problems of every single
cotton farmer.269 Therefore, it was believed that with the widespread use of
machinery, the elimination of capital shortages, the opening of new institutions, the
construction of highways and railways, and the introduction of additional labour
arising from the migration of Caucasian immigrants, most of whom were
Circassians, considerable developments in agriculture would occur in the Ottoman
lands.270 All these shortcomings are also linked to financial problems. The economic
revival in western Anatolia in the middle of the nineteenth century is not based on
sufficient data and documentation to substantiate the assertion that it took place
according to the conditions determined by local and foreign actors who were claimed
to have succeeded in appropriating a large part of the wealth arising from this
revival. The upward momentum has indeed been observed in the foreign trade
figures and the monetisation process in the economy since the 1850s. Foreign trade,
which has increased eight to ten times, has also accelerated domestic trade.
Notwithstanding the fact that domestic trade does not perform as well as foreign
trade, it can be acknowledged that there has been a three to fourfold increase in
domestic trade when the money in circulation is examined.271 Nonetheless, the price
269 “Cotton in the Sultan’s Dominions,” The Guardian, 16 January 1861, 4. Because, as Delmar
Hayter states, cotton requires extra effort and attention: “It is a [highly] personalised crop, demanding
extra labour, attention, and care from its growers to a greater extent than most other crops.” Hayter,
“Expanding the Cotton Kingdom,” 225.
270 “The Turkish Cotton Crop,” The Glasgow Herald, 15 August 1864, 6; “The Circassian Exodus,”
The Paisley Herald and Renfrewshire Advertiser, 10 September 1864, 2; Kasaba, A Moveable Empire,
117; and Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 68. Free cotton seeds were also
distributed to these immigrants, who were mostly settled in Adana and its vicinity. Gratien, “The
Mountains Are Ours,” 86. Thus, cotton agriculture in the region increased sixfold between 1860 and
1865. The dynamics that emerged during the American Civil War had triggered the stagnation of
cotton cultivation in the Adana-Çukurova region in the opposite direction. In other words, the claim
that the American Civil War had no effect on the Adana-Çukurova region does not reflect the truth.
For instance, a fruitful harvest in grain and cotton agriculture in 1863 had pleased the Sultan. BOA,
A.}MKT.MHM 282/69, 22 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1280/4 November 1863; and Gould, “Pashas and
Brigands,” 195.
271 Güran, “Zirai Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler,” 230.
94
increases—both raw cotton prices and wages—and the results drawn from the
production charts, which do not have the upper hand over the nature and details of
the economic revival, do not reveal the pervasive and complex networks of actors.
When the bankruptcy stories of those dealing with cotton enterprises are scrutinised,
particularly during these boom years, it is easily noticed that the hypothesis arguing
the economic revival took place in accordance with the conditions determined by the
intermediaries who controlled the wealth arising from this revival has weak grounds.
Even though there have been studies in recent years that have updated some of the
common (mis)perceptions and knowledge of nineteenth-century farms, these studies
do not change the fact that in the second half of the nineteenth century, for example,
in 1878, only one out of every 27 rural settlements in Anatolia and one out of every
four settlements in Rumelia had farms.272 That is to say, the central and distinctive
feature of the nineteenth-century Ottoman agricultural life was the predominance of a
subsistence economy. Additionally, it is not possible for production networks that
lack long-term organisational or structural stability to determine the conditions for
such a revival. Because, although the wealthy of the period were concentrated in
big/port cities and trade centres on the coast,273 no study has yet been conducted
revealing that this prosperous class has permanently transferred their wealth from
generation to generation.
In Ottoman economic history, there are various discussions about how much
of the accumulated capital was bezirgān (merchant), how much ṣarrāf (usurer/money
272 Ibid.
273 When it comes to such locations, annotations should always be made. For example, although
Genoa has been a bustling trading port for centuries, some villages within a few hours of it, ironically,
are not fully open to the outside world even today. Some subjects and questions may require a much
larger lens, while others require much smaller ones. The average per capita income in the Izmir
province rose almost three times between 1855 and 1876; however, this wealth was concentrated in
the coastal areas rather than inland. Akyıldız, Anka’nın Sonbaharı, 50.
95
changer), and how much productive capital. These debates sometimes date back to
include the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well. The main questions are:
Was there productive capital accumulation in Turkey in the nineteenth century? In
which areas was the existing capital accumulation occurred? How does this capital
compare and contrast with productive and industrial capital in Europe? Was the
Ottoman Empire governed by an extensive network of debit and credit? There are
some problems in addressing these issues. Some historians consider these economicbased
readings as economic determinism and approach them with suspicion.274
Therefore, how to avoid economic determinism here creates a separate and dynamic
field of discussion. Moreover, contemporary studies still associate capital production
in Anatolia with the capitalist world system because the scholars fear falling into the
“sluggish Eastern peasants” narrative of eighteenth and nineteenth-century travellers
(along with the literati, in fact).275 The depiction of the Anatolian peasant as a
“sluggish Eastern type” is already a reductionist view in every respect. It was not a
logical move for the subjects to produce more than their own needs and more than
the subject’s own tax burden in an uncommercialised or scarcely-commercialised
region. Anatolian peasants would not terrace the field and clear the stones to produce
a crop they could not sell. In addition, one should not forget the famines Anatolia
struggled with throughout the nineteenth century and even continued at the beginning
of the twentieth century.276 A historian who follows every actor/object comprehends
that s/he must always act cautiously when evaluating the term “sluggish Eastern.” It
should be noted that the “sluggish Eastern peasantry” narrative of some European
travellers was based on their own lands and habits. Such inferences can only be made
274 Conrad, What Is Global History?, 105.
275 “The Turkish farmer philosophically attributed the result to the will of Allah . . . .” Cochran, Pen
and Pencil in Asia Minor (1888), 386.
276 Turgay, Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 210.
96
when the characters and actions of the peasants are examined without including the
nature of the regions along with their potential.
In order not to fall into generalisations that partially reflect reality, the
material conditions of the empire are discussed in detail in this section. The
governments during the Tanẓīmāt era did not fully succeed in their three main
objectives in terms of the financial administration.277 The first of these goals was to
impose a tax on income and wealth directly instead of the traditional tax system that
does not consider solvency. The second was the taxation of everyone who could
afford to pay without exceptions and exemptions. The third goal was to collect these
revenues directly on behalf of the state with the establishment of an effective
financial bureaucracy, in other words, modern finance.278 The financial side of
Ottoman cotton production during the American Civil War does not contradict
Güran’s narrative. Perhaps the weakest point of the Tanẓīmāt movement, as Eldem
argues, is the failure of the financial part of the attempted administrative reforms and
regulations.279 During the reigns of Sultan Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz, state revenues
increased in a way that left no room for discussion. Significant steps were taken in
the direction of financial restructuring. The main objectives in the financial field,
namely direct taxation of income and wealth, taxation of everyone who could afford
to pay without exceptions and exemptions, and to collect these revenues directly on
behalf of the state by creating an effective financial bureaucracy, were tried to be
implemented. The same firm steps and determination have not been displayed in
bringing expenditures under fiscal discipline. It has not been successful in directing
the resources obtained through the domestic and then the foreign borrowing process,
277 Güran, ed., Osmanlı Malî İstatistikleri, 7:3–4. For a more detailed and recent account of the
nineteenth-century monetary system, please see Eldem, “Genel Kargaşa ve İdare-i Maslahat.”
278 Ibid.
279 Eldem, 135 Yıllık Bir Hazine, 25.
97
and more importantly, to increase production, that is, directing to areas that will
ensure the repayment of these debts. Therefore, the state and the society have found
themselves in the middle of a financial crisis. In other words, the Ottoman financial
administration faced financial bankruptcy despite all these substantial financial
restructuring efforts. After all, regardless of the numerous negotiations and the
tendency to realise whatever the circumstances required, the radical transformations
in Western Europe did not take place in the Ottoman Empire. For example, private
land ownership did not become more robust as in Europe, the weight and influence
of merchants on the state policies did not strengthen, and the accumulation of capital
in private hands did not reach a level comparable to that of Western Europe. Besides
the financial transformation stagnating, the influential power of the Ottoman
landowners, merchants, and industrialists over state policies has always been
minimal. Transformations in Europe were not seen on the workers’ and peasants’
front, either. The manoeuvring opportunities of the period, for the central
bureaucracy to hold power, were used in areas where the bureaucracy was very
sensitive, as long as they suited the needs of the bureaucracy, not to change the
institutions of the society or the general economic structure. Changes and
developments in private financial institutions were also very limited.
There has always been a need for financial institutions to retain investments
and any initiatives in the country. Therefore, this problem directly affects the case of
cotton. The Ottoman Bank alone was not as much as required, and during the
American Civil War, it did not yet have sufficient experience and capacity.
Moreover, the success of the Ottoman Bank’s branches outside of Istanbul was also a
controversial issue. According to C. G. A. Clay, by the end of the American Civil
War, there was no remarkable success due to the unstable structure of western
98
Anatolia, still open to many externalities. In addition, the dynamics of the region
differed excessively from Western Europe, and there were no executives who could
keep up with this dissimilitude.280 In these years, the Ottoman Financial Association
was established with a capital of one million pounds to assist the domestic enterprise.
However, the state’s capital could not keep up with the infrastructure works.281
Another problem in the finances of the Ottoman Empire is related to
statistics.282 Even though Agop Efendi, the then Undersecretary of the London
Embassy, was appointed as Turkey’s delegate to the International Statistics Congress
in 1860, there was no statistical activity in the country that the CSA could benefit
from.283 Therefore, it is seen that the CSA kept statistics with its means, and it is
impossible to determine the accuracy of these statistics. Maybe because it was aware
of this situation, the Ottoman Empire started to work on teaching statistics
throughout the country, suffering from statistical problems in cotton production and
trade.284 In Ratip Yüceuluğ’s 1947 study, which was written with the sharp language
of the early Republican regime against the Ottoman Empire and therefore should be
carefully analysed, it is stated that the studies on collecting statistics in the Ottoman
280 Clay, “Western Banking and the Ottoman Economy before 1890,” 496.
281 “The Ottoman Financial Association,” The Bankers’ Magazine (November 1864): 1033; and
“Ottoman Financial Association, Limited,” The Bankers’ Magazine (March 1864): 308. Among the
executives were John Cheetham, the President of the CSA, working on expanding cotton farming in
Turkey, and J. Lewis Farley, who would later become an official for the Ottoman government.
Therefore, among the objectives of this financial institution was to provide the local cotton producer
with the credit support they needed. “The Ottoman Financial Association,” The Spectator, no. 1859,
13 February 1864, 193; BOA, HR.SFR.3 85/36, 13 February 1864; “Intérieur. Constantinople,”
Journal de Constantinople, no. 3328, 4 March 1864, 2; and “Dernières nouvelles,” Journal de
Constantinople, no. 3339, 18 March 1864, 4. The financial institutions that emerged during the cotton
boom did not succeed. Clay, “Western Banking and the Ottoman Economy before 1890,” 477.
282 “. . . statistics can hardly be said to exist in Turkey . . . .” Clarke, “On the Supposed Extinction of
the Turks and Increase of the Christians in Turkey,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London
(1865): 261. The first statistical yearbook of the Ottoman Empire would be published in 1897. Güran,
ed., Osmanlı Devleti’nin İlk İstatistik Yıllığı 1897, 5:xix.
283 BOA, HR.SFR.3 53/3, 12 July 1860; and “International Statistical Congress, 1860. Foreign
Official Delegates. Turkey.—Agop Effendi, Secretary of the Ottoman Legation at Paris,” Journal of
the Statistical Society of London (September 1860): 384.
284 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 347/28, 9 Şaʿbān 1282/28 December 1864.
99
state only started with the Statistics Office created within the Ministry of Trade in
1875.285 The description was superficially correct, although some small advances had
shown that this narrative was incomplete. The failure to keep statistics on cotton and
the inability of a modern statistical institution to endure was one of the obstacles to
putting forward a planned and programmed cotton strategy.
So, what was the situation before 1875? In the discussions reflected in the
UK command papers, the inadequacy of the Ottoman finances was expressed in
terms of central administration and general control, and radical reforms were
expected in this regard. According to this source, it is challenging even to calculate
the average tithe paid by each village over the last five years since official records
were not kept for these payments.286 Despite all these financial deficiencies, some
modifications were made in taxation, primarily upon the insistence of British
actors—not only the ones who had direct relations with the state but also private
entrepreneurs and the press. The export duty on cotton, which was normally 12%,
was reduced to 1% in 1862.287 Thus, while there was a very weak cotton export in
1858, the size of cotton exports from the Ottoman Empire in 1864 and 1865,
285 Yüceuluğ maintains that, after a while, the Statistics Office was interrupted by the war between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire because the expert appointed to the head of the office was brought
from the Russian Tsardom. Yüceuluğ, Türkiye İstatistik Teşkilatı ve Tarihçesi, 15. A regulation was
issued in 1880 for the dissemination of statistical studies. In the same year, an independent Statistical
Directorate was established, and it was planned to establish a statistical commission in each ḳażāʾ
(district), livāʾ (county/sanjak), and vilāyet (province/provincial) centre. In addition, a statistical office
would be set up in each neẓāret (ministry). “İstatistik İdārelerine Dāʾir Niẓām-nāmedir [4 Ṣafer
1297/17 January 1880],” in Düstūr [Tertīb I] (1299 [1881/1882]), 4:670–72.
286 Foster and Hobart, Turkey. Report on the Financial Condition of Turkey, by Mr. Foster and Lord
Hobart, dated December 7, 1861 (1862), no. 2972, at 64:1–2. Similar complaints were also reflected
in the reports of the CSA. Wanklyn, Report on the Samples of Cotton in the International Exhibition,
Made on Behalf of the Cotton Supply Association (10 June 1862), 14. According to Kazgan, there was
not a single line in the budget report about the yield per hectare in wheat farming of Anatolia in those
years. Nonetheless, in the statistics kept in the central European countries in the same years, there
were figures that gave this and similar information and even specified their details to a greater extent.
In this respect, Kazgan evaluates the (budgetary) income and expenditure reports presented by Fu’ad
Pasha to Abdülaziz as “amateurs.” Kazgan, “Fuat Paşa’nın Sultan Abdülaziz’e Sunduğu Şubat 1862
Tarihli 1861 Yılı Bütçe Gelir ve Giderleri Gerekçesi ve Yorumu,” 181.
287 Panza, “De-Industrialization and Re-Industrialization in the Middle East,” 162.
100
although lagging behind Egypt, gained visibility in statistics, charts, tables, and
various visualisation studies of the period. One of them is the map prepared by
Charles Joseph Minard (see Appendix C).288
The capital accumulated in the Ottoman lands in the nineteenth century was
so limited that new Manchester entrepreneurs and other similar sources of capital
were sought to support cotton production ventures to provide the needed capital.289 In
other words, there was a desperate need for capital to be supplied and for
entrepreneurs who would patiently wait for the results. The Guardian described
Lancashire’s responsibility as follows: “The quickness of demand in Lancashire
outruns Asiatic slowness of supply; and, if in hot haste for speedy results, Lancashire
must look to furnishing materials for greasing the wheels.”290 For this reason,
although the priority of cotton seeds was given to people who were experienced and
had been in some experimental cotton production processes, the solution of
infrastructure problems turned into another endless story. The CSA, independent
British businessmen, and local entrepreneurs desperately run every single business in
the region. It also often falls to the CSA to find the capital, to dispatch competent
practical trainers to the required areas, to distribute useful publications on cotton
cultivation, albeit on a small scale, to persuade the government to take new and more
radical steps and initiatives, and to provide feedback on the actions taken. The CSA,
bent under this pressure, failed to delineate that things could not be accomplished
without a helpful and solution-oriented bureaucracy in a country with enormous
military expenditures.
288 Minard, “Carte figurative et approximative des quantités de coton brut importées en Europe en
1858, en 1864 et en 1865 [Map],” LOC G3201.J82/1865.M5, 1866.
289 “Cotton Growing in Turkey and Syria [from The Levant Quarterly Review], The Guardian, 25 May
1861, 5.
290 Ibid.
101
If the Aegean region was relatively more successful than other regions of the
Ottoman Empire, it was not only because of the favourable climate. Since the
mountain ranges in the Aegean region fall vertically, not parallel to the coasts, unlike
in the Mediterranean region, vast plains ideal for agriculture and human population
gathering and settlement stretch between these mountains inward from the coast. Due
to the condition of the mountains, transportation problems are less compelling
compared to other regions.291 Furthermore, Turkey’s precipitation regime is
irregular. The sudden change of weather cycles from one year to another, rain
sometimes less, sometimes excessively or unseasonably, may cause the crop to
deteriorate and all the effort to be wasted.292 A similar problem was also encountered
in India, and American agricultural practices failed due to the difference in
precipitation patterns.293 Greater climate volatility demanded more skills and more
labour from the Ottoman farmers. Although a part of this skill was met with
experience, experience alone was insufficient to meet another part of it. Thus, from
time to time, old knowledge and methods are entirely shelved; that is, the
combination of modern techniques and local knowledge, which is frequently
encountered as hybrid knowledge in the literature, becomes inoperable. The local
farmer only needs to apply modern methods and have access to the necessary
technology—at least, that is the case when it comes to cotton cultivation.
291 Sarc, Türkiye Ekonomisinin Genel Esasları, 1:20.
292 Ibid., 39. Damage to the crops due to the irregularity of the rains could bring farmers and
mültezims against each other, causing some mültezims to treat the farmers cruelly. Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no.
245, 7 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1281/7 November 1864, 1. In another example, The Morning Post’s Istanbul
correspondent reported that the cotton harvest suffered greatly with the onset of rains in October, the
harvest month: “Sixty per cent of the crop, he says, has been destroyed, and the remainder will be of
bad colour, and of weak and uneven staple.” “Turkey,” The Morning Post, 9 November 1864, 2; and
“The Cotton Crop in Turkey,” The Worcestershire Chronicle, no. 1404, 16 November 1864, 5. Even
though there were Ottoman historians who included “natural forces” in their narratives, they generally
found little space for themselves in economic history. For example, Sarah D. Shields draws attention
to the following fact in an article about the economy of the Mosul region: “Mosul’s agriculture was
closely tied to natural forces.” Shields, “Regional Trade and 19th-Century Mosul,” 22.
293 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 126.
102
Consequently, those who study agricultural history often come across farmers’
concerns about precipitation in both primary and secondary sources. In spite of the
fluctuations in the climate, the expectation for cotton from the region was very high,
and the potential of the region to attract new investors was exaggerated by various
newspapers over and over again. Unless the real potential of the region was known,
the potential was whatever the press speculated.
Another significant issue concerning the Ottoman Empire is the following
statement from the Hansard parliamentary records: “There was no middle class [in
the Ottoman Empire], in our conception of the term.”294 This anecdote may raise
questions such as: ‘Who was the middle class in the Ottoman Empire of the 1860s?’
‘What did it mean to be a middle class in this vast and diverse geography?’ The
debate in the Parliament is, of course, a reflection of the British experiences in the
Ottoman Empire. It was underlined that a middle class in the British Empire did not
exist in the Ottoman Empire. Even though the existence of the middle class in the
Ottoman Empire and the meaning of this class is still a subject that has not been
studied enough, it is apparent that the existence of a substantial middle class in the
Ottoman Empire as in Britain cannot be mentioned. As long as the discussion is not
limited to the Ottoman geography and is not dealt with within the dynamic structure
of the regions, problematising this statement, which was voiced in the British
Parliament, would be a superfluous discussion that conceals what needs to be said
rather than revealing the forces behind what is said.
The fact that there was almost no middle class also complicates the cotton
cultivation and production processes. It is much more challenging to attract
investment in a geography that does not have an economically advantageous
294 171 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) (29 May 1863) cols. 6–148 (emphasis added).
103
population for business. The only thing that could be found was debt, but with these
debts, no steps could have been taken to save the country from the current debt
spiral. Between 1854 and 1882, 20.4 billion piastres were borrowed, but only 11.6
billion piastres were generated as revenue.295 To define such developments in finance
as a part of modern public finance, it would be inevitable to exclude the Ottoman
Empire from all existing equivalents and commend it solely for its own effort to
employ the financial developments provided by the conditions of the period. Even
the articles published in the ʿİbret to complain about the actions of the Altıncı
Dāʾire-i Belediyye (Sixth Department of the Municipality) demonstrate how
problematic the concept of modern finance was in the Ottoman Empire. For example,
Nâmık Kemal, in his article titled “Altıncı Dāʾire-i Belediyye Ḥaḳḳında (About the
Sixth Department of the Municipality)” published in the ʿİbret, claims that no
records were kept of the income and expenses of the Sixth Department of the
Municipality.296 The fact that these and similar complaints came from prominent
elites or gentlemen, on the other hand, points out to an assertion that Lord Stratford
voiced in the Parliament, that public opinion had no legitimacy in Turkey, except in
extreme cases, and that the driving force must have come from abroad.297 When it
comes to cotton agriculture, there is also a need for a public voice that will mobilise
local and foreign actors and, more importantly, the state. The implication of this
public voice can be seen in the example of Britain. The voice of families affected by
the cotton crisis has shaped not only domestic but also foreign policy.
295 Güran, ed., Osmanlı Malî İstatistikleri, 7:15. Humorously, it can be said that the Ottoman Empire
was a life-long debtor state after the Crimean War. But it turned out that the Turkish proverb, borç
yiğidin kamçısıdır [debt is the whip of the mighty/brave], was just a folkloric footnote.
296 ʿİbret, no. 128, 3 Ṣafer 1290/2 April 1873, 1–2. Could not the articles in the ʿİbret be treated as a
kind of middle-class public opinion? Alternative approaches might be suggested as it had a limited
number of readers in a restricted region.
297 165 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) (14 March 1862) cols. 1511–26. For a contrasting thesis on the concept of
“public opinion” in the Ottoman Empire, please see Şiviloğlu, The Emergence of Public Opinion:
State and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire (2018).
104
There have been other historians following Christopher K. Neumann, trying
to bring a different perspective to the debate on whether there was a public opinion in
the Ottoman Empire. According to Neumann, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, in his writings,
used the terms “efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye” and “efkār-ı ʿāmme” for the public opinion and
drew attention to the fact that the discontented people formed a public opinion and
fell under the influence of predominant interest groups such as the Janissaries or the
ʿulemāʾ.298 There are some problems with this approach as well. The public opinion
that Lord Stratford speaks of is the fusion of the life principle adopted by a large
mass of people and the practice that supports it, that is, a public opinion that can be
taken into account. From this, it can be inferred that the conceptions of the term of
the two countries differ. The historian can subtly pull the concept of public opinion
to any point by considering it in the Ottoman Empire as akin to a reflection of an
implied social contract or a delicate balance between government and other
administrative units or the society.
Hence, the enquiries of what public opinion meant as well as its ontological
structure in different centuries turn out to be totally unanswerable and obscure.
Ontological differences in and between rebellion movements, efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye,
298 Neumann, “Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’nın Tarihçiliğine Yansıyan Zihniyet Dünyası,” 66. The example
given by Neumann can be shown as an example of the formation of a public opinion in the Ottoman
Empire, not a public opinion equivalent to that of Europe, but rather the formation of a public opinion.
There is another crucial aspect expressed by İbrahim Alâeddin Gövsa regarding the concept of public
opinion in the Ottoman Empire. Gövsa says that he finds the expression efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye crippled,
that the term opinion publique in French has been translated into Turkish as efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye, and
that it is a wrong genitive construction. As claimed by Gövsa, when efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye is made into a
Turkish compound, it means “umūmī fikirler (general opinions/ideas)” and is the opposite of “ḫuṣūṣī
fikirler (private/particular ideas).” In French, he says the equivalent is les opinions générales, and,
therefore, “efkār-ı ʿāmme” would be a more appropriate usage than “efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye.” According
to Gövsa, even though the shape of efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye is crippled and its base is foreign, its content,
connotation gained meaning and sincerity only after the Republic. In this respect, comparative studies
or a global history approach would be much more helpful in comprehending the concept of public
opinion more accurately Gövsa, “Efkar-ı Umumiye,” Yedigün, no. 313, 7 March 1939, 8. In his
related article, Neumann mentions the subject Gövsa had previously expressed in the footnotes of his
symposium paper without giving any reference to İbrahim Alâeddin Gövsa. Neumann, “Ahmed
Cevdet Paşa’nın Tarihçiliğine Yansıyan Zihniyet Dünyası,” 66.
105
and public opinion should not be ignored. Otherwise, how could the symbol of the
so-called efkār-ı ʿumūmiyye in London be decided against the symbol of Istanbul, to
be displayed against the British Parliament? How could the fact that Selimiye
Barracks was one of the massive structures to be seen in Istanbul find a place for
itself in the narrative? A narrative that does not focus on the ontological differences
in the mobility of the two cities cannot accurately answer these questions. Moreover,
when this difference was ignored, it could even be claimed that public opinion
played an active role in the appointment and dismissal of Ottoman statesmen.
Such an approach is sometimes indolently accused of Orientalism. Although
making Orientalism a purely derogatory concept is problematic, it is not as
straightforward as it seems to label this and similar interpretations as an Orientalist
discourse. Because the distribution regions of the newspapers and the number of
printed newspapers are not the facts that society constructs and manipulates. The
external world is a reality that goes beyond conceptual schemas and can stand
independently of them. Ferraris illustrates this with a good example: “. . . the fact of
knowing that this key lets me open the front door (epistemology) does not allow me
to open the door if I have lost the key in question (ontology).”299 In other words, the
reality encountered is a reality that reveals itself by contradicting our conceptual
expectations and, therefore, stands against the represented reality, which is the
favourite of social constructivists. Mainstream Orientalism critiques, on the other
hand, prefer a different path and make what we see depend on what we know. So, I
can either change what I see as I want or if what I see is what others see, my hands
are tied: a sweet ending that comes with conceptual schemes. It is such a sensitive
subject that searching for a reflection of all the Western practices or ‘lenses’ in
299 Ferraris, Manifesto of New Realism, 27.
106
different parts of the world and arranging similar ones under a specific category can
also be described as a sort of Orientalism. Today’s critique of Orientalism may be
tomorrow’s example of Orientalism.
Without further mentioning the scientific and technological input in Ottoman
cotton cultivation, the path followed by the Ottoman government can be summarised
as follows: Many propitious efforts to intensify cotton production, which started
before Sultan Abdülaziz and gained visibility with the impact of the American Civil
War, were implemented in socio-economic life with laws and regulations that
seemed necessary in this regard. The most noteworthy of these was the “pamuk
zirāʿatiniñ tervīc ve teksīri ḥaḳḳında erzān buyurulub muḳaddemce beyān-nāme-i
maḫṣūṣ ile neşr ve iʿlān olunan müsāʿadāt-ı seniyye fıḳarātı,” [the sections of
imperial permits, which have been approved, issued, and announced with a special
declaration on increasing and reproducing the value of cotton agriculture] dated 27
January 1862. Despite some problems and disruptions in practice, according to the
said declaration, those who would reopen the desolate and barren areas and make
them fields would be given those places free of charge, and then the title deeds of
these lands would be bestowed on them. The tithe would not be taken from the
farmers for one year from the crops of the lands they have opened for agriculture and
two years if the grounds were stony (i.e., not suitable for agriculture). If those who
opened the land for agriculture planted cotton on these lands, the exemption from the
tithe would be increased to five years. At the same time, the duration of the
exemption would be ten years from its announcement. In these ten years, customs
tariffs for cotton would not be changed, and the same rates of customs would be
taken from all kinds of cotton, no matter how high-quality the cotton produced. In
addition, it would be ensured that the cotton to be grown would be easily transported
107
to the piers and that the roads of the cotton cultivation areas would be repaired in
case of damage. Furthermore, if cotton growers demanded to bring agricultural tools
and machinery from Europe, customs would not be charged to them, and the costs of
the tools and machinery that were thought to be brought in case of need would be
covered by the state. Apart from this issue, instructions and pamphlets regarding the
cotton farming method would be prepared and distributed to the regions where cotton
was planted. Finally, an exhibition would be held every year in the cities and towns
of the areas where cotton was grown, and samples of the cotton grown there would
be exhibited, and those producing the highest-quality cotton would be rewarded.300
3.2 The role of scientific input
Despite some problems and deficiencies, from infrastructure to bureaucracy, cotton
cultivation efforts are seen in a vast geography from Edirne to Trabzon and Trabzon
to Cyprus.301 Although many details have been omitted, another important aspect is
missing from the narrative. The role of scientific and technological input and the
exigency for this input by different segments of society lingered in the background in
many academic studies. Nonetheless, even when the press of the period is delved
300 BOA, İ.MVL 462/20815, 19 Şaʿbān 1278/19 February 1862; BOA, HR.SFR.3 70/22, 13
Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1279/6 November 1862; “Pamuk Zirāʿatiniñ Tervīc ve Teksīri Ḥaḳḳında Erzān
Buyurulub Muḳaddemce Beyān-nāme-i Maḫṣūṣ ile Neşr ve iʿlān Olunan Müsāʿadāt-ı Seniyye
Fıḳarātıdır [26 Receb 1278/27 January 1862],” in Düstūr [Tertīb I] (1289 [1872/1873]), 2:437; and
US Congress, House, Executive Documents: Printed by Order of the House of Representatives During
the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress. 1862–’63. In Twelve Volumes (1863), 574–76. The
relevant decisions were also published in the British press. Another interesting point in one of the
news was that attention was drawn to the dissemination of scientific knowledge: “The [g]overnment
also promises to diffuse, by lectures and treatises, a knowledge of the subject, and to institute
periodical exhibitions, at which the best growths will be rewarded with prizes.” “Cotton in Turkey,”
The Leicester Mercury, 1 November 1862, 2. For incentives in this direction, please see BOA,
A.}MKT.UM 567/92, 25 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1278/24 May 1862. According to the news of The Bradford
Observer, in 1862, cotton became a regular export item for the first time in Turkey’s trade history.
“Turkish Cotton,” The Bradford Observer, 31 July 1862, 3. In 1862, a sudden increase in cotton prices
is noticed. Panza, “Globalisation and the Ottoman Empire,” 216.
301 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 255/84, 23 Şaʿbān 1279/13 February 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 259/97,
19 Şevvāl 1279/9 April 1863; BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 262/67, 17 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/6 May 1863; and
BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 264/7, 6 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1279/25 May 1863.
108
into, it can be noticed that the gravity of scientific and technological input is also
mentioned as much as infrastructure problems.302 It is possible to stumble upon many
publications as “sensory actors” revealing that scientific and technological input is
far-reaching enough to be a thesis/dissertation topic in this period. Among these
publications, James Lewis Farley’s statement best expresses the importance of
institutionalising modern science in those days: “It is obvious that a single discovery
in applied chemistry, which may be hourly made in any of the thousands of
laboratories in Western Europe or America, might have the effect . . . .”303 If a more
local precedent is sought within the context of the Ottoman Empire, the use of the
concept of “science” in an official state document itself is also encountered. In the
printed French text of the speech made by Sultan Abdülaziz on the improvement of
the administrative regime, there are references to the “progress” of “science,” its
tools and resources.304 Publications that drew attention to the gravity of scientific and
technological developments and the urgent need for their transfer started to attract
attention before the American Civil War and inflated their discursive power during
the war. In a request written to the Grand Vizier’s office by the CSA in Britain in
1858, it was stated that they demanded the pamphlet, which was adopted by the
302 Although it is not explicitly found in Ottoman sources, the British describe it as a “scientific
mission” to locate and ameliorate a suitable place for cotton cultivation in the region. Cotton Supply
Association, Cotton-Culture in New or Partially Developed Sources of Supply. Report of Proceedings
at a Conference Held on Wednesday, August the 13th, 1862, in the Council Room of the Royal
Horticultural Society, South Kensington, London, between a Deputation from the Cotton Supply
Association, Manchester, and Commissioners with Other Representatives of Countries Showing Raw
Cottons in the International Exhibition (1862), 23.
303 Farley, Turkey, 247. This age can be characterised as the age of experts and piecemeal
specialisation. Renaissance polymaths are now out of fashion. So much so that there was a
specialisation even in brokerage. For a comprehensive narrative about the specialisation in brokerage,
please see Frangakis-Syrett, “Uluslararası Önem Taşıyan Bir Akdeniz Limanının Gelişimi,” 38.
304 “Nous devons maintenant au progrès de la science de tels perfectionnements dans le système des
armes, et sous d’autres rapports, qu’un Gouvernement qui se respecte et qui est soucieux de ses droits,
se trouve forcé de le suivre autant que le lui permettent ses moyens et ses ressources.” [We now owe
to the progress of science such improvements in the system of arms, and in other respects, that a
government which respects itself and which is concerned about its rights, finds itself compelled to
follow it as far as its means and resources permit.] BOA, HR.SFR.3 154/22, 19 May 1869 (emphasis
added).
109
commission, to be translated into Turkish.305 In the same year, a deputy named
Carlton, sent by the commission, visited and examined the cotton-growing areas,
such as Aleppo, Algiers, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Bursa, Crete, Damascus, Edirne,
Erzurum, Harput, Izmir, Kastamonu, Konya, Kurdistan, Mosul, Saida (Sayda), Sivas,
Thessaloníki, Trabzon, and Tripoli, and distributed American cotton seeds free of
charge to farmers in these regions.306 This was just one of the signs that the CSA
desired to make the Ottoman dominions alternative sources for raw cotton.
In an article published in the Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl (Interpreter of Events) dated
13 Ṣafer 1278 [20 August 1861], Mehmed Şerif Efendi, as a sensory actor, expresses
the need for fünūn (plural of fenn)307 for cotton cultivation.308 In this article, it is
recognised that the debate, which was discussed in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis at the
beginning of 1840, still persists as to whether industry or agriculture is more
beneficial for Turkey. Even though some steps have been taken in both agriculture
and industry in the intervening two decades, the continuation of the discussion is an
indication that there has not been an overriding decision yet. According to Mehmed
Şerif Efendi, priority and emphasis should be given to the development of
305 BOA, İ.HR 160/8533, 13 Ṣafer 1275/22 September 1858. This translation will appear two years
later. Since it was written before the American Civil War, historical details that are trivial in the eyes
of the reader are given extensive coverage. Afterwards, cotton types that could be planted in the
Ottoman lands were introduced. It is underlined that the species that could be planted and cultivated in
the Ottoman world ought to be tested beforehand, and it would not be propitious to grow cotton
without experimenting on it. In addition, the dangers that may arise to the crop are explained in detail.
It is possible that this exhaustive account not only warned the farmers but also discouraged them.
BOA, HR.SYS 1889/37, 17 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1277/31 December 1860.
306 BOA, HR.MKT 240/10, 16 Şevvāl 1274/30 May 1858. The foreign press would often mention that
these free cotton seeds distributed throughout the course of the American Civil War boosted up
productivity. “Turkish Cotton,” The Leicester Chronicle or Commercial and Leicestershire Mercury,
6 August 1864, 2.
307 The translation of this word, what it means exactly in English, or if there is any equivalent, is a
subject far beyond the scope of the thesis. That is why it is used in its original form.
308 Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 68, 13 Ṣafer 1278/20 August 1861, 2–3. Mehmed Şerif Efendi was the
brother of Münif Pasha. He taught ʿilm-i emvāl-i milliyye (the ʿilm of national assets; a sort of political
economy) in the first Mekteb-i Mülkiyye, which was established in 1859. He was the first person to
teach what is closest to “economics” in Turkey. Kılınçoğlu, Economics and Capitalism in the
Ottoman Empire, 39.
110
agriculture. In industry, on the other hand, time was needed to reach the range
reached by Europe. However, the aspect of agriculture could be created in a short
time with little “himmet (benevolence).”309 Based on Mehmed Şerif Efendi, who
emphasised the time factor in Europe, by saying, “Avrupalularıñ emtiʿa-i
mütenevviʿayı ehven ṣūretle yapabilmek yolunı bu bābda ṭabīʿatıñ kendülerine aṣlā
yardım itmediği ḥālde mücerred mürūr-ı aʿṣār ile ḥuṣūle gelen mehāret ve melekeleri
vāsıṭasıyle . . . ,” [the way of the Europeans to produce various commodities easily,
although nature never helped them in this sense, only through the skills and faculties
that emerged with the passage of centuries . . . ,] the fault of the Ottoman Empire was
to be lax in the fields of agriculture, trade, and industry from the very beginning.310 It
was an indisputable fact that Mehmed Şerif Efendi studied the political economy of
the West well. Still, it is not possible to talk about a detailed roadmap and plan that
would bring these ideas to life. Instead, the support that should be given to
agriculture, trade, and industry is described in rounded terms: “. . . ṣanāyiʿ fünūnı ve
fünūn ise serveti ve servet ise zirāʿat ve sāʾireye yol virecek ṭuruḳ-ı müteʿaddideyi
vely ider.” [. . . industry emerges by following fünūn, and fünūn by wealth, and
wealth by various paths that lead to agriculture and the like.]311 Despite these rather
abstract, general, and superficial ideas for embodying an overall government policy,
it is remarkable that Mehmed Şerif Efendi underlines the “fünūn” dimension during
the American Civil War. Because the circulation of information is essential not only
for Mehmed Şerif Efendi but also for other actors, such as the CSA.312 Secondly,
309 Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 68, 13 Ṣafer 1278/20 August 1861, 2–3. It is possible to come across this
understanding in earlier texts. For example, according to Ionescu, cotton farming is one of the safest
and surest means of economic independence. Hunt, “The Culture of Cotton in Turkey,” Hunt’s
Merchants’ Magazine (February 1852): 156–59. It seems that the arguments for economic
independence go much further back in Egypt. Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 82.
310 Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 68, 13 Ṣafer 1278/20 August 1861, 2.
311 Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 69, 15 Ṣafer 1278/22 August 1861, 4.
312 The goals of the CSA were not goals that a single actor could handle. Maybe that was why
Henderson said there was “somewhat amateurish spirit” in the CSA’s work. He took an approach with
111
compared to other products of high commercial value, cotton cultivation needed
close monitoring throughout the production process, and it also needed to follow up
the information engendered by the United States as experts in the States took many
steps, diffused technological innovations in the cultivation of this product, and
produced a new knowledge base on its cultivation. Therefore, in the first months of
the American Civil War, in the issue of the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis dated 6 Cemāẕīyyü'lāḫir
1278 [9 December 1861], a detailed article was written about where and how
cotton would be planted, what precautions should be taken to grow cotton, and how
to deal with harmful insects that plagued cotton.313 With the Cotton Famine
precipitated by the American Civil War and the cotton textile industry’s turn to
alternative sources, publications and discussions on agricultural economy also soared
in the Ottoman Empire. For example, Mehmed Şerif Efendi ends his article with the
following sentences:
Şimdi burada bir suʾāl īrād olunabilür ki zirāʿatde kullanılacak makine ve
ālātıñ īcād ve istiʿmāliyle cedāvil ve yollarıñ iʿmāli ve fenn-i zirāʿatiñ tedrīsi
neye mahṣūṣdur el-cevāb fünūna bu fünūnuñ tedrīsi neyi müntic olabilür
ṣanāyiʿ ve zirāʿatiñ yol almasını bunun yol alması neyi intāc ider şübhesiz
serveti işte maṭlūb-da budur bunuñla her şeyʾ yapılur. [Now, a question can
be asked here: What are the purposes of the invention and use of machinery
and tools to be employed in agriculture along with the construction of roads
and the teaching of fenn-i zirāʿat? The answer is fünūn. What can the
education of this fünūn entail? The advancement of industry and agriculture.
What does this lead to, then? Undoubtedly, wealth, that is what is demanded.
Everything is done with it.]314
In addition to these, another journal called the Mecmūʿa-i Neẓāret-i Ticāret
(Journal of the Ministry of Commerce) began its publication life in 1863, which
would provide useful information to the public on trade, craft, and agriculture as a
classic British irony: “It seemed to assume that anyone could grow cotton by following the
instructions printed in leaflets.” Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 38.
313 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 1069, 6 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1278/9 December 1861, 2–3. It has not been very
successful in this regard. In 1866, lice could still be seen in the cotton bales sent from Izmir to
Manchester. BOA, MVL 723/99, 26 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/6 October 1866.
314 Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 69, 15 Ṣafer 1278/22 August 1861, 4.
112
sensory and transmitter actor.315 Brochures about cotton cultivation specific to the
regions were distributed as well. For example, Turkish and Greek pamphlets were
sent to Yanya (Ioannina).316 It is known that an agricultural bulletin was sent to Âlî
Pasha from the Ottoman Embassy in London.317 Thus, various objects played a vital
role in conveying and disseminating knowledge. At times, they exceeded the power
and influence of man. Moreover, they avoided treating what was experienced at a
pre-given level as if they were fantasies put together by people. These publications
are also among the sensory and transmitter actors, in which the recommendations of
the foreign press for cotton cultivation, namely the introduction of new seeds, the
replacement of old agricultural techniques, and the utilisation of effective cotton
gins, are repeated.318 These recommendations were implemented with limited
resources. For instance, cultivation areas were determined by the cotton farming
commissions to be established, American exotic seeds were imported and distributed,
the tithe was taken from the cotton produced per acre, and the cotton customs tariffs
were determined and remained in force for at least ten years.319
Many examples reveal how vital the transfer and dissemination of knowledge
is for cotton. One of the subjects in which scientific knowledge was most necessary
315 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 262/58, 16 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/5 May 1863. Some of the anecdotes from
foreign newspapers about cotton cultivation were also translated into Turkish in this period. BOA,
HR.TO 442/25, 13 August 1862. Articles published abroad on Ottoman agriculture and industry were
also closely followed. For example, the publication of Achille Brodin-Collet, published in La
Célébrité : industrielle, artistique et littéraire, the organ of l’Institut polytechnique universel, aroused
great interest. BOA, HR.TO 441/29, 18 September 1862.
316 “. . . pamuk zerʿi ve ḥarāseti içün vāżıḥ ʿibārāt ile tanẓīmi mevʿūd olan risāleleriñ bir ṭarafı Türkçe
ve bir ṭarafı Rumca olarak miḳdār-ı kāfī nüsḫasınıñ hemān irsāli . . . .” [. . . immediate dispatch of a
sufficient number of copies of the pamphlets, which were promised to be issued with precise phrases
for cotton agriculture, one side in Turkish and one side in Greek . . . .] BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 424/67,
15 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1278/13 June 1862.
317 BOA, HR.SFR.3 64/56, 8 May 1862.
318 “Cotton Cultivation in Turkey,” The Dundee Courier, 1 June 1863, 1.
319 BOA, A.}MKT.MVL 144/58, 16 Şevvāl 1278/16 April 1862. These developments were not
sufficient for British entrepreneurs. Their expectations were for the complete abolition of the tithe, and
these expectations were not met at the end of the day. Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871),
64.
113
was the locust problem. For example, in 1864, it was reported that locusts damaged
cotton crops in both Aydın and Saruhan320 as well as Tırhala.321 The literature on the
measures taken in this regard is limited, and there are documents and bad news about
the damage caused by the locusts to the farmers rather than the effective fight against
them. So much so that in the Taṣvīr-i Efkār (Description of [Public] Opinion[s])322
report stating that all necessary measures have been taken to increase cotton
production, an annotation is made that a desired escalation will occur if the locusts
do not harm the crop.323 Considering that the value of the cotton transported from
Anatolia to Izmir in 1863 reached 4 million liras, and the value of the cotton
exported from Anatolia and Rumelia reached 9 million liras, the impotence of value
production of this magnitude against the locusts was thought-provoking and also
indicated that effective and adequate measures could not be taken against the locusts.
Nevertheless, this problem needed an urgent solution because those who would
purchase cotton paid attention to its pest resistance, high crop yield, and whether the
fibre was silky, and they made their selections based on these criteria. This was the
reason why American planters did more experimental work with cotton than other
planters, namely to procure the best type of cotton.324 In this period, when the
commercial competition intensified so much and industrial agriculture expanded its
borders further to the east, the prominence of knowledge and information faced its
golden age. The reason for the cotton boom, especially in the southern states of the
320 Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no. 193, 2 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1280/9 May 1864, 1.
321 Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no. 198, 23 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1280/30 May 1864, 1.
322 While deciding on the translation, a column of İbrahim Alâeddin Gövsa was used. Gövsa writes in
this column, “. . . taṣvīr-i efkār means the description of ideas. There is no need even to ask what ideas
are meant to describe. It is apparent that the ideas of the people and the general public are meant. In
other words, the original name given to the newspaper is the Taṣvīr-i Efkār-ı ʿUmūmiyye. And
because this form is too long, the word ʿumūmiyye at the end has been removed, causing the
composition to be shortened.” Gövsa, “Efkar-ı Umumiye,” Yedigün, no. 313, 7 March 1939, 8. This
anecdote has been given with a direct translation into English.
323 Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no. 143, 26 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1280/8 November 1863, 1.
324 Hayter, “Expanding the Cotton Kingdom,” 226.
114
United States, was not only the manoeuvrability skills and the capacity of the capital
owned by the growers there. Since the spread of new species of cotton in the 1790s
and the proliferation of (Eli) Whitney’s cotton gin (1793) from one farm to another,
scientific knowledge has become increasingly crucial and has gone through a parallel
process with the institutionalisation of nineteenth-century science.
While examining cotton cultivation and production in Ottoman Empire
during the American Civil War, many foreign or hybrid press were ignored.
Nonetheless, it is also possible to find discussions about cotton in these publications.
The most compelling example that can be given is The Levant Quarterly Review of
Literature and Science.325 Dr Richard Ford Foote, who came to Istanbul after the
Crimean War, was a medical practitioner who began his career by exposing the
abuses he witnessed at the Pauper Lunatic Asylum in Norwich.326 During his years in
Istanbul, he continued to be closely interested in medical studies and wrote articles
for The Sanitary Review and the Medical Circular.327 He undertook the editorship of
The Levant Quarterly Review by establishing a branch of the National Association
for the Promotion of Social Science in England.328 The first issue of the journal was
published in July 1860; it was published quarterly and continued until September
1863.329 The place of publication of the journal was, precisely as in the journal, No.
1, Rue de la Banque, Galata.330 The journal defined its mission as: “A [j]ournal
325 The only piece written about the journal in question was Şeref Etker’s contribution published in
Kebikeç. It would be correct to describe it as a publication presentation rather than an academic
article. In his article, Etker mentions where the journal is registered in which inventory and the content
of the journal. Etker, “The Levant Quarterly Review,” 139–42.
326 Foote, “Reviews. The Levant Review of Literature and Social Science,” The Social Science
Review, and Journal of the Sciences (1 July 1864): 61.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
329 After Dr R. F. Foote died on 17 June 1864—he was only thirty-seven years old when he died—the
journal did not continue its publication life.
330 “Literature. Commercial Literature. The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science,” The
Economist, 6 October 1860, 1096–97. Rue de la Banque is that tiny street where St Pierre Han is
located. Therefore, it is not the main street, namely Voyvoda Caddesi (i.e., Bankalar Caddesi). Its
current name is Eski Banka Sokak.
115
devoted to original communications, reviews, retrospects, reports of learned
societies, and the latest discoveries in [s]cience, together with mercantile and other
miscellaneous information, interesting to all who are in any way connected with the
Levant.” A review published in The Economist praised the journal’s mission but
stated that its appearance was unimpressive, typography was problematic, and there
were numerous printing errors.331 One of the three most prominent articles as
specified by critics in the first issue is Foote’s article “On the Necessity of a Levant
Quarterly Review of Literature, Science, and General Information,” a review of
Xavier Heuschling’s L’Empire de Turquie (1860), and William Sandford’s article
entitled “Social Economy: On Cotton Growing in Turkey and Syria.”332 Besides all
its scientific purposes, the journal also listed among its aims contributing to the
development of agricultural activities in the Ottoman Empire.333 Every article in the
journal is valuable in terms of the social science debates and discourses of the period.
Alongside Dr Foote and Hyde Clarke, Sir John Chardin and A. G. Paspati were
among the journal’s leading authors. The journal published in a wide range of topics
from the education of Christian children in Egypt to the history of the Bulgarian
provinces and from the languages of the gypsies to the socio-economic structure of
Turkey. The Literary Gazette, one of the newspapers that commented on the
magazine, underlined that most of the articles were well written, but they were too
local in some places.334 This criticism of the magazine’s content also indicates that
the locality was ignored.
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid., 1096. A news about the article was also published in the Istanbul press. “Chronique locale et
faits divers,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1512, 28 March 1861, 3.
333 Foote, “Reviews. The Levant Review of Literature and Social Science,” The Social Science
Review, and Journal of the Sciences (1 July 1864): 62.
334 “The Levant Quarterly Review,” The Literary Gazette, no. 115 [2275], 8 September 1860, 181.
116
The conclusion drawn from the article topics of the journal was that it
attached great importance to the development of agriculture, and the journal’s
editorial policy was an ardent supporter of making this agriculture in the light of the
most modern and scientific methods. In the magazine’s first issue, the article entitled
“Social Economy: On Cotton Growing in Turkey and Syria” draws attention to the
following point: a reliable and fair order is required for capital. Last but not least,
waiting for mültezims (tax farmers) to collect the tithe was bringing about serious
trouble. Cotton was being damaged during this waiting. The tithe also turned out to
be a bigger problem for the local people with the intervention of speculators.
Therefore, the recommendation of William Sanford, the author of the article and a
CSA employee, was for the government to give up this income item—at least for one
season—and mobilise the market. He considers it appropriate to abolish the tithe and
slightly increase the import tax and bases this proposal on economic experiments and
experiences in Britain. Considering the Ottoman perspective on the tithe, this was not
even a proposal worthy of discussion from the eyes of the Ottoman bureaucracy.
Behind this proposal was the desire to fix each cotton production area to the
conditions of the United States, ignoring regional differences, state capacity, and
current circumstances.335
In addition to various initiatives and the publishing means, the British
Literary and Scientific Institution was established in Pera, near the Misserie’s
Hotel.336 The Lancet cites April 1860 as its founding date and Sir Henry Bulwer337 as
335 Sandford, “Social Economy: Conditions of Industrial Success. On Cotton Growing in Turkey and
Syria,” The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science (July 1860): 56; and “Literature.
Commercial Literature. The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science,” The Economist, 6
October 1860, 1096.
336 “The Constantinople Association of Pilots,” The Mercantile Marine (October 1860): 313.
337 Sir Henry Bulwer also published an article on aesthetics of poetry called “Original Poetry: The
Power of the Steam” in The Levant Quarterly Review; that is to say, he was in the world of culture and
art as well. “The Levant Quarterly Review.” The Literary Gazette, no. 115 [2275], 8 September 1860,
181.
117
the institute’s president.338 On the night of 22 April 1861, in his speech at the
renovated British Embassy in Pera, Bulwer addressed the members of the British
Literary and Scientific Institution.339 Among the guests of this speech were
diplomats, lawyers, bankers, priests, medical doctors, social scientists, men of letters,
engineers, and mechanical technicians who have shaped the social life of Istanbul
and taken critical positions in the leading institutions and communities of socioeconomic
and political life.340 All of these people can be considered as sensory
actors. Nonetheless, some of them have also been transmitter and entrepreneurial
actors. The only function of the society was not to be a gentlemen’s club where
politics or literature would be discussed. The purpose of this institution, similar to the
Syllogos of the Greek community and the ʿOsmānlı Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi (Ottoman
Literary Society) of the Muslim subjects, was to help the formation of a public
opinion in the fields of the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, social sciences,
and literature. This structuring can also be compared to the aforementioned
gentlemen’s clubs that have existed in Britain for a long time, especially since the
eighteenth century.341
338 “The Levant Quarterly Review of Literature and Science. Edited by R. F. Foote, M. D.,” The
Lancet (10 November 1860): 465.
339 Kentel, “Drawing Cosmopolitan Pera,” 63.
340 Ibid. It is not yet known how much these and similar associations or “clubs” include women and
children. In this context, these institutions should not be characterised as micro-societies from which
we can map social relations. Yet, the history of these institutions is essentially narratives made up of
conversations, rumours, and gossip. The walls are the only witnesses of these conversations, fights,
dreams, and even the various plans prepared to bring them to life.
341 “. . . ʿulūm-ı ʿāliyye ve fünūn-ı sāmiyyeniñ merkez-i istiḥṣāli pāy-i taḫt-ı şehinşāh-ı maʿdeletintimā
ʾ ve ṣanāyiʿ-i ġarībe ve meʿārif-i ʿacībeniñ muḳırr-ı istikmāli ḳıṭʿa-i Avrupa olarak ehālī-i
merḳūmeniñ her biri birer ṣūretle evḳāt-güẕār ve taḥṣīl-i maʿlūmāta ṣārif-i nuḳūd-ı bī-şümār oldığı
misillü Londra ehālī ve sekenesi dahi kemāl-i ṣafāʾ-yı bāl ile imrār-ı evḳāt itmek ve istediği fenn ü
maʿrifeti sühūlet ile derece-i ḥuṣūle getürmek üzere kulüb [club] nāmıyle nām-dār olan cemʿiyyetgāhlar
tertīb ve taḫṣīṣ ve bir kaç biñ kīse akçe ṣarfıyle ebniye-i ẓarīfeler inşāʾ ve tarṣīṣ itmişler ve şu
vechle bir ḳāʿide-i müstaḥseneye rabṭ eylemişlerdir . . . [;] cemʿiyyet-gāh-ı meẕkūrda her bir ʿulūm ve
fünūn ve meʿārif ve mūriѕ-i ẕevḳ ü sürūr olan luʿbiyyāt ü leṭāʾif mevcūd ve her biriniñ mevāḳiʿ-i
maḫṣūṣaları rū-nümūd olub ehālī-i merḳūme maḥāll-i meẕkūreden birine yazılarak maʿlūmāt-ı
meşrūḥadan kangısına [hangisine] mecbūr ise be-her gün oraya gidüb hem-meşrebleriyle imrār-i vaḳt
ider.” [. . . as the centre where the ʿulūm-ı ʿāliyye and fünūn-ı sāmiyye are produced, the European
continent where the astonishing “industry” and strange “skills, arts, and knowledge” are developed to
the highest degree, every people in this continent spends unlimited money to make good use of their
118
Even though in a review on The Levant Quarterly Review in The Literary
Gazette, the purpose of the British Literary and Scientific Institution is presented as
developing relations between the British and Levantine population living in Istanbul,
creating an intellectual environment, and promoting intelligence, more detailed
studies on the subject are required.342 Because the existing studies do not say
anything about who from the Ottoman subjects participated in the institute’s
activities. However, the lecture given by Alfred Augustus Fry343 at the institute was
turned into a booklet and published in The Levant Herald’s office (as in the
newspaper, No. 28, Rue Yazidji, Teké, Pera). Societies included in the dedication part
of the book are: “. . . the Members of the British Literary and Scientific Institution in
Pera, of the Mechanics’ Institution at Haskeui [Hasköy], and of the Literary Society
at Ortakeui [Ortaköy].”344 As can be deduced from the dedication of this lecture,
which was given and written on Lord Macaulay and his literature, the ʿOsmānlı
Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi had a relationship with these communities. The members of
the ʿOsmānlı Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi may have participated in the activities of other
societies as well. Nonetheless, reducing the institute’s work to a purely intellectual
pursuit is not correct. It should not be forgotten that the Levantines of Galata and
Pera brought about a totally different world in Istanbul with their unique lifestyles
and habits that shaped around them since the second half of the nineteenth century.
In Galata, there were printing houses, newspaper publishing houses, bankers,
time and to collect knowledge; similarly, the people and residents of London established societies and
associations called “clubs” to spend their time and obtain the knowledge and ingenuity they want with
ease, even they built elegant buildings with the expenditure of a few thousand purses of akçe and
bound these associations to admirable rules on this road . . . [;] in the aforementioned societies, there
are every “ʿulūm ve fünūn,” “meʿārif,” and “luʿbiyyāt ü leṭāʾif,” each having its own special place, and
the people mentioned are registered to these clubs, and, whichever they have to, go there every day
and spend time with their interest groups . . . .] Seyāḥat-nāme-i Londra (1269 [1852/1853]), 27–28.
342 The Levant Quarterly Review.” The Literary Gazette, no. 115 [2275], 8 September 1860, 181.
343 A British barrister-at-law.
344 Fry, A Lecture on Lord Macaulay (February 1861), 3.
119
lawyers, and doctors’ offices, and many various workplaces, while Pera was rather
an aristocratic settlement that developed under the leadership of embassies. After the
1850s, with the coming together of miscellaneous groups, an utterly different urban
space was formed in terms of social, cultural, and physical aspects.
Then, some fundamental questions to be asked in the context of the British
Literary and Scientific Institution are: What was the founding purpose and objective
of the institution? Did a society established before the Syllogos and the ʿOsmānlı
Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi set a precedent for these societies? If so, was this a one-sided
process, given current academic debates on the history and philosophy of science and
technology? Was the institution established only to meet the intellectual needs of
foreign actors living in Istanbul? What were the socio-economic and political
motivations that played a role in its establishment? After the Crimean War, when the
economic activities of the British and Levantines in the Ottoman Empire proliferated
exponentially, what sort of knowledge did these societies bring into being and put
into use to promote modern sciences and technologies? Enquiring into the role of
these societies in moulding the scholarly debates in the late Ottoman intellectual and
socio-economic milieu as well as public and private initiatives might offer a
contribution to the history of the development of the late Ottoman scientific debates.
Such an investigation might also shed light on the impact that such societies had
within the Ottoman Empire in the economic sphere and in the dissemination and
construction of scientific knowledge.
The institution’s public lectures were given weekly during the winter months.
Researchers have yet to track down the participants of these public lectures. The
institution had a chess room and an extensive library along with a news-room where
120
English and local newspapers and periodicals could be viewed and read.345 The
British, who have been to Istanbul, used to visit this institution, especially to follow
the newspapers. For example, a British traveller writing to The Nautical Magazine
noted that he found publications, such as Punch and the Illustrated News, The Daily
Telegraph, The Standard, The Malta Times, The Nautical Magazine, The Blackwood,
and Chambers’ Journal, in the institution’s library.346 According to this traveller’s
account, in 1873, the institution had 200 members, and the lectures were hung on the
wall of the reading room.347 The piece of information that rendered the British
Literary and Scientific Institution a part of the story of cotton in the Ottoman Empire
was that the British embassy priest in Pera, Revd Mr Gribblé, gave a public lecture
on cotton cultivation at the institution.348 Unfortunately, no written record or
narrative of this course has yet been found.
The above-mentioned institution, founded by the British in Pera, was not the
first scientific society in the Ottoman Empire. An unspecified number of similar
societies that existed in the empire prior to this institution were: la Société orientale
de Constantinople (the Oriental Society of Constantinople), the Constantinople
Mechanics’ Institute at Haskeui (Hasköy), the Imperial Medical Society, the Levant
Quarantine Association, the Committee on Railways, and the Smyrna Literary and
Scientific Institution.349 They were established by foreign actors, primarily British,
345 “Turkey. The British Literary and Scientific Institution,” in Bradshaw’s Continental Railway
Guide (February 1866), 498.
346 “Correspondence. Constantinople.—British Library, Reading Rooms, and Lecture Hall. To the
Editor of The Nautical Magazine,” The Nautical Magazine (September 1873): 747.
347 Ibid. In another narrative, it was stated that the number of members for the year 1861 was more
than 200. “Mission of Constantinople,” The Mission Field (1 February 1861): 38. When the
organisational structures of other similar local societies are examined, it is noticed that the British
Literary and Scientific Institution is imitated.
348 “The Cultivation of Cotton in Turkey,” The Manchester Courier and Lancashire General
Advertiser, 17 January 1863, 8. It is noteworthy that Mr Gribblé taught cotton farming as a reverend at
the institution. More extensive research is needed to find out where Gribblé’s knowledge to give
lectures on this subject comes from.
349 “The 1859 Shepherd’s Oriental Yearbook refers to the ‘Smyrna Literary and Scientific Institution’
at 19 Frank Street, with a reading room and library, stocking newspapers in many languages, and
121
who collaborated with local actors in the second half of the nineteenth century.
While some of these societies gravitated towards the social sciences, others revolved
around the natural sciences or other practical disciplines, such as medicine or
engineering. Still, there are no academic studies investigating them. A close
examination of the structures, members, and publications of these ‘clubs,’ whose
numbers have increased since the second half of the nineteenth century, will change
not only our knowledge of Ottoman cotton cultivation and production during the
American Civil War but also what we know about the science that began to be
institutionalised in the Ottoman Empire.
In addition to these societies, at a time when translation activities were
increasing, a society called the Teʾlīf ve Tercüme Cemʿiyyeti was established within
the Meʿārif Neẓāreti (Ministry of Education).350 Münif Pasha, who also presided over
the ʿOsmānlı Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi and the Mecmūʿa-i Fünūn, assumed the
presidency of the society.351 The society, which started its activities in 1865, aimed
to translate popular literary and scientific publications into Turkish.352 Although no
holding Monday philosophical classes and Thursday lectures.” There was also an English Club at the
same address. Mansel, Levant, 165. It is seen in the records that the meetings of the Homer Masonic
Lodge were held here. Lane, Masonic Records (1895), 319. The venue was also a hotel that provided
a place for intellectual meetings. The institution’s name, content, and structure signify that it is a
branch of the British Literary and Scientific Institution. It was established before the British Literary
and Scientific Institution, and it was more local compared to this society. The Literary and Scientific
Institutions Act, which dealt with the opening and management of these societies in Britain and
abroad, was adopted in 1854. Literary and Scientific Institutions Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 112.
Some meetings of the Imperial Cotton Commission were also held here. US Congress, House, Letter
of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial Relations of the United States with
Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1862 (1863), 577. It was written that in 1834,
Frank Street was started to be paved with stones. Based on the common opinion of many travellers,
this street was the most beautiful and most significant in Smyrna at that time. Today’s structure starts
from the east of Kemeraltı and extends to Pasaport, Cumhuriyet Square, and Alsancak. Demirbaş,
Rees Köşkü, 23. One of the well-known figures who gave public lectures at the institution was Cyrus
Hamlin. Hamlin’s public lecture “The Problem of Freedom and Slavery in the United States” was later
published as a pamphlet. In this work, Hamlin takes a stance favouring emancipation from slavery.
Hamlin, “The Problem of Freedom and Slavery in the United States,” The American Presbyterian and
Theological Review (April 1863): 267.
350 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 336/37, 7 Ṣafer 1282/2 July 1865.
351 BOA, MVL 873/80, 16 Şevvāl 1282/4 March 1866.
352 BOA, İ.MVL 529/23733, 16 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1281/12 April 1865.
122
publications on cotton have yet been identified among the work of this short-lived
society—which is not surprising since its establishment coincided with the end of the
American Civil War—it may be argued that it contributed to the scientific activities
in the empire.
Within the scope of scientific input, among the most significant
breakthroughs in the Ottoman lands was the distribution of pamphlets and treatises
on cotton cultivation. One of the most comprehensive was the risāle published in the
Taḳvīm-i Ticāret (Commercial Directory) on cotton agriculture belonging to an
Ottoman subject whose name (or nickname) was Kadri in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis.353 It
is not possible to be sure that Kadri is the same person as Kadri, who is encountered
in other publications, such as the Mecmūʿa-i Fünūn, since he does not have a title
other than his first name to distinguish him from other figures of the period. For the
same reason, it is ambiguous whether he took office in the Tercüme Odası
(Translation Office) or the Teʾlīf ve Tercüme Cemʿiyyeti (Writing and Translation
Society [of Books]). However, the mystery of his identity does not overshadow the
importance of his publication. Newspaper anecdotes containing detailed information
about the planting of cotton seeds were collected, and 1,500 copies were separately
printed in the form of a pamphlet. William Churchill, the owner of the newspaper
Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, who covered the cost of the pamphlet, was paid 2,375 piastres by
the government. In the state correspondences, it was highlighted that with the
application of the methods described in the risāle, progress in cotton agriculture
would be achieved in a short time.354 In addition, at the very beginning of the risāle,
353 Kadri, Pamuk Zirāʿatine Dāʾir Olub Defʿa-i Evvelī Olmak Üzere Taḳvīm-i Ticāret’de Tabʿ ve
Temsīl Olunan Risāledir (1283 [1866]). This risāle, which was published in the Maṭbaʿa-i (Printing
Press) Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, is also available in the Ottoman Archive (BOA). BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9
Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19 September 1866.
354 BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19 September 1866.
123
dated 1 May 1866, it was pointed out that the negative impact of the peace in the
United States on global cotton production would not pose a threat to the Ottoman
Empire if the recommendations and instructions in the risāle were followed with
strict attention to details. Stating that the topics, such as how, when, and how many
times the fields to be planted cotton would be ploughed according to the type of land,
how to plant cotton seeds, and what points to pay attention to, would be discussed
within the scope of the risāle, Kadri reported that the points to be considered during
the harvest would also be mentioned.
Although it is said at the beginning of the pamphlet that the agriculture of
some crops is not reasonable in compliance with the political economy of the period
due to the agricultural prices, cotton is not included among these crops.355 In the
pamphlet, which also drew attention to the heightened cotton prices attributable to
the American Civil War, it was written that one ḳıyye wheat was sold for 15-20
piastres. In contrast, a ḳıyye cotton was sold for one piastre. One of the main
arguments of the pamphlet was that cotton cultivation would be beneficial for land
reclamation. In this respect, it is seen that the risāle aims to persuade the
agriculturalists to cotton farming. Since the text of Kadri coincided with the end of
the American Civil War, he was most probably aware of the possibility of a plunge
in the price of raw cotton with the re-entry of the United States into the cotton market
after the war. Bearing in mind the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis’s publications to promote cotton
355 “İstiʿmāli ʿumūmī olmıyan baʿż-ı maḥṣūlāt zirāʿatinden her ne-ḳadar menāfiʿ-i kesīre müşāhede
olunursa da ekonomi politik [political economy] ḳāʿidesince müṭālaʿa olundığı ḥālde bu maḳūle
maḥṣūlātıñ külliyyet üzere zerʿ olunması cāʾiz değildir çünki maḥṣūlāt-ı meẕkūre lüzūmundan ziyāde
ḥāṣıl oldığı ḥālde fīʾātca żarūrü'l-vuḳūʿ olan tedennī zürrāʿ ṭāʾifesini maḥṣūlāt-ı meẕkūre zerʿinden
ferāgata mecbūr ideceği der-kārdır.” [Even though many benefits are observed from the cultivation of
some crops whose use is not general, when examined by the rules of political economy, it is not
appropriate to cultivate such crops as a whole, because it is apparent that if the aforementioned crops
are produced more than necessary, the decrease in prices will force the agriculturalists to renounce the
agriculture of the mentioned crops.] BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19
September 1866 (emphasis added).
124
cultivation since the advent of the American Civil War, it was natural for him to
include current debates in the pamphlet published by the newspaper’s own printing
house and to refute the arguments that would break belief in cotton agriculture.
According to Kadri, the end of the American Civil War eliminated the urgent need
for raw cotton. He considered it absolutely feasible to gain market share if adequate
effort and time were spent and American cotton seeds were planted and grown to a
high quality. In addition, he deemed the proximity of the Ottoman Empire to Europe
an advantage.356
The first improvement needed, according to Kadri, is to abandon the hitherto
used native seeds and generalise American seeds instead. It was the most successful
strategy of the period. He compares types of cotton with one another and concludes
that the Sea Island is of higher quality. However, since there are different varieties of
cotton seeds in America, the species of cotton seed that is more suitable for the
Ottoman geography, as the experience dictates, is the New Orleans seed.357 He also
states that in the absence of this seed, the use of Egyptian cotton seed is also
appropriate. Sharing the characteristics of suitable soil structure, such as when the
land is soft, stone-free, and the soil is deep and rich in minerals, Kadri mentions
which soil structures are not suitable as well, for example, clayey soil. He attributes
the unsuccessful cotton trials to the planting of the cotton in the wrong soil. Kadri
also pays attention to the fact that Anatolia is still a geologically young land
formation. Thus, he elaborates on the differences between the southern regions of the
356 BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19 September 1866.
357 There is an example that confirms Kadri’s claim. Nâmık Pasha’s Sea Island cotton (Gossypium
barbadense) trials in Diyarbakır were unsuccessful. Taylor [Consul], “Turkey. Diarbekr. Report of
Mr. Consul Taylor, on the Trade of the Pashalik of Diarbekr for the Half-Year Ending December 10th,
1862,” in Commercial Reports Received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s Consuls between
January 1st and June 30th, 1862 (1863), no. 3229, at 70:478–79.
125
United States and Anatolia. Apart from the rest, he brings up the absence of a capitalowning
agricultural class.358
Another quasi-scientific observation Kadri makes is that strong winds are not
reckoned with in cotton farming. Nevertheless, the cotton plant should be protected
against the sharp winds blowing from the north and south in the Ottoman geography,
and ideally, it should face the west. The cotton plant, which has its back to the
northern and southern winds, should stand against the sun, and the field where it is
planted should be moderately humid. In autumn, the fields should be ploughed as
quickly as possible, and the soil should be left fallow at appropriate times until the
seed is planted. The pamphlet complains that the farmers do not leave their fields
fallow and do not fertilise the soil. Besides, according to Kadri’s assertion, these
saplings are either fed to animals or used as wood instead of being used as natural
fertilisers. For this reason, cotton grown on land that is not fallowed and left without
fertiliser cannot keep up with the harsh conditions of nature.359
358 “. . . ṣarfı lāzım gelen ser-māyeye mālik olmıyan zürrāʿ ṭāʾifesine uṣūl-i meẕkūreyi ḳabūl ve icrāʾ
itdirmek şimdilik mümkün olamaz bir tarlaya toḫum zerʿinden evvel toprağıñ ḥālini bilmekliğiñ ne
derece ehemmiyyeti oldığı ilerüde beyān olunacak taʿrīfātdan añlaşılur eğer zirāʿat olunan tarla ekilen
toḫuma müsāʿid değil ise idilen meṣārif beyhūdeye gider ve bu meṣārif-de az bir şeyʾ değildir.” [. . .
for the time being, it will not be possible for the agriculturalists who do not have the capital to be
spent to accept and implement the aforementioned procedure. How important it is to know the state of
the soil before planting seeds in a field will be understood from the recipes that will be declared later.
If the cultivated field is not suitable for the seed sown, the expenses will be in vain, and these
expenses are not small.] BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19 September 1866.
359 “Pamuk ekilen tarlalara gübre vażʿı uṣūlü istiʿmāl olunmadıkca Amerika ve maḥāll-i sāʾireden aʿlā
cins pamuk toḫumı celb ve zirāʿatiñ hiçbir fāʾidesi görülemez bu ḥuṣūṣ tecārib-i mükerrere ve
fiʿiliyyeye müstenid oldığından iştibāh idecek yeri olmıyub hemān ḳabūl ve icrāʾsı lāzım gelür.”
[Unless the method of adding fertiliser to the fields planted with cotton is used, there will be no
benefit in bringing and farming the best kind of cotton seeds from America and similar places. There
is no room to doubt that this issue is dependent on repeated experiences and actions, and it needs to be
accepted and executed immediately.] BOA, İ.MVL 560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19
September 1866. In this section, Kadri compares the Ottoman Empire with Egypt and states that there
is no need for industrial fertilisers in Egypt due to the tides of the Nile and that its land does not need
fallow. Fowler, Report on the Cultivation of Cotton in Egypt (1861), 13. Essential details of cotton
planting, cleaning, and sales began before the American Civil War and persisted until after the war.
There were cases where outlandish pieces such as matches were found in the cotton bales taken from
Izmir and the cleaning was not taken care of. This type of news was a heavy blow to the manufacturer
and the seller. “Smyrna Cotton,” The Guardian, 18 March 1865, 5. Therefore, it is possible to think of
many newspapers as also pamphlets. In the United States, publications such as De Bow’s Review have
undertaken the mission of informing farmers about cotton. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 115. However,
considering that some newspapers remained local, the pamphlets that were prepared may have been
126
Stating that the sarclage (hoeing/weeding) method is the most costly and
time-consuming, Kadri says that in some regions of Balıkesir and Aydın, children
employed in this job are given seven piastres per day and adults fourteen to fifteen
piastres daily—he speaks of four-hundred to five-hundred piastres per day for some
extensive lands. Notwithstanding that the method’s difficulty is mentioned, the story
of the workers remains in the shadows once again since it is a very mechanical and
goal-oriented pamphlet. Even though there are some narratives about women
workers, women are not directly included in this pamphlet. Most of the methods
mentioned are defined as “uṣūl-i cedīde (new method[s]).” It is addressed that
although these methods and tools may seem expensive at first, they will eventually
reduce costs. On the one hand, he says that the drainage method, which is one of
these new uṣūl(s), is not suitable for the Ottomans because it requires capital. But on
the other hand, he also talks about this method for those who can afford it. After the
implementation of this method in Britain, the value of the land grew threefold. This
may indirectly indicate that small producers were in the majority in the Ottoman
Empire. After delineating how some “taḳlīds (imitations/simulations)” of the
drainage method can be implemented, attention is drawn to the mistakes made in the
cotton harvest. The last issue touched upon in the pamphlet is the urgent need for
people who know how to use imported machinery.360
used to reach a wider audience. “Smyrne et son commerce d’exportation,” Journal de Constantinople,
no. 4428, 26 July 1864, 1. In addition, short incentive statements were already sent to the provinces
suitable for cotton cultivation. BOA, A.}MKT.UM 566/48, 20 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1278/19 May 1862.
360 “. . . makine gāyet sāde görinürse de ḥaḳīḳatde pek ziyāde muṣannaʿ ve nāzik bir şeyʾ oldığından
tecrübesi sebḳat itmiyen eşḫāṣ lāyıḳıyle istiʿmāl idemiyeceği cihetle dāʾimā ḥüsn-i ḥālde tutmak ve
bozılursa taʿmīr eylemek içün her makine başında erbābından bir kişiniñ bulunması lāzım gelür.”
[Although the machine may seem quite plain, in reality, it is a very intricate and sensitive thing, and
since it cannot be appropriately used by inexperienced people, it is necessary to have a skilled person
at each machine to keep it in good condition and to repair it if it breaks down.] BOA, İ.MVL
560/25164, 9 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1283/19 September 1866.
127
In this text, which is not known to what extent it reaches the agriculturalists
and how much it is comprehended, is only a sort of information imported from
Europe mentioned? Is there not an amalgamation of local procedures and knowledge
from Europe? Recently, the concept of hybrid knowledge has come to the fore in the
trend of reductionist historiography that accuses even the ontological analysis of the
situation with Eurocentrism. It would not be realistic to claim that hybrid knowledge
dominated a commodity in Ottoman agriculture. It would be the most plausible
approach for some agricultural products to be dominated by hybrid knowledge, for
some merely local knowledge, and for others modern agricultural (agronomic)
knowledge that has been finalised in Europe and the United States. It is onerous and
problematic to discuss hybrid knowledge when deliberating about cotton cultivation,
even considering local conditions. In all kinds of narratives and in different primary
sources, it is often emphasised that local methods are faulty. There is an almost
consensus on this matter. Although local farmers had some experience, these
experiences did not make them more successful than a chemist at talking to nature.
Today, it is not a matter of discussion that modern agricultural methods and
technologies, which progress parallel with institutionalised science (along with
technology), are much more productive, thriving, and promising in interacting with
nature. Furthermore, writing a success story in cotton agriculture with local experts
and hybrid knowledge is also impractical since local cotton seeds are not melded and
meliorated with scientific methods and are of poorer quality. For example, Kadri also
states in his pamphlet that the methods he considers “old-school” have already been
abandoned in the United States. There is no tendency in Kadri’s tone to denigrate the
knowledge of the local people or to characterise the new ways as “saviours” that
128
allowed the empire to “progress.”361 It is, more precisely, an ontological reality that
Kadri draws attention to, which proves why cotton could not be grown well and
offers solutions. Therefore, it would be a more accurate approach to consider
scientific knowledge as an instrument used to maximise profits, especially for cotton.
It is hoped that the new methods will eliminate the “fatal engourdissement
(numbness)” that has infiltrated the soil.362 An ideal distance can be placed between
speculation and reality only if state standardisation and simplification are considered
by-products of this economic goal.
Besides the newspaper articles on Turkey’s resources, books were also
published in this period. The most famous of them was James Lewis Farley’s book
The Resources of Turkey (1862), frequently advertised in various publications such
as The Money Market Review. The London Ambassador of the Ottoman Empire,
Musurus Bey, thanked him in a private letter and said that this book would attract
British investors to the country to invest in fields such as railways.363 It is not known
whether Farley intended to benefit from the Ottoman Empire in writing such a book,
but it can be asserted that it paid off. Farley’s request to enter the Ottoman service,
first in The Levant Herald (1856–1914, with cuts and name change),364 which was
also funded by the government, was accepted, and then he worked at the Ottoman
consulate in Bristol.365 While working in Bristol, he wrote another book called
361 Burçak, “Modernization, Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman
Empire,” 69.
362 “L’héritage du roi coton II,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4568, 5 January 1865, 1. This is not
just a duality produced in mind. The fact that something is new is an ontological reality, just as
something is solid. According to Robert William Cumberbatch, the then British consul in Izmir, there
is no obstacle to cotton production in this country, except for those arising from the primitive
agricultural system. “Le coton en Turquie,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4511, 31 October 1864, 1.
What should be criticised in this discourse is not that there is a type of restrictive scientism (a narrow
and strong position) but that the lack of capital is lost in the narrative from time to time. Leaving this
criticism aside and criticising restrictive scientism is a superfluous addition that hides the problem
rather than revealing and explaining the driving force behind the narrative.
363 Musurus to Farley, “The Resources of Turkey,” The Money Market Review (5 July 1862): 8.
364 BOA, HR.SFR.3 154/11, 14 May 1869.
365 BOA, HR.SFR.3 160/53, 31 March 1870.
129
Modern Turkey (1872) and sent a copy to Musurus Pasha—Musurus was given the
title of pasha after Sultan Abdülaziz visited Britain in 1867.366
The scientific knowledge spread in the vast geography of the empire through
publications and actors is also reflected in applied studies. As a result of scientific
observations in Cyprus as of 1865, it was thought that drilling water (artesian) wells
for cotton farming would be successful. Thereupon, it was decided to carry it out
together with the necessary engineers.367 To be sure, it was possible to use traditional
methods in drilling water wells, but it was a viable approach to prefer new techniques
instead of classical well drilling for a crop such as cotton that spreads over large
areas and requires special attention and treatment. The aim was primarily to augment
productivity of cotton farming.
3.3 The role of technological input
The lack of machinery was also noted in the foreign press.368 According to Frederick
LaFontaine, a cotton cultivator and businessman from Izmir, the advantage of new
technologies in cotton farming would be better grasped when new machines replaced
366 BOA, HR.SFR.3 180/77, 17 April 1872.
367 “Il résulte des observations scientifiques qu’il est très probable et presque même certain qu’on
réussirait à forer des puits artésiens, et, quand on considère que l’eau ici a une valeur égale à celle de
la terre, on peut facilement comprendre combien une entreprise de ce genre serait rémunératoire.” [It
follows from scientific observations that it is very probable and almost certain that we would succeed
in drilling artesian wells, and, when we consider that the water here has a value equal to that of the
earth, we can easily understand how an enterprise of this kind would be remunerative.] “La culture du
coton en Turquie,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4706, 17 June 1865, 1.
368 “The want of good seed and a better class of machinery for cleaning the crop appears to be much
felt by cultivators.” The Morning Post, 24 September 1862, 6; “The Supply of Cotton from Asia
Minor [from The Cotton Supply Reporter],” The Glasgow Herald, 21 August 1862, 2; and Frangakis-
Syrett, “İzmir’de Pamuk ve Kumaş Ticareti,” 111. Another point that reveals the gravity of the
situation is the primitiveness and scarcity of the machines to be used in cotton production and
sanitation in cities far from Istanbul and western Anatolia. For example, there were only two cotton
gins in Basra. Johnston [Vice-Consul], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of
Cotton. Baghdad, Moossul, Bussorah, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Caiffa and Acre. Bussorah, Turkish
Arabia. His Highness Namick Pasha, Governor-General,” in Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s
Consuls in the Ottoman Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a Summary of Their
Replies (1865), no. 3498, at 57:7.
130
old equipment. LaFontaine, as an entrepreneurial actor, believes this would result in
ten times the yield. To illustrate, he cites a farmer he knows well. This farmer
attempted to sell his farm for 80,000 piastres for a while but could not find a buyer
for his desired price. After the introduction of new agricultural techniques and
machinery, he succeeded in making a net profit of 70,000 piastres in a year from
cotton alone on his farm. Moreover, he hopes to triple that amount next year.369
Although there was an effort to foster an expectation to raise cotton production in
every newspaper column of the period, LaFontaine’s approach did not seem
problematic. Because the lack of technology brought with it a waste of time to
separate the fibre and seed of the growing crop. The understanding that time is
money was dominant in commercialised agriculture. In addition to the lack of
technology, the shortage of engineers is also noted in the British consul reports. As
the local Ottoman administrators maintained, they did not have engineers who could
guide them correctly on these issues. In the consul reports, engineers from Britain to
conduct investigations and prepare reports on the Ottoman geography are
requested.370 Judging by the foreign experts that the Ottomans needed in this period,
it would be possible to argue that the state and different layers of society did not
enter the age of full specialisation in a narrow technical field and that the early
modern era of the so-called hezār-fenns (close to polymaths) somewhat endured. The
increasingly efficient mobility of sensory actors also marked the transition to the age
of experts.
369 “Turkey. The Cultivation of Cotton,” The North and South Shields Gazette, 9 January 1862, 6.
370 Lang [Acting Consul], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton. Syria
and the Island of Cyprus. Island of Cyprus,” in Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the
Ottoman Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a Summary of Their Replies (1865),
no. 3498, at 57:22–24. The failures in the Epirus region are also attributed to these and similar
problems. Stuart [Consul], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton.
Turkey in Europe. Epirus,” in Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Ottoman Dominions
Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a Summary of Their Replies (1865), no. 3498, at 57:30.
131
Being aware of the seriousness of this situation, Safvet Pasha, in the letter he
wrote to Musurus Bey, after mentioning the steps taken for the promotion of cotton
cultivation in Turkey, asked Musurus Bey for new information on cotton agriculture
and requested that the socio-economic situation of the Muslim people be taken into
account in the selection of suitable model/sample tools. In addition, if there were any
treatises on cotton agriculture that might be useful to be translated into Turkish
through the agency of Musurus Bey, it was ordered to obtain information about them
and send the copies to Safvet Pasha as soon as possible.371 At this point, it is
sometimes seen that a sensory actor can also be an entrepreneurial actor. In other
words, the identities observed in cotton production were not always fixed. Fluid
identities were also available. This status also applied to cotton producers who
worked within the CSA or who had a close relationship with the CSA. A chaotic
identity situation is also articulated with the complex production dynamics in
different regions because performing the roles of both identities brought with it new
challenges. Once in a while, actors failed to fulfil the required actions of both
identities properly.
It was reported that some tools for selecting and sorting seeds for the
province of Aydın would be sent and taught to the public to use them, the cost of
these would be paid by the treasury, and the amount of the tithe to be collected would
be determined according to the per acre of the planted area.372 Some of the British
consul reports allude to the success of such attempts, while others note that they are
371 He also mentions the substance of the practical dimension of the new knowledge to be obtained: “It
will not escape your observation that these treatises, to attain the object which the [g]overnment would
have in view in circulating them in rural districts, must be precise, and essentially practical.” BOA,
HR.SFR.3 69/8, 8 October 1862.
372 BOA, A.}MKT.MVL 144/58, 16 Şevvāl 1278/16 April 1862. Collecting the tithe according to the
per acre of the planted area was also applied in Izmir at that time. BOA, MVL 656/67, 6 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir
1280/20 September 1863.
132
unsuccessful. Particularly in the eastern parts of the country, mainly the Fertile
Crescent, most of the machines brought from Europe and America were the efforts of
foreign entrepreneurs. The attitude of local governments here is expressed as “dogin-
the-manger.”373 This statement from the Cyprus consular report is an example of
the challenges that transmitter actors pose to entrepreneurial actors.
There were many non-Muslims from the Tarsus sanjak who were allowed to
cultivate cotton by machine, such as R. Papasian (Papasyan). In another example, a
Greek engineer named Trypani came to the fore in Cilicia. This Greek engineer, who
started the cotton cleaning business with a small cotton gin, later became known for a
company called the Trypani Brothers.374 There were also those who were British
subjects and imported cotton carding machines.375 Machines imported from Britain
were shipped to the necessary places, albeit in limited numbers. For example,
(cotton) gins were built in Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin to clean cotton more
effectively.376 Two gins imported from London were accordingly shipped to Sivas.377
Various conveniences have been provided in the importation and customs clearance
of the machines.378 In addition, machinery was distributed to encourage cotton
373 “. . . [CSA] offered me, three years since, all necessary implements gratis; the Syrian Relief
Society would, I have reason to believe from their letters, have provided me with funds, provided I
could have land on good title, and my answer was, against the law; Europeans [cannot] hold land.”
Grierson [Vice-Consul], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton. Syria
and the Island of Cyprus. Latakia,” in Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Ottoman
Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a Summary of Their Replies (1865), no. 3498,
at 57:26.
374 BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 393/91, 19 Receb 1278/20 January 1862; and Fraser, The Short Cut to India
(1909), 77. Another local entrepreneurial actor, named Mıgırdıç Kayseriliyan, one of the Armenian
subjects, had a six-horsepower steam engine built in Geyikli of the Biga sanjak to clean cotton. BOA,
İ.MVL 524/23530, 28 Receb 1281/27 December 1864.
375 BOA, HR.MKT 379/52, 20 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1277/30 May 1861; and BOA, HR.MKT 415/50, 3
Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1279/27 October 1862.
376 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 299/36, 26 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1280/3 May 1864. The import of a cotton gin, which
was expected to be made in Edirne in the same year, was reflected in the foreign press. “Cotton from
Turkey,” The North Devon Journal, 13 October 1864, 7.
377 BOA, C.İKTS 2/97, 21 Ṣafer 1282/16 July 1865.
378 BOA, HR.MKT 411/46, 28 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1279/23 September 1862; and BOA, MVL 646/84, 8
Şevvāl 1279/29 March 1863.
133
farming. It is noteworthy that Münib Bey was awarded a cotton gin as well as a gold
medal for his success in growing cotton in Gallipoli.379
The interest shown by the Ottoman state in the exhibitions where agricultural
products and machinery were displayed should also be mentioned because thanks to
these exhibitions, producers from the Ottoman lands had the chance to demonstrate
their products to investors from all over the world and were also given the
opportunity to follow the latest developments in agriculture. These exhibitions were
vital to the advancement of cotton farming. The first international exhibition worth
mentioning was the one held in London in 1851. The items to be sent to this
exhibition were brought from the provinces, collected in Istanbul, and exhibited for a
week. Among the objects on display were products such as cotton clothes.380 The
exhibition in Istanbul, which Sultan Abdülmecid visited on 22 March, was allowed
to be visited by foreign state ambassadors on 23 March and by tradespeople as well
as by merchants on 24 March.381 Many high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats
participated in the London Exhibition opened on 1 May 1851. The most colourful
account of this exhibition and the London that hosts the exhibition belongs to a
Cerīde-i Ḥavādis reporter, whom himself visited the Great Exhibition, but it is
possible to find the author’s name neither in the newspaper issues nor in the
published travel book. Given that many texts in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis are published
anonymously, the identity and name of the author are not of vital importance.
Although the determination of the writer might enable different readings and insights
379 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 378/25, 25 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1283/31 March 1867.
380 These objects can be considered “entrepreneurial actors” because of the purpose they contain and
the role they play. Correspondingly, all exhibition objects in the thesis are handled in this way.
381 Önsoy, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası, 59; and Akçura, Türkiye
Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi, 20. The cotton samples sent to the exhibition in 1851 attracted the
attention of the foreign press, and these samples were found promising for the future of Ottoman
cotton agriculture. Hunt, “The Culture of Cotton in Turkey,” Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine (February
1852): 156–59.
134
into the text, it still gives a considerable amount of information about the reactions of
an average Ottoman literate to the conditions of the period. Since detailed
descriptions of the exhibition were regularly published in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, the
author focused on his impressions of London.
The most significant part of these impressions that can be discussed within
the scope of the thesis is his observations on British agriculture. As an Istanbulite,
the first difference that caught his attention in agriculture was that farmers in Britain
approached agriculture as a “scientific” activity.382 Another fundamental difference
that drew the author’s attention was mechanisation, which also made a difference in
agricultural techniques: “Zirāʿat maḥallerine defʿaātle gidüb seyr iderdim ki vapor
[vapour] ile dahi zerʿ ü ḥarѕ idiyorlar . . . [;] çiftleri dahi çelikden olarak pek aʿlādır.”
[I used to go to the agricultural areas over and over and watch that they are also
farming with vapour . . . [;] their pairs are also very good in steel.]383 This
observation is fundamental in apprehending the significance of mechanisation in
every agricultural activity, including cotton. Similar attention to agricultural
implements by the author would also be noticed in the 1863 Sergi-i ʿUmūmī-i
ʿOѕmānī (Ottoman General Exhibition). For example, Münif Pasha would introduce
the machines in the exhibition in 1863 one by one in the Mecmūʿa-i Fünūn, years
382 “. . . ve Londra’da zirāʿat māddesi gūyā kesb ü kār içün olmıyub ancak fünūn içün gibi ẓann olunur
ki ḥattā gübreyi gemiyle dört aylık maḥallden yaʿnī Peru ṭarafından kuş gübreleri getürüb bayağı
gübreden ziyāde istiʿmāl itmekle ḳanṭārı otuz iki ġurūşa gelür.” [. . . and in London, agriculture gives
the impression that it is done for fünūn, not for business and professional purposes. They even bring
bird manure (fertiliser) from Peru, four months’ distance by ship, use it more than common/ordinary
manure, and sell it for thirty-two piastres a ḳanṭār (approx. 56.5 kilogrammes).] Seyāḥat-nāme-i
Londra (1269 [1852/1853]), 76. It is worth remembering that this is a London-based impression.
383 Seyāḥat-nāme-i Londra (1269 [1852/1853]), 76. In addition, he underlines that a tax such as a tithe
is not collected from the farmer. However, all these did not mean that the British farmer did not have
any problems. “. . . ve ẕikr olunan beş-yüz arşun yeriñ derinliği ve düzlüğü ol-ḳadar kemāldedir ki hiç
inḥirāf görememişimdir ve birikdirdikleri ve ḳaṭʿ itdikleri mezrūʿātı dört kūşe gāyetle ẓarīf ve yağmur
geçmez derecede dizerler.” [. . . and the depth and flatness of the five-hundred (Turkish) yards
mentioned above are so perfect that I have not seen any deviation (or error), and farmers arrange the
crops they have accumulated and traversed in an exquisite and rainproof manner.] Seyāḥat-nāme-i
Londra (1269 [1852/1853]), 77.
135
after the narrative of the exhibition in 1851. Among them would be a machine that
clamps the cotton bales.384
The Ottoman Empire, who appeared as a regular participant in international
exhibitions, also wanted to take its place as a host in this exhibition frenzy. After the
Sergi-i ʿUmūmī-i ʿOѕmānī Niẓām-nāmesi (Ottoman General Exhibition Regulation),
prepared on 22 December 1862, subcommittees were established in various cities of
the empire under the chairmanship of the governors and district governors in order to
determine the goods to be included in the exhibition.385 The goods and commodities
selected by these committees were sent to Istanbul to be exhibited. The goods to be
displayed were exempted from all kinds of taxes and customs. At the end of the
surveys, over ten thousand items sent from all over the Ottoman Empire were found
worthy of display. The Minister of Finance of the time Mustafa Fâzıl Pasha, the
Ḫāriciyye Teşrīfātçısı (protocol official or usher on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) Kâmil Bey, Fu’ad Pasha’s son and a member of the Meclis-i Vālā Nâzım
Bey, the Trade Undersecretary Server Efendi, and Agathon Efendi, who also took an
active role in the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi, were at the head of the committee
established in Istanbul to carry out the exhibition works. At the opening, there would
be Sultan Abdülaziz, Yusuf Kâmil Pasha, Âlî Pasha, Fu’ad Pasha, and the Egyptian
governor (not yet the khedive) İsmâil Pasha.386 To determine the quality, variety, and
prices of the goods produced in various regions of the empire, to identify the
problems encountered in production and to attract the attention of the relevant
384 Turgay, Türk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Bakış, 148. The Mecmūʿa-i Fünūn is also known as the
publication of the ʿOsmānlı Cemʿiyyet-i ʿİlmiyyesi, which was also established in these years.
385 This regulation with 61 articles was published in the Cerīde-i Ḥavādis as well. Cerīde-i Ḥavādis,
no. 1128, 5 Şaʿbān 1279/26 January 1863, 1–2. The facsimiles of the regulation were published by the
newspapers of that period, as well as in a circular sent to all provinces and districts, the importance of
the exhibition was explained, and civil servants were asked to encourage farmers, artisans, and
merchants to participate in the exhibition, and it was stated that all kinds of convenience would be
given to the participants. Önsoy, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası, 72.
386 Akçura, Türkiye Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi, 26–27.
136
people, to enable businessmen and producers to come together and meet, and to
inform the producer about the latest agricultural techniques and tools, as a hub where
agriculture would be discussed and new collaborations would be established, the
Sergi-i ʿUmūmī-i ʿOѕmānī opened its doors to guests on 28 February 1863 (see the
Figure 3 below for the exhibition pavilion built at the Atmeydanı or the Hippodrome
of Constantinople).387
Figure 3. The front-side view of the 1863 Ottoman Exhibition388
An exhibition pavilion covering an area of 3,500 square metres was built in
the Hippodrome of Constantinople to host the products, machinery, tools, and
equipment that would participate in the exhibition. A commemorative decoration
with a depiction of the pavilion was minted and ornamented with three words:
387 Önsoy, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i
Osmani,” 234. Among those interested in the exhibition, French and British business and capital
circles drew attention. Even though the French did not stand out as much as the British actors in the
sources of the period, it should not be forgotten that entrepreneurs from other states were also a part of
the story. For example, a group of 10-15 people consisting of Parisian manufacturers and businessmen
came to Istanbul to visit the exhibition, take orders, and see the goods produced or manufactured in
the Ottoman Empire.
388 “Sergi-i ʿUmūmī-i ʿOѕmānī’niñ Öñ Ṭarafından Görünüşü [The Front-Side View of the 1863
Ottoman Exhibition],” Mirʾāt (Ramażān 1279/February-March 1863): 19.
137
“Ḥirfet, Ṣanʿat, Ticāret (Crafts, Industry, Trade).”389 A march was also composed for
the exhibition.390 Although in the beginning, only domestic products were considered
for the exhibition, it was decided that it would be advantageous to exhibit the newly
invented machinery, tools, and equipment that would be sent from Europe later on.391
Invitations were sent to entrepreneurs of foreign countries to dispatch agricultural
and industrial machinery and equipment for practical use to the exhibition. It was
guaranteed that these products would benefit from customs duty exemption.392 These
promises were kept, and the Order of the Medjidie (Mecīdiyye) were conferred on the
directors of four British factories that supplied the mentioned tools and equipment
for the exhibition. These companies are Richard Garrett & Sons of Suffolk; Wallis &
Steevens of Hampshire; Picksley, Sims & Co. of Lancashire; and Ransomes, Sims &
Jefferies of Ipswich (see Appendix D for a few varieties of ploughs from the
exhibition).393 The tools brought to the exhibition were also purchased by the
Ottoman government.394 Before the purchases, these tools were tried on at the
Serdār-ı Ekrem (field marshal or commander-in-chief) Ömer Pasha’s private estate
in the vicinity of Küçükçekmece, in front of the Grand Vizier Fu’ad Pasha and other
389 Eldem states that the only document found regarding the awarding of these medals bears the date
of 6 Şevvāl 1282 (22 February 1866), and that these awards were given to their owners only three
years after the exhibition. Eldem, Pride and Privilege, 241.
390 The composer of the march is Callisto Guatelli, the head of the Mızıka-i Hümāyūn (Imperial Band)
during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. This march, whose notes have survived to the present day, was
also performed by the London Academy of Ottoman Court Music ensemble directed by Emre Aracı.
Akçura, Türkiye Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi, 30.
391 Önsoy, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i
Osmani,” 208.
392 “De Omnibus Rebus,” Public Opinion (20 December 1862): 1104.
393 BOA, HR.SFR.3 84/20, 23 December 1863. All four companies wrote letters to Musurus Bey
expressing their gratitude and declaring that they were honoured. One of the reasons why a medal was
sent to these names may be that the governors of Latakia, Drama, Kavala, and Adana were awarded
medals at the International Exhibition of 1862 in London. Farley, Turkey (1866), 54–55; and Farley,
Modern Turkey (1872), 238–49. A total of 83 medals and 44 mentions were won. Akçura, Türkiye
Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi, 22.
394 BOA, İ.DH 515/35038, 13 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1280/27 September 1863. The tools and equipment
brought to the exhibition were not enough. Hence, the same tools were purchased again a year later.
BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 313/54, 29 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1281/1 October 1864.
138
state dignitaries. As a result of these trials, machines and tools were found useful,
and it was decided to purchase them for the development of the country’s
agriculture.395 Thus, although mechanised cotton farming persisted as an
unaffordable dream for small farms, some medium-sized and large estates had a
chance to get the new technology they needed.
The actors working for the exhibition were not only the actors of the state.
Hyde Clarke, the Vice-President of the Imperial Cotton Commission in Izmir and
one of the senior officials of the CSA, also attempted to increase the number and
variety of machines that would participate in the exhibition. In a letter he wrote to the
Izmir consul of the United States, Julius Bing, Clarke asked the United States to send
samples of cotton gins and other agricultural instruments to the exhibition.396
According to Hyde Clarke, the country’s agricultural methods and associated
equipment were so primitive and useless. In addition to this, he told Julius Bing that
European agricultural tools were not very apt for the Ottoman Empire and that he
thought the US agrarian implements would be more fruitful here due to their proven
success in the West Indies and South America (see Figure 4 below for one of these
instruments).397 Thanks to the exhibition in 1863, the urgent need for mechanisation
had become much more evident.
395 Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 1151, 10 Ṣafer 1280/27 July 1863, 1.
396 US Congress, House, Executive Documents: Printed by Order of the House of Representatives
During the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress. 1862–’63. In Twelve Volumes (1863), 574.
397 US Congress, House, Letter of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial
Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1863 (1865),
499. Some of these products were also exhibited in local buildings in Izmir. In another letter, Hyde
Clarke stated that the products displayed at the station of the Smyrna (Izmir)-Cassaba (Kasaba)
Railway were visited and admired by European agriculturalists and local people. However, some
minor adaptations seemed to be required because the iron ploughs sent were cumbersome for the
people of Izmir. After all, there were no strong horses to pull them. US Congress, House, Letter of the
Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial Relations of the United States with
Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1863 (1865), 499.
139
Figure 4. A tool used in America for hoeing and sprinkling cotton seeds398
Cotton-related products were exhibited in the seventh pavilion of the
exhibition, which consisted of 13 pavilions. As Rifat Önsoy points out, 92 cotton
samples were sent to the exhibition from almost all parts of the empire (see Table 3
below for the amount of cotton samples sent to the 1863 Ottoman Public Exhibition
by region). The most admired cotton samples in the exhibition came from Egypt and
then from Izmir. A man named Clarke grew raw cotton from New Orleans seed in
Söke (in the province of Aydın) and sent a sample that was satisfactory in all
respects, both in colour and in average fibre length. The Guardian highlights that
Clarke was the only person to write a detailed description of the sample he sent,
which was also one of the potential indicators that the exhibition was not managed
professionally enough.399
398 Âbidin, Pamuk: İstihsalden İstihlâke Kadar, 130.
399 “Cotton and Cotton Goods in the Turkish Exhibition [from The Levant Herald],” The Guardian, 13
May 1863, 3.
140
Table 3. Cotton Samples Sent to the 1863 Ottoman General Exhibition400
Location Number Location Number Location Number
Izmir 24 Acre 1 Manisa 1
Balıkhisar 10 Aleppo 1 Maraş 1
Amasya 7 Beirut 1 Mardin 1
Sérres 6 Çanakkale 1 Rhodes 1
Egypt 4 Damascus 1 Sivas 1
Filibe 4 Diyarbakır 1 Tekirdağ 1
İçel 4 Edirne 1 Thessaloníki 1
Adana 3 Izmit 1 Tırhala 1
Drama 3 Jerusalem 1 Tripoli 1
Latakia 2 Karasi 1 Yassıada401 1
Mosul 2 Konya 1 Kartalimen402 1
It was stated that Aydın cotton, like other cotton types grown in Turkey, had
excellent colour and strength, despite the shortness of its staple. Therefore, it was
believed that the region would come to be a critical supply and delivery point with
the utilisation of American and Egyptian seeds. It was claimed that the cotton
samples of Sérres, Thessaloníki, Drama, and Plovdiv dispatched from the Balkans
also displayed promise. Nonetheless, in the end, the number of products sent was
found insufficient by The Guardian.403 Moreover, while the samples sent to the
International Exhibition of 1862 in London were examined by the CSA and reports
were written on them, it was evident that the Ottoman government did not write
reports on the cotton samples at the exhibition in Istanbul and no scientific studies
400 Önsoy, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayii ve Sanayileşme Politikası, 76.
401 Ibid. From Sir Henry Bulwer’s farm in Yassıada (Pláti).
402 Ibid. From Kartalimen (today’s Kartal, a district of Istanbul).
403 Ibid.
141
were conducted in cooperation with the CSA.404 A comparative study between the
exhibitions can reveal how successful the Ottoman end of the exhibition was.
While it was said that the number of visitors to the exhibition reached 3,000
in the first two or three days,405 the possibility that the fair could lead to the
advancement of agriculture was voiced in the British press.406 Over ten thousand
items sent from various parts of the empire were displayed in the exhibition.407 Local
exhibitions were also held in some regions, such as Izmir. Prizes were distributed in
these exhibitions as well.408 After the exhibition in Istanbul, the CSA allegedly
proposed to the Sultan to establish an agricultural museum and the Imperial
Agricultural Society, but these two institutions did not see the light of day.409 Since
the tools and machines on display were exhibited for the first time in the Ottoman
Empire, great attention was drawn and even an article published in the Taṣvīr-i Efkār
commented, “Avrupa emtiʿasınıñ revācı Memālik-i ʿOsmāniyye maʿmūlātını ʿādetā
kūşe-i nisyānda bırakmış.” [The value/reputation of European commodities almost
left the Ottoman state in the corner of forgetting.] Still, it is difficult to observe the
positive effect of these new technologies on Ottoman agriculture.410 The rise in raw
cotton production was, of course, related to technological input, but it should not be
forgotten that the most significant hindrance to mechanisation in agriculture was that
the prices of these machines and tools far exceeded the purchasing power of the
404 Wanklyn, Report on the Samples of Cotton in the International Exhibition (10 June 1862), 1.
405 “Great Exhibition in Turkey,” The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, Western Countries and South
Wales Advertiser, 21 May 1863, 6. It was estimated that the exhibition was visited by 100,000-
150,000 people during its operating time. The revenue was around 450,000 piastres, which could only
cover one-fifth of all expenses. Sultan Abdülaziz personally paid the difference. Önsoy, “Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i Osmani,” 235.
406 “Morning Post,” Public Opinion (27 December 1862): 1118.
407 Önsoy, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumi-i
Osmani,” 210.
408 “Cotton in Asia Minor,” The Times, 16 October 1862, 17.
409 National Association for the Promotion of Social Science [Great Britain], Transactions of the
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1864), xlviii.
410 Taṣvīr-i Efkār, no. 79, 8 Şevvāl 1279/29 March 1863, 2 (emphasis added).
142
small and medium-sized farm owners. Even threshing and chopping machines would
hardly find a place in the dreams of an average Ottoman farmer. For an Ottoman
farmer to buy a tractor or a threshing machine, he had to work all his life and be able
to save what he earned.411 Therefore, the devices used in many regions had remained
relatively primitive. For example, in the reports of the British consul in Baghdad as
of 1865, it was written that the machinery used was extremely primitive, while a
small number of non-primitive machines were brought by European companies and
were rented for the use of local people.412 One of the main reasons on the surface of
the widening chasm between the countries of Western Europe and the rest of the
world from the nineteenth century onwards was the use of new technologies and the
capital available to invest in these technologies. According to Pamuk, as investments
in new technologies have become more widespread, productivity has increased in
industry, transportation and, to a lesser extent, agriculture.413 The difference
mentioned above, or the gap that Western Europe has riveted, is the result of every
state having a different era and a different longest nineteenth century. However, the
idea of progress that needs to be captured has now become an indispensable part of
the discussions of the Ottoman intellectual world. One of the best channels to follow
these discussions is the publications on technological input. This presence also
indicates that this whole subject has a discourse dimension that makes analysis
possible—although it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
411 Baskıcı, “Machine Prices and the Mechanization of Ottoman Agriculture,” 74–75. Baskıcı
enunciates that even the simplest type of plough was sold for 300 piastres in Edirne in 1908, which
corresponds to the quarterly income of an average farmer.
412 Kemball [Consul-General], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton.
Baghdad, Moossul, Bussorah, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Caiffa and Acre. Province of Baghdad. His
Highness Namick Pasha, Governor-General,” in Turkey. Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the
Ottoman Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a Summary of Their Replies (1865),
no. 3498, at 57:3–5.
413 Pamuk, Uneven Centuries, 11.
143
One of the other prominent exhibitions was the Paris Exhibition in 1867, and
the other was the Vienna Exhibition in 1873.414 In the 1867 exhibition, the Ottoman
Empire displayed examples of agriculture, industry, traditional handicrafts, and fine
arts in 64 different categories, and cotton products were also included in this
exhibition. Preparations for the Vienna Exhibition in 1873 were started, a year
before, by a commission under the chairmanship of İbrâhim Edhem Pasha, who was
the Minister of Public Works and Trade, and his son Osman Hamdi Bey was
appointed as the exhibition commissioner. Osman Hamdi Bey was assigned to
prepare the pavilion devoted to the Ottomans in the exhibition.415 Victor Marie de
Launay participated in both exhibitions, provided various assistance to government
officials, and made publications about Turkey. He was rewarded with a medal two
years later, albeit belatedly, for his articles in the Journal de Constantinople on the
Sergi-i ʿUmūmī-i ʿOѕmānī in 1863.416
It is no coincidence that the name of Sultan Abdülaziz is seen in two
exhibitions at the same time. He is one of those who participate in the narrative not
as a great man but as an actor in the dynamic structure of dissimilar actors, objects,
and networks of relations (cf. pages 6 and 7). As known, Abdülaziz, who spent the
first ten years of his reign with the reform policies of Âlî and Fu’ad Pashas, during
414 Details about the exhibition are explained in detail in the pamphlet called La Turquie à
l’Exposition universelle de 1867 (Turkey at the Universal Exhibition of 1867), written by Salâheddin
Bey, the exhibition commissioner of the Ottoman delegation in 1867. Salâheddin Bey [Commissaire
impérial Ottoman près l’Exposition universelle], La Turquie à l’Exposition universelle de 1867 :
ouvrage publié par les soins et sous la direction de Exc. Salâheddin Bey (1867).
415 Akçura, Türkiye Sergicilik ve Fuarcılık Tarihi, 36. Cotton samples were liked: “. . . many
provinces of the Ottoman Empire sent very good samples.” Campbell, “A Survey of the Exhibits
Connected with the Cotton Manufacture,” in Artisans’ Reports upon the Vienna Exhibition (1873), 58.
However, the overall performance of the Ottomans was not appreciated: “Turkey has only a small
show at Vienna, if that is all which is contributed in the main building of the [e]xhibition. The
saddlery is similar in style to our English, but it is poor and ill-formed, and composed of bad material.
We must not take this small show to represent the Ottoman Empire, when we have seen such excellent
samples of workmanship and material at a similar [e]xhibition, so short a time back as in 1867.”
Thompson, “Leather, Harness, Saddlery, Whips, Port-manteaus, Purses, Pocket-books, &c. Turkey,”
in Artisans’ Reports upon the Vienna Exhibition (1873), 23.
416 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 329/21, 15 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1281/11 April 1865.
144
the rest of his reign, became a part of processes, such as the strengthening of the
Ottoman navy, the realisation of the new provincial organisation, the publication of
the Meʿārif-i ʿUmūmiyye Niẓām-nāmesi (General Education Regulation), and the
establishment of the Dīvān-ı Muḥāsebāt (Court of Auditors), the Şūrā-yı Devlet
(Council of State), and the Dārü'l-fünūn. His rule is one of the periods that almost
every historian interested in the history of railways, trams, tunnels, sea routes,
banking, theatres, and exhibitions in the Ottoman Empire needs to examine
meticulously. What is less known about Abdülaziz, who was closely interested in his
farm in Üsküdar when he was still a young prince, according to some, is the fact that
he applied the latest agricultural methods in this farm and was allegedly the “most
superior farmer of the empire.”417 Even though the news in the Journal de
Constantinople does not validate Abdülaziz as the most outstanding farmer of the
empire, they reveal the importance that the Sultan gave to agriculture and farming.
Nevertheless, all these narratives should be approached with reasonable scepticism.
Because the press always tends to make a mountain out of a molehill. Although there
were developments in agriculture during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, none of them
was revolutionary. Furthermore, although it is said that Abdülaziz displayed interest
in many different things simultaneously, the narrative of how he developed in the
areas he was interested in is incomplete. Therefore, it is difficult to be sure whether
his interest in agriculture was a volatile situation. Regardless, it is still interesting
that, in these years, when cotton production increased, there were narratives in the
417 Ölçer, Sultan Abdülaziz Han Devri Osmanlı Madenî Paraları, 49; and “Voyage : de Sa Majesté
Abd-ul Azis à Brousse [17 avril],” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1851, 24 April 1862, 2. Although
some sources claim that before he became sultan, Abdülmecid had a farm in Beykoz, which was
defined as near Üsküdar then and spent most of his time there, this claim needs more proof. Because
Calhoun, who made this assertion, says that James Bolton Davis opened the Zirāʿat Taʿlīm-ḫānesi in
Beykoz, and this information, like most of the information Calhoun gave, is entirely wrong. Calhoun,
“Seeds of Destruction,” 134.
145
press portraying Abdülaziz as an exemplary farmer and that the Sultan was also
closely interested in science and technology.
Sultan Abdülaziz, who was followed by the Journal de Constantinople
correspondents during his visit to Bursa, wandered around the natural and industrial
goods of the province for a long time and was closely interested in the products and
producers.418 Two ploughs, one of which was the English and the other was of the
French system, attracted the attention of the Sultan, who was emphasised that he
frequently asked questions to the Grand Vizier.419 The suggestion of the Sultan, who
was not unfamiliar with the tools and equipment he was interested in due to his
farmer identity, that the French system combined with the British one, could be
applied to the country’s agriculture more comfortably, was also included in the
columns of the newspaper.420 Sultan Abdülaziz’s approach was of value because the
machinists and engineers of American cities took local conditions into account as
they had created the technology by 1850 that would allow US railroads to surpass
British railroads in terms of track length. The technology developed in Britain could
not be imported as it was not well suited to the United States due to the size of the
distances and the rigidity of the landforms. In the United States, railway technology
had to be developed locally with new techniques.421 One of the people the Sultan met
418 “Voyage : de Sa Majesté Abd-ul Azis à Brousse [17 avril],” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1851,
24 April 1862, 2.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid. Another example that justified Sultan Abdülaziz about the necessity of local regulations is
seen in Hyde Clarke’s letter to Julius Bing. In this letter, Clarke states that the iron ploughs dispatched
are not appropriate for the local farmer: “Iron ploughs have often been introduced here, and have
failed, because they were too cumbrous for the people, or because they required strong horses to draw
them.” US Congress, House, Letter of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the
Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30,
1863 (1865), 499.
421 DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, 82.
146
with during his visit was Torosoğlu, who also applied new agricultural methods in
his large estate near Bursa.422
There have been those who tried to make larger narratives out of Sultan
Abdülaziz’s interest in agriculture. Ricky-Dale Calhoun sets down that Abdülaziz
was the foremost proponent of cotton cultivation, based on the statement made by the
Sultan during his visit to Izmir in April 1863 and his dismissal of Mehmed Reşid
Pasha, the Governor of Izmir, on the grounds that he found the encouragement of
cotton cultivation insufficient. Calhoun claims that Abdülaziz intervened decisively
at these points where the local authorities were meagre.423 It is accurate that
Abdülaziz, like Abdülmecid, was closely interested in the country’s agricultural
policies. Hyde Clarke, one of the most influential names of the CSA in western
Anatolia, shared in the news in The Times that the Grand Vizier Fu’ad Pasha told
him that Sultan Abdülaziz had a personal interest in cotton planting.424 Still, it is not
possible to make a comparison with his elder brother Abdülmecid. Plenty of archival
documents and press contents make it evident that both sultans were closely
422 “Voyage : de Sa Majesté Abd-ul Azis à Brousse [17 avril],” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1851,
24 April 1862, 2.
423 Calhoun, “Seeds of Destruction,” 150. A similar narrative can be detected in Gardey as well, please
see Gardey, Voyage du sultan Abd-ul-Aziz de Stamboul au Caire (1865), 24–25. Was Mehmed Reşid
Pasha removed from his post because of Sultan Abdülaziz’s specific interest in cotton farming? This
question cannot be answered with absolute certainty and leaves the door open for speculation. For
instance, an event that substantiates the difficulty of claiming this is that of the three nights Sultan
Abdülaziz spent in Izmir, two were at Charlton Whittall’s mansion in Bornova, used by Ege
University Rectorate today, and the other at the estate of Dimonstanis Baltacı in Buca. Both names
were engaged in the cotton trade. So, these two figures may have directed Sultan Abdülaziz by
complaining about Mehmed Reşid Pasha’s poor performance. Nonetheless, this visit raised the
prestige of Charlton, who was approaching the end of his commercial life, and 40 well-known
merchants from the city’s notables presented him with a portrait made by George Edward Tuson—he
had also painted the portrait commissioned by the Manchester municipality as a gift to Sultan
Abdülaziz during his visit to Britain and spent a part of his life in the Ottoman lands. Among the
signatories of the introductory letter were the following people who stood out while writing the cotton
production story of Izmir: A. Edwards, Augustus Oakley Clarke, C. Hadkinson, C. P. Charlton,
Frederick Charnaud, Frédéric Giraud, John B. Paterson, Peter R. Gout, Robert William Cumberbatch,
Thomas Bowen Rees, and W. E. Browning. Giraud, Family Records—A Record of the Origin and
History of the Giraud and Whittall Families of Turkey, 73; Demirbaş, Rees Köşkü, 89; and Eldem,
“İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin Bir Kesişmesi,” 70.
424 “Cotton from Turkey,” The Times, 26 November 1862, 7.
147
interested in agricultural policies. It was in the nature of the goods that Abdülaziz’s
steps on cotton cultivation were much more prominent than other commodities due
to the American Civil War. As Calhoun also spelt out, during his speech in Izmir,
where Sultan Abdülaziz stopped on his way back from his Egypt trip, he expressed
his pleasure to see the consuls in his presence as well as the efforts made for the
development of agriculture, trade, and industry in the country. The Sultan underlined
that Izmir has made significant progress in the field of agriculture, that the cotton
farming experiments in the city are admirable, and that he is delighted with the
reverence shown to him by the people of Izmir.425 It is noteworthy that agriculture,
especially cotton farming, was emphasised in a speech based on ensuring the equality
of the subjects and increasing the welfare of the people.
Not only was the progress made by Izmir appreciated, but it was emphasised
that the Sultan and the Sublime Porte did not remain blind and deaf to the efforts of
actors such as local and foreign merchants and consulates who played a role in this
development. Âlî Pasha, who later printed this speech and sent it to Musurus Bey, the
Ottoman Ambassador in London, set down in his note that the Sultan made
maximum efforts to express his thoughts on the development and welfare of the
country and the equality of the subjects and demanded that this speech be read by
dignitaries and their opinions taken as well.426 However, it is also necessary to refrain
from making the role of Abdülaziz more prominent than other actors by constructing
larger narratives from here alone. Otherwise, failures in cotton cultivation in the
425 BOA, HR.SFR.3 77/5, 7 May 1863; Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 331, 17 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/6 May 1863,
3–4; Rūz-nāme-i Cerīde-i Ḥavādis, no. 620, 11 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/29 April 1863, 1–2; The Times, 11
May 1863, 6; Tercümān-ı Aḥvāl, no. 329, 12 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/1 May 1863, 2; Aksüt, Sultan Aziz’in
Mısır ve Avrupa Seyahati, 47–49; and Gardey, Voyage du sultan Abd-ul-Aziz de Stamboul au Caire
(1865), 237–39. In addition, Abdülaziz visited the cotton fields and factories in Egypt and sifted
through them. Gardey, Voyage du sultan Abd-ul-Aziz de Stamboul au Caire (1865), 136–37.
426 BOA, HR.SFR.3 77/5, 18 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1279/7 May 1863.
148
Ottoman Empire would have to be reduced to one man’s poor performance.
Nevertheless, the situation resulted from a much more complex network of relations
beyond the good or bad performance of one actor.
Ordinary men also find a place for themselves in this complex network of
relations. For example, Frederick George Vedova (Wedova), a British subject who
settled in Izmir in 1866, enhanced the already existing cotton gin.427 The benefit of
the machine was met with great interest, and it was also decided to send a sample to
Istanbul within three months.428 The certificate issued by the Provincial Cotton
Commission emphasised that labour savings were achieved thanks to this novel
design and that almost twice the efficiency of Platt’s machines, considered the best
so far, would also be attained. A fifteen-year concession was granted for the
construction and sale of the machine.429 Experiments and observations for granting
the concession were made in Vedova’s factory in Menemen. After this privilege was
given, the drawings of the machine (see Appendix E) were sent to the Ministry of
Public Works.430 One year ago, in the Journal de Constantinople, the developments
427 It can be traced in the records that Vedova applied for patents for different inventions in 1878:
“Frederick George Vedova, of Smyrna, in the empire of Turkey, temporarily at the Office for Patents,
6, Lord Street, Liverpool, for an invention of ‘[i]mprovements in the manufacture and application of
certain materials containing tannic acid, tannin, gallic acid, or the like, and the utilisation of certain
raw products for the purpose.’” “Inventions. Applications for Letters Patent. Patents Sealed: 2947 and
2948. Frederick George Vedova,” The Commissioners of Patents’ Journal (21 January 1879): 145. No
information about Vedova’s education was recorded. However, it is noteworthy that not all inventorengineers
received a professional education given the conditions of the period. So much so that
although Thomas Newcomen, the inventor of the first steam engine, was familiar with the basic
principles of steam and vacuum as embodied in the scientific instruments of that period, he built this
first engine mostly based on practical knowledge. Eli Whitney had also no professional engineering
training. Technological inventions and industrial development based on new knowledge were in the
hands of artisans and handicraftsmen with little scientific training but great mechanical genius.
DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, 94.
428 BOA, İ.MVL 571/25664, 27 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1283/2 May 1867.
429 BOA, İ.MVL 571/25664, 27 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1283/2 May 1867; and BOA, A.}MKT.NZD 382/13, 12
Muḥarrem 1284/16 May 1867.
430 The relevant report approving the concession was signed on 1 October 1866, sticking to the
spellings in the document, by Réchoud Moustapha, President of the Cotton Committee in Izmir, Vice-
President Frederick LaFontaine, Secretary Mehemed Djorded, and other members. BOA, İ.MVL
571/25664, 27 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1283/2 May 1867.
149
on the cotton gin were shared with the reader in a chronological narrative.431 The
detailed explanation of this article was such that it would direct many engineers or
enthusiasts to these new inventions. Vedova’s success was also heard in Britain. On
behalf of John Davies and Son, one of the owners, John Lacey Davies, made a
statement regarding Vedova’s improvement in cotton gin:
The [i]nvention relates to that description of “cotton gins” known as the
“double-action Macarthy gin,” and is designed to effect the self-feeding of
the raw cotton to the roller and knife, and the improvements consist in
securing the table of the “gin,” upon which the cotton is first placed to the
rocking shaft of the “gin,” the table being placed at an inclination towards the
grid bars, which bars are bent so as to form a concave or hollow surface, in
which hollow a bar of wood or other suitable material is supported, and
which extends the whole length of the ribs forming the grid, the supports for
this bar are formed of bent rods that are attached to the stays of the rocking
shaft; thus the table upon which the cotton is placed and also the bent ribs of
the grid and the cross bar having a rising and falling motion imparted to them
by means of their connections with the rocking shaft, and a second or lateral
reciprocating motion is also given to the said parallel bar by means of a crank
or eccentric, the combination of such motions supplies a regular and constant
feed to the knife and roller of the gin, and thereby time and improves the
cleaning power of the gin, greatly economises.432
Interest in inventions that accelerated the production rate was quite natural
because, utilising Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, the yield of raw cotton production could
be increased fifty times overnight.433 It is mentioned in the Ottoman records that, in
1869, an American named Noah Davis invented a new method to separate cotton
from its seeds. In the relevant document, this method (an upgrade rather than an
entirely new system) is referred to with some exaggeration as “. . . pamuk
çekirdeğiniñ istiʿmāli-çün iḫtirāʿ-gerdesi olan uṣūle dāʾir . . . .” [regarding the
invented method for processing cotton seed . . . .]434 It is underlined that the residue
431 “Machines à égrener le coton,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 4582, 21 January 1865, 4.
432 Davies and Vedova, Cotton Gins. Davies’ Improvements in Cotton Gins, UK Patent 2,753, issued
25 October 1866.
433 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 102.
434 BOA, HR.TO 451/73, 26 April 1869.
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left from the cotton seed is used and fertiliser is made from it in Davis’s method.435
Davis, like Vedova, obtained a fifteen-year privilege in the execution of the
procedure.436 Initiatives were encouraged by rewarding new inventions to extend
production. Then, despite the generous reward mechanism, why are not there more
examples of invention or machinery? Is this a recording problem, or is it a problem
arising from the occasional neglect of technology’s relationship with science?
Can an alternative answer be given to this question, apart from the
shortcomings mentioned in almost every sub-heading? For example, in Onto-
Cartography, Levi R. Bryant proposes a machine-oriented approach to the
humanities and social sciences. In this approach, the “machine” is synonymous with
“existence,” “thing,” “object,” or “being.”437 The term “machine” is used here in a
broader sense than when used in everyday language. Bryant argues that it is just a
perception bias that makes us think rocks are physical, tangible, or bodily. Cars,
hammers, buildings, and butterflies are different types of machines, but still
machines, just as, in Bryant’s thinking, reptiles are different kinds of animals from
mammals, but they are both animals. The choice of “machine” over the term “being”
is rhetorical. What matters is the concept behind the signifier, not the signifier chosen
to nominate that concept—maybe this approach also gives more meaning to the
words “object” and “actor” that I use throughout the thesis. Bryant considers
“machine” to be the term that best focuses on the question of what a being does and
how it does. Machinery is an essentially operational view of being. This term does
not ask what things are but what they do. It is a framework of concepts designed to
435 “. . . uṣūl-i meẕkūreden ḥāṣıl olan tortu aşağısında kalan maʿiyyetden tefrīḳ olundığı-ḥālde pek aʿlā
gübre olur.” [. . . when the residue formed by the mentioned method is separated from the excess
remaining below, it becomes a very good fertiliser.] BOA, HR.TO 451/73, 26 April 1869.
436 BOA, HR.TO 451/73, 26 April 1869; and BOA, HR.MKT 655/78, 9 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1286/19 June
1869.
437 Bryant, Onto-Cartography, 15.
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analyse entities in a particular way. Everywhere the question is how things work and
what they do. What does it mean to think of a tree as a machine? Instead of asking
what it is and what distinguishes it from all other plant and animal species, it is
investigated what trees do, how they work, what they work on, and the like. Trees are
seen as machines that transform the flow of water, soil nutrients, carbon dioxide, and
gas into cells, fruits, and oxygen and alter the nature of the soil and atmosphere.
Machine analysis reveals that institutions like schools and universities resemble
machines like trees. Different answers can be obtained when an institution is asked
what it does and how it works rather than what it is.
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CHAPTER 4
THE COEXISTENCE PROBLEM OF TWO INPUTS
“Science and technology multiply around us. To an increasing extent they
dictate the languages in which we speak and think. Either we use those languages, or
we remain mute.”
— J. G. Ballard, Crash, 1993438
4.1 The chicken-egg dilemma of science and technology
In the previous chapter, the infrastructural and financial structures of Ottoman cotton
cultivation and production were discussed, and the practical dimension of scientific
and technological input, which played a role in these processes, was examined. The
main subject of this chapter is how scientific and technological input exists in a
relationship and what this association signifies. This chapter will also follow a
similar trajectory from the general to the specific. The ongoing debate about the
relationship between science and technology is similar to the question of which
comes first, the chicken or the egg. According to the mainstream view in the history
and philosophy of science, which can also be called the traditional approach, science
is generally preceded in its relationship with technology. Science is a means of
communication that makes technology possible. Technology, on the other hand, is
the applied form of science and is, therefore, chronologically considered to come
after science. In line with an alternative view, which has recently been strengthened
by the debates in the field of the sociology of science, technology cannot be deemed
secondary in a chronological fashion.
438 Ballard, Crash, 7.
153
So much so that the practice called technology has come to life in various
parts of the world and has existed in every era and every single place on the planet,
from the Gardens of Eden of the mythologies engraved on the walls of the caves to
the valleys where human and animal sacrifices were made. Based on this
understanding, there have been engineers in every age and society, if not scientists—
especially when the definition of science is limited to a period extending from when
science started to be institutionalised to the present day. Although the
characterisation of non-institutionalised practices of knowing as “science” may bring
about different problems (demarcation is just one of them), technology somehow
finds its way in every narrative. In other words, every human being struggling with
the conditions of their age has developed and is developing technologies. Moreover,
in a sense, this meant that technology was driving science.439 Thus, with the desire to
establish an inclusive language, the difference between the inclusiveness of
technology and the inclusiveness of science has been discovered. When it comes to
this discussion, the fact that, with language, the world is being rebuilt every day
should not be underestimated. Because this alternative understanding, which brings
technology to the fore, rejects the ontological knot between science and norms,
principles and values, namely culture and essence. Technology is seen as a response
to the basic needs of human beings, such as their relationship with the conditions of
their age or nature as well as their survival and coexistence under these conditions. In
this answer, norms, principles, and values do not originate from technology but from
the requirements of the age and the struggle with nature itself. The narrative is
limited to historicism, and the conditions of the past turn out to be decisive.
439 Mauskopf and Roland, “The Historiography of Science and Technology,” 5:177.
154
Biology’s visions of the future are in the position of an egg thrown out of the nest by
the mother stork in the equation.
For this equation to succeed, cultures without hierarchies, none of which are
immeasurable, are required, and nature is set aside. In other words, science and
technology are dealt with in absolute relativity. The possibility that all communities
may form natures and cultures, only that the extent and speed of mobilisation may
differ, is ruled out. The reason why this is a restrictive point of view is that some
elements of reality are constructed in and through language and presented as a strict
form of relativity. Metaphorically speaking, the man deposed by Nicolaus
Copernicus is moved back to the centre. Human beings have been elevated to the
position of creating and activating the world through concepts. Thus, historical
studies are left to the field of a philosophical language game that stays away from the
pursuit of reality. The two contemporary fields most open to speculation and
manipulation in this setting are the history of science and conceptual history,
accompanied by the unfamiliarity of historians with some definitions and concepts
due to their distance from the latest literature on the philosophy of science and
technology. Language has been given so much importance that everything is turned
into linguistic issues or forms of cultural representation in every transformation, such
as the linguistic turn, cultural turn, et cetera. Materiality has become almost
irrelevant. So much so that the new-fangled approaches, which have the delusion that
the mistakes made in the effort to know are experienced in reality, have become the
producers of an ideological discourse beyond the then deconstructed concepts of
reality and rationality.
So, does this criticism make it necessary to support the understanding that
precedes science? No, both approaches suffer from internal problems. In the
155
understandings that precede science, considering the figures who have a place in the
history of technology, such as the American inventor Eli Whitney, despite the
distance between them and scientific activities, it can be concluded that it is not
possible to have a model that perfectly explains the relationship between science and
technology. If so, considering the analogy at the beginning, that is, when the question
is asked which comes first, the chicken or the egg, is it not possible to say, the egg
dreams of the chicken that will lay itself or the chicken creates the egg that it will
hatch? One of them is manifested in human language in the narratives that focus on
preceding science or technology. According to these approaches, which hinder the
dynamism they generate together, there must be a point of departure and forces
activating each other, just like a law of nature. Jens Beckert describes the search for
these “laws” as follows:
Today, most disciplines in the social sciences are much more cautious about
the existence of general laws in the social world, and most advocate more
limited and historically specific claims. These are often expressed through
concepts such as “ideal types,” “mechanisms,” “middle-range theories,”
“processes,” or “analytical narratives.”440
This situation, in a way, brings to mind a kind of science envy. In other words, it is
seen that disciplines, such as sociology, history, and philosophy, which are
essentially different from the natural sciences, try to wear a dress that looks coarse on
them. So, other than chasing universal laws that do not work, is there any alternative
other than inventing new concepts such as hybrid knowledge to explain a pattern of
agricultural knowledge in nineteenth-century Ottoman agriculture, for example?
How to delve into the nature of scientific and technological inputs reflected in
practice and discourse throughout the thesis? How can the chicken-and-egg dilemma
be explained if it cannot be presented with a classical social-construction discourse
440 Beckert, Imagined Futures, 246.
156
or an analogy of hybridity? When it comes to cotton cultivation and production,
many events can be covered, and it is impossible to cluster these events around a
single theme so easily. The identity and ideology of the researcher might influence
the analysis, the sources s/he decides on in the narrative, and the conclusion to be
drawn from them. Ways beyond epistemology, then, need to be explored. In other
words, the immeasurable breadth of the sack of epistemology promises nothing new
to the researcher.
Some academic trends, such as social or discursive constructivism, based on a
reductionist form of the Foucauldian episteme, often claim that objects and things,
such as physiological disturbances, scientific objects, etc., are established and
determined only by discourse or power relations, that is, social relations and human
activities have no reality beyond these discourses and human practices. Social
constructivism, which asserts to stamp out the fixity of the subject, paradoxically
establishes a discourse universe in which the idea of a world consisting of human
discourse and practices is reinforced. Is it possible to identify the forces that enlarge
or undermine the production of a commodity in this universe of discourse? It is
necessary, then, to reintroduce the presupposition into another scheme of ontological
relations. This can be expressed as follows: Human beings do not materially build
the world. The entire founding burden is not on their shoulders. People establish a
world of translation and experience among themselves. This universe of indicators is
a medium where they can share their encounters, finally making science possible.
Just as it is not feasible to describe digestion without mentioning the digestive
bacteria in the intestinal flora, it is not feasible to write the story of late Ottoman
cotton cultivation and production without revealing the entire ontological structure as
much as possible.
157
Then, it might be more accurate to approach this chicken-egg dilemma as
follows: the various forces seen belonging to cotton production are those that are
produced within and become a resultant of the powers of action of other forces that
do not belong to their category at all. Scientific and technological inputs have been
inseparable; each one may be creating the illusion that it comes first. In the Latourian
sense, things must be seen as an association that constitutes them, modes of existence
defined by their power to produce and be affected within a network. In this respect,
the most natural approach that can be brought to Ottoman cotton cultivation is the
idea that this production was self-organising. Therefore, the best possible way to
study any scientific or technological phenomenon is to consider them in their own
ontological autonomy without generating new dichotomies, underlining the
difference without separating one from the other. There is a distinct aspect to this in
most areas of the natural sciences, such as physics, chemistry, or geology. For a
similar understanding to be established in the humanities partially without
contradiction, it is necessary to focus on differences. An objection may be raised to
this point: Then, should botany and agricultural chemistry speak on cotton and cotton
production processes?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. Humanities scholars have to
defend their own academic habitat. They should do it while they still can. There is
one field that is still outside the realm of the natural sciences until something changes
as a result of the ultimate spread of science to other disciplines. The natural sciences
often reduce what they claim to be independent of humans either to their
components, i.e. their more minor constituents or their relations, i.e. interactions
among themselves. According to Graham Harman, this is the conviction that the real
elements can, in any case, be the smallest components and that everything can be
158
reduced to them. It is called smallism.441 These reductions are not useless and are
sometimes unavoidable. For example, the answer to the question of how organic life
‘arose’ is not in biology which is the science of the interactions of organic life ‘once
it emerged’—at least for now. Nevertheless, for example, when it comes to the yield
of cotton production in the Ottoman Empire, botany, agricultural chemistry, or
economics falls short of explaining the interactions of the phenomenon when the
phenomenon is reduced to scientific investigation per se. This methodology never
examines the possible future (virtual) dimensions of the phenomenon and anything
other than its relationships, or those who are outside the moment when it experiences
their existence at that moment. For this reason, a new method is required at this
virtual level when the ontological realities of things, such as their arrangements or
associations, are affected by their intricate networks. This explanation is an
alternative that does not emulate the natural sciences. If the study of social
phenomena is necessarily to speak of ‘agency,’ it must be seen in terms of
arrangements of networks as a whole, not people, the society, or other isolated
concepts. In other words, the agency of cotton, science, technology, or politicians
alone has no explanatory function under this setting.
The study of non-economic phenomena that falls outside the methods of the
natural and social sciences falls within the scope of history. To reveal the structure of
this role, it is necessary to focus on how the structure of the ontological relationship
between science and technology is dissolved within each other. In the next section,
this dissolved structure will be examined in the works of British actors who stand out
in cotton production. Thus, it will be seen how scientific and technological
developments overflow and spread to other fields and how they dominate these fields
441 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 30. For more detailed information, please see Coleman,
“Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism,” (2006).
159
in a methodological sense. The extent of the domain of this phenomenon is beyond
the question of how science is perceived because science has enlarged its sphere of
influence, whether or not it is seen as a “saviour” or “healer” within the empire’s
borders.442 This domination has no derogatory meaning other than the inability of
non-capitalist classes to keep up with the changing order.
Injudiciously claiming that scientific and technological input prevented the
repetition of some local experiences or that they were quickly adopted as the socalled
‘modernising’ tools and turned into ‘violent’ state policies means assuming
that every invention and every contemporary approach embraced the entire Ottoman
geography, touched upon every knot in the social fabric, and that every action was
structured from head to toe in a specific pattern. On the contrary, it is a reality
pointed out by historiography that there is a living dynamic between actions, actors,
networks, and phenomena. For instance, in this approach, the role of commercial
activities is handled differently than in classical methodologies. It is not trading that
purports to be a “zero-sum game,” which drives and builds the economy, but the
pooling, coordinating, and even redistribution of previously scattered energies.443
This is precisely what those involved in the cotton business in the Ottoman Empire
experienced from the second half of the nineteenth century. The functional
442 Although it has become almost impractical to make definite comments on the perception of science
due to the convoluted nature of networks, the desire and tendency to benefit from scientific
developments, regardless of their success or failure, is seen in the educated segments of the society. In
this respect, Burçak’s interpretation of this group’s perception of science is quite reasonable:
“Scientism here refers to a utilitarian approach to science, i.e. the acknowledgement of and pursuit of
science as a useful and applicable category of knowledge, and a strong belief in the authority of
science as a modernizing force to bring about the salvation of the empire.” Burçak, “Modernization,
Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” 69 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, it should be commented that it would be more correct to look at the phenomenon as an
‘object’ that cannot be controlled in the intrinsic nature of networks and has its own autonomy. The
unamendability feature of scientific and technological input mentioned in the introduction of the thesis
gives the phenomenon a sort of autonomy (cf. footnotes 4 and 9). Perhaps the most crucial reason for
the expansion of the rule and domain of science is this state of unamendability. In other words, it is
the one that throws a spanner in the works of the relativity that social constructivism strives to
establish.
443 Latour and Lépinay, The Science of Passionate Interests, 38.
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(practical) relationship between scientific and technological input needs to be
examined for comprehending this situation better.
4.2 The relationship of scientific and technological input in practice
During the American Civil War, although the British wanted to carry their own
experience, knowledge, and equipment to Turkey to grow cotton with their own
hands, their demands were sometimes accepted and sometimes not. For example, the
British citizen Thomas’s request for a field to cultivate in Cyprus was rejected.444 In
another example, the British offer to drain the swamps in Adana for cotton
cultivation was dismissed.445 Corresponding to MacFarlane, this was due to the
Sublime Porte’s excessive scepticism, which occasionally turns into a conspiracy
theory against British agendas.446 According to İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, the
desire of foreign capital to enter production directly by establishing large farms,
which was defined by Tekeli and İlkin as a “colonisation project,” was not accepted
because the Ottomans did not tolerate this along with the fact that the labour problem
444 BOA, HR.MKT 336/67, 11 Ẕi'l-ḳaʿde 1276/31 May 1860; and “The Capabilities of Turkey,” The
Money Market Review (2 August 1862): 95. It is said that the population of foreigners in western
Anatolia, together with their families, reached 17,500 in 1847, despite the suspicions and difficulties
caused by the Ottoman government toward foreign capital. Of the 123,787 people living in Izmir in
1860, 28,352 were foreigners. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 70.
445 US Congress, House, Letter of the Secretary of State, Transmitting a Report on the Commercial
Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, for the Year Ended September 30, 1863 (1865),
516. Examples can be multiplied. According to British consul reports, foreign initiatives were not
welcomed also in Sayda (Sidon), Lebanon. Abela [Vice-Consul], “Inclosure in No. 2. Précis of
Reports upon the Cultivation of Cotton. Syria and the Island of Cyprus. Sidon,” in Turkey. Circular to
Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Ottoman Dominions Regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with a
Summary of Their Replies (1865), no. 3498, at 57:28.
446 “‘No!’ said my Turk, ‘if Europeans were to come among us in that way, and to hold estates, they
would soon drive us out of the country!’” MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, 1:175. There are
similar statements in the sources of the period that financial capitalism was prevented from entering
Turkey: “The objections raised to European capitalists investing their money in land in Turkey is
stated to be the imperfection and corruption of the [a]dministration . . . .” Herbert [Lieutenant-
Colonel], “Inclosure in No. 5. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert to the Secretary to the Government of
India,” in Reports Respecting Communication with India Through Turkey, by the Euphrates Valley
Route (1872), c. 534, at 45:18. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire was a marginal supplier of raw
cotton compared to Egypt, India, and other British colonies.
161
was not resolved.447 However, there were precedents where foreign capital set up
exemplary farms. Foreign capital, which could not establish model farms, preferred
other ways to participate in the production. Tekeli and İlkin are not only mistaken in
enlarging and criminalising the role of foreign capital, but also the available evidence
does not corroborate the engagement of foreign investors with a “colonisation
project.” Yet, foreign names such as James Baker provided advice for investors.
According to him, owning land in Turkey was a safe investment.448 Land ownership
policies in the Ottoman Empire were a tangle of contradictions.
The Hansard record of UK parliamentary debates adds yet another
inconsistency to this tangle of contradictions. Even though it was stated in a meeting
that foreigners could not legally own land, it was mentioned that the Ottoman
government was generous now and then. Moreover, the following sentences of a
British Parliament member were recorded: “By several ingenious fictions of law,
which it is not necessary to describe, foreigners are virtually enabled to possess land,
and I have never heard of an instance in which they have been deprived of it.”449
Accordingly, in her detailed study on foreigners who could own real estate with
different strategies, Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu designates three ways: (i) obtaining a
ḥüccet—title or deed in the sense of proof—showing that the property belonged to
them by very intricate means, (ii) transferring the real estate they bought to their
447 Tekeli and İlkin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Eğitim ve Bilgi Üretim Sisteminin Oluşumu ve
Dönüşümü, 56. A similar approach can also be discerned in Taner Timur, please see Timur, Marx-
Engels ve Osmanlı Toplumu, 87. A series of legal and institutional developments, such as the Anglo-
Ottoman Trade Convention of 1838, the nativeness (or Osmanlılık) of the Ottoman Bank, the Düyūn-ı
ʿUmūmiyye (Public Debt Administration), or the Tobacco Régie along with its monopoly, were
interpreted as the conquest of the Ottoman Empire from within, and a “colonial” or “semi-colonial”
discourse was dominated stretching from primary schools to graduate programmes.
448 Baker, Turkey in Europe (1877), 484. Furthermore, reports indicate that domestic actors do not
want to share their privileges with foreigners. BOA, HR.SFR.3 91/13, 23 July 1864.
449 171 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) (29 May 1863) cols. 6–148.
162
spouses or another relative, who were Ottoman subjects, and (iii) gaining the right to
own the real estate they rented by incurring expenses that the owner could not pay.450
Through these ways, foreign actors who wanted to move their capital to the
Ottoman lands started to show their presence in the sectors in which they were
experienced, as the Ottoman state tacitly, if not explicitly, recognised some rights,
such as retail trade, owning immovable properties, or obtaining operating licences.451
Thus, foreign enterprises operating in many fields, from mining to cotton farming,
from cotton farming to railway construction, have become an indispensable part of
commercial life, especially in the southern Balkans and western Anatolia. Like a
religious covenant, they attempted to harbour three things with them: (i) capital, (ii)
machinery, and (iii) knowledge. They believed that they would overcome
infrastructure problems with capital, that they could stimulate production with
technology made possible by capital, and that they would defeat natural and artificial
problems with the repertoire of science, which has been evolved into an
indistinguishable relationship with technology. When they saw that the cooperation,
they tried to establish was not efficient enough, they desired to bring the unity of
science and technology to the Ottoman lands with their own hands and autonomy
with their capital. In the eyes of British entrepreneurs and consular staff, the Ottoman
government was blind and indifferent to the advantages of its lands.452 This attitude
450 Kütükoğlu, “Tanzimat Devrinde Yabancıların İktisâdî Faaliyetleri,” 111.
451 Frangakis-Syrett, “Implementation of the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention on Izmir’s Trade,” 110.
452 White [Vice-Consul], “Turkey. Cyprus. Report, General and Statistical, by Mr. Vice-Consul
White,” in Commercial Reports Received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s Consuls between
January 1st and June 30th, 1862 (1863), no. 3229, at 70:472. In addition, there were no monocropping
tendencies in the Ottoman lands, dating back to the 1810s, as in Egypt. While the Ottomans were
pursuing incentive policies, the Egyptian administration largely decided what would be cultivated in
the fields of Egypt, systematised the necessary scientific knowledge, and provided the essential capital
or opened the new ways to capital. The state was the largest intermediary between the merchant and
the farmer. Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 24. According to Beckert, cotton cultivation in
Egypt was largely successful because Mehmed Ali Pasha had a monopoly on violence. Beckert,
Empire of Cotton, 132. In 1833, while there were even no statistics in Anatolia, there were 30 cotton
factories in Egypt. Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 45. It was as if the Egyptian government
163
is one of the most traditional perspectives of colonialism. While the coloniser sees
the place to be colonised as an ‘opportunity space,’ he wants to have a moral
advantage over the former owner of this place. In this respect, the coloniser’s excuse
is ready, the fertile lands lie like a corpse, and invigorating this corpse is a morally
correct move. To understand this tendency, the example of the Düyūn-ı ʿUmūmiyye
(Public Debt Administration) and the Régie Company can be used. A historian may
speak highly of these organisations for providing financial discipline in the Ottoman
economic administration, increasing the gains in tax assessment, or their benefits in
agriculture. On the other hand, is it possible to defend an organisation with its own
law enforcement mechanisms (e.g., kolcus—“the armed surveillance unit(s) of the
tobacco monopoly”)453 that have caused numerous tensions, as one would defend a
charity? Even without the tensions mentioned above, equating a charity with a
creditor still makes no sense. This area is also a place with no black and white.
As a matter of course, this approach ignores Ottoman actors from both the
bureaucracy and the merchant class. In the section where financial and infrastructural
problems were discussed, many Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman actors had taken
the stage. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although the money/cash foundations
(para vaḳıfs) in the Ottoman Empire gave consumer loans, entrepreneurial financing
remained limited in the Islamic world due to the small amount of loans to
entrepreneurs. Besides, according to Gad G. Gilbar, what made the non-Muslim
population advantageous was that they had settled in port cities in addition to the
capital they had, and foreign non-Muslims could communicate with Muslims through
local non-Muslims and had some commercial privileges. They also had a monopoly
and Egyptian agriculturalists were preparing, albeit unaware of everything, for the opportunity of the
American Civil War.
453 Birdal, The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, 138–39.
164
on information. In other words, when exporting products, they were familiar with the
demand and marketing patterns in European countries.454 Seeing that the local actors
could not achieve the desired efficiency in time, the foreign actors wanted to
implement their projects without involving other actors. All they needed was a piece
of land where they could have the autonomy to bring together the latest tools and
machines for scientific farming as well as cotton cultivation. When they did not carry
out the agricultural practice they desired on such a piece of land with their own
hands, neither the infrastructure problems could be solved as they wished, nor the
transfer of scientific knowledge and technology was achieved as they dreamed of.
In addition, despite the increasing demand for Ottoman goods in European
markets, foreign actors were not yet able to operate in the inner regions of the
empire, which was still an unstable market. The excessive competition between local
and foreign actors also surged the prices of Ottoman goods to a level that would
deprive them of competitiveness in European markets.455 Especially in times of
famine, intermediaries, brokers, and speculators found a broader scope for action.
For example, in this period, samples were taken before the bales, and a process in
which purchases were decided on the selected specimen started.456 Thus, it was very
challenging for foreign actors to establish a functioning network among all actors in
a region where numerous actors were located and not under the control of a central
and imperial command. The British actors, by and large, recognised that they could
not shape the Ottoman geography as they desired. For instance, until 1865, the
licence for cotton ginning establishment was taken from the centre, and the process
454 Gilbar, “The Muslim Big Merchant-Entrepreneurs of the Middle East,” 24–25. In addition, they
mastered the local tastes and spoke the languages necessary for doing business. On the other hand,
local actors had advantages in local credit facilities. Frangakis-Syrett, “Western and Local
Entrepreneurs in İzmir in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” 82.
455 Frangakis-Syrett, “Uluslararası Önem Taşıyan Bir Akdeniz Limanının Gelişimi,” 36–37.
456 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 209.
165
of obtaining this licence was sometimes long and sometimes utterly frustrating.457
They could not penetrate new regions, if they had such a purpose, not only because
they could not carry private or state-centred violence mechanisms and their own rule
systems from geography to geography but also because of the differences arising
from the physical structure of each region.
There are many variables, including but not limited to different precipitation
regimes, various soil types, and farmers’ expectations of the soil and crop. Insomuch
that if the roots of the cotton plant reach some harmful chemicals under the ground, it
may negatively affect the harvest. Sometimes expectations come into play, and,
fearing famine, small-scale agriculturists find it more plausible to plant subsistence
crops. Even though cotton farming requires new ways of growing, cleaning
(ginning), and getting to market (transportation), local farmers do not always want to
go to the trouble of pouring new wine into the old bottles—it was even the case for
the American seed, which was the most productive among the seeds in question. At
this point, although not as strong as the economic conditions, even some religious
issues could be influential and preclusive. For example, in the land that John B.
Paterson purchased from Karamanoğlu Hüseyin Efendi, the peasants opposed the
drudgery because of Paterson’s non-Muslim identity, and yet another example of
pouring new wine into the old bottles was in C. S. Hanson’s farm to persuade the
farmworkers who were suspicious of the British plough.458 It seems that he did carry
out two-year experiments with this plough and only then convinced the farmworkers
with the results of the experiments.459 In other words, the desires and expectations of
the parties were different from each other. There may well be a choice between risk
457 “Cotton Cultivation in Turkey, Speech by Mr. Hyde Clarke,” The Guardian, 12 August 1864, 3.
458 Kurmuş, Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, 81, 89.
459 Ibid.
166
and security. However, the domain of power that scientific and technological input
derives from the principle of unamendability is revealing itself here (cf. footnote 9).
Foreign actors also preferred iron plough instead of hoe and primitive plough
in line with their own conditions. This tool, which was not necessary for small lands,
was one of the sine qua non for more extensive lands. For example, the benefits of
new technologies would not be able to be ignored for weed removal. At least some
foreign actors understood that some processes could not be easily separated from one
another. Well, were they more conscious than local actors about having this
understanding? It is complicated to give a definite yes or no answer to this question.
Just like the local actors, they have taken the proper steps and made the necessary
analysis, but there have also been entirely wrong steps and miscalculations. Rather
than evaluating the nineteenth-century Ottoman cotton production activity as merely
a reflection of foreign demand, this approach provides new insights to wade through
how these steps and analyses measure up to reality. Even though it is widely said that
the increase in cotton production occurs in regions already producing for world
markets, this is also a reductionist approach in the end. Although there is a
significant difference between the production rates of the regions for world markets
(coastal regions in general), cotton production has also increased in some unexpected
areas that do not specifically produce for world markets like Amasya, Diyarbakır,
Urfa, or Van, among many others. Variables such as plans shaped by expectations,
infrastructure problems, and financing emerge in the field of scientific and
technological input. It is unfathomable to consider one of them separately from the
other. Despite being aware of this situation, the CSA was less willing to take on the
failure while it took on the apparent success.
167
For example, in a speech published in The Journal of the East India
Association, Hyde Clarke compares the experience of cotton farming in India and the
Ottoman Empire. His main claim is that there is no difference between the
experience of these two geographies. In his article focusing on similarities, he further
attributed all the success to the CSA and the failures to local actors: “. . . wherever
they carried out those measures which were recommended to them by the [CSA],
there they succeeded; wherever they neglected them or delayed them, they are
suffering from the consequences of their neglect.”460 This approach ignored the
problems and reality of not only the centre but also the local people. The analysis of
the situation of the farmers, who were crushed under the tax burden imposed by the
central administration, avoiding commercial agriculture, and focusing on subsistence
farming under the heavy debt load, remained incomplete.461 For instance, conflicts
between ortakçıs (sharecroppers), çiftlik (estate)-holders, and the subaşıs who run the
farms were not included in the narrative at all (cf. footnote 141). However, the same
Hyde Clarke had also given a speech at the CSA meeting in Queen’s Hotel in 1864,
addressing the administrative differences between Egypt and Turkey.462 Even more
unreasonably, without any data to support his assertion, Hyde Clarke claims that, the
geographies that he does not see as equal will not only develop agriculturally thanks
to cotton farming, but those regions will thrive in a much more ‘comprehensive’
way: “As cotton cultivation particularly stimulates intelligence and improvements in
460 Frere and Fitzwilliam, “The Product of Cotton in India: Meeting at the Society of Arts, June 30,
1870. Future Prospects. Mr. Hyde Clarke,” Journal of the East India Association (31 March 1870):
194–95. A similar reductionism has been demonstrated in Egypt as well. The same recommendations
were made for all three regions, as if there were no differences between them. “On lit dans le
Manchester Guardian,” Journal de Constantinople, no. 1644, 29 August 1861, 2.
461 Kaya, “19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla İzmir Ekonomisinde Süreklilik ve Kırılmalar,” 50. In narratives
where even social problems are ignored, old-fashioned object-object relations, such as precipitation
regimes and soil structure, can only find a place for themselves in footnotes. For a more up-to-date
study of precipitation regimes in Turkey, please see McNeill, The Mountains of the Mediterranean
World, 21.
462 “Cotton Cultivation in Turkey, Speech by Mr. Hyde Clarke,” The Guardian, 12 August 1864, 3.
168
agriculture, it has the effect, as has been seen in some parts of India and in other
parts of the world, of improving all modes of culture.”463
Hyde Clarke was not just a CSA’s senior official and a well-known
Freemason.464 He also came to the fore as a renowned social scientist, anthropologist,
engineer, accountant, statistician, journalist, and traveller of the period. Clarke had
the opportunity to travel or work in many countries and closely observe the
geographies and people he wrote and drew about. Therefore, it is a disappointment
that he could not reflect in his analyses that communities from different religious and
ethnic backgrounds lived in a peculiar reality in the Ottoman Empire. For example,
spare parts of British machines transported to western Anatolia were stored at the
Izmir-Aydın Railway stations. Thus, when a malfunction occurred in the machines,
the necessary change was carried out with the help of the railway employees.465
However, many peasants did not have such an opportunity. Moreover, although
Hyde Clarke is an Englishman who does not fit into today’s caricatured Orientalist
schema, though he still maintains the Orientalist discourses of his period from time
to time, he adopts an attitude that homogenises the internal differences between the
Ottoman state and India. This attitude has been grossly neglected by those studying
the history of the CSA. Yet, in a comparative analysis, two cases or phenomena
463 Frere and Fitzwilliam, “The Product of Cotton in India,” Journal of the East India Association (31
March 1870): 194–95 (emphases added). It was also common among many travellers to despise the
local people in terms of intelligence and skill. Blunt, The People of Turkey (1878), 1:189. Even in
more balanced and relatively fair narratives, the so-called “cultural” reason was sought for the failure
of Turkish farmers with a highly essentialist approach: “But the religion, morals, and social customs
of the people, the tenure of property, and the political institutions of the country, are all adverse to
agriculture, commerce, and industrial enterprise.” Bentley, The Second Cotton Famine, and How to
Prevent a Third (1866), 17. Yet, the Turks—meaning Muslims—were only a part of the actors.
Considering the foreigners and non-Muslim locals engaged in cotton farming, it is difficult to estimate
which group corresponds to what percentage.
464 Morris, Freemasonry in the Holy Land. Or, Handmarks of Hiram’s Builders: Embracing Notes
Made During a Series of Masonic Researches, in 1868, in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and
Europe, and the Results of Much Correspondence with Freemasons in Those Countries (1876), 50.
465 Families such as Whittall, Paterson, Van Lennep, and Baltazzi allocated large budgets for
machinery. Kurmuş, Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi, 91.
169
could possibly be regarded as separate and fundamentally unrelated. Worse still, the
study may go no further than an attempt to justify the author’s convictions. Often, the
author is not even aware of this because too much contact with the object of interest
inevitably complicates or distorts the results. Therefore, many variables and details
are ignored or deliberately eliminated. Thus, the analyst is left with either an
essentialist critique or carefully chosen apologist excuses at the end of the day.
The fact that the CSA did not present a sincere and realistic critique may
explain the desire of British actors to have an autonomous structure at some stage.
They demanded this autonomous structure, including the lands on which they could
implement the latest methods and put scientific and technological inputs into practice
along with their facilities. Despite their mistakes, there was a grain of truth in their
wishes. According to years of experience in various parts of the world, technology,
science, capital, and politics were more closely connected than anticipated. These
ties were so tight that sometimes they became invisible, resulting in a chaotic
environment due to their intertwining. Capital did not solve all quandaries. In
addition to the finances, a political domain was also required. However, only such an
area could both provide scientific education and fully realise technology transfer.
Foreign actors have always had one or two. Once they had capital, their dominance
was curtailed. When their domination was not restrained, problems arose in which
their capital proved futile. The most reasonable solution they could find in such an
environment was to play in their own national garden. But their national gardens,
such as Britain’s, were not suitable for cotton cultivation. What was to be done then?
The national garden had to be moved and disseminated. They could move their
instruments to some places. They wanted to undertake something similar in western
170
Anatolia and the southern Balkans as well. While this had dire consequences in some
areas, it was not just a malicious intent either.
The model farm that W. P. C. Salvago wanted to establish is one of the most
apparent manifestations of the desire for autonomous structuring. There were various
correspondences between the CSA, which supported this project the most, and the
Ottoman government. After protracted negotiations, the project was tendered to
Salvago in Balıkesir and Bergama in 1863.466 It was seen that some aid was given to
British actors in earlier dates, too. For instance, some companies demanded lands
free of charge for cotton cultivation. It was reported that these lands should be
exempted from all kinds of taxes for ten years due to some costs, such as
infrastructure and imports—the exemption for the export duty was five years.467
Instead, the land tax to be accrued per acre would be determined between the state
and the company. These initiatives, which were relatively free in their activities on
the land, were made subject to Ottoman laws. Nonetheless, as was customary most of
the time, the Ottoman state accepted some demands while rejecting others in these
enterprises. The main reason for this uneasy attitude of the state was that those who
would cultivate the lands were predominantly foreign entrepreneurs, and they were
demanding too much tax exemption in the eyes of the state.468 Technology, science,
capital, and politics were supposed to be tightly interconnected, but the parties would
soon get to the point that an environment to realise this would not be attainable. Long
story short, the answer to the question raised in the sub-heading of the “chicken-egg
466 BOA, HR.TO 377/25, 17 July 1863; and BOA, MVL 649/13, 13 Cemāẕīyyü'l-evvel 1280/26
October 1863. The absence of the name of this actor in foreign sources gives the impression that the
name was entered incorrectly in the Ottoman state records.
467 BOA, MVL 845/64, 25 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1278/30 October 1861.
468 Ibid.
171
dilemma” is obvious. The egg can and has imagined the chicken that will lay itself.
However, the American Civil War was over before this dream could materialise.
4.3 Cotton cultivation after the American Civil War
As a result of the steps taken during the American Civil War, although the
expectations of local and foreign actors were not met, there was a noticeable increase
in cotton production, which is beyond dispute. It is possible to see this increase in the
Balkans and Anatolia (especially western Anatolia—Izmir/Smyrna and its
surroundings). Figure 5 below indicates the general cotton exports of the Ottoman
Empire to Britain, and Figure 6 illustrates the cotton exports specifically from Izmir
(both in terms of quantities). On the other hand, Table 4 and Table 5 underneath
display the actual and tariff values of cotton yarns and cotton manufactures imported
from Britain to the Ottoman Empire, respectively, between 1861 and 1866, in British
pounds sterling. These figures are indicative as they reflect the partial increase in
cotton production. There was a noticeable decline from 1865, immediately after the
American Civil War. The United States quickly returned to the market, and the new
entrants lost their market shares one by one due to various problems they could not
solve. Since the statistics kept are scattered, increases or decreases that do not change
the overall trend are likely. Although the raw cotton imported from the Ottoman
Empire did not satisfy the British demand, it can be assumed that the cotton
manufactures and cotton yarns the British exported to the Ottoman Empire relieved
their disappointment to some extent (see Figure 7 and Figure 8 below for statistics
between 1861 and 1866).
172
Figure 5. Raw cotton exports from Turkey to the UK, 1862–1866 (in cwts)469
Figure 6. Raw cotton exports from Smyrna to the UK, 1860–1869 (in bales of 400
lbs each)470
469 BOA, HR.SFR.3 118/15, 5 January 1867.
470 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 7.
41.212
110.294
169.234
223.133
92.926
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
1862 1863 1864 1865 1866
100.00 957.00
14,851.00
42,282.00
61,793.00
79,803.00
32,770.00
16,995.00
12,758.00
40,957.00
0.00
10,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
60,000.00
70,000.00
80,000.00
90,000.00
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869
173
Figure 7. Cotton yarns, imported to Turkey and Syria from the UK, 1861–1866 (in
lbs)471
Figure 8. Cotton manufactures, imported to Turkey and Syria from the UK, 1861–
1866 (in yards)472
471 BOA, HR.SFR.3 118/15, 5 January 1867.
472 Ibid.
8,818,415.00
5,619,260.00
6,225,920.00
6,825,054.00
8,037,671.00
10,187,940.00
0.00
2,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
6,000,000.00
8,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
12,000,000.00
1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866
214,658,337.0
169,365,634.0
222,318,543.0
194,899,438.0 194,296,483.0
247,006,141.0
0.00
50,000,000.00
100,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
200,000,000.00
250,000,000.00
300,000,000.00
1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866
174
Table 4. The Actual and Tariff Values of Cotton Yarns Imported to Turkey and
Syria from the UK, 1861–1866473
Year Actual value Tariff value Import duty Import duty,
ad valorem
1861... £407,762... £407,762... £32,000... £32,000
1862... 330,000... 255,000... 22,000... 27,000
1863... 598,835... 285,000... 24,000... 48,000
1864... 809,623... 310,000... 25,000... 64,000
1865... 681,185... 370,000... 30,000... 55,000
1866... 837,105... 460,000... 37,000... 65,000
Table 5. The Actual and Tariff Values of Cotton Manufactures Imported to Turkey
and Syria from the UK, 1861–1866474
Year Actual value Tariff value Import duty Import duty,
ad valorem
1861... £2,746,553... £2,746,553... £220,000... £220,000
1862... 2,687,637... 2,200,000... 176,000... 215,000
1863... 4,530,835... 2,850,000... 230,000... 360,000
1864... 4,783,883... 2,500,000... 200,000... 380,000
1865... 4,643,537... 2,500,000... 200,000... 370,000
1866... 5,706,862... 3,150,000... 250,000... 455,000
More specifically, what exactly was this trend in the post-war period?
Notwithstanding the fact that cotton production abated after the American Civil
War,475 this did not mean it was over. Cotton seed imports were carried on with even
after the war. With a slight delay, in 1866, the Sublime Porte decided to award a
medal as a token of gratitude to those who contributed to the growth of cotton
production within the empire’s borders. Here, it is necessary to mention the mutual
bestowal of medals. In 1865, the CSA had presented the Ottoman minister of
473 Ibid. Figures are given in British pounds (£).
474 Ibid.
475 Mudge and Nourse, Report upon Cotton (1869), 45.
175
commerce and his undersecretary with medals for their outstanding care and
contributions to cotton cultivation.476 Gold and silver medals bearing the ṭuġrā
(imperial calligraphic monogram) on one side and the symbolic depiction of
agriculture on the other were produced at the imperial mint. The gold medals were
sent to Sir Henry Bulwer, Musurus Bey,477 and William Sandford via the French
Mail.478 Apart from President Reşad Bey, Messrs Hyde Clarke, John B. Paterson,
Frederick LaFontaine, Thomas Bowen Rees,479 James Gout, Mustafa Efendi, Pergob,
and Offley, who served in the Smyrna Cotton Commission, were also awarded gold
medals. Other commission members, İbrâhim Efendi and Dibran, were given silver
medals.480 One year later, in 1867, an Ottoman cotton sample received one of the
grand prizes at the Paris International Exposition (Exposition universelle de 1867).481
The Guardian reported that the Ottoman government’s policy towards cotton
cultivation deserved British gratitude: “It is to be hoped that Europe will not fail to
recognise that during the cotton crisis, the policy of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan
towards us has been distinguished by friendliness and generosity.”482
476 BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 325/2, 17 Ramażān 1281/13 February 1865.
477 Known to be the owner of cotton fields in the Balkans, Musurus Bey was one of the bureaucrats
most praised by the CSA. It would not be wrong to designate Musurus Bey, one of the most pivotal
figures between the CSA and the Porte, as the most mentioned Ottoman actor of the period. Watts,
The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 60.
478 BOA, HR.SFR.3 110/16, 16 January 1866; and BOA, HR.TO 56/45, 8 February 1866.
479 In 1853, taking advantage of the Crimean War, he came to Izmir from Manchester to trade in
industrial paints. The family was originally from Wales. He was engaged in the dye trade and cotton
weaving in Izmir. Founded in 1863 under the name of the Asia Minor Cotton Company, he bought an
extensive amount of lands in Nazilli, Menemen, and Bornova. Thomas Bowen Rees owned 2,000
shares of this company. After a relatively prosperous period, the company reduced its activities when
western Anatolia’s importance in cotton cultivation plunged, and it dissolved itself in 1893. Demirbaş,
Rees Köşkü, 95.
480 İbrâhim Efendi was the commission’s secretary, and Dibran was its dragoman. “Turkish Cotton,”
The Standard, 17 January 1866, 2; “The Promotion of Cotton Growing in Turkey,” The Western Daily
Press, 18 January 1866, 3; and “Cotton Supply Association,” The Manchester Courier and
Lancashire General Advertiser, 1 February 1866, 3. One of the medal winners of this period was
Charles Alison, the British Ambassador to Tehran, who supplied Indian cotton seeds to the Ottoman
Empire, particularly to the Van region. BOA, HR.MKT 544/7, 23 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1282/9 May 1866.
481 Mudge and Nourse, Report upon Cotton (1869), 94.
482 “The Turkish Cotton Trade,” The Guardian, 15 February 1867, 4. One of the reasons why a
restrained and hopeful language was still used concerning cotton cultivation was the CSA’s conviction
that with the new post-war labour system, that is, cotton production would not be the same after the
176
During the visit of Sultan Abdülaziz to London in 1867, cotton negotiations
also remained on the agenda. A delegation from the CSA483 stayed at Buckingham
Palace to inform Abdülaziz of the gravity of expanding cotton cultivation in the
Ottoman Empire and to congratulate him for what has been achieved in this
direction.484 The delegation expressed their gratitude for the distribution of cotton
seeds, the gratuitous use of uncultivated mīrī (state) lands as well as their exemption
from tax for five years, the possibility of customs-free import of tools and equipment
for cotton cultivation, reductions in import duties of British industrial manufactures,
and finally the latest regulations regarding the expansion of foreigners’ right to own
private property in the Ottoman Empire.485 Furthermore, the delegation warned that
with the end of the American Civil War, the re-entry of the United States into the
cotton market might change the balance of trade. They presented recommendations
for the continuation of the efforts made during the Civil War period. They also stated
that the CSA welcomed the news about foreigners being able to own land in the
Ottoman Empire (except for the Hejaz region) from now on.486 Despite all these, the
reason for not demonstrating the success expected by the CSA in the following years
abolition of slavery. Cotton Supply Association, The Third Annual Report of the Executive
Committee, to which is Added a Report of the Proceedings at the Annual Meeting, Held at the Town
Hall, on Friday, May 11th, 1860, and a Review of the Present Position of the Cotton Trade in
Reference to Supply (1860), 5.
483 The names in the delegation are as follows: John Cheetham (President), Edmund Ashworth (Vice-
President), Isaac Watts (Secretary), Hyde Clarke, Colonel Gray, Edward Walmsley, George Hadfield,
H. A. Hurst, Hugh Mason, J. B. Smith, J. M. Bennett, J. T. Hibbert, John Laird, John Platt, Joseph
Fielden, Malcolm Ross, N. Eckersley, T. B. Potter, William Armitage, William Graham, and William
Jackson. “The Cotton Supply Association and the Sultan,” The Guardian, 16 July 1867, 6. Edhem
Eldem informs that the committee consists of 24 people. For a more detailed account of the meeting,
please see Eldem, “İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin Bir Kesişmesi,” 76–77.
484 “Cotton Cultivation in Turkey,” The Dundee Courier, 18 July 1867, 1; and Aksüt, Sultan Aziz’in
Mısır ve Avrupa Seyahati, 159–60. It should not be neglected that Mehmed Sa‘id Paşa, the Governor
of Egypt visited Britain before Sultan Abdülaziz during the American Civil War. Beckert, Empire of
Cotton, 256; and Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 44. For a country suitable for monocrop
agriculture like Egypt, cotton production has always been a priority.
485 Eldem, “İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin Bir Kesişmesi,” 77.
486 “The Cotton Supply Association and the Sultan,” The Guardian, 16 July 1867, 6; and Watts, The
Cotton Supply Association (1871), 61–62.
177
could be found in the belief of one of the former mayors of Manchester487 and an
alderman, Abel Heywood: “If the future of Turkey were to be great, it would be so
only by the adoption of the institutions of Western Europe.”488
In 1868, a few months after Abdülaziz’s visit to Britain, the letter of Nathan
L. Buckley, the Chairman of the Asia Minor Cotton Company, to the CSA was quite
harsh. Buckley complained that they were not given a space to use their “energies
and capital.” Their past five years of experience seemed like a colossal
disappointment: “Instead of being allowed free scope legitimately to employ our
energies and capital, we find petty impediments placed in our way on every side.”489
According to Buckley, the government’s policies initially gave confidence to
investors. Tax regulations and ease of importing machinery made people content, but
as mentioned earlier in the thesis, there was no integrity in the Ottoman bureaucracy.
Everything was not carried out within the framework of a central plan, and it was not
possible to talk about any model that was followed. For example, Buckley reported
that one season a tax collector insisted on imposing a double-weighing tax upon
cotton from one of the surrounding cotton (ginning) mills, local officials supported
these unpropitious moves, its books were confiscated, and the mill’s managers were
imprisoned. In another example, Buckley stated that they discovered lignite seams in
Kırkağaç (in Manisa) and Sérres and that they were never used before the British
487 The municipality mentioned here was actually a municipal corporation. The modern city of
Manchester was established as the Manchester Corporation in 1838 under the Municipal Corporations
Act 1835 and received its official city status in 1853. This municipal structure was different from that
in the Ottoman Empire. Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76; Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 50; and Frangopulo, Rich Inheritance, 59, 107.
488 “Visit of the Sultan to Manchester,” Manchester Weekly Times and Examiner, 20 July 1867, 3. The
text of gratitude presented to Sultan Abdülaziz is preserved in the State Archives. Furthermore, a
painting was commissioned to commemorate the contact of Abdülaziz with his visitors from the
Manchester municipality. Eldem, “İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin Bir Kesişmesi,” 78. Eldem draws
a parallel between the fate of the painting and the CSA’s expectations regarding cotton production in
the Ottoman Empire and states that both ended in a fiasco. Eldem, “İktisat Tarihiyle Sanat Tarihinin
Bir Kesişmesi,” 86.
489 BOA, HR.TO 509/56, 23 September 1868.
178
found them, that they used these coals, and paid the government for them. This deal,
Buckley claims, was later modified by the government to put businesses and ventures
in trouble. The corresponding letter was conveyed to Musurus Pasha by the CSA’s
Secretary Isaac Watts, “his excellency’s assistance” was requested, and the
complaint was described as “so embarrassing and disastrous.”490
These problems reveal a strange situation. On the one hand, promises were
made; on the other hand, they were broken. How can any phenomenon be modelled
when compliments and criticism fly in the same air simultaneously? In other words,
it is relatively easier to write equations (or build ‘models’) in a discipline like history,
but it is hard to solve them because they do not work most of the time. Although the
story of each country could sit in a global setting by some means, the experience of
the Ottoman Empire unveiled that cotton production in the Ottoman lands was
subject to a being without law.491 This example is beyond the scope of the thesis,
even though the sample pool is large enough to point to the superstitious origin of the
belief that laws of social phenomena can exist. Since there can be no talk of a
transcendent order encompassing the entire social fabric in the Ottoman geography,
no limits can be drawn for the creative proliferation of success and failures. In other
words, beyond the apparent empirical constancy of the laws of social phenomena that
preoccupied the (social) sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
particular, the possibilities for actual and chaotic change prevail. The infinity of these
possibilities indicates that they are inexhaustible. In the words of Quentin
Meillassoux, this is based on the lawless breaking of every law: “. . . mais de la
490 Ibid.
491 This phrase, with reference to Quentin Meillassoux, highlights the non-linear character of cotton
farming.
179
brisure sans loi de toute loi [but from the lawless breaking of all law].”492 One of the
proofs of this situation is that in examining the history of cotton production, one
cannot make an a priori inference from a determined situation to the following case
since an indefinite multiplicity of different futures can be envisaged without
contradiction. It is not only envisioned but also located in the same space-time.
A temporality whose formation is not subject to any determined law, that is,
to no fixed set of possibilities, also demands to be a part of the historiography. The
rejection of the metaphysical nature of models in the social sciences also goes
through the sacrifice of any such idea of absolute necessity, and the historiography
thus eludes the principle of sufficient reason. So, what makes then the plausible
chaotic nature of history so terrifying? The actual disorganisation of actors, actions,
and events limits any model’s chances of survival, making them at times impossible.
Yet, nothing is frightening in the reasonably chaotic nature of history. Just because
every law is broken without law does not mean that actors, actions, and events have
to change wildly. For such thinking, it is necessary to imagine that chaos is in a
completely radical form, and there is no reason for this. There is no absolute/forced
reason to switch from a general state A to a state B in simpler terms. Every transition
from A to B, whether or not it conforms to social science theories and models, may
be without reason, or neither is more necessary than the other. For example, in the
previous example, it is seen that the promises made were not kept, and the relations
were strained as if they would break. So, is this thread, stretched as if it were going
to break, really broken?
492 Meillassoux, “L’inexistence divine,” 7. This situation has led scholars working in the humanities
and social sciences to turn to linear problems. The persistent variants of non-linear events were
intimidating as they could not be kept under control (and at low intensity).
180
It is not correct to speak of a planned and programmed strategy or policy to
expand cotton cultivation, especially like what happened during the years of the
American Civil War. Instead, efforts on cotton cultivation had rather turned into
personal initiatives and become an ordinary part of the non-radical chaotic nature of
the Ottoman government. It is possible to compare these steps taken by the central
government to the aftershocks of an earthquake. The following lines of Nâmık
Kemal summarise the situation of the Ottoman Empire after the Civil War:
Ḥālimize biraz vāḳıf olanlar içün bedāhet derecesine vāṣıl olan ḥaḳāʾiḳdendir
ki bizde şimdi tezyīd-i servet içün eñ ʿācil ve eñ büyük tedbīr zirāʿati ıṣlāḥ
itmekdir. . . . Renc-berimiziñ eѕvābında ṭūfāndan biraz soñra insānlarıñ
yürütdükleri ḥayvān derilerinden teraḳḳīce ne-ḳadr farḳ var ise zirāʿatimiz
dahi devr-i Ādem’den-berü o nisbetde ya ilerülemiş ya ilerülememişdir.
Zirāʿatce zemānımıza göre muḥtāc oldığımız teraḳḳiyātı ḥāṣıl itmek ise
mücāhid-āne bir iḳdām ile Avrupa’dan çiftcilik fennini iġtinām itmeğe
tevaḳḳuf ider. Bunı ḥāṣıl itmek içün her vilāyet dāḫilinde birkaç zirāʿat
komisyonı ve birkaç numūne çiftliği ḥāṣıl itmek lāzımdır. [One of the
apparent facts for those who have little knowledge of our situation is that the
most urgent and most significant measure to increase wealth in our country is
to improve agriculture. . . . As much as there is a difference between the
clothes of our farmers in terms of progress from the skins of animals carried
by people a little after the Flood, our agriculture has also either advanced or
not advanced at that rate since the time of Adam. According to the conditions
of our time, achieving the progress, we need for agriculture depends on
obtaining the fenn of farming from Europe with hard work and effort. In
order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to establish several agricultural
commissions and several model farms within each province.]493
Since Ottoman intellectual life presents an extremely disrupted picture of
drawing a general portrait of Ottoman problems, care should be taken when
493 ʿİbret, no. 61, 25 Ramażān 1289/26 November 1872, 1. The failure in the field of agriculture
would also be mentioned in the Ottoman Parliament of 1877, years later: “Ziraat için ne kadar
düşünülecek şeyler vardır. Bu cümle ile beraber ziraat nezaretimiz, ziraat meclisimiz ve ziraat için
fazla fazla memurlarımız vardır. Ziraat, sınaat ve hırfet her bir tarafda ilerledi. Bizde yalnız geri kaldı;
çünkü ilerlemiş olsaydı müvazenemiz açık görünmezdi. Bu mes’elenin ehemmiyeti padişahımız
efendimiz hazretlerinin taht-i âlî-baht-i Osmaniye cülûs-i hümayunlariyle beraber bir ziraat mektebi
küşadını ferman buyurmalariyle isbat olunur.” [There are so many things to think about for
agriculture. We have an agriculture ministry, agriculture council, and too many civil servants for
agriculture. Agriculture, crafts, and trades flourished on all sides. We are left behind; if it had
progressed, our balance of trade would not have been in deficit. The significance of this issue is
proved by the Sultan’s order to establish an agricultural school.] Us, Meclis-i Meb’usan 1293=1877
Zabıt Ceridesi, 1:323.
181
attempting to read an entire period through its intellectual milieu. The profiles of
these people are, so to speak, like stock market data, or, to put it more precisely, a
reminder that trying to forecast the weather through the eyes of a meteorologist, risks
being influenced by many different variables. Taking pictures of a petrified object
frozen in time is much more challenging and often leads the researcher to inaccurate
conclusions. The most non-speculated interpretation that can be drawn from this text
of Nâmık Kemal is that the Ottomans were still at the point of grasping the
significance of agriculture. There was an awareness, even the progressiveness of the
era, but could an Ottoman man of letter ever resemble a calm sea? In another article
published in the ʿİbret, Kemal this time talks about the “ġarīb” or “strange”
reputation of trade and takes a stance indicating that the closer he is to agriculture,
the further he moves away from the subtleties of commercial dynamics of the age:
Ticāret ġarīb bir iʿtibār buldı. Biñ şirketden servetli ādemler, bir devletden
ḳuvvetli şirketler peydā idiyor. . . . Buḫār sāyesindedir ki yigirmi beş otuz
milyon nüfūsı olan yerlerde elli altmış milyon bār-gīr ḳuvvetinde temür
[demir] ve bakır hiç ārām itmeksizin leẕāʾiẕ ve ḥavāʾicimiziñ tedārik-i
esbābına çalışıyor. . . . Maʿrifet serhadd-i taṣavvura vardı. Ḳıṭʿalar ayrılıyor,
deñizler birleşdiriliyor. ʿUmmān ortalarında karalar, kum deryālarında sular
bulıyor. Fenn-i servet mesāʿīyi taḳsīm eyledi. Bir nā-ḳābil, sanʿatınıñ kendine
ʿāʾid olan cihetinde eski hezār-fennlerden on on beş derece üstād oluyor. Bir
çocuk uğraşdığı işde evvelki kār-güẕārlarıñ onuñdan on beşiñden ziyāde
maḥṣūl fiʿile çıkarıyor. [The trade found a “strange” reputation. Men richer
than a thousand companies create companies more potent than a state. . . . It
is thanks to steam that in places with a population of twenty-five/thirty
million, fifty to sixty million horsepower of iron and copper work without
rest to supply the means of our “welfare” and needs. . . . Ingenuity had
reached the limits of imagination. Continents separate; seas unite. There are
lands in the middle of the ocean and waters in the seas of sand. Fenn-i servet
(political economy, so to speak) divided labour. An incompetent person
becomes a master of his art by ten or fifteen times more than the old
polymaths. A child manufactures more products than ten or five of the
previous masters/adepts.]494
494 ʿİbret, no. 3, 11 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir 1289/18 June 1872, 1. Paragraphs in the original text have been
rearranged to fit into a narrative.
182
Based on his observations, Kemal articulates that the beginning of everything
that is the product of civilisation is to “take a lesson” or “ʿibret.” The text, which was
once an example of the idea of progress, is conducive to different lessons in the eyes
of new generations, who do nothing more than be the caretakers of the shrines.
Nevertheless, none of these lessons has anything to do with laying the groundwork
for progress. The article carries some insights into the distance between Ottoman
intellectuals and developments around them. Although Nâmık Kemal states in his
article that there are the “Tanẓīmāt,” the “Mecelle (Ottoman Civil Code),” “two
small railways,” “many sorts of weapons,” and a few “chaussées (highways)” in
“our” hands, it is not possible for the Ottomans to claim full ownership over any of
them, including the highways. That is to say, none of them was the single-handed
creation of the Ottoman Empire per se. Attributing the developments that are the
result of new partnerships, from the European capital to the workforce, from theory
to practice, only to a single denominator of the partnership can be discerned as an
attitude that manifests no lesson has been taken. Moreover, compared to the factories
in Manchester, referring to each and every facility in the Ottoman Empire as a
factory makes the term factory itself meaningless and obscure. “We could not
succeed in establishing a company. Is this how trade progresses?” Nâmık Kemal
asks. All these questions were an effort to generate the concept of wealth in the mind
of the Ottoman intellectual. So much so that Nâmık Kemal’s question of whether
there is a Muslim bank, not finding the Ottoman Bank to be a müʾmin (believer)
enough, would occupy this process of wealth generation for a long time with the
contradictions it contains. Nâmık Kemal, who bases the life of the people and the
fact that they are still breathing all the way back to the works of their great ancestors,
expresses the naïve excitement and desire of the Ottoman intellectual by not
183
answering the question of whether wealth comes from reasons or reasons from
wealth. To the extent that, with the intoxication created by this excitement echoing in
his lines, he attempts to build a school with a penny or two from the pockets of a
hundred people. Therefore, just like in this example, someone who is aware of some
of the realities of the period may stay away from some other realities. As such, the
story of cotton should be sought within any kind of distance.
From the 1870s, the praises of the Ottoman Empire, perhaps unsurprisingly,
gave way to a tone of disappointment. The British were caught in the distance
mentioned above. Isaac Watts highlighted the inadequacy of state capacity as the
reason for this disappointment. According to Watts, the government often lacks the
power to exhaustively realise its own wishes and the demands of others and has not
been able to fulfil its decisions promptly. Moreover, those who were ready and
willing to help the farmers and introduce machinery into the country faced a variety
of minor annoyances and hurdles:
Repeated complaints were made by the Asia Minor Cotton Company of the
difficulties placed in their way. At one time their machinery, though admitted
duty free, when carried up the country could not be erected for want of
authority from Constantinople, and much delay and loss were the
consequence; at another time the supply of fuel, previously used with the
knowledge and consent of [g]overnment, was arbitrarily stopped without
warning by local officials, and ginning operations were interrupted at the
busiest period of the year; at another season the attempted imposition of a
tax-collector led to the suspension of all operations for twelve months, the
seizure of the company’s books, and the imprisonment of the factory
manager.495
As the picture becomes gloomier from the 1870s onwards, a letter is sent
from the CSA to Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, signed by
John Cheetham, the President of the CSA; Edmund Ashworth, the Vice-President;
and Isaac Watts, the Secretary. The letter contains recommendations for cotton
495 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 63.
184
cultivation. The first recommendation in the letter is to appoint local experts to
monitor the cotton cultivation and assist the cultivators with their knowledge when
necessary. It is recommended that these experts write periodic reports. It is distinctly
underlined that there is a need for people who know the scientific dimensions and the
subtleties of this business. The second recommendation draws attention to the
importance of model farms and the latest farming techniques. In other words, the
results of the practical or applied aspect of science are highlighted. The third one is
for legal regulations and infrastructure problems. The tithe and lack of roads are
presented as severe obstacles. Apart from these, it is emphasised that the best type of
New Orleans seeds should be used. The lack of infrastructure needs was not
unexpected, given the current state capacity of the Ottoman Empire. Still, the fact
that the legal arrangements could not be made to please the CSA conclusively
(without any hurdles) was related to the Ottoman Empire being a sovereign country,
unlike India. Even though Britain used its economic and political power from time to
time to impose its wishes, the Ottoman Empire was able to show its own will simply
because it was not a colony. In a setting where British colonialism in India is
determined by the dynamics there, it is not a correct approach to evaluate the
initiatives in western Anatolia as in the case of India. At the end of the day, what
kind of exploitation was this that most of the foreign (and ‘colonial,’ so to speak)
ventures in western Anatolia during the American Civil War ended in bankruptcy?
The fourth recommendation is to take serious steps against the scams, swindles, and
frauds in the packaging of cotton and its preparation for the market. At the end of the
letter, it is noted that the United States is recovering after the Civil War and that this
is the last chance for the Ottomans: “. . . America is making such strenuous and
successful efforts to recover the ascendancy formerly possessed; it is of the highest
185
importance that other competing countries should make all practicable exertions to
secure permanently so valuable a branch of industry.”496
By 1872, the view of the British press towards the Ottoman Empire became
much more patent. The Journal of the Society of Arts reproached as follows: “Turkey
does little or nothing more for us.”497 According to another article in the press, no
country was as promising as Turkey in meeting the demand created by the American
Civil War in 1862. Nonetheless, despite intense and successful efforts for a while,
hopes faded over time.498 Based on data provided by James Baker, the value of
cotton exports fell from £1,560,968 in 1864 to £38,929 in 1874.499 Even at a time
when hopes were extinguished, private enterprises opened cotton factories.500 Neither
once a small British colony of technicians and engineers in Hasköy nor the British
population in Pera could see a future in Istanbul. The British consul, Sir P. Francis,
expressed this condition palpably in his letter to Earl Granville: “The information
which I have now to offer on the subjects of these communications will not, I fear, be
of much special use, because Constantinople, and the districts adjacent thereto, are
496 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 161–63.
497 “Raw Cotton and Cotton Plants,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (16 August 1872): 789. This
statement was made despite the increase in Turkey’s cotton exports to Britain from 1871 to 1872.
“Imports of Cotton into the United Kingdom,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (14 June 1872): 636.
Considering that this news was made even though the Ottomans sent cotton samples to the London
International Exhibition of 1872, it is uncovered that the atmosphere at the very beginning of the
American Civil War has come to an end. BOA, HR.MKT 747/86, 29 Rebīʿü'l-evvel 1289/6 June
1872.
498 “Raw Cotton and the Cotton Plant at the International Exhibition of 1872,” The Journal of the
Society of Arts (1 November 1872): 934. It should also be underlined that Turkey’s cotton exports to
Britain grew in the years when these reports were made. “Imports of Cotton into the United
Kingdom,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (14 June 1872): 636. During these years, Hyde Clarke,
the familiar name of the story of cotton in western Anatolia and the south-eastern Balkans, shifted his
interest to esparto cultivation in Söke, Izmir. However, the decline was not seen only in the Ottoman
Empire. A similar reduction is discerned in India after 1866. After the war, cotton exports in China
also ceased. Surdam, “King Cotton,” 124. To see the decline in all countries except the United States,
please see Mudge and Nourse, Report upon Cotton (1869), 101.
499 Baker, Turkey in Europe, 532.
500 A cotton factory was opened both in Adana and Thessaloníki. BOA, ŞD 2870/52, 3 Ẕi'l-ḥicce
1289/1 February 1873; and BOA, ŞD 2006/10, 28 Ṣafer 1292/5 April 1875. A year ago, it was
notified to the relevant authorities that cotton seeds to be imported to Adana for the factory opened
there were exempt from customs duty. BOA, ŞD 2116/28, 17 Cemāẕīyyü'l-āḫir 1289/22 August 1872.
186
eminently unfitted for English immigration.”501 There was more reason here than met
the eye why Sir P. Francis took such a pessimistic stance. In his letter, Francis
contended that there was no need for the British in agricultural labour, that the
technology and techniques used in agriculture would be too primitive for an English
farmer, and he underlined the story of every foreigner he knew dealing with
agriculture in Turkey ended in failure. According to Francis, putting new wine in old
bottles would have been more of a debacle than a success. The reason why Francis
thought this way was that even if technology transfer could be done successfully, it
would not be sustainable. For example, there was a lack of capital to deal with the
repair of instruments in the event of a breakdown. The local agricultural system, the
form of taxation, property problems, lack of security for life in some places,
deficiency of roads, and inadequacy of markets gave rise to issues for both local and
foreign actors.502 Therefore, as claimed by Francis, there was no room for
competition in these lands.503 Later, Samuel Sullivan Cox also expressed similar
problems, underlining that the agriculture practised in the remaining European lands
501 Francis, “Turkey. Sir P. Francis to Earl Granville,” in Further Reports from Her Majesty’s
Diplomatic and Consular Agents Abroad, Respecting the Condition of the Industrial Classes and the
Purchase Power of Money in Foreign Countries (1872), c. 635, at 62:369. The proverb shared in the
Australian press about cotton cultivation in Turkey did not correspond to the reality this time: “There
is a Turkish proverb which says that the man who knows how to wait is in the end sure to conquer.”
“Turkey: The Cultivators of Cotton, Constantinople, October 26,” The Empire [Sydney], 15 February
1866, 6.
502 Francis, “Turkey. Sir P. Francis to Earl Granville,” in Further Reports from Her Majesty’s
Diplomatic and Consular Agents Abroad, Respecting the Condition of the Industrial Classes and the
Purchase Power of Money in Foreign Countries (1872), c. 635, at 62:369. Another study about the
reform endeavours in Turkey by Eugène Morel, conveying the lines of Xavier Heuschling, drew a
similar picture to the one drawn by Sir P. Francis and pointed out that agricultural life was not
scientific: “Mais la science de l’agriculture n’y existe pas, et les productions si variées du sol sont
dues uniquement à la routine.” [But the science of agriculture does not exist there, and the varied
productions of the soil are due solely to routine.] Morel, La Turquie et ses réformes (1866), 168.
503 “. . . there is no place in Turkey itself for competition between native bad work and imported better
work, and that the latter is only occasionally called for by reason of the unnatural mixture of Oriental
and Occidental civilization in Turkey.” Francis, “Turkey. Sir P. Francis to Earl Granville,” in Further
Reports from Her Majesty’s Diplomatic and Consular Agents Abroad, Respecting the Condition of the
Industrial Classes and the Purchase Power of Money in Foreign Countries (1872), c. 635, at 62:373.
187
of Turkey could not be qualified as scientific, and he drew a hopeless portrait of
scientific agriculture in the Ottoman Empire.504
When the year 1876 is considered, unfortunate events come to mind in terms
of Ottoman history, at least in the eyes of the central bureaucracy. The Herzegovina
uprising, the April Uprising of 1876 or the Bulgarian revolt, the Salonika (former
name for Thessaloníki) Incident, the ṭalebe-i ʿulūm (ṣoftas) demonstrations, the
dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz, the accession of Murad V, the controversial death
of Abdülaziz, and the dethronement of Murad V immediately after his 93-day reign
were the highlights of these tough events. The story of cotton proceeds amidst all this
political turmoil and uncertainty. A basic synopsis of the journey is the following:
The state capacity of the Ottoman Empire could not reach the level that would satisfy
the actors who wished to invest in the cotton production of the Ottoman state from
various countries, notably the British and the CSA. However, the conviction that
causality is behind the events has produced a mysterious layer of meaning. Although
nineteenth-century rationalism has implemented specific models to overcome this
baseless artificial layer of meaning, the complexity that renders the models partially
or completely dysfunctional has not been overcome.
504 Cox, Diversions of a Diplomat in Turkey (1893), 609.
188
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The thesis critically addressed and re-evaluated the impact of scientific and
technological input on late Ottoman cotton cultivation between 1840 and 1876 in the
context of ‘export demand’ shifting predominantly towards the Near and Far East
during the American Civil War. The central argument of the thesis was that foreign
cotton entrepreneurs505 mainly in Asia Minor and the southern Balkans attempted to
homogenise the internal differences between Egypt, India, the West Indies, and the
Ottoman Empire—local actors also partially followed the said pattern. This
proclivity caused them to neglect the peculiar socio-economic (and political)
structure of the Ottoman Empire and to catch on the social as only having a share in
a commercial commitment. As highlighted throughout the thesis, the Cotton Supply
Association (CSA) argued that cotton cultivation and production in the Ottoman
Empire would escalate by solving the empire’s financial and infrastructural
problems. This supposedly ‘brilliant’ idea was also recurrently weighed up in
periodicals of those years, such as The Journal of the Society of Arts.506 When the
Ottoman state reports and correspondence are inspected, it is seen that this idea
emerged in the same way on the Ottoman side.
That being the case, the approaches of local and foreign actors to Ottoman
cotton farming in the second half of the nineteenth century can be recapped as
follows: The required resources and budget were tried to be met through local and
foreign institutions and actors along with their limited material opportunities.
505 The actors/objects underlined here are predominantly foreign because even though there are many
local actors as well, they do not appear as much as foreigners in the Ottoman press and archives
regarding cotton cultivation and production.
506 “Discussion,” The Journal of the Society of Arts (22 December 1871): 101.
189
Nevertheless, the fundamental complications were: (i) the scarcity of labour and
capital, (ii) infrastructural problems as well as the high cost of the necessary
infrastructure projects, (iii) simple and superficial solutions to multi-layered
problems arising from the dynamic structure of different actors and phenomena, and
(iv) the Ottoman Empire’s inadequate state capacity along with the failure of its
bureaucracy to respond uniformly to the steps taken. Until now, in the studies on the
cotton cultivation and production of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, it
has been largely suggested that the root cause for the failure of this endeavour was
the inadequacy of overseas demand to transform Ottoman agriculture. All
historiography has been packed into a supply-demand dichotomy determined by
capitalist dynamics altogether. However, it was almost impossible for the Ottoman
Empire, which was caught unprepared for the opportunities created by the American
Civil War, to keep up with the new order in which the imbalances and inequalities
between the states were increasing.507
Much of the cotton story faced a more critical phenomenon than overseas
demand. Farmers and workers who could apply the latest agricultural techniques, i.e.
agronomy, and be diligently involved in the planting of exotic cotton seeds were
needed, but a strategy that could meet this need could not be implemented. Thus,
merchants, mainly from Europe, did not dare to enter the inner regions of (western)
Anatolia, and although they gained dominance in some areas, they could not shape
the socio-economic dynamics as much as they desired. In this respect, particularly in
narratives that rely on less sophisticated versions of ‘history from below,’ the role
played by these actors has been compressed into a narrow narrative that benefits only
one side, in which one side is the evil oppressor and the other side the innocent
507 Eldem, 135 Yıllık Bir Hazine, 17.
190
oppressed. Foreign actors generally waited to grow cotton in their own agricultural
lands or bring the cotton crop to the Izmir market. Occasionally, they preferred to
dispatch their intermediaries to the inner regions of western Anatolia. Even though a
certain amount of efficiency was obtained from the scientific and technological input
that entered the country in this period, this efficiency could not reach the stage that
foreign demand dreamed of. Thus, the impact of the raw cotton trade, which alone
accounted for more than 50% of the value of the total Ottoman exports to Britain in
1864, never reached again the level it had climbed to in this period.508
To summarise briefly, foreign entrepreneurs initially attempted to increase
cotton cultivation with a few modest steps, such as through limited transfer of
scientific and technological developments and partial legal arrangements.
Nonetheless, in the end, due to the shortage of raw cotton caused by the American
Civil War, they would have no choice but to move from the consultant and supplier
to a much more active role. For example, in the beginning, the actions often
consisted of relatively simple practices, such as distributing exotic seeds free of
charge, but these attempts gradually evolved into participating in railroad tenders and
even ventures to set up model farms. Nevertheless, their plans and estimates could
not transcend dealing with financial, legal, or infrastructural issues because they did
not focus on what partnerships turned into at the actors’ hands and what methods
they used to bring them together. In other words, non-economic and political factors
that determine socio-economic life and least fit the models have been ignored.
However, perhaps the most integral elements that distinguished the operation of
Ottoman cotton production from other regions were the forms of relations that were
508 Between 1870 and 1874, the share of cotton in the total Ottoman exports to Britain fell to 6.6%.
Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, 91. Izmir, Adana, Tarsus, Mersin, and
Macedonia were the leading areas in this period. Watts, The Cotton Supply Association (1871), 66.
191
outside of state intervention and market relations. Despite some apparent
resemblances, the conditions prevailing in Egypt, India, and other well-known
cotton-producing regions were not valid in the Ottoman Empire. These actors were
both late for the exam they had with the people and dynamics of different conditions,
and they were not as successful as they hoped in the end.
The reasons these actors put forward for their failure were roughly: (i) the
primitive methods of agriculture in the Ottoman Empire, (ii) the mismatch of state
capacity with the size of its vast geography, (iii) internal and external differences of
the Ottoman state and its peoples with other cotton-producing regions and peoples,
(iv) the callousness of local administrations,509 (v) the hindrance of foreigners from
owning land (private property) until a particular date, and (vi) the simultaneous
involvement of more factors than local and foreign actors could control. Therefore, it
was not possible to change habits overnight, but the global supply chains of raw
cotton had no time to wait for transformation. Also, the dynamism needed to
establish the cooperation of an agrarian subject and a relatively integrated elite with
the West varied drastically from one region to another. For this reason, the steps
taken and the plans drawn could not calculate countless actors/objects and variables
and simply followed a model that seemed reasonable and rational just on paper.
The main idea behind the cotton policy of the Ottoman Empire comes to life
in a caricature published in the magazine Cem [Djem]510 years later (see Appendix
F)—the caricature is a stinging satire on the general reform policies of the Ottoman
509 The term of office of Ottoman bureaucrats and civil servants in the regions where they were
located was shorter than the tenures of British consular staff and private entrepreneurs. So, the
duration of tenure was also a salient factor in this problem. Given the exceptional official incumbency
of Musurus Pasha in London, it was almost impossible to stumble upon such an actor locally in the
Ottoman Empire.
510 It was a weekly, political, literary, and illustrated humour magazine published on Thursdays. It was
published in French and Turkish.
192
Empire. The young man asks: “What do you think about the improvement of the
tombs?” The director answers: “My idea is to set a fixed price first, then have a
uniform, then establish a directorate, then send an investigative team to Europe, and
then bring in an expert.”511 A similar path was followed in the cotton policy of the
Ottoman Empire. Even though a fixed price was not set in the first place, the
notorious tithe was (attempted to be) regulated, and guidelines were produced that
would attract the landlords to cotton cultivation. Then, the acknowledged agricultural
policy was followed by free cotton seeds distributed to the farmer. What makes this
policy no different from wearing a uniform and makes it comparable is the way it is
implemented. Chasing the fate of the distributed cotton seeds turned into a neverending
story as the Ottoman government did not keep track of what the farmers were
doing with the cotton seeds. In this period, various committees, subcommittees, and
institutions were established to promote agriculture, and their future reminded of the
established “directorates.” Contrary to the caricature drawn in the Cem magazine, the
investigation committee(s) had come to the Ottoman Empire with enthusiasm. For
example, during the years when the CSA took an active role, the Imperial Cotton
Commission appeared. On the other hand, a considerable part of the resemblance
goes further back to the Cotton Famine and even before. Therefore, when writing the
history of a commodity that constitutes a negligible part within other export items of
a country, considering the commodity as a becoming that already contains many
beginnings that have not yet taken place distinctly guides the historian that every
commodity is the product of historical processes.
511 “Bir Mülakat [Caricature],” Cem [Djem], no. 49, 2 May 1929, 8. Although the Cem’s approach
corresponds to the contemptuous view of the early Republican elite against the Ottoman Empire, it
should not be shirked that the Cem’s criticism is also directed against the Republican regime. Even
though its language was less sharp compared to the post-Constitutional era (after 1908), the Cem
persisted in criticising the current government and sometimes paid the price for it.
193
However, where there was effort, success could not always be achieved. No
customs duty was collected on tools, equipment, and machinery imported from
Europe, and American seeds were distributed free of charge. Pamphlets were handed
out, and newspaper articles were written on how to plant these exotic seeds, care for
the cotton plant, and eventually harvest the crop. The export duty on cotton wool was
reduced to one per cent ad valorem for a while, and regulations were made in the
tithe and land taxes. Despite all these efforts, they did not survive, as William
Sandford perspicuously states in his report:
Commissioners who had been travelling through some of the [p]rovinces
some years ago were represented by Sir Henry L. Bulwer to have done much
temporary good, but that eminent diplomatist also took [the] opportunity of
expressing the opinion that the good would only be temporary if a casual
journey were not converted into permanent supervision.512
The inability to forecast this problem in the first place due to the insufficient state
capacity thwarted the completion of the training of lower-level officials, the diffusion
of modern cotton-growing techniques to the base, and the elimination of the
infrastructure deficiencies. Notwithstanding the fact that scientific and technological
input had some undeniable positive effects on Ottoman cotton production, it is hardly
possible to go beyond a historical analysis of social phenomena since agricultural
production and production strategies in the Ottoman Empire did not fit into a specific
model. Although private and public institutions and initiatives were tried to be
analysed with all their maturation, decay, and inactivation periods in a way to capture
the change of their movements in their everyday lives, most non-/human actors
sketched bewildering patterns. Especially after the American Civil War, the survival
of an institution or any enterprise has become riskier for shareholders.
512 BOA, HR.SFR.3 118/15, 5 January 1867.
194
More importantly, scientific and technological input in cotton agriculture has
come to the forefront as the factor(s) that precipitated uncertainty together with nonhuman
actors/objects in the actions of different collaborations, both causing the
increase in the amount of raw cotton produced but also turning out to be the root
cause for its continuity. Because the transfer of the most preferred method and
instruments to the Balkans and Anatolia under the name of ‘technology transfer’ was
not enough to provide the desired efficiency in cotton production. Countless factors
played a role in every technology and method, from people to institutions, from
institutions to natural events, from natural events to even coincidence.
For this reason, a relatively comprehensive picture of cotton production as a
phenomenon is only possible with a narrative that addresses these reverse
uncertainty-generating actors and networks. Not only the demand but also the factors
discussed within the scope of these uncertainties had an impact on the growth in
Ottoman cotton production in the years corresponding to the American Civil War. In
the presence of scientific and technological input, it is within reach to come across
various narratives about the enhanced productivity of agriculture made with
mechanised and reorganised techniques. On the other hand, in the absence of
scientific and technological input, agriculture is not only abandoned to its primitive
methods, but also the ginning of the harvested raw cotton cannot be done
meticulously, and the crops are infested with diseases and insects. Reflecting on the
natural phenomena and forces that are not attainable to be in charge of, apart from
the institutionalised science, these uncertainty-generating factors bear the power of
affecting the annual cotton production rates. Putting these factors, namely scientific
and technological input(s) into the background, combined with the understanding
that homogenises the differences between regions, dominates cotton production
195
practices and succeeds in carrying the story to the global level of analysis but also
causes the distinctive dynamics to be ignored and eventually forgotten.
The issue, which is dealt with in the axis of crisis and global transformation
shaped around peculiar dynamics and practices, reveals that economic parameters
alone are insufficient and reductionist to shed light on Ottoman cotton production.
Local and foreign actors, who took an ambivalent approach to scientific and
technological input, made it difficult to place the Ottoman Empire’s story of cotton
production into any framework. Focusing on the history of science and technology
rather than economic parameters alone and seeking the possibilities of the political
economy of this story offers an alternative view for the rationale of the slight
increase in cotton production and why the expected upward surge did not occur.
According to this view, examining cotton cultivation and production efforts between
1840 and 1876, when one is too close to a phenomenon, it becomes lucid how this
familiarity distorts the perspective, and when one is too far away, then it leads to
another reverse distortion in the perspective, but this time the source(s) turns out to
be the distance itself. In the years covered by the thesis, both local and foreign actors
could not find a balance between the distance and proximity in question to
comprehend the world they were living in. In Ottoman cotton cultivation, where a
homogeneous mass or mass behaviour could not be mentioned, the information
produced, carried, and disseminated by sensory actors had to be processed through
entrepreneurial actors, but the lack of capital and the nature of unplanned strategies
engendered various unexpected obstacles to the entrepreneurial actors. Due to these
obstacles, the entrepreneurial actors could not gain full-scale control over the
contraction of cotton cultivation and production processes—such as in Cyprus (cf.
footnotes 370 and 445)—which can be compared to muscle structure in a biological
196
sense. Sometimes these obstacles arise from the class of bureaucracy that participates
in the narrative as transmitter actors.513 As a note for future studies, considering the
situation of cotton agriculture in Cyprus, which came under British rule in 1878, or
after the Düyūn-ı ʿUmūmiyye in general, it can be traced how ‘full-scale control’
played a role in cotton cultivation and production in the light of changing networks.
To sum up, in Ottoman cotton cultivation and production, which took place
under the shadow of weak ties now and then, where sensory and entrepreneurial
actors were not connected, the actors acted as if they did not require cooperation. The
complicated situation arising from this lack of communication or solitude makes the
coincidence absolute. Randomness and unpredictability come to be unmitigated and
divine in the absence of scientific and technological input(s), two inextricable factors
that cannot be set aside as they have proceeded to become institutionalised in the
nineteenth century. Even though this transformation was not completed during the
process, it affected the process. All these being the case, if no conditions are
supposed to be necessary, then everything is under the rule of a “non-radical
probability.” Ottoman cotton cultivation and production, too, did not operate on
certain foundations like any other historical event.
513 Similar patterns encountered in cotton cultivation discussed in the thesis were also seen in
viticulture of a later period. For more details, please see Eldem, “A French View of the Ottoman-
Turkish Wine Market, 1890–1925” (2017).
197
APPENDIX A
CARENZA’S AYAMAMA DRAINAGE PLAN
M. E. Carenza’s plan for the draining of the marshes in Ayamama, near Yeşilköy in
Istanbul. BOA, HRT.h 687, 26 Ṣafer 1267/31 December 1850.
198
APPENDIX B
THE MAP OF THE IZMIR-AYDIN RAILWAY
The map illustrating the Izmir-Aydin Railway. BOA, HRT.h 1744, 2 Rebīʿü'l-āḫir
1301/31 January 1884.
199
APPENDIX C
MINARD’S MAP OF COTTON IMPORTS
Figurative and approximate map of the quantities of raw cotton imported into Europe
in 1858, 1864, and 1865. Minard, “Carte figurative et approximative des quantités de
coton brut importées en Europe en 1858, en 1864 et en 1865 [Map],” LOC
G3201.J82/1865.M5, 1866.
200
APPENDIX D
SAMPLE PLOUGHS FROM THE 1863 EXHIBITION
From the model at the top to the lowest, in order: (i) a small plough with one horse
(bir bār-gīrli [beygirli] küçük saban), (ii) a large plough with two horses (iki bārgīrli
büyük saban), (iii) a large plough with two horses and two handles (iki bār-gīrli
ve iki oklı kebīr saban), and (iv) a plough with two horses with iron handles (iki bārgīrli
temür [demir] oklı saban). “1863 Sergisi’nden Numūne Pulluklar [Sample
Ploughs from the 1863 Exhibition],” Mirʾāt 1, no. 1 (Ramażān 1279/February-March
1863): 35.
201
APPENDIX E
VEDOVA’S SELF-FEEDER FOR COTTON GINS
A machine for cotton ginning invented by Frederick George Vedova, a British
subject, residing in Izmir. BOA, İ.MVL 571/25664, 27 Ẕi'l-ḥicce 1283/2 May 1867.
202
APPENDIX F
A CARICATURE FROM THE MAGAZINE CEM [DJEM]
A caricature in the magazine Cem [Djem] that mocks the general reform policy of the
Ottoman Empire and might also set a precedent for cotton cultivation. “Bir Mülakat
[Caricature],” Cem [Djem], no. 49, 2 May 1929, 8.
203
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