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 THE NOTION OF HASSA SOLDIERY AND KUL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE – EXAMPLE OF THE JANISSARY CORPS
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

In memory of Halil İNALCIK
THE NOTION OF HASSA SOLDIERY AND KUL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE - EXAMPLE OF THE JANISSARY CORPS
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of

THE NOTION OF HASSA SOLDIERY AND KUL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE – EXAMPLE OF THE JANISSARY CORPS – A COMPARATIVE STUDY

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
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ABSTRACT
THE NOTION OF HASSA SOLDIERY AND KUL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE - EXAMPLE OF THE JANISSARY CORPS

May 2022
This study aims to reveal the conceptual origins of the notion of hassa soldiery and the idea of kul system in the early Ottoman state on the example of janissary corps by using the early Ottoman chronics, fourteenth and fifteenth century vakf registers, foreign memories and a later source of Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan. A comparative approach referring to the pre-Ottoman and contemporary Turkic-Islamic near eastern states, Turco-Mongol states, as well as the Roman and the Byzantine states, reveals that the terms ghulam, kul or kapıkulu had a different meaning and function in the near eastern tradition and in the Ottoman context which cannot be found in western terminology, even though similar formations can be found in the Medieval states which are similar to the ghulam-kul system of the near east in terms of structure, as a result of the longue duree of acculturation between east and the west.The Ottomans seemed to establish a special form of hassa soldiery in the kul identity of the janissary corps peculiar to themselves.
Keywords: Hassa Soldiery, Janissary, Ghulam, Kul, Nöker
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ÖZET
YENİÇERİ ASKERİ ÖRNEĞİNDE ERKEN OSMANLI DEVLETİNDE HASSA ASKER KAVRAMI VE KUL KİMLİĞİ - KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

Bu çalışma, erken Osmanlı kronikleri, ondört ve onbeşinci yüzyıl vakfiyeleri ile yabancı hatıratlar ve bir onyedinci yüzyıl kaynağı olan Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan kullanılarak, yeniçeri askeri örneğinde erken Osmanlı devletindeki hassa asker kavramının ve kul kimliğinin kavramsal kökenlerini aydınlatmak amacındadır. Bu olgular, Osmanlı öncesi ve çağdaşı yakın doğu Türk-İslam, Türk-Moğol ile Roma ve Bizans devletleri ile karşılaştırılmalı bir yaklaşım ile değerlendirilmiştir. Her ne kadar yakın doğu Ortaçağ devletlerindeki gulam-kul sistemine benzer oluşumların doğu ve batı arasındaki uzun kültürel etkileşim süreci sonucunda mevcut olduğu görülse de, yakın doğu geleneğindeki ve Osmanlı özelindeki gulam, kul ve kapıkulu terimlerinin içerdiği farklı anlam ve fonksiyon batı terminolojisinde bulunmamaktadır. Osmanlıların yeniçeri-kul kimliğinde kendilerine özgü bir hassa asker kavramı meydana getirmiş oldukları görülmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hassa Asker, Yeniçeri, Gulam, Kul, Nöker
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………iii
ÖZET ………………………………………………………………………………...iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ………………………………………………………...v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………...………………..…..vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ………………………………..............................1
1.1 Objectives of the Study……………………………..................................1
1.2 Methodology of Comparative History…………………………………...7
1.3 Sources and Literature Review………………………...…………….…17
CHAPTER II : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND …………………..……………25
2.1 Ghulam and Kul Connotations in the Near Eastern Tradition and in the Ottoman Context ………………………………...……………….................25
2.2 Ghulam System in the Persian Realm ………………………...………...33
2.3 The Idea of Standing Army and Ghulam System in the Arabian Peninsula ………………………………………………………………….…………….43
CHAPTER III: WESTERN NOTION OF HOUSEHOLD TROOPS .…………50
3.1 The Roman Legionaries and the Praetorian Guard … ……...……...……50
3.2 Household Troops of the Carolingian State (688-741) ………...……….57
3.3 The Varangian Guard in the Eleventh Century Byzantine State ……...…59
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CHAPTER IV: THE NOTION of HASSA SOLDIERY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE and THE FORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN KUL (KAPIKULU)SYSTEM …………………………….……………………….62
4.1 The Kuls of the Early Ottoman State ……...……………………...……...62
4.2 The Establishment of the Janissary Corps ………...……...…...................73
4.3 The Military Roles of Janissary Corps up to 144……………………….. 90
4.4The Socio and Political Roles of the Janissary Corps up to 1422 ……………..,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,………...,,,,,….105
CHAPTER V: COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPORARIES…...113
5.1 Memluk System …………...………………………………………………..114
5.2 Nökership in the Turco-Mongol and İlhanid States ………………………..118
5.3 The Late Byzantine Household Troops ………………………………… ...124
5.4. Byzantine-Turkish Acculturation in the Fourteenth Century ……………. 132
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION ……………………………...……………...149
REFERENCES …………...……………………………………………………157
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1) The Objectives of the Study
Janissary Corps as the Hassa Soldiery of the Ottoman Sultans
The janissary corps, as the first regular standing army of the Middle Ages, shaped not only the military and the political structure but also the socio-economic structure of the Ottoman Empire for more than four centuries. As the professional salaried permanent household troops under the direct command of the Ottoman sultan and his specially trained hassa soldiery, they were the first example of a standing army of servant soldiers in the fourteenth century.
In the Ottoman circles, they began their career as slaves taken from the one-fifth of the war captives as the legal portion of the Ottoman sultan during the age of Murad I (1362-1389). They were kept by the frontier begs as a result of the incursions to darü’l-harb, non-Islamic lands in the Balkans. Hence they were labelled as the pencik oglanıs. Later, we observe that they were recruited through a system known as devşirme, that was based on the collection of youths within Ottoman subjects. In both cases, they were recruited and trained for military, administrative, as well as for ceremonial services in the Ottoman statecraft.
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There were some valid reasons which led the Ottoman men of ulema and bureaucrats who were motivated for the conscription and formation of such specialized man power. As the early chroniclers of the Ottoman historiography mention, the initial reason was the need for establishing a regular standing army under the direct command of the Ottoman sultan as his hassa force. This could be attributed to the expanding Ottoman territory in the first decades of the fourteenth century. Furthermore, this hassa force under the direct command of the Ottoman sultan would stand as a counterbalance against the frontier forces and the Turcoman yaya-infantry regiments in the provinces.
Additionally, the mentality behind the establishment of such regular regiments lay also in the need for the formation of a force under the direct command of the sultan whom they served on the basis of absolute loyalty. Therefore, the one-fifth of war captives were collected not only because it was the legal right of the sultan, but also because they were young, rootless and free of any ties. With these qualities, they could easily be trained both physically and mentally for the purposes mentioned above, that is, ‘absolute loyalty’ to the reigning Ottoman sultan.
Consequently, one can state that the Ottomans found a practical solution for the utilization of these extra number of war captives that they gained as a result of the expanding conquests in the Balkans in the second half of the fourteenth century. Hence, the war captives were recruited and trained as military and administrative personnel on the condition of ‘dependence’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘service’ to the Ottoman sultan. This example of the janissary corps could be considered the start of a ‘slave-originated’ and a ‘court-based imperial bodyguard’ of household troops known as kapıkulu, the ‘servants of the gate,’ in the Ottoman state in the second half of the fourteenth century. Janissaries, as the hassa kapıkulu, stood up as the essential tools in
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the centralization process as well as the pillars of the absolute authority of the Ottoman sultans and lasted untill the corruption of this institution in the last decades of the eighteenth century.
In our research we notice that the novelty of this idea was criticized in the anonymous chronics. Nevertheless, the creation of a personal army under the direct command of the Ottoman sultan was a good way to challenge the power of Turcoman frontier begs. Furthermore, as indicated above, the possession of a personal and permanent army of salaried troops as a hassa army was considered an essential tool in combating centrifugal tendencies among the Turcoman begs.1 Though it is open for debate, this might have been a significant reason for forming such forces.
On the other hand, we can state that such a practice of taking or purchasing the young war captives as slaves and training them for military, administrative and palace service was known as the ghulam system in the near eastern tradition, which had been in use in the pre-Ottoman Medieval Turkic and Islamic states. The ghulam system was different from the ordinary slave institution in Islam. In the ghulam system, the slave-originated war captives could not only become the essential part of the ruler’s household with a distinguished status of the ‘military’, but also they could be promoted to high positions in the military or in the administrative structure of the state after completing their palace education.
This constituted the special feature of the ghulam system in the near eastern tradition, which the Ottomans followed in their kul -kapıkulu institution. Thus the ghulam-kul system gave rise to a special typology of soldiery as special household troops who could be compensated on the condition of absolute loyalty and service to the ruler, based on the manner of his merit and bravery. Hence, the janissary-kapıkulu
1 Rhoads Murphey, “Yeni Ceri”, Encylopedia of Islam, (EI) Second ed., Vol. XI, (2002), 322
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identity in the Ottoman state portrayed a specific elite group of ‘military’ within the Ottoman class system. 2
In addition, the hassa soldiery was immune from public prosecution, and had an administrative and jurisdictional autonomy as a closed caste, together with their communal ethos, that bound them under yoldaşlık, as comrades-in-arms and the regimental cohesion, the group identity, solidarity, indepence and pride that made them a special category of soldiery 3. Furthermore, their political influence over the accessions and assassinations of the sultans and being clashing in nature, made them an influential group over state affairs.4Also, apart from their role in municipial service and provincial garrison duty, their ceremonial function as hassa regiments in their regular pay distributions, ulufe divanı, Friday prayers, accessions and their presence in foreign diplomatic missions, distinguished them as hassa forces of household troops5. The major motivation of janissary military service, as the professional salaried infantry who fought in the form of phalanx, was financial, that is their regular payments. The culüs bahşişi, which is a special payment upon the accession of each new Ottoman sultan, was vital for them to subdue to the authority of the new sultan. It is worth mentioning that other kuls of the sultan also received such payment upon accession.
2 In the Ottoman class system which had its origins in the near eastern state tradition, there were three main groups of classes. The first one was the ‘military’. They constituted the class who were directly in the service of the sultan and not engaged in any production. They were namely, the ulema, the men of religion, the military man and the bureaucrats together with their relatives. The second class was the class of ‘reaya’ those who engaged in trade and agriculture. The reaya constituted all the tax-paying subjects of the state regardless of their religous identity. The third group was the ‘exempted reaya’ who enjoyed certain tax exemptions and priviliges in return for several services to the state, like the yaya and müsellem corps, Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London: Phoenix, 1995), 68-69.
3 Murphey, “Yeni Ceri”, 325
4 Cl. Huart, “Janissaries”, Encylopedia of Islam, First ed., Vol.IV, (1987), 574
5 Ibid, 574
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In summary, through the formation of such court-based imperial household troops for military, administrative and ceremonial functions, the early Ottoman state gained prestige among the petty neighbouring Muslim states in Anatolia.6 This system of a kul or kapıkulu institution, where the janissaries played an essential role as the hassa household troops of the sultans, lasted until the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), who radically changed the Ottoman palace organization and abolished the janissary hearth in the 18267.
Within this perpective, there are two main objectives in this study. The first one is to find out the impacts of pre-Ottoman and contemporary Turkic-Islamic and Turco-Mongol states in terms of hassa soldiery on the Ottoman model of janissary-kul identity. In other words, I will analyze how the slaves become the kuls of the rulers, as his hassa forces in various Medieval near eastern Turkic-Islamic and Turco-Mongol states, and whether they stood as a model for the Ottoman formation of household troops. This will constitute the first argument of the study.
Hence, through the study the janissary formation will be evaluated within this conjecture of ‘slave-originated household troops’, that is the kapıkulu, in the near eastern and in Turco-Mongol tradition with emphasis on the acculturation between those cultures. For this, I will initially discuss various meanings of the terms ghulam and kul on a literal and sociological perspective. The intention is that analysis of
6 Murphey, “Yeni Çeri”, 322.
7 The reasons of the corruption of the kapıkulu and the janissary institution is beyond the scope of this study. In brief terms, though contemporary critics attributed the corruption of the janissary hearth to the enterance of the ones other than coming from acemi ocağı, novice education, the real reason must be searched within the change in the structure of warfare and equipment towards the end of sixteenth century in Europe. For the traditional view see, Mustafa Akdağ, “Yeniçeri Ocak Nizamın Bozuluşu”, DTCF Dergisi V (1947): 291-313 and for a broader overview, see Cemal Kafadar, “On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries”, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 15, No.2 (1991): 273-280. See also, Umut Deniz Kırca, “The Furious Dogs of Hell: Rebellion, Janissaries and Religion in Sultanic Legitimisation in the Ottoman Empire”. (MA Thesis, Bilgi University, 2010) and M.Mert Sunar, “Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps 1807-1826” (PhD Thesis, Binghampton University, 2006)
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various connotations of both terms will also help to reveal the conceptual origins of the pre-Ottoman ghulam-kul system.
As part of the first argument, the western case will also be analyzed to have a complete comparative analysis given the fact that the western case seems also important in the quest for the origins of the typology of such soldiery. To reveal their impact on the Ottomans, if there is any, I will take into consideration the direct or indirect impact of the pre-Ottoman and contemporary western household troops, specifically in the Roman and Byzantine cases and also further in the early Medieval European state of the Carolingians.
With respect to the second objective of the study, I will discuss the early kul formation and identity in the Ottoman state and the role of janissary corps, both as the military and household elements in the early Ottoman state. How the early janissary corps, as former slaves, became the forerrunners of the Ottoman kapıkulu institution as the early hassa kuls of the sultan will constitute the main argument. This phenomenon is important in the sense that, with these forces the Ottoman sultan gained prestige and advantage by owning the first standing army of the era. This will be discussed under the second objective of the study.
I will not discuss the devşirme regulation in the early Ottoman state, since that topic has been studied thoroughly so far. 8 So the main focus of the study will be on
8 For a recent study on devşirme See Nergiz Nazlar, “Some Aspects of the Organizational and Socio-Economic Role of Janissaries” .(PhD Thesis, Bilkent University,2017) Nazlar based her study on the investigation of conscription registers of the late fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries where she determined that the responsibility of conscription process was transferred from the local representatives of officials to the ‘janissary officials’ as part of a firm standing army which consolidated the central authority. For the legal status of devşirmes, See Gömeç Karamuk, “Devşirmelerin Hukuki Durumları Üzerine”, in Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a, eds. Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz (İstanbul; İmge Kitabevi, 2000):555-573. See also Gülay Yılmaz, “Devşirme System and the Levied Children of Bursa in 1603”, Belleten C.79, S.286, (2017):901-930
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the conceptual origins of hassa soldiery in the example of early janissary corps and their role as household troops in the early Ottoman state up to the end of Murad II’s (1421-1444,1446-1451) reign.
I was inclined to study this topic because no studies have been made so far to the best of my knowledge regarding the conceptual origins of this slave-originated court-based imperial household troops in the Ottoman service on such a broad ‘comparative basis’. Through this study, I hope to reveal the conceptual origins of hassa soldiery and the direct or indirect impact of various prototypes of such soldiery in the Middle Ages on the Ottoman example of the janissary-kul model and contribute to the literature on this subject.
1.2) The Methodology
Comparative Historical Research as a Model for Historical Studies
I will mostly follow a ‘comparative’ historical approach in the study. Comparative history can briefly be defined as the systematic comparison of certain historical phenomena for their better description, explanation and interpretation.9 The main reason to follow a comparative historical approach is that the objectives of the work naturally yield to such a methodology. The quest for the origins and the peculiarity of the historical phenomenon studied or my case study – the Ottoman hassa soldiery - can better be revealed by the comparison between the earliest and contemporary similar examples of the compared case. For this purpose, in the initial stage of my work, I will trace the analysis of the origins of hassa soldiery from
9 Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History”, in Comparative and Transnational History, eds. Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (New York: Berghahnbooks, 2009), 2.
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antiquity via research through the earliest example, where the historical phenomenon emerged, as a legitimate and necessary inquiry for a comparative historical study. 10 However, the obstacle and challenges lie in whether it was the same motives or the same circumstances which gave birth to the phenomenon compared11.
Thus, the first use of comparative historical research enables us to analyze – or for me rather to differentiate - societies that are widely spread in time and space so that any analogies between them cannot be explained by mutual influence or by a common origin.12 Within this framework, the concept of hassa soldiery in the Ottoman state, as the main historical phenomenon compared, will be studied for its origins in comparison not only to its contemporary eastern and western counterparts, other than having common origin, but also for their remote pre-Ottoman examples.
Also, within this context, as mentioned above, Max Weber’s comparative theory of “looking into non-western world to better understanding of the western rationalization” stood as a stimulus for my investigation of the west in terms of hassa soldiery, to a better understanding of the Ottoman case.
Though it is not appropriate to mention one specific comparative historical method that can be used in all of the comparative studies, there are various other models for comparative historical research developed so far. These characterize the methodology of a specific comparative historical study of a certain phenomenon.
10 Marc Bloch, “A Contribution Towards a Comparative History of European Societies”, in Land and Work in Medieval Europe (New York: Routlegde,1969), 55
11 Bloch, “Comparative History”, 55
12 Ibid, 46
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Initially the models of comparative history were developed by J. Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century in his treatise, A System of Logic, written in1843.13 In that work, he points out four distinctive methods for comparative historical inquiry, which are: the ‘direct method of agreement’, the ‘method of difference’, the ‘jointed method of agreement and difference,’ and lastly, the ‘method of residuese and concomitant variations’. These methods stood as the basis for most of the models for comparative history in the following centuries14.
Further, in the twentieth century, T. Skocpol and M. Somers developed specific models for comparative history which were modelled after the methodology of J. Mill.15 This new classification helped to evaluate the works of Marc Bloch, Max Weber, and Eisenstadt, who mostly worked on the dynamics of the social changes and epochal transformations of the cultures. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the pioneers of comparative historical research are the sociologists (and economists) like A. Tocqueville, Karl Marx, J. Stuart Mill, and Max Weber in the nineteenth century and J. Mockie, A. Toynbee, N.Eisenstadt, E. Durkeim, B. Moore, and Charles Tilly in the twelveth century.
13 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For Mill, comparative history of societies initially emerged among the intellectuals of the enlightenment in the eighteenth century such as, Montesque, Voltaire and Adam Smith.
14 For a recent study on comparative history, see, Balazs Trencsenyi ,et al,The Rise of Comparative History,(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021)
15 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22/2 (1980):174-197. The models they design for comparative historical studies are based on Mill’s classification; the first one is, the method of ‘Parallel demonstration of theory’ which elaborates theoretical models and hypthosises before turning to historical cases to convince the readers of the validity of certain theoretical arguments. A good example of this approach is Eisenstadt’s, The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Socities, (NY: Free Press, 1963) where he followed a structure-functionalist theory of the emergence, persistence and the decline of the centralized bureaucratic empires like the Ottoman state. In his work, comparative history serves as an ancillary mode of theoretical demonstration, Skocpol and Somers,176-178. The second model they offered is, the ‘Contrast of Contexts’, which seeks clear-cut differences between cases that are primarily contextual particularities. The main focus is on the contrasts between cases rather than the theories or hypothesis, Skocpol and Somers, 178-181. Finally, the last model is, the comparative history as the ‘Macro-Causal Analysis’, which can be considered as the combination of both models previously mentioned. It tests the validity of existing theoretical hypthesis to infere new historical generalizations. Moreover, it stands as a powerful tool for criticizing and invalidating mistaken theories, Skocpol and Somers, 181-187.
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Concomitantly, the concept of comparative research as a method of social science in history seemed to have an intimate relationship with ‘sociology’. Sociology, in its analysis of the transformation of the societies, uses the method of comparative history as a tool for its purpose. Therefore, the concept of ‘historical sociology’ became an esteemed phenomenon after the World War II with the contributions of researchers like B. Moore and T. Skocpol.
Similarly, M.Bloch’s analysis on the method of sociological comparative history is also noteworthy. In his work mentioned earlier, which was written in 1969, he points out two methods for comparative histoy.16 However, he was criticized by being incoherent and having lack of precision in offering both methods.17
According to Bloch, the first method of comparative historical inquiry is the ‘parallel study of societies’ once neighbouring and contemporary exercizing a constant mutual influence and owing their existence in part at least to a common origin. The second method, as mentioned earlier, is a ‘comparative methodology’ by the selection of some societies so widely seperated in time and space which any analogies observed between them cannot be explained either by mutual influence or by a common origin.
In any case, though there exist various comparative methods on a theoretical and statistical scale, historians usually refer to the method of ‘difference and similarities’, so that the comparative studies are classified in accordance with these combinations. I also intend to use both methods in the quest for the origins of the Ottoman hassa soldiery in the study.
16Bloch, “Comparative History”, 828-846
17 For the criticism of M.Bloch’s work, see Alette Olin Hill and Boyd Hill Jr., “Marc Bloch and Comparative History”, The American Historical Review, 85/4 (1980) :828-846
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Although all the methods of comparative history have their own outcomes, the usefulness of comparative historical methodology is several. For one thing, since historical pecularities can become explicit when compared to different examples that share similarities or differences in either respect, it helps to identify problems and questions which are hard to pose, in order to explain a historical phenomena and make a clear profile of the individual cases.18
Within the framework of the above argument, attempts will be made to analyze the historical phenomenon of hassa soldiery, its problematic origins and development, as well as its pecularities in the Ottoman case by comparing it with different examples of household troops. Moreover, some comparative history also helps to criticize ‘pseudo-explanations’ and check ‘generalizations’ in order to de-familiarize the “familiar” which leads us to reconsider our assumptions about the uniqueness of the case19. Within this perspective, by such an analysis I will show certain essential different features of the Ottoman hassa soldiery which so far are unfamiliar or remained unnoticed.
Furthermore, comparative historical research also helps to reveal the ‘cultural specificities’ and ‘historicity’ while looking into another country or culture. It enables us to better understand one’s own pecularities of the historical phenomena discussed.20 Within the light of the arguments above, I hope to find out the cultural
18 For instance, M. Bloch’s comparison of the English and French examples of the agrarian structures, not only identify a problem in agrarian history but also contribute to the rewriting of the region’s history by explaning its pecularities, Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond”, 3-4
19 In that sense, comparative history is like an indirect experimental design that can help to test hypothesis where like ‘a’ appeared without ‘b’ in the other historical case that helps to identify its pecularity, Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond”, 3-5
20 In their study, Kocka, evaluates this kind of comparative model with the intention of finding the origins of a historical phenomena as the ‘Asymmetrical Comparative Method’, in which the peculiarities of one case is revealed by looking at the others. This is a method generally used for the purpose of ‘background’ while the intensive investigation is reserved for the main area or problem researched. Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond”, 5.
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specifications and pecularities of the Ottoman hassa soldiery while comparing it with similar examples in different cultures.
Finally, the view of Mohoney, who points out the importance of ‘concept analysis’ is also worth mentioning. Considering that social sciences built around concepts and ideas, it is not possible to conduct research or analyze a topic without concepts. This can be done through comparative history that contributes to the understanding of the ‘conceptual development’ and the ‘conceptual background’of the cases compared in detail.21 Within this perspective, as I mentioned earlier, the first objective of the study is devoted to reveal the conceptual origins, development and background of the Ottoman hassa soldiery.
However, there are also problems and risks in comparative history. As it is in ‘parallel-oriented’ and ‘contrast-oriented’ comparative historical methods, as well as in ‘macro-causal’ analysis, the cases selected can be manipulated according to the logic of the theory or hypothesis built by the researcher22. Additionally, the juxtaposition of two or more historical cases may not actually stregthen the validation of theories, so there is always the risk of overgeneralizing the case study which may lead to erronous conclusions. Furthermore, there is also the risk of underestimating the multi-dimensionality and contingency of the historical phenomena without a deep analysis of the factors beneath.23
Nevertheless, comparative historical research, gives a ‘skeptical’ look and ‘analytical’ look on the historical cases with diachronic and synchronic comparisons. The latest trends in historical methodology, like comparative history or ‘entanglement
21 James Mohoney, “Comparative Historical Analysis in Social Sciences”, Annual Review of Sociology”, 30, (2004): 93-95
22 Skocpol and Somers,”Macrosocial Inquiry” , 194
23 Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond”, 8
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history’, makes historical phenomena less nation-specific or Eurocentric with a transnational and transregional focus on history on a multi-disciplinary scale by an innovative emphasis on symbolic forms and cultural practices. 24
So, such an approach, which focuses on the relations, transfers or interactions between cultures with emphasis on connections, continuity and hybridity of the historical cases, is of great value for historical studies.25 Consequently, comparative historical research, while looking at similarities and differences, can disclose quite striking and interesting results. Many “seemingly” analogies when closely examined may prove the opposite.
Therefore, by a broad-cased comparison within historically remote cultures in place and time, I will hopefully intend to make a contribution in the comparative historical studies by indicating the influences, transfers, relations of imitation between close and remote cases of the notion of hassa soldiery as household troops in the Middle Ages.
Comparative History in the East and in Turkey
The pioneer of systematic historical methodology and comparative historical analysis in the east was İbn Haldun (1332-1406), who was an important sociologist influenced not only the eastern realm but also the western sociological thought26. Later, Katip Çelebi of the seventeenth century was one of the important figures who
24 Kocka and Haupt, 17-20
25 Ibid, 1
26 Gülsüm Tütüncü and Neslihan Ünal,”Karşılaşmalı Tarih: Doğuşu, Gelişimi, Metodolojisi ve Türkiye’deki Durumu, Al Farabi Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 4 (2019), 80.For them, before İbn-i Haldun, Debusi (978-1039), Farabi (872-950), Biruni (973-1048), İbn Müsleveyh(d.1030) and Reşidüddin (1247-1318) were the other practitioners of social history.
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evaluated Ottoman history in face of Europe for the first time27. Further, in the nineteenth century, Cevdet Paşa, as a prominent man of law, statesmen and historian, wrote comparative essays on eastern versus western practices. After that, in twentieth century, A. Refik and A.N. Kurad can be cited as some of the historians who used comparative historical reasearch in their studies.
However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the emphasis is more on the socio-economic and demographic structures of the societies, as exemplified in the Annale school. The Annale echole offers the interpretation of history as a total long-term socio-economic integrity with the use of scienfic methods.28 This method, influenced by the French social thought in the late nineteenth century, had a strong impact on the studies of Z. Gökalp, as the follower of E. Durkheim. Later F.Köprülü, influenced by Lucien Febvre as one of the founders of Annale echole, in terms of methodology and conceptualization, focused his studies on the cultural roots of the Turkish states on a long-term comparative basis.29
In this respect, the methodology of F. Köprülü, who suggested evaluaing the Ottoman institutions within the scope of Turkish history with a ‘chronological’ and ‘comparative’ method for a study on the Ottoman institutions, is taken as a reference for this study. Thus, it will be helpful to mention briefly the view of F. Köprülü.
27 For Katip Çelebi’s life and works see, Katip Çelebi Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991)
28 For Annales School see, Halil İnalcık, “Impact of the Annales School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings”, Review I (3/4), (1978):69-96. The founders of this echole were Lucien Febvre, M. Bloch and Fernand Braudel. The first representative of Annale echole in Turkey is Ö.L.Barkan. He points out the economic and demographic problems in the Ottoman state. See, Ö.L.Barkan, “Türkiye’de İmparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri ve Hakana Mahsus İstatistik Defterleri”, İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, II/1, (1940):20-59 and his “Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi”, Türkiyat Mecmuası, X, (1951-53):1-23. Recently the comparative historical studies of Halil İnalcık and Özer Ergenç can be cited as the continuation of Annale echole. For example see, Özer Ergenç,Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi Kent Tarihçiliğine Katkı, XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya (Ankara: Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı, 1995).
29 İnalcık, “Annale School”, 69-70. See also Halil İnalcık, “Fransız Annales Ekolü ve Türk Tarihçiliği”, in Osmanlı ve Modern Türkiye, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013):269-284.
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In his article written in 1931 and titled Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri Hakkında Bazı Mülahazalar,30 Köprülü pointed out the indirect impact of the Roman-Byzantine institutions via Medieval pre-Ottoman Turkic-Islamic near eastern states on the Ottomans on an institutional basis. Considering the thousand years’ of interaction between the Greco-Roman and Persian civilizations and the inevitable acculturilization between Islam and Christianity, Köprülü asserts that the Roman-Byzantine institutions might have effected the Ottoman institutions in an indirect manner by way of pre-Ottoman Medieval Turkic-Islamic states.
Therefore, the relation and continuity between Roman-Byzantine and Ottoman institutions can only be managed through a strict ‘chronological’ and ‘comparative’ methodology by the evaluation of Ottoman history as part of Turkish history as suggested by F.Köprülü. 31On the other hand, though Köprülü admits Byzantine influnce over the Ottoman institutions as a result of the natural outcome of the close interaction between the two cultures, the results of his comparative inquiry indicate two seemingly similar cases might have quite different origins.
As for the second methodology of the study, a ‘comparative text critic’ methodology will be pursued by referring to the early Ottoman chronics on the passages about the establishment of janissary corps. This will help to determine the amendments made by their authors at different times. So, I attempt to make a text critic on the passages about the establishment of janissaries at the early chronics to
30 Fuad Köprülü, Some Observations on the Influence of Byzantine Institutions on Ottoman Institutions, ed. Gary Leiser, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1999), 26-32. For the acculturation between Byzantine an Ottoman states, See also, Sp., Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century (California: University of California Press, 1971) and Heath Lowry and Anthony Bryer, Continuity and Change in the Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society (Washington D. C.: Dumbarton Oaks Service, 1986).
31 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions, 26-32
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determine the original account as accurate as possible so that a full text on the accounts about the establishment of janissary corps will be revealed.
Within this framework, the importance and the aim of the text critic method in a historical study is to be mentioned. In brief terms, it can be defined as the ‘narration’ or ‘transliteration’ of a certain text or an idea about a different culture into modern times. To determine the original text or an idea as correctly as possible with a specific methodology is the quintessence of the analysis. Thus it became perceivable as a historical source. 32
Consequently, the study aims to reveal the place of the Ottoman state in the Medieval period in terms of the innovations that are peculiar to itself in the shaping of its military, the hassa soldiery and household forces as its kapıkulu as the example of janissary corps. This might have been shaped as a result of a process of longue duree by eliminating or incorporating various practices of the eastern and western traditions in the Medieval period.
Actually, the phenomenon of ‘acculturation’, as a long process of mutual influence between both sides that have taken place as a result of a long period of interaction, is the subject of sociology, or rather the anthropological sociology.33However, in the historical studies, the two aspects of acculturation, as defined by Güvenç are mostly referenced. Güvenç mentions the concept of ‘diffusion,’ where, although no direct interaction is of concern between societies or
32Halil İnalcık, “Hermenötik, Oryantalizm, Türkoloji”, Doğu Batı, I (2005):34
33 Bozkurt Güvenç, İnsan ve Kültür, (İstanbul:Remzi Yayınevi, 1979), 130-134
33 The second aspect of acculturation, as the ‘trans-culturation’ which is characterized by the imposition of ones cutural aspects to the other,consequed by the process of assimilation and subjection. N. Berkez regards the devşirme regulation as an example of this aspect. On the other hand for Güvenç, the janissary cross religious phenomenon is regarded as an example of this diffusion aspect, Güvenç, İnsan ve Kültür,136.
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cultures, they can influence each other in an indirect manner by way of other cultures34. As mentioned earlier, this view is highlighted by F.Köprülü, who pointed out the indirect influence of pre-Ottoman cultures on the Ottoman institutions. Following this process, I will make references to the examples of acculturation throughout the thesis where necessary.
In conclusion, I will discuss the historical case of hassa soldiery in the early Ottoman state by referring to its similar remote and close models in both near eastern and western realms on a comparative basis, pointing out the cases of acculturation where necessary.
1.3) Sources and Literature Review
The primary sources of the study are the works of the early Ottoman chroniclers who wrote in the second half of the fifteenth century, they are namely the works of Aşıkpaşazade, Neşri, Oruc Beg and the Anonymous Tevarih-i Al-i Osman35. Within this context, it is worth to share some information on the early Ottoman chronics which will be used in this study. The importance and authenticity of the early Ottoman chronics is pointed out by Halil İnalcık in his article “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”36, as a response to the opposing view, which regards them as merely consisting of fictitious accounts.
35 The following editions of the chronics are used in the study: Aşıkpaşa oğlu Ahmed Aşıki, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Çiftçioğlu Nihal Atsız (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1947), Mehmed Neşri, Kitab-ı Cihan-nüma, Vol. I-II, ed. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1995), Oruc bin Adil el-Kazzaz, Tevarih-i Ali Osman, ed. Franz Babinger (Hannover: Orient-Buchhandlung Heinz Lafaire,1925) Anonim Tevarih-iAl-i Osman, ed. F. Giese , translated by.Nihal Azamat (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992)
36 Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, in From Empire to Republic (İstanbul: Isıs Press, 1995): 1-15. For the view that the early Ottoman chronics merely cover folk tale and legendary material, See Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481 (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1990)
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Aşıkpaşazade, Neşri, Oruc and the Anonymous Tevarih seem to use the same source of Yahşi Fakih in their works for the first centuries of Ottoman history, according to İnalcık. This was a menakıbname, a narrative in the form of a legend, which must have been written in the age of Mehmed I. Yahşi Fakih was the son of the imam of Orhan Gazi. Hence, Yahşi Fakih’s work has been regarded as a contemporary source for the events of the early period of Ottoman history37.
However, as İnalcık pointed out, although the chroniclers seem to follow the same source as Yahşi Fakih until 1422, as abridged by Aşıkpaşazade, all must be regarded as separate sources. Their authors made certain abridgements and additions from different sources, like gavazatnames, the narratives of holy war and takvims, calendars or oral information, which cannot be found in any other sources. So all texts must be regarded as the individual versions of the original source in Aşıkpaşazade, since all of them use the original source in their own way by additions from different sources38.
Furthermore, according to Menage and İnalcık, the earliest chroniclers, as the early compilers, are significant for the early Ottoman historiography since they are regarded as the main sources for the later histories written on the first two hundered years of the Ottoman history.39 İnalcık also reveals that, apart from the chroniclers mentioned above, the latter chronics of İbn Kemal in his Tevarih, İdrisi Bitlisi in his work Heşt Bihişt, Ahmedi’s Dasitan in his İskendername, and Enveri in his Düsturname, also follow the text of Yahşi Fakih. This implies that they followed
37İnalcık, “The Rise”of Ottoman Historiography”, 1. For Yahşi Fakih, See Hüseyin Namık.Orkun, “Yahşi Fakih’e Dair”, Dergah V (1337): 106 and “Jahsy Fakıh”, Mitteilungen Z. Osmanischan Geschichte (II) : 317-321.
38 İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, 6-7
39Victor l. Menage, “The Beginning of Ottoman Historiography”, ed. B.Lewis and P.M.Holt, Historians of the Middle East, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962),168-169 and İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, 13
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Aşıkpaşazade-Neşri tradition which cover original information.40Thus, I will use the aforementioned sources as complementary sources to the early chronics.
It is important to mention that, apart from the early Ottoman chronics mentioned above, as a complementary source both for Christian and Ottoman chronics, the anonymous Gazavatname written on the battles of İzladi (1443) and Varna (1444) is also important, in the sense that it covers the menakıbname of Mahmud Paşa, which is unknown to early chroniclers41. Surprisingly, it seems that none of the early Ottoman chroniclers use this source. This source can be considered as one of the reliable sources from a contemporary view point, reflecting the typical epic character of the Ottoman historiography.42
In addition to the sources mentioned above, another important source for the organization of the janissary hearth, named Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan is noteworthy 43. İ.H.Uzunçarşılı used a version of this work in his work Kapıkulu Ocakları, where we find valuable information on acemi ocağı and the janissary institution. Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, as a seventeenth century source written by a nameless janissary, covers valuable information, though there were some chronological inconsistencies with respect to some events.
The unknown author of the Kavanin lived in the age of Ahmed I (1603-1617) and must have composed his work in the years between 1606 to 1617. Considering that the author’s grandfather had been in the service of the janissary hearth for twenty
40Halil İnalcık, Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları (1302-1481) (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010) , 213. The following editions of the mentioned authors are also used in the study: İdris-i Bitlisi, Heşt Bihişt Vol. I-II, eds. Mehmet Karataş and Selim Kaya (İstanbul: BETAV Yayınları, 1990), Nihad Sami Banarlı, “Ahmedi ve Dasitan-i Tevarih-i Müluk-i Al-i Osman”, Türkiyat Mecmuası 4 (1942):49-176 and Düsturname-i Enveri, (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928)
41 Gazavatname-i Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han, eds. H.inalcık and M.Oğuz (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1989)
42 Gazavatname-i Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han, VII-VIII.
43 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, ed. Tayfun Toroser (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2011).
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one years and participated in the campaigns as a member of the janissary garrison since the age of Mehmed II, treating the source of Kavanin as a contemporary figure makes sense; and we may regard it as an authentic source.
It is noteworthy that the author himself was also a member of the janissary hearth. This indicates that he had witnessed or heard about most of the affairs of the janissary hearth. 44 However, as will be seen below, there exists certain anachronisms in the text. It covers many references to the ‘old law’ regarding the early stages of the hearth.
Thus, it would be fair to say that for the early Ottoman history, Kavanin is to be used with caution. In any case, the analysis of the passages in the work in comparison with the early chronics using the method of text critic will hopefully reveal the original text on the establishment and early stages of the jannisary corps.
As for other primary sources, the memories of J.Schiltberger45 and Konstantin Mihail Konstantinoviç46 are also useful sources for the early stages of the janissary corps. What makes Schiltbergers’s work important and unique is the fact that he was an eye-witness of the events between 1396-1402. As we learn from the preface of his work, having participated in the battle against the Ottomans at Nicopolis in 1396 under his lord, he was caught as a war captive by the janissaries. Then, he was brought to Bayezıd I, where we have a vivid description of the treatment of war captives by the Ottoman sultan.
However, considering that he had composed his work at a later date (in 1427), based on his memory, which was mingled with tales and legends of the time, there
44 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 3.
45 Johannes Schiltberger, Türkler ve Tatarlar Arasında (1394-1427), trans. Turgut Akpınar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997)
46 Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, ed. Kemal Beydilli (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2003)
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exists certain historical mistakes. In any case, his work is still of some value, reflecting the real intentions of the slave-originated kuls and the existence of solak soldiery in the age of Bayezıd I.
The memories of Konstantin Mihail Konstantinovic, who served in the Ottoman palace, first as a novice, then as a Serbian janissary in mid-seventeenth century, also presents some valuable information on the military and social roles of janissary corps, such as the janissary influence over the second accession of Murad II (1446-1451), their role in the battle of Varna (1444) and the reasons for their rebellion in Edirne Buçuktepe to name a few, which were all well-presented by the author.
The author, himself being a member of kapıkulu organization, reflects the real intentions of janissaries as the “devoted” kuls. Furthermore, the author’s detailed reports of the palace structure and of the kuls, as a musician and intellectual who played role in diplomatic missions between Europe and the near east, discerned the work from other contemporary works.
As the Ottoman historians, like Babinger and Baranowski stated, there exists unprocessed information in this work, which so far were not utilized by the researchers47. The two manuscripts of the work, dated to fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were updated several times by different authors to serve the current political atmosphere. However, the work also needs to be evaluated with caution and put in the proper perspective since its tone reflects anti-Turk and anti-Islamic ideology. Nevertheless, Ottoman historians like R. Peters, R. Hartmann and H.İnalcık admit the authenticity and reliability of his work as a source for the early Ottoman history48.
47 Beydill, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, xiv-xvi
48 Ibid, xiv-xvi
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Furthermore, for the first period of Ottoman history, the early vakfiye registers are also important sources to determine the military titles and social status of the early kuls and janissaries of the early Ottoman state. These published Bursa Vakıf Registers cover most of the fourteenth and fifteenth century vakfiyye records and are significant sources for identifying the prototype of the early Ottoman kapıkulu-janissary identity.49
Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi50, also covers information on the social status and military rank of the soldiers, is another important source for the military costumes and headgear of the Ottoman soldiery.
Finally, the primary sources for the Seljukid and İlhanid ghulam system and for the general overview of the Anatolia between the twelveth and fourteenth centuries are the contemporary sources of İbn-i Bibi’s history,51Aziz B. Erdeşir-i Esterabadi’s Bezm u Rezm52, Yazıcızades’s Tarih-i Al-i Selçuk53 and Aksarayi’s Müsameretü’l-Ahba,r54 which are significant as they have many references to the ghulam-kul system which had been in use in the pre-Ottoman Anatolia. A more thorough analysis of the Ottoman kapıkulu system and palace organization can be found in İ.H. Uzunçarşılı’s works, which were developed primarily based on early vakf registers and mühimme records.55
49 Bursa Vakfiyeleri I, eds. Hasan Basri Öcalan and Sevim Doğan Yavaş (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2013)
50 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2014)
51 İbni Bibi, El-Evamirü’l-Ala’iyye fi’l Umuri’l Ala’iyye Selçukname, trans. Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara: TTK Yayınları,2014)
52 Aziz B.Erdeşir-i Esterabadi, Bezm u Rezm, trans. Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara:TTK Yayınları,2014)
53 Yazıcızade Ali, Tarih-i Al-i Selçuk, ed. Abdullah Bakır (İstanbul: Çamlıca Yayınları,2000)
54 Kerimüddin Mahmudi Aksarayi, Müsameretü’l-Ahbar, translated by Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2000).
55 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları I-II (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1988) and his Osmanlı Teşkilatına Methal (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1988)
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In addition to the sources above, we can also list two similar and popular works for the lively description of the janissary institution. The first one is Reşat Ekrem Koçu’s work, Yeniçeriler.56 Based on the mühimme registers, the author’s lively description of the janissaries gives a vivid depiction of the janissary institution from its beginning to its end. Similarly Godfrey Goodwin’s57 work Janissaries deals with the selection of youths from Christian families in Balkans for the janissaries as elite corps. In his work, the author points out the originality and distinctive characteristics of the janissary corps and their influence over the Ottoman sultans.
We can also mention Cemal Kafadar’s works on the early janissary identity, which has significant value in terms of understanding the role of the institution, not only in the early period but also in the later stages of the Ottoman history. In his work entitled, Between Two Worlds, The Construction of the Ottoman State, he points out the critical role of the janissary institution in forming a self-consciously centralizing administrative apparatus. Kafadar, in his work, further stresses the advantage of a janissary as a standing army which played the role of an essential military element as an extention of the royal household58.
Lastly, we could also cite a recent study by B.E.Çavadaroğlu, who worked on the role of janissary corps in the changing structure of Ottoman and European warfare between 1650-170059. The author argued that after the janissary corps became a permanent standing force in the Ottoman army as an infantry regiment, the structure
56 Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Yeniçeriler (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2015)
57 Godfrey Goodwin, Jannisaries (Saqi Books, 1994)
58 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, The Construction of the Ottoman State (London: University of California Press, 1995), 17. And his Kim Var İmiş Biz Burada Yoğ İken (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014) See also Gülay Yılmaz, “The Economic and Social Roles of Janissaries in a seventeenth Ottoman City: İstanbul” (PhD Thesis, Mc Gill University,2012) On this topic See also Cemal Kafadar, “Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict”( MA Thesis, Mc Gill University ,1981)
59 Burhan Erhan Çavdaroğlu, “Değişen Harp Usulü Karşısında Osmanlı Ordusu: Tımarlı Sipahiler ve Yeniçeriler “(1650-1700) (MA Thesis, Kırıkkale University ,2021)
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of both Ottoman and European warfare changed. He concluded that the usage of fire guns by the janissary corps not only gave an advantegous position to the Ottomans in the face of Europe, but also led to the rise of thte infantry and cavalry units with fire guns in Europe.
Consequently, considering that this study covers many secondary literature on various individual topics, relevant literature will be provided in each chapter.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1) Ghulam and Kul Connotations in the Near Eastern Tradition and in the Ottoman Context
The connotations and the usage of the terms ghulam or kul showed little variation in meaning among various sources. The literal meaning of the term ghulam, which is derived from the Arabic root gılma, means a boy, youth, lad or a slave, servant and waiter.60 In addition, it covers various specific connotations likea bodyguard and a slave, or a freed man bound to his master by personal ties, or an artisan.61
However, the implication of the term ghulam in the near eastern Turkic and Islamic states covers a more grander meaning than its literal meanings. The term ghulam refers to the members of a specific system, known as the ghulam (slave) system, where the youths of slave origin were acquired and trained for military, administrative and ceremonial services at the palace of the rulers. The rulers in the near eastern states owned an impressive number of ghulam who held high positions in the palace or in the army.62 Hence, in this respect we can say that the ghulams in the
60 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cowan (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980), 682
61 D. Sourdel, “Ghulam”, Encylopedia of Islam, Second ed. Vol.II, (2005): 1079.
62 Ibid, 1079.
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near eastern tradition were the adherents of an organization within the state as a distinguished class in the statecraft.63
The term Kul in the Ottoman Context
On the other hand, we find the term kul as the counterpart of ghulam in the Ottoman context. The term kul, as the direct translation of the Arabic term ‘abd, literally means a slave, servant, serf or bondsman and a human being or more likely the servant of Allah64. It also covers the meaning of a retinue, a servant, or, more likely, a loyal servant. Thus, it is fair to state that in the Ottoman context the term kul not only refers to the servant of Allah, but also of the Sultan and the Porte.
However, we notice problems in the translation of the term kul as “slave” in English, in terms of its interpretation in the ghulam-kul context. As İnalcık puts it, the translation of kul as “slave” is misleading, because to be a slave of the sultan was an honor and privilege and it does not designate a lesser status.65 This marks a key difference between an ‘ordinary slave’ and the ‘slaves of the Sultan’ in the Ottoman usage, though in both cases we use the term “slave” in English66.
Specifically, in the Ottoman historical context, kul or rather the kapıkulu, connotes the ‘servant of the sultan’ who was educated in the palace for the purpose of
63 Mustafa Z. Terzi, “Gulam”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol 14, ( 1996), 178
64 Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 586
65 İnalcık, The Classical Age,87.
66 Hakan Erdem, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu 1800-1909 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 10-11, An ordinary slave sold in the slave markets is labeled as a ‘slave’, esir or rakik which the literal meaning of the term connotes in connection to ones’ legal status; as the one owned by a master in Islamic law. M.Kunt states that, in course of time the term kul also designates the free Muslims who were of non-slave origin, (Erdem, 20). However, B. Papoulia regards kuls who were in the service of the Ottoman sultan, as the real slaves as long as they directly served the sultan, Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 14. For slavery in the early Ottoman state see, Nida Nebahat Nalçacı, Sultanın Kulları (İstanbul: Verita Yayınları, 2015) Nalçacı regards the usage of war captives as slave soldiery whose status is different from ordinary slaves as the tradition of miri, state-owned soldiery in the Ottoman state, Nalçacı, 43. For slavery in the Ottoman state, See also Osmanlı Devletinnde Kölelik, eds. Z.Güneş Yağcı and Fırat Yaşa, (İstanbul: Tezkire Yayınları, 2017)
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serving the state.67 Also, it is worth mentioning that the sons of the kuls were labelled as kuloğlu or as kapıkulu.68 So, the term kul in the Ottoman context refers to one’s special status, as being in the special service of the sultan.69
The kuls, whether they are in the service of the state or of a private owner, were not regarded as a member of lower class; on the contrary,, the status of being a kul procured influence and esteem in the Ottoman society.70 When we consider the near eastern concept of proximity to the sovereign that determined ones’s status, the kul of the sultan designates a status more than being a slave.71
Some researchers consider the kul or kapıkulu system as the backbone of the Ottoman administrative and military apparatus in the Classical period of the Ottoman state.72 As Özer Ergenç states, this system enables the formation of a typology of a certain Ottoman individual, whose participation in the system is possible on the condition of absolute loyalty to the sultan and on the degree of his merit, liyakat. However, it is true to say that the kuls were formerly slaves purchased or taken as pencik oglanıs. Perhaps, it is better to label them as the ‘special servants’ with the indication of ‘your majesty’ – kulunuz, the kul of the Allah, and the kul of the Sultan, keeping in mind the grandeur designation of the word in the Ottoman historical context73.
67 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 223
68 Abdülkadir Özcan. “Kul”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 26, ( 2002),348
69 Kemal Beydilli, “Yeniçeri”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 43 (2013) 450. Beydilli states that the term kul in the Ottoman context is used only for the ones who came through the acemi ocağı, the page-school of a novice, where the slaves were first stationed, before joining the janissary coprs.
70 Halil İnalcık, “Ghulam in the Ottoman Empire”, Encylopedia of Islam, Second ed. Vol.II,(2005), 1090
71 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 76
72 Ibid, 77
73 It seems rather convenient not to translate the term kul as the “slave” in the Ottoman context, since there isn’t any word which directly correspons to its direct connotation in English. So, the term kul will be used throughout the thesis to refer to the kapıkulu members and for the janissary corps. M.Kunt clearly indicates that kul is the equivalent of a kapıkulu member as being the “true ottoman”, M.Kunt,
28
Within this conjecture, it is worth mentioning certain specific characteristics of the Ottoman kapıkulu system and the specific condition of the janissary corps as part of this process. The status of the kuls of the Ottoman sultan as part of his kapıkulu, is similar to the position of ghulams in the near eastern tradition in terms of their acquisition, training and career. It is noteworthy to mention that the Ottoman concept of kul system is closely associated with palace education as was also the case in the near eastern tradition.
In the Ottoman notion of kul system, the slaves as war captives or as devşirme children who were the candidates for the kapıkulu institution, were required to go through several stages of education in order to become a kul.In the initial stage, the best of them were chosen as the novices, acemi oğlanları, who received special training (including physical, religious and literary education and craft or fine arts) that varied between 2-7 years. The rest of the novices were given to Turkish villagers in Anatolia to learn Turkish language and culture before being allowed to enter the janissary regiments.
After the initial phase, under the strict discipline and inspection of the palace tutors, all underwent a second selection process, which was known as çıkma, a kind of graduation to military or palace service. Hence, the most able had the right to be in the service of the sultan’s palace in the Greater and Lesser rooms or in janissary regiments, whereas the remainder were employed in the cavalry divisions of the Porte.74
“Osmanlı Dirlik-Kapı Düzeni ve Kul Kimliği”, in Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte “Öteki” Sorunu, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,1998), 166. It is also noteworthy that the janissaries opposed to be labelled as “slave”, conscious of their high status, Feridun Emecan, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2018), 49.
74 It is no doubt that those “slaves” educated at the Ottoman palace school contributed to the production of many Ottoman historical and literary writing as well as the development of the Ottoman
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Within that context, we may cite the stipulations of the ghulam-kul system as:
1) The acquisition of young war captives (slaves) through several ways (e.g., purchase, practice of pençik or devşirme, as a gift or as a hostage)
2) Training them for military and administrative services in the special palace schools (religious, military, fine arts and letters education) or giving them to Turkish families (in the Ottoman case)
3) Employing the most talented for palace service (in the course of time, some could be promoted to high posts in the statecraft based on their abilities and seniority) or,
4) Conscripting them for hassa regiments as regular professional forces; or leaving them in any other military segments (janissary regiments or other sekban regiments in the Ottoman palace)
It is noteworthy that a ‘slave’ could became ‘free’ and become a ghulam or kul upon these stipulations.
In the sixteenth century, the kuls, or rather the ‘specially educated servants’ who passed through the palace education, formed the core of the kapıkulu institution. They, as the ehl-i örf, constituted a separate category within the Ottoman class system, as the ‘military class’ to whom the sultan delegated his authorithy on the condition of unquestioning obedience and loyalty to him75. Moreover, they, as the special servants of the sultan, were the group who enjoyed the authorithy of the sultan and formed a distinguished class in the statecraft, which had its roots in the Persian-
architecture and fine arts, İnalcık, The Classical Age, 78-79 and 88. For a detailed describtion of the Ottoman kapıkulu organization in the age of Süleymen II See, A.Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Süleyman the Magnificent (London: Cambridge- Harvard University Press,1913)
75 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 94
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Indian concept of class system76. As an eye-witness novice who served in the palace in the seventeenth century mentioned, the Ottomans managed to govern their huge territory through this system of a well-organized palace education in various fields.77
In Max Weber’s analysis of the Ottoman class structure, on the other hand, the Ottoman patrimonial system was considered as ‘sultanism’, the extreme case of the patrimonial state which operates under the arbitrary power of the sultan in all affairs. Hence, the kul taîfesi or kapıkulları of the palace and the army were the ‘household instruments’ of the Ottoman sultan, discerned by the arbitrary power of the Ottoman sultan.78
Moreover, for Weber, the kuls, as the slave-originated troops of the Porte who were directly under the personal service of the sultan, were organized exclusively to respond to the ruler’ demands, although their training and specialization were not prerequisities for this. According to Weber, the promotitions of kuls depended on the ruler’s favor and arbitrary power, not on their merit.79
Based on Weber’s views, if we consider the status of kuls in a broader context, where the government was conducted at the ‘gate’ of the ruler, then it is true that his officials technically were all in the position of his “slaves” and Weber’s analysis could be meaningful. Also, there is no doubt that the kapıkulus constituted the
76 For the Persian-Indian class system, See The History of Al-Tabari, ed. Franz Rosenthal (New York: State University of Ny Press, 1989) and, Kalilah wa Dimnah, ed. M.Minovi, (Tahran,1962).
77 Albertus Bobovius ya da Santuri Ali Ufki Bey’in Anıları Topkapı Sarayı’nda Yaşam, ed.StephanosYerasimos and Annie Berthier, trans. Ali Berktay, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), 110.
78Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of Clifornia Press, 1978), 231-232. Here Weber analyzes the Ottoman kul system and the status groups arisen from it as the instruments of a patrimonial near eastern state which shaped by the arbitrary and despotic power of the ruler. On the other hand, İnalcık, conversely indicated the points that Weber missed for the restrictions of the arbitrary power of the Ottoman sultan. He states that it was not only the ‘tradition’ but also the ‘Islamic law’ and the kanuns, law codes, as well as the ehl-i örf as the power group within the government, that prevents the Ottoman state to be purely a state based on sultanism, Halil İnalcık, “Comments on Sultanism: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity”in The Ottoman Empire and Europe (İstanbul: Kronik Books,2017) 74.
79 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 232
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household troops of the sultan, who were employed in various services for the Ottoman sultan and of the Porte.
However, in the Ottoman context, this system of training discerned them as a special priviliged group within the Ottoman class system. As will be seen further in the study, they were actually the powerful group and were able to influence the sultan, as ‘traditional status groups’ within the state, who could manipulate the sultan and the state.
On the other hand, if we look back to the analysis of the meaning of the terms ghulam and kul, D. Pipes, for instance, described this type of slave-originated soldiery as ‘military slaves’. According to him, the terms ghulam, fata, memluk or kul have no direct connotation in the Western terminology and the practice of ‘military slavery’ is a concept peculiar to Medieval Islamic states.80 He further states that ‘military slavery’ is different from ordinary slavery in the sense that it requires a systematic military training as a proffessional soldier under the control of a central government or a ruler. Moreover, a military slave was acquired through three stages which were ’acquisition’, ‘transition’ and ‘employment’.81
Pipes’ argument seems reasonable within the context of the near eastern ghulam-kul context. However, E. Göksu, in his analysis of the ghulam system in the Seljukid period argues that the slave-originated ghulam system and the ‘arming of ordinary slaves’ in the west, which Pipes considers similar, are different. For Göksu, the ghulam system in the middle eastern states was developed through a specific process which requires the acquisition and training of the slaves ‘systematically’ to
80 Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam,5
81 İbid, 5-6
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make them ‘profesional soldiers’ or ‘officials.’ 82 Thus, according to Göksu, what Pipes might have missed could be the specialized position of the ghulams as a distinguished class of officials in the traditional ghulam system. In the near eastern notion of the ghulam system, the military slaves could hold high posts as military commanders or as high officials in the military and administrative apparatus, according to their competence and abilities. This factor seems to mark the difference between Pipes’s argument on military slavery.
Obviously, when we consider the multi-functionality of the ghulam-kul personages as the servants of the rulers or of the palace, the ghulam-kul system requires more than merely the arming of ordinary slaves in the near eastern tradition. Most importantly, it was the status of the kuls as high officals in the administrative apparatus of the state which distinguished them from Pipe’s definition. In any case, the stipulations offered by Pipes for military slavery seemed universal and could also be present in the western tradition, with variations from its classical form in the near east.
Interestingly, A. Çetin, in his analysis of the Memluk military structure, states that although it is true that military slavery developed in the circumstances of Islam and its well-developed form made its appearance in the Memluk state, he claims that this application is not peculiar to Islam, as examples can be found in the Sasanid and Byzantine states83. In the following section we will discuss the historical background of the ghulam system in the near eastern and western states in this conjecture.
82 Erkan Göksu, Selçuklu’nun Mirası, Gulam ve İkta (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap,2017), 14-15
83 Altan Çetin, Memluk Devletinde Askeri Teşkilat (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2007),44. For the analysis of the Memluk system see Chapter V of the thesis.
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2.2) Ghulam System in the Persian Realm
The Ottoman Empire of the late sixteenth century is regarded as a highly developed example of a near eastern empire in terms of its administrative, socio-economic and military structure84. Therefore, it will be meaningful to analyze the ghulam-kul system in the Turkic and Islamic states established in the near eastern realm and determine its impact on the Ottomans. Pursuing the traces of slave-originated court-based household soldiery under the direct command of the rulers in the Persian realm will also help reveal the conceptual origins of the ghulam-kul system and further enhance the analysis.
When we look at the states established in the ancient near east in the second part of Egyptian period, we observe that the lituents had the right to take certain war captives for various purposes; and we see a standing army under the grand commander for the guardiance and defense of the expanding Egyptian borders.85
The Asurians, on the other hand, utilized war captives in the service of the state in several ways. For example, some were recruited for the special regiments, and the rest were either employed as peasants, gardeners or shepherds or given to nobles and citizens for service as a reward. In the Asur Empire, the intimates of the king, after an oath of loyalty to him, constituted the core of his standing army. 86 Similarly, the existence of large slave armies are known to have existed in the Achaemenids. 87
As İnalcık asserted, however, it was mostly the Sasanid state which stood as a model for the Ottomans of the sixteenth century in terms of its statecraft and military
84 İnalcık, The Classical Age,3.
85 Amelia Kuhrt, Eski Çağ’da Yakındoğu, Vol. I, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: T.İş Bankası Yayınları, 2017), 285
86 Kuhrt, Eskiçağ’da Yakındoğu, Vol II, 204
87 İnalcık, The Classical Age,77
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organization, and whose influence came by the way of the Abbasids through the employment of Persian and Christian scribes.88 Within this framework, J. Howard points to the Sasanian success with an efficient tax system, a remified government, and an army paid by the government under the direct control of a centralized state.89 So we can say that a ‘slave guard’ as the ‘slave army’ must have constituted the nucleus of the early Sasanid army, as opposed to indigenous peoples.90
It is a known fact that war captives as hassa soldiery and as ghulams existed in the Sasanids before 500s. It was under the Soghdians that the children of inner Asian nomads were trained for military and agricultural purposes.91 In addition, colonizers, that is, the barbarians, who were the war captive people of Sind and were known as better fighthers than Iranian peasants, were systematically drafted in the Sasanid army; and they also constituted the permanent army of Khosroes I.92
As Tabari indicated, the ghulams of the Shah or certain followers, atba of the masters, who must have been of slave origin as a part of Sasanian army, are noteworthy.93 It should also be noted that the main army was mostly conscripted from those non-native elements. Therefore, it can be inferred that the practice of building up slave armies based on the practice of the recruitment of foreign elements dates back to the ancient near east.
88 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 3. The Sasanid impact on the development of Turkish institutions is also asserted by Köprülü. Also, Ottoman intellectuals like İbn Haldun and Ziya Gökalp admitted the Sasanid impact to the Ottomans by the way of Byzantine state. Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions, 31
89 James Howard-Johnson, “The two Great Powers in Late Antiquity: A Comparison”, inEast Rome, Sasanian Persia and the end of Antiquity, (Aldershot Ashgate: Variorum Collected Studies/848, 2006):157-226
90 C.E. Bosworth, “Ghulam in Persia,” Encylopedia of Islam, Second ed., Vol. II ( 2005),1081.
91 Pipes, Slave Soldiers , 162-163
92 Ibid,161-162
93 Ibid, 164
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Over the course of time Persia became the land of slave labor from Russia, Central Asia and India as a result of the economic growth during nineth and tenth centuries, and Turks, as slave-originated ghulams, began to be employed in the armies of the Persian states.94 A contemporary author, Ibn Hassul, narrates that the Turks were already in the slave armies of Persian states in the tenth century because of their known loyalty and brave martial qualities.95
The typical example of the employment of Turkish ghulams early in Persian realm was seen in the Samanid State (819-1005), where the slave guard of Turkish troops was regarded as the nucleus of the army96. For instance, the existence of various titles of Turkish origin in the Samanid statecraft can be attributed to the influence of Turkish ghulams in the Samanid army. It is also noteworthy that the soldiery were paid four times a year, as we see in the Ottoman payment schedule of its janissary corps. 97 So, it must have been through those Turkish troops and commanders that the military habits had been transferred throughout the centuries.
Regarding the systematic training of ghulams in the Samanid state, Nizamülmülk states that it was in the Samanid state where the training of ghulams for military purposes was first established.98 However, Bosworth argues against this view and points out the impossibility of such a long training program in the Samanid state because of the lack of administrative experience of the Samanids. He further claims that Nizamülmülk must have reflected the ideal situation, rather than the actual one. Considering that there exists little information on this issue in the sources, Bosworth
94Bosworth,”Ghulam in Persia”, 1081
95 Carole Hillebrande, Malazgirt Muharebesi (İstanbul: Alfa Tarih, 2015) , 167
96 Bosworth, “Ghulam in Persia”,1082. Apart from the Tukish ghulams which constitured the majority of the army, there were the troops of ıkta holders, the auxiliaries and the volunteers which constituted the total of the Samanid army, Aydın Usta, “Samaniler”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.36,(2009), 66
97 Köprülü, Byantine Institutions, 80
98 Göksu, Gulam ve Ikta,23
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states that the training program of the ghulams, which Nizamülmülk mentioned, must have been merely the field training that the troops were involved in the Samanid state.99
On the other hand, Turkish commanders in the Samanid state, like Alp-Tegin, had their private armies of ghulams. This can be considered one of the factors of Samanid decline, according to some historians. When central power decreased, Alp Tegin became a semi-autonomous leader with the power of his own ghulam forces against the Samanid state, and hence succeeded in establishing his own state with those slave-originated forces, that is the Ghaznevid state. We can say that this can be regarded as the disadvantage of the ghulam system, where the notables or powerful commanders could also have their private ghulam forces that could be used against the central government. Conversely, the Ottomans always tried to avoid the power of kapıkulus and powerful frontier begs against the state, which, as we saw in the case of Samanid state, have the potential of threatening the central government.
Within this context it will be worthwhile to give some information about the Ghaznevid (962-1187) military structure, which was also thought to have an impact on the military structure of the Ottoman state.100 It is important to note that the Gaznevid military and administrative apparatus, as a military and administrative machine, revolved around the personality of a ghulam ruler. Thus, the characteristics of the Ghaznevid army differentiates the armies of Islamic Persian dynasties from those of its pre-Islamic ancestors like the Sasanids.101 Founded officially by the descendant of a slave-originated Turkish ghulam commander in the Samanid army, Sebuk Tegin, Samanid influence on the building of an army of ghulams seems only
99 Bosworth, “ Gaznevid Military Organization”, Der Islam 36 (1-2) (1960): 45-46
100 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions, 100-101
101 Bosworth, “Ghaznevid Military”, 37-40
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natural. Turks, known for their loyalty to the rulers and martial qualities, were again preferred as ghulam forces in the Ghaznevid armies. The Turkish ghulams, who were either purchased or given as a gift as a result of the intense slave trade from the traditional central Asian sources, made up a greater part of the Ghaznevid army.
We can argue that the Gaznevid system of ghulam acquision lies in the purchasing of slaves at an early age. These slaves, who were free of roots, local connections, and consequently highy mobile for campaigning, were trained in warfare on the condition of loyalty.102 The above description of the Ghaznevid practice of ghulam acquision at an early age and training them for the purpose of loyalty, represents the main mentality behind the ghulam system in the near eastern tradition.
As mentioned earlier, the acquisition of the ‘rootless’ and the ‘unqualified’ who could easily be adapted to serve for the purpose of the state, makes the essence of this system.On the other hand, the existence of gulaman-ı saray or gulaman-ı hassa or gulaman-ı sultan as the personal household of the sultan in the palace, indicates that the ghulams began to be employed in personal service to the sultan as well as in the various services in the Ghaznevid palace. 103
Thus, we see the dual function of ghulams, either as the military or administrative (palace service) element in the Ghaznevid state. In addition, the ghulams, as crack forces in the Ghaznevid state, also took a role in the ceremonies.104 It should be mentioned that the Turkish ghulams again mostly constituted the military element, whereas the Persians made up the administrative part. 105 Hence, we can say
102 Bosworth, “Ghaznevid Military”,40
103 Erdoğan Merçil, “Gazneliler”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 13, ( 1996), 483. The palace ghulams of the Gaznevids seem to be an individual unit within the state apparatus, having their own commanders, officials and standarts similar to the organization of the janissary hearth.
104 Bosworth, “Ghaznevid Military”, 46-7
105 Ibid, 37
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that in the Ghaznevid state we find the early example of the classical ghulam-kul system.
If we continue to examine the Great Seljukid state as the successor of the Ghaznevids, we see that a similar practice is also observed in the Seljukid State in Persia, where the ghulams were employed for military and ceremonial purposes by the state. 106 It seems that the Seljukid sultan and other dignitiries had their own regular forces composed of slave-originated ghulams as their salaried hassa soldiery, known as the ghulaman-ı saray.107
The institution of ghulam is thought to be an important element in the Great Seljukid state, reflecting the power of the ruler that can be observed in every rank of the Seljukid society108. It should also be noted that the gulaman-ı saray under the command of salar-ı gulaman-ı saray, the commander of the ghulams, was paid four times a year, which is called pişegani, as was the case in the Samanids and the Gaznevids.109 As mentioned earlier, we can trace this practice all the way to the Ottomans. Moreover, the ghulams, also as hassa forces, constituted a great portion of the manpower of the Seljukid army. As war captives, they were taken following the Islamic law, which gives one-fifth of the slaves to the ruler, similar to the Ottoman pencik regulation110.
We also observe the continuation of the same military structure in the Anatolian Seljukids. Köprülü stated that it was predominantly the military structure of
106 Bosworth, “Ghaznevid Military”,47-48 For the ghulam system in the Seljukid states See Coşkun Erdoğan, “Selçuklu Devletlerinde Gulam Sistemi”, (MA Thesis, Atatürk University,2010.) Erdoğan states that ghulam system as an Islamic institution is to reinforce the central authorithy of the sultans and to utilize slaves by turning them into an aristocratic military class.
107 Uzunçarşılı, Methal, 52-53
108 Bosworth, “Ghulam in Persia”, 1080
109 Bosworth, “Ghaznevid Military”,, 52-53
110 Ali Sevim and Erdoğan Merçil,Selçuklu Devletleri Tarihi (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1995), 512.
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the Anatolian Seljukids which is thought to have influenced the Ottoman organization of its hassa soldiery and kul system.111 This view is also shared by İnalcık, who stated that the Ottomans inherited the idea of kul system from the Seljukids of Rum.112 Additionaly, the Seljukid historian O. Turan also argues that the practice of purchasing Christian children at a younger age and training them in special schools at the palace, ghulamhane, or at big cities and utilizing them for military and administrative practices, must have been taken as a model by the Ottomans from the Seljukids of Rum in their formation of the janissary corps.113
We know of many officials, like atabeğs or melik’ül-ümera, who were of ghulam origin and served in the important posts of the administrative apparatus of the Seljukid state. They were chosen amongst the most loyal and trustworthy of ghulams trained in ghulamhanes, as reflected in sources as the hass ghulam of the Seljukid rulers.114
Within this context, it is worth noting various references to ghulams who served in several capacities within the Seljukid sources of the twelveth to fourteenth centuries. In most of these sources, we find ghulams as always being the nearest to the Seljukid rulers and dignitaries as hassa forces in military or administrative apparatus. For example, in the work of Bezm u Rezm, which is attributed to Kadı Burhaneddin in
111 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions,106-107 Here Köprülü points out to the hassa army of ghulams in the Anatolian Seljukid state, 101-102
112 İnalcık, “Ghulam in The Ottoman Empire”, 1085
113 Osman Turan, Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk İslam Medeniyeti, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları,2010),348
114 Nejat Kaymaz, Anadolu Selçuklularının İnhitatinda İdare Mekanizmasının Rolü, (Ankara:TTK Yayınları, 2011). For example, Emir Ertokuş and Seyfüddin Ay-Aba were portrayed as the hass ghulam of İzzüddin Keyhüsrev who also constituted the intimate military retinue of the sultan, Kaymaz,38. It is noteworthy that there existed many statesmen of slave origin in the service of the Anatolian Seljukid state like Greeks, Kıpçak, Turks and Slavs who were trained in accordance with Turkish ghulam education, Kaymaz 18. Within this framework the specific case of Hüsameddin Emir Çoban is noteworthy. As an prominent frontier beg he was experienced in training of the ghulams in the Seljukid state, Kaymaz, 60, n.129.
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the fourteenth century, we find Hacı Mukbil as the ghulam of Hacı İbrahim, the former being an influential personality in state affairs.115
Likewise, in İbni Bibi, the hassa ghulams of the Sultan, is known as gulaman-ı hass who always looked after him. 116In Yazıcızade’s Tarih-i Al-i Selçuk, we find ghulam-ı hass as the equivalent of guardians. In the account, the ghulam Seyfal-Din Aybe is depicted as a candar, who fought for the sultan at the front stage for the sake of his life.117 In Aksarayi, the ghulams were portrayed as the bodyguards of the Sultan Alp Arslan who fought vigorusly for him.118 Aksarayi, as an officer in the Seljukid state, mentions that the power of the Sultan depends on the ghulams he purchased.119Thus, we find ghulams under different titles but similar functions such as, müfarede, Halka-i Has, Gulaman-ı dergah, Gulaman-ı yayak and Mülaziman-ı yatak ve yayak, that all coincided with the hassa soldiery of the Sultan throughout the Seljukid period. 120
Hence, if we consider ghulam in terms of a distinguished status, like the term kul, E.Göksu states that the term ghulam must have indicated a higher status than an ordinary slave, köle in the Seljukid period, and they were considered as being devletlu, prosperous and fortunate as the hassa kuls of the rulers.121 There are many examples of ghulams being promoted to the rank of high officials within the statecraft or in the provinces in the Anatolian Seljukids.122Consequently, although the ethnic origins of the ghulams in the Seljukid period were rather vague, the utilization of
115 Aziz b.Erdeşir-i Esterabadi, Bezm u Rezm, 127
116 İbni Bibi, Tarihi-i Al-i Selçuk, 574
117 Yazıcızade, Tarihi-i Al-i Selçuk, 89. In some places, the term ghulam is also used as the equivalent of life-time merceneries.
118 Aksarayi, Müsameretü’l-Ahbar,13.
119 Ibid, 263
120 Uzunçarşılı,Methal, 100
121 Göksu, Gulam ve İkta, 15-17.
122 İnalcık, “Ghulam in the Ottoman Empire”, 1085
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slave-originated foreigners, other than the native elements, as ghulams for military and administrative services must have been the common practice of neareastern states between the eighth to twelveth centuries.
The importance of having ghulams with different ethnic backgrounds was reflected in the work of Seljukid vizier Nizamülmülk’s Siyasetname, who advises the rulers to have soldiery of different kinds123. Having his own multi-ethnical ghulam corps named after him as Nizammiyye, Nizamülmülk points out the disadvantages of a homogenous army. For him, if the soldiery is of the same kind and origin, it will be potentially troublesome for the state, since they may choose to fight for their own race rather than the state.124 The advice of Nizamülmülk reflects the general tendency of the period in the near eastern realm and explains why the ghulam system persisted throughout the centuries. To form a heterogenous army of slaves, which could be adopted easily and utilized as the hassa force of the rulers, seems to be the essential factor in composing a ghulam army, instead of utilizing native elements.
Along this line, the existence of Byzantine ghulams in the Seljukid army should also be noted. As Bosworth indicated, a paid professional army of ghulams, mainly of Turkish and Greek origin, played an important role against the rebellious Turcomans in the Seljukid frontier during the tenth to eleventh centuries.125 One could assume that, apart from the Turkish ghulams, the ghulams of Greek origin must have been also responsible for the transfer of practices between the Turkish and Byzantine cultures.
123 Nizamülmülk, Siyasetname (İstanbul:Dergah Yayınları,1981). As an early example of the ghulam system, Nizamülmülk states that a thousand Turcomans were recruited as the ghulams in the Seljukids, Siyasetname, 145
124 Nizamülmülk, Siyasetname,146-147
125Bosworth, “Ghulam in Persia”, 1082
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As far as the Byzantine state is concerned, a similar practice of taking war captives or hostages at an early age and raising them as Byzantines seemed to be a common practice before the twelveth century. In the tenth century, Slavs were baptised and trained for the purpose of several services in the state.126 A commander who was Persian in race but raised as Greek in the twelveth century can be cited as an example. Another example was the regenerated Turkish war captives taking part in the Byzantine military as infantry forces armed with bows. Vryonis indicated that such neo-Byzantines played an important role in the military of the Byzantine state in the tenth century. 127
Considering that the late Byzantine army had a multi-ethnic character, the existence of many multi-ethnic groups as military forces seems reasonable. This could be taken as a supporting evidence that they must have played a significant role in the process ofcculturation between Turkish and Byzantine cultures. However, it seems that there did not exist any similarity with the near eastern systematic ghulam organization. Also different is the use of some youths in the Byzantine army for several services, such as baggage train and gathering fodder for animals which does not represent a model similar to the classical near eastern ghulam system.128
126 The Taktika of Leo VI, ed. G.Dennis (Washington D.C.: Dumporton Oaks Papers for Harvard Universitiy, 2010), 471
127 Sp.Vryonis, “Byzantine and Turkish Societies and their Sources of Manpower”, in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London:1975) , 128-135 .As Vryonis stated, by the eleventh century onwards Latins, Cumans, Uzes, Turks and Alans took part in the Byzantine army and the existence of Turks, and half-breeds (Greek and Turkish) in the armies of sultans and emperors revealed the ethnic composition of the Byzantine armies untill the fourteenth century.
128 Vryonis, “Manpower”, 142 and 132
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2.3) The Idea of Standing Army and Ghulam System in the Arabian Peninsula (622-1258)
The establishment of the ghulam system through the use of slaves as hassa military forces and the establishment of a standing army in the Arabian peninsula can be said to begin with the emergence of Islam. There is no doubt that there did not exist a permanent army before Islam, since the Araps were leading a bedevi, bedouin-type lifestyle based on a tribal organization of asabiyet, brotherhood.129 It is noteworthy to mention that, in the early Arabic society the first converts and the first emigrants to Medina were the soldiers who assembled under the religious brotherhood who fought for the holy war, cihad. They constituted the first military corps, together with Ensar under the command of Muhammed the Prophet 130.
In the first centuries of Islam, the soldiers were engaging with agriculture during peace time. Thus, in order to establish a disciplined army, Hz. Ömer prohibited the soldiers’ engagement with agriculture and turned them into proffessional salaried soldiers so that cihad would not be neglected. Through this practice, the first permanent standing army amongst the chosen soldiery had been experienced during the time of Hz. Ömer.
Later on, those who voluntarily fought for booty and holy war, as Islam requires, were transformed into a specialized corps with an obligation to fight in the Islamic army131. Thus, the above brief explanation of the early organization of the soldiery in the early years of Islam indicates that there existed a need for
129 Corci Zeydan, İslam Uygarlıkları Tarihi I, trans. Necdet Gök (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 213-214
130 Zeydan, İslam Uygarlıkları, 214
131 Ibid, 214-215
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specialization and a permanent standing force to fight regularly, specifically for the holy war.
The formation of the organized soldiery under Hz. Ömer also continued with the Emevids (661-750). When the Muslims gathered under the unity of the Emevid caliphate, then the caliphs began to establish standing armies with hassa forces. However, as the powerless caliphs could hardly maintain the order in the army, disobediance took place amongst the soldiers; and eventually, Haccac established the first regular permanent standing army and the first military organization in Islam. Thus, we can say that the traditional division between the salaried and voluntary service amongst the soldiery would have taken place in the Islamic military history.132
Within this context, it is noteworthy that the practice of utilizing slaves for military purposes was seen in the Emevid state, but not in a systematic way133. In the Emevids’ army, apart from the Arabic element, Turks as mevali, non-Arabic Muslims, together with the Persians and Berberis as war captives, were in the service of the caliph’s army as gılman (plural of ghulam) regiments.134
Thus, when the government abolished the infiltration of the non-Arabic elements into the administrative apparatus of the state, we can no longer talk about a typical ghulam system in the Emevid state in terms of the systematic acquision of foreign elements. However, over time, the Turks as gılman became the main element of the Emevid army as a permanent salaried professional soldiery. Hence, by that way, they were promoted to the mürtezika, the distinguished forces of the Caliph.135
132 Zeydan, İslam Uygarlıkları, 216-217
133 Göksu,Gulam ve Ikta, 21
134 Sourdel,”Ghulam,” 1079
135 Aydın Usta, “Emeviler”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.11, (1995), 95
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Nevetheless, as Pipes stated, the Emevid army always remained tribal in composition as the government hardly gained control over the army.136
In any case, we can confidently state that the first step in the formation of a standing army by using non-Arabic forces took place in the reign of Emevids. Moreover, the introduction of the Turkish element as gılman in the service of the caliph as mürtezika must have contributed to the formation of a permanent hassa force and the detribalizatioin in the Emevid state.
Subsequently, the Abbasids (750-1258), by ascending to the role of the caliphate, realized that there was a need for a loyal army and hence loyal soldiers to strengthen the power of the caliphate, so they eliminated the tribal element of the Emevid army. As Pipes put it, they ‘detribalized’ the army by organizing new kinds of corps of their own without any allegiances and loyalty to anyone but to the caliphate137. Therefore, they no longer depended on the ‘marginal area soldiers’ as Pipes labels them; namely, the Khurasanis, Arabian and Iranian elements who brought them to power but rather purchased alliances for the army who were again mainly the Turks.138
In this context, Mutasım was known to be the the first caliph who had officially introduced the foreign element as gılman into the government in the history of Muslim world. He bought slaves from the slave market of Bagdad, mainly of Ferganas and Turks; hence a Turkish corps of slaves, Turkish gılman, came into being as the nucleus of the Abbasid army as guard troops of the caliph, or employees in
136 Pipes,Slave Soldiers and Islam, 174
137 Ibid, 174
138 Ibid, 179-181
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palace service. 139 In the later stage, the war captives taken at a younger age were subjected to military training to be the warriors of Islam.140 However, it is not certain whether the ordinary slaves who constituted the greater part of the Abbasid society, were trained systematically and regularly for military service.141
Thus, by the 835s, Turks as mürtezika or gılman-ı hassa, began to be employed in the armies of the caliphs as hassa forces.142 The reasons for the utilization of foreign elements, mainly of Turks in the Abbasid army, were twofold. First, it was the high martial qualities of the Turkish archers as the infantry; second, the state, in order to eliminate the pressure of the Iranian elements, preferred to buy or collect Turkish slaves in the nineth century143.
Within this context, the idea of slave-originated foreign soldiery can also be considered as a challenge to the tribal strife and weakening of the Arab ruling class in the Emevid and Abbasid states.144Therefore, the employment of Turkish troops as the permanent profesional forces in the Abbasid state indicates a step towards the development of the ghulam system.145 From this point of view, Göksu, points to a change in the connotation of the term slave (ordinary slave) versus ghulam. Later on,
139 Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, “Abbasiler”,TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.1, (1988),39. The essential force directly under the control of the caliph as his hassa force, was the mürtezika, the salaried regular permanent force of the caliph like in the Emevids. Known also as haresü’l- halife, they stationed in the capital to protect the city and the caliph. On the other hand there were the forces of the high officials and forces in the provinces apart from the avasım and sungur stationed in the borders and the auxillary and voluntery forces of mutatavvıa as it is in the Emevids who fought for booty.
140 David Nicolle, İslam Orduları 600-1100, trans. Emir Yener (İstanbul: T.İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 20122), 22
141 Yıldız, “Abbasiler”, 46
142 Terzi, “Gulam”, 179
143 Sourdel, “Ghulam”,1080
144 Speros Vryonis, “Basilike D. Papoulia, Ursprung und Wesen der Knabenlese im Osmanischen Reich”, Book Review, Balkan Studies, 5, (1965):146
145 Göksu, Gulam ve Ikta, 22-23.
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the term ghulam began to be used as a technical term, where it represents the members of the administrative and military apparatus.146
However, over the course of time, as a result of the Abbasid’s policy of the utilization of Turkish slaves in the administratitive and militaryrole, the authority of the Caliphate declined in favor of Turkish commanders. As the descendants of the first gılman, they in a way formed a new aristocracy and in the end established their short-lived states with their slave armies. Consequently, the Turks as separate gılman regiments, fighting under their own free military chiefs, turned into powerful forces, challenging the authority of the caliphs and central administration by the second half of the nineth century. Having obtained high ranks within the statecraft or in provinces, they engaged in state politics, palace intrigues, coup d’etats, and even played a vital role in the succession of the caliphs147.
Hence, the approach of the caliphs to rely on such forces, free from all local attachments, to avoid civil war and to strenghen their central power, proved to be ineffective. It should be noted that it was those gılman regiments of the military chiefs who were responsible for the decline of the Abbasid caliphate.148
The political atmosphere of the Abbasid state is reflected in İbn Haldun’s work Mukaddime. According to Haldun, the decline and corruption of the Abbasid state was due to the existence of the ‘outsiders’, that is, the slaves, azatlıs and the ones who were in the service of the state, like the Turkish gılman. The status of aliens in İbn Haldun’s work is reflected as follows: “Though a ruler needed alians to avoid the threat and the occurance of group feeling amongst ones who were of his own
146Göksu, Gulam ve Ikta,22-23
147 Sourdel, “Ghulam”, 1080
148 İbid,1080
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geneology, in time the former gain a group feeling having lived together for long times hence, the assistance of ones who were not of his geneology is not proper for a ruler.”149
In this context, the Ottoman policy of absolute centralization of the state with the Sultan being the sole and absolute authorithy is noteworthy. Though his endless power was restricted by ehl-i orf, the avoidance of the military chiefs having absolute authority and autonomy can be regarded as one of the main features of the Ottoman policy. However, ironically in the Abbassid state the Ottoman administration in the eighteenth century could hardly restrict the establishment of asabiyet, group feeling and rebels amongst its janissary corps against the state150.
In conclusion, we may infer that the usage of foreigners, with all of its advantages and disadvantages, as ghulams, hassa servants of the ruler for administrative and military purposes seem to be rooted in the Abbasid state with the Turkish element. The Turks with regards to their martial qualities seemed to stand as the prototype of the ghulam or memluk element in these near eastern states.151 So why the ghulam system was establihsed and persisted within the Persian and Arabian realmcan also be found within the need for a loyal (to the ruler), unrooted, and qualified manpower for the administrative and military apparatus.This makes up the quintessence of the ghulam system as established in the Arabian peninsula as well.
Consequently, Vryonis states that the success of ghulam system in the Abbasids, Ghaznevids, and successively in the Seljukids and the Ottomans, lies in the
149 İbn Haldun, Mukaddime, 37-43
150 For the later stages of the janissary corps as becoming a powerful status group within the Ottoman state See Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of Ottoman order in the age of revolutions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)
151 İsmail Kızıltoprak, “Memluk”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi,Vol. 29, (2004): 87-88
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sovereignty of all in such a multi-lingual and a multi-ethnical atmosphere.152 In this sense, twelfth century Anatolia is of importance as where the Seljukids brought the traditional Islamic ghulam system.153 Moreover, it was through those Persian scribes of the Seljukids that this sytem of administrative practices was transferred to Anatolia.154 Thus, the Ottomans found a model for themselves already established in Anatolia, which they adopted for the establishment of their kapıkulu institution and hassa soldiery.
152 Sp Vryonis, “Selçuklu Gulamı ve Osmanlı Devşirmesi”, in Söğütten İstanbula, eds. Mehmet Öz and Oktay Özel (İstanbul:İmge Kitabevi, 2000),518-519
153 Ibid, 553
154 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 65
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CHAPTER III
THE WESTERN NOTION OF HOUSEHOLD TROOPS
3.1 ) The Roman Legionaries and the Praetorian Guard
The indirect impact or the transference of Roman institutions through the Byzantine state to that of the Ottomans as a result of the frequent interactions with the Byzantine state between the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries is rather a debatable issue, which has been discussed by some historians. As mentioned earlier, it was F.Köprülü who thoroughly pointed out the indirect influence of the Roman-Byzantine institutions by way of Medieval near eastern states on the Ottomans. H.inalcık also indicated the impact of Roman-Byzantine institutions and practices on the Ottomans. Furthermore, İ.Ortaylı stresses the importance of having the knowledge of Rome for a thorough understanding of the Ottoman case.155
Within this perspective, it is worth it to discuss the Roman military tradition to detect any indirect impact of the Roman military tradition on the Ottoman case in terms of the existence of household troops. Given the scarcity and complexity of the sources, especially for the early years of Roman history, it is hard to portray a
155 The impact of Roman-Byzantine institutions to the Ottomans is discussed in the article of Halil İnalcık in the example of the resemblences between the Roman-Byzantine and Ottoman taxes, “The Problem of Relationship Between Byzantine and Ottoman Taxation”, Akten, XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses,(1958): 237-242 and his Osmanlılarda “Raiyyet Rüsumu”, in Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi ( İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1992): 31-67.
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complete and cohesive picture of the Roman military tradition that was valid for all periods and regions.156 Nevertheless, the regal Roman military apparatus must have comprised of the king and his bodyguard and retainers, as well as the members of clan groups in the city or its vicinity.157As Roth pointed out, the status of the king was rather more like a chieftain or a warlord in the very early years of the early Roman period158. There, we observe a small formation around the king as his household retinue. This, no doubt, occurred out of the necessities of the protection of the kingship.
Besides, if we look at the structure of the Republican Roman army, there was an obligation that all free adult male citizens of the Roman state had to take part in the Roman army in wartime. 159 Over the course of time, the recruitment of all free male Roman citizens under 45 into the army constituted the regiments known as the ‘legioneries’. As profesional and heavy infantry, they served for several purposes. such as police force, taking part in some of the administrative apparatus or as constructors of the city walls.
They had an advantegous and honorable status as the ‘milites’- similar to the Ottoman military class - apart from the ordinary citizens of the empire. Therefore, it seems like the early Republican Roman army comprised all Roman citizens but not the slaves. 160 However, in the initial stage, in 216 BC some legions were recruited from the
156 Pat Southern, The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2-5
157 Lawrence Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army From Republic to Empire (London: Routledge, 1984) , 14.
158 Jonathan Roth, Roman Wafare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),7
159Ibid, 8. It is interesting to note that the term people derived from the Latin word populus denotes to the army and the term legio(n) which makes the backbone of the Roman army means the levy or recruitment of all the people or the soldiers, Southern, The Roman Army, 87
160 www.ancient.eu/Roman_legionary “Roman Legionary” by Donald L. Wasson 10 March 2021
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slaves who were freed for the purpose of serving in the army;161 However Roth states that those slaves were not used as combat forces, but rather were employed as labourers in the military units of the army.162
Therefore, whether those legionary regiments constituted a standing army under the direct command of the reigning emperor or not, is another issue to be discussed. Some of the legionaries of the late Republican period developed as permanent troops, known as the ‘Imperial Legions,’ and were stationed in Rome for the first time. However, as the Roman historians state, the Republican Roman army was not yet a professional and permanent standing army. Nevertheless, it was through the end of Republican period that troops were stationed in Rome for the first time on a standing basis, not disbanded in peace time163.
It should also be noted that in the former stages, the legions were under the command of the generals; and their loyalty was attributed to them, rather than the emperor and the Roman state. It was again by the reign of Augustus (27 BC – 14 AD) in the period of the Principate, that the legions formed a standing Roman army on a permanent basis on the condition of loyalty (and economic support) to the emperor.164 Hence, the Roman legionary became the ‘man’ of the Roman emperor by an oath of allegiance to him, sacramentum.
Thus, we can infer that under Augustus, who attempted to form a centralist autocratic administration, the military became under the monopoly of the imperial family as the hassa soldiery of the emperor. Therefore, under such circumstances, the need of reorganizing the legions under the monopoly of the emperor and the imperial family
161 Boris Rankow, “Military Forces”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol II, Part 1: The Late Republic and The Principate, eds. P.Sabin and H.Van Wees at all.,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),32
162 Roth,Roman Warfare, 34
163 Rankov, “Military Forces”, 44
164 Ibid,37
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became a necessity. As mentioned earlier, the janissaries, with a similar mindset, played an important role as the essential tool in the centralization process of the Ottoman state. Hence, one can find similarities between the Roman legionaries and the Ottoman janissary corps as both being the permanent regular forces.
Legioneries were grouped to form a citizen militia of a manipular army made up of cohorts. Thus, they formed a legion of infantry and cavalry units who fought as heavy infantry armed with a round shield and a long spear in the style of Greek phalanx (form of roller). Here, we have a portrayal of a legionary established in the early Republican Roman period, who, over course of time, became a well-trained, disciplined, full-time, and paid permanent professional soldiery, fighting as heavily armed infantry under the command of the legates, the commander of the legions. The historians note their resemblance to the Ottoman janissary corps who fought as heavy infantry in the form of a Greco-Roman phalanx.165
As for the training process of the legionaries, they were taken to a training camp before becoming a legionary soldier. However, this was intended to be only military training, rather than a thorough education in all fields, unlike the Ottoman palace education. In addition, each legionary soldier was required to take an oath of allegiance to the Roman emperor to guarantee his loyalty, which was renewed every year166. This seemed to be a contract designating mutual dependence for both sides. The legionaries, like the Ottoman janissary corps, were a distinctive group of ‘military’ who also enjoyed exemption from taxes and were subjected to military law.167
165 İnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Devlet ve Asker”, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Devlet ve Asker.”Doğu Batı, III. No. 53, (2010), 13
166 Rankov, “Military Forces”,65
167 Richard Alston, “The Military and Politics, ”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol II, Part 1: The Late Republic and The Principate, eds. P.Sabin and H.Van Wees at all.,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 178-184
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Thus, the legionaries became a priviliged unit, who received special donations from the emperor, apart from receiving a certain pay called stipendum, paid in arrears, generally in three to four monthly installments.168 So, is it a coincidence that we find the same ratio of payment in the near eastern tradition as pişegani that paid four times a year? It is noteworthy that the main interest of a legionary soldier was economic benefit; so when they were dissatisfied with their pay , they rebelled against the government like the janissary corps did. Moreover, as an influential social group, they were also very effective in accessions like the janissaries.
The legionary soldier, like the Ottoman janissaries, had to be single to ensure his loyalty merely to the emperor and to devote himself fully to the assigned military activities, nothing else. On the other hand, the prolonged military service of this manipular citizen army of legionaries no doubt contributed to the formation of a unit identity, espiris de corps, as a closed caste within troops, similar to the Ottoman janissary corporate identity, asabiyet.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the disbanding of the legionary Roman army was due to the entrance of all unqualified voluntery citizens to the regiments. This seems similar to the Ottoman sekban and saruca groups, who fullfilled the janissary cadros that led to the disintegration of the janisary institution.
Praetorian Guard as the Personal Bodyguard of the Roman Emperors
In the time of Augustus, certain regiments, who previously functioned under the name of ‘friends’ or ‘clients,’were reorganized as the permanent bodyguard of the emperor and the royal family. This seems to be a necessity of the new regime of
168Dominic Ratbone, “Warfare and State”, ”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol II, Part 1: The Late Republic and The Principate, ed. P.Sabin and H.Van Wees at all.,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 159
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Augustus in confrontation with his monarchial tendencies in his centralist state169. Known as the ‘praetorian guard,’ whose members mostly came from Italy or the fully-Romanised provinces. The Roman state practically made use of the excessive number of troops, who had accumulated around the capital as trained personnel in the praetorian guard. 170 This practice resembles the practical Ottoman solution in utilizing the excessive number of war captives as the men of kapıkulu or as janissaries.
However, it was not the slave-originated troops that Augustus made as his main force for the praetorian guard; instead, he chose mostly the Italians as the native citizens of the Roman empire, who were thought to be more faithful and loyal than the foreign troops. This seems quite reasonable, considering the precedence of Roman citizenship as the important tradition in the Roman empire. So it is no doubt that the main source for the army and of household troops was the Roman citizens, rather than the foreigners.
Hence, the praetorian guard, as the more privileged group than the legionaries, fullfilled all the traditional roles as a guard unit, like ceremonial escorting, palace protection, and military aid in the battlefield.171 It should be noted that, as the personel retinue of the emperor, they could be employed in various services wherever there was a need. As the civil administrators, they were mostly employed as fire-fighting and police guard or as speculators in games and workers in construction projects, rather than in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.172
169 Rankov, “Military forces”, 44
170 Sandra J.Bingham, The Praetorian Guard in the Political and Social Life of Julio- Claudian Rome,(Phd Thesis, University of British Colombia, 1997), 4. See also her, The Praetorian Guard: A History of Rome’s Elite Special Households (London: I.B.Tauris,2012)
171 Rankov, “Military forces”, 47
172 Bingthon, Praetorian Guard,7 Within this context, the municipal roleof the janissary corps as the fire-fighters or as police force in the capital or in the provinces in the late eighteenth century is noteworthy.
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Unlike the important ghulams who were promoted to high positions in the administrative or military ranks in the near eastern states, and unlike the Ottoman men of kapıkulu of highest rank, the praetorian guard seemed to be appointed only to rear services or to municipial services in the Roman state. Nevertheless, they constituted a distinguished group within the Roman state, having several immnunities, such as tax exemptions like the Ottoman janissaries173.
According to Bington, it was the ability of their ‘prefects’ who helped the praetorian guards to be successful in the imperial household of the emperors.174 As the head of the guard, the ‘praetorian prefect’ was the second man after the emperor who was allowed to carry a sword in the presence of the emperor. Moreover, he was of the highest equestrian rank who also functioned as advisory council of the emperor.
The position of the prefects recalls the position of the ağa of janissaries, who had a priviliged status besides the Ottoman sultan. The praetorian prefects, who were chosen from the elite body of the empire as the commanders of the guard, were highly experienced men. Similarly they directed the intrigues within the guard, and they were very influential in the political affairs, like the ağa of janissaries.
Consequently, if we evaluate the organization of those groups, that is, the legionery regiments and the praetorian guard, we cannot assert with certainty that they shared a totally similar structure with the ghulam-kul system of the near east. There were some differences. The main difference is that they were not slaves originally captured for the purpose of military and administrative duties, and they did not take any systematic training for a given purpose. They were mostly employed in various services apart from the administrative posts. Therefore, the mentality behind the formation of such
173 Rankov, “Military forces”,45
174 Bington,Praetorian Guard, 8
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household troops in the Roman state seems different from the near eastern ghulam-kul formation.
Thus, we may assume that the reorganization of legioneries and the Praetorian guard can be considered as the reflection of a new ideology under Augustus, that is based on the idea of absolutism, which took its roots from the Roman tradition as well as Hellenistic monarchs.175 The formation of the legionaries and the Praetorian guard can also be regarded as part of the essential elements in a centralist state, where such groups, as influential status groups, formed the household and military retinue of the rulers.
3.2 Household Troops of the Carolingian State (688-741)
The early European Medieval rulers seemed to have permanent personal military forces who fullfilled important representational and protective, as well as military functions. Rewarded with considerable wealth by the rulers, the household warriors as the bodyguards of the king functioned as a rapid force in the Carolingian period, similar to the housecarls of England in the eleventh century176. However, most of them did not have a special status.
In the Frankish kingdom of the Carolingian state (688-741), the household troops were usually recruited from the foreigners of semi-servile origins. 177 Hence, they could not take an eminent role as part of the political community in the Carolingian state. Therefore, we cannot state that the household troops in the early
175 Frank Ira Richard, “Scholae Palatinae: The Palace Guards of the Later Roman Empire”, (PhD Thesis, University of California, 1965)
176Timothy Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, ed. Maurice Keen( Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 13.
177 www.deremilitari.org Sandra Alvarez,“The Recruitment of armies in the early Middle ages: What can we know?”, June 30,2014
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Medieval period were specially trained and promoted to a special status of servant-warriors, as was the case in the near eastern ghulam-kul system.
With respect to the existence of a standing army in the Carolingian period, it is not clear whether the household forces constituted a permanent regular force in the army or not. On the other hand, there were the ‘conscript forces’ and ‘followings’ as military forces in the Carolingian state. The former covered all free adult males who were obliged to serve in the army, as was declared by Charlamagne in 806 in the order to Abbot Fulrad of St. Queen.178 They constituted the essential core of the armies as self-equipped troops. As for the other category, the ‘followings’, they were more likely the retinues of the king, who had rather humble origins and were associated with the military forces that they served on a feudal basis.179 They walked behind the king as their title designates.
However, according to some historians, the ‘followings’, by swearing an oath of loyalty to the lord, performed military service in compensation for land; and they made up the core of early Medieval armies.180 Nevertheless, the difficullty in supporting the huge realm of the Carolingian state financially and strategically must have prevented the formation of a standing army in a regular and systematic way.
Consequently, we observe that the early Medieval household troops shared a totally different structure in terms of mentality and organization than their counterparts in the near east. As Charles Oman indicated, it was only by the end of the early Middle Ages that we witnessed a sort of specialization of a military class in
178 Pierre Riche, The Carolingians A Family Who Forged Europe, trans. M. Idomir Allen (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 89
179 www.deremilitari.org Sandra Alvarez,“The Recruitment of armies in the early Middle ages: What can we know?”, June 30,2014
180 Ibid.
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terms of function, with the rise of a heavy armed cavalry in the eleventh century, as opposed to the tribal armed forces of the earlier times. 181
3.3) The Varangian Guards in the Eleventh Century Byzantine State
We detect a similar organization of household troops in the early Byzantine empire under the reign of Basil II (976-1025). They were organized as special regiments under the title of the ‘Varangians’. They were depicted as the personal life-guards of the emperor who were recruited from the foreigners, initially from the Christianized Russian and Scandinavian merceneries, later among the Anglo-Saxon refugees who immigrated to the Byzantine territories as a result of the Norman rule in the eleventh century. 182 However, the stimulus for Basil II in organizing such forces was different. It was because he had grown up at a court of intrigue and betrayal. Thus, he decided to recruit foreign soldiers with no political attachments and family roots.183
If we look at their organization, we see that Varangians were similar to the Ottoman men of kapıkulu; they were multi-functional and served in the inner and outer sections of the Byzantine palace. Their main function was military and ceremonial service similar to the Ottoman janissary corps, who accompanied the emperor in bothareas. As an elite unit recruited from the free men, they were
181 Charles Oman, Ok. Balta ve Mancınık Ortaçağ’da Savaş Sanatı (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2013),24
182 The ethimology of their title is disputable. According to the general view, the term Varangian designates to a foreigner who has taken service with a lord by a treaty of fealty to him. For the other, the title derives from the term varar, which means confidence and vow of fidelity, Sigfus Bröndal, The Varangians of Byzantium, ed. B.S.Benedikz Ulster(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
183 Sidney E. Dean, “Varangians and Mamluks”, Medieval Warfare, Vol.2, No.2 (2012),18
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subjected to severe military training, in which if they were unsuccessful, they were punished, which could be as harsh as being blinded or being executed.184
The Varangians, similar to the ghulam-kul or janissary personages, seemed to be an advantageous group within the Byzantine state. Apart from their income, they had the right to take the share of booty (one-third) and also received presents at each accession. Moreover, they had the right to eat at the table of the emperor at special banquets.185
By the early eleventh century, the Varangian regiments occupied an important part of the campaign army. They were present in the major campaigns of the eleventh century; they fought against the Seljukids in 1054 at Manzikert on the eastern frontier of Anatolia, and they were also present in the First Crusade in Nicea in 1097 and at Myriokephalon in 1176. This no doubt made them an element of acculturaton between the Persian, Turkish, and Byzantine cultures186.
Varangian regiments also portray a closed caste similar to the janissary hearth. For one thing, they had their own guard-rooms in the imperial palace, apart from their military camps, located in several districts in the empire. In addition, they had a special church for their prayers and a private bath. They had the right of judging their own members, but under the supervision of the emperor.187 These seem to be very
184 Bröndal, Varangians,23
185 Ibid, 28 and 180
186 For the military campaigns of Varangians see B.S.Benedikz Ulster, “The Evolution of Varangian Regiments in the Byzantine Army”, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Vol.26 Issue 1 (1969):1-5 A striking example of a longue duree of acculturation could be searched within the style of their battle costumes. Wearing conical ridge helmets of Byzantine design, in course of time, they put on leather straps on their body armours with mail or ring hauberks over their shoulders crossing to the waist in front and the back which prevented the hauberks from shifting. Though this sytle was known as the ‘Varangian bra’, it was actually the adoptation of Roman form transferred from Persian practice, Dean, “Varangians and Mamluks”, 19.
187 Braöndal, Varangians,181
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similar to the living conditions of the janissary corps who had their private barracks and jurisdictional autonomy.
On the other hand, Byzantine sources contradict each other in terms of the existence of the Varangian guard through the fourteenth century. Although they were thought to function until the end of the eleventh century as the only palace guard, the Chronicle of Morea mentions the last reference to Varangians in the fourteenth century. 188 The description of the Russian traveler Ignatius of Smolensk of the presence of Varangians in the coronation of Andronicus III ( 1328-1341 ), walking on either side of the emperor, proves their existence through the fourteenth century.189
Moreover, the miniature depicting the ceremonial role of the Varangian guard can also be regarded as an evidence of their existence until the fourteenth century. In the miniature, Ioannis VI Andronicus was presiding at the ecumenical council in 1351, where we see Varangians standing closest to the emperor with their white headgear adorned with golden ornaments.190
Consequently, although the Varangian regiment seemed closer to the janissary corps in terms of status, function and livelihood, we cannot assert that they were systematically acquired and trained, nor could have the chance of being promoted to high ranks within Byzantine hierarchy like their ghulam-kul counterparts in the near eastern tradition.
188Savas Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium 1204-1453 (Leiden: Brill, 2011),113
189 Ignatius of Smolensk, Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. G.Majeska (WashingtonDC:1984), 106-9.
190 Iohannis Spatharakis, The Portrait in the Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts (Leiden: Brill ,1976) İnalcık expressed the view that the white headgear that was worn by the hassa regiments of the Ottomans might have been modelled on the white cap that the Byzantine hassa regiments – in this case the Varangian guard- had worn.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FORMATION OF THE HASSA SOLDIERY AND KUL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN STATE
4.1) The Kuls of the Early Ottoman State as the Prototype of Hassa Soldiery
The famous work of Kutadgu Bilig that was written in the eleventh century provides valuable information about the ancient Turkic state traditions, along with the Indo-Persia mirror-for-princes literature. The work is an important source to study and learn about the Ottoman administrative practices, which are thought to be a combination of the ancient Turkic state tradition and that of the Persian.191 In the aforementioned work, the importance of wealth and a hassa army as the essential elements of the ruler is frequently mentioned by its author, Yusuf Has Hacip, who was acquainted with ancient Turkic state traditions.
The following verse from the work, Kutadgu Bilig, well reflects the function of the kuls in the Karahanid state in a thorough manner; “… I’m a kul, I’m the servant, My place is the gate, My trait is truthfullness and My disposition is to service my ruler.”192
191 Halil İnalcık, “Kutadgu Bilig’de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri” in Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuki Adalet, (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000), 19
192 Yusuf Has Hacib, Kutadgu Bilig, ed. Reşit Rahmeti Arat (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1988),590. It is noteworthy that we find a similar practice of purchasing slaves at a younger age and training them for military and administrative services in the Karamanid state. It was mostly the Turkish slaves who were
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In the Ottoman usage, we find the same term ‘gate,’ which designates the Ottoman divan, imperial council where the sultan supervises the affairs of the state.193 Hence, the gate, kapı, is a place where the kuls as the servants of the sultan served him with veracity. At this point, it would be meaningful to analyze the early kul identity in the Ottoman state as it is the prototype of the Ottoman men of kapıkulu.
Nökers, Comrades as the prototype of Kapıkulu
The initial warband of Osman Gazi who gathered around him were a group of warriors under different names and function, fighting under him for gaza, holy war and booty. They were namely the alps, heros and the gazis, alp-erens, holy warriors, the garibs, strangers as foreigners or slaves, nökers, comrades. 194 They were the first retinue and military entourage of Osman Gazi who were considered to be his kuls.
Within these groups, nökers seemed to play an important role in the formation and development of the Ottoman kul identity and kapıkulu institution. According to H. İnalcık, the institution of nökership is considered to be the backbone of the devşirme-kul system and the jannissary institution. İnalcık states that the janissaries of the Sultan, the ghulams of the begs (ghulam-i mir) and the ghulams as the servants of the tımariot sipahis were all in the position of nökers. 195
recruited as ghulam forces in the army, Abdülkerim Özaydın, “Karahanlılar”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 42 (2000), 410-411. The existence of ghulams traces to the time of Satuk Buğra Han, Reşat Genç, Karahanlı Devlet Teşkilatı (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1981), 197.
193 İnalcık, “Kutadgu Bilig”, 18
194 Halil İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye I (Ankara: T.İş Bankası Yayınları, 2009), 9-11
195 Halil İnalcık, Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları, 22-23
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Thus, nökership as a military-social system seemed to play an important role in the Ottoman society and also in the formation of the Ottoman kapıkulu organization as the kuls of the early Ottoman sultans. It was those nökers that were recruited from the allied states or captured enemies who formed the original household, that is the kul taifesi of Osman Gazi, who were tied to him with an oath of loyalty unto death.196
In addition, Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership also helps to explain centralist and formalized patrimonialism, where the personal household of the sovereign constitutes the essential element.197 Within this framework, being assembled around a leader, a nöker, means to become the intimate retinue of the leader as his hassa force. It should be noted that the most important function of the nökers was military. Hence, they can also be regarded as the prototype of hassa soldiery.
In the early chronics, we see that Osman Gazi granting favors to his nökers who submitted to him, as their good will depends on the favors granted to them by the Sultan. 198 Here we observe the mutual relationship between the two sides. Thus, loyalty and submission to the leader seem to be the essential factors in nökership. We also observe these factors in the traditional ghulam system of the near east as the prerequisites of the ghulam-kul identity.
In addition, a nöker doesn’t need to be from a clan based on blood relationship, as it was in the Turco-Mongol tradition, but rather he could be a foreigner, a garib or a slave coming to fight for holy war and booty199. Within this
196 İnalcık, “Sultanism”, 74
197 Ibid, 75
198 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman,108 “…Çadırlu tekvuru, Lefke tekvuru muti’ olub karşu geldiler. Memleketlerin teslim etdiler. Kendüler Osman Gazinün yanında yarar nökerler oldılar.” “… ve bir dahi nökerlerüne dayım ihsan et kim senün ihsanun anun halınun duzağıdur…”
199 İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye I,11
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framework, the specific case of Köse Mihal, who was formerly the Christian tekvur of Harmankaya, then as the nöker of Osman Gazi, is noteworthy. It is very important to note that, in the personality of Köse Mihal, we observe the characteristics of the early kuls in the Ottoman state. He was portrayed as always being very close to Osman Gazi in the early chronics. 200
In the account of Oruc’s history, presented in the form of an epic, Köse Mihal appeared first as a Christian tekvur, a local Byzantine prince of Harmankaya, named Constantin; and after his conversion, he took the name Abdullah201. The historical identity of Köse Mihal not only reveals a typical nöker functioning as his comrades and comrade-in-arms, but also the prototype of kapıkulu, as a newly converted Muslim, who were usually named as Abdullah after their conversion to Islam.
Thus, Köse Mihal portrays a prototype of a Christian notable in a muslim society, eventually apostolized to become a part of the ruling class. So the question is: is it a coincidence that the first generation converts in the Ottoman circles were generally named Abdullah where we find them as part of the kapıkulu in the Ottoman military class?202
Within this context the name Abdullah deserves some interpretation in terms of its significance as a name attributed to the kuls of the early Ottoman state. It was a common practice for the newly converted kuls in the Ottoman kapıkulu system to bear
200 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 99. “…Köse Mihal her dayım anun ile bile olurdı.”
201 Oruc Beg, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 10-11, 26. Though the historical identity of Köse Mihal is questionable, archival evidence proves him as being the descendant of Mihaloğlu family. For the historical identity of Köse Mihal See S. Hopwood, “The Tales of Osman:Legend or History”, XII. Türk Tarih Kurumu Bildiriler, C.III, Kısım III, (Ankara,2002),1-2
202 Sp.Vryonis, “Byzantine and Turkish Socities and their sources of Manpower”in Studies on Byzantine, Seljuks and the Ottomans, (1981), 125-140, According to Vryonis the kunya, bin Abdullah, denoting to new muslims, is a nomenclature which reflects the absorption (through conversion) or symbiosis of the foreign elemet in the cultures. He further states that similar terms with similar connotations also exist in the Byzantine society but without religious or patronymic colors.
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the name Abdullah or another variation of the name with the adjective‘abd denoting the slave and servant of Allah.
M.Kunt, in his analysis of the Ottoman names, suggests that the newly converted kuls were given the name Abdullah or Abdülmennan as their father’s name, rather than as their first name that referred to one’s new muslim status.203 As Kunt further asserts, in the places where islamization was dense, we find the name Abdullah among the kuls as their father’s name rather than their first name. However, in the places that had long been muslim we find the name, Abdullah as one’s muslim first name.204
We also find many references to the name Abdullah in the early vakf registers. The following example is worth mentioning to indicate the early existence of the name Abdullah given to a father of a kul at an early period. In the vakfiye of Orhan dated H.761/1360, we find the name Şahin bin Abdullah. In the same vakf register we find Evrenkuş hadim, as the man servant.205 Kunt interprets these pre-Islamic names, such as, Şahin or any other names of birds given to kuls like Balaban, Karaca or Doğan, as the names of the newly converted kuls.206
The following examples are also noteworthy since they provide some clues of the existence of the name Abdullah in the early Ottoman kul system. In the vakfiye of Asporça Hatun207, the wife of Orhan Gazi, dated H.723/1323, we find Serdar Lütfullah bin Abdullah as one of the eyewitnesses. In another vakfiye of Lala Şahin
203 Metin Kunt, “Ottoman Ages and Ottoman Names”, Journal of Turkish Studies-İnalcık Festcshrift, 10-11, (1987)
204 Kunt,”Osmanlı Dirlik Kapı-Düzeni ve Kul Kimliği”, 163-164
205 İ.H.Uzunçarşılı, “Gazi Orhan Bey’in Vakfiyesi”, Belleten, XXVI/107, (1963):442
206 Kunt, “Osmanlı Dirlik-Kapı Düzeni”,166, There were also such pre-Islamic names like İskender, Firuz, Bihruz, Ferhed and Hüsrev given to newly converted kuls by the impact of Iranian-Sasanian influence.
207 Bursa Vakfiyeleri I ,24.
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Paşa208 dated H.749/1348, we find Mehmed bin Abdullah as miralay, a military title denotinga colonel; and Ömer bin Abdullah as hazinedar, a treasurer.
Assuming that those aforementioned people were newly converted kuls, we may assert that the slave-originated kuls could hold positions in the statecraft at an early age. However, Kunt, in his counter argument, claims that such common muslim names, like Mehmed bin Abdullah or Abdullah bin Ahmed could hardly be newly converts but someone from ulema or clergy. 209
In addition, in the vakfiye of Süleyman Paşa210 dated H.761/1360 which was designed for the zaviye of Karaoğlan, we find Şahin bin Abdullah, Orunkuş Hadim and İlyas el-Matbahi, the chief of the kitchen. These titles can also be regarded as the indication of the newly converted kuls employed in the services of zaviyes in an early period.
It is important to mention that under Bayezıd I’s reign (1389-1403) the kuls coming from devşirme could hold high ranks in the statecraft and were granted tımars.211 On the other hand, in the temlikname of Orhan, we find the name tavaşi Mukbil, the eunuch in the service of the palace212. All these titles can be regarded as indications of the existence of the slave-originated kuls appointed as palace and administrative officers early in the age of Orhan Gazi213.
208 Ibid,54
209 Kunt, “Osmanlı Dirlik-Kapı Düzeni”,166
210 Bursa vakfiyeleri I, 132
211 Halil İnalcık,”Ghulam in the Ottoman Empire”, 1086
212 Uzunçarşılı, “Orhan Gazi Temliknamesi”, Belleten 5/19 (1941):40
213 İnalcık, “Ghulam in the Ottoman Empire”, 1085-6. In the vakfiye of Mekece of Orhan Beg we find the same Tavaşi Şerafeddin Mukbil as the mütevelli and himself as hadim(harem ağası) registered as the manumitted slave of Orhan Beg, Bursa vakfiyeleri I, 32. Uzunçarşılı considers those personalities who were named b. Abdullah as the azatlı kuls, “Çandarlızade Ali Paşa Vakfiyesi ( H.808/1405-6)”, Belleten, C.V, No. 20, (1941): 562
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The following example is also noteworthy: the name Abdullah was applied to kuls coming from novice barraks. In the vakfiye of Hasan Aga dated H.828/1425, Hasan Ağa himself appeared as Hasan Ağa bin Abdullah, who was once a member of acemi hearth and later became the sekbanbaşı of the janissary hearth, as one of the emirs of Bayezıd I.214 Also, in a document dated 1385, the name of the two janissaries İlyas bin Abdullah and İskender bin Abdullah can be considered to be a clue for the slave-originated kuls who were the member of the janissary hearth. 215
To clarify the usage of bin Abdullah, Lowry, by examining a sixteenth century record in a tapu register, interprets the term in the form of veled-i kul, as the son of a kul, or rather ‘the son of a janissary’. Lowry further states that, although the assertion deserves more study in a broader context, veled-i kul is a technical term applied to the sons of the janissaries.216
On the other hand, in the vakfiye of Mihaliç Beg217, dated H.763/1362, we find Özbek bin Abdullah subaşı el-Karahisari, as the chief of the corps. It is to be noted that here, the name with the epithet, el-Karahisari, refers to the place of where he was living as a native. This may also suggest his Muslim origin. Therefore, we may assume that in this context the name Abdullah appeared as a common Muslim name, rather than designating to one’s status as a newly converted kul.
Even though it is difficult to distinguish the two usages of the name, we can state that Abdullah is a common name usually attributed to the newly converts.
214 Bursa Vakfiyeleri-I,336
215 Uzunçarşılı,Kapukulu Ocakları I,145
216 Heath Lowry and Anthony Bryer (ed.), “The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms under Ottoman Rule , in Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society, (NY, 1986):235-259
217 Bursa vakfiyeleri I,152
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Likewise, in the vakfiye of Sultan Murad I218 dated H.787/1385, we find Hacı Hasan bin Abdullah, his epithet as the ‘hacı’ may indicate his Muslim origin. In conclusion, the usage of the name Abdullah, whether as the name of a muslim born or a converted new muslim, deserves careful attention in analyzing the Ottoman kapıkulu organization.
On the other hand, the early Ottoman chroniclers mention various references to early kuls as the comrade-in-arms of Osman Gazi, the prototype of kapıkulu. Initially, Balabancık Bahadır, as the hass kul of Osman Gazi, is mentioned as he who assisted him in the siege of Bursa.219 This shows that hassa kuls were employed in military affairs at an early stage. We also find the term karavaşi as a female slave in Aşıkpaşazade’s account as the servant of Evrenos Beg.220
Consequently, as the early Ottoman sources above indicated, the Ottoman kul identity with newly converted kuls began to take shape early in the fourteenth century, as seen in the examples of nökers and slave-originated kuls holding military and administrative ranks early in the Ottoman service.
Yaya Corps as the First Hassa Soldiery and Kuls
The early Ottoman chroniclers mention yaya corps as the first kuls in the status of kapıkulu and regular hassa soldiery of the early Ottoman state. Their status, as the early example of kapıkulu, is discussed by Palmer,221 based on the accounts of Aşıkpaşazade and Oruc Beg. Before commenting on the view of Palmer, it is worth
218 Bursa Vakfiyeleri I, 158
219 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman,106 “… Balabancuk derler idi bir kulı var idi. Ol dahı gayet dilir er idi…”
220 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 120 “…Evrenüz beyin getürdiği kulı, karavaşı bu taraftan gelen elçilere üleştirdi…”
221 J.A.B. Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 35/2, (1952/3):448-481
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mentioning briefly the accounts of the establishment of the yaya corps, both in Aşıkpaşazade’s and Oruc’s text so that Palmer’s assertions can be put in proper perspective222.
In both texts, we find the same conversation between Orhan Gazi and his vizier Alaaddin Paşa regarding the establishment of yaya corps223. Alaaddin Paşa suggested to Orhan Gazi to build up a hassa force from the excessive number of soldiery under his command, who were then distinguished by a peculiar symbol of their own, that is, the ‘white headgear’, apart from the rest of the soldiery, who were carrying ‘red headgears’.
There exists a subtle difference in the narration of the two chroniclers which captured the attention of Palmer in terms of the hassa status of yaya corps. In Aşıkpaşazade’s text, we read that the white headgear worn by the hassa soldiery was to distinguish them from the soldiery of the other begs. However, in Oruc’s text, the white caps that would be worn by the hassa kuls of Orhan Gazi was to distinguish them from the rest of the Ottoman soldiery224.
In this argument, Palmer prefers Oruc’s account to Aşıkpaşazade’s, as it was in Orhan’s time and some of the soldiery in the Ottoman territory was distinguished as his hassa kuls225. The expression of ilden yaya çıkar226, ‘let yayas be enrolled from
222 The text on the establishment of yaya corps in Aşıkpaşazade’s Tevarih-i Al-i Osman by Atsız edition (Bab 31, 117-118) was corrected by Halil İnalcık in N.E.Mergen, “The Yaya and Müsellem Corps in the Ottoman Empire (Early Centuries)”, (MA thesis, Bilkent University,2001.) For Yaya and müsellem institution in the Ottoman Empire See H.Doğru, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Yaya Müsellem Taycı Teşkilatı (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1990) and M.Arıkan, XV. AsırdaYaya ve Müsellem Ocakları (Toprak Tasarrufu, Vergi Muafiyeti ve Hizmet), (Unpublished Ass. Proff. Thesis,Ankara University, 1966)
223 In all the chronics Alaaddin Paşa appeared as the ‘brother’ of Orhan Gazi. However archival evidence proves that he was not the brother but ‘vizier’ to Orhan Gazi. See, İ.H.Uzunçarşılı, “Osmanlılarda İlk Vezirlere Dair Mütealala”, Belleten, 9/3 (1939):99-109
224Aşıkpaşazade,Tevarih-i Al-i Osman,117-118.
225 Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, 490
226 İnalcık, Osmanlı Sultanları, 72.
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the province’ (of Orhan) in Aşıkpaşazade’s account, actually reinforces the argument of Palmer. The yayas were then enrolled within the territory of the Ottomans, not from the territory of other begs.
On the other hand, the expression ilden yaya çıkar also refers to a call for the campaigns within the Ottoman territory. After the call, the yayas assembled under the flag of Orhan Beg. This also suggests that the status of the yayas was not permanent nor did they constitute a standing army in the age of Orhan Beg. So it is apparent that, as in Oruc’s account, we have a differentiation of soldiery within Orhan’s retinue as the ‘kuls’.
Thus, if we accept the account of Oruc, like Palmer, that means the Ottomans had already established the prototype of hassa soldiery early in the fourteenth century in the example of yaya corps, apart from the akıncı-gazi forces. In addition, Aşıkpaşazade narrates that being enrolled as a yaya must have been a distinguished status, as evidenced by people offering bribes to the kadıs to become yaya soldiery. So it is evident that the term yaya can be regarded as the equivalent of kul in terms of its advantagous status in its initial stage.
However, we cannot assert that they were specially trained for the purpose of administrative and military services, since the yayas were then part-time peasant-soldiers who were called up for the campaigns. Considering that they engaged in agriculture on their farms granted to them by the state, we cannot regard them as regular permanent forces as part of a standing army.
In any case, the yayas, whose status was distinguished from the rest of the Ottoman soldiery, stood as the first hassa soldiery of the Ottoman state, but not on a regular and permanent basis. After the establishment of the janissary corps in the
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second half of the fourteenth century, the yayas had to transfer their hassa status to this new group of soldiery, janissary corps, who constituted the first standing army of the time. Even though the yaya corps were no longer considered to be the hassa soldiery of the sultan, they continued to act as active combatants or as emergency troops recruited in times of nefir-i ‘am, a general call to arms, until the first half of the fifteenth century. Afterwards, they were taken to rear services as auxiliary troops until the abolition of their institution in the sixteenth century227.
Within that context, why the janissaries supplanted the yayas in terms of hassa status; or why the Ottoman state felt the need to create new hassa soldiery are the issues that deserve further discussion. Most critics of the age asserted that their loose organization, with regards to the frequent change in their status as temporary auxiliary troops, shold be looked at as an initial reason. Moreover, the hard conditions they were employed for, such as, cleaning the harbors, hauling cannons, guarding mountainpasses, must have had an impact on the disorganization of the troops228. Most importanly, acting both as soldiers or peasants (doing farm work) must have been burdensome for them. Thus, the state found a solution by separating the military from agricultural activities. Therefore, new regiments needed to be established as regular permanent forces. Hence, the Ottomans found the practical solution for the excess slave source of war captives gained as a result of the large campaigns in Rumelia and utilized them for the military and administrative needs of the state on a permanent basis. This phenomenon, as discussed earlier, was in contrast
227 For the conscription of yaya coprs in sixteetn century see Gyula Kaldy-Nagy,”The Conscription of Müsellem and Yaya Coprs in 1540”,Hungaro-Turcica Studies in honor of Julius Nemeth, (Budapest:Lorand Eötvös University,1976):275-281
228 For the firmans about rear services the yayas were employed See Ayn-i Ali Efendi, Al-i Osman der Hülasa-i Mezamin-i Defter-i Divan, ed. M.T.Gökbilgin (İstanbul:Enderun Yayınları,1979)
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with the near eastern mentality of having an army of unrooted foreign troops apart from the house of the ruler.
Furthermore, the Ottoman bureaucrats and ulema – acquainted with the near eastern tradition - were probably aware of the advantages of having a multi-ethnic army as the hassa element, rather than the employment of native elements, as experienced by the yaya corps. So in contrast with the near eastern tradition, the Ottomans then decided to utilize the war captives as slave-originated foreign troops as its hassa force.
4.2) The Establishment of Janissary Corps as Hassa Kuls in the early Chronics and Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan
The first reference to janissaries in the Ottoman sources is in Aşıkpaşazade’s Tevarih-i Ali Osman. 229 In other earliest chronics, such as Neşri’s Cihannüma, Oruc’s Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, and the Anonymous Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, we find the same version of the account in Aşıkpaşazade’s work with some variations230. Thus, to better
229 For Aşıkpaşazade’s life and work, See Halil İnalcık, “How to Read Ashıkpasha-zades’ History”, in Essays in Ottoman History, (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1998), 31-55. As noted in the introductory part of the study, the importance of Aşıkpaşazade’s work is his usage of an authantic contemporary source ;a menakıbname by Yahşi Fakıh, up to the period of Bayezıd I. As İnalcık mentioned in his article, rather than considering the genre of menakıbnames purely as legends, efforts should be made to infere authentic historical information from them. Within this framework, Aşıkpaşazade’s work can be regarded as a good example of this genre which cover real authentic historical information and legendery material. On the other hand, as İnalcık mentions in his aforementioned article Aşıkpaşazade’s comments should be evaluated with caution since being a descendant of a Vefai-Babai order family whose members had always been extended favors by the Ottoman sultans, his work must have reflect his appreciation to the Ottoman dynasty. Moreover, as İnalcık stresses, one should bear in mind that his work also reflects the ideas current in the first years of the Ottoman state.
230 For the texts on the establishment of janissaries in the mentioned chronicles, See Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Atsız ed.127-128; Neşri, Cihan-nüma I, 196-199; Oruc Beg, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Babinger ed., 21-22and the Anoymous Tevarih-i Ali Osman, Giese ed., 24-25. Regarding the work of İdris-i Bitlisi, Heşt bihişt, as Palmer analyzed, the passages about the establishment of yaya corps and janissary corps seemed to be confused with anachronistic expressions. So for the early stages of janissary corps, İdrisi’s work can not be preferred as a source presenting original information. However his work should also be considered as a source which covers first-hand information on the
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determine a complete and original account of the establishment of janissary corps, individual texts of the early chroniclers on this account should be analyzed comparatively with the method of text critic.
The establishment process of a group of new soldiery under the name yeni-çeri, the ‘new troop’, started after the conquest of Edirne in 761/1361 in the age of Murad I, which was given in all the chronicles except in Neşri who gives the date as 762/1362.231 However, as İnalcık revealed, the conquest of Edirne was in 1363232. So we can state that the janissary corps were established in 1363 after Murad I ascended the throne in Edirne.233
In all the accounts of the chroniclers, we find that Lala Şahin and Evrenos Beg, as frontier begs, concentrated their raids on Zağra, İpsala and Filibe. This signifies that the Ottoman state was then expanding into the Balkans with concentrated raids, which means a high accumulation of manpower as war captives taken as a result of these raids. As mentioned earlier, this must have stimulated the Ottomans with the practical solution of utilizing those war captives for military purposes as ‘slave soldiery’.
Afterwards, by the suggesstion of Kara Rüstem as a danişmend, a wise person from ulema from Karaman, and Çandarlı Halil as kadı-asker, the idea of utilizing war captives was discussed. Hence, it was the idea of those two personalities, both being
parts when he is not in ambivalence with the other early chroniclers. Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, 380
231 Neşri, Cihan-nüma I, 197
232 İnalcık. “Osmanlı Tarihinde Devlet ve Asker” 12.See also H.İnalcık , “Edirne’nin Fethi (1361)”, in Edirne, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1993):137-154
233 İnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Devlet ve Asker”, 12
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men of ulema, who came up with the idea of collecting one-fifth of the war captives for the sultan as his legal right according to Islamic law234.
Considering that both men came from the region of Karaman, the place of the Karamanid Principality, whose founders come to Anatolia from Azerbaycan as a result of the Mogol invasion, they seemed to play a key role in transferring the Persian administrative traditions, ascended from their ancestors to the Ottomans.235 Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that the Karamanids, originally the descendants of a Turkish family of the Afşar branch of the Oğuz tribes, also follow the administrative traditions of the Seljukids.236 According to Huart, the credit for the creation of regular regiments belongs to the merit of Çandarlı Halil, when Medieval Europe was still at the age of armed bands and long before the formation of companies of archers in England and a century before the creation of the first standing army in France.237
Pencik Regulation
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that in all the chronics, the legal portion of the one-fifth is assigned to the sultan. This regulation must trace its justification to the Islamic jurisdiction indicating, ‘the employment of slaves for the well-being of the
234 For Kafadar, the novelty of the idea is obviously the beginning of a ‘new army’ under the direct control of the Ottoman state. However, the tax imposed on the gazi forces in Rumelia could be a punishment for their independent actions where Kara Rüstem was appointed to collect them in 1376/7, Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 112-3
235 Faruk Sümer, “Karamanoğlu”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.24 (2003): 454-460. Çandarlı Halil Paşa is from the village of Cendere, Candır – Sivrihisar, Nallıhan which was once a village of the Karamanid province. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1980), 1-2 and Münir Aktepe, “Çandarlı Ali Paşa”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 8, (1993):209-213
236 Faruk Sümer, “Karamanoğlu”, 454
237 Huart, “Yeni Çeri”, 573
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muslims’238. This is narrated with different expressions in each of them. In Aşıki we find the expression, hanlık malı as one-fifth the right of the han,; in the Anonymous Tevarih we find the expression, beğlik malı as the right of the padişah; in Oruc we find it as ganimet malı as the right of the padişah; and in Neşri we find the expression as sultanlık malı as the right of the hünkar. Differences in terms can be regarded as an indication of the authors’ interpreting the original text in their own way, and each giving the Ottoman sultan a different title according to their mindset. It would be proper at this point to mention Menage’s criticism of the early chronicles for changing the original text.239
Within this perpective, it would be meaningful to give some information on the early pencik regulation in the Ottoman state. İ.H.Uzunçarşılı, based on a kanunname, a law code of pencik dated to the end of the fifteenth century, gives the date of the beginning of pencik regulation as 1363.240 So, considering that the establishment the janissary corps was after the conquest of Edirne in 1363, we may date the early application of the pencik regulation to after 1363. It is to be noted that the two dates coincide.
Additionally, in another law code of the pencik regulation it is stated that pencik is to be taken if a campaign is in the form of haramilik with the participation of more than a hundred campaigners with the intention of gaza to the darül-harb.241 This
238 Molla Hüsrev, Dürer’ül-Hukkam fi Şerh-i Gurerü’l-Ahkam I, ed. Sevim İlgürel (Ankara:TTK Yayınları, 1988), 46 See also Hezarfen, Hüseyin EfendiTelhüs’ül Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman (İstanbul:Fazilet Neşriyat, 2017), Vrk.79
239 Menage, “The Ottoman Historiography”, 74
240 Uzunçarşılı, Kapıkulu Ocakları I, .9 (For the Kanunname See Milli Tetebbular Mecmuası, no.2, 325)
241 Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri,2.Kitap,(İstanbul: Fey Vakfı,1999),128-134. According to Akgündüz, there exists two kannunnames about pencik which had survived. One of them dates before 1510 where we find information how the pencik was collected. “…uç beğleri, akıncı ve sair yiğit ve yeğil cem’ idüb gaza niyetine Darü’l-harbe seğirtmek akındır. Ve uç beğleri, kendüler eşmeyüb adamlarına akıncı ve sair yiğit ve yeğil koşub göndermek, eğer eşen kimesneler yüz ve yüzden ziyade olursa, haramiliktir. Bu iki kısımdan penç-yek alınır.Ve eğer uç
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also is in conformity with the Ottoman intention of gaza raids to the Christian provinces. In any case , those pencik oğlanıs, as the property of the Ottoman sultan, were no doubt a good source of income for the Ottoman state since the ones who could not afford this one-fifth ratio, gave instead 125 akçes for its counterpart.
On the other hand, if we look at the historical background of the pencik regulation, we find that it was an Islamic practice since the time of the Abbasids.242 The term derives from the Persian word penç ü yek as a one-fifth ratio and is regarded as the right of the ruler either as property in kind or cash. This is also mentioned in the Holy Book of Kuran.243 So it became a regulation of Islamic law as hums-i şer’i, that is taking one-fifth of war captives as beytü’l-mal.244 Similarly, in the Seljukid state and in the principality of Aydın we see the same ratio, one-fifth taken as pencik.245
In the Kavanin, we also find information on pencik kulus. It is stated that the ones collected as a result of the raids from the Christian provinces in the realm of Bilecik were named as pencik oğlanı, or, since one-fifth of them were regarded as the legal right of the sultan, they were registered as pençik kulu.246
In the account of the early chronics, it is stated that Evrenos Beg was assigned to take war captives in Gelibolu or its counterpart of 125 akçes with the approval of
beğleri kendüler eşmeyüb adam gönderib eşen adam yüzden eksük olursa, çetedür, penç-yek alınmaz….”
242 Abdülkadir Özan, “Pencik”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.34, (2007),226. For the pre-Islamic application of pencik see Chapter V of the thesis.
243 Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri,2.Kitap, 128
244 Erdem, Osmanlıda Köleliğin Sonu, 35
245 Enveri, Düsturname, 59 “…pencüyek çıkardı kısmet eyledi leşkerin cümle ganimet eyledi…”
246 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 15 “…Bu toplanan oğlancıklara pençik kulu demeye sebep şudur, Hıristiyan vilayetlerinden olan Bilecik diyarına akın yapıp ele geçen oğlanların beşte birini padişah için alıp üçyüz oğlanı deftere kaydettiler. Bunlara pençik kulu demeye sebep budur…”In the Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, the term pencik kulu was used by the author both denoting to the children collected but also for the official who collected them.
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the kadı 247. Being a descendant of a Byzantine family in the service of the Karamanid Principality, Evrenos Beg was a very experienced statesman and commander, who was familiar with the practices of different cultures in the frontier. Asis stated in Neşri’s chronic, Murad I always asked for the advice of Evrenos Gazi on important issues, as he is the most experienced in the frontiers.248 Thus, it becomes clear why Evrenos Gazi was assigned to register these war captives in Gelibolu.
However, it is to be noted that even in this early period of Ottoman state, frontier begs power was not absolute; rather their power was restricted, and in the frontier the akıncı forces were under the control of the pretenders, not the frontier begs.249 In any case, the role of frontier begs, like Evrenos Beg, who were accustomed with the affairs in the frontier lines, cannot be denied in organizing the military and administrative apparatus, and conquests of the early Ottoman state in the Balkans.
Pencik Oglanıs as the early Kuls
In the accounts of the early chronics, we have information on how the process of kulluk begins. Initially, upon the suggestion of Çandarlı Halil, the pencik oglanıs were given to the Turkish farmers in Anatolia for a couple of years’ training. In Aşıkpaşazade, we find the expression of Türke vermek, ‘given to the Turk’ to learn Turkish as part of their training process. In the history of Oruc and the Anonymous Tevarih, we find additional information on this issue; both works stating that they
247 Neşri,Cihannüma I, 271 Also in this part we have additional information in Neşri on the term one-fifth as hums and its counterpart of 125 akçes as geçit akçesi. As additionally narrated by Neşri, gazis began to run away in order not to bring the war captives or give the portion of 125 akçe. Here we see how Neşri uses the original sourcemore fully or add information from other sources.
248 Neşri, Cihan-nüma I, 271 “… Rivayet olunur ki hünkar….andan Hacı Evrenoza eyitti, nice zamandır seni bu ucta kodum, bunların ayinin, erkanın bildin ve tecrübe ettin…” For the uc beğis in Rumelia see Hasan Basri Karadeniz, Osmanlılar ve Rumeli Uç Beyleri (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2015) and Ayşegül Kılıç, Bir Osmanlı Akıncı Beyi Evrenos Bey (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2014)
249 Karadeniz, Osmanlılar ve Rumeli Uç Beğleri, 108
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were given to Turkish farmers in Anatolia for farming and learning Turkish for a period of three to four years.
The history of Neşri also provides additional information on their Islamization process. This is a good example for how chronicles complement each other in processing the original source. As we learn from the accounts of the chronics, they were brought to the kapı, gate, to become the kul of the sultan. Hence, they became yeniçeri, the ‘new troop’ with their distinctive symbol of white headgear. In the following pages we will see how Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan became a complemetary source for the early Ottoman chronics.
However, considering that the author of the Kavanin was an eye-witness of the period between 1575 to 1617, his narration for the early years of the janissary institution is anachrotic in some cases; and he seemed to confuse the narration on the establishment of yaya corps with that of the janissary corps. Nevertheless, the information known so far on the establishment of the acemi ocağı seemed to come from Kavanin.
According to Kavanin, acemi ocağı was first established in Gelibolu in the time of Murad I, where the slaves were first employed in naval service for one akçe in the ships between Lapseki and Çardak. Then, after 5 to10 years of service, they were recruited for the acemi ocağı.250 This practice reveals the very early stages of the janissary corps which all the early chronics lack.
On the other hand, if we analyze Kavanin with respect to writings on the kul identity of the corps as the hassa soldiery, the information presented mostly conforms with the near eastern concept of ghulam-kul identity. First of all, as mentioned in the
250 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan 7-8
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Kavanin, the war captives or devşirme children collected were to be non-Turkish and non-Muslim for the initial reason that, since they would later became hünkar kulu or kapıkulu, their relatives might also disguise as kapıkulu and exploit this position.
So, in order to preserve order in the society, those who are collected were to be rootless. The idea was that this, i.e., having no ties, would make them good soldiers; and being converted to Islamwould give them extra incentive to fight for their new religion and become hostile to their own non-Muslim relatives.251
According to an observation of an eye-witness novice in the Ottoman palace in the seventeenth century, those rootless converted Christians served the sultan in a more loyal and vigorous manner than the Turks, since their only hope was to get favors from the sultan252. So it is obvious that loyalty to the sultan was essential to become a kul.
Additionally, the marital status of the novices and their qualities were also important in forming a devoted kul to the sultan. As for the Kavanin, the boys collected had to be single and their affection only given to the sultan. Within this framework, the term kuloğlu must have designated the janissaries who married at a later age. Hence, the term kuloğlu designates the sons of the janissaries, either coming
251 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 13-14 “…Sakın ve sakın Türk evladını almayalar… Türk evladını almamaktan fayda odur ki onların çoğu hünkar kulluğuna geçerse, memleketlerindeki bütün akraba ve yakınları, hünkar kulu oldum diye halkı incidib tedürgün edib, öşür ve diğer vergilerini vermedikten başka, yeniçeri kimliğine girib, o diyardaki sancak beyleri, alay beyleri, vilayet voyvodaları, onları gerçek kapıkulu zannedib, zabt edemeyüb, taşrada hünkar kulu olan ile olmayan belirsiz olunca, gecikmeden haklarından gelmek mümkün olmayub, İstanbula arz itmek gereküb, fitne ve fesat ve eşkıya türemesine sebeb bu olur…” “….Hıristiyan evladını toplamakta fayda oldur ki, İslama geldiği gibi din gayreti baş gösterib, kendi halkına ve akrabalarına düşman olub, içlerinden düşman çıktığından serhadde her birinden yararlık ve dilaverlik görüldükten başka, kendüleri her rütbeye erişseler, yeniçeri kethüdası dahi olsalar, akrabaları gayrimüslim olduğundan haraçlarını aldırmamaya imkan bulamayacakları sebebiyle, hırıstiyan evladını toplamayı kanun yaptılar…”
252 Albertus Bobovius ,Topkapı Sarayı’nda Yaşam,41
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from acemi ocagı or through devşirme.253As indicated in the Kavanin, it was at the time of Selim Han that they were allowed to marry.254Furthermore, a novice was better to have no artistic skills other than martial skills; otherwise he would not prove to be a good soldier. 255
The distinguished status of the janissaries as the kuls coming from acemi ocagı is also stressed in Kavanin, stating that it was the kuls who come from the acemi ocagı that would be most useful to the sultan.256 Moreover, Kavanin, referring to the older practice of the earlier times, mentions that it was only from the kuls coming from acemi ocagı or devşirme that could become the kul or the kuloğlu257. It had been the rule not to make anyone other than these coming from acemi ocağı or through devşirme to be the kul of the sultan.258 Frequent complaints by the author of the Kavanin about the neglect of this rule in the seventeenth century indicates the corrupted status of the janissaries and the hearth at the time when Kavanin was written.
The Symbolism of Ak Börk ‘White Headgear’ as the Symbol of Hassa Status
The symbolism of hassa status appeared to be the ‘white headgear’ in the early Ottoman chronics and in the Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan. As mentioned above, it was the
253 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan,26 “… Yeniçerine kuloğlu derler…” and Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan,34 “… Yeniçeri ocağına hariçten adam girmesi mümkün değildir, çünkü babasının odasının odabaşısı yoldaşımız oğlu demez ve demeye gücü yoktur…”
254 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 40 “…Eskiden acemi arasında küçük yokmuş ve kuloğlu hiç yokmuş, çünkü o zamanlar yeniçeri bekarmış, evlenmezmiş. Sonra Sultan Süleyman oğlu Selim Han zamanında iş göremeyenler, padişaha arz idilip, evlenirlermiş…”
255 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 14 “…Evli olan oğlan alınmaya çünkü yüzü gözü açık olur ve evli olan padişaha kul olmaz. Sanatı olan oğlan alınmaya çünkü sanatı olan ulufe için bela çekmez, sanatına güvenir, sefere gitmeyib karına bakar, hizmet edilmemeye sebeb olur…”
256 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 22 “…Acemi ocağı başka ocaklara benzemez… padişaha lazım olacak kuldur…”
257 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 33 “…Kadim günlerden beri acemi oğlanları devşirmeden ve kuloğlundan, yani yeniçeri oğullarından olagelmiştir…”
258 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 24 “…Devşirme ile acemioğlanından başkasının kul yapmak kanun değildir…”
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yayas who wore the white headgear as a symbol of their hassa status; and as we see in the Kavanin, the white headgear was transferred to the janissaries because of their loyalty to the sultan and their willingness to fight vigorously for him.259
It is also worthwhile to point out the symbolism of white headgear in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The color white has been the color of nobility and the symbol of dependence on the sovereign beginning in early Turkish history.260 So it is no doubt that the impact of Middle Asian traditions have so far survived through the early years of the Ottoman state. According to common belief, the color white also symbolizes honour, dignity and justice. In the ancient Turk society, the dignitiries of the Hunnic Turks wore white dress in the campaigns. 261
In the history of İdris-i Bitlisi, regarding the clothing and the headgear of the Ottoman soldiery, we find that the most auspicious color that sultans and hassa soldiery wear is ‘white’. İdrisi stressed that “wearing white clothing is considered as Sunna according to the Islamic law”262. İdrisi mentioned that “ hassa soldiery of the Ottomans wear white felt caps as a symbol of their distinguished status”, which aligns with the traditional account of the early chronics. Furthermore, as we find both in
259 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 58 “…bu tayfa padişah uğruna can ve başlarıyla oynayageldikleri için beyaz keçeyi onlara yeniçeri keçesi tayin ettiler…”
260 Ziya Gökalp, Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi, ed. Kazım Yaşar Kopraman (İstanbul:1976),154.
261Ahmet Karadoğan, “Türk Ad Biliminde Renk Kültü”, Milli Folklor No. 62,( 2004):91-2((89-99). For Ak Börk see also Salim Küçük, “Eski Türk Kültüründe Renk Kavramı”,Bilig, No.54 (2010):185-210 and Elvin Yıldırım, Türk Kültründe Renkler ve İfade Ettikleri Anlamlar, (MA Thesis, İstanbul University,2012)
262 İdris-i Bitlisi, Heşt Bihişt I, 245-6 “… Cümle-i müluk-i tevaif memalik-i Rum’da bir dürlü libas-ı mahsusa ile mevsum ve sipah ve leşkerleri birer resm ile mümtaz ve ma’lumdur. Fe amma bu ecnad-ı mübarizan-ı cihad-ı şöhret-şi’ar ve ziynet-i tace ziyade i’tibar idüb ve ekseri nemed-i surhdan külah giyerler. Padişah-ı mücahidana münasib olan budur ki “hayrü’s-siyabi el-ebyadu” (elbiselerin en hayırlısı beyaz olanıdır) fetvasınca leşkeriyan-ı hassaya nemed-i sefidden tac-ı mefaharet ve imtiyaz kendülere dahi mutaba’at Sünnet-i Nebevi ile ser-i servetleri tac-ı ebyad ile ser-efraz eyleyeler…”
“…La cerem, iktiza-yı zaman ve mekan ve mülayemet-i ehl-i iman ile meyanı leşkeriyan-ı hassa ve guleman-ı mahsusa içün nemed-i sefid ta’yin buyurdular. Ol zamanda eyyam-ı saltanat-ı padişah-ı sahib-i tey’id Sultan Yıldırm Bayezıd’a degin libas-ı mukarrer-i şahan-ı Osmaniyan ancak tac-ı sefid idi. Zaman-ı Yıldırım Han’da Timurtaş Beg ki emirü’l-ümera idi. Libasda sebeb-i ref’i iltibas ile mülazıman-ı imtiyaz içün nemed-i sefidi müntesiban-ı sultana ve külah-ı nemed-i sürhi ümera ve leşkeriyanın hizmetlerinde olan çaker ve gulemana mahsus eyledi…”
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İdrisi’s work and in Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan that it was initially Timurtaş Beg who offered white felt caps for the distinguished soldiery and the ümera or the retinue of the sultan in the age of Bayezıd I.
However, the accounts of the early chronics state that the creation of white headgear probably originated in the age of Orhan Gazi. Aşıkpaşazade’s placement of the woven white headgear in Bilecik in the time of Orhan Gazi can be considered as his attempt to point out the importance of Bilecik where Ede-Bali of the Vefaiye order emerged.263
Furthermore, in the Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi of Mahmud Şevket Paşa written in the nineteenth century, we find the importance of headgear in the Ottoman society as a symbol of differentiation of the soldiery. It was stated in the work that white clothing is worn by the dignitiries like begs and pretenders to distinguish themselves from the rest of the society and enemies. It is also stated by Mahmud Şevket Paşa that according to a hadith, ‘the most auspicious color to be worn is white.’
In addition, in the narration of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, we see that the flag, which was thought to be given to Sultan Osman by the Seljukid ruler as a symbol of his sovereignty, is also white. 264 Mahmud Şevket Paşa also stated that white headgear
263 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 238.
264 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafet-i Askeriyesi, 25-26. “… Osmanlılarca tayin-i kıyafet hususunda bidayet-i emirde elbiseden ziyade serpuşlara ehemmiyet verilmiş ve askerin vakt-i sulhde ahaliden vakt-i harbide efrad-ı düşmandan fark olunması için başlarına aynı şekilde beyaz külah giymeleri münasıb görülmüşdür. Müverrihin-i Osmaniye’den bazısı renk-i mezkurun tercihi hususunda “esvabın hayırlısı beyazdır” mealinde olan hadis-i şerif veyahud kalem kibarı sebeb gösterdiği halde bazısı da Sultan-ı Selçuki tarafından ol (evvel)? Selatin-i Osmaniye olan Sultan Osman hazretlerine alamet-i istiklal olmak üzere irsal kılınmış olan sancağın rengi beyaz olduğu cihetle asker için kabul olunan külahın dahi beyaz renkli olmasına rical-i hükümetce karar verildiği beyan eylemektedir. Mezkur külahın yeniçerilerden evvel teşkil kılınan ve fakat daimi suretde silah altında bulundurulmayub sefer vaktinde bir akçe yevmiye tahsiliyle cem ve muharebeye sevk olunarak (Yaya) tesmiye olunan askere dahi iksa’ Edildiği mervidir. Ol vakit beyaz külahı efrad-ı askeriye ile
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was worn by the hassa soldiery of the Ottoman state, initially by the yaya corps and later by the janissary corps as a symbol of the differentiation of their status. Consequently, the white headgear no doubt sysmbolizes nobility, rank and dependence ton the sovereign in the early Ottoman hassa soldiery according to the ancient Turkish tradition.
On the other hand, the similarities between the Varangian white headgear and the Ottoman yaya-janissary white headgear is noteworthy265. Assuming that both sides impacted each other, this, that is wearing white headgear, must have resulted from the acculturation between the Byzantines and the Ottomans in the fourteenth century.
We find in Netayicü’l Vuku’at a similar view on the acculturation between Byzantine and Ottoman cultures. It is stated by Mahmud Paşa that not only the Ottoman soldiery like solaks and the military regiments, but also the costumes of the Ottoman state must have been transferred from the Byzantine state.266
On the other hand, Köprülü, based on Kondakov, points out the similarities between Byzantine palace costumes of the emperors and the costumes of the officals of the ancient Persian cavalry267 and concludes that it was the impact of ancient Persia on the Byzantine uniforms. On this issue, Nicolle points out the impact of Islamic-Persian military costumes on the military uniforms of the palace guards of late Roman state in the sixth century as ‘white’ kaftans and cloaks.268 In any case, the views
beyler ve şehzadeler dahi giyib vakt-i hasrda ve alaylarda külahın üzerine dülbend sarıklar dahi sararlar idi…”
265 See the miniature in the Appendix depicting the Varangians standing nearest the Byzantine emperor with their white headgear.
266 Netayicü’l- Vukuat Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi I, ed. Neşet Çağatay (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1987).66-7.
267 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions”, 149-150
268 David Nicolle, Doğu Roma Orduları MS.306-886, (İstanbul: T.İş Bankası Yayınları, 2017), 23
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mentioned above on the Byzantine influence on the clothing of the Ottomans needs further analysis, and interpretation should be based on more solid ethnographic evidence, along with the contribution of art historians.
The Emphasis on Hacı Bektaş through Ak Börk
The relation between Hacı Bektaş and his impact on the formation on the early Ottoman soldiery is rather a controversial issue269. It is kind of anachronistic to attribute a role to Hacı Bektaş (1209-1271) on the establishment of the janissary corps. However, the hearth’s affiliation with Bektashism by the end of sixteenth century is admitable. It was a time when a dede, a grandeous personality in Bektashism from the Bektaşi order, was crowned by the ağa of janissaries in the hearth; hence Hacı Bektaş was officially recognized as the patron Saint of janissaries.270
On the other hand, it was the common belief that the janissaries who were Christian in origin felt more comfortable being affiliated with this type of popular Islam rather than Sunni Islam.271 It is also noteworthy that, as a traditional status group, it seems natural that the janissaries sided with other traditional groups like ulema and religious orders like Bektashism.272 So, it is no coincidence that Mahmud II abolished the corps and the Bektashi order at the same time (1826).
269 For the relation between Bektashism and Janissary corps, See Betül Özbey, “Bektaşilik-Yeniçeri Ocağı İlişkisi”, (MA Thesis, Marmara University, 2013). Here Özbey admits the anacronism of Hacı Bektaş with the janissary institution. Moreover the relation between Hacı Bektaş and Janissary institution is rather a controversial historical problem with regards to his historical-mythological personality, A.Y.Ocak, “Hacı Bektaş-i Veli”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.14, (2001): 455-58.
270 İnalcık, The Classical Age, 194
271 Ibid,194
272 İnalcık, “Comments on Sultanism”, 64
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If we analyze the early chronics and the Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, in terms of this relationship, we find that the author of the Kavanin, who had written his work when this affiliation was in the foreground, attributed a significant role to Hacı Bektaş in the affairs of the hearth.273 However, he did this in an indirect manner; probably being conscious of the anachronism. The relation between Hacı Bektaş and the janissary hearth is reflected through the clothing and the white headgear of the Mevlevi külah, a special kind of conical cap, which was thought to be the headgear of the Bektashi order.
We have the description of the janissary headgear in the account of the Kavanin with the emphasis on grandeous personalities like Hacı Bektaş and Velizade Timurtaş Paşa (d. 1404), who was thought to be the descendant of Hacı Bektaş, and Emir Şah Efendi as the descendant of Mevlana274. As is stressed in Kavanin, the stable felt cap, doğru keçe worn by the janissaries with prayers, is the model of the headgear of Hazreti Mevlana; and the mohair, tiftik behind it, is the model of Hacı Bektaş, which was designed in the age of Murad I.275
273 Beydilli, “Yeniçeri”,453
274 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 56“… O zamanda kerameti meşhur olan Hacı Bektaş Velizade Timurtaş Dede ve Hazreti Mevlana evladından Emir Şah Efendi marifetiyle yeniçeri keçesini düzüp, bunlara giydirdiler. Keçeden yapıldığı için adına keçe dediler, başa giyildiği için börk dediler, namlarına yeniçeri dediler.Yeniçeri yoldaşların giydiği doğru keçe Hazreti Mevlana’nın giydiğinin örneğidir. Ardındaki tiftiği Hacı Bektaş Veli’ninkinden örnek alıp dualarla giydirdiler. Bu asker yeni kul olduğundan adına yeniçeri dediler…”,
The first years of Timurtaş Paşa is rather vague so his relation between Hacı Bektaş and his role in the esatblishment of janissary corps, F.Emecen,“Timurtaş Paşa”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 41,(2012),185-6
275 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 56 “…Hazreti Mevlana yolda yürürken ayağı taşa çarptı, Hacı Bektaş Veli bunu görünce, kepeneğinin yenini kesip, ayağına sar diyerek verdiğinde, o ayağına sarmaya layık görmeyip, uğur için başına giydi. Bu sebepten Timurtaş Dede adındaki oğluda yenini yeniçeriye giydirdi. Bu tayfanın giydiği giysiyi Hacı Bektaş Veli giymiştir. Osman Gazi ki Osmanlıların büyük atasıdır, kılıç kuşandığında bu giysi ile kuşanmış lakin yeniçeri teşkilatı kurulmadan önce ölmüştür. Bu yüzden oğlu olan Timurtaş Dede Orhan Gazi oğlu Sultan Murad zamanında yeniçeriye bu giysiyi giydirip yen-i çeri adını o vermiştir…” It is important to note that Palmer in his analysis of the Bektaşi vilayetnames he determines that, the same story actually exists in the Vilayetname-i Hacı Bektaş which was written earlier than the fifteenth century chronics, Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, 507-508.
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Here we see the authors’ efforts to show the influence of Bektashism on the janissary hearth. Therefore, the author puts a contemporary personality on the fifteenth century: Timurtaş Dede as the descendant of Hacı Bektaş and Emir Şah Efendi as a descendant of Mevlana, to point out the relation between Bektashism and janissary corps in the same age. This can be regarded as the legitimization of the passage concerning the relation between Hacı Bektaş and the janissary corps.
On the other hand, if we look at the early chronics of Neşri, Oruc Bey and the Anonymous Tevarih, we notice that they did not mention anything about the role of Hacı Bektaş in the establishment of janissary corps. However, only Aşıkpaşazade, at the end of his history in the form of question and answer, explicitly explains why he did not mention Hacı Bektaş in relation to the janissaries.276 Aşıkpaşazade stated that Hacı Bektaş was not living in the age of the Ottoman sultans; and that is the reason why he did not mention him.277
Further in the account, when Aşıkpaşazade was asked about the relation between Hacı Bektaş and the headgear of the janissaries, he stated that the headgear worn by the janissaries was actually invented at the time of Orhan Gazi in Bilecik. Moreover, the üsküf, elifi tac of the janissaries was actually worn by Abdal Musa, a notable Bektaşi derviş of Orhan’s time278. Here we see again Aşıkpaşazade’s efforts to attribute a role for his own order Vefaiye in the creation of white headgear to
276 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 238 “….Sual: Bu Bektaşiler eyidürler kim Yeniçerilerün başındaki tac Hacı Bektaşundur derder. Cevab: Yalandur! Ve bu börk hod Bilecükde Orhan zamanında zahir oldı… Ve illa Bektaşiler geymeye sebeb: Abdal Musa Orhan zamanında gazaya geldi. Ve bu yeniçerinün arasında bile yüridi. Ve bir yeniçeriden bir eski börk diledi. Yeniçeri üsküfini çıkardı. Bunun başına geydürdi. Abdal Musa vilayetine geldi ol börk bile başında. Sordılar kim: “Bu başundaki nedür?” Ol eyitdi: “Buna elifi derler” dedi. Vallahi bunlarun taclarınun hakikati budur…”
277 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman,237 ”…ve illa bu Hacı Bektaş Al-i Osman neslinden kimseyile musahabet etmedi…”
278 Emel Esin. “Bedük Börk, The Iconography of Turkish Honorific Headgears”. Proceedings of the IXth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference. Naples, 1970, 73, For Esin, Orhan gave an Islamic appearence to the headgear of his retinue, thus börk being worn only with military garments.
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Bilecik, as it was the place of Ede Bali of Vefaiye order whom the Ottoman dynasty is thought to be descended from.
On this issue, Palmer asserts that the white headgear was not actually the headgear of Hacı Bektaş, but modelled after the conical white serpuş, that was also known as elifi tac of the ahis, who were a group of impressive participants on the Ottoman sultans.279 Within that context, the shape and material of the janissary headgear, börk, needs to be discussed. It is noteworthy that the shape, material and the color of the headgear symbolized rank and status in the Ottoman-Turkish culture.
The proportion of börk as a symbol of dignitiy is mentioned in Kutadgubilig as “Neçe baş bedüse, bedük börk kedür”, “As the head rises into magnitude, the börk becomes proportinately larger”, reflects the relation between the rank and magnitude of the börk.280.
When we consider the shape and the size of janissary börk in terms of its magnitude, we may infere that they, as the hassa kuls of the sultan, deserved to put on such magnificant headgear. For more and detailed account of the headgear Kavanin would be a good source. It was mentioned in the account that the headgear they wear for good luck in the campaigns is the headgear, külah, of the conical cap of holy Mevlevis’, which represents fighting with the holy spirit of Mevlana and Hacı Bektaş. These caps were awarded to them in the age of Murad I.281
279Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, 459-466. Uzunçarşılı accepts the same alternative stating that white cap was actually the cap of the ahis, Kapıkulu Ocakları I, 11.
280 Esin,”Bedük Börk”, 73 According to Esin, The size of the börk determines the status of an individual which was actually a Chineese concept in origin though we observe this in many of the cultures.
281 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 57-58 “…Yeniçeri yoldaşlar gittikçe ziyade olup her bir seferde Hacı Bektaş Veli ve Hazret-i Mevlana himmeti ile büyük fetihler yaptıklarında, keçeleri delip, turna tüyü takarlardı. Sonra içlerinden birisi küçük bir yük takacak, gümüşten bir şey düzdürüp keçesinin önüne süs diye takdı. Diğerleri onun tüy takmaya yaradığını görünce, irice olup düşmana korku vermesi ve irice yükler takmak için sağlamca olması lazımdır diye, şimdiki yüklük gibi irice yaptırıp adına yüklük dediler. Yük koyacak yer olduğu için, gazada zenginlik elde eden yeniçeri yoldaşlardan bazı
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Moreover, as Kavanin mentioned, the ornaments on the headgear of the janissaries üsküf, a kind of knitted bonnet with a tassel, daltaç, with a place on the front line of the cap to put golden and silver bands, turna tüyü, crane furs; and yüklüks, a small bag to carry something in, were all placed on the headgear in order to cause fear among the enemy. On the other hand, it was also stated in Kavanin that, as the old law requires, the novices were to wear stable felt caps, düz keçe, not the üsküf, and placed in yüklüks. The holy felt cap of the janissaries were the headgear of four holy figures, evliya, which they wear during the campaigns to instill fear in the enemy by making themselves look grander in shape282.
For İçli,283 who thoroughly analyzed the tombstones of janissaries, üsküf was worn by the high officials of the janissaries only in ceremonies. Actually üsküf was not the characteristic headgear of the janissaries, but rather börk, dardağan, serdengeçti, kalafat and kuka were the most common types of headgear used by the members of the janissary hearth. In addition, the yüklük or kaşıklık on the daltaç, where they put certain ornaments, symbolizes the rank and the dignity of a janissary. So we may infere that headgear was important symbolism in the hierarchy of the Ottoman military.
ihtiyarcaları, altından ve gümüşten üsküf yaptırmayı dilediklerinde, bir azizin fikriyle daltaç yaptırdılar. Keçelerinin üzerini daltaçla kapladıklarında bir o denli zarif olup, düşmana korku olmuştur. Yeniçeri yoldaşların bahsedilen giysileri evliyanın kutsal Mevlevi külahıdır. Bu giysi Osmanoğullarından Gazi Süleyman Paşa ve Gazi Murad zamanında kabul edilip, kendileri de uğur için seferlerde giymişlersir.…” On the other hand Uzunçarşılı based on an manuscript of Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, interprets the term yüklük as yünlük, woolen cap. Kapıkulu Ocakları I, 264
282 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 85 “…(Yeniçeri) keçesinde heybet vardır, yüz keçeli bin görünür, bini on bin er görünür,bu kutsal keçe üç dört evliyanın keçesidir…”
283 H. Necdet İçli and Mehmet Kökrek, Yeniçeriler Remizleri ve Mezar Taşları (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2017), 67-69
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4.3) Military Roles of Jannisary Corps up to 1444
Age of Murad I (1362-1389)
The reign of Murad I can be characterized by concentrated raids to the Balkans to reinforce the Ottoman sovereignty in Rumelia. On the other hand, Murad I struggled with the Karamanids in Anatolia to control the lake provinces and the silk road passing through Asia Minor.284 Within this historical framework, the role of the janissary corps as the hassa soldiery of Murad I is significant in two cases, the battle with the Karamanids in 1386 and the battle of Kosova in 1389.
When we analyze the chronicles in terms of the military activities of the janissary corps in the age of Murad I, the most abundant information can be found in Neşri’s chronic, whereas Aşıkpaşazade, Oruc and the author of the Anonymous Tevarih do not provide much information.285 Regarding the organization of the soldiery of Murad I in his battle with the Karamanids in 1386, we find that the soldiers came to the battlefield with their horses and then they took the form of a straight line in each wing and put up the tent of the Sultan in the battlefield.
284 Halil İnalcık, “Murad I”, in Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları (1302-1481), (İstanbul: Timaş, 2010), 81-108.
285 The importance of Neşri’s history is that, it covers the Gazaname of Ahmedi narrating the account on the battle of Kosova. .Ahmedi (d. 1412/13) as a contemporary poet from the region of Germiyan had written an Ottoman history covering the period 1385-1413, namely the Dasitan-i Tevarih-i Mülük-i Al-i Osman in his İskendername when he was in the service of Mehmed I. The Gazaname on the battle of Kosova there can be regarded as the first of Ottoman şehnames covering authentic information. Neşri seemed to copy it in his Cihannüma. Ahmedi as an eyewitness of the period seemed to participate to the campaigns against Karaman, Bulgaria and Kosova by Murad I and more he also seemed to utilize from the accounts of Çandarlı Ali Paşa, Gazi Evrenos, Bayezıd I and certain Serbian soldiers in writing the part about the Ottomans. Moreover, he seemed to use the menakıb of Yahşi Fakih which was summarized in Aşıki and Enveri’s lost source which he used in his Düsturname, İnalcık, Osmanlı Sultanları, 108. For Ahmedi as an authentic contemporary source for the battle of Kosova, See H.İnalcık, “I.Kosova Savaşı Üzerine Çağdaş Bir Kaynak: Ahmedi”, in Osmanlı Tarihinde Efsaneler ve Gerçekler, İstanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2014. For Ahmedi’s work, see İsmail Ünver, Ahmedi İskendername, (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1982) and Nihad Sami Banarlı, Ahmedi ve Dasitan-i Tevarih-i Müluk-i Al-i Osman, Türkiyat Mecmuası, Cilt IV, (1939):49-176.
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Then, Murad I stood in the midst of the battlefield with his havass, the infantry located on the front line, and the cavalry located at the back side. Afterwards, his sons, Bayezid and Yakup Çelebi, took their position on each side of him, together with the other begs of Anatolia under his vassality. The references in Neşri to Yayabaşı İlyas, Pazarlu-Togan, Yahşi Beg, Saruca Paşa and Eyne Beg in Neşri, indicates that the yaya begs of the former hassa yaya and müsellem corps were stil active as the hassa soldiery in the military expeditions of Murad I.286
Uzunçarşılı verifies this battle formation and mentions that the janissaries were mostly located at the midst, kalb, of the army in the battlefield, where on each sides were located the kapıkulu cavalry and the tımariot cavalry.287 Thus, we can infere that by the term havass, Neşri must have referred to the janissary corps. According to İnalcık, the battle with the Karamanids signifies the success of the Ottoman standing army against the traditional tribal forces.288
In addition to this, when we analyze Neşri’s account of Ahmedi’s gazaname for the battle of Kosova, which was destined to end Ottoman sovereignty over the Balkans, we read that Murad I was fighting against the forces of the united Balkan states with the janissaries as his best kapıkulu on the battlefield. We also read that the
286 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 224-227 “…Tertib-i asakir-i Sultan Murad Han Gazi: Andan Hünkar buyurdı, çeri at arkasına gelüb, saflar düzüb, bar ü büngahı berkidüb, meymene vü meysere araste kılub ve cenah peyveste oldı. Murad Han Gazi dahi kendü havassıyla kalbe turub yayayı önüne atluyı girüye kodı. Büyük oğlu Bayezıd Çelebi’yi sola koyub, Firuz Beğ’le Hace Beğ’i Kastamonı çerisiyle sol cenah idinüb ve Laz’dan gelen kafir askerin meysere ucında kodı. Sağ kola kiçi oğlı Yakub Çelebi’yi koyub, Karesi Beği Eyne Beğ Subaşıyı ve Eğirdir subaşısını Kutlu Beğ’le sağ cenah idinüb, haracgüzar Sarac ile Köstendil’i meymene ucın kıldı. Leşkerkeş Kara Timurtaş’ı Germiyan çerisiyle göğüse koyub, Ahmed Çavuş’la Sivrihisar subaşısı Temürtaş’ı çerinun ardına kodı. Yayabaşları Saruca Paşa ve İncecük Balaban ve Torıca Balaban ve ilyas Beğ ve Müstecab subaşı, bunları cümle sağa sola kodı. Ve bi’l cümle leşkere tertib virüb, esbab ve alatı müretteb ve müheyya kılub yürüdi...”
287 Uzunçarşılı, Kapıkulu Ocakları I, 375.
288 İnalcık, “Murad I”, 99
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archers, who were mostly the janissaries, threw their arrows from each side of the battlefield.289
It is also important to mention that the Ottomans had used fire arms and cannons for the first time in the battle of Kosova. So apart from arrows, bayonets and swords, cannons seemed to be used by the Ottoman soldiers early in the last decades of fourteenth century.290 As far as we can observe, some verse portions of the Anonymous Tevarih on the part about the battle of Kosova are parallel to the Neşri’s account.291 According to both narrations, when Murad I was about to die in the battlefield at the battle of Kosova, he was left with a number of his kuls, hasekis. So we may infere that the author of the Anoymous Tevarih must have used Neşri-Ahmedi tradition.
Furthermore in the chronicle of Oruc, we have additional information on the number of Ottoman forces in the battle of Kosova. Oruc gives the number of infantry from Anatolia as ten thousand and some ten thousand azeps from Rumelia;292 whereas no number is provided in other chronicles. Given that the number of janissary corps equipped with arrows in the battle of Kosova numbered around two thousand,293 we may hardly rely on Oruc’s account for such details.
289 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 285 “…Murad Han Gazi eytdi, pes savab olur ki evvel tir-endazları öne tutub sağa ve sola ok yağdıralar…”
290 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 296-299 ”… El kıssa heman topçılar kafirler üzerine bir nice saf-şiken ve seng-efken, kaza-nevazil, kader-şemail toplar irsal eylediler… Hünkar tir-endazlara eyitti: heman bismillah diyüb, niyet-i gaza, kafire ok sepün ki, şöyle alayları kütüz olub turmasun…ve bi’l cümle heman tir-endazlar başladılar tarafeyden ok atub, küffar dahi çoknaşub guh-i ahenin manendi tururken tir-baran olıcak, harekete gele başladı…”
291 See the same statement in Anonymous Tevarih,29 “…Kova gitdi düşmeni hayli sipah Kaldı birkaç kul ile bir yirde şah…” and the same in Ahmedi’s Dasitan, 129. See Neşri, Cihannüma I, 304-5 “…Murad Han Gazi dahi kendü şehid olmasına cezm itmişti. Çünki kafir sığındı. Hiç kendüye eser-i şehadet belirmedi, teaccüb idüb birkaç hasekilerle bu har-püşte olan küşteleri seyri derken bir kafir varidi…”. It is noteworthy that Neşri had changed the verse forms into a regular narrative form where the author of the Anonymous Tevarih directly tranformed the verses.
292 Oruc, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 46-47
293 Beydilli, “Yeniçeri”, 455
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In sum, it can be inferred that, by 1387 the army of Murad I was comprised of his hassa forces of janissaries, the cavalry as well as the former yaya corps. As İnalcık stated, the Ottoman army began to essentially take shape as a professional regular army in the age of Murad I.294 So we can state that, the Ottomans had already established a well-organized standing army, mostly with janissary regiments, by the end of the fourteenth century.
Age of Bayezıd I (1389-1403)
When we analyze the accounts of early cronics in the age of Bayezıd I, Neşri again gives detailed information on the battle of Nicopolis, which was considered a challenge by the crusading forces against Murad I’s and Bayezıd’s former conquests in the Balkans. On the battle of Nicopolis, Neşri gives his source as Umur Bey, the son of Kara Timurtaş, who was an eye-witness of the battle. However, Neşri wrongly gives the date of the battle as 1394295. We also learn from Neşri that Bayezıd has a kul in the castle of Nicopolis named Togan who provided information about the the enemy. Moreover, Neşri states that Bayezıd divides his forces into two and with the tactic of ambush surrounded the castle296.
294 İnalcık, “Murad I”, 107. The Ottoman army in the age of Murad I also comprised of native christian soldiery in Rumelia together with the Arap, Persian and Turkish troops who were taken to the sipahi regiments in the Ottoman army. İnalcık resembles this multi-etnic army to that of the Byzantine hassa regiments,”Murad I”, 93-94.
295 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 328-329 “…Bu gazanın tafsili ve anda olan macerayı Kara Temur Taş’un oğlı Umur Beğden istifsar olununb, ol haber virdi ki anda hazırdı…bu gazanın tarihi hicretün yedi yüz toksan yedisinde vaki oldu…”
296 Neşri, Cihannüma I ,326-7 “…Hünkarın kalada Togan nam bir kulu vardı…Hunkar dahi yitişüb Niğbolı üzerinde Ungurus’la buluşub kafirler İslam leşkerini göricek, çerisini iki bölük idüb, İslam leşkerini araya almak istediler. İslam leşkeri dahi iki bölük olmışlardı. Sultan Bayezıd Han tarafı pusuda turmuşlardı…”
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On the other hand, the information from the western sources for the battle of Nicopolis is noteworthy. We can get additional information from them complementary to the limited data we get from the early chronicles. Within that framework, Atiya gives the number of Turkish infantry, the azebs and the janissaries in the battle of Nicopolis as twelve thousand 297, which coincides with İbnü’l Cezeri’s statement of twelve thousand Turkish forces against thirty thousand crusading forces.298 However, Neşri gives the number of crusading forces as a ‘hundred and thirty thousand’. Here, Neşri must have mistakenly added a hundred to the total number299.
On the other hand, M. Daş, in his analysis of the battle of Nicopolis, states that according to the chronicle of St. Dennis, who also uses contemporary sources for the battle, the Turkish forces were more than twenty thousand with the infantry advance forces and auxiliaries; and Bayezıd’s reserve forces was forty thousand. The forces of the crusades were also forty thousand300. In the chronicle of Oruc, we find the number of Turkish forces in Nicopolis to be ten thousand.301
On the other hand, Schiltberger, who had personally participated in the campaign and was taken as a war captive in that battle, states that the forces of Bayezıd I in the battle of Nicopolis was two hundred thousand, which is regarded by the authorities as a very exaggrated number. However, then he states that Bayezıd had
297 A.S.Atiya, Niğbolu Haçlılar Seferi, (Ankara: Güney Matbaası, 1956), 98 He stated in his work that he gave this number based on the eye-witnesses of the soldiery who participated to the battle. Emecan, Niğbolu, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.33, (2007):91
298 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 367“…Ungurus tekvuru yüz otuz bin erle Eflak ilinden Tunayı geçüb, İstanbul tekvuru tahrikiyle gelüb, Niğbolu’yu muhasara ide yürür…
299 Atiya gives the number of crusading forces of a hundred thousand which is regarded as too abrigated for him and he mentions based on Köhler that Turkish forces was ten thousand, Atiya, Niğbolu,77.
300 M.Daş, “Saint-Denis Ruhbanının Kroniği adlı Fransız Kaynağına göre Niğbolu Savaşı”, Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi, V. XXVII, No.1, (2012):69-77
301 Oruc, Tevarih-i Ali Osman,51
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sent twelve thousand infantry as the advance force, where they took the form of a crescent in the battlefield, encircling the enemy.302 This number, twelve thousand, also coincides with that of Atiya, citing İbnü’lCezeri. So these conflicting numbers exhibit that we must be careful in evaluating thenumbers in memoirs.
As for the role of janissaries in the battle of Nicopolis, Atiya states that the janissaries, as the permanent standing guiding force of the Ottoman sultan, constituted the first standing army of Europe. He also gives the depiction of their location in the battlefield, stating that the janissaries were located at the front line as pişdar, vanguard. He further states that, considering the Turkish tactic of placing the essential force at the front line, would mean that the janissaries were not regarded as the force of most importance.303
However, Atiya admires the janissaries brave fighting as the light infantry with their arrows, blade, axes, sword and mace against the heavily-armed cavalry of the crusading forces at the battle of Nicopolis.304 Moreover, St. Dennis also admits the bravery and discipline of the Turkish forces against the undisciplined forces of the crusader armies.305
Finally, the observation of Nicolle, who wrote based on the contemporary observations of J.de Creguy, Tournai J de Fay and Phillpe de Meziere, who fought in the army of Murad I, is worth mentioning.306 Nicolle states that the Ottoman forces in the battle of Nicopolis were comprised of the hassa janissaries, raiders, tımarıot
302 Schiltberger,Türkler veTatarlar, 29
303 Atiya, Niğbolu, 77-79
304 Atiya,Niğbolu, 83 and 95 For the drawing of janissary arms and equipment, see Graf Marsilli, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Zuhur ve Terakkisinden İnhitatı Zamanına Kadar Askeri Vaziyeti, trans. M.Kaymakam Nazmi (Ankara: Büyük Erkanıharbiye Matbaası, 1934)
306 David Nicolle, Niğbolu 1396, translated by Özgür Kolçak (İstanbul: T.İş Bankası Yayınları,1999), 30
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sipahis and müsellems, the mounted auxillary troops, together with the solak soldiery. As we learn form Nicolle, the janissaries and kapıkulu cavalryman were located at the back of the battle of Nicopolis so that they would be protected. 307
The statement of Nicolle, who mentions that the janissaries were located at the back in the formation of battlefield, contrasts with that of Atiya, who stated that the janissaries, as the essential soldiery of the Sultan, were located at the front line in the battle of Nicopolis. Hence, we may infer from those varying accounts that the janissaries were located in each side and line of the battlefield as the hassa forces of the Ottoman sultan. Nevertheless, the janissary corps, as the most costly group within the Ottoman kapıkulu organization in terms of their training and salaries, had to be the most protected group and were placed to hit the enemy last in the battlefiled.308
On the other hand, the chronicle Kronika Turecka, which was thought to be written by a janissary named Konstantin Mihail Konstantinovic in 1455, presents lively information on the importance of the janissary corps and their siege tactics in the battles. As Konstantinovic stated, when the Turks decided to conquer a city or a castle, they enter the city quietly at night. He continues as, “The janissaries camouflaged with the branches of the trees carrying sound stairs, advanced to the breaches in the walls of the castles and in day time, they climbed the castle with their stairs and the battle starts by throwing of the arrows and the firing of cannons with the strong voice of the drums”. 309
Further in the account, Konstantinovic stated that, “the natives of the city had fled away as a result of the firing of cannons then the janissaries on the city walls
307Ibid, 51-52
308 Beydilli, “Yeniçeri”,453-454
309 The work is to be evaluated with caution since it reflects a western oriented view with its anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic propoganda and updated several times to serve for the ideas current in the sizteenth century, Beydilli, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, vii-xvi.
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turned back and two sides began to fight with each other”. Konstantinovic, also states that if the Sultan thinks that he will be defeated, then he decides to retreat, leaving behind a certain guard force in the city. Through this tactic some important cities, such as Nicopolis, were captured by these forces. 310
On the other hand, Konstantinovic also admires the Turkish advantage of having light infantry, as opposed to the heavy cavalry of the enemy. Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of the janissary army of the fifteenth century and states that if the janissaries were defeated or left in the battlefield, wounded or killed, the Sultan could hardly manage to overcome the enemy.311
Schilberger as an early example of Solak Soldiery
Another important source for this period of Ottoman kapıkulu system and military organization is the work of Schiltberger, who, as an eye-witness, presents a vital description of the Ottoman kul system and the formation of solak soldiery in the Ottoman state. Solaks, as part of the Ottoman household troops, were important in the sense that they functioned not only as a military element, but also for ceremonial purposes. As Schiltberger himself stated in his memoirs, he participated in the battle of Nicopolis under his lord L. Richartinger, where he was caught by the janissaries and brought before Bayezıd I in 1394312.
310 Beydilli, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, 112-113
311 Ibid,103
312 Schiltberger, Türkler ve Tatarlar, 27
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The observation of Schiltberger is in conformity with the treatments applied to war captives according to the Islamic law.313 So we may rely on his source for this detail. As he himself stated, he was then 16 years old; hence, he was not killed because, as the Islamic law requires, slaves under 20 should not be killed but rather taken as the legal portion of the Sultan. Then, he was sent to Edirne and later to Gelibolu, where he was imprisoned for two months until he was sent to Bursa.
Afterwards, he stayed in the Ottoman palace, where he was in the service of Bayezid I, accompanying him in the campaigns until he was captured by Timur in 1402. On the other hand, considering his words stating that; “It was an Ottoman tradition that certain infantry walk in front of the Sultan wherever he goes”, we may consider him as an early example of a solak. Schiltberger also mentioned that he could afford a horse after a six years of service as infantry.314 This may indicate that he later became solakbaşı.
Within this framework it is worth giving some information on the solaks and their role as the hassa kuls of the sultan. Solak soldiery must have been established in the age of Murad I. They seemed to play an important role in the military and ceremonial activities of the Ottoman state315. The first reference to solaks in the early chronics is found in the Anonymous Tevarih.316 We also read in Neşri that they were
313 Ibid,34-38. For the Islamic practices on slavery See H.Erdem, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu, 14-16. According to Islamic law war captives were either killed or freed in return for fidye-i necat or in some cases freed without ransom and in any case enslaved.
314 Schiltberger, Türkler ve Tatarlar, 39
315 Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ, “Solak”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.37 (2009), 368. Solaks were chosen among the janissaries who were good at arms and had presentable appearence. Some of them was chosen as hassa solaks or rikab-ı humayun whose main function was the guardiance of the sultan either in ceremonies or in the battlefield. They walked in each side and ahead of him at alay-ı humayun or encircled the sultan in the battlefield. Only the solakbaşıs had the right to have a hourse. They were considered among the distinguished group of kapıkulus after the ağa of the janissaries.
316 Anonymous Tevarih, 35 “…Yıldırım Hanın karşısında nacaklarla solaklar tuturlardı…”
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wearing dikak börks, tall and thin caps, and walked ahead of the sultan with their tuğ, horsetail and arrows.317
Kavanin also presents important information on the solaks. Kavanin states that solakbaşılık was established in the age of Bayezıd I as one of the oldest offices which the ağas of the hearth hold.318 It had four cemaats with eighty people per cemaat, where the number of people were increased by twenty in the later stage. Furthermore, Kavanin states that one of the janissariy comrades who was tall, old and a veteran was chosen by the eighty in the cemaat as solak and another old and experienced yayabaşı selected as solakbaşı. When the latter died, the oldest amongst them was appointed as solakbaşı as the law required. Only the solakbaşıs had the right to have a house.
It is also stated in the Kavanin that, the yayabaşıs of the janissary corps are chosen amongst the ones who acted bravely in the campaigns by putting the flag on the captured castles and, hence, are promoted to yayabaşılık, bölükbaşılık, or become a gedik and become zağarcı, sekban, solak, sipahi and doorsmen, kapıcı.319
Moreover, a solak is described in the Kavanin as the one chosen amongst the devşirme children who was tall and handsome. Considering that their task was to instill fear in the enemy, they must also be good at throwing arrows and teach this skill to the inexperienced, as they were also the guardsman of the Sultan.320 We may
317 Neşri, Cihannüma I,199 “… Pes yeniçeri ve solaklar Murad Han zamanonda ihdas oldı. Ve solaklar dahi dikak börkler giyub ve tuğlar sokınub ok ve yayla hünkarın önince yürürlerdi…”
318 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan,144 “...Ocak ağalıklarının eski makamlarından biri de solakbaşılıktır. Yıldırım Bayezıd Han zamanında ortaya çıkmıştır, dört cemaattir, eskiden beri seksen kişidir, sonradan yirmi kişi artmıştır. Bunların ortaya çıkışı şöyle olmuştur, yeniçeri yoldaşlardan ihtiyar ve emektar olup, boy pos sahibi olanlardan seksen kişiyi yoluyla solak tayin edip, içlerinden yoluyla eski olan bir ihtiyar Yayabaşıyı üzerlerine solakbaşı tayin edip, o vefat ettiğinde içlerinden ihtiyar olanların solakbaşı olmasını kanun yaptılar...”
319 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 99-100 “... Yayabaşılardan hizmet edenler zağarcı, sekban ve solak olur...Seferde baş kesip, kaleye sancak dikip, erlik edenlere Yayabaşılık, bölükbaşılık, gedik verilir, bunların benzeri zağarcılık, sekbanlık, solaklık, sipahilik, kapıcılık dahi verilir, kanun budur...”
320 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan,14 “... Gayet Uzun boylu olan oğlan alınmaya, ahmak olur; ancak yüzce güzel olursa, padişaha solak olup, düşmana korku olması için alalar...” See also Kavanin-i
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infer from the account of the sources that Schiltberger, as one of solak who later had the right to have a horse, can be regarded as a good example of an early kapıkulu as a solak who later became solakbaşı.321
On the other hand, Schiltberger tells a story about himself and his friends’ plans as Christians for escaping from the Porte. However, they were unsuccessful in their plans and were caught by Bayezıd I’s soldiery. When they were brought to the presence of Bayezıd I, their lives were saved by the efforts of a soldier, çavuş of the janissaries who caught them. Later they were sentenced to a nine-month imprisonment; however, by the effort of Emir Süleyman during Ramadan, Bayezıd forgave them, gave their horses back and increased their salaries.322
Here we can assert that, though Schiltberger was one of a kapıkulu who was expected to be loyal to the sultan and Islam, he did not forget his Christian identity. Within that context, it is noteworthy that some of the janissaries were found carrying the gospel of St John.323 Also, a novice in the palace service clearly mentioned that the janissaries, though they were‘sarıklı’, they did not accept their new religion in their heart324. In general, although the examples mentioned above cannot be valid for all the slave-originated kapıkulus, the loyalty and trushtworthiness of the janissaries is
Yeniçeriyan, 146 “... Solak olacak kimsenin gösterşli ve boylu boslu olması gerekir, taze oğlan olmaması, köse ve bodur olmaması gerekir. Çünkü solaklar padişahın önüne süs olarak tayin edilmiş kuludur. Bunların taze olması kanuna muhaliftir zira bunlar düşmana korku vermek için tayin edilmiştir. Bunların işi ok atmak, vurup delmek ve bilmeyene öğretmektir. Bunların ok atıp delmesi lazımdır çünkü bunlar padişahı korumalarıdır.”
321 Schilberger, Türkler ve Tatarlar, 39 “… Ben Türk Kralının sarayına geldim ve orada başkalariyle birlikte altı yıl süreyle, kral nereye giderse ben de yaya olarak oralara önden yürüyerek gitmek zorunda kaldım. Çünkü hükümdarın önünde yaya olarak gidilmesi adettir. Bu altı yıl sonunda bir binek hayvanına sahip olma hakkını elde ettim ve altı yıl daha süvari olarak onun yanında kaldım ki, cem’an oniki sene Bayezıd’ın emrindeydim…” It is noteworthy that as the editor of his work indicated, here Schiltberger is anachronistic since it takes only six years between the battle of Nicopolis (1396) and the battle of Ankara (1402) where he was imprisoned, Türkler ve Tatarlar,39
322 Schilberger, Türkler ve Tatarlar, 45-47 The plans of escaping from the Porte had always been in the mind of janissaries as stated by Konstantinoviç aswell, Beydilli, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, 61
323 Vryonis, “Man power”, 139 Vryonis regards the devşirme and kul systems as the essential tools of theIslamization process of the Ottoman policy.
324 Albertus Bobovius, Topkapı Sarayı’nda Yaşam, 71
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questionable, since they hardly adopted this new religion in their heart as new converts.
Age of Murad II
The role of janissaries in Murad II’s first acession (1421) is noteworthy. The janissary effort who sided with Murad II against his brother Mustafa is also important in the sense that it resulted in the supression of frontier begs in Rumelia by Murad II after 1422. Thus, they played a vital role in the conquests of Balkans under Murad II. 325 Nevertheless, as a result of certain defeats in the Balkans, the unification of crusading forces against the Ottomans could not be prevented, which led to the battle in Varna.
In the battle of Varna in 1444, the janissary success against the heavy infantry of the crusading army is noteworthy. In the Gazavatname, janissaries are portrayed as the comrade-in-arms of the sultan who fought vigorously for Islam.326 The mutual relationship between the janissary corps and the sultan is well-reflected in the work. It is also noteworthy that as the loyal kuls of the sultan, they fought for the sultan without hesitating to lose their lives. We also find in the Gazavatname, the economic interest of janissary corps as a stimulus for gaza activities.327So, as seen above, it can
325 İnalcık, “Murad II”, Osmanlı Sultanları, 135-136.
326 Gazavatname, 57 “…Amma padişah emr eyledi, cümle yeniçeri ve yayabaşıları ve azaplar bi’l-külliye karşusuna geldiklerinde cümlesinin hatırların ele alub ve hayr dualar edüb eyitti kim, her gazada siz benim yoldaşlarımsınız Heman göreyim sizi din-i İslam aşkına aşıkane küffar-i hakisara, ki anlar dinimiz düşmanlarıdır nice kılıç urusunuz…”…” Amma eğer yeniçeri ve eğer yaya-başılar ve eğer azablar dediler kim, Padişahım, sen heman gönlünü hoş tutasın kim, biz kulların senin oğrına ve din-i mübin aşkına göresin kim, küffar ile ne savaş edüb ve ol din düşmanlarına nice kılıç urub ve nicemiz senin oğrına kurban olalım…”
327 Gazavatname, 22 “…Ez-in-canib padişah-ı ‘alem yeniçeri kullarını katına kagırub: İmdi yarın savaş günüdür, göreyim sizi, benim bunca hazinem sizindir, heman iş başarın, ben sizi altuna ve gümüşe müstagrak ederim dedikte, cümle kullar baş yere urub tek Padişahımız sağ olsun, inşallah
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be inferred that gazaname, rather than being merely a heroic-epic literary genre, it includes certain historical facts.
On the other hand, Konstantinovic, who was an eyewitness of the age of Murad II, mentioned in his memoirs that the sultan motivated the janissaries by stating that not only his treasury but also whatever he owned actually belonged to them. Moreover, the sultan stressed the critical role of the corps by advising his sons that whoever won the heart of the janissaries, would be the one who would hold the sovereignty.328
In the aforementioned work, we also find the critical role janissaries played in the second accession of Murad II. When Murad II was away from the throne for solitude, the janissaries hardly subdued his son Mehmed and got worried about the current conditions. Moreover, since they did not get their pay for six months, they rebelled and plundered the house of notables in the divan . It should be noted that they did not damage any public property.
This seemed to be the reason for their first rebellion in Edirne Buçuktepe. It was then that Murad II came back to Edirne and being ascended to the throne for a second time and his advice to his son that he should take care of the janissaries since they were not only the property of the sultan but also of the state.329
yarın küffar-i hakisara bir kılıç koyalım ki, bir zaman dastan ola dediklerinde padişah-ı ‘alem el kaldurub cümlesine hayır dualar eyleyüb kaviy’ül-kulüb eyledi…”
328 Beydilli, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, 80 and 92
329Beydilli, Bir Yeniçerinin Hatıratı, 46-7 According to the account of Konstantinoviç the janissaries who proved successful in big campaigns were granted rank, like promotion to sancakbeyilik hourse and extra Money.
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Military Role of Janissaries in Kavanin
On the other hand, if we analyze Kavanin in terms of the early military roles of the janissary corps, we find information on the earlier practices and the description of the janissary army in the battlefield referring to the old tradition. We read in the Kavanin that the janissary comrades put up their tents forming a street between the tents of the janissary serdar and the Sultan”.330 Additionally, Kavanin mentions that a talimhane was built during the reign of Sultan Bayezıd Han for the janissaries to be trained in throwing arrows and learning its ilm, science331.
Moreover, it was mentioned that a bölükbaşı, head of a section, was appointed as talimhanecibaşı, in order to train the janissary corps in how to throw arrows by reserving five odas, rooms, as a talimhane. However, it was stated in the Kavanin that in the seventeenth century they were neither engaged with throwing arrows nor using firearms.
Furthermore, Kavanin mentions that, in the earlier times, the janissary comrades practiced in throwing arrows and arches and firearms every morning; and stated that the later military success of the janissary corps in the campaigns was due to the quality of the firearms they were given from the treasury.332 It is noteworthy that
330 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan,”… Yeniçeri yoldaşlar cenk mahallinde çadırlarını serdarın çadırının ve padişah otağının iki tarafına kurarlar sokak gibi olur… “
331 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 154-5 “…Yeniçeri yoldaşlara ok atmayı öğretmek için eskiden bir bölükbaşıyı talimhanecibaşı tayin etmişlerdi. Odaların yakınındaki beş talimhaneyi Sultan Bayezıd Han yeniçeri yoldaşlar için yaptırmış ve bunların üzerine o bölükbaşıyı talimhanecibaşı yapmıştır… Bunlara hazineden yay alıverirlerdi ki yeniçeri yoldaşlar ok atmada usta olup, tüfek atmada usta olup, düşmanın kirli vücudunu okla delik deşik etsinler diye çalışırlardı...”,
Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 209 “... O talimhaneleri yapan yeniçeri yoldaşlar, divan olduğu günler gelip ikişer ok atıp, ok atma ilmini öğrenmeleri için yapmışlardır. Şimdi o talimhane kullanılmadığından, yeniçeri yoldaşlardan talep bile kalmamıştır... Bu yüzden ocağımızda ne ok atmaya rağbet eden var, ne tüfek atar var...”
332 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, .211 “...Yeniçerilere hazineden tüfenk verdiklerinde, iyisini vermek ve tüfenkleri iyi yapmak gerekir ki cenkte işe yarasın”,
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the janissary corps were acquainted with firearms, called tüfenk-endaz , early in the age of Murad II (1404-1451) at the battle of Kosova II.
Kavanin also mentions that in the earlier practice, only the ones who became kapıkulu after the process of passing successfully were given firearms. As the firearms carry the seal of the state on them, they could not be sold; and they were better than the guns privately owned. Moreover, as Kavanin indicates, periodic controls were made within 3 to 4 years by one of the yayabaşıs or bölükbaşıs, in order to determine the ones holding ‘state firearms’who were not hünkar kulu., If determined otherwise, they were returned to the treasury. 333
We also read from Kavanin that, initially there were tüfenkçis making firearms, either for the state or for private ownership for a fee; however, in the seventeenth century, the tüfenkçis no longer made such firearms and as a result no guns were distributed to janissary corps.
Thus, as far as we can infer from Kavanin, the firearms belonging to the treasury could only be used by hünkar kulu, the hassa kul of the Sultan in the early stages. Therefore, firearms can be regarded as a symbol of ‘state-dependency’ which was assigned to the hassa kapıkulu. The stress on firearms as a symbol of the hassa soldiery could be a reflection of the corrupted janissary identity in the seventeenth century, where the outsiders under the name of sekban, saruca infiltrated into the hearth, supplanting the military role of janissary corps.
333 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 136 “...Eskiden kapıya çıkana tüfek verirlerdi, onlar da seferde kullanırlardı, hazine damgalı olduğundan satılmazdı ve özel tüfenkten iyiydi. Üç dört yılda bir Yayabaşılardan veya bölükbaşılardan birini gönderir, şehirlide ve hünkar kulu olmayanda hazine tüfeği bulurlarsa alıp getirirlerdi, hünkar kulu olmayana kullandırmayıp hazineye verirlerdi. Sefer olduğunda , defterle odadan odaya dağıtırlardı.Şimdi oradaki tüfenkçiler, padişahtan bu kadar ulufe yerler, tüfenk yapmazlar. Yeniçeri tüfenk almadıysa tüfenkçilere de ulufe vermemek gerekir, eğer verilirse tüfenkleri de eskiden olduğu gibi vermek gerekir.”,
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Regarding the salaries of the janissary corps who participated in the campaigns, Kavanin states that when the hearth was established in the time of Murad I, 4 akçes cost 1 dirhem. So they were paid 4 akçes. However, in the later period, unless a janissary participated in the campaign, his ulufe was not paid.334 Considering that the corps hardly engaged in military activities by the seventeenth century, the salaries of the janissaries who did not participate in the campaigns were not to be paid335. This can be one of the essential reasons for their increased rebellions in the same century.
Moreover, Kavanin, referencing the old law, mentions that the janissary comrades who were on castle guard for three years were given one akçes. Kavanin then states that in the seventeenth century, since there did not exist any janissaries on the castles, a proportion of their wage was not paid. 336
4.4) The Socio and Political Roles of the Janissary Corps up to 1422
The Age of Bayezıd I
It is noteworthy that under Bayezıd I, the Ottoman state became a well- established centralized state, modeled after the near eastern tradition. Most importantly, it was the janissary army that played the essential role in the
334 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 88 “… Gazi Sultan Murad Han, Yeniçeri Ocağını kurduğunda 4 akçe 1 dirhemdi…”
335 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 210 “...Yeniçeri yoldaşların sefere geleninin ulufesini odabaşılardan eksiksiz alıverip, gelmeyenin bundan böyle ulufesi kesilir...”
336 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 84-85 “...Kanun odur ki; seferde, kalelere nöbetçi koyulduğunda, üç sene orada dururlar. Orada, kale hizmetinde olan yoldaşların birer akçe nafakaları vardır, verilir, eski kanundur. Şimdi o nafakayı padişahın hazinesinden çıkarıp, kalelere göndermezler; gönderdiklerinde de az gönderirler çünkü kaledekilerin erleri olmadığından talep edemezler, düzenleyenlerde kalır gider...”
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establishment of a centralized administration, both in Anatolia and the Balkans.337 The main instrument of this centralization policy was no doubt the kul system which was composed of slave-originated kuls functioning on the basis of loyalty and submission to the Ottoman sultan.
Within this framework, the following narration about Bayezıd I’s confrontation with Timur at the battle of Ankara in 1402, which is found in all the chronicles in variations, can be regarded as a good example reflecting the role of janissaries as the loyal kuls of the sultan. When the centralized administration of Bayezıd I was corrupted by Timur in 1402, the current situation is reflected in the chronicle of Aşıkpaşazade, who stated that he had cited this account from one of the solaks of Bayezıd I, Koca Nayıb. 338
In the account of Aşıkpaşazade, we find that, in Bayezıd I’s confrontation with the soldiery of Timur, Bayezıd came to the battlefield with his own soldiery, together with the soldiery of the other begs under his vassalage. His sons, Emir Süleyman, Çelebi Mehmed, and Mustafa were also with him on the battlefield.
337 Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Devlet ve Asker”, 113
338 Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman,144-5 “…Temür Engürüye doğrıldı. Bu taraftan Bayazıd Han heman evvelki tedbirinün üzerinde kim kendü vilayetinden ve gayrı vilayetden yazılu leşkerini çıkara…Ve hem Bayazıd Han üç oğlın dahi bile almış idi. Emir Süleyman Aydın Eli sancağı ve Karası sancağı ve Saruhan bile, Mustafa Hamid Eli sancağı ve Teke Sancağı bile. Ve Sultan Mehmed Amasya leşkeri ve cemi Rum leşkeri bile. Ve bu leşkerleri ki cem etdi. Tatarı ve gayrı leşkerikendüyle bile yüridiler. Anlar dahi Engürü’ye vardı. Temür-i bedbaht dahı geldi. Perşenbih gün sabah Temür kondı. Bayezıd Han ikindiyin kondı, bir birine karşu. Temür hendek kesdi. Cum’a güni sabah oldı. Oturdılar. Etrafda Cum’a namazı kılındı. Sultan Bayazıd sancakları çözdürdi. Kösler çalındı. Saf ber saf alaylar bağlandı. Hemin kim mukabil oldılar. Tatar hayın oldı. Kendü begleri oğlıyidi kim Erzincan begi Tahratan kim ol Erdananun kardaşı oğlıdur. Germiyan leşkeri Germiyanoğlına döndiler. Elhasılı her vilayetin leşkeri kendü beğlerine döndiler kim onlar Temura varmışlar idi. Vılakoğlu kafir çerisi bile eyü ceng etdi. Ve gördi kim her taraf kolaylu kolayına gitdiler, Vılakoğlu dahi kendü kolayına gitdi. Oğlı Mustafa atından ayrıldı. Belürsüz oldı. Emir Süleyman dahı paşaları aldılar. Ara yerden çıkdılar. Gitdiler. Sultan Mehmed Amasya leşkerini alub Amasiyyeye gitdi. Bayazıd Han kendü kapusı kuluyilen kaldı. Solak Karaca derler idi bir kulu var idi. Eyüdür: “Hay Bayazıd Han! Kanı ol güvendüğün oğullarun, ol sancağun begleri, ya ol sarhoş vezirlerin? Ne gökçek yoldaşlık etdiler sana dedi.”Akçayı harc etmedün. Hazineye koydun. Oğlancuklarım rızkıdır dedün”. Bayazıd Hana bu söz gayet acı geldi. “Bana mihnet mi edersiz” dedi. Atını depdi. Kulun arasından daşra çıkdı. Bilesince birkaç Yaya oğlanıyile bir niçe solak vardılar. Çağadayun alayını bir birine vurmağa başladılar…”
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However, during the battle, the soldiery of the other begs changed sides in favor of Timur.
Moreover, Bayezıd’s sons fled from the battlefield. Thus, they all betrayed him except his kuls; and Bayezıd was left alone in the battlefield with a number of his loyal yaya and solak soldiery and one of his kuls, Solak Karaca. Hence, Bayezıd I continued to fight with a number of his yaya oğlanı and solaks. Here, the loyalty of the kuls to the Sultan on the battlefield is reflected by Aşıkpaşazade with emphasis on the betrayal of all, except his kuls, who under no condition left him. This can be considered as an example of the importance of kul system in the Ottoman state.
In Neşri,339 who seemed to follow the same source as Aşıkpaşazade, we find the same account with an important addition. This can be regarded as a clue for Neşri who had operated Aşıkpaşazade’s source more fully. In Aşıkpaşazade, the identities of the kuls of Bayezıd I in the battlefield were not clear. However in Neşri, the direct reference to the term ‘janissaries’ and ‘solaks’ as the kapıkulu of the Sultan, indicated that the janissary corps were regarded among the hassa kapıkulus of Bayezıd I, who proved their loyalty to him.
On the other hand, in the Anonymous Tevarih, we find additional information on the same account.340 It was mentioned in the Anonymous Tevarih that Bayezıd I was left on the battlefield with a number of his kapıkulu, that is, ten thousand janissaries. It is known that the number of janissaries in 1480 was 10 thousand 341. So,
339 Neşri, Cihannüma I, 349-353 “…Bayezıd Han kendü kapusı halkıyle, kulları, Yeniçeri ve solaklarıyla kaldı…”
340 Anonymous Tevarih, 42-43 “…Andan Yıldırım Han yalnuz kendü kapusu halkıyla kaldı. Ol vakit Yıldırım Han’un onbin yeniçerisi varidi…”
341 Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600), (İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998),90
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this can be regarded as an example of the reliability of the Anonymous Tevarih when it comes to details.
On the other hand, the Anonymous Tevarih puts the same account which was found in Aşıkpaşazade and Neşri, in the mounth of a janissary, giving advice to Bayezıd I on the same battlefield.342 We read in the Anonymous Tevarih that, when Bayezıd I stood at the midst of the janissary corps on the battlefield, he was attacked by an unknown group.
As Bayezıd I wanted to take revenge on his soldiery who betrayed him, he decided to find them and fled away from the midst of the janissary corps. In that instance, one of the janissaries advised him not to go; however, Bayezıd I did not take his advice and hence was caught by Timur’s soldiery. The janissary whom the author of the Anonymous Tevarih portrayed as his source, stated that if Bayezıd would have taken their advice, neither he nor the janissaries would have been caught by Timur. In the chronic of Oruc, we have the shortest version of the same account described in the Anonymous.343
What can be inferred from the account is that the janissary corps began to interfere in the decisions of the Sultan at an early age. The accounts of the chroniclers can be regarded as an indication of a well-established kul system already early in the
342 Anonymous Tevarih, 43 “…Yıldırım Han bizim içimüzde tuturken geldiler, etitdiler: “Ne turursın, leşkerün hayin oldı, kaçdı gitdi” didiler. Heman kim bu haberi işitdi, gazaba gelüp el çomagına urup dahi alaydan çıkup ol leşkerün ardına düşmek istedi. “Hey hepsem ol alaydan çıkma” diyu gördük çare olup yinemedük. Alaydan çıkdı, yani kaçanları leşkerden döğe döğe gine laya getüre. Hemankim alaydan çıkdı, leşkerden hoz kimesne kalmamışdı. Bir zamandan sonra gördük küm tutmışlar, karşumıza getürdiler. Naçar biz dahi muti olduk. Eğer aramızdan çıkmaza umud vardı kim belki ele girmeyeydi. Ahşam oldugunlayın alup bir yana kaçar giderdük. Mal’lum değildi kim anı bizim içimüzden alabilirlerdi. Zira kim biz onbin yeniçeri idik, malum değüldi kim Timur leşkeri bizi tagıdaydı. Eğer Yıldırım Han söz tutaydı başına ol vakit ol vakıa gelmezdi. Hem bir dahi tutsak olup soyulmazdık…”
343 Oruc Beg, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 60-61 “…Yıldırım han kendi alayı halkı ve yeniçerisiyle kaldı…”
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fifteenth century with its instrument of the janissariy corps and solaks as part of the influential, loyal kapıkulus and hassa soldiery of the sultan.
Reign of Mehmed I and the Period of Interregnum
The early Ottoman chronics also present important information on the socio-political influence of the janisary corps on the Ottoman sultans and the pretenders in the period of interregnum. Though they were the loyal kapıkulu, their two-sided policy towards the Ottoman sultan and their real intention behind this issue is well reflected by the chronics.
Neşri states that, after the battle of Ankara in 1402, Mehmed I came to help his father with his own hassa soldiery which was enslaved by Timur. Mehmed I, who was then eleven, consulted his hass in order to save his father. Hence the hass, probably the janissaries, told him that they were ready to die for the Sultan, “Şaha, bizüm canımuz ve başımuz senündür.”344 Further in the account of Neşri, we read the janissaries giving battle tactics to Mehmed I in order to save Bayezıd I, which indicates not only the faithfullness of the corps, but also their martial intelligence.
344 Neşri, Cihannüma II, 367 “… Rivayet iderler ki, çün merhum Yıldırım Han Timur’la bir vakıa’ya uğrayub kaziyesi bu vechile olıcak, ol eyyamda Sultan Mehmed on bir yaşında idi. Tokat’ta olurdı. Çün Timur leşkeri galib olub, her kişiye kendü ehli ve iyali sevdası olub müteferrik olmuşlardı, bu dahi kendünün has askeriyle ve Rum dilaverleriyle sancağın çeküb, Timur’un askerin yarub çıkub, ‘azm-i Rum idüb, önüne gelen Tatar’dan bi-had ve bi-kıyas leşker kırub, gelüb Tokat’a yetişdi. Rum’a yitüşdikleri gün atasınun giriftar olduğın ve karındaşları nabedid olduğın ve memleket düşmanun ayağı altında payimal olub, ehl-i İslamı gaaret ve hasaret itdüklerinişidüb,gayret odı yüreğin yakub, mübarek gözleri yaşla tolub, ah ,düb, eytdi ki,: “Ey diriğ memleket-i Osman’a ki, düşmanun atı ayağında helak ola. Ve diriğ reayasına ki, vedayi-i hazret aferid-kardur, düşman elinde aciz ve sergerdan olmuşlardur. Ve Sultan babam dahi ‘aduv elinde giriftar olub, ol geçen ‘ıyş u nuş, niş olub, ferah teraha mübeddel olmuşdur”, diyüb ağladı. Andan haslarıyla şöyle müşavere itdi ki, kendüyi ‘aduv leşkerine ura, ya bir tarikle atasın kurtara ve yahud anun yolunda helak ola. Bunlar eytdiler ki: Şaha, bizüm canımuz ve başımuz senündür; yolunda feda olsun. Buyurdığınuz be-gayet boşdur, amma akılane maslahat oldur kim, bu düşman ki bu vilayete müstevli oldı, be-gayet çok leşkerdür, buna yakın olmak reva değüldür. Maslahat oldur kim, bunları ırakdan arkadan yürüyüb gözedelüm. Anun gibi halvet bulub ve leşker kenarında bulunanları cümle helak idelüm” didler. Sultan Mehmed bu tedbiri beğenüb asker-i Rumla kalkub, aşağı tarafa gitdi…”
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On the other hand, the following account in the Anonymous Tevarih indicates the real intention of the corps.345 In that account we have important information on the relation between Musa Çelebi and the janissary corps in the period of interregnum. The Anonymous mentions that Musa Çelebi was very generous towards his kulls and janissary corps. Here, the Anonymous narrates a vital depiction of Musa Çelebi as an example of his generosity . It was narrated in the Anonymous that Musa Çelebi was giving akçe with filori in a silver bowl to his kuls and the janissaries. Moreover, the Anonymous interestingly narrates that Musa Çelebi also distributed akçe and filori by putting it in the headgear, börks and üsküf of the janissaries so that the loyalty and support of janissary would have been maintained.
Furthermore, when some of the janissaries with their ağa turned to Mehmed’s side in the period of Interregnum, some janissaries and kuls stayed with Musa. Here the Anonymous must have inserted this anecdote about the money to show that the janissaries sided with Musa Çelebi because of money. There is no doubt that the main interest of the corps was always economic. Additionally, in the account of Anonymous, we find a hass kul of Musa named Derzi Saruca who was always with him until his death.346 Here the social function of the kuls as the comrade-in-arms and guardians of the Ottoman sultans is noteworthy.
345 AnonymousTevarih,, 54-55 “…Musa Çelebi gayet yavuz idi. Hem Rumililüyü sevmez idi, karındaşı yanında hayin geldikleriyiçün Ve illa kendü kulların severdi. Hem gayet cömerd idi. Şöyle rivayet iderler kim filoriyi akçayile karışdurırdı. Dahi yeniçeriye ve kendü kullarına bir gümüş sagrak içine toldururdı, dahi virürdi. Yahud başlarından börklerin çıkarurdı, dahi üsküf içine filoriyle akça koyardı, üleşdürirdi. Sonra Sultan Mehmed gelicek cümle girü Rumililüler hayin oldılar. Sultan Mehmed’e vardılar. Heman kendü kullarıyile yeniçeri kaldı. Cümle il Sultan Mehmed’e tapdılar. Çün iki Sultan beraber oldılar, gördiler kim hem yeniçeri kaldı. Yeniçeri eyitdi: “Gel seni alalum bir yana gidelüm” didiler. Uymadı. Ta hatta yeniçerinün agası dahi Sultan Mehmed’e kaçdı vardı. Hemin beraber olduk. Şöyle rivayet iderler kim çünkim agamız kaçtı, anda agamızun bir çuhadarı kaldı. Ol dahi tururken gafilin Musa Çelebi omuzına çaldı. Bir kolunu tutmaz eyledi. Ol dahi kaçdı gitdi. Çün Musa Çelebi kendüyi ol halde gördi, o dahi içimüzden çıkdı gitdi. Atı çamura çökdi. Bir kolu tutmaz oldı. Atını yinemedi ve hem kendi dahi yol bilmezdi, gayet yavuz çamurlu yirdi. Anda yirlisi acizdi…”
346 Anonymous, Tevarih, 55 “… Musa’nın bir kulu vardı, Derzi Saruca dirlerdi. Kendü kuliyidi…”
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On the other hand, we have the criticism of the establishment by iç oglanıs and Çandalı Ali and the men of ulema in the Anonymous Tevarih since they caused the intrigue in the state.347 It is no coincidence that the Ottoman society reacted to the establishment of a kul system made up of youths as echoed in the Anonymous. Within this perpective, we can also infer that the janissary corps was no doubt established as a counterbalance against the Turcoman forces in the hinterland at an early period. As the tools of a centralist regime, the janissaries, as the ‘men of the state’, served to strengthen the centralist policy of the Ottoman state. In any case, in the period of interregnum, the military groups were conscious of the fact that their status and prosperity strictly depended on the continuation of a centralized Ottoman administration. 348
The Role of of the Janissary Ağa in the period of Interegnum
The ağa of janissaries, chosen within the janissary hearth until the sixteenth century, was of the highest rank among the Ottoman officials in the central administration of the Ottoman state and the highest commander of the janissarry corps whom the sultan most trusted.349 It is important to note that in the Kavanin, the relation between the janissary ağas and the Sultan in the seventeenth century is well-stated in the passage on the graduation ceremony of the novices. As the Sultan Ahmed I stated, “I am the key and they (ağas of janissaries) are the lock” and “If I say I have
347Ibid,34, “…Heman ki Kara Halil oglı Ali Paşa vezir oldı, fısk u fücur ziyade oldı. Mahbub oğlanları yanına aldı, adını iç oğlanı kodı. Bir nice zaman ne gerekirse idüp çıkarup mansıb virdi…”
348 İnalcık, Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları, 130
349 Uzunçarşılı, Kapıkulu Ocakları I, 177. See Fatih Sultan Mehmed Teşkilat Kanunnamesi, Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri 1.Kitap, 317-318 and for their elkab 331
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the right to bring them to the gate, they know the worthy who would be taken to the gate” 350
On the other hand, Neşri presents information on the political roles of the janissary ağas in the period of Interregnum.351 Neşri narrates that in his struggle with his brother Süleyman Çelebi, Musa Çelebi decided to kill him. When Hacı Evrenos, the lala of Süleyman warned Süleyman that he would be killed by his brother Musa, Süleyman did not take the warning of Evrenos into consideration. Then Evrenos wanted Hasan Aga, the ağa of janissaries to warn him thinking that Süleyman might have taken ağa’s words into consideration.
In this account, Neşri signifies the influence of janissary ağas over the pretenders. However, Süleyman did not take his words into consideration as well, and ordered Hasan Ağa’s beard to be cut off. Hence, Hasan Ağa gets angry and states that “now that Süleyman Çelebi was no longer a statesman with felicity” and declared that he would be in the service of Musa Çelebi from then on and asked if there were any kapıkulu who would be with him for this adherence. Thus, Hasan Ağa, together with certain kapı oğlanı and a number of janissaries who heard of his call, adhered to Musa Çelebi. Here we see the two sides of the janissary ağa.
350 Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, 163 “… Ocağın kilidi bunlardır, anahtar benim, kapıya çıkarmak benim elimdedir. Eskilerini onlar bilir, kapıya çıkarmasını ben bilirim.”
351 Neşri, Cihannüma II, 482-485 “…Andan Musa Çelebi tamam yakın gelip, çerinin önü iki taraftan bir birine ulaşıp, savaşa başlayacak Hacı Evrenoz Emir Süleyman’a içeri giripi eyitti ki. “Ey şah-ı ‘alem Musa Çelebi gelip hayli asker perakende etti”, deyicek, eyitti ki: “Ey Hacı Lala, beni sohbetimden ayırma. Anın canı yoktur ki, bunda gelip, benimle mukabil ola”, dedi. Hacı Evrenoz çıkıp andan Hasan Ağa’ya eyitti ki: “Ey Ağa yörü, sen dahi var. Senin sözünü işidir ola”, dedi. Andan Hasan Ağa içeri girip söyliyeyin sınadı. Bunun sözü Emir Süleyman’a katı gelip heman emr etti. Hasan Ağa’nın sakalını yoldular. Andan Hasan Ağa taşra çıkıp, eyitti: “Ey Beyler ve ey ulular! Bu belalar bize nedir? Hürmetse ancak ola. Bu kişiden devlet ve saadet gitti. Şöyle bilmiş olasınız”, dedi. Hasan Ağa ol vakit yeniçeri ağası idi. Ve andan eyitti: “Hele bilmiş olasız ki ben Musa Çelebi katına giderim” deyip, “benimle gelen kapı oğlanı gelsin” dedi… mecmu’ Musa Çelebi’nin katına vardılar… Emir Süleyman’a haber yetişti ki, “Hasan Ağa külli yeniçeriyi ve kapı oğlanını alıp, karındaşın katına gitti…”
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Consequently, what can be inferred from the analysis of the above passages is that the janissariy corps and their ağa, as one of the most influential kuls of the sultan, began to play roles in the states’ policy, having influence on the decisions of the sultans at an early age. So, it is not as what Weber considers that is the arbitrary despotic power of the sultan who manipulates Ottoman policy in all spheres, but the influential status groups, like the janissary corps, who determined the decisions of the sultan, as reflected in the early Ottoman historiography.
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CHAPTER V
COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPORARIES
5.1) MEMLUK SYSTEM
The term memluk, derived from the Arabic verb, mulk; which means to have the right of possession or ownership; denotes to the one owned or the one in possession. Moreover, it also means a ‘white slave’.352 In the historical context, the term designates the special legal status of the war captives who were in the service of the Memluk state (1250-1517), possessing a special privilige and honor. So, similar to the connotations of ghulam and kul, the term memluk also designates the distinguished status of certain slaves who were in the service of the Memluk sultanate.
The main mentality behind the memluk system seems to have its roots in the near eastern tradition of the ghulam system. As will be seen below, the memluk system can be considered as a more developed form or rather the continuation of the ghulam system in the near east in the thirteenth century. Specifically, the significance of the Memluk state is that all the administrative and military apparatus were in the hands of the slave-originated memluks, including the sultan.
Therefore, the system can be regarded as a good example for how the “slaves” are developed into an aristocratic class of professional hassa soldiery and ruling class,
352 Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 922-923.
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and hence had power in government policy353. According to the common view, the main characteristics of the memluk system shared certain similarities with the Ottoman kapıkulu system, since the Ottoman kapıkulu organization is considered as a continuation of the ghulam and memluk systems. 354
A. Çetin, in his analysis of the memluk system, also shares the view that the Ottoman state presents a well-developed example of the memluk system. He further states that the status of the memluks in the Memluk state is similar to the status of the janissaries as the distinguished kuls of the rulers355. Within this context it is worth asking whether the main characteristics of the memluk system are identical or not to the Ottoman kapıkulu-janissary institution.
The memluks in the Memluk sultanate were mostly acquired through the purchasing of slaves from the Central Asian steppes and Caucasia. The qualified young slaves, either purchased or given voluntarily by the will of their parents, were brought to the presence of the Memluk sultan by the merchants.356 However, in the Ottoman case, the war captives as pencik oğlanıs or youths taken through devşirme, acquired under the direct control of a state official without any mediator from outside.
On the other hand, similar to the Ottoman practice, the memluks who were brought to the presence of the Memluk Sultan, took Turkish names and were subjected to religious and military education in special schools called tibak under a superviser, tavaşi. Afterwards, they went through a process of elimination and recruitment in terms of physical appearance and moral qualities; hence, they became a member of the Memluk Sultanate on condition of loyalty to his ruler357. This practice seems very similar to the çıkma in the Ottoman palace, where a constant mobility
353 Süleyman Kızıltoprak, “Memluk, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.29, (2004): 87-88
354 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions,112-113
355 Çetin, Memluk Devletinde Askeri Teşkilat,41-45
356 Ibid, 74-79
357 Çetin, Memluk Devletinde Askeri Teşkilat 86
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occurs within kapıkulu candidates after they finished their moral and physical education in Enderun, the inner palace.
However, the important and fundamental difference between the Ottoman kul sytem and the memluk system lies in the frequent change of the memluks in each accession. It is noteworthy that the most important task of the newly ascended Memluk sultan was to organize his own memluks and eliminate the ones of the preceeding sultan. However, in the Ottoman case, the newly ascending sultan hardly eliminates the former janissary corps. As mentioned earlier, the janissaries were always the ‘men of each legitimate sultan’ and the current government. The sultan could change, but the kapıkulu and the janissaries remain unchanged. This marks the fundamental difference between the memluk system of the Memluk Sultanate and the Ottoman notion of the kapıkulu system.
Nevertheless, like the Ottoman Sultan, the power of the Memluk sultans depended on the loyalty and quality of the memluks he owned as his principal supporters and an essential group who could execute his orders. Moreover, some of the memluks, who were qualified, became the Hasekiye of the Memluk sultan as his hassa soldiery or employed in his personal service in the palace. Hence, the Memluk sultan would have reserved himself a certain military hassa group called Hassekiye under his direct command.
It was this group, known also as the Memalik-i Sultaniyye, which constituted the kapıkulu soldiery of the Memluk sultan.358 Similar to the Ottoman janissaries of the hassa soldiery, the hasekiye, as the most distinguished group amongst the memluks, who were girdened with swords, kuşaklı-kılıçlı, occupied the intimates of
358 Uzunçarşılı, Methal, 414
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the Memluk sultan who had the power on accessions and symbolized the power of the reigning sultan359.
On the other hand, the social aspect of the memluk phenomenon as an individual status group within the society seemed to share similarities with the janissary hearth. Having lived in their tibaks under the control of their supervisor with special regulations peculiar to them, the life of a memluk was very similar to the life of janissaries, who lived in their special kışlas under the supervision of the ağa of janissaries. This no doubt did not prevent the occurrence of asabiyet, solidarity and huşdaşlık, brotherhood amongst the memluks, as we similarly observed in the Ottoman janissary corps.
Within this perspective, Weber’s description of the memluk identity is noteworthy. He pointed out the condition of memluks in the Memluk state as the ‘status groups’ within the state like the Ottoman janissary corps. As the household troops of a patrimonial state, they evolved into a closed caste as semi-autonomous traditional groups, whose corporate interests were an important factor in the struggle for power within the government.360
Consequently, the above discussion reveals certain similarities and differences between the Ottoman kul system and the memluk system in the Memluk sultanate . Within this framework, the impact of the memluk system on that of the Ottoman kul-kapıkulu system can be searched through the interaction between the Memluk and Ottoman states early in the fifteenth century.
When Murad I and Bayezıd I inclined to have good diplomatic relations with the Memluk sultans against their rivalry with the Karamanids and other principalities
359 David Ayalon, Memluk Ordusunun Yapısı Üzerine Araştırmalar I-II-II, trans. A.Mesut Ağar (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2015),19
360 Weber, Economy and Society I, 231-232
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in Anatolia who sided with the Memluks, this impact must have become foreground361I. Nevertheless, we can infer that the Ottoman notion of the kul system, although memluk impact can be observed, developed by their own practical needs peculiar to themselves.
5.2 Nökership in the Mongol-İlhanid Tradition
Nökership, as the comrade-in-arms and household servants of the Mongolian rulers, can be regarded as a good example of kul-sovereign relationship which was apparent in the Mongol and İlhanid states. However, it should be noted that nökership in the Turco-Mongol tradition is different from the classical ghulam-kul system in the near east. So, it is worth discussing the initial formation of Turco-Mongol nökership in the Mongol tradition within the framework of M.Bloch’s theory of ‘individual vassality’, that is, the boundage between the “weak” and the “strongest” . We believe, that the origins of the kul system had also its roots in this phenomenon of individual vassality.
To discuss it briefly, the idea of nökership lies in the notion of individual vassality, where one becomes the ‘man of the other’. In M. Bloch’s analysis of the relations of vassality in the early feudal Medieval Europe, this individual vassality is legitimized by a ceremony of hommage, biat; an oath of allegiance and by anda, an oath of loyalty to a ruler unto death, which symbolizes the dependence and protection of both sides. Hence, while one gets ready to obey and serve, the other is ready to offer him maintenance and protection. Bloch, labels this relationship in feudal terms
361 Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica No.2 (1954),123
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as follows: while the one becomes the ‘vassal’, the other becomes his ‘senior’ or ‘suzerain’362.
It is noteworthy that people have always desired to be under the protection of the stronger throughout the ages. As Bloch argues, especially in a circumstance that is lacking security and where the structure of a society is collapsing, specific structural safety units came into being as a result of this phenomenon. Hence, the weaker becomes under the protection of the stronger. On the other hand, Bloch argues that the stronger also needs the help of the weaker for the continuation of his prestige, wealth and security. Thus, one might see a mutual dependence in this contract.
However, for Bloch, ironically the weak is not only in the position of the vassal but also the protector. So for the weak, it is not only the desire to be under the protection of the stronger, but also the desire to get the command363. This we observe in all of the ‘status groups’ whose influence was heavily felt over the rulers and affairs of the state. Within this perspective, the phenomenon of individual vassality coincides with the mentality behind the ghulam-kul system in broad terms.
In both cases, we have a senior-suzerain relationship based on loyalty, protection, obedience and mutual benefit for each party. Moreover, we see how the “senior” became dominant over the “suzerain” in the examples of ghulams or kuls or how janissaries or other household troops interpolated into the affairs of the state as quite influential elements.
If we observe this phenomenon in the Mongolian state in the Cengizkhanid era onwards, we find the protogonists of this system in the house of Turco-Mongol states
362 March Bloch, Feodal Toplum, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay(Ankara:İletişim Yayınları, 1988),185-186
363 İbid, 188-9
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under different titles, such as boghol and nöker, that denotes broadly to a servant or bodyguard of slave or freedman who is bound to his master by personal ties.364 Similarly, their function as the comrade, protector, warrior or homeman of the rulers in the Mongolian society signifies the importance of nökers as a differentiated group within the Mongolian society as being the hereditary loyalties of the ancient steppe aristocracy.365
It is no doubt that Cengiz Khan derived his power from his talented nökers366. It is important to note that, a nöker in the Cengizhanid era could be of nomadic, sedentary, noble or of slave origin who in time acted as the members of imperial administration, both as the khan’s slaves and comrades367.
However, there did not exist any systematic acquisition and training in the Mongolian notion of nökership as it was in the ghulam-kul system. On the other hand, the role of nökers in shaping the military and feudal structure of the Mongol society like in the early Ottoman state is noteworthy. The nökers, discerned by being the comrade-in-arms of Cengiz Khan, constituted the core of his personal army; always accompanying him in the campaigns as his permanent guard forces.368 The case of the four famous nökers of Cengiz Khan, Cebe, Kubilay, Celme and Subetay, as being powerful commanders, proves this phenomenon. This can be compared to the case of the nökers around Osman Gazi as his comrade-in-arms.
364 Soudel, “Ghulam”, 1079
365 Rene Grousset,Stepler İmparatorluğu,Atilla, Cengiz Han, Timur, trans. Halil İnalcık (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2011), 231
366 Tat’jana Skrynnikova, “Boghol, A Category of Submission at the Mongols”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungariee, 58/3, (2005): 313-319
367Joseph Flecther,”The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 46/1, (1986), 20
368 B.Y. Vladimirtsov, Moğolların İçtimai Teşkilatı (Ankara: TTKYayınları, 1987), 66-67 Moğolların Gizli Tarihi, translated by Ahmet Temir (Ankara: TTK Yayınları,2010),146
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Within this framework, Weber’s theory of a charismatic leadership and patron-client solidarity in Eurasian steppes is noteworthy. As Weber stated, every leader starts his career with a warband of nökers recruited from allies or captured enemies bound to him by anda, oath of loyalty until death.369 As in the case of Osman Gazi, the nökers constituted the original household of Osman and the Ottoman ghulam, kul system of the later centuries, must have had its origins in the nöker institution370.
Moreover, as Golden stressed, this phenomenon can be regarded as “breaking the traditional tribal ties of kinship into a personal guard force based on loyalty to the ruler which was the characteristic of Medieval feudal socities and the nucleus of personal armies” 371
Finally, the function of the nökers as the personel men of the rulers in the early Mongol state is well-reflected in the contemporary source, The Secret History of Mongols. There existed slave servants in the household of Cengiz Khan, similar to the Ottoman men of kapıkulu. As the famous quotation from the Secrect History of Mongols echoed, “Let them be thy slaves in thy threshold, if they leave cut their heels, Let them be the servants in thy gate and if they leave thy gate cut their livers”. Here, Temir interprets the ones offered amongst the captured men to Cengiz Han, as the servants of threshold and kapıkulu372. It is no doubt that they, as the servants of Cengiz Khan’s gate, were to protect him.
Although the term gate is symbolic, referring to the place where the post was carried, the post of door-keeping was considered as an honorable post given to Cengiz Han’s retinue who were responsible for certain services like guarding and fighting for
369 Weber, Economy and Society,
370 İnalcık, “Comments on Sultanism”, 74
371 Peter Golden, “I will give the People unto Thee: The Cinggisid Conquests and their Aftermath in the Turkic World”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 21/41, (2000),25-26
372 Moğolların Gizli Tarihi, trans. Ahmet Temir (Ankara: TTK Yayınları,2010),146
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him and his clan373. Consequently, the notion of Turco-Mongol nökership no doubt contributes to the formation of Ottoman kul system in the early stage apart from its near eastern ghulam model.
The İlhanids (1256-1353)
When the Mongolian suzerainty became dominant in Anatolia in 1235 and successively the İlhanid sovereignty was realized after the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in the second half of the thirteenth century, the administrative traditions of Mongol-İlhanid statecraft, mingled with the Persian-Islamic state traditions, began to dominate Seljukid Turks, whose influence was felt down to the Ottomans.374 Within this atmosphere, an acculturation took place in terms of of nökership which already preexisted in Anatolia under the Seljukids of Rum. Thus nökership also seemed to be influenced by the ghulam system. If we consider nökership as ‘individual vassality’ of the kuls, as İnalcık stated, the Ottoman concept of kapıkulu institution seems closer to nökership than its Islamic counterparts.375
Though we hardly detect the classical form of ghulam system in terms of slave acquisition and training, as applied systematically by the İlhanids, there existed certain similarities between the nökership in the İlhanids and the ghulam-kul system. For one thing, slaves who had martial skills were taken by the ruler as his legal
373 Skrynnikova, “Boghol”,315-316
374 Köprülü,Byzantine Institutions, 37-38
375 İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”,120
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proportion of booty. Then they were employed either in the eastern provinces or taken directly into the service of the ruler as military forces or as administrative officials.376
For the others, a practice similar to devşirme regulation, which can be considered as a source for nökers, was also applied in the İlhanid state. Gazan Han was known to have taken one male child of a family for the army. Moreover, he purchased Mongol children to form a hassa force under his command. This way he had established a hassa army to reinforce the centralization of the state. 377 However, in the first years of the İlhanid state, one can hardly state that there was a systematic palace life and a strict organization of the army. The former tribal influences seemed to continue, although in the later stage the existence of soldiery called ketavul, as the salaried and hassa soldiery of the sovereign and a korucu as his bodyguard, was known to have existed.378
In any case nökers, as feudal aristocratic retainers and still functioning as military commanders or as palace officials, seemed to play an important role in the administrative and military structure of the İlhanid state. We also find boghols as the prototypes of nökers appearing as male servants or slaves in the service of İlhanids379.
Likewise in the early Ottoman vakfiyes, various references to nökers as eyewitnesses are observed in the vakf register of Cacaoğlu Nureddin, the emir of Kırşehir and Mongolian governor of Eskişehir in Anatolia in the thirteenth century380. This may indicate the role of nökers functioning like the early kuls of the Ottoman state. Similarly, in another contemporary source, Bezm u Rezm attributed to Kadı
376 Berthold Spuler,İran Moğolları (Ankara:TTK Yayınları, 2011), 453-4
377 Mustafa Uyar, “İlhanlı Devletinin Askeri Teşkilatı”, (PhD Thesis Ankara University, 2007),111-112.
378 Uzunçarşılı, Methal, 225
379 Spuler, İran Moğolları,300 and 435
380 Temir, Moğolların Gizli Tarihi,1959, 163
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Burhaneddin written in 1397/8, we find nökers functioning as the men of kapıkulu. There nökers appeared as the men of Kadı Burhaneddin and emirs as kapıkulu. In the aforementioned work, the expressions such as nökeran-i hassa and the kul, servant of the Sultan which were used for the nökers, indicate their role as the special intimates of the Sultan381. In the same work, we find nökers functioning also as the military retinue of the sultan or as the deputy of the Sultan as his guardians.382
5.3) The Late Byzantine Notion of Household Troops
The impact of Byzantine institutions in shaping the Ottoman institutions have been discussed by the Byzantine and Ottoman historians so far. It was mainly after 1453, after the conquest of Constantinople, that this assertion came to the foreground by Busbec, Gibbons, Mortdmann, Iorga and Hammer, who Köprülü thinks based their assertations on their prejudice and superficial observations done without any scientific criteria.383
As mentioned in the introductory part of the study, Köprülü admits Byzantine influence over the Ottoman institutions which took place as a result of the long period of interaction among them between fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Within this framework, the late Byzantine case is of importance in this issue in terms of the acculturation of military and administrative practices. So in this part we will look at the late Byzantine hassa soldiery and household troops to find out about this impact.
381 Esterabadi,Bezm u Rezm 1990, 175-6
382 Ibid, 440 and 297
383 Köprülü, “Byzantine Institutions”,16-26 The Byzantine effect on the Ottoman institutions was accepted as an axiom by some western historians specifically after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. The idea that it was only through the adoptation of Byzantine institutions that the “Asiatic Ottoman Principality” could established such imperial institutions based on the Byzantine heritage, is stronlgly opposed by Köprülü who stressed the point that the Byzantine state of the fifteenth century was no more than the corrupted version of the Eastern Rome.
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In the mid Byzantine period, although the mid and the late Byzantine period military forces were mostly characterized by the use of mercenaries, there existed certain groups of household troops to protect the emperor and the state, similar to janissary regiments in or outside the capital. As the early regiments of the Byzantine household troops in the seventh century, there were the ‘crack troops,’ which included the Buccellarii, Foederati and the Optimas384.
It should be mentioned that the units of those crack troops were initially under the control of their own leaders, who were mostly of native aristocrats; hence, their affection and loyalty were diverted to their leaders, rather than the emperor and the state.385 On the other hand, the success of emperor Heraclius against the Persians in the seventh century was considered to be the success of those crack troops, settled in various provinces of Asia Minor, who were then transferred into regular regiments under government control.386
As for a more systematic and regular force, we may cite the units of tagmata, created as a central rapid response force stationed in Constantinople and its environs, who were centrally paid and maintained by Constantine V (741-75). As the core of the central army, they functioned as the bodyguard troops within and outside the capital.387 As Haldon asserted, the tagmata units were established as a result of the
384 W.Ensslin, “The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire” in The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol.IV The Byzantine Empire, Part II Government,Church and Civilisation, ed. J.M.Hussey, at all, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 36
385 David Nicolle, Doğu Roma Orduları M.S. 306-886,trans. Buket Bayrı (İstanbul: T.İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 16
386 Ensslin, “The Government”, 39
387 Ibid, 39
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empire’s assertion of its military power in the east against Persian and Arab raids in the seventh to eighth centuries.388
Within this framework, tagmata units can be considered as the hassa retinue of the emperor, acting under a commander, domesticus, who played a vital military role as household troops until the eleventh century.389 Natives were preferred for the cadres of tagmata units in the initial stage, rather than the foreign troops or slaves. 390 It is noteworthy that, similar to the praetorian guards, the loyalty of tagmata units depends on their economic support by the emperor. They were the distinguished segments of the Byzantine army with better pay. Further, in the nineth century, when their function as the military decreased, they were mostly employed for ceremonial purposes.391
However, amongst the division of tagmata units, the (h)etaireiai was the real bodyguard of the emperor. Their name derives from the Greek word etairos, which denotes the ‘comrades’ or ‘comrade-in-arms’ of the emperor as his intimate retinue.392 As the direct continuation of the Roman foederati, they were recruited from foreign mercenary troops, mostly from the Germanic troops, Goths and Longobards, who accompanied the emperor on campaigns and ceremonies; and their existence can be discoverd in the sources until the last decades of eleventh century393.
388 John F. Haldon,”Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army C.550-950, A Study on the Origins of the Stratiotika Ktemata”, in Österreichishe Akademie der Wissenschaftten Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 357.Band, (Wien,1979), 84
389 Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army, 3-4
390 Nicolle, Doğu Roma Orduları, 36
391 Ibid,37
392 Ian Heath, Bizans Orduları 900-1461,trans. Buket Bayrı (İstanbul:T.İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014),15
393 Enslinn, “The Government and Administration of Byzantine Empire”, 39-41. There were also the soldiers of muslim origin as the hetaireiai, at the nineth century, Nicolle,Doğu Roma Orduları, 37.
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In any event, we do not have any information whether they were recruited or trained systematically similar to the ghulam-kul system in the near eastern tradition. It is noteworthy that as the distinguished segment of the tagmata sections, their cadros were sold at high prices. Thus, this shows that to be an hetaireiai, that is, to become the direct retinue of the emperor, must be advantegous.
On the other hand, regarding the status of hetaireiai, Birkenmeir states that they should not be considered among the tagmatic troops since they were not picked but rather attached to the emperor in some way, although they did have a formal elite status. They, as extra-heavy shock troops, served as special mission attachments, who were organized ethnically, but not trained and regularized like the other tagmatic troops of the following centuries.394
In the following centuries, tagmata units were divided into individual formations, each with a specific duty. Then in the late period, we find the tagmata units under the title of allagia or rather under vasilikon allegian, connoting both to the imperial escort guarding the emperor on campaigns and the mobile regiments in the provinces.395 Within this framework, the new units of allagia, like the tagmata regiments, can also be considered as the hassa forces of the late Byzantine state.396
Nevertheless, considering the complexity of late Byzantine army in terms of the inner and external problems in the fourteenth century, one can hardly search for one standing army which would protect and defend the whole territory of the Byzantine borders. So, tagmata regiments under various titles and subdividions portrayed individual small standing armies scattered around the provinces.
394 John Birkenmeir,The Development of the Komnenian Army 1081-1180 (Leiden: Brill,2002) 124-5
395 Savas Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium, 1204-1453 (Leiden: Brill,2011), 84-5
396 Heath,Bizans Orduları, 25
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Therefore, the allagia units, as infantry and cavalry regiments, seemed to serve not only as the bodyguard of the emperor, but also as the troops that guarded the city walls and the palace. However, one can hardly mention the systematic acquisition and training in the cadros of allagia units like in the classical ghulam-kul system in the near east.
On the other hand, the late Byzantine army was mostly characterized by the employment of foreign mercenaries who, until the mid fifteenth century, infiltrated not only into the sections of the army, but also most of the palace units. We may state that they constituted the ’hassa regiments of foreigners,’ who acted not only as household troops of the emperor and the palace, but also functioned as the essential military forces of the late Byzantine army. It should be noted that some mercenaries remained in Constantinople as ‘Imperial Mercenaries’ to protect the imperial city as the hassa bodyguard397
In the work of M. Bartusis, who studied the late Byzantine palace guards thoroughly, we find many ethnic-groups of foreign mercenaries employed as palace servants, although their status and function were rather vague in the late Byzantine sources. 398 The following groups are noteworthy in terms of their function as the household troops and their role in acculturation process. Within the perspective of the study, apart from the Varangian guard, we may cite the Vardarioati and a certain group of Catalans as palace guard units in the service of the Byzantine state, roughly from the tenth to the eleventh centuries.399
397 Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army, 237. For details see Part II: The Army as an Institution, Palace Guard, Garrisons, Borders, 271-306
398 Ibid, 269
399Ibid, 279-280
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The Varadarioti, as a group of palace guard, were actually Persians by race from the Vardar River. Whether they were Turks that are considered to be Persians in the Byzantine sources, or whether they were Hungarians (whom the Byzantines called the “Turks”) settled along the Vardar valley during the tenth century is disputable.400 Nevertheless, we follow them in the sources until the mid-twelveth century as an armed palace guard unit401. Moreover, as the entourage of the emperor, their duty was to keep people orderly in the ceremonies as imperial servants.402
We may also mention a group of Catalan troops who functioned as palace guards in the late Byzantine state. A very interesting assertation regarding a group of Catalan palace guards about their origins with the janissary corps is noteworthy. According to the account of contemporary Byzantine chronicler, N. Gregoras (1295-1360), some Catalan sailors remained in Constantinople after the Venetian-Genoese war in 1352. Gregoras writes that the emperor Kantakouzenos gathered 500 of them and armed them as a light infantry unit and made them his bodyguard.
However, as Pseudo-Kodinos narrates, they were not employed in any of the palace guard units but were recruited as the personal guard of the emperor.403 E. Zachariadou has an hypothesis regarding this Catalan group. According to her, the Ottoman term ‘janissaries’ , derived from the name of this Catalan group, who were named as the ianitzaroi. She states that the terms originally derived from the Latin word janizzarie, janizzeri or janua which denotes to the ‘porte’ or ‘light cavalry’ in the thirteenth century Europe. The term also exists in various forms as the genetari, giannetario or janizzeri in Greek, which is the equivalent of janitor in Latin, denoting
400 Kyriakidis,Warfare in Late Byzantium,114, Bartusis,Late Byzantine Army, 280
401 Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium,114-5
402 Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army279
403 Ibid,284
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the name of a Berber tribe of Zanata in Spain whose members were light infantry and served as the lowest level of imperial servants404.
Zachariadou bases her evidence on the memoirs of S.Syropoulos, who served as a member of the council of Florance between 1438-1439. He narrates that there existed a group called “janissarry’ as the retinue of emperor Ionnes Paleliologus (1425-1448) in his trip to the council in Florance.405 Moreover, Zachariadou asserts, based on Pachymeres, that this Catalan group came into the Byzantine service as the guard personel of I.Kankakuzenos VI and served him with loyalty until 1354406.
Furthermore, as mentioned by Syropolous, there were groups of troops known as the janizzeri in western Europe in the fourteenth century who later served the Byzantine state towards the end of the same century as a separate group apart from the stratiotes.407Thus, Zachariadou, using this as an evidence, stated that the term ‘janissary’ was actually the transliteration of the name of this Catalan group who were in the service of the Byzantine state in the late fourteenth century and she argues that the Ottomans transferred this term for their newly established corps as a result of their interaction with the Byzantines.
Zachariadou further asserts that, at the time of the existence of this group in the Byzantine service, the Ottoman janissaries had not yet been established408. So, she considers this to be the Byzantine impact on the Ottoman naming of its infantry.
404 E. Zachariadou “Les janissaires de l’empereur byzantin”, in Zachariadou Romania and the Turks No.XI (London,1985), 594. The Spanish terms as the genets, ianets or cavallers connotes to light armed cavalry in the west. Moreover, in Catalan the term as genetari or ginetari en catalan, as genetaire or genetayre or ianetaire in French and giannetaire or gianetario or giannettiere in Italian.
405 Zachariadou, “Les Janissaires”,591
406 Ibid, 596. See Slyvester Syropoulos, Les Memoires du Grand Ecclesiarque de l’Eglise de Constantinople Slyvestre Syropoulus sur le concile de Florance (1438-1439), ed. V.Laurent (Rome,1971)
407 Zachariadou, “Les janissaries”, 597
408 Ibid, 597
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According to Zachariadou, the Turkish impact on the Byzantine practices was very vague in that period. Moreover, for her, the Byzantines would probably not transfer the name of an Ottoman regiment for their own, whom they recall with hatred409
On the other hand, according to M.Daş, who had first commented on this issue, the Ottoman term no doubt is the transliteration of the Turkish term yeni-çeri, çeri refering to ‘soldier,’ already existing in the pre-Islamic Turkish. On the other hand, for him, the Turkish interaction with the Byzantines had already began before the Catalan guard was active in the Byzantine state. So the hypothesis of Zachariadou seems invalid.410
Regardless, we may assume that the term yeniçeri, like the term kul, has no equivalent in English; not only in terms of its actual connotation but also ofetymology. The term ‘janissary’ rather sounds like the distorted version of the Turkish yeniçeri in a western accent. Consequently, to conclude in an accurate manner, the term needs further interpretation by the linguists. Also, the interpretation of the term ianitzaroi by Zachariadou needs to be further evaluated by the linguists.411 Although words could have similar connotations in several languages throughout the centuries within cultures, we may hardly accept the hypothesis of the change in the accent of the word from the iannatzaria to janissary.
If we continue to analyze the palace guards in the late Byzantine state, the reasons for their disappearance give us clues about their organization. For one thing, it was diffucult for them to adapt to a new ruler or the new emperor when the new emperor might have wanted to create his own personal guards. In addition, there were
409 Zachariadou, “Les janissaries”, 595
410 M.Daş, “Osmanlı Tesiri ile Bizans Sarayında oluşturulan Yeniçeri Muhafız Birliği Hakkında”, Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi, No.12, (2002),293-304
411 For the ethimology of the word, See the aforementioned dictionaries mentioned in Zachariadou 594, ft.12
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difficulties in recruiting manpower for these guards; and finally, at times it was hard for the state to finance them.412
Thus, we can infer that as we observed in most of the household troops, the acquisition of manpower for the palace guards did not portray a systematic conscription and training under the control of a centralized government in the late Byzantine era. Hence, they were not regular, permanent guards but subject to change and dismissal upon the will of the new emperor. So, their status did not seem to offer such advantages as their ghulam-kul counterparts in the near east and in the Ottoman janissary regiments.
5.4) Byzantine Turkish Acculturation in the Fourteenth Century
The Byzantine frontiers which had been exposed to many raids by various ethnic groups, such as the Slavs, Persians, Arabs and the Turks starting by the seventh century up to fourteenth no doubt shaped the demography and military and administrative structure of the Byzantine state. This view is supported by Demirkent, who thinks the states encircling the Byzantine state must have reflected their impact.413 Within that context, we may state that the inevitable interaction along the borders helped shape the military structure of all parties.
As Köprülü mentioned, essentially the Sasanid and later the Arab influence over the Byzantine institutions are significant in the organization of their military.414 Moreover, Ostrogorsky also admits Sasanid influence, but argues that it was not as
412 Bartusis , Late Byzantine Army,272
413 Işın Demirkent, “Bizans”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol.6, (1992), 230-244
414 Köprülü, Byzantine Institutions, 30
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dominant as it was thought to be.415 However, it is noteworthy that the Abbasid frontier system of defence, avasım as the continuation of the Sasanid defence system, must have an impact on the organization of the Byzantine frontier system of limitai, apart from its Roman models.416
Furthermore, the employment and the settlement of foreign mercenary groups to maintain permanent military forces in various sections of the military regiments or granting of pronoia welcomes the introduction of Western and Turkish military practices to the Byzantine army before the fourteenth century.417
Considering the vivid interaction between the Turkish troops and the Byzantines in Asia Minor in the fourteenth century, it would be meaningful to have a look at the late Byzantine army in terms of acculturation of martial habits. This interaction no doubt led to the intermingling of martial habits. It was also by the fourteenth century that local governers of Byzantine cities and provinces in Asia Minor started cooperating with Turkish principalitites.418
A vivid scene for this interaction was the close relationship between Umur Pasha of Aydın principality and Kantakouzenos. The latter, admitting the impossibility of facing the strength of the Turkish military, decided to lead a policy of appeasement and cooperation with the Turks. Thus, he relied on Umur’s military assistance, as well as other Turkish groups.419Within this context, the existence of Umur’s archers as part of tagmata units in the Byzantine army is noteworthy.
415 Ostrogorsky, The History of the Byzantine State, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1956)
416 For the interaction between the Byzantines and the Arabs on the frontier line, see J.Haldon and H.Kenney, “Arab Byzantine frontier in the eight and nineth centuries:Military Organization and Society in the Borderlands,”, ZRVI , 19(1990)79-116
417 Batusis, Late Byzantine Army, 6-7
418 Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantiım, 28
419 Ibid,39
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When Umur Pasha assisted Kantakouzenos in 1345 at the battle of Peritheorion, he took the right flank with his Turkish archers, and Kantakouzenos stayed at the center with the group of Turkish soldiery, probably with the Alans and the Turkopoli, and Byzantine troops420. In the same battle we find Asen as the commander of the ‘imperial retinue’ of the emperor that was composed of the members of the ruling elite, holding the left wing with the Byzantine heavy cavalry.
It is noteworthy that, in the account of Enveri’s Düsturname-i narrating the activities of Umur Bey of Aydın Principality in the fourteenth century, we find the same Asen, the Byzantine commander who had close relations with Kantakouzenos, commanding the Byzantine forces with the emperor Andronicus III (1328-1341) at the campaign of Gallipoli in 1332.421
On the other hand, as a result of the interaction between the Byzantine and Turkish soldiery, we find the practice of taking ‘one-fifth’ as the ratio of the booty reserved for the Byzantine emperor. As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, originally the ratio of the one-fifth of booty reserved for the rulers was a pre-Islamic Arabic custom traced to antiquity, where the chief of the campaigners took the one-fifth of the spoils and the rest was divided amongst the raiders. 422
Within this context, the following discussion on the origin of the hums, as the ‘one-fifth,’ is noteworthy to evaluate its origins and its transference to the Byzantine state. Before the battle of Badr at 624 AD, the Prophet had free choice to divide the
420 Bartusis,Late Byzantine Army, 256. It is noteworthy that the battle formation of the Byzantine army mostly being light-armed infantry like the janissary troops resembled to that of the Ottoman formation of division of troops into three segments as the left, right and the center.
421 Düsturname-i Enveri, 61 “…Geliboluya Esen tekfura çun hakim olur Haktan şeh-i Mansur çun” “Çün Geliboluya çıkdılar guzat gördiler kim leşker olmuş kayinat” “Ol Esen tekfur ola elli bin er cem ıldı karşu çıkdı kopdı şer…”
422 Abdülaziz Sachedina, “Al-Khums: The Fifth in the Imami Shi’i Legal System”,Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol.39 No.4 (1980), 277. For this see also Norman Calder, “Judicial Authority in İmam Shi’i”, Bulletin of British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.6 No.2 (1979):104-108
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booty based on Arab customary law. However, since there was chaos among his followers regarding the distribution of spoils, upon the decision of divine legislation of the jurists, it was decided that one-fifth would be the portion of Allah, then the others would be divided among the nearest kin of the Prothet, and the rest to be distributed to the orphans and the poor.423
In an account of Kantakouzenos, narrating Andronicus III’s campaign against the Albanians in Epiros in 1338, we read him stating; “it was customary that the ‘one-fifth’, (pempte moira) of booty should be given to the emperor as a reward and an equal part to the megas domestikos, as he was the head of the whole army.”424
Similary in another account of Kantakouzenos, narrating the current situation after the Byzantines defeated the Albanians with Umur’s aid, we find similar expressions about the ratio taken by the emperor. When a great portion of the booty was left behind for them, we find the expression as “earlier in his experience it had been the custom for the army, whenever it won, more or less booty that the best fifth was granted to the emperor” and he continues as “but this time they did not do customary things”. 425
What could Kantakouzenos mean by the phrase ‘customary’? In the aforementioned statements, considering that Kantakouzenos had composed his work in the fourteenth century, he must have referred to the older Byzantine practice by stating that “it was the earlier custom to take best fifth of booty as the right of the emperor”. This suggests that the Byzantines encountered such non-Byzantine practices earlier than fourteenth century.
423 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (London: Oxford University Press,1995),121.
424 Kyriakidis, Warfare in Byzantium, 146-7
425 Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army, 249
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Moreover, in the account of an other contemporary work, Pseudo-Kodinos, we read, “ From the booty (koursos), first a fifth (pentamoiria) is given in the name of the emperor, a second portion on behalf of the entire army to the megas domestikos and a third to the division leaders, form the division each commands”426 So it is apparent that in both sources we find the same ratio of ‘one-fifth’ as the commander’s or the emperor’s portion in the Byzantine state. However, It is noteworthy that the portion of booty varied as ‘one sixth’ or ‘one tenth’ in the Byzantine sources of the tenth century.
In the Taktika of Leo VI compiled in the first half of the tenth century, we find the ratio of booty as ‘one-fifth’ as well. 427 Considering that Taktika contains many references to Islamic tradition as a result of the Arab raids in the seventh century, it must have been the Arab-Islamic influence on the Byzantine practice of portioning ratio of the booty. This practice was also seen in Muslim Spain and in the practices of the Catalan company based in Gallipoli.428
Within this framework, the reference to the ratio as ‘one-fifth’ in Kantakouzenos and Psedo-Kodinos must have traced to the old practice which was still in use when Taktika was compiled in the tenth century. Now, it becomes meaningful why Kantakouzenos uses the term ‘customary’ for practice of one fifth. So, it must have been the Arabic-Islamic influence over the Byzantine in the seventh century that this practice was transferred to the Byzantines.
Moreover, considering the alliance with Umur and Kantakouzenos, it must also be the impact of the Turkish principality of Aydın Bey, where this practice of
426 Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium,147
427 Ibid, 147-148
428 Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium,148
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one-fifth was in use. 429 On the other hand, we cannot answer whether it was only the booty taken on the ratio of one-fifth or whether there were any slaves taken using this ratio too. Considering that the Byzantine emperor Manuel served as a vassal in the porte and in the army of Murad I in the last decades of thirteenth century, and Orhan Beg had sent 10 thousand troops under the command of Süleyman Pasha to help Kantakuzenoz, the transference of various practices seems a natural outcome of these interactions . 430
On the other hand, whether there existed a model of devşirme or the recruitment of war captives as slave forces for the Byzantine army is another important issue to be discussed. The Byzantine emperor Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969) was known to have baptised certain Muslim children for military purposes in the tenth century. As Dela Jonquire indicated, Nicopheros Phocas was known to collect and baptise and then train ten thousand Muslim children for military purposes in 962.431
Moreover, we find in the Taktika of Leo VI that a certain group of Slavs were baptised and trained for the purpose of military manpower in the tenth century.432 Furthermore, in the reign of John Vatetzes (1193-1254), Cumans in Asia Minor were recruited as war captives for the purpose of settling them as peasant soldiers.433 The settlement of different ethnic groups for the defence of the borders, or to colonize a certain area in the Byzantine state was a common phenomenon of the late Byzantine
429 Düsturname-i Enveri, 59-60 “…ol ganimetden kamu şadan olur, gece yedi içdi yatdi iki emir, subh dem göndürdi verdi çok esir, geldi şehrine Hızır Beg namdar, kıldı paşaya du’a leyl ü payan, penc ü yek kim çıkdı yok payan u had…”
430 Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 504-5 and 487
431 A.S.Atiya, Niğbolu,161
432 Taktika of Leo VI, 471
433 Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army,208
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period.434 In any case, with respect to the ethnic composition of the Byzantine army, this policy must have contributed to the process of acculturation within cultures. However it is hard to state exactly who transferred from whom.
434 Bartusis, “On the Problem of Smallholding Soldiers”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 44, (1990),24
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
As a result of this comparative analysis, we concluded that the recruitment of slave-originated foreign troops as salaried, permanent, regular forces to be used for military, administrative and ceremonial purposes, was a phenomenon which was mostly seen in the near eastern states. Hence, in such a system we observed a transition from “slavery” to kulluk in the status of those slave-originated kuls who were differentiated from the ordinary slaves by being the special servants of the rulers. It can be inferred that the janissaries, as the hassa kuls of the Ottoman sultan, were probably aware of their distinguished status and power over the state affairs by an early period.
In the near eastern states, we observed the existence of such court-based imperial household soldiery under different titles, such as mürtezika in the Emevid and Abasid states, ghulaman-i saray, ghulaman-i hassa or ghulaman-i sultan in the Ghaznevid state, ghulaman-i dergah, ghulaman-i yayak, Halka-i hass, mülaziman-i yatak and yayak or müfrade in the Seljukid states, and Memalik-i sultaniye or Hasekiye in the Memluk sultanate. We find the similar category of hassa soldiery of
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household troops under the title of kul or kapıkulu with its special connotation to ‘janissary’ corps in the Ottoman state.
On the other hand, we observed that similar household troops that existed in the Roman-Byzantine states did not have a thoroughly distinguished status; hence, they were different from their counterparts in the sense of the classical ghulam-kul system in the near eastern tradition. For one thing, it was the ‘systematic’ recruitment and training of foreign troops, mainly of ‘slave’ origin, who constituted the core of these hassa household troops in the near east, as well as in the Ottoman state. For the other, the difference in the classical ghulam-kul system was that the kuls in the near eastern tradition could be promoted to high ranks within the statecraft, either as military commanders or as high officials in the administration. Hence, the term kul designates to a grander class of ‘military’ in the near eastern tradition.
However, likewise in the near eastern states, including the Ottomans, the Roman-Byzantine household troops, the legioneries, praetorian guard, the Varangians, the tagmata units and the heteriatia and the allegia, were effective groups over the states’s affairs and accessions; and they were the essential tools in the centralization process, reinforcing the ruler’s power against native elements. Thus, similarly they offered mutual advantage and prestige to both sides. Additionally, their loyalty, like their ghulam-kul counterparts in the near east, mostly depended on their economic interests.
For the late Byzantine impact on the Ottoman institutions, which have been rather a debatable issue discussed by the Byzantine and Ottoman histrorians so far, we concluded that, it seems that it was mostly the Turkic-Islamic practices that might have impact on the Byzantine practices. This was apparent in the case of the ‘one-
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fifth’ of booty the Byzantine emperor had taken as a result of the raids in the fourteenth century, or as in the similar regulation of devşirme applied by N. Phocas who collected and baptised Muslim, and Slav children for military purposes in the tenth century. We also find that Umur’s archers fought as part of tagmata units in the Byzantine army in the fourteenth century, which must have contributed to this acculturation process.
So apart from its near eastern model, the Ottomans seemed to be influenced by the notion of nökership in the Turco-Mongol tradition already existing in Anatolia in the early fourteenth century. We find such household troops under the title of boghol or nöker in the Cengizkhanid era and ketavul or nökeran-ı hassa in the İlhanid state. Although they functioned in a similar way compared to their counterparts in near eastern tradition, they were not systematically recruited and trained for the state’s service. We can say that the notion of nökership seemed to be transferred to Anatolia by the way of İlhanids, and then the Seljukids down to the Ottomans.
Within this perspective, we observed that, Köse Mihal, as a nöker to Osman Gazi, can be an early example of the hassa soldiery and kul identity in the Ottoman state in the early fourteenth century. Formerly, a Christian prince who later converted and took the name Abdullah, a name generally given new converts, Köse Mihal became the intimate retinue of Osman Gazi in the early fourteenth century.
Besides that, when we analyze the early vakf registers further in the fourteen and fifteenth centuries, we determined many references to the name Abdullah, who were assigned as kuls, not only in the palace service, but also in the military and administrative apparatus under the titles, hadim, enunch, tavaşi, hazinedar, treasurer and miralay early in the fourteenth century. This may indicate their non-Muslim slave
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origin, although Abdullah was also a name frequently given to the muslims. Hence, we may infer that a prototype of kapıkulu and palace organization had already been established early in the fourteen hundreds.
In addition, we determined that the name Abdullah was given to two janissaries in a vakf register of 1385. Finally, we found in a vakf register of 1425 that the name Abdullah was given to a sekbanbaşı of the janissary corps coming from the novice barrack. Consequently, we may assume that the Ottoman kapıkulu organization seemed to take shape by the end of fourteenth century by assigninig slave-originated kuls to the state’s service.
So, it seems that the Ottomans had established their kul-kapıkulu system with their own peculiarities. First of all, we may assert that the formation of a slave-originated hassa soldiery on a permanent standing basis signifies a departure from the Turcoman-yaya corps, who were considered as the first hassa soldiery of the early Ottoman state, but were actually native Turcoman peasant soldiers and served on a temporary basis.
Thus, the creation of a slave-originated court-based permanent regular force from the foreign kuls under the direct command of the sultan designated to a new stage in the formation of the Ottoman kapıkulu institution developing under the impact of the near eastern tradition in the second half of the fourteenth century. Moreover, it was the practical solution found by the Ottomans to utilize war captives to meet the needs of a hassa army under the direct command of the sultan for their further conquests.
On the other hand, when we look at the memluk model, which is thought to stand as the closest model to the Ottoman janissary-kul example, there exists a
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fundamental difference. Unlike the memluk system, where upon the accession of each new sultan, the cadros of memluks change, the Ottoman janissary-kuls remain untouched. Therefore, we may state that the Ottoman men of kul-janissay troops were actually the ‘men of the state’ or rather the ‘men of each legitimate sultan.’ This occupies the fundamental difference between the Ottoman notion of the kul system with that of the memluk model.
Consequently, for the first objective of the study, we may infer that the conceptual origins of the Ottoman kapıkulu of hassa soldiery was mainly shaped under the impact of near eastern tradition, as well as by Turco-Mongol nökership. Thus, a specific typology of kul identity was established by the Ottomans for the practical needs by pursuing a subtle policy for the development and the control of such household troops in the janissary model – as hassa kuls - under a centralist policy.
With regards to the second objective of the study, for the process of the establishment and the socio-political and military roles of the early janissary corps as the hassa soldiery in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, we observe that the early Ottoman historiography presents authentic information. However, they, as the historiographers of the state, are to be evaluated with caution, since there exists certain legitimizations and amendments, like additions or omissions of certain events reflecting the current Ottoman policy.
Anonymous Tevarih is the only source where we find a different perspective in certain accounts, which is natural reflecting the opposite public opinion. Therefore, the chronics are to checked and completed by other sources like Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan, kanun codes and memoirs for a total historical squence and also to
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eliminite anachronisms. We observe that all are complementary to each other, containing details which the other lacks.
Within this framework, we concluded that the janissary corps as pencik oglanıs were probably first recruited in 1363, after Murad I ascended the throne, a date in comformity with the first regulation of pençik. The role of prominent men of ulema like Çandarlı Halil and the Kara Rüstem, who were accustomed to Persian-Islamic traditions, and the important role of the frontier beg Evrenos, who was accustomed with the life on the frontiers, were also mentioned and stressed by early chronics in the formation of janissary-kul model. This also signifies their role on the acculturation of near eastern practices to the Ottomans.
Therefore, by the formation of a hassa soldiery of household troops under the name ‘janissary’, the new-troop, we find a new special category of ‘slave soldiery,’ who were more than ordinary slaves, as part of a special system known as the kapıkulu institution early in the fourteenth century Ottoman state.
Hence, the slave-originated kuls as the special servants of the Ottoman sultans constituted a grander class of hassa soldiery, who were distinguished by their ‘white headgears’, ak börk as a symbol of their hassa status designating nobility and dependence to the sovereign. Here, we detect Aşıkpaşazade’s effort to put emphasis on the role of the Vefaiyye order in the creation of ‘white headgear’ in Bilecik at the time of Orhan Gazi, rather than the Bekthasi influence on this issue.
On the other hand, this phenomenon is reflected through grandeur personalities like Timurtaş Pasha who was thought to be the descendant of Hacı Bektaş in Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan. This emphasizes the hearth’s affiliation with Bektashism and can be regarded as an attempt made by the source to legitimize and to
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avoid the anachronism of the time gap between Hacı Bektaş and the creation of janissary hearth.
For the second objective of the study, with regards to the early socio-political roles of the janissary corps, we concluded that the early Ottoman historiography, the Gazavatname-i Sultan Murad Han of the fifteenth century and the memoirs of contemporary figures, presented reliable information and details. Their sources were mainly the eye-witnesses of the current situation. What we can infer from the sources mentioned above is that, as a status group, the loyalty and the motivation of the janissaries to the sultan as his “devoted kuls” were mainly based on their economic concern. Additionally, their influence over the pretenders and the sultan’s decisions was significant. We also observed the critical role of the janissary ağa, his two-sided policy and the reflection of his relation with the Ottoman sultan by the symbolism of ‘key’ and the ‘lock’.
On the other hand, we find that Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan as a seventeenth century source, presents information on the early stages of the novice barrack which the chronics lack. In this source, we find the portrayal of the janissary-kul identity in conformity with the near eastern traditionm as being the rootless, single and unqualified novices to become good and loyal soldiers.
Moreover, we learn from Kavanin the importance of state-sealed firearms symbolizing ‘state dependency,’ which could only be used by the hassa soldiery or hünkar kulu who came through çıkma. Therefore, we may conclude that in the later stage, ‘fire-guns’ became the symbol of hassa soldiery apart from the ‘white headgears’.
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Furthermore, regarding the military role of the early janissary corps, we see that it is mostly the foreign memoirs that give information on the battle tactics and martial skills of the corps for this early period. Considering that they could hardly be ‘objective’ in their criticisms of the Ottoman side, however, the foreign observers admire the corps’s bravery as disciplined and regular light infantry, as opposed to the heavy-armed cavalry of the crusading forces as the accounts on Kosova and Nicopolis indicated.
Additionally, we also learn from the memoirs that the janissary corps fought in the form of phalanx scathered on each side of the battlefield with the tactics of ambush, crescend, retreat and camouflage as well as by throwing arrows and firing of cannons. It is noteworthy that we find cannons as firearms for the first time at the battle of Kosova, as narrated in the Anonymous Tevarih, which must have followed the Neşri-Ahmedi tradition.
Finally, we determined that Schiltberger, who wrote on the early Ottoman military and palace structure as an eyewitness, could be an early example of a solak soldiery who later became solakbaşı. As verified by Kavanin, solaklık, as a distinguished hassa regiment whose members functioned as the guardians of the sultan and for military and cereomial functions, was established in the age of Bayezıd I.
Consequently, by this comparative analysis of studies of the structure of the most of the household soldiery, we observed a similar pattern in terms of their structure, service, influence over the rulers, and their loyalty on the condition of the economic concerns. However, the systematization and equilibrium in terms of loyalty and autonomy of the status groups seemed to be well-balanced under the centralist
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Ottoman policy in the janissary-kul model which distinguished itself from its pre-Ottoman near eastern and Turco-Mongol models. Therefore, as seen throughout the study, the comparative analysis of various structures “seemingly similar” helps us to identify the peculiarities of the case discussed with an analytical look on the issue.
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