451

Keywords: Macedonian Question, banditry, Tahsin Uzer, memoir, Young Turk
The Macedonian Question greatly impacted the last fifty years of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman Macedonia, where the interests of the Great Powers and the Balkan
states clashed, became a conflict zone that was terrorized by nationalist and separatist
movements and waged a bloody fight for control since the last quarter of the
19th century. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire could not produce effective
and permanent solutions, although it fought military and political struggles against
the bandits in Macedonia. At a young age, first, being the district manager and
then the district governor, aka Kızan District Governor Tahsin Bey, was one of the
Ottoman bureaucrats who worked in risky areas during the most intense period of
banditry activities. The memoir Tahsin Bey wrote years later is important in providing
a better understanding of the different aspects of the banditry in Macedonia.
This study examines the bandit activities in Macedonia, the lives of villagers and
townspeople in the shadow of separatist-revolutionary committees, and the administration
of the Ottoman Empire in the region through the memoir of a Young Turk,
district governor. While examining the bandits and Ottoman rule in Macedonia
through Tahsin Bey’s eyes, the elements that shaped Tahsin Bey and his narrative
and the possible effects of these elements on Tahsin Bey’s Macedonia are discussed.
iv, çete, Tahsin Uzer, hatırat, Jön
Türk
Makedonya Meselesi, Osmanlı Devleti’nin son elli yılına büyük ölçüde etki etmiştir.
Büyük devletlerin ve Balkan devletlerinin çıkarlarının kesiştiği Osmanlı
Makedonyası, 19. yüzyılın son çeyreğinden itibaren milliyetçi ve ayrılıkçı hareketlerin
terörize ettiği ve kontrolü için kanlı bir mücadele verdiği bir çatışma sahası
haline gelmiştir. Osmanlı Devleti ise Makedonya’da çeteciliğe karşı hem askeri hem
de siyasi mücadele verse de etkin ve kalıcı çözümler üretememiştir. Genç yaşta
önce nahiye müdürü, sonra kaymakam olan namıdiğer Kızan Kaymakam Tahsin
Bey, çete faaliyetlerinin en yoğun yaşandığı dönemde riskli bölgelerde görev yapmış
olan Osmanlı bürokratlarından biridir. Tahsin Bey’in yıllar sonra yazdığı hatırat,
hem birbirine hem de Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı mücadele veren çetelerin ve Osmanlı
Devleti’nin Makedonya’daki çetecilikle mücadelesinin farklı yönleriyle daha iyi
anlaşılabilmesi bakımından önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu çalışma, Makedonya’daki
çete faaliyetleri ve ayrılıkçı-devrimci komitelerin gölgesinde köylü ve kasabalıların
yaşamları ile Osmanlı Devleti’nin bölgedeki yönetimini bir Jön Türk olan genç
kaymakamının hatıratı üzerinden incelemektedir. Tahsin Bey’in gözünden Makedonya’da
çetecilik ve Osmanlı yönetimi incelenirken, Tahsin Bey’i ve anlatısını şekillendiren
unsurlar ve bu unsurların Tahsin Bey’in Makedonyası üzerine muhtemel
etkileri tartışılmaktadır.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply grateful to those who have helped me come to an end on this difficult
journey. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my
supervisor, Selçuk Akşin Somel, who guided me throughout not only my thesis
writing process, but also my graduate education. This endeavor would not have
been possible without him. The greatest contribution to the completion of my
thesis is undoubtedly his. I also wish to show my appreciation to committee
members Ayşe Ozil and Mehmet Mert Sunar for their valuable suggestions that
contributed to the development of my thesis. I would like to thank Ferenc
Peter Csirkes for his help and support whenever I needed help. His help and
motivation have always given me strength. I would like to express my special
thanks to Tülay Artan, who taught me the culture and intricacies of academia
and trusted my academic competence from the very beginning. Special thanks
to Marloes Cornelissen Aydemir and Mehmet Kuru, who provided me with the
experience of teaching during my time as a graduate assistant and did not spare
their support after my assistantship. I would like to extend my thanks to Edhem
Eldem, who contributed to me getting to this point, broadened my horizons in the
meetings we had during my undergraduate project, and did not spare his support
in my process of getting accepted to the master’s program. I would also like to
express my deepest gratitude to my professors who helped shape my academic
career and provided their academic and personal support throughout my entire
higher education. I cannot express my profound gratitude to Bestami Bilgiç, who
contributed greatly to my decision to study Balkan History, to my esteemed professors
Rhoads Murphey, and Kemal Çiçek for their unwavering support over the years.
I was supported by the TUBITAK-BIDEB 2210-A program. I am grateful for
this scholarship and hope that the program can continue to support many young
scholars in the future as well. I also would like to acknowledge the library staff of
the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) for their help and kindness
throughout my research.
I am obliged to thank my friends Ardit Gjeli and Abdullah Güloğlu for their
support during the process of my thesis writing and defense. Also, warmest thanks
vi
and love to all my friends who touched my life at some point during this process
and made it easier for me.
Last but not least, I would like to express my sincerest and greatest appreciation to
my family. I would like to thank my parents for raising a self-sufficient, career-driven
daughter. I am eternally grateful to my dear grandmother, who has never been
given the opportunity of education, whose greatest desire is for her granddaughters
to have a life that she could not live, and who has never spared her prayers and
moral support. And finally, my most precious, my dear girl Pakize; thank you for
always making me smile and being such a loving companion.
vii
To my grandmother, Telli Hanım.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ÖZET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. A GENERAL OUTLOOK ON THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION 6
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Reintroducing the Concept of Macedonia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Roots of the Macedonian Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1. Russo-Ottoman War, Treaty of San Stefano and Berlin Congress 10
2.4. Macedonia Question as an International Crisis: Influence of the Great
Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. Socio-Economic Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6. Identity Crisis - Ethno-religious Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3. SYSTEMATIZATION OF TERROR: BANDTIRY IN MACEDONIA.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2. The Bulgaro-Macedonian Movement and Banditry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1. Cuma-i Bala Uprising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2. Ilinden Uprising in 1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3. Ottoman Administration and Muslim Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4. TAHSİN UZER’S MACEDONIA: MACEDONIAN BANDITRY
ISSUE AND OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE
EYES OF TAHSIN BEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
ix
4.1. Hasan Tahsin Uzer and his life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2. Macedonian Question and “Banditry” through the Eyes of Tahsin Uzer 46
5. TAHSIN UZER, THROUGH THE LENS OF HIS MEMOIR. . . . . 73
5.1. Development of his Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2. Understanding Tahsin Bey’s Ideological Development: Being a Young
Turk and Intellectual in the Hamidian Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.1. Tahsin Bey’s Initiating into the CUP and the Hatred of Abdülhamid
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2.2. Positivism and Social Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2.3. Traces of Encyclopedism and Didactic Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.3. The Malta Puzzle: Tahsin Bey’s Malta Exile and its Impact on his
Memoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1. Approximate numbers of guns per village. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Table 4.2. The situation of bandits in Yenice Vardar and Gevgili regions . 70
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1. Miss Stone’s Captors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 4.2. An insurgent band in the rising of 1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 4.3. The government mansion in Razlık under construction during
Tahsin Bey’s governorship, H. 1320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
xii
1. INTRODUCTION
“Once I saw my father in thoughts and asked what he was thinking
about, he said: ‘I was born in Yugoslavia, raised my child in FYROM,
spent my life in Macedonia, and now living in Northern Macedonia. I
changed four countries without moving.”
On a talk show, an actor born in Skopje, Ertan Saban, talked about another change
in his country’s name.1 When I2 was in “Macedonia” the official name of the
country written on the documents was FYROM, “The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia,” referring to “Vardar Macedonia”s Yugoslavian past. In the summer
of 2015, I was walking around the square where the giant statues of Alexander
the Great, the greatest Macedonian ever born, on his majestic horse saluting his
father Philip II, standing on the other side in front of the Stara čaršija. Animators
dressed as Roman warriors, Yugoslavian soldiers, and Macedonian komitadji outfits
with a more Slavic character were waiting for tourists to be photographed together.
A deficiency in this painting, which presented a visual feast, was striking. No one
represented the Ottoman period among these animators, reflecting different periods
of Macedonian history. It seems that Roman domination was more embraced
than Ottoman domination. It was the time that made me realize the identity
and political legitimacy crisis that Macedonia is going through even today. The
Macedonian Question was one of the major problems of the Ottoman Empire in
its last fifty years. However, the precious lands of Macedonia, which could not be
shared then, did not find peace after the Ottoman Empire vanished and continued
to cause political disagreements among the peoples of the region. Therefore,
the highly controversial Macedonian Question remains popular despite being a
well-studied topic, attracting scholars from different disciplines by offering a rich
1Sözcü Gazetesi, “Ertan Saban’dan Esprili Makendoya Anekdotu” April 29, 2019,
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/hayatim/magazin-haberleri/ertan-sabandan-esprili-makendoya-anekdotu
2The author of this thesis.
1
field of research and resources.
The Macedonian Question is crucial not only for the societies living in the Balkans,
but also for modern Turkey. According to Adanır, to understand the Macedonian
Question is to understand the history of modern Turkey. Because, until the 1950s,
the founding cadre and ruling elite of the Republic of Turkey consisted largely of
Young Turks who had grown up with the Macedonian Question or those close to
them.3
Hasan Tahsin Uzer is one of the important administrative and political figures who
grew up in late Ottoman Macedonia and one of the ruling elites of Modern Turkey.
Tahsin Uzer, as a historical figure who was raised in the Hamidian regime, served
in many parts of the empire from Macedonia to Syria and witnessed the important
events of the late Ottoman Empire, sets an important example for the point that
Fikret Adanır draws attention.
In the context of the Macedonian Question, banditry in Rumelia, separatist
movements, and Ottoman rule in the late 19th and the early 20th century in
the Balkans; it is possible to see a number of academic works based on various
primary sources such as official documents, newspapers, embassy, and intelligence
reports, memoirs of individuals aiming to present different perspectives. However,
Tahsin Bey’s memoir is relatively less focused on this field. There is a master’s
thesis and a doctoral thesis, which are largely devoted to Tahsin Uzer’s memory.
The first of these is Ender Korkmaz’s Master’s Thesis, which deals with Tahsin
Uzer’s whole life and political activities. Since this thesis focuses on Tahsin Bey’s
entire life and political activities, it is written like a biography. All chapters
deal with the life of Tahsin in chronological order. In this sense, there is not
much distance between the work and the author. Apart from a few points, the
sources used were also used to support what Tahsin told in his memoirs, and
the critical and multidimensional approach remained in the background. The
memoir is considered rather as the political life of Tahsin Bey than a collection
of his intimate memories. Korkmaz made determinations about some of the
factors that shaped Tahsin Bey’s administrative life, such as Tahsin Bey’s hatred
of the Hamidian regime, these allegations could be dealt with in more detail.
However, it is possible to see a more critical approach If we make a comparison
3Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu: Oluşumu ve 1908’e Kadar Gelişimi (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,
2001), 1.
2
with Mustafa Şahin. Mustafa Şahin’s doctoral thesis focused on Tahsin Bey’s
administration and political identity. As a doctoral dissertation, the study is much
more detailed, and the sources are more diverse. Since this study is primarily
dedicated to Tahsin Bey’s administrative and political career, the factors that may
have influenced the Macedonian Question or Tahsin Bey’s memoirs remain in the
background. In the memoir, there are important determinations about some details,
especially concerning his administrative life. It can be thought that the author, who
also benefited from Tahsin Bey’s family archive, was not distanced from the memoir.
Therefore, studying the memoir of Tahsin (Uzer) Bey within the framework of the
Macedonian Question is believed to give a chance to focus on the rural areas of
Ottoman Macedonia within the scope of the banditry and the Ottoman administration.
Furthermore, the memoir is expected to enable us to better understand
the banditry issue through the lens of a Young Turk administrator who served in
small districts and townships.
Studying the Macedonian Question through a late 19th – early 20th-century memoir
which is, in this case, Tahsin Bey’s memoir, is crucial in two ways: Firstly, as it was
mentioned above, Tahsin Bey was a Young Turk administrator who was appointed
to his fist duty at the age of 19. Tahsin Bey, who had served in small towns and
townships of Macedonia at the very beginning of his career, had the opportunity
to be in close contact with the region’s people. He was also part of the Ottoman
bureaucracy, albeit a young and early-career administrator. From this point of
view, Tahsin Bey can be considered to be in a key position. He could look at both
from the perspective of the state and the public and provide access to both sides.
His account gives many details and embodiments from multiple small townships
and districts of Macedonia where the separatist and nationalist guerilla fighters
were the primary issue contributing the Macedonian Question, daily life of locals
under these circumstances, their socio-economic and ethnic conditions, problems
and conflicts. His ideological background of being a Young Turk and having an
official duty gives him a critical outlook on the weaknesses and problems of the
Ottoman administration in the fight against the banditry. The situation according
to Tahsin Bey resulted with even more socio-political unrest and an unresolvable
Macedonian question. In this sense, by looking at Tahsin Bey’s account within
the framework of banditry and the Ottoman administration in Macedonia provides
a detailed and closer look at the rural life as well as both events he narrates.
His critical inferences on the macro-level can give a different perspective of a
Young Turk governor on the areas that are relatively less studied in this subject
3
and provide a more comprehensive study considering that there was a reciprocal
influence between micro and macro narratives on the related topic.
Secondly, the memoir of Tahsin Bey, which Celalettin Uzer published as “History
of Banditry and Ottoman Government in Macedonia,” seems to be relatively
neglected. Certain works on this subject refer to this personal account though
Tahsin Bey is a historical figure who is more likely to be studied with his later
duties in Eastern Anatolia, Syria, and İzmir where he was in much higher positions.
Apart from the above-mentioned master’s Thesis of Ender Korkmaz and Ph.D.
doctoral dissertation by Mustafa Şahin on Tahsin Bey’s life, Master’s Thesis
from Bilkent University by Anıl Kayalar gives a chapter to Tahsin Bey, but
the thesis is primarily based on the Records of Rumelia Inspectorship as it can
be inferred from the title which is: “Struggle Over Macedonia: Florina 1906,
According to the Records of Rumeli Inspectorhsip.” Thus, there seems to be a
gap and need for an extensive analysis that narrates what was written in the
memoir and provides it in a broader framework of the Macedonian Question,
banditry, and Ottoman administration, through Tahsin Bey’s perspective. The
memoir was published with the title of “History of Banditry and Ottoman Administration
in Macedonia” but an extensive analysis of his memoir at the center
of the related framework is absent. One of the aims of this research is to fill this gap.
Before analyzing the memoir, this study will draw a broader framework of the
Macedonia Question. The study will discuss the Macedonian Question in the
second chapter. The chapter will briefly explain the emergence and development
of the Macedonian Question and how the Macedonian Question was and is defined
from different perspectives. The chapter will explain the revival of “Macedonia”
and the milestones that significantly transformed the Macedonian problem into
a serious international question. The study will focus on the discussions in the
relevant field literature about the reasons for the development of the Macedonian
Question.
The third chapter will focus on the systematization of terror and banditry in
Macedonia in the late 19th – early 20th century. Since Tahsin Bey’s account
primarily focuses on the Bulgaro-Macedonian committees, this chapter will also
concentrate on them. In the last part of the chapter, the study will briefly explain
the Ottoman administration and Muslim reactions. The fourth and final chapter
will focus on Tahsin Uzer and his account.
4
In the fourth chapter, the Macedonian Question, banditry, and Ottoman administration
will be analyzed from his perspective and the reflections of Tahsin
Bey’s narrative will be sought mostly in the Ottoman archival sources. The last
chapter will attempt to draw a general persona of Tahsin Bey and compare some
of its characteristics with similar examples. The chapter will try to determine
the factors that might have influenced Tahsin Bey’s narrative and perspective on
the Macedonian “banditry”. The memoir has a special place with its multifaceted
features, which require a multi-perspective approach. The memoir of Tahsin Bey
as a late 19th-century account has been written from a perspective of a typical
intellectual of the Hamidian era, which bears a mission carried by the author is
visible throughout the memoir. Not only the information, including a brief history
of ancient Macedonia, that he constantly gives but also the way he tries to explain
the reasons and results of the incidents, from his actions to the major problems
on a macro level, could be considered as indications of efforts of justification of a
Young Turk intellectual and politician. Therefore, in chapters 4 and 5 the factors
that shaped Tahsin Uzer’s personal and intellectual background will be discussed.
Namely, his family, the city he was born and raised, the Hamidian education system
and prominent schools such as Mekteb-i Mülkiye, CUP, Young Turk publications
and mainstream thoughts that shaped Young Turks’ intellectual life will be analyzed.
5
2. A GENERAL OUTLOOK ON THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION
2.1 Introduction
Before analyzing “Tahsin Uzer’s Macedonia” and his experience with the banditry
problem, a general framework of the “Macedonian Question” and its roots needs a
brief explanation. The word Macedonia itself has significance. Thus, this study will
briefly explain the use of Macedonia and its geographical boundaries. Later, the
chapter will explain how the ancient name of “Macedonia” revives after centuries
of Ottoman administration in the region. Drawing a concrete line between “pax-
Ottomana” the relatively peaceful era when Balkans’ peoples lived side by side,
and the exact time of emergence of the “Macedonian Question” is as challenging
as drawing the exact boundaries of Macedonia or portioning its lands among the
Balkan nations. Therefore, this chapter and the following one will discuss the
milestones that led the way to the crisis. More in particular, concentrating on
the post-1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War period, the study will emphasize the San
Stefano and Berlin Treaties, as these moments took the Macedonian Question to an
international level. Beside the milestones and their impacts, the chapter will discuss
different views on the roots and the reasons for the emergence of the Macedonian
question. To construct a general framework, this chapter will address the spread
of nationalist ideas all around the Balkans, the disturbed balance of power in the
region after San Stefano, the crushing interests of Great powers and Balkan states,
socio-economic dynamics in the region and ethnoreligious conflicts inherited from
Ottoman millet system.
Although the formation of the dynamics that make up the Macedonian Question
was a long-term process, the July 1878 Berlin Treaty created a new status quo
in the Balkans.4 While newly established Balkan states sought more territories
4Gül Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu: Jön Türk Ihtilalinin Kökenleri, 1903-1908 (İstanbul: AFA Yayınları,
6
in Macedonia, Bulgaria appeared as a deeply dissatisfied country that lost its
ideal lands provided by the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. In fact,
Bulgaria considered entire Macedonia as the rightful country of the Bulgarians,
a claim which upset and threatened other Balkan countries with connections in
the region. Whereas this situation created a temporal balance favoring Ottoman
rule in the region, it also increased the tension in decades. Fikret Adanır brings
another dimension to the Question. Apart from tension within Balkan states and
Bulgaria, the exploitation of Bulgarian villagers and bourgeoise by Muslim notables
is considered as one of the major internal reasons of the Bulgarian movement.5 On
the other hand, Gül Tokay feels the need to note that even if Bulgarians’ conditions
were better under the Ottoman rule, there would still be a Bulgarian uprising
in Macedonia as the problem already transformed itself into national sentiments
against the Ottoman rule.
Bulgarians took action against the Ottoman central authority and the Greek Patriarchate,
which reveals to us why in Turkish and Western historiography, the
Macedonian Question is regarded as a "Bulgarian Question."6
2.2 Reintroducing the Concept of Macedonia
Geographically Macedonia is surrounded by; the north-western coasts of the Aegean
Sea in the south, the middle Vardar river in the north, and the Mesta Karasu7 river
in the east, stretching from Thessaly in the south up to the Shar mountains in the
north.8 Tahsin Uzer describes the region in his memoir as a part of the Balkan
peninsula located in the Struma, the Vardar, and Mesta river basins. The region is
in the southwestern part of the Balkans. Macedonia included the entire Selanik Vilayeti
(province) and the parts of Manastır and Kosova vilayets, excluding Albanian
lands and; after 1903, this region was given an “exceptional” administration under
the so-called “Three Provinces General Inspectorate” (Vilâyât-ı Selâse Umumî
1996), 31.
5Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu, 33-35.
6Ibid, 35.
7The river is known as Nestos in Greek and Mesta in Bulgarian.
8Zafer Koylu, “Makedonya Sorunu (1878–1913),” PhD diss., (Anadolu University, 1997), 18.
7
Müfettişliği) by the Ottoman administration.9
Until the early 20th century, the region did not present homogeneity regarding
ethnicity, geography, or climate. There were plains, mountains, and basins, not
only dividing climates but also people. Even people sharing the same ethnicity and
speaking the same language had quite different habits and cultures based on their
geography in Macedonia. In each basin, a different group of Slavs lived; some of
them were more homogeneous, while some of them were pretty mixed with Yoruks
and Konyar Turks. Slavs were living together with “Ottomans,” as Adanır identifies
in the north, while they were sharing their habitats with Greeks and Vlachs in the
south. The ancient term “Macedonia” had not been used by not only the Ottomans
but also the Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms before the Ottoman rule.10 So it
would not be surprising that the Ottomans did not use the consolidative term
“Macedonia”, instead they divided their European territories, which they used to
call “Rumelia,” into seven administrative units or vilayets in 1867, and these were;
Tuna, Edirne, Selanik, Manastır, Yanya, İşkodra, and Kosova.11
The ancient term called “Macedonia” was only revived as a geographical term in
the 19th century by European geographers. However, one should be cautious that
this revived term did not necessarily specify any well-defined geographical borders
in Macedonia”. 12
The term “Macedonia” acquired its political place as an international question at
the Berlin Congress in 1878 when the concept became an issue of the Ottomans.
However, the Sublime Porte did not use the term officially. The official term used for
Macedonia was Vilayet-i Selase, covering three vilayets in Macedonia; Manastır, Selanik,
and Kosova. Unsurprisingly, the Ottoman officials did not use a unifying term
revived and defined by Europeans somewhat subjectively in the 19th century. Using
the term officially would mean accepting how Europeans defined the geographical
borders. Furthermore, using the term with separatist connotation and13 considering
3 vilayets as one unified region would lead to accepting the autonomy of Macedonia.
It should be noted that one of the demands in the Balkans by different groups,
9Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1979),
81.
10Koylu, “Makedonya Sorunu,” 18.
11Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 3-4.
12Ibid, 4.
13Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu (1890-1918), trans. Ihsan Catay (İstanbul:
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), 34-35.
8
whether the Macedonian Revolutionary movement, the Great Powers or Albanians,
was the unification of a particular region that they were claiming. Unifying them
under one administrative unit would easily open the path for autonomy and later
independence from the empire.14
2.3 Roots of the Macedonian Question
Defining the “Macedonian Question” is a challenge that historians could not agree
upon. How to define the Macedonian Question is directly related to the definer’s
introductory perspective on what and who caused the turmoil in the region. As
the introductory part of the chapter already mentioned, there is a tendency to
describe the situation mainly as a “Bulgarian Question”. In another respect, some
may relate it to a “Turkish question,” as stated by Macedonian historian Ivanka
Vasilevska.15
On the one hand, it is not uncommon to consider the Macedonian question as a part
of the “ Eastern Question”. Kemal Beydilli16 describes the Eastern Question as to
the “expulsion of Turks from Europe” As Beydilli indicates, the “Eastern Question”
could be perceived as a fight for sharing the lands of Ottoman inheritance as a result
of the weakening of the empire since the late 17th century. Ottoman Empire’s lands
in Europe became “battlegrounds of European powers” to expand their territories
and political and economic spheres of influence. Especially European lands of the
Ottoman empire witnessed brutal struggles of different nationalist movements of
Balkan nations as well as a power struggle of the Great powers with the visible
decline of the empire by the 18th century.17 When the Ottomans were defeated
by Russia in 1878 and forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano, the emergence of
the “Great Bulgaria” through the incorporation of Macedonia into the principality
threatened European peace. This situation made the Macedonian crisis a part of
the Eastern Question. The rapid collapse of the Empire required a re-arrangement
14It is seen that the expression Macedonia is frequently used in Ottoman archive documents, especially after
1878. Although the state does not officially adopt the expression Macedonia, this does not mean that the
word Macedonia is not in use. So that, in a telegram sent to the Rumelia provinces, it is stated that place
names should be given at the end of notifications and petitions and that the name Macedonia should not
be used: “Ma’ruzat ve tebligatın sonunda mahal ismi bildirilerek, "Makedonya" tabirinin kullanılmamasına
dair irade olduğunun tebliği hususunda vilayetlere telgraf.” BOA, TFR.I..UM, 1-100.
15Ivanka Vasilevska “The Macedonian Question a Historical Overview.” Law Review , 2019. doi:10 Issue1
16Kemal Beydilli, “Şark Meselesi” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi.
17Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, “Makedonya” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2003.
9
of the borders and political relations in the Balkans.18
Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu is also one of the historians describing the Macedonian Question
as one of the most well-known problems of the Eastern Question and the Cretan
issue.19 Ivanka Vasilevska also discusses the “Macedonian Question” within the
“Eastern Question” framework. She quotes Ante Popovski; “In the second half of
the XIX century on the Balkan political stage the Macedonian question was separated
as a special phase from the great Eastern question.” Lack of serious support
from Great powers and lack of a “Macedonian millet” which will be discussed under
“ethnic-religious conflicts- part, Ivanka compares the situation that Macedonia
ended up as “a real Gordian knot in which, until the present times, will entangle
and leave their impact the irredentist aspirations for domination over Macedonia
and its population by the Balkan countries – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.” 20
2.3.1 Russo-Ottoman War, Treaty of San Stefano and Berlin Congress
With the end of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War and treaties signed in its
wake, the Macedonian Question came to the fore as one of most important aspects
of the broader Eastern Question. The war and its aftermath did not only change
the future of the Balkans, but also affected the future of the Empire. After
suffering a heavy defeat in the war, during which the Russian army had reached
Ayastefanos (Yeşilköy) on the outskirts of Istanbul, the Ottomans were forced to
sign to the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, 1878. The Treaty of San Stefano
included clauses that secured further Russian domination and expansion in the
Mediterranean basin.21 The Treaty of San Stefano also established a Greater
Bulgaria. This principality’s borders were vast, encompassing most of Macedonia.
The princedom was to be ruled by a Bulgarian prince chosen by the Bulgarians
themselves; in the meantime, the Ottomans had to de-militarize the region while
the Russians deployed troops until the Bulgarian army was established.
Further reforms were to be applied in those areas of the Balkans under Russian
18Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu.
19Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler, 422.
20Ivanka Vasilevska “The Macedonıan Questıon a Hıstorıcal Overvıew.” Law Review , 2019. doi:10 Issue 1.
21Anıl Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia: Florina 1906, According to the Records of Rumeli Inspectorship,”
Master’s Thesis, (Bilkent University, 2003), 13.
10
protection.22 The Treaty of San Stefano did not openly mention the name of
“Macedonia,” since almost the entire region was given to Greater Bulgaria according
to the sixth article of the treaty. Although it excluded Edirne and Thessaloniki, the
Bulgarian Principality nevertheless included important cities like Skopje, Monastır,
Ohrid, and Thessaly. With the new map, Ottomans did not only lose a significant
amount of their European lands, including most of Macedonia, but they also lost a
land connection to Thessaloniki, Janina, and rest of the Albania. Greater Bulgaria
was thus extended to the Aegean coast while Serbia, Montenegro and Romania
each received their independence.23
The Treaty of San Stefano broke the fragile peace in Europe established by 1856
Treaty of Paris and the 1871 Treaty of Istanbul.24 Consequently, the Treaty
provoked the immediate reaction and intervention of the Great Powers, especially
Austria-Hungary. The articles were a true victory of pan-Slavism, yet they
threatened the interests of other states/powers. Britain, too, found its routes to
her colonies endangered, while Austria’s influence over the Balkans was at stake.
For Germany, the treaty meant that the road between the North Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea was blocked. Other Balkan states were upset too, as Romania
lost territory while Serbia gained very little, and Montenegro lost its opportunity
to reach the Adriatic Sea. Indeed, it was not only the Bulgarians who desired
Macedonia but also the Serbs and the Greeks, and they were waiting for their own
opportunity to annex Macedonia. These conditions led to the emergence of a crisis
that threatened European peace and made the Macedonian Question a central part
of the Eastern Question. Since they thought the Ottoman Empire could no longer
maintain its dominance in the region for a long time and would disintegrate, the
re-arrangement of borders and political relations in the Balkans became an urgent
issue for the Great Powers.25 The Ottomans instead aimed to use the situation
to their own advantage with the help of Austria, and as such German Chancellor
Bismarck convened a congress in Berlin in 1878.26
The Congress of Berlin was concluded and the Treaty of Berlin was signed on July
22Halil İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar IV, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017), 285.
23Koylu, “Makedonya Sorunu.” 42-43.
24Ibid, 43.
25Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu. 272.
26Koylu, “Makedonya Sorunu,” 43.See also: Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia,” 13.
11
13, 1878. There were two main issues at the Berlin Congress: the Bulgarian Question
and Ottoman foreign debt. The British delegate Salisbury most prominently
brought up the Bulgarian issue by emphasizing that the territorial gains of Bulgaria,
which took up most of Macedonia, posed a great threat to the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, many people from the Rum millet remained within these borders.27
The establishment of a Greater Bulgaria would thus constitute a casus belli between
Great Britain and Russia. As a solution, San Stefano’s Bulgaria was divided into
three regions: in the first region, a Bulgarian Principality was to be founded as a
dependency of the Ottoman Empire. The second region, Eastern Rumelia, was to
have a special status of an eyalet governed by a Christian governor for five years
under Ottoman rule. The third region, “Macedonia,” was to remain under Ottoman
rule. However, the new agreement did not please any of the parties. After all, the
Ottomans lost a significant amount of their territories. Serbia lost the chance of
annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was given instead to Austria, and access
to the Adriatic Sea. Romania lost Bessarabia, and Bulgaria lost its ideal borders as
given by the Treaty of San Stefano. The Berlin Treaty upset Bulgaria the most, as
its borders changed to a considerable extent.28 San Stefano Bulgaria had created an
ideal for Bulgarians to achieve, and Macedonia came to be seen as a natural part of
the homeland. The loss of this “promised land of the Bulgarians” with the Treaty
of Berlin laid the ground for a future conflict in Macedonia. Furthermore, with
the Treaty of Berlin, not only Bulgaria but also Greece and Serbia became neighbors,
and the Treaty increased the tensions between these countries; on a larger
scale, it exacerbated the competition between Austria-Hungary and Russia over the
Balkans.29 Ultimately, the Treaty of Berlin only slightly improved the conditions of
the San Stefano in favor of the Ottoman Empire, and it sowed the seeds for many
issues, especially for the future of the Macedonian Question, with articles that did
not satisfy anyone. Some of these problems would not find a solution until the First
World War.
27İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 289-290.
28Koylu, “Makedonya Sorunu,” 44-45.
29Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia,” 16.
12
2.4 Macedonia Question as an International Crisis: Influence of the
Great Powers
“The Macedonian question was an absorbing and important diplomatic
problem.”30
Frances A. Radovich
From the second half of the 19th century, Macedonia virtually turned into a
chessboard on which states with different interests played delicate balance games.
In particular, the Berlin Congress convened in 1878 has an essential place in this
respect. Berlin Congress was convened after the diplomatic defeat of the Ottoman
Empire in the San Stefano Treaty signed as a result of the last Russo-Turkish War
in 1877-78. In this congress “Macedonian Question” took its place in the literature,
and Macedonia became the primary field of competition of interests and economic
and political interference of the external powers.31 We see on one side neighboring
Balkans states with irredentist policies on Macedonia, and on the other side, the
Great Powers competing with each other for reaching oil resources, controlling the
railroads extending towards rich soils and colonies, and reaching and dominating
the Ottoman market. New actors such as Italy and German Empire began to
compete with Britain and France for colonies and open markets, while historical
rivals like Russia and Austria-Hungary displayed clashing interests on the status
quo in the Balkans. All these factors made Macedonia one of the areas where
conflicts of interest were most intense in the entire Eastern Question. Nevertheless,
from the 1870s to the Balkan Wars, the relative balance of powers maintained the
status quo preserved with some minor changes. Meanwhile, the European powers
exploited the Balkan states they considered to be closer to themselves and allowed
them to aggressively influenced the Macedonian Question.32
Each Balkan State and Great Power had different policies toward Macedonia and
varying relations with the Ottoman Empire based on changing balance of power and
30Frances A. Radovich, “Britain’s Macedonian Reform Policy, 1903–1905,” The Historian 43, no. 4 (1981):
493.
31Mico Apostolov, “The Macedonian Question – Changes in Content over Time,” MPRA Paper 6568, University
Library of Munich, Germany, 2006.
32Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 274.
13
numerous variables. Some historians periodize the policies of external powers based
on certain developments or events, such as the Berlin Treaty or the Russo-Japanese
War.33
The most significant trouble of the Ottoman Empire was Russia for the eighteenth
and most of the nineteenth centuries. Until the early 19th century, Russian Empire
had shown a more or less determined attitude toward the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire and followed an expansionist policy. Initially putting Greek
merchants in the Black Sea under its protection, Russia later took advantage of the
support of Britain and France for the Greek revolution. Interestingly As Vlasidis
argues, Russia did not pay attention to Macedonia for a long term until the last
quarter of the century. By the mid-19th century, Russia attempted to compromise
with Britain. Because even after Russo-Turkish War, conditions for the dissolution
of the empire had not been met yet. The plan of portioning the empire between
Russia, Austria, Greece, and Britain included the Balkans and Constantinople.
However, Russian policy on the Balkans changed by the end of the 1850s by getting
Bulgarians onside and following a Pan-Slavist policy so that Russia could prevent
a second Crimean War.
The defeat of Russia at the Crimean War, followed by the Treaty of Paris of 1856,
forced the Russians to pursue their imperial aims indirectly by supporting the
Bulgarians. Here there is a need to focus on Ignatiev, who served as the Russian
ambassador in Istanbul, and foreign affairs minister Alexander Gorchakov34 who
implemented the Russian Panslavist policies in the Balkans and affected the
Macedonian Question in particular.35 Russia began to support Bulgarians on the
Macedonian question by supporting the rights of the Exarchate and the unification
of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Vlasidis argues that the Pan-Slavist Russian policies
of this period cannot be explained only by Panslavist leaders. Instead, one
should consider the post-Crimean War conjuncture in which conditions for the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire had not been met yet and would not be met
unless European Powers withdrew their support in this aspect. Therefore creating
33According to Adanır, Russia started to follow a different foreign policy from 1905 after it was defeated by
Japan in the Russo-Japanese war. According to the report of Ambassador Johann Pallavicini, after the
Russo-Japanese War, the area of conflict of interests of the great states descended to the Balkans. See:
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu ,252-254.
34Rahman Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” in Sultan II. Abdülhamid Dönemi: Siyaset, Iktisat,
Dış Politika, Kültür, Eğitim, 139–86. (İstanbul: İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim Üniversitesi, 2019), 145.
35Vlasis Vlasidis, “Macedonia and the Great Powers,” in The History of Macedonia, ed. Ioannis Koliopoulos,
(Thessaloniki: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 2007), 329-330.
14
a powerful state in the Balkans, Black Sea, and Aegean per Russian interests
was a better choice. Rahman Ademi remarks that Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Gorchakov and Istanbul ambassador Ignatiev’s Pan-Slavist policies had huge
impacts during the Hamidian era. Especially Ignatiev used bureaucrats as spies to
provoke Christians and support Bulgarians, disturbing not only the Sublime Porte
but also local Balkan Muslims populations. In the long term, these provocative
actions would result in consecutive murders of the Russian consul in Monastir and
Mitroviche in 1903.36
The Ottoman defeat at the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of
St.Stefano allowed Russia to design a Great Bulgarian Principality, which included
Macedonia in its territories.37 However, such a design created a crisis of balance
of power since vast territories, including Aegean coastline, key locations reaching
from Epirus to the Black Sea Coasts were incorporated into the new principality.
Although Russo-Ottoman War proved the international isolation of the Ottoman
Empire, The Great Powers immediately reacted against the San Stefano’s outcomes
which disturbed the balance of power and European Powers’ interests in the
Balkans, thus in the East. Instead of Greece, which would be a better ally or
Ottoman Empire easier to control, SanStefano’s Bulgaria in the region made things
inextricable not only in Macedonia but in all the Balkans and became the turning
point of many issues.
A congress was summoned immediately in Berlin to renegotiate the status in the
Balkans. The great success of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans conflicted with other
powers’ interests. For instance, Austro-Hungary, which aimed to reach Adriatic and
the Aegean Sea, preferred Serbian expansion on Macedonia so that it could annex
Bosnia and Herzegovina without difficulty. Moreover, Austria allied with Serbia a
few years later to support Serbian claims on Macedonia in 1881. For other Great
Powers, Macedonia became one of the regions that were too significant to just leave
to Bulgaria. In this sense, the Berlin Congress shaped Macedonia’s destiny and the
Macedonian Question. After the Berlin Treaty Great Bulgaria became/remained
a “Great Idea”. According to new terms Bulgarian Principality was established in
the north, and Macedonia was returned to the Ottomans with the conditions of
reforms.38
36Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” 140.
37Vlasis Vlasidis, “Macedonia and the Great Powers”, 330.
38Ibid, 331.
15
Competition in Macedonia increasingly continued among the Great Powers. After
the Berlin Congress in 1878, Austria-Hungary shaped regional policies based on
the plan of annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this direction, Austrians did not
oppose the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. Yet it was not the case
for Macedonia. Especially Thessaloniki and surrounding provinces that could
enable Austria-Hungary to reach the Aegean coasts were essential. Unlike Britain,
Austria-Hungary did not have oversea-colonies so the need for Aegean commerce
grew even more critical. Therefore, Austria-Hungary’s policies on Macedonia were
shaped accordingly, which could not tolerate a powerful Slavic state like Bulgaria.
Austria collaborated with Russia during this period to prevent territorial changes
in Ottoman Macedonia.39
Meanwhile, Germany showed up by the late-19th century as a new powerful actor.
As a new powerful actor, Germany was considered one of the primary concerns of
Britain, which could change the balance in Europe and pose a danger to the British
colonies40 Germany followed a more pro-Ottoman policy in this period compared
to its rivals France and Great Britain. The need for industrial raw materials for
developing German factories, a beneficial economic zone, and a strategic railroad
reaching Baghdad made the Ottomans an attractive ally. However, this alliance
and cooperation with Austria-Hungary to link the railroads alarmed Great Britain
and Russia, which found the solution to the Eastern Question by the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire. Although Germany did not follow a particular policy
regarding Macedonia and the Macedonian Question, Germans adhered to the
balance of power policy in the Balkans against Russia’s intervention in the regions
with Orthodox populations and Austria-Hungary’s attempt to reach the western
Balkans and Thessaloniki.41 Thus, the Germans wanted the status-quo in the
Balkans to continue. Germany formed a quite good relationship with the Hamidian
regime and Sublime Porte.42 However, a small note should be made here; In Berlin,
in 1878, the German Chancellor Bismarck stopped further Russian expansion,
though he remained unconcerned with the disintegration of the Ottoman lands. He
tolerated Britain taking Egypt and Cyprus.43
39Ibid, 335.
40İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 293.
41Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” 145.
42Vlasidis, “Macedonia and the Great Powers,” 336-337.
43İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 294.
16
Just like Germany, France did not follow a certain policy in Macedonia either.
France also needed a stable environment for a growing economy in the region as
France was dominating important sectors such as banking and transportation. Yet,
it would be wrong to assume that France was as supportive as Germany towards
the Hamidian regime. France frequently went along with Great Britain regarding
implementing extensive regional reforms.44
As for Russia, a significant actor that played an active role in the Macedonian
Question, one could see Russia’s foreign policy on Macedonia based on a delicate
balance. It is not unknown that Russians find the existence of the Bulgarian State
in the region suitable for their interests. Thus, some may take Russian support for
Bulgarians for granted. Yet, the delicate balance between the Balkan States and
Great Powers made it necessary for Russia to pursue more careful and sometimes
transformative policies. For instance, after the Berlin Congress until 1885, Russia
attempted to enhance its relations with Bulgarians and Greeks regarding the
Macedonian Question but remained inconclusive. In 1885 when the Bulgarian
movement gained momentum, Russia did not support Bulgaria’s annexation of
Eastern Rumelia because of the fear of Austria, Serbia, and Greeks.
On the other hand, Russia supported Bulgaria during the war with Serbia from
1885-1886. In the later period, it is possible to observe that Russia followed a
moderate policy in the Balkans. In 1902 Russian and Austrian foreign affairs
ministers Lambsdorff and Golychevski found the solution to the Macedonian
Question in the autonomy of Macedonia by a Christian governor.45 Rahman Ademi
also discusses how Pan-Slavism received a blow by new terms of the Berlin Treaty
led Russia to oppose San-Stefano Bulgaria’s unification. The alliance between
Russia and Austria to maintain the status quo in the Balkans in 1897 proves this
idea.46
Although Vlasidis is right to periodize the Great Powers’ policies on Macedonia
and Ottoman territorial integrity in the Balkans based on before and after the
Berlin Congress, it is noteworthy that the radical change in the British policy on
44Vlasidis, “Macedonia and the Great Powers,” 336.
45Ibid, 336.
46Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” 144-145.
17
Ottoman integrity was/ is observed with Gladstone government. In 1868, under
the government of Gladstone, Liberals came to power for the first time, ending
the period of British protectionist policy toward the Ottomans.47 So Britain was
less interested in the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and was shaping
her policies with this expectation while keeping the delicate balance in the region
to protect her interests. Also, Great Britain was the empire the Hamidian regime
hesitated most.48 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain made
occasional changes in Balkan policy under different variables. For example, in
Berlin Congress, British delegate Salisbury who was well known for his Turkish
opposition, took an efficient step to alter the terms of San Stefano regarding Great
Bulgaria. He claimed that terms on Bulgarian borders reaching out to the Ohrid
lake and the Aegean Sea were the most significant issue of the congress. Also, the
new borders presented a significant threat to Ottoman sovereignty. Thus, Ottoman
Empire could not be forced to accept these serious conditions.49 After the Berlin
Congress, Britain continued to favor the maintenance of the status quo against the
Russian expansion, yet in this period collapse of the empire was expected sooner or
later. Especially with Austria, Great Britain was one of the most influential actors
in changing the conditions of San Stefano in the Berlin Congress to prevent Russian
expansion through the straights and the Mediterranean Sea. Great Britain’s policy
towards Ottoman rule in Balkans was mainly affected by two significant factors;
Britain’s internal politics and changing balance in the “East”. That’s why one could
see Great Britain openly supported Bulgarian rule in the region, which they considered
to be much more suitable for the British interests, and created an ex parte
public opinion in favor of Bulgarians in 1876, while a couple of years later interfered
and changed the terms of San Stefano to the detriment of “Great Bulgaria”.50
British public opinion and government, especially liberals, favored Bulgarians and
their actions in a romantic way as they did during the Greek revolution. Gül Tokay
quotes Marchall saying that the Macedonian Question was not a result of the poor
administration of Turks but a result of enmity between Serbs and Bulgars though
the British Liberal government was in denial of this fact to maintain the support
of non-conformist votes.51 Nevertheless, this support for the Bulgarians of Britain
was cautious. British support for Bulgaria was more likely to be shown. If Bulgaria
47İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 292.
48Hakan Tan, “Makedonya’da Bulgar Komite Faaliyetleri ve Boris Sarafof,” Master’s Thesis, (Sakarya University,
2013), 18.
49İnalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, 288.
50Mithat Aydın, “İstanbul Konferansı (1876)’na Giden Yolda İngiltere’nin ‘Doğu’ Politikası,” Pamukkale
Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi 1, no. 17 (2005): 3.
51Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu, 163.
18
was strong enough to be free from Russian influence as strong Russian domination
in Balkans and straights would not be suitable for British interests in the East.
British governments at the end of the 19th century were no longer supporters of
Ottoman integrity though different governments proposed varying solutions in
the region. For example, during Ilınden Uprising, Britain supported Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), favored Bulgarians, and condemned the
way the Ottomans suppressed the uprising in 1903. On another the hand in
1897 the Gladstone government followed a different policy on Macedonia because
of the reconciliation of the Russo-Bulgarian relationship at the time. Britain’s
solution was the self-rule of the people of Macedonia under the protection of the
Great Powers instead of unification with Bulgaria. Neither Austria-Hungary nor
Russia accepted this proposal. Thus Britain continued with the plans of reforms
in Macedonia.52 Although 1878 was a turning point in European diplomacy and
its policies in the Balkans, a particular focus should be placed on the early 20th
century. Changing policies of Austria-Hungary and Russia on the Balkans, in the
first place, some significant development that took place in the world had essential
effects on the Macedonian Question.
In the early 20th century, Russia could not take an active stance in the Balkans for
a while due to the Russo-Japanese war that broke out in the east in 1904. Although
Russia continued to pursue a much more aggressive policy for the dissolution of
the Ottoman lands in the Balkans, Russian defeat against Japan in 1904-1905
proved its weakness which continued with 1905 revolution and 1907 Coup. These
developments required a new foreign policy. The most suitable field for the new
foreign policy to gain legitimacy was the Balkans because of its historical context.53
By 1905, the new context of Russia required British support, and the German threat
to British domains made this alliance possible. According to the report of the Austrian
ambassador Pallavicini, in the post- Russo-Japanese war period, the Balkans
became the center of the Great Powers’ conflict zone.54 Russian defeat in East Asia
disturbed the relative balance of power with Austria in the Balkans existing since
1897. Austria wanted to make changes in the reforms in favor of herself as soon
as the Russo-Japanese war broke out, which Russsian had no chance to accept and
resulting in excluding Kosovo and some provinces of Monastır from the reforms.
52Vlasidis, “Macedonia and the Great Powers,” 333-334.
53Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 252.
54Ibid, 254.
19
A Russian civil advisor who worked in Macedonia summarizes that the Macedonian
Question and the Russian-Austrian influence in the region have a more layered
context beyond the interests of peoples in Macedonia or historical ties: “The Macedonian
Question is first a European Question, and finally a Bulgarian Question. The
final outcome of this question depends on the interests of Europe, particularly the
interests of Russia-Austria-Hungary.” This quote explains why Russians pursued a
more realistic policy and did not want a strong Bulgaria in the region in this period.
On the other hand, Austrians provoked Albanians as a counterbalance to Serbs in
the region. Although they formed good temporal relations with the Bulgarian government,
Austria formed its policies to maintain the ethnic conflicts and turmoil in
the region
2.5 Socio-Economic Problems
The problems behind the Macedonian Question and banditry issue are far more
complicated than merely the spread of post-French revolution ideas around the
Balkans. As the chapter explained before, one of the most significant factors
making the situation unsolvable was the clashing interests of Balkan nations and
the Great Powers. On the other hand, one should consider internal dynamics
triggering what happens in Macedonia. It would be oversimplifying to reduce
the situation to a mere battle of ideologies. The internal conditions, especially
socio-economic conditions in Macedonia played a great role. Since the emergence of
national movements and internationally recognized Macedonian crisis, the general
western outlook as well as the main propaganda of the other Balkan states, claimed
the reality of Macedonia consisted of “oppressed Christian peasant and oppressing
Muslim lords”.
The hypothesis developed by Fikret Adanır by comparing the Balkan historiography
is invaluable in terms of refuting the dominant thesis used in the study
of the Macedonian question. According to this hypothesis, one can talk about a
Macedonian problem in the 19th-20th century Balkans and European politics rather
than a Macedonian national movement. Accordingly, the Macedonian question
did not emerge due to ethnic-national causes. The main reasons should be sought
in the socio-economic factors of Ottoman administration in the Balkans and to
a great extent in the European powers’ interests. This hypothesis suggests that
factors like the transformation in the urban-agricultural structure, the persistence
20
of the “millet system,” and the intrusion of European powers’ interests played
significant roles. Among these factors, socioeconomic changes led the path to social
unrest and finally gained functionality in national conflicts. These socio-economic
layers were never parallel with ethnic groups, and the contradiction between the
development of the productive forces and the conditions of landed property was
never on an ethnic basis. However, the fundamental contradiction was between
production and the market system, which were unsuitable for the current economic
conditions. As the socio-economic layers in the society are far more complex, an
oversimplified formula of the clash between Slav peasantry versus Muslim exploiter
does not explain the Macedonian question even though this could be attractive to
the national historiography. On the other hand, Fikret Adanr does not deny that
Slavic intelligentsia emerging due to urban developments could not find a suitable
place for themselves in the existing social structure. So in this sense, one can
speak of a role of a socio-national conflict as this intelligentsia had vital interests
in ending Ottoman domination.55
Macedonian historian Ivanka Vasilevska points out that the vast majority of the
population in Macedonia during the 19th and early 20th centuries was rural. Around
80 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture and their main concern was
to survive.56 It is essential to look at the taxation system as to which taxes were
applied and how much was collected are some of the questions that Fikret Adanır
dwells upon. Aşar tax for instance is the heaviest tax burden for a 20th-century
countryman. The tax itself and the way these taxes were collected was also a huge
problem. Turkish tax farmers took Macedonian aşar of one year and they in return,
were assigning their collection to sub-tax farmer contractors. In 1903 the bulk tax
farming system was abolished and in 1906 an alternative collective tax farming
system of farmers- peasants with collective responsibility was introduced. What is
most problematic about the debate on the Ottoman land system in the Balkans
is the exaggeration of çiftliks’ role. One of the primary reasons for that is the
traveler accounts of Europeans who mostly focused on çifltiks and created an image
as If the land system was entirely based on çiftliks. In the travelers’ accounts, the
transformation of share farmers to serfs, symbiotic relations, usury, and working
for debt were highly emphasized. Yet Adanır states that they had different legal
terms than European feudal lords, which enabled farmers to be independent from
landowners. Moreover in the post-Crimean War period number of çiftliks showed
a decline. In this transitionary process, great çiftlik owners’ conditions got worse,
55Ibid, 272.
56Vasilevska “The Macedonıan Questıon” 1-2.
21
followed by handing over of çiftliks to merchants, moneylenders, and share farmers,
which peaked in the 1890s. Research on Macedonia clearly shows the çiftliks that
are exaggerated by European scholars in Macedonia no longer play a significant
role in the last quarter of the 19th century.57
Yet another factor that emerged concerning the economic changes in Macedonia
was the issue of migration. Labor migration emerged due to abandoning çiftliks
and traditional agriculture and the rise of industrial plantations. Especially tobacco
farming and opium cultivation became two of the primary sources of income after
1835 as they were convenient for intense farming in small areas. Thus, it is no
surprise that tobacco, which is 13 times more valuable than wheat, became the
main export item in the late 19th century in Macedonia. It is no coincidence
that American and European companies competed in the early 20th century over
Macedonian tobacco.
Domestic labor migration was not the only reason of social mobility. Macedonia
had it’s share of mass emigration trend to America in the early 20th century. Curiously
enough, Adanır finds the consequences of this mass labor emigrations results
even more critical than the migration of Slavic-Macedonian intellectuals of Bulgaria.
This stroke a major blow on agricultural production, especially around 1905-1906
when the labor emigration peaked. The main predicament for Ottoman agriculture
was while lands were inadequate in mountainous areas, çiftliks were abandoned to
become pasturage. Over and above this war development, extraordinary taxes, road
constructions and partly feeding the Muslim refugees exiled from the lands occupied
by Russia imposed too much burden on the farmers and peasants, which caused unrest
and uprisings among Christian peasants.58 The social impacts of this dilemma
were well exploited by Macedonian revolutionary organizations at the beginning of
the 20th century.
2.6 Identity Crisis - Ethno-religious Conflicts
The identity crisis is one of the most contradictive aspects of the Macedonian
Question. Even “whether a Macedonian ethnicity exists at all?” is a debated
57Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 40-41.
58Ibid, 41-42,89.
22
question. Here both in the 19th and early 20th centuries and the contemporary
studies defining ethnic identities are as difficult as untangling the Gordian knot,
a term the Macedonian historian Ivanka Vasilevska uses to compare with the
Macedonian Question.59 There are two crucial problems in Macedonia’s social
structure; the region is ethnically diverse and has ethnic and linguistic fluidity
and ambiguity between groups. Yet another issue is how the Ottoman empire
regulated the interaction between these people. Ottoman “millet” system was
primarily based on confessions rather than the ethnic “nations” in the modern
sense. Majority of the Slavic-speaking Orthodox people and Orthodox Albanians
were part of Rum millet which was one of the factors that stoked up the conflicts
among different groups in Macedonia and also why especially Slavic speaking
groups fought against the Greek Patriarchate even more than they fought against
the Sublime Porte itself.60 After the conquest of the Byzantine Empire, Mehmet
II’s appointment of the Ecumenical Patriarch defined the relations with non-Muslim
confessional communities. However, the millet system was a more complex “web
of context-dependent arrangments” than a centrally supervised system. Therefore
İpek Yosmaoğlu says; “Unquesioningly accepting millet paradigm as an explanatory
model for social and political organization in Ottoman Empire undermines historical
complexity of the experience of different communities before their transformation
into nations and implicitly credits “national awakening narratives manufactured
retrospectively to bolster the legitimacy of the nation-state.61
One could look at the background of ethnoreligious conflicts to elaborate on the
development of new millets. The Ecumenic Patriarchate was in charge of all Orthodox
elements in the empire. Hellenic characteristics of the church created more
tension during the period of nationalist movements. Ecumenical characteristics,
power, influence, and unity of the Patriarchate were damaged in the 19th century,
first by Serbs, then the foundation of a national Greek patriarchate after the Greek
revolt based in Athens, followed by Romanians, and finally Bulgarians. Especially
the emergence of national states in the Balkans and Tanzimat reforms contributed
to secularization and reduced the influence and unity of the Patriarchate not
only in Macedonia but all around the empire. The superiority of the Fener Rum
Patriarchate as a result of privilege given by the empire was objected to by
59Vasilevska “The Macedonıan Questıon”,1.
60İlber Ortaylı, “Millet” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2020.
61İpek Yosmaoğlu, “From Exorcism to Historicism: The Legacy of Empire and the Pains of Nation-Making in
the Balkans,” in Beyond Mosque, Church, and State: Alternative Narratives of the Nation in the Balkans,
ed. Theodora Dragostinova and Yana Hashamova. (Budapest, New York: Central European University
Press, 2016), 59.
23
Slavic-speaking clergy. Egaliterianist policies implied by the new regulations during
the Tanzimat period officialized the abolishment of the privilege of the Patriarchate,
which İlber Ortaylı describes as a downturn period of the Fener Rum Patriarchate.62
Although one of the main goals of Tanzimat reforms was to centralize the authority
and unite people under Ottoman citizenship, which is a revisioned millet system
in the conditions of 19th century Macedonia,63 these measures were not enough to
solve ethnic problems. Even the Albanians who were the best example to integrate
into the Ottoman nation became another problem in the 19th century.64 In the
19th century, while Muslims were traditionally considered “Turkish” or ummah
both by the Porte and Europe, Orthodox people were bound to Patriarchate,
and Catholics were under the protection of Austria-Hungry. The language of
education was also shaped based on religious affiliation; Muslims were educated in
Ottoman educational system using Arabic script, Orthodox people using Greek,
and Catholics Latin.65
“If Fener Rum Patriarchate was entitled to control over the entire eastern Christianity,
what developments caused this series of sectarian conflicts among Christians
?” is a question to be answered. The emergence of the Bulgarian Exarchy in 1870,
when a millet based on ethnicity emerged in the Empire for the first time, the
religious division turned into a conflict. Consequently, this conflict turned into a
struggle between Serbians, Bulgarians, and the Rum Patriarchate. While Serbian
and Bulgarian Christianity was laying on a national basis, they engaged in a power
struggle against the ancient privileges of the Patriarchate that had been controlling
all Ottoman Christians. The main objective of the nationalist movements was to
justify the movement by defending all Balkan Christians against Muslim Empire.
As there could be no monolith Macedonian millet, with external influence based on
neighboring Balkan states and Great Powers’ interests, the main characteristics of
these movements became a constant struggle and conflict to transform each other’s
identity.66
62İlber Ortaylı, “Millet” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2020.
63Borche Nikolov, “Mro (Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) – A New Perspective on the “Millets”
in Ottoman Macedonia,” in Osmanlı İdaresinde Balkanlar II, ed. Alaattin Aköz et al. (Konya: Selçuk
Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi ve Medeniyeti Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Yayınları), 72.
64Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu, 39.
65Ibid, 33.
66Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 273.
24
Regarding the emergence and empowerment of bourgeoise in the Balkans, especially
Bulgarian bourgeoise who had a significant role in the Macedo-Bulgarian organizations
and national movements in Macedonia; Bulgarians’ conditions become
more of an issue. As Bulgaria was in a position of a hinterland or supplier to the
big cities in the region, there was a minimal opportunity for free trade. However,
wars did not have only adverse effects on Balkan socio-economic life. For example,
Russo-Ottoman Wars in the mid- 18th century and treaties signed with European
powers revived Bulgarian commerce. Increasing cultural and commercial relations
with Russia and Central Europe created a Bulgarian bourgeoisie. Thanks to
these relations, Bulgarian bourgeoisie’s children who got a chance of education
in Europe started to take place in Slavic countries’ state offices rather than in
Ottoman bureaucracy. In the new social structure rising Bulgarian bourgeoisie
emerged as a revival against Ottoman feudal institutions and privileged Feneriots.
The development of the Bulgarian national movement was not only related to the
socio-economic developments in Bulgaria and Macedonia but also to the Ottoman
external developments and the internal religious and political dynamics. Bulgarians
fought to change the balance of power in favor of themselves against the Greek
Orthodox church supremacy. One of the first demands was education and prayer
in vernacular language. The first step to accomplish this was the foundation of
schools separate from the Patriarchate, the first Bulgarian school was founded in
1835. These Bulgarian schools with secularized characteristics raised the Bulgarian
bourgeoisie against the schools of the Patriarchate with Hellenic ideas. Raising
urban intellectuals was not enough. So in the same period, a similar momentum of
the activities among rural bourgeoise could be observed. For the rural Bulgarian
bourgeoise, the only way to engage in political activities was the local communities
to take care of school and church affairs. In time, church communities, just like
schools, started to grow away from the influence of the Patriarchate.
The petite-bourgeoise who triggered these developments also gained political superiority.
By the Tanzimat Period, a period of the collapse of the Patriarchate’s power
as described previously, the rising power of this petite bourgeoisie was officialized
and they started to participate in local administrations. As discussed in previous
parts, the conflict between these groups was not free from international politics and
the different interests of the Great Powers. Bulgarians took advantage of French
support against Russia and started to convert to Catholicism which gave its results
immediately. Especially Bulgarians who were in search of strong protection started
to gravitate towards Catholicism. In this way, they could get support from France.
25
As mentioned before, Catholics became the major threat against the Patriarchate
as missionary activities spread around the empire and shook the Patriarchate’s
power of influence. Considering that Catholicism was officially recognized in 1830
and an Armenian Catholic Church was already established, some Bulgarians were
encouraged to convert as there was a powerful and officially recognized church
that could provide protection and create an alternative against the Patriarchate.
With the support of Catholic Europeans, they could resist the assimilation of the
Patriarchate and establish their church hierarchy within the Catholic Church as
they grew in number.67
Russia, which did not want to lose its influence over Bulgarians, pressured the Patriarchate
into reconciliation with Bulgarians and made compromises to keep them
under their and Patriarchate’s domain.68 Tanzimat Reforms and modernization
process afterward in this example proved something truly significant; renouncement
of ancien regime’s institutions for the sake of reforms and modernization. Greek
Orthodox Church’s damaged supremacy was one of the best examples of this
situation.69
Particular attention should be paid to the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856 as it is a
turning point for the Bulgarian Church, including articles to change the structure
of the previous millet system. The Bulgarian bourgeoisie welcomed these changes
in the millet system while the Patriarchate disapproved. Such that, increasingly
radical demands of the Bulgarians in terms of military service, school, language,
administration, and church confronted Patriarchate, and conflict between the two
groups intensified after 1860.70
According to Adanır, what mattered in the Greek-Bulgarian conflict was not establishing
an independent Bulgarian Church, but its domains. What the geographical
boundaries and religious, political authority, and limits of both churches would
be, is the vital question. Before going into details of the nationalist organizations
that emerged within the context of the Macedonian Question that will be discussed
in the next chapter, one of the causes and means of this brutal conflict between
67Ramazan Eren Güllü, “The Foundation of Bulgarian Exarchy and it’s Status,” Gaziantep University Journal
of Social Sciences 17, no. 1 (2018): 351.
681861 synod and decisions taken aftermath should be considered in this regard.
69Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 46.
70Ibid, 55-75.
26
Bulgarians and the Patriarchate should briefly be introduced. While Patriarchate
was ready to recognize the existence of a new religious group and their churches
in the highlands, it was not enough for Bulgarians. They demanded establishing
churches and gaining status in a wider area of Bulgaria and Macedonia. There
was a new millet emerging now, and its representative was the church; the places
Bulgarians had church would be designating the places to free from the Empire.
The main purpose was to prepare for as much territory as possible for the Bulgarian
state to be founded in the future. Thus, instead of being dispersed around uncertain
boundaries, getting stuck within a minimal mountainous area would not be
convenient for Bulgarians. In this situation, what is called the “Bulgarian church”
or churches demanded by Bulgarians, according to the radicals, were considered a
de-facto Bulgarian National church since 1860. In the following period, especially
in 1868, the Sublime Porte’s mediocre relations with Greece and policy to block
Russian interference through the Patriarchate which had just begun to reconcile
with moderate Bulgarians, changed the course in favor of Bulgarians. After a peak
of Bulgarian unrest in 1868, an imperial edict was declared about the Bulgarian
Exarchate in 1870. İpek Yosmaoğlu in her article which focuses on the “dynamics
of the conflict between Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate,” discusses
that “the religious independence and national emancipation are closely intertwined
and began in the 1830s but had long-term consequences.”71
Ramazan Erhan Güllü goes back to 1845 when Bulgarians were giving petitions to
the Sublime Porte to prevent the Patriarchate’s unpleasant policies and demands
such as having official representatives that provided direct connections to the center
of the empire, the establishment of a Bulgarian Church in Istanbul, and school. As
they could not succeed, in 1849 they sent a committee to Grand Vizier Mustafa
Reşit Paşa to make an official application. Although they were not allowed to
establish a church, they were permitted to build a clergy house in the Fener district
in Istanbul. Güllü discusses that the foundations of the Exarchate had been laid
with this clergy house in Fener, as for the first time the Empire recognized the
existence of Bulgarians who were subordinate to the Greek Patriarchate.72 İpek
Yosmaoğlu argues that the Macedonia struggle emerged due to the post-Berlin
Congress’s ambiguous and insecure atmosphere, though it was a struggle between
Bulgarians and Greeks and partly Vlachs and Serbs to gain control over the
territories in the region. She says: “One might argue that the origins of the
struggle went back to the creation of an autocephalous Bulgarian Exarchate in
71Yosmaoglu, “From Exorcism to Historicism,”70.
72Güllü, “The Foundation of Bulgarian Exarchy,” 352.
27
Constantinople in 1870.”73
The Edict declaring the establishment of a separate Bulgarian Church or Exarchate
consists of eleven articles. To summarize the articles, a separate metropolitan,
episcopate, and spiritual organization with control over some districts will be
founded under the name of Bulgarian Exarchate. The highest rank of metropolitans
in this institution, “exarch,” will be the leader who will be chosen following
Orthodox doctrine and approved by the Sublime Porte. Before electing the Exarch,
Sultan will be informed and his approval will be taken. They can directly consult
with the Sublime Porte and will be separate from the Patriarchate in their internal
affairs.74 Among the eleven articles, the 10th article is quite essential it regulates
the areas under the control of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The places named in the
article draw the boundaries of future Danube Bulgaria but territories in Macedonia,
which was a part of San Stefano Bulgaria, remain unclear.75
After the declaration of the imperial edict, the first Exarch was appointed in 1872.
In Macedonia( Ohrid and Skopje in particular), most of the population chose to
pass to the Bulgarian Church. Although the edict discourages any activity from
creating divisiveness in the society, the 10th article about having the majority (
2/3 of the population) have control over a region caused Bulgarian to work for it
in Macedonia, against which Greeks and Serbs did not remain silent. The article
became one of the significant problems for the Macedonian Question post-1870 and
the early 20th century. Yosmaoğlu also points out that fifteen dioceses were all in
the “Danubian Bulgaria” but they could attain more by fulfilling the 2/3 majority
requirement This was a serious threat for the Greek Patriarchate as Bulgarian
bourgeoise claims against Greek domination started to acquire a reputation among
Bulgarian speaking people and more people passed to the Exarchate. On the other
hand, there were a considerable amount of territories in which the Slav population
was divided. Many of these regions in which some Slavs did not want to separate
from their traditional church were in Macedonia.76
İpek Yosmaoğlu who focuses on the complex dynamics of the society in making
73Yosmaoglu, “From Exorcism to Historicism,” 70.
74Güllü, “The Foundation of Bulgarian Exarchy,” 354.
75Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 60-79.
76Yosmaoglu, “From Exorcism to Historicism,” 70.
28
nations in the Balkans gives wide coverage to religion as a tool for awakening the
national consciousness. She argues that increasing tension between the Greek Patriarchate
and the Bulgarian Exarchate was proof that sectarian tension was more
than a mere “doctrinal” difference and took an important place in the transition of
Balkan Christians into nations in Macedonia. She even claims that this issue was
even more important than other elements on the path of creating the nation such
as standardized education or industrialization.77
77Ibid, 71.
29
3. SYSTEMATIZATION OF TERROR: BANDTIRY IN
MACEDONIA
3.1 Introduction
Since the 1990’s scholars have discussed why conflicts and tensions escalated in
the region must be much more complex than the differences between people who
have to live together. İpek Yosmaoğlu focusing on the period between 1878-1908
emphasizes the influence of the Great Powers on people living in strategic regions
such as Macedonia and how their ethnic-religious and linguistic differences were
“constructed” in this period and violence was systematized after 1878.78 The Macedonian
Question, recognized as an international problem at the Berlin Congress,
was not resolved and became more intractable over the decades. Revolts that
had arisen for various reasons turned into organized terror and banditry together
with the secret societies founded to control Macedonia. Thus, terror and banditry
became integral to life in late 19th and early 20th century Macedonia. This chapter
will examine these secret societies, which various groups founded with different
motivations. The most important of these movements is the Bulgarian movement,
divided into sub-groups within itself. Since there was no separate ethnic Macedonian
identity and the development of Macedonian revolutionary societies within
the Bulgarian movement, this section will deal with different sub-groups under a
single heading. Macedonian bands called “chetas or komitadjis” interact with the
Bulgarian movement the most, and the identity debate is based on the Macedonian-
Bulgarian identity, they will be discussed under the Bulgaro-Macedonian movement.
The Greek movement, the most important rival of the Bulgarian movement, and
the activities of the Greek bands, which took up arms against the Bulgarian bands,
78İsa Blumi, “Review of Ipek Yosmaoğlu’s Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies (2015), 200-201.
30
constituted the second most important group that spread terror in the region. The
Greek bands and Bulgaro- Macedonian bands had the most brutal conflicts with
each other and both movements carried out propaganda activities against each
other in various fields.
Although they were not as effective as the Bulgaro- Macedonian and Greek movements,
the Serbs and Vlachs did not stay idle either. The study will briefly give
their banditry activities and motivations in Macedonia. The Albanians, which differ
from other groups in many aspects, and their reaction in the region since the
Berlin Congress will be examined in the context of Macedonia under the title of the
Albanian movement. The last two parts of the chapter will discuss the increasing
reform pressures in correlation with the increasing terrorist and banditry activities
in the region, and Ottoman administration’s struggle with the reform pressures and
these organizations both politically and militarily and the Ottomans’ reaction.
3.2 The Bulgaro-Macedonian Movement and Banditry
The previous chapter explained how significant the San Stefano and Berlin Treaties
played in developing the Macedonian Question as an international crisis. Especially
Berlin Treaty became a milestone for Macedonia’s nationalist movements and
uprisings. As the previous chapter discussed, Ottoman Empire had to sign the
Treaty of San Stefano after the defeat by the Russians in 1878. Especially the
foundation of the Bulgarian Principality by the San Stefano Treaty made the first
peak for the Bulgarian movement. According to this treaty, Bulgaria had a vast
territory, including most of Macedonia. It was the point that inspired the Bulgarian
movement to liberate Macedonia from Ottoman rule and re-gain the historical
lands of the Medieval Bulgarian Empire. With this motivation, secret revolutionary
societies were established to provoke the Slavic population against Ottoman rule.79
Although in Berlin Congress, the previous borders were divided into three regions
and only one of the regions was given to the Bulgarian principality, San Stefano’s
Bulgaria set an ideal for the Bulgarian nationalists to achieve.
This section will explain how The Bulgaro-Maceodonian movement that gained
79Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 4-5.
31
momentum after the Berlin Treaty evolved throughout the decades, the foundation
of the secret societies, their motivations, purposes, methods, and factionalism
within the movement. The 23rd article of the Berlin Treaty led to the emergence
of secret societies and increasing terror and banditry in Macedonia.
After the Berlin Agreement in 1878, Bulgarians revolted in Kresna & Razlog
(Razlık) to protest the return to Ottoman rule with the encouragement of Russian
officers. The Ottoman government suppressed this rebellion by sending an army to
the region.80 The Kresna-Razlog uprising in north-eastern Macedonia was triggered
by the loss of the territories granted with the San Stefano treaty and is considered
the continuation of the Bulgarian independence movement. Though it was more
like a failed attempt of an armed struggle than a large-scale rebellion, it was enough
to remind us that a Macedonian problem was waiting to be solved.
The Bulgarian revolutionary movement did not have a single organization or leader.
There was even disagreement between the committees on important issues, such
as gaining the support of the great power and cooperating with other Balkan
revolutionary organizations.81 To summarize the Bulgarian movement in the
following period, there were two main streams in the 1880s Bulgarian movement:
Revolutionists and evolutionists. Until the second phase of the movement in the
1890s, the Bulgarian movement followed a more evolutionist line and focused on
propaganda through the church and schools.82 This line was represented by the
Bulgarian church, supported and financed by the Bulgarian bourgeoise. Upper
clergy, church and school administrators and teachers actively participated. The
main motivation of this movement centered in churches and schools were to
re-gain villages and towns lost to the Fener Patriarchate and prevent the spread of
Hellenistic ideas propagated by the Patriarchate and Greece. These efforts resulted
in the 80’s and Bulgarian schools regained popularity and power. The role of
the complex relations of the Ottoman government with other Balkan states and
the Patriarchate should not be underestimated either. Disagreement between the
Sublime Porte and the Patriarchate caused a better treatment of the Porte toward
the Bulgarian Exarchate as a counterbalance. The second line of the Bulgarian
movement was the revolutionist one. Revolutionists believed the solution was an
80Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, “Balkanlarda Muhalif Hareketler ve Sultan II. Abdülhamid,” in Sultan II. Abdülhamid
ve Dönemi (İstanbul: İZÜ Yayınları,2019), 176.
81Barbara Jelavich, Balkan Tarihi, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları,2013,) 375.
82Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 89-96.
32
armed uprising and unification of the Eastern Rumelia in short term and to give
a sense of Bulgarian nationality to every Slav in Macedonia. They started their
activities with charity organizations for Macedonians in Bulgaria, though, in fact,
they were working to support the committees and banditry in Macedonia, attract
foreign intervention, and put the 23rd article of the Berlin Treaty into practice. In
1885, the annex of the Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria strengthened revolutionists.
By the 1890s, the fear of the Ottoman empire collapsing sooner than expected
and the danger of losing Macedonia to other Balkan states required the Bulgarian
movement to take a new turn. Dame Gruev with his compatriots Dr.
Hristo Tatarchev, Petr Pop Arsov, Ivan Hadzinikolov, Dr. Anton Dmitrov and
Hristo Bostanciev, founded The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(IMRO; Bulgarian: (BMPO) in 1893,
Thessaloniki. According to Tatarchev’s memoir, their purpose was to realize an
autonomous Macedonia in which the Bulgarian element was dominant. Otherwise,
the attempt of unification would be prevented by other Balkan states and Turkish
rule.83 The Internal Macedonian and Edirne Revolutionary Committee were jointly
established by the Macedonian origin youth and Bulgarian nationalists, who were
influenced by socialist movements, and set the goal of ensuring the autonomy of
Macedonia. Then, with the direct initiative of Bulgaria, another secret organization
called the Supreme Macedonian Committee was established in 1895. Macedonian
immigrant associations in Bulgaria also constantly protested for the Ottoman
government to carry out the reforms promised in the Berlin Treaty. The Supreme
Committee started an uprising in Melnik in 1895. The main purpose of the uprising
was to announce to the world public that the region was Bulgarian territory and
that the Bulgarians were unhappy under Ottoman rule, ensuring the intervention
of the great powers. The uprising could not get the support of the people and
fail but it succeeded to attract Europeans and Russia’s attention. Thanks to this
rebellion, Ferdinand, the Bulgarian Prince solved the recognition problem with
both Russia and the Ottoman Empire.84 However many Macedonians realized that
the Bulgarian government had used them for pragmatic purposes in Bulgarian
foreign politics they left the Supreme Committee and returned to Macedonia.
From this point, socialist ideas gained momentum and opponents took steps to
establish a real revolutionary organization that had a broad sphere of influence
83Ibid, 113, 118-119.
84Hacısalihoğlu, “Balkanlarda Muhalif Hareketler,” 177.
33
and activity.85 The rise of socialism in the Balkans gradually strengthened the
belief that the Macedonian movement should start in Macedonia and be carried
out by the Macedonian peoples. A socialist Bulgarian leader Dimiter Blogoev
advocates that the liberation of Macedonia cannot succeed with Europeans’ or
Russians’ intervention, it could only happen If Macedonians trusted no one but
themselves. The Internal Organization was organized in provinces in great secrecy,
keeping them as an underground society until 1897. During a house search of the
villagers, a lot of ammunition was seized, giving away the Internal Organization.
This situation disproves the idea of the Macedonian Question because of the
Bulgarian intervention, but people supported them too.86 The organization and
arsenals were discovered, and many members got arrested, though, by 1897, the
Bulgaro-Macedonian movement and banditry entered a new phase.
One incident in the Balkans had a significant influence on the Bulgaro-Macedonian
movement and other claimants on Macedonia. Cretan Question and 1897 Thesally
War between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. The uprising and aftermaths in
Crete became an example not only for Bulgarian nationalists but also other Balkan
nations that had desires on Macedonian territory. Although the unification of
Crete did not finalize until the Balkan Wars, the uprisings in Crete and Great
Powers’ support that gradually increased in favor of Creten Christians and Greece
set an example for other movements, especially for Macedo-Bulgarian. From Greek
Revolution in 1821 to 1913 several uprisings brought the Creten Question one step
further.87 After the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, the Ottomans’ diplomatic defeat
even though they won the war, was a crucial turning point for both separatist
organizations carrying out terrorist activities and other Balkan states. The loss
of Crete was a severe example for organizations that acted with the motivation
to join Bulgaria, in terms of the idea of connecting Macedonia to Bulgaria by
bringing it into a fait accompli. In addition, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in
the Battle of Thessaly was one of the strongest proves of the Ottomans’ complete
diplomatic isolation. As a precedent of whether an armed struggle of Christians
would succeed or not in the 19th century, the War of Thessaly and Cretan issue
proved to other groups that even an attempt to revolt against Ottoman rule could
be enough for European intervention and safe to attack without taking risk.88
85Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 126.
86Ibid, 127-128, 130.
87Cemal Tukin, “Girit” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1996.
88Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 132-133.
34
So even if an armed movement or rebellion was suppressed by the intervention
of the Ottoman army, it was possible to gain autonomy when the Great Powers
stepped in.89 By 1897, banditry entered a new and critical phase which was also
the time that Tahsin Bey started his career and faced with banditry issue. In
this period more intense armed struggles took place in Macedonia. The Internal
Organization adopted new rules focusing on protecting the villagers against other
bands, making propaganda, especially on the state corruption and insecurity
which will be discussed in the following chapter through Tahsin Bey’s experience.
In the earlier period most of the income came from the Bulgarian bourgeoise.
However, after the disagreement between the Bulgarian government, the peasantry
became the main source of finance instead of hostile bourgeoise who supported
the Exarchate. During this period split between Exarchists who were following a
more conservative and nationalist line and the Internal organization also known as
“centralists” who were in more socialist revolutionary line. Especially revolutionary
intellectuals and conservative clergy competed to be the absolute authority in the
Macedonian Question. For Exarchists, revolution meant destruction. The best way
to solve it was to keep the Macedonian question as a Bulgarian problem.
On the other hand, centralists welcomed all unpleasant elements, including other
Slavs. They did not need to be a member of the Bulgarian Exarchate, on the
contrary, otherwise would be better. Even so, the split between the two groups
should not be misinterpreted. Fikret Adanır suggests that it is quite misleading
to infer that a Macedonian national identity emerged from the conflict between
these two groups as contemporary Macedonian historians suggest. Adanır considers
this situation as an opposition of socialist groups against the Exarchate and the
bourgeoise. Moreover, after a severe response by the Ottoman government against
the Internal organization, they became dismissible without the support and struggle
of Exarchists. One could even suggest that the conflict between these two groups
intensified in the 1890s turned into a large scale of cooperation.90
3.2.1 Cuma-i Bala Uprising
In the early 20th century, relations between different fractions of the Bulgaro-
Macedonian movement and foreign politics of Bulgaria led a significant uprising in
Cuma-i Bala province. The split between two groups and the increasing isolation
89Hacısalihoğlu, “Balkanlarda Muhalif Hareketler,” 177.
90Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 147-149.
35
of Bulgari in the international arena led Prince Ferdinand to attempt to take
control of the movement and prevent the legitimacy of the Bulgarian cause from
getting harmed by the terror actions of the Internal and Supreme Committee.
So, Ferdinand wanted to take control through Konchev and Bulgarian military
officers believed to be the only solution. In the Macedonian Congress in 1901,
Konchev gained a victory and control whom the Serez group opposed under the
leadership of famous insurgent Sandanski.91 In 1902, the Supreme Committee
chose Cuma-i Bala region Zelesnica village. Yet they could get little support from
the villagers as the Internal Committee was already against this uprising. This
failed attempt by 300-400 terrorists was suppressed peacefully by the Ottomans
though many village searches put revolutionists into risk afterward. Yet, Konchev
and the Supremists did not consider it as a failure but a victory as, once again
Macedonian Question was recognized as a Bulgarian problem by the public opinion
which clearly shows the different approaches of the two groups. During this period,
the relationship between Russia and the Sublime Porte got better, affecting the
banditry in Macedonia. It is not a coincidence that Russians discouraged Serbs
and Bulgarians from the idea of a general Christian governor of the entire Vilayet-i
Selase within the reforms. Moreover, the Bulgarian government in this period
arrested and dissolved the Macedonian Committees in Bulgaria and set a cordon on
the Ottoman border to prevent bands attack.92 Surprisingly, Tahsin Bey notes that
banditry and komitadji attacks decreased in the more or less same period thanks to
his efforts and fights against the banditry in the towns he was working in.
The uprising that broke out in Cuma-i Bala was not the last incident. An
insurgency on a larger scale broke out in 1903 called Ilinden, referring to the day of
Ilias. The transitionary period between two major uprisings and internal conflicts
should be understood to see in what circumstances the uprising took place. In
1902-1903 post-Cuma-i Bala uprising required restoring the Internal Organization’s
authority, which would mean another revolt. On the other hand, villagers were not
sharing their interests and laying down their arms to the Ottoman government.
There were hot debates between different factions in the organization. The Supreme
Committee and the Bulgarian government did not want the Macedonians to act
independently. In the Internal Organization, Sandanski and his supporters thought
it would be the most suitable time for a large-scale insurgency, while Delchev and
Petrov believed a total rebellion should be considered the last card and should not
91Sandanski who got his name from “zindan” as he was a prison officer previously had a special place in the
Macedonian banditry history: Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 118.
92Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 167-171.
36
be wasted before the time. They also warned others that villagers’ escape to the
mountains in arms did not necessarily mean they were preparing for a revolution,
but it could mean the opposite. The peasants who handed their arms in also proved
that the people needed time and preparation. A revolt that could only taka place
in Monastir would destroy the image of the Internal Organization. What Delchev
and Petrov suggested was to establish terror cells inspired by Armenian terrorist
committees, in this way they could organize chetas in the towns and cities while
they were constantly terrorizing the villages and the city centers. In this phase,
until the Ilinden uprising, the Bulgaro - Macedonian movement chose terror as a
way of struggle. Besides the fact that they needed time for a total revolt, terror
would require constant military power, damage the Ottoman economy and attract
European intervention. However, the Supreme Committee decided for a total
revolt, the preparation for an uprising was discovered both by the Great Powers and
the Ottoman administration. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian government was playing a
double game.
When an uprising was about to break out, A secret Macedonian Revolutionary
Committee in Thessaloniki, following an anarchist line, organized anarchist actions
and assassinations in march of 1903. Bulgaro-Macedonian anarchist students
named Gerchikov, Mancukov and Bojkov were publishing a revolutionary terrorist
journal. They considered any chauvinism, including the Bulgarian, should be
fought against. No one can be superior to another in Macedonia. Peaceful Turks
should be welcomed to the struggle for liberation against the Sultan. The group
active in Thessaloniki named “Gemicii” organized terror attacks on several places
like the French ferry, German school or Ottoman Bank that terrified and turned
the European public opinion against themselves. This affected the situation of the
Internal Organization, many got arrested, tension increased among Muslims, some
important names like Goce Delcev were killed and the final preparation for the
uprising got wasted.
Meanwhile, a new government in Bulgaria tried to restore its reputation and
relations with the Sultan. However, Greece which had been in a bad situation
financially and militarily was extra careful and collaborationist toward the Ottoman
administration. When a Balkan government was in a disadvantaged situation, they
were restoring relations with the Ottoman empire fearing other Balkan states to
take the control over Macedonia before they recovered.
37
The temporary alliance between Greece and the Sublime Porte enabled the Ottoman
administration to fight against the Bulgarian bands effectively. Greek officers and
Patriarchate was most kind and helpful to the Ottoman authorities, they were reporting
Excarhists to get arrested. Especially a Greek priest Karavangelis, founded
his own paramilitary forces and fought against the Internal Committee. Ottoman
armed forces were helpful and tolerated the Greek bands in return, Greek intelligence
was giving away many members of the Internal Committee.
3.2.2 Ilinden Uprising in 1903
Gruev was elected the leader and a traditional guerilla fight was chosen. The uprising
was postponed several times as they struggled against Karavangelis’ forces
and Ottomans. Because of this collaboration, many members, including the famous
Chakalarov got killed. Even the villagers were not giving enough support, Ottoman
military forces could use more power but European pressure for reforms and intervention
prevented it. Under these circumstances, Saint Ilias Day, the 20th of July,
was decided for the uprising but it started two weeks earlier than the actual plan.
The Ilinden uprising did not mean to destroy Ottoman rule but to show how Christian
elements reacted against Muslims to the European public opinion. The Internal
Organization shifted from Delchev’s revolutionary line to an unplanned and random
attitude. While many Muslim Albanian-Turk were killed, Greek and Serb chetas
did not remain silent. Greeks were either neutral or If they were strong enough,
fought against the Bulgarian revolts. As this uprising was presented as a Bulgarian
national cause, Serbian bands also started an armed struggle in Skopje.
3.3 Ottoman Administration and Muslim Response
“Macedonia is the Second Jerusalem!” 93
The attitude of Bulgaro-Macedonian revolts toward the Muslims contradicted each
other. Though they decided to wage this war against the Sultan not the Muslim
people in Smilevo Congress, it is contradicting that the uprising started with the
attacks on Turk and Albanian majority villages. Especially Turkish villages in
93Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” 140.
38
Florina and Kastoria were targeted and the Bulgarian bandits killed many civilians.
The lack of plan and structure in the uprising led to attacks and the loss of Muslims,
which unified Muslims from different groups against the Bulgarians and created a
civil war. Ilinden uprising peaked the religious identity and tension among Muslims.
The Sultan’s lack of brutal response to the revolts led Muslims to organize and
engage in armed struggles. Although there was a huge lack of order and plan,
Adanır notes that the leaders of the Ilinden Uprising expected and planned the
Muslim reactions and missiles against the Slavs. Also, Bulgarian peasants’ setting
their Muslim neighbors’ houses fire and escaping to the mountains prove that
missiles were expected. What is also expected was the European intervention as
it was impossible to feed all those people in the mountains for a long time. If
the leaders could control the plain and be ready for a long-term uprising, they
would not let thousands of civilians who were blocking the logistics escape to the
mountains, proving that the Uprising was for propaganda rather than military
success. However, they could not get what they expected. Russian minister of
foreign affairs Lamsdorf suggested Ottoman ambassador to take strict cautions, end
the bloody actions of Bulgarian bandits and punish them severely. When troops in
Kosovo returned to Monastir, especially defense positions in Krushevo were shelled
and in the 24th of August, the Ilinden uprising was successfully suppressed. The
aftermath had destructive impacts on the Bulgarians in the short and long term.
Their plans to damage Turkish harvests reversed; people had no winter stock in the
mountains, the Exarchate was in difficulty. Muslims and the Patriarchate were fierce.
After the Ilinden Uprising, the Internal Organization got weaker; people turned
against them, even gave them away. Serres wing under Sandanski changed their
policies and adopted more social democrat principles. Though the uprising was a
disaster, it led European powers to focus more on the reforms. In Mürzteg, new
decisions were made on the reforms to be applied. After Mürtzteg, commissions
were founded based on nationalities instead of religious identity which was a
precedent for the history of Ottoman reforms.94 The objective was to balance
Bulgarian elements in Macedonia with other groups but it did not please Greeks
after all that they did for the Turkish government, as this situation harmed the
strength of the Patriarchate. The Mürtzteg reforms, on the other hand, could not
establish peace and order, on the contrary articles like the 3rd article increased
the tension in the region. The article enables border changes in vilayets based on
94Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 201-218.
39
the population and opened the path for ethnic cleansing and propaganda between
different groups.
Constant pressures for the reforms and foreign intervention were least welcomed by
the Muslims. Albanians were upset about the general governor which endangered
the Albanian lands and their national identity. Meanwhile, Abdülhamid II utilized
the sensitivity of upset Muslims within the Pan-Islamist sentiment and attracted
European public opinion. After the reform program was proposed in 1903 Abdülhamid
II made the famous French journal Le Figaro publish an article with the
name of Mısırlı Kâmil Bey in the 12nd of September 1903. To summarize this article
draws attention to European invention to split Muslims and Non-Muslims who
had been living together until now. The reform program imposed by Europe was
a start of the dissolution of the Empire, proving the Sultan’s words about Europe
launching crusades. The role of the sultan is emphasized; against these crusaders,
entire Islamic world should band together under the spiritual leadership of the Ottoman
sultanate. The European hypocrisy on the Bulgarian terror is criticized,
anarchists’ terror attacks in Thessaloniki are referred and accepting the terror of
Bulgars and blaming the Ottoman administration for restoring the peace is considered
unacceptable. The article emphasizes that the Macedonia Question is not an
ethnic, religious or sectarian issue. Conflicts between Bulgarians and non-Bulgarian
Christians such as Vlachs and Greeks are reminded and the author warns If these
people are left alone (without the Empire) they would immediately kill each other.
It is observed that The Cretan Question and annexation of the Eastern Rumelia
remain as traumas. The article’s author is well aware of these traumas and how
they set examples for the Bulgarians regarding the Macedonian issue. Bulgarian
atrocities, European hypocrisy and interference are the reasons for the turmoil, and
the caliphate is pointed to be the real solution mechanism.95 The article proves that
the Cretan issue and annex of the Eastern Rumelia did not influence only Balkan
separatist movement but also the perspective and the political discourse of Abdülhamid
II. While it is an interesting way to emphasize the significance of Macedonia
for the Empire by attributing sanctity, discourse seems to change from Ottomanism
to Pan-Islamism.
95BOA.Y.PRK.TKM., 47-18 19.06.1321/11.09.1903. The document was accessed through the work of Ademi.
See: Ademi, “II. Abdülhamid’in Balkan Siyaseti,” 140-141.
40
4. TAHSİN UZER’S MACEDONIA: MACEDONIAN BANDITRY
ISSUE AND OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE
EYES OF TAHSIN BEY
4.1 Hasan Tahsin Uzer and his life
Tahsin Uzer, due to his remarkable personality and the important government
positions he held, was an active and influential administrative and political figure
during the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Turkish
Republic. From a very early age he served as a central figure in various state
issues. He became an important figure among the founding cadres of the Republic
after taking an active role in governing some of the most critical regions of the
Empire, from the Balkans to Syria. With a career spanning from the reign of
Abdülhamid through the Republic’s first years, Tahsin Bey received recognition
from the regimes he worked for. Having served as governor of Van, Erzurum
and Syria during the Ottoman empire and taking a central role in the early
republican period, he is still recognized as one of the most famous governors in
the history of modern Turkey, with a short biography of his published among the
“50 Famous Governors” series from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However,
he is less well known for his work in Rumelia, especially when the Macedonian
Question was at its peak in the early stages of his career. Therefore, the study
of Tahsin Uzer’s life and influence should center more on the political, administrative,
ideological and social history of the Balkans during the late Ottoman period.
Hasan Tahsin Bey, later known as Tahsin Uzer, was born on August 29, 1877, in
Thessaloniki, recorded in Sicill-i ahvâl as hijiri 1294 According to the Register of
Persons, he was born on July 1, 1878.96 Tahsin Uzer traces his paternal lineage to
96Mustafa Şahin, “Hasan Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği ve Siyasetçiliği,” PhD diss., (Atatürk University,
2010), 12.
41
the famous Albanian leader Skanderbeg.97 His Father, whom Tahsin Bey refers as a
descendant of Skanderbeg, is Hacı İbrahim Ağa , his grandfather was İskenderoğlu
Yahya Kethüda and his great grandfather was İbrahim Kethüda. İbrahim Kethüda
was from Serin village of Radomir, located in Prizren, Kosovo. He acquired
extensive çiftliks and lived quite a religious and benevolent life. Tahsin Bey’s
father’s name was given after his great grandfather whom Tahsin Bey describes as
being a 1.90 m tall, blonde, fair-skinned, light blue-eyed, clean and well-dressed and
pious person. His father died in 1883 due to contracting pneumonia when Tahsin
Bey was only six years old.98
His mother was referred to as “İstanbullu Hacer Hanım” in Meşhur Valiler (Famous
Governors);99 however, Tahsin Bey gives his mother’s name as “Hatice Hanım”
saying that she was born in Thessaloniki and died in 1912 in Istanbul. His mother
was the daughter of Mahmut Bey, the commander of the fortress of Thessaloniki.
His mother’s family was quite well-known in Thessaloniki. Since Hatice Hanım was
orphaned at a young age, she grew up in her older brother, Abdullah Bey’s family
house.100
Tahsin Bey came from a relatively wealthy family. His father, who was in an
excellent financial situation, was engaged in trade. Later, he went to Balıkesir for
commercial purposes, and by buying goods from Mihaliç, Bandırma and Kirmasti
(present-day Mustafakemalpaşa) regions and sending them to Thessaloniki, he
established extensive commercial relations, staying in these regions for five years.
In the meantime, he was also assigned to ensure the transfer of land and sea troops
to the Crimean front. When the war was over, contracting also came to an end,
and his father adopted the city of Thessaloniki as his new business location and
settled there. Later, he married Hatice Hanım.
Hacı İbrahim Ağa built a house in Thessaloniki in 1860. In the haremlik there were
12 rooms, one kitchen, one hammam (Turkish bath) and two large gardens. The
selamlık had seven rooms, one kitchen, one hammam and a garden with a barn and
cistern. He also bought Gorgob Çiftliği from Istanbullu Salih Bey for 9000 gold
97Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 1.
98Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği.” 11.
99H.Orhun, C.,Kasaroğlu,M.Belek, K. Atakul K. Meşhur Valiler, İçişleri Bakanlığı Merkez Valileri Bürosu
Yayınları, 1969, 513.
100Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı.” 7.
42
liras and started farming and sheep husbandry. Tahsin Bey spent his childhood in
this house.
Tahsin Bey lost his father when he was only six years old. After his father died in
1883, his family rented out the selamlık of their house as a school where Tahsin
Bey received his primary education. After the death of his uncle, who was also the
school’s director, Tahsin continued his primary education at the Hamidiye İptidaisi
(Hamidiye Primary School) and graduated in 1888. Although he initially joined
the military school, he left after some time and continued at the Mülkiye Rüştiyesi
(Civil Secondary School). He attended boarding high school in Thessaloniki for two
years.
Later, Tahsin and his mother moved to Istanbul, where he enrolled at Soğukçeşme
Askeri Rüştiyesi (Military Secondary School) for a while before being accepted
to Kuleli İdadisi (Kuleli High School).101 Ender Korkmaz says that though the
Sicill-i ahvâl records do not mention his education at Soğukçeşme Askeri Rüştiyesi,
he might have graduated from there.102 Although Tahsin Bey was admitted to
the Kuleli Askeri İdadisi (Military High School), following the advice of his uncle
Cemal Bey, Tahsin Bey chose to attend the Mülkiye İdadisi (preparatory school of
the School of Civil Administration). After high school, Tahsin Bey continued at
the Mekteb-i Mülkiye (School of Civil Administration) where he first encountered
the then-secret and illegal Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). When he was
in his third year, supposedly around 1893-1894, Tahsin Bey joined the CUP with
the invitation of senior military medical school (Askerî Mekteb-i Tıbbiye) student
Selanikli Uzun Emin Bey.103
Tahsin Bey’s years as a student at the Mekteb-i Mülkiye coincided with the period
when the students of the Tıbbiye and Mülkiye organized as the revolutionary center
of CUP. Tahsin Bey took an oath, joined this society and worked to get the students
around him to join. He quickly became a trusted member of the community and
was assigned to distribute pamphlets. One day he was arrested when he went to
receive the organization’s papers in a German pub. Tahsin Bey was found not
guilty, as there was no proof against him and other innocent bystanders had been
101Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği.” 16-17.
102Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı.” 10.
103Ibid, 13.
43
arrested that day. Tahsin Bey’s health worsened during the long interrogation, so
he was released, although he was sent out of Istanbul by order of Yıldız palace.
In 1897, Tahsin Bey was appointed as the nahiye müdürü (township director)
of the Pürsiçan nahiyesi (township) of Thessaloniki in present-day Prosotsani,
northern Greece. This appointment was seen as an exile by both Tahsin Bey and
his family. Mustafa Şahin notes that exile largely was carried out in the form of
appointment to a civil service post outside of the city, since for Mülkiye, Tıbbiye
and Harbiye graduates, staying in Istanbul was essential to career advancement.
A lucky few had the connections to secure appointments in the city, while others
who were appointed to distant provinces saw their posts as de facto exile.104
One of the documents sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Governor of
Thessaloniki regarding Tahsin Bey’s appointment indicates that he was appointed
to the Pürsiçan township of Drama on an incidental basis after being taken into
custody by order of the palace and being forcibly exiled from Istanbul.105 Tahsin
Bey relates that every day “thousands of innocent and aggrieved youngsters”
were arrested and tortured. Many Tıbbiyeli students were arrested. Tahsin Bey’s
superiors, Emin and Tahsin Bey, and their wives were exiled to Fizan along with
400 others.106 Ender Korkmaz also remarks that, considering that many opposition
figures were exiled to Tripoli in the same year, his appointment to his hometown
of Thessaloniki with the title of township director could be considered a removal
rather than an exile and a lighter punishment than what others received.107
Tahsin Bey served in different sub-districts and towns in Rumelia. His lifelong career
as a civil servant started with his duty in Pürsiçan while he was only 19 years
old. After his term of office in Pürsiçan Tahsin Bey was appointed to Çiç township
in Drama.108 After a short time he returned to Pürsiçan. Once he reached
the age of military service, he served in Thessaloniki. Afterwards, Tahsin Bey was
appointed to Ağustos nahiyesi of Thessaloniki. After his term in Ağustos, Tahsin
Bey worked as qaymaqam (district governor) in Razlık, Gevgili, Florina, Kesendire
and Thessaloniki. After his duty in Ağustos Tahsin Bey worked as district governor
(qaymaqam) in Razlık, Gevgili, Florina, Kesendire and Thessaloniki. After a
104Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği.” 22.
105Orhun, Meşhur Valiler, 514.
106Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 16.
107Ibid, 16.
108(present-day Pangaio)
44
short time, he returned to Pürsiçan. Once he reached the age of military service, he
served in Thessaloniki. Afterwards, Tahsin Bey was appointed to Ağustos nahiyesi
of Thessaloniki. After his term in Ağustos, Tahsin Bey worked as qaymaqam (district
governor) in Razlık, Gevgili, Florina, Kesendire and Thessaloniki. After his
duty in Ağustos Tahsin Bey worked as district governor (qaymaqam) in Razlık,
Gevgili, Florina, Kesendire and Thessaloniki.109 Tahsin Bey, who later worked in
the governorships of Drama and Beyoğlu, was promoted to the governorship after
a while. Tahsin Bey then served in the eastern provinces during the critical years
of the First World War, first as the governor of Van and then to the governor of
Erzurum. During the First World War, he attracted the attention of the state,
especially in terms of providing logistical support to the army. On July 20, 1916,
he received the order to move to Damascus. Tahsin Bey mostly served on inspections
and front-line tours during this period, eventually Tahsin Bey resigned from
this duty which lasted for two years. While Tahsin Bey was on his way back, he
learned that he was appointed as the Governor of Syria again and went to Aleppo
to return to Damascus. However, the British forces captured the city before Tahsin
Bey returned to Damascus.110 Tahsin Bey, appointed as the Governor of Izmir on
November 9, 1918, could only stay in this post for 20 days, but he accomplished
many important works in Izmir within these 20 days. He was appointed as the Governor
of Izmir on November 9, 1918, and even though he could only stay in this post
for 20 days, he accomplished much in Izmir within these 20 days.111 Tahsin Bey,
who became a deputy of Chamber after his dismissal from governorship, served as
the İzmir Deputy from January 12, 1920, until the parliament was closed. After the
parliament was closed, he was arrested along with many others and exiled to Malta.
Returning from Malta in 1921, he went to Anatolia and served as a deputy in the
Grand National Assembly. After serving as a member of parliament for five terms,
he was appointed as the Third General Inspector by Atatürk and died in 1939 due
to cancer while he was working as an inspector. He became a Deputy of Chamber
after his dismissal from governorship, serving as the İzmir Deputy from January 12,
1920, until the parliament was closed. After the parliament was closed, he was arrested
along with many others and exiled to Malta. Returning from Malta in 1921,
he went to Anatolia and served as a deputy in the Grand National Assembly. After
serving as a member of parliament for five terms, he was appointed as the Third
General Inspector by Atatürk and died in 1939 due to cancer while working as an
109See “Macedonian Question and Banditry Through The Eyes Of Tahsin Uzer” for more details.
110Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 102.
111Mustafa Şahin and Cemile Şahin, “Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Partizanlık ve İç Çekişmeler Nedeniyle
Azledilen Tahsin Bey’in 20 Günlük İzmir Valiliği.” ÇTTAD X, no.22, (Spring, 2011,): 33.
45
inspector. 112
4.2 Macedonian Question and “Banditry” through the Eyes of Tahsin
Uzer
Before describing the Macedonian Question, Tahsin Uzer gives a brief history
of Macedonia and its administrative, ethnographic and geographical boundaries.
He provides a historical framework going back to the rule of famous Macedonian
conqueror Alexander the Great and continues with the Ottoman conquest of
Macedonia. While doing so, he mentions some of the integration policies the early
Ottomans used in order to gain the locals’ loyalty, as he considered them successful.
It is remarkable that Tahsin Bey explains the significance of the Macedonian
Question in world history, as it is seen as one of the main reasons for the outbreak
of the First World War. He calls the region a “Macedonian Salad” (ironically, a
century later, shopska salata is served as “Macedonian Salad” in the restaurants
of Skopje).113 In the following section, a brief history of the Russian-Ottoman
relationship over the previous few centuries is given, as well as an explanation of
the ideals of Great Russia and noteworthy wars and uprisings.
According to Tahsin Bey, the Ottoman Empire’s major troubles were as follows:
Macedonia, Yemen, Albania, Kuwait, Armenians, Druze, Hejaz, Jerusalem, Zionism,
Kurdish-Hamidiye Regiments, Nestorians, the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Fener Rum
Patriarchate and some other tribes.114 Among these, the Macedonian Question and
the history of Macedonia had a special place for Tahsin Bey. As he tells his son
in his memoir, Thessaloniki, the city where he and his son was born, belonged to
Macedonia and learning the history of their homeland was an ancestral obligation.115
In Tahsin Uzer’s view, the first signs of separatist movements and “banditry” started
to emerge during the reign of Mahmud II and Abdülmecid. One of the turning
points of the Macedonian Question occurred during the Tanzimat period. He firmly
112Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği,” 247, 290.
113“shopska salata : a salad combining sliced cucumbers, onions, and tomatoes with soft white cheese”. See
: Britannica,“North Macedonia, Cultural Life,” Sep. 1, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/North-
Macedonia/Cultural-life.
114Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 122.
115Ibid, 82.
46
believed that the Macedonian Question became a “gangrene” because governments
could not implement the necessary measures before it was too late. Moreover, they
let European states intervene in the domestic politics of the empire. Tahsin Bey
sought to uncover the roots of this issue in a much earlier era. According to him, if
the elements that formed the basis of the Macedonian Question had been minimized,
events such as the Peloponnese uprising would not have occurred. He suggests that
if the Ottoman Empire had continued Sultan Murad and Mehmed II’s policy of
converting the locals and settling Anatolian Turkmen in the region, Tuna vilayet
would not have become Bulgaria and Macedonia would not have become a thorn in
the side of the empire for a century.116 His ideas on this subject are best explained in
the pages where he describes his time serving as the governor of Kesendire District
The fact that there were almost no Turks or Turkish speakers in Kesendire, with
Greek flags and the king’s pictures hanging everywhere, made the town more like a
part of Greece than the Ottoman Empire. Tahsin Bey’s chagrin with his ancestors
is evident in the following passage:
“Why did you go to distant lands (Morocco, Tunisia, Malta, Persian
Gulf) and leave behind an unsettled state? So why did you come back?
Oh, Great Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, instead of sacrificing hundreds
of thousands of Turkish sons in the land of Nemse by besieging
Vienna, wouldn’t it be better if you had completely Turkified Halkidiki
and Macedonia and put them under our administration with solid ties?...
Oh, rusty-headed Şeyhülislam Halet Efendi, why did you neglect Mora
and the Greek uprisings and deal with Tepedelenli Ali Pasha instead?
Why did you send such a unique commander and vizier like Hurşit Paşa
against the Tepedelenli and make the sons of the country hurt each
other?117 Why didn’t you beat the Greeks of Kesendire instead of shedding
such brotherly blood? [...] If you had, today the Mora revolution
would not have happened, and the armies of King Constantine would
not have been able to cause thousands of troubles by stepping on our
beautiful Izmir. Halet Efendi! Get up from the grave and see!”118
116Ibid, 83.
117It was inevitable that Mahmud II’s policy of eliminating local powers to establish central authority would
eventually put an end to the power of Ali Paşa, who acted semi-independently and gradually expanded
his sphere of influence, Ali Pasha’s rule came to an end when he clashed with Nişancı Hâlet Efendi,
who was in an important position and had changed the balance of power through his scheming. Halet
Efendi played an important role in discrediting Tepedelenli. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha took advantage of the
turmoil in foreign politics, acting as an independent ruler and making agreements with other countries.
He reached the peak of his power in 1811 and helped inspire the idea of an independent Greek state,
which led to the Peloponnese Revolt. He prepared a revolt in Morea, held a meeting with the Greeks
and provided weapons and money to the Greeks in 1820 (see : Kemal Beydilli, “Tepedelenli Ali Paşa”,
TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi,Aug.28,2022,https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/tepedelenli-ali-pasa. ) Tahsin Bey
likely knew about this historical narrative, given the information he provided. Nevertheless, Tahsin Bey’s
point of view on these events is quite remarkable despite Tepedelenli’s collaboration with the Greeks of
Morea that Tahsin Bey nursed a grudge against.
118Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 219-220.
47
Tahsin Bey’s retrospective musings show that his perspective differed from the
official historical narrative of the Ottoman Empire at some points. Moreover, it is
possible to say that his views on the Kesendire Rums and the Peloponnese uprising
are related to traumatic events in his life that will be explained in the next chapter.
Likewise, these are the words of an exiled Ottoman deputy who had witnessed the
occupation of İzmir.
Tahsin Bey continues his historical background of the Macedonian Question with
the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War. He also lists the reasons that brought the empire
to war, specifically Russia’s policies and the establishment of the Istanbul Rum
Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate. Tahsin Bey notes that the granting of
the Greek Patriarchate with special privileges long before the establishment of the
Bulgarian Exarchate, constituted the biggest mistake made by the Ottoman State
after the collapse of Byzantium and the conquest of Istanbul. Taking it further,
he argued that Mehmet the Conqueror and his viziers committed an “unforgivable
political murder” in this matter. He also criticized those who underestimate
what a “temple” left for “Eastern Christians” could have done to a majestic and
magnificent state. “Like a boil in the heart of the country,” he emphasized what
a terrible and harmful entity this church later became. New troubles were added
when the Bulgarian church was permitted to be established during the reign of
Abdulaziz. Tahsin Bey noted the “terrible role” played by this Bulgarian exarchate
in the history of the Balkans and Macedonia. As for how these two churches
helped cause the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, the issue goes back to Peter I.119
The Russians, previously subordinate to the Istanbul Greek Patriarchate, declared
themselves the spiritual leaders of Orthodoxy during the reign of Peter I. This
development enabled Orthodox Christians in the Balkans to seek the protection of
Russia and to attempt rebellion.
Furthermore, thanks to Russia’s Tsar, many young Bulgarian students were sent
to be educated in Russia through the Bulgarian Exarchate, helping to establish a
Slavic-Eastern Orthodox national identity. Tahsin Bey blames grand vizier Âli Paşa
for this development, as he let the Bulgarian Exarchate pass unchallenged.120 Hasip
Saygılı agrees that the Fener Rum Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate caused
huge trouble by financing, training and protecting bandits. He reiterated that, in
literature, Bulgarian bands engaged in armed conflict were called Exarchists, and
119Known as “Deli Petro” in Turkish.
120Ibid, 115-116.
48
their Greek counterparts were called Patriarchists. According to him, this shows
that the separation of the churches was the main reason for ethnic clashes in the
region.121 Kemal Beydilli also suggests that the Macedonian Question emerged due
to the Bulgarian Exarchate’s establishment, Pan-Slavic ideals and the outcome of
the Russo-Ottoman War. The autonomous Bulgarian Church’s attempts to spread
its domains at the Patriarchate’s expense increased competition and tension in the
region.122 One of the most disastrous events that accelerated komiteci activities
was the Law of Churches, which was approved by Grand Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa
and resulted from the 77-78 Russo-Turkish War and the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. At
this point, Tahsin Bey agrees with Abdülhamid II that the law was a grave mistake
because it united Bulgarian and Rum guerillas who were previously fighting against
each other.123 The old policy of supporting groups of bandits fighting one another
could not work anymore. Multiple documents indicate that the empire tolerated
or even partly supported some of the Greek bandits against the more threatening
Bulgarian chetas in the region; however, there was tremendous pressure from the
Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire to take action against the Greeks. In the
same way, until 1906, Greek bandits did not consider the Ottoman administration
and Turks the main threat; they even supported their authority in some areas.124
On the issue of the Law of Churches, many historians hold similar views with
Tahsin Uzer and Abdülhamid II. İsmet Görgülü summarizes the impact of the 1910
Law of Churches as follows:
“While dealing with the turmoil, the Ottoman administration made a historical
mistake that played into the hands of the Balkan states - according to our current
assessments. The empire enacted the Law of Churches on July 3, 1910. With this,
the Ottoman Empire accepted the principle that whichever group made up the
majority when it came to disputed churches, schools and holy places would be in
charge of those sites. However, after Mehmed II conquered Istanbul, he appointed
the Greek patriarch in Istanbul as both the spiritual and material head of all
the people in European Turkey. The Greek Church used this advantage gained
over other churches to spread its own culture, to oppress and torment those who
did not belong to it. With the resulting friction, the churches, and therefore the
121Hasip Saygılı, “Rumeli Müfettişliği Döneminde (1902-1908) Makedonya’da Yunan Komitecileri ve Osmanlı
Devleti,” Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi 11 (2015): 147-185,153.
122Kemal Beydilli, “II. Abdülhamid Devrinde Makedonya Mes’elesi’ne Dair,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları 9, (1989),
78.
123Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 116-117.
124Saygılı, “Rumeli Müfettişliği,” 147-185, 161-167.
49
groups affiliated with them, fought each other for years and saw each other as
constant enemies. The Law of Churches ended this enmity, and it caused those who
had fought each other until then to unite and fight against the Ottoman Empire.”125
Although it is undisputed that the Law of Churches brought various troubles to the
state, an argument like the one above risk being an oversimplification. As discussed
in the second chapter, before the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, the
Slavic Orthodox people had already revolted against the oppression and abuse of
the Greek Orthodox church, preparing the ground for future conflict. However,
the principle that the party that constitutes a quorum has the right to establish
their own church and school is not enough to suggest that the Law of Churches
brought an end to the Greek-Bulgarian conflict. As mentioned in the second
chapter, Article 10 of the imperial edict, which approved the establishment of
the Bulgarian Exarchate despite strong opposition from the Greek Patriarchate,
also allows the party that constitutes a two-thirds majority of the population in
a region to have control of that region. This article caused the Bulgarians and
Greeks to fight to gain a majority in various regions, elevating the Macedonian
Question to a different level.126 Moreover, similar to the imperial edict ordering the
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, strong objections came from the Greeks
before and after this law was enacted. In a telegram dated July 4, 1910, there is
a joint complaint about the Law of Churches presented by the Greek Patriarchate
and Metropolitan bishops.127 In a report dated July 13, 1910, it is stated that the
Ministry of Internal Affairs allowed the Greeks to hold a meeting opposing the Law
of Churches in Ioannina within the limits of the law.128 In the July 4, 1910 issue of
the Tanin newspaper, which was first published after the Constitutional Revolution
and served as the media organ of the CUP, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı extensively
covered the objections of the Greeks in the patriarchate and parliament and their
threats of resignation, explaining the peace that the law would bring.129 The same
125Ismet Görgülü, “Balkan Harbi,” Türk Tarih Kurumu, Aug. 26, 2022, https://www.ttk.gov.tr/belgelerletarih/
balkan-harbi/
126See 2.4.3. Identity crisis- Ethno-religious conflicts
127BOA, İ.MBH, 2-88.
128BOA, DH.MUİ, 113-1.
129“Meclis-i mebusan ve muahharen meclis-i ayan kiliseler kanununu kabul etdikleri zaman hareketi
vakalarının mahiyetini ve iktisab edeceği netayici tamamen takdir etmemişler ve işin her cihetini
cihetini ariz ü ‘amîk teemmül ve mülahaza eyledikden sonra ellerini kalblerine koyarak ve vicdanen
mutmain ve müsterih olarak kararlarını vermişlerdi. Rum Patrikhanesinin bu neticeden mennun
olmayacağını, şikayet edeceğini, kanunu icra etdiremek için hatıra gelen ve gelmeyen kâffe-i vesaite
müraca’at eyleyeceğini kanunun vaza’ları daha evvel zaten keşf ü tahmin etmiş oldukları için
birkaç günden beri duran iden güftegûlar, istifa tehdidleri, zât-ı hazret-i mülûkâneye mürâca’at-ı keyfiyeti
kendilerini hayrete dûçâr etmez. Kanunu kabul edenler şimdiye kadar vuku bulan ve bundan
sonra vukua geleceği daire-i ihtimalde bulunan hadisat ve vekayiiin programını adeta ezberden
50
piece of legislation, however, can have different effects at different points in time.
By considering the internal and external policies of the Balkan states, discussing
why the situation in the Balkans paved the way for an alliance that could not
be established before 1910 can give a clearer idea about how effective the Law of
Churches was in the formation of this alliance.
The tumultuous history of Rumelia and the Macedonian Question was seen
first-hand by Tahsin Bey and is related in his account of the era. According to
Tahsin Bey, the annexation of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria occurred in 1899, after
which the Bulgarian Committee of Macedonia focused its activities on assembling a
country-wide congress and cooperating with the British government. In his account,
Tahsin Uzer describes the internal conflicts within the Committee. The movement
was divided into two: KomitadjiSandanski.130 led the first party of “Santralists”,
while Mihalovski led the party of “Virhoists”.131 Their principal difference lay in the
question of whether Macedonia belonged to Macedonians or Bulgarians.132 Tahsin
Bey gave the names of a few prominent komitadjis commenting that Sandanski
and Apostol133 were of great importance in the history of Macedonian banditry.134
Engaging in the struggle against the komitadjis himself as an administrator in the
field allowed Tahsin Bey to have extensive knowledge of these individuals and their
activities. Yet the year he gives as the date of annexation of Eastern Rumelia by
Bulgaria seems to be a mistake. As will be discussed in the third chapter, Eastern
Rumelia was annexed by Bulgaria in 1885, not in 1899. It is difficult to say if Tahsin
Bey was wrong or if the mistake was made when his writings were published, as
the fate of the original handwritten manuscript is unknown.
Hasan Tahsin Uzer made an effort to appear objective when giving information
about the region, explaining whenever necessary the cruelty of Bulgarian bands
and the persecution locals faced at the hands of the police and gendarmerie. He
bildikleri için şimdi bu muayyen programın muhtelif fusûlünüın sırasıyla sahne-i vukuatda zuhuriyesine
hiç bir taacüb, hiçbir asabiyet, hiçbir hiddet izhar etmeksizin muntazır-ı temaşa bulunuyor...”
See: Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Patrikhane Mehâfili,” Tanin, July 4, 1910,
https://dspace.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12575/4285/4%20Temmuz%201910.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y
130Yane Ivanov Sandanski (1872-1915)
131Stoyan Nikolov Mihaylovski (1856-1927).
132Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 117.
133Apostol Petkov Terziev (1869-1911).
134Ibid, 118.
51
saw poor Ottoman administration as the root cause of Bulgarian nationalism in
Macedonia.135 Furthermore, poor administration did not only cause banditry in
Macedonia but also in other regions. In the case of Macedonian, the extensive
borders of Rumelia created constant disagreements with the governments of other
Balkan states. Many of these disagreements resulted in military measures. The
necessity of resorting to military means in internal affairs meant that many civil
duties were assigned to military commanders. Abdülhamid II had to temporarily
compensate for the shortcomings of his administration through military means to
suppress problems such as rebellion and revolutionary movements; however, these
were temporary solutions. For example, the governors of Edirne, Kosovo, Shkoder,
Janina and Monastir were all either generals or marshalls. The 4th Army Marshal
Zeki Paşa,136 who Tahsin Bey saw as one of the champions of Sultan Abdülhamid’s
administration, displayed unconditional loyalty to the regime and was unaware of
the financial difficulties of the state treasury. Tahsin Bey compares the empire to
a “centuries-old plane tree with a woodworm inside” because of the internal and
external issues and the mistakes made during the reign of Abdülhamid II.137 Poor
governance and corruption created problems for local administrators in towns and
villages. Tahsin Bey faced numerous cases of corruption, poor administration and
economic mismanagement during his first assignment as a civil servant in Pürsiçan.
The fact that Tahsin Bey, as an exile, was appointed to Pürsiçan when he was
only 19 points to the system’s problems. He was underage, had not fulfilled his
military service and was still under the guardianship of his parents when he was
made governor.138
Tahsin Bey considered his first post a practical school that taught him the work
involved in administration. In his memoir, Tahsin Bey states that he learned the
principles of administration in Pürsiçan, the principles of maintaining order in Çiç,
and the importance of struggle and patience in Razlık.139 Pürsiçan has a special
place among all the districts and cities he served in, as he states several times in his
memoir. Tahsin Bey began his first post on October 17, 1897, in Pürsiçan.140 His
135Özge Kobak, review of Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi, by Tahsin Üzer, 2017.
https://www.academia.edu/33389384
136Zeki Kolaç (1862-1943).
137Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 124.
138Ibid, 24.
139Ibid,80. Razlık is present day Razlog in southwestern Bulgaria.
140BOA, DH.SAİD.d, nr. 81-242. I accessed the information in this document through Korkmaz’s work. See:
Korkmaz, “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 22.
52
first impression of township and government office was quite disappointing. The
government building was a dilapidated, filthy, crumbling structure where Bulgarian
women dried cotton. The previous director had planted tobacco in its garden.
Moreover, his predecessor, Cemal Efendi, was an alcoholic. His clerk was at least
as old as Cemal Efendi and his clothes were worn. Tahsin Bey’s office was no
better. It was like a cell with two chests glued to it, two or three chairs, and no
curtains.141 This first scene he encountered in his administration greatly impacted
Tahsin Bey, prompting him to ponder about the deplorable condition of the state.
The neglected condition of official offices not only gave him an impression of the
state’s weakness, but also proved to the local people that the state was not strong
enough. Tahsin Bey was quite aware of the symbolic meaning of these buildings.
Following this dramatic experience, one of the first things he undertook wherever
he went was the repair and construction of neglected government offices, military
buildings and schools. However, the condition of the buildings was not the only
problem he faced in Pürsiçan.
Although the most significant problem was Abdülhamid II’s “tyranny” and the
inefficiency of the central government, Tahsin Bey noted other factors, such as
corrupt officers that worsened the conditions for villagers in the region. From the
beginning, he encountered the arrogance of the Bulgarian and Greek notables of
the township when they visited Tahsin and presented him with gifts. This event
angered Tahsin Bey, prompting him to shout at all of them and chase them off.142
Another such group were corrupt imams who maintained power by using their
so-called networks to regulate and decide on who would go to the army and who
would be exempted in return for gifts and bribes from the already poor villagers,
many of whom gave up what little wealth they had to ensure the exemption of their
children or husbands.143
Additionally, cavalry gendarmes exploited the people of Pürsiçan, eating and
drinking from their stores and stealing their animals; in Christian villages, they
went even further, harassing wives of poor villagers. The peasants could do nothing
to resist. Since they could not harvest on time, they were forced to take loans to
141Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 29.
142Ibid, 29.
143Ibid, 40.
53
pay taxes and ended up stuck between brokers and officers. The official regulations
related to tax collection were neglected in rural areas, and officers behaved in an
arbitrary manner.144 One incident of an officer dealing with a group of Yoruks who
could not pay their taxes made Tahsin Bey very angry. An officer named Sergeant
Kara Osman had the nomads climb trees and forced them to stay there until they
paid their taxes. When Tahsin Bey witnessed this, he said he would pay the tax
himself, let the nomads down from the trees and beat the officer. However, when
he reported the incident to the Mutasarrıf (governor) of Drama, he found himself
in conflict with the governorship. He was sent to the Çiç sub-district for about five
months.145 This reassignment shows the level of corruption and weakness of the
Ottoman state on its periphery, in Macedonia.
Tahsin Uzer did not only fight for Muslims. He related an unpleasant instance of
a Bulgarian boy captured for ransom and how he made a serious effort to save the
child. Governor Tahsin Bey summarizes the situation: “If justice were applied in
Macedonia in this way, national sentiments would not awake among Bulgarians,
there would be no Balkan issue. While working in Pürsıçan, I raised the youth
against Abdülhamid and his rule.”146
After his appointment to Çiç township in 1898, he worked there for around 4
months and 19 days.147 Since the post represented a new place of exile for him, he
was reluctant to start his duty. The condition of the government office here was
not better than in Pürsiçan. Tahsin Bey faced many problems in Çiç, especially
regarding public order and corruption, and he struggled against these issues during
his few months there.148 Corrupt imams were using the guise of sharia to marry
young local girls for a short time, divorce them and re-marry them to other young
men. One of these imams also abused and tortured villagers to take a portion of
the harvest. Tahsin Bey earned the ephitet “Kızan Müdür”149 after beating one of
these imams to death, becoming, in his own words, the number one enemy of the
144Ibid, 33-34.
145Ibid, 35.
146Ibid, 56.
147Ibid, 35.
148Ibid, 40.
149Due to his young age when he served in Çiç township, Tahsin Bey was given the title “Kızan”, which was
used to refer to young boys in that region. However, this title soon gained the double meaning of “angry”
due to his cruel and violent attitude towards those he thought were persecuting the public.
54
imams.150 Tahsin Bey waged a war against corrupt officers, oppressive imams and
aghas, cruel thieves and rapists. He repaired crumbling mosques and rescued them
from corrupt imams. He wanted to improve local education, although he realized
that local authorities were not always as keen as he was to do so.151 After almost
five months, he returned to Pürsiçan, probably due to the change of governor in
Drama and his mother’s efforts.152 During his second governorship in Pürsiçan,
Tahsin Bey dedicated himself to public works and improving educational standards.
After gaining experience in the districts like Pürsiçan, Çiç and Ağustos, Tahsin Bey
was appointed to Razlık district as governor. Hasan Tahsin Bey’s appointment to
the Razlık district governorship was ordered on March 19, 1902. He took office on
April 11, 1902 and served in Razlık until December 28, 1904. Tahsin Bey’s memoirs
state that he served as the governor of Razlık district for about three years, from
1317 (1901) to Kanunuevvel (December) 16, 1320 (1904).153
In the second part of the book, Tahsin Uzer wrote about his experiences in Razlık.
He was appointed there at such a critical time because the district was in a key
strategic position, both politically and geographically. He had gained a reputation
as a just and effective administrator throughout Macedonia, which is why he served
one- or two-year terms in each district.
Razlık is the area where the Pirin and Rilla mountains in Bulgaria converge,
surrounded by pine forests and rivers. Due to its location on the Bulgarian border,
it was quite a dangerous place with the road between Cuma-i Bala and Razlık
the site of many incidents. Tahsin Bey states that one of these incidents played a
major role in his appointment as district governor to Razlık. According to Tahsin
Bey’s memoir, Ms. Stone, a “well-known American writer”, was kidnapped by the
Baniçe cheta on this road, causing the Ottoman Empire considerable trouble. An
encrypted military correspondence signed by Serasker Rıza Pasha, dated September
150Ibid, 41.
151Ibid, 43.
152Ibid, 35. Ibid, 41.
153Although there is an understandable gap between the dates of order and the dates he took the office,
difference between the dates written in the memoir and the decuments are still confusing. Mustafa Şahin
also remarks these gaps between the dates provided in the memoir and the official documents, interpreting
as a miscalculation when publishers translated the dates into Gregorian calendar. As Mustafa Şahin also
remaks, it is highly possible that the publisher of the memoir simply added 584 years to the years given
by Tahsin Bey according to Rumi calendar without taking month and day into consideration. See: Şahin.
“Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği,” 48.
55
10, 1901, states that an American nun and her companion were taken to the
mountain by thirty bandits on their way from Razlık to Cuma-i Bala. Another
document dated September 12, 1901, reported to the vilayet of Thessaloniki that
an American missionary mistakenly identified as “Madmazel Elinstone” and a
Bulgarian female schoolteacher were kidnapped.
More detailed information about Ms. Stone’s abduction can be found in Confessions
Of A Macedonian Bandit, published in 1908, in which a so-called American journalist
named Albert Sonnichsen shares his experiences living among the Macedonian-
Bulgarian chetas. Although we do not know much about the author and his credibility,
his detailed narration and language are quite remarkable. The book details
disputes within the Macedonian-Bulgarian revolutionary organizations after the fall
of Sarafov, under the leadership of Prince Ferdinand and General Tsoncheff. Hristo
Tchernopeef, the komitadji the American journalist spoke to, was one of those responsible
for Mss. Stone’s kidnapping, along with Sandanski and 18 other “husky
lads”. Tchernopeef related that, because of the poor decisions made in Sofia and a
betrayal in Thessaloniki, many cheta leaders were arrested and exiled to Anatolia,
leaving only Yane Sandanski and Tchernopeef active in North Macedonia.
“Sandanski and I were together. We were now so poorly equipped that
we didn’t even dare to meet Tsoncheff’s bands; we had to run from them,
as if they were asker. We needed money. So we determined to capture
some wealthy Turk and get a few thousand liras ransom. Once we tried
and failed. At that time there came to us a chetnik who had been a
student in the American school in Samakov. ’Capture one of the missionaries
he suggested, and the Turkish government will pay the ransom
immediately to avoid complications. The idea took us with fever heat.
You understand, it wasn’t pleasant to contemplate—we had never even
captured Turks for ransom. But Tsoncheff’s bands were pouring in on
us. When we heard that Dr. House was coming across the country, we
decided to take him. Dr. House has always been a friend of the peasants;
when we heard that he had decided not to come our way, I, for
one, only half regretted it. A few days later we heard that Miss Stone
was in Bansko, and would be traveling south in a few days. Down we
rushed to Bansko. I didn’t mind Miss Stone so much. She often preached
against us, telling the poor peasants that God would right their troubles,
and not the “brigands.” All harmless stuff nobody took it seriously,
but it made the business less difficult for us to gulp down. There was a
garrison in Bansko, and the villagers couldn’t even get food out to us.
But for two days Sandanski and I were in the village, dressed as peasants,
watching Miss Stone and arranging plans. It was the villagers who
persuaded us not to do it in Bansko; they feared reprisals. The courier
who afterwards was guide to the party was our man; he took them to
56
us. You will remember how we dropped down on them as they passed,
all of us disguised as bashi bazouks, but so famished that we hadn’t
the presence of mind to refrain from pork when we tore open the lunch
hampers. Sandanski and I had decided to take a Bulgar woman with us
as Miss Stone’s companion. We really wanted to be as decent to her as
was possible. But the elderly woman we had chosen was taken so ill she
couldn’t be moved. “Were the two women frightened?” I asked (the author,
Sonnichsen). “Naturally. That first night’s march took the breath
out of them. But afterwards well, we were inexperienced. We gave them
a month, believing we should have the money from Constantinople in a
week. Of course, we wanted them to take it seriously. Those missionaries
are different from us, but we know that some of them are in earnest.
We had one fear she might decide to martyr herself. Fortunately, she
didn’t. “So, we arranged dramatic scenes. I was best at them that’s why
I am the Bad Man. But Yani Sandanski has the instincts of a French
dancing master. I’ve seen the perspiration stand out on his bald head,
with winter frost about us. I’ve seen him go off by himself among the
trees and clench those big hands of his and grind his teeth. Well, he got
his reward. He was handed down to history as the Good Man...”
Figure 4.1 Miss Stone’s Captors
Source: Albert Sonnichsen, Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit, A Californian in
the Balkan Wars (The Narrative Press, 2004), 254, 261.
To improve the security of the area, with the help of the local population
57
Tahsin Bey started the construction of a barracks in the town of Preder, located on
the road. However, the issues of the region were not limited to the safety of this road.
Since Tahsin Bey was the district governor of Razlık during the 1903 Bulgarian
uprising, he was involved in the events that took place during the uprising as well.154
His intellectual background, knowledge of history and politics, and experiences in
the field allowed him to write a detailed narrative of the uprising and Bulgarian
committee activities. He took extraordinary measures in Razlık, confiscating
weapons from Bulgarians in the region, which helped decrease banditry activity in
the district. Even though Istanbul acknowledged his exemplary service, appointing
him to critical districts ultimately did not solve the complicated Macedonian
Question.155
Tahsin Bey briefly describes the general situation of Razlık in his memoir. Some
18 villages were inhabited by Bulgarians, two villages by Muslims, and the rest by
a mix of Muslims and Bulgarians. He describes the people of the Razlık district
as hardworking but entirely komitadji. This region always had a revolutionary air,
he notes, meaning that “banditry”, politics and administration in this district were
extremely important.156 He comments that Razlık was a whirlpool of banditry and
malice – as soon as he arrived in town, he received the news that two gendarmes
had been killed.157
Although he was only 23 years old when he was appointed to Razlık, Tahsin
Bey emphasizes that he actively fought against the bandits. He describes how
exciting yet frustrating it was to be a young and inexperienced governor caught
in the horrible events unfolding in Macedonia. It was his first confrontation with
bandits.158 frustrating it was to be a young and inexperienced governor caught
in the horrible events unfolding in Macedonia. It was his first confrontation with
bandits.159 Tahsin Bey complains a lot about the inadequacy of the state, not
only in terms of the image it projected but also in terms of the measures taken in
154Kobak, “Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi,” 2.
155Ibid, 6.
156Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 79.
157Ibid, 119. “Whirlpool of banditry and malice /şekavet ve fesat girdabı, şekavet merkezi”
158Ibid, 124.
159Ibid, 124.
58
the fight against “banditry”. Tahsin Uzer’s experiences in Macedonia during the
uprising reveal how the inefficiency and corruption of the Ottoman administration
fuelled the spread of the uprising.160 As discussed in the third chapter, there were
temporary improvements in the struggle against banditry during Tahsin Uzer’s
governorship. However, Tahsin Bey does not describe the large-scale developments
and changes in the balance of power between Balkan nations and the Great Powers
during this period. He highlights his personal achievements in the fight against
banditry. Mentions of notable figures like Sandanski give the audience the sense
that Tahsin Bey played a significant role in the Ottoman fight against banditry.
One of the first events that Tahsin Bey witnessed in Razlık revealed the scale of
banditry and ineffective administration. Following the murder of the gendarmes, a
Bulgarian child informed them that a Bulgarian band of at least 200 guerillas had
passed by the same field as Tahsin Bey and his officers only 5 minutes before; by
chance, they had missed an encounter that would have cost them their lives. While
the incident shook Tahsin Bey, the commander seemed not to care or take caution.
The young governor was aware that the combination of careless officers and armed
Bulgarians was a dangerous one.
On the other hand, he knew how difficult and provocative it would be to confiscate
weapons by force. However, after multiple incidents of Muslims being murdered
around the district, he took action. Various correspondences show that Tahsin Bey
started to collect weapons in Razlık. One correspondence between the District
Governor of Razlık and Ferik İbrahim Paşa reported the weapons collected from the
people in Erşenice,161 while a correspondence sent to the Serez Governorate from
Razlık a month later stated that the people in Razlık surrendered their weapons
voluntarily without any difficulty. According to a copy of the correspondence, two
Martini-Henry rifles and 1,160 cartridges were collected peacefully from Erşenice
village and sent to Dobronişte.162 Another report dated December 15, 1902, stated
that the district governor of Razlık had collected 130 rifles and 1280 cartridges
without coercion.163
In addition to these figures and reports, Tahsin Bey also relates how he collected
160Ibid,152.
161“ Razlık’a bağlı Eşnice köyü halkının ellerinde mevcut olan silah ve fişekleri teslim ettikleri.” BOA,
Y.PRK.ASK.,187-40.
162BOA, Y.PRK.UM.., 61- 22.
163“Razlık kaymakamının ifâ etdiği rızaya ve nasihat-ı hikemâneyi îşârı olarak ahâli-i [?] cem’[?] Yüz otuz
tüfenk ile iki bin dört yüz seksen fişenk fi 4 Mart sene 318 tarihli. . . ” BOA, Y.PRK.UM., . 61-22.
59
guns from villages. Hasan Tahsin Bey recruited a Bulgarian komitadji named Georgi
as an informant through Süleyman Ağa from Barçova village. The informant helped
him record how many and which type of weapons the villagers possessed. After he
employed force on some of the village’s Bulgarian notables and discovered an armory
in the church, the rest of the villagers started to turn in their weapons voluntarily.
Table 4.1 Approximate numbers of guns per village.
Village Name No. of Rifles
Dobronişte 150
Erşenice 250
Central district 280
Bakorit 350
Nedobriska 400
İki Kotorlar 400164
The documents regarding the number of weapons collected in Razlık prove that
Tahsin Bey did not exaggerate when describing the revolutionary atmosphere
in Razlık. The method Tahsin Bey used to collect weapons without using force
involved making a deal with the notables of the village, making use of informants
or through persuasion. The task of collecting weapons was not always easy,
however, and the situation sometimes got out of hand. Banditry was already a
significant problem in the region, especially in districts like Razlık. Tahsin Bey
faced multiple assassination attempts, not only from Bulgarian bandits but also
jealous commanders and displeased officers. One day, after Major Remzi Bey tried
to confiscate weapons from Banko by force, Lieutenant Colonel Hacı Nazmi Bey
threatened to attack which provoked the villagers.165 When Tahsin Bey returned
to the district, he persuaded the villagers to turn in 300 rifles, but he was accused
of protecting Bulgarians. A drunk lieutenant tried to kill him but was stopped by
gendarmes, an incident that nearly caused an internal conflict among the soldiers.
This anecdote is striking for Tahsin Bey as well because it also reflects the general
164Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 127.
165Major “Remzi from Samsun”, mentioned in this incident, tried to collect weapons in the village of Banko
and to suppress the village by surrounding it with a battalion of soldiers. Upon the Bulgarians’ resistance,
the major intensified the pressure and threatened the village with two mountain cannons. The memoir
does not give the date of this event. In the Ottoman archives, in a correspondence dated October 3, 1903,
Razlık district governor Tahsin Bey states that Redif Major Hüseyin Bey reached Razlık from Menlik with
250 people and two mountain cannons in the last of the telegrams. The previous telegrams give information
about the collection of weapons from the Christians. Although the date, region and some of the details
such as collecting weapons and bringing two mountain cannons coinciding with each other, It is unclear
whether these two events are the same event. BOA, TFR.I.SL,21-2011.
60
malaise of the era.166
Arzu Taşcan asserts that the cooperation between the Exarchate and the Bulgarian
Principality played a significant role in the 1903 uprising. Priests and teachers in
the service of committees also turned schools and churches into armories.167 A
telegram sent by Rükneddin Bey, the Governor of Serez, in July 1903, also reported
that the Bulgarian Committees had encouraged Bulgarian villagers to revolt in the
villages of Razlık, with the priests and some villagers participating in the uprising,
and that measures should be taken to prevent conflict.168 Although the official
documents report that weapons and cartridges were collected peacefully and Tahsin
Bey states that he had developed good relations with the public, the Bulgarian
committees did not remain silent in the face of intense efforts to confiscate weapons.
Within two months, Tahsin Bey succeeded in collecting 2000 firearms, around
10.000 bullets and 59 bombs, which provoked the Bulgarian committees to
attempt to assassinate Tahsin Bey. Likewise, several Bulgarian women made
complaints to several embassies, the Sublime Porte and even European states,
targeting Tahsin Bey. As a result of these complaints and foreign intervention,
a commission was established, and an investigation was held. He was found
guilty of not killing but using pressure on people. However, this was not the only
problem. Tahsin Bey survived an assassination attempt organized by Bulgarian
komitadjis. He was openly threatened in a note written by Komitadji Baytar Simon.
Several uprisings in a smaller scale in different districts of Cuma-i Bala, Menlik
and Petriç took place before the more significant Bulgarian uprising. Tahsin Uzer
says that towards the end of 1902, the banditry problem came to a boil. His
precautions prevented Cuma-i Bala and Menlik uprisings from expanding to Razlık
– at least for a while. Otherwise, as he suggests, Razlık was a more suitable place
for a revolt. Due to Tahsin Bey’s foresight about the danger in Serez and on the
borders of Bulgaria, he summoned the administrators of neighboring districts for a
meeting for consultation and coordinated measures. The local governors all agreed
on the danger of an upcoming revolt and the need for immediate precautions,
such as collecting all the firearms in the area, and they prepared a report. How-
166Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 130.
167Arzu Taşcan, “Prens Ferdinand ve Ekzarh Yosif Arasındaki Bazı Mektuplaşmalarda Makedonya ve Komitalar,”
Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi, no. 12 (2012): 235-248, 239.
168BOA, TFR.I..SL., 15- 1426.
61
ever, the report written in the meeting was not taken seriously by the authorities.169
Finally, as foreseen, an uprising broke out in Cuma-i Bala,170 rapidly spreading
to other regions. Armed Bulgarian villagers fought against the gendarmes and
attacked police offices and the local Duyun-ı Umumiye (Debt Administration) office
as well as Muslim villages. This uprising was barely suppressed before spreading to
Razlık, which indeed might have turned the famous 1903 Bulgarian Uprising into a
“1902 Bulgarian Uprising.”171
Kemal Beydilli says that the failure of the 1902 uprising demoralized but also
triggered Bulgarians to prepare for a more significant and broader scale revolt.172
This event made two things clear: the European press’s general approach and
the Sublime Porte’s inefficiency. The Sublime Porte preferred to downplay such
a critical event, emphasizing the loyalty of the majority of Bulgarian villagers
in the region to the state, a statement that Tahsin Bey did not agree with at
all. As Uzer expresses, even such a widespread and obvious situation failed to
alarm the administrators of the empire. The fire of revolution was still burning
because the state did not take any drastic action.173 He seems to have believed
that the reason for the lack of a brutal response was the unawareness of administrators
rather than the delicate balance of power increasingly working against
the Ottoman administration. Fikret Adanır reiterates that several viziers in the
Sublime Porte wanted to take serious action, but they were prevented from doing
so by Abdülhamid II, who feared doing so would make a Turkish- Bulgarian war
inevitable. In his memoir, Yıldız Mabeyn Başkâtibi (Court Chief Clerk), Tahsin
Paşa mentions Abdülhamid II’s cautious policies towards Bulgaria. According to
Tahsin Paşa, Abdülhamid II was right to be extremely cautious about Macedonia
and the situation in Bulgaria as the Macedonian Question was a problem that
concerned the whole of Europe and was so dangerous that it could drag the state
into a disaster. In his memoir, Mabeyn Başkâtibi, Tahsin Pasha explains what
Tahsin Uzer considered Abdülhamid II’s lack of endurance as follows: To “govern
the nations well” in a matter so sensitive that it could lead the empire to disaster
in both domestic and foreign policy; Abdülhamid was waging a two-front war, one
169Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 137.
170present-day Blagoevgrad
171Ibid,138.
172Beydilli, “ Makedonya Mes’elesi’ne Dair,” 92-93.
173Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi,139.
62
based on politics and the other on force, both through diplomacy and keeping the
military forces ready against revolutionary movements.174
However, Hasan Tahsin Bey was not the only one worried about the situation.
Kazım Karabekir was concerned that banditry in Macedonia was an intractable
issue. He reiterates that, during the 1903 Bulgarian uprising, around 30.000
Bulgarian revolutionaries were killed and the three vilayet were taken control of by
Europeans. In 1904, 27 Bulgarian komitadji were killed in Manastir; that number
increased to 78 Bulgarian and 27 Greek komitadji in 1905. Komitadjis always took
action in spring, killing Muslims and each other. European gendarmes, especially
Italians, cooperated with the komitadjis, trying to minimize the danger they faced
when sent to court. In contrast, if the bandits were captured by Ottoman soldiers
their situation was hopeless.175
As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1903 Bulgarian revolt, launched despite the protests
of various groups, shocked everyone, including the European states and Bulgaria at
the time. Shortly before the revolt started, Ottoman state authorities also received
intelligence stating that a general Bulgarian revolt would break out, and the
relevant authorities were ordered to complete the necessary military preparations.
An encrypted telegram sent to Manastır vilayet on August 3, 1903, repeating
information sent through another encrypted telegram dated July 31, 1903, reported
that the Bulgarian chetas attacked villages and massacred Greeks, Turks and
soldiers in their tents. Rumors circulated that the Bulgarian “bandits” around
Manastır were preparing for an all-out revolution and administrators took measures
to address the threat.176 In the telegrams sent from the governorship of Serres on
August 10 and 12, 1903, according to intelligence received from a reliable Bulgarian
informer, Tahsin Bey reported that Bulgarian bandits would massacre Muslims in
the villages, and that the Bulgarians had buried their goods in the ground before
the rebellion and smuggled their animals to the Princedom’s side. In the same
documents, Tahsin Bey reports that a solution must be found to protect both
Muslim and Christian villagers, especially women and children, from massacres and
attacks.177
174“govern the nations well/milletleri hüsn-i idare edebilmek için...” See: Said Paşa, Tahsin Paşa, İkinci
Meşrutiyetin İlanı, ed. Ö. Andaç Uğurlu (İstanbul:Örgün Yayınevi, 2008), 423.
175Kâzım Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 1896-1909, (İstanbul: TÜRDAV, 1982),197-198.
176BOA, TFR.I..MN, 14 -1343.
177“Siroz mutasarrıflığının şifre telgrafı 20 Temmuz sene 319
Razlık kaymakamlığından bu kerre dahi alınan bir telgrafnâmede Bilice karyesi İslam ağalarından ve sözüne
63
Sandanski chose the village of Bansko in Razlik as his base, and Razlık became one
of the hotspots for conflict in the region. The village of Bansko was strategically
located, approximately 5.5km south of Razlık and at the entrance to the mountainous
regions where the bandits could operate comfortably.178 A telegram sent
from Razlık district governorship to the Siroz governor Rükneddin Bey’s office on
August 7, 1903, reports on a clash with Sandanski and his militants near Razlık
and the consequent pursuit of the bandits.179
Sandanski, who came to the region through the Şarapçı gorge with his band of
approximately 150 komitadjis, spent the night before the uprising in a dairy near
the village and entered Banska in the morning to join the villagers and punish those
who did not participate. Many Bulgarians from the village of Bansko voluntarily
or compulsorily joined this band. However, the Ottoman forces clashed with the
band at 4 a.m.
Sandanski’s bandits suffered losses and had to retreat following a skirmish with
two detachments from the Ottoman law enforcement forces that lasted for about 7
hours. Ottoman forces pursued the retreating bandits. Razlık District Governor
Tahsin Bey, who could not come to Bansko because he participated in the clashes
in the center, assigned his aide Omer to gather news from the region. However,
Omer was seriously injured during the clashes and died.180
In a telegram dated August 10, 1903, the Governor of Siroz gave information
about the measures to be taken after the Razlık District Governorate reported
‘itimâd edilenlerden biri kaymakam-ı mumaileyhin nezdine giderin(?) devlete sadakat ve ..dan emin olduğu
bir Bulgar çorbacının evvelki gün yalnız olarak miyânelerinde açılan bir mekâtada eşkıyanın ve köy çorbacılarının
karyeleri yakmak ve orada bulunan İslamları katl etmek niyetinde bulunduklarını ve pek çoklarının
levâzım-ı niyetlerini hâne ve bağçelerinde topraklarında istihzâr etdikleri mahallerde koymakda bulunduklarını
ve iğtişaş(isyan)dan evvel Balkanda bulunan sığır ve koyun hayvanâtını Emâret tarafına kaçırmak
tasavvurunda olduklarını dahi kendünin dahi havfından nâşî yere gömdüğünü ve köy Bulgarlarının pek
haincesine .. tashîhâtlarını birer birer beyân ve İslâm olsun, Hristiyan olsun kadın ve çocukların duçâr-ı
tecâvüz ve tasallut olmamaları içün yalnız köyün dahilen muhâfazasına iktifâ olunub ekserîsi Bilice firarlarından
‘ibâret olan eşkıyanın köye adam duhûlleri esbâbının hâricen istikmâli çaresini düşünmek îcâb
etdiğini ve tezkire ile bir ay ticâret-i Bulgarya’ya giden Bilicelilerin hatt-ı imtiyâza karîb karyeye ‘avdet
eylediklerini [...].” BOA, TFR.I..SL., 16 -1563.
178Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv Evraklarına Göre İlinden İsyanında Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası
Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde Güncel Yaklaşımlar Dergisi (CALESS) 2, no 1. (2020): 319.
179BOA, TFR.I..SL, 16 - 1550.
180BOA, TFR.I.SL, 16-1550. Also cited in Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv Evraklarına Göre İlinden
İsyanında Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde Güncel Yaklaşımlar
Dergisi (CALESS) 2, no 1. (2020): 319.
64
that the bandit had traveled from the Sarapçı strait towards the Vlach village of
the Menlik district and that there was a possibility that he would attack Bansko
village.181 Tahsin Uzer narrates the clashes with the Sandanski and his cheta
in his memoir. One of the most striking parts in this narration is that pressure
from the “Infamous” Komiadji Sadanski led the entire village of Bansko to resist
the confiscation of their guns. Faced with the danger of the entire population of
Bansko village moving to the Pirin mountains in revolt, Tahsin Bey found another
agent to help him solve this issue in a legal way.182 Meanwhile, he faced several
dangers, from assassination attempts to armed conflict with one of the biggest
chetas. Tahsin Bey, who was informed that the Committee leader Sandanski had
passed through Razlık with a band of 250 people, pursued him. There were clashes
with the bandits in the “Şarapçı gorge”.183 Sandanski managed to escape, ten of
Tahsin Bey’s soldiers were killed and 20 wounded, while the bandits did not suffer
any losses. Tahsin Bey attributes the loss to Lieutenant Colonel “Hacı Ali Nazmi”
Bey’s stupidity.184 Despite the rapid and intense military intervention in both
Razlık center and Bansko, the efforts to start a rebellion continued into August. By
September, the Bulgarians were still trying to stockpile arms and arm men in the
area. Around August 25, a Coptic (Roma) citizen living in the area found a large,
newly manufactured bomb in Bansko and reported its location to the Ottoman
authorities.185 According to an intelligence report dated September 24, weapons
and were transferred across the border via the village of Godlova while activity
continued in several villages, including Draglishte-i Zir and Bansko. According to a
document dated September 24, it was reported that weapons and ammunition were
transferred across the border in the village of Godlova, which is close to the border.
According to what was learned from the same intelligence, activity continued in
several villages, including Draglishte-i Zir and Bansko. Around this time, a car full
of ammunition was seized in the village of Bane (probably present-day Banya). It
was also noteworthy that many young Bulgarians began to appear in the villages.
The Thessaloniki Governorate considered these developments as signs that a new
general uprising would begin in a few days.186
181BOA, TFR.I..SL, 16 – 1556.
182Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi,129.
183“ Şarapçı boğazında takip edilen eşkiyanın Menlik kazasının Ulah köyüne doğru gittiiği ve Banisko köyünde
kötülük yapma ihtimalı olduğu Razlık Kaymakamlığı’ndan bildirilmesi üzerine tedbir alınmasına dair Siroz
Mutasarrıflığı’nın telgrafı.” BOA, TFR.I..SL 16 – 1556.
184Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 131.
185BOA, Y.PRK.UM., 6-61. Also cited in Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv Evraklarına Göre İlinden İsyanında
Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde Güncel Yaklaşımlar Dergisi (CALESS)
2, no 1. (2020): 320.
186BOA, TFR.I.SL., 20-1936. Also cited in Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv Evraklarına Göre İlinden
65
The intelligence received was correct and telegraphic communication with Razlık
was cut off on the night of September 26. The bandits and their collaborators
opened fire on soldiers in Razlık and a clash ensued. A gendarme corporal was
killed in the conflict. In the morning, when the Ottoman law enforcement officers
tried to search the houses near where the conflict took place, the bandits opened
fire on the soldiers from the houses. In the resulting clash, two Bulgarian bandits,
one of whom was wearing the official uniform of the Bulgarian army, were killed.
Meanwhile, a barn used by bandits to store ammunition burst into flames. The
fire brigade tackled the fire. Although a group of 100 people left the bandits
and wanted to burn the village of Bachevo, about 4 kilometers north of Razlık,
this attempt also failed due to the intervention of Ottoman law enforcement. An
attempt by the bandits to organize a massacre in the Muslim quarter of Razlık
also proved fruitless.187 A cheta band trying to enter Razlık via Bansko was also
destroyed by the Pristina division in an ambush. Some 33 bandits were captured
or killed in clashes that lasted for two nights.188 By September 28, public security
was completely reestablished in Razlık.189
During the 1903 Bulgarian Uprising, Tahsin Bey witnessed and experienced many
adventures in Razlık. He gives a generous account of it in the book so the audience
could read different events in which officers, soldiers and ordinary villagers took
an active part. Baki Ağa’s and his son’s bravery in conflict with Bulgaria bandits
in Barçova, or Corporal Murat’s struggle against hundreds of Bulgarian bandits to
protect 300 Muslim civilians until reinforcements arrived are only a couple of the
İsyanında Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde Güncel Yaklaşımlar
Dergisi (CALESS) 2, no 1. (2020): 320.
187The village named “Bachevo” is “Barçova” which was mentioned by Tahsin bey in his memoir. Tahsin Bey
has an interesting anecdote regarding this village and incidents took place in September 1903. He mentions
a brave Albanian Baki Ağa who was ambushed by eight komitadji. After his horse died immediately, Baki
Ağa also pretended to be dead. When komitadjis showed up, Baki Ağa fired his flintlock and killed three
of them at once. After a short while his son “who was as brave as Baki Ağa” also joint him and they killed
the entire band. Razlık governor Tahsin Bey who was around and heard the gunshots and arrived. Baki
Ağa and his son hid six of the dead bodies and showed only two of them. They aimed to take the weapons
for themselves. However, Tahsin Bey permitted them to take eight weapons and reported the bravery he
witnessed to the Vali Hasan Fehmi. Baki ağa and his son were rewarded with fourth and fifth rank Majidi
medals and 200 golds which Baki Ağa did not receive and donated to the army with another 200 gold
lira of himself. See: Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 140-142. The document showing the request for
rewarding the Baki Ağa: “Razlık’ın Bacova karyesinden Baki Ağa’nın taltifi hususunun Sadaret’e arzı.” 21
September,1903. BOA, DH.MKT. 581 – 49.
188BOA, Y.PRK.ASK., 204-106; BOA, TFR.I.SL. 20-1944. Also cited in Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv
Evraklarına Göre İlinden İsyanında Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde
Güncel Yaklaşımlar Dergisi (CALESS) 2, no 1. (2020):321.
189BOA, TFR.1.SL., 20-1945. Also cited in Ender Korkmaz, “Osmanlı Arşiv Evraklarına Göre İlinden
İsyanında Yaşanan Başlıca Olaylar,” Uluslararası Dil, Eğitim ve Sosyal Bilimlerde Güncel Yaklaşımlar
Dergisi (CALESS) 2, no 1. (2020):321.
66
events he witnessed.190
Figure 4.2 An insurgent band in the rising of 1903
Source: Henry Noel Brailsford, Macedonia; Its Races and Their Future. New York:
Arno Press, 1971, 200.
During his governorship in Razlık, Tahsin Bey joined a commission of inquiry created
by both sides to investigate the clashes and losses at the Bulgarian border.
He compares the predicament of the Ottoman empire and the surprisingly much
better condition of Bulgaria, a newly founded state. The Bulgarian commission
was in much better condition, boasting a great number of participants, high-ranked
members and around twenty nurses. They also wore new uniforms – as the audience
could understand from the words of Tahsin Bey, this was not the case for the
Ottoman side.191 Tahsin Bey emphasizes and attaches importance to the issue of
image many times throughout the memoir, as it seems to have affected him quite
a lot. He was distraught when the Ottoman delegation revealed the weaknesses of
the state in the face of the image of a modern, effective and disciplined state like
Bulgaria. Years later, while serving as governor of Drama, Tahsin Bey was assigned
to a delegation to investigate after many Bulgarian soldiers were wounded or killed
in a conflict between Bulgarians and Turks in the Ropçoz-Dospat district on the
Bulgarian border. He writes that the Bulgarian delegation paled before his own
delegation. He compares the event to the meeting in Razlık ten years before and
190Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 143.
191Ibid, 148.
67
writes that the pride and joy he felt that day added five years to his life.192
Figure 4.3 The government mansion in Razlık under construction during Tahsin
Bey’s governorship, H. 1320
Source: BOA,FTG.f./168
Tahsin Bey’s success against bandits in Razlık and the course of events in Macedonia
influenced his assignment to his next places of duty. There were rumblings
of an uprising in the town of Gevgili. Notye township director Hasan Efendi was
ambushed around Baniçe and was wounded. The bandits killed ten soldiers and a
military medical student who were with the director before fleeing with their leader
Yuvan. Tahsin Bey was informed by Hulusi Bey, the inspector of the Courthouse,
when he arrived in Thessaloniki. Inspector Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa193 stated that
he hoped that Tahsin Bey would be as successful and diligent as he had been in
Razlık and sent his predecessor Münib Bey to court, holding Gevgili responsible
for his miserable condition. In his memoir, Tahsin Bey relates that he received
the information of his assignment by telegram on September 12, 1903, from the
192Ibid, 306.
193Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa ( 1855-1922) the Inspector- General of Maceodonia.
68
Governor Rauf Paşa, and started his duty on October 1, 1903.194 However, some of
the correspondences and documents after this date were signed by Tahsin Bey as
“district governor of Razlık.” For example, a document signed on 29 Kanunuevvel,
1320 (January 11, 1905) ordered the transfer of Razlık District Governor Tahsin
Bey to Gevgili, instead of Gevgili District Governor Mahmud Münib Bey due to
his impotence and appointment of Imroz District governor Ahmed Zihni Efendi.195
His letter of appointment to Gevgili indicates that, with the approval of Inspector-
General Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, Tahsin Bey was appointed to the Gevgili District
Governorate. The transfer was announced in a letter received from Thessaloniki
Province and Gevgili and Razlık Districts; after the examination, there was no
issue preventing him from being appointed. In accordance with the approval of
his appointment, Tahsin Bey was appointed to Gevgili in Kânunusani 31, 1320
(February 1, 1905). The documents mentioned above indicate that Tahsin Bey was
first transferred and later officially appointed to the governorship of Gevgili, which
explains the two-year gap between the dates in the documents and the memoir.196
The scene that greeted Tahsin Bey in Gevgili was discouraging. This region, being
close to the Greek border and rife with security problems, was, like Razlık, a hotspot
for banditry. Despite the banditry problem, Gevgili was considered a rich district
developed in terms of trade. At the time it had a population of approximately 35,000
people, 15,000 of whom were Muslims, 14,000 were Bulgarians and 6,000 were Greeks
and Vlachs. The biggest trouble in Gevgili was banditry. According to the report
from Tahsin Bey to Rumeli Inspectorate on April 2, 1905, under the leadership
of komitadji Cambaz Tampo, 7 cheta known as Vasil, Apostol’s brother’s Andon,
Taraykov, Lazar, Tudor, Yuvan and Arkir were engaged in banditry activities in
Gevgili.197
194Ibid, 181-182.
195BOA, DH.MKT. 923-59.
196Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği,” 55.
197BOA, TFR.1.SL. 69 – 6816 also cited in Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 54.
69
Table 4.2 The situation of bandits in Yenice Vardar and Gevgili regions
Number of
members Leader Alias
Years of
Activity Zone of Influence
23 Apostol Petkof
Vardar Güneşi
(Sun of Vardar) 20 Gevgili
18 Captain Sava Bulgarian Officer 3 Belkız
25 Yuvan Sığırtmaç 16 Yenice-Gevgili
15 Lonidof 7 Belkız-Gevgili
25 Arkir Baroviçe 15 Tikoşda
10 Lazar 10 Gevgili
8 Dede Yuvan
Tikoşlu Eski Kurt
( Old Wolf of Tikoş) 10 Gevgili
10 Gogo Kılkışla 15 Gevgili
Source: Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1979), 184.
Tahsin Bey fought against many of these famous chetas, eliminating or completely
neutralizing some of them, and was honored with medals by the state. Vardar
Güneşi Apostol Petkof and Sava arrived in Gevgili with their chetas and engaged
the Ottoman gendarmerie forces on February 28, 1904. Captain Sava and his
band were utterly destroyed. The battle with Apostol raged on, with Tahsin Bey’s
cousins coming to the rescue, destroying Apostol’s band without any casualties.The
date given here as 1904 would have been around March 1905, according to the
documents sent from Gevgili governorship. The correspondence reporting that the
Bulgarian bandit chief Apostol and a band of forty people under the command of
Loindras were defeated in Gevgili is dated March 19, 1905.198 After these victories,
Tahsin Bey and the other officers involved were rewarded with medals of merit,
silver medals and promotions.199 The destruction of these bands silenced the
Bulgarians and was celebrated by the Muslims of the area. Tahsin Bey states that,
despite his efforts, he could not appease the Muslims, who mutilated the corpses of
the komitadjis to the extent that Apostol could not be identified among them.200
In fact, Apostol had barely escaped with injuries. Tahsin Uzer later saw him at the
198“Şaki Apostol ve avanesinin kamilen helak edildiğini bildiren Gevgili Kaymakamlığı’nın telgrafı” BOA,
TFR.I.A, 66-254; BOA, TFR..I..A.., 26-2533
199“Bulgar eşkiya reisi Apostol ile avanesinin tepelenmelerinde gayret gösterenlere gümüş liyakat
madalyalarının dağıtılığı ve fazla madalyanın da iade edildiği.” BOA, TFR.I..A, 26 – 2533
200Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 186.
70
celebrations of the Second Constitutional Revolution.201
Tahsin Bey, according to a correspondence dated February 26, 1906, was assigned
to Florina District, taking over from then-Governor Refet Bey.202 Hasan Tahsin
Bey’s Florina district governorship started on March 2, 1906, lasting until March
17, 1908. The order for his appointment was issued on March 27, 1906, about one
month after the start of his duty similar to his appointment to Gevgili.203 Tahsin
Bey’s term of office in Florina lasted 25 months. During this period Tahsin Bey
reported that the people of Florina were very honest, respectful and self-sacrificing
people. However, Florina was one of the eight military regions set by the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and was one of the districts
where major battles took place during the Ilinden Uprising. By 1904, Greek bands
had also started their banditry activities and Florina became a major battlefield
for Bulgarian and Greek komitadjis.204
Due to economic problems and internal conflict within the IMRO, Bulgarian
guerillas lost the momentum they had shown in 1903; however, the region was still
in turmoil due to constant clashes between Bulgarian and Greek forces. In contrast
to the situation in Razlık, the main targets of the Bulgarian committee members in
Florina were generally the Greeks. Two of the most important events that Tahsin
Bey witnessed during his term as district governor was the battle of Istrebne and
Fethi Bey’s killing of committee members Yorgi, Bulani and Kara Vidas.205
Tahsin Bey traveled to Noska to meet the nahiye müdürü (township governor)
Zeynel Bey around 10 June.206 While they were visiting the house of a Vlach priest,
a letter from a Bulgarian informant arrived, notifying the men of the presence
of a large Greek band at Istrebne Balkan that had gathered with the intent to
burn Zelnic village, an Exarchist stronghold. On the morning of May 29, 1322,
(June 11, 1906), they led a regiment in that direction. The battle started at 9
a.m. The Greek band, estimated to consist of 150 men, was positioned at the
201Ibid, 185.
202BOA, TFR.I..MN., 86-8539
203Şahin. “Tahsin Uzer’in Mülki İdareciliği,” 58.
204Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia.” 85-86.
205Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 194.
206It was May 1906, according to the memoir. Ibid, 194.
71
upper hills of the İstrebne Balkan. Detachments from Florina, Kesriye and Soroviç
worked in coordination to besiege the Greeks. Throughout the course of the battle,
telegrams demanding more troops and artillery were sent to Manastır.207 The
clashes continued for 16 hours and were described as a small-scale war rather than
a battle. In the end, the Ottomans lost 20 soldiers, with 35 wounded while the
bandits lost 75 men and 57 komiteci were imprisoned. Tahsin Bey describes the
scale of the battle by giving the number of bullets used by the military forces: 750
men used 450,000 bullets. On the way back, Tahsin Bey and Fethi (Okyar) Beys
were ambushed, and Noska town manager Zeynel Bey was killed in the struggle.208
Between 1905 and 1906, the conflict between Bulgarian and Greek guerrillas, especially
the Patriarchists and Exarchists, escalated and did not subside until the last
days of Tahsin Bey’s district governorship. Tahsin Bey states that banditry activities
had decreased in Florina just before his appointment to Kesendire.209 While the
biggest clashes took place between Bulgarian and Greek bands, the komitecis were
also targeting non-committee members, especially the Greek bands trying to seize
the villages under the influence of Exarchate for the Patriarchate. Greek bands
fought against Bulgarian committees rather than Ottoman military forces during
the Exarchate-Patriarchate war. However, Anıl Kayalar states that, contrary to the
general opinion discussed in before, the Rumelia Inspectorate records indicate that
the Ottoman military forces did not show any special tolerance towards the Greek
bands.210 Tahsin Bey’s narration on his experiences with Greek bands in Florina,
including the battle of Istrebne and te clash at Balkamin, supports his claim.
207Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia,” 98-99.
208Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 195.
209Ibid, 213.
210Kayalar, “Struggle over Macedonia,” 109.
72
5. TAHSIN UZER, THROUGH THE LENS OF HIS MEMOIR
5.1 Development of his Personality
Studying Tahsin Uzer’s life from birth to his exile in Malta, where he wrote his
memoir, provides the opportunity to better understand the factors that shaped the
character of this historical figure, as depicted in his own words. Many variables
influenced the man, from the family he was born into, the schools he attended, the
education he received, the authors he read, his health and the political environment
he inhabited. To understand Tahsin Bey, one must examine him as an individual,
a late 19th century Ottoman intellectual, and a Young Turk civil administrator. If
we examine Tahsin Bey’s family background and early life as depicted in the first
parts of his memoir, a few points stand out.
Tahsin Bey was born into a relatively wealthy family, and his father was both a
farmer and a trader. He was assigned to provide supplies to the British, French,
Turkish land and naval forces during the Crimean War. Tahsin Bey’s father had
many commercial ties in Anatolia, Istanbul and Thessaloniki and had two houses
built one year after marrying Hatice Hanım in 1859. He also bought Gorgob farm in
Istanbul for 9000 gold coins in 1864.211 Tahsin Bey describes the financial situation
of his family as follows: he was born in a room facing the sea in the selamlık part of
the house his father had built in Thessaloniki. He had such a financially privileged
childhood that he could watch the hustle and bustle of people who did not even
have access to water. Even the water fountain where he watched people quarrel was
commissioned by his father in 1860 to alleviate a water shortage. The inscription
on this fountain indicated that Tahsin Bey’s father and grandfather were people
of great importance in the “Aşkomi river, Ohrid and Radomir region".212 This
211Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 7-8.
212“Sahibü’l-hayrat ve’l-hasenat Prizren kazasının, Radomir nahiyesine merbut Serin karyesinden Hacı
73
economic comfort remained a key part of Tahsin Bey’s life for many years, until
he got married and had children. Although he lost his father at a very early age,
Tahsin Bey still had the economic resources to complete his education. He and his
mother moved in with his brother-in-law when Tahsin’s father passed away, but
they had enough wealth to live on their own afterwards. In his memoir Tahsin Bey
states that his mother was generous with money and, thanks to this, he either gave
all the money he received as a child to the other children of the neighborhood or
bought toys for them.213 Tahsin Bey enjoyed this financial prosperity throughout
the early years of his career. There was a slight increase in his salary when he was
promoted from Pürsiçan to the directorate of the Ağustos township. The amount
of his salary, which he stated had increased from 378 kuruş to 480 kuruş, was
insignificant for Tahsin Bey because he was relying on his father’s farm income and
cash savings. For this reason, Tahsin Bey did not even go to receive the salary from
the district manager himself, but instead sent “old trooper" Mahmut to receive the
salary. Mahmut would tie each of their salaries inside a handkerchief and bring
them to Tahsin Bey, who would randomly choose one of these pouches and give it
to Mahmut.214
In order to understand the socio-economic conditions that Tahsin Bey was born
into on a larger scale, it is necessary to understand the city where he was born
late 19th-century Thessaloniki. Cosmopolitan, wealthy and culturally diverse,
Thessaloniki was one of the most important cities of the empire, especially within
the Balkan territories, and had a Turkish, Jewish and Greek population. It was
the second city after Istanbul to be granted a municipal council based on French
model and equipped with powers to expropriate property for the public good.215
According to some, Thessaloniki was the largest city of the Ottoman Empire after
Istanbul and Izmir. Although there were those who stated that the population
was 170,000, Kazım Nami Duru believes that the population of a city of this size
must have been much higher.216 The 1881-1883 census, conducted during Tahsin
Bey’s childhood, recorded 29,489 Muslims, 34,523 Jews and 36,985 Greek citizens
living in the central district of Thessaloniki. There were also a smaller number of
İbrahim bin Kethüda” Based on this kethüda inscription, Tahsin Bey deduced that his grandfather had
an important position in the aforementioned regions. See: Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 3.
213In addition to his good economic standing, Tahsin Bey tried to establish good relations with others throughout
his life, starting from childhood. See: Ibid, 5.
214Ibid, 59.
215Mark Mazower, Salonica City of Ghosts (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 224.
216Kazım Nami Duru, İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957), 11.
74
Bulgarians, Protestants, Vlachs, Armenians and other nationalities living in the
city. Kazım Nami Duru states, at the end of the 19th century, the majority of
Thessaloniki’s population consisted of Jews. Therefore, the most spoken language
was Judeo-Spanish. Since French was taught in Alliance Israelite Universelle.
schools, the intelligentsia spoke French and published a French newspaper called
the Journal de Salonique. Greeks and Bulgarians had gymnasiums. The Turks
seemed to have no private schools. Therefore, the children went to the Military
Middle School or Women’s Middle School.217 Since the last quarter of the 19th
century, Thessaloniki increased its importance even more, especially in terms of
culture and politics. Nevertheless, this statement of Kazım Nami Duru seems like
a bit of an exaggeration when we look at the different censuses and estimates.
According to Ritter’s population estimates, the province of Thessaloniki in 1872
was estimated as 1.237.338 while the population of Baghdat in 1874 was estimated
as 2.200.000.218 The most serious population census in Thessaloniki was held in
1890, and the population of Thessaloniki was 98,938, according to this census.
Based on this detailed census, the population of the Jews was 47,322, the Muslim
Turks were 31,703, the Greeks were 15,032, and the population of other nations was
4,900.219 when the Ottoman population in the provinces is examined, the official
Ottoman statistics between the years 1885-1914 indicate that provinces such as
Aydın and Trabzon were more populated than Thessaloniki.220 The position of the
city’s Muslim elite should not be underestimated either. When the city was first
granted to have a municipality, the prosperous bourgeoisie, led by Muslims after
Jews, found a partner in Muslim-led local government. The municipality attracted
Muslim elite from their estates in the hinterland to the city itself and became a
regulator of urban life. Also, it is not a correct assumption that Muslims did not
take good part in education and publishing. Some of the Turkish Muslim Private
Schools in Thessaloniki at the beginning of the 20th century were: Mekatib-i
Hususiye-i İslamiyye, Feyziye Mektebi, Yadigâr Terakki Mektebi.221 Muslims in
the city also publish newspapers. Turan Akıncı determined that there were 64
periodicals published in Thessaloniki between 1869-1924 and 25 of them were in
217Kazım Nami Duru, İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım. (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957), 11-12.
218Cem Behar, The Population of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü
Matbaası, 1996), 38.
219Turan Akıncı, Selanik (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2017), 62.
220In order to see the demographic statistics in the late 19th- early 20th centuries in the Ottoman provinces
including the provinces above-mentioned, see: Behar, The Population of the Ottoman Empire, 47-48.
221Akıncı, Selanik, 105.
75
Turkish. He cites Rumeli and Zaman newspapers as examples of these publications.
222 The newspaper Asr, published in 1895, can be given as another example.223
To conclude; Thessaloniki was a multi-religious, multilingual and multicultural
urban center where printing was carried out in Turkish, Greek, French, Bulgarian,
Ladino-Sephardic Hebrew and Romanian languages in the 1890s. Over time, it
had become an important port city and trade center, one of the nexuses where the
Turks and the Western world interacted most intensely. Goods from countries such
as England and France entered the market of the Ottoman Balkans at the Port of
Thessaloniki. Products such as Serres cotton and Macedonian tobacco were also
exported through this port.
Thessaloniki, as the headquarter of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),
where the party’s most important decisions were taken, played an important role
in the Constitutional Revolution.224 The Young Turk Revolution which started
out as an assertion of the values of cosmopolitan loyalty to the empire over the
divisive power of nationalism, and its ideology of “Unity of the Elements” seemed
attractive in a city like Thessaloniki where nationalism offered no sure future for
either the Muslims or the Jews.225 There were two clubs named Kristal and Yonyo
in the Olympos square in Thessaloniki. Especially the Yonyo was an important
place where the Unionists gathered and discussed the period’s politics. All kinds of
beverages were sold in these clubs; but mostly Munich beer was consumed.226 Being
a resident of Thessaloniki meant being involved in the intellectual, economic and
political life that characterized the city. Being brought up in such an environment
gave Tahsin Bey the opportunity to experience firsthand the different elements
of Ottoman society and the balance between them. Through these experiences
he developed an understanding of the region and its problems, enabling him to
serve as a more effective administrator during his civil duties.227 As the center of
222Ibid, 105-106.
223Mazower, Salonica, 230.
224Korkmaz, “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 7-8.
225Mazower, Salonica, 261.
226Tahsin Bey was also detained in 189, in Istanbul Beyoğlu while drinking beer in a German beer hall. It is
noteworthy that in centers important for the organization of the CUP, such as Thessaloniki and Istanbul,
Beer Houses are described in more than one source as social circles where Unionists gathered and exchanged
ideas and documents. It could be indicated that these narratives correspond with the lifestyle and social
practices associated with Unionists in different sources. Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 17-19, Duru,
İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım, 19.
227Korkmaz, “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 7-8.
76
CUP activity, where the party made important decisions regarding the Macedonian
Question and the future of the empire, Thessaloniki was a place of great importance
for Tahsin Bey and many Young Turks, especially those who were also born, raised
and educated in Rumelia. The city played a vital role in the proclamation of the
second Constitutional Monarchy. The term Kabe-i hürriyet (Kabaa of liberty),
which was also mentioned several times in the memoir of İbrahim Temo, was used
by the Unionists to refer to the city of Thessaloniki.228 In contrast, Istanbul,
which symbolized the tyranny and domination of Yıldız Palace, was called Kahpe
Bizans (Byzantium the fickle). After the revolution, there were those who bore a
special enmity towards those who came from Thessaloniki, emphasizing the fact
that Thessaloniki and those who grew up there had a considerable influence on the
socio-political affairs of the empire.229
The death of Tahsin Bey’s father when he was only six years old meant that the
absence of a father figure would shape his childhood. Tahsin Bey mentions how
his mother, Hatice Hanım, served as both a mother and a father to him and his
siblings. For this reason, he frequently mentions his mother and her prayers, wishes
and advice in many parts of his memoir. After his father passed away, Tahsin Bey
and his mother moved to the house of his older sister’s husband. However, because
his mother’s financial means were sufficient to allow her to live on her own, Tahsin
Bey and Hatice Hanım eventually left his brother-in-law’s house and continued to
live together.
Hatice Hanım came from one of Thessaloniki’s most prominent families, and both
she and Tahsin Bey’s father profoundly influenced the boy. Tahsin Bey describes
how his parents influenced him as follows:
“My father was never interested in politics or government affairs, but
my mother followed political events. My father did not like the civil
service. However, as his child, I entered the government service with the
township directorate at the age of 19 and until today, I have been busy
with government duties, big and small. I didn’t leave the government
for a minute. It is rare to find such a difference in life, soul and vision
between father and son. However, he had always been positive and
peaceful, and I have always lived in sorrow, grief and struggle.” 230
228İbrahim.Temo, İttihat ve Terakki Anıları (İstanbul: Arba Yayınevi, 1987), 173, 183.
229Mithat şükrü Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979), 53.
230Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 6.
77
It could be inferred from the words above that Tahsin Bey’s interest in politics
came from his mother. This interest was sparked at a young age when he overheard
conversations about national issues at the dinner meetings held at the house of
Celal Bey, Hatice Hanım’s older brother.231 Hatice Hanım’s death deeply affected
Tahsin Bey. Although he does not give much information about his father’s death,
Tahsin reserved a separate place in his memoir for his last memory of his mother
and her death. Hatice Hanım died of a stroke (possibly a seizure) while Tahsin Bey
was the governor of Drama, not long after he had lost both of his children.232
Another notable element in the memoir is Tahsin Bey’s psychological and physical
state, especially in his youth. The health problems that emerged during his student
years at Mekteb-i Mülkiye and continued in the early years of his administrative life
are mentioned throughout the first parts of the memoir. The political environment
of the Mekteb-i Mülkiye and his intensified hatred towards Abdülhamid II, combined
with his health problems, resulted in both physical and mental illness. Tahsin Bey
mentions that his health problems started when he was a student at Mülkiye and
grew worse, to the point that he believed he had tuberculosis. During this period,
he gradually lost weight and was so sickly that his family began to worry. While he
did not actually have tuberculosis. Tahsin Bey was diagnosed with hypochondria.233
Tahsin Bey’s rare health problem is described in the following passage:
“The illness anxiety disorder is a chronic mental illness previously known
as hypochondria. People with this disorder have a persistent fear that
they have a serious or life-threatening illness despite few or no symptoms.
People with illness anxiety disorder — also called hypochondria
or hypochondriasis — have an unrealistic fear that they have a serious
medical condition or fear that they’re at high risk of becoming ill. They
may misinterpret typical body functions as signs of illness. Even after
medical tests show no problems, people with hypochondriasis are still
preoccupied with the idea that they’re seriously sick. Their persistent
health worries can interfere with their relationships, careers and life.”234
As described above, during this period Tahsin Bey continually had body pains and,
231Ibid, 8.
232Ibid, 3-4.
233Ibid, 11.
234Cleveland Clinic, “Illness Anxiety Disorder (Hypochondria): Symptoms & Treatments,” Sept,
2, 2022, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/9886-illness-anxiety-disorder-hypochondriahypochondriasis.
78
despite taking care of his health, continued to lose weight and feared he had developed
tuberculosis. Tahsin Bey describes the desperate situation he was in:
“I just decided to visit the doctor for consolation, because I was sure that
I could not escape from tuberculosis. One day I requested that doctor
Fevzi Paşa explain the situation clearly. After a long explanation, he
assured me that I was healthy. However, these words did not assuage
my suspicions. I visited my cousin doctor Şevket, he repeated the same
things, but it did not change my opinion .” 235
Tahsin Bey’s hypochondria worsened after he joined the Committee. The unfavorable
political conditions of the Empire and his hatred towards Abdülhamid II
increased his anxiety, so much so that he considered giving up on life. He even
volunteered for the dangerous mission of assassinating the Minister of the Navy,
Hacı Hasan Paşa. His mood grew even worse before he was arrested and deported
to Pürsican in 1897. He describes himself as a mentally and physically sick man
who constantly cried while listening to songs and worried about political issues.
1897 was an important year when the CUP intensified its activities Especially in
July and August of 1897, hundreds of letters, newspapers, pamphlets, and leaflets
were sent weekly to the branch that only Tahsin Bey was involved in. At the same
time the Hamidian regime was making many arrests every day. Tahsin Bey, in
his statement more clearly showed his attitude towards the Abdülhamid regime,
describes the atmosphere of that day as follows: Everyday thousands of "innocent
and oppressed patriots" were arrested and tortured by Abdülhamid II’s spies in
cooperation with the governors of Beyoğlu and üsküdar, and the Beşiktaş guard.236
The political environment he was in must have worsened Tahsin Bey’s condition.
This illness continued during his duty in Pürsiçan, but after he was appointed
to the Çiç sub-district, he finally overcame it and became physically stronger.237
However, Tahsin Bey does not emphasize his pessimism and psychical weakness,
apart from his hypochondria. Instead, Tahsin Bey projects a positive image of
himself from his childhood years to his last place of duty. For example, when he
was a child, he was loved and admired by his mother’s friends, who often asked him
to sing because he had a beautiful voice. Throughout his education, he attracted
attention either with his student performance or leadership qualities that drew
people to him. He continued to exhibit these leadership qualities throughout his
235Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 12.
236Ibid, 17.
237Ibid, 15-16.
79
career. The locals loved him in every town and township he worked in, and his
successes as a governor, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, underline his
capability.
He did good work in every town and township he was appointed to, and became a
young, dynamic, principled and fair manager. At the age of 19, he was appointed
to the directorate of a township and at the age of 23, he became district governor
in a difficult region like Razlık, where the Bulgarian guerillas were most active. It
is not an unfounded claim that Tahsin Bey was a successful administrator in the
places where he worked. As stated in the previous chapter, the reflections of some
events mentioned in the memoir could be seen in the archival documents. These
documents confirm the reconstruction activities that Tahsin Bey mentions in his
memoir, such as the school, military and government buildings that he had built
with the support of the locals. In some documents cited in the previous chapter,
it is seen that he was acknowledged by the state several times both for his fight
against guerillas and for his public works. Considering these documents, it can be
thought that Tahsin Bey exhibited a good example of administration in the places
he served in Macedonia.
The thing to note here is not whether Tahsin Bey drew a realistic self-portrait
or not. It is his emphasis on how much he was approved, loved, and admired by
people, which he often expresses at different stages of his life. It is difficult to say
whether this situation has anything to do with his earlier psychological state or
whether it is simply his nature.238 Whether due to his character or in line with a
conscious agenda, Tahsin Bey draws a positive image both as an individual and as
an administrator. The incidents that seem like flaws in the narrative also serve this
image of Tahsin Bey. For example, the incident he experienced in Yörükler village
in Pürsiçan may seem like a negative situation at first glance. The Yörüks, who
could not pay their taxes, were forced to climb trees and were not allowed down
until they paid their taxes. Tahsin Bey tells that he beat the officer who collected
from the villagers in this way: "despite his(Tahsin Bey) young age, he showed
courage" and beat him to death. This incident caused Tahsin Bey to contradict with
238According to Freud, “hypochondriacal anxiety emanates from a variation of narcissism. Although the definition
of narcissm has changed a lot, Rosenfeld (1964) reviews the psychoanalytic literature on hypochondria
and offers his own, new theory in which he starts from Freud’s observation that the hypochondriac is fixated
in the narcissistic phase. Rosenfeld suggests that infantile confusional states, based on a failure of
normal splitting – a phenomenon of the paranoid – schizoid position – are at the heart of hypochondria.
He sees his new theory as a further exploration of the meaning of Freud’s assertion that hypochondria is
a narcissistic illness, thus confirming the value of and extending Freud’s observations in the narcissism
paper.” See: Philip Crockett, “Freud’s ’On Narcissism: An Introduction.’” Journal of Child Psychotherapy
32, no. 1 (2006): 4–20.
80
the governorship and face the danger of being dismissed. However, Tahsin Bey did
not give up on justice, standing with the righteous and the oppressed villagers, so
the region’s people loved him very much.239 Similarly, he mentions an investigation
opened against him while he was the district governor of Razlık. However, this
investigation was opened because Bulgarian women complained about him. Tahsin
Bey was actively fighting against guerillas and confiscating weapons. As a result of
this investigation, he was offered a reward instead of punishment.240
However, there were cases that Tahsin Bey did not mention in his memoir. While he
was the Director of Ağustos Township, he was sued for insulting Zülfikar Bey, one
of the people of Ağustos township. The Ministry of the Interior sent a document
requesting Karaferye District Governorate to investigate the case and send notification
to Razlık governor Tahsin Bey. The document does not reveal the content or
outcome of the case. However, such a lawsuit may mean that Tahsin Bey may have
acted selectively while creating his narrative not to damage his image.241
5.2 Understanding Tahsin Bey’s Ideological Development: Being a
Young Turk and Intellectual in the Hamidian Era
Two important factors shaped Tahsin Bey’s intellectual life and ideological development:
his education at the School for Civil Service and his participation in the
CUP. Due to his involvement in both Mülkiye Mektebi and CUP, the curriculum
he received, the names he read and the publications that influenced the students
of Mülkiye had a great impact on Tahsin Bey’s frame of mind. According to his
memoir, Tahsin Bey, who was a student in the Mülkiye İdadisi on September 9,
1889, graduated in 1897.242 In order to understand how Tahsin Bey’s intellectual
life and political thought were shaped during this period, it is necessary to take a
look at the education system of the period, especially the Mekteb-i Mülkiye and
Young Turks’ intellectual lives.
239Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 34-35.
240Ibid, 128-129.
241Mustafa Şahin, who came across the same document, has a similar conclusion.” Tahsin Bey never mentions
this subject in his memoir. We think there are two reasons for this. Making it a principle not to talk about
the investigations that did not result in a conviction, the second is that he does not talk about bad events.
He always prefers to include praiseworthy and proud events about himself.” See: Şahin, “Tahsin Uzer’in
Mülki İdareciliği,”45.
242Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 6-8.
81
While the history of the modernization of education in the Ottoman Empire goes
back to 1839, the spread of state education in the periphery became possible only
after the second half of the 19th century.243 During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid
II, great importance was given to schools. In the late 1870s, with Said Paşa, the
schools’ academic quality was strengthened. As one of the most influential names
at the time, (Mizancı) Murad Bey should be counted. The General World History
course given by Murat Bey at the Mekteb-i Mülkiye directly touched on political
issues. This course had impact on the students of Mülkiye and played a significant
role in raising young people with innovative and libertarian ideas, thanks to a
history course that was very different from the superstitions and traditions the
students were accustomed to hearing in primary school or at home.244 In general,
history education in Hamidian schools had been given since the 1880s in a way that
specializes in both provinces and subjects.245
Tahsin Bey took courses at the Mülkiye İdadisi included World History, World
Geography, French, mathematics, physics, Ottoman History, Finance, and commercial
law.246 Therefore, is not surprising that Tahsin Bey frequently included
information about political history in his memoirs, such as the history of ancient
Macedonia and more importantly, emphasized the importance of knowing about
regional, imperial and world history. General History knowledge and awareness,
especially provided to the students by the Mekteb-i Mülkiye; influenced not only
Tahsin Bey, but also the intellectual life of many other Young Turks who were
raised in this period. Murad Bey’s influence on the Mülkiye students and the Young
Turks secretly organized within Hamidian schools was not limited to history lessons.
Distribution of Mizan magazine, published by Murad Bey, reached a very high level
in CUP organizations, especially after 1895.247 Tahsin Bey, who was in charge of
receiving and distributing documents such as magazines, leaflets and newspapers in
the German beer hall in Beyoğlu in 1897, said that he cried after reading the Mizan
newspaper, which gives an idea about the prevalence of Mizan among the Young
243S.Akşin Somel, Osmanlı’da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi (1839-1908) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2010), 93.
244Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri 1895-1908. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları,
1964), 43, 63.
245Somel, Osmanlı’da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi, 245.
246Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,”11.
247Şükrü Hanioğlu,. Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük. (İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 1986), 201.
82
Turks and its influence on dissident students.248 Mizancı Murad’s effects on Tahsin
Bey were not limited to this. The "just ruler" ideal that Mizancı Murad followed
later249 seems to be a situation that Tahsin Bey took as an example for his own
administration. He emphasizes that he strove to be a fair manager at every opportunity.
In addition, the content Murad Bey’s novel “Turfa or Turfanda?" seems to
be parallel to Tahsin Bey’s own exile narrative in 1897 whereby the novel character
named Mansur Bey did suffer because of his chastity and idealism, and that he
was exiled to Syria because of his criticism of the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War.250
The reforms made during the period of Grand Vizier Said Paşa were interrupted
to a great extent, especially after the dismissal of Pasha in 1885. During this
period, courses such as French and philosophy were reduced and moral courses were
increased.251 With the increase in the activities of armed nationalist organizations
in the 1890s, absolutist policies were increased, and this absolutist attitude
was also reflected in the education curriculum. However, these changes in the
curriculum implemented by the Abdülhamid II regime should not be considered
anti-modernization but a necessity brought by the current situation. Already in
this period, the obligation to train civil servants, one of the most important duties
of schools, resulted in the dominance of modernist tendencies despite the changes
in the curriculum.252
The impact of the Hamidian period on the civil servants trained by the Hamidian
schools is complex. Thanks to the institutional education brought by the objective
and uniform examination system, which is applied at certain intervals according to
age and education level, an education in which success and merit can be measured
objectively has created strong thoughts on the objectivity of knowledge in the horizons
of children who grow up from this system. While individuals who grew up in
this system tended to be positivists and modernizers in general, they also tended to
have authoritarian thoughts. In this sense, contrary to Ramsour’s generalization,253
248Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 18.
249According to Şerif Mardin, this ideal is a characteristic reaction of Islamic communities participating in the
modernization movement in the first phase of westernization. See: Mardin, Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri,
67.
250Ibid, 67
251Ibid, 44.
252Somel, Osmanlı’da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi , 212.
253Ramsour always refers to the cadres that will form the backbone of the Young Turk movement as "Turkish
liberals". See: Ernest Edmondson Ramsour, Genç Türkler ve İttihat Terakki,(İstanbul: Etkin Yayınları,
83
It is difficult to see Hamidian education created liberal and democrats.254 The
end of Abdülhamid’s education could be a synthesis of authoritarian, bureaucratic
ideology and progressive worldview. Most of the individuals who grew up in this
system became obsessed with authority, progress and order. Compared to the ad
hoc administration of idare-i maslahat (Tahsin Bey uses this word as an insult) that
Abdülhamid II applied to different ethnic elements and conditions, the Unionists
were more concerned about putting the empire into a rational and standard legal
order.255 One of the situations that Tahsin Bey was most dissatisfied with while he
was the district governor in Razlık was the Governor Rüknettin Bey and his administrative
attitude. Almost every day, despite the komitadjis and the loss of soldiers,
with his insensitive attitude, Governor Rüknettin Bey annoys Tahsin Bey. Tahsin
Bey refers to him as “Kambur Rüknettin Bey" and criticizes his administration to
be "soulless and idare-i maslahatçı".256
5.2.1 Tahsin Bey’s Initiating into the CUP and the Hatred of Abdülhamid
II
Tahsin Bey devoted the second part of his memoir to how he got involved in the
CUP and his hatred towards Abdülhamid II. “During the time Tahsin Bey spent
at the Mekteb-i Mülkiye, besides acquiring an academic background, he met with
different ideas. In this period, Tahsin Bey, who got ideas about the homeland,
developed thoughts against the oppressive elements under the rule of Abdülhamid
II, and acted within the CUP in the context of his concerns about the homeland
and his hatred for the oppressive government. Moreover, despite coming from a
relatively wealthy family, being an orphan, his illness and political situation show
that he had a difficult adolescence. Nevertheless, Tahsin Bey developed a character
to struggle with difficulties in this period, and the experiences and thoughts he
gained during this period affected his attitude in his administrative life, especially
his duties in Macedonia.257
Tahsin Bey states that the CUP was restructured and organized in Istanbul when
2008).
254Somel, Osmanlı’da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi, 340.
255Ibid, 341-342.
256Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 126.
257Korkmaz, “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 16.
84
he was in the 3rd year of the Mülkiye İdadisi. At that time, Military Medical School
was the revolutionary center of the CUP. It was Uzun Emin Bey from Thessaloniki,
who was a medical student, who suggested that Tahsin Bey join the CUP. Tahsin
Bey, who took an oath and joined the CUP with the number 129, tells that he was
given the Mizan, Meşrutiyet and Kanuni Esasi newspapers. After joining the CUP,
he includes some of his trusted friends in the CUP and establishes the "Mekteb-i
Mülkiye Branch". Tahsin Bey, who started to work more effectively in the CUP
with the branch he founded, made his mother a member of the society. Meanwhile,
Tahsin Bey, who was physically ill, states that his hatred towards Abdülhamid II
intensified every day. With the effect of his deteriorating health, he decides to become
a fedai in 1892. Tahsin Bey states that this incident was an indication of the
degree of enmity and hatred towards "Kızıl Sultan Abdülhamid".258 Tahsin Bey’s
feelings and thoughts against Abdülhamid II and his administration are frequently
seen in the following years. He rebelled against Abdülhamid and his administration
and continued the struggle by sacrificing his life and youth to overthrow that
administration. He considered the Abdülhamid regime as a weak administration
that could not even protect the lives of its people.259 Tahsin Bey, who exhibited
a typical Unionist profile with his hatred of Abdülhamid, has other thoughts and
themes that are observed to have an impact on both his education in Mülkiye and
the Unionists he was a part of. One of them is the emphasis on the "salvation of
the homeland". Authors such as Namık Kemal were began to be read again among
the military medical students, and the theme of patriotism gained momentum with
the influence of the military profession. The main theme of the Young Turk magazines
published in Europe was that the homeland was going to perish and finding
a solution to this problem was more important than anything else. In the articles
Mizancı Murad Bey wrote to Meşveret, it is seen that since the autumn of 1896, he
focused on the First Constitutional Monarchy constitution and the theme of saving
the homeland.260 In a declaration published in Mizan in 1896, it was emphasized
that the sole purpose of the CUP was to save the homeland.261 Şükrü Hanioğlu
258Akşin Somel discusses the effects of the increasing absolutist policies in the 1890s, especially around 1892,
on the curriculum. Increasing CUP activities in 1897 and arrests against dissidents were discussed before.
In this context, it is not surprising to see the hatred of Abdülhamid and the years 1892 and 1897 as turning
points in his relations with the CUP in the memoirs of Tahsin Bey, a student of the Mülkiye See: Uzer,
Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 10-12.
259Ibid, 44, 50.
260Mardin, Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri, 51-52, 81.
261“Osmanlılar!
İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti bir cemiyet-i fesadiye değildir. Bil’akis vatanın selamet ve saadeti uğrunda
kendi selamet-i zatiyelerini bile feda etmiş erbab-ı gayret ve hamiyetden mürekkebdir. Emeli büyükdür,
necibdir. ...
...Maksadımız selâmet-i devlet ve hilâfetdir. Bunu anlamamış kimse kalmamışdır. Alemin matbuatı şöyle
dursun, mecalis-i resmiyede, kürsi-i hitabetlerde yahud resmi notalarda bile haysiyetşikenâne suretde İslâmiyet
ve Osmanlılık nâm ü şânına tecavüz ediyorlar.
85
states that the main motivation of the Young Turks in bringing the constitutional
government was not libertarian ideas, but the effort to save the state by creating an
upper identity with constitutional guarantees.262 İbrahim Temo, one of the founders
of the CUP, who went to the Military Medical School, said to Ishak Sükuti that "the
beloved homeland will perish with its current state and administration style, so it
is necessary to take action".263 Kazım Nami Duru also draws attention to the emphasis
on patriotism in the ideas spread especially among military school students.
He narrates that the words of the crowds at the meetings and celebrations during
the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, song composed for Namık Kemal
and the poem of Namık Kemal had a great emphasis on the theme of salvation
of the motherland.264 Tahsin Bey, like his contemporaries, was heavily influenced
by the theme of patriotism and the state’s concern for salvation, and he frequently
expressed this effect. In fact, he states that at the age of 19, his only concern is the
love of the country, and the love of the country drived him crazy. He states that one
of the reasons for his success in his civil service life is the love of the country, working
for the benefit of the nation and the state, and strengthening the bond between the
nation and the state. 265
5.2.2 Positivism and Social Darwinism
Şükrü Hanioğlu says about the Young Turks, “The Young Turks became very interested
in theories such as positivism that do not care much about the role of the
individual in society, but on the other hand, they showed an increasing interest in
the ideas that the individual should intervene more in the development of the society.”
266 Thoughts such as biological materialism, positivism, and social Darwinism,
who entered the Military Medical School without facing much pressure, were passed
on to new students.267 Ahmet Rıza, one of the representatives of positivism and
social Darwinism, was replacing dogmas with science. Ahmet Rıza, whom Auguste
....Erbâb-ı basireti artık gafletden vaz geçmeğe halisâne da’ve etmekle beraber her hâl ü kârda iltizam etdiğimiz
maksadın kudsiyetine binaen tevfikat-ı samedaniyyeye istinâd ve tevekkül ile hareket edeceğiz.
Heyet-i Teftiş ve İcra” ( Mizan, no 1, Kanun-i evvel 1896-9 Receb 1314, s.23) See: Hanioğlu, İttihad ve
Terakki Cemiyeti, 448.
262Ibid, 69-72.
263Temo, İttihat ve Terakki Anıları, 13.
264Duru, İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım,. 29-32.
265Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 15, 56.
266Hanioğlu, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 53.
267Ibid, 51.
86
Comte influenced, argued that every substance in the world is interconnected by a
law of nature. Understanding these objective laws of nature and their effects on
societies was imperative.268 The effect of these thoughts of Ahmet Rıza on the
Young Turks can be seen in Tahsin Bey’s memoirs. Tahsin Bey, whose health improved
when he became the director of the Çiç sub-district, explained his actions
that contradicted his duty as the director, as his youth. He states that he cannot
become an adult without first being a child, despite his patriotism and sense of
duty. “Everyone, whether he is a director or a sultan, is obliged to be subject to the
laws of nature and to pass the stages of human life.” He emphasizes the immutable
objectivity of the laws of nature.269 Apart from that, Tahsin Bey’s first impressions
were bad when he started to be the director of Çiç township. He complains that
people believe in dogmas, ignorance and primitivity.270 Several times he complains
about the situation and decides to escape to Europe where he could find a more
suitable lifestyle for himself. One could infer from his words that he was arrogant
but looking at memoirs written by other intellectuals in more or less same period, it
could be seen that Tahsin Bey’s account is not unique. Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran
in his memoir complains about the same situation. As an intellectual Tepeyran
draws a quite similar picture with his education, having similiar ideas about the
censorship implied by the Hamidian regime and ignorance of people. When he was
in Kastamonu, Tepeyran wants to develop agriculture and introduce the locals with
potato and opium poppy harvest techniques as they bring more profit than grains.
Yet, he faces with the ignorance and bigotry of the locals. Although they provide
all the means and seeds for cultivation, locals do not incline for this novelty. Moreover,
some of the peasants who used the seeds ask for money as they consider this
as a duty rather than something good for their own interests. Tepeyran’s attitude
proves how astonished and terrified he was against what he witnessed in locals. He
explains the situation as “pure ignorance of the shameless peasants. In addition,
the fear and superstitions displayed by the villagers, even in an event that could be
objectively explained by the laws of nature, such as the lunar eclipse, astonished
Tepeyran.271 Apart from these, Tahsin Bey’s attitude displayed in several parts of
his memoir can set an example for social Darwinism. For example, he expresses his
anger towards the Bulgarian guerillas and about the bulgarian peasants taking up
arms in the region due to the escalating terrorist incidents while he was the Razlık
268Mardin, Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri, 130-135.
269Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 45.
270“Eski köye yeni âdet olmaz. . . Bu iptidai, terbiyeden yoksun insanlarla nasıl çalışacağım? Hayır yapamam.
Avrupa’ya kaçmaya karar verdim.” See: Ibid, 29-38.
271Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran, Canlı Tarihler 1, Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran1-2. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,
1944), 52-54.
87
District Governor.
“[...] However, after the painful scenes I saw, I had an endless fire of hatred
and revenge against the Bulgarians[...] In many parts of the district,
the Turks were being killed one by one. I was getting nervous in the face
of these constant murders, and the hatred inside me was increasing. I
had to start by taking all risks and possibilities into account. I was determined
to take action by assuming the conscientious and administrative
responsibility.” 272
In the part where he describes the Florina district governorship, he talks about
the "Bulgarian Hafi Village Organization". According to Tahsin Bey, this organization,
which played a major role in the loss of Macedonia, was getting stronger.
Tahsin Bey argued that there were only two remedies that could hinder the work
of this organization: First, the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy as soon
as possible, the second; burning a Bulgarian village in retaliation for every village
burned and murdered by Bulgarians, and the complete extermination of its people.
273 Especially the second solution proposal can be given as a good example of
the combination of the conditions and traumas of the period with social Darwinist
thoughts. The idea of retaliating and destroying a village en masse when circumstances
develop in this direction is a good example of the harsh reality in which the
fittest survive.In all examples, it is possible to see the traces of both Tahsin Bey’s
and Tepeyran’s education and the effective currents of thought of the period.
5.2.3 Traces of Encyclopedism and Didactic Style
Ahmet Mithat is one of the main representatives of encyclopedism, which started
to be seen in the Ottoman intellectuals during the late Tanzimat and Hamidian periods.
While encyclopedism had no political concern, Young Ottomans like Namık
Kemal politicized the concept of westernization. The Young Turks also treated westernization
as a political issue. Nevertheless, some figures such as Abdullah Cevdet
continued to represent encyclopedism as of the late 19th century.274 However, some
encyclopedists, who focused only on science and culture without making political
criticisms and completely replaces religion with science, criticized Abdullah Cevdet’s
compromising attitude towards those with religious sensitivities. Therefore, it can-
272Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 126-127.
273Ibid, 200.
274Z.Avşar, E.Kaya,S.Onur, Toplumsal ve Siyasal Bir Proje: Ansiklopedi ve Ansiklopedizm, s231.
88
not be said that the Young Turk intellectuals fully embraced encyclopedism due to
its apolitical and anti-religious attitudes. However, as in Şinasi, for example, it is
not impossible to see an attitude somewhat similar to encyclopedists in order to
educate and inform the public. Although there is a hostile attitude towards corrupt
clergy in Tahsin Bey’s memoir, there is no negative attitude towards religion
itself. While Tahsin Bey appreciates European culture, he strongly opposes European
intervention in Ottoman affairs. Still, the memoir, which has an extremely
political and critical style, has a didactic style from time to time. Considering the
geographical structures, demographic information of the regions or the explanations
of the concepts from time to time, the effect of the encyclopedist movement can be
partially mentioned in this memoir.
5.3 The Malta Puzzle: Tahsin Bey’s Malta Exile and its Impact on his
Memoir
The published memoir ends with Tahsin Bey’s description of his time as deputy
governor of Bursa, which takes up a little bit more than a page. At the end of his
service in Bursa, he was appointed to Van province as governor.
In the third chapter of the memoir, the publisher, his son Celalettin Uzer, leaves a
note:
“I will present the readers memoirs of Tahsin Bey’s time in the governorships
of Van, Erzurum, Syria and İzmir, his service as the İzmir Deputy
in the Last Chamber of Deputies of the Empire, and to his exile to the
island of Malta: I will publish and present the second part of the memoir
which he wrote in Malta in the book. However, in this book, I will only
briefly touch upon these issues.” 275
One of the most controversial parts of this memoir, which is mostly related to
the Macedonian Question, is actually the issue of Tahsin Bey’s exile to Malta.
First, Tahsin Bey states that he wrote his memoir while in exile. The conditions
in which the work was written are of particular importance. Moreover, some left
Malta, where many key political figures were exiled, at different times, in different
ways. The time Tahsin Bey spent as governor of Van, Erzurum and Syria, which
275Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 335.
89
Celalettin Uzer claimed were to be found in the unpublished second part of the
memoir, could have given the reader more detail about the reasons behind Tahsin
Uzer’s exile in Malta. Moreover, the circumstances in which he was in exile in
Malta could have directly explained the circumstances in which the memoir was
written.
Before delving further, let us look at the nature of the late Ottoman memoirs in
general. Ali Birinci classifies the memoirs during the late Ottoman Empire, which
became widespread since the 1870s and gained momentum after 1908 revolution,
according to different criteria. One of them is that the memoir is characterized by
purpose of the author.276 These memoirs could be categorized as:
1- Sultan Abdülhamid II’s statesmen who wrote their memoirs such as Kamil Paşa,
Said Paşa, Serasker Rıza Paşa. Especially the memoirs of Kamil and Said Paşa
wrote refutations to each other’s memoirs.277
2- Memoirs written to express their personal effort and honorable role in the
declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy such as Mehmet Rauf from
Leskovik (Kırçak), İbrahim Temo, Kazım Nami Duru, Mithat Şükrü Bleda.
3- There are also examples of memoirs that describe the sufferings after the great
wars, or that they were written to express their service in the war and that they
did not have any faults due to their defeats. There are numereus civil servants,
statesmen and military officers who wrote their memoirs after the First World War
and the War of Independence. Some of them are Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Paşa, İsmet
(İnönü) Paşa, Kazım Karabekir Paşa, Fahrettin Altay Paşa.
Banditry issue in Macedonia constitutes a good part of Tahsin Uzer’s memoir. Yet,
Celalettin Uzer indicates that there is an unpublished volume of the memoir in
which a detailed narrative on Tahsin Bey’s governorship during the First World
War and the Malta Exile are provided. Besides, Tahsin Bey wrote his memoir
when he was exiled to Malta as a political prisoner due to the Armenian genocide;
276In particular, the statesmen of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II wrote their memoirs, some in haste and
some later, in order to keep themselves out of their old sins and to show that they were not responsible.
277One of the memoirs counted in the first made by Ali Birinci was written by Rıza Paşa, who served as
the serasker of Abdülhamid II for 17 years. Rıza Paşa was still in the position of seraskerlik during the
years when Tahsin Bey was governor in Macedonia, but he was dismissed and exiled by Abdülhamid II.
Serasker Mehmed Rıza Paşa also displays a similar motivation in the preface of his memoir. According
to his statement in the preface, he was dismissed on 21 July 1908 (Rumi 8 July 1324) because he wanted
the "Supreme Law" to be implemented before the revolution. Since the system of the first constitutional
monarchy was not completely established yet, some attacks took place against Rıza Paşa in the public
opinion, but Rıza Paşa, thought that the accusations made without legal basis, did not fit into either the
constitutional administration or justice, he prefered not respond at a time when the public had not calmed
down yet. However, upon the wishes of his children, who were negatively affected by the thoughts and
accusations against him, he felt the need to write and publish the "history of his life" “tarihçe-i hayatım”
in order to respond to the accusations against him. See: Rıza Paşa, Hülasa-i Hatırat, 1325.
90
Tahsin Bey’s memoirs can be considered both in the second category, but mostly
in the third category.
Another classification Ali Birinci does is that that memoirs can be classified
according to their authors’ profession. According to the classification made by Ali
Binici, Tahsin Bey can be considered both in the category of administrators and
those in prison or exile.278
Both the reason why Tahsin Bey was sent to Malta and his departure from Malta
are quite controversial. It is known that Tahsin Bey was exiled to Malta due to the
accusations of British authorities regarding the deportation of Armenians while he
was the governor of Erzurum.279
In his memoir’s first and only volume, Tahsin Bey does not say much about his
days in exile. He is only self-critical about his hesitation to side with Mustafa
Kemal from the start, realizing too late that he had made a mistake. He also briefly
describes his return. According to the memoir, after two years of exile, he returned
to Turkey with the other prisoners thanks to the delegation sent by Mustafa Kemal
to London. However, Rıdvan Akın’s article on the trial of the CUP government
before the military court and the Malta exiles provides a different story. Those
delegates of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies arrested after the occupation of
Istanbul were taken to Malta by ship on March 18, 1921. The exiles were newly
elected deputies, including Faik Bey (Baltakkıran), Rauf Bey (Orbay), Mehmet
Şerefettin (Aykut), Kara Vasıf, Numan Usta, Ali Çetinkaya, Mersinli Cemal Paşa,
Tahsin Bey (Uzer) and Celal Nuri Bey (İleri).280 According to Akın, Tahsin Bey
was among the 17 exiles that escaped from Malta during the time of the Battle
of Sakarya. A member of Karakol Society281 Kara Kemal Bey planned the escape.
Kara Kemal’s friends in Italy arranged a cargo ship, the exiles made it to Rome and a
Celaleddin Arif, a delegate from Ankara, provided them with passports. Most of the
278Ali Birinci, “Hatırat Türündeki Kaynakların Tarihi Araştırmalardaki Yeri ve Değeri”, 611-614.
279Bilal Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1985), 171.
280Rıdvan Akın, “İttihat ve Terakki Hükümetleri’nin Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi’de Yargılanması ve Malta Sürgünleri
(1918–1921),” Galatasaray Üniversitesi Hukuk Dergisi, no. 1 (2014): 90.
281In late 1918, a new intelligence organization was formed under the name of Karako Cemiyeti, or the Sentinel
Association, and proceeded to accomplish important mussions during the Turkish War of Independence
such as delivering weapons to armed groups fighting the occupation forces in the Anatolian heartland
and providing ssupplies and equipment to the National Forces. The Sentinel Association was dissolved
upon the occupation of Istanbul on 16 March 1920, when all of its senioor members including Kara
Kemal were arrested. See : National Intelligence Organization, “History of the MIT,”Sept. 10, 2022,
https://www.mit.gov.tr/english/tarihce.html.
91
exiles went to Germany and some of them later went to Ankara. This escape took
place in September 1921, which coincides with the time period indicated by Tahsin
Bey, though the details contradict with what he wrote in his memoir. According
to the memoir, instead of the “Bekir Sami” delegation sent to London, Celaleddin
Arif in Rome helped them to return to their country, thanks to the diplomatic
efforts of Mustafa Kemal. This contradiction and lack of details on the Malta exile
raise questions concerning the credibility of Tahsin Bey’s account. If the original
manuscript written by Tahsin Bey during his Malta exile were to be discovered,
these questions could be answered. The accounts of some of the other exiles suggest
that Tahsin Bey might have lived under better conditions in Malta than he had
during wartime. In a letter he wrote from Lemnos in 1919, Ziya Gökalp shared his
first impressions of Malta:
“They gave cots and bedding here. There is a person for the laundry.
There is a bath. We can also swim in the sea. They provide for our
every need. We do not have financial problems. We use the money to
buy what we need. We discuss science, literature and philosophy. We
live a university life here. Herds of sheep graze in front of us. We listen to
the birds of the field. In short, we live within the framework of beautiful
nature [. . . ]In short, this building is no different from European hotels.”
282
However, despite Ziya Gökalp’s description, other sources state that not all exiles
sent to Malta were held under the same conditions. Mithat Şükrü Bleda describes
the harsher side of the Malta exile in detail, noting that the occupation forces
made many arrests after Istanbul was occupied.283 He states that many of the
detainees were innocent and could not be executed, so they were exiled to Malta.
The British authorities did not treat the exiles very well. According to Bleda’s
memoir, the exiles spent their trip to Malta in uncertainty, fearing execution.
Meeting with people they knew after arriving on the island had a positive effect
on the mood of the exiles. Tahsin Bey is among the people Mithat Şükrü Bleda
mentions having met with in Malta. Bleda’s statements are therefore valuable in
providing qualifying information about Tahsin Bey’s experiences. It should also be
noted that those who came before him were subjected to ill-treatment, insults and
psychological violence when they first arrived on the island.
282Akın, Malta Sürgünleri, 59-120,102.
283Mithat Şükrü Bleda (1874-1956), CUP’s former secretary-general, was also born in Thessaloniki and was
a Malta exile.
92
Although the British authorities did not want to release the Malta exiles, who
included many important administrators who were likely to return to Anatolia
and organize the War of Independence, some were released thanks to negotiations
with the Ankara government. However, those who were accused of involvement
in the Armenian deportation were exempted from this exchange. After some time
on the island, terrible rumors arose about the exiles whose names were associated
with the deportation: “We knew that one day we would get out of this hell.
But the others... No one could say anything about their fate. The number of
those involved in the deportation of Armenians was 16. . . We decided to help
them escape from the island, no one would know about it except for these 16 people.”
As planned, these 16 exiles found local collaborators and made a deal in exchange
for money, managing to escape from Malta before the British authorities noticed.
The fugitives first hid in Italy for a while.284
The Ankara government wanted some administrators among the Malta exiles to
be smuggled into Anatolia to help organize the Turkish National Movement. An
intelligence officer named Basri, one of the former Unionists, was appointed to the
task and helped organize the escape in collaboration with Kara Kemal.285 On
September 6, 1921, the Italian ship Tricotti received permission to sail from Malta
to Naples. The Malta exiles, who were to escape on the same day, left the camp in
three groups and got on the ship. Tahsin Bey was in the third group. They arrived
in Naples on September 8, and in Rome on September 9, 1921, where they were
issued passports with the help of the Ankara government.286
Mustafa Şahin, based on the memoirs of Tahsin Bey and the statements of his
daughter-in-law, Sırma Hanım, states that Tahsin Bey returned from Malta thanks
to the diplomatic initiatives of Bekir Sami Bey’s delegation, traveling first to
İnebolu and then to Anatolia via the Berlin-Odessa route. However, Bilal Şimşir,
who Mustafa Şahin also refers to, provides extensive information about the Malta
exiles and states that Bekir Sami Bey’s delegation could not free all of the exiles
on the prisoner exchange list, despite the wishes of the government in Ankara.
Since some people in Bekir Sami Bey’s delegation did not share the same views as
284Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü, 126-142.
285Kara Kemal: A prominent Unionist, former Ottoman minister. (1868-1926)
286Arif Oruç, Kara Kemalin Son Günleri (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2021), 47-51.
93
the Ankara government, in the negotiations with the British on March 11, 1921,
they accepted that some prisoners be exempted from the exchange list. Bekir
Sami Bey stated that 27 exiles were political criminals and should be handed over
to the Turkish government. British authorities indicated that they could free 17
of the 27 exiles but held that there were some they would not free under any
condition. Tahsin Bey, given the prisoner number 2774, was among them. The
official agreement was signed on March 16, 1921. A total of 16 people were not
included in this agreement. According to the memoir of Ali İhsan (Sabis), cited
by Bilal Şimşir, all of these 16 were former Unionists that fled the island on the
above-mentioned Italian cargo ship, Tahsin Bey being among them.287 Tahsin Bey
must have stayed in Italy for a while, as there is a document reporting that he
went to Anatolia on February 26, 1922.288 Additionally, when Tahsin Bey passed
away in 1939, in an obituary published in İkdam newspaper stated that “He was
exiled to Malta with other patriots for protesting the occupation of Istanbul by the
enemy, fled from there and was included in the First Grand National Assembly as a
İzmir deputy.” This statement also confirms that Tahsin Bey escaped from Malta.289
Tahsin Bey’s exile to Malta and how he was able to return to Turkey are worth
discussing. First of all, Tahsin Bey wrote his memoir while in exile in Malta.
The reason for his exile, the conditions he experienced there, and why and how
he escaped are all interconnected and are likely to have influenced Tahsin Bey’s
narrative. Since there are two different inferences in two different theses on Tahsin
Bey,290 I believe it is important to contribute to the discussion by making an
assumption based on information from the sources. In addition, the absence of the
second part of the memoir, which is supposed to give more detail about Tahsin
Bey’s Malta exile, leads the researcher to make such speculations. Furthermore,
Tahsin Bey’s escape from Malta or his arrival as part of a prisoner exchange may
have had some important effects. As stated in the correspondence between British
High Commissioner Admiral de Robeck and Lord Curzon, Hasan Tahsin Bey,
287Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, 348-387.
288BOA, DH.EUM.AYŞ., 59-61
289“Bu kıymetli idarecimizin idarecilik hayatı burada başlar. Rumeli’ninmuteaddit nahiyelerinde dört sene
müdürlük yaptıktan sonra Razlık, GökeliGevgili), Florina (Florine) ve diğer bazı Selanik kazalarına yedi
sene kaymakamlık yaptıktan sonra Drama Mutasarrıflığı’na ve oradan da sırasıyla Beyoğlu Mutasarrıflığı,
Bursa Vali Vekaleti, Van, Erzurum, Suriye, İzmir valiliklerinde muhtar hizmetler gördükten sonra Son
Mebusan Meclisi’ne İzmir mebusu sıfatıyla iştirak etmiştir. İstanbul’un düşman tarafından vaki işgalini
protesto eden diğer vatanperver şahsiyetlerle birlikte Malta’ya neyfolunmuş ve oradan kaçarak Birinci Büyük
Millet Meclisi’ne İzmir mebusu olarak dahil olmuştur.” See: İkdam, Dec. 4, 1939, no.111, .2. This passage
was taken from the work of Korkmaz. See Korkmaz. “Tahsin Uzer’in Yaşamı,” 115-116.
290Ender Korkmaz’s MA thesis indicates that Tahsin Bey escaped from Malta, while Mustafa Şahin states
that Tahsin Bey was freed from Malta through diplomatic efforts.
94
former governor of Erzurum and Damascus and later İzmir deputy, was accused of
having close relations with Talat Pasha and being involved in the preparation of
the Armenian genocide.291 Bilal Şimşir describes the situation as a complete farce,
saying that even during the process of collecting evidence against the Malta exiles,
the British High Commissioner could find no evidence to prove the accusations
against Tahsin Bey.292 More importantly, the fate of Tahsin Bey and the other
prisoners accused of involvement with the deportation of Armenians was uncertain,
as Şükrü Bleda notes, meaning that the way they may have been treated differently
while on the island, which could have impacted their mental health.
Although he said that he started to write while in Erzurum, it is possible that Tahsin
Bey wrote this memoir in an attempt to address the accusations made about him.
If nothing else, one could infer that Tahsin Bey was trying to explain the entire
process of the dissolution of the empire and justify his personal actions during this
struggle. Moreover, it was an understandable situation for Tahsin Bey, considering
that his fate in Malta was uncertain. There are others who wrote memoirs with
a similar motivation in the period after the Ottoman defeat. For example, Cemal
Paşa293 wrote his account of the years 1913-1917 during the military trials of Divan-ı
Harb-i Örfi, which started in 1919 after the end of the First World War.294 In other
words, he described the period that was the subject of accusations and described
the events leading to the First World War from his own perspective. In addition,
Cemal Paşa’s memoirs were translated into German and French in 1922, and the
German version was printed.295 Similarly, Mehmed Selahaddin Bey wrote a book
called “What I Know About the Foundation of the CUP and the Fall of the Ottoman
Empire” in 1918,296 stating that he wanted to explain how the state came to this
point and to prevent similar events from happening in the future.297 An account
of the life of Şemsi Pasha, who was appointed to suppress the rebellion initiated by
Resneli Niyazi for the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy and was
291F. O. 371/5089/E. 2805: De Robeck’ten Curzon’a. Yazı. İstanbul, 25.3.1920, No. 402/R. 2886 This
passage was taken from the work of Şimşir. See: Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, 171.
292Ibid, 233.
293Ahmet Cemal Paşa (1872-1922).
294M.Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa.” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, Türkiye İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1993.
295Cemal Paşa. Hatıralar-İttihat-Terakki ve Birinci Dünya Harbi (İstanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959), 5.
296Mehmed Salahaddin Bey served in the Supreme Court for more than four years. Although there is not
much information about him, he was known to be close to the leaders of some political parties in the early
20th century.
297Mehmed Selahaddin Bey, İttihad ve Terakkinin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Devlei’nin Yıkılışı Hakkında Bildiklerim
(İstanbul: İnkılab,1989), 17-18.
95
killed by Mülazım Âtıf (Kamçıl), a Unionist fedâi, was published by Müfid Şemsi,
Şemsi Paşa’s son, in 1919 when the CUP left power. Müfid Şemsi stated that the
book was written in response to Resneli Niyazi and his memoirs. Moreover, Müfid
Şemsi tried to refute his father’s claims that he was ignorant and inadequate, and
presented the events that Resneli Niyazi related in his memoir from his own point
of view. It is understandable that the fall of the CUP and the Ottoman defeat at
the end of the First World War led to the proliferation of such narratives. Various
memoirs written between 1918-1922 have a similar motivation. It is not surprising
to see these attempts to explain the events that resulted in the disintegration of the
state from different perspectives, with some authors justifying their actions, while
others made accusations.
96
6. CONCLUSION
The Macedonian Question is not a temporary crisis emerged during the dissolution
of an empire. On the contrary its impacts still dominate the politics and the
societies of Southeast Europe. As an unsolved problem even today, the Macedonian
Question is still popular and source of debate for the scholars. Within
this framework one of the most attractive topics is the banditry issue in the
region. There are several studies which pursued different methods and having
different approaches. The Macedonian Question and its aspects became one
of the milestones in the creation of national memories and historiographies in
the Balkans. The Balkan Wars and loss of the entire Rumeli and as the next
phases of the Macedonian Question created major traumas affecting the ruling
elite of the Turkish Republic, thus official Turkish historiography. Tendencies in
Balkan historiographies have changed a lot within decades, especially stereotypical
arguments on evil Muslim ruler and Christian subject evolved into a more layered
debate in which socio-economic aspects gained more significance. In the last few
decades more revisionist scholars produced works and contributed to the study of
the Macedonian Question. In terms of sources and methods, personal accounts
gained popularity not only in Turkish but also in Balkan historiography. Scholars
studied memoirs within the Macedonian Question and banditry framework in which
it is possible to see several historical figures including Ottoman administrators and
bandit leaders. However, Tahsin Uzer’s memoir published by his son under the
name of “Macedonian Banditry History and the Last Ottoman Administration”
seem to be relatively neglected. There are not many studies on Tahsin Bey’s
memoir within this framework. A couple of master thesis and dissertations touch
upon his memoir in the relevant parts of their studies though a study directly
focused on the Tahsin Bey’s experience within this context is absent. This
study aimed to deal with the issue of banditry in Macedonia and the Ottoman
administration, as it says in its title, rather than a biography of Tahsin Uzer. Therefore,
the thesis excluded the irrelevant parts and his missions after he left Macedonia.
97
In order to better understand the context of Tahsin Bey’s memoir, the second and
third chapters outlined the issues that shaped the memoir. The second chapter
focused on the general framework of the Macedonian Question. Different views of
scholars from different historiographies were compared. The chapter discussed how
“Macedonian Question” is described in different historiographies. The emergence
of the question and milestones were given. The significance of the Russo-Ottoman
War and the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin were underlined in terms of the
recognition of the problem as one of the urgent international questions in European
diplomacy. The following sections focused on major reasons created the problem by
comparing different views. Many scholars more or less agree upon that the influence
and intervention of the Great Powers played a key role in the emergence of the
Macedonian Question. The second reason is changing in socio-economic dynamics
both in the region and in the empire in general. Existent laws, regulations and
administration could not meet the requirements of the socio-economic changes.
Last section focused on the ethno-religious conflicts and their impacts in the region.
There are different opinions on the factors that played significant roles in the
emergence and development of the crisis. Comparing to different historiographies,
it is possible to infer that the ground for such a complicated issue was established
much earlier. The constant wars and defeats did not only disturb the peace in
the Balkans but also affected the economic situation with a heavy tax burden
in the region. These wars especially the ones with Russia and Austria had a
negative impact on the Ottoman economy in general. Expansionist and pan-Slavist
policies of Russia and competition with Austria in the Balkans influenced internal
developments. Ottoman administration could not meet the requirements of the
change in the socio-economic dynamics in the society in Macedonia. Corruption
in local government and abuse of privilege by the Greek Patriarchate made ethnic
differences more visible contributed to the situation and led to violence and terror
to reign the region in the following period. These changes cannot explain the whole
story of Macedonia. It is difficult to indicate a certain point on which one can
talk about the emergence of the Macedonian Question. Yet, it is well-known that
the crisis was accepted as one of the primary issues within the Eastern Question
and internationally recognized in Berlin Congress conveyed after the Ottoman
defeat to Russians. After this point, the term of Macedonia and the "Macedonian
Question" became one of the primary issues in European diplomacy. Irredentist
policies of other Balkan states especially Bulgaria which had to give Macedonia in
the Berlin Congress and interests of the Great Powers had the greatest impact on
the development and complication of the Macedonian Question and it could not be
98
solved until the First World War.
The third chapter primarily focused on the systematization of terror and the
emergence of the revolutionary organizations in Macedonia. Although there were
several movements and organizations operated in the region, due to the time period
and places that Tahsin Uzer covered in his memoir, the chapter mainly focused
on the Bulgaro-Macedonian movement and its revolutionary committees and their
guerilla activities. Different parties within this movement such as the Internal
Organization and The Supreme Committee, their differing ideas on the future
of Macedonia and impacts of Bulgaria on banditry were discussed. The section
also focused on the Ottoman administration and Muslims’ reaction. Ottoman
administration had to deal not only with the bandits on the field but also with
other Balkan states and the Great Powers. At that point, every response shown
by the military forces, or the Sublime Porte would be exposed to more pressure of
reforms and threat of war by other Balkan states and European powers. Although
the conflict of interests between different groups and states turned the situation in
favor of the Ottomans from time to time, the loss of the whole Macedonia and even
the Balkans was inevitable.
The fourth and fifth chapter focused on Tahsin Uzer and his memoir. The memoir
of Tahsin Bey with personal experience as well as critical analysis from a broader
perspective provides historians a better understanding of the local and rural life in
the regions and time of banditry in Macedonia got its peak, how socio-economic and
administrative problems fed and influenced banditry and providing critical outlook
on nationalist movements other than the romantic ones and showing that a personal
narrative which was not a mere story of a "great man" but the one who actively
fought against both banditry and problems of Ottoman administration, at the time
and region. A less studied memoir written by Tahsin Uzer did not only contributed
with the information on banditry and uprisings that Tahsin Bey witnessed, but
also provided another perspective of how a Young Turk administrator perceived the
banditry issues, insight of the administrative relations between the periphery and
the center of a collapsing empire. His psychological situation was rather difficult
to be analyzed but his profile and traumas could contribute to the analysis of his
ego. The way he emphasizes his illness and weak nature in his early life, in the
later parts of the memoir evolves him into both a physically and mentally strong
person and a leading figure whose decisions and actions change the course of history.
99
The study did not only focus on what incidents were covered by Tahsin Bey but how
his ego, personality, background, his persona in short affect the way he narrated
and justify his actions and ideas. To have a critical and cautious approach to the
memoir, the study compared some other memoirs. It can be inferred that some
aspects of Tahsin Bey’s memoir are not unique, but they are highly related to the
conditions of their time period and the intellectual persona that this period created.
Tahsin Bey was born in Thessaloniki, one of the important commercial, cultural
and political centers of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the education he received
at the Mülkiye Mektebi, the high intellectual level of this school and the Young
Turk movement that Tahsin Bey met while he was studying here, became a turning
point in terms of Tahsin Bey’s administrative life and shaped his worldview and
ideological identity to a great extent. These influences show their effect in Tahsin
Bey’s memoirs, as in many other intellectuals of the period who were brought up
in similar conditions in the same period.
However, there are some points to be careful while studying Tahsin Uzer’s memoir.
Lack of the original manuscript limits analysis on the memoir. Thus, If the original
manuscript or further details belonging to the memoir are discovered, a more
detailed and accurate analysis could be made and interpretations would not remain
as speculations. The researcher’s lack of access to the original writing creates
an obligation to examine the memoir by questioning its originality, authenticity
and credibility. Moreover, as noted in the discussion about the Malta Exile,
a significant part of the work was not published, that may have influenced his
perspective on the subjects he dealt with in the memoir. In addition, when the
parts examined in the memoir, the style changed in different parts and that the
narrator suddenly passes from Tahsin Bey to his son Celalettin Bey. Celalettin
Uzer, by interfering with the flow of the memoir in the parts he deems, makes
the audience question some details that may not be in the original memoir,
and supported the information given by his father by adding some documents.
These are the parts that the researcher could see. Yet, the rest of the memoir
should also be approached carefully and cautiously. The possibility that the
language, is simplified is an issue which Ali Birinci finds quite troublesome in
terms credibility, should be considered here as well. In the book named Famous
Governors, there are small word differences in the part taken from the memoirs
in Tahsin Uzer’s biography and in the printed memoirs. Although the actual
reason for these is unknown, considering that the famous Book of Governors was
published at an earlier date (1969), the slightest difference in this book, which is the
100
only source with which we can compare the language of the memoir, is important.298
Moreover, while reading Tahsin Bey’s memoir and trying to understand the Macedonian
problem through his lens, different aspects of Tahsin Bey’s identity should be
taken into account, and different regions, different conditions and traumas he lived
in until the Malta Exile, in which he wrote his memoir, should not be forgotten.
Tahsin Bey, as a Young Turk from Thessaloniki, who traces his paternal lineage to
Skenderbeg, carrierd hatred towards the Abdülhamid II and his regime, joined the
CUP, and was arrested and sent to Pürsiçan for exile. However, Tahsin Bey was
also a person who was strickly bounded to the Ottoman empire and represented
the state as the administrator of wherever he went. Abdülhamit Kırmızı states
that seeing identity and personality as an constant and concrete entity and not
being able to go beyond black and white makes it difficult to understand historical
figures.299 A statist point of view can be observed, no matter how hostile he may
be towards Abdülhamid II. The terms he uses for komitadjis are not different from
those used in official documents. Some of the words he used for the committees,
the regions where these committees were active such as “eşkıya, komitadji, cheta,
şekavet yuvası, mikrop yuvası,” are also seen in Ottoman documents.
In addition, while describing his first visit to Razlık, Tahsin Bey, who tries to
protect the rights of the villagers regardless of their nationality and religion and to
pursue a fair administration, states that the Razlık region is a place of revolution
and almost all the people are komitadji. Here, the language used for the non-Muslim
people of regions such as Pürsiçan, Çiç, Ağsutos is gone, and a more vengeful
language comes instead. “It was my greatest desire to show myself in this duty,
which was my first district governorship, to serve the country and especially to
take revenge on the cruel Bulgarians who wanted to destroy my country and who
shed Muslims blood in Macedonia at the first opportunity.”300 Abdülhamit Kırmızı,
while discussing the life of Ferid Pasa from Avlonya; states that the life stories of
imperial bureaucrats show how life unites different geographies in the best way. An
298“On bin nüfuslu 20 kadar karyenin (Köy) idaresini deruhde eylemiş olduğum zaman henüz 19 yaşımı
ikmal etmemiş, daha doğrusu tevellüdüm, 1294 Ağustos (1878)....Müdür olduktan yedi ay sonra Selaniğe
gitmiş, Mahkemeyi şeriyede ispatı rüşt ederek eyrramda bulunan parama ve çiftlikteki hisseme mutasarrıf
olmuşdum.” See: Orhun, Meşhur Valiler,515. “Nâhiye müdürü olmuş, devletin, milletin mukadderatına
karışmış, 10.000 nüfusun, yirmi kadar köyün yönetimini yüklendiğim gün( 5 Teşrinevvel 1313-5 Ekim
1897) henüz 19 yaşını ikmal etmemiş, daha doğrusu, dağum tarihim 1877 Ağustos olduğuna göre 19 yaşına
girmiştim. Buna ne hâcet, müdür olduktan 7 ay sonra Selânik’e gitmiş, Mahkemeyi Şer’iyyede, ispat-ı
rüşt ederek, eytamda bulunan 590 altınıma tasarruf etmiş ve amcamla annemin vasiliklerinden resmen
kurtularak, çiftliklteki evime ve hisseme sahip olmuştum.” See: Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 24.
299Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa, Bir Ömür Devlet (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınevi,2014), 448.
300Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi, 79.
101
Ottoman statesman who worked in different parts of the empire gets the view of
every town, city and province he worked in. It was a necessity to take into account
the space. He has to keep up with the spirit of the place and the conditions it
imposes and survive in these conditions.301
This effect is also seen in Tahsin Bey’s narrative in some other parts. In particular,
while describing his days in Kesendire, he mentions not only the Greeks in
Kesendire, but also the Peloponnese and Crete revolutions, and the results of these
revolutions. Moreover, he complains that the Greek armies occupied İzmir because
the state did not follow a correct and effective policy in these regions. It is seen in
these pages that; it is not only the 20-year-old Kızan Kaymakam Tahsin Bey who
narrates about the events in Razlık, Kesendire and Florina. It is the narrative of
a statesman and former deputy who struggled with komitadjis in different parts
of Macedonia for years, served in eastern provinces, experienced a world war,
witnessed the occupation of İzmir and was eventually arrested and exiled to Malta.
While trying to understand the Macedonian problem through Tahsin Bey’s eyes,
it is necessary to analyze his character, the city where he was born and grew up,
the education he received, the ideologies and movements of the period and the
social-political atmosphere of the Abülhamid II period. Apart from this, the date
and conditions in which the memoir was written should also be taken into account,
and it should not be forgotten that Tahsin Bey’s experience and traumas over the
years may have influenced the way he narrated the events he experienced years ago.
Discovery of the original manuscript or the unpublished second volume of Tahsin
Bey’s memoirs can affect the entire story. Moreover, a new memoir or a document
giving details of how neighboring provinces and their governors were dealing with
the same issues can enrich the literature in this field.
Lastly, the memoir of Tahsin Bey requires a more sophisticated, multifaceted and
comprehensive approach than taking it as a mere historical source or an ego document.
It may not be peculiar but a typical example of its age but maybe that’s s
why it is even more crucial to approach it as a sort of hybrid narrative in which one
could not only analyze it as an ego document but also have a better understanding
of how major tendencies, ideals, ideologies, political concerns, and milestones of the
latest period of the Ottoman history reflect onto a Young Turk intellectual’s life
story. It could be achieved by looking at the world trough Tahsin Bey’s perspective,
empathizing with him and his view of the late 19th century Macedonian villages,
301Kırmızı, Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa, 445.
102
bandits, Hamidian rule and all the paths that led the unpleasant end of the empire.
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
A) Archival Sources
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (BOA)
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DH.EUM.AYŞ., 59/ 61; DH.SAİD.d, 81/ 242; DH.MKT., 923/ 59; DH.MUİ., 113/
1
Fotoğraflar: FTG.f./168
İrade: Mabeyn-i Hümayın: İ.MBH, 2/ 88
Teftişat-ı Rumeli Evrakı: Sadaret Evrakı; Manastır Evrakı; Selanik Evrakı; Umum
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