391

T.C.
SAKARYA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
ORTADOĞU ENSTİTÜSÜ
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC ACTORS ON IRAQ’S FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION:
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The project would not have been possible without the support of Professor Tuncay Kardaş, my PhD supervisor. I am thankful for his unwavering patience and expert guidance throughout this journey. His indispensable support was instrumental in bringing this dissertation to fruition, and I am privileged to have worked under his watchful eye.
I would like to give special mention to Professor Kemal İnat, who provided continuous advice and support. Professor İnat offered invaluable expertise and guidance, and I am deeply grateful for the time and careful thought she gave to my project. In addition, I wish to thank my second supervisor, Professor Murat Yeşiltaş, whose insightful advice provided a critical alternative perspective on this study.
I want to express my deep gratitude to Professor Ali Balcı. His diligent mentorship, unwavering support, and exceptional academic guidance have been a constant source of inspiration, propelling this thesis over three years (as well as during the four years of my BA studies before that). Professor Balcı’s influence has given me the strength and confidence to persevere.
Writing this thesis would have been far less enjoyable without the following colleagues and friends at the Middle East İnstitute in Sakarya University who have made the project more bearable, including Dr. Mehmet Rakipoğlu, Dr. Talha İsmail Duman, Abdullah Said Özcan, Furkan Halit Yolcu, Menderes Kurt, Mustafa Onur Yalçın, among others.
This thesis would not have been possible without the direct support of my loving wife. Her encouragement, advice, and endless patience were valuable and deeply appreciated. During my PhD studies, new people entered my life: my daughter Hafsa and our newborn son, Musab. My wife and our children’s presence made my academic life most pleasant and cheerful, and my acknowledgment is unlimited.

Department: Middle East Studies
This thesis provides a theoretical explanation for Iraqi foreign policy from the 1950s to the late Cold War by analyzing the successive regimes’ attitudes to the selected cases in this period. The research examines the dynamics and patterns of Iraqi foreign policy through the systemic factors from the great and regional powers and the unit-level factors of the Iraqi foreign policy executive (FPE) and societal elites. The study focuses on four dimensions of Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Iraq – the international, regional, and domestic threat environment, the FPE’s structural autonomy, the foreign policy coalition between the FPE and domestic actors, and the domestic balance of political power. Employing these concepts, the study attempts to unearth how the interplay between the FPE and domestic societal elites produces Iraqi foreign policy behavior. The thesis relies on a methodological framework that includes process tracing, case study analysis, and analytical narrative. The research examines secondary source materials, encompassing empirical and theoretical literature, media sources, and think-tank reports.
This study presents five arguments. Firstly, in states whose domestic decision-making environments afford strong structural autonomy to FPEs, decision-makers can construct foreign security policies and neglect domestic opposition when the international environment poses a threat to their survival. Secondly, in high-threat international environments and domestic ambiguity, whose risks to the state and its survival are paramount to the FPE, decision-makers utilize foreign policy to reverse societal groups’ challenge to their rule. The rivalry between Iraq and Egypt destroyed Qasim’s credibility, and opposition from societal groups pushed him to invade Kuwait to secure his regime. Thirdly, societal elites urge the FPE to identify shifts in the global or regional balance of power to strengthen their positions in the domestic balance of political power. Fourthly, the FPE makes concessions to societal elites in an environment where international threats and domestic ambiguity are low. Nasserism, Arab nationalism, and anti-Israel sentiments caused President Arif with weak structural autonomy to participate in the 1967 Arab Israeli War. Finally, when identifying specific components of the rising state’s power as a threat to the national interest in the high-threat environment, the FPE with strong structural autonomy in domestic certainty neglects and intimidates societal elites who have a different “evoked set” of concerns related to the ascending foreign power.
Key Words: Iraq, Neoclassical Realism, Structural Autonomy, Foreign Policy Executive, Domestic Actors
IV
ÖZET
Sakarya Üniversitesi, Ortadoğu Enstitüsü
Doktora Tez Özeti
Tezin Başlığı: Irak’ın Dış Politika Yapımında İç Aktörlerin Etkisi: Yapısal Özerklik, Dış Politika Koalisyonu ve İç Siyaset Güç Dengesi
Tezin Yazarı: Fatih Oğuzhan İpek Danışman: Prof. Dr. Tuncay Kardaş
Kabul Tarihi: 24/11/2023 Sayfa Sayısı: 12 (ön kısım) + 224 (tez)
Anabilim Dalı: Ortadoğu Çalışmaları
Bu tez, 1950’lerden Soğuk Savaş’ın sonlarına kadar Irak dış politikasına yönelik teorik bir açıklama sunmakta ve bu dönemde birbirini takip eden rejimlerin seçilmiş vakalara yönelik tutumunu analiz etmektedir. Araştırma, Irak dış politikasının dinamiklerini, küresel ve bölgesel güçlerden gelen sistemik faktörler ve Irak dış politika ricali ve toplumsal elitler üzerindeki birim düzeyindeki faktörler aracılığıyla incelemektedir. Çalışma, Irak'ta dış politika karar alma sürecinin dört boyutuna odaklanıyor: uluslararası, bölgesel ve ülke içi tehdit ortamı, dış politika ricalinin yapısal özerkliği, dış politika ricali ile ülke içi aktörler arasındaki dış politika davranışına dair koalisyonun oluşması ya da oluşmaması ve ülke içi siyasi güç dengesi. Bu kavramları kullanan çalışma, dış politika ricali ile toplumsal elit liderleri arasındaki etkileşimin Irak'ın dış politika davranışını nasıl ürettiğini ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Tez, süreç izlemeyi, örnek olay analizini ve analitik anlatıyı içeren metodolojik bir çerçeveye dayanmaktadır. Araştırma ampirik ve teorik literatürü, medya kaynaklarını ve düşünce kuruluşu raporlarını kapsayan ikincil kaynak materyallerin incelenmesine dayanmaktadır.
Bu çalışma beş argüman sunmaktadır. İlk olarak, ülke içi karar alma ortamlarının dış politika ricallerine güçlü yapısal özerklik sağladığı devletlerde, uluslararası ortam varoluşsal bir tehdit oluşturduğunda karar vericiler kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda dış güvenlik politikaları oluşturarak iç muhalefeti görmezden gelebilirler. İkinci olarak, devlete yönelik risklerin dış politika ricali için çok önemli olduğu yüksek tehdit içeren uluslararası ortamlarda ve ülke içi belirsizliklerde, karar vericiler toplumsal grupların kendi yönetimlerine karşı meydan okumasını tersine çevirmek için dış politikayı kullanmasıdır. Irak ile Mısır arasındaki rekabetten ötürü ülke içinde ve dışında prestiji sarsılan Kasım, rejimini güvence altına almak için Kuveyt’i işgal etmeye teşebbüs etti. Üçüncüsü, toplumsal elitler iç siyasi güç dengesindeki konumlarını güçlendirmek için küresel veya bölgesel krizlere dış politika ricalinin müdahil olması peşindedir. Dördüncüsü, dış politika ricali, uluslararası tehditlerin ve iç siyasi belirsizliğin düşük olduğu ortamda toplumsal elitlere taviz vermektedir. Arap milliyetçiliği ve İsrail karşıtı duygular, zayıf yapısal özerkliğe sahip Başkan Arif'in 1967 Arap İsrail Savaşı’na katılmasına neden oldu. Son olarak, yüksek tehdit ortamında yükselen devletin gücünün belirli bileşenlerini ulusal çıkarlara tehdit olarak tanımlayan dış politika ricali, iç siyasi belirsizlik olmasa da güçlü yapısal özerkliği varsa, toplumsal elitleri görmezden gelmekte ve sindirmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, Neoklasik Realizm, Yapısal Özerklik, Dış Politika Ricali, İç Aktörler
V
CONTENTS
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................. I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... II
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. III
ÖZET ............................................................................................................................. IV
CONTENTS .................................................................................................................... V
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF MAPS ............................................................................................................ IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ X
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
1. CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE .... 37
1.1. The Insufficiency of the Rational Actor Model and Liberal Innenpolitik Theory37
1.2. Neoclassical Realism ............................................................................................40
1.3. Variations of Neoclassical Realism ......................................................................47
1.4. Threat Identification Model of Type II Neoclassical Realism .............................60
1.5. Strategic Adjustment Model of Type II Neoclassical Realism ............................66
2. CHAPTER TWO: THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF THE IRAQI MONARCHICAL REGIME (1952-1958) TOWARD THE BAGHDAD PACT ..... 70
2.1. The Domestic Decision-Making Environment of the Hashemite Monarchy .......70
2.2. Penetration of Great Powers into the Regional Sub-system and Structural Autonomy of the FPE ..................................................................................................74
2.3. Regional Polarization in the Shade of Two Arab Nationalism Tenets .................80
3. CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN POLICY FORMUALTION OF “REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ” (1958-1963) OVER THE KUWAIT AFFAIR ......... 96
3.1. Ambiguity in the Domestic Policy Environment: The Revolutionary Forces in Disarray .......................................................................................................................96
VI
3.2. The Reorientation of Iraqi Foreign Policy ..........................................................101
3.3. The Kuwait Venture: Inefficient Threat Assessment and Counterbalancing .....115
4. CHAPTER FOUR: IRAQ’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AT ARIF BROTHERS’ RULE ...................................................... 123
4.1. Ambiguity in the Domestic Policy Environment: The Kurdish Rebellion and Competition between Nasserists and Ba’athists ........................................................123
4.2. Unity Efforts with Egypt in pursuit of Strong Structural Autonomy .................128
4.3. Towards the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Domestic Actors on the Stage .................135
5. CHAPTER FIVE: SADDAM HUSSEIN’S MOMENT AT IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY ........................................................................................................................ 142
5.1. The Domestic Decision-Making Environment of the Saddam Hussein regime .142
5.2. Highly Structural Autonomy, the 1973 Oil Embargo, and Rapprochement with the Western Powers .........................................................................................................148
5.3. Towards the War against Iran in High-Threat Environment and Certainty in the Domestic Circumstance .............................................................................................157
6. CHAPTER SIX: IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: ACTORS, PATTERNS, STRUCTURES ............................................................................................................ 164
6.1. Actors..................................................................................................................164
6.2. Patterns ...............................................................................................................167
6.3. Structures ............................................................................................................177
7. CHAPTER SEVEN: FUTURE PROSPECT: IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY TODAY ......................................................................................................................... 184
8. CONCLUSION: YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW ................................. 193
8.1. Research Methodology, the Main Findings, and Arguments .............................193
8.2. Contribution to the Field.....................................................................................200
8.3. Possible Avenues of Future Research ................................................................203
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 205
VII
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Four Theories of Foreign Policy………………………………………………41
Table 2: Classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism………………………45
Table 3: Examples of Polarity and the Nature of Strategic Environments……………..55
Table 4: A Complex Threat Identification Model………………………………………62
Table 5: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment………………………………………….68
Table 6: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment in the Monarchical Period led by Prime Minister Nuri……………………………………………………………………………78
Table 7: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the Monarchical period led by Prime Minister Nuri……………………………………………………………………………87
Table 8: Oil Revenues in the Middle East, 1951-58 (millions of dollars)………………92
Table 9: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment during the Tenure of the Qasim Regime………………………………………………………………………………...112
Table 10: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the Qasim Regime…………………..115
Table 11: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment during the Tenure of the Arif Brothers’ Regime………………………………………………………………………………...130
Table 12: Military expenditures as a percentage of GNP before and after the Six-Day War……………………………………………………………………………………138
Table 13: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the period of the Arif Brothers’ Regime………………………………………………………………………………...139
Table 14: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the period of the Ba’ath Regime……144
Table 15: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment in the period of the Ba’ath Regime…145
Table 16: Oil Revenues of the Gulf states, 1969–1978 (billions of US dollars)………149
Table 17: Crude Oil Production and Export, 1976–1997 (millions of barrels per day)……………………………………………………………………………………150
Table 18: Iraqi Imports for the Years 1974-1981 (in $ million)………………………155
Table 19: Iraqi Exports for the Years 1974-1981 (in $ million)………………………156
VIII
Table 20: Middle East Alliances, 1958-1961………………………………………….168
Table 21: Actors, Patterns, and Structures in Iraqi Foreign Policy Making…………..178
IX
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1: The Fertile Crescent, 2500 B.C. ………………………………………………..81
X
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AU : African Union
CUP : Constitutional Union Party
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
CENTO : Central Treaty Organization
DSG : US Defense Strategic Guidance
DAESH : Ed-Devletü’l-İslâmiyye fi’l-Irak ve’ş-Şam
FPE : Foreign Policy Executives
FDIB : Foreign, Defense, and Intelligence Bureaucracy
FPDM : Foreign Policy Decision Making
GCC : Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
IOCs : International oil companies
ICP : Iraqi Communist Party
IPC : Iraqi Petroleum Company
INOC : Iraqi National Oil Company
KDP : Kurdistan Democratic Party
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRC : National Council of the Revolutionary Command
NCR : Neoclassical realism
NDP : National Democratic Party
OPEC : Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRF : Popular Resistance Forces
PUK : Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RCC : Revolutionary Command Council
XI
SOEs : State-owned enterprises
SCIRI : Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SEATO : Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SOL : State of Law
US : United States
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UNSC : United Nations Security Council
1
INTRODUCTION
Defining the Puzzle, Research Question, Arguments
In 1954, the Minister of Finance, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Uzri, introduced fairer land distribution among the sheiks and peasants in Iraq. The sheiks had parliamentary representation, which in the 1950s never fell under 35 percent, and used this to their advantage in legislation. When the sheiks sabotaged property taxes and land reform through their presence in Parliament and close relationship with the ruling elite, several parliamentarians urged Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah to intervene on this issue on their behalf.1 The prince, however, took the sheiks’ side by stating to al-Uzri that alienating the sheiks would disturb “public interest,” as he believed that they presented a crucial pillar of political order “to stop the revolutionary tides that threaten the security and stability of the country.”2 Nonetheless, suspending the proposed bill alienated a broader social milieu, the urban middle class.3 As early as 1943, the British Ambassador to Iraq alerted Iraq’s Prince Abd al-Ilah to the stagnation of the ruling elite. The Iraqi ruling elite and its societal elites, the sheiks, tied their survival to Britain’s goodwill, culminating in the formation of a Western security organization, the Baghdad Pact. As the ambassador warned, peoples’ discontent in Iraq took violent forms a decade and a half later, stirring up revolutionary tide in 1958.4
This episode raises a significant puzzle for International Relations: under which internal and external political conditions do domestic actors shape foreign policy making? In particular, what motivated the Iraqi ruling elite to engage in the Baghdad Pact as a defensive alliance in the Middle East? Scholars base Iraq’s engagement in the pact on its regional security needs against the USSR. They also base it on the Iraqi leadership’s willingness to use the pact as leverage in the relations with Britain.5 This explanation neglects how international systemic pressures were filtered through Iraq’s domestic
1 Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp.151-52.
2 'Abd al-Karim Al-Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-'Iraq, 1930–1958, Beirut: Markaz al-Abjadiya, 1982, pp.454-57.
3 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.152-53.
4 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.150.
5 Charles Tripp, “Iraq,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shalim, Oxford: Oxford Univerty Press, 2003, pp.201.
2
political power balance. This debate also explains why the new established revolutionary regime in Iraq procrastinated in ending Iraq’s membership in the pact for nearly a year.
Regarding the puzzle, Neoclassical Realism (NCR), first proposed by Gideon Rose,6 suggests thoroughly analyzing the domestic decision-making environment embedded in a broader domestic political struggle. The critical concept to tell us about the decision-making environment is the structural autonomy of Foreign Policy Executives (FPE). Structural autonomy means FPE insulation from domestic political groups in foreign policy making. While weak executives have difficulty following an autonomous foreign policy, strong executives can pursue their policies even when faced with strong opposition.7
The Hashemite monarchy’s ruling circle comprised the leaders of tribes and other feudal lords, along with Britain and the old politicians responsible for cementing and enhancing the sheiks’ economic power.8 While Iraq experienced successive unstable governments, Nuri al-Said, the strongest stateman of the ruling circle, remained influential behind the scenes in domestic politics.9 In the regional environment, the Arab neutralist regional order replaced the Western-aligned “order of notables.” This systemic shift revealed the rise of the Westernized middle stratum to the detriment of notable classes in the pivotal Arab powers of Iraq, among others.10 In the domestic balance of political power, the Communists, the Arab nationalists, and the Kurds were among the societal groups opposing the monarchy’s foreign and domestic policy. Arab nationalists were in touch with Iraqi Army officers and divided into right and left wings. The Kurds also teamed up with the Communists and the Arab nationalists to gain local autonomy in Northern Iraq. In the first case, Arab nationalism threatens the survival of the Iraqi ruling elite, and their structural autonomy allowed Iraq to join a Western-security alignment. Thereon, the thesis argues (A1) that in states whose domestic decision-making environments afford strong structural autonomy to FPEs, decision-makers can construct foreign security
6 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol.51, No.1, 1998, pp.167.
7 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp.78.
8 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.151-52.
9 “ الصندوق الأسود: فائق الشيخ علي - الحلقة 4 ,” Youtube, 24 April, 2021, https://youtu.be/NKI-QKWVDRg.
10 Ewan Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp.54.
3
policies and neglect domestic opposition when the international environment poses a threat (here, Arab nationalism) to their survival.
In the second event, Iraqi President Abd al-Karim Qasim ordered the Iraqi military to mobilize to the Kuwaiti border after six days. Britain recognized Kuwait’s independence on June 19, 1961.11 In the 1960s, Egypt led by Nasser dominated the fragmented Arab system in which Arab rulers avoided forging an anti-UAR grouping for fear of isolation.12 In Iraqi politics, revolutionary forces were in disarray. At the same time, Iraqi communists backed the Qasim regime. Nasserists, Ba’athists, and Kurds censured the Iraqi regime’s domestic and foreign policy, causing isolation in the region. There was no military threat. The commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Air Force told the Air Force Colonel, “Don’t take notice of this madman [Qasim]. You think the English would just let us walk into Kuwait?”13 Iraq’s possible intervention in Kuwait propelled British troops to pour into Kuwait at Kuwait’s request on July 1.14 This episode also raises the puzzle of foreign policy decision-making, especially Iraqi foreign policy: Why did Iraqi President Qasim attempt to annex Kuwait instead of meeting them halfway?
Iraqi President Qasim prevented the Arab unity tide into Iraq during his five-year rule and emphasized Iraq’s sovereignty and national interests.15 He arranged a marriage of convenience with Iraqi communists to ward off pro-Nasser elements from seizing power.16 On the other side of the coin, the Kurdish forces clashed with the government forces after Qasim did not grant a semi-autonomous governance in northern Iraq, the Nasserists maintained cordial relations with Nasser’s Egypt, and the Ba’athists preferred to close the Syrian branch of the Ba’ath Party. At the international and regional level, Qasim reoriented Iraq’s foreign policy by withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact and
11 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.158-59.
12 Elie Podeh, “'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.14, No.1, 2003, pp.104.
13 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, pp.228.
14 The Gulf countries sought the external protection from the Great Britain before the U.S. Interview with Ali Bakeer, Assoc. Prof., about “Gulf Countries’ policies toward Iraq,” Doha, Qatar: April 7, 2022; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.228.
15 Adeed Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, edited by Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.126-27.
16 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp. 174.
4
forming ties with the USSR.17 Relations between Baghdad and Moscow remained cool owing to the crackdown on the Iraqi communists. Since the Eisenhower administration was trying to prevent further Soviet invasion of the Middle East, Qasim avoided alienating the Western countries.18 The Qasim regime reaped the fruits of a neutralist Iraq policy by receiving Britain’s political and military support until Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait.
The rivalry between Iraq and Egypt and Iraq’s regional isolation narrowed and delimited Iraq’s ability to shape regional politics. The opposition of societal groups to Qasim’s domestic and foreign policy led him to seize the opportunity of independence of Kuwait instead of placating the societal groups. Notwithstanding the two coup attempts and war with the Kurds, Iraqi President Qasim was willing to sustain his regime by putting domestic actors off their stride. In light of this backdrop, the thesis (A2) contends that in highly-threat international environments and domestic ambiguity whose risk to the state is paramount to its survival, decision-makers use foreign policy to reverse societal groups' challenges to their rule.
The third event of this thesis examines the Arif brothers’ regime that witnessed the fall of several governments. When President Arif did not agree on a single candidate to head a coalition government, President Arif finally appointed himself then-Prime Minister on 10 May. President Arif, more interested in domestic than foreign affairs, was caught up in an unexpected crisis after ending a war with the Kurds that drained the country’s treasury: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Iraq was reluctant to participate in other Arab forces, though it enjoyed a high reputation in the Arab world for military efficiency and experience. Arif, while not ripping up the Egypt agreement, had dispatched a small force.19 Iraq’s decision to engage in the war poses a puzzling question of how Arab nationalist forces drew Iraq into the vortex of the war. The thesis argues (A3) that societal elites urge the FPE to identify shifts in the global or regional balance of power to strengthen their positions in the domestic balance of political power. Additionally, the thesis argues (A4) that the FPE
17 Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 79; Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder: Westview Press, 2012, pp.93.
18 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.107-08.
19 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.289-91.
5
makes concessions to societal elites in an environment where there is low international threat and domestic ambiguity are present.
After the Ba’athist government, Ba’athist groups were divided into three groups. Arif's commitment to Arab unity with Egypt alienated Kurdish leadership and Shiite circles and associations in Iraq. These influences Arif could not reduce.20 The Kurds started clashing again in April 1965 and consolidated their de facto autonomy.21 Saudi Arabia opposed the Egyptian drive for mastery of the Arab world by keeping the US at arm’s length.22 The isolation of Egypt from mainstream Arab politics prompted Nasser to accuse Saudi Arabia and Jordan of conspiring and financing the sabotage of his union with Syria.23 The Arif brothers had no social base in the country except the Nasserists. The Arif brothers remained on a collision course with Nasserist officers and ministers who sought public control over foreign trade. This was during oil negotiations with the IPC.24 Iraq ceased unity plans with Egypt, partly because Egyptian President Nasser was unwilling to deal with Iraq’s domestic challenges. Iraq’s top security agenda included the Kurds, Iran, and Syria, not Israel. Consequently, the second Arif regime possessed a low level of structural autonomy. Nasserism and Arab nationalism regionally (independent variable) and domestic anti-Israel sentiments (intervening variable) forced President Arif to participate
20 Pierre-Jean Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movement in Iraq, London: Saqi Books, 2002, pp.94; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.172-74; Sherko Kirmanj, “The Clash of Identities in Iraq,” in Iraq Between Occupations Perspectives from 1920 to the Present, edited by Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp.50.
21 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.128-29; Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, London: Oxford University Press, 1967. The June 1966 Accord can be found in Khadduri. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.274-76.
22 A. Fawaz Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, Boulder, Colorada: Westview Press, 1994, pp.152-53.
23 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.150.
24 Phebe Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?,” in Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present, edited by Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeided, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp.25-26; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.243-44; Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, pp.1032-34; Majid Khadduri, “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait,” Current History, Vol.52, No.306, 1967, pp.87; Edith Tilton Penrose and Ernest Francis Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, London: Ernest Benn, 1978, pp.381-88.
6
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.25 The failure of the Arab countries in the war led to the decline of Arab nationalism and the fall of the Arif brothers’ regime.
The Iran-Iraq War, the third case, did not end with a return to the status quo before the war. It caused around 400,000 deaths, costing hundreds of billions of dollars in destruction and loss of revenue. The war not only consolidated the Iranian Revolution but also shaped the strategic landscape of the Persian Gulf, leading directly to the 1990 Gulf War.26 This incident begs the question of why Saddam Hussein waged war on revolutionary Iran. Scholars make two predominant arguments for Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980. One argument is that Saddam struck Iran for geopolitical gain. Another is that Saddam saw war as a means to neutralize the promoting effect of the Islamic revolution on Iraq’s restless Shi’a majority. Some scholars have been content with one factor or the other,27 while others have ascribed both motivations to Saddam’s decision to invade Iran.28 In lieu of these answers, the thesis argues (A5) that when identifying specific components of the rising state’s power as a threat to the national interest in the high-threat environment, the FPE with strong structural autonomy in domestic certainty neglects and intimidates societal elites who have a different “evoked set” of concerns related to the ascending foreign power. The Iranian revolution opened an opportunity for Saddam, who enjoyed highly structural autonomy in the high-threat
25 It is noteworth that the wave of Arab nationalism contributed into the overthrown of Iraqi monarchy, which had been “the bastion of Western influence in the area.” Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” pp.126-27.
26 Chad E. Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol.72, No.2, 2018, pp.246.
27 For accounts that underline the geopolical gain, see Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.180-82; Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp.262-76; Andrew T. Parasiliti, “The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: a Power Cycle Assessment,” International Political Science Review, Vol.24, No. 1, 2003. For those that stress domestic threat to Iraq, see F. Gregory Gause, “Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” Middle East Journal, Vol.56, No.1, 2002, pp.63-69; Efraim Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Journal, Vol.44, No.2, 1990; William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press, 2013, pp.405-06; Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.63-64.
28 For example, see Hal Brands, “Why Did Saddam Invade Iran? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor,” The Journal of Military History, Vol.75, No.3, 2011; Shaul Bakhash, “The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq, 1930–1980,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004, pp.21-22; W. Thom Workman, The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, Boulder: CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp.31-33; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, pp.62-69.
7
international environment, to bring Khomeini to his knees and cease his support for the Kurds and the Islamic Shi’ite groups.
The Iranian threat emerging from the Shatt al-Arab waterway and domestic instability (the renewal of the Kurdish rebellion) led the regime to turn to the Soviet bloc as a counterweight to Iran regionally and the Kurds internally. Iraq under Saddam Hussein played a leadership role in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israel settlement. Additionally, Saddam put aside his rift with the Gulf countries and forged ties with Western countries. Soaring oil prices due to the 1973 oil embargo provided Iraqi leadership with high structural autonomy in the domestic environment. Saddam expelled Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, and cracked down on the Iraqi Communists. This earned him credit in Western capitals.29 The Kurds, the Iraqi Communists, and the Shi’i Islamist groups were among the societal groups made up of outward-oriented internationalists. The Kurds continued to receive assistance from Israel, Syria, and revolutionary Iran. From Saddam’s perspective, the Iranian revolution encouraged Shi’ite Islamic groups to topple the Saddam regime, too.
This thesis aims to explain Iraqi foreign policy patterns through the systemic factors from great and regional powers and the unit-level factors of Iraq’s FPE and societal elites. It rejects a traditional unit-level understanding of foreign policy, which overemphasizes the role of domestic structure in Foreign Policy Decision Making (hereafter FPDM). To the contrary, this thesis utilizes the NCR to demonstrate three levels of analysis: international, regional, and domestic. The NCR assumes that international systemic pressures on the states must be filtered through intervening variables at the unit level, such as the FPE and societal elites/domestic actors. Applying the NCR as a theoretical framework helps us shape ample empirical data into a logically coherent whole. Remarkably, the study seeks to delimit scope of the NCR. The threat identification model assumes that the FPE, at the intersection of international and domestic politics, forges and sustains a foreign policy coalition with different societal leaders. The strategic adjustment model suggests that domestic actors with sufficient power to remove the FPE from power and obstruct the
29 Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, London: Bloomsbury Publising, 2001, pp.163.
8
government’s goals can have a meaningful impact on foreign and national policies when the state settles into a security-abundant environment.
After laying out the puzzle, research questions, and arguments, the thesis discusses its contribution to our understanding of Iraqi foreign policy. It lies at the intersection of Iraqi politics, Middle East politics, diplomatic history, and foreign policy analysis. The thesis will depict and analyze Iraqi foreign policy behavior during forty years of its political history with respect to the underexplored impact of domestic actors on its foreign policy. It outlines the shifts in Iraq’s external environment and the domestic balance of political power in its internal environment, which reveal the causal mechanism of Iraq’s FPDM. The Baghdad Pact, its neighbor Kuwait’s independence, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and Iraq’s war against Iran are key cases in Iraq’s foreign policy and diplomatic history. Understanding the role of these events is overarching from an empirical and policy standpoint. It offers academic and policy insight into international changes and domestic political transformations. International changes impact the Iraqi regional environment; thus, the interplay between the Iraqi regional environment and Iraq’s domestic political setting makes sense for Iraqi foreign policy behavior. For neoclassical realism, the FPE exists at the intersection of the international, regional, and domestic environment from which threats can emanate. For example, leaders can act internationally for domestic or international purposes.30
The research method of this study is process tracing. It is “an analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic evidence.”31 It allows the scholar to examine and assess specific causal mechanisms within a particular foreign policy's formulation, development, and evolution within a specific period. The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process (the causal chain and causal mechanism) between an independent variable/s and the outcome of the dependent variable.32 Broadly speaking, process tracing includes four stages: (a) identifying political
30 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.43.
31 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol.44, No.4, 2011, pp.824.
32 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004, pp.5.
9
and social phenomena and describing them; (b) reviewing previous explanatory hypotheses, exploring new hypotheses, and assessing these new causal claims; (c) gaining insight into causal mechanisms; and (d) bestowing with an alternative means.33 This study utilizes the analytical explanation variety of process tracing, in which a historical account is adapted into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.”
The study contributes to neoclassical realism literature, in which Western case studies dominate, and Iraqi foreign policy literature, discussed without theoretical approach. There is still an under exploration of non-Western states in neoclassical realism. It is the first study to analyze Iraqi foreign policy making through the lens of the NCR. As noted below, the research offers a fourth scenario for the threat assessment model of the neoclassical realism. The scarcity of studies discussing Middle Eastern states’ foreign policy decision-making increases its importance. This study considers Iraqi politics and society polarized. Its historical and contemporary periods have several characteristics in common ethnic and sectarian divisions, external intervention, and internal identity groups pursuing multiple foreign policies. It consists of four cases: the introduction of the 1955 Baghdad Pact, Iraq’s claim to Kuwait, Iraq’s engagement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and Iraq’s decision to go to war against Iran. These events brought about shifts in Iraqi domestic politics. The study will look at books, reports, statements, and press releases in English and Arabic languages to explore Iraqi foreign policy dynamics at systemic and unit levels. The study uses extensive literature on Iraqi foreign policy formation, great power relations with the Middle East, and the literature on the politics and international relations of the Middle East. Additionally, the author conducted a series of interviews in early 2022 with senior fellows on the Middle East in Qatar. Finally, it draws on the Foreign Relations of the United States Series published by the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State.
Survey of Existing Literature and its Themes
Historians and political analysts of modern Iraq emphasize two structures of Iraq’s foreign policy. On the one hand, foreign powers’ invention of the state, its exposure to external intervention, and the foreign policy constraints imposed by its domestic power structure dissension. Other writers focused on Iraq's domestic conditions and its dependence on
33 Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” pp.824.
10
regime control for foreign policy. These writers argue that Iraq must perpetually balance its necessity for outside protection or support against its need for domestic stability.34 By focusing on the relationship between identity and foreign policy, Added Dawisha asserts that identity (independent variable) produces a particular foreign policy behavior (dependent variable). Thus, he considers a set of perceptions decision-makers have of the environment as intervening variables. The existence of competing subnational, national, and supranational identities enabled the ruling elites to define and redefine the country’s identity according to their interests.35
For another explanation of the state level, Charles Tripp analyzes Iraqi foreign policy under Saddam Hussein. Tripp says it is essential to understand the degree to which Iraqi foreign policy was shaped both by the constraints under which Iraqi decision-makers operated and by the choices that their cognitive environment presented to them. Iraqi foreign policy is the interactions between regional opportunities and domestic actors’ imaginative place in their state in the region.36 Tripp asserts that three aspects of the Iraqi state determine Iraqi foreign policy. A vital aspect of the Iraqi state as a contentious project is the unresolved question of Iraq’s identity as a political community. Defining Iraqi identity was not a consensus among the population, which led to conflict throughout the country. Therefore, the Iraqi state remains “a terrain of contestation.” Second, geopolitics is a foreign policy determinant since Iraq was in existential insecurity, especially over its territorial integrity. Finally, Iraq’s aspiration for economic sovereignty is a foreign policy determinant since Iraq’s economy rested upon agriculture and oil and, thus, on Western economies.37
Focusing on state projects, Marr states that three themes have existed continually in Iraq’s foreign policy since 1945. The first has been the “nation-state” project since Iraq’s formation in 1921. Iraq’s leaders imagined Iraq as part of a larger Arab “nation.” The issue of Kurdish identity poses a linguistic and ethnic challenge to the “nation-state”
34 Phebe Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.181-82.
35 Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” pp.117.
36 Charles Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp.167-68.
37 Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” pp.168-71.
11
project as the ties between the Shi’a Arab population and revolutionary Iran did. The second theme is the desire for insulation from great power intervention. The third theme is the role of geography that constrains (border problems and limited access to the Gulf) and provides opportunities (ample resources). These themes were stable factors in Iraq’s foreign policy.38 Some studies offer descriptive research on Iraq’s foreign policy behavior towards the Arab region, including the Iraqi government’s involvement in the Palestinian problem. These studies are determined by geography, population, economic and military capacities, and political and social structure.39 By explaining the constant hostility between Syria and Iraq, Amjed Rasheed argues that pan-Arabism played a secondary role in the conflict between Syria and Iraq. Rather, Rasheed maintains that the geopolitical realities of the two countries and the resemblance of the belief systems of the two presidents played a determining role in Syria-Iraqi hostile relations.40
There are several studies regarding Iraq’s foreign policy decision-making. In analyzing Iraq’s foreign policymaking during the Second Gulf War, Mahmoud Mohamedou concludes that state building and regime security concerns affected Iraq’s foreign policy decisions.41 Gamal Soltan seeks to explain the discrepancy between Saddam Hussein’s rigid behavior during the Gulf crisis and his pragmatic decision-making style in the past. Soltan contends that crisis-induced stress diminished Saddam’s ability to process
38 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” pp.182-86.
39 Alberto Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” in Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies. The Relationship with Europe, edited by Gerd Nonneman, London: Routledge, 2005, pp.123-24; Ahmad Yousef Ahmad, “The Dialectics of Domestic Environment and Role Performance: The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” in The Foreign Policies Of Arab States. The Challenge Of Change, edited by Bahgat Korany and Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki, Oxon: Routledge, 2019, pp.186-215; Mohammed Soffar, “Foreign policy under occupation: Does Iraq need a foreign policy?,” in The Foreign Policies of Arab States. The Challenge of Globalization, edited by Bahgat Korany and Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008, pp.220-21, 25; Mahboob Alam, ”Iraqi Foreign Policy,” (Doctoral Dissertation), New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995; Elfatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam, “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Northwestern University, 1984; Sami A. H. Al-Kaisi, “Palestine and Iraqi Foreign Policy 1936-1958,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Baghdad, 1983; Mohammed Mughisuddin, “Foreign Policy Formulation in Egypt and Iraq: A Comparative Study (1968-1975),” (Doctoral Dissertation), The American University, 1975.
40 Amjed M. Rasheed, “Syro-Iraqi Relations: The Puzzle of the Perpetual Rivalry,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Durham, 2017.
41 Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, “State-Building and Regime Security: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Making During the Second Gulf War,” (Doctoral Dissertation), The City University of New York, 1996.
12
information and allowed his personality traits to influence his choices more.42 Shak B. Hanish investigates the decisions behind the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 from a classical realist perspective. Hanish points to the role of domestic policy, ideology, the type of political system, and the psychology of the leader in the decision to invade Kuwait.43 Moreover, Musallam Musallam examines the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait using three levels of analysis or “images” as Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War. Musallam evaluates the causal roles of (1) Saddam Hussein the man, (2) the state of Iraq, and (3) the formal anarchy of the post-Cold War international system as it affected the Gulf region.44
Speaking of Iraqi foreign policy literature following the US invasion of Iraq, Amena al-Ellam discusses the relationship between foreign policy and political identity, particularly sectarian and ethnic identity, and asks why Iraqi foreign policy in post-US occupation instrumentalizes sectarian and ethnic identity. Al-Ellam contends that pro-ethnic and sectarian foreign policy boosts the regime’s survival domestically amid internal division and fragmentation and gives the regime regional legitimacy.45 Nussaibah Younis examines the impact of state weakness on Iraqi foreign policy since the US invasion. Drawing on the concept of the social contract in political theory, Younis seeks to disentangle the relationship between state legitimacy, violence, and foreign policy.46 Adham Sauli argues that the political struggles inherent in the state-making process, geopolitical position, and international system affect Iraqi foreign policy. Firstly, domestic struggles of political dominance and resistance caused multiple foreign policies. Secondly, Iraq’s geopolitical location and regional rivalry influence Iraq’s foreign policy behavior. Thirdly, the international system’s configuration shapes domestic actors’
42 Gamal Soltan, “Decision Making Under Stress: A Case Study of the Iraqi Behavior During the Gulf Crisis” (Doctoral Dissertation), Northern Illinois University, 1995.
43 Shak B. Hanish, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: A Realist Interpretation,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Northern Arizona University, 1998.
44 Musallam A. Musallam, “The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: A theoretical explanation” (Doctoral Dissertation), Georgetown University, 1994.
45 Amena M. A. Al-Ellam, “Iraqi Foreign Policy and Ethnic-Sectarian Political Identity Since 2003,” (Master's Degree), İstanbul Şehir University, 2019.
46 Younis Nussaibah, “How Conditions of State Weakness Have Influenced Iraqi Foreign Policy Production 2003-2013,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Durham, 2014.
13
behavior by providing opportunities and constraints.47 Because of Iraq’s fragmented domestic politics, domestic actors take advantage of regional developments to strengthen or change their domestic positions. Additionally, fragmented domestic politics caused Iraq to become an area of conflict for international and regional actors. Saouli concludes that the broader the regional polarization, the more fragmented Iraq’s foreign policy would.48
Neoclassical Realism Literature
Gideon Rose shows that NCR literature dates back to the 1980s when the first wave of the theory came; Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and Michael Mandelbaum regarded relative power as the ordering principle for impressive studies of international politics for several centuries.49 The second wave, consisting of studies by Aaron L. Friedberg and Melvyn P. Leffler, observes how a shift in relative power causes a change in foreign policy.50 Fareed Zakaria and Aaron Friedberg examine how variation in extractive and mobilization capability influences grand strategic adjustment. Zakaria explains why the United States did not expand abroad more rapidly between 1865 and 1899 but grew rapidly between 1899 and 1908.51 Zakaria contends that American external behavior stems from national decision-makers’ tendency to use the means at their disposal.
Zakaria states, “What matters is state power, not national power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends.”52 Friedberg explains the United States’ balancing strategies at the dawn of the Cold War via bargains between the
47 Adham Saouli, “The Foreign Policies of Iraq and Lebanon,” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, edited by Raymond Hinnebusch, and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, London: Rienner, 2014, pp.106-31.
48 Saouli, “The Foreign Policies of Iraq and Lebanon,” pp.130-31.
49 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1981; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1987; Michael Mandelbaum, The Fates of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.155.
50 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.”
51 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.33-39.
52 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, pp.3-9.
14
federal government’s executive branch, Congress, and private industry.53 Friedberg states that variation in state power eventually shaped the types of grand strategies pursued by the superpowers during the Cold War.54 William Wohlforth and Aaron Friedberg examine elite perception of international power distribution as determinants of grand strategic choices.55 Wohlforth explains the superpower clash during the Cold War because of their differing elite perceptions of the international balance of power.56 Jack Snyder states that imperialistic cartelized regimes pursue policies resulting in over-expansion, over-extension, and self-encirclement as a consequence of domestic political regimes.57
The type II NCR pick up this line of analysis and apply it to a wide range of times and places. Steven E. Lobell introduces a complex threat identification model to the NCR. He contends, “States not only respond to aggregate shifts in the international distribution of power but also shifts in power differentials and specific components of other states’ material capabilities.”58 Divisions among FPEs, charged with policy formulation, and critical societal elites can adversely influence the threat assessment process. To exemplify his argument, Lobell presents the examples of British threat assessment of Germany before the two world wars.59 Mark Brawley examines threat assessment and strategic adjustment dilemmas in permissive international environments dominated by ambiguity.
Additionally, Brawley demonstrates that Great Britain, France, and the USSR identified Wilhelmine Germany’s rise as the greatest threat to their security. Still, they adopted different strategies to respond to the threat due to their strategic situations and domestic political constraints.60 Jennifer Sterling-Folker sets out the paradox that liberal theories
53 Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
54 Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, pp.75-148.
55 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War , Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp.10-17, 179-81, and 293-307; Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, pp.279-91.
56 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War.
57 Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
58 Steven E. Lobell Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Norrin M. Ripsman, Steven E. Lobell, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro,(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.33.
59 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.42-74.
60 Mark R. Brawley, “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies Toward Germany between the World Wars (1919-1939),” in Neoclassical
15
cannot explain how states can simultaneously view and treat one another as valued trading partners and security threats. Different domestic groups compete for resources among themselves and the legitimacy of making decisions for the state, according to Sterling-Folker. For instance, the interaction of national subgroups in Taiwan, China, and the United States led their respective countries to implement aggressive foreign and security policies despite increasing economic ties and evident power asymmetries.61
Colin Dueck discusses US military intervention in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq to confirm or disconfirm a neoclassical realist military intervention model. Dueck seeks an answer to the question of the extent to which domestic politics influence the decision to go to war in each case. He asserts that domestic political conditions are not the ultimate cause of military intervention, but they significantly influence the manner of intervention. In Korea and Vietnam, domestic politics were not the cause of U.S. intervention. Instead, the perception of American strategic interests shared by the President, his advisors, and political opinion leaders within the US was influenced by the decision to go to war. In the case of Iraq, there were no overpowering domestic political constraints on Bush’s ability to invade Iraq. Dueck concludes that in each case, domestic political restrictions on war were loose and multi-directional, and the president opted for war due to his administration’s perception of American national security interests. Domestic political incentives encourage intervention consistent with the NCR. Domestic political concerns shed light on every stage of presidential decision-making on major military interventions. Moreover, presidents go to war because they believe it is required for international reasons. Dueck concluded that Cold War exigencies necessitated US military interventions in Korea and Vietnam. However, public pressure in the US influenced American military intervention timing and style.62
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.81-89.
61 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit across the Taiwan Strait,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.99-138.
62 Colin Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.145-69; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
16
Norrin M. Ripsman finds an answer to the question of when domestic political institutions and societal actors are more likely to inhibit leaders’ responses to the external environment. Ripsman hypothesizes that the influential domestic actors who have the power to remove national executives from office (whether through the ballot box, legislative no-confidence votes, or coups d’état), who can act as “veto players” to obstruct the government’s programmatic goals, or who can shape the timing and style of the national interests. These actors affect foreign and national policies when the international threat environment is low, when leaders have a weak hold on power, and when the national security executive lacks structural autonomy. To illustrate his hypothesis, he draws examples from Great Britain, France, the United States, the USSR, Türkiye, Israel, and Egypt over the past century.63 Ripsman explains the long delay in equipping West German forces against the USSR in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although successive French prime ministers favored German rearmament, they faced domestic opposition and lacked state autonomy.64
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro lays out a “resource extraction” model of the state within the NCR. As a result, in terms of the NCR, state power is defined as the state’s capacity to extract and mobilize resources from domestic societies. This forms the basis for states’ internal balancing strategies. State power is a function of the state’s politico-military institutions, as well as nationalism and ideology. Taliaferro hypothesizes that when states confront high external vulnerability, states with higher extraction and mobilization capacity emulate the military, governing, and technological practices of the system’s most successful states. Conversely, states lacking high mobilization and extraction capacity have difficulty pursuing emulation. When states face low external vulnerability, states with higher extraction and mobilization capacity engage in innovation to enhance their long-term security and power. Conversely, states with low extraction and mobilization capacity are less likely to pursue emulation or innovation. States can increase their extraction and mobilization capabilities by spreading socialist ideologies or nationalism. In these circumstances, vulnerable states continue to employ existing strategies. To prove
63 Norrin Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Norrin Ripsman, Steven E. Lobell, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.170-93.
64 Norrin M. Ripsman, “The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy,” Security Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 2001.
17
these hypotheses, Taliaferro draws examples from the experiences of seven rising or declining great powers over the past 300 years: China, France, Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), Russia (Soviet Union), and the United States.65 Taliaferro explains that when China and Japan faced the same external threat of Western imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century, they responded differently to the same threat despite their historical-cultural ties. Taliaferro explains that states vary in their ability to mobilize domestic resources for defense.66
Schweller explains the concept of under-balancing in terms of four key variables: elite consensus and cohesion, regime vulnerability, and social cohesion. The first two influence the state’s willingness to balance and the last two depict the state’s ability to extract resources. Schweller argues that British and French foreign policies in the 1930s resulted from the “tradeoffs between internal stability and external security.” He contends both states gave priority to internal stability over external security. British leaders pursued appeasement since rearmament would trigger social unrest. Moreover, French elites, he contends, were divided on the nature of the external threat.67 On the contrary, Ripsman and Levy explain why Britain and France pursued an appeasement policy rather than a balancing strategy or a preventive war policy.68 They argue that British and French decision-making derives from strategic balance-of-power considerations. France always viewed German military power as a threat. Britain also realized the military balance had shifted in Germany’s favor. Therefore, Britain resorted to an appeasement policy to restore a favorable balance of power within a few years.69 British leaders used appeasement to buy time for rearmament against Germany.
65 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.194-226.
66 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” Security Studies, Vol.15, No.3, 2006, pp.2-3.
67 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006.
68 Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s,” Security Studies, Vol.16, No.1, 2007, pp.35.
69 Ripsman and Levy, “The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s,” pp.35; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” International Security, Vol.33, No.2, 2008.
18
Furthermore, Schweller discusses the problem of resource mobilization and extraction from a different perspective. He asks why modern great powers have been relatively rare in territorial conquest and regional hegemony bids. He contends the barriers to hegemony lie in the difficulties revisionist Great Powers have in mobilizing the domestic resources required to make a credible hegemon bid. In addition, he argues that fascism enabled the leaders of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to utilize ideologies to extract maximum resources from society and to mobilize support for expansionist foreign ventures.70
Benjamin O. Fordham discusses the limits of neoclassical realism, presenting a case study of US defense spending during the Cold War. He proposes an additive model of foreign policy instead of an additive manner that treats domestic and international pressures as separable. In his additive foreign policy model, there is a symbiotic relationship between domestic and international factors. He argues that the interaction between domestic interests and the international political environment determines foreign policy and security policy choices.71 Nicholas Kitchen argues that neoclassical realism explains grand strategies derived from international systemic pressures and competition among strategic ideas within a state’s FPE.72 Kitchen hypothesized that “prevailing ideas influence the type of foreign policy response to structural imperatives.” He stresses that ideas can intervene via different means, including state leaders, institutions, and cultural preferences of a state.73
By analyzing crisis decision-making in the Kosovo War of 1999, Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar explain why Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević rejected the March 1999 Rambouillet Accords, which demanded the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and to deploy a NATO peacekeeping force so as to enforce a cease-fire between the Serbs and
70 Randall L. Schweller, “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.227-50.
71 Benjamin O. Fordham, “The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.251.
72 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies, Vol.36, No.1, 2010.
73 Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation.”
19
the Kosovar Albanians.74 Devlen and Özdamar suggest two intervening variables. First, the unit-level intervening variable is derived from the leader images category, Milošević’s operational code, and the Clinton national security team’s aversion to a perceived loss in US prestige and credibility vis-a-vis its NATO allies. The second intervening variable posited Milošević’s domestic prospect of political survival.75 However, this model did not incorporate state-society relations or domestic institutional variables.
Focusing on the nuclear postures of China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and France, Narang raises two research questions: Which one of three distinct nuclear postures (catalytic, assured retaliation, or asymmetric) will a regional power select and for what reason? Does this choice of nuclear posture have any effect on the state’s ability to deter conflict?76 The dependent variables are the nuclear postures chosen by the regional powers and the impact of that selection on the likelihood of conflict. The first dependent variable, nuclear posture selection, is according to “a causes-of-effects approach to causation.” The second dependent variable, the impact of this selection on deterrence, is consistent with “the effects-of-causes approach” in quantitative research.77
William C. Wohlforth discusses the impact of unipolarity on peace and the impact of multipolarity on the prospects for war among major powers. Wohlforth argues that the pre-World War I international system did not compel Germany to wage war against Great Britain, its leading trading partner. Still, German leaders' preferences and concerns about relative status caused the war to interact with a multipolar balance of power to favor war.78 Christopher Layne explains the grand strategies of extra-regional hegemony (avoiding the rise of other great powers) pursued by successive administrations in the United States since World War II as a function of a dominant domestic coalition of liberal internationalists. They encouraged it to try and reshape the international system, leading it to strategic overexpansion. Layne argues that since the end of the Cold War, the United
74 Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar, “Neoclassial Realism and Foreign Policy Crises,” in Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation, edited by Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison, and James Patrick, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
75 Devlen and Özdamar, “Neoclassial Realism and Foreign Policy Crises,” pp.142-43.
76 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, pp.36.
77 Narang, pp.52-54, 222-52.
78 William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Vol.61, No.1, 2009, pp.32.
20
States has remained a hegemonic power overseas despite the absence of a Soviet threat.79 Brawley raises two questions to explain divergent British, French, and Soviet strategies towards Germany between the world wars. These questions are: how did decision-makers in France, Britain, and the USSR assess foreign threats and opportunities, and how and under what circumstances did domestic factors prevent these leaders from pursuing the strategies predicted by the balance of power and threat theories?80
Thomas Juneau argues that a favorable strategic environment after 2001 created by the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran engaged in strategies concerning the Shiite-Sunni conflict in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Iran’s nuclear program, which increased its international isolation.81 Juneau presents the relative distribution of capabilities as independent variables.82 He then suggests three domestic factors that affect foreign policy: status, regime identity, and factional politics.83 Juneau shows how time horizons and the permissive/restrictiveness of the regional security environment in the Middle East optimize Iran’s foreign policy responses in the cases of the Iraq War (high), the Arab-Israeli conflict (low), and the nuclear program (medium). Finally, he contends that states are ‘influence-maximizers’ that seek to control and shape their external environment.84
Kevin Marsh analyses the 2012 US Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) from the neoclassical perspective. By examining systemic, domestic, and elite influences affecting the United States in 2012, Marsh argues that the DSG reflected the Obama administration’s filtration of systemic-level imperatives through elite perceptions and domestic politics.85 Moreover, Marsh analyses the decision by the Obama Administration to intervene in a limited and supporting role in Libya. Marsh argues that “when the
79 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
80 Brawley, “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies Toward Germany between the World Wars (1919-1939),” pp.75.
81 Thomas Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.
82 Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy, pp.3, 21-24.
83 Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy, pp.4-6, 24-27, 41-49.
84 Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy, pp.27-28, 49-54.
85 Kevin Marsh, “Managing Relative Decline: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of the 2012 US Defense Strategic Guidance,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.33, No.3, 2012.
21
Administration intervened in response to perceived external-level threats to US national interests, salient intervening domestic-level variables and elite perceptions shaped and guided the tenor and scope of the operation.”86
Justin Massie provides a comprehensive assessment of Canada’s military engagement in the war in Afghanistan. Massie argues that the unipolarity of the US, domestic elite consensus on an Atlanticist security policy, and executive autonomy vis-a-vis public dissent account for Canada’s evolving Afghanistan policy.87 Wayne McLean uses neoclassical realism to explain how foreign policy elites in Australia frame domestic debates to avoid specific ideas interfering with security responses. Capturing three different elite responses (dilution, deflection, and inflation), McLean explains how elites mitigate potentially problematic domestic policy contests by pulling ideas toward the center of debates and marginalizing others.88
Sachio Nakato uses the neoclassical realism perspective to explain why North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. Nakato argues that pressures from external sources, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidential statement and North Korea’s internal logic, led it to conduct the second nuclear test as a nuclear power in response to changing international circumstances.89 Paolo Rosa et al. use neoclassical realism to conduct a quantitative analysis of the military behavior of Italy from 1946 to 2010. They argue, “Italian military behavior is a function of the country’s relative power as well as the levels of elite instability and regime vulnerability, the extraction capacity of the state, and the degree of elite consensus.”90 Moreover, Paolo Rosa and Paolo Foradori seek to explain, “Why China after having launched a crash program in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent did not formulate a clear operational doctrine concerning the targeting and employment of atomic weapons until the mid-1980s.” They
86 Kevin Marsh, “'Leading from behind': neoclassical realism and operation Odyssey Dawn,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol.30, No.2, 2014.
87 Justin Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan: A realist paradox?,” International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, Vol.68, No.2, 2013.
88 Wayne McLean, “Neoclassical realism and Australian foreign policy: understanding how security elites frame domestic discourses,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol.28, No.1, 2016.
89 Sachio Nakato, “North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Neoclassical Realism Perspectives,” Pacific Focus, Vol.27, No.1, 2012.
90 Paolo Rosa et al., “Neoclassical realism and Italy’s military behaviour, 1946–2010: a combined dyad/nation analysis,” Political Research Exchange, Vol.2, No.1, 2020.
22
contend that China’s domestic politics avoided the possibility of articulating a clear and detailed nuclear doctrine following the first nuclear test.91
Ilai Z. Saltzman explores the trajectory of Japan’s security policy transformation under Shinzo Abe’s government, paving the way for the shift from basic self-defense to collective self-defense that allows Japan to assume greater regional and global security assertiveness and responsibility. Saltzman traces the interplay between changes in Japan’s strategic environment, domestic politics, and the security policy decision-making process. Saltzman concludes that powerful domestic opposition challenges the inducements of Japanese security normalization.92 Saltzman stresses, “While the process will remain piecemeal rather than revolutionary, the course of Japan’s security policy favors continued self-assertion, emancipation, and reform.” 93
Hyon Joo Yoo analyses the dissimilar policies of Japan and the Republic of Korea towards US-led missile defense systems in East Asia. Yoo introduces a framework of domestic hurdles that combines Randall Schweller’s cohesion model and Jeffry Taliaferro’s resource extraction model. Yoo argues that the degree of elite cohesion and social and economic impediments as key causal determinants impede balancing against external threats. However, systemic variables suppose optimal policy options, such as balancing.94 Yuji Idotomo analyzes the dispute in the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China. Idotomo explains China’s assertiveness over the dispute via neoclassical realist theory. Idotomo identifies systemic factors as polarity, material capabilities, and domestic factors as the Chinese Communist Party’s performance legitimacy and nationalism.95
Alex Edwards examines the American policy of ‘dual containment’ towards Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf in the 1990s. In terms of domestic factors, Edwards identifies three key intervening variables: perceptions of threat on the part of policymakers, domestic
91 Paolo Rosa and Paolo Foradori, “Politics does not stop at the ‘nuclear edge’: neoclassical realism and the making of China’s military doctrine,” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Vol.47, No.3, 2017.
92 Ilai Z. Saltzman, “Growing Pains: Neoclassical Realism and Japan's Security Policy Emancipation,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.36, No.3, 2015.
93 Saltzman, “Growing Pains: Neoclassical Realism and Japan's Security Policy Emancipation,” pp.498.
94 Hyon Joo Yoo, “Domestic Hurdles for System-Driven Behavior: Neoclassical Realism and Missile Defense Policies in Japan and South Korea,” International Relations of the Asia- Pacific, Vol.12, No.2, 2012.
95 Yuji Idomoto, “Neoclassical Realism's Perspective on China's Policy Toward the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” (Master's Degree), The George Washington University, 2015.
23
political structures, and the operation of policy coalitions. In terms of external factors, Edwards examines domestic political structures and the operation of policy coalitions. Edwards concludes that the intervening variables shaped US policy towards Iran and Iraq. It reflected the perceptions held by American policymakers of American power and Iran and Iraq as “rogue” states and the measures perceived as required to advance Arab-Israeli peace. In addition, it reflected the influence of domestic interest groups and Congressional activism in the realm of foreign policy.96
Stjepan T. Bosnjak analyses Australia’s relationship with China during the Howard era. Bosnjak uses neoclassical realism to examine how the Howard Government in Australia managed to go from the lows of 1996 to the highs of 2003. Bosnjak argues that “Australia’s domestic institutions (including Parliament, political parties, bureaucracies, business and societal elites, the electorate) and its political culture (including Australia’s historical fear of ‘being swamped by Asians,’ of bandwagoning with greater powers, and Howard’s rise to power) shaped and restrained Howard’s responses to changes to the international structure.”97
Randall Schweller analyses China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States. Schweller argues that the interaction between nationalism (a second-image variable) and power trajectory (a third-image variable), which means how their relationship will unfold in the coming years, produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in rising (China) and declining (United States) powers.98 Taylor Michael Wettach, utilizing neoclassical realist theory, analyses China’s new maritime assertiveness in disputed territories in the East and South China Seas. Wettach argues that “the increasing strategic significance of the maritime domain to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s performance-based legitimacy and China’s goal of national rejuvenation” as domestic political elements interacted with the perception of growing relative power as an international political element. This interaction led to decision-making among
96 Alex Edwards, “A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American ‘Dual Containment’ Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001,” (Doctoral Dissertation), the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
97 Stjepan Bosnjak, “The Man of Steel and The Dragon: Australia’s relationship with China during the Howard Era,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Victoria University, 2017.
98 Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.11, No.1, 2018.
24
Chinese leadership relating to China’s new maritime assertiveness post-2008 financial crisis.99
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro et al. present a neoclassical realist theory of peaceful change between rising and declining great powers. They argue that “a declining hegemon will likely accept peaceful change—that is, acquiesce to a rising challenger—in very restrictive circumstances: namely, (1) when it has high confidence that change is inevitable because it lacks the military, political, or economic means to resist it; or (2) when the domestic political and economic costs of resisting change are anticipated to be prohibitively high; or (3) when the leadership of the declining hegemon is domestically constrained in its ability to enact and implement policies to resist the challenger.”100 Rangga Amalul Akhli seeks to analyze the dynamics of US former President Donald Trump’s foreign military assistance to Ukraine. Akhli states that Trump demanded his Ukrainian counterpart to investigate Joe Biden’s corruption and revert the Russia hack scandal in the last US presidential election in exchange for the release of military assistance. However, Akhli argues that the policy is prevented by some domestic elements: some of the FPE thought the halt policy had no gain to the US national security. Hence, they acted as whistleblowers suing Trump's personal interest in the issue to gain broader public awareness; (2) US Strategic Culture, a perception that shapes Russia as among the US enemies. Thus, that halt policy is perceived as against US collective value; (3) the US check and balance system; (4) Trump considers that the halt policy can jeopardize his position as president in the next election. These factors contribute to the release of assistance.101
Michael E. Becker et al. focus on the case of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine through a neoclassical realist lens. They argue that military force is no longer the sole or primary
99 Taylor Michael Wettach, “Rationale for Revisionism? Neoclassical Realism and China’s New Maritime Assertiveness,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Georgetown University, 2017.
100 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective,” International Studies Review, Vol.20, No.2, 2018.
101 Rangga Amalul Akhli, “The Rapid Changes of the U.S. Foreign Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2019: A Neoclassical Realism Perspective,” Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi ttg Kajian & Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism & Integrity, Vol.6, No.2, 2020.
25
means used to accomplish traditional security goals.102 Giedrius Česnakas analyses energy resources’ role in states’ foreign policy. After Česnakas used classical realism, defensive realism, and offensive realism, as for neoclassical realism, Česnakas argues that different state powers and different perceptions of the international system explain different roles of energy resources in the state’s foreign policy. States having the ability to extract resources from national power can use energy resources in foreign policy more actively and efficiently.103 Victor D. Cha discusses the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Cha asks: Why did these two powers have such volatile relations despite their élite ties, economic complementarities, and shared security adversaries throughout the Cold War and Post–Cold War eras? Cha argues that Japanese and Korean perceptions of their common great power patron’s security commitment (the United States) directly affect the level of political-military cooperation between the two states.104
Balci et al. discuss the Ottoman Empire’s decision to enter the First World War. They utilize a neoclassical realist analysis of the war decision as to the outcome of dynamic interactions between the systemic and unit-level variables. The systemic variables (e.g., the offense-defense balance of naval military technology between Ottomans and Russians in the Straits, German ‘foreign penetration,’ economic aid, the catastrophic defeat of the Austrian army by Russia) and unit-level variables (e.g., the divided nature of the Ottoman FPE, the Young Turks’ strategic culture) crystallize the parameters of the Ottoman war strategy and its bargaining options with the Great Powers.105 Balci et al., the Ottoman case of the divided FPE manifests that overbalancing was the preferred policy option, although there was no “elite consensus.”106
Nuri Yeşilyurt takes Türkiye’s policy response to the Arab Uprisings as a case study from a neoclassical realist perspective. Yeşilyurt tries to explain the causes of Ankara’s miscalculations while formulating an ambitious policy in 2011 and its failure to adapt to the new realities between 2013 and 2016. Yeşilyurt contends that the problems of
102 Michael E. Becker et al., “Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens,” European Security, Vol.25, No.1, 2016.
103 Giedrius Česnakas, “Energy Resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Approach,” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics,Vol.3, No.1, 2010.
104 Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2, 2000.
105 Ali Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” War in History, Vol.27, No.4, 2018, pp.644.
106 Balci et al., pp.648.
26
miscalculation and maladaptation in Turkish foreign policy were brought about by “distortive effects of certain unit-level factors.” Moreover, Yeşilyurt argues that “while the ideological tendencies of the ruling Justice and Development Party, as well as its consolidation of domestic power, shaped the content and styling of Ankara’s policy response after 2011, the extensive utilization of foreign policy for domestic purposes by the ruling party hindered Türkiye’s adaptation to shifting balances in the regional power structure between 2013 and 2016.”107
Philipp O. Amour addresses Hamas-Fatah reconciliation and rapprochement from both the neoclassical realist perspective and the neorealist perspective. He concluded that the interplay of systemic and domestic factors set Hamas and Fatah on different trajectories of national unity. According to Amour, domestic preferences explain the robustness of division and rift between Fatah and Hamas, taking into account the unfolding regional order in the Middle East since 2010.108 Michael Baun and Dan Marek examine the relaunch of European defense cooperation since 2016 from the perspective of neoclassical realism. They argue that while a change in Europe's geostrategic and security environment created incentives for increased defense cooperation, the form and content of this cooperation are explained by the preferences of key European states, especially France and Germany. Drawing from two new forms of European defense cooperation, PESCO and E21, the former inside the EU institutional framework and the latter outside of it, they conclude “these initiatives are explained by the contrast between French and German preferences on defense cooperation, which in turn reflect their divergent national security priorities but also their different strategic cultures, including their differing perspectives on European integration.”109
Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber probe the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system,
107 Nuri Yesilyurt, “Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective,” All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol.6, No.2, 2017.
108 Philipp O. Amour, “2010 Sonrasında Orta Doğu'da Değişen Bölgesel Düzende Hamas-FKÖ/Fetih Uzlaşısı ve Yakınlaşması: Neo-Realist ve Neo-Klasik Realist Bir Değerlendirme,” Anemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol.6, No.5, 2018.
109 Michael Baun and Dan Marek, “Making Europe Defend Again: The Relaunch of European Defense Cooperation from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective,” Czech Journal of Internatioal Relations, Vol.54, No.4, 2019.
27
these governments were compelled to raise Italy’s profile within the international system. However, these governments responded in different ways. Cladi and Webber argue that elite perceptions of power distribution and government instability (at the domestic level) explain these differences.110 Stefano Costalli discusses the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy from the perspective of neoclassical realism. Costalli argues that the realist perspective does not necessarily neglect ideational factors and the non-material dimension of power relevant to Euro-Mediterranean relations.111 Eugenio Cusumano provides a comparative dimension to the political drivers of military privatization by analyzing contractor support to US and UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cusumano argues that domestic political constraints shape US and UK contractors’ use as a force multiplier.112 Jason W. Davidson focuses on the roots of revisionism in the era of Fascist Italy, 1922-39. Davidson argues, “Rising states will become revisionist only when they are pressured by domestic political groups or concerns about their security or autonomy and have the opportunity to achieve revisionist objectives.”113 Federico Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez-Levaggi discuss the growing enlargement of the spheres of competition from the Middle East into the Horn of Africa. They use insights from regional order and neoclassical realist theory to understand the expansion of regional powers into this area. To analyze interregional security dynamics, they focus on three empirical cases in the 2015-202 period: The Gulf Cooperation Council’s crisis, the establishment of Turkish military bases in the Horn of Africa, and Israel’s new diplomatic engagement in Eastern Africa. Their central argument is that the clashing interests among Middle Eastern regional powers and power asymmetry with Horn of Africa countries are driving increased security interdependence between the two Red Sea shores.114
110 Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber, “Italian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: A Neoclassical Realist Approach,” European Security, Vol.20, No.2, 2011.
111 Stefano Costalli, “Power over the Sea: The Relevance of Neoclassical Realism to Euro-Mediterranean Relations,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol.14, No.3, 2009.
112 Eugenio Cusumano, “Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.39, No.1, 2016.
113 Jason W. Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39,” Security Studies, Vol.11, No.4, 2002.
114 Federico Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez-Levaggi, “Crossing Roads: The Middle East’s Security Engagement in the Horn of Africa,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol.33, No.1, 2021.
28
Tom Dyson asks to what extent the militaries of Britain, France, and Germany converged or diverged across the main axes of defense policy during the post-Cold War era (1990-2009). He argues that the changing structure of the international system was the major driver of reform in the three countries. Understanding the time lags between reform processes in France and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other hand, requires turning to domestic factors, particularly the relative autonomy enjoyed by executives in each state.115 Linnéa Gelot and Martin Welz analyzed the role of the African Union (AU) during the Libyan crisis of 2011. They seek to answer the question of why the AU did not play a central conflict manager role in that crisis from the neoclassical realist and post-structuralist lens. They stress not only the ability of dominant powers to influence the unfolding of events with material forms of power but also through immaterial ones, such as the advancement of a dominant discourse on a cosmopolitan liberal order.116
Elena Kropatcheva discusses different views on (in-)predictability and (non-)cooperation in Russian foreign policy towards the West in the realm of European security. Drawing on neoclassical realism, Kropatcheva argues that Russian foreign policy is selective and includes both cooperative and non-cooperative tactics.117 Moreover, Elena Kropatcheva analyses Russian energy policy that is usually considered in the regional context in terms of its energy power capability and strength vis-à-vis the EU and the post-Soviet states. Kroparcheva states that the impact of international changes in the energy sector is significant to Russia’s energy power. In this sense, the oil and gas shale “revolutions” represent such a global factor of influence. Kropatcheva analyses what the shale “revolutions” mean for Russia’s energy policy and its power capabilities vis-à-vis the EU, how the Russian political elite perceives this development, and how Russia reacts to it.118
Jonathan Fulton explores China’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. Fulton asks: “what motivating factors explain Chinese leadership’s
115 Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post- Cold War Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
116 Linnéa Gelot and Martin Welz, “Pragmatic eclecticism, neoclassical realism and post-structuralism: reconsidering the African response to the Libyan crisis of 2011,” Third World Quarterly, Vol.39, No.12 2018.
117 Elena Kropatcheva, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Realm of European Security through the Lens of Neoclassical Realism,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol.3, No.1, 2012.
118 Elena Kropatcheva, “He who has the pipeline calls the tune? Russia's energy power against the background of the shale 'revolutions',” Energy Policy, Vol.66, 2014.
29
decision to forge closer ties to the GCC? Are the relationships motivated by international systemic pressures, unit-level domestic pressures, or a combination of both? What is the motivation for GCC leaders in developing closer ties to China, and what kind of role can China be expected to play in the region as levels of interdependence intensify?” Taking China’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates as case studies, Fulton examines the systemic and domestic pressures that shaped China’s policy towards the Arab Gulf monarchies over four periods between 1949 and 2012: indifference (1949-1965), hostility (1965-1971), transition (1971-1990), and interdependence (1990-present). Fulton argues that systemic considerations were predominant for much of the history of Sino-GCC relations, but between 1990-2012 years, domestic pressures within China played a significant role.119
Mustafa Izzuddin discusses Malaysia’s China policy from 1970 to 2009 under four Malaysian Prime Ministers from the neoclassical realist perspective. Izzuddin explores the relationship between ethnic politics and Malaysia’s China policy. Izzuddin asks: why and how did Malaysia’s China policy evolve from a cautious rapprochement under Razak to a matured partnership under Abdullah despite the prevailing ethnic conflict between the Malays and Chinese? Izzuddin finds that domestic legitimation drove the Malaysian decision-makers to either continue or change Malaysia’s China policy. In addition, the systemic pressures in the external strategic environment were filtered through the prism of domestic legitimation, that is, by the perceptions of the Malaysian leader who got information about the ethnopolitical situation.120
Rajneesh Verma explains the ability of the Chinese oil companies to mobilize oil in the oil industry in West Africa relative to their Indian counterparts. Verma argues that the difference in the relative power of India and China explains “the ability of Chinese oil companies to outbid their Indian competitors and be preferred as partners by international oil companies (IOCs) and have better quality oil blocks as well as China’s widespread outreach in 11 countries in West Africa compared to India’s presence in two counties
119 Jonathan Fulton, “China’s Relations with the Arab Gulf Monarchies: Three Case Studies,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Leicester, 2016.
120 Mustafa Izzuddin, “Ethnic Politics and Malaysia’s China Policy Ethnic Politics and Malaysia’s China Policy From Tun Abdul Razak to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation” (Doctoral Dissertation), the LSE, 2014.
30
namely Nigeria and Gabon.” Taking differences in the political economy of India and China as an intervening variable, Verma explains why China is represented by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil industry in West Africa, whereas India is represented by SOEs or private enterprises.121
Gustav Meibauer explores the continuous use of no-fly zones across different US administrations from 1991 to 2016. Meibauer takes ideas as an intervening variable in “the transmission belt” from systemic imperatives to explain no-fly zone use in US foreign policy. Meibauer argues, “In a permissive international environment, decision-makers use ideas to guide their interpretation of systemic conditions.” Moreover, decision-making in the US foreign policy executive involves competition between diverging ideas about systemic incentives and constraints. Meibauer compares case studies on US foreign policy towards northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya to Kosovo, South Sudan/Darfur, and Syria and gives primacy to systemic factors in determining US foreign policy.122 Mehmet Şahin focuses on the systemic transition from a neoclassical realist perspective. Şahin analyzes the effects of the increasing capitalism on great powers, namely Russia and China since the 1970s to examine transition. Şahin takes the liberal international system as the independent variable and elite preferences as the intervening variable. Their political outcome on the international system is dependent variable. Şahin concludes that increasing capitalism changed the socialist systems into hybrid capitalist regimes. This converts the international order to multipolarity.123
There are also some studies related to the neoclassical realist research program. Nathan Alexander Sears states that the neoclassical realist research program suggests both progressive strengths and degenerative weaknesses.124 Jennifer Sterling-Folker states that the neoclassical realist research program is derived from the Realpolitik tradition of
121 Rajneesh Verma, “The Tiger and the Dragon: A Neoclassical Realist The Tiger and the Dragon: A Neoclassical Realist perspective of India and China in the oil industry in West Africa,” (Doctoral Dissertation), the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
122 Gustav Meibauer, “Doing Something Neoclassical Realism, US Foreign Policy and the No-Fly Zone, 1991-2016” (Doctoral Dissertation), the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017.
123 Mehmet Şahin, “Systemic Change and Elite Transition: A Neoclassical Realist Appraisal to the Political and Economic Transformation in Russia and China since the 1970s,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Middle East Technical University, 2019.
124 Nathan Alexander Sears, “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers,” International Politics Reviews, Vol.5, No.1, 2017.
31
structural realism, yet it is informed by insights from Innenpolitik and constructivist critics of structural realism.125 Brain Rathbun argues that neoclassical realism is “a logical extension and necessary part of advancing Neorealism.”126 Michiel Foulon discusses the deportation of neoclassical realism from Wendt’s constructivism, Moravcsik’s liberal theory, and Putnam’s two-level game liberalism.127
Scholars have employed neoclassical realist approaches to address a range of issues: the interventions of Wilhelmine Germany, Imperial Japan, and the United States in peripheral regions;128 the origins of Italy’s revisionist grand strategy in the 1920s and 1930s;129 the politics of threat assessment and alliance formation in Britain and France before the two world wars;130 the interaction of relative power shifts, the changing nature of global production, and domestic constraints on the Soviet leadership’s response to deep relative decline in the 1980s;131 domestic constraints on great powers’ ability to construct durable settlements after major wars;132 the explanatory power of the main strands of neoclassical realism in accounting for US foreign policy after the Cold War, including the origins of the Bush doctrine, and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq;133 and reading hedging on
125 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, pp.6; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading,” International Studies Review, Vol.4, No.1, 2002; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist-Constructivism and Morality,” International Studies Review, Vol.6, No.2, 2004, pp.341-43.
126 Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies, Vol.17, No.2, 2008, pp.294.
127 Michiel Foulon, “Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities,” International Studies Review, Vol.17, No.4, 2015.
128 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004.
129 Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39.”
130 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power; Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.
131 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security, Vol.25, No.3, 2001.
132 Norrin M. Ripsman, “The curious case of German rearmament democracy, structural autonomy, and foreign security policy,” Security Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 2000; Norrin M. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
133 Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, 159-205; Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy, pp.169-71; Tudor Onea, “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War,” International Relations, Vol.26, No.2, 2012; Michiel Foulon, “US grand strategy towards China, 1991-2015: A neoclassical realist analysis,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Warwick, 2019; Aharon Barth, “American Military Commitments in Europe: Power, Perceptions, and Neoclassical Realism” (Doctoral Dissertation), Georgetown University, 2004.
32
neoclassical realist perspective;134 the effects of the German news media on foreign policy decisions of the Federal Government towards Türkiye;135 the influence the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2014 on the relations between the European Union and Ukraine;136 Türkiye’s foreign policy;137 and Belarus’s foreign policy as a small power.138
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature in different ways: a) it makes a comprehensive overview of Iraqi domestic and foreign policy for 40 years of turbulent times through the collection of academic works and official documents; b) it conducts research into the Iraqi policymaking process and unveils the process by which foreign policy elites and societal elites/domestic actors are divided; c) it creates a new aspect to the complex threat assessment model, proposing that there is an additional fourth scenario in which the FPE is unconstrained in identifying a rising state as a threat though societal elites did not brand it as a threat.
Methodology and Research Design
This thesis tries to offer a theoretically informed empirical account of the subject matter and employs three different types of methodology: case study analysis, process tracing, and analytical narratives. Thus, the research design I used for this work is qualitative. For the empirical research, I benefited from a mix of i) a limited number of primary sources, that is, official documents publicly available and official press statements; and ii) secondary sources, i.e., studies published by academic scholars and think tank analysts. For George and Bennett, case studies suggest a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable.”139 Process tracing, according to George and Bennett, “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. It does so by focusing on ‘sequential
134 Nicholas Ross Smith, “Strategic Hedging by Smaller Powers: What Can Neoclassical Realism Add?” Prepared for the Workshop: Re-Appraising Neoclassical Realism,” the London School of Economics and Political Science, 29 November 2018.
135 Başar Şirin, “The Influence of News Frames on Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of German Foreign Policy Towards Turkey,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Freie Universitaet Berlin, 2019.
136 Danyil Polochaninov, “The Influence of the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 on the Relations Between the European Union and Ukraine,” (Master's Degree),Webster University, 2021.
137 Sami Kiraz, “Suriye iç savaşı sırasındaki Türk dış politikasının neoklasik realizmin bakış açısından analizi (2011-2017),” (Doctoral Dissertation), Gazi University, 2018; Hüseyin Yeltin, “Neoklasik realizm bağlamında son dönem Türkiye-Rusya ilişkileri,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Sakarya University, 2019.
138 Paul Hansbury, “The Agency of Smaller Powers: Belarus in International Relations,” (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Oxford, 2017.
139 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, pp.5.
33
processes’.”140 George and McKeown assert that the primary objective of process tracing is “to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.”141 Process tracing offers micro and medium levels of analysis to observe the behavior of Iraqi FPE and societal leaders/groups in cases of interest and to investigate the nature of relations and/or possible causal mechanisms connecting the actions performed by such actors.142 According to Stone, an analytical narrative is the “organization of material in chronologically sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots.”143 Juneau asserts that the key objective of the analytical narrative is to generate a theoretically cognizant and provisional account of the foreign policy of a state based on the prevailing circumstances. Juneau writes, “The development of analytical narratives by neoclassical realist research is a logical result of its use of process-tracing and case study methodologies.”144
Bennett and Elman contend that process tracing can involve either an inductive or a deductive approach.145 Rather, this thesis combined both inductive and deductive approaches. The inductive approach develops theory from the observation of empirical reality. It is composed of three stages: observation, seeking patterns, and developing a theory or preliminary conclusion. The deductive approach establishes and develops a conceptual and theoretical framework, which was used sequentially to lay the foundation of how to perform the analysis. It consists of five stages: beginning with an existing theory and creating a problem statement, formulating a falsifiable hypothesis based on existing theory, collecting data to test the hypothesis, analyzing and testing the data, and deciding
140 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, pp.6, 13.
141 Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, edited by Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985.
142 Carolina De Simone, “Italy and the community of Sant’Egidio in the 1990s. ‘Coopetition’ in post-Cold War Italian foreign policy?,” (Doctoral Dissertation), the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017, pp.23.
143 Lawrence Stone, The Past and the Present Revisited, London: Routledge, 1981, pp.74; Rajneesh Verma, “The tiger and the dragon: a neoclassical realist perspective of India and China in the oil industry in West Africa” (Doctoral Dissertation), the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013, pp.20.
144 Thomas Juneau, “Neoclassical Realist strategic analysis,” the Graduate Student Conference, European Consortium of Political Research, 2010.
145 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.40, No.2, 2007, pp.183.
34
whether the research rejects or supports the hypothesis.146 This thesis starts with the deductive approach, introducing the NCR and describing the research question, yet the inductive approach guides the case selection, helps reveal patterns, and improves the theory by observing and analyzing empirical evidence. The researcher contributes to the complex threat identification with an additional aspect, detailed in the last case study of the thesis.
In making causal inferences about observable phenomena, NCR has three variables: the independent variable, the intervening variable, and the dependent variable.147 The independent variable represents international systemic pressures that act as a causal force. The intervening variables entail whether, how, and when states respond to international systemic pressures.148 Identifying the key actors requires identifying the members and composition of the FPE, pinpointing policymakers who are operative in the formulation of foreign policy and determining the relative power and influence of actors within the FPE.149 There is a distinction between the FPE and the foreign, defense, and intelligence bureaucracy (FDIB). Consisting of the head of government and ministers, the FPE may involve other individuals who influence foreign policy choices. The FDIB, in contrast, is the bureaucratic organization responsible for the formulation of policy options for selection by the FPE and the implementation of foreign and defense policies. Not all states respond to systemic pressures in the same way since systemic pressures are filtered through domestic politics, which acts as the intervening variable in a causal mechanism. The dependent variable is the foreign policy behavior of an individual state that reacts to the pressures caused by the international system. The dependent variable, derived from the research question, can range along two dimensions: the time frame and the level of analysis.150
Structure of the Thesis
This chapter attempts to introduce the thesis by outlining the puzzle, the approach, methodology, and structure. The second chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual
146 Verma, “The tiger and the dragon: a neoclassical realist perspective of India and China in the oil industry in West Africa,” pp.20; “Inductive vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples,” Scribbr, April 18, 2019..
147 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.3, 105.
148 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.117.
149 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.123.
150 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.109.
35
framework of neoclassical realism in International Relations. The first section puts up for discussion the insufficiency of constructivist, systemic, and unit-level theories in explicating the thesis’s case studies in which domestic actors can affect a state’s national security policies unless the state inhabits a security-abundant environment. The second section presents a wider neoclassical realism explanation for reading the foreign policy of states in the anarchical international system. The third section introduces and rules out three types of explanations of neoclassical realism. The main subject of all the major neoclassical realist studies is the impact of relative power on foreign policy. The third and fourth sections present the theoretical argument. Specifically, two models of the type II NCR suggest alternate explanations for Iraq’s foreign policy behavior in the selected incidents.
The third chapter sheds light on Iraq’s engagement in a “Western” security alliance in the 1950s Middle East, the Baghdad Pact. Iraqi leadership sought to ensure regime survival through alliances with great Western powers against the domestic societal actors that posed an existential threat to the monarchical regime. This chapter also examines how international and regional sub-system dynamics constrain or diversify the FPE’s foreign policy choices. The emergence of the Free Officers Movement in Egypt in 1952 and the Suez Crisis in 1956 empowered the Arab nationalist current and ultimately isolated the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq through its membership in the Baghdad Pact. The fourth chapter handles Iraq’s endless claim to Kuwait's sovereignty by focusing on the five-year period of authoritarian rule in Iraq between 1958 and 1963. This episode explains that the international systemic pressures and domestic dynamics bring down the FPE foreign policy behavior. When receiving support from the Iraqi communists and opposing Arab nationalism in the country, the “revolutionary” government sustained the contention with Egypt and turned the USSR externally.
The fifth chapter provides insight into Iraq’s reluctance to join the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It showcases that the domestic societal elites have multiple foreign policy approaches and are interested in the changes in international and regional politics because these shifts affect the domestic balance of political power. In the aftermath of the five-year military rule, the Iraqi leadership recalibrated its relations with regional and great powers yet had no social base in implementing its policy choices. Arab nationalism was at its zenith and ultimately caused the regime change in Iraq in support of the Ba’athists. The sixth episode
36
explores the motivations of Iraq’s invasion of the revolutionary Iraq. The 1973 oil embargo imposed by Arab countries helped the Iraqi leadership diverge their attention totally to Middle East policy. This episode unearths how the FPE, with the high structural autonomy in the totalitarian state, undermined the domestic balance of political power. The seventh chapter explores patterns related to Iraqi foreign policy historically and introduces the main actors and structures in the FPDM of Iraq. This chapter underlines the implications of my research on Steven Lobell’s threat assessment model and Norrin Ripsman’s strategic adjustment one, the costs and benefits of foreign policy formulation, as the role of the FPE and societal elites. The conclusion summarizes the central findings of this thesis and examines Iraqi foreign policy today. It also proposes avenues for further research in analyzing the Iraqi foreign policy in the future.
37
1. CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE
1.1. The Insufficiency of the Rational Actor Model and Liberal Innenpolitik Theory
This section probes the rational actor model of FPDM, which is derived from the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940s.151 The rational actor model assumes that the rational actor is expected to be able to rank preferences “according to the degree of satisfaction with achieving these goals and objectives.”152 Rational actor models describe states as unitary actors negotiating in an anarchic international system and considering their security status vis-à-vis contenders and other threats while maximizing their goals. Security decisions are guided by rational assessments of the security environment.153 However, domestic politics can be more determinant of FPDM than the external security environment. For example, notwithstanding the Cold War, New Zealand’s break from the ANZUS illustrates that public opinion mattered to consolidate the antinuclear policy.154
Studies that use game-theoretic models, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken Game, and the Tit-for-Tat strategy, are built on the rational actor assumption. Game theorists presume that policies are affected by both domestic and international factors.155 They purport that leaders oversee domestic politics –elections, public opinion, and the bureaucracy– besides international factors that influence foreign policy decisions –deterrence, the arms race, and the regime type of the adversary. Game theory was used to demonstrate how democratic leaders were sensitive to the signaling of audience costs while threatening other democracies156 and how foreign policy decisions could be swayed
151 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.57.
152 Andrew Sage, Concise Encyclopedia of Information Processing in Systems and Organizations, New York: Pergamon Press, 1990, pp.233; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971, pp.29-30.
153 Mintz and DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp.60.
154 Michael Pugh, The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
155 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” in Theory and Structure in International Political Economy, edited by Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999; Mintz and DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp.62 and 67.
156 James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol.88, No.3, 1994.
38
by election prospects.157 Another application of game theory is to show that when a democratic government with strong support from the public –including the opposition– conveys a strong signal to potential adversaries, they are likely to back down, and there is no war.158 However, game theories do not work in the foreign policy cases of nondemocratic states. Saddam Hussein could not be forced to withdraw from Kuwait despite the threat of a U.S.-led attack.159
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory assumes that leaders make decisions about war and peace relying on the expected utility of their actions, determined by calculations of systemic factors such as the power of allies and geographical distance.160 The bargaining model of war, another rationalist approach, asserts that states are likely to avoid costly wars and, therefore, reach agreements based on the distribution of power in the international system that privileges the stronger in proportion to its strength. For this model, war occurs when the stronger state is declining in power and would expect any agreement reached to be infringed on by the rising challenger when its power transition is complete.161 According to both these models, state leaders respond to shifts in the balance of power in a fluid manner without having to bargain with societal groups to implement policy. At this point, NCR’s look at domestic politics distinguishes it from rationalist approaches. For instance, in the 1930s, when systemic incentives forced Britain to internal balance against Germany, British leaders could not raise the required resources for a rapid armament effort since internationalist elites in the City of London believed that balancing would harm their interests.162
NCR also offers an alternative to liberal Innenpolitik theories, which see foreign policy as the product of domestic political pressures. For liberals, the state is not an independent actor but chooses policies that show the aggregate preferences of the dominant societal
157 Alistair Smith, “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40, 1996.
158 Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
159 Mintz and DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp.63.
160 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
161 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.3, 1995.
162 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism,” in Neoclassical realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.289.
39
coalition.163 For democratic peace theorists, democratic leaders, the public, and the legislature should reject the use of force against other democratic states.164 Commercial liberalism argues that domestic economic interests will constrain states from aggressive foreign policy directed at key trading partners.165 Liberal inter-governmentalism or liberal institutionalism, the other variant of liberalism, holds that the international institutions which states construct are built upon the consent of the governed.166 Nonetheless, internal politics does not play as decisive a role in directing foreign policy as liberal approaches assume since domestic groups are compelled to deal with the constraints of the international system, which limits choices and forces certain policy alternatives.167 By downplaying international challenges, liberal approaches could tell us little about foreign policy choices, particularly during periods of high external threats in the international environment. Only if leaders face deselection in an election or a coup attempt, states may make policy choices for domestic political reasons.168 When Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who was far less popular than his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, faced intense domestic pressure to regain the Sinai in the early 1970s, he calculated that he could not remain in power without going to war with a far stronger Israel.169 Liberal theories are inefficient in explaining many aspects of international relations because, in general, they downplay the causal importance of relative power distributions.170 By supposing the primacy of the international system moderated by domestic political rivalry within a potentially autonomous state, NCR provides a wider picture of the dynamism of foreign policy-making.171
163 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol.51, No.4, 1997, pp.518.
164 Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
165 Robert O. Keohane, “International Liberalism Revisited,” in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, edited by John Dunn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.186-87.
166 Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
167 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism,” pp.192.
168 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.3.
169 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post- Populist State,” Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, 1981, pp.454.
170 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.6.
171 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism,” pp.192.
40
1.2. Neoclassical Realism
While the Innenpolitik approach assumes that internal factors determine states’ foreign policies, variants of neo-realism, offensive, and defensive realism assume that foreign policies are pressured by the international system. On the contrary, neoclassical realism challenges all three of these perspectives. By contrast with Innenpolitik’s theory, neoclassical realism assumes that states’ relative material power vis-a-vis the rest of the international system is a dominant factor shaping their foreign policies. In response to defensive realism, neoclassical realism predicts that a state’s perceptions of threat are partly shaped by one’s relative material power. Finally, neoclassical realism supposes, “states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment.”172
Neorealism and neoclassical realism agree with assumptions about the conflictual nature of politics, the centrality of conflict groups, and the importance of relative power distributions. However, both schools differ from each other in the dependent variable. While neorealism seeks to explain recurring patterns of international outcomes, neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states. Thus, NCR uses the internal characteristics of states to understand national responses to international constraints.173 Neoclassical realism shares realism’s three general principles. First, human beings can survive as members of large groups that provide some measure of security from external enemies. Second, politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups under conditions of general scarcity and uncertainty. The scarce commodities may be material capabilities or social resources, such as prestige and status. Third, power is a need for any group to secure its goals (i.e., universal dominance or self-preservation).174
172 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.147-52.
173 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.19-22.
174 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.14-15.
41
Table 1: Four Theories of Foreign Policy175
Theory
View of
International System
View of Units
Causal Logic
Innenpolitik
theories
Unimportant
Highly differentiated
Internal factors → foreign policy
Defensive
realism
Occasionally important; anarchy’s
implications variable
Highly differentiated
Systemic or internal→ foreign policy
incentives factors
(two sets of independent variables in practice, driving “natural” and “unnatural” behavior, respectively)
Neoclassical
realism
Important;
anarchy is murky
Differentiated
Systemic → Internal → foreign policy
incentives factors
(Independent (intervening
variable) variables)
Offensive
realism
Very important; anarchy is Hobbesian
Undifferentiated
Systemic incentives → foreign policy
Neoclassical realism refers to anarchy as opportunities and threats, seizing the middle ground between power (classical realism) and security (neorealism).176 In addition, neoclassical realism occupies the middle ground between structural theorists and
175 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.154.
176 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.
42
constructivists about agency structure and materialism-idealism.177 Neoclassical realism assumes that anarchy and the distribution of power necessitate the pursuit of security, which is the most important value for states in an anarchic international system.178 Neoclassical realism supposed that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources. Pervasive uncertainty and potential threats are central to anarchy in neoclassical realism.179 Neoclassical realism assumes that an increase in relative material power eventually leads to an expansion in the ambition and scope of a country’s foreign policy, and a decrease in such power eventually leads to a contraction in the ambition and scope of a country’s foreign policy. These processes not only depend on objective material trends but also on how political decision-makers perceive them.180 Neoclassical realist theory links independent, intervening, and dependent variables in a direct causal chain. Thomas J. Christensen stresses that neoclassical realist theory argues domestic politics matter in foreign policy, but it indicates the conditions under which they matter.181 Neoclassical realism supposes that every state’s power and position in the international system and, particularly, its relative share of material capabilities shape its external behavior.182 Neoclassical realists hinge on various indicators of a state’s material capabilities. These indicators include a state’s gross domestic product (GDP), level of annual defense spending (in absolute terms, as a percentage of GDP, or as a percentage of government expenditures), the size and the composition of the armed forces, military research and development, the size of the population, demographic trends within the population, natural resource endowments, and the size of the territory.”183 Moreover, neoclassical realism adopts the “elements of
177 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.152; Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.3, 1997.
178 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.176.
179 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.4, 28.
180 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.167.
181 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp.252.
182 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, pp.482.
183 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp.26-31; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.44.
43
national power,”184 which involves intangible resources such as national morale and the quality of leadership and diplomacy,185 and which distinguishes “power” from “influence.”186 Neoclassical realism maintains that state power differs across states and different historical periods.187
As Gideon Rose wrote in his 1998 review article in World Politics, neoclassical realists contend that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy are driven first by its place in the international system and particularly by its relative material power capabilities, but systemic pressures must be filtered through intervening variables at the unit level.” Unlike offensive neorealists, neoclassical realists argue that the impact of systemic factors on a country’s foreign policy is indirect, and systemic factors affect policy through intervening variables at the unit level.188 Besides, neoclassical realists argue that defensive neorealists’ systemic argument is needed in the introduction of unit-level variables.189 Two intervening variables emphasized by neoclassical realists are decision-makers perceptions and the strength of a country’s state apparatus and its relation to the surrounding society.190 A country’s relative material power capabilities are reviewed to the perceptions of political leaders and elites.191 For instance, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro gives importance to leaders’ process information to explain great power intervention in peripheral regions.192 Leaders who can be constrained by both international and domestic politics face a two-level game: on the other hand, they must respond to the external environment; on the other, they must extract and mobilize resources from domestic society, work through existing domestic institutions, and
184 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, London: SAGE Publications, 2002, pp.185.
185 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.44.
186 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, pp.17-18; Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, pp.6-7.
187 Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” pp.4-8.
188 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.146-47.
189 Walter Carlsnaes, “Foreign Policy,” in Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, London, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002, pp.439.
190 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.157-61.
191 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.146-47.
192 Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery.
44
maintain the support of key stakeholders.193 State officials have some conception of the national interest in the face of potential external threats.194
Neoclassical realism brought the state back into realist foreign policy analysis. This is done by focusing on institutional balances between the FPE and legislature195 or between the FPE and key societal supporters196 or by exploring how systemic incentives are transformed into foreign policy through ideational factors associated with grand strategy, tribalism, or the identity of the states.197 Depending on domestic political arrangements, each state can enact different policy responses to international challenges and extract resources to implement those policy choices.198 International imperatives are filtered through the medium of state structure and affect how top officials assess likely threats, identify strategies in response to those threats, and ultimately extract and mobilize the societal resources necessary to implement and sustain strategies. Unit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states to respond to systemic imperatives.199 While the international system imposes certain pressures on all countries, foreign policy behavior can be explained by unit-level variables such as elite perceptions and domestic political conditions. However, in the final analysis, neoclassical realism agrees with a “top-down” conception of the state, in which systemic factors constrain foreign policy behavior.200
193 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.7; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.152.
194 Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions,” pp.146.
195 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.
196 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model.”
197 Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation”; Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit across the Taiwan Strait.”; Anders Wivel, “From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark's Great Power Politics,” Swiss Political Science Review, Vol.19, No.3, 2013.
198 Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” pp.464-95; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.4, No.4, 2008.
199 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.3-4.
200 Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions,” pp.141; Hermann Margaret G., “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” International Studies Review, Vol.3, No.2, 2001.
45
Table 2: Classical Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical realism201
Underlying causal logic
Power distributions (revisionist vs. status quo) → foreign policy
Relative power distributions (independent v.) → international outcomes (dependent v.)
Relative power distributions (independent v.) → domestic constraints and elite perceptions (intervening v.) → foreign policy (dependent v.)
Dependent variable
Foreign policies of states
International political outcomes
Foreign policies of states
View of
the units
Differentiated
Undifferentiated
Differentiated
View of the international system
Somewhat important
Very important; inherently competitive and uncertain
Important; implications of anarchy are variable and sometimes opaque to decision-makers
Epistemology
and methodology
Inductive theories: detailed historical analysis
Deductive theories; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative and sometimes quantitative methods
Deductive theorizing; competitive hypothesis testing using qualitative methods
Research
program
CLASSICAL REALISM
NEOREALISM
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
201 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.20.
46
Neoclassical realism assumes that domestic factors are of secondary importance. Domestic political arrangements act as intervening variables because domestic political circumstances affect security policy.202 Neoclassical realism seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states – the extractive and mobilization capacity of political-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion – intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue.203 Leaders might conduct foreign policy, considering the domestic audience instead of the international exigencies.204 Threat assessment, strategic adjustment, and policy implementation may necessitate bargaining within the state’s leadership and with other stakeholders within society.205 Thus, neoclassical realists view the states as epitomized by a national security executive charged with making foreign security policy. The FPE perceives systemic constraints and infers the national interest. Nonetheless, political arrangements usually force the executive to bargain with domestic actors to extract resources to implement policy choices. Defining the “national interests,” leaders conduct foreign policy based on their review of relative power and other states’ intentions under the influence of domestic constraints.206 However, limitations on executive autonomy in varied national contexts might undercut their ability to respond as required to shifts in the balance of power. Neoclassical realists consequently consider policy responses as a product of state-society struggle.207 In the last instance, the international environment determines states’ interests and behavior.208 A state’s foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities stemming from the international
202 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, pp.311-47.
203 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.4.
204 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.170-93.
205 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.24-26.
206 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.24-26.
207 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.27.
208 Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” pp.17-18; Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” pp.1-25.
47
system over the long run. The relative amount of material power resources that countries own will form the magnitude and ambition of their foreign policies over the long term.209
1.3. Variations of Neoclassical Realism
The main subject of all the major neoclassical realist studies is the impact of relative power on foreign policy. While type I neoclassical realists view relative power as the ordering principle for international politics.210 Type II neoclassical realists picked up this line of analysis and applied it to a wide range of times and places in order to show how a shift in relative power caused a shift in the foreign policy of a particular state.211 These two types submit domestic politics, leader perceptions, state extraction capacity, state structure, and state strength as intervening variables.212 The first intervening variable is related to perception in international politics. The international environment presents a clear threat, and policy response by states occurs after signals of the international system pass through the transmission belts of leader perception and domestic politics.213 To explain discrepancies from neorealism, type I neoclassical realists realize that either the signals are misunderstood, or national leaders do not respond properly due to domestic political constraints.214
Aaron Friedberg, William Wohlforth, and Thomas Christensen conclude that elite calculations and perceptions of power have an intervening role in systemic imperatives and the formulation of foreign policies.215 William Wohlforth, in his analysis of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, argues that the state adapts to external constraints conditioned by changes in relative power.216 Wohlforth, along with Melvyn P. Leffler, stresses that the two superpowers’ changing relative power drives threat perceptions.217 For Thomas J. Christensen, the US and Chinese foreign policies during the early Cold
209 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.151-52.
210 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.155.
211 Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.
212 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.59-61.
213 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.156-57.
214 Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” Vol.17, No.1, 1992, pp.190-91.
215 Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905; Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War; Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958.
216 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War.
217 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.159.
48
War were driven initially by shifting distributions of power in the international system. The type of national security strategy pursued by them can take one of three values: “over-active (the optimal policy set plus added conflict), preferred (the optimal policy set), and underactive (a suboptimal policy set).”218 Christensen writes, “Underactive policies entail the failure to mobilize domestic power resources or to form effective balancing alliances in the face of rising international threats (e.g., interwar American and British strategies).” On the contrary, for his part, overactive policies include “those that waste valuable resources on areas of peripheral value to national security (e.g., American intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and those that needlessly either increase the number and power of one’s enemies or decrease the number and strength of one’s allies (e.g., Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution).”219
Randall L. Schweller develops a theory of under-balancing that rests on the level of elite and societal divisions in a state facing a rising challenger. His under-balancing theory assumes that elite consensus about external threats determines states’ response or non-response to changes in a state’s strategic environment. Schweller contends, “Balancing behavior requires the existence of a strong consensus among elites that an external threat exists and must be checked by either arms or allies or both.”220 States do not balance against threats when there is: “(i) significant elite disagreement in terms of threat perception; (ii) elite consensus that a threat exists, but disagreement over the appropriate remedy… or (iii) elite consensus to adopt other policy options such as appeasement, band-wagoning, buck-passing, or bilateral or multilateral binding strategies.”221 The first two influence the state’s willingness to balance, and the last depicts the state’s ability to extract resources. In other words, the degree of consensus or fragmentation at the elite and the societal levels can cause inappropriate balancing behavior. The level of elite consensus and cohesion will influence the assessment of the leadership of the nature and extent of foreign threats and response to them. Moreover, the level of social cohesion
218 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.13-14.
219 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.14.
220 Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security, Vol.29, No.2, 2004, pp.170-71; Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, pp.47-48.
221 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, pp.49.
49
reflects the degree of political and social integration. According to Schweller, states characterized by high levels of divisions and fragmentation among elites and societal actors tend to under-balancing.222 To illustrate, he shows the French failure to prepare for a war against Germany before World War I and the failure of British and French appeasement of Germany in the 1930s.223
The second intervening variable stressed by Type I and Type II neoclassical realism is “the strength of a country’s state apparatus and its relation to the surrounding society.”224 Not all states can direct policy on their own in the face of opposition from domestic interest groups and societal veto players.225 For this reason, Fareed Zakaria and Thomas Christensen distinguish between national power, which comprises the economic, technological, and human resources within society, and state power, which reflects a state’s ability to mobilize those resources for the sake of policy.226 Consequently, governments may not have the ability to extract and direct the resources of their societies. Zakaria states that the degree of harmony between state and society, the level of political and social cohesion within the state, public support for general foreign policy, and competition among societal coalitions to capture the state can influence state leaders’ ability to extract, mobilize, and harness the nation’s power.227 For instance, during the late 1940s and 1950s, both the American and the Chinese leadership were forced to mobilize national resources to respond to perceived shifts in the international balance of power, particularly for mobilization against the USSR.228 However, they lacked sufficient national political power, defined as “a key intervening variable between the international challenges facing the nation and the strategies adopted by the state to meet those challenges.”229 American and Chinese politicians used domestically popular policies to
222 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, pp.11-13.
223 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, pp.159-201.
224 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.161.
225 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
226 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.14-22; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, pp.37-39.
227 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, pp.39-40.
228 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.245.
229 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.11, 13.
50
incite conflict with each other.230 In addition, Friedberg, Schweller, and Taliaferro each assume an intervening role for domestic institutions, regime vulnerability, and extractive capacity in shaping states’ responses to changes in their external environments. For Friedberg’s part, the weak state institutions, the material interests of societal actors, and anti-statist ideology shaped the United States’ military strategy during the early Cold War.231 Especially, an American anti-statist ideology constrained the range of policy options under consideration in return for the perceived threat of the USSR.232 According to Schweller, the likelihood that states can balance against a foreign adversary depends on the regime’s vulnerability or the government’s vulnerability to removal from office.233 Finally, Taliaferro contends that the ability of states to emulate strategies of great power depends on levels of external vulnerability as filtered through the extractive and mobilization capacity of existing state institutions. The extractive capacity of state institutions, the degree of state-sponsored nationalism, and statist or anti-statist ideology shape states’ response to external vulnerability.234 Taliaferro stresses that states engage in costly interventions in regions for their core interests and insist on failing interventions. US interventions in the Korean and Vietnam wars and the USSR’s war in Afghanistan can be given as an example.235
The second type of neoclassical realism explains more foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustments than anomalies. When states are faced with clear threats, states behave as neorealism expects, but when the states are not faced with a clear threat, states often have a range of policy options rather than an optimal policy dictated by international circumstances.236 Under these circumstances, states’ choices are concerned with the world views of leaders, their strategic cultures, the nature of the domestic coalitions, and domestic political constraints. At this point, Steven Lobell argues that when German, Japanese, Russian, and American contenders posed a challenge to British hegemony in
230 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958, pp.6.
231 Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, pp.245-95.
232 Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, pp.22.
233 Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” pp.46-48.
234 Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War.”
235 Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” pp.215-22.
236 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism.”
51
the late nineteenth century, there was uncertainty as to how British grand strategy should respond. The degree of threat posed by each challenger and policy responses to that threat is a function of the competition of domestic political coalitions.237 In addition, Mark Brawley argues that British, French, and Soviet foreign policies in the 1920s were concerned about a resurgent Germany, but they could adopt different policy responses due to their strategic situations and their domestic political constraints.238 Dueck contends that policymakers choose policies that reflect culturally acceptable preferences to maintain domestic political support. Thus, strategic culture conditions the specific patterns of change and continuity.239
According to Steven Lobell, state-society relations, and especially societal competition between broad inward and outward-oriented coalitions (e.g., economic nationalist and free trade blocs), influence a declining hegemon’s grand strategic policies. There is a domestic political balance of power between them. Just as the state’s orientation strengthens some societal actors, any reversals in the rising states can strengthen the opposing societal group and thereby alter the domestic balance of power.240 Moreover, Norrin M. Ripsman argues that structural constraints such as a division of powers, checks and balances, and public support restrict democratic leaders and make it difficult for them to go to war. However, democracies vary in terms of checks and balances on their FPEs; thus, it is required to examine their institutional differences.241 In a democratic policy, significant institutional rules were pertinent to the autonomy of the executive and its relationship to the legislature and the bureaucracy.242 In non-democratic states, domestic institutions determine the leadership’s scope of authority and to what extent it must consult or respect key societal interests, such as the military or important business
237 Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, 135-208; Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, pp.43-85.
238 Brawley, “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies Toward Germany between the World Wars (1919-1939),” pp.81-89.
239 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy.
240 Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, pp.19-41; Steven E. Lobell, “Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain's Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903–1906, 1917–1923, 1930–1932,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.43, No.4, 1999.
241 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Peacemaking and Democratic Peace Theory: Public Opinion as an Obstacle to Peace in Post- Conflict Situation,” Democracy and Security, Vol.3, No.1, 2007.
242 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.6.
52
elites.243 Ripsman argues that the degree of structural autonomy of FPEs influences their independence from both legislative and popular opposition. However, Ripsman contends that constrained democratic leaders can pursue strategies to gain independence from political and societal opponents.244 Less autonomous states often build coalitions and make compromises to mobilize political and social actors to enact policy.245
Ripsman et al. refer to Type I and Type II neoclassical realism as “theories that explain foreign policy deviations from structural realist baselines” and “theories that suggest general models of foreign policy behavior,” respectively, and then present their ‘Type III’ neoclassical realist theory that seeks to explain how the international system and foreign policy affect one another.246 The third type of neoclassical realism, termed by Ripsman, Lobell, and Taliaferro, includes not only states’ foreign policy choices (the dependent variable of Types I and II neoclassical realism) but also international outcomes that these policy choices and the systemic structure interact with.247 Type III Neoclassical realism’s independent variables are the relative distribution of capabilities and polarity; the structural modifiers of geography, the rate of technological diffusion, and offense-defense balance; the relative clarity of threats and opportunities, time horizons, and strategies; and the relative permissiveness/restrictiveness of the strategic environment.248 Policy selection is affected by domestic-level intervening variables. Its intervening variables are leader images that intervene in inaccurate perceptions, the strategic culture that shapes state responses, state-society relations that affect the state’s ability to implement decisions, and domestic political institutions that can enable or constrain state leaders who face societal opposition to policy selection or implementation.249
243 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.70-77.
244 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.6-7.
245 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-57.
246 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 28; Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” pp.190-91; Sears, “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers,” pp.23.
247 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.80.
248 Sears, “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers,” pp.23.
249 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.33-34.
53
Leaders’ core values, beliefs, and images act as cognitive filters that elicit how they process information. The information about the outside world passes through cognitive filters. In addition, cognitive factors, a leader’s personality, and character can have a bearing on a state’s response to systemic pressures. Also, a leader’s operational codes can play a part in national foreign policy responses. An operational code consists of a set of master beliefs that help a leader get information.250 It is significant to distinguish between the real distribution of power and elites’ perceptions of the balance of power. The second set of intervening variables is a country’s strategic culture. There are two differentiations in terms of strategic culture. They are organizational culture, such as that of the military, and expectations of society.251 Schweller contends that fascism, as a nationalist culture, was favorable for the demands of an anarchic environment since it eased war mobilization for Germany, Italy, and Japan before World War II.252 In addition, strategic culture might prevent the state from responding to external challenges and opportunities, leading the state to pursue policies that jeopardize its primary security interests.253 The third intervening variable is state-society relations, which means “the character of interactions between the central institutions of the state and various economic and or societal groups.” The harmony or disharmony between the FPE and key societal interests or the public affects whether the policy satisfies domestic interests or international ones. The last intervening variable includes state structure and domestic political institutions. Formal institutions, organizational routines and processes, and bureaucracy determine who can contribute to policy formation and who blocks policy initiatives. The domestic institutions variable is important to respond to systemic pressures since structural impediments such as a division of power and checks and balances constrain democratic leaders. In non-
250 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.66.; Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision- Making,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.13, No.2, 1969, pp.190-222; Jack S. Levy, “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision- Making,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.307.
251 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.66.
252 Schweller, “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics.”
253 Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, Chapter 2.
54
democratic states, domestic institutions determine the leadership’s consultation and respect for key societal interests, such as the military or important business elites.254
Type III neoclassical realists submit that the above-noted intervening variables affect the three domestic processes, which include perception, decision-making, and policy implementation. Perception is conditioned by both international factors and leader images and strategic culture. Decision-making and policy implementation are determined by strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic political institutions. The intervening variables can have a bearing on the dependent variable to varying degrees over time. For example, leader perceptions affect short-term foreign policy decision-making because the FPE breaks up the societal actors due to time constraints, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions' influence in the medium and long term.255 Strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions are about domestic processes.256 In short-term crisis decision-making, ‘leadership images’ would have a greater influence, while unit-level process variables would have more influence in the medium-to-long term.257 Finally, its dependent variables are crisis decision-making, foreign policy, grand strategic adjustment, systemic outcomes, and structural change.258
Ripsman et al. (2016) stress four factors limiting states’ response to changing international circumstances: the ability of leaders to perceive systemic stimuli correctly, the lack of clarity in the international system, the problem of rationality, and the difficulty of mobilizing domestic resources.259 First, when state leaders perceive systemic stimuli incorrectly, a state’s national security posture is derived from its leaders’ personalities, beliefs, and images rather than systemic constraints and opportunities. Second, the international system is not always clear about threats and opportunities.260 Third, thereof,
254 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.70-77.
255 Steven E. Lobell, “The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War,” International Interactions, Vol.32, No.1, 2006; Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables”; Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” pp.319.
256 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.59-61.
257 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.649.
258 Sears, “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers,” pp.23.
259 Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables.”
260 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.20-25.
55
leaders do not always pursue a rational policy to respond to systemic stimuli.261 Fourth, states must bargain with domestic interest groups and societal veto players to mobilize domestic resources.262 Type III neoclassical realists agree that there are systemic, but not structural, factors that both affect the interaction of units and determine the types of levels of interaction. They submit the term “structural modifier” to indicate material variables at the level of an international system or a regional sub-system. These involve geography, the rates of technological diffusion, and the offense-defense balance in military technologies. These factors can alter the effect of the system’s structure on the variables of interactions and the foreign policy behavior of individual units. In addition, they contend structural modifiers do not influence the behavior of all states in the system equally.263 The structure of the international system and structural modifiers modify the parameters of states’ strategies and bargaining outcomes among those states. The relative distribution of power and power trends, which are the explanatory variables, are shaped by structural modifiers.264 Neoclassical realist theory embraces the elements of the national power approach, which regards power as an end and distinguishes “power” from “influence.”265 Recently, the morphogenetic approach to foreign policy was appealed to introduce the time dimension to classify both the relative weight of system-structural and unit-level factors and the dynamic and reciprocal interplay between them.266
Table 3: Type I, Type II, and Type III Neoclassical Realist Models
Type I
Type II
Type III
Independent
Variables
Systemic imperatives in the anarchical international system
Relative distribution of power in the anarchical international system and in the particular
The structure of the anarchical international system,
261 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, pp.2.
262 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.20-25; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
263 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.39-40.
264 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.43.
265 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.44.
266 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.649.
56
region, international threat situation
Structural modifiers
Intervening Variables
Leader perception,
Domestic politics
Domestic political coalitions,
Leader and Elite perceptions and calculations of relative power, domestic decision-making environment (certainty or ambiguity),
States’ extractive and mobilization capacity
Leader Images,
Strategic Culture,
State-Society Relations,
Domestic Institutions
Dependent Variables
Cases of deviations from structural realist expectations
Foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustment
Policy choices made by states
Type III neoclassical realists view the term polarity as “a function of the relative distribution of capabilities among the major states in the system.”267 Neoclassical realism has two systemic variables: the relative levels of clarity and uncertainty and the nature of a state’s strategic environment. Clarity includes three elements. The first element is the
267 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.45.
57
balance between clear threat and opportunity. Clear threats possess three components: (1) revisionism or expressed hostility to the state’s core interest; (2) the economic and military capability to damage the state; and (3) “a sense of imminence” (expectations about the state’s capability to damage immediately). Clear opportunities involve (1) “evidence that relative capabilities favor the state in question,” (2) evidence that other parties do not have the political resolve to encounter the state’s moves in question, and (3) evidence that “a favorable balance of capabilities and resolve will not persist indefinitely.” The second element of clarity is time horizons. Leaders have difficulty estimating adversary capabilities and intentions due to time horizons. The third element is clarity of options. The international system seldom provides clarity about optimal policy responses because it usually delimits the states’ options.268 The more clarity there is, the greater the degree of clarity should be about the nature of threats and opportunities, the time frame, and the optimal responses. In contrast, the less clarity there is, the greater room there is for specific leaders, parties, and states to pursue policy.269 When the international system does not provide states with clear information on power relations, state leaders are confused. Wohlforth, for instance, argues that after World War II, US and Soviet leaders disagreed about whether American economic superiority or the USSR’s advantage in conventional forces had more importance.270
Neoclassical realists think of uncertainty as an output of both agency and structure. They adopt that clarity about each state’s external environment changes across time and conclude that uncertainty is both inherent in international politics and results from “the interaction of imperfect agents with an international system.”271 While clarity and uncertainty relate to the scope of information, the nature of a state’s strategic environment bears upon the content of that information. Ripsman et al. purport:
“The more imminent the threat or opportunity and the more dangerous the threat (or the more enticing the opportunity), the more restrictive the state’s strategic environment is. Conversely, the more remote the threat or
268 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.46-48.
269 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.49-50.
270 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, pp.129-37.
271 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.51.
58
opportunity and the less intense the threat or opportunity, the more permissive the strategic environment is.”272
States might inhabit four possible worlds, changing along two dimensions: “the clarity of the international system regarding threats, opportunities, and the national interests; and the degree of information it provides on how best to respond to these structural conditions.” In World 1, international constraints are clear, and states’ policies to respond to them are clear, so societal actors should influence foreign policy. In World 2, the international system offers clear information about the types of threats and opportunities, but it does not provide clear information about optimal types of strategies states should pursue. Therefore, domestic political factors, such as coalition politics, determine the foreign security policy response. There is less structural determinism in World 2 than in World 1. In World 3, the international system provides ambiguous information about constraints and opportunities. Therefore, the national interest of states and proper foreign policies to maximize them are determined by unit-level factors. Nonetheless, World 3 is not consistent with realism. Finally, the international system in World 4 provides unclear threats and opportunities, yet policy responses are clear. Neoclassical realism is not useful for explaining the behavior of states in World 4.273
Many states or regimes might not function as “unitary” actors. Elite perceptions about the nature and extent of international threats, persistent divisions within the leadership, social cohesion, and the regime’s vulnerability to overthrow constrain the response of the state to systemic pressures.274 James McAllister argues that the early postwar international system was not bipolar; officials in Washington and Moscow perceived it as “a latent tripolar system” until the mid-1950s, since American and Soviet leaders alike expected “the reemergence of Germany as a great European power.”275 Neoclassical realists identify elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints as intervening variables between international pressures and states’ foreign policies. Relative power shapes how states define their interests and pursue ends.276 Competitive
272 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.52.
273 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism,” pp.282-87.
274 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.27-28.
275 James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-54, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.10-11.
276 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.28.
59
pressures and socialization effects shape the internal composition of states.277 Since neorealism makes no assertions about how domestic variables influence the way states assess and adapt to threats or opportunities in their environment, neoclassical realism conveniently utilizes Innenpolitik dynamics to explain specific foreign policy decisions.278
A state’s policy response depends on its domestic political arena, which can influence an FPE’s perception of the international environment, decision-making procedures, and the ability to implement selected policies.279 The FPE has three sets of aims: (1) to protect the state’s physical survival and political autonomy; (2) to sustain its power position; and (3) to advocate for all other ideological, religious, political, social, and economic goals they may possess. The FPE is expected to prioritize the first set of goals. However, the FPE may focus on the second and third sets in a permissive international security environment. Moreover, when they face the immediate threat of losing power, they may trade off security interests to strengthen their domestic power positions if the damage to national security is not great.280 The FPE’s menu for action is conditioned by systemic constraints before action, and systemic factors enable actors to change the course of their action, producing subsequent systemic inputs.281 The FPE decision is more likely to satisfy state preferences and the demands of the external environments when foreign policymakers are insulated from key societal interests.282 Balci et al. state that it is important to characterize the FPE of states and to determine what kind of hierarchy exists among members of the FPE and which member(s) have disproportionate influence over decisions. They take into account back-door deals with foreign missions and foreign
277 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” pp.30.
278 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.646.
279 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.33-34.
280 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Correspondence: Neoclassical Realism and Its Critics,” International Security, Vol.43, No.2, 2018, pp.198.
281 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.650.
282 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.648.
60
penetration into the FPE.283 States will pursue balancing rather than under-balancing or bandwagon strategies and opt for internal balancing over external balancing.284
1.4. Threat Identification Model of Type II Neoclassical Realism
The central questions of the neoclassical realist agenda are: How do states perceive international threats? Which domestic actors are the most important in the threat definition? What happens when domestic actors and interests disagree on the nature of threats? Neoclassical realism can account for which states will balance when they balance or why they fail to counterbalance.285 Lobell suggests a neoclassical realist theory of threat assessment to fill this gap neglected by neorealism, while Ripsman focuses on the impact of domestic political forces on foreign policy through structural autonomy.
For neoclassical realist theory, the state is an intervening variable between the international system and foreign policy. The “state” can be motivated by regime survival instead of national survival, and small group dynamics and loss aversion can affect the decision-making process of the FPE.286 To examine constraints on threat assessment, Lobell asks three questions: “How do states assess threats, who are some of the relevant domestic actors, and what happens when state and societal leaders disagree about whether a foreign state is a threat?” He contends that the degree of consensus among the FPE and key societal supporters about foreign threats will affect the efficiency and appropriateness of counterbalancing behavior. Second, he argues that when identifying a foreign threat, what matters are shifts in specific components of the rising state’s power rather than shifts in aggregate power alone. Finally, when the consensus among FPE and key societal supporters (i.e., foreign security policy coalition) over a shift in a component of the power of another state, the FPE is unconstrained, and efficient counterbalancing can occur. When no consensus among FPE and key societal supporters occurs over a shift in a component of the power of a foreign country, the FPE is constrained.287
283 Balci et al., “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” pp.647.
284 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, pp.146.
285 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.42.
286 Lobell, “The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War”; Mohammed Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.33, No.1, 1989.
287 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45-46.
61
Lobell develops a threat identification model for threat assessment. The state, and specifically the FPE, focuses outward on the systemic and sub-systemic balance of power (where states compete) and inward on the domestic balance of power (where societal blocs compete). Threats stem from other great powers and extra-regional actors, regional powers in the locale, or domestic opponents. The FPE, thus, assesses threats at the systemic, sub-systemic, and domestic levels. Leaders frequently act on one level, but they aim to influence the outcome on another level, as the boundary lines of the systemic-sub-systemic-domestic tiers are blurred and interrelated.288 Moreover, regions are semi-autonomous but not independent of the global Great Power system and domestic politics. Great Powers can create new threats and opportunities for local states by entailing shifts in the regional distribution of power. Furthermore, competition occurs between the major regional powers for leadership or hegemony over the locale.289
Foreign policy decision-makers and societal leaders respond to shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities that might pose threats to specific strategies and interests. A foreign state is viewed as threatening if shifts in specific components of its power, including territory, population, ideology, industry, or naval and air power, threaten other states. Furthermore, Lobell contends that different components of power present different threats to societal actors in other states.290 State leaders focus on shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities that threaten specific strategic interests.291
The FPE can act externally to manipulate the political and economic power within their society by implementing a foreign policy to manipulate domestic actors and interest groups in other states.292 Domestic actors who are strengthened or weakened by a foreign state press on their government to support their preferred policy. In addition, the FPE can act at the global level, defying the great powers to gain status among regional competitors. Even the FPE can act locally to pull reluctant extra-regional great powers into the conflict until all are involved.293 The FPE is responsible for the identification of changes in the
288 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.46-47.
289 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.47-51.
290 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.54-55.
291 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.62.
292 Steven E. Lobell, “The Second Face of Security: Britain's ‘Smart’ Appeasement Policy towards Japan and Germany,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.7, No.1, 2007, pp.74-75.
293 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.51-54.
62
global and regional balance of power and owns private information and a monopoly on intelligence about foreign countries, but factors such as political and social cohesion, public support for foreign policy objectives, and the quality of a government and administrative competence affect whether states harness their nation power.294
Table 4: A Complex Threat Identification Model295
Exogenous shift
Systemic/sub-systemic
and domestic ramifications
FPE
Threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “A”
Shift in a component power of a foreign state
FPE and societal leaders identify component as a threat (enables coalition)
Unconstrained
Highly efficient threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “B”
Shift in a component power of a foreign state
FPE and societal leaders identify component as a threat (enables coalition)
Limited to moderate constraints
Efficient to limited threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “C”
Shift in a component power of a foreign state
FPE identify component as a threat, but societal supporters do not identify component as a threat (disables coalition)
Constrained
There is no threat assessment and no counterbalancing
or
Inefficient threat assessment and counterbalancing
Societal elites made up of outward-oriented internationalists or inward-leaning nationalists, seek to lobby government policies that strengthen their bloc’s interests at the expense of the opposing faction’s interests and even the nation’s interests. Accordingly, societal leaders (i.e., socioeconomic leaders) are primarily concerned about immediate
294 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.56.
295 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.69.
63
shifts in the domestic balance of political power.296 That is why they do not engage in branding a foreign state as a “national” threat in which state and societal elites might possess a different “evoked set” of concerns related to an ascending foreign power. Societal leaders, maximizing their blocs’ interests, consider whether the shift in foreign states’ components of power threatens their firms, sectors, or factors of production. Societal coalitions are composed of two domestic coalitions: internationalist and nationalist. They have conflicting interests as their policy choices are shaped by their international or domestic orientation.297 The internationalist coalition is named after the internationally competitive sectors plus outward-leaning allies. They possess investments abroad and strong international links. Supporters favor heightened participation in the international system. They benefit from greater economic, political, and military engagement in the international system.298 On the contrary, the nationalist coalition is defined as domestically oriented groups and contest campaigns for greater international engagement as it erodes their constituents’ domestic power and position. They favor limiting international involvement by restricting military spending to the defense of the homeland, limiting foreign aid, and avoiding international commitments and entanglements.299
Changes in the domestic and international environment may push members to defect or join the ranks of the opposing bloc. Shifts in an element of the power of a foreign state push nationalist and internationalist elites to engage in political calculations about how threat assessment and counterbalancing affect their relative domestic power and position. Societal leaders can seek to brand states that have a component of power as a national threat and get the FPE balanced against the foreign state for their constituency. Societal leaders can affect the mobilization process because elites encourage or discourage their constituencies from providing support and resources for balancing. Societal elites use
296 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45, 51, 74.
297 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.57-58.
298 Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.26-29; Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of US National Security Policy, 1949–51, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp.3.
299 Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of US National Security Policy, 1949–51, pp.3-4; Lobell, “The Second Face of Security: Britain's ‘Smart’ Appeasement Policy towards Japan and Germany,” pp.78.
64
threat identification and counterbalancing to accelerate and expand the internal redistribution of political power. Hence, societal leaders might challenge a policy because it will weaken their coalitional interest, even though it is in the national interest. The domestic process entails three calculations:
“(1) Nationalist and internationalist elites recognize that shifts in an element of power of a foreign state can enable some societal actors and disable others; (2) nationalist and internationalist elites understand the domestic stakes involved in threat identification; (3) nationalist and internationalist elites know that counterbalancing a foreign threat will also create internal winners and losers.”300
Unconstrained FPE: scenario “A” and scenario “B”
In evaluating threats, the FPE is exposed to restraints and inducements that are derived at the systemic, sub-systemic, and domestic levels. In case forces at each level converge, the FPE is unconstrained in its threat identification and in implementing its counterbalancing foreign policy (scenario “A” and scenario “B”). When forces at each level diverge, the FPE is restrained in its threat identification (scenario “C”). In scenario “A,” the FPE is least restrained in identifying a foreign state as a threat (and counterbalancing against it). At all three levels, there is consensus that foreign power is an adequate danger. At the systemic-sub-systemic level, the FPE branded a component of the power of the foreign state as a threat to the national interest. At the domestic level, both internationalist and nationalist leaders brand different elements of the power of the same foreign state as a threat to their “parochial” interests, as neither nationalist nor internationalist elites believe that identifying the state as a threat or counterbalancing it will redistribute the domestic balance of power. In scenario “B,” the FPE is more restrained than in scenario “A,” nevertheless mostly free to identify foreign threats.301 At the systemic-sub-systemic level, differentials in growth rates entailed the FPE branding a component of the power of the foreign states as a threat to the national interest. At the domestic level, while the FPE’s societal supporters identify a component of the power of the foreign state as a threat to
300 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.57, 60-61.
301 Domestic institutions, regime type, and politics can affect whether the FPE can insulate itself from interest group pressure.
65
their parochial interests, the opposition does not see the same component of power or other components as a danger. If the opposition has strong ties to state leaders or can argue that the component of power is not a general threat to the national interest, they can moderate the FPE’s threat identification. In scenario “B,” systemic, sub-systemic, and domestic forces converge; the FPE can target societal blocs. Identifying and balancing against the foreign state might redistribute societal power by empowering the FPE’s domestic supporters and by weakening the FPE’s societal opponents. Thereby, the FPE can act as a “kingmaker” and implement foreign policies, which empower some societal groups to the detriment of others. Nevertheless, the subsequent counterbalancing might be inappropriate. The FPE and its societal supporters might neglect a threatening state that does not possess certain components of power, or they might brand a non-threatening state as a threat that owns certain components of power.302
Constrained FPE: scenario “C”
When a shift in a component of power, a foreign state disables a foreign policy coalition, the FPE is restrained in its threat assessment. There is disagreement among the FPE and its key societal supporters about whether the foreign state is a danger. In scenario “C,” the FPE identifies a component of the power of the foreign state as a threat, but the FPE’s societal supporters do not brand the element as a threat to their parochial interests. Societal leaders lobby the FPE to downplay the foreign state as a threat. In other instances, it is possible that the FPE will not view a component of power as a threat but that societal elites will brand it as a danger. In this example, societal elites will lobby the FPE to identify the state as a national threat. If societal leaders possess strong ties to the FPE, the result is delayed, slow, or inefficient threat identification (and counterbalancing). The FPE’s societal supporters or the opposing societal bloc/s are interested in threat assessment because it alters the internal balance of power. If the FPE favors defending the domestic position of its key societal supporters, this choice will permit a shift in the international or regional balance of power.303
Restraints on threat assessment can contribute to inappropriate balancing when: (1) leaders respond to the wrong elements or to shifts in particular capabilities that pose a
302 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.64-65.
303 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.66-67.
66
threat to specific domestic groups; (2) increases in a component of relative power do not threaten the opposing state’s societal interests equally; (3) the FPE’s response is shaped by the domestic distributional outcome of foreign policy.” 304 First, the FPE might focus on a component of power instead of aggregate power and under or overreact to external threats. Second, societal elites do not identify emerging states that do not have specific threatening components as hostile. Third, inappropriate balancing can emerge when leaders act on one level; however, the aim is to affect the consequences of the game(s) played on another level.305
1.5. Strategic Adjustment Model of Type II Neoclassical Realism
Neorealist theory neglects the impact of domestic political forces (such as public opinion, the legislature, and privileged interest groups) on foreign security policy. Norrin M. Ripsman, in his chapter, asks five critical questions about the role of domestic actors in determining policy: (1) Which domestic actors are important in foreign policy making? (2) Under what international circumstances will they have the most significant influence? (3) Under what domestic conditions will domestic actors have the most significant influence? (4) In what types of states will they matter most? (5) How is their influence likely to manifest itself?”306
After all, he draws forth a few assumptions. First, Ripsman does not treat domestic groups or actors separately in that they directly or indirectly influence policymaking.307 Second, even non-democratic states must take into account the demands of powerful political actors, such as the military, economic elites, and the public as a whole, if they seek to remain in power.308 Third, domestic actors who are motivated by personal, parochial, or domestic political motivations may attempt to influence the decisions of the FPE, while the FPE determines its policy in tune with international constraints and incentives. Finally, leaders are interested in preserving their domestic political position. The international system plays a dominant role in shaping decisions; international factors are
304 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.68.
305 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.68-71.
306 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.170.
307 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.170; Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, pp.32-39.
308 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.171.
67
filtered through the domestic political environment. Hence, states disparately respond to common international pressures.309
Domestic actors consist of the public, members of the legislature, many businesses, political institutions, ethnic groups, and the media. In non-democratic states or quasi-democratic regimes that do not have institutionalized democratic stability, the leadership’s desire to hold on to power comes under affecting attempts from two types of actors; they are kingmakers who can select, back, or eject leaders and groups, such as the military, which possess the capability to lead a coup or organized revolt against the regime.310 Domestic actors with the ability to frustrate the government’s agenda can bargain with the FPE over the content of security policy. In democratic states, the legislature may be able to influence policy choices, as it can act as a “veto player” over policy if no concessions are made to its demands. In non-democratic states, potential veto players, such as powerful bureaucratic actors, religious leaders, or the military, manipulate their power to extract policy concessions. Domestic actors can shape the mindset of the FPE by influencing the interpretation of international circumstances and helping identify national interests.311
Domestic actors and interest groups affect foreign security policy during stable periods when the state faces a low-threat international environment. In high-threat environments, the risks to the state and its survival are paramount; the FPE has strong incentives to neglect domestic political interests to secure the state. Conversely, in a low-threat environment, the costs of letting domestic actors contribute to the making of national security policy are low. Under these circumstances, the FPE is willing to make concessions to powerful actors and interests that can help it either retain power or contribute to its overthrow.312
In domestic circumstances, governmental vulnerability is the first variable conditioning the influence of domestic groups. If an electoral defeat, a military coup, or some other form of de-selection is imminent, the FPE strengthens its position by buying off a
309 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-44; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.172-73.
310 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.179-83.
311 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.184-85; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
312 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.186.
68
powerful interest group or the public in democratic governments. A non-democratic regime also considers domestic actors. Apart from governmental vulnerability, the degrees of both executive certainty and national consensus about policy affect the importance of domestic actors. If there is no executive certainty or national consensus, domestic actors have little room to maneuver. Conversely, when ambiguity reigns in the policy environment, a domestic actor can act as a policy entrepreneur and shape policy.313
Table 5: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment
The FPE influences
International Circumstance
In High Threat Environment
Domestic Circumstance
(The degrees of both executive certainty and national consensus)
Certainty
The High Level of Structural Autonomy
Domestic Actors influence
International Circumstance
In Low Threat Environment
Domestic Circumstance
(Governmental vulnerability)
Ambiguity
The Low Level of Structural Autonomy
Structural autonomy is the key variable enhancing the influence of domestic actors on national security policy. Domestic actors influence states whose executives own low levels of structural autonomy. A state’s domestic decision-making environment - comprised of its institutional structures and decision-making procedures - determines to what extent its national security policy executive is insulated from its domestic opposition.314 Autonomy varies both across states and within the same state over time. Both democracies and non-democratic states differ in the level of autonomy they have in
313 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89.
314 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50.
69
the national security area.315 For example, the executives of Fourth Republic France or contemporary Israel, both of which are/were comprised of fragile coalitions of poorly disciplined parties, possess less foreign policy autonomy than postwar Great Britain, with its strong one-party majorities.316 Thus, a structurally constrained non-democratic leader, such as Khrushchev, may have even less autonomy to conduct policy than a highly autonomous democratic foreign security policy executive, such as the American national security state during the early Cold War. Relative autonomy, therefore, is more critical than regime type.317 States with structurally autonomous executives respond to international threats as structural realists expect; states with non-autonomous executives are unable to respond effectively to systemic imperatives in the face of domestic opposition.318
Whether in democratic or non-democratic states, insulation from societal elites and institutions shields the leader from their policy demands. It is possible to see how structural autonomy affects the influence of domestic groups. When a democratic executive is independent of the legislature, it not only minimizes the interference of the legislature but also reduces the impact of public opinion that filters through to the executive indirectly by means of the legislature. Even in a non-democratic state, a non-autonomous FPE comes under the influence of the demands of domestic actors.319 Domestic actors may substantially impact policy choices when the international threat situation is low, when the leader’s hold on power is weak, and when the FPE lacks structural autonomy. Domestic actors can affect the timing and the style of a state’s national security policies rather than the definition of national interests unless the state inhabits a security-abundant environment.320
315 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.189.
316 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model.”
317 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.190.
318 Ripsman, “The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy,” pp.44.
319 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.189.
320 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.192.
70
2. CHAPTER TWO: THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF THE IRAQI MONARCHICAL REGIME (1952-1958) TOWARD THE BAGHDAD PACT
2.1. The Domestic Decision-Making Environment of the Hashemite Monarchy
From 1950 to the demise of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958, the politics of Iraq was dominated by the struggle between the Iraq-centered, pro-West Hashemite regime and pan-Arab nationalism.321 The ruling circle in the monarchical regime extended to the leaders of tribes and other feudal lords who, due to their economic interests, were symbiotically tied to the old politicians who, along with the British, were responsible for cementing and enhancing the sheiks’ economic power. The sheiks had parliamentary representation, which in the 1950s never fell under 35 percent, to use this to their advantage in the legislation of laws. When the sheiks sabotaged the issues of property taxes and land reform through their presence in Parliament and alliance with the ruling elites, several parliamentarians urged Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah to intervene on this issue on their behalf. The prince, however, was sensitive to the sheiks’ demands and interests. Following the riots of 1952, a revolt against British influence on Iraq, the prince insisted that the agriculture portfolio should be given to Haj Raih al-’Attiya, a sheik of a large southern tribe whom the prince counted as a loyal supporter.322 In 1954, the Minister of Finance, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Uzri, introduced a fairer land distribution among the sheiks and peasants. The prince, however, took the sheiks’ side, explaining to Uzri that public interest would be disturbed by alienating them as they presented a crucial pillar of political order “to stop the revolutionary tides that threaten the security and stability of the country.”323 Domestic actors motivated by domestic political incentives to preserve their domestic position may attempt to influence the decisions of the FPE.324 The opposite societal groups tried to gain credibility in the domestic balance of political power to the detriment of the sheiks, the latter forced the Iraq ruling elite to obstruct the attempt.
321 John F. Robertson, Iraq, London: Oneworld Publications, 2015, pp.518.
322 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.151-52.
323 Al-Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-'Iraq, 1930–1958, pp.454-57.
324 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-44; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.172-73.
71
The British embassy in Iraq promoted through the palace the appointment of governments that would implement specific policies rather than interfere in government business. Nuri could exclude British embassy influence from Iraqi politics after 1954, preferring to increase the number of British advisers in Iraq.325 The British Embassy advocated reform of the laws regarding socioeconomic conditions among tribal holdings, including new taxes on feudal landowners. Supported by Nuri al-Sa’id, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah confronted British pressure, arguing that they relied on the support of the sheiks, the only important segment of the monarchical order. Consequently, the rulers of the monarchy suspending al-Uzri’s bill alienated a broader social milieu, the urban middle class.326 Such Nuri’s mistrust of change and his unwillingness to effect a generational transformation had frustrated Great Britain that as early as 1943, the British Ambassador alerted Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah to the stagnation of the ruling elite. A decade and a half later, as the Ambassador warned, people’s discontent in Iraq took violent forms.327
Therefore, there was a weak relationship between the Iraqi ruling elite and Britain. Britain’s unwillingness to grant loans made Iraqi politicians believe it was attempting to pressure them to change their Palestinian policy, especially to reopen the Haifa pipeline.328 While Iraq refused to ratify the Treaty of Portsmouth that would redefine the British influence on Iraq and its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, Britain granted Iraq a substantial loan to prevent an imminent administrative collapse and the possible rise to power of anti-British elements in Iraq.329 For example, Britain could preserve its dominant position in Iraq by helping the regime deal with the severe crisis of 1948-49. Yet the government still lacked a broad base of support a decade later, and its demise was to end the British ascendancy in Iraq.330
325 Matthew Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, London: I. B. Tauris, 1996, pp.159, 62.
326 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.152-53.
327 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.150.
328 During the war in Palestine, Iraq had halted the flow of oil through the 12-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa to impede any of it from falling into the hands of Jews, although the action reduced Iraqi oil exports from 4 million tons per year to 2 million tons per year, which deprived Iraq of £1 million per year in royalties. See Daniel Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp.188.
329 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp. 201.
330 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp. 202.
72
Even if he was not in power, Nuri played an influential role behind the political scene.331 As Charles Tripp states, Nuri dominated all the instruments of state power at his disposal during the 1950s.332 He pursued domestic and foreign policies in his way, despite problems with the regent and challenges from the elite and the political circles of the Iraqi political public. Nuri perceived the political world on two levels; he consolidated alliances, coopted and coaxed potential adversaries, or, if needed, deterred and destroyed uncompromising opponents.333 Thanks to his party, he strengthened his support in parliament. He extended his vast patronage network into areas previously dominated by his political allies because it incorporated most of the tribal sheiks in the parliamentary who had hitherto been attached to the regent.334 The coming of Nuri al-Sa’id to power for the thirteenth time in 1954 had pointed to the beginning of a new era, a period of repression and reluctance to compromise. Under his tenure, the Iraqi government constrained the press and licensed several political parties affiliated with old politicians.335 Some, such as Nuri al-Sa’id’s Constitutional Union Party (CUP) and Saleh Jaber’s Nation Socialist Party, were a defender of the alliance between Iraq and Britain.336 Jaber appealed to the younger intelligentsia and urban professional classes and the more traditional Shi’i rural notables of the middle and lower Euphrates who were dissatisfied with the distribution of the rewards and privileges to Nuri’s followers in the CUP, many of whom were their local rivals.337
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Cold War was “regionalized” as a struggle within and between pro-Western and neutralist blocs of states. The Arab neutralist regional order finally replaced the Western-aligned “order of notables,” which dominated regional politics until 1952. The systemic shift revealed the rise of the effendiya to the detriment of notable classes in the pivotal Arab powers of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.338 The new generation mainly included the lower and upper classes, who preferred to identify with
331 Ali, “ الصندوق الأسود: فائق الشيخ علي - الحلقة 4 .”
332 Tripp, A History of Iraq.
333 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.106.
334 Ahmad Abdul Razzaq Shikara, Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, LAAM, 1987, pp.136.
335 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997, pp. 106.
336 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.104-05.
337 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.125-26.
338 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.54.
73
this generation. Most of them were civil servants and army officers, but the majority, particularly the professionals, had good incomes. The new generation was not middle class; they adopted the concept of a classless society. The effendiya community emerged from modern schooling and incorporated new opposition parties in Iraqi politics in the 1940s and 1950s. Among them were the centrist Liberal Party, the right-leaning Independence Party, the left-leaning National Democratic Party, and the United Popular Front, composed of a gathering of the rivals and enemies of Nuri amongst the political elite.339 Adeed Dawisha notes that Iraq witnessed less strident state authoritarianism following World War II.340 The opposition parties participated in the decision-making process on rare occasions.341 For example, three opposition parties held little presence in the parliamentary, a mere seven seats (of 138) in the election in June 1948.342
The ruling oligarchy, or the old generation, aware of the growing influence of the new generation, endeavored to disrupt the solidarity of the latter rather than accommodating itself to the new social conditions.343 The relationship between the effendiya, or westernized middle stratum, and traditional society composed of the elite and the tribes, or the politicians from the conservative ruling elite, influenced Iraq’s political conditions of the 1940s and 1950s. The intensification of the socio-economic gaps within Iraq and the reinforcement of radical social trends among the effendiya and the urban poor weakened the elite. They paved the way for a military coup d’état in 1958.344 Referring back to our theoretical argument, domestic actors who frustrate the government’s agenda can bargain with the FPE over security policy content. Governmental vulnerability, as well as the degrees of executive certainty and national consensus, force non-democratic regimes to consider domestic actors.345 This is evident that Nuri did not make concessions
339 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 104-5; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.104-05.
340 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.104-05.
341 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.150.
342 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.119-20.
343 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.6-7.
344 Michael Eppel, “The elite, the effendiyya, and the growth of nationalism and pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.30, No.2, 1998, pp.246.
345 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89.
74
to the opposition. He was not concerned with inducing the broad mass of Iraqis and winning over effendi opinion by preferring economic over political development.346
Nuri embarked on dividing the opposition parties by inviting representatives of the Liberal and National Democratic parties into the cabinet.347 To impede the opposition parties from dominating political life in Baghdad, Nuri repeated directing events from the wings, resigning from the prime ministry on a number of occasions.348 A government to supervise the elections was formed by Mustafa al-’Umari, with Nuri’s approval. Faced with the strength of the opposition, al-’Umari realized that he was caught between three forces: the regent, Nuri al-Sa’id, and the opposition. By the autumn of 1952, the opposition had formed a ‘Contact Committee,’ constituting an alliance between the Peace Partisans (set up as a front organization by the Iraqi Communists), the National Democratic Party, the United Popular Front, and the Independence Party, tacitly supported by Salih Jaber’s Socialist People’s Party.349
2.2. Penetration of Great Powers into the Regional Sub-system and Structural Autonomy of the FPE
Three features of the Cold War, namely bipolarity, nuclear weapons, and ideology, had a profound effect on post-1945 Middle East politics.350 Regional actors worldwide took positions alongside the Cold War ideological confrontation between East and West.351 Understanding Arab-superpower relations in the 1950s and 1960s requires considering regional and global factors. The deep polarization of the international system along East-West lines bestowed local actors with the greatest maneuverability and strong bargaining positions in their dealings with the superpowers. The international system’s structure restricted great powers’ control regional states’ actions. In other ways, the superpowers’ capacity to control and shape regional players’ actions was limited.352 Examples include
346 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.167.
347 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.38.
348 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.125-26.
349 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.125-27.
350 Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, “Introduction,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.1.
351 Sayigh and Shlaim, “Introduction,” pp.1.
352 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.3; Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, London: Verso, 1987, pp.33.
75
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 and the overthrow of Iraq’s pro-Western royal government in 1958.353
Furthermore, relations between the superpowers themselves influenced their relationships with the Arab states. For instance, the US-USSR rivalry urged them to compete for Third World actors’ support. On the other hand, the Cold War’s structural context determined small states’ capacity to shape their relationships with superpowers.354 Some local states exploited the Great Powers’ competition to pursue their regional agenda, manipulating the US-Soviet rivalry.355 In this manner, neoclassical realists articulate that regions are semi-autonomous but not independent of the global Great Power system and domestic politics. Great Powers can create new threats and opportunities for local states by entailing shifts in regional power distribution.356 Nuri and Nasser endeavored to exploit the rivalry of the great powers to counterbalance each other and strengthen their domestic and regional positions.357 Egypt received vast amounts of aid from the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s, playing the superpowers against each other.358
Because of the decline of European influence in world politics after the Second World War, the US and the USSR replaced Great Britain and France, the predominant powers in the Arab world, as the new superpowers in the Middle East.359 Soviet interest in the Arab world blossomed with the death of Stalin (March 1953) and developed into a remarkable new policy after Khrushchev’s arrival in power (February 1955).360 The Soviet Union initiated an active role in the region to create a new Soviet strategy towards nonsocialist, nationalist regimes in the developing world.361 Moscow had little involvement in the Arab arena until concluding an arms deal with Cairo in 1955, which
353 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.12.
354 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.1-3.
355 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.1-2; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1987, pp.80.
356 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.47-51.
357 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.29; Sylvia Kedourie, Arab Nationalism, University of California Press, 1962, pp.3.
358 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.3.
359 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.1-2.
360 L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.199.
361 Adeed Dawisha, “The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence,” in The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives, edited by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982, pp.8.
76
incorporated the Soviets into Middle Eastern diplomacy and gave way to breaking the Western monopoly on arms supplies to the region.362 The 1950s in the Middle East also witnessed the determined entry of the US into regional politics. Western fears of Soviet aggression inflamed by the Berlin Blockade and the takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 set the stage for alliances against the Soviet Union and its Communist allies worldwide.363 Following the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the US sought a Middle Eastern alliance to complete the encirclement of international Communist powers.364 Britain’s efforts to establish a Western-led security pact in the Middle East with the Arab states between 1951 and 1953 yielded no concrete outcomes since the Arab states feared that such a pact might ignite revolutionary forces in the region. For instance, under King Faruq’s pro-West regime, Egypt even rejected being part of these plans, which many Arabs would quite possibly oppose.365
Faced with the nationalist forces in Egypt who overthrew the pro-West regime, the Western powers were worried that Nasser’s alignment with the Soviets endangered the flow of the region’s oil resources to the West. The sole option for the West, for its part, was to strengthen Nasser’s regional opponents.366 Therefore, Egypt’s rejection of pioneering a Western defense alliance dictated the pro-Western Iraqi government to project Iraq as the balancing pole for Egypt in the Arab world.367 The Eisenhower administration (1953-1960) turned to Iraq and its pro-West and anti-Communist Prime Minister, Nuri Sa’id, who sought to terminate the 1930 treaty with Great Britain and to facilitate the completion of the alliance network.368 The US considered Iraq the bulwark against possible Communist expansion into the Middle East, and Baghdad’s significance to Washington and Moscow exceeded that of Damascus. Aside from its strategic location
362 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.16; Fred Halliday, “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.10.
363 Malcolm Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, pp.305.
364 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.113-4; Alan Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991, pp.58.
365 Juan Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, Maryland: University Press of America, 2011, pp.21.
366 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.14.
367 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.162.
368 William Polk, The United States and the Arab World, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, pp.231.
77
counted amongst the medium-sized states in the Middle East, Iraq had considerable oil reserves.369
In January 1948, when Britain reached a principal agreement with Iraq on the new treaty in which Britain would share military bases with Iraq, the extent and depth of anti-British sentiment in Iraq were such that riots forced the Iraqi government to abandon the new treaty.370 Nuri’s strategy of acceding to a Western security pact was designed to use external resources to strengthen his domestic and regional position, which signifies that Iraq’s international politics are an extension of its internal policies.371 Nuri hoped to constitute a productive relationship with the US, allowing Nuri to restructure his strategic alliance with the British with the aim of legitimizing it for his people and disregarding the protests of the radical Arab forces that viewed this move as sacrificing Iraq’s foreign policy independence on the altar of Western “imperialism.”372
For many years, both Nuri’s Fertile Crescent scheme and his idea of an Arab League headed by Baghdad were rebuffed by Britain and Egypt. For Nuri, a regional defense organization under Iraqi leadership might have been his last chance to assure Arab hegemony.373 His way to realize his ambition, i.e., his approach to the Baghdad pact, differentiated in the way in which ex-Prime Minister Salih Jaber374 and the regent approached the failed Portsmouth Treaty with Britain. First, he paved the way for the exclusion of disruptive opposition elements from the Chamber of Deputies and the legislation for a range of controls over parties, the press, demonstrations, and political
369 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.76; Benjamin Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, New York: Council For Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960, pp.12.
370 From May 1946 to October 1947 all British troops were withdrawn from Iraq. Although Britain still maintained control of two air bases, its ability to preserve its position and affect events in the country was now reduced. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, pp.394-97; Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.76, 155.
371 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.27.
372 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.29; Nicholas G. Thacher, “Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iraq in the 1950s,” in The Iraqi Revolution of1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and Roger Louis, London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, pp.67; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.114.
373 Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995, pp.47.
374 Jabr had not consulted the old politicians to any remarkable extent during the course of his negotiations with Britain, freezing all of them out of office. Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.145.
78
agitators. Second, his timing was flawless. From the viewpoint of internal security, the Minister of the Interior had advised, “The period between February and April 1955 would probably be the most suitable time for settling all questions in foreign affairs.” Finally, Nuri cared about consultation with established Iraqi politicians and made public statements on diplomatic developments during the course of negotiations.375 Eager to protect the regime against external forces and mounting internal pressures, the government of Nuri al-Sa’id came to negotiate the formation of an eastern defense military pact with Türkiye, Pakistan, and Iran to defend the east against the “threat” of communism.376
Table 6: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment in the Monarchical Period led by Prime Minister Nuri
International and Regional Environment
USSR
US (using Egypt as a counterbalance to USSR)
Britain
Revolutionary Camp
States In Limbo
Conservative Camp
Egypt, Saudi Arabia (till 1957)
Lebanon
←Syria (till 1955)
Iraq, Jordan (not acceding to the pact)
Domestic Environment
The FPE (The Regent and Old Politicians headed by Nuri)
Opposition (Communists, Nationalists, and Kurds)
International Circumstance
In High Threat Environment
Rivalry with the Revolutionary camp
Domestic Circumstance
Ambiguity
A potential military coup, Kurdish revolt, urban protest
The Highly (Strong) Structural Autonomy
375 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.40.
376 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Tarikh al-wizarat al-lraqiyyah, Beirut: Dar al-kutub, 1974, pp.56-61.
79
Under Nuri, Iraq followed an anti-Soviet line in the mid-1950s, culminating in suspending diplomatic relations with Moscow in January 1955 in preparation for the formation of the Baghdad Pact.377 The following month, Nuri signed the Baghdad Pact with Türkiye, and Britain, Iran, and Pakistan subsequently joined the pact.378 Moscow perceived Nuri’s action as a pact directed against the Soviet Union. Nuri could have believed he would impress his allies by severing relations with the Soviet Union.379 The then-Prime Minister Nuri wanted to benefit from the calm political atmosphere in Iraq, while Britain’s interest was in sustaining its military installations in Iraq. Britain agreed to cancel the 1930 treaty provided Iraq complied with a security arrangement with Türkiye.380 Elie Podeh argues that Iraq’s main aim in joining the Baghdad Pact was that Britain’s accession to it would revise the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which reminded the opposing societal groups of Western imperialism amid the wave of Nasserism. Baghdad signed a security treaty with Ankara in February 1955, known as the Baghdad Pact. Britain joined this pact on 5 April, which secured British military assistance in the event of aggression against Iraq.381 The Eisenhower administration did not join the Baghdad Pact despite British pressure on the Administration to accede to the pact, hoping to retain some credibility with Egypt.382 Since the mid-1950s, the US adopted a foreign policy preventing it from participating in intra-Arab quarrels “unless and until US material interests in the Arab world were directly threatened.”383 For the then-Prime Minister al-Sa’id, who now increasingly won over
377 Ara Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad pact,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.33, No.2, 1997, pp.236.
378 Nigel John Ashton, “The hijacking of a pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958,” Review of International Studies, Vol.19, No.2, 1993, pp.135-6.
379 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp. 29.
380 Polk, The United States and the Arab World, pp.231.
381 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.140.
382 Much of US promised military and economic assistance to Iraq failed to materialize. William B. Quandt, “America and the Middle East: A Fifty-Year Overview,” in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.63; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.190-91; Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, pp.58-59, 63; Ashton, “The hijacking of a pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958,” pp.135-6.
383 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.156; Ashton, “The hijacking of a pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958,” pp.135-6.
80
British confidence,384 the pact merely transferred the two British bases to Iraqi control, and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 would no longer be in effect.385
2.3. Regional Polarization in the Shade of Two Arab Nationalism Tenets
A distinctive feature of the Arab order in the 1950s was the revolutionary-conservative division. After a group of Egyptian officers known as the Free Officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, Jamal Abd Nasser, one of them, developed a creed known as Nasserism. The pillars of this platform were neutralism and non-alignment during the Cold War, as well as Arab unity and socialist reform.386 The then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id was the driving force behind the conservative camp until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, a camp implicitly supported by Jordan, while Egypt, under the leadership of Nasser, led the radical bloc, consisting of Syria and Yemen.387 The Egyptian-Iraqi struggle over Arab hegemony focused on regional defense, culminating in the conflict over the Baghdad Pact. Aside from being a power struggle, there was a clash between two schools of thought of pan-Arabism: one propagated by the old pro-Western Iraqi elite, and the second by the young nationalist leaders in Egypt.388 The first school of thought concentrated on Iraq’s leading role in the pan-Arab movement. The Hashemite rulers in Baghdad, whose source of legitimacy was their prominent role in the “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, dignified themselves as the “natural standard-bearers” of pan-Arabism. Iraq’s unity schemes manifested themselves in Nuri al-Sa’id’s initiative to establish the Fertile Crescent federation, or a Hashemite-dominated federation, which would be a Syria-Iraqi union and encompass Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine in full implementation.389 The second school of thought, Egypt, objected to the unification of the Fertile Crescent and became a dominant force in the
384 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.100.
385 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.72.
386 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.68.
387 Malcolm H. Kerr, “Persistence of Regional Quarrels,” in Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, edited by J. C. Hurewitz, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp.230-2.
388 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.1.
389 Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945, London: Routledge, 1986, Chapter 1.
81
Arab League that opposed Iraq’s effort towards dominance or takeover of Syria to isolate Egypt in its drive for Arab leadership.390
Map 1: The Fertile Crescent, 2500 B.C.391
From the autumn of 1954 to the summer of 1958, the personalities of their leaders had a significant influence on the relations between Iraq and Egypt.392 Nuri believed that Iraq, as a small power, could not afford the luxury of neutrality between the Eastern and Western blocs.393 The oil royalties from the foreign-owned IPC were insufficient to equip
390 For instance, the Kings of Egypt and of Saudi Arabia, Farouk and Ibn Saud had met with President Shukri al-Quwatli of Syria in January 1945. The meeting had expressed the polarization between the Hashemite and the Egyptian-Saudi blocs and Syria’s dependence on the latter in opposition to the Hashemite aspirations. See David Lesch, Syria and the United States, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp.4; Michael Eppel, “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945-49,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol,28, No.1, 1992, pp.108-09; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.2.
391 Roger B. Beck et al., World History: Patterns of Interaction, McDougal Littell, 2009, pp.30.
392 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.156.
393 Cognizant of the significance of the Arab world for Iraq, Nuri’s understanding of Iraq’s interests required that its foreign policies should engage in Türkiye and Transjordan. In 1946, he negotiated treaties of friendship with both Türkiye and Transjordan, disapproved by both many in the Iraqi political elite and the regent. The suspicion of Türkiye’s territorial ambitions in northern Iraq and the final withdrawal of French troops from Syria in 1946 colored much of the Iraqi political elite’s views of Türkiye. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.116-17. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.26.
82
and maintain a strong army against any possible outside threat.394 According to Nuri, the Arabs had two choices: following a policy consistent with the dominant international system or remaining marginalized and weak; thus, Iraq pursued the Western policy to combat the communist “epidemic.”395 The more significant threat to Iraq’s FPE was the Soviet one. Nuri viewed both Zionism and communism as potential threats to the security of Iraq and the Arab world.396 First, in the immediate postwar period, the USSR supported pro-Soviet secessionist movements in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish sections of Iran near the Iraqi border. Second, they delayed the withdrawal of their troops from Iran beyond the permitted time. Third, the USSR put considerable pressure on Türkiye for territorial concessions in the eastern part of the country and military bases at the Straits.397 Finally, the Soviet support of the Iraqi Communist Party linked the foreign and domestic threats by the Iraqi ruling elite. Accordingly, Iraq had followed an anti-Soviet line in the mid-1950s, culminating in suspending diplomatic relations with Moscow in January 1955 in preparation for the formation of the Baghdad Pact.398 Moscow perceived Nuri’s action as a pact directed against the Soviet Union. Nuri could have believed he would impress his allies by severing relations with the Soviet Union.399
Iraqi rulers sought to preserve close ties with Britain because they feared domestic upheaval. For instance, between 1936 and 1941, there were a series of military coups; between 1943 and 1945, there were two Kurdish revolts; and in 1948, there was a large-scale urban protest, the Portsmouth protests.400 Nasserism projected to unify the foreign, military, and social policies of all Arab states under Egypt’s leadership. Indeed, Nasser encouraged the masses and the armies in anti-Nasserist countries to overthrow their governments, particularly Iraq and Jordan, the two Hashemite monarchies seen as “slaves
394 Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad pact,” pp.233.
395 Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership, London: Cassell, 1959, pp.228; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.26.
396 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.27.
397 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.155; Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.227.
398 Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad pact,” pp.236; Ashton, “The hijacking of a pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958,” pp.135-6.
399 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.29.
400 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.227.
83
of imperialism” and enemies of Arab nationalism.401 After Nasser’s strong propaganda campaign against Jordan’s King Hussein, riots erupted against the pro-Western government in Jordan and resulted in the resignation of the cabinet in late 1955. Hence, Hussein failed to appoint a prime minister who could establish a new government that would be willing to join the Baghdad Pact.402 Nasser even attempted to forge connections with the Iraqi Army and attacked the Iraqi monarchy, specifically its most prominent statesman, Nuri al-Sa’id.403 At this point, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, the last Prime Minister of Iraq before the revolution, stressed that the traditional Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry impacted Nuri’s strategic thinking. In Nuri’s mind, the pact would provide Iraq with an alliance among Western powers and the Northern Tier states to enhance Iraq’s regional and international position.404 Charles Tripp argues, “The power, the resources, and the global reach of the US and the USSR were naturally taken into account by Iraqi governments when assessing dangers to their position or opportunities for furthering their interests.”405 As reflected in the motivations that impelled the Iraqi ruling elite to engage in a security pact, the international system plays a dominant role in shaping the FPE’s decisions, yet international factors are filtered through the domestic political environment. When the international threat situation is high, the leader’s hold on power is strong, and the FPE enjoys structural autonomy; the FPE should determine its policy in tune with international constraints and incentives.406
The Iraqi leadership relied on military alliances with Britain and its regional allies to enhance structural autonomy from domestic opposition on their national security policy.407 Moreover, Nuri had to ensure domestic compliance. He called an election in September 1954 that was so rigged that approximately 100 of the 135 members of the new parliament were ambitious Nuri supporters. Merely 23 seats were contested; the rest
401 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.68; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.166.
402 Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972, pp.79.
403 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.68.
404 Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, Mudhakkirat [Memoirs], pp.78-79, referred to in Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.30.
405 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.186.
406 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-44; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.172-73.
407 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.167. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50.
84
were won unchallenged.408 From 1954, the government under Nuri al-Sa’id gained increased structural autonomy; its national security policy executive became more isolated from its domestic opposition.409 Nevertheless, a new generation of protestors, opposition politicians, and younger army officers was influenced by the new brand of Arab nationalism on the one hand and by socialist-communist ideology on the other.410 Although officers in the Iraqi Army as potential veto players, in theoretical terms, were divided ideologically, all of them agreed to displace the pro-British monarchy.411 Some Iraqi officers labeled Nuri and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah “lackey of the West” and “hound of the Imperialists,” respectively.412 They thought that “imperialism” and “feudalism” were hindering the development of their country. They understood that the vast land holdings of tribal chiefs transformed the country into a feudal society in modern times.413
The Iraqi leadership calculated that advanced rearmament of the Iraqi armed forces from the UK via the Baghdad Pact would counter officers’ hostility to the alliance.414 On the contrary, Iraq’s engagement in a military alliance with Britain and its allies weakened the Iraqi leadership politically by alienating influential sectors of Iraqi society. Although Iraq utilized the Palestine problem as a lever to achieve internal and external gains by adopting an extreme attitude, this radical shift was not enough to cool the internal situation in Iraq.415 The young officers, later called the underground Iraqi Free Officers movement, believed that the older generals benefited from the monarchy’s patronage and, hence, were supporters of the monarchy.416 For instance, the leadership in the Iraqi Army became an instrument of internal control during the massive protests in Baghdad in 1952, which called for the nationalization of Iraq’s oil following the signed Iraqi-British Oil
408 K al-Husri, “The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958,” the Middle East Forum, 1965, pp.27.
409 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, p.50; Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.80.
410 Gerald De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008, pp.176.
411 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.71-72.
412 De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy, pp.176; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.72.
413 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.12-13.
414 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.72.
415 Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59, Routledge, 2005, pp.173.
416 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.20.
85
Agreement.417 In the popular insurrections of 1952 and 1956, the second period of prolonged domestic instability after the Wathba of 1948, the army saved the monarchical order, which would heighten the army’s desire for political power and control.418 The leadership in Iraq was striving to regain the Iraqi Army’s trust to prevent a possible coup by distributing housing stipends and plots of land to officers in the Army.419 The fact that the Iraqi leadership continued to suppress internal opposition alienated shades of public opinion. It thus sowed the seeds of occurring opposition forces in the Iraqi Army, which would later cost the Hashemite regime its overthrow.420 However, the younger officers remained sympathized with the protestors’ demands during the massive protests.421
The young officers were subscribing to the ideologies, such as Communism, pan-Arabism, and its new variant, Nasserism. Some pan-Arabists supported the right-wing Arab nationalist Iraqi Independence Party and Baath Party with which Colonel Ahmad Hassan Bakr was affiliated. Others were Iraqi nationalists or those who trumped the “Iraq First” slogan in opposition to Great Britain’s role in Iraqi affairs. Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim, one of two leaders overthrowing the monarchy, was in contact with the left-leaning National Democratic Party (NDP).422 The NDP was a determined critic of British influence in Iraq’s affairs and was committed to the continuation of the Iraqi nation as a separate sovereign entity. However, the Independence Party was an advocate of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism.423 The remaining officers were in contact with the Communist Party.424 The communists and the Ba’athists were transnational parties. The
417 Ismael Arif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, New York: Vantage Press, 1982, pp.42.
418 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.159; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.66.
419 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.31; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.159.
420 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp,27.
421 Even in 1951, Prince ‘‘Abd al-Ilah had told the British ambassador, Sir John Troutbeck, that “if he felt he could rely completely on the army, he would have no truck with any of the Opposition leaders and would even have potential troublemakers locked up. But because he could not rely completely on the army, he might be obliged to bring these Opposition leaders into the government….” John Troutbeck, “The revolution in Iraq,” Current History, Vol.36, No.210, 1959, pp.85; “Offices burnt in Baghdad riot, new cabinet under army chief,” The Times, London, November 24, 1952, pp.6; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.69; Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.36.
422 Shikara, Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, pp.114.
423 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.111; Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy.
424 Arif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, pp.47-48.
86
communists supported Iraqi nationalism over pan-Arab nationalism, and the Iraq Communist Party was so strong that as an illegal but still vigorous party, it instigated a major urban uprising amid negotiations of the Portsmouth treaty. In contrast to the communists, the Ba’athists had links with the Ba’ath Party branches throughout the Arab world.425 The party’s growth accelerated following Nasser’s onslaught on the Western alliance system, and the party received its most incredible boost after the Suez crisis.426
Referring to our theoretical argument, societal elites of outward-oriented internationalists or inward-leaning nationalists seek to lobby government policies that strengthen their bloc’s interests at the expense of the opposing faction and even the nation’s interests. Accordingly, societal elites engage in political calculations about how threat assessment and counterbalancing affect their relative domestic power and position.427 In scenario “B,” the opposing societal groups do not identify the Soviet armament of Egypt as a threat to their interests, whereas the FPE and their old political class brand it as a threat to Iraq’s national interest. The degree of consensus among the FPE and key societal supporters (here, established Iraqi politicians and the Sheiks) about foreign threats will affect the efficiency and appropriateness of counterbalancing behavior.428 As shown in Table 7, the fact that most Arab states avoided joining the Baghdad Pact illustrates limited threat assessment and counterbalancing.
Objections to Iraq’s possible accession to the Baghdad Pact were not raised only by Iraq’s domestic opposition but also by regional actors. Applying the Northern Tier concept devised by the US for containing the USSR to the Arab world would eventually shift the center of gravity from Cairo to Baghdad and jeopardize Egypt’s quest for hegemony. Cairo, hence, was to obstruct Iraqi accession.429 Nasser assumed to counterbalance Iraq by mobilizing the other Arab members against Iraq. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt aspired
425 The Ba’ath leadership in Baghdad was a “regional command” subordinate to the “national command” in Damascus.
426 Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1966, pp,53; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.155; Uriel Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, Jeruselam: Israel Universities Press, 1969, pp.15.
427 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45, 51, 74.
428 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45-46.
429 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.66.
87
to check Hashemite influence and considered the Baghdad Pact a direct challenge to their security and the autonomy of the Arab arena.430 Saudi Arabia fought alongside Egypt to prevent Jordan from acceding to the pact, as there was a traditional rivalry between the Saudi ruling family in Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite ruling families in Iraq and Jordan.431 The joining of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan would isolate Egypt by depriving it of facing the Israeli threat alone.432 As Fawaz Gerges argues, the result is that inter-Arab dynamics significantly affected the formation of the Arab states’ foreign policies. From 1954 to 1956, Egypt exploited resurgent Arab nationalism to establish an Arab alliance against the Baghdad Pact.433 Although the Egyptian-Saudi agreement was militarily insignificant, it signaled politically the reactivation of the old Egyptian-Saudi axis that had opposed Iraqi leadership.434 In addition to diplomacy, Cairo unleashed an intense propaganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact and those who signed the pact via the “Voice of the Arabs,” which dominated the region’s airwaves.
Table 7: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the Monarchical period led by Prime Minister Nuri
Exogenous shift
Systemic/sub-systemic
and domestic ramifications
FPE
Threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “B”
Armament of Egypt through the Czech arms deal in 1955
FPE and societal leaders identify component as a threat (enables coalition)
Limited to moderate constraints
Not acceding all Arab states to the Baghdad Pact
(Efficient to limited threat assessment and counterbalancing)
In contrast, Iraq had a limited capacity to jam Egyptian broadcasts in its backyard. Therefore, Iraqis who heard only the messages of Nasser illustrated two: on the one hand, their leaders continued to rely on the protection of the Great Powers; on the other hand,
430 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.25.
431 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration, London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp.70; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.193.
432 Mohamed Heikal, Cutting the Lions Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, London: Corgi Books, 1986, pp.86-8.
433 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.128.
434 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.73.
88
Egypt appealed for self-sufficiency against the ill will of foreigners.435 Elie Podeh argues that the competition between Egypt and Iraq for allies within the Arab world is a function of the “local balance of power.”436 Nasser and Nuri gave weight to the regional environment in seeking their internal and external interests. Both spent energy and scarce resources striving to pull undecided Arab states to their camps.437 Walt argues that Iraq’s geographical isolation and pro-Western orientation reduced its regional influence.438 In response to the formation of the “West-sponsored” Baghdad Pact, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia agreed on principles: On rejecting the Turkish-Iraqi alliance and any other alliances with non-Arab states; in setting up an Arab defense and economic cooperation pact; on inviting other Arab states to discuss the implementation of the principles.439
The anti-Iraqi axis weakened the Baghdad Pact, deterred other Arab states from acceding to it, and gave Egypt regional leadership in the Arab world.440 In April 1955, Nuri had asked for British and American views on a possible Iraqi military intervention in Syria. Having preferred covert means to install a pro-West Syrian government, London and Washington had opposed him on the grounds that taking such action ended up with increased regional tension.441 Syria’s presidential election was decisive in the rivalry between the two rival camps. On the one hand, Egypt and Saudi Arabia looked forward to “their” candidate pushing Syria into signing the tripartite pact; on the other hand, Iraq looked for a candidate likely to bring it into the Baghdad Pact or at least continue Syrian neutrality in Arab politics.442 In August 1955, Shukri al-Quwwatli, a presidential candidate supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, won the elections.443 After Syria’s
435 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.164.
436 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.59; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.37-38.
437 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.29; Kedourie, Arab Nationalism, pp.3.
438 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.54.
439 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.30; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.51; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.129.
440 Muhsin Muhammad al-Mutawalli al-Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa'id: Min al-Bidaya ila al-Nihaya, Bairut: Al-Dar al-‘Arabiyya li al-Mawsu‘at, 2005, pp.73; Eberhard Kienle, Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993, pp.12.
441 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.73-74.
442 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.159-60.
443 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.75-78.
89
election, the appointment of Sa’id al-Ghazzi’s cabinet brought about the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Syria.
Consequently, Iraq lost the battle for Syria.444 The fall of the pro-Western government in Syria paved the way for Syria to enter Egypt’s sphere of influence.445 The Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance was unsuccessful in both the military and economic fields. Still, it achieved its primary purpose in the political area of preventing Syria from acceding to the Baghdad Pact.446 The “loss” of Syria to Nasserism not only reduced Nuri’s standing in the Arab world but also endangered Iraq’s national security in Nuri’s view.447 Thereby, Iraq found itself isolated in the Arab world since neither Lebanon nor Jordan was as politically potent as joining the Iraqi camp. Syrian opposition to the pact has now neutralized the rest of the Arab states. Syria’s defection to the Egyptian bloc established Egypt as the regional hegemon, helping Cairo determine the foreign policy agenda of the Arab subsystem for the next six years.448 Nasser tried to reach a modus vivendi with Iraq based on the status quo.449 However, Nuri did not intend to meet Nasser’s requirements from Iraq, including that “Iraq should inform the Arab states that membership of the Baghdad Pact had been frozen.”450 For Nuri, any concession to his rivals would be considered a capitulation. In any event, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 was to cease the efforts at dialogue between the two leaders.451
Willing to make up for Egypt’s military weakness, Nasser agreed with the USSR through the Czech arms deal in September 1955 since the Western states had not favored selling modern arms to Egypt while they presented members of the Baghdad Pact with military aid.452 Under the Eisenhower Administration, the US had initially promised arms and
444 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.159-60.
445 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp.217-8.
446 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.30; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.51.
447 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.75-78.
448 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.29; Kedourie, Arab Nationalism, pp.3.
449 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.198.
450 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp. 196-202.
451 Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.202.
452 Dulles warned Nasser that the US might have to break diplomatic relations with Egypt or impose an economic blockade if Egypt followed through with the arms deal. Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.30-31, 34. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.35.
90
assistance to Egypt on specific conditions. The US even urged British troops to leave their base at Suez from 1953 to 1956. By mid-1956, the US, however, was pulling back from its courtship of Nasser since he edged closer to the USSR.453 The US and Britain took a decision to rescind the loan they had approved for the construction of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam, which galvanized the Suez Crisis of 1956. Egypt regarded this decision as Western support for Israel and nationalized the Suez Canal in July of that year, the catalyst for the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt in October-November of that year.454 The implicit goal of Britain and France was to annihilate Nasser and to arrest the declining fortunes of Britain and France in the Middle East.455 The opposite has occurred. The Suez crisis showed a radical shift in the international and regional balance of power. The United States and the Soviet Union replaced Britain and France as the dominant global players in the Middle East.456
The tripartite axis, the Czech arms deal, and the Suez crisis produced a new equilibrium in the regional system in favor of Egypt.457 Formulated to fill the perceived power in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis, one of the objectives of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to demolish Nasser’s leadership in the Arab world. To do this, Washington preferred to promote the regional role of Saudi Arabia, which could persuade other Arab states to turn pro-Western, isolate Nasser, and impede any further increase in Soviet influence in the Middle East.458 The Suez crisis made Nasserism a threat to Saudi Arabia’s monarchy; therefore, Riyadh pursued anti-Nasser policies to obtain a defense alliance with the US and American arms aid.459
453 Quandt, “America and the Middle East: A Fifty-Year Overview,” pp.63.
454 Michael George Ionides, Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960, pp.136-37.
455 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.69.
456 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.22.
457 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.59; Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.37-38; Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.161.
458 David W. Lesch, “The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis: Globalist Policy in a Regional Reality,” in The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, edited by David W. Lesch and Haas Mark L., New York: Routledge, 2018.
459 Andreas Rieck, “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation,” in Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Habib Ishow and and Koszinowski Thomas Derek Hopwood, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.321-22; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.59.
91
The Suez Crisis also had profound implications for Iraq. Egypt acquired the status of a regional leader in the Arab world, yet not as a fully hegemonic status as Egypt imposed its will on Iraq.460 With the anger at the Baghdad Pact, the Suez crisis enabled massive demonstrations to display the intensity of nationalist feelings in Iraq, and, for this reason, the situation deteriorated in Iraq so severely that the Iraqi government was compelled to impose martial law.461 Although the government put down the 1956 mass uprising, it forced four opposition parties, the Independence Party, the Ba’ath Party, the NDP, and the ICP, to put aside their ideological and political differences and form a United National Front, which prepared the way for the demise of the oligarchic monarchy in 1958.462 On the foreign scene, the pro-Western Iraqi regime settled for half-measures, such as breaking off diplomatic relations with France and excluding Britain from deliberations in the pact.463 The Suez Crisis had also cost Iraq a great deal economically since sabotage against the Syrian portions of the IPC pipeline reaching out through Syria to the Mediterranean cut Iraq’s oil output by 75 percent.464 Nuri showed concern about the continuity of oil supplies from Iraq’s northern oil fields to the Mediterranean.465 Iraqi oil revenue was $38 million in 1951. According to an agreement between Iraq and the British-run IPC postulating that Iraq would receive 50 percent annually of the company’s profits. As a result of more oil production and the construction of a 16-inch pipeline to Tripoli, and a second significantly altered concession agreement with the IPC, Iraq’s oil revenues reached a peak of $206 million in 1955.466 However, the blowing up of three pumping stations along the Syrian pipeline during the Suez war, though Nuri’s warnings, brought about heavy losses to Iraq’s economy (compare Iraq’s 1957 and 1956 revenues,
460 In 1957, the combined defense expenditure of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan totaled $156 million, while Egypt’s expenditure stood at $264 million. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.60. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1960), pp.509-35. Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.100. Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.37-38.
461 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.182.
462 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.107-08; Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp.79.
463 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, London: I.B. Tauris, 1987, pp.44; Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri:My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.74-75; Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.209.
464 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.88.
465 Shikara, Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, pp.136.
466 Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, New York: McCraw-Hill Book Company, 1969, pp.651; Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.88-89.
92
Table 8).467 Following the Hashemite Monarchy’s demise, Iraq’s oil revenues recovered to reach $237 million in 1958.468
Table 8: Oil Revenues in the Middle East, 1951-58 (millions of dollars)469
Year
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
1951
23
38
30
155
1955
90
206
305
274
1956
152
193
306
283
1957
214
137
365
291
1958
246
237
415
304
The Suez crisis encouraged the Iraqi Free Officers to overthrow the monarchy and contact Nasser and the Soviets to secure their assurances to counterbalance any possible Western intervention.470 Following the Suez crisis, most officers with a pan-Arab orientation formed the Central Organization of the Baghdad Organization, the core of the Free Officers executive committee.471 The committee drew out a general program calling for imperialism struggle and Arab unity.472 Upon their meeting discovered by the authorities, Qasim, one of two leaders toppling the Iraqi monarchy, was called in for talks with Nuri
467 That Iraq’s main asset, oil, was routed to Tripoli and Banyas made Iraq considerably dependent on the goodwill of changing Syrian governments. Hal Lehrman, “Development in Iraq,” in The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958, pp.259; United Nations, Economic Development in the Middle East, 1957-58, New York, p.30.
468 Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role of Oil in a Middle East Eastern Company, New York: Praeger, 1967, pp.23; Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.210; Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.202.
469 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.13-14.
470 In May, a plot to overthrow Iraq and Jordan’s thrones was discovered. Egypt was also determined to strengthen the relations of the Ba’ath Party with the ICP. Frederick W. Axelgard, “U.S. Support for the British Position in Pre-Revolutionary Iraq,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and William R. Louis, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991, pp.89-90; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.2. De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy, pp.186.
471 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.23.
472 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.83.
93
al-Said.473 The Iraqi ruling elite stationed Qasim in Jordan in November 1956 owing to their suspicions of him.474
Egypt’s response to the Baghdad Pact was merging Egypt with Syria in March 1958. Nasser aimed to keep Syria’s foreign policy in check, not to take responsibility for the Syrian government.475 The formation of the United Arab Republic stirred up nationalist excitement among pan-Arabs in Iraq about joining that union.476 ‘Abd al-Karim al-Uzri, a pillar of the monarchical political order and cabinet member, confirmed that the UAR “constituted a dangerous challenge to Iraq and a threat to its existence.”477 Al-Uzri depicts in his memoirs the response to the formation of the UAR at the popular level and among the ruling elite:
“[The UAR] generated among the educated and politically aware Iraqis an overwhelming sense of exuberance and ardor, and resuscitated within them aspirations, the realization of which they had considered to be no more than a dream… [The formation of the UAR] also engendered extreme bitterness against the existing Iraqi political order for isolating Iraq from the Arabist tide and distancing it from the unifying Arab nationalist movement. The unity between Egypt and Syria also caused a wave of fear and confusion among Iraq’s rulers, the Western supporters of Iraq, some of the neighboring countries, and members of the Baghdad Pact because of the immense dangers this unity would bring not only to Iraq but also to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Western interests in the area generally.”478
‘Abd al-Ilah strived to persuade the other members of the Baghdad Pact not to recognize the UAR, saying, “The Egyptian-Syrian union was aimed not only against Iraq’s security and national goals but also against its foreign policy, embodied in the country’s
473 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.73; George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Arab states, New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971, pp.93.
474 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.73-4.
475 Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, pp.321.
476 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.13-14.
477 Al-Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-'Iraq, 1930–1958, pp.550.
478 Al-Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-'Iraq, 1930–1958, pp.544.
94
membership of the Baghdad Pact.”479 Whereas Nuri and ‘Abd al-Ilah pressed Britain for military action against the UAR, it had received diplomatic recognition from countries such as the US and Saudi Arabia as well as the Baghdad Pact countries, which proved efficient in limiting threat assessment and counterbalancing Egypt.480 In June, Nuri asked the US and Britain for the landing of US or United Nations troops in Lebanon and Jordan as soon as possible.481 The US had initially approached Nasser in a more cautious manner before Washington decided to pursue proactive policies in Syria to promote regime change there.482 The US sent troops to Lebanon not against Nasir’s movements in Lebanon but against his possible annexation of Iraq.483 The US gradually concluded that the UAR was useful for anti-Soviet containment.484 In response to the formation of the UAR, “the Hashemite Arab Federation” was declared between Iraq and Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdoms, on 14 February 1958. The objective behind this political federation was to counterbalance Nasser and conserve the inter-Arab state subsystem.485 Yet Mufti points out, “The federation was virtually imposed on its protagonists by the Western powers.”486 Thus, not all segments of Iraqi society favored this brand of Arab nationalism.487 The relatively loose federation was dissolved by the revolution of 1958.488
Analysts of Iraq agree that the pact was one of the driving forces behind revolutionary change in Iraq.489 Majid Khadduri explains the demise of the monarchical regime in Iraq with three assumptions: First, Arab nationalist leaders were too preoccupied with political objectives to pay attention to social and economic development. Secondly, the old
479 Abd al-Razzak Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiya, al-Jusi’ al-Thalith, 1930–1933 (The history of Iraqi cabinets, vol. 3, 1930–1933, Baghdad: Dar al-Shu'un al-Thaqafiya al-'Amma, 1988.
480 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.139. Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.205.
481 De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy, pp.189.
482 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.86, 90.
483 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.11.
484 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.117.
485 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.74-75; Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Arab states, pp.78; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.101-02.
486 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.117.
487 Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp.127.
488 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.164.
489 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.31-32, 679, 766; John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, New York: Harper, 1958, pp.49, 61; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 12, 14.
95
politicians’ rule method caused an intense power struggle between the two. Thirdly, with the establishment of the UAR, the pan-Arab movement led to the collapse of the monarchical regime.490 When Nuri al-Said became Prime Minister for the thirteenth time on March 3, 1958, the Free Officers decided to abolish the British-imposed system and prosecute the supporters of the monarchy and the old elite.491 The Free Officers of Iraq were aware of the weakness of the monarchy.492 Developments in the domestic and international environment may push members to defect from the ranks of the opposing bloc in the domestic balance of political power.493 This is evident in the chaos arising against the pro-Western regime of President Kamil Sham’un between the Nasserist and anti-Nasserist factions in Lebanon in the summer of 1958. The Iraqi Hashemite monarchy dispatched a brigade of the Iraqi Army in Qasim’s command to protect Jordan. Thereon, Arif, Qasim, and a committee of officers set in motion on July 14 before the prince and Nuri left for a Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul. Herein, the chain of events for the coup began. The monarchy regime in Iraq ended.494 Britain advocated a full-scale armed operation in Iraq, but Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev warned that US intervention in Iraq would lead to “the most dangerous and unforeseen consequences.”495 Washington, thus, ignored sooner its local allies than to endanger the international balance of power.496 Qasim himself admitted that a strong US or British military presence in the Middle East would have forced the Free Officers to delay the overthrow of the monarchy.497
490 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.2.
491 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.74-75; Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Arab states, pp.78.
492 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.116.
493 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.64-65.
494 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.84; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.75.
495 Peter L. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.36, No.1, 2006, pp.45-46; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.116.
496 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.116.
497 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.210.
96
3. CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN POLICY FORMUALTION OF “REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ” (1958-1963) OVER THE KUWAIT AFFAIR
3.1. Ambiguity in the Domestic Policy Environment: The Revolutionary Forces in Disarray
The new government of Iraq had at its head a three-person sovereignty council, including the Shi’a, the Kurd, and the Arab-Sunni representative. The new cabinet included a broad spectrum of opposing groups to appease the opposition.498 Whereas the cabinet and the sovereignty council included six Arab Sunnis, five Arab Shi’a, and four Kurds, real power lay in the hands of Qasim and Arif. Qasim took the lion’s share of power since he was Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. At the same time, Arif was then-Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Deputy Commander in Chief.499 After the revolution of 1958, the struggle over Iraq’s new identity, particularly in the case of reorientation in foreign policy, revealed essentially two ideological camps in Iraq, nationalist and leftist facets. The nationalists suggested that all those “artificial” states merge under the union with other Arab states. There were two main groups on the nationalist facet, which mostly wanted to unite Iraq with a greater Arab Union.
On the one hand, a coalition of Arab nationalists turned to Nasser for leadership. On the other hand, the Ba’ath Party utilized the pan-Arab sentiment to strengthen its organization. Instead of Nasser, the party looked towards Syria, where the party had been formed.500 The leading group on the left, interested in Iraqi independence from the West and extensive political and social reform inside Iraq, was the Iraqi Communists.501 The other rival on the left was the NDP. However, the NDP was worse organized than it had been in Nuri’s day and divided between those supporting and opposing Qasim.502 He
498 The new Iraqi cabinet embodies two National Democratic Party representatives, one Independence Party, one Ba’ath Party, one Communist, one Kurd, and one liberal Arab nationalist representative. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.86.
499 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.86-87.
500 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.81-82, 89.
501 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.89-90.
502 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.89-90.
97
discerned that the demands of ideological groups conflicted with the permanent factors affecting Iraq’s foreign relations and his thoughts. These ideological groups, whether Iraqi communists or pan-Arabs, asked for an immediate withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, repudiation of the Anglo-Iraqi agreement (on air bases), and the American military and technical assistance terminated. The Communists, lukewarm to the Arab Union, demanded Soviet cooperation and friendship. The pan-Arabs, on the other hand, pressed for an immediate union with the UAR.503 Qasim’s rule was made possible by the intense rivalry among political parties, each vying for power by resorting either to Qasim for support or to a military faction expected to rise under the new regime. The Iraqi communists, oppressed under the Old Regime, made use of this opportunity and came out in favor of Qasim’s rule.504 During the revolution in Iraq, the Iraqi communists mobilized their base and divided the regional left between those that supported the Nasserist regional project and those that attributed importance to the Iraqi Revolution and the rise of communism in Iraq for Arab revolutionary aspirations.505 That is to say, societal leaders are maximizing their blocs’ interests in the domestic balance of political power and have conflicting interests as their policy choices are shaped by their international or domestic orientation.506
In the period of Qasim, Iraqi foreign policy continued to be determined by the regional environment more than the broader international environment.507 Qasim prevented the penetration of the Arab unity tide into Iraq during his five-year rule, which was supported by the domestic forces that made up the “Iraqi first” constituency, and Qasim’s foreign policy intended to undermine Nasser’s United Arab Republic, emphasizing Iraq’s sovereignty and its national interests.508 Qasim tied his authority to his ability to reveal a distinctive Iraqi patriotism that was pursuing to extend Iraq’s influence in the eastern Arab world as a counterweight to Egypt’s dominance of the Levant.509 Alternatively, Qasim
503 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.182-83.
504 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.99.
505 Mahmud Amin Al-Alim, I’tirafat Shaykh Al-Shuyuyi’yin Al-Arab: Mahmud Amin Al-Alim [Confessions of the Shaykh of the Arab Communists: Mahmoud Amin Al-Alim],Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2006.
506 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.57-58.
507 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.133.
508 Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” pp.126-27.
509 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.160.
98
proclaimed the willingness to revive Nuri al-Sa’id’s Fertile Crescent proposal by suggesting that Syria’s place was with Iraq rather than Egypt.510 For him, the plan that envisages uniting Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq would transform an imperialistic project into a patriotic one.511 Qasim admired Nuri’s handling of questions of foreign policy and thus was not opposed to Nuri’s entire foreign policy. Rather, Qasim disagreed with him on domestic policy regarding Nuri’s support of the ruling oligarchy and his ignorance of internal reforms.512 Qasim imposed progressive taxes on tribal sheiks and landowners to end their immense economic and political power that had gone unchallenged in the era of the monarchy.513 Furthermore, Qasim promised to eliminate policies that remember Western imperialism, achieve political cooperation with all Arab states, and improve the welfare of people, capturing the loyalty of the masses through these pledges.514 As such, he was to withdraw Iraq from the Baghdad Pact to weaken the former dominant elite of the monarchical regime.515
After the revolution, a rift between Qasim and Arif about Iraq’s position in the international and regional system occurred. The former adopted the Iraqi first approach that emphasized Iraqi unity and Kurdish-Arab cooperation and prioritized inward-looking nationalism, while the latter stressed an outward-looking pan-Arabism that strongly advocated Iraq’s unity with Egypt under Nasser’s leadership rather than Qasim’s.516 Perceiving a challenge from Arif to his power, Qasim found opponents of unity amongst the Communists who were ideologically opposed to nationality and unity with the UAR.517 The NDP, as a moderate party, was unwilling to support Qasim as there was no assurance that the Qasim regime would be transformed into a parliamentary system.518 Following the revolution of 1958, a temporary constitution519 was declared; there was no
510 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, 218; Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.50.
511 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.133.
512 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.77-78.
513 Michael Eppel, Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004, pp.157.
514 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.126.
515 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.123-24.
516 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.88; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.83.
517 Amatzia Baram, “Mesopotamian Identity in Ba’athi Iraq,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.4, 1983, 427.
518 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.116.
519 The permanent constitution was never drawn up. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.95.
99
segregation between the executive and legislative powers in the constitution.520 On the contrary, the Communists arranged a marriage of convenience with Qasim for their interests overlapped with those of Qasim. The sole aim of this alliance was to ward off pro-Nasser elements from seizing power. Consequently, the Qasim-Arif rift was a microcosm of political polarization in Iraq between the “unity right now” elements and the “Iraqi first” forces.521 In other words, the Qasim-Arif rivalry became a struggle for the domestic balance of political power between Iraqi communists and Arab nationalists.522 Qasim tried to receive the support of groups opposed to the Arab Union, both in military and civilian ranks, in order to counteract the drive for an immediate Arab Union and ensure Iraq’s independence. To keep a balance between pan-Arabs and Communists, Qasim strived to rally the domestic forces opposed to the Arab Union domestically, just as he sought the cooperation of powers opposed to the Arab Union regionally.523
In the first days of the revolution of 1958, the Qasim regime and the UAR recognized each other. Qasim, however, had second thoughts about his relations with the UAR.524 Qasim sent a delegation led by Arif to meet with Nasser in Damascus, Syria. Arif, who had been persuaded by the idea of the “Arab Union,” discussed the issue with Nasser without authorization from the Iraqi government. Arif suggested “Qasim would be ousted if he raised any objections” to Iraq’s joining the UAR, while Nasser thought the Iraqi Revolution required consolidation before any discussion of a union.525 After returning to Iraq, Arif began propagating for an “immediate union” with the UAR, drumming up support for Nasser.526 The Ba’ath Party advocated a union with the UAR to compensate for its popular weakness and gain power within Iraq and helped the Syrian Ba’athists
520 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.147.
521 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.174.
522 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.818, 22, 27; Rashid Khalidi, “The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, ed. Robert A. Fernea and Roger Louis, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991, pp.112; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.85. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.116.
523 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.184.
524 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.26-27.
525 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.113.
526 Johan Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp.86; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.817.
100
dilute Nasser’s dominance by bringing Iraq as a third partner into the UAR.527 On the other side of the political spectrum, the Iraqi communists opposed the efforts to merge Iraq with Nasser’s UAR. With implicit support from the NDP, the KDP, and Qasim himself, the communists organized a demonstration in Baghdad against immediate union with the UAR.528
The regional tug-of-war between Iraq and Egypt reached inside Iraq.529 As the tensions grew between Qasim and Arif, Qasim retired Arif from his posts and subsequently dispatched him as ambassador to West Germany, promoting communist colonels loyal to Qasim to the highest commands in Arif’s brigade.530 However, Arif returned unilaterally in November 1958, whereupon he and several Ba’athist officers were arrested “on a charge of plotting against the security of the homeland.”531 In addition, it was announced that membership in the Ba’ath Party was illegal, which alienated moderate elements whose representatives in his cabinet resigned in early 1959. Furthermore, Qasim antagonized the nationalist camp through his execution of opposing nationalist officers, though neglecting that they were more dominant than the Iraqi first group in the Iraqi Army.532 To strengthen his rule regime, Qasim balanced the political parties against each other, not relying on one group.533 Hanna Batatu described Qasim’s gamesmanship towards Arab nationalists and communists in Iraq as writing that “He [Qasim] prevailed by keeping them divided, by playing them off one against the other, and hedging them with their mutual aversions and antipathies.”534 The Qasim regime consolidated its control over the country by establishing two institutions, the Popular Resistance Forces (PRF) and the Special Military Court. Initially formed to train civilians in stabilizing domestic order, the PRF emerged as a tool of Qasim to remove political opponents. The
527 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.815-17; Khalidi, “The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World,” pp.112. Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.113.
528 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.88.
529 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.174.
530 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.835.
531 “Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, the Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Iran,” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 6, 1958, pp.8; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, pp.84.
532 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.83; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.116-17; Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, London: Pall Mall Press, 1970, pp.181-2.
533 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.82.
534 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.843.
101
Court was originally formed to convict royal loyalists who could damage the Republic, but it was transformed to convict officers who opposed Qasim.535 The court not only eliminated Qasim’s enemies but also eroded the rule of law; any criticism of Qasim became difficult.536
The Qasim regime’s support for leftist policies provoked a revival of Shi’ite activism. There were two important Islamic groups; the Society of Ulama was in favor of spreading mosques, schools, and services to other Sunni and Kurdish-populated cities, while the Da’wa, a Shi’ite political group, pursued reshaping Islam and its teachings.537 On the other hand, the chief marji’, Muhsin al-Hakim, had assumed a position in Iraqi domestic politics during the period of Qasim by supporting him against Nasser’s accusations of persecution against Islam in Iraq. In addition, al-Hakim issued a fatwa against communism and rejected unity with Egypt and Syria for fear of Sunni dominance. In all other matters, al-Hakim opposed Qasim for the reasons that he behaved softly on communists yet attempted to diminish the mujtahids’ influence on sensitive issues in Iraq.538
3.2. The Reorientation of Iraqi Foreign Policy
Qasim had initially maintained the foreign policy of the Old Regime in essence and modified it merely to the extent of not endangering his regime.539 Iraq remained a member of the Baghdad Pact until March 1959 for several compelling reasons. Firstly, Qasim was unwilling to provoke a military response at a time when the American military operation in Lebanon posed a potential threat to the new Iraqi regime. Secondly, Qasim sought diplomatic recognition and purchased arms from the West. Thirdly, a decision to break off all ties to the pact might have an adverse effect on Iraq’s economy if the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company suspended oil exports. Fourth, Iraq had paramount sterling reserves in British banks, and British displeasure with Iraqi policies could have caused
535 Eric Davis, Memories of State: politics, history and collective identity in modern Iraq, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2005, pp.127; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.79.
536 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.96.
537 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.103.
538 Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” pp.92.
539 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.181.
102
the freezing of these reserves.540 The more isolated Qasim’s regime began to be, the more Qasim diverged from traditional patterns of foreign policy under the pressures of one ideology or another.541 Qasim reportedly hesitated to withdraw from the pact, but he was to be compelled to withdraw Iraq from the pact.542 The procrastinated withdrawal of Iraq from the pact highlights that international factors are filtered through the domestic political environment. In spite of the Arab nationalism wave in the Middle East, Qasim protracted the Iraqi withdrawal from the pact until 24 March 1959.
In US eyes, the defection of Iraq from the pro-Western camp threatened to undermine the security of the conservative Arab regimes.543 Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia believed that behind the coup was Nasser with Soviet backing. The three countries urged the Eisenhower administration to contain the revolutionary currents sweeping their societies. Accordingly, the administration promised to act forcefully to prevent the possibility of “a complete elimination of Western influence in the region.”544 The essential threat to US hegemony in the Third World derived from indigenous nationalist leaders seeking to direct resources towards domestic ends.545 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated, “The directing forces were not Communist, but primarily forces favorable personally to a Sukarno, a Nasser, or the like.”546 The main concern of the West was oil; assuring the West of the continued and peaceful flow would eliminate the immediate danger to the revolution. In return, the Western powers would relent in their opposition to the Iraqi Republic.547 Qasim saw the West as the real danger to his regime: the United States landed troops in Lebanon, and the British sent more soldiers to Jordan.548 The case of a CIA-backed 1953 coup in Iran taught Qasim that the new Iraqi government was bound to sell oil to Western Europe. Accordingly, Qasim declared no desire to nationalize oil. 549 Oil
540 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.184-85.
541 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.181.
542 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.77-78, 184-85.
543 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.114.
544 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.116-8.
545 Bromley Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, pp.112; Roland Popp, “Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” Cold War History, Vol.10, No.3, 2010, pp.398.
546 Popp, “Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” pp.398.
547 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.26-27.
548 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.26.
549 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.129.
103
would flow to the West. To reassure the West further, Qasim dropped all claims on Kuwait and upheld for another three years the 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement with foreign oil companies that the Hashemite monarchy had been attempting to overturn since the mid-1950s.550
US policy towards Iraq passed through three distinct phases between 1958 and 1963. From the revolution through early 1959, the Eisenhower administration promoted the regional influence of Nasser as an alternative to communism. Phebe Marr argues that the US eventually feared communism more than Nasser’s Arab nationalism in the Middle East.551 In the aftermath of the revolution of 1958 and the US intervention in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration replaced Arab nationalism with local communist movements as the enemy of the US and concentrated on how Qasim’s regime would contribute to the strategy of dual containment of communism.552 In other words, the Eisenhower administration tried to work more closely with Arab nationalism to prevent further Soviet penetration of the Middle East.553 Washington initially tried to isolate Nasser, yet subsequently recognized that there was a real Communist threat in Iraq after 1958.554 A second phase began when Qasim approached the Soviet Union, which increased pressure for intervention in Iraq. The increasing communist influence in Qasim’s Iraq, along with the clash between Nasser and Khrushchev, motivated the Eisenhower administration to develop relations with Egypt and improve economic and technical assistance to the Nasser regime. The other reason for cooperation with Egypt was to secure conservative Arab regimes, primarily Saudi Arabia, with its substantial oil reserves.555 Washington sought to cultivate the friendship of the Egyptian-led bloc of states, the main bulwark against the reinforcement of American influence in the Middle
550 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.111.
551 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.107-08.
552 Kenneth Osgood, “Eisenhower and Regime Change in Iraq: the United States and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958,” in America and Iraq: Policy-making, intervention and regional politics, edited by David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, Oxon: Routledge, 2009, pp.11; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.129.
553 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.107-08.
554 Malik Mufti, “The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism,” in The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, edited by David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas, New York: Routledge, 2018, pp.106.
555 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.130-4.
104
East.556 Herein, Roland Popp argues that working with Egypt on a “common problem,” Iraq, and a restricted “working relationship” between the USA and the UAR contributed to the containment of Soviet advances in Iraq.557 Nevertheless, Washington avoided overall action against the Iraqi regime because the Arab cold war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularly between Arab conservatives and Arab socialists, helped contain communism in the Middle East.558 In early 1960, when Qasim placed firm control on the ICP and clarified that Iraq would not come under Soviet dominance, a new phase of rapprochement began and lasted until late 1961 when mounting domestic problems forced Qasim to confront the IPC.559
The eagerness of regional states to receive support from the two superpowers and the noninterventionist policies adopted by the two superpowers provided a maneuverable atmosphere for the regional powers.560 For instance, Nasser’s utilization of the superpower rivalry supplied Egypt with economic aid from both sides of the Cold War from 1954 to 1965, totaling $1 billion.561 Nasser also took advantage of the superpower rivalry as leverage in solving Egypt’s problems in foreign affairs. The acting Secretary of State for Eisenhower, Christian Herter, pointed out that Nasser asked to work with the USA in Iraq against Qasim.562 The US welcomed this idea as the US regarded Nasser as the “lesser of two evils.”563 In contrast to the US, Britain did not perceive Qasim as a regional threat. Rather, London saw Arab nationalism led by Nasser as a regional threat by viewing Qasim as a potential counterweight to communist and Nasserist puppet
556 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.55.
557 Popp, “Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” pp.397 and 412.
558 Nathan J. Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, pp.261-62.
559 Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt, “The End of the Concessionary Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958-1972,” (Doctoral Dissertation), Stanford University, 2011, pp.30-31.
560 Furkan Halit Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.26, No.3, 2020, pp.324.
561 Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp.328; Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, New York: Manchester University Press, 2003, pp.27.
562 Nathan J Citino, From Arab nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the making of US-Saudi relations, Indiana University Press Bloomington, 2002, pp.148.
563 Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp.329.
105
regimes in the Middle East.564 Britain, as well as the other European governments, decided to support Qasim’s policy of a neutralist Iraq.565 Britain presented Qasim with intelligence and military support, and Washington had raised no objection to Britain’s maintaining sending arms and equipment to Iraq.566
In the domestic realm, challenges to the Qasim regime shaped his approach to the region. The first challenge to Qasim by the nationalist forces came from Rashid Ali al-Kailani, who had returned to Baghdad after seventeen years of exile. On testimony that he had been planning a coup, Kailani was sentenced to death.567 This sentence and the resulting growing power of the communists convinced the nationalist members of the cabinet to resign in February 1959. Qasim replaced the departed ministers with independents who displayed unequivocal loyalty to the “sole leader.”568 Then, a war of words between Qasim and Nasser began when Qasim called Nasser “Hulagu,” a reference to Genghis Khan’s grandson who looted Baghdad in 1258. In return, Nasser deemed him “the Sole Divider of Iraq” in March 1959.569 The increasing communist influence led to the next two nationalist challenges whose conspirators felt they had been appointed to less critical posts: the failed Mosul revolt and the assassination attempt on Qasim. In March 1959, the Mosul revolt leader was a nationalist officer who commanded the military garrison in Mosul.570 Nasser had reportedly made inroads with the officers in Mosul, who were worried about Qasim’s ties with the communists and his unwillingness to hand more power to them,571 though Nasser denied being behind the Mosul revolt that he referred to as the Mosul Revolution.572 At any rate, the failure of the Mosul revolt persuaded the Ba’ath Party, which had failed to secure positions of power, to lay an assassination plot
564 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.107-08.
565 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.132; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.79.
566 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.128; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.130-31.
567 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.100-04.
568 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.175.
569 Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.54, 68.
570 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.176; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.91.
571 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.86.
572 Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp.329. Dann puts forward that many reports state the UAR flags were flown in Mosul during the revolt. Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.171.
106
to remove Qasim himself in October 1959, soon after the execution of the officers responsible for the Mosul revolt. The assassination attempt led to the purges of Ba’athist sympathizers.573
Only the army could act as a counterweight to either nationalists or communists. The Army Officers Service Law, which came into force before the reorientation of Iraq’s foreign policy, raised the officers' pay by between 50 and 90 percent.574 Put differently, Qasim appeased the military establishment by allocating 40 percent of the national budget to it. However, his network of supporters was weak since he had purged 2,000 officers from the Army during his tenure, contributing to a network of opponents.575 Qasim realized that the communists had an influence on the lower-ranking soldiers, who could compete for the strength of the pan-Arabists in the military.576 By 1959, when Qasim perceived that the rising strength of the Communists took the place of the waning of the pan-Arabists in the military, he began to retire officers with suspected Communist sympathies.577 The Kirkuk violence578 in July 1959 allowed Qasim to move against the communists. The communists and Kurds in the Iraqi Army took part in fighting in Kirkuk between Kurds and Turkmen.579 Qasim took advantage of the Kirkuk violence to crack down harder on the Iraqi communists.580 Their suspected sympathizers in the Iraqi Army were purged until Qasim felt that the communists could not challenge his authority. Qasim was aware of palpable unhappiness at the growth of the PRF, which transformed into an armed wing of the Iraqi communists, among loyal elements in the Iraqi Army. To alleviate their concerns and weaken the Iraqi communists, Qasim prohibited the PRF from carrying
573 In 1961 Qasim said to one of the Ambassadors that he had uncovered 27 secret plots against him since the attempt on his life in 1959. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.146. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.188.
574 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.149.
575 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.90.
576 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.818, 22, 27; Khalidi, “The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World,” pp.112; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.85.
577 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.907.
578 As a result of ethnic divisions between Turmen and Kurds, following the 1958 coup tensions gradually became political since many of the Kurds joined trade unions and the ICP. Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.109.
579 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.913.
580 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.128.
107
weapons or making unauthorized arrests.581 Finally, the Iraqi Communist Party’s application for a political party license was refused by the Interior Ministry.582 This decision was a significant setback for the Communists, who represented the biggest party in Iraq at that time.583 When the communists voiced the inclusion of communists in government, Qasim, who did not need them to resist UAR-oriented nationalists, showed little tolerance for any group demanding to rise above its station.584 The Iraqi communists, losing essential positions in the regime, changed their tactics: they tried to consolidate their social base and pull a neutralist Iraq to the left.585 Qasim now began using his foes against the communists. In late June, he granted an amnesty for Arab nationalist officers such as Ahmad Hassan Bakr and Major Salih Mahdi Ammash, imprisoned for their activities during the Mosul revolt.586 The Ba’ath party also waged a clandestine war against the Iraqi communists following the debacle of 1959 and accused them of trying to “influence the authorities into taking action against the Ba’ath Party and all loyal pro-union element…”587 As early as 1960, the Communists began to lose their ground, and their decline continued notwithstanding Qasim’s occasional support to counter pan-Arab retaliations.588
Owing to the assassination plot, Qasim allowed Iraqi communists’ influence to grow, particularly at the grassroots level.589 The nationalist efforts to remove Qasim led him to rely on the left. The communists had played a significant role in suppressing the coup to
581 The PRF members soared from eleven thousand in August 1958 to twenty-five thousand just nine months later. George Lenczowski, “Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq: Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.28, No.1, 1966, pp.53; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.127.
582 Among the parties to receive licenses were the NDP, the KDP (supporting Qasim until taking a position of opposition), and the Islamic Party Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.95-96; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 154; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.136; George Grassmuck, “The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958,” Middle East Journal, Vol.14, No.4, 1960, pp.397; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.129.
583 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.132; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.234.
584 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.177-78; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.127.
585 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.132; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.234.
586 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.108; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.69-73.
587 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.146; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.156.
588 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.126.
589 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.128.
108
which the UAR had given strong verbal and material support,590 and their power had increased considerably in the wake of the failed Mosul coup. After the Mosul revolt, Qasim appointed several Communists as ministers, thus shifting the cabinet towards the radical left.591 With this, several communist supporters had a chance at crucial positions in the army and bureaucracy.592 Meanwhile, many Free Officers who were appointed to unimportant positions or even not appointed to any positions bore hostility to Qasim.593 Furthermore, Qasim’s tactical cooperation with the communists brought about the communists’ efforts to capture the PRF, a citizen militia established by Qasim, to compensate for their weakness in the military.594 The PRF was designed to enlist the support of the public through voluntary participation in order to provide civil defense against possible foreign attacks. From its inception, Qasim used the PRF as a paramilitary instrument against ideological groups opposed to his regime, particularly pan-Arabs.595
Qasim’s need for allies to sustain his position pushed him more towards the Kurds.596 Qasim offered to cooperate with Kurdish leaders as co-partners with Arabs within the framework of Iraqi unity.597 Qasim permitted the return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a tribal chief of the KDP, and used him as a counterweight to the pan-Arabists.598 Nevertheless, relations between Qasim and the Kurds swiftly deteriorated in that he either did not or could not make any concessions towards Kurdish autonomy. For his part, Qasim subsequently realized that demands for Kurdish autonomy would spark Kurdish independence. He knew that the KDP involved very different facets of Kurdish society and used his divide-and-rule tactics among the Kurds; Mulla Mustafa Barzani was a tribal chief and a Naqshbandi sheik, while Ibrahim Ahmad was the representative of the
590 The UAR had transferred arms and ammunition to Mosul and encouraged the sheikhs of the powerful Shammar tribe to initiate a tribal insurrection. Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy, London: Macmillan, 1976, pp.27.
591 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.89-93.
592 Manfred Halpern, “Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp.314.
593 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.147.
594 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.89-93.
595 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.83-84.
596 Sa'ad N. Jawad, “The Kurdish Problem in Iraq,” in The Integration of Modern Iraq, edited by Abbas Kelidar, Croom Helm: London, 1979, pp.174.
597 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.176.
598 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.118.
109
political aspirations of urban leftist Kurd intellectuals.599 Many of the sophisticated members of the KDP shared the Iraqi communists’ view that Qasim is supposed to be supported owing to his commitment to anti-imperialism and his rejection of joining the UAR. For this, they were closely associated with the Iraqi communists in the early months.600 However, splits among the Kurds soon emerged. When Mulla Mustafa began to assert his political influence over Iraq’s Kurdish population at the expense of Ibrahim Ahmad and other tribal sheiks,601 Qasim saw in Mulla Mustafa’s leadership a challenge to his authority in the Kurdish provinces.602 When relations between the two wings of the Kurdish movement were broken down, Qasim encouraged the Kurd leftists against Barzani.603 With the burgeoning relationship between Iraq and the USSR, in early 1961, Barzani visited Moscow and asked the Soviet leadership to put pressure on Qasim, but he returned empty-handed.604 In July 1961, when Qasim refused Barzani’s memorandum on autonomy, a conflict broke out between Barzani’s forces and Ahmad, supported by the government. The involvement of the Iraqi army in the conflict transformed it into a full-scale war by the fall of 1961.605 Qasim was cornered by the Mosul uprising and the Kurdish rebellion at the same time, and the only available military force close to him was the communist guerrillas.606 He endeavored to balance the Kurdish guerrillas with the PRF, totaling 11,000 militants.607
Two weeks after the Mosul revolt, Qasim reoriented Iraq’s foreign policy by withdrawing Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and forming ties with the USSR.608 Qasim’s ambition to rid Iraq of any form of Western influence drew Iraq to the USSR. For Qasim, the Soviet Union could be a source of economic and diplomatic support from which he could obtain
599 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.104-5; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153-4; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000, pp.302-08.
600 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.80.
601 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.118.
602 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.177-78.
603 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.104-5; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153-4; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.302-08.
604 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.80.
605 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.157.
606 Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp.329.
607 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.126.
608 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.79; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.93.
110
the ability to modernize the Iraqi army.609 Therefore, Qasim pursued Soviet military and economic assistance externally and Communist support internally to protect Iraq’s independence.610 On the Soviet front, after the twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in January-February 1959, the USSR adopted to support local Arab communist parties since Nasser’s drive for Arab unity threatened Soviet vital interests in the region.611 The Kremlin leadership calculated that Qasim would counterbalance Nasser’s excessive influence. Consequently, the Soviet Union began to strengthen the new military regime in Baghdad as a counterweight to Cairo.612 The Qasim regime signed an agreement of technical and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union on 16 March 1959 and withdrew from the Baghdad Pact a week later.613 After declaring the withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact, Qasim ordered British air force units to leave Iraq and canceled the Point Four Agreement with the US, a strategic gain for the Soviet Union.614 In March 1959, the Soviet Union granted Iraq a development loan of $500 million for financing big industrial projects and undertook to install an atomic reactor in Baghdad.615 In addition, the USSR replaced Britain as the supplier of arms. American intelligence sources reported increased Soviet arms deliveries to the Qasim regime after leaving the Baghdad Pact.616 Iraq received 500 Soviet military advisors and sent its military personnel to Moscow for military training.617 Soviet military aid given to Iraq was estimated at $120 million in April 1960.618 However, the Iraqi-Soviet arms deal never had a palpable influence on the balance of power in the Middle East, militarily or politically.619
609 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.124-6; Yolcu, “Building a Model While Debunking Another: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp.330.
610 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.184.
611 Oles M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974, pp.130-1; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.126.
612 Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev, pp.130-1; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.14, 126.
613 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.93.
614 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.131.
615 Walter Z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, pp.96-97.
616 Stephen Blackwell, “A Desert Squall: Anglo-American Planning for Military Intervention in Iraq, July 1958–August 1959,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.3, 1999, pp.9.
617 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.79.
618 Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp.96-97.
619 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.151.
111
Egypt was concerned that the revolution of 1958 would lead the USSR to shift its focus from Cairo to Baghdad.620 In Nasser’s opinion, Soviet communism and Western imperialism used local instruments to subjugate the Arab world, and Qasim was serving Soviet communism just as Nuri had served as a tool of British and US interests.621 The relationship between Qasim and Nasser deteriorated in the aftermath of November 1958.622 Upon the arrest of Arif and other pro-UAR leaders in November 1958 in Iraq, Nasser decided to arrest Egyptian and Syrian communists and called them separatists and enemies of Arab nationalism.623 The struggle between Nasser and the Syrian communists drew the Iraqi communists into its vortex.624 On this occasion, “Voice of the Arabs,” the UAR’s propaganda machine, pounced on Qasim’s increasing reliance on the leftists and Communists in his struggle with Iraq’s pro-Nasir nationalists:
“Israel does not want Arab unity to be achieved, nor the Arab cause to succeed and be victorious. [Qasim] and the Communists want the same. Israel does not want the UAR to have good relations with the Iraqi Republic or cooperation between them. The Communists and [Qasim’s] government want the same. All these aims, decisions, and accusations are in harmony in the propaganda of Baghdad, the Communists, and Israel.”625
Throughout 1959, Nasser sought to isolate Iraq in Middle Eastern and wider international affairs.626 The Iraqi position in the regional context was weakened not merely by the long-lasting rivalry with Egypt but also by the difficulties in continuing cordial relations with the other Arab countries.627 Iraq’s domestic political problems and its political isolation in the region kept Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia cool. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine as soon as the Hashemite threat receded through the
620 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.76.
621 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.127.
622 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.156.
623 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.126.
624 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.156.
625 “Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, the Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Iran,” March 13, 1959, British Broadcasting Corporation, pp.8.
626 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.236.
627 Eberhard Kienle, “The Limits of Fertile Crescent Unity: Iraqi Policies towards Syria since 1945,” in Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.135.
112
revolution of 1958 and condemned Iraq’s rupture with the Western world. On the other hand, Qasim refused the Saudi regime on ideological grounds.628 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia inherited the leadership of the Arab conservative camp and replaced Iraq as the challenger of Egypt’s drive for local dominance, culminating in the Egyptian-Saudi involvement in Yemen.629 It was not until October 1960 that the relationship between Iraq and Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy, was re-established, a rapprochement with the two countries that disturbed Nasser sympathizers in Iraq.630 Egypt, however, was in an unfavorable position to induce the Arab countries to isolate Iraq in that Saudi Arabia and Jordan distrusted Nasser.631 Furthermore, Nasser’s campaign to arrest communists in Egypt and Syria caused a crisis in UAR-Soviet relations, and the deteriorating relationship between Cairo and Moscow lasted until 1961.632 Khrushchev and Nasser, however, had an interest in averting a full break in the two countries’ relationship since the USSR expanded its influence in the region thanks to Egypt’s efforts to combat Western hegemony. The Soviet Union remained the main military and economic supplier for Egypt.633
Table 9: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment during the Tenure of the Qasim Regime
International and Regional Environment
US (1957 Eisenhower Doctrine)
Britain (using Iraq as a counterbalance to Egypt till the nationalization of oil in Iraq)
USSR (deteriorating by the crackdown on Iraqi communists)
Arab Socialism Camp
States In Limbo
Iraq First Camp
628 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.59; Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.135. Rieck, “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation,” pp.322.
629 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.180.
630 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.135.
631 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.236.
632 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.126, 48; Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev, pp.161, 83-6.
633 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.128; Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev, pp.156.
113
Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (defecting following the break-up of the UAR)
Lebanon, Jordan
Iraq
Domestic Environment
The FPE (Qasim) and Iraqi Communists
Opposition (Kurds (supporting Qasim at the beginning) and Nationalists (Nasserists and Ba’athists)
International Circumstance
In High-Threat Environment
Eisenhower Doctrine, rivalry with the UAR
Domestic Circumstance
Ambiguity
The coup attempt, war with the Kurds
The Highly (Strong) Structural Autonomy
Qasim did not further improve relations with the Soviet Union.634 Firstly, the close relationship between the USSR and Nasser’s Egypt pointed to Qasim that he could not see Moscow as a regional ally of Baghdad.635 Hence, relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union cooled remarkably between 1960 and 1962.636 Secondly, the Soviet leaders became disappointed with Qasim owing to his systematic campaign to decrease the power of the Iraqi communists and bring them under control. Following the Kirkuk violence, although the Soviets imposed a media blackout on Iraq, they tried to dissuade the Iraqi Communists from withdrawing their demand for a government portfolio soon after the Mosul revolt.637 Qasim never made an evident break with the Iraqi communists for the reason of Moscow’s economic and military assistance programs to Iraq.638 Referring back to our theoretical argument, the FPE assesses threats at the systemic, sub-systemic, and domestic levels.
634 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.124.
635 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.158.
636 Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp.96-97.
637 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.148, 59; Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev, pp.161, 83-6; Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp.96-97. Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.259.
638 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004, pp.262; Oles M. Smolansky and Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press, 1991, pp.16.
114
Leaders frequently act on one level but aim to influence the outcome on another as the boundary lines of systemic-sub systemic-domestic tiers are blurred and interrelated.639 The purge of the Iraqi communists in 1963 ultimately led the USSR to suspend arms aid to the Qasim regime until the new Arif regime truce with the Kurds in 1964.640
Scholars point to Qasim’s need to wipe out the old dominant elites’ legacy. This is seen as a symbol of Iraq’s subjection to British and Western interests.641 Beginning in August 1958, Qasim had entered long negotiations with Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) over a series of issues, from the price of oil to the desire by the Iraqi government for equity participation in the company, an indicator that Qasim opted for pragmatism over ideology. He never sought a showdown nor pushed for a rupture of the negotiations up to the second half of 1961.642 When negotiations between the Qasim regime and the IPC dragged on because he asked for a greater than 30 percent share in profits and 20 percent Iraqi ownership in the IPC,643 he invited four oil-producing countries (Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) to Baghdad in the summer of 1960 to discuss solutions to stagnant oil prices. The result was the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to regulate production and increase producing countries’ leverage in pricing negotiations with the major oil companies.644 Consequently, Iraq’s revenue from oil increased by 60 percent in the era of the Qasim regime. In 1961, petroleum provided 27 percent of the total national income of Iraq and 90 percent of all foreign exchange.645
The withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and the burgeoning relations between Iraq and the USSR led to a crisis in its relations with Iran regarding the Shatt al-Arab during 1959. After a battle of words, both sides decided to settle their differences through negotiation.646 An agreement occurred between the two sides in the spring of 1961, but it did not solve the dispute. Both sides began to seek a negotiated way out. In this matter,
639 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.46-47.
640 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.222.
641 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.355; Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.123-24.
642 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.130.
643 Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.260-61.
644 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.182.
645 Eppel, Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny, pp.162.
646 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.108.
115
Iran built up relations with the Iraqi Kurds.647 Consequently, deteriorating relations with Iran emphasized the regional difficulty of pursuing a policy of “Iraq first.” The closure of the Shatt al-Arab waterway revived the question of Iraq’s limited access to the waters of the Gulf and the dominance of the UAR in the Levant; Qasim stared at the Persian Gulf, renamed by Iraq the “Arabian Gulf.”648
3.3. The Kuwait Venture: Inefficient Threat Assessment and Counterbalancing
By the end of 1960, Iraqi political life underwent “thirty months of stagnation:” the NDP split over whether or not to maintain backing Qasim and divided into a number of factions by October 1961; the Istiqlal Party could not play any influential role, though a number of its members gravitated towards the Ba’ath Party.649 After the failure of the attempt on Qasim’s life, a split emerged in the party that followed Ba’ath party secretary-general Fu’ad al-Rikabi’s defection to Nasser in June 1961.650 In 1962, the party formed its six-man Military Bureau that included retired Baathist officers and Ali Salih Al-Saadi, who was involved in the assassination attempt on Qasim’s life and convened the Iraqi Regional Command of the party as its new secretary-general. Nevertheless, the party had no capability to command a following among Iraq’s population.651 Still, there was not a common agenda among the opposition; divisions in ideology and political orientation continued.652 This domestic circumstance might have encouraged Qasim to turn his interest to Kuwait. In theoretical terms, certainty in the policy environment reduced the influence of domestic groups, determining to what extent the FPE is insulated from the domestic opposition.653
Table 10: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the Qasim Regime
Exogenous shift
Systemic/sub-systemic
and domestic ramifications
FPE
Threat assessment and counterbalancing
647 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.135.
648 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.158-59.
649 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.269.
650 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.82.
651 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.90-91.
652 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.81-82.
653 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89; Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50.
116
Scenario “C”
The formation of Kuwait
FPE identify component as a threat, but societal supporters do not identify component as a threat (disables coalition)
Constrained
British forces poured into Kuwait and alienation of the Arab states
(Inefficient threat assessment and counterbalancing)
The rich oil resources of Kuwait were no less important because the oil in Kuwait, one of the most accessible places to produce, had around 15 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.654 These revenues attracted the eyes of Arab leaders who sought to achieve pan-Arab goals such as Qasim and Nasser.655 Kuwait had been one arena for the Nasser-Qasim rivalry. In February 1959, pro-Nasser demonstrations in Kuwait City involved anti-Qasim speeches. Nasser’s bid to keep Kuwait out of Qasim’s hands caused him to miss the opportunity to press for Kuwait’s accession to the UAR.656 In addition to embroiling Iraq in conflict with Nasir’s UAR, Qasim caused tensions with its neighbor Kuwait. According to Qasim’s adviser on Gulf affairs, when Qasim recognized that Kuwait was moving towards a new status in its relationship with Britain, he began to ask for information on Kuwait’s historical connections with Iraq.657 Iraq had main motivations for its close interests in the Kuwait “question;” the smuggling problem, the need to establish an outpost in the Gulf to promote Iraqi political-economic interests, and territorial “regional” expansionism in the name of pan-Arabism.658 In June 1961, when Britain recognized Kuwait as an independent state, Britain, on Qasim’s part, forestalled the advancement of Arab unity and increased Iraq’s internal security problems. From the perspective of Iraq, Britain, with the rejection of countenancing Iraq’s claims to the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warba, blocked Iraq’s path to the open sea and prevented Iraq from increasing its oil resources.659 Qasim reiterated his claim to Kuwait in a series of public statements and clarified that he would resort to peaceful means instead of force, regarded
654 Kuwait exports abruptly reached 37.042,000 tons in 1952 to 80.573,627 tons in 1962.
655 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.168-69.
656 Nasser was using the “unity” as the basis for the UAR. Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.262.
657 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.168-69.
658 Shikara, Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, pp.134.
659 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.70.
117
as a threat to invade the emirate.660 Qasim claimed Kuwait as part of Iraq by basing its legal title to Kuwait on the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913. This agreement, never ratified, conditioned that Kuwait was an autonomous district of the Ottoman Empire and that the sheik of Kuwait was an Ottoman official.661 In a press conference on 25 June 1961, Qasim made an elaborate statement about Kuwait’s historical connections with Iraq:
“The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the ‘Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs [to ‘Iraq as part] of the province of Basra… We shall, accordingly, issue a decree appointing the Shaykh of Kuwait as qa’imaqam [district governor] of Kuwait, who will come under the authority of the Basra province…”662
Qasim recognized that he could barely justify his action, and he sustained shifting the grounds of his claim from legal to historical and political considerations. Qasim, presuming that his country would be with him, pursued to shift the focus of “a divided nation” from domestic to foreign affairs.663 However, neither the Arab nationalists nor the Kurds were interested in claiming Kuwait. According to Lobell’s complex threat identification model, the FPE is restrained in its threat assessment when there is disagreement among the FPE and the societal elites about whether the foreign state is a danger, which disables a foreign policy coalition. In scenario “C” of the model, the FPE identifies a component of the power of the foreign state as a threat; however, the societal elites, including the Communists, do not consider the element a danger to their parochial interests.664
660 Qasim based his argument on historical and legal considerations, although the Hashemite monarchy’s claims had been partly based on geographical propinquity and partly on ethnic and economic grounds. See, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.166-67.
661 Iraq’s claim to annex Kuwait dated back to King Ghazi tenure. Iraqi leaders strived to gain control of Kuwait since they sought territorial aggrandizement for the sake of prestige and power. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.109; Davis, Memories of State: politics, history and collective identity in modern Iraq, pp.139; Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, Berkeley: University Presses of Calinorfia, 1967, pp.336-47; Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.56.
662 See Ahmad Fawzi, Qasim wa al-Kuwayt, Qairo, 1961, pp.45-51.
663 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.168.
664 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.66-67.
118
On the regional system, Nasser dominated the fragmented Arab system. Arab rulers avoided forging an anti-UAR grouping for fear of being delegitimized by him.665 Nevertheless, Qasim ordered the Iraqi military to mobilize to the Kuwaiti border.666 Indeed, Adeed Dawisha argues that there never was any military threat by quoting his father’s, Air Force Colonel ‘Isam Dawisha, conversation with the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi air force, telling Dawisha, “Don’t take notice of this madman [Qasim]. You think the English would just let us walk into Kuwait?”667 In doing so, British troops began pouring into Kuwait at the request of Kuwait on July 1.668 Britain’s policy towards the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute was essential to retain the independence of Kuwait under British protection and thus necessary to head off any serious Iraqi encroachment on Kuwait.669 For Britain, failure to defend Kuwait would weaken its strategic position in the “Persian” Gulf.670 The oil production of Kuwait was vital to Britain. The relative production of crude oil by Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq in metric tons in 1957: Kuwait 57 million, Iran 35 million, Iraq 20 million.671 In addition, Britain received 60 percent of its oil from Kuwait, whose annual income from oil reached 350 and 400 million dollars, and Kuwaiti investments in Britain were substantial, between 50 and 80 million dollars annually.672 The intrusion of the British into Kuwait on 1 July deepened Arab hostility towards Iraq, humiliated the Iraqi military, and weakened Qasim’s position domestically.673 By September, the Arab League, dominated by Nasser, sanctioned the dispatch of Arab forces of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Saudi troops to replace the British.674
665 Podeh, “'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63,” pp.104.
666 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.158-59.
667 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.228.
668 The Gulf countries sought the external protection from the Great Britain before the U.S. Interview with Ali Bakeer, Assoc. Prof., about “Gulf Countries’ policies toward Iraq,” Doha, Qatar: April 7, 2022; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.228.
669 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.70.
670 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.170.
671 Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Middle East after 1945,” in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.56.
672 Miriam Joyce, “Preserving the Sheikhdom: London, Washington, Iraq and Kuwait, 1958–61,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.2, 1995, pp.283.
673 Davis, Memories of State: politics, history and collective identity in modern Iraq, pp.139; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.88.
674 Two days after the complete evacuation of the British force on 10 October, the U.A.R. removed her forces from Kuwait because of disagreement among the Arab states. Thus the Arab forces remained until 1962. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.172; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 110; Interview with Dr. Liqa
119
At the same time, the Kuwait affair was taking place on the diplomatic front. The Arab League hastened Kuwaiti entry into the League, thus legitimizing Kuwaiti sovereignty. Hashim Jawad, Qasim’s foreign minister, declared that Iraq would recall its ambassadors to any country that recognized Kuwait. In 1962, Iraq recalled its ambassadors to those countries, including Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon, and the US. Qasim withdrew Iraq from the Arab League by increasing the isolation of Iraq more and more and by helping bring about the end of his rule.675 On the Arab front, the Kuwait affair contributed to alienating Qasim’s regime from other Arabs like the Saudis who erstwhile backed him against the Nasserist camp.676 Iraq’s Kuwait venture ended in a fiasco. Following the failure of Qasim’s claim to Kuwait, the opposition’s disarray and the UAR's collapse in September 1961 gave overconfidence to Qasim for securing his remaining in power for more than two years.677 Qasim welcomed Syria’s secession from the UAR and later met its new president by normalizing Iraq’s relations with Damascus.678 In December 1961, Qasim unilaterally announced Public Law (PL) 80, which left the IPC to operate only in those areas already in production and granted the newly created state-owned Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) access to the new territory.679 The enforcement of PL 80 deprived the oil companies of 99.5 percent of the concession areas.680 The breaking up of the UAR in September 1961, which represents Egypt’s inability to dominate the Arab world,681 made Qasim think that he might no longer benefit Britain as a counterweight to Nasser. Britain had no desire to keep Qasim in power in this respect. Such considerations brought Qasim to rethink his behavior towards Egypt. Getting Nasser’s support to secure the withdrawal of the Egyptian contingent from Kuwait could enhance Iraq’s position in the Arab world and vis-a-vis Britain. Qasim wanted to reconcile with Nasser, under which he might receive support in the Gulf in return for giving support to Nasser in the Levant.682 The
Maki, Senior Researcher at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, about “Saddam’s Iraq,” Doha, Qatar: April 6, 2022; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.225.
675 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135.
676 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135-36.
677 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.82.
678 Kienle, “The Limits of Fertile Crescent Unity: Iraqi Policies towards Syria since 1945.”
679 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.101; Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.139.
680 Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984, pp.138-39.
681 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.146.
682 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.134.
120
isolation of UAR (now only including Egypt itself) by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, with the objective of resisting the spread of Arab socialism, motivated Nasser to make a tactical move towards a rapprochement with Iraq. However, as the British ambassador in Cairo indicated, “the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq is so fundamental that no rapprochement between them would be likely to last long.”683
The Kuwait affair not only isolated Qasim from his Arab neighbors but also solved no rifts at home.684 Mulla Mustafa imposed his control over a large area in Kurdish provinces at a time when Qasim had just become preoccupied with the Kuwait crisis.685 Isolated from the people and entangled in an unpopular war against the Kurds in the north of Iraq, Qasim might have looked to create new popularity for his regime by announcing Kuwait as an extension of the Iraqi nation.686 The opposition against Qasim’s regime shared the idea of the isolation of Iraq in the Arab world and their antipathy to communism.687 The seeds of dissent were sown within the army after the Kuwait disaster. Thus, pan-Arab officers started to plot a military coup to remove Qasim from power.688 The Military Bureau of the Ba’ath Party was formed in 1962 and composed of several senior Ba’athist officers, such as Brigadier Ahmad Hassan Bakr. The Bureau drew up plans for the overthrow of Qasim’s regime to ensure that the party would become a dominant actor following the overthrow of the Qasim regime.689 The KDP and the Ba’athists made a tentative agreement in the spring of 1962. If Qasim could be overthrown, Barzani and Ibrahim Ahmad would declare a cease-fire and then Kurdish autonomy.690 On the contrary, Qasim thought that his clients dominated the Iraqi state; he allied with weakened Iraqi communists and several army officers inside Iraq, and the USSR only stood by Qasim outside Iraq.691 However, the Iraqi communists even turned against Qasim’s “national oppression” in the north of Iraq, and throughout the spring of 1962, the Iraqi
683 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.134, 39.
684 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135.
685 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.178.
686 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135.
687 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.163; Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, pp.136.
688 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135-36.
689 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.162-3.
690 Sa'ad Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958–1970, London: Ithaca Press, 1981, pp.108-12; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.106.
691 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.110; Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.124.
121
communists came to lobby heads of socialist states for support for the Kurds and to take a stand against the war. The Kurdish war, thus, broke down relations between the communists and Qasim. Thousands of Iraqi communists were imprisoned as they appeared in support of Barzani and against Qasim.692 Qasim did not desire such an escalation and was unwilling to continue the fighting further. In lieu, he offered amnesties to the rebels in November 1961 and again in March 1962. Although the rebellion was gaining momentum because Qasim became increasingly isolated in both the domestic and regional scenes,693 the Iraqi Army forced Mulla Mustafa’s forces to withdraw to the mountainous area. The military operations led to a stalemate since the war was a burden on the economy of the country, alienated the Iraqi public, and promoted the elements opposed to Qasim to depose him at a time when the Iraqi people did not stand by him. In sum, the Kurdish war can be considered a reason for Qasim’s fall.694
The promise of social revolution, such as land reform and political hopes for liberalization, had died in the eyes of political and social groups in Iraq. In addition, the Kurdish war eroded the state structure and the sense of national identity. Qasim’s regime was to be overthrown by the Ba’ath Party, not by the United States or Britain, both of which lost the ability to drive events inside Iraq.695 US oil policy required pursuing “regime change” in Baghdad since, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration officials, the Iraqi leader’s ties to Iraqi communists would bring Iraq into the Soviet orbit.696 To the CIA’s (Central Intelligence Agency) warning, Egypt never had a conspiratorial apparatus inside Iraq sufficient to initiate an anti-Communist coup in Baghdad.697 Subsequent developments, such as the failure of the Mosul revolt in March 1959, Qasim’s decision to leave the Baghdad Pact in the same month, and the strengthening of the communist position in the country proved Egypt’s weak position inside Iraq.698
692 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.120-21.
693 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.308-11.
694 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.180-81.
695 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.110-11.
696 Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.247.
697 Popp, “Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” pp.403.
698 Popp, “Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” pp.404.
122
Qasim’s war with the Kurds led to an armed conflict with Iran and to an embarrassing position with the Soviet Union.699 Soviet-Iraqi relations reached a stalemate partly due to Qasim’s desire to keep the Iraqi Communists under pressure.700 The Soviet Union re-relied on Egypt as the gateway to the Arab world, stepping up their aid to Cairo.701 While Khrushchev withheld his full support from the Iraqi communists to repair the Soviet-UAR rift, Eisenhower carried out a classical divide-and-rule strategy by offering restraint support to Nasser. For instance, Qasim’s unsuccessful claim of Kuwait in 1961 also exemplifies in practical terms how the Arab cold war benefited the United States and its allies.702 The CIA, under Allen Dulles, dedicated to the pursuit of the Cold War, collaborated with the Ba’ath Party in the overthrow of Qasim by providing the party with the names of individual communists.703 The communists realized the ongoing plotting of the overthrow of the Qasim regime. By way of their influence in the army, the communists could uncover the Ba’athist plans before their execution and openly warned Qasim on 3 January 1963, pressuring him to purge the army, unleash political prisoners, and grant the Iraqi communists the space for political maneuvers.704 Qasim launched several arrests of Ba’athist officers. Ahmad Hassan Bakr, head of the military group, decided to raise the rebellion on 8 February, two weeks earlier than planned, before Qasim moved to arrest other Ba’ath leaders.705 The Iraqi communists resisted with what little resources they possessed at their disposal and mobilized their members to defend the Qasim regime despite its uneven relationship with him.706 In the aftermath of the coup of February 1963, the USSR did nothing to aid the Iraqi communists, while the CIA backed the Ba’athist and Nasserist groups in their massacre of Iraqi communists.707
699 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.185.
700 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.123-24.
701 Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp.66.
702 Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.261-62.
703 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.288.
704 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.962-67; Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.126.
705 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135-36; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.190.
706 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.163.
707 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.79.
123
4. CHAPTER FOUR: IRAQ’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AT ARIF BROTHERS’ RULE
4.1. Ambiguity in the Domestic Policy Environment: The Kurdish Rebellion and Competition between Nasserists and Ba’athists
The Arab nationalists in Iraq split into several groups, the most significant of which were the Nasserists and the Ba’athists. The former did not constitute a political party; instead, there was a collection of individuals who sought unity with Egypt, lacked clear leadership, and were inclined to see Abd al-Salam Arif as their spokesperson. They also could take advantage of support from conservative elements, which the radical changes introduced by Qasim alienated, from the Arab Sunni population in Mosul and Ramadi and military leaders, particularly those left out of the Qasim regime. On the other hand, the Ba’ath Party had its own weakness because it owned little military support and consisted mainly of young civilians who would have to rely on older, more conservative elements among the Nasserists.708
After the coup to overthrow Qasim on 8 February 1963, the Ba’ath members occupied all key posts in the new cabinet headed by Ahmad Hassan Bakr for nine months.709 The principal power, however, was vested in the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC). Constituting the core of the real power in the new regime, the NCRC was able to appoint and remove cabinets and function as the commander in chief of the armed forces. Membership in the NCRC clearly represented the Ba’ath Party members.710 The NCRC appointed Abd al-Salam Arif as “temporary” President of the Republic, pending the formation of a permanent constitutional regime.711 The Ba’athist leaders had claimed Arif as their leader in their party’s struggle against the Qasim regime to enhance their party’s prestige.712 The party’s cooperation with Arif was deemed to gain the support of conservative elements, who preferred to guide the new cabinet from behind the scenes
708 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.113-14.
709 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.197.
710 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1003; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.116-18.
711 Arif was unwitting of the Ba’ath activities concerning a military uprising and was suggested by some of the leaders to serve only as a figurehead of the new regime. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.192.
712 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.215-16.
124
rather than assume direct responsibility for public actions.713 Like the militia organization under the Qasim regime, another militia organization, the National Guard, was established to guard against the elements that opposed the Ba’ath rule and functioned as an instrument in the hands of the authorities. In addition to the Iraqi Army, it became one of the pillars of the new regime.714
During the tenure of the Arif brothers’ rule, societal elites sought to strengthen their positions in the domestic balance of political power.715 Ruling in Iraq between February and November 1963, the first government was meant to form a Ba’ath Party state, though it included the Ba’athist-Nationalist alliance. Abd al-Salam Arif headed the first government as a coalition of what may be termed military Arifites, military Ba’athists, and military Nasserists. The coalition of them was a coalition of competing groups. The core of the Arifite group was composed of Brigadier Abd al-Salam Arif and his brother Abd al-Rahman Arif, among others. At the head of the military, the Ba’athists stood Hassan Bakr, the vice-president of the Republic; Hardan al-Takriti, the minister of Defense; and Tahir Yahya, the then-Prime Minister. The central Nasserist military figures were Air Staff Colonel Arif Abd al-Razzaq, the air force commander, and other Nasserist military officers in the Iraqi Army. Their Nasserism was distinguished from Arif’s, attended by an attachment to the visible aspects of Islam.716 There was an ideological division between conservatives, recognizant of the party’s weak power base in the country and the need to reconcile with others, and radicals, who favored following up swiftly on a Ba’ath agenda.717 The Ba’athist leaders were divided into three groups. The right-wing group advocated cooperation with other nationalist elements, particularly in the army, whom they thought might strengthen its position in the country. This group asked for the delay in implementing radical principles, particularly socialism. In converse, the left-wing group pressed for implementing basic principles, especially socialism. They thought that socialism would ensure the support of the masses. Between these two extremes, there was
713 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.196.
714 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.198.
715 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.47-51.
716 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1027-31.
717 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.116-18; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.172; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.80-81.
125
a center group trying to reconcile the two extreme groups.718 During the Arif brothers’ regime, the Ba’athists and the Nasserists engaged in a power struggle and attempted to overthrow each other. The Iraqi Army thwarted these attempts.719
After the Syrian Ba’ath was elevated to power by a group of army officers opposed to Syria’s secession from the UAR on 8 March, Syrian and Iraqi delegations went to Cairo to negotiate a new scheme of Arab Union incorporating Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Since the Ba’ath Party was now in power in two Arab countries, authority in the unique structure of the Arab Union was proposed to be exercised by “collective leadership” rather than by one responsible leader. An agreement on a tripartite union was consequently signed on 17 April 1963.720 Referring back to the theoretical argument, state leaders focus on shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities that threaten specific strategic interests.721 On the other hand, societal elites seek to lobby government policies that strengthen their bloc’s interests at the expense of the opposing faction’s interests and even the nation’s interests.722 Arif’s quest for Arab unity further alienated the Kurds when he reached an agreement of unification with Nasser.723 The KDP had consented to support the efforts to overthrow the Qasim regime in return for a promise of autonomy. The agreement on a tripartite union led the Kurds to demand a binational state. Relations with the Kurds deteriorated, and war began again.724 Following the Cairo conversations, the 17 April unity agreement became obsolete because of a Nasserist failed attempt at a coup d’état on 18 July 1963 in Iraq. In fact, the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athists favored cementing the relations between the two countries, considering a bilateral arrangement through economic and military agreements.725
Furthermore, the Sixth National Congress of the National Command of the Ba’ath Party passed a resolution calling for a full federal union between the two countries.726 Iraq
718 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.209-10.
719 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.212.
720 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.205-06.
721 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.62.
722 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45, 51, 74.
723 Kirmanj, “The Clash of Identities in Iraq,” pp.50.
724 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.119.
725 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.206-07.
726 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.123-24; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.120.
126
signed an agreement for an economic union with Syria. On 8 October 1963, the two sides concluded on the “Military Unity Charter” as an initial step towards full unification.727 However, the Syrian government did not go as far as to establish a political union between the two countries, as such a union would be interpreted as an alliance against Egypt. After all, a Syrian-Iraqi union alarmed Cairo as well as Nasserist elements in Iraq. Such a union would materialize the one that Egypt had pursued to impede since 1944: the prevention of any Fertile Crescent unity that might destroy the importance of Egypt in inter-Arab affairs.728 Nonetheless, the Ba’ath’s bloody suppression of pro-Nasser Arab nationalist elements in Iraq caused Nasser to proclaim the unity agreement void so long as the Ba’ath remained in power. At this point, Arif capitalized on the internal and external suppression of the Ba’ath Party in order to topple the Ba’ath coalition in Iraq in November 1963, declaring his adherence to the April unity agreement. Syrian Ba’athists were thus isolated, and their political survival was on the line.729 The embroilment between Iraq and Syria ceased union talks between Baghdad and Damascus.
In September 1963, an internal crisis with the Ba’ath Party broke out between a radical left-wing faction led by Ali Salih al-Saadi and the moderate right wing of the party led by General Hassan Bakr. Al-Saadi’s faction urged the party to create a political structure less dependent on the military. On the other hand, Bakr’s faction underlined the importance of the Army in Iraqi politics and was anxious that the National Guard was about to usurp the role of the Army.730 Arif had realized that his position was only that of a figurehead. Still, he preferred to wait before asserting his leadership instead of engaging in a struggle for power with Ba’athist leaders. The friction and struggle for power between the two factions eased the way for Arif and his Arab nationalist supporters in the army to take over from the Ba’ath Party. He supported the right-wing Ba’athist leaders, intending to
727 In this regard, a Syrian brigade was dispatched to Iraq to participate in the operations against the Kurdish rebels in the north. To the military agreement, the Iraqi Minister of Defense was to become the Commander-in-Chief of the unified army. Roby C. Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007, pp.305.
728 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.123-24; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.120.
729 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.162-63.
730 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.96; Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, pp.199; Thomas Koszinowski, “Iraq as a Regional Power,” in Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.286.
127
weaken the left-wing group that controlled the party.731 Arif, willing to get rid of the Ba’ath party, capitalized on the split in the party. The moderate wing of the Ba’athists at this point rallied behind Arif.732 Clashes erupted in Baghdad between detachments of the National Guard and the Nasserist Arab Nationalist Movement. Arif, which favored disbanding the National Guard, dissolved it on 18 November.733 He also declared that a new government would be established with himself as president of the republic and commander in chief of the armed forces. In return, Arif “rewarded” four moderate Ba’athist officers with promotions to critical posts in the cabinet, and they continued in their positions by the spring of 1964.734
Much of the Ba’ath party’s previous influence was inherited by its Nasserist enemy, the Arab Nationalist Movement. Arif, acting in tune with the Nasserists, eased the Ba’athists out of one position after another.735 The Ba’athists were thoroughly displaced from power.736 Power was now strictly in the hands of the military, political parties disappeared, and the Ba’ath Party was suppressed. In this fluid atmosphere, the military came to establish blocs based not on party affiliation but on tribes and localities in an attempt to consolidate its hold on power.737 Arif strived to calm domestic turbulence and normalize Iraq’s relations with foreign powers. Arif relied diametrically on the Nasserist elements opposed to the Ba’ath ideology to consolidate his position internally and to receive Nasser’s much-needed support for his regime.738 Arif’s new regime turned towards friendship with Cairo, a propaganda battle began between Damascus and Baghdad, and relations with the West were strengthened.739
731 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.215-16.
732 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.96-97; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.186-87.
733 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.125-26; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.168-69.
734 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.96-97; Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.186-87.
735 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1027-31.
736 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.120-22; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.166-67.
737 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.116-18; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.172; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.80-81.
738 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.215-18.
739 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.116-18; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.172; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.80-81; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.125-26; Habib Ishow, “Relations between Iraq and Kuwait,” in Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Thomas Derek, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.314.
128
4.2. Unity Efforts with Egypt in pursuit of Strong Structural Autonomy
Since 1957, Saudi Arabia has opposed the Egyptian drive to master the Arab world by keeping the US at arm’s length and providing political and material assistance to the separatists in Syria before 1961. Saudi Arabia entered a new era of relations with Jordan, putting aside the historical rivalry between their two families.740 The isolation of Egypt from the mainstream of Arab politics prompted Nasser to accuse Saudi Arabia and Jordan of conspiring and financing the sabotage of his union with Syria. In return, Nasser decided to intervene on the side of the republican regime in Yemen to punish Saudi Arabia for meddling in the UAR’s affairs.741 Egypt and Saudi Arabia were thus locked in a struggle for the future of Yemen.742 Saudi Arabia, playing an assertive role in regional politics, formed the World Islamic League and allied with Jordan in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 up to 1964, to counterbalance the secular ideology of Nasserism and the radical Arab nationalist movement in the region.743 By the end of 1963, the Arab states were positioned on ideological lines, with a Cairo-Damascus axis confronting an Amman-Riyadh one. The Cairo Summit in mid-December 1963 started the era of reconciliation that lasted until 1966. During the interval, there were other summit meetings to develop a coordinated policy towards Israel and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Yemen war.744 Although King Feisal of Saudi Arabia was determined not to reward Nasser for his military intervention in Yemen, Egypt was to make a bid to win a victory for the revolution with 40,000 troops.745 In 1965, a joint US-British military aid package was signed with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The USSR tried to establish a united revolutionary front through Nasser and the Syrian Ba’athists.746 Although Egypt gained a political
740 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.152-53.
741 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.150.
742 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.127.
743 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.152-53, 86.
744 Nasser had standed by the revolutionary forces in Yemen in September 1962 as an opportunity to regain the initiative in Arab affairs for Egypt. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.140-41.
745 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.127.
746 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.167-68.
129
advantage from the Cairo summit, Nasser did not control other Arab states’ actions that were now looking to the East and West to counterbalance Egyptian pressures.747
Beginning with the Cairo Conference of January 1964, Iraq’s foreign policy had a definite pro-Egyptian orientation, drawing closer to Egypt.748 For Nasser, a stable Iraq could be useful to form an opposition to an anti-Nasserist Syria and support Nasser’s struggle with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.749 At the celebrations of the completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam to which Arif was invited, the two leaders signed a preparatory agreement for a union between Egypt and Iraq on 26 May 1964.750 Baghdad and Cairo agreed to proceed with the unification agreement over a two-year period. Nevertheless, this aim was forgotten, not owing to mistrust that had plagued Egyptian-Syrian relations, but rather owing to the political instability within Iraq and the difficulty in coordinating Iraq’s policies with those of Egypt in some ways.751 While blaming Ba’ath leaders for their failure to implement the tripartite agreement of 17 April on a tripartite union, Arif was no longer intent on moving swiftly to implement the agreement.752 Whereas the abortive Ba’athist coup led by Arif strengthened his grip on power and raised Iraqi-Egyptian relations to a new high, both Nasser and Arif held private reservations.753 In Arif’s view, his regime, though freed from Ba’athist influence, feared Egyptian dominance and disliked the sort of socialism that Nasser had introduced in Egypt.754 The Nasserist faction did not possess a notable popular following, relying instead on the patronage of Arif and Nasser, and on their own networks in the officer corps and in the state administration.755 Nasser did not want unity with Iraq for two reasons. First, Nasser disliked the idea of sharing leadership in the Arab world with the Ba’athists in Iraq.
747 Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration, pp.98, 109; Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.186.
748 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.221.
749 Laurance Glenn Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” (Master's Degree), Austin Peay State University, 1976, pp.18.
750 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.229.
751 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.163-64.
752 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.222.
753 Bryan R. Gibson, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp.87.
754 Arif advocated Arab socialism based on Islam, not on secularism. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.328-29; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.221.
755 Those who adhered to the Nasserist tendency in Iraq represented numerous sentiments focused on Arab nationalism, state socialist development and ‘third worldism.’ Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.174.
130
Second, he was unwilling to become entangled in Iraq’s domestic problems, particularly the Kurds.756
Table 11: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment during the Tenure of the Arif Brothers’ Regime
International and Regional Environment
USSR
US
Britain
Progressive Camp
States In Limbo
Conservative Camp
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Arab Republic, Iraq (up to 1964)
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia, Jordan
Domestic Environment
The FPE (Arif Brothers)
Opposition (Ba’athists, Nasserists, Kurds, Shiites)
International Circumstance
In Low Threat Environment
Pursuing balanced relations with the West and East
Domestic Circumstance
Ambiguity
Coup attempts, war with the Kurds
The Low (Weak) Structural Autonomy
This is evident in Arif’s close alignment with Egypt, leaving room for ideological disagreement and for a struggle for power in domestic politics amid the rebellion of the Kurdish community.757 Unification with Egypt engulfed the Kurdish leadership as well as Shiite circles and associations in Iraq, whose influence Arif could not reduce. Under the Arif brothers, Shi’ite scholar Muhsin al-Hakim denounced the nationalization decrees of 1964 (socialist one) as well as the government’s close links with Nasser.758 Many Shias feared that Nasserism would enhance the Sunni dominance in Iraq, while the Kurds
756 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.120.
757 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.163-64.
758 Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” 94; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.172-74.
131
worried that their position would be constrained in a larger Arab Union.759 The Kurds announced that they would insist on local autonomy on a federal basis if Iraq decided to join the UAR. In contrast, public opinion at that time in Iraq was not in favor of supporting the Arab Union if it meant the loss of de facto Kurdish autonomy.760 In theoretical terms, the FPE focuses outward on the systemic and sub-systemic balance of power and inward on the domestic balance of power.761 This is evident that Arif was on the fence about reconciling Iraq’s demand for internal unity with the demand for Arab Union.762
The formation of the Yahya Government, headed by Tahir Yahya, who had kept in touch with Kurdish leaders, generated a cease-fire with the Kurds on 10 February 1964.763 No agreement, however, was reached despite the letters to resolve specific issues that were exchanged between Abd al-Salam Arif and the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani. Arif announced that he would ensure the recognition of Kurdish national rights to be involved in a constitution.764 Barzani’s acceptance of the cease-fire disturbed the politburo of the KDP, led by Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad, as it was concluded over their heads. In April 1964, the KDP leadership publicly criticized his position, and Barzani let his forces loose on his dissident forces by forcing them across the border into Iran. He consolidated his hold on territory in the countryside.765 Aside from Barzani’s growing power, Arif’s commitment to Arab unification, embodying the socialist decrees of July 1964, heightened tensions between Arif and Barzani. Clashes erupted again in April 1965. The Kurds preserved their de facto autonomy.766
The Iraqi Nasserists had reached the peak of their influence in November 1964, increasing their share of seats from three to six and securing the key portfolio of Interior. Arif lost enthusiasm for a union with Egypt that would overshadow his role and ensure the
759 On the occasion, it should be noted that Nasser favored a degree of autonomy within the state of Iraq for the Kurds. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.319.
760 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.222.
761 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.46-47.
762 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.222.
763 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.272-73.
764 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.325-26; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1032; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.273.
765 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.128; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.315-17; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.103.
766 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.128-29; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. The June 1966 Accord can be found in Khadduri. See, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.274-76.
132
dominance of the small Nasserist faction in Iraq.767 He now favored strengthening the independence of the Iraqi state and a sort of Iraqi identity. Arif’s slow progress towards union with the Arab world and socialism disturbed the Nasserist ministers in the cabinet.768 By the spring of 1965, these differences between Arif and the Nasserist officers/ministers, who now demanded a certain degree of public control over foreign trade, came to a head in oil negotiations with the IPC.769 The Iraqi government reached an agreement in principle with the IPC in June 1965. This made available an immediate increase in government revenues, yet regained the IPC’s access, jointly with the INOC, to most of the territories from which the former had been excluded previously. For the Nasserists, this represented the IPC’s right once again to determine Iraqi production levels based on its own interests, not those of Iraq. In reaction to this, the six Nasserist ministers resigned on 10 July 1965 and campaigned against the draft agreement with the IPC. They lost ground partly because of Nasser’s reluctance to union and partly because of the short-range unfavorable effects of the nationalization decrees. This paved the way for Arif to move increasingly towards an “Iraq First” position.770
Arif had no intent to go a complete break with the Nasserists. He tried to secure Yahya’s resignation for the purpose of reducing the Nasserist opposition within the army while transferring army officers between different posts in line with their presumed loyalty to him.771 At the beginning of September 1965, he appointed Arif Abd al-Razzaq, who was part of a Nasserist organization in the Iraqi Army, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, but balanced him by giving the then-deputy Prime Minister and the portfolios of oil and foreign affairs to Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz who was a conservative nationalist and serving secretary general of OPEC. Arif’s moves did not mollify the Nasserists in the country, who were requesting immediate unity with Egypt. They attempted to seize power
767 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.345.
768 Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?,” pp.25-26; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.243-44.
769 Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?,” pp.25-26; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.243-44; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 1032-34; Khadduri, “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait,” pp.87; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.381-88.
770 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1032-34; Khadduri, “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait,” pp.87; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, 381-88; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.175-76; Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, pp.329.
771 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.328-29.
133
by exploiting his absence at an Arab summit meeting at Casablanca, yet the attempt failed.772 Al-Razzaq escaped to Cairo by receiving political asylum from Nasser. After that, Arif invited then-Deputy Prime Minister al-Bazzaz to form a government. The following eleven months (September 1965 to August 1966) demonstrated the superiority of civilian rule over military rule.773 Arif and several army officers never favored any attempt to meet Kurdish aspirations or the idea of any form of Kurdish autonomy within a single state. Al-Bazzaz favored ending the war and bringing a settlement to the north. However, Arif’s death in a surprising accident with a helicopter in April 1966 reopened the military-civilian struggle on the occasion of choosing a new President.774 The constitution provided to arrange for the election of a new president in a joint meeting between the cabinet and the National Defense Council.775 The army officers insisted on another military officer while al-Bazzaz pressed for a civilian candidate. The army was able to present two candidates: the first candidate was Brigadier Abd al-Rahman Arif, President Arif’s brother, who did not share the emotional antagonisms of his brother towards Kurdish claims; the second one, Brigadier Abd al-Aziz al-Uqaili who was known for his hawkish attitude towards the Kurdish problem. At length, the NCRC and the cabinet, meeting jointly, voted for Abd al-Rahman Arif.776
By May 1966, the Barzani faction, supported by money and weapons from Iran, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Iraqi army and the Talabani faction, which collaborated with the Iraqi government and began to receive arms and logistics.777 This defeat allowed the civilian al-Bazzaz government to make contact with both Barzani and KDP leaders.778 The discussions between the Kurdish representatives and those of the civilian al-Bazzaz Government resulted in a comprehensive agreement in principle known as the June 1966 Accord.779 Seeking good relations with neighbors, the al-Bazzaz government countered
772 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 1032-34; Khadduri, “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait,” pp.87.
773 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.329-34.
774 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.337-40.
775 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.265.
776 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.337-40.
777 Hussein Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Scoiety and the Struggle for a Kurdish State, California: Mazda Publishers, 2007, pp.121-22.
778 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.103-04.
779 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.128-29; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. The June 1966 Accord can be found in Khadduri. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.274-76.
134
the intra-regional cold war over Yemen. On the domestic front, the Nasserists in the military attempted a coup in which Abd al-Razzaq was involved, showing Nasser’s relation to Iraqi politics. Notwithstanding the help of the Nasserists, Razzaq’s attack on the Arif regime failed.780
The political-military class, however, resented the intrusion of civilian politicians. The Nasserists, along with the right and left wing of the Ba’ath, cornered the al-Bazzaz government. The opponent groups of al-Bazzaz formed organized political groups, whether open or clandestine. In the circumstances, relations between al-Bazzaz and Abd al-Rahman Arif deteriorated as the officers pressed on Arif to remove al-Bazzaz. Whereas Arif had resisted their demand for a while, their opposition to al-Bazzaz had reached such a point that Arif demanded and received al-Bazzaz’s resignation.781 Hence, by August, military factionalism had put an end to his prime minister. Following the resignation of al-Bazzaz, the Iraqi Army embarked on the formation of a government, but they were divided into various factions. The first, called the Wahdawiyun (Unionists), stressed the principle of union and Arab revolutionary ideas, depending on the degree of attachment to them. The second called the Iqlimis (Provincialists), advocated Iraqi unity and friendly relations with the West. The first faction was subdivided into three groups: first, the Nasserist group asked for an immediate merging of Iraq with the UAR. Secondly, the Ba’athist officers led by Hassan Bakr remained faithful to the principle of unity but objected to Nasser’s leadership of the Arab Union. Thirdly, a moderate group, led by Brigadier Naji Talib, who was one of the Free Officers, demanded the step-by-step implementation of the unity agreement of 26 May 1964 and thus stressed merging with Egypt as equal partners rather than as subordinates.782 In surrendering to the pressures of the military groups, Arif invited Naji Talib to form a new government, and thus, he lost the regard of the civilian public. The removal of al-Bazzaz, however, did not bring him military support.783
Naji Talib’s government (6 August 1966-10 May 1967) took no significant steps to achieve Arab Union. Talib’s government reversed Bazzaz’s stand on the Kurds by arming
780 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.343-46.
781 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.343-46.
782 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.284-85.
783 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.343-46.
135
Talabani’s forces to raid Barzani’s positions, yet Barzani increasingly strengthened his position further with Iranian (and Israeli) support between 1966 and 1968.784 The period of the Talib government was only marked by the settlement of the dispute between Syria and the IPC. After the coup in Syria on 23 February 1966, the new Syrian government demanded that the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company pay increased royalties for the piping of oil across Syria. The company rejected it, and in December, the Talib government closed the pipeline. Around half of Iraq’s oil production depended upon the pipeline. Nonetheless, both Syria and the IPC reached a compromise settlement in March 1967.785 Because of Syria’s disagreement786 with the IPC and insistence on its demands, Iraq’s economy fell into a financial crisis, and the Syrian government stopped pumping oil for three months. Whereas the conflict was finally settled, pressure from military officers on Arif was so great for Talib that he had to resign under pressure since his position had been weakened.787
4.3. Towards the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Domestic Actors on the Stage
In contrast to the 1950s, the 1960s witnessed the occurrence of the Arab-Israeli question as an independent variable in regional politics. Regional states utilized the issue of Palestine as a means to make up for their precarious internal and regional position.788 Nasser was not inclined to surrender his claim to be the main defender of the leaderless Palestinians by adopting a new Arab policy based on the spirit of reconciliation rather than on confrontation. As noted above, Nasser had convened a summit of Arab heads of state to handle the Israeli diversion of the Jordan River water.789 Nevertheless, the intense
784 Iran supported the Talabani faction until Iran realized that the military force of Barzani was stronger. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.104; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.320; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.130-31; Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S., Yale University Press, 2007, pp.21.
785 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, pp.166; Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968”, pp.13, 15.
786 In 1955 Syria and the company had agreed on pumping oil from Iraq to the Mdeiterranean in lieu of shipping it from the Persian Gulf to save transport expenses. In 1966 the Syrian Government took issue with the company and strived to compel it to change the profit in a major increase.
787 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.285-88; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.100.
788 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.162-63.
789 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.164-66, 80; Nigel J. Ashton, “Introduction: The Cold War in the Middle East, 1967–73,” in The Cold War in
136
rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularly the Yemeni civil war, pushed Cairo to take risk escalatory steps against Israel.790
The Arab-Israeli conflict not only caused the deterioration of relations between the Arab radicals and the Western powers, but it also made the Arab revolutionaries more dependent on Soviet assistance.791 The steady deterioration in US-Egyptian relations compelled Nasser to rely on the Soviet Union as an alternative source of economic and military aid and a powerful ally. The friendship between the two countries peaked during Khruschev’s visit to Egypt in May 1964.792 As for Iraq, Soviet-Iraqi relations were at a low ebb following the fall of the Qasim regime.793 Only Arif’s overthrow of the Iraqi Ba’athists in November 1963 paved the way for the improvement of Soviet-Iraqi relations. The Kremlin welcomed the purge of the ruling Ba’ath Party, a “tool of imperialist policy in the Middle East.”794 Besides, the Soviet Union was satisfied with Arif’s endeavors to moderate the harassment of Iraqi communists and to implement a conciliatory policy towards the Kurds.795 By the time of his brother’s death, Abd al-Rahman Arif, as the head of a military delegation, was negotiating an arms agreement which was the single largest procurement in the nine-year history of Soviet military sales to Baghdad.796
After becoming President, Abd al-Rahman Arif maintained the policies of his brother. This meant moderate relations with Cairo and cool relations with the Ba’athist regime in Syria. He also wanted to retain cordial relations with Moscow without alienating the West.797 Outside the sphere of military aid, a number of Soviet major projects, such as the Baghdad-Basra railway and an atomic reactor, were completed even though the Soviet
the Middle East Regional conflict and the superpowers 1967–73, edited by Nigel J. Ashton, Oxon: Routledge, 2007.
790 Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East, Boston: Beacon Press, 2009, pp.208.
791 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.162-63.
792 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.175, 80.
793 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968”, pp.1-4.
794 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.181.
795 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.181.
796 "Soviet Aid to and Presence in Iraq," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, October 25, 1966.
797 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.1-4.
137
Union was dissatisfied with Iraq’s persecution of the communists in the country, as well as military operations against the Kurdish nationalists.798 The Arif brothers were anti-communist domestically but not opposed to close relations with the USSR internationally, a foreign policy approach known as “positive neutrality,” which balanced the Eastern and Western blocs.799 During the first Arif regime, US-Iraq relations remained friendly, but it rapidly developed during the second Arif regime until the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.800 US-Iraqi relations under the Arif brothers’ regime were related to two interconnected issues: the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq and the deteriorating Iraqi-Iranian relations. With regard to the Kurdish problem, Barzani put preference to having the oil resources in the area “handled by an American firm in direct arrangement with the Iraqi Kurds”801 in exchange for financial and military assistance, particularly heavy weapons. The US did not grant Barzani assistance as Washington did not want to face the prospect of a reversal in US-Iraq relations, which would cause the Soviets and Nasser to gain the upper hand in their relations with Iraq.802 The emergence of a “special relationship” between the US and Israel and the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war challenged the US-Iraqi rapprochement.803 Among the obstacles to the continuation of relations with Washington was the demand by the US to end the Iraqi boycott of US goods and services.804
798 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.16; Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Aid to and Presence in Iraq," pp.3-4.
799 Janet Ahner Rubinoff, Nasser’s Policy of Positive Neutrality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968; "President's Daily Brief 1961-1969," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, May 11, 1967.
800 Bryan Robert Gibson, “U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958-1975,” (Doctoral Dissertation), London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013, pp.136.
801 Abbas Kadhim, “Opting For the Lesser Evil: US Foreign Policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008,” in Handbook of US-Middle East Relations, edited by Robert Looney, London: Routledge, 2009, pp.475.
802 Kadhim, “Opting For the Lesser Evil: US Foreign Policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008,” pp.475.
803 Arlene Lazarowitz, “Different Approaches to a Regional Search for Balance: The Johnson Administration, the State Department, and the Middle East, 1964–1967,” Diplomatic History, Vol.32, No.1, 2008; William B Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?,” Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.2, 1992; Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,” pp.50.
804 This issue was not resolved until Arif’s government was toppled by a Ba’ath Party coup on July 17, 1968. Kadhim, “Opting For the Lesser Evil: US Foreign Policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008,” pp.475.
138
Table 12: Military expenditures as a percentage of GNP before and after the Six-Day War805
Year
Israel
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Syria
1962
8.8
7.1
8.0
14.6
8.5
1963
9.5
8.5
9.9
14.9
9.6
1964
10.7
11.0
10.9
13.1
8.1
1965
11.5
12.2
12.2
11.7
8.3
1966
12.2
11.1
10.5
12.2
11.1
1967
13.8
12.7
10.3
12.8
11.9
After Talib’s resignation, the opportunity to form a government was now the turn of the Iqlimis or the moderate nationalists. No single candidate was agreed by the leaders to head a coalition government. President Arif finally appointed himself Prime Minister on 10 May. President Arif, more interested in domestic than foreign affairs, was caught up in an unexpected crisis after ending a war with the Kurds that had drained the country’s treasury: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Military expenditures of regional states in table 11 show that the war between Israel and Arab states was only a matter of time. The war caused widespread nationalist indignation, but Iraq was reluctant to participate with other Arab forces, though it enjoyed a high reputation in the Arab world for military efficiency and experience. Arif, yet not ripping up the agreement with Egypt, had to dispatch a force, albeit a small one. Iraq’s unpreparedness for the attack on Israel, as well as its distance from the area of war, made nonsense of Iraq’s assistance to Arab states.806 There was a disagreement among the FPE and its key societal supporters on whether the foreign state is a danger. The FPE did not view Israeli aggression as an imminent threat, while societal elites branded it as a danger. Domestic actors may substantially affect policy choices when the international threat situation is low, when the leader’s hold on power is weak, and when the FPE lacks structural autonomy.807 Iraq’s top security agenda at that time
805 Fred M. Gottheil, “An Economic Assessment of the Military Burden in the Middle East 1960-1980,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.18, No.3, 1974, pp.503.
806 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.289-91.
807 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.189-92.
139
included the Kurds internally, Iran, and Syria regionally, not primarily Israel. Nasserism and Arab nationalism regionally and anti-Israel sentiments domestically forced President Arif to dispatch a weak force.808 He also did not possess structural autonomy as his social base was weak, and war with the Kurds and a potential Ba’athist coup endangered his remaining in power.
Table 13: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the period of the Arif Brothers’ Regime
Exogenous shift
Systemic/sub-systemic
and domestic ramifications
FPE
Threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “C”
Israel’s aggression stirred up Arab nationalist sentiments
FPE identify component as a threat, but societal supporters do not identify component as a threat
(disables coalition)
Constrained
Arab nationalist groups led Iraq to join the 1967 war.
Yet, Iraq’s minor engagement in the conflict amid the Kurdish insurgency caused the overthrowing of the Arif regime
(Inefficient threat assessment and counterbalancing)
With the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the anti-western sentiment in the Middle East was at its zenith, and he relinquished his powers as Prime Minister to Tahir Yahya on 19 July. Yahya’s government adopted an anti-Western policy to divert attention from internal affairs by outlawing oil exports and severing diplomatic relations with the US and Britain.809 The 1967 Arab-Israeli War incited the pan-Arabs in the regional countries to demand the nationalization of the oil industry in retaliation against Western support for Israel. Arif turned to remove the remaining remnants of Western influence inside the
808 It is noteworth that the wave of Arab nationalism contributed into the overthrown of Iraqi monarchy, which had been “the bastion of Western influence in the area.” See Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” pp.125-26.
809 On April 6 the French government agreed to sell Iraq fifty-four fighter-bombers at a cost of $70 million. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.291; Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.63.
140
country, the IPC.810 Accordingly, the Arif regime in Iraq passed Public Law 97 on 6 August, which enabled the INOC to develop the expropriated territory and outlawed restoration to the IPC of the Rumaila field, one of the important producing areas of Iraq.811 Arif turned to France and the USSR. The Iraqi government signed a letter of intent with the Soviets in December 1967 stipulating Soviet assistance to INOC for the development of the Rumaila field, which shifted Iraq away from a more pro-Western foreign policy.812 Likewise, early in 1968, Iraq signed oil agreements with the French state-owned group of companies Entreprise de Recherches et. d’Activités Pétroliéres, hailed as a new departure in Iraq’s oil policy.813 One of the motivations for Iraq’s closer ties with the USSR and France was Iraq’s will to give these countries access to untapped oil fields for the purpose of breaking the IPC’s monopolistic control of Iraqi oil. A second motivation for Iraq’s growing ties with the USSR and France was the arms issue. President Arif, urging Moscow to speed up arms deliveries under a 1966 agreement, established arms agreements with France to bring down Iraq’s dependence on Soviet arms.814
In the aftermath of the 1967 war, Arab countries organized a series of summits attended by Iraqi officials. President Arif sought to divert the attention of the Iraqi people from the weaknesses of his regime as much as possible by sustaining emotional fervor against Israel.815 In the meetings, Iraq advocated a suspension of oil exports to nations that the Arabs considered to “support Israeli aggression” and called for the nationalization of all British and US business holdings in the Arab world. Algeria and Syria, at the outset, favored the plan, whereas Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya opposed the plan. The Arab leaders agreed on August 31 to permit each Arab state to decide independently whether it wanted to terminate the oil embargo. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait put an end to their
810 Iraq had initially negotiated outstanding issues with the IPC to mend fences with the Western countries between May 1964 and June 1965, which designed a joint venture between the IPC and the state-owned INOC in which the IPC was to possess a controlling interest. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.123-24, 30-31; Roger Pajak, “Soviet Military Aid to Iraq and Syria,” Strategic Review, Vol.4, No.1, 1976, pp.52; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.130-31.
811 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.130-31.
812 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.132.
813 On April 6 the French government agreed to sell Iraq fifty-four fighter-bombers at a cost of $70 million. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.291-93; Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968”, pp.63.
814 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968”, pp.77-78; "President's Daily Brief, 1961-1969," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, July 13, 1967.
815 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968”, pp.69.
141
embargoes on September 2 and 3, respectively.816 However, Iraq could not induce Syrian leaders, campaigning against Iraq’s proposal at the Khartoum Conference, to allow Iraqi oil to pass across Syrian territory. Arif’s failure to sustain the boycott of oil exports to the US and Britain at the conference contributed to the downfall of Abd al-Rahman Arif. 817
The Arab defeat in the 1967 War discredited the Arab nationalists and allowed intrusive players and ideologies to enter the Arab world.818 With the death of Abd al-Salam Arif in April 1966, the regime had lost most of the symbolic capital based on his personality. Abd al-Rahman never filled the vacuum that Arif’s death had created. This manifested itself in the lack of personal authority, the failure to take part effectively in the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the continuing conflict in the North, the evasions shown towards the IPC, and the increasing loss of confidence in the government by the public.819 In the aftermath of the June war of 1967, demonstrations and marches took place in Baghdad and other Iraqi towns, giving the upper hand to Saddam Husain, who was appointed deputy secretary-general of the Regional Command of the Ba’ath Party, with the aim of expanding the Ba’ath Party’s organization.820 On the right, the military Ba’athists, such as Bakr, Hardan al-Tikriti, and Salih Mahdi Ammash, who had lost power in 1963, resorted to disaffected supporters in Arif’s inner circle, who were responsible for protecting the Arif regime, to carry out the coup to topple the regime.821 The coup came on 17 July 1968.
816 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.35-43, 80; Rieck, “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation,” pp.323; Yoram Meital, “The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy After the 1967 War: A Reexamination,” The Middle East Journal, Vol.54, No.1, 2000.
817 Nor Soviet efforts to get Syria to cultivate working relations with the other “progressive” regimes in Egypt and Iraq have been worthwhile. Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.46, 48; "President's Daily Brief, 1961-1969," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, December 6, 1967.
818 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.16-7.
819 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.107; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1063.
820 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.183.
821 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.133.
142
5. CHAPTER FIVE: SADDAM HUSSEIN’S MOMENT AT IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY
5.1. The Domestic Decision-Making Environment of the Saddam Hussein regime
Within two weeks of the 17 July coup, the Ba’ath removed its supporters in Arif’s inner circle, Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif and Ibrahim al- Da’ud, from power and consolidated its position on the newly formed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),822 the new fulcrum of power. The Ba’ath Party constructed a totalitarian state that held a monopoly on institutions of violence.823 The formal publication of a new constitution brought in firm party control over the executive and legislative organs of the country. The constitution granted dominant power to the RCC, including the authority to deal with defense and security and to declare war and conclude peace. The RCC, the ultimate decision-making body, served as a military instrument to control and eliminate opposition within the government, the military, and society.824 The president, the executive of the RCC, was given the power to appoint, promote, and dismiss judiciary, civil, and military personnel.825
The relationship between Bakr and Hussein was complementary. Both Bakr and Saddam favored a policy of “Iraq First,” which placed the unity of the country, the stability of the regime, and economic independence above other considerations.826 By enjoying support from the army, Bakr presented the regime with a paternal face, while Hussein, careful not to challenge Bakr’s leadership, took the blame for removing Bakr’s rivals.827 President Bakr permitted Saddam Hussein to set up an independent power base in the security
822 The members of the RCC were Ahmad Hasan Bakr, Hardan al- Tikriti, Salih Mahdi Ammash, Hammad Shihab, and Sa’dun Ghaidan. The council was dominated by Tikrits. In November 1969, the five-member council was enlarged to fifteen. On this occasion, Saddam Hussein became vice chairman of the RCC, officially becoming the second most important figure in the regime after Bakr. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1088; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.140.
823 Stacy E. Holden, A Documentary History of Modern Iraq, Florida: Glatfelter Natures Book, 2012, pp.212.
824 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.112; Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: on professionals, praetorians, and revolutionary soldiers, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1977, pp.136.
825 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.141.
826 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” edited by Monica L. Belmonte, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012, pp.872.
827 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.141, 43.
143
services.828 The process whereby Saddam Hussein became the principal decision-maker in the fields of both domestic politics and foreign policy formulation was a cumulative one. Saddam Hussein was first elected Assistant Secretary-General of the Ba’ath Party Regional Command in November 1968. In November 1969, an amendment to the Provisional Constitution entitled him to be Deputy Chairman of the RCC and to exercise the powers of the President in case of the latter’s absence, thereby becoming, at least in theory, the second most influential figure in the regime.829
This time, the Ba’athists did not share power with non-Ba’athists. The party’s position was still precarious. It had to remove the military from decision-making positions at the time the regime was faced with internal pressures from the military, the Communist Party, the Kurdish and Shiite minorities, and external challenges from Iran.830 The years from 1968 through 1973 lasted with waves of secret arrests of Communists and left-wing Baathists.831 Saddam also tried to reduce the influence of the Iraqi Army in Iraqi politics.832 The Ba’athists were able to alter the military balance to their advantage to affect appointments in the army.833 Saddam Hussein and his growing security apparatus removed the two key military figures in the regime, Hardan al-Tikriti and Salih Mahdi Ammash, both of whom had constituencies in the military.834 In June 1973, when President Bakr was in Eastern Europe concluding a series of economic and cultural agreements, Nazem Kazzar, the Director General of Public Security, reportedly intended to remove Ba’ath rule. The coup attempt guaranteed that the military was ultimately excluded from top-policy-making positions in the government.835 Therefore, Saddam bypassed the military, a potential veto player which possesses the capability to lead a coup.836
828 Abbas Kelidar, Iraq: The Search for Stability, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975, pp.9.
829 Abdelsalam, “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982”, pp.113.
830 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.138-39.
831 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.858.
832 Keiko Sakai, “Irak’ta Devletin Kontrol Aracı Olarak “Aşiretleşme”: Ordu, Kabine ve Ulusal Meclis Üzerine Gözlemler,” in Aşiretler ve İktidar: Ortadoğu'da Etnisite ve Milliyetçilik, edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, pp.138.
833 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1077.
834 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.190-91.
835 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.859.
836 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.184-85; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
144
Table 14: The Politics of Threat Assessment in the period of the Ba’ath Regime
Exogenous shift
Systemic/sub-systemic
and domestic ramifications
FPE
Threat assessment and counterbalancing
Scenario “D”
Revolution in Iran
FPE identify component as a threat, but societal actors do not identify component as a threat (disables coalition)
Unconstrained
Solidarity in Iran,
Some Kurd and Shi’ite groups standing by Iran
(Inefficient threat assessment and counterbalancing)
Following the elimination of key military and civilian competition, from 1974 through 1977, personnel on three essential bodies of the Regional Command of the Ba’ath Party, the RCC, and the Council of Ministers overlapped.837 The party grew rapidly in this period. In 1968, the party membership may have been a few hundred. According to official party sources, by 1976, there would be approximately 10,000 full members and about 500,000 supporters.838 In addition to the party’s institutionalization, by the mid-1970s, there was a shift in the balance of power from Bakr to Husain. Bakr had come to retire from an active political role, and Husain’s office became the central focus of power and decision-making.839 Put differently, power in Iraq was increasingly dominated by the Tikriti clan to which Saddam Hussein belonged, not the Ba’ath Party.840 Consequently, there is executive certainty in Iraq; Iraqi domestic actors had little room to maneuver on
837 The National Command of the Ba’ath Party was composed of party members from various Arab countries. The Regional Command represented the leadership of the party within a single country. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.147 and 400.
838 By the early 1980s, full members numbered 25,000; followers, some 1.5 million. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.148; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1078.
839 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.149-50.
840 Faleh A. Jabar, “Şeyhler ve İdeologlar: Aşiretlerin Irak'taki Baba Tarafından Kalma Totalitercilik Altında Yapı Bozumuna Uğraması ve Yeniden Yapılanması, 1968-1998,” in Aşiretler ve İktidar: Ortadoğu'da Etnisite ve Milliyetçilik, edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, pp.83; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1978, pp.63, 79-89; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.207; Zuhair al-Jaza'iri, “Ba'hist Ideology and Practice,” in Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Fran Hazelton, London: Zed Books, 1994, pp.44.
145
foreign policy issues.841 States with structurally autonomous executives respond to international or regional threats regardless of domestic opposition.842 As a result of the elimination of all potential veto players in Iraq in the late 1970s, there was high or strong structural autonomy on foreign policy decisions. Isolation from societal elites shields the leader from their policy demands by displaying how structural autonomy affects the influence of domestic groups.843
Table 15: The Politics of Strategic Adjustment in the period of the Ba’ath Regime
International and Regional Environment
USSR (until the Iran-Iraq war)
US and some Western States (Beginning Revolution in Iran)
US (until the Revolution in Iran)
USSR (beginning the Iran-Iraq war)
Moderate and Pragmatic bloc
States In Limbo
Revolutionary Orthodoxy
Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia, Jordan
Lebanon
Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya
Domestic Environment
The FPE (Saddam Hussein)
Opposition (Radical Ba’athists, Kurds, Shiites)
International Circumstance
In High Threat Environment
Balancing its relations with the East while cultivating its relations with the West
Domestic Circumstance
Certainty
Elimination of key military and civilian competition, and economic boom thanks to oil revenues
The Highly (Strong) Structural Autonomy
The domestic balance of political power in Iraq turned out overwhelmingly to the Ba’ath Party, and there were three main opposing societal groups made up of outward-oriented internationalists: (1) Kurds, particularly the Barzani faction; (2) the Iraqi Communists;
841 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89.
842 Ripsman, “The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy,” pp.44.
843 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.189.
146
and (3) Shi’i Islamist groups, especially the Da’wa Party of Baqir al-Sadr. As Ewan Stein indicates, Iraq’s 1970s foreign policy served the regime’s efforts to control regime rivals and their potential allies in society by aiming to neutralize political threats from them.844 Leading among the domestic problems were the Kurdish question and the quest to nationalize western oil companies in Iraq. The Iraqi Kurds, one of the domestic actors, challenged the internal security and stability of several governments of Iraq. Ba’ath rule had inherited the Kurdish situation left over from the Arif era. By 1969, Barzani had turned against the Ba’ath government by attacking some of the IPC installations in Kirkuk since the government was supporting Barzani’s rival Ahmad-Talabani faction. Extensive foreign aid to Barzani helped turn the tide in Barzani’s favor. In March 1970, a principal agreement was signed with Barzani, which terminated a 10-year period of revolt, recognized the national rights of the Kurdish people, and granted regional autonomy.845 After acknowledging the principle of Kurdish autonomy in 1970, Baghdad declared the draft National Action Charter that aimed to ensure the political backing of the KDP and of the ICP. The latter supported the Ba’athist initiative, but the former did not. By April 1974, the war between the Barzani faction and Iraqi government forces had resumed as Barzani rejected the government’s own autonomy plan in April.846 In June 1975, the establishment of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Talabani’s leadership formalized the long-standing split between the Talabani faction and the Barzani one. Upon the death of the KDP leader, Mustafa Barzani, the party elected his son Masud Barzani as its chairperson.847 The emergence of counter-powers within the Kurdish political movement caused armed confrontations between the two different Kurdish parties.848 The Barzani faction maintained its relations with Israel by receiving Israeli aid in return for distracting and undermining the Ba’ath in the June 1967 war.849 Ba’athist political circles viewed Barzani as an American “agent.”850 Chad Nelson narrates, “Saddam had said in 1975 that the greatest strategic threat to Iraq was when an external
844 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.104-05.
845 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.864.
846 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.150-52; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.226-331; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.16-17.
847 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.169; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.343.
848 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: the Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.35.
849 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.331.
850 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.173-74.
147
power backed a ‘local power,’ i.e., a group within Iraq.”851 Still, Masoud Barzani, the son of Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, was to receive support from the new regime in Iran.852
Domestic actors strive to shape the mind-set of the FPE by influencing the interpretation of international circumstances and to extract policy concessions.853 This is evident in the political role of the Communists in Iraq, a sensitive issue for the Ba’ath to deal with. The ruling Ba’ath eased its stance on the communist problem since tackling that issue required Soviet cooperation.854 Soviet insistence on Iraqi communists’ participation in the government paved the way for a political alliance with them, given Iraqi dependence on Soviet military and technological assistance.855 When relations between the Kurds and the central government deteriorated in 1972 and 1973, the Communists, along with the USSR, sided with the ruling Ba’ath.856 Gibson depicts Iraq’s thaw with the US during the 1973 wars as “a byproduct of an internal power struggle within the Ba’athist regime, pitting a pragmatic wing led by President Bakr and Saddam Hussein against hardline elements within the military.”857 By 1978, hostility between the ICP and the Ba’ath Party came out into the open: the ICP newspaper criticized Saddam’s pragmatic approach.858 Relations with the Soviet Union were on the decline, while political and economic cooperation with Pahlavi Iran and the conservative Arab monarchies was on the rise.859 In analyzing Iraq’s foreign policy, the ICP criticized Iraqi purchases of military equipment from Western countries and its soft staunchness towards the Camp David accords.860 However, the temporary settlement of the Kurdish problem following the Algiers agreement with the Shah and warming relations with the West decreased Ba’ath’s need for Communist support. In fact, Saddam was uncomfortable with the Communists seeking a place for a communist party in Iraq.861 By the spring of 1978, the Iraqi
851 Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.259.
852 Hiro, The Longest War: the Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, pp.35.
853 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.184-85; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
854 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.16-17.
855 “Foreign Relations of the United States , Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.870.
856 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.16-17.
857 Gibson, “U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958-1975,” pp.220.
858 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.192.
859 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.127-30.
860 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.131.
861 Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.123-24.
148
government accused the communists of “subservience to Moscow” and introduced a decree prohibiting anyone who was serving, or who had ever served, in the Army from all non-Ba’ath political activity. The leadership of the ICP fled to other countries abroad, and by mid-1979, the ICP was driven underground owing to its weakened domestic position. The Soviet Union, wary of a total rupture with Iraq, responded weakly.862 By the late 1970s, the Shi’a, as the main concern of the Ba’ath, succeeded the Kurds.863 The Shi’ite groups did not pose a serious threat to the central authority in Baghdad until Ba’athist secularism deepened Shi’ite hostility in the mid-1970s. The most serious Shi’ite disturbance in Iraq became the bloody incidents in the Shi’ite holy cities of al-Najaf and Karbala that occurred in February 1977. Baghdad endeavored to circumscribe the power of Shi’ite mullahs by controlling their corporate revenues. In doing so, responsibility for the upkeep of Shi’ite shrines and tombs was transferred from the ulama to the government.864
5.2. Highly Structural Autonomy, the 1973 Oil Embargo, and Rapprochement with the Western Powers
The Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War led to the fall of the existing regimes in Iraq and Syria.865 Given the weakening of Egypt’s position in the post-1967 order, a number of Arab states came to lay claim to regional leadership; among them at the time were Iraq and Syria.866 Iraq and Syria developed durable regimes and became involved in fierce competition for regional dominance in the 1970s when different factions of the Ba’ath Party ruled both states.867 The Ba’ath had to deal with the aftermath of the Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 war and was faced with the shifts in the regional environment that turned against Iraq, which was isolated on all fronts.868 From 1968 to 1973, Iraq pursued an isolationist policy, nationalizing Western oil interests and replacing its trade
862 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.192; Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.123-24; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.127-30.
863 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.331.
864 Abdelsalam, “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982,” pp.66.
865 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144.
866 Abdelsalam, “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982,” pp.66.
867 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, pp.397-98.
868 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144.
149
relations with the West with countries refusing to support Israel in the wars of 1967 and 1973.869
The 1970s marked an important turning point in the Middle Eastern regional order. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War led Arab members of OPEC to impose an embargo against the United States in retaliation for the US support to the Israeli military and to gain leverage in the post-war negotiations.870 By the late 1970s, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were to emerge as regional powers with some military and financial weight through their massive oil wealth.871 Iraq’s oil revenue increased from $575 million in 1972 to $26 billion in 1980.872 Iraq’s domestic economy, however, became dependent on oil revenues: Iraq’s oil revenues in 1970 were 30 percent of its Gross Domestic Product and jumped some 60 percent of that before the Iran-Iraq war.873
Table 16: Oil Revenues of the Gulf states, 1969–1978 (billions of US dollars)874
Iran
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
UAE
1969
0.9
0.5
0.9
0.8
0.2
1970
1.1
0.5
1.2
0.8
0.2
1971
1.9
0.8
1.9
1.0
0.4
1972
2.4
0.6
2.7
1.4
0.6
1973
4.4
1.8
4.3
1.7
0.9
1974
17.8
5.7
22.6
6.5
5.5
1975
18.4
7.5
25.7
6.4
6.0
869 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.171-73.
870 “Oil Embargo, 1973–1974,” Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo#:~:text=During%20the%201973%20Arab%2DIsraeli,the%20post%2Dwar%20peace%20negotiations, (accessed October 16, 2023).
871 In 1979, Iraq’s oil production was second only to Saudi Arabia’s among all the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, pp.398.
872 Celine Whittleton, “Oil and the Iraqi Economy,” in Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, edited by Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, London: Zed Books, 1986, pp.65.
873 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.158; Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.129.
874 Ian Skeet, OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Appendix 3.
150
1976
20.2
8.5
30.8
6.9
7.0
1977
21.2
9.6
36.5
7.5
9.0
1978
19.3
10.2
32.2
8.0
8.2
Table 17: Crude Oil Production and Export, 1976–1997 (millions of barrels per day)875
Production
Export
1976-1980
2.69
2.5
1965
1.26
.961
1970
.550
.150
1975
.580
.180
1979
1.15
.840
In March 1969, the US declared the Nixon Doctrine, which offered support to any regional power able to procure security in the Middle East.876 American supplies of arms and economic assistance to Israel and the abortive Kazzar coup against the Ba’ath rule in June 1973 prevented the Ba’athist leadership from improving relations with the US.877 Besides, the civil war in Lebanon, in which Iraq supported left-wing leaders, affected Iraqi political relations with the US adversely. Finally, America’s tacit approval of Syria’s intervention in Lebanon antagonized the Ba’ath leaders.878 In the 1970s, while the USSR’s hold over the region waned, the US’s leverage grew.879 The flow of US arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two Gulf “pillars” of US policy, began.880 Iraq’s most
875 In 1979 Iraq’s oil production was second only to Saudi Arabia’s among all the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Iraq, 2002-2003, London, 2003; Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, pp.398.
876 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144.
877 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.171-73.
878 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.174.
879 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.211; Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.108-09.
880 Iran’s arms imports increased from $264 million in 1970 to $2.6 billion in 1977. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144; Amirav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.29.
151
significant challenge, however, came from Iran because, in February 1969, Iran demanded that the boundary between the two countries be drawn along the thalweg, the deep-water channel in the middle of the river on the grounds that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations under the 1937 treaty. Iraq rejected, and the two countries began to aid their dissidents.881
Iraq’s increasing oil revenue and desire to achieve swift economic development manifested themselves after 1975 in a pragmatic foreign policy. Relations with the USSR took a downturn. The economic boom brought with it the dropping of economic transactions with the Soviet bloc to some 5 percent of total trade.882 For Saddam, Iraq should build up its own military-industrial potential when improving ties with potential power centers such as Japan and France. In exchange for oil, Japan financed several major projects in Iraq. Among the Western powers, France contributed to the development of Iraq. In recognition of France’s “neutrality” in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Saddam Hussein paid a trip to France in September 1975 in order to diversify the sources of Iraq’s military and industrial purchases.883 The two countries signed contracts worth around $4 billion for agricultural projects and steel plants. France agreed to provide Iraq with scientific and technical assistance in improving an Iraqi nuclear energy program.884 Iraq, in turn, agreed to provide 15 percent of France’s petroleum needs. In the meanwhile, the Soviet share of Iraq’s arms purchases declined from around 95 percent in 1972 to approximately 63 percent in 1979. France, among others, increasingly replaced the Soviet supply.885 Iraq never abandoned Soviet arms completely. Four months following Saddam’s trip to France, in May 1976, Iraq ordered around seventy combat aircraft, which amounted to $1 billion.886
Since 1973, Saddam has emphasized economics over ideology, which gave Western support to him. His crackdown on the Communists in 1977 and expulsion of Khomeini,
881 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.145.
882 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.165; Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, New York: Free Press, 1991, pp.95.
883 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.205-06.
884 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.24; “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.892.
885 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.165; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.95.
886 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.205.
152
the man who was threatening the pro-West Shah, earned him credit in Western capitals.887 Diversifying major trading partners gave Saddam Hussein increasing economic independence to ensure the autonomy of the Iraqi political system under his own direction.888 Regionally, Baghdad needed to refrain from unnecessary conflicts with its neighbors to end its isolation, while Iraq’s ties to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria improved.889 The Ba’ath leaders showed concern for the security of Jordan and did not side with the Palestinians against the Jordanian regime in the events of September 1970, although the Iraqi Ba’ath leaders claimed they would support Palestinian leaders on ideological grounds. Despite Jordan’s cooperation with Syria, with which Iraq was in a disagreement, Jordan’s support for Iraq in international councils led Iraq to reach economic, commercial, and cultural agreements.890
Saudi Arabia and the conservative Gulf kingdoms were also disturbed by Iraq’s radical stance, its support for South Yemen, its ties to left-wing elements in North Yemen, and its aid to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf in Oman. Iraq tried to expand the port of Umm Qasr and negotiated that the two Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan be transferred or leased to it. After negotiations proved fruitless, on 20 March 1973, Iraqi troops attacked Kuwait’s border post, Samita. Saudi Arabia, along with the Arab League, came to Kuwait’s aid and called for Iraq’s withdrawal from the post.891 In the 1970s, following the withdrawal of the British forces from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia exploited Iraqi-Iranian rivalries to frustrate the spread of Iraqi influence to the Gulf and Iran’s plans to unite their Gulf neighbors in a security pact under its own leadership.892
Iraq shifted its policy towards the countries of the Arabian Peninsula by ending its efforts to destabilize the rulers of the Gulf countries.893 The Ba’ath regime, which showed a greater interest in Gulf affairs than former Iraqi rulers, assured no intention of interfering
887 Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.163.
888 Chubin and Tripp, Iran And Iraq At War, pp.200-215.
889 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.205-06.
890 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.164-67.
891 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.145-46; Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, pp.114-17.
892 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: the Ceaseless Quest for Security, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, pp.136, 268-72; Rieck, “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation,” pp.325.
893 Adeed Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, No.41, 1980, pp.136-37.
153
in the domestic affairs of Gulf countries. To improve relations with Saudi Arabia, Iraq should settle the delimitation of the frontiers, the dispute over the neutral zone, and other related matters - tribal migration, smuggling, and others. Visits were exchanged by Crown Prince Fahd to Baghdad and Saddam Hussein to Riyadh in 1974 and 1975 to prepare the way for formal negotiations that were followed by an agreement.894 Iraq’s relations with Syria, Iraq’s gateway into the mainstream of inter-Arab politics, warmed as the radical threat within the Ba’ath Party receded. This rapprochement with Syria ended after Saddam’s assumption of the presidency and the fall of the Shah.895 Interactions with the rival Syrian regime remained antagonistic partly because of Damascus’s aid to the Iraqi Kurds.896 Furthermore, Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and the Iranian revolution of 1979 increased tensions between Syria and Iraq.897 Syria never wanted relations to worsen to the extent that Iraq may reject military support in the case of renewed hostilities with Israel.898
Iraq’s isolation, the Iranian threat, and domestic instability (the renewal of the Kurdish rebellion) got the regime to turn to the Soviet bloc as a counterweight to these forces. The signing of a fifteen-year treaty in 1972 sustained supplies of military equipment and training at a high level and gave the Soviet access to Iraq’s ports and airports.899 The Ba’ath leaders resumed the Soviet-Iraqi cooperation as it served to enhance Iraq’s image as a progressive regime and their ideological objectives ran contrary to American foreign policy goals. In lieu of Washington, Moscow supported Iraq’s foreign policy objectives by supplying arms and armaments to Baghdad.900 For instance, Soviet technical assistance and sale guarantees were significant preconditions for the nationalization of Iraqi oil in 1972.901
894 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.159-61.
895 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.106-07.
896 Syria supported Talabani faction against Iraq. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144, 53-54; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.330, 38-39.
897 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, pp.405-06.
898 Anti-Israeli sentiments was stick of Arabic solidarity. "President's Daily Brief 1969-1977," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, April 14, 1975.
899 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.146.
900 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.144. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.124.
901 Peter Sluglett, “The Cold War in the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp.67; Michael E. Brown, “The
154
At any rate, Iraq’s main rival in the Persian Gulf, Iran, was disturbed by the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty and proclaimed its disagreements with the Iraqi regime in terms of its essential role in the US-led security system formed as part of the Cold War in the Middle East. The Iraqi-Soviet treaty led to American support for Barzani and the KDP from 1972 at a time when armed clashes between the government and Kurdish forces broke out as soon as negotiations continued.902 The direct and indirect assistance of the US to the Kurdish groups, upon request of the Shah of Iran, provided Iran with an instrument of exerting pressure on Iraq.903 By the spring of 1975, a stalemate had been reached because of Iran’s military primacy over Iraq and the unwillingness of the USRR to help Iraq.904 Therefore, the Iraqi leadership was obliged to make several concessions to Iran embodied in the Algiers Accord of 1975.905 In return, Iran pledged to stop backing Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents in return for Iraqi acceptance of Iranian territorial demands along the Shatt al- Arab, including abandonment by Iraq of its claim to Iran’s province of Khuzistan.906
Soviet influence in Iraq from the beginning of the Ba’ath Party rule to the Iran-Iraq war showed remarkable weakness. There was only considerable cooperation between Baghdad and Moscow between 1972 and 1975. The rising power of Iran prompted Iraq to seek support from the Soviet Union, and security ties expanded rapidly.907 Iraq never became a client state in its relations with the Soviet Union as the Iraqi Ba’ath leadership tried to follow an independent course in foreign policy.908 The regime’s hegemonic strategy, connected with the role of the ICP, was to reduce Iraq’s military and economic links with the USSR.909 Furthermore, Iraq reduced its dependence on the Soviet Union
Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.10, No.1, 1979, pp.120-22.
902 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.203; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.205-06.
903 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.605.
904 Iran had been alarmed by Baghdad’s treaty with the USSR and had been dismayed by the accord for the Kurds were a means of weakening Baghdad. Syria supported Talabani faction against Iraq. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.153-54; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.330, 38-39.
905 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.205-06.
906 Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Scoiety and the Struggle for a Kurdish State, pp.113; Gause, “Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” pp.49.
907 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.124.
908 Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq, California: RAND Corporation, 1980, pp.V.
909 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.106; Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.138.
155
and diversified its sources of arms purchases by benefiting from its oil income.910 As a result, Soviet-Iraqi relations cooled partly because Iraq pursued closer ties with Saudi Arabia and cultivated military and economic relations with the West911 and partly because Iraq was dissatisfied with the poor quality of Soviet goods.912 Another source of tension was the execution of several dozen Iraqi Communists in 1978 who were accused of forming cells in the armed forces.913 Iraq also barred Soviet planes from overflying Iraqi territory during Moscow’s intervention in the Horn of Africa in 1978.914 Last but not least, Saddam Hussein denounced the USSR for its failure either to restrain Iran in its assistance to the Kurds or to present Baghdad with adequate ammunition to defeat the Kurds overwhelmingly.915 The dramatic rise in the price of petroleum after the 1973 war and the defeat of the Kurds in the spring of 1975 enabled Baghdad to assert itself against Moscow. As a result, Moscow-Baghdad relations reached a near-breaking point in the period between 1978 and 1980.916
Table 18: Iraqi Imports for the Years 1974-1981 (in $ million)917
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Japan
269.7
765
518
789
881
1759
2413
3304
West Germany
190.7
754
848
802
476
1258
1980
3179
France
174.7
263
309
252
296
877
1179
1601
United Kingdom
126.2
238
273
307
261
470
803
1261
United States
188.2
370
218
218
426
486
797
1005
Italy
79.4
164
132
199
357
741
1037
1475
910 Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq, pp.V.
911 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.141.
912 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.146.
913 Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq, pp.56-61.
914 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.141.
915 Iran had been alarmed by Baghdad’s treaty with the USSR and had been dismayed by the accord for the Kurds were a means of weakening Baghdad. Syria supported Talabani faction against Iraq. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.153-54; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.330, 38-39.
916 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.26.
917 IMF, Direction of Trade: Yearbook 1982, Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1982, pp.210-11.
156
USSR and Eastern Europe
108.4
274
289
359
313
438
481
481
Brazil
131.0
200
77
70
48
264
318
318
Table 19: Iraqi Exports for the Years 1974-1981 (in $ million)918
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
France
1128.9
983
1449
1665
1922
3063
5088
662
Japan
183.4
360
527
674
712
1636
3963
843
Italy
1060.0
1512
1231
1264
1708
2625
2613
1919
Brazil
632.2
832
1088
1048
1212
2567
3589
926
Spain
248.6
446
353
502
504
834
1419
---
United Kingdom
226.2
205
447
528
867
762
1125
124
United States
2.0
21
112
382
427
657
336
151
USSR and Eastern Europe
14.0
15
19
22
25
38
45
18
Ba’athist foreign policy emanated partly from the Ba’ath ideology and partly from Iraqi national interests. The Ba’ath leaders sought an alliance with a Great Power and friendly relations with neighbors so as to ensure national interests. For ideological reasons, the Ba’ath political circles initially opted for the USSR as the ally of Iraq rather than a Western power. At this point, Khadduri argues that since the USSR followed a détente policy with the United States, Iraq began to separate economic from political objectives in its relations with the US.919 In other words, Iraq was clearly reorienting its international policies towards the West and away from its alliance with the Eastern bloc in the late
918 IMF, Direction of Trade: Yearbook 1982, pp.210-11.
919 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.174-75.
157
1970s.920 The dramatic leap in petroleum prices in 1973, the defeat of the Kurds, and the accord with Iran in 1975 contributed to Iraq’s new foreign policy approach.921 From 1978 through 1980, Iraq’s trade with the Eastern bloc declined, while its trade with Western Europe and Japan increased significantly. Iraq’s imports from Japan in 1979 were $1.6 billion (around twice as much as Iraq’s import bill from the entire Eastern bloc), while the European Community’s exports to Iraq in the same year amounted to $3.2 billion. In addition, Iraq was diversifying its arms sources. The Soviet share of Iraq’s military imports fell from 95 percent in 1972 to 63 percent in 1979, while Iraq turned to France, Italy, and even the United States.922
5.3. Towards the War against Iran in High-Threat Environment and Certainty in the Domestic Circumstance
In the late 1970s, independent economic power, thanks to oil revenues, opened the possibility of Iraq’s escape from the binary opposites of the Cold War and its assertion of its regional supremacy by using military force against Iran. Egypt’s pursuit of negotiations with Israel during 1978 was seen as an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to assert the role of Iraq as a potential leader of the Arab world, resulting in the Iraqi government’s calling of the Baghdad Summit in November 1978.923 In the regional context, the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel pushed Iraq into the mainstream of Arab politics. Following the Camp David talks, Iraq led the radical anti-Sadat front and put the Saudis under pressure to join this front.924 Riyadh signed the final declaration of the Baghdad Summit of 1978, censuring the Camp David Accords. Saudi Arabia also supported the subsequent decision to expel Egypt from the Arab League and to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt.925 The Camp David Accords cleared the way for a short-breathed rapprochement between Iraq and Syria in the period of 1978-1979.926
920 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.136-37; Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.108-09.
921 "Iraq under Baath Rule, 1968-1976," Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, November 1, 1976.
922 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.136-37.
923 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.208.
924 Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, pp.185; Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security, Springer, 1998, pp.142.
925 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.92.
926 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.207-13.
158
On October 1, 1978, Iraq offered to dispatch military forces to Syria to fill the void left by Egypt. Assad responded to this call by arriving in Baghdad for a meeting with Bakr and Saddam, the first of its kind for some five years, where the two sides concluded on October 26 a Charter for Joint National Action with the purpose of “bringing about the closest form of unity ties between Iraq and Syria.” Even a joint Higher Political Committee was set up to realize this goal.927 Moreover, Baghdad and Damascus agreed to cease backing each other’s opposition forces. The Kurds, meanwhile, compensated for the loss of Syrian aid by turning to Tehran.928 At this point, Mufti writes, “Dealing with the Kurds and the Shi’a meant dealing with an increasingly aggressive Iran, and he began shoring up his alliances in preparation for the coming battle.”929
The Iranian Revolution in February 1979 had a profound effect on the internal development of neighboring countries, mostly Iraq.930 In the first days of the revolution, Baghdad endeavored to reach out to the new government of then-Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, especially after its withdrawal from the Western-aligned Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and invited him to visit Iraq so as to improve relations between the two countries.931 In Saddam’s view, “Islamic Iran” posed a greater threat to his regime than Israel since Iran possessed an ideological weapon able to annihilate Iraq as both a political system and a nation-state.932 Saddam arguably convinced ailing President Hassan Bakr to step down in the face of the increasing threat of the Iranian revolution to Iraq’s domestic situation.933 Meanwhile, there was growing discontent within the Ba’ath Party, especially its national (pan-Arab) leadership, over Saddam’s rapprochement with the West and conservative Arabs.934 A planned coup against Hussein’s leadership by senior members of the Ba’ath Party helped him consolidate his power through a complete purge of the armed forces and the Ba’ath Party in the summer of 1979. Saddam also utilized
927 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, pp.105.
928 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.209-14.
929 Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.214.
930 Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq, London: Saqi, 2003, pp.225.
931 Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East, pp.58; Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.81.
932 Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq, pp.226.
933 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.140.
934 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” edited by Monica L. Belmonte,, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2012, pp.746.
159
alleged links between the plotters and the Syrian regime as a suitable excuse to cease the projected Syrian-Iraqi unity talks. Having consolidated his position within the armed forces and the Ba’ath Party, Hussein was to add momentum to this move for the Iraqi leadership by creating a parliamentary system. A 250-member National Assembly elected by some 7 million Iraqis will not intervene in matters of defense and internal security.935
It seems that the Iraqi leadership drew a distinction between the Bazargan government and clerical forces in Iran. However, the two states did not forge a burgeoning tie, as the Bazargan government could not contain the clerical forces who outmaneuvered Iran.936 From June 1979, relations between the two states deteriorated, especially after the Bazargan government resigned in November 1979 on the Iranian side and Hussein’s rise to the Presidency on the Iraqi side. The new Iranian leadership beamed Arabic-language radio broadcasts into Iraq that forced Iraqis to topple Saddam Hussein. Moreover, Iran escalated its anti-Ba’athist campaign by sustaining support for the Iraqi Kurds and by providing support to Iraqi Shi’ite social movements, which changed from clandestine educational activities to open mass political struggle.937 In tackling the Shi’i population, Saddam used his carrot-and-stick policy. On the positive side, he was generous in funding public projects in the south.938 The Iraqi regime’s rhetoric became more religious and anti-communist during the latter half of the 1970s in order to build bridges with Islamist opposition groups. In 1978, Saddam ordered the execution and arrest of the Communists “as a part of alleged communist infiltration of the Iraqi armed forces.”939 On the negative side, Hussein continued to suppress Shi’i scholars and their families, culminating in the Shiite leader Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr’s execution. Al-Sadr issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from joining the Ba’ath Party. These moves were accompanied by continued
935 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.140-41; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.217; Kienle, Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, pp.150.
936 Tareq Y. Ismael, Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982, pp.203-12; Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.252.
937 In return for Iran’s aid to Barzanis, they helped revolutionary Iran curb the Iranian Kurdish movement (the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran). Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, pp.105-06; Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq, pp.225.
938 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.195; Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, pp.101.
939 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.106; Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.138.
160
deportations of Shi’i Iraqis beginning in 1980.940 This exiled opposition, who might have totaled 200.000, gathered within the frame of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), designed as an umbrella group consisting of several Shi’i parties – the Da’wa, al-Hakim, and other groups – at the initiative of Iran.941
Identifying and balancing against a foreign state might redistribute the domestic balance of political power by weakening the FPE’s societal opponents, here Kurds and Shi’ite opponents.942 At this point, Saddam was desire to stop the promotion effect of the Iranian revolution on Kurds and Shi’ites. Three scenarios of the threat assessment model fall short of explaining systemic/sub-systemic and domestic ramifications when it comes to the case of the Iran-Iraq war. These three scenarios have a say in democratic and non-democratic regimes; non-democratic regimes are supposed to distinguish between authoritarian and totalitarian ones, requiring a fourth scenario, “D,” in which there are no societal supporters and the FPE is unconstrained. In scenario D, whereas the FPE identifies the Iranian revolution as a threat, the opposing societal blocs, i.e., Kurds and Shi’ites, do not brand the revolution as a threat to their parochial interests. There was efficient threat assessment, but inappropriate counterbalancing prevails because of the war of attribution.943 In high-threat international and regional environments, the risks to the state and its survival are paramount; thus, domestic actors do not affect foreign security policy.944
Iraq cooperated with Saudi Arabia and Jordan to balance the increasing threat from Khomeini’s Iran.945 Hussein cemented the emerging Saudi-Iraqi-Jordanian axis with a view to sustaining Iraq’s position in the Arab world and the Persian Gulf. In other words, the transnational implications of the Iranian revolution left the strategic vacuum to be filled by Iraq, the protector of the smaller Arab Gulf States against the Iranian threat.946 Saddam Hussein considered gaining over the Arab Gulf countries, the international
940 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 195; Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, pp.101; Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.252.
941 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.196; Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq.
942 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.64-65.
943 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.66-67.
944 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.186.
945 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.145.
946 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.145.
161
community, and the Great Powers about the humbling of the Iranian government.947 Saddam Hussein took steps to mend fences with Jordan. In June 1979, Hussein signed a series of agreements ensuring the expansion of the Aqaba port and the improvement of the road system between Amman and Baghdad.948 In February 1979, Iraq and Saudi Arabia concluded an internal security agreement; in April 1979, Iraqi president Ahmad Hassan Bakr became the first head of state of republican Iraq to visit Saudi Arabia.949
Iraq did not occupy a central place in American Gulf policy prior to 1979. The Iranian revolution, however, undermined the twin pillar strategy of the US. The American hegemonic position in the Gulf required the containment of Iran and the maintenance of a regional balance of power. The survival of the Iraqi regime, thus, became a foremost American priority until George W. Bush.950 Washington’s anti-Khomeini policies and traditional opposition to Syria-Iraq unity guaranteed American support for Saddam.951 The US came to support Iraq in protecting the Gulf countries against Iran. As such, Iraq was to receive intelligence support from the US in the Iran-Iraq war.952 On the Syrian front, relations reached a nadir in that Syria rejected to end its alliance with Iran, an act perceived by Iraq as treason to the Arab cause. Not long before the Iran-Iraq war, Baghdad broke off diplomatic relations with Damascus, and both were to host and support their regime dissidents. In addition, Syria went on to cut Iraq’s pipeline in April 1982, removing half of Iraq’s oil exports and costing Iraq $6 billion.953
The competition between Iran and Iraq had been characterized by Iranian dominance in the 1970s.954 Iraq strived to destabilize Iran by using Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime from the inside.955 Pro-Shah forces tried two military coups in 1980, but both
947 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.243.
948 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.166.
949 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, pp.50.
950 Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp.17-18.
951 Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.168-69.
952 Interview with Dr. Haider Saeed, Head of Research Department at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, about “Iraq’s position in the regional landscape,” Doha, Qatar: April 14, 2022; Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War, pp.84.
953 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.193.
954 Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.248.
955 Simon Henderson, Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein’s Ambition for Iraq, San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991, pp.104-05.
162
failed, marking a turning point for Iraq to take the initiative itself.956 On the other hand, there was an assassination attempt on then-deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz, a plot Iraq considered Iran’s hand in.957 At any rate, Saddam had the perception about the weakening of Iran in conventional power terms owing to a purge of the armed forces in Iran during the revolutionary chaos.958 Yet, the Iranian leader Khomeini had the power to call the Shi’ites in Iraq and the gulf to revolt against their rulers.959 It was the tipping point for Hussein. For neoclassical realist theory, when identifying a foreign threat, the FPE takes into account shifts in specific components of the rising state’s power.960 In Hussein’s mind, three opportunities could be realized: to reverse the 1975 decision on the Shatt al-Arab, to end the threat of revolutionary Iran by toppling the regime, and to control the Arab population of Khuzistan, the Iranian territory, which spells to constitute a new political entity at the head of the Gulf.961
Domestic political actors, Kurds, and Shi’ites, are motivated by the internal balance of power, while the FPE, Hussein, is restrained by the international and regional factors that are filtered through the domestic political environment.962 Preoccupied with issues such as the Iran hostage crisis and the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration officials neither expected nor encouraged Iraq’s attack on Iran.963 Iraq did not inform Moscow of Iraq’s intention to invade Iran, though a temporary stoppage of arms deliveries from the USSR.964 While the conservative Gulf States announced their support for Iraq, the Soviet-backed regimes of Syria and Libya leaned towards Iran.965 The spillover effect of the Iranian revolution triggered Iraq’s uneasy
956 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.181.
957 Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.248; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
958 Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.248; Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, pp.58-59.
959 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.146.
960 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.45-46.; Lobell, “The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War.”; Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?.”
961 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.181.
962 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-44; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.172-73.
963 Hal Brands, “Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?,” Cold War History, Vol.12, No.2, 2012, pp.319.
964 Sluglett, “The Cold War in the Middle East,” pp.63.
965 Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.148.
163
Shi’ite bloc to revolt against the regime. Although the attack on Iran did not meet a heavy backlash in the Arab League and at the United Nations like the Kuwaiti invasion,966 the war cost Iraq an arm and a leg; Iraq’s external debt, some $2.5 billion at the start of the war, jumped over $50 billion.967 The Iran-Iraq war points that the FPE can be motivated by regime survival instead of national survival.968 This is evident in the war’s cost to the Iraqi people.
966 Saddam’s invasion to Kuwait isolated Iraq in the international system. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.244.
967 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.202-03.
968 Lobell, “The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War.”; Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?.”
164
6. CHAPTER SIX: IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: ACTORS, PATTERNS, STRUCTURES
6.1. Actors
This chapter scrutinizes the patterns, actors, and structures of Iraqi foreign policy. The thesis categorizes domestic actors as the FPE and societal elites or groups. In the monarchical period, the FPE was the prince and the old politicians, particularly Nuri Said. The ruling circle found remarkable support from the leaders of tribes who relied on the old politicians for their economic interests. Britain cemented and enhanced their political and economic power from the very beginning of the political history of Iraq.969 The Iraqi leadership was dependent on military alliances with Britain and its regional allies to enhance structural autonomy from domestic opposition in their national security policy.970 Nuri was the most influential figure among the FPE because he dominated all the instruments of state power at his disposal during the 1950s. He, thus, sought domestic and foreign policies in his way despite challenges from the societal elites. He followed a divide and rule policy by co-opting and coaxing potential adversaries or by deterring and destroying irreconcilable opponents.971 Under his tenure, the Iraqi government constrained the press and licensed several political parties affiliated with old politicians.972 The Nasserism brand of Arab nationalism and socialist-communist ideology generated a new generation of protestors, opposition politicians, and younger army officers in the Iraqi Army.973 In theoretical terms, younger army officers as potential veto players were determinants to remove the pro-British monarchy. This solidarity emerged from the defeat in Iraq’s war in Palestine, in which the officers put the blame on Britain for the disaster.974 At any rate, the intensification of the socio-economic gaps
969 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.151-52.
970 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.167; Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50.
971 Ali, “ الصندوق الأسود: فائق الشيخ علي - الحلقة 4 .” Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.106.
972 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.106.
973 De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy, pp.176.
974 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.71-72.
165
within Iraq and the reinforcement of radical social trends among the urban and rural poor weakened the elite. They paved the way for a military coup d’état in 1958.975
In the aftermath of the 1958 “revolution,” the opposition movement definitely disintegrated. The leader of the revolution, Qasim, positioned himself in the FPE and took the lion’s share of power since he was Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. In the domestic political setting, the Communists demanded Iraq’s cooperation and friendship with the Soviets, while the pan-Arabs urged for an immediate union with the UAR.976 Oppressed under the “Old Regime,” the Iraqi communists drew on the internal and external hostility toward Qasim and came out in favor of his rule.977 Perceiving a challenge from Arif to his power, Qasim made a marriage of convenience to the Communists, lukewarm to the Arab Union;978 nevertheless, the increasing Communist influence on Iraqi politics provoked a revival of Shi’ite activism. The most influential Shi’ite scholar, Muhsin al-Hakim, issued a fatwa against communism and refused unity with Egypt and Syria for fear of Sunni dominance. Al-Hakim opposed Qasim for his soft stance on communists while he tried to decrease the Shi’ite scholars’ influence in Iraq.979 The Kurdish insurgency continued to fight the government forces until the overthrow of the Qasim regime. By the spring of 1961, the Iraqi Kurds received support from Iran that sought a negotiated way out with Iran.980 The KDP also made a tentative agreement with the Ba’athists in the spring of 1962 in exchange for Kurdish autonomy.981
Following the end of the Qasim regime, the Arab nationalists in Iraq were splintered into the Nasserist and the Ba’athist groups. The Nasserites sought unity with Egypt and were inclined to see Abd al-Salam Arif as their spokesperson. Before the overthrow of the Qasim regime, the Ba’athist leaders had claimed Arif as their leader to enhance their
975 Eppel, “The elite, the effendiyya, and the growth of nationalism and pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958,” pp.246.
976 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.182-83.
977 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.99.
978 Amatzia Baram, “Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.4, 1983, pp.427.
979 Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” pp.92.
980 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.135.
981 Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958–1970, 108-12; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.106.
166
party’s prestige.982 They took the opportunity to lead the Ba’ath government for eight months; however, the power belonged to Arif as FPE. To strengthen his grip on power, Iraqi President Arif eased the Ba’athists out of one position after another and raised Iraqi-Egyptian relations to a new high. The Nasserists inherited the Ba’ath party’s previous influence.983 However, Nasserist ministers were not satisfied with his slow progress towards union with the Arab world.984 By the spring of 1965, the Nasserist ministers demanded a certain degree of public control over foreign trade when Iraqi President Arif was heading oil negotiations with the IPC.985 Arif did not accept their offer, and they resigned. The increasing Nasserist influence in Iraq frightened the Iraqi Shi’ites on account that Nasserism would enhance Sunni dominance in Iraq. In fact, Shi’ite scholar Muhsin al-Hakim aired their grievances by censuring the socialist decrees of 1964 and Arif’s close links with Nasser.986 The Iraqi Kurds continued to fight the government forces that began to arm Barzani’s rival, Talabani’s forces. Barazani fortified his position further with Iranian and Israeli support between 1966 and 1968.987 The death of the first Abd al-Salam Arif deprived the second president, Arif, of structural autonomy, and the aftershock of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war opened the space for Ba’athist rule in 1968.
In the period of the Ba’ath Party rule, Hassan Bakr and Saddam Hussein became the principal decision-makers in the fields of both domestic politics and foreign policy formulation. The domestic balance of political power in Iraq was overwhelmingly the Ba’ath Party; there were three main opposing societal groups: Kurds, particularly the Barzani faction; the Communists; and Shi’i Islamist groups, especially the Da’wa Party of Baqir al-Sadr. At the outset of the Ba’athist governance, the Iraqi leadership signed a
982 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.215-16.
983 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1027-31; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.212, 215-218.
984 Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?,” pp.25-26; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.243-44.
985 Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?,” pp.25-26; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.243-44; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1032-34; Khadduri, “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait,” pp.87; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.381-88.
986 Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” pp.94; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.172-74.
987 Iran supported the Talabani faction until Iran realized that the military force of Barzani was stronger. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.104; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.320; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.130-31; Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S., pp.21.
167
principal agreement with Barzani, which recognized the national rights of the Kurdish people and granted regional autonomy.988 However, Barzani refused the government’s own autonomy plan, and the war between his forces and Iraqi government forces began once and again in April 1974.989 Although the Barzani faction maintained its relations with Israel, Iran’s Shah ceased his support for the Iraqi Kurds as he had his will on the border dispute with Iraq.990 Soviet encouragement of Communists’ participation in the Iraqi government opened space for them in the Iraqi political arena. When Iraqi dependence on Soviet military and technological assistance was off the table, Saddam moved to remove their entity from Iraq.991 The Iraqi government indicted the Communists for “subservience to Moscow” and introduced a decree prohibiting anyone who was serving in the Iraqi Army from all non-Ba’ath political activity. By mid-1979, the ICP was driven underground.992 By the late 1970s, the Shi’a, as the main concern of the Ba’ath, succeeded the Kurds.993 The Shi’ite groups did not pose a serious threat to the central authority until Ba’athist secularism deepened Shi’ite hostility in the mid-1970s.994 From the outset of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the relations between the Shi’ite community and Saddam deteriorated swiftly, and even a number of Shi’ite groups fought against Iraqi forces in the course of the Iran-Iraq war.
6.2. Patterns
There are a series of internal and external patterns in domestic and foreign politics. To begin with, regional leadership assertiveness prevailed during the period of four decades. The Hashemite rulers based their legitimacy on their outstanding role in the “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire during World War I and projected the Fertile Crescent federation that would encompass Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.995 The Hashemite monarchy could establish an Arab Federation with another Jordan, the
988 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.864.
989 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.150-52; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.226-331; Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.16-17.
990 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.331.
991 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.870.
992 Tripp, “Iraq,” 192; Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.123-24.
993 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.331.
994 Abdelsalam, “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982”, pp.66.
995 Porath, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945, Ch. 1.
168
Hashemite kingdom, five months before its demise. Following the monarchical regime, the revolutionary Iraq under Qasim tried to revive the Fertile Crescent proposal by suggesting that casting Egypt out would make an “imperialistic” project into a “patriotic” one.996 During the Arif brother’s tenure, Iraq also negotiated unity schemes with Egypt and Syria; however, a Nasserist coup attempt in Iraq impelled the Iraqi leader to cement relations with the Syrian Ba’athists.997 However, Syria did not continue the talks because an Iraqi-Syrian union alarmed Egypt. In the last chapter, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seized the opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by Egypt owing to its negotiations with Israel. Iraq hosted the summit of the Arab League in 1978 in order to condemn the Camp David Accords. As it can be understood from here, identity in terms of Arab nationalism is an essential element of power politics in Iraq.998 In this vein, the Arab unity projects failed due to three competing nationalisms: pan-Arab, Iraqi, and Kurdish.
Table 20: Middle East Alliances, 1958-1961999
Alliance
Interpretation
United Arab Republic (1958-1961)
Egypt and Syria merged under Nasser to fulfill pan-Arab ideology and prevent a Communist takeover in Syria.
Iraq-Jordan (1958)
A Federal Union is formed to balance against the UAR. It collapsed after the Iraqi revolution in July 1958.
Egypt-Saudi Arabia (1958-1961)
Saudi Arabia bandwagoned with Egypt to appease Nasser after the attempt to assassinate him failed.
Egypt-Iraq (1958)
A brief agreement is made to unite Iraq with the UAR. It ends when Qasim ousts Arif from leadership.
Soviet Union-Iraq (1958-1959)
Soviets supported Iraq to deter U.S. and British intervention because of the prominent role of the Iraqi communists. Qasim pursued to balance Egypt and appeased the Iraqi communists but moved
996 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.133. Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.218; Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp.50.
997 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.206-07.
998 Serra Can, “The Iraqi Identity: Faysal's Unsolved Legacy,” Trames, Vol.22, No.4, 2018.
999 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.80.
169
away from the Soviet Union when his position in Iraq was secure.
Kuwait Intervention (1961)
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt sent troops to Kuwait to deter Iraq’s plans to annex the sheikhdom. Egypt withdrew after the collapse of the UAR in 1961.
The assertive regional leadership fueled the power struggle between regional powers, Egypt, Syria, and Iran. By objecting to the unification of the Fertile Crescent, Egypt became a dominant force in the Arab League to the detriment of the Baghdad Pact by deterring other Arab states from joining the pact.1000 Egypt formed the United Arab Republic with Syria. In response to the formation of the UAR, Iraq formed a Hashemite Union with Jordan to counter the threat from Nasser.1001 Later in the year, Egypt signed another pact with Saudi Arabia, which Yemen joined. The efforts aimed to isolate Iraq politically (see Table 11).1002 The rivalry with Egypt continued during the Qasim period (1958-1963), and tug of wars between the two leaders occurred. Iraqi-Egyptian relations seemed to rise to a new high at the Arif brothers’ regime, yet Iraq backed away from the union that would discredit the Iraqi leaders.1003 Competition with Egypt isolated Iraq in the Middle East until Egypt signed the Camp David Accords.1004 Rivalry with Syria also caused heavy losses to Iraq’s economy whenever Iraqi regimes were at odds with Syrian regimes by interrupting the Syrian portions of Iraq’s pipeline reaching out to the Mediterranean. Communist-Ba’athist tensions in Syria overshadowed Iraq’s relations with Syria before 1968. Syria stopped the pumping of oil during the Iran-Iraq war by removing half of Iraq’s oil exports.1005 The persistent competition with imperial Iran began with the problem of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The two countries did not sort it out peacefully; thus, the two sides supported their adversary domestic groups; Iran backed the Kurds. Iraq focused on the Gulf and Iran in the 1970s by centering its ideological
1000 Al-Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa'id: Min al-Bidaya ila al-Nihaya, pp.73; Kienle, Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, pp.12.
1001 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.74-75; Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Arab states, pp.78.
1002 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.164.
1003 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.345.
1004 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.123-24.
1005 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.193.
170
orientation not on radical pan-Arabism but on pragmatism.1006 The temporary settlement of the Kurdish problem through the Algiers agreement with the Iranian Shah led the Iraqi leadership to make territorial concessions to Iran.1007 Nevertheless, the rivalry with Iran blossomed into conflict when the Iranian revolution posed a threat to Saddam through the Kurds and the Shi’ite Islamic groups.
Another external pattern of Iraqi foreign policy is Arab nationalism. Although Arab nationalism did not gain state identity in Iraq, it had a profound influence on Iraqi foreign policy behavior. Case studies in the thesis, i.e., the Baghdad Pact, Kuwait Affairs, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, became under the influence of the inter-Arab state subsystem in the period of 1956-1967.1008 Arab nationalism gained momentum with the overthrowing of the pro-West monarchical regime by the Free Officers Movement in Egypt. Arab nationalism was in the ascendant from the Suez Crisis of 1956 to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Two Great Powers, the US and the USSR, interrupted the crisis, and Egypt acquired the status of a regional leader in the Arab world.1009 More so, the Suez crisis promoted the Iraqi Free Officers to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, and the Ba’ath Party received its most incredible boost following the crisis.1010 Arab nationalism peaked in advance of the 1967 war and obliged Iraq to stand by Arab countries. The Arab defeat by Israel extirpated the legitimacy of the Arif brothers’ regime in Iraq and the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry in retaliation against Western support for Israel. The Arab defeat in the 1967 war caused the gradual decline of Arab nationalism. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War propelled Arab countries into announcing an embargo against the US, which the US supported with a view to gaining an advantage in the post-war negotiations.1011 In the fourth event, when Iraq went to war with Iran, the Middle East regional system was going through a new phrase: the Iranian revolution was sweeping the Islamic movements in the Arab countries, particularly in the Shi’ite groups. Iran could mobilize the exiled Iraqi
1006 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” pp.187-88.
1007 Tripp, “Iraq,” pp.205-06.
1008 Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, pp.1-3.
1009 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.60. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, pp.509-35; Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.100. Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, pp.37-38.
1010 Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization, pp.53; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, p. 155; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.15.
1011 “Oil Embargo, 1973–1974.”
171
Shi’ite movements by forming the SCIRI, including the Da’wa Party. Indeed, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was afraid of the overwhelming ideological effect on the Shi’ite Islamic groups in Iraq.
First internal pattern of Iraqi foreign policy is the “Iraqi First” emphasis and the contention between the Iraqi first approach and the Arab unity one. Notwithstanding the ruling elite’s ambition to build an Arabic unification, the monarchy pursued the Iraqi First policy in foreign affairs that focused on Iraq rather than on pan-Arab interests. Additionally, Abd al-Karim Qasim’s regime (1958-1963) preferred an Iraqi First policy that would focus on Iraq and reform its social and economic structure. Although the Ba’ath government in the Abd al-Salam Arif regime pursued pan-Arab politics for nine months (February to November 1963), the Iraqi President Arif, along with pragmatists within pan-Arab ranks, eased the Ba’athists out of power. A military coterie under Abd al-Salam Arif predominated its Ba’athist colleagues and constituted an Iraq-centered regime of military officers and civilian technocrats. Arif was moderately pan-Arab during the Qasim regime; challenges in unity with Egypt and pressures by pragmatists within the Iraqi Army may have urged him to loosen relations with Egypt. By the mid-1970s, Iraq’s intense involvement in pan-Arab affairs and Fertile Crescent politics diminished on the regional level. Both Bakr and Saddam favored a policy of Iraq First that placed the unity of the country, the stability of the regime, and economic independence above other considerations.1012
The Kurds revolted against Iraqi authority in the 1920s and were held in check until the early 1960s.1013 They supported the pan-Arabists and Communists’ efforts to topple the Iraqi monarchical regime by hoping that it would bestow them autonomy in Northern Iraq. However, Iraqi President Qasim took a tough stance against Barzani’s memorandum on autonomy; a war between Barazani and government forces broke out in the fall of 1961.1014 In Arif’s times, the KDP had contributed to pan-Arabists’ efforts to overthrow the Qasim regime in return for a promise of autonomy. When plans for a tripartite union
1012 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.872.
1013 Reeva S. Simon, “The imposition of nationalism on a non-nation state: the case of Iraq during the interwar period, 1921–1941,” in Rethinking Arab nationalism in the Middle East, edited by James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp.92-93.
1014 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.157.
172
among Iraq, Egypt, and Syria led the Kurds to demand a binational state, clashes erupted again in April 1965. Iraqi President Arif let the civilian al-Bazzaz Government conclude a comprehensive agreement with the Kurds in principle known as the June 1966 Accord, including a high degree of decentralized administration in Kurdish areas. Hence, the Kurds could preserve their de facto autonomy.1015 When the Ba’ath regime rose to power in Iraq, President Bakr promised to implement the 1966 accord so that the Ba’ath Party strengthened its political and social base in the country. In 1970, the Iraqi leader Bakr announced a principal autonomy agreement with the Barazani faction, yet Barzani lost confidence in the Iraqi leadership and set to receive Israeli aid in return for distracting and undermining the Ba’ath as in the June 1967 war.1016 Apart from a short duration during the early 1970s, the Ba’ath regime under the leadership of Saddam continued to pursue war against Kurdish insurgents.1017 After two years of conflict between the Kurdish insurgents and the Iraqi regime forces, the Ba’ath regime made a territorial concession to Iran as a last resort in controlling the Kurdish insurgency in the spring of 1975. The suppression of the Kurdish uprising allowed Baghdad to assert itself against Moscow but sowed the seeds of the war with Iran. Furthermore, it formalized the long-standing split between the Barzani and his rival Jalal Talabani faction with the formation of a new party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), under Talabani’s leadership.1018 As Phebe Marr contends, the Iraqi state and its leadership failed to assimilate Kurdish counter-hegemonic identity owing to their strong “cultural and linguistic identity.”1019 After the 1991 Gulf War paved the way for the decline of Iraq in the region, the Kurdish leaders in need of external support enjoyed de facto local autonomy instead of proclaiming their independence, which would disturb Türkiye and Iran.1020
Anti-Israel sentiments in Iraq were always strong and affected the decision-making environment of the FPE directly or indirectly. In the monarchical period, Iraqi Prime
1015 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.119; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.319; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.222.
1016 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.331. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.150-54.
1017 Yaniv Voller, “Identity and the Ba‘Th Regime’s Campaign against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Vol.71, No.3, 2017, pp.384.
1018 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.169; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.343.
1019 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.16.
1020 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp.52.
173
Minister Nuri considered Zionism a potential threat to the security of Iraq and the Arab world.1021 The 1948 Arab-Israeli War coincided with the negotiation of the Portsmouth treaty that would redefine the British influence on the Iraqi monarchy. The public, angry at British influence in the country, produced the popular insurrections of 1948 and 1952. The decision of the Iraqi ruling elite to support the Arab countries served to divert attention from internal affairs.1022 Thus, anti-Israel sentiment in Iraq stemmed from the tide of signing a peace treaty with Israel, which would mean recognition of Israel.1023 Additionally, the Suez crisis enabled massive demonstrations to highlight the intensity of anti-Israel feelings in Iraq.1024 The pro-Western Iraqi regime settled for half-measures, such as breaking off diplomatic relations with France and excluding Britain from deliberations in the pact.1025 With the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the anti-Israel feelings, together with the anti-western sentiment in the Middle East, forced the Iraqi leadership to outlaw oil exports and sever diplomatic relations with the US and Britain due to Western backing to Israel.1026 In the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq’s top security agenda included Kurds, Iran, and Syria, not essentially Israel. The Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein played a leading role in gathering the Arab countries in Baghdad in 1978 and capitalized on the anti-Israel sentiment in Iraq to legitimize his foreign policy choices. Israel’s support to the Iraqi Kurds and its air attack on the nuclear reactor of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war disturbed Saddam Hussein. Moreover, Hal Brands reports that Israel semi-covertly provided Iran with arms for procuring that Saddam did not achieve a quick victory that would allow him to turn to the West.1027 To appease the domestic upheaval during the coalition air attacks led by the US, Saddam ordered to attack Israel with SCUD missiles.
1021 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.27.
1022 Eppel, “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945-49,” pp.196.
1023 Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950, pp.170.
1024 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.182.
1025 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.44; Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.74-75; Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.209.
1026 On April 6 the French government agreed to sell Iraq fifty-four fighter-bombers at a cost of $70 million. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.291; Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.63.
1027 Hal Brands, “Saddam and Israel: What do the new Iraqi records reveal?,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.22, No.3, 2011, pp.508.
174
Another internal pattern of the Iraqi foreign policy is that the Iraqi regimes faced a number of coup attempts in each period. Broadly speaking, the military coups phenomenon spread over various Arab states. From 1949 until 1957, there were military coups in Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Between July 1958 and July 1968, there were nine attempted or successful coups in Iraq.1028 The coup attempts shaped the decision-making environment of the FPE, such as severing ties with some states or affecting the internal balance of political power. Iraq became the first modern Arab sovereign state in 1932 and witnessed two military coups in 1936 and 1941. The governmental vulnerability to the opposing officers pressed the ruling elite to join a military pact. In the period of the Qasim regime, the growing communist influence caused the failed Mosul revolt and the assassination attempt on Qasim. Nationalist officers in Mosul worried about Qasim’s ties with the communists and his unwillingness to hand more power to the Ba’ath.1029 The failure of the Mosul revolt led the Ba’ath Party to assassinate Qasim, though it failed.1030 In the third period, after the fall of the Ba’ath government in 1963, the Ba’ath Party, reorganized by Ahmad Hassan Bakr and Saddam, failed to seize power in September 1964, leading to the imprisonment of Bakr and Saddam. The abortive Ba’athist coup attempt allowed Arif to strengthen his grip on power and raised Iraqi-Egyptian relations to a new high.1031 When the Iraqi leader Arif held Nasser at arm’s length, the Nasserist officers led by Arif Abd al-Razzaq attempted a coup; however, Razzaq’s attack on the Arif regime failed.1032 After the Ba’ath Party recaptured power in 1968, the Iraqi political scene saw an attempted coup d’état organized by Colonel Nazem Kazzar, who was director of the national public security department. Colonel Kazzar and his supporters kidnapped the Defense and Interior ministers at the time when President Bakr was due to return from a trip to Bulgaria and Poland.1033 Saddam and his security apparatus brought Kazzar and his supporters under control.
1028 Eliezer Be'eri, “The waning of the military coup in Arab politics,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.18, No.1, 1982, pp.71, 75.
1029 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.86.
1030 In 1961 Qasim said to one of the Ambassadors that he had uncovered 27 secret plots against him since the attempt on his life in 1959. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.146; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.188.
1031 Gibson, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War, pp.87.
1032 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.343-46.
1033 “Iraq Executes 23 for Coup Attempt,” The New York Times, July 8, 1973.
175
Iraq was also subjected to domestic political transformation after each foreign policy behavior. On the Baghdad Pact, analysts of Iraq agree that the pact was one of the driving forces behind revolutionary change in Iraq.1034 The demise of the monarchical regime in Iraq had three assumptions: First, Arab nationalist leaders were too preoccupied with political objectives to pay attention to social and economic development. Secondly, the old politicians’ rule way led to an intense power struggle between the ruling elite and the opposition. Thirdly, the pact triggered the formation of the UAR that promoted the pan-Arab movement to topple the monarchical regime.1035 Ironically, the pact fell short of foreign support for the Hashemite monarchy. Qasim himself admitted that a strong US or British military presence in the Middle East would have urged them to delay the overthrow of the monarchy.1036 Big landowners and societal elites of the monarchy lost touch with the social, economic, and political marginal groups who consisted of a larger share of the urban population and who demanded to improve their standard of living. These groups promoted opposition and sparked riots against the regime, most particularly the Portsmouth Riots of January 1948 and the 1952 Intifada. The Effendi group’s criticisms and opposition to the regime undermined the regime’s prestige and legitimacy and precipitated the military coup d’état of July 14, 1958.1037 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Nasser dominated the fragmented Arab system and kept Arab rulers from forging an anti-UAR grouping.1038 His rivalry with Nasser isolated Qasim from both the Iraqi people and regional countries. Additionally, Qasim’s war against the Kurds was a burden on the economy of the country, alienated the Iraqi public, and promoted the elements opposed to Qasim to depose him. His war with the Kurds accelerated Qasim’s fall, leading to an armed conflict with Iran.1039 Qasim might have looked to create new popularity for his regime by announcing Kuwait as an extension of the Iraqi nation.1040 However, it drove a nail into Qasim’s coffin. US oil policy required pursuing “regime change” in Baghdad since, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration officials, the Iraqi leader’s
1034 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.31-32, 679, 766; Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, pp.49, 61; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.12, 14.
1035 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.2.
1036 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said 1954-1958, pp.210.
1037 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.18-27.
1038 Podeh, “'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63,” pp.104.
1039 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.185.
1040 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.135.
176
ties to Iraqi communists would bring Iraq into the Soviet orbit.1041 The CIA backed the Ba’athist and Nasserist groups in their massacre of Iraqi communists.1042
In the third case of this thesis, the second Arif lost the symbolic capital of the first Arif regime. Abd al-Rahman never filled the vacuum that his brother Abd al-Salam Arif’s death had created. The second Arif lacked personal authority, failed to join effectively in the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, engaged in conflict in Northern Iraq, and lost the public’s confidence in his regime.1043 He aimed to divert the attention of the Iraqi people from the weaknesses of his regime as much as possible by sustaining emotional fervor against Israel.1044 He resorted to a suspension of oil exports to nations that supported Israel and called for the nationalization of all British and US business holdings in the Arab world. Arif’s failure to sustain the boycott of oil exports to the US and Britain at the conference contributed to the downfall of Abd al-Rahman Arif.
In the 1970s, Iraq became a regional power and social state thanks to its oil revenues. The Iranian revolution, however, produced a new equilibrium for Iraq, internally and externally. Saddam oppressed the domestic groups and feared that the spillover effect of the Iranian revolution could trigger Iraq’s uneasy Shi’ite bloc to revolt against his regime. In contrast to Saddam’s opinion, the war with Iran generated Iranian solidarity and strengthened the Iranian revolution. The war cost Iraq an arm and a leg; Iraq’s external debt, some $2.5 billion at the start of the war, jumped to over $50 billion.1045 Saddam’s decision to wage war on Iran did not directly change the Ba’athist regime; however, it started a series of events to topple the Ba’athist regime in 2003. Saddam demanded that the Gulf countries write off Iraq’s debt by advocating that Iraq fight against the revolutionary Iran for the security of the Gulf countries, too. Hence, the Iran-Iraq war caused Saddam to invade Kuwait and the US-led operation in 1991. The US did not go to remove Saddam from office because there was no alternative person to him in 1991. The survival of the Iraqi regime, thus, became a foremost American priority. The Iranian
1041 Citino, “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961,” pp.247.
1042 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.79.
1043 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.107; Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.1063.
1044 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.69.
1045 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.202-03.
177
revolution undermined the twin pillar strategy of the US, and the American hegemonic position in the Gulf required the containment of Iran.1046
6.3. Structures
Iraqi foreign policymaking became in the hands of a clique. In the 1950s, the prince, the old politicians, and then-Prime Minister Nuri shaped the foreign policy of the Hashemite monarchy. Britain was a dominant external actor helping the Iraqi ruling elite implement foreign policy choices. The British embassy in Iraq promoted through the palace the appointment of governments that would implement specific policies rather than interfere in government business. Nuri could exclude British embassy influence from Iraqi politics after 1954, preferring to increase the number of British advisers in Iraq.1047 From 1954, the government under Nuri al-Sa’id gained increased structural autonomy; its national security policy executive became more isolated from its domestic opposition.1048 Nuri’s way of shaping Iraqi foreign policy differentiated from ex-Prime Minister Salih Jaber’s approach to the agreement with Britain. First, he paved the way for the exclusion of disruptive opposition elements from the legislation for a range of controls over parties, the press, demonstrations, and political agitators. Second, he cared about consultation with established Iraqi politicians and made public statements on diplomatic developments during the negotiations.1049 In the second period, Abd al-Karim Qasim took the lion’s share of power since he was then-Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The other leader, Abd al-Salam Arif, was then-deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and deputy Commander in Chief. The quest for Iraq’s national identity or foreign orientation revealed a rift between the two leaders. Iraqi President Qasim was able to exclude Arif from office. The Qasim regime never drew up a permanent constitution. There was no segregation between the executive and legislative
1046 Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War, pp.17-18; Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.168-69.
1047 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.159, 62.
1048 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50. Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.80.
1049 Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.40; Isam Al-Khafaji, “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba'thist Iraq,” in War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, edited by Steven Heydemann, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp.262.
178
powers in the constitution.1050 In the third case, when Qasim was overthrown, Arif tolerated the Ba’athist rule for nine months until they took issue with him over Iraq’s unity efforts against Egypt. The Nasserists subsequently took the Ba’athist influence over. The Nasserist ministers demanded a certain degree of public control over foreign trade during oil negotiations with the IPC. However, Arif lost enthusiasm for a union with Egypt that would reduce his role.1051 In the last case, Saddam constructed a totalitarian state that held a monopoly on the institutions of violence.1052 Increased state control of the economy and a development program reduced discontent in the major population.1053 There were two aspects of the state for the shaping of foreign policy. First, Saddam Hussein trusted those in the presidential compound in Baghdad and those in Tikrit associated with his clan. Hence, Saddam’s “foreign policy” began at the boundaries of the presidential compound in Baghdad or outside those areas of Tikrit. The second important aspect is to view the world restrictedly. Saddam and his circle considered world politics as a ruthless view of politics. He consequently restrained Iraq’s foreign policy choices in a manner that secured his political survival.1054 Iraqi leadership relied on the intelligence and security apparatus for decisions and conduct in foreign policy.1055
Table 21: Actors, Patterns, and Structures in Iraqi Foreign Policy Making
Time
Frame
Actors
Patterns (all times)
Structures
(all times)
Internal
External
1952-1958
FPEs
Regent, Old Politicians, Sheiks
Iraqi first and Arab unity contention
Regional leadership assertiveness and unity schemes
Foreign policymaking in the hands of a clique
Societal groups
Communists, Nationalists, Kurds
FPE
Qasim
1050 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.86-87, 95, 147.
1051 Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.345.
1052 Holden, A Documentary History of Modern Iraq, pp.212.
1053 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” pp.187-88.
1054 Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” pp.171-74.
1055 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” pp.198.
179
1958-1963
Societal groups
Communists (supporter of Qasim) Kurds, Nasserists, Ba’athists
Kurdish Insurgency
Coup Attempts
Anti-Israel sentiments
Domestic political transformations
Regional power struggles
Societal leaders’ conflicting interests in foreign policy
1963-1968
FPEs
Arif brothers
Societal groups
Ba’athists, Nasserists, Kurds, Shi’ites
Arab nationalism
Divide and rule policy
1967-1980
FPEs
Hassan Bakr, Saddam Hussein
Societal groups
Radical Ba’athists, Kurds, Shi’ites
Societal leaders have conflicting interests in Iraqi foreign policy choices as their international or domestic orientation affects their choices.1056 Iraq’s engagement in a military alliance with Britain and its allies alienated the influential sectors of Iraqi society. Although Iraq utilized the Palestine problem as a lever to achieve internal and external gains by adopting an extreme attitude, this radical shift was not enough to cool the internal situation in Iraq.1057 While the older officers in the Iraqi Army stood by the Iraqi ruling elite, the younger officers were subscribing to opposing groups, such as Communism, pan-Arabism, and its new variant, Nasserism. The strongest domestic actors were the Iraqi communists and the Ba’athists. The communists and the Ba’athists were transnational parties. The communists supported Iraqi nationalism over pan-Arab nationalism, and the Iraqi Communist Party, an illegal but still vigorous party, was so strong that it instigated
1056 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.57-58.
1057 Yesilbursa, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59, pp.173.
180
a major urban uprising amid negotiations for the Portsmouth treaty with Britain. In contrast to the communists, the Ba’athists had links with the Ba’ath branches throughout the Arab world.1058 The party’s growth accelerated following Nasser’s onslaught on the Western alliance system, and the Party received its most incredible boost after the Suez crisis.1059 Another significant domestic actor, the Kurds, under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani, established the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq, which remained the dominant party in Iraq until the 1970s.
In the second episode of this thesis, Qasim retired Arif from his posts and promoted communist colonels loyal to Qasim to the highest command in Arif’s brigade.1060 The Iraqi communists voiced the inclusion of the communists in the government; however, Qasim showed little tolerance for any group demanding to rise above its station.1061 After losing key positions in the regime, the communists changed their tactics: they tried to consolidate their social base and pull a neutralist Iraq to the left.1062 Qasim now began using his foes against the communists. In late June, he granted an amnesty for Arab nationalist officers such as Ahmad Hassan Bakr and Major Salih Mahdi Ammash, imprisoned for their activities during the Mosul revolt.1063 The Kurds launched a Kurdish rebellion against Qasim’s regime after he was unwilling to grant a sort of autonomy. Their political strategy was to ensure local autonomy in northern Iraq. In the third episode, Arif’s quest for Arab unity further alienated the Kurds when he reached an agreement of unification with Nasser.1064 The KDP had consented to support the efforts to overthrow the Qasim regime in return for a promise of autonomy. Unification with Egypt engulfed the Kurdish leadership as well as Shiite circles and associations in Iraq, whose influence
1058 The Ba’ath leadership in Baghdad was a “regional command” subordinate to the “national command” in Damascus.
1059 Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization, pp.53; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair, pp.155; Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, pp.15.
1060 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.835.
1061 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.177-78; Mufti, Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp.127.
1062 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.132; Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.234.
1063 Franzén, Red star over Iraq: Iraqi communism before Saddam, pp.108; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp.69-73.
1064 Kirmanj, “The Clash of Identities in Iraq,” pp.50.
181
Arif could not reduce.1065 Arif’s commitment to Arab unification, embodying the socialist decrees of July 1964, heightened tensions between Arif and Barzani. Clashes erupted again in April 1965. The Kurds consolidated their de facto autonomy.1066 Many Shias feared that Nasserism would enhance the Sunni dominance in Iraq, while the Kurds worried that their position would be constrained in a larger Arab Union.1067 The Nasserists tried to keep Iraq closer to Egypt. In the last episode, domestic actors had their own foreign policy orientation and pursued political strategies to achieve their interest in foreign policy. Interactions with the rival Syrian regime remained antagonistic partly because of Damascus’s aid to the Iraqi Kurds.1068 They also took up arms against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Besides, the Iraqi leadership was uncomfortable with the Iraqi Communists seeking a place for a communist party in Iraq.1069 In analyzing Iraq’s foreign policy, the ICP criticized Iraqi purchases of military equipment from Western countries and its soft staunch on the Camp David Accords.1070 Iraqi leadership expected Shi’ite scholar Muhsin al-Hakim to censure Iran and support them over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Yet, al-Hakim never buttressed them.1071
The fourth chapter of this thesis reveals that Iraqi leadership followed a divide-and-rule policy to implement foreign policy choices and weaken domestic political actors. The ruling oligarchy of the Hashemite monarchy was aware of the increasing grievances of the new generation and opted to disrupt their solidarity with them rather than meet the new social conditions.1072 The coming of Nuri al-Sa’id to power for the thirteenth time in 1954 pointed to a period of repression and reluctance to compromise. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri either deterred his adversaries or divided the opposition parties by inviting representatives of some political parties into the cabinet.1073 When Qasim came to power,
1065 Luizard, “The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Ba'th,” pp.94; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.172-74.
1066 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.128-29; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. The June 1966 Accord can be found in Khadduri. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.274-76.
1067 On the occasion, it should be noted that Nasser favored a degree of autonomy within the state of Iraq for the Kurds. Penrose and Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development, pp.319.
1068 Syria supported Talabani faction against Iraq. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.144, 53-54; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.330, 38-39.
1069 Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The politics of revenge, pp.123-24.
1070 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, pp.131.
1071 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.193-204.
1072 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.6-7.
1073 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.106; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.106. Elliot, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958, pp.38.
182
he exploited the intense rivalry among domestic groups, each competing for power by turning either to Qasim for support or to a military faction to rise under the new regime.1074 To strengthen his rule, Qasim balanced the parties against each other, not relying on one group.1075 Hanna Batatu described Qasim’s gamesmanship towards Arab nationalists and communists in Iraq as stating that “He [Qasim] prevailed by keeping them divided, by playing them off one against the other, and hedging them with their mutual aversions and antipathies.”1076 Furthermore, Qasim used divide-and-rule tactics among the Kurds; Ibrahim Ahmad was the representative of the political aspirations of the urban leftist Kurd intellectuals against Mustafa Barzani.1077 When disagreements between the two wings of the Kurdish movement came to a deadlock, Qasim encouraged the Kurd leftists against Barzani.1078
Arif's regime let the Ba’athists and Nasserists expand their influence in the country early on. Iraqi President Abd al-Salam Arif let the Ba’athist government make a mistake for nine months instead of engaging in a struggle for power with Ba’athist leaders. The Ba’athist leaders were divided into three groups. The first faction, the right-wing group, asked for the delay in implementing radical principles, particularly socialism. The second faction, the left-wing group, pressed for implementing basic principles, especially socialism. The last group tried to reconcile the two extreme groups.1079 The Nasserist ministers replaced the Ba’athist ones until the unity talks with Egypt endangered Arif’s power. Arif’s social base was not strong. The Ba’athists and the Nasserists engaged in a power struggle, and they attempted to overthrow each other. The Iraqi Army thwarted these attempts.1080
Under the Ba’athist regime, Saddam Hussein was a foremost player in the traditional divide-and-rule policy in Iraq. Iraqi President Hassan Bakr allowed Saddam Hussein to
1074 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.99.
1075 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, pp.82.
1076 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, pp.843.
1077 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.104-5; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153-4; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 302-08.
1078 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.104-5; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.153-4; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp.302-08.
1079 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.209-10.
1080 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.212.
183
set up an independent power base in the security services and remove his own rivals.1081 The years from 1968 through 1973 lasted with waves of secret arrests of Communists and left-wing Baathists.1082 Moreover, Saddam stepped up the pressure on the Kurdish insurgency leader, Barzani, whom Ba’athist political circles viewed as an American “agent,”1083 and collaborated with Barzani’s rival Talabani faction.1084 In dealing with Shi’ite uneasiness, Saddam used his carrot-and-stick policy. The regime’s rhetoric became more religious and anti-communist during the latter half of the 1970s in order to build bridges with Islamist opposition groups. Saddam ordered the execution of some Iraqi Communists on charges of their infiltration of the Iraqi Army.”1085 On the other hand, Saddam ordered the execution of Shiite leader Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr, who issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from joining the Ba’ath Party. The regime also deported some 200,000 Iraqi Shi’ites, closed religious schools in Shi’ite regions, and confiscated Shi’ite foundations beginning in 1980.1086 This exiled opposition gathered within the frame of the SCIRI at the initiative of Iran.1087
1081 Kelidar, Iraq: The Search for Stability, pp.9; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.141, 43.
1082 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976,” pp.858.
1083 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.173-74.
1084 Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Scoiety and the Struggle for a Kurdish State, pp.119.
1085 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, 106; Dawisha, “Iraq: The West's Opportunity,” pp.138.
1086 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.195; Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, pp.101; Nelson, “Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran,” pp.252.
1087 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.196; Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq.
184
7. CHAPTER SEVEN: FUTURE PROSPECT: IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY TODAY
In this chapter, this thesis attempts to analyze contemporary Iraqi foreign policy in the 2010s. Drawing on neoclassical realism, the first case of this thesis attempts to account for Maliki’s back to the Syrian regime amid the civil war, despite the deeply cool relations with Damascus. The second case tries to explain how then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi could facilitate the US-led military troops in Iraq on the occasion of the fight against the DAESH (ed-Devletü’l-İslâmiyye fi’l-Irak ve’ş-Şam). Abadi’s call for US deployment was a turning point for Iraq, where the US invasion invented a new political landscape. This research also employs some theoretical concepts, such as international and domestic environment and structural autonomy, through these two cases.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Cold War permitted domestic anti-regime forces to surface.1088 Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the US-led coalition put the Iraqi opposition in power and invented an ethno-sectarian apportionment system. In this power-sharing system known as muhasasa ta’ifia, ministerial portfolios, civil service jobs, and government contracts were distributed along ethno-sectarian party lines. Since 2003, successive Iraqi governments are paralyzed owing to the clash of sectarian and partisan interests.1089 Positions in both Nuri al-Maliki’s and Haider al-Abadi’s governments were distributed between different parties based on the number of each party’s parliamentary seats, which made state institutions resemble the fiefdoms of powerful parties. Ministers follow their party’s instructions about micro-management issues such as appointments and contracting.1090 Iraq’s social elite used politics to loot public funds. The term “kleptocracy” describes the ruling elite in Iraq. Kleptocracy means extensive corruption whereby high-level political power is abused to allow ruling elites to steal public funds for their own private gain using public institutions.1091 In such
1088 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.216.
1089 “How Iraq’s sectarian system came to be,” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/3/29/how-iraqs-sectarian-system-came-to-be/.
1090 Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, Brandeis University: The Crown Center for Middle East Studies, June 2016, pp.5; Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
1091 “What is kleptocracy and how does it work?,” Chatham House, July 4, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-kleptocracy-and-how-does-it-work; Christopher Walker and
185
settings, internal checks on power are neutralized or co-opted. Walker and Aten note, “The state is captured by narrow interests who use the global financial system to launder and save their ill-gotten earnings.”1092
Prime ministers of Iraq did not fully control their government due to this power-sharing arrangement. The exception to this was Maliki’s second tenure, by which he formed a kind of shadow state that circumvented constitutional limitations. Even so, the prime minister in contemporary Iraq is restrained both by the need to take back his own social base and by the inflexibility displayed by leaders of other communities.1093 Prime minister candidates in Iraq tried to gain the consent of the most powerful Shia cleric, Ali al-Sistani, who emerged as a key player in the processes that constituted and sustained the post-2003 Iraqi political order. Although Sistani did not have an official position in Iraq, the political elite of Iraq considered Sistani’s consent to be their candidate for prime minister before getting the support or consent of the US and Iran. For instance, the Grand Shi’i cleric, Sistani, took issue with Maliki’s insistence on staying in office for a third term. Iran was the only major backer. Sistani’s position and the United States’ will to see a new prime minister put enough pressure on Iran to withdraw its support for Maliki.1094 After Abadi took office as prime minister, Sistani expressed that his support for Abadi would continue as long as Abadi succeeded in achieving social consensus and eliminating the country’s weaknesses, which emerged due to the mistakes of previous leaders and corruption.1095
Iraq’s foreign policy priorities became sovereignty and economic reconstruction.1096 After Maliki’s coming to power, foreign policy began to serve the survival and strengthening of the Maliki regime. National interests are defined by the narrow interests of the ruling elite. Foreign policy began not at the country’s borders but at the political boundaries of the “Malikiyoun,” with strong personal ties to Maliki and the Da’wa
Melissa Aten, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: A Challenge For Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.29, No.1, 2018.
1092 Walker and Aten, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: A Challenge For Democracy,” pp.3.
1093 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.5; Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism.
1094 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.3; Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, “The ‘formal’ Marjaʿ: Shiʿi clerical authority and the state in post-2003 Iraq,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.46, No.3, 2019.
1095
1095 “Sistani welcomes Iraqi politicians,” Al-Monitor, November 13, 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iraq-religious-authority-ali-sistani-politics.html.
1096 Soffar, “Foreign policy under occupation: Does Iraq need a foreign policy?,” pp.225.
186
Party.1097 A small group of functionaries, the Malikiyoun, contributed to securing Maliki’s grip on power. Maliki positioned them at the center of a network of influence and patronage that bypassed the cabinet and tied the prime minister directly to those generals and senior civil servants who were exerting state power below the ministerial level.1098 Faced with a weak and highly corrupt state, then-Prime Minister Nuri Maliki mobilized the backing of Shi’a voters by utilizing openly sectarian language, demonizing the Sunni sections of Iraqi society, first as Ba’athists and then as “jihadi terrorists,” which enabled the DAESH to expand so rapidly.1099 Maliki utilized the Sunni objection to the central government as a way to reconstruct his image as a strong and determined leader. Moreover, he could use the systemic threat of his archrival Iraqiya’s vote to impose a rough unity on the Kurdish and Shi’a parties. Maliki formed the State of Law (SOL), a Da’wa-led coalition that emerged as the largest and most popular Shia coalition.1100
Maliki’s legacy is the reintroduction of the traditional strong-man model into Iraqi politics.1101 The fragmentation between political party groups allowed Maliki to play political groups to control the system as much as possible. In 2011, Maliki temporarily took over the cabinet’s vacant Interior, Defense, and National Security ministries. Moreover, Maliki subordinated the Election Commission and the Central Bank to his government, while the Supreme Judicial Court issued administrative authority to eliminate those who challenged Maliki’s power.1102 The Maliki regime established offices where loyal people worked parallel to the work of the ministries. Maliki established a command post of the armed forces within the Office of the Prime Minister. With this office, Maliki consolidated its grip on the Iraqi security forces.1103
1097 Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, pp.182.
1098 Toby Dodge, “State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: the rise of a new authoritarianism,” International Affairs, Vol.89, No.2, 2013, pp.245; Joel D. Rayburn, “Rise of the Maliki regime,” Journal of International Security Affairs, No.22, (Spring-Summer 2012).
1099 Toby Dodge et al., Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq, London: the LSE Middle East Center, October 2018, pp.8.
1100 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.3.
1101 Ned Parker, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia: Nouri al-Maliki Builds the Body Politic,” World Policy Journal, Vol.26, No.1, 2009, pp.21.
1102 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.350-51; Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State, Routledge, 2015, pp.134.
1103 Dodge, “State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: the rise of a new authoritarianism,” pp.249.
187
Structural autonomy is the main variable insulating the FPE from the influence of domestic actors on national security policy. Domestic actors will play a role in states only if executives own low levels of structural autonomy. Therefore, a state’s domestic decision-making environment determines to what extent the FPE keeps them away from domestic opposition.1104 In domestic circumstances, if there is no governmental vulnerability, such as a military coup or some form of de-selection, domestic actors have little room to maneuver. In addition, if there is executive certainty or national consensus about policy, the effect of domestic actors on foreign policy decisions decreases.1105 The authoritarian power consolidation practices of the Maliki regime alienated the Kurds and the Sunnis.1106 In the 2010 parliamentary election, Maliki lost the election to the Iraqiya coalition headed by secularist Ayad Allawi, who won the most parliamentary seats, with 91. But Maliki, who obtained 89 seats, managed to remain in power. During his second term, Maliki embarked on an over-centralization campaign that silenced his opponents and pursued a strategy to divide and rule the Sunni leadership by enticing opponents with government positions and money. As a result, Iraqiya was divided into various streams, destroying the unity Allawi had built.1107 On the other hand, Maliki continuously fought the Kurds’ attempts to achieve their constitutional regional autonomy. There was a high level of political conflict between the Kurds and the central government over the Kurds’ oil and gas reserves, decreasing their reliance on Baghdad. The Kurds concluded oil deals with international companies against the will of the central government, which caused Maliki to stop the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)’s allocation of the budget.1108
The 2010 parliamentary elections, in which Iraqiya received remarkable votes, had pushed Maliki to receive support from Iran, albeit he acted against Iran’s demands in his first term. Maliki initiated to get Iranian aid, especially after the withdrawal of US troops in December 2011, and to serve Iran’s policies in the region. Hence, Maliki could not
1104 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.50.
1105 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89.
1106 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and the MENA States System, London: the LSE Middle East Centre, October 2014, pp.18.
1107 Renad Mansour, The Sunni Predicament in Iraq, Carniege Middle East Center, March 2016.
1108 Dylan O’Driscoll, “Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State,” Ethnopolitics, Vol.16, No.4, 2017, pp.2 and 9; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Breaking From Baghdad: Kurdish Autonomy vs. Maliki’s Manipulation,” World Affairs, Vol.175, No.4, 2012.
188
reject Iran’s request for Iraqi Shiite militias to support Bashar Assad in the Syrian Civil War.1109 Ties with Syria remained cool until the Syrian Civil War, as the Iraqi ruling elite saw Syria as the leading financier and refuge of the Iraqi Ba’athists.1110 The civil war impelled the Iraqi leadership to consider that if the Assad regime fell in Syria, Iraqi Sunni groups fighting against the Maliki regime would use Syrian territory as a base to overthrow the government in Iraq. Secondly, if the Assad regime is overthrown, there is a possibility that Sunnis will come to power. Maliki feared that the rise of a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus would bolster the alienation of Sunnis in Iraq’s western provinces. Finally, if Iran loses Syria, Tehran will make more demands on Baghdad and threaten Maliki’s autonomy.1111
When Maliki took the decision to restore relations with the Assad regime, the international and regional imperatives presented a high-threat environment for the FPE. There was a regional struggle between the rival US/Saudi-led (moderate/Sunni) and Iran-led (resistance/Shi’a) axes.1112 On the defensive, Iran sought to create a corridor linking Iran to Syria and the Lebanese coast via Iraq, allowing Iran to supply Hezbollah and providing the Asad regime with a two-sided buffer that could help it survive.1113 Over half of heads of state, including GCC rulers, boycotted the Arab Summit meeting in Baghdad in 2012. The Saudis perceived Maliki as an Iranian proxy and backed his rivals among the Sunnis supported by Türkiye. Iraq’s Shi’a political elite moved further into the Iranian camp.1114 Iraq abstained from the Arab League vote in 2011 to freeze Syria’s membership, refused the US call for Assad to go, and opposed further sanctions and overthrowing the Syrian regime by force. While other Arab states demoted ties with Assad, Iraq moved in the opposite direction. It hosted official visits, expanded business ties, and provided material support, including much-needed diesel fuel. Iraq opened its
1109 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2017, pp.5-9.
1110 Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, pp.193.
1111 Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, pp.193-94; Hinnebusch, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and the MENA States System, pp.22.
1112 Mustafa Yetim and İ̇smail Numan Telci, “Another 'Third Way' to Narrate the Existing Alliances in the Middle East: Turkey-Qatar, Saudi Arabia-UAE, and Iran-Syria,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.25, No.3, 2023.
1113 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Arab Uprisings and The MENA Regional States System,” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, Vol.11, No.42, 2014.
1114 Hinnebusch, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and the MENA States System, pp.18.
189
airspace to resupply flights between Iran and Syria and allowed Syria to use Iraq’s banking institutions. The Maliki regime resumed supporting Syria despite diplomatic pressure from the US. To frustrate these pressures and over-dependence that the US may use as leverage over him, Maliki signed a $4.2bn arms deal with Russia by making Russia the second largest supplier of weapons to Iraq. Having invested so much in Iraq, the US did not cut off aid to not lose its remaining position in the country.1115
The decline of the Iraqi central government forces in their struggle against DAESH in April 2014 not only highlighted the shortcomings of the government's efforts, which had consumed more than 20 billion dollars but also eroded the political standing of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.1116 During his initial tenure, Maliki had taken a firm stance against militias. However, he was compelled to collaborate with Shiite militia organizations and endorse the creation of the militia coalition known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) due to the security sector’s collapse in the face of DAESH. This shift in Maliki’s approach underscored Iran’s increasing influence over him.1117 These actions ultimately led to his loss of power, as he no longer enjoyed support from both Kurds and Sunnis. Consequently, this made it impossible for him to secure re-election in the aftermath of the 2014 national elections.1118
The rivalry between Abadi and Maliki within the Da’wa Party led to a division of support between their respective allies.1119 Abadi garnered support from various quarters in his resistance to Maliki's ambition to secure a third term as prime minister. Domestically, he received backing from Ali Sistani. At the same time, regionally, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Arab League, as well as international powers such as the USA, the UK, and the European Union, have lent their support to Abadi.1120 Iraqi political
1115 Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, pp.193-94; Hinnebusch, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and the MENA States System, pp.22.
1116 Benjamin Isakhan, “The Road to the ‘Islamic State’: State-Society Relations after the US Withdrawal from Iraq,” in State and Society in Iraq: Citizenship Under Occupation, Dictatorship and Democratisation, edited by Benjamin Isakhan, Shamiran Mako, and Fadi Dawood, London: I.B. Tauris, 2017, pp.272.
1117 Mansour and Jabar, The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future, pp.5-9.
1118 O’Driscoll, “Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State,” pp.12.
1119 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.4.
1120 Caroleen Marji Sayej, Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018; “Maliki’s political games,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/14/malikis-political-games/.
190
parties displayed less interest in appointing a strong prime minister, ultimately choosing Abadi amid a turbulent political landscape. Abadi’s key policy objectives included limiting Iranian influence, preventing foreign interventions in Iraq (which had become a playground for various regional and global actors), and combating DAESH. To achieve these goals, he sought assistance from the United States and Western countries to counterbalance Iran and strengthen the central government’s authority throughout the country.1121 Nonetheless, Abadi adopted a balanced approach to his relations with the United States, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. He also worked towards fostering social harmony among all segments of Iraqi society, aiming to gain the support of alienated Sunni communities while also satisfying the Shiite population in the south of Iraq.
Maliki tried to use his leverage within powerful groups in the PMF, such as the Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah, to weaken Abadi’s authority.1122 Some pro-Iranian militia groups in the PMF voluntarily fought along with pro-Assad forces in Syria. Abadi was caught in the middle of two choices: either to fight the influential networks that Maliki had embedded within state institutions or to ally with Maliki so as to secure the support of the SOL. Abadi took three important steps toward reversing Maliki’s leadership style. Firstly, he removed the position of commander in chief, which Maliki had used to circumvent the Ministry of Defense and make military decisions in isolation from the formal chain of command. Secondly, Abadi’s government agreed on the “cabinet by-law:” A series of rules governing the meetings of the Council of Ministers so as to organize its decision-making process. Finally, Abadi further abolished four ministries and transferred their authority either to other ministries or to the provinces on August 9, 2015.1123
Unlike Maliki, Abadi could not employ patronage to pull allies and neutralize some of his opponents since oil prices reached unprecedented heights. While Maliki rested on the
1121
1121 “Sistani“Sistani deniesdenies supportingsupporting Soleiman'sSoleiman's involvementinvolvement inin Iraq,”Iraq,” AlAl--MonitorMonitor,, DecemberDecember 2,2, 2014,2014, https://www.alhttps://www.al--monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iraqmonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iraq--najafnajaf--sistanisistani--denydeny--soleimanisoleimani--iraniran--interference.htmlinterference.html..
1122 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.5; “The Return of Maliki and a New Sunni Insurgency in Iraq?,” the LSE Middle East Center, July 12, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2017/07/12/the-return-of-maliki-and-a-new-sunni-insurgency/.
1123 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.3-4; “Iraq’s Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders,” Institute for the Study of War, November 13, 2014, https://www.iswresearch.org/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html.
191
Shia community, Abadi endeavored to create a constituency on behalf of a reformer amid a wave of popular protests that began during the summer of 2015. Lacking a parliamentary bloc that supported him, Abadi counted on that pressure and on extra-constitutional forces, such as the Shia religious authority, to force parties to accept reforms that limited their powers. Owing to his lack of leverage and a costly war against DAESH, Abadi could neither assert his image as a reformer nor keep the support of major political groups.1124 Maliki, determined to retain his ministerial post and prevent any of his close associates from leaving, staunchly opposed the cabinet reshuffle from the outset. Furthermore, certain Sunni and Kurdish factions were reluctant to embrace the reform, as they were apprehensive about relinquishing their positions within the government formed after the election. Sadr, dissatisfied with Abadi’s limited progress in political reforms, delivered a scathing speech condemning the government in April 2016. Subsequently, his followers stormed the parliament in the Green Zone.1125
Relations with the Kurds have been problematic since Maliki’s second term as Baghdad and Erbil disputed the share of the Iraqi budget and how to manage Iraq’s and Kurdistan’s oil resources.1126 Amid DAESH’s rapid growth, the Kurdish leadership, for the first time, voiced their desire for secession by calling a referendum to vote on whether to break away from Iraq.1127 Whereas Abadi struck a major oil and budget deal with the KRG, this long-standing dispute may have propelled KRG president Masoud Barzani into organizing a referendum on the independence of Kurdistan in 2017.1128 The KDP, with 25 parliamentary seats out of 328 seats, persistently welcomed a prolonged US presence in Iraq, resulting in the establishment of a U.S. base in Erbil in 2015.1129 At any rate, the phenomenon of the DAESH dramatically increased Iranian military involvement in Iraq. Tehran, concerned about the rise of the group, neglected the US military commitment to
1124 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.6-7.
1125 Recep Tayyip Güler, “Irak 2016,” in Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2016, edited by Kemal İnat and Muhittin Ataman, Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2017, pp.24-25.
1126 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.3.
1127 O’Driscoll, “Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State,” pp.1.
1128 Al-Qarawee, From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister, pp.3; “Post-Maliki Iraq: An uncertain future?,” the LSE Middle East Center, February 3, 2015, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/02/03/post-maliki-iraq-an-uncertain-future/.
1129 “How the Kurds Helped Draw the United States Back to Iraq,” Carniege Middle East Center, June 29, 2015, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/02/03/pohttps://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/how-kurds-helped-draw-united-states-back-to-iraq-pub-60522.st-maliki-iraq-an-uncertain-future/.
192
Iraq.1130 The United States regarded Abadi as a pragmatist leader to counter Iranian influence in Iraq. The fight against DAESH contributed to the domestic ambiguity in Iraq and strengthened the influence of the US-Iranian rivalry on the domestic political environment. Therefore, Abadi did not have a strong structural autonomy, and the presence of US troops in Iraq remained undebated until the Sadrist movement and the political wings of the Shi’ite militia organizations, which had an edge over the 2018 parliamentary elections, would overwhelmingly berate the US troops.
1130 “The U.S. and Iran are aligned in Iraq against the Islamic State — for now,” Washinton Post, December 27, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-and-iran-are-aligned-in-iraq-against-the-islamic-state--for-now/2014/12/27/353a748c-8d0d-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html.
193
8. CONCLUSION: YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW
This thesis examines in detail the origins and evolution of Iraqi foreign policy from the 1950s until the 1980s and the actors, patterns, and structures embedded in Iraqi foreign policy. This chapter summarizes and revisits the arguments with regard to the puzzle and the research question. At first, the conclusion revisits the research methodology used and why NCR was opted as the analytical framework. After summing up the main arguments and empirical findings, it presents its contribution to Iraqi foreign policy and NCR literature. In addition, it assesses the varying impact of each independent and intervening variable in the four cases undertaken, analyzes the Iraqi foreign policy today, and concludes with possible future directions for research in NCR, Foreign Policy Analysis, and International Relations. Moreover, the conclusion underlines how neo-classical realism can further account for foreign policy decisions by employing the role of domestic politics and leadership as integral parts of the analysis. Finally, by using Lobell’s threat assessment and Ripsman’s strategic adjustment approach, which is understudied on the international level and almost never tested in the Middle East, the thesis attempts to reach some conclusions and explanations of state behavior.
8.1. Research Methodology, the Main Findings, and Arguments
This thesis combines inductive and deductive research. Inductive research contributes to developing a relevant research topic and constructs a strong working theory, while deductive research follows up with inductive research to confirm or invalidate the conclusion. The four cases in the thesis represented a puzzle in themselves during the time span of that case study. In the grand scheme of things, Iraqi foreign policy undergoes external penetration by superpowers and regional powers. However, the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy decisions emerged to a different degree. In other words, although superpower and regional power penetration into Iraqi foreign policy is an external structural factor in Iraqi foreign policy, the degree of domestic actors’ influence on foreign policy is different.
The thesis examined Iraq’s foreign policy toward selected cases from the 1950s to the late 1970s and sought to answer the main question of how the interplay between the Iraqi leadership and domestic societal elites or groups shaped Iraqi foreign policy in general
194
and its relationship with Middle Eastern countries. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, existing research on this topic was limited and lacks an explanation by an international relations theory. On their own, these studies do not address the complexity of FDPM in Iraq as they mainly rely on some internal or external variables. Analyzing foreign policy outcomes with solely internal or external variables takes away from the ability to mean a country’s behavior and foreign policy-making process. Therefore, this research used a combination of neoclassical realism as well as foreign policy coalition among the FPE and societal actors over threat assessment and structural autonomy of the FPE as the framework for a more comprehensive analysis. This eclectic approach combined leadership and structural conditions as independent variables and structural autonomy of the FPE and foreign policy coalition among the FPE and societal leaders as the intervening variables. The interaction of structural conditions, leadership perception, structural autonomy of the FPE, and foreign policy coalition among the FPE and the societal elites helped explain the foreign policy of Iraq. Governmental vulnerability, as well as the degrees of executive certainty and national consensus, force even non-democratic regimes to consider domestic actors.1131 Consequently, the integration of multiple levels of analysis is a valuable contribution to the study of IR and foreign policy, especially in authoritarian countries.
In particular, the thesis sought to elucidate reasons as to why the Iraqi leadership joined a Western security pact rather than making concessions to emerging societal domestic groups, claimed over Kuwait in spite of the opposite societal groups, engaged in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War while pursuing balanced relations with West and East; and decided to go to war with revolutionary Iran. The period from the 1950s to the late 1970s is selected, as the 1950s marked the beginning of dramatic shifts inside and outside Iraq. The cases ended with the Iran-Iraq war since it caused the decline of Iraq by paving the way for the Kuwait invasion. Therefore, the 40 years that elapsed provided a long enough period to analyze Iraqi foreign policy and determine causality and its empirical phases. Upon selecting the cases, the research followed empirical process tracing, whose aim was to put the cause (independent variable) and outcome (intervening variable) in sequential order. The use of an intervening variable in the causal analysis gives NCR an edge in analyzing
1131 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.188-89.
195
individual foreign policies. The domestic factor that acts as the intervening variable is a filter through which international systemic pressure gets translated into a foreign policy outcome. As Ripsman, Lobell, and Taliaferro termed, there are three types of NCR: type I of NCR explains anomalies of neorealism, type II of NCR addresses a foreign policy puzzle and analyzes the foreign policy outcome, and type III of NCR includes not only states’ foreign policy choices but also international outcomes that these policy choices and the systemic structure interact. This thesis relies on the second theme of NCR, highlighting that domestic politics is a factor in the causal mechanism.
Argument 1: In states whose domestic decision-making environments afford strong structural autonomy to FPEs, decision-makers can construct foreign security policies and neglect domestic opposition when the international environment poses a threat to their survival. Neoclassical realists warn that autonomy varies both across states and within the same state over time. Both democracies and non-democratic states differ in the level of autonomy they have in the national security area.1132 Relative autonomy, therefore, is more critical than regime type.1133 Iraqi political leadership had two motivations for the domination of Iraq’s politics. The first was to protect the independence of the state and to guarantee its territorial integrity. Second was the ambition to see their country as the force that would lead to Arab emancipation and unity. When Iraq acceded to the Baghdad Pact, the international and regional environment posed a threat to the survival of the Iraqi ruling elite, partly because of alleged Soviet threats to the Middle East and partly because of the wave of Arab nationalism.1134 The Iraqi leadership counted on a Western alliance to strengthen Iraq’s position in the region.1135 The foreign policy of the Hashemite monarchy over-stressed Iraq’s common interests with non-Arab neighbors at the expense of Arab solidarity. In the meantime, pan-Arab excitement had reached a high pitch and jarred with the neutralism that become predominant in the Arab world. The opposition leaders, who had already been malcontent with Iraq’s rulers over domestic policy, accused the ruling oligarchy of weakening Arab solidarity and isolating Iraq from the Arab procession.1136
1132 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.189.
1133 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.190.
1134 Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp.141-42.
1135 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.181-82, 84.
1136 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.12; Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914-1967, Macmillian, 1968, pp.115-16.
196
Indeed, pan-Arab ideologies dominated government and elite circles in the Arab world. The Hashemite family provided the rulers of Jordan and Iraq (up to 1958), lost their monopoly on ideological Pan-Arabism when republican political forces challenged the Iraqi and Jordanian monarchs during the late 1940s and the 1950s.1137
Fred Halliday divides the evolution of the Cold War in the Middle East into four historical periods: 1946-55, 1955-74, 1974-85, and 1985-91. In the first period, the USSR had not the capacity to challenge the West in the Arab world itself. In the second phase, however, the USSR managed to position itself as the major ally of several radical Arab nationalist regimes, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, later Libya, and South Yemen. Moreover, Arab nationalism posed a grave danger to Western domination in the region. Furthermore, this second period witnessed that the US gained ground in the Arab world.1138 The Baghdad Pact marked the response of Western governments and their allies in the region to the rising nationalist movements and increasing Soviet influence. There was a series of regional events that compelled Britain and the US to consider alternatives for securing their oil interests in the region: the nationalization of oil in Iran, the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy that allied with Western powers, and finally, the expansion of a nationalist, anti-British movement in Iraq.1139 The establishment of the Arab League and the crystallization of the Arab world as an international sub-system turned the inter-Arab Middle Eastern arena into one more front of the Cold War between the West and the Communist Bloc.1140
Argument 2: In high-threat international environments and domestic ambiguity whose risks to the state and its survival are paramount to the FPE, decision-makers utilize foreign policy to reverse societal groups’ challenge to their rule. After the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy, Iraqi President Qasim neutralized Arif and the Arab nationalists and reduced the Iraqi communists to a size that did not endanger his regime.1141 There was wide-ranging opposition from societal groups (except the Iraqi communists) to
1137 Gregory Gause, “Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.45, No.2, 1992, pp.444-45.
1138 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.99-100.
1139 Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy, pp.107.
1140 Lesch, Syria and the United States, pp.4; Eppel, “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945-49,” pp.108-09.
1141 Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, pp.179-80.
197
Qasim’s domestic and foreign policy. Instead of placating the societal groups, Qasim seized the opportunity of the independence of Kuwait to intimidate domestic opposition groups. Qasim was also willing to remove a significant disadvantage; Iraq has very narrow access to the Gulf and is dependent on the transit traffic through the adjacent countries in its foreign trade.1142 Qasim had structural autonomy in claiming Kuwait as a part of Iraq, whereas the societal actors did not identify the independence of Kuwait as a threat to Iraq’s national security. Last but not least, international and regional systemic pressures did not favor Iraq’s claim for Kuwait. The Cold War system had a decisive role in preserving an Egypt-led neutralist regional order.1143 Qasim’s attempt was rebuffed first by the British and then by Arab League forces.
Argument 3: Societal elites urge the FPE to identify shifts in the global or regional balance of power to strengthen their positions in the domestic balance of political power. Societal elites may urge the FPE to identify changes in the global or regional balance of power to strengthen or preserve their positions in the domestic balance of political power.1144 Although Iraqi president Qasim declared his support for Arab solidarity, the Nasserist faction in Iraq was not content with close cooperation with the United Arab Republic, instead of membership; however, Qasim had not reached firm decisions on the matter. His ambiguous policy eventually caused a rupture with the Nasser regime. The rivalry between Iraq and Egypt caused the regional isolation of Iraq by delimiting Iraq’s ability to shape regional politics.1145
Argument 4: the FPE make concessions to the societal elites in the low-international threat environment and domestic ambiguity, resulting in domestic political transformation. Arab nationalism determined Iraq’s domestic policies as well as Baghdad’s relations with other states. The first consequence of Arab nationalism on the political scene of Iraq was anti-Western sentiments and revolution. The second result was unity and disunity. The nationalist response to Western imperialism stirred up revolutionary sentiments among the population, which increased between 1948 and 1958.
1142 Koszinowski, “Iraq as a Regional Power,” pp.283.
1143 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.79.
1144 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements, pp.43-44; Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.172-73.
1145 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.133.
198
These sentiments ultimately peaked in the Free Officers coup on July 14, 1958.1146 Arab nationalism and unity promoted by Nuri and Qasim in different ways produced a sharp polarization of political forces in Iraq and the Arab world, ensuing disunity resulting from another competing brand of Arab unity advocated by Egypt.1147
The fragility of state cohesion and legitimacy, the domestic and trans-border identity questions of the Kurds and the Shi’ites, the external vulnerabilities resulting from these questions, and the wave of Arab nationalism have shaped the Iraqi foreign policy environment.1148 Iraq witnessed four changes of regime, and countless failed coups between 1958 and 1968. The Arif brothers’ regime lacked structural autonomy. President Arif endeavored to divert the attention of the Iraqi people from the weaknesses of his government as much as possible by sustaining emotional fervor against Israel.1149 Above all, Arab nationalism and Nasserism regionally and anti-Israel sentiments domestically forced Iraq to participate in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The failure of the Arab countries in the war led to the decline of Arab nationalism and the fall of the Arif brothers’ regime. Iraq’s foreign policy under President Arif was not merely formulated by his personal disposition but also by the oil issue, the arms issue, and the pan-Arab philosophical issue.1150
Argument 5: Identifying specific components of the rising state’s power as a threat to the national interest in the high-threat environment, the FPE with the strong structural autonomy in domestic certainty neglects and intimidates societal elites who have a different “evoked set” of concerns related to the ascending foreign power. In the 1970s, a set of rules governing the Cold War considerably affected Iraq’s regional and international behavior. By the mid-1970s, the Ba’ath regime consolidated power domestically and set out to shift its policy away from heavy dependence on the USSR and to deal with both Cold War blocs. On the regional level, Iraq’s intense involvement in pan-Arab affairs and Fertile Crescent politics diminished. In the 1970s, most states in the Middle East got closer to the Western orbit, shifting the balance of the Cold War in the
1146 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.XVIII.
1147 Romero, The Iraq Revolution of 1958, pp.XIX.
1148 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.123.
1149 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.69.
1150 Kennedy, “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq From April, 1966, To July, 1968,” pp.IV; Dawisha, “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy,” pp.125-26.
199
US’s favor in the region.1151 Even so, the USSR, expelled from Egypt between 1972 and 1976, retained its position through military links in other Arab states, notably Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen.1152 The Iranian revolution in 1979 opened an opportunity for Saddam, who had strong structural autonomy in the high-threat international environment, to bring Khomeini to his knees and cease Iran’s support for the Kurds and the Islamic Shi’ite groups.
As discussed in the empirical chapters, all leaders sought ways to maintain their regime’s vital interests and survival by invoking policies to maximize benefits, even if it meant demonizing international and regional powers and antagonizing domestic societal elites. In general, the Western countries did not constitute a direct military threat to Iraq, expected the flow of oil from Iraq to Western markets, and contained the sweeping effect of communism and Arab nationalism over the Middle East. Iraqi leadership tried to gain regional leadership in the region and engaged in the tough competence with Nasser’s Egypt, which alienated Iraq regionally. In the aftermath of Kuwaiti independence, Iraq reiterated its claim to Kuwait in spite of strong opposition from international and regional powers. Additionally, Iraq under Saddam Hussein maintained unfriendly relations with Syria amid a fierce competence for regional dominance in the 1970s in order to nullify the effect of the Ba’athist branch in Syria. On the domestic political scene, the fragmented societal elites and groups in Iraq did not promote the foreign policies of the Iraqi FPE. On the occasion of the Baghdad Pact, the FPE did not find support for the pact among the societal actors in the country. All segments of the opposition in the country were worried about the British influence on their country. Secondly, they also had divergent interests in domestic and foreign policy and thus did not stand by Iraqi President Abd al-Karim Qasim in the matter of Iraq’s claim to Kuwaiti independence. The exception to this was the Iraqi communists who backed Qasim. Thirdly, when the 1967 Arab-Israel War broke out, the Arab nationalists pulled Qasim into the war. The Kurds did not deal with Arab issues and always looked for a sort of local autonomy. Iraqi Shi’ites also prioritized dispelling the communist effect in the country. Lastly, the societal groups diametrically
1151 Stein, International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order, pp.83-84, 108-09.
1152 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, pp.99-100.
200
opposed Saddam’s war against the revolutionary Iran. Even Shi’ite groups exiled by Saddam fought the Iraqi forces.
Iraqi leadership had a monopoly on shaping the general direction of foreign policy with some input from the security establishment and societal elites and groups. Certain geo-political restrictions and international and regional systemic pressures, as well as domestic societal groups’ opposition to them, restricted their autonomy in shaping foreign policy and dictated specific policies. Therefore, Iraq’s leaders tried to pursue foreign policy to remain in power and societal elites. Nuri’s foreign policy isolated Iraq from the pan-Arab and Soviet blocs, but Qasim’s policy isolated Iraq from almost all Arab and Western countries.1153 Societal elites made up of outward-oriented internationalists or inward-leaning nationalists attempted to manipulate foreign policy to strengthen their position in the domestic balance of political power. Both the Ba’athists and the Communists were ideological parties. Their ideologies, although they varied in consistency and content, were action-oriented, which aroused the zeal and emotions of their activists. Second, they were mass-mobilizing parties calling for revolutionary change. Finally, both parties were transnational: their organizations in Iraq were linked to outside structures, one to the international Communist movement, the other to the Ba’ath branches throughout the Arab world.1154 At this point, Telhami and Barnett differentiate between state identity and national identity. State identity means “The corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus.” Nation identity alludes to a group of people who have a historical homeland and share shared historical memories.1155
8.2. Contribution to the Field
This research contributes to the domain of NCR, Middle East studies, and IR in general. The thesis applied the Type II neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy to explain the Iraqi foreign policy behavior produced by the interplay between the Iraqi leadership and domestic groups. This approach helps us identify intervening variables in foreign policy
1153 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.185.
1154 Tonini, “Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63,” pp.125.
1155 Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, edited by Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.8.
201
outcomes. Type II neoclassical realist theory introduces leaders’ perceptions of international politics, state extraction capacity, and state structure and state strength to FPDM. When states are faced with clear threats, states behave as neorealism expects, but when the states are not faced with a clear threat, states often have a range of policy options rather than an optimal policy dictated by international circumstances.1156 Under these circumstances, states’ choices are concerned with the world views of leaders, the nature of domestic coalitions, and domestic political constraints. Type II neoclassical realist theory stresses “the strength of a country’s state apparatus and its relation to the surrounding society.”1157 Not all states can direct policy on their own in the face of opposition from domestic interest groups and societal veto players.1158 The level of political and social cohesion within the state, public support for general foreign policy, and competition among societal coalitions to capture the state can influence state leaders’ ability to extract, mobilize, and harness the nation’s power.1159
Domestic politics in Iraq are characterized by intra-state competition.1160 The thesis uses two analytical explanation models of type II neoclassical realist theory, which puts emphasis on the domestic balance of political power. Foreign policy decision-makers and societal leaders respond to shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities that could pose threats to specific strategies and interests. A foreign state is regarded as threatening if shifts in specific components of its power, such as ideology, threaten other states. Therefore, Steven Lobell’s threat identification model for threat assessment guides whether a common position in foreign policy among the FPE and societal elites occurs or not. In doing so, the thesis uncovers the attitudes of the FPE and domestic actors.1161 By their own lights, state leaders and societal actors focus on shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities that threaten their specific strategic interests.1162 The threat identification model sheds light on strategies or attitudes of the domestic political actors, as well as the FPE, in the process of the FPDM. A significant contribution of this thesis to NCR is that three scenarios of the model fall short of explaining systemic/sub-systemic and domestic
1156 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, “Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism.”
1157 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp.161.
1158 Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
1159 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, pp.39-40.
1160 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.47-51.
1161 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.54-55.
1162 Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” pp.62.
202
ramifications in the case of the Iran-Iraq war. These three scenarios have a say in democratic and non-democratic regimes; non-democratic regimes need to discriminate between authoritarian and totalitarian ones, requiring a fourth scenario, “D,” in which there are no societal supporters and the FPE is unconstrained.
Bargaining or conflict between the FPE and domestic actors in Iraq is a landmark to mean foreign policy decisions of the Iraqi ruling elites. The second analytical explanation model of type II neoclassical realist theory, the strategic adjustment model developed by Norrin Ripsman, brings a new dimension to the explanation of foreign policies in which domestic actors, explicit or implicit, play a significant role. The model points to international systems as high-threat and low-threat environments. Domestic actors may affect foreign policy when the international environment poses a low threat to states. The FPE bargains with powerful actors that can either help it retain power or contribute to its overthrow, as the costs of letting domestic actors affect the making of national security policy are low. However, when the risks to the state and its survival are paramount in high-threat environments, the FPE have strong incentives to ignore domestic political interests to secure the state.1163 The model also defines veto players, such as powerful bureaucratic actors, religious leaders, or the military, to manipulate their power to extract policy concessions.1164 Accordingly, the thesis identifies the potential veto players of the military in history and religious leaders in contemporary foreign policy.
In terms of Middle East studies, the greatest contribution of the thesis is empirical. This thesis identifies key shifts in the Iraqi systemic and domestic environment that shaped the country’s place in the international and regional system from the 1950s to the 1980s. Moreover, the thesis briefly extends the period of Iraqi foreign policy to the 2010s to bridge the gap between historical Iraqi foreign policy and contemporary one. Empirically, the thesis contributes four cases indicating key turning points in Iraqi foreign policy. Theoretically, it expands the explanatory power of the neoclassical realist theory in non-Western case studies. Finally, this research displays how the bargaining process between Iraqi domestic political actors with multiple foreign policies contributes to produce Iraq’s
1163 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.186.
1164 Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” pp.184-85; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
203
foreign policy behavior. With this in mind, the study provides the potential for future research.
8.3. Possible Avenues of Future Research
This study attempted to analyze the Iraqi foreign policy in the Middle East from the post-1945 world order until the end of the Cold War era and, in so doing, unearthed several related areas where future research can be undertaken. This research employed Steven Lobell’s threat identification model to show domestic actors’ standpoints on the foreign, threatening states in the sight of the Iraqi ruling elite. This study also utilized Norrin Ripsman’s strategic adjustment model to explain the decision-making environment both at domestic, regional, and international levels. Other possible studies could use type III of neoclassical realism theory to make sense of foreign policy behaviors by identifying the intervening variables. Leader images intervene in inaccurate perceptions, strategic culture shapes state responses, state-society relations affect the state’s ability to implement decisions, and domestic political institutions enable or constrain state leaders who face societal opposition to policy selection or implementation.
Given the emergence of the new parliamentary system in post-2003 Iraq, a further examination of Iraq’s policy responses to Israel’s normalization with a number of Arab states could be undertaken. This case enables us to show whether a foreign policy coalition between the domestic actors and the ruling elite occurs or not over the case in question. It also displays that the potential veto player, such as Ali Sistani, draws the boundaries of foreign policy by dragging his social base (Shi’ite community) to oppose the establishment of ties with Israel. As indicated in a public opinion survey conducted across the Arab world by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, an overwhelming majority of Iraqis (92%) would disapprove of their countries’ recognition of Israel.1165 Yet, in addition to these aspects, there are also a number of avenues for future research that emerge from the findings of this study.
Iraq’s relationships with its Gulf Arab neighbors have been characterized by tensions and misunderstandings over the last two decades, but Iraq has developed stronger ties to the
1165 “Arab Opinion Index 2022: Executive Summary,” Arab Center Washington DC, January 19, 2023, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2022-executive-summary/.
204
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since 2018. The burgeoning relations are a function of structural change in Baghdad that reflects a governmental willingness to balance relations with the surrounding region. Protesters in October 2018 voiced over the US and Iran’s foreign influence on their countries, lighting the touch paper of establishing a new government that would focus on balancing relations with the Gulf countries. Popular attacks on pro-Iranian political parties and anti-Iranian chants by protesters compelled the Shia political elite to revise their approach to regional policies. After the 2018 election, the FPE in Iraq had a governmental vulnerability to take account of the protestors’ demands on foreign policy.
205
REFERENCES
Books and Book Chapters
Abir, Mordechai. Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration. London: Croom Helm, 1988.
Abu Jaber, Kamel. The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966.
Aburish, Said K. Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge. London: Bloomsbury Publising, 2001.
Acharya, Amirav. U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf. London: Routledge, 1989.
Ahmad, Ahmad Yousef. “The Dialectics of Domestic Environment and Role Performance: The Foreign Policy of Iraq.” In The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, edited by Bahgat Korany and Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki. Oxon: Routledge, 2019, pp.185-215.
Al-Alim, Mahmud Amin. I’tirafat Shaykh Al-Shuyuyi’yin Al-Arab: Mahmud Amin Al-Alim [Confessions of the Shaykh of the Arab Communists: Mahmoud Amin Al-Alim]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2006.
Al-Arabi, Muhsin Muhammad al-Mutawalli. Nuri Basha Al-Sa'id: Min Al-Bidaya Ila Al-Nihaya. Beirut: Al-Dar al-Arabiyya li al-Mawsu‘at, 2005.
Al-Hasani, ‘Abd al-Razzaq. Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-Lraqiyyah. Beirut: Dar al-kutub, 1974.
Al-Hasani, Abd al-Razzak. Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-‘Iraqiya, Al-Jusi’ Al-Thalith, 1930–1933 (the History of Iraqi Cabinets, Vol. 3, 1930–1933). Baghdad: Dar al-Shu'un al-Thaqafiya al-'Amma, 1988.
Al-Jaza’iri, Zuhair. “Ba’thist Ideology and Practice.” In Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Fran Hazelton. London: Zed Books, 1994.
Al-Khafaji, Isam. “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba’thist Iraq.” In War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, edited by Steven Heydemann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp.258-91.
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim, and Sammy Salama. Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History, London: Routledge, 2008.
Al-Uzri, ‘Abd al-Karim. Tarikh fi Dhikrayat Al-‘Iraq, 1930–1958, Beirut: Markaz al-Abjadiya, 1982.
Alam, Mahboob. Iraqi Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995.
206
Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.
Alnasrawi, Abbas. Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role of Oil in a Middle East Eastern Company, New York: Praeger, 1967.
Arif, Ismael. Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, New York: Vantage Press, 1982.
Ashton, Nigel J. “Introduction: The Cold War in the Middle East, 1967–73.” In The Cold War in the Middle East Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73, edited by Nigel J. Ashton. Oxon: Routledge, 2007, pp.1-15.
Axelgard, Frederick W. “U.S. Support for the British Position in Pre-Revolutionary Iraq,” In the Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and William R. Louis. London: I. B. Tauris, 1991.
Ayoob, Mohammad. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
Bakhash, Shaul. “The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq, 1930–1980,” In Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004, pp.11-27.
Baldwin, David A. “Power and International Relations,” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, London: SAGE Publications, 2002, pp.235-256.
Barnett, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order. Columbia University Press, 1998.
Barrett, Roby C. The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: Us Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Be’eri, Eliezer. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. London: Pall Mall Press, 1970.
Beck, Roger B., Linda Black, Larry S. Krieger, Phillip C. Naylor, and Dahia I. Shabaka. World History: Patterns of Interaction, McDougal Littell, 2009.
Birdwood, Lord. Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership, London: Cassell, 1959.
Brawley, Mark R. “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the World Wars (1919-1939).” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign
207
Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.75-98.
Brown, L. Carl. International Politics and the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The War Trap, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
Busch, Briton Cooper. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, Berkeley: University Presses of California, 1967.
Campbell, John C. Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, New York: Harper, 1958.
Carlsnaes, Walter. “Foreign Policy.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 430-52. London: SAGE Publications, 2002.
Christensen, Thomas J. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Chubin, Shahran, and Charles Tripp. Iran and Iraq at War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Citino, Nathan J. From Arab Nationalism to Opec: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
Citino, Nathan J. “Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.-Iraqi Relations, 1958-1961.” In The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, pp.245-70.
Cleveland, William L., and Martin P. Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 2013.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R. Wagner. The Lessons of Modern War, Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1990.
Dann, Uriel. Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963. Jeruselam: Israel Universities Press, 1969.
Davis, Eric. Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2005.
Dawisha, Adeed. Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
208
Dawisha, Adeed. Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy, London: Macmillan, 1976.
Dawisha, Adeed. “Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy.” In Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, edited by Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.117-36.
Dawisha, Adeed. Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Dawisha, Adeed. “The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence.” In The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives, edited by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha. London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
De Gaury, Gerald. Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq's Monarchy. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008.
Devlen, Balkan, and Özgür Özdamar. “Neoclassial Realism and Foreign Policy Crises.” In Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation, edited by Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison and James Patrick. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp.136-63.
Dodge, Toby. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
Dueck, Colin. “Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.139-69.
Dueck, Colin. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Dyson, Tom. Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Elliot, Matthew. Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958. London: I. B. Tauris, 1996.
Eppel, Michael. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004.
Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile Iraq, 2002-2003. London, 2003.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: I.B. Tauris, 1987.
Fawzi, Ahmad. Qasim Wa Al-Kuwayt. Qairo, 1961
209
Fordham, Benjamin O. “The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and the Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.251-79.
Franzén, Johan. Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Friedberg, Aaron L. In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Fukuyama, Francis. The Soviet Union and Iraq, California: RAND Corporation, 1980.
Gallman, Waldemar J. Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri Al-Said 1954-1958. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.
Gause, Gregory. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making.” In Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, edited by Robert Coulam and Richard Smith. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985, pp.21-58.
Gerges, A. Fawaz. The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967. Boulder, Colorada: Westview Press, 1994.
Gibson, Bryan R. Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Güler, Recep Tayyip. “Irak 2016.” In Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2016, edited by Kemal İnat and Muhittin Ataman. Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2017.
IMF, Direction of Trade: Yearbook 1982, Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1982.
Haddad, George. Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971.
Haj, Samira. The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Idelogy. New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.
210
Halliday, Fred. The Making of the Second Cold War. London: Verso, 1987.
Halliday, Fred. The Middle East in International Relations: power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Halliday, Fred. “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War.” In The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim. Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.6-26.
Halpern, Manfred. “Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class.” In The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp.277-316.
Heikal, Mohamed. Cutting the Lions Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes. London: Corgi Books, 1986.
Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984.
Henderson, Simon. Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein’s Ambition for Iraq. San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. The International Politics of the Middle East. New York: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. London: Routledge, 1989.
Holden, Stacy E. A Documentary History of Modern Iraq. Florida: Glatfelter Natures Book, 2012.
Hurst, Steven. The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Ionides, Michael George. Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960.
Isakhan, Benjamin. “The Road to the ‘Islamic State’: State-Society Relations after the Us Withdrawal from Iraq.” In State and Society in Iraq: Citizenship under Occupation, Dictatorship and Democratisation, edited by Benjamin Isakhan, Shamiran Mako and Fadi Dawood. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.
Ishow, Habib. “Relations between Iraq and Kuwait.” In Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Habib Ishow and Thomas Derek Hopwood and Koszinowski. Oxford: St. Antony's College, 1993, pp.303-18.
Ismael, Tareq Y. Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
211
Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State. Routledge, 2015.
Jabar, Faleh A. The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi, 2003.
Jabar, Faleh A. “Şeyhler Ve İdeologlar: Aşiretlerin Irak'taki Baba Tarafından Kalma Totalitercilik Altında Yapı Bozumuna Uğraması Ve Yeniden Yapılanması, 1968-1998.” In Aşiretler Ve Iktidar: Ortadoğu'da Etnisite Ve Milliyetçilik, edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013.
Jawad, Sa’ad. Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958–1970. London: Ithaca Press, 1981.
Jawad, Sa’ad. “The Kurdish Problem in Iraq.” In The Integration of Modern Iraq, edited by Abbas Kelidar. Croom Helm: London, 1979, pp.171-82.
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Norrin M. Ripsman Steven E. Lobell, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.1-41.
Juneau, Thomas. Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Kadhim, Abbas. “Opting for the Lesser Evil: US Foreign Policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008.” In Handbook of US-Middle East Relations, edited by Robert Looney. London: Routledge, 2009, pp.467-82.
Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Rautsi. Saddam Hussein. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
Kedourie, Sylvia. Arab Nationalism. University of California Press, 1962.
Kelidar, Abbas. Iraq: The Search for Stability. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.
Keohane, Robert O. “International Liberalism Revisited.” In The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, edited by John Dunn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.165-94.
Keohane, Robert O., and Helen V. Milner. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
212
Kerr, Malcolm H., “Persistence of Regional Quarrels.” In Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, edited by J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
Kerr, Malcolm H., The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Khadduri, Majid. Republican Iraq. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1978.
Khadduri, Majid. The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East. Boston: Beacon Press, 2009.
Khalidi, Rashid. “The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World.” In The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and Roger Louis. London: I. B. Tauris, 1991.
Kienle, Eberhard. Ba’th V. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989. London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993.
Kienle, Eberhard. “The Limits of Fertile Crescent Unity: Iraqi Policies Towards Syria since 1945.” In Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow and Thomas Koszinowski. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.357-80.
Kirmanj, Sherko. “The Clash of Identities in Iraq.” In Iraq between Occupations Perspectives from 1920 to the Present, edited by Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde and Ronen Zeidel. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp.43-60.
Koszinowski, Thomas. “Iraq as a Regional Power.” In Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow and Thomas Koszinowski. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.283-302.
Kupchan, Charles. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Laqueur, Walter Z. The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
Layne, Christopher. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
213
Lehrman, Hal. “Development in Iraq.” In The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur, 256-63. London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.
Lesch, David. Syria and the United States. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
Lesch, David W. “The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis: Globalist Policy in a Regional Reality.” In The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, edited by David W. Lesch and Haas Mark L.. New York: Routledge, 2018, pp.77-92.
Lobell, Steven E. The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.
Lobell, Steven E. “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.42-74.
Louis, Wm. Roger. “Britain and the Middle East after 1945.” In Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown. New York: I.B. TAURIS, 2004, pp.21-58.
Love, Kennett. Suez: The Twice-Fought War. New York: McCraw-Hill Book Company, 1969.
Luizard, Pierre-Jean. “The Nature of the Confrontation between the State and Marja'ism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Al-Hakim and the Ba’th.” In Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 2002.
Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Mandelbaum, Michael. The Fates of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Marr, Phebe. “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities.” In Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.181-206.
Marr, Phebe. “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?”. In Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present, edited by Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde and Ronen Zeidel. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder: Westview Press, 2012.
214
McAllister, James. No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-54. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen Jr. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Mufti, Malik. Sovereign Creations:Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq. Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Mufti, Malik. “The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism.” In The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, edited by David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas. New York: Routledge, 2018, 93-109.
Narang, Vipin. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
Osgood, Kenneth. “Eisenhower and Regime Change in Iraq: The United States and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.” In America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics, edited by David Ryan and Patrick Kiely. Oxon: Routledge, 2009, 4-35.
Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. Yale University Press, 2007.
Penrose, Edith Tilton, and Ernest Francis Penrose. Iraq: International Relations and National Development. London: Ernest Benn, 1978.
Perlmutter, Amos. The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1977.
Podeh, Elie. The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995.
Polk, William. The United States and the Arab World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Porath, Yehoshua. In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945. London: Routledge, 1986.
Pugh, Michael. The Anzus Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” In Theory and Structure in International Political Economy, edited by Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
Quandt, William B. “America and the Middle East: A Fifty-Year Overview.” In Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and
215
Outside Powers, edited by L. Carl Brown. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.59-74.
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
Rieck, Andreas. “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: From Rivalry to Confrontation.” In Iraq: Power and Society, edited by Habib Ishow and and Koszinowski Thomas Derek Hopwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.319-40.
Ripsman, Norrin. “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Norrin Ripsman Steven E. Lobell, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.170-93.
Ripsman, Norrin. Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
Ripsman, Norrin, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell. “Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.280-99.
Ripsman, Norrin, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Robertson, John F. Iraq. London: Oneworld Publications, 2015.
Romero, Juan. The Iraq Revolution of 1958. Maryland: University Press of America, 2011.
Rubinoff, Janet Ahner. Nasser’s Policy of Positive Neutrality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Russett, Bruce M. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Safran, Nadav. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Sage, Andrew. Concise Encyclopedia of Information Processing in Systems and Organizations. New York: Pergamon Press, 1990.
Sakai, Keiko. “Irak’ta Devletin Kontrol Aracı Olarak ‘Aşiretleşme’: Ordu, Kabine Ve Ulusal Meclis Üzerine Gözlemler.” In Aşiretler Ve Iktidar: Ortadoğu'da Etnisite Ve Milliyetçilik, edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, pp.135-55.
216
Saouli, Adham. “The Foreign Policies of Iraq and Lebanon.” In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, edited by Raymond Hinnebusch, and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. London: Rienner, 2014.
Sayej, Caroleen Marji. Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.
Sayigh, Yezid, and Avi Shlaim. “Introduction.” In The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim. Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.1-6.
Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994.
Schultz, Kenneth. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Schweller, Randall L. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998.
Schweller, Randall L. “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.227-50.
Schweller, Randall L. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism.” In Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, pp.311-48.
Schweller, Randall L. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Shikara, Ahmad Abdul Razzaq. Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. LAAM, 1987.
Shwadran, Benjamin. The Power Struggle in Iraq. New York: Council For Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960.
Silverfarb, Daniel. The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Simon, Bromley. Rethinking Middle East Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
Simon, Reeva S. “The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: The Case of Iraq During the Interwar Period, 1921–1941.” In Rethinking Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, edited by James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp.87-104.
217
Skeet, Ian, OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Sluglett, Peter. “The Cold War in the Middle East.” In International Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp.62-78.
Smolansky, Oles M. The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974.
Smolansky, Oles M., and Bettie M. Smolansky. The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press, 1991.
Snow, Peter. Hussein: A Biography. London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972.
Snyder, Jack L. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Soffar, Mohammed. “Foreign Policy under Occupation: Does Iraq Need a Foreign Policy?”. In The Foreign Policies of Arab States. The Challenge of Globalization, edited by Bahgat Korany and Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008, pp.195-252.
Solingen, Etel. Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Stein, Ewan. International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit across the Taiwan Strait.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.99-138.
Stone, Lawrence. The Past and the Present Revisited. London: Routledge, 1981.
Tahiri, Hussein. The Structure of Kurdish Scoiety and the Struggle for a Kurdish State. California: Mazda Publishers, 2007.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, edited by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.194-226.
Taylor, Alan. The Superpowers and the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
218
Telhami, Shibley, and Michael Barnett. “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” In Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, edited by Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.1-25.
Thacher, Nicholas G. “Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy toward Iraq in the 1950s.” In The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and Roger Louis. London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.
Tibi, Bassam. Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security. Springer, 1998.
Tonini, Alberto. “Propaganda Versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim’s Years, 1958–63.” In Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies. The Relationship with Europe, edited by Gerd Nonneman. London: Routledge, 2005, pp.123-44.
Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Tripp, Charles. “Iraq.” In The Cold War and the Middle East, edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shalim. Oxford: Oxford Univerty Press, 2003, pp.186-215.
Tripp, Charles. “The Foreign Policy of Iraq.” In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp.167-92.
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1987.
Whittleton, Celine. “Oil and the Iraqi Economy.” In Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, edited by Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq. London: Zed Books, 1986.
Williams, Ann. Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914-1967. Macmillian, 1968.
Wohlforth, William C. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Workman, W. Thom. The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Boulder: CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
Yapp, Malcolm. The near East since the First World War: A History to 1995. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.
Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
219
Yesilbursa, Behcet Kemal. The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59. Routledge, 2005.
Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
220
Journal Articles
Adler, Emanuel. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” European Journal of International Relations. Vol.3, No.3, (1997), pp.319-63.
Akhli, Rangga Amalul. “The Rapid Changes of the U.S. Foreign Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2019: A Neoclassical Realism Perspective.” Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi ttg Kajian & Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism & Integrity. Vol.6, No.2, (2020), pp.174-89.
Al-Qarawee, Harith Hasan. “The ‘Formal’ Marjaʿ: Shiʿi Clerical Authority and the State in Post-2003 Iraq.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.46, No.3, (2019), pp. 481-97.
Amour, Philipp O. “2010 Sonrasında Orta Doğu'da Değişen Bölgesel Düzende Hamas-Fkö/Fetih Uzlaşısı Ve Yakınlaşması: Neo-Realist Ve Neo-Klasik Realist Bir Değerlendirme.” Anemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. Vol.6, No.5, (2018), pp.621-31.
Ashton, Nigel John. “The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958.” Review of International Studies. Vol.19, No.2, (1993), pp.123-37.
Ayoob, Mohammed. “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?”. International Studies Quarterly. Vol.33, No.1, (1989), pp.67-79.
Balci, Ali, Tuncay Kardaş, İsmail Ediz, and Yildirim Turan. “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War.” War in History. Vol.27, No.4, (2018), pp.643-69.
Baram, Amatzia. “Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.19, No.4, (1983), pp.426-55.
Baun, Michael, and Dan Marek. “Making Europe Defend Again: The Relaunch of European Defense Cooperation from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” Czech Journal of Internatioal Relations. Vol.54, No.4, (2019), pp.27-46.
Be’eri, Eliezer. “The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.18, No.1, (1982), pp.69-128.
Becker, Michael E., Matthew S. Cohen, Sidita Kushi, and Ian P. McManus. “Reviving the Russian Empire: The Crimean Intervention through a Neoclassical Realist Lens.” European Security. Vol.25, No.1, (2016), pp.112-33.
Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol.40, No.2, (2007), pp.170-95.
221
Blackwell, Stephen. “A Desert Squall: Anglo-American Planning for Military Intervention in Iraq, July 1958–August 1959.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.35, No.3, (1999), pp.1-18.
Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Norrin M. Ripsman. “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft.” Foreign Policy Analysis.Vol.4, No.4, (2008), pp.371-98.
Brands, Hal. “Saddam and Israel: What Do the New Iraqi Records Reveal?” Diplomacy and Statecraft. Vol.22, No.3, (2011), pp.500-20.
Brands, Hal. “Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran: Was There a Green Light?” Cold War History. Vol.12, No.2, (2012), pp.319-43.
Brands, Hal. “Why Did Saddam Invade Iran? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor.” The Journal of Military History. Vol.75, No.3, (2011), pp.861-85
Brooks, Stephen, and William Wohlforth. “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas.” International Security. Vol.25, No.3, (2001), pp.5-53.
Brown, Michael E. “The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company.” International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol.10, No.1, (1979), 107-24.
Can, Serra. “The Iraqi Identity: Faysal's Unsolved Legacy.” Trames. Vol.22, No.4, (2018), pp.389-405.
Cha, Victor D. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol.44, No.2, (2000), pp.261-91.
Cladi, Lorenzo, and Mark Webber. “Italian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: A Neoclassical Realist Approach.” European Security. Vol.20, No.2, (2011), pp.205-19.
Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics. Vol.44, No.4, (2011), pp.823-30.
Costalli, Stefano. “Power over the Sea: The Relevance of Neoclassical Realism to Euro-Mediterranean Relations.” Mediterranean Politics. Vol.14, No.3, (2009), pp.323-42.
Cusumano, Eugenio. “Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations.” Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol.39, No.1, (2016), pp.94-119.
Davidson, Jason W. “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39.” Security Studies. Vol.11, No.4, (2002), pp.125-59.
222
Dawisha, Adeed “Iraq: The West’s Opportunity.” Foreign Policy. No.41, (1980), pp.134-53.
Eppel, Michael. “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945-49.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.28, No.1, (1992), pp.108-19.
Eppel, Michael. “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958.” International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol.30, No.2, (1998), pp.227-50.
Foulon, Michiel. “Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities.” International Studies Review. Vol.17, No.4, (2015), pp.635-61.
Gause, F. Gregory. “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990.” Middle East Journal. Vol.56, No.1, (2002), pp.47-70.
Gause, Gregory. “Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East.” Journal of International Affairs. Vol.45, No.2, (1992).
Gelot, Linnéa, and Martin Welz. “Pragmatic Eclecticism, Neoclassical Realism and Post-Structuralism: Reconsidering the African Response to the Libyan Crisis of 2011.” Third World Quarterly. Vol.39, No.12, (2018), pp.234-53.
Gottheil, Fred M. “An Economic Assessment of the Military Burden in the Middle East 1960-1980.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.18, No.3, (1974), pp.502-13.
Grassmuck, George. “The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958.” Middle East Journal. Vol.14, No.4, (1960), pp.397-415.
Fearon, James. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review. Vol.88, No.3, (1994), pp.577–92.
Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization. Vol.49, No.3, (1995), pp.379–414.
Hahn, Peter L. “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol.36, No.1, (2006), pp.38-47.
Hermann, Margaret G. “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework.” International Studies Review. Vol.3, No.2, (2001), pp.47-81.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. “The Arab Uprisings and the Mena Regional States System.” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi. Vol.11, No.42, (2014), pp.7-27.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. “Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post- Populist State.” Social Problems. Vol.28, No.4, (1981), pp.442-64.
223
Joyce, Miriam. “Preserving the Sheikhdom: London, Washington, Iraq and Kuwait, 1958–61.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.31, No.2, (1995), pp.281-92.
Karsh, Efraim. “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War.” Middle East Journal. Vol.44, No.2, (1990), pp.256-68.
Khadduri, Majid. “Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait.” Current History. Vol.52, No.306, (1967), pp.84-115.
Kitchen, Nicholas. “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation.” Review of International Studies. Vol.36, No.1, (2010), pp.117-43.
Kropatcheva, Elena. “He Who Has the Pipeline Calls the Tune? Russia's Energy Power against the Background of the Shale ‘Revolutions’.” Energy Policy. Vol.66, (2014), pp.1-10.
Kropatcheva, Elena. “Russian Foreign Policy in the Realm of European Security through the Lens of Neoclassical Realism.” Journal of Eurasian Studies. Vol.3, No.1, (2012), pp.30-40.
Lazarowitz, Arlene. “Different Approaches to a Regional Search for Balance: The Johnson Administration, the State Department, and the Middle East, 1964–1967.” Diplomatic History. Vol.32, No.1, (2008), pp.25-54.
Lenczowski, George. “Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq: Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices.” The Journal of Politics. Vol.28, No.1, (1966).
Lobell, Steven E. “Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain's Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903–1906, 1917–1923, 1930–1932.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol.43, No.4, (1999), pp.671-93.
Lobell, Steven E. “The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War.” International Interactions. Vol.32, No.1, (2006), pp.27-48.
Lobell, Steven E. “The Second face of Security: Britain’s ‘Smart’ Appeasement Policy Towards Japan and Germany.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Vol.7, No.1, (2007), pp.73-98.
Marsh, Kevin. “’Leading from Behind’: Neoclassical Realism and Operation Odyssey Dawn.” Defense & Security Analysis. Vol.30, No.2, (2014), pp.120-32.
Marsh, Kevin. “Managing Relative Decline: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of the 2012 Us Defense Strategic Guidance.” Contemporary Security Policy. Vol.33, No.3, (2012), pp.487-511.
224
Massie, Justin. “Canada’s War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?”. International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis. Vol.68, No.2 (2013), pp.274-88.
McLean, Wayne. “Neoclassical Realism and Australian Foreign Policy: Understanding How Security Elites Frame Domestic Discourses.” Global Change, Peace & Security. Vol.28, No.1, (2016), pp.1-15.
Meital, Yoram. “The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A Reexamination.” The Middle East Journal. Vol.54, No.1, (2000), pp.64-82.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization. Vol.51, No.4, (1997), pp.513-53.
Nakato, Sachio. “North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Neoclassical Realism Perspectives.” Pacific Focus. Vol.27, No.1, (2012), pp.10-35.
Nelson, Chad E. “Revolution and War: Saddam’s Decision to Invade Iran.” Middle East Journal. Vol.72, No.2, (2018), pp.246-66.
Onea, Tudor. “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and Us Expansion in the Post-Cold War.” International Relations. Vol.26, No.2, (2012), pp.139-64.
O’Driscoll, Dylan. “Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State.” Ethnopolitics. Vol.16, No.4, (2017), pp.315-32.
Pajak, Roger. “Soviet Military Aid to Iraq and Syria.” Strategic Review. Vol.4, No.1, (1976).
Parasiliti, Andrew T. “The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment.” International Political Science Review. Vol.24, No.1, (2003), pp.151-65.
Parker, Ned. “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia: Nouri Al-Maliki Builds the Body Politic.” World Policy Journal. Vol.26, No.1, (2009), pp.17–25.
Podeh, Elie. “’Suez in Reverse’: The Arab Response to the Iraqi Bid for Kuwait, 1961-63.” Diplomacy and Statecraft. vol.14, No.1, (2003), pp.103-30.
Popp, Roland. “Accommodating to a Working Relationship: Arab Nationalism and Us Cold War Policies in the Middle East, 1958–60.” Cold War History. Vol.10, No.3, (2010), pp.397-427.
Quandt, William B. “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?”. Middle East Journal. Vol.46, No.2, (1992), pp.198-228.
Rathbun, Brian. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.” Security Studies. Vol.17, No.2, (2008), pp.294-321.
225
Rayburn, Joel D. “Rise of the Maliki Regime.” Journal of International Security Affairs. No.22, (Spring-Summer 2012), pp.45-54.
Ripsman, Norrin M. “Peacemaking and Democratic Peace Theory: Public Opinion as an Obstacle to Peace in Post- Conflict Situation.” Democracy and Security. Vol.3, No.1, (2007), pp.89-113.
Ripsman, Norrin M. “The Curious Case of German Rearmament Democracy, Structural Autonomy, and Foreign Security Policy.” Security Studies. Vol.10, No.2, (2000), pp.1-47.
Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. “The Preventive War That Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s.” Security Studies. Vol.16, No.1, (2007), pp.32-67.
Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s.” International Security. Vol.33, No.2, (2008), pp.148-81.
Rosa, Paolo, Stefano Benati, Paolo Foradori, and Gian Marco Longoni. “Neoclassical Realism and Italy’s Military Behaviour, 1946–2010: A Combined Dyad/Nation Analysis.” Political Research Exchange. Vol.2, No.1, (2020), pp.1-21.
Rosa, Paolo, and Paolo Foradori. “Politics Does Not Stop at the ‘Nuclear Edge’: Neoclassical Realism and the Making of China’s Military Doctrine.” Italian Political Science Review. Vol.47, No.3, (2017), pp.359-84.
Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics. Vol.51, No.1, (1998), pp.144-72.
Saltzman, Ilai Z. “Growing Pains: Neoclassical Realism and Japan's Security Policy Emancipation.” Contemporary Security Policy. Vol.36, No.3, (2015), pp.498-527.
Sanjian, Ara. “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.33, No.2, (1997), pp.226-66.
Schweller, Randall. “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Vol.11, No.1, (2018), pp.23-48.
Schweller, Randall. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” International Security. Vol.29, No.2, (2004), pp.159-201.
Sears, Nathan Alexander. “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers.” International Politics Reviews. Vol.5, No.1, (2017), pp.21-31.
Smith, Alistair. “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol.40, (1996), pp.133–53.
226
Stein, Ewan. “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading.” International Studies Review. Vol.4, No.1, (2002), pp.73-97.
Sterlink-Folker, Jennifer. “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol.41, No.1, (1997), pp.1-26.
Sterlink-Folker, Jennifer. “Realist-Constructivism and Morality.” International Studies Review. Vol.6, No.2, (2004), pp.341-43.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State.” Security Studies. Vol.15, No.3, (2006), pp.646-495.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. “Correspondence: Neoclassical Realism and Its Critics.” International Security. Vol.43, No.2, (2018), pp.197-99.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective,” International Studies Review. Vol.20, No.2, (2018), pp.283-291.
Troutbeck, John. “The Revolution in Iraq.” Current History. Vol.36, No.210, (1959), pp.81-85.
Voller, Yaniv. “Identity and the Ba‘th Regime’s Campaign against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq.” Middle East Journal. Vol.71, No.3, (2017), pp.383-401.
Walker, Christopher, and Melissa Aten. “The Rise of Kleptocracy: A Challenge for Democracy.” Journal of Democracy. Vol.29, No.1, (2018), pp.20-24.
Wilgenburg, Wladimir van. “Breaking from Baghdad: Kurdish Autonomy Vs. Maliki’s Manipulation.” World Affairs. Vol.175, No.4, (2012), pp.47-53.
Wivel, Anders. “From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark's Great Power Politics.” Swiss Political Science Review. Vol.19, No.3, (2013), pp.298-321.
Wohlforth, William C.. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics. Vol.61, No.1, (2009), pp.28-57.
Yesilyurt, Nuri. “Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East During the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace. Vol.6, No.2, (2017), pp.65-83.
Yetim, Mustafa, and İ̇smail Numan Telci. “Another ‘Third Way’ to Narrate the Existing Alliances in the Middle East: Turkey-Qatar, Saudi Arabia-Uae, and Iran-Syria.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. Vol.25, No.3, (2023), pp.484-505.
227
Yolcu, Furkan Halit. “Building a Model While Debunking Ano-ther: The Rivalry of Arab Nationalism between ‘Abd Al-Karim Qasim and Gamal Abdel Nasser.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Vol.26, No.3, (2020), pp.319-35.
Yoo, Hyon Joo. “Domestic Hurdles for System-Driven Behavior: Neoclassical Realism and Missile Defense Policies in Japan and South Korea.” International Relations of the Asia- Pacific. Vol.12,No.2, (2012), pp.317-48.
Yoo, Hyon Joo. “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security. Vol.17, No.1, (1992), pp.177-98.
228
Dissertations
Abdelsalam, Elfatih Abdullahi. “Pan-Arabism and Charismatic Leadership: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Arab Region: 1968-1982.” Doctoral Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1984.
Al-Ellam, Amena M. A. “Iraqi Foreign Policy and Ethnic-Sectarian Political Identity since 2003.” Master’s Degree, İstanbul Şehir University, 2019.
Al-Kaisi, Sami A. H. “Palestine and Iraqi Foreign Policy 1936-1958.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Baghdad, 1983.
Barth, Aharon. “American Military Commitments in Europe: Power, Perceptions, and Neoclassical Realism.” Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2004.
Bosnjak, Stjepan. “The Man of Steel and the Dragon: Australia’s Relationship with China During the Howard Era.” Doctoral Dissertation, Victoria University, 2017.
Edwards, Alex. “A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American ‘Dual Containment’ Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001.” Doctoral Dissertation, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
Fordham, Benjamin O. Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of US National Security Policy, 1949–51. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan Press, 1998.
Foulon, Michiel “US Grand Strategy Towards China, 1991-2015: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Warwick, 2019.
Fulton, Jonathan. “China’s Relations with the Arab Gulf Monarchies: Three Case Studies.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Leicester, 2016.
Gibson, Bryan Robert. “U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958-1975.” Doctoral Dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
Hanish, Shak B. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: A Realist Interpretation.” Doctoral Dissertation, Northern Arizona University, 1998.
Hansbury, Paul. “The Agency of Smaller Powers: Belarus in International Relations.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford, 2017.
Idomoto, Yuji. “Neoclassical Realism’s Perspective on China’s Policy toward the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.” Master’s Degree, The George Washington University, 2015.
Izzuddin, Mustafa. “Ethnic Politics and Malaysia’s China Policy Ethnic Politics and Malaysia’s China Policy from Tun Abdul Razak to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation.” Doctoral Dissertation, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014.
229
Kennedy, Laurance Glenn. “The Diplomatic and Military Role of Iraq from April, 1966, to July, 1968.” Master’s Degree, Austin Peay State University, 1976.
Kiraz, Sami. “Suriye Iç Savaşı Sırasındaki Türk Dış Politikasının Neoklasik Realizmin Bakış Açısından Analizi (2011-2017).” Doctoral Dissertation, Gazi University, 2018.
Meibauer, Gustav. “Doing Something Neoclassical Realism, Us Foreign Policy and the No-Fly Zone, 1991-2016.” Doctoral Dissertation, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017.
Mohamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud. “State-Building and Regime Security: A Study of Iraq's Foreign Policy Making During the Second Gulf War.” Doctoral Dissertation, the City University of New York.
Mughisuddin, Mohammed. “Foreign Policy Formulation in Egypt and Iraq: A Comparative Study (1968-1975).” Doctoral Dissertation, the American University, 1975.
Musallam, Musallam A. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: A Theoretical Explanation.” Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1994.
Nussaibah, Younis. “How Conditions of State Weakness Have Influenced Iraqi Foreign Policy Production 2003-2013.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Durham, 2014.
Polochaninov, Danyil. “The Influence of the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 on the Relations between the European Union and Ukraine.” Master’s Degree, Webster University, 2021.
Rasheed, Amjed M. “Syro-Iraqi Relations: The Puzzle of the Perpetual Rivalry.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Durham, 2017.
Soltan, Gamal. “Decision Making under Stress: A Case Study of the Iraqi Behavior During the Gulf Crisis.” Doctoral Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1995.
Şahin, Mehmet. “Systemic Change and Elite Transition: A Neoclassical Realist Appraisal to the Political and Economic Transformation in Russia and China since the 1970s.” Doctoral Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2019.
Şirin, Başar. “The Influence of News Frames on Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of German Foreign Policy Towards Turkey.” Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universitaet Berlin, 2019.
Verma, Rajneesh. “The Tiger and the Dragon: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective of India and China in the Oil Industry in West Africa.” Doctoral Dissertation, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
230
Wettach, Taylor Michael. “Rationale for Revisionism? Neoclassical Realism and China’s New Maritime Assertiveness.” Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2017.
Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon. “The End of the Concessionary Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958-1972.” Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2011.
Yeltin, Hüseyin. “Neoklasik Realizm Bağlamında Son Dönem Türkiye-Rusya Ilişkileri.” Doctoral Dissertation, Sakarya University, 2019.
231
Internet Resources
“Sistani Welcomes Iraqi Politicians.” Al-Monitor, November 13, 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iraq-religious-authority-ali-sistani-politics.html.
“Maliki’s Political Games.” Aljazeera, August 14, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/14/malikis-political-games/.
The Return of Maliki and a New Sunni Insurgency in Iraq?” the LSE Middle East Center, July 12, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2017/07/12/the-return-of-maliki-and-a-new-sunni-insurgency/.
“Iraq’s Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders.” Institute for the Study of War, November 13, 2014, https://www.iswresearch.org/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html.
“ الصندوق الأسود: فائق الشيخ علي - الحلقة 4.” Interview with Sheikh Ali Faeq, Youtube, April 24, 2021, https://youtu.be/NKI-QKWVDRg.
“How Iraq’s Sectarian System Came to Be.” Aljazeera, March 29, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/3/29/how-iraqs-sectarian-system-came-to-be/.
“Arab Opinion Index 2022: Executive Summary.” Arab Center Washington DC, January 19, 2023, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2022-executive-summary/
“Iraq Executes 23 for Coup Attempt.” The New York Times, July 8, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/08/archives/security-chief-and-backers-killed-after-trialruling-party-held.html.
“Sistani Denies Supporting Soleiman's Involvement in Iraq.” Al-Monitor, December 2, 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iraq-najaf-sistani-deny-soleimani-iran-interference.html.
“How the Kurds Helped Draw the United States Back to Iraq.” Carniege Middle East Center, June 29, 2015, https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/how-kurds-helped-draw-united-states-back-to-iraq-pub-60522.
“What Is Kleptocracy and How Does It Work?” Chatham House, Jul 4, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-kleptocracy-and-how-does-it-work.
“Offices Burnt in Baghdad Riot, New Cabinet under Army Chief.” The Times, November 24 1952, p.6.
“Oil Embargo, 1973–1974.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo#:~:text=During%20the%201973%20Arab%2DIsraeli,the%20post%2Dwar%20peace%20negotiations.
232
“The U.S. And Iran Are Aligned in Iraq against the Islamic State — for Now.” Washinton Post, December 27, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-and-iran-are-aligned-in-iraq-against-the-islamic-state--for-now/2014/12/27/353a748c-8d0d-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html.
“Post-Maliki Iraq: An Uncertain Future?” the LSE Middle East Center, February 3, 2015, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/02/03/post-maliki-iraq-an-uncertain-future/.
“Inductive Vs. Deductive Research Approach | Steps & Examples.” Scribbr, April 18, 2019, https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/inductive-deductive-reasoning/.
233
Reports and Conference Papers
Al-Qarawee, Harith Hasan. From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraq’s Prime Minister. Brandeis University: The Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 2016, http://iraqieconomists.net/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/FROM-MALIKI-TO-ABADI-THE-CHALLENGE-OF-BEING-IRAQ%E2%80%99S-PRIME-MINISTER.-BY-HARITH-HASAN-AL-QARAWEE-.pdf
Al-Husri, K. “The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958.” The Middle East Forum, 1965.
Dodge, Toby, Zeynep Kaya, Kyra N. Luchtenberg, Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, Bahra Saleh, Christine van den Toorn, Andrea Turpin-King, and Jessica Watkins. Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq. London: the LSE Middle East Center, 2018. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90514/1/Iraq%20synthesis%20paper%20understanding%20the%20drivers_2018.pdf.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and the Mena States System. London: the LSE Middle East Centre, 2014, https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60004/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_LSE%20Middle%20East%20Centre%20Papers_Hinnebusch_Syria%20-%20Iraq%20relations.pdf.
Juneau, Thomas. “Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis.” The Graduate Student Conference, European Consortium of Political Research, 2010.
Mansour, Renad. The Sunni Predicament in Iraq. Carniege Middle East Center, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_59_Mansour_Sunni_Final.pdf.
Mansour, Renad, and Faleh A. Jabar. The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017.
Smith, Nicholas Ross. “Strategic Hedging by Smaller Powers: What Can Neoclassical Realism Add?” Prepared for the Workshop: Re-Appraising Neoclassical Realism.” London School of Economics, 29 November 2018.
United Nations. Economic Development in the Middle East, 1957-58. New York.
United Nations. Statistical Yearbook, 1960, New York.
234
Others
British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Iran.
Interview with Ali Bakeer, Assoc. Prof., about “Gulf Countries’ policies toward Iraq,” Doha, Qatar: April 7, 2022.
Interview with Dr. Liqa Maki, Senior Researcher at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, about “Saddam’s Iraq,” Doha, Qatar: April 6, 2022.
Interview with Dr. Haider Saeed, Head of Research Department at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, about “Iraq’s position in the regional landscape,” Doha, Qatar: April 14, 2022.
“Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976.” edited by Monica L. Belmonte. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v27/pdf/frus1969-76v27.pdf.
“Iraq under Baath Rule, 1968-1976,” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, November 1, 1976, CIA-RDP79T00889A000900040001-6.
“President’s Daily Brief 1961-1969.” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, May 11, 1967, 0005973796.
“President’s Daily Brief 1969-1977.” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, April 14, 1975.
“President’s Daily Brief, 1961-1969.” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, July 13, 1967, 0005973904.
“President’s Daily Brief, 1961-1969.” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, December 6, 1967, 0005974157.
“Soviet Aid to and Presence in Iraq.” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, October 25, 1966, CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010005-5.