386

 TURKISH-ITALIAN RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

CONTENTS
PREFACE……………………………………………………………………..….....viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………..….…...1
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MARE NOSTRUM
POLICY OF ITALY AND ITS PROMINENCE IN THE
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE
WARS………………………………………………………………....5
CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-ITALIAN
RELATIONS…………………………………………………….…...26
CHAPTER 4: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND
ITALY, 1922-1927: TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF
ROME………………………………………………………….….…35
CHAPTER 5: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND
ITALY, 1927-1932: SO-CALLED FRIENDSHIP…………….….…68
CHAPTER 6: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND
ITALY, 1932-1939: THE RETURN OF BELLIGERENCE….……..95
CHAPTER 7: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND
ITALY…………………………………………………………...….153
CHAPTER 8: THE ROLE OF THE DODECANESE ISLANDS IN
TURKISH- ITALIAN RELATIONS ………....................................180
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………..200
APPENDIX………………………………………………………………………...204
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….214
vii
TABLES
Table Page
1. The Proportion of Italy in Turkish Exports and Imports………………….162
2. Turkish-Italian Trade……………………………………………………...162
3. The Balance of Trade between Turkey and Italy……………………… ....163
4. Cotton Trade with Italy……………………………………………………165
viii
PREFACE
This thesis aims to illuminate the relations between Turkey and Italy in the interwar
period with respect to both Turkish and Italian foreign policy goals of the time. As
emphasized throughout this study, Turkish-Italian relations between the wars were on
the basis of the Mare Nostrum (our sea) policy, which depended on the expansionism
in Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, of Italy and the response of Turkey
to this policy through different means. Therefore, apart from being a detailed story of
the specific relationship between these two countries, this study exemplifies the clash
between one offensive and another defensive country in the interwar era that became
the scene of this struggle under the name of revisionist-antirevisionist contention.
In this respect, after making a few remarks about the reasons for my interest in
the topic in the first chapter as an introduction, defining the place of Turkish-Italian
relations within the foreign policy of Turkey and Italy and on the history of the
interwar period seemed appropriate to me, in order to place this relationship within a
general framework. In order to achieve this, firstly, I tried to designate the general
course of events in Europe between the wars on the basis of a revisionistantirevisionist
division. In this sense, not only the content of the expansionist Mare
Nostrum policy of Italy and the methods that it implemented in order to realize this
goal but also the place of Italy both in the mind of Turkey and in Turkish foreign
policy vis-à-vis the expansionist agenda of Rome are discussed.
In this regard, when I tried to designate the historical narrative of this study
hereafter, I obtained the opportunity for both showing this general framework of the
Turkish and Italian bilateral relationship and presenting the details of the Turkishix
Italian contacts at the time, references to which are not common in the Turkish
historiography.
In order to achieve these goals, a chapter on the Turkish-Italian contacts in the
pre-1922 period provides background to the main target of this study. It is important
to note that this brief history, which involves the Italo-Ottoman relationship on the
basis of the Italian expansionism will show the continuity in the Italian foreign policy
towards Turkey despite the fact that the change in the relationship occurred on the
basis of the alternating methods that Italy used in order to achieve domination over
Turkey between the wars.
After this short background, the fourth chapter about the diplomatic relations
between 1922 and 1927 begins with the Lausanne Conference, because the stance of
Italy, which had favored closer contacts with the Ankara government during the
National Struggle period with the dream of gaining economic concessions, began to
change in this time scale. Italy, which understood that Kemalists were against any
kind of economic privileges, came closer to the Entente powers and behaved harshly
to Turkey, parallel with her goals. Therefore, this period illustrates the aggressive
stance of Rome towards Ankara beginning with the Lausanne process, and
subsequently, especially around the Mosul issue linked to the British, and around the
individual plans of Italy for gaining territory from Anatolia.
However, with 1927, the stance of Rome began to change in the sense that the
attitude of Italy softened towards Turkey. Thus, the fifth chapter sheds light upon this
new period, which lasted until 1932. For strategic reasons, Turkey and Italy came
closer to each other diplomatically and economically in this period. What should be
emphasized for this period with respect to the methods of Italy’s Mare Nostrum
policy is that Italy changed the strategy and Turkey accepted it as a “so-called” friend
x
country for various reasons, but in reality Italy’s aim remained the same, only the
methods had changed. Parallel to this, Turkey did not resist the friendship of Italy, but
never trusted it.
The sixth chapter looks at the breakdown of this so-called friendship in the
sense that Italy returned to its aggressive stance not just in terms of Turkey, but in
terms of international politics. This chapter shows not only the increasing aggressive
tone in the Italian foreign policy after 1932, but also the reactions of the Turkish
foreign policy to the intimidating position of Italy in the area of Mare Nostrum. In
this respect, the orientation of Turkey vis-à-vis Italy in international relations is
designated through the different events that depended on the Italian aggressiveness of
the time.
It is important to note that diplomatic relations are able to display only the
general lines of the contacts. Without analyzing the economic relations separately,
this study could not be complete. For this reason, I sought and analyzed the economic
relations in the seventh chapter, which brings out the commercial relations and the
economic cooperation between the two countries. From this excerpt, one can see that
Italy tried to use economic tools in order to dominate Turkey especially through
cooperation in economic matters on the one hand, and that the economic penetration
strategy coincided with the period in which Turkey and Italy cooperated
diplomatically, on the other hand. What all of these facts imply is that although the
figures of commerce did not depend on the diplomatic relations especially in the
conditions of open economy, like they had in the pre-depression period, economic
cooperation was totally based on the political relations.
With these chapters, nearly all of the dimensions of these bilateral relations
are displayed. However, amongst the all of these issues, the Dodecanese Islands
xi
necessitated special attention, because Turkey felt all of the aggression of Italy
through these islands near Anatolian territory. Therefore, the eighth chapter is
devoted to the Italian presence on the Dodecanese Islands not only in terms of the
strategic aspects in which the Turkish officials were interested mostly, but also in
terms of the nature of the Italian administration in the Islands which was mainly
composed of the Greeks but inhabited also the Turkish minority.
As can be seen from the division and the content of the chapters, this study
necessitated intensive research of both primary and secondary sources. However,
secondary sources specifically about Turkish-Italian relations are insufficient, both
with the exception of the works of Dilek Barlas, from which I benefitted
substantially, and with the exception of the some Turkish foreign policy books that
had limited numbers of pages on the issue. I must underline additionally that very
similar to the ignorance of the Turkish works, the Italian and the other foreign
secondary sources focus not on specifically Turkey but on the general framework of
the Italian expansionism in Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, which I
used mainly for the general framework.
This lack of secondary sources orientated me to study primary sources
essentially, for the historical data specifically on the bilateral Turkish-Italian contacts.
However, due to the inability to access the archives of the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, I concentrated on the sources obtained from the General Directorate
of the Prime Ministry State Archive Office of the Republican Archives. I tried to
supplement these historical documents both with the written proceedings of the
Turkish Assembly of the period and with articles and editorial columns from
Cumhuriyet (Republic), one of the leading newspapers of the time. In addition, the
published statistics of the State Statistics Institute about the Turkish commerce for the
xii
economic relations chapter and the Görüşlerim (My Views) by Tevfik Rüştü Aras,
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1925 and 1938 uninterruptedly, for
the chapter on diplomatic relations between 1932 and 1939 were the important
sources from which I benefitted intensely. As can be seen, in order to reach specific
conclusions about the bilateral relations between Turkey and Italy in every aspect, I
utilized both primary and secondary sources in the sense that I used the former for the
historical narrative of bilateral contacts specifically, and the latter in order to
complete the broader picture, which, in my view, led to a balanced situation in this
work in terms of the methodology.
In conclusion, with the help of these various sources, following pages will
show the content and the techniques of the Mare Nostrum policy of Italy, the place of
Turkey within this policy, and the determinant role of Italy in Turkish foreign policy
during the whole interwar period, but intensively in the 1930s.
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Although the period from 1918 to1939 era constitutes one of the most important
epochs of the history of mankind, there is still lack of historical and analytical studies
on the era with the exception of some popular subjects, such as Nazi Germany. When
one looks at the picture from a broader perspective rather than the historical
experiences of the individual countries, like the revisionist and anti-revisionist
division of Europe in the interwar era, it is seen that the works about the stronger
overbalance the ones about the relatively weaker.
The implication of this statement is that the works about the international
relations of the interwar era mainly and justifiably focus on the German aggression,
the French resistance, and the British condonation to some extent. Related to the
purpose of this thesis, for instance, despite the abundance of literature on the German
concept of Lebensraum (living space) in Eastern Europe, “Mussolini’s ambitions in
this region are less well known and are usually taken less seriously than those of
Adolf Hitler.”1 However, since there was the Mare Nostrum policy of Italy in these
areas, which was analogous to the lebensraum of Germany, but less successful,
discussing the aims and the methods of the Italian policy via this particular case is
important.
Therefore, one reason that drove me to study this particular case is the
ignorance of the academic literature about the details of the Italian expansionism
with the exception of the Abyssinian War, because although it was overshadowed by
1 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change
(London; New York: Routledge, 1998), p.467.
2
the policies of the other powers, the imperialistic strategy of Italy posed a threat to
Eastern Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean of which Turkey was a part. In this
way, through Turkey, the content of the Italian foreign policy on the basis of Mare
Nostrum is exemplified. The behaviour of Italy towards Turkey, as will be
demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, is capable of demonstrating every tool,
from aggression to friendship, that fascist Rome used within this policy.
In addition to the desire to deal with the relatively untouched phenomenon of
Italian expansionism in the Mare Nostrum area, with the exception of Abyssinia, the
realization of the ignorance of the Turkish scholars about the issue on the basis of the
Turkish foreign policy encouraged me to go into the details of the topic. In fact, the
lack of any study on this subject is suprising especially if the importance of the
Italian aggression in Turkey’s security in the interwar era is kept in mind. To put it
differently, an ill-balanced situation exists in the studies about the Turkish foreign
policy in the sense that although one of the most important anxieties of the Turkish
officials was the Italian expansionist aims especially throughout the 1930s, this
determinant role of Rome over the foreign policy makers in Ankara was ignored in
the Turkish historiography.
In this context, this thesis, apart from exemplifying the content of the Mare
Nostrum policy of Italy, analyses the Turkish foreign policy decisions on the basis of
the Italian threat, rather than listing them separately and unconnectedly from each
other, as is done in many resources.
From this perspective, the major issues for Turkey in the interwar era, such as
the ultimate decision of Turkey in terms of accepting the League’s judgment over the
Mosul problem, entrance into the League of Nations, taking initiative and
participating in the Balkan Entente, efforts at forming a Mediterranean Pact, the
3
decision to draw closer to Britain and France towards the end of the period, and
many other phenomena are examined vis-à-vis their relationship to Italy. This
method was very necessary not only due to the subject matter, but also due to the
need to interpret the Turkish foreign policy in this epoch on the basis of various
dynamics in which Italy played a major role in the sense that most of Turkey’s
international issues between the wars could be connected to the Italian threat either
directly or indirectly, as the subsequent chapters will show.
Therefore, I can summarize that in addition to the ignorance of the literature
towards the two wings of the topic; namely towards the expansionist policy of Italy
in the Eastern Mediterranean and its methods, and towards the determinant character
of Italy in the interwar Turkish foreign policy, the desire for looking at the Turkish
foreign policy, in which I specifically interested, on the basis of a connection of
either events or characteristics, rather than small independent pieces became the
main reasons for doing this study particularly in this way.
A thesis, written as a result of the aforementioned deficiencies and the
necessities, will reflect the means that Italy used within the framework of Mare
Nostrum on the basis of the Turkish case, in the sense that the subsequent chapters
discuss the military plans, economic cooperation and penetration efforts, and
political cooperation desires of Italy simultaneously or sequentially.
It also designates the determinant character of Italy, or in specific terms the
Italian “threat” in the Turkish foreign policy. This study will answer the question of
what the importance of fascist Italy was for Turkey between the wars in every aspect.
When this is done through the designation of various examples and arguments, the
general framework of the Turkish foreign policy will come into the scene.
4
In consequence, the analysis of this study, which tries to scrutinize these two
problematic, is important in terms of reaching general points both about the nature of
the Italian Mare Nostrum policy of which Turkish-Italian relationship is a part and
about the nature of the Turkish foreign policy in the interwar era.
5
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE MARE NOSTRUM POLICY OF ITALY AND ITS PROMINENCE IN
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS
The interwar period had become a scene of imponderable developments within
human history. The events in this era were so important and devastating that nearly
twenty years after the end of the Great War, another world war came into existence.
In this respect, for an expressive and consistent argument, it is essential to look at the
course of events in Europe because of the fact that a preliminary framework of all
Europe between the wars will shed light not only upon the Turkish and Italian
foreign policy orientations separately, but also upon the nature of the bilateral
Turkish-Italian relations in this period of time.
In this sense, the first thing that is necessary to state for the post-war shape of
the European continent was that the long-lived empires of the pre-war Europe had
disappeared during and after this four-year destructive period. The disappearance of
the Ottoman Empire as well as the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the scene had led
to the continued formation of various nation-states in these areas that had begun in
the nineteenth century. The meaning of this situation for European politics was that
specifically Eastern Europe began to include small-nation states with various features
and problems hereafter, which would be determinant for the European political arena
on the one hand and for the international arena on the other, due to the existence of
more actors therein which would necessitate different kinds of policies and systemic
analyses. Therefore, the existence of these smaller states especially in Eastern Europe
constituted an atmosphere in which the bigger and more powerful states both
influenced the fate of the less powerful states with their policies and ambitions and
6
also were influenced by the stance and the policies of these smaller states in return.
Thus, in sum, European politics became more complicated than the pre-war period.
For this reason, with the end of the war, the states began to think about a
formulation that could provide peace in the whole world. International relations
before the Great War were dependent on the notion of the balance of power, which
assumed that an unbalanced power was dangerous for other states.2 Therefore, the
states had formed alliances on the basis of keeping any one state from developing a
preponderance of power,3 however; the result had become a world war due to the
increased rigidity in the alliance system.4
In fact, at the structural level, there were two determinants of the war; the
aforementioned problematic alliance system and the rising German power.5
Therefore, it becomes meaningful that the peacemakers of 1919 were specifically
interested firstly in the German problem, and secondly in the future structure of
world politics, because the powers worried about the possible reiteration of past
experiences.
In this context, in terms of the latter, peace was established on the basis of the
ideas of the U.S. President Wilson, who proposed the principle of collective security.
According to him, since there was a necessity for the defense of peace under the
international law rather than the security concept that depended on national interest,
2 Tayyar Arı, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika (Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 2008),
p.293.
3 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory
and History (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), p.63.
4 Ibid., p.69.
5 Ibid.
7
there was a need for an international institution dedicated to maintaninig the peace.6
It was this idea that laid the foundation of the League of Nations.
In terms of the German problem, the winners envisioned a peace settlement
which should cripple Germany to the extent that this “guilty” nation would not pose
a threat to any country in the future. Setting aside the concrete clauses of the peace
treaty, it is necessary to state in general terms that the post-war settlement created an
atmosphere in Europe, which would be regarded in subsequent decades as having led
to the Second World War. That is to say, the Versailles Treaty created a Versailles
System which became the most important element of the future clashes within
European politics, on the way to another world war.
The common feature of these two components of the post-war settlement was
their failure in the sense that the interwar years experienced a collapse both in the
collective security and in the Versailles System, step by step. In this context, it could
be suggested that although there were different phases in the interwar history, the
determinant feature of this era was the continuous change for the worse. If the
periodizations of the various scholars are analyzed, this feature of the interwar era is
seen. For instance, while Sander classifies the interwar history as the period of the
protection of peace (1919-1924), the period of Locarno (1925-1930), and the period
of the collapse (1930-1939) respectively,7 Crozier makes the same division as the
period of the making of the inter-war world (1919-1923), the period of the failed
peace (1919-1933), the period of the challenge to the international system (1933-
1936), and the period of the deepening crisis (1936-1938).8 As can be seen,
6 Henry Kissinger, Diplomasi (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2002), p.216-
217.
7 Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih, 1918-1994 (Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2007), p.16-63.
8
regardless of the different authors’ classifications on the basis of their own
interpretations, what seems clear is a downward linearity in terms of the international
relations in the interwar history.
Although some positive developments occurred in terms of international
peace, like the temporary relief that the Dawes Plan about the German war
reparations and the Locarno Agreement about the security issues of Western Europe
brought, it was obvious that these were exceptional cases in the sense that with this
kind of peace settlement there was no possibility for the preservation of peace,
because apart from becoming one of the reasons for the return of crippled Germany
to the European arena with an aggressive stance, the Paris Peace Treaties created a
specific division within Europe. Thus, the division of Europe into revisionist and the
pro-status quo camps with a major clash of interests between each camp became a
determinant factor in terms of bringing Europe to a deadlock.9 The picture seems
much more completed when the impacts of the world economic crisis of 1929 are
added to this politically divided atmosphere in the sense that the acceleration of the
tension and the polarization of the international arena on the basis of the revisionist
and the anti-revisionist division after 1930 were assisted also by the devastating
effects of the Great Depression in one way or another.
In this general European framework between the wars, the determinant factor
for the position of a country in terms of revisionism and anti-revisionism was the
result that it took from the Great War. Specifically, the general trend in this respect
was the revisionism of the losers and the anti-revisionism of the winners. For
8 Andrew J. Crozier, The Causes of the Second World War (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997), p.37–146.
9 Baskın Oran, “Göreli Özerklik-I, Dönemin Bilançosu” in Türk Dış Politikası:
Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol.1, p.242.
9
instance, on the one hand, France on the basis of controlling Germany, and Romania
on the basis of protecting its excessive territorial gains after the Great War were both
anti-revisionist. On the other hand, Germany in terms of getting rid of the chains of
Versailles and Bulgaria in terms of regaining lost territories, reflected revisionism
substantively.
Therefore, the main issue in terms of the subject of this study becomes the
position of Turkey and Italy separately in this environment on the one hand, and the
position of one of these countries vis-à-vis the other, on the other hand. In this
respect, it is important to note that when the stances of these two countries are
analyzed, their unique conditions are displayed, in the sense that neither Italy nor
Turkey reflected the general proposition that defeated countries became revisionist
while the victorious ones followed pro-status quo policies. On the contrary, Turkey
did not follow an anti-status quo policy although she was one of the defeated powers
of the First World War.10 The importance of the success of Ankara in the National
Struggle, which led to the Lausanne Treaty with better circumstances than the Sevres
Treaty, was apparent in this orientation.11 In this respect, it could be stated that since
Turkey had already revised the system in terms of Sevres Treaty, it was not
surprising that the future policies of Ankara would depend on the protection of the
existing system; in other words, on anti-revisionism.
By the same token, Italy, which had territorial ambitions over the Eastern
Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, failed to achieve its goals although it had been
victorious. Since it could get neither Anatolian lands nor the Dalmatian shores, but
just South Tyrol after the Great War, “the Italian reaction to the peace settlements
10 Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk
Türkiye'sinde (1923–1983) Dış Politika Sempozyumu (24 Ekim 1983): Bildiriler (İstanbul:
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1984), p.54.
11 Ibid.
10
that followed the First World War may be described as one of well-nigh unanimous
disillusion.”12 Therefore, Italy developed a revisionist foreign policy that would be
based on expansionism throughout the interwar years, different from other victorious
countries.
In this atmosphere, Turkey and Italy became the representatives of
diametrically opposite groups. In addition to the profound impact of this situation on
the two countries’ individual foreign policy choices, the bilateral relationship
between Rome and Ankara proceeded also in accordance with this division.
Therefore, at this point, it is important to draw the general framework of these two
countries’ foreign policies because this elaboration will also show the general
theorization of the bilateral relations between the countries.
In terms of Italy, it is not erroneous to suggest that the foremost guide of the
Italian foreign policy was the aforementioned disappointment which was felt by all
of the segments of the Italian society. Italy had participated in the First World War,
because the Entente powers had made various appealing promises to it. However,
Italy made only minor territorial gains but suffered major political, social, and
economic problems from the war. Therefore, the disappointment of the war and the
social disorder led to a Fascist takeover led by Benito Mussolini in October 1922. In
fact, the fascist takeover showed that the existent institutional structures of the Italian
state, which had been functioning ever since the Italian unification, could no longer
govern the country.13 Therefore, as a response to the need to bring a new governing
style to Italian society, the fascist regime tried to change every aspect of the Italian
life. Apart from the restructuring of Italian society on the basis of Fascist ideology,
12 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, “Italian Foreign Policy, 1914–1922,” The Journal of
Modern History 20, no.4 (December 1948), p.338.
13 Ibid.
11
Mussolini brought a new style also to Italian foreign policy even if this did not bring
necessarily a change in the foreign policy goals. That is to say, as Bosworth writes,
“what was different about the foreign policy of Liberal and Fascist Italy was not the
aim, but the method,”14 and these method changes were very closely linked to the
aforementioned argument about the need for a new governing style.
At this point, the important issue becomes the foreign policy objectives of
Italy between the wars regardless of their periodic origin in terms of liberal and
fascist in the sense that these objectives also designate the place of Turkey within the
framework. In this sense, the key term for Italy, was Mare Nostrum in the sense that
it either explained or implied the regions in which the Italian foreign policy was
interested throughout the interwar years. This area was so fundamental for Rome that
the Italian foreign policy between the wars can be summarized as a mere Mare
Nostrum policy on the basis of dominating this region.
Therefore, although the boundaries of Mare Nostrum cannot be portrayed in
definite terms, it was obvious that the reference of the term was to the areas that
ancient Roman Empire had dominated. Actually, the attachment to ancient Rome
was an ideal of national force and regeneration;15 it, in other words, was an issue that
concerned every aspect of the Italian life rather than just a foreign policy. This broad
meaning of ancient Rome for Fascist Italy can also be seen in the speeches of Benito
Mussolini:
14 Richard Bosworth, “Italian Foreign Policy and Its Historiography,” in Altro Polo:
Intellectuals and Their Ideas in Contemporary Italy ed. Richard Bosworth and Gino Rizzo
(Sydney: May Foundation, University of Sydney, I983), p.73, quoted by Stephen Corrado
Azzi, “The Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy,” The Historical Journal 36, no.1
(March 1993), p.196.
15 Jan Nelis, “Constructing Fascist Identity, Benito Mussolini and Myth of
Romanita,” Classical World 100, no.4 (2007), p.400.
12
Rome is our point of departure and reference; it is our symbol or, if
you wish, our myth. We dream of a Roman Italy that is wise and
strong, disciplined and imperial. Much of what was the immortal
spirit of Rome, resurges in Fascism: Roman is the Lictor, Roman is
our organization of combat, Roman is our pride and courage: Civis
Romanus sum.16
As can be seen, this effort for the definition of the self through Romanness had
consequences in foreign policy in the sense that the attribution that Mussolini made
directly emphasized the imperial character of the Roman Empire, which in return
brought an expansionist and imperialist character to the foreign policy. It is important
to underline that the expansionist character of the Fascist regime stemmed not from
Fascism in itself but from the Italian historical conception of ideal fatherland which
perceived the “task of acquiring specific territories as fundamental to the objective of
national regeneration.”17 In this sense, it was not surprising to see that the territories
of the ancient Roman Empire were brought onto the agenda under the name of the
Mare Nostrum policy by the Fascist administration as a precondition of being a great
power.
Thus, it could be suggested that Fascist Italy, which would pursue revisionist
policies throughout the interwar years in order to become a real great power that had
been so fundamental due to the insulation of the mutilated victory in the Great War,
had determined its areas of interests as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic
Sea. That is to say, the Mare Nostrum policy actually rested on two mare nostrums;
the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.18
16 Quoted by Nelis, p.403.
17 Aristotle A. Kallis, “To Expand or Not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and
the Quest for an 'Ideal Fatherland,” Journal of Contemporary History 38, no.2 (April 2003),
p.239.
18 H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), p.18.
13
However, Italy was not the only power that was interested in these areas. On
the contrary, other big powers also paid great attention to these parts of the world
either at the same time as each other, or in different phases. In the Adriatic, or in
general terms, on the Balkan side of the Mare Nostrum policy, the most serious rival
to Italy was France in the 1920s, which had risen as the most powerful state in
Continental Europe after the end of the war.19 Therefore, from the beginning of the
interwar era to the period in which Germany gained ascendancy, France took the lead
in the reorganization of these areas and sought to constitute alliances with the states
that had benefitted from the peace treaties against those who could be expected to
seek the revision of these settlements.20 As a result of the combination of the natural
pro-status quo stance of specific Eastern European countries with the efforts of
France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania as the Little Entente countries
plus Poland became the bulwarks of the status quo in Eastern Europe.
Therefore, Italy as a revisionist country had to tend towards the other
revisionist countries in the region in order to compete with or at least to balance the
French power. To this end, Italy, which had imperial designs in Albania, Dalmatia,
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Greece and Asia Minor, on the one hand tried
to constitute a patron-client relationship with the rulers of Austria, Hungary, and
Bulgaria throughout the period and with Greece and Turkey in the late 1920s, and on
the other hand, aided and abetted authoritarian-corporatist tendencies as well as
Macedonian nationalist and Croatian Fascist terrorism.21 Italy hoped not only that it
could fill the power vacuum in the Balkans and Eastern Europe after the demise of
19 Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (London: Hurst, 2000), p.733.
20 P. Kissoudi, “Balkan Politics: Relations between Greece and the Balkan States in
the Inter-war Years and the Role of the Great Powers in the Region,” International Journal
of the History of Sport 25, no.13 (2008), p.1720.
21 Bideleux and Jeffries, p.467.
14
the major Empires, but also that it could replicate the Roman dominance in the
Balkans by turning the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas into Italian lakes again.22
The aim of Italy for the realization of Mare Nostrum policy necessitated an approach
similar to the French one, but on the revisionist side. In fact, parallel moves with
Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary were achieved easily especially if the stances of
these three countries were kept in mind. However, Italy had another and more
difficult aim, which could be explained as making a triangle in the Balkans with
possible collaboration among Rome, Athens and Ankara in order to compress
Yugoslavia.23 According to Italian formulations, the next step would be conjoining
these two blocks, in other words, forming an alliance in the Balkans that would be
composed of Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece. Although there were problems
among each of these powers, Italy believed that, on the one hand “Turkey inclined
more toward the Italian–Bulgarian camp than to that of Romania and Yugoslavia;
members of the Little Entente,”24 and on the other hand, the problems between
Yugoslavia and Greece could not be solved in the near future.
However, the diplomatic developments in the Balkans ensured that neither of
these visions of Italy would be achieved. In addition to the fact that Yugoslavia and
Greece reached an agreement in 1929, the Greco-Turkish rapprochement, for which
Mussolini especially made great effort for the sake of the further goals of Rome,
once achieved, became the one of the most important bulwarks of the status quo in
the Balkans.25 The Balkan Entente is an example of this situation in the sense that
22 Ibid.
23 Burgwyn, p.42.
24 Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.
Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s,” Journal of
Contemporary History 40, no.3 (2005), p.446.
15
Greece and Turkey, as the so-called allies of Italy during the last years of the 1920s
and Romania and Yugoslavia as members of the Little Entente formed a pact which
was strongly against revisionism.
Therefore, it could be suggested that in the Balkans, Italy achieved nothing
beyond a strong collaboration with Bulgaria and Hungary and dominance over
Albania. The situation did not change after the rise of Nazi Germany in the sense that
the competition between Italy and France over Eastern Europe turned into a
competition between Italy and Germany. However, Italy with some exceptions such
as Albania, could not handle this rivalry with Germany, firstly due to the fact
Germany had become its ally in the second half of the 1930s, secondly due to the fact
Italy did not have the economic capacity for this job. That is to say, in the Balkans,
the Lebensraum of Germany overbalanced the spazio vitale (vital space) of Italy. In
consequence, in terms of the Eastern European Mare Nostrum, Italy had not carried
out its defined agenda on the eve of the Second World War.
By the same token, in terms of the Mediterranean section of Mare Nostrum
policy, Italy was confronted by Britain and to some extent by France. In the
Mediterranean, Abyssinia had become an issue of national self-esteem for the
Italians, for whom the revenge of the Adowa defeat of Italian troops in 1897, with
the conquest of Abyssinia was much more important than anything else. However,
since the conquest of Abyssinia would change the balance of power in the Eastern
Mediterranean in terms of Egypt and the Red Sea, Italy had to clash with Britain over
it.26 Although for various reasons, Italy achieved conquering Abyssinia, Britain
25 Stavrianos, p.736.
26 Robert Mallett, “The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis,
January-October 1935,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no.4 (1999), p.77.
16
remained both as the leader of the area and as the major obstacle that stood against
the large scale plans of Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
As could be seen from this historical and strategic analysis of the Mare
Nostrum policy of Italy, the desire of Rome was dominance both in the Eastern
Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean, through expansionism. At this point, the
question to ask is what methods Italy implemented to reach its foreign policy goals.
As emphasized above, Italy chose to make alliances among the revisionist powers in
Eastern Europe in order to establish a patron-client relationship, in other words, to
establish hegemony in these areas. With this way, Rome would command these
societies in terms of their closely linked foreign policy choices. However, gaining
hegemony through constituting alliances was not the only way that Italy had used in
the target area, between the wars.
The second means that Italy used was the military methods, as in the case of
the Corfu incident and of the occupation of Abyssinia. In fact, war as a means,
especially in the European Mare Nostrum was not the first option for Italy in the
sense that a war in Eastern Europe could not be a limited one between only Italy and
the other country at issue. Therefore, it should be underlined that Italy preferred war
only if it would be in periphery and in a limited way, as in Abyssinia.27
Apart from war, Italy also used economic penetration as a means of
dominating a country. Although it lacked the tools necessary to dominate a state
economically due to its inadequate economic power especially when compared to
Germany’s economic penetration in the Balkans in the1930s, it struggled to achieve a
similar kind of hegemony in these areas. For instance, in the case of Albania, Italian
27 G. Rochat, “Il Ruolo delle Forze Armate nel Regime Fascista: Conclusioni
Provvisorie e Ipotesi di Lavoro,” Rivista di Storia Contemporanea 1, no.2 (April 1972),
p.194.
17
economic penetration in the form of commercial agreements, an immense amount of
trade, loans, and the institutions for the administration of these had key roles in the
dominance of Italy on the country.28 By the same token, Rome tried to utilize trade in
other Balkan countries in order to establish economic hegemony in the target society.
In this sense, the trade of arms constituted a fundamental part of commercial
relations. Arms trade with Turkey,29 especially in the period between 1927 and 1932,
during which the two countries came close to each other, and with Hungary were
important examples of the fact that Italy was using military issues for economic
purposes and economic issues for political purposes. Although especially after 1934,
with the German economic penetration in the area, Italy lost its importance, economy
should be regarded as the strategic tool for Italian expansionism between the wars.
Apart from armed clashes, strategic alliances, and economic penetration, Italy
benefitted from another tool, which was Fascist groups abroad, in her imperialist
policy. In fact, Fascist groups abroad under the name of Fasci all’Estero (Fascists at
Abroad), had many tasks, but all of these tasks could be summarized as “exporting
fascism.”30 To this end, these groups “sought to regiment Italian emigrants and,
ultimately, hoped to disseminate fascist ideology beyond Italy's borders,”31 and
worked with the idea of backing the Italian expansion in these regions.32 It becomes
necessary not only to underline that these groups existed also in Izmir and Salonika
28 Besnik Pula, “Becoming Citizens of Empire: Albanian Nationalism and Fascist
Empire, 1939–1943,” Theor Soc 37, (2008), p.575.
29 For more information about the arms trade between Turkey and Italy see, Dilek
Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “To Build a Navy with the Help of an Adversary: Italian-Turkish
Naval Arms Trade, 1929-1932,” Middle Eastern Studies 38, no.4 (October 2002), p.143-168.
30 Luca de Caprariis, “Fascism for Export? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani
all'Estero,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no.2 (April 2000), p.151-183.
31 Ibid., p.151.
32 Ibid., p.156.
18
in terms of the Balkans, but also to emphasize that they developed roots especially in
Turkey in terms of the Middle East33 when the mission of these groups and the aims
of Italy to control Turkey are kept in mind. To sum up, the ideological aspect of the
expansion in Fascist Italy was so fundamental that Fascist groups were supported by
the Italian state both in order to create an environment in target societies suitable for
expansion and in order to deploy Fascism as an international phenomenon.
Obviously, Rome benefitted from all of these four tools in order to realize its
expansionist agenda on the basis of Mare Nostrum. For instance, when Rome
decided that it could handle military takeovers without disrupting the balances that
could cause problems with the other Great Powers; she was showing her aggression
through military means. However, if the conditions for the military takeover were not
mature, Italy resorted to economic penetration, strategic alliances, and ideological
dominance either one by one or jointly.
Therefore, when I analyse this content of the Italian mare nostrum or
expansionist policy and when I see the processes both in the Eastern Europe and in
the Eastern Mediterranean, for the topic of this study, I reach a conclusion that the
Italian attitude towards Turkey was not unique; rather it constituted a part of a grand
formulation. It means that Turkish-Italian relations cannot be analyzed as just
Turkish-Italian relations in themselves, but as a division of Italy’s overall Mare
Nostrum policy. Thus, with this character, the relationship between Rome and
Ankara is also capable of giving some hints about the policies of the former in the
Balkans and in the Mediterranean.
Obviously, the diplomatic developments and the economic relations which
will be discussed below will show the necessity of looking at Italian-Turkish
33 Ibid., p.154-158.
19
relations within the framework of the broader Mare Nostrum policy Italy used,
because almost all of the methods of this policy, as explained above, were tried to be
implemented upon Turkey.
Exemplifying some cross-sections of the contacts can be illustrative in terms
of concretizing these methods over Turkey. In this sense, first of all, in terms of the
aggressive stance of Italy, the events after the Great War are highly explanatory. As
will be demonstrated in detail in the following chapters, although some parts of the
southwestern Anatolia had been occupied by Italy, during and after the National
Struggle, Italian forces left Turkish territory. However, the ambitions of Fascist Italy
continued to have plans involving Asia Minor specifically around the issue of Mosul
and linked to the collaboration with the British. In this period, Italy did not undertake
a military operation towards Turkey; however, it constantly fortified the Dodecanese
Islands.
When the conditions of this war-like situation came to an end in 1927, Italy
tried to come closer to Turkey and also to Greece, both in order to counterbalance the
power of France in the region and in order to dominate these countries not by force
but by finesse. This method of being closer to Turkey in this era specifies the
political rapprochement option of Italy.
It should be underlined that while Rome was trying to form friendly relations
instead of posing a threat to Turkey in this era, it also utilized a method of economic
collaboration. Therefore, economic cooperation between Turkey and Italy developed
parallel to the political cooperation to an extent that Ankara asked for professional
help about some economic issues and for credits from Rome.
Apart from political and economical cooperation, the tools for ideological
penetration were also active in Turkey in the sense that in addition to the presence of
20
the aforementioned Fasci all’Estero organizations in Turkey, there were other efforts
for disseminating Fascist ideology in Turkey. For instance, a document sent to the
Turkish Prime Ministry by the Turkish General Staff stated that Italy was sending
some periodicals to Turkey under different titles, yet they were actually making
propaganda of Italian Fascism.34
The use of political, economic and ideological means for obtaining
domination in Turkey became so widespread in this period that foreign newspapers
like the New York Times stated their hesitations about the possible future
“Italianization” of Turkey.35 Although this period of Italy’s economic, political and
ideological penetration efforts over Turkey did not last very long due to the
intensified aggression of Italian foreign policy that led to a deterioration of the
relations beginning with 1932, it was obvious that Italy tried various ways to
implement Mare Nostrum policy within a specific time period.
In this regard, the consistency of the above-mentioned means with some
cross-sections of the historical development of bilateral relations shows that the
relationship with Turkey was carried out on the basis of the wide-range Mare
Nostrum policy. Actually, Turkey’s place in this broad area of ambition and the
wide-scale methods that were implemented in order to dominate Asia Minor were
not very surprising because Turkey both before and during the Great War had had an
importance for the Italian objectives, apart from being part of the ancient Roman
territory. These interests continued in the interwar era also, within the framework of
Mare Nostrum policy despite periodic fluctuations in the Italian priorities.
34 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/86.568..2.
35 New York Times, 7 June 1929, translated and quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of
General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..12.
21
Apart from the place of Turkey and the Turkish-Italian relationship within the
Mare Nostrum, another issue that should be particularly underlined is the place of
Italy and Italian-Turkish relationship in Turkish foreign policy between the wars
because as a response to the specific Italian formulation of Turkey within the
framework of the aforementioned policy, the Turkish formulation of Italy in terms of
Turkish foreign policy constituted the complementary determinative of this
relationship.
In this respect, it could be suggested that the apprehension of Italy in the
Turkish mind depended on various factors, but the most important one was its
expansionist and the aggressive behaviour. Apart from the Italian territorial designs
on the different parts of the Ottoman Empire in the past, the belligerent and the
intimidating attitude of Italy also in the 1920s created a perception in Turkey that
Fascist Italy was an enemy of Turkish sovereignty and independency. Actually
Turkey was not unjustified in its viewpoint due to the above-mentioned plans of
Italy.
There were other reasons that intensified the Turkish fear and the distrust of
Rome, one being the geographic position of Turkey. That is to say, when Turkey was
founded after its War of Liberation in 1923, it had become a neigbour to all of major
powers in the sense that it was encircled by Britain through Cyprus and the Iraq
mandate, by the French through the Syrian mandate, by Italy through the Dodecanese
Islands, and by the Soviet Union on the eastern borders.36 In this territorial position,
Turkey, as a newly founded country which had come through a series of wars, was
already uncomfortable with this feeling of being surrounded by major powers. In this
sense, when the intimidating behaviour of Italy towards Turkey through the
36 Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiyenin Dış Politikası (1919–1938)
(Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1990), p.52.
22
Dodecanese Islands, which were very close to the Anatolian mainland, was
combined with the neighbourhood of these states, the Italian threat became concrete
in the minds of the Turkish political circles.
It should also be added that the “the historical experiences of being reduced
from a vast empire to extinction, and then of having to struggle back to save the
national homeland and its independence,”37 had made Turkey more sensitive
especially in terms of the threat that the major powers could have pose to it.
Therefore, these unique conditions of Turkey, in addition to the Italian aggression on
the basis of the Mare Nostrum policy turned the belligerent Italians into an enemy in
the eyes of the Turks.
This image of Italy as a potential threat to the Turkish territory would survive
throughout the interwar years either openly or inwardly. It had become so effectual
in the first years of the republic that the distrust of Ankara, even in the period
between 1927 and 1932, when both political and economic contacts had reached at
peak, persisted. Likewise, it was this image that led to the Turkish misinterpretations
of Italian actions like the military fortifications in the Dodecanese in 1935, which
was actually a preparation for the Abyssinian campaign.
In this context, since idea that the utmost threat to Turkish territory could
come from Italy according to the Turkish officials persisted, I suggest that Italy
throughout the interwar years, but especially in the 1930s, became one of the
determinants of Turkish foreign policy. That is to say, the threat that Turkey
perceived from Italy played a major role on almost all of the foreign policy decisions
and initiatives of Ankara in the period between the wars. In this sense, while this
study looks at the content of the Mare Nostrum policy of Italy vis-à-vis Turkey, it
37 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework
and Traditional Inputs,” Middle Eastern Studies 35, no.4 (Oct 1999), p.156.
23
also designates this determinant role of Italy in the orientation, decisions, and
initiatives of Turkish foreign policy.
Many major and minor cases in which Italy played roles either decisive or
subsidiary will be examined in the following pages. However, in terms of showing
the important role of Italy in interwar Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to touch
upon some of them. In this respect, the settling of the Mosul problem is a
fundamental example in the sense that although it seemed irrelevant to the Italians,
there was an Italian element in the whole process through the Islands. During this
one of the most complicated problem of the young Turkey, both the intelligence
reports that were stating that the preparation of Italy on the Islands signified the
possible landing of Italians in southwestern Anatolia,38 and the meetings between the
Austen Chamberlain and Mussolini39 implied an Italian intervention in the issue
acting in cooperation with the British in order to compel Turkey to accept the
League’s decision. So indeed, in the decision of Turkey in terms of the acceptance of
the League’s decision, the Italian stance played a role in the sense that a possibility
of war on various fronts was a very real danger due to the collaboration between the
British and the Italians. Although the British factor alone and the Turkish desire to
focus on its domestic modernization project without international problems played
the major role in Turkey’s decision, the Italian factor still shows the capacity of
Rome in terms of intervening in a Turkish foreign policy issue.
Another instance that shows the importance of Italy in Turkish foreign policy
was the Montreux Conference. Although attempts for a new Straits regime had been
made before, they had not been accepted by the other powers that were interested in
38 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/101.653..13.
39 Peter Edwards, “The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings,”The Historical
Journal 14, no.1 (1971), p.153-159.
24
the arrangement. However, when Italy attacked Abyssinia, especially Britain, as the
biggest powers in the Mediterranean, began to support a new Straits arrangement in
order to gain the support of Turkey against the Italian threat in this area.40 Therefore,
surprisingly, Italy made a decisive yet positive impact on one of the most
fundamental issues of Turkish foreign policy, on the contrary of the Mosul
question’s consequence.
In addition to these cases on which Italy played one positive and one negative
role especially if the goals of the Turkish foreign policy over these issues were kept
in mind, Italy played another role in terms of the orientation of Turkey. One of the
most important impacts of Italy in this respect was the orientation of Turkey towards
the Britain and France in the late 1930s. Although this rapprochement stemmed also
from the distinctive characteristic of Turkish foreign policy, namely the balance of
power notion, which drove Turkey to become closer politically to the British-French
camp due to its economic dependence on the German-Italian camp in these years,41
the explanation in 1936 of Ismet Inonu who stated that the most important issue of
Turkey in these days was Italy and its position in the Mediterranean, according to
which Turkey needed to position itself in European politics,42 was able to display the
determinant role of Rome in this rapprochement.
As will be emphasized, just as in the above-mentioned cases and the facts, in
the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, in the participation of Turkey at the
Nyon Conference and the signing of the Nyon Agreement, in the formulation of an
40 Kudret Özersay, “Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi,” in Türk Dış Politikası:
Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.1, p.372.
41 Oran, “Göreli Özerklik-I, Dönemin Bilançosu,” p.256.
42 Quoted by T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Plânlama Genel
Müdürlüğü, Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı, vol.3 of Türk Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl,
(Ankara: Genel Müdürlük. 1973), p.54.
25
anti-revisionist block in the Balkans, the foremost concern of Turkey was either the
Italian threat or the revisionist powers that Italy supported. Therefore, when the
progress of Turkish foreign policy between the wars is examined, the existence of the
Italian threat can be seen in almost every aspect.
As can be seen, there are two components of the Turkish-Italian relationship
in the interwar era in terms of this study’s framework. On the one hand, in terms of
Italian foreign policy, there is a necessity to analyze the historical narrative on the
basis of Italy’s Mare Nostrum policy, because the attitude of Italy towards Turkey
did not reflect an individual set of policies, but the more common implementations of
a general policy which were experienced by the other states in the Balkans and in the
Eastern Mediterranean, to some extent. In this sense, when the factual history is read
with this awareness, it is possible to see clues about the general framework of the
Mare Nostrum policy, in other words a major part of the interwar Italian foreign
policy. On the other hand, in terms of Turkish foreign policy, although this
relationship is ignored by the relevant works, it is suggested that Italy had a
determinant place on the international decisions, initiatives, and the orientations of
Ankara to an extent that the history of interwar Turkish foreign policy is full of this
kind of instances which could be linked to the Italian threat, one way of another.
Therefore, these two components conjointly display the Italian threat on the basis of
the Mare Nostrum policy and the responses of the Turkish foreign policy to this
threat in different times and in various ways.
26
CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-ITALIAN RELATIONS
The events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in terms of Turco-Italo
relations were consequential due to the fact that they became the mirror of the
forthcoming relationship between these two states within the interwar era, in the
sense that the stance of Italy towards the Turkish lands throughout the late Ottoman
period would become the nature of the contacts within the Republican era also.
In the late nineteenth century, Italy failed to create a colonial empire, not
because of a lack of imperial ambition, but because of its inherent weakness after the
achievement of a late unity,43 which had been achieved in 1871. Conversely, the
Ottoman Empire had been repeatedly partitioned due to the collaboration of Great
Power politics with the nationalism of different ethnic groups within the Empire. In
this atmosphere, it was not very surprising that Italy, like the other European powers,
had some territorial ambitions regarding Ottoman lands, in order to satisfy itself in
terms of gaining colonies, which was being regarded as a belated necessity in this
period.
In this respect, since the Mediterranean Sea held a key strategic importance
for the Italians due to their fear of being surrounded in this sea either by the British
or by the French through their colonies, and additionally due to specific position of
Italy that was a border between great and small powers44 in continental Europe; Italy
had to look for colonies within the Mediterranean in order to balance the situation.
43 William C. Askew, Europe and Italy’s Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912 (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University press, 1942), p.3.
44 Albrecht-Carrie, p.326.
27
With this imperialist agenda, in addition to the strategic necessities of holding
colonies, the increasing population problem of Italy would be settled and economic
gains would be handled.
Compatibly with its goals, Italy focused on a North African territory of the
Ottoman Empire, namely Tunis, as a target, because firstly Tunis was geographically
close to Italy; secondly it had been a principality of the Roman Empire; and thirdly it
could be a suitable emigration destination with which Italy had intense economic
linkages.45 However, contrary to the Italian dreams, Tunis became a French
protectorate in 1881, which disappointed Rome very much.
It should be underlined that these partitions were being made either through
tacit agreements or through declared collaborations among the Great Powers. In this
respect, while Britain and Germany supported the French takeover of Tunis,46 they
also tried to direct the displeased Italians towards Libya in order not to alienate them.
Accordingly, Italy began to pay attention to Tripoli, which was obviously less
appealing economically and was harder to conquer than Tunis, in order not to retain
the last part of the North Africa.47 Actually, the participation of Italy in the Triple
Alliance with Germany and Austria in 1882 was also closely related to the enmity of
the French due to Tunis and the fear of possible future French ambitions regarding
Tripoli.48
45 Hale Şıvgın, Trablusgarp Savaşı ve 1911–1912 Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri:
Trablusgarp Savaşı'nda Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'le İlgili Bazı Belgeler (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), p.2.
46 Germany was trying to make France to forget Alsace-Lorraine by giving consent
to colonization of Tunis.
47 İsrafil Kurtcephe, Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri, 1911–1916 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1995), p.13.
48 Ibid., p.11.
28
To this end, Italy, on the one hand, sought to provide the necessary conditions
for the annexation in terms of European diplomacy and assent; on the other hand it
consolidated itself in Libya through economic tools. Actually, the initial intent of the
Italians was not a war with the Ottomans, but peaceful economic penetration. Since
the Ottoman officials knew what the peaceful economic penetration meant, they tried
to impede every initiative realted to Italian economic enterprises in Tripoli, which led
to the Italian threats of an armed conflict rather than a peaceful takeover.49 Turkey
tried to contest the economic penetration of the Italians but it could not succeed in
the sense that in the 1900s Italy increased its volume of trade with Tripoli and more
importantly it founded various enterprises in Tripoli, specifically the Bank of Rome
(Banco di Roma), which became one of the most important assistants of Rome in the
economic penetration of Libya through the excessive purchase of landed property
and the takeover of the trade.50
Obviously, in the first decades of the 1900s, while Italy was becoming one of
the great powers of Europe with its rapid economic progress,51 the Ottoman Empire
was struggling with various difficulties. Although the constitutional monarchy had
been re-declared as a result of the 1908 Revolution and had given a hope over the
course of events, the problems continued with increasing frequency both within and
outside the Empire. For instance, in 1908, Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by
Austria, Bulgaria gained autonomy, and the Crete parliament declared its decision
about the unification with Greece. In short, the empire was falling apart.
49 Orhan Koloğlu, Osmanlı-İtalya Libya Savaşında İttihatçılar, Masonlar ve
Sosyalist Enternasyonal (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1999), p.14.
50 Kurtcephe, p.15-17.
51 Askew, p.23.
29
In this atmosphere, Italy, which adjudged that the economic penetration could
not reach the desired end, declared war against the Ottoman Empire on the grounds
that the Ottoman authorities had prevented Italian economic initiatives with bad
intentions although Italy had stated various times that Tripoli and Benghazi, which
were important for Italy due to their proximity to its territory, deserved developed
and “civilized” living conditions.52 That is to say, the main reason for the war was
Italian colonialism rather than the obstruction of the Italian economic initiatives in
the area.
The war began on 29 September 1911. Although the Italian army seized some
of the coastal towns easily, the collaboration of the Ottoman voluntary army corps
that had come from different parts of the Empire with the locals, which were Senussi
resistant fighters, in the interior regions not only prolonged the war, but also frayed
the Italians both militarily and psychologically. Therefore, Italy, which had given the
guarantee to the Western European powers that the war would not endanger Europe,
in other words, the Balkans,53 decided that if it attacked other parts of the Ottoman
Empire, both the Ottomans and the Western powers would try to ensure a peace in
favour of the Italians. In that respect, Italy bombarded Beirut and the Dardanelles and
invaded the Dodecanese Islands. However, the peace that the Italians were willing to
sign did not come until October 1912, when the first episode of the Balkan Wars
began.
According to the Ouchy Treaty, while Turkey would surrender Libya to Italy,
Italy would give back the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey. However, in 1913 Italy
refused to evacuate the Islands under the pretext that the Ottoman Empire had not
52 Kurtcephe, p.64.
53 Şıvgın, p.48.
30
withdrawn its troops from Benghazi.54 In this way, as a result of the Tripolitan War,
Turkey lost not only Libya but also the Dodecanese Islands. Apart from the territorial
loss of the Ottoman Empire, the balance of power in the Mediterranean shifted in
favour of the Triple Alliance in the sense that Tripoli and also the Aegean Islands
had strategic importance that could be used by these countries.55
Although Italy was unable to occupy Tripoli completely due to the Senussi
resistance until 1925 and although there were disagreements between the Great
Powers about the future of the Dodecanese Islands due to the aforementioned
strategic apprehensions, Italy succeeded to acquire territories from the Ottoman
Empire one way or another. It should be underlined that these territories would not
be the once for all, thus, Italy, which had defended the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire in the last half of the nineteenth century vis-à-vis France
specifically in terms of North Africa, would set its sights on new areas within the
Empire in order to satisfy its colonial appetite.
In accordance with this desire, after a brief period of rapprochement between
1913 and1914 during which Italy and the Ottoman Empire cooperated in the
commercial and financial issues,56 with the outbreak of the Great War they came up
against each other again. In fact, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance.
However, it was obvious that cooperation between Italy and Austria could not be
sustained because Italy was willing to obtain territory from Austria. Therefore, Italy
54 Timothy W. Childs, Trablusgarp Savaşı: Türk-İtalyan Diplomatik İlişkileri (1911–
1912) (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), p.257.
55 Askew, p.187-188.
56 Kurtcephe, p.234.
31
declared neutrality as opposed to the agreements concerning the Triple Alliance, on
the grounds that the war had begun beyond its control.57
After this point, Italy underwent negotiations both with the Alliance and with
the Entente. However, due to the aforementioned Austrian factor, Italy was
apparently closer to the Entente. In this context, the secret Treaty of London, which
was signed between the Entente powers and Italy in April 1915, secured “an
advantageous strategic frontier from Switzerland to the Adriatic”58 as well as “a clear
title to the Dodecanese and the promise of some undefined colonial compensation,
especially in Asia Minor, in the event of corresponding acquisitions by its Allies.”59
Therefore, Italy, which declared war against Austria on May 1915, became the
enemy of the Ottoman Empire, again with ambitions over the Turkish lands.
Related to these territorial ambitions, Italy and the Allies made another secret
treaty during the war. Italian desires were addressed in the agreement of St. Jean de
Maurienne in 1917, through which Rome obtained further concessions in Adalia and
Izmir region although it could not receive privileges regarding the Adana-Mersin
zone due to the opposition of the French, despite the intense efforts in this
direction.60
During the Great War, Turkey and Italy did not fight against each other
directly for the territories at issue in the sense that Italy imposed blockade to the
Mediterranean and Aegean shores,61 but it did not attack the region. When the
57 Ibid., p.234.
58 Albrecht-Carrie, p.332.
59 Ibid., p.332.
60 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923
(Norman: University of Oklahoma press, 1931), p.186.
61 Kurtcephe, p.248.
32
Mudros Armistice was signed in September 1918, Italy, as one of the Entente
powers, was declared a victorious country vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. The
meaning of this victory was that the provisions of the secret agreements that were
signed during the war could be finally realized. Accordingly, firstly, Italy became
one of the parties that occupied Istanbul in November 1918. Secondly, she landed
soldiers in 1919 to Antalya, Selçuk, Muğla in accordance with the agreements.
However, Italy was not comfortable with its situation in Turkey as a
victorious power, because it was experiencing difficulties with the other Entente
powers. First of all, in Istanbul, the Italian officials found themselves in the backseat
vis-à-vis Britain and France. Italy was disappointed by the fact that the number of its
troops remained at the minimum as a result of the attitudes of Britain and France
which sought to prevent Italian authority and the Italian army’s cooperation with
their troops.62 The behaviour of the British and the French was understandable
regarding Istanbul to some extent due to the fact that the secret agreements with Italy
had not included provisions about the Ottoman capital or the Straits and Italy was a
“lesser” great power in comparison to Britain and France. However, what was more
disappointing to the Italians was this attitude was also prevalent in terms of the
territories that had been given to Italy before and during the war according to the
agreements.
In this respect, the most important point of clash among the allies became
Izmir, Aydın province (vilayet) in general, which had been formulated as an Italian
sphere of influence. However, in May 1919, Greek troops landed in Izmir which
became a major turning point not only for the Turkish resistance, but also for
Turkish-Italian relations. After this point, Italians came closer to Turkey and began
62 Fabio L. Grassi, İtalya ve Türk Sorunu (1919–1923) Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika
(İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2003), p.35.
33
to follow policies that were sometimes different from those of its allies in Anatolia.
For instance, Italians tried to gain sympathy from the Turkish population with benign
conduct, because they thought that they could secure economic initiatives and
privileges more easily that way.63
In addition, Italy regarded the National Struggle of Turkey as a legitimate
defence and the Italians stated that they appreciated Turkish National Forces (Kuvayi
Milliye) and Mustafa Kemal.64 Obviously, if the intensity of the Italian national
disappointment about the Greek occupation of Izmir is kept in mind, it is not
surprising that Italy sympathised with a war that was fought directly against the
Greeks. The recognition of the National Struggle’s legitimacy by the Italians
detached the policies of the Entente powers day by day in the sense that while the
British was the main supporter of the Greece in Anatolia, Italy, on the contrary,
helped the Turkish Nationalists in the Italian occupational zone. This attitude of Italy
towards the Ankara government and the National Struggle would last until 1922 after
which a rapprochement was achieved among Britain, France, and Italy, due to
various reasons.
To sum up, the relationship between the unified Italy and the Ottoman
Empire before the period between 1922 and 1939 was shaped by the territorial
ambitions of Italy and the other European powers, which was not very different from
the subsequent periods. Obviously, the Ottoman period was much sharper than the
Republican era in nature, due to the existence of direct wars between the parties
before the interwar years. Additionally, it should be underlined that the fluctuating
nature of the Turkish-Italian relationship in the interwar era had been a characteristic
63 Mevlüt Çelebi, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri (Ankara:
Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 1999), p.120-121.
64 Ibid., p.156.
34
of their relationship in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of
the twentieth century. While after the Libyan War a nearly three-year détente period
occurred, after the enmity of the First World War, Italy, by aiding the nationalists
ironically, gave a start to a new period. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the
Turkish-Italian relationship in the interwar era, which had similarities to the previous
period, would have some legacies from this epoch, like the lands promised in the
Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne and the rapprochement period within the National
Struggle that would be used in order to provide a basis for the relations in the era at
issue.
35
CHAPTER 4
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITALY, 1922-1927:
THE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF ROME
The term “interwar”65 is generally used to qualify the period between 1918, the end
of the Great War, and 1939, the beginning of the Second World War. However, as is
known, from 1918 to the 1923, Turkey did not experience a period that could be
regarded as “between the wars.” In other words, these years saw the National
Struggle, or War of Independence, period of Turkey rather than interwar period.
Therefore, it would not be erroneous to suggest that Turkey entered the interwar
years, after the Lausanne Treaty.
This understanding has some logic in itself in the sense that on the one hand,
Turkey terminated the Great War not with one of the Paris Peace Treaties, but with
the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923. On the other hand, Turkey changed its system of
regime in 1923. In other words, it began to live the interwar period under a new
national republican state, undergoing a fundamental rupture with the old system.
However, for the topic of this thesis, this conception has some problems. First of all,
after a brief period of mutual understanding between Rome and Ankara government
due to the mutual needs of the parties during the first years of the War of
Independence in Anatolia, beginning with 1922 and to some extent the second half of
1921, the relations began to become tense due to the dominance of different points of
views in Rome, other than Sforza’s thinking, and to the more nationalistic stance of
the Kemalists, as will be seen. In that respect, beginning with the year 1923 would
mean missing the starting point of the stated parties’ antagonistic attitudes to each
65 It can be used also as “interbellum.”
36
other which would continue throughout the period. Secondly, in 1922, a major
turning point for Italy occurred in the sense that Mussolini’s famous March on Rome
initiated a new phase in Italian history. Therefore, in my view, the proclamation of
the Republic as a starting point would cut the Fascist period’s integrity needlessly,
for the sake of perpetuating the general tendency of Turkish historiography.
For these reasons, it is appropriate to begin with 1922. In this way, the
attitudes of different Italian governments towards Ankara can be compared in terms
of consecutive liberal and fascist regimes and the position of Italy after the Turkish
victory, during the negotiations of the Armistice of Mudanya and the Lausanne Peace
Conference can be analyzed without being separated from the continuum. To put it
differently, this conception provides the ability to present the unchanged Italian
position, which either depended on hostility on the basis of imperialism or on
collaboration with the “allies” on the basis of obtaining benefits which would persist
until 1927, undividedly.
In that respect, before coming to 1922, it should be mentioned that the three
major developments that determined the destiny of the relations between Rome and
Ankara dated back to 1921. As is known, Carlo Sforza, who had guaranteed a
democratic and benign program in terms of Italian foreign policy,66 had been the
major figure behind the indulgent position of Rome towards Turkey after the Great
War. This attitude stemmed from the fact that Rome had become alienated from its
allies due to the fact that the obligations of the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne
had been broken depending on the pretexts of the Allies about the absence of
Russia’s signature.67 Thus, the Italian government, and mainly Sforza, had believed
66 Burgwyn, p.15.
67 Francesco Coppola, “Italy in the Mediterranean,” Foreign Affairs an American
Quarterly Review 1, no.4 (1922/1923), p.110.
37
that forging a friendship with Turkey would give influence to Italy in the Eastern
Mediterranean,68 because increased confidence on the part of Turkey would lead to
the grants of economic and political privileges to the Italians.
However, these hopes did not materialize. For example, the treaties signed by
Bekir Sami (Kunduh), a representative of the Ankara government, with the Italians,
British, and French separately, in 1921, were not approved by the Ankara parliament
on the grounds that they were against the independence of Turkey. This upset the
Italians, because the treaty would have granted them economic privileges in
southwestern Anatolia and the devolution of the Ereğli coal mines to a Turkish-
Italian company.69 The refusal of this treaty had meant the “bankruptcy of the Sforza
policy”70 for the Italians and constituted the first step for the cooling off of relations.
Second development involved Italian domestic policy. The Giovanni Giolitti
government was succeeded that of Ivanoe Bonomi due to the escalating economic
and social turmoil in the country. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomasi della
Torretta “did not implement opposite policies but seemed less willing to sacrifice the
Italian-British relations than his predecessors at the expense of Turkey,”71 contrary to
the attitude of Carlo Sforza. Therefore, the explanations of Sforza about the
unchanging friendship between Rome and Ankara that arose from the Italian
conviction which had recognized the legitimacy of Turkish claims72 obviously did
68 Burgwyn, p.115.
69 M. Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (İstanbul: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1997), vol.1,
p.392.
70 Grassi, p.146.
71 Ibid., p.165.
72 Çelebi, p.246.
38
not seemed to reflect the truth. After that point, the new Italian governments would
display rapprochement with its allies, especially with Britain, again.
However, it would be erroneous to suggest that after that point the friendship
between the parties came to an end, or that they became adversaries again. Adducing
a harsh transformation within the contacts could neither reflect the reality nor explain
the recession of the Italian occupation forces from Antalya region in the same year.
The situation, on the contrary, could be qualified only as the first steps in a change
both in the Italy’s method of approaching the Ankara government and in Turkish
behaviour towards Rome. While the former was convinced that it could gain more
benefits with the help of Britain rather than with the sympathy of the Turks; the
latter, by being aware of the mentality change in Italians in terms of behaving with
the Allies, sought to negotiate the issues, especially with Britain and France. For
instance, when Mustafa Kemal sent Ali Fethi (Okyar) to Paris and London in 1922
for the last diplomatic undertakings before the Great Offensive, he did not need to
send him to Rome; so, to some extent, he showed that Italy was of secondary
importance for Turkey.73
Since the Kemalists gained a victory in 30 August 1922, a new phase began
in which the each state played its cards against the each other, or cooperated, for its
own interest. Because the issues at stake were political and economic in nature; and
because Italy tried to obtain these benefits with different methods throughout the
War of Independence period but had failed, Italian political and public circles reacted
with different points of view to the victory of the Turks.
The common opinion persisted about their beliefs on the high probability of
future economic privileges, due to the Italian sympathy in Turkey, which had come
73 Grassi, p.176.
39
into being during the War of Independence. According to the Italian mind, since the
Turkish people knew that Italy had desired complete justice for them, the Italians
would have a conjoint future with the Turks in the moral, industrial and economic
spheres.74 Therefore, the Turkish victory should have been regarded a positive
development for Rome. However, it should be underlined that opposite
considerations were also existent in the sense that the victory of the Turks was
interpreted as the end of the Italian dream of economic privileges, mines and
petroleum.75 In fact, the second interpretation was closer to the reality especially if
the purposes of the Kemalists and the course of events are kept in mind. However,
although the goals of the Kemalists were very clear, the official cadres tried not to
alienate Italy and behaved accommodatingly on the threshold of the peace
intercourses. Thus, why general public opinion in Italy greeted the Turkish victory
positively can be understood easily within this condition.
In this atmosphere, where there was utmost uncertainty in terms of being
allies, friends or rivals, Turkish troops were moving along the Dardanelles. In the
period of the Dardanelles crisis, when Britain risked a war with the Ankara
government in order to impede the Turks from entering the Dardanelles, Italy
behaved in an unstable way. On the one hand, they became closer to the British due
to their fears about the possible impact of the Turkish attitude that could damage the
economic privileges not only in terms of future benefits but also in terms of existing
capitulations; on the other hand, they declared that if the stance of Britain led to a
74 Ibid., p.182.
75 Çelebi, p.337.
40
war in Asia which could spread to Europe, Italy could not collaborate in such a war
alongside the British.76
The Chanak crisis ended without a war and the Allies delivered a note, which
was an invitation for the armistice meeting in Mudanya, to the Ankara government
on 23 September 1922, which was accepted by Ankara on 29 September. In the
conference at Mudanya, which dealt with ceasing fire between the parties, with
determining a line in Thrace in order to retract the Greek troops, and with paving a
way for future peace negotiations, the parties experienced some clashes. In this
atmosphere, the stance of the Italian delegate, General Monbelli, who preferred to
made pressure to Ismet Pasha for the impositions of Britain in cooperation with his
French colleague, is very meaningful. Ismet Pasha reported that the Italian and
French representatives were exerting pressures upon him in “friendly special
meetings” in order to make him sign the armistice as soon as possible.77 The same
reports also indicated the threats, which underlined that the conditions of the Allies
would become more severe in the case of non-signing.78 This position of the Italian
delegate can be interpreted in two ways; firstly, Italy knew that it could find itself in
a state of war one way or another reluctantly if the armistice was not signed, and
secondly, it was indicating the signs of its position on the Turkish issue, which could
be become a clue about the Italian stance in future meetings.
A few days after the signing of the Mudanya Armistice, a turning point in
Italian history occurred. With the famous “March on Rome,” with which Benito
Mussolini came to power on 29 October 1922, Italy turned into a Fascist state. In
76 Salahi R. Sonyel, Gizli Belgelerle Lozan Konferansının Perde Arkası (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006), p.5-6.
77 A. Öner Pehlivanoğlu, Barış Yolunda Mudanya Mütarekesi (İstanbul: Kastaş
Yayınevi, 2002), p.164-65.
78 Ibid.
41
fact, Italy, after Great War could not be rallied by the various governments, in other
words it had “suffered from what may be called ‘post-war neurasthenia.’”79 The
masses that had fought in or supported the war had not received what had been
promised before and during the war, and they had to deal with post-war economic
and social difficulties. For instance, 1921 and 1922 had been the darkest periods of
the post-war economic crisis that had deteriorated also by an exceptional drougt.80
When the economic ruin and financial bankruptcy combined with the parliamentary
instability and several national strikes are kept in mind, it is not hard to anticipate
that the cities were on the verge of a civil war situation. In this environment,
Mussolini formulated the March on Rome in order to handle the administration that
should be based on nationalism, conservatism and anti-bolshevism. After a day of the
general mobilization of the militant Fascists, on 29 October, Rome became
surrounded by Black Shirts. Therefore, the King chose to invite Mussolini to Rome
to create a cabinet rather than choosing to declare marital law to enable the
government to defend itself.81
The importance of the Black Shirt Revolution in terms of Turkey was that
Fascism also would have impacts on Italian foreign policy. Violence and the desire
to be feared were strong characteristics of Benito Mussolini and he tried to establish
these not only in the domestic but also in foreign affairs.82 However, although
Mussolini liked portraying Fascist Italy as a new, dynamic and great power, he did
79 Gaetano Salvemini, The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy (London: Jonathan Cape,
1928), p.15.
80 Ibid., p.139.
81 Ibid., p.151-52.
82 Dennis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (New York: Viking Press, 1976),
p.1.
42
not have the raw materials and industrial base that being a great power necessitated.83
Additionally, Italy was experiencing a problem of overpopulation, which was
supposed to be solved through expansionism. Therefore, it could be stated that the
colonial and expansionist agenda of Italy in the interwar period depended on this
being a great power phenomenon as well as on finding new areas of immigration for
the increasing Italian population and of raw materials.
In this respect, the change of dynamics in Italian foreign policy was important
for Turkey, which was on the eve of peace negotiations. From the signing of the
Mudros Armistice to the recent day, Italian governments’ policies towards Turkey
had usually been accommodating. Even if they had begun to sour within the complex
situations in both Ankara and Rome as was seen above, the developments had not led
to rupture, but to instability within the relations.
How Mussolini would conduct the affairs between Ankara and Rome was an
important question, because Italy could change its routes about its foreign policy
implementation due to the fact that for Mussolini “national grandeur rested on two
mare nostrum; the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.”84 In this context, Turkish
political circles were evidently worrying such a degree that a deputy in the Grand
National Assembly felt to be obliged to ask about the Italian stance towards Turkey.
Although Rauf Bey (Orbay) said that “we have not received any information about
negative change in the latest political course of events due to the change of
government in Italy, on the contrary, the political circles inform us that the
government will conduct a propitious policy towards Turkey;”85 the developments
83 Burgwyn, p.18.
84 Ibid.
85 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 13 November 1922, Devre:I, Cilt:24, İçtima senesi:3, 13
November 1922, p.497. “Italya’da hükümetin tebdili dolayısıyla şimdiye kadar mevcut
43
did not confirm the assembly discussions and explanations. For instance, due to the
chaotic environment in Istanbul, just before the peace negotiations, in which the
French and British were fleeing despite the assurances from the Turkish officials and
in which the different ethnicities were colliding, the new Italian Prime Minister
Mussolini was thundering in Rome, warning Mustafa Kemal, and advising the
postponement of the Lausanne Conference if the events continued.86 He was barely
calmed by the French, who stated that possible delay could cause a new war with the
Kemalists.87 Additionally, according to the British Ambassador in Rome, Mussolini
was sharply criticizing the Kemalists on the Italian press.88
Obviously, the stance of Italy at least for the Lausanne Conference, even if
not in the whole period, began to appear also with the statements of Mussolini who
was evidently willing to cooperate with the British. Indeed, Mussolini quickly
reached this aim, because also the British, before coming to the Conference, desired
a unity among the Allies.89 The unending exchange of views among the Allies in
order to constitute unity had led to the postponement of the conference which was
supposed to begin on 13 November.90 It could be stated that these meetings seemed
to yield the desired results in the sense that Ismet Pasha reported that a visit of an
Italian ambassador who underlined the possible difficulties in the negotiation process
bulunan siyasi cereyanların tebeddül ettiğine dair bize bir haber yoktur. Bilakis bize ricali
siyasiyei hükümetin Türkiye’ye karşı hayırhah bir siyaset takibedeceklerini ifham ediyorlar.”
86 Sonyel, p.31.
87 Romani Damiani, Türkiye'de Yabancı Bir Gazetecinin Araştırmaları: İtalya'nın
Antalya'yı İşgal Kararı, Rodos'u İlhakı ve Mersine Çıkarma Planı (Ankara: Demircioğlu
Matbaacılık, 1998) p.67.
88 Ibid. p.33.
89 Bilal N. Şimşir, Lozan Telgrafları: Türk Diplomatik Belgelerinde Lozan Barış
Konferansı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990), vol.1, p.104.
90 Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1971), p.77.
44
in which the Italians could not detach themselves from their Allies.91 Apart from the
unity of the attitudes, the Allies had made a separate agreement through which the
states admitted not to make separate treaties.92
Therefore, to the conference, which began on 21 November 1922, Italy
attended with Marki Camillo Garroni and Giulio Cesare Montagna. The fact that
Italy displayed a pro-British stance compatible with the agreement among the Allies
can be seen within the negotiation process. In other words, throughout the
Conference, nothing beyond the expectations occurred. Apart from the position of
Italy within the common attitude of the Allies, what was more important at that point
was the conduct of specific issues that specifically concerned Italy. It seems that two
noteworthy issues were contentions between Turkey and Italy bilaterally: the
economic and judicial capitulations and Meis Island.
To begin with Meis Island, it should be recalled that when the Dodecanese
Islands had been lost as a result of the Italo-Ottoman war over Libya, Meis also had
accepted the sovereignty of Rome. The importance of the island for Turkey stemmed
from the fact that the island was inside Turkish territorial waters, so the sovereignty
of another country on the island was desperately diminishing the security of western
Anatolia. Therefore, the stance of Ankara on the issue of Meis for the Lausanne
Conference was in the direction of taking the island under Turkish sovereignty.
Ismet Pasha also had considered the possibilities of this goal even before the
Conference. For instance, when he asked about the future of the island issue in a
meeting with Mussolini in Paris, Mussolini had taken a conclusive attitude in the
91 Şimşir, p.107.
92 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:I, Cilt:25, İçtima Senesi:3, 29 November 1922,
p.119.
45
sense that he stated that the issue was a settled one and that settled issues could not
be negotiated again.93
However, the issue was reopened to the negotiations in the conference by the
Turkish delegates. Turkish representatives reiterated their positions on the basis of
Turkish security. However, Italy also did not abdicate from her position; the island
had become a fundamental issue for the Italians.94 Sure enough, the Meis issue
became a prestige matter for Rome, like the Dodecanese Islands. According to the
Italian representative, Montagna, Italy had experienced a continuous disappointment
since the Great War due to the non-fulfillment of the promised territories and
privileges, thus, for the new fascist government which had thrown out the old
incapacitated administration, the Meis issue was one of the symbols of the fascism’s
self-respect although in the normal conditions it was just a small bit of rock.95
Obviously, the security of Anatolia was much more important to the
Kemalists than the Fascist government’s self-esteem, which was plainly a diplomatic
play. However, the Lausanne Conference depended on a very fragile basis in the
sense that at the end of January, it had experienced a rupture. Since the peace of
Turkey was indeterminate and all of the parties were willing to reach a conclusion as
soon as possible; Turkey became obliged to make a sacrifice on the issue of Meis. In
return, on the one hand she gained the Tavşan Islands; on the other hand she imposed
a military guarantee upon Italy, which assured Turkey that the island could never be
used against Anatolia. Thereby, one of the two issues between Ankara and Rome
reached a conclusion. It should be added that Italy also gained sovereignty of the
93 İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, edited by Sabahattin Selek (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi,
2006), p.328.
94 Ibid., p.118.
95 Karacan, p.482-483.
46
whole Dodecanese Islands, whose definitive status could not be decided for many
years, with the Lausanne Treaty. The conclusion of the islands issue was so
disappointing for the Turks that in the Assembly some of the deputies, like Şükrü
Kaya, declared that they could not accept the treaty with these provisions both
because “the islands in the hands of the Italians would be the re-beginning of a policy
of exploiting Anatolia”96 and because Italy “would disturb Turkey again”97 through
the Dodecanese.
For all of the Aegean Islands issue, it should be stressed that although Italy
had promised not to use the islands against Turkey, it always thought that “the value
of the islands were arising from geographic military position, which enabled to make
of them the base of the future expansion.”98 Thus, by constantly making military
build-ups therein, Rome created an “Italian fear” within the Turkish foreign policy.
The second issue, which was economic and legal privileges, namely the
capitulations, was much more important than Meis both for Italy and Turkey.
Actually, it was the most important topic of the whole Lausanne process. Obviously,
the economic and legal capitulations were fundamental for all of the great powers
involved; however, if the efforts of Italy in terms of its economic interests throughout
the War of Liberation are kept in mind, it is not erroneous to state that the crucial
point of Lausanne for the Italians was specifically this issue rather than the Straits or
the Ottoman debts. The leadership of the Italian delegate Mark Garroni over the
commission for the capitulations also can be regarded as a reflection of the
importance that the country attributed to the privileges.
96 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:1, İçtima Senesi:1, 21 August 1923, p.238.
97 Ibid.
98 C.D. Booth and Isabelle Bridge Booth, Italy's Aegean Possesions (London:
Arrowsmith, 1928), p.286.
47
In this context, it is not surprising that the suggestions and the explanations of
the Italians began to be laid out even before the conference. For instance, Mussolini
stated in his first speech on the Italian parliament that the word of “capitulations”
was archaic and making the Turks furious, thus there was a need for new and
efficient system without using this word.99 That is to say, Italy would insist on the
continuation of the capitulatory system with a new arrangement if necessary, at any
price.
Accordingly, the Italian delegate either asked for economic cooperation
separately or became the ardent supporter of the permanent capitulation regime in
general throughout the conference. In terms of economic privileges, Garroni
proposed economic collaboration with Turkey. Although Turkey did not accept any
economic privileges that could violate its independence, obstinacy on the economic
capitulations by Italians as well as the French would last until the end of the
conference.
In terms of legal capitulations, on the other hand, the negotiations were much
more austere. Garroni in the private meetings stressed the requirement of a judicial
capitulation settlement, “at least,”100 ever so often. The stance of the Italians about
the judicial assurances led to the harsh criticisms in the parliament. The deputies in
the Turkish assembly objected to the demands on the issue very strongly. A deputy
reminded his colleagues of the old incidents in which Italian criminals had been set
free by the Italian officials, by underlining the misuses of implementations of the
judicial capitulations.101
99 Sonyel, p.38.
100 Şimşir, p.338.
101 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:I, Cilt:26, İçtima Senesi:3, 3 January 1923, p.168.
48
When the conference came to a deadlock, the Italian delegate Montagna
offered a new solution which would be termed thereafter as the “Montagna formula.”
Although it was not accepted by the Turkish delegation in the first period of the
Lausanne Conference, efforts were made to have it in the second period due to the
fact that other formulations had much more cumbersome provisions.
The problem seemed almost unsolvable within the process until the very end.
In this stalemate situation, the Italians played a major role. The roles were exchanged
during the second period of the conference in the sense that “no problem remained
between the British and the Turks now, but Italy and France, which had previously
declared that they were the friends of the Turks, began to follow a threatening and
possessive attitude against Turkey.102 While the Turkish press was blaming the
Italians for the futile negotiations, Garroni was still reiterating that Italians were
considering the capitulation issue as the sole matter of the conference.103 Actually, it
was surprising that the Italians, who had become nearly friends with the Turks
throughout the National Struggle, stood as the last power at the end of Lausanne that
resisted the Turkish disposition. Since the territorial plans of Italy over Anatolia
during and after the Great War had failed, only economic aims were left for the
Italian appetite, so the fluctuations in the Italian stance before and during the
conference were closely related to the Italian calculations about the success of certain
policies. The insistence of Italy in terms of the capitulations should be looked upon
from this perspective.
However, it should be also added that since Turkey had determined its stance
much earlier as “not concluding a peace as long as they wanted ‘assurances’ and
102 Vakit, 6 February 1923, quoted by Sonyel, p.140.
103 Şimşir, p.369.
49
strove for the words like the ‘assurance;’”104 the Italians, as the other great powers,
had to give up their insistence about the capitulations. The matter ended up with a
Turkish victory in the Lausanne Conference, being a second blow to the Italian goals
involving Turkey.
After the peace agreement was signed on 24 July 1923, Ismet Pasha sent
some letters to the Italian delegate in order to clarify some uncertain issues regarding
the Italian companies in Turkey, in the light of the orders from Ankara. With one of
these letters, Ismet Pasha stated that Turkey, which had decided to take the cabotage
rights under the national sovereignty, invited the parties to negotiate about the
conditions on the continuation of Italian maritime companies’ transportation
activities.105 Otherwise, these countries would have a two-year-right of coast trading.
Another letter enunciated that the agreements on the railways between
Anatolia-Bagdad, Mersin-Adana, as well as the Oriental railways, and Haydarpaşa
station, which had been subscribed before 29 October 1914 on the basis of economic
privileges but compatible with the procedures, would be protected.106 However,
these agreements would be accommodated under the new economic conditions,
which meant that Turkey with the new arrangement in Lausanne would change the
conditions in favor of itself.
Although these letters were responded with diplomatic courtesy by
Montagna, it was obvious that the abolition of the capitulations was a disaster for the
countries which had benefitted from these assurances. Italy, which had gained the
104 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:I, Cilt:26, İçtima Senesi:3, 3 January 1923, p.170.
105 These companies were: Societa Italiana Servici Maritimi, Societa Italiana di
Navigazione, Lloyd Triestino Società, quoted by TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:1,
İçtima Senesi:1, 21 August 1923, p.199-200.
106 Ibid., p.203.
50
Dodecanese Islands including Meis, had lost the “sole issue” with its own statements.
However, after the signing of the treaty, Italian official circles did not declare
anything negative about the Lausanne Treaty. On the contrary, Montagna, who
became now the Italian ambassador in Turkey, stated they were happy with the
treaty, including Mussolini.107
The declarations of the Italian officials reflected diplomatic courtesy again. In
fact, according to the Italians, the “Eastern Question” had entered a new phase.108
That is to say, it had not been solved yet; it had just changed shape. Obviously, both
Turkey and Italy were changing shape in the sense that the republic had been
proclaimed on 29 October 1923 in Turkey, after being recognized by the world with
the Lausanne Treaty. Hereafter, while Turkey was trying to cure the traumas as a
result of the unending wars and also trying to formulate the “Turkish nation” on the
contrary of the notions of the “Ottoman Empire” under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal, Italy was being administrated by the Fascists and was also being theorized on
the basis of the Fascist style under the leadership of Benito Mussolini.
In this context, it was not surprising that Mussolini, who accused the old
politicians, specifically Sforza, with appeasement both over Adriatic and Anatolia,
formulated his foreign policy on the basis of an aggressive style that was directed to
Mare Nostrum. In this sense, a new period was beginning between Turkey and Italy
on the basis of Italy’s aggressive stance and of Turkey’s fear, suspicion of and
vigilance of Rome even though this new period had begun with the declaration of
107 Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 23 August 1923, quoted by Sonyel, p.211.
108 Ibid., quoted by Sonyel, p.212.
51
“Mussolini’s desire for founding a friendship with Ankara”109 to the Turkish
officials.
The Fascist tone in the Italian foreign policy asserted itself first in the port
city of Fiume and Greek controlled Corfu Island in the Adriatic, successively. In
terms of the former, it should be reminded that Fiume had previously been declared
the “free state of Fiume” in 1920 compatibly with the foreign policy mind of Carlo
Sforza, who was thinking that “Italy should extend her influence in the Balkans by
means of a policy of cooperation rather than of coercion or pressure,”110 after the
incident of invasion of the city. However, in 1923, in accordance with the ambitions
in the region, Mussolini began to pressure Yugoslavia about the cession of Fiume to
Italy to such an extent that on 8 August of that year he threatened Belgrade with
military act if no agreement was reached before September.111
At the same time as this continuous tension over Fiume, a conflict with
Greece emerged. There were problems between Italy and Greece over the problem of
Albanian border and over the harsh public opinion in Greece against Italy due to the
Italian sovereignty of the Dodecanese Islands as well as armament in the Aegean
Sea. On 25 August, the Italian officers who had been assigned to the commission for
a solution to the aforementioned border problems were assassinated in Greece. When
Athens refused to take the necessary measures that were sent through an ultimatum
by Rome, Italy invaded the island. What is important here is that when the British
asked that the issue be brought to the League of Nations, Mussolini did not recognize
the League’s jurisdiction and threatened to withdraw Italy from this institution.
109 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.594..7.
110 Albrecht-Carrie, p.334.
111 Joel Blatt, “France and the Corfu-Fiume Crisis of 1923,” Historian 50, no.2
(February 1988), p.235.
52
However, “after considering the possibility of an Italian war against Greece, with the
collaboration of Yugoslavia and Great Britain, it was reported on September 13 that
Italy would be vulnerable if the British navy took action against it.”112 Therefore,
Mussolini, who could not risk a war with the British, decided to evacuate the island
in September.
While the Corfu crisis was solved in this way, the problem with Yugoslavia
over Fiume was still enduring. The negotiations between the parties were concluded
in the following months in the sense that “intimidated by Italy’s aggressive behavior
during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually conceded and recognized Italy’s full
sovereignty over Fiume,”113 in January 1924. It is important to note that the policies
of France on the basis of preventing a possible Italian-Yugoslav war that could
disturb its situation in the area played an important role in this settlement.
There was a noticeable reflection of these two developments on Turkey. More
dominantly than the realization of the motives of Rome towards the Balkans114 and
the Mediterranean Sea, in other words, perception of the fascist foreign policy’s
meaning, Turkish parliament inferred from this incident the weakness of the League
of Nations in finding an effective solutions to international problems, because at the
same time as these incidents, Turkish deputies seemed very anxious about the Turks
in Western Thrace. Allegedly, the Turkish population under the Greek sovereignty
was being ill-treated. How the Corfu issue was related to the Turks in Western
Thrace was closely related to the position of Italy vis-à-vis the League of Nations in
the sense that one section of the Turkish deputies, rather than being worried about the
112 Ibid., p.236.
113 Dilek Barlas, “Friend or Foes: Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey,
1923-1936,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no.2 (May 2004), p.234.
114 Ibid.
53
aggressive behaviour of Rome, was trying to persuade the others about to take
similar measures, like Vasıf Bey:
The League of Nations…Which League of Nations, my friends! We
understood how the League of Nations is so far from being effective and
how it is ridiculous, from the Corfu issue of the Italians. In the face of
force, in the face of determination of Mussolini, all of the initiatives and
decisions of the League have become ridiculous and we understand that
even the League of Nations, which is the symbol of nations, even of
civilization, obeys the power. Its decision when it sees the power
becomes different from the one when it does not see the power.
Therefore, we must resort to the necessary measures rather than working
in order to make the League take civilized and important decisions from
this platform. I am sure with my soul that we should accept the style of
Italian Prime Minister Mussolini and be sure that that time the decision
that the members of the League will give will become very
different…Just that time, the miserable circumstances of the Turks will
be ended.115
As can be seen from the statement, the disquiet towards the Fascist foreign policy
seems to take little place, at least in the speeches of the deputies. Ironically, the
Turkish deputies, who would describe Italy as one of the fiercest enemies both in this
period and after the 1930s, chose to highlight the effectiveness of the aggression and
the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. It should be underlined that the
inspiration of the Italian style at this time did not stem from being supportive of
Fascist foreign policy, but from the isolation of Turkey in international relations and
the fear of suffering from the injustices in this international arena, due to the
115 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:3, İçtima Senesi:1, 10 November 1923,
p.323. “Cemiyeti Akvam… Hangi Cemiyeti Akvam arkadaşlar! İtalyanların Korfu
meselesinde Cemiyeti Akvamın ne gülünç olduğunu ve müessir olmaktan ne kadar çok uzakta
bulunduğunu yakinen anladık. Kuvvetin karasında, Başvekil Musolini'nin azmi karşısında
Cemiyeti Akvamın bütün hareketleri, kararları, gülünç bir şekle girmiştir ve anlıyoruz ki
değil akvamın hatta medeniyetin timsali olan Cemiyeti Akvam bile kuvvet önünde daima
serfürû etmektedir. Kuvveti gördüğü gün kararı başkadır, kuvveti görmediği gün kararı yine
pek başkadır. O halde bu kürsüden Cemiyeti Akvama medeni ve mühim kararlar verdirmek
için çalışacağımıza icabeden tedbirlere tevessül etmeliyiz. Bütün ruhumla kaniim ki İtalyan
Başvekili Musolini'nin tarzı siyasetini kabul edelim ve emin olunuz ki, arkadaşlar! O zaman
Cemiyeti Akvamın ve onun mümessillerinin vereceği karar büsbütün başka olacaktır… Ve
ancak o zaman Türklerin bu bedbaht vaziyetlerine nihayet verilecektir.”
54
memories of the Ottoman past. Although at this time the expansionist aims of Italy in
the Adriatic Sea seemed to be ignored at the expense of a pragmatic approach for
Turks in Thrace, the same kind of aims of Italy in the Mediterranean would
encounter the strong reactions from Turkey in the future.
As has been stated above, that there were two mare nostrums in the mind of
Mussolini. While in the Adriatic, Mussolini displayed some part of his geographical
intention, in the Eastern Mediterranean “there was a growing feeling that Mussolini’s
policy of Italian expansion was aimed more or less directly at Asiatic Turkey.”116
The reasons behind the Italian desire of expansion were also two-tiered in the sense
that Italy, on the one hand, sought to form a strong and secure empire compatibly
with the motives of the day; on the other hand, it was bounded to expand due to the
“growth of population.”117 Therefore, Italy had to find a place for its growing
population and additionally this place had to be rich in terms of raw materials for the
needs of the people who were living in their home-countries. Therefore, according to
Rome, Western Anatolia was a rich target in order to solve the overpopulation and
underproduction problem in Italy.
Mussolini brought up these aims in his speeches in which he stated the
Fascist administration’s motto, “Italy’s glance is in the East” clearly or by
implication. This made Turkey anxious. After a speech again by Mussolini on the
same line, Turkish officials began to discuss the issue with relation to the Caliphate,
because the Caliphate had been recently abandoned in March 1924 in Turkey.
116 E. W. Polson Newman, Mediterranean and Its Problems (London: A. M. Philpot
Ltd. 1927), p.162.
117 Accoring to Francesco Coppola, in 1881 Italy’s population was a little over
twenty eight millions, in 1921 it had risen to fourty millions in Italy itself and about 8
millions abroad. Thus, in fourty years it had increased more than seventy percent. (Coppola,
p.105).
55
Mussolini’s speech coincided with the rumours that Italy had invited the last Caliph.
Considering this coincidence, Ankara felt that the two occasions were related to each
other. However, although an explanation was asked from the government by the
deputies whether Italy had a complex plan over Turkey, Prime Minister Ismet Pasha
preferred to answer these issues individually, in order to calm down the indisposed
crowd. On the one hand, he stated that there was not an official invitation by Italy to
the former caliph and Turkey was no longer interested in matters involving the
former caliph.118 On the other hand, after different topics, he declared that the
Turkish Republic had enough strength to protect the country, and that Mussolini had
given a guarantee about the peace policy towards Turkey.119
The government members and even the president made these kinds of
calming explanations in the National Assembly throughout 1924. For instance, while
Mustafa Kemal was declaring that the political and economic relationship was
improving between Turkey and Italy,120 the prime minister was saying that there was
nothing threatening in the relationship between the two countries.121 However, these
declarations did not reach a point beyond attempts to relieve the public in general. In
reality, Turkish foreign policy was entering a dangerous phase in the sense that Italy
and Britain, in private meetings, had already begun to discuss the “future” of Turkey
on the basis of the Mosul question, which had become a milestone in interwar
Turkish history.
118 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:7, İçtima Senesi:2, 22 March 1924, p.838.
119 Ibid.
120 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:10, İçtima Senesi:II, 1 November 1340, p.4.
121 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:II, Cilt:10, İçtima Senesi:II, 27 November 1340,
p.399.
56
In this context, it is necessary to summarize the basis of the Mosul question
briefly before analyzing the Italian link to the problem. Mosul had been invaded by
the British through the 1918 Mudros Armistice on the basis of Article 7.122 After the
War of Independence, the Turkish delegate had tried to defend the acceptance of
Mosul, which was also included in the National Pact, under Turkish sovereignty.
During the Lausanne Conference, Britain had rejected the Turkish thesis sharply and
tried to send the issue to the League of Nations, contrary of Turkey’s will. In fact,
“throughout the entire history of the Mosul question the Turks showed their
preference for bilateral negotiations and objected to appealing to a third party for a
decision,”123 because Turkey was not a member of the League in which Britain had a
dominant role. However, it could be stated that Turkey’s space for manoeuvring over
the Mosul issue was very limited.124
Therefore, the issue was not discussed at the Conference but it was decided
that the parties would negotiate within nine months. In this sense, since the Golden
Horn Conference, which was started in May 1924, could not solve the issue, the
parties appealed to the League. Throughout the negotiation process in the League in
1925, uprisings and rebellions were observed in various towns and cities in Turkey.
For instance, a Nestorian uprising in Hakkari and famous Sheikh Said rebellion
occurred within this period. While for the former, the documents indicate the British
122 Article 7 foresaw that the Allies could occupy anywhere in which they felt
themselves in danger. This article enabled the occupation of many towns and cities in
different part of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies.
123 Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of
Kemal Atatürk, 1919-38 (Beverley, N. Humber: Eothen Press, 1982), p.81.
124 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri, 1919–1926 (Ankara: Ankara
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1978), p.287.
57
intervention125 for the latter the provocation by the British cannot be documented.
Whatever the factual situation, there was a reality that the Turkish government
stranded with these developments during the process of the Mosul issue.
The British perceived the efforts at suppression by the Turkish government as
against themselves; therefore, they even made a war plan that aerial attack would be
the first reaction against Turkish aggression, followed by a possible blockade of
Istanbul by Royal Navy through occupation of the Turkish islands at the South of the
Dardanelles.126
In this epoch in which the two sides were on the verge of war, the League of
Nations decided in favor of the British in December. Turkey, which was an isolated
country externally and which desired a peaceful environment domestically in order to
succeed at modern reforms at the same time,127 decided to accept the situation in
June 1926.
After this brief background of the problem, the question that should be asked
is to what extent Italy played a role both during the process and in Turkey’s
acceptance of the League’s decision. Perhaps due to the lack of archival documents
on the issue, studies pass over the Italian intervention into the Mosul issue with little
mention or do not even touch upon this role. However, the findings, even if they are
not plenty, show that Italy throughout the period, behind the British, played a major
role in the Mosul issue, in accordance with the Fascist foreign policy’s ambitions of
expansion.
125 Mim Kemal Öke, Belgelerle Türk İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu
1918–1926 (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992) p.139.
126 Evans, p.94.
127 Kürkçüoğlu regards these two features for the acceptance of the situation by
Turkey as the major reasons. Kürkçüoğlu, p.301-314.
58
In fact, the relationship between Mosul and Italy dated back to the end of the
Great War. During the post-war settlement, Italy had sought a fair share of the Near
Eastern oil. In 1922, Lord Curzon promised that Italy would be given a share of oil
when the question of Mosul had been definitely settled.128 Although Italy’s oil claim
would be forgotten even before the date that the issue was settled,129 Britain tried to
spark Italian claims in Anatolia during the negotiation process in order to pressure
Turkey with the Italian occupation threat, for making it understand that “a Turkish
invasion of Iraq would be signal for an Italian landing in Anatolia.”130
To this end, first of all, British Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain and
Mussolini met in various places privately many times. In the first of these meetings,
which took place in December 1924, it is commonly thought that Mussolini and
Chamberlain agreed on diplomatic and economic cooperation in Turkey, although
there is no written evidence about this plan.131 However, in a document, the Italian
War Minister “stated that he had been asked by Mussolini to study the means and
requirements of a possible war against Turkey.”132 It should be underlined that before
the Mussolini-Chamberlain meeting, the British Foreign Secretary also had met with
French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot. Therefore these relations led to hesitations
both in Turkish press and in political circles.
128 Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism, and the Middle East in
British Foreign Policy, 1900-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.139.
129 Ibid., p.140-141.
130 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs (London;
New York: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1926), vol.1925, part.1, p.526.
131 Edwards, p.153-154.
132 Ibid., p.154.
59
For this reason, a deputy in the National Assembly felt obliged to ask what
the basis of these meetings was because it was being claimed that Chamberlain had
stated that the Turkish Republic was weak during the contacts.133 In fact, the
government had already asked the grounds for these points of view through its
diplomatic representatives and had received assurances that none of the powers had
accepted that the topic of the meetings was Turkey specifically. Therefore, viceminister
Şükrü Kaya commented on this situation in the assembly with direct
statements from the politicians of other countries in order to reassure the group.
However, Italy’s statement, “Turkey was not the topic either as an enemy or as a
friend and Italy did not have a ‘Turkey business’ to discuss with Britain,”134 did not
reflect the truth. Turkey knew this fact in the sense that after these explanations,
another deputy declared passionately that “Italy was dreaming of Anatolia and there
is a possibility of a new war.”135
Nearly in the same period, a speech in the Italian parliament set forth the
situation precisely. This time Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) chose
to pass over the question of Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) in April 1925, because
the affair and the intent behind it were clear. The topic of the Italian deputy’s speech
mainly was about the situation in Anatolia. The Italian deputy, Pedarci, stated that
the new customs regime in the Turkish Republic had made a mess of the economic
links between Asia and Europe by closing the doors of Anatolia to European
countries, and additionally that since Turkey had applied a new economic regime, it
133 TBMM Zabıt Cerideleri, Devre:II, Cilt:11, İçtima Senesi:II, 3 January 1925, C:1,
p.360.
134 Ibid., “İtalya Hükümeti dahi Büyük Elçimize, ne dost ve ne düşman Türkiye'nin
hiçbir suretle mevzuubahis olmadığını ve İtalya'nın İngiltere ile görüşecek bir Türkiye işi
olmadığını bildirdi.”
135 TBMM Zabıt Cerideleri, Devre:II, Cilt:13, İçtima Senesi:2, 3 February 1935,
p.131.
60
had only five or six million people although these vast areas could feed nearly fifty
million people.136 Since geographically Turkey belonged to the Mediterranean rather
than to Anatolia, Italy as a Mediterranean country was so uneasy with the situation
that it had to show how Turkey needed its help.137
This statement could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, Italy,
which had made a great effort within the National Struggle and ever after in order to
obtain economic concessions, was perpetuating its position, within an aggressive
mode this time. On the other hand, and more importantly, the reference of the Italian
deputy to the population figures had an inner meaning, other than the new customs
regime of Turkey, because of the fact that one of the motivations of the Italian
expansionism was the overpopulation, as was stated above. Therefore, this speech
can be viewed as an expression of the appropriateness of Anatolia for the Italian
population and initiatives not being in contradiction with the previous period. In
fact, Italy had been interested with this population issue before in the sense that
Italian authorities had given importance to the 1923 population census result in
Turkey.138
Needless to say that, the timing of Pedarci’s speech and the British backing of
Italy over the Anatolian territory due to the Mosul issue were not a coincidence. Italy
was trying to benefit from the heightened tension between Britain and Turkey.
Obviously, the aims of Italy were becoming more worrysome day after day for
Turkey in the sense that the occurrence of menacing speeches and actions was
increasing constantly. For instance, just after the speech of Pedarci, military
136 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/7.42..39.
137 Ibid.
138 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/94.134..11.
61
fortifications even in Sicily had become alarming for Turkey although the Italian
representatives in Ankara tried to tranquilize the Turks.139
In a period in which Turkey had major problems with Britain and with Italy
under the patronage of Britain, new dangers seemed to emerge for Turkey as various
information indicated that Italy was not alone in this issue also. While on the one
hand, there were rumours about a possible Soviet-Italian cooperation against Turkey
in an event of war between Ankara and London;140 on the other hand, there was a
possibility of collaboration between Greece and Italy through which the former
would attack to Eastern Thrace and the latter would make an attempt on
southwestern Anatolia141 at the same time, in the case of a war.
Actually, although whether the former reflected the truth or not was not
certain, the latter was close to the reality in the sense that in addition to the claims
about the presence of a secret treaty between Athens and Rome, there was an
immense amount of intelligence reports that proved cooperation between Greece and
Italy. For instance, one of these reports, which had come from the administrative
district of Ayvalık in August 1925, told that twelve warships under the Greek and
Italian flags had come to the island of Midilli, which was very near Ayvalık, in the
Aegean Sea.142 The head of the region stated in the report that while some of the
warships had gone towards the north, the others before the Midilli Island had made
139 Kürkçüoğlu, p.302
140 Ibid.
141 Newman, p.174.
142 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/101.654..10.
62
fifteen cannon shots.143 As can be inferred, this joint display of power was important
evidence of cooperation between Greeks and the Italians at that time.
Apart from the possible coalition between different powers against Turkey,
Italy, which was constantly increasing its fortifications on the islands, posed a major
threat to Turkish territory even if it was alone. It seems that military fortifications
were a two-tiered strategy of the Italians because, on the one hand, with this military
presence Italy would irritate Turkey with or without the realization of war, and on the
other, in the case of a war it would use the islands. In other words, the presence of
military fortifications on the islands was an effective way to threaten Turkey both
morally and materially.
In that respect, Turkey began to follow the military developments on the
islands closely and interpreted every change on the islands as a proof of the Italian
aim to land in western Anatolia. Although this careful monitoring of the islands
would last throughout the interwar years and republican history due to their strategic
location in terms of Turkish security, it was done with particular vigilance between
1924 and 1927. For instance, an archival document from 1924 underlines the
escalation of military build-ups on Samos Island, and says with “within twenty four
hours,”144 which shows that Turkey was following every development on the islands
with an intelligence network. Additionally, the number of soldiers, ships, and the
airplanes on the islands were constantly being followed in order to anticipate the
future acts of the Italians.145 The final result that the Turkish political authorities
143 Ibid.
144 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/101.653..19.
145 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/101.653..13.
63
derived from these intelligence reports was that Italy was preparing for a war against
Turks in the southwestern Anatolia.146
Considering the information from the islands, the aggressive speeches of
Italian officials, and political rumours, Italy genuinely was preparing for war against
Turkey in order to obtain what they could not get a couple of years ago. Actually,
Italy, which was in a close collaboration with Britain, was obviously benefitting from
other agreements and concessions, which could be seen from the other meetings
between Mussolini and Chamberlain, within general terms between the Italians and
the British.
In that respect, the second meeting between Mussolini and Chamberlain took
place within the period of an official conference in Locarno in October, as opposed
to the secret and private one in December 1924. Actually, the Treaty of Locarno was
concluded between Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy in order to fix the
western borders of Germany while leaving out the eastern territory of it. Although
Italy was much more interested in the eastern borders of Germany; “Chamberlain
hoped to win Mussolini’s adherence to the Rhineland negotiations by offering Italy
‘a special authority’ in the Balkans.”147 Therefore, although this second meeting
between Chamberlain and Mussolini did not target Turkey specifically, it gave a
free-hand to Mussolini in the Balkans. In this context, it was also a potential danger
to Turkey.
According to Barlas, Locarno gave two important advantages to Italy. While
on the one hand, it gave Rome the right to interfere in the politics of Western Europe
as a great power, on the other hand, it paved the way for Mussolini to focus on the
146 Ibid.
147 Burgwyn, p.30.
64
Balkans due to the fact that Locarno did not guarantee the frontiers in the East.148 If
the permission of Chamberlain about the free hand in the Balkans is added to this
interpretation, it was very natural that Rome would play a dominant role in Eastern
matters thereafter.
In terms of the freehand of Italy, it could be stated that two countries were
under the threat of Italian aggression in this period, Albania and Turkey. For the
former, Italy first made economic aids, with consequential demands that were
submitted to the Albanian government in return.149 Since Albania was on the eve of
revolution and financial bankruptcy, Ahmed Bey Zogu was forced to sign the Tirana
Treaty finally in November 1926. This treaty, which actually made Albania a
disguised protectorate, changed the equilibrium not only in the Adriatic region, but
also in the Balkans in general.150
In terms of Turkey, after Locarno, Italy both continued to prepare militarily
on the islands and increased its cooperation with the British. In that respect, the third
meeting between Chamberlain and Mussolini occurred in December 1925, in
Rapallo, three months after Locarno. Although the Locarno meetings had not led to
speculations specifically about Turkey despite the fact it had given free hand to Italy
in terms of the Balkans, the third meeting between the parties was regarded as a
meeting that “Italy and Britain agreed over the policy in the Balkans and Iraq
respectively in Rapallo.”151 The aforementioned “Balkans” here probably implied
Turkey, because the point at issue was Mosul.
148 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.234.
149 Kissoudi, p.1716.
150 “Eastern Europe,” Current History (New York) 26, no.2 (May 1927), p.320.
151 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 30..10/12.71..38.
65
Whether Britain really agreed to permit Italian expansionism by getting
Fascist support against Turkey on the Mosul issue or not cannot be proved on the
basis of written documents. However, there was a reality that this cooperation played
a major role on Turkey’s acceptance of the League’s decision over Mosul. Although
the intelligence claimed that Italy decided not to land in Izmir in the last months
before the acceptance of the terms over Mosul, contrary to their clear decision to land
beforehand,152 Turkey was constantly alarmed by Italian aggression. In this sense,
the Turkish government called the young men aged 21 and 22 years and the reserves
of 23 to 26 to the arms with this fear,153 and conducted military exercises in Izmir as
a show of force, and finally accepted the decision of the League of Nations, because
it thought that it could not cope with both the British and the Italians, and maybe
with the Greeks as well, on different fronts at the same time. This orientation of
Turkey reflected a logical attitude in the sense that despite the intelligence reports of
some officials, the Italians had not ended their plans about Turkey, yet, even if they
had done this for Izmir. Therefore, it can be suggested that Italy was one of the major
determinants in terms of Turkey’s acceptance of the Mosul decision of the League,
under the classification of external reasons.154
Since the Italian ambitions towards Turkish lands were revived with British
backing, it could be expected that Italian plans would come to an end after the
problems between Turkey and Britain were resolved. However, the plans of Rome to
land in Anatolia had not expired. Although some data claim that Italians had given
up the idea of landing on Turkey, specifically at Izmir, as seen above, other
152 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.595..37.
153 Lybyer Albert Howe, “Turkey Alarmed by Rumored Italian Agression,” Current
History 24, no.3 (June 1926), p.477.
154 Kürkçüoğlu, p.302.
66
documents suggest that the considerations of the Italians had not totally ended, but
that they changed the zone in the sense that even after the British support ceased to
exist, these documents show that Italians began to search for ways to enter the
Adana-Mersin region throughout 1926 and in some parts of 1927.
In this period, correspondences passed between the Italian Consulate of
Adana, Mersin, Istanbul, and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the
geographic, economic, and military conditions of the area in order to reach a final
conclusion about the probability of success of a possible occupation. For instance, a
letter from the Italian Consulate in Adana to the Ministry in Rome describes the
obstacles, in general, in the region for an invading army.155 According to this letter,
the Adana region was not suitable for transportation in the rainy seasons; additionally
it lacked of plant cover, clean water, and housing facilities.156 Therefore, it could be
claimed that Italy, even after the Mosul issue was concluded, continued to dream
about Turkish lands. However, not due to the above-mentioned reasons but due to
various causes like changing international political and economic conditions both for
Italy and Turkey, and the withdrawal of British support for the Italians who could not
have the power to pursue this kind of ambitious program alone, beginning with 1927
Turkey and Italy laid the foundations of a détente period which would evidently
become the exact opposite of this era, as can be seen in the subsequent part.
In conclusion, in 1922, the relationship between Turkey and Italy began to
take its shape, and continued throughout this period. As opposed to the first years of
the National Struggle in which the resentful Italians who had not been able to take
what had been offered with the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne, had acted in
155 Quoted by Damiani, p.143-144.
156 Ibid., p.143-44.
67
favour of the Kemalists, because they were alienated from the Allies. This strategy
was formulated by Carlo Sforza, who thought that Italy could obtain economic
concessions even if it could not make any territorial advances. However, due to the
government changes in Italy and the increasing nationalist stance of the Kemalists,
Italy began to rethink that the Allies could provide many more advantages to Italy
than Ankara could propose. In this respect, a close cooperation among the Allies was
seen during the Lausanne conference. Although Italy took a tough position at
Lausanne both over Meis Island and over the capitulations, it succeeded only in the
former while it lost the negotiations together with its Allies over the capitulations.
After 1923, the relationship between fascist Italy and the Turkish Republic
proceeded on the same axis, in other words, in the vein of expansionism, combined
with the Fascist tone in the Italian foreign policy. In this period, Italy chose the
Balkans as its targets in the sense that it began to show its intent beginning with the
Fiume and Corfu incidents. However, the overpopulation and underproduction
problems of Italy led Rome to seek areas that could solve these issues. Therefore,
Rome began to deal with Turkey, which was an internationally isolated country with
some major international problems, and with Albania, which was dependent on Italy.
In terms of Turkey, Italy chose to act behind the British in the sense that
Britain was playing the Italian card in order to force Turkey to accept the British
position. Obviously, this strategy of the British proved to be useful, because Italy
became one the most important reasons behind the enforced obedience of Turkey to
the League’s decision over the Mosul issue. But, interestingly enough, although the
Mosul problem came to an end, the ambitious plans of Italy did not expire. That is to
say, between 1926 and 1927, Italy continued to plan landing on that Anatolian lands,
mainly in the Adana region. However, within 1927, Rome decided to abandon this
68
territorial strategy, thus, to turn down the page within the Turkish-Italian relationship
through different strategies.
69
CHAPTER 5
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITALY, 1927-1932:
SO-CALLED FRIENDSHIP
Throughout this study, Turkish-Italian diplomatic relations are shown as a curve
which fluctuated ever so often. In that respect, if the previous chapter designated the
lower part of the curve beginning with Lausanne negotiations, conversely to the War
of Independence but compatibly with aforementioned characteristic of fluctuation,
this chapter is going to mark the upper part of it. To put it another way, between
1927 and 1932, the contacts between Turkey and Italy depended on cooperation in
various issues, as opposed to the antagonism of the former period.
In this respect, before displaying the specific events of the period, two
common but substantially mistaken orientation of the Turkish historiography about
this time scale should be mentioned. First of all, numerous sources that deal with
Turkish foreign policy in the interwar era are prone to regard Turco-Italo relations as
a continuum.157 These studies usually underline that although 1928 Treaty became a
turning point in terms of détente between the parties, the relations did not follow a
peaceful path hereafter. However, archival materials show that after 1928 Treaty, in
addition to the political rapprochement, positive economic and social linkages had
been formed between Turkey and Italy and these four years could be handled as a
period different from the other two ones.
Secondly, while some writers ignore the détente in the relations, the others
who made these distinctions prefer defining the starting point as 1928. For instance,
157 For instance, Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış
Politikası (1919-1939); Fahir Armaoğlu, Siyasi Tarih 1789–1960 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası,
1964); Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar ed., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası; (1919-1965)
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1969).
70
Barlas, refers to the 1928-1932 time interval when she mentions a “warmth” in the
relations.158 It is true that 1928 was very important due to the signing of the Treaty of
Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Solution (Türkiye-İtalya Tarafsızlık, Uzlaştırma
ve Yargısal Çözüm Andlaşması) between the parties on May of that year, which
became evidently a major turning point in the relations. However, as can be
anticipated, this treaty did not stem from an overnight agreement. On the contrary,
1927 had a very special role in the conclusion of this Convention due to the
developments both specifically in Turkish and Italian domestic and foreign contexts
in that year, and also in the European arena in general. Thus, it is suitable to initiate
the period with 1927 that paved the way for the Neutrality and Friendship Treaty
rather than to begin with the date of the treaty itself.
In this context, first of all, one of the most noteworthy reasons for the
détente between Turkey and Italy was the existing competition between France and
Italy both in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. Compatibly with the displays of
the previous chapter about the background and the conduct of this competition, Italy
pursued a policy of pinpricks in this time interval also, directed at Paris, which was
scarcely surprising in the sense that, France remained “public enemy number two” in
an environment where, at least in the short term, there was no longer “public enemy
number one” because on the one hand Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist and on
the other hand Germany, within the chains of the Versailles System, could not pose a
threat to Austria, therefore, to Italy, yet.159 It should be noted that only after Hitler
became a threat to whole Europe, France and Italy would soften to each other but in a
very limited way.
158 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.231-32.
159 R. J. Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, 1860-1960 (London, UK: Routledge,
1995), p.44.
71
Therefore, the effort of Italy to become closer to Turkey was meaningful in
this context where France had dominated the Little Entente by 1927. Although the
formation of the Entente had been undertaken by the Central-Eastern European
countries, which had been born from the ashes of the Austria-Hungary Empire
independently from France in the first half of 1920s, Paris signed alliance treaties
with those Central-Eastern European powers in order to dominate this alliance
system step by step. The final point within that relationship occurred when France
and Yugoslavia concluded the last alliance treaty within the framework of the Little
Entente on 11 November 1927. This treaty particularly irritated Italy because Italy
was considering Yugoslavia as an enemy due to its broad territories in an area in
which Italy was chiefly interested and this alliance was the last one of “the series of
treaties that marked the high point of French ascendancy in the Balkans and Eastern
Europe.”160 Therefore, by 1927, an anti-revisionist bloc had been formed near Italy’s
territory, and worse, this anti-revisionist bloc was headed by an adversary, France.
In this context, Italy, which had already good relations with revisionist
Bulgaria and Hungary and dominated Albania with the 1926 treaty, began to pay
attention to Turkey and Greece interdependently, in the area because, according to
Rome, the French Entente system could be counter-balanced by forming an Aegean
bloc between Ankara, Athens, and Rome.161 Although Italy failed to achieve that
kind of bloc at that time because of the problems between Turkey and Greece it
would never give up the idea of forming a bloc including these two countries and
mainly Bulgaria, perhaps also with Hungary, as the following pages will show. What
is important here, is that the desire to balance the dominance of France brought Italy
160 Stavrianos, p.734.
161 Barlas and Güvenç, p.146.
72
alongside Turkey, which was experiencing problems with France at that time due to
the Syrian border issue and the Ottoman debts.
Secondly, a problem which seriously affected Turkish-Italian relations in the
previous years had been eliminated in 1926. That was the Mosul problem which had
brought Turkey and Britain nearly to the brink of war. Italy’s position on the issue,
and relatedly on the Dodecanese Islands had formed the basis of the fear that Turkey
had felt towards Italy. However, by 1927, this obstacle had been completely
removed. Therefore, while Italy was no longer backed by Britain anymore in order to
startle Turkey, in return, Turkey obtained a chance to ameliorate its foreign relations
with other powers, including Italy. For that issue, Barlas argues that Rome, which
was waiting for the break down of the Turkish Republic, saw that the Mosul issue
did not lead to the collapse of the new republic, therefore, Mussolini began to regard
Turkey more as a regional actor rather than as a potential colony.162 This
interpretation reflects the truth in the sense that in these years the republican regime
was consolidated both internally with the elimination of all opposition and externally
with the efforts to solve the existing problems with the Great Powers. It should be
underlined that since Rome tried to achieve its foreign policy goals regarding the
southwestern Anatolia in collaboration with the British around the Mosul issue at
that time, it was very meaningful that Italy tried to be closer with Turkey after the
British-Turkish problems came to an end. Although after the end of the Mosul
problem Italy had made individual invasion plans about Anatolia, in the context of
1927, it decided to implement peaceful means through which it could both
counterbalance France in the Balkans and form domination in Turkey.
162 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.232-238.
73
Apart from the political factors that depended on the strategic orientation of
Italy and Turkey, economic conditions played a fundamental role in the
rapprochement of Italy to Turkey. Firstly, the global economy, in general, was one
the verge of a big financial collapse which materialized in 1929. Additionally,
together with the global financial difficulties, the Italian economy was experiencing
economic hardships. In that respect, Rome adapted autarchic policies in 1927 in
order to cope with the economic problems.163 This meant that while Rome imposed
high tariffs on imports, it wanted to make exports with products from the traditional
sectors in order to ease the balance of payments pressure.164 Therefore, what Italy
sought to achieve with the peace in the relationship had an additional economic
dimension through which it would broaden its influence in the Turkish economic
market. In this context, both the uppermost position of Italy in the import levels of
Turkey at the end of the period and the naval trade between the parties in the
meantime should be considered also from an economic point of view.
All of these reasons led to the desire of Italy to become closer to Turkey. In
return, Turkey had also important considerations in favor of this rapprochement. First
of that was the loneliness of Turkey “in which a sense of insecurity was more
accentuated than in most Balkan countries because of its international isolation,
marked by its outcast status vis-à-vis the League of Nations.”165 Therefore,
rapprochement with Rome would constitute the first step in the normalization of
relations with other European powers. In addition, friendship with Italy was
important also in terms of securing Turkish territory in the sense that Italy as a
163 Jon S. Cohen and Giovanni Federico, The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820-
1960 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.22.
164 Ibid., p.22.
165 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.239.
74
country which had ambitions towards Turkish territory would accept the integrity of
this territory by defining itself as a friend of Turkey, according to viewpoint of
Ankara.166
Therefore, both sides found rapprochement advantageous for their interests
although Ankara became suspicious about the sincerity of Rome due to the fact that
Turkish leaders knew that Rome would not suddenly become an ally of Ankara.167 In
fact, this mistrust about Italy regarding the “real” intent of the Fascist state towards
Turkey always persisted at least in the minds of the Turkish officials and influenced
the course of events in the subsequent periods. However, for now, despite all of the
deficiencies, like confidence within the contacts that should exist in a friendship, it
could not be denied that Turkey and Italy were opening a new phase in terms of their
relationship.
In that respect, the meeting which took place between Tevfik Rüştü Aras and
Mussolini in Milan, in 1927 could be regarded as the first instance in which efforts
were made in order to come closer. About the meeting, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, in his
book Görüşlerim, conveys that, first of all, Mussolini complained about Turkey’s
attitude, which was regarded as an insult to Italy by the Fascist state.168 The reason
behind this feeling of Rome was that Italy was on notice about the efforts of Turkey
in order to solve the problems with Greece, and it had interpreted some issues in the
contacts against itself. After Aras assured Mussolini that the contacts were just about
the solution of existing problems and the mutual restriction of naval arms on the
Aegean Sea, without being against any power, Mussolini seemed to be satisfied and
166 Gönlübol and Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası, p.77.
167 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.238.
168 Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Görüşlerim (İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi 1945), p.52.
75
mentioned his desire for a tripartite alliance in which Bulgaria also could take part in
the near future.169
As this chapter will show, Italy would insist on a possible collaboration
among these Balkan powers during the subsequent meetings, but the existing
problems among those states would not allow such an accompanying alliance.
However, although Mussolini’s plan did not seem achievable at the time of this
meeting, it should be underlined that the success of the meeting laid in the fact that it
paved the way for further diplomatic contacts and negotiations as well as for the
1928 Turkish-Italian Friendship and Neutrality Treaty.
Accordingly, after the Milan meeting, a series of other meetings were held
between Turkish and Italian officials. Every one of them contributed to making these
two countries closer, but specifically the one held again in Milan on April 1928 was
very influential on the signing of the treaty in May 1928. At that meeting, the Italian
officials tried to achieve two goals. First, they struggled to convince Turkey of their
good will, second, they tried to constitute a basis for a tripartite alliance in the
Mediterranean, which above all else required a peaceful settlement of problematic
issues between Ankara and Athens.
In order to achieve the latter, Mussolini provided an atmosphere in Milan
where the Turkish and Greek officials could meet and exchange views about the
possibility of an arbitration treaty and additionally he accentuated Italy’s
presumptive role as a guarantor in a future Turkish-Greek compromise.170 What
Mussolini wanted to achieve at that point was to be able to take a grip on both
Turkey and Greece by dominating the forthcoming peace between these two
169 Ibid.
170 M. Murat Hatipoğlu, Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954 (Ankara:
Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), p.110.
76
countries. In other words, Mussolini thought that if Italy endeavored for a solution to
the Greek-Turkish problems, these two countries would feel indebted themselves to
Italy, therefore Italy, as the founder of the peace, would impose its will upon them
more easily.
Obviously, the points under consideration between Turkey and Greece
were not so plain that the invitation of the two countries’ foreign ministers to direct
the negotiations was not adequate for the solution. The different interpretations about
the population exchange settlement of the Lausanne Treaty, the property problems on
the basis of the exchange of populations, minority rights, and the status of the
ecumenical patriarchate were problems which were constantly provoking disputes
between the Turks and the Greeks since 1923.171 Additionally, the different
occasions on which the sides tried to find peaceful settlement to these problems had
never yielded any results. Italy was aware of this fact and did not insist on an
expeditious agreement at that time. Rather, it continued to push for further
negotiations between the parties.
What this meeting achieved, instead was the defrosting of Turkish-Italian
relations. Actually, all of the meetings and the negotiations which were held from the
year 1927 to April 1928 was influential in yielding the desired results in terms of the
normalization of this relationship. However, the 1928 Milan meeting had the utmost
importance in the sense that it became a threshold in the rapprochement between
Rome and Ankara. This characteristic of the meeting was also underlined on 22 April
1928, right after the Milan meeting, in one of the sessions of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who said:
“Our intercourse with Italy, which is one of our Western neighbors, is very amicable.
171 For further information, see H. J. Psomiades, Greek-Turkish Relations, 1923-
1930: A Study in the Politics of Rapprochement (Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 1962).
77
The meeting, which occurred in Milan recently with the neighbor and friend
country’s head of government, who is also an important personality of our epoch,
became an admirable milestone in the way of these friendly relations”172 about the
negotiations.
Apart from the statement of Aras, the importance of the meeting was also
evident in its concrete result, the Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial
Solution, was signed in Rome on 30 May 1928. According to this treaty, the parties
would remain neutral in an event of aggression that was directed against one of them,
would consult for reconciliation method or judicial processes if a problem arose
between them, and would resort to the Hague Tribunal if a disagreement arose about
the interpretation and the implementation of the treaty.173 Although the general
framework of the text was peculiar to the atmosphere of this era, in other words,
although there was no striking point within the treaty, it was important in the sense
that on the one hand it was made between Turkey and Italy, the relations of which
were malignant for years, on the other hand, it opened a new phase in which these
countries began to manage their affairs within the sphere of diplomatic courtesy
rather than coercion and deterrence.
The importance that was attributed to the treaty can be seen also from the
speeches of the prime ministers of both countries. As Mussolini, in a speech in the
Senate on 5 June 1928, said:
During the last two years, since the intrigues of elements, alien to Turkey
but hostile to Italy, had ceased, Italo-Turkish relations have greatly
improved…The importance of this Protocol, which seals the agreement
172 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:III, Cilt:3, İçtima Senesi:1, 22 April 1928, C:1,
p.197. “Garb komşularımızdan İtalya ile münasebatımız çok dostanedir. Devrimizin çok
mühim şahsiyetlerinden komşu ve dost devletin reisi hükümeti ile Milano’da ahiren vuku
bulan mülakat bu dostane münasebat yolunda şayanı kayıt bir merhale olmuştur.”
173 İsmail Soysal, Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte Türkiye’nin Siyasal
Andlaşmaları (1920-1945) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), vol.1, p.333-339.
78
between Italy and Turkey, is obvious. The horizon of the Eastern
Mediterranean is now clear and free of all clouds. Italy meets Turkey in a
sincere and friendly spirit…174
İsmet İnönü also emphasized the disappearance of the obstacles to peace in the
Mediterranean and the improvement of the friendship between the countries by
stating:
…both countries have suffered greatly from the currents of suspicion and
lack of confidence which have been stirred up artificially by one or
another side with the object of creating a storm of misunderstanding
between the two countries. The signature of the treaty of arbitration and
non-aggression with that country has happily put an end to the lies of
international speculators of all kinds, which fact has probably
exasperated them; the treaty has been a blessing for the two countries as
well as for the real friends of peace…I can assure you that since the
signature of the treaty, this confidence has steadily increased on both
sides.175
Parallel to the speeches of the prime ministers, Aras, who was one of the most
notable promoters of the Treaty, stated that the friendship with Italy was compatible
with Turkey’s real interests, in a speech on the occasion of ratification. He also
underlined the importance of this treaty for the Mediterranean, which was on the
intersection point of three continents.176
As can be seen from the speeches, both sides attributed great importance to the
treaty, and therefore, to their strategic friendship. In that respect, after that point, both
sides would try to benefit from this relationship on the basis of their interests. While
Turkey tried to utilize the coadjutant role of Rome towards Ankara in the political,
economic, military realms, Rome enjoyed from the privileges, in terms of being
174 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs
(London: New York: Oxford University Press, 1929), v.1928, p.143.
175 Ibid., p.220
176 T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:III, Cilt:V, İçtima Senesi:I, 29 November 1928,
p.73-74.
79
considerably influential in Turkish politics and economy that evidently stemmed
from this cooperation.
If 1927 became the preparation year and 1928 became the turning point in
terms of Turkish-Italian relations, 1929 could be qualified as the consolidation year
of this partnership. Accordingly, the areas from which the two countries tried to
benefit as underlined above were undertaken through the diplomatic visits from
different levels throughout the year.
In this context, in February 1929, Dino Grandi, Undersecretary of the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, travelled to Ankara in order to discuss several political
and economic issues between Rome and Ankara. However, his visit was reduced by
several European newspapers, especially the French ones, to the efforts of the Italian
officials to form a tripartite alliance among Ankara, Athens and Rome.177 Although
these claims were not authenticated, the visit of Grandi to Greece right before the one
to Turkey, and his explanations after these two meetings about the goodwill of both
two sides for the solution of the problems, denominated that Rome was intervening
in the negotiation process between those two countries even if it did not push for a
tripartite alliance at this immature level.
Obviously, Italy’s real intent within the issue was to form an alternative bloc
which would revisionist above all in the Balkans to which actually neither Greece not
Turkey was a volunteer. However, there was an undeniable reality that Italy was
trying to solve the issue whatever its intent was. Thus, at that point, both Turkey and
Greece accepted this helping hand, because Ankara tried not only to adjudicate
population exchange problem but also to find a place for itself in the European arena
through the cooperation with Italy while Greece used this friendship both “to press
177 Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1928.
80
Yugoslavia in settling the long-standing dispute over the free zone in Salonika,”178
and to obtain the most successful result from the negotiations with Turkey. To put it
differently, the domination of Italy was profitable for both of them in the meantime
even if their foreign policy perspectives were not revisionist.
However, since Italy was regarded as a Fascist state with ambitions in Anatolia
and, in contrast, Turkey was qualified as a middle power with limited opportunities,
the exponential friendship led to different interpretations. For instance, rumors about
a secret mutual aid treaty between the parties were so outspreaded that Aras felt
bound to make an explanation in which he stated that Turkey was ready to sign
neutrality treaties with any country, but would never conclude a mutual aid pact.179
While Turkey displayed conduct which emphasized the independent nature of
Turkish foreign policy due to its disquiet about this kind of rumor, Italy was trying to
placate Ankara about the disposition of Rome. In that respect, Mussolini made
speeches through which he explained the general conduct of the Italian foreign
policy by denoting that Italy did not want to be harmful to the peace, which had been
obtained by forming friendships and signing treaties with its neighbors.180 To what
extent Turkey was relieved with these explanations was ambiguous; however,
whatever the real situation was, Turkey and Italy began to take steps within their
contacts at a rapid pace.
Accordingly, in the same month with information which designated that the
Turkish-Greek negotiations were full of disputes due to the different goals of the
parties, news indicated that Turkey called upon Italian assistance. In other words, it
could not be a coincidence that just after Turkey felt indisposed about news on the
178 Stavrianos, p.736.
179 Cumhuriyet, 26 February 1929.
180 Quoted by Cumhuriyet, 12 March 1929.
81
sale of Turkish real estates in Greece before a compromise and about the reports
which indicated that the negotiations would be suspended;181 the Italian press wrote
information about an upcoming visit by Aras to Rome.182 Although there were other
important political and economic issues that should have been discussed between two
countries, it was evident that Italy also would try to provide options for a peaceful
solution with its precursor role in the issue. The press of the other countries also
linked the desire of Turkey for the conciliatory role of Italy in the negotiations with
the visit of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Rome.183
Although Turkish official circles did not pronounce this nature of the visit
explicitly, Aras, before his trip to Rome, stated that although this was a return visit,
people were free to interpret the occasion as they liked.184 Therefore, it would not be
erroneous to claim that, with this explanation, Turkish officials confessed the
appraisals, yet in a tacit way.
On 11 April 1929, Aras departed from Turkey, firstly, to Geneva, with the aim
of participation in the preparation committee for the Conference on the Limitation of
Armaments. It should be reminded that throughout the interwar years, the limitation
of armaments issue was negotiated within different realms, either in the meeting
between the Great Powers or within the framework of the League of Nations. Since
disarmament had been qualified as a sine qua non requirement for sustainable
peace,185 interwar international relations, especially in the period between the end of
181 Cumhuriyet, 10 March 1929.
182 Giornale D’Italia, 27 March 1929, quoted by Cumhuriyet,28 March 1929.
183 Le Petit Parisien, 15 April 1929, quoted by Cumhuriyet, 16 April 1929.
184 Cumhuriyet, 11 April 1929.
185 Fahir Armaoğlu, Siyasi Tarih 1789–1960, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1964), p.
533.
82
the First World War and the year 1933, tried repeatedly to come to agreement on the
disarmament issue. In this context, the commission meeting in 1929 in Geneva, too,
in which Aras participated and defended that “the will to put limits to the armament
was the requirement for the peace and composure of the humanity,”186 remained an
unimportant move in world history.
Although the conference became an inconclusive and unimportant example of
peace efforts, as many others in the whole interwar era, the post-conference period
became very important for specifically the Turkish Republic in terms of the visit to
Rome just after Geneva, because in this meeting many issues, both political and
economic, were discussed and some of them were concluded.
First of all, the solution to the contentious issue of the problem of the territorial
waters between Italy-owned Meis Island and the western Anatolian coast, and the
problem of the proprietorship of Karaada, were laid down in this meeting. In fact, the
Karaada issue had been decided in favor of Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty.187
However, Italy had insisted on its sovereignty on the island near to Bodrum Coast. In
response to the continuous claims of Italy, Turkey had delivered several notes to the
Italian government with an emphasis on its rights that stemmed from the Lausanne
Treaty.188 Despite the efforts of Ankara to persuade Rome on the basis of its position,
the problem persisted up until this meeting. However, after the meeting, with the
help of improving friendship and the promise of solving the issues through the legal
means set in the 1928 Treaty, the two states decided to solve the issue within the
186 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: III, Cilt:12, İçtima Senesi:2, 19 May 1929, p.64-
66.
187 Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty says that “except where a provision to the
contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from
the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.”
188 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.596..28.
83
framework of the Hague Tribunal. In that respect, the parties signed a contract on 30
May 1929 about their agreement to arbitration in which Turkey declared that it
would accept the final decision of the court.189
This decision shows that, on the one hand, the meeting between Aras and
Grandi as well as Mussolini became the base for the solution of a long-standing
problem; on the other hand, it showed that the relationship between Turkey and Italy
had reached at a level at which the two states were not thinking of any method other
than peaceful ones, as opposed to the previous period. Additionally, it should also be
noted that this issue would not be solved in the Court, because after a decision of the
parties to negotiate the issue between themselves again,190 it would be solved through
the diplomatic channels in 1932. The result would be qualified as the success of the
Turkish-Italian friendship, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter.
Apart from the Karaada issue, economic matters were taken into consideration
at the meeting. At that point, it should be claimed that both the Turkish and Italian
governments were satisfied in the sense that after Aras returned to Turkey, he
declared that a trade agreement would be signed in the near future after the
negotiations were completed between the officials.191 The declaration of Aras
displays that economic matters were given as much attention in these meetings as
political ones.
What should be underlined at this point is that although important steps in
terms of politics and economy were taken as a result of the meeting, there was
neither any declaration nor any concrete results regarding the Turkish-Greek issue,
which had raised the rumors that had been confirmed implicitly before the visit. It
189 Ibid., 030..10/237.598..1.
190 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: IV, Cilt:3, İçtima Senesi:1, 15.07.1931, p.129-130.
191 Cumhuriyet, 1 May 1929.
84
was evident that the issue had been handled during the visit within the framework of
the increasing intervention of Rome; however, it was impossible to reach a
conclusion at that point in the sense that there was a long road to the peace which
would be concluded in 1930.
To conclude the remarks about the meeting, one can assess that both sides were
so satisfied with the results that when Tevfik Rüştü Aras explained the contacts both
to the Grand National Assembly and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he
highlighted the “positive and fruitful results and the hospitality of the official circles
to the Turkish delegate”192 and the “respect of Italy to the Ghazi and to the open
politics of the Turkish Government.”193
The developments after May are especially worth to mentioning. Mutual
gestures were made in order to make the warm contacts warmer. For instance, while
Turkey declared that in the summer holiday one thousand scout students would visit
Italy in order to make contacts with Italian scouts, Italy declared their desire to hold
football matches with Turkish teams.194 Thus, improvements in diplomatic relations
was tried to be spilled over into the social spheres.
Additionally, a development in the same month which could be qualified not
only as economic but also as military one occurred. After the Turkish government
had declared its ten-year naval armament program in 1928 and different tenders had
been made for naval construction contracts, on 24 May 1929 the decision of Turkish
officials in favor of the Italians was made public.195 When the visit of the Air
Minister, General Italo Balbo, the air fleet with some torpedo boats, and nearly 20
192 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..1.
193 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: III, Cilt:12, İçtima Senesi:2, 19 May 1929, p.65.
194 Cumhuriyet, 9 May 1929.
195 Barlas and Güvenç, p.149-153.
85
journalists showed simultaneity with the victory of the Italian companies in the bids
of the Turkish navy’s renewal, world public opinion began to worry about the nature
of the relationship. In that respect, an article that was published in New York Times
made noteworthy interpretations about the developments between those two states.
According to that article, the contract with the Italians for the naval
construction, which had been signed although the French and British companies
offered much more favorable conditions, and right after the visit of the Italian air
fleet to Istanbul with the Air Minister was nothing beyond a policy of Turkey’s
“Italianization.”196 The article stated that, this visit, on the one hand, was one of the
steps that was taken by the Italian government to “Italianize” Turkey, in other words,
to dominate the country; on the other hand, was the initial move of Italy in terms of
its ambitions towards the Eastern Mediterranean.197 The same source also indicated
that Italy, which also aimed at obtaining territory for its growing population in the
Antalya region, was turned a blind eye by the British, because Britain at the time
seemed pleased at the appearance of Italy as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union in
the region.198
It was obvious that Turkey shared these concerns about Fascist Rome, due to its
legacy and the consciousness of Turkish officials about the nature of the Fascist
foreign policy. However, as the reasons were explained, both countries needed to
come closer continuously in this period and Turkey could not resist what the Italians
offered.
196 New York Times, 7 June 1929, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General
Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..12.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
86
In this context, what the Italian support meant for Turkey at this time scale will
be easier to understand if, for instance, the initiative of the “United States of Europe”
is analyzed. In September 1929, the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand broached
the idea of a European Federation for which he adapted the principle that each
nation, while mindful of its own interest, should not feel obliged to oppose the
interest of any other.199 Actually, the European Federation idea had been proposed
and discussed several times before the initiative of Briand. The importance of
Briand’s proposal stemmed from the fact that firstly, the European scene needed this
kind of a project, because “Briand had accepted that the Europe would not be saved
either by the Statute of the League of Nations or the Locarno Treaties;”200 and
secondly, that the proposals before this had not gone beyond academic debates.
However, although the European Federation idea became a tangible issue with
Briand’s proposal,201 the problem for Turkey with the idea was that it was not invited
to the meetings in Geneva, as the Soviet Union and the Republic of Ireland were not.
The ignorance of Turkey and the Soviet Union by the other European states largely
stemmed from the fact that these states were not members of the League of Nations
rather than from an ideologically driven debate about the Europeanness of Turkey or
Russia.
At that point, what is important in order to understand the importance of Italy
for Turkey at that time was the fact that Italy displayed its stance during the first
session of the relevant meeting in favor of Turkey. In this context, firstly Italian and
German officials contributed to the formation of a commission that discussed the
199 Jules-Bois, “Aristide Briand, Member of Twenty-One French Cabinets,” Current
History (New York) 31, no.3 (December 1929), p535.
200 Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası (İstanbul: Kaynak, 2003), p.74.
201 Ibid.
87
participation of Turkey and the Soviet Union in the negotiation process, and secondly
Dino Grandi, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1929,
repeated his stance throughout the discussion by stating that the “a European Union
without Turkey would never become a complete Europe.”202 As a result of the efforts
of Italy and Germany, Turkey, in conclusion, participated in the negotiations in
Geneva.
Thus, what this story points out is that Italy during this period, worked to
alleviate Turkey’s isolation. Therefore, even if Ankara was not very comfortable
with the nature of the Italian foreign policy, as stated above, and was aware of the
real intent of Rome, it was in a need of friends in the international arena. It should
also be underlined that Rome also behaved in a careful, at least non-aggressive,
manner towards Turkey, in order not to alienate it, because Italy had comprehended
that this kind of policy, rather than a colonialist one that was hard to achieve due to
the consolidation of the Republic, had the chance of success in terms of benefitting
from Turkey politically, economically, and militarily.203 In other words, in a suitable
environment, Italy and Turkey cohabited in the meantime.
Turning to the 1929 developments, while Turkish-Italian relations were
increasingly improving, the world and the European scene began to darken. First of
all, the disarmament and the war reparations issues were subjects of tension within
Europe. For the former, despite negotiation process that was going on in Geneva, no
concrete result was yielded. On every occasion related to the disarmament issue, the
relations among the big powers deteriorated as a result of the speculative speeches of
the leaders. For the war reparations, on the other hand, the Dawes plan which had
202 Cunhuriyet, 23 January 1931.
203 Barlas and Güvenç, p.149.
88
been formulated in 1924 seemed to work until 1927, after which problems started to
appear in the system. When Germany requested a revision of the Dawes Plan, the
Allies and American bankers responded in early 1929 with the Young Plan which
reduced German obligations and set up new collection machinery;204 however, this
Plan had not been adapted easily. For instance, while France had resisted the Young
Plan for a long period of time, Mussolini also had criticized the Plan stating that “the
states, which seems peace-loving, are playing with the fire.”205
The Young Plan could not be implemented due to the most important
development of the 1929, which affected the whole world, including the concerned
parties of this study. This was the Great Depression, which began with the New York
stock exchange crisis on 24 October 1929. Although the crisis originated in the U.S.,
the impacts became worldwide and enduring.
How Turkey and Italy responded to the financial difficulties and to what extent
Turkish-Italian economic relations were affected by the world economic crisis will
be analyzed in another section. However, it should be underlined that, at a time when
Turkey wanted to found a national central bank in order to cope with the crisis more
efficiently and was unable to obtain the necessary reports that it expected from the
German financial experts,206 the former Italian Minister of Finance, Cont Volpi
accepted Turkey’s request to make investigations about the conditions for a central
bank and travelled to Turkey.207 Just after the visit of Volpi, who expressed positive
204 Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the
Former Central Powers,1921-29 (Wilmington: Del. Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1983), p.155.
205 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..15.
206 Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy
Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939 (New York: Brill, 1998), p.86.
207 Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, n.d., “Tarihçe,” available [online]:
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/banka/tarihce.html, [15 January 2009].
89
views about the issue, Turkey declared that it would found the central bank. The
importance of that fact was that Turkey tried to benefit from Italian backing, which
was ready at that time as well as in the time of the Great Depression. In other words,
this instance showed that in that period Turkey used its smooth diplomatic relations
with Italy for its ends repeatedly.
However, another issue with which Ankara had already preferred the
involvement of Italy, namely relations with Greece, was progressing slowly. The
negotiation process was sometimes getting tense in the sense that the parties were
delivering notes to each other. Apart from the slow process of negotiations, Greece
misinterpreted Turkey’s efforts to invigorate the navy. The Greek press wrote that
Turkey would assault to the Greek Islands.208 It was no coincidence that nearly at the
same time Greece also decided on the renovation of its navy. However, Italy still
believed and anticipated that the problem would be settled in the near future.209
Actually, Rome was pressingly in a need of an agreement between Ankara and
Athens, because apart from the overall desire to counterbalance the Little Entente, it
wanted to settle issues that could be harmful to the Eastern Mediterranean security
due to the fact that in the first half of 1930, the western Mediterranean was becoming
increasingly tense because of the endless debates about disarmament. The
negotiations among the Great Powers had become complicated and Italy had
positioned itself vis-à-vis France. Therefore, on every occasion that the parties could
not agree, Mussolini made extremely sharp speeches.210 In that context, Mussolini,
who thought that Italy would make a war with France sooner or later, in the
208 Cumhuriyet, 11 September 1929.
209 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..14.
210 For instance, “Bize Ancak Mahvolmak İsteyenler Çatabilir” trans. “Merely The
Ones That Want To Perish Can Be Against Us” quoted by Cumhuriyet, 19 May 1930.
90
meantime desired a secure eastern Mediterranean with the same mentality. The
considerations of Italy about France were so serious that in May 1930, Rome
declared that new ships would be constructed for the Italian navy.
Turkey and Greece shook hands with each other about the exchange of
populations in this atmosphere on 10 June 1930. This was a positive development for
all the powers including Italy, which had tried very hard in order to realize this goal.
Thus, when the agreement was presented to the other powers through the embassies,
the Turkish ambassador in Rome rendered thanks to the Italian government and
specifically to Mussolini, for their continuous efforts. Additionally, Aras, in a speech
in the Grand National Assembly, highlighted the Italian help which had enabled the
result through the exhibition of friendly feelings towards both powers.211 By the
same token, after the signing of the Treaty of Neutrality, Friendship and Arbitrage
Treaty between Greece and Turkey212 (Türk-Yunan Dostluk Tarafsızlık, Uzlaştırma
ve Hakemlik Andlaşması) on 30 October 1930, Ankara presented its gratitude to
Mussolini and Grandi again for their help in the conclusion of the treaty.213
However, Italy, which had finally acquired the desired situation in the area,
became worried about another development therein. That was the idea of a Balkan
Conference in order to discuss the problems of the area, to provide solutions to them
insofar as it could, and to form a federation among the states if possible. The need for
the Balkan integration had stemmed from the impressions about the Locarno
Agreement and Briand’s United States of Europe idea, as well as the economic
211 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: III, Cilt:2, İçtima Senesi: 3, 17 June 1930, p.265.
212Soysal, p.393-396.
213 A. Suat Bilge, Büyük Düş, Türk Yunan Siyasi İlişkileri (Ankara: 21.Yüzyıl
Yayınları, 2000), p.164.
91
difficulties of the Great Depression.214 However, the motto “the Balkans for the
Balkan people,” was certainly incompatible with the vision of Rome. In that respect,
it was no coincidence that around the time of the First Balkan Conference, Princess
Giovanna of Rome married King Boris of the revisionist Bulgaria. The timing of the
wedding showed that Italy would not contemplate losing its revisionist allies,
Bulgaria in this case and the formation of a pro status quo block near to its territory.
The attitude of Italy would last throughout the process, so both Bulgaria and Albania
would not sign the treaty adducing the minority issues as a reason.
It was obvious that the efforts of Italy in both agreements began to estrange it
from Turkey and Greece in terms of their stances, ironically, because, contrary to the
desires and expectations of Italy, the “Greco-Turkish tie, once achieved, proved to be
one of the strongest bulwarks of the status quo in the Balkans.”215 In this sense, while
İsmet İnönü stated that “the sameness of the cardinal interests and mutual needs is
the only basis for the continuation and endurance of the friendship that ties nations to
each other. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that the Turks and Greeks are
bounded by cooperation in the Balkans as well as in the Mediterranean basin on
which they had the same major joint interests,”216 he probably was not indicating a
revisionist alliance in accordance with the wishes of Italy, but a stable environment
in the Balkans for the sake of their territories.
214 R. Joseph Kerner and Harry N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan
Entente, 1930-1935: A Study in Recent History of the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1936), p.21-23.
215 Stavrianos, p.736.
216 Bilge, p.162. “Tarafların belli başlı menfaatlerinin ve karşılıklı ihtiyaçlarının
tıpkılığı, milletleri bağlayan dostlukların devamına ve dayanıklılığına yegane zemindir. Bu
böyle olunca, Türkler ve Yunanlıların her hususta Balkanlarda ve aynı büyük menfaatlere
malik bulundukları Akdeniz havzasında anlaşmaya ve birlikte çalışmaya mecbur oldukları
teslim edilmelidir.”
92
However, it should be underlined that this estrangement would occur gradually
in the sense that Italy did not take the backseat in the foreign policies of Turkey and
Greece overnight. On the contrary, while the status-quo stance of Greece and Turkey
was progressing, specifically in terms of the Balkan Union, both countries continued
to stand near to Rome at the same time, because, firstly they did not want to alienate
or annoy Italy due to the fact that both feared from Rome, and secondly, they could
still benefit from the friendship of Fascist Italy.
Another visit of Aras to Rome and Venice during which he met with Grandi
and Mussolini, respectively, which took place in November 1930, could be seen from
this perspective. That is to say, although both countries were uneasy about their
foreign policy directions, their relationship seemed to develop in the short run. The
press, also saw this side of the story. Rather than writing about the specific issues
that were under discussion, they emphasized the “pleased progress of the intercourse
between the two countries.”217
However, it was very meaningful that during this meeting Mussolini, who had
probably anticipated the change in the direction of Turkey on the basis of the distrust
of Italy, needed to give assurance to Turkey with his speech:
You can be sure of Italy’s friendship. I am not a disingenuous man. I am a
man of his word. If I say ‘I am your friend’, I remain your friend. In fact,
no point of controversy that separates Turkey and Italy remains. On the
contrary, there are interests that unite the two nations. In the future there
are many things that the two countries will realize together in the political
and economic realms.218
217 Cumhuriyet, 29 November 1930.
218 Cumhuriyet, 30 November 1930. “Italya’nın dostluğundan emin olabilirsiniz, ben
ikiyüzlü adam değilim. Sözünde duran adamım. Dostunuzum deyince, daima dost kalırım.
Esasen Türkiye ve İtalya’yı ayıran hiçbir ihtilaf noktası kalmamıştır. Bilakis, iki milleti
birleştiren menfaatler vardır. İstikbalde iki memleketin siyasi ve iktisadi sahada birlikte
yapacağı şeyler vardır.”
93
Sure enough, Rome was behaving compatibly with the expressions that the official
circles reiterated. For instance, the Federation of Europe issue, was concluded in
favor of Turkey, at this time. In addition, in nearly every week, both the Turkish and
Italian press wrote about the remarks through which the Italians glorified new
Turkey and its genius leader, Ghazi. For example, while on one day the Italian
ambassador in Turkey, Baron Aloisi, declared that “Turkey belongs to Turks,”219 on
another day a tourist group that shouted “Long Live Turkish-Italian Relations! Long
Live Mustafa Kemal!”220 were reported in the headlines.
Moreover, both social and economic relations were on the rise parallel to the
political developments. The exchange of students and mutual visits of scouts took
place with great excitement. Likewise, the completion and delivery of two torpedo
boats the Kocatepe and the Adatepe in October; of the assault boats the Martı, the
Denizkuşu, and the Doğan in September; and of the submarines the Dumlupınar and
the Sakarya in November 1931221 highlighted, each time, the unshakable ties
between Rome and Ankara.
Thus, in the last months of the period under discussion, the Turkish and Italian
friendship seemed to reach at peak. Although there were hesitations in the minds of
both two sides, they seemed to be making efforts towards the same diplomatic goals.
In that respect, during a conference in Geneva in September, Aras took the initiative
to obtain rapprochement between Bulgaria and Greece in collaboration with Rome
which “hoped that Turkey having reconciled with Greece, would contribute to a
219 Cumhuriyet, 28 Mayıs 1931.
220 Cumhuriyet, 23 June 1931.
221 Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması (1923–1960) (İstanbul: T.C. Deniz
Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 1967) p.59-60.
94
similar political reconciliation between Athens and Sofia.”222 Bulgaria, which for
previous twenty years had resented the fact that it had been thrown out of the
Aegean,223 had problems also with Greece, as well as with Yugoslavia. Therefore,
when the aims of Italy are taken into the consideration especially in terms of this
multipartite alliance, the efforts of Rome in a relation to Ankara appear reasonable.
However, although the efforts of Italy can be explained by its aims, the efforts of
Turkey seemed complicated, especially if the “real” stance of Ankara towards
revisionism and revisionist countries is considered.
In this context, it could be pointed out that Ankara’s move was double-sided.
On the one hand, even if Turkey did not envision a revisionist alliance, it could not
dispense with the friendship of Italy, because Rome had provided support to Ankara
in every aspect, beginning in 1927, and because the alienation of Rome could turn
the clocks back five years ago. Therefore, it was lucrative for Turkey to cooperate
with Italy in the strict sense of the word.
On the other hand, Turkey’s attitude was not a mere obligation in the sense that
a détente between Greece and Bulgaria would constitute a peaceful environment in
Thrace that Turkey desired regardless of Italy. Additionally, with this rapprochement
at least one problem would be decreased in favor of the Balkan Union idea. In other
words, apart from the Yugoslavian-Bulgarian issues, a positive step would have been
taken for the Balkan Entente movement, with which Italy was obviously
uncomfortable. Thus, while Turkey appeared as if it was behaving under the
direction of Rome in this case, it was actually serving its own interests regardless of
Italy.
222 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.243.
223 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941
(Cambridge: University Press, 1946), p.355.
95
In fact, Rome was also aware that Ankara favored the Balkan Pact over a
tripartite alliance. The recommendations of Grandi that Italy should take precautions
against the independent diplomacy of Turkey in the Balkans224 can also be seen from
this perspective. However, although Turkey and Greece were advancing in terms of
the Balkan Pact step by step, as can be seen from the Second Balkan Conference that
took place in Istanbul, they had not alienated Italy yet by 1931. In other words, in
1932, which was qualified as the year that the course of events began to change, the
Turkish-Italian friendship seemed flawless.
To conclude this section, it can be stated that throughout the period between
1927 and 1932, the relations between Turkey and Italy proceeded very different from
the previous stage. The mutual interests of the parties brought them together. Turkey
needed support in the international arena as an isolated country to some extent and
Italy inquired the ways, if possible with Turkey and Greece, to counter-balance the
France-sponsored Little Entente. To this end, Italy made the best, in terms of
political, economic, and military support, in order to attract Turkey. However,
although Turkey responded positively to these efforts, in reality, Italy, as a more
powerful country than Turkey, had ambitious foreign policy objectives and also had
an intimidating past towards Anatolia. Therefore, although Turkey benefitted from
the friendship of Italy, she always carried a hidden mistrust and always sought
alternative alliances, like the Balkan Entente. Since the relationship depended on
hesitation, it was impossible for it to last long, so a new period was about to begin.
224 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.244.
96
CHAPTER 6
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITALY, 1932-1939:
THE RETURN OF BELLIGERENCE
In the previous chapter, Turkish-Italian relations between 1927 and 1932 were
explained. The détente period in the bilateral relations that began in late 1927 and
continued until 1932 was described. However, after 1932, due to the reappearance of
the aggression in the foreign policy of Mussolini, Turkey’s distrust in Italy
resurfaced. Therefore, a new period, in which the bilateral relations deteriorated
constantly until the outbreak of the Second World War, began.
In that respect, it is appropriate to look at the whole period beginning from
the events of 1932, during which diplomatic relations between the parties began to
change in a way that the pretended positive relations of the previous period could
never be reinstated. However, it must be underlined that although this year marked
the end of a specific period, the new epoch did not begin full of enmities as a result
of sudden changes in the foreign policy of the two states. On the contrary, good
relations appeared to continue until 1934 although a gradual deterioration began in
1932 that would last until the outbreak of the Second World War. In other words,
1932 cannot be regarded as a rupture point for the contacts, but as a starting point of
a setback.
Accordingly, in January 1932, Turkish and Italian politicians made a
diplomatic decision that could be considered as a positive development both for
Ankara and Rome. That was a new treaty225 signed in order to solve the problem of
225Convention on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters between the Anatolian Coast
and the Island of Castellorizo (Anadolu Kıyısı ile Meis Adası Arasında Karasularının
Sınırlandırılması ve Bodrum Karşısındaki Kara Ada’nın Egemenliği Konusunda Sözleşme).
97
sovereignty on the islands and islets between Turkish territory and Meis Island under
the control of Italy, as well as to determine the limits of the territorial waters between
the two countries. According to that convention, while Italy recognized the
sovereignty of Turkey on some of the islands including Karaada, Turkey accepted
the sovereignty of Italy on the islands that would stand within the area between
Castellorizo church and San Stephano point.226 Although Güçlü argues that the
Convention in 1932 remained an isolated instance of mutual trust227 especially if the
orientation of the contacts in the late 1930s is kept in mind, in the meantime, it was
regarded as the presentation of bona fides. Therefore, it was not very surprising that
due to the ratification of the treaty, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dino Grandi
made a speech on the close friendship that had solved the single remaining problem
between the two countries without a need for an international arbitration decision,228
for which the parties had applied to the Court of Justice in the previous period.
Another development that demonstrated the warmth in the relations was a
visit of İnönü with Aras in Rome in May 1932. The reason behind the visit was to
discuss pending economic and political issues.229 Both before and during the visit,
the Turkish and Italian press highlighted the fraternity between these countries. The
importance of these countries for the Mediterranean security and peace was
emphasized and additionally the assistance of Rome to Ankara government during
the War of Independence was referred in order to show the continuum in the
226 Soysal, p.340-343.
227 Yücel Güçlü, “Fascist Italy’s Mare Nostrum Policy and Turkey,” Belleten LXIII,
no.238 (December 1998) p.814.
228 Cumhuriyet, 6 May 1932.
229 Barlas, “Friend or Foes,” p.245.
98
relationship.230 Apart from the press, the prime ministers of both countries also
reiterated the everlasting trust between them. The foreign press also gave importance
to this visit in the sense that the Rome meeting just after the Moscow visit of the
Turkish officials, was even regarded as the harbinger of a new era of political and/or
economic cooperation among the Soviet Union, Turkey and Italy.231
However, the facts were very different from what the officials were
presenting. In the political sphere, no obstacle had caused any deterioration yet. On
the contrary, at this meeting, officials had decided on a five-year prolongation of the
Neutrality Treaty which had started a new phase in Turkish-Italian relations in
1928.232 In the economic sphere, however, bilateral trade had been already in decline
as a result of the adverse effects of the Great Depression. According to the officials
of the two states, trade should have been at a greater level.233 Additionally, there was
the issue of credit that Turkey tried to obtain from Italy. Since the Soviet Union was
ready to give a loan without interest as opposed to the 6.5% that the Italians
demanded, Turkey decided to get loan from Moscow rather than Rome, which, as a
result, accused Ankara of being suspicious of the Western countries.234 Therefore,
the vision of İnönü, who had stated in Rome that Turkish-Italian relations would
improve, began to show the signs of disproof.
Two months after the Turkish officials visited Rome, in July 1932, an
important event, which was regarded by many, dubiously, as a turning point in
230 Cumhuriyet, 22 May 1932.
231El Ehram,18 May 1932, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of
Transactions, 030..10/13.74..6.
232 Cumhuriyet, 27 May 1932.
233 Cumhuriyet, 26 May 1932.
234 Barlas,“Friend or Foes,” p.245.
99
Italian foreign policy, occurred. Mussolini, known as Il Duce (The Leader), took
over the foreign office, and made Fulvio Suvich his undersecretary. Italian
historiography sometimes designates the takeover of the foreign ministry by
Mussolini as a step in the implementation of an expansionist and imperialist agenda
which was specifically directed to constitute social togetherness.235 Obviously, this
kind of explanation for the Fascist foreign policy implies that before the 1930s there
had not been an imperialist agenda within the Italian thinking. However, “more
recently the balance of ‘historiographical opinion236 has tended to tilt towards a
belief in the underlying consistency of Mussolini’s foreign policy, the intent of which
was always expansionist even when it was conducted in a moderate manner.”237 For
example, even before the takeover of the foreign ministry by Mussolini, the existence
of the expansionist policy in Italy had also been reflected by the foreign press, which
had been already writing about the intent of expansionism especially into the Africa
and Eastern Europe,238 apart from the implementations. Additionally, a speech of
Mussolini about Grandi also proves the revisionist and uninterrupted imperialist
agenda of Italian foreign policy in the sense that Grandi’s passivism was not
regarded as suitable for the goals of the Great Italy: “Grandi had made a mess of
everything in the last three years; he had made himself a prisoner of the League of
235 Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fasicst Italy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006),
p.56.
236 There are different point of views about the nature of fascist foreign policy. While
one group defends that the fascist foreign policy was formulated on the basis of the needs for
a coherent domestic environments, in other words on the basis of propaganda purposes, like
the historians Gaetano Salvemini, Dennis Mack Smith, A.J.P. Taylor, and to some extent
Ennio di Nolfo; the other group of historians such as Giorgio Rumi, Giampiero Carocci,
Alan Cassels, Esmonde Robertson, MacGregor Knox and Renzo De Felice claims that a
coherent imperialistic agenda was existent in fascist foreign policy and colonialist
expansionism was an end in itself. For more information, see Azzi, p.187-203.
237 Blinkhorn, p.56.
238 For instance, The Times, 20 May 1932, “Ambitions of Italy,” quoted by PMRA,
Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 30..10/237.600..2.
100
Nations…had gone to bed with the pacifists and made Italy pregnant with
disarmament…and had taken Italy out of the groove of egoism and realism.”239
As can be seen, the foreign policy aims of Italy did not alter after Mussolini’s
seizure of the foreign ministry. Only the method that could realize the expansionist
agenda changed on the basis of the conditions of the time.
Accordingly, when the content of the Mare Nostrum policy in terms of its
geographical area is kept in mind, the appointment of Suvich and the Aloisi,
officials with expertise in these areas, as high authorities indicated that the more
dynamic and the militant style of Mussolini would aim at the Balkans and the
Eastern Mediterranean.240
Not surprisingly, this fascist tone (tono fascista) in the Italian foreign policy
would influence the relations between Turkey and Italy. However, since there was
no problem with Italy at specifically that time, the changes in the cabinet were not
perceived as a negative affair in Turkey. The Turkish press sent off Baron Aloisi,
the Italian ambassador in Ankara, with the wishes of success while the Italian fleet
that visited Turkey took the headlines as the admirers of the Kemalist regime.241
In the same month in 1932, Turkey became a member of the League of
Nations. Ankara, was aware of the run of events in the world, like war reparations
and disarmament issues which were leading big clashes of interests among the big
powers constantly, and defended seeking solutions to these problems in a collective
body. Therefore, on 6 July 1932, the League of Nations decided for the invitation of
Turkey with the proposal of Spain, and in return, the Turkish Grand National
239 Quoted by C.J. Lowe and F.Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (London:
Routledge, 2001), p.220.
240 Burgwyn, p.71.
241Cumhuriyet, 22 July 1932.
101
Assembly decided for accession in 9 July. Barlas argues that Italy firmly opposed
the membership of Turkey and this situation led to the deterioration of relations
between two countries.242 However, whatever the real stand of Italy was, diplomatic
relations occurred in diplomatic ways. For instance, an Italian delegate said:
…Today Italy is chiefly happy for making an address to Turkey. As a
matter of fact absence of Turkey, with her feature of being an essential
component of Europe, was a deficiency in our midst…Through backing
this proposal; I not only announce the friendship and sincerity again
about Turkey, but also affirm in from of General Commission that my
country greets with a trust and follows the development of the birth of a
Mediterranean country under the enlightened leadership of Gazi…243
In response to this speech, Aras rendered his thanks to the Italian delegate for their
friendship and warm-hearted feelings for Turkey and specified his happiness at
Turkey’s having been given the chance to cooperate with Italy under the umbrella of
the League of Nations.244 Thus, when Turkey became a member of the League, the
linkage between countries did not seem damaged, at least in the speeches of their
leaders. However, it seems clear that Turkey was no longer an isolated country
anymore, so it was not in desperate need of Italy, it had been as in the previous
period.
Obviously, the tono fascista ever so often revealed its nebulous intent:
withdrawal from the League of Nations. Whether it was a threat or not, Italy felt that
242 Barlas, “Friend or Foes,” p.246.
243 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, ,
Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı, vol.3 of Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, (Ankara:
Genel Müdürlük, 1973) p.296. “…Bugün Türkiye’ye hitap edilmesinden dolayı İtalya
bilhassa bahtiyardır. Filhakika Türkiye Avrupa menfainin esaslı bir unsuru sıfatiyle
aramızda eksik duruyordu…Heyeti umumiyenize yapılan teklife muzaheret etmekle yalnız
Türkiye hakkında tekrar dostluk ve samimiyet beyanatında bulunmuş olmuyorum. Aynı
zamanda Gazi’nin münevver idaresi altında genç Akdeniz Devleti’nin doğuşunu
memleketimin nasıl bir itimat hisleriyle karşıladığını ve inkışafını da takip ettiğini Heyeti
umumiyeniz önünde teyit ediyorum…”
244 Ibid., p.303.
102
none of the issues of the day, like the delimitation of arms or war reparations, could
be solved within a collective body. In that respect, Mussolini began to think about a
pact within which Germany, France, Britain and Italy could discuss the problematic
issues. In fact, this idea had existed since 1928, but it had remained futile because
only personal efforts had been made, especially by Grandi, without the necessary
support from the leaders.245 When the pact was being discussed again in 1932 with
the effort of Mussolini this time, as Mallett writes it was “little more than a veiled
attempt by Mussolini to prevent the French preemptive war he feared, while
encouraging Berlin to slow the pace of German rearmament, thereby reducing the
likelihood of an Anschluss”246 the mention of which was a nightmare for Italy at that
time, because if it was achieved, Germany would pose a threat to the Italian territory
through South Tyrol, similar to the danger that the old Austria-Hungary Empire had
posed before. Obviously, Italy was willing to play a diplomatic game among the big
powers in the sense that Rome thought that France was ready to give more
concessions to Italy for the support about the issues over Germany in return. Sure
enough, the expressions on the desire of Italy about the repartition of the mandates
during the negotiations of the Pact in Geneva in March 1933 and the reports of the
press which stated the possibility of it for the French side247 showed that a pressing
bargaining process was going on. Since the Four-Power Pact was signed within the
framework of the League of Nations as a result of French insistence, the withdrawal
245 Lowe and Marzari, p.224.
246Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p.21.
247 Cumhuriyet, ,23 March 1933.
103
of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations following
month terminated the Pact.248
Turkey was concerned much more with the goals and possible results of the
Four-Power Pact idea, rather than the disengagement of the pact, because it had
been a pact among the biggest powers that probably would determine the fate of the
other ones. When the negotiations for the pact were progressing, even the
postponement of the disarmament conference in order to wait for the result of the
Four-Power Pact process illustrated how the League of Nation was trivialized by
this initiative.
Turkey thought that this Pact was against the collective security
understanding and against the small states which had become anxious by the idea
that their futures could be shaped by the great ones.249Ankara interpreted the issue as
the move of Italy which was trying to establish an arena other than the League of
Nations which was dominated generally by France and the Great Britain in order to
discuss the international issues that were supposed to have been concluded in the
peace treaties after the Great War, such as the problematic boundaries, reparations
and rearmament in a new environment that it could balance the domination of
Britain and France.250 As a new but a dedicated member of the League of Nations,
Turkey manifested its stance also with Kemal Atatürk’s declaration, in which he
stated that he could not understand the necessity of this Pact to the representatives of
the foreign states in Ankara.251
248 Lowe and Marzari, p.227.
249 Cumhuriyet, 24 March 1933.
250 Aras, Görüşlerim, p.58-59.
251Aras, Görüşlerim, p.59.
104
In terms of Turco-Italo relations, it is obvious that the Pact was a negative
development. Even if Turkey did not target Italy in its criticisms directly, the
principal ascribing but hidden point was Rome as the foremost proponent of the
pact, apart from the essence of it. However, it must be underlined that after the Four-
Power Pact, Turkish-Italian relations did not take a blow rapidly; on the contrary,
the statements from both sides continued to express friendship and sincerity which
would last until 1934. That Pact, rather, became one of the steps that played a role in
the deterioration of relations.
When the relations began to tense, news published in the French press led to
some hesitations in the Turkish mind. Before the Four-Power Pact affair, it had been
claimed that the French had thought of giving some concessions to Italy in terms of
land, in order to cope with the ambitions of the Fascist regime. Apart from Syria, as
has been discussed above, Africa and the south Anatolia were denominated as the
targets that could be suitable for the Italian appetite. At that time, Turkey had
perceived these statements as products of the vulgarity of France and mainly the
French press,252 which wanted to drive a wedge between Turkey and Italy. In that
respect, on 9 June 1932, Yunus Nadi, editorial writer of Cumhuriyet, put the issue
on the front page with the headline of “Turkey Is Not an Easy Nutshell to Crack” by
highlighting the evil aspirations of France, Italy’s greatest rival in the
Mediterranean.253 However, the second incident, again by the French press, on the
same issues, in 1933 this time, blurred the mind of Ankara to the extent that Italy
felt obliged to answer these arguments through its official paper, Popolo D’italia.
Italian officials specified that Italy was tied to Turkey not only through legal
252 Mentioned newspaper was “Temps.”
253 Cumhuriyet, 9 June 1932, “Türkiye Kolay Yenilir Yumuşak Bir Ceviz Değildir.”
105
documents, but also through their constructive sentiments, so the aforementioned
information was a maneuver of France.254 It is unknown to what extent Turkey
calmed down with the Italian counterarguments; however, there was a reality that
Ankara became increasingly displeased with those kinds of remarks, because after
1932 Italy “laid claim to an ideological conception of foreign policy: this was to be
the era of Fascism, in which Italy’s imperial destiny would be fulfilled at last.”255
Obviously, throughout the interwar era Turkey did not trust Italy; however, it should
be admitted that a kind of cooperation had been created in the previous period
between these two states which had left Turkey in uncertainity about its stance
towards Italy especially in 1932 and 1933.
The audience that took place between Mussolini and Aras in Rome in July
1933 should be seen from this perspective, because it was declared after the meeting
that the parties had discussed the dynamics that had formed their friendship.256 That
is to say, they were still underlining their friendship. However, it should also be
underlined that this meeting had another purpose; that was the explanation over the
Convention on the Definition of Aggression (Mütecavizin Tarifi Muahedesi) by
Turkey.
The Convention on the Definition of Aggression had been signed 4 July
1933 after negotiation processes that had occurred during some of the sessions of
the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. In addition to
Turkey, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia had signed the
treaty. Under which circumstances a state could be labeled the “aggressor” was
denoted in Article 2 of the Convention, and the signatory states declared that neither
254 Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1933.
255 Blinkhorn, p.61.
256 Cumhuriyet, 12 July 1933.
106
political, military, economic, nor other considerations could serve as an excuse or
justification for aggression, in Article 3.257
Two notable interpretations about this treaty can be made on the Turco-Italo
relations. On the one hand, it is worth mentioning that this convention was prepared
and signed after the Four-Power Pact. Therefore, Italy understood this move as an
answer through which those countries were trying to overcome the possible negative
results that the Four-Power Pact might impose upon them. On the other hand, it was
a pact which was defended also by France,258 and signed by Romania, Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia, in other words, by the Little Entente countries. If one takes the
competition and the enmity between France and Italy or between status quo and
revisionism into account, it is easy to understand why Aras chose to visit Rome just
after the Convention. Aras wrote that since it was expectable that the Mussolini
might feel offended, this visit was an appropriate move to pamper the pride of the
Duce.259 To sum up, all of the 1933 events showed that the paths of Italy and Turkey
were growing more and more apart, but they were still trying not to startle each
other.
In that respect, 1934 became a major turning point for Turco-Italo relations.
Although deterioration had already begun in late 1932, the statements continued to
emphasize the friendship scale of the contacts, as can be seen above. However, after
this year, Turkey began to feel the Italian threat keenly as a result of the events that
occurred during this period, as will be explained below. Therefore, also the political
language took on a caustic tone, especially by the Turkish side, in the sense that, for
257 Soysal, p.429-432.
258 Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Lozan’ın İzlerinde On Yıl (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935),
p.204.
259 Aras, Görüşlerim, p.63.
107
instance, the Turkish press no longer referred to Italy as the “friend Italy” over again
even though Italy persisted in its goodwill and appeasing attitude towards Turkey
despite being in direct contradiction with its sarcastic behaviour towards Ankara.
To begin with 1934, the signing of the Balkan Entente by Turkey, Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Romania in February, obviously annihilated the contacts. Actually,
the impacts of the Pact were so broad that the balance in both intra-Balkan and intra-
European relations was influenced. Therefore, before looking at the effects of the
Balkan Entente on Turkish-Italian relations specifically, it is necessary to look at the
process of preparation and its impacts between 1932 and 1934 on the general
European picture. In this respect, the reasons behind the idea, the developmental
process such as the First and the Second Balkan conferences in Athens and Istanbul
respectively, and the stance of the major European powers towards a possible
Balkan Confederation has been designated in the previous chapter. A declaration,
with which Alexandros Papanastassiou, Greek Prime Minister of the period, stated
that “certainly many obstacles still exist, and national egoisms, narrow conceptions,
prejudices, and unilateral interests are still influential, but more powerful is the
necessity for union, more dominant the desire of the peoples to guarantee peace and
better conditions of existence,”260 summarizes the situation of a Balkan Union in
1932.
When the Bucharest Conference in 1932 began in October, the state of events
were not so hopeful in the sense that Bulgaria was insisting on a pre-condition, which
was being refused definitely by Yugoslavia, about the rights of the Bulgarian
minority living outside its territory, for the further advancement of the negotiation
260 Quoted by Kerner and Howard, p.68.
108
process.261 Although there were some improvements in terms of the social, judicial
and cultural spheres, withdrawal of the Bulgarian delegate and the threatening
Albanian position in the same manner designated that the “spillover effect” in terms
of political union that the other Balkan states’ politicians had previously envisaged
was not very likely to occur in the near future.
A telegram from the Turkish Ambassador in Athens to the Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs interpreted all of these issues on the basis of the Great Powers. In
that respect, the Ambassador related the Bulgarian and Albanian stance to the
preventive efforts of Italy, which feared not only a stronger Yugoslavia but also an
Albania that could have a potential to resist Italian incursion if the Balkan Federation
came into being.262 So, it was not surprising that both Bulgaria and Albania argued
about the minority issues, especially if the Italian support for revisionism in the area
is born in mind.263
In terms of Turkish-Italian relations, while Turkey’s eagerness for a prostatus
quo pact upset Italy, Italy’s destructive attitude did so Turkey. In fact, as
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Italy had sought to construct a tripartite
alliance among Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey in 1929 and 1930 because she was
thinking that Turkey, which was supposed to have closer ties with revisionist
Bulgaria and Italy rather than the anti-revisionist Little Entente countries, would
have a leading role in the Balkans that would not ruin Italian influence.264 In
addition, although the first half of the 1930s had shown that Turkey was much more
inclined to Yugoslavia and Romania, Italy still was trying to form a Balkan alliance
261 Ibid., p.72.
262 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/226.523..30.
263 Ibid.
264 Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean,” p.446-447.
109
in which Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, even Hungary and Austria would involve in
1933.265 Since a revisionist Balkan block was a necessity for Italy in order to balance
the anti-revisionist Little Entente and to achieve domination in the area through a
kind of patron-client relationship, every move towards the Balkan Entente formed an
important component of the relations that got stretched day by day after 1932, as this
chapter suggests.
When 1933 came,the four Balkan countries tried to speed up the process of
political collaboration because obviously the world scene was necessitating alliances
especially in an environment in which the League of Nations was ineffective at
solving international problems. In this context, for instance, the rise of Hitler to the
power in 1933, the attempts at the Four-Power Pact and the other hopeless course of
events in Europe had led to the institutionalization of the Little Entente in the same
year.266
Parallel to this development, the Balkan states met in Salonika at the Fourth
Balkan Conference in order to reach a consolidation. Actually, there had been some
achievements among the Balkan countries before the Conference. Firstly, a Turkish-
Greek treaty, which showed the magnificent collaboration and trust between the
former enemies by giving each other the responsibility of mutual representation in
the international conferences,267 had been signed in September 1933. Secondly, as
one of the visits among Balkan political leaders, that of the Yugoslavian King to
Ankara had been regarded, especially by the Yugoslavian press, as an important
265Daily Herald, 4 May 1933, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of
Transactions, 030..10/226.525..13.
266 Kerner and Howard, p.97.
267 Soysal, p.435-436.
110
event that paved the way for the Entente.268 Contrary to the Yugoslavian and Turkish
statements underlining that there was not a target on the basis of the contacts, Italy
ascribed the relations between those two states as being the desire to isolate
Bulgaria.269 Although there were various claims regarding whether the Balkan
countries were intending to isolate Bulgaria, there was the reality that these countries
had begun to believe in the necessity of a political pact with or without Bulgaria day
by day due to the developments in Europe. Even Turkey, which had tried to bridge
the gap between Bulgaria and other countries, as opposed to the viewpoint of Italy,
finally accepted a Balkan Pact without Bulgaria.270 In that context, although all of the
six countries worked together for many resolutions at the Salonika Conference
differently from the previous one, only four of them would sign the Balkan Pact on 9
February 1934.
The dominant view on the Turkish foreign policy studies emphasizes that the
Balkan Entente was the result of the Italian threat.271 That is partially true; however,
although there was a perception of an Italian threat within the Turkish mind, the
conclusion of the Balkan Entente was not the result of Italy’s dangerous foreign
policy only, but of the revisionism and the revisionist countries in general; because
all these four countries were against any border changes within the Balkan Peninsula.
It should be also noted that the Balkan Conferences before the pact was signed had
268 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/200.366..22.
269 Ibid.
270 Wolfgang Höpken, “National Self-Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: Balkan
Cooperation between the Two World Wars” in İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve
Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika edited by Murat Sarıca Anısına Sempozyum,
(İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert Vakfı: Aybay Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1994), p.106.
271 For instance, Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge states that “The fear of the Italian
designs upon Turkish territory was a real factor.” in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1918-1948,
(Ambilly-Annemasse: Impr. Franco-Suisse, 1950) p.81
111
had many other objectives in terms of economy and culture. In other words, although
the Balkan Entente finally turned into a military alliance rather than a real entente,272
it had many other purposes that cannot be reduced to the Italian threat alone.
Another problematic interpretation in the Turkish foreign policy, a natural
result of the former problem, states that the Balkan Entente was signed against a
possible Italian attack,273 especially in order to ensure the unity of the Balkans. If the
elements of the text are analyzed carefully, it became obvious that the Entente aimed
at a possible Bulgarian attack.274 According to the second article of the additional
protocol, the pact guaranteed the security of the Balkan territories against the
aggression of any Balkan state rather than protecting the parties against any power,
therefore, as a non-signatory of the Pact, Bulgaria was the intention of the Balkan
states rather than Italy.275 The reservation by Greece, which specified that it would
never come up against Italy under any circumstances that could require collaboration
within a specific combination, shows that the states sought not to alienate Italy rather
than to target it. In consequence, it is important to note that the dominance of the
Italian threat perception in the interwar foreign policy literature causes not to errors
totally, but to deficiencies, at least.
272 Oral Sander, “The Balkan Cooperation in Perspective,” Turkish Yearbook of
International Relaitons, no.7 (1966), p.108.
273 This interpretation exists in many resources. Some specific examples; Yücel
Güçlü “Fascist Italy’s Mare Nostrum Policy and Turkey,” Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign
and Strategic Policy 1934-42,” Middle Eastern Studies 31, no.3 (July 1995), p.483-502.
274 Melek Fırat, “Göreli Özerklik-I, Yunanistan’la İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası:
Kurtuluş Savaşından Buıgüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Baskın Oran (ed.) (İstanbul:
İletişim, 2006), vol.1, p.351.
275 Gareth M. Winrow, “The Balkans in International Politics: An Examination of the
Interwar Period,” in İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve
Uluslararası Politika edited by Murat Sarıca Anısına Sempozyum, (İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert
Vakfı: Aybay Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1994), p.89.
112
However, even if the direct target within the protocols was not Italy, the
general adversary throughout the pact was revisionism, which defended ardently by
the Fascist Rome. Therefore, Italy took a negative attitude towards the Balkan Union
from the beginning to the end that in return had influenced the relations between
Turkey and Italy. First of all, the Italian efforts to balance the pro-status quo Little
Entente both in the Balkans and the Central Europe had not yielded the desired
results in the sense that Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece could not be reconciled within a
revisionist bloc. On the contrary, both Greece and Turkey had tended towards antirevisionism
beginning with the Balkan Conferences. In this context, Italy defined her
negative attitude unequivocally even for the conferences through Popolo D’italia:
If the Balkan Conference met in order to remove the unfair results that
emerged after the end of the First World War, it could be beneficial;
however, it seems that it is not anything beyond the aim of protecting the
status quo…The Conference…by regarding the general condition of the
recent day as if it would continue eternally, appears as if it tries to
perpetuate the present hegemony.276
Also, as can be seen in the previous pages, the Bulgarian and Albanian behaviour
had been attributed to Italian influence over these countries. In that respect, it can be
argued that Italy was thinking that, on the one hand, it should have prevented this
initiative, on the other hand, if the conclusion was inevitable, she should have
injured it by influencing Bulgaria at least. Actually, the aim was not only to divide
Balkans into the camps, but also to counteract a possible Slavic alliance, which also
276Popolo D’italia, 17 October 1930. Quoted by T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma
ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı, p.310.
“Balkan Konferansı 1. Dünya Harbi sonunda ortaya çıkan haksızlıkları izale gayesiyle
toplansaydı müfid olabilirdi, fakat bu konferansın hedefinin statüko’yu muhafaza etmekten
başka bir şey olmadığı görülüyor…Konferans…bugünkü vaziyeti umumiyeyi ebediyen devam
edecekmiş gibi telakki etmekle, şimdiki hegemonyaların idamesini temine çalışıyor gibi
görünmektedir.”
113
would make other countries in the area uncomfortable, such as Greece and
Turkey.277
In that respect, Italy reiterated its uneasiness about the conferences on all
occasions and Rome both warned and criticized Turkey in terms of the conferences
and also of the Pact. For instance, in a meeting between Turkish and Italian
politicians and officials, Mussolini stated that Turkey had put itself into the
problematic Balkan issues by regarding itself as a Balkan country, which was an
incorrect decision for Turkish foreign policy, which had gone in the accurate
direction until this period.278 In addition to this kind of warnings, Italy tried to delay
the signature of the Pact in 1933 through some requests from Turkish officials with
the blind excuse of the Bulgarian decision about non-participating.
The warnings turned into the harsh criticisms when the signatories decided
to proceed regardless of the participation of Bulgaria. Italy both declared that
Turkey’s opposition to revisionism was meaningless due to the fact that it was the
first country which changed the Versailles System, and criticized the skeptical
attitude of Turkey, pointing out the vascillating nature of the Turkish foreign policy
towards the Italian friendship.279
It was true that Turkey was not trusting Italy’s friendship, but Ankara was
still worrying about the Italian position on the Balkan Pact and the future
implications of this position, and especially about the impact of the Pact on Turkish-
Italian diplomacy. The meeting of Atatürk and Venizelos shows this point clearly in
the sense that Atatürk told Venizelos that the Italy’s sensitivity should be taken into
277 Sander, “The Balkan Cooperation in Perspective,” p.107.
278 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü,
Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı, p.313.
279 Ibid. p.349-355.
114
consideration due to the location of Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean where
Italy was a great power.280
In this context, Ankara tried to calm Italy’s fear about the Pact. Firstly,
Turkey charged its ambassador Vasıf Çınar, in Rome with the task of making the
necessary explanations emphasizing that the Pact would not be against any power.
This point, later on, was underlined also in a speech by Aras within the Turkish
Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the Pact’s affirmation.281 Secondly, the
Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Maximos, went to Rome in order to assure
Mussolini that the Pact would be a collaboration among the Balkan states that would
not formulate any design outside the territory, and therefore would never be against
Rome.
To what extent Rome concurred with Turkey and Greece is hard to answer,
because it was conspicuous that “Fascist Rome could not abide any concordance in
the Balkans leaving aside a union.”282 However, both the Greek and Italian press
had the opposite impressions or they had to do so. The daily Messager D’Athenes
stated that the visit of Maximos to Rome had removed the concerns of Italy283 while
Giornale D’italia, after displaying the Rome’s support for Bulgaria, finally wrote
that the visit of Maximos had yielded the desired results anyway, in the sense that
280 Ibid. p.321.
281 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:IV, Cilt:2, İçtima Senesi:3, 6 March 1934, p.15.
“Bu sulh vesikasının mahiyeti itibariyle ve onu yapanların zihniyetine hakim olan maksat
itibarile de hiçbir devletin aleyhine müteveccih olmasına imkan yoktu ve mevcut ve meri olan
karşılıklı taahhütlerimizin hududu dahilinde yapılabilirdi ve böyle olmuştur.”
282 Aras, Görüşlerim, p.54.
283 Messager D’Athenes, 12 January 1934, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General
Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/226.525..20.
115
Rome had accepted that the Pact would not be against the Italian politics.284
Therefore, it would not be erroneous to claim that even if Italy did not consent to the
Balkan Pact in this form, it understood that the Pact would not be averted.
Therefore, Mussolini thought that dealing with the Balkan issues after the signing of
the Pact within a new atmosphere would be a much more suitable option than giving
a bitter reaction to it. In other words, Rome was not persuaded,285 but decided to
deal with the Balkans after the signing of the treaty which had already become
sentential by January 1934. The unchanged viewpoint of Italy about the Balkan
Entente could also be seen firstly in the fact that Italy warned Bulgaria at different
times about a possible Bulgarian-Yugoslav détente in order to prevent such a
predicament,286 and secondly in the fact that when Aras proposed a friendship treaty
between Italy and the Entente in 1935, Mussolini refused it by putting forward
groundless excuses.287
Evidently, the process of the Balkan Entente constituted an additional
component of the deteriorating relations between Turkey and Italy. After the pact
was signed, the relations had deteriorated to a degree that the Turkish press, which
had always referred to Italy as “friend” despite everything, accused Italy for trying
to keep Bulgaria from signing the pact.288 By the same token, the Italian press,
which had underlined the unshakeable ties between two countries many times,
284 Giornale D’Italia, 12 January 1934, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General
Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/226.525..20.
285 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü,
Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı, p.321.
286 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/226.525..20.
287 Aras, Görüşlerim, p.52-53.
288 Cumhuriyet, 2 March 1934.
116
claimed that Yugoslavia and Turkey seemed to be united in terms of their attitudes
vis-à-vis Italy.289
The Balkan Entente injured the relations between Turkey and Italy seriously,
but the final blow came on 18 March 1934, as a result of a speech by Mussolini.
However, related to this speech, what occurred in the same month is especially
important for a rational analysis of Italian foreign policy and Turkish-Italian
relations.
In this context, it is fundamental to note that in March 1934, Mussolini took
an initiative by meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös, and the
Austrian dictator, Engelbert Dolfuss, in Rome. After a series of negotiations, the
three states concluded several protocols in 17 March 1934 that have been called the
“Rome Protocols.” These agreements drew the three countries together in the form
of increased commercial ties, future consultation and coordination concerning their
respective foreign policies.290 Therefore, this led to different interpretations on the
European scene. For instance while the French saw the issue as a move against the
Little Entente, the Bulgarians did so as a balance against the Balkan Entente.
Although the former was more accurate than the latter, it was also deficient in the
sense that the actual goal behind the move of Rome was to dominate Austria, which
was under the threat of Anschluss, because at that time Italy was on the intent that
the Austria should be independent at any price. The idea of that “Prussians on the
‘Brenner’291 would mean war”292 stemmed from the fact that Anschluss could pose a
289 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/227.527..15.
290 Endre B. Gastony, “Hungarian Foreign Minister Kalman Kanya’s Grand
Design,1933-1936,” East European Quarterly 19, no.2 (Summer 1985), p.179.
291 Brenner Pass ties Italy to Austria within the Alps. In Italian, it is Il Passo del
Brennero.
117
threat also to Italian territory, which had to be secured before the invasion of
Abyssinia, the imperial dream for the Italians.293 Therefore, although Gömbös was
actually hoping for cooperation between Austria, Hungary, Italy and Germany,294
Italy had obviously signed the Protocols with anti-German sentiments.
Turkey interpreted the Rome Protocols as an expression of Italy’s
domination of the Danube region.295 It was a problem for Turkey because Italy, with
this move, had formed an openly revisionist bloc in the area regardless of whether it
was directed against the Little Entente or against the Balkan Entente. However, the
problem and the final rupture within the relations did not stem from the fact that
Italy had made some efforts to form an alternative bloc in Eastern or Central
Europe, but stemmed from a speech on the following day on the prompting of
Second Five-Year Fascist Congress. Mussolini, on the one hand, declared that
Hungary was justified in all its demands for the revision of the Triannon treaty, in
accordance with the subsequent rumors which claimed the Italian assistance to
Hungarian remilitarization, on the other hand set the Italian imperialistic agenda in
his speech:
I could give you the details of a plan up to 1945 but I prefer to point
out to you the historic objectives towards which our generation and the
generations to follow should be directed during the present century…
The historic objectives of Italy have two names: Africa and Asia.
South and the East are the cardinal points that should excite the interest
and the will of Italians. There is little or nothing to do towards the
North and the same towards the West, neither in Europe not beyond
the Ocean. These two objectives of ours are justified by geography and
history. Of all the large Western Powers of Europe, Italy is nearest to
292 Lowe and Marzari, p.231.
293 Ibid., p.223.
294Betty Jo Winchester, “Hungary and the Austrian Anschluss,” East European
Quarterly 10, no.4 (Winter 1976), p.410.
295 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, p.155.
118
Africa and Asia. A few hours by sea and much less by air are enough
to link up Italy with Africa and Asia.296
This part of the discourse became a breaking point within Turco-Italo relations.
Ankara not only was shocked but also felt that Italy had predicated its actual
disposition towards Turkey which had apprehended this beforehand. In other words,
Turkey was no longer unjustified in terms of its impressions about the threat that
Italy was supposed to pose. Therefore, both the Turkish press and the government
reacted for a long time, sometimes in a harsh manner.
Yunus Nadi, for instance, gave the title “The Words of the Duce Will Sting to
the Whole World Like a Thorn”297 to his editorial column in Cumhuriyet in 21
March. In this column he stated that:
Benito Mussolini…has recreated an aggressive and bellicose manner,
for some reason or other, which had been heard for a long time, in his
speech that mainly dealt with the foreign policy issues…Since we are,
Turks, friends with Italy, we do not take affront at the words of
Mussolini that touch Asia, the Far East, the Near East and the Cape of
Good Hope…It is not only Italy, which knows that the claims of
Germany oriented towards originally German Austria are much
stronger facts than the claims of Italy over Asia and Africa…Whatever
the war circumstances are, we are absolutely sure that we can
discomfit not only one country but also the whole world if the question
is the defense of the country due to the integrity of the fatherland and
the independence of the nation. Therefore, we do not have any
concern.298
296 Quoted by Güçlü, “Fascist Italy’s Mare Nostrum Policy,” p.816.
297Cumhuriyet 21 March 1934. “Duçe’nin Sözleri Tüm Dünyaya Şüphesiz Bir Diken
Gibi Batacaktır.”
298 Ibid. “Mussolini…bilhassa harici meselelere temas eden konuşmasında bütün
dünyanın uzun zamandan beri işitmemeye alıştığı ve nihayet unutmaya meylettiği harpçı ve
mütecaviz bir eda tarzını her nedense tekrar ihya eylemiştir…Biz Türkler İtalya ile dost
olduğumuz için Mussolini’nin Ümit Burnu’na kadar, Afrika’ya ve Uzak Şark’a varııncaya
kadar sözlerinden alınmaklığımıza tabii mahal yoktur. Almanya’nın aslen Alman olan
Avusturya’yla beraber Tirol aksamına müteveccih iddiaları İtalya’nın Afrika’ya ve Asya’ya
müteveccih emellerinden daha kuvvetli hakikatler olduğunu belki yalnız İtalya
bilmiyor…Zamanın harp şeraiti ne olursa olsun iş vatan yekpareliğinin tamamiyeti ve millet
istiklalinin en ufak halelden masuniyeti kaygusile memleketin mukaddes müdafaasına taalluk
edince biz bu müdafaayı karşımıza tek bir devlet değil bir husumet cihanı çıkacak da olsa
119
As can be seen from the quotations, although Yunus Nadi used a diplomatic style,
by underlining the friendship of Italy towards Turkey to some extent, he also tried to
disprove the historical foundation of Mussolini’s speech, by using the example of
Anschluss, which could annoy Italy most, at the time. The end of the column
obviously designates the real position of Turkey towards the speech and shows that
Turkey actually took offense at this speech despite the statements to the contrary.
Additionally, Tan made an interpretation that showed the contradiction in
which Italy had become entangled in its foreign policy. According to the article,
while Rome supported the revisionism for itself and Hungary, it sought to protect
the status-quo in terms of Austria. Therefore, it was insincerity to support both
Fascist imperialism and the cooperation with the Rome Protocols, at the same
time.299
After the harsh critiques by Turkey, Mussolini offered an explanation about
his speech. He specified that he had meant Africa and Asia in his discourse. His
country accepted Turkey as a European power, and more importantly, as a friend
with whom it had accords. Despite his explanation, the Turkish Grand National
Assembly held a session in which specifically this issue was discussed heatedly on 5
April 1934. In this session, while Aras tried to underline the Mussolini’s reference
to the European identity of Turkey in order to appease the frustrated group, Izmir
deputy and the holder of the query, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt emphasized the historical
bütün müteaarızları hezimete uğratacak veçhile muvaffakiyetle intaç edeceğimizden en kat’i
surette eminiz. O yüzden hiçbir endişemiz yoktur.”
299 Tan, 20 March 1934, quoted by Cumhuriyet, 22 March 1934.
120
rights of Turkey within the discussed areas on the contrary of Italy, and highlighted
the need to be on alert even against the allies.300
As can be seen both from the newspaper columns and from the discussions
within the political circles, Turkey could not be persuaded by the explanations of
Mussolini, despite his insistence on Turkey’s Europeanness. This speech thus
marked a rupture in the relations which were deteriorating day by day. What should
be analyzed at this point, in my view, are that the reasons behind Turkey’s fear
despite the assurances and Mussolini’s reassuring attitude towards Turkey.
In terms of Turkey’s fear, first of all, it should be stated that although Turkey
highlighted all the time its “Europeanness” in accordance with the role of the new
Republic, the administration was aware of the fact Turkey would not rescue itself
from the events that would occur near its territory whether this region was Africa or
Asia.
Furthermore, in his speech, Mussolini had frequently referred to historical
claims. Even if these claims were shown as Africa and Asia, the theoretical
background of the Italian expansionism depended on the Mare Nostrum idea, which
actually extended from the Adriatic to the Africa, as historically belonged to Roman
Empire.301 As emphasized in the previous chapters, it was the aggressive behavior of
Rome towards Turkey before 1927 on the basis of this geographical plan that had
constituted the grounds for the Turkish distrust towards Fascist Italy. In fact, Italian
threat was so effectual for Turkey that even in the period between 1927 and 1932, in
which Mussolini implemented a method of political and economic cooperation
rather than one of aggression, the distrust of Turkey had persisted, yet in a hidden
300 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: IV, Cilt:21 İçtima Senesi: 2, 5 April 1934, p.15-
17.
301Aristotle Kallis, Fascist Ideology: Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–
1945 (London New York : Routledge, 2000), p.50.
121
way. For this reason, after Fascism’s imperial ambitions were declared in a speech
by Mussolini in a belligerent tone, it was natural that Ankara was not relieved with
the assurances given by Rome, due to the fact that Turkish political circles believed
that this declaration marked a return to the aggressive means in Italian foreign
policy. Therefore, it is not erroneous to argue that the speech of Mussolini
transformed the hidden distrust of Turkey towards Italy into an explicit one, in terms
of being on constant alert. Accordingly, this fear of Italy became one of the most
important determinants of Turkish foreign policy.
If Italy’s ambitions really included Turkish territory, why Italy tried to assure
Turkey after the speech is an important question. It could be answered that it was a
necessity of the diplomatic contact between so-called friend states; however, in my
view there was a more important reason for it. The friendship of Turkey, or
neutrality at least, was noteworthy for Italy in the sense that the probable Italian
expansion into Africa, specifically into Abyssinia, would certainly lead to clashes in
the Mediterranean with other powers. In that respect, the enmity of the neighbor
near the Dodecanese Islands would not be favorable position for Italy within a
possible clash with other powers.
In addition to the desire to not alienate Turkey, due to the above-mentioned
reason, it could be suggested that Mussolini tried to assure Turkey, because the
short-term aim of Italy was colonial expansion into Africa, specifically Abyssinia,
not Turkey. It was true that Turkish-Italian relations were in decay between 1932
and 1934 and had experienced a rupture after 1934; however, many events, to which
Ankara took affront during this period actually had targets other than Turkey, as the
following pages will show. Therefore, it can be argued that while for Turkey the
main foe became Italy especially after 1934, Italy had other priorities, like Germany
122
in Europe, Britain in the Mediterranean, and Abyssinia in Africa. It is necessary to
reverse Turkish historiography, which places Turkey at the centre, in these accounts.
Setting aside these assumptions, there was a reality that the relations had
been damaged severely and the balances within Europe had begun to change more
quickly and bitterly, so it could not be expected, after this point, that attempts at
cooperation to be successful, not only between Turkey and Italy specifically, but
also among the other countries due to the uneasy European atmosphere. The
stillborn idea of the Mediterranean Pact302 project can be seen from this perspective.
In terms of the Mediterranean Pact, it could be stated that although the
architect of this initiative was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Barthou;
Turkey, which had always underlined the importance of cooperation and collective
security, enthusiastically supported the idea,303 and throughout the second half the
1930s tried to search ways to realize the project.
However, there were some problems that would affect the progress of the
idea. The first problem about the pact was the ambiguity about the possible
participatory countries. This entanglement, which was conspicuous also in the
press,304 continued as long as the idea survived. Italy’s participation in that kind of
pact was very important both especially for the countries that feared the Italian
ambitions and for its rival, France, which also had to deal with Germany in Europe.
This was the origin of the second problem in the sense that Mussolini was not
302 Sometimes it is called “ the Mediterranean Locarno.”
303 Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean,” p.452.
304 Cumhuriyet, 24 Haziran 1934: “Misaka bir rivayete göre sekiz devlet bir rivayete
göre de Türkiye, Fransa, Yugoslavya, Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan Girecekler” trans
“According to one rumour eight states and to the another Turkey, France, Yugoslavia,
Greece and Bulgaria will join the pact.”
123
accepting the certain frontiers in which Italy is interested305 and the Mediterranean
project evidently reflected anti-revisionist features. L. Barthou’s death and the
ignorance of Pierre Laval, the new French Foreign Minister, slowed the
undertakings in terms of the French side. For instance, during a Laval-Mussolini
meeting in January 1935, Laval did not find any reason to insist on this Pact when
Mussolini said that he was not quite sure about the meaning of the Mediterranean
Pact, which should have involved, besides France, Italy, and England, all the lesser
states such as Turkey, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and perhaps even Romania and
Bulgaria, which depended on their links through the Turkish straits to the
Mediterranean.306 In addition to Italy, Britain was also reluctant to form this kind of
pact.307
Therefore, the Mediterranean Pact contacts illustrated successfully how the
selfishness of the big powers and the clash of interests among them could limit and
hinder such undertakings.308 After that period, although Aras made many personal
efforts to reach a successful conclusion, the idea could not be realized, as a result of
especially Mussolini’s negative rigid attitude. At that point, it is appropriate to
underline that Turkey could not realize its will in contravention of the Great Power
politics as opposed to its success upon the lesser countries within the framework of
305Allan Nevinsi, “Eastern Locarno Project,” Current History (New York) 41 no.1
(October 1934), p.75.
306 G. Bruce Strang, “Imperial Dreams: The Mussolini-Laval Accords of January
1935,” The Historical Journal 44, no.3 (2001), p.805.
307Brock Millman, Ill-Made Alliance, Anglo-Turkish Relations 1939-1940
(Montreal&Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), p. 62.
308 Nevinsi, p.75.
124
the Balkan Pact.309 Like the Mediterranean Pact, the unaccomplished Eastern
Locarno project also contributed to the separation of Europe into opposite blocs.
While Turkey was making efforts to form alliances on the basis of the status
quo, on the revisionist side, Italy was sharpening its rhetoric day by day. Throughout
1934 Mussolini refused Locarno-like formations and kept on making declarations
especially about war and peace, disarmament, and the League of Nations that did
not please many countries, including Turkey. For instance, in May 1934, Mussolini
stated that peace was not suitable for the character of humanity and war was
inevitable. To the every speech from Rome, Turkey reacted with both declarations
from the higher echelons and with efforts for international cooperation.
The speeches of Mussolini were natural in the sense that the occupation of
Abyssinia had became a haunting idea beginning in 1932 and turned into a acute one
especially in 1934. It could be argued that after 1934, every move, alliance and
cooperation of Italy can be attributed to the plans for Abyssinia, which had become
an honour issue for the Italians due to the great defeat of in Adowa in 1896.310
Obviously, support for this expansionist mission could have been gotten from
Germany, another revisionist great power in Europe; however, the Austrian problem
was a major obstacle between Rome and Berlin at that time. Although in June
Mussolini and Hitler met in Venice in order to discuss European issues and to some
extent to reach an agreement about the problems between them, the Austrian Nazis’
attempted coup in Vienna and the assassination of Dolffuss on 24 June resulted in a
hostile reaction by Mussolini, who announced his support for independent Austria
and mobilized the Italian troops in the Alps against a possible Anschluss.311 What
309 Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean,” p.464.
310 Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, p.19.
125
these events meant was that Italy had to come closer with other powers, namely
Britain and France, both to achieve its goals in Africa and to appease Germany.
In this context, Laval and Mussolini met in Rome in January 1935. This
meeting, which has come down in history as the Mussolini-Laval Accords, has been
debated for a long time in terms of its content. Whether France gave a “free hand”
Italy in Ethiopia or not became a vital point of academic and political discussions. In
the context of French attempts to secure Italian support against Germany, the Italian
documentation seems clear: Laval gave Mussolini a free hand to invade
Abyssinia.312 It is also important to note that all of those agreements were handled
with the support of Britain. In other words, even if the collaboration of these three
powers would not last very long due to the implementation of Italy’s Fascist
expansionism, at that time they joined their efforts against the problem of Nazi
Germany.
What attracted the curiosity of Turkey about the accords was that with these
agreements Italy seemed willing to be closer to the Little Entente countries with
which it had always had problematic relations due to the competition with France
and to its stand towards anti-revisionism. Ankara interpreted the issue of one of the
aims of Italy as being against the Balkan Entente, because according to Turkish
Foreign Ministry, Rome had tried to alienate Yugoslavia and Romania from the Pact
by procuring the interests of those states for a certain time, especially in order to
isolate Greece and Turkey in the area.313 Obviously, this understanding was highly
concordant with the news which argued that Italy was very worried and angry about
311 Crozier, p.104.
312 Strang, p.809.
313 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/219.476..4.
126
the growing Turkish-Yugoslav attachment.314 Therefore, it is not erroneous to argue
that Italy with the Laval accords both set up the atmosphere for the future invasion
of Abyssinia and additionally tried to remove the some alliances which had
disquieted it.
In fact, there was another issue that disturbed Turkey more than the aims and
the results of the Laval-Mussolini Accords: The military concentration that Italy
began to intensify on the Dodecanese Islands throughout 1934. Although Rome
denied the military build-up on the islands continuously, the intelligence about the
issue disproved the claims of the Fascist state. Since Italy denoted its future in Asia
and Africa through the speeches of Mussolini, the armament program on the
Dodecanese in the same year led to suspicions about the probability of an Italian
invasion of Anatolia among the Turkish public.
This fear of territorial invasion was not novel to Turks. The Turkish
Republic had been founded nearly ten years ago after the War of Liberation that had
been fought against the invasion of the former Ottoman territory by the European
powers, among them Italy. Additionally, the fear of Italian invasion had not come to
an end after Lausanne and persisted especially around the Mosul issue. Therefore,
the threat that was felt by many circles in Turkey in 1934 was not fully unjustifiable.
However, while on the one hand Turkey feared an aggression or invasion of
its territory, due to the legacy of the late Ottoman period; on the other hand, it
displayed reactionary stance by underlining the War of Liberation phase in order to
show the power of the “Turk” in terms of fatherland defense. In this context, at the
beginning, the answer that Turkey tried to give to the Italian military build-up was
much more psychological. Although the foreign press made some news about the
314 Cumhuriyet, 12 December 1934.
127
urgent military build-up in Izmir in order to defend western Anatolia,315 these were
confuted, as Italy did the same. Whether these counter-concentrations were true or
not, what Turkey tried to do was actually deter Italy if it had such a plan. For this
reason, articles that explicated the tragic end of Greece in terms of the Anatolian
journey after the Great War were published. By the same token, carrying a statement
by a former Greek general on the front page, which was “The Occupation of the
Dodecanese Islands for Military Purposes is Useless,”316 was especially important in
order to influence not only the Italian mind but also the Turkish one.
The issue of build-ups of the Dodecanese islands continued to produce
tension, debates and controversy in the Mediterranean Sea. However, at this point, it
is necessary to discuss to what extent Turkey’s fear about the probable Italian
invasion of the Anatolian lands reflected the truth. The disdain about the vigilant
position of Turkey would be an erroneous attitude if the Mare Nostrum policy of
Italy is kept in mind. However, the designation of Turkey as the foremost aim of
Rome in 1934 obviously does not reflect the truth. In that respect, one should
conclude that Turkey was included within the final plan that the Fascists would try
to achieve, because the utmost aim of Mussolini and his cadre was to rule the whole
Mediterranean. However, in 1934 Italy was so obsessed with Ethiopia that
Mussolini ventured a war even against Britain, which was definitely against
315 These newspapers were Daily Herald and Temps, quoted by Cumhuriyet, 23
December 1934.
316 Cumhuriyet, 15 December 1934 “Oniki Ada’nın Askeri Gayeler için İşgali
Faydasızdır” In the same column, the retired general emphasized repeatedly: “Eğer
Yunanistan yahut herhangi başka bir devlet, bizim 1919-1922’de yaptığımız hatayı tekrar
ederse er geç bizim düştüğümüz akıbete uğrayacaktır,” trans. “If Greece or any other state
repeats the mistake that we have done in 1919-1922, she will come to a bad end like us.”
128
aggression over Ethiopia due to concerns about its own colonial security, and
ordered the necessary preparation for a probable clash with the Royal Navy.317
Therefore, when Mussolini was explaining that the target of the
concentration on Dodecanese islands was not Turkey but Britain, he was stating the
real intent, because Mussolini knew that he would be faced with a war with Britain
if he insisted on a war with Ethiopia. However, Ankara’s alarm at the situation was
still understandable due to the fact that one of its neighbors was making military
concentration next to the Turkish mainland as well as was making warlike
declarations.
1934 passed with the famous speech of Mussolini and the military
concentration in the Dodecanese islands. 1935 began with the Laval-Mussolini
Accords, which disrupted Turkey again, as was shown. In fact, the concerns that
Turkey felt were not unique in the sense that the political scene was moving towards
a large scale aggression in general. Although the former enemies France and Italy
had joined their hands against Nazi Germany, they did not have the deterrent power
on many issues like the German reincorporation with the Saar in March and
reintroduction of the military service in violation of the Versailles Treaty, in the
same month.
In this atmosphere, Britain, Italy, and France reacted to the growing German
“threat” with the Stresa meeting. Even if they emphasized the independence of
Austria, and in general stated that “three powers…find themselves in complete
agreement in opposing…any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger
the peace of Europe”318 in the final declaration, the Stresa front did not last long.
317 Mallett, “The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis,” p.80–
84.
318 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs (London:
H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1936), v.1935, part.1, p.159-161.
129
First of all, France at that time was trying to form a Franco-Soviet Mutual
Assistance Treaty which disturbed Italy in the sense that France would strive less for
a collaboration with Italy with this alliance. Secondly, the treaty that Britain and
Germany bilaterally concluded about the naval arms rates between the two countries
in June shocked France. Apparently, Britain had begun its long debated
appeasement policy with this agreement319 by slighting France, the main enemy of
Germany. More importantly, although the two powers, Italy and Britain,
collaborated against the dangerous German revisionism, they would come to the
brink of war on the Abyssinian issue. In other words, although the Italian-British
declaration at Stresa underlined the validity of the Locarno settlements,320 the two
countries would be tough enemies in the Eastern Mediterranean after a short period
of time. In consequence, the complex relations and different strategies for different
aims among these three powers hindered the success of the Stresa Front.
Although the persistence of the Stresa Front was evidently artificial in the
1930s environment, Turkey’s attitude towards the presence of this initiative was
negative. Turkey’s discomfort arose not only from the fact that two powers to which
Ankara was trying to become closer had cooperated with the major enemy Italy, but
also associated with the historical experiences, which indicated that it could be a
dangerous development for the small powers in terms of the likelihood of the
imposition of the great power interest on the smaller states.321 It should be stressed
that the Stresa Front coincided with the efforts of Turkey for a wide-range
Mediterranean Pact. Therefore, Stresa was regarded as a different kind of
319 Armaoğlu,p.562.
320 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of Intenrational Affiars v.1935,
part.1, p.161.
321 Millman, Ill-Made Alliance, p.39.
130
Mediterranean Pact which excluded the smaller powers.322 However, the
aforementioned danger about the Stresa Front did not materialize, because Italy
attacked Ethiopia in October 1935. Therefore, apart from Africa, the European scene
began to experience a crisis in which not only for the whole world, but also for
Turkey specifically, new dangers and threats appeared.
Obviously, these threats were apparent beforehand, because Italy had already
made declarations about Ethiopia, or Africa in general terms, and it had begun smallscale
operations especially in border zones. For instance, after that kind of a clash in
Abyssinia in January 1935, the Abyssinian government had resorted to the League of
Nations. Especially the first half of 1935 passed with explanations as well as
intimidations. In fact, the atmosphere in which armed attacks by Italy and the
responses of the Addis Ababa government had become mundane activities, had
already proved that the war between Abyssinia and Italy was inevitable in the near
future. The declarations of Mussolini about the function of the League of Nations on
this occasion strengthened the pessimistic views of the likelihood of a large scale
war; because Mussolini stated repeatedly that he did not want a negotiation process
in Geneva but bilateral relations between the two states;323 in other words, freedom
of action on the matter.
In fact, the position of Rome was not as easy as many thought. Although
Britain ignored the Laval-Mussolini Accords in January and tried not to mention
Abyssinia during Stresa meetings due to the threat of Germany, Italy would become
the ferocious enemy when the attack became unavoidable. Even if Britain had never
thought of Italy as a threat like Germany, it understood the seriousness of Rome’s
ambitions. After that point, Abyssinia became a fundamental problem because it
322 Ibid.
323 Cumhuriyet, 20 May 1935.
131
could change the balance of power in the Mediterranean, which was as Monroe
writes “a main arterial road… a vital interest in the full sense of the word to the
British Commonwealth of Nations.”324 The British concerns were not fully
groundless because it was clear that Abyssinia constituted the first step of the Italian
imperial dreams, which meant that in the future British colonies would come under
the Italian threat. As a result, Britain made a considerable effort in order to solve
Abyssinian problem within the framework of diplomacy. However, Mussolini did
not have a diplomatic solution, but a military one in mind. Therefore, tension
between Rome and London worsened over the course of that summer, as the crisis
metamorphosed from an Italo-Ethiopian tension into a full-scale international one.325
What was the situation of Turkey throughout the pre-Abyssinian war process
is an important question to ask both in order to show the conduct of the Turkish-
Italian relations and to comprehend the impacts of the tense world politics upon
Turkish foreign policy. In that respect, first of all, Turkey displayed a negative
attitude towards Italy because first, the issue was the independence of a country, put
it another way, was imperialism. Second, that imperialism was being made by Fascist
Italy, which posed the utmost threat to Turkey at that time. Therefore, in the pre-war
days, Turkish press published columns that gave voice to the Ethiopia, and the
“friend” Mussolini of three years ago turned into a “dictator.”326 Italy felt indisposed
about the Turkish stance and counter-acted through the press, in accordance with the
nature of the Turkish-Italian relations in those years. For instance, Il Giornale
D’Italia, on 27 August 1935 stated that Italy could not construe the reasons for the
324 Elizabeth Monroe, Mediterranean in Politics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1938), p.11.
325 Mallett, Mussolini and The Origins of the Second World War, p.40.
326 Cumhuriyet, 24 May 1935.
132
attitude of Turkey and the Turkish press, which had become pejorative and hostile to
Italy, because Turkey neither was representing the Islamic world anymore nor had
any material interests in Abyssinia.327 The article continued with a menacing style
which warned that Turkey could not forget the Italian help and friendship in the hard
times and also reminded that security and independency within the Mediterranean
(without clashing with Italy) would be to advantage of Turkey itself.328 It could be
concluded that Abyssinian crisis turned into another point of tension between two
countries whose friendship had already been ruined.
In addition to the position of Turkey towards Abyssinia, news that stated that
Abyssinia was recruiting Turkish, Greek, and American volunteers,329 made the bad
atmosphere between two states worse. However, when these artificial news and to
some extent some real developments began to disquiet also Ankara, the officials felt
responsibility for making an explanation to Italy, because the issue transcended the
recruits in the sense that the reports were indicating that a former ‘Ottoman Pasha’330
had gone to Abyssinia as the supreme commander of the army. Ankara immediately
issued a statement, which was published in Ottobre, an Italian daily, stating that this
figure did not have any connection with the Kemalist regime; he was actually an
opponent of it.331
Therefore, it can be argued that even if Turkey was apparently against Italy
on this occasion, it made efforts to abstain from misunderstandings and direct
327 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/238.606..7.
328 Ibid.
329 Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1935.
330 Vehip Pasha.
331 PMRA, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, 030..10/106.693..28.
133
challenges against Italy, with this explanation. However, these kinds of reports
continued to be embarrassing for Turkey vis-à-vis Rome, because new ones were
added such as the news about Kazım Karabekir Pasha332 about whom publications
claimed that he would go to Abyssinia with a group of army officers.333
Apart from these specific issues that pertained to Turkish-Italian relations
with respect to the Abyssinian War, there was another impact of this period on
Turkish foreign policy, the Straits. Although Ankara raised Turkey’s concerns about
the existing legal system and its deficiencies, almost on every occasion throughout
the 1930s, the pre-Abyssinian war period alone became a good opportunity for
vocalizing the desire for a new arrangement. As will be shown below, these efforts
would yield result after the Abyssinian campaign, and would lead to the conclusion
of the Montreux Convention.
Turning to the Abyssinian War, in an environment where the public was
arguing whether Italy would assault or not, the war began in 3 October 1935.
Obviously, after Mussolini decided to withdraw his delegate from Geneva in
September, the war had become an anticipated reality. Hereafter, while Britain and
Italy came to the verge of a war in the Mediterranean, the League of Nations began
to discuss sanctions as a response to the aggression.
Although Italy and France had already agreed over Abyssinia in the
Mussolini-Laval accords, that did not constitute a basis for the same kind of an
agreement between London and Rome. On the contrary, Abyssinia became not only
a rupture in the relatively stable British-Italian relations, but also an inconsistency in
French-British relations because of the tacit acceptance of the occupation by the
333 This news was made in Yenigün in Antakya, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of
Directorate General of Transactions, 030..10/101.656..27.
134
French. However, as can be expected, within a possible clash between Britain and
Italy, France would support its traditional ally, Britain. However, Mussolini was so
obsessed with a Mediterranean Empire that, according to him, Italy would able to
defeat British Royal Navy in the Mediterranean in a potential war, contrary to the
Italian naval leadership that “were far from prepared to risk war with Britain in order
to achieve the colonial objectives.”334 In addition to the Italian naval leadership,
British officials also did not desire a war, because a war with Italy would irreparably
damage the power of Britain especially in the Far East335 and, more importantly, the
Reich was getting stronger militarily every day and would take advantage of any
discord between France, Britain, and Italy.336 Therefore, London, which thought
inaccurately that the Stresa Front could be repaired if this process culminated without
war, tried to evade the imposition of petroleum embargo, which would plainly
galvanize Mussolini, in the League of Nations sessions about the matter. However, it
was self-evident by December 1935337 that Italy had come closer to Germany and
British-Italian-French relations were on the decline.
In this atmosphere where Europe began to be divided into the blocks which
would become the basis of the Second World War, Turkey sought to rescue itself
334 Mallett, “The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis,” p.78.
335 Michael L. Roi, “A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude: The British
Foreign Office, American Neurality and the Hoare Laval Plan,” Canadian Journal of History
29, no.2 (August 1994), p.342.
336Aaron L. Goldman, “Sir Robert Vansittart’s Search for Italian Cooperation
Against Hitler, 1933-1936,” Journal of Contemporary History 9, no.3 (July 1974), p.119.
337 See Hoare-Laval Plan. It was the last attempt by France and Britain in order to
reach an agreement with Italy in terms of Abyssinia that resulted in a fiasco. It is usually said
that Hoare-Laval Plan buried the Stresa Front which was already asleep. It is also claimed
that it constituted the basis for the Axis.
135
from the impacts of the strained relations while trying to benefit from the some
opportunities that stemmed from this dangerous environment.
First of all, in terms of sanctions, Turkey had to make a decision between its
economic and political relations with Italy and a cooperative action for world peace.
In that respect, while the sanctions issue was being debated without a result yet, the
higher echelons of the Turkish political circles were inclined to the participation in
the sanctions. Despite the existence of this predisposition, the ambivalence of the
political scene in Ankara was self-evident because of the fact that the imposition of
sanctions would be a move against the major threat, Rome, which was intimidating
Ankara by warning that participation in the coercive measures would also influence
the diplomatic relations, besides the economic ones, even after the sanctions
ended.338 The debates in the assembly for the voting of the sanctions mirrored this
confusion explicitly. For instance, Berç Türker, a deputy, stated:
Italy is buying goods from Turkey and if we participate in the
sanctions at a time that the trade between two countries can improve,
Italy can possibly cut its commercial relations with us and decide not
to buy any goods from us in the future. Besides, the duration of the
commercial treaty between Italy and Turkey has expired. Our
participation will surely constitute an impediment for its renewal. If we
paralyze our commercial ties with Italy by participating in the decision
of the League of Nations, how will the League of Nations provide
compensation for us in return for this sacrifice?...Unfortunately the
League of Nations could not prevent the war, now can it stop the war
with coercive measures?339
338 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, ,
Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları, 1935-1939, vol.4 of Türk Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl
(Ankara: Genel Müdürlük, 1973), p.12.
339 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: V, Cilt:6, İçtima Senesi:1, 13 November 1935,
p.51-52. “Şimdi İtalya bizden mal alıyor ve bu memleketle olan ticaretimizin inkışaf
edebileceği bir zamanda, zecri tedbirlere iştirak edersek, olabilir ki İtalya, aramızdaki ticari
münasebatını kessin ve atide bizden mal almamağa karar versin. Bundan maada İtalya ile
akdettiğimiz ticaret muhadesinin vadesi hulul etmiştir. Zecri tedbirlere iştirakımız bittabi bu
muahedenin tecdidine bir mani teşkil edecektir. Biz Uluslar Kurumunun kararına iştirak
etmek suretiyle, İtalya ile cari olan ticari münabetimizi felce uğratsak, acaba Uluslar
Kurumu bu fedakarlığa karşı bize ne gibi maddi ve ameni ‘compensation’ temin
136
Although after that deputy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a speech in favor of
the sanctions, there was no doubt that Turkish politicians remained suspicious, firstly
about the necessity of a sacrifice that would certainly damage the economic interests
of the country and would create more tension in the already tense diplomatic
relations between the two countries, and secondly about the reliability of the
cooperation between the countries within the sphere of the League of Nations instead
of bilateral relations. It must be underlined that these kinds of question marks within
the minds of the officials were not unique to Turkey; dissatisfaction with the League
of Nations was the general thinking of the interwar era.
As can be anticipated, Turkey, despite the risks, accepted and the
implemented coercive measures against Italy by delivering a note that stated,
“despite the friendly feelings towards Italy, Turkey complies with the
commitments.”340 Obviously, these measures reflected also on the Turkish-Italian
trade rates in the sense the figures dropped dramatically after the embargo. It has
been always emphasized in the Turkish historiography that the sacrifice of Ankara is
direct evidence that the international institution the task of which was to protect the
global peace outweighed the national interests, for Turkey.341 Although this was
proved many times by the initiatives of Turkey and by the speech of the officials, it
should be underlined that Turkey did not support the League of Nations blindly. The
issue was beyond the realm of just bilateral economic relations, it was about Fascist
Rome, which made Turkey to feel threatened at a time when it desired to feel secure
edecektir?...Malesef Uluslar Kurumu harbin önüne geçemedi, şimdi zecri tedbirlerle harbi
durdurabilecek mi?”
340 Quoted by T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel
Müdürlüğü, Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları, p.13.
341 Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, ed., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası; 1919-1965
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 1969), p.121.
137
within its new boundaries. That is to say, Turkey always highlighted international
cooperation; however, the cost-benefit analysis logic in this instance is highly
marked. The answer that Turkey sent to Geneva, which stated that Turkey was
obliged to implement economic sanctions but would not participate in the possible
military measures automatically,342 is also a good example illustrating this costbenefit
analysis rationale.
In addition to the embargo issue which aggravated already broken off
relations between the two countries, this time both politically and economically,
there was another impact of this process on Turkey with respect to Italy. It was the
issue of the military build-up on the Dodecanese islands. The real intent of Rome for
the military bases and the misinterpretation of Ankara at the time and the Turkish
historiography in general, were designated above.
However, as opposed to the diplomatic studies, Turkey began to understand
that the military build-up in the Dodecanese islands was against specifically Britain.
It could be concluded that although Turkey did not put an end to its suspicions about
the fortifications on the islands,343 it felt at ease after Italy attacked Ethiopia and
broke ties with Britain. For example, newspapers began to inquire into the reasons
for the military fortifications depending on strategic realities, rather than feelings of
threat.344 In consequence, the Abyssinian campaign brought relief to Turkey from a
different point of view.
Furthermore, one of the most important results of the Abyssinian assault was
the warmth in the relations between Turkey and Britain, because the same enemy
342 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/234.580..13.
343 Cumhuriyet, 16 October 1935.
344 Cumhuriyet, 13 October 1935, “What is the reason for the preparation of war in
the Dodecanese Islands?”
138
posed threat to both in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, it can be suggested that
the direction of the foreign policy of Ankara began to incline towards London at a
time when the world began to divide into just two camps. This argument can be
proved with the formal guarantees that Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and
Turkey gave each other, in January 1936. These assurances, which were known as
the Mediterranean Accords, envisaged essentially the help of Britain, which had the
utmost power in the Mediterranean, to those states which were under the threat of
Italy due to their participation in the sanctions.345 In reaction to these assurances,
Rome asked Ankara about the consistency of 1928 Turkish-Italian Friendship Treaty
with these Mediterranean Accords. In other words, Italy pointed out the
inconsistency between these two treaties in a critical way.
Whatever the criticisms of Italy were, Turkey attached great importance to
these agreements because it had finally gained the help of a Great Power in the
Mediterranean although these agreements were not the Mediterranean Pact that
Ankara had previously desired to realize. However, it was still important for Turkey
in the sense that even after the sanctions against Italy came to an end, the Turkish
government desired to hold the mutual responsibilities and later, wanted to form a
kind of bilateral agreement which was refused by Britain in order not to expedite the
Axis by alienating Rome. The disappointment of Ankara due to the refusal of Britain
can be seen in the speech of Atatürk to the British Ambassador in Ankara: “Dear
Ambassador, I am sorry about this answer, there is danger and this danger is
growing. The European skies are getting cloudier. According to my assessment, up
345 Soysal, p.489–492.
139
until four-five years, Italy and Germany will unite and will lead us into the
catastrophe of the Second World War.”346
However, even if Turkey was disappointed in terms of the desired agreement
in 1936, it can be concluded that the Abyssinian crisis and the Mediterranean
Agreements became turning points both in British-Turkish relations vis-à-vis Italy
and in the Turkish foreign policy in general. The Mediterranean scene had become so
problematic that Turkey needed to be closer to a Great Power on the other side, in
order to protect itself from possible Italian aggression. However, the versatility of the
relations should also be highlighted that it was the same Italian threat from which
Ankara had benefitted mostly in terms of Montreux Arrangement.
Actually, throughout the 1930s, the Turkish government tried to change the
regime of the Turkish Straits, because the Lausanne Treaty was not capable of
ensuring the security of Turkish territory. Therefore, in every incident that pertained
to Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean Sea, Turkish officials brought the
issue into the international arena. As stated many time above, in the interwar period
Turkey feared an attack from the Mediterranean, and specifically from the
Dodecanese islands. The deterioration of the relations with Italy led Turkey to search
for support.
The necessary conditions matured when Italy attacked Abyssinia because the
interests of the Great Powers were at stake.347 Since Britain and Turkey united their
hands vis-à-vis Italy in the Ethiopian case, Britain, which was satisfied with the
346 Quoted by Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, (Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınları: Ankara, 1987), vol.1, p. 84. “Sayın Büyükelçi, bu cevaptan teesür duydum, tehlike
vardır, büyümektedir. Avrupa semaları üzerine kara bulutlar her gün daha ziyade
yoğunlaşmaktadır. Benim değerlendirmelerime göre dört beş seneye varmayacak, İtalya ile
Almanya birleşip başımıza İkinci Dünya Harbi felaketini çıkaracaktır.”
347 Within the same months, the invasion of Rhinland and termination of Locarno by
Germany should be also kept in mind.
140
existing status-quo in the Straits, changed its mind and began to support Turkey.348 In
this atmosphere, Turkey delivered a note on the necessity of change in the Straits
regime on 11 April 1936 to the concerned states.
Italy’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, declared that Italy had
been exposed to an international injustice with the sanctions and would participate in
the conference only if the sanctions were lifted.349 Therefore, Italy’s stance about the
attendance in the Montreux Conference, which depended on the support in Geneva,
was manifested. In addition to the thoughts of Rome that considered the conference
as against specifically Italy, “the truth of the matter was that Italy did not want to
participate in a lawful conference for the revision of the peace treaties.”350Actually, if
the stance that Italy could have taken in the conference is taken into the
consideration, the absence of the dissident Rome in the proceedings seems to have
been much more advantageous for Turkey.
The Conference began on 22 June 1936 without Italy. Despite its absence, it
continued to influence the progress of the negotiations with polemical declarations.
For instance, on the same day as the opening of the conference, Rome denoted that it
was unusual to negotiate about an important Mediterranean issue without a
Mediterranean country which could not participate due to existing ambiguities on
international circumstances.351 Aras’ response, which expressed that “unfortunately,
348 The British support for the change in the Straits regime can also be interpreted as
a desire of being a balance to the Soviet Union in the region. At the time, Britain feared from
colloboration between the Soviet Union and Italy despite the fact that it was a weak
probability.
349 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü,
Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları, p.53.
350 Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations 1933–1939 (London: Secker and
Warburg, 1976), p.38.
351 Cumhuriyet, 23 June 1935.
141
it was impossible to have the vital interests of a nation coincide with the moments
judged opportune by Italy,”352 in one of the sessions of the Conference is important
in terms of showing the outraged status of the bilateral relations.
In the end, the Montreux Convention, which permitted the remilitarization of
the Straits and established the full sovereignty of Turkey in the area on the contrary
of the Lausanne arrangement, was accepted on 20 July 1936. However, as could be
expected, Italy did not sign the treaty. Turkey was aware of the fact that the absence
of Italy could have many problematic consequences for the Montreux Convention
although Turkey denominated the issue as if it was a detail in the Assembly sessions.
In other words, despite statements from the Foreign Minister and some deputies
which expressed their belief about Italy’s signature to the Convention in near
future,353 the acceptance by Italy was a great concern for Turkey.
The foremost concern for Turkey about the absence of Italy in the conference
and at the Convention, first of all, stemmed from the fact that Italy had been one of
the concerned authorities of the Straits regimes in the Lausanne Treaty. Therefore,
the absence and non-acceptance of Italy led to question marks about the new
arrangement in terms of international law in the sense that whether this convention
was valid for Italy or not was debated intensely. While some of the parties supported
the idea that the old Convention remained in force for Italy because of its absence at
the conference, Turkey, as a response, stated that Montreux was valid for Italy
because Rome had failed to fulfill its responsibilities in terms of participating.354 It
352 Ibid.
353 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:V, Cilt:12, İçtima Senesi:1,31 July 1936, p.314-
315.
354 Süleyman Seydi, The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreux
Convention to the Early Cold War,1936-1947 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003 ) p.56.
142
could be presumed that these debates disturbed the Turkish official and public circles
in terms of the acceptability of the Straits regime. Thus, the Italian signature on the
Montreux Convention became very important for Turkey.
Actually, all of the states knew that the stability in the Mediterranean could
not be achieved without Italy. Therefore, especially Britain, which wanted to both
achieve stability in the Mediterranean and to forestall a Rome-Berlin Axis due to the
major threat that this collaboration could pose to the Mediterranean balance of
power, aimed at the acceptance of Montreux by Italy. However, Rome stated that it
would not sign the treaty unless Turkey recognized the sovereignty of Italy in
Ethiopia. However, in the conditions of 1936, Turkey did not accept this
precondition.
After 1936, Britain continued to make efforts for the acceptance of the
Convention by Italy. In this sense, in addition to the fact that the sanctions were
lifted, the termination of the Mediterranean Accords, which had been made under the
conditions of the Abyssinian crisis, had aimed at softening Italy. By the same token,
Italy and Britain had signed the Gentleman’s Agreement in January 1937 through
which both countries promised to respect the status quo in the Mediterranean.355 In
fact, this agreement led to some kind of détente both within the British-Italian
relations and within Turkish-Italian relations.356
In this context, Aras made a visit to Milan in order to discuss the Convention
issue, but not surprisingly Italy persisted in its stance towards the treaty. Actually,
Italy would not sign the Montreux Convention until the recognition of the Italian
355 Ibid., p.68.
356 Ibid.
143
Empire in April 1938 by Turkey. After Turkey transformed what had previously
been de facto recognition into de jure one,357 Italy signed the treaty in May 1938.
To conclude the Montreux issue, it must be underlined that the Straits regime
became a battlefield among the many countries, including Turkey and Italy.
Although Italy did take the revenge for the sanctions, in a sense, with this issue, it
could not be regarded as a mood directed against only Turkey. On the contrary, if the
Montreux process was a war among the powers, Italy assaulted every front, not just
one. The signature of Italy in 1938 was a late but satisfactory development for
Turkey because Ankara foresaw this arrangement as lifelong, not special to the
interwar era, so Italy’s accession put an end to the debates and ambiguity. However,
as will be seen below, this process did not influence the conduct of Turkish-Italian
relations until the end of the Second World War. On the contrary, by 1936, it was
evident that Turkey and Italy had diverged into the different blocks although the prostatus
quo group tried hard to estrange Germany and Italy from each other.
This divergence of Europe would be observed best within the period of the
Spanish Civil War. In this sense, although Spain was a distant area which seemed as
if it could not directly affect Turkey, the interference of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany
and the communist Soviet Union in the war had direct impacts on both European
politics in general and on Turkish diplomacy specifically. Since it had also influences
on Turkish-Italian relations, it is necessary to look at the course of events in the
Spanish Civil War.
After the war broke out between the forces of the nationalist General Franco
and the republican government forces in July 1936, Italy decided to interfere in the
357Anthony Rocco De Luca, The Montreux Conference of 1936: A Diplomatic Study
of Anglo-Soviet Rivalry at the Turkish Straits (Master’s thesis, Stanford University, 1974),
p.249.
144
war, by supporting the forces of Franco. The reason behind the armed support of
Italy can be explained by the fact that “virtually from the first day of the war, the
conflict was considered throughout the world not as merely Spanish affair but as the
first round in the struggle of fascism.”358 With this explanation, the interference of
Italy and Germany as well as of the Soviet Union can be understood clearly. The
interference of these countries influenced European politics, because the Rome-
Berlin Axis,359 which came into being in November, was consolidated during this
ongoing process, so the European scene was thoroughly clustering.
In addition to the impacts of the Spanish Civil War on European diplomacy,
the course of events resulted in a certain issue in which Turkey was interested
specifically: the piracy in the Mediterranean Sea that had begun after the outbreak of
war. Torpedo and airplane attacks on shipping in the Mediterranean were growing in
frequency, thus a new crisis which shifted attention to the maritime traffic
occurred.360
When two merchant ships were sunk by submarines near the Dardanelles,
Turkey felt particularly indisposed, because these attacks showed that there were
unknown submarines within the Straits. This highlighted the issue of Turkish
preparedness and military capability in the defense of the Straits, posing some
dangerous complications in the international arena, for Turkey, which had recently
358 John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in Spanish Civil War (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1975), p.13.
359 Actually, in July 1936, Austria and Germany had signed “Austrian-German
Gentleman’s Agreement” (Abkommen) through which Germany came closer to Anschluss.
Then, isolated Rome due to the Ethiopian assault, accepted the position of Germany on
Austria in order to improve the relations with Berlin. Therefore, only problem between two
countries disappeared. After that point, in November, in other words, during the Spanish
Civil War, in Milan, Mussolini made an announcement that stated “this Berlin-Rome Line is
not a Diaphragm but rather than an Axis.” With this statement the Axis had been founded.
(Burgwyn, p.152)
360Coverdale, p.13
145
gained sovereignty of the region.361 Therefore, after the incidents, Ankara declared
that the existence of a submarine in the Straits meant the violation of the Montreux
Convention, so Turkey would take the necessary actions provided that the Turkish
authorities could detect an unknown submarine within its waters.
However, since these incidents were not unique to Turkey in the sense that
the piracy events were breaking down the order of the whole Mediterranean, the
Mediterranean countries, with the initiative of Britain and France, decided to meet in
Nyon in September 1937. Because Italy put forward the recognition of the Italian
Empire as a precondition for participation again, the suspicions about Italy even
before the conference turned into a tacit blame at Nyon which was held in the
absence of Italy and Germany, without delay. As a result of the achievement of the
Conference, Aras described the conference “as a success from status quo powers and
a defeat for Italy.”362 The reactions against Italy continued with the Turkish and
Greek decision to close their port facilities to Italy. This move demonstrated that
Turkey, as in other international cooperation examples, felt more comfortable
towards Italy provided that it was backed by one or more powers. In other words,
with the backing of Britain, both Turkey and Greece, as lesser powers of Europe,
began to act confidently against Italy.
Furthermore, what is astonishing about this conference, in terms of Turkish
politics, is that it brought the divergence of ideas between Atatürk and İnönü in terms
of Italy to the surface. According to Atatürk, Turkey needed to become closer to
Britain. For instance, in this case, Turkey should have given Britain permission to
patrol in Turkish waters. For İnönü, that meant provoking Italy, which had military
361 Yücel Güçlü, “Nyon Agreement of 1937 and Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies,38
no.1 (January 2002), p.56.
362 Ibid., p.62.
146
fortifications in the nearby Dodecanese Islands. İnönü insisted even before the
conference that Turkey should wait for the position of Italy and warned that any
agreement in which Italy did not partake could lead to clashes with Rome.363
However, Atatürk insisted on the collaboration with the British against the Italians
and conducted the conference directly through Aras regardless of İnönü. In Turkish
political history, the Nyon conference is considered as one of the reasons for the
resignation of İnönü that September. In terms of foreign policy, Atatürk’s domination
on this issue symbolized a new direction, being completely against Italy. Aras later
interpreted the Nyon Conference, too, as “if nothing else, it drove the Turks and
Britain closer together by associating them in what was, in effect, an informal
alliance against Italy.”364 As could be anticipated, a new era, in which diplomacy did
not play a major role, began in Turkish-Italian relations. In this new era, Turkey
usually took action with the support of Britain, which would formalize the informal
alliance that Aras stated; after it comprehended that Italy could not be rescued from
the hands of Germany.
However, before the final blow, in other words before the Turkish-British-
French Tripartite Alliance, another initiative, namely the Saadabad Pact,365should be
touched upon, because it is usually regarded as an alliance against Italy, which had
territorial ambitions in the region.366 In this sense, it could be stated that although the
Pact was signed in July 1937 by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the efforts for
cooperation in the Middle East dated back to 1935. Since this year especially
symbolized the invasion of Abyssinia, it is normal to think that the pact was against
363 İsmet İnönü, Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşileri, comp. İlhan Turan,
(Ankara: TBMM, 2003), vol.1 p.337.
364 Güçlü, “Nyon Agreement of 1937,” p.67.
365 Soysal, p.584-587.
147
Italy. The Turkish political history books also point out this aspect of the alliance.367
This is not totally inaccurate, but a simplified interpretation. It is true that the aims of
Italy in Asia and Africa, as Mussolini had stated, brought the countries closer, not
only in the Middle East, but also in the Balkans as was explained. However, like the
Balkan Entente again, the Pact was not against specifically Italy. Actually, it was a
friendship and good neighborhood treaty that was compatible with the aims of
Turkey, which was trying to constitute a stable and peaceful area around its
territory.368 The most important reason behind the pact was not Italy, but the desire to
find peaceful solutions to the boundary problems among the states as well as the
desire for collaboration in terms of the Kurdish tribes that were leading problems
with various rebellions between the states.369 Therefore, considering the Saadabad
Pact rather as a notification of respect for each other’s boundaries and as the efforts
to diminish the influence of the Kurdish tribes within the bilateral relations will be
the correct way of approaching the history.
After this brief but necessary comment on the Sadaabad Pact, it is appropriate
to turn to something which was really against Italy; British-French-Turkish Tripartite
Alliance, which was concluded in 1939, the war year. Before the analysis of the
Alliance, the conditions that played roles in its birth must be examined. In that
respect, the events of 1938 and especially of the first half of 1939, which had utmost
importance, should be explained first.
367 See, Armaoğlu, Siyasi Tarih; Sar and Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası
(1919-1965).
368 Soysal, p. 582.
369 Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürküçüoğlu, “Göreli Özerklik-I/Ortadoğuyla
İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Buıgüne Olgular, Belgeler Yorumlar,
ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), p.365-366.
148
While the Spanish Civil War, which tied Germany and Italy to each other
more and more, continued throughout 1938, one of the most important incidents of
the year was the German annexation of Austria in March. Italy already had accepted
this inevitable culmination for the sake of the relations with the Germans, so no
resistance or reaction came on the part of the Italians. Besides, especially after
Sudetenland was evacuated by Czechoslovakian government in the same year, the
Danubian area fell under the dominance of Germany. Actually, with those
developments, Italy began to feel inferior to Germany, because step by step Berlin
gained ascendancy over Rome, the sphere of conduct of which was evidently put
under restraint.
Although the two were allies, the hegemony of Germany on Italy led to more
active stance in the Mediterranean by Mussolini because, according to the partition
of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea belonged to the Italians while
East-Central Europe did to the Germans. However, when Germany began to
influence Yugoslavia, Italy felt upset. Therefore, some steps were taken, especially in
the Balkans, which influenced Turkish foreign policy also.
First of all, Italy became closer to Yugoslavia, which had already positive
contacts with Bulgaria. Therefore, the balance in the Mediterranean began to change
at the expense of Turkey and Greece because Yugoslavia was a member of the
Balkan Entente. Therefore, Turkey and Greece, which both feared Italian dominance,
made another Friendship Treaty designed to promote security in the
Mediterranean.370
Secondly and more importantly, Italy invaded Albania in 1939, just a month
after that Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. After that point, the British and the
370 Soysal, p.588-590.
149
French gave assurances to Greece and Romania and proposed the same assurance to
Turkey. However, Ankara refused this offer by stating that this kind of assurance
would attract the enmity of Italy and Germany, which in return could lead to an
assault on the Straits when the war broke out.371 After giving this reason, Turkey
underlined the necessity of an alliance on which these issues could be discussed. It
should be underlined that the stance of Turkey, which depended on abstaining from
provoking the Axis, does not show that Turkey wanted to cower down against Italy.
On the contrary, Turkey used this blind-excuse in order to obtain more effective
guarantees from Britain.
This device of Turkey gave birth to the “British-French-Turkish Tripartite
Alliance”372 through which Ankara gained support from its allies against a
presumptive Mediterranean attack after which the Dodecanese islands would be
made secure for Turkey. As can be seen, Turkey was reflecting its feeling of
insecurity about the Dodecanese Islands, again. Another important aspect of the
Alliance was that France participated in the Alliance later, because Turkey and
France had being experienced problematic relations due to the Sanjak issue, which
was solved in 1939. After that date, with the participation of France, the Alliance,
which tied Turkey to the Western bloc was completed. Not surprisingly, Italy reacted
to this Alliance, which was mainly against itself. Actually, it is not erroneous to
argue that even if the Tripartite Alliance was not directly against Italy, it would
probably be against it anyway, because the relations between Turkey and Italy had
became so strained by 1939 that revisionist Italy reacted and criticized even the
371 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü,
Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları, p.193.
372 Soysal, p.600-607.
150
annexation of Hatay with Turkey, which had led to a war between the presses of two
countries.373
In consequence, when the Second World War began, Turkey had already
determined its position. This position was totally formed definitely on the basis of
the perception of Italian threat. Rome and its expansionist foreign policy played the
utmost role in Turkey’s choice, which was made despite the efforts of Germany to
include Ankara in the Axis, which could not be possible due to the presence of Italy.
Even after determining its stance, Turkey waited hopefully for the position of Italy
which was neutral at the beginning of the war, because for Turkey, Italy was the key
actor that would dictate the situation of war in the Mediterranean and also was the
enemy in respect to which Turkey should have positioned itself.374 In other words a
statement by İnönü made in 1936, remained true even after the war: “The most
fundamental matter, perhaps the only matter of Turkey for today is the security of the
Mediterranean and the ambitions of Italy…If Italy remains neutral, we should be
neutral by all means. If Italy enters into the war, being neutral again in order to
preserve our power is the most beneficial way.”375
All in all, the aim of this chapter was to designate the diplomatic relations
between Turkey and Italy within the period of 1932-1939, taking the other powers’
conditions and the general events in Europe into account. What can be argued at that
point is that the relations in the previous period, which had been conducted in a
373 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/85.558..22.
374 Selim Deringil, Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası
(İstanbul: Türkiye Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,1994), p.96-97.
375 Quoted by T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel
Müdürlüğü, Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları, p.54. “Türkiye’nin en mühim meselesi ve
belki bugün için yegane meselesi Akdeniz Emniyeti ve İtalya ihtirasatı meselesidir…İtalya
bitaraf kaldığı takdirde mutlaka bitaraf kalmalıyız. İtalya harbe girdiği halde yine bitaraf
kalıp kuvvetimizi muhafaza etmek en faydalı yoldur.”
151
polite and friendly manner, were reversed in this new era. In other words, a return to
the pre-1927 period, in which Turkey feared Italian ambitions in Anatolia
eventuated. However, there were differences between the two periods, because one
the one hand, the pre-1927 period was entirely hostile in terms of the attitude of Italy
towards Turkey, except for the War of Liberation period; on the other hand, the plans
for the southwestern Anatolian territory had the utmost importance on the Mare
Nostrum agenda. However, in this period, Italy’s Mare Nostrum policy was obsessed
with Abyssinia specifically; in other words, the priority was not Anatolia.
But, as suggested throughout the chapter, this does not mean that Turkey’s
feelings were groundless. What is suggested rather is that many developments in the
Mediterranean that alarmed Turkey in this period were not directly about Anatolia.
However, the location of the territorial aims of Mussolini after Abyssinia, Albania,
Yugoslavia, was another question, especially if the content of the Mare Nostrum
policy is kept in mind. In other words, whether the next turn would be Turkey or not
is beyond the ability of this chapter to answer, on the basis of the historical material.
Another aim of this chapter was to show that how this perception of threat
affected Turkish foreign policy. The alliances and the initiatives in which Turkey
participated were looked upon from this perspective with the effort of not falling into
the traps of the general misinterpretations in Turkish historiography, as in the case of
Saadabad Pact and the Balkan Entente. The most fundamental impact of the Italian
threat on Turkish foreign policy was that it drove Turkey to the side of Britain and
France. Its importance, fist of all, stemmed from the fact that it signaled the change
in the interwar foreign policy tradition, which had depended on neutrality. It should
be kept in mind that after 1935, the world scene became so complicated that it was
152
impossible for a middle power to conduct an independent foreign policy. Therefore,
the impact of Italy was not on choosing a side but choosing the British side.
Secondly, it changed the conduct of Turkish-Italian relations. Turkey and
Italy conducted their diplomatic relations much more bilaterally before Turkey and
Britain became closer. However, after 1935, which symbolized the Abyssinian
campaign and closer Turkish-British relations thereafter, Britain also became a part
of this relationship. The period of the Montreux Convention is a good example of
this suggestion, in terms of their collaboration.
Thirdly, Italy, while influencing the foreign policy choice of Turkey at the
end of the interwar era, also determined the future of Turkish foreign policy
indirectly because the choice of Turkey before the Second World War continued also
long decades after the war.
Apart from the nature of the Italian foreign policy towards Turkey and its
impacts on Turkish foreign policy in this era, there is another point that needs to be
made before concluding the diplomatic relations part. In this sense, attention should
be drawn to the determinant character of the foreign policy in terms of the bilateral
relations between these two states. It was shown in the previous three chapters, the
contacts depended on the attitude of Italy towards Turkey on the basis of the foreign
policy goals of Rome and Ankara. This identifier character of foreign policy could be
seen from this period best, because although “the way in which Mussolini seemed to
forge national unity and to energize Italian society impressed many in Turkey,”376
this appreciation did not have any impact on the bilateral relations in terms of
rapprochement.
376 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I.B Tauris, St. Martin's
Press, 1997), p.181.
153
In this sense, it should be underlined that there were political and cultural
interactions between these two states, even if they were limited, throughout the
1930s in which the Turkish stance towards Italy depended on adversity, on the
contrary. For example, the Turkish criminal code, which was adapted by Turkey in
1926 from the 1889 Italian code, was changed many times in order to conform to
Turkish values throughout the 1930s, yet the changes that were adapted to the text
also came from Mussolini’s newly promulgated 1930 Fascist code of criminal law.377
By the same token, the People’s Houses, which were opened in 1932, had been
formulated on the basis of Italian dopolavoro (afterwork) institutions. Therefore, a
detailed analysis of similar institutions in other countries, but especially of
dopolavoro before and during the foundation process of the People’s Houses,378 was
not a surprising but an inevitable procedure, especially if the aforementioned positive
view of the Kemalist cadre about the ability of Fascism to shape the society is kept in
mind.
However, the existence of these cultural and political interactions between the
two regimes throughout the interwar years, but specifically in the 1930s, due to the
increasing authoritarian tendencies also in the Turkish regime to some extent, did not
have any impact in terms of the bilateral relations. Thus, rather than sympathy, the
relationship depended on an animosity, which stemmed from the Italian threat to
Turkish territory and the Turkish fear of the Mare Nostrum policy, rather than
existent social linkages.
377 Ruth A. Miller, Legislating Authority: Sin and Crime in the Ottoman Empire and
Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.108.
378 Sefa Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri 1932–1951 (İstanbul:
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2002), p.25–26
154
CHAPTER 7
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITALY
The importance of the economic relations between Turkey and Italy in the interwar
period stems from the fact that bilateral economic relations shed light upon some
specific features both of countries and of the era, apart from being a mere evaluation
of the historical information. In this sense, firstly and most importantly, the Italian-
Turkish economic relations in the interwar era show to what extent the content of the
economic links depended on diplomatic affairs and vice versa. Secondly, the nature
of this commerce also shows the characteristics of an economic relationship between
a rural country and an industrial one in the sense that the division of the major
commodities that two countries bought and sold reflected the division of a quasiperiphery
economy and a core one to a certain extent. Last but not least, this
relationship also reflects the conditions of the era regardless of the countries in
question, because the period, which could be divided into two in terms of economic
policies due to the Great Depression, displayed some specific characteristics that can
be understood through the single case of Turkish-Italian economic intercourse. In
short, apart from handling the economic relations simply in terms of the exchange of
commodities, statistical data, and financial matters, it is much more important to
focus on the implications that the contacts conveyed.
With these concerns, at this point, it is important to look at the conditions
both in Turkey and Italy before the First World War. In terms of the Ottoman
Empire, which had been experiencing a disintegration process, was economically
dependent upon foreign capital. Turkey displayed the features of a semi-colony
155
despite never having been declared a colony officially, in the sense that on the one
hand it exported raw materials while importing industrial goods; on the other hand it
dealt with the capitulation regime and the rapidly growing foreign debts which had
already led to the formation of a Public Debt Administration ineffectually.379 In an
environment in which political and economic independence were regarded as
absolute necessities that supports each other, the Ottoman Empire both economically
and politically was under the pressure of the European powers.
In terms of the latter, the unification of Italy, which had consisted of
independent city states, had been completed just in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At this time, Italy was a backward and rural country in which the per capita
income was nearly 50% of that of Britain and about 60% of that of France.380
However, beginning with the Risorgimento (Revival),381 this backward and poor
society began to undergo an economic development with which it became a
relatively prosperous, modern industrial economy.382 In accordance with the
industrialization of the economy and also with the trends of the time, Italy aimed at
colonization in order to find the areas necessary not only for the raw materials that it
lacked but also for places as destinations for the emigration of its increasing
population. It should be kept in mind that the late industrialization and unification
features of Italy as well as that of Germany are always portrayed as the reasons for
their active imperialistic agenda which, in the end, became one of the causes of the
wars in Europe and in the world.
379 Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–1985 (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi,
1990), p.10-13.
380 Cohen and Federico, p.1.
381 The word qualifies the political and social movement that aimed at a single
unified Italy.
382 Cohen and Federico, p.17.
156
Accordingly, in terms of economic gains, Italy, which had already benefitted
from the capitulation regime in the Ottoman Empire through the direct initiatives of
the Italian citizens and companies therein, began to pursue also colonial ends for the
parts of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. The war between Italy and the Ottoman
Empire over Libya in 1911-1912 was a consequence of this policy. Gaining a colony
from North Africa had been both an economic, demographic, and a prestige matter
for Italy.
What had been much more valuable to the Italians was the southwestern
Anatolia, which was economically one of the most important parts of the Ottoman
Empire. To this end, Italy, in the intra-European negotiations before and during the
Great War, had always tried to obtain these areas as a sphere of influence for the
post-war settlement. In addition to the secret Treaty of London, with which the
Entente powers promised unspecified lands in Asia Minor to the Italians,383 the
Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne in 1917, through which Rome obtained further
concessions in Adalia and Izmir regions,384 had led to the Italian participation in the
Great War on the part of the Entente. In fact, the Adana-Mersin region also had a
fundamental importance with its cotton production, which was very important for the
textile industry of Italy. However, due to the French rejection, Italy failed to secure
this region as a sphere of influence in these two secret treaties.385
These areas were genuine requirements for the Italian mind in the sense that
being the “least of the great powers” had always caused “national inferiority
complex” which stemmed from a fundamental weakness in terms of not possessing
383 Albrecht-Carrie, p.332.
384 Howard, p.186.
385 Ibid., p.186.
157
the economic resources to compete with other great powers.386 It was for this reason
that the Greek occupation of western Anatolia on the contrary to the promises which
had been made in the secret treaties turned the victory in the Great War into a
“mutilated” one for Italy and remained one of the national humiliation occasions in
the Italian history.
Therefore, if the necessity of the Anatolian lands for the Italians is kept in
mind, the attitude of Italy both politically and economically towards Turkey becomes
meaningful after this point of rupture. In this context, throughout the National
Struggle, despite being an occupation force in some part of Anatolia, Italy did not
take a harsh stance towards the Kemalist movement. On the contrary, the Italians
tried to gain sympathy from the Turkish population with benign conduct, because
they thought that they could obtain economic initiatives and privileges more easily in
that way.387
Actually, after the point of the Greek landing in western Anatolia, all of the
Italian behaviour took a shape that depended on gaining economic privileges. For
instance, Italy, with the agreement that Bekir Sami (Kunduh) signed with the Italians
in London in 1921, had accepted the surrender of Thrace and Izmir to the Turks in
return for priority for Italian economic initiatives in various southern and western
Anatolian cities, and most importantly, for the transfer of Eregli mines to a collective
Italian-Turkish company.388 It is important to note that the orientation of Rome in
terms of Turkey had depended on the deficiencies of the Italian economy. In other
words, it was not a coincidence that Italy, which was very poorly endowed with
386 John F. Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy (London; New York, N.Y.:
Routledge, 1998), p.88.
387 Çelebi, p.120-121.
388 Atatürk, p.392.
158
minerals,389 had been interested in the Eregli mines. In fact, the connection of Italy
with the Eregli mines was not unfamiliar to the Turkish political circles. In other
words, in addition to the Bekir Sami’s agreement, which was not approved in the
Turkish parliament, there had been another case which had led to enormous tension
among the deputies. In this case, a deputy, Celaleddin Arif, who possessed ten
percent shares of the Eregli mines and who transferred these rights to an Italian
company, was harshly accused of selling the “lands of the fatherland” despite
knowing well the dreams of Italy over Turkish territory in terms of natural
resources.390 What these cases display is that Italy was repeatedly searching for ways
to obtain the natural resources of Anatolia that it lacked and therefore obtained
economic dominance in Turkey, which in the end would lead to a political one.
Actually, the impossibility of the dreams about economic privileges of Rome
is explicit when the stance of Kemalists about the economic independency is kept in
mind. The position of the government in terms of the economy is comprehensible
within the statement of Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Economy, an the
Izmir Economy Congress in 1923:
…we will not hand over Turkey, or the Turkish economy, as a country
of slaves to foreign capital. However, we are prepared to recognize every
kind of facility, even more than shown by other nations, to foreign
capital willing to live and earn in a legitimate manner, on the condition
that it conforms to our laws and regulations and is not granted more
privileges than Turks.391
389 Cohen and Federico, p.54.
390 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: I, Cilt:8, İçtima: 1, 26 February 1921, p.431-433.
391 Quoted by A. Afetinan, İzmir İktisat Kongresi, 17 Şubat–4 Mart 1923 (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), p.77. “…biz Türkiye’yi, iktisadiyatını bir esirler ülkesi halinde
ecnebi sermayesinin eline terk ve tevdi edemeyiz. Fakat memleketimizde meşru bir surette
kazanmak ve yaşamak isteyen yabancı sermayesine kanun ve nizamlarımıza koşmamak
şartiyle memleketimizde her türlü teshilatı hatta diğer milletlerin gösterdiği teshilattan fazla
kolaylıkları irade etmeğe her zaman hazırız.”
159
While the leaders were formulating the Turkish economy on the basis of the equality
of Turks with other nationalities as well as on the basis of prospective Turkish
sovereign rules and regulations, Italy continued to insist on economic privileges, this
time at the Lausanne Conference, in terms of capitulations. In fact, it could be
suggested that the capitulations issue was the most important topic of the conference
for the Italians at Lausanne. From the beginning of the conference to the end, Italy
ardently supported the continuation of the capitulation system, as can be seen in the
speech of Italian representative:
It should be acknowledged that the capitulation system is regarded as a
form of reducing the sovereignty of an independent and free state and
the will of Turkey in terms of abolishing this old capitulation regime can
be easily understood…however, it should be acknowledged also that the
foreigners in Turkey, who have settled and created important
establishments therein, have taken the initiatives by relying on the
guarantees that have been given by various agreements…therefore, even
Turkey should doubtlessly desire a legal system and an organization of a
justice that would give guarantee everybody in lieu of the capitulation
system that it wants to abolish.392
As can be seen, the perpetuation of economic and legal privileges, whether under the
name of capitulations or of something different, had a vital importance for Rome.
However, Italy, after the territorial disappointment in Turkey, experienced another
one in the arena of the economy due to the results of the Lausanne Conference
through which “each of the High Contracting Parties accepts, in so far as it is
392 Quoted by, T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Araştırma ve Siyaset Plânlama Genel
Müdürlüğü, Lozan, 1922-1923, vol.2 of Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, (Ankara: Genel
Müdürlük, 1973), p.69. “Şunu tasdik etmek lazımdır ki, kapitülasyon usulü müstakil ve
serbest bir devletin hâkimiyet kudretini tenzil edecek bir şekilde görülmekte ve Türkiye
hükümetinin artık eskimiş olan bu kapitülasyonları ilga etmek hususundaki arzusu kolaylıkla
anlaşılabilmektedir… yalnız şunu da teslim etmek gerekir ki Türkiye’ye yerleşmiş ve orada
ehemmiyetli müesseseler vücuda getirmiş ecnebiler bu teşebbüslere bir takım muahedelerin
bahşettiği teminata itimat ederek girişmişlerdi…bu cihetten izalesinin görmek arzusunda
bulunduğu kapitülasyon usulü yerine, herkese emniyet vermek için bir kanunlar manzumesi
ve bir adalet teşkilatı ikamesini hiç şüphesiz Türk hükümeti dahi arzu etmelidir.”
160
concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect,”393
although the existing tariffs would not be raised until 1929.
Therefore, by 1923, the Turkish Republic had been founded as an
independent but a ruined country in every aspect, due to more than a decade of war.
At the time that the republic was founded, both the total population and agricultural
production numbers had regressed vis-à-vis the figures of 1913.394 For instance,
while the population of Turkey was 16.3 million in 1913, it was 13.6 million even in
1927.395 Related to this post-war situation of an economically and socially battered
country as well as the decision of the Lausanne Treaty in terms of the continuation of
the 1913 tariffs until 1929 led to an economic policy which could be defined as
“reconstruction on the conditions of open economy.”396 In this respect, Boratav
argues that the Republican era was unable to bring a rupture with the Ottoman past in
terms of economy as it did in terms of political arena, due to the tariff imposition of
the Lausanne Treaty until 1929.397 Therefore, when Turkish foreign economic
relations, or in general terms, the Turkish economy is analyzed, it is necessary to take
into consideration that Turkish economic policies in the interwar era can be divided
into two, as being before and after 1929.
On the other hand, Italy, as a so-called victorious country of the Great War,
did not differ from Turkey very much in terms of the well-being of the overall
393 Lausanne Treaty, Article 28, “Tarafeyni Âliyeyni Âkıdeyn Türkiye'de
kapitülâsyonların kâffei nıkatı nazardan tamamen ilgasını her biri kendisine taallûku
cihetinden kabul ettiklerini beyan ederler.” Quoted by, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II,
Cilt:1, İçtima Senesi:1, 21 August 1923, p.117.
394 Yahya S. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950 (İstanbul:
Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), p.97-102.
395 Ibid., p.97.
396 Boratav, p.37.
397 Boratav, p.28.
161
economy, in the sense that it “was afflicted by a succession of overlapping crises:
food and raw material shortages during 1918-19; acute inflation, beginning during
the war and continuing down to 1921; and as 2.5 million demobilized ex-servicemen
returned home from early in 1920, rapidly rising unemployment.”398 As a matter of
fact, these kinds of social and economic disorders in the post-war Italy were some of
the most fundamental reasons for the Fascist takeover in 1922.
Considering this background of the economic relations, generally on the basis
of the capitulation insistence and economic aims of Italy involving Turkish territory,
it is important to note that these two ruined and metamorphosing country began to
play major roles in each other’s commerce in the 1920s. The commerce between the
states in this era was so intensive that Italy became the main trade partner of Turkey
throughout the decade. Actually, this first-rank position of Italy in Turkish commerce
was surprising, because except Italy, the countries that Turkey carried on commerce
were same with the ones of the Ottoman Empire.399 Between 1911 and 1913, Britain,
France, Austria-Hungary and the United States received the 60% of the aggregate
Ottoman exports while 55% of the imports were made from Britain, Austria-
Hungary, Germany and France, respectively.400 It should also be added that the role
of Germany in Turkish trade had displayed pattern of increase in the war years.
If the foreign trade figures are studied, it is seen that Italy had a minor role in
Ottoman trade in the sense that total proportion of Italy in the Ottoman import-export
398 Blinkhorn, p.17-18.
399 Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye: 1923–1929 (Ankara: Tarih
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993), p.100.
400 Celal Aybar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Ticaret Muvazenesi (Ankara: DİE,
1939), quoted by Tezel, p.165.
162
did not go beyond three of four percent.401 However, Italy became the main trade
partner of Turkey after 1923. Two changes can be cited as reasons for the
intensification of Turco-Italo trade. First of all, the port city of Trieste, which had a
key strategic location not only for Eastern European but also German and Austrian
commerce,402 was surrendered to the Italians as a result of the Austrian defeat in the
Great War. Trieste had an importance in Turkish commerce in the sense that while
the goods that Turkey imported came from Trieste, by the same token the first arrival
point of the Turkish export goods was again that place through which these items
were resold to the Central-Eastern European countries by the Italian merchants.403
In addition to the strategic location of Trieste, another reason for the increase
in the foreign trade rates between Turkey and Italy was that the many Greek
merchants who had left Turkey after the foundation of the Republic and had settled
in Trieste, maintained their commercial activities, which had been done between
Turkey and the other countries before, using the Trieste as a way port this time.404 In
short, the insignificant levels of Ottoman-Italo trade increased so rapidly that Italy
could became the main trade partner of the Turkish Republic. The numbers could be
seen also from the numbers in Tables 1 and 2:
401 Ibid., quoted by Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, Cumhuriyetin Kurulduğu Yıl Türkiye
Ekonomisi (Ankara: n.p., 1998), p.228.
402 Keyder, p.101.
403 Ibid.
404 Tezel, p.166.
163
Table 1. The Proportion of Italy in Turkish Exports and Imports
Years Exports (%) Imports (%)
1924 22 21
1925 26 18
1926 28 16
1927 23 12
1928 18 12
1929 22 13
1930 21 14
1931 24 5
Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri (Ankara: Başbakanlık
Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü), vol.1924-1931.
Table 2. Turkish-Italian Trade (Million Liras)
Years Turkish Imports Turkish Exports
1925 43.5 50.3
1926 37.1 57.1
1927 26.0 37.0
1928 26.4 31.6
1929 32.0 33.8
1930 20.4 32.0
1931 18.4 30.7
Total 267.1 203.8
Source: Cumhuriyet, 28 May 1932.
Another point that made Turco-Italo trade exceptional was that although the Turkish
balance of trade showed a continuous deficit in general and vis-à-vis the concerned
164
countries, its exports to Italy exceeded its imports. The reason behind that Italy was
buying more Turkish goods due to the fact that Rome was benefitting from a
trilateral trade because it profitted from reselling Turkish goods to other countries.405
Table 3. The Balance of Trade between Turkey and Italy (Millions of Lira)
Years Excess
1926 14.7
1927 11.0
1928 5.2
1929 1.8
1930 11.6
Source: Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, v.1926-1930.
However, at this point, where the statistics show that both countries had utilized the
intense commercial relations, the content of this trade should be considered. This
analysis will show the true picture that was different from the statistical data in
relation to the diplomatic relations. To put it differently, the nature of Turco-Italo
economic relations can be understood clearly only if the political considerations of
the sides towards each other are kept in mind.
In the previous chapters, the course of events in terms of Turco-Italo
diplomatic relations was depicted. What determined this relationship between 1922
and 1927, and even in the Ottoman times, had been the ambitions of Italy regarding
territorial and economic expansion in Turkey. In this respect, Italy had collaborated
with the British over the Mosul issue in the sense that in return for intimidating
405 Keyder, p.106.
165
Turkey connected with the Western coasts in order to make that country abandon its
claims over this region, Rome was being encouraged about southwestern Anatolia by
Britain. Rome continued its plans about southern Anatolia, namely, the Adana and
Mersin region, even after a solution was reached on the Mosul issue. In short, Turkey
felt continuously threatened by the Italian aggression about the territories in the
southern Anatolia until 1927.
In this context, it is necessary to ask about the primary reason behind the
obsession of Italy with this region, which dated back to the Ottoman period.
Although a couple of answers can be given to this question and although every
explanation reflects the truth partially, thinking through the economy indicates that
agricultural products that were necessary to the Italian industry could be raised in
these areas played major roles on the intentions of Rome. Therefore, with this type
consideration, the reasons behind the efforts of Italy to obtain the Mersin-Adana
region as a sphere of influence during the Great War with the secret treaties firstly,
and then after the foundation of the republic with plans of seizure, become
meaningful, because the cotton of the region had a fundamental importance for the
Italian textile industry as a raw material.
Turkey exported unrefined cotton to Italy, but it bought finished cotton
products frm Italy. Therefore, the advantageous side in cotton trade was that of Italy,
because the finished materials were much more expensive than the raw materials. For
instance, in 1930, Turkey sold 8.9 kilos of unrefined cotton in exchange for 4.4
million liras; however it bought 4.3 million units of cotton products in exchange for
9.1 million liras.406
406 Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, v.1926-1930.
166
Table 4. Cotton Trade with Italy
Years Export (Million Lira) Import (Million Lira)
1926 3.9 24.1
1927 2.4 16
1928 2.1 17.2
1929 3.5 21.8
1930 4.4 11.1
Source: Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, v.1926-1930.
Although Turkey was in a disadvantageous position in terms of balance of trade in
this item, like other quasi-periphery countries that experienced similar problems visà-
vis the industrialized core ones, it is not erroneous to state that Italy was in a need
of this raw material in order to sustain production in the textile industry. In this
sense, it was this need of the raw material that directed Rome’s occupation plans
towards the Adana region in 1926 and in the first half of 1927. In fact, before this
economically driven landing plan of Italy to Adana and Mersin, different means had
been used in the region in order to dominate the economy of the area. In this sense,
Italian business circles had made enormous efforts in order to gain the control of the
cotton production in the area as well as to fix the Turkish imports in terms of cotton
textiles to Italy.407 One of the means of dominating Cukurova was the Italian textile
company SITMAC. SITMAC, which would become the main cotton purchaser of the
region, opened a branch in 1924 in Adana.408 The success of the company also led
the Italian bank, Banco di Roma, to open a branch therein in order to give credits to
407 Tezel, p.166.
408 Keyder, p.164.
167
the producers.409 Therefore, the Italian business in the region became a
multidimensional matter because SITMAC, Banco di Roma, and the Italian state
were all cooperating for the control of the area.
Obviously, in a country, where foreign capital was not forbidden, the
involvement of an Italian company and bank should not have seemed problematic.
However, the documents from the Mersin Consulate of Italy show that Italian
imperial aims were so obsessed with this region that even military plans were
designed on the basis of the consulate officials’ intelligence reports.410 In this
context, what the collaboration among SITMAC, Banco di Roma, and the Fascist
government qualified in this case was a very familiar strategy towards Turkey in the
sense that Italy had implemented the same “peaceful economic penetration” policy
in the Libyan case that operated under the same conditions, like increasing the
volume of trade with the target region and the foundation of Italian enterprises and
the branches of Italian banks.
In consequence, it can be suggested that although the trade between Turkey
and Italy seemed intense statistically, on the one hand, as in the cotton issue, it
implied quite often a political matter on the basis of the imperial aims of Italy
regarding Turkish territory as being parallel to the atmosphere of the era in which
Turkish-Italian diplomatic relations were at odds; on the other hand it was
disadvantageous for Turkey in the major items.
In fact, there was another problematic issue on the Turkish-Italian commerce
that seemed to the advantage of Turkey, but actually was disadvantageous. It was
stated that above that Italy through Trieste benefitted from multidimensional trade.
409 Ibid., p.142.
410 For these reports, see Damiani, p.101-130.
168
The Turkish products that were sold to merchants of Trieste were being resold to
other countries. Therefore, since both Turkey and Italy were Mediterranean countries
with similar agricultural products to some extent, there was competition both in
terms of the production and exports of some agricultural items like tobacco and the
nuts. In this sense, for instance, before Italy re-exported Turkish tobacco, which was
quite often re-sold to America, Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia, the highquality
Turkish crops was mixed with the lower-quality Italian crops.411 By the same
token, in terms of nuts, Italians could supply only the deficiency of their crops
through blending the high-quality Turkish nuts with their crops.412 In addition, as
competitors with the same items, the Italian and the Spanish merchants
propagandized against the Turkish nuts, stating that these nuts rotted in a short period
of time.413
Considering these facts, it is not erroneous to state that the content of Turco-
Italo trade contacts had rather different features from those that the statistics showed.
Apart from disadvantageous situation of Turkey vis-à-vis Italy despite the excess of
trade due to the raw material exportation of the former and the multidimensional
trade of the latter, the enduring efforts of Italy in terms of imperialism both
geographically and of economically towards Turkey displayed similar disquieting
features also in economic relations as in the diplomatic ones. However, although the
former problem was much more about the structure of the Turkish economy, the
latter one was dependent on the politics. In this sense, compatible with the changes in
411 Ziraat Kongresi, 1931 Ziraat Kongresi (Ankara: Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf
Cemiyeti, 1931), p.7-8.
412 Ibid., p.513.
413 Ibid., p.572.
169
the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Italy beginning with 1927, also
economic relations entered into a new phase.
In this respect, the friendship between Turkey and Italy, which in general
terms stemmed from Turkey’s need of allies in the international arena in which it
was isolated and the desire of Italy to counterbalance the effectiveness of France in
Eastern Europe through the Little Entente by using Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece.
Therefore, beginning with 1927 the problematic issues between two states were tried
to be settled and friendship ties were established, at least in appearance. In
consequence, although between 1927 and 1932, the economic statistics did not differ
from those of 1923-1927 excessively, the nature of the economic relations changed
in accordance with the political developments.
In this sense, friendship between the states so predominated the contacts that,
for instance, the newspapers were inclined to interpret even the gains of Italy from
the multilateral trade in terms of reselling Turkish agricultural products like nuts and
tobacco from a positive point of view. Accordingly, one of the columns of
Cumhuriyet on the front page stated in 1932 that despite the transit trade that the
Italian merchants carried out, commerce with Italy was useful for Turkey because
Italy was giving a chance to the Turkish products in terms of circulation of them in
the international markets in spite of the ascending protectionism,414 and Turkey could
benefit from the further opportunities through close economic and political
cooperation in the sense that Italy, which obtained 95% of its coal from the foreign
countries, could provide its coal needs from Turkey, which was experiencing
exporting problems in this area.415 These expressions about Turco-Italo trade imply
414 Cumhuriyet, 28 May 1932.
415 Ibid.
170
that even if the transit trade of Italy was disadvantageous for Turkey, it could be
tolerated or be approved for the sake of the further benefits in terms of the Turkish
economy or politics.
However, it should be underlined that this stance displays a direct
contradiction with the former position which criticized both the mixing of highquality
Turkish crops with the lesser quality ones and the reselling of Turkish
products by the Italians to the other states rather than constituting the necessary
environment that could lead Turkish merchants to be able to sell the products directly
to these destination countries. It was apparent that this change in the interpretations
about Turco-Italo trade stemmed from the developing political relations.
In addition to the change in the interpretation of the existing commercial
relations, what should be emphasized in this period is the new extensions within the
scope of the economic relations. One of the most important developments in this
period was the naval arms trade between Turkey and Italy. In this respect, it is
important to note that Ankara, which had declared a naval renewal program in 1928
in order to counterbalance the Greek navy in the Aegean, announced in 1929 that it
had chosen the Italians for this business although the offers of the British, for
instance, were much more profitable.416 This was a definite example of a situation in
which economy and the politics advanced hand in hand; in other words, politics had
profound impacts on the economy. With this decision, Turkey, while underlining the
“so-called” friendship between Ankara and Rome, gained the chance to reconstruct
its navy. On the other hand, Italy, while earning money from this trade, sought to
416 Barlas and Güvenç, p.149-153.
171
transform Turkey “into a pro-Italian actor in the Eastern Mediterranean naval
balance.”417
Actually, these kinds of economic links aroused the suspicions of the whole
world. For instance, the New York Times wrote that the contract with the Italians for
the naval construction, which had been signed although the French and British
companies offered much more favourable charges, and right after the occurrence of
the visit of the Italian air fleet to Istanbul with the air minister was nothing beyond a
policy of Turkey’s “Italianization.”418 In other words, the arms trade between the two
countries was construed as politically driven, which actually did reflect the truth.
Before analyzing the role of the Italians on the foundation of the Turkish
Central Bank in order to understand the level that the economic cooperation between
the two states had reached by 1930, it should be touched upon the one of the most
important incidents of the interwar era, in fact of the twentieth century: Great
Depression. The crash of the New York Stock Exchange in 24 October 1929, which
was named as Black Thursday, had become a turning point not only in the United
States, but also in the whole world. Every state and the society entered into economic
difficulties, so new policies were adapted in order to deal with the economic crisis.
The tendencies of the states to cure their economic bottleneck brought certain
changes in the international economic arena. A fall in the volume of the international
trade, uncoordinated exchange rates, an increase in the protectionist measures, and
the settlement of trade on a bilateral basis occurred.419
417 Ibid., p.143.
418 New York Times, 7 June 1929, quoted by PMRA, Catalogue of General
Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/236.597..12.
419 Michael Kitson and Solomos Solomou, “Bilateralism in the Interwar World
Economy,” Bulletin of Economic Research 47, no.3 (1995), p.198.
172
Apart from the general world economy, for specifically Turkey, 1929 would
have been a turning point even if the Great Depression had not occurred, because this
year meant the removal of the obstacles that the Lausanne Treaty had introduced
involving higher tariff rates on external trade. In fact, when 1929 came, optimism
was dominant in Turkey because on the one hand there was an expectation of a good
harvest which would increase the export incomes that year, on the other hand the
opportunity for the higher tariffs would become additional income for the state.420
However, Turkey had to deal with the conditions of the world economic crisis, as
opposed to the expectancies about the shining future of the Turkish economy. The
crisis brought a depreciation in the Turkish Lira421 and huge deficit in the balance of
payments firstly due to the huge import storages from 1928 because of the
knowledge of the future high tariffs and secondly due to the fall of agricultural
product prices in the international arena more than those of industrial products,
which became more disadvantageous for the countries that exported the former while
importing the latter.
Therefore, Turkey, in addition to some specific and small-scale measures that
were taken in order to cope with the situation, launched a wide-range change in terms
of its economic policy in the sense that the liberal trade policies of 1923-1929 came
to an end. The two distinctive features of the Turkish economy after 1930 became
protectionism and etatism.422 Therefore, the Turkish economy entered a phase which
420 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, 1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi
Politika Arayışları (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977), p.75.
421 Ibid., p.78–80.
422 Boratav, p.59.
173
could be termed “protectionist etatist industrialization,”423 as opposed to the previous
period which had depended on a rather open economy.
Another measure that Turkey wanted to take in the crisis environment was the
creation of a Central Bank. Although the severe economic conditions of 1929
directed the Turkish government to the foundation of a central bank, the efforts for
this initiative dated back to 1927. Since the need for a state institution which would
regulate the money markets and would formulate the economic policies of the
country had intensified with the atmosphere of 1929, the government began to search
for ways to found it.
The worth of the cooperation between Turkey and Italy was proved also in
this issue. In fact, Turkey had invited a German consultant named Schacht to analyze
the necessity of a central bank. His assistant, Müller, who had come to Turkey for
this job because of the inability of Schacht due to his excessive works, prepared a
report in which both he and Schacht stressed that the conditions of both the Turkish
economy and the finance were insufficient for the foundation of a central bank.424
After this unsuccessful attempt at cooperation with the German specialists,
Turkey decided to collaborate with the Italians, who had become one of the allies of
Turkey at that time.425 Therefore, Count Volpi, who was the former minister of
finance of Italy, came to Turkey in order to assess the appropriateness of the
economic situation for the foundation of a central bank. After some investigations
both in Ankara and in Istanbul, he signalled his positive point of view about the issue
423 Ibid., p.59–60.
424 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Para ve Kredi Sisteminin Oluşumunda Bir Aşama.
Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (Ankara: T.C. Merkez Bankası, 1981), p.270–272.
425 Ibid., p.274.
174
in his departure by stating, “although Turkey has some difficulties, she will ensure
her economical and financial development.”426
Indeed, the opinion of Volpi that was issued in 1930 from Rome was
compatible with his preceding explanation. According to this explanation, Volpi
recommended that the government should found state central bank immediately if it
wanted to show its intention in the face of the financial and monetary problems.427
Although there was no any mention about the “Italian banks’ interests in the
shares”428 as had been stated in the Turkish newspapers during the visit of Volpi, this
positive point of view about the necessity of a central bank was an achievement for
Turkey, because especially if the reports of the German specialists were kept in
mind, the views of Volpi paved the way for the foundation of the state bank and
became prestigious for Turkey in the international arena.429 Therefore, as can be
seen, the political cooperation between Turkey and Italy played an important role in
one of the most important developments of the Turkish economy.
Cooperation between the states in the sphere of the economy continued until
the relations began to deteriorate again. For instance, in addition to the initiative of
the Italian companies to construct fibre and paper factories in Anatolia,430 the
participation of the Turkish products at the international Milano exhibition for the
426 Cumhuriyet, 11 November 1929.
427 Tekeli and İlkin, Para ve Kredi Sisteminin Oluşumunda Bir Aşama, p.275.
428 Cumhuriyet, 9 November 1929.
429 Tekeli and İlkin, Para ve Kredi Sisteminin Oluşumunda Bir Aşama, p.275-276.
430 Cumhuriyet, 2 January 1932.
175
first time431 excited the Turkish public and were regarded as one of the signs of the
close contacts between Rome and Ankara.
By the same token, the visit of İsmet İnönü to Rome in May 1932 was
predominantly evaluated in terms of its results in the economic sphere. For example,
newspapers underlined this notion of the meeting by stating that both Turkish and
Italian businessmen were following the positive results of the visit,432 compatibly
with the desires of two sides to increase the volume of bilateral trade. Apart from the
expectations of the businessmen, this visit became an environment in which the
credit requisition of Ankara from Rome was discussed. Although this credit issue
would become a point of disappointment for the Italians, who “claimed that the
Turks always suspected that the foreign states would ask concessions from Ankara in
return for economic aid,”433 due to the Ankara’s preference of Moscow in terms of
loans, the discussion over a loan issue solely had the capacity to depict the level of
economic cooperation that was reached between 1927 and 1932, on the basis of
political attachment.
However, 1932 became a year not of a rupture but of a point at which both
political and also economic relations began to change. In terms of politics, the rising
fascist tone in the Italian foreign policy, which reminded Turkey that Italy had
imperial ambitions, increasingly affected Turco-Italo diplomatic relations. Ankara,
which supposed that the inner target of all Italian menacing declarations was
Anatolia, somewhat erroneously felt threatened by Italian aggression, as in the pre-
431 Cumhuriyet, 22 April 1932.
432 Cumhuriyet, 28 May 1932.
433 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?”p.245.
176
1927 period. Needless to say that all of the economic cooperation that had developed
hand in hand with the diplomatic rapprochement came to an end.
Apart from the diplomatic cooling that led to the disappearance of the
existing cooperation in economic issues, figures about the trade between Turkey and
Italy also declined. In fact, the decline in the bilateral trade figures was not very
unnatural in the sense that the Great Depression, after which the states tried to
implement protectionism, had reduced the volume of trade all around the world.
However, what is remarkable is that Italy was no longer the primary partner even
within these lower rates of trade, because Nazi Germany had seized the first-rank
position in Turkish commerce.
It is fundamental to underline that bilateral trade between the states under the
protectionist measures was being done through clearing agreements through which
the states bartered specific items within the limits of quotas. Although Turkey and
Italy also signed this kind clearing treaty in 1934,434 the agreements with Nazi
Germany were much more appealling for Turkey. Therefore, not Italy but Germany
became the dominant actor in the commerce of Turkey.
In fact, the rise of Germany was not unique to Turkey in the sense that
Germany was rapidly extending her economic influence throughout South-Eastern
Europe.435 After the Nazi seizure of power, Germany “began to develop toward a
German Grossraumwirtschaft (large area economy) to build a large, self-sufficient
economic area in concert with several South-Eastern European countries in
434 For the full text of the agreement see, Republic of Turkey, Düstur, 3rd Tertip,
Cilt:15, p.1094-1117.
435 Stavrianos, p.740.
177
Germany’s backyard.”436 In order to achieve this, Germany began to take raw
materials from these countries while exchanging industrial commodities. This type of
exchange seemed advantageous for the rural countries for a while because they could
find a customer for their agricultural products above the market prices. However, the
more they traded with Germany, the more they found themselves tied to Germany.437
In this way, Germany turned its “generous aid” into a tool of pressure intended to
force these countries to meet German demands.438
Similar to other Eastern European countries, Turkey’s trade with Germany
after 1934 made up almost half of its total volume of trade.439 In addition, since
Germany had become nearly the only purchaser of some specific items, it also
became the determinant of the price of these items, which in the end led to some
problems in commercial relations.440 The disquiet in Turkey in terms of the relations
with Nazi Germany grew to an extent that, for instance, Ankara began to choose
British companies in the bids despite the better offers of the German ones.441
As can be seen, Germany had become the main trade partner of Turkey on a
level that bothered Turkey itself. Since this situation was not unique to Turkey but
included all of the Eastern European countries, Italy, just before the World War II,
had been deprived of its goal to dominate the Balkans and the Eastern European
436 T. Ivan Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World
War II, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, c1998), p.273.
437 Stavrianos, p.740.
438 Berend, p.276.
439 Boratav, p.69.
440 İlhan Uzgel, “Göreli Özerklik-I, Almanya’yla İlişkiler,” Türk Dış Politikası:
Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, c2006), vol.1, p.305.
441 Ibid.
178
countries, politically and economically, apart from Turkey. Although the contacts
between Germany and Italy were developing towards the Axis by 1934, the political
and economic competition over the Balkans had become a source of potential friction
between them442 because of the fact both two powers had had aims to create a selfsufficient
empire which involved the Balkans as a backyard. In fact, both Italy and
Germany were aware of the competition between them despite their intimate
relationship. For this reason, for instance, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
even made a plan with which Rome and Berlin would “arrive at a special agreement
that would enable both to penetrate the region to mutual benefit.”443 However, when
the interwar period came to the end, it would be seen that the joint penetration idea of
Italy was not realized, so Italy had been “left with only marginal interests.”444
Therefore, Turco-Italo economic relations, from this perspective, remained an
important case in terms of illustrating the loss of Italy in the Balkan Peninsula. In
other words, German dominance in Turkey, as a country that had frequently
cooperated in economic matters with Rome in the period between 1927 and 1932 and
as a country that had traded chiefly with Italy whether unintentionally or not in pre-
1932 period, presents the deprivation of Italy as well, in terms of waking up from the
Balkan dreams due to the rise of her ally, Nazi Germany.
However, it is important note that German penetration did not mean that
Turco-Italo trade came to an end. Rather, it continued on the basis of the Turkish-
Italian clearing settlement, yet on a very small scale. The actual blow came upon the
economic cooperation due to the deterioration of diplomatic relations. After the
explanation of Mussolini, who declared that the interests of Italy were in the East,
442 Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, p. 84.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
179
Turkish-Italian diplomatic relations experienced a rupture in the sense that laying
aside the economic cooperation, Turkey began to define Italy as its foremost enemy.
Additionally, as in the realm of political and economic dialogue, commercial
relations, which had already been crippled by the German economic dominance,
experienced a rupture as a result of the Abyssinian campaign of Italy. Turkey, as a
member of the League of Nations, abided by the decision of this institution in terms
of implementing an embargo on Italy. In this respect, on November 1935, Turkey
accepted the League’s sanctions that put a ban on trade of certain commodities that
curtailed Turco-Italo trade further,445 despite the existence of counterviews which
underlined the importance of the Turco-Italo commercial relations.446
It is possible to state that the fear of Turkey of the Italian expansionism
overbalanced the economic ties on this issue. Actually, the point of views which
thought that nobody could repair the damage to the trade figures even after the
sanctions were lifted, were accurate in the sense that after this point of rupture,
nothing would be as before, not only in the diplomatic but also in the economic
arena. To put it differently, when the war began to pound at the door, Ankara lost all
of its ties with Italy.
To conclude this chapter, it is appropriate to suggest that the economic
relations between these two states were similar to the diplomatic relations in the
sense that economic contacts also did not follow a unilinear course. In this sense,
while in the pre-1927 era the commercial figures were quite high regardless of the
nature of the diplomatic relations of the period, although these high figures did not
always mean that the content of the commerce was always advantageous to Turkey,
445 For the enactment see, Republic of Turkey, Düstur, 3rd Tertip, Cilt 17, p.5-6.
446 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: V, Cilt:6, İçtima Senesi:1, 13 November 1935,
p.51-52.
180
the period between 1927 and 1932 depicted both high trade figures and economic
cooperation on the basis of friendly diplomatic relations. Therefore, it is important to
note that the statistics of Turco-Italo commerce depended on various dynamics not to
one, yet the economic cooperation, as in the example of the foundation of the Central
Bank, paralleled the diplomatic relations, naturally. Additionally, as an important
detail, the commerce between Turkey and Italy throughout the period that Rome held
the first-rank position in the statistics reflected the general features of trade between
an industrialized country with an agricultural one.
Again, after 1932, the economic cooperation between the states came to an
end due to the deterioration of the diplomatic contacts. Similarly, the position of Italy
within the trade statistics declined, but as in the previous period, being dependent on
various conditions. In addition to the adverse effects of the Great Depression on trade
volumes, the system that came after the economic crisis, namely the clearing system,
which paved the way to the rising German economic dominance not only in Turkey
but also in other Eastern European states, played a role in this fall. When these
reasons unified with the diplomatic preference of Turkey in terms of participating in
the economic sanctions as a result of the Abyssinian campaign of Italy, the economic
relations between the sides bottomed out. That means, by 1939, before the war broke
out, both the economic and the diplomatic relations were at the worst conditions of
all the interwar era alike, even if the correlation of these two different spheres was
not one hundred percent, as explained above.
181
CHAPTER 8
THE ROLE OF THE DODECANESE ISLANDS IN TURKISH-ITALIAN
RELATIONS
The Aegean Islands had always carried importance for different states and
civilizations throughout the world history. After being captured by the Cretans firstly
and by other civilizations like Macedonia, Rome, and Byzantium subsequently,447 the
seizure of the Aegean Islands in general, and the Dodecanese Islands specifically, by
the Ottoman Turks had been completed in the sixteenth century. The sovereignty of
Turks over the islands lasted until 1912, when Italy occupied the islands within the
conditions of the Ottoman-Libyan War. Therefore, throughout the interwar years,
these islands were under the supremacy of Italy.
Although the term Dodecanese is originated from the Greek word dodeka,
which means twelve, the Dodecanese, actually, includes more then twelve islands,
yet, the major ones, apart from the minor islets, reflect the meaning of the
Dodecanese. The importance of these islands and islets stems from the fact that
gaining this region provides a strategic advantage to the power at issue, not only visà-
vis Asia Minor, but also within the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the Dodecanese,
which was mainly Greek in terms of population, but, indeed, “was home to all three
peoples of ‘The Book’, each of whom had different leaders, judicial systems and
laws”448 in the Ottoman times, played a major role in Turkish-Italian relations in the
interwar era. In this respect, the absence of an analysis of the Dodecanese Islands in
terms of the impacts on the Turkish-Italian relationship, not only on the basis of the
447 Ronald John Lagoe, Greece and the Great Powers: The Question of the Aegean
Islands, 1912-1914 (Ph.d diss., Ohio State University, 1976), p.3-4.
448 Nicholas Doumanis, Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean: Remembering
Fascism's Empire (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.26.
182
aforementioned strategic importance of the islands for the Anatolia and the
Mediterranean Sea but also on the basis of the Turkish minority within the area under
the supremacy of Italians, would be an enormous deficiency for this study.
In this context, it will be useful to begin with the Ottoman loss of the
Dodecanese in the Libyan War. As was stated in this study, Italy, which had
developed colonial ambitions over North Africa, in 1911 had attacked to Libya,
which was the last Ottoman territory in the region. However, due to the resistance of
the local population on the one hand, and the resistance of the Ottoman voluntary
corps in the area on the other, Italy failed to seize the interior regions easily.
Therefore, Italy, which had begun to be influenced by the difficulties of the war both
in terms of war itself and in terms of the Italian psychology at home, bombarded
certain points of Turkey in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, including the
Dardanelles, and occupied the Dodecanese Islands in 1912. The reasons that drove
the Italians to occupy the islands were firstly “to have a strong guarantee for any
prospective peace negotiations”449 vis-à-vis the other European powers which feared
from the spread of war into the other parts of Europe, especially to the Balkans, and
secondly “to give prestige and stability to the Italian government by impressing on
the people of Italy the good results of military glory.”450
It is important to note that the Treaty of Ouchy, which was signed between
Turkey and Italy in 1912 necessitated the evacuation of the Dodecanese Islands in
return for the concession of Turkish rights in Libya to Italy.451 However, Italy did not
449 Michael D. Volonakis, The Island of Roses and Her Eleven Sisters: or The
Dodecanese from the Earliest Time Down to the Present Day (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1922), p.323.
450 Ibid, p.323.
451 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Italo-Turkish War,” Available [online]:
“http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9043030” [15 January 2009].
183
evacuate the Islands on the pretext that the Ottoman Empire had not withdrawn its
troops from Benghazi by 1913.452 In fact, the Ottoman corps had already left Libya
because of the Balkan Wars, but the Italians were still dealing with the local Senussi
resistance.
Since the Dodecanese islands had strategic importance, Italy refused to
abandon the area. Thus, until the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, at which the destiny of
the islands was determined definitely, Italy made great efforts in order to maintain its
hold on this region. In this context, it is not surprising that the Dodecanese issue was
one of the negotiation topics of the secret treaties of London and of Saint Jean de
Maurienne during the Great War.
Obviously, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a party in the discussions
about the Dodecanese Islands, because not Turkey, but Italy and Greece claimed
rights to these territories. In this sense, for instance, while in 1920 an agreement
which stated the cession of the Dodecanese to the Greeks between Athens and Rome
was concluded despite the fact that the subsequent Italian government declared the
agreement void.453 At the Treaty of Sevres, these islands were again ceded to Greece
with the exception of Rhodes, for which a broad local autonomy was foreseen.454
Thus, within the historical context of the day, the negotiators became the Italians, as
“temporary occupiers,” and the Greeks as the major ethnic group on the islands.
Actually, this situation did not change within the Lausanne Conference. There
were two issues in which Rome was mostly interested, the capitulations and the
Dodecanese Islands. Since the Dodecanese issue seemed as if it had been settled
through various agreements before, it could not be discussed at the Lausanne
452 Childs, p.257.
453 Volonakis, p.338.
454 Ibid., p.339.
184
Conference because the rules and regulations of the conference necessitated that a
previously finalized issue could not be negotiated on the basis of the will of Turkey,
which would bring essential alteration in the existing status-quo, as Italian
representative Mr. Montagna reminded everyone during the discussions.455
Therefore, the Turkish aim focused on the Meis specifically, not on the Dodecanese
in general, due to the fact that this small island was inside Turkish territorial waters,
thus, the sovereignty of another power over this island posed a threat to western
Anatolia excessively. Before anything else, the existence of another power in Turkish
territory complicated the situation in terms of the principles of international law.
Despite the negotiations and the efforts of Turkey, however, Meis remained under
the Italian sovereignty. In consequence, apart from specifically Meis Island, the
temporary situation of Italy over the Dodecanese had gained a clear title through
Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty, which stated that:
Turkey renounces her all of the rights and their justifications about the
following islands in favour of Italy: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes
(Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos),
Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso),
Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the
islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizo.456
Therefore, with this statement, the de facto sovereignty of Italy in the islands turned
into a de jure one. This meant that although the results of the Great War had become
a disappointment for Italy mainly due to the Greek invasion of Anatolia, with the
455 Muhammed M. Arpacı, Lausanne Barış Konferansı'nda Ege Adaları (master’s
thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1993), p.96.
456 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt:1,İçtima Senesi:1, 21 August 1923, p.115.
“Madde 15: Türkiye Türkiye zirde tadadohman adalar üzerindeki bilcümle hukuk ve
müstenidatından İtalya lehine feragat eder: Elyevm İtalya'nın tahtı işgalinde bulunan
Astropalya (Astropalia), Rodos (Rhodes), Halki (Calki), Skarpaseto Kazos (Casso),
Piskopis,v (Tiles), Misiros (Misyros), Kalimnos, Leros, Patnos, Lipsos, Sombeki, (Synıi) ve
î'stanköy (Kos) adaleliyle bunların tevabiinden olan adacıklar ve Meis (Kastellorizo),
adası.”
185
acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands it was compensated in some sense, because
“the value of the islands arose from geographic military position, which enabled to
make of them the base of the future expansion,”457 in accordance with the territorial
ambitions of the Fascist Rome. The threat that stemmed from the combination of the
expansionist ambitions of Italy with the sovereignty in the islands that were in the
immediate vicinity of Anatolia, had disquieted Turkey from the beginning in the
sense that within the discussions about the approval of the treaty in the parliament,
the deputies emphasized the risks of a this kind of settlement for Turkey. In this
sense, the explanation of Şükrü Kaya in the assembly was important in terms of
being a correct vision for the future:
…are the three documents that divided Anatolia into the interest zones
among the three powers destroyed? If it is looked upon the declarations
of the official and unofficial circles here and there, in the programs of
the formal and informal parties, the traces of these policies in Italy are
seen, and the connection of the islands to Italy cannot be accepted…The
islands, in my view, in the hands of Italy, are the preamble of a policy of
exploitation that would awake towards Anatolia…Gentlemen! I fear
from these traps. Gentlemen! They will not leave us in peace and ease
again.458
Genuinely, to with this statement, with the exception of the period between 1927 and
1932 in which Turkey and Italy were so-called friends, the Dodecanese Islands
persisted to be the most problematic issue between the sides in the sense that the
Islands turned into a trump card with which Italy threatened Turkey. In this respect,
beginning with the first years of the Turkish Republic, Italy used these islands as a
457 Booth and Booth, p.286.
458 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt:1,İçtima Senesi:1, 21 August 1923, p.238.
“…üç devlet arasında Anadolu'yu nüfuz mıntıkalarına taksim eden üç vesika da imha edilmiş
midir? Şurada, burada resmî ve gayri resmi adamların beyanatına, resmî ve gayri resmi
fırkaların programlarına bakılacak olursa İtalya'da hâlâ bu siyasetin izlerine tesadüf olunur
ve adaların İtalya'ya münasebeti kabul edilemez…Adalar, bence İtalyanların elinde
Anadolu'ya doğru uyanacak bir isti'mar ve istismar siyasetinin bir
mukaddemesidir…Efendiler! Ben bu tuzaklardan korkuyorum. Efendiler! Yine bize sulh ve
sükûn vermeyeceklerdir.”
186
military base from time to time, thus leading to the perception of a threat in Turkey,
whether accurate or not. The importance of the Dodecanese in the relationship
between the parties can be seen from the major cases of the three time periods that
this study divides the relationship into the chapters.
In this respect, the first example that showed how the Dodecanese Islands
could be used against Turkey was the Mosul problem for the period between 1922
and 1927. Rome played a fundamental role in this issue, which was one of the most
crucial problems of interwar Turkey’s foreign policy. Firstly, in accordance with the
close collaboration between Britain and Italy, which were holding secret negotiations
about the Turkish territory, Rome was constantly fortifying the islands. In this
respect, Turkish press of the time underlined the possibility of Italy’s use of Rhodes
as a military base in a possible war.459 The military build-ups in the Dodecanese had
two points of logic for Italy. While Rome was intimidating Turkey through the
military bases on the islands, thus making Turkey accept British sovereignty over
Mosul due to the danger of war on various fronts, it was supposed to gain privileges
from the British regarding southwestern Anatolia for which it had had long-lived
imperial dreams.
In this atmosphere, Turkey felt so threatened that apart from monitoring every
development on the islands through various intelligence networks,460 it called young
men aged 21 and 22 years and the reserves of 23 to 26 to the arms,461 and
additionally chose Izmir as a place for military manoeuvres due to its proximity to
the islands. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the sovereignty of Italy over the
459 Barlas, “Friends or Foes?” p.236.
460 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/101.653..19.
461 Howe, p.477.
187
Dodecanese became one of the determinants of the Mosul question’s result. What
this situation meant was that the fear of an Italian landing in Anatolia through the use
of the islands played a role both in certain foreign policy choices of Ankara as in the
case of Mosul, and on the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Italy in the
sense that Ankara usually perceived Italy as an enemy to its territorial integrity
despite the existence of some exceptional friendship years within the interwar era.
This exceptional period between 1927 and 1932, in which there was not any
case of uneasiness, brought attempts for a peaceful solution to the problem of the
territorial waters between Meis and the Anatolian coast. As a good example of the
impact of the détente between the parties, the Convention on Delimitation of
Territorial Waters between Anatolia and Castellorizo and on the Sovereignty of
Karaada (Anadolu Kıyısı ile Meis Adası Arasında Karasularının Sınırlandırılması ve
Bodrum Karşısındaki Kara Ada’nın Egemenliği Konusunda Sözleşme) was signed in
1932.”462 This agreement settled the territorial waters issue that had been tried to be
solved before specifically through the means of international arbitration. At that time,
since the treaty had come to be as a result of the fraternity between the parties, the
press also made the emphasis on the unshakeable friendship between Rome and
Ankara.463 Just as the designation of the treaty as a result of the fraternity between
the parties, this treaty was regarded as an improvement in the cordial intercourse
between Turkey and Italy. Therefore, it could be suggested that while the
Dodecanese played a major role in the deterioration of the contacts, likewise it
constituted one of the aspects of the rapprochement.
462 Soysal, p.340-343.
463 Cumhuriyet, 6 May 1932.
188
However, after this brief period, the increasing fascist tone in the Italian
foreign policy turned the Dodecanese into a problem for Turkey again. In fact, after
1933, the atmosphere of Europe began to deteriorate in the sense that countries either
began to formulate aggressive policy choices and aims or began to solve their
problems with each other through aggressive methods. Apart from the rise of the
Nazi Germany and its escalating belligerent position within Europe, Italy, which had
already an expansionist agenda on the basis of the Mare Nostrum, had re-adapted
aggressive means in order to achieve these ambitious aims. Contrary to the previous
periods, the aims of Italy, this time, were not primarily related to Turkey specifically.
That is to say, the primary target of Rome was not directed to southwestern Anatolia
but to Abyssinia, at that time.
In this respect, the fascist tone in the Italian foreign policy, especially after
the seizure of the Italian Foreign Ministry by Benito Mussolini in 1932, necessitated
resorting to force. Since the Fascist expansionism in the Mediterranean would
threaten the flow of the Nile, vital to the Egyptian economy, and traffic through the
Red Sea,464 in other words, would threaten the British hegemony therein the events
brought two powers opposite to each other. Thus, if Mussolini’s directives about the
military preparations for a possible war with the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean465
for his dream of conquering Abyssinia are kept in mind, it is not very surprising to
see that Italy was constantly building up its military forces in Libya and the
Dodecanese.”466
464 Mallett, “The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis,” p.77.
465 Ibid., p.80-84.
466 Güçlü, “Fascist Italy’s Mare Nostrum Policy,” p. 818.
189
Therefore, even if the primary target of Rome was not Anatolia in this case,
the military fortifications disquieted Ankara, inherently, because of the proximity of
these islands to Turkey; in other words, because of the possible shift in the target of
the Italian aggression. Thus, every development in the Dodecanese Islands during the
Abyssinian crisis was followed and analyzed by Turkish political circles and by the
Turkish press cautiously.
In this sense, both the military build-ups and the initiatives for landing
soldiers on the Dodecanese Islands, especially Leros and Rhodes, appeared in the
headlines in the newspapers ever so often, beginning with 1934. For instance, news
on the front page of Cumhuriyet under the headline “Fearsome Fortifications in the
Dodecanese” described the military developments on the islands in a detailed
manner.467 The elaboration under this title, which stated that there were twelve
battleships, seventeen destroyers, twelve submarines, 250 airplanes, 900 pilots for
these planes, three wireless stations, and many artillery positions within and around
the Dodecanese,468 shows the importance that Turkey gave to the every development
on the islands. Although the first paragraph of the text emphasized that Italians were
struggling to constitute an environment in the Dodecanese that would be “the
equivalent of the Britain’s garrison in Egypt;”469 that is to say although Italy was
competing with Britain in the Mediterranean, Turkey was concerned with the
situation in the islands as if it would be assaulted by Italian forces.
Actually, it is not surprising to see that after 1934 the newspapers and
intelligent reports were closely interested in the Italian attitude on the Dodecanese
467 Cumhuriyet, 2 January 1936. “Oniki Adada Dehşetli Tahkimat”
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid.
190
Islands in an atmosphere in which the Turkish-Italian relations were dependent on
Turkey’s fear of the Italian Mare Nostrum policy and the possible use of the
Dodecanese for this goal. Thus, especially between 1934 and 1936, the fear of Italian
assault in Turkey through the Dodecanese became acute. In this sense, although there
were also many logical analyses about the intent of the Italian fortification and
landing of soldiers on the islands, as it was achieved in the column under the
headline “What Are the Reasons for the Italian Military Preparations in the
Dodecanese Islands?”470 that explained the targets of Italy from a realist point of
view, in other words, on the basis of the British-Italian adversity of the day,471 the
increase in the numbers of soldiers specifically in Rhodes and Leros continued to be
written about with fear and irritation. Headlines such as “Italians Landed Soldiers to
Rhodes and to Solidified Leros!”472 and “Italians Landed Soldiers to Dodecanese
Islands Again”473 became ordinary articles for the reader due to their frequency in the
newspapers.
Apart from the newspapers and their various official and unofficial sources,
the Turkish state was also gathering information about the situation on the islands
through its institutions. Just as in the period of the Mosul issue during which Ankara
received frequent intelligence reports, after 1934 the rate of the reports intensified.
For instance, one report from the Turkish Consulate on Rhodes in 1938 discussed the
470 Cumhuriyet, 13 October 1935. “İtalyanların Oniki Adadaki Harb Hazırlıklarının
Sebebi Nedir?”
471 Ibid.
472 Cumhuriyet, 11 August 1935. “İtalyanlar Rodos’la Tahkim Ettikleri Leros’a
Asker Çıkarmışlar!”
473 Cumhuriyet, 17 February 1935. “İtalyanlar Oniki Ada’ya Tekrar Asker
Çıkarmışlar.”
191
importance of Rhodes for the Italians and gave the numbers of even cartridges.474
Another one from the Turkish national security stated the ratio of artillerymen to
infantrymen on the islands.475 Considering these facts, it could be suggested quite
easily that developments in the Dodecanese Islands were kept under the surveillance
by the Turkish state and public, because Turkey was so convinced that the most
important danger for Turkish territory could stem from Italy, most probably, through
the Dodecanese Islands.
Therefore, the result that can be derived from these developments on the basis
of the Dodecanese is that the Islands, which were very close to Turkish territory but
were under Italian sovereignty, played a major role in Turkish-Italian relations in the
interwar era. Since throughout the interwar years Turkey defined its major threat as
Italy because of the aggressive stance of the latter, every development on the Islands
not only led to fear and irritation in Turkey, but also to the positioning of Turkey visà-
vis Italy, therefore vis-à-vis other powers. That is to say, the Dodecanese Islands
also led to certain foreign policy choices by Turkey on the basis of the Italian threat.
In this context, it was not a coincidence that in an atmosphere where Greece and
Turkey were close friends and Italy was a potential threat, the articles, which said
that the Greek sovereignty in the Dodecanese Islands “would provide and strengthen
the political stability in Archipelago,”476 reflected the foreign policy direction of
Turkey to some extent. By the same token, the Turkish desire of being closer to
British in the late 1930s was related to the Italian threat which was also closely
related to the Italian position on the Dodecanese Islands. As can be seen, the Italian
474 Cemalettin Taşkıran, Oniki Adanın Dünü ve Bu Günü (Ankara: Genelkurmay
Basımevi, 1996), p.86.
475 Ibid., p.86-87.
476 Cumhuriyet, 22 November 1931.
192
presence in the Dodecanese occupied a key role in Turkey’s political position
throughout the interwar era.
However, actually, it was not the military presence alone that should have
concerned Turkey. There was also a Turkish minority, even if it was a small
community, under the Fascist regime that could affect the Turkish-Italian relations
and Turkey’s stance. However, it seems that the Turkish minority living on the
Dodecanese Islands was not as influential as the military fortifications issue in the
Turco-Italo relations. There are three reasons for my judgment in this direction.
Firstly, while the documents about the Dodecanese in terms of its strategic aspects
are plenty in the Turkish archives, there is a lack of material in terms of the
conditions of the Turkish islanders for the period at issue. Secondly, as compared to
the Turkish materials, Greek literature is full of records of the Italian colonial
administration regardless of their reflection of the reality. It could be stated that the
multitude of Greek literature for the issue was natural because the Greek population
constituted the majority on the Islands. Nevertheless, the lack of documents in the
Turkish archives shows the different roles of the Dodecanese between Turkish-
Italian relations and Greek-Italian relations. Thirdly, it can be observed that the
Turkish press also tended to skip the issues about the Turkish minority although it
tended to highlight the military fortifications in the islands and analyzed the
conditions of the Greeks rather than the Turks.
Therefore, apart from the minor role of the Turkish islanders in Turkish-
Italian diplomatic relations, these three facts imply that either Turkish minority was
satisfied with the Fascist administration or Turkey did not want to intervene in the
domestic affairs of another sovereign country. Indeed, one can state that both
suggestions reflect the truth to some extent. However, in order to show these partially
193
truths, it is necessary to benefit from the colonial record of Italy in the Dodecanese
both for the Turkish and Greek islanders. To this end, looking at the relatively
plentiful amounts of literature of the Greeks both could shed light upon the general
situation in the islands in terms of the rights and liberties and could enable us to
make a comparison between the conditions of the different ethnic and religious
groups therein.
In this sense, it could be suggested that the Greek “historians and other
patriotically-minded Greeks have always regarded the Italian occupation as a moral
injustice, and have insisted that the occupation was an oppressive experience for
which nothing redeemable could be said.”477 Actually, because the Ottoman period
had always been seen as “yoke” by the natives, the Italian occupation of the
Dodecanese had been welcomed by the Greeks to an extent that the Greek population
met the Italians with the bunch of flowers.478 when the Italians ran up their flags to
the islands during the Libyan War. However, since the Italians were welcomed on
the basis of their promises about the future local autonomy through which the Greeks
could be unified with motherland Greece in the end, the failure of the Italian
administration in terms of keeping these promises led to discontent among the Greek
population.479
After that point, Greek national discourse states that the patriotic Greeks
resisted the Italian rule, which was quite repressive and malignant. However,
according to Nicholas Doumanis, who used oral history techniques in his studies,
477 Doumanis, Myth and Memory, p.2.
478 Ali Kurumahmut and İdris Bostan, Trablusgarb ve Balkan Harplerinde İşgal
Edilen Ege Adaları ve İşgal Telgrafları (Ankara: Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli
Komitesi, 2003), p.88-89.
479 Doumanis, Myth and Memory, p.31
194
“many locals described the occupation as a time of progress and development, when
there was plenty of work and the cost of living was low, while others characterized
the period as an uneventful and quiet time in their lives, a much welcomed respite”480
as opposed to the nationalist Greek discourse. In other words, despite the existence of
the problems with the colonial rule, the Italians also were appreciated indeed due to
their successes in handling the administration, especially in creating a modern
economic structure.481
The credit that was given to the Italian administration was so high that the
local people defined the colonial administration as “fascist” only after Mario Lago
was succeeded in 1936 by De Vecchi, who adapted harsh policies, as a “true fascist”
in the Dodecanese.482 However, these facts, in other words, the satisfaction with the
Italian administration on a large scale, do not mean that the official discourse was
completely wrong and the actual situation of the people was splendid. Instead, the
local people also felt indisposed by some of the rules and regulations of the Italian
administration. For instance, compulsory Italian language classes in schools
primarily and the ban of Greek in the schools thereafter led to discontent in local
population.
However, in my view, what should be underlined is that the official discourse
evaluated all incidents on the basis of “blacks and whites” or of Greek nationalism in
the sense that every sign of discontent was regarded as a patriotic and nationalist
uprising, without analyzing the real intent of it. Obviously, it is true that the Greeks
became the most oppressed ethnic group under Italian sovereignty. It is also true that
several uprisings occurred on the basis of the popular discontent about the
480 Ibid., p.3.
481 Ibid., p.48.
482 Ibid., p.55.
195
restrictions on cultural rights, as on Rhodes on which, for instance, in 1934 the
people rebelled because of the “Italian regulations about the Greek Church and the
religious organizations which disturbed both the inhabitants and the public in
Greece.”483 However, there were also some examples of demonstrations and
uprisings which were interpreted as nationalist resistance movements but indeed
were manifestations of different developments. For instance, factual evidence
suggested that the uprisings in Castellorizo in 1934 did not stem from nationalistic
feelings but from the rising duties on food and fuel.484 In consequence, it could be
suggested that although there were disturbing elements in the Italian administration,
firstly every uprising was not related to nationalistic feelings and there was popular
sympathy for the Italians among the locals to some extent as opposed to the
nationalist discourses, which denigrate every aspect of the Fascist presence.
In fact, the situation of the Greek islanders gives some minor clues about the
condition of the Turkish community despite the existence of noticeable differences.
First of all, growing fascist oppression within the Dodecanese, especially in the late
1930s, was strongly felt by the Turkish community, too. For instance, a Turkish
interviewee of Nicholas Doumanis, parallel to the expressions of the Greek ones,
classified only the Cesare De Vecchi’s period as a Fascist era by stating that before
the Fascists, in other words, during the period of Mario Lago, the conditions of the
Turkish community were better; however, when the fascists came, even the Turkish
schools were closed down, sharing a similar fate with the Greek schools.485 This
483 Cumhuriyet, 18 April 1934.
484 Nicholas Doumanis and Nicholas G. Pappas, “Grand History in Small Places:
Social Protest on Castellorizo (1934),” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 15, (1997), p.103-
104.
485 Nicholas Doumanis, “Dodecanese Nostalgia for Mussolini’s Rule,” History
Today 48, no.2 (February 1998), p.18.
196
narrative means that not only the Greek but also the Turkish islanders experienced
oppression under the rules and regulations of the fascists. However, it should be
underlined that every incident that showed the discomfort of the Turkish islanders
was not on the basis of cultural oppression. Despite the existence of a limited number
of documents about the cultural issues that will be shown below, it could be
suggested that the main problem of the Turkish islanders was economic in nature.486
In this sense, one of the documents which was written by the Minister of
Interior to the Prime Ministry in 1934 stated that the Turkish Islanders living on Kos
and Rhodes during the Lausanne Treaty and had taken Italian citizenship in this way,
were escaping from these islands to Turkish coasts either by leaving their property
behind or by selling it at low price.487 In response to these developments, the Turkish
government had taken some measures in terms of sending them back and in terms of
propagandizing on the islands in order to hinder these kinds of events.488
Considering this document, it could be suggested that the Turkish community
passed through hard times on the islands. However, it could be stated that this
example of the will to live in Turkey stemmed from financial hardships, rather than
repression. The problem of the migration of the Dodecanese Turks to southwestern
Anatolia on the basis of economic difficulties was experienced throughout the 1930s
in the sense that other measures were taken by the Ankara government in accordance
with the will of Turkish community. In this context, it is important to note that the
Minister of Interior, in another letter, informed the Prime Ministry about the will of
the islanders, who were working at temporary jobs in Turkey, about the permission
486 Elçin Macar, “Lozan’dan Günümüze Oniki Ada Türklerinin Sorunları,” İ.Ü.
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, no.34 (Mart 2006), p.51.
487 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/237.602..2.
488 Ibid.
197
for residence for six months in a year after which they would turn to the Dodecanese
with their earned money.489 As could be seen from the documents, efforts were made
to solve the problems stemming from economic difficulties by Turkey through
different measures, yet with an effort not to irritate Italy.
However, as was emphasized above, there were also other incidents that were
related directly to cultural issues. One of the archival documents about the
educational matters of the Turkish islanders reflects this dimension of the Italian
administration, parallel to the statements of Doumanis’ Turkish interviewee. In this
case, in 1934, the governor visited a Turkish association on Rhodes in order to
express his uneasiness about the children that were being sent to Turkey for
educational matters rather than choosing the Italian schools in the island.490 The
governor stressed that the schools on Rhodes were adequate and high-quality for the
islanders, but if there was a need for higher education, the Rhodes administration
would not hesitate to send these people to Italy.491 In addition to the emphasis on the
favour of the Italian government towards the Muslims in the Dodecanese, the
governor underlined the necessity of a warning for the Italian citizens who were
Turkish in origin and received education in Turkey, for their intemperate and
aggressive behaviour towards the administration.492
Obviously, the content of this meeting between the governor and the Turkish
association in Rhodes indicates that the rules and regulations, especially the
limitations on languages within the schools, were not appreciated by certain Turkish
489 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/116.811..12,
quoted by Macar, p.37.
490 PMRA, Catalogue of General Directorate of Transactions, 030..10/237.604..23.
491 Ibid.
492 Ibid.
198
families, who had chosen sending their children to Turkey for education, and formed
a good example of cultural oppression.
However, although there were some examples of the Fascist administration’s
oppression in cultural matters as well as some destruction on the Turkish cultural
heritage like “Sümbüllü Bath”493 during the Italian era, one could claim that Turkish
minority was not exposed to massive ill-treatment, as compared to Greeks. In other
words, the incidents discussed above were exceptional cases. Since the majority in
the Dodecanese was Greeks, Italy did not regard the Turks as a threat to the Fascist
administration, due to their relatively outnumbered position.494 As in Mario Lago’s
statement above, the Fascist administration favoured the Turks vis-à-vis the Greek
community, perhaps because of their potential counter-balancing ability on the
islands.
Therefore, why the Dodecanese and the Turkish community did not cause to
big clashes between Turkey and Italy throughout the interwar era, becomes
understandable. On the one hand, compared to the Greeks, they lived in a more stable
environment in terms of oppression. Thus, Turkey did not have to take measures ever
so often for the Turkish islanders, as was done in the minor cases that were
mentioned above. At this point, it should be reminded that while it is said that the
conditions of the Turkish islanders were relatively easy, the connotation implies that
it was easier than the lives of the Greeks at this time; on the one hand, on the other
hand it was easier compared to the subsequent periods. To put it another way, when
the Turkish interviewee of Doumanis stated that “we had it good here, under the
493 Macar, p.43.
494 Ibid., p.51.
199
Italians,”495 he was probably expressing his ideas by making comparison with the
Greek period during which more serious oppression was implemented by the Greek
authorities against the Muslims of the Dodecanese, on the basis of the Turkish
culture and Turkish identity.496 Therefore, in a relatively stable period, Turkey and
Italy did not come up against each other on the subject of the Turkish community in
the Dodecanese too much, and as a result, the public mind in Turkey did not upsurge
for the conditions of their fellows, as opposed to the frustrated Greek public in the
motherland Greece.
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of the Turkish islanders in Turkish-
Italian relations in the interwar era was that minorities and the minority rights in this
period were under the dominance of the sovereign country in the sense that
intervening in the domestic affairs of another country was not as common as it is
today. If the threat that Italy posed to Turkey in the interwar era is also added, the
efforts that Turkey made for the above cases, like sending back the Dodecanese
migrants to the islands, become more meaningful, in the sense that Turkey obviously
did not desire other dynamics that could sharpen the existing tension between the
parties.
To sum up, it is seen that although there were two components of the
Dodecanese Islands in terms of the impacts on Turkish-Italian relations in the
interwar period, the strategic position of the Dodecanese became a much more
important determinant than the Turkish population. However, this situation was not
surprising in the sense that in an atmosphere in which the relationship between
Turkey and Italy depended on the fear of the former in terms of a possible Italian
495 Doumanis, “Dodecanese Nostalgia,” p.18.
496 Macar, p.51.
200
assault on Turkish territory as well as on the aggressive expansionist policies of the
latter, the military fortifications on the islands played a major role in the relations. It
could be suggested that the increasing military build-ups in the islands in certain
periods were perceived as proof of the aggressive plans of Italy towards Turkey.
Therefore, the islands both influenced the diplomatic relations as in the whole
interwar period and were influenced by the developments.
However, the other component of the relations, in other words, Italian rule for
the Turks in Dodecanese, was not as influential as the strategic concerns. In this
respect, the relatively comfortable conditions of the Turkish minority as compared to
the Greek majority, and the reluctance of the Turkish government in terms of
intervening in the domestic affairs of another country with which it experienced
problems, played a major role on this character of the bilateral relations.
201
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, the Turkish-Italian relations in the interwar period were examined
comprehensively. Although diplomatic relations constituted the principle part of this
study, as can be seen from the division of chapters, the contacts also in terms of
economy or in terms of social linkages were either designated in a separate chapter
or touched upon inside the sections under different titles. In this respect, both the
degree that the every aspect of these contacts reached and the phases that the bilateral
relationship underwent, from the end of the Great War until the beginning of the
Second World War, were revealed.
In fact, in this thesis, setting out the historical narrative was a consequential
purpose due to the deficiency of the resources about the issue despite the multiplicity
of narratives about other diplomatic relations of Turkey in the era under
consideration. This narrative, which was generally made in a chronological order
with some divisions, revealed some consequences that should be presented apart
from being an end itself.
The first finding of this thesis was the determination of the place of Turkey in
Italian foreign policy. All of the diplomatic and the economic relations designated
that Turkey became a part of Italy’s Mare Nostrum policy, which aimed at
dominating Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean in the interwar era. From
the beginning of the period to the end, various methods related to this policy were
implemented on Turkey.
202
In this sense, all of the methods that Italy used towards Turkey, such as
aggression, finesse, and economic cooperation in order to dominate the Anatolian
territory were seen in the course of the historical narrative. For instance, while the
Italian occupation schemes for southwestern Anatolia until 1927 display the
intimidating strategy of Italy, the political cooperation period between 1927 and
1932 shows the finesse strategy of Rome, which tried to form an alliance with
various states in the Balkans both in order to counterbalance French power in the
region and in order to form a hegemony over the states through peaceful penetration.
Likewise, economic cooperation in the aforementioned period between 1927
and 1932 points out another strategy of Rome in terms of its efforts to support the
finesse strategy with economic means. After 1932, the return of aggression to Italian
foreign policy in general implies that Italy was using different strategies on the basis
of the needs and conditions of the specific time frame. Therefore, the implementation
of almost all strategy on Turkey shows the place of Turkey in the general framework
of the Italian Mare Nostrum policy. Thus, the historical story signifies that the
Turkish-Italian relationship between the wars was a case that should be analyzed
from a broader perspective rather than from a narrow one that looks at specifically
bilateral relations full of factual data.
Obviously, the inclusion of Turkey within the Mare Nostrum policy and its
situation of being exposed to the various methods of this policy show a particular
characteristic of this relationship, which is the second finding of this study. It is
normal to think that if there is an adversity in a relationship on the basis of
intimidation and fear reciprocally, the course of events proceeds in the same
direction. However, as seen from the division of the periods, the different methods
that were implemented against Turkey led to different periodizations that indicate
203
fluctuations within the relationship, like the transition from the aggression policy to
the one of finesse in 1927. However, since the aim of the Mare Nostrum policy of
Italy remained same, it could be suggested that the Turkish-Italian relationship in the
whole period fluctuated in terms of the methods and periods that depended on these
methods but was linear in terms of the mentality. That is to say, even in the period
between 1927 and 1932, during which the relationship reached peak, neither Italy
changed its ambitions towards Turkey in terms of dominating country nor Turkey
could give up its distrust of Italy.
The third fundamental finding of this thesis is the determinant character of
Italy in Turkish foreign policy throughout the interwar history. As was explained in
the above pages, the perception of the Italian threat by Ankara made Italy one of the
most important determinants of interwar Turkish foreign policy due to the
consideration of it as an enemy to Turkish survival. In this respect, this study claims
that this perception of the Italian threat influenced nearly all the decisions, initiatives
and orientations of Turkey in its international relations, especially in the 1930s. The
Italian impact on the Mosul question, the efforts to form an antirevisionist alliance in
the Balkans, the Montreux Convention, the Nyon Agreement, the initiative for a
Mediterranean Pact, and the rapprochement with Britain and France in the last years
of the 1930s constitute only some of the major issues to which the Italian fear
contributed despite the existence of many other major and minor instances. The
Italian fear was so influential for Turkey that despite the existence of some political
and cultural interactions that could contribute to some kind of closeness, this
relationship depended on antagonism in a sense that Turkey specifically positioned
itself exactly opposite of Italy particularly in the late 1930s.
204
In conclusion, the historical data in this thesis showed that the Turkish-Italian
relations in the interwar period both depended on the Mare Nostrum policy of Italy
on the basis of the expansionist goals of this country on the one hand, and on the
response of the Turkish foreign policy with various actions on the basis of the desire
for the survival, on the other hand. These two components of the contacts determined
both the nature and the course of events throughout the period, which led to the
fluctuations ostensibly but linearity in the animosity.
205
APPENDIX
Documents of the Quotes
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213
214
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