5.5

 

In the yearbook of the ministry printed in 1889, brief personal information for the 152 officials was provided.⁶⁰¹ Of these, 98 were Muslims. The remaining 54 were non- Muslims. Of these 54 non-Muslim officials, 25 were Armenians. The number of Greeks working in the ministry was 15. The remaining 14 non-Muslims were Catholic/Orthodox Arab, Jewish, Bulgarian, or European⁶⁰². Of the Muslims, 73 were scions of state officials of varying ranks. Of the non-Muslims, 29 were scions of non-state official fathers. Only 14

⁶⁰⁰ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306 /1889), pp. 485-630.

⁶⁰¹ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 485-630.

⁶⁰² One Bulgarian (Aleko Vogoridi Pasha) served as Ottoman ambassador (to Vienna) between 1876 to 1877. Although no Jew served as an Ottoman ambassador, the son of a Jewish convert to Islam became an Ottoman ambassador. Several Europeans and A rab Christians also served as Ottoman ambassadors. However, predominantly, it was Armenians and Greeks that rose to prominent posts in the diplomatic service. See

Kuneralp, Sinan, ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,‖ in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p. 115, 126.

of the non-Muslims were the children of state officials. The remaining six had fathers with a nationality other than Ottoman.

We observe an upward mobility within the generations. For example, Irfan, the senior secretary of the London embassy was the son of an official in Directorate of Forestry in the province of Selanik.⁶⁰³ Although the prestigious posts of ―full ambassadorships‖[ambassadors to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Teheran were ―full ambassadors‖ (büyük elçi) whereas ambassadors to capitals such as Athens, Belgrade, Washington, Den Haag were ―orta elçi‖s (middle ambassadors)] were predominantly restricted to the scions of dignitaries and families of high-ranking bureaucrats, there were also exceptions. For example, Mahmud Esad Pasha, the ambassador to Paris, was the son of a minor ulema in Izmir. Mahmud Esad Pasha owed his impressive rise in the civil service to his enrollment in the Ottoman School in Paris. He joined the Bab-ı Ali Translation Office after his graduation from the Ottoman School. He was posted to the embassy in St. Petersburg after his years in the Translation Office from where he was promoted regularly every five years before he was appointed as the ambassador to France in 1885.⁶⁰⁴

Others did not enjoy such upward mobility. Several scions of sadr-ı azams, ministers, and generals were assigned modest positions and most held on to mediocre offices before their retirements. Even though they lived prosperous lives thanks to their backgrounds, they could not transfer their financial and familiar assets into ranks and offices. In that sense, Ottoman statecraft differed from the 19^th- century British statecraft, the aristocratic nation par excellence, or Prussian statecraft, where the integration of the aristocracy and the bureaucratic estate (Beamtenstand) privileged the aristocrats. It has to be noted that the scions of Ottoman dignitaries comprised a considerable portion of the diplomatic corps. This was most visible in the posts of full ambassadorships. Full ambassadors of the Hamidian era, such as Sadullah Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Yanko Fotiyadi Pasha, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Salih Münir Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, and Musurus Pasha, were all men of

 

 

⁶⁰³ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 603.

⁶⁰⁴ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 537-538.

aristocratic and illustrious backgrounds⁶⁰⁵. Apparently, the ministry was a prestigious office where the sons of Ottoman dignitaries hastened to draft their sons.

Abdülhamit Kırmızı‘s survey of the social origins of the governors is to some extent compatible with the findings presented above on the social origins of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the ministry‘s four annals.⁶⁰⁶ Kırmızı also finds that the sons of officials made up a high percentage of governors. Sons of local notables and dynasties, ulema, and merchants comprised the remaining office-holders. However, it is remarkable that the percentage of governors descended from state officials is significantly smaller in comparison to diplomats. The most likely reason for this difference might be attributed to the necessity of having sufficient fluency in French to serve in the ministry, which consequently privileged the sons of state officials who had greater access to French learning. The officials‘ sons were more likely to be enrolled in the prestigious schools where they could master the French language. Furthermore, they grew up and were socialized in environments where one was more prone to French learning. Moreover, their being raised in an environment where one could develop a more cosmopolitan cultural formation and be more prone to acquire knowledge relevant to the diplomatic service should have favored the sons of officials. However, as suggested above, Kırmızı‘s survey and the findings provided here indicate the predominance of the sons of officials in the state bureaucracy, which produced a distinct cultural intimacy closed to outsiders. The outsiders had to endorse the specific codes of conduct to be fully admitted and assimilated into this cultural and social world.

Some recruiting might have served to prove the loyalty of the âyân dynasties to the state. It can be observed that numerous scions of local dynasties were recruited to the Ottoman diplomatic service. This phenomenon probably indicates a strategy by the local elites to integrate their descendants and family into the state. The early Tanzimat-era witnessed the destruction of the power bases of many local dynasties in the course of the policy of centralization. The devastation of the local dynasties was followed by their

⁶⁰⁵ For the biographies and social origins of the Hamidian ambassadors as of 1889, see

Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 530-560.

⁶⁰⁶ Kırmızı, Abdülhamit, Abdülhamid‟in Valileri, İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2007, pp. 69- 70.

displacement and resettlement in Istanbul, or exile to distant localities. This process was to some extent semi-voluntary in the sense that the local dynasties, once they accepted their new status, were granted attractive opportunities in the capital and welcomed. Given the pros and cons, many members of these dynasties ―collaborated.‖ The Bedirxans, Karaosmanoğlus,⁶⁰⁷ Menemencioğlus⁶⁰⁸ and Çapanzades⁶⁰⁹ raised the new generations of their families in the modern schools of Istanbul and in a few in Europe, and gave their best sons to the service of the state.

The transition and interconnectedness between the local notables and the state was a phenomenon that existed before the advent of the Tanzimat, especially in the post-classical centuries as the provincial elites consolidated their power in their localities. The delicate balance and mutual recognition between the Istanbul and local power holders was the backbone of the Ottoman control of Anatolian and Roumelian lands in the post-classical Ottoman Empire. The center and the provincial elites were in a relationship consisting of bargain and compromise rather than a clash and zero-sum game.⁶¹⁰ Nevertheless, the âyân did not bother getting their sons recruited into the central administration, but rather trained them to rule over their own land and possessions. The center was not yet attractive enough. The pull and push factors were not sufficiently strong. As the center increased its relative

⁶⁰⁷ Yuzo Nagata notes that ―after the negative impact of the centralization policies of Mahmud II, the Karaosmanoğlu family… tried to retain its influence over the region by taking offices in the government.‖ Nagata, Yuzo, Tarihte Ayanlık: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p.191. One cannot neglect to recall that one descendant of the Karaosmanoğlu family was a ―reluctant diplomat.‖ After the failure to retain their influence over their homelands and after moving to Izmir and Istanbul, the descendants of the Karaosmanoğlu family had made impressive governmental (and later civil) careers.

⁶⁰⁸ For the destruction of the Menemencioğlu family‘s powerhouse, narrated by a contemporary member of the family, see Menemencioğlu Ahmed Bey, Menemencioğlu Tarihi, Ankara: Akçağ, 1997 (ed. Yılmaz Kurt)

⁶⁰⁹ Ahmed Şakir Pasha, the ambassador to St. Petersburg between 1878 and 1889, was a descendant of the Çapanzade family. Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 533.

⁶¹⁰ See Barkey, Karen, Bandits and Bureaucrats, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994; Khoury, Dina Rizk, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540- 1834, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1997. For the dynamics of center- periphery relations in the Classical Age and its origins, see Kunt, Metin, The Sultan‟s Servants, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

(as well as absolute) power vis-à-vis the provincial elites, this relationship evolved into one of submission and obedience. This did not, however, mean that this obedience was necessarily disadvantageous to the submissive provincial elites as long as they benefited from the new opportunities offered to them. As Nagata noted, the âyân were not annihilated in the reign of Mahmud II. On the contrary, they survived, rehabilitated themselves, and assumed power within the Tanzimat local administrations.⁶¹¹ Those whose local powerhouses were uprooted sought other lucrative and desirable options. They found means to adapt to the changing circumstances, albeit not under favorable conditions. ―By 1820, the center had asserted its control over all of Anatolia and Eastern Rumelia although occasional clashes with lesser notables persisted for a time. Those notables who adjusted to the new reality of a strong and assertive center continued to wield economic power well into the twentieth century.‖⁶¹²

 

 

 

4.1.     Assimilating and Integrating the Local Aristocracies: Periphery Marries the Center

 

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we encounter several descendants of Babans and other Kurdish tribal leaders, Turcoman chieftains, local Albanian dynasties, and Crimean aristocrats from the family of the Crimean khans⁶¹³. The recruitment of the Circassian tribal chiefs should be regarded as a distinct sub-category. Although many descendants of the Circassian tribal leaders (for obvious reasons) were recruited into the Ottoman military

⁶¹¹ Nagata, Yuzo, Muhsin-zade Mehmed Pasha ve Ayanlık Müessesesi, Study of Languages & Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series, 1982, p. 11.

⁶¹² Hanioğlu, Şükrü, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 61.

⁶¹³ Apart from the reputable Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the ambassador to Berlin and London, Hüseyin Saadet, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Ministry who died at a young age in 1901, and Ali Seyyid Bey were also members of the family of the Crimean khanate (Girays). Çankaya, Ali, ibid, vol. III, p. 305. Ahmed Tevfik Paşa was described by Esat Cemal in his memoirs as ―Türk oğlu Türk‖ probably due to his impeccable (ethnic) credentials as a member of the Crimean khanate (who were, in fact, descended from Genghis Khan). Paker, Esat Cemal, Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları, Hilmi Yayınevi, 1952, p. 47.

after fine educations, we encounter only one descendant of a Circassian tribal leader, Mehmed Şemseddin Bey,⁶¹⁴ within the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶¹⁵

One of the most established figures in the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a local dynastic background was Numan Menemencioğlu. His father, Rifat, was a high- ranking bureaucrat who served as the governor of Baghdad, Minister of Finance, and President of the Senate, and he married the daughter of Namık Kemal, thus integrating himself into the culturally exclusive world of the Istanbuliot bureaucracy. His son, Numan entered the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1914 as the third secretary at the embassy in Vienna. He graduated from Saint-Joseph Lycée before studying law at the University of Lausanne.⁶¹⁶ In other words, he followed the smooth path of a son from a well-to do family and enjoyed the comfortable life of an aristocrat. Looking at him more closely, Numan Menemecioğlu defies categorizations. From a family of local Turcoman notables in Cilicia by birth, his kin were well assimilated into the Ottoman aristocracy; he, himself, served as a loyal servant of the Republic in Ankara. His father‘s marriage to the daughter of Namık Kemal, who belonged to a family of the state aristocracy, and therefore acquiring from these family backgrounds different social and political values, further complicates the social background of Numan Menemencioğlu. Beginning his career in the Empire and being the most important person in the conduct of foreign affairs in the late 1930s and early 1940s of the Republic, he embodied the multifacetedness of the late Ottoman

 

 

⁶¹⁴ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 512-513.

⁶¹⁵ For a biography of Mehmed Şemseddin, Çankaya, Ali, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1969, vol. III, pp. 83-85. For the prominence of Circassians of aristocratic descent in the Hamidian era in various distinguished posts and Abdülhamid‘s pro-Circassian policies, see Avagyan, Arsen, Çerkesler, Belge Yayınları, 2004, pp. 95-104.

⁶¹⁶ For a biography of Numan Menemencioğlu, see Güçlü, Yücel, Eminence Gris of the Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu, no publishing house, 2002. For an analysis of the diplomatic perspectives and views of Numan Menemencioğlu, see Dikerdem, Mahmut, Hariciye Çarkı, Cem Yayınları, 1989, pp. 23-26; Deringil, Selim, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality, Cambridge,

U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 51-57; Weisband, Edward, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 46-54.

bureaucracy.⁶¹⁷ Numan‘s brother, Edhem Menemencioğlu, born in 1878, had a career in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1906 to 1927 and briefly served as ministerial undersecretariat in 1916. Edhem Menemencioğlu, who taught courses on international law, private international law, and diplomacy at the School for Civil Service (Mülkiye) after his departure from the ministry, had an impressive career.⁶¹⁸ Turgut Menemencioğlu, the nephew of Numan, was also a high-ranking bureaucrat of the Republic, and held the posts of ambassador to the United Nations and to Washington. In short, the Menemencioglu family illustrates the path of a 19^th- century provincial family joining the imperial bureaucracy from the periphery and surviving in the 20^th- century Republican bureaucracy.

Another provincial dynasty, the Baban family, was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kürd Said Pasha served as the ambassador to Berlin between 1883 and 1885, in addition to his eleven-year tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His son, the famous Şerif Pasha, who claimed to represent the Kurds after the Armistice of Mondros in 1918, entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after serving as a military officer. Another member of the family who advanced in his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Halil Halid Bey, who also served as the ambassador to Belgrade and Teheran.⁶¹⁹ The father and son Babanzades (and Halil Halid) may be seen as exemplifying an apparent case of the assimilation of the periphery into the center. The father, Kürd Said Pasha, was born in his hometown of Suleymaniye (present day Iraqi Kurdistan) in 1849. His birth was just two

 

 

 

⁶¹⁷ Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, who worked with Edhem, the brother of Numan, for one year in the embassy in Bucharest, sees these brothers as some of the last representatives of the old-style diplomat - aristocratic, cultivated, exceptionally well- educated, and well- mannered. For Söylemezoğlu, the diplomatic service‘s quality deteriorated drastically after World War I (what he actually meant was after the proclamation of the Republic) because of the employment of youths lacking respectable origins, manners, and sophistication. See Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde Kırk Sene, Şaka Matbaası, 1949, pp. 285-86.

⁶¹⁸ For a biography of Edhem Menemencioğlu, see Çankaya, Ali, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968-9, vol. II, p. 1124-25.

⁶¹⁹ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 544.

years after the destruction of the independence/autonomy of the Baban emirate.⁶²⁰ He was raised in Istanbul, where his family had to resettle. After graduating from Mekteb-i Sultani, he entered state service in the Translation Office. He was employed in a variety of posts in different governmental offices before he got his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (and subsequently as the ambassador to Berlin). His son received a better education. Following his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani, he enrolled in the prestigious Saint-Cyr Military Academy in Paris. He was appointed as the military attaché in Brussels and subsequently in Paris. He was appointed as the second secretary in the embassy to Paris before his appointment as the ambassador to Stockholm. He was married to Emine Hanım, the granddaughter of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha. His liberal politics in opposition to the Unionists and his conversion to Kurdish nationalism after his decades- long aristocratic/imperial leanings reflects the permeable nature of identities and dispositions.

The Babans were a good illustration of the refashioning of an aristocratic family, uprooted from its own soil, but having accommodated to the new opportunities and benefits of the centralized Empire. Many members of the Babanzades became prominent Ottoman bureaucrats, and with the emergence of an autonomous public space, leading Ottoman/Turkish intellectuals, ideologues, etc. They were also leading early Kurdish nationalists.⁶²¹ The process by which Şerif Pasha, the loyal Ottoman diplomat, became a Kurdish nationalist seeking an independent Kurdistan is representative of the complexities and permeabilities of the ―ideologies‖ of the time. The contribution of Babans both to the emergence of a Kurdish nationalism and to the Ottoman imperial grandeur simultaneously was not a contradiction. These were strategies of the members of the grand families of yesterday, who were trying to determine the best way to survive and to preserve and foster

 

 

 

⁶²⁰ For the Tanzimat‘s destruction of the Kurdish emirates, see Özoğlu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 59-68.

⁶²¹ For a list and general view of the members of the Babanzade family in the late Ottoman and Turkish world, see Alakom, Ruhat, Şerif Paşa: Bir Kürt Diplomatının Fırtınalı Yılları, İstanbul: Avesta, 1998, pp. 16-20.

their power in transforming circumstances.⁶²² The varieties of the strategies employed by different individuals, and even the strategies employed by these certain individuals in the different phases of their lives, may differ but the concerns behind these strategies are the same. One intelligent strategy was to be incorporated into the imperium and be a part of the imperium, if not a major stakeholder in it. Moreover, such a course was welcomed and even encouraged by the state. Thus, we observe the emergence of a new state elite with aristocratic backgrounds assimilated into the service of the state.⁶²³ This process was not unlike the ―stick and carrot tactics‖ of the French absolutist monarchs in gathering the French aristocrats at Versailles.⁶²⁴

The maneuvers of Şerif Pasha, the recruitment of the members of notable Kurdish families into the Ottoman state, and the generation of Kurdish nationalism by other family members posed no contradiction. At a time when identities were not forged and fixed, oscillations and shifting loyalties were to be expected. In the absence of identity politics, the primary concerns of these actors were adaptation to the new circumstances at an optimum level. They may prefer ―exit,‖ ―loyalty‖, or ―voice‖ at a given time and then switch to another option at a later time when their interests were best served by that option.⁶²⁵

In fact, there was no strict separation between local dynasties and the Istanbul aristocracy. In a way, Tanzimat may be interpreted as the gradual move of local notables to Istanbul. The greater families‘ accession to the center was more spectacular and came about later. Nevertheless, most of the first-generation Tanzimat statesmen were scions of

⁶²² For the Kurdish elite, see Özoğlu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, State University of New York Press, 2004; Strohmeier, Martin, Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2003.

⁶²³ Abdülhamid Kırmızı‘s list of governors displays the presence of the descendants of the local dynasties of Kurdish, Turcoman, Albanian and Anatolian/Roumelian Turkish origin as well as the scions of Daghestani aristocrats. Kırmızı, Abdülhamid… p. 69.

⁶²⁴ Major, Russell J, From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles & Estates, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 375.

⁶²⁵ For the double movement of the Kurdish notables, see Özoğlu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, State University of New York Press, 2004; Strohmeier, Martin. Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2003.

local notable families who had previously opted to move to the center. Aristocratic families of Istanbul such as the Samipaşazades were all recent newcomers to Istanbul who had left their Roumelian homelands not long before. As pointed out earlier in the study, such grand names of Tanzimat as Fuad Pasha, Münif Pasha, Midhad Pasha, and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha can be seen in this light. They were all descendants of small notables and ulema in the provinces.⁶²⁶ One difference between them was the voluntary accession of the early recruits who had a smaller stake, less glory, and less prestige to lose by leaving their homelands; therefore, opportunities and posts in Istanbul were more attractive and adventurous for them. This contrasted with those who were forced to accommodate the new realities as their last chance.

The background of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (not to be confused with the ―Great‖ (Koca) Mustafa Reşid Pasha for whom he was named), the last of the Ottoman foreign ministers and ambassador to Bucharest, Rome, and Vienna, nicely reflects the move, adaptation, and promotion of a local notable family. The Müftüzades were an Evlad-ı Fatihan (Descendants of the Conquerors) family and the holders of the office of the mufti of Ioannina (present-day northwestern Greece). The office belonged to the family, and sons replaced fathers. The family‘s respectability did not originate from the ownership of land, but, not unsurprisingly, the family owned vast lands that enabled them to live prosperously when they moved to Istanbul. Due to the family‘s religious titles and indirect affiliation with the state, the adaptation to the changing circumstances was not easy. After Mahmud II abolished the practice of hereditary succession to Roumelian mufti offices, the family moved to Istanbul to seek more attractive prospects. Şakir Mehmed Bey became a protégé

⁶²⁶ Apart from various names mentioned throughout this study, some examples from local dynasties and prominent families are Yusuf Kamil Pasha (İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnan, Son Sadrazamlar, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982 , p. 196) Hüseyin Avni Pasha (İbnülemin…, p. 483), Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (Rifat Uçarol, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989, p. 7). (Istanbul or local) Ulema were another source for the recruitment of the Tanzimat statesmen. Some were the sons of alim, such as Münif Pasha (Budak, Ali, Münif Pasha, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2004, p. 4) or were from prominent local ulema families, such as Fuad Pasha (İbnülemin…, Ibid., p. 149) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (Fatma Aliye Hanım, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Zamanı, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1332, p. 7). Apparently, a significant portion of the Tanzimat elite were fathered by prominent servants of the state like Mustafa Reşid Pasha (Sicil-i Osmani, p. 1384), Mehmed Emin Pasha (İbnülemin…ibid., p. 83), Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940, p. 1).

of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (hence the name given to his son) and advanced in his career, serving as the head of the State Financial Council (Meclis-i Maliye).⁶²⁷ Both of his sons graduated from the Mekteb-i Sultani. Being thus eligible for admission to the ministry, they began their careers in diplomacy, and both subsequently became ambassadors. Thus, the Müftüzades constitute an example of the identified pattern in three generations. Like the Müftüzades, many sons of other families with notable backgrounds that had settled in Istanbul entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two more examples of this pattern are Mahmud Hamdi Bey, the Head of the Personnel Registers (Sicil-i Ahval) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose origins went back to a dynasty in Nevrekob (present-day Goce Delcev, in southwestern Bulgaria) and Mehmed Nuri Bey, who was an official in the same department in the ministry and whose origins went back to a local dynasty in Serres (present-day northeastern Greece). The other sons of these dynasties were apparently distributed to the other governmental offices (kalems) and constituted a significant portion of the late Ottoman bureaucracy.⁶²⁸ The old house of the Köprülüs was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Ahmed Ziya Bey, who was the grandfather of the historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and who served as the ambassador to Bucharest between 1885 and 1888.⁶²⁹ The Keçecizades, after Keçecizade İzzet Molla and his son Fuad Pasha, secured posts for many of their sons in various governmental offices, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the late Tanzimat period. The Samipaşazades, a family of religious scholars from the Peloponnesus, emerged as another distinguished family after Abdurrahman Sami Pasha had to settle in Istanbul after Greek independence and a sojourn

⁶²⁷ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 550.

⁶²⁸ Also, for the career of Enis Bey (Akeygen), who had a similar socio-economic background, began his career in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1901, served as the undersecretary of the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1927 and 1929, and retired in 1945, see Tulça, Enis, Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat: Enis Bey, İstanbul: Simurg, 2003. He belonged to a reputable family in Plovdiv that owned sizeable lands and possessions before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. After the war, the family‘s fortunes waned and it lost its possessions. A number of its members died, and the rest had to move to Istanbul, where they joined the ranks of the Ottoman central bureaucracy.

⁶²⁹ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306 /1889), p. 549; ―Mehmed Fuad Köprülü,‖ DİA, vol. 28, p. 471.

in Egypt in the service of Mehmed Ali.⁶³⁰ The mansion of Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha, the son of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha‘s son, became a meeting place of the secluded Tanzimat elite where intellectual, literary, and cultural exchanges took place and networks of patronages developed.⁶³¹ Two of his brothers, Sezai and Necib (and one of his grandsons, Resmi⁶³²), became diplomats. One of the prominent families of the Tanzimat elite, its members displayed the unity and divergence of the ideological orientations of the sons of the Tanzimat. The family had one prominent Young Ottoman (Ayetullah Bey), one early novelist (Sezai), and one prominent Turkist, first as a Unionist and then as a Kemalist (Hamdullah Suphi). Abdurrahman Sami Pasha was the Minister of Public Education of Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the years between 1857 and 1861. His son Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha served as the Minister of Public Education for Abdülhamid (1876-1878). Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha‘s son, Abdurrahman Sami Pasha‘s grandson, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the Minister of National Education of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1920-1, 1925).⁶³³ He was later appointed as ambassador to Bucharest as a de facto exile after the abolition of Turkish Hearths and its incorporation into the RPP as People‘s Houses, over which he presided.⁶³⁴ The Söylemezoğlus were another local family of notables from Kiğı (present-day eastern Turkey) that obtained positions for many of its members in governmental offices. These included İbrahim Edhem Pertev and Galip Kemali, who got posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁶³⁵.

Another example of the shifting and changing loyalties and identities reminiscent of the political trajectory of Şerif Pasha was the flight of Abdürrezzak Bedirxan. Beginning his

⁶³⁰ For the origins of the SamiPashazade family, see the account of a descendant of the family, Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, Bir Türk Ailesinin 450 Yıllık Öyküsü, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2005. Also see İbnül Emin Mahmud Kemal, Son Asır Türk Şairleri, 1969, pp. 1649-50.

⁶³¹ Kerman, Zeynep, Sami Paşazade Sezai, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p. 11-12; Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, Bir Türk Ailesinin 450 Yıllık Öyküsü, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2005, pp. 74-76; Mardin, Şerif, Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996, p. 20; Şehsuvaroğlu, Haluk, ―Sami Paşa Konağı,‖ Cumhuriyet, 24 August 1951.

⁶³² Abdülhak Hamid… p. 277.

⁶³³ Üstel, Füsun, Türk Ocakları, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997, pp. 60-61.

⁶³⁴ Üstel, Füsun… p. 61.

⁶³⁵ Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, ibid, p. 7.

career in the diplomatic service, he served as the third secretary in St. Petersburg and then in Tehran. While he was serving in Russia, he became acquainted with many Russians and developed connections. He then left the diplomatic service and took refuge in Russia to pursue pro-Kurdish activities. Later, he was pardoned by the Ottoman state⁶³⁶ but exiled and subsequently executed during the World War I. Loyalties were not mutually exclusive. Abidin Pasha, one of the Foreign Ministers of Abdülhamid was at the same time a sympathizer of the Albanian League and, according to a European observer, was alarmed by the territorial demands of Greeks during his tenure due to his Albanian background and instincts.⁶³⁷ Turhan Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg (and ex-ambassador to Rome and Madrid) left the diplomatic service to be the prime minister of the newly founded independent Albania.⁶³⁸ Another Albanian diplomat who not only served as ambassador to Sofia and Bucharest but also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1920 and 1921, Abdüllatif Safa Bey, was a member of the local Albanian dynasty of the Frasheri family and was the nephew of Şemseddin Sami and Naim Frasheri, one of the pioneers of Albanian nationalism.⁶³⁹ The Albanian identities and Ottoman/imperial identities and loyalties did not contradict each other.⁶⁴⁰ They may have complemented one

⁶³⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM, 30/97, 27 R 1312; BOA, HR.SYS 32/26, 7 July 1895; Celile Celil,

Kürt Aydınlanması, Avesta, 2001, p. 102.

⁶³⁷ Watson, Charles (ed.), The Life of Major General Sir Charles William Wilson, London:

E.P. Dutton, 1909, pp. 179-80.

⁶³⁸ Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk (1912-1920), İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009, p. 195; Kuneralp, Sinan, ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,‖ in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p. 115. For Turhan Paşa‘s diplomatic and administrative activities during his prime ministry in Albania, see Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk (1912-1920), İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009.

⁶³⁹ Levent, Agah Sırrı, Şemsettin Sami, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1969, p. 49.

⁶⁴⁰ For the multiple identities of Şemseddin Sami Frasheri, the influential Albanian/Ottoman intellectual, see Bilmez, Bülent Can, ―Şemsettin Sami mi Yazdı Bu

‗Sakıncalı‘ Kitabı?,‖ Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Spring 2005, no: 1, p. 141. As Bilmez demonstrates, Şemsettin Sami Frasheri writes and acts as an Albanian and Turkish nationalist simultaneously, and this multiplicity does not pose any contradiction. For the complexities of the transition from Ottomanism to Arabism of Satı al-Husri, see Cleveland, William L, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satı-al Husri, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. For the Albanian

another in specific cases, given that the Albanian League was originally founded in 1878 by Albanians who wanted to defend their Albanian lands from Christian ambitions ⁶⁴¹ in reaction to moves by Christian Slavs and Greeks⁶⁴². Notable Druze families contributed to the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, too. Muhammad Arslan, a distant cousin of Shakib Arslan, served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁴³ Osman Adil Bey, the son of Hamdi Bey, the Dönme mayor of Salonika and a member of one of the leading and influential Yakubi Dönme families served in the legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when Dönmes increasingly began to join the imperial governmental offices⁶⁴⁴. In short, many non-Turkish Muslim recruits of the ministry manifested overlapping loyalties and identities. In that regard, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more inclusive than the German Foreign Office, where Catholics were significantly underrepresented and the very few Jews were discriminated against,⁶⁴⁵ and more inclusive than even the British Foreign Office, where non-conformists, Jews, and Scotsmen were ―conspicuously absent.‖⁶⁴⁶ Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that notables from various ethnicities were united in one aspect. The fact that non-Turkish Muslims (not unlike their ethnic Turkish colleagues) came predominantly from high class origins also arguably demonstrates the limits of inclusion, not only with regard to non-

students studying in the imperial Mülkiye and their later careers, also see Clayer, Nathalie,

―Albanian Students of the Mekteb-i Mülkiye: Social Networks and Trends of Thought,‖ in Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, Özdalga, Elizabeth (ed.), London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp. 289-309.

⁶⁴¹ Skendi, Stavro, The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 36-38.

⁶⁴² For a memoirs demonstrating the compatibility of Albanian and Ottoman identities, see Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk (1912-1920), İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009.

⁶⁴³ Akarlı, Engin Deniz, ―Daughters and Fathers: A Young Druze Woman‘s Experience (1894-1897), in Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World, Tezcan, Baki & Barbir, Karl (ed.), Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007, p. 181; Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1320 /1902), p. 73.

⁶⁴⁴ Baer, Marc David, The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 90; DH.SAID 81/227, 29 Z. 1284.

⁶⁴⁵ Cecil, Lamar, ibid., p. 96.

⁶⁴⁶ Steiner, Zara, ibid., p. 19.

Turks but also with regard to Turks. Their social prominence, aristocratic backgrounds, and respectability (and education in the same imperial colleges for the forthcoming generations) were the common denominators. Thus, these newcomers to the state machine were welcomed with due respect for their heritages and social respectabilities. Ethnicity may have divided them, but their social backgrounds united them as long as this commonality remained compelling and rewarding.

Assimilation and integration of the peripheral elites is analogous to a marriage, where the center was the groom and the peripheral elites were the bride. Apparently, this was a strategy of the center, partially derived from conventional Ottoman practices and partially from the practicalities of the nascent modern state. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid developed a special concern to contact, co-opt and incorporate the peripheral elites, a practice that would deteriorate after the end of the Hamidian regime.⁶⁴⁷

 

 

 

4.2.  Non-Muslims

 

Different from the Muslim officials, non-Muslims working in the Ministry of Foreign Ministers were the scions of merchants and financers, as well as officials. The considerable number of Armenians whose fathers were sarrafs is also telling. Of the 25 Armenians employed in the ministry as of 1889, six of them were the children of sarrafs. Their efforts to get their sons recruited into the civil service reflect the interrelation between the state and its financiers and the efforts of the financers to integrate their family into the state. In this closed world, the state was the main benefactor, and people wanted to get close to it. The high level of recruitment highlights the possible connections and networks between the state and the sarrafs. The tendency for the sarrafs to have their sons and descendents recruited into the positions within the state makes one think that this intimate connection between the sarrafs and the state is one that cannot simply be reduced to material interests. Two prominent (almost legendary) Armenians of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were both descendants of subcontractors to the palace and indirectly servants of the palace.

⁶⁴⁷ See also Akpınar, Alişan & Rogan, Eugene, Aşiret, Mektep, Devlet, İstanbul: Aram Yayınları, 2001.

Gabriel Noradonkyan was the son of Krikor Noradonkyan, the chief supplier of bread to the military. Artin Dadyan was from a family of barutçubaşı, his grandfather Arakel Dadyan being the last appointed barutçubaşı in the reign of Mahmud II. The Manas family, many of whose sons were recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as the palace painters from the 17^th century to the early 19^th century.⁶⁴⁸ The traditional Ottoman governmental subcontracting practices given to Armenian artisan families as hereditary family businesses enabled their descendants living in the age of the market to reestablish their affiliation with the Ottoman state in the changing environment at a time when personalized subcontracting practices were no longer tenable and when the Ottoman state was undergoing reorganization and eliminating its personalized attributes in favor of a depersonalized modern state. In such circumstances, the new form of incorporation into the state consisted of the recruitment of its members as (prominent) state officials. Ironically, family businesses and ―special relations‖ between the Armenian amira class and the state continued in modified form. The premodern mode of relations was adapted into the modern practices of a bureaucratic state. The mode of relation had changed but the beneficiaries of the old practices survived. Whereas previously the privileged non-Muslim families were incorporated into the state through indirect and semi-official mechanisms, with Tanzimat they formally became part of the state. The continuity within change is striking in the case of the adaptation of the relation between ―state Armenians‖ and the state.⁶⁴⁹ The relations between the Greek Phanariot families and the Sublime Porte also became more formalized several decades after the Greek rebellion. Although socio- economic dynamics and conditions formed the backbone of the special relationship between the Sublime Porte and the amira class and Phanariot families, it was formed at a very personal level. One example of the integration and persistence of personal ties with the state and its transformation into adherence to the state was the recruitment of the two

⁶⁴⁸ Çark,Y, Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler, İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1953, p. 135.

⁶⁴⁹ For the amira class, see Barsoumian, Hagop, ―The Dual Role of the Armenian Amira Class within the Ottoman Government and the Armenian Millet (1750-1850),‖ in B. Braude & B. Lewis (ed.), Christians and the Jews in the Ottoman Empire, New York; London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, v. I, pp. 171-184. For the presence of Armenians in the provincial bureaucracy, see Krikorian, Mesrob, Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire 1860-1908, London; New York: Routledge, 1977.

sons of Mavroyeni Bey, the personal doctor of Abdülhamid, into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁶⁵⁰. Although Yanko pursued a modest career, Aleksander‘s impressive career included the post of ambassador to Vienna.⁶⁵¹ In short, the world and fortunes of the privileged non-Muslim dignitaries continued to be constructed around the state.

A few non-Muslim dignitaries of the Foreign Ministry were appointed to the Senate in 1908. Excluding Bohor Efendi and Dimitri Mavro Kordota, who had left their diplomatic careers at some point, Manuk Azaryan and Gabriel Noradonkyan were two prominent figures of the ministry. Manuk Azaryan was an erstwhile undersecretary of the ministry in 1909⁶⁵², and Gabriel Noradonkyan was, as mentioned above, the long-time legal counselor of the ministry. In the Senate sessions, they emerged as among the most active members of the Senate. It has to be pointed out that Senate discussions were conducted very differently from parliamentary debates. Whereas there were heated debates in parliament, the Senate was a milieu for the dispassionate and calm exchange of views. Although several different opinions were held and expressed by the senators, all these differences of opinion were discussed calmly, as if these differences of opinion were merely technical matters that were bound to be resolved. In other words, all the members appeared to disregard ―politics‖ and acted as bureaucrats rather than politicians, hence continuing the code of conduct of the Şuray-ı Devlet. All the members spoke as responsible non-partisan servants of the imperium whose only concern was its advancement.

Whenever non-Muslim senators discussed matters pertaining to religion, they would routinely point to the tolerance shown by the imperium to Christianity and to Christian

 

 

⁶⁵⁰ Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, Alexander Mavroyeni Bey: From the 19^th Century Reform Era to the Young Turk Revolution Through the Life and Ideology of a Neophanariot Ottoman Bureaucrat, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004,

pp. 43-44.

⁶⁵¹ For the Mavroyeni family, see Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, Alexander Mavroyeni Bey: From the 19^th Century Reform Era to the Young Turk Revolution Through the Life and Ideology of a Neophanariot Ottoman Bureaucrat, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004; Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrımüslimler, unpublished MA thesis, Hacettepe University, 1998, pp. 16-18.

⁶⁵² Demirci, Aliyar, İkinci Meşrutiyet‟te Ayan Meclisi 1908-1912, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, p. 471.

religious sermons reiterating their loyalty and reverence.⁶⁵³ Azaryan presented the Christian faith as ―pertaining to the individuality‖ ―which is protected and secured by the Ottoman Empire‖ and reiterated that Christianity was one of the three legitimate faiths of the populace of the Empire and the Christian faith‘s political significance was limited to the conduction of Christian millets‟ communal affairs and Christians were part of the Ottoman political nation.⁶⁵⁴ Gabriel Noradonkyan also emerged as the dispassionate technical expert providing expertise in legal and administrative issues and instructing the senators. His speeches were always technical and informative. Azaryan also assessed the issues discussed from the point of view of the imperial interests in a calm and dispassionate tone. Apparently, both of these senators came from the Armenian amira, born in Istanbul to wealthy and respectable families. Therefore, they were natural candidates for appointment as senators. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that they were prominent figures in Armenian communal affairs and, therefore, had representative quality. Azaryan assumed the post of the secular head of the Armenians and was the head of the general assembly of the Armenian community.⁶⁵⁵ He was prominent in the Armenian communal affairs run by the Armenian elites of Istanbul and was an opponent of the rural and East Anatolian Armenian revolutionaries and militants⁶⁵⁶.

There is a striking contrast between Greeks and Armenians in terms of their fathers‘ occupations. Of the 25 Armenians counted in the 1889 annal of the Ministry, only four had a father serving in the Ottoman state. In contrast, of the 15 Greeks counted, six had a father employed in the civil service. Minor officials in the diplomatic service had Greek fathers who were merchants. These included, for example, Istavriki Kiryagidi, a certain Konstantin, and Azgoridi Nikolaki, whose fathers were Kiryako, Anesti, and Istavriki Ezgoridi from Erdek (on the southern shores of Marmara Sea), respectively. Although two

⁶⁵³ For the speech of Beserya Efendi, see Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi V. I, pp. 669- 671.The chairman of the session, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, reiterated the ―extensive level of tolerance‖ Muslims showed to the non-Muslims (p. 671).

⁶⁵⁴ Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi, V. 1, p. 669.

⁶⁵⁵ Pamukçıyan, Kevork, Biyografileriyle Ermeniler, İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 2000, p. 65.

⁶⁵⁶  For  the  tension  between  the  conservative  amira  class,  the  newly developing

―enlightened‖ middle classes, and the rural radicals, see Panossian, Razmik, The Armenians, London: Hurst & Company, 2006, pp. 148-153.

Greek officials of the ministry, Mihalaki Akselos and Aristidi Akyadis, had fathers who were officials of relatively more humble origins, in general the Greeks who joined the ministry had fathers who were officials of prominence and not minor officials. They belonged to the old Phanariot families⁶⁵⁷ or the protégés of the established old Phanariot families (such as Musuruses) who were incorporated into the Ottoman state machine via established Phanariot families. This observation is equally valid for the social origins of prominent Greek bureaucrats and senators as a whole. Logofets, Mavrokordatos, Mususruses, Aristarchis, Karacas (of originally Romanian origin) filled the ranks of holders of Ottoman posts, especially diplomatic posts where they could serve the Ottoman state and their family prospects and reputations simultaneously. Whereas the Greeks of more humble origins were minor officials, the scions of Phanariot families were ambassadors, ambassadorial counselors, or holders of other high-ranking offices. From the Phanariot families, as of 1889, two Mavroyani brothers (Aleksandr and Dimitri), two Karateodori brothers (Etienne and Aleksandr) and the father and son Fotiyadis were in the diplomatic service. One Karaca was the Ottoman ambassador to Stockholm and Den Haag. His father was the ex-ambassador to Den Haag, and the son assumed the office as if it was a right of patrimony after twenty one years. In that regard, these Phanariot families resembled the local dynasties of Turkish, Kurdish, or Albanian origin incorporated into the centralizing state. The role of marriage in this incorporation was as important among the Phanariot families as it was with the Muslim local notable families. The Phanariot families also intermarried and maintained themselves as a closed community and thus retained their privileged status⁶⁵⁸.

⁶⁵⁷ For Phanariot families, see Philliou, Christine, ―Communities on the Verge: Unraveling the Phanariot Ascendancy in Ottoman Governance,‖ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 51(1), pp 151–181; Janos, Damien. ―Panaiotis Nicousios and Alexander Mavrocordatos: The Rise of the Phanariots and the Office of Grand Dragoman in the Ottoman Administration in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century,‖ Archivum Ottomanicum 23 (2005), pp. 177–96; Runciman, Steven. The Great Church in Captivity, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 360-384; Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, Alexander Mavroyeni Bey: From the 19^th Century Reform Era to the Young Turk Revolution Through the Life and Ideology of a Neophanariot Ottoman Bureaucrat, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004, pp. 8-22.

⁶⁵⁸ Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, ibid, p. 53.

While the Ottoman state gave its due to its loyalist Greek families of repute and dignity, it opened the way to the aspiring young Armenians to be promoted in the Ottoman diplomatic service. Apart from the reputable families, Greeks seemed distant to the Ottoman state. The Greek communities of Anatolia and Macedonia were almost invisible in Istanbul. The background of the Armenian officials examined in the annals discloses a different picture. Armenians from different social and economic backgrounds, with or without any connections to the state, were recruited. The mixed and diverse backgrounds of the Armenian officials show that Armenians were comparably more ―integrationist‖ whereas Greeks remained outside of the Ottoman political and administrative edifice. Of the 15 Greeks serving in the ministry, only one of the officials was born outside Istanbul (Meleka Yanapoulo, the consulate general to Trieste, born in Lesbos) disregarding Ianko Karaca, who was born in Berlin. In contrast, Armenian officials serving in the ministry were born in various peripheral cities such as Aleppo, Edirne, and Izmir. The Armenian modernizing educational infrastructure also spurred an upward mobility for many provincial Armenians to prosper and establish an Armenian intelligentsia residing in Istanbul who could join the Ottoman bureaucracy⁶⁵⁹. Nevertheless, certain Armenian families who were prominent within the Armenian community and had acquired their wealth and prominence due to their connections with the palace and the state, known as the amira, supplied a considerable portion of the officials of the ministry, e.g., Dadyans and Manas as indicated above.⁶⁶⁰ Service to the state was also a hereditary family business. Many Armenian diplomats and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sons of diplomats and  Ministry of  Foreign  Affairs  officials⁶⁶¹. Ohannes  Kuyumcuyan,  an

 

 

⁶⁵⁹ Beşiryan, Aylin, Hopes of Secularization in the Ottoman Empire: The Armenian National Constitution and the Armenian Newspaper Masis, 1856-1863, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007.

⁶⁶⁰ For Dadyans, see Pamukçıyan, Kevork, Biyografileriyle Ermeniler, Aras Yayınları, 2000; Pamukçıyan, Kevork, Zamanlar, Mekanlar, İnsanlar, Aras Yayınları, 2003; Ter Minassian, Anahid, Ermeni Kültürü ve Modernleşme, Aras Yayınları, 2006, pp. 95-117. For the English of this text, see ―A Family of Armenian Amiras: The Dadians,‖ Armenian Review 45 (3/179), Fall 1992, pp. 1-16.

⁶⁶¹ For a list of these sons and fathers, see below.

undersecretary of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the son of Bedros Kuyumcuyan, a member of the Şuray-ı Devlet and a protégé of Âli Pasha⁶⁶².

One striking finding in the annal of 1889⁶⁶³ is that the non-Muslim officials were much more likely to be born in Istanbul than non-Muslim officials. Whereas 25% of the Muslim officials were born outside Istanbul, this was the case for only 12% of non-Muslim officials (excluding non-Muslim officials of foreign origin). The higher percentage of non- Muslims born in Istanbul is yet further evidence of the relationship of the non-Muslims with the state. Although the non-Muslims of the capital tended to join the ranks and worlds of Ottomanism, there were fewer propensities for non-Muslims from the provinces to join the Ottoman ranks and be integrated into the system. It may be argued that the politics of Ottomanism was not free from class relations. Here, we observe the development of a class formation based not only on economic opportunities and economic relations, but also on state and geographical affiliations. ―The new-fangled official ideology (Ottomanism-DG) fared well in social strata already benefiting from the Pax Ottomana. Greek Phanariots, members of the Armenian amira class, and Bulgarian merchants who imported garments from Manchester and sold them in Aleppo were the typical enthusiasts of an ideology that promised to remove the social disabilities afflicting non-Muslims. Wider swaths of the Ottoman population, such as Bulgarian peasants who continued to chafe under their Gospodars, or Christian Bosnian and Herzegovinian peasants serving Muslim landowners, derived  little  benefit  from  the  new  ideology.‖⁶⁶⁴  Although  recent  studies⁶⁶⁵  have

⁶⁶² Akarlı, Engin Deniz, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 199.

⁶⁶³ Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306 /1889), pp. 485-630

⁶⁶⁴ Hanioğlu, Şükrü. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 107.

⁶⁶⁵ Kayalı, Hasan, Arabs and Young Turks, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997; Kechriotis, Vangelis, The Greek Community in Izmir, 1897-1914, unpublished dissertation, University of Leiden, 2005; Campos, Michelle U, ―Between "Beloved Ottomania" and

‗The Land of Israel‘: The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine's Sephardi Jews, 1908-13,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), pp. 461-483; Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, Alexander Mavroyeni Bey: From the 19^th Century Reform Era to the Young Turk Revolution Through the Life and Ideology of a Neophanariot Ottoman Bureaucrat, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004; Vezenkov, Alexander, ―Reconciliation of the Spirits and Fusion of the Interests:

established that Ottomanism was not marginal within the non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire, it found support predominantly among the elites of these communities. The politics of Ottomanism also enabled these communal elites to dominate their coreligionists. Although these communities had had patriarchal and hierarchical social organizations previously, the new environments of the 19^th century intensified the power of the communal elites thanks to the politics of Ottomanism and new ways of communicating with the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state subcontracted the allegiance of its non-Muslim communities to the communal elites. Thus, we observe an overlapping of interests between the Ottoman state and the communal elites. These imperial non-Muslim Ottomanists were also the leaders and prominent figures of their respective communities. For example, as indicated above, Azaryan, the undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry and senator, assumed the position of chairman of the Armenian cismani meclis (Spiritual Assembly) in 1909 and became the chairman of the Armenian patriarchy‘s ―secular assembly.‖⁶⁶⁶ Apparently,

―democratization,‖ enhancing educational opportunities, and vertical mobilization for a larger segment of the communities would not only destroy this patriarchal structure, but also the promises of Ottomanism.⁶⁶⁷

The Greek Revolution of the 1820s was one of the major causes of the reorganization of the Translation Office. Once the Greeks became suspect and viewed as untrustworthy, new cadres of Muslim origin had to be trained and recruited⁶⁶⁸. ― ‗Greeks‘ former preponderance as non-Muslims in official and semi-official positions had declined drastically following the Greek Revolution of the 1820s…Greeks had gone into eclipse as officials, so opening the way for the Armenians to become the chief beneficiaries of Tanzimat egalitarianism. Referred to then as the millet-i sadıka (faithful people or nation),

―Ottomanism‖ as an Identity Politics‖, in Mishkova, Diana (ed.), We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 2009, pp. 47-77.

⁶⁶⁶ For a biography of Azaryan, see Pamukçıyan, Kevork, Biyografileriyle Ermeniler, İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 2000.

⁶⁶⁷ See Avagyan, Arsen. ―İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki İlişkiler,‖ in Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki, İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 2005, pp. 11-141.

⁶⁶⁸ Erdem, Y. Hakan, ― ‗Do not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers‘: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence‖, in Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (ed), Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey, London; New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 73-74.

the Armenians retained this prominence until the last quarter of the century, when nationalist conflict disrupted the Ottoman-Armenian relationship… Had the Empire lasted longer, it is interesting to speculate whether Ottoman Jews could have succeeded Armenians as the leading non-Muslim minority in official service, as the Armenians had supplanted the Greeks… It is interesting that the last Translator of the Imperial Divan (Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı), a position that Greeks monopolized for over a century until 1821, was a Jew, Davud Efendi.‖⁶⁶⁹ The fact that in Findley‘s survey Jews constitute the youngest ethnic group in the Ministry of Ottoman Affairs⁶⁷⁰ seems to be evidence supportive of this speculation.⁶⁷¹

Differentiating between the lower echelons of the ministry, the middle ranks and the higher echelons provides further insight into the ethnic makeup of officials. As of 1889, of the 71 officials of the middle and lower ranks serving in Istanbul (those who were paid 5,000 guruses or less a year), 54 were Muslims and 17 were non-Muslims. Of the 54 Muslims, 44 were the sons of state officials of different ranks and positions. Of the 17 non- Muslims, five were the sons of state officials, whereas 12 were sons of merchants or financiers. They were born predominantly in Istanbul.

An examination of the highest ranking officials in the ministry in 1889 as listed in the annal of the Ministry provides similar findings. Of the seven Muslims in posts of major significance, six were sons of state officials. Of the four non-Muslims of equal rank, none were scions of state officials. According to these figures, there is no significant differentiation based on the rank of the posts. The primary distinction was apparently based on the religion of the officials. The social and economical backgrounds of minor and

⁶⁶⁹ Findley, Carter, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 95-97.

⁶⁷⁰ Findley, Carter, ibid, p. 97.

⁶⁷¹ In his memoirs, Abdülhak Hamid points out the contrast between the prevalence of Armenians, especially in the highest echelons of the Foreign Ministry, with the almost total lack of Greeks in the diplomatic service and tacitly questions the loyalty of the Greeks.

―For example, Midhat Pasha had one Odyan Efendi, Mahmud Nedim Pasha had one Artin Dadyan Efendi, Safvet Pasha had one Serkis Hamamcıyan and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had one Noradonkyan Efendi. Why were all the undersecretaries of the prime ministers (foreign ministers-DG) Armenians with the exception of Davut Efendi? Why was there only one Greek beside them? Said Pasha‘s undersecretary was Sultan Hamid. That was a different case.‖ Abdülhak Hamid… p. 357.

prominent officials are similar. This statistic is yet another demonstration of the different modes of social production of social (and economic) capital for Muslims and non-Muslims. Whereas the recruited Muslims came from a considerably small closed group welded around the state, the non-Muslims came from different backgrounds. This demonstrates the diversification of the development of the non-Muslims‘ social (and economic) capital, which was more productive than that of the Muslims.

A cursory look at employment within the ministry would reveal that Armenians constituted the intellectual backbone of the ministry.⁶⁷² The legal and technical offices were filled by them. ―The special association of the Armenians with the Foreign Correspondences Office went back to its earlier years, when, at the end of the Crimean War, Sahak Abro, an able Armenian official well regarded by the Tanzimat leadership, became head of the Office and –a familiar motif- made of it something like a preserve for people he found congenial, namely, his coreligionists. By the end of the Hamidian period, however… the Office was losing its predominantly Armenian character.⁶⁷³‖ A comparison of the officials working in the ministry as listed in the annals of 1889 and 1902 shows a slight but consistent decrease in the employment of Armenians.⁶⁷⁴ Muslim youngsters who in the 1890s were learning the skills of writing erudite memorandums in French and developing their capabilities had risen to the high-ranking professional positions of the Ministry. Among them, for example, was the undersecretary of the ministry during the time of the Unionists, Reşad Hikmet Bey.⁶⁷⁵ Another legendary name in the Ministry was

⁶⁷² The stuffing of the Ministry by the Armenians was regretted by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In the beginning of his Ma‘ruzat he wrote, ―Reşid Pasha retained the procedures and traditions of Mahmud II. After he was replaced by Ali Pasha, Armenians were promoted and the Foreign Ministry was filled with Armenians. These Armenians gradually eliminated not only the Muslim clerks, but also those Armenians who were loyal to the state, and replaced them with Armenians sharing their views. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was controlled by Armenians.‖ Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Ma‟ruzat, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p.1.

⁶⁷³ Findley, Carter, ibid., p. 264.

⁶⁷⁴ For example, compare the staff of the embassy as listed in the yearbook of the ministry in 1320 (1902), where the Armenian presence had considerably deteriorated (pp. 70-100)

⁶⁷⁵ See the account of Esat Cemal (Paker), who joined the Foreign Correspondence Office in 1896 after his graduation from Mekteb-i Sultani, Paker, Esat Cemal, Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952, pp. 8-9. For valuable information, observations,

Ibrahim Hakkı Bey (later pasha), who was appointed as one of the legal counselors of the Ministry. ―The appointment of one so young as the government‘s counselor on international law aroused surprise. But the appointment had a larger significance, too. For the Empire had until then employed foreign experts in these positions. The simultaneous appointments of İbrahim Hakkı and Gabriel Noradounghian presented Ottomans with exciting proof that the Empire could produce its own experts for this function.‖⁶⁷⁶ After Ibrahim Hakkı‘s long tenure, no Muslim as impressive as Ibrahim Hakkı emerged. The Armenians continued to hold on to the key positions like the legal counsellorship, undersecretariat, and assistantships to these two positions even after the Revolution of 1908, when Turkification had manifested itself. Of the 286 officials of the enlarged ministry listed in the yearbook of the Ottoman Empire for 1906, only 40 were non-Muslim, which indicates a dramatic decline over the years.‖⁶⁷⁷ Ohannes Kuyumcuyan retained his position as the undersecretary until he was replaced by Said Bey in 1912 and Hrand Abro, the son of Sahak Abro, continued to serve as the legal counselor. One British report noted that the replacement of the undersecretariat by a Muslim after a long time may render the undersecretariat more influential. The report assesses Ohannes Kuyumcuyan as ―possessed of a good knowledge and some knowledge of affairs‖ but ―as under-secretary…timorous and unenterprising.‖ Said Bey; ―as a Moslem he may, perhaps, have a greater share in the counsels of the ministry.‖⁶⁷⁸ Reşad Hikmet, the next ―Moslem‖ undersecretary will be a man of respect and a person whose opinions and suggestions are considered by the prime minister and foreign minister. Although the new and younger recruits were significantly Muslim (with some Jewish), the higher offices continued to be held by non-Muslims (and predominantly by Armenians). According to the salname (annal) in 1910 (1326), of the 46 officials holding the highest posts, 35 were Muslims and 11 were non-Muslims⁶⁷⁹. This

and insights on the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, pp. 53-62.

⁶⁷⁶ Findley, Carter, ibid., pp. 196-7.

⁶⁷⁷ See Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye (1324) (excerpted in Salname-i Nezaret-i Umur-ı Hariciyye (1320/1902), İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 2003, pp. 356-383). In this count, the consulates and consulate officials were not counted.

⁶⁷⁸ PRO FO, 371/1812, p. 348.

⁶⁷⁹ Salneme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (1326), pp. 196-213.

was a sharp decrease in comparison to twenty years earlier. Two years later, the ratio remained more or less the same. Of the 46 high-ranking officials, 34 were Muslims and 12 were non-Muslims. A sharper decline in the representation of non-Muslims was observed with the advent of the World War. World War I was used by the Unionist leadership as an opportunity to Turkify capital, employment, and any other area.⁶⁸⁰ The Turkification in the Ottoman diplomatic service was achieved to a considerable degree. According to the 1918 (1334) annals, of the 52 officials in Turkey, only seven were non-Muslims⁶⁸¹. These seven non-Muslims were old timers such as Aleko Kasap, Hasun Efendi, and Hrand Abro Bey. No non-Muslim was promoted to a prominent position. Only some professionals were kept in their positions to practice their expertise. The degree of Turkification in the embassies was much more visible. Whereas in 1912, a significant portion of the staff was non- Muslim, in 1918 all the staff in the embassies was Muslim with very few exceptions. Not surprisingly, by 1926, no single non-Muslim remained within the ministry which moved to Ankara⁶⁸².

 

 

 

4.3.  Apprenticeship for the Modern

 

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry also served as a school for men of various interests. The Foreign Ministry was a prestigious office attractive for many fathers. Many caring fathers with good connections directed their sons to the craft of diplomacy. With the profession of diplomacy, these sons attained satisfactory incomes, not to mention relatively light workloads, which enabled them to pursue their personal interests. Arguably the most famous diplomat of the ministry within this category was Abdülhak Hamid, who served in several consulates and embassies, including Paris, Den Haag, and London, and wrote

 

 

 

 

⁶⁸⁰ Toprak, Zafer, Türkiye‟de “Milli İktisat” 1908-1918, İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 1982.

⁶⁸¹ Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye (1334), pp. 185-190.

⁶⁸² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Salnamesi (1926-1927), pp. 281-300.

literary pieces while serving in the embassies (and enjoying London and Paris).⁶⁸³ Although he was known to succeeding generations as a poet, a gentleman, and a man of letters, he was a full-time diplomat by occupation. Although, he was known for his disregard of his professional obligations and duties, in his memoirs, he depicted himself as a diligent and committed diplomat.

Others had begun their careers in the Foreign Ministry but left after briefly serving in the diplomatic service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was seen as a prestigious office in which many sons of the high-ranking public servants who turned out to be men of high significance served for a short time (one to three years on average). Predominantly, they served in the Office of Translation to master their French (or in the Office of Correspondence). Short-time officials of the ministry included Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, Mizancı Murad, İsmail Kemal, Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, Ferit Kam, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, and Avlonyalı Ferit. Mizancı Murad was recruited in the Translation Office at a time when state officials with the proficiency to master diplomatic French were few. Thus, the French fluency he had acquired in the Russian gymnasium was incomparably exceptional.⁶⁸⁴ Others were recruited in the ministry at the beginning of their careers. Avlonyalı Ekrem worked in the Legal Department of the Ministry while studying in the Law Faculty. His was a de facto part-time job due to the fact that he was the nephew of Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha.⁶⁸⁵

Another short-term official in the ministry was Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil). Halid Ziya failed to be recruited to the ministry. This very much disappointed his father, who was highly desirous of such a career path for his son. Halid Ziya‘s father had asked two acquaintances, Agop Pasha, the Overseer of the Imperial Treasury, and Mustafa Mansurzade, the Minister of Education, to arrange the recruitment of his son into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Young Halid Ziya went to Istanbul from Izmir with the dream

⁶⁸³ When Abdülhak Hamid was appointed to a post in the embassy to Belgrade, he was infuriated and, using his connections, he had this appointment abrogated. He ―did not want to live in a barn after Paris‖, as he wrote in his memoirs. Abdülhak Hamid, ibid., p. 127.

⁶⁸⁴ Emil, Birol… pp. 37-41, 57.

⁶⁸⁵ For the account of Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey on his service in the ministry, see Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, Osmanlı Arnavutluk‟undan Anılar (1885-1912), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 99.

of being appointed to the embassy in Paris, the city with which he was fascinated. To his misfortune, just after young Halid Ziya visited Mustafa Mansurzade, Mansurzade was deposed. Agop Pasha, the other acquaintance of Halid Ziya‘s father, advised young Halid Ziya not to enter the civil service, but instead to join his family‘s business as entering into trade was more beneficial to the interests of the state than serving it as a official. Agop Pasha acknowledged that the state needed competent officials, but he believed that these officials should be recruited not from the families of prominent tradesmen, but from more humble sections of the society. It was more important for the state to have trained people in trade and industry.⁶⁸⁶ The Uşakizades were one of the few prominent Muslim merchant families in Izmir among the many Greek, Jewish, and Levantine merchant families. Needless to say, their position was rather precarious, and they experienced daily conflict in the economic, social, and political spheres. Halid Ziya‘s short experience in the Directorate of Foreign Affairs combined his concerns as a member of an Izmir merchant family of Turkish origin and a state official. He and his colleagues in the directorate displayed the skepticism of the state officials towards the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as well as towards the Europeans. Knowing that the local non-Muslim merchants that held the nationality of a foreign country (especially Greece) were privileged before the law, the officials felt as though they were vanguards in the fight to defend Turkishdom (in the economic war) against the bloodsucking non-Muslims. As a member of an Izmir merchant family, Halid Ziya must have had such concerns much more fervently as openly indicated in his memoirs.⁶⁸⁷

Remembering the episode of his failure to be recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Halid Ziya acknowledged that after more than forty years, he was still thrilled to imagine a career path in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in the embassy in Paris. Nevertheless, he served for a while in Izmir as the assistant to the foreign affairs director.⁶⁸⁸ Halid Ziya, the failed diplomat, contrary to the mercantilist advice of Agop Pasha, did not enter into family business, but opted to settle in Istanbul as a man of letters

⁶⁸⁶ Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, Kırk Yıl, İstanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat T.A.Ş., 1936, vol. II,

pp. 43-48.

⁶⁸⁷ Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, ibid., pp. 84-88.

⁶⁸⁸ Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, ibid., vol. III, pp. 84-88.

(and serving in various governmental offices to make his living). However, Edhem, the big brother of Halid Ziya, ―although graduated from law school in Istanbul,‖ engaged in the family business in Izmir, disavowing bureaucratic prestige.⁶⁸⁹

The failed diplomat Halid Ziya brought up his two sons as diplomats. His son, Bülent Uşaklıgil, served in Paris as the Turkish ambassador and died as the ambassador of Turkey to Paris. Apparently, diplomatic service continued to be an occupation desired by the well- off families, especially due to the prestige it provided.

Halid Ziya‘s circle included many young men serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The deposition of Mustafa Mansurazade and the illness of his mother may have hindered his prospective career in the diplomatic service, but other youngsters with literary interests were admitted to the ministry and were known for their literary works rather than their deskwork. Besides the ―greatest poet,‖ some personalities who are known to posterity for activities they pursued out of their office were Samipaşazade Sezai, Saffeti Ziya, Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), and Ahmet Hikmet (Müftüoğlu). Serving at the embassy in Paris, the literary capital of the world, was an aspiration most of them shared with young Halid Ziya.⁶⁹⁰ A small circle of friends from similar backgrounds made up a significant portion of the staff of the ministry, as we can see from the literary recollections of the time. In fact, it was the same pool from which the early men of letters and diplomats were obtained, as established earlier in this study.

These were personalities whose principal life-time contributions, concerns, and preoccupations were irrelevant to their professional work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs trained the new early 20^th–century generation, a function it had had during the early Tanzimat period. This is not because the ministry taught and motivated its staff to be pioneers in various fields. Rather, it had to do with the fact that it was the imperial recruits who had the social and intellectual capital to be entrepreneurs and pioneers in introducing

⁶⁸⁹ Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, ibid., vol. II, p. 147.

⁶⁹⁰ Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, ibid., p. 45. For the account of Samipaşazade Sezai‘s first visit to Paris while going to London to serve as an ambassadorial secretary, his enchantment with Paris, and his acknowledgement of the privilege of enjoying Paris, see ―1901‘den İtibaren Paris‘te Geçen Seneler,‖ Servet-i Fünun, 5 February 1340, excerpted in Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2001, v. II, pp. 124-25.

the aspects of the modern West. They opted for a career in diplomacy principally because it provided them with free time, comfortable lives, income, prestige, and connections. Furthermore, brought up in a particular habitus, they knew no alternatives. Their positions and connections also facilitated the pursuit of alternative careers. It is unsurprising to observe that the diplomatic service contributed to pioneering more than other governmental offices did thanks to its close contacts with the West in general and its cosmopolitan nature. The opportunity they had to be in proximity to the means of communication and exchange of ideas with the West enabled them to import many previously unknown ideas and insights.

The diplomatic service also assisted the emergence and development of the Ottoman/Muslim satire. Cemil Cem, the founder of the satirical journal Cem, served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Being the son of Cemal Pasha, a military doctor, he graduated from law school. After his graduation, he joined the diplomatic service and served in the consulates of Nice and Toulouse before being appointed to more prestigious posts in the embassies to Rome and Paris. He regularly contributed to the satirical journal Kalem while serving in posts in Paris and Vienna between 1908 and 1909. He resigned from the ministry to publish his own satirical journal. He founded Cem in 1910. After his resignation from the government, he never assumed any bureaucratic post except for serving briefly as the Director of the School of Fine Arts. Throughout his life after his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made his living drawing cartoons and painting, which was unthinkable before 1908.⁶⁹¹

Heinzelmann wrote that the first Muslim cartoonists (who emerged only in 1908 after the near monopoly of Armenian cartoonists in the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras) were predominantly ex-officials, civil or military⁶⁹². Most of them resigned from their posts just

⁶⁹¹ For a short biography of Cemil Cem, see Heinzelmann, Tobias, Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu 1908-1914, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, p. 70.

⁶⁹² For the the development of satire and cartoons in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire, predominantly practiced by Armenians and other non-Muslims with some Muslims before the entry of Turkish/Muslim cartoonist in large numbers and launching of popular cartoon journals owned by Turks/Muslims after 1908, see Çeviker, Turgut, Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986; Çeviker, Turgut (ed.), Terakki Edelim Beyler: Nişan G. Berberyan, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986; Çeviker, Turgut (ed.),

after 1908, believing that it was an opportune time for free expression of their opinions.⁶⁹³ 1908 may be characterized as a milestone that ensued the development of a non-official sphere, as officials began working in non-state (private) positions or were self-employed. Nevertheless, ironically this was a break with the state only in terms of leaving the civil service. On the other hand, it meant an extension of the official sphere with regard to the emergence of new classes of free professionals maintaining the views and habitus they had acquired and internalized throughout their ―education‖ in state service. Thus, they reproduced and extended a particular state-centric worldview, political cosmology, and cultural/intellectual formation. Therefore, we may suggest that, the Turkish middle class and the free professions emerged and developed in the image (and custodianship) of the state.

Although the Armenian and other non-Muslim printing activity and newspapers were commercially profitable, the Turkish language printing, publishing, and newspapers continued to be predominantly non-commercial or promised only modest profits or commercial value. This rendered the Turkish press a part-time voluntary pursuit of civil servants motivated by political concerns and goals, and not a strictly professional occupation. Thus, Turkish printing and publication retained its character as an extension of the official mind. Nevertheless, with slow but gradual commercialization and capitalization, Turkish printing and publishing became more commercial and more emancipated. It was the civil servants who had moved from governmental offices to private bureaus beginning with Agah Efendi, Şinasi, and Namık Kemal in the 1860s to establish the journalism of the Second Constitutional period⁶⁹⁴. Hence, it was the original state-

 

 

Osmanlı Tokadı: Ali Fuat Bey, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986; Çeviker, Turgut,

Meşrutiyet İmzasız Karikatür Antolojisi, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1989.

⁶⁹³ Heinzelmann, Tobias, ibid, p. 72. Many resigned from their governmental posts to pursue careers in non-governmental occupations in which they felt they could seek fulfillment. . For example, see Arseven, Celal Esad, Sanat ve Siyaset Hatıralarım, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 52.

⁶⁹⁴ For the boom of Turkish-language and Ottoman press following the 1908 Revolution, see Koloğlu, Orhan, 1908 Basın Patlaması, İstanbul: Bas-Haş, 2005; Zarcone, Thierry & Clayer, Nathalie & Popovic, Alexandre, Presse Turque et Presse de Turquie, Istanbul; Paris: Editions Isis, 1992.

funded capital accumulation that had financed the emergence and development of the materially non-profiting printing and publishing sector.

Another transfer to the arts from diplomacy was Burhanettin Tepsi, a pioneer of Turkish theater. Coming from a family of diplomats, he was recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani. In his daily routine in the ministry, he spent most of his time reading and studying the latest plays of Paris. Thanks to the interference of the sadr-ı azam Avlonyalı Ferit Pasha, he was sent as envoy to Paris, where he had the opportunity to follow theater and buy the texts of the latest theatrical oeuvres. After a few years in the ministry, he resigned to pursue an artistic career abroad.⁶⁹⁵

Sports also benefited from the contributions of the diplomats. The first Turkish soccer team, the Black Stockings, was founded in 1901 by Mehmed Raşid Bey, a career diplomat, along with Fuad Hüsnü Bey, the son of Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha. He was elected as the president of the club and assigned as the coach of the first Turkish soccer club in its only match against the local Greek soccer club before the Black Stockings team was closed down by the public authorities and Mehmed Raşid exiled to Iran to serve in the embassy to Teheran.⁶⁹⁶ Another Ottoman diplomat, Reşid Saffet Atabinen, served as the head of the Turkish Olympic Committee between 1933 and 1936.⁶⁹⁷

The civil service‘s fostering of the arts and humanities was not limited to its recruitment. Most of the first generation of artists, scientists, journalists, and pioneers in the free professions were scions of bureaucrats. The relatively comfortable material opportunities of these families facilitated the emergence of the first generation of the

 

 

⁶⁹⁵ See his autobiographical article published in 1941 as quoted in Ertuğrul, Muhsin, Benden Sonra Tufan Olmasın! İstanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1998, pp. 86-91.

⁶⁹⁶ Gökaçtı, Mehmet Ali, “Bizim İçin Oyna”: Türkiye‟de Futbol ve Siyaset, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, pp. 26-28. This book (and any other book on the beginnings of Turkish soccer and sports) demonstrates the immense role the sons of high-ranking bureaucrats played in the founding of sports organizations and the promotion of sports.

⁶⁹⁷ Çelik Gülersoy, ―Ölümünün 29. Yılında Reşid Safvet Atabinen,‖ Tarih ve Toplum, February 1994, no: 122, p. 71.

practitioners of the modern professions.⁶⁹⁸ The comparably high incomes of their fathers provided the capital needed for the development of non-productive or at least non-profit endeavors. Simply put, for a non-productive sphere which does not produce any surplus to flourish, an already accumulated capital had to be amassed and transferred. For the non- Muslims, this original capital was provided by finance, commerce, and industry given that most of the pioneers in the arts were the scions of merchants and financiers (resembling the West European pattern).⁶⁹⁹  The remuneration provided by the state in the form of

―salaries‖ and other pecuniary rewards served the same function for Muslims.

The networks and patronages developed as important mechanisms for political, literary, and intellectual advancement. Apparently, blood relations and relations based on marriages were also very significant factors in the Tanzimat. A map that demonstrates these relations would be illuminating. Such a map would also display the intertwined character of the families. The Tanzimat elite was not only small and secluded, but also interwoven and integrated. Moreover, the political, intellectual, and literary realms were not distinguishable from each other. They were all intertwined. Thus, it would be interesting to look at the genealogies of the late Ottoman (and early Republican) men of letters. Being men of letters required free time, good educations, and financial support. Therefore, a typical man of letters in the late Ottoman Empire was (and had to be) a scion of a two- generation family of bureaucrats, whether descended from a high-ranking bureaucrat or a low-ranking civil servant.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁸ Young Celal Esad, resisting the pressure exerted on him by his family to seek a military/governmental career, notes that he wanted to live freely, and he knew well that his fortune allowed him to enjoy such a luxury. Arseven, Celal Esad, ibid., p. 44. Later in his memoirs, Arseven remarks that his friend and fellow artist, Nazmi Ziya, also had to face sharp opposition from his family. See, ibid., p. 73.

⁶⁹⁹ For the social origins of Armenian painters, see Kürkman, Garo, Armenian Painters in the Ottoman Empire, İstanbul: Matusalem Consulting and Publishing, 2004 (2 volumes). Also see the observations made by Celal Esad Arseven regarding non-Muslim artists studying in the Academy of Fine Arts, see Arseven, ibid., p. 50.

⁷⁰⁰ This is not the place to present a detailed documentation of the men of letters of Tanzimat, but rather to give a brief survey to corroborate the argument made above. See Recai-Zade Mahmud Ekrem‘s genealogy see Parlatır, İsmail, Recai-zade Mahmud Ekrem, Ankara: Akçağ, 2004, pp. 13-14. The Recaizade family was originally from Kepsut in Balıkesir. Selim Ağa, Mahmud Ekrem‘s grandfather from fifth generation, had moved to

More interestingly, an analysis of the late Ottoman literature will show that late-Ottoman literature was a closed sphere. It was written by the members of a certain community, read by the members of the same community, and narrated the worlds and lives of the members of that community. The characters, the plots, and the themes of these literary works strictly addressed the world of the governing elite. Thus, this literature was unintelligible and incommunicable to the non-members of the governing elite. Given that the readers‘ market was predominantly restricted to the members of this habitus and to the aspiring youth emulating this habitus, the wider populace was neglected. The themes and inspirations of the literary works reflected the intellectual upbringing and social milieu of the authors.⁷⁰¹

Istanbul and joined the janissaries. Selim Ağa‘s son served as a judge. Mehmet Şakir Recai Efendi, Mahmud Ekrem‘s father, continued the family‘s gradual upward mobility by serving as Takvim-hane Nazırı. Mahmud Ekrem was born in 1847 in Recai Efendi Yalısı in Vaniköy as a scion of an established family. As a further note, Mahmud Ekrem began his civil service career in 1862 in the Hariciye Mektubi Kalemi, where he met Namık Kemal and Ayetullah Bey. He continued his civil service career in various posts in the Ministry of Finance and then in the Council of State. A very similar pattern is seen for Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar (see Karaca, Nesrin Tağızade, Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar‟ın Eserlerinde Geçmiş Zaman ve İstanbul, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1998). His family‘s origins went back to Ali Pasha of Tepelen. His great grandfather, Selim Sırrı Pasha, a grandson of Ali Pasha of Tepelen was the last guardian of Belgrade before Belgrade was evacuated. After the evacuation, he moved to Istanbul, where he rose in the central bureaucracy to the position of vizier. His son served as an official in Tophane-i Amire. Abdülhak Şinasi was born in his grandfather‘s yalı (seaside mansion in Bosphorus) in Rumelihisarı as a descendant of an established Istanbul family. Although today he is remembered as a man of letters detached from the colorless actual world and a desperate nostalgic in search of the Ottoman lost time, he made a long career in European firms active in Istanbul. He became a civil servant in 1924 when Regié was taken over by the state, where he was an official. Interestingly, he left his beloved Istanbul and moved to Ankara to serve as the Secretary of the Balkan League. He was appointed as a legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1931. He worked in the preparation of the Montreaux Protocol. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1945. He published well- known novels and books, such as Fahim Bey ve Biz (1941), Boğaziçi Mehtapları (1942) and Çamlıca‟daki Eniştemiz (1944) while he was a civil servant in the Foreign Ministry. Fahim Bey ve Biz is the story of a young recruit of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and is a parody of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.

⁷⁰¹ This observation is applicable to all the first generations of Ottoman novelists. When Nabizade Nazım penned a novel (or a long story) in which the setting was a remote village of Antalya, he did an extraordinary job of describing an environment in which his readers were uninterested and with which they were unfamiliar. Reşat Nuri Güntekin, who with his novels illustrates the unbroken continuity from the Empire to the Republic, perfectly recounts the life of clerks in their offices and in their daily lives. Güntekin depicts this

Needless to say, the decisions of young men to seek artistic careers were not well received by their disappointed parents, who had anticipated seeing their sons as high ranking imperial bureaucrats or officers, and not despicable artists, as we can observe in the memoirs.⁷⁰² In contrast to Europe (and non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul), where capital had been amassed from commerce and industry, in the Ottoman Empire the state became the main supplier of the capital for the emergence of an autonomous sphere for the fine arts and the humanities. This support was not limited to financial resources. The state also provided the intellectual capital through the training it provided in the imperial high schools and colleges. These scions of the civil service who opted for the fine arts and literature also received their training in schools established to train civil servants. It is no coincidence that the Military Academy produced the pioneers of the fine arts. Technical skills taught as a part of the military and engineering curriculum enabled many youth to encounter the fine arts for the first time. Şeker Ahmed Pasha, Halil Pasha, Hüseyin Zekai Pasha, Hoca Ali Rıza and Celal Esad (Arseven) are some examples (and pioneers of Turkish painting) of individuals who had been recruited into the fine arts while in the Military Academy.⁷⁰³ Şeker Ahmed, who may be regarded as the first Ottoman painter in the Western sense, made his way to study art in Paris thanks to his education in the Military Academy, where he learned painting for the first time. He made his career in the military for more than thirty years and was paid as a civil servant, in contrast to the free-lance artists who depended on the sales of their work for an income.

In the fine arts, the first generation of artists was composed of, almost without exception, the scions of civil servants, and particularly high-ranking ones.⁷⁰⁴ One exception was the theatre, where the bulk of the early performers had been recruited from traditional

unique habitus of the officialdom brilliantly as an insider. What is also so striking in Güntekin‘s novels is the lack of almost any difference from the Empire to the Republic as his clerks continued their routines. In his novels, their habitus remains uninterrupted.

⁷⁰² See Arseven, Celal Esad, ibid., p. 43.

⁷⁰³ Tansuğ, Sezer, Halil Paşa, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1994, p. 13.

⁷⁰⁴ Due to the necessity of being trained technically and the necessity of having the privilege to be able to observe the contemporary works to develop aesthetics, the pioneers of Turkish painting predominantly had aristocratic backgrounds. To give the best-known example, for the aristocratic origins of Abidin Dino, see Abidin Dino:Bir Dünya, İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi, 2007.

street theater; in other words, it was it was performed by self-made people of lower class origins.⁷⁰⁵ A few of the early men of letters came from mediocre origins in contrast to the pioneers in the fine arts who came predominantly from families with civil service backgrounds. This was due to the fact that it did not require expensive and time-consuming training unlike the costly and extensive training required for the fine arts.

The late Ottoman pattern to an important extent resembles pre-revolutionary Russia.

―(T)he Russian imperial bureaucratic elite was very much a part of the highly cultured world of pre-revolutionary-educated society. In no field was that more true than in that of music. A.S.Taneev was the first cousin of Serge Taneev and a close friend of P.I. Tchaikovsky. The latter was educated alongside future members of the State Council, at the School of Law, just as N.V. Rimsky-Korsakov and Mussorgsky, along with Serge Rachmaninov, himself a good friend of Nicholas II‘s brother Mikhail, all came from families of the Russian landowning gentry.‖⁷⁰⁶ Lieven remarks that the Russian traditional upper class‘ ―contribution in the fields of literature and music was far more impressive than those of any of their European peers.‖⁷⁰⁷ This is hardly unexpected given the social, economic and political organization of Russian society and the state. The same observation is equally true for the Ottoman social, political, and economic organization.⁷⁰⁸ Apparently,

⁷⁰⁵ For the emergence of modern Ottoman theater, its Armenian pioneers, and Muslim latecomers, see And, Metin, Osmanlı Tiyatrosu, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1999.

⁷⁰⁶ Lieven, Dominic, Russia‟s Rulers under the Old Regime, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 204.

⁷⁰⁷ ibid., p. 206.

⁷⁰⁸ Some examples of the scions of state officials of the Ottoman Empire played pioneering role in the development of Western music in Turkey are as follows: Cemal Reşit was the son of Ahmed Reşid; Sadeddin Arel was the scion of a family of high-ranking ulema including his grandfather, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who served as the kazaker. His father was a religious scholar and a member of the committee that prepared the 1876 Constitution. (Öztuna, Yılmaz, Türk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970, pp. 45-46.) Ulvi Cemal Erkin was the son of Mehmed Cemil, a high- ranking bureaucrat. (Say, Ahmet, Türkiye‟nin Müzik Atlası, İstanbul: Borusan Kültür ve Sanat Yayınları, 1998, p. 61). Adnan Saygun came from a notable provincial family from Nevşehir known as Fişekçizadeler for their family business of producing fireworks. His father was incorporated to the state and modern professional life by becoming mathematics teacher and settling in Izmir. (Arabacı, Emre, Ahmed Adnan Saygun, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007, p. 37). The aforementioned Samipaşazade family contributed to the

we do not observe a similar pattern in countries such as Britain, Germany and France, where bourgeoning middle classes were the driving force of ―modernity‖ and the promoters of newly developing cultural habitus. It was predominantly the sons of middle classes who were the pioneers in the arts and sciences. In these countries, the aristocratic elites were pushed into the bureaucratic world and left the spheres that had developed independence from the state to the middle class, which was intellectually more adept and more comfortable with modernity. Therefore, the roles of the elites in these countries were to retain and reproduce spheres of power for themselves, but not to invest power in the future.⁷⁰⁹ Likewise, the spheres independent of the state were the dynamic forces shaping the future of these nations in contrast to the Russian and Ottoman/Turkish cases, where the state was the chief initiator and harbinger of modernity and the modern professions.

With regard to the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fine arts, the example of Muhsin Ertuğrul, the pioneer of Turkish cinema, who was the son of Hüseyin Hüsnü Bey, a cashier of the ministry can be given.⁷¹⁰ Definitely, Nazım Hikmet, whose father Hikmet Bey worked in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as the Ottoman consul in Hamburg, can be regarded as the most ―spectacular‖ scion of an Ottoman diplomat⁷¹¹. Sedad Hakkı Eldem, one of the foremost 20^th century Turkish architects, was the grandson of Grand Vizier Edhem İbrahim Paşa, a descendant of a late Ottoman aristocratic family, and the son of İsmail Hakkı Alişan, who as an official served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry from 1891 to his retirement in 1925⁷¹². The Ertegün brothers, the Turkish-American music executives, were the sons of Münir Ertegün, the

emergence of contemporary music in Turkey. Erdem Buri, a pioneering jazz musician, was a member of the Samipaşazade family (Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, ibid., pp. 172-74).

⁷⁰⁹ For the 19^th and early 20^th century British aristocracy, see Cannadine, David, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, London: Papermac, 1996; Cannadine, David, Aspects of Aristocracy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. For the surviving French aristocracy in 19^th century France, see Higgs, Daniel, Nobles in Nineteenth Century France, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

⁷¹⁰ Ertuğrul, Muhsin, Benden Sonra Tufan Olmasın! İstanbul: Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1998, p. 48.

⁷¹¹ Timms, Edward & Göksu, Saime, Romantic Communist: The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet, London: Hurst & Co., 1999, pp. 3-4.

⁷¹² Çankaya, Ali, ibid, p. 410. Sedad Hakkı Eldem‘s brother, Sadi Eldem, also became a Republican ambassador and retired from his ambassadorial post in Teheran in 1975.

ambassador of Turkey to United States (between 1934 and 1944), who began his career in the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1908 just before the Revolution of 1908 and advanced in his career due to his impressive legal expertise⁷¹³.

Gendering the theme, not unsurprisingly, the same pattern is much more evident in the case of the recruitment of females into the modern professions. If providing a good education for sons requires a certain level of prosperity, it is much more so for the education of daughters. It is, obviously almost impossible for a woman of modest upbringing to enter the arts and the modern professions. Thus, early feminists and pioneering women in different fields were all the daughters of civil servants. Moreover, they were predominantly the daughters of high-ranking bureaucrats and men of prominence.⁷¹⁴

It is also very significant to note that, for a long time, Ottoman Muslim medical doctors were civil (or predominantly military) servants rather than free professionals. Although medical doctors of non-Muslims origins had been practicing their professions independently, in the case of medical doctors of Muslim origins, it was the official positions where the first medical doctors proved and improved themselves. A similar observation is valid for the law and lawyers. Muslims learned the intricacies of modern law in governmental offices. The many legal offices of the state established in the Hamidian era to apply modern Western laws and to regulate the commercial laws prepared Muslim graduates of law faculties to train themselves to be lawyers after gaining experience in these offices. The professors of the first universities and high schools of the Ottoman

⁷¹³ For Münir Ertegün, see Harris, George S, ―Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934-1944)‖, in Harris, George S. & Criss, Nur Bilge, Studies in Atatürk‟s Turkey: The American Dimension, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009, pp. 177-196. Harris writes; ―thanks to his sons, the Turkish Embassy took the lead in desegregating the capital, hosting black musicians at a time when Marian Anderson was unable to perform at Constitution Hall in Washington because she was black.‖ Harris, ibid, p. 195.

⁷¹⁴ A glance at the contributors to the Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete reveals this aspect. The contributors include the daughter (Fatma Aliye and Emine Semiye) and granddaughter (Zeyneb) of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Abdülhak Hamid‘s daughter (Hamide), the granddaughter of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (Fatma Fahrünnisa), the daughter of Osman Pasha, and the head of the Military School (Şair Nigar bint-i Osman). Çakır, Serpil, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994, p. 32.

Empire were also predominantly comprised of ex-officials and scions of officials and thus academic studies and natural and social sciences were also initiated and advanced by this caste, arguably in line with the epistemological premises held by this caste. Thus, the free professions of law and medicine and academia developed as apprenticeships with the state.⁷¹⁵

Thus, we can argue that the state became the bedrock for free professionals such as medical doctors,⁷¹⁶ lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, and academicians.⁷¹⁷ It provided not only the primitive accumulation of capital for the development of the free professions among Muslims but also, due to the origins of the pioneers of these professions, it exported the particular cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations welded around it.⁷¹⁸

 

 

 

4.4.  Merry Marriages

⁷¹⁵ For the emergence of the legal profession in relation to the predominant role of the state, see Demirel, Fatmagül, Adliye Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1876-1914), unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2003, pp. 225-231.

⁷¹⁶ Şehsuvaroğlu, Bedi & Erdemir Demirhan, Ayşegül & Cantay Güreşsever, Gönül, Türk Tıp Tarihi, 1984, Bursa, no publishing house; Terzioğlu, Arslan & Erwin, Lucius (ed.), Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şahane ve Bizde Modern Tıp Eğitiminin Gelişmesine Katkıları, İstanbul: Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları, 1989; Ataç, Adnan, Gülhane Askeri Tıp Akademisinin Kuruluşu, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı, 1996.

⁷¹⁷ For the foundation and development of Darülfünun (later University of Istanbul) as the first university of the Ottoman Empire, see Dölen, Emre, Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi 1: Osmanlı Döneminde Darülfünun, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitsi Yayınları, 2010; Bilsel, Cemil, İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarihi, İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1943; Ergin, Osman, Türk Maarif Tarihi, İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1977; Çankaya, Ali, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968, v. I; Irmak, Sadi & Saatçioğlu, Fikret & Oğuzman, Kemal & Pekiner, Kamuran, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1973, İstanbul, no publishing house; İshakoğlu-Kadıoğlu, Sevtap, İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen Fakültesi Tarihçesi (1900-1946), İstanbul: İ.Ü. Basımevi, 1998

⁷¹⁸ For some studies of the development of the free professions critical of the axiom that the free professions are harbingers of liberalism, see Jarausch, Konrad, The Unfree Professions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990; McClelland, Charles E, The German Experience of Professionalization, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2002; Jarausch, Konrad & Cocks, Geoffrey (ed.), German Professions, 1800-1950, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990; Balzer, Harley D, Russia‟s Mising Middle Class, Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1996; Kovacs, Maria, Liberal Professions and Illiberal Politics: Hungary from the Habsburgs to the Holocaust, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Marriages serve a purpose in the establishment and consolidation of elites and elite cohesion. Before the advent of the ―love marriage,‖ marriage was an institution of social exchange. Daughters and prospective wives were assets to be employed efficiently⁷¹⁹. Marriages were to provide financial means, connections, and entitlement for the father of the bride (the owner of the asset) and the groom (purchaser of the asset), and both parties would try to maximize their profit by making optimal choices.⁷²⁰ One of the functions of marriage was the integration of the holders of the financial means into holders of titles of social prestige and political power. This was due to the contradictory political/economical environment of early modern Europe in an age of capitalist accumulation when the economically powerful lacked the means to transfer their financial power into real power and the economically vulnerable held political means. Marriages also provided the means through which those who wanted to be incorporated into a certain caste could circumvent their lack of blue blood lineages.

A prevalent pattern of marriage (especially observable in early modern Europe), in which both parties were satisfied with the conclusion of the marriage, consisted of an arrangement between a son of a socially aspiring and ascending family and a daughter of a socially deteriorating family that was superior in social prestige, but inferior in actual terms. This pattern of marriage was exercised extensively in ancien régime France, where the aristocracy tried to slow its decline, and the bourgeoisie wanted to be ennobled.⁷²¹ Nevertheless, in stable economic, social, and political environments, the ―normal‖ practice of aristocratic marriage was endogamy, sons of nobles marrying daughters of nobles.

⁷¹⁹ Before modernity, as the Lasletts argue, the household was the basic and principal economic unit. Thus, marriage regulated the economies of households. See Laslett, Barbara, Household and Family in Past Time, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1972; Laslett, Peter, The World We Have Lost, London: Methuen, 1965.

⁷²⁰ For some classical studies on pre-modern marriages and family, see Stone, Lawrence, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977; Duby, Georges, Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Duby, Georges, The Knight, The Lady and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

⁷²¹ Doyle, William, Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 12, 156.

Ottoman upper-class marriage patterns had changed from a certain mode of marriage in which the marriage was perceived as simply a man‘s taking a woman to maintain his lineage to a mode of marriage in which the bride was an asset providing benefits both for her father and for the groom. In the Classical Ottoman Age, a man of prominence was to marry a modest bride or a freed concubine. This pattern avoided the development of aristocratic lineages. This mode of marriage was also compatible with the household structuring of the Ottoman polity in which the patriarch of the household was the sole authority and the intactness of the households was to be maintained as long as allegiance was owed to a single authority. Not unexpectedly, intimate life was the sphere where the influence of Westernization and modernization had a very slow and gradual impact.⁷²² Old marriage patterns, which had persisted for a generation after the Tanzimat, were replaced by a new marriage pattern in which marriages were arranged between the scions of two equal or compatible families. The marriage connections of Abdülhak Molla‘s family and Ahmed Tevfik‘s daughters‘ marriages,⁷²³ which will be discussed below, are just two prominent examples of this trend. Curiously, although Abdülhak Molla had married a woman of respectable descent, his son, Hayrullah Efendi, married a concubine. Likewise, Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha was married to a woman of slave origin.⁷²⁴ Nevertheless, these were the last and (partially exceptional) examples in the new era of Tanzimat. Tanzimat grandees such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, and İbrahim Hakkı were among the last sons born to Circassian concubines. Concubinage was seen by the new generation as a barbaric anachronism to be eliminated and replaced by affectionate marriage.⁷²⁵ As the

⁷²² For the classical study investigating the family lives and perceptions of the modernizing Ottoman urban middle-class sons of the Tanzimat, see Parla, Jale, Babalar ve Oğullar, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993. For a depiction of the family life of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha, see Melek Hanım, Haremden Mahrem Hatıralar, İstanbul: Oğlak Yayınları, 2003.

⁷²³ Of his three children, the first married a sultan from the palace, the second, a daughter of a diplomat colleague (and granddaughter of Sadullah Pasha), and the third, the son of Memduh Pasha, himself the son of Abdülhamid‘s long-time minister of the interior. See Okday, Şefik, ibid.

⁷²⁴ Baydar, Mustafa, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları, İstanbul: Menteş Kitabevi, 1968, p. 37.

⁷²⁵ One of the most reputable criticisms of the institution of slavery and concubinage was leveled by Samipaşazade Sezai in his novel ―Sergüzeşt‖ published in 1888 while he was

structures of political legitimacy and the organization of the political order were transformed, marriage patterns changed⁷²⁶ along the same lines, and a new domestic ideal developed.⁷²⁷ The new mode of marriage was a derivation of the (European) aristocratic endogamous marriage practice in which marriages were arranged between two equal parties, or at least between two parties of same origin, unless they were forced to do otherwise.⁷²⁸ The 19^th century European bourgeoisification of marriage partially influenced the transformation of 19^th-century Ottoman marriage patterns as well.⁷²⁹ Third-generation Tanzimat members were influenced by the idea of bourgeois affectionate marriage (albeit limited to the sons of the bureaucratic elite) via French novels (and very early 20^th century Ottoman novels such as Aşk-ı Memnu and Eylül) and acculturalization. In practice, however, marriage patterns continued to replicate those of the earlier generation. At the same  time,  the  anachronistic  imperial  institution  of  the  harem  had  become  an

 

 

 

 

serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2003, v. I, pp. 1-78.

⁷²⁶ For the end of the medieval marriage pattern and the rise of the new monogamous conjugal marriages in Egypt, see Cuno, Kenneth, ―Ambiguous Modernization: The Transition to Monogamy in the Khedival House of Egypt,‖ in Family History in the Middle East, Beshara Doumani (ed.), New York: State University of New York Press, 2003, pp. 247-270.

⁷²⁷ Diane Robinson-Dunn argues for the replacement of the ideal of patriarchal household

―by a new ideal, that of the middle-class home, which contemporary Egyptians believed would provide a new foundation for the new nation‖ on the eve of the twentieth century with the elimination of slavery in Egypt. Robinson-Dunn, Diane, The Harem, Slavery and British Imperial Culture, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006, p. 57.

⁷²⁸ For the patterns and strategies of marriages in the Pomeranian Junker nobility from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century, see Baranowski, Shelley, The Sanctity of Rural Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 32-34.

⁷²⁹ For some prominent theories on the making of the modern affectionate bourgeois family, see Shorter, E, The Making of the Modern Family, New York: Basic Books, 1975; Stone, Lawrence, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977; Gay, Peter, The Tender Passion: The Bourgeois Experience, from Victoria to Freud, Volume II, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999; Willis, John, A World of Their Own Making: Myth, Ritual and the Quest for Family Values, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997.

embarrassment to the Ottoman aristocratic elite⁷³⁰ and in time led to the dissolution of the Hamidian harem by the Young Turks.⁷³¹

During the Tanzimat, we observe two general trends of marriage: intermarriages within the same social layer and marriages between the scions of two different, but converging social groups, e.g., provincial merchants and dynasties with aristocrats in Istanbul. An example of the prevalence of this inter-marriage is given from the Abdülhak Molla family. Abdülhak Molla, the chief doctor of the palace, was married to the daughter of Naci Efendi, the head of the Translation Office and, hence, the aunt of Ahmed Vefik Pasha. Nasuhi Bey, the grandson of Abdülhak Molla, the son of Hayrullah Efendi, and the brother of Abdülham Hamit, was married to the daughter of Rıza Pasha, the chief of staff. Mihrünnisa Hanım, the sister of Nasuhi was married to the son of Fuad Pasha. Therefore, Abdülhak Hamid, a descendant of the family, had the chance to work with many of his relatives in the diplomatic service. While he was the ambassador to Den Haag, his second secretary was one of his relatives by marriage, Mehmed Ali Bey.⁷³² These marriages reestablished and reproduced the coherence and convergence of the closed circle of the Tanzimat elite. In short and with slight nuances, Tanzimat marriages were exclusively inter-elite marriages.

Some diplomats, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha⁷³³ and Mustafa Reşid Pasha⁷³⁴, arranged royal marriages for their sons. Necib Bey, while he was a scribe in the embassy in Paris, was married to Mediha Sultan, the daughter of Abdülmecid. Necib Bey became Necib Pasha through this marriage. This marriage was probably arranged due to the prestige of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the father of Necib (and Sezai), a highly respectable and strong

 

 

 

 

⁷³⁰ Erdem, Hakan, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, Basinstoke: Macmillan, 1996, pp. 149-150.

⁷³¹ Erdem, Hakan, ibid, pp. 147-49.

⁷³² Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 286.

⁷³³ Okday, Şefik, Büyükbabam Son Sadrazam Ahmet Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul, no publishers indicated, 1998, p. 13.

⁷³⁴ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960, v. II, p. 70.

personality during the Tanzimat period, who developed an extensive patronage network.⁷³⁵ After the sudden and unexpected death of Necib at an early age, Mediha Sultan married a colleague of Necip, Ferid, then a scribe in the embassy in London.⁷³⁶ Apparently, this marriage enabled young Ferid to be appointed to the Senate after 1908 and facilitated his career. Some diplomats married women from non-Ottoman royal families such as Şerif Pasha, who married a member of the Kavalalı dynasty.⁷³⁷ Houlusi Foad became part of the Kavalalı dynasty by marrying the granddaughter of Ismail Pasha.⁷³⁸ Intra-marriages between the members of the diplomatic service were also prevalent. A marriage was arranged between Sadullah Pasha‘s granddaughter (Asaf Sadullah‘s daughter) and Tevfik Pasha‘s son.⁷³⁹ Abdülhak Hamid arranged the marriage of his daughter to Emin Bey, who served in the ministry as ambassador to Teheran (a post once filled by Hayrullah Efendi) and Director of Political Affairs⁷⁴⁰. Naum Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris was married to the daughter of Franko Paşa, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the sister of Franko Paşa‘s sons who were also serving in the Ottoman diplomatic service.⁷⁴¹ Esat Cemal (Paker), whose memoires will be utilized extensively in this study, was married to Osman Hamdi Bey‘s daughter and thus entered a family of diplomats.⁷⁴²

This pattern enabled the unification of a single state aristocratic grouping that dominated the high-ranking bureaucratic positions and had the financial means to maintain a relatively prosperous lifestyle.

⁷³⁵ Erdem, Can, Sadrazam Damat Ferit Paşa, unpublished dissertation, Marmara University, 2002, p. 2.

⁷³⁶ Erdem, Can, ibid., p. 2.

⁷³⁷ Alakom, Rohat, Şerif Paşa: Bir Kürt Diplomatının Fırtınalı Hayatı, İstanbul: Avesta, 1998, p. 15.

⁷³⁸ Tugay, Emine Foat, Three Centuries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, table I on the back flap.

⁷³⁹ Okday, Şefik … p. 20.

⁷⁴⁰ Abdülhak Hamid… p. 340.

⁷⁴¹ Akarlı, Engin Deniz, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 195.

⁷⁴² E-mail from Edhem Eldem (18 February 2010). I owe this information to Gül İnanç.

Another area in which the diplomatic service pioneered was marriage to European women. One apparent reason for the frequency of marriage to European women was because diplomats were not allowed to take their wives with them to the countries in which they were serving. The first ambassador to marry a European was İbrahim Haydar Bey, the ambassador to Vienna. In 1867, he married a Hungarian woman.⁷⁴³ Nevertheless, the Ottoman ambassadors and diplomats could not arrange marriages with the daughters of the European aristocrats. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, a member of the Crimean khanate family, married the daughter of a Swiss policeman⁷⁴⁴ whom he met in Athens while she was working as a governess. She was looked down upon within diplomatic circles because of her lower class origins. Likewise, Mustafa Reşid Pasha married an Italian woman of low origins, which cost him the ambassadorship to London because the British government did not want to include a European woman of low origins in the royal protocol. Mustafa Asım Bey, ambassador to Sofia and Teheran and foreign minister for a short time, was married a Viennese woman.⁷⁴⁵ Asaf Sadullah, son of Sadullah Pasha and himself also a diplomat, was married to a German woman. Celal Münif‘s first wife was American⁷⁴⁶. İbrahim Edhem, who remained a low-ranking official in the headquarters of the ministry in Istanbul and in the foreign legations of the Ottoman Empire, married a Frenchwoman⁷⁴⁷. Other diplomats married women of better origins. For example, Mehmed Rifat Pasha married the daughter of a Russian general who converted to Islam after the marriage.⁷⁴⁸ In contrast to his Muslim colleagues, Musurus Pasha was successful in marrying off his daughter to the general secretary of the Italian embassy in London. The son-in-law of Musurus Pasha would later be appointed to Istanbul.⁷⁴⁹ Malkom Khan, one-time Persian ambassador to

⁷⁴³ Kuneralp, Sinan, ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,‖ in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p. 117.

⁷⁴⁴ Okday, Şefik, ibid, p. 13.

⁷⁴⁵ Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim, Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1340, p. 96.

⁷⁴⁶ BOA, HR.İM 227/68, 18 July 1928.

⁷⁴⁷ Çankaya, Ali, ibid, vol. III, p. 194.

⁷⁴⁸ Çankaya, Ali, ibid, v. III, p. 92; Kuneralp, Sinan, ibid, p. 117.

⁷⁴⁹ Abdülhak Hamid… p. 177.

Istanbul and London, an Armenian convert to Islam, and the pioneer of Persian reforms married a woman from the Dadyan family while he was serving in Istanbul and became the son-in-law of the Dadyan family.⁷⁵⁰

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry resembled Austria in that it enjoyed the fruits of favorable marriages. Although it is beyond the capabilities of the author to list comprehensively the marriage patterns of the diplomats, the anecdotal evidence shows three things. Firstly, the diplomats entered into auspicious marriages and, thus, established good connections. Secondly, intra-marriage within the group (in-marriage) was common. Thirdly, diplomacy turned into a family profession in which succeeding generations were recruited into the diplomatic service. The genealogical continuity of the cadres of the ministry was partially explained by the marriage patterns.⁷⁵¹

 

 

 

4.5.  Fortunate Sons

 

Osman Hamdi‘s father, Ibrahim Edhem, served as ambassador to Berlin in 1879 and ambassador to Vienna between 1879 and 1882. Originally a Greek from Chios, he was captured, enslaved, and sold to Hüsrev Pasha, who sent him to Paris to study mining engineering. His skills led him to appointments to various posts from the military to diplomacy in addition to his later political appointments as the Grand Vizier, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of the interior. He raised sons who rose to prominence. Osman

⁷⁵⁰ Algar, Hamid, Mirza Malkum Khan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, p. 10; Abdülhak Hamid… p. 178.

⁷⁵¹ Marriage was a very important institution for the 19^th -century European aristocratic culture, as well as the diplomatic establishment. ―In the opinion of the (German) Foreign Office… (T)he women, like the men, were to have grace, tact and polish; they should be German-born and propertied. Aristocratic lineage was desirable but not essential provided…[the]wife had a ‗patrician or cosmopolitan background and natural good manners, in addition to a lot of money‘ ‖ Cecil, Lamar, The German Diplomatic Service 1871-1914, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 87. For the marriage connections within the Dutch diplomatic service, see Wels, C.B, ―The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Netherlands 1579 to 1980,‖ in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 372.

Hamdi‘s ―brothers served the state in various capacities…While his brother Mustafa became a customs agent and his brother Galip Ibrahim became the first Ottoman numismatist, his youngest brother, Halil (Edhem), followed in Osman Hamdi‘s footsteps as assistant director of the museum after the latter‘s death in 1910. He later played a significant role in the transition of Ottoman cultural institutions in the Turkish Republic and served as a member of parliament from 1923 until his death in 1935.‖⁷⁵² Osman Hamdi, who probably spoke French at home in his childhood, developed his interest in the arts thanks to the high-level administrative posts of his father. Cosmopolitanism, fluency in French, encounters with ―Western culture‖, and more importantly, connections and financial means were bestowed by the mechanisms of officialdom. Osman Hamdi‘s refinement and elegance is a perfect example of the creation of a self-made and self-styled aristocracy in two generations.

Osman Hamdi‘s entry into the world of the arts was possible within this environment and set of circumstances. He could renounce a fine career the bureaucracy offered him. He was sent to Paris to study law. ―However, he soon decided to pursue his interest in painting instead, left the law program, and trained under the French Orientalist painters Jean-Léon Gérome and Gustave Bolunager.‖ He was called back to Istanbul by his father, who was concerned by his son‘s turning into a vagabond in Paris,⁷⁵³ When Osman Hamdi returned to Istanbul from Paris, where he had a fanciful and uncommon life, he was posted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed to several positions. He also served for one year in Baghdad in the retinue of Governor Midhad Pasha. It was not yet acceptable for a scion of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat to live completely out of the world and shelter of the government. Furthermore, there was as yet no social sphere in which a Muslim could make such a living. Thus, Osman Hamdi pursued the career of a typical official. In 1881, he was appointed as the director of the imperial museum. He became the director of the Academy of Fine Arts and thus combined his interests and his

⁷⁵² Shaw, Wendy, Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 98.

⁷⁵³ Artun, Deniz, Paris‟ten Modernlik Tercümeleri, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007, p. 59.

responsibilities to the public and to the family name.⁷⁵⁴ Moreover, the first artists perceived their art and profession as being in line with their political loyalty to the state (and the nation embodied within the state).⁷⁵⁵ The process whereby artists began questioning their innate loyalty to the state and became (at least moderate and loyalist) dissenters began only after the 1908 Revolution. Even after that, the artists and men of letters never equaled the level of radicalism and dissent of their European and Russian counterparts.

This was particularly true because serving in state service was inherited from the family. It was not perceived as a career or a profession. It was rather the habitus in which fortunate sons felt comfortable and which they did not easily or voluntarily leave. Many sons followed in their father‘s footsteps. Mehmed Cemil, the son of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, served as the ambassador to Paris three different times over a 3-year period and was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1872. Two sons of Mustafa Reşid, Mehmed Cemil and Ali Galip, served as Ministers of Foreign Affairs for very brief periods. Mustafa Reşid Pasha‘s two grandsons, Mehmed Tevfik and another, Mustafa Reşid Beyefendi, also served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul. Fuad Pasha‘s son, İzzet Fuad Pasha, was the ambassador to Madrid between 1900 and 1908. Celal Münif, son of Münif Pasha, became a career diplomat serving in various posts in Ottoman embassies abroad before being appointed as the Director of Protocol of the Republican Foreign Ministry in 1924.⁷⁵⁶ Arifi Pasha‘s son, Mustafa Şekip Bey, was the ambassador to Stockholm. Given that Arifi Pasha‘s father, Şekip Pasha, was also an ambassador and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, three generations of the family worked in the ministry. Individuals in two different generations held the position of foreign minister. Four Franko brothers, Yusuf, Nasri, Fethi, and Feyzi, were sons of the former governor of Lebanon, Franko Pasha, and served in the Ministry simultaneously. Mustafa

 

 

 

⁷⁵⁴ Shaw, Wendy, ibid, p. 99.

⁷⁵⁵ For this transformation, see Artun, Deniz, ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 86; Abdülhak Hamid… p 357.

Reşid and Yusuf Ziya, Agah Efendi and Şakir Pasha, and Ahmed Cevad and Şakir were brothers who both served as ambassadors⁷⁵⁷.

As pointed out previously, genealogical continuity was particularly prevalent in the non-Muslim officials. Kostaki and Stefanaki were father and son ambassadors to London. The embassy to London operated practically as the private property of the Musurus family until 1874, when all the officials in the embassy were relatives of Kostaki Musurus Pasha. The staff included the ambassador Stefanaki Musurus Pasha, his brother, his two sons, and his son-in-law.⁷⁵⁸ The military attaché appointed in 1874 was the first non-Musurus recruitment. The state of affairs at the London embassy, the privileges held by Musurus Pasha, and the appointment of his son Maurus can be seen as artifacts of the pre-modern practice of giving posts as family possessions. Artin Dadyan, the long-time secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Ministry, recruited his son, Diran, into the ministry. Diran worked as an administrative official in the ministry in Istanbul⁷⁵⁹. Artin Dadyan‘s brother, Arakil, also briefly served as translator in the embassy in Paris.⁷⁶⁰ Hrant Noradonkyan, whose brother Gabriel Noradonkyan was the grey eminence of the ministry, also served in the ministry as assistant counselor in the Legal Council⁷⁶¹. Hırant, the son of Sahak Abro who was also the long-time Head of the Office of Foreign Correspondence, became a preeminent legal expert in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁷⁶². Naum Paşa‘s son also entered the Ottoman diplomatic service⁷⁶³. The same was true for Said Bey, the son of Jewish Davud Efendi, the long time chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign

 

⁷⁵⁷ For family ties of the ambassadors, see Kuneralp, Sinan, ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,‖ in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, pp. 113-118.

⁷⁵⁸ Kırmızı, Abdülhamid. Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrımüslimler, unpublished MA thesis, Hacettepe University, 1998, p. 36.

⁷⁵⁹ BOA,, DH.SAID 10/207, 1270 Z. 29.

⁷⁶⁰ Kırmızı, Abdülhamid. Osmanlı … p.34.

⁷⁶¹ BOA, DH.SAID 88/143, 1293, Z. 29; Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, Osmanlı …. p. 32.

⁷⁶² BOA, DH.SAID 71/117, 1278 Z. 29.

⁷⁶³ Akarlı, Engin Deniz, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 197.

Affairs.⁷⁶⁴ Ahmet Rüstem, the Ottoman ambassador to Washington, was the son of the Polish aristocrat, émigré, and convert, (Nihad) Bilinski, who also served in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁷⁶⁵.

Asaf Sadullah, Sadullah Pasha‘s son, worked as the secretary in the Berlin embassy while his father was the ambassador to Berlin. Nusret Sadullah, another son of Sadullah Pasha, who became the ambassador to Den Haag in 1915, appears to be an exception to the absence of European-style ―monarchism‖. He resigned from the diplomatic service after the proclamation of the Republic due to his loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty and went into self-exile in Nice, where the members of the Ottoman dynasty had settled. Abdülhak Hüseyin, the son of Abdülhak Hamid, began his diplomatic career in Den Haag and London working with his father⁷⁶⁶ and died while he was the charge d‘affaires in Washington during World War I after replacing Ambassador Ahmed Rüstem. Mehmed Su‘ad, who served in the offices of the Legal Councilor and the Translation Office, was the son of Asım Pasha, a Minister of Foreign Affairs for Abdülhamid, and was not a career diplomat.⁷⁶⁷

This pattern was not unique to the Ottoman case. On the contrary, the Ottomans reproduced the European pattern. In France, ―(t)he profession could at one time have been considered a kind of caste…an aristocracy that was permitted to elect its own members…There have been in France, both before and since the Revolution, dynasties of diplomats…There have also been instances of brothers following parallel diplomatic

 

 

⁷⁶⁴ Özdemir, Bülent (ed.), İngiliz İstihbarat Raporlarında Fişlenen Türkiye, İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2008, p. 80.

⁷⁶⁵ BOA, DH.SAİD 1/664, 1236 Z. 29.

⁷⁶⁶ Sons working with their fathers (or nephews working with their uncles) was not unique to the Ottoman diplomatic service. ―Two ambassadors to France, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenloe-Schillingfürst and Baron Willhelm von Schoen, were joined in Paris by their sons. In Madrid, Radowitz sent for his son, while young Count Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg served under his father at the Court of St. James…When Count Karl von Pückler, a junior army officer, desired to become a diplomat, he asked his uncle, Prince Heinrich VII Reuss, the ambassador to Austria-Hungary, to request that he be assigned to the embassy.‖ Lamar, Cecil, ibid., pp. 21-22.

⁷⁶⁷ BOA, DH.SAID 22/197, 1278 Z. 29.

careers.‖⁷⁶⁸ In Austria-Hungary, ―employment in the foreign service was almost a family affair. Indeed, once a new family had gained a foothold in the Foreign Ministry it was almost a rule that the sons, even the grandsons, remained in this profession.‖⁷⁶⁹ In the Netherlands, offices were ―handed down from father to son, uncle to nephew.‖⁷⁷⁰ In Russia, ―(p)laces in the diplomatic corps were generally reserved for men born into the gentry. In fact, a diplomatic career was often passed down through the family.‖⁷⁷¹ In short, genealogical continuity was a European-wide phenomenon. ―These (Foreign Office-DG) staffs were small and their members personally known to their chiefs. Gradually, positions came to be handed down from generation to generation. The same family names appeared- fathers and sons, brothers, uncles and nephews. There were many ‗closed shops.‘ Successive generations of civil servants were often related to one another through descent or marriage.‖⁷⁷² The genealogical continuity was a corollary of the aristocratic quality of the diplomatic services. Though, many ―diplomatic dynasties‖ lacked impressive aristocratic credentials, they became de facto magnate families or nobles of the robe in the 19^th century style by associating themselves with the most prestigious offices of the states and became families of prominence. This was especially the case in France, where some dynastic families of the foreign office were of middle class origin. State service was an

 

⁷⁶⁸ Dethan, Georges, ―France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century,‖ in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 218. For the French state elite, see also Bourdieu, Pierre, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1998;

Charle, C, ―The Present State of Research on the Social History of Elites and Bourgeoisie: A Critical Assessment,‖ Contemporary European History, 1 (1992), pp. 99-112.

⁷⁶⁹ Rumpler, Helmut, ―The Foreign Ministry of Austria and Austria-Hungary 1848 to 1918,‖ in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 51.

⁷⁷⁰ Wels, D.C, ―The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980,‖ The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 372.

⁷⁷¹ Uldricks, Teddy J, ―The Tsarist and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‖ in ibid., p. 518.

⁷⁷² Steiner, Zara. ―Introduction,‖ in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 13.

elite-processing mechanism converting aristocracies of lineage to state aristocracies creating their own aristocratic lineages.

 

 

 

4.6.  The Legacy of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

 

Needless to say, genealogical continuity survived the Empire. Salih Münir Pasha‘s nephew, Melih Esenbel, served as Turkey‘s long-time ambassador to Washington, ambassador to Tokyo, the general secretary of the ministry, and Minister of Foreign Affairs for a very short while. Diplomacy was a family business on Melih Esenbel‘s father‘s side, as well. His maternal grandfather, Şemsettin Ziya, a descendant of the Ramazanoğulları, was another Hamidian diplomat. Melih Esenbel was the product of an intra-marriage within the diplomatic service given that there were diplomats on both sides of the family.

Selim Sarper, Turkey‘s ambassador to Rome and Moscow, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Minister between 1960 and 1962, was the nephew of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu. Yüksel Söylemez, the son of a nephew of Galip Kemali was another diplomat raised in the family. Hüsrev Gerede, military officer-turned- diplomat during the Republic, who served in the key post of ambassador to Berlin during World War II, was the son-in-law of Söylemezoğlu. However, the diplomatic genealogy of the family began not from Galip Kemali but from Kabuli Pasha, the father of Galip Kemali, who served as ambassador to Vienna. Seyfullah Esin, a descendant of both Sadullah Pasha and Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, served as ambassador to Bonn, Cairo, and the United States. Seyfullah Esin was married to Emel Esin, who was the daughter of Ahmed Ferit Tek, a Young Turk who became a career diplomat in the Republic, serving as ambassador to London, Warsaw, and Tokyo.

We meet the Uşaklıgil family again in the marriage of Cevat Açıkalın, the influential secretary-general of Minister of Foreign Affairs⁷⁷³ and son of Ali Cevad, the imperial secretary to Abdülhamid, to Mevhibe Uşaklıgil, the sister of Latife, the niece of Halid Ziya, and the aunt of Bülent Uşaklıgil. Cevad Ezine, the late Ottoman and early Republican

⁷⁷³ For a biography of Cevat Açıkalın, see Güçlü,Yücel, The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın, Ankara, no publishing house, 2002.

ambassador and a descendant of a prominent family from Ezine (a town in the Çanakkale province of modern Turkey) married the daughter of the illustrious Halil Edhem Bey and became the son-in-law of an aristocratic Istanbuliot Ottoman family. These two marriages were examples of the incorporation of two diverse elites. Hulusi Fuad Tugay, the son of Deli Fuad Pasha and himself served as an ambassador of Turkey, married the granddaughter of Khedive Ismail Pasha and son of Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman military commander and the ambassador to Berlin between 1913 and 1915.⁷⁷⁴ This marriage was yet another marriage which connected diverse elites. The Republican cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be the scions of late Ottoman civil servants. Prominent figures of the Republican diplomatic service such as Fatin Rüşdü Zorlu (and his brother Rıfkı Rüşdü Zorlu), Muharrem Nuri Birgi (and many other prominent ambassadors such as Nureddin Vergin, İsmail Erez, Pertev Subaşı and Nüzhet Kandemir) were descendants of Ottoman pashas.⁷⁷⁵ Hasan Esat Işık, the ambassador to Paris and Moscow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense, was the son of Mehmed Esat (Işık), one of the pioneering medical (military) doctors and medical bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire. Among others, Süreyya Anderiman, the Republican ambassador to Tokyo, was the son of Mehmed Süreyya Bey,⁷⁷⁶ who began his diplomatic career in 1892 and served as Ottoman consul and ambassadorial secretary in various posts throughout the Hamidian era before becoming the Director of Protocol in the Republican ministry in 1931. Mustafa Reşid Paşa‘s son, Basri Reşid Danişment, was also a Republican ambassador. Sons of Ottoman figures as diverse as Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), Ebubekir Hazım (Tepeyran) (Celal Hazım Tepeyran), Ali Kemal (Zeki Kuneralp), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir Bey (Bedri Tahir Şaman), Ali Fuat (Türkgeldi) (Âli Türkgeldi) and the grandsons of Kamil Pasha (Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Hilmi Kamil Bayur), Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Fuad Paşa (Şevket Fuad Keçeci being the grandson of both Fuad Paşa and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa),

⁷⁷⁴ Tugay, Emine Foat, Three Centuries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

⁷⁷⁵ Günver, Semih, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu‟nun Öyküsü, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985, p. 7, 17. This book is a valuable resource providing many genealogical and marriage connections, ranging from late Ottoman officialdom to the second generation of the Republican bureaucratic elite via the founding generation of the Republic.

⁷⁷⁶ Derin, Haldun, Çankaya Özel Kalemini Hatırlarken, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995, p. 81.

Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi⁷⁷⁷) İbrahim Edhem Pasha (Sadi Eldem)⁷⁷⁸ and Ali Kemal (Selim Kuneralp, son of Zeki Kuneralp) served as Republican diplomats and ambassadors.⁷⁷⁹

In short, the degree of continuity of the cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of blood lineages from Empire to the Republic is enormous. It has been argued previously that the critical threshold of the founding of Turkish modernity and the modern state was surpassed by the Tanzimat and Hamidian elite and that there was continuity from the Hamidian aristocratic culture to the Republican culture with certain breaks and alterations. This continuity can be established not only in ideological terms, but also in genealogical sense.

The ―imagined state elite‖ persisted in holding the major positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea of the state for the members of this elite was not an external reality. On the contrary, the state was part of their daily life. The state was a concrete and intimate reality. It was not sacred and transcendental.⁷⁸⁰ On the contrary, it was very real and familiar. It was their own. The state was internalized, familiarized, and personalized. The state was not something to which they should be servile, but the pivotal symbol of their sense of belonging and the safe harbor in which they felt secure. It was the polar star

⁷⁷⁷ Fuad Simavi was also the nephew of Lütfi Simavi, an Ottoman diplomat and Lord High Chamberlain of Mehmed Reşad and Vahdeddin. Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim, Dersaadet: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1340, p. 10; Birol, Nurettin, Halil Rıfat Paşa, C.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, v. 27 (December 2003), p.

278. He is also a cousin of Sedat Simavi.

⁷⁷⁸ These data had been gathered by examining the obituaries retrieved in the database of the daily Milliyet‘s on-line archive and the yearbook of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs‘ preepared in 1964-65. (Aral, Hamid (ed.), Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı (1964-1965), Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı. )

⁷⁷⁹ All the above-mentioned Republican diplomats were entitled ambassadors with the exception of the son of Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), who resigned from the diplomatic service after serving as secretary in the embassies to Jerusalem and Tokyo and as consul, and the grandson of Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi), who was removed from the diplomatic service. Ateş, Sabri, Tunalı Hilmi, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009,

p. 108; Dikerdem, Mahmut, Hariciye Çarkı, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989, p. 24.

⁷⁸⁰ For a classical interpretation of the Ottoman/Turkish modern state along these lines, see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Beverley, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985, p. 66.

in their mental cosmology which made them confident in the eternity of the universe and provided ontological security.⁷⁸¹ From this ―cultural intimacy‖, they also invented a national imagination which linked the state, the nation, and themselves and attributed the nation ―national characteristics‖ they themselves attained themselves in their habitus.

The state became more ―sacred‖ and ―transcendental‖ in the 20^th century as the bureaucracy became more formalized, depersonalized, and defamiliarized, and thus state lost its humane touch and its immediate proximity. The state also lost its embeddedness within the culture of a certain class formation. It lost its very personalized aspects and its emotional contact with its constituency. It ceased to be flesh and blood although the very 19^th century perception of the state persisted in the minds of the state elite who exported this perception of the state to masses.⁷⁸² Thus, a certain imagery was disseminated. It was no coincidence that the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the institutions that was able to partially avoid formalization and anonymization. It could keep its corps d‘esprit, retain the ―closed shop‖ nature of the 19^th - century (Ottoman) bureaucratic habitus, and be harbinger of a (state-centric) distinct nationalism and national imagination embedded within a certain culturalization.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

⁷⁸¹ For Giddens‘ notion of ―ontological security,‖ see Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1990, pp. 94-99. For a discussion of ―ontological security‖ with regard to the perception of the people of the Republican state, see Alexander, Catherine, Personal States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.19.

⁷⁸² See Alexander, Catherine, ibid.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER V

 

 

THE ROUTINE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND ITS ENCOUNTERS ABROAD

 

5.1.  Defending the Hamidian Autocracy Abroad

 

A habitual assumption regarding the cadres of Foreign Ministry is that they are primarily interested in ―international‖ affairs, unlike the other bureaucratic offices. However, only a small percentage of the office work of the Foreign Ministry relates to the conduct of foreign relations. This is true for all foreign ministries, but it was much more so regarding the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The chief tasks of the Ottoman Ministry were the supervision of the activities of Ottoman nationals and especially the activities of the dissidents and non-Muslims abroad, the tracking of the local press‘s commentaries regarding the Ottoman Empire and the sultan, in addition to many technical matters, such as the pursuit of the commercial and legal rights of Ottoman residents abroad. In short, in an age of internationalization, or in Hobsbawms‘s Age of Empire , foreign policy was not a matter of technicality in isolation from domestic politics and political struggles. The Ottoman representatives were not mere technicians, but civil servants whose duties and policies were shaped by the domestic concerns of the Hamidian regime. A separation of foreign policy and internal policy was untenable. However, the diplomatic service was not a garrison of the Hamidian regime, either. In some ways, the Ottoman diplomats were at the very center of the Hamidian political structures, given their representation of the Hamidian establishment abroad. Yet, given their closeness to the international world, they constituted a privileged small group freed from the restraints of the Hamidian establishment.

Different embassies specialized in the pursuit of different national dissident groups. For example, the correspondence of the embassy to Washington abounds with documentation of the activities of the Armenians, whether they were dissidents or not. Not only did the bulk of the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and United States consist of the status of missionary schools and the problems deriving from the legal problems faced by Armenians in obtaining American citizenship, but we also observe that the Ottoman embassy to Washington‘s specific task was the monitoring of Armenian activities (rallies, demonstrations, publications, organizational works) in the United States. Although the tracking of Armenians residing in the United States had been a regular activity of the embassy in Washington prior to 1890, with the rupture of the Armenian insurgencies, it became the principal preoccupation of the embassy. Prior to 1890, dispatches written by the embassy remained infrequent. These dispatches were written down not for urgent matters, but as regular dispatches every two weeks or so. With the explosion of the Armenian insurgency, the embassy to Washington‘s workload increased drastically.

These dispatches included the regular supervision of the Armenian press in the United States⁷⁸³ with a specific focus on the New-York based Haik⁷⁸⁴, a close surveillance of the American press and their commentaries on the Armenian events, the writing of disclaimers to the relevant newspapers to be printed, and the lobbying of congressmen with pamphlets, et cetera. In 1896, the tekzips (disclaimers) had been gathered and published as a separate pamphlet to be distributed to congressmen.⁷⁸⁵ In 1890, the embassy submitted a comprehensive report, an overview of the Armenian press in the United States⁷⁸⁶. It was recommended in 1896 that some American newspapers, such as the New York Herald⁷⁸⁷

 

⁷⁸³ BOA, HR. SYS 64/13, BOA, 26 June 1895; HR.SYS 60/40, 16 March 1891.

⁷⁸⁴ For a close scrutiny of the newspaper Haik, see BOA, HR.SYS 63-22, 4 August 1894; 60-46, 9 February 1895. The embassy repeatedly disclaimed the ―unfounded allegations‖ in the Armenian journals. For the monitoring of the New-Jersey based Armenian newspaper ―Arekag‖, BOA, HR.SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.

⁷⁸⁵ BOA, HR.SYS 65/52, 2 June 1896.

⁷⁸⁶ BOA, HR. SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.

⁷⁸⁷ BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.

and the Washington Post⁷⁸⁸, be denied entry to the Ottoman Empire due to the insulting pictures they published regarding the Armenian events. The embassy also regretted that the unfounded reports relayed by the Armenian press had been publicized by the American newspapers.⁷⁸⁹ As counter-propaganda, texts written by the Matbuat-ı Ecnebiye Kalemi (Office of Foreign Press) were published in the American media.⁷⁹⁰ In this regard, Ahmed Rüstem Bey, who was appointed as the ambassador in Washington in 1914 but who had been working in the Washington embassy in various posts previously, was the Turkish diplomat who did the most to combat the negative propaganda. He actively pursued a counter-propaganda policy by publishing articles in prominent American newspapers and making statements to the American newspapers. His Polish origins and European erudition should have facilitated his communication with Westerners and allowed his skills to impress and convince them.⁷⁹¹ Reports also summarized the articles printed in prominent newspapers. For example, the embassy noted in 1895 that the newspaper ―Sun‖ had argued that the Armenians were victorious vis-a-vis the Ottoman state with regard to their improved relations with the European powers.⁷⁹² The embassy also dispatched the publications of Armenian newspapers to Istanbul. As an example of the dangerous deeds of the Armenian press based in New York and in other cities, the embassy noted that the Armenian press in the United States had requested Britain to be involved in Armenian affairs in order to protect the rights and interests of the Armenian people.⁷⁹³

As the principal concern of the Ottoman Empire in its diplomatic relations with the United States of America was Armenian affairs, the predominant preoccupation in the diplomatic correspondence of the USA with the Ottoman Empire was the same as can be gathered from the yearbooks ―Foreign Relations of the United States‖. The number of documents regarding diplomatic relations with ―Turkey‖ included in the yearbooks is very

⁷⁸⁸ BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.

⁷⁸⁹ BOA, HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.

⁷⁹⁰ BOA, HR.SYS 64/12, 25 June 1895.

⁷⁹¹ See Erol, Mine, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nun Amerika Büyük Elçisi A. Rüstem Bey, no publishing house, 1972.

⁷⁹² BOA. HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.

⁷⁹³ BOA, HR.SYS 61/6, 10 August 1891.

small vis-a-vis the excessive amount of documents on other European and Latin American countries. Furthermore, no political report of ―Turkey‖ was seen as necessary to be included in the yearbooks. The selected dispatches written from Washington to the embassy in Istanbul and from the embassy in Istanbul to Washington were covering the problems the missionaries and their schools (especially the Euphrates College in Harpoot) were facing. The selected documents were on the ―maltreatment‖ and ―murderous attacks‖ on the Armenians. Also, a lot of paperwork was devoted to the naturalization of Armenian residents of Ottoman nationality, and the problems the naturalized Armenians residing in America were facing regarding inheritances and legal rights⁷⁹⁴. In short, the diplomatic relations with America meant predominantly ―Armenian dissidence‖ for the Ottoman diplomatic service.⁷⁹⁵ It was no coincidence that Ahmed Rüstem Bey, after serving long in the embassy to Washington, wrote a book in Switzerland defending the Ottoman policies regarding the massacres of 1915.

Of course, although dominated by Armenian-related activities, the only occupation of the embassy was not police work. The embassy regularly reported the latest developments in the American political system. A regular report in 1898 informed Istanbul about the aggression between Nicaragua and Costa Rica which could have triggered a war between those two countries.⁷⁹⁶ The embassy also followed the crisis over the Panama Channel in 1903 and the involvement of the United States in these affairs that resulted in the independence of Panama from Colombia.⁷⁹⁷ The embassy also relayed information about South American politics since South American politics constituted the main interest of the United States government in international politics. Several reports informed Istanbul on the

 

 

⁷⁹⁴ See Foreign Relations of the United States, years 1885, 1886, 1890, 1891, 1892.

⁷⁹⁵ Also see Erol, Mine, Birinci Dünya Savaşı Arifesinde Amerika‟nın Türkiye‟ye Karşı Tutumu, Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1976; Moore, John Hammond, America Looks at Turkey 1876-1909, unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1961. Fendoğlu, Hasan Tahsin, Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri, İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2002; Şafak, Nurdan, Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri, İstanbul: OSAV, 2003.

⁷⁹⁶ BOA, HR.SYS, 77/15, 30 April 1888.

⁷⁹⁷ BOA, HR.SYS, 77/16, 17,18,19,20,21,22,23. (5 May 1886, 2 February 1893, 11

November 1903, 30 November 1903, 14 December 1903, 2 January 1904, 18 April 1904)

international and domestic politics of countries such as Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Mexico.

As the embassy in Washington was specialized in the pursuit of Armenian activities, the embassy in Rome was specialized in monitoring Albanian dissidents or ―potential‖ dissidents. There was no timeframe in which the preoccupation of the pursuit of dissidents increased significantly. On the contrary, this was a constant concern. From the 1870s onward, there was a continuous concern about Albanian activities in Italy (as well as in Austria, Greece and to a lesser extent in Romania). The level of vigilance remained constant before the Albanian rebellion of 1911 when the Albanian problem turned out to be a primary and immediate concern for Istanbul.

In contrast to the Armenian activities in United States, the Albanian dissidence in Italy was disorganized and personal. However, that does not mean that the embassy in Rome was less concerned as the routine dispatches reporting the latest Albanian activities demonstrate. It was one of the main tasks of the embassy although in contrast to the embassy in Washington reporting Albanian dissidence comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the immense load of paperwork.

A report in 1886 relayed that the Albanian émigré community in Bari was trying to finance a newspaper and an institute in the Albanian language.⁷⁹⁸ The embassy was particularly alarmed when in 1880, two Albanian dissidents, Ali Hilmi and Süleyman Sami, moved from Athens to Rome. The embassies in both capitals sent dispatches relaying their information on these dissidents. The dissidents were chased in Rome.⁷⁹⁹ Suspicions were raised that they would move to Vienna. However, in the end the dissidents asked for permission to return to the Ottoman Empire after failing to advance their activities.

The task of the embassy was much simpler because the Albanians in Italy lived on their own and were not in regular contact with the indigenous people and the leaders of public opinion. In short, although the occupation of the embassy in Washington was a sophisticated and multi-faceted job, the job of the embassy in Rome remained a policing

⁷⁹⁸ BOA, HR. SYS 125/22, 18 March 1886; 127/25, 17 March 1886.

⁷⁹⁹ BOA, HR.SYS 126/2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 (dated from 10 June 1878 to 14

August 1878).

activity. As pointed out above, the embassy had much more political obligations and important duties such as following the Italian intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire and with regard to the other European powers. The other embassies which were occupied with the Albanian dissidence were Athens, Bucharest, and Vienna.

One of the main preoccupations of the embassies was the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in the press. All the embassies were equally concerned with the advancement of the image of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the general perception and portrayal of the Ottoman Empire was negative, and this was perceived as a principal threat to the interests of the Empire. Of course, embassies were not only relaying information on the mood of the local press. They were also active in changing and transforming the negative presentation of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a dispatch from the embassy informed Istanbul that a newly founding Vienna-based newspaper was planning to employ a correspondent in Istanbul, and the embassy requested/suggested that the Ministry be involved in the process so that the future correspondent would be sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁰⁰ Every embassy was so paranoid about the negative coverage of the Ottoman Empire in their local press that a dispatch from Vienna portrayed the press of Vienna as ―the center of the anti- Ottoman coverage in Europe‖.⁸⁰¹

It has to be said that it was Abdülhamid who had aspired to influence, lead, and manipulate the Western press after the relatively passive stance of his predecessors. His personal policy of developing contacts with Western correspondents had brought up a general concern for struggling with and manipulating Western media. The interest in the foreign press was a top-to-bottom affair. Abdülhamid‘s first act in this issue was trying to influence English public opinion by publishing the letters of Admiral Hobart in the prestigious newspaper, The Times, in 1877.⁸⁰² Abdülhamid developed close relations with the correspondents in Istanbul. In 1878, he awarded Ottoman insignia to three of the seven French correspondents resident in Istanbul.⁸⁰³ Since then, he continued to follow the

⁸⁰⁰ BOA, HR.SYS 184/46, 25 January 1887.

⁸⁰¹ BOA. HR.SYS, 198/9, 8 April 1903.

⁸⁰² Koloğlu, Orhan, Avrupa‟nın Kıskacında Abdülhamid, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998,

p. 65.

⁸⁰³ Koloğlu, Orhan, ibid, p. 67.

Western press coverage personally.⁸⁰⁴ Although Abdülhamid had established a bureau in the Yıldız Palace to follow foreign press coverage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was always active in tracking the foreign coverage and taking action when necessary.

The issue of ―public opinion‖ became an obsession throughout the reign of Abdülhamid. We know that ―public opinion‖ became a novel factor to be considered and if possible controlled by the reign of Mahmud II.⁸⁰⁵ Throughout the Tanzimat, with the emergence of newspapers, it became apparent that public opinion had become a significant factor that had to be dealt with accordingly. For the first time, subjects and the minds of those subjects were a matter of concern. The idiom ―efkar-ı umumiye‖ emerged and assumed a great importance.⁸⁰⁶ The state was obliged to measure, respond to, and lead public opinion. This concern became almost an obsession for Abdülhamid.

Newspapers were treated as acid tests of public opinion. In fact, excerpts from newspapers were not only sent to Istanbul as ―annexes‖ to dispatches, but also comprised the bulk of the dispatches themselves. Sometimes, insignificant and minor press coverage caused scandals and uproars and caused a heavy load of dispatches to be sent from both Istanbul and the embassy in question. Nevertheless, in the diplomatic dispatches, it was

 

 

⁸⁰⁴ For the rich documentation of Abdülhamid‘s personal follow-up of the Western press coverage and his acts to influence and lead it, see Orhan Koloğlu‘s ―Avrupa‘nın Kıskasında Abdülhamid.‖ Needless to see, although this endeavor was a personal venture of the sultan, it was the hard-working diplomats, whether they may be Ottoman representatives abroad or the diplomats working in Istanbul who had informed Abdülhamid and did the job in the name of the sultan. However, Abdülhamid was not a person who was satisfied with the regular work of the bureaucracy. Abdülhamid recruited Louis Sabuncu, who was in charge of following the newspapers published in English, French, Italian, and Arabic and translating the articles on the Ottoman Empire. See the memoirs of Sabuncuzade Louis Alberi, Yıldız Sarayı‟nda Bir Papaz, İstanbul: Selis, 2007.

⁸⁰⁵ Kırlı, Cengiz, ―Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire‖, in Public Islam and the Common Good, Salvatore, Armando & Eickelman, Dale

F. (eds.), Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2004, pp. 75-97.

⁸⁰⁶ For example, Ebüzziya Tevfik in his memoirs clearly indicates that he and his colleagues (the first generation of Turkish journalists) succeeded in developing and promoting a public opinion (efkar-ı umumiye) that had to be respected and heeded, which was beneficial for the well-being of Turkish nation. Ebüzziya Mehmed Tevfik. Genç Osmanlılar Tarihi, 3 volumes, İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1973.

elections which were seen as the primary (and direct) manifestations of public opinion.⁸⁰⁷ The diplomatic service was underlining the role of public opinion expressed via political parties and via other means of the expression of public opinion. The anti-Ottoman mood of the public in Britain during the Russo-Turkish War had left a devastating impact on the Ottoman diplomatic service. For this reason, party politics in Britain was carefully followed. Reports on the party lines and positions were meticulously dispatched to Istanbul from Britain. A comparable concern regarding partisan divisions and disputes was also displayed in France, Italy, and other parliamentary regimes. Unsurprisingly, the correspondence from the embassies in Germany and Russia lacked tracking of a ―public opinion‖.

Ironically, Britain was the country where artificial manipulation of public opinion was least possible due to its developed civil society and open public political debates. It was also the country where public opinion exerted the most pressure on the foreign policy of the British cabinet. Knowing this, the Ottoman diplomatic corps showed a special concern for public opinion in Britain as became clear from the long reports assigned to it.⁸⁰⁸ Paradoxically, although it was least likely to influence public opinion in Britain via authorized publications, paying affiliated journalists, and other ―artificial‖ means, it was in Britain where the most effort was exerted and the incomparably highest expenditures were made.

With the emergence of the Armenian events in the 1890s, this issue began to haunt all the embassies⁸⁰⁹. Although the massacres caused diplomatic tensions, the most disturbing repercussion of the events was the uproar of the public opinion and the press rather than

⁸⁰⁷ For a political report commenting on the British elections as the manifestation of British public opinion, BOA, HR.SYS 582/20, 28 January 1892.

⁸⁰⁸ For the permanent pressure on the Ottoman diplomatic corps in London, see the memoirs of Abdülhak Hamid and Esat Cemal (Paker). Abdülhak Hamid, Abdülhak Hamid‟in Hatıraları, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1994; Paker, Esat Cemal. Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952.

⁸⁰⁹ For the tension the Ottoman representations abroad experienced due to the Armenian events and its international repercussions, see Abdülhak Hamid… p. 217, 280. Abdülhak Hamid‘s very negative views on the Armenian activities displays the immense effect of these events on the Ottoman diplomatic service. He endorsed a very defensive position on behalf of the Hamidian regime against the Armenian threat.

the relatively mild reactions of the European governments. All the embassies struggled with the growing bad reputation. The severest pressure was on the shoulders of the embassy in London as the British had the most organized and most outspoken civil society with Protestant/humanitarian reflexes⁸¹⁰. Moreover, the Bulgarian atrocities had displayed the enormous role of public opinion and public agitation in the making of foreign policy in Britain.⁸¹¹ The embassies felt a strong urge to defend the empire‘s honor and their own although this experience also instigated an escalating reaction to the sultan‘s corrupt reputation in the eyes of the diplomatic service. The Young Turks in exile also cultivated contradictory sentiments regarding the Armenian events. They oscillated between cooperating with the Armenian organizations in Europe and defending the actions of the Ottoman government as legitimate self-defense against a bloody insurrection.⁸¹²

From 1890 onwards, the embassies dispatched an abundant number of reports related to the Armenian problem. Four embassies were sending by far the highest number of reports on the issue: the embassies to St. Petersburg, Washington, London, and Paris. As mentioned above, these reports constituted the main paperwork of the embassy to Washington whereas the ―Armenian work‖ was one of the main activities in the other three embassies. The importation of any publication into the Ottoman Empire that reported on the Armenian issue was to be prevented. Therefore, the embassies informed on the harmful

⁸¹⁰ For an Ottoman tract accentuating the significance of public opinion in Britain and criticizing how humanitarianism had been hijacked by the biased propaganda of Turcophobe opinion leaders; Halil Halid, A Study in English Turcophobia, London: Pan- Islamic Society, 1904.

⁸¹¹ Halil Halid, who was employed in the consular service in London and as a Turkish instructor in Cambridge University, addressed the British audience and pointed out that the reality of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was different from what the public assumed due to the success of Armenian propaganda in Britain. Halil Hamid, The Diary of a Turk, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1903. Halil Halid also published articles in the British newspaper to challenge the anti-Ottoman propaganda. See Wasti, Tanvir. ―Halil Hamid: An Anti-Imperialist Muslim Intellectual‖, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 29, no:3, 1993, pp.559-579.

⁸¹² For some puzzling repercussions of the attempted assassination of Abdülhamid organized by the Armenian committees on the Young Turk opponents of the regime, see Hanioğlu, Şükrü. Preparation for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001,

p.59. Also, for the ambivalent attitude of Young Turks towards Armenian revolutionaries, see Hanioğlu, Şükrü. Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

contents of publications and proposed the prohibition of publications or certain issues of publications in the Ottoman Empire.⁸¹³ It is not surprising to observe that the embassies in Vienna and Berlin did not find much to report to Istanbul. In the Hamidian era, Berlin and Vienna emerged as two reliable and unwavering allies of the Ottoman Empire in which any kind of unruly or seditious activity of dissent was not permitted or sympathized with. On the contrary, the German diplomatic service even requested friendly countries such as Switzerland to disallow any activity of the Ottoman dissidents within their territories⁸¹⁴. Although the number of dispatches on the Armenian issue erupted in 1890, after the quietening of the Armenian events in the late 1890s, dispatches of the same ilk continued to be sent until 1908. Only a slight decrease is observable after the pacification of the Armenian problem in the late 1890s. In the eyes of the diplomats and the center, the affair had calmed down only temporarily, and therefore vigilance and readiness for a prospective eruption of the affair had to be maintained. This shows the extent of the impact the Armenian phenomenon had on the psyche of the Ottoman center. It may be also argued that the constant Armenian threat and subversiveness nurtured the development of a sense of ―we‖ against ―them‖ (Armenians), and subsequently this sense of ―we‖ was transferred into an awareness of Turkishness, the only loyal element within the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman officialdom kept its level of vigilance and alarm regarding the Armenian problem. Armenians abroad continued to be monitored and their activities reported. All the Armenians, whether they were students, peasants, people seeking their fortune, or political activists, were individually identified by files containing short biographies and information about their physical appearances. The movements of Armenians (especially when in groups) were followed and reported. In that regard, the Ottoman representatives abroad displayed the quick consolidation of a modern state seeking to know its own subjects in detail, given that in the Ottoman Empire citizenship had only been established in 1869. Nevertheless, the dimensions and effort of documenting and identifying were at a very

⁸¹³ For example, see the request of Salih Münir Pasha, the ambassador in Paris regarding the prohibition of the entry of the newspapers ―Echo de Paris‖ and ―Aurore‖ into the Ottoman Empire, BOA, HR.SYS 2750-24, 4 April 1902.

⁸¹⁴ Hanioğlu, Şükrü. Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 126.

modest scale in comparison to the provincial administrative offices from which reports and dispatches identifying and documenting were flowing abundantly.

 

 

 

5.2.  Opposing Young Turks

 

Apparently, the activities of the Young Turks were another issue to be addressed by the Ottoman foreign representatives. Regular reports on the activities of the Young Turks and informative memoranda were continuously sent from the embassies to Istanbul.⁸¹⁵ The rich reports on the activities of the Young Turks and analyses of their personalities took a considerable amount of ambassadorial and consular work. When Ali Haydar Midhat, the son of Midhat Pasha, left İzmir for Paris for subversive activity, he was contacted by the relevant Ottoman representatives personally both in Athens and Marseilles.⁸¹⁶ One report just after the move of Kemal Bey, the grandson of Midhat Pasha, to France, suggested that Kemal Bey‘s participation in the Young Turks should be avoided, by employment abroad if necessary.⁸¹⁷ Ahmed Rıza Bey, İsmail Kemal, Ali Nuri (Gustaf Noring), and Edhem Nuri were the figures whose activities were most frequently reported.⁸¹⁸ However, Mahmud Celaladdin Pasha who joined the Young Turks in Paris was the dissident who was most carefully and exhaustively followed and tracked at every opportunity. Loads of reports were amassed and dispatched to Istanbul.⁸¹⁹ His desertion to the Young Turks shocked and panicked Abdülhamid and his establishment. The scare Mahmud Celaleddin‘s desertion evoked reverberated in the continent wide communications concerning Mahmud Celaleddin. All the Ottoman diplomatic legations were on the alert for the possible moves of the renegade spy master. His short stay in Greece to get into contact with the Albanian

⁸¹⁵ .See the folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788/1814.

⁸¹⁶ Ali Haydar Midhat, Osmanlı‟dan Cumhuriyet‟e Hatıralarım, İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2008, pp. 149-155.

⁸¹⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 41/55, 1320 N. 21.

⁸¹⁸ See folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788 to 1797.

⁸¹⁹ For the reports on Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, see the folder BOA, HR.SYS 1791, 1792 (correspondence between 14 December 1899 to 3 February 1902, with half of it dated from the year 1902).

revolutionary committees organized by Ismail Kemal who voyaged to Corfu from Southern Albania created an immense uproar. His activities in Greece created a continent wide alert in the Ottoman legations. His journey was reported day-to-day by the relevant representatives. His short stay alarmed Istanbul. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried every means to persuade the Greek government to expel the renegade spy master. The rebuff of the Greek government was regretted by Rifaat Bey, the ambassador to Athens who admitted that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha was a figure of sympathy for journalists, parliamentarians, and even ministers. He also related the negative response of the Greek authorities, who asserted that such an expulsion would be contrary to the spirit of their constitution. Thus, concluded Rifaat Bey, who was desperate to accomplish the tasks given to him, Greece provides ―liberty of action to the anarchists‖. Nevertheless, at the end, Mahmud Celaleddin was forced to leave Greece, not for his ―anarchist activities‖ but ―out of his own will‖ as imposed by the Greek government. His departure from Greece via Corfu was instantly communicated to Istanbul with relief by Rifaat Bey who got definite information from the consul general of the Ottoman Empire in Corfu. He landed in Brindisi, and this was reported by the Ottoman embassy in Rome. Simultaneously, Salih Münir Bey, the ambassador to France was informed that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha might be on his way to France. The exchange of dispatches included brainstorming on how to react to Mahmud Celaleddin‘s prospective arrival in France. The embassy in Rome kept Istanbul informed continuously until Mahmud Celaleddin left Italy for Switzerland. His activities in Switzerland, where he tried to organize the Young Turks in Geneva under his leadership, were followed very closely by the Ottoman consul general in Geneva, Baron Richthofen. Baron Richthofen sent regular and bulky reports to Istanbul on the moves of Mahmud Celaleddin.

The principal reason for the panic that emerged with the desertion of Mahmud Celaleddin was the sympathy expressed by European public opinion towards him. The European press portrayed Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha as a liberal and an able opponent of Abdülhamid who might challenge and seize his authority as he was acknowledged to be capable of such a takeover due to his impressive political background, intellectual credentials, and royal marriage.

Since his pro-British sympathies were well known, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha contacted Britain support. These maneuvers alarmed Abdülhamid who feared Mahmud Celaleddin would ―translat(e) it into a movement of the pro-British wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy and instructed Ottoman diplomats to scrutinize the affairs of his brother in- law. Later, the palace tempted Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha to return with an offer of

£ 50,000 and shares in the concession that he had been trying to acquire for a British company. Later in England, Anthopulos Pasha made him a new offer, and finally Turhan Pasha added some inducement in order to persuade him to return.‖⁸²⁰ Although Abdülhamid failed to convince his brother in-law to return, his diplomatic efforts enabled the British to give a cold reception to his request for support. Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha‘s efforts to seek assistance from Germany and France also failed. Mahmud Celaleddin‘s desertion resulted in one of the most coordinated and extensive flurries of Ottoman diplomatic activity involving various diplomatic posts in Europe.

Although regular reporting of the subversive activities of the Young Turks was a permanent task of the diplomatic representatives, the number of reports on subversive activities exploded in 1898 and declined by 1905. The years 1900, 1901, and 1902 were years of heightened panic and tension as we can observe from the unprecedented amount of work devoted to the subversive activities in these three years. These years were also the years of Abdülhamid‘s aggressive purge of the Young Turks. After Abdülhamid successfully countered the Young Turks, things calmed down from 1902 onwards. Nevertheless, the tracking of any Ottoman citizen within the area of responsibility of any diplomatic post continued to be a primary concern regardless of the potential threat the individual in question posed. Students, merchants, and others were to be tracked with equal diligence.

Salih Münir Pasha in Paris was the chief antagonist in the eyes of the Young Turks. He was the willing master spy of the sultan and pleased Abdülhamid with his impressive service.⁸²¹ Salih Münir Pasha played the role of the intermediary between Abdülhamid and European diplomatic representatives by using his personal diplomacy and became a

⁸²⁰ Hanioğlu, Şükrü. ibid, p. 143.

⁸²¹ For a bleak portrait of Salih Münir Pasha, see Fesch, Paul, Abdülhamid‟in Son Günlerinde İstanbul, İstanbul: Pera, 1999, pp. 81-89.

confident of the sultan.⁸²² Being the son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who was a high- ranking bureaucrat and Minister of Public Works in the Hamidian age, probably helped in gaining the trust of the sultan. He was rewarded for his loyalty with his long tenure as the Ottoman ambassador in Paris from 1895 until the fall of Abdülhamid. He chased the Young Turks carefully on every occasion and reported all their malice to his master. He was responsible also for Switzerland and Belgium. He tracked down the Young Turk committees in Geneva with equal determination as well.⁸²³ However, Salih Münir Pasha was no subservient loyalist. He was also a master of double-dealing. He asked for pay for informing the sultan of the subversive activities of the Young Turks. Unless he was pleased financially, he preferred to keep the information for himself. Moreover, he also invented conspiracies to squeeze money out of the sultan. The privileged ambassador visited Istanbul several times a year as he managed to keep his halo of immunity. His capacity to intrigue rendered the Yıldız Palace incapable of subordinating him. He succeeded in keeping the trust of the sultan.

Not surprisingly, he was dismissed immediately after the takeover of the Young Turks. He was degraded, and his title of ―Pasha‖ was revoked. He was persecuted for his dealings, and his possessions were confiscated. He was forced to leave the Ottoman Empire. He was denied a pension until 1913.⁸²⁴ Only in 1925 he could return to Turkey.⁸²⁵ Salih Münir Pasha was one of the few victims of the Young Turks as he was one of the prominent symbols and arch-villains of the corrupt regime of Abdülhamid in the eyes of Young Turks. He was also the only major figure from the diplomatic service who encountered such a demonization. Apparently, he was purged and eliminated not for ideological reasons, but for personal maneuverings. The diplomatic service in general was relatively free of the disgrace of cronyism with the corrupt regime. The governors and military officers had much more chance to promote their own interests and benefit from the regime.

⁸²² İsmail Kemal Bey, The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey, London: Constable, p. 150.

⁸²³ Hanioğlu, Şükrü. The Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 161-2.

⁸²⁴ BOA, MV 174/62, 1331 Ra. 11.

⁸²⁵ Birinci, Ali, Tarihin Gölgesinde: Meşahir-i Meçhuleden Birkaç Zat, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001, p. 91.

In comparison, the Ottoman diplomatic service never enjoyed the prestige and privileges of the German diplomatic service within the autocracy that would have enabled them to be one of the pillars of the autocracy.⁸²⁶

Although the toughest and most extensive work was performed by the Paris embassy, all the other embassies were carefully tracking any Young Turk activity and their contacts within their areas of responsibility. Necib Melhame, the brother of the ill-reputed Selim Melhame, was appointed as the undersecretary to the embassy to Paris with the specific mission of ―buying‖ Young Turks. However, his corruption obliged the French government to declare Necib Melhame ―persona non grata‖, and he was deported. Although Abdülhamid appointed his favorite as the Commissioner to Bulgaria, his corruption ended with the Bulgarian government‘s deportation of Necib Melhame, declaring him again persona non grata.⁸²⁷ Gadban Efendi and Necib Melhame, both Christian Arabs, were Abdülhamid‘s special appointments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the specific purpose of tracking down Young Turks, and they acted as Abdülhamid‘s personal informants and intelligence officers. Nevertheless, except for these figures, Abdülhamid did not interfere with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

An important point we have to address is the personal convictions and views of the members of the diplomatic service. The considerably high number of diplomats who joined the Young Turks makes us think that, apart from their obligation to perform their office work and their concern for future promotions, diplomats had not much enthusiasm and conviction in tracking down the Young Turks. Beginning from Kanipaşazade Rifat Bey, a scribe in the Paris embassy who joined Namık Kemal and his entourage when they left the

 

 

⁸²⁶ For a comparison, see the immense influence of Prince Eulenburg, ―the best friend of the kaiser‖, on the kaiser, Röhl, John C.G. ―Philipp Eulenburg, the Kaiser‘s Best Friend‖, in The Kaiser and his Court, John C.G. Röhl, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 28-69. Apparently, there was no equivalent of Prince Eulenburg in the Ottoman diplomacy. Furthermore, such an influence and affinity is unimaginable given the different social status and social prestige of the ministries of foreign affairs in these two countries.

⁸²⁷ For Necib Melhame‘s short diplomatic career, see Kırmızı, Abdülhamid. “Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrımüslimler”, unpublished MA thesis, Hacettepe University,1998, p. 48.

Ottoman Empire for Paris, many others opted to join the Young Turks.⁸²⁸ Samipaşazade Sezai, while working in the İstişare Odası (Counseling Office) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided to join the Young Turks and moved to Paris in 1901.⁸²⁹ Reşid Sadi Bey, the chief secretary of the London embassy, participated in the conspiratorial meeting organized by Prince Sabahaddin and İsmail Kemal in London in 1903.⁸³⁰ The observation that these officials seemed indifferent and lacking any conviction while performing their professional duties seems valid for the entire Hamidian bureaucracy as can be deduced from the memoirs of the officials as suggested previously. Of course, it is dangerous to make any such generalization. Many other officials, who were generally older and scions of the first Tanzimat generation, were loyal, not necessarily to the person of the sultan, but to the idea of the Ottoman polity. Lastly, careerism also had to be a decisive motivation in generating loyalty and conservative attitudes. It would be more accurate to reconstruct the conflict between the Young Turks and the palace not as an exclusively ideological clash, but a function of the unfulfilled expectancies of the newly rising educated generation, who felt that their merits and their superior Western-style education were not rewarded adequately, vis-a-vis those who owed their social status and offices to traditional and patrimonial loyalties, connections, and old-style education. Once the new generation were satisfied, they were prone to abandon their opposition and keep their personal opinions to themselves unlike the Russian opposition where the opponents of the regime were forced to give up their relationship with and loyalties to the regime completely.

After a compromise was reached between Abdülhamid and the Young Turks, ―İshak Sukuti and Abdullah Cevdet became medical doctors at the Ottoman embassies in Rome and Vienna; soon after, Tunalı Hilmi was appointed scribe to the Ottoman embassy in Madrid.‖⁸³¹ The age old, pre-modern Ottoman practice of appointing dissidents to state offices illustrates the complicated nature of politics. Abdülhamid could be confident that

⁸²⁸ Davison, Roderick, ibid, pp. 212-13.

⁸²⁹ ―Sezai (Samipaşazade)‖, Tanzimat‘tan Bugüne Edebiyatçılar Ansiklopedisi, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001, vol. II, p. 735.

⁸³⁰ Ali Haydar Midhat, Osmanlı‟dan Cumhuriyet‟e Hatıralarım, İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2008, p. 176.

⁸³¹ Hanioğlu, Şükrü, Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 134.; Ateş, Sabri. Tunalı Hilmi Bey, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009, p. 67.

these Young Turks would not confuse the minds of the staff in the embassies. His confidence derived not from his trust in the ideological and personal perfection of the staff in the embassies but from his recognition that the Young Turks would immediately cease to propagate their subversive ideas once they were subordinated to the palace. For example, one report suggested that if Kadri Bey, who had previously been a contributor to the subversive Saday-ı Millet (Voice of the People) published in Bucharest and was subsequently appointed as consul to Kraguyevaç, was not paid his salary, he would go back to Bucharest and continue his subversive activities.⁸³²

Abdülhamid followed the same policy with regard to Halil Halid. Halil Halid departed from the Ottoman Empire for Britain to pursue his opposition politics and worked for the opposition newspaper of Selim Faris printed in London. He was persuaded by Abdülhamid in 1897 to quit the newspaper and to be employed as the second secretary in the Ottoman embassy to London.⁸³³

In the previous chapter, it had been pointed out that sharing the same social milieu, experiencing similar processes of socializations and therefore being part of the same state elite, Young Turks could be recruited in the embassies upon deference to the sultan. The world of Ahmet İhsan (as depicted in the previous chapter), the Young Turks, and the embassies was a familiar/habitual one in which conflicts and compromises were more personal than we may appreciate from outside and thus could be reconciliated in personal level.⁸³⁴ The tone and discourses employed in the ―submission letters‖ of the Young Turks can be analyzed in this regard. In them, they were enforced to depict themselves as

⁸³² BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 30/62, 1316 Ş. 25.

⁸³³ Şirin, İbrahim & Kılıç, Musa, ―Halil Halid Efendi ve Londra Sefaretine Dair bir Layiha‖, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, n.18(2005), p. 396. For more information on Halil Halid, see Öztürk, Kurtuluş. Cambridge‟de Bir Türk Eğitimci, unpublished MA thesis, Marmara University, 2005.

⁸³⁴ One striking illustration of the primacy of personal and kinship over ideology is the closeness of Mehmed Bey and his uncle Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was portrayed by the Young Ottomans as the arch-reactionary enemy of the Young Turks and any progress whatsoever. Mehmed Bey, the most radical and a partially anarchist member of the Young Ottomans, developed good relations with his uncle after his uncle became Grand Vizier. He supported his uncle and became his bridge to the Young Ottomans, who were frustrated by his appointment to the post of Grand Vizier. (See Mardin, Şerif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 62-3.)

wrongly rebelled to the order in which they were taken care of and thus breached the code of conduct of this cultural intimate world. ⁸³⁵ Although, apparently this discourse is imposed on them, given that Young Turks predominantly came from the same social milieu (or at least trained in schools where they experienced a similar socialization process and were assimilated to this culture) reconciliation with them and recruitment of the apologetic Young Turks in the embassies was possible. Thus, the Hamidian regime could develop its mechanisms of repression without ever using physical violence. The executions the Young Turks committed after the suppression of the Incident of March of 31 heralded the beginning of a new era in which political disagreements were no more seen as an intrafamily problem, but genuine, irreconcilable political enmities. Therefore, in this new world, there was no room for compromise as the legitimacy of politics was acknowledged and ―age of politics‖ had emerged.

 

 

 

5.3.  Connecting Two Worlds Apart

 

The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unique in the sense that it functioned as the intermediary institution between the ―foreigners‖ and ―Ottomans‖, between ―Muslims‖ and ―non-Muslims‖, and between ―provincial Ottoman officials‖ and

―high-ranking bureaucrats in Istanbul‖ as it coordinated the implementation of the Ottoman

―reform‖ (i.e., reform of the situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire) in an interactive bargaining between the parties.⁸³⁶ The local officials reported their implementation of the ―reform‖ as well as the general situation regarding the relations between Muslims, Christians, and the state. Not surprisingly, most reports were optimistic regarding the implementation and the results of the ―reforms‖. On the other hand, many

⁸³⁵ For example, for the ―submission letter‖ of Mizancı Murad in 1897, see Emil, Birol,

Mizancı Murad Bey, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009, pp. 149-150.

⁸³⁶ For the genesis and development of the Armenian imbroglio in the Ottoman diplomacy throughout Hamidian era, see Küçük, Cevdet. Osmanlı Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı 1878-1897, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1994. Also see Şaşmaz, Musa, British Policy and the Application of Reforms for Armenians in Eastern Anatolia 1877-1897, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000.

complaints were voiced by the missionaries, the representatives of the local churches, and the consuls of the European powers, and these needed to be communicated to the offices in charge or to be reviewed by the Ministry itself.⁸³⁷

Of course, the ministry also collected reports from the local governmental offices (governorships, district administrations, military garrisons, police) reporting the subversive military, political, and non-political activities of Armenians, the communications and relations between the foreign consuls and the Armenians, et cetera. These reports were transmitted to the Prime Ministry. In short, the ministry was in the center of a web of communications between distant parties. At the same time, it conveyed communications to alleviate the situation and to execute the coordination of the progress of the counter- insurgency by managing its international dimensions. For example, with the 1900s, Roumelia became a very important concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It transmitted the international dynamics of the Roumelian problem and coordinated the pursuit of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian brigands moving back and forth between the Ottoman Empire and their ―homelands abroad‖.⁸³⁸ In the correspondence of the Ministry, Roumelia emerged as a priority issue with the end of the 1890s. The Roumelian problem was a multilayered and multi-faceted one in which diplomatic, political, law and order, and ideological dimensions were intertwined. Therefore, it needed the instant follow-up of various dynamics simultaneously.

This task of the Ministry regarding the non-Muslims partly derived from the fact that the supervision and administration of the Ottoman non-Muslim millets had been managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1876. “Mezahip Odası” (later called Deva-i Hariciye Kitabeti) was established to administer the records of the non-Muslim millets and coordinate their relations with the state. Mezahip Odası was also charged with handling the legal disputes among non-Muslims and Muslims.⁸³⁹ ―Mezahip Odası” was transferred to

⁸³⁷ For the constant follow-up on the turmoil the Christians (and predominantly Armenians) had experienced by the British military consuls throughout Anatolia, see DeVore, Ronald Marvin, British Military Consuls in Asia Minor 1878-1882, unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1973. Also see Hans-Lukas Kieser, Iskalanmış Barış, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005.

⁸³⁸ See BOA, HR.SYS 1132/1, 19 February 1903.

⁸³⁹ ―Hariciye Nezareti‖, DIA.

the Ministry of Justice in 1877 with all the tasks of the office maintained due to the recognition that non-Muslims were subjects of the Ottoman Empire like the Muslims.⁸⁴⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs partially acted as the overseer of the ―reforms‖ due to its intermediary role between the clashing parties.

Given the interconnectedness of the external and internal politics of the Ottoman Empire, it is hard to perceive the Ottoman Foreign Ministry as merely the coordinator of foreign relations. For example, the concerns of the Inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia were a major preoccupation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Ministry corresponded with the relevant embassies to track necessary information to inform and assist the inspectorship.⁸⁴¹ Apparently, the inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia is a good example of the interconnectedness of domestic and international politics. Nevertheless, the Inspectorship of Province of Roumelia was not the only Ottoman governmental office assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Any governmental office in need of information was provided with that information and logistics by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, this was one of the crucial responsibilities of the Ministry. Security concerns of the Dahiliye were an important task of the Prime Ministry. The

―şekavet‖ (brigandage) activities of Balkan nationalists were tracked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the Dahiliye.⁸⁴²

The Foreign Ministry conveyed the dispatches of the embassies to the relevant ministries (predominantly Dahiliye and Zabtiye) through the Prime Ministry.⁸⁴³ The ministries and the prime ministry were also in touch with the Foreign Ministry for attaining the necessary information and consultation. These included the reliability of individuals of foreign nationalities (as well as the Christians of Ottoman nationality regarding their

⁸⁴⁰  Demirel,  Fatmagül,  Adliye  Nezaretinin  Kuruluşu  ve  Faaliyetleri  (1876-1914),

unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2003, p. 54.

⁸⁴¹ For example, see folders BOA, HR.SYS 1622 to 1636.

⁸⁴² For example see BOA, DH.MKT, 474/60 (1319 Z. 29) for the communiqué of the Dahiliye Nezareti requesting the governorships to dispatch the şekavet incidents to the MFA on daily basis.

⁸⁴³ For example, the dispatch from the Athens embassy submitted to the Prime Ministry by the MFA reports the plans of the Armenian revolutionaries in Athens to instigate a rebellion in Istanbul. BOA, A.MKT.MHM 630/20, 1314 Ca 2..

possible activities and connections abroad), possible foreign contacts of the local activists, et cetera.

It is important to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire had a very centralized organization in which every communication was passed through the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry was informed of any communication between any two governmental agencies.⁸⁴⁴ The Prime Ministry was acting in the name of the sultan, and this status endowed the Prime Ministry with immense power. The organizational structure of the Sublime Porte was instituted taking the Prime Ministry as the center and the ministries as conductors of daily business rather than independent bodies. Thus, it was no coincidence that the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs were both working in the building complex of the Prime Ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its routine cannot be dissociated from the other governmental offices. This is true also with regard to its ideological build up as reflected in the official documents and correspondence.

 

 

 

5.4.  From Sedition to Anarchism: Enemies of the State

 

The Hamidian official language used when referring to Armenian affairs was strikingly ―archaic‖. As Grigor Suny has observed, we cannot assess the Turkish-Armenian conflicts as the outcome of ―two competing nationalisms‖ but rather between the rising Armenian nationalism and ―state imperialists‖ who were ambivalent and vexed facing a threat they could not comprehend in an age of nationalism.⁸⁴⁵ The official language is not only dehumanizing, but also self-confidently and arrogantly state-centric. First of all, in the

⁸⁴⁴ See BOA, A.MKT.MHM 617/41, 1324 C 13. Terşabuk, who had lived in Paris for several years and had just returned to Mersin where his relatives resided, was arrested with his relatives. An interrogation was conducted simultaneously by Zabtiye, Dahiliye (Governorship of Adana), and Hariciye, which requested an investigation of Terşabuk‘s possible political activities in France. All the correspondences are coordinated by the Prime Ministry. Also see Akyıldız, Ali. Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p. 47.

⁸⁴⁵Suny, Ronald Grigor. ―Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Armenians, Turks and the End of the Ottoman Empire‖, in In God‟s Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century, Bartov, Omer & Mack, Phyllis (eds.), New York: Berghahn, 2001, pp. 24-5.

eye of the Ottoman bureaucrat, Armenian disorders were “Ermeni fesadı denilen asar-ı şekavet” (signs of brigandage known as the Armenian conspiracy). Armenian activity was imagined and defined as merely brigandage in its pre-modern and pre-political sense. Thus, the response to the Armenian militancy was police action. The Ottoman embassies and consulates were to undertake police action such as informing Istanbul regarding the moves of the Armenians and demanding the persecution of the Armenians by the host countries. Thus, no agency was conceded to Armenians. As indicated previously, this perception was equally applicable to any of the rebellious ethnic groups such as Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians and derived from the state-centric vision of the Ottoman bureaucratic world. “Yüz bulmak” was a frequent official label depicting the attitude of the non-Muslim communities who were to be only stimulated and manipulated by external forces.⁸⁴⁶

The innocent Armenian folk who were yet to be ―encouraged‖ by external forces was carefully dissociated from the Armenian “tertibat-ı fesadiyye‖ (conspiratorial organization) in an imperial benevolence.⁸⁴⁷ This was because, as the developing official discourse argued, the Armenian community lived peacefully and faced no difficulty in practicing its religion and religious ceremonies with the grace of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the Armenian brigandage was irrelevant.⁸⁴⁸ Nevertheless, probably partially for reasons of practicality, Armenian militants in official correspondence were described simply as

―Armenians‖, which establishes an image that ethnicizes political activity, includes all the members of the ethnic group, and subsumes them within a single politicized community. Thus, although the official discourse uses an archaic state-centric language that curses those who were not grateful for the benevolence of Ottoman rule, it transforms through repetition into an ethnically sensitive state-nationalist if not nationalist language.

It is interesting to compare and contrast the language used between the Ottoman governmental offices and between Ottoman officialdom and their foreign counterparts. The Armenian bands were termed as ―erbab-ı fesad‖, “eşkiya”, “Ermeni fesadesi”, “erbab-ı

⁸⁴⁶ For Armenians, see BOA,Y.EE 167/7; for Serbians, see BOA, İ.HUS 54/1320.

⁸⁴⁷ BOA, HR.SYS, 2829/47, 15 February 1894.

⁸⁴⁸ ―Cümlenin ma‟lumu olduğu vechile tebe‟a-i şahaneden bulunan Ermeniler mine‟l kadim Hükümet-i Seniyyenin saye-i adl ü re‟fetinde asude-nişin (ve) emn ü eman olarak her hususda dare-i emniyyetde ve mezhep ve ayin bahsinde de serbesti-i kamil içinde yaşamış‖. (p.2)

iğtişaş”, ―Ermeni müfsedatı‖, “fesad komiteleri” (intriguers, brigands, Armenian conspiracy/sedition, conspiratorial committees) in the interdepartmental correspondence of the Ottoman state.⁸⁴⁹ The label of ―erbab-ı fesad‖ and others were dropped in the dispatches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed to its foreign counterparts. However, it looks that ―erbab-ı fesad‖, a specific concept meaningful only in its Ottoman/Islamic background was also excluded in the (French language) intraministerial correspondence of the Foreign Ministry and not translated into French. The same was true with regard to the language employed in reporting on the Young Turks. For example a dispatch sent to Abdülhamid in Turkish from the Ottoman consul general in Geneva defines Geneva as ―her kısım erbab-ı müfsedat ve melanetin ilticagahı⁸⁵⁰‖ (the haven of all kinds of seditionists). Apparently, these terms were very emotionally loaded and bound to lose their specific references when translated into French and more so when translated into diplomatic French. The same dispatch defined the journal ―Osmanlı‖ as ―Osmanlı nam melanetkarane”.⁸⁵¹ We observe that the use of French as the language of communication tempered the tone of the discourse as any language was another medium in which the discourses were reconstructed according to the references of the language. The French language with its ―civilizationist‖ and ―objective/rational‖ sounding nature in the eyes of the Ottoman bureaucrats remained aloof from the discourse and vocabulary of the Ottomans. The fact that it was accessible to any foreigner should also have forced the producer of the texts to accommodate to a new mental milieu and develop strategies specific to the language of conduct. In the French-language reports, the erbab-ı fesad turned into Armenian anarchists, transforming the age old seditionist and unruly subjects of the Muslim polity into modern conspirators aiming to destroy the social order.⁸⁵²

 

⁸⁴⁹ For example, see BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 9/69, 1306 N. 19.

⁸⁵⁰ Quoted in Ateş, Sabri. Tunalı Hilmi Bey, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009, p. 59.

⁸⁵¹ Quoted in Ateş, Sabri, ibid, p. 59.

⁸⁵² The volumes published by the State Archives Directory provide us many examples of correspondence regarding the Armenian activists abroad written in French. See Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002; Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık

The 1890s were also the peak of anarchist activism and assassinations throughout Europe (and the United States). It was a preeminent concern of the European governments. The 1890s were a decade in which several heads of the state had been assassinated. Sadi Carnot, Umberto I, and McKinley were murdered by anarchist assassins following the killing of Alexander II in 1881 by the Narodnaya Volya.⁸⁵³ The activities of the anarchists, as well as the persecution of the anarchists, were seen as important news to be dispatched to Istanbul. Anarchism was a common threat to the states, the established order, and the ruling elites of Europe. This aspect was underlined by the Ottoman diplomats as they were aware that all the established elites were floating on the same ship. Such an understanding was developed as early as the Congress of Vienna in which the representatives of the European powers agreed to intervene in the case of a popular unrest or rebellion. This policy was implemented many times between 1815 and 1830 before such interventionism became unproductive and even counterproductive.⁸⁵⁴ Given that Armenian Dashnaks, Hncaks, and the Bulgarian IMRO were all influenced by the socialist and anarchist currents and militancy, the Ottoman state aimed to influence European governments by referring to the subversive programs of these movements. The Ottoman state also tried to learn to combat anarchism from the methods and strategies of the European governments.⁸⁵⁵ Regular information was conveyed by the embassies such as the passing of new bills to combat anarchism⁸⁵⁶ and the pursuit of anarchists of various countries.⁸⁵⁷

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2004; Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2006.

⁸⁵³ For the dispatches reporting the murder of Sadi Carnot by an anarchist in June 1894, see BOA, HR.SYS 419/27, 4 July 1894. For the relay of measures taken against the anarchists in the United States by the Ottoman legation in Washington, see BOA, HR.SYS 419/26, 1 July 1894.

⁸⁵⁴ Schenk, H.G. The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, New York: Howard Fertig, 1967,

pp. 214-221.

⁸⁵⁵ For the report dispatched from the embassy to London on cooperation between the Armenians and the Russian nihilists based in London, see BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/13, 1311

B. 5.

⁸⁵⁶ For the dispatch informing the amendment made to the Italian penal code to combat anarchism, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/6, 7 July 1894.

⁸⁵⁷ For the Russian policing of the activities of the nihilists in the United States, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/2, 21 October 1883.

The Russian revolutionaries were also followed and reported ⁸⁵⁸. Anarchism among Italian workers in Istanbul was monitored as well.⁸⁵⁹

The Foreign Ministry was alarmed by the ―anarchist international‖. It pursued not only those who posed a threat to the empire but also those who might present a danger to the other empires and states. This was the undertaking of a responsible state showing solidarity with its fellow states. A certain Alexandre Mikolovich (in French spelling), a Serb by nationality, had left Istanbul for Copenhagen with two bombs for a task he undertook for the Polish revolutionary committee. Due to a request made by the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Ottoman consul general in Copenhagen in early May 1885, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry investigated the activities and connections of the aforementioned revolutionary in Istanbul for two weeks. The investigation concluded that Mikolovich resided in İstanbul at the Hotel Britannia. The Ministry deepened the investigation by requesting the Ottoman legations in Vienna and Budapest to investigate and report on the activities of Mikolovich while he stayed in Vienna.⁸⁶⁰ This case was just one of the examples of the investigation of suspicious anarchists and revolutionaries by the Ottoman Empire, not for its immediate interest and police activities, but for its imperial reflexes and imperial solidarity. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire rightfully expected the other European states to inform Istanbul regarding the Ottoman dissidents and revolutionaries and take action when necessary. The Foreign Ministry investigated various suspicious individuals who were assumed to pose a threat to the public and political order of the Empire. Many Greek nationals and other individuals holding Balkan nationality fell into this category.

The Ottoman establishment was cognizant of the anarchist dispositions of the Armenian revolutionary committees and their links to the anarchist currents in Europe. This dimension facilitated Ottoman demands on the European powers regarding the surveillance of Armenian revolutionaries. Legations abroad were in pursuit of informants to access intelligence. Although there were several irrelevant intelligence reports provided by informants not in the interest of the empire, many other informants notified the Ottoman

⁸⁵⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 24/30, 1313 Za. 6.

⁸⁵⁹ BOA, HR.SYS 1759/3 (correspondences 22 June 1898 to 18 April 1899).

⁸⁶⁰ BOA, HR.SYS 1822/8, 22 May 1885.

representatives regarding the activities of the Armenian revolutionaries abroad.⁸⁶¹ For example the Ottoman embassy to Washington conveyed that Ali Ferruh Bey was informed that a certain Vartan Bulguryan, aged thirty-five, departed New York for Moersina with dynamite, arms, and money.⁸⁶² Another move of Armenian revolutionaries was dispatched from Tblisi. According to the consul in Tblisi, Essad Bey, four Armenian exiled revolutionaries arrived in Tblisi.⁸⁶³ Every small move of the Armenians was meticulously followed.⁸⁶⁴ These accounts display the modern individualist anarchist aspects of the Armenian revolutionaries besides their rural origins and motivations, coming as they did from the poor localities of Ottoman Armenia.

The Ministry was involved extensively in the investigation of the failed assassination of Abdülhamid by a Belgian anarchist in the service of the Armenian revolutionary committees by activating its channels of international communication. The investigation was conducted by requesting the Ottoman legations in various countries, as well as the European embassies in Istanbul, to provide extensive information on the persons involved in or related to the failed assassination. The final report was prepared in light of these communications and information-gathering by a commission and later published as a separate book in 1905.⁸⁶⁵

With the reign of Mahmud II and the Tanzimat, we encounter the emergence of the

―rhetoric of tolerance‖. The Ottoman imperial system of managing religious and confessional groups began to be consecrated as ―tolerance‖, and this concept, which is a very historicized notion, became eternalized and adapted to the classical age of the Ottoman Empire although it was only after 1856 that the non-Muslims were admitted (reluctantly or not) into the political nation. Needless to say, the ―rhetoric of tolerance‖

⁸⁶¹ For a depiction of an Armenian informant visiting the Ottoman embassy to London, see Paker, Esat Cemal, Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952, pp. 21- 22.

⁸⁶² BOA, HR-SYS 1760/18, 20 July 1898.

⁸⁶³ BOA, HR-SYS 1760/19, 21 July 1898.

⁸⁶⁴ Also see the documents collected in the aforementioned three-volume Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri.

⁸⁶⁵ The final report is to be found in the Prime Ministry archives at BOA, HR SYS. 1823/1, 30 September 1905.

was an imperial discourse. It also implies that the maintenance of tolerance is conditioned on the Armenian community‘s tacit consent to the hierarchy between the millets.

―Tolerance‖ is a contract not signed by two equal and legitimate parties but imposed on one of the parties. The Armenian revolutionary organizations had challenged this tacit consent. The conceptualization of the Armenian militarized organizations is also interesting. Rather than being nationalists, they were perceived and indicted for being anarchists and corrupters. Moreover, they were socialists. As has been suggested previously, the rhetoric that was employed by the state described Balkan nationalist movements not as free agents, but as pawns of foreign powers (especially Russia), and not as serving the aspirations of nationhood, but as supporting anarchy and chaos.⁸⁶⁶

Ottoman officialdom denied that nationalism was the motivation of the Armenian organizations. This discourse was careful to differentiate between the corrupting minority of Armenians and the majority of Armenians, who were innocent and loyal subjects of the sultan but who could potentially be led by the corrupting minority due to their naivety (and ignorance). Reproducing the Islamic legal notions of order, peace and war, because the Armenian militant organizations had rebelled against the legitimate order and, therefore, against peace, any violence inflicted on them was perceived as legitimate and even necessary. Within this perception, the Ottoman administrators did not feel that they transgressed the boundaries of legitimacy when they employed undue violence not only on the militants, but also on those who were influenced by them.⁸⁶⁷

The ministry got notifications of the latest activities of the Armenian nationalist organizations from the local governmental offices written in this language and vocabulary. The ministry was supposed to use this information to respond to the international pressure regarding the ―oppression of the Armenians.‖ As expressed above, the reports and dispatches of the Ministry were self-assured of their righteousness and regarded the problems as a matter of discipline and order within a very Islamic and imperial conceptualization. For Abdülhak Hamid, all the articles published under titles such as

⁸⁶⁶ For similar language being used for the Balkan nationalists, see Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, Mir‟at-ı Hakikat, İstanbul: Bereket Yayınevi, 1983.

⁸⁶⁷ For the ―annihilationist mentality‖ of the Tanzimat, see James Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878, Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2000.

―massacres in Anatolia and Roumelia‖ (perpetuated by Turks) were outright blatant libels and only the writers of these articles believed in these lies.⁸⁶⁸ What the Ministry tried to do in its efforts to whitewash the Ottoman policies was the merging of the very traditional discourse imposed by the Islamic legacy and the modern (and European) discourse of rights and liberties. In one regard, the Ministry polished and reinvigorated the very Ottoman discourse and rendered it politically correct and compatible with the modern political discourses of legitimacy. Nevertheless, this was not a distortion, but a rearticulation of the concerns of the Ottoman officialdom in a language more communicable to the European discourses of legitimacy. The Ministry seemed to agree with the premises of these reports sent from the provinces given the fervor expressed in the intra-ministry dispatches against the European interference to the Ottoman Empire and their abuse of the conditions of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the disagreement between the Ottoman officials and the Westerners‘ indictments derived from different perceptions of state, violence, and legitimacy structures. Furthermore, such an encounter is a site where the rhetoric of confrontation was produced and reproduced.⁸⁶⁹

In short, the international dimensions of the Armenian issue display the centrality of the Armenian factor in the constitution of Turkish nationalism. It should also be said that extreme alarm can not be regarded as a symptom of paranoia given what had already happened (the loss of Bulgaria which is another episode constitutive of Turkish nationalism) and what would happen (in the Balkan wars, the loss of Crete, et cetera). Another impact the Armenian events had generated was the frustration the Ottoman officials experienced. Ottoman officialdom regretted the fact that the Westerners only listened to the ―other side‖ and had to surrender to the anti-Ottoman agitation instigated by public opinion. This sentiment of frustration resulted in a gradual rise in anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism throughout the Hamidian era before it became a clear aspect of the

⁸⁶⁸ Abdülhak Hamid… pp. 245-46.

⁸⁶⁹ For a more open account of the distrust of an Ottoman diplomat towards Britain, France, and Russia in their double-dealing and their support and encouragement of militant Armenian nationalism, see the report on the Armenian problem prepared by Münir Süreyya Bey, Münir Süreyya Bey, Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihi, Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2001. Also see Salih Münir Pasha, La Politique Orientale de la Russie, Istanbul: Isis, 2000.

Young Turk regime.⁸⁷⁰ The Armenian factor is decisive in the constitution of Turkish nationalism not only due to the sedition and attacks of the Armenian militants and nationalists against the Ottoman center, but also due to its internationalizing dynamic.

During the Tanzimat, the ―enemy‖ was Russia as it had been for the previous century and a half.⁸⁷¹ Apparently, this enmity had a long history. The Tanzimat maintained the traditional concerns, fears, and anxieties of the Ottomans which were primarily based on the possibility of an attack from the neighbor to the north. What we observe with the Hamidian era is the alteration of the modes of enmities and the emergence of an unprecedented mode of enmity. First of all, this novel mode of enmity was deracinated, diffused, and unspecified. It did not have a particular, attainable, and identifiable focus. It was rather a perpetuated perception of immediate threat from anywhere and everywhere. Constant caution and vigilance had to be maintained to face this new mode of enmity. The principal object of this enmity was the emerging and rising threat and perceived threat from the non-Muslims and their economic advancement. The hostilities perpetrated by the non-Muslim brigands and the unruliness of the non-Muslim populace were not new. The methods to subdue these disturbances were not new, either. However, the intensification, politicization, and internationalization of these unrests created a completely novel situation which triggered an intense fear and panic on the side of the Ottoman center. Friendly Britain, a country adored in the Tanzimat, revoked its support of the Ottoman polity and its reform program. This development encouraged the non-Muslim militants and activists. It also created an intense disappointment and frustration for the Ottomans. The tension

⁸⁷⁰ For a strong dose of anti-imperialism already apparent in the Hamidian era in two diplomats serving in the London embassy, see Halil Halid, The Crescent Versus the Cross, London, 1907. For the anti-imperialism of Abdülhak Hamid, see his play ―Finten‖, and particularly the introduction he wrote for ―Finten‖, published in Servet-i Fünün for the first time in 1898. For the introduction to his play, see Abdülhak Hamid Tarhan, Tiyatroları 3, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998, pp. 156-59.

⁸⁷¹ For a study written by an eminent diplomat that reconstructs the course of the history of Tanzimat diplomacy as the Ottoman efforts to resist Russian maneuvers by means of diplomacy, reform, and military force; Salih Münir Pasha, La Politique Orientale De La Russie, Istanbul: Isis, 2000 (originally published in Lausanne in 1918). In line with his contemporaries, Salih Münir Pasha does not develop a particular antipathy towards Britain and France. For him, the Russians were the chief enemy of the Ottomans and were behind the internal unrest within the Empire.

between the Ottomans and Britain was not similar to the hostility between the Ottomans and Russia. This hostility was not limited to the military realm. The traditional modes of enmity as had existed between the Ottomans and the despicable Russians were no longer applicable in this new world. Domestic policy and foreign policy were no longer separate. Foreign policy could no longer be isolated. In these circumstances, a deep mistrust developed towards the outer world as the only genuine concern of the Ottoman center was to hold on to what it already had, and the outer world seemed not to sympathize with the defensive concerns of the Ottoman Empire. Nobody was a ―friend‖ of the Ottomans, and no one was to be trusted. On the domestic scene, no Christian (and in later stages no non- Turk) was to be trusted or relied upon for cooperation. Therefore, the Hamidian era gave birth to a constant fear, the perception of an imminent threat, and the demonization of the outer world. Apparently, it was the diplomats who experienced this frustration personally.

 

 

 

5.5.  The Dusty Desk of the Weberian Bureaucrat?

 

Unsurprisingly, the most detailed, meticulous and informative political reports were dispatched from the London embassy. This was obviously due to the fact that Britain was the most important country regarding European affairs in general and Ottoman affairs in particular. These regular dispatches were also superior in their content and in their level of analysis. They were longer as well. They were also prepared not to report recent developments or incidents, but to pen down on regular basis summaries of all the latest developments and debates worth considering. In that regard, they were much more professional, informative, and routinized. Other evidence indicating the level of professionalism was the absence of any press sources. Presenting numerous journal articles, which was an important preoccupation of the Ottoman diplomatic service, was a sign of lack of substantive sources and the capacity to develop an analysis of its own. These reports surveyed British politics, regularly reporting the latest political developments, and were centered on the parliament. It is also noteworthy of mention that

the British reports concentrated much more on parliamentary politics, rather than the execution of cabinet policies.⁸⁷²

The alignments in the parliament made up a significant portion of the political reports. The two parties and their policies were carefully examined as the Ottoman diplomatic corps were attentive to the shift in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Different predispositions of the two parties were observed with maximum attention. Of course, Gladstone, whose name had been associated with the anti-Turkish campaign he launched during the Russo-Turkish War in 1876-77, thereby gaining notoriety in the eyes of the Ottoman state elite, had created policies with enduring ramifications for the Ottomans. From then on, his stance became a principle reference for liberal politics with very negative connotations. The efforts of Armenian committees based in London to contact him and attempt to engage him in their campaign against the Ottoman state were followed with disquiet.⁸⁷³ In the 1880s, the Irish problem triggered a division within the liberal ranks as the liberals who were against ―Home Rule‖ left the party to form a liberal unionist group. This group was more sympathetic to the Ottoman cause. This arduous conflict was carefully noted by the London embassy.⁸⁷⁴ The dispatches display an overt sympathy towards the Conservative Party as opposed to the Liberal Party, and the electoral and parliamentary successes of the Liberals were relayed with unease.

Apparently, the delicacies of British politics had a prominent impact on British foreign policy. The intricate and multi-dimensional issues had been well scrutinized and analyzed by the embassy reports which were masterfully prepared in a manner far superior to the reporting of any other embassy. In these reports, domestic political developments and foreign policy orientations were analyzed in tandem. It is a question to what extent the diplomats and administrators of the Ottoman Empire could analyze the impact of domestic politics and party politics in the making of foreign policy. Given that, Abdülhamid was

⁸⁷² Nevertheless, the quality of political reports of the Ottoman embassy is disappointing vis-a-vis the European political reports dispatched to their capitals. See the description of the Austria-Hungarian embassy in London in Bridge, F.R. Great Britain and Austria- Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p. 22.

⁸⁷³ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 12/70, 1308 C. 1; 12/73, 1308 C. 6.

⁸⁷⁴ See the political report; BOA, HR.SYS 582/19, 1 December 1891.

nominating the prime ministers considering the attitudes and dispositions of the foreign powers; this dimension should have been realized to a certain extent although dynamics of party politics and authoritarian polities are apparently very different.

Strictly technical analyses were employed by the embassies. An exception to the cold- bloodedness of the reports was a report dispatched after the passing of the Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons in 1893. The dispatch regarded this new bill as, ―a formidable and dangerous innovation leveled against the English ‗ancient constitution‘ ‖. The dispatch suggested that this bill would probably be vetoed by the House of Lords. The dispatch also noted the hostile attitude of the ―Gladstonians‖ during the parliamentary sessions against the opponents of the bill⁸⁷⁵. After summarizing the content of the bill, the dispatch ended with the analysis that Gladstone and the radicals leaned on the newly emerging and developing class of laborers and the lower orders. It was noted that the role of this class was so significant that it had the power to shape the composition of the House of Commons. Apparently developing a class perspective, the embassy observed the transformation of British politics due to its democratization, which was alarming for the Ottoman Empire. In the dispatch, the fervent anti-Gladstonianism which will be a recurring theme in Ottoman intellectual formation, was very strong, seeing Gladstone as the figure who was responsible for the collapse of the traditional British-Ottoman common understanding.⁸⁷⁶ Furthermore, the new radicals (many of them from the free professions and not from the ―landed interests‖) who were transforming the traditional Whig character of the Liberal Party were followed with unease. The Ottoman diplomatic service knew well that they could speak and compromise with people coming from a similar social and cultural background.

One remarkable aspect of the nature of the political reports of the embassies was their

―mechanisticism‖. By ―mechanisticism‖, we mean the dull and technical accounting of the highly politically sensitive and even precarious matters. The routine follow-up of the St. Petersburg embassy of Pan-Slavism or the routine follow-up of the Dreyfus Affair by the Paris embassy display such a remarkable ―dullness‖. Reading the political reports, it is as if

⁸⁷⁵ BOA, HR.SYS 582/40, 22 April 1893.

⁸⁷⁶ Also see the views and remarks of Abdülhak Hamid, a diplomat with a very long tenure in the Ottoman embassy to London. Abdülhak Hamid… p. 250.

the Pan-Slavs were not agitated Russian expansionist warmongers yearning for Russian domination over the Ottomans and as if the Dreyfus affair had not divided France into two over a very hard-edged and emotional dispute. Loads of dispatches reporting the Pan- Slavist meetings and organizations and Pan-Slavists‘ articles published in the prominent newspapers and journals of Russia (with the copies of the articles included in the files as an appendix) were blithely penned down as mere informative accounts.⁸⁷⁷ Likewise, issues such as the Irish problem in Britain were recounted constantly as if it had no Ottoman repercussions, as if it were only a matter of technical dispute between the conservatives and liberals, and, within the liberal party, among the radical and liberal unionist factions. These observations would lead us to assume that the Ottoman diplomats were cold-blooded technical experts, not moved by national interests of any sort. These dispassionate and boring reports that contained only factual information without any passionate comments exemplify the deskwork of a Weberian bureaucrat. The reports were predominantly fact- based. That is to say, the reports were composed to convey the latest developments without making pretentious judgments. This is a distinction between a bureaucrat and a politician. The bureaucrat leaves the assessment to the reader of the report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The same observation can be made also for the reporting of the provincial administrators who developed a new language towards their ―subjects‖. The 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic language endorsed the dispassionate language of its European counterparts which indicates a radical break from their predecessors. However, in light of the extra-documentary information we have, we must assume otherwise.⁸⁷⁸ How to assess this striking contradiction?

As has been suggested, the same observation can be made for military officers as well. The professionalism of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was already discussed. His field work

 

 

⁸⁷⁷ See political reports dispatched from the St. Petersburg embassy, BOA, HR.SYS 1184/1 to 63; BOA, HR.SYS 1185/1 to 72.

⁸⁷⁸ For example the regular articles Samipaşazade Sezai wrote in the Paris-based Young Turk journal Şuray-ı Ümmet after he joined Young Turks in Paris in 1901 are clearly in contrast to the dispassionate ambassadorial reports he sent from Madrid after 1908. His Şuray-ı Ümmet articles were heavily loaded with Turkish nationalism and abhorrence towards the ―hypocrisy‖ of the ―West‖.

was to suppress any rising against the imperial order.⁸⁷⁹ The military officers, who were passionate and fervent nationalists by definition, also displayed an impressive professionalism and disinterested documentation of events. They had the habit of documenting everything they deemed necessary and elaborated on them to render their arguments explicable. In short, these military officers were professionals not only in their deskwork, but also in their memoir writings. Kazım Karabekir is arguably the first name to be mentioned in this category. His well-documented massive output goes along with his fervent and aggressive nationalism and militarism.⁸⁸⁰ His output epitomizes the meticulous nature of the deskwork of the military bureaucrats as well as the civil bureaucrats, regardless of their ideological orientations.

 

 

⁸⁷⁹ Another impressive account of a military officer was written by Ahmed İzzet Pasha. Ahmed İzzet Pasha is an interesting figure who had been trusted enough by the Unionists to be appointed as the joint chief of staff, minister of war, and eventually prime minister after the flight of the Unionists in 1918, yet still a man belonging to the age of Abdülhamid. Ahmed İzzet Pasha, who came from the Albanian nobility, epitomizes the value-system of the Hamidian state elite with his liberal, elitist, and conservative attributes, which neither contradict nor restrain each other. Ahmed İzzet Pasha, as he portrays himself in his memoirs, is a hard-working and thoughtful soldier loyal to his state and the values his state represents. Moreover, he is a professional and disciplined (Prussianized) officer who is at the same time a man of the old times as well as a man open and eager for adaptation to new times. His memoirs reflect the world of a soldier who grew up loyal to the old values which he integrated with the values of the new times. In short, the memoirs of Ahmed İzzet Pasha are another impressive account reflecting the professionalism of his generation, which coexisted with the value-system of the Tanzimat and Hamidian world. Ahmed İzzet Pasha, Feryadım, İtanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992-93 (2 volumes) For Ahmed İzzet Pasha, also see Mahmud Kemal İnan, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1950, p. 1973-2028. Mahmud Şevket Pasha may be another figure who exemplifies another curious character although he is much more ―modern‖ and

―Prussianized‖ in comparison to his generation. See Swanson, Glen W. Mahmud Şevket Pasha and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1970.

⁸⁸⁰ Kazım Karabekir‘s works make up more than thirty volumes. However, his output is remarkable not in its gigantic size but in his tidiness and his delicate documentation of the material he covers. Kazım Karabekir may be regarded as a militarist who believed in an autarchic Turkey dedicated to the well-being of Turks, as can be deduced from his works. However, regardless of his ideological predispositions, he exemplifies a hard-working and disciplinized Weberian officer. A similar observation can be made for other military officers as well. Nutuk is another masterpiece of a Weberian military bureaucrat.

At a time when a written text was perceived as semi-sacred and seen as having the power to reveal the truth and only the truth, writing was a serious and intense activity, very different from the experience of writing one century later.⁸⁸¹ ―Writing‖ had an authoritative quality. Likewise, ―writing‖ as a formal activity was a ―serious‖ task to be undertaken accordingly. Its significance diminished drastically in an age of informality and relativization of truth. A text had an unprecedented authoritative power in the 19th century before its diminution in the 20th century.

The aesthetics of handwriting was also a very important concern for the quality of the document. Elegance and mastery in handwriting were not seen as technicalities of secondary importance, but were perceived as skills of primary importance, worthy of being acquired. The aesthetics and quality of their handwriting was an important asset for young diplomats seeking promotion. The young diplomats were assisted by their mentors in developing their handwriting styles and the language used in their dispatches.⁸⁸² Bismarck‘s imposition on the German diplomatic service of stringent standards for meticulous handwriting is well-known. ―A diplomat who wanted to make an impression on the chancellor would also do well to have a scribe whose handwriting pleased him. Even the color of ink and the quality of letterheads fell under the chancellor‘s scrutiny.‖⁸⁸³ Of course, it was not only handwriting that mattered to Bismarck. He was very concerned about the straightforwardness, literary quality,  and elegance of the communiqués.

⁸⁸¹ The very relation between writing, modernity, and bureaucracy is viewed by Herzfeld as follows: ―Writing occupies a pivotal position in this symbolic constellation. The symbol, as well as the instrument of all bureaucratic power, it is, above all, the key to the reification of personal identity. Rather than being asked for a personal name as such, one is just as likely to be asked-especially in formal contexts- pos ghrafese (―how are you written‖). Writing, too, is the instrument of fate‘s irrevocable decrees.‖ Herzfeld, Michael. The Social Production of Indifference, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 139. Apparently, writing no longer possesses the power it used to have in the 19th century.

⁸⁸² Urbach, Karina, Bismarck‟s Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell‟s Mission to Berlin, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 25. The young diplomat Odo Russell was grateful to his mentors, Layard and Hammond, for their assistance and suggestions in developing his writing style.

⁸⁸³ Cecil, Lamar, The German Diplomatic Service 1871-1914, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 242. For the ―especially good‖ handwriting of the British Foreign Office, see the memoirs of Drummond Wolf. Drummond Wolf, Henry, Rambling Recollections, London: Macmillan and Co., 1908, v. I, p. 47.

Formalism was an important concern of the 19th century bureaucrat. The form was considered as important as its content. A fine document had to be perfectly written and correctly constructed in its form. The form itself was important and great care needed to be exercised to perfect its formalism. The form was irrelevant to its content, and it was equally important for the form to be proper for the future careers of the officials and their promotions. The painful process of drafting and then revising the text to perfection through several additional drafts was one of the most tiring and crucial preoccupations of Ottoman officials in all the governmental offices, including the Foreign Ministry.⁸⁸⁴

In short, passion and professionalism are not mutually exclusive. A passionate clerk may pen a dispassionate and formal text. This was how he was trained. The Weberian bureaucrat is not necessarily the soulless desk worker who detaches himself from his passions and identities, but what he tries to imitate is the fictive soulless bureaucrat, the imaginary role model of the 19th century bureaucratic. The reason why the Weberian ideal-type was taken for granted until being questioned recently is that the written evidence and archival documents left to us forces us to assume bureaucratic pretensions as reality. Likewise, the alleged contrast between the deeds and deskwork of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucrat was not a contradiction, but a matter of different modes of expression.

The Ottoman diplomats, who were only a few generations removed from the ―scribes‖, were naturally skilled and learned in the aesthetics of handwriting. The Tanzimat was not a sharp break in which the old ways of conducting statecraft gave way to a new and modern way of conducting statecraft. On the contrary, it took several decades and a few generations for a transition from the traditional scribe to the modern official.⁸⁸⁵ The traditional Ottoman a‟dab (refinement) with the genteel culture of the Tanzimat was

⁸⁸⁴ See Veled Çelebi, Hatıralar: Tekke‟den Meclis‟e, İstanbul: Timaş, 2009, p. 28.

⁸⁸⁵ The examination made by the state to recruit the graduates of the rüştiyes of Süleymaniye and Sultan Ahmed to recruit them in various kalems, as accounted by Aşçı İbrahim Dede, was to measure the level of knowledge of the students and to see the elegance of their handwriting. For Aşçı İbrahim Dede, the students of Süleymaniye were better in terms of knowledge and the students of Sultan Ahmed were better in terms of their elegant handwriting. One exception among the students of Süleymaniye was Ziya (the future Ziya Pasha), who had an impressive handwriting. Aşçı İbrahim Dede, Aşçı Dede‟nin Hatıraları, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2008, v. I, p. 183. Aşçı Dede İbrahim was recruited to the military as a civil official after this examination.

integrated into the making of the Ottoman diplomats‘ culture of conduct in their work. The Tanzimat was not a renunciation of the ancien régime, but a refashioning of it even in its maturity, not only in an ideological sense, but also evident in the bureaucrats‘ work and in the culture of bureaucracy.

 

 

 

5.6.  The World of the Ancien régime Aristocracy: A Shared World

 

Another point to be underlined in the ambassadorial reports is the depiction of political matters at a technical level. The reports did not display the subjectivity, complexity, and intricacy of political matters. The reports were penned down as if there was no room imagined for the ―political‖. This may be seen as unsurprising for an Ottoman official given there was no political space permitted or imagined within the worlds of the Ottoman political imagination. Though, lack of political space in the Ottoman Empire did not prevent any official from making political assessments. As has been suggested previously, this is not simply because no democratic space was permitted by the state. The opponents of the regime did not themselves develop a sense of politics for reasons previously elaborated. The opponents had a non-political political vision in which the deficiency of the Ottoman state derived merely from Hamidian corruption and despotism, and it was believed the situation would be ameliorated once an appropriate and learned policy program was implemented. Such a background rendered the conceptualization of such political notions as ―public opinion‖, ―democratic legitimacy‖, ―pressure groups‖ abstractions, instead of vivid realities. As a conclusion, we may suggest that, this deficit caused the Ottoman Empire to fail to grasp political situations and therefore hindered the development of a realistic and plausible policy in response to the maneuvers of these powers. Parliamentary debates made up an important portion of the reports. Although the ferocious debates in the Ottoman parliament back in 1876-77 were not to be forgotten⁸⁸⁶, the presentation of the parliamentary debates related in the reports seemed like technicalities (maybe analogous to the meetings of Şuray-ı Devlet and other administrative

⁸⁸⁶ For the first Ottoman parliament convened in 1876, see Devereux, Robert, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.

and legal commissions of the Ottoman Empire), rather than political debates with flesh and bone.

Another issue which is overlooked in these reports is economics. Nevertheless, this does not show any deficiency of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment vis-a-vis the European diplomatic services. Indifference to and disregard of economics was a common attitude of the pre-WW I diplomatic establishments, contrary to the Marxian argument that diplomacy was an instrument of the economic interests.⁸⁸⁷ The diplomats had no considerable knowledge of economic matters. However, more importantly, they had no comprehension of the role of economics in international politics. The aristocratic upbringing of the diplomats infused them with disdain towards ―moneyed interests‖. For them, it was not respectable to consider pecuniary matters. This attitude enhanced with the rise of the middle-classes to prominence in the political scene in the nineteenth century. In the culture of diplomats, high politics was only a matter of state politics, and economics had no place in it. Therefore, they had no interest in commercial matters.⁸⁸⁸ The interrelation between politics and economics was yet to be recognized. State affairs and economic affairs were (and should be) two different and unrelated realms, and the former was deemed respectable whereas the later was regarded as embarrassing. ―Curiously

 

 

 

⁸⁸⁷ The quasi-Marxian analysis of imperialism, which was derived from Hobson‘s critique of imperialism, takes it granted that international prerogatives of the European powers were economically motivated and determined. However, there is no empirical data that verifies this Marxian assumption. Many studies conclude that it was not the economic motivations but politico-military motivations that had triggered high imperialism and that the economic benefits of imperialism were negative. For some classic studies on high imperialism, see Fieldhouse, D.K., Economics and Empire1830-1914, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973; Hopkins A.G., Cain P.J. British Imperialism 1688-2000, New York: Longman, 2002; Gallagher J., Robinson R., Deny, A., Africa and the Victorians, London: Macmillan, 1981, Cain, P.J., Harrison, Mark, ―Introduction‖, Imperialism, v. I, p. 1-31, London; New York: Routledge, 2001. For the emergence of the theory that associates imperialism with economic interests, see Koebner, Richard & Schmidt, H.D., Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Word 1840-1960, Cambridge, U.K. : University Press, 1964.

⁸⁸⁸ Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 184.

enough, this anti-commercial bias was possibly strongest in Britain.‖⁸⁸⁹ Even the British consuls, who were to protect the British communities overseas and safeguard/promote British commerce, were appointed not based on their merits and skills regarding commerce, but on patronage and connections. Therefore they failed to provide efficient services to the ―moneyed interests‖. For the consuls and their superiors in London, the chief tasks of the consuls were administrative and judicial matters.⁸⁹⁰ ―British businessmen saw, or thought they saw, a more wholehearted promotion of trading interests by the consuls of their foreign rivals, especially the Germans and Americans, and they demanded the same treatment from their own. For many years British Government resisted any suggestion that its officers should become actively engaged in the promotion of British trade.‖⁸⁹¹ The consular service in the eyes of a contemporary critic in 1903 was a ―harbour of refuge for retired army officers and for failures whose only recommendation is aristocratic, official or personal influences, or an easy source of reward for persons to whom the Government of the day is in some way indebted.‖⁸⁹² One exception to the contempt of diplomatic establishments towards ―moneyed interests‖ was the Netherlands.

―(T)he pressure was so strong that between 1825 and 1850 the diplomatic missions were downgraded, the consular service augmented and the Ministry staff increased to handle commercial rather than political affairs.‖ Though, the Dutch exception had its apparent reasons and it was the exception that proves the rule. ―The reduction of the Netherlands after 1830 to a third-class power meant a diminished interest in power politics and favored a sustained shift of attention to economic and colonial affairs(.)‖⁸⁹³ In other words, the

 

 

⁸⁸⁹ Steiner, Zara, ―Introduction‖, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 18.

⁸⁹⁰ Platt, D.C.M. The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825, New York: Longman, 1971, p. 104.

⁸⁹¹ Platt, D.C.M. ibid, p. 107.

⁸⁹² Quoted in Platt, D.C.M. ibid, p. 22.

⁸⁹³ Steiner, Zara, ―Introduction‖, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 15. Also see Wels, C.B. ―The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980‖, in ibid, p. 370.

marginalization and exclusion of the Netherlands from the diplomatic scene and European politics caused its diplomatic establishment to prioritize economic interests.

This state-centric vision of international politics only slightly began to erode in the decade preceding the World War I with the reformation and partial democratization of the foreign offices.⁸⁹⁴ The financialization of international economics and extra- Europeanization of international affairs and state interests in the late nineteenth century was another factor that rendered economics a matter of concern in the eyes of policymakers although staunch resistance to this process never ceased in the foreign offices.⁸⁹⁵ Until the ―opening of the state‖ with democratization, the state was claimed only by those who perceived themselves as part of the state and perceived the state as theirs; namely by the aristocracy which historically and originally meant the entourage of the kings and emperors. Industrialists, merchants, and professionals were seen as outside the realm of the state. Furthermore, they were seen as within the realm of markets which were juxtaposed against the interests of the realm of the state.

One scholar of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy observed; ―(w)hat reports often lacked, however, was detailed analyses of economic issues. Aside from tariff problems, these questions simply did not get much scrutiny. This weakness reflected the general failure within the Habsburg leadership to recognize until too late the potential of economic tools for political purposes.‖⁸⁹⁶ The Habsburg Empire lacked the economic means to obtain

 

 

⁸⁹⁴ Hayne, M.B., The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898- 1914, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 150; Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office…

p. 185.

⁸⁹⁵ The consulates operating principally to assist and protect merchants abroad were not only secondary-level posts, but also the European diplomatic service was established on the complete separation of these two services. The separation between the two services ended only with reforms beginning on the eve of World War I but was not completed until World War II. Cecil, Lamar. The German Diplomatic Service 1871-1914, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 18; Maisel, Ephraim, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919-1926, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 24. For the British consulates abroad and their inferior positions, see Platt, D.C.M., The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825, New York: Longman, 1971.

⁸⁹⁶ Williamson Jr., Samuel R., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991, p. 41.

political gains except through some modest economic initiatives in the Balkans.⁸⁹⁷ Economic tools were at the disposal of the British, French, and German foreign offices, and they employed them to force countries to certain decisions, but the foreign offices were aloof to economics and economic diplomacy. As late as the interwar period, the deficiencies pointed out above regarding the ambassadorial reporting of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic services were observable. In this period, this deficiency was observable in all the diplomatic services. In the United States, ―political reporting, so far as it was influenced by old school diplomats, tended to deal with leading figures of government rather than deep social and economic forces(.)‖⁸⁹⁸

In this regard, the failure of the Ottoman diplomatic service to regard economics as an indispensable component of international politics should not be perceived as a sign of its backwardness in statecraft. On the contrary, the Ottoman diplomatic service pursued the 19th century European pattern in its ideological and cultural make up.

In the ambassadorial reports, esteem and reverence for royalty were expressed very delicately. Esteem and respect were observed for non-royal offices as well. The prime ministers, presidents of states, and military generals were addressed with due respect as the Ottoman Empire and its ruling elite were integrated into the established order and the family of the national nobilities of Europe. This was not only limited to the honoring of the persons in question with proper forms of address. While reporting on political developments, an important part of the dispatches was devoted to ceremonies. The

⁸⁹⁷ For the economic interests of Austria-Hungary in Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, see Bridge, F.R, ―The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire‖, in Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, Marian Kent (ed.), London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 31-51.

⁸⁹⁸ DeSantis, Hugh & Heinrichs, Waldo, ―The Department of State and American Foreign Policy‖, in The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 582. The 19th century State Department of the United States was a refuge of European aristocratic manners. It remained ineffective and amateurish throughout the 19th century. It was only (partially) professionalized and modernized in the first half of the twentieth century. With its aristocratic and dandy characters, the State Department was ignored and overlooked. Also see Heinrichs, Waldo, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; Ilchman, Warren Frederick, Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779-1939, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

―acceptance speeches‖ of the new prime ministers⁸⁹⁹, the speeches of the prime minister in the parliament to honor visiting royal figures, and the inauguration speeches read at the beginning of the parliamentary year by the kings were all meticulously reported in detail.⁹⁰⁰ These concerns and perceptions are a further indication of the transformation of Ottoman political culture (to be destroyed and reversed by the end of the empire and replaced by the republic‘s own political culture) and its integration into the ―European royal family‖.⁹⁰¹

Reception of the ambassadors and ―corps consulaire‖ were also regarded as worth reporting to Istanbul. From the dispatch of the 27th of February in 1891, we learn that the

―corps consulaire‖ in Venice had been received by ―son Altesse Royale le Dine de Genes‖, the prince. Not unexpectedly, the reception was described in very respectful language. Soghadis Bey, the Ottoman consul in Venice, presented his homage to ―L‟Auguste Frére de la Reine d‟Italie‖ via the royal palace of Venice. The prince, who recently visited Istanbul, drew attention to the increasing commercial relations between Venice and the ports of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁰² Many such reports narrating these ceremonies were to be found in the dispatch folders.

Naturally, international relations made up an important part of the reports. In these reports, the foreign policies of the governments were taken as ―cabinet policies‖. This contrasts with the approach of assuming foreign policy orientations to be state policies rather than deliberations by the cabinets. The reports were very much cabinet-centered. The parliamentary debates also amounted to a significant portion of the reports. The permanent governmental institutions did not find much place in the reports. The Ottoman embassy reports did not assume the existence of a permanent state interest to take precedence over the subjectivity and temporariness of the cabinets and the intentions of the

⁸⁹⁹ For example see BOA, HR.SYS 778/6, 14 February 1891.

⁹⁰⁰ See the account of the inauguration speech of Queen Victoria addressing the parliament, BOA,HR.SYS 582/3, 15 September 1890. A copy of the brochure of the inauguration speech is enclosed in the dispatch.

⁹⁰¹ For a study on the role and impact of the kings and other royals on the diplomacy (predominantly as appeasers and problem resolvers), see McLean, Roderick R. Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890-1914, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁹⁰² BOA, HR.SYS, 778/9, 27 February 1891.

prime ministers and foreign ministers.⁹⁰³ The reports did not reflect the state-centric assumption that politics was a sham when it comes to the making of foreign policy.⁹⁰⁴ On the contrary, the cabinets were treated as having free hands in the making of foreign policy. Thus, cabinets comprised of politicians from parties more sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire were desired to be established and cabinets perceived as antagonistic to the interests of the Ottoman Empire were desired to be dissolved.

We may argue that this perception disappeared with the coming to power of the Young Turks.⁹⁰⁵ The ultimate western-skeptic and anti-imperialist Young Turks (very much like

⁹⁰³ Although this we can say only based on embassy reports. Abdülhak Hamid (although in 1923) writes as follows: ―(In London) there exists one certain Foreign Office. The ruler changes, the cabinets change, parties change and evolve but Foreign Office is always what it was and what it will be. The essence of politics is pursuit of interests. Foreign Office rules over the palace, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, trade and even navy and the dominions. It rules England.‖ Abdülhak Hamid… p. 184. It has to be noted that from ambassadorial dispatches, no such view can be inferred. The same is true for Sami Paşazade Sezai whose articles in Şuray-ı Ümmet reflect views poles apart from his ambassadorial dispatches.

⁹⁰⁴ The genre of ―diplomatic history‖ is very much a product of the 19th century unlike other genres of history (social history, history of mentalities, economic history, et cetera). The standard diplomatic history narrative also lacks the assumption of the ―permanence of state interests‖ which are superior to the orientation of cabinets. The analysis of

―permanence of state interests‖ will appear with the domination of a full-blown materialistic and deterministic perspective over the social sciences with the twentieth century. Likewise, the classical diplomatic history fails to recognize any domestic or extra- political sources in the making of foreign policy. Primat der Aussenpolitik is the basic assumption of the classical diplomatic history. It is curious to see that this perspective is congruent with the logic of the makers of foreign policy in the nineteenth century. For the first classics of diplomatic history at its best, see Temperley, Harold, England and the Near East: The Crimea, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1936; Temperley, Harold, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827, G. Bell and sons, 1925; Gooch, G.P, Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1938, Gooch G.P, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1942; Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822, G. Bell, 1925; Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, London: G. Bell, 1951.; Mowat R.B, A History of European Diplomacy 1815-1914, London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927; Crawley, C.W, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821- 1833, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1930.

⁹⁰⁵ For the escalation of the rhetoric of anti-imperialism of the Young Turks in their last years of opposition, see Hanioğlu. Şükrü, Preparation for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 302-305.

the distrustful sultan Abdülhamid II) denied any significant role to politics as they were sure that the Western powers were inherently Turcophobe and imperialist.⁹⁰⁶ For them, political discourses were mere facades to deceive the naive old school diplomats. The magical word ―imperialism‖ rendered diplomatic and political maneuvers, dexterities, and compromises meaningless as the ultimate end of diplomacy was merely the implementation of imperialism. Moreover, politics was also unnecessary as imperialism is (a la Lenin) one single program to be activated and no small adjustment, alteration, or variation of it possible. Diplomacy was a zero sum game. In the world of imperialism, it meant zero for the underdog and one for the imperialist. It is also a fact that as World War I approached, the compression of the international situation and tightening of the alliances left no free space for political and diplomatic flexibility and maneuver. The complexities of the age of imperialism also made the makers of foreign policy incapable of deciding the track of foreign policy independently.⁹⁰⁷ Moreover, the ―political‖ lost its centrality in a time when economic and financial interests begin to play a significant role in interstate relations. By then, the magnificent days of the masters of diplomacy such as Canning and Castlereagh were long gone, especially after the deposition of Bismarck. The Hamidian Ottoman diplomatic service was cognizant of this transformation of the style and conduct of foreign policy albeit with some delay and ambivalence.

Writing in 1910, Hayreddin Nedim‘s acclaim of the art of diplomacy reflects the education of a diplomat having the 19th century upbringing with his favorite, inspiring themes such as the genius of Bismarck.⁹⁰⁸ Writing in a new age in which the delicacies of

⁹⁰⁶ For the anti-imperialist discourse of Young Turks, see Brummett, Palmira, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 1908-1911, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000; Aydın, Cemil, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. For a Young Turk anti-imperialistic track, see Ahmed Rıza, La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient, Libraririe Picard, 1922.

⁹⁰⁷ For some prominent studies on the ―approach of World War I‖, see Fischer, Fritz, Germany‟s Aims in the First World War, New York: W.W.Norton, 1967; Stevenson, David, Arnaments and the Coming of War, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Joll, James, The Origins of the First World War, London; New York: Longman, 1992.

⁹⁰⁸ Hayreddin Nedim, Vesaik-i Tarihhiye ve Siyasiyye Tetebbuatı, Dersaadet: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası Matbaası,1326, vol.II, p. 76.

diplomacy were abandoned, Hayreddin Nedim praises Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, but above all the legendary Mustafa Reşid Pasha for their genius in diplomacy.⁹⁰⁹ He exemplifies a salon gentleman of yesterday with his accumulation of knowledge and his mental framework, all imported from the 19th century diplomatic/aristocratic culturalization and intellectual formation and the arsenal of knowledge it nurtured. It would not be wrong to argue that the Hamidian diplomatic service observed and exercised the novelties and alterations of the political world after some delay.

To conclude, the ambassadorial reports which reflected less the personal opinions of the ambassadors and the ambassadorial scribes than the reiteration of the official discourse present us some vistas of a vision of a particular socialization and cultural formation. The dispassionate reports were produced not in Weberian bureaucratic offices, but in a personalized habitus. The content and priorities of the reports also manifested a worldview subsuming and amalgamating political and personal concerns. This cultural formation was constituted within an intimate relation established with a state that was in retreat and that had to be saved in order to maintain the moral universe the authors of the reports subscribed to. This world was a bygone age by 1908 in some regards but was also constitutive of its after life in other aspects.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

⁹⁰⁹ Hayreddin Nedim, ibid, vol. II, p. 90.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI

 

 

THE MENTALITIES AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

 

An appraisal of the nineteenth century Ottoman ―bureaucratic mind‖ has been presented in the previous chapters. The mind of the nineteenth century diplomatic service was the epitome of the Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Moreover, it constituted one of the pillars of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment and therefore bears the constitutive characteristics of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind at its best. The Ottoman bureaucratic mind of the nineteenth century may be divided into four variants developed and based on the preoccupations and tasks assigned. The military, the civil administration, the diplomatic service and the technical offices, such as the agricultural, forestry, and public construction offices, reflect varieties of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Modernization, security, and incorporation into the ―civilized world‖ were the coexisting preoccupations and concerns of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. All these bureaucratic offices prioritized some of these coexisting preoccupations and concerns due to their areas of responsibility and their daily encounters. Nonetheless, disregarding their immediate tasks, in their intellectual formations and socializations they shared the same ethos and same worldview with nuances and variations developed due to their professional encounters and obligations. Nonetheless, as a whole, these variations of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind complement each other and constitute a meaningful overarching structure of mentality. Thus we have to perceive the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment as a particular manifestation of the ideological/intellectual/cultural formation of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic establishment.

Apparently, the structures of mentalities do not come out of a vacuum. They developed within a certain international political context. As has been stated, the zenith of

the power and influence of the Ottoman diplomatic service was the early Tanzimat era. In these particular decades, an optimism regarding the future of the Ottoman realm led the Ottoman state to prioritize diplomacy as the crucial and decisive pursuit of the state. The Ottoman reforms were undertaken with the support and assurance of Britain although the British interference hindered it as much as encouraged it.⁹¹⁰ International diplomacy, reformism, reorganization of the administration, and the suppression of local militarized powerhouses were four complementary preoccupations which cannot be separated from each other.⁹¹¹ The Tanzimat reformism was derived and encouraged by prospects envisaged by the Ottoman leadership in the international scene.⁹¹² Thus, the alliance during the Crimean War generated further optimism. However, after the disastrous 1877-78 Russian War, it became clear to Abdülhamid II and many Ottoman statesmen that it was seemingly impossible to keep the empire intact by only peaceful means and reformism. Though Abdülhamid II was mastering the complex webs of diplomacy, a fatal threat loomed, and diplomacy was no more a guarantee for the survival and integrity of the Empire. Moreover, the early optimism regarding the administrative reforms conducted by the local and province-level offices failed. On the contrary, these efforts produced unexpected and detrimental outcomes. The Ottoman state could not accommodate the rising non-Muslim unrests and nationalisms that were prompted by the Tanzimat

 

⁹¹⁰ Davison, Roderick, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 9.

⁹¹¹ Of course, one should not underestimate the role of the military and violence in Tanzimat in avoiding all kinds of mutiny and unrest and eradicating local militarized powerhouses in all parts of the Empire (first and foremost in Kurdistan) to be able to implement the Tanzimat.

⁹¹² Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi in his chronicle writes: “Binaenaleyh Reşid Paşa sefaretle nezdinde bulunduğu devletlerin vükela ve erkanına ve mecalis ü mehafil eshabına bizzat ve bi‟l-vasıta her türlü ifadat-ı lazimenin icra ve gazetelere o yolda havadis ü mebahis „itası ile saltanat-ı seniyenin ıslahat-ı adliyeye ve nizamat-ı lazimeye teşebbüs halinde bulunduğunu i‟lan ve Avrupa‟ca efkar-ı umumiyenin Devlet-i Aliyye tarafında hüsn-i meyalanına can-siparane gayret eylemiş olduğu delail-i nakliye ve Paris ve Londra‟da Devlet-i Aliyye namına sefarethaneler teşkiline ve her bir usul ve nizamda Avrupa düveli sırasına geçmeyi Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin akdem-i efkar edinmiş olduğunuen evvel Avrupa‟da Reşid Paşa meydana koymuşdur.” Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi, Vak‟anüvîs Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi Tarihi, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999, p. 1026.

reformism.⁹¹³ The limits of the Tanzimat reformism convinced the non-Muslims to rebuff the Ottoman alternative and seek the promotion of their national/communal interests. In the eyes of the larger segments of non-Muslim communities, the Ottoman Empire promised no future (if it ever did in the eyes of these communities).

Due to the changing realities within the Ottoman territories and the international scene, new reflexes developed to encounter the changing (gloomy) conditions. Although diplomacy was at the very center of the Hamidian polity, diplomacy was relegated to a technical business. It ceased to be perceived as redemptive. In the reign of Abdülhamid II, diplomatic service was no more on the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. Abdülhamid personally took over the ―diplomatic front‖. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the sultan did not elevate men of diplomatic origins to loftier political posts. The statesmen he supported and preferred in his appointments were predominantly from non-diplomatic offices such as governors, officers, and fiscal administrators. Men from his personal retinue, such as Said Pasha and Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, also rose to prominence in the Hamidian era. Abdülhamid‘s neglect of the diplomatic service was so great that he appointed military men to most of the ambassadorial posts in the 1890s. His long-time ambassadors in Berlin (Tevfik Pasha), in St. Petersburg (Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha), in Stockholm (Şerif Pasha), in Belgrade (İbrahim Fethi Pasha), in Cetinje (Ahmed Fevzi Pasha), and in Madrid (İzzet Pasha) were of military origin.⁹¹⁴ Although the appointment of military officers to posts at Cetinje, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg are partially understandable, appointments of officers to posts in Stockholm and Madrid are hardly understandable. Appointment of an officer to Berlin leads us to assume that Abdülhamid‘s assessment  of  his  cooperation  with  Germany  was  predominantly  a  military one.

⁹¹³ Artinian, Vartan, The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839- 1863, İstanbul: no publishing house, 1969, p. 106; Davison, Roderick, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, New York: Gordian Press, 1973, pp. 125-26; Davison, Roderick, ―Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century‖, American Historical Review, 59:4 (July 1954), pp. 844-864. Davison, Roderick,

―The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire‖, in Braude, Benjamin & Lewis, Bernard (ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, New York; London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, v. I, pp. 319-337.

⁹¹⁴ For the ambassadors assigned to various post in the late Ottoman Empire, see Kuneralp, Sinan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839-1922): Proposografik Rehber, Istanbul: Isis, 1999.

Furthermore, appointing people with a deep knowledge of military matters, rather than diplomacy, reveals what kind of skills and expertise Abdülhamid expected from the men whom he selected as his main providers of information. In short, Abdülhamid‘s preference for military officers displayed his prioritization of military over diplomatic affairs and the creeping militarization of diplomacy. Although classical diplomacy was pursued, Abdülhamid was aware that diplomacy not supported by a substantial military power with assets to be employed and manipulated in diplomatic bargaining was ineffective and futile.⁹¹⁵ Thus, Abdülhamid switched to a Realpolitik diplomacy from a post-Metternich- Castlereagh diplomacy in the age of Bismarck. More evidence that Abdülhamid did not respect the professional diplomatic service is that from the 1890s until his overthrow in 1908, he retained the ambassadors giving them tenures of fifteen years. Most of the ambassadors he appointed in the 1890s kept their posts until the Revolution of 1908. Mehmed Rifat Bey in Athens served from 1897 to 1908. Ibrahim Fethi Pasha served as ambassador to Belgrade from 1897 to 1908. The list of the other long-serving Hamidian ambassadors with their years of service is as follows: Ahmed Tevik Pasha in Berlin, from 1897 to 1908; Hüseyin Kazım Bey in Bucharest from 1896 to 1908, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha in Cetinje from 1891 to 1908, Salih Münir Pasha in Paris from 1896 to 1908; Mustafa Reşid Pasha in Rome from 1896 to 1908, Şerif Pasha in Stockholm from 1898 to 1908; Mahmud Nedim Pasha in Vienna from 1896 to 1908.⁹¹⁶ It is highly unreasonable to assume that Abdülhamid‘s confidence in them was based on merit. Seemingly, he appointed them because of their loyalty to him, and he did not risk appointing new representatives who might have been less loyal. He personalized his relations with the ambassadors. Long tenures might also have helped the development of a mutual confidence between the

⁹¹⁵ For Abdülhamid‘s foreign policy, see Yasamee, F.A.K, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996; Deringil, Selim, The Ottomans, The Turks and World Power Politics, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000; Özcan, Azmi, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, Ottomans and Britain 1877-1924, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1997; Çaycı, Abdurrahman, Büyük Sahra‟da Türk-Fransız Rekabeti (1858-1911), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995; Eraslan, Cezmi, II Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1992; Kuneralp, Sinan, Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1987 (5 volumes); Georgeon, Francois, Sultan Abdülhamid, İstanbul: Homer, 2006, pp. 116-147, 249-277.

⁹¹⁶ Kuneralp, Sinan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839-1922): Proposografik Rehber, Istanbul: Isis, 1999.

appointee and the appointer. At least, this was what Abdülhamid might have calculated. In short, we may argue that he sacrificed competent and dynamic diplomacy in favor of stability and confidence in his bureaucrats. In his personalized diplomacy, ambassadors began to write directly to the palace instead of addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sultan gathered all the necessary information both from the embassies abroad and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then he formulated and implemented his complex foreign policies and maneuvers. From the flow of information coming from embassies and ministry, as observed previously, it seems that domestic concerns were very significant in the making of foreign policy.⁹¹⁷ The threat of domestic instability and separatist agitation was a matter of primary concern. However, it has to be noted that Abdülhamid‘s militarized diplomacy was less his personal preference than his reluctance to adapt to changing circumstances and respond to them.

The diplomatic service was no longer at the forefront of Ottoman reformism and modernization, either. By the Hamidian era, the early efforts to establish the modern governmental infrastructure had developed considerably. Modern forms of administration to regulate forests, agriculture, and metallurgy were all in the process of reaching maturity.⁹¹⁸ All the relevant offices were able to improve themselves in communication with the West without needing any external assistance. It was the military ventures and military efforts to modernize the army that had engendered, forced, and prompted Ottoman modernity, technology transfer, and importation of modern knowledge.⁹¹⁹ The dramatic development of military technology and the new horizons in military organization in Europe after the 1870s were to be imported by the Ottoman Empire⁹²⁰. It was no

⁹¹⁷ For the information provided to the sultan from the embassies and the ministry, see BOA, Y.PRK.HR, BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA.

⁹¹⁸ See Qutaert, Donald, Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia 1876-1908, unpublished dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles 1973; Keskin, Özkan, Orman Ma‟adin Nezareti‟nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2005; Dursun, Seçuk, Forest and the State, unpublished dissertation, Sabancı University, 2007.

⁹¹⁹ See Griffiths, Merwin Albert, The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army Under Abdülhamid (1880-1897), unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1968.

⁹²⁰ Bond, Brian, War and Society in Europe 1870-1970, Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998,

pp. 42-44.

coincidence that the Young Turks, who made progress in the Hamidian era captured the

―mission civilisatrice‖ of the Ottoman Empire after 1908. The ―military modern‖ of the late 19th century was to replace the ―19th century modern‖.

However, this does not mean that the military had grabbed the role of pioneer of modernization and transformed it. On the contrary, it was the changing and evolving perception of modernity that engaged the military. It was not the takeover of the Ottoman military that had modified the track of Ottoman modernization, but it was the modification of the Ottoman modernizing mind that had put the military in the driver‘s seat as far as statecraft was concerned. Partially, it was a response to the international alignments and the rise of military superpowers, such as Germany and Russia (and Japan in the East). It was Abdülhamid who had endeavored and spent enormously to strengthen the Ottoman military and ironically as a reward for his efforts, he was toppled by the military he had built up.⁹²¹ The military did not seize control as much as have it bestowed upon them. It was a change in the times that had enforced a transforming ―modernizing ideal‖ which was not simply an Ottoman phenomenon, but a continent-wide phenomenon.⁹²² Thus, a shift in the minds of the diplomats was observed as well. As we will observe below, the Ottoman diplomatic service also lost its confidence in the 19th century ―concert of Europe‖ of Metternich, Castlereagh, and ―reformism‖.

 

 

 

 

 

 

⁹²¹ For the Hamidian military reorganization, see Griffiths, Merwin Albert. The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army Under Abdülhamid (1880-1897), unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1968. It is interesting to compare the Hamidian and Tanzimat approaches to the military. It was the era of Abdülhamid that had given birth to the modern Ottoman/Turkish military after the relatively poor record of the Tanzimat regarding the modernization of the Ottoman army.

⁹²² For the emerging ―spirit‖ of the fin de siecle, see Hughes, H. Stuart, Consciousness and Society, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002. For the military build-up in Europe and its repercussions, see Stevenson, David, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Herrmann, David G, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

6.1.  “Official Mind” ?

 

Although embassy reports and dispatches were very bureaucratic and impersonal, still they may tell us something about the ―official mind‖ of the ministry and Ottoman statecraft in general. The dullness and colorlessness of the reports lead us to think that the dispatches tried their best to reproduce the ―official mind‖ and never failed to accommodate the official mind. They were skillfully penned down not to divert from or contradict the

―official mind‖. Doing what was to be expected and not doing what was not to be expected would be the most appropriate act of an official in order not to be discarded, but instead promoted and considered for higher office. Here, we do not mean that there existed an

―official mind‖ decided somewhere or that this ―official mind‖ was an impersonal entity. On the contrary, what I mean by ―official mind‖ is its commonsense nature. It was produced not by a limited number of high-ranking officials, but by the entire Ottoman bureaucratic cadre anonymously. It was impersonal in the sense that it was produced by the Ottoman bureaucracy as a whole. But the ―bureaucracy as a whole‖ is not a supra-personal category. It is constituted by individuals. Furthermore, it was not a static entity. The official mind was reproduced and reconstituted every time a new dispatch was penned down. The reiteration of it was not a mere procedure. Every time it was enhanced and when it was not reiterated consistently, it lost its lucidity, pervasiveness, and persuasiveness. It may be also dubbed as ―state wisdom‖. The ―Ottoman‖ official mind involved caution, risk-aversion, reluctance to take action, and extreme reluctance to take instant action. It consisted of profound admiration, contempt, and an enmity towards the European powers. The ambivalent attitudes taken vis-a-vis the European powers were crafted within this prism.

The diplomatic reports were how they were supposed to be. However, the authors of the reports were not mere passive duplicators. We may argue that, they each contributed to the making of this anonymous ―official mind‖, and therefore they were manufacturers of the official mind while they were replicating the schemes to which they were supposed to adhere. They were simultaneously captives and masters of the ―official mind‖. The reports provide us the opportunity to survey and scrutinize the official view of the Ottoman polity‘s approach to liberals, anarchists, parliamentary elections, Britain, budget deficits, et

cetera. These reports were also transformative of the Ottoman official mind because they contained new knowledge of different sorts. The reports were also transmitting knowledge without being aware of the repercussions of these transmitting activities. The gathered knowledge was significant in the making and remaking of the modern Ottoman mind. In this regard, we can suggest that, the making of the Ottoman mental set is constituted as a response to the intense reception of a novel, alarming, and disturbing accumulation of knowledge.

A similar observation regarding this institutional thinking is made by Jill Pellew, a scholar studying the British Home Office. Pellew writes; ―The interesting thing to the historian of an institution is that the institution itself is an entity –almost a persona- over and above those individuals who constitute its personnel at any given moment. Its ethos is derived from its designated functions, its historical development, its effectiveness and the extent of its influence, to which the accumulated actions and interactions of those who have worked in it have contributed. While, to a greater or lesser degree this ethos may be given a shift in direction by one generation of individuals passing through it, they in their turn are to some extent influenced by the institution itself.‖⁹²³ Regarding the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, here it is argued that the institution was an ―idea‖ as much as it was ―substance‖. Therefore, its imposing power on the individual serving within the institution was less in comparison to its Western counterparts. That is to say, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not a dispassionate machine limited to the undertaking of its assigned tasks. It was not merely a supra-individual bureaucratic organization. It was created in the image of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite in an age of turbulence. The individuals and the institution are mutually reconstituting each other. It was the institutionalization of a certain mode of thinking transformed into the ―official mind‖. Via this process, we observed the impressiveness and capabilities of the Ottoman official mind in surviving and prospering against all odds.

Reports of the Ottoman embassy to Teheran may illustrate some tiny bits and aspects of the Ottoman ―official mind‖. The political environment and realities of late 19th century

⁹²³ Pellew, Jill, The Home Office 1848-1914, Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982, p.1. Also see Douglas, Mary, How Institutions Think, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Persia were quiet similar to the Ottoman Empire regarding her relations with the Western powers. Persia in the 19th century was a clear example of the struggle of competing imperialisms over a nominally independent but economically dependent state.⁹²⁴ Particularly, the military aggressiveness of the Russians was creating increasing concern in Persia. Russophobia was prevalent both among the public and the ruling elite. It would be interesting to observe the correspondence of the Ottoman diplomatic representations dispatched from a Muslim country sharing similar concerns with the Ottomans although in incomparably more severe conditions.⁹²⁵

Not very unexpectedly, the amount of the deskwork dedicated to conducting relations with Persia was very limited. Much of the deskwork of the embassy was devoted to scrutinizing and accommodating the activities of Great Britain in Persia. For instance, the navigation rights on Shatt-al Arab comprised a significant portion of the deskwork of the embassy. The embassy tried to avoid the emergence of a possible disagreement and a crisis with Great Britain. The pursuit of Russian involvement in Persia was another major concern of the embassy. Although coordination with Russia was a rather insignificant agenda item for the embassy, communication with Russia was maintained to accommodate the interests of the Ottoman Empire to the Russian interests and to avoid any severe crisis with Russia.

Correspondence on relations with Persia was limited to technical matters. One exception to these technicalities was a report concerning the local Kurdish disturbances near the Ottoman-Persian border, the movement of Kurdish bands across the border, and disagreements over the border drawn in 1847. In short, the correspondence from the embassy to Teheran reveals to us the world of competing imperialism in which Ottomans were spectators anxious not to be entangled within the webs of this struggle. They were not trying to benefit from the Western powers economic and military drives, but were only concerned about avoiding any loss or retreat. The typically cautious and low-profile diplomacy and statecraft of the Ottomans were also visible in the Persian context. They

⁹²⁴ Kazemzadeh, Firuz, Russia and Britain in Iran, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

⁹²⁵ For the dispatches from the embassy to Teheran, see BOA, HR.SYS 682 to HR.SYS 686.

were pragmatists. They knew the world in which they were trying to maneuver and played the game following the rules of the game.

This world came to an end in 1906 in Persia. Expectedly, the Persian Revolution in 1906 drastically changed the picture we have drawn above. The contents and concerns of the reports changed dramatically after the Revolution. As the political situation became more complex and multifaceted, the reports began to reflect these novel realities. The reports after 1906 were more political and interpretive in contrast to the technical dullness of the earlier reports. We observe the ―emergence of politics‖ in these reports. For the first time, the Persian government emerged as a serious counterpart of the embassy.⁹²⁶ Persia was now perceived as an actor herself although to a very limited extent. Russia‘s hostile attitude to the Revolution and the growing resentment of Russia among the governing circles, parliament, and the people in general became a concern. With 1906, the reports began to become less technical and more political in the age of imperialism, the clash of imperialisms, and rising reactions to imperialism. This was the time when the Ottoman Empire evolved into an imperialist power as well. In Selim Deringil‘s ―borrowed terminology‖, this was ―borrowed imperialism‖.⁹²⁷ This was ―enforced imperialism‖, as well. In the Persian context, remembering how the Unionist governments practiced

⁹²⁶ The Ottoman perception of diplomacy and international politics follows the general pattern. The Ottoman representation in Persia accepts it as a given that Persians do not possess any power to influence Persian affairs, influenced by the views of the Great Power diplomatic establishments. Paul Gordon Lauren summarizes the perception of the nineteenth century diplomatic establishments of the Great Powers. ―(F)oreign affairs were confined essentially to those relations among European states. Bureaus to manage American, Far Eastern, Southeast Asian, or African affairs remained either non-existent or subject to a confused and unstable development. Furthermore, these divisions demonstrate the fact that, under this classical system, a very real distinction existed between the Great Powers and those of secondary importance, or the Small Powers. The smaller or weaker states lived as victims, subjects, or pawns in the great chess game of diplomacy. Major decisions were made and enforced by that club of the elite: France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. All other states could be used, divided, treated, or sold.‖ Lauren, Paul Gordon, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p.12. This nineteenth century perception collapsed at the turn of the twentieth century. Of course, it was not only Persia but also the Ottomans who wanted and tried to be influential actors in the wake of the World War I.

⁹²⁷ Deringil, Selim. ― ‗They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery‘: Perceptions of Provincial Imperialism in the Late Ottoman Empire‖, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, 2003, p. 312.

imperialist politics and visions over Persia, it is interesting to observe how the cautious Ottomans became active aggressors, and subsequently became entangled in the Persian web. Nevertheless, Ottoman firmness did not wait for the Young Turks to come to power.

―Under the pretext of policing the border, Turkish forces in autumn 1905 occupied a strip of land from ten to fifty kilometer wide between the frontier line and Lake Urmiye(.)‖⁹²⁸ The Turkish occupation lasted until the evacuation in 1912 followed by another invasion during World War I.

Another random sample to be taken is the embassy to Athens. The embassy to Athens may exemplify the ministry‘s attitude towards a small neighboring country. Feridun Bey, the ambassador to Athens, is regarded as a fairly hard-working bureaucrat. His regular reports were meticulous and informative. His reports were heavily concentrated on the parliamentary affairs and informed Istanbul on the parliamentary debates, where fervent discussions regarding the Ottoman Empire and the relations of Greece with the Ottoman Empire were held. For example, in one of his reports summarizing parliamentary debates, he recounted the accusation by the parliament that the cabinet was Turcophile.⁹²⁹ Nevertheless, in his ―rapports particulair‖, he informed the ministry on subjects like the

―medical society of Athens⁹³⁰‖, the University of Athens⁹³¹, and railway construction in Greece⁹³². It is probable that such information on the technical and institutional development of Greece was demanded (or expected) from Feridun Bey. In one sense, they resemble the seferatnames of the early 19th century.⁹³³ However, the purpose here is probably not learning from Greece but tracking the level of development and the advancement of one of the Ottoman Empire‘s immediate enemies. Not surprisingly, the diplomatic moves and relations of Greece with greater powers and small regional powers

⁹²⁸ Kuneralp, Sinan, ―The Turco-Iranian Persian Border Problem In Azerbaijan 1905- 1912‖, in Kuneralp, Sinan (ed.), Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, vol IV, p. 73.

⁹²⁹ BOA, HR.SYS 1645/8, 22 November 1887.

⁹³⁰ BOA, HR.SYS 1645/3, 23 March 1887.

⁹³¹ BOA, HR:SYS 1645/5, 3 June 1887.

⁹³² BOA, HR.SYS1645/7, 19 August 1887.

⁹³³ For the seferatnames of early 19th century, see Unat, Faik Reşit, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1968.

were followed and reported. One report investigated the anti-governmental speech of Papamikhalopoulo, which was full of allusions to the glorious history of Greece and inspired the ―grande ideé Hellenique‖. Papamikhalopoulo noted that the issue of Greeks in Eastern Roumelia was emerging as an issue after the takeover of Eastern Roumelia by the Kingdom (sic) of Bulgaria. The Greek government, given its limited financial sources, looked for individuals to support the Greeks of Eastern Roumelia, who had to be protected against the Bulgarian administration.⁹³⁴ After Feridun Bey and following the acting ambassadorship of Mehmed Şemseddin (in 1887), Rıza Bey (in 1988) was appointed to the post of ambassador to Athens. Mehmed Şemseddin left us only a tiny number of documents during his tenure. It has to be said that Rıza Bey‘s reports lacked the quality of the reports of Feridun Bey. They were shorter, less legible, and much less meticulous. His dispatches were event-oriented rather than providing comprehensive and informative documentation. Rıza Bey‘s appointment also coincided with the escalation of Greek domestic politics and the rise of Greek expansionist passion and irredentism. The changing circumstances of Greece might have played a role in the replacement of Feridun Bey with Rıza Bey.

The dispatches from the embassy to Belgrade were extremely disappointing in comparison to the dispatches from Athens. Moreover, the dispatches were limited only to overt political moves by the Serbians, and they especially concentrated on Serbia‘s special relation with Russia and its diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. We may say that the post in Serbia was much less important in the eyes of Istanbul. In 1890, Feridun Bey whom we already met at his post in Athens, was appointed to the embassy to Belgrade. We observe an improvement in the style and quality of the reports with the coming of Feridun Bey. The reports also expanded in size and in the information they contained. Furthermore, Feridun Bey‘s reports were written in a more legible handwriting. As an observation, it has to be said that Feridun Bey‘s dispatches were much better in quality although still incomparably weak vis-a-vis his previous reports and the dispatches he sent from Athens. Furthermore, he limited himself to political affairs. This was obviously due to the fact that Serbia played a much less significant role in the eyes of Istanbul, and the extra-political developments of

⁹³⁴ BOA, HR.SYS 1645/15, 15 June 1888.

Serbia were of no interest.⁹³⁵ The reports were written only to relay concrete matters of concern, and we do not see many reports sent in the absence of such a necessity.

To conclude, these dispatches are far from exposing a certain and consistent ideological/intellectual/cultural formation. However, this does not mean that they are unworthy. On the contrary, they display the basic premises of an ―official mind‖. They are not mere facades. They establish their own reality. Nonetheless, other sources tell us more about the formations of the members of the diplomatic service. In this regard, a very valuable source we may turn to is Galip Kemali‘s (Söylemezoğlu) immense account.

 

 

 

6.2.  Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu: A Liminal Diplomat

 

Galip Kemali was a complex figure embodying all the ambivalences and contradictions (from our point of view with a century of hindsight) of his time. He was a liminal character reflecting the interconnectedness of nationalism, modernism, elitism, and Ottoman imperialism. In his mental framework, all these dispositions overlapped and coexisted. His memoirs are arguably one of the best primary sources reflecting the structures of mentalities of his time. This is not only in terms of the memoirs‘ massiveness, but also in terms of their quality, profoundness, and multilayered nature.

Galip Kemali came from a local notable family, whose forefathers had moved to Istanbul after serving in the provincial administration in Trabzon as the protégés of Halil Rifat Pasha when he was the governor of Trabzon. Galip Kemali was born in 1873 and joined the diplomatic service in 1892 after his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani. His father, Ali Kemali Pasha, served as the governor of Konya and can therefore be regarded as a high-ranking bureaucrat. Arguably, Ali Kemali Pasha‘s career path resembled the pre- Tanzimat pattern of career advancement before the formalization and regularization of the bureaucracy which ceased to exist with the generation of Galip Kemali after the development and consolidation of training and merit-based recruitment and promotion. His uncle, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, served in various high positions, including Assistant Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose career in various postings in

⁹³⁵ For the dispatches of Feridun Bey and others, see BOA, HR.SYS 1420.

different governmental offices was also resembling the premodern and pre-Tanzimat pattern of career.⁹³⁶

Having grown up in an atmosphere of parvenu aristocracy (local notables slightly in process of integrating into the imperial Tanzimat aristocracy), it seems that Galip Kemali endorsed the aristocratic culture he encountered in Istanbul emphatically. Although he belonged to the first generation of the family in terms of having a sound, formal education unlike his autodidact father and uncle, he was a staunch defender of aristocratic exclusivism throughout his career and was uncompromising in his criticism of the failure to follow the aristocratic code of conduct in diplomacy. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu kept reminding his readers that diplomacy was not simply a matter of settling disputes and implementing policies, but is also a style and art. Therefore, only those who possessed special qualities could be genuine diplomats. He was also very strict regarding upholding the standards of professionalism. For example, he was very disturbed by the dilettantism, impatience, and crude patriotism of the Unionists. Conceding that they were sincere patriots, Galip Kemali argued that they destroyed the Empire with their empty rhetoric.⁹³⁷ He was particularly disappointed with the obstruction of the Turco-Greek alliance he attempted to launch while he was ambassador to Athens to counter the Slavic threat from the North by the Unionists because of their obsession over Crete and their empty nationalist fervor. After the negotiations between Greece and the Ottomans collapsed, Greece aligned with the Balkan states, and apparently this alliance cost the Ottomans severely in the Balkan Wars. For Galip Kemali, the Young Turks and their lack of insight into diplomacy were the chief culprits in this fiasco. Very critical of the nationalist arrogance of the Unionists and their obstruction of diplomatic pragmatism, he himself was not less nationalist or Turkist than the Unionists as will be shown in the coming few pages. He was no less critical of the Republican establishment. Writing his memoirs in the 1940s, Galip Kemali criticized the Kemalist Republic explicitly but ―politely‖. One of his criticisms was with regard to the Republic‘s abandonment of official uniforms. Pointing

⁹³⁶ For a biography of Ibrahim Edhem, Galip Kemali‘s uncle, see Gürel, Naz Rana, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, İstanbul: Berikan, 2004. İbrahim Edhem also briefly served as a secretary in the embassy to Berlin.

⁹³⁷ Söylemezoğlu, Kemali, Atina Sefareti (1913-1916), İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1946,

p. 83.

out that even Bolshevik Russia reestablished official uniforms, particularly for the diplomatic service; it was not only necessary but an imperative for Turkey to reestablish official uniforms for the diplomatic service.⁹³⁸ He suggested that ―even the most democratic‖ countries were following the rituals of official clothing and bestowing and accepting badges. Apparently, what democratic meant for Galip Kemali was Republicanism and the prevalence of the culture of egalitarianism over aristocratic exclusivism. For Galip Kemali, aristocratic formalities and codes of conduct were the very basis of diplomacy, and it was untenable to conduct diplomacy in their absence.⁹³⁹

Though he was a staunch advocate of the 19th century European code of conduct, his Islamic upbringing and socialization also showed itself at some moments. One remarkable episode worth mentioning is the transformation of Galip Kemali‘s approaches to ―fez‖ and

―hat‖ as depicted in his memoirs. Before his first appointment abroad as secretary in the embassy to Bucharest, he was nervous. He wrote; ―Until that time, I was instinctually disgusted with the hat. Like any other Turkish and Muslim child, my ears were ringing with the rhymes of ‗whoever wears a hat, God forbid, becomes an infidel‘ ‖. Fortunately, before his departure to Bucharest, his pious father advised him that ―if you wear hat out of necessity, it is permissible. It is impermissible only if you wear a hat as an imitation of the Westerners.‖ Although convinced by the argument of his father, on the first day he wore a hat while presenting himself to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian diplomatic establishment, and he was very much embarrassed and distressed.⁹⁴⁰ But over time, he began to feel more comfortable without a fez on his head. He notes that before 1908, the fez was an indispensable part of the Ottoman official uniforms, but after 1908, he preferred not to don a fez and left his head uncovered while he was in official garb. Moreover, while ambassador to Athens, he encouraged and convinced a colleague of his to take his fez off and wear a hat while socializing in Athens, assuring him that it is no

⁹³⁸ Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, 1949, pp. 126-28.

⁹³⁹ Interestingly, the annal of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 1964-65 provides detailed information on the Ottoman insignia, medallions and forms of addressing which is contradicting with the official line of the culture of the republican bureaucracy. See Aral, Hamid (ed.), Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı (1964-1965), Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı.

⁹⁴⁰ Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, ibid, pp. 78-9.

sin to wear a hat. Söylemezoğlu advised him that, ―one has to follow the culture of foreigners when he is in their environment.‖⁹⁴¹ We observe the transformation of Galip Kemali into a proud defender of the hat during his tenure in the diplomatic service. He began to attribute to the hat a symbolic (and positive) meaning in reaction to resilient antagonism towards the hat which Galip Kemali perceives as baseless superstition.⁹⁴²

Apparently, the fez was a sensitive issue. It symbolized the very mark of the Muslim identity while wearing Western suit. It is the threshold of Muslimness. The astonishing resilience in defense of the fez and dislike towards the hat displays the seeming contradictions and ambiguities which are consistent and totally explicable for their protagonists. The fez and hat duality conveys the liminality of the group we are investigating. The fez is a sign of authenticity within a full-fledged Westernization. It is also associated with notions like honor and decency. The fez acquires an intense and resolute meaning irrelevant to its own reality and in wearing it, a value system which is felt to be lost, is regained.