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 Patterns of Factional Strife in Greece and the Eastern
Question: The Story of Ioannis Velentzas (1821 1840)



Thee ppurpose of this urpose of this tthesishesis is to investigate how regional networks of is to investiğate how reğional networks of political patronage and violence within the Ottoman political patronağe and violence within the Ottoman pprovincial admin-rovincial admin-istration in the Peloponnese and Rumeli have adapted to the new politi-istration in the Peloponnese and Rumeli have adapted to the new politi-cal environmentcal environment after 1821, andafter 1821, and continued to dominate the continued to dominate the ppolitical olitical do-do-mainmain in in Greece after Greece after itsits independenindependencece from the Ottoman Empire. from the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, while aimingAdditionally, while aiminğ to show how the factions that have emerged to show how the factions that have emerğed during the Greek war of independence have been built on personal rela-durinğ the Greek war of independence have been built on personal rela-tionships prior to 1821, this thesis also attempts to showtionships prior to 1821, this thesis also attempts to show how each of how each of these factions in Greece became entangled with a specific European these factions in Greece became entanğled with a specific European power, and thus, power, and thus, was was indirectly indirectly influenced byinfluenced by the broader political the broader political devel-devel-opmentsopments in postin post--Vienna Congress Europe. Vienna Conğress Europe. This This sstudy follows the partic-tudy follows the partic-ular patronular patron--clientclient relationship of the two Rumeliot men, Ioannis Ve-relationship of the two Rumeliot men, Ioannis Ve-lentzas and Ioannis Kolettis throughout the years following the outbreak lentzas and Ioannis Kolettis throuğhout the years followinğ the outbreak of the war of independence. The purpose is to explore how the two men of the war of independence. The purpose is to explore how the two men have formed their alliance thanks to the violent circumstances phave formed their alliance thanks to the violent circumstances provided rovided by the war, the process that made Kolettis’s Rumeliot faction labelled as by the war, the process that made Kolettis’s Rumeliot faction labelled as the French party, and ultimately to see how through his relationship with the French party, and ultimately to see how throuğh his relationship with Kolettis, Velentzas’ irredentist foray in 1840 to Ottoman territories could Kolettis, Velentzas’ irredentist foray in 1840 to Ottoman territories could be seen as a scheme desibe seen as a scheme designed to involve Greece into the politics of the ğned to involve Greece into the politics of the Eastern Question.Eastern Question.
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lişkilerinin nasıl 1821 sonrası siyasi iklime adapte olup Osmanlı’dan bağ ımsızlığ ını kazanan Yunanistan’daki siyasi alana eğemen olduğ unu ortaya koymayı amaçlıyor.
Bunun yanı sıra, Yunan bağ ımsızlık savaşı sırasında ortaya çıkan bo lğesel hiziplerin 1821 yılı o ncesinden kalma şahsi ilişkiler u zerine kurulduğ una dikkat çekilirken; bu tezde aynı zamanda bu hiziplerin her birinin ayrı birer Avrupalı ğu çle yakın ilişkilere ğirerek do nemin Viyana Konğresi sonrası Avrupa siyasi du zeninin dolaylı o zneleri olmaları su recinin de ortaya konması amaçlanıyor. Bu doğ rultuda, bağ ımsızlık savaşının başlamasını takip eden su reç içerisinde iki Rumelili I oannis Kolettis ve I oannis Velentzas’ın siyasi ve askeri himaye etrafında şekillenen ilişkisi o zel olarak izleniyor. Buradaki amaç bu iki adamın nasıl Yunan bağ ımsızlık savaşının oluşturduğ u uzun şiddet ortamı sayesinde siyasi bir ittifak oluşturabildiğ ini ve Kolettis’in Rumeli hizibinin nasıl su reç sonunda “Fransız Partisi” ismiyle anılmaya başlandığ ını ğo stermek. Nihayetinde de Velentzas’ın 1840 yılında Osmanlı topraklarına yo nelik orğanize ettiğ i başarısız bir irredentist saldırıyı kendisinin Fransız partisi lideri Kolettis ile olan ilişkisi u zerinden okuyarak, bunun Yunanistan’ı do nemin doğ u sorunu olarak adlandırılan doğ u Akdeniz u zerindeki bo lğesel siyasi hesaplara dahil etme tasarısı olduğ unu ortaya koymak.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations and Acronyms xxiiiiii
Acknowledgements
Acknowledğements xxvv
1
1 INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION 11
2
2 THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING IN INSURGENT GREECE BEFORE 1821THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING IN INSURGENT GREECE BEFORE 1821 1111
2.1
2.1 The Setting in Rumeli The Settinğ in Rumeli inin 18211821 1313
2.2
2.2 The Setting in the Peloponnese in 1821The Settinğ in the Peloponnese in 1821 2323
2.3
2.3 The Setting in the Islands in 1821The Settinğ in the Islands in 1821 2828
2.4
2.4 PhanariotsPhanariots 3030
2.5
2.5 Conclusion 3Conclusion 322
3
3 THE FORMATIN OF THE REGIONAL FACTIONS AND THE FIRST CIVIL WARS THE FORMATIN OF THE REGIONAL FACTIONS AND THE FIRST CIVIL WARS (1821(1821--1828)1828) 3333
3.1
3.1 The Rebels of the The Rebels of the PeloponnesePeloponnese 3355
3.2
3.2 The Rebels of Rumeli, and the Mavrokordatos and Kolettis Fac-The Rebels of Rumeli, and the Mavrokordatos and Kolettis Fac-tionstions 4040
3.3
3.3 The RumeliotThe Rumeliot--Peloponnesian Conflict, and the Civil Wars of 1823Peloponnesian Conflict, and the Civil Wars of 1823--18251825 4646
3.4
3.4 The Egyptian Invasion, and the Internationalization of the Greek The Eğyptian Invasion, and the Internationalization of the Greek CrisisCrisis 5522
3.5
3.5 The Emergence of Foreign The Emerğence of Foreiğn Oriented FactionsOriented Factions 5577
3.6
3.6 Conclusion 6Conclusion 633
4
4 TTHE PERIOD OF KAPODIASTRIAN AND BAVARIAN ADMINISTRATIONS AND HE PERIOD OF KAPODIASTRIAN AND BAVARIAN ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE VELENTZAS ESCAPADE (1828THE VELENTZAS ESCAPADE (1828--1840)1840) 6655
4.1
4.1 The Kapodistrian PeriodThe Kapodistrian Period 6666
4.2
4.2 The Third Civil War and Return of the Kolettis The Third Civil War and Return of the Kolettis –– Velentzas Cooper-Velentzas Cooper-ationation 7722
4.3
4.3 The Regency ofThe Reğency of the Bavarians and the Armansperg Administration the Bavarians and the Armansperğ Administration (1833(1833--1837)1837) 7777
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4.4
4.4 Otto’s Absolute Rule and the “DilemOtto’s Absolute Rule and the “Dilemmama of Neutrality” (1837of Neutrality” (1837--1840)1840) 8855
4.5
4.5 The Eastern Question and the Velentzas Escapade (1840)The Eastern Question and the Velentzas Escapade (1840) 8888
4.6
4.6 Conclusion 9Conclusion 955
5
5 CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION 9966
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY 9999
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations and Acronyms
B.O.AB.O.A Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivleri
AAAA Academy of AthensAcademy of Athens
AYEAYE ArArheio eio tou Ypourgeiou ton Eksoterikon (Foreign Ministry Ypourgeiou ton Eksoterikon (Foreign Ministry Archives of Greece)Archives of Greece)
TNATNA The National ArchivesThe National Archives
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xv
Acknowledgements
Acknowledğements
I would like to
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Ramazan express my deepest ğratitude to my advisor Ramazan Hakkı Öztan for his guidance and assistanceHakkı O ztan for his ğuidance and assistance. He has always trusted and . He has always trusted and encouraged me during the writing process of the thesis. I am also grateful encourağed me durinğ the writinğ process of the thesis. I am also ğrateful to him for his courses at the Instituteto him for his courses at the Institute that have broadenedthat have broadened my perspective my perspective as a researcheras a researcher..
I wish to express my sincere thanks to Cengiz Kırlı for his courses at
I wish to express my sincere thanks to Cenğiz Kırlı for his courses at the Institute and his valuable comments during the jury. I am also thank-the Institute and his valuable comments durinğ the jury. I am also thank-ful to Ayşe Özil for her valuable contributions during the jury. I also thank ful to Ayşe O zil for her valuable contributions durinğ the jury. I also thank TrTracy M. Lord for her suggestions during the initial phases of my re-acy M. Lord for her suğğestions durinğ the initial phases of my re-search.search. I haveI have alsoalso to express my sincere thanks to Seda Altuğ, to express my sincere thanks to Seda Altuğ , for her for her courses and valuable support that further motivated me as a researcher.courses and valuable support that further motivated me as a researcher.
I thank my friends at the Ataturk Institute Mu
I thank my friends at the Ataturk Institute Mustafa Emir Küçük and stafa Emir Ku çu k and Cenk Yılmaz Bayır for their suggestions and assistance during the writing Cenk Yılmaz Bayır for their suğğestions and assistance durinğ the writinğ process. I would like to thank Filiz Yazıcıoğlu for her comments on the process. I would like to thank Filiz Yazıcıoğ lu for her comments on the first drafts of my thesis.first drafts of my thesis.
I would like to thank my friends
I would like to thank my friends Deniz YılmazDeniz Yılmaz andand Ebrar Büyük-Ebrar Bu yu k-kkapucuapucu, , for their assistance and support during the writing process.for their assistance and support durinğ the writinğ process.
Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my family,
Last but not least, I would like to express my ğratitude to my family, my parents, Necati and Ülkü Karapunar, and to my sisters Halenur and my parents, Necati and U lku Karapunar, and to my sisters Halenur and Gülsüm. Without their support, I would nGu lsu m. Without their support, I would not be able to finish my thesis. ot be able to finish my thesis.
NOTE
NOTE:: The inThe in--house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed rec-house editor of the Atatu rk Institute has made detailed rec-ommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syn-ommendations with reğard to the format, ğrammar, spellinğ, usağe, syn-tax, and style of this thesis.tax, and style of this thesis.
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1
1
1 IntroductionIntroduction
uring the Greek war of independence and the years following the
urinğ the Greek war of independence and the years followinğ the creation of the independent Greek kingdom, a variety of prominent creation of the independent Greek kinğdom, a variety of prominent and influential figures have burst onto the scene and left their mark in and influential fiğures have burst onto the scene and left their mark in the history of the history of mmodern Greece. Some of these men haileodern Greece. Some of these men hailed from the previ-d from the previ-ously present Ottoman administration ously present Ottoman administration in the region in the reğion and managed to and manağed to maintain their political influencemaintain their political influence in the postin the post--Ottoman transitionOttoman transition, , whilewhile some of them benefited from the opportunities of social advancement to some of them benefited from the opportunities of social advancement to move up the social hierarchy tmove up the social hierarchy that had been presented by the extraordi-hat had been presented by the extraordi-nary circumstances of war. nary circumstances of war. As suchAs such, the latter group was mainly the prod-, the latter ğroup was mainly the prod-uct of the Greek war of independence, and consequently relieduct of the Greek war of independence, and consequently relied even after even after
D
D
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the war ended
the war ended on theon the warwar--timetime alliances and networks of power that alliances and networks of power that shapeshaped their political d their political capitalcapital..
The war providing channels of upward mobility was inevitable.
The war providinğ channels of upward mobility was inevitable. SinceSince in early in early nineteenthnineteenth--century Greece, like other rural Mediterranean soci-century Greece, like other rural Mediterranean soci-eties, taking arms and joining a band was one of the few ways for a peas-eties, takinğ arms and joininğ a band was one of the few ways for a peas-ant to acquire riant to acquire riches or reach a position of honor and power; whether as ches or reach a position of honor and power; whether as a bandit or a captain who was authorized to protect the land from bandits a bandit or a captain who was authorized to protect the land from bandits was often not important, as the line dividing these two groups was very was often not important, as the line dividinğ these two ğroups was very blurred. When the war blurred. When the war broke outbroke out in 1821, continental Gin 1821, continental Greece (reece (RumeliRumeli))1 was crowded with irregular bands, who quickly adapted to the new mili-was crowded with irreğular bands, who quickly adapted to the new mili-tary conditions and became centers of power with ever increasing poten-tary conditions and became centers of power with ever increasinğ poten-tial of political influence. Naturally, in addition to not having many alter-tial of political influence. Naturally, in addition to not havinğ many alter-native options during thnative options durinğ the war other than taking up arms in an e war other than takinğ up arms in an extraordinarily uncertain and hostile environmentextraordinarily uncertain and hostile environment,, many young Rume-many younğ Rume-liot men coming from poverty such as peasants, shepherds, outcasts, and liot men cominğ from poverty such as peasants, shepherds, outcasts, and vagabonds were inevitably gravitated towards the charm of the irregular vağabonds were inevitably ğravitated towards the charm of the irreğular bands thbands that were at were not onlynot only fighting against the Ottoman troops, but also fiğhtinğ ağainst the Ottoman troops, but also increasingly accessing and controlling resources by means of physical increasinğly accessinğ and controllinğ resources by means of physical force. force.
This thesis focuses on
This thesis focuses on Ioannis Velentzas, Ioannis Velentzas, who was one such men, plac-who was one such men, plac-ing him inğ him within significant and transformativewithin siğnificant and transformative events that influenced the events that influenced the Greek political domain in the first half of the Greek political domain in the first half of the nineteenthnineteenth--century. Ve-century. Ve-lentzas was a native of lentzas was a native of Almyros in Almyros in Phthiotis, a mountainous region be-Phthiotis, a mountainous reğion be-tween Thessaly and Attica. His date of birth is unknown, but it is plausible tween Thessaly and Attica. His date of birth is unknown, but it is plausible that he that he was in his twenties when he participated in the war. In 1822, Ve-was in his twenties when he participated in the war. In 1822, Ve-lentzas joined the band of Tzamis Karatasos, son of the famous Macedo-lentzas joined the band of Tzamis Karatasos, son of the famous Macedo-nian klepht Dimitrios Karatasos, who arrived in the region after the Otto-nian klepht Dimitrios Karatasos, who arrived in the reğion after the Otto-mans crushed the Greek insurgence in Macedonia, ofmans crushed the Greek insurğence in Macedonia, of which Tzamis was which Tzamis was a leader. The fact that he joined Tzamis Karatasosa leader. The fact that he joined Tzamis Karatasos,, a captain who was a a captain who was a
1 The broad geographic term of “Rumeli” generally refers to the territorial possessions of The broad ğeoğraphic term of “Rumeli” ğenerally refers to the territorial possessions of the Ottoman Empire in the whole Balkan peninsula. In this thesis, the term refers mainly the Ottoman Empire in the whole Balkan peninsula. In this thesis, the term refers mainly to the geography north to the Peloponnesito the ğeoğraphy north to the Peloponnesian peninsula that starts with Attica and in-an peninsula that starts with Attica and in-cludes the lands previouslycludes the lands previously under the jurisdiction of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in Epirusunder the jurisdiction of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in Epirus and and Thessaly.Thessaly.
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newcomer in the region of Rumeli, indicates that Velentzas was in fact not
newcomer in the reğion of Rumeli, indicates that Velentzas was in fact not part of the networks of violence in Thessaly prior to the war.part of the networks of violence in Thessaly prior to the war.2 After all,After all, the social dynathe social dynamics of the traditional rural society in Rumeli in which mics of the traditional rural society in Rumeli in which these networks emerged, favored personal and more salient relation-these networks emerğed, favored personal and more salient relation-ships such as agnatic kinships and blood ties, as well as patronage net-ships such as ağnatic kinships and blood ties, as well as patronağe net-works under powerful men with a strong sense of local identityworks under powerful men with a stronğ sense of local identity. .
This is an important hypothesis, because it affirms that Velentzas be-
This is an important hypothesis, because it affirms that Velentzas be-longs to lonğs to aa group of military men who started to increasingly operate ğroup of military men who started to increasinğly operate within the traditional networks of violence in Rumeli precisely thanks to within the traditional networks of violence in Rumeli precisely thanks to the circumstances provided to them by thethe circumstances provided to them by the war. The geography from war. The ğeoğraphy from which Velentzas originates was in the turn of the which Velentzas oriğinates was in the turn of the nineteenthnineteenth--century par-century par-ticularly home to a society that produced a handful of famous captains ticularly home to a society that produced a handful of famous captains that led large bands of armed men. These captains were on the top of that led larğe bands of armed men. These captains were on the top of their own networks their own networks of clientage. Some of them were even authorized of clientağe. Some of them were even authorized with certain fiscal and military tasks, making them an essential part of with certain fiscal and military tasks, makinğ them an essential part of the social fabric in continental Greece. The fact that Velentzas was not an the social fabric in continental Greece. The fact that Velentzas was not an active part of this regional network prior to the war seemsactive part of this reğional network prior to the war seems to have com-to have com-pelled him to join Tzamis Karatasos an outsider to the region of Rumeli, pelled him to join Tzamis Karatasos an outsider to the reğion of Rumeli, where he soughtwhere he souğht new channels as well. Karatasos consequently con-new channels as well. Karatasos consequently con-ducted his military operations increasingly within a ducted his military operations increasinğly within a broaderbroader scale rather scale rather than trying to restrain with a mothan tryinğ to restrain with a more regional character, because for an out-re reğional character, because for an out-sider, the former was a much more promising way to obtain a profit from sider, the former was a much more promisinğ way to obtain a profit from the war, with the war of independence being increasingly managed by a the war, with the war of independence beinğ increasinğly manağed by a
2 The term “Networks of Violence” refers to the ithe informal webs in which participants nformal webs in which participants mostly act mostly act autonomously, and can be characterized by their nomadicautonomously, and can be characterized by their nomadic--militaristic life militaristic life style and collective experiences with other individuals or groups within the life with style and collective experiences with other individuals or ğroups within the life with whom occasional exchange of information, weapons, and manpower was possible. In whom occasional exchanğe of information, weapons, and manpower was possible. In addition to theaddition to their role in the endemic banditry in Rumeli, the emergence of multiple con-ir role in the endemic banditry in Rumeli, the emerğence of multiple con-centrations of power in Rumeli at the turn of the 1centrations of power in Rumeli at the turn of the 199thth century gave these individuals the century ğave these individuals the opportunity to advance the social hierarchy by becoming clients to powerful office hold-opportunity to advance the social hierarchy by becominğ clients to powerful office hold-ers, orers, or create their own clientele of violent men, being able to easily use their military create their own clientele of violent men, beinğ able to easily use their military talents on both sides of the law. Securing the services of these irregular military net-talents on both sides of the law. Securinğ the services of these irreğular military net-works, who were experts in using works, who were experts in usinğ directdirect violence to obtain resources proved to be a violence to obtain resources proved to be a ccrucial element during military conflicts, such rucial element durinğ military conflicts, such aas the Greek war of independence.s the Greek war of independence.
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central administration. Thus, Velentzas became part of a military net-
central administration. Thus, Velentzas became part of a military net-workwork that looked up to a central administration that was perhaps foreign that looked up to a central administration that was perhaps foreiğn to the traditional social structure of Greece at the beginning of the war to the traditional social structure of Greece at the beğinninğ of the war but would increasingly assert more influence as but would increasinğly assert more influence as the the years went by. When years went by. When Ioannis Kolettis, the shrewd politician aIoannis Kolettis, the shrewd politician and former member of Ali nd former member of Ali PPasha’s asha’s court, assumed the role of patron of the already present network of Ru-court, assumed the role of patron of the already present network of Ru-meliot bands, Velentzas’s career for the remainder of his life was fixed. meliot bands, Velentzas’s career for the remainder of his life was fixed. The war established Kolettis as one of the most influential politicians in The war established Kolettis as one of the most influential politicians in GreecGreece, and leader of a political faction for e, and leader of a political faction for the nextthe next decades. Kolettis’ big decades. Kolettis’ biğ success was to utilize Ali success was to utilize Ali PPasha’s method of establishing political patron-asha’s method of establishinğ political patron-age for the irregular bands in Rumeli, and in return establishing himself ağe for the irreğular bands in Rumeli, and in return establishinğ himself a powerhouse in the region. Around a powerhouse in the reğion. Around 18231823--24 Velentzas established a 24 Velentzas established a strong personal relationship with Kolettis and became part of this clien-stronğ personal relationship with Kolettis and became part of this clien-tele. Thus, while trying to assert more influence and power through his tele. Thus, while tryinğ to assert more influence and power throuğh his personal relationships that he established during the war, Velentzas in personal relationships that he established durinğ the war, Velentzas in return breturn became member of a network that turned into a political party in ecame member of a network that turned into a political party in Greece. Greece.
Despite all his struggles, Velentzas never became a major political fig-
Despite all his struğğles, Velentzas never became a major political fiğ-ure in Greece on a national scale. However, neither is he completely invis-ure in Greece on a national scale. However, neither is he completely invis-ible in historical records. Both Ottomible in historical records. Both Ottoman and Greek archives mention him an and Greek archives mention him directly on and offdirectly on and off, describing his activities that spanned, describinğ his activities that spanned a period of three a period of three decades. Documents reveal that Velentzas took part in the civil wars of decades. Documents reveal that Velentzas took part in the civil wars of 18231823--1825 in Greece, and became a client of Kolettis at this time, who w1825 in Greece, and became a client of Kolettis at this time, who was as in charge of the Rumeliot faction that invaded the Peloponnese during in charğe of the Rumeliot faction that invaded the Peloponnese durinğ the civil war. Through documents it can also be observed that thanks to the civil war. Throuğh documents it can also be observed that thanks to his relationship with Kolettis, within a few years Velentzas rose his relationship with Kolettis, within a few years Velentzas rose up up the the ranks and becameranks and became thethe captain of his owcaptain of his own band, with which he took part n band, with which he took part in yet another civil war that erupted after the assassination of Kapodis-in yet another civil war that erupted after the assassination of Kapodis-trias, and aided Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction. After the year 1832, when the trias, and aided Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction. After the year 1832, when the Greek monarchy under the Bavarian king Otto was established, Velentzas Greek monarchy under the Bavarian kinğ Otto was established, Velentzas like olike other men who made themselves a living through violence during a ther men who made themselves a livinğ throuğh violence durinğ a decade of warfare, struggled to find his place within the new government. decade of warfare, struğğled to find his place within the new ğovernment. For a brief period, he joined the newly created gendarmerie and skir-For a brief period, he joined the newly created ğendarmerie and skir-misher troopsmisher troops.. HHoweverowever,, his constant insistence onhis constant insistence on being stationed in beinğ stationed in
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Eastern Rumeli under the command of other Kolettists, and his continued
Eastern Rumeli under the command of other Kolettists, and his continued loyalty to Kolettis shows that he was still part of Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction loyalty to Kolettis shows that he was still part of Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction that became that became known as known as the French Party. After Kolettis was sent to Paris the French Party. After Kolettis was sent to Paris as ambassadoras ambassador in 1835, mainly as an attempt to in 1835, mainly as an attempt to keepkeep him him and the other and the other party leaders party leaders away from Greece away from Greece as the Bavarian monarchy sought to as the Bavarian monarchy souğht to bring the government under its control,brinğ the ğovernment under its control, Velentzas appears to have in-Velentzas appears to have in-creasingly become rogue in his attempts to make a living through creasinğly become roğue in his attempts to make a livinğ throuğh tradi-tradi-tional violent means due to the temporary loss of his vital political con-tional violent means due to the temporary loss of his vital political con-nections provided by Kolettis. nections provided by Kolettis.
It is also during this period that Velentzas’ name started to appear in
It is also durinğ this period that Velentzas’ name started to appear in dispatches sent dispatches sent by theby the Ottoman officials Ottoman officials reporting onreportinğ on the Greek frontier the Greek frontier tto Istanbul. Velentzas’ hometown Phthiotis was along the Ottoman fron-o Istanbul. Velentzas’ hometown Phthiotis was alonğ the Ottoman fron-tier, which became a convenient hub for armed bands to operate raids tier, which became a convenient hub for armed bands to operate raids from into Ottoman lands and return afterwards to hide on the Greek side from into Ottoman lands and return afterwards to hide on the Greek side of the frontier, making use of its mountainous of the frontier, makinğ use of its mountainous terrain. For a period of two terrain. For a period of two decades Ottoman documents reportdecades Ottoman documents reporteded aboutabout ‘‘Kapudan VelençeKapudan Velençe’ ’ (Captain (Captain Velentzas)Velentzas),, summarizingsummarizinğ his exploits that were exclusively directed to-his exploits that were exclusively directed to-wards the Ottoman province of Thessaly. What is noteworthy and also a wards the Ottoman province of Thessaly. What is noteworthy and also a central component ocentral component of this f this thesisthesis is the nature of one particular foray that is the nature of one particular foray that Velentzas led on the Ottoman frontier, that is the raid he orchestrated in Velentzas led on the Ottoman frontier, that is the raid he orchestrated in the fall of the year 1840. the fall of the year 1840.
Although t
Althouğh the event itself was small and even inconsequentialhe event itself was small and even inconsequential, I argue , I arğue that it was an attempt by that it was an attempt by a local powerbroker to play into the politics of a local powerbroker to play into the politics of the Eastern Question, the question that made the Eastern Question, the question that made the territorial integrity of the territorial inteğrity of the Ottoman Empire the Ottoman Empire a central tenet of Europeana central tenet of European security security in the aftermath in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna (1815)of the Conğress of Vienna (1815).. ByBy carefulcarefullyly examinexamininginğ the patronthe patron--client client relationship relationship betweenbetween Ioannis Velentzas and the French party leader Io-Ioannis Velentzas and the French party leader Io-annis Kolettis, annis Kolettis, this thesis seeksthis thesis seeks to carefully exto carefully exploreplore the evolution of tra-the evolution of tra-ditional power structures and regional networks of violence in continen-ditional power structures and reğional networks of violence in continen-tal Greece tal Greece inin the tranthe transition from the Ottoman political system to the sition from the Ottoman political system to the Greek nation stateGreek nation state. The goal is. The ğoal is to investigate how traditional networks of to investiğate how traditional networks of patronage adapted to the new political climate and became political en-patronağe adapted to the new political climate and became political en-terprises on a national scale, and to see how through their relterprises on a national scale, and to see how throuğh their relationships ationships with Greece’s three guarantor powers these political parties, the French with Greece’s three ğuarantor powers these political parties, the French
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party in particular, attempted to appropriate international affairs in the
party in particular, attempted to appropriate international affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean in the first half of the Eastern Mediterranean in the first half of the nineteenthnineteenth century. There-century. There-fore, while aiming to folfore, while aiminğ to follow the story of the patronlow the story of the patron--client relationship be-client relationship be-tween Velentzas and Kolettis that led to Velentzas’ involvement in the ir-tween Velentzas and Kolettis that led to Velentzas’ involvement in the ir-redentist foray of 1840, this redentist foray of 1840, this study discussesstudy discusses the transformation of the transformation of traditional power structures into modern political enterprises intraditional power structures into modern political enterprises in early early nineteenthnineteenth--century Greece.century Greece.
There exist a number of s
There exist a number of studies on the networks of tudies on the networks of provincial provincial entre-entre-preneurs in Ottoman Rumeli in early preneurs in Ottoman Rumeli in early nineteenthnineteenth--century century that examine that examine the social circumstances the social circumstances within whichwithin which they hathey hadd emergedemerğed.. For a long time For a lonğ time until the 1970’s thuntil the 1970’s thee fiscal decentralization fiscal decentralization of the Ottoman Empire of the Ottoman Empire had had been accepted as signs of decline in the Ottoman state apparatus that been accepted as siğns of decline in the Ottoman state apparatus that geared towards disintegration. Ariel Salzmann showsğeared towards disinteğration. Ariel Salzmann shows,, however that on however that on the contrary, the decentralizthe contrary, the decentralization of fiscal offices encouraged provincial ation of fiscal offices encourağed provincial enterprises, and with the emergence of competitions and alliances enterprises, and with the emerğence of competitions and alliances among state elites and nonamonğ state elites and non--state elites or central and provincial elites, state elites or central and provincial elites, the provincial units and the center were more connected and the rela-the provincial units and the center were more connected and the rela-titionships among these fiscal nexuses more dynamic than imagined be-onships amonğ these fiscal nexuses more dynamic than imağined be-fore.fore.3 According to Accordinğ to Ali YaycıoğluAli Yaycıoğ lu,, ththeseese relationshiprelationshipss between provincial between provincial notables and the imperial center was much more horizontal than previ-notables and the imperial center was much more horizontal than previ-ous studies would have shown, stressing that the ous studies would have shown, stressinğ that the binary relationship of binary relationship of centercenter--periphery was an inaccurate way to approach the relationship be-periphery was an inaccurate way to approach the relationship be-tween the tween the eempire and the provinces, that the empire was actually fairly mpire and the provinces, that the empire was actually fairly integrated, and provincial and central elites were in constant negotia-inteğrated, and provincial and central elites were in constant neğotia-tions that redefined tions that redefined their roles. He also their roles. He also discussesdiscusses how these powerful re-how these powerful re-gional notables nurtured their own patronğional notables nurtured their own patron--client relationships, bureau-client relationships, bureau-cracies and alliances in their influence zones, paralleling the Imperial cracies and alliances in their influence zones, parallelinğ the Imperial administrative apparatusadministrative apparatus..4 In terms of networks of violence,In terms of networks of violence, Tolga Esmer Tolğa Esmer notes that patterns of patronage have a significant place in writing a cul-notes that patterns of patronağe have a siğnificant place in writinğ a cul-tural and social history of violence and power. tural and social history of violence and power. HHe depicts how violent e depicts how violent
3 Ariel Salzmann. “An Ancien Regime Revisited: ‘Privatization’ and Political Economy in Ariel Salzmann. “An Ancien Reğime Revisited: ‘Privatization’ and Political Economy in the Eighteenththe Eiğhteenth--Century Ottoman Empire” Century Ottoman Empire” Politics & SocietyPolitics & Society, 21 no.4 (1993): 393, 21 no.4 (1993): 393--423.423.
4 Ali Yaycıoğlu, Ali Yaycıoğ lu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revo-Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revo-lutions lutions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)..
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circumstances at the turn of the
circumstances at the turn of the eighteentheiğhteenth--century created the environ-century created the environ-ment for social dependency ment for social dependency between agents of violence, between ağents of violence, and and how how center center and periphery models fail to explain the dynamism of Ottoman society and periphery models fail to explain the dynamism of Ottoman society due to multiple concentrations of political and economic powerdue to multiple concentrations of political and economic power..5
The historiography had
The historioğraphy had for long for lonğ approached approached the Greek war of inde-the Greek war of inde-pendencependence as aas an analytically narrow n analytically narrow storystory of the liberation of a wellof the liberation of a well--de-de-fined nation from foreign oppression. Starting with the second half of the fined nation from foreiğn oppression. Startinğ with the second half of the twentieth century, historians such as John Anthony Petropoulos, alt-twentieth century, historians such as John Anthony Petropoulos, alt-hough still in some instances taking the idea of a well houğh still in some instances takinğ the idea of a well understood Greek understood Greek nationalism in the minds of the protagonists of the struggle for granted, nationalism in the minds of the protağonists of the struğğle for ğranted, has revealed the regionally fragmented nature of the groups that partici-has revealed the reğionally frağmented nature of the ğroups that partici-pated in the making of the Greek state, and how the rivalries among sev-pated in the makinğ of the Greek state, and how the rivalries amonğ sev-eral factions that emeeral factions that emerged from this fragmentation had dominated the rğed from this frağmentation had dominated the first decade of the Greek kingdom.first decade of the Greek kinğdom.6 In one of the latest publications on In one of the latest publications on the subject, Mark Mazower emphasizes the same issue and describes the subject, Mark Mazower emphasizes the same issue and describes how the war of independence had been in fact more of a series of inter-how the war of independence had been in fact more of a series of inter-connected regional conflicts.connected reğional conflicts.7 The fact that the Greek war of independ-The fact that the Greek war of independ-ence was noence was not simply one single event with a concrete beginning and con-t simply one sinğle event with a concrete beğinninğ and con-clusion, and a homogenous group of protagonists is further revealed in clusion, and a homoğenous ğroup of protağonists is further revealed in Şükrü Ilıcak’s work in the Ottoman Archival documents that shows how Şu kru Ilıcak’s work in the Ottoman Archival documents that shows how the Ottomans the Ottomans themselves themselves had made sense of these conflictshad made sense of these conflicts, as well as , as well as that a set complicated dynamics and series of events had determined its that a set complicated dynamics and series of events had determined its outcome.outcome.8
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century,
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, sstudies on violent en-tudies on violent en-trepreneurs in pretrepreneurs in pre--modern societies had largely focused on their possi-modern societies had larğely focused on their possi-ble representation oble representation of class struggle, or potential role as revolutionary f class struğğle, or potential role as revolutionary
5 Tolga U. Esmer, Tolğa U. Esmer, A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing DiscA Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discoourses of urses of Justice in Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790the Ottoman Empire, 1790--18081808 (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2009)(PhD diss., University of Chicağo, 2009)..
6 John Anthony Petropoulos, John Anthony Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833--18431843 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968)(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968)..
7 Mark Mazower, Mark Mazower, The Greek Revolution, and thThe Greek Revolution, and the Making of Modern Europee Making of Modern Europe (New York: Pen-(New York: Pen-guin Press, 2021)ğuin Press, 2021)..
8 Şükrü Ilıcak, Şu kru Ilıcak, Those Infidel Greeks: The Greek War of Independence Through Ottoman Ar-Those Infidel Greeks: The Greek War of Independence Through Ottoman Ar-chival Documentschival Documents (Boston: Brill, 2021)(Boston: Brill, 2021)..
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heroes, based on folklore or sources of retrospective assessment by
heroes, based on folklore or sources of retrospective assessment by newly emerged nation states that embrace them as nationalist pioneers newly emerğed nation states that embrace them as nationalist pioneers who fought against tyranny. Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of the banwho fouğht ağainst tyranny. Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of the bandit dit was largely based on this description of a fictional/mythical avenger.was larğely based on this description of a fictional/mythical avenğer.9 Since the 1980s, this understanding started to be reversed. John Koli-Since the 1980s, this understandinğ started to be reversed. John Koli-opoulos revealed that the Klephtic hero in Greece was a myth, and many opoulos revealed that the Klephtic hero in Greece was a myth, and many fighters of the Greek war of independenfiğhters of the Greek war of independence, particularly the irregular mil-ce, particularly the irreğular mil-itary element in Rumeli, instead of being “national heroes” defying Otto-itary element in Rumeli, instead of beinğ “national heroes” defyinğ Otto-man rule, had been formerly employed to serve the Ottoman provincial man rule, had been formerly employed to serve the Ottoman provincial security system, and had been pursuing a violent lifestyle in line with security system, and had been pursuinğ a violent lifestyle in line with their fortheir former life after the Greek kingdom was founded.mer life after the Greek kinğdom was founded.10 In another in-In another in-stance ofstance of distancing the bandit in Mediterranean agrarian societies from distancinğ the bandit in Mediterranean ağrarian societies from the mythical figure of social bandit, Anton Blok demonstrates how the the mythical fiğure of social bandit, Anton Blok demonstrates how the attraction of the career as a bandit did not emerge attraction of the career as a bandit did not emerğe due to a class solidar-due to a class solidar-ity among the peasantry, but through the desire of power and honor that ity amonğ the peasantry, but throuğh the desire of power and honor that was enabled through networks of political patronage. Thiswas enabled throuğh networks of political patronağe. This,, of courseof course, as, as he pointhe pointeded outout,, was the outcome of the need for violent men to protect was the outcome of the need for violent men to protect the lands of absenthe lands of absentee estate holders in provincial areas.tee estate holders in provincial areas.11
While engaging with these
While enğağinğ with these studiesstudies, this , this thesisthesis slightly departs from sliğhtly departs from them them inin termsterms of methodology, of methodoloğy, as well asas well as its scale and focus. It investi-its scale and focus. It investi-gates how historical transformation has been experienced by particular ğates how historical transformation has been experienced by particular iindividuals, and the ways these developments have changed their lives ndividuals, and the ways these developments have chanğed their lives and recontextualized their political options after the transition from and recontextualized their political options after the transition from eem-m-pire into nation statepire into nation state in the political environment of early nineteenthin the political environment of early nineteenth--century.century. In a way, In a way, regarding the 1840 forareğardinğ the 1840 foray of Velentzas, y of Velentzas, this study aims to this study aims to contribute to the field of “global microhistorycontribute to the field of “ğlobal microhistory,,””12 ttaking akinğ relatively relatively modestmodest actionsactions as starting point and pulling back to view grander and more ex-as startinğ point and pullinğ back to view ğrander and more ex-tensive historical changes, this study aims to provide a window into the tensive historical chanğes, this study aims to provide a window into the
9 Eric Hobsbawm, Eric Hobsbawm, BanditsBandits. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969..
10 John John S. Koliopoulos, S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism In Modern Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism In Modern Greece, 1821Greece, 1821––19121912. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)..
11 Anton Blok, Anton Blok, Honour and ViolenceHonour and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001)(Cambridğe: Polity Press, 2001)..
12 Francesca Trivellato, “Is There a Francesca Trivellato, “Is There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global His-Future for Italian Microhistory in the Ağe of Global His-tory?”tory?” California Italian StudiesCalifornia Italian Studies, 2 no.1. (2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.5070/C321009025, 2 no.1. (2011). http://dx.doi.orğ/10.5070/C321009025
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big picture through iğ picture throuğh a a smaller microsmaller micro--scale details.scale details.13 Drawing on this view-Drawinğ on this view-point, the aim is to view how with the Greek war of point, the aim is to view how with the Greek war of iindependence, new ndependence, new alliances such as that between Velentzas and Kolettis have formed in line alliances such as that between Velentzas and Kolettis have formed in line with the previous provincial networks inwith the previous provincial networks in Ottoman Rumeli, and trans-Ottoman Rumeli, and trans-formed to adapt to the new political circumstances, when domestic Greek formed to adapt to the new political circumstances, when domestic Greek politics increasingly became subject to European geopolitics in the 1830s. politics increasinğly became subject to European ğeopolitics in the 1830s.
The thesis is comprised of three chapters. The chapters are in chron-
The thesis is comprised of three chapters. The chapters are in chron-ological orderoloğical order, following various historical stages and political frame-, followinğ various historical stağes and political frame-works in Greece, in which the networks central to this thesis have come works in Greece, in which the networks central to this thesis have come to evolve. Chapter 1 introduces the various regions most of which became to evolve. Chapter 1 introduces the various reğions most of which became the basic geographical units of Greece, with a particuthe basic ğeoğraphical units of Greece, with a particular focus on Rumeli lar focus on Rumeli and the historical and geographical conditions that provided the social and the historical and ğeoğraphical conditions that provided the social environment for men like Velentzas and Kolettis to emerge. This chapter environment for men like Velentzas and Kolettis to emerğe. This chapter also presents key individuals from other regions with diverse cultural also presents key individuals from other reğions with diverse cultural and social backgroundand social backğrounds that would be highly significant in the political s that would be hiğhly siğnificant in the political environment of Greece starting with 1821. environment of Greece startinğ with 1821.
With the start of the Greek revolt, key individuals within the regional
With the start of the Greek revolt, key individuals within the reğional political networks present at the time quickly adapted to the new violent political networks present at the time quickly adapted to the new violent circumstances. circumstances. Chapter 2 aims to follow the actions of these actors and Chapter 2 aims to follow the actions of these actors and identify the political instruments that these men used in order to obtain identify the political instruments that these men used in order to obtain leadership in their regions by filling a large vacuum of power. It is signif-leadership in their reğions by fillinğ a larğe vacuum of power. It is siğnif-icant to understand the nature of their politicalicant to understand the nature of their political actions, their objectives actions, their objectives in forging alliances and reason of switching between camps to under-in forğinğ alliances and reason of switchinğ between camps to under-stand the environment in which men like Velentzas have struggled to find stand the environment in which men like Velentzas have struğğled to find their place. As the war went on, conflicts arose between regional camps, their place. As the war went on, conflicts arose between reğional camps, who refused to swho refused to surrender their regional authorities to a provisional gov-urrender their reğional authorities to a provisional ğov-ernment. As the chapter continues, it aims to investigate the nature of ernment. As the chapter continues, it aims to investiğate the nature of these conflicts and their outcome as civil wars in 1824 that almost re-these conflicts and their outcome as civil wars in 1824 that almost re-sulted in the end of the war of independence in particularsulted in the end of the war of independence in particular with the Egyp-with the Eğyp-tian invasion that immediately followed it. After providing a brief sum-tian invasion that immediately followed it. After providinğ a brief sum-mary of these events, the chapter follows Velentzas’ story throughout mary of these events, the chapter follows Velentzas’ story throuğhout
13 Konstantina Zanou, Konstantina Zanou, Transnational Patriotism in the Mediterranean, 1Transnational Patriotism in the Mediterranean, 1880000--1850: Stammer-1850: Stammer-ing the Nationing the Nation (Oxford:(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 3Oxford University Press, 2018), 3..
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these episodes as he slowly made his name known among certain Rume-
these episodes as he slowly made his name known amonğ certain Rume-liots which eventually resulted in liots which eventually resulted in him becoming a loyal client under Ko-him becominğ a loyal client under Ko-lettis’ patronage, whose faction would increasingly become to be associ-lettis’ patronağe, whose faction would increasinğly become to be associ-ated with France.ated with France.
Chapter 3 takes over from the previous chapter chronologically, and
Chapter 3 takes over from the previous chapter chronoloğically, and further details the process in which Greece’s traditional leadefurther details the process in which Greece’s traditional leaders and fac-rs and fac-tions began to create relationships with the three powers, eventually be-tions beğan to create relationships with the three powers, eventually be-coming labelled as the English, French, and Russian factions. Despite Ka-cominğ labelled as the Enğlish, French, and Russian factions. Despite Ka-podistrias’ and the Bavarians’ serious attempts to eliminate traditional podistrias’ and the Bavarians’ serious attempts to eliminate traditional regional networks of power, treğional networks of power, the summary of which constitutes half of the he summary of which constitutes half of the chapter, these leaders remained to be the primary actors in Greek politics chapter, these leaders remained to be the primary actors in Greek politics especially following the assassination of Kapodistrias, which once again especially followinğ the assassination of Kapodistrias, which once ağain through another civil war victory brought Kolettis into the centthrouğh another civil war victory brouğht Kolettis into the center of er of Greek politics, and opened up channels for Velentzas to become a recog-Greek politics, and opened up channels for Velentzas to become a recoğ-nized military figure through his assistance to the former. The chapter nized military fiğure throuğh his assistance to the former. The chapter then continues and summarizes the Bavarian monarchy’s attempts to ba-then continues and summarizes the Bavarian monarchy’s attempts to ba-sically realize policies similar to thatsically realize policies similar to that of Kapodistrias, and how the strong of Kapodistrias, and how the stronğ reactions in the provinces necessitated the Bavarian regime to recognize reactions in the provinces necessitated the Bavarian reğime to recoğnize traditional elements particularly in Rumeli. After showing how the three traditional elements particularly in Rumeli. After showinğ how the three guarantor powers have interfered in domestic Greek politics in various ğuarantor powers have interfered in domestic Greek politics in various waways, the chapter concludes with Velentzas organizing an irredentist ys, the chapter concludes with Velentzas orğanizinğ an irredentist foray into neighboring Ottoman provinces, as part of a proforay into neiğhborinğ Ottoman provinces, as part of a pro--French French scheme of the Kolettis faction during the Ottomanscheme of the Kolettis faction durinğ the Ottoman--Egypt conflict of 1839Eğypt conflict of 1839--1841.1841.
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2 The Political and Social Setting in The Political and Social Settinğ in GreeceGreece inin 18211821
nderstanding the particular trajectories of each region that made
nderstandinğ the particular trajectories of each reğion that made up the basic geographical units of modern Greece is key to mapping up the basic ğeoğraphical units of modern Greece is key to mappinğ out the origins of various regional factions and their conflicts.out the oriğins of various reğional factions and their conflicts. Each re-Each re-gion had different forms of social organization thğion had different forms of social orğanization that influenced the modus at influenced the modus operandi of their political factions during the revolutionary years and af-operandi of their political factions durinğ the revolutionary years and af-ter the birth of the Greek nation state. The protagonists of the Greek in-ter the birth of the Greek nation state. The protağonists of the Greek in-surrections in 1821 were very diverse in terms of regional and social iden-surrections in 1821 were very diverse in terms of reğional and social iden-tification.tification. The insurgents in the Peloponnesian peninsula were various The insurğents in the Peloponnesian peninsula were various landowning primate families such as the Londos, Zaimis, Delilandowninğ primate families such as the Londos, Zaimis, Deligiğiannis fam-annis fam-ilies, and the Mavromichalis clan of the Mani region, Moreot Klephts like ilies, and the Mavromichalis clan of the Mani reğion, Moreot Klephts like
U
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Kolokotronis and Nikitaras, and their bands
Kolokotronis and Nikitaras, and their bands consisting of Peloponnesian consistinğ of Peloponnesian peasants. In Rumeli the insurgent leaders were mainly the military chief-peasants. In Rumeli the insurğent leaders were mainly the military chief-tains and armatoles of Thessaly, Epirus, and Atticatains and armatoles of Thessaly, Epirus, and Attica,, Souliot clans, and Souliot clans, and prominent civilian Rumeliots who were formerly prominent civilian Rumeliots who were formerly atat the court of Ali the court of Ali PPasha. asha. In the AegIn the Aeğean islands the leaders of the uprising were the ship owners ean islands the leaders of the uprisinğ were the ship owners and maritime merchants of the islands of Hydra, Spezza and Psara such and maritime merchants of the islands of Hydra, Spezza and Psara such as the Koundouriotis clan. Besides the actors from these regions that as the Koundouriotis clan. Besides the actors from these reğions that eventually beceventually becaame the three basic regional units of Greme the three basic reğional units of Greece, there were ece, there were Phanariotes and other heterochthon civilians from the diasporaPhanariotes and other heterochthon civilians from the diaspora1 who who would also play a significant role in the war of independence and within would also play a siğnificant role in the war of independence and within the political domain of revolutionary Greece, such as Alexandros Mavro-the political domain of revolutionary Greece, such as Alexandros Mavro-kordatos and the Kapodistriakordatos and the Kapodistrias brothers.s brothers.
The strong regional identities and the very fragmented nature of the
The stronğ reğional identities and the very frağmented nature of the Greek speaking society would be a predominant element in Greece’s po-Greek speakinğ society would be a predominant element in Greece’s po-litical domain throughout the war of independence. In fact, the develop-litical domain throuğhout the war of independence. In fact, the develop-ments that would follow during the wments that would follow durinğ the war would further sharpen these di-ar would further sharpen these di-visions this time within the newly emerging domain of national politics, visions this time within the newly emerğinğ domain of national politics, and the new political setting that would come with it. Simultaneously, and the new political settinğ that would come with it. Simultaneously, this strong regional emphasis was further exacerbated due to the ab-this stronğ reğional emphasis was further exacerbated due to the ab-sence of a ssence of a strong central authoritytronğ central authority among the insurgentsamonğ the insurğents and the emer-and the emer-gence and rise ofğence and rise of thethe regional.reğional. The differing objectives of these actors re-The differinğ objectives of these actors re-garding the rebellion in 1821 was to be among the primary factors that ğardinğ the rebellion in 1821 was to be amonğ the primary factors that shaped the internal conflicts. This chapter aims to pshaped the internal conflicts. This chapter aims to present a picture that resent a picture that would provide an understanding of how the historical functions of these would provide an understandinğ of how the historical functions of these various groups in the Ottoman provincial regime prior to 1821 heavily in-various ğroups in the Ottoman provincial reğime prior to 1821 heavily in-fluenced the nature of their political action within the framework of the fluenced the nature of their political action within the framework of the Greek war of indGreek war of independence. ependence. To examine the historical developments and To examine the historical developments and geographical conditions in these regions is useful ğeoğraphical conditions in these reğions is useful as well as well in presenting in presentinğ certain features of the origins of these divisions, regional factions, and certain features of the oriğins of these divisions, reğional factions, and party politicsparty politics that that came tocame to dominate the Greek politicdominate the Greek political domain in the al domain in the following decades. followinğ decades.
1 Konstantina Zanou, Konstantina Zanou, Transnational PatriotismTransnational Patriotism, 5, 5..
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§ 2.12.1 The Setting in Rumeli in 1821The Settinğ in Rumeli in 1821
Continental Greece (Rumeli) has a distinct feature in that its social
Continental Greece (Rumeli) has a distinct feature in that its social structure has equally been formed strongly by environmental conditions structure has equally been formed stronğly by environmental conditions as well as historical developments. The Pindus as well as historical developments. The Pindus Mountain range that Mountain ranğe that stretches over the peninsula starting from Attica to today’s Albania has a stretches over the peninsula startinğ from Attica to today’s Albania has a central role in shaping the social, economic, and administrative condi-central role in shapinğ the social, economic, and administrative condi-tions in the region due to its extremely harsh and challenging physical tions in the reğion due to its extremely harsh and challenğinğ physical environment. As a cenvironment. As a consequence of this sharp contrast to the surrounding onsequence of this sharp contrast to the surroundinğ regions, these highlands were home to an immense number of mountain reğions, these hiğhlands were home to an immense number of mountain communities that sustained their livelihood mostly through animal hus-communities that sustained their livelihood mostly throuğh animal hus-bandry and nomadic pastoralism. These nomadic shepherds had been bandry and nomadic pastoralism. These nomadic shepherds had been mmoving their animals and flocks through the Balkans for centuries, and ovinğ their animals and flocks throuğh the Balkans for centuries, and in central Greece, this transhumance economy was practiced between in central Greece, this transhumance economy was practiced between the the various various mountain districts on the Pindus range.mountain districts on the Pindus ranğe.2
It appears that pastoralism became increasingly widespread in cen-
It appears that pastoralism became increasinğly widespread in cen-tral Greece around the turn of the tral Greece around the turn of the nineteenth centurynineteenth century. In addition to the . In addition to the region’s mountainous environment favoring transhumance pastoralism reğion’s mountainous environment favorinğ transhumance pastoralism above agriculture, the increasing political and ecabove ağriculture, the increasinğ political and economic power of onomic power of Tepedelenli Ali Tepedelenli Ali PPasha, whose policies of consolidating small landholdings asha, whose policies of consolidatinğ small landholdinğs into large estates (chiftliks) leaving many peasants landless and certainly into larğe estates (chiftliks) leavinğ many peasants landless and certainly adding to the numbers of mountaineers, more importantly it left large addinğ to the numbers of mountaineers, more importantly it left larğe areas of arable landareas of arable land empty and open for pasture.empty and open for pasture.3 In fact, many absentee In fact, many absentee estate estate holdersholders in Rumeli found it much more lucrative and less risky to in Rumeli found it much more lucrative and less risky to rent their lands as seasonal grazeland to pastoralists instead of hiring rent their lands as seasonal ğrazeland to pastoralists instead of hirinğ tenant farmers or sharecropperstenant farmers or sharecroppers,,4 further increasing thefurther increasinğ the number of number of mountain dwelling shepherds at the expense of agricultural cultivation. mountain dwellinğ shepherds at the expense of ağricultural cultivation.
This pattern of ecological adjustment and transition
This pattern of ecoloğical adjustment and transition toto a way of living a way of livinğ in response to arbitrary in response to arbitrary fiscal fiscal administration contributed to the popula-administration contributed to the popula-tion of an already separate tion of an already separate society on the highlands of Rumeli that society on the hiğhlands of Rumeli that
2 William W. McGrew, William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800--18811881 (New York: The (New York: The Kent State UKent State Unniversity Press, 1985), 13iversity Press, 1985), 13..
3 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Brigands with a CauseCause, 21, 21..
4 Ibid. 22Ibid. 22..
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showed insecurity and hostility towards sedentary town life on the
showed insecurity and hostility towards sedentary town life on the plains, and the administrative and fiscal responsibilities that come with plains, and the administrative and fiscal responsibilities that come with it. The mistrust towards outside authority strengthened local bonds. In it. The mistrust towards outside authority strenğthened local bonds. In tratraditional agrarian societies at the time such asditional ağrarian societies at the time such as those found inthose found in Rumeli, Rumeli, trust within a community was primarily located in bonds between ag-trust within a community was primarily located in bonds between ağ-natic kinsmen when a strong state control was absent.natic kinsmen when a stronğ state control was absent.5 This is a valid in-This is a valid in-terpretation of Rumeli at the turn of the terpretation of Rumeli at the turn of the ninnineteentheteenth--century. Blood ties century. Blood ties became the primary base for attachment along with other traditional ties became the primary base for attachment alonğ with other traditional ties such as such as that of that of godparenthood and adoption. As one historian puts it, a ğodparenthood and adoption. As one historian puts it, a strong patriarchal nucleus and its values were at the center of where in-stronğ patriarchal nucleus and its values were at the center of where in-dividual lodividual loyalty and service was expected to be directed at, and social be-yalty and service was expected to be directed at, and social be-havior was based on.havior was based on.6
Another important feature of these groups was arms bearing. In ad-
Another important feature of these ğroups was arms bearinğ. In ad-dition to the obvious necessity of security concerns, this practice served dition to the obvious necessity of security concerns, this practice served occasional brigandage, sheep occasional briğandağe, sheep stealing and robbstealinğ and robberyery. The knowledge of Ru-. The knowledğe of Ru-meliot mountain communities on the local terrain and meliot mountain communities on the local terrain and their their talent in us-talent in us-ing arms led to the emergence of a distinct military class originating from inğ arms led to the emerğence of a distinct military class oriğinatinğ from the mountains of Rumeli. The utilization of personal violence becamethe mountains of Rumeli. The utilization of personal violence became a a vital element in everyday life, in particular with the emergence of the en-vital element in everyday life, in particular with the emerğence of the en-demic banditry as an economic endeavor. To prevent banditry from dis-demic banditry as an economic endeavor. To prevent banditry from dis-rupting the order, another group of men called Armatolos were con-ruptinğ the order, another ğroup of men called Armatolos were con-tracted in order to protect peasants, and in ptracted in order to protect peasants, and in particular the lands of articular the lands of absentee chiftlik holders. They were also usually authorized to collect absentee chiftlik holders. They were also usually authorized to collect taxes on the lands they were stationed on. It appears that the armed men taxes on the lands they were stationed on. It appears that the armed men employed within armatolos corps were much more frequent to come employed within armatolos corps were much more frequent to come across than simple vagabacross than simple vağabond bandits, and ond bandits, and to becometo become an armatolos cap-an armatolos cap-tain was the ultimate goal of almost every bandit. tain was the ultimate ğoal of almost every bandit. After all,After all, no matter how no matter how talented or powerful, outlaws required protection to a certain extent in talented or powerful, outlaws required protection to a certain extent in order to survive, and that protection could not be provided by torder to survive, and that protection could not be provided by the peas-he peas-antry. Therefore, the bandit profile of Rumeli does not have the features antry. Therefore, the bandit profile of Rumeli does not have the features
5 Blok, Blok, Honour and ViolenceHonour and Violence, 89, 89..
6 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause,, 2525..
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understood by Hobsbawm.
understood by Hobsbawm.7 The men of arms in Rumeli fit more into the The men of arms in Rumeli fit more into the category of men who constantly struggle to acquire a position of power, cateğory of men who constantly struğğle to acquire a position of power, recognized by a higher authority recoğnized by a hiğher authority that would enable them to harbor as that would enable them to harbor as many men as possible.many men as possible. AsAs AntonAnton Blok defines the character of patronage Blok defines the character of patronağe of this type of armed men: “Protectors of bandits may range from a close of this type of armed men: “Protectors of bandits may ranğe from a close though narrow circle of kinsmen and affiliated friends to powerful politi-thouğh narrow circle of kinsmen and affiliated friends to powerful politi-cians, including those who hold formal office as well as grassroots pcians, includinğ those who hold formal office as well as ğrassroots politi-oliti-cians. Protection thus involves the presence of a power domain. Of all cat-cians. Protection thus involves the presence of a power domain. Of all cat-egories, the peasants are the weakest. Unless bandits find political eğories, the peasants are the weakest. Unless bandits find political protection, their reign will be short.”protection, their reiğn will be short.”8 Or to put another way, while these Or to put another way, while these mountaineers created disordermountaineers created disorder, , issues of security issues of security and threat to the effec-and threat to the effec-tive processing of the administrative mechanisms tive processinğ of the administrative mechanisms in Rumeliin Rumeli,, around the around the turn of the turn of the nineteenthnineteenth--century, they at the same time formed a pool of century, they at the same time formed a pool of armed men ready to be hired by provincial notables or absentee land-armed men ready to be hired by provincial notables or absentee land-owneowners for protection.rs for protection.9 This form of political protection was an essential This form of political protection was an essential feature of Rumeliot bands, and as we will see in the following chapters, feature of Rumeliot bands, and as we will see in the followinğ chapters, its practice continued throughout the war of independence and brought its practice continued throuğhout the war of independence and brouğht many men into the political landscape of many men into the political landscape of revolutionary Greece.revolutionary Greece.
The group of men called Armatoles were lawfully contracted arm
The ğroup of men called Armatoles were lawfully contracted arm bearers employed by Ottoman authorities to chase brigands, guard bearers employed by Ottoman authorities to chase briğands, ğuard passes, and maintain order in their contracted regions ever since the passes, and maintain order in their contracted reğions ever since the sev-sev-enteenth centuryenteenth century..10 The brigands The briğands (klephts) and the armatoles of Rumeli (klephts) and the armatoles of Rumeli were were originating from the same social oriğinatinğ from the same social and cultural and cultural environment. The dis-environment. The dis-tinction between a brigand and armatolos was significantly blurred in the tinction between a briğand and armatolos was siğnificantly blurred in the early early nineteenthnineteenth--century. century. TheThe more fortunate men coming from this cul-more fortunate men cominğ from this cul-tureture of violence became armatoles and enjoyed certain of violence became armatoles and enjoyed certain politically politically recog-recoğ-nized privileges. When they lost the trust of thenized privileğes. When they lost the trust of their superiorsir superiors, they simply , they simply
7 Eric Hobsbawm’s famous definition of the “Social Bandit” proposes a type of “mythical Eric Hobsbawm’s famous definition of the “Social Bandit” proposes a type of “mythical criminal” originating in agrarian societies as a form of sociacriminal” oriğinatinğ in ağrarian societies as a form of social protest. See, Eric l protest. See, Eric Hobsbawm, Hobsbawm, BanditsBandits. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969. . New York: Pantheon Books, 1969.
8 Blok, Blok, Honour and ViolenceHonour and Violence, 18, 18..
9 Ali Yaycıoğlu, Ali Yaycıoğ lu, Partners of the EmpirePartners of the Empire, , 3333..
10 See, See, Cengiz Orhonlu, Cenğiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Derbend TeşkilatıOsmanlı İmparatorluğunda Derbend Teşkilatı (İstanbul: Eren (I stanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1967)Yayıncılık, 1967)..
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returned to banditry
returned to banditry until acquiring a pardon againuntil acquirinğ a pardon ağain. Both groups, ar-. Both ğroups, ar-matoles and brigands occasionally switched sidmatoles and briğands occasionally switched sides as a es as a rulerule whenever whenever they saw their fortunes on the other side of the law. This tthey saw their fortunes on the other side of the law. This tendency to do endency to do soso would also be predominant among several Greek captains who were would also be predominant amonğ several Greek captains who were former armatoles during the war of independence, many of former armatoles durinğ the war of independence, many of whomwhom hahadd switched sides, switched sides, and and some evsome even en done so for done so for multiple times.multiple times.
The
The districtsdistricts policed by the bands of armatoles were called armatolik policed by the bands of armatoles were called armatolik or captanlik, which were units or captanlik, which were units sometimes sometimes consisting of several villages. consistinğ of several villağes. These captanliks were autonomous and had the armatolos captain re-These captanliks were autonomous and had the armatolos captain re-sponsible for thesponsible for the collection of their taxes, which he sometimes further collection of their taxes, which he sometimes further farmed out for his own profit.farmed out for his own profit.11 Clientelism was a defining characteristic Clientelism was a defininğ characteristic of the Armatolic system. of the Armatolic system. Some powerfulSome powerful Armatolos captainArmatolos captainss had several had several villages, families, and subordinate captains with smallevillağes, families, and subordinate captains with smaller bands under r bands under their command. In addition to his duties, the captain as well had his own their command. In addition to his duties, the captain as well had his own very large herd of cattle, which he let out to herdsmen, who in return pro-very larğe herd of cattle, which he let out to herdsmen, who in return pro-vided him with a percentage of the yearly product.vided him with a percentağe of the yearly product.12 Over the course ofOver the course of time, some of the armatime, some of the armatolics developed into small scale military aristoc-tolics developed into small scale military aristoc-racies. By being powerful men and proving their efficient use of violence racies. By beinğ powerful men and provinğ their efficient use of violence to obtain resources in areas with lowto obtain resources in areas with lowerer central state authority, these men central state authority, these men inspired respect among the common people. They became inspired respect amonğ the common people. They became ‘‘memen of honorn of honor’. ’. They solved disputes andThey solved disputes and provided protection to the people in their dis-provided protection to the people in their dis-tricts, creating a network of patronage tricts, creatinğ a network of patronağe of their own of their own with a strong empha-with a stronğ empha-sis on local identity, that is founded on personal relationshipssis on local identity, that is founded on personal relationships.. This was a This was a very common occurrence in agrarian Mediterranean societies at the turn very common occurrence in ağrarian Mediterranean societies at the turn of the of the nineteenthnineteenth--centurycentury..
The notion of honour as expressed in a person’s successful control
The notion of honour as expressed in a person’s successful control over resources by means of physical force is characteristic of me-over resources by means of physical force is characteristic of me-dieval Europe dieval Europe and contemporary Mediterranean societies and and contemporary Mediterranean societies and other agrarian societies.... In the absence of stable central control other ağrarian societies.... In the absence of stable central control over the means of violence, people could not rely for protection on over the means of violence, people could not rely for protection on state institutions. With respect to sheer physical survival, they state institutions. With respect to sheer physical survival, they
11 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 27, 27..
12 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, , 5555..
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were la
were largely dependent on themselves, or on the protection of rğely dependent on themselves, or on the protection of more powerfulmore powerful persons. Successful bandits inspire fear and re-persons. Successful bandits inspire fear and re-spect. Hence the fascination they radiate, especially for those who spect. Hence the fascination they radiate, especially for those who are themselves in no way respected are themselves in no way respected –– the peasants, from whose the peasants, from whose ranks theyranks they usually emerge.usually emerğe.13
During the decades preceding the Greek war of independence, many
Durinğ the decades precedinğ the Greek war of independence, many influential Armatolos captains had inherited their posts from their father influential Armatolos captains had inherited their posts from their father or another patriarch within their family, as agnatic kinships were the cen-or another patriarch within their family, as ağnatic kinships were the cen-tral defining feature tral defininğ feature of a sense of belonging. Notable examples include of a sense of belonğinğ. Notable examples include the two rival clans of Tzavelas and Botsaris of the Souli region, Odysseas the two rival clans of Tzavelas and Botsaris of the Souli reğion, Odysseas Androutsos and Ioannis Gouras in eastern Rumeli, GAndroutsos and Ioannis Gouras in eastern Rumeli, Geeorgorğiios Karaiskakis os Karaiskakis (the illegitimate son of another captain, Dimitris Iskos) in (the illeğitimate son of another captain, Dimitris Iskos) in Karditsa, Geor-Karditsa, Geor-gios Varnakiotis and Gogos Bakolas in western Rumeli, Vasos ğios Varnakiotis and Goğos Bakolas in western Rumeli, Vasos Mavrovouniotis (of Montenegrin origin) in Euboea, and Athanasios Dia-Mavrovouniotis (of Monteneğrin oriğin) in Euboea, and Athanasios Dia-kos in Phocis. When the war erupted in 1821, these were the names of the kos in Phocis. When the war erupted in 1821, these were the names of the military chieftains of the region who wiemilitary chieftains of the reğion who wielded a significant amount of in-lded a siğnificant amount of in-fluence, and led bands of armed fluence, and led bands of armed menmen in the region where Velentzas was in the reğion where Velentzas was from. Velentzas grew up in the environment that was mostly inside the from. Velentzas ğrew up in the environment that was mostly inside the jurisdiction of the armatolik system. jurisdiction of the armatolik system.
As the power and jurisdiction of the chieftain
As the power and jurisdiction of the chieftains grew, competition and s ğrew, competition and rivalries started to occur. Blood feuds among these clans were frequent rivalries started to occur. Blood feuds amonğ these clans were frequent and a natural part of their ethos. As a move of retaliation, the act of shed-and a natural part of their ethos. As a move of retaliation, the act of shed-ding the blood of the enemy, or that of a relative of the enemy was a pow-dinğ the blood of the enemy, or that of a relative of the enemy was a pow-erful elemeerful element of this culture of violence in way that it symbolized cleans-nt of this culture of violence in way that it symbolized cleans-ing the filth of dishonor. In some cases, avoiding this might lead to social inğ the filth of dishonor. In some cases, avoidinğ this miğht lead to social exclusion.exclusion.14 Many of these blood feuds that mostly emerged during Ali Many of these blood feuds that mostly emerğed durinğ Ali PPasha’s domination in the region, such as thatasha’s domination in the reğion, such as that between the two Souliot between the two Souliot clans Tzavelas and Botsaris, or between Bakolas and Botsarisclans Tzavelas and Botsaris, or between Bakolas and Botsaris—— Gogos Goğos Bakolas had killed Markos Botsaris’ father with the orders of Ali Bakolas had killed Markos Botsaris’ father with the orders of Ali PPashaasha15
13 Anton Blok, Anton Blok, Honour and ViolenceHonour and Violence, 21, 21..
14 Ibid, 97Ibid, 97..
15 H. A. Lidderdale, ed. H. A. Lidderdale, ed. The Memoirs of General Makriyannis The Memoirs of General Makriyannis 17971797--18641864. (London: Oxford . (London: Oxford University Press, 1966)University Press, 1966), 27, 27..
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during the latter’s siege of Souli in 1803
durinğ the latter’s sieğe of Souli in 180316 —— would continue in the fol-would continue in the fol-lowing decades lowinğ decades and have an impact in the national political domain of and have an impact in the national political domain of insurgent Greeceinsurğent Greece,, as both Kitsos Tzavelas and Markos Botsaris would be-as both Kitsos Tzavelas and Markos Botsaris would be-come important political actors during and after the war. Kitsos Tzavelas come important political actors durinğ and after the war. Kitsos Tzavelas would even become Prime Minister of Greece for a brief tiwould even become Prime Minister of Greece for a brief time in 1847.me in 1847.17 The noteworthy feature of the blood feud between the Souliot clans of The noteworthy feature of the blood feud between the Souliot clans of Tzavelas and Botsaris is that it defined the political orientation of their Tzavelas and Botsaris is that it defined the political orientation of their leaders, and consequently that of their kins in the following decades leaders, and consequently that of their kins in the followinğ decades within the national politiwithin the national politics in Greece.cs in Greece.
Ali Pasha, too, had made use of these feuds. His conquest of Souli was
Ali Pasha, too, had made use of these feuds. His conquest of Souli was assisted periodically by the leaders of either one of these clans. In an-assisted periodically by the leaders of either one of these clans. In an-other note, Ali Pasha’s expansion towards Souli is also significant in other note, Ali Pasha’s expansion towards Souli is also siğnificant in showing his method of expanshowinğ his method of expanding his regional holdings in spite of the dinğ his reğional holdinğs in spite of the Porte’s position on the issue and imposing this encroachment by making Porte’s position on the issue and imposinğ this encroachment by makinğ use of the conditions of a militarily turbulent period that diverted the at-use of the conditions of a militarily turbulent period that diverted the at-tention of Istanbul.tention of Istanbul.18 This understanding of acquiring taxable landThis understandinğ of acquirinğ taxable land through military means and imposing this fait accompli to the senior po-throuğh military means and imposinğ this fait accompli to the senior po-litical authorities within a violent period had been adopted by the cap-litical authorities within a violent period had been adopted by the cap-tains during the Greek war of independence, who were formerly under tains durinğ the Greek war of independence, who were formerly under the employment of Ali Pasha. the employment of Ali Pasha.
Most of these
Most of these prominent captains were also under prominent captains were also under thethe authority of Ali authority of Ali PPasha, the famous governor of Ioannina. Ali asha, the famous ğovernor of Ioannina. Ali PPasha himself was asha himself was the the son of son of a prominent bandit.a prominent bandit.19 In early In early nineteenthnineteenth--century when Ali century when Ali PPasha was at asha was at the height of his power in the region and pursued a polthe heiğht of his power in the reğion and pursued a policy of gradually icy of ğradually consolidating his power in Epirus and Thessaly (also for a brief time consolidatinğ his power in Epirus and Thessaly (also for a brief time when his son Veli when his son Veli PPasha was appointed governor in the Peloponnese), he asha was appointed ğovernor in the Peloponnese), he had direct authority over the network of armatoles as the Derbent had direct authority over the network of armatoles as the Derbent PPasha asha of Thessaly. The relationship between Ali of Thessaly. The relationship between Ali PPasha and the armatoles was asha and the armatoles was
16 B.O.A. HAT 82, 3414 [18 Safer 1219 (23 May 1804)]B.O.A. HAT 82, 3414 [18 Safer 1219 (23 May 1804)]..
17 B.O.A. A.}MKT 96, 97 [22 Şevval 1263 (3 Oct 1847)]B.O.A. A.}MKT 96, 97 [22 Şevval 1263 (3 Oct 1847)]..
18 Isa Blumi, Isa Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800--19121912. (New . (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011) 50York: Palğrave Macmillian, 2011) 50..
19 K. E. Fleming, K. E. Fleminğ, The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and OrieThe Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orienntalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece talism in Ali Pasha’s Greece (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 33(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 33..
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not an easy one. Both Ali
not an easy one. Both Ali PPasha, and the captains were known for their asha, and the captains were known for their changing allegiances, and some captains along with their captanlik suf-chanğinğ alleğiances, and some captains alonğ with their captanlik suf-fered severe persecutions by the hands ofered severe persecutions by the hands of the f the PPasha. His famous cam-asha. His famous cam-paignpaiğnss against the Souliots in 1792 that bore fruit in 1803 had almost the ağainst the Souliots in 1792 that bore fruit in 1803 had almost the entire area forced to migrate to Parga and later to the Ionian islands to entire area forced to miğrate to Parğa and later to the Ionian islands to escape persecution.escape persecution.20 He had also moved against several captains whom He had also moved ağainst several captains whom he suspected of Russian sympathy during the Napoleonic wars.he suspected of Russian sympathy durinğ the Napoleonic wars.21
Captains who proved their loyalty to the
Captains who proved their loyalty to the PPasha, or the ones fortunate asha, or the ones fortunate enough to have gained his sympathy, enjoyed several privileges and were enouğh to have ğained his sympathy, enjoyed several privileğes and were frfrequently at the company of the equently at the company of the PPasha in his court in Ioannina. Famous asha in his court in Ioannina. Famous captains who would be key actors in the war of independence such as captains who would be key actors in the war of independence such as Androutsos, Varnakiotis, Tsongas, Karaiskakis and Iskos were among Androutsos, Varnakiotis, Tsonğas, Karaiskakis and Iskos were amonğ them.them.22 There, they also had the opportunity to makThere, they also had the opportunity to make acquaintances with e acquaintances with other military and civilian officials both Muslim and Christian. Notable other military and civilian officials both Muslim and Christian. Notable other names from the circle of Ali other names from the circle of Ali PPasha who would become very influ-asha who would become very influ-ential in the following years in Rumeli were Ömer Vrioni who com-ential in the followinğ years in Rumeli were O mer Vrioni who com-manded several Ottoman campaigmanded several Ottoman campaiğns against the Greek insurgents in Ru-ns ağainst the Greek insurğents in Ru-meli; and Ioannis Kolettis, the physician of Ali meli; and Ioannis Kolettis, the physician of Ali PPasha’s son Muhtar asha’s son Muhtar PPasha, asha, who would in the following years become the undisputed patron of the who would in the followinğ years become the undisputed patron of the Rumeliot captains like Velentzas, and make a political career based on Rumeliot captains like Velentzas, and make a political career based on thisthis relationship.relationship.23
20 George Finlay, Georğe Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1 (Edinburgh: William, Vol.1 (Edinburğh: William Blackwood and Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 62Sons, 1861), 62..
21 Ibid. 79Ibid. 79..
22 Ibid. 94Ibid. 94..
23 Beside his role as one of the most prominent leaders of the Greek war of independence, Beside his role as one of the most prominent leaders of the Greek war of independence, and patron of Rumeliot fighters throughout the war and its aftermath, Ioannis Kolettis and patron of Rumeliot fiğhters throuğhout the war and its aftermath, Ioannis Kolettis is also the person first to formulate the concept of “Megali Idea” during the debais also the person first to formulate the concept of “Meğali Idea” durinğ the debates be-tes be-fore the promulgation of the 1844 constitution. One of his speeches on the subject is as fore the promulğation of the 1844 constitution. One of his speeches on the subject is as follows: follows:
“
“The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part, the smallest, poorest part of The Kinğdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part, the smallest, poorest part of Greece. The Greek isGreece. The Greek is notnot oonnly he who inhabits the Kingdom, butly he who inhabits the Kinğdom, but also he who inhabits also he who inhabits Ioannina or Salonika or Serres or Adrianoupolis or Constantinople or Trëbizond orIoannina or Salonika or Serres or Adrianoupolis or Constantinople or Tre bizond or CCrete or Samos or any other region belonging to Greek history or the Greek race.... There rete or Samos or any other reğion belonğinğ to Greek history or the Greek race.... There araree two great centtwo ğreat centerers of Hellenism. Athens is thes of Hellenism. Athens is the capital of tcapital of the Kingdom. Constantinople he Kinğdom. Constantinople
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Ioannis Kolettis was born to an Epirot family with Vlach origins. He
Ioannis Kolettis was born to an Epirot family with Vlach oriğins. He studied medicine in Pisa, and upon his return, he became the personal studied medicine in Pisa, and upon his return, he became the personal physician of physician of Ali Pasha’s son Ali Pasha’s son Muhtar Muhtar PPasha. There, he became friends and asha. There, he became friends and enemies with a number of peenemies with a number of people, many of whom would become im-ople, many of whom would become im-portant figures in Greece in the following years. It is alsoportant fiğures in Greece in the followinğ years. It is also atat this court this court where he learned his share of politics. He was a man who was able to where he learned his share of politics. He was a man who was able to combine traditional Epirot and western manners. combine traditional Epirot and western manners. As As Petropoulos Petropoulos de-de-scribedscribed::
Kole
Kolettis revealed a fascinating combination of coarse manners ttis revealed a fascinatinğ combination of coarse manners and personal charm, ruthless ambition and fervent patriotism, and personal charm, ruthless ambition and fervent patriotism, shrewd realism and naïve sentimentalism. Many of the contradic-shrewd realism and naı ve sentimentalism. Many of the contradic-tions in his personality reflected his mixed cultural orientation, tions in his personality reflected his mixed cultural orientation, which pwhich proved a distinct political asset. His oriental qualities, roved a distinct political asset. His oriental qualities, which he publicized by his dress in the native kilts, appealed to the which he publicized by his dress in the native kilts, appealed to the people. Yet his partial familiarity with Western ways permitted people. Yet his partial familiarity with Western ways permitted him to hold his own against Westernized Greeks and even to him to hold his own ağainst Westernized Greeks and even to charmcharm Europeans. Other traits, prized by the Greeks because unu-Europeans. Other traits, prized by the Greeks because unu-sual among them, were absence of boastfulness or pretentious-sual amonğ them, were absence of boastfulness or pretentious-ness, gravity, reserve, and silence. These he perhaps owed to his ness, ğravity, reserve, and silence. These he perhaps owed to his Vlach ancestry.Vlach ancestry.24
Velentzas was not among these men called
Velentzas was not amonğ these men called Ali PasalideAli Pasalidess. It is plausible . It is plausible to think that his involvement in this kind of life started during the down-to think that his involvement in this kind of life started durinğ the down-fall of Ali fall of Ali PPasha. His personal acquaintance with certain Albanians from asha. His personal acquaintance with certain Albanians from the Ali the Ali PPasha court such as a certain Vehis Vashari asha court such as a certain Vehis Vashari (probably referring to (probably referrinğ to the famous Frasthe famous Frasheri clan) heri clan) has been attestedhas been attested..25 YetYet considering the fact considerinğ the fact that Vashari comes from the same Albanian clan that was employed by that Vashari comes from the same Albanian clan that was employed by Ali Ali PPasha to seek the support of the Greek captains in 1821 in asha to seek the support of the Greek captains in 1821 in IIn Rumelin Rumeli,,26
is the great capital, the City, the dream and hope of all Greeks.” See, Michael Llewellyn
is the ğreat capital, the City, the dream and hope of all Greeks.” See, Michael Llewellyn Smith, Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919--19221922 (Michigan: The University of Michi-(Michiğan: The University of Michi-gan Press, 1998), 2ğan Press, 1998), 2--3.3.
24 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics anPolitics and Statecraftd Statecraft, 86, 86..
25 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 117, 117..
26 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 112, Vol.1. 112--113113..
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it could be said that Velentzas became
it could be said that Velentzas became acquainted with them during this acquainted with them durinğ this brief period. What is important here is that in Koliopoulos’ account, Vehis brief period. What is important here is that in Koliopoulos’ account, Vehis Vashari and Velentzas met personally in late 1840 when Velentzas was Vashari and Velentzas met personally in late 1840 when Velentzas was leading a foray into Ottoman territories. Vehis Vashari was the Ottoman leadinğ a foray into Ottoman territories. Vehis Vashari was the Ottoman DerbenDerbent ağa in the same regiont ağ a in the same reğion, and the two had met there, and the two had met there. The. Theyy alleg-alleğ-edly discussed a possible cooperation,edly discussed a possible cooperation,27 butbut more detail on the event is more detail on the event is not availablenot available.. It showsIt shows howeverhowever that even two decades later, the networks that even two decades later, the networks of violence in the region from the time of Aliof violence in the reğion from the time of Ali PPasha was still an effective asha was still an effective defining feature in the relationships between these men, and one that defininğ feature in the relationships between these men, and one that was a much more valid element for them than national consciousness. was a much more valid element for them than national consciousness.
To see the nature of the political understanding and reflexes of the
To see the nature of the political understandinğ and reflexes of the Rumeliot captains,Rumeliot captains, it is essential to see the system and network of vio-it is essential to see the system and network of vio-lence of Ali lence of Ali PPasha that they were directly or indirectly part of. Ali asha that they were directly or indirectly part of. Ali PPasha asha was the patron of a network that allowed several men to make a military was the patron of a network that allowed several men to make a military career of irregular nature. The blessing of the career of irreğular nature. The blessinğ of the PPasha casha created many oppor-reated many oppor-tunities for violent men of Rumeli. With his recognition they were able to tunities for violent men of Rumeli. With his recoğnition they were able to assert influence in their own region and create their own clientele, and assert influence in their own reğion and create their own clientele, and they had the freedom to pursue a violent lifestyle with partial impunity. they had the freedom to pursue a violent lifestyle with partial impunity. This was also dueThis was also due to Ali to Ali PPasha recruiting them for his own campaigns. A asha recruitinğ them for his own campaiğns. A notable example of his use of the Rumeliot notable example of his use of the Rumeliot eşkiyaeşkiya was when he was or-was when he was or-dered by the Porte to aid the siege of Vidin when the Ottoman govern-dered by the Porte to aid the sieğe of Vidin when the Ottoman ğovern-ment declared war on Pasvanoğlu Osman.ment declared war on Pasvanoğ lu Osman.28 When we think of the argWhen we think of the arğu-u-ment made by ment made by AntonAnton Blok that guardians of bandits could be patrons in Blok that ğuardians of bandits could be patrons in formal office that provide political protection,formal office that provide political protection, Ali Ali PPasha may fit into this asha may fit into this category.cateğory.29 This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that this kind of This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that this kind of patronpatron--client relationship was cclient relationship was continued to be sought after by the ban-ontinued to be souğht after by the ban-dits of Rumeli who were formerly employed by the dits of Rumeli who were formerly employed by the PPasha after the latter’s asha after the latter’s death. It was Ioannis Kolettis, another protégé of Ali death. It was Ioannis Kolettis, another prote ğe of Ali PPashaasha, who, who suc-suc-ceeded him and became the protector patron of Rumeliot captains. This ceeded him and became the protector patron of Rumeliot captains. This was mwas made possible with the creation of a provisional government during ade possible with the creation of a provisional ğovernment durinğ Greek waGreek warr of independence, in which Kolettis held many influential of independence, in which Kolettis held many influential
27 B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/54 (4 June 1831)B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/54 (4 June 1831)..
28 Esmer, Esmer, A Culture of RebellionA Culture of Rebellion, , 107107..
29 Blok, Blok, Honour and ViolenceHonour and Violence, 18, 18..
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offices, giving him the power to provide necessary funds and resources
offices, ğivinğ him the power to provide necessary funds and resources to his clientele of armed bands in Rumeli. It is safto his clientele of armed bands in Rumeli. It is safe to assume that his time e to assume that his time as the physician of Ali as the physician of Ali PPasha’s son Muhtar asha’s son Muhtar PPasha enabled Kolettis to meet asha enabled Kolettis to meet and create relationships with several captains, and then capitalize on and create relationships with several captains, and then capitalize on these relationships, as having an office would not have been as effective these relationships, as havinğ an office would not have been as effective in creatingin creatinğ a strong local clientele without the personal kinships estab-a stronğ local clientele without the personal kinships estab-lished prior, which was a significant element within the social dynamics lished prior, which was a siğnificant element within the social dynamics of Rumeli. That it is believed that it was Karaiskakis for example, the fa-of Rumeli. That it is believed that it was Karaiskakis for example, the fa-mous captain in Rumeli who escorted Kolettis outmous captain in Rumeli who escorted Kolettis out of Ioannina in 1821, of Ioannina in 1821, proves that Kolettis had already wellproves that Kolettis had already well--established ties with the military established ties with the military element in Rumeli.element in Rumeli.30
It appears that certain correspondence with the Philiki Etairia and
It appears that certain correspondence with the Philiki Etairia and the captains was made at Ali the captains was made at Ali PPasha’s court in the year 1820. The dragomaasha’s court in the year 1820. The drağoman n of the Russian consulate in Patras, K. Paparrigopoulos was a member of of the Russian consulate in Patras, K. Paparriğopoulos was a member of the Etairia and when the rebellion of Ali the Etairia and when the rebellion of Ali PPasha against Ottoman govern-asha ağainst Ottoman ğovern-ment started in 1820, the two have met in Preveza to negotiate a possible ment started in 1820, the two have met in Preveza to neğotiate a possible Russian invasion of the Balkans that woRussian invasion of the Balkans that would help the cause of the uld help the cause of the PPasha.asha.31 Before his departure to St. Petersburg, Paparrigopoulos met with arma-Before his departure to St. Petersburğ, Paparriğopoulos met with arma-tolos captains to encourage them to support Ali tolos captains to encourağe them to support Ali PPasha in his war against asha in his war ağainst the Sultan.the Sultan.32 In the initial phases of Ali’s rebellion, many Greek captains In the initial phases of Ali’s rebellion, many Greek captains sided with him. sided with him. Despite the fact that their Despite the fact that their total total devotion to Ali Pasha’s devotion to Ali Pasha’s cause can be attestedcause can be attested,, due to their characteristic of always keepdue to their characteristic of always keeping their inğ their options open,options open, they knew very well that in ththey knew very well that in the case of an armistice be-e case of an armistice be-tween the tween the PPasha and the Porte, the wrath of the asha and the Porte, the wrath of the PPasha for their treachery asha for their treachery would be far more devastating for them than that of the would be far more devastatinğ for them than that of the far away far away Ottoman Ottoman capitalcapital. Their pragmatic attitude towards political circumstances showed . Their prağmatic attitude towards political circumstances showed itself onceitself once again when the tide had turned against the ağain when the tide had turned ağainst the PPasha and his de-asha and his de-feat became imminent. Many captains such as Androutsos, Varnakiotis, feat became imminent. Many captains such as Androutsos, Varnakiotis, and Iskos abandoned Ali and Iskos abandoned Ali PPasha, moved against Muslim Albanians still asha, moved ağainst Muslim Albanians still loyal to him and expanded their captanlik at the expense ofloyal to him and expanded their captanlik at the expense of them. This them. This incentive of taking military possession of taxable land incentive of takinğ military possession of taxable land during politically durinğ politically
30 Gianni B. Benekou, Gianni B. Benekou, Kolettis:Kolettis: O Pateras Ton Politikon Mas IthonO Pateras Ton Politikon Mas Ithon (Athens: Kypseli, 1961), 38(Athens: Kypseli, 1961), 38..
31 B.O.A. I.DUİT, 192, 55/23 [24 Rebiülahir 1236 (29 January 1821)]B.O.A. I.DUI T, 192, 55/23 [24 Rebiu lahir 1236 (29 January 1821)]..
32 Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 29, 29..
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turbulent periods
turbulent periods as as a a fait accomplifait accompli, such as their former patron Ali Pa-, such as their former patron Ali Pa-sha,sha, would be awould be among themonğ the central characteristiccentral characteristicss of Rumeliot military of Rumeliot military chieftains and their politicchieftains and their political stance in their participation in the war of al stance in their participation in the war of independence.independence.33
§
§ 2.22.2 The Setting in the Peloponnese in 1821The Settinğ in the Peloponnese in 1821
The administrative system, social structure, and demography was dif-
The administrative system, social structure, and demoğraphy was dif-ferent in the Peloponnese. In contrast to Rumeli, demographically the ferent in the Peloponnese. In contrast to Rumeli, demoğraphically the peninsula was openinsula was overwhelminglyverwhelminğly GreekGreek Christian. Before the war erupted, Christian. Before the war erupted, there were around 40.000 Muslims on the entire peninsula that had a to-there were around 40.000 Muslims on the entire peninsula that had a to-tal population of 400.000,tal population of 400.000,34 and almost all ofand almost all of the Muslims and Jews were the Muslims and Jews were living in urban centers such as Tripolitsa, Patras, and Corinth. Rural areas livinğ in urban centers such as Tripolitsa, Patras, and Corinth. Rural areas were almost entirely inhabited by Greek peasants, which may partly ex-were almost entirely inhabited by Greek peasants, which may partly ex-plain the swift successes and spread of the insurrection on the whole plain the swift successes and spread of the insurrection on the whole peninsula as peninsula as early as 1821, and the only early as 1821, and the only instances of instances of resistance being lim-resistance beinğ lim-ited to a few urban centers. In a sharp contrast to their demographic ited to a few urban centers. In a sharp contrast to their demoğraphic weakness, Muslim landowners controlled the majority of the landed weakness, Muslim landowners controlled the majority of the landed property in the region, making it possible for the emergencproperty in the reğion, makinğ it possible for the emerğence of certain e of certain landed notables with immense wealth. The most obvious example is landed notables with immense wealth. The most obvious example is Kamil Kamil BBey. From his seat in Corinth, he controlled dozensey. From his seat in Corinth, he controlled dozens,, if not a hun-if not a hun-dreddred,, villages and their revenues. However, in contrast to those notables villağes and their revenues. However, in contrast to those notables of other regions, Kamil of other reğions, Kamil BBey and Mey and Muslim notables of the Peloponnese did uslim notables of the Peloponnese did not have the military strength equal to their economic power, mainly due not have the military strenğth equal to their economic power, mainly due to a limited number of Muslim males in the region. Back in 1770, during to a limited number of Muslim males in the reğion. Back in 1770, durinğ the Orlov revolt in the Peloponnese that took place during the Russothe Orlov revolt in the Peloponnese that took place durinğ the Russo--Ot-Ot-totoman war between 1767man war between 1767--1774, Muslim Albanian irregulars had to be 1774, Muslim Albanian irreğulars had to be brought over from Rumeli to crush the rebellion due to this lack of Mus-brouğht over from Rumeli to crush the rebellion due to this lack of Mus-lim manpower in the region.lim manpower in the reğion.35 In 1821, when Hurşit In 1821, when Hurşit PPaashsha, the governor a, the ğovernor
33 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands wBrigands with a Causeith a Cause, 45, 45..
34 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 73, 73..
35 Ibid. 74Ibid. 74..
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of Morea was ordered to take his garrison and move
of Morea was ordered to take his ğarrison and move against Tepedelenli ağainst Tepedelenli Ali Ali PPasha, Tripolitsa, the capital of the asha, Tripolitsa, the capital of the Mora Mora Vilayet was Vilayet was enentrusted into trusted into the hands of Albanian mercenaries led by Elmas the hands of Albanian mercenaries led by Elmas BBey (Elmas Meçe).ey (Elmas Meçe).36
The Peloponnese was also home to a number of
The Peloponnese was also home to a number of influential Christian influential Christian primate families called Kocabaşı. These Christian notables were valuable primate families called Kocabaşı. These Christian notables were valuable for the Ottoman government due to their function in raising revenues and for the Ottoman ğovernment due to their function in raisinğ revenues and collecting taxes from Christian peasants within their jurisdiction. In re-collectinğ taxes from Christian peasants within their jurisdiction. In re-turn for theirturn for their service, these primates were granted a significant degree of service, these primates were ğranted a siğnificant değree of autonomy within their districts. Being an aristocratic class as a product autonomy within their districts. Beinğ an aristocratic class as a product of of both both Ottoman imperial governance in the regionOttoman imperial ğovernance in the reğion as well as the tradi-as well as the tradi-tional communal rule in the regiontional communal rule in the reğion, the kocabaşı, the kocabaşı’s’s served in the advisory served in the advisory council of the Ottoman governor in Tripolitsa and capitalized from the council of the Ottoman ğovernor in Tripolitsa and capitalized from the Ottoman fiscal administration in the countryside. In addition to these fea-Ottoman fiscal administration in the countryside. In addition to these fea-tures, they were also known for their partly imitation of the Ottoman tures, they were also known for their partly imitation of the Ottoman elites’ way of lielites’ way of living to distinguish themselves from the Greek peasants vinğ to distinğuish themselves from the Greek peasants that they ruled over. that they ruled over. The cultural affinity of the primatesThe cultural affinity of the primates to their Muslim to their Muslim counterparts in Tripolitsacounterparts in Tripolitsa had reached such an extent that they had reached such an extent that they had be-had be-gun to be addressed with titles such as “bey”, and theiğun to be addressed with titles such as “bey”, and their sons as “beyzade”, r sons as “beyzade”, such as the clan of Giorgos Sisinis,such as the clan of Giorğos Sisinis,37 or Petrobey of Mani, and his sons, or Petrobey of Mani, and his sons, who appear even in Makrygiannis’ memoirs as “Beyzade”.who appear even in Makryğiannis’ memoirs as “Beyzade”.38 Their cloth-Their cloth-ing and houses were imitations of those of the Muslim notables and inğ and houses were imitations of those of the Muslim notables and PPa-a-shas in Tripolitsa and Cshas in Tripolitsa and Corinth. In the sense of this imitation of the Otto-orinth. In the sense of this imitation of the Otto-man ruling class in order to strengthen their place within it, they do to a man rulinğ class in order to strenğthen their place within it, they do to a certain extent resemble the Phanariotes.certain extent resemble the Phanariotes.39
For the peasants living in miserable conditions under these primates,
For the peasants livinğ in miserable conditions under these primates, they were not onthey were not only seen as oppressors who lively seen as oppressors who livedd luxuriously at theluxuriously at theirir ex-ex-penspense,e, but also as collaborators with the Muslim overlords. Besides being but also as collaborators with the Muslim overlords. Besides beinğ tax farmers, these tax farmers, these primatesprimates were also moneylenders to the peasantry, were also moneylenders to the peasantry, through which they often made them dependent, and subject throuğh which they often made them dependent, and subject to their to their
36 Ilıcak, Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks,, 16511651..
37 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 30, 30
38 Lidderdale, ed. The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, Lidderdale, ed. The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 6969
39 Christine M. Philliou, Christine M. Philliou, Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolu-Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolu-tiontion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 66..
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clientele.
clientele.40 Even though many primates became important politicians in Even thouğh many primates became important politicians in the war of independence, such as Kanellos Deligiannis, Andreas Zaimis, the war of independence, such as Kanellos Deliğiannis, Andreas Zaimis, Petros (Petrobey) Mavromichalis, and Andreas Londos, this enmity be-Petros (Petrobey) Mavromichalis, and Andreas Londos, this enmity be-tween these two classes continued and tween these two classes continued and was capitalized on by other influ-was capitalized on by other influ-ential political and military figuresential political and military fiğures,, such as the famous klepht Theodoros such as the famous klepht Theodoros Kolokotronis, and the first president of Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias, Kolokotronis, and the first president of Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias, both of whom presented themselves as the champion of the peasantry both of whom presented themselves as the champion of the peasantry and commonand common people.people.
Although
Althouğh these these families and their clientele represented the same in-families and their clientele represented the same in-tereststerests as a whole,as a whole, they were also competitive amongst each other. The they were also competitive amonğst each other. The most prominent of the Peloponnesian primate families, Deligiannis, most prominent of the Peloponnesian primate families, Deliğiannis, Zaimis, Notaras, and Londos, and their estZaimis, Notaras, and Londos, and their estates were located in the northates were located in the north--western part of the peninsula, south of the Corinth Golf, making their es-western part of the peninsula, south of the Corinth Golf, makinğ their es-tates neighbortates neiğhbor toto each otheeach other:r: Deligiannis in Karytaina, Zaimis in Deliğiannis in Karytaina, Zaimis in Kalavryta, and Londos in Vostitsa. Historically, the Deligiannis clan and Kalavryta, and Londos in Vostitsa. Historically, the Deliğiannis clan and the Zaimis athe Zaimis and Londos clans were rivals. Andreas Zaimis and Andreas nd Londos clans were rivals. Andreas Zaimis and Andreas Lontos were lifelong allies, often mentioned as the LontosLontos were lifelonğ allies, often mentioned as the Lontos--Zaimis faction. Zaimis faction. The rivalry between the LondosThe rivalry between the Londos--Zaimis and Deligiannis factions along Zaimis and Deliğiannis factions alonğ with their clientele had already been further deepened iwith their clientele had already been further deepened in the decades be-n the decades be-fore the revolution by the act of every Ottoman governor in the Pelopon-fore the revolution by the act of every Ottoman ğovernor in the Pelopon-nese allying himself with one faction and alienating the others in order nese allyinğ himself with one faction and alienatinğ the others in order to strengthen his authority.to strenğthen his authority.41 AAn important instance onn important instance on this rivalry this rivalry among the Peloponnesian kocamonğ the Peloponnesian kocabaşı abaşı isis the series of events that followed the series of events that followed the appointment of Veli the appointment of Veli PPasha, son of Ali asha, son of Ali PPasha as governor of Pelopon-asha as ğovernor of Pelopon-nese in 1807. This appointment caused an immediate controversy among nese in 1807. This appointment caused an immediate controversy amonğ the landed elite in the Peloponnese Muslim and Christian alike, many of the landed elite in the Peloponnese Muslim and Christian alike, many of wwhom feared that this appointment would lead to an eventual loss of hom feared that this appointment would lead to an eventual loss of their dominionstheir dominions,, as Ali as Ali PPasha’s asha’s objective to enlarge his dominions by objective to enlarğe his dominions by
40 Vaso Serinidou, “Communities,” in Vaso Serinidou, “Communities,” in The Greek RevolThe Greek Revolution: A Critical Dictionary.ution: A Critical Dictionary. ed. Pas-ed. Pas-chalis chalis M. M. Kitromilides, and Constantinos Tsoukalas. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Kitromilides, and Constantinos Tsoukalas. (Cambridğe: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021), 87Harvard University Press, 2021), 87..
41 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 65. 65..
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obtaining appointments for his sons and other relatives was well
obtaininğ appointments for his sons and other relatives was well known.known.42 A strong opposition emerged among the PeloponA stronğ opposition emerğed amonğ the Peloponnesian nota-nesian nota-bles, who tried to use their political and financial influence to get rid of bles, who tried to use their political and financial influence to ğet rid of Veli Pasha.Veli Pasha.43 Despite this common reaction across confessional divide Despite this common reaction across confessional divide however, local rivalries have nehowever, local rivalries have nevvertheless demonstrated themselves. ertheless demonstrated themselves. Sotirakis Londos had allied himself with Veli Sotirakis Londos had allied himself with Veli PPasha and managed to use asha and manağed to use his rival Deligiannis’ opposition to Veli his rival Deliğiannis’ opposition to Veli Pasha Pasha for his own fortunes, be-for his own fortunes, be-coming one of his favorites. When the unified opposition of Muslim and cominğ one of his favorites. When the unified opposition of Muslim and ChristiChristian notables bore fruit and they convinced the Porte to replace Veli an notables bore fruit and they convinced the Porte to replace Veli with another governor called Icwith another ğovernor called Icililli Ahmet in 1812, this change caused the li Ahmet in 1812, this chanğe caused the execution of Londos, and the brief ascension of the Deligiannis faction as execution of Londos, and the brief ascension of the Deliğiannis faction as favorites.favorites.44 AfterAfter the replacement of Ithe replacement of Icciilllli Ahmet in 1815, this time i Ahmet in 1815, this time Deligiannis was executed by the new governorDeliğiannis was executed by the new ğovernor Şakir Ahmet in 1816Şakir Ahmet in 1816..45 Like Like the rivalry of the Souliot Botsaris and Tzavelas clans, the rivalry between the rivalry of the Souliot Botsaris and Tzavelas clans, the rivalry between the Deligiannis and Londosthe Deliğiannis and Londos--Zaimis factions originating during Ottoman Zaimis factions oriğinatinğ durinğ Ottoman adminiadministration would have a longstration would have a lonğ--lasting impact on the national political lastinğ impact on the national political arena in independent Greece. Both Kanellos Deligiannis and Andreas arena in independent Greece. Both Kanellos Deliğiannis and Andreas Zaimis would often join separate factions and political parties instead of Zaimis would often join separate factions and political parties instead of creating a unified Peloponnesian primate facticreatinğ a unified Peloponnesian primate faction, except for the brief pe-on, except for the brief pe-riod of civil war that will be explained in the following chapters.riod of civil war that will be explained in the followinğ chapters.
On the southernmost tip of the Peloponnesian peninsula is the Moun-
On the southernmost tip of the Peloponnesian peninsula is the Moun-tainous Mani region. This area had a distinguished status due to its com-tainous Mani reğion. This area had a distinğuished status due to its com-plete autonomy, and sepplete autonomy, and separate administration from the rest of the penin-arate administration from the rest of the penin-sula. The chieftain of Mani was Petros (Petrobey) Mavromichalis, head of sula. The chieftain of Mani was Petros (Petrobey) Mavromichalis, head of the very large Mavromichalis clan that administered the Mani district. the very larğe Mavromichalis clan that administered the Mani district. Despite their dominance in the region, the Mavromichalis clan wasDespite their dominance in the reğion, the Mavromichalis clan was not not
42 Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Aspects of the Working of the Fiscal Machinery In the Areas Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Aspects of the Workinğ of the Fiscal Machinery In the Areas Ruled by Ali Paşa,” in Ruled by Ali Paşa,” in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760--1850: Conflict, Transformation, 1850: Conflict, Transformation, AdaptionAdaption. ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, and Elias Kolovos. (Rethymno: University of. ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, and Elias Kolovos. (Rethymno: University of Crete Crete –– Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), 63Department of History and Archaeoloğy, 2007), 63..
43 B.O.A. TS.MA,e 710, 27 [29 Zilhicce 1225 (25 Jan 1811)]B.O.A. TS.MA,e 710, 27 [29 Zilhicce 1225 (25 Jan 1811)]..
44 Dean Konstantaras, “Christian Elites of the Peloponnese and the Ottoman State, 1715Dean Konstantaras, “Christian Elites of the Peloponnese and the Ottoman State, 1715--1821,” 1821,” European History QuarterlyEuropean History Quarterly 43 no.4 (Octo43 no.4 (October 2013): 628ber 2013): 628--656, 639656, 639..
45 B.O.A. HAT 686, 33324 [18 Safer 1231 (19 Jan 1816)]B.O.A. HAT 686, 33324 [18 Safer 1231 (19 Jan 1816)]..
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wealthy. The Mani region in general was not yielding much revenue to
wealthy. The Mani reğion in ğeneral was not yieldinğ much revenue to begin with. One of the primary incomes of the Maniots was the occasional beğin with. One of the primary incomes of the Maniots was the occasional raid and plunder in the surrounding lowlands in southern Peloponnese raid and plunder in the surroundinğ lowlands in southern Peloponnese such as Kalamata that were held by Turkisuch as Kalamata that were held by Turkish landowners,sh landowners,46 and the moun-and the moun-tains of the autonomous Mani in return provided refuge from persecu-tains of the autonomous Mani in return provided refuğe from persecu-tion. Among his other responsibilities, Petrobey, was apparently assigned tion. Amonğ his other responsibilities, Petrobey, was apparently assiğned by the Porte to eliminate the endemic brigandage of Maniots.by the Porte to eliminate the endemic briğandağe of Maniots.47 Despite Despite his partial atthis partial attempts in curbing the banditry originating from Mani to sat-empts in curbinğ the banditry oriğinatinğ from Mani to sat-isfy the Porte, Petrobey also had his eyes set on the large estates in south-isfy the Porte, Petrobey also had his eyes set on the larğe estates in south-ern Peloponnese. In 1818, he became a member of the Philiki Etairia, and ern Peloponnese. In 1818, he became a member of the Philiki Etairia, and was one of the first Greek notables to join the rwas one of the first Greek notables to join the revolution in March 1821. evolution in March 1821. After quickly capturing large lands in southern Peloponnese, Petrobey After quickly capturinğ larğe lands in southern Peloponnese, Petrobey and his Mavromichalis faction with their strong patriarchal bond and lo-and his Mavromichalis faction with their stronğ patriarchal bond and lo-cal attachment, became a powerhouse in future Greek politics.cal attachment, became a powerhouse in future Greek politics.
In the Peloponnese the milit
In the Peloponnese the military element as well was different than ary element as well was different than that in Rumeli. Rumeliot armatolos bands were military enterprises that that in Rumeli. Rumeliot armatolos bands were military enterprises that provided their service to the provided their service to the iimperial authorities in their region. They mperial authorities in their reğion. They were instructed to protect a certain district and enjoyed fiscal privilewere instructed to protect a certain district and enjoyed fiscal privileges ğes and a certain amount of administrative autonomy. The military class in and a certain amount of administrative autonomy. The military class in the Peloponnese that had a legitimate operation were called the Peloponnese that had a leğitimate operation were called kkapoi (apoi (pplural lural for for kkapos).apos).48 In the Peloponnese, where large estates were much more In the Peloponnese, where larğe estates were much more abundant, and powerful Christian estatabundant, and powerful Christian estate holders present, kapoi were e holders present, kapoi were armed Greek militia hired by these notables to protect their lands from armed Greek militia hired by these notables to protect their lands from bandits in return for wages. They were not entrusted with authorities bandits in return for wağes. They were not entrusted with authorities that went further than simply guarding estates. Like in Rumeli, the dis-that went further than simply ğuardinğ estates. Like in Rumeli, the dis-tinction betwtinction between a kapos and a bandit was very blurred however, and een a kapos and a bandit was very blurred however, and men found themselves frequently on both sides of the law. Despite the men found themselves frequently on both sides of the law. Despite the fact that similar to the armatoles there was a deep traditional element to fact that similar to the armatoles there was a deep traditional element to the military class in the Peloponnese, the latter never the military class in the Peloponnese, the latter never occupied adminis-occupied adminis-trative positions like the former, and were almost always dependent on trative positions like the former, and were almost always dependent on
46 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft,, 6969..
47 B.O.A. HAT 574, 28126 [27 Rebiülevvel 1234 (24 Jan 1819)].B.O.A. HAT 574, 28126 [27 Rebiu levvel 1234 (24 Jan 1819)].
48 Probably originating from the Italian word Capo, which was Probably oriğinatinğ from the Italian word Capo, which was also used in Sicily to name also used in Sicily to name the heads of the Mafia clans hired to protect estates from bandits.the heads of the Mafia clans hired to protect estates from bandits.
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their primate patrons for recognition and livelihood, but also to be able
their primate patrons for recoğnition and livelihood, but also to be able to pay their men. Otherwise, they themselves would have to resort to ban-to pay their men. Otherwise, they themselves would have to resort to ban-ditry. ditry. The war of indepThe war of independence provided an opportunity for these men to endence provided an opportunity for these men to rise within the social hierarchy. rise within the social hierarchy. Famous chieftains who have served as Famous chieftains who have served as kapoi were the kapoi were the renownedrenowned klepht Theodoros Kolokotronis, his nephew klepht Theodoros Kolokotronis, his nephew Nikitaras, Basil Petimezas, and Dimitrios Koliopoulos. Kolokotronis, NNikitaras, Basil Petimezas, and Dimitrios Koliopoulos. Kolokotronis, Ni-i-kitaras, and Koliopoulos served the Deligiannis family, and Petimezas the kitaras, and Koliopoulos served the Deliğiannis family, and Petimezas the Zaimis family.Zaimis family.49
Being a kapos was not a full
Beinğ a kapos was not a full--time occupation however, as they worked time occupation however, as they worked as kapoi only when they were not engaging in brigandage themselves. In as kapoi only when they were not enğağinğ in briğandağe themselves. In 1806, after a vigorous c1806, after a viğorous campaign by Ottoman troops, most of the klephts ampaiğn by Ottoman troops, most of the klephts had fled to the Ionian islands.had fled to the Ionian islands.50 In the following decade, the Ionian is-In the followinğ decade, the Ionian is-lands went from the French to the Russians and eventually to British con-lands went from the French to the Russians and eventually to British con-trol. During their exile in the Ionian islands the Peloponnesian trol. Durinğ their exile in the Ionian islands the Peloponnesian klephts klephts such as Kolokotronis joined the regiments that were created by each of such as Kolokotronis joined the reğiments that were created by each of these powers. Kolokotronis became close friends with Richard Church, these powers. Kolokotronis became close friends with Richard Church, the commanding officer of the 1the commandinğ officer of the 1stst Regiment Greek Light Infantry, in which Reğiment Greek Liğht Infantry, in which Kolokotronis himself was junior ofKolokotronis himself was junior officer.ficer.51 Two decades later, Richard Two decades later, Richard Church joined the Greek cause and became the Church joined the Greek cause and became the one of the most influential one of the most influential military commanders in western Rumelimilitary commanders in western Rumeli. .
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§ 2.32.3 The Setting in the IslandsThe Settinğ in the Islands
The islands of Hydra, Psara, and Spezza were home to influential mar-
The islands of Hydra, Psara, and Spezza were home to influential mar-itime merchaitime merchant families and their commercial fleet. The entire economy nt families and their commercial fleet. The entire economy of these islands was based on maritime trade. The islands enjoyed com-of these islands was based on maritime trade. The islands enjoyed com-plete autonomy and in return paid an annual tribute to the Ottoman cap-plete autonomy and in return paid an annual tribute to the Ottoman cap-ital. The islands also provided sailors for the ital. The islands also provided sailors for the iimperial fmperial fleet.leet.52 Unlike in Unlike in the Peloponnese, despite a social divide between ship owning aristo-the Peloponnese, despite a social divide between ship owninğ aristo-cratic families such as the Koundouriotis family, and common sailors cratic families such as the Koundouriotis family, and common sailors
49 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 34. 34..
50 Ibid. 34Ibid. 34..
51 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 80, 80..
52 Ibid. 152Ibid. 152..
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existed, the profit from commercial voyages was shared with every par-
existed, the profit from commercial voyağes was shared with every par-ticipant.ticipant.53 During the Napoleonic wars, Greek maritime merchants had Durinğ the Napoleonic wars, Greek maritime merchants had increased their revenues from the Mediterranean trade and prospered increased their revenues from the Mediterranean trade and prospered further with the increase of grain prices, due to the war in Europe having further with the increase of ğrain prices, due to the war in Europe havinğ a negative impact on the harvest in the continent. Aftea neğative impact on the harvest in the continent. After 1815, however, r 1815, however, grain prices started to decrease, and the sailors on these islands in par-ğrain prices started to decrease, and the sailors on these islands in par-ticular were heavily affected. In 1821 when the revolution in mainland ticular were heavily affected. In 1821 when the revolution in mainland Greece erupted, there was great unrest in the islands, mostly due to in-Greece erupted, there was ğreat unrest in the islands, mostly due to in-creased unemployment caucreased unemployment caused by the economic stagnation. Therefore, it sed by the economic stağnation. Therefore, it is no surprise to see that the revolution, and the prospect revenues is no surprise to see that the revolution, and the prospect revenues through privacy was received enthusiastically by the common sailors. throuğh privacy was received enthusiastically by the common sailors. The notables of Hydra, however, were not that desirous. The idea of giv-The notables of Hydra, however, were not that desirous. The idea of ğiv-iing up the administrative and fiscal privileges by the Porte that they had nğ up the administrative and fiscal privileğes by the Porte that they had been enjoying for the last decades, and having to utilize their small com-been enjoyinğ for the last decades, and havinğ to utilize their small com-mercial fleet to face the mercial fleet to face the iimperial navy was understandably making them mperial navy was understandably makinğ them hesitant to devote to what they saw ashesitant to devote to what they saw as the arbitrary cause of Etairists the arbitrary cause of Etairists from Russia, and a few Peloponnesian notables.from Russia, and a few Peloponnesian notables.54 Despite the hesitanceDespite the hesitance,, however, Konstantinos Koundouriotis, the wealthy notable of Hydra, ac-however, Konstantinos Koundouriotis, the wealthy notable of Hydra, ac-cepted the call eventually, and Hydra formally joined the insurgents. This cepted the call eventually, and Hydra formally joined the insurğents. This was acwas achieved mostly due to the everhieved mostly due to the ever--increasing pressure and threats of increasinğ pressure and threats of the mob of sailors led by the sea caption Andreas Oikonomou, leaving the the mob of sailors led by the sea caption Andreas Oikonomou, leavinğ the notables in the end no other choice but to declare the participation of notables in the end no other choice but to declare the participation of Hydra.Hydra.55 The contribution of the Aegean islandThe contribution of the Aeğean islands to the rebellion was cru-s to the rebellion was cru-cial, in terms of the economic as well as military survival of the uprising. cial, in terms of the economic as well as military survival of the uprisinğ. While the Aegean and Ioanian islands had contributed to the war effort While the Aeğean and Ioanian islands had contributed to the war effort with awith an estimated fleet of six hundred vesselsn estimated fleet of six hundred vessels56, the Aegean islands, Hy-, the Aeğean islands, Hy-dra in pardra in particular, had played a significant role during the civil wars as ticular, had played a siğnificant role durinğ the civil wars as well. The Rumeliot camp took refuge in the islands, and this influence on well. The Rumeliot camp took refuğe in the islands, and this influence on
53 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 36. 36..
54 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 153, 153..
55 Ibid. 153Ibid. 153--155155..
56 Katerina Galani, and Gelina HarlaftisKaterina Galani, and Gelina Harlaftis, “, “Aegean Islands and the Revolution at SeaAeğean Islands and the Revolution at Sea,” in ,” in The The Greek Revolution: A Critical DictionaryGreek Revolution: A Critical Dictionary,, 147147
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the civilian government enabled Giorgos Koundouriotis, the magnate of
the civilian ğovernment enabled Giorğos Koundouriotis, the mağnate of Hydra to assume the role of head of the executivHydra to assume the role of head of the executive between 1823 and 1826.e between 1823 and 1826.
§
§ 2.42.4 PhanariotsPhanariots
Another distinct group of influential people that would take an im-
Another distinct ğroup of influential people that would take an im-portant role in Greece were the Phanariotes. In the Phanar neighborhood portant role in Greece were the Phanariotes. In the Phanar neiğhborhood of Istanbul, where the Ecumenical Patriarchate is located, certain local of Istanbul, where the Ecumenical Patriarchate is located, certain local elite famelite families emerged such as the Mavrokordatos (İskerletzade), Karat-ilies emerğed such as the Mavrokordatos (I skerletzade), Karat-zas, Kallimaki, Soutsos, Mourouzis, and Ypsilantis families. Their influ-zas, Kallimaki, Soutsos, Mourouzis, and Ypsilantis families. Their influ-ence originally derived from their commercial activities in the capital and ence oriğinally derived from their commercial activities in the capital and the Aegean Sea. However, from the late the Aeğean Sea. However, from the late seventeeseventeenth nth century onwards, century onwards, these families would increasingly be able to attach themselves to the Ot-these families would increasinğly be able to attach themselves to the Ot-toman Imperial governance and be trusted with important bureaucratic toman Imperial ğovernance and be trusted with important bureaucratic and administrative positions in the Empire. There were two major posts and administrative positions in the Empire. There were two major posts for Phanariots. The firfor Phanariots. The first was the office of grand dragoman, which granted st was the office of ğrand drağoman, which ğranted an important diplomatic function to the Phanariotesan important diplomatic function to the Phanariotes such as engaging in such as enğağinğ in highly delicate diplomatic negotiations with foreign diplomatic emissar-hiğhly delicate diplomatic neğotiations with foreiğn diplomatic emissar-iesies..57 The other one was the two offices of Haspodar of WallacThe other one was the two offices of Haspodar of Wallachia and hia and Moldavia. Thanks to their dominance over the Orthodox Patriarchate, Moldavia. Thanks to their dominance over the Orthodox Patriarchate, the the Phanariot families were able to create a monopoly on these two offices. Phanariot families were able to create a monopoly on these two offices. Along with occupying important offices in the Alonğ with occupyinğ important offices in the eempire, and being repre-mpire, and beinğ repre-sentatives of the ruling elite, thesentatives of the rulinğ elite, they also adopted certain elements from the y also adopted certain elements from the way of living from their Muslim counterparts, such as their clothing, and way of livinğ from their Muslim counterparts, such as their clothinğ, and their terminology; their terminoloğy; while developing similarwhile developinğ similar kinship practices by creating kinship practices by creatinğ their own courts in the Principalities.their own courts in the Principalities.58 In that sense, they resemIn that sense, they resembled the bled the Peloponnesian primate families. Where they differed heavily however, Peloponnesian primate families. Where they differed heavily however, was that Phanariots were complete foreigners to the lands that became was that Phanariots were complete foreiğners to the lands that became insurgent Greece. Besides the fact that they never exercised any form of insurğent Greece. Besides the fact that they never exercised any form of influence in the region, they were influence in the reğion, they were resented by localresented by local eliteselites..59 In addition to In addition to
57 Ariel Salzmann, Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern StateEmpire: Rival Paths to the Modern State (Bos-(Bos-ton: Brill, 2004), 111ton: Brill, 2004), 111..
58 Philliou, Philliou, Biography of an EmpireBiography of an Empire, , 1111 ..
59 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 26, 26..
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the hostility towards outsiders, the Phanariotes’ European demeanor
the hostility towards outsiders, the Phanariotes’ European demeanor and their disdain towards locals made them increasingly unlikeable. This and their disdain towards locals made them increasinğly unlikeable. This would particularly cause a problem in the Peloponnese where the pri-would particularly cause a problem in the Peloponnese where the pri-matesmates were highly uncompromising in sharing political authority with were hiğhly uncompromisinğ in sharinğ political authority with newcomersnewcomers;; whereas in Rumeli, whereas in Rumeli, the the Phanariotes found a relatively genial Phanariotes found a relatively ğenial environment, mostly due to the fact that the revolutionary leaders in Ru-environment, mostly due to the fact that the revolutionary leaders in Ru-meli were military chieftains, and their attachmmeli were military chieftains, and their attachment to a higher political ent to a hiğher political authority would benefit their cause of seeking recognition in the political authority would benefit their cause of seekinğ recoğnition in the political arena. We saw this way of seeking political protection in the passages arena. We saw this way of seekinğ political protection in the passağes about Ali about Ali PPasha, and how this practice continued when Kolettis assumed asha, and how this practice continued when Kolettis assumed this role. Ithis role. In fact, Kolettis and the Phanariot Mavrokordatos, who estab-n fact, Kolettis and the Phanariot Mavrokordatos, who estab-lished his power base in western Rumeli would be lifelong political rivals. lished his power base in western Rumeli would be lifelonğ political rivals.
In the early
In the early nineteenthnineteenth--century, many young Phanariotes started to century, many younğ Phanariotes started to join the Philiki Etairia. Apart from Alexandros Ypsiljoin the Philiki Etairia. Apart from Alexandros Ypsilantis, the leader of the antis, the leader of the society and commander in chief of the society’s foray into Moldova, and society and commander in chief of the society’s foray into Moldova, and his brother Dimitrios Ypsilantis; the future Russian ambassador to his brother Dimitrios Ypsilantis; the future Russian ambassador to Greece, Gavriil Katakazy was an Etairist and Phanariot.Greece, Gavriil Katakazy was an Etairist and Phanariot.60 The haspodar The haspodar of Moldavia between 1of Moldavia between 1819819--1821 Michael Soutsos was also a member. The 1821 Michael Soutsos was also a member. The Ypsilantis brothers’ political careers in Greece would not last very long. Ypsilantis brothers’ political careers in Greece would not last very lonğ. Alexandros was to be captured by the Habsburgs police, whereAlexandros was to be captured by the Habsburğs police, where, , due to due to Prince Metternich’s zealous antiPrince Metternich’s zealous anti--revolutionary policies revolutionary policies he he endedended up in a up in a Vienna prison. Dimitrios capitalized on his brothers’ fame and remained Vienna prison. Dimitrios capitalized on his brothers’ fame and remained somewhat politically relevant in the Peloponnese for somewhat politically relevant in the Peloponnese for the nextthe next few years. few years. Soutsos was to be slightly more fortunate in terms of a political career in Soutsos was to be sliğhtly more fortunate in terms of a political career in Greece, where he occupied Greece, where he occupied several domestic and diplomatic posts. How-several domestic and diplomatic posts. How-ever, the most prominent Phanariot who would dominate the political ever, the most prominent Phanariot who would dominate the political domain in Greece was Alexandros Mavrokordatos. When the uprisings in domain in Greece was Alexandros Mavrokordatos. When the uprisinğs in the the PeloponnesePeloponnese began, Mavrokordatos was in Pisa along with his cousin beğan, Mavrokordatos was in Pisa alonğ with his cousin princeprince Karatzas, former haspodar of Wallachia, who had fled to Europe Karatzas, former haspodar of Wallachia, who had fled to Europe due to his maladministration of the principality causing the Sultan to turn due to his maladministration of the principality causinğ the Sultan to turn againstağainst him.him.61 Upon learning of the uprisings, Mavrokordatos took off to Upon learninğ of the uprisinğs, Mavrokordatos took off to
60 Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 28, 28..
61 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutiThe Greek Revolutionon, 116, 116..
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Greece and arrived
Greece and arrived inin Missolonghi, where heMissolonğhi, where he would create his powerbase would create his powerbase in in wwestern Rumeli.estern Rumeli.
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§ 2.52.5 ConclusionConclusion
In the following years, starting with the uprisings in 1821, these pro-
In the followinğ years, startinğ with the uprisinğs in 1821, these pro-tagonists coming from diverse backgrounds became involved in conflicts tağonists cominğ from diverse backğrounds became involved in conflicts beyond anybody’s expectation. They were the products of different seg-beyond anybody’s expectation. They were the products of different seğ-ments within Ottoman society, and the culturalments within Ottoman society, and the cultural and social elements that and social elements that united them were indeed fewer than those dividing them. In addition to united them were indeed fewer than those dividinğ them. In addition to conflicting interests due to personal rivalries, historical feuds, and class conflictinğ interests due to personal rivalries, historical feuds, and class antagonism, regional sentimentalism became a primary factor in deter-antağonism, reğional sentimentalism became a primary factor in deter-mining one’s amininğ one’s alliances and the scope of his armed struggle within lliances and the scope of his armed struğğle within Greece’s war of independence. As soon as the possibility of a central ad-Greece’s war of independence. As soon as the possibility of a central ad-ministration emerged that would threaten historical power arrange-ministration emerğed that would threaten historical power arranğe-ments, regional factionalism came forward, which is going to be thements, reğional factionalism came forward, which is ğoinğ to be the sub-sub-ject of the next chapter. Velentzas, too, was the product of this ject of the next chapter. Velentzas, too, was the product of this environment and thanks to the war, was increasingly becoming entan-environment and thanks to the war, was increasinğly becominğ entan-gled in these networks of violence in Rumeli that were present prior. The ğled in these networks of violence in Rumeli that were present prior. The Rumeliot character was to be a defining elemenRumeliot character was to be a defininğ element of his military future. t of his military future.
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3
3 The Formation of the Regional Factions and the First The Formation of the Reğional Factions and the First Civil Wars (1821Civil Wars (1821--1828)1828)
he purpose of this chapter is to go through the military and political
he purpose of this chapter is to ğo throuğh the military and political developments after the war started. In the previous chapter we have developments after the war started. In the previous chapter we have seen the various complex dynamics in each region that produced the pro-seen the various complex dynamics in each reğion that produced the pro-tagonists of the Greek war of independence, andtağonists of the Greek war of independence, and the following pages will the followinğ pağes will try to show how revolutionary leaderships had either been built on the try to show how revolutionary leaderships had either been built on the previous social arrangements within each region or been born thanks to previous social arranğements within each reğion or been born thanks to the revolutionary circumstances that provided channels for other indi-the revolutionary circumstances that provided channels for other indi-viduals to climb thviduals to climb the social hierarchy. In any case, political roles have still e social hierarchy. In any case, political roles have still continued to be defined within the models and relationships of the pre-continued to be defined within the models and relationships of the pre-vious Ottoman administration. This becomes obvious with intravious Ottoman administration. This becomes obvious with intra--revolu-revolu-tionary conflicts whenever the possibility of a break fromtionary conflicts whenever the possibility of a break from previous previous
T
T
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arrangements occurs. We will see in the following pages that the partici-
arranğements occurs. We will see in the followinğ pağes that the partici-pation of historically privileged persons and groups in the war, who in pation of historically privileğed persons and ğroups in the war, who in the future became prestigious leaders in Greece was conditioned by their the future became prestiğious leaders in Greece was conditioned by their need to contain and restrain need to contain and restrain the unpredictable mobility from below, in the unpredictable mobility from below, in particular among the Peloponnesian primates and islanders. In Rumeli, particular amonğ the Peloponnesian primates and islanders. In Rumeli, despite the fall of Ali Pasha, types and patterns of patronage among the despite the fall of Ali Pasha, types and patterns of patronağe amonğ the irregular military element continued to be an essential element. irreğular military element continued to be an essential element.
The c
The chapter then continues to reveal the conflicts between the re-hapter then continues to reveal the conflicts between the re-gional leaderships. ğional leaderships. Despite the military successes on multiple fronts, the Despite the military successes on multiple fronts, the insurgent Greeks on a majority did still not see their actions within a insurğent Greeks on a majority did still not see their actions within a framework of a unified Greece. A territorial unitframework of a unified Greece. A territorial unity under the common y under the common Greek identity that included the Peloponnese, Rumeli, and the Aegean is-Greek identity that included the Peloponnese, Rumeli, and the Aeğean is-lands made little sense for most of the agents of the revolution, because lands made little sense for most of the ağents of the revolution, because most of them had never seen their identities exceed regional definitionsmost of them had never seen their identities exceed reğional definitions, , and even if they dand even if they did, many of them were not keen on giving up their priv-id, many of them were not keen on ğivinğ up their priv-ileges to a central authorityileğes to a central authority. This became painfully obvious when at-. This became painfully obvious when at-tempts were made by the civilian authorities to centralize the Greek in-tempts were made by the civilian authorities to centralize the Greek in-surgence under a single government, and consequently led to thesurğence under a sinğle ğovernment, and consequently led to the reactions which resulted in civil wars. These internal conflicts deepened reactions which resulted in civil wars. These internal conflicts deepened the factional divide among the insurgents, and personal followings and the factional divide amonğ the insurğents, and personal followinğs and regional factions evolved into separate political enterprises. reğional factions evolved into separate political enterprises. Among theAmonğ the purposepurposess of this chapter is to createof this chapter is to create a genealogy of these factional di-a ğenealoğy of these factional di-vides. vides.
Furthermore, this chapter aims to see how these factions established
Furthermore, this chapter aims to see how these factions established alliances with the emissaries oalliances with the emissaries off the great powers and evolved into the the ğreat powers and evolved into the “French”, “English”, and “Russian” parties during the Kapodistrian and “French”, “Enğlish”, and “Russian” parties durinğ the Kapodistrian and OthOthonian period. For the story of Kolettis as well as Velentzas, this period onian period. For the story of Kolettis as well as Velentzas, this period is in particular significant, because it provided Kolettis the political is in particular siğnificant, because it provided Kolettis the political means to ascend to the position of a Rumeliot faction leader. His personal means to ascend to the position of a Rumeliot faction leader. His personal following in the later years followinğ in the later years camecame to be known as the French party. In the to be known as the French party. In the case of Velentzas, case of Velentzas, this was whenthis was when he he started to find his place within this started to find his place within this changing world and chanğinğ world and made made a name for himselfa name for himself in certain important circles in certain important circles ththanks toanks to his actions during the Rumeliot invasion of the Peloponnese,his actions durinğ the Rumeliot invasion of the Peloponnese, and later on during the fight against the Egyptian invaders. Both men and later on durinğ the fiğht ağainst the Eğyptian invaders. Both men
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established their patron
established their patron--client relationship in the same period. Through client relationship in the same period. Throuğh tracing the beginnings of this relationship, it will be possible to discover tracinğ the beğinninğs of this relationship, it will be possible to discover the ways Kolettis made himself a pothe ways Kolettis made himself a political benefactor for Rumeliot cap-litical benefactor for Rumeliot cap-tains, as well as how through his allegiance to Kolettis, Velentzas, aware tains, as well as how throuğh his alleğiance to Kolettis, Velentzas, aware or not, became involved in a political network that later on transcended or not, became involved in a political network that later on transcended the Greek political domain and got increasingly entangled with the Euro-the Greek political domain and ğot increasinğly entanğled with the Euro-pepean diplomatic system. an diplomatic system.
§
§ 3.13.1 The Rebels of the PeloponneseThe Rebels of the Peloponnese
The insurrection in the Peloponnese began in March 1821, and spread
The insurrection in the Peloponnese beğan in March 1821, and spread rather quickly to the whole peninsula in the span of a few months. rather quickly to the whole peninsula in the span of a few months. Among Amonğ the developments that drove these earlier uprisings werethe developments that drove these earlier uprisinğs were the the continued continued beliefbelief of a guaranteed Russian aid even after Ypsilantis’ defeatof a ğuaranteed Russian aid even after Ypsilantis’ defeat,,62 the ef-the ef-fect of the Etairists’ endless encouragements,fect of the Etairists’ endless encourağements,63 and the obvious vulnera-and the obvious vulnera-bility of the Ottoman military in the Peloponnese after Hurşit bility of the Ottoman military in the Peloponnese after Hurşit PPaashsha and a and his troops took off to siege Ioannina. The uprisings occurred more or less his troops took off to sieğe Ioannina. The uprisinğs occurred more or less at the same time in numerous places without the arrival of at the same time in numerous places without the arrival of Alexandros Alexandros Ypsilantis or Ypsilantis or any other higher authority. This is perhaps the most signifi-any other hiğher authority. This is perhaps the most siğnifi-cant function that the Philiki Etairia cant function that the Philiki Etairia had had served in the region in 1821. They served in the reğion in 1821. They succeeded in infiltrating and using the succeeded in infiltratinğ and usinğ the existingexistinğ networks of patronage in networks of patronağe in the Peloponnese. the Peloponnese. As early as March 1821, OttAs early as March 1821, Ottoman authorities in the Pel-oman authorities in the Pel-oponnese immediately noticed the kocabaşı’s of Kalavryta and Vostitsa, oponnese immediately noticed the kocabaşı’s of Kalavryta and Vostitsa, Zaimis and Londos of engaging in suspicious activities.Zaimis and Londos of enğağinğ in suspicious activities.64 The induction The induction of key members within this traditional network of key members within this traditional network into the Etairia into the Etairia enabled enabled the insurrection to spread fast and mobilize vast amount of the popula-the insurrection to spread fast and mobilize vast amount of the popula-tion in the countryside at once.tion in the countryside at once.65
Upon hearing the news, Kolokotronis secretly crossed to the Pelop
Upon hearinğ the news, Kolokotronis secretly crossed to the Pelopon-on-nese and made it to Mani. nese and made it to Mani. With prior knowledge thatWith prior knowledğe that the chieftain of the chieftain of
62 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 93, 93..
63 Ibid. 91Ibid. 91..
64 B.O.A. HAT 839, 37816 [27 Cemaziyelahir 1236 (1 April 1821)]B.O.A. HAT 839, 37816 [27 Cemaziyelahir 1236 (1 April 1821)]..
65 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 91, 91..
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Mani, Petrobey is a member of the Etairia,
Mani, Petrobey is a member of the Etairia, KolKolookotroniskotronis pledged his ser-pledğed his ser-vices to him. Ottoman authorities immediately requested Petrobey to vices to him. Ottoman authorities immediately requested Petrobey to seize him. Apparently, they still had the beliseize him. Apparently, they still had the belief that Petrobey would stay ef that Petrobey would stay loyal, since his son was held hostage in Istanbul to ensure that very thing. loyal, since his son was held hostağe in Istanbul to ensure that very thinğ. The son had already escaped however, making it easier for his father to The son had already escaped however, makinğ it easier for his father to act in favor of the insurrection. Maniot troops, led by Kolokotronis,act in favor of the insurrection. Maniot troops, led by Kolokotronis, andand NikitNikitaras along with Petrobey as commander in chief, quickly captured aras alonğ with Petrobey as commander in chief, quickly captured Kalamata and the plains in Messenia. The southern plains of the Pelopon-Kalamata and the plains in Messenia. The southern plains of the Pelopon-nese apart from a few wellnese apart from a few well--fortified towns were captured by the insur-fortified towns were captured by the insur-gents by the summer of 1821.ğents by the summer of 1821.
After Kalamata was cap
After Kalamata was captured, Kolokotronis took his few men and tured, Kolokotronis took his few men and wandered further north to Karytaina, his birthplace. Despite a lack of per-wandered further north to Karytaina, his birthplace. Despite a lack of per-sonal wealth, Kolokotronis had the fame of being the most skilled military sonal wealth, Kolokotronis had the fame of beinğ the most skilled military leader in the Peloponnese, which neither the primates, nor other rleader in the Peloponnese, which neither the primates, nor other revolu-evolu-tionary leaders possessed. This quality made him immediately one of the tionary leaders possessed. This quality made him immediately one of the most key actors of the revolution in the Peloponnese. Kolokotronis was most key actors of the revolution in the Peloponnese. Kolokotronis was already a wellalready a well--known and influential banditknown and influential bandit. Yet,. Yet, his life took a similar his life took a similar path with Velentzas in the sense tpath with Velentzas in the sense that it was the war that brought him the hat it was the war that brouğht him the reputation with which he would be remembered, although Kolokotrois’ reputation with which he would be remembered, althouğh Kolokotrois’ level of prestige and reputation waslevel of prestiğe and reputation was and still isand still is significantly higher than siğnificantly hiğher than any other revolutionary hero. The war provided these men in the Pelo-any other revolutionary hero. The war provided these men in the Pelo-ponnponnese and Rumeli the perfect violent circumstances to advance the ese and Rumeli the perfect violent circumstances to advance the ranks of the social hierarchy, because they were the experts of the private ranks of the social hierarchy, because they were the experts of the private use of violence as a means of control in the public arena.use of violence as a means of control in the public arena.66
In Karytaina, Kolokotronis’ social origins provided h
In Karytaina, Kolokotronis’ social oriğins provided him with two sig-im with two siğ-nificant benefits. The first one is that the troops nificant benefits. The first one is that the troops consisting ofconsistinğ of peasants in peasants in the region felt a certain social relatedness to him due to him coming from the reğion felt a certain social relatedness to him due to him cominğ from a humbler social background than that of the primates.a humbler social backğround than that of the primates.67 This very same This very same feature made himfeature made him also a convenient partner in the eyes of Deligiannis, the also a convenient partner in the eyes of Deliğiannis, the primate of Karytaina and his former employer. primate of Karytaina and his former employer. DeligiannisDeliğiannis did not con-did not con-sider him as a potential political challenger in the future, but merely as a sider him as a potential political challenğer in the future, but merely as a
66 Anton Blok, Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860--1960: A Study of Violent Peasant 1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entre-Entre-preneurspreneurs (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), 6(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), 6..
67 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 76. 76..
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k
kaposapos in the service of his patron. Kolokotronis toin the service of his patron. Kolokotronis took control of the troops ok control of the troops in Karytaina and created a powerful military foundation for his future in Karytaina and created a powerful military foundation for his future role in revolutionary politics. role in revolutionary politics. An important aspect of Kolokotronis’ polit-An important aspect of Kolokotronis’ polit-ical rise was his relationship with Deligiannis, as well as the differences ical rise was his relationship with Deliğiannis, as well as the differences between thbetween the two mene two men. . The dynamic between themThe dynamic between them shows further dimen-shows further dimen-sions of the war of independence, perhaps even sions of the war of independence, perhaps even one of one of its most revolu-its most revolu-tionary featuretionary featuress. Clearly, Deligiannis’ plan for the insurrection did not in-. Clearly, Deliğiannis’ plan for the insurrection did not in-volve a radical break with the present social arrangemenvolve a radical break with the present social arranğements. It merely ts. It merely anticipated a political future that involved the replacement of the Muslim anticipated a political future that involved the replacement of the Muslim overlords with Greek primates. On the other hand, the rise of the likes of overlords with Greek primates. On the other hand, the rise of the likes of Kolokotronis, along with a strong popular support, Kolokotronis, alonğ with a stronğ popular support, signaledsiğnaled the possibil-the possibil-ity of the future diity of the future disintegration of historically entrenched power struc-sinteğration of historically entrenched power struc-tures in the Peloponnese.tures in the Peloponnese.68 This possibility was later on probably noticed This possibility was later on probably noticed by Deligiannisby Deliğiannis,, too, atoo, as hes he abandonabandoneded his fur and robes that symbolized his fur and robes that symbolized his kocabaşı status and his kocabaşı status and putput on the traditional foustanellaon the traditional foustanella,, whichwhich couldcould be be taken as a clear symbolic gesture to appeal to that trend.taken as a clear symbolic ğesture to appeal to that trend.69
After becoming the de facto military commander of the troops in Kar-
After becominğ the de facto military commander of the troops in Kar-ytaina, Kolokotronis along with Deligiannis took their troops to Tripolitsa ytaina, Kolokotronis alonğ with Deliğiannis took their troops to Tripolitsa and began to siege the provincial caand beğan to sieğe the provincial capitalpital of the Mora eyaletof the Mora eyalet. They were . They were soon joined by Petrobey and his Maniot forces, and Dimitrios Ypsilantis, soon joined by Petrobey and his Maniot forces, and Dimitrios Ypsilantis, whowho,, as the proxy of his brotheras the proxy of his brother,, was seen by many as the supreme com-was seen by many as the supreme com-mander of the revolution. However, besides his name and the affectionmander of the revolution. However, besides his name and the affection thatthat thethe peasantry seemed to have for him, again mostly due to him not peasantry seemed to have for him, ağain mostly due to him not being a kocabaşı, Ypsilantis had nbeinğ a kocabaşı, Ypsilantis had neither aeither a particular political nor military particular political nor military skill to offer, and his synthetic authority would soon perish as the pri-skill to offer, and his synthetic authority would soon perish as the pri-mates and captains realized his incompetencemates and captains realized his incompetence and took advantage of it.and took advantağe of it.70 During the siege of Tripolitsa, suspecting that he would get in the way of Durinğ the sieğe of Tripolitsa, suspectinğ that he would ğet in the way of letting the soldiers plunder the city after its eventual surrender, Pelopon-lettinğ the soldiers plunder the city after its eventual surrender, Pelopon-nesian chieftains made sure Ypsilantis left the siege and took his small nesian chieftains made sure Ypsilantis left the sieğe and took his small
68 Ibid. 76Ibid. 76
69 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 97, 97..
70 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek History of the Greek RevolutionRevolution, Vol.1. 289, Vol.1. 289..
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force to
force to the the golf of Corinth, afğolf of Corinth, after he was wrongly made to believe that an ter he was wronğly made to believe that an Ottoman attack was Ottoman attack was imminentimminent from that direction.from that direction.71
The fall of the city
The fall of the city of Tripolitsaof Tripolitsa was made easier after secret negotia-was made easier after secret neğotia-tions with Elmas tions with Elmas BBey and his unit of 1.500 Albanian mercenaries, whom ey and his unit of 1.500 Albanian mercenaries, whom Hurşit Paşa had leftHurşit Paşa had left in the city as a security force. According to Makrygi-in the city as a security force. Accordinğ to Makryği-annis, Hurşit left Elmasannis, Hurşit left Elmas,, because because hehe was an Ali was an Ali PPasha loyalist.asha loyalist.72 Koloko-Koloko-tronis personally negotiated with Elmas tronis personally neğotiated with Elmas BBey and made a ey and made a BesaBesa (word of (word of honor) with him, after sending him a letter assuring him thathonor) with him, after sendinğ him a letter assurinğ him that they would they would not be harmed if they accept the proposal, and emphasizing that he (Ko-not be harmed if they accept the proposal, and emphasizinğ that he (Ko-lokotronis) has never violated his lokotronis) has never violated his BesaBesa..73 As a resultAs a result,, the Albanian unit the Albanian unit was allowed to leave the city unharmed. This emphasis by Kolokotronis was allowed to leave the city unharmed. This emphasis by Kolokotronis on the term on the term BesaBesa shows the disshows the distinct kind of shared mentality and conduct tinct kind of shared mentality and conduct of honor these military men had among themselves. It is a word of honor of honor these military men had amonğ themselves. It is a word of honor that both men know that the other one will hold. This kind of mentality that both men know that the other one will hold. This kind of mentality was explained by a historian as follows: “was explained by a historian as follows: “WWhile the eşkhile the eşkiiya leaders weya leaders were re willing to rescind the promises they made to the sultan and his officials, willinğ to rescind the promises they made to the sultan and his officials, they seemed to have their own codes of conduct and honor that informed they seemed to have their own codes of conduct and honor that informed how they interacted with each other.”how they interacted with each other.”74
A day after the Albanians left, on 8
A day after the Albanians left, on 8thth of October, Tripolitsa surrof October, Tripolitsa surren-en-dered and became a scene of an unprecedented civilian massacre.dered and became a scene of an unprecedented civilian massacre.75 De-De-spite the wealth he gained through the plunder of his men during the spite the wealth he ğained throuğh the plunder of his men durinğ the massacres of Tripolitsa, Kolokotronis’ reputation suffered for a while due massacres of Tripolitsa, Kolokotronis’ reputation suffered for a while due to his role in the whole affair. Not long to his role in the whole affair. Not lonğ after Tripolitsa, Corinth was also after Tripolitsa, Corinth was also captured, making the Peloponnese almost entirely liberated from Otto-captured, makinğ the Peloponnese almost entirely liberated from Otto-mans, mans, exceptexcept Patras. Patras. Other thanOther than due to its effective defenses, the siege of due to its effective defenses, the sieğe of Patras was further damaged by a clear example of Peloponnesian Patras was further damağed by a clear example of Peloponnesian
71 Ibid. 265Ibid. 265..
72 Lidderdale, ed. Lidderdale, ed. The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 27, 27..
73 B.O.A. HAT 915, 39917 [29.Zilhicce 1837 (16 September 1822)]B.O.A. HAT 915, 39917 [29.Zilhicce 1837 (16 September 1822)]..
74 Esmer, Esmer, A Culture of RebellionA Culture of Rebellion, 114, 114..
75 For the Report of the Ottoman Vezir on the For the Report of the Ottoman Vezir on the aftermath of the fall of Tripolitsa, see; B.O.A. aftermath of the fall of Tripolitsa, see; B.O.A. HAT 877, 38842 [15 Rebiülahir 1837 (9 January 1822)]; For a more detailed account on the HAT 877, 38842 [15 Rebiu lahir 1837 (9 January 1822)]; For a more detailed account on the Tripolitsa massacres from a contemporary source See: Finlay, History of the Greek Rev-Tripolitsa massacres from a contemporary source See: Finlay, History of the Greek Rev-olution, Vol.1. 269olution, Vol.1. 269..
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factional cont
factional controversy. Andreas Zaimis, who as their primate, was the roversy. Andreas Zaimis, who as their primate, was the commander of the Kalavryta troops during the siege of Patras, prevented commander of the Kalavryta troops durinğ the sieğe of Patras, prevented Kolokotronis from taking over the siege.Kolokotronis from takinğ over the sieğe.76 Most probably fearing that the Most probably fearinğ that the formers rising fame would damage his authority for the formers risinğ fame would damağe his authority for the benefit of his ri-benefit of his ri-val Deligiannis, who was still seen as the patron of Kolokotronis. Zaimis’ val Deliğiannis, who was still seen as the patron of Kolokotronis. Zaimis’ concerns in regard to Kolokotronis potentially liberating Patras after the concerns in reğard to Kolokotronis potentially liberatinğ Patras after the events in Tripolitsa was also confirmed by a letter he haevents in Tripolitsa was also confirmed by a letter he hadd sent to Mavro-sent to Mavro-kordatos, making kordatos, makinğ extensive complaints about Kolokotronis’ exploits in extensive complaints about Kolokotronis’ exploits in the Peloponnese and emphasizing that captains such as the latter should the Peloponnese and emphasizinğ that captains such as the latter should not be entrusted with military affairs.not be entrusted with military affairs.77 The date in which the letter was The date in which the letter was sent is unknown, but it shows that in addition to fiercesent is unknown, but it shows that in addition to fierce primate factional-primate factional-ism, as early as the 1821ism, as early as the 1821--1822, the emergence of former bandit captains as 1822, the emerğence of former bandit captains as prominent political figures thanks to the war and creating potential prominent political fiğures thanks to the war and creatinğ potential threats to the entrenched power structures in the Peloponnese was threats to the entrenched power structures in the Peloponnese was a de-a de-velopment that was reckovelopment that was reckoned with.ned with.
In June 1821, the Peloponnesian Senate was created for issues such as
In June 1821, the Peloponnesian Senate was created for issues such as Zaimis’ concern of preserving the privileges of primates against the rising Zaimis’ concern of preservinğ the privileğes of primates ağainst the risinğ star of revolutionary heroes. star of revolutionary heroes. This reflex of putting aside differences in This reflex of puttinğ aside differences in order to focus on theirorder to focus on their collective interests like preserving their privileges collective interests like preservinğ their privileğes regarding statuses and property rights was a common characteristic of reğardinğ statuses and property riğhts was a common characteristic of the Peloponnesian kocabaşı class.the Peloponnesian kocabaşı class.78 Now that almost the whole Now that almost the whole ppeninsula eninsula was in the hands of the insurgents, the collection of taxes, organization was in the hands of the insurğents, the collection of taxes, orğanization and payment of the troops, and the question of the large estates captured and payment of the troops, and the question of the larğe estates captured by Muslim notables by Muslim notables and pious foundations (waqf) and pious foundations (waqf) were primary issues were primary issues of the senate.of the senate.79 Its members weIts members were almost entirely primates and influen-re almost entirely primates and influen-tial clergymen. The Senate selftial clerğymen. The Senate self--proclaimed itself the supreme authority proclaimed itself the supreme authority in the Peloponnese and was a strong indication of Peloponnesian partic-in the Peloponnese and was a stronğ indication of Peloponnesian partic-ularism throughout the war.ularism throuğhout the war.80 This particularistic reflex of the This particularistic reflex of the
76 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1, , Vol.1, 276276..
77 B.O.A. HAT 938, 40518 [29 Zilhicce 1837 (16 September 1822)]B.O.A. HAT 938, 40518 [29 Zilhicce 1837 (16 September 1822)]..
78 Yaycıoğlu, Yaycıoğ lu, Partners of the EmpirePartners of the Empire, 114, 114..
79 McGrew, McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern GreeceLand and Revolution in Modern Greece, 56, 56..
80 John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos Veremis, Greece: John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel, From 1831 to the Pre-The Modern Sequel, From 1831 to the Pre-sentsent, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2002), 45, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2002), 45..
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Peloponnes
Peloponnesian senate would create a conflict later on with the provi-ian senate would create a conflict later on with the provi-sional government, and evolve into an open civil war, that saw the inva-sional ğovernment, and evolve into an open civil war, that saw the inva-sion of the Peloponnese by Kolettis’ Rumeliot troops, which Velentzas sion of the Peloponnese by Kolettis’ Rumeliot troops, which Velentzas was also a part of. was also a part of.
§
§ 3.23.2 The Rebels of Rumeli, and the MThe Rebels of Rumeli, and the Maavrokvrokordatos and Kolettis ordatos and Kolettis FactionsFactions
In Rumeli, the prospects of a military success like that in the Pelopon-
In Rumeli, the prospects of a military success like that in the Pelopon-nese were much lower. Demographically, the region was very mixed, nese were much lower. Demoğraphically, the reğion was very mixed, which made it much harder for definitive control over the countryside. In which made it much harder for definitive control over the countryside. In the summer of 1821, Hurşit Paşa’s troops alonthe summer of 1821, Hurşit Paşa’s troops along with other Ottoman forces ğ with other Ottoman forces in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia were much closer, Ali in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia were much closer, Ali PPasha was still asha was still alive, and the overall uncertainty of a possible general Greek uprising alive, and the overall uncertainty of a possible ğeneral Greek uprisinğ made it much harder to guarantee the participation of the majority of the made it much harder to ğuarantee the participation of the majority of the captains,captains, whose fate was not necessarily dependent on an independent whose fate was not necessarily dependent on an independent Christian state to begin with. The Christian state to beğin with. The aarmatolic character of always keeping rmatolic character of always keepinğ their options open applied here as well. Throughout the war, Rumeliot their options open applied here as well. Throuğhout the war, Rumeliot captains switching sides between Ottoman and Greek cacaptains switchinğ sides between Ottoman and Greek camps, or between mps, or between multiple Greek factions was frequent and most of the time not something multiple Greek factions was frequent and most of the time not somethinğ that much of a shock for contemporaries. It was not seen necessarily as that much of a shock for contemporaries. It was not seen necessarily as treachery, but as a certain prudence that was a necessary feature of the treachery, but as a certain prudence that was a necessary feature of the military element in Rummilitary element in Rumeli for survival, in which principal stances were eli for survival, in which principal stances were less important than personal relationships. Within a few years, less important than personal relationships. Within a few years, Karaiskakis, and Androutsos for example would fight on the side of Ali Karaiskakis, and Androutsos for example would fiğht on the side of Ali PPasha against the Sultan, then switch to the Sultans side, and eventualasha ağainst the Sultan, then switch to the Sultans side, and eventually ly ending up fighting on the side of the Greek uprising, before briefly switch-endinğ up fiğhtinğ on the side of the Greek uprisinğ, before briefly switch-ing to the Ottoman side, and back again.inğ to the Ottoman side, and back ağain.81
It was not only to avoid betting on the wrong horse that contributed
It was not only to avoid bettinğ on the wronğ horse that contributed to the versatile nature of the allegiances of Rumeliot captains, bto the versatile nature of the alleğiances of Rumeliot captains, but also ut also individual rivalries and feuds, especially when it came to seizing disputed individual rivalries and feuds, especially when it came to seizinğ disputed territories. After Karaiskakis abandoned Ali territories. After Karaiskakis abandoned Ali PPasha, he seized the district asha, he seized the district
81 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 137, 137..
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of Agrapha and claimed it his own armatolik, trying to benefit from the
of Ağrapha and claimed it his own armatolik, tryinğ to benefit from the absence of authority withabsence of authority with the downfall of the latterthe downfall of the latter and farm its taxes;and farm its taxes; wwhereas Rangos, who had already become a client of Mavrokordatoshereas Ranğos, who had already become a client of Mavrokordatos,, was was appointed by him to the same area. Clearly showing how political protec-appointed by him to the same area. Clearly showinğ how political protec-tion of an influential patron was utilized. The dispute for Agraphation of an influential patron was utilized. The dispute for Ağrapha reached such heights that in order to evict Rangos once and for all from reached such heiğhts that in order to evict Ranğos once and for all from the district, Karaiskakis entered into negotiations with the Ottomans, fig-the district, Karaiskakis entered into neğotiations with the Ottomans, fiğ-uring that he could not win over Rangos from within the same camp with-urinğ that he could not win over Ranğos from within the same camp with-out the political backing that the othout the political backinğ that the other one had; but he could eliminate er one had; but he could eliminate his rival if he could confirm his claim by the Ottomans and then assist his rival if he could confirm his claim by the Ottomans and then assist them in their efforts to recapture the area.them in their efforts to recapture the area.82 This would also enable This would also enable Karaiskakis to obtain the necessary political legitimacy for his use of vi-Karaiskakis to obtain the necessary political leğitimacy for his use of vi-olencolence as a means of controlling a public domain. Whether from the e as a means of controllinğ a public domain. Whether from the Christian Mavrokordatos, or the Muslim Ottoman commander was irrel-Christian Mavrokordatos, or the Muslim Ottoman commander was irrel-evant at that point. Karaiskakis would eventually rejoin the Greek campevant at that point. Karaiskakis would eventually rejoin the Greek camp.. PPerhaps because Mavrokordatos became the president of terhaps because Mavrokordatos became the president of the central gov-he central ğov-ernment, Karaiskakis thought that a local dispute such as that for Agra-ernment, Karaiskakis thouğht that a local dispute such as that for Ağra-pha would not be among his primary concerns. In the later years of the pha would not be amonğ his primary concerns. In the later years of the warwar,, Karaiskakis would become one of the most celebrated symbols of Karaiskakis would become one of the most celebrated symbols of the Greek war of independence. Hthe Greek war of independence. However, the dispute over Agrapha owever, the dispute over Ağrapha would continue until his death in 1827.would continue until his death in 1827.83
Upon arriving in Missolonghi, Alexandros Mavrokordatos immedi-
Upon arrivinğ in Missolonğhi, Alexandros Mavrokordatos immedi-ately started his efforts to create a provisional regional administration. ately started his efforts to create a provisional reğional administration. Etairists were never as influential in Etairists were never as influential in wwestesterernn Rumeli as they had been in Rumeli as they had been in the Peloponnese, so Mavrokordatos did not face a very heavy challenge the Peloponnese, so Mavrokordatos did not face a very heavy challenğe in persuading the chieftains and notables of western Rumeli to support in persuadinğ the chieftains and notables of western Rumeli to support him. The provisional administration of western Rumeli was founded on him. The provisional administration of western Rumeli was founded on the principles ofthe principles of an extraordinary contract that Mavrokordatos made the an extraordinary contract that Mavrokordatos made the notables and chieftains of the region sign. Through this document, he in-notables and chieftains of the reğion siğn. Throuğh this document, he in-troduced certain western principles of statecraft that were novel to the troduced certain western principles of statecraft that were novel to the region and tried to create an impersonal form of adminisreğion and tried to create an impersonal form of administration with tration with
82 KoliopoulosKoliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, Brigands with a Cause, 45, 45--4646..
83 Ibid. 46Ibid. 46..
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participation of representatives of various localities.
participation of representatives of various localities.84 This was a sharp This was a sharp contrast to the situation that was going on in the Peloponnese, where an-contrast to the situation that was ğoinğ on in the Peloponnese, where an-other Phanariot other Phanariot Dimitrios Dimitrios Ypsilantis was desperately and unsuccessfully Ypsilantis was desperately and unsuccessfully trying to establish his tryinğ to establish his personal undisputed leadership, frequently em-personal undisputed leadership, frequently em-phasizing his role as the representative of phasizinğ his role as the representative of his brother his brother Alexandros Ypsi-Alexandros Ypsi-lantis whom he still naively assumed of having the claim of the title of lantis whom he still naively assumed of havinğ the claim of the title of Prince of Greece.Prince of Greece.85 It is noteworthy that the arguably more moderate lib-It is noteworthy that the arğuably more moderate lib-eral Mavrokordatos would later on become the leader of the soeral Mavrokordatos would later on become the leader of the so--called called English Party in Greece, and many western Rumeliot notables and cap-Enğlish Party in Greece, and many western Rumeliot notables and cap-tains would be his political clients.tains would be his political clients.86 The Peloponnese in return, The Peloponnese in return, espe-espe-cially under the future leadership of Kapodistrias that heavily invested in cially under the future leadership of Kapodistrias that heavily invested in a more autocratic administration would become the backbone of the soa more autocratic administration would become the backbone of the so--called Russian party.called Russian party.
Being from a
Beinğ from a particular particular region did not automatically make a person reğion did not automatically make a person belong to a regionbelonğ to a reğional faction. Western Rumeliot chieftains were heavily in-al faction. Western Rumeliot chieftains were heavily in-volved in rivalries and feuds volved in rivalries and feuds againstağainst each other. In fact, this was among each other. In fact, this was amonğ the reasons for Mavrokordatos’ relatively easy ascendancy into the re-the reasons for Mavrokordatos’ relatively easy ascendancy into the re-gional leadership. In addition to the overall political vağional leadership. In addition to the overall political vacuum caused by cuum caused by the absence of Ali the absence of Ali PPasha’s presence, for the chieftains of the region it was asha’s presence, for the chieftains of the reğion it was much more preferable to have an outsider as leadermuch more preferable to have an outsider as leader or mediatoror mediator than than having to accept the leadership of another one amongst themselves. havinğ to accept the leadership of another one amonğst themselves. While the Souliot Botsaris waWhile the Souliot Botsaris was a Mavrokordatos loyalist and s a Mavrokordatos loyalist and one of the one of the most influential military leadersmost influential military leaders of western Rumeliot troops, his rival of western Rumeliot troops, his rival Tzavelas was not a Mavrokordatist, and would later ally himself with the Tzavelas was not a Mavrokordatist, and would later ally himself with the Russian partyRussian party, the rival party of Mavrokordatos’ English party, the rival party of Mavrokordatos’ Enğlish party. Anoth. Another er chieftain that had a feud with Botsaris, Gogos Bakolas, went even further chieftain that had a feud with Botsaris, Goğos Bakolas, went even further and negotiated with Ömer Vrioni, commander of the Ottoman troops, and neğotiated with O mer Vrioni, commander of the Ottoman troops, which led to a series of events that almost cost Botsaris his life.which led to a series of events that almost cost Botsaris his life.87
Another Mavrokordatos loyalist chieftain,
Another Mavrokordatos loyalist chieftain, Varnakiotis as well Varnakiotis as well switched sides and came into an agreement with Ömer Vrioni, whom he switched sides and came into an ağreement with O mer Vrioni, whom he
84 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutThe Greek Revolutionion, 127, 127..
85 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 286, Vol.1. 286..
86 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 81, 81..
87 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 327, Vol.1. 327..
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probably knew from Ali
probably knew from Ali PPasha’s court. Unlike Gogos Bakolas however, he asha’s court. Unlike Goğos Bakolas however, he left the Mavrokordatos camp after finally coming to understand that the left the Mavrokordatos camp after finally cominğ to understand that the political system that Mavpolitical system that Mavrokordatos was trying to eventually bring into rokordatos was tryinğ to eventually brinğ into the region had no place for the likes of himthe reğion had no place for the likes of him, since, since the disposal of tradi-the disposal of tradi-tional military elites in the provinces like him would tional military elites in the provinces like him would come at the expense come at the expense ofof his personal authority and revenues. Worse even, without shis personal authority and revenues. Worse even, without sufficient ufficient amount of revenues, they would be unable to pay the men under their amount of revenues, they would be unable to pay the men under their command who could possibly go serve a rival chieftain.command who could possibly ğo serve a rival chieftain.88 In the words of In the words of Mark Mazower:Mark Mazower:
Varnakiotis remains a shining example, not of treachery
Varnakiotis remains a shininğ example, not of treachery –– a term a term which implies allegiance twhich implies alleğiance to a sovereign state o a sovereiğn state –– but of the lingering but of the linğerinğ impact of the old Ottoman system of regional governance upon the impact of the old Ottoman system of reğional ğovernance upon the behavior of some of the military men of continental Greece. That behavior of some of the military men of continental Greece. That was the system they had grown up with, and their actions was the system they had ğrown up with, and their actions –– prompted by their own seprompted by their own selflf--interest with its roots in the prosper-interest with its roots in the prosper-ity of the villages under their control ity of the villağes under their control –– pointed to the power of pointed to the power of localism that lingered in the region long after independence had localism that linğered in the reğion lonğ after independence had been gained.been ğained.89
In eastern Rumeli and Attica, where Velentzas
In eastern Rumeli and Attica, where Velentzas hailedhailed from, the powerfrom, the power vacuum in 1821 was large. Neither was the armatolik system as strong as vacuum in 1821 was larğe. Neither was the armatolik system as stronğ as in western Rumeli, nor had there ever been in western Rumeli, nor had there ever been very very powerful large estate powerful larğe estate holding holdinğ Kocabaşı’sKocabaşı’s like in the Peloponnese.like in the Peloponnese.90 In 1821, the weak regional In 1821, the weak reğional administrative body was headed by the Phadministrative body was headed by the Phanariot and friend of Alexan-anariot and friend of Alexan-dros Mavrokordatos, Theodoros Negris, who tried to imitate what Mavro-dros Mavrokordatos, Theodoros Neğris, who tried to imitate what Mavro-kordatos was trying to do in western Rumeli, but ultimately was unsuc-kordatos was tryinğ to do in western Rumeli, but ultimately was unsuc-cessful. The real political authority in the region was soon held by cessful. The real political authority in the reğion was soon held by Odysseus Androutsos (Odysseus Androutsos (Disava), the armatolos and former guard of Ali Disava), the armatolos and former ğuard of Ali PPa-a-sha. By the end of 1821, Androutsos had driven out the weak primates of sha. By the end of 1821, Androutsos had driven out the weak primates of Livadeia, and established a strong military foothold in Attica, including Livadeia, and established a stronğ military foothold in Attica, includinğ the districts of Livadeia, Thebes, and Atalanti. He became ththe districts of Livadeia, Thebes, and Atalanti. He became the virtual ruler e virtual ruler
88 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 58, 58..
89 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek The Greek RevolutionRevolution, 186, 186..
90 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 373, Vol.1. 373..
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and commander in chief of eastern Rumeli, and like his many counter-
and commander in chief of eastern Rumeli, and like his many counter-parts, started to increasingly treat the liberated areas under his com-parts, started to increasinğly treat the liberated areas under his com-mand like his own kaptanlık, and appropriated its resources to consoli-mand like his own kaptanlık, and appropriated its resources to consoli-date his own personal influence.date his own personal influence.91 This would perhaps explain why many This would perhaps explain why many men like Velentzas joined the bands that came from another region like men like Velentzas joined the bands that came from another reğion like that of Tzamis Karatasos, since Androutsos increasingly left little domain that of Tzamis Karatasos, since Androutsos increasinğly left little domain and resource to be exploited by others. and resource to be exploited by others.
Tensions grew between Androutso
Tensions ğrew between Androutsos and the regional administration s and the reğional administration in 1822. Being fed up with what George Finlay describes as a “state of an-in 1822. Beinğ fed up with what Georğe Finlay describes as a “state of an-archy” caused by Androutsos’ bands roaming the region and raiding ci-archy” caused by Androutsos’ bands roaminğ the reğion and raidinğ ci-vilians, the provisional government formally dismissed Androutsos, and vilians, the provisional ğovernment formally dismissed Androutsos, and with the iwith the initiative of Ioannis Kolettis,nitiative of Ioannis Kolettis, sent two men to the region to re-sent two men to the reğion to re-place him, place him, namely namely Palaskas and Noutsos.Palaskas and Noutsos.92 The two men were known by The two men were known by Androutsos from their shared time in Ali Androutsos from their shared time in Ali PPasha’s court. Interpreting this asha’s court. Interpretinğ this move as an attempt to eventually remove him from thmove as an attempt to eventually remove him from the political scene al-e political scene al-together, Androutsos, shockingly, killed the two men and increased the toğether, Androutsos, shockinğly, killed the two men and increased the tensions between him and the government to a high point. With a similar tensions between him and the ğovernment to a hiğh point. With a similar traditional armatolos logic to that of Karaiskakis and Varnakiotis, whose traditional armatolos loğic to that of Karaiskakis and Varnakiotis, whose priorities had alsopriorities had also been focused more on asserting their regional military been focused more on assertinğ their reğional military and fiscal control than to offer their service to a new civilian authority, and fiscal control than to offer their service to a new civilian authority, particularly one that was seen alienparticularly one that was seen alien by themby them; Androutsos, entered into ; Androutsos, entered into secret negotiations with the secret neğotiations with the more familiar more familiar Ottoman auOttoman authorities. His pri-thorities. His pri-mary concern was mary concern was not not to lose his grasp on the districts that he had been to lose his ğrasp on the districts that he had been controlling into the hands of an appointee of the controllinğ into the hands of an appointee of the revolutionary revolutionary admin-admin-istration. This concern grew further when he failed to prevent the troops istration. This concern ğrew further when he failed to prevent the troops of Mehmet Paof Mehmet Pashsha, and Dramalı Mahmut a, and Dramalı Mahmut PPasha from advancing into Attica, asha from advancinğ into Attica, creating another possible opportunity for his rivals to intervene.creatinğ another possible opportunity for his rivals to intervene.93 In De-In De-cember 1822, Androutsos went into negotiations with Mehmet Paşa, of-cember 1822, Androutsos went into neğotiations with Mehmet Paşa, of-fering to abandon the Greek cause and entering Ottoman servferinğ to abandon the Greek cause and enterinğ Ottoman service again, ice ağain, in return for his appointment in return for his appointment asas armatolosarmatolos in the districts that he cap-in the districts that he cap-turedtured. In a dispatch sent to Celal Pasha, governor of Rumeli in December . In a dispatch sent to Celal Pasha, ğovernor of Rumeli in December
91 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 189, 189..
92 Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 346Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 346..
93 Ibid. 376Ibid. 376..
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1822, it is stated that as the price for his mercy, Androutsos also offered to
1822, it is stated that as the price for his mercy, Androutsos also offered to pay the jizya amount opay the jizya amount of two years in advance,f two years in advance, which gives a fair idea of which ğives a fair idea of how much revenue he had amassed in the past year as a rebel captain.how much revenue he had amassed in the past year as a rebel captain.94
It is unclear whether Androutsos really attempted to abandon the
It is unclear whether Androutsos really attempted to abandon the Greek cause altogether. His claim was that he was merely trying to sGreek cause altoğether. His claim was that he was merely tryinğ to stall tall the Turkish advance led by Mehmet Pashathe Turkish advance led by Mehmet Pasha to create time for civilians to to create time for civilians to leave the region.leave the reğion.95 Like in the case of Karaiskakis, Androutsos’ moves re-Like in the case of Karaiskakis, Androutsos’ moves re-flect the Rumeliot reflex of constantly keeping their options open; as ra-flect the Rumeliot reflex of constantly keepinğ their options open; as ra-ther than an allther than an all--in struggle in tin struğğle in the name of an abstract concept such as the he name of an abstract concept such as the Greek nation, it was survival within the traditional world of the Rumeliot Greek nation, it was survival within the traditional world of the Rumeliot captain that is built on personal relationships captain that is built on personal relationships whatwhat determined his moti-determined his moti-vation of political action. In George Finlay’s words, the ambitionvation of political action. In Georğe Finlay’s words, the ambition of An-of An-droutsos and other captains such as Bakolas and Varnakiotis was “to ape droutsos and other captains such as Bakolas and Varnakiotis was “to ape the tyranny of Ali the tyranny of Ali PPasha in a small sphere”.asha in a small sphere”.96 He eventually returned to He eventually returned to the Greek side. However, as a man of high military and administrative ca-the Greek side. However, as a man of hiğh military and administrative ca-pacity combined with little to nopacity combined with little to no trust at all, he was soon started to be trust at all, he was soon started to be sidelined and saw his former underlings to be promoted. sidelined and saw his former underlinğs to be promoted.
Ioannis Kolettis, another former Ali
Ioannis Kolettis, another former Ali PPasha man, and an increasingly asha man, and an increasinğly powerful minister in the government during the civil wars of 1823powerful minister in the ğovernment durinğ the civil wars of 1823--1825, 1825, had a had a particular interest in eliminating Androutsos and becoming the un-particular interest in eliminatinğ Androutsos and becominğ the un-disputed patron of the Rumeliot palikars. In fact, it is believed by contem-disputed patron of the Rumeliot palikars. In fact, it is believed by contem-poraries like Makrygiannis and Finlay that it was part of Kolettis’ plan all poraries like Makryğiannis and Finlay that it was part of Kolettis’ plan all along to send Palaskas and Noutsos, hisalonğ to send Palaskas and Noutsos, his other two potential political ri-other two potential political ri-vals, against Androutsos, knowing well how the latter would eliminate vals, ağainst Androutsos, knowinğ well how the latter would eliminate them, and create a justification for his own downfall along with itthem, and create a justification for his own downfall alonğ with it, while, while eventually reducing the competition for the leadership of a Rumeliot fac-eventually reducinğ the competition for the leadership of a Rumeliot fac-tion stion significantly in favor of Kolettis.iğnificantly in favor of Kolettis. The political plot here is noteworthy The political plot here is noteworthy due to the fact that all of the people involved had been former Ali Pasha due to the fact that all of the people involved had been former Ali Pasha
94 B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 577, 185. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 577, 185. Cited in Ilıcak, Those infidel GreeksThose infidel Greeks, 489, 489..
95 Ilıcak, Ilıcak, Those infidel GreeksThose infidel Greeks, 1653, 1653--16541654..
96 George FinlayGeorğe Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2, History of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2 (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and (Edinburğh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), Sons, 1861), 9292--9393..
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protégés and viewed each other as rivals.
prote ğe s and viewed each other as rivals.97 While doing that, Kolettis was While doinğ that, Kolettis was also using the funds that were entalso usinğ the funds that were entrusted to him in aiding other Rumeliot rusted to him in aidinğ other Rumeliot fighters, creating strong bonds with younger Rumeliots like Velentzas fiğhters, creatinğ stronğ bonds with younğer Rumeliots like Velentzas and Gouras.and Gouras.
In 1825, Androutsos contacted Ömer Vrioni and once again asked
In 1825, Androutsos contacted O mer Vrioni and once ağain asked for amnesty to switch sides,for amnesty to switch sides, fearing that Kolettis’ increasing influencefearinğ that Kolettis’ increasinğ influence would soon be directed against him.would soon be directed ağainst him.98 The Ottoman governor of Rumeli, The Ottoman ğovernor of Rumeli, Reşid Mehmet Pasha (Kütahi) accepted Androutsos’ request,Reşid Mehmet Pasha (Ku tahi) accepted Androutsos’ request,99 partly partly with the motivation to capitalize as much as he can from the civil strife with the motivation to capitalize as much as he can from the civil strife the Greeks were experiencing at the time. Hothe Greeks were experiencinğ at the time. However, the firm impression wever, the firm impression of Androutsos’ untrustworthiness did not change in the eyes of the Otto-of Androutsos’ untrustworthiness did not chanğe in the eyes of the Otto-man authoritiesman authorities,, either.either.100 Androutsos’ gains from his constant tricks of Androutsos’ ğains from his constant tricks of playing one side against the other had come to an end, and even though playinğ one side ağainst the other had come to an end, and even thouğh his request fohis request for amnesty was accepted, he did not gain this time as much r amnesty was accepted, he did not ğain this time as much as he hoped. as he hoped. His dream of becoming the next Ali PashaHis dream of becominğ the next Ali Pasha hadhad failed. failed. Ko-Ko-lettis, pleased with Androutsos presenting him with the opportunity, sent lettis, pleased with Androutsos presentinğ him with the opportunity, sent a force led by Androutsos’ former subordinate, Ioannis Ga force led by Androutsos’ former subordinate, Ioannis Gouras, of whom ouras, of whom Androutsos was also the best man in his wedding, to take over Attica and Androutsos was also the best man in his weddinğ, to take over Attica and capture Androutsos. Left without aid from Kütahi Pasha, Androutsos was capture Androutsos. Left without aid from Ku tahi Pasha, Androutsos was captured and executed by Gourascaptured and executed by Gouras..101 TThus, Kolettis eliminated another hus, Kolettis eliminated another rival, and strengthened his rival, and strenğthened his political influence in eastern Rumelipolitical influence in eastern Rumeli
§
§ 3.33.3 The RumeliotThe Rumeliot--Peloponnesian Conflict and the Civil Wars Peloponnesian Conflict and the Civil Wars of 1823of 1823--18251825
In December 1821, after the first initial military successes against the
In December 1821, after the first initial military successes ağainst the Ottoman troops in both Rumeli and the Peloponnese, regional leaders Ottoman troops in both Rumeli and the Peloponnese, reğional leaders
97 Lidderdale, ed. Lidderdale, ed. The MemThe Memoirs of General Makriyannisoirs of General Makriyannis, 61; Finlay, , 61; Finlay, History of the Greek Rev-History of the Greek Rev-olutionolution, , Vol.2Vol.2.. 9393..
98 B.O.A. BEO .AYN. 580, 100. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO .AYN. 580, 100. Cited in Ilıcak, Those infidel GreeksThose infidel Greeks, 797, , 797,
99 Ilıcak, Ilıcak, Those infidel GreeksThose infidel Greeks,, 16501650..
100 B.O.A. BEO .AYN 580, 100. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO .AYN 580, 100. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 797, 797..
101 Dimitrios Papastamatiou, “Military Leaders,” in Dimitrios Papastamatiou, “Military Leaders,” in The Greek Revolution: A Critical Diction-The Greek Revolution: A Critical Diction-aryary, 404, 404..
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from all
from all over insurgent Greece came together in Epidaurus. The meeting over insurğent Greece came toğether in Epidaurus. The meetinğ was first decided to be held in Tripolitsawas first decided to be held in Tripolitsa. Yet,. Yet, because of the plague that because of the plağue that was caused due to the massacres after the insurgents entered the city,was caused due to the massacres after the insurğents entered the city, Epidaurus became the place where the first natiEpidaurus became the place where the first national assembly was onal assembly was held.held.102 The first national assembly established Mavrokordatos as the The first national assembly established Mavrokordatos as the head of the executive, and Kolokotronis as the commander in chief, side-head of the executive, and Kolokotronis as the commander in chief, side-lining Ypsilantis to an insignificant post as lininğ Ypsilantis to an insiğnificant post as the the head of the legislative.head of the leğislative.103 However, the first naHowever, the first national assembly did not have a very long lasting and tional assembly did not have a very lonğ lastinğ and binding impact, bindinğ impact, becausebecause after its conclusion, everybody immediately re-after its conclusion, everybody immediately re-turned to their respective regions to continue the fighting. Mavro-turned to their respective reğions to continue the fiğhtinğ. Mavro-kordatos for example, despite his post not requiring doing so, wentkordatos for example, despite his post not requirinğ doinğ so, went back back to western Rumeli to assume military leadership of the defenders during to western Rumeli to assume military leadership of the defenders durinğ the first siege of Missolonghi. He knew that in practice, the office of the the first sieğe of Missolonğhi. He knew that in practice, the office of the executive was not giving him any executive was not ğivinğ him any real real authority, but it was his firm grasp authority, but it was his firm ğrasp on the military networks thon the military networks that he established in western Rumeli that gave at he established in western Rumeli that ğave him the capacity to influence revolutionary politics.him the capacity to influence revolutionary politics.
In December 1822, the second national assembly was held in Astros. It
In December 1822, the second national assembly was held in Astros. It is the developments that followed this assembly that led to the divide be-is the developments that followed this assembly that led to the divide be-tween severaltween several political factions and personal followings, which domi-political factions and personal followinğs, which domi-nated the remainder of the war, perhaps even the first decade of inde-nated the remainder of the war, perhaps even the first decade of inde-pendent Greece. The civilian leaders of the revolution and the military pendent Greece. The civilian leaders of the revolution and the military party led by Kolokotronis came into a conflict. Suspicious oparty led by Kolokotronis came into a conflict. Suspicious of Kolokotronis f Kolokotronis and his following of a military class consisting of Peloponnesian peasant and his followinğ of a military class consistinğ of Peloponnesian peasant soldiers and bandits’ increasing influence on the Peloponnese at the ex-soldiers and bandits’ increasinğ influence on the Peloponnese at the ex-pense of the central government, the civilian party led by Mavrokordatos pense of the central ğovernment, the civilian party led by Mavrokordatos and other Peloponnesianand other Peloponnesian primates, mainly Zaimis and Londos, rivals of primates, mainly Zaimis and Londos, rivals of Kolokotronis’ primate ally Deligiannis, tried to curb his military strength Kolokotronis’ primate ally Deliğiannis, tried to curb his military strenğth by offering him the civilian office of videby offerinğ him the civilian office of vide--presidency. As an attempt to fur-presidency. As an attempt to fur-ther strengthen civilian central authority, the office ofther strenğthen civilian central authority, the office of supreme military supreme military commander that was held by Kolokotronis was abolished by the legisla-commander that was held by Kolokotronis was abolished by the leğisla-tive in April 1823. This led to Kolokotronis openly defying the assembly. tive in April 1823. This led to Kolokotronis openly defyinğ the assembly.
102 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.1. 294, Vol.1. 294..
103 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics aPolitics and Statecraftnd Statecraft, 83, 83..
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He captured the members of the new executive. Zaimis, one of the cap-
He captured the members of the new executive. Zaimis, one of the cap-tured members of the executitured members of the executive escaped and joined the civilian camp.ve escaped and joined the civilian camp.
The insurgents had now two rival governments. One was dominated
The insurğents had now two rival ğovernments. One was dominated by the Peloponnesian military class led by Kolokotronis and his allies by the Peloponnesian military class led by Kolokotronis and his allies such as Petrobey Mavromichalis, Kanellos Deligiannissuch as Petrobey Mavromichalis, Kanellos Deliğiannis and and Andreas Met-Andreas Met-axasaxas..104 The The other government was comprised of heterochthon civilians, other ğovernment was comprised of heterochthon civilians, Rumeliots, rival Peloponnesian primates, and the primates of the islands. Rumeliots, rival Peloponnesian primates, and the primates of the islands. Since this government had fled and took refuge on the islands, it saw the Since this ğovernment had fled and took refuğe on the islands, it saw the rise of islander primates to key officesrise of islander primates to key offices,, such as such as Georgios Koundouriotis Georğios Koundouriotis who became the president.who became the president.105 The real rising star thanks to this conflict The real risinğ star thanks to this conflict however was Ioannis Kolettis. In 1822 he had become minister of interior however was Ioannis Kolettis. In 1822 he had become minister of interior and thus gained a strong foothold on the national political arena. Through and thus ğained a stronğ foothold on the national political arena. Throuğh this office he was able to strengthen his profile as patron ofthis office he was able to strenğthen his profile as patron of Rumeliots Rumeliots with more concrete means, such as financing Rumeliot captains with nec-with more concrete means, such as financinğ Rumeliot captains with nec-essary fundsessary funds..
Actual fighting between the two camps did not break out until late
Actual fiğhtinğ between the two camps did not break out until late 1823 when the season of Ottoman offensives was over. This first stage of 1823 when the season of Ottoman offensives was over. This first stağe of the military conflictthe military conflict amongamonğ the Greek insurgents did not last very long. the Greek insurğents did not last very lonğ. After a few minor battles between Kolokotronis’ men and the Rumeliots After a few minor battles between Kolokotronis’ men and the Rumeliots who were brought by Kolettis, Kolokotronis gave up and surrendered who were brouğht by Kolettis, Kolokotronis ğave up and surrendered Nafplion to the government in Kranidi. This rather quick victory waNafplion to the ğovernment in Kranidi. This rather quick victory was s partly partly the result of the news of the arrival of the English loans that were the result of the news of the arrival of the Enğlish loans that were ensured by the Philhellenes in London.ensured by the Philhellenes in London.106 The fact that Mavrokordatos The fact that Mavrokordatos was the choice as the recipient of the money made all the difference, and was the choice as the recipient of the money made all the difference, and the prospect of having a share of tthe prospect of havinğ a share of this money gave the Peloponnesians led his money ğave the Peloponnesians led by Kolokotronis the reason for a truce.by Kolokotronis the reason for a truce.107 Zaimis and Londos acted as me-Zaimis and Londos acted as me-diators between the two camps, trying to rediators between the two camps, tryinğ to re--establish themselves in their establish themselves in their regional stronghold, the Peloponnese.reğional stronğhold, the Peloponnese.108
104 An ancestor of Ioannis Metaxas, the dictator that ruled Greece between 1936An ancestor of Ioannis Metaxas, the dictator that ruled Greece between 1936--19411941..
105 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 85, 85..
106 Dimitris Livanios, “Civillian Leaders and the Beginnings of the Modern State,” in Dimitris Livanios, “Civillian Leaders and the Beğinninğs of the Modern State,” in The The Greek RevolutioGreek Revolution: A Critical Dictionaryn: A Critical Dictionary, 360, 360..
107 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 86, 86..
108 IbidIbid.. 8787..
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Another man who saw his fortunes
Another man who saw his fortunes change to the positive during the chanğe to the positive durinğ the civil wars was Ioannis Velentzas. Kolettis capitalized on his ability to di-civil wars was Ioannis Velentzas. Kolettis capitalized on his ability to di-rect the violence of Rumeliots towards the Peloponnese. Velentzas bene-rect the violence of Rumeliots towards the Peloponnese. Velentzas bene-fited by participating in the invasion of the Peloponnese, through which fited by participatinğ in the invasion of the Peloponnese, throuğh which he ghe ğained the recognition of men like Makrygiannis, who talks about Ve-ained the recoğnition of men like Makryğiannis, who talks about Ve-lentzas in his memoirs in very high regard. At the time, Velentzas was still lentzas in his memoirs in very hiğh reğard. At the time, Velentzas was still withwith Tzamis Karatasos’ band.Tzamis Karatasos’ band.109 Through Makrygiannis, Karatasos and Throuğh Makryğiannis, Karatasos and Velentzas becVelentzas becaame an acquaintance and client ofme an acquaintance and client of Kolettis.Kolettis.110 This relation-This relation-ship with Kolettis allowed them, like other numerous captains from Ru-ship with Kolettis allowed them, like other numerous captains from Ru-meli to exploit the internal conflict and invade the Peloponnese in the fol-meli to exploit the internal conflict and invade the Peloponnese in the fol-lowing second civil war.lowinğ second civil war.
The brief period that followed the truce saw Zaimis and Londo
The brief period that followed the truce saw Zaimis and Londos’ alle-s’ alle-giances further gravitate towards the Peloponnese. Being powerful pri-ğiances further ğravitate towards the Peloponnese. Beinğ powerful pri-mates of the Peloponnese, they had no real power in the civilian faction mates of the Peloponnese, they had no real power in the civilian faction due to being away from their strongholds. Moreover, the domination by due to beinğ away from their stronğholds. Moreover, the domination by Rumeliots and islanders in the governRumeliots and islanders in the ğovernment, the explicit nepotism that ment, the explicit nepotism that Kolettis was showing towards Rumeliots,Kolettis was showinğ towards Rumeliots,111 and Zaimis being removed and Zaimis beinğ removed from office that further displayed his subordinate role in the eyes of the from office that further displayed his subordinate role in the eyes of the RumeliotRumeliot--Island faction, led Zaimis and Londos Island faction, led Zaimis and Londos to to join the Peloponnesian join the Peloponnesian camp. It was earlier mentioned that Peloponnesian particularism was camp. It was earlier mentioned that Peloponnesian particularism was strong, and wistronğ, and with the creation of a unified Peloponnesian faction, Koloko-th the creation of a unified Peloponnesian faction, Koloko-tronis once again revolted against the government with much stronger tronis once ağain revolted ağainst the ğovernment with much stronğer support from the entire peninsula. The second civil war started in the fall support from the entire peninsula. The second civil war started in the fall of 1824. It was partly the result of the military parof 1824. It was partly the result of the military party in the Peloponnese ty in the Peloponnese led by Kolokotronis trying to capitalize on their military successes with led by Kolokotronis tryinğ to capitalize on their military successes with political rewards. But also, according to one Ottoman report, it was due political rewards. But also, accordinğ to one Ottoman report, it was due to the conflict on the distribution of the English loanto the conflict on the distribution of the Enğlish loan..112 The moneyThe money was was distributed bydistributed by the governments nepotism toward Rumeliots with the im-the ğovernments nepotism toward Rumeliots with the im-pact of Kolettis. The inclusion of the primates in the Peloponnesian camp pact of Kolettis. The inclusion of the primates in the Peloponnesian camp
109 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 44, 44..
110 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 94, 94..
111 Dimitris Livanios, “Dimitris Livanios, “CivilianCivilian Leaders and the Beginnings of the Modern State,” in Leaders and the Beğinninğs of the Modern State,” in The The Greek Revolution: A Critical DictionaryGreek Revolution: A Critical Dictionary, 360, 360..
112 B.O.A. HAT 938, 40529 [29 Zilhicce 1242 (24 July 1827)]B.O.A. HAT 938, 40529 [29 Zilhicce 1242 (24 July 1827)]..
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despite their class antagonism was the consequent result of the govern-
despite their class antağonism was the consequent result of the ğovern-ment’s attempts to completely subjugate the Peloponnese wiment’s attempts to completely subjuğate the Peloponnese with the use of th the use of Kolettis’ Rumeliot chieftains. The military nature of the conflict made Ko-Kolettis’ Rumeliot chieftains. The military nature of the conflict made Ko-lokotronis the natural leader of the Peloponnesian faction. It is also in the lokotronis the natural leader of the Peloponnesian faction. It is also in the Ottoman report that was sent to Ömer Ottoman report that was sent to O mer PPasha in Euboea, which explicitly asha in Euboea, which explicitly namenamedd Kolokotronis Kolokotronis and his allies from Karytaina as the leaders of the and his allies from Karytaina as the leaders of the rebellious faction. It states unsettled issues (probably referring to the dis-rebellious faction. It states unsettled issues (probably referrinğ to the dis-tribution of the English loan) and leadership disputes as the reason of tribution of the Enğlish loan) and leadership disputes as the reason of this conflict and expresses the hope that this civil stthis conflict and expresses the hope that this civil strife brings the end to rife brinğs the end to their rebelliontheir rebellion..113 Kolokotronis used the undisputed leadership of the Kolokotronis used the undisputed leadership of the Peloponnesian faction given to him thanks to his military talents and cap-Peloponnesian faction ğiven to him thanks to his military talents and cap-italized on it by increasingly becoming the sole political leader and creat-italized on it by increasinğly becominğ the sole political leader and creat-ing a strong poinğ a stronğ political following. The Peloponnesian alliance between for-litical followinğ. The Peloponnesian alliance between for-mer bandits, peasants and primates led by Kolokotronis would become mer bandits, peasants and primates led by Kolokotronis would become the nucleus of the future Russian party.the nucleus of the future Russian party.114
In the second civil war (1824
In the second civil war (1824--1825), the Peloponnese saw an over-1825), the Peloponnese saw an over-whelming Rumeliot invasiwhelminğ Rumeliot invasion led by Kolettis. In on led by Kolettis. In the course of sixthe course of six weeks, weeks, the whole peninsula was destroyed. Kolokotronis and Deligiannis impris-the whole peninsula was destroyed. Kolokotronis and Deliğiannis impris-oned, and the estates of Zaimis and Londos plundered and destroyed by oned, and the estates of Zaimis and Londos plundered and destroyed by the troops of Karaiskakis.the troops of Karaiskakis.115 Kolettis was joined by almost every majKolettis was joined by almost every major or military leader from Rumeli such as Karaiskakis, Tzavelasmilitary leader from Rumeli such as Karaiskakis, Tzavelas,,116 Karatasos, Karatasos, and Makrygiannis,and Makryğiannis,117 most of whom did not pass on the opportunity to most of whom did not pass on the opportunity to raid the Peloponnese and further enrich themselves, but also to prove raid the Peloponnese and further enrich themselves, but also to prove their allegiance to Kolettis, who was in ththeir alleğiance to Kolettis, who was in the unique position to distribute e unique position to distribute funds to literally whomever he pleased. There is almost no Rumeliot funds to literally whomever he pleased. There is almost no Rumeliot chieftain who did not ask Kolettis for financial help during this period.chieftain who did not ask Kolettis for financial help durinğ this period.118 Kolettis used public office to create a loyal following and dissociate the Kolettis used public office to create a loyal followinğ and dissociate the
113 B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 580, 7. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 580, 7. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 780, 780..
114 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, PoPolitics and Statecraftlitics and Statecraft, 105, 105..
115 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 56, 56..
116 “Tzavelas and Karaiskakis to Kolettis” AA 67220 (14 April 1825)“Tzavelas and Karaiskakis to Kolettis” AA 67220 (14 April 1825)..
117 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 56, 56..
118 “Vasos Mavrvouniotis to Kolettis” AA “Vasos Mavrvouniotis to Kolettis” AA 67152 (21 June 1825); “Markos Botsaris to Kolettis” 67152 (21 June 1825); “Markos Botsaris to Kolettis” AA 67217 (14 April 1825); “Makrygiannis to Kolettis” AA 74039 (4 April 1826)AA 67217 (14 April 1825); “Makryğiannis to Kolettis” AA 74039 (4 April 1826)..
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men h
men he harbored from his rivals in eastern Rumeli. It was this period e harbored from his rivals in eastern Rumeli. It was this period when he convinced Gouras to eliminate his former chief Androutsos in when he convinced Gouras to eliminate his former chief Androutsos in Attica, which was mentioned earlier. On top of these developments, the Attica, which was mentioned earlier. On top of these developments, the second civil war gave Kolettis the unique opportunisecond civil war ğave Kolettis the unique opportunity to further capital-ty to further capital-ize on his position of patron of Rumeliots by commanding them to fight ize on his position of patron of Rumeliots by commandinğ them to fiğht the Peloponnesians thus giving them the opportunity to gain booty from the Peloponnesians thus ğivinğ them the opportunity to ğain booty from Peloponnesian primate estates.Peloponnesian primate estates.
As a former Ali
As a former Ali PPasha asha protégéprote ğe , Kolettis using Rumeliot captain, Kolettis usinğ Rumeliot captains, most s, most of whom were former armatoles or bof whom were former armatoles or banditsandits to fight an internal conflict, to fiğht an internal conflict, significantly resembles Ali siğnificantly resembles Ali PPasha using the Rumeliot asha usinğ the Rumeliot eşkiyaeşkiya during the durinğ the siege of Vidin when the Porte had attacked Pasvanoğlu, and asked Ali sieğe of Vidin when the Porte had attacked Pasvanoğ lu, and asked Ali PPa-a-sha for reinforcement.sha for reinforcement.119 It is thiIt is this familiar role of a political office holder s familiar role of a political office holder giving the irregular military element of Rumeli opportunity to fight and ğivinğ the irreğular military element of Rumeli opportunity to fiğht and plunder with impunity that further strengthened Kolettis’ position as plunder with impunity that further strenğthened Kolettis’ position as head of a Rumeliot faction during the civil wars. The civil wars werhead of a Rumeliot faction durinğ the civil wars. The civil wars were the e the result of factional conflictsresult of factional conflicts;; howeverhowever,, the consequences of these the consequences of these confron-confron-tations alsotations also made sure that this factional divide became even sharper. An-made sure that this factional divide became even sharper. An-other noteworthy aspect is the fact that at this stage of the war of inde-other noteworthy aspect is the fact that at this stağe of the war of inde-pendence, regional particularispendence, reğional particularism was still so strong that it could lead to m was still so stronğ that it could lead to an invasion of such a devastating magnitude, almost like a war against a an invasion of such a devastatinğ mağnitude, almost like a war ağainst a completely alien entity. The factional fight between Greeks and the de-completely alien entity. The factional fiğht between Greeks and the de-struction of the Peloponnese, would make it much easier for the troopstruction of the Peloponnese, would make it much easier for the troops s of Ibrahim of Ibrahim PPasha of Egypt to defeat the Greek insurgent the next yearasha of Eğypt to defeat the Greek insurğent the next year af-af-ter Sultan Mahmud asked his governor of Egypt Mehmet Ali for reinforce-ter Sultan Mahmud asked his ğovernor of Eğypt Mehmet Ali for reinforce-ments.ments.120
Like Kolettis,
Like Kolettis, albeit albeit to a lesser degreeto a lesser değree,, Velentzas has Velentzas has also also made his made his bones thanks to the factional strife that led to the civil wars, but also bones thanks to the factional strife that led to the civil wars, but also due due toto the fight against the Egyptians that the fiğht ağainst the Eğyptians that unfoldedunfolded that episode. In 1824, Ve-that episode. In 1824, Ve-lentzas was stationed in Attica, lentzas was stationed in Attica, still withstill with Tzamis Karatasos. They were Tzamis Karatasos. They were soon convinced to join soon convinced to join Kolettis’ Rumeliot army and headed to the Pelo-Kolettis’ Rumeliot army and headed to the Pelo-ponnese and joined the exploits that took place there. Velentzas became ponnese and joined the exploits that took place there. Velentzas became
119 Esmer, Esmer, A Culture of RebellionA Culture of Rebellion, 107, 107..
120 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2. 37, Vol.2. 37..
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a mainstay in Kolettis’ network and became more and more dependent
a mainstay in Kolettis’ network and became more and more dependent like other captains of his caliber on Kolettis holding office. This beclike other captains of his caliber on Kolettis holdinğ office. This became ame much more apparent when the fighting stopped after 1827, and the pro-much more apparent when the fiğhtinğ stopped after 1827, and the pro-spects of acquiring material gains through plunder significantly de-spects of acquirinğ material ğains throuğh plunder siğnificantly de-creased. Therefore, it is at a later stage of the war that Velentzas became creased. Therefore, it is at a later stağe of the war that Velentzas became a completely devout Kolettis loyalista completely devout Kolettis loyalist, du, due to his need of patronagee to his need of patronağe. After . After the civil war ended, with the Egyptian invasion, another major episode in the civil war ended, with the Eğyptian invasion, another major episode in the Greek war of independence began that temporarily led to peace the Greek war of independence beğan that temporarily led to peace among the factions and enabled them to focus on their common goal.amonğ the factions and enabled them to focus on their common ğoal. Af-Af-ter the Egyptter the Eğyptian invasion started, iian invasion started, in a letter addressed to n a letter addressed to the Rumeliot the Rumeliot Karaiskakis, Karaiskakis, the Peloponnesian primate the Peloponnesian primate Zaimis assures him that he is on Zaimis assures him that he is on his way to the Peloponnese to join the fight, stating that their old differ-his way to the Peloponnese to join the fiğht, statinğ that their old differ-ences belong to the past.ences belonğ to the past.121
§
§ 3.43.4 The Egyptian InvasThe Eğyptian Invasion and the Internationalization of the ion and the Internationalization of the Greek CrisisGreek Crisis
In February 1825, the Egyptian troops of Ibrahim
In February 1825, the Eğyptian troops of Ibrahim PPasha started to in-asha started to in-vade the Peloponnese. With the addition of another Ottoman advance vade the Peloponnese. With the addition of another Ottoman advance from the north, from the north, which pulledwhich pulled the majority of the Rumeliot army to ththe majority of the Rumeliot army to the e northern frontier, the northern frontier, the Greek Greek government was left unable to fight on two ğovernment was left unable to fiğht on two fronts. On top of that, Peloponnesian soldiers refused to be commanded fronts. On top of that, Peloponnesian soldiers refused to be commanded by Rumeliot commanders by Rumeliot commanders whom theywhom they regarded alien.reğarded alien.122 Therefore, the Therefore, the government released Kolokotronis and the otheğovernment released Kolokotronis and the other Peloponnesian captains r Peloponnesian captains because their military experience was strongly needed against their for-because their military experience was stronğly needed ağainst their for-midable Egyptian foes. The joint Ottomanmidable Eğyptian foes. The joint Ottoman--Egyptian attack led also to a Eğyptian attack led also to a cool down in the animosities among the Greeks because everybody cool down in the animosities amonğ the Greeks because everybody rushed back to their homerushed back to their home regions for defense. The offensive began from reğions for defense. The offensive beğan from multiple direction and included the siege of Missolonghi, the siege of Ath-multiple direction and included the sieğe of Missolonğhi, the sieğe of Ath-ens, and the Egyptian invasion of the Peloponnese. ens, and the Eğyptian invasion of the Peloponnese.
121 “Zaimis and Londos to “Zaimis and Londos to Karaiskakis and Tzavelas” AA 67239 (20 April 1825)Karaiskakis and Tzavelas” AA 67239 (20 April 1825)..
122 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 300, 300..
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Ibrahim
Ibrahim PPasha’s Egyptian army set foot on the Peloponnese near Nav-asha’s Eğyptian army set foot on the Peloponnese near Nav-arino, and partlyarino, and partly thanks to the exhaustion among the Greeks due to their thanks to the exhaustion amonğ the Greeks due to their civil strife, easily captured the town with only the first five thousand sol-civil strife, easily captured the town with only the first five thousand sol-diers that he brought over from Crete.diers that he brouğht over from Crete.123 Velentzas was near Navarino Velentzas was near Navarino when the Egyptian invasion began in 1825.when the Eğyptian invasion beğan in 1825.124 The EgyptiaThe Eğyptian forces had n forces had overwhelmed the united Peloponnesian troops consisting of Koloko-overwhelmed the united Peloponnesian troops consistinğ of Koloko-tronis, Zaimis, Deligiannis and Lontos, and in a letter addressed to the tronis, Zaimis, Deliğiannis and Lontos, and in a letter addressed to the other leaders in which he gave account of the battles, Kolokotronis men-other leaders in which he ğave account of the battles, Kolokotronis men-tioned that he requested the help otioned that he requested the help of Rumeliots such as Karatasos, and f Rumeliots such as Karatasos, and despite not mentioned, it is highly likely that Velentzas was among the despite not mentioned, it is hiğhly likely that Velentzas was amonğ the men who accepted to join the Peloponnesian defense with this re-men who accepted to join the Peloponnesian defense with this re-quest.quest.125 Together with MakrygiannisToğether with Makryğiannis,, he organized the defense of Ne-he orğanized the defense of Ne-okastron and becameokastron and became a close friend with the latter. They resisted Ibrahim a close friend with the latter. They resisted Ibrahim PPasha’s army asha’s army upup until they ran out of water and ammunition. Without aid until they ran out of water and ammunition. Without aid from the government, they surrendered the fort and made a pact with from the ğovernment, they surrendered the fort and made a pact with Ibrahim Ibrahim PPasha, who let them leave on an English ship and sailasha, who let them leave on an Enğlish ship and sail to Kala-to Kala-mata.mata.126 Ibrahim Ibrahim PPasha himself went on to sail to Patrasasha himself went on to sail to Patras in order toin order to make make preparations to aid the siege of Misolonghi.preparations to aid the sieğe of Misolonğhi.127
Velentzas’ destination after he left Neokastron is not documented
Velentzas’ destination after he left Neokastron is not documented. . However, iHowever, it is plausible that he went along with Makrygiannit is plausible that he went alonğ with Makryğiannis to Attica s to Attica and joined the defense there. Velentzas’ presence there is likely because and joined the defense there. Velentzas’ presence there is likely because almost every other major captain of eastern Rumeli was there such as almost every other major captain of eastern Rumeli was there such as Karaiskakis, Gouras, Makrygiannis, and Karatasos. A year later Velentzas Karaiskakis, Gouras, Makryğiannis, and Karatasos. A year later Velentzas addressed Kolettis in a lettaddressed Kolettis in a letter asking for er askinğ for financial aid.financial aid.128 The reason wasThe reason was the hope of defending Attica and preventing Mehmet Reşit (Kütahi) the hope of defendinğ Attica and preventinğ Mehmet Reşit (Ku tahi) PPasha asha and Ömer Vrioni from passing through the region and entering the Pelo-and O mer Vrioni from passinğ throuğh the reğion and enterinğ the Pelo-ponneseponnese andand combining their forces with Ibrahim. Almost all Rumeli wacombininğ their forces with Ibrahim. Almost all Rumeli was s recaptured by the Ottomans and some captains like Rangos and Iskos recaptured by the Ottomans and some captains like Ranğos and Iskos
123 B.O.A. BEO.AYN.580, 117. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO.AYN.580, 117. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 801, 801..
124 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 75, 75..
125 B.O.A. HAT 893, 39418 [20 B.O.A. HAT 893, 39418 [20 Zilhicce 1240 (3 August 1825)]Zilhicce 1240 (3 Auğust 1825)]..
126 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 80, 80..
127 B.O.A. BEO. AYN.580, 110. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO. AYN.580, 110. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 800, 800..
128 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 71482 (8 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 71482 (8 ΑΑpril 1827)pril 1827)..
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switched to the Ottoman side
switched to the Ottoman side,, allured with theallured with the promises of promises of taxtax--farming farminğ contractscontracts..129
The collapse of the entire insurgence at this point was becoming more
The collapse of the entire insurğence at this point was becominğ more and more likely. It is at and more likely. It is at this point when the Egyptian troops enabled the this point when the Eğyptian troops enabled the Porte to turn the tide, the governments of the European powers became Porte to turn the tide, the ğovernments of the European powers became more involved in what they called the Greek question. Themore involved in what they called the Greek question. Theirir involvement involvement completely changed the course of the Greek crisis and guaranteed tcompletely chanğed the course of the Greek crisis and ğuaranteed the lib-he lib-eration of Greece. In order to frame the relationship between Greek poli-eration of Greece. In order to frame the relationship between Greek poli-ticians and the three guarantor powers in the following pages, we shall ticians and the three ğuarantor powers in the followinğ pağes, we shall briefly remember the course of events that established the Greek crisis briefly remember the course of events that established the Greek crisis as a European matter involving mulas a European matter involvinğ multiple powers. tiple powers.
After it became obvious that the Concert of Europe’s expectation from
After it became obvious that the Concert of Europe’s expectation from the Ottoman Empire to crush the rebellion in the Peloponnese would not the Ottoman Empire to crush the rebellion in the Peloponnese would not bear fruit, the attitude towards the Greek crisis slowly changed. For Brit-bear fruit, the attitude towards the Greek crisis slowly chanğed. For Brit-ain the involvement in theain the involvement in the crisis had several reasons. The Ionian islands crisis had several reasons. The Ionian islands had been under British suzerainty. Revolutionary sentiments had the po-had been under British suzerainty. Revolutionary sentiments had the po-tential to spread to their own dominionstential to spread to their own dominions, possibly with the objective to , possibly with the objective to join the Greeks from the mainlandjoin the Greeks from the mainland. Many Greek fighters were takin. Many Greek fiğhters were taking ref-ğ ref-uge in these islands to escape Ottoman reprisals, in particular during the uğe in these islands to escape Ottoman reprisals, in particular durinğ the first siege of Missolonghi in 1822, and the Ottoman victory in Peta that had first sieğe of Missolonğhi in 1822, and the Ottoman victory in Peta that had almost cost Botsaris his life, which resulted in the suppression of the re-almost cost Botsaris his life, which resulted in the suppression of the re-bellion in Soulibellion in Souli..130 In faIn fact it was these series of Ottoman advances that ct it was these series of Ottoman advances that had made Mavrokordatos decide to return to the region. had made Mavrokordatos decide to return to the reğion. AsAs a side note, it a side note, it can also be said that instances of interaction with Greek insurgents was can also be said that instances of interaction with Greek insurğents was also directed from the British controlled also directed from the British controlled IonianIonian islands to tislands to the Greek he Greek mainland. On a note sent to the Ottoman Grand admiral in January 1826, mainland. On a note sent to the Ottoman Grand admiral in January 1826, it is mentioned that a memorandum was sent to Stratford Canning com-it is mentioned that a memorandum was sent to Stratford Canninğ com-plaining about how the plaininğ about how the IonianIonian islands were used by the Greek fighters to islands were used by the Greek fiğhters to escape Ottoman authorities, but alsoescape Ottoman authorities, but also that financial aid from British mer-that financial aid from British mer-chants from the islands were sent to Mischants from the islands were sent to Misssolonghi.olonğhi.131
129 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution,, Vol.2. 153Vol.2. 153..
130 B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 576, 92. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 576, 92. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 391, 391--392392..
131 B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 582, 39. Cited in Ilıcak, B.O.A. BEO. AYN. 582, 39. Cited in Ilıcak, Those Infidel GreeksThose Infidel Greeks, 898, 898--899899..
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An additional reason for increasing British interest in the matter was
An additional reason for increasinğ British interest in the matter was the financthe financial ial boom in London after the end of the Napoleonic wars. Fi-boom in London after the end of the Napoleonic wars. Fi-nanciers in London were in snanciers in London were in search for new investments, which was also earch for new investments, which was also the reason for Britain’s relatively more positive policies to other revolu-the reason for Britain’s relatively more positive policies to other revolu-tions that had taken place in that period in Latin America and southern tions that had taken place in that period in Latin America and southern Europe that made Britain distance herself from the holy alliance.Europe that made Britain distance herself from the holy alliance.132 In In 1824, after the first civil war, the civilian Greek government had received 1824, after the first civil war, the civilian Greek ğovernment had received a loan from the London stock market, and this money was entrusted to a loan from the London stock market, and this money was entrusted to the hands of Mavrokordatos, whothe hands of Mavrokordatos, who,, with his Anglophile friend Spyridon with his Anğlophile friend Spyridon TrikoupisTrikoupis,, headed a political faction theaded a political faction that would later be labelled as the hat would later be labelled as the English party. This moneyEnğlish party. This money,, of courseof course,, was used by Kolettis to fund the Ru-was used by Kolettis to fund the Ru-meliot troops during the civil wars. The danger of Ibrahim meliot troops durinğ the civil wars. The danğer of Ibrahim PPasha crush-asha crush-ing the Greek revolution altogether and laying waste on the Peloponnese inğ the Greek revolution altoğether and layinğ waste on the Peloponnese was puwas putting the investments in jeopardy. The reports ttinğ the investments in jeopardy. The reports ooff rumors that Ib-rumors that Ib-rahim rahim PPasha had started a process of extermination in the Peloponnese asha had started a process of extermination in the Peloponnese and was taking civilian Greeks hostages to Egypt to be made slaves was and was takinğ civilian Greeks hostağes to Eğypt to be made slaves was further agitating the western publicfurther ağitatinğ the western public..133
Another re
Another reason of Britain’s increasing involvement in the Greek crisis ason of Britain’s increasinğ involvement in the Greek crisis was Russia’s position. When the uprisings began, the Russian govern-was Russia’s position. When the uprisinğs beğan, the Russian ğovern-ment headed by Tsar Alexander and his foreign ministers Nesselrode and ment headed by Tsar Alexander and his foreiğn ministers Nesselrode and Kapodistrias opposed an intervention on behalf of the GreKapodistrias opposed an intervention on behalf of the Greeks, emphasiz-eks, emphasiz-ing the necessity to preserve the conservative nature of the diplomatic inğ the necessity to preserve the conservative nature of the diplomatic structure created in 1815.structure created in 1815.134 The year 1825 marked a break from this The year 1825 marked a break from this stance. After the Egyptian invasion, Britain’s involvement required the stance. After the Eğyptian invasion, Britain’s involvement required the cooperation with Russia, their cooperation with Russia, their rival in the European diplomatic arena at rival in the European diplomatic arena at the time, to avoid a major disturbance that could threaten the balance of the time, to avoid a major disturbance that could threaten the balance of power in Europe. It was this competition through cooperation that would power in Europe. It was this competition throuğh cooperation that would be the predominant feature of Anglobe the predominant feature of Anğlo--Russian relations in the followiRussian relations in the following nğ years.years.135 It was also the government headed by George Canning’s aim to It was also the ğovernment headed by Georğe Canninğ’s aim to
132 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 262, 262..
133 “From Stratford Canning to “From Stratford Canninğ to George Canning” TNA. FO 800.231 p.27 (December 17, 1825)Georğe Canninğ” TNA. FO 800.231 p.27 (December 17, 1825)..
134 Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 35, 35..
135 Ozan Özavcı. Ozan O zavcı. Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798--18641864 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 92021), 9..
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prevent a potential unilateral Russian intervention. Russia quitting the
prevent a potential unilateral Russian intervention. Russia quittinğ the holy alliance and cooperating with Britain therefore became a prerequi-holy alliance and cooperatinğ with Britain therefore became a prerequi-site for British diplomacy.site for British diplomacy.136 With the dWith the death of Tsar Alexander in 1825 and eath of Tsar Alexander in 1825 and the succession of his brother Nicolas who was much more open to a pro-the succession of his brother Nicolas who was much more open to a pro-active policy towards the Greek issue and cooperation with his allies for active policy towards the Greek issue and cooperation with his allies for that end, the road was paved for bilateral Anglothat end, the road was paved for bilateral Anğlo--Russian action.Russian action.137
To establis
To establish the ground for a common action, the duke of Wellington h the ğround for a common action, the duke of Wellinğton was sent to St. Petersburg. On April 4was sent to St. Petersburğ. On April 4thth, 1826, the St. Petersburg Protocol , 1826, the St. Petersburğ Protocol was signed between the two powers. Twas siğned between the two powers. They hey agreed tağreed too act as mediatoract as mediatorss be-be-tween the Greeks and the Ottoman empire tween the Greeks and the Ottoman empire inin the pacificthe pacification of the ation of the LLe-e-vant, providing security for European commerce, and creating Greek au-vant, providinğ security for European commerce, and creatinğ Greek au-tonomy under Ottoman suzerainty.tonomy under Ottoman suzerainty.138 The other two members of the holy The other two members of the holy alliance, Austria and Prussia refused to be involved. Francealliance, Austria and Prussia refused to be involved. France,, however, ea-however, ea-gerly joined as a mediator in ğerly joined as a mediator in order to regain her position of a Great power, order to reğain her position of a Great power, and to check the dominant influence of Britain and Russia in European and to check the dominant influence of Britain and Russia in European affairs since their victory over Napoleonic France.affairs since their victory over Napoleonic France.139 With this triple col-With this triple col-laboration, the protocol transformed into the Treaty of London on July laboration, the protocol transformed into the Treaty of London on July 66thth, 1827, and the three powers offered their mediation for an armistice. , 1827, and the three powers offered their mediation for an armistice.
The Greek side immediately accepted the proposal as the military sit-
The Greek side immediately accepted the proposal as the military sit-uation was turning aguation was turninğ ağainst them after 1826. In fact, theainst them after 1826. In fact, the newnew Greek gov-Greek ğov-ernment headed by Zaimis had already made an appeal in 1826 to Strat-ernment headed by Zaimis had already made an appeal in 1826 to Strat-ford Canning, British ambassador to Istanbul for British mediation.ford Canninğ, British ambassador to Istanbul for British mediation.140 This actThis act,, however created an uproar due to the belief that this wouldhowever created an uproar due to the belief that this would po-po-tentially cause only the liberation of the Peloponnesetentially cause only the liberation of the Peloponnese,, as Rumeli at the as Rumeli at the time was practically completely recaptured by the Ottomans. The Porte’s time was practically completely recaptured by the Ottomans. The Porte’s refusal of the proposal led to a joint fleet made by the three powers sail-refusal of the proposal led to a joint fleet made by the three powers sail-ing to the Mediterranean to enforcinğ to the Mediterranean to enforce an armistice. The Egyptiane an armistice. The Eğyptian--Turkish Turkish fleet was hunted down in the bay of Navarino where the European fleet fleet was hunted down in the bay of Navarino where the European fleet for for unclear reasons unclear reasons destroyed the entire Egyptiandestroyed the entire Eğyptian--Turkish fleetTurkish fleet,, an event an event
136 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 406, 406..
137 Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 36, 36..
138 Özavcı. O zavcı. Dangerous GiftsDangerous Gifts, 124, 124..
139 Ibid. 125Ibid. 125..
140 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 354, 354..
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that
that changchanğeded the fortunes of the Greeks overnight. Ththe fortunes of the Greeks overniğht. These series of ese series of eventeventss aalso marked the starting point of the foreign powers’ increasing involve-lso marked the startinğ point of the foreiğn powers’ increasinğ involve-ment in the domestic politics of Greece, as the idea of a liberated Greece ment in the domestic politics of Greece, as the idea of a liberated Greece created the questions of how and by whom the country was going to be created the questions of how and by whom the country was ğoinğ to be governed. The future of Greece was now lağoverned. The future of Greece was now largely dependent on the poli-rğely dependent on the poli-cies of these three powers, and with the removal of the Ottoman military cies of these three powers, and with the removal of the Ottoman military threat, the factions in Greece and their military following saw the oppor-threat, the factions in Greece and their military followinğ saw the oppor-tunity for political survival in their association with one of these powers. tunity for political survival in their association with one of these powers.
§
§ 3.53.5 The The Emergence of Foreign Oriented FactionsEmerğence of Foreiğn Oriented Factions
Of course, the process that brought the Greek crisis and its agents into
Of course, the process that brouğht the Greek crisis and its ağents into the domain of European diplomacy was not unilaterally initiated by Eu-the domain of European diplomacy was not unilaterally initiated by Eu-ropean powersropean powers alonealone. The Greeks had been actively involved as well. . The Greeks had been actively involved as well. StartinStarting with his arrival in western Rumeli, Alexandros Mavrokordatos ğ with his arrival in western Rumeli, Alexandros Mavrokordatos had persistently tried to create a picture of Britain being a potential ally had persistently tried to create a picture of Britain beinğ a potential ally to Greece, both in Greece among his peers, but also by attempting to ap-to Greece, both in Greece amonğ his peers, but also by attemptinğ to ap-peal to British policy makers.peal to British policy makers.141 His policy oHis policy of creating a much more west-f creatinğ a much more west-ern oriented form of government could be interpreted in that direction ern oriented form of ğovernment could be interpreted in that direction as well, with the aim of giving an image of a modern and responsible gov-as well, with the aim of ğivinğ an imağe of a modern and responsible ğov-ernment that could be held accountable for potential financial aid. ernment that could be held accountable for potential financial aid. Mavrokordatos’ insMavrokordatos’ insistence on distancing the Greeks from Russia in favor istence on distancinğ the Greeks from Russia in favor of Britain made his faction a potential ally in the future for Angloof Britain made his faction a potential ally in the future for Anğlo--Greek Greek relations. Another reason for certain Greek politicians gravitating away relations. Another reason for certain Greek politicians ğravitatinğ away from Russia as a potential benefactor was Russia’s profrom Russia as a potential benefactor was Russia’s proposal in 1824 to di-posal in 1824 to di-vide Greece in three autonomous principalities.vide Greece in three autonomous principalities.142
Even though
Even thouğh the proposal for three autonomous principalities cre-the proposal for three autonomous principalities cre-atateded a distaste in the eyes of many towards Russia, Kolokotronis, and the a distaste in the eyes of many towards Russia, Kolokotronis, and the majority of the Peloponnese were Russophiles, anmajority of the Peloponnese were Russophiles, and the Peloponnese with d the Peloponnese with the leadership of Kolokotronis would become the stronghold of the the leadership of Kolokotronis would become the stronğhold of the
141 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft,, 4343..
142 Pericles S. Vallianos, “Historiographical Traditions and Debates,” in Pericles S. Vallianos, “Historioğraphical Traditions and Debates,” in The Greek Revolu-The Greek Revolu-tion: A Critical Dictionary,tion: A Critical Dictionary, 680680..
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future Russian party. One probable reason was their still highly particu-
future Russian party. One probable reason was their still hiğhly particu-laristic reflex of opposing the western oriented and Anglophile Mavro-laristic reflex of opposinğ the western oriented and Anğlophile Mavro-kordatos faction operatingkordatos faction operatinğ from western Rumeli. The combined Rumeliot from western Rumeli. The combined Rumeliot forces invading and pillaging the Peloponnese had a traumatic impact on forces invadinğ and pillağinğ the Peloponnese had a traumatic impact on the Peloponnesians, primate and peasant alike. The opposition to a fac-the Peloponnesians, primate and peasant alike. The opposition to a fac-tion that is believed to be backed by the English had an effect on tion that is believed to be backed by the Enğlish had an effect on manmanyy Peloponnesians being drawn to RussiaPeloponnesians beinğ drawn to Russia.. Another reason for the strength Another reason for the strenğth of proof pro--Russian attitude of the Peloponnesians was the strong impact of Russian attitude of the Peloponnesians was the stronğ impact of the Philiki Etairia that had created the idea of an Orthodox solidarity with the Philiki Etairia that had created the idea of an Orthodox solidarity with Russia and the expectation of a poteRussia and the expectation of a potential Russian aid in the fight against ntial Russian aid in the fiğht ağainst the Ottoman Empire. Despite Russia’s initial diplomatic distance towards the Ottoman Empire. Despite Russia’s initial diplomatic distance towards the Greek revolutionaries and the failed proposal for the autonomous the Greek revolutionaries and the failed proposal for the autonomous principalities. The period after the Navarino incident would initiate a pe-principalities. The period after the Navarino incident would initiate a pe-rriod of strong Russian influence in Greeceiod of stronğ Russian influence in Greece, with, with the former Russian for-the former Russian for-eign minister and Corfiot Kapodistrias eiğn minister and Corfiot Kapodistrias being elected Presidentbeinğ elected President of Greece, of Greece, who accepted the who accepted the postpost with with TTsar Nicholas’ approval.sar Nicholas’ approval.143
In addition to cultural and ideological concerns, and reg
In addition to cultural and ideoloğical concerns, and reğional power ional power struggles, personal rivalries had also played a role in the decisions of fac-struğğles, personal rivalries had also played a role in the decisions of fac-tions joining a particular party. Local competitors saw the necessity to tions joininğ a particular party. Local competitors saw the necessity to ally themselves with different parties. It should be noted that rivalries ally themselves with different parties. It should be noted that rivalries that were born beforethat were born before the war were frequently determining the political the war were frequently determininğ the political agenda of those allying themselves with a political party. For example, the ağenda of those allyinğ themselves with a political party. For example, the alliance between the Souliot Botsaris clan and Mavrokordatos was men-alliance between the Souliot Botsaris clan and Mavrokordatos was men-tioned in the first chapter. This was enough reason for Kitsotioned in the first chapter. This was enouğh reason for Kitsos Tzavelas, s Tzavelas, leader of another famous Souliot clanleader of another famous Souliot clan,, to join the Russian party. Both men to join the Russian party. Both men were commanding hundreds of armed Souliot men, which contributed to were commandinğ hundreds of armed Souliot men, which contributed to the military branch of these factions. the military branch of these factions. In tIn the he following years, anfollowinğ years, an ideologi-ideoloği-cal struggle between the prcal struğğle between the proo--Russian Kapodistrias and proRussian Kapodistrias and pro--English Enğlish Mavrokordatos Mavrokordatos would slowly emerge would slowly emerğe on the national scaleon the national scale. The introduc-. The introduc-tion of this kindtion of this kind political practicepolitical practice was newwas new among the Greeks that fought amonğ the Greeks that fouğht the war of independencethe war of independence. As a consequence, the parties. As a consequence, the parties ended upended up harbor-harbor-inginğ old local feuds through old local feuds throuğh both both sides of the feud siding with separate sides of the feud sidinğ with separate
143 Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 40, 40..
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parties, thus creating a domain for the continuity of old socio
parties, thus creatinğ a domain for the continuity of old socio--cultural cultural practices. Another local power struggle that is frequently mentioned in practices. Another local power struğğle that is frequently mentioned in this this thesisthesis is that between the Peloponnesiis that between the Peloponnesian primate factions of an primate factions of Deligiannis and LondosDeliğiannis and Londos--Zaimis. Throughout the war the Peloponnese Zaimis. Throuğhout the war the Peloponnese witnessed a change in the entrenched power structures of the Ottoman witnessed a chanğe in the entrenched power structures of the Ottoman administration with the emergence of revolutionary heroes from the administration with the emerğence of revolutionary heroes from the lower classes. Despite the primlower classes. Despite the primate families’ struggle to maintain their au-ate families’ struğğle to maintain their au-thority through the creation of the Peloponnesian senate, this class an-thority throuğh the creation of the Peloponnesian senate, this class an-tagonism would play a critical role, as the former kapoi and klephts along tağonism would play a critical role, as the former kapoi and klephts alonğ with their peasant soldiers would inevitably rise to positions of pwith their peasant soldiers would inevitably rise to positions of power ower duduee the military nature of the struggle. The the military nature of the struğğle. The former former klepht Kolokotronis klepht Kolokotronis would become the undisputed leader of the Peloponnesian factionwould become the undisputed leader of the Peloponnesian faction.. HHence the primate rival of his former employer Deligiannis, Andreas ence the primate rival of his former employer Deliğiannis, Andreas Zaimis, would frequently look for new allianceZaimis, would frequently look for new alliances such as the Mavro-s such as the Mavro-kordatos faction to balance the rise of Kolokotronis. It should also be kordatos faction to balance the rise of Kolokotronis. It should also be noted that the alliance of Deligiannis and Kolokotronis would also not noted that the alliance of Deliğiannis and Kolokotronis would also not last very long. As a concrete example of the dissolving impact of the rev-last very lonğ. As a concrete example of the dissolvinğ impact of the rev-olution olution oon Peloponnesn Peloponnesian power structures, the rise of Kolokotronis fac-ian power structures, the rise of Kolokotronis fac-tion created a rivalry between the two former allies.tion created a rivalry between the two former allies.144 As a result, As a result, Deligiannis became a later ally of Kolettis’ French party. Of course, France Deliğiannis became a later ally of Kolettis’ French party. Of course, France was not a strong contender up until that point in influencinwas not a stronğ contender up until that point in influencing Greek poli-ğ Greek poli-tics, and the rise of the French party that split the Rumeliots in two camps tics, and the rise of the French party that split the Rumeliots in two camps would have to wait until the aftermath of 1827.would have to wait until the aftermath of 1827. The dichotomy of Russian The dichotomy of Russian and English parties would not last very long, and the emergence of the and Enğlish parties would not last very lonğ, and the emerğence of the French party with Kolettis’ leadership would complete the Triade of the French party with Kolettis’ leadership would complete the Triade of the political parties that dominated the political domain of the Greek nation political parties that dominated the political domain of the Greek nation state in the fstate in the first half of the nineteenth century. irst half of the nineteenth century.
The sympathy for France among certain men probably started during
The sympathy for France amonğ certain men probably started durinğ the famous defense of the Acropolis between 1825the famous defense of the Acropolis between 1825--1827 which was led by 1827 which was led by the French philhellene Fabvrier, a former officer of Napoleon.the French philhellene Fabvrier, a former officer of Napoleon.145 The ar-The ar-rival of trival of the French troops to Greece as authorized by the London he French troops to Greece as authorized by the London
144 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 136, 136..
145 Dimitris PapastamatiDimitris Papastamatiou, “Military Leaders,” in ou, “Military Leaders,” in The Greek Revolution: A Critical Diction-The Greek Revolution: A Critical Diction-ary,ary, 417417..
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conference to oversee Ibrahim
conference to oversee Ibrahim PPasha’s peaceful evacuation of the Pelo-asha’s peaceful evacuation of the Pelo-ponnese, might also have been a reason for the sympathy of some.ponnese, miğht also have been a reason for the sympathy of some.146 Ko-Ko-lettis’ sympathy towards France was not personal. Several reasons led to lettis’ sympathy towards France was not personal. Several reasons led to his relationship with France. First of all, he was smart enough to see that his relationship with France. First of all, he was smart enouğh to see that both Britain and Russia had big plans for the near eastboth Britain and Russia had biğ plans for the near east at that pointat that point. He . He predicted that the duel betweepredicted that the duel between the two powers would potentially dom-n the two powers would potentially dom-inate Greece through their respective adversaries. For him, France inate Greece throuğh their respective adversaries. For him, France seemed like the least interested power, hence a more suitable ally in his seemed like the least interested power, hence a more suitable ally in his eyes.eyes.147 French interest in the French interest in the NNear ear EEast would of course increase espe-ast would of course increase espe-cially cially after the July revolution in 1830after the July revolution in 1830 and the invasion of Algeria the same and the invasion of Alğeria the same yearyear, but at that point the French party had already been established. An , but at that point the French party had already been established. An interesting parallel present itself here regarding the French party’s char-interestinğ parallel present itself here reğardinğ the French party’s char-acter. On the scale of international acter. On the scale of international diplomacy, it was more of an antidiplomacy, it was more of an anti--Eng-Enğ-lish and antilish and anti--Russian sentiment that drew the party headed by Kolettis Russian sentiment that drew the party headed by Kolettis towards the French. Domestically, as well many allies of Kolettis’ French towards the French. Domestically, as well many allies of Kolettis’ French party were drawn to the party more through their opposition to the ad-party were drawn to the party more throuğh their opposition to the ad-versaversaries of the other two parties rather than a close ideological or per-ries of the other two parties rather than a close ideoloğical or per-sonal affinity towards Kolettis. sonal affinity towards Kolettis.
The emergence of the French party was the result of Kolettis manag-
The emerğence of the French party was the result of Kolettis manağ-ing to transform his personal following and allied factions into a political inğ to transform his personal followinğ and allied factions into a political party. The party. The core of the party was Kolettis’ Rumeliot clientele dominating core of the party was Kolettis’ Rumeliot clientele dominatinğ easteasternern Rumeli, with the addition of primates who lost their influences in Rumeli, with the addition of primates who lost their influences in their localities to the agents of the other two parties. Through consecu-their localities to the ağents of the other two parties. Throuğh consecu-tive offices in the civilian governmenttive offices in the civilian ğovernmentss, Kolet, Kolettis strengthened his ties tis strenğthened his ties with the Rumeliot captains by providing them contracts of tax farming on with the Rumeliot captains by providinğ them contracts of tax farminğ on the provinces which they obtained through military means.the provinces which they obtained throuğh military means.148 The close The close resemblance of this military and fiscal practice through the use of the resemblance of this military and fiscal practice throuğh the use of the decades old netdecades old networks of violence, with that of the Armatolic system from works of violence, with that of the Armatolic system from the times of Ali the times of Ali PPasha that has been generated by the former Ali asha that has been ğenerated by the former Ali PPasha asha employee Kolettis, shows how the latter successfully adapted the preemployee Kolettis, shows how the latter successfully adapted the pre--modern system in Rumeli modern system in Rumeli toto a more modern framework. a more modern framework. Most oMost of thef the
146 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 46, 46..
147 Ibid. 100Ibid. 100..
148 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2. 31, Vol.2. 31--3232..
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future exploits of Rumeliot captains against the Greek government
future exploits of Rumeliot captains ağainst the Greek ğovernment should be considered as attempts to preserve this system within an in-should be considered as attempts to preserve this system within an in-creasingly centralizing political environment. Kolettis’ strong motivation creasinğly centralizinğ political environment. Kolettis’ stronğ motivation to eliminate his rival Androutsos which to eliminate his rival Androutsos which has been mentioned has been mentioned earlier in earlier in thisthis chapter could also be interpreted as an attempt to dispose of a rival chapter could also be interpreted as an attempt to dispose of a rival who was creating a monopoly on these revenues, hence leaving little who was creatinğ a monopoly on these revenues, hence leavinğ little room for lesser captains to obtain rewards for their allegiance to Kolettis. room for lesser captains to obtain rewards for their alleğiance to Kolettis. The faThe fact that the person to execute Androutsos, Ioannis Gouras, was a ct that the person to execute Androutsos, Ioannis Gouras, was a former underling of the former, and the order to execute him was given former underlinğ of the former, and the order to execute him was ğiven by Kolettis, has resulted in Gouras acquiring more revenue in eastern Ru-by Kolettis, has resulted in Gouras acquirinğ more revenue in eastern Ru-meli,meli,149 and Kolettis in securing another loyal aland Kolettis in securinğ another loyal ally in the region. Among ly in the reğion. Amonğ thethe prominent members of this network were captains such as prominent members of this network were captains such as Mavrovouniotis, Makrygiannis, Gouras and Velentzas. All of whom had Mavrovouniotis, Makryğiannis, Gouras and Velentzas. All of whom had been involved in the war in eastern Rumeli and Atticabeen involved in the war in eastern Rumeli and Attica,, and were clients and were clients of Kolettis. Velentzas in particof Kolettis. Velentzas in particular, being still a rookie in contrast to the ular, beinğ still a rookie in contrast to the others, depended strongly on Kolettis. others, depended stronğly on Kolettis.
This dependence shows itself in various letters that went back and
This dependence shows itself in various letters that went back and forth between the two and can be explained by the political transfor-forth between the two and can be explained by the political transfor-mation in Greece after the period tmation in Greece after the period that followed Navarino in 1827, and the hat followed Navarino in 1827, and the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The decreasing frequency of the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The decreasinğ frequency of the battles against Ottoman troops left men like Velentzas little opportunities battles ağainst Ottoman troops left men like Velentzas little opportunities for revenue. In March 1827, Velentzas addressed Kolettis in a letter afor revenue. In March 1827, Velentzas addressed Kolettis in a letter asking skinğ for financial helpfor financial help,, noting notinğ that he was unable to pay the little number of that he was unable to pay the little number of men men under his commandunder his command..150 A month later, he repeatA month later, he repeateded this request with this request with another letter, indicating that his previous request was not fulfilled.another letter, indicatinğ that his previous request was not fulfilled.151 He He additionally askadditionally askeded the formerthe former not to lose hope in him, knowing very well not to lose hope in him, knowinğ very well that without the need to constantly keep small bands of armed men to that without the need to constantly keep small bands of armed men to fight Ottomans, Velentzas’ services would no longer be requiredfiğht Ottomans, Velentzas’ services would no lonğer be required as as strongly as in they were in the paststronğly as in they were in the past. He was still dependent on a powerful . He was still dependent on a powerful ppolitical figure to act as his patron, and he had not distinguished himself olitical fiğure to act as his patron, and he had not distinğuished himself
149 Mazower, Mazower, The Greek RevolutionThe Greek Revolution, 352, 352..
150 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 78322 (8 March 1827)“Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 78322 (8 March 1827)..
151 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 71482 (27 April 1827)“Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 71482 (27 April 1827)..
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fully as an indispensable Rumeliot captain for the Kolettis faction in con-
fully as an indispensable Rumeliot captain for the Kolettis faction in con-trast to the likes of Makrygiannis and Mavrovouniotis. trast to the likes of Makryğiannis and Mavrovouniotis.
This is not, however, to indicate that the relation
This is not, however, to indicate that the relationship between Kolettis ship between Kolettis and Velentzas was and Velentzas was on the on the declindeclinee. Of course, Velentzas was not an equal . Of course, Velentzas was not an equal ofof KolettisKolettis.. NNor was he even a strong ally at that point. He was a man who or was he even a stronğ ally at that point. He was a man who desperately desperately soughtsouğht to maintain a to maintain a vital vital relationship relationship that could enable him that could enable him political achpolitical achievementsievements, which he acquired exclusively through the cir-, which he acquired exclusively throuğh the cir-cumstances provided by the war. Now that the military phase of the cumstances provided by the war. Now that the military phase of the struggle was coming slowly to an end, his future, like many other partic-struğğle was cominğ slowly to an end, his future, like many other partic-ipants of the waripants of the war,, depended on capitalizing on whatever politdepended on capitalizinğ on whatever political connec-ical connec-tion they obtained in the previous years. Kolettis’ inability to provide aid tion they obtained in the previous years. Kolettis’ inability to provide aid to Velentzas was due to the fact that Kolettis’ authority also depended on to Velentzas was due to the fact that Kolettis’ authority also depended on him holding public office. The influence that he wielded was the result of him holdinğ public office. The influence that he wielded was the result of him providing a pohim providinğ a political channel for the Rumeliot military element, litical channel for the Rumeliot military element, which in return gwhich in return ğaveave him the necessary muscle at the local level to en-him the necessary muscle at the local level to en-force his policies on the national level. Kolettis’ political fortunes suffered force his policies on the national level. Kolettis’ political fortunes suffered during the years between 1828durinğ the years between 1828--1831, which coincided wit1831, which coincided with the presidency h the presidency of Ioannis Kapodistrias, which will be talked about in the following of Ioannis Kapodistrias, which will be talked about in the followinğ chap-chap-terter. The fact that Kolettis maintained to hold his faction together was due . The fact that Kolettis maintained to hold his faction toğether was due to Kapodistrias’ policies of centralization at the expense of regional lead-to Kapodistrias’ policies of centralization at the expense of reğional lead-ers, and his aders, and his adamant stance against the irregular military element, which amant stance ağainst the irreğular military element, which succeeded in many dissidents to gravitate towards the traditional politi-succeeded in many dissidents to ğravitate towards the traditional politi-cians such as Kolettis. Velentzas remained loyal to Kolettiscians such as Kolettis. Velentzas remained loyal to Kolettis as wellas well, with , with their personal correspondence being documented their personal correspondence beinğ documented thrthrough letters ouğh letters inin 18291829..152 Velentzas’ activities between 1827 and 1830 are not well docu-Velentzas’ activities between 1827 and 1830 are not well docu-mented in contrast to the previous and upcoming period, which perhaps mented in contrast to the previous and upcominğ period, which perhaps is on its own an explanation of his involuntary inactivity. It is interesting is on its own an explanation of his involuntary inactivity. It is interestinğ to note that the fortunes of both men went on to note that the fortunes of both men went on a parallel course. With Ve-a parallel course. With Ve-lentzas’ loyalty firmly established, the rise of one man made that of the lentzas’ loyalty firmly established, the rise of one man made that of the other also possible, and in many schemes that were created by Kolettis, other also possible, and in many schemes that were created by Kolettis, Velentzas’ fortunes would change for the better, which will be further dis-Velentzas’ fortunes would chanğe for the better, which will be further dis-cussed in cussed in the following chapter.the followinğ chapter.
152 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 66234 (9 April 1929)“Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 66234 (9 April 1929)..
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§ 3.63.6 ConclusionConclusion
In the span of six years, the Greeks went from rapid military successes
In the span of six years, the Greeks went from rapid military successes to the creation of a provisionary government, two civil wars, Egyptian in-to the creation of a provisionary ğovernment, two civil wars, Eğyptian in-vasion, and the involvement of the great powers that paved the way for vasion, and the involvement of the ğreat powers that paved the way for indepindependence. This politically and militarily turbulent period created endence. This politically and militarily turbulent period created perfect opportunities for Kolettis to use the already present network of perfect opportunities for Kolettis to use the already present network of violence in Rumeli as an effective force both against his rivals and ene-violence in Rumeli as an effective force both ağainst his rivals and ene-mies but also as an instrument to establish pmies but also as an instrument to establish political influence through olitical influence throuğh traditional methods. Velentzas, by becoming a mainstay in the Kolettist traditional methods. Velentzas, by becominğ a mainstay in the Kolettist faction and a client under his patronage became increasingly involved in faction and a client under his patronağe became increasinğly involved in actions that contributed significantly to the political capital that he accu-actions that contributed siğnificantly to the political capital that he accu-mulated.mulated. In addition to the rise of both men’s careers, this chapter also In addition to the rise of both men’s careers, this chapter also aimed to provide a picture of the political environment in which the fac-aimed to provide a picture of the political environment in which the fac-tional strife emerged in which these men played various important roles. tional strife emerğed in which these men played various important roles. The factions and traditional networks continuThe factions and traditional networks continued to play an important ed to play an important role in the political domain of Greece by collaborating with the three role in the political domain of Greece by collaboratinğ with the three great powers who intervened in the Greek question in this period, and ğreat powers who intervened in the Greek question in this period, and became increasingly labelled as the English, French, and Russian factions. became increasinğly labelled as the Enğlish, French, and Russian factions. In this chapter,In this chapter, we saw how the traditional networks of violencewe saw how the traditional networks of violence In Ru-In Ru-melimeli prior to the war had become to be controlled by Kolettis, and the prior to the war had become to be controlled by Kolettis, and the ways in which his faction began to be drawn towards France. As a result, ways in which his faction beğan to be drawn towards France. As a result, Velentzas’ rising career as a band leader in the ranks of Velentzas’ risinğ career as a band leader in the ranks of the Kolettist fac-the Kolettist fac-tion made him indirectly subject to French influence in Greek politics.tion made him indirectly subject to French influence in Greek politics.

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4 The Period of Kapodiastrian and Bavarian Admin-The Period of Kapodiastrian and Bavarian Admin-istrations and the Velentzas Escapade (1828istrations and the Velentzas Escapade (1828--1840)1840)
he third national
he third national assembly of Troezen that convened in April 1827 assembly of Troezen that convened in April 1827 elected Ioannis Kapodistrias as the president of Greeceelected Ioannis Kapodistrias as the president of Greece.. Yet, his de-Yet, his de-cision to acceptcision to accept the election and his arrival in Greece was almost a year the election and his arrival in Greece was almost a year after the Battle of Navarino. The election of Kapodistrias who hadafter the Battle of Navarino. The election of Kapodistrias who had no no prior relationship with any faction until that point was no coincidence. prior relationship with any faction until that point was no coincidence. The internal factional strife had made it impossible for The internal factional strife had made it impossible for establishedestablished actors actors to assume power in the upcoming government. Starting with this periodto assume power in the upcominğ ğovernment. Startinğ with this period on and continuing during the Bavaon and continuinğ durinğ the Bavarian administrationrian administration, the center of po-, the center of po-litical power would continually be represented by groups that had no litical power would continually be represented by ğroups that had no prior political presence in Greece. prior political presence in Greece. OfOf coursecourse, this, this also coincided with the also coincided with the highly transformative impact of the European powers’ intervention on hiğhly transformative impact of the European powers’ intervention on the Gthe Greek crisis that created a conjuncture in which the foundation of reek crisis that created a conjuncture in which the foundation of
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national political power had increasingly shifted from internal mecha-
national political power had increasinğly shifted from internal mecha-nisms such as military control and regional alliances to external factors nisms such as military control and reğional alliances to external factors such as diplomatic support from a European powesuch as diplomatic support from a European power.r.1 Despite vigorous at-Despite viğorous at-tempts, the traditional political networks had survived the Kapodistrian tempts, the traditional political networks had survived the Kapodistrian period and would continue to appropriate the new political climate in the period and would continue to appropriate the new political climate in the 1830s. The aim of this chapter is to follow the stories of the characters 1830s. The aim of this chapter is to follow the stories of the characters central to central to this thesis, particularly this thesis, particularly those of those of Kolettis and Velentzas, during Kolettis and Velentzas, durinğ the presidency of Kapodistrias and the royal period, as well as to describe the presidency of Kapodistrias and the royal period, as well as to describe the political environment both domestically the political environment both domestically andand internationally that internationally that made the irredentist foray of Velentzas in 18made the irredentist foray of Velentzas in 1840 possible.40 possible.
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§ 4.14.1 The Kapodistrian PeriodThe Kapodistrian Period
It is the shift in the nature of politics in Greece to be more foreign ori-
It is the shift in the nature of politics in Greece to be more foreiğn ori-ented that made the presidency of Kapodistrias appealing to certain ented that made the presidency of Kapodistrias appealinğ to certain groups in Greece, with the belief that a stronger relationship with Russia ğroups in Greece, with the belief that a stronğer relationship with Russia wwould create a clearer path to military victoryould create a clearer path to military victory.. ThisThis would bewould be confirmed confirmed in a few years by the Russoin a few years by the Russo--Turkish war of 1828Turkish war of 1828--29 that paved the way to 29 that paved the way to Greek independence after the period that followed the treaty of Adriano-Greek independence after the period that followed the treaty of Adriano-ple. As equally important to ple. As equally important to Russophile inclinations was the aim to estab-Russophile inclinations was the aim to estab-lish a strong balance to the increasing influence of the Anglophile faction. lish a stronğ balance to the increasinğ influence of the Anğlophile faction. This is also confirmed by George Finlay who says that the election of Ka-This is also confirmed by Georğe Finlay who says that the election of Ka-podistrias was proposed by Kolokotronis and his propodistrias was proposed by Kolokotronis and his pro--Russian facRussian faction to tion to bring a balance to the increasing English influence with Richard Church brinğ a balance to the increasinğ Enğlish influence with Richard Church becoming the commander of all the Greek troops, and Alexander becominğ the commander of all the Greek troops, and Alexander Cochrane admiral of the Greek fleet.Cochrane admiral of the Greek fleet.2 Additionally, his diplomatic reputa-Additionally, his diplomatic reputa-tion in Europe and antition in Europe and anti--revolutionary zerevolutionary zeal were seen as potentially posi-al were seen as potentially posi-tive traits that would help Kapodistritive traits that would help Kapodistriaas in providing diplomatic assis-s in providinğ diplomatic assis-tance from the other great powers, and his relationship to the Russian tance from the other ğreat powers, and his relationship to the Russian tsar would be a particularly crucial head start. tsar would be a particularly crucial head start.
1 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 106, 106..
2 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2. , Vol.2. 139139..
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This binary distribution of influ
This binary distribution of influence in ence in NNear ear EEastern affairs was also astern affairs was also in line with the conjuncture in Europe in the 1820s. Despite their desire in line with the conjuncture in Europe in the 1820s. Despite their desire to see him plant seeds for a politically stable Greece, the British govern-to see him plant seeds for a politically stable Greece, the British ğovern-ment was cautious. After Kapodistrias had visited London, he was in-ment was cautious. After Kapodistrias had visited London, he was in-forformed that along his journey to Greece, he should not visit Corfu, his med that alonğ his journey to Greece, he should not visit Corfu, his birthplace. It was in the interest of the British government to prevent any birthplace. It was in the interest of the British ğovernment to prevent any disturbance in the Ionian islands that might be supported by Kapodis-disturbance in the Ionian islands that miğht be supported by Kapodis-trias in the name of Greek territorial dematrias in the name of Greek territorial demands that would potentially nds that would potentially have Russian support. This was adamantly advised by the Russophobe have Russian support. This was adamantly advised by the Russophobe Lord high commisLord hiğh commisssioner of the Ionian Islands Sie Frederick Adam.ioner of the Ionian Islands Sie Frederick Adam.3 In this In this environment of Englishenvironment of Enğlish--Russian competition, the French Party of Kolettis Russian competition, the French Party of Kolettis had fallen to had fallen to a secondary position, and it became clear to him that France a secondary position, and it became clear to him that France had to associate herself more with Greek affairs for Kolettis’ party to had to associate herself more with Greek affairs for Kolettis’ party to maintain its influence. maintain its influence. After allAfter all,, it became painfully obvious that from it became painfully obvious that from then on traditional leaders like himself would be then on traditional leaders like himself would be unable to assert influ-unable to assert influ-ence without gaining the favor ence without ğaininğ the favor ofof an outside power. On top of that, Ka-an outside power. On top of that, Ka-podsitrias’ policies of fiscal and military centralization that would de-podsitrias’ policies of fiscal and military centralization that would de-prave traditional leaders from their influence in the province would prave traditional leaders from their influence in the province would further diminish their further diminish their traditional networks of patronage. Throughout the traditional networks of patronağe. Throuğhout the Kapodistrian period, Kolettis stood Kapodistrian period, Kolettis stood relatively relatively quietquiet. H. He rightly expected e riğhtly expected the former’s tenure to be temporary and assumed a prudent position, but the former’s tenure to be temporary and assumed a prudent position, but also because his political action required a political officalso because his political action required a political office that would en-e that would en-able him to rally his Rumeliot clientele. Thus, with Kolettis’ passive atti-able him to rally his Rumeliot clientele. Thus, with Kolettis’ passive atti-tude, Velentzas struggled to make ends meet in this periodtude, Velentzas struğğled to make ends meet in this period as well, which as well, which was the case at was the case at least until the assassination of Kapodistriasleast until the assassination of Kapodistrias..
Kapodistrias
Kapodistrias had been had been a very a very controversial personcontroversial person whosewhose political political viewsviews were difficult to categorizewere difficult to cateğorize. Throughout his presidency, he ha. Throuğhout his presidency, he hadd cre-cre-ated a devoted following that would be the nucleus of the future Russian ated a devoted followinğ that would be the nucleus of the future Russian party (also called Napist party), so his neutrality can be questioned. Onparty (also called Napist party), so his neutrality can be questioned. On the other hand, multiple historians the other hand, multiple historians argued arğued that Kapodistrias’ that Kapodistrias’
3 Eleni AngelomatisEleni Anğelomatis--Tsougarakis, “Ionian Islands,” in Tsouğarakis, “Ionian Islands,” in The Greek Revolution: A Critical Dic-The Greek Revolution: A Critical Dic-tionarytionary, 228, 228..
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Russophilism was only second to his Greek patriotism
Russophilism was only second to his Greek patriotism..4 Kapodistrias was Kapodistrias was a product of enlightenmenta product of enliğhtenment, similar to many educated men of his gener-, similar to many educated men of his ğener-ation,ation, more so with his humanitarianism rather thanmore so with his humanitarianism rather than radicalism. In fact, radicalism. In fact, he was an adamant opponent of the latter. His constitutionalism was due he was an adamant opponent of the latter. His constitutionalism was due to his belief that it would save societies from the disruptive effect of rev-to his belief that it would save societies from the disruptive effect of rev-olutionolution,, aalthoughlthouğh,, in his moderate view of liberalism, not every society in his moderate view of liberalism, not every society was mature enwas mature enough to be ruled with constitutional rights. He believed in ouğh to be ruled with constitutional riğhts. He believed in the gradual progression of society through educating the common peoplethe ğradual proğression of society throuğh educatinğ the common people and enabling them to own property,and enablinğ them to own property, and in his view by doing so liberating and in his view by doinğ so liberatinğ them from the oppression of traditional leaders.them from the oppression of traditional leaders.5 In fact, eliminating the In fact, eliminatinğ the ruling elite of the rulinğ elite of the AAncien ncien RRegime, a number of whom had risen to im-eğime, a number of whom had risen to im-portant positions of revolutionary leaderships in the past decade, was a portant positions of revolutionary leaderships in the past decade, was a prerequisite for Kapodistrias’ political ideal. The state he envisioned was prerequisite for Kapodistrias’ political ideal. The state he envisioned was on the western on the western modelmodel,, aa unitary bureaucratic state with an enlightened unitary bureaucratic state with an enliğhtened law code.law code.6 He believedHe believed,, howeverhowever,, that this ideal of his could only be that this ideal of his could only be achieved in the future, not in present. achieved in the future, not in present. AccordinglyAccordinğly,, in orderin order toto create an create an environment that would allow his reformist agenda, he insisted on environment that would allow his reformist ağenda, he insisted on re-re-taining taininğ extraordinary extraordinary powerspowers and turned the Greek government into a and turned the Greek ğovernment into a provisional dictatorship, which he managed to do provisional dictatorship, which he manağed to do rather rather easily due to the easily due to the traditional politicians needing himtraditional politicians needinğ him desperately desperately as a prestigious political as a prestiğious political asset at the state of emergency Greece was in at that time. On 30 January asset at the state of emerğency Greece was in at that time. On 30 January 1828, the constitution of the Troezen assembly was suspended by vote, 1828, the constitution of the Troezen assembly was suspended by vote, and its powers were transferred to the president and a consultative bodyand its powers were transferred to the president and a consultative body with twentywith twenty--seven members, later on to be called the Panhellenion.seven members, later on to be called the Panhellenion.
Kapodistrias soon realizedKapodistrias soon realized,, howeverhowever,, that he could not antagonize all that he could not antağonize all of the factions and expect a smooth operation. He either had to seek the of the factions and expect a smooth operation. He either had to seek the support of all the factions, which was almossupport of all the factions, which was almost impossible due to their t impossible due to their
4 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 108; Frary, , 108; Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityGreek Identity, 469, 469..
5 For more information on the “GFor more information on the “Greek Enlightreek Enliğhtenenment” and discussions on the “Enlight-ment” and discussions on the “Enliğht-ened Absolutism” adapted by Kapodistrias, See, Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ened Absolutism” adapted by Kapodistrias, See, Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Enlighten-Enlighten-ment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greecement and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Massachusets: Harvard University (Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 2013), 117Press, 2013), 117--155.155.
6 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 108, 108..
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unwillingness to compromise with each other, an attitude that enabled
unwillinğness to compromise with each other, an attitude that enabled Kapodistrias’ ascension to power in the first place. Kapodistrias’ ascension to power in the first place. Alternatively,Alternatively, he could he could ally himself with one of the factions and try to overpower the others, and ally himself with one of the factions and try to overpower the others, and due to tdue to the increased factional strife as a result, he could rely on the loyalty he increased factional strife as a result, he could rely on the loyalty of his followers. He chose the latter of his followers. He chose the latter option option and hoped that the association and hoped that the association of one party with the government would mobilize the support of the of one party with the ğovernment would mobilize the support of the masses, a party to end all parties and tomasses, a party to end all parties and to create the political stability to create the political stability to undertake his reformist agenda. The proundertake his reformist ağenda. The pro--Russian faction of Kolokotronis Russian faction of Kolokotronis and Metaxas emerged and Metaxas emerğed aas the nucleus of the Kapodistrian party (as known s the nucleus of the Kapodistrian party (as known as Russianas Russian/Napist/Napist party) with its strongholds in the Peloponnese, and party) with its stronğholds in the Peloponnese, and certain certain areas in Rumeli, mainly with the recruitment of certain former areas in Rumeli, mainly with the recruitment of certain former Kolettis and Mavrokordatos clients such as Gouras and Varnakiotis re-Kolettis and Mavrokordatos clients such as Gouras and Varnakiotis re-spectispectivvely, who sought to detach themselves from the other leading chief-ely, who souğht to detach themselves from the other leadinğ chief-tains of the region in order not to be forced to shartains of the reğion in order not to be forced to share political influence in e political influence in their stronghold region with them.their stronğhold reğion with them.7 The Kapodistrian party was also The Kapodistrian party was also joined by the Souliot Kitsos Tzavelas. His nemesis from another Souliot joined by the Souliot Kitsos Tzavelas. His nemesis from another Souliot clan, Botsaris was a Mavrokordatclan, Botsaris was a Mavrokordatos clientos client, hence, hence of the of the English party, Enğlish party, which compelled Tzawhich compelled Tzavelas to gravitate towards the provelas to ğravitate towards the pro--Russian Kapodis-Russian Kapodis-trian party, where he would stay even after the assatrian party, where he would stay even after the assasssination of Kapodis-sination of Kapodis-trias. This shows again how entrenched pretrias. This shows ağain how entrenched pre--independence power strug-independence power struğ-gles in Rumeli were, and how their protagonists adapted to the ğles in Rumeli were, and how their protağonists adapted to the requrequirements of the new postirements of the new post--Ottoman political climate to continue their Ottoman political climate to continue their polpoliitical careers in the same traditional pattern. tical careers in the same traditional pattern.
Certain captains switching to the Kapodistrian party was also the re-
Certain captains switchinğ to the Kapodistrian party was also the re-sult of the latter’s policy of distributing land to Rumeliot chieftsult of the latter’s policy of distributinğ land to Rumeliot chieftains due ains due to his belief that proper land ownership would to his belief that proper land ownership would helphelp to to persuadepersuade them them not not to to revert to banditry.revert to banditry.8 His policy of separating fiscal and military duties, His policy of separatinğ fiscal and military duties, however, led to a conflict between his government and the Rumeliot however, led to a conflict between his ğovernment and the Rumeliot chieftains who had taken posschieftains who had taken possession of tax farming estates as reward for ession of tax farminğ estates as reward for participating in the revolution. The revolt of Tzamis Karatasos in 1831 was participatinğ in the revolution. The revolt of Tzamis Karatasos in 1831 was the result of this very attemptthe result of this very attempt.. It is also noteworthy that KaratasosIt is also noteworthy that Karatasos,, aalong lonğ
7 Ibid.Ibid. 113113..
8 McGrew, McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern GreeceLand and Revolution in Modern Greece, 69, 69..
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with members of his band, were
with members of his band, were refugeerefuğeess from Macedonia,from Macedonia,9 wwhich had hich had also the Ottoman authorities alarmed due to their activities potentially also the Ottoman authorities alarmed due to their activities potentially spreading to Ottoman spreadinğ to Ottoman lands in lands in ThessalyThessaly and Macedoniaand Macedonia..10 The contracts The contracts of taxof tax--farming they had acquired by the revolutionary government had farminğ they had acquired by the revolutionary ğovernment had been one of the few aspects that sebeen one of the few aspects that secured the loyalty of these refugee cured the loyalty of these refuğee bands outside their locality that was now on the northern side of thebands outside their locality that was now on the northern side of the up-up-comingcominğ frontier. The reactions such as that of Karatasos are understand-frontier. The reactions such as that of Karatasos are understand-able. He came from a world in which a captain acquiring a tax farming able. He came from a world in which a captain acquirinğ a tax farminğ contractcontract as reward for his services was usual. The fact that Velentzas was as reward for his services was usual. The fact that Velentzas was not a participant not a participant inin this revolt despite his former ties with Karatasos this revolt despite his former ties with Karatasos might indicate his desire for power through proper political channels, miğht indicate his desire for power throuğh proper political channels, which explainedwhich explained his continued loyalty to Kolethis continued loyalty to Kolettis, whose trust he proba-tis, whose trust he proba-bly saw as a much more promising political asset than the unstable posi-bly saw as a much more promisinğ political asset than the unstable posi-tion of Karatasos.tion of Karatasos.
The distribution of land was also opposed by the British government
The distribution of land was also opposed by the British ğovernment through the British resident in Greece, Edward James Dawkins. When in throuğh the British resident in Greece, Edward James Dawkins. When in 1821824 British bond holders had provided a loan to the revolutionary gov-4 British bond holders had provided a loan to the revolutionary ğov-ernment, these national estates had been pledged as a guarantee for the ernment, these national estates had been pledğed as a ğuarantee for the repayment of the loan capital.repayment of the loan capital.11 Finances had played a substantial role in Finances had played a substantial role in the three great powers’ intervention in Grthe three ğreat powers’ intervention in Greek affairs. According to an Ot-eek affairs. Accordinğ to an Ot-toman report after the treaty of Adrianopletoman report after the treaty of Adrianople in 1829in 1829, not including naval , not includinğ naval expenses, the Greeks owed Britain 480.000 expenses, the Greeks owed Britain 480.000 kkise, most of which to British ise, most of which to British bond holders. The amount owed to the French was roughly 300.000 bond holders. The amount owed to the French was rouğhly 300.000 kkise ise including includinğ the expenses of the French troops. To the Russian, the owed the expenses of the French troops. To the Russian, the owed amount was 250.000 amount was 250.000 kkise due to the Russian navy’s assistance to the Ka-ise due to the Russian navy’s assistance to the Ka-podistrian government.podistrian ğovernment.12
Another reason for intervention was the judgment that a provisional
Another reason for intervention was the judğment that a provisional government should not be undertaking a policy of such a magnitude like ğovernment should not be undertakinğ a policy of such a mağnitude like land distribution. The provisional nature of this government was in fact land distribution. The provisional nature of this ğovernment was in fact at the center of many issues. Until 1830, that the center of many issues. Until 1830, the opposition to Kapodistrias e opposition to Kapodistrias
9 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 74, 74..
10 B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/47 (4 June 1B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/47 (4 June 1831)831)..
11 McGrew, McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern GreeceLand and Revolution in Modern Greece, 70, 70..
12 B.O.A. TS. MA,e 673, 51 [17 Rebiülevvel 1255 (31 May 1839)]B.O.A. TS. MA,e 673, 51 [17 Rebiu levvel 1255 (31 May 1839)]..
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was relatively soft, as his administration was seen temporary until the
was relatively soft, as his administration was seen temporary until the monarch arrives. However, when Leopold of Saxemonarch arrives. However, when Leopold of Saxe--CoburgCoburğ13 abandonedabandoned his his earlier earlier decision to accept the Greek throne in 1830, patience ran out decision to accept the Greek throne in 1830, patience ran out among dissidentamonğ dissidents as Kapodistrias’ rule was s as Kapodistrias’ rule was automatically automatically extended. An-extended. An-other development other development in in the same year, the July revolution in France that the same year, the July revolution in France that brough Louis Phillipe to the throne, provided a convenient rationale for brouğh Louis Phillipe to the throne, provided a convenient rationale for the opposition to increasingly call out for a constitutionthe opposition to increasinğly call out for a constitution, which they saw , which they saw as a valuable element for their opposition to Kapodistrias’ increasingly as a valuable element for their opposition to Kapodistrias’ increasinğly autocratic rule. Despite no apparent relationship with liberal sentiments, autocratic rule. Despite no apparent relationship with liberal sentiments, this climate of “revolutionary sentiments against tyranny” was success-this climate of “revolutionary sentiments ağainst tyranny” was success-fully utilized by cerfully utilized by certain dissidents of Kapodistrias’ policies, such as tain dissidents of Kapodistrias’ policies, such as Petrobey of Mani.Petrobey of Mani.
Kapodistrias’ policies had understandably been in conflict with
Kapodistrias’ policies had understandably been in conflict with Mani’s status. Under the Ottomans, Mani had enjoyed autonomy with its Mani’s status. Under the Ottomans, Mani had enjoyed autonomy with its own militaristic social system and customary law. Wheown militaristic social system and customary law. When Kapodistrias at-n Kapodistrias at-tempted to incorporate Mani into the central administration, he came tempted to incorporate Mani into the central administration, he came into conflict with the Mavromichalis clan which led to an overall revolt, into conflict with the Mavromichalis clan which led to an overall revolt, in which thanks to the traditional corporate nature of the Maniot society, in which thanks to the traditional corporate nature of the Maniot society, the whole region tookthe whole reğion took up arms. It was more of an attempt to preserve up arms. It was more of an attempt to preserve traditional administrative autonomy than a liberal uprising against tyr-traditional administrative autonomy than a liberal uprisinğ ağainst tyr-anny. anny.
Another significant uprising was the Hydra revolt. Like Mani, the is-
Another siğnificant uprisinğ was the Hydra revolt. Like Mani, the is-land of Hydraland of Hydra,, too too had enjoyed a certain autonomy under Ottomahad enjoyed a certain autonomy under Ottoman rule. n rule. The grievances of Hydriots towards The ğrievances of Hydriots towards KapodstriasKapodstrias were due to the latter’swere due to the latter’s centralizing policiescentralizinğ policies,, and the breakdown of negotiations regarding the and the breakdown of neğotiations reğardinğ the payment of economic relief that they payment of economic relief that they had had demanded from the govern-demanded from the ğovern-mentment. The reasons of this demand were. The reasons of this demand were ththe devastating impact of the e devastatinğ impact of the shifting patterns of trade in the Mediterranean, new customs duties im-shiftinğ patterns of trade in the Mediterranean, new customs duties im-posed by the new Greek government, a quarantine system that further posed by the new Greek ğovernment, a quarantine system that further slowed down trade, and the overall destruction of their commercial fleet slowed down trade, and the overall destruction of their commercial fleet throughout the rethrouğhout the revolution.volution.14 The revolt was immediately joined by The revolt was immediately joined by
13 The future King of Belgium between 1831The future Kinğ of Belğium between 1831--18651865..
14 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 121, 121..
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prominent dissident politicians from other regions such as Mavro-
prominent dissident politicians from other reğions such as Mavro-kordatos, Zaimis and Trikoupis, all of whom were members of the English kordatos, Zaimis and Trikoupis, all of whom were members of the Enğlish faction. To Kapodistrias’ aid came the Russian Admiral Ricord with the faction. To Kapodistrias’ aid came the Russian Admiral Ricord with the ships under his commandships under his command..15 Yet, Yet, the Hydriots did not shy away from en-the Hydriots did not shy away from en-gaging into an open conflict with the Russian fleet near Poros and ğağinğ into an open conflict with the Russian fleet near Poros and sseized eized the naval arsenal of the government.the naval arsenal of the ğovernment.16 This conflict would go on until the This conflict would ğo on until the assassination of Kapodistrias. In the assassination of Kapodistrias. In the year 1831, the opposition thus con-year 1831, the opposition thus con-sisted of the Hydriots sisted of the Hydriots supported by the supported by the English party, the Maniots, and Enğlish party, the Maniots, and severalseveral Rumeliot chieftains. After the conflict with Mani, the series of Rumeliot chieftains. After the conflict with Mani, the series of events led to the arrest of Petrobey by the Kapodistrian government, events led to the arrest of Petrobey by the Kapodistrian ğovernment, which wawhich was turned into a vendetta by his nephewss turned into a vendetta by his nephews, who, who assassinated Ka-assassinated Ka-podistrias onpodistrias on 9 October 18319 October 1831.. The assassination of Kapodistrias was inter-The assassination of Kapodistrias was inter-preted as a blow to Russian influence in Greece by the Ottomans, taking preted as a blow to Russian influence in Greece by the Ottomans, takinğ also into account the former’s struggle with a Polialso into account the former’s struğğle with a Polish revolt sh revolt that took place that took place in the same year.in the same year.17 In fact, the period which saw the assassination of Ka-In fact, the period which saw the assassination of Ka-podistrias and the political chaos that followed it, had coincided with a podistrias and the political chaos that followed it, had coincided with a diplomatically turbulent period in other parts of Europe as well. All of the diplomatically turbulent period in other parts of Europe as well. All of the three three powers were occupied with matters such as the July revolution in powers were occupied with matters such as the July revolution in France, the independence of Belgium, and the Polish revolt, which led to France, the independence of Belğium, and the Polish revolt, which led to a partial indifference to the domestic quarrels in Greece. The assasa partial indifference to the domestic quarrels in Greece. The assasssina-ina-tion also paved the way for Kolettis to retion also paved the way for Kolettis to re--ententer the national political arena er the national political arena and create another series of career opportunities for the likes of Ve-and create another series of career opportunities for the likes of Ve-lentzas.lentzas.
§
§ 4.24.2 The Third Civil War and Return of the KolettisThe Third Civil War and Return of the Kolettis--Velentzas Velentzas CooperationCooperation
The aftermath of Kapodistrias’ death was anarchy. The senate ap-
The aftermath of Kapodistrias’ death was anarchy. The senate ap-pointed a threpointed a three men coe men commmission to oversee the government temporarily, mission to oversee the ğovernment temporarily, consisting of Augustinos Kapodistrias, the younger brother of the former consistinğ of Auğustinos Kapodistrias, the younğer brother of the former
15 Finlay, Finlay, History of the History of the Greek RevolutionGreek Revolution, Vol.2, 236, Vol.2, 236..
16 B.O.A. HAT 962, 41202 [11 Rebiülevvel 1247 (20 August 1831)]B.O.A. HAT 962, 41202 [11 Rebiu levvel 1247 (20 Auğust 1831)]..
17 B.O.A. HAT 1282, 49732 [29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830)]B.O.A. HAT 1282, 49732 [29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830)]..
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president, Theodoros Kolokotronis, and Ioannis Kolettis. The inclusion of
president, Theodoros Kolokotronis, and Ioannis Kolettis. The inclusion of Kolettis was due to the aim of the former KapKolettis was due to the aim of the former Kapoodistriadistrian establishment to n establishment to prevent him from joining the opposition and cprevent him from joininğ the opposition and creatingreatinğ a united antia united anti--Ka-Ka-podistrian front. However, this could not have presented a better oppor-podistrian front. However, this could not have presented a better oppor-tunity to him. The appointment enabled Kolettis to finally revive his old tunity to him. The appointment enabled Kolettis to finally revive his old Rumeliot faction by assRumeliot faction by assuming an opposition from within the assembly. uminğ an opposition from within the assembly. HHaving a voice in the government also enabled him to win over other op-avinğ a voice in the ğovernment also enabled him to win over other op-positional figures. Two camps now emerged, the Kapodistrians, and the positional fiğures. Two camps now emerğed, the Kapodistrians, and the Rumeliots. Rumeliots.
The two camps were to meet
The two camps were to meet atat the national assembly in Argthe national assembly in Arğos. How-os. How-ever, as seen before, ever, as seen before, the the attempts to unite different camps again led to attempts to unite different camps ağain led to further divisions among them. The Kapodistrians, consisting of Augusti-further divisions amonğ them. The Kapodistrians, consistinğ of Auğusti-nosnos KapodistriasKapodistrias, Kolokotronis and Tzavelas had arrived with a body of , Kolokotronis and Tzavelas had arrived with a body of corps, and declared themselves the corps, and declared themselves the sole national governmentsole national ğovernment, and at-, and at-tacked the Rumeliot camp with the orders of Augustinos, attempting a tacked the Rumeliot camp with the orders of Auğustinos, attemptinğ a fait accompli while they still had the military upper hand.fait accompli while they still had the military upper hand.18 ThiThis smalls small--scale clash between the Rumeliots and Peloponnesians resulted in the scale clash between the Rumeliots and Peloponnesians resulted in the death of hundred men death of hundred men oon each siden each side,,19 and initiated the series of military and initiated the series of military conflicts which is called the third civil war, and devastated the country-conflicts which is called the third civil war, and devastated the country-side in the Peloponnese yet onceside in the Peloponnese yet once again. The conflict was further deep-ağain. The conflict was further deep-eneneed when in December 1831 Sir Stratford Canning arrived in Nad when in December 1831 Sir Stratford Canninğ arrived in Naffplion plion while he was on his way to Istanbul to obtain the while he was on his way to Istanbul to obtain the ssultans recognition on ultans recoğnition on the selection of Otto, the son of the Bavarian king Ludwig as the King of the selection of Otto, the son of the Bavarian kinğ Ludwiğ as the Kinğ of GreGreece.ece.20 He made a stop in Greece to announce the selection of OttoHe made a stop in Greece to announce the selection of Otto.. But,But, despite his warnings to Augustinos to stop the war that he commenced, despite his warninğs to Auğustinos to stop the war that he commenced, the news of the the news of the upcomingupcominğ arrival of the King motivated the two camps arrival of the Kinğ motivated the two camps even further as both even further as both sides sides wanted to obtain twanted to obtain the he political political upper hand and upper hand and welcome the King themselves, possibly presenting the regency with a set welcome the Kinğ themselves, possibly presentinğ the reğency with a set of terms. The London protocol on 13 February 1832 made Greece a mon-of terms. The London protocol on 13 February 1832 made Greece a mon-archy under the sovereignty of Otto, whose arrival in Greece would archy under the sovereiğnty of Otto, whose arrival in Greece would have have to to wait another ywait another year.ear.
18 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 126, 126..
19 B.O.A. HAT 358, 20024 [18 Şaban 1247 (2 Feb 183B.O.A. HAT 358, 20024 [18 Şaban 1247 (2 Feb 1832)]2)]..
20 Finlay, Finlay, History of the Greek RevolutionHistory of the Greek Revolution, Vol.2. 255, Vol.2. 255..
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In Jan
In Januuary 1832, after the clash in Argos, it became practically certain ary 1832, after the clash in Arğos, it became practically certain that the conflict between Augustinos and Kolettis would turn into a mili-that the conflict between Auğustinos and Kolettis would turn into a mili-tary clash, and the threat of Kolettis’ retary clash, and the threat of Kolettis’ re--emergence as a Rumeliot leader emerğence as a Rumeliot leader attacking the Peloponnese reviveattackinğ the Peloponnese revived past hostilities. Remembering the Ru-d past hostilities. Rememberinğ the Ru-meliot invasion of 1825, figures from the Kolettis led constitutionalist meliot invasion of 1825, fiğures from the Kolettis led constitutionalist camp such as Zaimis switched to the Kapodistriancamp such as Zaimis switched to the Kapodistrian--Peloponnesian alli-Peloponnesian alli-anceance, paralleling the same move he had done in 1824, parallelinğ the same move he had done in 1824. The picture in early . The picture in early 18321832 very interestingly presented almost an exact replica of the civil wars very interestinğly presented almost an exact replica of the civil wars in 1824in 1824--25. Regional sentimentalism and particularism prevent25. Reğional sentimentalism and particularism preventeded any at-any at-tempt to create a unified polity, and eventually resulting in a Peloponne-tempt to create a unified polity, and eventually resultinğ in a Peloponne-siansian--Rumeliot clash. It also further showRumeliot clash. It also further shows s that that despite historical rivalries, despite historical rivalries, the levels of solidarity that Peloponnesian the levels of solidarity that Peloponnesian KKocabaşı leaders can create ocabaşı leaders can create against what they saw as an outside intrusion ağainst what they saw as an outside intrusion thatthat threatenthreateneded their his-their his-torical privileges. This was the case in the civil wars of 1824torical privileğes. This was the case in the civil wars of 1824--25, and also25, and also in 1812 when the majority of them had unified against Veli in 1812 when the majority of them had unified ağainst Veli PPasha. Another asha. Another similarity of the civil war with the previous ones was its outcome. Kolettis similarity of the civil war with the previous ones was its outcome. Kolettis channeled the Rumeliot bands into the Peloponnese and devastated the channeled the Rumeliot bands into the Peloponnese and devastated the Kapodistrian troopsKapodistrian troops..
It was also Ve
It was also Velentzas’ time to shine once again. He inevitably benefited lentzas’ time to shine once ağain. He inevitably benefited from the military turmoil that presented him with another opportunity from the military turmoil that presented him with another opportunity to rise in the ranks of the Kolettist faction. This time, however, Velentzas to rise in the ranks of the Kolettist faction. This time, however, Velentzas was to become a much more influential captain due was to become a much more influential captain due to several reasons. to several reasons. After the death of Gouras, the military authority that he had taken in east-After the death of Gouras, the military authority that he had taken in east-ern Rumeli was divided among many Kolettist captains, such as ern Rumeli was divided amonğ many Kolettist captains, such as Vasos Vasos Mavrovouniotis, to whom Velentzas had become subordinate in Phthio-Mavrovouniotis, to whom Velentzas had become subordinate in Phthio-tis. Another reason for Veltis. Another reason for Velentzas’ rising star was probably his prior expe-entzas’ risinğ star was probably his prior expe-rience from the successful Rumeliot invasion in the Peloponnese during rience from the successful Rumeliot invasion in the Peloponnese durinğ the first civil warthe first civil war in 1825in 1825, , whichwhich enabled him to yield the trust of his su-enabled him to yield the trust of his su-periorsperiors for the upcoming military clashfor the upcominğ military clash. Kolettis had created h. Kolettis had created his admin-is admin-istrative commission in Perachora, from where Velentzas would receive istrative commission in Perachora, from where Velentzas would receive direct military orders. In a letter from late 1831, the committee ordered direct military orders. In a letter from late 1831, the committee ordered Velentzas to take his troops consisting of 150 men and come to defend Velentzas to take his troops consistinğ of 150 men and come to defend
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Perachora against the enemy camp.
Perachora ağainst the enemy camp.21 The fact that Velentzas had 150 men The fact that Velentzas had 150 men under his command is a significant indicator of the magnitude of the Ru-under his command is a siğnificant indicator of the mağnitude of the Ru-meliot invasion, considering that despite his rising starmeliot invasion, considerinğ that despite his risinğ star,, Velentzas was Velentzas was still a secondary figure in Rumeli and there were probably numerous still a secondary fiğure in Rumeli and there were probably numerous higherhiğher rarannking captains with significantly more men under their com-kinğ captains with siğnificantly more men under their com-mand. mand. It also further shows the ranks that Velentzas had achieved. It also further shows the ranks that Velentzas had achieved. In aIn an-n-otherother dispatch in January 1832, addressed to Velentzas and Klimakas, an-dispatch in January 1832, addressed to Velentzas and Klimakas, an-other captain under the Kolettist Mavrovouniotisother captain under the Kolettist Mavrovouniotis,,22 both men were both men were ordered to take their troops and combine their forces with the remaining ordered to take their troops and combine their forces with the remaininğ troops to crush the enemy.troops to crush the enemy.23 Kolettist captains gradually combining their Kolettist captains ğradually combininğ their forces further shows the quick evolution of the constitutionalist camp forces further shows the quick evolution of the constitutionalist camp into a military enterpriinto a military enterprise under the political patronage of Kolettis.se under the political patronağe of Kolettis.
After the victory in the third civil war, the triumphant Kolettis negoti-
After the victory in the third civil war, the triumphant Kolettis neğoti-ated with the residents of the three powers in his attempts to create a ated with the residents of the three powers in his attempts to create a governing commission to welcome the new King. The members of the ğoverninğ commission to welcome the new Kinğ. The members of the nnew commission were the following: Kolettis, Koundouriotis, Botsaris, D. ew commission were the followinğ: Kolettis, Koundouriotis, Botsaris, D. Ypsilantis, Zaimis, Metaxas and PlapYpsilantis, Zaimis, Metaxas and Plapooutas. utas. It wasIt was an attempt to incorpo-an attempt to incorpo-rate all foreign oriented partiesrate all foreiğn oriented parties under the political umbrella Kolettis tried under the political umbrella Kolettis tried to create.to create. Kolettis and KoundouriotisKolettis and Koundouriotis werewere from the French party, Zaimis from the French party, Zaimis from the English party, and Metaxas from the Russian party were in-from the Enğlish party, and Metaxas from the Russian party were in-cluded. The procluded. The pro--English Mavrokordatos was to be secretary of state. ThisEnğlish Mavrokordatos was to be secretary of state. This excessive reexcessive re--orientation of Greek politics according to their ties with for-orientation of Greek politics accordinğ to their ties with for-eign powerseiğn powers during the interregnumdurinğ the interreğnum was was remarked and criticizedremarked and criticized by Ve-by Ve-lentzas’ friend Makrygiannis in his memoirs as follows: “Later, you filled lentzas’ friend Makryğiannis in his memoirs as follows: “Later, you filled us up with factions us up with factions –– Dawkins wants uDawkins wants us to be English, Rouen French, and s to be Enğlish, Rouen French, and Katakazi Russian: and you leave not one Greek to himself.”Katakazi Russian: and you leave not one Greek to himself.”24 Despite this Despite this patriotic outcrypatriotic outcry,, however, he cannot help himself to play favorites among however, he cannot help himself to play favorites amonğ the three powers. the three powers. Makrygiannis wroteMakryğiannis wrote: :
21 “Administrative Committee to Velentzas“Administrative Committee to Velentzas,,” AA 74400 (5 Jan 1832)” AA 74400 (5 Jan 1832)..
22 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 138, 138..
23 “Administrative Committee to Velentzas and Klimakas“Administrative Committee to Velentzas and Klimakas,,” AA 74410 (6 Jan ” AA 74410 (6 Jan 1832)1832)..
24 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 146, 146..
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Our country owes great thanks to
Our country owes ğreat thanks to all its benefactors and especially all its benefactors and especially to the French commanders, those good, brave men. For what they to the French commanders, those ğood, brave men. For what they gave us was verily of great worth and they set us on our feet ğave us was verily of ğreat worth and they set us on our feet amidst our dangers and never resorted to deceit and guile to make amidst our danğers and never resorted to deceit and ğuile to make living brave men oppress the dlivinğ brave men oppress the dead and dying.ead and dyinğ.25
The reason of this confusing sentiment might be that Makrygiannis
The reason of this confusinğ sentiment miğht be that Makryğiannis was an ally of the French party despite his dislike was an ally of the French party despite his dislike ofof Kolettis. Another Kolettis. Another possible reason, in fact perhaps possible reason, in fact perhaps a a much more relevantmuch more relevant oneone, is the fact that , is the fact that Makrygiannis probably tMakryğiannis probably thoughthouğht of Fabvrier when he talkof Fabvrier when he talkeded about the about the brave French commander, with whom he took part in the defense of Ath-brave French commander, with whom he took part in the defense of Ath-ens against Ibrahim ens ağainst Ibrahim PPasha in 1826. He very well knew of the likes of asha in 1826. He very well knew of the likes of the the British Richard Church and Cochrane who also led Greek troops success-British Richard Church and Cochrane who also led Greek troops success-fufully against the Egyptian invasion. However, they were commanding the lly ağainst the Eğyptian invasion. However, they were commandinğ the troops of the protroops of the pro--English faction and operating mostly in western Rumeli Enğlish faction and operatinğ mostly in western Rumeli and the islands, where Makrygiannis was less politically invested com-and the islands, where Makryğiannis was less politically invested com-pared to eastern Rumeli, where most of his popared to eastern Rumeli, where most of his political alliances had taken litical alliances had taken place. place. These are further indicators that regional entrenchment of politi-These are further indicators that reğional entrenchment of politi-cal factions in Greece towards 1832 was strong.cal factions in Greece towards 1832 was stronğ.
Despite his attachment to eastern Rumeli and the French party,
Despite his attachment to eastern Rumeli and the French party, Makrygiannis became a political rival of Makryğiannis became a political rival of Kolettis. This would be a crucial Kolettis. This would be a crucial detail in Velentzas’ future operations in a way that the latter’s loyalty to detail in Velentzas’ future operations in a way that the latter’s loyalty to Kolettis would often lead him to exclude his friend Makrygiannis from his Kolettis would often lead him to exclude his friend Makryğiannis from his military exploits in the future. Makrygiannis would eventually become amilitary exploits in the future. Makryğiannis would eventually become a dissident to whoever assumed power in Greece. He describedissident to whoever assumed power in Greece. He describedd the various the various politicians in Greecepoliticians in Greece,, Mavrokordatos, Metaxas, Kolettis, and Kapodistrias Mavrokordatos, Metaxas, Kolettis, and Kapodistrias in that orderin that order as follows: as follows:
The cannibals begrudged us this and sowed amongst us the seeds
The cannibals beğrudğed us this and sowed amonğst us the seeds of their own virtue,of their own virtue, dissension, faction, espionage, all their own dissension, faction, espionağe, all their own uncleanliness and made our country an old straw dummy with the uncleanliness and made our country an old straw dummy with the enlightenment of the Phanari, the virtue of Cephalonia, and the enliğhtenment of the Phanari, the virtue of Cephalonia, and the
25 Ibid. 145Ibid. 145..
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qualities of the pupil of Ali Pasha, and the great Philosopher of
qualities of the pupil of Ali Pasha, and the ğreat Philosopher of Corfu.”Corfu.”26
Despi
Despite Rumeliot victory, fierce rivalries continued to prevent a po-te Rumeliot victory, fierce rivalries continued to prevent a po-litical order before the arrival of the king. Due to several conflicting inter-litical order before the arrival of the kinğ. Due to several conflictinğ inter-ests, the ruling commission was reduced to three members consisting of ests, the rulinğ commission was reduced to three members consistinğ of Kolettis, Zaimis, and Metaxas, again one repKolettis, Zaimis, and Metaxas, ağain one representative from each party. resentative from each party. Velentzas was still providing a military muscle to the Kolettist faction and Velentzas was still providinğ a military muscle to the Kolettist faction and was officially congratulated by the commission inwas officially conğratulated by the commission in 1832 for his services.1832 for his services.27
T
The extended presence and plunder of the Rumeliot troops made Pel-he extended presence and plunder of the Rumeliot troops made Pel-oponnesiaoponnesian chieftains like Kolokotronis once again heroes in the eyes of n chieftains like Kolokotronis once ağain heroes in the eyes of the peasantry and strengthened Peloponnesian sentimentality. On top of the peasantry and strenğthened Peloponnesian sentimentality. On top of that, there emerged a principal conflict among the constitutionalistthat, there emerğed a principal conflict amonğ the constitutionalist camp camp as wellas well. The French party led by Kolettis was i. The French party led by Kolettis was in favor of the promulgation n favor of the promulğation of a constitution before the arrival of the of a constitution before the arrival of the kking, presenting him with a fait inğ, presentinğ him with a fait accompli, while the English party of the moderate Mavrokordatos sup-accompli, while the Enğlish party of the moderate Mavrokordatos sup-ported the idea that it should be in the King’s authority as well as the ported the idea that it should be in the Kinğ’s authority as well as the nations to nations to decide on the constitution.decide on the constitution.28 In the end, the latter camp pre-In the end, the latter camp pre-vailed but the country would have to wait another decade for a constitu-vailed but the country would have to wait another decade for a constitu-tion under the Bavarian monarchy.tion under the Bavarian monarchy.
§
§ 4.34.3 The Regency of the Bavarians and the Armansperg Re-The Reğency of the Bavarians and the Armansperğ Re-gime (1833ğime (1833--1837)1837)
In January 1833, Otto von Wittelsbach, the seventeen
In January 1833, Otto von Wittelsbach, the seventeen--yearyear--old new old new King of Greece arrived at Nafplion along with Kinğ of Greece arrived at Nafplion alonğ with the the members of his Regency members of his Reğency council. The sovereignty of the Greek Kingdom was guaranteed by Brit-council. The sovereiğnty of the Greek Kinğdom was ğuaranteed by Brit-ain, France, and Russia, and the thrain, France, and Russia, and the threee guarantor e ğuarantor powers promised a loan powers promised a loan of 60.000.000 Francs that was to be transferred in three sepof 60.000.000 Francs that was to be transferred in three sepaarate rate
26 Ibid.Ibid. 148148..
27 “Administrative Committee to Velentzas” AA 68054 (1 Feb 1832)“Administrative Committee to Velentzas” AA 68054 (1 Feb 1832)..
28 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 131, 131..
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installments. Yet only the first installment of 20.000.000 was guaranteed,
installments. Yet only the first installment of 20.000.000 was ğuaranteed, and the fate of next two installments would in the following years be and the fate of next two installments would in the followinğ years be practically conditionepractically conditioned on the three powers’ separate demands from the d on the three powers’ separate demands from the Greek government. This relationship with the guarantor powers would Greek ğovernment. This relationship with the ğuarantor powers would result for the next years, in the words of Petropoulos, “to recommenda-result for the next years, in the words of Petropoulos, “to recommenda-tions which amounted to the demand for a privileged position both fortions which amounted to the demand for a privileğed position both for its minister in Athens, and for the Greek party which it patronizedits minister in Athens, and for the Greek party which it patronized.”.”29 Do-Do-mestically, the real power would be held by the members of the regency mestically, the real power would be held by the members of the reğency council, who had been appointed by Otto’s father Ludwig, King of Bavaria. council, who had been appointed by Otto’s father Ludwiğ, Kinğ of Bavaria. The London The London TTreaty of 7 May 1832, thareaty of 7 May 1832, that determined these developments t determined these developments had made Greecehad made Greece,, in the words of Nicholas Kaltchas “in the words of Nicholas Kaltchas “aa Bavarian protec-Bavarian protec-torate under the suzerain control implicit in the ambiguous ‘guarantee’ torate under the suzerain control implicit in the ambiğuous ‘ğuarantee’ of the three powers.”of the three powers.”30 The three regents were Count Joseph von Armans-The three reğents were Count Joseph von Armans-perg, Generalperğ, General Karl Wilhelm von Heideck, and Professor Ludwig von Karl Wilhelm von Heideck, and Professor Ludwiğ von Maurer. Armansperg was to be first among equals in the counsel, and in Maurer. Armansperğ was to be first amonğ equals in the counsel, and in the following years, he would become one of the most influential actors the followinğ years, he would become one of the most influential actors in Greek politics. in Greek politics.
The Bavarians had also brought with thems
The Bavarians had also brouğht with themselves Bavarian troops con-elves Bavarian troops con-sisting of 3.500 men to protect the regime as well as to oversee the organ-sistinğ of 3.500 men to protect the reğime as well as to oversee the orğan-ization of a regular Greek army. ization of a reğular Greek army. According to Roderick Beaton, the na-Accordinğ to Roderick Beaton, the na-tional army had tional army had receivedreceived the highest priority, and the hiğhest priority, and since the borders of the since the borders of the new kingdom new kinğdom were internationally guaranteed, were internationally ğuaranteed, the purpose of the purpose of the new the new regime’s reğime’s investinvestmentsments in thein the armyarmy was not was not strengthening strenğtheninğ thethe protectprotection ion ofof the countrythe country. The aim of investing so heavily in the military was to elim-. The aim of investinğ so heavily in the military was to elim-inate local power bases and the irregular military eleminate local power bases and the irreğular military element in the prov-ent in the prov-inces.inces.31
Similar to Kapodistrias, the Bavarian regency, especially Armansperg
Similar to Kapodistrias, the Bavarian reğency, especially Armansperğ were principally not against a constitution and were principally not ağainst a constitution and a a national assembly, but national assembly, but as a contrast as a contrast deployed absolutist policiesdeployed absolutist policies in practice. They had arrived in in practice. They had arrived in
29 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 146. 146..
30 Nicholas Kaltchas, Nicholas Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern GreeceIntroduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece. (New . (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 91York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 91--9292..
31 Roderick Beaton, Roderick Beaton, Greece, Biography of a Modern NationGreece, Biography of a Modern Nation. (Chicago: The University of Chi-. (Chicağo: The University of Chi-cago Press, 2019), 117cağo Press, 2019), 117..
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Greece in the
Greece in the aftermath of a bloody civil war that destroyed the country, aftermath of a bloody civil war that destroyed the country, hence they believed that a national assembly that would presumably be hence they believed that a national assembly that would presumably be filled with the traditional elite would inevitably lead to a similar political filled with the traditional elite would inevitably lead to a similar political chaos. Furthermore, the regency deployed a polichaos. Furthermore, the reğency deployed a policy of employing Bavari-cy of employinğ Bavari-ans in state service due to their belief in accordance with the nineteenthans in state service due to their belief in accordance with the nineteenth--century understanding, that the source of civilization was Europe, and century understandinğ, that the source of civilization was Europe, and creating a modern and civilized state could only be possible with Euro-creatinğ a modern and civilized state could only be possible with Euro-pean assistance. Tpean assistance. This his belief belief has has also also been explicitly mentioned by Maurer, been explicitly mentioned by Maurer, one of the regents, who went even one step further to argue that it should one of the reğents, who went even one step further to arğue that it should be Germans specifically who should assume this “responsibilitybe Germans specifically who should assume this “responsibility..””32 This This nepotism towards Bavarians in key positions would unnepotism towards Bavarians in key positions would understandably lead derstandably lead to conflicts with local actors in the next years. to conflicts with local actors in the next years.
The policy of the regency regarding the traditional parties was to get
The policy of the reğency reğardinğ the traditional parties was to ğet rid of them by gradually eliminating the social circumstances that gave rid of them by ğradually eliminatinğ the social circumstances that ğave them strength. One of the first actions takethem strenğth. One of the first actions taken by the regency was issuing n by the reğency was issuinğ decrees that ordered the disbanding of irregular bands.decrees that ordered the disbandinğ of irreğular bands.33 Throughout the Throuğhout the revolutionary years and the interregnum in 1831revolutionary years and the interreğnum in 1831--1832, the number of 1832, the number of armed men especially in Rumeli had increased immensely, many of armed men especially in Rumeli had increased immensely, many of whom had come from lanwhom had come from lands north to the border that remained within Ot-ds north to the border that remained within Ot-toman borders. These men were without home or land, and particularly toman borders. These men were without home or land, and particularly prone to entering the patronage of traditional politicians. prone to enterinğ the patronağe of traditional politicians. AAfter 1833fter 1833, with , with the end of the war, as well as the civil wars, mthe end of the war, as well as the civil wars, many irregular fiany irreğular fighters from ğhters from disbanded bands took to the modisbanded bands took to the mouuntains and became brigands along the ntains and became briğands alonğ the mountainous border zone in Thessaly or crossed the border to seek em-mountainous border zone in Thessaly or crossed the border to seek em-ployment as captains under the Ottoman provincial security system, ployment as captains under the Ottoman provincial security system, which they which they had beenhad been familiar with. Presumfamiliar with. Presumably, until that point, they had ably, until that point, they had been expecting a kind of future along this line in Greece too. been expectinğ a kind of future alonğ this line in Greece too.
Seeing
Seeinğ thatthat civilian life was not an attractive option for the irregular civilian life was not an attractive option for the irreğular troops in Rumeli, the Greek government created the skirmisher troops to troops in Rumeli, the Greek ğovernment created the skirmisher troops to incorporate thincorporate these Rumeliots. Among the captains hired to command ese Rumeliots. Amonğ the captains hired to command
32 Maurer, Griechische Volk, II, 39Maurer, Griechische Volk, II, 39--40. In Petropoulos, 40. In Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. . 162162..
33 ““Government Gazette, 8 March 1933, decree of 2 March 1833.Government Gazette, 8 March 1933, decree of 2 March 1833.”” In Koliopoulos, In Koliopoulos, Brigands Brigands with a Cause,with a Cause, 7676..
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these units in Rumeli were Makrygiannis, Dyovouniotis, and Velentzas
these units in Rumeli were Makryğiannis, Dyovouniotis, and Velentzas,,34 who had been part of Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction up until that point. These who had been part of Kolettis’ Rumeliot faction up until that point. These men were among the seconmen were amonğ the seconddary figures within their political camp. They ary fiğures within their political camp. They had been commanding the troops necessary for the military muscle of had been commandinğ the troops necessary for the military muscle of their factions, and took orders from the their factions, and took orders from the traditional political leaders, traditional political leaders, whose influence the regency wanted to decrease. Therefore, the attempts whose influence the reğency wanted to decrease. Therefore, the attempts at incorporating secondary figures into the gendarmerie and skirmisher at incorporatinğ secondary fiğures into the ğendarmerie and skirmisher troops had two objectives: eliminating banditry in Rumeli through open-troops had two objectives: eliminatinğ banditry in Rumeli throuğh open-ing state spinğ state sponsored employment to those having potential to resort to onsored employment to those havinğ potential to resort to banditry; and gradually taking away the parties’ military muscle at the banditry; and ğradually takinğ away the parties’ military muscle at the provincial level. With this program the ultimate goal was to bring all do-provincial level. With this proğram the ultimate ğoal was to brinğ all do-mestic parties behind the crown, and to prevent intermestic parties behind the crown, and to prevent interferences from for-ferences from for-eign powers through these parties that they were patronizing. eiğn powers throuğh these parties that they were patronizinğ.
In this new political environment, Kolettis became member of a short
In this new political environment, Kolettis became member of a short--lived cabinet for a brief period in 1833, and he probably had been influen-lived cabinet for a brief period in 1833, and he probably had been influen-ttial in the appointment of Velential in the appointment of Velentzas as captain of a skirmisher unit, where zas as captain of a skirmisher unit, where he remained until at least 1835 when Kolettis was sent to Paris as ambas-he remained until at least 1835 when Kolettis was sent to Paris as ambas-sador of Greece as honorary exile. In the years 1833sador of Greece as honorary exile. In the years 1833--34, however, Kolettis 34, however, Kolettis was on the rise. In 1833, the government arrested leaders of the Rwas on the rise. In 1833, the ğovernment arrested leaders of the Russian ussian party, such as Kolokotronis and Tzavelas, with the accusation of organiz-party, such as Kolokotronis and Tzavelas, with the accusation of orğaniz-ing an uprising against the monarchy. Theinğ an uprisinğ ağainst the monarchy. Thesese arrests and accusations were arrests and accusations were protested by the Russian minister to Athens, Katakazy.protested by the Russian minister to Athens, Katakazy.35 Through an ar-Throuğh an ar-bitrary trial process, the accusedbitrary trial process, the accused were sentenced to death, but they were were sentenced to death, but they were eventually pardoned by the King, giving the inevitable impreeventually pardoned by the Kinğ, ğivinğ the inevitable impresssion of a sion of a staged plan to intimidate the Russian party. In late 1833, the Maniots re-stağed plan to intimidate the Russian party. In late 1833, the Maniots re-volted partly as avolted partly as a protest to the Kolokotronis trial, but also as a protest to the Kolokotronis trial, but also as a reacreactiontion againstağainst the regency’s attempts to integrate Manithe reğency’s attempts to inteğrate Mani, an attempt that had , an attempt that had eventually cost Kapodistrias his lifeeventually cost Kapodistrias his life. .
In the following year
In the followinğ year,, a larger revolt erupted in the Peloponnesian re-a larğer revolt erupted in the Peloponnesian re-gion of Messinia that took six weeks to be crushed by the government. Tğion of Messinia that took six weeks to be crushed by the ğovernment. To o supsupppress the revolt, which coincided wress the revolt, which coincided wiith Kolettis’ tenure as minister of th Kolettis’ tenure as minister of
34 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause,, 8080..
35 Frary, Frary, Russia and Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identitythe Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 81, 81..
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interior, the government employed Rumeliots to fight the rebels. These
interior, the ğovernment employed Rumeliots to fiğht the rebels. These series of events had been useful to Kolettis to such an extent that rumors series of events had been useful to Kolettis to such an extent that rumors had had circulated that circulated that KolettisKolettis had lhad let the revolt to break out despite having et the revolt to break out despite havinğ known the of the plans.known the of the plans.36 He was entrusted with the suppression of the He was entrusted with the suppression of the revolt by Armansperg who knew that the Rumeliot Kolettis had every revolt by Armansperğ who knew that the Rumeliot Kolettis had every reason to act against the rebels of Peloponnese, the region which was also reason to act ağainst the rebels of Peloponnese, the reğion which was also the stronghold of the Russian party. These series of developments shthe stronğhold of the Russian party. These series of developments show ow that within a year, the factions/partiesthat within a year, the factions/parties, whom, whom the regency had principally the reğency had principally aimed at destroying, showed strong signs of appropriating the new polit-aimed at destroyinğ, showed stronğ siğns of appropriatinğ the new polit-ical mechanisms in independent Greece.ical mechanisms in independent Greece.
After the suppression of the revolts in the Peloponnese, the relatio
After the suppression of the revolts in the Peloponnese, the relation-n-ship between Armanspertg and Kolettis regressed and the two became ship between Armanspertğ and Kolettis reğressed and the two became political rivals. In 1835, leading politicians from the three parties were political rivals. In 1835, leadinğ politicians from the three parties were sent as ministers to European capitals, in order to cut their ties with their sent as ministers to European capitals, in order to cut their ties with their local strongholds. Kolettis was senlocal stronğholds. Kolettis was sent to Paris, which agitated his followers. t to Paris, which ağitated his followers. In a letter from December 1835, Velentzas reIn a letter from December 1835, Velentzas re--emphasized his devotion to emphasized his devotion to Kolettis despite his upcoming absence from the domestic political scene Kolettis despite his upcominğ absence from the domestic political scene and wished his quick return to Greece. Following these tributary re-and wished his quick return to Greece. Followinğ these tributary re-marmarks, the letter goes on to reveal its true intention. Velentzas complains ks, the letter ğoes on to reveal its true intention. Velentzas complains that following Kolettis’ departure, the government has appointed him to that followinğ Kolettis’ departure, the ğovernment has appointed him to be stationed in Argolis, which is on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese, be stationed in Arğolis, which is on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese, sepsepaarating him from Rumeli and signaratinğ him from Rumeli and siğnaling the plans of gradually breaking linğ the plans of ğradually breakinğ down traditional networks.down traditional networks.37 He served there until 1836, when he joined He served there until 1836, when he joined the newly created national guards in eastern Rumeli, under the command the newly created national ğuards in eastern Rumeli, under the command of Vasos Mavrovouniotis, a Kolettist chieftain. The national guards were of Vasos Mavrovouniotis, a Kolettist chieftain. The national ğuards were crecreated with the recruitment of Rumeliot irregulars to maintain order in ated with the recruitment of Rumeliot irreğulars to maintain order in Rumeli after the outbreak of the Acarnania revolt in 1836. Vasos was com-Rumeli after the outbreak of the Acarnania revolt in 1836. Vasos was com-missioned to recruit two thousand men with monthly payment, and Ve-missioned to recruit two thousand men with monthly payment, and Ve-lentzas immediately applied to be recruited by Vlentzas immediately applied to be recruited by Vasos, whose area of op-asos, whose area of op-eration in eastern Rumeli was close to the area in Thessaly where eration in eastern Rumeli was close to the area in Thessaly where
36 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 223. 223..
37 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 68823 (7/19 December 1835)“Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 68823 (7/19 December 1835)..
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Velentzas was from.
Velentzas was from.38 Velentzas remained to be stationed here until 1840, Velentzas remained to be stationed here until 1840, the same year he would launch his irredentist foray from the same area.the same year he would launch his irredentist foray from the same area.
The Acarnania revolt i
The Acarnania revolt in February 1836 signaled a political turning n February 1836 siğnaled a political turninğ point for Greece, domestically as well as internationally. During the ab-point for Greece, domestically as well as internationally. Durinğ the ab-sesennce of Ottoce of Otto, who had been visiting Bavaria, who had been visitinğ Bavaria between 1836between 1836--1837, Armans-1837, Armans-perg became the most influential politician in Athens. After the episperğ became the most influential politician in Athens. After the episodes odes with the Russian party andwith the Russian party and the conflict with the conflict with Kolettis, Armansperg in-Kolettis, Armansperğ in-creasingly leaned diplomatically towards Britain with the help of the new creasinğly leaned diplomatically towards Britain with the help of the new British minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons, who in return presented British minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons, who in return presented Armanpserg to London as a skillful libeArmanpserğ to London as a skillful liberal leaderral leader..39 The increasing ties of The increasinğ ties of the the Bavarian regimeBavarian reğime with Britain has come to the attention of the other with Britain has come to the attention of the other guarantor powers, and it appears that it created such an inconvenience ğuarantor powers, and it appears that it created such an inconvenience that the French and Russian ministers to Athens held secret meetings dis-that the French and Russian ministers to Athens held secret meetinğs dis-cusscussing the future of the monainğ the future of the monarrchy, as well as the possibility of replacing chy, as well as the possibility of replacinğ the the kking with a relative of Louis Phillipe, in order to counter British influ-inğ with a relative of Louis Phillipe, in order to counter British influ-ence in Greece, and consequently the Near East.ence in Greece, and consequently the Near East.40 The instigators of the The instiğators of the Acarnania revolt that erupted withAcarnania revolt that erupted within this political climate had strong in this political climate had stronğ party affiliations, such as Nicholas Zervas from the Kolettist French party, party affiliations, such as Nicholas Zervas from the Kolettist French party, and Malamos from the Russian party. It is also rumored that among the and Malamos from the Russian party. It is also rumored that amonğ the instigators were other chieftinstiğators were other chieftaains such as Grivas, Tzavelas, and Vasos, ains such as Grivas, Tzavelas, and Vasos, all ll of whom are associated with either the Russian or French party.of whom are associated with either the Russian or French party.
Apart from its party affiliations, one reason for the revolt is believed
Apart from its party affiliations, one reason for the revolt is believed to be the confrontation between the regency’s attempts to intervene in to be the confrontation between the reğency’s attempts to intervene in local customs, and the reactionary position olocal customs, and the reactionary position of the population in Rumeli. f the population in Rumeli. In 1835, the government had issued a new sheep tax per head,In 1835, the ğovernment had issued a new sheep tax per head,41 as part of as part of its policy to decrease nomadic pastoralism in the mountains of Rumeli, its policy to decrease nomadic pastoralism in the mountains of Rumeli, and force pastoralists to settle in order to facilitate order in the northern and force pastoralists to settle in order to facilitate order in the northern frontfrontier. In the winter of 1835ier. In the winter of 1835--36 the situation became even more tense 36 the situation became even more tense when the government decided to appropriate pastureland as national when the ğovernment decided to appropriate pastureland as national
38 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 91, 91..
39 “Lyons to Palmerston” FO 32.52 (2 June 1835). In Petropoulos, “Lyons to Palmerston” FO 32.52 (2 June 1835). In Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 244. 244..
40 B.O.A. HAT 1218, 47703 [29 Zilhicce 1251 (16 April 1836)]B.O.A. HAT 1218, 47703 [29 Zilhicce 1251 (16 April 1836)]..
41 Government Gazette, 17/13 May 1835, decree of 8 April 1835. In Koliopoulos, Government Gazette, 17/13 May 1835, decree of 8 April 1835. In Koliopoulos, Brigands Brigands with a Causewith a Cause, 84, 84..
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estate.
estate.42 The government’s decisions to ignore decades old local customs The ğovernment’s decisions to iğnore decades old local customs had also agitated the military element in Rumeli had also ağitated the military element in Rumeli that participated in the that participated in the revolt. Many participants were dissatisfied with their role in the new revolt. Many participants were dissatisfied with their role in the new army and gendarmerie corps. They resented taking orders from Bavarian army and ğendarmerie corps. They resented takinğ orders from Bavarian officials, and the western inspired military duties such as wearing mili-officials, and the western inspired military duties such as wearinğ mili-tary uniforms and tary uniforms and drills. The antidrills. The anti--Bavarian motivations of the revolt is Bavarian motivations of the revolt is also explicitly cited by the participants of the revolt who later took refuge also explicitly cited by the participants of the revolt who later took refuğe on the Ottoman side of the frontier.on the Ottoman side of the frontier.43 VelentzasVelentzas,, too, in one of the letters too, in one of the letters in which he describes the situation in Greece in which he describes the situation in Greece during the same period to durinğ the same period to Kolettis, complains of Armansperg and invites the recipient to take action Kolettis, complains of Armansperğ and invites the recipient to take action against him.ağainst him.44 In fact, many believe that another cause of the revolt was In fact, many believe that another cause of the revolt was the anger of Rumeliot pallikars regarding the dismissal of Kolettis, their the anğer of Rumeliot pallikars reğardinğ the dismissal of Kolettis, their patronpatron, from the government., from the ğovernment.45
The national guards which
The national ğuards which laterlater became the frontier guards after became the frontier ğuards after 1838, in which Velentzas became a captain under the command of Vasos 1838, in which Velentzas became a captain under the command of Vasos was result of this revolt. Upon the inability of the was result of this revolt. Upon the inability of the newly created regular newly created reğular armyarmy led by Bavarian officialsled by Bavarian officials to supto supppress the revolt, Armansperg real-ress the revolt, Armansperğ real-ized theized the necessity to take a step back and come to terms with the tradi-necessity to take a step back and come to terms with the tradi-tional military element of Rumeli. Instead of the Bavarian troops, Rume-tional military element of Rumeli. Instead of the Bavarian troops, Rume-liot chieftains such as Vasos, Grivas and Tzavelas were commisliot chieftains such as Vasos, Grivas and Tzavelas were commisssioned to ioned to recruit their own irregular soldiers and suppress recruit their own irreğular soldiers and suppress the revolt. It worked the revolt. It worked because in addition to their better knowledge of the local terrain and the because in addition to their better knowledğe of the local terrain and the military tactics that the rebels were using, their corps were providing an military tactics that the rebels were usinğ, their corps were providinğ an opportunity of the type of military employment that the rebels or poten-opportunity of the type of military employment that the rebels or poten-tial rebels wtial rebels would prefer. The employment of potentially dangerous irreg-ould prefer. The employment of potentially danğerous irreğ-ular captains proved to be an effective measure to create orderular captains proved to be an effective measure to create order.. HHowever owever it also provided a space for them to recreate their military clientele. In it also provided a space for them to recreate their military clientele. In other words, “other words, “their very existence was perpetuatintheir very existence was perpetuating the dangerous social ğ the danğerous social elements in the countryside that the regime had an interest in elements in the countryside that the reğime had an interest in
42 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, , 8888..
43 B.O.A. HAT 1218, 47703 [29 Zilhicce 1251 (16 April 1836)]B.O.A. HAT 1218, 47703 [29 Zilhicce 1251 (16 April 1836)]..
44 “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 75517 (11/23 March 1836) “Velentzas to Kolettis” AA 75517 (11/23 March 1836) ..
45 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 227. 227..
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suppressing and principles that were
suppressinğ and principles that were ccontrary to its most fundamental ontrary to its most fundamental objectives.”objectives.”46
The Acarnania revolt shows that the formal political program of the
The Acarnania revolt shows that the formal political proğram of the Bavarians, and tBavarians, and their actual practice would inevitably differ in many in-heir actual practice would inevitably differ in many in-stances. Despite the formal adaptation of a western institutional frame-stances. Despite the formal adaptation of a western institutional frame-work by the Bavarian dominated monarchy, at the local level, traditional work by the Bavarian dominated monarchy, at the local level, traditional power structures and networks of patronage remained unchapower structures and networks of patronağe remained unchanged in the nğed in the long run.lonğ run.47 In the next years, local powerbrokers managed to appropriate In the next years, local powerbrokers manağed to appropriate the state machinery in many cases and reversed their roles. the state machinery in many cases and reversed their roles. Despite their Despite their serious initial attempts, tserious initial attempts, the inability of the Bavarian monarchy to create he inability of the Bavarian monarchy to create a monopoly on means ofa monopoly on means of coercion by eliminating traditional military coercion by eliminatinğ traditional military forces resulted in instances in which the monarchy itself became the cli-forces resulted in instances in which the monarchy itself became the cli-ent of protection provided by the irregular military element, as a form of ent of protection provided by the irreğular military element, as a form of ‘inverse racketeering’‘inverse racketeerinğ’,,48 which was not that different from howwhich was not that different from how the Otto-the Otto-man rule had functionedman rule had functioned in the region. in the reğion. This hypothesis is further sup-This hypothesis is further sup-ported by the fact that ported by the fact that Rumeliot chieftainsRumeliot chieftains such as such as Theodoros Theodoros Grivas are Grivas are believed to have encouraged the groups that created disorder in the re-believed to have encourağed the ğroups that created disorder in the re-gion in order to force the governmeğion in order to force the ğovernment to ask for nt to ask for hishis service, hence gaining service, hence ğaininğ the permission to form bands of irregular soldiers in their province and the permission to form bands of irreğular soldiers in their province and regain their positions of local patrons.reğain their positions of local patrons.49 The change of attitude by the re-The chanğe of attitude by the re-gime towards the traditional military element is noteworthy ğime towards the traditional military element is noteworthy in termin terms ofs of showing its resilience. According to Makrigiannis, in 1833, he showinğ its resilience. Accordinğ to Makriğiannis, in 1833, he had beenhad been told by Heideck, member of the Bavarian regency, that his position in told by Heideck, member of the Bavarian reğency, that his position in terms of the reward that shall be given to the veteran captains is “A dry terms of the reward that shall be ğiven to the veteran captains is “A dry bone to worry at, till their teeth bone to worry at, till their teeth are worn out.”are worn out.”50 In less than five years In less than five years
46 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Brigands with a CauseCause, 83, 83..
47 Kostas B. Kostis, “The formation of the state in Greece, 1830Kostas B. Kostis, “The formation of the state in Greece, 1830––1914” in 1914” in Citizenship and the Citizenship and the NationNation--State in Greece and TurkeyState in Greece and Turkey ed. Dragona, Thaleia, and Faruk Birtek. (London: ed. Drağona, Thaleia, and Faruk Birtek. (London: Routledge, 2005), 19Routledğe, 2005), 19..
48 Achilles Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch Achilles Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch a Thief: Statea Thief: State--Building and the Employment of Buildinğ and the Employment of Irregular Military Formations in MidIrreğular Military Formations in Mid--NineteenthNineteenth--Century Greece” in Century Greece” in Irregular Armed Irregular Armed Bands and Their Role in Politics and State FormationBands and Their Role in Politics and State Formation ed. Diane E. Davis, and Anthony W. ed. Diane E. Davis, and Anthony W. Pereira. (New York: Cambridge UniversitPereira. (New York: Cambridğe University Press, 2003), 150y Press, 2003), 150..
49 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 85, 85..
50 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 152, 152..
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after this conversation, the regime had managed to exile away the party
after this conversation, the reğime had manağed to exile away the party leaders such as Kolettis, but leaders such as Kolettis, but captains within captains within their military clientele such their military clientele such as Velentzas and Vasos, had become an indispensable element for theas Velentzas and Vasos, had become an indispensable element for the se-se-curity of the countrycurity of the country..
§
§ 4.44.4 Otto’s Absolute Rule and the “Dilemma of Neutrality” Otto’s Absolute Rule and the “Dilemma of Neutrality” (1837(1837--1840)1840)
In 1837, upon his return to the country, Otto, now an adult, dismissed
In 1837, upon his return to the country, Otto, now an adult, dismissed Armansperg Armansperğ as first chancelloras first chancellor, and abolished the office altogether, initi-, and abolished the office altoğether, initi-ating the period of his absolutatinğ the period of his absolutee rule in Greece. The dilemma in which Otto rule in Greece. The dilemma in which Otto found himself as a result was similafound himself as a result was similar to that of Kapodistrias a decade ear-r to that of Kapodistrias a decade ear-lier: The question of how to create a loyal following around the crown lier: The question of how to create a loyal followinğ around the crown that would provide the necessary political infrastructure. In contrast to that would provide the necessary political infrastructure. In contrast to Kapodiastrias, who chose to patronize one particular party at the ex-Kapodiastrias, who chose to patronize one particular party at the ex-pensepense of alienating of alienatinğ otherother sectionsectionss of the society, Otto decided to assume of the society, Otto decided to assume a role of arbitration between the parties, giving each of them representa-a role of arbitration between the parties, ğivinğ each of them representa-tion in the administration in different periods, thus alsotion in the administration in different periods, thus also aiming toaiminğ to satisfy satisfy the periodic demands of the powers ththe periodic demands of the powers that were sponsoring them.at were sponsorinğ them.51 In a In a sense, from a starting point that aimed to break down traditional patronsense, from a startinğ point that aimed to break down traditional patron--client relationships in Greece, the monarchy ended up becoming the big-client relationships in Greece, the monarchy ended up becominğ the biğ-gest patron of them all. Otto ğest patron of them all. Otto managed to manağed to creatcreatee a loyal personal following a loyal personal followinğ from tfrom the likes of Kolokotronis, Mavromichalis, Kountouhe likes of Kolokotronis, Mavromichalis, Kountourriotis, Zaimis, iotis, Zaimis, Tzavelas, and BotsarisTzavelas, and Botsaris.. All of these menAll of these men had been influentialhad been influential figures fiğures from from the period preceding the war of independence, many of whom having the period precedinğ the war of independence, many of whom havinğ been persons of power within the Ottoman been persons of power within the Ottoman provincialprovincial administrative administrative ma-ma-chinerychinery. With their association on a personal level with the crown, they . With their association on a personal level with the crown, they gained the social respectability that they had been pursuing throughout ğained the social respectability that they had been pursuinğ throuğhout the revolutionary years. Kitsos Tzavelas, and Kostas Botsaris, members the revolutionary years. Kitsos Tzavelas, and Kostas Botsaris, members
51 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 288, 288..
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of the two Souliot clans from the times of Ali
of the two Souliot clans from the times of Ali Pasha, had even become Pasha, had even become Otto’s aidesOtto’s aides--de camp. de camp.
Among the reasons behind Otto’s decision to refrain from an exclusive
Amonğ the reasons behind Otto’s decision to refrain from an exclusive affiliation with a particular party was the need to secure the next two in-affiliation with a particular party was the need to secure the next two in-stallments of the loan. The second and third installments had alrestallments of the loan. The second and third installments had already ady come to be at risk due to Armansperg’s procome to be at risk due to Armansperğ’s pro--English policies eventually Enğlish policies eventually resulting in the governments of France and Russia deciding to withhold resultinğ in the ğovernments of France and Russia decidinğ to withhold their share of the loan in 1836. Fratheir share of the loan in 1836. Frannce’s consecutive foreign ministers, De ce’s consecutive foreiğn ministers, De Broglie, and Thiers had presented Broğlie, and Thiers had presented Greece with a series of political de-Greece with a series of political de-mands in 1835mands in 1835--1836, which included the return of Kolettis to Greece and 1836, which included the return of Kolettis to Greece and his appointment as head of government.his appointment as head of ğovernment.52 It is safe to assume that Ko-It is safe to assume that Ko-lettis’ presence in Paris had an influence on antilettis’ presence in Paris had an influence on anti--Bavarianism Bavarianism ofof the the French goFrench ğovernment, and he was continuing his opposition from abroad. vernment, and he was continuinğ his opposition from abroad. Despite his efforts from abroad, and the letters in which he assures the Despite his efforts from abroad, and the letters in which he assures the king that he is making efforts to convince the French government to grant kinğ that he is makinğ efforts to convince the French ğovernment to ğrant the third installment of the loan,the third installment of the loan,53 Kolettis remKolettis remained in France, and Otto’s ained in France, and Otto’s absolutist rule continued until 1843absolutist rule continued until 1843..
In the late 1830s, Otto decided to appease to Russia by bringing key
In the late 1830s, Otto decided to appease to Russia by brinğinğ key members of the Russian party into administrative posts such as Paikos as members of the Russian party into administrative posts such as Paikos as foreign minister and Glarakis as minister of intforeiğn minister and Glarakis as minister of interior. He also appointed erior. He also appointed certain secondary figures from the French party and tried to not isolate certain secondary fiğures from the French party and tried to not isolate France altogether in the pursuit of seeking Russian support for his re-France altoğether in the pursuit of seekinğ Russian support for his re-gime.ğime.54 DomesticallyDomestically,, too, the Russian party increasingly became a much too, the Russian party increasinğly became a much safer ally for Osafer ally for Otto, due to its popular support among the peasantry, its tto, due to its popular support amonğ the peasantry, its strong Orthodox identification that could protect the still catholic king stronğ Orthodox identification that could protect the still catholic kinğ from a religious opposition, and it being the party with the least associa-from a reliğious opposition, and it beinğ the party with the least associa-tion with constitutionalism. The ascendancy of the tion with constitutionalism. The ascendancy of the Russian party would Russian party would continue until 1839, when the socontinue until 1839, when the so--called “Philorthodox society” conspiracy called “Philorthodox society” conspiracy turned the king against the Russian party. turned the kinğ ağainst the Russian party.
52 Ibid. 260Ibid. 260..
53 “Kolettis to Otto” “Kolettis to Otto” ΑΑ 66854 (ΑΑ 66854 (Undated)Undated)..
54 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 303, 303..
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In late 1839, a secret society called the “Philorthodox Society” had
In late 1839, a secret society called the “Philorthodox Society” had been discovered through one of its members, Emmanbeen discovered throuğh one of its members, Emmanouil Papas,ouil Papas,55 turn-turn-ing himself in as one of its members. Other members of the society were inğ himself in as one of its members. Other members of the society were Georgios Kapodistrias, the youngest brother of the former president, and Georğios Kapodistrias, the younğest brother of the former president, and Nikitaras Stamatellopoulos, nephew of Kolokotronis.Nikitaras Stamatellopoulos, nephew of Kolokotronis.56 The alleged plan The alleğed plan of the society was to of the society was to overthrow the king and replace him with an Ortho-overthrow the kinğ and replace him with an Ortho-dox monarch, and initiate a territorial expansion towards Thessaly, Epi-dox monarch, and initiate a territorial expansion towards Thessaly, Epi-rus, and Macedonia, the rumors of which had lerus, and Macedonia, the rumors of which had ledd the Ottoman govern-the Ottoman ğovern-ment despite the assurances of their Greek counterparts that the ment despite the assurances of their Greek counterparts that the conspiconspirators have been arrested, to increase security in these prov-rators have been arrested, to increase security in these prov-inces.inces.57 Despite the fact that the objectives of the society were contrary Despite the fact that the objectives of the society were contrary to the Near East policies of Russia in 1839, and Katakazy’s additional as-to the Near East policies of Russia in 1839, and Katakazy’s additional as-surances to Otto, the allegations inevitably resurances to Otto, the alleğations inevitably resulted in Otto putting a dis-sulted in Otto puttinğ a dis-tance to his former protance to his former pro--Russian policies, also partly with the influence of Russian policies, also partly with the influence of the English minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons putting pressure on the the Enğlish minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons puttinğ pressure on the Greek government.Greek ğovernment.58
This reorientation away from Russia in terms of foreign po
This reorientation away from Russia in terms of foreiğn policy with licy with encouragement from the other two powers had also showed itself in the encourağement from the other two powers had also showed itself in the commercial treaty negotiations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire commercial treaty neğotiations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire in 1839in 1839--1840. A commercial treaty between the two sides that would 1840. A commercial treaty between the two sides that would strengthen political tranquility, hence strenğthen political tranquility, hence commercial security in eastern commercial security in eastern Mediterranean was particularly in line with British interests in the re-Mediterranean was particularly in line with British interests in the re-gion, especially as the military conflict between the Ottoman government ğion, especially as the military conflict between the Ottoman ğovernment and Egypt had put forward the question of Crete’s future as a potential and Eğypt had put forward the question of Crete’s future as a potential conflict conflict for Greek foreign policy as well, the impact of which in Greece for Greek foreiğn policy as well, the impact of which in Greece will be elaborated shortly. Diplomatically, it is understood that this treaty will be elaborated shortly. Diplomatically, it is understood that this treaty that Lord Palmerston was advocating from London would assist their that Lord Palmerston was advocatinğ from London would assist their policy of decreasing Russian influence in Greecpolicy of decreasinğ Russian influence in Greece.e.59 Interestingly enough, Interestinğly enouğh,
55 A relative of Emmanouil Papas the famous founding member of the Philiki EtairiaA relative of Emmanouil Papas the famous foundinğ member of the Philiki Etairia..
56 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 164, 164..
57 B.O.A. İ. MTZ (01) 1, 2 [15 Zilkade 1255 (20 January 1840)]B.O.A. I . MTZ (01) 1, 2 [15 Zilkade 1255 (20 January 1840)]..
58 KaKatakazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840 ll. 68takazy to Nesselrode, Athens, Mar. 10, 1840, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 9/1840 ll. 68––71. In 71. In Frary, Frary, Russia and the Making of the Modern Greek IdentityRussia and the Making of the Modern Greek Identity, 177, 177..
59 B.O.A. HAT 1221, 47762 [25 Muharrem 1254 (20 April 1838)]B.O.A. HAT 1221, 47762 [25 Muharrem 1254 (20 April 1838)]..
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despite an initial agreement between the two sides, when Zographos,
despite an initial ağreement between the two sides, when Zoğraphos, thethe Greek ambassador to Istanbul returned to Athens to present the draft Greek ambassador to Istanbul returned to Athens to present the draft that they had agreed upon for its ratification by the king, it created a neg-that they had ağreed upon for its ratification by the kinğ, it created a neğ-ative publicative public uproar in Greece. The issue of the commercial treaty has uproar in Greece. The issue of the commercial treaty has shown the impact of the eastern crisis’ influence on nationalist senti-shown the impact of the eastern crisis’ influence on nationalist senti-ments of the Greek public at the timements of the Greek public at the time.. AAfter the full text of the treaty being fter the full text of the treaty beinğ published in the newspaper published in the newspaper AionAion,,60 it became the it became the primary subject of con-primary subject of con-versation in Athens. One particular criticism towards the treaty is under-versation in Athens. One particular criticism towards the treaty is under-stood to be a clause that forbade merchants to renounce their citizenship stood to be a clause that forbade merchants to renounce their citizenship in either state.in either state.61 The Ottoman side had also been dissatisfied with the The Ottoman side had also been dissatisfied with the treaty, particutreaty, particularly regarding the proposition that Greek merchants shall larly reğardinğ the proposition that Greek merchants shall pay three percent tariff in Ottoman domains, whereas Ottoman subjects pay three percent tariff in Ottoman domains, whereas Ottoman subjects were to pay much more.were to pay much more.62 The treaty did not The treaty did not materialize, howevermaterialize, however. It was . It was rejected by Otto, blaming Zographos, to protect himselrejected by Otto, blaminğ Zoğraphos, to protect himself from public crit-f from public crit-icism, which resulted in a protest with a diplomatic note from the Porte.icism, which resulted in a protest with a diplomatic note from the Porte.63
§
§ 4.54.5 The Eastern Question and the Foray of Velentzas (1840)The Eastern Question and the Foray of Velentzas (1840)
The Eastern Question, a term that in its broader definition refers to
The Eastern Question, a term that in its broader definition refers to the problem of the the problem of the unforeseeableunforeseeable ppotential problems for European and otential problems for European and NNear ear EEastern peace that might result from the territorial disintegration astern peace that miğht result from the territorial disinteğration of the Ottoman Empire, had come of the Ottoman Empire, had come toto strongly determine Greece’s foreign stronğly determine Greece’s foreiğn policy towards the Ottoman Empire. During the episode in 1839policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Durinğ the episode in 1839--40 that 40 that brought the Ottoman government into a military conflict with their gov-brouğht the Ottoman ğovernment into a military conflict with their ğov-ernor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali of Kavala, the diplomatic attention of the Eu-ernor of Eğypt, Mehmet Ali of Kavala, the diplomatic attention of the Eu-ropean ropean powers had strongly focused on the powers had stronğly focused on the EEastern astern MediterraneanMediterranean, , which gave the parties in Greece, especially the French party unique po-which ğave the parties in Greece, especially the French party unique po-litical opportunities. After the collapses of the prolitical opportunities. After the collapses of the pro--English, and proEnğlish, and pro--
60 ““Aion, 18 April 1840.Aion, 18 April 1840.”” In In PetropPetropoulosoulos, Politics and Statecraft, Politics and Statecraft, 352, 352..
61 Ibid. 355Ibid. 355..
62 B.O.A. HAT 832, 37554 [29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839)]B.O.A. HAT 832, 37554 [29 Zilhicce 1254 (15 March 1839)]..
63 B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 23 (31 December 1840)B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 23 (31 December 1840)..
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Russian foreign policies throughout the 1830s, a pro
Russian foreiğn policies throuğhout the 1830s, a pro--FreFrench foreign pol-nch foreiğn pol-icy became much more popular in 1840, especially now that the French icy became much more popular in 1840, especially now that the French prime minister and foreign minister, Adolphe Thiers was openly support-prime minister and foreiğn minister, Adolphe Thiers was openly support-ing the cause of Mehmet Ali, showing his inclination against the territo-inğ the cause of Mehmet Ali, showinğ his inclination ağainst the territo-rial status quo in the region.rial status quo in the reğion.64 The eastern crisis was also exploited by The eastern crisis was also exploited by the French party in Greece to increase its popular support, especially the French party in Greece to increase its popular support, especially among the irregular military element along the Ottoman frontier, where amonğ the irreğular military element alonğ the Ottoman frontier, where Velentzas was stationed as a frontier guard captain, and launched an iVelentzas was stationed as a frontier ğuard captain, and launched an ir-r-redentist foray into the Ottoman side of the frontier.redentist foray into the Ottoman side of the frontier.65
The origin of the conflict include
The oriğin of the conflict includedd a familiar episode in the Greek war a familiar episode in the Greek war of independence. When the Sultan had invited Ibrahim Pasha, the son of of independence. When the Sultan had invited Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmet Ali of Egypt to invade the Peloponnese and crusMehmet Ali of Eğypt to invade the Peloponnese and crush the rebellion, h the rebellion, he had also promised him the governorships of the Peloponnese and he had also promised him the ğovernorships of the Peloponnese and Crete. In 1831, a year after the independence of Greece was recognized, Crete. In 1831, a year after the independence of Greece was recoğnized, and Mehmet Ali’s prospects of obtaining the governorship of the Pelo-and Mehmet Ali’s prospects of obtaininğ the ğovernorship of the Pelo-ponnese for his son had failed, Mponnese for his son had failed, Mehmet Ali launched an assault to Syria, ehmet Ali launched an assault to Syria, using his conflict with Abdullah Pasha the governor of Sidon (Acre), as an usinğ his conflict with Abdullah Pasha the ğovernor of Sidon (Acre), as an excuse.excuse.66 The military confrontation of the Porte and the army of Ibrahim The military confrontation of the Porte and the army of Ibrahim Pasha in northern Syria had led to an Egyptian victory, and with Russian Pasha in northern Syria had led to an Eğyptian victory, and with Russian intervention in favor of the Porte,intervention in favor of the Porte,67 the conflict ended in a stalemate, leav-the conflict ended in a stalemate, leav-ing the territories up until Syria practiinğ the territories up until Syria practically under the rule of Ibrahim Pa-cally under the rule of Ibrahim Pa-sha. The developments in the late 1830s revived this conflict. The Baltali-sha. The developments in the late 1830s revived this conflict. The Baltali-manı Convention of 1838 that abolished local monopolies and opened up manı Convention of 1838 that abolished local monopolies and opened up Ottoman markets to British merchants had, despite its economic nature, Ottoman markets to British merchants had, despite its economic nature, more shmore short term political objectives. Since the treaty nominally included ort term political objectives. Since the treaty nominally included the provinces in Syria, it gave the British a stake at the preservation of the provinces in Syria, it ğave the British a stake at the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty in her Ottoman sovereiğnty in her NNear ear EEastern provinces. For Lord Palmer-astern provinces. For Lord Palmer-ston, among the objectives was to balance the inston, amonğ the objectives was to balance the influence of Russian fluence of Russian
64 ÖzavcıO zavcı,, Dangerous GiftsDangerous Gifts, 215, 215..
65 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 357, 357--359359..
66 Khaled Fahmy, Khaled Fahmy, Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of EgyptMehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt (Oxford: Oneworld (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2009), 83Publication, 2009), 83..
67 Özavcı. O zavcı. Dangerous GiftsDangerous Gifts, , 161161..
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commercial privileges that were granted with the Treaty of Edirne in
commercial privileğes that were ğranted with the Treaty of Edirne in 1829.1829.68 It is also after the signing of this treaty that the British had encour-It is also after the siğninğ of this treaty that the British had encour-aged the Greek government to sign a commercial treaty with the Otto-ağed the Greek ğovernment to siğn a commercial treaty with the Otto-mans to further gravitmans to further ğravitate Greek ate Greek foreignforeiğn policy away from Russian influ-policy away from Russian influ-ence. In 1839, Lord Palmerston managed to satisfy the Russian ence. In 1839, Lord Palmerston manağed to satisfy the Russian government by guaranteeing the closure of the Straits, however French ğovernment by ğuaranteeinğ the closure of the Straits, however French foreign policy had foreiğn policy had shiftedshifted the same year to a more overt diplomatic sup-the same year to a more overt diplomatic sup-port port to Mehmet Ali’s cause.to Mehmet Ali’s cause.
In Paris, the treaty of 1838, and its implication in terms of British com-
In Paris, the treaty of 1838, and its implication in terms of British com-mercial influence in mercial influence in EEastern astern MediterraneanMediterranean had not been had not been receivedreceived posi-posi-tively, and protively, and pro--Egyptian publication started to occur in French newspa-Eğyptian publication started to occur in French newspa-pers.pers.69 French foreigFrench foreiğn policy had become increasingly involved with the n policy had become increasinğly involved with the eastern eastern MediterraneanMediterranean after their invasion of Algiers in 1830. Further-after their invasion of Alğiers in 1830. Further-more, more, oon 15 July 1840, as a result of the disagreement between Thiers and n 15 July 1840, as a result of the disağreement between Thiers and PalmerstonPalmerston,, the London convention of the the London convention of the pacificationpacification of the of the Levant was Levant was signed with four of the European powers, exclusiğned with four of the European powers, excludding France due to her inğ France due to her ongoing diplomatic support to Mehmet Ali.onğoinğ diplomatic support to Mehmet Ali.70 In the meantime, Thiers In the meantime, Thiers was also encouraging several Greek politicians in favor of Greek partici-was also encourağinğ several Greek politicians in favor of Greek partici-pation in the crisis. The military ipation in the crisis. The military involvement of Greece would open up nvolvement of Greece would open up another front in the war, and perhaps relieve Egyptian war effort. It is another front in the war, and perhaps relieve Eğyptian war effort. It is also during this brief period that Kolettis is believed to have asked Otto also durinğ this brief period that Kolettis is believed to have asked Otto to be given permission to return to Greece.to be ğiven permission to return to Greece.71 Otto had found himself in aOtto had found himself in a dilemma, between an aggressive foreign policy that would cut Greece’s dilemma, between an ağğressive foreiğn policy that would cut Greece’s stable relationship with the concert of Europe, and the nationalist senti-stable relationship with the concert of Europe, and the nationalist senti-ments of the overwhelming majority of his country, because the conflict ments of the overwhelminğ majority of his country, because the conflict involved the future of Crete as well. Evinvolved the future of Crete as well. Even Paikos, the foreign minister who en Paikos, the foreiğn minister who has been known of prohas been known of pro--Russian inclinations, had been in talks with Ko-Russian inclinations, had been in talks with Ko-lettis, asking whether Greece wlettis, askinğ whether Greece wouldould collude with France.collude with France.72 The fact that The fact that the foreign minister the foreiğn minister askedasked such a question to Kolettis, the ambassador in such a question to Kolettis, the ambassador in
68 Ibid. 196Ibid. 196..
69 B.O.A. HR.SYS 2922, 40 (22 September 1838)B.O.A. HR.SYS 2922, 40 (22 September 1838)..
70 Özavcı. O zavcı. Dangerous GiftsDangerous Gifts, 216, 216..
71 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 358, 358..
72 “Paikos to Kolettis” AA 75874 (18/30 August 1840)“Paikos to Kolettis” AA 75874 (18/30 Auğust 1840)..
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Pari
Paris, reveals where the nucleus of Greek foreign policy was located in s, reveals where the nucleus of Greek foreiğn policy was located in during the events of 1840. durinğ the events of 1840.
In the meantime, certain preparations appear to have been made, out-
In the meantime, certain preparations appear to have been made, out-side formal channels. Many Pallikars stationed in Rumeli along the Otto-side formal channels. Many Pallikars stationed in Rumeli alonğ the Otto-man frontier, had beenman frontier, had been long associated with Kolettis and his French party. lonğ associated with Kolettis and his French party. The proThe pro--French policy that involved an armed struggle on the other side French policy that involved an armed struğğle on the other side of the frontier had material prospects for the irregular military element of the frontier had material prospects for the irreğular military element beyond nationalist aspirations. Towards the end of 1840, beyond nationalist aspirations. Towards the end of 1840, Velentzas, along Velentzas, alonğ with other familiar names, such as Makrygiannis, and Karatasos, had with other familiar names, such as Makryğiannis, and Karatasos, had made preparations to cross the border and instigate a Greek revolt in made preparations to cross the border and instiğate a Greek revolt in Thessaly. It appears that they had been expecting the French to continue Thessaly. It appears that they had been expectinğ the French to continue their support, and thus, madtheir support, and thus, made preparations for the spring of 1841.e preparations for the sprinğ of 1841.73 How-How-ever, after the destruction of the Egyptian war effort by the joint fleet of ever, after the destruction of the Eğyptian war effort by the joint fleet of the quadruple alliance in the quadruple alliance in SeptemberSeptember, King Louis Phillipe of France de-, Kinğ Louis Phillipe of France de-cided not to force war with the alliance, and forced Thiers to rescided not to force war with the alliance, and forced Thiers to resign in iğn in October. These series of events led to the partial abandonment of a proOctober. These series of events led to the partial abandonment of a pro--French war policy in Athens, however, this was not the end of the story in French war policy in Athens, however, this was not the end of the story in Rumeli. In November, Velentzas had suddenly left the likes of Makryigan-Rumeli. In November, Velentzas had suddenly left the likes of Makryiğan-nis, and crossed the border witnis, and crossed the border with a few men of his own.h a few men of his own.74 Leaving Makryg-Leavinğ Makryğ-iannis, a political rival of Kolettis, despite his association with the French iannis, a political rival of Kolettis, despite his association with the French party behind, is an indication of the event as a distinct Kolettist affair, party behind, is an indication of the event as a distinct Kolettist affair, through his loyal client Velentzas. Despite the Egyptian defethrouğh his loyal client Velentzas. Despite the Eğyptian defeat becoming at becominğ imminent, if a military disturbance through an uprising could be created imminent, if a military disturbance throuğh an uprisinğ could be created within Ottoman territories where the Greek speaking population was within Ottoman territories where the Greek speakinğ population was abundant such as Thessaly, an intervention of the European powers, as abundant such as Thessaly, an intervention of the European powers, as well as the Greek government mightwell as the Greek ğovernment miğht have been a possibility in the eyes of have been a possibility in the eyes of the instigators.the instiğators.75 In early November 1840, Velentzas appeared in Thes-In early November 1840, Velentzas appeared in Thes-saly along with his band consisting of Rumeliot fighters originally from saly alonğ with his band consistinğ of Rumeliot fiğhters oriğinally from Thessaly and Macedonia.Thessaly and Macedonia.76 Throughout the month, Velentzas appears to Throuğhout the month, Velentzas appears to havehave roamed the province, and ended up entering into negotiations with roamed the province, and ended up enterinğ into neğotiations with
73 Lidderdale, Lidderdale, The Memoirs of General MakriyannisThe Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 165, 165..
74 Ibid. 165Ibid. 165..
75 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft. 360. 360..
76 AYE, F1840/100/2AYE, F1840/100/2..
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the Derbent ağa in the region, Ve
the Derbent ağ a in the reğion, Vehhis Vashari (Frasheri). Andronikos Pai-is Vashari (Frasheri). Andronikos Pai-kos, foreign minister of Greece insisted that Greek authorities had been kos, foreiğn minister of Greece insisted that Greek authorities had been unaware of Velentzas’s band crossing the bordunaware of Velentzas’s band crossinğ the border, and that there was no er, and that there was no intention from the Greek side to disturb the piece in the neighboring Ot-intention from the Greek side to disturb the piece in the neiğhborinğ Ot-toman provinces.toman provinces.77 Kostaki Musurus Pasha, Ottoman minister to Athens, Kostaki Musurus Pasha, Ottoman minister to Athens, in a dispatch to Mustafa Reşid Pasha, argued the opposite. He firmly be-in a dispatch to Mustafa Reşid Pasha, arğued the opposite. He firmly be-lieved that this foray had been directed by lieved that this foray had been directed by the the Greek authorities, and in-Greek authorities, and in-sisted on the connection of the affair with the conflict witsisted on the connection of the affair with the conflict with Mehmet Ali h Mehmet Ali Pasha. In his letterPasha. In his letter,, he wrote the following:he wrote the followinğ:
All of our considerations, together with other data, render Mr. Pai-
All of our considerations, toğether with other data, render Mr. Pai-coscos’’ assertion devoid of foundation or even premature, and come assertion devoid of foundation or even premature, and come to the support of the opinion generally accepted here, which stateto the support of the opinion ğenerally accepted here, which states s that Velenzas had the mission to pass with his band on Ottoman that Velenzas had the mission to pass with his band on Ottoman territory, to meet there other adherents, and stir up an insurrec-territory, to meet there other adherents, and stir up an insurrec-tion which would, on the one hand, serve as a diversion for the tion which would, on the one hand, serve as a diversion for the cause of Mehemet Ali, and on the other hand, would be profitabcause of Mehemet Ali, and on the other hand, would be profitable le to Greece. Whether due to the fall of Minister Thiers disconcerting to Greece. Whether due to the fall of Minister Thiers disconcertinğ the constituents of Velenzas, or whether the attempt had failed in the constituents of Velenzas, or whether the attempt had failed in the face of the energetic vigilance of his Excellency Namık Pasha, the face of the enerğetic viğilance of his Excellency Namık Pasha, we have now succeeded in forcing Velenzas to give uwe have now succeeded in forcinğ Velenzas to ğive up his project. p his project. He then asked to submit to Vaiz aga and have a job from him.He then asked to submit to Vaiz ağa and have a job from him.78
It is
It is plausibleplausible to believe that the dismissal of Thiers did not immedi-to believe that the dismissal of Thiers did not immedi-ately give some French adherents in Greece the idea of a reversal in the ately ğive some French adherents in Greece the idea of a reversal in the nature of their Ottoman policies, nature of their Ottoman policies, which resulted in the Velentzas esca-which resulted in the Velentzas esca-pade being carried out despite the upcoming change in French foreign pade beinğ carried out despite the upcominğ chanğe in French foreiğn policy. Velentzas probably had taken off with the expectation that he policy. Velentzas probably had taken off with the expectation that he would would receivereceive support from Athens, and when the Greek government had support from Athens, and when the Greek ğovernment had renounced hirenounced him after it became obvious that an aggressive foreign policy m after it became obvious that an ağğressive foreiğn policy towards the towards the OOttomans became untenable, Velentzas was left with no op-ttomans became untenable, Velentzas was left with no op-tions, and negotiated with Vashari, who in return is argued to have tions, and neğotiated with Vashari, who in return is arğued to have
77 B.O.A. HR.SYB.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/54 (4 June 1831)S 1678, 6/54 (4 June 1831)..
78 B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/59 (4 June 1831)B.O.A. HR.SYS 1678, 6/59 (4 June 1831)..
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secretly welcomed Velentzas’ presence there, because it rein
secretly welcomed Velentzas’ presence there, because it reinforced the forced the necessitynecessity of the irregular bands in the region like that of his for security.of the irreğular bands in the reğion like that of his for security.79 Both men showed the Rumeliot pallikari character of constantly keeping Both men showed the Rumeliot pallikari character of constantly keepinğ their options open to preserve their irregular military life as a career. Af-their options open to preserve their irreğular military life as a career. Af-ter the option of ter the option of working with the Derbent ağa had failed, in December, workinğ with the Derbent ağ a had failed, in December, Velentzas sent a letter to one of his friends, stating his intention to march Velentzas sent a letter to one of his friends, statinğ his intention to march to Athens with a large force,to Athens with a larğe force,80 further implying that he had been disap-further implyinğ that he had been disap-pointed with lack of support from Athens that he probpointed with lack of support from Athens that he probably was led to be-ably was led to be-lieve would arrive. lieve would arrive.
The events in late 1840, showed that Kolettis still had the ability to
The events in late 1840, showed that Kolettis still had the ability to mobilize bands in Rumeli for his political ambitions, appropriating the mobilize bands in Rumeli for his political ambitions, appropriatinğ the political climate of any given time. The Velentzas foray was not an event political climate of any ğiven time. The Velentzas foray was not an event that involved large numbers of fighters, but it is almost certain that, had that involved larğe numbers of fiğhters, but it is almost certain that, had Thiers not been dismissed from office, and the proThiers not been dismissed from office, and the pro--French military op-French military op-tion in Greece continued, a general mobilization of Rumeliot fighters on tion in Greece continued, a ğeneral mobilization of Rumeliot fiğhters on the Greek side of the border might havthe Greek side of the border miğht have been an option. The foray of Ve-e been an option. The foray of Ve-lentzas might have been an experimental move, to see whether an at-lentzas miğht have been an experimental move, to see whether an at-tempt to create a Greek revolt could lead to a positive political outcome tempt to create a Greek revolt could lead to a positive political outcome for Greece, at for Greece, at aa time when the fate of Crete was at the table of European time when the fate of Crete was at the table of European diplomacydiplomacy. Naturally, to undergo such a risky business, Kolettis could . Naturally, to underğo such a risky business, Kolettis could only trust few men under his patronage, and Velentzas was unquestion-only trust few men under his patronağe, and Velentzas was unquestion-ably among them. The plot proved ably amonğ them. The plot proved unsuccessfulunsuccessful due to the king immedi-due to the kinğ immedi-ately changing his views on the proately chanğinğ his views on the pro--French foreign policy,French foreiğn policy, and his govern-and his ğovern-ment preventing further passages from the border. The outcome of the ment preventinğ further passağes from the border. The outcome of the Eastern crisisEastern crisis, a British victory,, a British victory, had led him to decide on adapting a prohad led him to decide on adaptinğ a pro--English foreign policy, which brought the English party leader and Enğlish foreiğn policy, which brouğht the Enğlish party leader and Phan-Phan-ariotariot Mavrokordatos’s appoMavrokordatos’s appointment as prime minister for a brief period intment as prime minister for a brief period in 1841. in 1841.
79 Koliopoulos, Koliopoulos, Brigands with a CauseBrigands with a Cause, 117, 117..
80 Petropoulos, Petropoulos, Politics and StatecraftPolitics and Statecraft, 360, 360..

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§ 4.64.6 ConclusionConclusion
The Kapodistrian period provided a glimpse of how resilient tradi-
The Kapodistrian period provided a ğlimpse of how resilient tradi-tional social networks of the Ottoman provincial system had been against tional social networks of the Ottoman provincial system had been ağainst attempts to create attempts to create a centralized bureaucratic state in Greece. Despite se-a centralized bureaucratic state in Greece. Despite se-rious attempts to eliminate traditional leaders and their factions as a po-rious attempts to eliminate traditional leaders and their factions as a po-tential threat to central authority, in the end, they prevailed and the po-tential threat to central authority, in the end, they prevailed and the po-litical circumstances immediately returned to its prelitical circumstances immediately returned to its pre--Kapodistrian phase, Kapodistrian phase, almost as if the past four years had not happened at all. In the royal pe-almost as if the past four years had not happened at all. In the royal pe-riod, similar problems arose between the agents of the new regime, and riod, similar problems arose between the ağents of the new reğime, and the traditional political leaders. The attempts of the Bavarian regime to the traditional political leaders. The attempts of the Bavarian reğime to eliminate local poeliminate local political entrenchments in favor of a centralized civilian litical entrenchments in favor of a centralized civilian bureaucracy had failed, and Bavariansbureaucracy had failed, and Bavarians, , tootoo,, had to come to terms with the had to come to terms with the political and social reality of Greece. This partial recognition proved ex-political and social reality of Greece. This partial recoğnition proved ex-pedient also due to the young regime’s need to diplpedient also due to the younğ reğime’s need to diplomatically get along omatically ğet alonğ with her guarantor powers. The patronage that the guarantor powers with her ğuarantor powers. The patronağe that the ğuarantor powers had been providing for the three political parties in Greece had created a had been providinğ for the three political parties in Greece had created a political environment in which domestic politics in Greece could not be political environment in which domestic politics in Greece could not be practiced disregardinpracticed disreğarding the international balance of power in Europe. ğ the international balance of power in Europe. Throughout the 1830s, Velentzas continued to obtain opportunities Throuğhout the 1830s, Velentzas continued to obtain opportunities through his association with Kolettis, and his French party. During the throuğh his association with Kolettis, and his French party. Durinğ the civil war after Kapodistrias’ assassination, and the rebellion in Rumecivil war after Kapodistrias’ assassination, and the rebellion in Rumeli in li in 1835, Velentzas always dependent on the relationships and alliances that 1835, Velentzas always dependent on the relationships and alliances that he created within the network of the Kolettis faction, and managed to find he created within the network of the Kolettis faction, and manağed to find a place within the new regime as well with these networks. In Velentzas’ a place within the new reğime as well with these networks. In Velentzas’ irredentist foray in 1840, weirredentist foray in 1840, we can see how in the span of twenty years, a can see how in the span of twenty years, a faction in revolutionary Greece that was built on top of prefaction in revolutionary Greece that was built on top of pre--existing pro-existinğ pro-vincial power structures in Rumeli, evolved into a political party with the vincial power structures in Rumeli, evolved into a political party with the backing of a foreign power, and played an ambitious role withinbackinğ of a foreiğn power, and played an ambitious role within the the framework of the framework of the EEastern astern QQuestion. uestion.
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5
5 ConclusionConclusion
he Greek war of independence has without doubt changed the
he Greek war of independence has without doubt chanğed the course of history in many ways. It resulted in the carving out of a course of history in many ways. It resulted in the carvinğ out of a state out of former Ottoman provinces, and introduced new political state out of former Ottoman provinces, and introduced new political agents who influenced the political life in Greece for the dağents who influenced the political life in Greece for the decadesecades to fol-to fol-lowlow. These men had been part of the regional networks within the Otto-. These men had been part of the reğional networks within the Otto-man provincial system. Some of them had been associated with their ad-man provincial system. Some of them had been associated with their ad-ministration prior to the war, and some had found the ministration prior to the war, and some had found the appropriateappropriate channels for political ascendancy thankchannels for political ascendancy thanks to the unstable circumstances s to the unstable circumstances provided by the war. In any case, despite being protagonists of what we provided by the war. In any case, despite beinğ protağonists of what we retrospectively might see as a struggle for national liberation, they were retrospectively miğht see as a struğğle for national liberation, they were in reality operating within their own regional struggle for power, and tra-in reality operatinğ within their own reğional struğğle for power, and tra-ditditional networks of patronage. Starting with 1821, irregular fighters in ional networks of patronağe. Startinğ with 1821, irreğular fiğhters in Rumeli made use of the violent circumstances provided by the war in Rumeli made use of the violent circumstances provided by the war in their target of acquiring public revenues through physical force. Ioannis their tarğet of acquirinğ public revenues throuğh physical force. Ioannis Velentzas as well, a young Rumeliot pallikaVelentzas as well, a younğ Rumeliot pallikar at that time, struggled to find r at that time, struğğled to find his place within this environment. After he managed to establish a pa-his place within this environment. After he manağed to establish a pa-trontron--client relationship under Ioannis Kolettis, the former Ali Pasha client relationship under Ioannis Kolettis, the former Ali Pasha protege, who utilized his relationship with Rumeliot fighters for his po-proteğe, who utilized his relationship with Rumeliot fiğhters for his po-litical purlitical purposes, most of whom had been associated with Ali Pasha poses, most of whom had been associated with Ali Pasha as as wellwell, Velentzas started to find himself part of a regional faction, and , Velentzas started to find himself part of a reğional faction, and
T
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operated within its agenda. With the regional conflicts turning into civil
operated within its ağenda. With the reğional conflicts turninğ into civil wars, we see how the services of Rumeliots such as wars, we see how the services of Rumeliots such as Velentzas had been Velentzas had been used by Kolettis to guarantee his political authority. used by Kolettis to ğuarantee his political authority.
We also saw how various factions during the war had become to be
We also saw how various factions durinğ the war had become to be associated with European powers, and labelled with the name of that associated with European powers, and labelled with the name of that country. Despite the attempts of Kapodistrias tocountry. Despite the attempts of Kapodistrias to eliminate partisan strife, eliminate partisan strife, the association of these parties with European powers, in a period when the association of these parties with European powers, in a period when the political future of Greece practically depended on the former’s ap-the political future of Greece practically depended on the former’s ap-proval, gave them the chance to survive, and with the civil war that proval, ğave them the chance to survive, and with the civil war that erupted after Kaperupted after Kapodistrias had been assassinated, another civil war re-odistrias had been assassinated, another civil war re-sulted in the return of partisan strife that enabled the ascendancy of Ko-sulted in the return of partisan strife that enabled the ascendancy of Ko-lettis once again, and gave Velentzas another opportunity to offer his ser-lettis once ağain, and ğave Velentzas another opportunity to offer his ser-vices. vices.
The cooperation b
The cooperation between Kolettis and Velentzas continued to appear etween Kolettis and Velentzas continued to appear in critical turning points in the following years. Despite the Bavarian re-in critical turninğ points in the followinğ years. Despite the Bavarian re-gime’s attempt to eliminate traditional ğime’s attempt to eliminate traditional powerhousespowerhouses in the provinces to in the provinces to strengthen the centralized bureaucratic state machinery, strenğthen the centralized bureaucratic state machinery, whewhetherther former former Ali Pasha captains, or Peloponnesian kocabaşıs, these networks proved Ali Pasha captains, or Peloponnesian kocabaşıs, these networks proved to be more resilient than the Bavarians had imagined. Kolettis continued to be more resilient than the Bavarians had imağined. Kolettis continued to mobilize the Rumeliot irregular military element for his political pur-to mobilize the Rumeliot irreğular military element for his political pur-poses poses IIn almost every Kolettn almost every Kolettist scheme, Velentzas appears to be almost ist scheme, Velentzas appears to be almost zealously involved in the service of his political patron who became the zealously involved in the service of his political patron who became the head of a political enterprise called the French party. The evolution of the head of a political enterprise called the French party. The evolution of the Kolettis faction into the so called French party, and representKolettis faction into the so called French party, and representing the ob-inğ the ob-jective to align Greek foreign policy more with French interests, has jective to aliğn Greek foreiğn policy more with French interests, has strongly shown itself during the Eastern crisis of 1840. In line with the stronğly shown itself durinğ the Eastern crisis of 1840. In line with the French government’s support to Mehmet Ali of Egypt against the Otto-French ğovernment’s support to Mehmet Ali of Eğypt ağainst the Otto-man government, Velentzas, the Koleman ğovernment, Velentzas, the Kolettist captain in Rumelittist captain in Rumeli,, attempted to attempted to organize an irredentist foray into Ottoman lands, to contribute to the proorğanize an irredentist foray into Ottoman lands, to contribute to the pro--French inclinations in the Greek government. The French inclinations in the Greek ğovernment. The initiativeinitiative was utterly was utterly unsuccessfulunsuccessful.. YetYet, it , it not only illustratednot only illustrated how provincial networks of how provincial networks of power in Ottoman Rumeli hapower in Ottoman Rumeli hadd withstood vigorous attempts to transform withstood viğorous attempts to transform the political and social fabric in Greece in the first half of the nineteenth the political and social fabric in Greece in the first half of the nineteenth century, century, but also showed the ways in whichbut also showed the ways in which the involvement of these the involvement of these
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regional fact
reğional factions with European powersions with European powers hadhad shaped domestic as well as shaped domestic as well as foreign policies of the Greek governmenforeiğn policies of the Greek ğovernment.t.

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