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 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
SULTANISTS, REPUBLICANS, COMMUNISTS: THE TURKISH NATIONAL
MOVEMENT IN ISTANBUL, 1918-1923

LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... x
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................................... xiii
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 1
Unionist Factor .................................................................................................................................... 3
Arguments and Organization ......................................................................................................... 6
Sources ................................................................................................................................................. 11
CHAPTER I: KARAKOL AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ........................................................... 14
Committee of Union and Progress ............................................................................................ 15
Ottoman War Ministry ................................................................................................................... 20
Karakol Society ................................................................................................................................. 25
National Congress ............................................................................................................................ 32
Istanbul versus Anatolia ............................................................................................................... 35
CHAPTER II: NATIONAL DEFENSE ............................................................................................................. 40
Karakol/Zabitan ............................................................................................................................... 42
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Mim-Mim ............................................................................................................................................. 48
National Defense .............................................................................................................................. 53
Central Committee of the National Defense .............................................54
Factions of the National Defense ............................................................................................... 58
CHAPTER III: UNION AND PROGRESS ...................................................................................................... 65
Istanbul Branch of the CUP after the Armistice ................................................................... 67
Unionist Left in Anatolia ............................................................................................................... 72
Enverist Faction ................................................................................................................................ 79
Anatolia ...................................................................................................................82
Istanbul ...................................................................................................................85
“Sultanists” and Republicans....................................................................................................... 90
“Sultanists” ............................................................................................................92
Republicans ...........................................................................................................98
CHAPTER IV: COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS .................................................................. 103
Turkish Communists in Russia ................................................................................................. 104
Turkish Spartacists in Germany ............................................................................................... 109
Unified Communist Party ........................................................................................................... 114
Communists and the Labor Movement ................................................................................. 119
International Union of Workers (IUW) ................................................... 124
Towards a Labor Confederation ................................................................ 127
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Kemalist-Communists and Mim-Mim ..................................................................................... 131
Power and Opposition in Ankara ............................................................................................ 137
Anti-Communism in Istanbul .................................................................................................... 143
CHAPTER V: NATIONAL REGIME ............................................................................................................. 148
Popular Mobilization .................................................................................................................... 155
Non-Muslims under National Rule .......................................................................................... 160
Commission of Economic Organizations .............................................................................. 167
Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU) .......................................... 168
Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA) .......................... 170
Union and Progress ....................................................................................................................... 173
Towards a Communist-Socialist Bloc .................................................................................... 176
Istanbul General Union of Workers (GUW) ......................................................................... 186
CHAPTER VI: PURGE OF THE LEFT ......................................................................................................... 191
Municipal Elections ....................................................................................................................... 194
General Elections ........................................................................................................................... 198
Purge of the Left ............................................................................................................................. 205
Nationalism ...................................................................................................................................... 209
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................... 213
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 223
PRIMARY SOURCES....................................................................................................................... 223
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ARCHIVES ........................................................................................................... 223
PERIODICALS .................................................................................................... 223
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................... 224
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Central Committee of the National Defense Organization…………………………………..60
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AMAE Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
BBC Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi
BBO Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
CPU Committee of Progress and Union
CUP Committee of Union and Progress
FIAA Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations
FO Foreign Office Catalog, Public Record Office
FGWU Federation of General Worker Unions
ICG Istanbul Communist Group
IUW International Union of Workers
ISP Independent Socialist Party
GUW Istanbul General Union of Workers
NDA National Defense Association
OFS Ottoman Freedom Society
PRP Progressive Republican Party
PSP People’s Soviets Party
PSPT People’s Socialist Party of Turkey
RPP Republican People’s Party
SDNR Society for the Defense of National Rights of Anatolia and Thrace
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SDP Social Democrat Party
SEF Society of Exalting the Fatherland
SHAT Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre
TBCP Turkish Bolshevik Communist Party
TCO Turkish Communist Organization
TCP Turkish Communist Party
TİTE Türkiye İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Arşivi
TNCU Turkish National Commerce Union
TSP Turkish Socialist Party
TÜSTAV Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları Vakfı
TWPSP Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party
TWA Turkish Workers Association
UTCY Union of Turkish Communist Youths
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must first thank my adviser Prof. Ada Holly Shissler for her guidance. This dissertation could not have been completed without her support, patience, and understanding. I also owe thanks to Prof. Cornell Fleischer for his continuous support throughout my graduate studies in Chicago. I was fortunate to have Prof. Orit Bashkin in my dissertation committee. She was always encouraging, and willing to help during difficult times.
I am grateful to Erden Akbulut, the chairman of the executive board of TÜSTAV (Social History Research Foundation of Turkey), for his contributions to my dissertation research. He generously shared the transcriptions of a number of documents from the TÜSTAV-Comintern archives. I could read these documents long before their publication in his and Prof. Mete Tunçay’s common work on the Aydınlık group in 2013. I also had several opportunities to benefit from Prof. Tunçay’s expertise on the communist and labor movements of the armistice period. I would like to thank him for his time and comments on this occasion. I also thank Sibel Sular for her assistance during my research on the TÜSTAV – Comintern archives.
In 2010, the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago provided me an opportunity to study as an exchange student at École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. This allowed me to meet Prof. Hamit Bozarslan and attend his inspiring seminars at EHESS. I owe him special thanks for his contributions to my archival research in Paris and for his comments on the initial fragments of my project. I would also like to thank Prof. Méropi
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Anastassiadou, Prof. Marc Aymes, Prof. Nathalie Clayer, and Prof. Elise Massicard from EHESS for their contributions. They all were very helpful, friendly, and supportive. So were Falma Fsahazi, Claire Khelfaoui, and Gökçe Bülbül.
My dissertation research in Turkey was supported by a fellowship provided by the American Research Institute in Turkey in 2010-2011. Another fellowship provided by the Nicholson Center for British Studies allowed me to conduct research at the Public Records Office in London. Special thanks should go to the staffs of a number of institutions, including but not limited to the Beyoğlu Atatürk Library, the İSAM Library, the Boğaziçi University Library, the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, the Prime Ministry Republic Archives, and the TİTE Archives.
Cihangir Gündoğdu, Megan Clark, Alidost Numan, Ayşe Polat, and Elif Yalabık read and commented on the first synopsis of the project. We met a number of times to exchange ideas and to deal with the challenges of dissertation writing together. Dilek Çankaya helped me complete my research in Ankara. Harun Özkan, Ayşe Polat, Yasmeen Mekawy, Basil Salem, Zeynep Bilginsoy, Kerem Uşşaklı, and Eylem Delikanlı helped edit the manuscript. Yusuf Doğan Çetinkaya and Bilge Seçkin Çetinkaya were always around when needed. Hakan Koçak, Besime Şen, and Sinan Yıldırmaz generously shared their sources.
During my graduate studies, I received support from numerous friends and colleagues. Abdurrahman Atcil, Megan Clark, Stefania Costache, Umud Karaca Dalgıç, Cihangir Gündoğdu, and İbrahim Kaya Şahin supplied invaluable helps in hard times. Mehmetcan Akpınar, Nikolay Antov, Zahit Atcıl, Toygun Altıntaş, Lale Barlas, Melissa Bilal, Erin Glade, Nagihan Gür, Greg Hedin, Rafi Mottahadeh, Robert Neiser, Carl Shook, and Metin Yüksel made my experience in Hyde Park rewarding and enjoyable. I benefited
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greatly from discussions with Tolga Cora, Ferenc Csirkes, Side Emre, Ekin Enacar, Kavveh Hemmat, Nazlı İpek Hüner, Mustafa Kaya, Hani Khafipour, Christopher Markiewicz, Ahmet Tunç Şen, Bike Yazıcıoğlu, and Nükhet Varlık. This list would be incomplete without the names of Ahmet Bekmen, Foti Benlisoy, Stefo Benlisoy, Sinan Birdal, Zeynep Çeken, Görkem Doğan, Erhan Keleşoğlu, İnci Kerestecioğlu, Zeynep Kıvılcım, Ayşegül Komsuoğlu, Eylem Özdemir, Barış Alp Özden, Sevgi Uçan, Varol Ülker, Cumhur Yörük, and Emrah Yüce.
I am grateful to my parents, Osman Ülker and Fendiye Ülker, who have never given up hope on me. I cannot express my gratitude to my wife, Fatoş, for her patience, support, and affection, without which I could have never finished this project.
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ABSTRACT
The subject of my dissertation is the formation of the Turkish national movement in the period between the end of World War I and the founding of the Republic of Turkey as a new nation state in October 1923. It focuses on Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, which was under the British, French and Italian occupation during this crucial period. My dissertation analyzes the power struggles between various social and political forces involved in the resistance movement against the Allied occupation.
The leading cadres of the Turkish national movement consisted of the Unionists, i.e. the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had ruled the Ottoman Empire in an authoritarian manner during World War I. One of the most important findings of my research is that the Unionists split into two competing factions by the middle of 1922 – one supported the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultanate while the other espoused the establishment of a republican regime. I demonstrate that this division allowed the nascent Turkish communist movement to become a significant political actor by cooperating with the populist and radical elements of the national movement. The de facto coalition of these forces developed in two large confederations that unified the majority of the artisan corporations and worker unions in Istanbul.
However, this coalition disintegrated in March 1923 as a result of power struggles between its constitutive elements. Thereafter, the anti-communist wing of the national
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movement consolidated its authority in Istanbul. By the time the Republic was proclaimed in October 1923, the communist and populist groups had been largely marginalized. This process was accompanied by the rise a widespread campaign for the elimination of Christians from the economy, driven by the labor and merchant confederations. I argue that this movement provided the initial popular base of the Turkification policies that troubled Istanbul’s non-Muslim communities during the 1920s and 30s.
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INTRODUCTION
The Turkish national movement emerged after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I. After the signing of the Mudros Armistice by the British and the Ottoman governments on October 30, 1918, the Allied powers began to occupy Ottoman territories. In parallel with this process, a number of regional resistance movements arose throughout Anatolia and Thrace.1 In September 1919, a general congress convened in Sivas centralized these local movements under the administration of the Society for the Defense of National Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia. The Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) of this organization led the initial stages of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) against the Greek army that occupied much of the Asia Minor.
Anatolia was the center of the Turkish national movement. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) established himself as the principal leader of this movement after moving from Istanbul to Samsun in May 1919. He was then elected president of the Society for the Defense of National Rights at the Sivas Congress in September. In April 1920, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was formed in Ankara, a provincial town located at the heart of central Anatolia. This assembly became the main executive and legislative organ of the Turkish
1 For an analysis of these local movements and their importance for the Turkish independence movement, see Bülent Tanör, Türkiye’de Kongre İktidarları, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002).
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national movement. Ankara was eventually made the capital city of the Republic of Turkey, promulgated on October 29, 1923.
During the War of Independence, the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, was under Allied occupation. The British, French, and Italian forces de facto occupied the city in November 1918. In March 1920, the Allied authorities established military control over Istanbul by formally occupying it. Only after the ultimate defeat of the Greek army in September 1922 did the Ankara government take over the governance of Istanbul. On October 19, 1922, Refet (Bele) Pasha entered the city as the official representative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. On November 1, the Ottoman Sultanate was dissolved. Three days later, the Ankara government declared to have established its sovereignty in Istanbul. The Allied forces completely evacuated the city when the occupation formally came to an end on October 6, 1923.
This study explores how the Turkish national movement developed in Istanbul under occupation, and how this movement broadened its social base in the aftermath of the Independence War by incorporating large segments of Muslim merchants, artisans, and workers living in Istanbul. But the most important goal of my dissertation is to shed light on the political rivalries and factional struggles that emerged within the national movement during the armistice period (October 1918 – October 1923). This inquiry will provide insights about the political character of the republican regime proclaimed in October 1923.
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Unionist Factor
Since its first publication in 1984, Eric Jan Zürcher’s The Unionist Factor: the Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, has become a standard reference for modern scholarship on the subject.2 This important research takes issue with the main theses of the Turkish official historiography, which attributes a central role to Mustafa Kemal in the rise and growth of the Turkish independence movement. Zürcher’s primary thesis is that the Unionist leadership played a key role in the formation of the national movement and the rise of Mustafa Kemal as its principal leader.
The term Unionist refers to the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), one of the most influential political movements in the history of the late Ottoman Empire. After leading the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution in July 1908, the Unionists seized absolute control of the Ottoman government with a coup d’état in January 1913. Thereafter, they ruled the Ottoman Empire in an authoritarian manner until the end of World War I. The CUP was removed from power and eventually disbanded in the aftermath of the war. According to Zürcher, however, the cadre of this organization formed the driving force of the Turkish struggle for national independence.
To be more specific, Zürcher introduces two interlinked arguments. First, he suggests, "… the Unionists were even more than contributors; … it was in fact the CUP which took the initiative in organizing the national struggle, possibly according to a prearranged plan …”.3 Second, the Unionists were constantly divided between those who
2 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1908-1926, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984).
3 Ibid. p. 69
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rallied behind the authority of Mustafa Kemal and the others who opposed to his leadership.4 This dichotomy characterized the power struggles within the national movement until an attempt to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in 1926. All the Unionists that posed a potential threat for his leadership were eliminated as a result of the trials that followed this attempt.
Zürcher demonstrates that the Karakol (Guard) society represented the first dissident movement. The CUP leadership formed this secret organization in Istanbul at the beginning of the armistice period to protect the Muslim population and the CUP members from the reprisals by the Entente and the Christian minorities. However, the Karakol leaders insisted on preserving their autonomy from the Anatolian movement. Zürcher holds that the tension between Karakol and Mustafa Kemal was resolved after the Allied powers formally occupied Istanbul in March 1920. The occupation resulted in the purge of Karakol, many of whose activists were arrested by the Allied authorities. Devoid of its leadership, Karakol was disbanded by the Anatolian movement on April 23, 1920, on the same day as the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.5
There is a difference between Zürcher’s study and Nur Bilge Criss’ book, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, with respect to the fate of Karakol.6 The latter is the most important research exploring the social and political conditions of Istanbul under occupation. Like Zürcher, Criss refers to the Unionists’ crucial role in the founding of the
4 See the chapter of the same book, entitled “Unionist Attempts to Regain Control,” pp. 118-141.
5 Ibid. p. 122.
6 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999).
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Karakol society. Unlike Zürcher, however, she argues that Karakol was reorganized after the military occupation in March 1920. According to Criss, Karakol continued operating under the name of Zabitan (Officers) although it no longer played an effective role in the resistance movement.7 Despite this difference, Zürcher and Criss are in agreement as to what replaced the Karakol society. They both mention that the National Defense (Müdafa-i Milliye) organization, also known as the Mim-Mim or M.M. group, took over Karakol’s underground functions. The Ankara government effectively controlled Mim-Mim, which “… functioned as a part of the nationalist army”.8
Another research published by Mesut Aydın in Turkish challenges this narrative.9 Aydın asserts that Karakol continued to be an influential group after its revival under the name of Zabitan in October 1920.10 More importantly, he claims that the National Defense and Mim-Mim were two separate organizations competing for the control of the resistance movement in Istanbul. To support these arguments, Aydın utilizes a large number of archival documents, but one of his basic sources is a two-volume book published by Hüsnü Himmetoğlu in 1975.11
7 Ibid. pp. 113-114.
8 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 122.
9 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar ve Faaliyetleri, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1992).
10 Ibid. pp. 33-47. See also Mesut Aydın, “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde İstanbul’da Anadolu Lehinde Faaliyette Bulunan Gizli Gruplardan Zabitan Grubu’na Ait Bir Vesika. Teşkilat ve Faaliyet Raporu,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, vol: VI, no: 18, July 1990, pp. 591-599.
11 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, (İstanbul: Ülkü Basımevi, 1975).
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Himmetoğlu was a merchant who participated in the resistance movement. In the aftermath of the national struggle, he carried out extensive research in the archives of the Turkish General Staff. His book provides a great number of documents mostly in full-text. Especially its first volume seeks to demonstrate that Mim-Mim and Müdafa-i Milliye were two separate organizations. This is an important point because in Ottoman Turkish the letter “ م,” that is, “Mim” reads as “M” in Latin alphabet when used in a word. Therefore, “ .م
م,” that is, Mim-Mim or M.M. seems to be an abbreviation for Müdafa-i Milliye, i.e. the
National Defense. However, according a detailed report published by Himmetoğlu
The M.M. group was an organization founded specially by a few friends separately. Their desire was to take the first letters of the name of National Defense – a well-established organization that permeated all around Istanbul and whose foundation was officially recognized by Anatolia – to benefit from the size and officially recognized status of this organization with the help of these letters; namely, to replace the National Defense organization under the name of M.M.12
Arguments and Organization
The first two chapters of my dissertation aim to clarify the relationship between Karakol/Zabitan, the National Defense organization, and the Mim-Mim group. Chapter 1 examines how the Unionists initiated the founding of the Karakol society, which laid the foundations of the resistance movement. This section demonstrates that Karakol collaborated with the Ottoman War Ministry and presided over the National Congress. The latter aimed to form a national front based on the existing social, cultural, political, and professional organizations. Most of these organizations had been under the control of the CUP during World War I.
12 This report was written by a nationalist agent Bican Bağcıoğlu. Ibid. vol. I, p. 125.
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In Chapter 2, I show that the National Defense was founded in 1921 as the principal organization of the Turkish national movement in Istanbul. Although this organization was affiliated with the General Staff in Ankara, the national (or Ankara) government’s authority over it was limited. In fact, the Ottoman (or Istanbul) government had more influence in the Central Committee of the National Defense (Müdafa-i Milliye Heyet-i Merkeziyesi). The majority of the committee members were associated with the ministers of the Istanbul government who supported the Turkish national struggle. The Karakol society, which assumed the name Zabitan after March 1920, was powerful in the Central Committee as well.
My dissertation shows that the power struggle between Istanbul and Ankara did not come to an end right after the Allied authorities formally occupied the Ottoman capital in March 1920. I suggest that the Mim-Mim group was not a separate organization, but one of the factions operating within the National Defense. The leaders of this group were mostly former Karakol members who began to work under the command of the General Staff in Ankara over the second half of 1920. They represented the Ankara government within the resistance movement in Istanbul. During the War of Independence, however, the Mim-Mim was a minority group that engaged in opposition to the prevailing leadership of the National Defense organization.
My basic argument is that the factional conflict within the National Defense became part of a broader division over the course of 1922. This division originated from a political disagreement over the character of the regime to be formed after the national struggle as much as the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. I argue that the Unionist cadre of the Turkish national movement split into republican and sultanist factions in the spring of 1922, and
8
these two factions formed two rival coalitions that incorporated various social and political forces. I concentrate particularly on the formation of a republican bloc in Istanbul during the period between October 1922 and March 1923. I demonstrate that this was a left-wing populist bloc in which the nascent Turkish communist movement played an active part.
Chapter 3 examines the origins of the split under study. It shows that in the first half of 1922 a group of former CUP leaders began to place more emphasis on the necessity to protect the Ottoman sultanate. This circle then participated in the founding of the Second Group of the Defense of National Rights in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Although the Second Group did not have a distinctly sultanist program, it emerged as a platform of opposition against the Defense of National Rights Group, i.e. the First Group, led by Mustafa Kemal. A similar coalition simultaneously arose in Istanbul, where a Unionist circle formed alliances with diverse political groups that had ties to the Palace and the Ottoman government. It had a significant following among the Ottoman officer corps and became a dominant faction in the Central Committee of the National Defense. After the General Staff forced the committee members to resign in December 1922, this coalition preserved its political influence and formed the base of the Second Group’s Istanbul organization over the initial months of 1923.
During the last quarter of 1922, another coalition was brought into existence to counterbalance the faction that presided over the National Defense. The Mim-Mim group was one of its components. After the conclusion of the War of Independence in September 1922, the radical members of this group engaged in an informal alliance with a Unionist circle that had stayed away from the National Defense organization. This was a populist
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circle operating under the name of Union and Progress.13 Some of its leaders espoused a corporatist program called the Representation of Professions (Meslek-i Temsil), which had an explicitly republican orientation. This program was one of the major ideological references of the political and ideological tendency that the prominent historian Mete Tunçay aptly describes as the Unionist left.14
Chapter 4 deals with the Turkish communist movement, focusing on two particular groups. One is the International Union of Workers (IUW) – whose activists and leaders consisted mainly of Ottoman Christians and Jews – and the other is the Istanbul Communist Group (ICG), also known as the Aydınlık (Clarté) group. I seek to outline the complex relationships between the communists and the diverse factions of the Turkish national movement, paying particular attention to the rise of an anti-communist tendency within the First Group. I refer to this tendency, which came to power in Ankara in July 1922, as the right wing of the First Group as well. The communists had ties to the radical members of the First Group, some of who were identified as national socialists. There was also collaboration between the communists and the radical members of the Mim-Mim group who figure as Kemalist-communists in the available primary sources.
Chapter 5 elaborates on how the coalition between the communist movement, the Mim-Mim group, and the Union and Progress network developed in two large confederations that unified the majority of the artisan corporations and worker unions in Istanbul. These confederations were founded right after a series of mass demonstrations
13 I deliberately avoid referring to this organization as the CUP because it was far from uniting all the Unionist cliques that emerged in the armistice period.
14 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925), Cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 258-326
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that celebrated, first, the defeat of the Greek army in August-September 1922 and, then, the passage of the governance of Istanbul to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in November. Against the background of this political context, the labor movement provided a convenient platform for the cooperation of the populist, socialist and communist organizations that were operating in Istanbul.
Chapter 6, the last part of my dissertation, examines how this radical coalition broke up because of competition between the Mim-Mim group and the Union and Progress network. The efforts of merging them under the First Group had failed by the end of the municipal elections in March 1923. The Istanbul branch of the First Group was organized after the municipal elections anyway, but it had nothing to do with the radical and populist groups of the resistance movement. The central bureau of this branch even consisted of certain figures who had a history of collaboration with the Second Group. In June 1923, the major anti-communist leaders of the First Group, such as Rauf (Orbay), Refet (Bele), and Ali Fethi Okyar, were elected to parliament from Istanbul.
The purge of the left was a direct outcome of this political shift. Right after the May Day of 1923, a number of communist leaders were arrested. Following the general elections in June, the Ankara government began targeting the populist and socialist leaders as well. Meanwhile, a xenophobic tendency was consolidated in the worker and merchant confederations in Istanbul. Prior to the promulgation of the Republic, the leaders of these unions launched a widespread campaign for the elimination of Christians from the economy. This grassroots movement provided the initial popular base of the Turkification policies that troubled the non-Muslim communities during the 1920s and 30s.
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Sources
This study is based largely on archival research in Turkey, France, and Britain. I carried out research in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul (BBO, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) and the Prime Ministry Republican Archives in Ankara (BBC, Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi). However, I utilize a greater number of primary sources from the Institute for the History of the Turkish Revolution Archives in Ankara (TİTE, Türkiye İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Arşivi).
Most of the documents I have drawn from the TİTE archives are correspondences between the nationalist agents in Istanbul and the General Staff in Ankara. Among them are reports written by the members of the Mim-Mim group. Some of such reports elaborate on the power struggles within the National Defense organization. They informed Ankara of the leaders of the resistance movement who collaborated with the Ottoman government and/or the Second Group’s opposition. There are also documents referring to the activities of the communists and populists within the artisan and labor unions.
I make use of another set of primary documents from the Defense Historical Service Archives in Paris (SHAT, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre), and the French Foreign Ministry Archives (AMAE, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères) in Paris, as well as the Foreign Office Catalogs of the Public Record Office in London (FO). Apart from a large number of consular reports from Turkey, some of which I utilize in this study, these archives hold the correspondences of the British and French occupation forces. Many of the correspondences I use are the summary or complete text of the reports written by various informants who worked for the Allied authorities. Such reports provide detailed
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information about the political circles and organizations involved in the resistance movement and the relations of those groups with the Ankara government.
I also worked on the Comintern documents held in Istanbul by the Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (TÜSTAV, Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları Vakfı). The majority of the Comintern documents I utilize in my dissertation are reports prepared by the communist leaders. These reports provide useful information about the communist activities and the labor movements in Istanbul. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut have published many such reports in two complementary studies: International Union of Workers and From the Istanbul Communist Group to the Turkish Communist Party.15 In addition to the documents I obtained in the course of my own research in the TÜSTAV – Comintern archives, I make great use of the reports published by these important books16.
Apart from the primary sources from the archives mentioned above, my dissertation draws on a range of published documents and memoirs. One of the published sources is worth mentioning here. Edited by Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan, the court records of the Ankara Independence Tribunals in 1926 (1926 Ankara İstiklal Mahkemleri) form a very
15 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, 1919-1926, 1. Cilt 1919-1923, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2013); Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, 1919-1926, 2. Cilt, 1924-Mart 1926, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2013); Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı (Mütareke İstanbulu’nda Rum Ağırlıklı Bir İşçi Örgütü ve TKP ile İlişkileri), (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2009).
16 If a Comintern document I use in my dissertation is published in one of Tunçay and Akbulut’s studies, I cite both the location of this particular document in the book and its catalog number in the TÜSTAV – Comintern archives when I first refer to it. If I use the original document, I cite only the catalog number when I mention that particular document once again. Otherwise, I cite only the page numbers of the complete text or summary of the document in question in Tunçay and Akbulut’s study. Needless to mention, I cite only the catalog numbers of the documents that are not published in one of those two studies by Tunçay and Akbulut.
13
useful source of information for this study.17 The Unionist leaders who were charged with having attempted to assassinate Mustafa Kemal made important statements behind the court concerning their activities and political engagements after World War I.
Moreover, I consult a group of newspapers and periodicals published in Istanbul during the armistice period. The daily Tevhid-i Efkar is particularly important for my dissertation because this newspaper represented the interests of the anti-communist wing of the Turkish national movement in Istanbul. From the second half of 1922 onwards, it came to the forefront of an anti-communist campaign in Istanbul. On the other hand, the journal Aydınlık (Clarté) is a useful source for understanding how the communist movement operated in Istanbul. This journal was published by the leaders of the Istanbul Communist Group, which then underlay the Turkish Communist Party. The articles published in Aydınlık provide significant insights about diverse subjects, including the development of the labor movement in Istanbul as well as the communists’ approach to the national leadership.
17 Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi: Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi’nde Cereyan Eden Su-i Kasd ve Taklib-i Hükümet Davasına Ait Resmi Zabıtlar, (İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 2005).
14
CHAPTER I: KARAKOL AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
This chapter examines the formation of the Turkish resistance movement in Istanbul. After a brief outline of the history of the CUP, it concentrates on the period between the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied powers in March 1920. The second part of the chapter deals with the Ottoman War Ministry and its role in the rise of Mustafa Kemal as leader of the independence movement in Anatolia. The third section focuses on how the Karakol society laid the foundations of the resistance in collaboration with the staff of the War Ministry. The fourth section demonstrates that the Karakol leaders had considerable influence over the National Congress, which aimed to form a national front based on the existing social, cultural, political, and professional organizations.
The final part of the chapter addresses the power struggles between the Unionist leaders of Karakol and Mustafa Kemal. This struggle stemmed partly from the insistence of the Karakol leaders to maintain their autonomy from the headquarters of the Anatolian movement. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal was not willing to accept Karakol’s independent line. The conflict between Istanbul and Ankara came to the surface in the second half of 1919.
15
Committee of Union and Progress
The foundations of the CUP were laid in 1889 by a small group of medical students in Istanbul.18 They intended to restore the Constitution suspended by Abdülhamid II in February 1878, less than two years after its promulgation in December 1876. Over the next few years, the CUP grew steadily within the Ottoman Empire and abroad, reaching the heights of its power in Istanbul, where it tried to depose Abdülhamid with a coup d’etat in the second half of 1896.19 After the failure of this attempt, the organization began to disintegrate under the pressure of the Hamidian regime’s effective security measures, and also because of a series of internal conflicts between the leaders of the Young Turk movement in Europe.20
The organization that led the Revolution of July 1908, which restored constitutional order in Ottoman domains, was the second Committee of Union and Progress. The second
18 At that time the organization was named İttihad-ı Osmani (the Ottoman Unity). Among its founders were İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmet Reşit, Hikmet Emin and Hüseyinzade Ali. For the meeting that resulted in the founding of this organization, see the memoirs of İbrahim Temo, İbrahim Temo’nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987), pp. 13-18. See also M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük, (1889-1902), vol: I, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), pp. 173-174; Ernest Edmonson Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali, (İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1972), pp. 30-37; Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998), pp. 27-37.
19 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, pp. 214-219.
20 The First Congress of Ottoman Opposition Parties, held in Paris in February 1902, formalized the de facto disintegration of the Young Turk movement in Europe. At the end of this conference, the movement split between the majority coalition led by Prince Sabahattin and the minority coalition of Ahmet Rıza Bey. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preperation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-11. For the ideological differences between the majority and minority coalitions, see Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992).
16
CUP emerged in September 1907 as a coalition of two separate organizations, the majority of whose founders had been once affiliated with the first CUP.21 They were the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU)22 and the Ottoman Freedom Society (OFS).23 The headquarters of both organizations were located outside of Istanbul, with the former in Paris, and the latter in Salonika, a cosmopolitan port city of Ottoman Macedonia.24 The coalition of the two organizations initially carried the name CPU. Only in the aftermath of the July Revolution did it come to be called the CUP.25
21 For the establishment of the second CUP, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preperation for a Revolution, pp. 210-217; Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 87-94.
22 The CPU was based on the Minority coalition towards the end of 1905. It was the renowned Unionist Bahattin Şakir who took great initiative in the reorganization of the Minority into the CPU. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preperation for a Revolution, pp. 136-141. For Bahattin Şakir; see also Hikmet Çiçek, Dr. Bahattin Şakir: İttihat ve Terakki’den Teşikilatı Mahsusa’ya Bir Türk Jakobeni, (İstanbul Kaynak Yayınları, 2007).
23 The OFS was formed in Salonika in September 1906. The practical leader of this organization was Talat Bey, who had been affiliated with the Edirne branch of the first CUP. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preperation for a Revolution, pp. 210-217; see also Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), pp. 37-39; İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “İttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin Oluşumunda Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapısının Belirleyiciliği,” in Cumhuriyet’in Harcı. Vol: I Köktenci Modernitenin Oluşumu, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 1-65.
24 After the merger, the CPU center in Paris formed the new organization’s external headquarters while OFS functioned as its internal headquarters Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preperation for a Revolution, pp. 215-217.
25 According to Kazım Karabekir, the CPU began to use the name CUP starting from 29 July 1908. Kazım Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 1886-1909, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993), p. 131.
17
A number of junior officer corps recruited by the OFS, especially its Monastir branch in Macedonia,26 formed the driving force of the revolutionary movement that culminated in the restoration of the Constitution on July 23, 1908.27 The movement started in Monastir at the beginning of July when a number of soldiers and some civilians, led by the staff officer Niyazi of Resne made it to the hills of the city to launch a military uprising against the Porte.28 The uprising immediately spread throughout Macedonia under the command of Unionist officers, including Enver, Eyüp Sabri and Ali Fethi (Okyar). Unable to subdue this movement by means of military measures, Abdülhamid was left with no choice but to promulgate the restoration of constitutional order and call for the elections.29
After the Revolution, the CUP became the Ottoman Empire’s most influential political movement. Although the Unionist leaders in parliament could not immediately monopolize political authority in their hands, the CUP exerted a considerable degree of control over the prevailing governments until it was removed from power by an anti-
26 The staff officers Enver and Kazım (Karabekir) were among the OFS’ most important activists who led the organization of the Monastir branch. Kazım Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, p. 140; Halil Erdoğan Cengiz (ed.), Enver Paşa’nın Anıları, 1881-1908, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 61-86;
27 For more information on the spread of the movement among the officer corps, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “İttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin Oluşumunda Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapısının Belirleyiciliği,” pp. 53-54; Şükrü Hanioğlu highlights that the organizational network of the center in Paris helped the movement to spread throughout Macedonia and the Balkans, Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, pp. 227-229.
28 Feroz Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995), pp. 15-29. Ayku Kansu’s The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997) is one of the most comprehensive works about the unfolding of the revolution belongs to Aykut Kansu; see especially pp. 73-113.
29 François Georgeon, Abülhamid II. Le Sultan Calife (1876-1909), (Paris: Fayard, 2003), pp. 401-402.
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Unionist coalition in July 1912.30 In January 1913, the Unionists overthrew this coalition with a coup d’état.31 Yet the character of the new regime gradually formed afterwards was fundamentally different from the previous era, during which the CUP had been faced with the political pressure of the opposition. In the course of World War I, the Unionist leadership ruled the Ottoman Empire singlehandedly by building an authoritarian regime under which no rival political movement could survive.32
At the end of World War I, the Unionist one-party regime suddenly collapsed. In October 1918, the Talat Pasha cabinet resigned33, and then the Mudros Armistice was signed with the Allied powers, formalizing the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war.34 During the months that followed, the capital city witnessed the de facto occupation of the British, French, and Italian troops.35 Many of the Unionist leaders, including Talat, Enver,
30 The character of the CUP’s hold on political power during this period is described as the CUP’s “supervising rule” (denetleme iktidarı) since the organization did not directly monopolize the state power, but instead sought to control the prevailing governments by putting pressure on them. The political developments of this period have been explored in detail by a group of modern historians – among the most important of them are Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 120-365; Feroz Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 1908-1914; Aykut Kansu, Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000); Baran Hocaoğlu, II. Meşrutiyette İktidar-Muhalefet İlişkileri, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2010).
31 The justification of the coup consisted in the prevailing anti-Unionist Kamil Pasha cabinet’s decision to finish the First Balkan War at the cost of giving up on Edirne, which had been practically lost to Bulgaria. Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 324-340.
32 For the characteristics of the Unionist one-party rule, see Ibid, pp. 377-459.
33 Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, Mütareke’de İttihatçılık. İttihat ve Terakki Partisi’nin Dağılması, (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2006), pp. 27-31.
34 Ibid. pp. 48-51.
35 Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I: Mutlakiyete Dönüş, 1918-1919, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), p. 66.
19
Cemal, Bahattin Şakir, and Dr. Nazım, fled the country.36 In November 1918, the CUP dissolved itself in its final general congress. The short-lived Renewal Party (Teceddüd Fırkası), which was formed in this congress to replace the Union and Progress, could play no significant political role in the armistice period.37 Nor could the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası), which was established by a group that broke with the CUP in October 1918.38 The Ottoman government, headed by pro-British Damat Ferit Pasha since March 191939, disbanded both organizations on May 5, 1919.40
The removal of the CUP’s successors from the sphere of politics did not halt the activities of the remaining Unionist cadres in Istanbul. When the Renewal Party and the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party were outlawed in May 1919, these cadres had already laid the foundations of a resistance movement against the occupation, having established this movement’s legal and underground network of relations, embodied in the Karakol society and the National Congress. In what follows, I provide a brief account of how the military cadres associated with the Ottoman War Ministry contributed to the formation of the Turkish independence movement, before elaborating on these two important organizations of the resistance movement.
36 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 677-679; Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, Mütareke’de İttihatçılık, pp. 70-78.
37 For more information on the Renewal Party, see ibid, pp. 148-186.
38 Ibid, pp. 95-148.
39 For more information on the rise and activities of the first and second Damat Ferit Pasha cabinets, see Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, pp. 173-377.
40 Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, Mütareke’de İttihatçılık, pp. 185-186.
20
Ottoman War Ministry
Shortly after the coup d’état of January 1913, which brought the Unionists back to power, the Ottoman army came under the full control of the CUP. The Unionist staff officer Enver ascended to the top of the military hierarchy at an exceptionally rapid pace, which departed from normal patterns of career development within the Ottoman Army.41 In January 1914, Enver was appointed both War Minister and Chief of the General Staff, owing to the support of the CUP headquarters.42 He then immediately embarked on a large-scale operation in the army, purging the opponents of the CUP and retiring senior commanders associated with the military establishment of the previous era.43 In parallel with this operation, Enver turned the War Ministry into a focal point of power, around which a network of political and economic relations was built.
To be sure, the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) formed the most important component of this network. Although there are different accounts of the origins and actions of this organization,44 it seems to have been officially founded in November 1913 as
41 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 66.
42 Enver also seems to have received the support of a large following among young officers and a group of activists known as volunteers (fedailer) who were used by the CUP for dangerous missions, especially political murders. Hande Nezir Akmeşe, The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I, (London: Tauris, 2005), p. 158.
43 M. Naim Turfan, Jön Türklerin Yükselişi: Siyaset, Askerler ve Osmanlı’nın Çöküşü, (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2005), pp. 403-412.
44 Zürcher indicates that the name Special Organization is used by many sources in reference to the group of volunteers surrounding Enver. According to Zürcher, the formal establishment of the Special Organization was an acknowledgement of the already existing situation, Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 59.
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a department under the War Ministry.45 In Ottoman-Turkish historiography, the Special Organization has always been associated with the perpetration of massacres against the Armenian population, which was deported all over the Empire in 1915.46 It is also known that this organization carried out various duties in its capacity as an intelligence agency, from the suppression of anti-Ottoman revolts in the Arab peninsula to Islamist propaganda in British and French colonies.47 In mid-1915, the name of the organization was changed as the Office of Eastern Affairs (Umur-u Şarkiye Dairesi). Ali Bey of Başhampa was appointed president of this office. He held this position until the end of October 1918.48
From the onset of the mobilization for World War I, the War Ministry also functioned as one of the key authorities governing the Ottoman wartime economy. The Military Commissariat controlled by İsmail Hakkı Pasha was accorded extraordinary
45 According to a document found by Polat Safi in the ATASE archives, the exact date of the organization’s founding was November 30, 1913. Polat Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization - Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: a Historical Assessment with Particular Reference to Its Operations against British Occupied Egypt, (1914-1916), Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Submitted to the Department of History, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2006, p. 121.
46 See, for example, Taner Akçam, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolmuştur: Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), pp. 168-180; Taner Akçam, İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu. İttihat ve Terakki’den Kurtuluş Savaşı’na, (Ankara: imge Kitabevi, 1999), pp. 163-166. A recent book by Taner Akçam and Vahakn N. Dadrian not only provides the registers of the court martial trying the CUP members on their war crimes, especially those related to their part in the Armenian massacres of 1915, but also includes a group of these scholars’ articles on the subject. The Special Organization’s role in the massacres is a recurring theme in the court records. For this relationship, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, “İstanbul Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi’sinde Ermeni Soykırımı Konusunda Görülen Davalar ve Verilen Kararlar,” Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam (eds.), “‘Tehcir ve Taktil’. Divan-ı Harb-I Örfi Zabıtları. İttihat ve Terakki’nin Yargılanması, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), pp. 99-106.
47 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 339-359.
48 Polat Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization, pp. 124-125.
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powers to utilize the economic sources and facilities of the Empire at the service of the army.49 İsmail Hakkı’s authority expanded exponentially over the course of the war. In July 1916, he was appointed to the newly established Central Committee of Supplies, which governed the provisioning of both the army and the civilian populace under the chairmanship of Talat Bey, the Minister of the Interior.50 In August 1917, however, the administration of the whole matter was delegated to the General-Directorate of Supplies, a new department established under the Ministry of War.51 It was, again, İsmail Hakkı who presided over this department, which organized the acquisition and distribution of supplies for the Ottoman Empire as a whole for a year.
Already before the end of the war, the authority of the military headquarters had begun to decline. In August 1918, the War Ministry lost many of its economic privileges when much of the control over the wartime economy was taken from it and delegated to the newly established Ministry of Supply, which replaced the General-Directorate of Supplies.52 With the fall of the CUP from power, Enver and İsmail Hakkı left the Empire along with a group of principle Unionist leaders. Afterwards, the Office of Eastern Affairs
49 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Ekonomik Düzenlemeleri ve Kara Kemal Bey’in Yeri,” İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Cumhuriyetin Harcı. İkinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 8.
50 The other members of the committee consisted of undersecretaries appointed by the ministers of finance, commerce and agriculture, of the director of the Bank of Agriculture, and two other figures approved by the minister of interior, Zafer Toprak, İttihat – Terakki ve Cihan Harbi. Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye’de Devletçilik, (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2003), p. 139.
51 Ibid, pp. 143-149.
52 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, Cilt: III. 1914-1918 Genel Savaşı. Kısım: 4. Savaşın Sonu, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), pp. 543-545.
23
was formally disbanded.53 Despite all these developments, however, the War Ministry maintained its significance after the armistice was signed, since it emerged as an important center participating in the formation of the Turkish independence movement.
Until the Allied authorities occupied Istanbul de jure on March 16, 1920, thereby establishing full control over the governance of the capital, the Ottoman military hierarchy was presided over by a series of commanders who supported prevailing attempts to build an armed resistance against the partition of the Empire. Among them were Cevat (Çobanlı) Pasha (19 December 1918 – 2 April 1919), Cemal Pasha (10 October 1919 – 25 January 1920), and Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha (3 February 1920 – 16 March 1920).54 Relying on the implicit support of these commanders, some of the high-ranking officers in provinces – the majority of whom were of a Unionist background, such as Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) and Cafer Tayyar – sabotaged the disbanding of the army corps, which would, in turn, form the nucleus of the national army in Anatolia.55
The rise of Mustafa Kemal as the Anatolian movement’s leader did not occur independently of the authority of the War Ministry. In the middle of May 1919, Mustafa Kemal went from Istanbul to Samsun in the capacity of military inspector. His officially duty was to restore order on behalf of the central government.56 It was the Unionist circles in
53 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 97.
54 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 101.
55 Ibid. pp. 93-105, 109-110.
56 He was appointed inspector of the 9th Army in Eastern Anatolia. Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, p. 253-254. Meanwhile, the war minister was Şakir Pasha and the chief of the staff was Cevat (Çobanlı) Pasha. Ibid. p. 115.
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the capital that initiated Mustafa Kemal’s appointment to this important position.57 Yet the General Staff was aware of the motive behind this appointment, so it provided Mustafa Kemal with extraordinary powers.58 By the time Mustafa Kemal departed from Istanbul, provincial CUP branches had already begun to set up regional movements of resistance.59 The Sivas Congress in September 1919 resulted in the centralization of all these local movements under the Society for the Defense of National Rights of Anatolia and Thrace (SDNR). Mustafa Kemal was elected president of this organization’s Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye).
It is known that until the formal occupation of Istanbul in mid-March 1920, the high-ranking officers presiding over the War Ministry remained in close touch with the Representative Committee by means of telegraphic communication.60 According to a report written by the French intelligence service at the end December 1919, there were also military missions operating in between, and working for the cooperation of the
57 Ibid. pp. 106-117.
58 The instructions defining the scope of the inspectorship’s authorities were drafted by the second chief of the staff Kazım (İnanç) Pasha, as Fevzi Pasha, the chief of the staff was away from the capital on a duty in Thrace. Ibid, p. 115. See also Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, p. 253. Regional congresses were important developments for the rise of the independence movement across the provinces of the Empire. On this subject, see Bülent Tanör, Türkiye’de Kongre İktidarları.
59 For the organization of local movements of resistance in provinces, see Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, pp. 85-93; M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, Milli Mücadele Başlarken…Mondros Mütarekesinden Sivas Kongresine, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959), pp. 73-85. Regional congresses were important developments for the rise of the independence movement across the provinces of the Empire. For a more focused analysis of the dynamics underlying the formation of a local movement in the Aegean region of Anatolia, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Ege’deki Sivil Direnişten Kurtuluş Savaşı’na Geçerken Uşak Heyet-i Merkeziyesi ve İbrahim (Tahtakılıç) Bey, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989).
60 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 102.
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Ottoman War Ministry and the nationalist leadership in Anatolia.61 According to the same report, these two centers had recently reached an agreement on how to transfer war materials and officer corps from Istanbul to the national forces. It was the Karakol society that undertook large responsibilities for putting this strategic cooperation in practice.
Karakol Society
As noted above, after the CUP was removed from power and then formally dissolved, the machinery of this organization largely survived, and many of its remaining cadres took part in the establishment of the Turkish independence movement. It was the Karakol society that sought to lead and maintain the integrity of the Unionist network of resistance in Istanbul. There is no objective information revealing when and how this underground organization was formed. Most of what we know on this subject is based on the memoirs of and interviews with several Karakol members62. Although these narrative sources are
61 SHAT, 20 N 167, SR Marine, 2e Bureau, Carton: 57, File: 2, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Succinct sur la Situation en Turquie,” 31 December 1919.
62 The major points of these memoirs and interviews have been summarized by Fethi Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar: Karakol Cemiyeti, Türkiye’de İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti, Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti, Yeşilordu Cemiyeti, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), pp. 3-50. Tevetoğlu also made references to and published the full-texts of a number of documents about Karakol provided by these narrative sources, especially Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk (Speech) and Kazım Karabekir’s İstiklal Harbimiz (Our War of Independence). Another important study in this respect is Musa Gürbüz, Karakol Cemiyeti, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Submitted to Ankara University, Institute for the Turkish Revolution, 1987, see, especially, pp. 1-28. Information provided by Tarık Zafer Tunaya on the Karakol society is based largely on his interviews with a group of nationalist activists associated with Karakol: Ahmet İdikut, Galip Vardar, Hasene Ilgaz, Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez), Ali Rıza, Şükri Oğuz (Yenibahçeli) and Dr. Adnan Adıvar. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952), pp. 520-523. Another important source based on interviews belongs to Hasene Ilgaz, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” Tarih ve Edebiyat Mecmuası, 1 Ocak 1981, no: 17, p. 13.
26
marked by some contradictions, they establish that Karakol came into existence within the months that followed the signing of the Mudros armistice. According to the majority of the sources, Kara Kemal was one of the Unionist leaders who took part in the founding of the Karakol society.
Kara Kemal was the party secretary (katib-i mesul) of the CUP’s Istanbul branch during World War I.63 At the beginning of the war, he took over the management of the distribution of supplies in Istanbul.64 To carry out this business, he drew largely on the Society of Tradesmen, a Unionist organization that had centralized the administration of more than 50 guild associations in 1915.65 With profits accumulated from the management of supply distribution, Kara Kemal formed a set of companies that served to promote the national economy.66 These companies were organized as economic corporations, many of whose shareholders consisted of Muslim artisans and shopkeepers. Kara Kemal’s economic
63 For more information on Kara Kemal, see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki, pp. 408-411.
64 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Cumhuriyetin Harcı. Birinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 361-367.
65 For the bylaws of the Society of Tradesmen, see “Esnaf Cemiyetleri Nizamnamesi,” Tasvir-i Efkar, 4 Nisan 1915, p. 2. For a detailed account of how Kara Kemal led the organization of supply distribution in Istanbul, see Osman Nuri Ergin, Mecelle-i Umur-ı Belediye, Vol: 2, (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1995), pp. 813-828. This account was read in the CUP’s general congress of 1916.
66 Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat (1908-1918), (Ankara:Yurt Yayınevi, 1982), pp. 58-61, 281.
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and political power expanded to the extent that he was appointed head of the newly created Ministry of Supplies in August 1918.67
At the end of January 1919, however, Kara Kemal was arrested along with many other Unionist leaders to be tried by court martial.68 In May 1919, this group was banished to Malta.69 Afterwards, Karakol’s leadership became concentrated in the hands of Kara Vasıf (Karakol), a Unionist staff officer who had worked as a military counselor for Kara Kemal when the latter had been appointed Minister of Supplies.70 In fact, aside from Kara Vasıf, the majority of Karakol’s founders and key activists were drawn from the officers of Unionist background, such as Kemalettin Sami, Şevki of Galata, Ali Rıza (Sevkiyatçı), Nail, Şükrü and Ömer Lütfi of Yenibahçe.71 Many of them had previously worked for the Special Organization/Office of Eastern Affairs. Although this organization was officially disbanded at the end of the war, Karakol was built on its wide network, which had comprised not only officers, but also civilian agents.
Hüsamettin Ertürk was the last director of the Office of Eastern Affairs. He states in his memoirs that this organization continued its activities under his command, receiving
67 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Ekonomik Düzenlemeleri ve Kara Kemal Bey’in Yeri,” p. 20.
68 Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, pp. 128-132; Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, Mütareke’de İttihatçılık, pp. 216-217.
69 Ibid. pp. 233-235.
70 On Kara Vasıf’s involvement in the Ministry of Supplies, see the statement of Ali İhsan (İloğlu) in the Ankara trials of 1926, Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 138. See Kara Vasıf’s statement on the same subject in ibid. p. 616.
71 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 80-83; Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 99.
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the name General Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic World (Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilali Teşkilatı) upon the order of Enver Pasha.72 Ertürk identifies it as a separate organization from Karakol, claiming that he was never associated with the latter. Yet this statement contradicts the memoirs of Hüseyin Rauf Bey, who became the Minister of Navy in the first Ottoman cabinet formed by Ahmet İzzet Pasha after the fall of the CUP, and who then participated in the formation of the independence movement.73 According to Rauf, Kara Vasıf and Şükrü of Yenibahçe, two of Karakol’s principal leaders, were affiliated with the “Committee of Islamic Revolution”.74 Moreover, many of the available sources present Ertürk as chief of Karakol’s Topkapı branch.75
Karakol maintained close relations with both the Ottoman War Ministry and the headquarters of the Anatolian movement. On the one hand, the Karakol leaders formed the Istanbul branch of the SDNR.76 Kara Vasıf was elected one of the 16 members of the
72 Ibid. p. 98.
73 For Rauf Bey’s relations with the Karakol society, see Emel Akal, Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2008), pp. 155-159.
74 Feridun Kandemir, Hatıraları ve Söyledikleri ile Rauf Orbay, (İstanbul: Yakın Tarihimiz Yayınları, 1965), pp. 28-29. See also Hasene Ilgaz, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” p. 11
75 Yaşar Semiz and Ömer Akdağ (eds.), Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey’in Hatıraları, (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011), pp. 61-62; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, p. 520.
76 The Representative Committee intended to recognize Kara Vasıf’s coterie as the executive committee of the SDNR’s Istanbul section, not the leaders of the Karakol society. Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1960), p. 482. In fact, the Representative Committee never officially recognized Karakol. Hence a telegram wired from Istanbul to Ankara in October 1919 to inform the Representative Committee of the structure of the resistance movement in the capital did not mention the name of the Karakol society. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, Cilt: 3, Vesikalar, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1967), pp. 1130-1131. According to this document, the underground movement
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Representative Committee in the Sivas Congress of September 1919.77 On the other hand, Karakol stayed in touch with the War Ministry through his contact person Şevket of Galata there.78 Not only did the War Ministry supply the underground resistance with funds;79 but it also provided the means of communication between the Karakol society and the Representative Committee. Kara Vasıf and Şevki of Galata used the Ministry’s telegraphic lines for their correspondences with Ankara.80
The cadres of the Karakol society set up and operated a “flight line” (menzil hattı) through which numerous officers, civilian activists, and Unionist cadres secretly crossed to Anatolia to join the independence movement. It was Şükrü of Yenibahçe who controlled the operation of the flight line that started from the Üsküdar district.81 These cadres also smuggled war materials and ammunition to Anatolia. In doing so, they benefited greatly from the cooperation of porters, dockers and boatmen.82 At the end of January 1919, Şehremaneti, the municipal authority of Istanbul, abolished the Society of Tradesmen and
in Istanbul had three crowded branches in the city, and recruited numerous members from the army corps, police forces and civilian functionaries.
77 Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, Heyet-i Temsiliye Kararları, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1974), pp. 9-10. At the end of December 1919, the headquarters of the SDNR was transferred from Sivas to Ankara, Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-II: Son Meşrutiyet, 1919-1920. (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), pp. 165-171.
78 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 102. According to Hasene Ilgaz, each and every department of the war ministry secretly cooperated with Karakol, Hasene Ilgaz, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” p. 11.
79 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 87.
80 Ibid. p. 102.
81 Yaşar Semiz and Ömer Akdağ (eds.), Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey’in Hatıraları, pp. 60-61.
82 According to Şükrü of Yenibahçe, it was Ali Rıza (Sevkiyatçı) who established Karakol’s connections with these workers. Ibid. p. 60.
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fired the Unionist commissars of guild organizations.83 Practically, however, these associations remained under the Unionists’ control during the armistice period.
Apart from its contributions to the independence movement developing in Anatolia, Karakol also sought to organize an underground resistance movement in Istanbul. To this end, the cadres of the organization laid the foundations of the armed district committees, which would later constitute the nucleus of the National Defense organization. Based on the existing sources, it is not possible to find out exactly when they began to be formed. Already in January 1920, however, the British intelligence service reported the formation of armed nationalist bands across Istanbul to stir up sabotages, strikes, and general disturbances in case of the loss of the city.84 According to this report, it was Kara Vasıf who coordinated this process, and the machinery of the armed bands existed in the National Defense Association (Müdafa-i Milliye Cemiyeti, hereafter NDA), whose branches had been called once more into existence.
What is to be noted here is that the association spoken of by the British intelligence was not the same organization as the one formed under the name of National Defense around the middle of 1921. Founded at the beginning of 1913, while the First Balkan War was continuing, the NDA was one of the associations through which the CUP aimed to mobilize the population for its war efforts.85 It was a paramilitary association intended to
83 “Esnaf Katib-i Mesullüğü ve Kethüdalığı,” İkdam, 28 January 1919, p. 2.
84 FO, 371/5165, “Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports issued by M, I, 1.c., Constantinople Branch for Week ending 22nd January 1920,” 2 February 1920.
85 For this association, see Nazim H. Polat, Müdafa-i Milliye Cemiyeti, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991). For the process of its establishment, see pp. 22-33.
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prepare those behind the front lines for wars.86 The NDA organized campaigns to collect donations for the army, formed voluntary battalions, and sought to develop citizens’ martial capacities by means of various training activities in sports, weapon-use, and bulwark making. Until dissolved by the Ottoman government in March 1919,87 it had 10 local branches in Istanbul’s principal districts.88
As can be inferred from the aforementioned British report, it is very likely that the armed groups in question relied to some extent on the NDA’s local branches. In fact, there was considerable overlap between the areas where NDA branches had operated and where, according to Hüsamettin Ertürk, the first resistance groups emerged.89 Based on the existing sources, we cannot establish the extent of this organizational continuity, but there is no doubt that some key members of the NDA played important roles in the formation of district committees. For example, Hafiz Kemal, a professor in the teachers’ training college,
86 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Vol.1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908-1918, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), p. 475.
87 Nazim H. Polat, Müdafa-i Milliye Cemiyeti p. 144.
88 The districts where NDA was organized were Fatih, Beyazıd, Beyoğlu, Kadıköy, Makriköy (Bakırköy), Anadoluhisarı, Adalar, Mirgun, Kartal, Gebze. Ibid. p. 83. For the members and activities of these local braches, see also ibid. pp. 83-95.
89 Erturk’s list comprises the Şehremini, Aksaray, Eyüp Sultan and Beyazıt districts. They were situated in and around the Fatih area, where there was an NDA branch. Other overlaps of this sort are Bakırköy and Anadoluhisarı. Beşiktaş and Galata were other districts in which local resistance groups were formed. They were very close to Beyoğlu where an NDA branch had been organized. The other districts listed by Ertürk are Üsküdar, Kuzguncuk, Beylerbeyi, Çengelköy, Beykoz (close to Anadoluhisarı), Kavak, Sarıyer and Büyükdere. Samih Nafiz Tansu (ed.), İki Devrin Perde Arkası. Anlatan: Emekli Süvari Albayı Hüsamettin Ertürk (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Başkanı). (İstanbul: Çınar Matbaası, 1969), p. 226, see also pp. 227-232.
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had been involved in the administrative committee of the NDA’s Fatih branch.90 Then he became one of the major organizers of a resistance group in Eyüpsultan, a district bordering the Fatih area.91 He would later take part in the National Defense Organization’s Central Committee.
There are some clues in the narrative sources we have concerning the social and political backgrounds of the founders of the local resistance groups. According to the memoirs of Ertürk and Hüsnü Himmetoglu (a merchant who participated in the resistance movement in Istanbul), the majority of them were patriots who came from the educated circles of the society (münevver zümre).92 Ertürk enumerates a number of such figures, most of who were from the civilian and military staff.93 According to Ertürk, there were many Unionists among them. He argues that the main reason that led the Unionist cadres to participate in the organization of the resistance movement was their fear for being charged and punished for the “Armenian deportation and massacre”.94
National Congress
The Unionists were also active in a set of legal associations. Many of them, like the NDA, the Association of Ottoman Navy (Osmanlı Donanma Cemiyeti), the Turkish Heartlands (Türk
90 Nazim H. Polat, Müdafa-i Milliye Cemiyeti. p. 86.
91 Samih Nafiz Tansu (ed.), İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 229.
92 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 94-100.
93 Samih Nafiz Tansu (ed.), İki Devrin Perde Arkası, pp. 227-232; 236-241.
94 Ibid, p. 226.
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Ocakları), and the Red Crescent (Kızılay) had been established before the armistice.95 In November 1918, the National Congress sought to unite them together under a national front. This federation was established “with the objective to unify all national forces (kuva-yı milliye)” in Istanbul.96 There were over 50 associations and political parties involved in the National Congress. Each of them was represented by two delegates in this federation. Although the associations and political parties of a Unionist background dominated the Congress, the leaders of this entity were careful to incorporate non-Unionist individuals and organizations as well. For example, İsmail Bey of Gümülcine, one of the leading figures of the anti-Unionist Liberal Entente Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) was a member of the Congress’ executive committee.97
There was a close association between the National Congress and the Karakol Society. Dr. Esat (Işık) was the leader of the former. Affiliated with the Special Organization before the armistice, he also became a Karakol member.98 At the same time, he was president of the Association of National Training and Manners (Milli Talim Terbiye Cemiyeti) and involved in the executive board of the Association of Ottoman Farmers (Osmanlı Çiftçiler Cemiyeti). The former association led by Dr. Esat took the first step
95 For the close relationship between Karakol and the Red Crescent, see Hasene Ilgaz, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” p. 12.
96 See the National Congress’ program in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt: 2. Mütarake Dönemi, 1918-1922, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), p. 171.
97 Ibid. p. 165. See also Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu, “Milli Kongre ve Faaliyetleri,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, November 1988, vol: 3, no: 7, p. 208.
98 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, pp. 76-77. For more information on the development of Dr. Esat’s political and professional career, see H. Kadircan Keskinbora, Bilimde, Siyasette, Milli Mücadele’de Bir Işık: Esat Işık. (İstanbul: Kavis Yayıncılık, 2010).
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towards the founding of the National Congress in its meeting on October 17, 1918. Four members of its executive committee were charged to carry out this process: Mehmet Emin, Ali Kamil, Haydar Rıfat and Baha Sait, who issued the first call for the formation of the National Congress.99 At least one of them, Baha Sait, a retired Unionist officer, was a Karakol member. He was involved in the nucleus that formed this underground organization.100 According to Şükrü of Yenibahçe, it was Baha Sait who gave the Karakol society its name.101
In the second half of 1919, the National Congress engaged in an attempt to form a national coalition for the general elections that would take place in December. It invited all associations and political organizations in the capital to partake in this effort by dispatching representatives regardless of whether they were involved in the National Congress or not. It was the Karakol member Dr. Esat who led this process on behalf of the National Congress102. Baha Sait was the Chief of the Election Commission that consisted of the representatives dispatched by the existing political organizations.103 Yet, negotiations taking place at the meetings of the Commission demonstrated the difficulty of finding a
99 For the text of this call, see Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu, “Milli Kongre ve Faaliyetleri,” p. 200.
100 Fethi Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar: Karakol Cemiyeti, p. 4.
101 Yaşar Semiz and Ömer Akdağ (eds.), Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey’in Hatıraları, pp. 58-59.
102 An important source that sheds light on the National Congress’ efforts to form a national bloc is a report addressed by an undersecretary of the ministry of interior to the current grand vizier Ali Rıza Pasha on November 17, 1919. A copy of this report translated into French is available at SHAT, 20 N 167, SR Marine, 2e Bureau, Carton: 57, Dossier 2, “Rapport sur le Milli Congres et les Parti Politiques. Adressé au Grand-Vézir par le Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat du Ministre de l’Intérieure.” The name of the reporter is “Ahmed Kechfi”.
103 Ibid. p. 5.
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common basis of cooperation between the participating Unionist and non-Unionist groups.104 Although the National Congress eventually produced a list of 10 candidates,105 this outcome was far from the original blueprint. Unable to overcome the diverging attitudes of the existing political groups106, many of which preferred to participate in the elections with their own separate lists,107 the National Congress could not go further than recommending these candidates to voters.
Istanbul versus Anatolia
A growing tension between the leadership of the National Congress and the Representative Committee marked the election process. In the beginning of October, while preparations for the elections were underway, Dr. Esat addressed an open telegram to the Representative Committee, which was published by the Istanbul press108. The letter accused the SDNR of interfering in the elections process in provinces and of propagating Unionism (İttihatçılık) during this process. In his response to Dr. Esat, Mustafa Kemal
104 According to the report cited above, each and every meeting of the commission of elections witnessed fierce debates between the delegates of different political movements because of the Unionists’ intrigues. Ibid, pp. 5-6.
105 “Bugün İstanbul Mebuslarının İntihabı,” İkdam, 18 December 1919, p. 1.
106 SHAT, 20 N 167, SR Marine, 2e Bureau, Carton: 57, Dossier 2, No: 1404 – A-3, Congres National et les Elections, see especially Annexe IV, “La Faillite du ‘Congres National’”. For the declaration of Hulusi Bey, the secretar-general of the Association of Ottoman Farmers, about the failure of the national bloc, see also ibid, Annexe VI, “Le Point de Vue du ‘Tchiftchiler Derneghi’”.
107 For the decisions of the National Turkish Party (Milli Türk Fırkası) and the National Liberal Party (Milli Ahrar Fırkası) to break with the National Congress, see ibid, Annexe V, “Communique du Parti ‘National Turc’,” and Annexe VII, “Demissions du Parti National Liberal”.
108 “Milli Kongre’den Teşkilat-ı Milliye’ye,” İkdam, 3 October 1919, p. 1.
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claimed that the SDNR did not intend to intervene, but some of its members took part in the elections on their own initiative.109 More importantly, Mustafa Kemal pointed to the efforts of the National Congress in many cities, like Bursa, Trabzon, and Kastamonu, to get the Unionist candidates elected.
In fact, this dispute was part of a broader conflict between the resistance’s leaders in Istanbul and the Representative Committee, which came out because of Karakol’s independent line.110 The Karakol leaders sought to extend the scope of their activities beyond Istanbul by developing ties with the CUP’s provincial branches,111 and conducting propaganda among national armed forces through the circulation of Karakol’s pamphlets and directives.112 The conflict came to the surface during the Sivas Congress in September 1919, where Mustafa Kemal and Kara Vasıf had a dispute over Karakol.113 Even so, the Karakol leaders continued to act independenly from the Representitive Committee to the extent that they signed an agreement of collaboration and friendship with the Bolshevik
109 “Kuvva-yı Milliye İntihabata Müdahale Ediyor mu?” İkdam, 10 November 1919, p. 1.
110 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, pp. 119-122.
111 Karakol spread its activities in the Aegean region of Anatolia staring from June 1919. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Ege’deki Sivil Direnişten Kurtuluş Savaşı’na Geçerken Uşak Heyet-i Merkeziyesi ve İbrahim (Tahtakılıç) Bey, p. 224.
112 Fethi Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar: Karakol Cemiyeti, pp. 20-21.
113 Another topic of competition between Mustafa Kemal and Kara Vasıf seems to have been the question of American mandate in Turkey, Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, pp. 481-485.
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Russia in January 1920. The Representative Committee did not ratify this agreement signed by Baha Sait on behalf of Karakol.114
This competition coincided with the deterioration of relations between the Ottoman War Ministry and Mustafa Kemal.115 Just as Mustafa Kemal and his followers criticized Karakol’s autonomous line, so were the high-ranking officers in Istanbul disturbed by Mustafa Kemal’s independent actions and uncompromising attitude. According to Eric Jan Zürcher, the intention of the military group in Istanbul was to to acquire more favorable peace terms by putting pressure on the Entente through an armed resistance movement in Anatolia. But they urged this movement to be under their own control. In the eyes of Mustafa Kemal, however, the Anatolian movement was the only legitimate representative of the nation.116 The conflict between the two opposing views reached the point that Fevzi Pasha, one of the leaders of the pro-nationalist military faction in the capital, even tried to replace Mustafa Kemal with more tractable Kazım Karabekir.117
With the inauguration of the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, the competition between the national leadership in Istanbul and the Representative Committee acquired a new form. The Parliament remained in Istanbul, despite Mustafa Kemal’s insistence on
114 Baha Sait signed this agreement as a representative of both Karakol and the executive committee of Uşak Congress, over which Karakol had considerable influence. Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, pp. 482-483. Stefanos Yerasimos, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devrimi’nden Milli Mücadele’ye, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), pp. 113-115. See also Emel Akal, Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm, pp. 271-278.
115 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, pp. 102-103.
116 Ibid. p. 103.
117 Ibid.
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moving it to Ankara, where the headquarters of the Anatolian movement had been located since December 27, 1919.118 This rendered Istanbul the true center of the national movement, over which Mustafa Kemal had little influence. He could not convince the Unionist majority to constitute a parliamentary group to be called the Defense of Rights.119 Instead, after the declaration of the National Pact in January, which became the statement of the Turkish independence movement’s territorial and political goals, this group was named as Felah-ı Vatan (Salvation of the Fatherland).120 Kara Vasıf, one of Karakol’s principal leaders, was among the seven members of this parliamentary group’s representative committee.
However, the military occupation of Istanbul by the Allied authorities on March 16, 1920, overturned the balance of power between Istanbul and Ankara.121 The Ottoman Parliament was abrogated while the leaders of the national movement were being arrested. Many of the arrested Unionists were immediately banished to Malta by the British. Among those exiled by the end of March were the previous War Minister Cemal Pasha, the Karakol leaders Kara Vasıf, Şevket of Galata, and Dr. Esat, as well as the nationalist leader Hüseyin
118 Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-II, pp. 165-171.
119 Ibid, p. 278.
120 For the Felah-ı Vatan group, see Tülay Duran, “Son Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusanı’nda Felah-ı Vatan İttifakı,” Belgelerler Türk Tarihi Dergisi, vol: 11, no: 61, October 1972, pp. 12-21. See also Ali Saltan, Felah-ı Vatan Grubu, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Submitted to the Yeditepe University, Institute for the Principles of Atatürk and the History of the Revolution, 2008.
121 For the developments accompanying the occupation, see Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-II, pp. 352-361.
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Rauf Bey122. Many other Unionist leaders crossed over to Anatolia to participate in the independence movement, and some of them became deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, inaugurated in Ankara on April 23, 1920.
122 FO, 371/5089, British High Commission, Constantinople, 25 March 1920.
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CHAPTER II: NATIONAL DEFENSE
The Turkish resistance movement emerged in the capital, Istanbul, under the initiative of the CUP leaders, who founded the Karakol society. The Karakol activists worked in tandem with the staff of the Ottoman War Ministry to create armed committees of resistance throughout Istanbul. They also sought to unite diverse social and political organizations under the roof of a national front through the National Congress. Yet Karakol was dispersed after the Allied forces formally occupied Istanbul in March 1920.
This chapter deals with the reorganization of the resistance movement under the National Defense organization, and suggests a revision to Eric Jan Zürcher’s perspective on this process. According to Zürcher, the National Defense organization was “… also known by its Ottoman initials as Mim-Mim.”1 “It was a very different organization from its predecessor.”2 Karakol “… adopted a leading and independent role in the resistance, thus threatening the political leadership of Mustafa Kemal’s Representative Committee in Anatolia.”3 However, the National Defense organization, or Mim-Mim, “… was linked
1 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 122.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 119.
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directly to the leadership in Ankara through a department of its General Staff under Colonel Hüsamettin (Ertürk) and it functioned as a part of the nationalist army.”4 “So in a way the British occupation of Istanbul had enabled Mustafa Kemal to turn the Unionist underground in the occupied territories into an obedient instrument.”5
What I try to demonstrate in this chapter is that the Ankara government’s authority over the National Defense organization was far from being absolute. Although the National Defense was affiliated with Ankara, the Ottoman government had more authority over its Central Committee in Istanbul. Moreover, having been reorganized under the name of Zabitan (Officers), the Karakol society enjoyed considerable influence in the Central Committee. That is to say, the power struggle between Istanbul and Ankara did not come to an end right after March 1920, but it changed form with the rise of the Mim-Mim group as one of the factions that represented the authority of the Ankara government within the resistance movement in Istanbul.
The first part of this chapter deals with the reorganization of the Karakol society around October 1920. The second section looks at how the Mim-Mim group was brought into existence by the former Karakol members who began operating under the authority of the General Staff in the second half of 1920. The third section focuses on the founding of the National Defense organization in 1921. In the final part, I examine the factional struggles that took place within the Central Committee of this organization.
4 Ibid. p. 122.
5 Ibid. pp. 122-123.
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Karakol/Zabitan
The de jure occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920, brought about significant changes, including the change of government. On April 5, shortly after the establishment of the Allied military governance, the pro-British Damat Ferit Pasha cabinet came to power. The Grand Vizier Damat Ferit also presided over the War Ministry for several months.6 Among his first acts was to remove those in the military who supported the independence movement in Anatolia and to replace them with men whom he fully trusted. Until the resigning of his cabinet in October 1920, the relations between the Istanbul and Ankara governments increasingly deteriorated. During this period, Damat Ferit led a series of political and military campaigns against the national government in Ankara. There was almost a civil war between Istanbul and Ankara.7
After the rise of this anti-nationalist government in Istanbul, a number of Unionist leaders were arrested and then banished to Malta, and many others who could survive this wave of arrests crossed over to Anatolia. This was followed by a series of police operations against the cadres who formed the backbone of the underground resistance movement. There was a crowded group of activists arrested at the end of May.8 In the period between June and August 1920, the Istanbul press published several news items about how the cells of a secret organization that had been smuggling weapons to Anatolia were uncovered by
6 Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele – III: İç Savaş ve Sevr’de Ölüm, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), p. 4. He left the administration of the ministry to Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha on August 28. Ibid, p. 228.
7 Sina Akşin provides the details of how this civil war unfolded in ibid. pp. 16-105; 241.
8 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 112.
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security forces.9 In this way, devoid of its leaders and key activists, the Karakol society was largely dispersed.
This political context rapidly changed after the Ahmet Tevfik Pasha cabinet came to power on October 17, 1920. In comparison to Damat Ferit, Ahmet Tevfik Pasha was much more conciliatory to the independence movement. The same holds true for his cabinet’s Minister of the Interior Ahmet İzzet Pasha10. Ahmet İzzet was a respected politician of a military background in the eyes of the nationalist leaders in Ankara.11 Therefore, he played a key role in the re-establishment of communication networks between the Istanbul and Ankara governments soon after Ahmet Tevfik was asked to form the new cabinet after Damat Ferit.12 Meanwhile, Ziya(eddin) Pasha was appointed as the War Minister of the new
9 See, for example, “Hafi Bir Teşkilat,” İkdam, 18 June 1920, p. 2; “Teşkilat-ı Hafiye,” İkdam, 5 August 1920, p. 3; “Teşkilat-ı Hafiye,” İkdam, 9 August 1920, p. 3.
10 The annual report prepared by the British High Command in Istanbul relating to Turkey’s current social, political and economic conditions in 1920 presents the objectives of the new cabinet as follows: “The main plank on which Tewfik Pasha came into power was to put an end to the duality which existed in the government of Turkey. The new cabinet was, therefore, only too ready to enter into negotiations with the Nationalists. Marshal İzzet Pasha, who had long been regarded as a Moderate Nationalist in sympathy and also was supposed to have influence with the Angora leaders entered the new Government as the Minister of the Interior, with the express object of promoting a reconciliation.” FO, 371/6469, Turkey: Annual Report, 1920, Constantinople, 27 April 1921, p. 13.
11 After the decline of the CUP from power, Ahmet İzzet had been appointed Grand Vizier in the first cabinet over which the Unionists had considerable influence. There were four Unionist ministers in this cabinet: Cavit Bey, Ali Fethi (Okyar), Hayri Efendi and Rauf Pasha. Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele – I, pp. 13-18. Ahmet İzzet could lead this cabinet because of the Unionists’ trust in him. For a biography of Ahmet İzzet, see Metin Ayışığı, Mareşal Ahmet İzzet Paşa (Askeri ve Siyası Hayatı), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997).
12 FO, 371/5172, Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by S. I. S. (Constantinople Branch) for week ending 4. 11. 20, 17 November 1920, pp. 1-5.
44
cabinet, which meant the return of the pro-nationalist military faction. With Ziya Pasha’s tacit approval, the transport of war materials and ammunition from the arsenals of Istanbul to Anatolia was resumed.13
In October 1920, around the time that Ahmet Tevfik Pasha came to power, the Karakol society was reorganized under the name of Zabitan (Officers).14 Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa of Muğla undertook great initiative in the process. One of the important Karakol activists, Mustafa of Muğla had previously led the İstanbul branch of this organization with Colonel Hafız Besim.15 In an important article, Mesut Aydın refers to a document that includes the instructions given for the founding of the Zabitan group16. This document encompasses the signatures of Mustafa of Muğla, as well as Major Ali Rıza and Captain Kemalettin.17 Unless there is a coincidence of names, these two figures had also been among the principal members of Karakol.18
13 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, pp. 122-125.
14 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar ve Faaliyetleri, p. 33. According to Erdal İlter, the reorganization of the Zabitan group occurred on October 27, 1920. Erdal İlter, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Tarihçesi, (Ankara: Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Müsteşarlığı, 2002), p. 12.
15 İhsan İdikut, Türk Lavrensleri, (İstanbul: Öztürk Matbaası, 1953), p. 22; Hasene Ilgaz, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” p. 11.
16 The document was entitled “a general assessment concerning the organization and the things that need to be done here”. Mesut Aydın, “Zabitan Grubu’na Ait Bir Vesika,” pp. 591-599.
17 Ibid. p. 599.
18 Hasene Ilgaz mentions Ali Rıza as one the seven members of Karakol’s executive committee, “Milli Mücadele’de Varlığı Gizli Kalan Bir Cemiyet: Kara-kol Cemiyeti,” p. 13.
45
In addition to the above-mentioned document, a report written by the British intelligence service on March 31, 1921, provides detailed information about the structure of the Zabitan group.19 There is almost no room for doubt that the “nationalist committee” to which the British intelligence service refers in this report is Zabitan. The British report asserts that this committee had three principal departments: political, military and commercial. “The first two are completely controlled by military officers, who are aided and abetted by Zia Bey, the present Minister for War, and who are also in close communication, by telegraphic and other means, with Angora”.20 “The military group constitutes the headquarters of the organization, and consists, for the most part, of former members of the notorious Special Organization. Its most prominent members are Staff Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Bey, Staff Majors Ali Rıza Bey and Mustafa İzzet, and Second Lieutenant Sheref Bey, all former members of the General Staff”.21
According to the same report, the department of politics was also under the direction of military officers, like Major Hüseyin Hakkı Bey, the former director of Military Stores. Other members of this department consisted of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Hafız Besim, the former military governor of Pera, Muhlis Bey, formerly one of the principal secretaries of the CUP, and Captain Edip Bey, who had been a former member of the Special Organization and one of Enver Pasha’s protégés. The British report does not give details about the political activities carried out by this department, except for mentioning that it worked closely with the intelligence section of the military department, dealt with the
19 FO, 371/6573, the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, 31 March 1921.
20 Ibid. p. 7.
21 Ibid. pp. 7-8.
46
financial arrangements for the entire organization, and received funds directly from Ankara.22
The British report summarized above clearly demonstrates that similar to Karakol, Zabitan maintained close relations with both the Ottoman War Ministry and the headquarters of the independence movement in Ankara. In collaboration with these two authorities, Zabitan coordinated the dispatch of officers and military materials to Anatolia.23 The report also includes the information that the group’s commercial department purchased large quantities of supplies of various kinds in Istanbul for the Ankara government.24 While carrying out all these supposedly secret operations, the group members cooperated with a number of military staff, customs officials, and police agents.25 Yet it needs to be underlined that Zabitan was not the only underground organization in Istanbul seeking to assist the Anatolian movement. There were a few other groups such as
22 Also mentioned in this respect is that some students at Istanbul University who had connections with the political department organized prayers at the Aya Sofia Mosque for those who had fallen during the Independence War in Anatolia. But a quarrel occurred after the prayers between the nationalist students and the anti-Kemalist members of Ulema. FO, 371/6573, the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, 12 April 1921.
23 Ibid. p. 10.
24 FO, 371/6573, the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, 31 March 1921, pp. 9-10.
25 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, pp. 33-35.
47
Berzenci and Namık,26 and yet the Felah (Salvation) group was the most important one among them.27
Felah set about its activities in September 1920 under the name of Hamza.28 The name of the group was later changed to Mücahid, Muharib, and finally to Felah in order to outmaneuver the intelligence services of the Allied authorities. Unlike Zabitan, Felah was formed by and operated under the direct command of the General Staff in Ankara.29 The influence of Felah considerably increased once it was merged with the İmalat-ı Harbiye (Military Manufacturing) group by the Ankara government towards the end of 1920.30 The latter group had been formed in March 1920, and it was organized especially in the military factories of ammunition and weaponry. Before incorporating with this group, Felah was specialized in intelligence and propaganda.31 After the unification, it became competent also in the smuggling of war materials and ammunition for the national army.
Since Zabitan and Felah focused on a similar set of underground activities, the rise of competition between these two secret groups was unavoidable. The competition between
26 Sinan Yıldırmaz, “İstanbul’da Milli Mücadele ve Gizli Örgütlerin Faaliyetleri,” Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları, no: 1, 2002, pp. 357-388.
27 The basis of the Felah group was a previous secret group that had been formed by Captain Neşet Bey under the name of Moltke. İhsan Aksoley, “‘Moltke’ Grubunun Faaliyeti,” Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, vol: 2, no: 9, October 1969, pp. 24-31.
28 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, pp. 48-52.
29 Ibid. p. 55.
30 For the İmalat-ı Harbiye Group, see Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 156-167; Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, pp. 135-136.
31 Sinan Yildirmaz, “İstanbul’da Milli Mücadele ve Gizli Örgütlerin Faaliyetleri,” p. 370.
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the two groups began to take place from the first months of 1921 onwards.32 Felah was backed by the General Staff in Ankara, which allegedly reduced the amount of funds extended to the Zabitan group.33 Thanks to this support, Felah gradually seized control of operations concerned with the transfer of men and war materials to Anatolia. Another circle established under the name of the Mim-Mim or M.M. intelligence group challenged Zabitan’s control over the resistance movement as well.
Mim-Mim
The military occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces in March 1920 did not completely destroy the resistance movement. The memoirs of the nationalist cadres suggest that a number of resistance groups spontaneously emerged across the Muslim-populated neighborhoods of the city after the Damat Ferit Pasha cabinet came to power.34 However, these local resistance groups were autonomous from (perhaps even unaware of) one another in the absence of an organization such as the Karakol society.35
32 See a correspondence of the military headquarters in Ankara, entitled “Samsun’da Süvari Kaymakamı Hüsamettin Bey’e,” 30 March 1921 in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 88-90.
33 Ibid. p. 91.
34 For the development of this process, see Murat Koraltürk (ed.), Ahmet Hamdi Başar’ın Hatıraları -1. Meşrutiyet, Cumhuriyet ve Tek Parti Dönemi. “Gazi Bana Çok Kızmış!…,” (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), pp. 103-105; Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, pp. 227-232, 236-246.
35 “Although each of these organizations [in districts] was gradually established and enlarged by the attempts and initiatives of some progressive patriots who cooperated and mutually aided one another, they existed completely autonomously (tamamen özel bir şekilde bulunmakta idiler),” Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 95-96.
49
One of the local resistance groups was formed in Topkapı, where the Karakol society had previously had a branch. Hüsamettin Ertürk, the last director of the Special Organization, was the leading figure of the movement in this Muslim neighborhood. According to the available sources, Mehmet of Topkapı, (accountant) Hüseyin İhsan of Topkapı, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal (Koçer), and Captain Emin Ali were among the other leaders of the Topkapı committee.36 This group extended the scope of its underground activities towards Şehremini around the middle of 1920.37 Şehremini was another Muslim-populated neighborhood that bordered the Topkapı district. Although the members of this group had been affiliated with the Karakol society, they did not join the Zabitan group, and remained as an independent circle.
The importance of this circle greatly increased after Hüsamettin Ertürk went to Ankara towards the end of 1920. He was appointed as head of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff in Ankara.38 Meanwhile, the Chief of the General Staff was Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha, who had been the War Minister of the Ottoman government when the Allied authorities had formally occupied the capital, Istanbul. Fevzi Pasha had fled to Ankara in
36 Ibid. pp. 97-100, 128-129. Kemal Koçer, Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul. (İşgal Senelerinde M.M. Grubunun Gizli Faaliyeti, (İstanbul: Vakit Basımevi, 1946), pp. 12-16; Murat Koraltürk (ed.), Ahmet Hamdi Başar’ın Hatıraları -1, pp. 101-102.
37 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 98.
38 Ibid. p. 130; Bilge Criss, İşgal Altında İstanbul, pp. 173, 176.
50
the aftermath of the military occupation.39 Ertürk claims in his memoirs that Fevzi summoned him to Ankara because of his experience with intelligence work.40
The Intelligence Bureau controlled an important organization in Istanbul: the Mim-Mim or M.M intelligence group. Although this was originally an abbreviation for Müstahberat-ı Mahsusa (Special Intelligence),41 it was also used as an abbreviation for Müdafa-i Milliye İstihbarat Grubu (National Defense Intelligence Group).42 Ertürk asserts in his memoirs that he formed this group while he was in Samsun, where he spent few months before proceeding to Ankara.43 He received a telegram from Fevzi Pasha, which urged him to establish an intelligence agency in the capital. Ertürk then asked Mehmet of Topkapı, who happened to be in Samsun as well, to inform their “secret organization” in Istanbul of the decision to establish an intelligence agency. It is not possible to confirm whether Ertürk really communicated with Mehmet of Topkapı or not. But it is certain that Ertürk received a telegram from Fevzi Pasha while he was in Samsun.
39 According to Hüsamettin Ertürk, Fevzi Pasha departed from Istanbul on the night of April 5, Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 468. Fevzi Pasha was first appointed Minister of National Defense by the Ankara government.
40 Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 468.
41 See the document entitled “to the Illustrious Presidency of the General Staff of the Grand National Assembly” and published by Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 119.
42 See Bican Bağcıoğlu’s report in ibid. p. 125.
43 Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, pp. 475-476.
51
Fevzi Pasha’s telegram was wired to Ertürk on March 3, 1921.44 In this correspondence, Fevzi complained about how Mustafa of Muğlalı’s group, i.e. Karakol/Zabitan, was sabotaging the activities of the Muharib (Felah’s current name) group, which was backed by the General Staff. Fevzi Pash also mentioned that some of the officers dispatched by Karakol (Zabitan) to Anatolia were disloyal to the national cause.45 Therefore, he ordered Ertürk to found a new secret organization by recruiting the reliable elements of the Muharib and Zabitan groups. However, Ertürk chose the majority of the leading cadres of the new intelligence group from the committee organized in the Topkapı-Şehremini area.46
The earliest document showing the first cadre of the Mim-Mim group dates to June 15, 1921.47 It shows that the group initially consisted of fifteen members. Its chief was Mehmet Bey of Topkapı, but Captain Kemal (Koçer), and Hüseyin İhsan were also in charge of the administration. There were seven officers among the members of the group: Captain
44 “Samsun’da Süvari Kaymakamı Hüsamettin Bey’e,” 30 March 1921 in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 88-90. Mesut Aydın confirms the authenticity of this document based on his research in the ATASE (Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt) archives. Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 87.
45 Fevzi Pasha had complained about this problem already in January 1921. A message he addressed to the Mücahidin group at that time pointed out to the merge of those working for the British intelligence with hundreds of officers sent by Mustafa Bey’s group to Anatolia without proper security check. He asked the Mücahidin group to conduct an investigation to find out if Mustafa Bey’s group or some of its members were sold out to a foreign intelligence service. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 87-88.
46 According to Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Felah was under the control of the cadres loyal to Mustafa Kemal and his close associate İsmet İnönü. Therefore, Ertürk was left with the only choice to work with the Mim-Mim group, which he could control. Ibid. pp. 130-131.
47 TİTE, 34/8, 15 June 1921.
52
Kemal (Koçer), Lieutenant Saffet, Captain Hakkı, Captain Ahmet Zeki, Captain Bilal of Erzurum, Major Hamdi of Harput, Lieutenant Burhanettin (adjutant of the general-director of the Istanbul police). Two of the group’s civilian members were women: Şükufe Nihal Hanım (professor at the teachers’ college) and Muhsine Hanım. In addition to Mehmet of Topkapı and Hüseyin İhsan, the other civilians consisted of Mehmet Edip (one of the former executive officers in the political department of the police directorship), Mehmet of Hemşin (a steward of boatmen), Şevki Bey (a police officer at the police directorate’s political department), and Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) (the editor-in-chief of the journal İktisad).
By the end of the armistice period, the Mim-Mim group had greatly expanded the scope of its influence in Istanbul. There were more than 120 “civilians who primarily served the group” (gruba birinci derecede hizmet eden siviller).48 The civilians comprised journalists, judges, police officers, and officials. There were some twenty military officers affiliated with Mim-Mim.49 Moreover, a large number of civilians and military officers were separately listed as serving the group in the second degree (gruba ikinci derecede hizmet edenler).50 Nevertheless, despite this broad network of relations, Mim-Mim could not capture the full control the resistance movement until the last months of the armistice period.
48 Bülent Çukurova, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Haberalma ve Yeraltı Çalışmaları, (Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 1994), Appendix: 3, pp. 199-201.
49 TİTE, 38/20.
50 Ibid.
53
National Defense
The National Defense emerged as the principal organization of the resistance movement in Istanbul around the middle of 1921. According to its bylaws, issued in April 1922,51 one of the goals of the organization was to counteract the actions and associations of the Greeks who pursued the Megali Idea, that is, the unification with Greece. The National Defense was intended to promote the solidarity of the Muslim-Turkish subjects to fight against the violation of their rights and values. The aim of the organization was to struggle with all anti-national forces that received support from foreign powers. In a correspondence with Ankara, Colonel Esat Bey, the president of the National Defense, stated that the organization came into operation at the beginnings of 1921.52 However, the founding of the National Defense was formalized on May 3, 1921, with a special decree issued by the General Staff.53
The National Defense organization centralized the administration of the existing district committees and initiated the formation of new ones. At one point, there were more than twenty local groups across Istanbul, primarily its İstanbul, Üsküdar and Beyoğlu
51 A full-text transcription of the National Defense’s bylaws has been published by Nazım H. Polat, “İstanbul Müdafaa-i Milliye Teşkilatı ve ‘Talimatname’si,” Tarih ve Toplum, May 1990, vol: 13, n: 77, pp. 282-285, and Bülent Çukurova, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Haberalma ve Yeraltı Çalışmaları, appendix 2, pp. 192-198.
52 See the telegram from Colonel Esat Bey to the general staff in Ankara, dated December 10, 1922 in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 118-119.
53 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, Appendix: 8, “Müdafa-i Milliye Teşkilatı,” pp. 291-293.
54
divisions54. Each of these groups was under the responsibility of an executive committee that consisted of three to five members. These members formed the central cadres of the National Defense organization, and were enrolled as officers on the staff of the Ministry of National Defense in Ankara. The structure of the local groups of resistance and the cadres that led them were changed at different times during the armistice period. The organization National Defense recruited a large number of armed men from the officers and security forces.55 It also received considerable support from the guilds of porters, dockers, boatmen, and coachmen.56
Central Committee of the National Defense
The National Defense’s headquarters (merkez-i umumi) was in Ankara.57 The organization was attached to the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff led by Hüsamettin Ertürk and
54 For the list of the district committees, see three documents published by Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, appendix: 7,8, 9, pp. 285-297; for a different list of the National Defense’s cadres in the districts, see also TİTE, 33/16. The latter list is dated from January 23, 1923.
55 According to Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, there were some ten thousand armed men associated with the National Defense organization. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 96-97. Based on his research in the ATASE archives, Mesut Aydın confirms this piece of information, Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, pp. 84-85.
56 According to a report by the French intelligence service in Istanbul, the number of men associated with the National Defense was 18,500. They consisted, reportedly, of the following elements: 3,500 porters, 1,000 coachmen and chauffeurs, 300 bakers, 5,000 firemen, 2,000 boatmen and coal heavers, 400 policemen, 700 gendarmeries, 2,000 soldiers. SHAT, 20 N 1103, Carton: 38/1, File: 796, 2 October 1922.
57 Nazım H. Polat, İstanbul Müdafaa-i Milliye Teşkilatı, p. 28.
55
Fevzi Pasha.58 The National Defense had its Central Committee (Müdafa-i Milliye Heyet-i Merkeziyesi) in Istanbul. Based on the available sources, it is not possible to have a firm answer to the question of how this committee was constituted. Yet, two contradictory accounts exist in this respect. According to one account, asserted in Ertürk’s memoirs, the committee members were appointed from Ankara by Ertürk and Fevzi Pasha.59 Ertürk enumerates fourteen names that were included in the first Central Committee.60 However, Kemal Koçer, a member of the Mim-Mim group, who also took part in the Central Committee of the National Defense, provides a completely different account from that of Ertürk, which is as follows.
Kemal Koçer refers to the National Defense as a front (cephe) organization.61 Its founding was motivated by “an absolute necessity to create a powerful unity by bringing together and putting under a single command the diverse (perakende) organizations obliged to send many of their members to Anatolia in the face of the pressure of the occupiers”.62 According to Koçer, the central committee of this front was established at the
58 Hüsamettin Ertürk states his role in the administration of the National Defense as follows: “… [A] secret armed organization was founded in Istanbul. This organization constituted an enormous block (kütle). It was composed of the organization of the M.M. group, on the one hand, which conducted works of intelligence and propaganda and whose center was located in Ankara, and, on the other hand, the armed forces named as Armed National Defense (Müsellah Müdafa-I Milliye), whose central committee was in Istanbul although it was controlled from Ankara. The command and rule of all of this was entrusted to me with Mustafa Kemal’s approval and Fevzi Çakmak’s designation”. Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 491.
59 Ibid. pp. 479-482.
60 Ibid. pp. 487-488.
61 Kemal Koçer, Kurtuluş Savaşlarımızda İstanbul, p. 113.
62 Ibid. pp. 112-113.
56
end of a meeting that took place in Istanbul. Koçer does not clarify exactly when this meeting convened. Nor does he mention who the participants were. All he relates is that some forty individuals of a Unionist and non-Unionist background came together in an obscure hermitage (inzivagah) to discuss the duties of the organization to be formed.63 Some of them left at the end, yet those who stayed determined the Central Committee, which had thirteen members.
In the absence of a more objective source demonstrating how the Central Committee was formed, it is not possible to validate one of these accounts, both of which were written long time after the armistice period. What can be established based on the available documents is that the first Central Committee was formed in June 1921, around the same time as the formation of the first cadre of the Mim-Mim group.64 Furthermore, relying on his research in the ATASE archives, Mesut Aydın demonstrates that the Central Committee initially had seven members, not thirteen or fourteen.65 They were Colonel Esat (president), Lieutenant Colonel Hafız Besim (vice-president), Lieutenant Colonel Ferhat, Captain Kamil, Captain Lütfi, Captain Ömer Lütfi, and Lieutenant Colonel Kemal (Koçer).66
The initial composition of the Central Committee members provides insights about the connections between the Ottoman government and the organization National Defense.
63 Ibid, p. 113.
64 The organization’s headquarters was informed of the central committee’s formation at that time. TİTE, 43/39, 17 June 1921.
65 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 80.
66 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu lists six committee members. The one missing in Himmetoğlu’s list is Captain Ömer LütfiHüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 100-101.
57
According to a French intelligence report, Ahmet İzzet Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was one of the founders of the organization.67 He exerted great authority over the National Defense through his brother Esat Bey, the president of the organization.68 The two were not only brothers but also political allies. In June 1921, Esat Bey was appointed as chief of the Istanbul police due to Ahmet İzzet Pasha’s political influence.69 The War Minister Ziya Pasha was also counted among the founders of the National Defense, alongside Ahmet İzzet Pasha, Esat Bey, and Kemal Pasha, the Commander of Gendarmerie.70 Ziya Pasha’s aid de camp, Captain Kamil, was a member of the Central Committee.71
The Karakol/Zabitan group was incorporated into the administration of the National Defense organization. There were, at least, two Zabitan members involved in the Central Committee. One of them was Captain Hafız Besim, the vice-president of the National Defense. As noted above, he was one of the officers who presided over Zabitan’s political department. The other one was Captain Lütfi, who is listed by Mesut Aydın as one of the officers collaborating with Zabitan.72 Hüsamettin Ertürk confirms Lütfi’s affiliation with
67 SHAT, 20 N 1103, Carton: 38/1, File: 796, 2 October 1922.
68 TİTE, 42/154, p. 2.
69 Ali Dikici, “Millî Mücadele Döneminde İç Güvenlik ve Türk Polisi,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, vol: 23, no: 67-68-69, March-July-November 2007, p. 362.
70 SHAT, 20 N 1103, Carton: 38/1, File: 796, 2 October 1922.
71 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 80. By mid-July, 1922, however, Kamil Bey resigned from his duty in the Central Committee. TİTE, 43/78, 78001; TİTE, 43/78, 2001, 12 July 1922.
72 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 34.
58
Zabitan in his memoirs, stating that Lütfi worked for the Yavuz (Courageous) group while attending the National Defense at the same time.73 Zabitan was renamed as Yavuz in October 1921.74
The Mim-Mim group had little influence in the administration of the National Defense organization at the initial stage of its formation. Of the seven members of the Central Committee, only Kemal Koçer was associated with Mim-Mim. This should not come as a surprise because Mim-Mim was no more than a small group that focused on intelligence work at that point. Soon, however, it consolidated its power in the Central Committee with the support of the General Staff.
Factions of the National Defense
Shortly after its formation, the composition of the Central Committee of the National Defense was significantly modified. On July 21, 1921, the General Staff formalized the appointment of both the Central Committee members and the members of the Mim-Mim intelligence group.75 Both groups received and signed their mandates in August. But the
73 Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 491.
74 The name of the group was changed after its leader Mustafa of Muğla crossed over to Anatolia. Mesut Aydın, “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde İstanbul’da Anadolu Lehinde Faaliyette Bulunan Gizli Gruplardan Zabitan Grubu’na Ait Bir Vesika,” p. 594; Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 29, footnote 20. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 87.
75 This is the date specified by the mandates of both the Mim-Mim and the National Defense’s central committee members. See, for example, the mandates of the following cadres from the Mim-Mim group: Şükufe Nihal Hanım, TİTE, 34/25, 15 August 1921; Şevki Bey, TİTE, 34/26, 1001, 14 August 1921; Muhsine Hanım, TİTE, 34/26, 2001, 26 August 1921. For few examples of the central committee members’ mandates, see Hüseyin Hüsnü Bey, TİTE, 34/16, 17 August 1921; Kamil Bey, TİTE, 34/17, 13 August 1921; Ferhat Bey, TİTE, 34/21, 13 August 1921.
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General Staff appointed a group of new members to the Central Committee in the meantime. As the table below demonstrates, there are differences in the existing sources as to the identities of the Central Committee members, and only Hüsnü Himmetoğlu refers to the modification initiated by the General Staff. In their memoirs, Kemal Koçer and Hüsamettin Ertürk make no distinction between the first committee members and the new members appointed by the General Staff.
This modification, which seems to have been initiated by Hüsamettin Ertürk,76 radically changed the balance of power within the Central Committee in favor of the Mim-Mim group. At least two of the newcomers were formally associated with Mim-Mim: Ahmet Hamdi and Hüseyin İhsan. The former’s mandate shows that he was appointed both as member of the National Defense’s Central Committee and as agent of the Mim-Mim group.77 This should be the case with Hüseyin İhsan as well. Although we do not know of the status of his relations with Mim-Mim at that time, (Mehmet) Enis Bey would be later listed among those who worked for the Mim-Mim group.78
76 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 101. See also Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, “M. Mücadele Esnasında İstanbul’daki Gizli Kurullardan M.M. Grubu ve Gerçek Yüzü,” Yakın Tarihimiz, vol: 3, no: 32, 4 October 1962, pp. 165-167.
77 TİTE, 34/20, 15 August 1921.
78 Bülent Çukurova, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Haberalma ve Yeraltı Çalışmaları, Appendix: 3, p. 199.
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Table 1: Central Committee of the National Defense Organization
Central Committee Members
Mesut Aydın
Hüsnü Himmetoglu
Hüsamettin
Ertürk
Kemal Koçer
Colonel Esat (president)
Colonel Esat (president)
Colonel Esat
Marshal Esat
Captain Hafız Besim
(vice-president)
Lieutenant colonel Hafız Besim
(vice-president)
Captain Hafız Besim
Captain Hafiz Besim
Lieutenant colonel Ferhad
Lieutenant colonel Ferhad
Captain Ferhat
Lieutenant colonel Ferhad
Captain Kemal (Kocer)
Lieutenant colonel Kemal (Kocer)
Kemal of Erzurum (General Kocer)
Captain Kemal (himself)
Captain Lütfi
Captain Lütfi
Captain Lutfi
Captain Lutfi
Captain Kamil
Captain Kamil
Captain Kamil
X
Captain Ömer Lütfi
X
X
X
New Members Appointed by the General Staff
New Members Appointed by the General Staff
Hamdi Baba (honorary president)
Hamdi Baba (honorary president)
Hamdi Baba
Hamdi Baba
Ahmet Hamdi (Basar)
X
Ahmet Hamdi (Basar)
Ahmet Hamdi
(Limancı Hamdi Bey)
Huseyin Ihsan
Ihsan
Ihsan of Topkapi
Accountant Ihsan
Vehbi
Vehbi
Vehbi
Vehbi
Hafiz Kemal
Professor (Muderris) Kemal
Hafiz Kemal
Hafiz Kemal
Seyh Huseyin Husnu
Seyh Husnu
X
X
Enis Bey
X
Enis Bey
Enis Bey
X
Mehmet of Topkapi
Mehmet of Topkapi
Mehmet of Topkapi
X
X
Captain Hüsnü
X
X
X
X
Marshal Sadi
It seems that the first members of the Central Committee were not informed of the new members and their association with Mim-Mim. This becomes apparent in a correspondence addressed by Colonel Esat to the General Staff in October 1922.79 In this memorandum, Esat Bey spoke of how he was reassured at the time of the National
79 See Esat’s memo, entitled “To the Illustrious Presidency of the General Staff of the Grand National Assembly,” Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 118-121.
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Defense’s establishment that Mim-Mim had been formed as a separate group with which he did not have to work. Hafız Besim made a similar case in another correspondence with Esat Bey on June 5, 1922. According to Hafız Besim, it was around October – November 1921 that the incorporation of the Mim-Mim members into the Central Committee was revealed.80
In any case, towards the end of 1921, the leadership of the National Defense began to undergo a polarization between the two rival groups associated with Zabitan and Mim-Mim. Their competition seems to have already reached the point of a split by that time. If we believe Hafız Besim, the Mim-Mim members did not want to join the meetings of the Central Committee81. Therefore, according to Hafız Besim, the rest of the Central Committee members cut their relations with the Mim-Mim agents. Instead of dealing with the duties of their own intelligence group, the Mim-Mim members, excluded from the administration of the National Defense, formed a rival center under the name of the Society of Civilians. Hafız Besim claims that not only did this rival center engage in the founding of new district groups, but it also sought to seize some of the National Defense’s existing branches, dividing the organization into two.
The other side of this polarization raised an opposite claim in a memorandum submitted to the General Staff on December 19, 1921.82 Signed by seven members of the Central Committee, including Kemal (Koçer), Ahmet Hamdi, Vehbi, Hüseyin İhsan, and Mehmet Beys, this memorandum asserted that although Hafız Besim and Lütfi broke with
80 TİTE, 43/38, 6 June 1922.
81 Ibid.
82 TİTE 43/130, 19 December 1921.
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the Central Committee they continued to present themselves as leaders of the National Defense.83 Nonetheless, some of their actions risked the safety of the entire organization. In April 1922, the group associated with Mim-Mim in the National Defense went further and accused Hafız Besim of cooperating with an anti-nationalist clique in the elections to choose the president of the Association of Porters (Hamallar Cemiyeti).84
The conflict between the two rival camps carried on with an increasing degree of intensity. In May 1922, Hafız Besim set out for Ankara to carry out negotiations with the General Staff. With this visit, he aimed to argue against the counter propaganda about himself and the other committee members who did not cooperate with Mim-Mim. According to Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, it was Colonel Esat Bey who charged Hafız Besim with this duty.85 Yet Esat and Hafız Besim’s attempts to refute the claims against themselves did not change much. In the course of July and August 1922, the rival group engaged in a new campaign against Hafız Besim, claiming that he had not participated in any of the Central Committee meetings for months, especially since he had been back from Ankara, and proposed that his position should be replaced by a new officer.86
83 Mesut Aydın states that he did not see Mehmet of Topkapı among the members of the National Defense’s center in the documents he locates in the ATASE and TİTE archives. Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 81, footnote: 177. In this document, however, Mehmet Bey looks like involved in the central committee of the faction led by the Mim-Mim group.
84 TİTE, 43/120, 1 April 1922, Hafız Besim rejects this accusation stating that he remained neutral in the competition between Raşit and Salih Reis. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 112-113. Raşit was being considered as an agent of the British whereas Salih Reis was in close touch with the National Defense.
85 Ibid.
86 TİTE, 43/78, 12 July 1922; TİTE, 46/91, 1 August 1922.
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***
To conclude this chapter, it should be emphasized that starting in the summer of 1922, the character of the power struggle within the National Defense underwent a significant shift. Throughout the next sections of this study, especially in Chapter V, it will be clear that the partition of the resistance movement around two rival circles continued until the last weeks of 1922. This schism was resolved only in December 1922 after Esat Bey was forced to resign from the administration of the National Defense under the pressure of the opposition. By the time Esay Bey resigned, however, the composition of the rival factions had turned more complicated than the initial separation between the Zabitan/Karakol and Mim-Mim groups.
The degree of this change can be followed from a memo that Esat Bey addressed to the General Staff on December 10, 1922, right before he was removed from the Central Committee.87 Although this document was concerned mostly with the activities of the Mim-Mim group that threatened the unity of the National Defense organization, Esat Bey raised another important point for our discussion. He stated that the Central Committee was still operating under his authority. He enlisted the following figures as the committee members: Lieutenant Colonel Hafız Besim, Major Ferhat, Captain Ali Haydar, Captain Lütfü, Hafız Kemal, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, and Enis Bey.88
87 The complete memo is published in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 118-121.
88 Ibid. p. 121.
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The last two names on this list were involved in the Mim-Mim group. It is especially the association between Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, i.e. Kemal Koçer, and Esat Bey that is worth consideration since the former was one of the two names responsible from the administration of Mim-Mim. More importantly, this relationship seems to have started much earlier than December. In the spring of 1922, Esat and Hafız Besim had mentioned the name of Kemal Koçer among those with whom they had intended to work in the Central Committee of the National Defense.89 Although the headquarters of the General Staff disapproved their list of Central Committee members, which included no one except Kemal Koçer from the Mim-Mim group, it is apparent that Kemal Koçer maintained his relations with Esat and Hafız Besim during the months that followed.
This is not simply a case of defection from the ranks of Mim-Mim. In the next chapter, I will argue that Kemal Koçer’s association with the rival clique was a result of a broader split in the resistance movement than any kind of organizational competition such as the one between Zabitan/Karakol and Mim-Mim. This split arose in the first half of 1922 within the Union and Progress movement, and it concerned a disagreement on the character of the new regime to be formed after the national struggle.
89 Ibid. pp. 111-112.
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CHAPTER III: UNION AND PROGRESS
The preceding chapters dealt with the resistance organizations, the majority of whose founders, leaders, and activists were of a Unionist background. However, none of these organizations can be considered successors to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The CUP was the late Ottoman Empire’s most influential political movement, which had by World War I monopolized state power. Neither Karakol nor the National Defense or Mim-Mim were political movements in the strict sense of the term. Other than attaining national independence, these organizations did not have a clear set of objectives.1 In other words, they did not propose political programs outlining how the state, society and economy should be organized.
During the Independence War, there were two Unionist circles organized around specific political programs. One of them consisted of a group of Unionists that controlled the CUP’s Istanbul branch. In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss how this circle sought to maintain the integrity of the Union and Progress movement in the armistice period by creating a populist program called the Representation of Professions. The
1 For the Karakol’s program and bylaws, see TİTE, 299/34 and TİTE, 299/35, respectively.
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following section shows how this program became a major reference point for the left wing of the Anatolian movement after the military occupation of Istanbul in March 1920. In this process, some associates of the circle in question moved their headquarters from Istanbul to Ankara, where they came to be known as Solidarists (Tesanütçüler).
The other circle I deal with in this chapter consisted of the Unionists who remained loyal to the leadership of Enver Pasha after the armistice. This group was organized abroad as the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (hereafter the League) while its Turkish branch was named the People’s Soviets Party (PSP). The PSP, too, adopted a leftist-populist political program: the Party Program of the People’s Soviets. The argument here is that this circle, known as the Enverist party or faction, had a considerable following among the National Defense’s activists and the Central Committee members and therefore had significant authority over the resistance movement in Istanbul.
The final section of this chapter focuses on Unionists’ split into two movements, one espousing the maintenance of the sultanate, and the other supporting the establishment of a republican regime. In September 1921, the PSP was renamed Union and Progress. Sometime during the first quarter of 1922, Kara Kemal, who had escaped from Malta in September 1921 – joined this organization with his comrades who had remained in the capital after the occupation in March 1920. However, by May 1922, when the cadres of the Enverist party embarked on building an opposition against the republican orientation of the national movement’s prevailing leadership, the unity of the Union and Progress network reorganized in Istanbul was broken.
This split saw the emergence of the National Defense and the Union and Progress as two separate organizations. Presided over by Esat Bey, the National Defense
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accommodated the Unionists who joined the anti-republican (or anti-Kemalist) opposition. The Union and Progress network, on the other hand, remained under the leadership of Kara Kemal. The republican orientation of this network was strengthened with the participation of the Solidarists who began to move the center of their activities back to Istanbul after the conclusion of the War of Independence in September 1922. Unlike the Party Program of the People’s Soviets, the Representation of Professions program had an explicitly republican character.
Istanbul Branch of the CUP after the Armistice
In the second half of 1919, there emerged in Istanbul an important circle that sought to maintain the integrity of the Union and Progress as a political movement. Led largely by Ali İhsan (İloğlu), known by his pseudonym, the Blind, this circle became politically active particularly after May 1919,2 when the Ottoman government dissolved the potential heirs to the CUP, the Renewal Party and the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party. Ali İhsan had been involved in the Central Committee of the CUP’s Istanbul branch (İttihat ve Terakki İstanbul Heyet-i Merkeziyesi), which had exercised a great degree of political control over artisan chambers.3 He had worked with Kara Kemal, the principal leader of the Istanbul branch, in the administration of the national companies and in the provisioning of Istanbul.4
2 The most important scholarly work on Ali İhsan’s political and ideological activities belongs to İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı.”
3 Ibid. pp. 357-361.
4 After Kara Kemal was appointed Minister of Supplies, Ali İhsan served as chief of the commercial department in this ministry. Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 138.
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In the aftermath of Kara Kemal’s banishment to Malta in May 1919, Ali İhsan greatly increased his political and ideological influence. He did so by maintaining his connections with the leading members of the CUP’s Istanbul branch. Among the most important of these figures were Memduh Şevket (Esendal), Hüseyinzade Ali (Turan), Muhtar Bey (who became the Istanbul deputy in December 1919), Muhtar of Ayıntap, Vehbi, Hamdi, Ethem, Hüsnü and Hüseyin Beys.5 Although the CUP was formally dissolved at the beginning of the armistice period, these individuals came together once again to form the CUP’s Istanbul headquarters.6 An important decision they made in this meeting was the adoption of a political program called the Representation of Professions (Meslek-i Temsil).7
This program suggested the reorganization of political and economic life based on corporations to be formed by nine occupational groups:8 farmers/shepherds, artisans, craftsmen, merchants, workers, officials/employees, military officers, miners and sailors. In their scheme, the National Assembly would represent these categories as opposed to individual voters. This was presented to be the only way to create, on a national level, an equal society free from the moral, economic and political degeneration of
5 Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 120.
6 This meeting must have occurred sometime before the elections in November 1919. Ali İhsan stated in the trials of 1926 that the CUP’s Istanbul center had not been active before the preparations for the elections had started. Ibid.
7 Ibid. p. 121.
8 The first version of the program composed in 1917 suggested the founding of two assemblies as the constitutive parts of the state’s legislative organ: one based on the representation of professions and the other on the general vote. The second assembly was dropped from the program when it was publicized in Ankara in December 1920. For an overview of the program’s evolution, see “Meslek-i Temsilcilik Ne Demektir,” Meslek, no: 1, 10 December 1925, p. 5.
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bureaucratization. For Ali İhsan, the Representation of Professions program embodied the egalitarian spirit of artisan guilds and tımars, upon which the Ottoman state had once depended.9 According to him, the decline of the Ottoman Empire began when the bureaucratic structure of the kapıkulu system took over; the establishment of a new Turkey was dependent on the realization of a program that aimed to institute the rule of the people.
The intellectual and political origins of the Representation of Professions have not been thoroughly investigated. What is known is that Ali İhsan introduced this program to the CUP’s political agenda by the end of 1917.10 It constituted one of the ideological references for a movement that Mete Tunçay persuasively describes as the Unionist left.11 The newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar became the port parole of this movement that espoused a corporatist political regime.12 Yunus Nadi was the editor-in-chief of this important
9 A. Cerrahoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalizmin Tarihine Katkı, (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1973), pp. 398-407.
10 According to Hamit Z. Aliyev, an Azeri historian whose relevant work is cited by Mete Tunçay’s Cihat ve Tehcir, Ali İhsan submitted the program to the CUP headquarters in the spring of 1916. Hamit Z. Aliyev, Türkiye Birinci Dünya Muharebesi Devrinde – Dahili Vaziyet, (Bakü: ASSC İlimler Akademisi Neşr, 1965), pp. 98-99, cited by Mete Tunçay in Cihat ve Tehcir, (İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1991), pp. 6-7. On the other hand, Ali İhsan’s brother Asım Süreyya Bey notes that the program was submitted to the CUP headquarters towards the end of 1917 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” p. 367.
11 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 266-267.
12 Tasvir-i Efkar was one of the most important periodicals that informed the public opinion about the course of developments accompanying the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Uygur Kocabaşoğlu and Metin Berge, Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), see especially pp. 91-133. The newspaper’s interest in the Revolution was attributed to Yunus Nadi’s effect, but a recent study also draws attention to the impact of Rasim Haşmet Bey, who was writing columns for Tasvir-i Efkar at the time of the Revolution. İ.
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publication. He supported the application of radical economic measures, calling for a greater degree of state control over the economy.13 In his editorials, he was very critical of Muslim merchants who accumulated large amounts of capital under wartime conditions thanks to the state policies that deliberately promoted the rise of a class of Muslim bourgeoisie.14 Yunus Nadi was instead advocating for the corporations of small entrepreneurs as the backbone of the national economy.15
The leadership of the Istanbul organization proved to form a significant focus of power after the armistice by having three candidates elected to parliament in December 1919: Muhtar Bey, Kamil Efendi and Numan Efendi.16 Especially the election of Numan was seen as a political scandal by the non-Unionist press in the capital city.17 A journeyman working at the Zeytinburnu Weapon Factory, Numan presented himself as the true representative of workers in Istanbul. This identification was intensely criticized. It was claimed that Numan was a committed Unionist. He was allegedly in Berlin before the
Arda Odabaşı, Osmanlı’da Sosyalizm, Türkçülük ve İttihatçılık, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011), pp. 26-27. Rasim Haşmet was a socialist intellectual from Salonika.
13 See, for example, his article “İktisad-i Meslek,” Tasvir-i Efkar, 18 May 1918, p. 1.
14 Yunus Nadi,” “Yeni Zenginler Meselesi,” Tasvir-i Efkar, 13 August 1917, p. 1.
15 For Yunus Nadi’s corporatist approach to the question of the national economy, see “Milli İktisadın İlk Esaslı Hatvesi-I,” Tasvir-i Ekfar, 11 October 1916; “Milli İktisadın İlk Esaslı Hatvesi-II,” Tasvir-i Ekfar, 12 October 1916; “Milli İktisadın İlk Esaslı Hatvesi-III,” Tasvir-i Efkar, 16 October 1916. These articles deal with a group of economic corporations formed in Aydın, and set these enterprises as an example of how the economy in Anatolia should have been organized.
16 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, (Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı, pp. 373-376.
17 SHAT, 20 N 167, carton: 57, file: 2, “Le Socialisme en Turquie. L’Election de Numan Effendi,” 27 December 1919.
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elections, and frequently meeting Talat Pasha.18 After his return, he reportedly continued working for the CUP’s secret central bureau.
It is noteworthy that Numan identified himself as a national socialist (milli sosyalist). There were certain parallels between how he defined this ideological stance and the basic principles of the Representation of Professions Program. According to Numan, internationalism was incompatible with the needs of the Turkish working class.19 He considered his election as an important step towards the formation of a truly national assembly where all socio-economic layers of the nation should be represented. Accordingly, the assembly was to work for the independence of the nation and the socio-economic growth of the country. To reach these goals, Muslim and Turkish workers were to become conscious of their rights and thus organize themselves around labor unions. In his eyes, materialization of socialism in Turkey was by no means independent from the independence of the nation.
Seen as a Unionist partisan, Numan was among the first to be arrested and then banished to Malta by the British shortly after the military occupation in March 1920.20 This development interrupted the activities of the Union and Progress network as a whole. In a letter addressed to Enver Pasha in April 1921, Memduh Şevket spoke of how the leading
18 This information was transmitted by the French intelligence service with reference to an article published by the Istanbul newspaper Peyam (this should have been Peyam-ı Sabah). SHAT, 20 N 167, carton: 57, file: 2, “Numan Effendi. Député Socialiste,” 23 December 1919.
19 Ibid. p. 3.
20 FO, 371/5089, 25 March 1920. In addition to Numan, there were 11 more figures arrested in the first place: Rauf Bey, Cemal Pasha, Şevket of Galata, Kara Vasıf, Faik Bey (the deputy of Edirne), Şeref Bey (the deputy of Edirne), Hasan Tahsin (ex-vali of Erzurum and Damascus), Mahmut Pasha of Çürüksu, Dr. Esat, Cevat Pasha.
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cadres of this network were divided into two parts. The group that stayed in Istanbul included “… two of our friends and the members of the Istanbul headquarters and the effendis whom we used in various organizations…”21 Memduh Şevket did not identify who they were in his letter. Nevertheless, it is clear that Hüsnü Bey, the party secretary of the CUP’s Beyoğlu branch, was one of them.22 Another one seems to be İbrahim Ethem Bey, the party secretary in Bakırköy during World War I.23 The second group, on the other hand, crossed over to Anatolia in the aftermath of the occupation.24
Unionist Left in Anatolia
Ali İhsan and his friends arrived in Ankara shortly after the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920. They maintained their practice of organizing around national companies there by forming a corporatist enterprise called Solidarity Administration (Tesanüt İdaresi).25 Ali İhsan was no doubt the most prominent figure of this circle. Also involved were Vehbi and Hüseyin Beys from the Istanbul headquarters as
21 Ibid. p. 192.
22 Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 364. Another one would have been Hüseyinzade Ali, who seems to have never left the capital in the armistice period. In the course of his trials in 1926, Hüseyinzade Ali never talked about being in Anatolia. Ibid, pp. 154-166.
23 See the records of Ethem Bey’s trial in 1926, in ibid. pp. 444-458.
24 Şükrü of Yenibahçe states in his memoirs that Ali İhsan crossed over to Anatolia with Nizamettin Nazif, Arif Oruç, and (Telefoncu) Ziya Beys. Yaşar Semiz and Ömer Akdağ (eds.), Yenibahçeli Şükrü Bey’in Hatıraları, pp. 146-147.
25 Ibid. p. 377.
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well as Emin Bey, the deputy of Eskişehir.26 The members of this circle were engaged in various commercial activities in Ankara.27 They also ran a coffeehouse named Solidarity, which served as their shelter and a regular meeting place, earning this group the sobriquet the Solidarists (Tesanütçüler).28
A detailed report written by a French diplomat in January 1921 associated the leaders of the CUP’s Istanbul branch with a center of socialist propaganda in Ankara.29 The leadership of this center was attributed to Ali İhsan, Yunus Nadi, and Muhittin (Birgen), formerly the editor-in-chief of the CUP’s semi-official newspaper Tanin.30 The author of the report noted that these were Unionist leaders of secondary importance who had nothing in common with socialism, and had been involved in all sorts of embezzlements in connection with the business of exportation and supply distribution during the war years in Istanbul. He argued that these Unionist figures were trying to affect the policies of Mustafa Kemal by putting political pressure on him just as they had manipulated Talat Pasha for their own interests in the course of the war.
26 See the statement of Vehbi Bey in the trials of Ankara court martial in 1926, in Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 347.
27 For example, Vehbi Bey was engaged in the commerce of firewood. Ibid.
28 Samet Ağaoğlu, Kuvvayı Milliye Ruhu. ‘Birinci Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1973), p. 58. According to Enver Behnan Şapolyo, that was not a coffeehouse but a shop in which there was almost nothing to be sold. Enver Behnan Şapolyo, Mustafa Kemal ve Milli Mücadelenin İç Alemi, (İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1967), pp. 119-122.
29 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 95, carton: 308, dossier: 1, 28 January 1921, p. 73.
30 For a biography of Muhittin Birgen, see Zeki Arıkan, Tarihimiz ve Cumhuriyet. Muhittin Birgen (1885-1951), (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), pp. 1-99.
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This report was written at the time of a political radicalization within the Anatolian movement. In May 1920, a group of Unionists had formed a leftist-populist organization named the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu).31 Yunus Nadi was among its founders. Of the other important members were Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), Dr. Adnan (Adıvar), Hakkı Behiç, and Hüsrev Sami.32 The Green Army acquired considerable military power with the participation of Çerkes Ethem under whose control there was a sizable brigade, the Mobile Forces (Kuvva-i Seyyariye).33 There was a close association between the Green Army and the People’s Faction (Halk Zümresi).34 The latter was founded at the end of summer 1920 to represent the Green Army in the National Assembly. This parliamentary group had Nazım Bey (deputy of Tokat) elected Minister of the Interior in September 1920, despite the opposition of Mustafa Kemal, who supported the election of Refet Bey instead.35
The Green Army was disbanded with the formation of the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) on October 18, 1920.36 The latter organization is often referred to as the official
31 For the history of the Green Army, see Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 284-301; Paul Dumont, “La Révolution Impossible. Les Courants d’Opposition en Anatolie 1920-1921” in Du Socialisme Ottoman à l’Internationalisme Anotolien, (Istanbul: lSIS, 1997), pp. 320-329; Fethi Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar, pp. 197-260.
32 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 287-288.
33 Paul Dumont, “La Révolution Impossible,” p. 324.
34 For the People’s Faction, see ibid. pp. 329-337; Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 301-307.
35 Ibid. p. 301.
36 On October 20, 1920, an official decree signed by Dr. Adnan Adıvar, the Ankara government’s minister of the interior, forbade all kinds of communist or Bolshevik activisms or organizations, including the Green Army, unless they were approved by or associated with the official TCP. TİTE, 23/27, 20 October 1920.
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communist party since it was Mustafa Kemal who initiated its founding by convincing some of the radical Unionists affiliated with the Green Army to participate in it.37 Of its members were also several high-ranking officers, such as Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha, İsmet (İnönü), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), and Refet (Bele).38 The so-called official communist party caused a split among the Green Army’s cadres. While many of them joined the official communist movement, another faction in the National Assembly, which was comprised of Nazım Bey, Şeyh Servet and Mehmet Şükrü sided with the People’s Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası).39 The latter was officially founded on December 7, 1920,40 by a secret communist group associated with Mustafa Suphi’s Turkish Communist Party in Baku.41
37 A report of the French diplomatic mission in Turkey rightfully resembled the official TCP to the socialist organization formed in 1917 upon an instruction of Talat Pasha to participate in the Second International’s Stockholm Conference. AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 95, carton: 308, dossier: 1, 28 January 1921, p. 71. For the official TCP, see George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publication, 1967), pp. 80-95; Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 307-315; Paul Dumont, La Révolution Impossible, pp. 337-343.
38 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 80.
39 The most important study so far published about this organization is Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (1920-1923), (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2007). See also Paul Dumont, La Révolution Impossible, pp. 343-348; Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1967), pp. 184-199.
40 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası. p. 96.
41 For the evolution of Mustafa Suphi’s communist movement, see Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997); Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler, pp. 200-267; George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, pp. 50-67; Paul Dumont, “Bolchevisme et Orient. Le Parti Communiste Turc de Mustafa Suphi, 1918-1921,” Du Socialisme Ottoman à l’Internationalisme Anotolien, (Istanbul: lSIS, 1997), pp. 223-258. N. Todorov, “La Grande
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It was a week before the TCP’s official formation that Ali İhsan issued the Representation of Professions program. The program appeared in the newspaper Anadolu’da Yeni Gün (New Day in Anatolia), which Yunus Nadi began printing in Ankara on August 10, 1920.42 Meanwhile, Muhittin Birgen published a series of articles in the pages of Yeni Gün, dealing with the question of socialism and its application in Turkey.43 Some of his articles were concerned particularly with the Representation of Professions program. He exaggerated Ali İhsan’s role by characterizing him as the Turkish equivalent of Karl Marx. According to Muhittin Bey, the Representation of Professions program was the embodiment of the Turkish form of socialism, and Ali İhsan interpreted the Ottoman history from the same perspective by which Karl Marx had explained world history.44
The Representation of Professions program was included in the agenda of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in December 1920 during negotiations over the Constitution of 1921 (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye).45 Yunus Nadi was in charge of the commission that wrote the draft of the Constitution.46 The draft criticized the rule of bureaucracy and
Révolution d’Octobre et le Mouvement de Libération Nationale en Turquie,” Etudes Balkaniques, no: 7, 1967, pp. 23-39.
42 A. Cerrahoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalizmin Tarihine Katkı, p. 211.
43 Zeki Arıkan, Tarihimiz ve Cumhuriyet. Muhittin Birgen (1885-1951), pp. 26-35.
44 Ibid. p 33.
45 For a summary of these negotiations in parliament, see Rıdvan Akın, “Birinci Türkiye Millet Meclisi’nin 1921 Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu Layihasını Müzakeresi” in Tarık Zafer Tunaya’ya Armağan, (İstanbul: İstanbul Barosu, 1992), 343-357. See also Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980), (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), pp. 188-192.
46 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, (Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı, p. 389.
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political parties, which, the commission believed, prevented the solidarity of occupational groups. The commission maintained that the National Assembly must represent such groups and not individual voters. Parliamentary discussions on this draft demonstrated that the program published by Ali İhsan had a considerable following. Nonetheless, the Constitution adopted on January 21, 1921, was not based on it.47 The commission’s initial draft faced opposition from the deputies of various political leanings. The Constitution reflected the principles of the program that Mustafa Kemal submitted to the Assembly in September 1920, which had not made any reference to the corporatist program in question.48
After the Constitution was adopted, the Unionist left began to lose its political influence. This corresponded to the aftermath of Çerkez Ethem’s revolt against the Ankara government at the end of January 1921.49 The government used the revolt as a pretext to crack down on the People’s Socialist Party.50 Meanwhile the TCP’s activities were stopped, and the organization ceased to exist ipso facto.51 Many of those associated with this
47 For the articles of the law, see Şeref Gözübüyük, Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları. 1876, 1921, 1924, 1961, 1982 Anayasalarının Yapılışları, Özellikleri ve Yapılan Değişiklikler, (Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi, 2005), pp. 41-44.
48 This program is, in general, presented as Mustafa Kemal’s populist program. But in a recent article, Zafer Toprak has demonstrated that although Mustafa Kemal called it so in his Speech, the program was not named “populist” when it was submitted to the General Assembly. Zafer Toprak, “Halk Fıkası’nın Kuruluş Evresi: ‘Halkçılık Programı’ ve 1923 Nizamnamesi,” Toplumsal Tarih, September 2011, no: 213, pp. 20-29.
49 Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV. 1921-1922. Cumhuriyete Doğru, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), pp. 13-28.
50 Ibid. pp. 29-35.
51 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 37.
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organization would later participate in the Defense of National Rights Group52, also known as the First Group. Mustafa Kemal formed the group in May 1921 so as to consolidate his authority over the National Assembly by unifying his supporters under a single parliamentary group. Some of the radical Unionists, in turn, took part in the Second Group of the Defense of National Rights.53 Formed in July 1922, the Second Group was a loose coalition that included the radical as well as conservative elements of the National Assembly. Their common goal was to build up an opposition block against Mustafa Kemal and his followers unified in the First Group.
Yet a socialist tendency continued to exist in Ankara. Towards the end of 1921, Numan Usta joined the National Assembly as the Istanbul deputy. What made this possible was an agreement signed by the British and Ankara governments in October 1921 for the exchange of war prisoners.54 Along with Kara Vasıf, Rauf (Orbay), Celal Nuri and many other nationalists, Numan was one of the fifty-one Turkish prisoners released by the British on November 1, 1921.55 Numan took part in the First Group of the Defense of National Rights after he arrived in Ankara.56 At the same time, he continued identifying himself as a
52 For the basic documents concerning the establishment of the First Group, see Faik Reşit Unat, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin Birinci Devresinde Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaai Hukuk Grubunun Kuruluşuna ve Çalışmalarına Ait Bazı Vesikalar,” Tarih Vesikaları, August 1944, vol: 3, no: 13, pp. 1-14.
53 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931), (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), pp. 45-47.
54 For the details of how this agreement was signed, see Selma Yel, “Malta Sürgünlerinin Mübadele Edilmesi,” Askeri Tarih Bülteni, no: 35, August 1993, pp. 222-233.
55 Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, pp. 203-204.
56 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, p. 123.
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socialist deputy, closely collaborating with Tevfik Rüştü, the deputy of Menteşe.57 Mehmet Vehbi (Sarıdal), the general director of commerce, was among the other socialist leaders in Ankara,58 as was Nizamettin Bey, the general director of industry.59
Enverist Faction
By the time the TCP disappeared from the political scene, an effort to revive the Union and Progress had been underway. It was Enver, one of the former CUP leaders, who led the initial stages of this revival from abroad. As noted in Chapter 1, Enver was one of the statesmen that had left Istanbul following the conclusion of World War I. Later, he established contacts with Bolsheviks in Berlin,60 and then moved to Russia, where he
57 “İstanbul’da Amele Mebusu Numan Usta’yla Mülakat,” İleri, 20 December 1922, published by Sabahattin Özel and Işıl Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu in Osmanlı’dan Milli Mücadele’ye Seçilmiş Mülakatlar, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2003), pp. 197-198. In Comintern documents, Tevfik Rüştü is presented to be one of the leading figures of the socialist movement in Anatolia along with Numan Usta. See, for example, “Komünist Enternasyonel Yürütme Komitesi Doğu Şubesi’ne,” Ankara, 28 May 1922, the complete document has been published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 202-208, for a reference to Numan and Tevfik Rüştü, see p. 207; see also the communist partisan Hüseyin Hüsnü’s letter in May 1922 in ibid, pp. 338-340.
58 Mehmet Vehbi was also involved in the administration of the Union of Teacher Associations. Ibid, p. 267.
59 In October 1923, both Mehmet Vehbi and Nizamettin were forced to resign due to their association with the socialist movement. “Sosyalist Oldukları İçin İstifa Etmişler,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 6 October 1923, p. 3.
60 Talat, too, was in Berlin with Enver. The former also contributed to the Unionist movement abroad, founding the Eastern Club (Şark Klubü) in Berlin, which functioned as a shelter and a political center for a considerable group of Muslim exiles. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 268-269. Since he was assassinated in March 1921, however, Talat’s role remained limited compared to Enver. In 1919, Enver and Talat made their first contact with Bolsheviks by helping Karl Radek to be released from prison in Berlin. On this subject, see Emel Akal, Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm, pp. 79-83.
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presented himself as a leftist alternative to Mustafa Kemal.61 Enver stayed in touch with the leaders of both the Green Army and the official TCP. To obtain support of the Bolsheviks, he also founded the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (hereafter the League) by the end of 1920.62 While the League’s headquarters was located in Berlin, its leaders intended for offshoots of their organization to form all around in the Muslim world. Its Turkish branch was named the People’s Soviets Party (PSP).63
Between September 5 and 8, 1921, the PSP had a congress in Batumi, a Georgian city located on the Black Sea coast.64 One of the important decisions made there was the adoption of the Party Program of the People’s Soviets.65 This program was predicated largely on the Labor (Mesai)66 Program previously drafted by Talat the junior (Küçük Talat) and Nail Beys.67 The Labor Program proposed the formation of a corporatist political system in Turkey. Until this became a realistic option, however, the regime was to rely on
61 A new round of negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Unionists started in Moscow in May 1920. Paul Dumont, “La Fascination du Bolchevisme: Enver Pacha et le Parti des Soviets Populaires 1919-1922,” Du Socialisme Ottoman à l’Internationalisme Anotolien, (Istanbul: lSIS, 1997), p. 126. Enver reached Moscow in August. Mete Tunçay, “Mesai”. 1920 Halk Şuralar Fırkası Programı, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972), p. 6.
62 Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star. Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919-1922, (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), pp. 37-43.
63 Ibid. p. 43.
64 Paul Dumont, “La Fascination du Bolchevisme,” p. 139.
65 This program has been published by Mete Tunçay in Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 407-417.
66 For the Labor Program, see ibid. pp. 378-401.
67 Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, p. 34. According to Paul Dumont, Enver himself most likely played some part in its preparation as well. Paul Dumont, “La Fascination du Bolchevisme,” p. 129
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general elections in their opinion. Thus the Labor Program was drafted for a political party. It differed in this respect from the Representation of Professions program, which was composed almost like a draft constitution specifying the basic principles on which the new regime in Turkey must be built.68 The program adopted in Batumi radicalized the terminology in the Labor Program by condemning imperialism and capitalism alike.
The other important decision made in Batumi was to change the PSP’s name into the Union and Progress.69 To be sure, this decision alone did not automatically result in the CUP’s revival. There were no more than a handful of delegates present in this meeting. Most of them were part of the community of Unionist exiles, which included, in addition to Enver himself, Enver’s uncle Halil Pasha, Talat the junior, Dr. Nazım, Nail Bey and Hacı Sami.70 During the next few months, it became clear that there was no consensus even among the leaders of the movement abroad as to whether the organization named the Union and Progress in Batumi was and could be the true heir to the CUP.71 For this reason,
68 For a concise comparison of these two programs, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” pp. 399-402. Also Mete Tunçay provides an overview of political processes underlying the evolution of and relations between the different versions of the Unionists’ political programs in Anatolia and abroad. Mete Tunçay, “‘Mesai’. 1920 Halk Şuralar Fırkası Programı,” pp. 1-38.
69 Mete Tunçay describes this name change as the CUP’s “return to its origins” (aslına rücu). Ibid, p. 12.
70 Ibid, pp. 138-139; Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, p. 60.
71 “Kamil Bey (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Puluhakiyan), Berlin, March 8, 1921” in Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, document no: 155, p. 299. Kamil Bey complained to Enver that Dr. Nazım had been talking about the need for the CUP’s revival (thus implying that it had not already been revived) while Baha Bey (most likely Bahattin Şakir) had not been mentioning the organization in his undertakings.
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it is more appropriate to consider this organization as a Unionist faction whose principal leader was Enver.
Anatolia
Based on the available sources, it is not possible to determine precisely how this faction was organized in Anatolia. This is, for the most part, because of the secret character of the Enverist party. The PSP/Union and Progress was not a legal political movement in territories controlled by the Ankara government,72 whose current leaders were intolerant of Enver’s plans to seize control of the Turkish national movement. Therefore, this movement’s activists and, more generally, the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress that remained loyal to Enver’s authority, did not overtly reveal their political affiliations. Nonetheless, it is clear that there was a fairly large Enverist faction within the Anatolian movement.73
It is known that Enver had a following among deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Although it is difficult to determine how many deputies were involved in this clique, and who they were, it is clear that Enverists were far from re-uniting the CUP’s former members now involved in the Turkish independence movement. According to
72 Therefore the congress in Batumi demanded the legalization of the activities of the PSP/Union and Progress from the Ankara government. Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, p. 60.
73 The British sources refer to the Enverist faction rather than the CUP or PSP. See, for example, FO, 371/7889, “The Nationalists and Unionists: Aziz Bey’s Activities, etc.,” 29 August 1922. This report suggests, “… for the time being, a distinction must be drawn between Enver’s personal partisans and other prominent Unionists.”
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the British, there were only some 15 deputies associated with this clique in October 1921.74 Of these deputies, Hafız Mehmet, Şükrü (Oğuz) and Eyüp Sabri are the most well known.75 In the National Assembly, the majority of the deputies formerly involved in the Union and Progress rallied around the leadership of Mustafa Kemal by participating in the Defense of National Rights Group he founded in May 1921.
Yet the influence of the Enverist faction in the Anatolian movement was not confined to a relatively small number of deputies in the National Assembly. According to a British report, dated from the end of July 1921, some four hundred Enverist partisans were actively working in various regions of Anatolia.76 This document refers to them as members of the “Turkish communist organization.” This phrase must have been referring to the leftist-populist orientation that Enver’s movement was pursuing then. In any case, it is known that Enver’s supporters were particularly powerful in Trabzon, where they controlled the local Defense of National Rights organization.77
Around mid-1921, the leaders of the Enverist party attempted to form a coalition with the Solidarist group,78 which enjoyed large political and ideological prestige in Anatolia. To be sure, if realized, such a coalition would have created a significant focus of
74 FO, 371/6533, “The Political Situation in Anatolia,” 22 October 1921, pp. 2-3.
75 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 129.
76 FO, 371/6473, “Enver Pasha and the Turkish Communist Party,” 26 July 1921, pp. 2-3.
77 When Enver began to search for an opportunity to enter Anatolia through Trabzon after the congress in September, Mustafa Kemal had his supporters launch an operation against Enverists in this city. For the details of this long-lasting operation, see Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, pp. 285-334.
78 Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, pp. 125-126.
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power in Anatolia, which would have seriously threatened the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. However, they could not persuade Ali İhsan the Blind, the principal leader of the Solidarist circle. Not only was Ali İhsan against the rise of an alternative leadership within the national movement, but he also did not find the Party Program of the People’s Soviets convincing.79
What followed was the purge of some of Enver’s known supporters by the Ankara government.80 This operation, which considerably weakened the Enverist party, developed in parallel with the victory of the Turkish army over the advancing Greek forces in the Sakarya region in September 1921. Meanwhile, Enver was still in Batumi, waiting for an opportunity to enter into Turkish territories. Nonetheless, he was denied entry by the government in Ankara, and eventually made his way to Bukhara in mid-October,81 where
79 Among those who participated in the negotiations with Ali İhsan were Nail, Abdülkadir (previously mayor (vali) of Ankara), Şükrü and Naim Cevad Beys. Ibid. The latter was among the Enverits arrested in the course of the operations against them in August 1921. Arsen Avagyan, “Kemalistler, İttihatçılar ve Bolşevikler-II. Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Ankara-Sovyet İlişkileri,” Toplumsal Tarih, no: 160, April 2007, p. 44.
80 Ibid. pp. 44-45. If we accept a British report to be true, Halil Pasha (Enver’s uncle) was arrested in Trabzon in late October 1921 for being a supporter of Enver. He was then sent to Ankara, where Nuri Pasha and Kazım Bey, Enver’s brother and brother-in-law, respectively, were under arrest together with the twelve other Enverist partisans. FO, 371/6580, “The Angora Government and the Enverists,” 29 October 1921. Halil Pasha does not relate in his memoirs any such case of imprisonment. What he relates is that he stayed in Trabzon for some time despite the pressure of the Turkish government, and then passed to Batum, where he was arrested by Bolshevik agents (ÇEKA). Taylan Sorgun (ed.), Halil Paşa. İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyete Bitmeyen Savaş, (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1997), pp. 350-370.
81 Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, p. 64.
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he was killed in June 1922, while fighting against the Red Army at the head of Basmachi bands.82
Istanbul
There is limited information about the organizational capacity of the Enverist party in Istanbul. What can be established based on the existing sources is that the PSP/League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies began to organize there in the beginning of 1921.83 This is made evident by a memo sent from Istanbul to the League’s headquarters in Berlin, and signed by two Unionist agents whose pseudonyms were Uygur and Subutay. In the memo, they demanded Berlin the seals of the League for some 20 branches in Istanbul. Furthermore, on September 11, 1921, Enver stated in a letter to Cemal Pasha that the PSP’s Istanbul organization was quite powerful. Enver argued in this letter that there were 29 branches already established in the Ottoman capital.84
No independent source confirms whether the PSP could generate such a wide organizational network. Nevertheless, the available sources demonstrate that the PSP operated under the guise of a leftist-communist movement in Istanbul. The agents of the Turkish intelligence groups connected with Ankara, above all Felah and Mim-Mim, as well as foreign intelligence services spoke of the PSP’s members as communists, Muslim
82 Ibid. pp. 66-70.
83 “Uygur and Subutay (Istanbul) to the C.C of the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Berlin), Istanbul, January 6, 1921” in Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, document no: 46, p. 142.
84 “From Enver Paşa to Cemal Paşa,” Batum, 11 September 1921 in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları. Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar, edited by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), pp. 98-99.
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communists (İslam Komünisti), or Muslim Bolsheviks.85 In July 1921, for example, the British spotted a “communist-Unionist” cell operating under the cover of the “Turan Artisans Club”.86 Moreover, in October 1921, a spy working for the French uncovered a “Muslim-Bolshevik committee” in the Eyüp Sultan district.87
At least some elements of the Enverist party were active in the ranks of the resistance movement in Istanbul under occupation. Nonetheless, they concealed their political affiliation from agents working for the Ankara government. While Enversits were being purged in Anatolia, this contradiction found expression in a British intelligence report as follows:
…the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople [was] keeping a close watch upon certain individuals who arrived in Constantinople from Batum towards the end of September, and who [were] suspected of being Enverist agents. One of these individuals [was] a Major Nevzad Bey, whom the Nationalist Committee found to be in close touch with one of their most trusted members, Baki Bey, brother of Hakkı Bey, former Deputy for Sabanja [Sapanca]. Baki Bey was a close friend of İsmail Hakkı Pasha, the Unionist Director of Supplies.88
We do not know the extent to which the cadres of the PSP and the activists of the resistance movement overlapped. However, Enver was certainly in contact with some leaders of the resistance. The vice-president of the National Defense organization, Hafız
85 In 19 June 1921, for example, an intelligence report written most likely by a Felah agent was sent from Istanbul to Ankara in order to inform Mustafa Kemal that Hamid Bey, the captain of the Gülcemal ferry, was a “Turkish communist” associated with Enver’s organization. TİTE, 326/37, 19 June 1921. See also TİTE, 46/35, 19 July 1921.
86 The name of this club was the “Turan Sanaatkiaran Guji” FO, 371/6527, “The Communist Movement in Constantinople,” 29 July 1921.
87 SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 874, document no: 3376, 14 October 1921.
88 FO, 371/6580, “The Angora Government and the Enverists,” 29 October 1921.
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Besim was one of these leaders. During the course of the power struggles that divided the Central Committee of this organization into two rival groups, he was constantly accused of associating with Enver. Hafız Besim had to defend himself against such claims when he visited Ankara in the spring of 1922. Although he did not deny being in communication with Enver, Hafız Besim also emphasized that he did not approve of Enver’s return to the country.89 To be sure, a different statement would have put him in a difficult position there. In any case, there is no doubt that he was one of Enver’s supporters in Istanbul.90
Of the National Defense’s central committee members, Hafız Kemal was another important figure associated with the Enverists. Between September and October 1921, the French authorities in Istanbul collected detailed intelligence with respect to the aforementioned “Muslim-Bolshevik committee” in Eyüpsultan. They followed the activities of the committee’s members in this area, such as Tchek Tchek Recep, Galip and Suat Beys. According to this investigation, Hafız Kemal was one of the leaders of this committee, i.e. the People’s Soviets Party. In the municipal elections of January 1923, Hafız Kemal would become the Union and Progress’ candidate from the Fatih area.91
There is nothing extraordinary about Enver’s ongoing influence on the national movement in Istanbul. The Unionists played a key role in the rise of this movement. They formed, first, the Karakol society, and, then, the Zabitan group, which maintained Karakol’s
89 See the telegram that Fevzi Pasha sent to Esat Bey on May 9, 1922, in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 112-113.
90 One report submitted to the French authorities in October 1922 showed Hafız Besim among the leaders of the Union and Progress network in Istanbul. SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 796, 2 October 1922.
91 See İbrahim Ethem Bey’s statement in Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 455-456.
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organizational network. Enver was in contact with both groups. At least until September 1921, he continued transferring funds for them.92 The National Defense relied to a large extent on the district committees of resistance founded by the cadres of Karakol/Zabitan.93 When Enver spoke of the twenty-nine branches of the organization established in Istanbul, he probably referred to those neighborhood committees that came under the control of the National Defense in mid-1921,94 rather than another organizational network operating under the name of the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies or the People’s Soviets Party.
Even some members of the Mim-Mim group, who formed a rival group in the National Defense’s Central Committee, were once engaged in the Enverist party. In mid-1921, around the time of the National Defense’s formation, two members of the League’s Turkish center sent to the organization’s headquarters “a list of some of the Union and Progress members that were in need of economic aid” (İttihat ve Terakki’ye mensup olup da muhtac-ı muavenet bir halde bulunanlardan bir kısmının listesi).95 This list included the names of two figures associated with the National Defense’s headquarters: Lieutenant
92 In September 1921, Enver asked the League’s headquarters in Berlin to increase the amount of monthly funds sent to the Karakol organization (of Kara Vasıf) from 6,000 to 20,000 German Marks. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa, Üçüncü Cilt, 1914-122, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), p. 554.
93 Ibid. pp. 550-554.
94 Over the second half of 1921, there were twenty-four district organizations attached to the National Defense. Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar ve Faaliyetleri, pp. 285-290.
95 “İbrahim Bey and Talat Bey (Istanbul) to the C.C of the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Moscow), Istanbul, May 16, 1921” in Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, document no: 99, pp. 239-241.
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Colonel Kemal Bey and the journalist [Ebuzziya] Velid Bey. The former was not only a member of the Mim-Mim group, but also a member of the National Defense’s central bureau since its inceptions. Velid Bey was incorporated into both in 1922.96
Enver’s influence on the leadership of the National Defense is one of the factors accounting for the opposition of the Mim-Mim group. When the Karakol society held full control of the resistance movement, there were tensions between the leaders of the national movement located in Istanbul and Ankara. This situation had a great deal to do with the link between the leaders of the Karakol society and the Unionist leaders abroad, particularly Enver. With the founding of the Mim-Mim group, this power struggle was carried to the headquarters of the National Defense. Mim-Mim recruited some Karakol members and/or former Unionists, turning them into the agents of the national government. This group was directly linked to the authority of Ankara, more specifically the General Staff headed by Fevzi Pasha, and the General Staff’s Intelligence Bureau, whose chief was Hüsamettin Ertürk.
Despite the fact that he was not of a Unionist background, Esat Bey, the president of the National Defense was heavily involved in the schism within the national movement.97
96 Until late 1921, Velid Bey was in Malta as a political exile. In December 1922, Esat Bey reported that it had been the Mim-Mim members that had recently elected Velid Bey to the central committee without informing the majority of the other committee members, including himself. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 120. Velid Bey was counted among the civilians who served to the Mim-Mim group. Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar ve Faaliyetleri, p. 301.
97 A report of the Mim-Mim group does not identify Esat as a Unionist, but as someone who seeks to exert some influence on the Unionist movement together with his brother Ahmet İzzet Pasha. TİTE, 42/154, “Merkez Heyet-i Umumiyesine Şayan Tesir-i Ceryanlar. Esat Bey Cereyanı,” p. 2
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During the first half of 1922, tensions in the Central Committee of the National Defense developed particularly around the rivalry between Hafız Besim and Mehmet of Topkapı, the chief of the Mim-Mim group. Later that year, however, Esat overtly sided with the group that had formed around Hafız Besim, which included at one point the central committee members consisting of Major Ferhat, Captain Ali Haydar, Captain Lütfü, Hafız Kemal, and, surprisingly, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal and Enis Bey from Mim-Mim.98 To account for how and why this clique came about, we need to take a closer look at the course of political developments in the summer of 1922.
“Sultanists” and Republicans
Kara Kemal was one of the 16 Turkish exiles that escaped from Malta in September 1921.99 He made it back to Istanbul after spending several months in Europe, meeting the other Unionist leaders abroad.100 He managed to re-establish control over the national companies,101 and the remaining leaders of the CUP’s Istanbul committee, some of whom
98 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 121.
99 Mehmet Akif Bal, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Bekirağa ve Malta Anıları (1919-1921), (İstanbul: Ark Kitapları, 2003), p. 50.
100 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, (Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı, p. 403. Bilge Criss notes that Kara Kemal and Memduh Şevket Esendal met in Italy, and they got back to Istanbul with the help of Italians. Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 106. According to Criss this occurred in 1920. This information based on an interview with Azize Yenel, the spouse of Mithat Bey (Gözlüklü Mithat), might not be precisely true. According to a statement from Hüsnü Bey (one of the CUP’s party secretaries in Istanbul) in the Ankara trials of 1926, he, (Gözlüklü) Mithat and one Nihat met Kara Kemal in Germany. Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 365.
101 On January 2, 1919, the minister of foundations in the first Tevfik Pasha government dismissed the Unionist executives of the national companies, replacing them with the members of the anti-Unionist Liberal Entente Party. Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve
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he later brought back to the head of the company administrations.102 The group around Kara Kemal joined forces with the Enverist faction in Istanbul. Although we do not know exactly when, this fusion had surely taken place by March 8, 1922.103 A telegram wired on that day from Berlin informed Enver of this development: “Kara Kemal’s organization have joined our people there [Istanbul] with a decision from the central committee.”104
Over the summer of 1922, Kara Kemal established himself, once again, as the principal leader of the Union and Progress network in Istanbul.105 This happened while Enver was in Bukhara, where he was killed in July 1922. But the rise of Kara Kemal to head of the Unionist movement cannot be explained simply by reference to Enver’s death. Rather, I suggest, this development had to do with a split around a political question that
Milli Mücadele-I, pp. 119-120. According to a statement Ali İhsan the Blind made during the trials of the Ankara Court Martial in 1926, Kara Kemal used his personal influence to reestablish his control over the national companies when the Ottoman government’s director of foundations was one Raşid Bey. Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi: pp. 118-119.
102 For more details about close relations between the national companies and Kara Kemal, see the records of Gözlüklü Midhat, Hasan Fehmi, İhsan and Ali Rıza Bey’s trials in 1926 in ibid. pp. 493-528.
103 It seems that the group from the CUP’s Istanbul headquarters that remained in the capital after the occupation of March 1920 joined the PSP by the time of the congress in Batumi. In one of the letters he addressed to his followers, Enver states that “[t]he Istanbul central committee is very firmly organized. Of our old friends Hasan and Ethem are working in this committee. There is no doubt that the experience and intelligence of these friends will be used”. Arsen Avagyan, “Kemalistler, İttihatçılar ve Bolşevikler-II,” p. 41. Ethem and Hasan were most likely from the circle in question.
104 “Merkez-i Umumi kararı ile oradaki Kara Kemal teşikilatı da bizikilere iştirak etmiş,” “Kamil Bey (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Puluhakiyan), Berlin, March 8, 1922” in Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, document no: 155, p. 299.
105 FO, 371/7889, “The Nationalists and Unionists: Aziz Bey’s Activities, etc.,” 29 August 1922; SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 796, 2 October 1922.
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concerned the character of the new regime to be formed in Turkey after the national struggle. One wing of the movement espoused the maintenance of the sultanate whereas the other supported the establishment of a republican regime. I argue that it was the republican wing of the movement that Kara Kemal began to lead after this split, and it was this group that continued to be associated with the politic heritage of the Union and Progress.
“Sultanists”
One important proof of this split is a report signed on July 11, 1922, by Nevile Henderson, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul.106 A lengthy passage from this report is worth quoting at this point:
1. A certain amount of speculation has been aroused here by the appearance a few days ago in the Peyam Sabah newspaper of an article applauding the performances of Enver Pasha in Central Asia. As Your Lordship is aware the Peyam Sabah is the only anti-Kemalist Turkish paper now appearing in Constantinople, and is published by the well-known politician Ali Kemal Bey. This gentleman is always very personal in his ideas, and has frequently been at variance with other persons opposed to the Kemalists, but he has of late been taking a hand in the attempts to combine the various anti-Kemalist elements here into a single party, a fact which gives his advocacy of Enver Pasha greater significance, especially as one of the main planks in the platform of an united anti-Kemalist opposition would be to restore the Sultan’s authority.
The editorial by Ali Kemal, titled “Enver’s New Brave Acts (Enver’in Yeni Celadetleri),” to which Henderson refers in the above excerpt, was printed in the Peyam-ı
106 FO, 371/7868, Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour – (Received July 17), Constantinople, July 11, 1922.
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Sabah on July 3, 1922.107 As Henderson implies, Ali Kemal was a keen opponent of the prevailing leadership of the national movement, always very critical of Enver as well.108 In this particular piece, however, Ali Kemal praises Enver’s struggle against Bolsheviks in Central Asia, saying
Enver Pasha found the right way after weltering in shadows for long years. We will almost applaud Enver Pasha, whom we have condemned so far as a reckless, frivolous and spoiled person, for his new brave acts in Central Asia because these are right, wise and politically appropriate actions.109
For Henderson, Ali Kemal’s article was a sign of the rise of an anti-Kemalist coalition in which Enver would take part. Henderson thus spoke of two political scenarios circulating about this anti-Kemalist platform:
2. It is apparently believed in some quarters that the article in question was due to British inspiration and those who hold this erroneous opinion see in it an indication that Enver has come to some arrangement with the British government.
3. Another theory is that Enver, having fallen foul of the Bolshevists, and being hostile to Mustafa Kemal, is coming out as a man loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. There have been scattered indications that he may be moving in this direction, and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that the Sultan may see in Enver a possible means of destroying Mustafa Kemal, whom his Majesty detests as strongly as ever, and whose tendency in internal politics has been to become more and more anti-dynastic and revolutionary. There can be little doubt that the one potentially strong element opposed to the present Angora Government in the interior of Anatolia is the Enverist faction, as it has adherents not only among the population
107 For a reference to this editorial, see Zeki Sarıhan, Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü IV (Açıklamalı Kornoloji), Sakarya Savaşı’ndan Lozan’ın Açılışına (23 Ağustos 1921 – 20 Kasım 1922), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), p. 507.
108 For a study of Ali Kemal’s political and intellectual biography, see Osman Özsoy, Gazetecinin İnfazı, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1997).
109 “Enver Paşa, senelerce zılal (gölgeler) içinde yuvarlandıktan sonra reşada erdi. Şimdiye kadar zırtopuz, hoppa, şımarık diye muaheze eyledğimiz Enver Paşa’yı Orta Asya’daki yeni celadetlerinden dolayı adeta alkışlayacağız. Çünkü bu hareketlerde isabet, hikmet, siyaset var”.
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but in the Army. Now that Enver has gone against the Bolshevists, whom His Majesty also detests and fears, the Sultan might well be tempted by the prospect of utilizing this potential force to oust Mustafa Kemal and re-establish his own authority.
Henderson’s report is not the only source referring to the rise of an anti-Kemalist coalition. A Turkish intelligence report speaks of exactly the same phenomenon.110 Its anonymous author begins his report pointing out to Sultan Vahdettin’s (Mehmet VI) growing concerns about the Anatolian movement’s republican orientation. He, too, suggests that Vahdettin tended to come to terms with Enver Pasha – in spite of his hatred for this infamous Unionist leader – for the protection of the sovereignty of the Sultanate. This anti-Kemalist or anti-republican coalition allegedly incorporated the Society of Exalting the Fatherland (hereafter SEF, İla-yı Vatan Cemiyeti) with whose leaders Enver was in communication.
The SEF was an organization founded in the armistice period by political figures that either had close relations with or were members of the anti-Unionist Liberal Entente Party.111 Tarık Zafer Tunaya notes that this organization was an element of the “Sultanist front” (Padişahcı Cephe), standing for the opposite of what the Defense of Rights organization represented.112 According to the author of the intelligence report under consideration, pro-British Damat Ferit Pasha was secretly backing the SEF, which was in close touch with the Ottoman Palace and the British. Furthermore, aside from its legal
110 TİTE, 52/1. Though not dated, this report is clearly written sometime in the summer of 1922, most probably around the same time as Henderson’s report discussed above.
111 For more information on this organization, see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt: 2. Mütarake Dönemi, pp. 518-523.
112 Ibid. p. 520.
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existence, the SEF was ruling over an informal network that had a large following among [non-Unionist] officers. The informant goes on to argue that there was no question about Enver’s association with the SEF during the previous months.
I have not come across another source pointing to Enver’s relations with the SEF. It seems, however, that there is some element of truth to the argument about the formation of an anti-Kemalist coalition. The establishment of the Second Group of the Defense of National Rights is the main indication of this tendency.113 As noted above, this group emerged in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in July 1922 as a platform of opposition against the First Group led by Mustafa Kemal. According to Eric Jan Zürcher, the Second Group included Enver’s partisans in Ankara, such as Şükrü (Oğuz) and Hafız Mehmet Beys, in addition to a group of conservative deputies.114 Of the founders of this group was Kara Vasıf, the leader of the Karakol society before the military occupation of Istanbul in March 1920.115
The formation of a similar coalition was underway in Istanbul in parallel with the rise of the Second Group. The vice-president of the National Defense that was in touch with
113 One of the most comprehensive researches on the Second Group belongs to Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet. İkinci Grup. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994). Demirel points to the rise of a narrow circle, called the Committee of Public Safety (Selamet-i Umumiye Komitesi), within the Defense of National Rights Group as one of the reasons that led to the formation of the Second Group. See ibid, pp. 381-391. According to Demirel, the signs of the rise of an opposition in the National Assembly were already evident in March 1922. The Committee of Public Safety was created to maintain the integrity of the Defense of National Rights in the face of this opposition. Yet the creation of such a secret circle seems to have speeded up the opposition’s split from the Defense of National Rights as a separate group.
114 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 129.
115 For the list of the Second Group’s members, see Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet. pp. 126-127.
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Enver, Hafız Besim seems to have been an important figure leading this process. At the beginning of April 1922, he represented the National Defense in the elections for the chief of porters. Salih Ağa was the candidate of those porters among whom the national movement was organized. Instead of Salih Ağa, Hafız Besim supported the election of another candidate: Raşid Ağa.116 Raşid was allegedly a man of Zeynelabidin, the secretary general of the pro-British Liberal Entente Party. Meanwhile, on April 4, the Mim-Mim group reported to Ankara that Ali Osman Ağa, a steward of bargemen, began to collaborate with the Enverists, who were working with the opposition.117 Ali Osman was an important activist of the resistance movement in Istanbul.118
Esat Bey, the president of the National Defense, became involved in this coalition towards the end of April. The available sources suggest that he had deliberately avoided openly taking side with any party in the struggle between Hafız Besim and the Mim-Mim leader Mehmet of Topkapı before the end of 1921.119 Even at the beginning of April 1922, Esat was opposed to Hafız Besim’s policy of supporting Raşid Ağa against Salih Ağa in the elections of the porters’ guild.120 By April 23, however, Esat and Hafız Besim had been
116 TİTE, 43/120; 1 April 1922.
117 TİTE, 67/61, 4 April 1922.
118 For Ali Osman’s connection with the resistance movement, see the memoirs of Hüsamettin Ertürk in Samih Nafiz Tansu, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 240.
119 See the correspondences between Esat and Fevzi Pasha on December 25 and December , 1921, in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 105-107. In his telegram to Fevzi, Esat mentions this competition between the groups around Hafız Besim and Mehmet Beys. The only critique directed to Mehmet Bey is his lack of communication with the headquarters of the National Defense. But Esat also points out that Hafız Besim only occasionally contacts with the National Defense.
120 TİTE, 43/120; 1 April 1922.
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settled on the assignment of a new central committee for the National Defense from which Mehmet of Topkapı and his friends were to be excluded.121 What is to be highlighted here is that starting in early May 1922, the elements that formally brought the Second Group into existence had de facto started acting like a common bloc in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.122
The General Staff in Ankara did not approve the list of central committee members submitted by Esat Bey and Hafız Besim.123 But cooperation between these two figures became increasingly more explicit during the second half of 1922. In mid-December, they were leading the wing of the National Defense that was in competition with the Mim-Mim group. Built, to some extent, on the supporters of the Enverist party, this faction appears to have even recruited members from the Mim-Mim group. As pointed out above, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal (Koçer) was one member of the National Defense’s central bureau led by Esat Bey and Hafız Besim. Previously he had been among the founders of the Mim-Mim group.
All this evidence substantiates the common thesis of the aforementioned intelligence reports concerning the formation of an anti-Kemalist (or anti-republican coalition). I could not find any proof demonstrating whether or not Sultan Vahdettin was personally involved with this process. Yet it is almost certain that the alliance under consideration was linked to the Ottoman government. Written most likely by an agent of the Mim-Mim group, one intelligence report at hand asserts that Esat Bey was seeking to
121 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 110-112.
122 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, pp. 379-380, footnote: 1.
123 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cil1: 1, p. 112.
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acquire influence over the Unionist movement. In the light of what has been discussed thus far, this claim appears valid. According to the same document, the Ottoman Foreign Minister Ahmet İzzet Pasha was also involved in this effort through his brother Esat Bey’s authority in the administration of the National Defense.
Republicans
Kara Kemal was not one of the Unionist leaders engaged with this coalition in Istanbul. An important source in this respect is the memoirs of Kılıç Ali, who was a trustee of Mustafa Kemal and a leading member of the First Group. On the whole, the narrative he presents explicitly illustrates his position against Kara Kemal. At one point, however, Kılıç Ali relates how he was dispatched to Istanbul for inspecting the “national organization” (milli teşkilat) there.124 In a meeting with the movement’s leaders, Kara Kemal emphasized his disapproval of the division that emerged in the national movement with the founding of the Second Group. Kılıç Ali states that Kara Kemal was still considering himself as a significant political figure relying on the Union and Progress.
There was, in fact, a wide organizational network operating under the name of Union and Progress in Istanbul. According to a report submitted to the French authorities in October 1922, this network was organized in eighteen different neighborhoods in Istanbul.125 The document in question provides information on each of the committees associated with the Union and Progress. It shows that there were between two to seven
124 This happened sometime in the second half of 1922. Hulusi Turgut (ed.), Atatürk’ün Sırdaşı Kılıç Ali’nin Hatıraları, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2012), p. 414.
125 SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 796, 2 October 1922.
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cadres leading the Union and Progress’ district organizations. The total of seventy Unionist activists enumerated by the document under consideration consisted of military and police officers, bureaucrats as well as guild members. These cadres seem to have had control over a fairly large organization. Furthermore, an independent source reported in September 1922 that the Union and Progress had some one thousand members in Istanbul.126
The Union and Progress continued acting like a leftist-communist movement under Kara Kemal’s leadership. According to a British report, dating from August 1922, the members of the Unionist group in Istanbul were “still masquerading as communists”.127 This document states that Kara Kemal and his associates founded a committee under the title of ‘National Circle and Union of the Orient’ (Mahfil Milli Şark Birliği) “with a view to carrying out the group’s programme”.
The building rented by this Committee [was] also frequented by the Chiefs of various labor guilds in Constantinople, the Presidents of Turkish so-called ‘Sporting Clubs’, Presidents of Associations of the Stamboul University, prominent members of the Association of Turkish Youth, and a number of Gendarmerie Officers.128
With the end of the War of Independence in September 1922, the Solidarist circle in Ankara began to move the center of their commercial and political activities back to Istanbul. Some of this group’s central cadres started working with Kara Kemal in the capital
126 This source is a report written by a Bolshevik agent from Bukhara, named Kalakov. “1 Haziran – 1 Eylül 1922 Döneminde İstanbul’daki Politik ve Ekonomik Durum” in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan (Aydınlık Çevresi) – Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, 1919-1926, 1. Cilt: 1919-1923, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2012), p. 210.
127 FO, 371/7889, “The Nationalists and Unionists: Aziz Bey’s Activities, etc.,” 29 August 1922.
128 Ibid.
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city.129 This means that the clique that had controlled the central bureau of the Committee of Union and Progress’ (CUP) Istanbul organization before the armistice once again established its authority over the Unionist movement in this city. This was why the Istanbul press often referred to the leadership of this movement as Provisioners (İaşeciler).130 These two terms could be interchangeably used because the CUP’s Istanbul headquarters had been practically in charge of the provisioning of Istanbul during most of World War I.
The involvement of the Solidarists was a clear sign of the Union and Progress’ republican orientation in Istanbul. The Representation of Professions program written by Ali İhsan the Blind was radically different from the Labor Program in terms of its republican outlook.131 The Labor, which underlay the Party Program of the People’s Soviets, espoused the maintenance of the Sultanic authority, albeit with certain constitutional restrictions. As early as April 1921, shortly after founding the League of Islamic Revolutionary Societies, Enver stated in a letter to Cemal Pasha that “… we support
129 Vehbi Bey, for example, returned to the capital after the retaking of İzmir from the Greeks in September 1922, and become one of Kara Kemal’s most trusted men. Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 347. Ali İhsan, began to frequent Istanbul around the same time. He also seems to have carried some of his business to Istanbul at that time İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” p. 405-406.
130 For example, “İntihabat Dedikoduları Etrafında: Yeni İntihabatta Mücadele Edecek Ceryanlar,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 4 April 1923, p. 1.
131 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” p. 400.
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the protection of the Caliphate and the Sultanate”.132 Whereas the Representation of Profession’s first article was formulated as follows:
The right to government and sovereignty relies unconditionally on the nation. Therefore, the executive and legislative powers are manifested in the general national assembly, which is the genuine representative of the nation.133
All this points to a significant political split that the Turkish national movement was going through in the second half of 1922. In the beginning of October, the Union and Progress became independent from the faction of the National Defense led by Esat Bey and Hafız Besim.134 In the meantime, these two organizations were ruling over two separate networks of district committees across Istanbul. In addition to Hafız Besim, this faction of the National Defense consisted of such former Unionists as Hafız Kemal, Captain Lütfü and Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, who had been previously associated with the Enverist party and/or the Karakol/Zabitan group. It seems that this clique engaged in an attempt to incorporate as many former Unionists as possible into the ranks of the National Defense.135
132 “Halk Şura Fırkası deyince tabii yanlış bir şey anlaşılmasın. Biz Hilafet ve Saltanat’ın muhafazası taraftarıyız.” Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, p. 74. The entire letter is published in pp. 71-76.
133 “Hakk-ı Hükümet ve hakimiyet bila kayd-ü şart millete racidir. Bu itibar ile kudret-i icra ve selahiyeti teşri milletin mümessil-i hakikisi olan meclis-i umumi-i milletde tecelli eyler.” İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı,” p. 425.
134 SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 796, 2 October 1922.
135 One of the reasons that caused Esat Bey to be removed from this organization’s administration in December was the recruitment of new members despite the disapproval of the general staff in Ankara Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 117.
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In terms of their relations with this clique, the Union and Progress and the Mim-Mim group were on the same side of the political spectrum. In spite of his disagreements with the General Staff in Ankara, Esat Bey formally remained to be the president of the National Defense until mid-December 1922. This provided the anti-Kemalist coalition with considerable leverage over the leadership of the national movement in Istanbul. Chapter 5 will demonstrate how the Union and Progress and the Mim-Mim group engaged in the formation of a rival bloc despite their ongoing rivalries. But I will first deal with the rise of the Turkish communist movement, which became an essential actor of this bloc.
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CHAPTER IV: COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS
During the initial months of 1922, the Unionist cadres of the resistance movement became politically divided in Istanbul. A Unionist group engaged in a coalition with various political circles that had ties to the Palace and the Ottoman government. By the middle of the year, this coalition had become a dominant faction in the Central Committee of the National Defense. Thereafter, the Union and Progress emerged as a separate organization from the National Defense.
This chapter examines the formation of the Turkish communist movement in Istanbul and its relations with the diverse factions of the national movement. After outlining the origins of Turkish communism, I concentrate on the Istanbul Communist Group (ICG) and the International Union of Workers (IUW), which initiated the founding of a labor confederation in July 1922. I suggest that the Mim-Mim group was also involved in this enterprise through a radical group of its members who collaborated with the communists. The activists of this radical group are identified as Kemalist-communists in the available sources.
The final part of this chapter explores how and why the Istanbul police cracked down on the labor movement in October 1922 by shutting down the labor unions
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controlled by the communist groups. I argue that this operation was initiated by the leadership of the National Defense organization – which held the control of the Ottoman police forces – as a result of the power struggles within the national movement. It was carried out in cooperation with the anti-communist cabinet that had come to power in Ankara in July 1922. This cabinet was formed by Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay), who represented the anti-communist wing of the First Group.
Turkish Communists in Russia
At the end of World War I, there were more than 60,000 Muslim-Turkish war prisoners in various regions of Russia.1 Although precise statistics do not exist on this subject, it is known that a number of these prisoners were exposed to and influenced by communist propaganda after the Bolshevik revolution in November 1917. Fighting on the side of the Red Army in the civil war, some of them formed socialist and communist circles especially in and around the Caucasus. The war prisoners associated with such circles became the first elements of the Turkish communist movement when they returned to Ottoman domains. They formed communist cells throughout various urban centers in Anatolia, such as Eskişehir, Erzurum, Ankara, Samsun, Zonguldak and Trabzon.2
Mustafa Subhi became a prominent leader of the Turkish communist movement during its early stages of formation.3 By the time his career as a communist began, Suphi
1 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), pp. 440-441; Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, pp. 42-43.
2 Ibid. pp. 94-111.
3 Emel Akal, “Mustafa Suphi” in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt 8: Sol, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp. 138-164.
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had been an opponent of the CUP. Therefore, he had been banished to Sinop, when the Unionist leaders had purged many of their political adversaries following the assassination of the Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket Pasha in June 1913. In May 1914, Suphi escaped to Russia, where he participated in the Bolshevik movement. After the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in November 1917, he initiated the establishment of a Turkish branch within the Bolshevik Party, and began publishing a communist periodical in Turkish: the New World (Yeni Dünya).
In July 1918, Suphi pioneered the Conference of Turkish Left Socialists in Moscow.4 Convened under the authority of the Bolshevik Party’s Central Muslim Commissariat, this meeting laid the foundations of the Turkish Communist Organization (TCO). According to George Harris, it was no less a figure than Joseph Stalin who initiated the founding of the Commissariat by persuading Şerif Manatov (a deputy of Bashkiria in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly) to form it.5 Paul Dumont notes that Manatov was one of the principal leaders of the Bashkirian national movement’s right wing until the end of 1917, but in February 1918 he became an assistant to Mulla-Nur Vahitov in the Muslim Commissariat.6 Vahitov was a Tartar revolutionary who ran the Commissariat with Sultan Galiyev.7 It was, however, Manatov who introduced Mustafa Subhi to this bureau.8
4 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 54.
5 Ibid. p. 53.
6 Paul Dumont, “Bolchevisme et Orient,” p. 230, footnote: 23
7 Ibid. pp. 229-233.
8 Ibid. p. 230. See also Şerif Manatov, “Mustafa Subhi Beş Sene Evvel Moskova’da,” January 1923 in Burhan Tuğsavul (ed.) Mustafa Suphi ve Yoldaşları, 28-29 Ocak 1921’i Unutma, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2004), pp. 38-40.
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In January 1919, the TCO headquarters was transferred from Moscow to Crimea. In April 1919, however, it was moved to Odessa this time, just before Denikin’s anti-Bolshevik forces, supported by a British-French fleet, captured Crimea.9 Meanwhile, the communist agents sent from Crimea began to form the organization’s Istanbul committee.10 On May 14, 1919, the first group of Turkish communists departed from Crimea on a boat.11 They arrived in Istanbul on June 12.12 By the end of that month, a communist center with twelve active members had already been established in the capital.13 The president of the committee was one Yusufov at this stage of its establishment. Later in 1919, another group associated with the TCO’s executive bureau in Odessa started leading the Istanbul committee.
9 Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, p. 69.
10 Mustafa Suphi, “Türkiye Komünist Teşkilatı Merkezi Heyetinin Faaliyeti” in Emel Seyhan Atasoy and Meral Bayülgen (eds.), Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi (TKP Kuruluş Kongresi). (Tutanaklar-Belgeler). Bakü 10-16 Eylül 1920, (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2008), p. 78.
11 “Bakü’deki Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatına,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 2, file: 3_36, No: 48-49, 9 September 1920.
12 “Rusya Şuralar Hükümetinin Komünist Bolşevik Moskova Merkez Komitesine,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 1, file: 1_36, no: 118a-119, 19 June 1919. The Turkish transcription of the complete document is published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, 1919-1926. 1. Cilt 1919-1923, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2013), pp. 36-38. The author of this report name four agents who reached Istanbul: Zekeriya, Mehmet, Yusufov and the Georgian communist Yehanov (or Necatof).
13 “Türkiye Komünisterinin Vaziyeti Hakkında Moskova Merkez Komitesine Suret,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 1, file: 1_36, no: 118a-119, 29 June 1919. Published in ibid. pp. 38-40. The list of these twelve agents is provided in p. 122. The four figures listed in the previous footnote are among them.
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Some figures in this group were previously the CUP’s political opponents like Mustafa Suphi himself.14 One of them was Captain İsmet Lütfü, whose pseudonym was Bomber (Bombacı). His father was Zeki Pasha,15 a chief military judge in the martial court that tried the Unionist leaders for their war crimes in 1919.16 İsmet Lütfü had been in the group of political exiles who had run away from Sinop in 1914.17 Apart from İsmet Lütfü and Mustafa Subhi, this group included Ahmet Bedevi (Kuran), another adversary of the CUP.18 After working with Subhi in Russia,19 İsmet Lütfü returned to Istanbul, where he became one of the leaders of the communist committee alongside Ahmet Bedevi and
14 According to a French informant, Subhi’s initial comrades, such as İsmet Lütfü, Cevdet Ali and Ethem of Bosna had been of Turkish liberals, the movement to which Damat Ferit Pasha and Ali Kemal belonged. AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 95, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 69. Manatov also mentions of Ethem of Bosna, stating that he accompanied Suphi in the latter’s first visit to the Muslim Commissariat. Şerif Manatov, “Mustafa Subhi Beş Sene Evvel Moskova’da,” p. 38.
15 “Muhterem Suphi Yoldaş,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 2, file: 2_36, no: 468-470, 15 June 1920. This document is a letter sent to Mustafa Suphi by Lütfi Necdet, Hüseyin Sait, Baha Ali. A part of it published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 21-22.
16 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “İstanbul Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi’sinde Ermeni Soykırımı Konusunda Görülen Davalar ve Verilen Kararlar,” p. 69; Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele-I, p. 175.
17 TİTE, 60/55, 05 May 1923. For a narrative of this escape, see Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1956), pp. 549-551. See also Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, pp. 11-14.
18 Ibid. p. 12.
19 TİTE, 60/55, 05 May 1923. In November 1918, Lütfü read a report as a representative of the TCO in the First Congress of Muslim Communists in Moscow. Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, p. 65.
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Cevdet Ali.20 The latter was a war prisoner who returned to Istanbul with İsmet Lütfü.21 He had been elected vice-president of the Congress of Turkish Left Socialists,22 also heading the efforts to build a Turkish red battalion in Kazan.23
The TCO’s first activists in Istanbul were recruited mostly from officers and war prisoners that had come from Russia.24 According to a speech made by Mustafa Suphi in September 1920, two boats full of Turkish war prisoners departed from Odessa in May 1919.25 One of the boats sailed to Anatolia, and the other to Istanbul.26 This piece of information is confirmed to some extent by a series of reports that the Ottoman government received during the period May-August 1919.27 These reports refer to the activities of Muslim Bolshevik officers in Istanbul, İzmir, Bursa and Gemlik. Most of these officers had reportedly served in the Caucasus under the command of Enver and Nuri
20 “Muhterem Suphi Yoldaş,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 2, file: 2_36, no: 470, 15 June 1920.
21 Ibid.
22 Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, p. 55.
23 Ibid. pp. 62-63.
24 When İsmet Lütfü arrived in Istanbul, he reportedly began working with a group of officers he had met in Russia, such as Captain Zeki, Major Cevdet, and Lieutenant Yekta. TİTE, 60/55, 05 May 1923
25 Mustafa Suphi, “Türkiye Komünist Teşkilatı Merkezi Heyetinin Faaliyeti” in Emel Seyhan Atasoy and Meral Bayülgen (eds.), Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi, p. 78.
26 Bülent Gökay, Emperyalizm ile Bolşevizm Arasında Türkiye, (İstanbul: Agoro Kitaplığı, 2006), p. 84.
27 All these reports are gathered in a single file BOA, DH.KMS, 52-4/35, 29 September 1919.
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Pashas. They were allegedly still working for the interests of the Union and Progress while conducting communist propaganda in Istanbul and Anatolia.28
Turkish Spartacists in Germany
Another circle that would play a significant role in the formation of the Turkish communist movement was taking shape in Germany almost simultaneously with the one in Russia. This circle was comprised of a large number of Turkish students and young workers residing in Germany for education and professional training. They became concentrated in Berlin. Many of them had been sent abroad by the Ottoman government because of the growing need for skilled labor during World War I. According to a contemporary estimate, the Ottoman government sent 4,000 workers to Germany, Austria, and Hungary during the war.29 Half of them, if we take another estimate into consideration, were in Germany.30
The Turkish community in Berlin experienced a turbulent period of German history. By the end of World War I, the German socialist movement had been divided into rival factions. Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Clara Zetkin had split from the Social Democrat Party, and founded the Spartacus League, which received the name German
28 See, in particular, the document entitled “Vilayat ile Elviye-i Müstakiliye’ye Takdim Şifre” in ibid.
29 From the report that the communist agent Ali Cevdet, known as Fahri, submitted to the executive committee of the Communist International in November 1921. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 123.
30 Affan Hikmet, “Türkiye Komünist Partisi Milli Azadlık Savaşı Devrinde” in Erden Akbulut (ed.) Milli Azadlık Savaşı Anıları, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2006), p. 21. According to Dimitır Şişmanov, the number of Turkish workers in Germany was 3,000. Dimitır Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist Hareketi Kısa Tarihi (1908-1965), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), p. 71.
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Communist Party in December 1918. This organization launched the Spartacist Uprising in January 1919. Having been introduced to radical communist ideas, some of the Turkish workers and students joined this movement.31 There were Turkish socialists among the revolutionaries who lost their lives during the uprising.32
Although they did not have any formal association with the Spartacus League or the German Communist Party, this radical group of students and workers are known as Turkish Spartacists.33 This circle founded the Turkish Worker and Peasant Party in Berlin, where the first issue of the socialist journal Kurtuluş (Emancipation) was published on May 1, 1919.34 Later in May, however, most of them returned to Istanbul. In September, this group applied to the Ottoman government for the establishment of the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party (TWPSP).35 The second issue of Kurtuluş was printed in Istanbul within the same month.
Şefik Hüsnü was recruited into the ranks of the Turkish Spartacists in Istanbul. His background was different from many of the TWPSP’s founders who joined the socialist
31 Stefo Benlisoy, “Türkiyeli Spartakistler ve Kurtuluş Dergisi” in Mehmet Alkan, Tanıl Bora and Murat Koraltürk (eds.) Mete Tunçay’a Armağan, p. 462.
32 The delegates of the TCO congress in Baku commemorated the Turkish workers who died in the Spartacist uprising. Emel Seyhan Atasoy and Meral Bayülgen (eds.), Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi, p. 187.
33 Mete Tunçay, “1919 Berlin’inde 18 Türk Spartaksti,” first published in Mülkiyeliler Dergisi, no: 205, March 1989, pp. 16-22; republished in Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, document: 1, pp. 785-792. See p. 787 for a discussion on the name Spartacist.
34 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 711-715. The transcriptions of all issues of the Emancipation have been published by Rasih Nuri İleri (ed.), Kurtuluş. 1 Mayıs 1919-Şubat 1920. Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası Organı, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2007).
35 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 41.
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movement in Berlin. Born into an affluent crypto-Jew (donmeh or Sabbateaist) family from Salonika, Şefik Hüsnü was educated as a Francophone since his childhood. He studied medicine in Paris, where he was politicized under the influence of the French Section of the Worker’s International (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière).36 After having served as a military physician during the Balkan Wars and World War I, he began his civilian life with the armistice, opening his own private clinic in Istanbul.37 It appears that he joined the TWPSP upon an invitation from the painter Namık İsmail,38 the first president of the party.39 Şefik Hüsnü was then made its secretary-general.
The TWPSP soon became an influential political organization. According to a report written by Şefik Hüsnü in 1922, the party initially had 1,200 members, and 65% of them were workers. In October 1919, the TWPSP attempted to form a union with the other socialist parties in Istanbul for the upcoming elections.40 To this end, they organized a congress that took place in the Ferah theater hall on October 24 with a large participation
36 Paul Dumont, “Aux Origines du Mouvement Communiste Turc. Le Groupe “Clarté” d’Istanbul,” Du Socialisme Ottoman à l’Internationalisme Anotolien, (Istanbul: lSIS, 1997), p. 206. On this topic and also about Şefik Hüsnü’s family and educational background, see Erden Akbulut (ed.), Dr. Şefik Hüsnü Deymer. Yaşam Öyküsü, Vazife Yazıları, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2010), pp. 9-12.
37 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
38 Rasih Nuri İleri (ed.), 40’lı Yıllar-5: “İfşa Ediyorum”: Türkiye’de Komünizm ve Irkçılık, Kazım Alöç; Savcı Konuştu, Söz Sanığındın, Mihri Belli, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2006), p. 33.
39 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Volume 2, p. 482.
40 “Rapport sur la Turqui[e],” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25b, file: 32_36, no: 175-180. A Turkish translation of this document is published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 175-177.
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of workers.41 The congress was concluded with the constitution of a representative committee that founded the Union of Turkish Socialist Parties at the end of the month.42 Aside from the TWPSP, the union included the Turkish Socialist Party and the Social Democrat Party (SDP).43 However, these three socialist groups parted ways and participated in the elections with their own candidates due to their leaders’ unwillingness to cooperate.44
None of the socialist candidates could be successful in the end. The TWPSP candidate Mehmet Vehbi (Sarıdal) could get no more than 14 votes from the secondary electors, while the TSP candidates Dr. Refik Nevzat and Sadrettin Celal received even less.45 Numan Usta was the only worker elected to parliament with 135 votes. As discussed in Chapter 3, Numan owed this success to the support of the Unionist circle led by Ali İhsan the Blind. The TSP sharply criticized this outcome by publicly denouncing Numan as a candidate of the Union and Progress bloc that had nothing to do with socialism.46 The
41 “İstanbul’da Amele ve İşçinin Hakkını Müdafaa Yolunda İlk İçtima,” İkdam, 25 October 1919, p. 3.
42 “Sosyalist Partileri Birliktir,” İkdam, 30 October 1919, p. 2.
43 The SDP came into existence at the end of 1918. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt: 2, p. 237. Its president was Dr. Hasan Rıza, who had resigned from the CUP in January 1911. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 80, footnote: 47
44 Ziynetullah Nevşirvanov (Zenon), “Ethem Nejat Arkadaş” in Burhan Tuğsavul (ed.) Mustafa Suphi ve Yoldaşları, p. 113; Paul Dumont, “Socialisme, Communisme et Mouvement Ouvrier à Istanbul,” p. 300.
45 Refik Nevzat got 7 votes and Sadrettin Celal got none. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 74, footnote: 26.
46 The transcription of this statement has been published by Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt: 2, pp. 427-429.
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TWPSP reacted in a different manner. According to the spokesman of this organization, Numan’s election was a positive development, which demonstrated that a large number of secondary electors had realized the importance of labor movements47.
This affirmative approach to the election of Numan Usta should not come as a surprise. Numan came from the same background as many of the Turkish Spartacists. In the course of World War I, he had stayed in Berlin and joined the Turkish Workers Association (TWA, Türkiye İşçiler Derneği),48 which had been founded by the same socialist circle that had organized the Turkish Worker and Peasant Party49. After this labor union’s center was transferred to Istanbul,50 the TWPSP seized control of its administration. A leading figure of the Turkish socialist movement since Berlin, Sadık Ahi, for example, was actively involved in the TWA.51 In fact, the call for the labor conference that met on October 24 was issued by the TWPSP and TWA together, and workers that had come from Germany constituted the majority of the participants.52
47 A concise summary of this interview has been published by A. Cerrahoğlu, Türkiye’de Sosyalizmin Tarihine Katkı, pp. 358-362. See also “Türkiye Seçimleri,” Kurtuluş, no: 4, 1919, in Rasih Nuri İleri (ed.), Kurtuluş. 1 Mayıs 1919-Şubat 1920, pp. 198-199.
48 SHAT, 20 N 167, carton: 57, file: 2, “Numan Effendi. Député Socialiste,” 23 December 1919
49 Fethi Tevetoğlu. Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler, p. 84; George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 40.
50 The official date of the TWA’s establishment was December 12, 1919. “Türkiye İşçi Derneği,” İfham, 15 December 1919, p. 4.
51 Ibid.
52 İstanbul’da Amele ve İşçinin Hakkını Müdafaa Yolunda İlk İçtima,” İkdam, 25 October 1919, p. 3
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Unified Communist Party
With the military occupation of Istanbul in March 1920, the TWPSP’s activities were interrupted. The British closed the journal Kurtuluş, whose last issue had been published in February, and the Party ceased activity with the constitution of the Damat Ferit Pasha cabinet.53 Afterwards, a large number of socialist activists associated with the TWPSP crossed over to Anatolia. According to Şefik Hüsnü, many of them joined the People’s Socialist Party of Turkey (PSPT).54
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the PSPT was founded in December 1920. The nucleus of this organization was formed by a group of Turkish communists. Their pioneer was Şerif Manatov, who founded the Turkish Bolshevik Communist Party (TBCP) in June 192055, while working with the radical Unionists in the Green Army56. The TBCP constituted the Anatolian branch of the TCO led by Mustafa Suphi.57 The leaders of the TBCP brought the PSPT into existence after the establishment of the so-called official
53 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 49.
54 “Rapport sur la Turqui[e],” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25b, file: 32_36, no: 176.
55 Emel Akal, Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), pp. 97-98. Mete Tunçay abd Erden Akbulut refer to this organization as the (secret) Turkish Communist Party in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 83-86. But I use the name TBCP to distinguish this organization from the so-called Turkish Communist Party.
56 The British viewed Şerif Manatov and his comrade Vakkas Ferit as the “advance guard” of the Green Army. FO, 371/5178, “Political Report. Asia Minor. Affairs in Anatolia,” 12 August 1920, pp. 4-5. For Manatov’s activities in Anatolia and Istanbul, see Emel Akal, Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde İştirakiyuncular, pp. 87-96.
57 Emel Akal shows that the TBCP was attached to the TCO in August 1920. Emel Akal, Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde İştirakiyuncular, p. 129.
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Turkish Communist Party in October. Unlike the TBCP, the PSPT was a legal organization represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The latter drew some of its members from the cadres of the Green Army and the People’s Faction who were not involved in the TBCP.58
On the other hand, the Istanbul Communist Group (ICG) was established in May 1920.59 According to Şefik Hüsnü, this development was initiated by a sizable group of communists working in the TWPSP.60 Facing the pressure and arbitrary policies of the Ottoman and Allied authorities, they went underground and formed the ICG. Although the existence of the TWPSP was maintained, argues Şefik Hüsnü, it was used as a cover for the activities of this secret communist group. In any case, after the TCO’s Istanbul committee, the ICG became the second Turkish communist group operating in the capital. In September 1920, both groups were represented in the First Congress of the Turkish Communist Organizations (Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi) in Baku.
This important congress was initiated by the TCO,61 whose headquarters had been moved to Baku in May 1920.62 Apart from a number of war prisoners, the congress
58 The PSPT’s leader Nazım Bey insistently rejected the accusation about his association with the TBCP. See the registers of his trials in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, c: II, i: 10, 21 March 1921, pp. 14-26.
59 “Rapport du Groupe Communiste de Cons-ple [Constantinople] au 3e Congres de l’International Communiste,” 21 May 1921, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 25a, file: 31_36, No: 538-541. The translation of this report into Turkish has been published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 104-107.
60 “Rapport sur la Turqui[e],” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25b, file: 32_36, no: 176.
61 Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, pp. 208-209.
62 Ibid. p. 85.
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brought together delegates from such cities as Trabzon, Zonguldak, Samsun, Erzurum, and Bayburt.63 There were two individuals who represented the ICG: Ethem Nejat and (Hilmioğlu) Hakkı. They had departed from Istanbul in July to take part in the Second Congress of the Comitern to be held in Moscow in July-August 1920.64 Having been late for this congress, they made it to Baku, where they were accepted as members of the TCO’s central committee. To the Baku congress, they submitted a unanimously accepted proposal for the merge of all the communist groups in Istanbul, Anatolia, and Russia under the roof of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Fırkası).65 This was a crucial step towards the creation of a unified communist movement in Turkey.
On the night of 28-29 January 1921, however, Mustafa Suphi and thirteen of his comrades were killed in Trabzon.66 Upon the permission of the national government in Ankara, this group had stepped in Turkish territories through the Black Sea at the end of December 1921.67 After spending a few weeks in Kars, they set out for Erzurum, where they faced protests provoked by anti-communist circles. Unable to stay there, Suphi and his friends moved to Trabzon, hoping that they would later continue to Ankara. But they were
63 For a list of the delegates, see Emel Seyhan Atasoy and Meral Bayülgen (eds.), Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi, pp. 243-258.
64 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 69-77.
65 “Türkiye’de Komünist Teşkilatlarının Birleşmesi Hakkında Bir Teklif” in Emel Seyhan Atasoy and Meral Bayülgen (eds.), Türkiye İştirakiyun Teşkilatlarının Birinci Kongresi, p. 194.
66 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 80, pp. 340-345; Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, pp. 327-333.
67 Ibid. pp. 288-301.
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treated the same way in this town. They decided to move back to Baku in the end. Yet an armed gang that served one Kahya Yahya (a steward of the boatmen guild in Trabzon) caught their boat on its way to Batumi and killed them all.
Who was, in fact, behind the decision to massacre Suphi and his friends is a question that has not been exhaustively answered yet.68 But it is clear that this massacre was the most dramatic phase of a broader purge that targeted the communist movement. At the beginning of January, the armed forces led by Çerkes Ethem revolted against the Ankara government. The crushing of this revolt was accompanied by the closure of the PSPT. Many of its leaders, including the secretary general Salih Hacıoğlu and the president Mehmet Bey (deputy of Mersin), were arrested.69 The Treaty of Moscow, signed by the Soviet and Ankara governments in March 1921, constituted another step for the elimination of the Turkish communist movement.70 This treaty required the removal of the Turkish Communist Party from Soviet territories. Thereafter, the center of the Party, named the Organization Bureau in April, was moved to Batumi. In December 1921, this bureau was turned into a department of the Georgian Communist Party.
In January 1921, while the liquidation of the Anatolian communism was underway, the ICG’s four leading members went to Ankara: Mehmet Vehbi [Sarıdal], Nafi [Atuf Kansu],
68 For a detailed discussion on this question, see ibid. pp. 338-359.
69 Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, pp. 34-35; For documents about these arrestments, see Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 118-123.
70 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 80-81.
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Servet [Berkin] and Sadık Ahi.71 They developed close relations with the socialists of a Unionist background. The residence of Muhittin Birgen, who had previously identified himself as an enthusiastic supporter of the Representation of Professions program, served as their regular meeting place.72 In May 1921, Muhittin Birgen went to the Caucasus.73 At the end of the year, the Istanbul deputy Numan – who had been kept in Malta as a political exile more than a year and a half – came to Ankara. The Turkish Spartacists, such as Mehmet Vehbi and Nizamettin [Ali Sav], took part in a socialist group with Numan and Tevfik Rüştü, which enjoyed considerable influence in Anatolia over the railway employees, workers of military manufacturing, typographers, and teachers.74
Meanwhile, the communist groups in Istanbul that had participated in the Baku congress remained far from united. Some of the communists associated with the TCO’s Istanbul committee continued to operate for some time under the authority of the
71 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 106. On his way to Ankara with Nazım Hikmet and two other friends, Vala Nurettin run across these figures in İnebolu. He says this happened in January 1921. Vala Nurettin, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1965), pp. 66-68. See also Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, pp. 51-60.
72 Also involved in this circle were young poets Nazım Hikmet and Vala Nurettin, who later became the prominent figures of Turkish communism. Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, p. 55.
73 Zeki Arıkan, Tarihimiz ve Cumhuriyet. Muhittin Birgen, p. 39. Nazım Hikmet followed him in September. Mahmut Goloğlu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – IV, p. 56
74 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut have published a series of documents providing insights about this group’s activities in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 207, 223, 267. See particularly the report titled “An Awakening in Anatolia in the Area of Professions,” (Anadolu’da Mesleki Alanda Uyanış) which provides details about the prevailing conditions of labor organizations and political movements controlling them. Ibid. pp. 267-270.
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Organization Bureau in Batumi.75 By the middle of 1922, this group had completely ceased to exist, whereas the ICG had survived, drawing new members from other communist circles in Istanbul. In June 1921, the members of this organization led by Şefik Hüsnü began publishing the journal Aydınlık (Clarté), which soon turned out to be the ideological and intellectual pioneer of Turkish communism.76 From the early months of 1922 onwards, the ICG, also known as the Aydınlık group, became an important actor of labor politics.
Communists and the Labor Movement
During the armistice period, Istanbul witnessed the largest wave of labor mobilization since the rise of a series of strike movements just after the Constitutional Revolution in July 1908.77 At least 18 strike actions took place in the capital between the years 1918 and 1923.78 At the same time, there was a general trend of unionization among the workers employed in the diverse sectors of the economy.79 The Turkish Socialist Party (TSP) was the organization that led the majority of the unionization and strike movements in Istanbul
75 See the reports sent from Istanbul to the Organization Bureau in September-October 1921, in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 91-99.
76 Paul Dumont, “Aux Origines du Mouvement Communiste Turc. Le Groupe ‘Clarté’ d’Istanbul,” p. 208.
77 Yavuz Selim Karakışla, “The 1908 Strike Wave in the Ottoman Empire,” The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, vol: XVI, no: 2, September 1992, pp. 153-177; Hakkı Onur, “1908 İşçi Hareketleri ve Jön Türkler,” Yurt ve Dünya, March 1977, pp. 277-295
78 M. Şehmus Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi, 1908-1984, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), pp. 110-113.
79 For a concise discussion on the labor unions of this period, see Lütfü Erişçi, “Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfının Tarihi” in Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2003), pp. 89-114.
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under occupation.80 The president of this organization was the famous socialist leader Hüseyin Hilmi, who is also known by his pseudonym İştirakçı (Solidarist).81
Hüseyin Hilmi lost control of the TSP due to a strike movement in the Tramway Company in 1922. Towards the end of this movement, he was arrested for sabotaging the Company’s electric cables in the Beyazıt area.82 According to a revision made in the organization’s bylaws in October 1920, Hüseyin Hilmi was the organization’s permanent, unchangeable (değişmez) president.83 But the congress convened on March 9, 1922, modified this specific article for the constitution of a new administrative board for the TSP.84 Thanks to this modification, Şakir Rasim was elected new president of the Party in the congress.85
80 Oya Sencer, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı, (İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1969), pp. 271-276. According to the Comintern representative Magdeleine Marx, 8,000 workers were organized under the TSP, Magdeleine Marx, İstanbul 1921– Ankara 1922: Makaleler Anılar, (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2007), p. 46. In April 1921, the contemporary newspaper Alemdar reports that the number of the TSP members increased to 17,000, cited by M. Şehmus Güzel in Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi (Yazılar-Belgeler), (İstanbul: Sosyalist Yayınlar, 1993), p. 104.
81 Foti Benlisoy and Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Erken Dönem Müslüman/Türk Sosyalizmi ve İştirakçi Hilmi” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Sol Düşünce, ed. by Murat Gültekingil, vol: VIII, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 165-183
82 Paul Dumont, “les Organisations Socialistes et la Propagande Communiste à Istanbul,” p. 291. Also arrested were Emin Mehmet, Kenan Nuri, Salih Yusuf and İbrahim Mahir. BOA, DH.KMS, 61-2/63, 07 June 1922.
83 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Volume 1, p. 401.
84 “Amele Kongresi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 10 March 1922, pp. 1-2. According to this news item, the TSP’s new board of administration consisted of the following names. President: Sakir Rasim; Vice-President: İstavri (Silahdarağa Factory); General Delegate (Murahhas-ı Umumi): Rıza Bey (Şirket-i Hayriye); Secretary: Süleyman Bey; Cashier: Nuri Bey; Members: Kenan, Mehmed, Cemal Beys.
85 Ibid.
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According to a report by the French intelligence service, Şakir Rasim was a former Unionist expelled from the military academy before the Constitutional Revolution due to his political engagements.86 He began working for the Tramway Company in 1914. In April 1916, Şakir Rasim was one of the three Muslims among 22 employees who held administrative positions within the company’s department of operations, and the only Muslim working as a manager of one of the company’s 3 tram depots, which was in the Aksaray area.87 By the time Hüseyin Hilmi was arrested, Şakir Rasim had been the TSP’s vice-president since, at least, October 1921.88
Compared to the TSP, the ICG’s influence over the organized labor movement was very limited during much of the armistice period.89 The ICG’s members were active particularly in the Turkish Workers Association (TWA). Yet this labor union founded in Berlin by the Turkish Spartacists ceased activity after the Allied occupation in March 1920. Although the TWA was revived in the spring of 1921, this union incorporated no more than several hundred workers employed in the state factories.90
86 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 94, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 156. Mete Tunçay published the Turkish translation of another French report that provides details about Şakir Rasim’s background and his dismissal from the military academy. Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, pp. 12-13.
87 BCA, 230.87.17.2, 18 April 1916.
88 Of the documents I have come across so far, the earliest one speaking of Şakir Rasim as the TSP’s vice-president is SHAT, 20 N 1106, Carton: 38/4, File: 1, “Note de la Reunion concernant la Greve des Tramways à Constantinople, tenue au Q. G. des Forces Allies d’Occupation,” 8 October 1921.
89 See the reports of the group providing information on this subject in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 110-116.
90 “Türkiye İşçi Derneği,” Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi, vol: 3, pp. 387-388.
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The ICG became much more active in labor politics with the removal of Hüseyin Hilmi from the administration of the TSP. Thereafter, the members of the communist organization intensified their propaganda activities among the tram workers and the employees of the Electric Company.91 The workers mobilized by the TSP, especially the tramwaymen, formed by far the largest group in the May Day demonstration of 1922.92 The ICG distributed a flyer in this meeting, which referred to how the workers had been repeatedly betrayed thus far, calling for the constitution of a “red syndicate” to be associated with the Communist International.93 During the first half of 1922, the ICG acquired some degree of influence on the tram and electric workers.94 It also developed close relations with the TSP’s new leaders who were in search for allies in the labor movement.95
91 TİTE, 48/27, 01 June 1922. See also “the Report of the Istanbul Communist Group” in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 190.
92 The May Day meeting took place in Kağıthane. According to the French authorities in Istanbul, there were 3,500-4,000 workers present in the meeting. 3,500 of them were the TSP members. Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 24. An article published in Ziya, on the other hand, estimates the total number of participants 5,000-6,000. Mete Tunçay, BKP’nin Yayın Organı Ziya, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2009), p. 38.
93 BOA, DH.KMS, 61-2/62, 1340.N.10, “Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesine,” 7 May 1922. An original copy of the flyer distributed in the meeting is attached to this file.
94 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 190,192.
95 See the ICG’s quarterly report submitted to the headquarters of the Communist International on June 2, 1922, in ibid. p. 181.
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In June 1922, Hüseyin Hilmi was released from prison.96 By the middle of this month, he was restored as the president of the TSP with the approval of the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior.97 On June 12, Şakir Rasim broke away from the TSP, and formed the Independent Socialist Party (Müstakil Sosyalist Fırkası, hereafter ISP).98 He succeeded in carrying a large number of tram workers to the new organization. According to one estimate, there were some 1,000 tram workers involved in the ISP at that time.99 The ICG leaders called all communist sympathizers to join the new party, hoping to conquer it from within.100 Meanwhile, another communist group associated with the International Union of Workers (Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı) was conducting propaganda among the tram workers.
96 Paul Dumont, “les Organisations Socialistes et la Propagande Communiste à Istanbul,” p. 293.
97 “Sosyalist Fırkası,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 12 June 1922, p. 3; “Sosyalist Fırkası,” Akşam, 14 June 1922, p. 3. The takeover happened after the police department approved it on June 16, “Sosyalist Fırkası Riyaseti ve Hilmi Efendi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 15 June 1922, p. 3.
98 For the split of TSP, see Paul Dumont, “les Organisations Socialistes et la Propagande Communiste à Istanbul,” p. 293. See also “Müstakil Amele Fırkası,” Akşam, 13 June 1922, p. 2; “Amele Cereyanları,” İleri, 5 July 1922, p. 2.
99 “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, pp. 361-365, for information on ISP, p. 362. Information that 1,000 tram workers got affiliated with ISP seems exaggerated. According to another source, a greater majority of the tram workers detached themselves from any organization or union existed. “Şehrimizde Amele Hareketleri,” Aydınlık, 20 July 1922, no: 7, p. 199.
100 This concern was expressed as follows: ““the mission of the workers of Istanbul is to turn this party [ISP] into a real worker-communist party under their own administration and control.” “Müstakil Sosyalist Fırkası,” Ziya, 20 December 1922, no: 7, published by Mete Tunçay in BKP’nin Yayın Organı Ziya, p. 60
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International Union of Workers (IUW)
The IUW was founded in May 1920.101 It was an organization dominated largely by labor activists from the non-Muslim communities of Istanbul. In August 1922, the IUW reportedly had 135 activists.102 120 of them were Greeks, and the others consisted of Armenians, Jews and Turks. Of the IUW’s founders, Roland Ginsberg was an Ottoman Jew, who, according to George Harris, brought into existence a communist cell in October 1918.103 Originated from a Greek family of Istanbul, Sarafim Maksimos was another figure engaged in this early enterprise before becoming one of the IUW’s leading members. The IUW published the journal Neos Antrepos in Greek. It was associated with the international communist movement through the Profintern (the Red International of Labor Unions) in
101 Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 25. The IUW’s predecessor was a union of labor associations that had operated in Istanbul before the outbreak of World War I: the Union of Dersaadet Worker Associations. For more information on this union, see Orhan Silier, “Dersaadet Amele Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” Tarih ve Toplum, no: 79, July 1990, pp. 24-30. This article has been reprinted by Mete Tunçay in Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 144-152, document no: 7.
102 “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” 11 August 1922, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, no. 361-365. It was Kazım of Van who wrote this report, which was then translated into Russian. The Turkish translation of this report in Russian is published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 198-202.
103 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 36. Among other studies referring to this early communist circle are Radmir Platonovich Korniyenko, The Labor Movement in Turkey (1918-1963), (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1965) translated from Russian and published by U.S. Department of Commerce, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, Joint Publication Research Service, 1967, pp. 11-12; S. Üstüngel [İsmail Bilen], TKP. Doğuşu, Kuruluşu, Gelişme Yolları, (İstanbul: Alev Yayınları, 2004), pp. 8-10. İsmail Bilen does not mention the name of Ginsberg among the activists of this communists cell.
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Moscow as well as the Communist Federation of Balkans led by Georgi Dimitrov from Sofia.104
The IUW initiated the founding of three separate labor unions. The largest of them was the International Union of Construction Workers (Beynelmilel Bina İşçileri İttihadı), which had 7 branches in Istanbul.105 In August 1922, there were reportedly 2,500 workers associated with this syndicate.106 The great majority of these workers were Greeks. There were around 200 Armenians, Turks, and Jews in total. The International Union of Maritime Workers (Beynelmilel Deniz İşçileri İttihadı) had some 1,000 members. They consisted of approximately 800 Greeks and 200 Turks. The third syndicate controlled by the IUW was the International Union of Carpenters (Beynelmilel Sanayi-i Haşebiye İşçileri İttihadı). Of its 200 members, 160 were Greeks and the rest were Armenians and Turks.
On the other hand, the IUW’s members worked within the other labor associations to spread revolutionary ideas, recruit new members and struggle against reformist tendencies in the labor movement.107 The union of the tram and funicular workers was one
104 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, pp. 97-98. The IUW decided to join the Profintern and the Balkan Federation in February 1921. For the documents of this decision, see Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, pp. 32-35. For relations between the Profintern and the Communist Federation of Balkans, see also Dimitar Mladenov, “L’Activité de Georgi Dimitrov pour l’Union des Mouvements Révolutionnaires et Syndicaux dans les Balkans,” Etudes Balkaniques, no: 1, 1970, pp. 77-82.
105 These branches were located in 7 districts: Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş, Ortaköy, Balat, Unkapanı, Kadıköy, Langa (Yenikapı). “İstanbul Amele Havadisleri. Beynelmilel Bina İşçileri İttihadı Kongresi,” Aydınlık, no: 14, April 1923, p. 375.
106 “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” 11 August 1922, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, p. 364.
107 All members of the organization were required to work in labor associations. As a rule, however, they were supposed to stay out of the administrations of such organizations until
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of such organizations in which they operated. The IUW had a considerable number of members who advocated a militant course of action within this union attached to the TSP.108 Also the IUW began cooperating with the administration of the Socialist Party after Şakir Rasim replaced Hüseyin Hilmi in March 1922.109 In June, the IUW and TSP organized a common campaign against the decision of the Ottoman ministry of the interior to bring Hüseyin Hilmi back to head of the Socialist Party.110 When this campaign failed to produce any result, the IUW collaborated with Şakir Rasim in the establishment of the Independent Socialist Party (ISP).111
It is clear that the communists played an important part in the rise of the ISP as a new labor organization that rivaled the TSP. The members of both the IUW and the ICG
transforming them in accordance with the IUW’s communist-syndicalist program. Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 32, 47.
108 In August 1921, Ginsberg estimates this number as 25. But later he revises this estimate as 73 (with 50 full members and 23 candidates). Ibid. pp. 48-55.
109 This alliance became so manifest that Sarafim Maksimos and Şakir Rasim participated together in the elections of the tram workers’ representatives that occurred in the Şişli tram depot on May 7, 1922. According to an informant working for the French intelligence service, both gave speeches about socialism and the working class. “Compte-Rendu. Elections dans le Personnel des Tramways,” SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 2, 12 May 1922. According to a report prepared most likely by Ginsberg in 1924, the IUW’s members even took part in the TSP’s administration, particularly in a committee of supervision that had more authority than the president and the central committee in some respects. Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 127. Indeed, there was a separate committee selected in TSP’s congress in March 1922. The members of this committee were Mehmet Cemal, Mehmet Ali, Süleyman, Nuri, Mehmet Behiç, Hüseyin Avni, Burhanettin and Murat Beys and Maraşlıyan Efendi. “Amele Kongresi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 10 March 1922, pp. 1-2.
110 For the documents of this campaign, see Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 172-174.
111 “Amele Cereyanları,” İleri, 5 July 1922, p. 3. This news item speaks of Şakir Rasim’s collaboration in this process with the “party of Greeks,” i.e. the IUW.
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joined the new Party. At the same time, all these organizations – the IUW, the ICG, and the ISP – were engaged in an effort to construct a broader confederation to bring together all the labor associations in Istanbul.
Towards a Labor Confederation
The call for the establishment of a labor confederation was made by the Turkish Worker Association (TWA) – which was controlled by the ICG – on July 15, 1922.112 There were several organizations that attended the first meeting on July 21.113 Among them were the Armenian Social Democrat Party (Hunchakian Party), the Independent Socialist Party (ISP), and the Association of Ottoman Typographers (Mürettibin-i Osmaniye Cemiyeti). The IUW and the syndicates associated with it took part in this meeting as well, dominating the enterprise from the outset.
By the time of this meeting, there had emerged a factional conflict within the IUW. Şefik Hüsnü provides a detailed account of this conflict in a report he addressed to the Comintern’s Eastern Section on July 9.114 According to this report, an opposition group led by Roland Ginsberg enforced the IUW’s president Sarafim Maksimos to resign in May. Ginsberg would later speak of this conflict as a power struggle between an anarcho-
112 See Şefik Hüsnü’s report referring to this initiative in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 194-195.
113 “İşçi Teşkilatlarını Tevhid Konferansı,” Aydınlık, no: 8, 20 August 1922, pp. 218-219.
114 “The Report of the Istanbul Communist Group,” Ibid. pp. 188-194
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syndicalist tendency represented by Maksimos and a communist group led by himself.115 Another report written in December 1922 by one Altukatyan, who was an agent of the Comintern, indicates that Mustafa Kazım was among the founders of the communist nucleus that emerged within the IUW in May 1922.116
Mustafa Kazım (Kip), also known as Kazım of Van, is an intriguing figure of Turkish communism. During World War I, he stayed in Paris as a student of a technical school, and worked with Dr. Refik Nevzat in the TSP’s Paris bureau.117 After turning back to Istanbul, Kazım engaged himself with both the TSP and IUW. Around September 1920, he fled to Moscow because he was being searched by the British for distributing communist leaflets.118 In his memoirs, Kazım mentions, without giving much detail, that he met Mustafa Suphi and his friends in Moscow. When he returned to Istanbul, adds Kazım, he got in touch with the group of Şefik Hüsnü, while working in the IUW at the same time119.
Ginsberg and Kazım seem to have gathered around themselves an enlarging group of communist activists from May 1922 onwards. According to a representative of the
115 These are the terms by which Ginsberg speaks of his rivalry with Maksimos in a report titled “a Brief Look at the Turkish Labor Movement”. Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 135.
116 According to Altukatyan, the other founders were Dayaş and Bedrosyan, of whom we have no information. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 244.
117 M. Kazım Kip (Vanlı Kazım), Anılarım, published in Erden Akbulut (ed.), Milli Azadlık Savaşı Anıları, pp. 79-94.
118 “La Situation Politique à Constantinople,” AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 94, carton: 308, dossier: 1, pp. 154-158. This report written on November 13, 1920, notes that “Kiazim (Kurde ou Arabe) qui a travaille à Paris et est parti il y a 3 mois à Moscou,” p. 157.
119 M. Kazım Kip (Vanlı Kazım), Anılarım, p. 87-88.
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Comintern’s Eastern Section in Istanbul, Mehmet Kalakov,120 this narrow group that operated within the IUW had some 30 members in September.121 According to Altukatyan’s report dating from December 1922, on the other hand, the same group had 60 members, which consisted of an Armenian majority (36 members) as well as Jews (9), Greeks (7), and Turks. Regardless of its size, it was this faction that seized control of the IUW’s administration after the resigning of Maksimos, which did not lead to any major secession from the organization.122
The same faction enjoyed considerable authority over the initiative that aimed to build a labor confederation in Istanbul. Kazım took part in this enterprise as a delegate of the IUW. He was then made secretary general of a commission of ten members, whose mission was to form the center of the labor confederation to be established.123 There were seven organizations represented in this commission.124 Aside from the IUW, two of them were associated closely with the group led by Kazım and Ginsberg: the International Union of Maritime Workers and the Independent Socialist Party. The former union had been
120 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 198.
121 See Kalakov’s report, titled “Political and Economic Situation in Istanbul in the Period 1 June – 1 September 1922,” 17 September 1922 in ibid. pp. 207-210.
122 Ibid. p. 191.
123 “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” 11 August 1922, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, p. 365.
124 These were TWA, ISP, the IUW, the Armenian Social Democrat Party, the International Union of Maritime Workers, the Association of Ottoman Typographers, and the International Union of Carpenters. Ibid. p. 364.
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founded directly by the communist group in question.125 The members of the same group were operating among the tram workers as well.126
Şefik Hüsnü and his friends in the ICG never trusted Ginsberg from the outset.127 They accused Ginsberg of sabotaging the labor confederation.128 The competition between the two groups became all the more intense right before the simultaneously held congresses of the Profintern and the Comintern in November-December 1922. The leaders of both the IUW and the ICG urged to be recognized by these international organizations as the legitimate representative of the communist movement in Istanbul.129 This struggle became so aggressive that a member of the ICG blamed Kazım of Van for collaborating with the “adventurists of worst sort,” above all Hüseyin Hilmi and his successor Şakir Rasim, and
125 According to Kalakov, it was Kazım’s group that founded this union of sailors. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 198. This happened sometime after Kalakov’s appointment to Istanbul as a delegate of the Communist International on May 20, 1922, and certainly before the first meeting for the confederation on July 21. According to the French, this union, whose secretary general was one Axiopoulos, had only 200 members of all nationalities in August 1922. There was communist propaganda conducted among these workers under the cover of socialism. “Renseignement, 18 Août 1922,” AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 97, carton: 308, dossier: 1, 2 October 1922, p. 162.
126 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 208. See also TİTE, 48/27, 1 June 1922. This intelligence report speaks of Armenian and Turkish communists operating among the tram workers.
127 As early as June 1922, Şefik Hüsnü made it clear that he found Ginsberg’s group unreliable. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 193.
128 Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, pp. 85-86.
129 For some of the documents concerned with this competition, see ibid. pp. 80-91.
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for supporting a candidate of the Second International to prevent the election of a communist as president of the tram workers’ union.130
Kemalist-Communists and Mim-Mim
The Turkish resistance movement developed informal relations with the communists and the labor movement through a radical group of activists, one of whose main leaders was Mehmet of Hemşin. There is little information about the background of this intriguing character. İsmail Bilen, the secretary-general of the Turkish Communist Party in the 1970s, was his cousin. A short biography of Bilen’s political life provides some clues about Mehmet of Hemşin, also known as Mehmet Aruz, Baba (Father) Mehmet, or Bolshevik Mehmet.131 It suggests that Mehmet joined the October Revolution in Russia, became a member of the Bolshevik Party, and then went to Istanbul at the head of the communists dispatched by Mustafa Suphi.132 If this narrative is correct, Mehmet was a member of the communist cell formed in June 1919 by a narrow group that had come from Crimea.133
One year later, Mehmet figured among the agents that constituted the first cadre of the Mim-Mim group.134 It needs to be remembered at this point that the Mim-Mim was an
130 All these claims were raised by Sadrettin Celal in a report submitted to the Comintern’s executive bureau. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 245-246.
131 TKP MK Sekreteri İsmail Bilen. Kısa Biyografi, (İstanbul TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2004). This biography was published between October 1977 and May 1978 in the journal Yeni Çağ.
132 Ibid. p. 10.
133 See Chapter 4, footnotes 9 and 10. This group formed the nucleus of the Istanbul committee of Mustafa Suphi’s communist organization.
134 TİTE, 34/8, 15 June 1921.
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intelligence group operating under the direct authority of the General Staff presided over by Fevzi Pasha. This group was linked to the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff, whose chief was Hüsamettin Ertürk. In his memoirs, Hüsamettin Ertürk notes that Mehmet provided the group with intelligence on communist activities.135 This statement is confirmed by other sources. In the second half of 1923, the Interior Minister Ali Fethi Bey started an investigation about several Mim-Mim members, including Mehmet of Hemşin, accusing them of collaborating with communists.136 The group did not reject Mehmet’s connections brought up by Ali Fethi, but justified them as part of intelligence work Mehmet had performed as a Mim-Mim agent.137
These sources give the impression that Mehmet of Hemşin was simply a nationalist spy infiltrated into the communist movement. Yet this view contradicts how he is presented by some of the communist-socialist literature. The aforementioned biography of İsmail Bilen, for example, portrays Mehmet as a communist militant who struggled against the imperialists that invaded the country.138 For Mihri Belli – a prominent ideologue of the revolutionary youth movement in the 1960s and 70s – Baba Mehmet was a communist patriot who fought at the forefront of the struggle for national independence with the
135 Samih Nafiz Tansu (ed.), İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 279.
136 “İstanbul Vilayetine,” TİTE, 70/3.
137 “Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaset-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/3, 21 July 1923. Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi Müşir Fevzi’den Dahiliye Vekalet-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/7, 15 August 1923
138 TKP MK Sekreteri İsmail Bilen, pp. 10, 13-15. Likewise, Mihri Belli, the prominent ideologue of the revolutionary youth movement of the 60s and 70s, speaks of Baba Mehmet as someone who urged the transformation of the independence movement into a social revolution.
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expectation of a social revolution.139 In any case, Mehmet was involved in the resistance long before Mim-Mim. He was the one who helped Kazım of Van escape from Istanbul around September 1920.140 Kazım narrates in his memoirs how Mehmet of Topkapı – who later became chief of the Mim-Mim group – introduced him to Mehmet of Hemşin at that time.141 Mehmet of Topkapı and Mehmet of Hemşin stayed in touch as friends and comrades for a long time.142
Mehmet of Hemşin was surrounded by a group of activists while operating as an agent of the Mim-Mim group. He was a steward of bargemen,143 and this is probably why he had great prestige over the bargemen of a Laz origin, many of who were from the Hemşin/Rize area of the Black Sea region.144 Mahmut of Hemşin, Abdullah of Hemşin, Captain Tahsin, Captain Ahmet, and Captain Osman constituted the immediate circle
139 Mihri Belli, Mihri Belli’nin Anıları: İnsanları Tanıdım, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1989), p. 19
140 “La Situation Politique à Constantinople,” AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 94, carton: 308, dossier: 1, pp. 154-158.
141 Mehmet of Topkapı figures in Kazım’s memoirs as head of the committee of national defense (Milli Mücadele Komitesi). M. Kazım Kip (Vanlı Kazım), Anılarım, pp. 85.
142 See Mehmet of Hemşin’s letter to Mehmet of Topkapı, praising their comradeship in the Mim-Mim group and common service to the Turkish national struggle. TİTE, 70/29, 2 May 1924.
143 “Relations Turco-Communistes de Constantinople avec Angora,” SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 1, June 1921 – July 1922, p. 3. According to this report, Mehmet was the chief of bargemen at Haliç (Golden Horne). Hüsnü Himmetoğlu counts one Mehmet Efendi as the chief of the association of bargemen as a whole, but it is not clear if that is the same person. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 2, p. 286.
144 Mehmet’s influence on the Lazs was highlighted in the aforementioned correspondences between Istanbul and Ankara. “İstanbul Vilayetine,” TİTE, 70/3; “Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaset-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/3, 21 July 1923.
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around Baba Mehmet.145 The reports of the French authorities refer to this group as Kemalist-communists146and imply that this category was larger than the bargemen led by Mehmet of Hemşin. These reports mention several other Kemalist-communist cells, such as the group of Ali Bey in Beykoz, the group of Kara Mehmet, and the group of Hasan, who was a bargeman in Beykoz.147 It was claimed that all these groups were receiving orders directly from Ankara.148
The available sources do not provide much information about the Kemalist-communists. The president of the IUW, Serafim Maksimos spoke of them in his letter to Georgi Dimitrov in August 1921.149 Maksimos highlighted in this letter that many of the “Kemalist-communists of Ankara production” were pure nationalists and liberals and their number was increasing every passing day. This observation confirms, to some extent, the
145 In addition to the TİTE documents cited in the previous footnote, see also “Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi Müşir Fevzi’den Dahiliye Vekalet-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/7, 15 August 1923; and Samih Nafiz Tansu (ed.), İki Devrin Perde Arkası, p. 279.
146 See, for example, “Relations Turco-Communistes de Constantinople avec Angora” and “Aperçu sur les Comité Communiste de Constantinople et sur ses Liaisons” SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 1, June 1921 – July 1922. One of the reports holds that the foundations of the Kemalist-communist cells were laid in February 1922 by a resistance group working for Ankara. This claim was raised by a report dating from August 26, 1921. It is available in SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 1, June 1921 – July 1922. This report is cited by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 37, footnote: 61 with reference to the dissertation of Nur Bilge Criss, who is the author of İstanbul under Allied Occupation.
147 “Aperçu sur les Comité Communiste de Constantinople et sur ses Liaisons”. SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 1, June 1921 – July 1922.
148 The group of Ali Bey was supposed to keep them in touch with Ankara through the assistance of Mehmet of Hemşin and his friends. “Relations Turco-Communistes de Constantinople avec Angora”. SHAT, 20 N 1106, carton: 38/4, file: 1, June 1921 – July 1922.
149 Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 38.
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French reports that referred to an underground network of Kemalist-communist cells although we are still far from understanding the composition and structure of these cells.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Mehmet of Hemşin and his friends worked with the communists, which was why they were subject to an investigation in 1923. The correspondences over this investigation indicate that (Baytar) Ali Cevdet was one of the communists who had relations with the Mim-Mim group.150 Ali Cevdet, who used the pseudonym Fahri, was not only an ICG member but also the secretary general of its youth organization, the Union of Turkish Communist Youths (UTCY).151 If we believe the documents in question, his house around the Hırka-i Şerif mosque in the Fatih area, as well as that of the apprentice pharmacist Galip Efendi, who was also a member of the UTCY,152 became the major centers for the communists’ meetings. Among those who regularly frequented the meetings were several judges as well as a group of Laz boatmen, including Mahmut of Hemşin, Captain Ahmet, and Captain Osman, who were Mehmet of Hemşin’s comrades in the Mim-Mim group.
Furthermore, Mehmet of Hemşin seems to have developed ties with the initiative that aimed to establish a labor confederation in Istanbul. One of our sources about this
150 İstanbul Vilayetine,” TİTE, 70/3; “Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaset-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/3, 21 July 1923; “Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi Müşir Fevzi’den Dahiliye Vekalet-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/7, 15 August 1923.
151 For detailed information on the establishment and activities of this communist youth organization, see Fahri’s report in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 117-122.
152 Galip was one of the communists arrested in the aftermath of the May Day in 1923. “Komünistler Yakalanıyor,” Tanin, 4 May 1923, p. 3; “Komünistlik,” Tanin, 6 May 1923.
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enterprise is a report signed by Kazım of Van (as Faruk Asri) on August 11, 1922.153 In their comprehensive research on the Aydınlık group, Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut provide a copy of this report translated into Russian most likely for the Comintern’s Fourth Congress.154 This translation was made by Mehmet Kalakov, a representative of the Comintern in Istanbul, and approved by Mehmet Aruzov, that is, Mehmet of Hemşin or Baba Mehmet. A copy of the same document with minor differences also exists at the Institute for the History of the Turkish Revolution Archives (TİTE) among the documents that belonged to Mehmet of Topkapı.155 It was, again, Kazım of Van who signed this report about two weeks later than it had been originally written.
However, the involvement of the Mim-Mim group did not save the labor movement from the Istanbul police. In October 1922, the police shut down both the IUW and the TWA, thus preventing their efforts to constitute a labor confederation.156 Some of the organizations’ executives were arrested while several communist leaders, like Ginsberg, Maksimos, and Sadrettin Celal, had to flee abroad.157 What needs to be highlighted here is
153 “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” 11 August 1922, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, no. 361-365.
154 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 198-202.
155 “İstanbul İşçi ve Sosyalist Teşkilatları Hal-i Hazır Hazır Harekatı,” TİTE, 61/46, 24 August 1922.
156 “İstanbul İşçi Teşkilatlarının Kapatılması,” Aydınlık, no: 10, 1 November 1922, p. 270.
157 For more information on these developments, see Paul Dumont, “Socialisme et Mouvement Ouvrier en Turquie au Lendemain de l’Armistice de Mudanya” in Du Socialisme Ottoman à l’Internationalisme Anotolien, (Istanbul: lSIS, 1997), pp. 387-388; George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, p. 119. Harris argues that it was the Allied authorities that carried out this operation against communists, but this is not true.
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that the chief of the Istanbul police forces was Esat Bey, the president of the National Defense organization. By the time the Istanbul police cracked down on the communists and the labor unions they controlled, the Mim-Mim members had been engaged in opposition to Esat Bey’s authority in the resistance movement. To explain the degree to which this antagonism affected the closure of the labor unions in Istanbul, we first need to look at the changing balance of power in Ankara.
Power and Opposition in Ankara
In the aftermath of the Turkish victory over a major Greek offensive in September 1921, the Ankara-Soviet relations reached the highest point.158 On October 13, the Ankara government signed the Kars Treaty with the Soviet Governments of Transcaucasia, i.e. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.159 A day before this development, İbrahim Ebilov had arrived in Ankara at the head of the Azerbaijani Soviet Government’s diplomatic mission.160 On December 13, Mikhael Frunze, a representative of the Ukrainian Soviet government, visited Ankara. On January 2, 1922, he signed a treaty of friendship with the Turkish
158 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 169.
159 Mehmet Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri (Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle), (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), pp. 112-113.
160 Ibid. pp. 110-111. For more information on Ebilov’s political and diplomatic roles in Ankara, see Betül Aslan, Türkiye Azerbaycan İlişkileri ve İbrahim Ebilov, 1920-1923, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2004).
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government.161 On January 26, Semyen İvanoviç Aralov reached Ankara as the official ambassador of Moscow.162
The rapprochement with the Soviets was accompanied by the revival of the Turkish communist movement in Anatolia. In September 1921, the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued an amnesty to free the communists arrested in the past January. This decision had a great deal to do with the Ankara government’s intention to consolidate its alliance with the Soviets, whose financial and military support was still crucial for maintaining the national struggle against the Greek invasion.163 In March 1922, after a period of caution, the communist leaders founded the People’s Socialist Party of Turkey (PSPT) for the second time.164 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut’s comprehensive research over this organization shows that the Soviet Ambassador Aralov and the Comintern representative Golman played an active role in the PSPT’s revival.165
By July 1922, the communists had greatly increased their prestige and political influence in Ankara. During April and May 1922, the PSPT leaders engaged in an effort to form a coalition with the socialist and populist groups within the national movement.166
161 Mehmet Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri, pp. 114-122.
162 Ibid. pp. 130-132.
163 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 169-170.
164 For the reorganization of the PSPT, see the report by Salih Hacıoğlu, ibid. pp. 179-180.
165 See, for example, Golman’s report dated April 9, 1922, ibid. pp. 195-196.
166 Ibid. p. 275.
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Golman was very active in this process.167 He planned to bring into existence a more radical, pro-Soviet platform than the Defense of National Rights Group.168 This strategy yielded some results with the populist group in the National Assembly, i.e. the People’s Faction, which seems to have lost much of its vigor since the beginning of 1921. In July, this group began publishing a journal named Şarkın Sesi (Sound of the East) with funds provided by the communists.169
Likewise, the leaders of the national movement were more inclined than ever to cooperate with the communists during the same period. This was true especially for the socialist group led by the Istanbul deputy Numan Usta, the Menteşe deputy Tevfik Rüştü, and Mehmet Vehbi, the general director of commerce at the Ministry of Economy.170 Numan and Tevfi Rüştü were members of the Defense of National Rights Group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.171 On March 18, 1922, the socialists participated in a reception at the Russian Embassy for the anniversary of the Paris Commune, which hosted
167 See the report Golman sent to the Comintern’s Executive Bureau on May 28, published in ibid. pp. 202-208. This report shows that Golman himself carried out some of the negotiations with the populist and socialist leaders for convincing them to form a common platform with the Turkish communists. Ibid. p. 207. On the other hand, a reception given in the Soviet Embassy on March 18, 1922, for the anniversary of the Paris Commune hosted the communist, populist and socialist deputies at the same time. Ibid. p. 181. For this reception as well as the character of relations between the Soviet mission and the PSPT, see also George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, pp. 110-111.
168 See the same report of Golman cited above, Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 207.
169 Ibid. pp. 224-227, 275. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 615-616; document no: 1.
170 Mete Tunçay indicates that it was the “socialist” minister Mahmut Celal (Bayar) who appointed him to this important position. Ibid. p. 722, footnote: 2.
171 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet. İkinci Grup, pp. 120-124.
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a group of communist as well as populist deputies.172 The socialists were also present at the Labor Day celebrations of 1922 alongside the Soviet ambassadors Aralov and İbrahim Ebilov.173
Yet this political atmosphere rapidly changed with the establishment of the Second Group of the Defense of National Rights in July. Of more than 330 deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly,174 only around 60 joined the Second Group.175 But the opposition was able to mobilize a larger body in parliament, as it became clear during the discussions on a law proposal that concerned the election of cabinet members. The Second Group’s leaders had persuaded the majority in parliament for the modification of the prevailing law that granted Mustafa Kemal – the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly – the right to nominate a list of candidates for any vacant ministry. The new system allowed the deputies to choose between self-designated candidates based on secret ballot and simple majority.176
In July 1922, Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay) was elected Prime Minister in place of Fevzi Çakmak. Having been banished to Malta after the Allied authorities had formally occupied
172 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 207.
173 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 464-466, document no: 10.
174 For a discussion on the number of deputies in the first Turkish National Assembly, see Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet. İkinci Grup, pp. 86-90.
175 In his comprehensive study, Ahmet Demirel extensively discusses the number of deputies involved in the First and Second Groups with reference to different sources at hand. Demirel pays attention particularly to the list of the Second Group’s members provided by Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş) in an interview published by Tevhid-i Efkar on April 30, 1923. Ibid. pp. 109-128.
176 Ibid. pp. 410-418.
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Istanbul, Rauf had joined the Turkish Grand National Assembly towards the end of 1921. He was neither a member of the Second Group nor part of the inner circle that controlled the First Group.177 According to Kılıç Ali, Rauf was inclined to the opposition although he never broke away from the First Group.178 Kılıç Ali was not the only one who observed this association. On the day of the cabinet reshuffle, the British envoy Nevile Henderson sent a report to London in which he pointed to the ongoing tension between Rauf and Mustafa Kemal.179 Like an earlier British report,180 Henderson traced the roots of this tension back to a quarrel between the two leaders, which had caused Rauf to resign from the Ministry of Public-Works in January 1922.181
Mustafa Kemal had little influence over the constitution of the new cabinet under Rauf Bey. Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) and Kazım (Özalp) Pashas indicate in their memoirs that the Second Group voted for Rauf’s election as Prime Minister.182 This seems to be true given
177 As discussed earlier in Chapter IV, footnote 53, it was a narrow group named the Committee of Public Safety that controlled the First Group. For more information on this committee, see ibid. pp. 381-391. Hulusi Turgut (ed.), Atatürk’ün Sırdaşı Kılıç Ali’nin Hatıraları, pp. 180-181.
178 Ibid. pp. 172-178.
179 FO, 371/7868, Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour – (Received July 24.), Constantinople, July 18, 1922.
180 FO, 371/7881, Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston – (Received January 31), Constantinople, January 24, 1922.
181 In his memoirs, Kılıç Ali, too, speaks of this incident in the same manner. Hulusi Turgut (ed.), Atatürk’ün Sırdaşı Kılıç Ali’nin Hatıraları, pp. 172-175.
182 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, General Ali Fuat Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatıraları, (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1957), p. 20; Kazım Özalp, Milli Mücadele, 1919-1922, cilt: I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985), p. 230.
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that Rauf was elected receiving 197 of 204 votes.183 In his comprehensive research, Ahmet Demirel shows that the Kayseri deputy Rifat Bey, who became the new Minister of Justice in August, was the Second Group’s candidate. So was the Konya deputy Mehmet Vehbi, the new Minister of Pious Foundations elected in November.184
After the new cabinet came to power, the Ankara government began to take repressive measures against the communist movement. This anti-communist attitude became apparent in August, when the government outlawed the PSPT’s general congress, which therefore convened illegally.185 At the end of the same month, Rauf revealed the government’s decision to dissolve the PSPT.186 Around 20 communists were arrested in Ankara when this decision was eventually implemented on October 19.187 The PSPT leaders would later assert that Rauf planned this operation with the Minister of the Interior Ali Fethi (Okyar).188
183 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet. İkinci Grup, p. 419.
184 Ibid. pp. 422-426.
185 The documents of this congress have been published by Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, pp. 271-287.
186 Ibid. p. 300.
187 Ibid. p. 388. Golman claims that some 60-70 communists were arrested on that day. Ibid. p. 300.
188 It was Nazım and Kenan Beys who raised this claim in March 1923 in a detailed report addressed “to the Presidency of the Communist International’s Eastern Section”. This report is published in ibid. pp. 421-428.
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Anti-Communism in Istanbul
The Ottoman government cracked down on the TWA and the IUW within the same month as the purge of the communists in Anatolia. In fact, the two were related developments. On October 14, the Ankara government was informed of the communists who had been distributing a leaflet in Istanbul. Prepared in Ankara, this leaflet invited the workers in the capital to rise against the occupiers, the Sultan, and the Ottoman government.189 Several days later, on October 19, the PSPT was liquidated and its leaders were arrested. This was followed by the arrest of an IUW member in Istanbul, and then the TWA and the IUW were forced to cease activity.190
Since the Ahmet Tevfik Pasha cabinet came to power in Istanbul in October 1920, there was always communication between the Ankara and Istanbul governments. In the outlawed congress of the PSPT, however, the communist leaders underlined that Rauf Bey had closer ties with the Ottoman ruling elite than any of his predecessors:
In Anatolia the crowd of old Pashas, aristocrat Beys, officers loyal to Enver and Refet, and hodjas in black gowns are all sympathetic with the Sultan, the Istanbul government, and, by implication, the Allied states. Rauf Bey’s government demonstrates this blunt truth.191
189 TİTE, 60/53, 14 October 1922. The complete transcription of this flyer has been published by Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, Document: 6, pp. 656-658.
190 “Eceli Gelen Kelp Cami Duvarına Siğdirirmiş,” Ziya, 22 November 1922, published by Mete Tunçay in BKP’nin Yayın Organı Ziya, p. 59.
191 “Anadolu’da bulunan eski paşalar, aristokrat beyler, Enverci ve Refetçi subaylar, kara cüppeli hocalar sürüsü, Sultana ve İstanbul hükümetine, dolayısıyla da İtilaf devletleri[ne] sempati duymaktadır. Rauf Bey hükümeti bu acı gerçeği gösteriyor”. This excerpt is taken from the draft of the theses to be read in the PSPT’s general congress. Ibid. p. 259.
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This was not an ungrounded statement. In May 1922, London was informed of the rise of a major faction in the Turkish Grand National Assembly that favored reconciliation with the Sultan”.192 Nevile Henderson presented Rauf as a potential leader of this group: “Rauf may emerge as a rival [to Mustafa Kemal], possibly with leanings towards loyalty to the Sultan Caliph”193. More importantly, the British High Commissioner Sir H. Rumbold reported in August 1922 that there was a political affiliation between Rauf and Ahmet İzzet Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I [Rumbold] then asked İzzet Pasha what he thought of the present situation at Angora. He replied that everything pointed to the fact that Mustafa Kemal’s position had been considerably shaken … The Ministers of the Angora Government were no longer chosen by Mustafa Kemal but by secret ballot of the National Assembly. İzzet Pasha considered that this was a distinct advantage as Rauf Bey, the President of the Council of Commissaries was a man of moderate views whom he knew well.194
The political association implied by this excerpt had a certain background. After the fall of the CUP from power in November 1918, Ahmet İzzet Pasha had formed the first Ottoman cabinet and appointed Rauf Bey as Minister of Navy. While Rauf was in exile, Ahmet İzzet Pasha played a key role in the rapprochement between the Istanbul and Ankara governments. In December 1920, he met Mustafa Kemal as the Ottoman Minister of the Interior,195 and then stayed in Ankara until March 1921.196 Although Ahmet İzzet
192 FO, 371/7863, Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston – (Received May 8), Constantinople, May 1, 1922.
193 FO, 371/7868, Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour – (Received July 24.), Constantinople, July 18, 1922.
194 FO, 371/7870, Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour – (Received August 14), Constantinople, August 5, 1922.
195 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2011), pp. 356-357.
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resigned from the Ottoman government after his return to Istanbul, he was later appointed as the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 1921.
There are several points that need to be remembered here. First of all, Ahmet İzzet Pasha had great authority over the National Defense organization due to his brother Esat Bey, the president of this organization.197 Moreover, during the period April-May 1922, Esat Bey consolidated his relations with the right wing coalition that had been taking shape in the capital simultaneously with the Second Group in Ankara. The nucleus of this faction was formed by a group of Unionists who collaborated with diverse political forces against the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his followers in the national movement.
Esat Bey was also the chief of the Istanbul Police Department, which was a stronghold of the National Defense organization. According to a French intelligence prepared in October 1922, there were some 400 policemen associated with the National Defense organization.198 The Ottoman police adopted a distinctly anti-communist position under Esat Bey, which became evident in the aftermath of the May Day demonstration in 1922. Right after the Labor Day, the agents of the National Defense began to watch the communists more closely than ever,199 and the Istanbul police started an investigation
196 Ibid. pp. 407-409
197 TİTE, 42/154, “Merkez Heyet-i Umumiyesine Şayan Tesir-i Ceryanlar,” p. 2.
198 SHAT, 20 N 1103, carton: 38/1, file: 796, 2 October 1922.
199 Shortly after the May Day 1922, they collected the communist flyers having been distributed in Istanbul. TİTE, 61/36, 14 May 1922. In addition to this one, several other correspondences occurred between Istanbul and Ankara until the end of October 1922, providing information about communist activities. See TİTE, 48/27, 1 June 1922; TİTE, 60/53, 14 October 1922; TİTE, 61/50, 23 October 1922. Mete Tunçay refers to one of such documents available in the TİTE archives in Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 726, footnote: 14.
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about the distribution of a Bolshevik leaflet.200 Yet, as indicated above, the circulation of another flyer was later used as the main pretext for the closure of the IUW and TWA in October. Why were these organizations shut down in October, not earlier or later?
***
From August 1921 until July 1922, Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha served as both Prime Minister and Chief of the General Staff. It was over the course of this period that the Turkish-Soviet relations greatly improved. The radicals in the First Group, who espoused the policy of rapprochement with the Soviets, lost control of the government with the formation of the Rauf Bey cabinet. However, Fevzi Pasha remained as Chief of the General Staff. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the National Defense organization was formally attached to the general staff. Besides, Fevzi Pasha backed the Mim-Mim leaders’ opposition to Esat Bey and his allies in the Central Committee of the organization.
On October 7, 1922, Fevzi Pasha notified Esat Bey of his decision to dissolve the Central Committee.201 Although this decision was justified as a necessary measure to put an end to the factional conflicts that had paralyzed the National Defense thus far, it eventually led Esat Bey to resign from the administration of the organization in December, as it will be clear in Chapter 5. It was after Fevzi Pasha revealed the decision to disband the central committee that the Ottoman police led by Esat Bey began to arrest the communists and close the labor unions they controlled. Although there is no specific source referring to his
200 “Polis Müdiriyet-i Umumiyesine,” 7 May 1922. BOA, DH.KMS, 61-2/62 in 1340.N.10. The transcription of the flyer, which was attached to this file is published by Mete Tunçay in Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, document: 5, pp. 814-815.
201 “To Esat Beyefendi, President of the Istanbul National Defense Central Committee, through the Istanbul Felah Group” in Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 115.
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role in the process, it would be surprising if this large-scale operation were carried out without his initiative or approval.
In any case, the closure of the labor organizations in October 1922 was an action that affected the communists as well as the radicals organized within the Mim-Mim group in Istanbul. It seems that the labor movement paved the ground for the cooperation of diverse political movements, including the socialists associated with the First Group.202 According to an intelligence report sent from Istanbul to Ankara on June 1, 1922, the communists who had been propagating for unionization among the workers received orders from the Istanbul deputy Numan Usta.203 It demonstrates, at least, that Numan and his friends were aware of the projected labor confederation. In the middle of December 1922, Numan set out for Istanbul to revitalize this project that failed in October.
202 According to the Comintern representative Golman, the socialists in Ankara had never cut their relations with Istanbul. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası, p. 223.
203 TİTE, 48/27, 01 June 1922.
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CHAPTER V: NATIONAL REGIME
The War of Independence in Anatolia was concluded with a major offensive of the Turkish national army, which began on August 26 and resulted in a rapid and decisive victory by the end of the month.1 The Mudanya armistice was signed on October 11, formalizing the triumph of the Turkish War of Independence waged against Greece.2 On November 20, negotiations for a peace treaty were launched in Lausanne.3 Although the Lausanne Conference was interrupted for more than 2 months because of disagreements concerning economic and financial issues, the final draft of the peace treaty would be ultimately signed on July 24, 1923, and ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on August 23.
In the course of this critical period, the Allied occupation over Istanbul formally continued until October 6, 1923.4 However, the Turkish national government practically
1 Mete Tunçay, “Siyasal Tarih (1908-1923)” in Sina Akşin (ed.) Türkiye Tarihi 4. Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908-1980, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), p. 73.
2 Ibid. pp. 75-76.
3 Standford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 365-369.
4 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 140-155.
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acquired the control of the city in November 1922. On October 19, Refet (Bele) Pasha had entered Istanbul as the official representative of the Ankara government. On November 1, the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultanate null and void. Upon this decision, the Ahmet Tevfik Pasha cabinet resigned, recognizing the sovereignty of the National Assembly. Afterwards all public authorities at Istanbul declared their loyalty to Ankara.5 On November 4, Refet Pasha announced to have taken over the administration of the Ottoman capital on behalf of the national government.
In Chapter 5, I pointed out that there was a conservative, anti-communist tendency within the First Group (of the Defense of National Rights). Refet Pasha was associated with this tendency of which the current Prime Minister Rauf Bey was a leading figure.6 In fact, Rauf had played a significant role in Refet’s appointment as the official representative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Istanbul and Eastern Thrace.7 Before this development, Refet had been no more than a high-ranking officer discredited in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal for a long time.8 Therefore, he could not take part in the command of the
5 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 24.
6 According to Mustafa Kemal, both Refet and Rauf were loyal to the Ottoman Palace, and they moved together in their struggle against the removal of the sultanate’s sovereignty Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1967), pp. 683-685. Similarly S. İ. Aralov, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, refers to Refet’s conservative attitudes and his close relationship with Rauf Bey. Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları, 1922-1923, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007), pp. 120-121. Aralov argues that these two powerful leaders were not only identifiable with their enmity of the Soviet Russia but also engaged in insidious conspiracies against Mustafa Kemal.
7 Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (ed.), Rauf Orbay’ın Hatıraları (1914-1945), (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2003), pp. 320-321; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, pp. 680-682.
8 According to the Speech, this was due for the most part to Refet’s aspiration for becoming the national army’s commander in chief while holding the ministry of national defense at
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offensive against the Greek army in August 1922. It was thanks to Rauf’s assistance that Refet could overcome this isolation.
During the first days of his mission in Istanbul, Refet took care in giving the impression that he was an impartial leader embracing all segments of the Muslim population.9 Yet this image did not bring about much change for communists. Refet had arrived at Istanbul soon after the Ottoman police had cracked down on the International Union of Workers (IUW) and the Turkish Workers Association (TWA). Afterwards Şefik Hüsnü and his friends associated with the Istanbul Communist Group (ICG) attempted to put the TWA back into operation, assuming that the sanctions of the old regime were no longer in effect.10 However, the labor organizations shut down by the Ottoman government remained close after the administration of Istanbul had changed hands due, seemingly, to bureaucratic obstacles posed by the new government11.
This was not a random policy. As indicated before, the leadership of the National Defense was divided between two competing factions that had radically different attitudes towards the communist movement. Refet Pasha clearly favored the anti-communist wing of
the same time. Ibid. pp. 586-587. Rauf Bey, too, speaks of problems between Mustafa Kemal and Refet in his memoirs. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (ed.), Rauf Orbay’ın Hatıraları, p. 321.
9 He met the delegates of students, workers and artisans. See, for example, “Refet Paşa Hazretleri Amele ve Esnaf Heyetleri Arasında,” Vakit, 25 October 1922, p. 1.
10 “Rapport au C.E. de l’I.C.,” 6 November 1922, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, no: 230-237. A translation of this report is published in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 226-228.
11 “İşçi Cemiyetlerinin Vaziyeti,” Aydınlık, 10 December 1922, p. 295.
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the organization from the outset. He was reportedly in close touch with Hafız Besim.12 As discussed earlier, Hafız Besim was involved in the headquarters of the National Defense organization. In the power struggles between the organization’s central committee members, he was allied with Esat Bey. The latter was not only the president of the National Defense but also the chief of the Ottoman police department that had moved against the communist-oriented labor organizations in October.
The period between October and December 1922 was very chaotic for the national movement. On October 7, Fevzi Pasha (the chief of the general staff in Ankara) informed Esat Bey of his decision to dissolve the National Defense’s Central Committee. Fevzi justified this decision based on the necessity to form a more homogenous executive board, but in fact he meant to weaken Esat’s authority in the resistance movement. Fevzi Pasha and Hüsamettin Ertürk (the chief of the general staff’s intelligence bureau) had close ties with the Mim-Mim group. The faction led by Esat was struggling with the opposition of this group in which there was a radical tendency collaborating with the communist movement.
Despite the opposition backed by the general staff in Ankara, Esat Bey could preserve his authority. He owed this partly to the explicit support of Refet Pasha, who promoted him as the prefect (vali) of Istanbul on November 7.13 Moreover, the dissolution of the National Defense’s headquarters practically remained an ineffective decision. The
12 This relationship was highlighted in a report apparently written by a member of the Mim-Mim group after Refet’s arrival at Istanbul. “Kaymakam Hafız Bey Cereyanı,” TİTE, 42/154. According to this report, Hafız Besim and his friends succeeded in receiving the support of Refet Pasha by providing him with false and misleading information about the National Defense Organization.
13 For the document of this appointment, see Polis Mecmuası, 1 December 1922, pp. 904-905.
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majority of the central committee members reportedly carried on with their duties under the presidency of Esat Bey.14 Meanwhile, however, another group controlled by the principal Mim-Mim leaders was also acting as the National Defense organization’s central bureau. This group was taking decisions for the organization on the whole.15 Therefore, it was not possible to speak of the National Defense as a single organization in November 1922. There were, rather, two distinct groups both of which were identified by their leaders as the Central Committee of the National Defense organization.
This schism was seemingly resolved with the intervention of Ankara. On December 5, 1922, Fevzi Pasha formally removed Esat Bey from the Central Committee of the National Defense organization.16 Fevzi performed this intervention carefully. Technically, Fevzi just approved the resignation that Esat had already submitted on November 25. However, Esat was, in fact, forced to resign. He had decided to withdraw because of the continuing opposition of the Mim-Mim group and when the general staff in Ankara had not met his demand that the Mim-Mim leaders, above all Mehmet of Topkapı, Vehbi and Ahmet Hamdi, be retained in Ankara until the end of the national struggle.17 In the end, General
14 According to a letter by Esat Bey addressed to the national government on December 10, 1922, this group consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, Major Ferhat, Enis Bey, and Captain Ali Haydar in addition to Hafız Besim and Lütfü Beys. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 121. The complete document is published in ibid. pp. 118-121.
15 See, for example, TİTE, 43/8, 3 November 1922. This document is concerned with the establishment of the commission of economic organizations. I will go back to this commission below. For another reference to the establishment of this commission by the central committee of the National Defense, see TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922.
16 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 121-122.
17 Ibid. pp. 116-117.
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İhsan (Aksoloy) was appointed president of the National Defense organization in place of Esat Bey.
Unlike Esat, there was no question about İhsan Bey’s loyalty. Previously affiliated with the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), İhsan Bey had taken part in the founding of the Felah group, and continued his underground activities working for this group before coming to the head of the National Defense organization.18 As mentioned in Chapter II, Felah was an intelligence group reporting directly to the intelligence bureau of the general staff. The Central Committee over which İhsan Bey began to preside had 7 members. Esat Bey and the figures close to him, above all Hafız Besim and Captain Lütfü, did not take part in the new administration of the organization.19 However, Esat and his friends maintained their influence over the activists of the resistance movement even after excluded from the organization’s headquarters.20
Esat Bey’s prestige became clear right after Fevzi Pasha decided to disperse the Central Committee of the National Defense organization in October. Upon this decision, Esat convened the organization’s cadres loyal to himself. Following a period of
18 Moltke was the first group in whose founding İhsan Bey took part along with Neşet Bey. As mentioned earlier, after Neşet Bey attached the group to the general staff of the Ankara government, Moltke was renamed, in turn, as Hamza, Mücahit, Muharip and Felah. İhsan Aksoley, “‘Moltke’ Grubunun Faaliyeti,” Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, vol: 2, no: 9, October 1969, pp. 24-31. For more information about İhsan Aksoley, see also Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 2, pp. 248-251.
19 Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, p. 84.
20 For this reason, the leadership of the Mim-Mim group asked them to be kept in Ankara till the end of the national struggle. “Heyet-i Acizanemizin [İstikameti] (I could not read this word),” TİTE, 42/154. According to this report, Hafız Besim had already resigned from the central committee at the end of June 1922 in a meeting where Esat Bey himself was present.
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negotiations, this group addressed a memorandum to the military headquarters in Ankara, signed by 29 members of the National Defense organization.21 This group suggested the recruitment of the central committee members from the executives of the district groups. This demonstrates the self-confidence of Esat’s supporters about their ongoing control over the neighborhood organizations that had formed the backbone of the resistance movement in Istanbul.
The great majority of the leaders of the district committees were officer corps.22 The authority of Esat Bey and his associates in the central committee relied particularly on these officers. This is why the struggle between the competing factions of the National Defense organization looked like a power struggle between officers and civilians.23 Esat seems to have maintained his authority over the military cadres of the National Defense organization well into the first quarter of 1923. Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail that Esat and Hafız Besim began to collaborate with the propagandists of the Second Group in
21 Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 115-116.
22 For the list of these members, see the documents published by Mesut Aydın, Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde TBMM Hükümeti Tarafından İstanbul’da Kurulan Gizli Gruplar, pp. 285-302.
23 This is why Hafız Besim accused the leaders of the Mim-Mim group of seeking to form an alternative organization to the National Defense, to be called the “Society of Civilians,” TİTE 43/38, 6 June 1922. In one of his correspondences with Refet, Fevzi Pasha also speaks of gossips about a rivalry between officers and civilians, asking him to preside over a meeting of the National Defense’s headquarters to prevent this competition. Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, pp. 117-118. This correspondence occurred on December 7, 1922.
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this period,24 and this collaboration allowed the Second Group to acquire a large following among the officers in Istanbul.25.
Nevertheless, the Mim-Mim group’s control over the National Defense organization considerably increased after the founding of the new central committee by İhsan Bey. The members of the group henceforth concentrated their activities around the commission of economic organizations (Teşkilat-ı İktisadiye Encümeni). To make sense of the significance of this commission and its activities, we need to take a closer look at the political context of the transition to national regime in Istanbul. During the first weeks that followed the military victory in Anatolia, the Turkish national movement was evidently undergoing factional struggles in Istanbul. Yet the same period was characterized also by one of the largest transformations in the ethno-religious, political and social structure of the Ottoman capital.
Popular Mobilization
The Turkish Grand National Assembly took over the governance of Istanbul on November 4, 1922. The day after this crucial development, on November 5, the French diplomatic mission in Istanbul described the introduction of the national regime in the capital as a revolution peacefully accomplished.26 Though relatively peaceful in terms of the lack of
24 Another report at hand claims that Hafız Besim and his followers were among the first individuals with whom the Second Group’s propagandists got in touch when they arrived at Istanbul. TİTE, 42/41, 20 March 1923.
25 See, for example, a report addressed from Istanbul to Hüsamettin Ertürk by a representative of the First Group. TİTE, 45/23, 19 March 1923.
26 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 20.
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clashes or a significant case of inter-communal conflict, the so-called peaceful revolution was not at all silent. A series of demonstrations in which thousands of people from the Muslim population of the city took part accompanied the passage of Istanbul’s administration to the national government in Ankara.
The public demonstrations that took place during the first week of November formed the final stage of a large mass mobilization. When the Turkish offensive against the Greek army resulted in a decisive victory at the end of August, Istanbul witnessed a series of mass demonstrations.27 On September 2, the Friday prayers in various mosques – including Sultan Ahmet, Ayasofya, Fatih and Beyazit Mosques – invoked the national army and the martyrs of the War of Independence.28 During the next days that followed, thousands of Muslims took to streets to celebrate the triumph of the national forces. This process gained momentum especially after the emancipation of İzmir from the Greek occupation on September 9, after which there was a demonstration every single evening until the middle of September.29
Refet Pasha’s arrival in Istanbul in October 19 revitalized the popular mobilization that began to subside over the second half of the previous month. From his first day in Istanbul onwards, Refet was welcomed in his official visits and other public encounters
27 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 97, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 164.
28 “İstanbul Dün Bir Tek Kalp Gibi Çarptı,” Vakit, 2 September 1922, p. 1.
29 A detailed coverage of the mass meetings can be followed from the contemporary Turkish press. See, for example, the following news items: “Fener Alayları,” Vakit, 9 September 1922, p. 3; “Fener Alayı” and “Dün Akşamki Tezahürat,” Vakit, 10 September 1922, p. 3; “İstanbul’da Vatanperverane Tezahürat,” Vakit, 11 September 1922, p. 2.
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with the banquets, parades and demonstrations that continued well into the evenings.30 This wave of mass mobilization carried on for the next few days31, reaching its zenith on November 5. The day after the establishment of the national rule over Istanbul, thousands of Muslims poured to streets. The largest demonstration seems to have taken place in the Sultanahmet Square, but there were many other gatherings across various districts.32 Public demonstrations went on during the night.33
The popular mobilization that heated-up Istanbul’s streets and squares in the period September-November 1922 had certain characteristics. First of all, the demonstrations were reportedly very well organized, and the Muslim people from the “low classes of the population” attended them in large numbers.34 Most of the manifestations began in the evening. The demonstrators gathered separately throughout the Muslim quarters of the city. They began to march after a while with the torches and posters of Mustafa Kemal in
30 On October 21, for example, the Istanbul Municipality gave a banquet in Fatih for the honor of Refet Pasha, which set off a large demonstration that continued during the night. “Şehremanetinin Muhterem Paşamıza Ziyafeti,” Vakit, 22 October 1922, p. 1; “Evvelki Gece Yapılan Tezahürat,” Vakit, 2 October 1922, p. 2.
31 On November 2, for example, the Darülfünun students organized a large public demonstration in the Sultanahmet Square. “Dünkü Tezahürat-ı Milliyemizden,” İleri, 2 November 1922, p. 1.
32 “Saltanat-ı Milliye’yi İçin Dün Yapılan Tezahürat,” Vakit, 6 November 1922, p. 1.
33 “Une révolution s’est accomplie pacifiquement aujourd’hui à Constantinople,” AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 26.
34 “Les manifestations qui ont eu lieu dans la soirée étaient visiblement préparés; elles étaient composées des plus bas éléments de la population”. AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 35.
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their hands.35 The crowds that met in different neighborhoods united at larger squares such as Sultan Ahmet, Fatih, Kadıköy and Üsküdar. They sometimes went on marching in thousands across the city towards different directions, mostly on the directions of Sirkeci or Beyoğlu on the European side of this.
These were no doubt organized actions. Although there is little information about who initiated them, it is certain that the students of Tıbbiye (Medical School) and Darülfünun (today’s Istanbul University) were at the forefront of the manifestations.36 The district committees of the National Defense must have been active in the organization of the processions as well. These committees of resistance were quite powerful throughout the Muslim neighborhoods of the city, where the demonstrations were set off. There is also evidence that the Greek, Armenian, and Turkish members of the International Union of Workers (IUW), which had been forced to cease activity in October, were involved in the mass movements celebrating the victory of the Independence War.37
Nonetheless, the involvement of the IUW’s non-Muslim members was an exceptional case. During the period of transition to national rule, Istanbul witnessed one of the largest mass mobilizations ever since the Constitutional Revolution in July 1908.38 Yet the city’s Christian population that had attended the celebrations of the Constitutional Revolution in
35 That demonstrators carried the posters of Mustafa Kemal was reported in “İstanbul’da Vatanperverane Tezahürat,” Vakit, 11 September 1922, p. 2.
36 The Darülfünun students organized a torchlight procession on the evening of September 10. “Fener Alayı,” Vakit, 10 September 1922, p. 3.
37 It is a report written by Roland Ginsberg that provides this information. Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, p. 140.
38 Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, pp. 101-104.
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large numbers was now missing from the streets. At the end of the struggle for independence, there was evidently a major divergence between the Muslim and Christian communities of Istanbul. This situation originated from various reasons. To be sure, the Armenian massacres of 1915, and, more generally, the Turkification policies implemented by the CUP during World War I were among the most important factors in this respect. Furthermore, the Greek-Turkish War in Anatolia was accompanied by an unprecedented politicization of the existing ethno-religious distinctions by Greek and Turkish nationalist propaganda.39
What exacerbated this situation during the Allied occupation, which had lasted more than three years, were the excessive and sometimes aggressive attitudes of the Christian communities, especially the Greek subjects who embraced the nationalist idea of unification with Greece, towards Muslims.40 On October 30, 1922, a memorandum signed by C. R. Ballard, the British president of the Allied police commission, spoke of such attitudes as follows:
Under Allied protection they [the Christian population in Istanbul] considered themselves quite safe, and foolish enough in some cases to adopt provocative attitudes towards their old enemies the Turks; for instance, during the Greek advance towards Angora.41
39 For the question of nationalist propaganda in the Greek and Turkish press in Istanbul, see Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, pp. 45-49.
40 Ayhan Aktar argues that such aggressive behaviors exercised a traumatic impact on the Muslim-Turkish element. Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama: Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi 1923-1924,” Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 57.
41 FO, 371/7960, Memorandum: The Civil Population of Constantinople, 30 October 1922.
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In any case, the leadership of the Turkish national movement had no desire to tolerate the existence of an economically powerful Christian community in Istanbul.
Non-Muslims under National Rule
Around the time that the Independence War ended, Istanbul’s population was well over 1 million.42 According to the formal census records from the armistice period, the population was around 1.2 million, and a census taken from police jurisdictional areas calculated it to be approximately 710,000 in 1922.43 The Muslim population is estimated to have been approximately 560,000 in 1920.44 There were about 385,000 Greeks, 118,000 Armenians, and 45,000 Jews residing in the city at that time.45 In addition, the Levantines and foreign subjects constituted a significant proportion of the total number. In November 1922, the population was definitely far less homogenous in composition than it was few years later.
42 For a concise review of the contemporary literature on the population statistics of Istanbul, see Clarence Richard and M. A. Johnson (eds.), Istanbul 1920, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), pp. 24-27. (This book was published in 1922 for the first time, and its original title was Constantinople To-day or the Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople. A Study in Oriental Social Life).
43 İlhan Tekeli, The Development of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area: Urban Administration and Planning, (İstanbul: Kent Basımevi, 1994), p. 50. According to a booklet prepared by the National Congress in 1919, on the other hand, there were 700,000 Muslims, 180,000 Greeks and 65,000 Armenians residing in Istanbul. L’Asie Mineur et ses Populations. Pour la Défense des Droits Légitimes de la Nationalité Turque, (Lausanne: Imprimerie A. Bouvard Giddey, 1919), p. 5. Yet these statistics aimed for propaganda in Europe are far from being reliable.
44 Bilge Criss, İşgal Altında İstanbul, p. 39.
45 Ibid.
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According to the Turkish Republic’s first official census in 1927, there were 448,000 Muslims, and 187,000 non-Muslims living in Istanbul.46
Not only did Christians form a large community in Istanbul, but they also controlled the economy of the city to a large extent. In 1922, Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) conducted one of the most detailed contemporary investigations into the extent of their economic power. One of the leading Mim-Mim agents, Ahmet Hamdi was also the editor-in-chief of the Economy Journal of Turkey (Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası), which began to be published in June 1921.47 In June 1922, he initiated the founding of the Incorporation of Economic Investigations, Publications and Transactions (İktisadi Tetkikat, Neşriyat ve Muamelat A.Ş). This agency was engaged in an activity that can be described as economic intelligence. Under the guise of preparing a commercial yearbook, it carried out an investigation about the ethno-religious composition of the groups involved in Istanbul’s economic life.
According to the results of this investigation, there were 4,267 commercial enterprises of all sorts in Istanbul.48 The Muslim-Turkish subjects owned 1,202 of these enterprises, which amounted to no more than 28 % of the total. This rate was even smaller in the particular areas of the economy traditionally dominated by non-Muslims. The number of Muslim-Turkish entrepreneurs in the business of import and export amounted to 4% of this sector. This rate was approximately 3% in brokerage. The Muslim-Turkish
46 İlhan Tekeli, The Development of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area, p. 51.
47 Murat Koraltürk, “İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası’nın Türkleştirilmesi” in Murat Koraltürk, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi,” (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 123.
48 Ibid. p. 128; Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama,” pp. 55-57.
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element had almost no influence over the economy concentrated around the Istanbul port, where the languages of business were Greek, Italian and French rather than Turkish. The employees of the foreign companies consisted largely of non-Muslims. The Muslims who could find jobs in these companies were reportedly employed in relatively inferior positions for lesser salaries compared to the non-Muslims.
The weight of the Christian population in the economy began to diminish with the nationalist takeover. This development was immediately followed by the mass departure of the non-Muslims from Istanbul. A contemporary report by the British High Command brings some insights about the extent of this exodus.49 According to this report, dated March 28, 1923, the number of Christians that had left Istanbul since the introduction of the national regime was around 330,000, and 400,000 for the entire Vilayet of Istanbul. More than 200,000 of them were Greeks, and some 85,000 were Armenians, although it was not specified how many of them were Ottoman subjects. Around 30,000 houses, 20,000 shops and other premises, as well as 74,000 acres of land had been abandoned by then. The report also claimed that in addition to hundreds of small businesses, 21 Armenian textile houses and 110 important Greek firms had been closed down since November 1, 1922.
Even though the reliability of these statistics can be questioned, there is no doubt that the Christian population was significantly reduced in a few months that followed the introduction of the national regime. This happened despite the fact that the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire who resided in Istanbul were excluded from the exchange of
49 FO, 371/9114, Office of the Commercial Secretary, British High Commission, Constantinople, 28 March 1923. This report was based on a recent article published by Economiste d’Orient, and this article was based on a report of the ministry of the interior.
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Orthodox and Muslim minorities between Turkey and Greece.50 Yet it seems that a great number of Ottoman Christians lost their hopes for living in Istanbul safely.51 In his letter to the British High Command on December 1, 1922, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Meletios expressed the prevailing state of insecurity, highlighting that the atrocities presently inflicted upon the Christian communities of Asia Minor had terrorized the Orthodox Greeks of Istanbul to the extent that he was unable to prevent them from leaving the city at all costs.52
The non-Muslims subject had valid reasons to be anxious about their security in Istanbul. During the mass meetings in September, they became target to the occasional aggressions of the demonstrators. The worst event took place on the night of September 10, when a crowded group of demonstrators moved on the direction of the Beyoğlu, Pera and Şişli area populated largely by non-Muslims. The crowd attacked some residences and stores, breaking their windows.53 The Turkish press sought to exonerate the Muslim community, claiming that there were non-Turkish provocateurs among the aggressors, and some of the stores and residences attacked actually belonged to the Muslims.54 According
50 The agreement specifying the terms of the population exchange was signed by Greece and Turkey in January 1923 although the process could be started as late as November 1923.
51 Ballard’s aforementioned memorandum reflects the state of panic among not only the Christian communities but also the Allied authorities. FO, 371/7960, Memorandum: The Civil Population of Constantinople, 30 October 1922.
52 FO, 371/7960, Letter from the Patriarcat Oecuménique to the British High Command, 18 December 1922.
53 “Kırılan Camlar,” Vakit, 12 September 1922, p. 2.
54 Ibid.
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to the Allied police reports, however, a Greek was killed, and several others were injured during the night. Some 20 aggressors were arrested in the meantime.55
This incident had some significant repercussions. A few days after it occured, Fevzi Pasha felt the need to make a public statement that the security forces in Istanbul had taken all the necessary measures to protect the honor, lives and properties of the people as a whole. He made this statement even though the governance of the city had not formally come under the control of the national government yet.56 Moreover, towards the end of the month, Esat Bey, the chief of the Istanbul police and the current president of the National Defense organization, stated to the press that additional measures would be taken to protect the public order in the city.57
No significant assault against non-Muslims was reported during the demonstrations in October and November 1922.58 There was a considerable tendency among the demonstrators to carry out aggressions especially against Greeks.59 Some individuals who did not wear fez (the symbol of identification with the Muslim community) were reportedly harassed in streets. Yet the fact that such attitudes did not cause a serious conflict during this period of nationalist euphoria implies that the national movement well organized in
55 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 97, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 164.
56 “İstanbul’un Asayişi,” Vakit, 20 September, 1922, p. 2
57 “İstanbul’un Asayişi,” Vakit, 28 September, 1922, p. 1
58 AMAE, Série E, Levant, Turquie, 1918-1929, vol: 98, carton: 308, dossier: 1, p. 26.
59 This source was a report written by a member of the communist-oriented International Union of Workers (Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı). The complete document has been published by Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Beynelmilel İşçiler İttihadı, pp. 123-143. For the demonstrations, see p. 140.
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the districts of Istanbul took full control of the mass mobilization that accompanied the introduction of the national regime. The status of the city was not determined yet, and the Allied occupation was still in effect. Thus, such a conflict would surely not befit the interests of the national leadership.
However, the new regime made it clear from the first days of its establishment that it would not easily accommodate the Christian communities, especially the Orthodox Greeks. At the beginning of November 1922, Refet Pasha warned that the Greeks who identified themselves with Greece should leave the city by November 18.60 Meanwhile, the Turkish press published news items about the journey to Istanbul of Armenian revolutionaries with the object of creating disorder and assassinating national leaders. According to the British High Command, such news had the definite object of creating panic among the Armenians.61 Furthermore, the establishment of a dual Allied and Turkish control on police matters deprived the Greeks and Armenians of the Allied protection they had enjoyed until the advent of the national regime.62
The nationalists’ approach to the Christian population was materialized most perceptibly in a widespread campaign that demanded nationalization in the economy. One dimension of this campaign consisted in pressure exercised by the government on the foreign companies for the use of Turkish as the principle language of all commercial and bureaucratic transactions. The companies were also asked to dismiss not only foreigners but also Ottoman Christians, and replace them with Muslim and Turkish employees. This
60 Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 151.
61 FO, 371/7960, 1 December 1922.
62 Ibid.
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was a de facto policy implemented through demands extended by the Turkish authorities, above all Refet Pasha, to the company administrations.63 In February 1923, the use of Turkish was made obligatory by the Ankara government.64 At the end of May 1923, moreover, all the foreign companies operating in Istanbul accepted employing only Turkish personnel.65
On the other hand, the Turkish national movement considerably popularized this campaign of nationalization by seeking to disseminate it to grassroots. Of the most visible manifestations of the desire to eliminate the Christian element, according to the British High Commission, was the formation of a confederation of guilds and a Turkish commercial union.66 It was the commission of economic organizations that brought both unions into existence.
63 Some of such correspondences between the Turkish authorities and company administrations are available in BOA, HR.İM, 37/12, 10 December 1922; and HR.İM, 37/13, 22 November 1923. The dates on these files would be misleading. Although the first one is dated December 1922, it comprises a series of correspondences from 1923 as well. The earliest document in this file is from 27 November 1922. It is a note of protest addressed by the French High Command to Refet Pasha about the deportation of some of the İzmir-Kasaba Railways’ Christian personnel. This note also clarifies that the company administration fired a number of its Christian employees as it was demanded by the Turkish authorities.
64 “Şirketlerde Türkçe,” Vakit, 9 February 1923, p. 3.
65 “Şirketlerde Türk Memurlar,” Vakit, 1 June 1923. In May, delegates from all foreign companies in Istanbul were convened in Ankara to conduct negotiations with the Turkish government about the legal framework of their operations.
66 FO, 371/9114, Office of the Commercial Secretary, British High Commission, Constantinople, 28 March 1923.
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Commission of Economic Organizations
The economy commission was established on November 3, 1922, while the leadership of the National Defense was de facto split into two parts.67 It was the faction controlled by the leaders of the Mim-Mim group that formed this commission. Its executive committee consisted of the Mim-Mim leaders Ahmet Hamdi, Vehbi, and Mehmet of Topkapı Beys.68 The other four members were Seyfi, İsmail Hakkı, Hilmi, and Ali Cemal Beys, who were also members of the commission of financial works (Maliye Encümeni). The economy commission was declared to be an organ of the National Defense organization despite the ongoing power struggle with the other faction over which Esat Bey presided. After İhsan Bey replaced him, it continued to operate in this capacity.
The major duty of the economy commission was to form grassroots organizations to unite all occupational groups in the city and attach both the new and old associations of this sort to the National Defense.69 Thereby, it was intended to create a network of relations with the Muslim merchants, workers, and artisans next to the district committees. The National Defense had already been in relationship with various guilds, like the unions of porters, boatmen, lightermen, and coachmen. All these unions controlled by the National Defense organization were put under the authority of the economy commission.
Just after it was founded, the commission embarked upon a wide range of organizing activities. It was in close touch with a union of university students at
67 TİTE, 43/8, 3 November 1922.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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Darülfünun.70 But it concentrated particularly on forming new federations through which the administration of the existing or newly created guilds, chambers, labor unions, and other sorts of trade bodies would be centralized. By the initial days of December 1922, earlier than Esat Bey had been removed from the administration of the National Defense, the members of the commission of economic organizations succeeded in founding two important confederations: the Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA, İstanbul Esnaf Cemiyetleri Heyet-i Merkeziyesi) and the Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU, Milli Türk Ticaret Birliği).71
Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU)
The TNCU was formally established with a public meeting of its founders on December 1, 1922.72 It was Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) who first brought up the idea of creating this confederation to bring together the Muslim-Turkish merchants and businessmen.73 He was then elected secretary-general of the TNCU. Of the members of the TNCU’s administrative board, Hilmi and İsmail Hakkı Beys were also affiliated with the economy commission.
70 It was reported that students at various faculties were informally connected with the National Defense thanks to the 3 members of the Union of Darülfünun. TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1923.
71 It seems that preparations for the establishment of both the FIAA and TNCU had been started by November 1922. On October 24, Refet Pasha accepted two separate missions representing the coalitions of the city’s Muslim artisans and merchants. “Refet Paşa Hazretleri Amele ve Esnaf Heyetleri Arasında,” Vakit, 25 October 1922, p. 1.
72 FO, 371/9113, Union Nationale de Commerce Turquie, 13 January 1923.
73 TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922
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The TNCU was based largely on the Incorporation of Economic Investigations, which had carried out the aforementioned research about the ethno-religious composition of those involved in the economy. A number of Muslim-Turkish merchants who had come together under the roof of this incorporation formed the nucleus of the TNCU’s leading members along with the cadre of the economy commission.74 Among these merchants were Necati Bey, (Hacızade) Mehmet Mesut Bey, and (Yelkencizade) Rıfat Bey. The president of the administrative board was (İbrahim Paşazade) Hüseyin Bey of Kavala, and the vice-president was (Hacı Hüzeyinzade) Ali Haydar Bey. The inspector of accounting was (Boldanlızade) Ahmet Bey.75 The first meeting of the TNCU met in the executive office of the Incorporation of Economic Investigations, which was located on the same building as the Turkish Red Crescent in Cağaloğlu.76
With his opening speech at this public meeting, Ahmet Hamdi put forward the goal that underlay the founding of the TNCU quite frankly. He said that the economy in Istanbul was controlled by “anti-national hands” and foreigners at present, and that the TNCU aimed to mobilize the Muslim-Turkish merchants, so far devoid of all kinds of economic privileges put at the disposal of the Christian entrepreneurs, to change this situation. The TNCU was supposed to achieve national independence in the sphere of economy. The first chapter of the Union’s bylaws seconded Ahmet Hamdi’s statements by setting one the organization’s major goals as establishing the economic independence of the Turkish merchants in
74 Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi,” p. 57. See also Murat Koraltürk, “İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası’nın Türkleştirilmesi,” pp. 123-131.
75 FO 371/9113, Union Nationale de Commerce Turque, 13 January 1923.
76 Murat Koraltürk, “İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası’nın Türkleştirilmesi,” p. 128.
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Istanbul, the most important commercial center of Turkey, by forming trusts and consortiums among them.
It seems that the TNCU went into action towards these goals soon after its formation. According to the British Commercial Secretary at Istanbul, two important Turkish enterprises were created in the city during the first days of the national regime installed by the Ankara government.77 One of them was the Société Anonyme Nationale d’Importation et Exportation en Turquie. This company was built on a capital of 1 million Turkish Liras, and there were 50 deputies from the Turkish Grand National Assembly who took part in this enterprise. The other one was the Société Turque de Commerce National. The initial capital of this Turkish company amounted to 100,000 Turkish Liras, divided into the capital shares at the value of 25 Liras each. It was reported that the formation of both companies had to do with the desire of the nationalist government to eliminate the Christian element from the economy.78
Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA)
The FIAA was intended to unite all artisan corporations in Istanbul. It was officially established at a meeting that took place on November 12, 192279. Present in this meeting were delegates from 24 different corporations that reportedly represented 22,000
77 FO, 371/9114, Office of the Commercial Secretary, British High Commission, Constantinople, 28 March 1923.
78 Ibid.
79 TİTE, 42/159, 10 December 1922.
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artisans.80 Among them were the associations of grocers, drivers, butchers, hotelkeepers, and quilt-makers. An important one of them was the Artisan Association of All Porters (Umum Hamallar Esnaf Cemiyeti). There were some 4,000 porters in the city, and 2,500 of them were involved in this corporation.81 The Association of Bargemen and Lightermen (Mavnacılar ve Salapuryacılar Cemiyeti) was another important corporation, which had 3,000 members. There were also some 1,200 dockers united by the Association for the Solidarity of the Workers of Shipment and Unloading (Tahmil ve Tahliye Amele Teavün Cemiyeti).
There were two attempts to institutionalize the FIAA. On the one hand, the economy commission suggested the incorporation of the Federation’s administrative council, which consisted of 5 members, into the cadre of the National Defense.82 Yet the Central Committee did not accept this proposal. Instead, İsmail Hakkı Bey from the economy commission was put in charge of relations between the National Defense and the FIAA. The latter was accepted to be a special department of the National Defense. İsmail Hakkı was made responsible for the administration and supervision of this department’s operations in accordance with the directions of the Central Committee.
On the other hand, the Federation’s administrative council applied for official recognition to the Ankara government. The application addressed to the Turkish National Assembly included the draft regulations, a statement of the Federation’s goals, and a
80 See the notes of the commission’s meeting on December 13, 1922, TİTE 42/53.
81 Yet the faction led by Raşid Ağa, a steward known to have been an opponent of the national movement, controlled a considerable part of the porters as well. Ibid.
82 TİTE, 42/194, 18 November 1922.
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petition justifying the establishment of such a union.83 This justification relied on the view that once prosperous Ottoman economy controlled by Muslims and Turks had declined because of the rulers’ indifference to progressive developments in industry and technology.84 This, it was argued, had gradually paved the way for the elimination of Muslims and Turks from commercial activities since the majority of their most enlightened elements preferred to take bureaucratic positions rather than dealing with business and industry, and thus all aspects of economic life had come under the control of non-Muslims privileged by capitulations. The Federation aimed to unify Muslim and Turkish artisans to help re-establish national control over economy.
The FIAA was planned to operate under the authority of the National Assembly’s Commissariat of Economy, not the municipal government, which had thus far supervised all guild associations.85 The Union’s administration was to promote the cooperation of the existing corporations in line with national interests, regulate their internal and external affairs that would concern the state of the national economy in general, and work for the increase of their capital for the development of the national economy.86 The FIAA also aimed to establish a national bank with the objects of evaluating the revenues of the
83 A report of the British High Commission in Istanbul provides both the regulations and the petition in French. The authority to which the petition in question was addressed was the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Commissariat of Economy. FO, 371/7969, from acting High Commissioner Mr. Anderson, Constantinople, 19 December 1922
84 “Au Commissariat d’Economie de la Grande Assemblée National de Turquie,” ibid.
85 “Règlement Intérieur de la Confédération des Corporations,” Article 19. Ibid. p. 3.
86 Ibid. See Articles 1-3.
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corporations and lending funds to their members87. All such measures, it was hoped, would turn the corporations controlled by Muslims into strong industrial and commercial entities. They would thereby compete with foreign companies and their protégés; namely, the Christian subjects, who had exclusively enjoyed the privilege of benefiting from the protection of the existing financial institutes.88 Hence, when the Christian elements leave the country, Muslim and Turkish entrepreneurs would replace them and work for the benefits of the national economy.89
Union and Progress
During the new regime’s first weeks in Istanbul, the confederations created by the commission of economic organizations did important services for the national movement. The FIAA and TNCU helped broaden the social basis of the Turkish national movement, turning it into a large popular movement. They conducted a broad-based campaign for the nationalization of the economy, advocating for the hegemony of the Muslim-Turkish element over Istanbul’s commercial and industrial life. At the same time, however, the control of these economic unions, especially that of the FIAA, came to the center of political struggles that involved the Union and Progress network, which could still exert a large measure of authority over the artisan corporations.
In Chapter 3, I examined the revival of the Union and Progress as a political movement pursuing a radical-populist program and underlined that Kara Kemal
87 Ibid. See Articles 23-36.
88 “Exposé des Motifs”. Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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established himself as the principal leader of this movement in the second half of 1922. All this happened while the National Defense had a split between two rival groups. At one point, Kara Kemal tried to arbitrate between the two factions.90 There is no doubt that resolving this schism would have greatly increased Kara Kemal’s political prestige and influence in the national movement. His intervention appears to have constituted one of the factors that led Fevzi Pasha to replace Esat Bey with more reliable İhsan Bey as president of the National Defense organization.91
Still, however, the Union and Progress network had considerable influence over the cadres of the resistance movement many of whom were of Unionist background. It seems that a group of the members of the National Defense organization received orders from the Unionist leadership while maintaining their association with the National Defense at the same time.92 Apart from such overlaps, however, the Union and Progress network was driven into a competition with the Mim-Mim group – which had led the establishment of the FIAA and TNCU through the commission of economic organizations – especially for the control of the artisan corporations.
90 See Fevzi Pasha’s telegram to Rauf Bey, the Prime Minister of the Ankara government at that time, Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İstanbul ve Yardımları, Cilt: 1, p. 122.
91 Fevzi Pasha referred to Kara Kemal’s intervention in a message to Rauf Bey in which he justified why Esat’s resignation had been accepted. Ibid. p. 122. It should also be emphasized that Esat had submitted his resignation on November 25. Ibid. pp. 116-117, 121.
92 The customs officer Cemal Bey was one of such members of the National Defense working with the Union and Progress. TİTE, 33/14, Registers of Decisions, Article 6, 15 January 1923. As will be discussed in the chapter, İhsan Bey would embark upon the purge of such Unionist cadres from the ranks of the National Defense in March 1923. TİTE, 42/41, 20 March 1923.
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This competition was reported as early as November 12, 1922. That was the day on which the founding of the FIAA was formalized with the conference of the delegates from most artisan chambers. Acting on an order from Kara Kemal, one Hasan Bey had visited the Association of Bargemen before this conference to demand the administrative board of this guild to resign.93 Meanwhile, the head of the guild was Hafız Ahmet Efendi.94 Under his control, the Association of Bargemen participated in the founding of the FIAA; Hafız Ahmet was elected one of the 5 members of this confederation’s administrative board.95 The executives of the bargemen’s guild rejected Hasan Bey’s demand, stating that they would obey only the instructions of the National Defense’s Central Committee, no other authority from outside.96
The Union and Progress’ efforts to consolidate its influence over the artisan associations continued the next days. A report we have provides detailed information on this subject.97 It relates that the group around Kara Kemal tried to take over the Association of Bakers (Fırıncılar Cemiyeti). The president of this chamber was one Mehmet Bey at that time. According to the document under consideration, Kara Kemal summoned Mehmet Bey to demand the dissolution of this association’s board of directors. Kara Kemal’s goal was to place his own men in the administration of this chamber. Meanwhile, Ethem Bey, also Kara Kemal’s associate, got in touch with Huri Bey. The latter was a member of the executive
93 TİTE, 57/106, 12 November 1922.
94 TİTE, 42/161, 11 December 1922.
95 TİTE, 42/194 18 November 1922.
96 TİTE, 42/178, 4 December 1922.
97 TİTE, 42/161, 11 December 1922.
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board of the Association of Butchers (Kasaplar Cemiyeti). Ethem asked Huri to stop cooperating with Emir Bey. The president of the butcher’s guild, Emir was working with the Mim-Mim group in the FIAA.
All these cases demonstrate that the Union and Progress leadership sought to revive the organization’s previous connections with the guilds. Kara Kemal and his men competed with the Mim-Mim group,98 but they did not attempt to found rival chambers, or an alternative confederation that could rival the FIAA.99 In other words, they tried to take control of artisan associations, but avoided dividing the movement into rival camps while doing so. The Unionist strategy concerning the labor movement was somewhat similar: forming and operating within the largest union possible. Numan Usta was the main actor putting this strategy into practice.
Towards a Communist-Socialist Bloc
On December 16, 1922, a few days after Esat Bey was removed from the administration of the National Defense, the Istanbul deputy Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) replaced Refet Pasha as the Ankara government’s official representative in Istanbul.100 Adnan Bey was part of a narrow group of deputies that constituted the ruling nucleus of the First Group.101 He had been vice-president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly until resigning from this position on
98 They also got in touch with the executive of the coachmen’s guild to this end. Ibid.
99 The members of the Union and Progress were still active in the FIAA in mid-April 1923. “İntihabat Etrafında Son Vaziyet,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 14 April 1923, p. 2.
100 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, General Ali Fuat Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatıraları, p. 211.
101 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, pp. 385-386. This nucleus was known as the Committee of Public Safety (Selamet-i Umumiye).
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December 6 supposedly because of his health problems.102 There is no mention of why and how he was appointed in place of Refet Pasha in the existing sources. But what is more important for us is that Numan Usta was among those who went to Istanbul with Adnan Bey.103
Numan Usta has figured many times in this study thus far. He was a journeyman of a Unionist background who identified himself as a national socialist. In December 1919, he was elected to the Ottoman Parliament as deputy of Istanbul thanks to the votes he received from the Unionists. He was banished to Malta in the aftermath of the military occupation of Istanbul in March 1920. When he joined the Turkish Grand National Assembly at the end of 1921, he became a prominent figure of a socialist circle involved in the First Group. This circle was in touch with the communist movement embodied in the People’s Socialist Party of Turkey (PSPT) in Anatolia.
During the spring of 1922, the PSPT’s efforts to form a common bloc with the socialists did not work out for different reasons.104 After Numan returned to Istanbul in December, however, there emerged a loose coalition between a wide range of social and political forces from the majority of labor organizations to the communist groups and the
102 Ibid. p. 437.
103 The other two deputies involved were Şükrü and Süreyya Beys. “İstanbul’da Amele Mebusu Numan Usta’yla Mülakat,” İleri, 20 December 1922, published by Sabahattin Özel and Işıl Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu, Osmanlı’dan Milli Mücadele’ye Seçilmiş Mülakatlar, p. 197.
104 It seems that this was partly because the socialists did not want to break the unity of the Defense of National Rights Group to which they belonged by engaging themselves in such a political bloc. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası. Ibid. p. 275. There was also competition between the socialists and the communists for the control of the existing labor organizations in Anatolia. For more information on this competition, see the report, titled “an Awakening in Anatolia in the Area of Professions” in ibid. pp. 267-270.
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Union and Progress network. This coalition did not have a single leadership. Nor did it emerge as a result of a centrally administered process. The rise of this bloc was contingent on a set of crucial developments that concerned multiple social and political actors.
Held in Moscow in November-December 1922, the Comintern’s Fourth Congress was one of such developments. A crucial decision made in this congress was the unification of all communist groups in Istanbul and Anatolia under the roof of a single organization to be called Turkish Communist Party.105 The name of the commission appointed to carry out this task was the Organization Bureau. Its members consisted of Şefik Hüsnü from the Istanbul Communist Group (ICG), Kazım of Van from the International Union of Workers (IUW), and Salih Hacıoğlu from the PSPT. Also involved in the Organization Bureau was the Comitern representative Gafurov, also known as Şarki, who arrived in Istanbul in the middle of January 1923.106 Despite serious tensions among the components of this enterprise, the Organization Bureau continued operating over much of the year 1923.
Simultaneously with the emergence of this communist bloc, the labor movement entered a new phase of activism. Before Numan’s return to Istanbul in December, labor activism had been in decline since the defeat of the last tram strike in February 1922. There was no longer a labor organization such as the TSP, which had once unified a large proportion of workers under the leadership of Hüseyin Hilmi. Most labor activists were divided into two separate organizations that broke away from Hilmi’s organization: the ISP (Independent Socialist Party), whose leader was Rasim Şakir, and the Turkish Labor
105 For the documents of this decision, see Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 243-247.
106 Ibid. p. 281.
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Party.107 None of the two organizations, however, received significant support from the workers,108 and the communist-led efforts to form a labor confederation had been suppressed in October. In this hopeless period, Numan’s arrival created a new atmosphere of optimism for labor activists.
On December 21, Numan gave a public conference for workers.109 There was a large participation in this event hosted by the ISP.110 In his speech, Numan emphasized the importance of constituting labor syndicates and associations throughout all economic sectors and workplaces in Istanbul. According to him, the administration of all such organizations should have been centralized by a single labor confederation. Numan called for the constitution of a special commission of labor representatives towards this goal.111 All these suggestions were well received. On January 1, 1923, a commission that aimed to initiate the founding of the Federation of General Worker Unions (Umum Amele Birlikleri Heyet-i Müttehidesi) met for the first time.112 At the second meeting held on January 17, the
107 “Amele Ceryanları,” İleri, 5 July 1922, p. 2. According to another news item, the name of this organization was Independent Labor Party, “Müstakil Amele Fırkası,” Akşam, 13 June 1922, p. 2.
108 “Şehrimizde Amele Hareketleri,” Aydınlık, no: 7, 20 July 1922, p. 199. See also “İstanbul’da Sosyalist Fırkalarıyla İşçi Teşkilatlarının Bugünkü Hal ve Harekatı,” TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, pp. 361-365.
109 He had to repeat the conference twice on the same evening for the Türkiye Kıraathanesi (Coffeehouse of Turkey) in which the meeting occurred was not big enough to accommodate the audience. “Numan Usta,” İleri, 23 December 1922, p. 2. For the complete text of Numan’s speech in this conference, see “Amele Mebusu Numan Usta’nın Konferansı,” İleri, 22 December 1922, p. 2.
110 Numan Usta,” İleri, 23 December 1922, p. 2.
111 Ibid.
112 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, pp. 728-729.
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commission members decided to move fast to bring the projected confederation into existence.113
Compared to the earlier enterprise suppressed in October, the initiative led by Numan brought together a larger number of workers and labor organizations. There were, reportedly, delegates representing more than 15 organizations in the first meeting of the commission.114 Among the labor groups involved in this coalition by the May Day of 1923 were the ISP, the Association of Ottoman Typographers (Mürettibin-i Osmaniye Cemiyeti), the Association of All Workers of Shipment and Unloading (Umum Tahmil ve Tahliye Amele Cemiyeti), the Association of Tram, Funicular and Electric Workers, the union of state-owned factory workers, the workers of Tobacco Regie, maritime workers, construction workers, dockers, the workers of Silahdarağa Power Plant and the workers of Seyr-i Sefain Factory.115
The local communist groups centrally partook in this enterprise. The Organization Bureau gave two delegates to the commission whose duty was to write the statute of the labor confederation.116 One of them was Şefik Hüsnü, the leader of the ICG.117 The other one
113 “Amele Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” Vakit, 18 January 1922, p. 2.
114 Paul Dumont, “Socialisme et Mouvement Ouvrier en Turquie au Lendemain de l’Armistice de Mudanya,” p. 393; According to the Komintern representative in Istanbul, there were 19 labor organizations, which had approximately 15,000 members, were involved in this enterprise. Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, pp. 25-26.
115 “1 Mayıs Mukarreratı,” İleri, 2 May 1923, p. 3. Some of these groups may not have been involved from the outset. ISP, on the other hand, was no more part of this initiative because it ceased to exit with the formation of the General Union of Workers in the period between the end of December 1922 and January 1923. I will return to this topic in the next chapter.
116 For the list of the commission members, see “Amele Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” Vakit, 18 January 1922, p. 2.
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was Kazım of Van from the IUW. The chairman of the commission was Hayrullah Hayri, a member of the Association of Ottoman Typographers. Şakir Rasim was another important one in the commission that consisted of 6 members.118
At the end of 1922, the communist movement stood at the center of a network of complex relations. Not only was this movement in touch with the socialists in Ankara, but it also had considerable influence in the reorganization of the labor movement. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, the communists developed informal relations with the radicals in the Mim-Mim group to whom some of the existing sources refer as Kemalist-communists. Of the Mim-Mim members, Mehmet of Hemşin and his friends were in contact with such communist leaders as Kazım of Van and (Baytar) Ali Cevdet.119 Several members of the group were reportedly attending the communist meetings taking place in the Fatih area of the city.120
The international communist movement was engaged in this network of relations as well. The Comintern representative Gafurov (or Şarki) was a member of the Organization Bureau. He appears to have been very active in the reorganization of the local communist
117 This group had considerable weight in the labor coalition underway. Although ICG’s labor organization, i.e. the Turkish Workers Association had been closed by then, this group was involved in this coalition under the cover of the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party. “1 Mayıs Mukarreratı,” İleri, 2 May 1923, p. 3.
118 The other two members were Aziz Avni and Hakkı Beys of whom we know nothing.
119 It seems that Mehmet of Hemşin continued to be in touch with Kazım of Van until 1924. In February 1924, Kazım of Van reported about his relations with comrades Mehmet and Mahmut, who were most likely Mehmet of Hemşin and Mahmut of Hemşin. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, 1919-1926. 2. Cilt, 1924-Mart 1926, (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları, 2013), pp. 22-23.
120 İstanbul Vilayetine,” TİTE, 70/3; Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaset-i Celilesine,” TİTE, 70/3, 21 July 1923
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movement under a single party, reporting to the Comintern headquarters about the development of this process.121 A union of Russian maritime transportation workers issued a statement of support for the “organization of Turkish labor unions”.122 Moreover, according to one Turkish intelligence report, it was very likely that the Trans-Caucasian Trade Delegation in Istanbul provided support for Numan’s efforts to seize control of the labor movement.123
The Trade Delegation was a Bolshevik enterprise operating in Istanbul. Although there is no precise information about when it was established,124 the British intelligence service reported on its activities as early as August 1921.125 Another report written by an agent of the Turkish national movement in April 1922 refers to the activities of the Trade Delegation as well.126 According to both reports, there were communists of different
121 Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut have published several reports by Şarki to the Komintern in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 295-314.
122 “Türkiye İşçi Birlikleri Teşkilatına Hitapname,” TİTE, 61/38.
123 TİTE, 44/95. This document is not dated, but it is clear that it was written after Numan’s arrival in Istanbul and before the municipal elections, which began in the second half of January.
124 With reference to a report by the British intelligence service, Paul Dumont speaks of the establishment of a “Russian Trade (Commercial) Delegation” in Istanbul around March 1921. Paul Dumont, “Socialisme, Communisme et Mouvement Ouvrier à Istanbul,” p. 313. But I couldn’t confirm if this organization and the Trans-Caucasian Trade Delegation were the same entities.
125 FO, 371/6527, “The Transcaucasian Trade Delegation in Constantinople,” 10 August 1921.
126 “Dersaadet’teki Rus Bolşevikleri Hakkındaki Malumat ve Tahrirattır,” TİTE, 60/51, 09 April 1922.
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nationalities involved in this entity, and many of them were from the Caucasus.127 The British report in question speaks of the formation of a new financial enterprise, i.e. the Financial Industrial Bank, in connection with the Trade Delegation. The task of this bank was to provide funds for all the Turkish nationalist and “Bolshevik-Kemalist” groups that allowed the spread of communist ideas in Near East.
What needs to be emphasized here is that Numan was not only a national socialist but also associated with the Union and Progress network. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ali İhsan the Blind was one of the leaders of this network. After the military occupation of Istanbul, Ali İhsan moved to Ankara, where he became the principal ideologue of the Representation of Professions program while dealing with the Solidarity (Tesanüt) network. After the conclusion of the Independence War, the Solidarists (Tesanütçüler) began to be active in the ranks of the Union and Progress movement in Istanbul. Although he never publicly acknowledged, Numan was associated with this movement as well.128
It is noteworthy that the communist leadership was completely aware of Numan’s attachment to the Union and Progress network. In a report addressed to the Comintern headquarters on January 22, 1923, Şefik Hüsnü speaks of the “resuscitation of the Union and Progress from its ashes”.129 He states his conviction that Numan was working for the Union and Progress, whose cadres were energetically organizing among the workers and
127 The British report notes that the president of the Trade Delegation was one Karp Modabadze.
128 TİTE, 44/95. This report asserted that Numan’s activities had to do with the intention of the Unionist leadership to dominate the labor movement in Istanbul.
129 Şefik Hüsnü (O. Masdar), “Au Présidium de l’exécutive de l’ I.C,” 22 January 1923, TÜSTAV Komintern Arşivi, cd: 24_25_b, file: 32_36, pp. 463-469.
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artisans.130 Şefik Hüsnü also highlights that some other labor delegates he was working with were certainly receiving instructions from the Unionist leaders. None of this, however, refrained the local communist movement from collaborating with Numan and his friends in labor politics.
This collaboration, in fact, had a broader significance in Şefik Hüsnü’s political calculations. In his aforementioned report, Şefik Hüsnü argues that the Turkish communist movement adopted the strategy of drawing on the authority of the opposition party, i.e. the Union and Progress, by preserving its own independent line.131 Şefik Hüsnü attributes two basic goals to this strategy. One of them was to benefit from Numan’s prestige for the founding of a strong labor organization. The other was to put an end to the arbitrary policies of the ruling party, removing it from power if possible. This statement demonstrates that Şefik Hüsnü considered the communist movement on the opposition side against the prevailing government, which accounts to some extent for the rapprochement between the communists and Unionists in the second half of 1922.
Şefik Hüsnü’s reasoning makes sense if we remember the character of the prevailing government in Ankara. The head of the cabinet was Rauf Bey, who not only represented the anti-communist wing of the First Group, but also received support from the conservative deputies of the Second Group, which became clear when he was elected Prime Minister in July 1922. One of the important actions he performed in this capacity was the purge of the communist leaders in Ankara. As a nationalist statesman who had close relations with the ruling circles in Istanbul, he also had a finger at the Ottoman government’s strike against
130 Ibid. p. 466.
131 Ibid.
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the communist-led labor organizations around the same time. All such developments demonstrate that the national government over which Rauf presided was identifiable with its anti-communist character.
The attitudes of the communists leadership towards this government became manifest in a speech that Sadrettin Celal gave in the Comintern’s Fourth Congress on November 19. He spoke there of how communists were repressed in Anatolia as well as Istanbul, presenting this as one of the signs about Ankara’s readiness to come to terms with the imperialist powers for the benefits of Turkish grand bourgeoisie.132 In an article published by Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz two weeks later, Sadrettin Celal solidified his earlier argument133. He suggested that the nationalist bourgeoisie, so the Kemalist regime representing it, was no longer a revolutionary power. Hence, as the true representative of the Turkish popular masses, the duty of the Communist Party was to confront not only the imperialist powers but also the Ankara government, which had already reconciled with imperialism.134
After the conclusion of the Independence War in Anatolia, the Turkish communist movement was gradually shifting towards opposition against the national government now controlled by the right wing of the First Group. Against the backdrop of this shift, some of the communist leaders, above all Şefik Hüsnü, began to consider the Union and Progress as
132 For the complete speech, see Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut, İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, pp. 231-235.
133 For the complete article, see ibid. pp. 239-242.
134 This was an evidently different strategy from the one that had been formulated in the Baku Congress of September 1920, according to which the communists of the oppressed people were to support national struggles against imperialists
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a potential ally. This approach makes sense because at that time the Union and Progress was operating as a populist movement with considerable influence over the workers and artisans. Numan’s intervention was decisive in the revival of the labor movement after mid-December 1922. By the beginning of January 1923, however, the Istanbul General Union of Workers had already emerged as a rival to this alliance emerging in labor politics.
Istanbul General Union of Workers (GUW)
The GUW was founded on December 20, 1922, one day before the labor conference in the course of which Numan called for the constitution of a general labor confederation.135 Its president was Mehmet of Topkapı, the chief of the Mim-Mim group and a member of the commission of economic organizations.136 After the FIAA and TNCU, the GUW was the third confederation founded by the economy commission’s members and incorporated into the organizational structure of the National Defense.137 The central offices of all these three confederations were located in the same building as the headquarters of the Mim-Mim
135 Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 25. This piece of information is based on a report published by GWU’s administration in 1924. “Amele Birliği Ne Yaptı? Az Söz Çok İş,” published by Mete Tunçay in ibid. pp. 109-121.
136 “Amelemizin İttihadı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 4 January 1923, p. 3; Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 25. See Mehmet Bey’s identity card from GWU in TİTE 70/10. Mehmet Bey was also involved in the administrative board of the Association of Turkish Employment (Türk Çalıştırma Derneği), TİTE, 70/31, 24 December 1923.
137 The fact that the economy commission formed GWU is noted in a correspondence of Fevzi Pasha with Hüsamettin Ertürk, TİTE, 46/22, 12 January 1339.
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group138. Ahmet Hamdi, the secretary general of the TNCU, was also a member of the GUW’s commission of labor.139
The GUW came into existence shortly after an important interview that Mustafa Kemal, the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, had given to the Ankara based newspaper Hakimiyet-i Milliye on December 7. In this interview, Mustafa Kemal mentioned his desire to form a political party to be named the People’s Party.140 During the weeks that followed, it became clear that the new party was intended to embrace all socio-economic layers of the Turkish people among which there was supposedly no conflict in the sense of class conflicts. Mehmet of Topkapı justified the establishment of the GUW as an attempt to organize the People’s Party among the workers in Istanbul.141
It was on January 4 that the Istanbul press announced the GUW’s founding also by printing Mustafa Kemal’s telegram of congratulation on this development, wired on January 2.142 It was highlighted that the GUW did not have any political agenda or whatsoever other than protecting workers’ rights in accordance with national interests.
138 Murat Koraltürk (ed.), Ahmet Hamdi Başar’ın Hatıraları -1, p. 135.
139 In August 1923, Ahmet Hamdi accompanied Mehmet Bey in this capacity to Ankara. They made this trip in order to conduct negations with the national government. “Amele Birliği Reisi Ankara’ya Gidiyor,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 7 August 1923, p. 1.
140 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, pp. 47-49.
141 On January 2, 1923, Adnan Bey, the Turkish National Assembly’s Istanbul representative, inquired about the validity of this claim with a telegram he addressed to the Ankara government. “İcra Vekilleri Heyet-i Riyasetine,” BCA, 30.10.204.394.2, 2 January 1923. Then this inquiry was forwarded to Fevzi Pasha. “İzmir’de Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekili Müşir Fevzi Paşa Hazretlerine,” BCA, 30.10.204.394.2, 4 January 1923. This is because Mehmet claimed that he had credentials from Fevzi Pasha.
142 “Amelemizin İttihadı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 4 January 1923, p. 3
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This organization was intended to struggle with the foreign companies that pursued only their own selfish economic interests at the expense of labor rights. The GUW’s delegates expressed this view in a report submitted to the administration of the TNCU on January 23.143 This report emphasized that there was no class conflict between Turkish merchants and workers. It was only the foreign capital owners, not the Turkish merchants, who represented the real capitalist class in Turkey.144
The GUW was first organized among a group of tram workers recruited by the commission of economic organizations by mid-December 1922.145 The Union’s first branch was founded on January 1 among the tram workers of the Aksaray depot, and the second one in the Şişli depot of the Tramway Company.146 It seems that the GUW owed its influence on the tram workers to Şakir Rasim, who had been the secretary general of the Independent Socialist Party (ISP) by then. He was brought to the same position in the GUW. This new federation was built, to a large extent, on the organization of the ISP.147
There was a complex relationship between the GUW and the labor confederation controlled by the communist and socialist leaders. On the one hand, the inner
143 “İstanbul Umum Amele Birliğinin Milli Türk Ticaret Birliğine Sunduğu Rapor” in A. Gündüz Ökçün (ed.) Türkiye İktisat Kongresi. 1923-İzmir. Haberler – Belgeler –Yorumlar, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981), document no: 56, pp. 161-163,
144 For a discussion on this report, see also Paul Dumont, “Socialisme et Mouvement Ouvrier en Turquie au Lendemain de l’Armistice de Mudanya,” pp. 394-395.
145 TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922. This report by the economy commission speaks of a tram workers union to be formed within several days.
146 Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 25.
147 “İstanbul İşçileri Arasında,” Aydınlık, no: 12, 6 January 1923, p. 317.
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correspondences of the National Defense organization underlined that the GUW’s goal was to save the labor movement from the influence of the communists and Unionists.148 The leaders of the confederation were aware of this intention. Therefore, they felt the need to change the name of their enterprise from the Federation of General Worker Unions (Umum Amele Birlikleri Heyet-i Müttehidesi) to the Federation of Istanbul Worker Organizations (hereafter FIWO, İstanbul İşçi Teşkilatları Heyet-i Müttehidesi) to avoid any association with the GUW, i.e. Istanbul General Union of Workers (İstanbul Umum Amele Birliği).149
On the other hand, the GUW was still engaged in the labor confederation initiated by Numan. On December 21, Şakir Rasim was one of the participants in Numan’s public conference. Right before this important event, the ISP hosted a feast for Numan Usta in which all members of the party’s executive offices were present.150 Soon after the GUW’s establishment was made public, the administration of this organization publicly highlighted its support for the labor confederation.151 Afterwards, Şakir Rasim began to work with Şefik Hüsnü and Kazım of Van in the commission responsible for writing the statute of the labor confederation.152
The reluctant relationship between the FIWO and the GUW continued only until March 1923. What followed was a complete rupture, accompanied by a more accelerated
148 TİTE, 42/53, 13 December 1922; TİTE, 67/60, 30 January 1923. See also Fevzi Pasha’s note to Colonel İhsan Bey in which he emphasized the importance of the GUW for protecting workers from “harmful (muzır) movements”. TİTE, 46/94, 2 March 1923.
149 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 729
150 “Numan Usta,” İleri, 23 December 1922, p. 2.
151 “Umum Amele Birliği’nin Tevzihi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, p. 4.
152 “Amele Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” Vakit, 18 January 1922, p. 2.
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struggle for the leadership of the labor movement. This was a direct outcome of the Unionist leadership’s break away from the republican bloc embodied in the First Group. The aim of the final chapter is to explore the unfolding of this process in Istanbul.
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CHAPTER VI: PURGE OF THE LEFT
At the beginning of 1923, the administrative status of Istanbul was not clear yet. Although the War of Independence was over, the negotiations for a peace treaty that had started in Lausanne on November 11, 1922, were still continuing. The final accord would not be signed earlier than July 19231. During this interim period, the Allied occupation was still formally in effect. On the other hand, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had been consolidating its authority over the Ottoman capital since November 4, 1922. Even though the sovereignty of the sultanate had been abolished, the caliphate of the Ottoman dynasty remained intact while the new political regime was being institutionalized.
The Turkish national movement was highly fragmented in this political context. The National Defense organization had acquired a semi-official status with the introduction of the national regime. Although Colonel İhsan Bey had been presiding over this organization since mid-December 1922, the group around Esat and Hafız Besim was still influential on the organization’s military cadres who controlled most of the district committees of resistance throughout Istanbul. This faction that included many former Unionists was in
1 For the progress of the Lozan negotiations and the consequences of this process for Turkish politics, see Mahmut Goloğolu, Milli Mücadele Tarihi – V. 1923. Türkiye Cumhriyeti, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), pp. 3-48; 209-220.
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close touch with the opposition to Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. This relationship became evident in March 1923, when the deputies associated with the Second Group began to organize in Istanbul for the upcoming general elections. Esat and Hafız Besim immediately joined the activities of the Second Group in Istanbul.2 Ahmet İzzet Pasha collaborated with the Second Group as well.3
After this faction lost control of the National Defense organization, the influence of the Mim-Mim group greatly increased. The Mim-Mim leaders, who had constantly contested the authority of Esat Bey and his friends, became very active in the administration of the National Defense.4 The Mim-Mim also dominated the National Defense’s commission of economic organizations. Between November 1922 and January 1923, this commission formed three large confederations: the Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA), the Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU), and the Istanbul General Union of Workers (GUW). Unlike the rival faction, the leadership of the economy commission was working in tandem with the First Group, which would later underlie Mustafa Kemal’s People’s Party.
There was a reluctant cooperation between the Mim-Mim group and the Union and Progress network. Presided over by Kara Kemal, the Unionist network drew on its former relations with the artisan associations to check the Mim-Mim’s growing influence. But this policy was never carried to the point of dispersing the FIAA. On the other hand, the Union
2 TİTE, 42/41, 20 March 1923; TİTE, 45/23, 17 March 1923.
3 Ibid.
4 The records of the National Defense’s decisions between December 1922 and March 1923 shows that Mehmet of Topkapı carried out a number of important duties in the name of the National Defense, such as conducting the organization’s relations with Kara Kemal’s group and the representatives of the First Group in Istanbul. TİTE, 33/14.
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and Progress became an important actor in labor politics through the Istanbul deputy Numan Usta, who led the formation of the Federation of Istanbul Worker Organizations (FIWO). The Mim-Mim leaders founded the GUW largely because they intended to counterbalance Numan’s great authority over the labor movement. Until March 1923, however, the GUW never completely broke away from the FIWO.
The communist movement was de facto involved in the reluctant alliance between the Mim-Mim and the Unionist network. Several communist leaders developed informal relations with the resistance movement through their connections with Mehmet of Hemşin, one of the founders of the Mim-Mim group. More importantly, the communists played a key role in the founding of the FIWO. In mid-December 1922, they began to collaborate with Numan Usta for the establishment of a labor confederation. Numan was a socialist deputy associated with the First Group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He was also in contact with the Union and Progress network in Istanbul, which was operating as a leftist-populist movement with an explicit republican orientation.
In January 1923, there were multiple organizations, circles, and factions associated with the Turkish national movement, but all these groups were lined up around two broad coalitions. One of them had an anti-Kemalist orientation in a broad sense, and connected with the Second Group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The other one relied on an alliance among the Mim-Mim group, the Union and Progress, and the communist circles unified under the Turkish Communist Party since the Comintern Congress in November-December 1922. This alliance was manifest particularly in the labor movement, and connected with the radical wing of the First Group.
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This chapter aims to shed light on how this political setting radically changed in the course of the period between January and October 1923. I show that the republican coalition came to disintegrate in March, towards the end of the municipal elections. What followed was the organization of the First Group in Istanbul separately from the National Defense and the Union and Progress. This was accompanied by the purge of the populist and communist groups from the national movement at the time that the First Group began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Second Group. The elimination of the left wing went hand in hand with the rise of a more aggressive campaign for nationalizing the economy that targeted non-Muslims at popular level. By the time the Turkish Republic was promulgated on October 1923, anti-communism and nationalism had already dominated the Turkish national movement in Istanbul.
Municipal Elections
In mid-January 1923, Mustafa Kemal attempted to give a more institutional form to the coalition associated with the First Group. He took an important step towards this goal during his visit to İzmit on January 16 and 17, where he publicly repeated his desire to build a political organization to be called the People’s Party.5 In the course of this visit, Mustafa Kemal met Ebuzziya Velid from the Mim-Mim group as well as Kara Kemal, the leader of the Union and Progress network in Istanbul.6 Also present in this meeting was Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), who would become one of the most prominent intellectual
5 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, p. 49.
6 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 133.
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and political figures of the Turkish Republic. Yakup Kadri represented the Istanbul branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights.
The Istanbul Defense of National Rights was formed in August 1922. According to the available intelligence reports, this organization came into being as a result of a split from the National Defense.7 Reportedly, it was (Salahorzade) Ziya Bey who initiated this division while working in the National Defense’s district committee in Erenköy, a neighborhood located on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. By the end of January 1923, the Istanbul National Rights had been organized in 7-8 different districts of the city.8 However, neither the National Defense’s current administration nor the Mim-Mim leaders ever recognized this group as an official branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights, i.e. the First Group.9 It was claimed that the Istanbul National Rights had been formed independently from and without the approval of the organization’s headquarters in Ankara.
Yakup Kadri’s memoirs bear witness to the shaky foundations of the republican bloc under consideration. What we learn from his narrative is that Mustafa Kemal proposed the unification of all these groups – Mim-Mim, the Union and Progress, and the Istanbul Defense of National Rights – under the Society for the Defense of National Rights.10 According to Yakup Kadri, Kara Kemal seemed eager to accept this proposal. He even denied the
7 TİTE, 33/13; TİTE, 42/109, 24 January 1923. See also Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, pp. 526-527.
8 TİTE, 42/109, 24 January 1923.
9 Ibid.
10 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), pp. 27-31.
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existence of the Union and Progress as an independent political entity. If Yakup Kadri’s narrative is correct, Kara Kemal described the group he was leading only as an informal circle – not a political movement – which brought together some of the former CUP members, whose aim was nothing but to contribute to the national cause. Ebuzziya Velid’s attitude was completely different. He considered himself delegate of the National Defense as a whole, implying that this organization was the only legitimate representative of the national movement in Istanbul.11
Ebuzziya insisted on this approach afterwards, adopting quite an aggressive attitude towards the Union and Progress and the National Rights in the first meeting between the delegates of all these groups in Istanbul.12 The National Defense’s Central Committee was of the same opinion as Ebuzziya. This became clear right before the municipal elections that started towards the end of January.13 The official representative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Istanbul, Adnan (Adıvar) Bey urged the National Defense, the Union and Progress, and the National Rights to participate in the elections as a common bloc. However, the National Defense objected to this strategy. The organization’s central bureau repeated the claims that Kara Kemal’s group had nothing to do with the CUP, which had been dissolved after World War I, and that the National Rights was not in fact associated with the Society for the Defense of National Rights.14 Therefore, the National Defense
11 Yakup Kadri relates this point of Ebuzziya as though he was speaking of the Mim-Mim group, not the National Defense. Ibid. p. 28. But it is clear that Ebuzziya was referring to the National Defense whose administration changed hands in December 1922.
12 Ibid. pp. 31-32.
13 For the list of candidates in the elections, see “Belediye İntihabatı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 19 January 1923, p. 3.
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should be the single organization representing the national movement in the municipal elections.
The municipal elections constituted the beginning of the end for the unstable coalition of the forces in question. These elections were held to appoint members of Istanbul’s municipal council, and completed in mid-March 1923.15 Despite all its objections, the National Defense participated in the elections under a coalition with the Union and Progress and National Rights groups.16 Toward the end of the elections, however, this pact was broken. Although the existing sources do not provide us with a clear picture of why this happened, it is certain that the other two groups excluded the National Defense.17 In the end, the candidates of the Union and Progress and the National Rights acquired a majority in the new municipal council.18
It seems that the coalition from which the National Defense (and thus the Mim-Mim group) was excluded incorporated certain elements associated with the Second Group. Hüsamettin Ertürk, the chief of the General Staff’s Intelligence Bureau, pointed to this in a
14 TİTE, 42/109, 24 January 1923.
15 On March 3, the elections were still continuing in the Kadıköy area. “Kadıköy Seçimleri Devam Ediyor,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 3 March 1923, p. 4.
16 On this subject, see Hüsnü Bey’s statement in the Ankara trials of 1926, Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, p. 366.
17 Hüsnü Bey states that the National Rights also had problems with Mim-Mim, and it was the latter group that broke the coalition by not accepting some of the Union and Progress’ candidates that had been approved at the beginning of the elections. Ibid. pp. 366-367.
18 TİTE, 46/14. This document shows that İhsan Bey, the president of the National Defense, misinformed Hüsamettin Ertürk about the results of the elections in the first place. It seems that İhsan Bey sent a telegraph to Hüsamettin Bey, the chief of the general staff’s intelligence bureau in which he stated that the National Defense won the elections. Hüsamettin found out the actual results from the Tanin newspaper.
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memo he sent to Mehmet of Topkapı.19 Of those elected to the Istanbul municipal council, according to Hüsamettin Bey, several figures were working with the Second Group. This claim certainly had some element of truth because Hafız Kemal was a common candidate of the Union and Progress and the Istanbul Defense of National Rights from the Fatih area.20 Hafız Kemal had been associated with the faction of Esat Bey and Hafız Besim that had presided over the central bureau of the National Defense until mid-December 1922. Another report sent by the new administration of the National Defense to Ankara in March 1923 spoke of Esat and Hafız Besim’s close relations with the National Rights group in Istanbul.21
General Elections
In any case, the municipal elections formed a significant turning point for the national movement. One of the immediate consequences of this process was the decline of the National Defense’s prestige in Ankara. After its failure in the elections, the leaders of the First Group lost confidence in the National Defense’s ability to cope with the opposition of the Second Group. Therefore, they decided to build the First Group in Istanbul. Upon the recommendation of Mustafa Kemal, the group charged the deputies Kılıç Ali and Hoca Rasih Efendi with this duty.22 These two central figures of the First Group came to Istanbul in the
19 Ibid. This document was addressed to “Demir Bey,” which was the pseudonym of Mehmet of Topkapı.
20 See Vehbi Bey’s statement on this subject in Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, pp. 456-457.
21 TİTE, 42/41, 20 March 1923.
22 TİTE, 46/14.
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second half of March. They formed the Kadıköy branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights towards the end of the month.23 Until that time, the official authorities did not recognize the existence of this society in Istanbul.24
At the same time, the National Defense cut all its relations with the Union and Progress. This rupture became most clear in the labor movement. At the beginning of March, Fevzi Pasha, the chief of the military staff, sent a memo to Istanbul, asking the administration of the National Defense to expel the Unionist agents that had infiltrated into the GUW.25 Around the same time, Şakir Rasim, the GUW’s secretary general, began to sabotage the activities of the FIWO. He declared that the GUW had already been formed as a labor confederation; thus there was no need for another union of this character. On March 23, Şakir Rasim and his men attended one of Numan Usta’s public conferences given in the opening ceremony of the tram, funicular and electric workers’ club in Şişli.26 They protested Numan, accusing him of being an agent of the Union and Progress, not a sincere labor delegate.
Meanwhile, the Second Group was on its way to organize more firmly in Istanbul. Some of the deputies associated with this group were dispatched to the city. Among them were Kara Vasıf, Çolak Selahattin, Hulusi Bey, Nafiz Bey and Sami Bey. Their goal was to create the Istanbul branch of the Second Group in the Ottoman capital.27 As noted above,
23 “İstanbul’da Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Teşkilatı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 31 March 1923.
24 “İstanbul’da Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Var Mı?,”Tevhid-i Efkar, 13 March 1923.
25 TİTE, 46/9, 2 March 1923; see also TİTE, 62/9 and TİTE 63/3.
26 Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 29.
27 TİTE, 46/16.
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the Second Group immediately began working with the faction around Esat Bey and Hafız Besim that had a significant following among the officers. According to the reports sent to Hüsamettin Ertürk in March 1923, the agents of the Second Group were conducting unprecedentedly intensive agitation and propaganda in the army.28 It was reported that almost every officer was reading the newspaper Tan, the official publication of the Second Group since January 1923.29
Another significant development reported in mid-March was the increasing degree of communication between Unionist leaders.30 It was asserted that Kara Kemal was regularly meeting with the former leaders of the CUP, many of who had been either abroad or in Anatolia during the War of Independence. Among the Unionist figures enumerated in this report were İsmail Canbolad, Doktor Nazım, Şükrü Bey, Hafız Mehmet, Hilmi Bey, and Nail Bey. The goal of their meetings was to convene a Unionist congress in Istanbul. This assembly was supposed to bring together not only the principal cadres of the Union and Progress network that was active in Istanbul, but also tho Unionist leaders who had pursued different political trajectories during the national struggle by joining the First Group or the Second Group, or staying abroad.
28 TİTE, 45/23, 21 March 1923.
29 For more information on this daily, see Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, pp. 61-63.
30 TİTE, 45/23, 18 March 1923.
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The Unionist congress under consideration took place shortly after the Turkish Grand National Assembly called a general election on April 1.31 In his important study, The Unionist Factor, Eric Jan Zürcher sheds light on how the congress was organized, and which decisions were taken there by using most of the available sources on this subject.32 What we learn from Zürcher’s research is that the Unionists met in the house of Cavid Bey, who had been finance minister during much of World War I. There were 15 to 20 figures present in the negotiations that continued 2 days. In addition to Kara Kemal, Cavit and many of those referred to in the previous paragraph, Ali İhsan the Blind, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Hüseyinzade Ali, Ahmet Nesimi (Sayman), Ahmet Şükrü and Dr. Rüsuhi were some of the participants.
The underlying goal of the congress was to find out whether the CUP could be revived as a movement incorporating different political and ideological tendencies. This proved to be an impossible undertaking at this stage. The only concrete outcome of the congress was a draft programme that consisted of 9 articles. According to Zürcher, “[t]he nine point programme aimed at a more conventional Western-type democracy than that current in Ankara under the Teşkilati Esasiye Kanunu [Fundamental Law], with two chambers, division of powers, a new constitution and with Istanbul as capital”.33 In fact, this programme, which was not shared with the public, was insufficient in bring about a unified movement of various factions that had a Unionist background.
31 “Büyük Millet Meclisi Yeni İntihabat İcraasına Karar Verdi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 2 April 1923, pp. 1-2. The congress met by April 6. “İttihat ve Terakki İntihabata Karışıyor Mu?,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 6 April 1923, p. 1.
32 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor. pp. 133-135.
33 Ibid. p. 135.
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On April 8, 1923, Mustafa Kemal announced that the First Group would be turned into the People’s Party after the elections, which practically meant that the former would compete in the elections.34 Whether the Union and Progress would take part in the elections independently from the First Group or not was a much-debated topic in Istanbul especially during the first half of April.35 This question was definitively answered at the end of the month, when Kara Kemal declared in an interview with the newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar that he had withdrawn himself from politics. He added that he was not supporting any side as far as the competition between the First and Second Groups was concerned.36
It is noteworthy that by the time Kara Kemal made this statement, the leaders of the opposition had already declared that the Second Group had decided not to participate in the elections as a separate party.37 This was partly because of their disagreements concerning the Second Group’s political programme and goals. However, a fundamental change in the First Group’s approach to the opposition appears to have played a role in the disintegration of the Second Group as well. The First Group’s Istanbul branch adopted a rather conciliatory attitude towards the opposition that proved to have enjoyed considerable prestige and authority in the capital.
34 He also declared the 9 basic principles of the People’s Party in this speech that he gave in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Ahmet Demirel, Tek Partinin İktidarı. Türkiye’de Seçimler ve Siyaset (1923-1946), pp. 33-35.
35 The daily Tevhid-i Efkar reflected the public interest in this question with several news pieces published in this period: “Yeni İntihabda Mücadele Edecek Cereyanlar,” 4 April 1923, p. 1; “İttihat ve Terakki İntihabata Karışıyor Mu?,” 6 April 1923, p. 1; “İntihabat Faaliyeti ve Mücadelesi,” 12 April 1923, p. 1; Ebuziyazade (Velid) “İttihatçılık Bahsi,” p. 1.
36 “İaşe Sabık-ı Nazırı Kemal Bey Ne Diyor,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 1 May 1923.
37 For an overview of the Istanbul press’ take on the Second Group’s internal debates in the course of April, see Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, pp. 533-569.
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During April 1923, the First Group made a significant progress in expanding its organization as well as popular base in Istanbul. It secured full support of the confederations formed by the Mim-Mim group. On April 8, the GUW declared that its members would vote for the First Group.38 The FIAA issued a similar statement on the 15th of the month.39 Furthermore, in a lengthy article published by Aydınlık on May 1, Şefik Hüsnü called all communist sympathizers and workers to vote for the progressive candidates of the First Group in the general elections.40 The impression one gets from all these developments is that the republican bloc that had disintegrated in March was re-forming around the First Group, but this time without the Union and Progress.
However, the First Group’s Istanbul branch had almost nothing in common with the populist and radical movements of the preceding period. Its central bureau, which was chosen on April 2,41 incorporated certain elements that supported a rapprochement with the Second Group. Yakup Kadri was one of this bureau’s five members. Previously, he had been a leading figure of the Istanbul Defense of National Rights. In an editorial published by İkdam on April 7, Yakup Kadri spoke of the need to distinguish the Second Group’s patriotic, reasonable members, such as Hüseyin Avni, Kara Vasıf, and Süleyman Necati, from the reactionaries, such as Salih Efendi and Hoca İsmail Şükrü.42 This statement
38 “Amele Birliği’nin İtihabat Hakkındaki Kararı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, p. 2.
39 “Esnaf Heyet-i Müttehidesi’nin İçtimaı ve Kararı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, p. 1.
40 Şefik Hüsnü, “İntihabat ve Yoksul ve Orta Halli Sınıflar,” Aydınlık, no: 15, 1 May 1923, pp. 383-385.
41 “Yeni İntihabat ve ‘Müdafa-i Hukuk’,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 3 April 1923, p. 1.
42 This article is summarized by Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, pp. 549-550.
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obviously had to do with the intention to highlight, even provoke the differences and disagreements of the Second Group’s leaders. A few days after Yakup Kadri’s article, Hüseyin Avni gave an interview in which he stated that there was no significant political difference between the First and Second Groups.
Hafız Mehmet was another member of the First Group’s central bureau in Istanbul. He was a Unionist deputy from Trabzon in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Having been one of Enver’s partisans in Ankara, Hafız Mehmet had joined the Second Group.43 In March 1923, he figured among the former CUP leaders who were in close contact with Kara Kemal. However, none of the existing sources mention Hafız Besim among the participants of the Unionist congress that took place in April because Hafız Mehmet had already joined the Istanbul branch of the First Group by then.
The developments summarized above suggest that the Union and Progress network and the First Group competed to recruit the Unionists affiliated with the Second Group into their own ranks. This competition intensified in April, and it was one of the factors that led the opposition to withdraw from the elections. The Second Group had been formed as a common platform of diverse political and ideological tendencies, whose common goal was nothing more than opposing to the growing authority of Mustafa Kemal. This heterogeneous group lacked any kind of programmatic unity to keep its members together in the face of political pressure exercised by both the Union and Progress and the First Group. Ahmet Demirel’s research on the Second Group’s internal debates demonstrates
43 Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, p. 129.
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that all the attempts of the opposition to come up with a political programme had failed by the end of April.44
There is no reliable source of information about negotiations surely taking place behind the scenes between the leaders of the First and Second Groups. What we know is that the Second Group withdrew from the general elections, and the Union and Progress did not succeed in incorporating this group’s members that were of a Unionist background. This was most probably why Kara Kemal decided not to participate in the elections. As a result, the First Group remained as the only organization represented in the general elections. It thus managed to send all of its 15 candidates to parliament45. The list of the candidates that had been prepared under the supervision of Mustafa Kemal did not incorporate any figure once associated with the Second Group. However, the right wing of the First Group that had been in touch with the opposition had considerable weight among the new deputies of Istanbul. Rauf and Refet Beys were elected to parliament from Istanbul. So was Ali Fethi Bey, the Interior Minister who led the purge of the left wing of the national movement.
Purge of the Left
The results of the general elections reflected the changing balance of power in the national movement. Until March 1923, the communist movement was an essential element of the populist coalition de facto formed towards the end of the previous year. Of the other
44 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, pp. 533-568.
45 “İstanbul Mebusları da Dün İntihab Edildi ve Kamilan Paşa’nın Namzedleri Kazandı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 29 June 1923.
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components of this bloc, the Mim-Mim group included a radical group of activists collaborating with the communists. And the Union and Progress network was identified as a left-wing populist movement. There was no one from these organizations among the new deputies of the First Group in Istanbul. On the contrary, the national government had already begun to move against the left wing of the national movement, starting with communists, by the time the elections were held at the end of June.
The communist movement’s relationship with the coalition that took shape around the First Group was rather problematic from the outset. The main components of the unified Turkish Communist Party – Istanbul Communist Group (ICG) and the International Union of Workers (IUW) – continued working with Numan Usta in the FIWO whereas the leadership of the party adopted the strategy of supporting the First Group as the most progressive wing of the Turkish national movement.46 On the other hand, the GUW had been struggling against Numan Usta and the FIWO to save the labor movement from the influence of the communists and Unionists. In return, the communist publications were accusing the GUW of betraying the interests of workers and surrendering the labor movement to the initiative of the government.47 The partition of the labor movement became evident in the May Day of 1923. The GUW and the FIWO celebrated the Labor Day in two separate meetings.48
46 For a detailed account of the strategy pursued by the communists’ in the general elections, see İsmail Göldaş, “1923 Seçimleri ve Sol. TKP/TİÇSF/İşçi Örgütleri” in Takrir-i Sükun Görüşmeleri: 1923 Seçimleri, Atama Meclis,” (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1997), pp. 236-286.
47 Ibid. p. 252-256; Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, pp. 24-38.
48 Ibid. pp. 30-33; “1 Mayıs Mukarreratı,” İleri, 2 May 1923; “Amele Bayramı,” Tanin, p. 2.
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This tension was eventually resolved when the government cracked down on the Communist Party in May 1923. The pretext of this operation was a leaflet distributed by the communist activists for the Labor Day.49 This leaflet inveighed against the GUW for serving the interest of bourgeoisie and identified its leader Şakir Rasim as an enemy of workers. It also criticized the People’s Party for defending the interests of privileged classes.50 On April 28, a telegram sent from Istanbul informed the Ankara government of this leaflet, claiming that it insulted Mustafa Kemal. Right after the publication of Şefik Hüsnü’s article that called for support to the First Group in the elections, around 20 communists were arrested for an attempt to overthrow the government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The communists arrested, including Şefik Hüsnü, Ali Cevdet, Sadrettin Celal, and Kazım of Van, were set free on June 7 to be tried later in August.51 Although nobody was imprisoned in the end,52 the case confirmed that the communist movement would remain illegal in Turkey. Furthermore, the FIWO ceased activity after the arrest of the communists who formed the driving force of this enterprise. This allowed the GUW to rapidly grow after the May Day of 1923. There were no more than 50 workers who became member to this union when it was founded in December 192253. In the spring of 1923, it was still a small organization that reportedly brought together no more than 500 members affiliated
49 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar, p. 734.
50 The transcription of this leaflet is published in ibid. pp. 836-838.
51 “Mahkeme Komünistleri Tahliye Etti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 7 June 1923, p. 3.
52 The case was closed with the declaration of a general amnesty as required by the Lozan Peace Treaty. Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 260, footnote: 195.
53 Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 109.
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with 5-6 different labor unions.54 In April 1924, however, the GUW had more than 7,000 members organized in 32 different labor associations.55 In October 1923, it was turned into a nation-wide confederation with the participation of several other labor organizations outside Istanbul.56
Yet the GUW, too, got its share from the anti-communist context of the period. Following the Istanbul elections, around the middle of July, the Interior Minister Ali Fethi Bey launched an investigation about Mehmet of Topkapı, the president of the GUW and the chief of the Mim-Mim group.57 This investigation was concerned with the relationship between the Mim-Mim group and the communist organizations. Both Mehmet of Hemşin and Mehmet of Topkapı were charged with collaborating with communists. Thereafter, Mehmet of Topkapı was called to Ankara, where he stayed between August 7 and 20.58 According to Tevhid-i Efkar, the reason of this visit was to conduct negotiations with the government on several topics related to labor affairs.59 After his return to Istanbul,
54 See Şarki’s report in Mete Tunçay and Erden Akbulut in İstanbul Komünist Grubu’ndan Türkiye Komünist Partisi’ne, p. 311.
55 “Amele Birligi Ne Yaptı? Az Söz Çok İş,” the complete document has been published by Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, Appendix: IV/4, pp. 109-121.
56 It was then renamed as the Turkish General Worker Union (Türkiye Umum Amele Birligi). Ibid. p. 70.
57 “İstanbul Vilayetine,” TİTE, 70/3.
58 “Amele Birliği Reisi Mehmet Bey Ankara’ya Gidiyor,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 7 August 1923, p. 1; “Mehmet Bey’in Avdeti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, p. 3.
59 Ibid.
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Mehmet Bey remained silent for some time, and he eventually stepped down from the GUW’s presidency on October 17.60
Mehmet Bey’s resignation apparently had to do with a larger operation that targeted the left wing of the national movement. When he went to Ankara, the communist leaders were being tried in Istanbul61 Few days after the second Turkish Grand National Assembly was opened on August 11, Rauf Bey resigned, and Ali Fethi was appointed in his place.62 It seems that the cabinet Ali Fethi formed did not favor the existence of socialists in the bureaucracy. In the first week of October, Vehbi Bey and Nizamettin Bey, the directors of commerce and industry at the Ministry of Economy, respectively, had to resign because of their socialist background.63
Nationalism
The end of Mehmet of Topkapı’s authority in the GUW was immediately accompanied by the rise of hostile attitudes towards non-Muslims in labor politics. On August 16, while Mehmet was still in Ankara, the secretary general Şakir Rasim organized a meeting in the GUW’s central bureau with the delegates of the tram and funicular employees.64 The aim of this meeting was to draw the attention of the public opinion to the employment of a large
60 “Amele Birliği Reisi Mehmet Bey İstifa Etti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 18 September 1923, p. 1.
61 “Komünistlerin Muhakemesi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 13 August 1923, p. 3.
62 “Meclis Dün Heyet-i Vekileyi İntihab Etti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 15 August 1923, p. 1.
63 “Sosyalist Oldukları İçin İstifa Etmişler,” Tevhid-i Efkar, p. 3.
64 “Türk Amelenin Şirketlerden Haklı Şikayeti,” İleri, 17 August 1923, p.1; “Şirketler Müslüman Amele Kullanmalıdırlar,” Vakit, 17 August 1923, p. 1; “Tramvay ve Tünel Şirketlerinin Milletimiz Hakareti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 17 August 1923, p. 1.
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number of non-Muslims by the foreign companies in the city. In addition to the foreign companies, the labor delegates accused the state commissars who represented the government in the administration of public utilities of not protecting the Muslim and Turkish employees against the non-Muslims and foreigners.
The GUW was a nationalist labor union organized exclusively among the Muslim workers since its formation.65 Until the meeting in mid-August, however, the foreign companies constituted the main target of its nationalist rhetoric mixed with a vague notion of anti-imperialism. In the first week of August, the GUW even led a strike movement to which a group of non-Muslim workers participate. This strike movement broke out on August 4 at the Bomonti Beer Factory, a foreign enterprise whose headquarters was in Geneva.66 There were some 300 workers involved in this movement, and 97 of them were non-Muslim.67 The strike lasted less than three days, and the workers defeated the company thanks to the intervention of the Economy Minister Mahmut Esat in their favor.
The public meeting on August 16 demonstrates that the GUW shifted the focus of its nationalist agitation from the foreign companies to the non-Muslim workers in less than two weeks. Şakir Rasim – who had increased his authority over the GUW in the absence of Mehmet Bey – resorted to the policy of nationalizing the labor force by demanding the dismissal of non-Muslims. This proved to be an effective strategy. Two days after the GUW’s press conference, the state commissars felt the need to publicly defend themselves by
65 Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 34.
66 Paul Dumont, “Socialisme et Mouvement Ouvrier en Turquie au Lendemain de l’Armistice de Mudanya,” p. 414.
67 “Bomonti Amelesinin Grevi İtham Buldu,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 6 August 1923, p. 1.
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drawing attention to their ongoing efforts for the employment of more Muslims workers.68 On the same day, they submitted a common petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They asked the Ministry to put more pressure on the foreign companies for the replacement of Christians and foreigners with Muslim employees.69
The rise of this xenophobic attitude in this particular period was not a coincidence. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Turkish National Commerce Union (TNCU) was one of the organizations associated with the National Defense’s economy commission. In August 1923, the TNCU engaged in an attempt to “nationalize” the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry.70 Since its formation in 1880, the non-Muslims had been dominant in the activities and administration of this important institution, which organized and recorded all kinds of commercial transactions in Istanbul.71 At the Chamber’s annual congress in August, all non-Muslims were excluded from its board of directors. The members of the TNCU were brought to key positions in the administration of this institution. Hüseyin Bey of Kavala, the president of the TNCU, was also elected president of the Chamber in the congress.
68 “Şirket Komiserleri Kendilerini Müdafaa Ediyorlar,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 19 August 1923, p. 2.
69 BOA, HR.IM, 20/99, 18 August 1923.
70 This paragraph is summarized from Murat Koraltürk, “İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası’nın Türkleştirilmesi,” pp. 130-142.
71 The Chamber had undergone a series of transformations from its formation to nationalization. For the history of this process, see Ufuk Gülsoy and Bayram Nazır, Türkiye’de Ticaretin Öncü Kuruluşu Dersaadet Ticaret Odası, 1882-1923, (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 2003); Hakkı Nezihi, 50 Yıllık Oda Hayatı, (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Yayınları, 1932); Murat Koraltürk, Türkiye’de Ticaret ve Sanayi Odalarının Tarihsel Gelişimi, (1880-1952), (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2002); Celal Yerman and Samet Ağaoğlu, Türkiye İktisadi Teşkilatında Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları, Esnaf Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları, (Ankara: Titaş Basımevi, 1943), pp. 30-36.
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These developments were the precursors of the Turkification campaigns that troubled Istanbul’s non-Muslim communities during the 1920s and 30s. They emerged in parallel with the gradual change of the political atmosphere in Istanbul. The magnitude of this change became apparent only two days before the Turkish Republic was promulgated in Ankara. On October 27, the GUW proposed the anti-communist leader Rauf Bey to become president of the organization in place of Mehmet of Topkapı.72
72 “Amele Birliği Riyaseti Rauf Bey’e Teklif Olundu,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 28 October 1923, p. 3.
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CONCLUSION
The Unionist cadres laid the foundations of the resistance movement after the Ottoman defeat in World War I. They first founded the Karakol society when the Allied powers occupied the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. Karakol not only smuggled men and ammunition to Anatolia, but it also formed armed committees of resistance throughout Istanbul to protect the Muslim population. In 1921, the administration of such committees was delegated to the Central Committee of the National Defense. The National Defense became the main organization representing the authority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Istanbul. This organization was affiliated with the General Staff in Ankara.
Over the second half of 1922, the Unionists were politically divided into two rival camps. It seems that this division originated initially from a new strategy Enver adopted in his struggle for leadership with Mustafa Kemal, who presided over the Society for the Defense of National Rights, i.e. the First Group. Having failed to seize control of the Anatolian movement, Enver came to terms with the Ottoman Sultanate. Thereafter, his followers in Istanbul joined forces with various politic circles that had ties to the Ottoman government. This coalition dominated the Central Committee of the National Defense until December 1922.
The Second Group of the Defense of National Rights emerged in the Turkish Grand National Assembly simultaneously with this coalition in Istanbul. The Second Group unified the deputies of diverse political and ideological leanings, including those loyal to Enver, in
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opposition to Mustafa Kemal and the radical members of the First Group that rallied around him. The government controlled by the radicals pursued a policy of rapprochement with the Bolshevik Russia following the defeat of a major Greek offensive in September 1921. The members of the Second Group voted for the election of Rauf Bey as Prime Minister in July 1922. Rauf represented the anti-communists in the First Group, and the cabinet he formed included several ministers from the members of the Second Group. One of the first actions of this cabinet was to take repressive measures against the communists in Ankara. Meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior was Ali Fethi Bey, who would become Prime Minister in August 1923.
Against the backdrop of this political context, Istanbul witnessed the rise of a large unionization movement among the artisans and workers. One of the political elements initiating this process was the Union and Progress network that broke away from the National Defense organization in the second half of 1922. Having organized its own committees throughout the Muslim quarters of Istanbul and exercised considerable authority over the artisan corporations, the Union and Progress was a left-wing populist movement. In November 1922, the members of this movement began working in the Federation of Istanbul Artisan Associations (FIAA), which was formed by the National Defense’s economy commission. This commission was under the control of the Mim-Mim group.
There was a radical circle represented in the Mim-Mim group by such figures as Mehmet of Hemşin and Mehmet of Topkapı. The activists of this circle are often identified as Kemalist-communists in the existing primary sources. They informally collaborated with a group of communists associated with the IUW (International Union of Workers) and the
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ICG (Istanbul Communist Group), which were merged under the roof of the Turkish Communist Party towards the end of 1922. All these groups as well as the Union and Progress network participated in the founding of a labor confederation in January 1923. This confederation was later named as the Federation of Istanbul Worker Organizations (FIWO).
The forces that brought about these unionization movements were in contact with the radicals of the First Group who had lost control of the national government after the Rauf Bey cabinet was installed in July 1922. A worker of a Unionist background who identified himself as a national socialist, the Istanbul deputy Numan Usta was one the key figures that maintained this relationship between Istanbul and Ankara. While in Ankara, Numan was in contact with the socialist and communist groups in Istanbul as well as the Unionist network that had sent him to parliament in 1919. The middle of December in 1922 marks the date for Numan’s return to Istanbul, where he took a significant initiative in the establishment of the FIWO.
However, the coalition that developed in Istanbul around the labor and artisan confederations did not last long. It relied on a reluctant alliance of the communist movement, the Mim-Mim group, and the Union and Progress network. These forces competed with one another for various reasons, but above all for the control of the labor movement. This became evident with the founding of the GUW (Istanbul General Union of Workers) by the Mim-Mim group. The GUW was intended to counterbalance the growing influence of the communists and the Unionists in the labor movement. Its establishment was announced few days after the initiative that eventually founded the FIWO set out to work in January 1923. Although the GUW continued to cooperate with this initiative for
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some time, it completely broke away from the FIWO in March 1923, when the alliance of the forces in question disintegrated.
In January 1923, Mustafa Kemal tried to give an institutional form to this informal bloc. He met in İzmit the leaders of the Unionist network and the Mim-Mim group. Also represented in this meeting was the Istanbul branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights, which had come into existence around August 1922. Mustafa Kemal suggested these groups to merge under the roof of the Society for the Defense of National Rights, that is, the First Group. However, this proposal was not well received by the Mim-Mim group. In the course of the municipal elections, the Union and Progress network and the Istanbul Defense of National Rights group excluded the Mim-Mim group and nominated common candidates for the municipal council in some districts. Some of their common candidates had ties to the Second Group.
By the time the Society for the Defense of National Rights, the First Group, turned itself into the People’s Party on August 8, 1923774, the Ankara government had completely dispersed the left wing of the national movement in Istanbul. The communist movement was de facto outlawed, the FIWO ceased to exist after the communist leaders were arrested in May, the radical members of the Mim-Mim group were under investigation for collaborating with communists, and Mehmet of Topkapı was practically removed from the administration of the GUW. Rauf and Ali Fethi Beys, the engineers of the purge of the left, were elected to parliament from Istanbul in June 1923.
With the elimination of the left, Istanbul turned out to be the stronghold of the right wing of the People’s Party, which became evident immediately after the Republic of Turkey
774 “Müdafa-i Hukuk Grubu Resmen Halk Fırkası Oldu,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 9 August 1923, p. 2.
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was proclaimed on October 29, 1923. This was a development initiated by Mustafa Kemal, who had created a political crisis that led Ali Fethi Bey cabinet to resign on October 27.775 The Turkish Grand National Assembly promulgated the Republic to solve the crisis. This happened while several prestigious leaders of the national movement, such as Rauf, Refet (Bele), Adnan (Adıvar), and Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), were away from Ankara. The new cabinet was formed by İsmet (İnönü) Pasha, a member of the group that rallied around Mustafa Kemal in the People’s Party.776 On November 1, the Istanbul press published an interview in which Rauf criticized the method pursued in the founding of the Republic as a fait accompli.
During the next days, Rauf proved his popularity in Istanbul. On October 27, he had been proposed to become the president of the GUW.777 He declined this offer after several meetings with the union’s representatives.778 On November 13, however, the GUW held a reception in the honor of Rauf779, who had been summoned to Ankara to account for his criticism of how the Republic was founded.780 The day before this event took place, the GUW had expelled six workers from the organization for conducting communist
775 Eric Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), pp. 49-50.
776 Eric Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 52.
777 “Amele Birliği Riyaseti Rauf Bey’e Teklif Olundu,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 28 October 1923, p. 3.
778 Rauf stated that it was not possible for him to serve as the Istanbul deputy and the GUW’s president at the same time “Rauf Bey’le Refet Paşa Pazartesi Ankara’ya Gidiyorlar,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 7 November 1923, p.2.
779 “Rauf Bey Şerefine Çay Ziyafeti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 13 November 1923, p. 1.
780 Ibid.
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propaganda, which highlighted the union’s anti-communist orientation once again.781 On November 14, a large crowd sent Rauf off to Ankara from the Haydarpaşa Train Station. In addition to labor representatives, this crowd included merchants, high and low ranking officials, and members of various artisan corporations.
The GUW’s relations with Rauf did not continue for a long time. Şakir Rasim set out for Ankara on the same day as Rauf.782 It seems that the former felt obliged to change the GUW’s political stance as a result of his contacts with the cabinet members. Immediately after returning to Istanbul, Şakir Rasim called for an extraordinary congress, which met on November 23. The congress elected the People’s Party member Refik İsmail (Kakmacı) as the GUW’s vice-president.783 With this arrangement, the GUW leaders obviously aimed to reconcile with the new political context that emerged with the İsmet Pasha cabinet.784 Nonetheless, the government decided to close down the GUW in December.785 According to Mete Tunçay, this decision was made as a result of Şakir Rasim’s earlier attempt to make Rauf Bey president of the union.786
781 “Amele Birliği’nde Komünizm Propagandası,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 13 November 1923, p. 3.
782 “Amele Hareketleri,” Tanin, 15 November 1923, p. 3. The decision for this trip was made by 3 November 1923. Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, p. 73.
783 “Türkiye Umum Amele Birliği’nin Kongresi,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 24 November 1923, pp. 1-2; Mete Tunçay, 1923 Amele Birliği, pp. 76-78.
784 A journalist who had an interview with Şakir Rasim on November 24 sarcastically criticized this effort. “Amele Birliği’nde,” Vatan, 24 November 1923, p. 3.
785 The GUW leaders sought to maintain the union for a while. In May 1924, however, they had to abrogate the organization. Mete Tunçay provides the details of this process in his 1923 Amele Birliği, pp. 95-104.
786 Ibid. p. 123.
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In November 1924, on the other hand, Rauf and his friends broke away from the People’s Party to establish the Progressive Republican Party (PRP). Istanbul was the PRP’s main center. Of the five Istanbul deputies that participated in this opposition party, Kazım (Karabekir) was president; Rauf and Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) were vice-presidents.787 The other two Istanbul deputies that joined the PRP were İsmail Canbolat and Refet (Bele).788 The PRP’s Istanbul branch was rapidly organized. It received considerable support from the merchants, artisans, and workers of the city.789 Much of the Istanbul press supported the opposition as well.
The PRP program was predicated on the basic principles of political liberalism, advocating for individual freedoms as well as the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.790 It is often emphasized that this program was not radically different from that of the People’s Party, which assumed the name Republican People’s Party (RPP) after the split. Therefore, “… some historians have concluded that the PRP did not present an alternative to the RPP and that the new party was merely an instrument in the struggle for leadership in the Turkey of the mid-1920s”.791 However, one significant difference is often ignored or superficially treated in the existing literature. The PRP placed a great emphasis
787 The secretary-general was the Ankara deputy Ali Fuat (Cebesoy). Eric Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 89.
788 Ibid. pp. 75-76.
789 For the organizational structure of the PRP, see ibid. pp. 87-98.
790 For the PRP’s political program, see ibid. pp. 130-135.
791 Feroz Ahmad, “The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925” in From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire, volume: 2, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), pp. 239-240.
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on the autonomy of municipal governments.792 The opposition demanded autonomy particularly for the governance of Istanbul.793
This demand implies that the PRP leaders were confident of their ability to dominate local politics in Istanbul. They not only enjoyed a large measure of popular support but also made great progress in unifying the major elements of the opposition in the city. At the end of November 1924, the Second Group decided to join the PRP.794 Of this group’s leaders, Hüseyin Avni and Kara Vasıf took part in the central bureau of the party’s Istanbul branch.795 The possibility of joining forces with the PRP was discussed also by the Unionist leaders who had not participated in the Second Group during the national struggle.
Ali İhsan the Blind’s statements in the Ankara Independence Tribunals form one of the most detailed accounts of how this discussion was carried out.796 This account suggests that the PRP’s founding constituted another turning point that forced the Unionists to part ways. Some of them, like the Istanbul deputy İsmail Canbolat, joined the opposition. Ali İhsan was one of those who decided to stay away from it. This was largely because of his
792 For the specific articles of the PRP’ program that concerned municipal governments and the principle of decentralization (adem-i merkeziyet), see Eric Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 171.
793 For a clear statement of this goal, see an interview with the Erzincan deputy Sabit (Sağıroğlu), “Yeni Fırka İstanbul’da Teşkilata Başladı,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 22 December 1924, pp. 1-2.
794 “İkinci Grup’da Yeni Fırka ile Birleşiyor,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 27 November 1924, p. 2.
795 “Yeni Fırkanın Faaliyeti,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 23 December 1924, pp. 1-2.
796 For these statements, see Selma Ilıkan and Faruk Ilıkan (eds.), Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, pp. 128-137.
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disagreements with Cavit Bey, who wrote the sections of the PRP program over economy and finance from a liberal perspective. Cavit did not allow Ali İhsan to incorporate his corporatist views into the program prepared for the new organization.797 Although Kara Kemal was willing to join the opposition, he had to change his mind in the end because the men he trusted, including Ali İhsan, left him alone in his attempts to come to terms with the PRP leaders.798
Just as the Second Group supported the election of Rauf Bey as Prime Minister in July 1922, so the PRP members voted for the Ali Fethi Bey cabinet after İsmet Pasha resigned on November 21, 1924.799 The latter change meant that the radicals lost control of the government once again. This became obvious when the Minister of the Interior Recep (Peker) Bey resigned from the government in the first week of January 1925.800 Recep Bey was one of the three ministers in the new cabinet that had previously served in the İsmet Pasha cabinet.801 He resigned because the majority of the ministers supported the election of the mayor of Istanbul (Şehremini). According to the established regulation, the mayors of Istanbul were appointed by the central government whereas the members of the municipal council were elected. The PRP leaders were the champions of the modification of
797 Ibid, p. 132.
798 According, Ali İhsan, Kara Kemal decided to write a separate program for an independent party Ibid. pp. 134-136.
799 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, pp. 105-107.
800 “Dahiliye Vekili,” Tevhid-i Efkar, 5 January 1925, p. 1.
801 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, p. 106.
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this regulation for they considered the election of mayors as an important step towards the autonomy of Istanbul.802
We need further research to understand the degree to which the power struggles during the early years of the Republic centered on the administration of Istanbul. But it is clear that the purge of the left deprived the radicals in the RPP of a solid political ground to rely on in Istanbul. This is probably why İsmet İnönü insisted on imposing martial law in Istanbul right after the founding of the PRP.803 According to Mete Tunçay, İsmet resigned when his proposal for the application of martial law was rejected.804 However, the outbreak of the Şeyh Said revolt in the Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey in February 1925 gave him the opportunity to rule not only Istanbul but also the whole country under martial law until November 1927. The foundations of the RPP’s one party regime were laid over the course of this period, after the RPP was closed down in June 1925.
802 The need for the election of mayors in Istanbul was highlighted in a specific article of the PRP’s program. Eric Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 171.
802 Ibid. pp. 75-76.
803 “İstanbul’da İdare-i Örfiye İlan Edilecek Mi?” Tevhid-i Efkar, 8 December 1924, p. 1.
804 Mete Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, p. 105.
223
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
ARCHIVES
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, AMAE, Paris
Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri, BCA, Ankara
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, BOA, Istanbul
Dahiliye Vekaleti, DH
Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti Belgeleri, KMS
Hariciye Vekaleti, HR
İstanbul Murahhaslığı, İM
Public Record Office, Foreign Office Catalogs, FO, London
Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, SHAT, Paris
Türkiye İnkılap Tarih Enstitüsü Arşivi, TİTE, Ankara
Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları Vakfı, Komintern Arşivi, TÜSTAV-Komintern Arşivi, Istanbul
PERIODICALS
Akşam
Aydınlık
İfham
İkdam
İleri
Meslek
Tanin
Tasvir-i Efkar
Tevhid-i Efkar
Vakit
Vatan
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