358

 THE MAKING AND TREATMENT OF AN ICONIC EVENT:
THE MENEMEN INCIDENT (1930) IN
1    

February 2016, 185 pages
The Menemen Incident is an attempt at rebellion by six armed insurgents on
23 December 1930. The Republican People’s Party introduced the incident after its
occurrence as a reactionary challenge to the republic instigated by the Nakşibendi
order. The government proclaimed a state of emergency in Menemen, Manisa and
Balıkesir, established a special military court for the trial of the accused. The court
decided that indeed the order had preplanned the rebellion and actualized it to undermine
the very existence of the republic.
This thesis explores the Menemen Incident. It reconstructs the events based
on critical analyses of official statements, court documents and contemporary newspapers
–with special attention to the trial process. Furthermore, the thesis examines
the various representations of the incident in the contemporaneous media as well as
in the secondary popular and academic accounts of the succeeding years.
The study indicates that this was a minor incident carried out by six ignorant
hashish smokers. However, the beheading of Kubilay, an idealist republican reserve
officer, stirred up the government to action and to hand out harsh punishments.
The decision of the military court to condemn the Nakşibendi order as the instigator
of the event was preordained by the RPP leaders and unjustifiable. Nevertheless,
the court’s decision, misleading official statements, and newspaper reports that
echoed the regime’s position led to the emergence of a literature that continued to
advocate and embellish this position over the years. In the process, the Menemen Incident
grew into a potent icon that evoked the belief in the victory of republicanists
over reactionists. A group of authors developed counter interpretations eventually.
But they indeed reversed and perpetuated the polarized perspectives of the officiallybiased
accounts. Even highly reputable scholars could not overcome the misinformation
that became endemic to the coverage of the Menemen Incident.
Keywords: the Menemen Incident, Derviş Mehmet, Kubilay, Nakşibendism, the
martial court of Menemen, early republican period
v
ÖZ
İKONİK BİR VAKAYI ANLAMAK: MODERN TÜRKİYE TARİHİNDE
MENEMEN OLAYI
Vaizoğlu, Mehmet Hakan.
MA, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı
Şubat 2016, 185 sayfa
Menemen olayı, altı silahlı asinin 23 Aralık 1930’da gerçekleştirdiği bir
başkaldırı girişimidir. Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası liderleri, peşinen olayın cumhuriyete
karşı irticai bir eylem olup ve arkasında Nakşibendi tarikatının bulunduğunu
açıklamışlardır. Menemen, Manisa ve Balıkesir’de sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş,
sanıkların yargılanmaları için askeri mahkeme kurulmuştur. Mahkeme, Nakşibendi
tarikatının olayı cumhuriyeti yıkmak amacıyla önceden planlayıp gerçekleştirdiğine
hükmetmiştir.
Bu tez, olay sonrası yapılan resmi açıklamalar, gazete haberleri ve mahkeme
dosyalarını eleştirel bir gözle ve dikkatle inceleyerek gelişmeleri mümkün olduğunca
doğru tespit etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, daha sonra yazılan ikincil kaynaklar ile
ciddi akademik metinlerde olayın nasıl anlatıldığını da irdelemektedir.
Tez, olayın altı esrarkeş cahil tarafından gerçekleştirildiğini, çapının ve halk
üstündeki tesirinin çok sınırlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Ancak idealist bir cumhuriyetçi
yedek subay olan Kubilay’ın başının kesilerek öldürülmüş olması, hükümeti
derhal harekete geçerek ağır cezalar vermeye itmiştir.
Tez, askeri mahkemenin olaydan Nakşibendi tarikatını sorumlu tutan
kararının, aslında CHF liderleri tarafından önceden verilmiş olduğunu göstermektedir.
Bu temelsiz mahkeme kararı, yanıltıcı resmi açıklamalar ve rejimin duruşunu
yansıtan gazetelerin haberleri ile de beslenerek, olay hakkında daha sonra
yayınlananları şekillendirmiştir. Süreç içerisinde Menemen olayı, cumhuriyetçilerin
irticacılara galebe çalacağına olan inancı çağrıştıran etkili bir ikona dönüşmüştür. Bu
ikinci kuşak yayınlar, doğru olmayan bilgileri abartarak yeniden üretmişlerdir. Zamanla
bir grup yazar karşı açıklamalar ortaya koymakla beraber, ciddi araştırmalara
dayanmaktan ziyade resmi görüşü yansıtan anlatıların çift kutuplu perspektiflerini
ters-yüz etmişlerdir. Saygın araştırmacıların Menemen olayına dair yazdıkları dahi
yaygın yanlış bilgiler veya kutuplaşmış perspektiflerden etkilenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Menemen olayı, Derviş Mehmet, Kubilay, Nakşibendilik,
Menemen sıkıyönetim mahkemesi, erken cumhuriyet dönemi
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Intellectual background of this thesis, along with my other researches and
studies, were built in the Foundation for Science and Arts (BİSAV). Perpetual scholar
activities of BİSAV have triggered my search for knowledge during my undergraduate
years and still continue to inspire me. Seminars of İhsan Fazlıoğlu, Mustafa
Özel, Ahmet Okumuş, Cüneyt Kaya, Eyyüp Said Kaya, Erdal Yılmaz and the reading
groups of Mehmet Akif Kayapınar, Metin Demir and Alim Arlı are particularly
worthy of mentioning since they extensively helped me understand basic subject
matters of scholarly areas of humanities and social sciences.
I attended to courses of Istanbul Foundation for Research and Education
(İSAR) for one and a half year during my master program. İSAR also provided
scholar, financial and accommodation opportunities and substantially backed up my
studies, including this thesis.
Studying at the library of the Centre for Islamic Studies (İSAM) was very
productive. Librarians of the centre were fairly helpful and practical. Opportunities
that İSAM offers continue to facilitate the studies of researchers.
Open-minded professors of İstanbul Şehir University History Department
showed an elegant favor in accepting a student who was graduated from a department
quite irrelevant to history. For providing various opportunities and carrying out
student-centered educational policies, I am very indebted to İstanbul Şehir University.
I will always remember the time I passed there with exceeding gratitude and admiration.
Many professors of İstanbul Şehir University made significant contributions
to my journey for scholarly knowledge. Lectures of Abdulhamit Kırmızı, Coşkun
Çakır, Ferhat Kentel, Hızır Murat Köse, Berat Açıl and Şerif Mardin enhanced my
knowledge as well as enriched my perspectives.
Nurullah Ardıç has been my lecturer in various terms since my graduate
years. He has multiply guided and supported me with openhearted patience. He edited
many of my papers in terms of form and content and gave crucial advices, including
this thesis of which he was also an examining committee member. By the way, it
was also an honor to meet and work with Tufan Buzpınar, who was the other examining
committee member of my thesis.
I have been supported by İshak Arslan for years as well. During my assistantship,
in our reading groups and our influential conversations, his critical approaches
and sharpened intelligence have developed my viewpoints.
Eyüp Süzgün has been a teacher as well as a big brother for me in my life.
His extended knowledge in various scholar fields set light to my way. He accompanied
me in difficult and good times. I will be in permanent need of his unconditional
supports.
The psychological support of Taha Burak Toprak helped me get back on the
road and keep on a stable line when I was in depressive moods. His extended
knowledge and understanding directed me comprehend the human nature and its sovii
phisticated relations with the world in certain degrees.
Engin Akarlı has been a master academician to me in the M.A. program. His
supervision to me during his course and the process of my thesis writing is beyond
measure. He edited my previous papers sentence by sentence including this thesis.
Whenever he did so, the quality of the related study went a step further. His esteemed
knowledge has been educatory and inspiring in many terms.
Talha Üstündağ, Secretary of the Graduate School of Humanities and Social
Sciences, has been collaborative since the beginning of the program. He eased the
administrative procedures of the program in a well-intentioned manner. Rana Marcella
Özenç and Hugh Jeff Anderson edited chapters and made tangible contributions
to this study. Lengthy conversations I had with my friends Mehmet Akif Berber and
Hümeyra Bostan were pretty motivating. I made use of the thesis templates of Emine
Öztaner and Abdurrahman Nur, whose generosity were praiseworthy.
The patience and immense tolerance of my family have made it possible me
to pursue knowledge. The unlimited love and embracement of my mother and sister
along with the backing of my uncle frequently relieved me. Their supports encouraged
me in difficult times and let me proceed on my way. It is to them that I dedicate
this study.
That is to say, this thesis is a result of collective efforts. The aforementioned
people implicitly or explicitly helped me complete it. I am greatly thankful and in
debt of gratitude to them. Still, all the responsibilities of the omissions and errors of
this thesis belong to me completely.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... iv
Öz ................................................................................................................................. v
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... vi
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... viii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
CHAPTERS
1. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND IN DUE COURSE OF THE MENEMEN
INCIDENT ................................................................................................................... 9
1.1. Before the Incident ......................................................................................... 9
1.1.1. The Insurgents and Their Activities in Manisa ........................................ 10
1.1.2. Departure from Manisa ............................................................................ 14
1.1.3. The Group in Paşa .................................................................................... 16
1.1.4. In the Village of Bozalan ......................................................................... 17
1.3. Events in Menemen ......................................................................................... 21
1.3.1. Entrance to Menemen and Initial Activities ............................................. 21
1.3.2. Attitude of the Officials During the Events ............................................. 24
1.3.3. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay ............................................................................ 27
1.3.4. Kubilay Rushing to the Scene .................................................................. 30
1.3.5. On the heels of the Events in Menemen ................................................... 33
2. THE OFFICIAL REFLECTIONS AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF
THE MENEMEN INCIDENT ................................................................................... 35
2.1. Determination of the Government’s Stance in the Aftermath of the Incident 35
2.2. Official Assessments ....................................................................................... 40
2.3. Proclaim of the Martial Law ........................................................................... 48
2.4. Internal Inquires .............................................................................................. 49
2.5. Newspaper Reports ......................................................................................... 54
2.5.1. Officially-Biased Newspapers ................................................................. 54
2.5.2. Counter-Official Newspapers ................................................................... 61
ix
2.5.3. Blaming the Opposition Newspapers ....................................................... 65
3. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS OF THE MENEMEN INCIDENT ........................... 67
3.1. The Constitution of the Martial Court ............................................................. 68
3.2. Attitudes and Expressional Patterns of the Perpetrators ................................. 70
3.3. Informing Against One Another ..................................................................... 73
3.4. The Court’s Pressure on Detainees ................................................................. 76
3.5. Grudge and Consent ........................................................................................ 80
3.6. Tragicomic Statements .................................................................................... 83
3.7. Extolling the State ........................................................................................... 86
3.8. The Court Searching for Behind the Scenes ................................................... 88
3.8.1. Laz İbrahim .............................................................................................. 96
3.8.2. Şeyh Esat ................................................................................................ 101
3.9. Suspicious Aspects of the Judicial Process ................................................... 105
3.10. Court in the Name of the Republic ............................................................. 111
3.11. Distortion of the Newspapers ...................................................................... 114
3.12. Verdicts of the Martial Court and Executions ............................................. 116
3.13. Subsequent Trials ........................................................................................ 121
4. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND EVALUATIONS ABOUT THE MENEMEN
INCIDENT ............................................................................................................... 123
4.1. Officially-Biased and Misleading Accounts ................................................. 124
4.1.1. The Nakşibendi Order as the Ultimate Culprit ...................................... 124
4.1.2. On the Background of the Nakşibendi Order ......................................... 126
4.1.3. The Enemy of the Republic .................................................................... 128
4.1.4. People’s Support for Reactionism .......................................................... 130
4.1.5. Specifying the Agents of the Event ........................................................ 132
4.1.6. Material Support of the Nakşibendi Order ............................................. 135
4.1.7. Exaggerating the Capacity of Insurgents ............................................... 136
4.1.8. Responsibilities of the Security Forces .................................................. 139
4.1.9. Wrong Information on Moves Before, During and After the Incident .. 139
4.1.10. Literature on Political Reasons of the Incident .................................... 143
4.2. Counter-Official and Conspiracy Narrations ................................................ 149
4.3. Unbiased Accounts ........................................................................................ 155
x
4.3.1. Hamit Bozarslan ..................................................................................... 156
4.3.2. Eyüp Öz .................................................................................................. 160
4.3.3. Umut Azak ............................................................................................. 165
4.3.4. Barış Ertem ............................................................................................. 170
4.3.5. General Studies Touching on the Incident ............................................. 171
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 181!
1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on various aspects of the Menemen Incident and has several
arguments. Based upon critical analysis of primary sources, this study mainly
seeks to accurately understand what happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930
and under which circumstances it occurred. How the event was encountered in the
political arena and media is another specific subject matter. The thesis also analyses
what happened after the incident and how the legal proceedings concluded. A last
general topic of the research is the ways in which the event has been recounted in academic
and popular writings.
The Menemen Incident is the sum of the happenings that occurred on the
morning of 23 December 1930 in Menemen, a town in the İzmir province, located
thirty-three kilometers northwest of İzmir, the provincial capital. Six disciples of the
Nakşibendi order took to the road from Manisa; half of them were armed. Having
frequently smoked weed, the group entered the town of Menemen. They took from
the Müftü Mosque a green banner on which Quranic verses were written and raised
it. They made a few prayers follow them and went to the town square by shouting
that they were to bring the old regime back.
Along with their leader Derviş1 Mehmet, who had announced himself to be
the Mahdi (“the rightly guided one” who will appear as the world nears its end), the
company wandered in the neighborhoods of the town and proclaimed the restoration
of the sharia. They called people to pass under the banner, which would mean declaration
of their loyalty not solely to “the Mahdi” but also to the rightful way of the Islamic
religion. After walking within the town center, they had a demonstration in the
municipal square led by Derviş Mehmet. He had gathered a crowd of about a hundred
people who joined in his group to perform a reciting of God (zikr). Another
hundred of them watched the happenings from a distance.
Three gendarme officers, one of whom was the commander himself, came to
the square, spoke with Derviş Mehmet, told him to halt their activities and warned
the crowd to disperse. However, neither Derviş nor the townspeople did what the
commander or other officers wished. Then, a reserve officer, Mustafa Fehmi Kubi-
1 Also known as Giritli Mehmet.
2
lay, came to the square with his battalion. He left his unit behind and went to have a
talk with Derviş on his own, unarmed. When Derviş did not heed his warnings, Kubilay,
hot-tempered by nature, became angry and seized Derviş by the collar. Thereon
Derviş shot him with his rifle. Kubilay’s battalion fled because there were no bullets
in their rifles.
Having heard the shot, some of the crowd dispersed. Kubilay tried to get
away, yet collapsed in the courtyard of the Gazez Mosque nearby the square. Twenty
minutes after his shooting, Derviş was somehow informed of Kubilay’s condition.
Along with one of his fellows, Derviş then went to the courtyard and cut Kubilay’s
head off with his knife. Derviş brought Kubilay’s head to the square, sought to attach
it on the edge of the banner but failed. Then they fastened the banner to a pole on the
square. There, two district wardens became engaged in a gun battle with the company,
but were killed.
Soon enough, support battalions arrived from the regimental commandry with
machine guns and warned the insurgents to lay down arms. Derviş and his associates
did not surrender. In response, machine guns were fired and three of the insurgents
including Derviş were killed. Another one of them was injured while two others escaped
and were captured two days later.
Martial law was proclaimed and investigations regarding both the perpetrators
and negligent officials were initiated. In consequence, the martial court announced
the event to have been planned by the Nakşibendi order, a sufi religious order
founded in the fourteenth century. Its leader Şeyh Esat was accused of being the
prime agent. Perpetrators of the incident were described to have been incited by notable
figures of the order. At the end of the proceedings, twenty-eight defendants, including
some prominent dervishes of the order, were executed.
The subject matter of this study was determined while I was writing the final
assignment of Professor Şerif Mardin’s “Research Seminar on Concepts in Historical
Change.” When examining the court records of the Menemen Incident, I noticed that
the martial court charged the agency of Nakşibendi order as a whole of the Menemen
Incident. The court charged some notable figures of the order in particular with inciting
the perpetrators, despite the lack of substantial evidence. This observation intrigued
me to undertake a more in-depth examination of the issue, with special attention
to the judicial proceedings in general, as well as on analysis of the reactions to
3
the event. The result is the present study. It shows that although some prominent figures
of the order were condemned for having instigated a revolt against the republic,
the related records of the trials and interrogations of the defendants bore no evidential
value to justify these decisions.
Although six insurgents were the core perpetrators of the actions, official
statements as well as pro-government newspapers instantly announced the event to
be a plot executed by reactionists against the very existence of the republic. However,
as the thesis shows, the RPP leaders were aware of the simplicity of the event and
yet deliberately described it to be a well-rounded movement preplanned by the
Nakşibendi order to overthrow the government.
The Menemen Incident became one of the most commemorated and recounted
events of the history of the Republic of Turkey. Three years after the incident in
1933, a monument of Kubilay and two wardens was laid on top of a hill in Menemen.
It was built by the donations collected from citizens through a campaign organized
by the daily Cumhuriyet. The monument was exceptional in that it remained
the only one erected in the name of someone other than Atatürk, until his death in
1938. In the ceremony of the erection of the monument, the head of the Republican
People’s Party and of the administrative council in the province stated that the monument
would be the Kaaba of republican reforms.2
Annual ceremonies have been held in Menemen on 23 December. Thousands
of people attended these ceremonies since the incident. These meetings turned into
secularist demonstrations. The incident has been officially narrated as one of the
most important manifestations of reactionary threats. RPP administrators used the incident
to illustrate the dangers of religious reactionism to Republican Turkey. Political
leaders and after them official historiography presented and narrated the event
along these lines in order to remind citizens of the need to protect the secular republic
against its internal enemies.3
Kubilay was a teacher, dedicated to Atatürk’s Reforms and a member of the
Türk Ocakları. He was known to be a nationalist who sincerely defended the republican
ideals. Thus, “the beheaded officer Kubilay, the heroic victim of the incident, has
2 Anadolu, October 30, 1933.
3 Umut Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State
(London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 21, 43.
4
become an icon of Kemalist secularism as a source of inspiration against the enemies
of the republic. The Kemalist elite were committed to turn him into a long-lasting
symbol in the national memory as the martyr of the revolution and the embodiment
of the national ideal.”4 The account of his beheading has been narrated constantly in
commemorative ceremonies. His sacrifice has been emphasized in many official announcements
and in history textbooks. Many issues of magazines have been published
and poems have been written dedicated to the memory of Kubilay.
The purpose of the thesis is to probe and analyze this politically symbolic and
consequential incident. It diverges from the prevailing popular and academic writings
on the Menemen Incident and offers an original narrative on the whole. A critical
approach to primary sources is essential in order to understand and objectively.
Shaped by the official viewpoint to a large extent, the primary sources include misleading
information. In order to avoid this trap that perpetuates misinformation and
skewed viewpoints, I strived to filter the unreliable or questionable information from
the reasonably trustworthy through careful examination of the accuracy of the
sources by comparing them with each other.
In line with the purpose to reconstruct and contextualize the event, I divided
this study into four chapters. In the first chapter, I aim to make a sensible depiction
of the happenings that composed the Menemen Incident. I search for answers to the
following questions: Who were the insurgents of the Menemen Incident? How did
they come together under the leadership of Derviş Mehmet? What were their motivations
to attempt to undertake such a revolt? What happened in the villages where
they stayed prior to their arrival at Menemen? To what extent and why did the villagers
aid them? What exactly happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930? How
did the townspeople and law enforcement officials react to the group’s activities?
Which mistakes paved the way for Kubilay’s killing?
I construct the story line of the events from three primary source categories.
The first class of sources are the statements of the three perpetrators of the events
who were seized when the situation was brought under control. The statements of the
perpetrators made in the trials of the Menemen Incident do not contradict with each
other in terms of their activities. The second primary source is the reports of the officials
who were assigned to investigate the incident. Among these, there were reports
4 Ibid., 22, 40.
5
of the Presidency of the General Staff’s inspector, the doctor who examined Kubilay’s
body, and the testimonies of civil servant witnesses. Most of the materials in
this second category were published by the Turkish Security General Directorate. I
obtained another part of these sources from the archives of the Turkish General Staff.
Some other sources are available online at the website of the same institution. Official
reports in general present objective information about the incident since their
purpose was to reveal the truth. Lastly, the testimonies of townspeople from Menemen,
who were interviewed in the aftermath of the incident, provided information for
some aspects of the demonstrations in Menemen. By constructing a factual and justified
description of actual happenings with a critical examination of the primary
sources, I try to constitute a solid foundation upon which I make the succeeding
analyses.
In the second chapter, I examine the official reactions to and media representations
of the incident in general after the event but prior to the martial court trials.
Primary sources of this chapter are parliament records and newspapers of the time.
The chapter addresses the following research questions: What were the responses of
the RPP leaders to the incident? How did they regard it? What decisions were taken
regarding the official proceedings? What were the concrete steps that the government
agencies took? How did the newspapers of the era report the incident? In what ways
did their coverage differ from each other?
By searching answers to these questions, I indicate the distinction between
the real events of the incident and the ways it was officially presented. Establishing
the political circumstances under which the incident occurred is another purpose of
the chapter. With detailed analyses of the official statements, parliament speeches
and media news, I also look into the extent to which the legal procedure was predetermined.
Chapter three focuses on the judicial process and the trials related to the
Menemen Incident. The primary source I use here is the court records of the Martial
Court of Menemen. The chapter searches for answers to the following questions:
What happened in the trials? What were the prominent features of the trials? How
can we analyze or characterize these trials in judicial terms? What sorts of proof did
the court have? Were they adequate to charge the defendants? Did the evidence substantiate
the accusations? What sort of attitude did the perpetrators, defendants and
6
the chief judge adopt? What specific evidence did the court rely on in blaming the
notable Nakşibendi figures for their presumed role in inciting the perpetrators? How
did the court reach legal verdicts? What did these verdicts reflect regarding the outlook
or position of the people in power and the image of the state?
In the third chapter, I divide the content of the trials into categories in terms
of the chief judge’s questions and the detainees’ responses. By doing so, I try to describe
the course of trials. The critical examination of the trials enables me to evaluate
the consistency of the court’s decisions and justifications with reality or what we
can possibly know about the events that made the Menemen Incident.
I offer a literature review of the Menemen Incident in a distinct chapter,
namely chapter four. Here I divide the accounts that I analyze into three categories:
officially-biased, counter-official and unbiased accounts and seek to answer the following
questions: How can we group the subsequent writings on the incident analytically?
What are the sources on which these accounts are based? To what extent do
they examine the narrations they recount? What is the general content of later writings?
To what extent and in what ways do they present biased accounts and misinformation?
What unique perspectives do these relatively unbiased writings represent?
This critical evaluation of the relevant literature is a major subject matter of
this thesis. Consequently, it is addressed in a distinct chapter rather than in the form
of an introductory literature review aiming at positioning the thesis among current
narratives.
There is such a vast amount of non-academic narration on the Menemen Incident
that it is not quite feasible to gather and analyze all of them. Still, I tried to see
as many of them as possible. My survey indicates that a good part of this literature
relies uncritically on biased official accounts, newspaper reports and court records.
They reproduce biased perspectives about the event and recount the prevailing misinformation.
I defined the writings that adopted official descriptions of the incident as
“officially-biased.” I name the narrations that embrace a reverse perspective as
“counter-official.” I indicate that both group of authors not only recount the events
from skewed perspectives, but also generate a great deal of disinformation themselves.
I choose and take into consideration the most referenced ones among them.
I examine all the academic writings that focus on the Menemen Incident. By
doing so, this thesis differs from others since there is not an academic study that ex7
plores and analyses all the scholarly texts systematically. I divide these academic accounts
into groups in terms of the bias or neutrality of their content. In this way, I
evaluate the prejudiced academic texts together with ordinary writings, and I regard
the neutral ones separately.
Studies of Hamit Bozarslan, Eyüp Öz, and Umut Azak, whose works are examined
in detail in chapter four, are noteworthy to briefly mention here. Among
them, only Azak offers a careful summary of the actual happenings both prior to and
during the incident, although it too gives in to some widespread but misleading information.
Furthermore, the brevity of Azak’s account deprives the reader of specific
details significant to understanding the real motivations of the perpetrators and of
other people who were somehow involved in the incident.
The common argument of these three authors is that the incident was not a
plot of the Nakşibendi order and that the court records do not present substantial evidence
to that effect. However, they do not provide sufficient details to prove their
points as compellingly as possible. In order to do just that, this thesis dissects and
contextualizes the content of the judicial process –as indicated above. Another disadvantage
of these three studies is that they do not pay adequate attention to the political
atmosphere of the era in order to contextualize the reactions to the event. Thus,
they do not grasp the pattern formed by the official statements and pro-government
news, which indicated the direction of subsequent official proceedings. This thesis
shows those patterns and sheds light on the intensity of the political arena, thereby
explaining why such a small-scale incident became so overblown as to justify predetermined
judicial process and verdicts.
Bozarslan and his student Öz attempt to come up with explanations based on
the social circumstances of the region in which the event occurred. They argue that
certain economic and political conditions, and religious feelings paved the way for a
collective expectation of the emergence of a millenarian savior. For them, Derviş
Mehmet stepped into action and initiated a revolt under these conditions. A crucial
drawback of their studies is that they assume a connection between certain social, political
and religious circumstances and the attraction of people to Derviş Mehmet, rather
than clearly showing that connection.
Although Bozarslan and Öz do not adopt the officially-biased arguments in
general, their assumption of the existence of deep structural justifications to explain
8
the incident leads them to the grossly exaggerated conclusion that the incident represented
an extensive rebellion. In contrast, this thesis will indicate that it is not appropriate
to define the Menemen Incident as a “rebellion” in either social or political
terms. The incident did not have a social base. Neither the inhabitants of Menemen
nor the people from surrounding regions stepped into action against law enforcement
agencies under the guidance of the perpetrators. It was a distinct and extraordinary
accident that occurred in Western Anatolia. The act of beheading, the applause of a
small group of the people and the religious terms the insurgents used severely disturbed
the government. The subsequent official proceedings reflected the authoritarian
determination of the state to intimidate anyone who would dare to initiate such a
revolt especially for religious-political purposes.
9
CHAPTER 1
ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND IN DUE COURSE OF
THE MENEMEN INCIDENT
The purpose of this chapter is to make a reasonable description of the activities
that occurred just prior and during the Menemen Incident. First, it discusses the
actors who sought to initiate a rebellion in Menemen. Then, this chapter elucidates
the central happenings of the incident and gives a narration including all the significant
actions that occurred in the town of Menemen. It also provides information
about Kubilay, whose vicious murder during the incident was one of the symbolic
and pivotal elements of the event, and of the Republican history in general. By putting
forth the actual happenings, known in total as the Menemen Incident, this chapter
provides a substantial basis for the thesis to make subsequent evaluations and to
assess other accounts.
1.1. Before the Incident
The basic information about the company’s actions before the incident was
provided by the three perpetrators who were captured.5 This section of the chapter
examines and compares the court testimonies of these perpetrators in terms of consistency.
Official reports that were prepared after the event and published later are
also taken into consideration. The chapter takes advantage of the newspapers of the
period as well. The contents of the newspapers are also carefully compared and scrutinized.
This section introduces and provides brief information about the agents of the
Menemen Incident. It accounts for Giritli Mehmet’s ability to gather followers
around himself, lead and mobilize them with religious intentions. Thus, the section
touches on their meetings in Manisa and their departure. It then covers their arrival at
villages and their actions. It culminates with their coming to the outskirts of Menemen
to propagate their motivations and goals.
5 The other three insurgents, including Derviş Mehmet were killed in shootout.
10
1.1.1. The Insurgents and Their Activities in Manisa
The leader of the insurgents who sought to prompt a revolt in Menemen was
Derviş Mehmet “the Cretan.”6 He was born in Manisa and was thirty-three years old
at the time of the incident according to official records. His family was originally
from Girit.7 Though he was a barber by profession, he had been busy with tree trimming
and worked as a hoer.8 At the times of the Greek invasion between 1919-1922
he was accounted to have taken to the hills and lived in the mountains. With respect
to the field research of Eyüp Öz, Giritli Mehmet came down from the mountain to
disturb the villagers of Paşa at gunpoint.9 The official recordings point out that he
joined the Nakşibendi sufi order10 in 1923 and his sheikh11 was Ahmet Muhtar
Efendi.12 He appeared to be always in search of something.13 According to Öz, all
the testimony about Giritli agreed on his being a short-tempered person.14 He was
shot dead in the shootout in Menemen.
Sütçü (milkman) Mehmet was sixty-three years old, and the eldest of the
company. He was from the Bozalan Village of Menemen and resided in Manisa. He
had worked as a laborer and farm hand previously. Later on he became a milkman.
6 Aforementioned Mehmet was known as Derviş (Dervish) Mehmet and Giritli Mehmet
(Mehmet from Cretan) as well as Mehdi (Mahdi) Mehmet.
7 Araştırma Planlama ve Koordinasyon Dairesi Başkanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Cumhuriyetin
75. Yıldönümünde Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler: 150’lilikler, Kubilay Olayı,
Çarşaf-Peçe-Peştemalle Örtünme Sorunu (Ankara: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, 1998), 42
Document No: 13212-5/1.
8 According to Eyüp Öz, who studied the Menemen Incident, Giritli Mehmet had worked in
various jobs. He had been a warden, an official in the marriage office, a farmer and even a
bartender. Eyüp Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek: Menemen Olayı İrtica Mı, Komplo
Mu?,” FSM İlmî Araştırmalar İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi 5 (2015): 412. Accounts
about the incident are elaborated on in the literature review chapter. Since Öz’s statements
are exceptional because he seeks to establish the personal background of the perpetrators,
they are discussed when the occasion arises in the thesis.
9 Ibid.
10 Öz asserts based on witness accounts that Giritli Mehmet was a Sunni-Bektashi. Again for
Öz, Giritli might have been fascinated by the significations of the Twelve Imams in the
Bektashi order. That is why, he announced himself as the twelfth imam along with being the
Mahdi in Menemen. Ibid., 419.
11 Sheikh means the spiritual head in the religious order.
12 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42.
13 Again with regard to Öz’s unverified allegation, Giritli was a good speechmaker and was
able to convince people to follow him. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 413.
14 Ibid.
11
He joined the Nakşibendi order in 1925 and his sheikh was Giritli Mehmet. He was
captured dead at the time of the incident.15
Şamdan Mehmet was also killed in the gunfight in Menemen. He was from
Manisa, twenty-eight years old and a vine grower. He joined the order in 1927 and
his sheikh as well was Giritli Mehmet.16
Mehmet Emin was twenty-nine years old and from Manisa. He was a vine
grower. He joined the Nakşibendi order three months before the Menemen Incident.
17 He was seized wounded after the firefight in Menemen. According to Mehmet
Emin’s statements in court, Derviş Mehmet hired him as a laborer to work in his
vineyard. Later on Giritli associated him to the Nakşibendi order. Derviş Mehmet
talked to his followers about the requirements and benefits of becoming a disciple,
made them seek spiritual signs in their dreams (istiare), and interpreted their dreams
in terms of spiritual meaning. Mehmet Emin stated repeatedly in the court that
Derviş Mehmet’s spiritual explanations fascinated them.18
Ramazan was another member of the company who ran away on the journey.
He was in his twenties at the time. According to his statements in court, he had met
Sütçü Mehmet when buying milk from him. He committed himself to the Nakşibendi
order five months before the incident. He had not known Derviş Mehmet before joining
the order. It was Sütçü Mehmet who introduced Ramazan to Derviş Mehmet.
Ramazan, like other detained perpetrators, stated that Derviş Mehmet had many other
disciples. Yet, Ramazan did not know any other sheikh in Manisa except Derviş
Mehmet. Ramazan also alleged that Sütçü Mehmet remarked about 70,000 angels
who were supporting and defending Derviş Mehmet. According to Sütçü Mehmet, it
was the reason why Ramazan became a follower of Derviş.19
15 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Yirmi Beşinci İn’ikat T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt: 25, “Menemen Hadisesini Ika Ve
Teşkilâtı Esasiye Kanununu Cebren Tağyire Teşebbüs Edenlerden 37 Şahsın Ölüm Cezasına
Çarptırılması Hakkında 3/564 Numaralı Başvekâlet Tezkeresi ve Adliye Encümeni Mazbatası,”
January 31, 1931, 9.
19 In the court, Ramazan alleged that Sütçü Mehmet intimidated him that in case he refused
to dedicate himself to Derviş, things would go wrong for him. Ibid., 15. However this statement
might be Ramazan’s fabrication in order to convince the court that he had been forced
to obey. The arrestee made this sort of expressions in the court frequently to please the court
members. This issue is discussed in “The Process of the Court” section in detail.
12
Küçük Hasan, was seventeen years old, and the youngest member of the
company. He resided in Manisa. He was a vine grower and single.20 He had no educational
background, similar to other followers of Derviş Mehmet. Küçük Hasan
joined the Nakşibendi order one month before the Menemen Incident. He, along with
Nalıncı Hasan, fled from Menemen during the shootout taking advantage of the ensuing
confusion. As Küçük Hasan stated in the court, one day Derviş Mehmet had a
talk with Küçük Hasan’s father and asked him whether his children went to mosque
and prayed. This was the initial point of Küçük Hasan’s acquaintance with Derviş
Mehmet. Then he asked Küçük Hasan if he knew about Derviş.21 Küçük Hasan said
that he did. Thereon Derviş Mehmet introduced himself as the expected Mahdi and
invited Küçük Hasan to become his disciple. Derviş Mehmet then taught him invocations
(zikr) of God.22
Nalıncı Hasan was twenty years old and from Manisa. He was a clog maker,
23 single, and unschooled. He joined the Nakşibendi order two years before the
Menemen Incident. His sheikh was Laz İbrahim from Manisa. According to Nalıncı
Hasan, he met Derviş Mehmet at his workplace in Manisa, through the agency of
Şamdan Mehmet. He stated not to have been familiar with him for a long period.
One day, though the date is not accurate, Şamdan Mehmet and Derviş Mehmet came
to his shop and Nalıncı Hasan ordered coffee for them. There, Derviş Mehmet expressed
his being “the Mahdi” and his plan to declare himself. Derviş told Nalıncı
Hasan his intention to recover the Islamic religion. He spoke of becoming a better
Muslim and spiritually getting closer to God by way of citing his name. In addition,
Derviş Mehmet stressed the significance of their gatherings in Çırak Mustafa’s coffeehouse,
where they had performed zikr, and asked Nalıncı Hasan to attend to become
a fellow and his disciple. Nalıncı Hasan began to participate in the meetings
and perform zikr in the coffeehouse.24
20 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42.
21 Mahdi is a savior who, Muslims believe, will emerge at the end of times. He is deemed to
provide justice, maintain order and restore the faith. Ekrem Sarıkçıoğlu, “Mehdi,” Türkiye
Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA) (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, n.d.),
369.
22 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 13.
23 His name Nalıncı came from his vocation.
24 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11.
13
Mehmet Emin, Ramazan, Tatlıcı (confectioner) Hüseyin, Nalıncı Hasan and
Küçük Hasan, all disciples of Derviş Mehmet, used to congregate in Çırak (apprentice)
Mustafa’s coffeehouse in Menemen. They were accustomed to perform collective
invocations of God.25 They had religious goals to fulfill, such as reaching a certain
number of invocations. For example, as Küçük Hasan recounted in the court,
Derviş Mehmet obliged him, during their meetings at Çırak Mustafa’s coffeehouse in
Manisa, of reciting the holy phrase of lâilâhe illallah for 500 times.26 Derviş
Mehmet’s spiritual assignments of this nature did not invite adverse reaction. All his
disciples seemed to comply and carry out their assignments.
However, Derviş Mehmet’s religious motivations apparently deviated from
those of typical sheikh affiliated with the order. According to Mehmet Emin, Derviş
Mehmet used to tell his companions that God appeared to him and commanded that
believers should cite him frequently. Together with his revelations, Derviş Mehmet
referred to these revelations and advised his companions to cite God as much as they
could. In another time, when Derviş asked his followers how many reciting they
practiced, they told him “500”. Then, he suggested to them that they should increase
the number. He told them that the Prophet used to mention God ever so much that by
this means he could become God’s beloved.27 In obedience to their mentor, they cited
one of the most significant divine phrases in Islamic faith, lâilâhe illallah28, more
than a 1,000 times a day.29
Derviş Mehmet had primarily asked the ones he met whether they prayed and
cited God. His overall argument was that the greater the number of times they recited
God’s name and prayed to him, the closer they would become to God. Derviş prescribed
to those who were acquainted with him to step up their efforts and he led
them in prayers. He was a guide who directed them to religious reciting and praying,
and remained around to check upon them.30 Derviş Mehmet manifested himself as
being the Mahdi to some of his followers. He notified others of the imminence of the
arrival of the Mahdi. He advised them to keep on reciting God’s name in order to
witness to the Mahdi’s arrival.
25 Ibid., 8–9.
26 Ibid., 13.
27 Ibid., 8.
28 A statement of acknowledging and accentuating the oneness of God.
29 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11.
30 Ibid., 18.
14
In the court, Mehmet Emin recalled a conversation between Hafız Ahmet,
another person of the Nakşibendi order in the Manisa region, and Derviş Mehmet
about the Mahdi in one of their gatherings. The Mahdi was expected to show up at
the end of the world (ahir zaman) according to their belief. Hafız asked Derviş
Mehmet whether the Mahdi would be a human being or emerge in a shape of something
else. In his answer, Derviş Mehmet stated that all of the prophets had been human
beings, therefore the Mahdi as well would necessarily be a human being. Then
Derviş Mehmet told Hafız Ahmet that he was the expected Mahdi. From that moment
on, he declared that he was the Mahdi. After this, Hafız Ahmet asked Derviş
Mehmet whether he could overcome and cope with being the Mahdi or not. Derviş
replied he would get through. Hafız Ahmet kissed Derviş’s hand and announced him
as a true saint. Hafız Ahmet then summoned the people present in the meeting to
firmly believe in Derviş and warned them not to touch him. However, this story
stands in the middle of truthfulness and fabrication. Mehmet Emin mentioned that he
had heard about this affair both from Derviş and Fırıncı Ahmet (baker), a follower of
Derviş. However, there was no other testimony that validated this questionable account.
31
Somehow the police had learned about the gatherings to recite zikr. Later on,
the coffeehouse was closed down. The police might have known about the group and
the identity of the participants, who they were, and what they did when they came
together in the coffeehouse, including their performance of zikr. Yet, no legal action
was initiated against them. After the coffeehouse was closed, Tatlıcı Hüseyin proposed
to continue the zikr meetings in his house. That is to say, the group came together
in a coffeehouse and then at a private home in Manisa before their departure.
They kept on praying in Tatlıcı’s house for a while.32 Ramazan asserted that they
continually talked about the issues of Mahdism there as well.33
1.1.2. Departure from Manisa
As Mehmet Emin told in the court, they were performing zikr every afternoon
in the house of Tatlıcı Hüseyin until they left. In one of the last days of their gatherings
in Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s house, Derviş Mehmet brought forward his consideration of
31 Ibid., 8. This issue is discussed in chapter three.
32 Ibid., 11.
33 Ibid., 15.
15
the necessity of enhancing their invocations of God. He propounded the idea of a
constant fifteen days of seclusion in a cave for better praying. He told his companions
that he would be expecting revelation from God in this cave. He recounted them
that the Islamic Prophet Muhammed had taken divine inspiration in the same way
when he prayed in seclusion in cave. He also referred to Şeyh Esat in İstanbul. By
Derviş Mehmet’s own evaluation, Şeyh Esat, the mentor and leader of Nakşibendi
order, possessed very large power. He held the world in his hand and he could create
cataclysms, storms, and was able to run the world upside down. After their staying in
the cave, Derviş Mehmet intended to go to the village of Paşa, declare his Mahdism,
and invite people to join him.34 He shared his plans with others in Manisa. No dispute
occurred over those plans when he mentioned them.
Derviş Mehmet charged Küçük Hasan to go to a certain İsmail, present his
compliments and ask for a rifle for himself. Küçük Hasan did as Derviş wished and
brought a rifle to him. It was the first gun they acquired. Derviş in addition obtained
a knife from Koca Mustafa in Manisa. When they left Manisa to go to the village of
Paşa, they had one rifle and one knife as their weapons. They also speculated about
assaulting a law enforcement station to obtain guns.35 According to Ramazan, Sütçü
Mehmet as well obtained a gun for himself in Manisa.36 The company, composed of
seven people, namely Derviş Mehmet, Şamdan Mehmet, Sütçü Mehmet, Küçük Hasan,
Nalıncı Hasan, Mehmet Emin, and Ramazan, thus, intended to initiate a religious
movement in their own way. To fulfill their goals, some, but not all of them
obtained guns and left the city armed.37 Yet, Derviş Mehmet did not mention going
to Menemen during any of their meetings in Manisa.
They split into two groups in Manisa before taking the road. The first group
consisted of Derviş, Sütçü Mehmet, and Şamdan Mehmet. The other group included
Mehmet Emin, Ramazan, Nalıncı Hasan, and Küçük Hasan. The first group was
34 Ibid., 11.
35 Ibid., 13.
36 Ibid., 15.
37 Eyüp Öz asserts that Derviş Mehmet, Sütçü Mehmet and Mehmet Emin divorced their
wives before setting off for Menemen. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415. Öz’s
study generally seeks to stay away from prejudiced arguments. However, as it is the case
here, he gives unverifiable information. No other account mentions that these people divorced
their wives before their departure. This information appears to be fabricated as evidence
of Derviş Mehmet and his followers’ commitment to their goals. Such problems of our
sources are discussed in the literature review chapter. We refer to this particular rumor here
because of its relevance.
16
headed for the village of Paşa where they waited for the second group to join them
subsequently. They intended to go to the village of Bozalan after Paşa. According to
the statements of the three perpetrators who were detained alive, their journey would
continue after these two initial stops. They planned to go to many villages, towns,
and cities to summon people to join them to uphold the religion. Derviş spoke about
going to Arabia and even to China. He would unite with Jesus (upon Jesus’ second
coming) and then head for European countries to invite them to Islam.
1.1.3. The Group in Paşa
The groups arrived at the village of Paşa separately and united at the house of
Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law Rukiye and brother-in-law Ahmet, a post officer.
Ahmet hosted them for three to four days and met their needs. There, Derviş obtained
another weapon for himself and one for Şamdan Mehmet.38
In the village of Paşa, they stayed for four days and kept on invoking God’s
names and smoking hashish. Initially they told the villagers that they were in the village
for hunting. Yet later on, Derviş Mehmet declared his Mahdism to the villagers.
He had a dog with himself called Kıtmir, named after the dog of the ashab-ı kehf,
known as the companions of cave and seven sleepers. Derviş instantiated the dog to
townspeople as his sign of Mahdism.39 He told them to obey him and stated that every
one of villagers was obliged to do so.40 Most likely due to the absence of an evidence
to verify his Mahdism, he pointed out his dog to the villagers.
As mentioned by perpetrators, some of the inhabitants of Paşa believed in
Derviş while some others did not. Still, no one reported the unusual assertions of the
company to officials. The reason of their silence was most likely kinship. As re-
38 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 9.
39 An article published in Cumhuriyet after the event claimed that Derviş Mehmet and his
fellows adopted second names for themselves after seven sleepers. They called themselves
Mernuş, Etabiyoş, Kefeş, Sazenuş, Debernuş etc. Cumhuriyet, January 17, 1931. Indeed, according
to one version of the legend, seven sleepers would join the Mahdi. However, this
matter was not mentioned in the court process nor touched upon in the official reports. The
perpetrators did not mention that they adopted the identity of the ashab-ı kehf in the trials.
Only the newspapers alleged this point. As it will be discussed in the relevant section, much
misinformation was fabricated after the event, especially by the newspapers. Umut Azak,
another scholar who wrote about the Menemen Incident in detail, took this situation seriously
and stated it in her study. Azak remarks that according to the story, Eshab-ı Kehf, the seven
sleepers, were to be the helpers of the Mahdi. For Azak, even the number of Derviş
Mehmet’s own group, seven, was not accidental, “showing that he wanted to enact the Koranic
story of Eshab-ı Kehf with his disciples”. Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 26.
40 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
17
marked, Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law resided in Paşa. As villagers
stated in the court, Derviş Mehmet, used to come to the village previously
along with some others as well. That is to say, villagers were familiar with, at least,
Derviş. If Öz’s statements are true, the villagers knew of Derviş from his times of
banditry as well. Since Derviş could arrive at Paşa armed with his disciples and manifest
his Mahdism comfortably, there seems to have been no hostility between him
and the villagers. The population of the village at the time is not clear. Neither is
proportion of the ones who believed in Derviş is known. Still, no matter how sincerely
some of the villagers believed in him, not a single one of them joined the company
and dedicated himself to Derviş’s purposes. Moreover, as stated by perpetrators in
the court, Derviş’s mother-in-law warned and advised him not to go in pursuit of his
intentions during their stay and when they left the village. Derviş did not heed the
advice.
Derviş and his followers left the village of Paşa for the village of Bozalan.
They arrived in a district named Sünbüller after an eleven-hour walk at night. They
sat in a pinetum beside running water. Ramazan, a member of the group, left to relieve
himself. However, he did not return. Sütçü Mehmet went to look for him but
could not find him. Ramazan had run away from the group. According to the statements
of three perpetrators in the court, Derviş Mehmet began to keep a close watch
on his followers in the aftermath of Ramazan’s escape. He intimidated and threatened
to shoot them in case any one else would tend to run away. In Sünbüller, Derviş
spent time interpreting his companions’ dreams, and they carried on smoking hashish.
41
1.1.4. In the Village of Bozalan
When they approached Bozalan, they spent the night on a hill close to the village.
In the morning, Sütçü Mehmet went to the village and returned to the company
with his younger brother Hacıismailoğlu Hüseyin, an inhabitant of Bozalan. They
were taken to the village and initially hosted by Hacıismail.42 Sütçü Mehmet’s older
41 Ibid.
42 Another misinformation about the motions of the company before the Menemen Incident
is that they visited nearly a dozen villages before arriving at Bozalan. (See Öz, “Yasak Bir
Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415.) Neither the statements of the defendants nor the official records
mention that insurgents had been to any villages other than Paşa and Bozalan. They
18
brother, Hacıismail’s son, whose name was also Hüseyin, put them into a house
where they continued to chant God’s names for a week. Initially, Derviş told the villagers
that they were there for hunting.43 Yet, later on he declared his Mahdism and,
according to Küçük Hasan, some of the villagers blessed him and rendered their
thanks to God, saying elhamdülillah for letting them witness the arrival of the Mahdi
and see his face. Derviş explained his duty to summon people to the religion and told
villagers to join him. Moreover he stressed that as soon as he succeeded in his goal,
he would distribute official duties (memuriyet) to them.44
When they were in the house supplied for them in Bozalan, Derviş Mehmet
assigned two of the villagers, who were relatives of Sütçü Mehmet, to go to Manisa.
Those two villagers were to pretend that they were to buy things, but in reality they
would check out whether the government officials realized the absence of the members
of his company. The two villagers went to Manisa and learned from Sütçü
Mehmet’s wife that their absence was noticed and the police officials were trying to
get additional information about them. However, this does not mean that a warrant
was issued for their apprehension or any other legal action was taken by the law enforcement
agencies.45 When he got the news that the police were aware of their absence,
Derviş Mehmet became concerned. On the excuse that they could not concentrate
on reciting God comfortably in the village, he asked Sütçü Mehmet to construct
a cottage for them on the hill on the outskirts of the village. Sütçü Mehmet assigned
this task to his brother-in-law Mustafa.
might have passed by some villages, but evidently they entered only the aforementioned two
villages.
43 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
44 Ibid., 14.
45 Another allegation about the company’s activities, again mentioned by Öz, is that the rumors
about Giritli Mehmet’s departure from Manisa spread to rural regions. Whispers of an
imminent rebellion reached even Menemen. Furthermore, the issue was discussed in the
Menemen office of the Türk Ocakları, which was an official organization that aimed to
propagate the nationalist ideals of the republic. Öz asserts that Kubilay as well was presumably
involved in that discussion. In this presumed meeting, participants talked about their loyalty
to Atatürk and the virtues of the republic. (See Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,”
418.) There is no source to verify this information. There were meetings held in the Menemen
Türk Ocağı, yet no rumors about the company spread in the neighboring regions. Öz’s
statements imply that the law enforcement agencies became alarmed and began to follow the
company around. However, the company’s journey was not so serious as to cause such an
alarm. Their absence was noticed in Manisa since Küçük Hasan’s father had reported the departure
of his son with others to the police station. There was neither a legal action nor an
emergency measure taken upon this news.
19
Mustafa built the requested cottage, and the group proceeded to perform their
chants there. According to Nalıncı Hasan, they were praying day and night. At the
recommendation of Derviş, they used to recite the phrase of lâilâhe illallah 200,000
times at night. They also kept on smoking hashish in the cottage. Derviş asserted that
the Prophet Muhammed as well had smoked hashish and it was after doing so that he
experienced the ascension (miraç) to the level of God and had been able to speak to
God.46 Mehmet Emin further claimed that Derviş told them that God appeared to him
on several occasions.47 They stayed in the cottage for fifteen days. During their lodging,
villagers from Bozalan, named Hasan and Hacıismail, brought food to the
group.48
According to the statements of the insurgents in the court, Derviş Mehmet
frequently exemplified the circumstances of the Prophet’s period while defining his
intentions to redeem the religion and re-establish the former religious institutions. He
remarked how and in what ways the Prophet handled the issues that he faced in his
time. Derviş took advantage of the anecdotes about the methods the Prophet used to
convince his followers and to increase their commitment to the way they were on.
Derviş presented his plans by drawing analogies with the Prophet’s. He used the presumed
correspondence of his approach to the Prophet’s to consequently enhance his
deeds and aims, and to increase the legitimacy of his position in general in the eyes
of his disciples.49 He told them that the center of the Nakşibendi order was the
Prophet himself.
Mehmet Emin accounted that in their last days in the cottage, Derviş asked
Küçük Hasan about who knew the town of Menemen best. Küçük Hasan pointed
Nalıncı Hasan, since Nalıncı had frequently been visiting Menemen bazaars for merchandise.
Derviş asked Nalıncı about the number of gendarmes in Menemen. Nalıncı
said gendarmes were small in number there. Derviş then, mentioned of going to
Menemen to listen to the teachings of Saffet Hoca, a person he knew. Planning to
46 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
47 According to the newspapers Derviş Mehmet told his disciples in the cottage that the time
had come and he had reached the level of the Prophet. Cumhuriyet, December 27, 1930. No
other source verifies this information. Kemal Üstün, another author who wrote about the
event, took this datum for granted and stated it in his book along with other ungrounded information.
Kemal Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1978), 66.
48 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
49 Ibid., 13.
20
stay at Saffet Hoca’s house, he intended to send telegrams to Şeyh Esat and other
sheiks to bring them together in on effort to hold down the government,50 re-establish
the dervish lodges and suspend the government for two months. On this journey to
redeem the Islamic order, Derviş’s aim was to arrive at İstanbul, proclaim the caliphate
and to appoint sheikhs to each city of the country, such as Şeyh Saffet to
Menemen.51 All three of the perpetrators accounted in the police station as well as in
the court that these were Derviş’s goals. Newspapers, official accounts and subsequent
writers presented these plans as if they were very realistic. Six people took the
road from Manisa, and finally headed for entering Menemen with only three of them
armed. On the eve of their entrance to Menemen, they still upheld their aims, although
these goals were impossible to actualize under the aforementioned circumstances.
The only reasonable explanation of how on earth they could suppose to fulfill
those goals is that they were blunted by the hashish they had been smoking.
When they left the cottage in the outskirts of the village of Bozalan and took
the round to Menemen on the night of December 22, villagers Abdülkerim and
Hacıismailoğlu Hüseyin accompanied them until the Gediz River. Abdülkerim told
Derviş not to forget about him and wished success and Godspeed for their purposes.
Abdülkerim also told that they would follow him. They were to observe Menemen
from Bozalan and if they heard a gunfire burst, they would bear their arms and arrive
at Menemen.52 Lastly, he gave them cigarettes and sent them off.53 It is notable that
not a single villager of Bozalan participated in the company though they hosted
them. The villagers of neither Paşa nor Bozalan reported anything about Derviş
Mehmet, his armed company and their purposes to the gendarme. The reasons why
50 These statements indicate that Şeyh Esat, the leader of the Nakşibendi order of the era, did
not know about the so-called mission of the company. As it will be discussed in subsequent
sections, Mehmet Emin, along with other perpetrators, sought to leave the impression that
their actions were planned within the knowledge of the order. For them, the leader of the order,
notably Şeyh Esat, not only knew about the upcoming rebellion, but also motivated it.
However, as it will be designated in the relevant section, there is no proof of a connection
between Derviş Mehmet’s company and Şeyh Esat. Here Nalıncı Hasan seems to be stating
unwittingly that Esat did not know about their actions. Otherwise, why should Derviş plan to
send telegrams to Şeyh Esat to inform him?
51 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
52 When they departed from Bozalan, Derviş Mehmet gave a gun to Küçük Hasan as well.
Yet, Küçük Hasan claimed in the court not to have used it. T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,
14. In that case, almost every one of them had a gun when they were about to enter Menemen.
53 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
21
they were taken for granted in Paşa is also pertinent for their hosting in Bozalan.
There were relatives of the members of the company living in Bozalan as there were
in Paşa. Besides, the extent to which the inhabitants of Bozalan had faith in Derviş to
be the Mahdi is unknown. Still, the case that no one joined the group indicates that
the villagers refrained from stepping into armed action against the government.
The company arrived at the Gediz River where they needed to get across. The
boatman was asleep and they awakened him. Derviş Mehmet named himself as the
Mahdi even to the boatman and told that they were going to summon people to the
religion under their banner. Derviş said that they had no money, and asked the boatman
to help them to cross the river through giving a verbal guarantee that they would
please him afterwards via appointing him to a government office.54 Early in the
morning, they sat in an olive grove near Menemen. There, they smoked hashish
again and read the ayetel-kursi, a specifically significant verse of the holy Quran, to
ask help from God. Before their departure, Derviş gave his company instructions of
how they would enter the town.55
1.3. Events in Menemen
This section gives details about the events that happened in Menemen on 23
December 1930. The development of these events is constituted here mainly in reference
to official records. Statements of the perpetrators made in the court and official
reports prepared after the events are taken into account as the primary sources to reconstruct
the actions. There is hardly any contradiction between the statements of the
company members and official reports. However, newspapers of the era published
much misleading information about the movement in Menemen as well as about the
background of the event. Many of those distortions are discussed in relevant parts of
this thesis. Still, some of them are specified in this part as well. The purpose here is
to determine what exactly happened so as to provide the basis of subsequent evaluations.
1.3.1. Entrance to Menemen and Initial Activities
Menemen is a town, located thirty-three kilometers northwest of İzmir, the
third big metropolis of Turkey. According to the population census results of 1927,
54 Ibid., 11.
55 Ibid., 10.
22
Menemen’s population, including affiliated villages, was 28,000.56 According to the
results of the 1935 census, 13,000 people lived in the town itself.57 That is to say,
when the Menemen Incident occurred, there were approximately 12,000 habitants
living in Menemen.
The group came to an olive grove near Menemen in hunter clothes before
down on 23 December, 1930.58 After smoking hashish one last time and reading
Quranic verses, they took action. They entered the Menemen town center chanting
the holy words lâilâhe illallah (there is no god except Allah) and Allahuekber (God
is supreme). They initially went to the mosque named Müftü. A few people were in
the mosque to perform their morning prayers.59 In the mosque Derviş Mehmet introduced
himself as the Mahdi. When he did so, some of them cited the words of testimony
(kelime-i şehadet), a special religious phrase that implied they approved and
believed in him.60 Thereon, Nalıncı Hasan took a green banner on which Islamic holy
phrases were written and left the mosque with a couple of men.61 The number of
the prayers in the Müftü Mosque is unknown. Still, there were not many people inside
and not all of them followed Derviş. They came to the town square after leaving
the mosque. There, they performed zikr for a while. Then, Derviş wished to go
around the neighborhoods in the town. He asked one of inhabitants62 to guide them.63
They walked in the quarters of the town while chanting God’s names and prayers and
shouting Islamic slogans loudly with the banner in their hand. Derviş began to announce
that a caliphate army of 70,000 soldiers was waiting outside of Menemen for
his sign to intervene. The ones who were not willing to join him would be slaugh-
56 “T.C. İzmir Vilayeti 1930 Senesi Yıllık İstatistiği,” in T.C. İzmir Vilayeti İstatistik Yıllığı
(Başbakanlık İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1930), 12.
57 Başbakanlık İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü, Genel Nüfus Sayımı 1935 (Devlet Basımevi,
1936), 333–4.
58 Hikmet Çetinkaya made interviews with two residents of Menemen who witnessed the incident.
Their names were Osman Yurtsever (Singer Osman) and Ragıp Dere. Osman
Yurtsever stressed that some of the townspeople initially took the insurgents for hunters because
they wore hunting clothes. Hikmet Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları (İstanbul:
Çağdaş Yayınları, 1997), 19.
59 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
60 Ibid., 14.
61 Ibid., 10.
62 The names of the people who participated in the actions of the company are indicated not
here but in the section on court sessions later in the thesis. The point here is that all of the
townspeople who were explicitly or implicitly related with the events in Menemen were arrested
and taken to court.
63 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 14.
23
tered.64 He claimed that they had no other purpose except to redeem and replenish
the religion of Islam in Menemen. According to Nalıncı Hasan, while they walked
through the districts, some of the townspeople believed in their claims, joined their
crowd and tagged along with the company, but many others did not. Derviş indicated
the dog by his side as the evidence of his Mahdism to townspeople as well.65
Before coming to Menemen, Derviş Mehmet mentioned Saffet Hoca, who
lived in Menemen. According to the Derviş, they would receive help from Saffet and
reside in his house when they took control of the town. According to Küçük Hasan,
Derviş Mehmet encountered Şeyh Saffet during their tour of the streets.66 When Saffet
saw Derviş, he began to walk to his home in discontent. Derviş followed him to
his home and called his men. He made them stand in line and perform a formal bowing
for Saffet while he was getting into his home.67 However, Saffet did not pay attention
to them and went inside his home and closed the windows.68
After the wander in the streets, they came back to the municipal square at
07:40. They planted the banner they carried to the ground with the help of an inhabitant
of the town who did the digging.69 According to Nalıncı Hasan, when they came
to the town square, there were approximately a hundred people in their group, participating
in the zikr led by Derviş Mehmet. There were also a hundred more who were
waiting around and observing the events.70
Derviş repeated in the town square as well that there was an army of 70,000
caliphate soldiers nearby.71 He kept intimidating that whosoever did not get under
the banner and join them would be beheaded by midday.72 The company was constantly
chanting Allahuekber in the square under the banner.73 Derviş Mehmet pro-
64 Ibid., 10.
65 Ibid., 12.
66 Ibid., 10.
67 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45.
68 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 14.
69 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45.
70 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 12. The point that there were 200 people in the square in
total is compatible with official reports: “Büyük Erkânı Harbiye Riyasetinin 26/12/930 Tarihli
ve 6747 nolu Tezkeresi Sureti,” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle
Gerçekler, 57.
71 This matter was voiced in different terms. For instance, Küçük Hasan stated the army consisted
of 70,000 saints (evliya). Some newspapers alleged that Derviş and his followers declared
they had conquered İzmir and İstanbul. (See Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930.)
72 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15.
73 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 19.
24
claimed that wearing hats was a sin. Both the religion and the state would be redeemed
eventually.74 They further asserted to have cut the telegraph lines so they
hindered the communication of the town with the outside.75
1.3.2. Attitude of the Officials During the Events
The first official who came to interfere with the demonstrators was a certain
gendarme clerk named Ali Efendi. It was an attorney clerk named Mehmet Tevfik
Efendi who informed Ali Efendi of the situation. When he learned what was happening,
Ali Efendi took four armed gendarme privates with him and went to the square.
Ali Efendi came and asked Derviş Mehmet what he wanted. Derviş stressed that he
was the expected Mahdi and said they were to summon the townspeople to return to
Islam and to invite them to join the order. Ali Efendi refused his claims, urged him to
call off the meeting and warned the crowd to scatter. Yet, Derviş repeated his statement
that he was the Twelfth Imam and 70,000 soldiers surrounded the town. He ignored
the gendarme and proceeded with zikr.76 Neither the crowd nor the company
intended to disperse. In the face of this antagonistic situation,77 Ali Efendi went to
the house of the commander of gendarmes, along with the four soldiers accompanying
him. The Commander Captain Fahri Bey came directly to the square with Ali
Efendi.78 Derviş repeated his assertions and purposes to him as well. Fahri Bey mentioned
they, too, were Muslims and asked the group to disperse. Derviş again rejected
the warning. As accounted in the official reports, Captain Fahri Bey plainly invited
the crowd composed of inhabitants of Menemen to disperse. However, they did
not budge and remained in the square with and around Derviş.79 As soon as Fahri
Bey realized his commands did not make any effect, he left the crowd and got inside
the state house in the square along with Ali Efendi and four armed gendarme pri-
74 Ibid.
75 The official reports preserved in the ATASE Archives of the General Staff include the testimonial
statements of Nail Bey, a post office clerk in Menemen at the time. Nail Bey explains
that as soon as he heard the allegation that they had cut the lines, he checked them. He
found that the wires were not cut and worked properly. Nail Bey further informed the İzmir
Governorate of the situation. (See “Menemen Telgraf Memuru Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin
Tanıklık İfadesi,” Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ATASE Arşivi, http://www.tsk.tr/Content/img/
tarihten_kesitler/menemen6.jpg)
76 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11.
77 Küçük Hasan moreover stated in the court that Derviş Mehmet pulled a gun on the gendarmes.
Ibid., 15. However, official recordings do not refer to such an incident.
78 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 46.
79 Ibid.
25
vates. Thereafter Fahri Bey did not leave the government office until the end of the
events.80 When the captain was leaving the square after the Derviş’s disregard of his
warnings, a part of the crowd applauded,81 acclaiming his success in repulsing the
law enforcement officers.82 This applause uplifted and encouraged Derviş.83
As indicated above, the state officers heard about the happenings in the town
center and began to step into action. The situation was serious. Plain intervention
without using active force would not suffice to disperse the company. There was a
series of phone calls made by state officers to each other to pave the way for effectively
dealing with the situation. However, according to official reports that assessed
the officers’ acts, the process of conveying the armed forces to the scene of incidents
was not conducted efficiently. That inadequacy in coordination of the state offices
culminated in the brutal murder of a reserve officer.
After getting inside the state office, Fahri Bey phoned the Third Regimental
Command Headquarters in Menemen and recounted the situation to the officer on
duty and the deputy commander Nedim Bey. He requested from the command headquarters
a battalion to be deployed to the government square. He sought to reach the
district governor by phone but could not. Moreover, Fahri Bey phoned the governor’s
office in İzmir to inform them of the situation in Menemen. He ordered the four
gendarme privates to defend the building in the case of an offensive action until
backup arrived.84 The captain also sent the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi to meet and
80 “Büyük Erkânı Harbiye Riyasetinin 26/12/930 Tarihli ve 6747 nolu Tezkeresi Sureti”
ibid., 57.
81 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.”
82 According to other assertions, Derviş stated to the mass in the square after Fahri Bey’s departure
that the state forces actually supported them. Bahriye Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen
Olayı,” Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş
Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi 8 (1998): 61; Another allegation about the events in the
square is that people got fired up due to Derviş’s apparent firmness in the face of the gendarme’s
attempts to scatter them. Therefore they began to shout; “No more government.”
(Artık hükümet yok.) Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 418. Although the state administration
responded harshly to the townspeople’s approving attitude, there is no record indicating
that the crowd shouted the aforesaid slogan attributed to it.
83 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11.
84 He is reported to have placed two of the gendarmes to window ledge so they could commence
fire in case of need. Yet, there was no gunshot from the state building when Kubilay
was shot or Derviş Mehmet beheaded him twenty minutes later. This situation invites the
question whether the governmental square was within the state building’s range of view or
not. We may assume that if soldiers had seen Kubilay’s being shot, they would have opened
fire. It makes sense that they did not see what was happening in the square. Thus, their pur26
accompany the battalion that would be sent from the regiment headquarters.85
Meanwhile, an unknown inhabitant of Menemen saw the goings-on in the square and
went to regimental headquarters to inform them. Before entering the headquarters, he
came across the reserve officer Kubilay Bey, who was preparing his detachment for
morning drills, and conveyed to him what he observed. According to the records, that
inhabitant went into the headquarters and recounted the situation there as well.
Meanwhile, Captain Fahri Bey also required a battalion from the regiment. Deputy
Commander Nedim Bey dispatched an order to Kubilay to delay his departure. However,
this order could not be conveyed to Kubilay since he had hit the road as soon as
he learned the situation from the aforementioned inhabitant.86
Ten minutes after the entrance of Fahri Bey into the building, another soldier,
the mess officer Mehmet Ali Bey, on duty of the Fourth Regiment, came to the
square and encountered the movements. Derviş Mehmet saw Mehmet Ali Efendi,
and called him to talk.87 He loudly preached him about tevhid, the oneness of God,
the sharia, and finding the rightful path. As soon as Mehmet Ali realized the seriousness
of the circumstances, he too called for a battalion from the deputy commander
Nedim Efendi. Nedim Efendi mentioned the request made by Captain Fahri Bey and
that a battalion was already on its way to the square. Nedim Efendi also told Mehmet
Ali Bey to contact the forthcoming squad. Mehmet Ali Efendi waited for the arrival
of the unit for a while and dispatched his orderly to bring his gun from his home.
However, without waiting for his gun, he went on to enter the government office. In
the building Captain Fahri Bey gave him a rifle and told him to stay there with him.88
As indicated above, Fahri Bey had ordered the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi to
meet the division sent from the headquarters. Kubilay and his detachment however,
took a shortcut to arrive at the square. Therefore Kubilay missed Ali Efendi and confronted
the demonstrators without knowing about the state of the other law enforcement
units.89
pose to stand by the windows was to resist in case the crowd came close and intended to enter
the building.
85 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 46–7.
86 “Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti” ibid., 58.
87 Summoning an officer to talk to seems to derive from the exaltation Derviş felt after the
encouraging applause of the crowd for his deeds.
88 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 58.
89 Ibid.
27
When Fehmi Efendi phoned the district governor, he could not reach him due
to a connection problem. He then called the post office and talked to the postmaster
to deliver the information. It was the Postmaster of Menemen Hüseyin Sabri Efendi
who informed the district governor and the regiment commander of the developments.
As soon as he witnessed the group performing zikr in the square, he decided
to let the state executives know. Sabri Efendi initially went to the home of the district
governor. Thereon they found the regiment commander. Afterwards, the district governor
and the regiment commander came to the regiment headquarters together. They
ordered three more battalions to get prepared and to bring the incident under control.
The report prepared by an inspector of General Staff Headquarters after the
incident refers to and criticizes the lack of healthy communication between state officers.
The report remarks that the captain neither mentioned the extent of the event
nor expressed the reason why they demanded the division. Due to the poor information
Fahri Bey provided, the first group was sent to the scene of the incident unarmed.
90 However, this seems to be untrue. As accounted in the archival documents
of the police and indicated above, Fehmi Bey informed the regimental commanders
about the situation.91 Although assistant regiment officer Nedim Bey gave the instruction
for Kubilay to stand by, the order was not conveyed to Kubilay. Hereon,
there seems to have been two possibilities to explain why Kubilay did not order his
detachment to put bullets into their rifles. First, the information Kubilay received
from the inhabitant may not have made him realize fully the severity of the situation.
The second possibility is that Kubilay simply forgot to order his men to put bullets
into their rifles.
1.3.3. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay
Before explaining the following events, providing information about Kubilay’s
character will help to understand why his murder made such a tremendous impact.
State administrators, newspapers, and writings in the aftermath of his murder,
have condemned the incidence ever since. Though neglected during some periods of
republican history, there have been regular ceremonies conducted to commemorate
Kubilay and the two wardens, as martyrs of the Republic up to the present.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 46–7.
28
Kubilay92 was a reserve officer who sought to intervene in Derviş Mehmet’s
actions and was brutally murdered by him in Menemen. He was twenty-four years
old when he was murdered. His real name was Mustafa Fehmi. He took the name
“Kubilay” at Teacher’s Training School in İzmir during his studentship. Taking the
name of famous persons or the places they had lived in Turkish history was a current
trend in those years. Under the influence of this tendency, Mustafa Fehmi got the
name “Kubilay”.93 After his graduation, he began to work as a teacher in Aydın.
There he met Fatma Vedide,94 who was a teacher as well and they got married. On
May 10, 1929 their son Vedat was born. However, later on they divorced due to irreconcilable
differences.95 Meantime, Mustafa Fehmi was at Menemen doing his
military service as reserve officer at the 43rd Infantry Regiment.
Fatma Vedide’s interview with Hikmet Çetinkaya, a Kemalist journalist writing
for the Cumhuriyet, includes information about Mustafa Fehmi’s personality.
Vedide mentioned that they got married in Aydın and this was the first civil marriage,
namely the first matrimony that took place according to the new code of civil
law. Vedide placed importance on this matter.96 Vedide and Kubilay used to talk
about national matters a lot. For Vedide, they both loved their country very much and
had strong nationalist feelings. They also adhered to “The Great Redeemer” Atatürk’s
revolutions such as “rescuing the woman from çarşaf, adoption of the new alphabet,
closure of the madrasas and dervish lodges”. For Vedide, they both were not
devoutly religious or conservative. Ataturk had abolished the order of sharia and they
were both teachers of the era and dedicated to Ataturk’s principles.97 For Vedide,
Kubilay neither was an alcoholic nor a gambler. He did not go to coffeehouses. He
only used to do sports and teach his students about Ataturk’s reforms.98
92 The name “Kubilay” was written differently in various newspapers of the era as well as in
witness statements such as Kublay, Koplay, and Kuplay.
93 Kubilai Khan was one of the grandsons of Cengiz and the fifth emperor of the Mongol
Empire. He reigned in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.
94 Fatma Vedide was at the age of 76 when she gave the interview. Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı
ve Tarikat Kampları, 7.
95 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 417. Their divorce has been mentioned very rarely
both right after the event and in the related literature. For the most part of the related writings,
Kubilay has been a heroic figure. Therefore not a single piece of information that may
overshadow this image has been given place in the writings on Kubilay.
96 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 11.
97 Ibid., 12.
98 Ibid.
29
Vedide depicts Kubilay as a hot tempered and impulsive person.99 He used to
play volleyball with his students at break times. He was ambitious to win and when
he lost the game, he became upset. Vedide told that once when Mustafa Fehmi’s
team lost the game, he yelled and created havoc so much so that nobody could come
near him due to his temper.100 Vedide added that he was a persistent person who defended
his opinions to the end, yet he did not act hostilely. He entered into tough discussions
but did not pick a fight. Mustafa Fehmi was a member of the Turkish
Hearths and participated in its meetings held in the Menemen office.
One of his friends from the Turkish Hearths and the football team was Bedri
Onat. Çetinkaya’s book includes an interview with him as well. Onat also lived
through the Menemen Incident and served as the city manager of Menemen town ten
years. According to Onat as well, Mustafa Fehmi was quick-tempered and intensive
in football matches.101 Onat remarked about the discussions they held in the Turkish
Hearths about various matters. Mustafa Fehmi became exited and insisted on his ideas.
However he calmed down as soon as the discussion was over.102 Neither Onat nor
Vedide witnessed him fighting with someone. Onat stressed that Kubilay was an affectionate
and courageous person.103 Kemal Üstün, who also wrote about the Menemen
Incident, states that he knew Mustafa Fehmi. Üstün also refers to Mustafa
Fehmi’s hotheadedness nervous treatment.104
Mustafa Fehmi’s temperament helps to understand his actions in Menemen.
Mustafa Fehmi buttonholed Derviş Mehmet in the government square and was shot
due to this of his action. Official pronouncements, newspapers reports, and other
writings harshly condemned his murder. Along his being a reserve officer on duty to
maintain order, his personality traits contributed to the intensity of the reactions to
his murder. He was a successful student at school.105 After his graduation, he began
to serve as a teacher of the republic. He was dedicated to his job. He had taken the
name of a legendary emperor, and became a member Turkish Hearths regularly attending
to its meetings. In short, he was a prototype of Republican ideals. The brutal
99 Ibid., 13.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 26.
102 Ibid., 20.
103 Ibid., 26.
104 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 20.
105 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 14.
30
murder of such an iconic citizen in the hands of “Islamist reactionaries” caused great
resentment and indignation in the official circles and others who shared republican
ideals.
1.3.4. Kubilay Rushing to the Scene
Kubilay and his unit arrived at the town square at 08:30. He ordered his soldiers
to fix bayonets to their rifles and left them thirty to forty meters away from the
crowd.106 He went to face Derviş Mehmet and his cohort alone. Derviş repeated his
claims to Kubilay as well. When Kubilay warned the group to disperse, in the way
the former officers did, Derviş ignored him too, and rejected Kubilay’s warnings.
There, due to his hot-tempered characteristic, Kubilay suddenly buttonholed107
Derviş and yelled at him to do as he said. Then Derviş pushed back Kubilay. At that
point, Derviş108 shot Kubilay in the chest.109 Having been heavily wounded, Kubilay
fell down there.
After the gun shot, Kubilay’s platoon fled. They neither commenced fire110
nor made any kind of intervention.111 Therefore, they had no information about what
happened to their commander afterwards. At that point, a part of the crowd dispersed
106 The number of soldiers in Kubilay’s unit is unknown. It is recorded that the sergeants and
corporals in his detachment were put on trial afterwards. However, how many of them were
there and waiting behind is unclear.
107 It was asserted in various writings, including the statement of a witness, Mustafa Şengönül,
that Kubilay slapped one of the insurgents in the face. (See Can Dündar, Gölgedekiler,
1st ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1995), 64.) But it is not true. The perpetrators
unanimously mentioned that Kubilay buttonholed Derviş.
108 There are different accounts about who shot Kubilay as well. In their court statements,
perpetrators Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan stressed that it was Derviş himself who shot
Kubilay. “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15. However, the General Staff’s report mentions
that it was one of Derviş’s followers who shot Kubilay. ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya
İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.”
109 There are rumors about this point as well. For instance, Sami Özyılmaz, one of the witnesses
of the incident who was a child at the time and was interviewed by Can Dündar, described
Kubilay having been shot in the foot. Can Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor”
(www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/25/yazar/dundar.html) But the autopsy report leaves
little doubt that he was shot in the chest. The bullet busted Kubilay’s rib cage bones and his
lung. “Otopsi Raporu” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 67.
110 It was alleged that soldiers fired blank shots to no effect. However, there was not any sort
of bullets in their rifles, including blank cartridge. ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin
İfadesi.”
111 “Büyük Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti,” Emniyet
Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 57. Witnesses also remarked that
the soldiers fled. Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.” Specifically non-reaction
of the soldiers was harshly criticized in the official reports prepared in the aftermath of the
incident.
31
as well. Some of them, including the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi, entered the post office.
Post officer Nail Bey mentioned that it was illegal for people to enter the post
office and asked them to leave. Ali Efendi requested to use the back window to exit.
They broke the back window and Ali Efendi went away. Nail Efendi advised him to
get a gun and return to the scene. Ali Efendi did not do so.112
After getting shot, Kubilay was on the ground for fifteen seconds.113 Then he
stood up and could walk to the courtyard of Gazez Mosque, which was twenty to
thirty meters away.114 However, under the influence of the heavy wound, he fell on
the ground in the courtyard.115 Kubilay waited there for a while since insurgents did
not intend to chase him initially. However, after fifteen to twenty minutes, one of the
insurgents learned about Kubilay’s condition, and told it his friends. Derviş and
Şamdan Mehmet went to the courtyard and held Kubilay.116 There, Derviş Mehmet
cut Fehmi’s head off with a knife by Şamdan Mehmet’s help.117 Later on, Derviş
brought Kubilay’s head to the square and tried to attach it to the tip of their ban-
112 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.”
113 Ibid.
114 According to an eyewitness, Sami Özyılmaz, and some other narrations, Kubilay sought
to enter the state building at first. The locked door obliged him to walk to the mosque.
Özyılmaz comments that in case Kubilay had entered the government office, he would not
have been beheaded. (See Dündar, “Menemen'in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.”) But these statements
do not make sense. The captain of gendarmes, the regiment officer Mehmet Ali and
four gendarme privates were in the building. They would certainly have intervened in the
situation and taken Kubilay inside. Such unreasonable explanations paved the way for conspiracy
accounts about the event, which claim that the law enforcement officers deliberately
abandoned Kubilay to his fate and watched him murdered from the windows.
115 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45.
116 The newspapers of the time, together with many others later, gave wrong information
about this point as well. It was asserted that having been wounded, Kubilay sought to escape
from the hands of insurgents, but could not. Meanwhile, there were people around watching
the scene and applauding Derviş and they even cried “Allah Allah.” Vakit, January 16, 1931;
Milliyet, January 16, 1931. This is a faulty assertion, putting the townspeople under severe
suspicion. The number of people in the square at the time or the number of those who followed
Derviş to the courtyard is unknown. As discussed later in the relevant section, the
Chief Judge of the martial court persistently clamped down on people charged with applauding
in the square, but there was no one accused of acclaiming Kubilay’s beheading.
117 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.” There was some misinformation
about Derviş’s knife as well. As discussed in the literature review section, some writers
claim that the knife was blunt and therefore the process of beheading took a while, implying
the depth of the hatred of the reactionists and Kubilay’s suffering. However, the knife
was keen-edged. “23 Aralık 1930 tarihli hükümet tabibi imzalı Keşif Zabıt Varakası”,
Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ATASE Arşivi, http://www.tsk.tr/Content/img/tarihten_kesitler/
menemen1.jpg.
32
ner.118 But the head fell down from the banner. Then, they asked a rope and a
townsman brought it. They fastened the head to a pole with the rope.119 Under the
circumstances, two district wardens engaged in combat with the insurgents and were
killed.120 Another part of the crowd dispersed after this shootout.121
Before long, the three battalions dispatched by the regimental commander
and district governor arrived at the scene. Troops encircled the company, warned the
remaining spectators to disperse, and called the insurgents to surrender, while firing
their guns into the air.122 But Derviş was in absolute trance claiming invulnerability.
Other insurgents were in a similar state as well. Although they saw the arrival of the
armed troops, they did not give in and lay down their arms. Then the troops opened
fire with their machine guns. Three of the insurgents, Derviş Mehmet, Şamdan
Mehmet, and Sütçü Mehmet were killed. Mehmet Emin was wounded. Nalıncı Hasan
and Küçük Hasan took the advantage of the disorder that erupted after gunshots,
and fled.123
118 Newspapers of the next day reported that Derviş said; “Drinking blood is forbidden in our
religion, but it is halal to drink this blood," and then drank Kubilay’s blood. (Anadolu, December
24, 1930.) There was no reference to such an incident or words in any official report
or court statement. We have to conclude that this news as well was fabricated. However, it
found a place in later narratives, particularly in Kemalist accounts of the incident.
119 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15.
120 Yet the precise time or conditions in which they engaged in combat with the insurgents
and got shot are quite uncertain. They might have clashed with the insurgents before the arrival
of the regimental troops. It was also claimed by some writers that the two wardens were
killed by the machine gun fire of the troops. No source supports this claim. The records indicate
that the troops warned the insurgents to surrender before starting the gunfire. Therefore
it is quite impossible that the wardens would remain standing within the fire range of the divisions.
121 Certain newspapers published news that Derviş cried to the crowd not to run away because
the Messenger Mahdi was invulnerable and immortal. (Anadolu, December 24, 1930)
Eyüp Öz, who believes this point, argues Derviş Mehmet relied on an amulet, which Ahmet
Muhtar, an associate of the Nakşibendi order in Menemen had given him previously. (See
Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415.) There is no evidence to indicate the background
of this amulet. Derviş was able to send away three officers who came to ask the
crowd to disperse. He did the same with Kubilay’s troops. These incidents combined with
the killing of Kubilay and two district wardens probably made him feel that he could succeed
in taking hold of the town center. Furthermore, being under the influence of the hashish he
smoked must have convinced him of his immortality.
122 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 48.
123 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15.
33
1.3.5. On the heels of the Events in Menemen
Some townspeople were wounded during gun shooting.124 Witnesses of the
incident accounted that the law enforcement forces searched all the houses in the
town center to capture the fugitives.125 The crime scene investigation team examined
Kubilay’s dead body. Soldiers waited beside his blood in the square. Mehmet Emin
was captured and immediately interrogated. As reported by the newspapers, he was
talking nonsense when he was seized.126
In the town center, machine guns remained to stay deployed all day. It indicates
that the armed forces were ordered to provide security in case of an offensive
action. They stayed on alert against the rumor that Derviş had spread about the arrival
of an army of 70,000 soldiers. Until they determined whether this was true in any
measure, the officials maintained the safety.
Menemen townspeople related with the incident may be divided into four
categories. The first group consisted of the ones who solely stood still as spectators
in the square. They neither participated in the activities of Derviş and his cohort nor
helped them in any way. The second group assumed an appreciative attitude. They
joined the people who gathered under the banner, took part in zikr performance, and
applauded Derviş. Third, a small part of the crowd de facto helped the insurgents.
One inhabitant guided the company through the neighborhoods. Another person dug
the hole into which the banner was planted. Yet another gave cigarettes to insurgents.
Also, a man brought rope to attach Kubilay’s head to the banner. Furthermore, two
townspeople were charged with shooting during the actions.127 The ones on the side
124 For the official records and some of the newspapers, merely one inhabitant was wounded.
“Büyük Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti,” Emniyet
Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 57; Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay,
24; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 25, 1930. According to some other newspapers, four
people got wounded and taken under treatment. Anadolu, December 25, 1930. Kemal Üstün
was a teacher and friend of Kubilay. He remarks that there were bullet holes on some walls
and broken glass pieces in the square. This shows that troops may have fired the machine
guns quiet randomly.
125 Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.”
126 Indicating his unconscious condition, he said his friends did not die and the Mahdi would
be resurrected soon. He also said that they were like the prophet Ibrahim who was thrown in
the fire and came back alive. Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930.
127 According to a local researcher, at the time of the incident, there was a rifle in almost every
residence of Menemen for protection against wild animals and burglars. Oktay Özengin,
Kubilay Olayı Tarihi: “40 Gün” (İzmir: Özengin Matbaası, 1996), 31. Still, the extent to
34
of the government may be categorized as the fourth group. As mentioned above,
there were people who de facto acted against the insurgents. Post officer Nail Efendi
served as a witness and expressed what he had seen during the events to government
inspectors. He as well helped the gendarme officer to run away and informed them
about the fleeing of two insurgents. An advocate clerk Mehmet Tevfik Efendi, instantly
reported the happenings to gendarme officers. Postmaster Hüseyin Sabri
Efendi128 rushed to the home of the district governor to inform him of the developments
as soon as he received Fahri Bey’s call. People from the first three groups
were detained and put on trial.
***
This chapter sought to filter the primary sources in order to present as accurate
a picture as possible. It provided details of actual events and developments to reconstruct
a reliable narrative of the Menemen Incident. Activities of the perpetrators,
on the hole, occurred in the ways expressed above. Additional actions attributed to
the perpetrators and mentioned above when relevant are mostly fabricated and therefore
misinformation. Misinformation about this incident spread to many narratives
and evaluations made subsequently, beginning with the official statements and
newspapers of the era. Furthermore, the supposed intentions and criminal behavior
were attributed to people who were not on the scene in Menemen. The notables of
the Nakşibendi order in particular were accused of inspiring the incident implicitly
by inciting the perpetrators. A great part of the accounts of the incident defined it as
a reactionary rebellion executed by a malicious organization. Others pointed to the
opposition circles in general, and the former Free Republican Party, in particular as
instigator of such acts.
which the people in the square had their rifles with themselves is unknown. There were only
two inhabitants charged with shooting their guns during the incident.
128 Sabri Efendi was the father of Sabahat Erkal, who was a little girl at the time and gave an
interview to Can Dündar many years later.
35
CHAPTER 2
THE OFFICIAL REFLECTIONS AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS
OF THE MENEMEN INCIDENT
This chapter investigates the general reactions of officers and the media elements
displayed after the Menemen Incident. The event initiated quite a great impulse
and remained on the agenda until the judicial process was over. I begin with
the meeting Mustafa Kemal held in İstanbul and Ankara with the RPP leaders. These
meetings determined the court rulings. Namely, court verdicts had already been decided
at the very beginning of the legal proceedings. I will then discuss the government’s
condemnation of the event and its preparations for formal investigations. The
establishment of the martial court and details of internal inquiries are among the subject
matters of the chapter. These inquiries also signify the dimensions of the event.
Newspaper reports on the incident are discussed in depth and grouped in accordance
with the differences in their approach. In this regard, reflections discussed here will
constitute a meaningful whole as to what the Menemen Incident meant for the Early
Turkish Republic.
Official statements and pro-government newspapers, announced the incident
as a serious and well-rounded revolt shortly after the event. For them, the perpetrators
aimed at overthrowing the republican regime as well as re-establishing the Caliphate
order and a state upholding the sharia. Along with this prejudgment, much misinformation
about the actual happenings was published in these newspapers. Initial
reactions to and representations of the event influenced the subsequent narrations of
the event deeply and led to recursively recounted misinformation.
2.1. Determination of the Government’s Stance in the Aftermath of the Incident
This section discusses mainly the meeting held by Mustafa Kemal in the
Çankaya Palace on 7 January 1931. In a previous meeting in Dolmabahçe on 2 January
1931, Mustafa Kemal met Şükrü Kaya and received detailed reports about the
event as well as about sufi organizations in the western region of the country. The
meeting of 7 January is significant since it determined the procedures and policies
observed in the aftermath of the incident. Top government officials such as Prime
36
Minister İsmet (İnönü) Paşa, President of the Assembly Kazım (Özalp) Paşa, Interior
Minister Şükrü (Kaya), Minister of National Defense Zeki (Apaydın) Bey, Chief of
the General Staff Fevzi (Çakmak) Paşa, and Fahrettin (Altay) Paşa the Commander
of Martial Law in the region attended the meeting held by the President of the Republic,
Mustafa Kemal. How the judicial process would continue and be concluded
were issues particularly addressed during the meeting. Moreover, the statements expressed
in the gathering synoptically reflected what the event meant for the state
from that day on. The meeting prejudged the incident officially as a collective action
planned by a religious order. The main sources of the meeting in question are the
notes of Fahrettin Paşa and Kazım (Özalp). In his memories, Fahrettin Paşa remarks
that the content of the meeting was like instructions for him, and hence he wrote
down the details carefully.
Mustafa Kemal was unusually angry, nervous and upset about the Menemen
Incident.129 He indicated the importance of investigating the background of the event
and looking for political organizations behind it. He stressed that the investigation
would aim at revealing whether it was politically motivated or not.130 He also stated
his concern that if the former members of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver
Cumhuriyet Fırkası) were involved in the event in any manner and for political
interests.131 He further emphasized that the investigations should not be limited
to the town of Menemen alone.132
In the meeting, İsmet İnönü put forward the issue of the Free Republican Party,
which had been closed down one and a half months before the event.133 He stated
129 In his memoir, Özalp wrote that Mustafa Kemal would never forget about the event.
Kazım Özalp and Teoman Özalp, Atatürk’ten Anılar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür
Yayınları, 1992), 48.
130 Taylan Sorgun, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete: İmparatorluk, İttihat ve Terakki, Cumhuriyet
1902-1938 Üç Devrin Galerisi: Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor (İstanbul: Kamer
Yayınları, 1988), 434–5.
131 Ibid. However as partly remarked in the previous chapter, when the course of events and
the judicial process are examined, it is difficult to establish a substantial connection between
the insurgents and political actors.
132 Fahrettin Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş: 1912-1922 ve Sonrası (İstanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970),
438.
133 FRP was the second opposition party set up primarily by the instructions of Mustafa Kemal.
He expected Fethi Okyar to help take some tension off the political arena of the republic.
Instead, the establishment of the party led to a rise of political tension, especially in the
western regions of the country. In some places, in İzmir above all, people welcomed the new
party with cheers and rendered it as “the savior” of the people from RPP. The political tension
became so unbearable that the party abolished itself.
37
that a probable relationship between the insurgents and former members of FRP
should be looked into.134 Such suspicion derived from a few substantial issues. For
instance, during his trip in the Aegean region, Fethi Okyar visited Menemen and was
welcomed with joy and acclamations.135 As soon as the party was established, the
Menemen office was set up. Upon settling in the town center, FRP planned to expand
into the villages and sought to open offices in districts as well.136 During the Municipal
Elections held on 14 October 1930, it was the FRP candidate who was elected to
the mayorship of Menemen. Furthermore, Sami Özyılmaz, one of the witnesses of
the event, mentioned that there had been rivalry among a few people in the town on
the political party issue. This meant that members of FRP and RPP had been having
quarrels, to some extent.137 This was the reason why İsmet İnönü brought forward
the issue of FRP in the meeting. Since the day after the incident, there were newspaper
articles and deputy statements accusing FRP implicitly or explicitly as being responsible
for the eruption of such a reactionary event, occurred against the very existence
of the republic.
As recounted by Kazım Özalp, Mustafa Kemal was extremely angry about
the people of Menemen. He was concerned for the matter that an officer of the army
could be beheaded at the governmental square in the name of religion, and no one
among the people would report anything to the officials.138 According to Mustafa
Kemal, instead of preventing such an incident, the people of the town preferred to
encourage the beheading by shouting Allahuekber.139 Mustafa Kemal, filled with anger,
asked where the appreciators had been during the Greek invasion and why they
did not protest the Greeks. According to him, the townspeople believed that a ruthless
attack on an officer of the army would save their honor and religion. Therefore,
134 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 435.
135 Hizmet, September 9, 1930
136 Hizmet, September 22, 1930.
137 Can Dündar, "Menemen'in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor," (December 25, 2005), www.
milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/25/yazar/dundar.html
138 It seems that Mustafa Kemal was not aware that a few of the Menemen townspeople reported
the events to law enforcement officials, as mentioned in the previous chapter.
139 Let me repeat that Kubilay was not beheaded on the square but in the courtyard of a certain
mosque. Also there was not a crowd of thousands of people but about 200 people.
Moreover, there probably was not anyone around when Derviş was cutting the head of Kubilay
in the courtyard. However there might have been some people who acted in an approving
manner when he returned to the square with the head in his hand. Still, in the trials, the chief
judge did not charge anyone with appreciating the beheading though he frequently drove the
defendants into a corner.
38
not only the traitors who killed Kubilay, but also the townspeople ought to be punished
severely. Mustafa Kemal emphasized that beheading an officer meant beheading
the republic itself. As the entire town was responsible for the rebellion in his
mind, Menemen should be declared as Vilmodit.140 For Mustafa Kemal, the least
guilty of the townspeople were the ones who stood as onlookers to the actions and
would all be banished.141 He further stated that particular new laws should be implemented
to announce the accused towns and villages as uninhabitable.142 Villagers received
their share of verbal reactions in the meeting as well. For instance, İsmet Paşa
mentioned that some of the villagers could dare to suggest to the insurgents to raid a
certain gendarme station and take their guns in order to achieve their goals.143
One major subject of the meeting was the Nakşibendi order. As mentioned
above, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya had been to the Dolmabahçe Palace on 2 January
and filed a report for Mustafa Kemal. It was about the order’s operations in the
country, its members, and intensive activities in the regions of İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa,
Alaşehir, Balıkesir and Antalya.144 During the Çankaya meeting, Mustafa Kemal
stressed that the order had many disciples in the country,145 and while not all of them
could be harmful, the prominent ones were dangerous and able to cause much harm.
Members in the locations where the order was active must be scattered and eliminated.
146 Some unrealistic and extreme words were uttered in the meeting as well. For
instance, Kazım (Özalp) defined the Nakşibendi order as a political institution that
140 Özalp and Özalp, Atatürk’ten Anılar, 47–8. In its French origin, the word ville maudite
meant the punished city. If a city or town were declared as “Vilmodit,” all families who lived
there would be one by one exiled to other cities and the city set afire entirely. To make an
example of it all, a huge black column would be planted in the city square. Taking Mustafa
Kemal’s overreaction into consideration, others neither objected immediately to this idea nor
accepted it. They opted to appease him and suggested to wait for the official reports. Though
in the end of the meeting Mustafa Kemal was still quiet angry, the idea of making Menemen
a “Vilmodit” did not recur.
141 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5.
142 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 438.
143 Ibid., 434.
144 Cumhuriyet, January 3, 1931. The title of the report: “Menemen’deki irtica hareketi ile
birlikte ülkedeki tarikatlar ve bunların mensupları ve bu tarikatların İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa,
Alaşehir, Balıkesir ve Antalya’da yoğun faaliyetleri.”
145 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5. Laz İbrahim was one of the alleged planners
of the incident and also a prominent member of the order. He was detained and interrogated
by the investigating magistrate. As recorded in the archives of the Turkish General
Staff, he stressed that before the abolishment of the dervish lodges, Şeyh Esat had approximately
20,000 disciples. ATASE Arşivi, CDİ Koleksiyonu; Kls.: 135; D.:1; F.:2-272/273.
146 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 438.
39
incited all former revolts. To him, Abdülhamit II was also a member of this order.
Furthermore, Şükrü (Kaya) recounted that the protagonists of the 31 March Incident
were associates of order as well. Kazım Özalp defined the Nakşibendi order as a vicious
snake, which had to be exterminated. To him, dervish lodges should either be
transformed into public schools or be set on fire.147 Mustafa Kemal expressed similar
thoughts. He stated that women disciples of the order should not be tolerated. “All
administrators of the state must know that this order must be annihilated. There must
remain no qutb148 or qutbu’l-aktab (leader of leaders).”149
One other issue dealt with during the meeting was the oppositional press.
Mustafa Kemal expressed that such newspapers as Son Posta and Yarın were used to
publishing any sort of negative materials that aimed to poison the public opinion.
They sought to cause damage to the government as much as they could and made
every effort to overthrow it. Mustafa Kemal expressed that these newspapers created
and incited the impression that “the government was not something to be feared
of.”150 “Therefore, the responsible managers of these newspapers must be courtmartialed.”
151 According to the president, the journalists in question must thus be
taught a lesson, showing them that what they had been doing so far had nothing to do
with the freedom of press.152
The procedures of the martial court were also addressed in the meeting. Mustafa
Kemal stated that the martial court must be able to decide the forced migration
of the townspeople of Menemen.153 He also introduced a new criminal code imposing
heavy penalties to the sheikhs and their disciples who were found guilty of the
charge of regularly practicing the order’s ritualistic activities.154 Kazım Paşa pointed
out that the court should decide that the Nakşibendi order was a political organization
and the activities it maintained after the abolishment of dervish lodges were a
147 Ibid., 436.
148 Qutb means the spiritual leader of an Islamic sufi order. As for qutbu’l-aqtab, it implies
the most prominent of all the spiritual leaders in a given era.
149 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 437.
150 Ibid., 435.
151 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5.
152 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 436.
153 Ibid., 438.
154 Ibid., 439.
40
reactionary conduct. The sheikhs of the order should gradually be taken to court.155 It
was also decided that the capital punishments decided by the court ought to be confirmed
by the National Assembly.156 Mustafa Kemal urged that the martial court
should act quickly. For him, particularly the ones who received the death penalty
should be executed immediately.157 Other detainees who were sentenced to different
punishments would also be penalized one by one, rather than leaving all to the
end.158 Finally, Mustafa Kemal gave directions for the trials to take place in public.
He also indicated that some closed sessions may be arranged if considered necessary.
In brief, subject matters of the meeting were the Nakşibendi order, the townspeople
of Menemen, villagers of that area, issues related to the already closed FRP,
and the opposition press. The meeting was held on 7 January 1931, two weeks after
the incident. Remarks expressed in the meeting correspond to the earlier official accounts
and newspaper reports as well as to the subsequent statements of administrative
officials. It was in this meeting that the course of the subsequent judicial process
was decided. The martial court reached verdicts as indicated by the attendants of the
meeting.
2.2. Official Assessments
This section presents the initial official reactions to the event. In its discourse
and de facto actions, the state administrators responded harshly to the event. The
most prominent feature of the event was that it received public appreciation, although
to a small extent. Therefore, the common element of government officials was
the condemnation of the people of Menemen. The remarks of the administrators, including
İsmet İnönü, in the aftermath of the incident involved also criticism and accusation
of the former FRP for encouraging reactionary elements to dare to undertake
such a rebellion against the republic. The opposition press as well received their
share of criticism. According to the Republican People’s Party leader and deputies,
these journalists attempted to overthrow the government through constant faultfinding
in its conduct. By doing so, they instigated the enemies of the republic to riot.
Officials who were on duty during the events in Menemen were also criticized. To
155 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 436. The judicial process was conducted in almost
the same way as Kazım (Özalp) remarked here.
156 Ibid., 437.
157 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 438.
158 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5.
41
some, law enforcement forces of Menemen were responsible for the development of
the events that culminated in the brutal murder of Kubilay. Some official accounts
drafted after the events involved misinformation. Thus, in the very early days after
the event, it was declared that what happened in Menemen was a planned attack
against the very existence of the state. However, virtually all accounts agreed in extolling
the republic and the emphasizing on the state’s eternity.
The funeral ceremony of Kubilay and the two district wardens took place on
24 December 1930. Newspapers reported that thousands of people attended the ceremony.
Members of the Türk Ocakları offices of Menemen and İzmir, the deputies
and the governor of İzmir, associates of teaching school, military and civil officials
of Menemen and nearby districts, and students in Menemen constituted the crowd
during the ceremony. Many wreaths were sent to the funeral as well. Three funeral
prayers were performed for each of the martyrs. Kubilay was buried in his uniform,
which was still bloody.159
The first account condemning the public attitude was the Governor of İzmir
Kazım Bey’s report of 24 December 1930 written to the Ministry of the Interior.
Kazım Bey indicated some of the townspeople were watching during the murder of
Kubilay, which was by itself a cause of misery.160 When the Minister of Internal Affairs
Şükrü Bey and the Commander of Martial Rule in the region, Fahrettin Paşa,
arrived at Menemen on 28 December, they went to the cemetery straight away. At
the graveside of Kubilay, Şükrü Bey stressed that the most grievous aspect of the
event was that, several people among the public appeared undisturbed, approving
and even encouraging in the face of such a disastrous murder of an officer.161
Mustafa Kemal, in his letter of 28 December, offered his condolences to the
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Fevzi Paşa. He underlined that it was a
shameful situation for all republicans and patriots that in the presence of such reactionary
ferocity, some inhabitants acted in a confirmatory manner by clapping
hands.162 In his speech in the parliament, Prime Minister İsmet Paşa stated that the
striking point in the initial reports about the event was the people watched the devel-
159 Cumhuriyet, January 26, 1930; Yeni Asır, December 25, 1930.
160 Belge No: 13212-5/1, “Menemen”, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle
Gerçekler, 54–5–6.
161 Yeni Asır 29 Aralık 1930; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 30, 1930.
162 Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri-IV (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih
Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991), 601.
42
opments carelessly at the square. He remarked that some of them were even affirmative.
İsmet Paşa added that during this action that defied the law, summoning the military
force was the last option. Although Kubilay’s vocational responsibility by his
position was to use his gun in the first place, he, a young man in his twenties, appealed
to the people to bring them to their senses and to end the rebellion without resort
to violent measures. What he received in return for his nobility was in no terms
acceptable. İsmet Paşa asked to what extent could that neighborhood be poisoned so
as to have been deprived of their senses. Inhabitants watching the scene in cold blood
was in itself utterly intolerable.163 Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey, current independent deputy
and former magnate of the FRP, also drew attention to the nonreactive public. To
him, this was a tragic and vulgar mental attitude, and when he first heard of it, he
would have liked to curl up and die out of embarrassment.164 Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey in
his parliament speech said that the idea of republic itself was a religion from top to
bottom. This religion, this faith meant to have a sacred book, a type of praying, and
believers. There was supposed to be men working day and night to disseminate the
virtues of the republic in order to educate ignorant communities. For Ağaoğlu, the
pioneers of the republic had failed in fulfilling this responsibility. If they admitted
this failure as their share of the sin in the spiritual presence of the martyr, if they
awoke and carried out their duties, Kubilay’s holy blood would not be wasted. If the
intellectuals of the country came to the government’s help, only then the measures of
the state would be able to have an impact. Otherwise, the enemy of the republic, the
giant (reactionary elements in general) had forty thousand heads and when one was
cut, another one would emerge. The main point was to kill the sinister giant itself.165
Although Ağaoğlu made speech against reactionism, it triggered discussion,
which was likely to erupt soon. Ali Saip Bey, a deputy of the RPP, asked Ağaoğlu to
beg for the forgiveness of the nation from the platform of the parliament. For Ali
Saip, Ağaoğlu was wrong when he said they were all responsible for what happened.
He remarked that three months earlier, Ağaoğlu travelled to Menemen where he was
welcomed with the same banner on which Kubilay’s head was attached later.166 Almost
all members of the parliament were RPP deputies and already accusing the
163 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” January 1, 1931, 3.
164 Ibid., 8.
165 Ibid., 9.
166 Ibid., 7.
43
former FRP of instigating reactionism. For them, the presence of FRP heartened the
puritans who were eager to get into action to subvert the republican regime. FRP was
considered politically responsible for the rise of the reactionaries from the grave and
providing them with a political sphere to work toward their goals. However, there
was neither explicit nor implicit connection between associates of the former FRP
and the agents of the Menemen Incident.
In his speech in the parliament, İsmet Paşa also claimed that the perpetrators
of the Menemen Incident could act such defiantly because they assumed a weakness
in government. “They had this impression because of the irresponsible and exaggerated
criticisms directed against the government.”167 For İsmet Paşa, the incident was
nothing short of using religion as an instrument of politics.168
Officials on duty during the events in Menemen became targets of politicians.
The Governor of İzmir Kazım Bey, mentioned in his first report to the Ministry of
Interior that they were investigating the reason why the troops under Kubilay’s
command withdrew. They were looking into whether they feared and fled in a rush
or were confused due to becoming leaderless.169 İsmet Paşa, again in his parliament
speech, stressed that the citizens and law enforcement agencies were supposed to
know clearly the conditions under which military forces should be summoned and
what their missions involved in such cases. He asserted that military intervention
should be sought as a last resort in the case of internal threats to public security.170
RPP deputy Mazhar Müfit Bey in his parliament speech, also accused law enforcement
forces and city officials for not taking the necessary steps in the face of the developments.
171
Official interpretations of the event in its aftermath involved misinformation
as well. For instance, while evaluating the Menemen Incident in the assembly, Mazhar
Müfit reported that it took the rebels twenty minutes to cut Kubilay’s head off
with a blunt knife. Witnessing the event, thousands of townspeople kept their silence.
Müfit Bey said one could assume they were terrified, but there was no defense for
167 Ibid., 5.
168 Ibid., 3.
169 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 54–5–6.
170 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 6.
171 Ibid., 7.
44
their appreciative applause of the beheading.172 Ağaoğlu Ahmet stated Kubilay’s beheading
took twenty minutes without any outside intervention.173 However, as remarked
in previous sections, there was no record indicating how many of the townspeople
were there, watching the beheading of Kubilay by Derviş at the mosque
courtyard. It is true that some of the public applauded particularly when Derviş
chased away the gendarme officers and the commander. Still, the extent to which
townspeople welcomed Derviş when he beheaded Kubilay and brought his head to
the square, is unknown. Moreover, the doctor’s report clearly stated that the knife
Derviş used for the beheading was sharp. Exaggeration of the actions by adding misinformation
served to increase the reactions to the event and left the impression that
the enemies of the republic could become furious.
Along with the disinformation, the prejudiced belief that the incident was not
of a small scale became considerably pervasive. Thus the belief that the event was
the initiation of a planned overthrowing of the government by a religious organization.
The first official account, drawing a frame for the background of the event was
Kazım Bey’s second report to İzmir dated 25 December. In the report, he marked the
Nakşibendi order to have backed up the reactionaries. Derviş Mehmet, who announced
himself as the Mahdi, had been under the influence of and encouraged by
certain leaders of the order in Manisa, such as Şeyh Hafız Hasan, Şeyh Hacı Hakkı
and Hacı Hilmi Efendi.174 That is to say, Kazım Bey’s report was a pioneer that
shaped the following official accounts.
As can be understood from the following process of the incident, Mehmet
Emin was interrogated as soon as he regained his consciousness. He must have recounted
the names he had known from earlier times related to the event. The issue of
group members having been smoking hashish was also mentioned in the report.
Kazım Bey accounted that all of the perpetrators were in possession of hashish.
Derviş Mehmet had the habit of giving hashish to his disciples in Manisa and had
been increasing his influence over them this way.175
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., 8.
174 “Dahiliye Vekaletine,” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler,
61–2.
175 Ibid., 62. Insurgents smoked hashish beyond any doubt. Given their condition, they could
not possibly achieve their alleged intentions. They were just six people who arrived at
Menemen with only a few rifles. They had no back up forces that would follow them or any
45
One of the initial reports that was congruent with Kazım Bey’s statement was
that of Mustafa Muğlalı Paşa, the commander of the Second Corps. In his military
report written on 26 December, he indicated that the Menemen Incident was not a
movement of “six punks.” For Muğlalı, it was apparent that a number of traitors provoked
the reactionaries of Menemen.176
Mustafa Kemal, in light of the initial information from the scene of the incident,
touched upon the essence of the event in his letter of condolences. For him, the
nation regarded the outrage to the young and heroic soldier, as a conspiracy against
the Republic itself.177 The same assessment of the incident was verbalized in the National
Assembly of Turkey as well. İsmet Paşa, in his speech on 1 January 1931, remarked
that the reports from the region in question were being examined. For İsmet
Paşa, reports indicated the event to be a reactionist and savage incident. The issue
they were facing was an attempt against the very existence of the republic.178 For İsmet
Paşa, investigations demonstrated that the perpetrators had previously gone to
Menemen to explore it and in this way they were able to plan their rebellion. This
was not an impromptu attempt undertaken by three-four men, but one organized in
Manisa in the last three months. There had been meetings in Manisa after the act of
rebellion was decided. Moreover, İsmet Paşa accounted, there had been many goings
back and forth between big cities in the preparation process. Furthermore, there were
collaborators in Menemen who waited for the arrival of the rebels in order to provide
them with assistance.179
Many of İsmet Paşa’s statements were inaccurate. Statements of the perpetrators
in the court did not involve anything about a former exploration of Menemen.
Derviş did not tell them they would go to Menemen before leaving Manisa.180 The
assistance awaiting them in Menemen. Their initiation of a pseudo-rebellion ended as soon
as the armed battalions arrived at the town square in the first place. So there was no sensible
frame or concrete evidence that their actions were rationally planned. Still, the authorities
and the press kept announcing the incident as a wide-ranging and planned rebellion.
176 “Büyük Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti” Ibid.,
59.
177 Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri-IV, 601.
178 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 3.
179 Ibid.
180 It must again be noted that the activities of the insurgents were not as planned as the authorities
alleged them to be. They had been smoking hashish both in Manisa and on the way.
They were moving so extemporarily that in the end they halted immediately when they faced
the armed troopers.
46
aforementioned travels between big cities referred to the visits made to Şeyh Esat’s
home in İstanbul. One of the three perpetrators in the court accounted that he stayed
at Esat’s house and he mentioned that there had been talks, though he himself was
not included. He alleged that the republican state was criticized in these talks. But no
substantial connection was constituted between the talk and Derviş, his intentions, or
the Menemen Incident. Moreover, there was no one waiting for the group to arrive in
Menemen. Not a single person was charged with this in the court. For İsmet Paşa,
when the initiation failed in Menemen, the situation in other regions remained hidden.
Here he implicated that the Nakşibendi order organized a nationwide rebellion,
and was suggesting that while no such movement occurred in other areas, this did not
mean there would not be upcoming events. The state officers had not uncovered the
other actors who were supposed to start the riots in other districts as of yet.181
When Mazhar Müfit Bey took the floor in the assembly to speak for the RPP
group, he said they were convinced of İsmet Paşa’s statement that the Menemen Incident
was a large-scale and prearranged movement.182 In a petition given to the
speakership of the parliament, RPP deputies named the Menemen Incident as a direct
conspiracy against the republic itself. For them, the treatment to which the heroic officer
was subjected proved that this was not an act of a few bandits and hashish addicts
but an organized and far-reaching movement.183 Interior Minister Şükrü (Kaya)
Bey prepared a report about the event upon his arrival at Menemen and investigations.
He initially indicated that the event occurred locally and did not pervade to
other regions. The substance of the event, however, was extensive in his opinion.
Fellows of the order in Turkey gave their support to the event in such a way that a
multitude of men from a lot of cities had become associated with the events. The incident
was “the result of the greed of some ill-minded people.”184 Thus, Şükrü Bey’s
report is quite ambiguous in terms of defining the extent of the event. This might be
due to the lack of substantial evidence to depict the incident as wide-ranging.
181 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 4.
182 Ibid., 7.
183 Ibid., 2–3. Deputies of the parliament made these expressions on 1 January 1931. As seen
above, these inferences regarding the essence of the event derived from İsmet Paşa’s statements.
İsmet Paşa himself, predicated his conclusions on the reports written by state inspectors
sent to Menemen. However, these reports were based not on substantial evidence but rather
the words of the captured perpetrator Mehmet Emin.
184 Vakit, January 3, 1931.
47
As soon as the nature of the incident was declared as a well-rounded organization
planned by a religious order targeting the very existence of the republic, deputies
expressed their severe condemnations. They stressed their absolute loyalty to the
republican principles in impassioned enthusiasm. Reactionism was presented as the
ultimate internal enemy of the republic. The fight against it would continue with determination.
Within the general political atmosphere, as previously remarked, the
opposition press and the former FRP were regarded as responsible for encouraging
the reactionists and for favoring the adoption of antagonistic attitudes against the republic.
For instance, RPP deputy Ali Saip Bey stated that the newspapers opposing
the regime were sold for a price ten times higher than the ones supporting it. For Saip
Bey, the perpetrators of the Menemen Incident gave rise to the 31 March Incident as
well. He further alleged that they waged war against the republicanists during the
war of independence. They were responsible for the Şeyh Said Rebellion also. Once
again, the same enemies now brought Derviş Mehmet forward against the republic in
Menemen.185
Political agents of the early republican period often stated that the nation
would prevail despite many antagonisms. For them, no trouble could discourage or
frustrate the progress of the nation under republican regime. Moreover, any problem
the nation had would contribute to the betterment of the republic. Mustafa Kemal,
this way, emphasized in his letter of condolences that the pure blood of the protagonist
young soldier Kubilay, an element of the community of idealist teachers, would
strengthen and intensify the vitality of the republic.186 In the parliament, Mazhar
Müfit addressed the “damned force.”187 He stressed that the army, which provided a
new homeland for them, had always been and would permanently be the guardian of
the republic and the reforms. He asked the deputies in the parliament not to worry
because honorable souls would rest in peace. The republic and the reforms were Kubilay’s
ideals and no one would be able to hinder them. These principles would be
185 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 9. Denouncing any expression and
action that opposed RPP as treachery was in fashion in the early republican era. Whenever
an event that expressed dissatisfaction occurred, it was called as “an act of the enemies of the
republic.” As seen here, it was not important for the RPP deputies to prove their allegations.
They charged their opponents in any adverse development with damaging the nation and its
independence.
186 Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri-IV, 601.
187 Here Müfit Bey implicated the Nakşibendi order as well as all the reactionists.
48
preserved continuously. For him, the Turkish youth included thousands of Kubilays
who were determined to constantly choke and crush the “black snake” and prevent it
from poisoning its environment.188
The official accounts expressed after the occurrence of the event corresponded
to many of the newspaper reports. The event was announced as a planned rebellion,
designed by the Nakşibendi order and therefore detailed investigations had to be
executed in the first place. As it is discussed in another section of this chapter, contradictions
arose between the partisan press and the opposition newspapers. The
Menemen Incident was not the only issue of dispute for the newspapers. The political
atmosphere of the country had already tension lines and the press reflected this situation.
As official statements demonstrated, internal investigations were on the way.
Not only the perpetrators and their explicit and implicit supporters would be arrested,
but also the state officers would be interrogated to detect and punish whoever did not
perform his duties properly and promptly.
2.3. Proclaim of the Martial Law
Before the enactment of martial law, the Council of Ministers submitted a
law for the preservation of reforms (inkılabı koruma kanunu) to the Turkish National
Assembly for approval. The code gave exceptional powers to the government in the
case of such reactionist movements. The law authorized the government to constitute
an emergency court or to assign an established court to hear a specific case. Verbal
and actual interference with the republican reforms would be severely punished. The
government would be at liberty to take extraordinary measures for the duration it
deemed appropriate in the event of attacks against the reforms.189
After the aforementioned speeches took place, the deputies voted for the declaration
of state of emergency in Menemen and putting it under martial law on 1 January
1931. The draft of this decision was prepared by the Council of Ministers and
undersigned by the Prime Minister İsmet Paşa. The draft remarked that the council
took the preparation phase of the incident into consideration and determined that it
was a far-reaching organizational act against the republic. It was thus decided to put
the town of Menemen and the cities of Manisa and Balıkesir under state of siege for
188 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 7. Mazhar Müfit’s words were applauded
in the assembly.
189 Anadolu, December 30-31, 1930; Hizmet, December 30-31, 1930.
49
one month. Along with the approval of the parliament, martial law went into effect in
these places as of 1 January.
Although the state of emergency was approved by the parliament on 1 January,
the executive order was announced on 7 January. After the martial law went into
effect, all civilian officials in the involved regions delegated their duties and authority
to the military.190 Martial law rules imposed a curfew from 08:00 PM. to 07:00
AM.191 when no one could be outside except the security forces. If someone was
seen he would be warned immediately, and executed by a firing squad if he disobeyed
the firing.192 Every workplace had to be shut down before 08:00 PM. All inhabitants
would deliver their weapons to the officials. Defiant ones would be punished.
193 Hunting was prohibited.194 People could go to Menemen only with the courtesy
of a credential taken from the district governorate, with the photo of the person
on the document. Leaving the town required the same permit. Identities would be
controlled at the train station.195 The post office was closed down. Letters were subject
to censorship. Any letter had to be short and delivered to the officer unclosed.
They had to be written in Turkish, using other languages in letters was forbidden.
The writings would be plain and could not be encoded. Legal actions would be taken
about anyone who would not conform to the instructions. All gatherings and celebrations
were prohibited, including circumcision feasts, weddings, birth celebrations
etc.196 All directives were publically announced.197
2.4. Internal Inquires
Under the stunning effect of the incident, not only the perpetrators and their
supporters, but also the state personnel, both civilian and military, related with the
event, charged with inattentiveness began to be interrogated. These officials included
mainly those from the municipal police of Manisa, Governorship of Manisa, District
Governorate of Menemen, Gendarme Commander of Menemen, and the soldiers of
190 Cumhuriyet, January 8, 1931.
191 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 11, 1931.
192 Cumhuriyet, January 9, 1931.
193 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 9, 1931.
194 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 11, 1931.
195 Vakit, January 8, 1931.
196 Cumhuriyet, January 9, 1931.
197 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 11, 1931.
50
Kubilay’s battalion. Internal and external investigations began amid politicians’ grim
talk and condemnations of the Menemen Incident.
The first detailed official report indicating the negligence of state officers and
soldiers was written by the Deputy Commander of First Corps Mustafa Muğlalı
Paşa198 on 26 December in detail. He was appointed by the Headquarters of the General
Staff. This report recounted all officers who were supposed to execute their duties
in a much more responsible way than they actually did. All officers mentioned in
the report under this charge had to be interrogated and punished in various forms.
Muğlalı Paşa stressed that the evildoer insurgents initially came to public sight in
Manisa. They regularly met in a coffeehouse of hashish-addicts and turned that place
into a dervish lodge. Recently, they had grown beards and adopted an utterly suspicious
appearance. Muğlalı Paşa mentioned that the municipal police of Manisa had
been aware of this situation. Rebels’ immediate disappearance from Manisa was denounced
by a family member of one of them. Even so, the Governorship of Manisa
did not take any action against the group. The governor’s office neither informed the
nearby towns about the insurgents nor investigated whether they were organized in
Manisa and outside. The situation was thus left to chance. None of the public authorities
were aware of what went on in the adjacent regions and Derviş Mehmet’s
and his gang’s inculcations to villagers for fifteen days.199 The district administrators
in Menemen were in no way aware of the armed group’s arrival at Menemen, their
morning prayer performance, their leaving the mosque with a banner in their hands
along with few of the townspeople, and their arrival in front of the government office.
The district governor of Menemen came to the government office only after it
was surrounded by soldiers. Until then, he was a mere spectator. Muğlalı Paşa’s
statements about the gendarme commander were quite insulting. He described him to
be “womanly,” hiding in his office with four privates while one of his fellow soldiers
was being butchered.200 Muğlalı also condemned the soldiers of Kubilay’s unit for
leaving their commander and running away while bandits slaughtered him. “Due to
their cowardice, those soldiers should instantly be sent away from Menemen to other
regiments. Starting a legal process about their misconduct is also necessary.”201
198 Mustafa Paşa would also be appointed as the chief judge of the martial court.
199 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 59.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid., 60.
51
The deputies in the parliament as well criticized those who breached their duties
were acutely. For instance, Mazhar Müfit Bey questioned, “Where have our civilian
administrators been in the preparation phase? Were not there a governor, municipal
and city polices, a gendarme commander?”202 Local civil servants were to be
treated as required by the applicable legislation for failing to carry out their duties.
The newspapers as well addressed this issue. For instance, a reporter from Yeni Asır,
İsmail Hakkı Bey, asserted that the gendarme commander of Menemen was not
aware of his responsibilities. This situation gave six punks the opportunity to perform
malicious acts in the middle of the town for five or six hours.203 This plain case
of incompetent management required substantial investigation. For İsmail Hakkı,
such improvidence might have culminated in more disastrous consequences.204 The
same newspaper questioned, “Were not there any other bullets in the rifles of the battalion
except plastic ones?”205
In the same manner as in Mustafa Paşa’s report, the newspapers severely criticized
the Gendarme Commander Fahri Bey and, to a lesser extent, the District Governor
Cevdet Bey. Fahri Bey was defined to be a mere spectator of the insurgents’
activities. It was further alleged that when the privates with him in the building
wished to commence fire on the rebels, he prevented them by saying “This is not a
matter for you to decide.”206 Vakit’s columnist Mehmet Asım Bey expressed that
subsequent support force “fortunately” caught up and banished the reactionists. Otherwise,
the cowardice of the qaimaqam (district governor) and the commander would
undoubtedly have cost the nation more heavily, according to Asım Bey. “The negligence
of civil servants and gendarmes in the face of such reactionism was incomparable
to anything else. The qaimaqam and the commander’s failure to act against the
rebels’ felonious deeds made not much difference than directly obeying Derviş.”207
202 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 6.
203 From the group’s entrance to the mosque to the firing of machine guns, there elapsed a
maximum of three hours. The events did not take place as long as it was asserted by İsmail
Hakkı Bey.
204 Yeni Asır, December 26, 1930.
205 Yeni Asır, December 30, 1930. However, this question reflects a misinformation, rather
than a criticism. As indicated earlier, the soldiers under Kubilay’s command ran away without
any shooting because they did not have bullets of any kind in their rifles.
206 Vakit, December 31, 1930; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 29, 1930. Fahri Bey’s alleged
saying in Turkish: “Bu sizin bileceğiniz bir iş değildir.”
207 Vakit, December 31, Aralık 1930.
52
After the Interior Minister Şükrü Bey and the Commander of the Martial Law
Regions arrived at Menemen, they examined the scene of the incident. Then, they
went to the state house and interrogated Fahri Bey and Cevdet Bey. Then, Fahri Bey
was arrested for not executing his duty.208 Cevdet Bey was regarded as negligent of
his responsibilities in the course of the event and was moved to the central office of
the ministry.209 Baha Bey, the District Governor of Urla, was temporarily appointed
to Menemen.210 Some rumors spread among the press as well that the Governors of
İzmir and Manisa might be dismissed. There were further allegations that the prosecution
of the Governor of Manisa was about to begin.211
After inquiries were made about Fahri Bey, he was released. Still, his file was
sent to the martial court.212 After the martial court pronounced rulings regarding the
detainees of the Menemen Incident, it heard the cases of the state officers who were
charged with negligence of duty. In the court, Fahri Bey stated that he waited in the
building so as to take precautions and protect the state offices. Besides, he stressed
that he had informed the regimental commander of the happenings immediately. As
for Cevdet Bey, he stated that he went to the regimental headquarters and ordered
them to send soldiers to the scene of the incident. Thereon in the court, he began to
cry by saying he had been appointed to Menemen just recently and was not familiar
with any one.213 The regiment guard officer Mehmet Ali Efendi, who was sent by
Fahri Bey to meet Kubilay’s battalion, was also put on trial. The court appealed to
the testimony of the deputy commander of the Menemen regiment Major Şefik Bey
about the details of the incident.214 The sergeants, captains and corporals of Kubilay’s
platoon were charged too, for having left their commander behind and escaped.
They were expelled from Menemen, and relocated somewhere else. The Martial
Court of Menemen determined that the trials of Mehmet Ali Efendi and Fahri Bey
had to be conducted by a superior military court since their crimes were in the cate-
208 Vakit, December 29, 1930; Cumhuriyet, December 29, 1930.
209 Vakit, December 29, 1930; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 30, 1930.
210 Yeni Asır, April 1, 1931. He would return to Urla later on. Still, due to carrying his duties
successfully in Menemen in the state of emergency, Baha Bey would receive a letter of appreciation
from the ministry of the interior.
211 Milliyet, December 29, 1930; Vakit, December 29, 1930; Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1931.
212 Vakit, 2 Kanunusani, 1931.
213 Vakit, February 13, 1931.
214 Hakimiyeti Milliye, March 9, 1931.
53
gory of military offence.215 Court files of the two officers were sent to the military
court of the First Army Corps.216
Another group of officers put on trial by the martial court included the gendarmes
of Manisa. Officer Hamdi and Platoon Commander Lieutenant Kemal were
charged with dereliction of duty regarding their conduct when they heard about
Derviş’s departure. Lieutenant Kemal was accused of not paying attention to and taking
legal action about Küçük Hasan’s joining of Derviş Mehmet and others, though
he had been informed about it. Küçük Hasan’s father Bedevioğlu Ali Ağa and his entourage
were called to the court. It was understood that Küçük Hasan’s father, along
with few friends, went to the gendarme station in Manisa fifteen days prior to the
Menemen Incident to report his son’s leaving the city with others. Ali Ağa had reported
to officer Hamdi and explained clearly the details of the circumstances and
requested the officers to save his son. According to the newspapers, Ali Ağa had also
explained the group’s political intentions to officer Hamdi. Hamdi Efendi, in front of
Bedevi Ali Ağa and his companions, phoned Lieutenant Kemal and clarified the situation.
217 Officer Hamdi was being charged for not applying to a higher authority
and not reporting the situation to another superior unit, and thus not stopping at the
outset a development that caused such damage to the state.218 However, when Bedevi
Ağa and others testified about Hamdi’s phone call to Kemal Bey, the court ruled that
he performed his duties and released Hamdi. As for Kemal Bey, he was sentenced to
imprisonment of three months and suspension from state service for his carelessness
and misconduct.219
The aforementioned officers charged with neglect and misconduct were treated
tightly in the course of interrogation and trials. This situation, too, indicates the
seriousness of the issue and the tense mood that emerged after the incident. So to
say, the state brought its officers to account for their misconduct both in the days
leading to the incident and when it occurred.
215 Milliyet, March 5, 1931; Akşam, March 5, 1931; Cumhuriyet, March 5, 1931.
216 Anadolu, March 6, 1931.
217 Hakimiyeti Milliye, March 4, 1931.
218 Anadolu, March 2, 1931.
219 Milliyet, March 4, 1931; Hakimiyeti Milliye, March 4, 1931.
54
2.5. Newspaper Reports
National and local newspapers gave considerable space to the Menemen Incident
starting as early as the day after it occurred. All the internal and external investigations
and detentions had widespread media coverage. Including the executions of
the penalties and judicial processes, all developments were followed and represented
on a daily basis. This way, the incident and its aftermath were kept on the agenda.
There was one distinct uniformity in the newspapers, coverage of the incident. All of
the press reported the event as a reactionist movement bearing religious goals and
condemned it for this. Apart from this overall label and unanimous condemnation,
there were sharp contrasts in the presentation of the details of the event. The press
displayed great disintegration and tension particularly when regarding the background
and context of the incident. A major part of the press promoted and echoed
the official statements. They described the incident as a preplanned action implemented
by an organization that aimed at overthrowing the republic. This study refers
to this press, which echoed the government as “officially-biased.” A minor fragment
of newspapers, which were already known for their oppositional stance, defined the
event as “not that big of a deal”. This study defines the newspapers of this sort of
content as “counter-official.” The reactions of the newspapers to the event corresponded
to the political atmosphere. In other words, the tension of the political arena
was represented in the contradictions of the newspapers’ coverage of the Menemen
Incident. Some information the newspapers conveyed was true, while others were
apparently false. A part of the newspapers reported information which can not be
confirmed or falsified because their sources remain unknown or unverifiable.
2.5.1. Officially-Biased Newspapers
The officially-biased newspapers, along with official statements, harshly criticized
the townspeople who were at the square at the time of the incident. For Hakimiyeti
Milliye, the citizens of a contemporaneous and secular republic watching the
events so motionlessly was the true catastrophe about the Menemen Incident.220 It
was shameful that Menemen’s townspeople stood there without reaction as if they
were looking at a table while bandits beheaded a young soldier and displayed his
220 Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 31, 1930.
55
head by attaching it to a banner.221 Had the people of Menemen born civic ethical
values, they would have prevented the occurrence of the incident.222 Such civic social
consciousness had not developed among them. They did not consider the fact
that the public itself may have had a set of liabilities and duties of their own. Therefore,
they held that Turkish revolutionists must direct all their efforts to teach the
public to nurture civic moral values of which the people were deprived.223 Newspaper
Vakit defined the townspeople’s applause as disgusting. Whoever acclaimed the
unprecedented homicide would be revealed one by one and be spat on the face.224
For Cumhuriyet, there was no difference between applauding that ferocity and de
facto participating in it.225 Akşam named Menemen “the land of the cursed.”226
Misinformation about the activities that happened in Menemen appeared particularly
in officially-biased newspapers. Hakimiyeti Milliye asserted that when
Derviş Mehmet and his group approached Menemen, they met with someone outside
the town and proceeded to subsequent actions. They also had supporters in the town.
They arranged the banner inside the mosque earlier. In Menemen, Derviş went to the
home of “a sheikh” and had a talk with him.227 However, according to the statements
of the perpetrators and official records, the group did not meet with any one outside
the town. There was no assistant waiting for them inside the town either. The aforementioned
sheikh was Saffet Hoca and he did not talk with Derviş, though they met
in the town. He merely went to his home and did not leave it after then. For the same
paper, Kubilay’s beheading for twenty minutes in front of the eyes of the townspeople.
228 Again, twenty minutes was not the correct time period of Kubilay’s murder.
As discussed in the first chapter, Kubilay could move away from the square after getting
shot and then fell in the courtyard of a mosque. He waited there for some time.
After a while, Derviş Mehmet and Derviş Mehmet came there and cut his head off.
The knife was sharp and there was definitely no evidence as to indicate that his beheading
took twenty minutes. Instead, twenty minutes was the time between Kubi-
221 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 1, 1931.
222 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 16, 1931.
223 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 30, 1931.
224 Vakit, December 29, 1930.
225 Cumhuriyet, December 29, 1930.
226 Akşam, January 7, 1931. The definition of the town in Turkish was ”mel’unlar diyarı.”
227 Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 29, 1930.
228 Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 31, 1930.
56
lay’s getting shot and Derviş’s bringing his head to the square. As for the people
watching his murder, the only official report that gave this information was written
by Muğlalı Paşa. However, as will be shown in the following chapter, Mustafa Paşa
himself did not charge someone with acclaiming the beheading of Kubilay in the
court, although he frequently gave the detainees a hard time.
Another fabricated fact was the part about the drinking of Kubilay’s blood.
Hakimiyeti Milliye and Cumhuriyet stated that after Derviş murdered Kubilay, he
cried out “although drinking blood is forbidden by the religion, the blood of Kubilay
is lawful” for him since he had killed on behalf of religion and became deserving of
heaven. Thereon Derviş is asserted to have drank Kubilay’s blood.229 This has been
one of the most fictive information regarding the actions in Menemen. No official
report involved this information, nor did any perpetrator account for such story. Still,
for the sake of exaggeration as to what extent those crazed reactionists had been, this
sort of disinformation was given space in newspapers.
According to some periodicals, after he was seized, Mehmet Emin stated they
would not burn in fire but that they would return from it as did prophet İbrahim.230
As for Anadolu, Mehmet Emin asserted that his friends were not dead and would be
resurrected at night. Moreover, he was also alleged to have said that the world would
be falling apart that night. He told the officials to bring the mufti of Menemen to
whom he would confess everything. It was reported that although the mufti came,
Mehmet Emin talked nonsense and summoned him to religion.231 Indeed, it is quite
impossible to determine whether Mehmet Emin told such things when he was captured.
No official report refers to these statements and they did not come up during
the court process either. Consequently, we can consider them a fabrication. However,
because the members of the group had been smoking substances, they were not
sound-minded in general, and Mehmet Emin might have talked such absurdly for this
reason. The most significant point here is the newspapers’ treatment of the subject.
For Milliyet, Mehmet Emin’s presumed statements indicated their dedication to what
they were doing.232 However, it is quite explicit that such words demonstrate the
senseless and distracted mood in which Mehmet Emin and his friends were, rather
229 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 2, 1931; Cumhuriyet, December 26, 1930.
230 Milliyet, December 26, 1930.
231 Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
232 Milliyet, December 26, 1930.
57
than their dedication as alleged. As for Anadolu, the expressions of Mehmet Emin
were ridiculous.233 However, the same newspaper asserted that a uniform secret organization
centered in Manisa was exposed. This organization had been in operation
for a long time and gave instructions to perpetrators of the Menemen Incident.234 The
periodical might have sensed no contradiction between the news and interpretations
it conveyed on the same issue. For Anadolu, the “black force”, which revolted in
Menemen was, in full sense of the word, an outbreak of a prepared, rooted reactionist
movement. “The investigation pointed to this conclusion without hiding anything.”
235 However, this report was dated 25 December, two days after the incident.
Since no investigation had been concluded by this time, apparently, the newspaper
prejudged the events. Anadolu was not the only paper that defined the incident as a
preplanned action of an organization. Many other newspapers, compatibly with official
statements, announced the incident as a planned movement of a religious order,
aiming to subvert the republican regime, at a very early stage even before the drafting
of any official report. Anadolu further asserted that when looked from a broad
perspective, it was clear that though it was an extensive and widespread plan, it
broke out in the most convenient region, Menemen.236
Unfounded stories related to the event were narrated as well. For instance, a
certain draper Akif Efendi was asserted to have reported a significant issue to the
public prosecutor. One week before the event, Akif Efendi bought walnuts from
three women living in a Manisa village, Türkmen or Sarınasuhlar.237 It was asserted
that these women told Akif that in one-week fes would be worn, sheikhs and dervishes
who were banished from Manisa would return and Muslimism would revive.
Thereon, “the officials began to look for the women in question.”238 This was nothing
short of a fictive story aiming to mislead the public to presume the presence of
early plans of revolting against the state.
Cumhuriyet as well depicted the event as a planned action. “The armed insurgents
believed in their cause and agreed among themselves beforehand upon pretend-
233 Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
234 Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 The name of village was given either to be Türkmen or Sarınasuhlar.
238 Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
58
ing to be mad if they failed.”239 According to Cumhuriyet, the situation was not the
doing of a few lunatics as some newspapers asserted. The country faced a preplanned
reactionism. The six perpetrators men took strength from the ones who were
behind the movement. The reactionist movement was not restricted to Menemen and
had the Menemen uprising worked, plans regarding other regions would have been
executed. “The movement was instigated by an organization, which had spread to
various parts of the country, including İstanbul.”240
According to another newspaper Vakit, the situation was so serious and a
number of “malicious microbes” were perceived in the heart of the Menemen
events.241 Insurgents intended to re-establish the theocratic state. Toward that end,
they intended to riot against the republican regime, to re-establish the caliphate and
to bring Caliph Abdülmecit Efendi to power.242 A reader of such news might have
supposed that the government repressed an immense uprising. The newspapers conveyed
the perpetrators as if they were well-minded and determined people whose intentions
to overthrow the republic were realistic. They represented the situation as
though a massive rebellion was precluded on the brink. Newspaper Vakit based its
own reasoning on signifying the presence of a concealed organization. Insurgents
bore arms and came to Menemen by crossing the mountains and hills. They waited
until the morning twilight to enter the town and went straight to a mosque. For Vakit,
the activities of the perpetrators proved to what extent they had thought over their
plans and determined to succeed before stepping into action. “The plan could not
have been prepared by a number of ignorant and inexperienced young people at the
age of 18-20.”243
As already indicated above, although these newspapers represented the events
as a consequence of a planning process, they were in fact simple in nature. Basically,
six insurgents came together, found a few arms, went to two villages and finally arrived
at Menemen where they attempted to initiate an inconsequential movement. Alleging
that these simple happenings derived from an extensive plan does not make
sense. Nevertheless, officially-biased newspapers saw no harm in making these crude
239 Cumhuriyet, December 26, 1930.
240 Cumhuriyet, December 28, 1930.
241 Vakit, December 26, 1930.
242 Vakit, December 30, 1930.
243 Vakit, December 27, 1930.
59
actions look as if they reflected a huge foundation. Besides, they undertook the task
of embellishing the official statements about the incident.
Milliyet depicted Derviş Mehmet not as a crazy and raving person but rather
one who was trained by an association, and a shadow of that background structure.244
According to the newspaper, he gathered his team, dedicated himself to climbing the
hills and colliding with law enforcement forces in a sound-minded manner. To repeat,
the presence of an organization backing up the perpetrators was enunciated as
early as two days after the incident.245
The reports of the officially-biased newspapers did not ascribe the event only
to a religious order. There were also references to Derviş Mehmet’s former and present
connection with Çerkez Ethem.246 It was asserted that he had worked with
Çerkez Ethem at the time of the Independence War. Furthermore, he was alleged to
have served the Greeks.247 Derviş Mehmet had participated in robberies Çerkez
Ethem committed. Thereon he had been corresponding with Çerkez Ethem.248 As it
was mentioned during the trials, Derviş Mehmet’s being a bandit for some time was
true. Still, it was uncertain whether he was a follower of Çerkez Ethem or not. The
prominent matter here is that Derviş Mehmet was not as significant a person as he
was depicted in the newspapers. The reports about his ties to Çerkez Ethem were rather
aimed to make people think he had leadership ability. Although there was no a
substantial evidence about his working with Çerkez Ethem, he was represented as
such, even as a co-leader.
A portion of the officially-biased newspaper contents sound to be far-reached
conspiracies in nature. For instance few periodicals claimed that the rebels had made
a deal with a factory in Vienna and had placed an order for a great number of fes.
This was because they would have repealed the hat act and liberated wearing fes if
244 Milliyet, December 30, 1930.
245 Milliyet, December 25, 1930.
246 Çerkez Ethem was a commander of the local Turkish militia who fought against the Allied
Forces that invaded Western Anatolia. Later, he refused to join the regular army established
by the republican regime. When the government of Ankara acted to disperse his forces,
he took refuge in Greece. Therefore he was proclaimed as a traitor and was among the
famous list of the 150 discredited individuals (“Yüzellilikler”). The people on the list were
not allowed to enter the country. Before waging war against invaders of Anatolia, Ethem was
engaged in banditry for a while.
247 Cumhuriyet, December 25-26-27, 1930; Vakit, December 28, 1930; Anadolu December
25, 1930.
248 Anadolu, December 28, 1930.
60
they succeeded in their revolt.249 In other words, after a certain point, assertions
about the incident completely exceeded realistic grounds and became eccentric fiction.
In reality, members of the group were utterly penniless so that they even needed
a boatman to bring them across the river for free. All support they got such as hosting,
harboring and weapons were provided by their relatives and acquaintances.
Another early predication of many officially-biased newspapers was that certain
political institutions, notably the former FRP, was responsible for the incident.
The evidence for this argument was Mehmet Emin’s alleged statements. For such
papers, officers questioned Mehmet Emin as soon as they seized him. They immediately
asked him the reason why Menemen was chosen for a reactionary action.
Mehmet Emin gave the answer that FRP had won the mayorship of Menemen in the
last elections. Then they had decided that if they initiated the rebellion in a district
where FRP had been elected, they might succeed.250 Thus, Menemen was not a random
choice. As the townspeople had voted for the mayoral candidate of FRP, the insurgents
believed they would now support them.251 This account was included in the
newspapers published two days after the incident, but it was a total fabrication. From
the beginning of their gatherings in Manisa, during their departure, and travel to the
nearby villages, neither FRP nor anything related to it entered the agenda of the
company. The matter of FRP connection was mentioned neither in the official reports
written in the aftermath of the event nor in the statements of perpetrators given
in court.
The pro-government newspapers continued to blame the opposition, though
none of the oppositional parties was active at the time. For Vakit, the actions towards
provoking people to revolt in Menemen were the consequences of previous ideas,
which were brought forward in several districts of the country under the name of partisanship.
252 For them, the seeds of intrigue that were spread in various regions of the
nation in the name of a political party burgeoned in Menemen.253 The same journal
remarked that Abdülkadir Kemali Bey, the leader of the Community Party,254 had
disappeared three days before the incident. The newspaper insinuated his involve-
249 Cumhuriyet, January 8, 1931; Vakit, January 10, 1931.
250 Milliyet, December 27, 1930, Cumhuriyet, December 31, 1930.
251 Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
252 Vakit, December 25, 1930.
253 Vakit, December 25, 1930.
254 Turkish translation: Ahali Fırkası. A short-lived former political party centered in Adana.
61
ment in the event also.255 Although CP had no influence in the political arena of the
country, its leader was depicted to be another agent responsible for the Menemen Incident
since he was in an opposition position. But the perpetrators had no implicit or
explicit connection to the man in question. This was yet another fabricated interpretation
of the newspaper.
According to officially-biased papers, opponents in the political arena and the
media had to learn from the Menemen Incident. They needed to recognize that the
event was a consequence of excessive opposition. The antagonism against the republic
reached up to the level of blind passion. The antagonists unconditionally attacked
everything related to RPP and the government just for the sake of opposition. For the
pro-government papers, under such circumstances, it was not difficult to determine
who encouraged the insurgents of Menemen.256 Recently, the opposition abused
freedom in the country at the utmost due to the government’s neglect and tolerance.
In a society that underwent a radical transformation, the government’s exposition to
such harsh attacks in the name of the liberty of press paved the way for deviants to
undertake such events as the insurgence in Menemen.257 “Some ill-minded writers
raved each day in the name of the freedom of press so much so that the springing up
of such events was not surprising at all.”258
Facing such charges and accusations, the opposition press took the line of defending
freedom of the press and emphasizing the significance of the opposition in
democratic regimes. They argued that what happened in Menemen had nothing to do
with the opposition media. For them, the event was completely local in nature and
there was no reason to dramatize it as if the republic encountered a reactionist threat.
2.5.2. Counter-Official Newspapers
Counter-official newspapers, issued both locally and nationally, approached
the event and its details differently. Their main arguments were that the activities of
the insurgents of Menemen did not reflect the characteristics of the entire nation. According
to them, the incident was not as big a deal as the pro-government press made
of it to be, and there was no nationwide reactionism in the country.
255 Vakit, December 30, 1930.
256 Anadolu, December 24, 1930.
257 Cumhuriyet, December 26, 1930.
258 Cumhuriyet, December 25, 1930.
62
One of the arguments of the counter-official papers was that the inadequacy
of the police department gave the dervish lodges and the reactionist networks a
ground to operate.259 Counter-official newspapers regarded the incident to be the action
of “six punks” who certainly did not have significant and extensive origins. “The
perpetrators were miserable followers of sharia. The Republican regime was in no
way in danger and it was safe.”260 It would be more accurate to name the event as an
insolence of six lunatics rather than calling it “the Menemen Incident.”261 The event
was not political by nature, and had nothing to do with the former FRP.262 These papers
published the accounts of Ağaoğlu, a prominent member of the former FRP, to
prove their points. He remarked that the government circles held FRP liable for the
blood spilled in Menemen. Moreover, RPP asserted that FRP leaders had been in
touch with Derviş Mehmet. According to Ağaoğlu, holding the former FRP responsible
for the Menemen Incident was a mistake.263
Counter-official newspaper accounts as well tended to exaggerate their
points. For instance, some of them stressed that although the reactionists had arrived
at Menemen with the hope of receiving support, they did not find the attention and
support they had expected to receive.264 Among the inhabitants of Menemen, there
was not “a single brainless” soul who would follow the insurgents.265 For these
newspapers, if the townspeople had born reactionist ideas, they would have fallen for
the traitors’ cries to save the religion. However, the periodicals argued that the
townspeople of Menemen did not listen to these traitors and waited consciously and
patiently. “Although the people of the town were ignorant, they still properly recognized
and embraced the virtues of the state and the republic. Nothing could convince
the people to betray the state.”266 This picture drawn by the opposition press did not
reflect reality. In order to maintain a counter stance against the officially-biased
newspapers and to suppress their exaggerated accounts, they resorted to covering the
attitude of the townspeople. It was quite apparent that though the crowd was small in
259 Serbest Cumhuriyet, December 28, 1930.
260 Yarın, December 26-27, 1930; Serbest Cumhuriyet, December 26, 1930; Yeni Asır, December
28, 1930.
261 Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930.
262 Son Posta, January 7, 1931.
263 Son Posta, January 12, 1931.
264 Yeni Asır, December 24-25-26, 1930; Hizmet, December 26, 1930.
265 Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930.
266 Serbest Cumhuriyet, December 25, 1930.
63
proportion to the town’s population, an approximate number of 200 people stood in
the square. Half of this number participated in the zikr performance of Derviş and his
group. They merely looked on when the military officers came to talk to Derviş and
they stood still when warned to disperse.
Apart from the last issue just pointed out, many of the counter-official accounts,
although exaggerated, were on a large scale accurate. As discussed in the
previous sections of this study, official records and the statements of the perpetrators
by no means mentioned the involvement of FRP or any other political organization
in Derviş’s doings. Moreover, Derviş Mehmet’s aim in declaring himself as the expected
Mahdi was to takeover the republican state and to re-establish a religious order.
These aims had nothing to do with supporting another political party instead of
RPP. For the opposition press, the government circles and newspapers supporting
them used the Menemen Incident to annihilate the opposition.267 Surely, such an incident
was not an issue the secular republican regime wished to face. Politicians and
administrators affiliated with RPP, along with many of the newspapers published to
support the republican regime, constantly advocated the republican principals, particularly
secularism. The state was established and the main reforms were already put
into practice. What the RPP administrators expected from the Turkish public was to
interiorize the republican principles and become modernized in desired ways. The
republican state had no tolerance for those who initiated an undertaking intended to
bring back the “old order”. In other words, there was no room for a movement that
sought to interfere in the political sphere hailing such religious references. This intolerance
against a riot using religious slogans is perhaps understandable. However,
this notion of RPP transformed into a political monocracy that rejected almost all
kinds of contrarian attitudes in the political arena as well as in the press.
As for the FRP issue, it was established on 12 August 1930 by Fethi (Okyar),
as a second attempt to transition to a multi-party system. It was Mustafa Kemal who
wanted this “deliberate opposition” party to be founded. However, its establishment
revealed the dissatisfaction of the public with the new regime, including certain aspects
of its secularist policies. After the municipal elections held on 14 October
1930, harsh discussions took place in the parliament and on the eve of the closure of
the party. Deputies of RPP asserted that on the election day, FRP members went door
267 Ibid.
64
to door to cry the slogan “no more taxes, God and the Prophet are with us, do not
vote for RPP” in cities such as Konya, Balıkesir and others.268 The district heads of
FRP were asserted to be crying out “Damn the government and the Republican People’s
Party!” Moreover, it was alleged that they threatened those who ignored them
with death.269 There were sheikhs gathering people in the mosques and ordering
them how to vote. Villagers were looking for fes to put on in the crowd and crying
out ecstatically that religion would be recovered on the election day.
According to the statements of RPP deputies, the events in question presented
a situation of sedition and anarchy.270 In the parliament, RPP deputies in this way
urged upon the motivations of people who voted for FRP with the expectation of the
establishment of a religious order soon. A specific example of this was an old man
who stood over the ballot box and cast his vote by saying in the name of religion and
sharia. RPP deputies stated that this man was Şeyh Halil Efendi, father of İbrahim
Sururi, who was the General Secretary of FRP. According to RPP members, similar
instances occurred in many regions.271 RPP representatives took such events into account
to conclude that the public expected FRP to bring back “the old regime”.272
FRP deputies were accused of not condemning explicitly those who acted and spoke
with ill against the republic on behalf of FRP until that day. For them, FRP members
solely gave vague replies.
The situation threatened to become uncontrollable for RPP. The members of
FRP were presented to have estranged from the republican and revolutionary principles.
FRP members were introduced as if they exploited the naiveté of the public for
easy success, and thus, they were responsible for damaging the state and the nation.
273 These accounts reflect the extent to which FRP was considered responsible
for reactionist activities. RPP deputies envisioned the country to be on fire, and FRP
as resurrecting reactionism from the grave. FRP deputies, including the leader Fethi
Bey, rebutted the accusations and accounts of RPP members by pointing out their
exaggerated and fictitious aspects. However, the accusatory attitude of RPP leaders
did not change. Convinced that conflicting views in the political arena undermined
268 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:22 Beşinci İn’ikat,” November 15, 1930, 47.
269 Ibid., 48.
270 Ibid., 47.
271 Ibid., 38.
272 Ibid., 37.
273 Ibid., 47.
65
the republican reforms and principles, they decided to end FRP. The party was
forced to dissolve itself on 17 November 1930, thirty-six days before the Menemen
Incident.
That is to say, the political atmosphere of the country had already been tense,
particularly regarding issues considered to be provoking reactionism. Along with
FRP, the opposition press as well was blamed for inciting the reactionists in the
country. After the Menemen incident, opposition newspapers were charged with being
responsible for yet another reactionist act.
2.5.3. Blaming the Opposition Newspapers
Many of the newspapers reporting the details of the event gave place to officially-
biased interpretations and accused the opposition press of causing reactionism.
As discussed above, the newspapers can be divided into two separate groups. Most
of them accused the opposition press and politicians. A minor part of the newspapers
defended freedom of the press and stated that the opposition had no relation to the
incident. This sharp contrast was evident in the coverage of the Menemen Incident
but not new. A battle of words had already been raging between the two media
groups.274
Accusatory papers asserted that the encouraging content of the opposition
press had stimulated the reactionists.275 For them, articles published by the opposition
press were like declarations of counter-revolutionary positions.276 This criticism
intensified when Mehmet Emin replied in his interrogations that a series of articles
named “Kan Kalesi” published in the İstanbul newspaper Köroğlu.277 Aside from the
content of the articles, this news itself was fabricated. As discussed previously, there
were many statements Mehmet Emin was asserted to have made when he was captured.
However, these words were attributed to him most likely inaccurately.
Mehmet Emin’s accounts in question, including his making an analogy with Prophet
İbrahim, were inconsistent. While few of the newspapers described his words as
“nonsense,” for some others, they indicated the extent to which the group acted with
determination. In the court, neither Mehmet Emin nor other perpetrators projected
274 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1998, 141.
275 Milliyet, December 25, 1930.
276 Hürriyet, December 26, 1930.
277 Cumhuriyet, December 25, 1930; Vakit, December 27, 1930; Milliyet, December 27,
1930; Anadolu, December 25, 1930.
66
the image of having read any newspapers or followed other sorts of publications that
might have inspired them. According to their expressions, Derviş Mehmet was not a
scholar, whether in religious or secular terms. Officially-biased newspapers made a
deliberate effort to impress their readers so that they assumed the insurgents wellminded
and thoughtful men who acted knowingly and decisively.
***
This chapter presented the official statements and the newspaper reports
made after the incident. The starting point has been the meetings held by Mustafa
Kemal. These meetings are especially significant, because they demonstrate two issues
regarding the incident and have been ignored by many subsequent writers. First,
they revealed, contrary to officially-biased narrations, that the state already knew
about the activities of orders. The Nakşibendi order in particular did not have underground
activities outside of the government’s knowledge, as alleged by many. Second,
the outcome of legal proceedings, including capital punishments and executions,
were determined in advance. This chapter also discussed the statements of RPP
leaders and the reports of officially-biased newspapers. The latter case revealed the
extent to which prejudgments and disinformation influenced the publications about
the event and how this distorted information spread. It indicated how the incident
was conceived and reflected upon in the overall political medium of the republic at
the time. Subsequent writings recounted these early reflections made after the event
and relied on them almost exclusively.
67
CHAPTER 3
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS OF THE MENEMEN INCIDENT
This chapter discusses the judicial process of the Menemen Incident. The trial
records of the case along with the court decision documents were sent to the parliament
for approval. The written records and documents include all the conversations
between the court board, particularly the Chief Judge Mustafa Muğlalı and the defendants.
The defendants in the trials were divided into four groups. The first group
was composed of the three perpetrators who gave basic information about their activities
prior to and in due course of the happenings in Menemen. The second group
was composed of the people who provided substantial support to the group such as
hosting and food, or provision of arms and the like. The third group included the
townspeople who participated in the activities of the insurgents in Menemen. The notable
Nakşibendi dervishes and sheikhs constitute the fourth group, and they were
charged with instigating Derviş and his followers.
Although the number of arrestees was high, there were not too many charges
brought against them, because there was not enough evidence against many of the
defendants. The interrogations did not take long. It was the statements of the three
perpetrators and the defences of the alleged promoters of the event, namely a few notables
of the Nakşibendi order, which took much time. Statements of these prominent
figures and other defendants and the questions and interpretations of the chief judge
constitute certain patterns. This chapter will discuss the content of trials in sections
that correspond to those patterns.
One of the arguments of this chapter is that the verdicts the court reached had
already been determined before the trials began. The intention had been to declare
the Nakşibendi order as the organization behind the event. It was determined beforehand
as well to give death sentences to certain defendants including prominent figures
of the order and to those who provided substantial support to the group and the
core perpetrators. This chapter will show the lack of evidence needed to define the
Nakşibendi order as the true agent of the incident by discussing the trials of each of
the aforementioned groups. Beginning with the establishment of the martial court,
this chapter will discuss the trials and the issues they brought in, including the behav68
iour of the perpetrators, other defendants and the chief judge. Thus, I will discuss the
defendants’ fear before the court, due to which they occasionally turned against one
another. Another subject matter is the perpetrators’ very eagerness to denounce the
Nakşibendi order and blame the respondents. In addition, I will argue the pressure
put on the arrestees by the chief judge in the name of the republic. I will further focus
on several suspicious issues within the judicial process and demonstrate how the
newspapers published distorted reports about the trials. Lastly I will analyse the court
decisions and touch upon the second phase of the judicial proceedings.
3.1. The Constitution of the Martial Court
Preliminary inquests were launched the day after the incident by an investigation
committee under the leadership of the state attorney of İzmir. This committee
acted until the specially formed martial court reported for duty on 2 January 1931.
When Mehmet Emin was able to stand up, since he was captured injured, and
Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan were seized, they pointed to certain inhabitants of
Menemen who had participated in the activities.278 As it was asserted by the newspapers
of the time, the Menemen office of Türk Ocakları accused fifteen inhabitants of
Menemen for applauding the actions of the core group of insurgents. Türk Ocakları
organization was involved because one of its members had been martyred. Reportedly,
the members of the organization wandered around the neighbourhoods of the
town to determine the ones who applauded the reactionists in order to get them arrested.
279 Based on the statements of Mehmet Emin, Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan,
additional people were detained in various cities, towns and villages.280
Colonel Mustafa Muğlalı Paşa, Deputy Commander of the First Corps, who
as mentioned previously, wrote a report on the incident for the Headquarters of the
Turkish General Staff, was appointed as the chief judge of the martial court of
278 As a witness, Sami Özyılmaz described this situation later on. According to his account,
the law enforcement officials confronted the perpetrators with the townspeople. Through facing
the inhabitants respectively with insurgents, the officials asked the perpetrators who participated
in their activities during the course of the events. The gendarmes picked up those
identified by the perpetrators. According to Özyılmaz, things looked bad for whoever the insurgents
pointed to. (See Dündar, “Menemen'in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.”)
279 Cumhuriyet, January 1, 1931; Hizmet, December 30, 1930.
280 Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 30, 1930. Some false arrests were also made during the investigations.
For instance, a certain lawyer named Hasan Fehmi was detained erroneously.
But he was released as soon as the mistake was realized. Cumhuriyet, January 1, 1931; Son
Posta, January 1, 1931.
69
Menemen. Among the members of the court board, there were four other military officers
and four prosecutors as well as three investigating judges.281 Still, it was almost
always Muğlalı, who interrogated and dealt with the defendants.
The path that the martial court followed to decide whether a trial would be
held for a particular detainee, was as follows: The investigating judges conducted the
preliminary inquiries, evaluated the files and made their decisions as to whether to
bring a particular detainee to trial. Thereon they delivered the files to the attorney
general to get his opinion.282 The examining committee prepared nine investigation
files, each of which was of 200 pages. These files were delivered to and examined by
the board of the martial court once it assumed its judicial duty.283 An approximate
number of 220 people were arrested during the investigation process in the first
phase of the tenure of the martial court.284
The martial court’s area of jurisdiction was not limited to the districts put under
martial law. Whenever seen necessary, the court could summon a certain citizen
from anywhere in Turkey as a witness or suspect. The verdicts of the martial court
could not be appealed and they had to be executed immediately.285 In the proceedings
of the court, detainees were not permitted to have advocates. Thus, the arrestees
of the Menemen Incident would prepare their own defence.286
The trials of the Menemen Incident began on 15 January 1931. Interrogations
took place until 24 January and the court adjudicated the following day. Proceedings
of 105 defendants, implicitly or explicitly related to the Menemen Incident were held
at this stage.287 After the execution of sentences, the court board dealt with the cases
of other detainees accused of being associates or notable members of the order.
Prior to the trials, Fahrettin (Altay) Paşa, the Martial Law Commander, gave
an interview to newspapers. He was asked about the probable death sentences that
281 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 3. Still, these other members of
the court hardly ever talked during the trials. The Chief Judge Muğlalı remained in the forefront
and dealt with the defendants himself.
282 Anadolu, January 11, 1931; Hizmet, January 11, 1931.
283 İsmail Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı” (unpublished master thesis, Anadolu Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2000), 102. Those files in question are lacking that no information
about where they had been archived is unknown and might have been disposed.
284 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 16-17, 1931.
285 Serap Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat
Fakültesi Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi 10 (1995): 322.
286 Anadolu, January 12, 1931; Hizmet, January 12, 1931.
287 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 5.
70
the court might pass. He merely stated that the death penalty was subject to the approval
of the parliament. What attracts attention here is the presence of an expectation
of death penalties. The harsh reactions of state administrators and the disputes in
newspapers reflect the tense atmosphere that emerged in the country following the
Incident. In compliance with official statements, Fahrettin Paşa described the beheading
of Kubilay, a lettered son of the country, in front of the very eyes of many
townspeople as an outrageous incident.288 Muğlalı Paşa also spoke to newspapers before
the trials. His statements were in concordance with what he had written in his
report of 26 December. He indicated that “following the traces” of the incident revealed
a secret organization that used religion only for its members’ own interest under
the mask of a tarikat.289 His explanation did not amount merely to a mere preconceived
opinion, but reflected the prejudgement of the court. He recounted this
statement during the trials word for word. Consequently, regardless of almost all the
defences, the court reached rulings according to the same early assumptions.
The proceedings of the martial court were to be open to the public. Yet,
closed sessions could be held if considered necessary.290 If needed, trials would continue
in the evenings and nights.291 Audiences could attend the proceedings provided
that they submitted credentials from the District Governorate of Menemen.292
3.2. Attitudes and Expressional Patterns of the Perpetrators
The court based its verdicts primarily upon the statements of the perpetrators.
In other words, the perpetrators’ words were judicially prevailed over the assertions
of others. When one of the perpetrators spoke about someone’s illegal actions, such
as performing a collective zikr, or talking against the state and the like, he was very
likely telling the truth, according to the judge. This was because, in the eyes of the
judge, the perpetrators had nothing to lose for reporting the crimes. A perpetrator
was not asked to prove his allegation. Rather, it was the denier who was supposed to
somehow demonstrate that he had not committed the crime of which he was accused.
The perpetrators, namely Mehmet Emin, Küçük Hasan, and Nalıncı Hasan cooperated
with the court and provided detailed information in the hope to receive relatively
288 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 14, 1931.
289 Ibid., January 16, 1931.
290 Ibid., January 14, 1931.
291 Ibid., January 16, 1931.
292 Yeni Asır, January 15, 1931; Anadolu, January 15, 1931.
71
light sentences. There was almost no contradiction between their statements about
the general course of the event as well as about the participation of others.
It was only these perpetrators who accepted their roles in the events as they
considered it was of no use to deny. Still, all three of them asserted their delusion.
For them, they were unaware of what they had being doing, which was indeed, the
only defence or excuse behind which they could take refuge. However other inmates,
without exception, utterly rejected all the accusations. In general though the perpetrators
explained their previous doings explicitly, they abstained from providing details
regarding the events in Menemen. It was the happenings in Menemen, particularly
the brutal murder of Kubilay (and the two wardens) that mostly drew reaction. For
instance, Mehmet Emin stated that while they were wandering around Menemen, he
was unconscious, so he had no recollection of what exactly happened.293 For the perpetrators,
their acquaintance and companionship with Derviş Mehmet remained because
they were, in a sense, captivated by him. Under his influence, they acted in the
way he wished, as if they had no other option. They had no choice other than following
him, because they were frightened, spiritually overwhelmed, and unconscious.294
Mehmet Emin, for instance, during his statement in the trial, defined himself as insane,
and stated he could not remember many things as he had lost his mental balance
for the last three months and he was not even aware of himself, of whether he
was in the sky or on the earth.295 He held that he had been so frightened that he could
not escape from Derviş.296 He also repeatedly mentioned that Derviş Mehmet’s
words were meaningless and regretted to have known him.297
Moreover, Mehmet Emin frequently discredited the Nakşibendi order. He described
the order as a center of malignity and poison. According to Mehmet Emin,
the order should be exterminated. Unless the organization was eradicated, the republic
would not be able to find safety. He even personally requested the Chief Judge
Muğlalı to annihilate the order in the trial.298 Although all three men asserted the
same thing, Mehmet Emin put much more emphasis on being deceived by Derviş
Mehmet and the order. Compared to the other two men, he gave much more infor-
293 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 21.
294 Ibid., 11.
295 His saying in Turkish was: “Yerde miyim gökte miyim belli değil.”
296 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10.
297 Ibid., 8.
298 Ibid., 10.
72
mation to the court against the other detainees. He consistently extolled the republican
government and the court. The reason why he kept on talking so much about his
regret was because he wanted to gain the favour of the chief judge. As for Küçük
Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan, they knew they would get over the judicial process by receiving
only imprisonment since they were under twenty-one years of age. However,
Mehmet Emin was much older and he desperately hoped to elude the death penalty.
Therefore he adopted an excessively reconciliatory attitude towards the court.
Nalıncı Hasan, likewise, defined his acquaintance with Derviş Mehmet as a
matter of deception. He expressed that Derviş deceived them by reciting the verses of
the Qur’an and emphasizing the virtues of the order. Nalıncı described himself as
having lost his consciousness ever since he became attached to the Nakşibendi order.
299 Küçük Hasan mentioned being threatened by Derviş Mehmet frequently even
before the retreat of Ramazan. He asserted that he was in fear, because he had been
inwardly fascinated by religious invocations and prayers. He identified Derviş as an
evildoer who had malevolent intentions of which they did not know beforehand.300
He, as the other two defendants did, defined himself as an insane person, and said he
could not even understand whether he was on earth or in the sky at the time.
Ramazan was one of the insurgents, yet he had fled the company on the way.
He as well asserted to have been deceived by Derviş Mehmet’s spiritual remarks and
suggestions. Derviş used to advise him to cite God as much as he could, in order to
get closer to God. Ramazan also described the journey to Menemen as an indispensability
for him, because he was forced to go. For instance, on their way to Bozalan,
which took eleven hours on foot, he claimed to have walked under compulsion. He
and Küçük Hasan were following the others, and they were not among the leading
ones.301 Ramazan stated Sütçü Mehmet made him join the order. Yet according to
Ramazan, Sütçü had did not tell him what the meaning of the order was. Thus, he
expressed that he was completely ignorant about the issues of the order except for reciting
the name of God.302
These critical accounts of the perpetrators stimulated the other detainees to
denigrate the order. They frequently indicated that the Nakşibendi order was a malef-
299 Ibid., 11.
300 Ibid., 13.
301 Ibid., 18.
302 Ibid., 46.
73
icent organization for the republic and the nation. They talked this way since they
thought discrediting the order would help them get acquitted. All the arrested people
refuted any sort of allegations of association with the order. Furthermore, some of
the defendants told in trials that they were invited to become a member of the order
in the past but refused the invitation on grounds that joining the order was not a religious
necessity. They also alleged that when they encountered someone who dedicated
himself to the order, they sought to dissuade them from this commitment.
Those, who gave statements along these lines, portrayed the perpetrators and Derviş
as fractious and malevolent liars who always talked nonsense.303 Many of the detainees
agreed on several issues such as this one. Still, they did not protect one another
during the trials all the time. Instead, they often resorted to give information against
each other to become cleared of the blames.
3.3. Informing Against One Another
There were three ways of speaking against one another in the court. First,
though rarely, the perpetrators refuted each other’s statements. For instance, court
judges asked Ramazan why Derviş had preferred him as a disciple. In his interrogation,
Ramazan replied that he had not been acting in his own free will. Mehmet Emin
stood up and expressed that Ramazan willingly adhered to Derviş. He also stressed
that Ramazan used to give them food. Ramazan immediately replied to have been
frightened and said he rarely provided them with food.304
Second, the perpetrators provided information against other detainees. Generally
when asked by the judge, Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan gave information
about the defendant who was being interrogated. In comparison to the other two,
Mehmet Emin was more ready to incriminate others. Because he was quite sure that
he would be condemned to capital punishment, he tried desperately to change the
opinion of the court. He was eager to demonstrate that he was at the side of the court,
and hence of the republic. Even so, when someone unfamiliar to them was interrogated,
they honestly told the court that they did not know that person. For instance,
Hacıalioğlu Mustafa from Bozalan was charged with not reporting the arrival and
acts of Derviş and his followers. He denied to be aware of someone named Derviş.
Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan acknowledged that they did not see this man.
303 Ibid., 45, 51.
304 Ibid., 18.
74
During his interrogation, İbrahimoğlu Mehmet from Bozalan claimed to have
gone to welcome the company of Hacı İsmail’s brother Sütçü Mehmet, but then, he
went to his field where he remained ten days and did not know about Mahdi.
Mehmet Emin intervened to express that everyone knew about their presence in the
village including İbrahimoğlu Mehmet. Mehmet Emin told that İbrahimoğlu brought
them food during their stay at the cottage. Nalıncı and Küçük Hasan confirmed this
statement. Mehmet Emin referred to the villagers as “microbes.” İbrahimoğlu
Mehmet refused the assertion. İsmailoğlu İsmail, another inhabitant, also stated that
he did not see the insurgents in the village nor was he seen by them. However, the
perpetrators said İsmail visited them, once every night and once again during midday.
305
Derviş’s brother in-law Ahmet from Paşa Village claimed he had a conflict
with Derviş about an issue of heritage. Because of this hostility, he did not follow
any activities of Derviş, including his coming to the village. The three perpetrators,
however, again appeared determined to tell the truth. They told the court that it was
impossible for Ahmet not to notice their arrival at the village with their guns and zikr
performances. Thus, perpetrators rebutted Ahmet’s defence. They did the same to
many others who were being interrogated and making false statements.306
Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law Rukiye from Paşa was questioned about
hosting and feeding Derviş with his companion and not reporting their actions to the
officials. Rukiye stated that Derviş came to her house with two guests and a dog.
They explained they were there for hunting. Rukiye told the court that she believed
them because of the dog. She was reminded that Derviş Mehmet had declared his
Mahdism there. Thus, chief judge asked how it was possible that she did not know
this. Rukiye asserted that Derviş Mehmet did not say anything about his Mahdism in
her village. Yet, Mehmet Emin stood up and stated that she was lying.307
Hacı İsmail, Sütçü Mehmet’s elder brother from Bozalan, as well asserted
that he was unfamiliar with the intentions of Derviş and his companions. At that
point, the chief judge questioned him as to whether he asked the group what their intentions
were while he hosted them in his house. Hacı İsmail claimed not to have
305 Ibid., 30.
306 Ibid., 18.
307 Ibid.
75
asked anything, as they used to come over on a regular basis to his house. The judge
stressed that he should have suspected their intentions, as they were acting strangely.
Hacı İsmail said they were not acting weirdly and seemed to have been right-minded.
Again, Mehmet Emin interfered and cried out: “Shame on you!” He recounted that
they had been in their village for a while, performing zikr even so they were denying
this. Hacı İsmail was also questioned about the cottage he constructed for the company.
He disclaimed this and said he had nothing to do with the cottage. Nalıncı Hasan
interfered and repointed that the cottage was repaired by them and even Hacı İsmail’s
son Hüseyin helped them set up a pole for the cottage. Hüseyin denied this.308
Nalıncı Hasan claimed that Hacı İsmail and his sons Hasan and Hüseyin came to the
cottage.309
When questioned, İbrahim Ethem and Fırıncı Ahmet from Manisa emphasized
they had nothing to do with Derviş. Yet, Mehmet Emin intervened, again, to
indicate that both men were dervishes of Derviş Mehmet. They knew about performing
the zikr and Derviş’s teachings though they pretended as if they did not.310
Third, the detainees denounced each other. Along with asserting their innocence,
they occasionally pointed fingers to the “true criminals” in their own terms.
For instance, Çulha Mehmet Çavuş, who was accused of participating in the gatherings
in Manisa, denied any sort of connection with the zikr activities. He brought up
some certain inhabitants of Manisa such as Hacı Mehmet Emin Efendi as the dervish
of Hafız Ahmet. Fırıncı Ahmet and Mutaf Süleyman were also dervishes according
to him. He added that the real criminals were slandering him. Hacı Hasan Efendi
from Manisa was accused of participating in the gatherings and performing the zikr.
He rejected the allegations and said that he had not heard of such a thing before. He
indicated that Hacı Emin, Nalıncı Hasan, Hacı Hasan, Mehmet Çavuş, Fırıncı Hafız
Ahmet and Süleyman Çavuş were the disciples of Hafız Ahmet and continued to
gather at Hafız Ahmet’s house to perform the zikr on Thursdays and Fridays. He
added the windows of Hafız Ahmet’s home were covered with paper to prevent being
seen from the outside. Hacı Hasan intervened and said he had nothing to do with
the assertion.311 It must be noted there was not even a single villager who spoke
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid., 20.
310 Ibid., 45.
311 Ibid., 34.
76
against another villager in the court. The ones who gave counter testimonies were
from Manisa, and few were from Menemen.
3.4. The Court’s Pressure on Detainees
The chief judge of the court grilled the detainees about certain points of the
incident. These questions were mainly about why they did not report anything to
government officials, or why they did not suspect the behaviour of the insurgents and
similar points.
It must be noted that the atmosphere of the court was tense. The chief judge
was the dominant figure in trials. None of the defendants were able to withstand or
resist the successive interrogations of the judge. They could in no terms behave in an
adverse and negative manner in the court. No one was able to question the attitude of
either the chief judge or other members of the court board and the prosecutor. Fear
was the ultimate determinant of the statements of the arrested. They were on trial and
accused of participating in and/or and supporting a revolt against the state. If found
guilty, they would be sentenced to capital punishment. As they were quite sure of
what would happen to them, the detainees were merely defending themselves. At the
expense of making inconsistent statements, they were declining all the pressed
charges.
One of the common questions the chief judge asked to all of the detainees
was why they did not let the government officials know about the actions of Derviş
and his companions. Some of the defendants indicated that Derviş and his followers
were insane, and therefore they did not suspect they might be involved in a conspiracy
against the regime. For example, Tütüncü (tobacconist) Haydar from Menemen,
stressed that when he heard of the insurgents creating trouble, he thought they were
only a few mad men. He alleged to have considered that the government would surely
seize them soon. He further told he recommended to the people around him in
Menemen, not to believe the words of the company. According to Haydar, his recommendations
were sensible and everyone agreed with him.312
For some others, the insurgents were acting in a normal manner. Thus, there
was no reason to doubt their actions. Nearly all of the defendants stated that if in any
way they had known about the malicious intentions of the company, they would most
312 Ibid., 26.
77
definitely have informed the officials of the situation. Some of them asserted that
they would themselves shoot the insurgents if they had been aware of their purposes.
Hacıalioğlu Mustafa was another person charged with not reporting the arrival and
acts of Derviş’s company. Hacıalioğlu Mustafa stated he would have informed the
officials if he had known the men, in any way, had malicious intentions. He stated he
had been the village headmen previously and knew how things worked. Further, he
claimed he would have shot the fellows himself if he knew about their plans.313
Some of the villagers asserted that their homes were far from the place where Derviş
and his company stayed. That is why they had not been informed about their arrival
or any other actions. As for some others, they saw only one or two people. For instance,
Şerif Ahmetoğlu Eyüp from the village of Paşa claimed to have seen only
Küçük Hasan coming to the village.314 The villagers claimed that the persons they
saw were usually someone’s relative.
When counter evidence was brought forward by the court, the detainees insisted
on their denials as far as they could. Many of them swore oaths for they were
entirely innocent. The judge was quite aware that the initial aim of the arrestees was
to reject the charges against them in any way possible. Therefore he frequently told
them to tell the truth. Whenever such a dialogue occurred, the subject defender proceeded
to refute the alleged crimes in different terms. When the judge questioned the
detainees persistently, many of them gave desperate answers. They only sought to
save the moment. For instance, the judge questioned Ramazan as to whether Derviş
had talked to them about the places they would go to in their walks. When Ramazan
answered no, the judge in return questioned whether he was not able to ask the
townspeople about Derviş’s intentions, since they provided them weapons. Ramazan’s
replies remained desperate. According to Ramazan, he instantly ordered the
company to depart as soon as Derviş got the guns. He said, there was no time left for
him to inquire about their destination and their goals. The judge further asked what
the time period was exactly between their getting guns and the departure. Ramazan
answered it was around a quarter of an hour. Yet, the judge objected, and stated that
there was an extended period of time and asked Mehmet Emin the same question.
Mehmet Emin replied as 1-1,5 hours.
313 Ibid., 19.
314 Ibid., 73.
78
The judge persistently questioned the arrestees as to why they were not thinking
about the consequences of their actions. He asked the villagers repeatedly why
they had not become suspicious of the company. Furthermore, he asked some of
them why they had not questioned Derviş or other disciples about their aim since the
defenders constantly denied any knowledge of the purposes of the company. The
court’s persistence about this issue mainly derived from two facts. First, the insurgents
carried guns with them on their way. Second, Derviş Mehmet declared his
Mahdism in the villages of Paşa and Bozalan.315 Thus, the chief judge grilled the villagers
how they did not doubt his intentions and report the situation to law enforcement
agents.
When the judge questioned Haliloğlu Hasan from Bozalan along these lines,
he said he saw them but thought they were there for hunting as they had come to the
village for that purpose the previous year. This is why he did not become suspicious
upon their arrival. Sarıoğlu Halil, another resident of Bozalan, stated he did not know
when the insurgents arrived at the village. He said Hacı İsmail informed them about
his brother’s arrival. Later, Halil went to welcome him and thought he was there for
hunting as they had done two years ago. So there was no reason for Halil to become
doubtful of the men in the village.316 The judge was not satisfied with this answer
and continued to ask the men how they could so easily believe they came to hunt.
But the arrestees had no considerable reply to this question.
On occasion, the judge implicitly repeated questions he had asked before
when dealing with another issue. His purpose was to provoke the detainees to unwittingly
confess what they had been accused of. Still, the situation did not change in
general and they maintained their refusal of all the accusations.
The Chief Judge Muğlalı kept looking for contradictory or inconsistent
statements. He questioned Hüseyin, the warden of Bozalan, who gave him a gun and
why. He replied that the government had given him the gun to protect the village territory
against strangers with suspicious behaviour. He was then questioned as to how
he could not see six armed men coming into the village planning to do violence
against the government. The answer of the warden was similar to those of the others.
He claimed he did not see the group. The judge insisted that it was his duty and obli-
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., 30.
79
gation to know, and kept on questioning him relentlessly. He asked Hüseyin, where
exactly he had been so that he could not see the group. His answer was that he had
been with the tax collector. The judge questioned for how long he had been with the
official and Hüseyin replied it was for one day. Then the judge asked how he possibly
could not see the men as they had stayed in the village for fourteen days. He then
claimed he had been busy elsewhere distributing coal. The judge asked how long that
work took, and Hüseyin replied he arrived at the village after two days. The judge
turned and asked the village headman Mustafa whether the tax collector had been at
the village during the time in question. The headman confirmed, but he mentioned
that during the collector’s stay, the company was not in the village. The judge understood
that Hüseyin was lying, and turned to another person to ask the same questions
as to whether he had seen Derviş Mehmet and his companions or how he had seen
them.317
Thereon, the chief judge interrogated Mustafa, the village headmen of Bozalan,
about how he was not informed of the rebels’ presence in the village for fourteen
days. The headmen replied that he was a newly appointed official in the village and
had been there for only eight days, living in a house far from the village. Besides, he
was busy attending to the tax collectors who were in the village.318
The detainees from Menemen asserted that they were compelled to obey
Derviş Mehmet. Arabacı (driver of municipality) Hüseyin, for instance, was accused
of digging a hole for the rebels to plant the banner. Hüseyin claimed that the rebels
threatened him and held a rifle against his head. He stated he left his house in order
to buy medicine as he had a sick person at his house. But the insurgents withheld on
his way, gave him a shovel, and obliged him to dig the hole. He claimed to have refused
initially, pretending that the ground was firm, yet they pressed him to do as
said. When he hit the ground, the shovel was bent. He asserted to hit the ground for
only two times. However the judge objected that a shovel would not be bent by hitting
the ground only twice. Still, Hüseyin insisted on his statement and on the firmness
of the ground. The defendants, similarly, objected to the accusatory arguments
of the chief judge and kept on purporting the truthfulness of their claims. Kamil from
Menemen was charged with providing the rope with which the insurgents tied Kubi-
317 Ibid., 20.
318 Ibid.
80
lay’s head to a pole. He told he was a shoemaker and he had the rope in his pocket
already when Derviş detained him. He claimed that Derviş held a gun to his chest
and forced him to give the rope. He was frightened so he did as said.319 As it seems,
these defences were not reliable in the eyes of the court board so that the two men
were executed in the end.
3.5. Grudge and Consent
Another attitude pattern in the trials was the defendants’ occasional assertion
that they were slandered. For them, the charges brought against them were the denigration
of specific people. These people carried a grudge against them and this was
why they were blamed for the Menemen Incident and the events that led to it.
An arrestee did not have to know his accusers to call them slanderers. For instance,
Süleyman from Menemen was charged with standing among the crowd that
gathered around Derviş Mehmet and his companions when they performed zikr with
the banner in their hands. He claimed he had no connection to the company and to
what happened in Menemen. For him, anyone who asserted a relationship between
him and the events had hostility towards him. Süleyman added that he did not have a
single enemy in Menemen and he did not even realize why such an allegation was
made against him.320 Tütüncü Haydar Efendi was charged for applauding the movement
at the government square. Yet, for him, whoever denounced him ought to have
been either a debtor or a competitor.321
Harputlu Memet from Menemen was yet another person charged with applauding.
He said he was accused because someone had a grudge against him. According
to Harputlu, he had seen Hacı Hasan, the witness who said he had applauded,
drinking rakı in his shop on a Ramadan day. When Harputlu warned him not to
drink, at least not during the holy month of Ramadan, Hacı Hasan developed a
grudge against him since then. That was the reason why he cast blame on him. To
evoke pity, he also mentioned that he was a man loyal to the government for sixty
years and an old man who could hardly see or hear.322
319 Ibid., 25.
320 Ibid., 24.
321 Ibid., 68.
322 Ibid., 67.
81
Driver Ali was accused of firing a gun during the actions in Menemen. However,
he stated, there was hostility between him and Kepekçi Mehmet Efendi, the
witness who accused him of such action. One day Ali was standing by the fountain to
fill his container. He accidentally broke Kepekçi’s pitcher. Thereon Kepekçi held a
grudge against him. According to Ali, this was why Kepekçi accused him. He further
mentioned that Kepekçi’s house was located far from his, and he asked how Kepekçi
could have seen him firing a gun.323
Jözef was as well interrogated with the charge of applauding. The judge addressed
Jözef that he was there from the beginning to end and applauded, as there
were witnesses who saw him do so. Jözef opposed the allegations. He claimed that
he had neither stayed among the crowd nor clapped his hands. He mentioned two
witnesses, Tahsin and Mehmet Efendi with whom he went to his house since they
were all scared. He claimed he had been quite sure the government would punish the
rebels.324 Hoca Mehmetoğlu İbrahim was the witness who indicated that Jözef had
been applauding. Jözef stood up and accused İbrahim of bearing a grudge against
him and hence speaking ill of him. İbrahim further asserted that everyone had applauded;
yet he had not been able to see exactly who had, so he stated he did not
want to accuse anyone wrongly.325 Jözef stated that he was detained on charges of
applauding, although there were no witnesses who saw him actually doing so. The
only thing he had done was “to be loyal to the government.”326 Yet, the witnesses he
mentioned were not brought to the court and he could not change the situation in his
favor, so he was hanged.327 There were others who struggled to prove their innocence,
but their defenses were similarly disregarded by the court. Thus, none of the
witnesses mentioned by the detainees were brought to the court.328
323 Ibid., 71.
324 Ibid., 23.
325 Ibid., 28.
326 Ibid., 68–9.
327 Ibid., 23.
328 There were other witnesses present in the trials, but in general they shunned accusing other,
unlike Mehmetoğlu İbrahim, who informed against Josef. As a matter of fact, statements
of witnesses did not have a huge effect on the trials. Many of them indicated that Derviş
Mehmet and his followers were lunatics. The witnesses in general did not want to put the detainees
in a difficult position. Rather than giving details about the activities of specific individuals,
who implicitly or explicitly participated in the demonstrations, the witnesses refrained
from providing illustrative information. Some of them remarked that they did not
remember the happenings in detail or on the commonly known aspects of the events. Some
82
Kerimoğlu İbrahim, an inhabitant of Menemen, was charged with supporting
Derviş’s actions. He denied the accusation and added that the ones who accused him
were Hulusi and Deveci Mehmet. According to İbrahim, Deveci’s camels had once
entered his field and damaged the crops. Then, İbrahim took a certain tool of Deveci,
in return. This was why Deveci had borne a grudge and testified against him.329 He
was then questioned about particularly summoning people to see the company and
announcing them to be saints. Although he denied it, there were witnesses who testified
that he actually did this. Mehmetoğlu Hulusi, a witness under oath, testified that
İbrahim was telling the townspeople that Derviş and his disciples were invulnerable
and no bullet could hurt them. In return, İbrahim asserted that Hulusi as well was his
enemy, because of an earlier dispute. He claimed he had been at home with two of
his neighbours during the demonstrations of the company.330 The judge reminded
him the opposite assertion that he had been outside. In reply, İbrahim suggested that
if his witnesses told the same story, he would consent to the punishment. The judge
in return tested whether İbrahim would retract his denial of being outside. The judge
expressed that standing outside was not itself a crime and that he might express it
without hesitation if he had done so. Still, İbrahim maintained his claim to have been
at home. Another witness, Mustafaoğlu Mehmet, a municipal guard, agreed with Hulusi’s
claims against İbrahim. İbrahim had something to say against Mustafaoğlu
Mehmet as well. He asserted that this was all because he had taken Mehmet’s felt
cloak after a certain camel issue.331 Clearly, the detainees were determined to defend
themselves however they could.
Kerimoğlu İbrahim was not the only person accused of helping Derviş and
his company. Hasan and Ahmet, two villagers, were accused of advising Derviş and
the company to invade the Emiralem station, kill the officers and take their weapons
since it had fewer officers on duty. Both men denied the accusations. Ahmet stated
he did not even know where the Emiralem station was located.332 Hasan said if the
allegation were to be proven, he would consent to his punishment.333
witnesses, however, told that they recognized the people who attended the demonstrations in
Menemen. Ibid., 29.
329 Ibid., 30.
330 Ibid., 35.
331 Ibid., 36.
332 Ibid., 18.
333 Ibid., 19.
83
Another prisoner Molla Süleyman was charged with providing cigarettes to
the rebels. His excuse was, once again, the grudge of Çolak Hacı Hasan, the owner
of the adjacent shop. Süleyman stated they had traded stamps years ago and he had
made a greater profit. Çolak spoke against him because of this rivalry. They resented
one another for six years and everyone in the town knew about this.334 Molla Süleyman
mentioned three civil servants working in the neighbourhood. If they were to
testify as to his giving cigarettes to the rebels, he would consent to the penalty. He
also stated to have taken Fehmi and Hacı Hasan to his house during the events. He
added that his son had been outside and he could not go out to look for him because
the soldiers prevented him. Thus, he returned home and waited.335 Nevertheless, his
explanations were not taken into account. None of the names he mentioned as witnesses
were brought to the court. Regardless of whether he consented to the verdict
or not, he was executed at the end.
The respondents often claimed that they were being wrongly accused, and
expressed their consent to the forthcoming punishment. A substantial part of the detainees
was composed of the villagers of Bozalan and Paşa. Some of them were the
relatives of Derviş’s followers while others were familiar with them. Although none
of the villagers joined the company, they hosted them and did not report them to the
officials. As for the Menemen inhabitants, they were acquainted with neither Derviş
nor his friends. Still, a proportionally small group followed them into the town. They
had no previous preparation, nor did they know anything regarding the upcoming
events. Therefore, the defendants did not have many arguments with which they
could defend themselves. They certainly denied all charges and made simple arguments
to defend themselves against the accusations. Claiming that their accusers
were a slanderer who nurtured a grudge against them was indeed a simple defence.
Stressing the willingness that they were ready for the punishments in case proven
truly guilty was as well a desperate attitude of the defendants. These naïve defences
did not benefit them.
3.6. Tragicomic Statements
Some statements of the detainees could be seen as tragicomic for they were
so unreasonable. For instance Ramiz, charged with participating in the company’s
334 Ibid., 27.
335 Ibid., 28.
84
activities, said he was following the group in Menemen from thirty steps behind in
order to observe where they were going. When the judge asked the reason why he
followed the group, his answer was “to prevent them from harming the country.” The
judge further questioned Ramiz why had he not reported the company to the gendarme
station if he truly doubted their intentions. Ramiz claimed he was not able to
report to the station. He told to have been afraid the company would escape while he
went to the station to report. He was also worried that the gendarme would interrogate
him about why he had let them get away, if he reported the company. He recounted
the happenings as if he was an official and it was his duty to follow the
group. Nevertheless, Nalıncı Hasan intervened and indicated Ramiz followed the
group, because he participated in the demonstrations. Ramiz further asserted how he
encountered a doctor and a man named Tevfik at the square, and asked them whether
they had reported the situation to the gendarme. When they said “yes,” he continued
his mission of tracking the insurgents.336
Another person charged with standing among the Derviş’s crowd was
Harputlu Mehmet from Menemen. He stated he was in the coffeehouse observing the
rebels. He stressed he foresaw the probable consequences of the insurgents’ actions
and that the group consisted of shady and bad men. Then, he lost his interest in the
insurgents.337
Mustafa, a member of the administrative council of the Bozalan Village was
questioned about not informing the authorities about the insurgents. He said he had
been very busy in his field all day and was not able to talk to anyone else. Other
members of the village administration, İbrahim and Mustafaoğlu Mustafa, were interrogated
regarding the same issue. İbrahim said he had been ill during that period.
As for Mustafa, he stressed that his house was located at the upper edge of the village
and it was only natural for him not to be aware of the company. Mustafa
claimed to have been ill as well, and he said he was home all day playing with his
children.338
Fırıncı Hasan from Manisa was accused of being an associate of the
Nakşibendi order. He claimed he did not have any connection with the order. He said
336 Ibid., 22, 23.
337 Ibid., 24.
338 Ibid., 20.
85
he never attended the meetings in Manisa, nor did he know Laz İbrahim. The judge
questioned Fırıncı Ahmet as to why he had been arrested and brought to the court
then. Fırıncı said he did not know why.339
Ali Koç, an inhabitant of Horos, was questioned about his visit to Şeyh Esat.
He said they went to İstanbul and travelled around the mosques and subsequently
visited Şeyh Esat’s mansion. He stated they could not see him as he had been ill.
They visited his son and stayed there for one night. The judge asked the reason of
their stay, if not for sufi issues. Ali Koç replied the reason was that Esat was old.
Then the judge stressed there had been a certain man named Zaro Ağa in İstanbul
who was 150 years of age, much older than Esat. He asked Ali Koç if their purpose
was to visit the old, why had they not visited Zaro Ağa instead. Ali Koç replied that
if they had heard of Zaro Ağa, they would have visited him too.340
As previously mentioned, these kinds of defence did not influence the attitude
or perception of the chief judge Muğlalı. He was not to be deluded. On several occasions
he grilled the detainees on specific issues, but when the interrogations ended up
in a vicious circle because the detainees kept denying all the charges, he passed on to
the next issue by realizing they did not have much to say and were merely trying to
save themselves. Still, these accounts prove that the people, who were connected to
the events in one way or another, did not act in a pre-planned manner. They were not
highly motivated contrarians expecting someone to emerge to lead the way to a revolution
against the republic. Rather, as it seems, their different levels of dissatisfaction
against the republican ideology could merely present itself by watching Derviş to see
what would happen.
According to the statements of all the detainees and witnesses as well as the
official records, followers of religious orders in Manisa were speaking out against
the government. Thus they were, to various degrees, opposing the republican regime.
This was a passive opposition in the sense that no disciple of the Nakşibendi order,
except Derviş and his fellows, participated in the demonstrations. The villagers of
Bozalan and Paşa might have been displeased with the government as well, perhaps
particularly in regards to their perception of secularist politics. However, there is not
substantial information to verify this premise. Thus, what explains their hosting of
339 Ibid., 35.
340 Ibid., 40.
86
Derviş or his fellows is the fact that they were relatives of some of these villagers.
Therefore, their relationship of affinity or acquaintance with insurgents was the defining
reason of their treatment of the company. In other words, the villagers’ relationship
with perpetrators might have taken precedence over their dependence on the
government, regardless of the extent to which they were discontent with the policies
of the government.
3.7. Extolling the State
Another pattern one can observe in the trials is the exaltation of the state by
the detainees as well as the chief judge. The defendants revered the state in various
ways to specify their intimate loyalty as they had absolutely nothing to do with an
action undermining the republic. Some of the detainees declared their loyalty to the
republic by mentioning their civilian or military services as proof of their innocence.
For instance, Halil from Manisa remarked that a young Turkish man’s fundamental
duty was to love his country and to defend his honour. He asked, therefore, how
could one ever turn against the state. Keçeci Süleyman expressed he had been in the
service of his country for eight years. To arise pity, he also spoke of his two children
left in miserable conditions in Manisa.341 Manisalı Ali Çavuş emphasized his elevenyear
of military service for the sake of the country and nation. He claimed he had not
been guilty of treason.342 Ömeroğlu Hafız Ahmet indicated he had been a poor man
who had lost his mind at the time of the Greek invasion, since he loved his country
so much. He asserted to have regained his mental abilities when the country was taken
back.343
Hafız Hilmi Efendi from Manisa was charged with being an associate of the
order and for laying the groundwork for a rebellion. His initial words were that he
had always been loyal to the government and had never committed any offense
against it. He had worked in favour of the ideal of Turkish victory during the period
of the Greek occupation.344 He had monitored every step the Greeks took and informed
the government. When the Greeks realized what he was framing, they retained
him. He stated he would absolutely shy away and abstain from reacting
341 Ibid., 71.
342 Ibid., 67.
343 Ibid., 71.
344 Ibid., 64.
87
against the government, which definitely saved the vulnerable nation from brutality.
He was so loyal to the government that if he had any contrary idea inside him, he
would have committed suicide. He swore an oath in the name of his knowledge of
the Quran and religion, and told he regarded opposing the government as a sin. He
told the judge to inquire about his personality in the RPP organization and Türk
Ocakları.345
Hafız Hilmi’s words are representative of the statements of other accused
persons who were charged with providing necessary material and moral support for
the rebellion. Cases in point are Mehmet Ali Efendi, Laz İbrahim, and Saffet
Hoca.346 They all asserted to have done their utmost in the service of the country and
pointed to the contradiction between their previous services and the recent charges.
However, the chief judge did not take such claims into serious consideration. Whenever
someone started to praise himself by mentioning former services, the judge told
him to get to the point and address the accusations. Indeed, when someone began to
extol the republic, it could affect the judge adversely. When the respondents dignified
the state, the judge told them that since the state was sacred, then how come they
dared to undertake counteraction against it.
The chief judge, representing the court, was evidently convinced that the
people before the court had betrayed the state in various degrees. Although it was a
company of six people who initiated the revolt actively, their action brought to light
that the fellows of the order in Manisa were speaking out against the government on
their own. According to the state, this was also considered to be disloyalty or even
betrayal. By hosting the company, villagers already committed serious offense
against the state in the eyes of the court.
The chief judge did not take seriously the arguments of even the ones who
brought forth that they were members of RPP. Due to the prevailing tension in political
grounds between RPP and former FRP, defendants sought to take advantage and
gain the favour of the chief judge by mentioning that they were associates of RPP.
For example, Gözlüklü Mehmet Ali was accused of applauding the rebels. He mentioned
he was a member of the RPP’s local committee. He expressed he had never
participated in such sedition against the government. As many others did, he told he
345 Ibid., 65.
346 See ibid., 59.
88
would have definitely informed the officials of the situation, if he had only known
about it. When disorder occurred in Menemen, he claimed he was suspicious of a
party conflict and refrained from possible violence as he had been a member of RPP.
He swore several times that he was far from collaborating with the insurgents, and he
did not see any of them. He said he could most certainly prove this.347 He also added
that none of the perpetrators cited his name while accounting the details of the
events. He ended his last words by asserting that revolt against the government did
not conform to his character.348
Another respondent, Topçu Hüseyin was charged with attending the gatherings
at Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s house in Manisa. He denied his alleged presence in those
meetings. The persons who asserted that such meetings were held had a grudge and
hence sought to ruin his name. The key element of this grudge against him was the
conflict between political parties. Topçu stated he supported RPP, while his accusers
were from the FRP, and this was a good and sufficient reason for them to slander
him.349 However, the chief judge did not take much notice of the defendants’ party
memberships. Instead, he remarked that association with political parties was not an
issue in the trials and required the ones who brought up their party affiliation to
move on and get to the point.350
3.8. The Court Searching for Behind the Scenes
The court’s major objective was to reveal the background structure and the
agents of the Menemen Incident. As previously mentioned, the court intended to rule
that the Nakşibendi order organised the event. Nevertheless, the statements of the
perpetrators in this regard were quite unreliable and controversial. Therefore, the
most equivocal stage of the trials involved the effort to elaborate the origins of the
event.
Throughout the trials, the perpetrators mentioned three separate phases of
meetings held in Manisa. The first was the gathering of Derviş and his followers in a
certain coffeehouse. In these meetings, they performed the zikr and smoked hashish.
After the municipal police found out what they had been doing there, the coffeehouse
347 Ibid., 25.
348 Ibid., 67–8.
349 Ibid., 17.
350 Ibid., 76.
89
was closed down. Then Derviş’s disciples continued to gather in Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s
house. There was nothing disputable, since all three perpetrators said the same thing
until this point. However, ambiguities emerged with regard to two other groups of
people who were not Derviş’s disciples. The first group consisted of people gathering
in each other’s homes, such as those of Manifaturacı Osman Efendi, Ragıp Bey,
and Mutaf Süleyman Efendi. The second group consisted of some notable associates
of the order, who were active locally and in general, such as Hafız Ahmet, Laz
İbrahim, and Şeyh Esat. Perpetrators asserted that Derviş Mehmet was fully under
the influence of the persons of the latter group. They alleged it was these sheikhs
from whom Derviş learned all the maleficent ideas on which he acted.
Mehmet Emin stated that after Derviş Mehmet made him a disciple of the order,
they attended, along with their own gatherings, the sermons of certain preachers
in Manisa, such as Hafız Ahmet, Hacı Hilmi, Şeyh Hakkı, and Saffet Hoca. In his
statement, Mehmet Emin referred to a conversation that took place between Derviş
Mehmet and Hafız Ahmet. Derviş Mehmet asked Hafız Ahmet from where the expected
Mahdi would come. Hafız replied he would emerge from among mankind, yet
he, who recited the name of God the most would be assigned the task. He also indicated
that the Prophet Muhammed was the general soul of the order. Allegedly,
Derviş Mehmet declared his Mahdism to Hafız Ahmet and Hafız acknowledged it
and recommended him to others. However, they fell into bad terms with each other
later on.
When the judge questioned what he would say about the issue, Hafız Ahmet
Efendi rejected all allegations. For him, there were many taskmasters, officials, and
civil servants among those who had come to listen to his preaching. His sermons attracted
about three hundred people each time. Therefore, Hafız Ahmet stated if the
asserted conversation between him and Derviş Mehmet had actually occurred, somebody
would have reported it to the authorities. He indicated that all the assertions
against him were outright lies. When asked again by the judge whether a quarrel had
occurred between them, he claimed he had never seen or heard about Derviş Mehmet
before.351 Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan said they did not know whether Hafız
Ahmet had met Derviş or not. Then, Hafız Ahmet accused Mehmet Emin of casting
aspersions on him. He further referred Menmet Emin to God’s punishment and told
351 Ibid., 45.
90
their accounts would be settled in the greatest court, after death. Mehmet Emin’s answer
was “The greatest court is right here.” Thereon, Ramazan began to speak and
said Mehmet Emin was not telling the truth about the issue between Hafız Ahmet
and Derviş Mehmet. The judge later turned to Hafız Ahmet and told him that there
were written documents and testimonies indicating his affirmation of Dervish
Mehmet as the Mahdi. Still, Hafız Ahmet rejected the materials in question, and
brought forward several names as witnesses who could assert that he did not know
Derviş.352
At that point, although the chief judge referred to documents indicating the
reality of the dialogue between Derviş and Hafız Ahmet, he did not go into detail. As
will be demonstrated later in this section, the judge introduced the content of substantial
materials, such as letters written between the prominent figures of the order,
in order to prove the activities of the order. The judge thus cornered the authors of
these letters. For this reason, it is quite surprising why the judge did not display all
the evidence that the court supposedly held regarding the alleged conversation between
Hafız Ahmet and Derviş.
As stated, other perpetrators, Ramazan, Nalıncı, and Küçük Hasan continued
to state their ignorance about that conversation. Mehmet Emin further emphasized
that he had heard it from Derviş and Fırıncı Ahmet, another inhabitant of Manisa,
who was also charged with being a disciple of the order.353 When questioned about
the topic, Fırıncı Ahmet expressed he had heard this story from Sütçü Mehmet, another
member of Derviş’s company, who was killed by soldiers in Menemen.354
Thus, the story about Hafız Ahmet’s ratification of Derviş Mehmet as the
Mahdi is unfounded. It seems Mehmet Emin’s ungrounded story intended to discredit
all leaders of the order. As opposed to Mehmet Emin’s account, Hafız Ahmet’s
sounds reasonable. Indeed, he had a large audience and one of them would have reported
to the authorities if he made an inappropriate statement.
There were other equivocal matters stated by the perpetrators. Still, no matter
how equivocal, expressions of the perpetrators formed the basis of the charges
brought against the Nakşibendi order that it arranged the Menemen Incident. The
352 Ibid., 46.
353 Ibid., 8.
354 Ibid., 46.
91
idea was to adduce the accusations in perpetrators’ testimonies as substantial proof.
According to the court, the perpetrators’ accounts would indicate the specific role
that the order played in the incident. As the judge had already said previously in the
court, he considered the statements of the perpetrators as true as their crimes were
apparent. They had nothing to lose while others were seeking to hide the truth. In addition,
as demonstrated before, the court process had already been determined to inflict
the responsibility of the Menemen Incident on the Nakşibendi order. This had
been decided prior to the trials. Given this decision (and presumption), the perpetrators
appear to have taken instructions from officials to make accusatory statements
against the members of the order. It was evident that two of the perpetrators could
not be sentenced to death due to the age limit. Only Mehmet Emin’s condition
seemed fit for capital punishment and he pinned his hope on the court’s mercy for a
probable pardon. Under such circumstances and particularly to reveal the supposedbackstage
of the event, the perpetrators attributed it to the malevolent aims of the
Nakşibendi order and its members. The court kept on giving credence to the perpetrators’
sayings.
The judge told Mehmet Emin that praying at home was not legally prohibited.
Yet, he questioned him and friends about the cruel purposes of the prayer meetings
they held at home. He replied that the meetings discussed how the government’s
aim was making every Muslim become disbelievers and infidels. According to
Mehmet Emin, these statements subverted the republic and poisoned young minds.
He said Derviş Mehmet served two ideas. First, he abused people to serve his intentions.
He poisoned their faith and made them smoke hashish. Second, he intended a
crime against the republic by dreaming to re-establish the order of sheikhdom and
dervish lodges. During meetings in Manisa, Derviş Mehmet continuously condemned
the officers of the republic, for letting their family members, particularly the
women, walk outside without clothes to cover their bodies fully.355
Nalıncı Hasan initially mentioned Derviş Mehmet’s aims were put into words
during their meetings in Tatılıcı Hüseyins’s house, in Manisa.356 He said additional
meetings took place, to which Laz İbrahim, İzmirli Mehmet Ali Hoca, İmam İlyas
Efendi, Şeyh Hakkı, Hacı Hilmi, Hafız Cemal, Hafız Ahmet, Ragıp Bey and Mutaf
355 Ibid., 8, 9.
356 Ibid., 11.
92
Süleyman attended.357 He signified these gatherings as other occasions when the targets
of the order were discussed. He emphasized that Laz İbrahim used to go to İstanbul
and return to the gathering with books relevant to the order. They used to perform
the zikr after the night prayer. Later, as Nalıncı conveyed, Laz İbrahim mentioned
the arrival of Sultan Abdülhamid’s sons as well as the re-establishment of the
caliphate. Having retrieved the old regime, they would be able to easily perform their
reciting. In other words, their fundamental aim and the subject matter of their meetings
was, according to the perpetrators, to overthrow the republican regime.358
In this regard, the chief judge questioned Manifaturacı Osman Efendi as to
the goals and content of the meetings and about his relationship with Laz İbrahim.
He identified Laz İbrahim as his customer who used to come to his shop and that he
had taken him as a guest to his home a few times. He said they would gather in each
other’s homes, along with Ragıp Bey, Süleyman Efendi and İlyas Hoca. However,
they never discussed anti-government concerns in any of the meetings. Osman
Efendi told the court that those who asserted the opposite did not know what they
were saying and named them as “mad.” He requested the chief judge to be deaf to
the perpetrators’ allegations.359 Mehmet Emin intervened and asked Osman Efendi,
“Then, from whom did Derviş Mehmet take his denominational inspiration, since he
had no education from school or madrasa?”360 It must be re-noted that the only evidence
for the disparagement of the republican regime during the gatherings in question
was the accounts of the perpetrators. The extent to which the attendants of the
meetings criticized the republic remains quite uncertain. This allegation might be
true due to the aforementioned displeasure, particularly in religious terms, against the
357 Ibid., 9.
358 Ibid., 31.
359 The publication of the General Directorate of Security Affairs of Turkey about the
Menemen Incident includes an anecdote about these meetings, albeit without mentioning its
source. It was asserted that at the home of İlyas Efendi, who was a regiment imam, Laz
İbrahim came from İstanbul where he visited Şeyh Esat and brought important news. Laz
İbrahim allegedly accounted that Selim Efendi, the son of Abdülhamid II, would occupy
Ankara and the entire country with a major military force. He would ascend to the position
of caliphate as well as sultanate. The sharia would be reconstituted. All these issues were
discussed and approved in İstanbul. (See Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle
Gerçekler, 43.) Although this matter was not brought to the fore in the court, its inclusion in
an official publication reflects the extent to which information about the Menemen Incident
has been twisted. The secondary literature about the incident has taken this official account
for granted to a large extent and reproduced it recurrently.
360 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 32.
93
secularist politics of the republic. The wish for the ancient regime might have lived
on for a long time in conservative circles. However, the perpetrators’ statements do
not prove this point. Their allegation that they stepped into action because of the
people’s discontent with republican policies, as if people were ready follow them, is
ungrounded. Their activities were of small-scale and flimsy. Despite the presence of
displeasure with the republican policies in different extents and terms, the event was
not an arranged riot rested on people’s support.
Hafız Cemal, another person accused of participating the meetings in Manisa,
initially defined himself as dignified and self-respecting. He told he despised going
to coffeehouses and he met with his friends only at each other’s homes. There were
only around four or five of them in total. They did not even think of talking about
politics or the government. He told he respected İlyas and İbrahim Hoca since they
were government officials. Osman Efendi was one of his colleagues, and Ragıp and
Süleyman Efendi were his neighbours. Therefore, he knew all of them well, and they
regularly went to each other’s houses and had heart-to-heart talks. At that point
Nalıncı Hasan interrupted the conversation and claimed Hafız Cemal had been a
member of the Nakşibendi order and made the villagers of Horos perform the zikr in
a certain mosque.361
As seen, the crimes to which Nalıncı referred were the activities of those who
adhered to an order. Although dervish lodges were closed down in 1925, they were
still present, but they remained underground. Indeed, the court’s charge was not to
determine the extent to which the associates of the order were active. Nevertheless,
the Chief Judge Muğlalı was probing the agents operating under the roof of the sufi
order, in a manner that the court’s concern was to reveal whether the order was active
or not.
Thereafter, Nalıncı turned to Ragıp, another participator in the Manisa meetings,
and asked him why they were denying the facts. Ragıp replied they were not as
crazy as to act in opposition to the government’s prohibitions. He added he was not
that mad to perform the zikr. For Ragıp, the perpetrators were criminals and were
able to say anything they wanted. Nalıncı Hasan shouted “As long as these men in
point stay present, the Republican regime would not be everlasting.”362
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
94
Cemal Efendi stated later that it was irrational and insensible for a few men to
oppose the government.363 The judge then aggressively questioned Cemal Efendi as
to whether he had known about Laz İbrahim’s previous detention for making a stimulating
speech in a sermon in Manisa. Cemal Efendi expressed that Laz İbrahim was
released after the initial inquiry, and cleared of the charges. He asked the judge if
Laz İbrahim would be released if he were guilty. When Mehmet Emin argued against
him, Osman Efendi asked the judge how possibly a criminal, Mehmet Emin, could
speak out against him. He required the court not to pay attention to Mehmet Emin’s
assertions and not to rely upon them. Still, according to the judge, if Mehmet Emin
had not seen Cemal Efendi, he would not have spoken about him.364 Here again one
comes under the impression that the court had already decided to depend on the
statements of the perpetrators and rule accordingly.
Next, Ragıp Bey admitted his presence in Osman and Cemal Efendi’s houses
along with Laz İbrahim. The judge asked the topics Laz İbrahim spoke about in the
meetings. Ragıp Bey expressed they were religious issues and advice. The chief
judge further questioned Ragıp Bey why he needed to be taught as if he did not know
religious rules and conventions. Ragıp Bey described the topics as ordinary ones
about praying to God.365 At that point Nalıncı Hasan accounted that Laz İbrahim told
them to be extremely quiet in order not to alert the police while they were performing
the zikr at İlyas Hoca’s house. Evidently, the judge was rather trying to uncloak
religious gatherings and zikr performances as the background of the incident.
Another defendant, Şeyh Hakkı Efendi, was accused of being a sheikh and
gathering disciples around him in Manisa. He asserted that he did not know about the
gatherings and had no claim to be a sheikh. Nalıncı Hasan and Mehmet Emin, however,
indicated that he was indeed a sheikh. Hakkı Efendi said his brother was a
sheikh before he died, but he himself was not. He also emphasized that one needed to
have a certificate to become a sheikh, but he had none. At that point, Mehmet Emin
363 Ibid., 32. Such sensible statements made in the court by some of the defendants reveal
that something was not right. Indeed, how could those people be in charge of an attempt to
overthrow the republican regime? The movement those insurgents initiated ceased quickly as
soon as the battalions with machine guns arrived at the scene. Three of the insurgents were
killed on the spot. Meanwhile, people were detained regardless of the extent of their participation
in the event.
364 Ibid., 33.
365 Ibid.
95
took the floor and asked how a certification for sheikhdom could still be present after
the abolition of sheikhdom.366 Still, the trial records indicate that the attenders of the
meetings in question did not contribute to Derviş’s actions in any way. Their only
crime was to be in a meeting with Laz İbrahim, who was considered to be one of the
main protagonists of the events that led to Kubilay’s killing.
A letter written by Hafız Ali Osman to Şeyh Esat was read in the court as a
concrete evidence. The date of the letter was 1930. The judge stated that Hafız Osman
had previously said he was no longer interested in issues regarding the order.
The letter proved otherwise. Another letter to the same effect was written to Hacı
Hilmi, who was also charged with being a member of the order.367 The judge expressed
that there were such as words as tarikat (sect) and ihvan (Muslim brotherhood,
fellows) that were signs of Osman’s relationship with the order.
Another person accused of being a disciple of the order was Ahmet Muhtar
Efendi. During his interrogation, the judge referred to an amulet found on Derviş.
Ahmet Muhtar’s name was written on the amulet. He denied the charge and said he
did not give it to Derviş. Yet the judge stated that the writing on the amulet was
compared to his writing and found similar. Küçük Hasan stated that he saw Ahmet
Muhtar once entering Derviş Mehmet’s house. Küçük Hasan also added how
Derviş’s wife told him that Ahmet Muhtar had stayed at their home once. Ahmet
Muhtar insisted that these statements were false. Nalıncı Hasan stressed that Derviş
Mehmet was a disciple of Ahmet Muhtar. According to Nalıncı, once Ahmet Muhtar
Efendi had asked Derviş Mehmet if he had wished to become a saint (veli). Derviş
Mehmet said he wanted to and asked him to make him one. Thereafter Ahmet Muhtar
told him to commit himself to the order. Derviş accepted the offer. Then Ahmet
Muhtar brought forward the issue of his smoking hashish. When Derviş admitted it,
Ahmet Muhtar made him promise not to smoke hashish again. Afterwards, Ahmet
Muhtar taught him the many names of God and made him his dervish.368 Mehmet
Emin also confirmed Ahmet Muhtar stayed at Derviş’s home.
Nalıncı Hasan accused three additional inhabitants of Manisa for being dervishes
with Hafız Ahmet as their sheikh. These individuals, Ahmetoğlu Mehmet
366 Ibid., 34.
367 Ibid., 55, 56.
368 Ibid., 47.
96
Çavuş, Tütüncü Hasanoğlu Hasan and Hüseyin Mazlum who were present in the trial.
369 The issue continued to be elucidating the memberships of the order. Although
substantial evidence indicated that the order was active, there was by no means any
element pointing to an attempt to riot. The transition of the court’s agenda towards
establishing the activities of the membership of the order and uncovering the times
and places of their zikr meetings was not incidental. After a certain point, the subject
matter of the trials turned into testimonies regarding the existence of the order and
the activities of certain detainees in this regard. Revealing the persons who were disciples
did not shed light on the background of Derviş Mehmet’s attempt to revolt.
The three men Nalıncı mentioned were acquitted. Among the aforementioned names,
those charged with organizing meetings in their homes, Manifaturacı Osman Efendi,
Hafız Cemal, İlyas Hoca, Ragıp Bey and Mutaf Süleyman Efendi were sentenced to
capital punishment. The owner of the coffeehouse in which Derviş and his fellows
initially gathered, Çırak Mustafa, who did not speak one single word during the trials
and Tatlıcı Hüseyin whose home was the second meeting place were also given the
death penalty. The aforementioned members of the Nakşibendi order, Hafız Ahmet
and Ahmet Muhtar, shared the same fate. As for Hafız Ali Osman and Hacı Hilmi,
they received imprisonment for one year, while Şeyh Hakkı Efendi was acquitted.370
3.8.1. Laz İbrahim
Laz İbrahim had been an imam in a military regiment of Manisa for three
years. He was introduced as the real intriguer behind the Menemen Incident. He allegedly
motivated Derviş Mehmet to initiate a rebellion against the republic. The
judge asserted that Laz İbrahim did not commit such an act on his own but he took
instructions from Şeyh Esat, the leader of the Nakşibendi order at the time. Nalıncı
Hasan’s accounts were the primary evidence on which the charges against Laz
İbrahim were based crimes. Nalıncı stated he had become a disciple of the order via
Laz İbrahim.371
Laz İbrahim was charged with recruiting people from Manisa and nearby villages
for the Nakşibendi order. He convinced people to dedicate themselves to the
order. He spoke of the republican politics critically and talked about the re-opening
369 Ibid., 51.
370 Ibid., 90–1.
371 Ibid., 31.
97
of dervish lodges. The judge questioned Nalıncı as to whether Laz İbrahim organized
secret meetings in the villages or not. Nalıncı replied that he did not know about any
secret organization, but he remarked that Laz İbrahim made people perform the zikr
after the prayers (namaz). He stated that Laz İbrahim advised people not to be afraid
of the government. He further said the government could not prevent their reciting.372
Mehmet Emin as well stated Laz İbrahim was an important person in the Nakşibendi
order and an enemy of the republic. He added that the organization and its members
acted against the republic by hiding behind religion. Laz İbrahim was reported to
have referred to people who wore hats as infidels.373
Laz İbrahim was not consistent in his replies. He initially mentioned having a
poor memory and an impairment of consciousness. He said he had a heart condition
and an eye disease as well and he was not able to see clearly. It is quite difficult to
determine to what extent these weaknesses were true and affected him during the trial.
It is apparent that he tried to avoid the pressure which the judge put on him. When
asked about whose home they had been gathering in in Manisa, he said he did not
remember, but their meetings did not involve conversations about politics or the
government. He said they only discussed the Prophet’s sayings and he gave advice
only about religious issues.374 To support his claims, he cited some verses from the
Qur’an, and stressed he was ready to take an oath.
Laz İbrahim’s restless attitude, together with his other manners, reflected that
he had been speaking against the government. He had also been organizing zikr rites
and summoning people to the order. For example, when imam Mustafa Asım Efendi
was brought to the witness stand, he said he knew Laz İbrahim in the past. Laz
İbrahim talked to him about the favours of being a dervish on several occasions.
Mustafa Asım was not interested in becoming a dervish. Yet, Laz İbrahim insisted on
the favours of being a dervish and suggested to Mustafa Asım to enlighten those who
came to his mosque. At that point, Laz İbrahim became annoyed with Mustafa
Asım’s resistance and told him “A person must take initiative actively and not be
[driven like] an animal.”375 This report (and others) suggested that Laz İbrahim
looked for imams to participate in the order organization and to train others and was
372 Ibid., 13.
373 Ibid., 9.
374 Ibid., 37, 63.
375 The expression in Turkish: “İnsan müteaddi olmalı hayvan olmamalı.”
98
tense about the persistent rejection of the imams of his request -judging by his harsh
words which Asım Efendi could clearly remember.376
Another witness Uncu Mehmet Emin Efendi explained in his sworn statement
that the villagers of Horos had no connection with the order previously. Yet, Laz
İbrahim came to the village in 1928 and recruited the villagers into the order. He
took three of his fellows to İstanbul to kiss Şeyh Esat’s hand. When questioned by
the judge about other issues, Uncu said Laz İbrahim was taken to court for saying
that anyone who dances is an infidel.
Another incident of Laz İbrahim was that he had argued against the hat act
and was reported by the village headman of Horos, İbrahim.377 Laz İbrahim reminded
the court that those charges against him were dropped and asked the judge if it
were legal to be interrogated again for the same charges. The judge responded that he
wanted to examine Laz İbrahim’s past.378 The judge asked him about the zikr. Laz
İbrahim expressed he recited God’s name at home on his own. He referred to a verse
from the Qur’an in which reciting the name of God is advised. He also added that
since zikr is a form of prayer, he performed it in the mosque as well. Nalıncı Hasan
interrupted and said, “You are standing in the presence of a paşa of the republic but
you still lie!” Mehmet Emin added, “What might the ignorant and illiterate ones do if
scholars like Laz İbrahim act in such impulsive ways.” Laz İbrahim said reciting
God’s name was not a crime. In return, the judge stressed everyone can pray at home
or recite, but he blamed Laz İbrahim for gathering naive people around him and poisoning
their minds behind the mask of the order. Laz İbrahim stressed the purpose of
his reciting was not what the judge claimed. He added he did not break the law.379
Thus, this interrogation as well developed along similar lines to previous ones. Instead
of investigating the degree and forms of the role Laz İbrahim played in the
Menemen Incident, his interrogations revolved around his organization of zikr performances
and his working for the benefit of the order.
Nalıncı accounted for his visit to the mansion of Şeyh Esat in Erenköy in detail.
This narration is significant in indicating the unreliability of the statements of
the perpetrators about the position of the order’s notable leaders. Nalıncı told the
376 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 39.
377 Ibid., 40.
378 Ibid., 63.
379 Ibid., 37, 63.
99
court that he stayed there for eleven days. During his stay, Laz İbrahim was there as
well. One day, while Nalıncı, Laz İbrahim, Şeyh Esat and others were having a conversation,
they asked Nalıncı to leave the room and let them talk in private. Nalıncı
said he left the room but stayed in front of the door to listen to the conversation. He
alleged that, in the room, Laz İbrahim told the others that the caliphate would be reconstituted,
and the dervish lodges would soon be re-established. The Hat Act would
be repealed and wearing the fes would be brought back. In other words, allegedly
they were engaged in conversations against the republican government.380 In response,
Laz İbrahim admitted that they stayed at Şeyh Esat’s house. Moreover he
agreed that they asked Nalıncı to leave the room. So Nalıncı did not hear what was
said. But he stated that obviously Nalıncı was lying about the nature of their conversation.
381 Indeed, it is quite uncertain whether Nalıncı could have heard the talks behind
closed doors. Still, the authenticity of the story did not have great influence on
the profile of Laz İbrahim due to his prevailing antagonism against the republic, in
the eyes of the court. However, Nalıncı’s account made Şeyh Esat liable for hostility
against the state. Regardless of the truthfulness of the story and because the court did
not care to verify it, Şeyh Esat became implicitly connected to the Menemen Incident.
As it will be further discussed below in detail, Esat had nothing to do with the
event in reality. Nalıncı’s story provided the basis of the court’s opinion about Şeyh
Esat’s antagonism to the republic. In addition, Esat was accused of and charged with
instructing Laz İbrahim to undertake a rebellion. Again according to Nalıncı, at one
point, he and Laz İbrahim were walking in İstanbul, and Laz İbrahim pointed to two
battleships and told him that the sons of Abdülhamid II were waiting inside for the
caliphate order to be re-established soon.382 This was only an assertion by Nalıncı,
and there is no way to know whether or not Laz İbrahim told such things.
The concrete materials against Laz İbrahim were letters written by him, Şeyh
Esat’s son Mehmet Ali Efendi, and Şeyh Esat himself. In one letter written by Laz
İbrahim to Mehmet Ali in 1928, he mentioned he had no fault in a certain matter and
begged Şeyh Esat’s pardon. In addition, Laz İbrahim stressed his efforts to increase
380 Ibid., 12.
381 Ibid., 37.
382 Ibid., 12–3.
100
the public’s sympathy towards Şeyh Esat in the region.383 The letter in question was
a reply of Laz İbrahim to a former letter by Mehmet Ali. In the former one, Laz
İbrahim was warned to know his own bounds. He was told not to go over Şeyh
Esat’s authority while conducting the order’s work. The judge interpreted what was
written in these letters as evidence of Laz İbrahim’s full commitment to the betterment
of the Nakşibendi order.384
Other letters written by Şeyh Esat to some others about Laz İbrahim were
mentioned in the trials as well. In one of these letters, Şeyh Esat notified a certain
person about where to find Laz İbrahim.385 In another one, Esat informed someone
that Laz İbrahim was with him in İstanbul386 Another letter included Esat’s statement
that a district governorship was established in Sarıyer, and Laz İbrahim had applied
to the mediators and their “dear friends (muhib)” to be appointed as mufti there.387
The letters in question evidently show the mutual acquaintance between Şeyh Esat
and Laz İbrahim. Thus, they can be seen as implicit evidence that the order remained
active. Nevertheless, the letters provide not a single piece of information about the
Menemen Incident or Derviş Mehmet and his followers.
Afterwards in the trials, facing the judge’s insistent questioning, Laz İbrahim
altered his statements and pretended to be confessing. Addressing the judge, he said
he was at fault for performing the zikr and regretted to be advising everyone to do
so.388 He told giving people religious advice was his fault. He pretended as if he had
just comprehended that the order was harmful. He took a step back and yielded to the
judge’s negative attitude and adverse interpretations. But he never admitted anything
related to the Menemen Incident.
However, the judge did not seem to be convinced by his explanations. He
continued to question him harshly. He asked him why did he invite others to join the
order. Moreover, he questioned why he tried to attract supporters to the order even
383 The relevant part of the letter was published in a newspaper. Laz İbrahim’s words were as
follows in Turkish: "Ben kendi namıma çalışmıyorum; ilanı istiklal etmedim, ben gittiğim
yerlerde bütün halkın size karşı aşk ve muhabbetini temin yolunda çalışıyorum. Sizin
hatırınıza gelenler doğru değildir. Ben bu vazifemi yaparken vazifemin, cazip ve sehhar
tesirleri altında bazen ne yaptığımı unutuyorum, affediniz. Bütün mevcudiyetimle emrinizi
ifa ediyorum." Anadolu, January 12, 1931.
384 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 57.
385 ATASE Arşivi, CDİ Koleksiyonu; Klasör.: 135; D.:4; F.:3-10.
386 ATASE Arşivi, F.:3-5.
387 ATASE Arşivi, F.:3-12.
388 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 57.
101
though Şeyh Esat had retired after the abolition of the lodges. At that point, Laz
İbrahim expressed one of the vital points of the case. He stated that, because of the
atmosphere of the period after the abolition of the lodges, the Menemen event was
made to look as an undertaking of dervishes. He implied that the three perpetrators
were intentionally casting aspersions on him and on others. However, according to
Laz İbrahim, the members of the Nakşibendi order were loyal to the government.389
These last statements of Laz İbrahim were truthful. As discussed in various
sections of the present work, the state officers were completely aware of the presence
of the order. In the meeting in Dolmabahçe on 2 January 1931, Mustafa Kemal received
a report from Şükrü (Kaya) about the Menemen Incident as well as the sufi
activities of religious circles in certain regions of the country. Mustafa Kemal’s following
meeting on 7 January in Çankaya plainly demonstrated that top government
officials had inherently known about the activeness of the order and stressed their determination
to annihilate all religious orders for the sake of the republic.
3.8.2. Şeyh Esat
Şeyh Esat, was the leader the Nakşibendi order at the time of the Menemen
Incident. As it is stated above, Nalıncı Hasan claimed to have overheard a conversation
in Şeyh Esat’s mansion, where anti-government issues were discussed. He stated
that the people taking part in the conversation said the caliphate order and the dervish
lodges would soon be reconstituted. This was the only testimony implicitly hinting
that Şeyh Esat was involved in the Menemen Incident. Şeyh Esat as well gave temperate
statements, seeking to refrain from any kind of tension between him and the
judge. He was 83 years old and exhausted at the time. His initial sayings indicated he
had no criminal record and a clean past, and the government had never had any issues
with him.390
Şeyh Esat admitted the guests came to his mansion and stayed for days. He
stressed he remained to preach people after the abolition of the sheikhdom. The
judge asked if there had been any kind of procedure with which a guest had to comply,
prior to coming to his presence. The judge pointed out few letters in which there
were instructions for guests to follow.391
389 Ibid., 58.
390 Ibid., 62.
391 Ibid., 60.
102
The Judge further questioned Esat to what extent the order was concerned
with the superficial events. Having presumed that the sects had been depending primarily
on esoteric and internal issues, the judge asked if they were involved in any
physical action in the world. Esat said the order had no connection to superficial matters.
Another question was what were the essences and features of the order. Esat recounted
five elements: heart, mystery, soul, privacy/secrecy and faith (kalp, sır, ruh,
hafa, iman). The Judge further asked him to elaborate on the element of mystery.
When Esat defined it as a divine grace of God, the judge inquired what the intention
of the order was regarding this element. Esat spoke of some mystical details, none of
which were relevant to the society or policy, so the judge changed the topic.392
There were other letters brought forth during the trials. They were written by
Şeyh Esat to his son Mehmet Ali. The letters involved Esat’s recommendations to his
son about the development of the order. The judge told Şeyh Esat that it was good
for a father to advise his son, but as far as he could understand from the letter, Esat
had assigned the organization of the order to his son. Esat stressed that his letters
were not specifically about the order. He alleged to have been merely advising his
not to lose his way.393
Later, the judge asked Şeyh Esat whether he was on good terms with Laz
İbrahim. He answered he knew Laz İbrahim as a sincere person. When questioned
about his son’s warnings about Laz İbrahim, Esat’s reply was the same; he said he
knew Laz İbrahim as a well-intentioned man.394 However, Esat’s son Mehmet Ali
told that he had warned his father against Laz İbrahim, in view of his blameworthy
actions. Despite this concern, according to Mehmet Ali, his father was a naive old
man and kept in touch with Laz İbrahim.395
Mehmet Ali said he did not take care of the order’s business. He also emphasized
his loyal services to the country. He asserted that he had not been involved in
any counter political movement against the government.396 He added that he had
been away from his father and did not intervene in his affairs. He was not aware of
the zikr recitals and it would not have been suitable for their social status to be en-
392 Ibid., 61.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid., 62.
395 Ibid., 59.
396 Ibid.
103
gaged in such activity, which was forbidden by the government. He claimed Laz
İbrahim did not listen to him. Mehmet Ali asserted that he had been worried about
Laz İbrahim’s probable actions when Laz İbrahim told him he was going to Manisa.
Mehmet Ali said he advised Laz İbrahim not to go, yet he did not listen.397 Nevertheless,
particularly the last statement of Mehmet Ali was rather ostensible. He appears
to be seeking to impress the court that he was really concerned about Laz İbrahim’s
presumptive and harmful conduct. In order to justify himself and to prove his innocence,
Mehmet Ali further implicitly accused Laz İbrahim of being the agent of subsequent
happenings upon his arrival at Manisa. However, as mentioned before, there
was no substantial evidence revealing that Laz İbrahim or any other local associate
of the order contributed to the Menemen Incident.
When the prosecutor indicted Şeyh Esat for being among the instigators of
the Menemen Incident, Şeyh Esat told he was astonished at the prosecutor’s opinions.
He stated that they loved the government and remained very obedient to it. He
told that the government banned performing the zikr and founding orders, but not
welcoming guests and advising them. If hosting guests was banned as well, then he
had nothing else to say. He repeated that he had no former criminal reports. He refused
the allegation that his greeting of guests and advising them caused any damage.
He asked the judge to clarify the terms by which he was charged guilty. He asked
what offenses had he committed exactly. He said he did not accept charges based on
presumptions and probabilities. He added that he was uncomfortable and had not
slept, so he had become confused and tired. He also asked for the mercy of the court.
The chief judge assured him about the justice of the court and expressed his best
wishes.398
Şeyh Esat was right in being surprised about the charges brought against him.
Similar to other members of the order, a link was somehow established between him
and the actions of Derviş Mehmet. The judge maintained his pursuit to ultimately
prove that the order remained active. Interrogations of Şeyh Esat aimed to indicate
the presence of a leader whose words were still welcomed, respected and obeyed.
These steps of the court aimed at establishing the basis of the punishment of a crime,
although they were not about the Menemen Incident. The interrogations focused on
397 Ibid., 68.
398 Ibid., 72.
104
revealing that the order had a leader and followers and continued its (religious) activities
–but did not (could not) prove a connection between these activities and the
Menemen Incident. Nevertheless, prominent figures of the order mentioned here
were eventually sentenced to the death penalty for their involvement in the Menemen
Incident.
None of Esat’s objections were taken into consideration. His interrogation
consisted of his affairs related with the order while he was charged with instigating
the insurgents involved in a reactionist revolt. Furthermore, as mentioned above, his
activities had already been under surveillance. Laz İbrahim during his interrogation
had remarked that the provision of the law regarding the closure of dervish lodges
did not include restrictions for people to pay visits to sheikhs. Moreover, the mansion
of Şeyh Esat had always been under police surveillance.399 Police officers and the
police captain occasionally came to the mansion to observe the situation. Therefore
the activities in the mansion were not illegal or clandestine. If an incident or movement
had occurred against the government there, it would instantly become evident
and officials would have intervened.400
There were as well newspaper reports about the surveillance of Şeyh Esat.401
The martial court sent an information request to the attorney general of İstanbul regarding
this issue.402 The Prosecution Office assigned the request to the Police Department
of İstanbul on 5 February 1931. In reply, the Security Directorate stated
that the mansion of Şeyh Esat had been under surveillance de facto. It was determined
that visitors came to the mansion from various cities, bearing gifts. Particularly
on Fridays, many guests from the city centre of İstanbul visited the sheikh and this
was reported to the Department of the Interior. The Security Directorate emphasized
that they infiltrated the order by placing an officer who knew Esat to work as a servant
in the mansion. The agent reported back and stated that no religious ceremonies
399 Ibid., 57.
400 Ibid.
401 The article was entitled “A Rumor in Erenköy” and referred to “some whispers” about “a
sheikh” conducting religious ceremonies in his mansion in Erenköy. Vakit, July 28, 1930.
Authors who adopted counter-official way of accounting the event would render this “impassivity
of official authorities” as “too noteworthy." Mustafa Müftüoğlu, Yakın Tarihimizden
Bir Olay: Menemen Vak’ası (İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1991), 79.
402 The details about this correspondence appeared in a series of articles written by a Kemalist
writer in 1966. (See Cemalettin Saraçoğlu, “Menemen İrticaı Adı Altındaki Cinayetin
Esrar Dolu İç Yüzü,” Tarih Konuşuyor 29 (1966): 2490–94, 2429–33, 2513–16.) The interpretations
of the writer in question are discussed in the next chapter.
105
or zikr performances happened in the mansion. The Security Directorate stated the
officials sought to “create” grounds to necessitate legal intervention. In this way,
they had been in touch with the Security Chief Office of Konya, where a relevant
event had taken place. They asked information, which would be sufficient for them
to start the investigation on Şeyh Esat’s work regarding the order’s activities. The
police department of İstanbul stressed that the officials had not received any confirmation
from Konya at that time. Consequently, the Security Directorate of İstanbul
could not commence an investigation about Şeyh Esat.403
3.9. Suspicious Aspects of the Judicial Process
This section aims to discuss certain suspicious situations that came to light
during the trials. For example, the names of some detainees who were present in the
trials were not included in the decision text of the court. Some of the defendants
claimed their statements were falsified. Certain others asserted they were forced into
admitting to accusations when they were first interrogated in the gendarme or police
stations. For instance, İbrahimoğlu İsmail said he had not applauded while the events
were taking place. However, when he was first taken to the station, the captain promised
him he would be set free as soon as he confessed and admitted to applauding.404
By false persuasion, he confessed he applauded, but then he was arrested.405
Another defendant who faced the same situation was Berber (Barber) Hafız
Ahmet. He was accused of firing a rifle from the mosque minaret to the gendarme
while the insurgents were beheading Fehmi.406 Hafız Ahmet stated that a disorder
occurred after a gunshot (probably the shooting of Mustafa Fehmi). There he encountered
a soldier who asked him to climb to the minaret and check whether
Menemen was surrounded by 70,000 men or not. When he climbed the minaret, another
gun was fired, but he could not go up to the balcony of the minaret. Later in the
day, he was called to help gather the corpses. He went to the office of the gendarme
to give his statement. The officers told him to admit to be reciting the ezan (call to
the prayers) while he was up in the minaret, so they could save him. Hafız Ahmet
claimed he did not say he recited the call, and he told them he did not witness any-
403 Ibid., 2293–4.
404 The defendant referred to the captain’s words as follows: “Yüzbaşı Bey, ‘el çırptım’ de,
‘namussuzum seni koyuvermezsem,’ dedi.”
405 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 70.
406 Ibid., 26.
106
thing. Moreover, he directly addressed the judge and told him to interrogate the perpetrators
and ask them if he had done anything wrong. 407 In other words,
İbrahimoğlu İsmail and Berber Hafız Ahmet made the same assertion that they were
imposed on to admit the charges made against them. Nevertheless, Hafız Ahmet was
acquitted while İbrahimoğlu İsmail was executed due to perpetration in the second
degree. The judicial basis of these different verdicts remains unclear.
Another intriguing matter is related to Laz İbrahim. The judge questioned
him about a letter he wrote to Hafız Osman Hoca when he was arrested.408 He admitted
to the letter in which he asked for pocket money from Hafız Osman as he was detained
unexpectedly and did not know where he was being taken. However, according
to Laz İbrahim, an anonymous sentence was added to the letter. He said he
brought this point to the attention of the examining magistrate earlier and asserted
that the sentence was added to the letter by government officers. The statement allegedly
added to the letter was “Do not worry.” The judge did not press the matter
since it was obvious that Laz İbrahim only asked for money in the letter.409 However,
Laz İbrahim’s assertion is quite interesting in revealing the extent of the lack of evidence.
The officers might have tried to plant evidence particularly to pave the way
for the court to conclude that the event was pre-planned. Since Laz İbrahim’s assertion
was neither falsified nor verified, it remains as a point that needs to be used with
caution.
Ayanoğlu Mehmet was among the ones whose names were not included in
the decision text. He was questioned as to whether he was acquainted with the captured
villains or the ones who fled. He asserted that he was detained and brought to
Menemen anyway although he did not know the insurgents. It was not clear whether
Ayanoğlu Mehmet told the truth or not.410 It seems, he was not charged with any
crime but was detained and taken to the court. Nevertheless, his name was not included
in the decision text.411 Memetoğlu Halil was in the same situation. He said
407 Ibid., 27.
408 Ibid., 54.
409 Ibid.
410 Ibid., 72.
411 His statements indicate that Ayanoğlu Mehmet was from Menemen. The court documents
refer to only “Ayan Mehmet” from Manisa, close to this name. However there was no statement
made in the trials and recorded in the name of Ayan Mehmet. Such miswriting instances
create ambiguities but not to an extent that would block our understanding of the issues
107
that although he told the officials he was innocent and unaware of anything, the investigating
magistrate issued his arrest warrant and he was brought to the court.412
There was no court decision regarding Memetoğlu Halil either.
Some of the anomalies observed in the trial process were probably the result
of the regime’s strong reaction to the Menemen Incident. The distinctive point of
Kubilay’s cruel murder was its attribution to Islamist reactionists. The perpetrators
were seen as reactionists, and this perception ascribed significance to the event. Six
armed men in a republican town, with a banner in their hands, declared Mahdism.
They encouraged and attracted the interest of the townsfolk as spectators, although to
a very proportion of them. The townspeople’s explicit and implicit support to the
group, along with the beheading of Kubilay received harsh response from the regime,
notably from the republican leaders. Given this reaction, the local law enforcement
agents might have acted in a rush to prove that the inhabitants supported the demonstrators.
They used many means to achieve this end, including deceptive promises to
make them admit to the accusations. In return, officers assured some of the respondents
that they would soon be set free. However, the reason why some of the defendants
came to the stand only once and then were never seen again was that the court
probably recognized they had nothing to do with the event and sent them away.
Two accused persons were sentenced to the death penalty by the martial court
but the decision was reversed by the parliament. One of these persons was Talat Bey.
During the trials, Mehmet Emin said Talat Bey was a dervish. For him, Talat was an
important member of the order and had a significant position in the eyes of Şeyh
Esat. He stated Talat Bey and Derviş Mehmet used to meet at Ali Çavuş’s coffeehouse.
When the judge questioned Ali Çavuş as to whether Talat and Derviş Mehmet
had met in his coffeehouse, he answered they had.413 Although the court decided on
capital punishment for Talat Bey, the Justice Commission of the Parliament reversed
the decision and gave him two years of imprisonment instead.
Keçeci İsmail414 from Paşa Village was the second detainee whose verdict
was changed to two years of imprisonment. His situation was, at the same time, the
first of the two cases in which the perpetrators changed their testimonies. Based on
and events completely.
412 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 67.
413 Ibid., 51, 52.
414 He was also recorded as Kahya Ahmetoğlu İsmail from Paşa Village, in the records.
108
the initial statements of the perpetrators, he was accused of taking Derviş Mehmet
and his company into his car. He was found guilty as charged. The accusations held
that Derviş Mehmet got in Kahya (Keçeci) İsmail’s car and set off to the village of
Paşa along with others.415 Later in the concluding remarks of the trials, Mehmet
Emin stated that his mind felt fuzzy previously when he said Keçeci had taken them
into his car. He changed his statement and said they only had been in Keçeci’s home
but not in his car. Küçük Hasan as well said they stayed at Keçeci’s home for an
hour.416 Still, the alterations in the statements did not influence the court decision at
first. Keçeci İsmail was among the persons who were sentenced to capital punishment.
However, as in the case of Talat Bey, the Justice Commission of the National
Assembly changed the decision and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment.
The commission’s justification of changing the court’s sentence in these two cases is
unknown.
The second case involving a change in the perpetrators’ statements took place
during Saffet Hoca’s interrogations. The distinctive point of Saffet Hoca is that he
was charged with being an instigator of the actions of Derviş Mehmet and his fellows.
As pointed out in the second chapter, testimonial statements and official narrations
agreed on Saffet Hoca’s doings in the scene of the event. He had not joined in
Derviş’s group. While the group went around the town, Derviş met Saffet, then
summoned his men, and lined them up. He made them show their guns in the presence
of Saffet. Still, Saffet did not join to the group, and went home.
During the interrogation regarding Saffet’s acquaintance with Derviş, Nalıncı
Hasan said that he came across Derviş Mehmet and Şeyh Saffet one day three weeks
prior to the incident. They were next to a pine grove and were talking in Greek. They
offered him a cigarette, and shortly after, Nalıncı left them. But he stayed close in
order to spy on them. Although Nalıncı stated that they talked to each other for an
hour, he did not give details about the conversation. Another day, again according to
Nalıncı, Saffet saw him and took him to an olive grove. Saffet pulled a piece of paper
from his pocket, wrote something down on it and gave it to Nalıncı to deliver to
Derviş Mehmet. He took the note, but he had no information about what was written
415 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 74.
416 Ibid., 69.
109
in it. What is interesting in this case is that even the court judges did not ask what
was written in the note.417
In the court, Saffet Hoca initially gave details about his life to prove his point
that he was not involved in the crime. He emphasized his full commitment to the betterment
of the country, as did many of the defendants. He gave well-known names of
some generals with whom he had fought side by side during the War of Independence.
He also mentioned some important names as mutual acquaintances. All these
acquaintances were of the intellectual class. He told that after the occupation, he applied
to jobs and was appointed as the Preacher of Manisa. His preaching was in
complete accordance with the instructions of the programme assigned by the Directorate
of Religious Affairs. He claimed his preaching he had nothing to do with the
opposition to the government and included explicit, self-evident topics.418
Saffet rejected all the allegations and stated that if it were established that he
had known even the name of Derviş Mehmet previously, he would comply with the
decision of the court. Saffet’s statements were at a higher intellectual level compared
to most others. He pleaded his innocence in an effective and literary discourse. He
swore an oath to the effect that he by no means had any relationship with the reactionist
movement and was ready to do anything to justify that his hands were
clean.419 He stated it was him as a scholar who declared there was no such thing as
the Mahdi twenty years ago. He warned people not to believe in such superstitions.
420 However, according to Mehmet Emin’s statements, they went to the mosque
and listened to Saffet Hoca’s sermons.421 According to Mehmet Emin, though he did
not see any personal contact between them, Derviş had been inspired by Saffet Hoca.
Again according to Mehmet Emin, everyone knew that Derviş depended on Saffet
Hoca.422
417 Ibid., 12.
418 Ibid., 21.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid., 22.
421 Ibid., 8.
422 Ibid., 8, 18. Moreover Ramiz from Menemen, who was charged with following the group
in Menemen, asserted that when Derviş Mehmet saw Saffet Hoca, he asked him why he had
been standing away and told him to get under the banner; ibid., 22–3. Apart from the perpetrators’
accounts, which could occasionally be fabricated particularly when they talked about
prominent detainees, Derviş’s direct appeal to Saffet and Saffet’s calmly going away without
saying anything also demonstrates an acquaintance between the two of them. However, the
extent of this acquaintance remains uncertain.
110
Saffet Hoca’s defence, thus, did not influence the court’s decision. In the
general opinion as to the accusations, he was considered among the principal actors
of the crime.423 However, during the concluding remarks of the detainees, an interesting
situation occurred. “As the chairmanship of the court considered necessary,”
Küçük Hasan was “re-questioned” about a dream he had while residing in Bozalan.
He gave a statement conflicting with other accounts. Küçük Hasan, in his new statement,
alleged that on the day of their departure to Menemen, Derviş Mehmet questioned
the members of the company as to what they dreamed of during the former
night. Küçük Hasan said he saw a hoca who would help the company when they arrived
at Menemen. Since Nalıncı Hasan had often been to Menemen to sell pattens,
Derviş asked him: “Who would be the hoca to help us upon our arrival at Menemen?”
Nalıncı Hasan replied the hoca must have been Saffet in Menemen. At first,
the judge had not questioned any of the perpetrators regarding any dreams in the
course of the trials. Nalıncı had emphasized earlier in the trials that Derviş had said
they would go to the home of Saffet Hoca in Menemen and would take measures
against the government.424 Mehmet Emin also stated Derviş informed them that they
would stay at Saffet Hoca’s house for one night.425 As for Küçük Hasan, it was
Nalıncı who had mentioned Saffet Hoca, not Derviş himself.426 That is to say, the
judge intentionally brought up the subject of dream and made Küçük Hasan change
the content of the aforementioned conversation. In other words, it was an intervention
at the end of the trials on the way to proclaim Saffet’s innocence.
Saffet Hoca’s wife wrote a letter and submitted it to the chief judge. It was
highly literate and stated Saffet’s innocence by praising the government and expressing
their trust in the court’s justice. It touched upon the lack of evidence against
him.427 At the end of the trials, Saffet was acquitted due to lack of evidence.428 Saffet’s
situation was quite unusual compared to others who were charged with support-
423 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 78.
424 Ibid., 11.
425 Ibid., 10.
426 Ibid., 73. The documents including the concluding remarks of the defendants are situated
before the prosecutor’s opinion as to the accusations in the relevant file in the parliament archives.
427 A similar letter to the court was submitted by the sister of Josef, charged with applauding
the company. In the letter, the sister expressed that jews were absolutely loyal to the Turkish
state. However, it was not taken into consideration and Josef was executed. (See ibid., 84.)
428 Ibid., 89.
111
ing Derviş’s actions. All the other prominent detainees were sentenced to heavy penalties,
most of them to capital punishment. Although the evidence against the other
prominent figures was as unjustifiable as that against Saffet, his name was somehow
cleared. The real reason why he was acquitted still remains as unknown.
A final point that needs to be mentioned here is the judge’s attitude towards
the detainees regarding the alleged crimes. The persons whose crimes were obvious
did not have much to say. They merely rejected the accusations, but did not defend
themselves from various aspects. For example it was plain that the villagers hosted
the company, and they pleaded themselves in simple terms. In some of the cases
though, such as the case of the defendants from Manisa who were assumed to be behind
the events, the chief judge brought forward evidence such as letters and statements,
pointing to the crime of the person in question. Nevertheless, he usually did
not expand on the assumed concrete proofs that he mentioned to be present, and
passed on.
The trials did not only exhibit counter evidence and statements against the detainees.
It became apparent that there had been suspicious situations that occurred
during the interrogations made by the gendarme, police and investigating magistrate.
Some respondents were misled by officers, records disappeared, and there were allegations
that officers planted evidence. Such suspicions cast doubt on the judicial process.
It can be argued that the court had already made its final decision at the very
beginning that the event was planned by a religious order to harm the republic, and
this is why the contradictions in the judicial process did not matter.
3.10. Court in the Name of the Republic
The attitude and statements of the chief judge demonstrated that he was positioned
as the representative of the republic. He was acting on behalf of the regime rather
than seeking to establish the justice. Thus, examining his expressions help understand
various aspects from which the Menemen Incident was perceived by the
state. He explained what the republic would have expected the people to do in the
case of such an incident. Moreover, when religious issues were brought forth, the
judge’s explanations reflected the general policies of the republic on public-religion
relations. Among the interrogations, he frequently assured the defendants of the ultimate
justice of the court.
112
The chief judge stated there had never been such an incident in history in
which an officer was slayed in front of many citizens. He condemned the defendants
for standing by as spectators.429 He occasionally questioned the defenders one on one
to see why they did not take a stand against the six insurgents as a crowd collectively.
He asked if they had been so afraid of Derviş that they became paralyzed.430 He
further questioned them angrily if their lives were much more precious than that of
the officer who was killed. Another question was if they would run away when a
robber entered their homes and cut their wives and children, as “unmanly” as they
did in Menemen. He argued that they could have intervened in the shameful event in
one way or another, even though they were unarmed. By not doing so, for the judge,
the defendants dishonoured Turkish history.431
As for the chief judge’s accounts on personal and religious affairs, he stated
that fulfilling the duties of Islam was a necessity. Every Muslim was to know God,
recognize the Prophet, and pray.432 Anyone could perform zikr when alone, since
worship was the most sacred duty of Muslims. In one particular interrogation, an accused
person, as a strategy of defence, stated that far from being a dervish, he did not
even perform salaat. The judge admonished the man, telling him he ought to perform
salaat and if he did not, he was at fault. For the judge, saying “I do not perform salaat”
was not a defensive argument; “a Muslim man could not talk in such manner,”
it was shameful for him to say “I do not even perform salaat” to defend himself.433
When he asked the detainees to tell the truth about the issue, he sometimes evoked
religious phrases such as “God is the helper of the one who tells the truth.”434
During his interrogation about his connection with the villagers of Horos, Laz
İbrahim said some of the peasants did not know how to perform ablution. They were
so ignorant that some of the inhabitants even thought God was situated in İstanbul.
He said this was why he preached to the villagers. When the chief judge asked the
villagers of Horos about this, they admitted their ignorance. They stated Laz İbrahim
taught them the rules and conventions of Islam. In return, the judge expressed his
surprise and asked how they possibly had not known how to perform their ablutions.
429 Ibid., 26.
430 Ibid., 24.
431 Ibid., 26.
432 Ibid., 62.
433 Ibid., 70.
434 Ibid., 31.
113
He asked them if they were not Muslims, since they did not know such a fundamental
element of Islam.435 According to the judge, there were preceptors who possessed
scholarly competence and were assigned by the government to explain and educate
people about religious matters. He then asked, why would one regard being directed
by someone else about religion necessary? Laz İbrahim said his purpose was to recruit
people to do good and be benevolent. He taught people that doing good things
was among the provisions of the Qur’an and asked the judge if what he did was a sin.
The judge replied that illiterate people might seek a scholar to learn from. Laz
İbrahim metaphorically responded that “the people are so much ill that the doctor is
supposed to visit him personally.” He recounted that many of the villagers of Horos
did not know how to perform salaat either. The judge’s response was that a patient
ought to call a doctor himself, implicating that it was not their duty to go to people
and instruct them about religion.436 The judge said a hoca might pray and recite
God’s name in his home, which was praiseworthy. However, in this case, others
were coming together in houses to discuss damaging issues.437 “One must not gather
people around him and use religion as a means for other purposes. It is wrong to poison
people this way. Evil would occur if people come together to justify their intentions
religiously.”438
After these statements of the judge, Laz İbrahim provided political examples.
For him, until then, there had been approximately 10,000 pashas and deputies depended
on the government. Yet, for him, the hocas did not object to governmental
acts since they had no intention of getting political positions in the state. However,
the judge had a different opinion. For him, the nation had suffered much from the socalled
enlightened and scholarly members of the order. If one were to examine the
four hundred years of Turkish history, one would realise that the followers of the
Nakşibendi order had been poisoning naïve and poor Muslims under the roof of the
order. For the judge, the order used the Turkish nation as an instrument. The judge
then said that people who acted secretively had done harm to the country. Laz
İbrahim restated that the people who had harmed the government were inside the
parliament, or were among other important state officials, but there was no notable
435 Ibid., 39.
436 Ibid., 62.
437 Ibid., 49.
438 Ibid., 70.
114
religious person among them. However, the judge’s response was immediate and
harsh. He referred to the rebellion of Şeyh Said and said the leader himself and his
sixty followers were sheikhs.439 The judge stressed that the republic had no more endurance
and patience left for them. Reactionist movements and revolts constantly occurred
so that consequently foreigners ridiculed the country. He asked the detainees
how could this be possible.440
The judge said the government of the country worked day and night for these
lands, which had been blessed with the pure blood of Turks. For him, the court had
been conducting detailed investigations in order to expose and punish the betrayers
who tried to damage the state and the nation. The court was capable of distinguishing
the cruel from the innocent. He stressed it was necessary to stop those who damaged
the country. Common good and public interest required this action. Instead of fourteen
million Turkish people crying because of the actions of the traitors, it should be
the insurgents who must shed tears.441
3.11. Distortion of the Newspapers
The officially-biased newspapers reported the judicial proceedings in their
own terms. Along with conveying distorted information, they made the perpetrators’
statements particularly those related to the order, look trustworthy. As discussed earlier,
starting immediately on the day after the event, these newspapers described the
incident as the planned revolt of a religious organization. Subsequently, they maintained
and promoted this position. They analysed the perpetrators’ statements in
terms of the malevolent and harmful intentions of the Nakşibendi order. The martial
court facilitated great convenience for these reporters of these newspapers to observe
the court process at all phases.442
After the first session, Küçük Hasan was interestingly depicted as very intelligent
in the media.443 Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan were most probably ordered
to tell everything they knew with exaggeration. They were probably told to degrade
the Nakşibendi order and its associates, its leaders who were present in the trials.444
439 Ibid., 63.
440 Ibid., 69.
441 Ibid., 71.
442 Yeni Asır, February 5, 1931.
443 Cumhuriyet, January 16, 1931.
444 The newspapers described both of them as being calm in their cells to convey the psy115
In return, they would be rewarded and not be sentenced to death because of the age
limit. That praise of Küçük Hasan also provided the basis for the presumption that
the perpetrators would tell the truth about everything. However, there were also false
reports that the newspapers made up about the statements of the defendants. For instance,
it was asserted that Şeyh Esat told his son Mehmet Ali about his regret and
that he wished he had not “become involved in such bloody affairs.”445 As discussed
earlier, Şeyh Esat never said anything that implied his involvement in the incident.
Mehmet Emin was asserted to have said in the first session that Derviş
Mehmet had not performed the salaat but made his disciples do it. Nevertheless,
Mehmet Emin did not say anything such as this in any session of the trials.446 A
quarrel was also alleged to have taken place between Mehmet Emin and Ramazan in
trials. While Ramazan was making statements, Mehmet Emin was reported to have
intervened by saying: “Do not tell a lie to the court of the republic. Did you not adore
Derviş Mehmet as if he were God?”447 Again such a dispute never occurred during
the proceedings.448
Another misleading article was about Raşitoğlu İbrahim, who allegedly said
to the public, “You will get what you deserve three days later.” before the incident.
449 According to the newspaper, although the accused refused to confess saying
so, “some witnesses” asserted the truth of this statement. It is necessary to discuss
this matter because the newspapers relied on these stories to indicate that the events
had been pre-planned. As the issue came to the fore in the trials formerly, İbrahim
was not addressing the “public” or telling the people publically about what was going
to happen. This was merely a conversation between him and a certain Yusuf in
chology of the defendants. They were sorrowing because they would rot in jail, but were
glad also because being younger than twenty-one saved them from the death penalty. Cumhuriyet,
January 23-24, 1931; Milliyet, January 23, 1931. However, it was not the same for
Mehmet Emin who was twenty-nine years old and could not take advantage of the age limit.
He was more eager to cooperate with the court to reveal “the truth” in trials and more distressed
outside the court room than the other two perpetrators. He kept telling that he was innocent
and deceived by Derviş Mehmet in desperate sadness. Yeni Asır, February 2, 1931.
445 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 9, 1931.
446 Milliyet, January 16, 1931.
447 Cumhuriyet, January 17, 1931.
448 These newspaper reports are significant not only for reflecting the extent of the misinformation
fabricated by the media, but also for showing how a good part of the literature published
on this matter later relied on these reports as their source, as if they conveyed true information.
449 Milliyet, January 20, 1931.
116
Menemen. During the trials, the judge as well initially took this account as evidence
that İbrahim knew what would happen. Later, Yusuf Efendi and Mehmetoğlu Abdullah,
inhabitants of Menemen, were asked about the issue. They explained that while
talking about the RPP organization in the town, İbrahim jokingly said, “Although
you established the party organization, you will see what will happen.” Witnesses
said İbrahim had been a supporter of FRP and he attended the party rally, which had
been organized before the local elections in Menemen.450 That is to say, there were
no “witnesses” insisting on the accuracy of the aforementioned sayings as alleged by
the newspaper. Besides, Raşitoğlu İbrahim would be among the persons who were
acquitted.
There was distorted information about Saffet Hoca as well. Certain newspapers
reported Nalıncı Hasan to have stated that when they arrived at Menemen, first
they went to the home of Saffet Hoca. Saffet did not answer the door initially. But
then, he came and talked to Derviş Mehmet. There, Derviş promised him that if they
were to achieve their goals, he would appoint Saffet’s uncle as a civil servant.451 One
newspaper even defined him as “the would-be qaimaqam of Menemen under the aspired
reactionary order.”452 However, news about Saffet Hoca had to be reversed because
of his acquittal. The papers wrote “Saffet Hoca’s acquittal may seem bizarre at
first glance” since the perpetrators had blamed Saffet Hoca for having a hand in the
incident during the trials. As explained above, however, the concluding remarks of
the detainees cleared Saffet of the blemishes. Nalıncı stated that what he had said
about Saffet Hoca was only a dream and not true. This change of statement was as
well reported and the court’s decision regarding the acquaintance of Saffet was
commented as rightful.453
3.12. Verdicts of the Martial Court and Executions
The decisions of the court were read on the last day of the trials. There were
serious judicial contradictions and ungrounded statements in the decision text. This
was the case because the court was to rule reach certain designated verdicts after all.
As previously discussed, the prosecutor’s arguments in the opinion as to the accusa-
450 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 36.
451 Cumhuriyet, January 16-17, 1931.
452 Anadolu, January 22, 1931.
453 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 30, 1931; Vakit, January 30, 1931. Indeed, according to these
newspapers, each verdict of the court was just in any case.
117
tions conflicted with the facts. The offences with which the prosecutor charged the
detainees in the opinion as to the accusations were almost the same with the initial
charges of the court. Decisions of the court accorded with initial charges and prosecutor’s
opinion. So to say, the arguments of the defendants do not seem to have influenced
verdicts. Only the women from the aforementioned villages, the female relatives
of the perpetrators, and some men who had no direct connection to the events
or the order, were unconditionally released due to lack of evidence.
In the opinion as to the accusations, the prosecutor had inferred that the event
was not local but extensive in nature. He stated that the evidence revealed the presence
of an organization as the real actor behind the incident. According to the prosecutor,
the details of the intended event had been discussed and the attendants agreed
on the steps to be taken in the last meeting held at Tatlıcı’s home in Manisa on 6 December
1930. This was a strategic point to link the actions in Menemen to Manisa.
However, nothing about Menemen was mentioned in Manisa. As all the perpetrators
expressed, though they took action with the purpose of declaring Mahdism, Derviş
Mehmet firstly stressed his plan to go to Menemen in Bozalan. This is among the
crucial points, which undermines all allegations that the riot had been pre-planned.
As the newspapers of the era as well as subsequent narrations asserted, the insurgents
chose Menemen deliberately because of the opposition of its people to government
policies. But this reference to a deliberate choice is not true. As the perpetrators stated,
Derviş asked them questions about Menemen just before they left Bozalan. It is
difficult to determine whether Derviş had set his mind to going to Menemen from the
beginning. Still, it is clear that the company did not depart from Manisa especially to
arrive at Menemen. Although the prosecutor mentioned that Derviş gave hashish cigarettes
in pairs to each of his disciples and that they entered the town under its influence,
454 he still insisted they were acting according to plan.
In the opinion as to the accusations, the prosecutor expressed that he would
bring the origins of the events to light. He emphasized it was the Nakşibendi order
that trained the actors of Menemen and it was again the same order that had deceived
the people by operating under the mask of the order. In the document, he gave some
general information about the order and named Laz İbrahim the caliph of caliphs
(halifeler halifesi). He stated that by traveling almost all over Anatolia, Laz İbrahim
454 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 75.
118
made the roots of the order stronger. He was trying to empower it, while spreading
his corrupt thoughts as an enemy of the state.455 In other words, the prosecutor defined
Laz İbrahim as a nemesis of the regime without remarking in detail on his allegedly
hostile and maleficent actions.
As for Şeyh Esat, the prosecutor stressed that as all the notebooks, letters and
the like, found in the search during the investigations demonstrated, the order was
“still active and he was its sheikh.”456 However, establishing this was not on the
agenda of the court and hence it should not concern the prosecutor. For him, the evidence
about the Nakşibendi order explicitly revealed that it was a political organization.
457 Nevertheless, the way the Nakşibendi order was defined as a political agency
was a fabrication. Neither a single political movement of the order was specified, nor
a collective attempt of its members to intervene in the political arena was found.
The issues pointed out by the chief judge about the background organisation
were recounted by the prosecutor as well. For instance he mentioned that there were
meetings held in Manisa to which Laz İbrahim, Osman, Ragıp and others attended,
and zikrs were performed. He expressed some of the men frequently went to İstanbul
to visit Şeyh Esat. These were among the points made to justify that the order was
the actual agency behind the events. He further spoke of Hafız Ahmet testing Giritli
Mehmet to see if he were fit for Mahdism.458 The story was most probably a fabrication,
as discussed earlier. However this story implicated that not only Hafız Ahmet
but all hocas in question were associated with the events.459 The fact that Laz
İbrahim made villagers of Horos disciples of the order was further irrelevantly defined
as a pointer of the incident as a planned action of the Nakşibendi order.
The aforementioned letters of Şeyh Esat and Laz İbrahim were brought forth
as evidence as well.460 As the most important element, the prosecutor emphasized
455 Ibid., 79.
456 Ibid.
457 Ibid., 80.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid., 81.
460 The statement in the document was as follows: “Anadolunun bir tarafında bulunan bir
şeyhin diğer bir tarafta şayanı itimat bulduğu bir şahsa tarikat yolunda faaliyette bulunması
için mektuplar göndermesi gibi deliller, bize Menemen faciasını doğuran esas faillerin,
başında Kutbülazam olduğu halde, oğlu Mehmet Ali ve Laz İbrahim ve Laz İbrahim’in muhiti
faaliyetine aldığı aynı tarikata mensup yukarda isimlerini arzettiğim maznunlardan
mürekkep bir şebeke tarafından yetiştirildiğini maddeten ortaya koymaktadır.” Ibid., 81–2.
The aforementioned letters were examined in the relevant section, and yet it must be repeat119
that “all perpetrators claimed that the hocas in question were involved in the events”.
In other words, the statements of the perpetrators were the justification of their accusations
against others. The perpetrators’ explanations regarding the purpose of the
Nakşibendi order to overthrow the government, re-establish the dervish lodges and
bring back the sultanate order reflected the reality because they said so. The only evidence
was Nalıncı’s supposed eavesdropping on a conversation in which “reconstituting
the caliphate order was discussed” in the mansion of Şeyh Esat.461
With a few exceptions, such as that about Saffet Hoca, the court’s verdicts
corresponded to prosecutor’s charges. The detainees were sentenced to penalties on
various grounds. Some of them were charged with forcibly attempting to change the
constitution of the Republic of Turkey by declaring Mahdism. Another group was
found guilty for joining the said attempts. Several others were convicted for helping
insurgents, while some were accused of encouraging the public to join the riot. Punishments
were inflicted according to the relevant provisions of the criminal code.462
The martial court passed sentences for 105 detainees on 25 January 1931.
Seventy-eight of the arrested people were punished while twenty-seven were acquitted,
including all of the women. There were thirty-seven death sentences, however,
six of them were later changed to imprisonment for twenty-four years, because of the
age limit. Capital punishment verdicts of thirty-one men were submitted to the parliament
for approval, along with the interrogation records of the court process. The
Justice Commission of the Parliament examined the file, then approved twenty-eight
of the capital punishments and submitted it to the Speaker’s Office for voting.463 The
decision of the Commission was put to vote in the parliament and approved on 2
February 1931.464
All the notable dervishes and sheikhs charged with implicitly or explicitly
participating in the Menemen Incident, those who hosted the group and supplied maed
that they were entirely about religious issues or the business of the order such as performing
zikrs and reciprocal regards. There was nothing about Menemen in those letters, or any
indication that Laz İbrahim or others “trained” some activists as pioneers of forthcoming rebellions.
Nevertheless, later on newspapers would define Laz İbrahim as “the Lawrence of
reactionism.” Milliyet, February 5, 1931.
461 Ibid., 81.
462 Ibid., 87–9.
463 One of the convicts died a natural death. The commission reversed the judgement of Talat
Bey and Keçeci İsmail and converted them to imprisonment for two years. As accounted in
the relevant section, the reason of this change was not specified and is still difficult to tell.
464 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:25 Yirmi Beşinci İn’ikat,” February 2, 1931, 11.
120
terials for them, and the townspeople who were asserted to have applauded the demonstrators
during the events were sentenced to capital punishment. Şeyh Esat was
condemned to death and his punishment as well was changed since he was over-age.
He died in hospital.465
The newspapers published news about the executions. The executions of the
convicts were carried out one by one on 4 February, in various districts of Menemen
including the governmental square and the market place.466 Mehmet Emin was
hanged exactly the same place where Kubilay was beheaded.467 In order to make it
be a lesson and make sure that all people observed, officers did not remove the bodies
but let them wait for several hours.468 There was a piece of paper on each of the
bodies in which their crimes were written.469 Later on, the corpses were loaded on a
truck and taken to the cemetery.470
Newspapers published the pictures of the hanged ones along with the photographs
of the killed perpetrators on the day of the event as a deterrent to others. According
to some newspapers, the executions were a sign showing that those who
committed murder under the name of religion and tarikat would certainly be punished.
“Within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, all such attempts would
end the same way.”471 Newspaper reports in general conveyed the exact message that
the republican regime intended to give. It must be noted that although the chief judge
Muğlalı recurrently stated the maleficence of the order during the trials and the prosecutor
defined the Nakşibendi order as the enemy of the republic, the case of the
Menemen Incident did not evolve into an operation to annihilate it. By inflicting se-
465 Milliyet, February 1, 1931.
466 One of the convicts, Hacıismailoğlu Hüseyin from Bozalan, waiting on the line, ran away
by taking advantage of the officers’ preoccupation with an ongoing execution. A reward was
announced for the informant of his whereabouts. He was detained on 16 February in a village
of Manisa, denounced by villagers. He was taken back to Menemen and executed on 18
February. Son Posta, February 19, 1931.
467 Hakimiyeti Milliye, February 5, 1931. After Mehmet Emin, the Jewish (Jözef) was executed
with a religious procedure conducted by a rabbi who came from İzmir. Anadolu, February
5, 1931. He was reported to have shouted “Long live the republic” when he was to be
hanged. Vakit, February 4, 1931. He might have done so in blind hope. He is reported to
have cried very much during the trials as well.
468 Cumhuriyet, February 4, 1931.
469 Dündar, Gölgedekiler, 70.
470 Ibid.
471 Yeni Asır, February 5, 1931.
121
vere punishments,472 the regime demonstrated its intolerance against the reactionist
movements, no matter how they may have occurred. Apparently that was deemed as
a sufficiently strong message that religion was for private life and should have no
place in politics and governance.
3.13. Subsequent Trials
The martial court examined 606 files, which were prepared by investigating
magistrates during the martial law. The court decided to hold trials for 272 files. It
also decided non-prosecution for 255 and it had no jurisdiction for seventy-nine
files.473 After the sentencing of the 105 detainees of the Menemen Incident, the martial
court resumed the proceedings to hear the cases of the remaining 167 people.
This second phase of the trials continued until the martial law was lifted on 8
March.474 In this second stage, the trials were not conducted in the same way as the
former ones. The trials were separated into various categories.475
There were detainees from Bozalan, Alaşehir, Balıkesir, İstanbul, Eskişehir
and other places. They were generally accused of breaking the law regarding the closure
of dervish lodges, working to rebuild the orders, particularly the Nakşibendi order,
and subverting the regime by exploiting religion.476 Particular charges included
membership in the order; continuing to be engaged in the activities of an order; visiting,
writing and receiving letters from sheikhs, performing rituals through gatherings
at mosques and homes; not informing the law enforcement agencies about such activities
and the like. Sixty-one of the 167 detainees were given imprisonment sentences
ranging from two months to five years. These accusations as well as the evidence
regarding the associates of the order were almost the same as the ones in the
472 Öz alleged that all the prisoners would be released by courtesy of the amnesty proclaimed
to honor the republic’s tenth year anniversary. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 421;
Nevertheless, Öz did not mention his source for this information. There is no other source
that mentions it. What is known is that Bedri Onat, a friend of Kubilay and a witness of the
event, accounted in an interview that he had been in jail in Manisa for a while and saw
Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan there in 1936. In other words, at least two perpetrators were
still in prison after the tenth anniversary of the republic. Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat
Kampları, 28.
473 Anadolu, March 1, 1931; Cumhuriyet, 1 March 1931.
474 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 27, 1931.
475 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 179.
476 Somehow a case about an attempt to assassinate the district governor of Foça was combined
with the Menemen files by the martial court. Twenty people were arrested for this attempt
and all of them were released eventually. Yeni Asır, January 28, 1931.
122
case of the Menemen Incident. Still, the martial court inflicted much lighter sentences
in this second phase of the trials where half of the people in the sixty-one cases
were given imprisonments for three months.477
The martial law in Menemen was removed on 8 March 1931, when the martial
court resolved all the cases before it.478 Life in Menemen returned to normal and
a bronze statue of Kubilay was erected in the governmental square.479 As soon as the
trials in Menemen were concluded, National Assembly as well completed its third
term and went on a break until the next elections.
***
This chapter focused on the trials of the court process of the Menemen Incident.
Rather than constituting a fair judicial process, it appeared to be a formalistic
procedure intended to mark the Nakşibendi order as the planner of the incident. Despite
the apparent lack of evidence, the leader of the order was found guilty of instigating
Derviş Mehmet to initiate a revolt against the republic. The conclusion of the
legal proceedings that the event was a pre-planned anti-government rebellion, would
be taken for granted unquestioningly by authors who wrote on this event in the following
years.
477 Yeni Asır, February 27, 1931. Almost all of the convicts received cash fines in varying
amounts. Only two of them received an imprisonment penalty of five years. These two were
charged with being regional leaders of the order. Another man was sentenced to two years of
imprisonment. Three people were merely fined. Twenty-four convicts were sentenced to imprisonment
for periods ranging from two months to one year. The punishments of ten people
remain unclear. Some imprisonment periods were shortened due to old age and/or taking into
consideration of the time spent in detention. (See Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 180–210,
which is based on the February and March issues of Hakimiyeti Milliye newspaper mainly.)
478 Anadolu, March 9, 1931.
479 Milliyet, March 9-12, 1931.
123
CHAPTER 4
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND EVALUATIONS
ABOUT THE MENEMEN INCIDENT
A variety of diverse accounts make up the literature on the Menemen Incident.
All of the writers we will review here claim that the information they present is
based on the primary sources of the time. However, there are many contradictions
between their accounts of the incident. Subsequent literature on the event is categorized
here in accordance with the statements and news reports, made right after the
event by RPP leaders, officers and newspapers. I divide the accounts about the event
that I discuss in this chapter into three main groups: officially-biased and misleading;
counter-official and presumptive of conspiracy; and unbiased. Officially-biased narratives
mainly rely on official statements made after the incident by RPP leaders as
well as pro-government newspapers. Along with their biased approaches, almost all
of the accounts discussed under this category include wrong information about specific
aspects of the incident as well. Thus, bias and misinformation explored in this
chapter are inseparably intertwined.
Counter-official accounts include the similar manner as well. On the one
hand, they specify noteworthy issues and ask questions which profoundly challenge
officially-biased accounts. On the other hand, they also recount misinformation and
speculations about the event. Their speculations even verge on presumptions of conspiracy.
Thus, the significance of their critiques against officially-biased explanations
fall short because of their fictively conspiratorial stories.
There are unbiased descriptions of many aspects of the incident, made by
scholars. These studies constitute a third category. They are not prejudiced in the
ways the former two categories are. Still, although they seek to understand the actions
as well as the conditions under which the incident occurred, they make ungrounded
evaluations to provide causal explanations. Besides, these unbiased scholars
also recount, though to a small degree, misinformation particularly on the activities
that took place prior to and on the day of the event. Some of the misleading information,
rooted principally in newspapers and official statements of the era, has
penetrated all the writings in a way that influenced even unbiased scholars.
124
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss all these categories of literature and
to correct misleading information through grounding on substantial primary sources.
By doing so, the context of the event is discussed, analyzed and interpreted from different
angles.
4.1. Officially-Biased and Misleading Accounts
I will not discuss officially-biased accounts separately in this section. I divide
these biased narrations into subtopics since they generally repeat the same issues as
well as give the same sort of wrong information. I will indicate that officially-biased
accounts converge on defining the Nakşibendi order as the agent of the incident. In
this way, I will discuss the misleading information on the historical background of
the order provided by these accounts. I will also argue how the order has been depicted
as the enemy of the republic. The support that the people allegedly gave to
“reactionism,” according to officially-biased narrations, is another subject matter of
this section. I will also discuss the false presentations of the perpetrators. Another issue
of this section is the substantial infrastructure that the order was alleged to have
prepared for such revolt. I will discuss the extent to which the relevant literature exaggerated
the insurgents’ actions. I will further explore the officially-biased accounts’
coverage of the responsibility of the officers when the incident occurred. I
will also point to the flaws of recent literature particularly concerning the actions of
the company. Finally, I will discuss the officially-biased narratives’ attacks on FRP
as being politically responsible for the event.
4.1.1. The Nakşibendi Order as the Ultimate Culprit
The basic point of the officially-biased literature is that the Nakşibendi order
was the driving force behind the Menemen Incident. These authors did not fabricate
this point on their own. Their sources were the newspapers of the era, official statements
and most significantly, the decision text of the martial court of Menemen.
Once the court delivered this judgment about the order, that it was the agent that instigated
the incident, a large part of the subsequent narrations have taken it for granted.
Thus, they have reiterated the decision of the court.
RPP leaders announced and continued to define the event as an act of the
Nakşibendi order. For instance, in an interview he gave to a French journalist, İsmet
Paşa expressed that someone was trying to hurt their reform efforts for civilization,
125
freedom and the republic. For this purpose, “Nakşibendi members carried out the incident
to revive an order that the republic can not tolerate any more.”480 This official
notion has remained identical and the agents of the event are still thought of as associates
of a reactionist organization in the eyes of state.
The predetermined verdict of the court has been the primary mainstay for officially-
biased literature. On the whole, they narrated the event as far-reaching and
organized by Nakşibendi followers with the specific phrase “according to the official
records of the martial court of Menemen.” According to the officially-biased writers,
official investigations and legal process revealed that it was not the act of a few miscreants
and hashish addicts. Rather, for them, the Nakşibendi order was “its real supporter,”
“planner,” “effective power,” and “organizer.”481 “Inquiries uncovered that
Derviş Mehmet was just a front man.”482 The center of the event was Manisa483 and
many other arrangements were made elsewhere.484 Menemen was just one of the targets
of the insurgents. Had the reactionist revolt not been suppressed, it would have
expanded to other places. Therefore the Menemen Incident was nationwide in nature,
rather than local.485 Newspaper accounts have also been a primary source for this
type of narration. Such newspapers as Cumhuriyet “certainly validated” that the incident
was preplanned.486 “Under the circumstances of 1930, national press made a
480 Vakit, February 9, 1931.
481 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33–8; Erdinç Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki
Tepkiler” (unpublished master thesis, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap
Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2007), 101–3.
482 In other words, the writer insinuates that the Nakşibendi order decided to step into action
once Derviş Mehmet attracted supporters and claimed himself as the Mahdi. However, in the
same article, the writer contradicts himself. He states; “Since it was brought to the light in
the court process that the event was not broad in scope, subsequent trials dealt with giving an
intimidation to religious orders. Capital punishments were executed but the inhabitants of
Menemen were not banished.” Necdet Aysal, “Yönetsel Alanda Değişimler ve Devrim Hareketlerine
Karşı Gerici Tepkiler ‘Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,’” Ankara
Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü 11, no. 44 (2009): 601, 610. In other words, Aysal
is quite aware that the incident was not broad in scope, but he maintains his officially-biased
position that the incident threatened the republic.
483 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 315.
484 Aslan Tufan Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939) (İstanbul:
Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1984), 239. Yazman states that he was a former
neighbour of Kubilay.
485 Nihal Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası (1923-1933)” (unpublished
master thesis, Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2005), 72.
486 Hikmet Çetinkaya as well described the event as a planned reactionist action, referring to
the relevant reports of Cumhuriyet of which he was a reporter. As mentioned previously, he
had an interview with Bedri Onat, a friend of Kubilay and a member of the Türk Ocakları.
126
significant contribution in conveying the truest and broadest information about the
Menemen Incident to the country.”487
4.1.2. On the Background of the Nakşibendi Order
Some of the officially-biased accounts provide background information about
the Nakşibendi order. They usually depend on secondary sources about Islamic faith
and mysticism. The information they offer is limited and superficial. For instance, a
master thesis asserts that in the essence of Nakşibendis there are some remnants of
old Persian cults, particularly Zoroastrianism. “Nakşibendi rituals of reciting the
names of God have adopted some patterns from Zoroastrianism.”488 This explanation
does not only consider a grand order as simple and uniform, it also fails to substantiate
its comparison of two religious practices. İsmail Kurtoğlu, the writer of the thesis,
does not point where and how these rituals resemble each other. He also does not
give a single reference to scholarly studies regarding either the Zoroastrian or the
Nakşibendi rituals.
Another assertion of the officially-biased authors is that the Nakşibendi order
was the sole social, political and ideological force which formed the cultural history
of Asian Muslims, particularly under the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.489
“Those establishments were initially constituted as religious and cultural centers but
degenerated in time. On the one hand, they were addicted to lazing around and self
indulgence, relying on the donations of rich Muslims to good causes and the poor,
while on the other, they collected money from the humble folk under the name of
sheikhdom.”490
Onat’s expressions about the event and the inferences of Çetinkaya, all in the same book, are
explicitly contrasting. Çetinkaya quotes Onat, “if we had known anything previously, we
would have caught the insurgents tightly and prevented the incident. Those men had nothing
in their minds. They were all exhausted and beaten up from smoking hashish.” Çetinkaya,
Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16, 21, 27, 28. In other words, people there knew that
the incident was an isolated, unexpected and simple event in nature. Nevertheless,
Çetinkaya, under the influence of the official position regarding the event, did not notice and
consider these important details.
487 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 101.
488 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 36.
489 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 52.
490 Neşet Çağatay, Türkiye’de Gerici Eylemler (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat
Fakültesi Yayınevi, 1972), 18.
127
According to İsmail Kurtoğlu, “they became organizations that brought every
sort of harm in the name of religion.”491 Moreover, he claims the Nakşibendi order to
have been influential in various regions of Anatolia at different times, taken a stand
against every type of renewal attempts and given rise to great riots.492 Yazman’s assertion
is that “the only thing this order brought to Turkey since the eighth century is
the rebellion of Şeyh Said and the reactionist Menemen Incident.”493 That is to say,
what the officially-biased accounts express about Nakşibendi order is that they either
degenerated in time or already had some deviations. The Nakşibendi order, in this
regard, is indicated as a uniform and invariably harmful organization, beginning
from its origin and throughout the time. The writers referenced above make no explanations
about how and in what ways did the Nakşibendi order become transformed
into a detrimental organization that arranged revolts every now and then.
They present no political or religious historical context for their argument nor explain
how the order instigated any specific riot. Therefore, these unsubstantiated narratives
on the order’s history are not useful academically.
According to officially-biased accounts, religious orders, particularly the
Nakşibendism, has been using religion as a tool to maintain their interests. The prestige
of the members of the order rested on the religious sensibilities and fears of people.
494 “By means of secret exercises, it exploited the weakest and most delicate subject
of the society, namely its religious thoughts.”495 “Whenever its interests were in
danger, it intensified the exploitation of people’s religious senses and prompted them
to fight against progressive reforms.”496 This was the case for the Menemen Incident
as well. “It was understood from the Menemen Incident that the disciples of the order
were not busy with just mysticism and religion but also engaged in political issues.”
497 “Although some notables of the order recommended waiting and leaving
everything to time, they could not make others hear them.”498
491 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 35.
492 Ibid., 37.
493 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 242.
494 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1998, 137.
495 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33.
496 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 100.
497 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 242. These words,
too, come from the statement of the Menemen prosecutor that characterized the order as a
political organization.
498 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 53.
128
Indeed, the notion of “using religion as a means” has been a common element
in many accounts regarding religious issues in the republican period. The authors of
such accounts have generally been speaking for the republic itself by extolling the
new state, its revolutions and castigating opposition elements. Describing opponents
as “exploiters of religion” was a usual practice of this officially-biased point of view.
However, the content of this repeated statement has been rhetorical and poorly substantiated.
Like the case here, sufi organizations are described to have been deceiving
the common people, who fail to see that they are exploited. This general type of expression
is not accompanied usually by specific instances or details indicating how
the sufi orders use religion to preserve their interests. The members of the order in
question are described as if they are insincere in their religious beliefs in the reality.
That is to say, these biased accounts are not seriously interested in showing how these
orders use people and oblige them to make donations to the orders.
4.1.3. The Enemy of the Republic
Officially-biased narrations allege that religious orders, particularly the
Nakşibendis, sought to sustain their elevated positions in the republican era as well.
“Factions whose interests were harmed by the transformation from theocracy to a
secular state described laicism as irreligiousness and strived to stir up opposition to
the reformists.”499 Thus emerged the problem of “reactionism” against the republic,
according to the biased writers. They state radical religious groups did not embrace
the abolition of the dervish lodges, and religious orders continued to exist in secrecy.
500 “They watched for an opportunity to regain their interests”501 and “tried to antagonize
their followers, who made up the lower class of society, against the government.”
502 “They intended to deceive ignorant citizens with the motto that “Religion
is at stake!”503 “The Menemen Incident occurred under these conditions the
Nakşibendi order, which was weakened, sought to stir up a revolt by appealing to the
religious senses of the people so as to recover its former strength.”504
499 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1998, 137.
500 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33.
501 Bahriye Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı” (unpublished master thesis, Dokuz
Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1997), 10–1.
502 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 50.
503 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 10–1; Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay,
126–7.
504 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 100.
129
According to the authors who adopted officially-biased points of view, the
event was exactly a reactionist movement.505 “It was an attack of the Nakşibendi order,
which did everything possible to deceive society and demolish the public order506
as well as the republic507 and Atatürk’s Reforms.508 The purpose was to overthrow
the republic and the secular system.509 “The republic of Atatürk prohibited underdeveloped
organizations like sheikhdom, and yet the order aspired to establish a
sharia state.”510 Even after the suppression of the rebellion of Şeyh Said, a prominent
member of the order, it dared to raise its voice511 and to attempt to achieve its dream
of reviving the old regime.512
The only other rebellious figure associated with the order in the officiallybiased
accounts, in addition to the case of Menemen, is Şeyh Said. His rebellion too
is depicted as a movement carried out by exploiters of religion who did nothing but
harm for the country. It is somehow taken as an element of an element of truth that
the Nakşibendi order watched for an opportunity to step into action to overthrow the
government. That is to say, the order operating to the detriment of the republic was
so powerful that state administrators and law enforcement agencies were unable to
prevent it from doing harm. This explanation is unconvincing in many respects.
Firstly, mystical circles and rituals continued after the legal abolition of orders within
the knowledge of government officials. Indeed, public administrators did not regard
the orders as an enemy which needed to be eliminated. Secondly, officially-biased
accounts do not give details about the secret plans that Nakşibendis allegedly make
and how they managed to operate behind the scenes. As the official reports indicate,
the mansion of Şeyh Esat was not only under surveillance but also there was a secret
505 According to Köse, when one takes into consideration the insurgents’ intention to found a
theocratic state, their preparation for the event, their financial situation and their educational
level, it does not “sound reasonable” that they did it on their own. Moreover, writers like
Köse stress that it is crucial to reveal the real agents behind the incident, thus, they look for
background figures and structures carefully. Ibid., 1, 3, 47–8.
506 For Kurtoğlu, “it could be said that” among religious circles, it was the Nakşibendi order
that reacted to the abolition of the caliphate and the proclamation of the republic most.
Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 28, 33.
507 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 126–7.
508 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 21.
509 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 10–1.
510 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16.
511 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 38. Kurtoğlu’s words intend to show that the Nakşibendi
order stirred up a riot as occasion served.
512 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 48.
130
police put inside it. This is just a synoptic example of the extent to which state officers
kept an eye on orders.513
4.1.4. People’s Support for Reactionism
Some of the officially-biased accounts assert that the masses, whose level of
education was low and who were blindly attached to the “old social order”, reacted
against the innovations made in the early years of the republic. The Menemen Incident
was also a consequence of this reaction.514 One of the stories discussed in the
third chapter is told in the later literature as well. Erdinç Köse’s master thesis refers
to Milliyet of 27 December 1930 that a certain citizen had heard some rumors from
two women while shopping in the villages of Menemen that wearing the fes and the
old order would be restored within a week. Köse expresses that after this instance
was reported in newspapers, the opinion that the event was a prearranged action became
even stronger.515 This story was most likely fabricated, in that it depended on
third person narrations and was devoid of substantiality. Questions about the identity
of those women and why a legal procedure was not conducted remain unanswered.
The significant matter here is that the later authors writing about the event see
no harm in taking this sort of stories for granted without making an effort to verify
their accuracy. By doing so, they frame a certain group of people as being hostile
towards the republic, ready to participate in opposition movements,516 and involved
in one when the opportunity arose as in the case of the Menemen Incident. In other
words, officially-biased authors imply that ordinary people were somehow informed
about the approaching riot, while law enforcement agencies were not.
This opinion applies to villagers as well. It is asserted that each inhabitant of
Bozalan, including village headmen, assured Derviş Mehmet and his followers that
513 The reason why this type of account defines religious sub-groups as enemies of the republic
and keeps on reproducing this expression partly lies in those writers’ perception of the republican
reforms. The primary mistake of these writers however, is their projection of themselves
as representatives of the republic without considering the actual implementation of the
republican reforms and their adoption by the people. They seem to make normative evaluations
with respect to their positions rather than regarding people’s cultural and religious diversity
and the process of how long and in what ways they would keep pace with the republican
type of ideal citizen.
514 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 31.
515 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 71–2.
516 The number of people who gathered at the municipal square in Menemen was exaggerated,
arguably to make it look like that the townspeople supported the so-called rebellion in
great numbers. (See the explanation of this point below in this chapter.)
131
they would raid a gendarme station, take their guns and come to assist them as soon
as the group arrived at Menemen.517 This anecdote is not true either. According to
the statements of the perpetrators, merely one man named Abdülkadir, while accompanying
the group outside the village, wished them Godspeed and told that he would
come for help if needed. Still, Abdülkadir told it for the sake of conversation and he
was not speaking for the whole village. There is no evidence indicating that the villagers
of Bozalan and Paşa, inhabitants of Menemen or Manisa were anticipating an
opportunity to stir up a rebellion against the republic. Not a single scene of action
against the republic was recorded in the regions in question. All the defendants in trials
seemed to be afraid of what might happen to them. They did not leave this impression
that they would or could oppose the republic. On the contrary, they tried to
keep on the right side of the chief judge no matter all the hard time the judge gave
them.
Some of the officially-biased writers make demi-fair evaluations about the
inhabitants of Menemen. They want the republic to have mercy on them. Another
master thesis states that it would be unrealistic to expect the republican principles to
spread in a society that was accustomed to absolutism for 600 years. According to
Bahriye Acar, the author of this thesis, the reason why local inhabitants did not react
too strongly against reactionists in the Menemen Incident was that they did not comprehend
the republican regime adequately yet.518 As for Köse, newspapers right after
the event reported that the inhabitants of Menemen did not engage in the reactionist
movement but condemned it vehemently.519 Nevertheless, the majority of newspapers
harshly disparaged all the people of Menemen, and not just the ones who participated
in the events.
Another case in point is Kemal Üstün’s account, which contradicts itself. 520
On the one hand, he defines the incident as the incitement of ignorant masses by
those people whose interests had been negatively affected by republican reforms.521
On the other hand, he talks about the role of inhabitants as follows: “Elders who
517 Barış Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” International Journal of History
5, no. 1 (2013): 160.
518 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 76.
519 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 68.
520 Üstün was a colleague and a friend of Kubilay in Menemen. He stresses that he was
among the audience in trials of the martial court. Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 8.
521 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 126–7.
132
were at the mosque for dawn prayer were taken to the square by the insurgents at
gunpoint. Other people on their way to work were stopped and forced to participate.
That was how the crowd gathered around reactionists. In other words, they were
compelled to do so.”522 This information is also misleading. Though small in proportion,
523 about a hundred people were engaged in the demonstrations either by merely
taking part in reciting God’s name or by substantially assisting the company. Their
applause was the principal act that received the sharpest reaction from officials as
well as newspapers. Yet, writers like Kemal Üstün and Aslan Tufan Yazman try hard
to acquit all of the townspeople. The point they seek to emphasize is that the people
of Menemen had unhesitatingly embraced the principles of the republic nationalistically.
4.1.5. Specifying the Agents of the Event
Officially-biased accounts describe the notable figures of the Nakşibendi order
as the true agents of the Menemen Incident. Much the same as previously mentioned
accounts, the information being discussed here also derives from the fact that
the writers take court verdicts and newspaper reports for granted. They adopt the existing
primary sources in their narrations unquestioningly and without examination,
and present them as true. This is expressed in statements like “as a result of the proceedings,
it became clear (or was revealed) that…” In other words, the judicial process
is treated as if it did what it had to do and concluded justly. Thus, these accounts
bear a notion that they are to recount the truth as reached by the court.
The role played by different figures varies in diverse officially-biased accounts.
For instance, it is alleged that “Şeyh Esat played an active role in the preparation
phase of the riot as it became clear in the trials of the martial court.”524 Since the
judicial process ended with the verdict that the event was preplanned and carried out
by the Nakşibendi order with its leaders and associates, each named one by one, sub-
522 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 13–4. He depicts the period as a time in which every
Turk was full of the joy of living, which Mustafa Kemal had ignited, and was engaged in a
struggle to rise and reach up to the level of contemporary civilization.
523 The best evidence indicates that about a hundred people participated in the demonstrations
of Derviş’s company in the square, while another hundred stood nearby merely watching.
The population of the town was approximately 12,000. Thus, namely 0.83 % of its
population was in the square.
524 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 610. This writer further alleged
that Saffet Hoca was among the masterminds of the event according to the court. On the contrary,
Saffet Hoca was acquitted of all charges.
133
sequent accounts recounted those names as the agents. “The murder of Kubilay was
planned by the leader of the Nakşibendi order, Şeyh Esat.”525 “It was the 84-year old
leader of the order, living in a mansion in İstanbul, who gave the instructions.”526
The event took place with the incitement and instruction of the notables of the
Nakşibendi order, and primarily their leader Şeyh Esat527 who was able to operate
freely and propagandize for the order in moral and material terms.528 Early writings
on the case, particularly Üstün’s and Çetinkaya’s books, influenced the later literature.
For instance, an article about the incident refers to Çetinkaya’s definition of
Şeyh Esat as “pervert” and continues that he did not merely impress the naïve and
ignorant mass but also the educated and cultured people.529
Again with reference to the court decisions, Esat’s son Mehmet Ali is indicated
as another designer of the incident.530 “The head of the Nakşibendi order and
his son took advantage of the appropriate conditions, made arrangements and stepped
into action at a place whose inhabitants they regarded as opponents of the government.”
531
Officially-biased narrations claim that, since those unschooled, ignorant hashish
addicts could not have implemented the plan of bringing the political system
down and establish a theocratic order by themselves, there must have been more
525 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16.
526 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 126–7.
527 Kurtoğlu asserts that all three perpetrators stated in trials that they were in continuous
contact with Şeyh Esat. Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 38, 40. However, the perpetrators neither
said anything of this nature during the trials nor could they provide meaningful information
to support their asserted connection to Şeyh Esat.
528 Saraçoğlu repeatedly comments on the agonizing news of the beheading of Kubilay in
later issues of the journal. In his introduction, he mentions that critical and in-depth accounts
of this incident based on the evaluation of official and other sources were needed. He defines
his study as a consequence of several months of hard work. Saraçoğlu, “Menemen İrticaı Adı
Altındaki,” 2290, 2293. Nevertheless, he provides deficient accounts due to flawed interpretations
of the official evaluations of the event. For instance, he points to the newspapers of
July 1930, which reported rumors on Şeyh Esat’s presence in Erenköy, to comment that Esat
had been acting against the republic for a long time. He then asks law enforcement agencies
did not intervene in his wrong-doings. In other words, Saraçoğlu appears convinced that Esat
was an enemy of the republic and does not reflect on the information available to him. He
does not take into consideration that security officers knew about Esat and others. Instead,
Saraçoğlu argues that Esat could operate in pursuit of his own benefits and against the republic
for months despite the close surveillance under which he lived.
529 Nurşen Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Sosyo-Kütürel ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Analizi,” Toplum
ve Bilim 90 (2001): 132.
530 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 235; Aysal,
“Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 610.
531 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 19.
134
agents behind the scenes.532 “One of these agents was a deviant named Laz İbrahim
who was appointed as his top caliph in Manisa by Şeyh Esat.”533 Some authors offer
descriptions of Laz İbrahim based on journalist Çetinkaya. For instance, a statement
in an article is as follows: “Hikmet Çetinkaya adduced Laz İbrahim’s dispatch to the
region by Şeyh Esat as the most explicit proof of the incident’s instigation by the
Nakşibendi order.”534 Though he did not engage in actions, Laz İbrahim was among
the think-tank of the organization, defined himself as ‘the caliph of the caliphs,’535
and established contacts between Şeyh Esat and other caliphs.536 “He selected
Menemen as a target since he knew the town and many of its inhabitants. He poisoned
the people’s minds, attracted many supporters, and staged the incident.”537
Another master thesis recounts the latter argument and emphasizes that Laz
İbrahim’s choice of Menemen is very conceivable since he knew like-minded people
lived there.538
Officially-biased accounts also rely on evidence brought forth in trials, such
as the evidence on meetings in Manisa and letters. For instance, a specific meeting in
Manisa, in which Laz İbrahim and some others participated, is asserted to demonstrate
the preparations and determination of the agents. In this gathering, Laz İbrahim
talked about a conversation made in İstanbul. There, it was discussed that İstanbul
Selim Efendi, son of Abdülhamit II, would occupy the country with a great force,
become the caliph and the sultan. “Nevertheless, since the reactionists could not
speak their thoughts out loud, they began to prepare and watch for an opportunity in
secret.”539 In other words, it is beyond question for officially-biased accounts that
these agents were able to make plans and take action on their own. It is not considered
whether they had enough facilities, infrastructure and material organization to
actualize such a large-scale goal. Instead, those figures are indicated as enemies of
the government and seeking its overthrowing.
532 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 57–8.
533 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16; Oğuz Aytepe, “Menemen Olayı,”
Anıtkabir Dergisi 18 (2004): 28.
534 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 53.
535 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 132.
536 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 40.
537 Aslan Tufan Yazman, “Menemen Olayı’nın İçyüzü ve Serbest Parti,” Sigorta Dünyası
160 (April 1973): 20.
538 Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası,” 72.
539 Ibid., 89.
135
The issue of letters is remarked as well in the literature: “The court obtained
the letters Laz İbrahim and Şeyh Esat had written to each other, which proved that
they took steps against the republic.”540 However, those letters in question neither included
a simple anti-republican stance nor implied such an opposition. But these details
are not addressed, and the evidence offered by the court is accepted unquestioningly
in much of the officially-biased literature. For instance, Laz İbrahim’s bringing
books from İstanbul for the betterment of the order is mentioned as one of his malignant
doings.541 Typically, officially-biased authors do not elaborate on details of the
information provided by the court as evidence.
Derviş Mehmet is defined as having had a close relationship with Şeyh Esat
in this line.542 “He was one of the accredited and prominent disciples of Esat.”543
Derviş Mehmet’s acquaintance and collaboration with Çerkez Ethem is also brought
forward. Related assertions do not merely say that he was a former fellow of “the
traitor” Çerkez Ethem, but also that he was a homosexual.544 “Derviş Mehmet fled
from the country with Çerkez Ethem but returned since he was not among the list of
the 150 persona non grata.”545 A further allegation is that both of them aligned themselves
with the Greeks.546 These are almost entirely mere immaterial allegations. The
extent of Derviş Mehmet’s previous relationship with Çerkez Ethem is unknown.
Writers in question give no substantial references to the expressions related to
Çerkez. They neither doubt nor examine the extent of the reliability of this information
and how such a supposedly detrimental figure could act freely against Turkey
for quite a while.
4.1.6. Material Support of the Nakşibendi Order
These biased authors also explain the commitment of both Derviş Mehmet
and his followers to the Nakşibendi order. “As it became evident, the leader of the
Nakşibendi order Şeyh Esat and Laz İbrahim gave money to poor people as well as
540 Ibid.
541 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 39.
542 Nihal Eyrice, “Tarih Eğitiminde Yerellik: 1922-1950 Döneminde Menemen Kazası” (unpublished
master thesis, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Enstitüsü, 2005), 14.
543 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 25; (See also Melih Cevdet Anday’s 1977 essay, titled
“Bir Yıldönümü: Kubilay.” Ibid., 140.)
544 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 131.
545 Eyrice, “1922-1950 Döneminde Menemen Kazası,” 15.
546 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 43.
136
to unemployed youth.”547 “Laz İbrahim took the money that Şeyh Esat collected
from surrounding people, and distributed it to the unemployed youthful disciples of
the order.”548 “The leaders of the order selected Derviş Mehmet as the protagonist
and put miserable wretches together with him.”549 In other words, it is claimed the
perpetrators were very poor in economic conditions. Due to their dependence on
handouts, their primary concern was “to gain happiness in the afterlife since there is
no way for me to be happy here.”550 Their dedication to the order increased by this
means. “However, since they were not knowledgeable about religion, they easily fell
into the trap of wealthy notables, operating for their own benefit backstage.”551 Similar
to previous statements, this matter of giving money to youth for deception is not
validated. Rather, it is a general argument of writers whose accounts regarding religious
issues run in parallel to official statements. Neither the perpetrators’ statements
in trials nor the official reports refer to any money or other type of support provided
by the order notables. To promote the assertion that the event was carried out by the
Nakşibendi order, these biased writers seek to form an unreal material background.
It is also claimed that Derviş Mehmet and his company received support in
the form of money, clothes, guns etc., on their way to Menemen from people, who
were Laz İbrahim’s followers.552 This is another unverified assertion. All the support
the group got derived from affinity and acquaintanceship. They were hosted in
homes, were provided food and guns and were not reported to law enforcement
agencies for their probable actions since they were known around the region.
4.1.7. Exaggerating the Capacity of Insurgents
Just like the newspapers of the period and many official statements, officially-
biased accounts introduce the actions and aims of the insurgents as if they were
realistic. Although the aims of Derviş Mehmet, as stated in the trials by the perpetrators,
were completely infeasible, they are depicted as tangible plans. According to
the authors in question for instance, the company’s choice of Menemen was not ac-
547 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 145.
548 Aytepe, “Menemen Olayı,” 28.
549 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 242; Yazman,
“Menemen Olayı’nın İçyüzü ve Serbest Parti,” 20.
550 Çağatay, Türkiye’de Gerici Eylemler, 16; Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 32.
551 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 32.
552 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 243.
137
cidental. Laz İbrahim was ranked as “the caliph of caliphs” and sent to Anatolia by
Şeyh Esat to augment the disciples of the order. “He came to Menemen where his
acquaintances were living and there he poisoned them.”553 However, this account of
Yazman is full of incorrect information. According to the perpetrators’ statements
and official reports, the inhabitants of Menemen did not expect Derviş and his followers.
There is no information indicating the presence of Laz İbrahim’s acquaintances
in Menemen whom he organized to revolt. Yazman seems to have used unreliable
second-hand information and not made careful research.
According to other similar narrations, “Menemen was among the places that
insurgents selected as targets and if the reactionist movement had not been stopped
there, it would have expanded to other locations. Therefore the Menemen Incident
was not local but national in nature.”554 “In order to announce that the caliphate had
been revived, insurgents chose of a small town populated by 4000-5000 people, and
not a big city such as İzmir or Manisa where security forces would instantly bring the
situation under control.”555 These arguments as well are problematic. Menemen had
a population of about 12,000 people and hence was not as small as alleged. Moreover,
Menemen was thirty kilometers away from İzmir city center. Therefore the observation
is not very sensible.
Another exaggeration about the insurgents is their so-called religious objectives.
They are portrayed as trying to establish a theocratic state and spread Islam to
the entire world. “After they constituted a state based on sharia in Turkey, they
would go as far as China and to all the European countries in order to make every
non-Muslim accept Islam.”556 Authors of these arguments give references to court
records and express the forementioned purposes, which were mentioned by perpetrators,
as realities. The perpetrators are framed as if they were organizationally prepared
and the conditions were proper for them to actualize their purposes.
However in the same court records, there are so many anecdotes which present
the true circumstances and the pitiful state of the insurgents. Still, writers take
these claims as well seriously. For instance, when the company wanted to cross the
553 Yazman, “Menemen Olayı’nın İçyüzü ve Serbest Parti,” 242.
554 Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası,” 72.
555 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 601.
556 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33; Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,”
56.
138
Gediz River, they had no money and nothing to pay the boatman. They told him that
they would appoint him as a civil servant as long as he helped them cross the river.
Rather than regarding this state as another indicator of the company’s lack of resources
to carry out their plans of overthrowing the government, it is interpreted as
evidence of “the detailed plans the insurgents made in advance.”557 Their arrival at
Menemen is accounted as an incoming of “the army of sharia.”558 Moreover, it is
suggested that if Derviş Mehmet waited longer instead of taking the road with a few
men, there might have occurred a much larger event with a lot more disciples joining
the group, since the order had sufficient resources.559
Another exaggeration is describing the incident as a threat against the very
existence of the republic.560 Referring to the parliamentary minutes, it is mentioned
that “the rebellion was an attempt to change the constitution of the Republic of Turkey
by force and establish the rule of a caliphate and sultanate depending on sharia.”
561 “The newly-founded republican regime and its ideology overcame a significant
challenge in Menemen.562 Another repeated assertion is that the regime recognized
the potential of the opposition.563 “It was further perceived that the foundations
of the new regime had not yet been secured and it was under a severe threat.”564
However, this is not a reasonable evaluation since the government was already aware
of the discontent of a part of the population as well as the presence of religious orders.
This situation is obvious in the debates of the deputies at the parliament. Although
the terrifying beheading of Kubilay and the applause of some people concerned
the government, no specific legal regulation was made to suppress public’s
opposition. In other words, although the event was not extensive and far-reaching in
nature, authors who assume the responsibility and duty of speaking for the regime,
depict the event as another menace that the republic overcame.
557 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 57–8.
558 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 25.
559 Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası,” 89.
560 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 328.
561 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 32.
562 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 315; Kurtoğlu, “Menemen
Olayı,” 260.
563 Sertaç Solgun, “Menemen Olayı Sonrasından İkinci Dünya Savaşı’na Türkiye’nin İç
Güvenliği (1931-1939)” (unpublished doctoral thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri
ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2010), 261.
564 Ibid., 263.
139
4.1.8. Responsibilities of the Security Forces
Although the issue of the security force officers was given a wide place in the
newspapers of the era, officially-biased accounts do not pay it much attention. They
approach the matter differently and are divided into two types: one criticizes the
gendarme officers, the other praises them highly. According to the latter approach,
Gendarme Captain Fahri Bey realized the severity of the situation, entered the state
house to take measures and demanded a support force from the regiment as required
by law.565 The critical approach disparages the captain as well as the privates in Kubilay’s
battalion. Fahri Bey is accounted to have become so terrified by the reactionists
and by the crowd that gathered around them that he could not stop the event.
Fahri Bey, in this opinion, assumed that he would not halt the insurgents with the
unit under his command. “However, if he had fired his gun into the air at once, he
would have brought the situation under control. But he ignored that possibility and
was unable to prevent the murder of a young Turkish officer.566
4.1.9. Wrong Information on Moves Before, During and After the Incident
There is much misinformation and exaggeration about the concrete actions of
the company as well in line with the assertions about the event that it was an inclusive
and far-reaching revolt carried out by furious enemies of the republic. The misinformation
is presented according to the chronologic flow of events.
It is alleged that the dervishes had been on a diet of merely eating figs and
drinking water as an element of their preparation.567 However, the perpetrators did
not make such a statement in the trials and there is no report referring to it. So this
anecdote is a fabrication.
The number of townspeople standing around Derviş Mehmet is another instance
of information pollution. For one account there were 1000 impertinent people
“unconsciously gathered together under the influence of herd mentality and scared
by threats.”568 According to another account, there were 1500 people and none of
them sought to prevent the traitorous movement but rather gave support by saying
565 Saraçoğlu, “Menemen İrticaı Adı Altındaki,” 2432.
566 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 60.
567 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 235.
568 Ibid., 243.
140
Allahuekber.569 Kubilay entered the scene with a battalion to disperse the crowd, but
the number of soldiers under his command is indeterminate. Although some writers
assert that there were twenty-six privates with him,570 no official record verifies this
number. We have confusing information also about the rifles of Kubilay’s unit. Journalist
Hikmet Çetinkaya conveys from a witness of the event that Kubilay and his
soldiers came to the square with blank cartridges in their rifles.571 Another allegation
of Yazman is that Kubilay ordered his privates to fire blanks into the air.572
Later literature refers to these initial narrations as well as the newspaper reports
of the time.573 It is additionally alleged that there had been a military maneuver
recently and Kubilay forgot to change the blank cartridges with real bullets.574 When
privates fired rifles and no one got hurt, according to these stories, Derviş Mehmet
began to shout: “You see, I am invulnerable!”575 For another account, a certain hoca
among the crowd cried to people: “As you see, bullets did not hurt them, those are
saints (evliya)!”576 Thus, “Derviş Mehmet and his disciples took courage very
much.”577 They “considered themselves to be immortal”578 and “attributed this situation
to Derviş Mehmet’s being the true Mahdi.”579 However, as previously discussed
and as official reports explicitly indicated, there were no bullets in the rifles of the
privates under Kubilay’s command. They had only bayonets and fled when Kubilay
was shot at. Given this situation, the story of the blank cartridges was fabricated most
likely because of the oddness that those rifles did not have bullets. In order not to
tarnish the image of law enforcement agencies, and thus of the republic, this untrue
569 Ibid., 46–7.
570 Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler Ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” 162; Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet
Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 603.
571 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 21.
572 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 236–7.
573 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 603; Mazıcı, “Menemen
Olayı’nın Analizi,” 144; Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 258.
574 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 417–8.
575 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 21.
576 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 236–7.
577 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 603.
578 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 417–8. Öz’s article can not be categorized as officially-
biased since he does not blindly repeat what the official statements, newspaper reports
and court records say. The information he provides is not a simple effort to denigrate the
agents, to reveal the backstage and praise the state. In his own way, Öz seeks to account for
the details of the incident, although some unsubstantiated and ungrounded information is
found in his article.
579 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 144.
141
information was published by newspapers as well as the initial narrators of the incident,
who seem to have considered themselves as representatives of the government
or its ideals.
Reports and perpetrator statements point out that Kubilay was ignored by
Derviş Mehmet at first. After this underestimation, Kubilay became angry and seized
Derviş by his collar. Another allegation is that Kubilay slapped Derviş.580 However
this is another exaggeration and not true.
A different sort of disinformation is about the way he was beheaded.581 According
to the claim, “raving, rabid and punk zealots” beheaded Kubilay with a
saw.582 However, it is certain that he was beheaded by a knife. Furthermore, one account
asserts that Kubilay’s head was cut off slowly and in an agonizing way.583
Based on the newspaper reports of the time, it is also proclaimed that the
townspeople applauded the beheading of Kubilay as they did Derviş’s former actions.
While one writer states that it was only a small part of the crowd that applauded
the demonstrations,584 for another, Kubilay was beheaded with the applause of all
of the one hundred people gathered at the square.585 However, it is quite uncertain
whether the townspeople witnessed the beheading and applauded him. The extent to
which they kept on applauding when Derviş brought Kubilay’s head to the square is
also uncertain. Although the chief judge of the martial court mentioned a certain
number of defendants had applauded Derviş’s actions, he did not charge any of them
with doing so at the scene of Kubilay’s beheading. Therefore, asserting that “the
townspeople of Menemen applauded the martyrisation of Kubilay” is unjustified.
The publication of such exaggerated and uncertain information is also defamatory for
the townspeople in nature.
As previously mentioned, officially-biased authors base much of their information
on newspaper reports. For instance, the 30 December 1930 issue of Yeni Asır
580 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 417.
581 Bernard Lewis’s account is in this category. He narrates the event as follows: “A young
Kemalist officer called Kubilay heard a local dervish leader addressing the populace and attacking
the Regime. When he remonstrated, he was seized by the mob, held down, and slowly
beheaded, amid the acclamation of the sheikh and his supporters.” Bernard Lewis, The
Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 417.
582 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 237; Anday, “Bir
Yıldönümü: Kubilay,” in Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 138.
583 Saraçoğlu, “Menemen İrticaı Adı Altındaki,” 2293.
584 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 57.
585 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 417.
142
reported that “onlookers clapped the beheading of Kubilay for twenty minutes, and
that some merely grinned in the face of this atrocious murder.” For the newspaper,
they further acclaimed Derviş’s drinking the blood of Kubilay.586 Although such an
issue was not brought to the agenda of the court in any session, the decision text of
the justice commission of the parliament included a phrase about the drinking Kubilay’s
blood.587
Though there is no evidence for it whatsoever, blood drinking became another
subject repeatedly narrated by officially-biased authors. Thus they wrote, for instance,
“unsatisfied with beheading, Derviş Mehmet drank Kubilay’s blood by handfuls
in the sequel.”588 It is additionally alleged that prior to drinking Kubilay’s blood,
Derviş shouted: “Although it is forbidden (haram) by religion, drinking the blood of
this (addressing Kubilay) is legitimate (helal).”589 “When he said this, other perpetrators
drank the blood of the young officer as well.”590 “Derviş subsequently said Allahuekber
with his bloody mouth.”591 It is further stated that Derviş put the head of
Kubilay on a stone in the courtyard of the mosque and said: “You see! Infidels end
up just like this!”592 Nevertheless, none of the perpetrators mentioned such an issue,
nor did the chief judge. Official reports written right after the incident did not mention
any blood either. Clearly, it was a fabrication of republican administrators and
pro-regime newspapers.
Other trivial instances of misinformation about the actions of the perpetrators
include assertions that they fled into the corners of a the Gazez mosque as soon as
support forces arrived at the square.593 However, the onlookers are not reported to
have left the square and hidden in the mosque. Rather, they were still there in the
square when the troops arrived. Although one account alleges that all the remaining
586 Yeni Asır, December 30, 1930; Anadolu, December 24, 1930.
587 “Kubilay Bey’in silahla yaralanması ve sonra da bıçakla başını keserek ve kanını içerek
ellerindeki bayrağa bağlamak suretiyle cürüm ika etmek.” “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:25
Yirmi Beşinci İn’ikat,” 90.
588 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 27; Anday, “Bir Yıldönümü: Kubilay,” in ibid., 141;
Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 604.
589 Özalp and Özalp, Atatürk’ten Anılar, 46–7.
590 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 30.
591 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 27.
592 Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası,” 74.
593 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 30.
143
three perpetrators were seized while trying to flee after the shootout,594 only Mehmet
Emin was captured and the others ran away.
There is wrong information about the attitude of the perpetrators after their
detentions. “The national press described the perpetrators to be in good mood.”595
According to another account, many of the Nakşibendi disciples shouted at the prosecutor
of the martial court saying “You are an infidel! Derviş Mehmet will be resurrected
and kill you!” during the interrogations.596 These assertions do not reflect the
reality and even distort it entirely in certain respects. To start with, contemporaneous
newspapers do not describe dispositions of the detainees all together. The available
evidence indicate that the detainee were concerned about their situation and were
afraid of what would happen to them. They were aware that they would possibly be
condemned to capital punishment. Indeed, officially-biased authors as well knew that
the defendants repeatedly stated their loyalty to the republic, but they evaluated these
statements as the result of the hypocrisy and slyness of the arrestee.597
4.1.10. Literature on Political Reasons of the Incident
Recent accounts about the political motives of the insurgents, likewise, depend
on contemporary newspaper reports. To a large extent, these narrations repeat
those news reports. They do not look for substantial causal connections but insist that
the perpetrators took advantage of the internal and external political conditions of the
era. Some authors mention the general circumstances under which the insurgents
stepped into action while others directly refer to and blame FRP as a primary cause
or instigator.
For instance, the economic situation of the era is indicated as a determinant.
598 Acar states that the great world economic depression of 1929 influenced the
economy of Turkey.599 According to her, some armed groups from Iran crossed Turkey’s
border and raided some villages in Eastern Anatolia in the second half of 1930.
“Those activities strained the relations between the two countries, and Turkey sent
594 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 604.
595 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 78.
596 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 22–23.
597 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 77.
598 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 47; Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet
Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 599–600.
599 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 8.
144
diplomatic notes to Iran a few times. This topic remained on the agenda of the country
until September of 1930. Alongside these external problems, the government was
obliged to tackle the newly founded FRP in domestic policy.”600 However, Acar does
not establish a substantial connection between the Menemen Incident and these developments.
Moreover, she seems to be unaware that FRP was established with the
instructions of Mustafa Kemal. In other words, it emerged under the control of RPP
and not by itself.
Economic conditions are also considered important in other accounts. According
to Öz, the effects of the 1929 great depression and progressively intensifying
social displeasure led the government transit to a multi-party system.601 This explanation
does not make much sense in that the political atmosphere of the country was
already intense. Officially-biased authors describe the repealing of the law on the
maintenance of order (takrîr-i sükûn) on March 1929 as an inception of a more liberal
period. However, for them, the opposition media exploited the freedom of the
press. “Still, although it was absolutely apparent that some press agents abused their
liberty, the government sought to act consistently regarding the freedom of the
press.”602 “[This act] that set the opposition free on the way of democratization in
1930 prompted reactionist circles to step into action to overthrow the republic.”603
“Proceeding to another political stage made the disguised fanatic reactionists think
the conditions were ripe for revolt.”604
“The discontent of the masses became apparent with the foundation of
FRP.”605 The municipal elections of 14 October 1930 triggered debates on FRP’s encouragement
of reactionists. Long discussions took place in the parliament in which
RPP deputies, notably ministers, often mentioned FRP as a reactionist party. For instance,
Interior Minister Şükrü (Kaya) Bey once told that the notion of reactionism
600 Ibid.
601 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 422.
602 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 55. In the long run, on 8 August
1931, the Press Law was introduced and opposition newspapers were prohibited. (T.C.
Resmi Gazete, August 8, 1931.) Surely it was not a consequence of the Menemen Incident,
but a reaction to accumulated criticism of both the RPP administrators and the partisan press.
603 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 257; Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen
Olayı,” 599–600.
604 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 18.
605 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 183.
145
(along with communism and anarchy) was inherent in FRP.606 People’s support for
FRP as opposed to RPP in the Aegean Region allegedly gave hope to cloaked disciples,
607 first and foremost of the Nakşibendi order.608 “The real reason of the Menemen
Incident was the tendency of the people close to FRP to encourage the sheikhs
and followers of the order.”609
Officially-biased accounts vary in their coverage of FRP. While some of
them specifically blame FRP, others indicate that it was innocent in itself, but taken
advantage of. On the one hand, some descriptions assert that although FRP was
founded by people bound to the republic in their hearts, they were unable to prevent
some enemies of the revolution from infiltrating the party organization.610 On the
other hand, penetration of reactionists is regarded unexceptional. “In the party meetings,
the government was plainly being accused; from time to time it was said that
religion was at stake, that women had been uncovered and that wearing the hat became
obligatory. These issues attracted some anti-revolutionist sharia-seekers and
groups to either join the party or to become its partisans. Thus they were provided
the political opportunity to fight for their own ideas.”611 Nevertheless, these writers
give no information about who participated in and manipulated the FRP organization.
This opinion remains as an assumption that lacks both specificity and adequate
support. Some writers also argue that FRP pursued concessive policies that provided
incentive to reactionists in the Aegean Region.612 “The planning of the Menemen Incident
was made possible under these circumstances.”613
The most significant issue within this context is the mayoral elections in
Menemen. Many of the townspeople voted for the candidate of FRP.614 Kurtoğlu
606 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:22 Birinci İn’ikat,” November 1, 1930, 50. The FRP was
linked with the event to such an extent that Ahmet Ağaoğlu, vice chairman of the party, later
commented that they were described as if they participated in Derviş Mehmet’s actions. Son
Posta, January 12, 1931.
607 Kemal Üstün, Devrim Şehidi Öğretmen Kubilay: 60. Yıl (1930-1990) (İstanbul: Çağdaş
Yayınları, 1990), 18.
608 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 27, 32.
609 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 19.
610 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 53.
611 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 601.
612 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 47.
613 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 145; Anday, “Bir Yıldönümü: Kubilay,” in ibid., 142.
614 I could not refer to original sources to double check this information, but according to Öz,
FRP received 1009 votes while PR received 544. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,”
416, 420.
146
makes an unsubstantiated assertion in his thesis. He argues, For him, “as the court
records show, insurgent reactionists considered Menemen an appropriate place [to
initiate revolt] since it was the FRP candidate who won the municipal elections
there.”615 However, such a matter was not brought to the fore in any of the trials.
Tabak makes a similarly unverified assertion: “the prosecutor of the martial court of
Menemen specified in the bill of indictment that insurgents deemed Menemen a suitable
place to achieve their goals since FRP had won the municipal elections
there.”616 However, the prosecutor did not touch upon this issue implicitly or explicitly
as best we can tell from the available evidence.
Eyüp Öz states that “the question of ‘Why Menemen?’ leads us to the identity
of the town as well as to its strong bond with FRP.”617 For Öz, Menemen becomes
prominent with its former intense opposition to the government.618 Nevertheless, this
issue is itself complicated. İsmet Paşa, in his parliament speech, stressed the enlightened
character of the western regions of Turkey, including Menemen, and expressed
his surprise at how such an incident could occur there. This case is recounted by
some others too as follows: “Menemen was not situated in a region from which an
attempt at revolt was expected.”619 Yet, when looking for the political causes of the
incident, the town’s opposition to the government comes to mind. One should make
a distinction between opposing the government religiously, sympathizing with a religious
order, onlooking a demonstration and participating in one actively. Since proportionally
a very small number of the town population participated in Derviş
Mehmet’s actions, the events there had little to do with the general characteristics of
the people of Menemen, as previously explained.
615 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 34, 258.
616 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 316.
617 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 416.
618 Ibid., 425.
619 According to Mazıcı, among the revolts that occurred between 1924 and 1938 only the
Menemen Incident took place in Western Anatolia. She purports that rates of literacy and
economic development were higher in Menemen than in central, eastern and southeastern
Anatolia. Moreover, feudal personages and agencies were less influential there, so the new
regime could easily reach it. She finally concludes that the Menemen Incident is an aberrant
instance of revolts. Her interpretations appear to have been based on suppositions or general
impressions rather than clear information based on an in-depth study. Consequently, the value
of her account remains limited. Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 131. Thus, along
with the previously mentioned officially-biased wrong information, she does not provide
significant contribution to accounts on the event.
147
Öz adds another unverified piece of information. He asserts that according to
the statements made in the trials, all of the defendants were followers of FRP. “They
tended towards the party since they considered it as the sole remedy for their situation.
Thus, the closure of FRP meant for them the collapse of the legitimate political
roof. They then directed their expectations to a call for divine salvation.”620 This is
an unsubstantiated and misleading argument. As mentioned in trials, only a few of
105 defendants were affiliated with FRP. Besides, the chief judge did not regard this
affiliation as an important matter. The judge neither used the party issue as a point in
his considerations nor mentioned it in the final charges and decisions.621
Another argument brought forward in recent works is that the Menemen Incident
was another indicator of the prematurity of the transition to a multi-party system.
622 This point is generally made about the closure of FRP and the failure of that
second attempt to shift to a multi-party system. FRP was accused of being reactionist
and creating an opportunity for reactionists to operate. The Menemen Incident is
viewed in the same equation623 as if it were a politically motivated revolt, planned
and carried out by the remaining followers of FRP. In reality, the perpetrators of the
event had nothing to do with the former FRP or any other political group.
There are also ambiguous arguments in point. According to Mazıcı, the
Menemen Incident occurred under some intersecting conditions. In addition to the
closure of FRP, the Popular Republican Party (Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası), which did
not adopt a reactionist political line, was closed as well by a cabinet decree on 21
December, 1930. The request to establish the Workers and Farmers Party of the Republic
of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi) was also refused, on
the grounds that it tended toward communist purposes. Mazıcı argues that the occurrence
of the Menemen Incident after the termination of those three political projects
is significant.624 Her account holds that there was potential for political opposition in
the country. This potential became manifest in the attempts to establish political par-
620 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 435.
621 Although Eyüp Öz diverges from the officially-biased writers in general, his study involves
misleading or weak information in no small measure. His emphasis on the FRP connection
is a case in point. Öz’s account is discussed in the “Unbiased Accounts” section below.
622 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 581.
623 Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler Ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” 177.
624 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 144.
148
ties. Mazıcı implies that when these initiatives were precluded, oppositional circles
took action in Menemen. This is a misleading and misinformed deduction. Neither
the agents of the incident nor the supposed backstage actors were associated with any
political organization. Such inferences appear to be the consequence of attempts to
portray the incident as a well-rounded revolt, carried out by networks determined to
oppose the regime.
Not all of the officially-biased writers ascribe direct responsibility to FRP for
the Menemen Incident. According to Yazman, for instance, “although critics assert
that it gave rise to the rebellion, FRP was not a reactionist party. It was only indirectly
connected to the incident. FRP opened a road to a broad range of freedom in the
country if for a short time of three months. Under these liberal circumstances, those
who secretly nursed a grudge against the republican revolutions found encouragement
and took off their masks.”625 Yazman continues by mentioning the İzmir meeting
of FRP, held on 7 September, 1930, and to which 50,000 people attended.
Yazman holds that the İzmir meeting revealed how tens of thousands of people
turned against the hat and wished to wear the fes again. “Owing to that meeting, under
the assumption of attracting a wide range of supporters, reactionists chose
Menemen to initiate their revolt.”626
This explanation is weak. Defining the participants’ wish to wear the fes
again in the FRP’s İzmir meeting as an hostile attitude against the republic is not
convincing. Opposing the hat or even the party in power does not mean opposing the
regime itself. Although Yazman tries to make his explanation plausible by not charging
FRP directly, he describes its supporters as potential rebels who, in due time, attempted
a revolt against the republic. Moreover, the link between the participants of
the FRP meeting in İzmir and the Menemen Incident is missing in his argument. He
presumes that secret protagonists of actions against the new regime attended the FRP
meetings and then undertook a rebellion, Yazman does not explain who these protagonists
were and how their opposition evolved into a revolt. Thus, Yazman’s narrative
remains flawed and unconvincing.
Mazıcı as well offers explanations about the conditions that facilitated the
Menemen Incident. “Despite all its efforts, RPP could not lead the country out of the
625 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 234.
626 Ibid., 235.
149
economic crises that occurred after eleven years of war. Additional factors were the
aridity of the summer of 1927 and the impact of the great world depression of 1929.
These adverse conditions affected Western Anatolia partıcularly hard. Under the influence
of these economic troubles, the Menemen townspeople voted for FRP in the
municipal elections. Having fallen short in resolving the country’s economic problems,
RPP adopted a populist policy in order to retain power. RPP appealed to fears
of ‘reactionism and communism’ to condemn FRP indiscriminately. RPP used these
notion provocatively to blame the political alliance that FRP represented and thus
depicted FRP as a meeting ground of anti-republicans and opponents of laicism.”627
Indeed, as previously discussed, Mazıcı offers some officially-biased arguments to
explain the background of the Menemen Incident. This study is not the place to elaborate
on the reasons why people voted for FRP, but one can argue that Mazıcı’s account
about Menemen townspeople’s choice of FRP and why people in general supported
it makes the most sense among the officially-biased recent interpreters of the
Menemen Incident. However, her explanation is ultimately flawed for the same reason.
Asserting that “RPP’s definition of FRP as reactionist stimulated antigovernment
agents to gather under the roof of FRP and prepared the ground for the
Menemen Incident ” is untenable. Mazıcı does not show how and where did the protagonists
of the Menemen Incident connected to opposition leaders affiliated with
FRP.
4.2. Counter-Official and Conspiracy Narrations
The second group of the recent literature about the Menemen Incident differ
from others by their bent on counter-official and conspiratorial arguments. In this
section, I discuss two kinds of narrations. The first one is marked with its contrast to
official arguments as well as reliance on conspiratorial explanations. In order to
claim that the incident occurred in a different way than that described in officiallybiased
accounts, these authors incorporate misinformation peppered with conspiracy
arguments. The second group of accounts are distinguished by containing conspiratorial
arguments predominantly, regardless of being officially-biased or moved by
counter-official concerns.
627 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 140.
150
The counter-official perspective628 stresses that although many years have
passed since the event, it is still used to defame religious figures and Muslims in
general.629 Counter-official authors thus describe the incident as an organized plot
aimed at putting believers and Islamic orders, as well as Islam itself (as a religion) in
a difficult position. In this regard, the initial point of the plotline is a decision of RPP
administrators allegedly made in Bursa, “in the summer of 1930, [when] Şükrü
Kaya, Mahmud Esat Bozkurt, Vasıf Çınar, and other prominent figures of RPP were
staying in a hotel in Bursa.”630
According to the story, Şeyh Esat was also in the city and went to a hotel
across from the one in which RPP leaders stayed. It is alleged that RPP leaders observed
the crowd gathered in front of Şeyh Esat’s hotel, welcoming Esat, presenting
their affection and respect.631 “There, RPP magnates decided to crush all religious
figures, starting with Esat.”632 They had a conversation among themselves as follows:
“It’s time to annihilate those men. An incident shall be stirred up in Menemen
under the guise of rebellion against the regime. Religious protagonists will be
grabbed and crushed one by one.”633 That is to say, Kemalists allegedly condemned
Şeyh Esat much earlier than the Menemen Incident. These authors do not seem to
have been concerned with providing evidence to back their story. Therefore, we do
not have a clue where to check whether such an encounter happened or not.
Counter-official accounts thus describe the event as a staged revolt,634 part of
a game plan to condemn “reactionism.”635 According to Mustafa İslamoğlu, his ar-
628 The first influential author who accounted the event in a counter-official context is Necip
Fazıl Kısakürek. The arguments of subsequent authors are based on his explanations.
629 Recai Kömür, “Menemen İstismarı Artık Bitmeli”, Aksiyon, December 31, 1994,
http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/kapak/menemen-istismari-artik-bitmeli_500412 ; Mustafa Armağan,
“Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit Atıyordu!” Zaman, December 28, 2014,
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazarlar/mustafa-armagan/menemende-ajanlar-ciritatiyordu_
2267024.html
630 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 73.
631 Mustafa İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler ve Menemen Provakasyonu, 7th ed. (İstanbul:
Denge Yayınları, 1998), 78.
632 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 25th ed. (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu
Yayınları, 2009), 159.
633 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 86.
634 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 129.
635 For these writers, “some would show displeasure for the suspicion that the Menemen Incident
was a provocation of the Kemalist regime.” The incident is defined as having been organized
to satisfy both İsmet Paşa’s desire to punish the public for its support of FRP and
Mustafa Kemal’s wish to annihilate the Nakşibendi order. As for FRP, it discovered that the
151
guments “would be described as another conspiracy theory. Those, who will describe
them in that way, believe what the official history and state chroniclers say. However,
there are proofs that demonstrate the presence of some dirty hands in the incident.”
636 “Based on the narration of a certain private, who did his service in the unit
under Kubilay’s command, some secret agents were working undercover in Menemen
in those days. A specific bearded agent was instigating the townspeople on the
day of the event. He was detained but did not appear in the court, and no one ever
saw him again.”637 “Since the perpetrators of the incident did not truly intend to stir
up a revolt, but were rather directed by the state, the work of the secret agent was not
difficult.”638 “The agent in question observed the events in black sheet from afar.”639
Although the narrators of this story refer to people who witnessed or knew about these
situations,640 they neither give names nor provide details. Therefore, this account
of a secret remains a fictional story.
According to these authors, none of the actors engaged in the incident was
qualified to initiate such a religious movement. “In addition to the fact that they utterly
lacked any sort of religious perception and sensibility, the leader of the company
was also an ignorant pervert and psychopath.”641 “All these prove the presence of
a secret background without the need to offer further support.”642 “Kubilay was sacpeople
were yearning for a religious order. Thus, the label of “reactionism” attributed to the
FRP, would be proven through staging “the game of Menemen.” (See Müftüoğlu, Menemen
Vak’ası, 60, 61.; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 93; Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din
Mazlumları, 128.)
636 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 81.
637 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 69. Mustafa Armağan, “Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit
Atıyordu!” This writer remarks that the British ambassador to Ankara at the time reported in
an official document on 4 February, 1931, that a statement of Mustafa Muğlalı, the chief
judge of the martial court, alleged that Şeyh Esat made an explicit declaration in his deathbed
that Lawrence, the famous British agent, was connected with the Menemen Incident.
Armağan thinks that this alleged British document was fabricated to cover the provocation
executed by native secret agents.
638 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 138.
639 Ibid., 140; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 85.
640 Kısakürek even says that one of those witnesses was still alive at the date of his writing.
Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 140; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler.
641 They are also described to not have any sort of association with the Nakşibendi order.
Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83.
642 Misinformation about the actions of the company are also present in these counter-official
writings. The company members are described as having been so raving that hashish addict
Derviş did not content himself with cutting the head off the poor officer but also drank his
blood by handfuls in the manner of a mad man. Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 139;
İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 76.
152
rificed for the sake of this conspiracy. He was deliberately sent in unarmed, with his
privates’ rifles loaded with blanks.”643 In this account, the district wardens are asserted
to have been shot with the bullets of machine guns of support units, and killed in
the confusion.644 “There are witnesses of this last event as well.”645 Nevertheless, the
accuracy of this testimony is doubtful because the witnesses in question are untraceable.
A further allegation is that the perpetrators were shot in the crossfire to do
away with the evidence instead of detaining them.646 The so-called plan involved a
payment to the actors as well. “Those hashish-addicts were given 10,000 liras in exchange
for what they would do. According to the testimonies of someone present
there, Mehmet Emin said: ‘What happened to the money which we were promised to
get?’ when he was apprehended.”647 As the examples above should illustrate, these
narrators who challenge the official accounts do not provide verifiable information
and largely remain conspiracy theorists.
There are some reasonable points in the accounts of these counter-official authors.
They indicate the incapacity of the insurgents to stir up as well-rounded a rebellion
as argued in the officially-biased accounts. They plausibly note the ignorance
and stupidity of the actors,648 though they reach the conclusion that they were directed
by government agents.649 They also mention the implausibility of the overthrowing
of the government by six hashish-addicts and drunks.650 “If the Nakşibendi
order had been the organizer of the alleged rebellion to institute sharia, they would
not assign the task to such ignorant hashish-addicts as Derviş Mehmet, but to respectable
and esteemed persons.”651 “The perpetrators had nothing to do with either
the Nakşibendi order or the Islamic religion. Smoking hashish is out of the question
643 “Kubilay’s lamenters were the ones who sent him to his very death.” İslamoğlu, Devrimlere
Tepkiler, 87.
644 Ibid., 76.
645 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 67.
646 The exaggeration here is that this way of removing proof is similar to the methods employed
by the CIA, KGB and MOSSAD. İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 87.
647 Ibid., 82.
648 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83.
649 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 140.
650 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 97. In a former interview published in Zaman, 25 December
1988, Kubilay’s daughter-in-law Müzeyyen is claimed to have said: “The killers of
Kubilay were a few hashish-addicts. Yet, because of several bad seeds, all Muslims have
been tarnished, I’m against this.” Mustafa Armağan, “Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit Atıyordu!”
651 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83.
153
for a Muslim.”652 İslamoğlu further argues that the government was aware of the
perpetrators beforehand, and their families had reported them to the police.653 “Şeyh
Esat was under surveillance as well.”654 İslamoğlu stresses that the prosecutor based
his charges regarding the incident, which was carried out by six hashish-addicts, on a
ridiculous assertion655 and the court ascribed the responsibility of the incident to the
Nakşibendi order in an unlawful way.656
Within this context, counter-official accounts indicate that the real purpose of
carrying out the incident was to destroy the Nakşibendi order, frustrate religious
people,657 and annihilate notable religious figures,658 Şeyh Esat especially.659 The assertion
here is that Şeyh Esat did not die a natural death due to his old age and disease,
but was murdered.660 “As he could not be legally executed because of his age,
the executioners of the government resorted to murder.”661 Nevertheless, Şeyh Esat
was already eighty-four years old at the time and was so ill that during the trials he
was excused by the chief judge several times to rest. The idea that he was murdered
by state officers lacks any sort of substantial proof and hence it remains merely a
rumor.
652 Recai Kömür, “Menemen İstismarı Artık Bitmeli.”
653 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 87.
654 Kısakürek explains on this issue basing upon Saraçoğlu’s account. Kısakürek, Son Devrin
Din Mazlumları, 144.
655 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 97.
656 İslamoğlu says that anyone who wish to write the history of “radical irreligiousness” and
to know how cheap life is in Turkey should read the prosecutor’s opinion as to the accusations
that justify the death sentences issued in the Menemen Incident. Ibid., 103.
657 It is alleged that İsmet Paşa, as usual, incriminated all Muslims in his parliament speech
on January 1, 1931. Ibid., 77; This is not true. The prime minister did not condemn all Muslims.
He disparaged the actors who had been seeking to use religion as a means to intervene
in the political arena. Furthermore, for Eyüp Öz, Jewish Jözef’s sentence with capital punishment
for applauding the demonstrations of Derviş Mehmet and his followers was “a price
paid in the name of all non-Muslims.” Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 429.
658 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 128–9.
659 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 75.
660 Kısakürek alleges that Şeyh Esat’s food was poisoned several times, but “they” obtained
no result, except that, he became sicker. Later, they injected poison with a syringe to his
body at night, finishing Şeyh Esat off and reaching their goal. Kısakürek mentiones that this
information is based on rumors and there is no document to justify these news, but he adds
that the logic of the flow of events leaves no room for doubt. Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din
Mazlumları, 160–1.
661 İslamoğlu says: “What I have heard from Şeyh Esat’s old disciples, who were dedicated
to him, agrees with the news of his being martyred by poison injection.” İslamoğlu, Devrimlere
Tepkiler, 116.
154
These counter-official conspiracy theorists express significant points regarding
the contradictions of the accusations against the entire Nakşibendi order. However,
their arguments are flawed for defining the incident as a plot and disregarding the
crowd in the square. They ignore the people’s implicit or explicit acclamation and
support during the event. It was this support that invited the government’s harsh response.
The counter-official accounts discount the rationale behind the government’s
reaction and hold that “the republic showed extreme injustice, in punishing and
hanging many people regardless of their involvement in the incident, [making one
think of] a state terrorism”662
The republican regime had no tolerance for someone manipulating people
with political-religious promises such as establishing a caliphate regime, abolishing
the Hat Act, and the like. An even more unbearable matter was people’s putting their
support behind such movements. Thus, the regime wished to give a clear and intimidating
message to everyone, particularly religious orders, so they would not dare to
attempt such a rebellion.
Counter-official authors also suppose that the republican regime aimed to annihilate
the sufi orders for good. According to these authors, “the regime was the enemy
of the activities of all sufi orders.”663 However, this is not true. As even the authors
in question stress, state officers knew that the sufi organizations were still active.
Moreover, they remained alive after the incident as well. Thus, the suggestion
that the regime aimed to destroying all sufi and other religious activities is misleading.
The second category of this section covers the totally fictive arguments, regardless
of official or counter-official perspectives. The accounts of Atilhan and
Küçük top the list.664 For Atilhan, the incident was “a game planned by Zionist anarchists
who used thousands of Nakşibendis as an instrument and made them play it
662 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 77.
663 Ibid., 102.
664 Cevat Rıfat Atilhan (d. 1967) was a former military man and ideological writer. He wrote
hundreds of articles and books from such ideological perspectives such Turkism, pan-
Islamism as well as anti-Semitism. Yalçın Küçük (b. 1930), has similarly adopted quite various
ideological positions ranging from Marxism to Nationalism. He writes on political and
historical issues.
155
through using their naiveté and ignorance.”665 According to Atilhan, “the main purpose
of the event was to blacken religion and religious figures in the eyes of the rising
generation. Aegean people considered the abolition of FRP an affair of honor.
Their dissatisfaction of the government grew day by day. Thus, it posed a danger for
İnönü. Consequently, to frighten as well as to win the favor of the Aegeans, İnönü
prepared a scenario of insurrection with the help of a few free-mason deputies.
Nakşibendis were unwittingly used as a means of Zionist ideals and enabled İnönü
and other masons to remain in power for many years.”666
Yalçın Küçük describes the incident as a mission, prepared and launched to
set the Kemalist regime right. “An anti-regime revolt was considered necessary in
order to discipline the society and suppress economic distress. Kubilay was deliberately
sent to his death so that the government could bring its opponents to their heel
and legitimate its oppressive regime.”667 Despite the ungrounded content of these
conspiracy theories, they are recounted in proto-academic writings. For instance,
Mazıcı remarks “although Küçük’s interpretations may seem to be speculative exaggerations,
he makes thought-provoking points. ‘Why was an unarmed reserve officer
with a few days of experience of military service sent to intervene’ is an important
question. Another point is why the rifles of Kubilay’s troops did not have real bullets
when the rebels could gather 1500 people around themselves.”668
The criticisms previously mentioned are also applicable for the last two authors.
Rather than providing substantial proof to support their claims, they choose to
speculate on the origin of the event and provide misleading, unverified and unverifiable
information. While these accounts avoid the black-and-white thinking of the officially-
biased or counter-official authors in their effort to draw a general picture and
to capture the essence of the event, they can only produce basically fictional stories.
4.3. Unbiased Accounts
The accounts discussed here do not generally approach the Menemen Incident
within narrow boxes as do the officially-biased or counter-official accounts. For
instance, none of these researchers depict the purposes attributed to the perpetrators
665 Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, Menemen Hadisesinin İç Yüzü (İstanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1968),
50.
666 Ibid.
667 Yalçın Küçük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989), 236–7.
668 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 141.
156
as feasible –such as occupying Ankara and other cities or re-establishing the caliphate.
In this sense, instead of describing the incident as a rebellion threatening the
very existence of the republic, they seek to understand the causal relations within and
behind the events discussed under the heading of the Menemen Incident. They also
do not have a biased perspective and do not make normative-ideological interpretations.
Therefore, these attentive scholarly works deserve to be examined one by one.
The unique interpretations and arguments of this thesis will also be discussed alongside
the relevant issues.
4.3.1. Hamit Bozarslan
Bozarslan is the first scholar who elaborated on the primary sources academically
and brought forward path-breaking arguments against officially-biased and
counter-official accounts. However, Bozarslan’s explanations have weak points as
well. Intended to focus on the event as a “millenarian movement,” Bozarslan discusses
it in political, economic and religious terms. One of his main arguments is that
even though the perpetrators of the revolt were associated with the order, “it was a
local event rather than a rebellion.”669
Bozarslan explains the circumstances which led to the incident. For him, one
of the reasons why people, particularly villagers, provided support in different degrees
was that a social banditry tradition was still alive in the region.670 However,
Bozarslan appears to be taking this point for granted. Bozarslan does not give reference
to a primary or secondary sources that would help establish the existence of
bandits and familiarity with bandits in this region.
According to Bozarslan, immigrants from Crete composed a large part of region’s
population. “Those immigrants were under pressure to gain acceptance by the
native population. The region was suffering from the economic effects of the Great
World Depression of 1929. In addition, taxes were high and peasants were in a really
difficult situation. Moreover, the climate of the region at the time was arid, and
floods occurred and killed many people while leaving many more of them home-
669 Hamit Bozarslan, “Messianisme et mouvement social&: l’événement de Menemen en Turquie
(décembre 1990),” Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-
Iranien, no. 11 (1991): 79.
670 Hamit Bozarslan, “Le madhisme en Turquie&: L’«&incident de Menemen&» en 1930,” Revue
des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée, no. 91–94 (2000): 303.
157
less.”671 Bozarslan underlines that these factors enhanced the people’s perception of
the era as a chaotic one and raised their expectation of a messiah. Nevertheless, he
does not give references to primary sources nor he provides detailed information
about the extent to which these natural disasters affected the lives of people so much
so that they came to expect a sacred savior. He does not substantially frame the conditions
of the region as he describes them. He also does not establish the readiness of
the people for such a messianic proclamation. He does not provide sufficient information
to support his claim that the people of Menemen and the surrounding West
Anatolian regions believed that they were living in the end of times (ahir zaman).
Bozarslan states that a large part of the population perceived that the republican
regime was fighting an open war against religion.672 This aspect of Bozarslan’s
argument is correct. A common displeasure against the government’s religious policies
might be indicated as a general reason for some people to show support. Indeed,
the RPP’s policy of laicism would remain the subject of debate for a very long period
in Turkish history. The transformation from a lifestyle, which was largely defined in
religious terms, into a secularist political system and culture generated a perception
among the religiously and culturally conservative people that their religion was at
risk. This point thus explains to a significant degree why some people supported or
acclaimed the actions of Derviş Mehmet and his friends. For Bozarslan, within this
context, although major signs of the end of the world in Islamic literature, such as the
sunrise from the west and sunset from the east, did not occur, there was tangible evidence
to conclude that the Dajjal673 had come and that his name was Mustafa Kemal.
674
Furthermore, according to Bozarslan, “Fethi Okyar was seen as a political
messiah, a savior certainly unexpected but desired. However, Okyar was betrayed, or
worse, betrayed his followers by leaving them alone to face their destiny. In Menemen,
a town which had acclaimed FRP in the municipal elections of 1930, the religious
messiah had only to take on the role of political messiah to fulfill the hopes of
671 Ibid., 303–5.
672 Ibid., 306.
673 Dajjal, comparable to Antichrist, is an evil figure in Islamic eschatology. It is believed
that he will emerge on Earth at the end of times and will deceive people to deflect them from
the right way.
674 Bozarslan, “Le Madhisme en Turquie,” 305.
158
the crowd.”675 Nevertheless, these last statements of Bozarslan are not grounded on
facts. Although Derviş plainly stressed the infidelity of RPP leaders, no record indicates
that he mentioned the word “Dajjal.” In fact, Bozarslan can not point to a single
official record or perpetrator statement or another source that would help him verify
his point. Similarly, he can not produce any source that shows the perception of Fethi
Okyar as a political Messiah.
Indeed, Bozarslan’s attempt to offer an esoteric explanation for the incident
remains ungrounded in general. The villagers’ hosting of Derviş did not derive from
their expectations of a sacred savior but from their relationship and acquaintance
with him and his followers. Still, the reason behind a small proportion of the Menemen
townspeople’s seeming approval of Derviş Mehmet can be explained in terms of
their disappointments and displeasure of the republican policies –rather than their
specific anticipation of the Mahdi. Indeed, if the people had truly expected the emergence
of the Mahdi and had followed Derviş Mehmet for that reason, they would
have dedicated themselves to him sincerely and would not have hesitated to engage
in a gun battle with law enforcement agencies.
The actions of the company were parts of a sacred ritual, according to
Bozarslan. “They codified a discrete language for communication. It was incomprehensible
to persons outside the group.”676 But not a single piece of supporting information
is present on their using of a communication code. Bozarslan argues that the
company’s smoking of hashish was also a part of their messianic ritual, “as seen in
some Christian messianic experiences.”677 He takes Derviş’s presumed saying, “It's a
sin to drink blood, but his blood is lawful," for granted as well and makes further
contrived interpretations.678 For him, Kubilay’s beheading signals a return to the pre-
Abrahamic age, in the sense that Derviş, in company with the crowd’s applause,
transformed the killing of Kubilay into an ethereal sacrifice.679 These assertions indicate
a break from the factual base. As a matter of fact, the gathering of townspeople
around Derviş, though they were very small in number, emboldened him to carry out
675 Ibid., 308.
676 Ibid., 299.
677 Ibid.
678 For instance, Bozarslan recounts in his study that 1000 people gathered in the town
square. He also relates uncritically the words Mehmet Emin allegedly uttered when he was
detained, saying, “Derviş Mehmet will rise again. He will kill you all.” Ibid., 300, 302.
679 Ibid., 300.
159
such a gruesome murder. However, he neither said Kubilay’s blood was lawful nor
drank it. With reference to these cases, Bozarslan’s decision to assert the messianic
aspects of the event influences his interpretation of the rumors as fact. His effort to
set the actual happenings in a metaphysical messianic framework is ultimately unproductive.
Another claim of Bozarslan from the same perspective is the inability of Kemalist
leaders to understand the violent incident in messianic terms. “Since they did
not realize the eschatological nature of the event, they interpreted it as an act of subversion,
a plot against the existence of the government.”680 Nevertheless, the event
was understood by RPP leaders very well. It was a naive attempt at rebellion, carried
out by ignorant, senseless insurgents who frequently smoke hashish and acted in impertinent
ways. The government’s real reaction to the incident, including hanging
twenty-eight people regardless of their substantial engagement in the events,
amounted to a warning to everyone who would dare to initiate such a revolt, particularly
in religious terms, and to people who would in any way participate in or approve
of such an undertaking. In this regard, his expression that “the Kemalist government
decided to overcome the Menemen townspeople’s acute cry of insurrection”
is an exaggeration.
For Bozarslan, the government showed an unprecedented rage against FRP
and opposition media as well as sufi circles.681 However, the harsh response of the
government was not as unprecedented as Bozarslan states. A strict polarization affected
the political atmosphere of the era and increased tensions. Conflicts between
newspapers and the statements of RPP deputies make this situation clear. Bozarslan’s
expression of “the defense of the revolution” was already going on. All the opposition
elements, including the members of FRP and opposition media, were under severe
criticism. Bozarslan’s argument that the government did not prioritize determining
individual guilt after the incident however, appears reasonable. As he puts it, “the
case, though conducted within the legal process, turned out to be an exemplary instance
of revolutionary justice.”682
680 Ibid., 308.
681 Ibid., 301.
682 Ibid., 302.
160
4.3.2. Eyüp Öz
Eyüp Öz, a student of Bozarslan, basically seeks to expand Bozarslan’s arguments.
For him as well, the incident was local in nature and there is no reliable
proof of external connections of sufi orders or to Şeyh Esat.683 Still, his main purpose
in the article is to discuss the causes which led the people of the district to support or
acclaim Derviş in various ways as well as the motivations of the perpetrators in initiating
such a revolt. Some of Öz’s explanations are neither verifiable nor falsifiable,
because there is no reliable primary or secondary source to rely on. Other assertions
of Öz appear mistaken. For him, the reasons behind the uncertainties of Giritli
Mehmet stem from his depiction as a pawn in both official and opposition accounts
of the event. However, Öz asserts that examining his past reveals a fragile and disturbed
portrait.684
In a similar vein to Bozarslan, Öz states that immigrants composed a vast
amount of Menemen’s population685 and were having housing problems as well as
being marginalized by local residents. Therefore, they tended towards sufi orders,
expecting acceptance and support.686 Indeed, an immigrant crowd of people might
try to adapt to local organizations. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, such accounts
remain to be guesses or suppositions. There is no evidence that indicates the general
orientation of the district’s people towards sufi orders. Thus, the assertion that this
notion contributed to the Menemen Incident in terms of both the perpetrators and the
locals remains unconvincing.
As for the specific motivations of the insurgents, Öz suggests that conditions
such as “poverty, all kinds of illegitimacy, prostitution, homicide, family violence,
and the sale and use of drugs” might have influenced Manisa’s immigrant neighborhoods.
“In order to ensure their security and to use in case of need, residents of these
poor quarters were carrying weapons. Thus, Giritli Mehmet and his disciples’ smoking
hashish does not conflict with their social status and environment. The assassina-
683 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 421.
684 Ibid., 412.
685 Öz says the population was approximately 30,000, and yet it was the sum of the entire
township. The town itself had a population of 12,000 people. Still, the number of residents is
not the problem. It must be noted that a very small proportion attended Derviş’s demonstrations
anyway, irrespective of the size of the town’s population. Otherwise, one would pave
the way for the perception that the incident was a rebellion in which the townspeople of
Menemen participated widely.
686 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 426.
161
tion of Kubilay might be defined as a type of violence generated with regards to the
circumstances under which Derviş lived. Although Öz alleges that local newspaper
reports support his accounts, he does not give reference to those primary sources.
Thus, his reference point and further arguments in this line remain ambiguous.687
Öz offers details about the social structures of the villages as well. For him,
“the number of foreclosures was incredible in size, so much so that villages had
turned into uninhabitable places. Local newspapers had notices of thousands of acres
of peasant lands in Manisa villages, including the land of Derviş’s wife, put on sale
in exchange for unpaid loans.”688 For Öz, this issue “directly documents” the connection
between the crisis of the agricultural sector and the event itself. It is also a reasonable
answer to the question why Derviş was welcomed with respect, according to
Öz. That is to say, Derviş Mehmet was elevated to become the religiously identified
leader of peasants whose land had been seized, in terms of Öz’s explanations.
Another argument that Öz makes is that “deficiencies of the Menemen Municipality’s
infrastructure services created another problem for the people. Access to
drinking water was a particularly acute problem.”689 Öz is under the impression that
“it is truly tiresome to stand in long lines to water fetch from a few fountains. Epidemics,
marshes, transportation problems and natural disasters like floods occurred
in the autumn of 1930, killing tens of people. Government support and relief efforts
were inadequate and victims became helpless.”690 These were other issues from
which the people of the region suffered, according to Öz.
Öz claims that although FRP had been closed, its “associates” remained active.
“Under the stress of the government’s extreme surveillance, these masses were
inclined to keep their ears open to any antagonist voice. Under these circumstances,
several mahdis emerged in various Anatolian provinces and Derviş Mehmet was one
of them.691 This point appears entirely speculative. It does not rest on any source or
study that demonstrates the occurrence of similar claims of Mahdism, comparable to
Derviş Mehmet’s emergence, in those years.
687 Ibid., 427.
688 Ibid., 427–8.
689 Ibid., 428.
690 Ibid., 428, 430.
691 Ibid., 424–5.
162
Following Bozarslan’s lead, Öz also expresses that Derviş Mehmet appeared
after the political Mahdi, namely Fethi Okyar, since the latter was welcomed in the
Aegean regions as a savior.692 This statement is partly correct. Okyar had been met
with great excitement and expectations, primarily due to economic reasons. However,
Okyar himself did not seem to have wished to be regarded as such a savior. What
is more important is that Derviş Mehmet did not receive much support.” The incident
took place within only a few hours. His intentions were wildly imaginary and unrealistic.
He was by no means able to actualize what he promised. Thus, such comparison
with FRP experience remains quite far-fetched.
Öz adds other reasons to the political ones to explain the messianic expectations
of the people. “1930 was an extraordinary year. It was a time in which great
crises, cultural breaks and state coercion were at their highest level. These factors
were conceived as signs of the end of the world. Thus, expectations of the emergence
of the Mahdi naturally arose.”693 However, the inference that all these troubles piled
up in such an extraordinary degree as to create an expectation of a sacred savior still
remains an unsubstantiated argument. According to the arguments of Öz and
Bozarslan, the villagers hosted the company and the townspeople of Menemen welcomed
Derviş since they considered him as the rescuer who would change their dire
situations. In other words, those people are described as if they would not have questioned
whether Derviş Mehmet had the qualifications and the potential to address
their difficulties. Without taking Derviş and his company’s smoking hashish, ignorance
and pennilessness into consideration, Öz and Bozarslan allege people followed
him blindly. By doing so, Öz and Bozarslan repeat the mistake of officially-biased
accounts. In the villages of Bozalan and Paşa, there were relatives of Derviş himself
as well as of his followers. In other words, kinship and acquaintance were the ultimate
determinants of the company’s being hosted as well as the reason why they
were not denounced. Villagers’ bonds of kinship and mutual acquaintance precluded
them from reporting the armed group’s suspicious positions to law enforcement
agencies. It must be noted that the villagers’ silence on this issue does not indicate
their disloyalty to the state. If they had truly turned against the state and dedicated
themselves to Derviş Mehmet as a savior in religious terms, they would have fol-
692 Ibid., 429–30.
693 Ibid., 430.
163
lowed him on his subsequent actions or at least strengthened his hand as much as
they could. In addition, the company was able to remain uncaught since no law enforcement
officers was on duty in these villages. Though a certain villager of Bozalan
assured them that they would arm themselves and come for assistance if needed,
nobody left his village or joined the group in any way. Derviş Mehmet’s mother-inlaw
even warned him and asked him not to proceed.
Economic distress can not be offered as the main reason why some townspeople
followed Derviş Mehmet in Menemen. It is an abstract explanation. One
needs to show specifically how economic distress moved a part of townspeople in
Menemen to follow some armed strangers. Those who put forward the economic
misery of people as a cause, do not provide testable data.
The rationale behind the participation of a small number of the townspeople
in Derviş Mehmet’s demonstrations has to be sought in several overlapping factors.
The initial point is the company’s religious statements. Öz reasonably argues that the
people’s reaction to the republic’s policies regarding religion was one of the strongest
causes of opposition at the time.694 The group’s promise of re-establishing the caliphate
and reinstating sharia must have had an effect on people. Nevertheless, it
does not suffice on its own to explain people’s support. While wandering around in
the neighborhoods and meeting in the town square, the insurgents declared that an
army of the caliphate consisting of 70,000 soldiers, had captured İstanbul as well as
İzmir, and now surrounded Menemen. They moreover purported to have cut the
communication lines, and stated that the entrances to and exits from the town were
under their control. These declarations must have excited and affected some of the
townspeople to different extents but enough to persuade some of them to follow the
armed Derviş Mehmet. Some of them must have believed these claims. The insurgents’
threats against the townspeople, in that anyone who would not get under the
banner would be slaughtered by mid-day. Under the influence of such rumors and
threats spreading by word of mouth, some people probably wondered whether they
would regret participating in the group or not. Those who were indecisive remained
to stand still nearby and watched the events unfold. However, a very high number of
inhabitants chose to stay at home. When one considers that there was not an armed
intervention until the battalions with machine guns arrived 3,5 hours after the begin-
694 Ibid., 428.
164
ning of the demonstrations, some people’s gathering around the insurgents does not
become a surprise. The delay of intervention in the demonstrations enhanced the influence
of the insurgents’ words. Even so, the crowd was not determined to stay in
the square at any cost, but was inclined to disperse. When the shooting started, people
ran away. No one remained behind to become engaged in the gun battle with military
units. There was not a single defendant in the trials charged with joining in the
insurgents during the gunfight. It could be asserted that if Kubilay had not been murdered
with such brutality, the gathered crowd would not have constituted such a
problem in the eyes of the PRR leaders.
As for political consequences, Öz accounts that the incident became an opportunity
“served on a silver platter for the government. The RPP government turned
the crisis into an opportunity and was able to overcome the strong dynamics that favored
the opposition, particularly the former FRP. The opportunity allowed RPP to
justify suppressive policies.”695 Öz’s remarks make good sense to a certain extent.
The characterization of FRP as a reactionist coalition was commonplace. In the political
atmosphere of the era, RPP members condemned any dissenting opinion, criticism
or critic as the enemy of the republic. Thus, they pointed to the occurrence of
such an incident of the one in Menemen as evidence of the reality of the threat of reactionism.
Nevertheless, it might be unfair as well as irrational to allege that the RPP
government, in a sense, enjoyed the political consequences of the incident. On the
contrary, such an attempt of revolt, carried out with religious zeal, was precisely
what the RPP did not want. İsmet Paşa’s statements on what the laic state meant was
significant, particularly his emphasis that it did not amount to a notion of antireligiousness.
In İsmet Paşa’s review, laicism was the opposite of irreligiousness in
that it assured people to live their religion under the over-sight of the government.
İsmet Paşa’s words and similar statements neither relieved the culturally and religiously
conservative masses of their worries nor made them embrace the government’s
laicist policies. Still, RPP leaders insisted on this line of policy and had no
tolerance for any initiation of religiously motivated political movements. This was
the reason why the Menemen townspeople were so harshly blamed to have allowed
such an attempt.
695 Ibid., 436.
165
4.3.3. Umut Azak
Umut Azak’s study presents the most reasonable and modest account of the
incident. Her research does not include exaggerations or unsubstantiated causal
chains like those of Bozarslan and Öz. She mentions that her account differs from the
Islamist as well as the Kemalist narrations of the rebellion. Azak initially gives a
brief summary of the recent political history of the republic, including the attempts to
shift to a multi-party system, the Şeyh Said Rebellion, the Law on the Maintenance
of Order, and other key incidents or developments. She then outlines the different
phases of the Menemen Incident.
Her account of the rebels’ activities is largely based on the speeches they
made during the trials. Though she offers a fair summary of the event, there is some
misleading information as well in her narrative. For instance, she states that the guns
of Commander Fahri Bey, who came to scatter the crowd prior to Kubilay, and his
unit did not have real bullets. Here Azak implies that Fahri Bey and his battalion
might have shot at the company. If so, Derviş Mehmet did not get hurt because of the
use of blank cartridges and he appeared to have proved at least for a short time his
invulnerability. Thus the crowd in the square applauded him.696 However, the evidence
of hand shows that Fahri Bey went to the government building and did not
stay in the square or intervene to halt the demonstration when Derviş paid no heed to
him.
Another misinformation in her study is that Kubilay was shot in the leg by
Derviş.697 Actually, he was shot in the chest. After Derviş beheaded Kubilay, as
Azak accounts with reference to secondary literature, “he displayed his head to the
crowd and received an acclamation in return.”698 However, there is no reliable information
on this point in the primary sources and it is most likely a myth fabricated
afterwards.699
Azak asserts, “apparently shaken by the violence of the rebels and the people’s
alleged collaboration with them, the government aimed to restore its authori-
696 Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 30.
697 Ibid.
698 Ibid.
699 In addition, the extent to which this crowd remained standing in the square when Kubilay
was shot and Derviş beheaded him is equally uncertain.
166
ty.”700 In fact, the RPP leaders did not seek to restore the government’s authority because
the situation was brought under control immediately as there were merely six
perpetrators in the so-called rebellion.701 Rather, the government aimed at the intimidation
of both the public and the religious figures. Azak as well purports that it was
the alleged collaboration of the people with the insurgents that disturbed the political
leaders most.702 And yet, the vital point of the matter is not just the assertions about
townspeople having provided support. Government officials knew the extent to
which people gathered in the square to spectate Derviş’s acts or to participate in
them. The government’s harsh response non-compliance of the people with the warnings
of gendarme officers and their applause and acclamation of Derviş. In other
words, the collective stance of some townspeople typically met with a punitive reply
of the government.
According to Azak, RPP leaders truly regarded the incident as a reactionist
rebellion, a real threat the state overcame. “The political leadership saw the still vibrant
social network of the tarikat, despite the formal ban on them since 1925, as a
major threat to the state’s authority, and was convinced that the rebellion was
planned by Nakşibendi sheikhs who used Derviş Mehmet as a pawn.”703 Nevertheless,
Azak misses the point that the government knew well that certain sufi orders
continued to exist even after their formal ban. Thus, it was not the case that RPP
leaders realized all of a sudden after the Menemen Incident that these orders, particularly
the Nakşibendis, survived underground. It is clear from the situation that the second
phase of the judicial process mostly aimed at the prosecution of the Nakşibendis
in a small part of the country. In other words, the situation did not turn into a hunt
of the Nakşibendis and other followers of sufi orders all over the nation as Azak asserts.
704
700 Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 31.
701 Azak uses the term “rebellion” to describe the incident. I believe the events that made up
this incident can not be defined as a rebellion, as if they enjoyed the backing of a large number
of people engaged in various forms of social and political conflicts, including violent
confrontation with law-enforcement agencies. Defining the Menemen Incident as “an attempt
at rebellion” makes more sense.
702 Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 31.
703 Ibid., 35.
704 For her, the state leaders desired a general campaign against underground tarikat activities.
Ibid.
167
Azak emphasizes the lack of evidence indicating the Nakşibendi order’s role
in the incident.705 For her, “the link between the group of Derviş Mehmet and
sheikhs in the upper echelons of the Nakşibendi order remains obscure”706 and “there
is no evidence that Derviş Mehmet planned the rebellion in collaboration with larger
sufi networks. Prosecutor’s claim in this regards, that Şeyh Esat not only engaged in
the events but was also the leader of the riot is unproven.”707 In other words, the incident
“was neither a plot of Şeyh Esat in İstanbul to overthrow the secular government
nor a plot of the latter to oppress the Nakşibendis. It was an attempt at local rebellion
conducted by minor and local members of the Nakşibendi order.”708
Azak also indicates that the reason why insurgents chose Menemen as the
town to introduce their rebellion is unknown. “Neither the court speeches of the three
companions of Derviş Mehmet nor the final indictment of the prosecutor include any
substantial detail which could explain these points.”709 The reason why the company
headed for Menemen is indeed obscure, but not so significant. This is to say, the actions
of Derviş and his followers did not derive from sound minds. It is not very reasonable
to look for logic in the acts of those hashish smokers as if they could have
taken all their steps thoughtfully. Searching for a higher rationale behind all their
deeds is pointless. Having taken courage from being hosted by his relatives and acquaintances
in the neighboring villages, Derviş might have really supposed that Saffet
Hoca would welcome and protect them in Menemen. In this way, he might have
dreamt of occupying the district governorate and taking the military forces under his
control. There does not seem to be a clear motive for Derviş to choose Menemen
aside from these premises.
As an answer to the writings that put responsibility on the former FRP for the
incident, she expresses that there is no proof of a connection between FRP and the
705 However, when defining the Nakşibendi order, she recounts that it played an important
role in the Kurdish rebellion led by Şeyh Said. Ibid., 23. This statement is misleading in that
the order as such was a major and country-wide organization. Tarikat connections might
have had an influence on such an anti-government movement. However, “the Nakşibendi order”
refers to a widespread esoteric religious organization in nature. When one says it played
a role in a political movement, one has to be careful not to create the misleading impression
that the order, as a whole, including all its members, participated in that movement or event
and supported it.
706 Ibid., 27.
707 Ibid., 31, 36.
708 Ibid., 38.
709 Ibid., 30.
168
participants of the Menemen uprising.710 As evidence for her argument, Azak mentions
that FRP was closed one month before the incident. This is a plausible but insufficient
explanation. She needed to show as well that there is not a single piece of
evidence indicating a concrete relationship between members of FRP and any of the
perpetrators or their alleged incentives in all the substantial materials available to us
on the incident –as already indicated above in the present work.
In explaining the motives of the insurgents, Azak states: “We can only suggest
that the rebels might have been inspired by the general expression of social and
economic dissatisfaction and the consequent support that the masses extended to the
opposition party in their region.”711 Her argument that insurgents had been affected
by people’s general dissatisfaction is not substantial, as discussed in the previous
sections in detail above. It makes more sense to argue that they were deceived by
themselves rather than that they were encouraged by people’s probable support. Having
been doped up under the influence of hashish, they must have fancied that the six
of them would suffice to an attempt of a revolt that would attract people’s support –
although nobody from the villages had joined in them.
Azak emphasizes that the people believed in Derviş to be the Mahdi and thus,
hosted him. For her, villagers might have believed in Derviş not because of their
mere expectance of a random savior but since they had been familiar with the notion,
located in common vocabulary of Islamic belief.712 Azak explains that, whether they
recognized or not, the villagers’ help to Derviş possibly rested upon their opinion
that Islam needed to be restored.713 Azak plausibly describes that “the villages where
the rebellious group camped were the villages of their close relatives,” but, “the real
motive of those who hosted the rebels is difficult to discern.”714 Indeed, the extent to
which the villagers believed in Derviş is a significant question since not a single one
of them joined the company. The group merely stayed in villages, where they were
hosted and provided with basic provisions. Villagers did not prepare to become collectively
engaged in an upcoming revolt. Moreover, the company practiced their
710 Ibid., 25.
711 Ibid.
712 She stresses that “a messianic expectation, i.e. the belief in the Mahdi who will come to
redeem the world and to render it just, as the prophet Muhammed once did, has been part
and parcel of both Shiite and Sunni traditions in Islam.” Ibid., 26.
713 Ibid., 27.
714 Ibid.
169
zikrs in a cottage where they lived on their own. Peasants did not attend the group’s
rituals. Therefore, it is quite implausible to infer that villagers believed Derviş
Mehmet to be the Mahdi. In fact, it is quite probable that they grew suspicious of the
group. Within this context, the most distinct reason why the villagers hosted them
and not reported them to law enforcement agencies appears to be their kinship ties
and acquaintance.
She asks why and in what ways the Menemen Incident deviates from other
rebellions, since it has been commemorated more than the others. Her reply in this
regard is that Kubilay has been iconized within Kemalist memory since the case of
his beheading “revived the fear of reactionary Islam (irtica).”715 Her expression of
Kemalist commemoration of Kubilay as an icon is very accurate and demonstrates
the significance of the topic. However, whose fear the beheading awakened is quite
ambiguous. It would not make much sense to assert that the RPP leaders, including
Mustafa Kemal, were concerned about reactionism arising as a great threat to the
state. There did not exist not country-wide antagonist organizations that watched for
an opportunity to initiate a revolt. Nor was there a domestic disturbance in the country.
Law enforcement agencies were not fighting against reactionist rebels.
Still, it does not mean that culturally and religiously conservative people were
pleased with RPP’s policies regarding religion. The state had established his control
of religious institutions and no reactionist organization constituted a threat to it.
Therefore, Azak needed to explain her point if she had in mind certain social groups,
that had embraced secularism culturally and politically, and felt threatened by armed
reactionism after the incident. In other words, the argument that the Menemen Incident
ignited the fear of reactionism in RPP’s social base needs to be reconsidered.
Reactionism had been on RPP’s agenda for quite a while. Pro-government newspapers
promoted it and presented reactionism as an enemy of the state as well as of the
nation. Thus, it is more sensible to argue that the RPP government considered the
beheading of its officers as a challenge to state authority rather than remarking that
Kubilay’s beheading renewed the fear of reactionism. For the government, the event
was another proof of the damage that reactionism did and could do to the nation.
Azak’s statements about the Kemalist regime’s use of Kubilay as a martyr appeals
sounder. For her, “the Kemalist regime institutionalized the memory of the Menemen
715 Ibid., 22.
170
Incident and used the martyrdom of Kubilay as a tool of national mobilization and
reinstatement of its authority vis-à-vis the continuing popularity of tarikats.”716
4.3.4. Barış Ertem
Barış Ertem is another researcher who made an important contribution to
studies on Menemen Incident. His study as well relies on archival records. Ertem uses
the documents competently and presents an unbiased summary of the incident. His
main argument is that the Menemen Incident did not only leave a brutal and bitter
mark, but also became one of the factors which retarded the building of a multi-party
political system and reflection of the national will to the ballot box until the 1950s.717
Ertem states this argument at the end of his article, but his study does not support this
conclusion compellingly. Though plausible, his study is a short summary of the actions
of the perpetrators, reactions to the event and the judicial process, without any
critical assessment. He does not carry out an elaborate evaluation of the incident. He
does not address the charges against the Nakşibendi order. He does not focus on insurgents’
motivations and the conditions under which they received support or the
extent and reasons of this support.
Despite these shortcomings, his study is more reasonable than many others
thanks to his balanced statements, careful summary and judicious use of the available
primary sources. Still, his article involves some points that need to be corrected. For
instance, he states (with reference to a contemporary newspaper) that there was a
crowd of 1000-1500 people in the square during Derviş Mehmet’s actions.718 According
to him, similar to the discussions in the parliament and the press, the court
searched for a tangible connection between the former FRP and the incident.719 Thus
the respondents mentioned that they were members of RPP when defending themselves
in trials, but might accuse others as being associated with FRP.720 However,
the Chief Judge Muğlalı did not question the defendants’ party membership. He explicitly
mentioned that the court was not interested in this issue. Similarly, neither
716 Ibid., 43; For Azak, the consolidation of the authoritarian regime was such that after the
incident, no toleration remained for an opposition party until the transition to a multi-party
system in 1946. Ibid., 42.
717 Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” 177.
718 Ibid., 162.
719 Ibid., 171.
720 Ibid., 171–2.
171
the prosecution’s charges nor the final decision of the martial court referred to party
membership or affiliation as an issue.
4.3.5. General Studies Touching on the Incident
This section examines the studies that do not focus on the Menemen Incident
specifically, but include it as a subtopic. These studies diverge from the officiallybiased
as well as counter-official accounts in explaining the background of the incident.
Mete Tunçay, for instance, expresses “such a serious order [Nakşibendis]
would not have regarded an ignorant disciple’s claim of Mahdism worthy of notice.”
721 Tunçay’s explanation is sensible, but he does not expand on the issue to
show that there is no tangible evidence that connects the order as an organization to
Derviş’s plot. This shortcoming is probably because Tunçay did not have the time to
check the relevant primary sources about this particular case in detail.
Tunçay’s statement that the incident was used to annihilate the Nakşibendi
order needs to be revised. He contends that the martial court kept working in order to
find additional evidence to condemn the order.722 Indeed, the second phase of the trials
did not expand the investigation on the Menemen Incident, but dealt with additional
personages affiliated with the Nakşibendi order and charged them with violating
the law that abolished the sufi orders. Surely, this second phase of the trials
marked the government’s attempt to intimidate the sufi circles, yet it differed significantly
from the first phase. The accused were acquitted except for a small number of
them who received light sentences.
Another point made by Tunçay is that the effort to associate the incident with
the former FRP remained inconclusive and effectively groundless.723 This is a sound
observation. However, Tunçay’s point that the reactionists’ smoking of hashish during
their rituals was a presumption is inaccurate.724 Had Tunçay examined the rele-
721 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931),
6th ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 304; This is noteworthy in that Tunçay,
in a previous account, described the Nakşibendis as the most prominent religious circle that
objected to the abolition of the caliphate and the proclamation of the Republic. In the article
in question, far from arguing against the official statement, he agreed with the charges that a
religious order was behind the plot. He advocated as well other officially-biased points discussed
above regarding religious organizations. (See Mete Tunçay, “Menemen Olayı,”
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), 573.)
722 Tunçay, Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, 305.
723 Ibid.
724 Ibid., 304, footnote no. 13.
172
vant primary documents carefully, he would not question the insurgents’ addiction to
hashish. Tunçay is on firmer grounds when he deems Derviş Mehmet’s drinking of
Kubilay’s blood by handfuls after his beheading as an agitating exaggeration. Likewise,
he approaches with suspicion the accounts that described Derviş Mehmet as a
former associate of Çerkez Ethem. Tunçay observes that attributing a connection between
anyone who opposed the government and Çerkez Ethem became a custom in
Turkey.725 Yet, Tunçay’s statement that thirty-four people were executed by the martial
court needs to be revised to twenty-eight.726
Carter Findley also briefly addresses the incident in his recent book and provides
both correct and mistaken explanations. For him, the preeminent Şeyh Esat had
no relation with the incident, while the order itself was unlikely to have been linked
to it.727 “Blaming one of the most serious-minded religious orders for the acts of village
millenarians was typical of an official attitude that equated the most learned religiosity
with reaction and superstition.”728
Nevertheless, Findley’s account needs revisions on a few points. He argues
that after the declaration of martial law, a “witch hunt” was initiated. Likely or unlikely
suspects were detained including former FRP associates during that hunt.729
Findley probably has in mind the second phase of martial court, when approximately
120 people were brought to the court and charged with breaking the law related to
the closing of the dervish lodges. Most of these people were acquitted. A small number
received minor punishments, and even fewer of them received imprisonment for
some years. The government’s intention was to intimidate the religious orders to impress
on them that they were being watched, rather than a witch hunt.
Zürcher is another well-known author who offers a brief summary of the
event. His account too needs revisions. For instance, he says that over 1000 people
watched Derviş Mehmet’s demonstrations as spectators.730 In fact, about one hundred
people and participated in the demonstrations while another hundred of them
725 Ibid., 304, fn. 13.
726 Ibid., 305.
727 Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007
(New Haven&; London: Yale University Press, 2010), 259.
728 Ibid.
729 Ibid. Similar to Tunçay’s account, Findley mistakenly recounts that thirty-four of those on
trial were executed at the end. This number needs to be revised to twenty-eight.
730 Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, 25th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,
2010), 266.
173
were there as spectators. Zürcher’s statement that insurgents attached Kubilay’s head
to the edge of a stick and roamed with it731 is a fabrication. The demonstrators remained
in the square after the beheading. Though they sought to attach Kubilay’s
head to the banner in their hands, they failed and hung the banner on a pole. Zürcher
also says that over 2000 people, including many of the former FRP followers, were
arrested after the event.732 During the state of siege, the martial court examined 606
files, which were prepared by the investigating magistrates and FRP membership
was not an issue on which these magistrates focused. Zürcher also mentions a law
that was drafted with the support of Mustafa Kemal concerning the eradication of
Menemen from the map, “but which was later dropped.”733 This was not a draft law,
but solely a wish Mustafa Kemal expressed in his meeting with RPP leaders on 7
January in Çankaya. The ministers and especially İsmet Paşa did not support the idea
at the meeting and Mustafa Kemal never mentioned the matter afterwards.
The last scholar we will discuss here as an example of those who offer quite
objective information on the Menemen Incident, but as a subtopic in a larger work is
Mahmut Goloğlu. In his book on the history of the republic, published in 1972, he
defines the Menemen Incident as a basically apolitical reactionist event carried out
by Giritli Mehmet, who deceived some of his workers and relatives to act with
them.734 Goloğlu notes, “five of the six perpetrators were shot and killed,”735 although
only three of them died in the shootout. Goloğlu discusses İsmet Paşa’s allegation
that the oppositional groups played a role in instigating the incident. He criticizes
the paşa’s position for relying on speculations rather than fact.736 Goloğlu
holds that the incident was neither a collective uprising of the local community nor
directed from a political center. Indeed Goloğlu notes that some of the defendants’
statements in the trials reveal that they were associates of RPP.737 Thus, Goloğlu insists
on the apolitical nature of the incident, but he refrains from discussing the accuracy
of the charges that a religious order was behind this reactionary incident.
731 Ibid.
732 Ibid.
733 Ibid.
734 Mahmut Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I%: Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 3rd ed. (İstanbul:
Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 331.
735 Ibid., 333.
736 Ibid., 333–4.
737 Ibid., 337.
174
***
This chapter analyzed the secondary literature about the incident. It depicted
how the subject is treated quite contradictorily because the authors have opposite
perspectives. All of the accounts include misinformation in different degrees. This
literature review is an indication of the extent to which such a small-scale event
might be narrated in so many diverse ways. Along with sensible statements and evaluations,
there have been irrational and biased explanations on the incident as well.
Misinformation and biased accounts are uncritically echoed by others who share similar
perspectives. This perpetuation of misleading information and skewed perspectives
makes it quite difficult to determine what exactly happened and to analyze the
causal connections between the events. The official description of the incident was
problematic. Officially-biased accounts adopted, recounted, and defended the official
arguments. They have supported the official republican usage of Kubilay as a political
symbol. Counter-official narratives challenged these accounts and created their
own version of the incident as a plot of RPP against Muslims and have kept reproducing
these arguments. Misinformation infiltrated even serious scholarly studies
and it became difficult to tell fact from fiction.
175
CONCLUSION
This thesis probed into the Menemen Incident as an attempt to understand it
from various aspects. It initially sought to establish a concrete base by explaining
what happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930. It then put forth and analyzed the
official statements and newspaper reports about the event. It evaluated the judicial
process and focused on the trials of the incident. Finally, it reviewed the literature
about the event in detail.
This study indicated that the event known as the Menemen Incident was fundamentally
carried out by six uneducated insurgents with apparently questionable
mental states due to their long addiction to hashish. Derviş Mehmet’s claims to be
the Mahdi and his goal of re-establishing the sharia order and restoring the caliphate
were fictitious and unrealistic. They were evidently deprived of the sense of reality
and lacked the infrastructural necessities to maintain a revolt. The inattention of law
enforcement agencies, as it was recognized after the event as well, was the reason
why and how they could leave Manisa and arrive at Menemen armed. It was also the
negligence of gendarme officers, including the commander, in Menemen that paved
the way for the insurgents to continue their activities in the town center for three-four
hours. The eventual consequence of these negligent and careless behavior was the
brutal beheading of a military officer by stoned perpetrators. Moreover, the events
were immediately suppressed as soon as armed battalions arrived and none of the
townspeople were engaged in the shootout with law enforcement agencies. Instead,
they dispersed.
It was a minor incident and not a revolt that enjoyed public support. The defendants
in the trials behaved in a subdued manner. They all appeared intimidated in
the trials and did not object to the chief judge audaciously. Indeed, they were aware
that severe penalties were on the way and tried to stay on the right side of the chief
judge, hoping to be acquitted or at least to receive light sentences at the end. There is
not a reasonable clue to define them as antagonists of the republic. They were not
enemies of the state seeking to riot as soon as they found a chance. This behavior of
the accused makes one wonder how such a minor event could be treated and described
as a rebellion, reactionary uprising, and the nemesis of a nation or a regime.
176
However, the Martial Court of Menemen decided that the incident was a rebellion
planned by the Nakşibendi order and supported by certain villagers and
townspeople of Menemen. As discussed in this thesis, the court associated the event
with the notable figures of the Nakşibendi order, primarily with its leader Şeyh Esat,
without substantial evidence. This opinion of the court was preordained. The martial
court had little choice but to impute the responsibility of the incident to the
Nakşibendi order and give capital punishments to presumed antagonists of the regime.
The dominant pro-government media as well strengthened the hand of the regime
in denouncing the Nakşibendi order as a reactionist organization that strived to
destroy the republic persistently and defining the Menemen Incident as yet another
one of its attempts. The essential objective of the martial court was not to establish
justice, but to reach certain pre-determined decisions. The court was driven by the
RPP leaders to pin the insurgents’ actions on the order and to condemn it as a plotter
even before the beginning of the trials.
This study indicated that the judicial process in the case of the Menemen Incident
is an example of political use of the law as a tool of intimidation. It tried to
open a window to the political structure of Turkey at the time of the incident and
demonstrated that there was no separation of powers thereat. A single party organization,
RPP, led by a few significant figures, ruled the country. Their views and decisions
carried ultimate authority. The handling of the Menemen Incident indicates that
not only the law enforcement agencies but also the courts observed the decisions of
the political center, but within the boundaries of certain procedures. An analysis of
the historical background of this situation and the changes regarding the exceptional
prerogatives of martial laws and courts from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of
Turkey need to be addressed in future studies. The structure of martial courts, their
legal status and boundaries as defined by the constitution and conventions in the early
republican period might be examined. The regime’s specific use of the martial
courts in other instances and the legality of their decisions might also be studied.
Portraits of the members of these courts as well should give us an idea about the notions
of law, legality and state-society relations in this era.
The infliction of twenty-eight capital punishments and other prison sentences
was a harsh reaction and indicative of the autocratic nature of the regime, as the thesis
argued. The evidence at hand that helps explain this verdict points to concerns
177
about taking preventive measures to set an example against other probable attempts
at appealing to religious sentiments to undermine the regime. It was an intimidating
decision, a show of strength demonstrating what would happen to those who dared to
initiate a riot against the republic, and aimed as a warning to religious circles in particular.
Three fundamental elements of the incident instigated the regime to resort to
intimidation: the beheading of Kubilay, acclamation of the crowd, and the religious
slogans of the group.
The primary and the most abhorrent aspect of the Menemen Incident was the
brutal beheading of a military officer. Indeed, the Menemen Incident would have
been rarely accounted and remembered if Kubilay had not been beheaded. It was
deemed by Mustafa Kemal as an attempt to cut off the head of the state itself. Such
audacity urged the regime to punish everyone who were related with the events implicitly,
explicitly, or presumably. The republican regime did not only revenge its officer,
but upheld him as an ideal citizen of the republic, and transformed him into an
iconic-hero of the Turkish nation.
Almost every year, condolences have been issued especially by the Headquarters
of the General Staff. Commemorations of the anniversary of the incident
have been organized to celebrate Kubilay as a hero who stood up to reactionary forces,
a martyr killed by reactionists, an icon of progress and enlightenment, an embodiment
of the republican principles, and an inspiration for all good (ideal) citizens.
Newspapers have reported, and history textbooks for primary and secondary education
have accounted the incident and celebrated Kubilay. Annual commemorations
etched his memory into minds permanently. The Menemen Incident and Kubilay
thus became one of the most widely known and symbolic topics of the history of the
Republic of Turkey.
A further study in this regard might examine the iconization process of Kubilay
as a politically and ideologically symbolic figure. One may search for the extent
to which the memory of Kubilay and the incident have penetrated the minds. Under
which specific circumstances and how often was the story of Kubilay evoked or triggered
to condition political action and ideological reaction in the history of the Republic
of Turkey? This is a question that needs to be studied in the context of the political
use of symbols in the formation of nations and nation states.
178
Another reason why the incident invited harsh reaction was the gathering of
some townspeople around the insurgents and the acclamation of a group of them of
the demonstrations. The RPP leaders severely condemned this crowd. In his letter of
condolence, written to the Chief of the General Staff, Mustafa Kemal described some
of the crowd’s approving and applauding of “the ferocity displayed by reactionists,”
as “a shameful incident that should embarrass all the republicanists.” Deputies of
RPP and pro-government newspapers as well criticized the crowd starkly. However,
this censure of the participants turned into a damnation of the town itself. For a
while, Menemen was mentioned as a town whose people supported an antigovernment
rebellion. After a certain point, what really happened in Menemen became
insignificant in official statements as well as in the media representations of the
incident. What remained in minds was that reactionists revolted against the republic,
without asking whether it was a real rebellion with significant public support. Future
studies should elaborate the transformation of the perceptions of the Menemen Incident
in collective memories since then.
Third, the incident provoked harsh measures because of the insurgents’ reference
to religious terms to carry out and justify their activities. The republican regime
was newly-established and had the decisive aim to instill its principals in people’s
minds. Laicism was one of those principles. The RPP regime did not have an issue
with religious practices and personal religious preoccupations. However, in line with
its purpose to make culturally religious citizens embrace laicism, it had no tolerance
for someone who would attempt to use religion as a means to gain political influence
and to intervene in the political arena.
The reaction of the regime that derived from these three aspects of the incident
indicates its sense of insecurity as well. The perception that the beheading of
Kubilay meant cutting the head of the regime, condemnation of the Menemen
townspeople collectively as if many of them revolted against the government by supporting
the demonstrations of Derviş Mehmet and his companions, and responding to
the religious slogans of the insurgents by emphasizing the laicism of the republic
were the reactions of a yet insecure regime. The confusion of the law enforcement
agencies about the handling of such events was another indicator of the insecurity of
a regime in the making. İsmet Paşa himself stated in the parliament after the incident
that both citizens and military units were supposed to know under what conditions
179
law enforcement agencies must intervene in such situations. He mentioned it was required
for the government to make a set of arrangements that would regulate the mutual
duties and courses of action of both the military forces and the civilians in cases
of emergency.738 Inefficient communication and the lack of clarity in the distribution
of duties were echoed in the parliamentary debates, pointing to the yet unsettled aspects
of the state apparatus.
Through its control of the terms of political debates, the regime defined “reactionism”
as a nemesis of the republic and used the pro-government media to warn
the nation against this enemy. Members of RPP used this concept in such a broad
sense as to include not only those who appealed to religion in their political statements
but almost everyone who opposed the government.
The sweepingly broad use of such concepts also signifies the insecurity of the
regime. The statements of the deputies in the parliament after the incident indicated
that they wanted to aggrandize the republican regime and degrade its presumed enemies,
reactionism being on the top of their list. For them, reactionists harmed the nation
whenever they found a chance. Although RPP deputies denigrated reactionism
emphatically, the reactionary actors and organizations were not clear in their discourse.
This notion of RPP deputies to ostracize reactionists in a sweeping-discourse
is another sign of their sense of insecurity.
FRP, which was closed under the impression that it had been promoting the
reactionist circles, received its share from the aggressive statements made after the
Menemen Incident. Although none of the associates of FRP were involved in the
event in any way, they could not avoid the accusations of instigating such a rebellion.
This accusation as well point to the tendency of the regime to silence all opposition
to its policies by generating a cursed category of opposition and then lumping together
all opposition in that category. Repression of all the opposition words and
deeds, including FRP and other short-lived small political parties also point to the authoritativeness
of the regime.
It must also be stated that the widespread argument that claims that the
Menemen Incident, along with the challenges of FRP, was a significant factor in delaying
the transition to the multi-party system remains questionable. This is a misleading
observation that adopts the officially-biased perspective. This is not the place
738 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 3.
180
to ask whether the Menemen Incident delayed the transition to multi-party system
regime or not. Perhaps it is not even an appropriate question and we should ask instead
why Turkey made the shift from a single-party into a multi-party system in
1946. The answers to that question would shed light on the political conditions of the
transition.
This thesis however focused on generating images and information in an authoritarian
era and the legacy or effects of such actions in light of the coverage and
treatment of the Menemen Incident. Clearly, official (mis)perceptions and/or
(mis)representations of the incident influenced not only popular imagination but also
the scholarly texts. Much of the misleading information that was recounted subsequently,
even reaching up to today, sprang from the initial press coverage and official
statements. Subsequent officially-biased writings did not only take the early reactions
for granted, but reproduced and extended them. Counter-official authors who
challenged the officially-biased accounts created their own way of explaining the incident,
but usually by reversing the same, polarized categories of thinking and judgment.
The biased content of these two positions ensured perpetuation of disinformation
about the incident until today.
This thesis tried to reconstruct the events and relationships that made up the
Menemen Incident through careful examination and a critical analysis of the relevant
primary sources and major accounts. If, in this process, the thesis has also generated
a fuller awareness of the limitations of thinking with polarized categories, then it has
achieved its purpose.
181
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