53

 DELIMITATION OF THE OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER: TAHIR PASHA

AND THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER COMMISSION, 1905-1908

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

The Ottoman-Iranian frontier in the early twentieth century consists of two separate

categories: (1) the disputed lands, where a status quo was declared between the two

states, and (2) the undisputed lands, where the Ottoman-Iranian boundary had been

already shaped. This study concentrates on one of the last Ottoman frontier

commissions, led by Tahir Pasha between 1907 and 1908, and illustrates the

historical trajectory that shows how Tahir Pasha, as an experienced Ottoman

statesman, who lived more than thirty-three years in various eastern frontier

provinces, was involved in the boundary making process. The study introduces not

only Tahir Pasha to historical studies, but also it exposes the anatomy of the

commission that he led, so the study presents insightful data regarding the salaries,

previous tasks, and tenures of its officials, and conditions under which Ottoman

commissioners served in a limited financial situation that restricted the activities of

the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elites. Paradoxically, the expenditures of the

commission and the cost of keeping alert the additional Ottoman troops in the

frontier zone deteriorated the situation. Providing this data, this study shows how the

commission interacted with British, Russian, and Iranian officials diplomatically in a

period where the Ottoman military began to occupy parts of the contested lands

between 1905 and 1908, and explains the possible reasons of the invasion by

cinsidering the international power relations that was strained with the Ottoman

intervention. Considering the impacts of the international conjecture, the study

discusses how Ottoman and Iranian governments and commissioners held

negotiations, what kind of procedures were applied, how negotiations were

conducted, what the results were, and how all developments led both commissions to

reach a deadlock regarding the fate of the boundary in 1908. During this process,

v

Tahir Pasha's individual initiatives, research methods, and concluding remarks are

analyzed by evaluating official reports he sent to Istanbul.

Keywords: Tahir Pasha, disputed lands, frontier commission, frontier delimitation,

frontier negotiations, military fortifications.

vi

ÖZ

OSMANLI-İRAN SINIRININ BELIRLENMESI: TAHIR PAŞA VE OSMANLI

SINIR KOMİSYONU, 1905-1908

Karlıoğlu, Fatih

MA, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı

Haziran 2015, 154 sayfa

Osmanlı-İran sınırındaki tartışmalı arazilerin genel olarak iki kısımda şekillendiği

görülür. İlk kısım Osmanlı ve İran arasında statüko ilan edilen ihtilaflı arazileri

kapsar. Bu arazilerin hangi ülkeye ait olduğu yirminci yüzyılın ilk on yılında iki ülke

arasında temel anlaşmazlık unsuru olmuştur. İkincisi ise Osmanlı ve İran arasında

sorunsuz çözüme kavuşturulma potansiyeline sahip toprakları içerir. Tüm sınırı

belirlemek ve Beyazıt’tan Süleymaniye’ye kadar olan ilk kısım arazilerin

oluşturduğu sorunları engellemek için 1907 yılında Tahir Paşa yönetiminde yeni bir

sınır komisyonu oluşturulur. İhtilaflı bölge içinden geçen sınırı belirlemek

çalışmaların ağırlık noktasını oluşturması gerekirken, İran’ın toptancı tutumu ve

buna karşılık Osmanlı’nın Savuçbulak’a kadar olan tüm bölgeyi kendisine ilhak

etmek istmesi süreci tekrar tıkamıştır. Bu tez tüm bu süreci tekrar ele alırken, aynı

zamanda Van, Bitlis, Musul, Erzurum ve Trabzon gibi doğu sınır eyaletlerinde

toplamda 33 yıl görev yapmış bir Osmanlı devlet adamı olan Tahir Paşa’nın sınır

belirleme işlerine hangi şartlarda katıldığı ve süreci nasıl yönettiği tartışılmaktadır.

Çalışma hem Tahir Paşa’yı tarih çalışmalarına tanıtırken hem de yine onun

tarafından yönetilen bir sınır komisyonu anatomisi çıkarmaktadır. Tahir Paşa ve

komisyon görevlilerinin maaş miktarları, görev süreleri, komisyondan önceki görev

yerleri, sınır komisyonunda hangi şartlarda ne kadar hizmet ettikleri ile ilgili

niteliksel ve niceliksel bilgiler verilmiştir. Bunun yanında komisyonun çalışmasını

engelleyen unsurlara da dikkat çekilmiştir. İklim ve coğrafi zorlukların yanında,

Osmanlı maliyesinin kötü durumu, komisyonun rahat çalışmasını olumsuz etkileyen

önemli faktörlerden biridir. Bu sınırlı mali durum bir yandan Osmanlı sınır

politikalarını ve askeri faalyietlerini kısıtlarken, diğer yandan askeri tahkimatla

oluşan yeni harcamalar finansal durumu paradoksal olarak daha da kötüleştirmiştir.

vii

Sonuç olarak, bu tez, 1905’ten 1908’e kadar oluşan iç ve dış dinamikler

çerçevesinde, Osmanlı sınır komisyonunun İngiliz, Rus ve İranlı bürokratlar ile nasıl

bir diplomatik etkileşim içerisinde bulunduğunu anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Birinci

Dünya Savaşı öncesi Ermeni ve Kürt rekabeti hakkında fikir veren bu çalışma,

rekabette Osmanlı’nın dengeleyici bir rol üstlenmeye çalıştığını göstermektedir.

Mevcut çalışma, Osmanlı işgallerinin arkasında yatan nedenleri dönemin bölgesel

güç ilişkileri çerçevesinde ele alarak, Osmanlı, Rusya ve İngiltere’nin bölge ile ilgili

pozisyonlarını birincil kaynaklar üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Tüm bu bilgiler

ışığında, sınır müzakerelerinin hangi şartlarda başladığı, ne çeşit bir yöntem ya da

müzakere teknikleri uygulandığı, bu müzakerelerin nasıl yönetildiği, ne çeşit

sonuçlar üretildiği, ve sınır müzakerelerini çıkmaza sokan iddialar ve görüşler ortaya

konmuştur. Bu aşamada, Tahir Paşa’nın sınırla ilgili bireysel girişimleri, araştırma

teknikleri ve ulaştığı sonuçlar merkeze gönderdiği kendi raporları üzerinden

değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tahir Paşa, ihtilaflı araziler, sınır komisyonu, sınır kesimi, sınır

müzakereleri, askeri tahkimatlar.

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Engin

Akarlı for his patience, guidance, and most importantly, for taking me under his wing

despite his many other academic and professional commitments. I would like to

thank him for helping me understand the Ottoman documents I used in this study,

and for directing me in the right direction. It was because of him I was able to

understand better the mentality behind the inter-institutional correspondences of the

Ottoman State. His knowledge and his important academic works inspired me in

many ways.

I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Abdulhamit Kırmızı for assisting me in

my research, every time I needed help. He informed me about rarely known sources.

I would not have been able to finish this study without his invaluable and insightful

comments. I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Kahraman Şakul for his

participation in my thesis committee.

I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Kemal Karpat,

Prof. Dr. Coşkun Çakır, and Mehmet Genç, for conveying lifelong experiences in the

profession to us, their students, via their courses offered at Istanbul Şehir University

and for being such great academic role models to us.

Many thanks to the Academic Writing Center staff Rana Marcella Özenç and

David Reed Albachten, and Yakoob Ahmed, for proofreading my thesis and

providing insightful criticisms and recommendations as I wrote my thesis, and for

pointing out to me how to write an academic thesis according to established rules and

standards. I am grateful and indebted to Graduate School Secretary Talha Üstündağ

for his valuable comments and instructions as well.

I would like to thank the library staff of Istanbul Şehir University,

particularly Yelda Kahvecioğlu and Mesut Yılmaz for helping me locate the books

and articles I required, but could not find anywhere else, and Tugba Örün for being

very helpful. I would like to thank to the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archive and the

library of the Centre for Islamic Studies (ISAM) for letting me use available sources

they have.

I would like to express my profound gratitude to TUBITAK (The Scientific

and Technological Research Council of Turkey), particularly to the subdepartment

BIDEB for financially supporting me since my undergraduate years. Individually, I

ix

would like to thank Seda Barıtlı, the coordinator, for providing all the technical

information I needed along the way.

Finally, I must express my deepest thanks to my family and my friends,

especially to Arzu Karlıoğlu for her unlimited support throughout the process of

researching and writing this thesis.

This thesis could not have been completed without the help and support of

any of the aforementioned people. Once more, to everyone, I would like to say, thank

you.

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ....................................................................................................................... iv

Öz ................................................................................................................................ vi

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... viii

Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... x

List of Maps ............................................................................................................... xii

List of Tables............................................................................................................. xiii

List of Abbreviations................................................................................................. xiv

CHAPTER

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

1. 1. Literature Review and Research Methodology ................................................ 6

1. 2. Review of Works on Ottoman Frontiers .......................................................... 6

1. 3. Research Methodology................................................................................... 12

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................... 14

2. 1. Ottoman-Safavid Relations and Frontiers (1502-1736) ................................. 14

2. 2. Ottoman-Qajar Relations and Frontiers (1796-1925) .................................... 18

2. 3. A Convention: For Peace or For War ............................................................ 24

2. 3. 1. The Anglo-Russian Treaty (1907-1914) ................................................ 25

2. 3. 2. Comments on the Anglo-Russian Convention: ...................................... 26

2. 3. 3. Disputed Border Zone ............................................................................ 31

FORMATION OF THE FRONTIER COMMISSION .............................................. 33

3. 1. Commission Members, Commission-Related Expenses, and Increasing

Budgetary Problems ............................................................................................... 33

3. 2. Salaries and Travel Payments of the Commission Members ......................... 36

3. 3. Members of the Commission and Their Salaries ........................................... 37

3. 4. Occasional Expenditures, Military Fortifications, and the Claims for the

Termination of the Boundary Commission ............................................................ 43

3. 5. Tahir Pasha’s Involvement in Boundary Delimitation................................... 46

3. 5. 1. Praying for Rain and Rioting against the Governor: The Case of Ferid

Pasha .................................................................................................................. 47

xi

3. 5. 2. Anti-Governor Riot in Van: The Case of Ali Bey Efendi ...................... 50

THE COMMISSION IN ACTION ............................................................................ 52

4. 1. The Phase of Inquiry ...................................................................................... 52

4. 1. 1. A Local Dispute: Pro-Iranian Muslims and Nestorians vs. Pro-Ottoman

Kurdish Villagers ............................................................................................... 55

4. 1. 2. Charges against the Ottoman troops and Clarifications ......................... 57

4. 2. The Phase of New Occupations and Boundary Negotiations ........................ 62

4. 2. 1. Imperial Edicts, The Porte’s Reports, Ancient Treaties and Maps ........ 63

4. 2. 2. The Boundary Negotiations ................................................................... 71

4. 2. 3. Where was Ushni and where was the Status Quo Line? ........................ 82

4. 2. 4. Two Tribes and Their Search for Protection .......................................... 90

4. 2. 5. Ottoman Discourses and Savuçbulak ..................................................... 93

4. 2. 5. 1. Fundamentals of Ottoman Discourse for Military Fortification and

Intervention ........................................................................................................ 95

4. 2. 6. The States and Inter-Tribal Conflicts ................................................... 100

Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 104

Bibiliography ........................................................................................................... 111

Appendices ............................................................................................................... 120

A. TAHIR PASHA’S CAREER LINE ................................................................ 120

The First Phase: (1868-1880) ........................................................................... 120

The Second Phase: (1880-1912) ...................................................................... 123

B. BIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER OF TAHIR PASHA ...................................... 129

C. SOME EXAMPLES FROM TAHIR PASHA’S REPORTS .......................... 131

D. MEMORANDUMS EXCHAGED BETWEEN THE COMMISSION OF

TAHIR PASHA AND THE DELEGATES OF OTHER STATES ..................... 136

E. BRITISH TRANLSATION OF SECOND TREATY OF ERZURUM .......... 149

F. THE JOINT MAP OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN ............................................ 152

G. THE MAP OF OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER IN 1910 ....................... 153

H. REPRODUCTION OF THE MAP OF OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER IN

1910 ...................................................................................................................... 154

I. THE PICTURES OF TAHIR PASHA AND WRATISLAW .......................... 155

xii

LIST OF MAPS

Map 4.1: Military Fortifications…….………………………………………………88

Map 4.2: Northern Parts of the Ottoman-Iranain Frontier…………………………101

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: A Summary of the Financial Estimates for 1325………………..………34

Table 3.2: Travel Allowance, Salaries, and Extra Salaries of the Boundary

Commissioners………………………………………………………………………39

xiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. AMD. Amedi Kalemi

A. MKT. Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Belgeleri

BEO. Bâb-ı Âlî Evrak Odası

BOA. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

DH. MKT. Dahiliye Nezâreti Mektubî Kalemi

DH. SAİD. Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahvâl Kayıtları

DH. SYS. Dahiliye Nezâreti Siyasî Kısım Belgeleri

FO. Foreign Office

HRT. h. Haritalar

İE. ML . İbnülemin Maliye

İ. DH. İrâde - Dahiliye

İ. HUS. İrâde-i Hususiyye

Y. A. HUS. Sadâret Hususi Maruzât Evrakı

Y. MTV. Yıldız Mütenevvî Maruzât Evrakı

Y. PRK. ASK. Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askerî Maruzât

Y. PRK. BŞK. Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Mâbeyn Başkitâbeti

KE. Kânun-u Evvel

KS. Kânun-u Sani

TE. Teşrin-i Evvel

TS. Teşrin-i Sâni

M. Muharrem

S. Safer

Ra. Rebîülevvel

R. Rebîülâhir

Ca. Cemâziyelevvel

C. Cemâziyelâhir

B. Receb

Ş. Şaban

N. Ramazan

L. Şevval

Za. Zilkade

Z. Zilhicce

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The history of the world

is best observed from the

frontiers.”1

Pierre Vilar

Differing from most of today’s modern nation states, the empires of the past

had more flexible, penetrable, and porous frontiers. Today, nobody uses the concept

of frontier to describe the outer limits of a state. Instead, it seems that the concept of

border / boundary is universally accepted by the states in order to define their limits

precisely. However, the wide usage of the notion of the border / boundary in the

present day obstructs the reality that the concept of the frontier is still alive. All the

modern states experienced distinctively such a complex transitional period from the

pre-modern frontiers to the modern border / boundary.

Extending to Eurasia and across Africa for centuries, the Ottoman Empire

created a cultural space where many languages were spoken, many religious rituals

were practiced, and many ethnic groups lived. The frontiers of the Ottoman Empire

reflected this cosmopolite nature highly. A. C. S. Peacock states that scholars rarely

examined the Ottoman frontiers compared to that of Rome and China. According to

Peacock, the Ottoman frontiers were ‘places both of interaction with the outside

world through trade and [places] of war and conflict, places where the empire’s

prestige and authority were both displayed and challenged’.2 The actors who became

the agents of the state on the frontiers, exercised the imperial rules, but the

difficulties on the frontier boundaries challenged the full-implementation of this

authority. These difficulties on the frontiers intensified in the modern era when the

Ottoman Empire began to suffer under international and internal pressures.

1 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (California: University

of California Press, 1989), 1.

2 A. C. S Peacock, “Introduction: The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers,” in The Frontiers of the

Ottoman World, by A. C. S Peacock, Proceedings of the British Academy (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2009), 1.

2

One the most striking examples of these difficulties occurred on the frontier

with Iran in the early years of the twentieth century. This border front remained

stable in terms of its conflicts. Peacock states, “the border with the Safavids [of Iran]

was ambiguous with numerous tribes of fluctuating loyalties inhabiting the no-man’s

land between the two empires. However, for the merchants and pilgrims there were

clearly defined stations which nonetheless marked the transition from one political

jurisdiction to another in sixteenth- to seventeenth century Iraq.”3 The frontier

became the stage for Sunni-Shi’i conflicts beginning from the sixteenth century. As

Kemal H. Karpat explains, the same trend on the frontiers was that religion [Islam]

affected the relations of Iran and the Ottoman Empire by the late eighteenth and

throughout the nineteenth century.4 In order to settle the conflicts by demarcating the

boundary, both Iran and the Ottoman Empire formed many boundary commissions

and produced a significant amount of frontier knowledge.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine to what extent one of these

boundary commissions, which was formed under Tahir Pasha5, shaped the Ottoman-

Iranian relations between 1907 and 1908 in its international context. Many scholars

studied the struggle over the delimitation of the eastern frontiers of the Ottoman

Empire. Nevertheless, these studies are not enough to explain how the imperial

frontiers turned into imperial borders. Although there are well-written grand stories

of the boundary, they tend to examine the frontier as a whole over a broad period on

a macroscopic level. This method brings advantages and disadvantages. This kind of

study helps the reader understand the general framework of the boundary

delimitation, and the issues of conflict, but neglects the inner elements of the

boundary affairs such as the role of frontier actors. To examine the complex set of

conflicts rooted in the past requires such a broad perspective, but these subjects can

be studied by choosing a specific theme such as the imperial eastern boundary. Some

scholars address this gap. Metin Atmaca6 and Janet Klein7’s works are just two

examples of this new trend. I also suggest a microscopic level of analysis in my

3 Peacock, “Introduction”, 2.

4 Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens, Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political

Changes (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 1.

5 See Appendix A. Tahir Pasha’s Career Line in Two Phases.

6 Metin Atmaca, “Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier: The Babans

(1500-1851)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg, 2013).

7 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (California:

Stanford University Press, 2011).

3

study that focuses on the boundary delimitation and conflicts through the eyes of the

boundary commissioners themselves and some other frontier actors. I think the

boundary commissions and their commissioners have their own history. As the key

political entity, the boundary commission was being formed with hopes to make a

change in the present state of the boundary. Thus, the period of each commission is a

period of reactivation, interactions, and reactions, aimed to settle violent disputes,

and conflicts of the frontiers by delimiting the eastern boundary in a modern sense.

The present study identifies the subject matter mentioned above by using a

mixed method of both the macro and micro modes of research, making use of both

quantitative and qualitative research methods. In order to show the struggle behind

the formation of the boundary commission, it adopts financial figures that were

required for the sake of the boundary delimitation. To be able to understand the

stance of the Ottoman government regarding its eastern boundary, it relies on the

qualitative method of analysis interpreting data within their context. Moreover, I give

particular importance to the chronological order of the events by comparing the

reports which were written by the British and Ottoman officers. The study makes

Tahir Pasha, the chief commissioner of the boundary commission, the center of

analysis because the commission was dominated by his view of the boundary. Thus,

the present study can also be considered a contribution to biographical works of the

Ottoman elite because it partly constructs the life of Tahir Pasha through his political

activities intermixed with thirty-three years of his life on the imperial eastern frontier

provinces. As a result, it aims to introduce an example of a governor whose long

tenure8 in state affairs enabled him to witness many local disputes, some of which

are still matters of contestation in today’s Turkey.

The study seeks answers to various research questions, such as the following.

To what extent could a frontier actor act independently from the center? Was it

possible for a frontier actor to act independently? How was the Ottoman

administration in the eastern peripheries in the late period? How did the Ottomans

control a marginal area, which was disputed? Why did the Ottomans occupy certain

disputed lands between 1905 and 1908? How did these occupations affect Ottoman-

Iranian relations? How did Britain and Russia react to these occupations? What was

the response of the Ottoman Empire to their counter-arguments during the boundary

8 See Appendix A. Tahir Pasha’s Career Line in Two Phases.

4

negotiations? To what extent did the natural conditions have an impact on the

boundary delimitation process? Most importantly, how was the relation of the Palace

and the Porte regarding the Kurdish subjects of the State? How did they co-operate

and disagree? How were the state-tribe relations? What was the role of religion in

Abdulhamid’s relations with the Sunni-Kurdish tribes that remained loyal to him?

What were the arguments of the chief boundary negotiator, Tahir Pasha? What kind

of approach did he adopt? Did the idea of Islamic unity play a significant role in

Tahir Pasha’s approach? Thus, can we say that pro-Caliphate polices influenced the

delimitation of the imperial eastern boundaries in the orient? Did the Ottoman

government have an effective authority over these groups? Did the tribes have an

ability to shape the state’s policies? How were the relations of the Kurds with the

Armenians who were backed by Russia? How did the Kurds view Russia? How did

the frontier society view and react to the reforms? How was the relation between the

rulers and the ruled?

In chapter 1, the recent studies on the imperial eastern boundaries are

discussed according to the time they cover and the methodology they use. The

chapter discusses the research methodology of the thesis as well.

Chapter 2 presents the historical context of Ottoman-Iranian relations relying

on a periodization according to the reign of Iranian dynasties. The historical

development of Ottoman-Iranian relations during the Safavids (1502-1736) is

examined in 3. 1. By leaving out some dynasties such as the Avşars (1736-1747) and

the Zends (1747-1796), the chapter then focuses on the developments on the frontier

during the time of the Qajars (1796-1925). Within this period, the years starting from

1840s emphasized because the states took most of the serious decisions regarding the

boundary delimitation in those years. Thus, the chapter establishes that the Ottoman

Empire and Iran covered disputed and undisputed territories.

Chapter 2 examines the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 based on articles

included in The Times. These articles reflect the public opinions of Britain, Germany,

and Russia over the imperial rivalries. Thus, the chapter discusses how the

convention was the product of Britain’s isolationist policies towards Russia in the

Iranian Gulf. The convention indicated that both countries, whose interests

intersected on the peaceful colonization of Iran, respected the integrity of Iran. Thus,

it aimed to stop the Ottoman occupations and fortifications in / around the disputed

zone, and the convention consolidated the ideas to form a new boundary commission

5

in 1907 in order to delimitate the disputed zone where the Russians had impediments

due to the frontier difficulties.

Chapter 3 examines the effort to form a boundary commission when the

Ottoman budget had suffered from cash shortages that show how essential cash is to

political advancement. This chapter introduces the boundary commissioners and

examines two political unrests in Bitlis and Van in 1907, which became a reason to

bring Tahir Pasha back to Bitlis and Van from Trabzon. In detail, salaries and travel

payments of the commissioners, occasional expenditures, and the cost of military

fortifications are presented as commission-related expenses, which increased the

budgetary problems of the Ottoman Empire.

Chapter 4 investigates the actions of the boundary commission in two phases

based on the reports of Tahir Pasha and other Ottoman frontier actors as well as on

the reports of the British, Russian and Iranian representatives. The first phase in

section 4. 1 evaluates the first duty of the commission, which was inquiring the

charges against the Ottoman troops following a local dispute between the Pro-Iranian

Nestorians, Muslims and Pro-Ottoman Kurds. The second part in section 4. 2

illustrates how Tahir Pasha developed a conceptual framework benefiting from the

imperial edicts, the Porte’s reports, ancient treaties and maps. Section 4. 2. 2. shows

that Tahir Pasha used a ‘Civilizational Approach’ during the boundary negotiations

by taking strength from the framework he cultivated and the secret instructions of the

Palace. The rest of the sections deal with new territories such as Ushni and

Savuçbulak (Suj Bulak) during Tahir Pasha’s period, and the Ottoman legitimization

efforts of the occupations through the protectionist policies that can be seen vividly

in their inter-institutional correspondences.

A broad range of the terms is introduced in the thesis, such as the frontier

actors, the frontier difficulties, the status quo, and the status quo line. Some of these

terms may call for clarification. The frontier actors include all the commissioners, the

high-ranking military commanders who are responsible to observe the status quo,

and the governors who served in the frontier provinces. It seems these three groups

were the main actors in the frontier zone and they shaped the frontier policies. They

were also the implementers of the civilizational approach in the field. The third term

is the frontier difficulties. This term is used to define the conflicting nature of the

disputed lands, and it refers to the inter-tribal conflicts, raids, attacks, plunders,

lawlessness, feuds, rumors, and the geographical limitations of the lands in the

6

general sense. The Times reporter described these lands as ‘Wild Districts’ due to

these difficulties. The status quo as a term coincides with the frontier zone that

included the controversial districts between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. However,

each state had a different understanding of the status quo. While the Ottoman State

designated a district to fall in the status quo area, Iran disputed that position. The

status quo line (istatüsko hattı) corresponds to the last limit of the status quo.

1. 1. Literature Review and Research Methodology

First, this chapter presents my eveluation of the available literature on the

Ottoman frontiers in three groups. The first group introduces the scholars who

studied the frontiers of the empire during its construction on the peripheries of the

Byzantium Empire. Then, it opens a subcategory to evaluate the works of Alfred J.

Rieber and Cem Emrence, who studied the Ottoman frontiers in a broader

perspective relying on the Annales School. The chapter continues with the second

group, which is made up of the works that indicate the formation of the frontiers

during the Safavid period. The third group includes works that show the interactions

between the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist) and the frontiers in the late Ottoman period.

The present study as well shares this approach and discusses the works of Sabri Ateş

and Melike Sarıkçıoğlu in particular. The chapter ends with a discussion of the

research method of the current study, explaining how existing data are selected and

discussed.

1. 2. Review of Works on Ottoman Frontiers

The last ten years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of

academic works studying Ottoman history from its frontiers. Many scholars in

Turkey and abroad have studied topics related to Ottoman frontiers. Although their

research scope intersected in examining the frontiers and their effects on the interior,

they mostly approached these issues from different views. These scholars can be

categorized according to their scope of deviation in examining different Ottoman

times, themes and spaces until the emergence of different modern nation-states at the

frontiers.

Such studies reveal that works on frontiers have three main pillars that have

roughly gone parallel with the periodization of Ottoman history. These three

7

frameworks, within which scholars study frontier-related topics mainly focus on the

role of frontiers in the construction of the Ottoman State, the Safavid-Ottoman

struggle that reverberated on their frontiers, and the agitations of the late Ottoman

period and their impact on “moving frontiers”9. Many other scholars have produced

similar works concerning other parts of the empire as well. The late period, however,

is different in nature. Ottoman history in this period is discussed in terms of

modernity and traditional continuity. Thus, the eastern frontiers are seen as a stage to

examine a stage to examine the dissolution of the empire in comparison to other

parts.

Many scholars, such as Herbert Adams Gibbons, Mehmet Fuad Köprülü,

Paul Wittek, Colin Imber, Halil İnalcık, Mehmet Öz, Colin Heywood have put

forward hypotheses regarding the emergence of the Ottomans. More recently, these

studies on the “true origins” of the proto-Ottomans10 have been re-evaluated by

Cemal Kafadar.11 One of the common themes among these debates is the existence

of a fluid frontier zone in southeastern Anatolia where the newcomers (the Turkishspeaking

settlers and conquerors) enjoyed the existing borderland institutions and

local knowledge. 12 These early frontier-interior relations, which many authors

debate, show that frontier zones had their own distinct features. Kafadar discovered

this through sources from the Turco-Muslim frontier milieu of Anatolia, which

involved legendary accounts of the lives of warriors and dervishes. He discussed

how frontier people invented their own state-like structures and traditions by basing

them on a complex set of values and attitudes embodied in the concept of Gaza.13

Departing from all identifications of the early Ottomans, they were partly the last

product of long and ongoing interactions among the neighboring settlers in the

frontiers.

Before discussing the second category, it should be stated that there are a few

authors who focus on the whole frontier history of the Ottoman Empire making use

of the approach of the Annales School of history. This approach entails a holistic

9 Reşat Kasaba, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees (Seattle: Washington

University Press, 2009), 59.

10 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (California:

University of California Press, 1996), 9: Kafadar uses this term in his explanations of the earlier

influences that shaped a collective Ottoman identity.

11 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 9.

12 Ibid., 3.

13 Ibid., 13.

8

study of a historical problem in interaction with geography and sociology. For

instance, Alfred J. Rieber and Cem Emrence have used this methodology in their

works. Emrence’s work explains imperial experiences by referring to his own

conceptualization of pathways such as “the coast, the interior and the frontier”14

interacting with one another. Rieber adopts a more distinctive methodology and

historiography. As he was obviously inspired by the Annales School, he attempts to

write the global history of Eurasian empires by adopting a broad comparative and

transnational approach towards the imperial space, ideologies, cultural practices,

institutions (armies, bureaucracies and elite), frontier encounters, crises, and legacies.

He examines these issues at two distinct levels: from above, and from below.15 By

doing so, he seeks to answer some important questions within a long time span (La

longue durée). One of the questions to which he sought an answer in his study is,

how the continental empires survived competition in the same regions for such a

long time. 16 According to him, geo-cultural, geopolitical, and civilizational

approaches dominate studies on this issue, but his preference is a geo-cultural

approach. He looks, at three spatial concepts: Eurasia, borderlands, and frontiers as

shaped by intricate historical processes over many years.17 In other words, Rieber

stresses that his study interprets Eurasia, its frontiers, and the borderlands as spaces

shaped by complex historical processes forming a geo-cultural context in which the

great conflicts of the twentieth century came to be situated.18

The second category can be designated under two significant edited books

containing various articles. The first one is Kemal Karpat and R. W. Zens’ The

Ottoman Borderlands, where some issues such as identities and political alterations

on the borderlands are examined for the first time. The second is The Frontier of the

Ottoman World, which was edited by A. C. S. Peacock six years later than The

Ottoman Borderlands. A comparative study embraces many essays the authors of

which have benefitted from historical and archeological approaches. Although, it

does not compare the subjects discussed, it gives a chance to its audience to compare

them based on the diverse articles in the book. It sets out important aspects of

14 Cem Emrence, Remapping the Ottoman Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy, and the

Islamic State (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 2.

15 Alfred J. Rieber, The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern

Empires to the End of the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 2.

18 Ibid., 5.

9

Ottoman frontier fortifications, administration, society and economy in terms of how

Ottomans cope with the challenge of controlling its frontiers.

Neither of these works is designed to cover a specific region nor a specific

theme. They do not present a stable period either. Distinct articles evaluate a variety

of subjects regarding the Ottoman frontiers from the fifteenth to the twentieth

century. They cover many articles written specifically for the sake of Ottoman

frontiers and borderlands from north to south, from east to west in a composition of

various contents and theoretical claims. In the case of the Ottoman frontiers and

borderlands, these works represent a limited literature, since they are scattered and

bring more complexity to the issues due to the fact that the interrelations of the

borderlands changed according to local knowledge and practices, and it would be

more relevant if studies could be gathered under different titles. In particular,

imperial eastern borders, as never completely settled borders until the first quarter of

twentieth century, present a unique historical experience in terms of Ottoman border

studies due to its consequences on todays’ Turkey. Apart from the articles in which

the Black Sea, Balkan and North African frontiers of the empire were examined by

various authors, most of the articles that fall under the second category evaluate the

borders, by especially focusing on the Safavid period. This is very important in that

these studies have constituted a background for a better understanding of the

Ottoman-Iranian conflicts of the late period and helped the analysis of the impacts of

frontier interactions in early twentieth century Ottoman-Iranian relations.

The third category of border studies emerged to gather together studies

eastern borders of the empire but in a different period. This category tends to bring

together studies related to the late Ottoman period, and particularly the Hamidian era.

Albert Hourani, Melike Sarıkcıoğlu, Sabri Ateş, Janet Klein, and Metin Atmaca are

prominent researchers who focus on the circumstances of the eastern borders in the

late period or the imperial eastern frontiers overall. Their works intersects roughly

between the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Sarıkçıoğlu’s Osmanlı-İran Hudut Sorunları (1847-1913) covers a period that

she frames as a deadlock. It starts with the Erzurum Treaty in 1847 and ends with the

Istanbul Protocol in 1913. In this period, the parties failed to settle their border

conflicts, and this situation prevented the development of Ottoman-Iranian relations

10

for a long time.19 Ateş extends this period to the beginning of the First World War

(WWI) because he believes that the two states finally recognized their shared

boundaries a few days after the outbreak of the war. 20 These two works were

originally PhD dissertations. Other works based on PhD dissertations are Klein’s The

Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militia in the Ottoman Tribal Zone, and Atmaca’s

Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier: The Babans

(1500-1851). In their studies, Klein and Atmaca focus on one theme rather than

directly examining border conflicts and border delimitation. Klein examines the

changing dynamics of frontier conflicts and shifting alliances, center-periphery

relations, and many other issues regarding the border control of the empire in light of

evaluating the role of Kurdish militias in the imperial tribal zone. Her research

determines there was a strong correlation between being a militia loyal to Ottoman

Sultan and gaining material superiority in the tribal frontier zone.

Depending on this relationship, the Kurdish tribal chiefs abused the system

by using the titles and honorary ranks given them to acquire more power and local

hegemony and obtaining more lands and privileges from the state in the process.21

Klein argues that Ottoman policies of incorporating Kurds in the state by way of

recruiting them to the Hamidiye Light Cavalry System (1890-1908 and beyond)

brought the incorporation and the dissolution at the same time ‘in a sort of non-state

space’.22

Atmaca deals with the history of the Kurdish Baban emirate and its

surroundings from 1500 to 1900. He claims that Ottoman authorities did not

administer the region directly. Although regional governance belonged to the

Ottoman authorities, local notables directed and mobilized local opinions. He

underlines that Ottoman authorities and local notables were mutually dependent

because the rising power of the notables came from their connections with the elites

in Istanbul.23 It can be said that constructive and deconstructive manners of the

Ottoman governors and commanders accompanied the creation of such a network.

19 Melike Sarıkçıoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran Hudud Sorunları (1847-1913) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,

2013), XI.

20 Sabri Ateş, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary 1843-1914 (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2.

21 Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone, 180.

22 Ibid.

23 Atmaca, “Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier: The Babans (1500-

1851),” VIII.

11

It is useful to compare two important studies of this category. One is Ateş’s

work. The other is Sarıkçıoğlu’s study. These two studies are important in terms of

providing valuable knowledge on Ottoman-Iranian relations in the late period by

analyzing these relations using different methods. They also use different sources.

While Sarıkçıoğlu uses Iranian and Ottoman archives predominately24, Ateş mainly

uses the British archival sources (such as envoy reports), and newspapers as his

primary sources. Sarıkçıoğlu focuses on the political economic strategies of the states

intersecting at the frontiers. She examines the interrelations of the Ottoman Empire

and Iran, which changed conjecturally over time. She investigates the activities of the

Ottoman-Iranian frontier commissions in a chronological order and marks the steps

of boundary negotiations from a macro perspective. Thus, she attempts to show how

political unrests and imperial rivalries had a major impact on the policies of both

states, and how these disturbances changed the direction of their respective polices. 25

Ateş investigates the same period by including the story of the efforts of the

Ottomans for modernization and its impact on the borderlands, the dilemmas of

borderlanders in terms of identity and loyalty, and the local power struggles in the

greater history of Ottoman-Iranian relations.

The boundary delimitation is a key point issue in in both of these studies.

Both of them mirror the activities of all the boundary commissions who were

charged to delimitate the Ottoman-Iranian boundary starting from the 1840s. They

had reached a deadlock regarding the validity of the treaties.26 Arthur Conolly, a

British officer in the 1840s, described the same period that Sarıkçıoğlu and Ateş

cover with a pithy expression. This period had become a stage to the contest of

24 She explains that she extensively used the papers of “Güzide-i Esnad-ı Siyasi-i İran ve Osmani”

published in seven volume, which contains all the documents regarding the Ottoman-Iranian relations

till 1920, and she also used the papers existing in Iranian National Library and in various libraries in

Tehran: Sarıkçıoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran Hudud Sorunları (1847-1913), XI–XII.

25 Ibid., 16.

26 Ibid., 17. Sarıkçıoğlu addresses the ambiguity regarding what was the inception of Ottoman-Iranian

frontier conflict. She states that Ottoman and Iranian statesmen had accepted the creation of a border

commission to regulate border conflicts in the arbitration of Russia and Britain in 1843. The

commission had finalized its work by concluding a treaty based on nine articles. However, the

Ottoman Empire had not recognized this treaty. Ali Pasha, the foreign minister of the Ottoman

Empire, had stated that the Ottomans had not confirmed that treaty by declaring the treat included

some articles, which were unclear. Then, the Russian and British ambassadors had accepted to clarify

the fourth article. Following this, all parties had signed the treaty of Erzurum in 1847. Iranian

Government in Tehran had learnt the results of the negotiations after Muhammed Ali Han, the Iranian

chief negotiator, arrived to Tehran. Then, they had refused the treaty by announcing that Iran did not

recognize it.

12

Russia and Britain for hegemony over Eurasian borderlands, so he called this period

an era of “the Great Game” (1818-1907). 27 This expression became a historical

concept later indicated the framework of the pressure diverging until 1907, turned

into a collective pressure on the Ottoman and Iranian territories in 1907. Their

compromise necessitated the speedy solution of the boundary conflicts and the

boundary delimitation between two states not to brink them to the edge of war.

Although Russia and Britain reached a compromise, the Ottoman and Qajar

governments did not reach a similar compromise.

1. 3. Research Methodology

This study relies on quantitative and qualitative research methods employs an

explanatory framework of analysis. The research gives special importance to

establishing the chronological order of events, and examines the archival data in a

comparative perspective. I found nearly three hundred files, which include hundreds

of official documents, in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul. This group of

documents embodied directly the activities of Tahir Pasha and the other frontier

actors. To investigate their activities accurately, I adopted a critical and comparative

approach to the documents to prepare the ground for an examination of Tahir Pasha

and the Boundary Commission. The existence of several Tahir Pashas of Albanian

origins complicated the confirmation of the documents attributed to our Tahir Pasha

who headed the Ottoman delegation in boundary negotiations with Iran. I separated

first Tahir Pasha by comparing all the reports written by all Tahir Pashas with his

biographical register. This examination enabled me to discard documents related to

other Tahir Pashas.

My research relies largely on qualitative research methods. This qualitative

approach enables us to understand human behavior and the reasons for such behavior

within a framework of the meanings, attributes, and symbols of a particular period.

In the fifth chapter, a quantitative analysis is employed in order to

demonstrate a correlation between the Ottoman budget and border related

expenditures, and the evident and eventual impact of this correlation on the policy

and decision making.

27 Elena Andreeva, Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism (New York:

Routledge, 2007), 19.

13

I analyze the discourse of the frontier actors in the sixth chapter to understand

Ottoman statesmen’s approach to local people and borderlands in the disputed

territory by an analysis of the semiotic meanings of the Ottoman discourse in official

documents.

The research relies heavily on primary sources such as annual reports,

recollections, newspapers, and maps, and secondary sources like various books and

selected articles.

A map has ben used to illustrate whole range of the boundary. Practically, I

preferred taking snapshots in order to demonstrate a local area, Ottoman military

fortifications, and lodging of the Ottoman commissioners.

I have widely used two significant terms, namely, frontier actors and frontier

difficulties. The first term suggests those actors who implemented or challenged

Abdulhamid’s policies in the frontier zone. These actors had multiple roles, as they

were mostly the governors of border provinces, border commanders, commission

members, foreign consuls, and tribal leaders. The second term, frontier difficulties,

conceptualizes the conditions surrounding frontier actors. Briefly, the prevalent

conditions around the disputed territory which were strained by inter-tribal conflicts,

raids, attacks, plunders, lawlessness, feuds, rumors that were based on false and

biased information, and geographic handicaps for wheels complicated the work of

frontier actors in advance. The Times reporters used to describe this territory by using

the term ‘Wild Districts’ to draw attention to the prevalent roughness of the disputed

terrain.

14

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter begins with an analysis of the Ottoman-Safavid (1502-1736)

relations and the conditions of the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire in that

period. Second, it moves on to a historical period when the Ottoman state had the

Qajar state (1796-1925) as its eastern neighbor. I emphasize the era from the 1840s

to the 1870s, as this era produced high volume of local knowledge on the Ottoman

Iranian frontiers. These efforts resulted with the narrowing of a long boundary to the

status of partly defined boundary by creating a border zone that would be demarcated

later. Thus, this chapter provides a better understanding of the historical context of

the boundary conflicts and the efforts to delimitate the boundary until the emergency

of the border zone.

2. 1. Ottoman-Safavid Relations and Frontiers (1502-1736)

The Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) was an influential entity in Eastern

Anatolia and Northwestern Iran, where it emerged as a combination of political

traditions and religious actors. It formed a state several decades after the Ottomans

had conquered Constantinople in 1453.28 As Dale states, these actors were the Aq

Qoyunlus, as (the White Sheep Turks), and the Safavid Sufi pirs. These groups had

limited political and religious influence in the region in 1453. Together, these groups

competed with other hegemonic dynasties in the region, such as the Qara Qoyunlu

(Black Sheep Turks), located in Tabriz. Under the leadership of Uzun Hasan, the Aq

Quyunlus began to establish its hegemony over the other dynasties in the region by

forming a challenging power in Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and Northwestern Iran.29

As Dale asserts, Uzan Hasan, a Sunni Turkish Muslim, aimed to constitute a

legitimate confederation that could be transformed into a “major Perso-Islamic

principality”. For this purpose, he began to patronize Muslim institutions and Sufi

orders. Moreover, he tended to consolidate his legitimacy by promoting

28 Stephen F. Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2010), 63.

29 Ibid.

15

intermarriages with the pirs from the Safavid order after the Ottomans defeated them

in 1471.30

Shah Ismail (b. 1847- d. 1524), whose mother was the daughter of Uzun

Hasan, turned the Safavid order into a state. The audience on which he based his

legitimacy was quite fragmented. He embraced the Shi’i concepts as doctrine and

demanded the obedience of Sunni Muslims, Sufi pirs, and Shi’i Imams. He used

intermarriage as a way of policy making, and he wanted to solidify his relations with

members of tribal military coalitions.31

Shah Ismail defeated his Aq Quyunlu relatives in 1501 and occupied most of

the Iranian plateau within the following decade. He continued to enforce Shi’ism as

the dominant belief system in the region and tried to institutionalize Shi’ism in a

territory where the number Sunnis exceeded that of the Shi’a. 32

Ismail began to proclaim himself as the Padishah of Iran, the king of kings

and the sultan of sultans. In political terminology, the Ottomans used similar titles

and the Ottomans perceived his actions as a threat to their sovereignty in Eastern

Anatolia. They were two different Islamic entities competing in the same field and

region. When Ismail turned his face to the west, and began winning over most of the

Oghuz tribes, Selim I (r. 1512-20) decided to put an end to the propaganda of Ismail.

An incident not prompted this decision was the revolt of Shah Kulu in

Southeastern Anatolia, which became very influential. Ideologically, the revolt

carried anti-Ottoman features and supported Shah Ismail’s ideology.33 As Selim had

the opportunity to observe this revolt closely, he proclaimed that Is’mail created a

heretical belief system. In 1514, he destroyed the army of Ismail in Chaldıran in

Azerbaijan. Ismail was forced abandon his claims of sovereignty in Eastern

Anatolia, and withdrew to the Iranian plateau,34 while the Ottoman borders moved

eastwards to the current western borders of Iran.

After the war, the Safavids began to deal with internal conflict, inter-tribal

rivalries, and external threats. Frictions, incursions, and occupations continued

throughout the century between the Safavids and the Ottomans. Shah Tahmasb

(1524-76), who was Ismail’s successor, had an aggressive attitude towards the

30 Ibid., 65-66.

31 Ibid., 69.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 86.

34 Ibid., 70.

16

Ottomans, and he did not hesitate to confront the Ottomans once again. The territory

of the Ottoman Empire was religiously divided, so the Ottomans did not abstain from

interfering in western parts of Iran.35 However, as Faroqhi states, the major Ottoman

conquest of Safavid controlled lands was achieved during the reign of Suleiman the

Magnificent (b. 1494- d. 1566). Iraq and Basra became Ottoman provinces as a result

of the campaigns of 1534 and 1546.36

After Selim I ended the influence of Ismail, he started a diplomatic campaign

to win over the tribes located on the eastern frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. For

example, the principalities in the Van region accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1515

due to the diplomatic enterprise of Molla Idris Bidlisi.37 Many local princes, notables

and families chose to shift to the Ottoman side. Bitlis, Hakkari, Mahmudi, and many

other districts on the border gradually became integrated into the Ottoman Empire

during the sixteenth century.

Matthee describes the frontiers where merchants crossed from one border

point to another as political borders. He states that tribes, “whose loyalty might be

bought but could never be taken for granted”38, resided in the vast proportion of the

border area. According to him, the Kurds inhabited the northern parts of the

borderlands and the Arabs inhabited the southern parts. These tribal people were

unwilling to submit to central control. The states’ strategies to bring security to the

borders and benefit from the area could not be implemented because the states could

not control the tribes that lived on both sides.

In this context, centrally controlled Ottoman lands, where the government

could implement a proper tax system were limited in the region. Many ideas, from

pragmatism to ideological commitment, were put forward regarding how the

government would take over the region.39 As Sinclair stresses, it was important to

maintain a balance depending on mutual interests between the central Ottoman

government and regional principalities, which could slip out of the government’s

hand as wet soap. He states, “the whole existence of the principalities depended on

35 Rudi Matthee, “The Safavid-Ottoman Frontier Iraq-I Arab as Seen by the Safavids,” ed. Kemal H.

Karpat (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2003), 164.

36 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 34.

37 Tom Sinclair, “The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region of

the Sixteenth Century,” in Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalites and Political Changes, ed.

Kemal H. Karpat (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2003), 121.

38 Matthee, “The Safavid-Ottoman Frontier Iraq-i Arab as Seen by the Safavids.”

39 Ibid., 173.

17

an equilibrium of tribal transhumance patterns and allegiance.”40 Öz asserts that the

Ottomans considered regional differences and applied a variety of pragmatic and

flexible land-tenure systems throughout the empire in this century. He presents a

case study on the lands of Bitlis where he points out that the Timar system, which

was applied throughout the empire, was not applied in most districts in the

borderlands. Instead, the Ottomans implemented the hükümet41 and ocaklık42 systems

in the sub-province of Bitlis. In return, they received the tribes’ consent and

obedience to the sultan.43 Sinclair states that the application of the sancak system in

these frontier regions, which were largely populated by tribes, could push the local

population to seek government protection on the other side of the borderlands. Öz

justifies this view by explaining that “the number of hükümets and “yurtlukocaklık”

44 districts used to increase when the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry increased

towards the middle of the seventeenth century.”45 Sinclair states that having borders

with the Safavid Empire accelerated the escape of some tribal population, and the

Ottomans needed further and firmer arrangements in districts nearby the Safavid

Empire.46 It is clear that having similar and mutual benefits connecting one tribe to

another, which is the strong essence of tribal kinship, not only defines their internal

relations but also their external relations with other states. This enables the

40 Sinclair, “The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalties of the Lake Van Region of the

Sixteent Century,” 142.

41 Hükümets were “given to the administration and property of their holders in return for their service

and obedience. These lands were conferred upon local ruling families in return for their help and

services at the time of conquest. All the revunees of these lands belonged to their holders.”Mehmet

Öz, “Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bitlis in

the Sixteenth Century,” in Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes

(University of Wisconsin: Madison, 2003), 146–147. By modifications, this system survived, and the

ocaklık-hükümet (hereditary and semi-autonomous) system lasted until the mid-nineteenth century.

Ibid., 153. The approach of the Ottoman State regarding its eastern frontiers in pre-modern era based

on pragmatism, practicality, and flexiblity. “They did not hasitate to turn hükümet or yurtluk-ocaklık

districts into ordinary sancaks or to do just the opposite if it seemed necessary and fruitful.”Ibid., 155.

42 This system was giving partial independence to local government, “where the central government

allowed pre-Ottoman local rulers (hakims) to hold their hereditary districs under certain conditions

dating from sixteenth century, but later on it was changed.”Öz, “Ottoman Provincial Administration in

Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bitlis in the Sixteenth Century,” 145.

43 Ibid.

44 These districs were under the control of provincial governors, and th timar system could have been

applied to these districts.

45 Öz, “Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bitlis in

the Sixteenth Century,” 153.

46 Sinclair, “The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region of the

Sixteenth Century,” 142–43.

18

identification of the allegiance patterns of eastern border landers of the empire in the

pre-modern era. It can be seen that state-tribe relations in the frontier zones

embodied pragmatism, ideological commitment, and flexibility.

2. 2. Ottoman-Qajar Relations and Frontiers (1796-1925)

The central administration of the Ottoman Empire, governed by one dynasty,

was more stable compared to Iran’s. At the end of prolonged political turmoil in Iran,

the Qajar dynasty took charge of Iran and governed it from 1785 to 1925. In this era,

complex interrelations in the frontier zones among statesmen and tribes continued by

small configurations, in the context explained previously. Since the time of Ismail,

the legitimacy of the governors was based on winning the consent of the tribes

among other factors. One dimension of this policy was to control the tribes and tribal

lands by promoting intermarriages. Sine the Ottoman dynasty had its political center

far from the state’s eastern peripheries, it did not have such a policy. Instead, it

shared its authority with local rulers without having any systematic application of

dynastical intermarriage to tribal lords.

During the Qajar period, Iran seemed to be a country of tribal confederations

with influential spiritual figures (pirs). Keddie describes the consequences of the

former Iranian policy by these words:

These indigenous factors at the turn of the twentieth century weakened the

modernization efforts in Iran, so industry, infrastructure, or agriculture

remained primitive thanks to decentralizing powers of tribes, ulema, some

cities and regions.47

The attempts of the Qajar governors were thus far in favor of Iran on its

western border zone where it competed with the Ottomans over the domination of

borderlands. In the 1890s, the Ottomans systematically developed few institutions to

solidify the tribes and state relations in the context of the implementation of pro-

Caliphate policies. Abdulhamid II established schools for the tribes and formed new

troops recruiting the Kurds, but throughout the centuries, the conflicts, wars and

agreements created porous borders with many fugitives.

47 Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (United States of America: Yale

University Press, 2006), 35–6.

19

It is clear that the earlier efforts for the modernization of the Ottoman

Empire, which pre-dated those in Iran, may have damaged the loyalty of some

Ottoman tribes living in borderlands adjacent to Iran due to the fact that these

modernization efforts restricted the movements of the tribes, which were prompted

by pragmatic concerns. If the empire became more pragmatic, the tribes could have

flexibly changed their sides.

The flexible and pragmatic policies of the tribes did not overlap with the

nature of the modern state, and tended to create a greater problem for a state whose

modernization process was on the verge of crumbling. Moving and shifting tribes

from one side to another began to cause major conflicts. For centuries, Iran spent

much energy to make the tribes its loyal subjects, but as it strove to do so, it slowed

down its own modernization process. However, this created an advantage over the

Ottomans, who had started to modernize earlier. This factor showed where the

legitimacy of the Qajar dynasty came from in Western Iran. Another factor was the

protection Iran had from Britain and Russia throughout the nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries. To shed light on this point further, the modernization efforts,

which can be open to debate as to whether or not they ever existed in western Iran,

should be investigated in terms of the application of land and tax systems enforced

on the tribes, in order to discover whether there were any points weakening the

loyalty of the tribes and pushing them to seek refuge in Ottoman territories in the

early twentieth century.

In order to map out in detail the relationship of the Ottomans and the Qajars

intersecting on the frontier, the period between 1843 and 1876 need be investigated

carefully, given its importance. During this period, the Ottoman and Qajar frontier

relations reached their peak in defining the borders due to some changes in world

politics. Both Britain and Russia desired to achieve stability in the area (in especially

Mesopotamia in the case of Britain, and the Caucasian provinces in the case of

Russia). They did not want to lose the economic advantages they had gained earlier.

The crisis in Egypt, multilateral conventions based on economic interests to pacify

the Levant, and the establishment of a reliable regime over the Ottoman straits during

this time created conditions that were a priority for these nations rather than the

20

frontiers in the 1840s.48 This international conjecture resulted in an arrangement of a

quadripartite boundary commission in 1843 aiming to create a borderline, which was

more definitive and binding and could end territorial disputes.49

The next four years were to determine the owner of the Muhammerah port on

the Shatt al-Arab. Russia and Britain in agreement asserted that the port had greater

links to Iran than the Ottomans.50 However, specifying the ownership of Shatt Al-

Arab River embodied vagueness. The Ottoman proposals were rejected by Britain

and Russia on grounds that they were the entire owners of the river, so the river

dispute could not have been resolved until 1975.51

Shofield compares the status quo mentioned in the articles of the treaty of

1843 to the ones in the treaty of 1847. As he explains, article 2 of the 1843 treaty had

many ambiguities, but it envisioned some territorial definition associated with

Suleymaniye and Zohab. For instance, article 2 envisioned the allocation of Zohab

between Ottoman lands and Iran. The western parts of Zohab would be given to the

Ottoman State, but the eastern parts including the mountains and valleys, specifically

Kerrind, would be given to the State of Iran. Article 2 also shows that Iran gave up

all claims regarding the situation of Suleymaniye. Lastly, article 2 gives insight

regarding the situation of Muhammerah. The article recognized the town and the

seaport of Muhammerah and the eastern side of the Shatt-el Arab to be under full

“Iranian” sovereignty.52 The parties could not agree, but they signed an agreement in

1847. According to this treaty, the parties would establish a commission consisting

of four parties to survey the mentioned lands. If this effort would not be successful,

the treaty, which was signed in 1843, would be considered as grounds for further

negotiations.

The commission gathered in 1850 and worked until 1852, but could not find

common grounds regarding the status quo by making contradictory comments about

the articles of 1847, the Erzurum Treaty.53 In this commission, Dervish Pasha was

the Ottoman representative. After he ended Iranian occupation of Khotour, he

48 Richard Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth Century Efforts to Delimit and Map

the Perso-Ottoman Boundary,” in War & Peace in Qajar Iran: Implications Past and Present, ed.

Roxane Farmanfarmaian (New York: Routledge, 2008), 152.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 154.

52 Ibid., 154–55.

53 Ibid., 155.

21

recognized the port of Muhammerah and the Island of Khizr as being Iranian. In

return, Iran would “abandon illegally-held territorial positions further north in the

borderlands, including Khotour”.54 Then, Iran demanded sovereignty over all eastern

parts of the Shatt al-Arab. Obviously, the parties found themselves dealing with the

articles of 1843. At least, in 1851, the Ottoman and Qajar commissioners (Mirza

Jaafar Khan) adopted a “status quo line”55 at Muhammerah. The next phase of ran

into a deadlock when the nonnative powers imposed the determination of the

sovereignty over Zohab according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1847, which put

the Ottomans in a disadvantageous position. Dervish Pasha insisted on the restoration

of the 1843 status quo line in Muhammerah and Zohab, but nonnative powers

continued to work and announced in 1852 that the “mediating commissioners were in

possession of sufficient topographical data to map the southern Perso-Ottoman

borderlands from the Gulf northwards to Zohab.”56

Although the Ottomans were clearly unsatisfied with the terms of the

Erzurum Treaty, the Qajar commissioner showed Khotour as a condition to agree

with the prescriptions of the Erzurum Treaty. This restricted the border delimitation

further, and, the creation of a border map was suspended, but a long borderline had

become limited to a border zone57, a debatable and conflict prone space.58

After a while, Dervish Pasha reconvened the commission to finish the survey

that would eventually define the rest of the borders from Zohab to Mount Ararat, but

Shofield asserts that Dervish Pasha was behaving “unilateral”59, meaning he was

acting independently from the other commissioners, trying to cultivate his

relationship with the people who inhabited the mentioned border zone60.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress that demographic elements of the border zone

seem entirely vague in terms of determining its ethnic and religious components at

this point. This border zone belonged to none of the local states, so it was open to

54 Ibid., 156.

55 “This line, was previosuly designed by Colonel Williams, ran southwards from Hawizeh to the

junction of the Jideyeh canal with the Shatt al-Arab and from there along the east (Iranian) bank of the

river to the Iranian Gulf.” Ibid., 158–9.

56 Ibid., 159.

57 The zone ranged in width between 20 and 50 miles. Ibid., 160.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Schofield asserts people who lived in some districts (Serdesht, Banna, Larijab and Ushni) had

“well-established” allegiance to the Shah. Ibid. Nevertheless, he does not show any evidence or give

any reference to show where he got this idea.

22

conflict and negotiations in the 1850s. This is why, the argument that Dervish Pasha

seduced people residing at the border zone seems neither valid nor impartial, because

if the border zone people were of Iranian origin, why would there be a need for

further negotiations regarding the border zone? His argument seems to be

teleological, and aiming to legitimize the leaving of the border zone to Iran, ignoring

the seductive activities of Iranians in these districts.

It seems Britain began to advocate Iran after the border was specified from

the Gulf to Zohab, and aimed to delimitate the rest of the border in favor of Iran.

Somehow, the British officials lost all the accounts, including surveys regarding the

border delimitation. They encouraged Iranians privately to sign contracts regarding

the forts on the line. By losing the accounts, it seems the British forced the Ottomans

to accept the articles of 1847. British representative Williams, after having lost the

documents, stated:

Mediating commissioners’ original instruction had been to confine territorial

restitution to Muhammerah, Suleymaniye, and Zohab, in conformity with the

1847 treaty, but elsewhere to respect the status quo as originally estimated in

1843.61

Under these circumstances, the Porte rejected the suggestion to partition

Zohab. The occupation of Khotour by Dervish Pasha became one obstacle in front of

the resolution. Russia and Britain were trying to restore Khotour to Iran. In 1861,

Istanbul refused to evacuate Khotour as well.62 Russia and Britain did not have even

an identical draft map in 1867. Their maps were different from one another,

indicating different place names and the ignorance of the British and Russian

representatives of the local languages. According to Schofield, this explained why

the Ottomans did not trust nonnative commissioners, since these mediating

commissioners simply did not consider “the human geography of the borderlands”.63

Dervish Pasha’s unilateral action can be perceived as a reaction to their ignorance. In

1869, Britain and Russia completed the Identical Map or Carte Identique, but it still

included “errors with upwards of 4,000 discrepancies.”64 However, the Qajar

government was sufficiently satisfied with the Anglo-Russian map in contrast to the

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., 161.

63 Ibid., 162.

64 Ibid., 163.

23

Porte. In 1869, they recognized the status quo in the border zone by signing an

agreement minimizing the border disputes and ending the construction of buildings

in disputed lands. However, manipulation and conflict continued.

Local commissioners played a border game by switching between the

treaties, which were signed until the 1870s. Form the 1840s to the 1870s, the border

saw minor changes, but the local knowledge regarding the border increased.

However, the local parties frequently manipulated the articles of the treaties. When a

new agreement designated a new status quo, they would determine to what extent

these new parameters were useful to them, and shift the status quo depending on

points that were more beneficial to them. The problem was that all treaties

approached the border as a single issue, but, especially by basing it on the 1847 and

1843 treaties, the local parties would try to apply their own will by getting strength

from one or another article of a mentioned treaty that they saw useful for their aims

regarding a section of the borderland. In other words, they had a whole text in theory,

but in practice, they wanted to apply one article to one part of the border while they

applied another article from another treaty to another part. This way, they

manipulated the treaties and the articles, and this created major problems in border

delimitation between the 1840s and the 1870s, especially for the disputed lands.65

Although all parties tried to find common grounds for compromise, the

outbreak of the Serbian War of 1876 and Turco-Russian War of 1877-1878 delayed

the process. The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed in 1878, caused extensive losses

of territory, and included some articles regarding the eastern peripheries of the

empire.66 One of these articles was about Khotour. With this article, the Ottoman

Empire had to hand Khotour over to Iran.67 Khotour held an important place in

Ottoman border diplomacy because this point was an exit for the forces located in

Van.68 With the ceding of Khotour, the Ottoman Empire lost one of its most

significant pathways to the inner parts of Iran.

65 Please check for the examples. Ibid., 165–6.

66 Mustafa Tanrıverdi, “The Treaty of Berlin and the Tragedy of the Settlers from the Three Cities,” in

War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, ed. M. Hakan

Yavuz and Peter Sluglett (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2011), 449.

67 FO 881/3831, “Iran and Turkey: Papers. Cession of Khotour to Iran under Art. 59 of Treaty of

Berlin. 4 Maps,” 1878, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3658305.

68 Schofield, “Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth Century Efforts to Delimit and Map the Perso-

Ottoman Boundary,” 170.

24

In conclusion, new parameters or paradigms of border definitions became

unclear and foreign interventions put the Ottomans in a disadvantageous position

causing them to lose geographical superiority vis-à-vis Iran. Local knowledge

defining the borders increased with surveys in the region, but reliability of these

surveys, and the articles of the treaty were open to debate. The Ottoman government

did not trust the surveys, which were prepared by outsiders, so Dervish Pasha

shuttled between unilateralism and multilateralism in a pragmatic state of nature.

However, as mentioned above, at least, the parties agreed upon the southern parts of

the border and a border zone was drawn in the north. The rest of the study analyzes

how the states dealt with the demarcation of this border zone, which evolved little

through history.

2. 3. A Convention: For Peace or For War

From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century,

the demarcation of the border zone continued to be the prime concern of the

competing states. Russian and British policies regarding the region had to change

due to major conjectural changes in the world. Britain began to follow inclusive

policies for the developments occurring in the frontier of the Ottoman and Qajar

States against Russia by shifting away from its isolationist policies to cultivate the

ground for a rapprochement in the first decade of the twentieth century. Russia and

Britain knew that Iran would not be able to take the possession of the disputed lands,

when they saw a strong resistance against Majd es Sultanah’s fortifications and

actions in the frontier zone. In 1907, Russia and Britain put pressure on both the

Ottoman and the Qajar governments to agree another to another frontier commission.

Wratislaw expressed the reasons behind the common ground that would lead to the

formation of the commission:

Russia and G. Britain now began to show increased interest in the doings on

the Turco-Persian frontier—Russia because she did not at all approve of the

Turks establishing themselves in a position which would lay the Caucasus

open to a flank attack in the event of a war, and G. Britain in the cause of

peace and order, and to some extent because the Anglo-Russian agreement

being now an actual fact, she felt bound to support Russia and Persia.69

69 A. C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons,

1924), 231.

25

This section evaluates the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 as a crucial

development that prepared the ground for the formation of a new boundary

commission to demarcate the rest of the border zone and to sustain the Anglo-

Russian rapprochement in Iran. This chapter also examines the public opinion in

Britain, Russia, and Germany, based on the Times and on local newspaper articles

quoted in the Times. Thus, it discusses the convention that was signed before the

completion of the designation of the boundaries. The convention brought neither

peace nor total war to the region but pushed the formation of the boundary

commission to the field amid inter-tribal fighting.

2. 3. 1. The Anglo-Russian Treaty (1907-1914)

When the treaty70 was signed between Britain and Russia in St. Petersburg on

August 31, 1907, it incited a discussion that fluctuated between optimistic and

pessimistic views of the Anglo-Russian Entente. As Hughes stresses, a significant

portion of the British public opinion remained skeptical about the treaty, although the

Tsarist government assured that it had given up its traditional ambition of moving

forward [to the south] policy in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet.71 Ira Klein argues,

Britain was dissatisfied with the convention because it failed to “fulfill the British

aim of halting Russian expansion in areas strategically crucial to the defense of India,

and that in Central Asia, after 1912, the Anglo-Russian Convention hindered rather

70 The treaty was signed by Russia and Britain on August 31, 1907, in St. Petersburg, and it was

introduced as it would bring a ‘fixing solution’ to the rivalry of Russia and Britain clashing on the

three main locals: Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The convention consisted of three parts. The first part

was about Iran, and it divided Iran into three parts. The first sub part was designated the British sphere

of influence, and can be called the southern zone, lying “south and east of a line drawn from the

Afghan boundary near Gazik, through Gazik, Birjand, and Kerman to Bunder Abbas on the Strait of

Ormuz”. The second one was specified as the Russian sphere of influence in the northern zone. This

zone lied “within and north of an angle that has its vertex in the south at the town of Yezd, and that

runs thence northeast and northwest - northeast through Kakhk to the intersection of the Iranian,

Russian, and Afghan frontiers, and northwest through Isfahan to Kasr-i- Shirin”. The last part, which

became neutral or buffer zone in the middle of these two zones, was left to Iran. By this treaty, they

agreed upon “not to seek for themselves and not to support in favor of the subjects of third powers any

concessions of a political or commercial nature-such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs,

roads, transport, insurance, etc., outside their respective zones.” Editorial Comment, “The Recent

Anglo-Russian Convention,” The American Journal of International Law 1, no. 4 (October 1907):

979.

71 Michael Hughes, “Bernard Pares, Russian Studies and the Promotion of Anglo-Russian Friendship,

1907-14,” The Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 3 (July 2000): 511.

26

than furthered the British quest for security.”72 The year of 1905 was a long year for

Russia. It was defeated by the Japanese armies and had to deal with revolutionary

tumults at home. Furthermore, the German push for economic concessions and

privileges in Iran and other places where the Russians had vested interests pushed

Russia to agree with Britain in 1907. The failure of the Russians in front of the

Japanese armies prepared the ground for reconciliation. Before the Anglo-Russian

treaty was signed, Iran began to take advantage of the conditions. Majd es Sultanah

attempted to penetrate the disputed lands, which belonged to no one, and attacked the

area in order to conquer it in 1905.73 The Ottomans responded to this unilateral

attempt the same way, and gave the option to Iran to fight for or to withdraw from

their military fortifications.

2. 3. 2. Comments on the Anglo-Russian Convention:

Correspondence regarding the responsible countries shows that the Russian

and German press closely followed the Anglo-Russian agreement and debated as to

the consequences of the agreement by putting forward comments in their

newspapers. For instance, different newspapers belonging to different social milieus

in Russia criticized the agreement with different views, some being against the

agreement and others favoring it. The Russ, The Novoe Vremya, The Radical Journal

Tovarishch, The Bourse Gazette portrayed the different sides of the agreement. For

instance,

The Russ states:

The convention is not so much a treaty embodying bargains as a courteous

exchange of presents, preluding a further development of cordial relations

and promising in the near future a new combination of the political forces of

the world and a settlement of many complicated questions hitherto believed

to be insoluble. Russia has definitely abandoned old idea of an outlet towards

the Indian Ocean. Is there not serious reason to believe that compensation for

this painful renunciation may be given in a future Convention with Great

Britain concerning the Near East, where the question of the Straits still awaits

a settlement?74

72 Ira Klein, “The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia, 1907-1914,” Journal

of British Studies 11, no. 1 (November 1971): 126.

73 “The Recent Anglo-Russian Convention,” 981.

74 “Russian Press Comments,” The Times, September 27, 1907.

27

The Novoe Vremya states:

The Convention can serve as an instrument either for peace or for war. Which

it is to be depends on the attitude of the other Powers and ourselves, for in a

rapprochement with Great Britain we attract the antipathy of Powers which

have hitherto been hostile to her and confirm our sympathy with those powers

which have been friendly to her.75

Tovarishch remarks:

Russia may be satisfied in loosing so little. She would not have signed such a

treaty five years ago, when she was dreaming of an expedition into India, or

was at least ready to threaten Great Britain on the first favorable occasion.76

The Bourse Gazette states:

Inasmuch as the form of the Convention is unprecedented, it will not be

surprising if Iran, behind whose back the experiment is being conducted,

expresses discontent. The danger of the situation is increased by the fact that

there exists in Europe a tertius gaudens how in certain given circumstances

may be desirous of increasing the suspicions of the new ‘Sick Man’ in the

East. Russian and British diplomacy should make heroic efforts thoroughly to

convince Russia nor Great Britain is pursuing secret aims in Iran or

contemplating any intrigues against the independence or integrity of that

country.77

Apart from the Russian and British views regarding the Anglo-Russian treaty,

one Times reporter gives an insight as to the German press. According to him,

Germany attempted to discover “which of the two parties to the Anglo-Russian

Agreement had secured the greater advantage by the Convention”78. He reports to

have seen the German attempt as a “futile” attempt. Perhaps, it was the way of tactics

used by the Times not to awake Russia further, but it seems the German press aimed

to reveal the disadvantageous position of Russia. Thus, an idea, which was

represented by the Bismarckian political doctrine, shows that German interests

demand that “points of friction between England and the other Powers should be

carefully maintained”.79 Therefore, he explains, this agreement should be “prevented

from extending to spheres in which vital German interests are concerned”.80 The

opinions mentioned above more likely concentrated on the penetration of the

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 “The Anglo-Russian Convention: German Opinion,” The Times, September 27, 1907.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

28

Germans in the commercial sphere. The Germans asserted that the “Anglo-Russian

Convention, with respect to Iran, as a possible menace to legitimate expansion into

the sphere”81.

The Cologne Gazette read, “two Powers cannot be prevented from settling

their differences and safeguarding their interests as they think fit.” The Rhenish

journal evaluated the role of the third party in the commercial sphere as follows:

Third parties also have their inalienable rights, and that in the economic

struggle in Iran, for example, Germany, who has never cherished any but

commercial ambitions in that region, will have to show that she is an efficient

competitor.82

The newspaper concluded, “British and Russian trade in Iran will trespass

upon each other’s spheres of influence, and that new points of frictions will be

created to the advantage of third parties.”83 The Frankfurter Zeitung evaluated the

Anglo-Russian Convention in an article attempting to show the agreement is a

posthumous product of the British policy of Germany. They linked the inception of

negotiations between Russia and Britain regarding the convention to the time that

Anglo-Germen relations were under great pressure. It was stated:

With the improvement in Anglo-German relations Germany can contemplate

the Agreement with greater equanimity than would have been the case last

year, provided that German trade in Iran is allowed full scope for expansion.

Although Germany would at first be able to offer but little opposition, a

partition of Iran as a result of the Convention between Great Britain and

Russia would not ultimately be conducive to the maintenance of the world’s

peace, which the two Powers have professedly desired to promote.84

The Times stated the official German quarters did not have any useful

proposition. It read, “Modern German policy is essentially opportunist” and

continued, “Parliamentary interpellations or more remote contingencies could be a

sufficient reason for tolerating the survival of a view of British policy which has long

been discredited”85.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

29

Although the Anglo-Russian Agreement was signed in August, it was

announced in the Iranian parliament on October 5, 1907. One of the parliament

members, Musteshar Dauleh, elucidated the importance of the agreement regarding

the independence of Iran. As the Iranian correspondent of the Times stated, on

October 6, 1907, “Iranians were equally friendly to England and to Russia, but they

did not recognize that foreign treaties had power to deal with the affairs of Iran.”86

The conflict continued among the empires to establish commercial and

territorial superiority over places connected to the Indian trade route dominated by

Britain. The Ottomans had extended their authority in the disputed lands. The Times

reporter in Tabriz reported the “Turks occupied Askerabad 20 versts from Urumiah.

Salma has also been taken. Then, the British Consul left Urumiah for Mawana in

order to communicate to Tahir Pasha.”87 For the Ottomans, it was the best time to

occupy the disputed lands; otherwise Iran would have done that in 1905.

In addition, the international political conjecture was quite suitable for this as

well as the internal politics of Iran that dealt with two groups, those who supported

the monarchy on the one hand, and those who supported the parliament and

constitutionalism on the other. Both Britain and Russia approached these two groups

differently. Britain supported the revolutionary attempts in the neutral zone and in its

sphere of influence in the south, in contrast to the Russians who supported the Qajar

dynasty.88 However, there were revolutionary attempts also in northern Iran where

Russian interests lay, and Britain guaranteed its existence in the south by limiting

Russia to the northern zone by the provisions of the treaty and by following a secret

agenda to keep Russia preoccupied in the north with the revolutionary groups.

During this time, a member of the Iranian nationalist movement, Atabeg, was

assassinated. This formally made him a national hero of the Iranian reform

movement. The Times asserted that a constitutional movement so largely tempered

by this assassination scarcely seems to deserve the sympathy conferred upon it by

British radicals who would have cheerfully sacrificed the prospect of a peaceful

solution for Asiatic difficulties with Russia to the susceptibilities of the amiable

86 “Iran: Parliament and the Anglo-Russian Agreement,” The Times, October 6, 1907.

87 “The Turkish Incursions,” The Times, October 7, 1907.

88 Klein, “The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia, 1907-1914,” 128.

30

“children of Iran.”89 Apart from the methods that the Iranian Parliament advocated

for the salvation of the country, disorder was rampant throughout the country.

In the meantime, an Ottoman force took a considerable slice of Iranian

territory under its control on the northwestern frontier. This frontier region was

described as a “wild district” in Lake Urumiah.

According to the Times, the position of the sultan was stronger than that of

the shah in those wild districts of the border zone. It was stated that many

circumstances favored the designs, which the sultan pursued with his usual

persistency. First, it stated that his adversaries were weak and distracted by internal

commotions. Second, it elaborated the sultan wanted to safely venture upon liberties

with Russia whose sphere of interest in Iran included the disputed territory. Russia

would not have dared to take the area prior to the Japanese War. Third, it explained

that the frontier was never fully and accurately delimited. Fourth, the dispute had

been going on for long and could commend itself to Turkish conservatism. Lastly, it

was a dispute with who were held to be heretical Shias and could be given a fine

orthodox flavor.90

The Times implied that Britain and Russia would welcome the occupation of

the disputed border zone by Iran in 1905. It stated that Turkish troops had been

encroaching steadily and progressively for the last two years in the territory, which

was hitherto being held and occupied by the Iranians, although the status quo of the

border zone did not allow Iran to interfere. Thus, Iranian fortifications around the

zone in 1905 were against the agreement that was signed in 1869 stressing the

importance of non-intervention of the parties. With the interference of their troops in

the zone, the Ottomans increased their unilateral actions in the border zone. The

Times read:

They (the Ottoman troops and tribal forces) have been in Lahijan for two

years, they hold Mergawan and Tergawan, which, like Baradost, possess easy

descents into the rich plain of Urumiah, and they are trying to levy taxes

within a few miles of that city itself.”91 The rout of the Iranians under Majdes-

Sultanah in July has made the Ottomans more aggressive than ever, and

the four regiments of Iranian infantry with guns, which are to accompany the

89 “The children of Iran” was the movement, which was impressed by Iranian Nationalist leaders,

defended removing all obstacles in the path of national liberty and progress.

90 “The Situation in Iran,” The Times, November 2, 1907.

91 Ibid.

31

Shah’s new Commissioner, are not likely to overawe the Turkish

commander.92

The Anglo-Russian treaty did not create common grounds to fix the border

conflicts on the border zone, but tended to guarantee the supremacy of Russia and

Britain in their respective spheres of influence. Moreover, it can be said that the

treaty prevented a possible coalition like the Anglo-German or Russian-German

Ententes. Thus, it can be said that the treaty also prevented third party intervention.

The Anglo-Russia convention encouraged them to reevaluate the historical process

of the delimitation of the Ottoman-Iranian boundary under Russian and British

observation because the Ottoman-Iranian boundary that remained undefined was

threatening the regional security and stability of Iran, thus, their interests as well.

2. 3. 3. Disputed Border Zone

The Times mentioned the general tendency of the two mediating powers

regarding the border issue in 1907, as it was believed that the “two Muslim

Governments” could actually fix the precise frontier line within the zone.93 The

Times mentions retrospectively the current situation of the boundary as follows:

Between 1843 and 1865, a mixed commission where British, Russian,

Ottoman and Iranian representatives existed, investigated whole frontier from

Mount Ararat to the Iranian Gulf, and finally a map was prepared on which

the undisputed territories were laid down between two states, together with a

zone twenty or thirty miles broad, which included all the disputed

territories.94

The Times described both governments as “Oriental Governments” so that

they did nothing further to solve their problems. In contrast, both governments had

repeated to maintain a provisional status quo within the zone, but the disorder in the

zone continued even though the Russian and British concerns turned into pressure

that necessitated the resolution of the border delimitation as soon as possible.

To respond to the Porte militarily, the Qajar government constituted a force

thanks to the significant sum given by the Iranians to expel the Ottoman troops from

the zone. People from various national and political societies collected £400,000 and

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

32

asked the government to take prompt measures to ensure the safety of the roads, to

restore the order in the provinces, and to send an able and patriotic person to

represent Iran on the Commission for the settlement of the frontier dispute. This

statement shows that Iran was not capable to provide public order and security on its

frontiers under the prevailing conditions.

The convention had a dual role in the pre-war period. It could not stop the

rivalry between Russia and Britain, but it suspended it for a while. This opened a

space to restart the boundary negotiations. The convention became influential

bringing all parties to the table to solve border conflicts. It increased the hopes of

creating a fixed borderline. However, the provisions of the treaty were far from

bringing peace to the region, because Britain and Russia had different methods and

approaches to fix these regional problems, but at least, they prevented the

deterioration of the Russian position in northern Iran. This suspension of antagonism

between Russia and Britain prevented a third party intervention as well, but the

situation encouraged the Ottoman advancements in the controversial border zone and

explains why the Iranians behaved reluctantly and desired to incorporate disputed

proportion of the border zone without negotiations. Nevertheless, they were forced

by the mediating powers to resume negotiations in order to end the arbitrary behavior

of the tribes and other unknown groups committing crimes against humanity in the

border zone. Chapter 3 and 4 will show that the Ottomans demonstrated a manifest

sensitivity to providing regional security and stability.

33

CHAPTER 3

FORMATION OF THE FRONTIER COMMISSION

This chapter begins with an evaluation of the rationale behind forming a new

boundary commission, despite serious financial problems. Second, it analyzes the

relevant financial information regarding the salaries, travel payments of the

commission members, the costs of border-related military fortifications and the like.

Third, it shows the pathway that Tahir Pasha involved to the frontier delimitation

after having role in the settlement of public outrages that were erupted in Bitlis and

Van. His role in the settlement led him to be the chairperson of just forming frontier

commission in a critical period. In sum, this chapter sets the ground to shed light on

the reasons why Abdulhamid and the Sublime Porte repeatedly forced Tahir Pasha95

to delimit the imperial eastern boundary when the budgetary problems of the

government peaked.

3. 1. Commission Members, Commission-Related Expenses, and Increasing

Budgetary Problems

This section consists of two parts. First, it evaluates the cost of the

commissioners’ salaries and travel allowances. Second, it analyses the financial

ramifications of the Ottoman military fortifications. Then, both are analyzed in a

broader context in terms of what all the variables meant for the Ottoman image on

the border in a transition period between the Abdulhamid and CUP eras.

95 The study of the life span and career trajectory of Tahir Pasha is necessary in order to understand

how the Ottoman government approached the disputed border zone during this period of history.

Evidence shows there is a strong correlation between Tahir Pasha’s personal characteristics and the

political atmosphere he induced. Giving a detailed political biography of him in connection with the

significant interrelated events allows us to understand one of the most prominent actors of the border

making process. Examining his political life spent in the borderlands by giving special references to

the financial difficulties that the Ottoman Treasury encountered provides an insight about why the

sultan struggled to delimitate the frontier to a boundary. Tahir Pasha’s biographical record indicates

why Abdulhamid trusted such a loyal person who was able to establish good relations with the local

people. Thus, it has been seen that the networks Tahir Pasha established and the tasks he achieved

throughout his career increased his visibility in a growing bureaucracy. Tahir Pasha struggled hard to

conclude border investigations in favor of the Ottoman State, although increasing financial problems

put him frequently in a difficult position. For this reason, evaluating the expenditures of the

commission shows the importance that the Ottoman government attributed to the border-making

process, regardless of its limited resources.

34

The basic economic parameters of the period (1907-1908) indicate that the

financial troubles of the earlier years continued. Engin D. Akarlı shows this

continuity by under the three generations of 1839-71/6, 1876-1909, and 1909-18. In

all three cases, economic backwardness and budget deficiencies caused serious

disadvantages. Akarlı argues that healing the budget deficit created by the first

generation preoccupied the second and third generations.96 The second generation

(1876-1909) of this category corresponds to the reign of Abdulhamid, when the

Ottoman government had to deal with grave financial problems. The boundary

commission was formed amid this financial depression. Its formation brought

additional burden on the central treasury. In order to meet the requirement of the

budgets of 1323, 1324, and 1325, and to cover the budget deficits, the treasury

disposed of some of its resources. G. Lowther states regarding this matter:

Table 3.1: A summary of the financial estimates for 1325, which were

forwarded to Istanbul before the end of November.

Income Amount Expenditures Amount

£ T. £ T.

Local Revenues 1, 936, 421 Civil expenditure 969, 122

3 per cent Customs surtax 660, 000 Military expenditure 1, 486,

397

Advance by Public Debt 250, 000 Railway guarantees, &

c.

390, 901

Total 2, 846, 421 Total 2, 846,

421

The figures adopted for the special resources assigned by the Porte to cover

the excess of expenditure over local revenue, namely the 3 per cent. Custom surtax

and the advance made by the Public Debt were the same as for 1324.97

The budget of the Ottoman Empire was annually arranged and allocated

department by department. This enabled the departments to participate in the making

of the annual budget. However, unexpected expenditures created additional problems

in balancing the budget. Some of the expenditures of the boundary commission were

of this nature. Besides the budgetary difficulties of the Ottoman Empire became

96 Engin D. Akarli, “Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909,” Middle Eastern

Studies 28 (1992): 443.

97 Gerard Lowther, “General Report on Turkey for the Year 1908,” Annual Report (Foreign Office,

June 1909), 44–45.

35

chronic, Akarlı argues that the budget was being mostly prepared in a four-phase

process during the time of Abdulhamid.98 However, inter-departmental discussions

on how they would provide for the sums required by the boundary affairs

demonstrated that the commission’s expenditures were not included in this process to

prepare the regular budget. Finding these sums had a process of its own. Because the

formation of the commission was decided suddenly, the Ottoman government had to

apply a complex procedure to pay for its expenditures.99 It is important to ask from

where the government hoped to find the funds to meet the costs of the boundary

delimitation. How did the Ottomans deal with such unexpected payments? Why did

the payment of even such sums that were relatively minor compared to the regular

budget items prove so difficult? Answering these questions will clearly show the

struggle behind the border delimitation, too. Clearly, the Ottoman officials had to

apply a complex set of payment procedures to meet the expenditures of the border

commission.

The inter-departmental correspondences related to this issue added up to a

significantly high number of documents. The ambiguity regarding how these

expenditures would be paid was obvious. Dealing with this situation preoccupied the

Ottoman officials. For instance, this ambiguity concerned both the Ministry of

Financial Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs. However, the Ministry of

Internal Affairs was the main institution that had to resolve the budgetary problems

of the commission by producing practical solutions. The officials of all three

ministries became involved in the struggle to create funds. Two main reasons caused

98 Akarlı states ‘first, the government departments reported their cash requirements for the next fiscal

year. At the same time, the revenue departments assessed revenue prospects on the basis of provincial

reports and the records of previous years. Second, a special committee of ministers and administrators

evaluated, compared and adjusted the statements by different departments on projected expenditures

and revenues. Third, the preliminary budget was discussed by the Council of Ministers, which also

had to deal with the task of narrowing or eliminating the deficit. Finally, the budget was submitted for

the Sultan.’ Akarlı, “Economic Policy and Budgets" Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 3 (July 1992):

444.

99 Akarlı points out that there were two distinct budgets, which were prepared annually. ‘One of the

budgets was the ordinary budget (adi büdce) and the other extraordinary (fevkalade büdce). According

to him, the ordinary budget was based upon the customary and recurrent expenditures and revenues of

the state. The extraordinary budget was created to deal with the unexpected, unusual and temporary

needs of the state. Additionally, he believes that when extra cash was needed during an unexpected

military engangment, these needs were met in one or several of the following ways: (a) additional

taxes (i’ane); (b) transfers from the Privy Purse; (c) diversion of funds from, or savings in, the

ordinary budget; (d) discounting a portion of the next year’s revenues; and (e) short-or long term

loans.’ He found out ‘the last three were the most usual’. Ibid.

36

problems. First, the commission was formed after the annual budget was fixed.

Second, the time that the boundary delimitation would take was not known, so the

officials could not tell how long the commissioners would be paid for. Initially, these

two reasons caused ambiguity. Later, this ambiguity intensified because it began to

become apparent that the central treasury did not have the necessary funds to pay for

either the salaries of the commissioners or their daily needs in the border front. Their

payments were gradually released and always delayed. The treasury paid the

payments by taking loans and issuing payment vouchers that would be paid months

later.

The complex set of the payment procedure turned into a cycle that kept

manifesting the destitution of the Ottoman treasury. Even when the Ottoman treasury

had funds to rely on, the formation of the boundary commission abruptly and the

activities in which it was involved generated a need for ready cash and increased the

budgetary problems. Furthermore, as the commission had been formed in order to

prevent the cross border violence and the proliferation of the conflicts that

undermined the public security and order on the eastern limits of the Ottoman

provinces, it became the basic reason for new expenditures. The frontier policies

produced by the commission supported the consolidation of the Ottoman military

fortifications around the frontier. These additional expenditures as well strained the

Ottoman finances.

3. 2. Salaries and Travel Payments of the Commission Members

The commission was formed initially as a committee of inquiry expected to

investigate the unrest in Van and to settle the boundary disputes and conflicts. Tahir

Pasha was just a member of this committee, which was headed by Emin Bey Efendi,

a Member of the Court of Appeals.100 Later, Tahir was appointed as the head of the

investigation committee, replacing Emin Bey. This committee eventually turned into

a boundary commission. Abdulhamid confirmed its staff on August 10, 1907, by

appointing a chairman, members and officers. 101

The members of the boundary commission met for the first time upon their

appointment to the investigation committee. They served in different posts and

places across the empire previously. One exception to this was Tevfik Bey. He

100 BOA, İ. HUS. 157 / 39. 1325 B 16, 25. 08. 1907.

101 BOA, İ. HUS. 157 / 86. 1325 B 26, 4. 09. 1907.

37

served as the director of the Ministry of Education in Trabzon before he was

appointed as one of the commissioners. Tahir Pasha probably knew him from the

days of his governorship of Trabzon and invited him to join the commission to fill

the gap left by Emin Bey’s departure. He became the last member to join the

commission and his appointment ended the discussion whether there was need for

new members or not.

Although the organization of the commission was completed, how much

money they would receive while they served on it had not been clearly specified yet.

This ambiguous situation regarding the finances of the commission continued almost

until the Porte terminated the commission.

The salaries of each employees of the commission differed according to their

position of significance and rank. It was decided that their salaries would have been

paid monthly, but their salaries were sent cumulatively months later due to financial

problems. All the payment procedure and figures show that the commissioners kept

their previous post in addition to their duties in the commission. Accordingly, they

were paid not only for their service in border affairs but also for their previous post.

Relatively, they received a small rise in their salaries or an extra salary that changed

in accordance with their original salaries. However, these financial supports turned

into their second salaries when the affairs of the commission prolonged for many

reasons because these additional salaries were paid to them as long as they remained

as a member of the commission in addition to their first salary. Furthermore, they

were to be reimbursed for their travel costs in keeping with the set procedures of the

regulation for travel allowance (Harcırah Nizamnamesi) calculated according to the

miles they covered.

3. 3. Members of the Commission and Their Salaries

As it is stated above, the Boundary Commission embodied a group of senior

bureaucrats and military commanders. Some of the commissioners were invisible

throughout in the inter-departmental correspondences, while others were not. The

salaries indicate that there was a hierarchy within the commission. Tahir Pasha was

at the top of this hierarchy, but Ali Nadir Pasha, Brigadier General, Şakir Bey,

Colonel, and Danyal Pasha, Kerkük Commander-Divisional General, were the other

38

commissioners whose say was important.102 In addition to these prominent figures,

there were lower ranked military officers, civil servants, and assistants, who were

included and excluded intermittently according to the need of the commission. For

instance, Kazım Bey and Abdülrezzak Efendi, two junior officers, had been asked to

provide the security of the commission, on March 31, 1908. They became also

temporary staff of the commission for a while wherever the commission went. They

were to be paid double their junior salaries. Thus, each of them received two hundred

and fifty qurushes monthly. In total, they were paid five hundred qurushes extra, but

the condition of the central treasury was inadequate to pay even such a small amount,

so Musul supplied this payment by cash, and sent its vouchers, which showed how

much they paid, to the central treasury to refund it from the allocation of the Ministry

of Interior.103

The seventeenth article of the Regulation for Travel Allowance indicated that

any officer who had been temporarily appointed to an official post would be paid an

additional sum to compensate his travel costs. These travel allowances compromised

the cost of their round trip and multiple destinations. The temporary members of the

commission as they became visible only through the payment of their allowances and

were invisible in the rest of the commission’s records, Brigade Commander

Abdurrahim Pasha, and Colonel Mustafa Bey, are cases in point. Their actual salaries

and supplementary salaries were calculated together, so Abdurrahim Pasha was paid

seven thousand and two hundred qurushes and Mustafa Bey was paid three thousand

and six hundred qurushes.104

102 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01: DMK. Maliye Nezareti Celilesine, 27. 08. 1325.

103 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907 & 648 / 16. 17 Nisan 1324, 30. 04. 1908.

104 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173/ 41, 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907 & 5 Ağustos 1324, 18. 08. 1908.

39

Table 3.2-Travel Allowance, Salaries, and Extra Salaries of the Boundary

Commissioners (In 1907: 650 Liras= 65.000 qurushes, so 1 Lira = 100 qurushes)

Com. Members Travel Allowance Present Salary Extra Salary

Tahir Pasha Not available 23.000 q 1, 500 q

Danyal Pasha 15, 000 q Not available 800 q

A. Nadir Pasha 25, 000 q Not available 720 q

Tevfik Bey Not available Not available 700 q

Şakir Bey 25, 000 q Not available 350 q

+

Zeki Pasha Not available Not available Not available

The amount of Tahir Pasha’s travel allowance was not specified. When Tahir

Pasha was recalled from Trabzon to Bitlis, he received travel allowance for a round

trip. Probably, Tahir Pasha continued using this money for his trips between

provinces. 105 Until his duty was confirmed, the travel allowance he received created

some problems. The finance officers began to ask the Grand Vizierate whether Tahir

Pasha and Tevfik Bey would receive a travel allowance and an extra salary or not.

Furthermore, they asked how much they would be paid, if they would be paid .106

The officers also questioned whether Danyal Pasha would receive an extra salary or

not apart from his travel allowance.107 While the officers continued to inquire about

the payments of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey, they decided to pay one extra salary to

Ali Nadir Pasha and Şakir Bey each commensurate with their actual salaries at the

beginning.

105 Tahir Pasha was paid twenty-seven thousand and seven hundred fifty six qurushes and five paras in

total. His share from that amount of money was eight thousand and three hundred and sixty six

qurushes for his own traveling expenses.105 Another document, written a few months later, indicates

that Tahir Pasha and the officers who went with him took twenty seven thousand and seven hundred

and fifty six qurushes and five paras, as it is stated above. However, it is also stated that Tahir Pasha

received a loan, which was sixteen thousand and five hundred and forty four qurushes for his round

trip although he should have taken nine thousand six hundred and twenty qurushes for his traveling

expenses. He probably assumed he would return to Trabzon. It did not happen. After the settlement of

the incident, Abdulhamid II appointed Tahir Pasha to the governorship of Bitlis. It seems the Ministry

of Finance demanded from Tahir Pasha to return some of his travel allowance (6,923 qurushes) back

to the Treasury. He paid back four thousand and sixty four qurushes, the rest of the money (2,859

qurush) remained unpaid, but the Treasury demanded it again. 105

106 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: (...) 5 Eylül 1323, 18. 09. 1907

107 Ibid.

40

The travel allowances that would be paid to Ali Nadir Pasha, Şakir Bey and

Danyal Pasha had been specified. Ali Nadir Pasha and Şakir Bey, each of them,

would receive two hundred and fifty liras (25, 000 qurushes) and Danyal Pasha

would receive one hundred and fifty liras (15, 000 qurushes). In total, three of them

were paid six hundred and fifty liras (65, 000 qurushes) for their travel allowance.108

The Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior demanded this payment

immediately from the Finance Ministry and expressed that it must be added to the

annual budget of the Ministry of the Interior in 1907.109

The Treasury found the payment of these sums impossible for lack of

adequate funds. When the central treasury declared its inability to pay these sums in

a short time to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, the Province of

Musul was ordered to pay the required sum in cash in return for vouchers. The

officers in Musul would send the vouchers to the Central Treasury requesting the

payment of the indicated sums out of the allocation of the Ministry of the Interior.

Thus, Musul paid 7,500 qurushes to Tahir Pasha as supplement and paid

4,000 qurushes to Danyal Pasha. Ali Nadir Pasha was paid 3,600 qurushes. Şakir

Bey was paid 1,800 qurushes. Tevfik Bey was paid 3,500 qurushes.110 In total, they

received 20,400 qurushes. The financial officers struggled hard to pay Musul its

expenses, but they could not do it due to the condition of the treasury. Instead, they

began to delay the payments. The bills circulated from one office to another. The

finance officials observed, “If those sums could not be paid on time, the payments

should have been conveyed to the Unexpected Expenses Account (Zuhurat Tertibi)

of the Ministry of the Interior in 1907.111

On January 2, 1908, the Financial Ministry notified that the Unexpected

Expenses Office of the Ministry of the Interior could not provide all the money, so

they assumed that the Expenditure Allocations Office (Mesarif Mürettebatı) should

pay the remaining sums. However, this office as well stated that they had limited and

fixed funds and noted that to the General Allocations Office (Mürettebat-ı

Umumiyye), which arranged the Budget of the Ministry of the Interior, should make

108 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: DMK. Maliye Nezareti Celilesine, 27. 08.

1323, 09. 09. 1907.

109 Ibid.

110 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 3080 / 20. 21 Ekim 1323, 4. 12. 1907.

111 Ibid.

41

the payments. At the end, the Ministry stated that paying such a significant amount

of money was impossible.112

On January 13, 1908, apparently, they still had not supplied the required

funds. They kept debating how they would find the required sums. They suggested

that the unpaid vouchers should be returned to the Unexpected Expenses. Then, the

accountants stated that there was not another choice left apart from adding that sum

as a budget deficit to the current year’s (1907) budget under the Arrangement of

Unexpected Expenses when the vouchers arrived.113 However, these financial

problems did not stop them to seek the funds needed for frontier delimitation.

The issue of paying the extra salaries of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey114 was

finally resolved. It was decided that they would receive extra salaries as long as they

were involved in the border defining process. However, the exact amount of their

payment remained unfixed. Probably, this sum was paid by Van because the

provincial revenue office of Van inquired about the clarification of a few points

regarding the extra salaries of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey. In this respect, Mehmed

Sabri, the Minister of Finance, conveyed the appeal of the revenue office to the

Ministry of the Interior, on January 25, 1908, requesting information about their

tenure as members of the frontier delimitation mission from the beginning to the end.

In addition, the revenue office asked whether their first extra salaries would

be increased or not, and their salaries would be subject to five per cent deduction for

Aid for Civil Officials (Mülkiye Musabin), an insurance fund for civil bureaucrats,

and one per cent for Aid for Debilitated Soldiers (Zu’afa-yı Askeriyye İ’aneleri)115, a

fund to help debilitated soldiers.116

On February 4, 1908, the Financial Affairs informed the revenue office that

Tahir Pasha and other commission members should have been paid as of the

beginning of their boundary investigation duty, and should not be subject to the

112 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 3614 / 29. 31 Kanun-i Evvel 1323, 13. 01.

1908.

113 Ibid.

114 The name of that member is not mentioned in the documents. However, Tahir Pasha and Tevfik

Bey’s extra salaries were not specified yet becasue Tahir Pasha was shifted from the membership of

the commission to its presidenty. Tevfik Bey was added to the commission following Tahir Pasha

became its president. The member whose name is not mentioned is Tevfik Bey becasue only one

person whose extra salaries remained unspecified apart from Tahir Pasha. Thus, it can be said that

Tevfik Bey was that unknown officer.

115 Cutting 1 % from everyone created a fund in order to help those suffering soldiers.

116 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 120.

42

regulations regarding the insurance funds. However, the Chief Secretary of the

Ministry of the Interior noted that their extra salaries needed to be cut by five percent

for the insurance fund for civil bureaucrats and one percent for a similar insurance.

However, their salary should not increase (terakki) and not be subject to cuts for the

Debilitated Soldiers Insurance Fund (Zu’afa-yı Askeriyye İanesi).117 Thus, the

prolonged process to deliver the salaries of these two significant members of the

commission ended.

Tahir Pasha’s actual salary was 23, 000 qurushes when he was appointed to

the Governorship of Bitlis, on July 30, 1907.118 According to his biographical

register, he received, apart from his own salary 1, 500 qurushes extra to recover the

money he spent from his own pocket while he dealt with the border affairs.119 That

means, in total, he received 24, 500 qurushes for each month. If Musul paid 7, 500

qurushes to Tahir Pasha to supplement his actual salary, on January 14, 1907, we can

assume that Tahir Pasha stayed there at least five months since he received 1, 500

qurushes extra for each month.

By this logic, Musul paid 4, 000 qurushes to Danyal Pasha, 3, 600 three

qurushes to Ali Nadir Pasha, 1, 800 qurushes to Şakir Bey, and 3, 500 qurushes to

Tevfik Bey, which means 20, 400 qurushes in total. 120 Thus, if these sums covered a

five-month period, the share of each commissioner can be calculated, as Danyal

Pasha received 800; Ali Nadir Pasha received 720; Şakir Bey received 350; Tevfik

Bey received 700 qurushes for each month as an addition to their actual salaries.121

However, it must be added that these figures do not reflect the entire sum that

was paid to the commissioners until the last day of the commission, but it gives some

insight about the extent of the pressure their payments put on the budget throughout

the border defining process. All these factors show that the Ottoman Treasury

suffered from the shortage of revenue. Thus, extraordinary expenditure further

strained the Ottoman finances.

The formation of the commission put a new burden on the budget. They

solved the problem only by taking domestic loans from Musul and Van. The

117 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 3879 / 24.

118 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

119 Ibid.

120 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: [14. 01.1907].

121 These figures show assumptions regarding how much they receved as an extra for each month.

These assumptions are calculated according to the data which is taken from the biographical register

of Tahir Pasha, as a result of comparing datas taken from his register and some other documents.

43

vouchers were written in the name of the provinces. The Treasury promised to pay

these sums back soon. However, these bills circulated from department to

department as the officials tried to find a budget account from which they could

make the payments.

Despite the problems were encountered to reimburse, the Province of Musul

continued to meet the requirements of the commission against future payments by

the Treasury. 122 On February 11, 1908, the Chief Secretarial Office of the Ministry

of the Interior clarified the procedure for finding the funds. They wrote that several

documents involving requests for payment had been sent to the Ministry of the

Internal Affairs inadvertently instead of the Treasury. 123 These seven pieces dispatch

notes and three promissory notes referred to transactions that involved salary and

travel cost payments to the commissioners. These sums, which were eventually paid

by Musul, amounted to 42, 855, 50 qurushes.124

The expenditures of the commission appear to have been added to the annual

budget temporarily in 1908. On March 19, 1908, the Chief Secretarial Office of the

Ministry of the Interior informed the Ministry of Finance again that the salaries

allocated to Tahir Pasha and the other commissioners should have been stated in the

budget as a temporary item because the work of the commission was about to end. It

would have been permanently removed from the budget if the commission were

finally dismissed. In this case, the travel allowances that would be paid to Tahir

Pasha and the commissioners were set at 122, 400 qurushes for the period from

September 14, 1907, to March 13, 1908. The sum for their extra salaries would be

added to this amount, and all would have been allocated from the annual budget,

eventually.125

3. 4. Occasional Expenditures, Military Fortifications, and the Claims for the

Termination of the Boundary Commission

Beyond the difficulties encountered in meeting the payments of the

commissioners, border-related issues increased the burden on the budget in other

122 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 3937 / 28. 29 Kanuni Sani 1323, 11. 02.

1908.

123 Ibid.

124 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: DMK. 3937 / 28. 10 Muharrem 326, 13.

02. 1908.

125 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 61 / 6. 6 Mart 1324, 19. 03. 1908.

44

ways as well once the commission became involved in these issues proactively. The

Porte acted on frontier matters according to the information it received from the

frontier actors. The tendency of the Ottoman and Qajar governments to solve the

problems diplomatically shifted to aggressive military fortifications and unilateral

action of the chief commissioners towards the end of 1908. Each fortification and

expansion effort created a state of panic in the Ottoman Finance Ministry because

they knew the Treasury did not have sufficient funds to afford the expenses of the

military fortifications in the villages around the Lake Urumiah. Most of them

believed that each day the Ottoman troops spent in the frontier zone would bring a

heavy burden on the Treasury.

When these occasional pressures increased and cash shortages began to be

unbearable, the Ottoman officials began to question the number of the military

troops. They thought the number of troops in the frontier zone could be reduced.

They suggested the withdrawal of troops, hoping to reduce the costs. This proposal

divided the Ottoman officialdom into two groups. One group, including Tahir Pasha,

stressed the importance of the troops. They believed the present number of troops

should be maintained. The other group demanded the reduction of the number of

troops to alleviate the burden on the Treasury. Initially, Tahir Pasha opposed them.

On August 18, 1908, he sent a telegram to the Internal Affairs in which he clearly

showed his unwillingness to decrease the number of troops. He stated that all the

battalions that were kept in the border zone were actually very necessary, and the

Ottoman soldiers should not leave the districts where they were stationed. However,

the condition of the government finances forced him to agree to the recalling of some

of the battalions, but he warned Istanbul that this measure would jeopardize the

security in two significant frontier zones, where nineteen battalion companies

situated. As Tahir Pasha indicated, he could only decrease the number of them from

nineteen to twelve or eleven. According to him, seven or eight battalion companies

should continue their duties and this would be sufficient for now to defend the two

critical frontier areas, near the disputed zone.126

126 Asâkir-i Şâhâne’nin şimdi bulunduğu hudûd noktalarından ayrılması kat’iyyen câ’iz değil ise de,

iki mıntaka hudûdunun muhâfazasına yedi, nihâyet sekiz tabur kâfî bulunduğuna göre, iki mıntakada

bulunan on dokuz taburun on iki yâhûd on bir taburun eski yerlerine i’âdesiyle masrafın taklîli

mümkin ve münâsibdir. BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: Tahir Pasha, 5

Ağustos 1324, 18. 08. 1908.

45

Two days later, Ali Rıza, the Governor of Van, in a telegram that showed his

opposition to the decision that Tahir Pasha had to take unwillingly. Van was a

province bordering with these conflict prone zones, and these troops in question were

actually stationed around the border of Van. Their reduction would threaten border

security in Van, according to Ali Rıza. His reports provide details about the Ottoman

fortifications (including the number of troops and the range of military equipment)

on the border front. According to him, the troops consisted of two artillery battalions,

two battalions of infantry troops, two regular army squads, one militia unit or

reserve, and one cavalry squad.127 Then, he asked vitally about the cost of these

troops for the Central Treasury. He stated that if the two regular army squads, whose

costs were paid by Musul, were excluded, the total cost 155, 300 odd qurushes. Thus,

Ali Rıza argued that the evacuation of the troops to decrease the expenditures would

create security problems, and creating funds by dissolving the troops on the border

was not more important than keeping the public secure and maintaining order in the

border zone.128 Nevertheless, these regular troops were withdrawn as described in

Tahir Pasha’s letter mentioned above.

The usefulness of the commission began to be questioned. In September of

1908, Ali Nadir Pasha and Tevfik Bey resigned from the commission. The appeals of

these resignations show that they thought that the commission’s expenses were

unnecessary and aggravating the financial crisis. The reasons behind their resignation

are explained in the rest of this study, but the most significant statement was in

Tevfik Bey’s appeal as he referred to current financial situation: “I resigned from the

commission not to contribute any longer to the damage inflicted on the State

Treasury unnecessarily…”129

127 “…nevâhî-i ma’lûmede kuvâ-yı mütehaşşide iki batarya tôpçu ve iki tabur ve iki bölük nizâmiyye

ve bir tabur redîf ve bir bölük nizâmiyye süvârîsinden ibâret olup Musul Vilâyeti’nce tesviye

edilmekde olan iki bölük nizâmiyyeden başka diğer kıta’âtın mu’ayyenât-ı havâleleri yüzelli beş bin

üç yüz küsûr gurûşa bâliğ olduğu gösterilmişdir. BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06.

1907: 14607. Ali Rıza, 7 Ağustos 1324, 20. 08. 1908.

128 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 14607. Ali Rıza, 7 Ağustos 1324, 20. 08.

1908.

129 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: 16366. 20 Ağustos 1324, 2. 09. 1908 (The

Resign of Tevfik Bey).

46

3. 5. Tahir Pasha’s Involvement in Boundary Delimitation

Tahir Pasha was a key frontier actor. He had become a significant policy

implementer, usually for the Palace. He was often asked to mediate and to

investigate local disputes. Following Tahir Pasha’s footprints throughout his career

and detecting the degree of his influence in other state affairs is a challenge. He was

charged with different duties concerning various problems in different provinces,

including some the affairs of which were not directly related to his official post. He

usually had to move from one province to another to investigate conflicts and

contribute to their settlement. Undoubtedly, his personal experience of governance

that spanned thirty-three years in the eastern provinces became influential to

prescribe him as an official capable of restoring public order and calming down

social unrest caused by governors’ “ignorant” of the conditions in the eastern

provinces.130

First, Ferid Pasha was the Governor of Bitlis whose disrespectful treatment of

a mixed group of villagers and sheikhs spurred mass rallies and public unrest in

1907.131 Second, Ali Bey Efendi, the Governor of Van, caused a similar reaction in

Van the same year.132

Tahir Pasha served previously in these provinces. The Porte formed a

committee of inquiry to discover the reasons behind the unrests. At that time, Tahir

Pasha was the Governor of Trabzon. Following the outbreaks of the events, he was

immediately recalled first to Bitlis and then sent to Van before the unrests in these

two provinces became widespread. O. H. Parry comments in view of these unrests:

I told the Grand Vizier that I had news from Bitlis that there was considerable

political effervescence and discontent there as well as at Van and Erzurum,

that there appeared to be a strong feeling against the Imperial Government

130 I suspect that this ‘ignorance’ stemmed from different outlooks of the governors regarding

Abdulhamid’s policies. It seems the regional rivalry between Armenians and Kurds played a

signficiant role in this matter. It can be said that these governors had divergent views of Ottomanism

and Islamic Unity. It also seems that the most of Kurdish tribes of eastern Anatolia embraced the the

idea of Islamic solidarity and did not like the governors who projected an Ottomanist idelogy. Zeki

Pasha explained this when Ali Bey, the governor of Van, witnessed such a matter. As a result, these

political unrests in Bitlis and Van could be the outcome of this clash of policies.

131 BOA, Y. MTV. 299 / 102. 1325 CA 14, 25. 06. 1907.

132 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 07. 1907. Eighth Division Commander Divisional

General Mahmud Pasha informs Istanbul about the current situation in Van and demands an

experienced bureaucrat. “Emniyyet ü asayişi başka bir renk kesb etmiş olan bu vilayetin tecribe-dîn

[sic! tecribedâr-tecribeli?] ve kâr-âzmud[e] bir zâta ihâlesi esbâbının istikmâli ehemmiyyet-i maslahat

namına müsterhemdir - ol-bâbda."

47

among the Notables, and that there was great danger of a combination

between the Revolutionary party and the Kurds owing to the exactions and

maladministration of the country, and that while the Sultan’s attention was

fixed on a few kilometers of country across the frontier, a dangerous

revolutionary movement would perhaps break out behind and spread

throughout the land owing to the excitement engendered by events on the

frontier.133

On November 20, 1907, concerning the latter view of the events, Sir. N. O’Conor

states that

. . . the state of affairs in Bitlis and Van Vilayets is so disturbed in

consequence of the attitude of the Kurds and the general scarcity and

suffering that Tahir Pasha, who is still Vali of Bitlis, will probably not be able

to prolong the negotiations with the belated Iranian Commission . . . 134

3. 5. 1. Praying for Rain and Rioting against the Governor: The Case of Ferid

Pasha

Ferid Pasha was the governor of Bitlis in 1907. During his time as governor,

he faced a public reaction, which was led by some of the sheikhs. The reasons behind

why the local people and sheikhs came together and opposed the governorship of

Ferid Pasha had an interesting background, and demonstrated fragile interrelations

between the representatives of the central government and the local population. Tahir

Pasha knew the internal dynamics of Bitlis very well, because Bitlis was the first

place with which he became acquainted in his long career in the eastern provinces.

He had served there on various occasions. When the incident occurred in Bitlis,

Tahir Pasha was sent to Bitlis from Trabzon.

Brigadier General Celal Pasha explained in detail what happened in the

province until Tahir Pasha reached Bitlis. Celal Pasha was the leading official who

witnessed the development of the unrest and dealt with its settlement for the first

time. His explanations indicate that the sheikhs had strong influence over the people,

and this point gives us an insight regarding the governmentality of the region at that

time. The sheikhs used the authority they derived from their influence over people

against Ferid Pasha, one of the governors of the Ottoman State. Taking the local

people behind them, the sheikhs underlined that the anger was against the governor

himself and had nothing to do with the sultan.

133 Schofiled. Vol. IV, p. 153.

134 Sir N. O’Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, November 20, 1907, Schofield IV, 236.

48

Celal Pasha’s report regarding this incident helps us understand the reasons

behind the incident, but it seems that the Ottoman officials could not understand at

first what happened when people began to gather in front of the government

building. Celal Pasha’s report indicates that this incident started on June 9, 1907, and

it continued more than three days. Many days before the incident occurred, local

people and sheikhs had appealed to Ferid Pasha to exchange some money. This

exchanging money is not clear, but it gives an idea about Ferid Pasha’s reluctance to

accommodate the demands of the local people.

Local people in Bitlis depended on agriculture for their living and agriculture

depended very much on suitable climate conditions. However, a drought hit them in

the summer of 1907. In order to avoid this arid summer, villagers, sheikhs, and

ulema came together to pray for rain for three days. On the last day, they demanded

Ferid Pasha to participate while they were passing by the government building. Ferid

Pasha did not participate in this praying activity and met them at the door without

covering his head.

Most probably, the sheikhs, who had control over the local people, found

Ferid Pasha’s behavior disrespectful and something that diminished their authority

over ordinary people. This friction and opposition turned into a social protest against

his governorship. Meanwhile, Celal Pasha tended to calm down the crowd. He heard

the voices of people standing in front of the exterior door and yelling and setting fire

to the government building: “Pasha, come meet us! If you do not, we are going to

harm the soldiers and you as well! We obey the Padishah; our target is the

governor.”135

Apart from angry crowd who gathered around the government building,

another group consisting of some ulama, sheikhs, notables, and other respectabile

people of Bitlis, occupied the telegraph station in Bitlis. By doing so, this interesting

composition of people aimed to cut off the communications with Istanbul. They

prevented Celal Pasha as well when he wanted to inform Istanbul about the incident.

Ferid Pasha simply did not understand how he had caused such a public riot,

so he was unaware of his mistake. He asked Celal Pasha to learn the demands of the

crowd that gathered in front of the government building: “… Inform the sheikhs and

135 BOA, Y. MTV. 299 / 134. 1325 CA 18, 29. 06. 1907.

49

call them here. If people do not want me, we should solve this without using

force…”136

Some of the sheikhs left the telegraph house to talk to the crowd and to scold

and restrain those people who had begun to behave violently. These disgruntled

people plundered the government building and killed an Ottoman military officer. On

the third day, the relations with some of the sheikhs began to normalize. These

sheikhs feared further deterioration of the situation, and chose to cooperate with

Celal Pasha by providing intelligence that suggested taking protective measures for

the safety of Mustafa, Vice Governor and Provincial Captain for Security, and

Muhammed Efendi, the Gendarme officer.

To prevent the escalation of the conflict further in Bitlis, Tahir Pasha was

sent to Bitlis in order to listen to the complaints of the people and to investigate the

inappropriate actions of those people who behaved anarchistically against the

authority of the governor.137 Celal Pasha was replaced with another person in Bitlis,

and the place of some of the officers changed. 138 Some troops were shifted from

Mush and Van to Bitlis under the command of the Divisional General Mahmud

Pasha, while the Porte advised all the officials in Bitlis to calm the people down.139

Before Tahir Pasha arrived at Bitlis, Ferid Pasha had already left the province

by imperial order, and was in a village nearby Bitlis, waiting for Tahir Pasha’s

arrival.140 However, later, Ferid Pasha moved to the army headquarters to prevent

any harm towards him and was ordered to wait there until the investigation

concluded.141 Meanwhile, Istanbul was looking for possibilities for a resolution to

calm down the people and to restore public order in Bitlis. Tahir Pasha was urged to

move faster,142 as reports indicated that the agitation of the people increased in Bitlis

and the communications with the province was cut off.143

The urgent arrival of Tahir Pasha at the province was very important under

these circumstances. However, traveling from Trabzon to Bitlis within a short time

was difficult because everyone had to use traditional means of transportation.

136 Ibid.

137 BOA, BEO., 3085 / 231366, 1325 CA 13 / 24. 06. 1907.

138 BOA, Y. Mtv., 299 / 89, 1325 CA 12, 23. 06. 1907.

139 Ibid.

140 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 512 / 68. 1325 CA 13, 24. 6. 1907.

141 BOA, BEO., 3085 / 231369. 1325 CA 14, 25. 6. 1907.

142 BOA, Y. Mtv., 299 / 105. 1325 CA 14, 25. 6. 1907.

143 Ibid.

50

Fortunately, they were in the summer season and Tahir Pasha did not have to deal

with the heavy weather conditions that usually closed roads for months. The means

of transportation, distance, and road conditions still prolonged his travel. A document

conveyed to the deputy governor of Trabzon indicates that travelling from Trabzon

to Bitlis normally took eighty-nine hours, almost full four days, in 1907.144 For that

reason, travelling this route faster than normal would have been an invaluable

contribution to the settlement of the uprising, for, evidently the center saw Tahir

Pasha as the only official who had the capacity to resolve the conflict.

3. 5. 2. Anti-Governor Riot in Van: The Case of Ali Bey Efendi

Ali Bey Efendi succeeded Tahir Pasha as the governor of Van, when Tahir

Pasha’s term (1898-1906) ended due to his medical problems. Van was nearby

province with Bitlis. A conflict erupted in Van as well. Although it did not escalate

as much as it did in Bitlis, it had such a potential impact. Two commanders,

Divisional General Mahmud Pasha and Marshall Zeki Pasha shed light on the

reasons why Ali Bey Efendi encountered resistance in Van.

Their statements revolved around four reasons: a) Ali Beg Efendi was

ignorant of the local conditions. b) He did not comply with the procedures to gather

information in order to maintain public order because of his lack of experience. c) He

offended the Muslim population.145 d) There was an obvious disparity between his

behavior and position.

Marshal Zeki Pasha, as a strong defender of the Hamidian Light Cavalry,

summarized that the Armenians manipulated the present conditions due to Ali Bey

Efendi’s poor administration and inexperience as he had been in Van for almost a

year. He asserted that a group of Armenians abused his lack of local knowledge and

instigated tumult by spreading hatred among the inhabitants of Van.146 Ali Bey

Efendi rejected all these accusations against him. Then, the Porte decided to send an

investigation committee to find out whether Ali Bey Efendi was at fault or not.

144 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 1, 12. 6. 1907: DMK., 188.

145 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: Zeki Pasha’s telegram: Ermeni hazelesini

der-dest fikriyle sürekli ve fekat neticesiz ta’kibat u teharriyatda bulunarak birkaç memurun itlafına

sebebiyet vermesi, Ahali-i Hıristiyaniyye’yi şımartmış ve Ermenilere karşı bir sedd-i kavi vü metin

teşkil eden Aşayir-i İslamiyye hakkında icabsız tazyikat ü şikayatda bulunarak gücenmelerine neba’ir

vermiş ve mu’amele-i hod-binane ile bi’l-cümle ecanib ü memurini dil-gir etmişdir.

146 Zeki Pasha’s telegram, Ibid.

51

Together with some well-known people that would involve later in the

frontier commission, the Porte appointed Emin Bey Efendi, a Member of the Court

of Appeals, as the chief investigator.147 Tahir Pasha was appointed as the governor of

Bitlis after settling the unrest. He was also nominated to participate in the

investigation. Then, he was ordered to join the investigation committee headed by

Emin Bey. The Porte was counting on Tahir Pasha as a conflict resolver in Bitlis.

When a need emerged to investigate the unrest in Van, the Porte understood that his

absence could lead to similar events in Bitlis. Thus, they decided to appoint a deputy

governor by stressing that he should be a suitable person capable of managing the

province properly during Tahir Pasha’s absence.

Proto-boundary commission that was charged to investigate the accusations

directed to the imperial army was the integral part of the investigation committee of

Emin Bey. Tahir Pasha was in this committee as well. The Porte charged the border

commission with full authority to investigate Ali Bey Efendi’s conduct, thereby

dismissing Emin Bey. The Porte’s decision implied that a copy of the report that

showed the findings of the investigation of Emin Bey’s committee would be sent to

Tahir Pasha because he did not have the time to wait for the results. He had to leave

to meet to the British, Russian and Iranian representatives on the border front.148

At the end, the investigation committee found Ali Bey Efendi guilty, and the

Porte decided to dismiss him. Thus, Zeki Pasha, who insisted on Ali Bey’s guiltiness,

reached his aim after the assertions about Ali Bey proved accurate.

147 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 151. 13 Recep 1325, 22. 08. 1907.

148 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: Mektubi Kalemi, 564 / 150.

52

CHAPTER 4

THE COMMISSION IN ACTION

The previous chapter discussed the formation of the Ottoman frontier

commission, the impact of the commission’s expenditures on the Central Treasury,

and the circumstances under which Tahir Pasha was involved in the commission that

was shaped to settle the boundary issue. This chapter specifically examines how the

frontier commission led by Tahir Pasha dealt with the frontier difficulties and

attempted to define the imperial eastern boundary. In the first phase of this endeavor,

the commission was charged to inquire about a local frontier dispute, which was not

related to the delimitation of the boundary directly. In the second phase, which

proved quite intense, the commission focused on negotiations to settle the boundary

issues. The section shed light on the difficulties involved and how the occupation of

controversial territories in keeping with the Palace’s response aggravated those

difficulties. The chapter discusses as well the various reasons, multiple factors and

development that led to the dissolution of the boundary commission. One of these

reasons, the impact of the 1908 movement, is analyzed especially closely.

4. 1. The Phase of Inquiry

After Tahir Pasha dealt with the political unrest in Bitlis and Van, he was

ordered to attend a joint meeting with the Russian, British and Iranian delegates in

order to clarify a local dispute and the charges made against the Ottoman troops.

In this phase, the Russian and British Consuls had conversations with the

Ottoman frontier commissioners, and they tried to anticipate the objectives of the

commission. The first job that Tahir Pasha fulfilled was to reprove military officers

for their misconduct and to arrest certain Kurds. Sir. N. O’Conor, a British

ambassador in Istanbul, perceived this action as a hopeful sign that the new

commission could eventually define the boundary.149 The manner in which Tahir

received O’Conor was most cordial. As O’Conor said, Tahir Pasha would see the

Iranian commissioners as soon as they arrived; The Pasha was waiting for the arrival

of the Iranian commissioners with impatience. The objects of his mission were, first,

149 Schofield, IV, p. 171.

53

to examine the charges made against the Ottoman troops, and second, to look into the

question of the frontier in a general manner.150

Before formal conversations started, all the representatives, particularly the

British consuls, held unofficial conversations to understand the intentions of the new

commission. The Ottoman commission arrived at the border front before the Iranian

commission did. Thus, the British and Russian consuls found an opportunity to

figure out first the intention of the Ottoman commissioners. The scope of these

unofficial conversations revolved around whether the Ottoman government would

withdraw its troops or not from the disputed lands. In a similar conversation, Tahir

Pasha informed Sir. N. O’Conor that they considered the occupied districts

Mergaver, Tergaver, Beradost, Somai, and Anzel as Ottoman territory. He assured

O’Conor that his arguments were based on Dervish Pasha’s map, combined with

other evidence. The appeals of the local people were also another point that Tahir

Pasha used to justify his position. He found it impossible to disregard the appeal of

the inhabitants of the district of Ushni for the blessings of the Ottoman government,

so he implied that he could order the occupation of Ushni when required.151

The British Consuls questioned whether these were Tahir Pasha’s own

initiatives or based on the instructions sent form the Palace or the Grand Vizierate.

O’Conor believed that Tahir Pasha would not risk his position in the service of the

Ottoman government, a position which he valued highly. Apparently, the consul

believed that Tahir was acting under the instructions of the Palace. The Grand

Vizierate was providing different assurances to the British and Russian Consuls

about the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the occupied lands. At this stage,

the Porte had a negative view of the occupations, unlike the Palace. This

contradiction between the Palace and the Grand Vizierate reverberated on Tahir

Pasha’s relations with the Grand Vizierate as well. The British consuls felt that Tahir

Pasha maintained a cordial working relationship with the Palace and was overriding

the assurances given by the Sublime Porte to Britain, Russia and Iran.

The British Consul-General, A. C. Wratislaw frequently recommended to

Tahir Pasha to retrace the false steps he took on his own initiative. Tahir Pasha

responded to him that he was ‘only a humble functionary, whose duty it was to carry

out his instructions, not to criticize them, and that unasked-for interference in matters

150 O’Conor to Grey, October 6, 1907, Schofield IV, 216.

151 O’Conor to Grey, October 6, 1907, Schofield IV, 216.

54

outside his competence would lead to no other result than his dismissal.’152 The

Ottoman archival sources indicate that the Porte very often questioned the authority

of Tahir Pasha because his action diverged from the orders they sent.

On November 20, 1907, the Ottoman Commission was still waiting on the

frontier the arrival of the Iranian commissioners. The negotiations would start as

soon as the Iranian commissioners arrived. Meanwhile, the British consuls continued

to try to clarify the stance of Tahir Pasha and his commission through the unofficial

conversations they held with him. Their aim was to understand what Tahir Pasha

could propose during the negotiations. Sir N. O’Conor asserted

Tahir Pasha no doubt will argue that the greater part of the disputed districts

belongs to Turkey, that the Iranian Government have never established

effective jurisdiction, that the consequent state of anarchy is unbearable, that

the Ottoman government cannot allow Sunnis to be oppressed by Shiahs, and

that Dervish Pasha’s map, although not official, is strong evidence in their

favour, which must be taken into consideration.153

Moreover, the British and Russian consuls began to understand the Ottoman

troops did not have any intention to evacuate the districts they had occupied, so the

consuls began to criticize the Sublime Porte for adopting an obstinate position. They

found Tahir Pasha’s arguments to justify the Ottoman claim to the annexed territory

flimsy and self-destructive. They thought that it would be difficult to find a basis for

the negotiations unless the Ottoman commissioners produced arguments that are

more satisfactory.154

For the boundary commission, the Ottoman State did not accept the

intervention of third parties as mediators; similar to the role Britain and Russia had

played in the 1840s. Thus, previous mediating powers were excluded from becoming

an official part of the meetings in the early years of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, Britain and Russia sought solutions that would not undermine their

interests in Iran before the negotiations commenced behind closed doors. Giving

advice to both sides was the best way to observe the negotiations and to influence

their outcome. For instance, Wratislaw stated that Tahir Pasha had not attempted to

question his right to lecture him and pointing out the errors in his line of thinking. In

152 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, October 25, 1907, Schofield IV, 244.

153 O’Conor to Grey, Pera, November 20, 1907, Schofield IV, 236.

154 Marling to Grey, Tehran, November 19, 1907, Schofield IV, 242.

55

fact, Wratislaw appears to have believed that Tahir accepted him as an official

member of the frontier commission.155 The reason why Tahir Pasha behaved in this

manner was that he believed British and Russian consuls would be on the Ottoman

side. On the contrary, as Wratislaw indicated, they were inevitably in opposite

camps, but they had to keep friendly relations with both states.

The Russian Vice-Consul Baron Tcherkassov and Captain Dickson, R. A.,

the British Vice Consul at Van, and the Ottoman commissioners met in Başkale in

order to inquire about the local dispute mentioned above and to evaluate the general

appearance of the boundary. During the meeting, the Russian Vise Consul stressed

the importance of the recent convention that guaranteed the political integrity of Iran.

Tahir Pasha handed a memorandum to the Russian Vise Consul that explained the

general objectives of the Ottoman frontier commission.156

4. 1. 1. A Local Dispute: Pro-Iranian Muslims and Nestorians vs. Pro-Ottoman

Kurdish Villagers

Frontier difficulties as they were mentioned in the methodology chapter

showed that the relations of the frontier actors, whether interstate or intertribal, were

fragile, the scarcity of summer and winter pastures in the region was mainly pushing

the tribes to cross the status quo line. This was the main source of conflicts between

the Ottoman Empire and Iran. In the microscopic level, the prevalent religious,

ethnic, and tribal differences had created rivalry and antagonistic feelings among the

local inhabitants of the region. As Vice-Consul Dickson reported:

The Assyrians are divided up into many religious parties, and change about

from one to the other with a conscience made easy by the inducements,

pecuniary or otherwise, offered by the advocates of various creeds. Thus, in

most villages one finds, Nestorians, Chaldeans, (i.e., Roman Catholics),

Russian Orthodox, and American Presbyterian of some denomination,

besides protégés of the English mission. They may have their petty

jealousies, and differences of opinion among themselves, but they combine

against the Kurds.157

These socio-political differences could easily become sources of conflict

when combined with economic concerns. Tahir Pasha witnessed a similar dispute,

155 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, October 25, 1907, Schofield IV, 244.

156 See Appendex B for the Memorandum of the Commission.

157 Sir N. O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 5, 1908, Schofield IV, 265.

56

among the local people, which involved several ethnic and religious groups.

According to Tahir Pasha, Iranian officers instigated the Nestorians158 and pro-

Iranian Muslims to attack seven Kurdish villages in order to keep them under their

sovereignty. When the Iranian officers could not win the tribes over, they turned to

diplomacy. In Tahir Pasha’s eyes, Iran followed methods that ranged from

diplomacy to coercive policies.

An Iranian officer, Majd es Sultanah, was a modernist and favored a

centralized state. He became the “boss” of the Enjumen in Urumiah in 1907.

Wratislaw portrays him as the enemy of the crown prince.159 It seems he actively

participated in local politics since 1905. As an editorial comment that was published

in 1907 by the American Journal of International Law indicates:

The present violence (1907) dates from disturbance that resulted from an

ineffectual attempt by a Persian armed force, under command of the vigorous

Majd es Sultanah, to capture, in the disputed Turco-Persian frontier in the

indefinite Kurdistan region, the accomplices in the murder of the Rev. B. W.

Labaree, an American missionary killed at Urumiah in March, 1904.160

Tahir Pasha blamed Majd es Sultanah for the actions of the Nestorians and

other Muslim groups. Tahir Pasha depicted that Majd es Sultanah employed two

hundred armed men with rifles from the village of Mavane to coerce the Kurds to

obedience. With two hundred armed men, they seized seven Kurdish villages by

violence and set fire to their houses.161 Wratislaw cited this dispute in his memoirs in

detail.162 Tahir Pasha stated that the Kurds had decided to take revenge and this time

158 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 518/27, 9 M 1326/ 12 February 1908.The number of the Nestorians was about

three thousands during this time according to the British sources. Tahir Pasha believed that they were

increasingly used by Iran to manage the European public opinion. Thus, Iran could use this European

pressure to manage better the boundary affairs.

159 Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, 230.“My old “Basti,” Majd es Sultanah, his enemy the crown

prince (Valiahd) being now at a safe distance, returned voluntarily from Tiflis in February, thus

releasing us from any further responsibility towards him, and threw himself joyously into the political

arena of Urumiah. After some vicissitudes (changes in worse), including summary expulsion from the

town, he finally succeeded in capturing the Enjumen (local council) and making himself boss of the

place.

160 “The Recent Anglo-Russian Convention,” 981.

161 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 137, 14. 09. 1907.

162 Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, 230–1. “…If he could have controlled his other ambitions, all

might have gone well with him, but he set his heart on taking vengeance on his old enemies the

Begzadeh Kurds. With this object he imposed heavy fines on his political opponents, and with the

proceeds raised and equipped with a miscellaneous force of Muslims and Christians, he invaded the

district of Dasht. The rashness of this proceeding is obvious, considering that his opponents were now

under Turkish protection. All went well at first, and the Kurds withdrew to the mountains before the

57

they raided Nestorian villages. They noticed that the Nestorians, who burned their

houses, and Majd es Sultanah , were going to Urumiah. In a short time, the Kurds

surrounded Mavane and the neighboring two villages, which did not have any

military equipment, weapons and guards.163 They captured two hundred and eightythree

cows, seven hundred and twenty-six cattle, two thousand nine hundred and

seventy-nine sheep, many goods, and other items.

The Ottoman Army reached the region, and prevented further infighting and

stopped the plundering of Kurdish villagers. Then, the Ottoman officers persuaded

Kurds to return the plundered animals and goods to the Nestorians, which they did.

However, the Nestorians had already applied to the Russian Consulate in Urumiah.

Tahir Pasha found this application unnecessary so that their losses could have been

completely compensated by the Ottoman government if they had asked. In fact, the

Kurds had returned Nestorian’s animals, goods and items.164 Tahir Pasha was afraid

of the possibility of a triple alliance among the Russians, Iranians, and Nestorians,

which could put the Ottoman subjects at a disadvantageous position in Urumiah. He

ordered immediately that a person should have been appointed to represent these

people. In order to prevent any arbitrary action and to gather accurate intelligence, he

suggested the appointment of Memduh Bey, the Consul of Hoy and Selmas to

Urumiah 165 By using Christian Nestorians in his expedition, Majd es Sultanah had

created a ground to complain about the Ottomans to Britain and Russia. These

complaints turned into charges that the British and Russian consuls pursued against

the Ottoman commission of inquiry in the first meeting.

4. 1. 2. Charges against the Ottoman troops and Clarifications

The position of Russia at this meeting was to protect the integrity of Iran. The

delegates of Iran did not come to the meeting. Instead, the Russians had to attend the

meeting with the Ottomans alone. Russia’s representatives consisted of four officers.

invading host, which plundered their empty villages with great gusto. But soon Turkish soldiers

appeared on the scene, and Majd with his army abandoned their tents and equipment and fled in

inglorious rout to Urumiah. Majd himself thereupon retired again to Tiflis, leaving the luckless

Christians of Mavana and other villages, which had joined him to the mercy of the Kurds. Most of

them took refuge in Urumiah, and their villages were occupied by Turkish soldiers after being first

plundered by Kurds…”

163 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 137, 14. 09. 1907.

164 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 1088 /5, 19. 09. 1907.

165 Ibid.

58

One of them was the famous officer: Mösyö Yanavşakof (Russian Vice-Consul

Baron Tcherkassov)166 also known as “Mu’allim,” the teacher, by the Iranians. The

Russian delegate expressed two accusations that were asserted by the Iranians,

namely that the Ottoman Imperial Army had entered the village of Mavane after

bombarding it, and the troops kidnapped girls, and killed many women and children.

Tahir Pasha shared the results of his own investigations and asserted that none of

these arguments had any basis. The Ottoman troops had not violated anyone. In

contrast, they had expelled the joint army of Mecdü’s-Sultanah while he was

attacking the Kurdish villages. Tahir Pasha explained that the Ottoman Army had

neither violated the status quo nor committed crimes against humanity.167

According to Tahir Pasha’s report, Russian and British consul said the final

word on behalf of the Iranian delegates, as Iranians did not participate in the meeting.

In a debate during the meeting, the Russian consul gave a speech confirming the

Ottoman position that Majd es Sultanah was the actual violator of the border, and

that the accusations reflected not the reality, but the opposite. All the officers at the

meeting, including the Russian consul of Urumiah, agreed that the information they

had about the Ottoman soldiers firing guns on the Christian villages and insulting

women did not have any basis.168

On the contrary, the Russians made remarks that corroborated the Ottoman

position and suggested that the Ottoman soldiers had maintained justice there. The

Russian officers stated that public security was at risk in the region and order was

broken in Ushni in particular. They urged officially that everything should be done to

provide security promptly and completely. The Russian officers made

recommendations about how the Ottomans could help maintain security in the border

region.169

Besides, the British consul behaved neutrally. A British consul reflected

retrospectively on the British position regarding the frontier question in general at the

time of the first meetings.

166 The Ottoman archival sources speak of Mösyö Yanavşakof, but his profile was not given in detail.

Thus, I think that the Russian Vice-Consul Baron Tcherkassov, was frequently mentioned in the

British archival sources, is Mösyö Yanavşakof.

167 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 133, 1. 11. 1907.

168 BOA, Makam-ı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Serasker: Rıza, 28 November 1907.

169 Ibid.

59

The disturbances on the Turco-Iranian frontier were in a locality in which

Russia was more interested then we were. British interests were not directly

affected, for the places we had Oil Concessions were further south, and were

not at present involved. The locality was also out of our reach. Further, if we

took the initiative in moving our fleet, the impression would be given that

war between us and Turkey generally was impending, which would not be

confined to the Iranian frontier, this might give rise to trouble and excitement

in Egypt and elsewhere … We could not therefore take the initiative … But,

on the other hand, we could cordially support an initiative taken by Russia.170

In the same line with the above statement, the British consul asserted there

was not a borderline that the two sides agreed upon officially, so Majd es Sultanah’s

transgression cannot be considered as a border violation because how could one

transgress a borderline that did not exist. However, Tahir Pasha asserted Mecdü’s-

Sultanah did not have the right to intervene in the affairs of people living in the

disputed zone even if there was not a settled boundary line. At the end of the

meeting, Britain was satisfied with Tahir Pasha’s argument. The Russian and British

consuls refused to pursue the accusations that were brought to the commission.

The British consul clarified his position by stating that he would not pursue

this issue further. Furthermore, he asked whether the Ottoman State would be content

it if the occupied places were left to it.171

Evidently, Tahir Pasha took this question seriously and responded by an

information sheet in which the Urumiah directorate had been blamed due to his

commitment to the crime and violation of the border by provoking the Shikal tribe,

inhabiting in Somay and Çehrin villages. According to Tahir Pasha, these pro-Iranian

tribes transgressed the border and broke the public order by damaging people’s

properties and killing many.

Tahir Pasha was not authorized to annex any piece of territory. He could

resort to action only after the Porte authorized him. Nevertheless, he thought that a

prompt response to the British consul in this case would be good for maintaining

public security in disputed places and could work in favour of the Ottoman State.

Due to internal turmoil, Iran was not able to maintain public security and order even

within its provinces proper. Thus, Tahir Pasha responded to the British consul that

the disputed villages should have been left under Ottoman rule because the Ottoman

State had the ability to end the violence and lawlessness prevailing in the frontier

170 Grey to O’Beirne, Foreign Office, June 22, 1908, Schofield IV, 321.

171 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 134.

60

zone. In addition, he demanded the protection of the current Ottoman administration

in the region. He added that the Ottomans would not hesitate to leave those districts,

which were adjacent to the fertile plains of Urumiah, when a superior commission

formed, once the public security was provided.172

Before the meeting was completely dismissed, the participants discussed

where they would meet next. They could not agree on the time and purpose of the

next venue for the continuation of the discussions regarding the disputed districts and

border matters. The Russian consul suggested Urumiah for the next meeting.

However, they had to express that Iranian commissioners would be able to arrive at

Urumieh thirty-four days later. Indeed, the Ottoman commissioners had waited for

Iranian commissioners in different places since some months until the meeting. Tahir

Pasha perceived the delaying of the meeting again as a big challenge and wondered

suspiciously why Russia had chosen Urumiah while there were many other

alternative places such as Selmas and Deyleman. The Russians propounded that

Selmas or Deyleman were not proper places because the Caucasian revolutionaries

(Kafkasiyye İhtilalcileri) were in the middle of the way and would stop them. Passing

through narrow paths where these illegal groups situated could create catastrophic

results for the commissioners. However, Tahir Pasha did not want to meet at

Urumiah due to its security problems and the possibility that Iran could provoke

some Iranian-Kurdish tribes in there. 173

The meeting resulted with a relative victory for the Ottomans as they found

an opportunity to express their opinions and to clarify accusations. In addition, Tahir

Pasha criticized the Iranian Committee of Inquiry and associated their absence with

their wish to decelerate the process of border demarcation and not to confront the

consequences of their violent deeds in the Kurdish villages.

Then, the British consul left the meeting and returned to Van via Beyazid

after they stopped by four villages in Urumiah, Salmas, and Hoy. The Russian consul

returned to Urumiah. Tahir Pasha deployed the Ottoman commissioners to Van and

Bitlis until he received the next order due to the reason mentioned below.174

172 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 134.

173 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: Tahir Pasha: The attitude of Iranian Commission in

Urumiah, 18 August 1908.

174 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 134.

61

If Muhteshem es Sultanah leaves now, he will be able to arrive at the border

front more than a moth later, but our commission has waited them for more

than two months. If we spent one more month on the border front, indeed, we

shall not able to implement our duty due to upcoming winter.

In contrast, he witnessed the Porte’s resistance. Tevfik Pasha, the Minister of

Exterior, suggested the commission should wait there as he had learnt that the Iranian

officers were on their way. His reasons to order Tahir Pasha to wait can be outlined

as follows. According to him, if the Iranian delegates arrived after the Ottoman

commissioners left the region, they could manipulate the situation to create a

perception as if the Ottoman State was actually leaving the boundary delimitation

issue in limbo. Thus, the presence of the Ottoman commissioners at the meeting

place would prevent labeling it as a reluctant state, deferring the resolution of the

border conflicts. He feared further that Iranian complaints and false accusations

could find a ground to be deemed convincing, and help them gain consequently the

support of foreign powers in their future interventions.175 Considering all these

variables, Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha did not admit Tahir Pasha’s request to leave and

ordered him to wait for the arrival of the Iranian commissioners.176 Moreover, as the

Russians proposed, the Iranian commissioners sent an information sheet and invited

the Ottoman commissioners to Urumiah.

Danyal Pasha, an Ottoman commissioner, opposed meeting in Urumiah for

the similar reasons that Tahir Pasha had in his mind and he found the meeting place

risky because Iran had strong influence on some of the Iranian-Kurdish tribes settled

there.177 He added a sentimental comment on the duty of the commission. The

boundary commission had been charged by a great state (the Ottoman State) to fulfill

the responsibilities of the Caliphate, thus, they should not walk behind scattered

government officials. Frontier inhabitants could perceive walking behind Iranian

officers and going to places designated by them as a weakness. If the Ottoman

commissioners acted under the direction of the Iranian commissioners, the allegiance

and compliance of the frontier people might have been shaken gradually.178 In

contrast to Tahir Pasha and Danyal Pasha, the Iranian commissioners insisted on

175 BOA, Babı ali Dairei Sadaret, 2159, Hariciye Nazırı: Tevfik Pasha, 12 November 1907.

176 BOA, A. AMD., 2000, Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha, 13 November 1907.

177 The term was adopted from Michel Foucault.

178 BOA, Makamı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Hususi, Danyal Pasha, 1 January 1908.

62

meeting in Urumiah.179 Instead, Tahir Pasha decided to meet in Mavane. He went to

Mavane via Selmas to meet with Muhteshem es Sultanah, the Chief Negotiator of the

Iranian Commission. Thirty cavalrymen and their captain accompanied Tahir.180

On January 8, 1908, it was reported that Muhteshem es Sultanah did not

come to Mavane although he was there earlier. Instead, he sent a letter to the

Ottoman commission, suggesting to meet in the center of Urumiah. Despite the risks

Tahir Pasha saw in such a meeting, he accepted to go to Urumiah.181

One of the risks that Tahir Pasha considered was that Muhteshem es Sultanah

tried to lead the Iranian Kurds astray with the support of Iranian soldiers ever since

he came to Mavane. Tahir Pasha thought Muhteshem es Sultanah intended to disturb

the peace in areas where the Ottoman State maintained the security. He criticized the

intrigues of Muhteshem es Sultanah harshly and accused him of behaving

irresponsibly: “an officer who was appointed to a joint investigation should not

follow such a vulgar manner and threaten public security.”182

He invited Muhteshem es Sultanah to a village in Urumiah in order to carry

out the negotiations. All these delaying tactics and wavering showed that Iran was

reluctant to negotiate while the Ottoman military occupied the disputed lands. None

of these two states trusted the other, and confrontation remained always an option in

contrast to the British and Russian who wanted to achieve a peacefull colonization of

Iran. Tahir Pasha kept the military option in his hand. He could deploy at a moment’s

notice the regular troops and some other forces that were carefully assembled in

Savuçbulak for action in case of an emergency.183 The boundary negotiations began

in this belligerent atmosphere.

4. 2. The Phase of New Occupations and Boundary Negotiations

Following the ad hoc meeting, which was the first meeting that Tahir Pasha

attended at Başkale, the method in which the negotiations would be conducted

became apparent. All the parties agreed that the question would be settled by friendly

conversation, mutual concessions, formal negotiations, and the exchange of written

memoranda. The Ottoman commission would lead the process, so they wrote the first

179 BOA, Makamı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Hususi, Ser Asker: Rıza, 2 January 1908.

180 BOA, Makamı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Hususi, 1 January 1908.

181 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1325 CA 01: 1515/24, 8 January 1908.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid.

63

memorandum setting down their case. The Iranian commission followed suit and

demanded the recognition of the neutral zone and the Second Erzurum Treaty of

1847 as the basis of the negotiations.184 Tahir Pasha was getting prepared to propose

that the earlier treaties should be the basis of the negotiations.185

4. 2. 1. Imperial Edicts, The Porte’s Reports, Ancient Treaties and Maps

Tahir Pasha did not have a predetermined plan apart from embracing the

steps taken by Dervish Pasha. Within a short time, he learnt which registers from the

Ottoman archives could be utilized to justify his arguments. First, Tahir Pasha

ordered the retrospective examination of the imperial edicts of the last one hundred

and fifty years that would enable him to understand the history of the boundary

delimitation and the background of the present conflicts. Second, Tahir Pasha

demanded the examination of the imperial edicts more specifically. This time, he

ordered the investigation of the edicts, covering a hundred fifty years, particularly

issued to the pashas and Beys of Imadiyye, Vezene and Hakkari. His aim was to

understand the question whether some townships, including Soma-yı Çehrin, were

under Ottoman rule or not. Furthermore, he wanted to formalize those sections of the

boundary186 that the late Dervish Pasha had investigated and depicted in his

explanatory document (layiha) and map.187 He extracted from Dervish Pasha’s

explanatory document that those townships, Ushni188, some villages of Soma-yı

Çeherin, and townships of Deşt-i Bil were part of the Ottoman Empire, but the

Enzel-i Bala Township was under the jurisdiction of Urumiah.

Tahir Pasha believed that the Iranian officers had confirmed the explanatory

document of Dervish Pasha in the past. He asserted that Iran had never established an

administrative unit in these lands, so they did not have the right to claim sovereignty

over these lands. Moreover, he showed Iran as the main instigator of the disorder

184 Marling to Grey, Tehran, April 10, 1908, Schofield IV, 292.

185 G. Barclay to Grey, Constantinople, April 26, 1908, Schofield IV, 306.

186 Hududun resmi-i sübutuna medar olmak...

187 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 1035 / 27, 10 September 1907.

188 The evidences that I found show Ushni was part of the Ottoman territory. First, Tahir Pasha’s own

statement: “Ûşnî, nâm-ı diğeri Şînô Nâhiyesi Rü’esâsı’ndan yiğirmi kişi kadar, nezd-i çâkerâneme

gelerek a’şârın vakti geçmeksizin içlerine me’mûr gönderilmesi talebinde bulundular…” For Tahir

Pasha’s statement: BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41. 1325 CA 01, 12. 06. 1907: Vali Tahir, 06 Eylül

1323/19. 09. 1907. Second, a table of Imperial head tax (collected from non-Muslims) dating back

1726, the reign of Ahmed III, shows that the Ottoman Empire levied head tax from Şînô. For the

table: BOA, İE. ML. 11473 / 2 Mart 1726.

64

because Iran had incited the tribes in the frontier zone clandestinely and

continuously, although it was prohibited.189 He blamed Iran for breaking the public

order and security in the frontier zone by inducing cross-border violence, injustice,

and lawlessness.190 When the Ottoman state responded by taking the initiative and

fortifying its military forces around the zone, the tribes retreated and Iranians began

to complain about the intervention of Ottoman troops to Russia and Britain by means

of its embassy.

Tahir Pasha referred to the demographic features of the frontier zone as

evidence to justify his arguments. According to him, the inhabitants of these villages,

districts, and townships were practitioners of Sunni Islam, so they would never

accept to live under the sovereignty of Qajars. They could be brought under the

protection of the Caliphate in a short time in order to save them from the frontier

difficulties.191

He also benefited from geostrategic arguments to legitimate his actions

pragmatically. When this was the case, his arguments became very suggestive of the

occupations. For instance, he stated that if Ushni and Deşt-i Bil were taken under the

protection of the Ottoman State, military facilities in that region would be closer to

the Ottoman forces stationed in Vezene. He added that annexing the villages of

Somay and Çehrin would also serve the promotion of regional security.

His arguments necessitated the occupation of these lands, but if these lands

were under the sovereignty of the Ottoman state once, why did it not establish an

administrative unit covering these villages? One of the statements of Tahir Pasha can

be an answer to this question. Tahir Pasha asserted that previous Ottoman frontier

officers created the current complex situation by leaving these lands in a state of

flux, so the gap had been filled by the constant intrigues of Iranian officers.

Wratislaw illustrated the details of Tahir Pasha’s argument regarding how those parts

of Kurdistan and some of the Kurds had remained in the hands of Iran:

189 Hudud boyunda (along the border)

190 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 1089 / 5, 19. 09. 1907.

191 Ibid.

65

Naib es Sultanah192 profited by the state of confusion into which Turkey was

thrown by her disastrous wars with Russia, the suppression of the Janissaries,

the institution of the Nizam Jedid (New Order), and other reforms, to seduce

the Kurds and annex Turkish territory. But now the Kurds have returned to

their ancient allegiance to the sultan.193

After he made this argument, he implied that the Ottoman State would no

longer stay silent and negligent. He believed that inability of Iran to establish its

jurisdiction in these districts in the past showed that Iran had never established any

authority in these territories. To solidify his argument, Tahir Pasha used Dervish

Pasha’s explanatory document and map, which showed accurately, according to him,

under whose jurisdiction the disputed villages and townships were.194

He thought taking these villages under Ottoman rule was an obligation for

several reasons. First, Iran’s efforts to win over the tribes gradually would continue.

Second, the tribal leaders who appealed for Ottoman subjecthood could perceive the

inaction of the Ottoman State as a weakness, and hence drawn to Iran. Third, the

prevalent violence in the region was a problem and the Ottoman State had the

capacity to prevent it. Because of prevalent anarchy in the disputed lands, Tahir

Pasha proposed that protecting these people was a necessity and a priority of the

Ottoman State.195

As mentioned above, the third group of documents Tahir Pasha ordered for

examination was the Porte’s Reports (Divan tezkireleri). He realized that these

reports could be used to specify the identity of townships thanks to the technical and

taxation information that they included.

A case in point is Tahir Pasha’s attempt to clarify whether the township of

Beradost belonged to the Ottoman Empire or Iran. He concluded that Beradost was

actually an Ottoman township. On December 4, 1907, Tahir Pasha brought out an

information sheet, written by Dervish Pasha earlier. According to this sheet, Beradost

was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire because it showed that the collection of

the taxes of this township along with certain administrative duties was auctioned to

Hatim Bey, an Ottoman subject, previously. He added that ‘during the time of

192 George N. Curzon, Persia and Persian Question, vol. I (New York: Adegi Graphics LLC, 2012).

Third Son of the Shah, Kamran Mirza, but he called more commonly by his title of the Naib es

Sultanah (Lieutenant of the Kingdom).

193 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, July 2, 1908, Schofield IV, 337.

194 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 1089 / 5, 19. 09. 1907.

195 Ibid.

66

Dervish Pasha, Hatim Bey’s son, Halil Bey, brought up the records of this

commission including a copy of the Porte’s relevant reports. These documents

verified the relationship of the township to the Ottoman Empire.196 This example

illustrates as well the ambivalence of the status of certain borderlands because of the

need to dig deep into records to establish where they stood in between the two

neighboring states. Tahir Pasha was evidently eager to gather as much information as

possible to clarify the Ottoman identity of the their disputed areas. He asked for a

scanning of the Porte’s reports going back hundred and fifty years towards this end.

The fourth group of documents that Tahir Pasha requested included all the

old treaties the Ottoman Empire and Iran had signed since the sixteenth century. He

examined a total number of six treaties. The first treaty that he mentioned was the

Treaty of Zuhab, or the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, signed on May 17, 1639 (1049),

which indicated the validity of some of the articles related to his claims. This treaty

fixed the frontier line in view of the conflict of nations, and accordingly, confirmed

that the Iranian government should not interfere in [the affairs of] the Ottoman-

Kurdistan. The second treaty was signed in Hemedan after a series of battles broke

out between 1723 and 1727. Tahir Pasha stressed that this treaty agreed to leave

under the Ottomans not only Kurdistan but also certain cities that were currently

under Iranian administration. The third treaty was signed in 1736. It confirmed

previous agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. The fourth treaty was

the treaty of Kerden, signed on September 4, 1746. This treaty, known as the Second

Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, confirmed the previous frontier limits and relevant articles.

The fifth treaty was the treaty of Erzurum, which was signed in 1823, after the

Iranian army lost a significant number of its soldiers due to an outbreak of cholera.

By this treaty, Iran returned the lands it occupied in Eastern Anatolia, recognized the

former border and guaranteed that it would not interfere in any district in the

Kurdistan region. The sixth treaty was signed in 1857 and known as the Second

Erzurum Treaty. It approved the outcomes of the previous treaties by revising and

clarifying some parts of the border, such as Zuhab. Considering each treaty, which

repeated each other and revolved around the first treaty, Tahir Pasha claimed that

Iran did not have any right to interfere in any of the villages, sub-districts, districts,

196 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 1137 / 13, 12. 10. 1907.

67

or sub-provinces of the Kurdistan region, which stretched from Beyazid to

Suleymaniye.197

His examination of the imperial edicts and relevant government reports,

dating back a hundred and fifty years, revealed that Iran had ratified Ottoman

sovereignty in the Kurdistan region.

He reached a conclusion signifying that the current situation of the border did

not reflect the provisions of the treaties in the field. The present status in the border

districts opposed to both the treaties and the rules, although the treaties assigned

many districts in disputed lands to the Ottoman Empire, but previous frontier officers

(serhad memurları) had not completely applied the treaty articles.198 Moreover, these

districts, which were ignored by those frontier officers, became the main problems

day by day between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Even though these districts in the

border zone were ignorantly neglected, the Kurds in these lands perpetually and

strongly maintained allegiance to the Ottoman State, which was understood at the

end of small survey that was undertaken to learn about people’s opinions in the zone.

In fact, Fazıl Pasha’s ability to mobilize thirty thousand Kurds in the zone against

Firman-Firma supports Tahir Pasha’s view. All these variables show that a

significant number of Kurds in the zone supported pro-Ottoman and pro-Caliphate

policies because the discursive references of the Ottomans to the Sunni-Kurds

resonated and acquired a practical meaning in view of the refugee demands.

However, they were not only a group who wanted to benefit from Ottoman

protection, there were also many people in the zone who opposed Iranian polices and

chose to be an Ottoman subject regardless of ethnic and religious differences.

The fifth group of documents Tahir Pasha considered was Dervish Pasha’s

map and its explanatory notes. Tahir Pasha’s reports make amply clear that he relied

extensively on this map and its explanations that Dervish Pasha provided. Therefore,

one can argue that the boundary line in Tahir Pasha’s mind was the line specified

according to Dervish Pasha’s surveys. In this study, unfortunately, I used not Dervish

Pasha’s map, but a map that was drawn by the Ministry of Ottoman Foreign Affairs

197 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 518/27, 1326 M 09 / 12 February 1908: Tahir Pasha clarifies his stance

regarding Kurdistan to Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha.

198 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 518/27, 9 M 1326/ 12 February 1908: “…İşte Bâyezîd’den Süleymâniyye

hudûdı nihâyetine kadar olan Kürd-istân Livâ ve Kazâ ve Nevâhî ve Kurâsında Îrân Devleti’nin

ba’zan başgöstermiş olan müdâhalesi bir hakka müstenid olmayub hilâf-ı ‘uhûd ve menâfi’-i kâ’ide-i

hem-civârî olarak, ba’z-ı ser-hadd me’mûrlarınıza ‘â’id fuzûlî bir şeydir…”

68

in 1910 based on the maps drawn during Dervish and Tahir Pasha’s commissions.

The boundaries that were shown in this map199 differed from the projections of the

Anglo-Russian Joint Map200. The map of 1910 shows the geographical and

demographical features of the empire’s eastern frontiers in detail, indicating the

disputed and undisputed parts. Thus, the map illustrates the mountain ranges, rivers,

lakes and their names, including the tribes living in the disputed-frontier strip name

by name. The map shows the tribal neighborhood clearly. Thus, the map facilitates

the understanding of the historical conflicts among the tribes and the states. The

map’s legend that should have showed the symbols and color codes is missing.

However, a version of this used by Melike Sarıkçıoğlu provides this information.201

Tahir Pasha did not accept the Joint Map as a basis of the negotiations. He

wanted to specify the boundary line according to the data set by Dervish Pasha and

attempted to increase its accuracy by referring to earlier treaties. However, the

British and Russian representatives believed that neither the Ottomans nor the

Iranians had the original copy of the first treaty in 1639 on which Tahir Pasha

constructed his arguments. According to them, the Ottomans did not have the treaty

because the original text of the treaty was burned in one of the several fires in

Istanbul. Iranians did not have it either because the treaty was lost during the internal

turmoil in Iran. Iranians agreed, but not Tahir Pasha. He insisted that the copy he had

was correct.

To prove the invalidity of the Joint Map, which ignored the Ottoman rights

over the Sunni population as based on the first treaty, he stated that Düvel-i Erbe’a

(the four states of Britain, Russia, France and Austria) had done a survey in order to

identify the tribes and their will in the past. After the survey, these states had

prepared a map to be communicated to the Ottoman and Iranian States. However,

Tahir Pasha asserted that the map was invalid due to the chronological order of the

agreements because the Joint Map emerged after the Ottoman State and Iran signed a

treaty, regarding Istankob. According to him, this map had to have confirmed the

treaty first, but the map did not ratify it. Tahir Pasha insisted that the treaty remained

valid. He referred to the inhabitants of Istankob to illustrate his point. He said they

would enjoy relative freedom of movement and nobody would interfere in their

199 See Appendix G: The Ottoman-Iranian Frontier Map of 1910.

200 See Appendix E.

201 See Appendix H.

69

affairs if the entire boundary line were delineated clearly as it was stated in the

treaty. On the one hand, he thought that the joint map was invalid because it ignored

this provision of the treaty. On the other hand, the treaty prohibited any construction

in this territory. Contradicting the treaty, the notables of Urumiah, who had close

relationship with Iran, encouraged Iranian officers to establish a customhouse in the

villages of Cirmi Behbik, whose inhabitants always identified themselves as

Ottoman subjects. According to Tahir Pasha, the joint map prepared by Russia and

Britain ignored the realties of the region, and that was why the treaty and the map

contradicted each other. Furthermore, he noted, Article IV of the treaty did not allow

the parties to control any part of the disputed lands until the states formed a new

boundary commission. In order to stress the validity of the treaty, Tahir Pasha stated

that four states had recognized it because their representatives had entered to their

buildings in Urumiah by passing through the disputed lands by relaying on the treaty.

In addition, Tahir Pasha referred to the reign of Nadir Shah (1736-1747)

when Iranians often fought with the Ottomans for regional superiority. In the post

war period, the Ottoman State and Iran signed the Kerden Treaty in 1746 at the end

of negotiations. Even during the later battles, Nadir Shah’s imperial edicts and many

other documents remained valid. During the reconciliation time, Iran had signed new

treaties with the Ottoman State, and these treaties amended previous ones by

preserving the ancient boundary between Iran and the Ottomans.202 Tahir Pasha

highlighted the importance of Dervish Pasha’s map and explanatory documents. He

articulated his confidence in the late Dervish Pasha’s work by these words:

… Here, Dervish Pasha's map and explanatory document do not

contradict the agreements. On the contrary, they are all accurate and

compatible with previous records …203

Overall, he meant that the treaty of 1869, which ratified the old treaties,

remained valid. The intrusions and military fortifications of the Iranian officers

and commanders around the disputed lands in 1905 were wrong and

contradicted the existing agreements. These attempts of Iran to intervene in the

disputed lands became a reason to justify the Ottoman occupations. When the

Ottoman occupations started in 1905, Iran sent a committee of inquiry to

202 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 133, 1. 11. 1907.

203 Ibid.

70

Istanbul in 1906. Tahir Pasha stated that the diplomatic conversation held

between Iranian officers and Istanbul showed that Iran had confirmed the

validity of Dervish Pasha’s map. Regarding this issue, he stated that he found

an information sheet indicating the Iranian ambassador to Istanbul in 1906 cited

Dervish’s map as evidence while arguing for the removal of troops from certain

districts which included four villages. So Tahir Pasha argued, “I think there is

nothing else that we can do now apart from considering Dervish Pasha’s map as

a reference point.”204

Dervish Pasha’s map showed that some people from the Ottoman tribes had

been under the influence of the notables of Urumiah for many years. According to

him, this situation produced several consequences: first, it served pro-Iranian

notables in Urumiah to increase their properties, possessions, and wealth. Second, it

caused the obedient people of both sides to move freely. Tribal competition in such a

place that was officially under the authority of neither government accelerated

regional conflicts, and the tribes on both sides shed blood in occasional incidents.

This authority gap resulted in the destruction of many villages in tribal and other

regional conflicts. Tahir Pasha proposed that his aim was to end this humanitarian

crisis.205 He stated that he would welcome the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907,

because Britain and Russia would both favor stability in the region.206 In this

manner, he hoped that Iran would refrain from such arbitrary actions in the frontier

zone such as supporting some tribal chiefs who willingly interfered in the affairs of

pro-Ottoman tribes living in Urumiah.

The Ottoman occupations until this time served the promotion of regional

security. As Wratislaw stated, the Ottomans had achieved a very fair order in the

territory they occupied, which was about a hundred miles long and fifteen to twenty

miles wide.207 According to Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman troops situated around

Urumiah provided regional security, public order and safety as never seen earlier, so

he demanded that these territories remained under Ottoman sovereignty because they

were part of the well-protected domains of the empire incontrovertibly.

204 BOA, DH. MKT. 1173 / 41, 1325 CA 1, 12. 06. 1907: 564 / 133, 1. 11. 1907.

205 Ibid.

206 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, London, 1908, Vol CXXV, Cmd. 3750.

207 Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, 232.

71

4. 2. 2. The Boundary Negotiations

The commissions of both states launched into the negotiations in this strained

atmosphere in Urumiah in February 1908. Nevertheless, the Ottoman commissioners

supplied the first memorandum to the Russian Vice-Consul Baron Techerkassov at

Başkale in November 1907.208 This memorandum underlined importance of the

Convention of 1869 and other old treaties signed between the Ottoman and Iranian

states. Wratislaw found the tone of this memorandum very ‘uncompromising’ and

noted that the pasha received new instructions. These strained relations of the first

meeting reverberated in later sessions, and the debates on earlier international

treaties. Tahir Pasha was a unique chief commissioner in his intensive reliance on old

treaties in boundary negotiations. In its memorandum, of February 8, 1908, the

Ottoman Commission stressed the importance of the old treaties, which are

mentioned above in detail.209 Tahir Pasha believed that these six treaties reflected the

true nature of the frontier and that the Ottomans and Iranians had explicitly defined

the frontier in conformity with two criteria: national distinctions and the nonintervention

of Iran in Ottoman-Kurdistan. This memorandum did not refer to the

Treaty of 1869, as Tahir Pasha had done in detail in the first meeting at Başkale.

The point they reached was to discuss the related articles of the Second

Erzurum Treaty of June 1, 1847. This memorandum showed that the Ottomans

recognized the Second Erzurum Treaty, as the most recent treaty, but not with a

special reference to it as if it were conclusive. However, the memorandum sent by

the Imperial Iranian Commission to the Imperial Ottoman Commission on February

8, 1908, clearly stressed that Iran recognized this treaty as the sole basis of the

negotiations on the demarcation of the frontier, for it was the last of the international

treaties between the two states and explicitly annulled the earlier ones.210

The Iranians pointed to articles II and III to reject the claims of the Ottoman

Commission.211 The Imperial Ottoman and Iranian commissions exchanged the

memorandums in the form of questions and answers. The Ottoman commission

wrote a memorandum on February 15, 1908,212 in response to the Imperial Iranian

208 See Appendix D/1, No: 27, Translation Part.

209 See Appendix D/2, Inclosure 1 in No. 386.

210 See Appendix D/2, Inclosure 2 in No: 386.

211 See (Appendix D/2, Inclosure 2 in No: 386) to check how Iran interpreted on the II, III, and IX

articles of the Erzurum Treaty.

212 See Appendix D/3, Inclosure 2/1 in No. 49.

72

commission’s memorandum of February 8. The Ottoman commission claimed that

the Iranian government should show a treaty that allowed Iranian officials to

interfere with the Kurds living in the sub-provinces of Shehrzur, Kurkuk, Rowanduz,

Amadia, Hakkari, Van, and Bayazid. According to the Ottoman commission, article

III explained article II. The treaty can only refer to the boundary of Muhammerah,

Zohab, and Suleymaniye, and it did not cover the sub-provinces mentioned above. If

the treaty were concerned with those districts, it would explicitly mention their

boundary. Then, the Commission repeated its demand:

Iran should put an end to her wrongful interference with our tribes and

territory in the livas, kazas, nahiehs, and villages of Kurdistan from the

Sanjak of Bayazid to the extremity of the Sanjak of Suleymaniye, except

Kotour.213

The Iranian commission responded to this memorandum by its own on

February 17, 1908.214 They referred to articles II and III of the 1863 treaty again. The

Iranian commissioners believed that the treaty avoided redundant and ineffective

expressions. They stated that article II did not need further explanation because it

shows clearly that the question related to Suleymaniye, Zohab, and Muhammerah

were settled. According to the Iranian commission, article III also did not have any

ambiguity, and it asserted that the two contracting parties abandoned their territorial

claims. Furthermore, the Iranians asked for an explanation of the Ottoman

occupation of Baneh, Serdesht, Lahijan, Ushni, Mergevar, Dasht, Tergaver,

Beradost, and other places, moving beyond the territory they claimed.

The Iranian and Ottoman commissions exchanged a third memorandum

respectively on February 20 and 22, 1908.215 Wratislaw found the character of this

and the previous memorandums very ‘recriminatory’.216 The Ottoman commission

stated the treaty was related to the frontier and the territory covering Zohab,

Muhammerah, and Suleymaniye. Article III was attributed to the territory and

frontiers explained in article II. Thus, ‘the treaty had nothing to do with the territory

and frontiers of Kurdistan between Beyazid and Sulaimaniya.’ Then, the Ottoman

commissioners stated that they needed the interpretation of those articles by a

supreme authority, while insisting on non-interference with the Ottoman Kurds. The

213 Schofield, IV, p. 295.

214 See Appendix D/3, Inclosure 2/2 in No. 49.

215 See Appendix D/4, Inclsoure 2 in No. 57 and Inclosure 3 in No. 57.

216 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, March 2, 1908, Schofield IV, 297.

73

Iranian commission in response insisted that Articles II and III of the treaty were

clear.217

After these assertions, Tahir Pasha thought the commissions were not

‘competent to decide on the right interpretation to be placed on Article III, so the

matter must be left to their respective Governments’. As Wratislaw stated, Tahir

Pasha had perceived this as a notable success and left Urumieh for Serai on February

29, 1908. Tahir Pasha went to Van and he stayed there in a lodge close to the

telegram house to receive further instructions.

However, Istanbul ordered Tahir Pasha to return to Urumiah to resume the

negotiations. Wratislaw used the time when the labor of the commission was

suspended to review the works of the commission up until Tahir Pasha left, including

the evaluation of the personality and qualifications of the two chief commissioners.

He stated that:

The relations between the two Commissions have throughout been far from

cordial. Muhteshem-es-Sultanah is quick-tempered and not endowed with

much tact, while arrogant assumption of Tahir that all the territory at stake

was indisputably Turkish was very aggravating to his opponent. The Suj

Bulak incident was like oil on the flames, and latterly the attitude of the two

Chief Commissioners towards one another resembled that of the proverbial

cat and dog.218

He blamed Tahir Pasha for the consequent deadlock, because Tahir acted

independently from his colleagues, Danyal and Ali Nadir Pasha, who were well

informed, and did not entirely agree with Tahir Pasha’s attitude. Wratislaw believed

Tahir was receiving secret instructions, and he believed that Tahir Pasha should have

been replaced by one of these two Ottoman commissioners, because, according to

him, they would be more conciliatory than Tahir, if the negotiations were

resumed.219

Wratislaw was dissatisfied with Tahir Pasha’s endeavor, but he stated in his

memoirs (A Consul in the East) that Tahir had a remarkably pleasing personality and

gained the hearts of the Kurds very easily. This time, the central government

participated actively in the negotiations with a pro-memorid. The Grand Vizier, who

updated the British consuls with the recent information he received regarding the

217 Iranian commissioners to Ottoman commissioners, 19 M 1326/ 22 February 1908, Schofield IV,

299.

218 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, March 2, 1908, Schofield IV, 299.

219 Ibid.

74

boundary affairs, stated that a pro-memorid that would be communicated by the

Sublime Porte to the Iranian Ambassador at Istanbul formed the basis of the

instructions sent to Tahir Pasha.220

Before I continue, I want to clarify a point. Examining the period of Tahir

Pasha by only relying on the fourth volume of R. Schofield’s work obstructs the

context in which the boundary commission operated. For instance, the reports in the

fourth volume did not exactly provide the reasons why the boundary delimitation

remained unconcluded up until Tahir Pasha left the negotiations to the Porte. The

parts of the fourth volume that coincide with the period of Tahir Pasha Commission

do not mention that the Ottoman government had conditionally recognized the

Second Treaty of Erzurum. In contrast, M. Sarıkçıoğlu in her work, which benefits

from the Iranian and Ottoman sources as well, demonstrates that the Ottoman

government recognized the Second Erzurum Treaty with its additional documents.

However, Iran did not recognize these additional documents although its

commissioner (Muhammed Ali Han) signed them.221 Iran recognized the treaty as the

last treaty in contrast to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, this disagreement between the

states, which was maintained by Britain,222 became the main reason why numerous

boundary commissions produced no result as neither of the two states abandoned its

arguments. This problem stalled the entire boundary commissions since the 1840s.

Tahir Pasha’s Commission was just a segment of this sequence, a segment that

coincided with the acceleration of the Ottoman occupations.

Sabri Ateş seems to be repeating the same mistake in those parts of his work

where he relies on Schofield IV. Contradicting the whole work of M. Sarıkçıoğlu,223

Ateş states:

… the Ottoman Empire launched what would become its last expansionist

effort. Its attempt to conquer the northwestern Sunni Kurdish parts of the

shah’s domains was in direct contravention to the fifty-years-in-the-making

220 See Appendix D/5, Inclosure in No. 114.

221 Sarıkçıoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran Hudud Sorunları (1847-1913), 17.

222 I say Britian becasue the interest of Britian in Muhammerah, which is a district of Basrah, started

in the 1840s. Although Iran demanded the rejection of additional documents, Russia and Britian

maintianed this agreement becasue the additional documents gave certain parts of Muhammerah to the

Ottoman Empire. However, Russia and Britian appear to have ignored their own signature and gave

Muhammerah unofficially to Iran. By this way, especially, Britian acted easly in Muhammereh which

were consequently given neither to Ottoman State nor to Iran.

223 Sarıkçıoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran Hudud Sorunları (1847-1913).

75

frontier negotiations and, indeed, to all of the treaties that had thus far helped

transform the Ottoman-Iranian frontier into boundary.224

Sarıkçıoğlu’s work indicates that there was not such a big difference or

contradiction in time in the eastern frontier policies pursued by the Ottoman

government. Indeed, the Ottoman occupations showed that the Ottoman

government’s frontier policies remained consistent from the 1840s until Kamil

Pasha’s government in August 5, 1908-February 14, 1909.

In the pre-memorid, the Ottoman government asserted that the view of

Muhteshem es Sultanah that the Treaty of Erzurum settled the frontier question as a

whole did not reflect the reality truly. The Ottoman government suggested that the

two governments should reach first a preliminary agreement on the basic points of

the Erzurum Treaty. They stressed that the treaty was not the sole source for defining

the boundary; there were other documents such as official-joint notes, which were

made an integral part of the treaty by Iranian, Russian and British envoys and

delegates in 1848. According to the Ottoman government, the treaty only dealt with

the ownership of the Sanjak of Zohab, the lands of Muhammerah and Suleymaniye.

The other districts remained controversial, as the treaty did not explicitly deal with

them. The lack of special provision regarding these districts in the treaty meant that

there would be a continuation of the status quo. Article IX of the treaty explains

clearly that ‘all the provisions and effects of previous treaties and, in particular the

provisions of the First Erzurum Treaty in 1823 had been maintained. They stated that

this agreement defined the districts of the boundary where the Second Erzurum

Treaty remained silent. They supported their view by showing the ratification of

those treaties by the mediating powers, namely the British and Russian delegates, in

1848 and 1865 as ‘the validity of the unabrogated portions of older Treaties.’225 To

sum up, the Sublime Porte did not consider the Treaty of Erzurum as final, and

referred to the treaty signed by Sultan Murad IV in 1639, while Iranian government

considered Articles II and III of the Erzurum Treaty as final in deciding the frontier

question.226

By using more specific and precise language, the Ottoman Government did

not make a different claim than that Tahir Pasha had made earlier. Indeed, it

224 Ateş, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary 1843-1914, 228.

225 Ottoman Government to Iranian Ambassador, Schofield IV, 308.

226 Note Respecting Turco-Iranian Frontier, Schofield IV, 319.

76

supported Tahir Pasha’s claims by presenting new evidences, which were detailed,

well designed, and a better argued. It has been understood that Tahir Pasha’s

decision to leave Urumiah was a clever move taken on time, although the Porte and

many of the consuls had heavily criticized his action. On the other hand, the Iranian

government hesitated to dispatch a special mission to Istanbul that would debate the

frontier question with the Porte or directly with the Palace. A memorandum written

by Muhteshem es Sultanah to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, clearly shows that Iran could not

replay the memorandum of the Ottoman government well.227 Charles M. Marling

believed that Iran did not have any evidence to prove their claims. He found the

memorandum written by Muhteshem es Sultanah ‘unintelligible’ and criticized his

proposition with impracticability that suggested returning to status quo ante. G.

Barclay stated in a telegram he sent to Sir Edward Grey,

Tahir Pasha reasserted that ‘Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzurum alludes solely

to the places mentioned in Article 2 of the treaty. It is stated that clearly in

this Article that these localities are lied down in the note addressed to the

Iranian Ambassador by the Porte. Tahir asserts, again, that all the sanjaks of

Kurdistan belong to Turkey according to the Treaty of 1639, and that up to

the beginning of the nineteenth century they remained in the possession of

Turkey. It was not till then that Iran trespassed on Turkish territory, profiting

by Turkey’s domestic difficulties and disastrous wars to seduce the Kurds.228

Tahir Pasha invited the Iranian Commissioner to continue with the

negotiations in the line mentioned in his statement above. As Wratislaw stated, Tahir

Pasha believed that the Treaty of Murad IV had described the frontier on the

principle of distinction of religion and nationality, and further explanations was

unnecessary beyond the statement that ‘the Shias are not to interfere’.229 This

statement of Tahir Pasha excludes the possibility of the Kurds who can be Shia. He

was most probably thinking that all the Kurds were originally Sunni.

This consistency of the Ottoman commissioners’ arguments changed after

political authority shifted abruptly from the Palace to the Porte in July 24, 1908. This

process of political transformation, which was triggered by the so-called Young Turk

‘Revolution’, prepared the ground for the Grand Vizierate to fulfill its assurances

227 See Appendix D/6, Inclosure in No. 171.

228 G. Barclay to Grey, Constantinople, July 13, 1908, Schofield IV, 327.

229 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, July 12, 1908, Schofield IV, 337.

77

that the Ottoman troops could be withdrawn from the disputed lands they had begun

to occupy back in 1905. One can argue that Russia with its military power and

Britain with its political influence had now increased the pressure they put on the

Ottoman government after the 1908 “revolution”. Sir A. Nicolsan stated that M.

Tcherykoff spoke with the Ottoman foreign minister about the next steps that would

be taken for the sake of a final and amicable settlement of the frontier question by

demanding the mediation of Britain and Russia. He found out that the attitude of the

Ottoman government had changed and the minister was saying that his government

would withdraw the Ottoman troops. Nicolson found this new position of the

Ottoman government satisfactory and stated, with exaggeration, that the constant

efforts of British and Russian governments had created this favorable change by

August of 1908.230 Another point made by Charles M. Marling stressed the

importance of this governmental change for the frontier delimitation. He stated,

It is not impossible that with the recent change of Government in Turkey the

Ottoman Ministries, who have all along shown a far more reasonable attitude

than the Sultan’s unofficial advisers, will now be able to enforce their

instructions on the Turkish Commission, and that Tahir Pasha will either be

relieved or will be induced to be more amenable to argument.231

Towards the end of negotiations, the southern parts of the boundary were

demarcated peacefully. Major General Zeki Pasha, who was the chief commissioner

before Tahir Pasha, had been charged to ratify the status quo line from Suleymaniye

to Musul. Tahir Pasha needed those maps and Zeki Pasha’s explanatory documents

included concluding remarks concerning the boundaries of the southeastern

provinces of Ottoman Empire. Zeki Pasha sent all these documents to Tahir Pasha

after he delimitated the boundary of Musul and transferred all the responsibility of

the Musul boundary to Tahir Pasha’s Commission.232 Towards the end of August,

Tahir Pasha set forth the frontier of the Baghdad Province and Zohab by declaring in

a note that he neither recognized the “identic” zone nor accepted the status quo. He

noted to Wratislaw that he would leave Urumiah if the Iranian commissioner kept

ignoring the arguments Tahir Pasha proposed.

230 Sir A. Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 22, 1908, Schofield IV, 335.

231 Marling to Grey, Gulahek, August 14, 1908, Schofield IV, 336.

232 BOA, Y. PRK-ASK., 259/ 29, 29 C 1326/ 29 July 1908, Zeki Pasha’s telegraphy: 23 July 1908.

78

The Ottoman Minister of Internal Affairs instructed Tahir Pasha to rejoin his

post in Bitlis and informed him that Danyal Pasha would succeeded him.233 Thus,

Danyal Pasha continued from the point where Tahir Pasha left. He first went to the

telegraph office to get fresh instructions from Istanbul. On September 1908, M.

Tcharykoff stated that ‘Wratislaw might be instructed to leave when the Turkish

troops have completely evacuated the country between Urumiah and Tabreez on the

north side of the lake.’234 This showed that the hopes of British, Russian and Iranian

representatives for the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from the disputed lands

increased in this period.

Tahir Pasha had been ordered to decrease the number of those troops situated

on the border on August 18, 1908. This order of the new government established by

the intervention of the Community of Union and Progress (CUP), suggests that they

found it unnecessary to alert the Ottoman troops around the status quo line due to the

critical financial situation. The new government ordered to decrease the number of

troops. Although Tahir Pasha found this order inappropriate, he unwillingly recalled

about eleven or twelve troops out of nineteen battalions (tabur) located in two

frontier zones.235

Ali Rıza, the new governor of Van in 1908, opposed decreasing the numbers

of the battalions, but he had to comply with the Porte’s orders. He supported Tahir

Pasha’s argument, which suggested that the troops were very important to maintain

public security in the region. As the Porte knew that they would have difficulty with

Tahir Pasha in terms of the withdrawal of the troops, they directly communicated

with Ali Rıza himself. However, Ali Rıza responded to them with a letter in which

he stated that he did not know the technical sides of the situation and lacked the

knowledge to provide details. He stated that Tahir Pasha had all the information

because he knew the contents of all the correspondence with Istanbul (the Palace?).

The only thing Ali Rıza asserted with certainty was the need for these forces for the

security of the borders of his province. Thus, he gave to Tahir Pasha and the other

233 Wratislaw to Sir G. Lowther, Urumiah, August 27, 1908, Schofield IV, 341.

234 Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, September 12, 1908, Schofield IV, 342.

235 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: Tahir Pasha: Decreasing Number of Military Troops in

Two Border Zones, 18 August 1908.

79

frontier actors the technical responsibility to decide whether the Iranian forces could

reoccupy the districts or not, if the Ottoman troops evacuated these districts.236

CUP insisted on the withdrawal of troops by pointing out the current

predicament of the Treasury and budget. The imperial frontier actors found

themselves facing a dilemma due to the financial situation. Either they would

accelerate the depletion of the treasury by maintaining the current number of the

frontier troops or they would expose the eastern borders to Iranian intervention. The

urgency of financial difficulties dominated the inter-departmental discussions.237 Ali

Rıza came up with an alternative. He suggested that the Reserve Troops (Redif

Taburları) in Van, which was held ready for a possible war with Iran, could be

released because their significance was not as high as those regular troops situated in

the districts of the frontier zone.238

In the meantime, the other Ottoman commissioners increased the pressure

they exerted to end the work of the boundary commission because they did not

believe the commission would be useful in defining the rest of the boundary. They

believed that Iran created an impasse in the negotiations by repeating their fallacies

frequently. One of the commissioners, Tevfik Bey, who became the Education

Director of Baghdad later, expressed his opinion regarding the dismissal of the

commission after paying due attention to the current situation of the budget. 239

According to him, they had tried everything that they could to demarcate the

boundary. He believed that this commission had accomplished the political

surveying of the boundary. He asserted that now a technical commission was

urgently needed to draw the boundary lines specifically.240 However, Tevfik Pasha’s

claim about the readiness of the conditions for a technical commission did not have a

basis, because the two commissions had not yet reached a consensus on the articles

of the treaties.

236 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: The Governor of Van, Ali Rıza: Giving Opinion

Regarding the Withdrawal of the Ottoman Troops, 14607/425, 20 August 1908.

237 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: 978/1109: “... Kuva-yı mütehaşşide hakkındaki suret-i

iş’arata ve hal-i hazır hazinenin ilca’atına nazaran...”

238 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: The Governor of Van, Ali Rıza: Giving Opinion

Regarding the Withdrawal of the Ottoman Troops, 14607/425, 20 August 1908.

239 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: 16366/390, Tevfik Bey: “Hazine’nin bi-hude görmekde

olduğu zarara daha ziyade iştirak eylememek üzere bendeleri azalıkdan istifa eyledim...”

240 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: 16366/390, 2 September 1908.

80

After the duty of Tahir Pasha as chief negotiator ended, he remained as a

member of Danyal Pasha’s commission. This commission could not go beyond being

an extension of Tahir Pasha’s commission. Eventually, Tahir Pasha was sent to

Erzurum. The other commissioners, including Brigadier-General Ali Nadir Pasha

and Tevfik Bey submitted their resignations to Danyal Pasha. They went to Istanbul.

Only Danyal Pasha and Colonel Şakir Bey remained as members of the boundary

commission.241 The Chief Secretary of Internal Affairs expressed his opinion on the

same line with the commissioners. He stated that the telegraph lines between

Urumiah and Tehran were broken, so the Iranian commissioners would not find a

way to keep in touch with their superiors. They stated that the current political

situation in Iran was not suitable to carry on the negotiations because the Iranian

leaders had to deal with socio-political frictions due to the introduction of

constitution in Iran. Danyal Pasha also demonstrated his unwillingness to carry on

the affairs of the commission for “how much time the conclusion of the boundary

negotiations would require was unknown”.242

The Porte began to question Tahir Pasha’s ability and capacity in crisis and

conflict management. However, it seems that he was just implementing the orders of

the Palace. Wratislaw had reached the conclusion that his superiors were instructing

him to encroach on Iranian territories because Tahir Pasha would not take serious

steps on his own unless he was sure that his official superiors approved them.243

Charles M. Marling stated that:

It appears to me, however, that Tahir Pasha had probably not then been

convinced that the formal orders of the Sublime Porte might not still be overridden

by the secret instructions from the Palace. His withdrawal from

Urumiah, as reported by Wratislaw, may very well be consequence of his

having received unmistakable information of the altered condition of affairs

at Constantinople, and that in order to save his face he has chosen to ascribe

his departure to the impossibility of continuing negotiations with Muhteshem

es Sultanah.244

Thus, the new government in Istanbul, and the British and Russian consuls,

who observed Tahir Pasha’s decision, did not like his close relations with the Palace.

241 BOA, BEO., 3379/253385, 23 Recep 1326/ 21 August 1908.

242 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: 2028, 5 September 1908.

243 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, August 10, 1908, Schofield IV, 344.

244 Marling to Grey, Gulahek, September 1, 1908, Schofield IV, 343.

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The Consul-General Wratislaw associated discrepancy between the assurances of the

Grand Vizierate and Tahir Pasha’s action regarding the frontier affairs with his secret

relations with the Palace. Not only the British and Russian consuls but also the

members of the new Ottoman government perceived him as a member of the old

Palace regime.

Kamil Pasha became the new Grand Vizier on August 4, 1908. Throughout

the British reports, it seems that the British consuls hold sympathy for Kamil Pasha.

As they favorably stated, the internal situation of the empire began to settle down

during his time. However, the frontier difficulties intensified upon the withdrawal of

most of the Ottoman troops. The new government could not effectively deal with

these difficulties because they were preoccupied with difficulties they encountered in

the Balkans and internal matters that resulted from constitutional activities. Austria-

Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 5, 1908. The same day, Bulgaria

declared its independence. A day later, Cretans announced their island’s integration

with Greece.245

Nevertheless, the new cabinet under Kamil Pasha’s leadership sincerely

promised to regularize the position regarding the Ottoman-Iranian boundary. In this

period, the British and Iranian demands for the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from

the disputed areas increased, urging the Ottomans for ‘speedy’ action. Thus, Kamil

Pasha’s government adopted a scheme that suggested returning to the status quo of

three years ago (1905) before the occupation of Vezneh and Pasveh. Sir G. Lowther

showed the current state of the Ottoman troops on the line mentioned above with the

paragraph below:

…three battalions were withdrawn from the Pasveh-Lahijan region, leaving

some four battalions to garrison the frontier. Of these, one battalion remained

at Pasveh, east of the contested zone. Similarly, some five battalions and one

mountain battery were withdrawn from the Van section of the frontier, while

Wratislaw reports that only one mountain battery remained in Mergavar,

Tergavar, and Baranduz, one or two companies at Somai and Charik, and a

handful of Turkish troops in Beradost. It appears that these units are

considerably below their normal strength, and that they are stationed at

Mavana, Charik and other places situated on the eastern edge of the contested

zone, the only Turkish troops stationed actually east of the zone being the

battalion at Pasveh…246

245 Cevdet Küçük, “Abdülhamit II (1842-1909),” Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, I, 1988, 222.

246 G. Lowther to Grey, Therapia, October 26, 1908, Schofield IV, 347.

82

In the following years, the Ottomans supported the constitutional movement

in Iran because they thought the constitutionalists were less dangerous than the

royalists, who claimed the lands that belonged to the Ottoman Empire.247 Due to the

fluctuating polices and the pressure of many other conjectural changes, the Ottoman

government had to recognize the Second Treaty of Erzurum as the basis of the

negotiations in 1910. This recognition implied that the Ottoman government

loosened the diplomatic resilience that it maintained since the 1840s.

4. 2. 3. Where was Ushni and where was the Status Quo Line?

Ushni was one of the controversial lands that became the subject of territorial

ambiguity regarding whether this township was beyond the status quo line or not.

Before the Ottoman officials concluded the debates that would decide its fate, they

decided to occupy Ushni on October 10, 1907 by the troops under the command of

Tahir Pasha. Tahir Pasha had put forth the increasing security concerns in Ushni the

basic reason for its occupation at first. A group of the Sunni-Kurdish tribes in the

western peripheries of Iran began to attack the town of Savuçbulak and plundered the

villages in the neighborhood. The Ottoman troops at Serdasht was ready to support

these tribes and they thought that the local authorities in Savuçbulak would welcome

the Ottoman soldiers and the tribes.248

When the occupation of Ushni started officially, all the foreign and some

Ottoman officials surprised. These astonished group of officials believed that the

occupation was one of the expansionist deeds of Tahir Pasha, although an

information sheet that he wrote on January 19, 1908 indicates that the order for the

occupation was the result of a decision taken in the Special Council of Ministers

(Encümen-i Mahsus-ı Vükela) on September 25, 1907.249 What were the points that

the Council made to justify its argument and the occupation? Yet, there are not clearcut

answers to these questions, but in a meeting where all the Ottoman

commissioners met with the Russian and British consuls on November 11, 1907, the

Ottoman commissioners challenged the arguments of Russian Vice Consul by

publishing a memorandum, and defending the correctness and validity of Dervish

Pasha’s map. This shows that Ottoman government considered Dervish Pasha’s map

247 Ateş, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary 1843-1914, 266.

248 Marling to Grey, Tehran, October 31, 1907, Schofield IV, 223.

249 BOA, Y. MTV., 305/162, 26 January 1908.

83

and explanatory document valid, and used them as the basis of the occupation of

Ushni. Furthermore, the session focused on two more points. First, they argued for a

convention between Iranian and Ottoman governments concerning the status quo line

(presumably in 1869) by which the joint map is rendered inoperative. Second, they

also discussed the frontier that was established by earlier treaties as embodied in the

map.250

Moreover, some foreign officials saw the occupation as the integral part of a

bigger plan. For instance, the British Vice Consul Dickson had some doubts in his

mind that brought the political side of the question into prominence. He believed that

the Ottoman concern for a future Russo-Turkish war was the main reason of the

occupation. He highlighted the geostrategic and logistic importance of the occupied

lands, as these lands would enable troops to have an easy passage. In addition, he

observed the unfriendly attitude of the Kurds towards the Russian officer who

arrived in Ushni.251 The travelling account that was written by Dickson while he was

in Van shows that he informed Sir. N. O’Conor about the frontier question of

Ottoman-Iran underlining that all classes in Van considered Russia as the real

opponent, and not Iran. Dickson stated that the problem between the Ottomans and

Russians was dormant from 1878 to 1904, when certain Russian activities aroused

the Ottomans’ suspicion. According to him, some key moves gave an idea about the

Russian interests in the region. These moves included the Russian plan for an

extension of their railway to Julfa; building roads to Tabriz and some other places;

the appointment of a Russian Vice-Consul to Urumiah, and the wholesale conversion

of the Assyrians in Iran to the Russian Church.

Obviously, geographical conditions diminished the capabilities of the great

powers to pursue their goals. Russia had experienced this during the Russo-Japanese

War. Dickson believed that for “a railway to be constructed from Russia to Baghdad

or the Iranian Gulf, the easiest way to pass would be through Lahijan and Vezene;

while if a railway or cart road were to be constructed from Beyazid to Baghdad, it

would have to follow through the same pass.”252 Tahir Pasha and the commissioners

knew that they were dealing with Russia and not Iran, and they were convinced that

Britain would support them eventually against Russia. At the end, Dickson judged

250 O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, November 11, 1907, Schofield IV, 225-6.

251 O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, November 20, 1907, Schofield IV, 230.

252 Vice-Consul Dickson to O’Conor, Van, December 14, 1907, Schofield IV, 262.

84

that “ the Ottoman State would be glad to fight with Russia now and pay off some of

their old scores because Russia was weak due to the Russo-Japanese War and her

internal troubles”. Thus, he decided, “a strong attitude of Turkey over this frontier

was not a bluff because these districts had vital importance to her”.253

While the British officials were preoccupied with divulging the reasons of the

occupations, the Ottoman frontier officers and commanders, as previously

mentioned, could not identify the townships. The lack of a status quo that was

ratified by both states created the basic problem. The occupation of Ushni caused the

resurgence of this matter again, and it incited the Ottoman frontier officials to seek

an answer during the post-occupation period. Tahir Pasha appointed several officers

to take on its administrative duties, and the government did not see necessary to

fortify the township with additional troops. However, the Ottoman commander in the

frontier zone kept asking whether Ushni was beyond the status quo or not as they

could not understand the map in their hands. If it were within the status quo line, they

would demand deployment of additional troops.254 Tahir Pasha believed that all

parties had recognized the status quo and guaranteed it under the treaty of 1869. As

he interpreted according to the treaty, the two parties should preserve the districts

they held as part of the status quo until the boundary was fully delimitated. Probably,

he believed that this agreement lost its validity due to the efforts of Russian interest

to construct new railways that would increase their capacity in mobilizing their

soldiers and the increasing military fortifications of Iran close to the disputed

lands.255

Nevertheless, Abdulhamid’s order was clear regarding the status quo that

draws the international limits of the disputed lands. According to him, nobody should

transgress the border, but a district within the status quo256 should be definitely

protected. In addition, the Porte stated that all subjects of the empire should be

protected from all threats to their lives. However, it did not answer the question of

what would happen to the people from the disputed lands, who just became Ottoman

subjects from disputed lands? Ottoman state actors of the frontier could not turn

253 Vice-Consul Dickson to O’Conor, Van, December 14, 1907, Schofield IV, 262.

254 BOA, Makam-ı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Hususi, Which side Ushni?, 14 January 1908.

255 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/111, 16 M. 1326/ 19 February 1908: Tahir Pasha’s one depiction of status quo:

10 Kanun-i Sani 1323/ 23 January 1908.

256 Statüko dahilinde: Within the status quo. This expression reffered to the zone of disputed lands.

Any peace of territory in this zone was subject to status quo. Normally, the Ottoman Empire did not

have a right to be there militarily. Abdulhamid’s order suggested not to go beyond the status quo.

85

down the inhabitants of lands if they appealed to become an Ottoman subject from

the disputed lands.257

During the post-annexation of Ushni, the Ottomans had placed small number

of troops in Ushni. Prince Governor-General of Azerbaijan and the cousin of the

shah Firman-Firma began to collect a force in order to evacuate the Ottoman troops,

and punish the Kurds. He located about 12,000 cavalry, infantry, and mountain

artillerymen in Miyan-ı Devabb, and continued to recruit soldiers and tribal cavalries

in considerable numbers by providing ammunition and arms from other provinces of

Iran such as Azerbaijan, Erdebil, and Hemedan. He attempted to enter Savuçbulak

with these forces in order to push the Ottoman troops out of Ushni.

The First Major General and the Commander of the Ottoman Border Forces

Fazıl Pasha learnt about Firman-Firma’s preparations through the Tabriz newspapers.

He believed that the shah himself had ordered this attack because the shah had

declared a “holy war” against the Ottoman Empire by forcing the Kurds to fight on

his side. Fazıl Pasha stated that he tried to solve this conflict diplomatically. He

believed Russia encouraged Firman-Firma, who refused to consider diplomatic

solutions to the problem, and continued his military fortifications around the frontier

zone after situating himself in Savuçbulak. This situation worried Fazıl Pasha about

the security of Ushni. Fazıl Pasha wanted to be sure that the security of Ushni was

maintained. He considered abandoning Ushni without providing for its security a

breach of state tradition.258 For this reason, the Porte decided to give permission to

the Ottoman troops in Ushni to open fire against the forces of Firman-Firma, if they

attacked Ushni. Accordingly, the government increased the number of soldiers

stationed in the frontier zone and reinforced their capabilities. However, the

government also warned the Ottoman forces not to violate the border rules by

transgressing the status quo.259 All the high-ranking Ottoman frontier actors were

warned not to attack the Iranian fortifications around Savuçbulak, and Fazıl Pasha

was charged to enforce this caution.260

These frictions between Fazıl Pasha and Firman-Firma made the obscurity of

the status quo more apparent. Tahir Pasha himself did not know where the status quo

257 BOA, Makam-ı Ser Askeri, Mektubi Kalemi, Hususi, Which side Ushni?, 14 January 1908.

258 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, Ferik Mehmed Fazıl Pasha, 12 M 1326/ 5 February 1908.

259 BOA, Makam-ı Ser Askeri Mektubi Kalemi Hususi, Serasker Rıza, 18 January 1908.

260 BOA, BEO., 3237/242714, 24 Z 1325/ 28 January 1908.

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lines lay, although he kept stressing the importance of 1869 provisionally. He

questioned very often the direction that the status quo line would run within the

frontier zone, taking into consideration the demographic characteristics of the

districts as well:

If the status quo line meant the borderline that was drawn by late Dervish

Pasha, Ushni was clearly in the Ottoman side. The earlier registers indicated

that Ushni was a district that previously connected to the center of Şehr-i Zur

Province that belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and whose inhabitants were

Sunni-Kurds.261

According to him, Dervish Pasha’s observation, which was based on

demographic realities, suited all the agreements; so sending additional troops to

Ushni was against none of the former treaties.262 Furthermore, Fazıl Pasha portrayed

Firman-Firma’s aggression bitterly.

Firman-Firma suddenly attacked the villages on their way with the support of

Ahmed Han, a Kurdish tribal leader, and they violated the border by taking

into account the winter conditions that disadvantaged the Ottoman soldiers

and tribal forces. 263

When the Ottoman troops approached them, Ahmed Han ran away. Other

supporters of Firman-Firma also evacuated Savuçbulak, but they had already caused

significant damage to the local people. Fazıl Pasha observed:

Firman-Firma committed a crime against humanity by attempting to clean

Savuçbulak from pro-Ottoman elements. His attempts were totally against

universal values, the necessities of humanity and civilization.264

Nevertheless, most of the people under their oppression had migrated to

Pasve in order to avoid a bigger catastrophe. Accordingly, the number of people who

applied to Ottoman subjecthood increased drastically. Fazıl Pasha knew that he did

not have the authority to accept these refugees to Ottoman citizenship. He put the

task of addressing this issue under the responsibility of the boundary commission.

261 BOA, Y. Mtv., 305/162, 26 January 1908.

262 BOA, Y. Mtv., 305/162, 26 January 1908.

263 BOA, Y. Mtv, 306/64, 12 M 1326/ 5 February 1908: Fazıl Pasha explains why he intervened the

border conflicts.

264 Ibid., Fazıl Pasha: “…[Osmanlı Devleti]’ne ‘arz-ı dehalet idenler haklarında kıyam...”

87

Hearing these appeals could have been considered the duty of the commission,

although deciding them was not. At any rate, Fazıl Pasha did not accept their appeals

because he thought this action could create further diplomatic crisis and delay the

boundary delimitation. 265 This sensitivity regarding accepting the refugee appeals

did not reflect the reality, and the refugee policy of the empire had to change over

time because the struggle with Firman-Firma continued.

The local people and the tribal forces resisted the attacks of Firman-Firma’s

forces by taking the support of Ottoman troops. These joint forces besieged him in

Savuçbulak and prevented the access of military reinforcements and additional

supplies to the city. However, Fazıl Pasha thought the joint tribal force did not have

the ability to resist Firman-Firma much longer. If this local resistance was broken,

the Iranian military forces could march to Basra and Baghdad, and establish contact

with the Twelver Shias (Jafaris) living there. Having these concerns in mind, Fazıl

Pasha thought that Firman-Firma’s aggression could damage the relationship

between the Ottoman government and the tribes of the region because the latter were

being forced to shift their loyalties when they faced superior forces.

To prevent this shift and to end Firman-Firma’s oppressions, Fazıl Pasha

stationed four hundred regular soldiers in Pasve. This number increased to a

thousand, when Fazıl Pasha recalled the six hundred soldiers he had sent to winter

quarters, because of inadequate food supplies and financial resources. However, even

this force appeared inadequate to protect the status quo and those who applied for

Ottoman protection.

As it is discussed in the third chapter, financial struggle shortages new

recruitments. Fazıl Pasha asserted that increasing the number of troops was going to

be a growing burden on government finances day by day. In these circumstances, he

had to prepare a joint force cooperating with the pro-Ottoman Kurdish tribes

persecuted by Firman-Firma. After he put together a sufficient number of armed

men, he began to draw up his strategy and distributed all the soldiers under his

command to strategic points of Savuçbulak.

He left two hundred regular soldiers in Pasve considering the winter

conditions, which usually closed the roads for months. Fazıl Pasha thought that

Firman-Firma had chosen this time of the year deliberately. He transgressed the

265 Ibid., Fazıl Pasha continues reasoning his intervention.

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status quo in the coldest season of the year because the heavy winter conditions

would cut off the communications and make the flow of urgent information difficult.

He positioned eight hundreds soldiers in the village of Mahmud Shah. He then went

to Köse Güherize, which was a village in a distance four hours away from the center

of Savuçbulak, with the remaining soldiers and fifteen thousands tribal forces.

Map 4.1: This map shows the center of cities where Fazıl Pasha and Firman-Firma

fortified their forces, and it demonstrates their proximity to the rivers and mountains,

which means to the strategic points such as important passageways.266

Meanwhile, Firman-Firma was under the siege of the Kurdish tribal forces.

Fazıl Pasha praised them for their bravery and ardent attachment to their country and

family. However, their resistance against a regular army would not last long, so

Firman-Firma could break their resistance very soon. He reminded as well that these

people had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Before the tribes became totally

exhausted and tired, and ceased fire, Fazıl Pasha charged some officers with the task

of assuring them that the Ottoman military support was behind them. Consequently,

he sent a memorandum to Firman-Firma telling him the evacuation of Savuçbulak

and otherwise, his joint forces would expel them. Firman-Firma found the Ottoman

troops and tribal forces deterrent, and retreated to Miyan-ı Devabb without making

any effort to fight. Fazıl Pasha evaluated Firman-Firma’s withdrawal with an

266 BOA, HRT.h..453, 1 Ra 1328 / 13 March 1910, (Ölçek 1/720000, 3 Piece)

89

interesting statement that Firman-Firma had lost Kurdistan completely to the

Ottoman Empire. 267

These initiatives of Fazıl Pasha would be subject to investigations. In order to

justify his position to the Porte, he stated that:

… Firman-Firma took control of the tribes living in the disputed lands by

force and oppression, so my action cannot be seen as one that breached the

rules because it was obvious that Firman-Firma’s interference would later

create dangerous situation, just as it did before. My action was against the

Iranian military fortifications around the border …268

Fazıl Pasha defended himself that He preserved the prestige of the Ottoman

State in the eyes of the Kurds by interfering in a dispute that threatened them and did

so by organizing a local force made up of the Kurds and backed by regular army

troops. He believed protecting the status quo with only the available troops in the

frontier zone was impossible. Thus, this cooperation between the Kurdish tribal

forces and the Ottoman troops maintained the security of the imperial borders and

people who sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Otherwise, the Ottoman

government had to recruit thirty thousand soldiers to protect the status quo for an

unspecified length of time.

As the annexation of Ushni launched new debates, Fazıl Pasha’s

interventions in Savuçbulak created similar debates. The Ottoman Empire found the

status of Savuçbulak also in dispute. Fazıl Pasha asserted that Iran did not have any

right to be in Savuçbulak because they had appointed neither an officer nor sent a

solider there, which meant Iran had never governed this place in the past. The

Ottoman government provided another reason to prioritize the occupation of

Savuçbulak. They stressed the importance of Savuçbulak for different reasons,

although Savuçbulak was obviously beyond the status quo line. One of the reasons

was the township of Pasve. They believed that Pasve was on Ottoman soil and

bordering Savuçbulak. Thus, any dispute in Savuçbulak could directly have a

negative impact on the public security and order of Pasve that was in the status

quo.269

267 BOA, Y. Mtv, 306/64, 12 M 1326/ 5 February 1908:

268 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, 12 M 1326/ 15 February 1908, The Date of Telegram: 6 February 1908.

269 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, 12 M 1326/ 5 February 1908:

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4. 2. 4. Two Tribes and Their Search for Protection

To explain the complexity of the frontier difficulties, Fazıl Pasha’s

intervention to the frontier affairs exemplifies an important instance. How a state

could resist a significant amount of appeals for protection in a contested area where

two states competed for regional superiority constituted one of the difficulties while

pro-Ottoman tribes, who appealed to the Ottoman State for being refugee from the

disputed lands, were being pushed by Firman-Firma to westward. Mekri and

Deveböğri tribes were just two of the tribes who took refuge in the Ottoman Empire

with their five thousand cavalries and infantries in the same number to escape

Firman-Firma’s persecution and oppressions. Fazıl Pasha stated that these people

were subjects of the empire, so the government had to protect them as freely as

Russia did for the well being of those people who chose to become a Russian

subjects in the same region. He stated:

The Russian consul gave a particular importance to the evacuation of two

people, Kerbelayı Osman and Nevruz Ali, who lived in Savuçbulak, but took

refuge in Russia. These people were neither Russian nor Christian, but they

became subjects of Russia.270

He meant that if Russia had the right to accept new subjects from the region and

protect their well being, the Ottoman State had the same right. At first glance, this

was a reasonable wish in terms of maintaining the security of the subjects of the

empire, but it was bringing up new territorial claims, and thus, conflicts. Tahir Pasha

clarified the importance of the refugees for the empire:

… No objections against the people those who accepted Ottoman sovereignty

can be accepted, because they were naturally part of the Muslim community,

and thus, they could be the subjects of the Empire. Ottoman State will protect

their rights and claims for their “ancient lands”...271

He justified these claims for Muslim-Kurds based on old treaties. According to the

treaties, Kurdistan was part of the Ottoman Empire, and Iran did not have any right

270 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, 12 M 1326/ 5 February 1908:

271 Ibid.

91

to intervene in its affairs.272 He found his own interpretation of the treaties

trustworthy and a realistic definition of the boundary, yet Iran ignored this reality

constantly and encroached the disputed lands gradually. According to Tahir Pasha,

they became successful and these attempts of Iranian officials in the past eased their

penetration to the disputed lands. Thus, the old treaties, which showed the real

owners of the lands, lost its basis, and Tahir Pasha realized that the treaties were no

longer valid for the some parts of the frontier zone due to systematic encroachments

of Iran. Moreover, the Ottoman State did not loose its contact with the inhabitants

who felt religiously bound to it. He believed that if the Ottoman State took

possession of these lands, Golden Age (devr-i se’adet) would return. Wratislaw did

not see this nostalgic view of the past correct because he could not be sure whether

Tahir Pasha quoted justly without seeing a copy of the Treaty of 1639.273 He asserted

that they provided public security and order increasingly in these lands on behalf of

humanity and Islam by stopping the tribal raids, so boundary settlement would serve

the same purpose.274

A detailed Ottoman version of Firman-Firma’s intervention shows that a pro-

Kurdish tribal leader who wanted to be dominant in the region played a significant

role in terms of helping Firman-Firma. For example, Ahmed Han, a pro-Iranian

Kurdish tribal leader had interfered with the other Kurdish villages. Like these

attacks for local superiority, Firman-Firma’s military fortifications had roused the

tension on the frontier. His action resulted with his evacuation of Savuçbulak, but he

continued his attacks on the Sunni-Kurdish villages on his way out, and ordered

killing of villagers. According to Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman frontier actors did not

encourage the Kurds, but Firman-Firma had actually provoked the Kurds by

attacking their villages. By taking precautionary measures, Fazıl Pasha had just

prevented the proliferation of this regional instability.

Regarding the relationship between Firman-Firma and Fazıl Pasha, Tahir

Pasha shared an interesting intelligence. Firman-Firma and Fazıl Pasha were friends

for many years in Baghdad. Fazıl Pasha became a commander responsible for the

272 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 518/27, 9 M 1326/ 5 February 1908. Tahir Pasha: “...Kürdistan esasen ecza-yı

Memalik-i Şahane’den olup İran’ın Kürdistan’da müdahaleye hakkı olmadığına dair bir ictima’da

kıraet olunan varaka...”

273 Wratislaw to Marling, Urumiah, July 12, 1908, Schofield IV, 337.

274 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 518/27, 9 M 1326/ 12 February 1908.

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security of the imperial eastern frontiers. Eventually, both of them wanted to

terminate all the quarrels in the frontier zone.

However, Tahir Pasha believed that Firman-Firma was planning to abuse his

friendship with Fazıl Pasha to gain some more time for collecting soldiers that would

enable him to control Savuçbulak. His relation was a cynical ploy of ill intentions

and would give more space to Firman-Firma for his divergent purposes such as

resettling in Savuçbulak, isolating the pro-Ottoman Kurds with magisterial measures,

and finally appointing Iranian officers.

Tahir Pasha criticized Iranian commissioners and he complained that they

were doing nothing for the wellbeing of the people other than accusing the Ottoman

government to the Europeans. He believed that Iran was using this method in order

to prolong the boundary delimitation. He also did not find appropriate Iranian

attitudes, claiming Savuçbulak belonged to Iran unconditionally, so they could do

whatever they wanted in their territories. On the contrary, Tahir Pasha thought that

this claim was not certainly reflecting the truth because Iran must not commit

massacres in Savuçbulak, even if they had a say in these territories. The only

evidence of sovereignty they can show in Savuçbulak was the existence of an Iranian

embassy there, but the treaty of 1869 (1286) did not mention an embassy there as a

reference point. He believed that Iran established that embassy in Savuçbulak in an

illegal manner. He stated that if Iran based their claims on the treaties (he meant the

Second Treaty of Erzurum), they had to show sensitivity to the diplomatic rule

(pacta sund servanda) first by respecting the Ottoman rights (coming from the treaty

of 1639) in Savuçbulak.275

He believed that Iranian commissioners were delaying boundary negotiations

intentionally. By this way, they were gaining some time to apply magisterial

measures to the tribes before they intimidated them. The economic value of the

Savuçbulak plain was making them more aggressive because, as Fazıl Pasha stated,

the region consisted of wide, large and fertile lands. To take the possession of these

lands under their sovereignty, Iran used magisterial measures and sophisticated

strategies for centuries yielding them to win the tribes over living in status quo. Iran

275 BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK., 78/27, 10 M 1326/ 13 February 1908, Tahir Pasha: 7 February 1908.

93

gave these tribes many privileges like high ranks, golden swords, many khalats

(robes of honor) as well as tax reduction.276

Beside Iranian measures and strategies, Tahir Pasha and Fazıl Pasha believed

that the previous Ottoman frontier officers had in the past had created present

situation. They criticized these frontier officers for their condoning of Iranian

infiltration into the region. They accused these officers with behaving irresponsibly

and never asking the tribes again.

Infact, Fazıl Pasha had collected thirty thousand tribal forces in a short time

against Firman-Firma. This showed that Ottoman claims had a ground as they

usually proclaimed that the Kurds were increasingly returning to their real protector.

He said that he did not intend to disregard the order of the sultan regarding nobody

would transgress the status quo, in contrast, he had protected the status quo by

relying on the local forces. If he let Iran to cross the status quo line, Iranian

commanders could apply a forward policy, and threaten Iraq in their next move.277

Meanwhile, Abdulhamid appreciated Tahir Pasha’s effort, and he awarded

him a medal on February 13, 1908, as he found his service on the boundary

settlement loyal and invaluable because he did not allow Iran to transgress the status

quo line even one-hand span and he did not condone Iranian interventions and

violations in the frontier zone.278

4. 2. 5. Ottoman Discourses and Savuçbulak

To describe their connection with the local people in the region, the Ottoman

frontier actors used several distinctive words in their correspondence. These words

indicate how frontier officials justified their actions and positions that transgressed

the position of the Ottoman government regarding the frontier zone. For instance,

Fazıl Pasha had to justify his action discursively when he intervened the affairs of

Savuçbulak.

Fazıl Pasha underlined the importance of Savuçbulak in terms of its high

economic value thanks to its fertile plains, its geostrategic position, and its people.

276 These materials symbolically represented the semi-autonomy of the tribes and their allegiance to

the state that rendered this semi-autonomy possible.

277 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, 12 M 1326/15 February 1908, Fazıl Pasha: “…Zîrâ ‘Acemlere bu def’a

meydân virilür ise durmayub ilerü gideceklerini ve Hıtta-i ‘Irâkıyye içün büyük hazer kapuları

açılacağı ma’lûmdur. Binâ’en ‘aleyh her dürlü fidâ-kârlıkda bulunmaklığım mahzâ bu kapuları

bağlamak maksadına mebnîdir…”

278 BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK., 78/27, 10 M 1326/ 13 February 1908.

94

Savuçbulak was also important for the British interests because it was a township

adjacent to Muhammerah and Basra. Some related British reports in Shofield’s

collection of Volume IV indicates neither shah nor revolutionary groups were able to

implement their authorities completely in Savuçbulak, so Britain was indirectly

governing the region through the sheiks they agreed and threatened.

When Fazıl Pasha began to interfering Savuçbulak, Iran protested him. Tahir

Pasha replied in protest, arguing that some factors had pushed Fazıl Pasha to take

such an action. According to him, Fazıl Pasha had merely expelled Firman-Firma’s

military forces and he had saved the Muslim inhabitants of the township who

suffered from prevalent anarchy and appealed to the Caliph for help and

assistance.279 Yet, Tahir Pasha was not sure whether Savuçbulak was in the Ottoman

territory or not. On February 3, 1908, he announced that all of Kurdistan belonged to

the Ottoman Empire, including the inhabitants of the Kurdish villages scattered in

the Urumiah plain.

Besides Iranian and Russian officials, British consuls did not see Tahir Pasha’

claims something that can be justifiable. In particular, British consuls perceived

Ottoman advancement into Savuçbulak as a threat to their position in Basra. They

suspected that this recent advancement of the Ottoman military showed the Ottoman

State had plan that was prepared carefully.280 Even though they could not find any

evidence exposing the German role in the occupations, they thought that Germany

might be involved in this plan as well.

Fazıl Pasha’s involvement to Savuçbulak increased their anxiety and inclined

them to produce domino effect theories because they feared possible Muslim or tribal

conflagration in Muhammerah that was in the British sphere of influence. Their

situation in this place where they controlled through agents and sheikhs since fifty

years was about to disappear. Fazıl Pasha’s intervention corresponded to the period

when Britain sought methods to consolidate their relations with the sheikhs, so his

action obviously could undermine the British interests. Thus, Savuçbulak strained the

diplomatic relations much more than ever in this period. The British consuls thought

the expansion of Ottoman encroachments into the territories of the sheikhs, where

the British Oil Companies had concessions, could create further problems. To

dominate and control all these local variables, they would demonstrate their navy in

279 O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 1, 1908, Schofield IV, 260.

280 Sir A. Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, January 27, 1908, Schofield IV, 260.

95

Basra, if necessary. They stated, “… any disturbance of the status quo at

Muhammerah would affect British interests and might lead to the active intervention

of the British government, who gave the sheikhs certain assurances regarding their

territory.”281

4. 2. 5. 1. Fundamentals of Ottoman Discourse for Military Fortification and

Intervention

The Ottoman leadership did not accept Shia Iran as a member of the Muslim

community. This opposition had shaped Ottoman and Iranian bilateral relations since

the Safavid period, so this difference reverberated to their language as well. In the

first decade of twentieth century, the Ottoman officials addressed to the problems of

local people who remained out of the Ottoman imperial territory considering this

different understanding of Islam.

Maintaining the security (hâsıl-ı emniyyet), people of Islam (ahâlî-i

İslâmiyye), Ottoman tribes (aşayir-i Osmaniyye), Muslim tribes (aşayir-i Müslime),

People of the Sunni doctrine (Sunniyyül mezhep ahali), preservation of the rights of

Ottoman subjects (teb’a-i şâhânenin muhâfaza-i hukûkları) were groups of words

they used frequently to remind their religious, political and cultural connections with

the local people. In other words, they highlighted tribal interrelations with the

Ottoman government on issues of identity and security.

The frontier actors who reported all the information associated with the

frontier zone to Istanbul used some many other phrases as well. Two of them were

“ancient lands” (arâzî-i kadîme) and status quo line (Istatuko hattı). Like the

previous words, these words draw the frame of the borderlands where these local

people inhabited, and so their connection with the Ottoman State was being

solidified. Most of these groups of local people, mainly Sunni Kurdish tribes, applied

for taking refuge or political asylum (arz-ı dehalet) to Ottoman Empire. However,

these appeals encouraged the Ottoman frontier actors, and the eastern frontier policy

of the empire evolved furthermore by the time to embrace these people as official

Ottoman subjects. Fazıl Pasha became the chief actor of this changing policy. He

took the initiative to maintain the security of the people, who applied to the “Caliph”

for protection, by differing than the Porte. The Porte was opposing new occupations

and was reminding the frontier actors to preserve the status quo rules. They inquired

281 Grey to O’Conor, Foreign Office, February 25, 1908, Schofield IV, 274.

96

the reasons about Fazıl Pasha’s initiative when he occupied Muhammed Shah village

in order to make the River Çığata the boundary between the two states.

Unlike the Palace’s motivation, there was not a political space that Ottoman

government could stay behind these policies and discourse because each move of the

Ottoman Empire was also encroaching the Russian and British spheres of influence.

For this reason, the Russians demanded Fazıl Pasha to inform the Russian Embassy

in Istanbul each day and urged him not to cause a new conflict, so the Russians

began to follow the moves of Fazıl Pasha and the Ottoman troops closely around

Savuçbulak. In fact, the Ottoman government that was informed about the quarrel in

Savuçbulak later did not see territories beyond Pasve including Savuçbulak as part of

the empire, so they decided to withdraw Fazıl Pasha from Savuçbulak when they

learnt about the occupation.

On February 15, 1908, Rıza Pasha, the Minister of War, was notified by a

telegram, which was originally sent from the British Consul in Savuçbulak to the

British Embassy, that Fazıl Pasha was still in Savuçbulak, although the Porte had

decided to evacuate the Ottoman troops a week ago. Instead, Fazıl Pasha took charge

of the government customhouse and appointed an Ottoman consul to govern it. On

this border strip, he wrote letters to the Kurdish tribes in order to formalize the

government’s relations with them by taking their written consent to their obedience

to the Sultan.

Such actions of Fazıl Pasha and his refortifications around Baghdad arouse

the reaction of pro-Iranian parties. Russia and Britain feared any disturbance that

could increase national sentiments in their respective spheres of influence. Russia

sent a military commission to investigate into the roots of this anger of the people

there. The pressure Russia put on the Porte worked. The Porte underlined that Fazıl

Pasha’s presence in Savuçbulak could create problems with Russia. In fact, the

Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg indicated that Russia had begun to prepare a

force of twenty thousand soldiers to transport to Caucasia.282 Rıza Pasha assumed

that any close contact with Russian forces before full-delimitation of the boundary

could complicate the situation further. Thus, he ordered Fazıl Pasha to withdraw his

forces from Savuçbulak to Pasve, namely, the other site of the status quo line. Ferid

Pasha shared the same opinion with Rıza Pasha and believed that the situation could

282 BOA, Y. Mtv., 306/64, 12 M 1326, 15 February 1908.

97

get worse if Russia intervened in the conflict in Savuçbulak, so they should withdraw

the rest of the soldiers from there.283 Thus, it seems, Russian opposition restrained

the implementation of the Ottoman discourse about Savuçbulak.284

Tahir Pasha continued dealing with boundary affairs. He became the object of

Muhteshem es Saltanah’s complaints. He criticized him,

Tahir Pasha has fiddled around by claiming the frontier investigations and

negotiations were done already. Tahir Pasha has asserted that Savuçbulak and

Kurdistan belonged to the Ottoman Empire wherever he went from Urumiah

to Selmas, and its villages. He has transformed some buildings into station

houses, fortresses, and customhouses.285

The historical roots of this fact that was problematized by Muhteshem es

Sultanah could be found in the earlier stages of the boundary negotiations. As

Wratislaw observed, the boundary negotiations had been delayed for three months

after the Ottoman commissioners reached to border front. New developments and

violent incidents occurred around the boundary each day. The Ottoman Empire had

significant number of Kurdish population as well. Therefore, the postponements of

the negotiations pushed the representatives of the Ottoman State to seek what their

alternatives were in face of Iranian efforts to win over the tribes in the disputed

lands. Tahir Pasha read the delays as deliberate tactics to suspend the meetings to

gain additional time for Iranian penetration into the disputed lands.

Tahir Pasha found himself in a dilemma. On the one side, the Porte insisted

on the delimitation of the boundary. On the other side, the current impasse made the

Ottoman commissioners unwilling to continue the negotiations under prevailing

circumstances. Towards the end of March, Tahir Pasha could not resist further the

283 Ibid.

284 In the meantime, Tahir Pasha was the governor of Bitlis, but he could not preform his duty until the

boundary negotiations ended. Feyzi Bey, the mutasarrıf of Siird, was serving in his place as the

deputy governor of Bitlis. In 1908, Feyzi Bey encountered some difficulties in Bitlis due to the

activities of Armenian fedais in Mush and its vicinity. The Imperial Fourth Army complained him to

the Porte because he did not have the capacity to govern a province, but governmental weakness.

Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha questioned these accusations and asked Tahir Pasha whether they were

correct or not. Tahir Pasha investigated the problem, and responded to Ferid Pasha by stating that

Feyzi Bey did his job properly, and his governance did not indicate weaknesses. BOA, Y. A. HUS.,

518/59, 17 M 1326/ 20 February 1908. Amedi Divanı Hümayun, 111, Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha

confirms Tahir Pasha.

285 BOA, Y. A. HUS., 519/20, 7 S. 1326/ 11 March 1908: Îrân Hudûd Komisyon Re’îsi

Muhteshemü’s-Saltana (Muhteshem es Saltanah) Hazretleri’nden 2 Safer 326 (6 March 1908)

Ta’rîhlü vârid olan Telgraf-nâme Tercemesi.

98

internal pressure coming from the commission members. He tended to break the

negotiations off, and ended the work of the commission unilaterally and returned

from Urumiah to Bitlis without consulting the central government.

On March 28, 1908, Tahir Pasha informed the Palace that the negotiations

produced eight official reports, which were “signed” and submitted by two frontier

commissions. Seven of these reports were signed by the Ottoman and Iranian

commissioners at the end of the negotiations. One report remained unsigned, but that

one was signed when the Iranian delegates met with the Ottoman commission in the

village of Kuşçu three days after the Ottoman commission left Urumiah.

Tahir Pasha summarized the contents of all these reports in a single report

embodying the results of the border negotiations. In particular, he referred to the

conditions that were ignored in the first treaty (1639). He stated:

The boundary line from Kızılça in Süleymâniyye to Van had not been

mentioned by the Ottoman State and Iran in the first treaty, yet they had

accepted the “sectarian controversy” (ihtilâf-ı mezheb) for the boundary line

by conditioning Kızılbaş must not intervene. This aspect was expressed with

the term of “controversy of people” (ihtilâf-ı akvâm) in our official report.

(Iran) In their response, they did not interfere in this aspect and accepted it.

Finally, Iranian officers began to complain our commission when they could

not find any article that they can use in none of those previous agreements

apart from finding the article III of Second Erzurum Treaty that is unrelated.

If all claims for the possession of lands had to comply with previous treaties,

namely, the rule of pacta sunt sevanda, Iran must reconfirm the rights of the

Ottoman State over the Kurds, coming from the same rule. 286

Ottoman and Iranian officials delimitated the long boundary, mainly from south to

north. When the boundary line reached to Van, a new dispute emerged in the districts

bordering with Van. Before Tahir Pasha left his duty, he considered annexing the

township of Havder on March 26, 1908. He was concerned with the Kurdish tribes

286 “…Birinci Mu’âhede-nâme’de, Süleymâniyye dâhilinde bulunan Kızılça’dan Vân’a kadar hatt-ı

hudûd zikr olunmayub, yalnız Kızılbaşın ‘adem-i müdâhalesi meşrût olarak hatt-ı hudûd içün ihtilâf-ı

mezheb esâsı kabûl buyurulmuşdur. Mazbatamızda bu cihet, ihtilâf-ı akvâm ta’bîriyle ifâde

olunmuşdur. Cevâblarında, bu hakîkate ilişik itmeyüb kabûl eylediler. Ve’l-hâsıl Îrân Me’mûrları bu

işe te’allukı olmadığı meydânda olan Altmış üç Senesi Mu’âhede-nâmesi’nin Üçünci Mâddesi’nden

sonra da işlerine yarayacak mu’âhedelerde bir mâdde bulub götürmediklerinden, hey’etimizi şikâyete

başladılar. Mâdâmki tesarrufun ‘ahde tâbi’ olması meşrûtdur, cerbezelerine i’tibâr idilmeyerek

Kürdler hakkındaki talebimizin te’yîd buyurulması, menût-ı Re’y-i ‘Âlîleridir…” BOA, Y. PRK.

BŞK., 78/27, 10 M 1326/ 13 February 1908, the cipher from Tahir Pasha: 15 Mart 1324/ 28 March

1908.

99

whose leaders urgently asked for protection, so he believed that Havder was also part

of the Ottoman Empire.

Tahir Pasha was resolved to maintain the security of these people and their

protection from Iranian attacks as much as possible. He perceived this event as one

of the outcomes of the friction between the people of Islam (Sunni) and the Shiite in

the northern parts of the status quo area, because the Shiite groups had been

attacking the Sunni villages and plundering their properties. 287

The local conditions reshaped the refugee policies of the Ottoman

government. It seems the government did not have a settled and official plan for

refugees. Frontier actors confused with each wave of appeals for protection that were

causing further ambiguities and complexities. However, these appeals to come under

the protection of Ottoman State increased dramatically. Tahir Pasha or other frontier

officers did not know what kind of official procedure they would follow on behalf of

the sultan in response to these appeals.288 Tahir Pasha could accept all the appeals

personally, but the Ottoman government warned him to abstain from accepting the

applicants as Ottoman subjects because it could create further problems with Iran.

An inquiry of the Minister of War Rıza Pasha asking the Porte about the procedures

to be observed regarding the asylum seekers points to the ambiguities of the issue in

the Ottoman Empire.289 The appeals for refuge kept coming in increasing numbers

from the people who inhabited the northern shores of the Lake Urumiah.

This situation enabled the Ottoman frontier officials to consolidate two other

significant terms that one encounters in Ottoman daily politics in 1908. Dehalet is

one of them, referring to political asylum or refugee. Muavenet was another term,

connoting assistance and protection. These two terms that supported each other

interactively, the inter-tribal quarrels and inter state rivalry accelerated their

application.

Relying on their power or the benefits they hoped to get from the state, the

tribes acted freely in a flexible environment. They did not have advanced war

technologies and military equipment aside from the regular tribal cavalries. They

287 Tahir Pasha did not accept that Shite was part of people of Islam.

288 BOA, Y. Mtv., 308/148, 24 RA 1326/ 26 April 1908, Forth Army conveys Tahir Pasha’s claims

regarding Havder and people living in the region: 22 April 1908: “…‘arz-ı dehalet idecekler ve

mu’avenet taleb idecekler...”

289 BOA, Y. Mtv., 308/148, 24 RA 1326/ 26 April 1908: Minister of War, Rıza informs about the

procedure: 26 April 1908.

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depended on the support of the states to establish superiority over another tribe with

which they quarreled or to protect themselves from the tribe that enjoyed artillery

support from a rival state. This situation brought Iran and the Ottoman State to the

brink of war on several occasions. Neither the Ottomans and nor the Iranians

hesitated to back their tribal cavalry forces with artillery support, when the

conditions required the application of more offensive polices in order to protect their

respective allies in the frontier zone.

Besides these frontier difficulties, the commission members had to deal with

their own needs. Indeed, they served under exhausting climate, geographical, and

sheltering conditions. On April 9, 1908, Tahir Pasha, as the chairperson of the

commission, reported that all members of the commission needed to go to nearby

towns such as Hakkari, Van, and Başkale for three or five days in order to find

doctors, who could check their health, to buy indispensible supplies and materials,

and to wait for their next orders. Tahir Pasha himself went to Erciş from Gevar to

receive his orders.290

4. 2. 6. The States and Inter-Tribal Conflicts

Many cases can be found to illustrate the above-mentioned situation between

1905 and 1908. The Imperial Fourth Army, which was situated in Erzincan, sent a

telegram vividly elaborating the basic pulse of these interstate and inter tribal

activities.

For example, Timur Han, an Iranian Commander-in-Chief, led a joint

military consortium consisting of a group of tribal forces from Arusanlı, Celali,

Abdudi tribes from the Iranian side and three hundred Armenian fedais (guarillas).

They carried a cannon and attacked with this cannon to the Castle of Çari in Sumay.

They also bombarded the Şikak tribe with cannon fire in the same village.

290 BOA, DH. MKT., 1173/ 41, 1 CA 1325: Tahir Pasha: Needs of the Commission Members,

564/116, 9 April 1908.

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Map 4.2: This map shows the northern parts of the Ottoman-Iranian frontier and the

geographical location of Havder, Sumay, Beradost and Selmas. The Lake on the

right is Urumiah. 291

The reason behind the attack was very interesting. It reveals the complex

interrelations between the states and tribal entities in the frontier zone of northern

Urumiah, a zone that was shattered sociologically. The Fourth Army linked this joint

campaign of Iran to the intelligence reports that Iranians received earlier about

Ottoman military plans to annex Havder, Çari, Sumay, and their vicinity.

Upon receiving this intelligence, the Iranians immediately granted these

lands, including Çari, to Ismail Agha, the leader of the Abdudi tribe. The other tribes

resisted this fait accompli. The first tribe who resisted this situation was the Kardar

tribe that has lived in the same district. All these tribes recognized the Ottoman

sovereignty. In order to push its regional rival away from the district, Ismail Agha

prepared his forces to confront them with due military support of the Iranian

government. On the other hand, Ismail Hasup, another agha in Çari and the leader of

the Kardar tribe, adopted a pro-Ottoman position and asserted that the lands they

291BOA, HRT.h..453, 1 Ra 1328 / 13 March 1910, (Ölçek 1/720000, 3 Piece)

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inhabited were part of the Ottoman Empire and they would not recognize Iranian

sovereignty.

This situation pushed Iran to pursue a two-dimensional policy. On the one

hand, they wanted to win Ismail Hasup over with various promises. On the other

hand, they sent five hundred cavalry against the Kardar tribe. Ismail Hasup who was

left to choose between fighting or become an ally wanted assistance from the

Ottoman government. To prevent these kinds of oppressive policies of Iran in Çari,

the Ottoman Empire decided to annex it before Iran consolidated its power in these

lands.292

Thus, the Ottoman State and Iran became involved in a proxy war through

these two tribes who espoused different sovereignties. While the battle continued on

the tribal level, Sertib, the brother of the leader of the Şikak tribe293, and the chief of

Kardar tribe, Ismail Agha came to the Ottoman barracks in order to ask for military

support. The Imperial Fourth Army requested permission to dispatch regular

Ottoman soldiers, namely the troops in Nisah and Şecare in order to help the Şikaks

for a variety of reasons. The conditions of the Şikaks were becoming worse and their

losses were increasing. Furthermore, this situation worried the Ottoman officers and

this situation of panic reverberated on the reports of the Fourth Army that detail these

tribal disputes.

The reports explain that the Şikaks barricaded themselves in the fortress of

Çari to defend themselves against the joint Iranian forces. However, the Iranian

forces brought the fortress under cannon fire. Ottoman officers feared that the tribal

resistance could be broken soon due to destruction of the fortress with cannon fire.

They believed that the Iranian forces could then head towards the Ottoman

headquarters after they killed “the people of Islam”.

The Ottoman officers needed to consolidate their de facto refugee support

policies (muavenet) in the region. They realized that the number of the Ottoman

troops in the frontier zone was inadequate, and they considered that the Iranian

292 BOA, Y. PRK-ASK, 256/90, 17 R 1326/ 19 May 1908, Fourth Army informed the Iranians may

have learned of the occupation of Havder, Çari and Sumay by virtue of intelligence: 6 May 1908.

293 According to the report of Captain Sykes of a Journey through the Turkish Provinces, giving a list

of Kurdish Tribes, he evaluates the Şikak (Shekaks) under the category of semi-nomads of the plains

and southern hills. He states they were from Baban Kurds, and strictly orthodox Sunni Moslems. The

total number of families was 6,000. They are a notable tribe, who are called Revand by the local

Armenians, and they only spend three months in the tents, and therefore may be called sedentary.

Schofield, Vol. IV, pp. 124-130.

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forces could defeat them in a future attack. For this reason, they fortified the

Ottoman military stations in the frontier zone to dispatch the Ottoman troops against

the joint Iranian force fighting the Şikak tribes in Sumay. Brigadier-Commander of

the Ottoman Frontier Forces, Yaver Bey, was responsible for the protection of the

status quo, public security and order in the frontier zone. He suggested the

fortification of the Ottoman troops located in Beradost as well.

The Field Marshal of the Fourth Army explained the trick and the attack of

Iranian state and tribes. He believed that these Iranian attempts could facilitate their

encroachments. It could cause irremediable consequences for the defense of the

frontier zone, so he supported the deployment of additional Ottoman troops.294 This

resistance of Ottoman troops and tribal forces prompted the Iranian troops and its

tribal allies to stop and retreat.

Tahir Pasha set himself to annex Havder, but the Ottoman government was

very reluctant to allow him, although he insisted that Havder was within the status

quo. The Ottoman government believed that both Ottoman and Iranian commissions

should rapidly fix the boundary by avoiding any action that would prolong this

process of frontier delimitation.295 The government considered the frontier

delimitation more important than the protection of some pro-Ottoman tribes, and

thought that the annexation of Havder could block the negotiations for the

delimitation of the frontier zone. They wanted to postpone the decisions to be taken

on Havder’s status for a while, until after the end of the negotiations.

294 BOA, Y. PRK-ASK., 256/90, 17 R 1326/ 19 May 1908: The Ottoman Şikak Tribe was attacked by

other Iranian tribes under the control of Iranian commander: 12 May 1908.

295 BOA, Y. PRK. ASK., 256/90, 17 R 1326/ 19 May 1908: Minister of War, Rıza repeats the Port’s

opinion regarding the occupation of Havder: 19 May 1908.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this thesis has been to investigate one of the most

controversial Ottoman boundary commissions, namely the one led by Tahir Pasha in

1907-1908, with emphasis on the international conjecture that affected the

commission’s work. This study showed how the boundary commission was formed

and how it interacted with internal and external politics. The reports of Tahir Pasha

and other officials who were in charge of maintaining the security of the frontier and

of the people around the frontier constituted one of the major sources of this study. I

compared these reports to the reports written by the British envoys. These reports

indicate that the boundary commission played a central role in the implementation of

the orders of the Palace, just as the reports of the frontier actors enabled the Palace to

deal with the conflicts emerging in the eastern peripheries.

My argument is that the Ottoman frontier commission under the headship of

Tahir Pasha was a political instrument of the sultan to implement his eastern policy.

Tahir’s conduct and the positions he took suggest that the sultan was wary of

possible Russian encroachments and hoped to create a diplomatic space against

Russia and Iran by winning the loyalty of the predominantly Sunni population of the

frontier zone.

As it has been indicated above, the peripheries of the empire became centers

of conflict late in his history. As well, it has been asserted that the Palace and the

Ottoman government diverged in their approach to and perception of the boundary

affairs. The frontier actors, especially Tahir Pasha, became a source of resistance

against Iran’s increasing military activism around the frontline. The Palace and the

majority of the frontier actors from governors to high-ranking commanders shared a

similar perspective regarding the boundary conflicts. They were willing to occupy

the disputed lands until Iran agreed to negotiate. In fact, Iran’s main goal became

clear in 1905, when it showed its desire to annex the disputed lands with British and

Russian diplomatic support. To prevent this fait accompli, the Ottomans occupied

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significant parts of the disputed lands, and even went beyond the disputed lands in

order to force Iran to negotiate.296

The status quo of the eastern boundary remained unconcluded for many years

after Russia and Britain, the so called mediating powers, and the Ottoman and

Iranian States, known as the contracting powers, specified a neutral or disputed zone

in the 1870s, after fixing other parts of the frontiers as undisputed territory. However,

these states could not reach an agreement to fix the disputed zone, because of frontier

difficulties, such as tribal movements or acts against government authority and intertribal

conflicts.

Review of the existing literature on Ottoman-Persian boundary conflicts

revealed how the states came to the point mentioned above. It showed the complex

nature of historical struggle that indicated the efforts to transform the traditional

imperial frontiers to imperial boundaries. It became clear that the written knowledge

of the states regarding the region, including that of Britain and Russia, was quite

sketchy in the 1840s. The Ottoman government thought Britain and Russia wanted to

settle the frontier disputes in favor of Iran by relying on superficial surveys, which

included thousands of discrepancies regarding the physical and demographic features

of the area. Dervish Pasha, who was aware of these mistakes, had acted unilaterally

to correct the discrepancies by his own surveys. However, he could not persuade

others effectively after he rejoined the negotiations. The issue of frontier conflicts

between the Ottoman State and Iran remained unresolved although several boundary

commissions were established to deal with the problem. The analysis of the existing

literature indicated that the Ottomans had never given up their arguments, and that

their eastern frontier polices of the Ottoman Empire did not fluctuate much. As

Melike Sarıkçıoğlu’s work (2013) shows, these polices were stable, and there was

continuity in their eastern frontier policies throughout history. Thus, it can be said

that the Ottoman occupation of the disputed lands was an aggressive expression of

296 In 1905, the Ottomans began to occupy Vezene, Lahijan, and Pasve. Abdulhamid II had already

ordered to occupy these lands in 1905 before Tahir Pasha was appointed as a chief negotiator in 1907.

Ottoman troops continued to advance close to Savuçbulak on October 1906. Besides previous

districts, Ottomans took complete possession of the districts of Dasht and Mergawer in May 1906, and

the occupation of Mergawar and Tergawar Plains were eventually completed following the Persian

expedition to punish Begzadi (or Dasht) Kurds in 1907. In August 1907, Ala-es-Sultana, Minister of

Foreign Affairs for Persia, declared, “Turks had occupied Mergawer, Tergawer, Chereek, and the

districts of Dasht and Beradost as far as Kotur, that is, up to the eastern limit of the frontier zone.”

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these polices. Tahir Pasha’s boundary commission did not digress from these

policies.

The main and most important chapter of this thesis is Chapter 5. The other

chapters are meant to provide a theoretical framework and a historical context to

assess the problem. Chapter 3 shows that the boundary commission was formed in a

period whilst the Ottoman treasury suffered from cash shortages. The lack of

insufficient funds to pay the salaries of the boundary commissioners and additional

expenditures related to boundary delimitation efforts, including the flexing of

military muscle around the boundary pushed the Ottoman frontier actors to relying

on tribal forces for military support in order to deter similar Iranian forces. This

study has asserted that taking military action for the Palace was not simply an

expansionist or opportunist move under the prevailing circumstances. Multiple

factors such as ideological, humanitarian, and geopolitical ones played significant

roles in Abdulhamid’s spontaneous act to conquer the eastern peripheries of the

empire in contrast to the British envoys who suspected the existence of a systematic

plan prepared together with Germany.

Tahir Pasha was the governor who implemented Ottoman policies shaped

with unintended consequences in the eastern peripheries of the empire. The

appointment of Tahir Pasha as a head boundary investigator and negotiator was not a

coincidence. His political career, the social network that he cultivated for thirty-three

years by being in the same environment made him the best option available as an

official who could pursue Abdulhamid’s regional goals. Appendix A provides an

original account of the early life, political identity and career of Tahir Pasha as an

Ottoman bureaucrat. It indicates that Tahir Pasha became the chief negotiator two

years after the Ottoman occupation of the disputed lands actually began. A few

newspaper articles, several reports of the British envoys, and the Ottoman reports

portray Tahir Pasha between two opposite poles. He was perceived as an Ottoman

bureaucrat who grasped a conciliatory approach. As well, he characterized a person

who became ‘narrow-minded’ and an ‘obstinate old gentlemen’. The actions he took

in different periods shaped these different judgments, and comments. All the reports

have shown that he was a Kurdish-friendly Ottoman bureaucrat, because for him the

Kurdish people were part of the Islamic community. This did not mean that he

behaved unjustly to other ethnic and religious groups. Was Tahir Pasha merely an

implementer of the state orders? Did his emotions influence his conduct of the affairs

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of the state? How did he balance the state orders, his emotions, and local realities?

These topics need further studies. According to himself, Tahir Pasha was not a

governor-negotiator who acted independently of the Palace. He saw his actions as the

extension of Abdulhamid’s policies. Obviously, he saw Abdulhamid as the head of

the government. He became an instrument of the Palace in the eastern periphery of

the empire. Others suspected that he received secret instructions directly from the

sultan. This situation increased the dissatisfaction of the Ottoman grand vizier (the

Sublime Porte), the other commissioners in Tahir Pasha’s commission, and the

British and Russian delegates.

The dissatisfaction caused by the secret instructions of the palace made

visible the dualism, discord, and friction within the Ottoman government. Not only

did Abdulhamid send secret instructions to governors holding sensitive posts, he also

relied on his advisers to control the empire from the Yıldız Palace rather than letting

the ministers run the empire. Such practices caused discord with the leading officials

of the Sublime Porte, especially the grand vizier. In other words, diverging views

regarding the delimitation of the imperial eastern boundary indicated the existence of

disharmony in conducting the affairs of the Ottoman state in 1905-1908. In this

period, the Palace favored aggressive policies to define the imperial borders in the

east, while the Porte embraced moderate and practical policies for the same purpose.

The policies of the Palace regarding its borders were not compatible with the views

of Russia and Britain, where the Porte advocated ideas similar to those of the

Russian and British ambassadors, consuls, and representatives in general and as such

opposed to those of the sultan or his advisers.

I have elaborated on the issue of inter-governmental relations in the new

imperialist era. Historians in general hold that Britain had close relations with the

Ottoman government and the constitutionalists. Britain followed the same policy in

Iran. It established close contact with the Qajar government and the revolutionaries.

Germany maintained a close relationship with the sultan, while Russia chose the

shah as a political partner. In this respect, Russia and Britain contradicted one

another in their approaches to the internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and Iran,

although Britain and Russia agreed in 1907.

While these relations were at the state level, different states acted according

to ethnic and religious differences at the local level. The states used these differences

as an excuse to have a say in the affairs of the groups they backed in the region. In

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this period, the different ethnic and religious identities defined the identity of a

territory or a district on the border front. These two terms were intermixed.

Nestorians and Armenians cultivated close relationships with Russia. Britain was

interested in cultivating close relationships with these two Christian groups, as well.

Iran was interestingly in the same company. In this socio-political environment,

Abdulhamid arranged regional alliances by developing close relationships with the

region’s tribes in order to safeguard Ottoman interests against possible threats.

I have also discussed that the pleas of the local people for inclusion (dehalet)

Ottoman Empire gave legitimacy to the frontier actors’ policy to aid (muavenet)

these people in the disputed lands as an effective way to promote the prestige of the

sultan in the eyes of his Muslim subjects, particularly the Kurds.

I have additionally discussed two political riots that occurred in Bitlis and

Van. The reports indicate that these riots aimed at driving away the governors, who

had different mentalities (Ottomanism?) than that of Abdulhamid and Tahir Pasha

(Islamist Ottomanism?). I also explained how widespread scarcity of grains in 1907

due to inadequate rainfalls played a role in the escalation of public discontent. The

general characteristics of the riots, in other words, certain actions of the protestors

such as the occupation of telegraph houses by the sheikhs in the provinces showed

that the climatic conditions do not suffice to explain the reasons behind the protest.

Other factors such as customary, traditional, and religious ones played crucial roles

as well. I would argue that they simply did not want any governor, because they

thought these governors disapproved the continuity of the sheikhs’ local supremacy.

In Chapter 4, I explained the actions of the boundary commission. The

chapter aimed to inquire how effective the Ottoman governance in the periphery was,

and how the Ottomans co-opted the local people and elites while the government

faced certain grave problems. A. C. Peacock raises these questions in order to

understand the inner dynamics of the Ottoman frontiers. I sought answers to similar

questions in my effort to understand the situation in the eastern peripheries of the

empire. Thus, this thesis sheds some light on the interactions of the Ottomans in the

late period with their neighbor Iran, and what motives they had and which methods

they used to pursue their goals. The chapter also presented examples from the region

that showed the relations of the people of the frontier (tribes) with the Ottoman

garrisons and administration. I argued that pro-Ottoman Kurds saw the Ottoman

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garrison as safe places and asked for military support against Iran, and that religious

and political distinctions influenced neighborly relationships in the periphery.

The taxation systems of these two neighboring states need to be further

studied in order to illustrate the economic activities and concerns of the people at the

frontier, as well as their interactions with one another, because economic motives as

well caused conflicts in the region. Evidence shows that the Kurds who constituted a

great part of the population on the Ottoman side of the frontier were not against the

rule of the sultan. They had a strong sense of ‘belonging’ so long as the

government’s approach to local issues remained flexible. As British reports show,

most of the tribes identified themselves as Sunni and Kurdish. They were engaged in

pastoral activities primarily. This thesis has shown that the Palace was capable of

exerting influence on these people, who in general considered the authority of the

Sublime Porte legitimate.

I have examined how Tahir Pasha prepared to provide a background for the

to his arguments in the boundary negotiations. He examined the imperial edicts, the

Porte’s reports, ancient treaties, Dervish Pasha’s explanatory documents, and maps.

This examination proved fertile in consolidating the Ottoman arguments during the

negotiations. However, the British envoys viewed these evaluated Ottoman

arguments as futile as the earlier arguments put forward in the past.

I discussed how the boundary negotiations progressed, and what kind of

methods the Ottomans followed before and during the negotiations. One can argue

that Tahir Pasha’s approach was civilizational, in that historical phenomena were

compatible with all treaties. He widely used the argument that religious and national

distinctions should be taken into consideration in designating the frontier during the

boundary negotiations. Thus, he asserted that all the Kurds were subjects of the

empire. According to him, they would not desire to stay under Iranian rule, when

Iran relieved them of the force it used against the tribes. As Iranians knew this, they

insisted on the precondition of the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the

disputed lands to resume the boundary negotiations. Towards the end of the

negotiations, the Porte advocated similar views subtly. The debates that dominated

the negotiations indicated that the legitimacy of the Ottoman rule and claims in the

region theoretically relied on “ancient” or old treaties. The practical manifestation of

his position was the aggressive policies that the Palace pursued. However, as I

mentioned above, the Porte did not develop a practical policy (apart from accepting

110

Iran’s arguments) though the Porte shared the theoretical vision that informed the

Palace. They did not know how they would achieve their goals if they withdraw the

Ottoman military force from the disputed lands, a space where the interests of the

Great Powers converged and competed.

111

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113

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120

APPENDICES

A. TAHIR PASHA’S CAREER LINE

The first phase of Tahir Pasha’s bureaucratic career comprises of twelve

years until he was discharged from the chief secretaryship of Salonika. The second

phase of his career embraced a longer period, more than two-thirds of his career,

which started with his tenure as a chief secretary in Bitlis, on January 15, 1880. This

appointment became a turning point in his life and bureaucratic career. He carved out

a mediating role for himself in the eastern provinces at the margins of the empire.

Despite his disadvantages for being ignorant the regional dynamics at first, the time

he spent in the eastern provinces made Tahir Pasha an expert of the region, as based

on the sources. His biographic records did not give much detail that would shed light

on the reasons behind his appointment from Salonika to Bitlis, which on the surface

looks as though he was exiled. At this point, it is important to ask why he was

suitable for a position in Bitlis, while he was not for a similar administrative position

in Salonika. His biographical record indicates two reasons for his dismissal from

Salonika. His status did not match to his ability to govern (hâl ü iktidâr) although his

handling of records and correspondence (mu'âmelât-ı tahrîriyyesi) was good.297

There must have emerged a controversy between him and other officials in Salonika.

Living in Bitlis for a person who did not have any connection in the area was

a big challenge, so he needed an adaptation process in a different social milieu that

was very different than those he experienced in the western parts of the Ottoman

Empire. He knew the local language of his own community in the west, apart from

Iranian and Arabic; he did not know the local languages of the eastern peripheries

such as Armenian and Kurdish. In such an alien community at first, most probably,

his life was affected by a series of special differences stemming from divergent

socio-economic, communal and environmental factors, but it can be said that his

Islamic identity eased the adaptation process. He established good networks with

sheiks and prominent figures of the region that enable him to communicate easily

with the local people, who were very religious. The best example of this can be

observed in his good relations with a Modernist-Kurdish religious figure,

Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursî298, during his governorship of Van. Thus, Tahir Pasha’s

influence in the eastern parts of the empire can be understood through the scope of

his social contacts.299

The First Phase: (1868-1880)

Tahir Pasha was born in Shkodra, one of the oldest towns in northwestern

Albania, in 1849. He was born into a world where the majority of the population

consisted of Albanian-Muslims. There were also people whose ethnic and religious

backgrounds differed. This cosmopolitan nature of Albania shaped young Tahir in

the same way. He learnt several local languages. In 1880, Izzet Pasha, Governor of

297BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

298 Mehmed Paksu, ed., Son Şahitler Bediüzzaman Said Nursi’yi Anlatıyor: Necmeddin Şahiner, vol. 1

(İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1993), 41–42.

299 BOA, DH. SYS. 43/3, 1330 R 08, 19. 03. 1912. “Nevahi-i cedide işlerinde iyi hizmetlerinden

dolayı Tahir Paşa komisyonu vasıtasıyla maaş ve rütbe ile taltif edilen Mamiş aşireti Reisi Hamza,

Zerzava Aşireti Reisi Şinolu Rıza Han, Zikvar Nahiyesi Kurt ve Zerza rüesası Mustafa Han, Harput ve

Yarattı nahiyesi müdürü Kerim bin Aziz ve saire.”

121

Shkodra, remarked that Tahir had both reading and writing ability of Serbo-Croatian

in addition to Turkish. He indicated that Tahir could fluently speak Turkish, Bosnian,

and Albanian.300

Relating to years when Albanian nationalism accelerated, Tahir Pasha’s

political position is unknown, but his silence in the sources and lack of evidence

regarding his political stance indicates he advocated remaining under Ottoman rule.

He preferred identifying himself as an Ottoman-Muslim bureaucrat. Not only

Ottoman bureaucrats but also foreign officials and their press specifically knew him

as the governor of Van and Bitlis, although he served in many different provinces as

a governor.

Table 3: This table shows tenures of Tahir Pasha’s governerships in various

provinces.

Dates From To

Places Hicri/Rumi Miladi Hicri/Rumi Miladi

Musul 15 Za.1306 13 July 1889 8 Za. 1308 15 June 1891

Van 9 L. 1315 3 March 1898 2 Za. 1324 18 Dec. 1906

Trabzon 28 R. 1325 10 June 1907 19 C. 1325 30 July 1907

Bitlis 19 C. 1325 30 July 1907 30 B. 1326 28 August 1908

Erzurum 30 B. 1326 28 August 1908 1 Ca. 1327 21 May 1909

Bitlis 18 M. 1328 30 January 1910 9 Za. 1330 11 October 1912

Musul 19 B. 1328 27 July 1910 9 Za. 1330 20 October 1912

Tahir Pasha was one of six sons of Haji Ali Bey Efendi, a local ruler in

Podgarica, a district of Montenegro. Tahir married twice. From his first wife, he had

a boy, Cevdet, and two girls, Fikriye and Naima. Cevdet spent all his professional

life as a provincial administrator around Van until he became the governor of Van at

the end. He was imprisoned on the island of Malta during the First World War, but

he escaped later.301 From his second wife, he had Mün’ime, Münibe, Mükrime,

Necdet, Fikret, Hikmet, Fahrünnisa and Mihrinnisa. One of his daughters, Mün’ime

married to Fahreddin Altay Pasha, a commander in the war of independence.302

His primary school education was a religious one. In the Ottoman education

system, the students used to start their primary school at the age of five or six in

order to learn introductory religious subjects and other basic knowledge. In these

schools, students used to learn the Holy Quran, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, grammar

and syntax, writing/calligraphy, Islamic behavior (ilm-i hal), history of religions,

ethics, and arithmetic.303 After he completed all these courses, he continued his

education in a madrasa. This was an educational institution where relatively

advanced religious sciences (tafsir, hadith, kelam, fiqh, and aqaid), were taught in

addition to introduction to medicine and engineering.304 Young Tahir learnt Arabic

very well, and reached on advanced level in Persian. However, his educational

lineage was not indicating he would be a person who would deal with governance

300 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

301 Paksu, Son Şahitler Bediüzzaman Said Nursi’yi Anlatıyor: Necmeddin Şahiner, 1:44.

302 Ibid., 1:40.

303 Mefail Hızlı, "Osmanlılarda İlköğretimin Tarihi," Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 6, no. 12

(2008). pp. 85-138.

304 Interview (Mehmet İpşirli), "Mehmet İpşirli Ile Medreseler Ve Ulema Üzerine," ibid. p. 457.

122

and administration because he followed on educational trajectory that normally

produced ulema (religious scholars and functionaries).

This educational background shaped Tahir Pasha and his achievements

through his bureaucratic carrier always indicated his background. It can be seen that

he attained positions in various secretariats of different provinces during his earlier

career. In detail, at the beginning of his career, on April 24, 1868, Tahir entered the

secretarial office of Podgorica (Podgoriçe Kazası Tahrirat Odası) for an on-the-job

training into civil service (mülazemet) when he was twenty years old. Five months

later, he was appointed as the secretary of the Koç Sub-district (Koç Nahiyesi Katibi)

with a wage of two hundred and fifty qurushes. In 1872, he was appointed as the

secretary of the Podgorica Land Registry (Podgoriçe Tapu Kitabeti) with an

additional income of twenty to forty qurushes. On March 1, 1873, his mission in the

office changed, and he was appointed as the Second Counterpart of Secretariat

(Tahrirat Kalemi Suver-i Sanisi) with a salary of three hundred and fifty qurushes.

During the time when Tahir Pasha acquired experience in the affairs of the

state, the state itself was also changing. By the dethronement of Sultan Murad V in

August of 1876, Abdulhamid became the thirty-fourth sultan of the empire. The

declaration of the first constitution in 1876 started a new era in the history of the

Ottoman Empire until the outbreak of the Ottoman Russian War in 1877, when the

constitution was suspended Abdulhamid established an authoritarian regime. Tahir

lived the most successful years of his career during the reign of Abdulhamid until the

Young Turk movement dethroned Abdulhamid in April of 1909. Afterward, his

loyalty was frequently questioned. The CUP suspected him as a potential threat to

their regime. The CUP-dominated cabinets changed his place of duty often. They had

to keep him within the bureaucracy because Young Turks had a few well-trained and

experienced bureaucrats in their ranks in the first years of their government. In 1912,

he was retired due to his age, and went to Istanbul to seek treatment for his chronic

thyroid disease, but he died in November 1913.305

The documents of hand indicate that Tahir Pasha was seen as an assiduous

bureaucrat throughout his career in the bureaucracy. He began to work as the chief

secretary of the Shkodra Province (Mektubi Odası) in 1877. The declaration of the

Ottoman constitution called for the formation of a nominated senate (Heyet-i Ayan),

and the organization of an elected chamber of deputies (Heyet-i Mebusan).306 Tahir

was temporarily appointed to the Senate as a clerk with a monthly salary of five

hundred qurushes.307

Following his temporary service, Tahir was transferred back to Shkodra

Province as chief secretary (İşkodra Vilayeti Mektupçuluğu) with a salary of three

thousand qurushes, on October 27, 1878. Thus, he became one of the leading

officials of the province, because the chief secretary of a province undertook

significant tasks as a member of the governor’s main staff and carried out the

province’s correspondence, filing, and the publication of a yearbook (Salname).308

Two years later, Tahir was promoted to the rank of third degree (rütbe-i sâlise) on

March 13, 1880, due to his seniority and good services in the civil service.

305 Paksu, Son Şahitler Bediüzzaman Said Nursi’yi Anlatıyor: Necmeddin Şahiner, 1:40.

306 Hasan Kayali, "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919,"

International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (1995). p. 266.

307 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

308 Abdulhamit Kırmızı, Abdulhamid’in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi 1895-1908 (İstanbul:

Klasik, 2008), 127.

123

The Ottoman bureaucracy tended to be quite volatile; officials moved from

one post to another within a few years. It was possible to see sharp breaks or

fluctuations within one’s career. Tahir Pasha was one of those who had a fluctuating

career path. He had to leave his official post while being transferred and appointed to

another post. In one instance, he was not assigned to a post related to his career and

commensurate with his seniority, so he resigned. At this time, Izzet Pasha was the

governor of Shkodra. He filed a report referring to the general qualities of Tahir as a

chief secretary, on November 11, 1880:

Aforementioned (Tahir) is capable of fulfilling his civil service duties

promptly and competently and capable of settling even arduous disputes

between litigious parties thanks to his intuitive understanding of the

time and the necessities of the state and the place. He is a punctual

young bureaucrat who goes to his job regularly. He has the capacity to

fulfill the requirements of his praised title. He has a praiseworthy

personality, which deserves great respect.309

New financial difficulties emerged following the Ottoman-Russian War of

1877-1878. The Ottoman government was struggling to balance its budget, and

trying to reduce or cut the expenses that were not vital. One outcome of this policy

became the promulgation of the Regulation for Salary Adjustment (Tensîk-i Ma’âşât

Karârnâmesi). According to this Regulation, the salaries of many officials were

reduced. By this act, which went into force on March 14, 1880, Tahir Pasha’s salary

was also reduced to two thousand and five hundred qurushes.310 On August 4, 1880,

the Ministry of War stated that Tahir Pasha could not continue in the same post

because the post was not compatible with his qualifications even though he had been

in a similar position before. Thereupon, Tahir Pasha was transferred to the position

of chief secretary in Salonika (Selânîk Mektûbçuluğu) with a raise of five hundred

qurushes, which increased his salary to three thousand qurushes.311 This increase of

his salaries represented that he was gradually promoted due to his growing

knowledge of and experience in state affairs. Eventually, he moved from Shkodra to

Salonika, where he served about four months, beginning on August 10, 1880.

However, when he was transferred to the chief secretaryship of the Bitlis Province

(Bitlis Vilâyeti Mektûbçuluğu) on April 15, 1880, his salary dramatically decreased

to two thousand and five hundred qurushes.

The Second Phase: (1880-1912)

His appointment to Bitlis marked the beginning of the thirty-three years of his

career that he spent in the eastern provinces. This appointment was clearly a turning

point in his life. Bitlis consisted of four sub-districts: Bitlis, Mush, Siird and Genç.

The weather conditions in the region were terrestrial in general. The winters were

very severe and extended to six months. These harsh climatic conditions led to the

closing of roads for a long time. Besides, the mountainous terrain negatively

restricted the transportation and shipping in the region. The province was surrounded

with highlands in the east and bordered on the lake Van, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, and

309 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

310 Ibid.

311 Ibid.

124

Musul in the west.312 Demographically, Bitlis maintained a significant number of

Muslim populations together with Armenians, Assyrians, and Yezidis in low number

in the twentieth century.313

After four years in Bitlis, Tahir was promoted to the Second Class (Sâniye

Sınıfı) of his third rank on January 15, 1884. 314 His rise within the state bureaucracy

fluctuated, but continued, and he was promoted to Sınıf-ı Mütemâyizîn, a civil rank

equivalent to army colonel, on January 17, 1885.

Within five years of his tenure in Bitlis, Tahir seems to have adapted to the

social milieu of Bitlis. He established a good network of neighborhood and

cultivated close relations with some of the notables and officials in the province.

However, cultivation of this type of relations by a high-ranking official could create

problems, and it was against Ottoman state traditions and rules. To establish this kind

of networks had been prohibited to prevent the emergence of oppositions and

criticisms by other prominent figures in the province. In this case, we have an

example that some prominent officials complained about Tahir Pasha and his

brother, the governor of the Mûş Sancak (Mûş Mutasarrıfı), because they were

establishing close relations with local people.

The governor of Bitlis decided to send Tahir to another post, which equaled

to his current post, on January 29, 1887. The sources say that the allegations were

proven at the end of an investigation, but they are silent about the kind of relations he

established with local notables. He was allowed to stay in Bitlis until December 4,

1887, when he was appointed as the governor of Suleymaniye (Suleymaniye

Mustasarrıfı) with a salary of seven thousand and five hundred qurushes.315 During

his tenure in Suleymaniye, Tahir Pasha sent a telegraph to Istanbul, to report one of

his good deeds that helped maintain public security. He reported that a bandit of

Hemvend, Ahmed Turşi, was finally killed on March 24, 1889.316 Within a short

time, he was appointed to the deputy governorship of Musul (Musul Vilayeti Vali

Vekaleti) on May 28, 1888 with a salary of fifteen thousand qurushes. Evidently, he

was appointed as the governor of Musul on July 13, 1889.317 He was climbing up to

high ranks and began to take medals for different reasons from not only his own state

but also from France and Iran. However, he became involved in rivalries among

local notables, therefore, attracted complaints frequently.

Several people accused Tahir Pasha during his governorship of Musul. An

investigation was ordered to clarify these allegations. The most significant figure

who complained about him within the bureaucratic structure was Abdülkâdir Pasha,

the governor of Mamurat ül-‘Aziz. The investigator first looked into the reliability of

his reports about Tahir Pasha as Abdülkâdir Pasha severely criticized him on few

points and saw him as a corrupt person participating in corruptive activities. One of

the assertions was more striking than the others. Abdülkâdir asserted that Tahir had

taken money from the fund allocated for orphans and widows, and had depleted it.

Another accusation was that Tahir Pasha released the chiefs of Shimr (Şümür), who

had been arrested during the time of the late-former governor Rashid Pasha, in return

for fourteen Arabian horses. The third accusation was based on that he decreased the

salaries of officers for a few years because the Finance Office (Mâl Sandığı) was

312 Necdet Sakaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı Coğrafyası (İstanbul: Deniz Bank, 2007), 229.

313Ibid., 230.

314 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

315 Ibid.

316 BOA, Y. MTV. 38 / 21, 1306 B 22, 24. 03.1889.

317 BOA, İ. DH. 1143 / 89184, 1306 ZA 15, 13. 07. 1889.

125

short of funds. A personal voucher for five hundred-odd thousand qurushes was

entered in the journal for income and expenditures during the time of Tahir Pasha. At

the end of investigation, he was acquitted of all charges. However, accusations

suggest that Tahir Pasha used available resources to manage local conflicts and

politics in the border provinces, where he served. The case of Arabian horses

illustrates this point.

By basing their arguments on the records of finance office, the investigators

reported that there was not any evidence that indicated that Tahir Pasha was actually

guilty of embezzlement of money from the revenue of province. According to

investigators, these claims were dubious and unfair because Tahir had actually

borrowed the sum in question. As for the charges related to the freeing of the Shimr

(Şümür) chiefs, the inspectors decided that the chiefs had been released due to the

fact that the reason for the arresting was unclear. Besides, they found out that the

chiefs had assisted the Ottoman troops who tried to eliminate the looting activities on

the border, and that the officials took this service into account. When the army

confirmed all these good services of the Shimr chiefs, Tahir was acquitted of these

allegations as well. Indeed, Tahir restored the image of the sultan in the eyes of the

chiefs. Receiving gifts like Arabian horses from the Shimr chiefs, who were in

government service, was the order of the Sublime Porte (Bâb-ı Âlî) and sending

valuable gifts in return was necessary to honor the prevailing custom gift exchange

between the state and the chiefs.

The late Abdulkadir Pasha had reported from Musul that the salaries of the

regular and reserve army officers and of widows and orphans were paid against a

loan. The financial distress of recent years [and the consequent delay of the payment

of salaries] obliged the local officials to borrow [at a discount] against their salaries

[in arrears]. Thus, under Tahir Pasha’s administration, promissory notes worth 500,

000 qurushes were entered into the general daybook [yevmiyye defteri], although no

entry was made in the local Treasury [accounts] for the corresponding years. It

would be unfair to leave Tahir Pasha under suspicion for this reason, even if we

assume these promissory notes represented discounted salaries. When Tahir Pasha

was asked to provide his view on this charge, he reminded his telegram to the Grand

Vizierate on 5 April 1306, where he had explained how the contractors [who offered

cash at a discount against salaries in arrears] would accept only the promissory notes

made to their names and refuses others. Consequently, he had made other

arrangements, vouching for the payment of the salaries of officials and pensioners. In

fact if he had any illicit intentions, he would not have accepted to buy back at a fifty

percent discount the promissory notes in the hands of contractors and then devoted

the revenue of about 3, 000 gold liras that eventually accrued to the local Treasury

due to this transaction to good deeds [in the province].318

On September 25, 1892, the inspectors reported that the accusations were

insubstantial, and Tahir was innocent. The Porte decided that there was no need for a

new investigation because it made no sense to pursue the accusations whether related

to fraud or the matter of Arabian horses.319

Tahir was appointed the deputy governor of Genç, a sub township of Bitlis

(Genc Sancağı Mutasarraflığı Vekaleti). Tahir occupied this position twice. First, he

served there from October 26, 1881, to June 10, 1883, and second, from August 18,

1885, to November 12, 1885, with a salary of 1, 175 qurushes. Bitlis provincial

government ratified the investigation results by noting that Tahir Pasha touched

318 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138.

319 BOA, DH. SAİD. 138 / 139.

126

neither the state’s property nor the people’s money. Similarly, the Local Council of

Administration of Bitlis reported that Tahir Pasha improved public order in Bitlis and

managed very well the auctioning of the tithe (a tax on crops).320

On February 22, 1898, he was appointed as the governor of Van. This

governorship continued until 1906. 321 A week after he became the governor of Van,

he was granted a Mecidi badge of the first order (Birinci rütbe’den Mecîdî nişân-ı zîşânı).

322 However, his medical problems such as thyroid disease began to relapse

quite often towards the end of 1906. Accordingly, the cabinet (Meclis-i Mahsûs-i

Vükelâ) decided that the governmental gaps that occurred in the absence of Tahir

Pasha could not be tolerated any longer because the provincial government of Van

was very significant. Thus, they decided to appoint another person as a governor

instead of Tahir Pasha and to appoint him to another governorship, suitable to his

title after he recovered. Abdulhamid (İrâde-i Seniyye-i Hazret-i Hilâfet-penâhî)

unwillingly approved this decision because Tahir Pasha remained completely loyal to

him, and appointed another official instead on December 18, 1906.

After recovering from illness, he was transferred to the governorship of

Trabzon for a short time from June 10, 1907,323 to July 30, 1907.324 Before long, he

was re-called to Bitlis in order to investigate a local conflict. Then, he was

additionally appointed as the Head of the Investigation Committee for the Iran

Border (Îran Hudûdu Hey’et-i Tahkîkıyyesi Riyâseti) by the approval of both

Abdulhamid and the Grand Vizier on September 2, 1907.325 This appointment

initiated a new era that changed his life significantly while affecting as well the lives

of people who lived on the borderlands between the Ottoman and Qajar empires.

There was a perception among the people who lived in the eastern provinces that all

the officials of the empire represented the Sultan, so the officials had to behave

according to the necessities of this link between the sultan and his subjects.

Abdulhamid chose Tahir for the position indicated deliberately not randomly. This is

evident from the marginal note the sultan added to Tahir’s appointment sheet.326 One

can argue that Tahir’s local knowledge, ability and contributions to settle local

disputes and mose between the rulers and the ruled, as demonstrated by his earlier

performance in Bitlis and Van made him a prominent figure. His background

endeared him to the majority of the population in the eastern provinces.

His service during the border defining process, which was highly appreciated

not only by Abdulhamid but also many Ottoman officials, raised him to the rank of

vizier (Rütbe-i Sâmiyye-i Vezâret) on February 13, 1908, although there were some

participants of the negotiations who frequently criticized him for his expansionist

tendencies. Tahir Pasha continued to enjoy the central government’s confidence so

long as Abdulhamid stayed on the throne. He became the sultan’s eye at the eastern

margins of the empire in a critical time of period. Some other officials and

commissioners anticipated this relationship between Abdulhamid and Tahir Pasha.

For instance, Danyal Pasha implied to Wratislaw that Tahir Pasha pursued a secret

agenda that was instructed directly from the Palace, and about which he did not talk

320 BOA, DH. SAİD. 139.

321 BOA. BEO. 1085 / 81329, 1315 L 09, 22. 02. 1889.

322 BOA, DH. SAİD. 139.

323 BOA, İ. DH. 1455 / 41, 1325 R 28, 10. 06. 1907.

324 BOA, İ. DH. 1457 / 22, 1325 C 19, 30. 07. 1907.

325 BOA, DH. SAİD. 139.

326 Ibid.

127

even to other commissioners.327 For that reason, he was one of the people who were

highly affected by the dethronement of Abdulhamid, because CUP saw him as one of

the loyal servants of the sultan. Actually, this perception of CUP initiated a new era

for all officials who advocated the policies of Abdulhamid. Many of them were sent

to exile and suppressed. For similar reasons, Tahir Pasha was frequently removed

from his post, but the main reason was the skepticism of the CUP leadership about

the employees of the old regime whom they thought were favoring the reign of

Abdulhamid.

Nevertheless, Tahir was recalled to duty several times, as the CUP did not

have very many qualified and experienced administrators until they retired him due

to his age and illnesses. Thus, we can see the 1908 movement as another turning

point in his life, for reasons indicated above and because all the bureaucrats’ life

underwent to experience fundamental changes and transformations after 1908. The

border commission that he led did not continue long after 1908. After the

commission was dissolved, Tahir Pasha was transferred to the governorship of

Erzurum with a salary of twenty one thousand and five hundred qurushes on August

27, 1908. However, he was paid a salary of twenty thousand qurushes plus a sum of

two thousand qurushes earmarked for special expenses. They continued decreasing

his salary until it became seventeen thousand qurushes without additional funds in

1909. These constant salary decreases show that CUP was willing to discard such an

experienced bureaucrat.

He had to leave the governorship of Erzurum due to the decision of the

Commission of Ordinances and Regulation under Domestic Affairs (Dâhiliyye

Tensîk Komisyonu). It declared he did not have the capacity and stamina to

administer the province. Finally, he was asked to retire on September 2, 1909 based

on the eleventh article of the commission.328 There were also some other reasons

why Tahir Pasha was removed from his post, including his reputation for having

sympathies towards the reign of Abdulhamid II.

CUP announced an Imperial rescript that linked Tahir Pasha with reactionary

groups and dismissed him accordingly as they thought Tahir Pasha maintained

contact with the counteractions against CUP in Erzurum. They blamed him for

supporting and provoking those people in Erzurum who wanted to revive the reign of

Abdulhamid. When CUP noticed this side of Tahir Pasha, they immediately

discharged him, and appointed another official in his place, on May 30, 1910.329 As

Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador in Istanbul, expressed in his annual report

about Turkey in 1908, “the news of the Constitution was generally received in the

Asiatic provinces with rejoicing, although in some cases employees of the old regime

were roughly handled.”330 His analysis regarding how the people in the eastern

provinces perceived the constitution is particularly striking. For instance, “[In] Van,

Diyarbakir, and Musul, there was inability on the part of the population to

accommodate themselves to the new idea of a common country, based on the

principles of justice, fraternity, and equality.”331 The Kurds, who had more than

those principles under the reign of Abdulhamid II, did not have a positive look on the

proclamations of CUP. Under these circumstances, CUP reappointed Tahir Pasha to

327 Lowther, General Report on Turkey for the Year 1908, 15.

328 BOA, DH. SAİD. 139.

329 Ibid.

330 Lowther, General Report on Turkey for the Year 1908, 5.

331 Ibid.

128

Bitlis with a salary of twelve thousand and five hundred qurushes, on February 28,

1910332.

CUP’s act was compatible with the statements of the Ottoman officers who

paid attention to the need to entrust Bitlis to a person who had the capacity to govern

a province where fragile interrelations existed. Actually, the fragility came from the

failure of the new governors to appreciate the conservative nature of Bitlis. For that

reason, the bureaucracy needed an officer who had deep knowledge of the local

people as well as experience about handling the fragility of the region.333

In general, the salaries of the Ottoman officials corresponded to the

qualifications and seniority of the official for the post to which he was appointed.

The salaries could roughly change according to these parameters or, perhaps, salary

changes occurred according to the hierarchy of the provincial administration system

in general. The decrease in salaries generally indicated that an official, whether high

ranking or not, had constantly lost his importance for the bureaucracy. This pattern

became more apparent when an official was denied additional duties that would

bring extra income. In this case, Tahir Pasha was appointed to Musul as a governor

from Bitlis with the same salary on July 14, 1910. The comparison of his salaries

with the previous years indicates that there was a dramatic decrease in his payment

as his salary decreased from twenty thousand to ten thousand qurushes.

The fluctuations in Tahir Pasha’s career continued in these years. CUP’s

intervention in politics was quite normative. They expected to create a rapid change

in order to break away from practices of the reign of Abdulhamid, but they had to

lean on the legacy of the old regime. Tahir Pasha was victim of this transition period

because CUP treated him unjustly. Neither his personality nor the environment in

which he worked appears to have been well prepared for such a grand change in

state-society relations. They suspected him again, of establishing close relations with

those groups who were trying to revive the reign of Abdulhamid, and considered this

link as a significant weakness for his governmental capacity.334 However, it was

impossible, for a senior bureaucrat, who was aged and spent his entire career in the

eastern provinces under Abdulhamid, simply to forget the influences of his reign and

to adapt to a new civil officialdom, which CUP had just begun to shape. The salary

cuts became prevalent throughout the empire for the sake of balancing the budget. In

fact, they did not pay Tahir Pasha’s pension. For this reason, he wrote a petition

demanding his pension, as he did not have any other source of income. Instead of

allowing Tahir Pasha a pension, the Ministry of Internal Affairs asked whether Tahir

Pasha could work for a ministry or not. In a note dating December 1, 1912, they

simply decided that Tahir Pasha could actually work, when he was sixty-three years

old and suffered from thyroid disease in 1912.335

332 BOA, DH. SAİD. 139. “…mahalliyyeye vâkıf ve tecrübe-kâr bir zâta tevdî’i hâlen ve maslahaten

muktezâ bulunduğuna ve müşârun ileyh evvelce orada ve vilâyet-i mütecâvirede müddet-i medîde

valilikle bulunarak ahvâl ü ihtiyâcât-ı mahalliye hakkında vukuf-ı ma’lûmât-ı tâmmeyi hâ’iz olduğuna

binâ’en…”

333 Ibid.

334 Ibid.

335 Ibid.

129

B. BIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER OF TAHIR PASHA

BOA, DH. SAİD. 138-139.

130

131

C. SOME EXAMPLES FROM TAHIR PASHA’S REPORTS

BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK, 78/27, 10 M 1326.

132

BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK, 78/27, 10 M 1326.

133

BOA, Y. A. HUS, 518/27, 9 M 1326.

134

BOA, Y. A. HUS, 518/27, 9 M 1326.

135

BOA, Y. A. HUS, 518/59, 17 M 1326.

136

D. MEMORANDUMS EXCHAGED BETWEEN THE COMMISSION OF

TAHIR PASHA AND THE DELEGATES OF OTHER STATES

D/1: Schofield IV, pp. 245-246.

137

138

D/2: Schofield IV, pp. 289-290.

139

140

D/3: Schofield IV, pp. 293-295.

141

142

D/4: Schofield IV, pp. 299-300.

143

D/5: Schofield IV, pp. 307-308.

144

145

D/6: Schofield IV, pp. 317-318.

146

D/7: Schofield IV, pp. 328-330.

147

148

149

E. BRITISH TRANLSATION OF SECOND TREATY OF ERZURUM

150

151

152

F. THE JOINT MAP OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN

Reduced from the Anglo-Russian “Identic Map” completed in 1869 (communicated to the

Ottoman Government in 1869, and to the Iranian Government in 1870).

G. THE MAP OF OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER IN 1910

153

154

H. REPRODUCTION OF THE MAP OF OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER IN 1910

Sarıkçıoğlu, Melike, Osmanlı İran Hudud Sorunları (1847-1913), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,

2013, p. 233.

155

I. THE PICTURES OF TAHIR PASHA AND WRATISLAW

Tahir Pasha

156

Mr A. C. Wratislaw336

A Consul-General in the Levant Consular Service.

He served at Basra as Consul and later at Tabriz as Consul-General.

He was observer of the British interests during the Boundary Negotiations

336 G. E. Hubbard, From the Gulf to Ararat: An Expedition through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, New York: E. P.

Dulton & Company, 1917. (The picture of Mr A. C. Wratislaw), pp. 16-17.