47

 THE CRESCENT, THE LION AND THE EAGLE: RE-ANALYZING

THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON

CORFU (1537) IN THE CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RIVALRY

iii

ABSTRACT

THE CRESCENT, THE LION AND THE EAGLE: RE-ANALYZING THE

OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU (1537) IN THE

CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY

This dissertation produces a detailed historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537. Although the Apulian Campaign, a

natural consequence of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, which characterized the

sixteenth-century Ottoman policies and discourse of universal sovereignty, was

originally planned as an Ottoman-French joint military operation, it remained as an

individual Ottoman attack on the south eastern Italy since the French King did not

offer his already promised military support during the campaign. The attacks of

Andrea Doria and the Venetian captains on the Ottoman ships during the campaign

changed the course of the initiative and Sultan Süleyman I ordered the attack on the

island of Corfu, under Venetian control. The Ottoman attack were ended since the

iv

season of war ended and the Ottoman army returned to Constantinople without

having completed the conquest of Corfu.

This dissertation mainly argues that one could not understand why the Ottomans

engaged in such a venture without analyzing the nature of the rivalry between the

Ottoman and Habsburg dynasties in the sixteenth-century. The study defines the

campaign as the Apulian Campaign and defends the argument that the Ottoman

sought to establish some sort of suzerainty in south eastern Italy, bound to the

Habsburg realm. Moreover, it asserted that the campaign should not be evaluated as

the “Expedition of Corfu” by stating that Corfu was not the principal target of the

Ottomans in 1537. The impact of the 1537 Campaign on the Ottoman-Venetian

relations is also discussed in this study.

Keywords: Charles V, Diplomacy, Ottoman-Venetian Relations, Süleyman I,

Universal Sovereignty

v

ÖZET

HĠLÂL, ASLAN VE KARTAL: OSMANLI-HABSBURG REKABETĠ

BAĞLAMINDA OSMANLI’NIN APULYA SEFERĠ VE KORFU SALDIRISINI

(1537) YENĠDEN ĠNCELEMEK

Otman, Elvin

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez DanıĢmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Paul Latimer

Bu tez Osmanlı’nın 1537’deki Apulya Seferi ve Korfu Saldırısı’nın tafsilatlı bir

tarihsel anlatısını ortaya koymaktadır. On altıncı yüzyıl Osmanlı siyasetini ve

evrensel hâkimiyet söylemini karakterize eden Osmanlı-Habsburg rekabetinin doğal

bir sonucu olan Apulya Seferi temel olarak Ġtalya üzerine yapılacak bir Osmanlı-

Fransız ortak askerî harekâtı olarak planlanmıĢ olsa da Fransa Kralı’nın sefere

vadettiği askerî desteği vermemesi sebebiyle güneydoğu Ġtalya’ya yapılan münferit

bir Osmanlı saldırısı olarak kalmıĢtır. Sefer sırasında Andrea Doria ve Venedik

kaptanları tarafından Osmanlı donanmasına yapılan saldırılar harekâtın seyrini

değiĢtirmiĢ, Sultan I. Süleyman Venedik kontrolündeki Korfu Adası’na saldırı emri

vermiĢtir. Osmanlı saldırısı savaĢ mevsiminin sonuna gelindiği gerekçesi ile Eylül

ayında sonlandırılmıĢtır, Osmanlı ordusu Korfu fethini tamamlayamadan Ġstanbul’a

dönmüĢtür.

vi

Bu tez, temel olarak, on altıncı yüzyılda Osmanlı ve Habsburg hanedanları arasında

süregelen rekabetin doğası tetkik edilmeden Osmanlı’nın neden böylesi bir sefere

kalkıĢtığının anlaĢılamayacağını ortaya koymaktadır. ÇalıĢma harekâtı Apulya Seferi

olarak tanımlamakta ve Osmanlıların 1537’de Habsburg idaresindeki güney doğu

Ġtalya’da bir nevi metbuiyet arayĢında olduğunu savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, seferin

“Korfu Seferi” olarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiği de değerlendirilmesinin doğru

olmadığı savı Korfu’nun Osmanlı’nın 1537’deki ana hedefi olmadığı tespitiyle

desteklenmektedir. ÇalıĢmada 1537 Seferi’nin Osmanlı-Venedik iliĢkilerine etkisi de

tartıĢılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: V. Charles, I. Süleyman, Diplomasi, Evrensel Hâkimiyet,

Osmanlı-Venedik ĠliĢkileri

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation, while an individual work, has come into existence with the support

and sincere contributions of numerous people. First of all, I would like to express my

deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Paul Latimer. Few graduate students have a

supervisor who prioritizes his/her student’s desires, comfort and happiness and

always encourages him/her. I am one of that few. I am honored and lucky to feel that

he was present whenever I needed him. He was always ready to chat, to read, to edit

my long sentences, to work on “fancy” headings that I liked to use, to advise, to face

my anxiety attacks and to motivate me even when I gave up on myself. Without his

support, this work could never have come into existence. I would also like to thank

with my whole heart to Dr. Oktay Özel, who worked as much as I did to make this

dissertation better. He provided me with his guidance during my entire graduate

study by means of his unforgettable classes that I always enjoyed and by his valuable

suggestions and insightful opinions. He unconditionally encouraged and taught me

that there was no great victory than exceeding my own limits. I owe my acquaintance

with the Ottoman primary sources to his constant support. His advices and criticisms

motivated me to read and study more. He always supported my academic and nonacademic

projects and was always present at my joys and sorrows not only as a

mentor, but as a friend and as a father. I would also express my gratitude to Prof.

Nevin Özkan Spellman, who was present from the first steps of this process. I closely

felt her support during my entire graduate study. I was truly honored to have Prof.

viii

Özkan in my dissertation supervision committee. Her comments and criticisms led

me improve not only my dissertation, but also my article. She was ready to help, to

read the text and to share her opinions whenever I needed her. I would like to thank

Prof. Evgeni Radushev, who always supported my studies and honored me by

accepting to be in my dissertation defense jury. His comments and suggestions

improved my dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Emrah Safa Gürkan for his

valuable suggestions upon the context, method and edition of the text and for sharing

his immense knowledge in sixteenth-century sources with me. His encouragement

and attentive warnings enabled me to improve my research. I am honored to have Dr.

Gürkan in my dissertation defense jury and to discuss my study with him.

I owe too much to Prof. Halil Ġnalcık, the professors’ professor and the pole star of

the historians, who passed away in 2016. He was the one who recommended to me to

study on this subject. He shared his immense knowledge in Ottoman history with me,

taught me how to formulate my research and encouraged me to improve my

hypothesis. I am so honored to discuss my studies with him, to listen to his

invaluable comments and suggestions and to have inspirational conversations on

various subjects with him. May he rest in peace.

I would like to thank my professors, who contributed to my formation as historian

during my entire graduate study at Ġ.D. Bilkent University. I am especially indebted

to our chair, Mehmet Kalpaklı, for his support throughout my studies in the History

Department. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Özer Ergenç, from

whom I learnt the Ottoman history and paleography. I am very fortunate to have

benefited from his immense knowledge in the Ottoman socio-economic history and

Ottoman diplomatics. I owe a lot to Dr. M. Akif Kireççi. Without his constant

ix

support, I could never conclude this project. He offered his help whenever I needed.

He generously spent his time in editing and shaping my article; he shared his

teaching experiences with me and improved my studies with his insightful

comments. I am so honored to be his teaching assistant between the years of 2009

and 2012. I also thank to Dr. David Thornton, Dr. Kenneth Weisbrode, Dr. Edward

Kohn, Dr. Luca Zavagno and Dr. Berrak Burçak for their support.

I have also received a great deal of help and support from some other institutions and

individuals I thank Ġ.D. Bilkent University for providing me various facilities since

2006. This study was the product of the four years of scholarship granted to me in

2013 by the Turkish Historical Society (TTK) for my doctoral research. I would like

to express my deepest gratitude to the Turkish Historical Society for financing my

research. Moreover, I thank the staff of the TTK Library for helping me cordially. I

specially thank to Eser Berkel Sunar and Ece Türk for their sincere help as

administrative assistants and to the staff of Bilkent Library.

I would like to thank my other professors playing influential roles in my academic

life. I owe special thanks to Prof. Maria Pia Pedani from Ca’ Foscari University, who

accepted to be my supervisor during my research in Venice. She kindly shared his

vast knowledge in the Venetian sources and historiography with me and was always

ready to help me when I was confused. I benefitted a good deal from Prof. Mustafa

Soykut’s interesting courses when I studied at METU. Without his support I would

hardly have decided to pursue an academic career. I also thank Prof. Hülya TaĢ from

Ankara University for helping me in reading Ottoman documents. I am also grateful

to Prof. Gül Ġrepoğlu who always inspires me.

x

My thanks are also due to a number of friends. First of all, I would like to thank my

Bilkent family. I owe a lot to my dearest friend AyĢegül Avcı. It was her enthusiasm

which encouraged me to complete this dissertation. I always felt her support, even

when she severely criticized me. I am so happy to have her company, since 2006.

Polat Safi has always been a real brother with his constant support. He was always

eager to help and to encourage me and made me smile whenever I felt depressed, or

exhausted. Sena Dinçyürek is a very precious friend whose company enriched my

life. I will never forget her support. I owe special thanks to Seda Erkoç and Harun

Yeni for always being ready for help and encouraging me. Melike Tokay Ünal offers

her help and positive energy at any case. I always enjoyed chatting with Fatma Gül

Karagöz about everything. I am so grateful to Abdürrahim Özer, IĢık Demirakın,

Nergiz Nazlar, Neslihan Demirkol, Selim Tezcan, Hasan Çolak, Fahri Dikkaya,

Merve Biçer, Burcu Feyzullahoğlu, Can Eyüp Çekiç, Aslıhan and Michael D.

Sheridan for their valuable friendship. They all made my Bilkent days more

enjoyable.

I owe special thanks my chosen brother M. Ġhsan Aybakar for his invaluable

friendship of almost twenty-five years. Whenever I need him, he is always at a

distance of call, offers help for anything that I ask, makes me smile and shares my

joys and sorrows. His support encouraged me to complete this study. It is not

actually possible to utter my chosen sister Mine Osan’s share adequately. She was

always present whenever I needed her with her lovely smile. She witnessed all ups

and downs of this study and willingly rushed to help me without a second thought. I

am so grateful to Hümay Akın Ġleri, who brought her sparkle in my life. She

undertook the tiring task of editing the text, sacrifices her time for helping me, faced

my anxiety attacks. I am also indebted to BaĢak Öncel witnessing my academic

xi

venture since 2006 when we met in Florence. She was the one who made me believe

that I could do this research. Her effective planning strategies helped me to complete

the writing process of this dissertation. I owe a lot to my precious Pınar Özbek who

was always a keen supporter of my projects. I am grateful to Murat BaĢalp, who

helped me in the map-drawing. Special thanks go to Neslihan Arslan, Nihan

Aydemir and Didem Ayberkin with whom I have always shared all I experienced. I

also thank to Gökçe Selen Serçen, Ġlke Elibol, Yasemin Abayhan, Ece Erbuğ, Begüm

Kolaylı, Tuğba Hascan, Sevi Tabuman, Bilgen Topgül, Aslı and Burcu Kolçak, Uğur

Yolak, Ebru Aker, Ekin Kayıran, Begüm KitiĢ, Reyhan Çamlıca Kaya, Burçin

Yonar, Özlem Kesiciler Kudun, Zeynep Günal, Ebru Ergun Toros, Irmak Ünal,

Evren Ġleri, Fuat and Nesrin Arslan, Erçağ Pinçe Gökhan Ġnan, Melek Temel and

Mehtap Arslan for their sincere supports throughout my studies. Special thanks go to

my students Nurten Çevik, S. Melike Koç, AyĢegül Uncuoğlu, Ali Can Onat, Kübra

ġahin, Öncü GüneĢ, Ertuğrul Polat, Simge Güzelel, Ömer Alkaçar and Zeynep

Kılıçoğlu and to my friends in Büyükharf Yayıncılık, in particular to Eren Safi who

offered me the chance of improving my writing skills.

I also thank my all equestrian friends for supporting me in this stressful process. I

owe special thanks to my friend and trainer Aydın “Reis” (Erkmen), the

Cacciadiavolo of the 21st century, who taught me how to ride, made my dreams my

goals, guided me to overcome my fears and doubts and always motivated me to ride

and to write. I also thank my dearest horse-friend Mighty who made me convinced

that impossible was possible. I should also mention my other trainers Gergena

Mileva, Fuat Songu, Özgen Ersoy, Sercan Yılmaz and my dearet younger friends

Talya ĠbriĢim, Mina Rençber and Tuğkan Gök, Meriç Çağlar, who reduced the stress

of the process with their companies.

xii

I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to my Italian family. I am indebted

to Concetta Ianuzelli who has always seen me her daughter. I cordially thank

Saverio, Manlio and Gianluca Caiazza making my days in Venice more enjoyable. I

am grateful to Michela Dal Borgo who helped me in my research in the Archive of

Venice.

Needless to say, I owe the most to my family always encouraging me and teaching

me to follow my beliefs and dreams. Without my parents’ guidance and support, I

would hardly have completed this study. I cordially thank my mother Ferhan and my

father Harun for boring the burden of this study upon their shoulders together with

me. My sister, my second half, Selin deserves a particular appreciation. I am so

grateful to her for her unconditional love and constant support. She witnessed every

stage of this process and never gave up motivating me. She was present on the day of

defense at Bilkent with me, as she has always been in all my all unforgettable

memories. Last but not least, I also thank my dearest aunt ġeyda Müzezzinoğlu, who

passed away in 2016. This dissertation is dedicated to her unforgettable memory.

xiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iii

ÖZET............................................................................................................................ v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................... vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... xvi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1

1.1. Historiography and Sources .............................................................................. 9

1.2. A Chapter-by-Chapter Outline ........................................................................ 22

1.3. Notes on the Languages Used for Names and Terms and on the Translations 24

CHAPTER II: CONTEXTUALIZING 1537: OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY

IN THE EARLY SIXTEENTH-CENTURY AND SURROUNDING STATES ...... 26

2.1. One World, Two Emperors: A Brief Analysis of the Ottoman-Habsburg

Rivalry in the Early Sixteenth-Century .................................................................. 27

2.1.1. The New Caesar versus the Second Charlemagne: Rival Grand Strategies

and the Discourses on Italy ................................................................................. 34

2.1.2. Süleyman’s Responses to Charles V: Ottoman-Habsburg Military Rivalry

in Hungary. ......................................................................................................... 47

2.1.3. A New Theatre in the Western Mediterranean: The Ottoman-Habsburg

Struggle over Tunis (1534-1535) ........................................................................ 55

2.2. Footsteps towards 1537: Ottoman-French Convergence in the Early Sixteenth

Century, Directed against Charles V ...................................................................... 65

2.2.1. Habsburg-Valois Rivalry in Italy .............................................................. 66

xiv

2.2.2. The Fleur-de-Lys at the Porte: The Ottoman-French Relations (1525-

1534) ................................................................................................................... 67

2.2.3. The French Invite the Sultan into Italy ..................................................... 70

2.3. Walking on a Tightrope: The Serenissima and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry

................................................................................................................................ 72

2.3.1 Defending the Serenissima: Venetian Policy in the Early Sixteenth Century

............................................................................................................................ 75

2.3.2. Suspicious Neutrality ................................................................................ 78

2.4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 81

CHAPTER III: THE CRESCENT AGAINST THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE

OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU (1537) ........... 84

3.1. Moving towards 1537: The Ottoman-French Alliance and Tension between

the Porte and the Serenissima ................................................................................. 86

3.1.1. My Enemy’s Enemy is My Friend: The Ottoman-French Alliance for a

Joint Operation in Italy (1533-1536) .................................................................. 86

3.1.2. The Lion between Two Fires: (1534-1536) .............................................. 94

3.2. The Crescent against the Eagle and the Lion: The Ottoman Campaign of 1537

.............................................................................................................................. 101

3.2.1. Initiating the Campaign: The Ottoman Move on Valona ....................... 103

3.2.2. “The Turk” in Italy: Reactions to the Ottoman Campaign and the Military

Maneuvers in Apulia ......................................................................................... 105

3.2.3. All ll Roads Lead to Corfu?: Encounters at Sea and the Ottoman Siege of

Corfu ................................................................................................................. 110

3.3. Re-Analyzing the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 ............................................. 121

3.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 132

CHAPTER IV: THE OTTOMAN VIEW: THE APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND

ATTACK ON CORFU ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN CHRONICLES ..... 135

4.1. Voices from the Front: The Actors in the Theatre of War ............................ 136

4.2. From the Campaign to the Future: Süleymânnâme of Matrakçı Nasûh and

Tabakâtü‟l-Memâlik fi Derecâtü‟l-Mesâlik of Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi ........... 148

4.3. The Reverberations of the Campaign: 1537 in the Books on Ottoman History

.............................................................................................................................. 164

4.4. A History of the Maritime Subjects for the Great Ones: Katip Çelebi Narrating

1537 ...................................................................................................................... 175

xv

4.5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 180

CHAPTER V: ECHOES IN THE SERENISSIMA: THE OTTOMAN APULIAN

CAMPAIGN OF 1537 AND THE ATTACK ON CORFU ACCORDING TO THE

VENETIAN CHRONICLES ................................................................................... 186

5.1. Witnessing the War: The Ottoman Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in the

Eyes of Contemporaries ....................................................................................... 188

5.2. Historians at Work: 1537 in Venetian Historiography .................................. 209

5.3. Studying the Ottomans: Discussions of 1537 in Venetian Books on Ottoman

History .................................................................................................................. 224

5.4. The Voice of a Seventeenth-Century Corfiot: Andrea Marmora and Della

Historia di Corfu .................................................................................................. 237

5.5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 248

CHAPTER VI .......................................................................................................... 253

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 253

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 264

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 284

A. Glossary ........................................................................................................... 284

B. Map 1 ............................................................................................................... 286

C. Map 2 ............................................................................................................... 287

xvi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASV Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice

b. busta (box/volume)

BNM Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice

col. column

DĠA Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi

EI2 Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition

EITHREE Encyclopedia of Islam, Third Edition

fil. filza (folder)

ĠA İslâm Ansiklopedisi

l. libro (book)

no number

p. parte (part)

reg. registro (register)

s. serie (series)

TSMA Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ArĢivi, Ġstanbul

TTK Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara

v. volume

(eng.) English

(it.) Italian

(o.) office

xvii

(ott.) Ottoman

(r.) reign

(sp.) Spanish

(ve.) Venetian

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1520, when Süleyman I of House of Osman succeeded to the Ottoman throne as

the tenth sultan, he inherited almost a world empire, controlling a large amount of

territory in three continents. His reign coincided the rise of another political figure in

the west, Charles V of Habsburg, who had been elected as the Holy Roman Emperor

in 1519. Thanks to his dynastical inheritance, formed mainly by cleverly arranged

marriages of his ancestors, Charles V was able to take a large realm under his control

as Süleyman. These two super-powers of the early sixteenth-century formed the

Ottoman and Habsburg grand strategies of the time by which, they figured the

politics of the European and Mediterranean world with their policies, military

initiatives, and ideological discourses. Their almost life-long challenging with each

other also led the crowned-heads and the states of the time to adjust their policies,

according to their own political, military and financial interests and to position

themselves in face to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the early sixteenth-century.

Süleyman challenged Charles V through various military operations in Central

Europe and in the Western Mediterranean from 1526 to 1535. Charles V’s conquest

2

of Tunis in 1535 opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In 1537,

Süleyman initiated a new military campaign; this time the war theatre for the

Ottomans was the Italian peninsula. Since it had been the center of the Roman

Empire and Christendom, possessing Italy was an important matter of Ottoman

politics, especially by the reign of Mehmed II. Following the conquest of

Constantinople, the Ottoman sultans had been claiming the inheritance both in the

east and west. Conquering Italy, in particular the city of Rome, identified as the

legendary Red Apple, was perceived by the Ottomans as the sign of the universal

supremacy ordained to the Ottoman Sultan by God that would revive the Roman

Empire under one rule and one faith.

On the other hand, the lack of political unity in Italy had already made the peninsula

a war theatre of the Christian monarchs in the early sixteenth-century. Charles V and

the French King, Francis I, had been struggling for inherence of the Duchy of Milan

and the Kingdom of Naples by 1520s. Although, Charles V was crowned as the Holy

Roman Emperor in Bologna in 1530 and was able to declare his authority over Italy,

Francis I was not willing to give up his claims on possessing Milan and Naples. Thus

the Italian peninsula remained as the main stage of war between these two Christian

monarchs. Moreover, possessing Italy was perceived by both Charles V and Francis I

as the stepping stone for political supremacy over the entire Christian world and for

Charles V, dedicating himself to unite Christendom under his political rule was the

most important goal of his imperial strategy.

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign of 1537, the direct outcome of Ottoman-Habsburg

imperial rivalry, was planned between the years of 1535 and 1536, during the

negotiations between Ġbrahim Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Süleyman and Jean de la

Forest, the French ambassador to Constantinople. The French ambassador had

3

convinced the Pasha for an Ottoman-French joint attack on Italy by which, the

French armies would penetrate into Lombardy and seize Milan, while the Ottoman

forces would be invading the south eastern Italian region of Apulia, possessed by the

Kingdom of Naples, bound to the Habsburg Emperor. The plan was set on a strategy

of orienting the Habsburg forces into two different fronts in order to weaken their

control in Italy. The French proposal gave the Ottomans an upper-hand for

attempting a decisive intervention in Italy, which would also manifest Süleyman’s

being the sole decisive power in the politics of the time.

Ottoman invasion of Apulia in 1537 was initiated by mid-July, but the French did not

show up in Italy while the Ottoman forces were penetrating into the region.

Therefore, the campaign remained limited to be an only Ottoman attack, rather than

being a joint Ottoman-French invasion as it had already been agreed on by both

parties. Moreover, by mid-August, the course of the campaign unexpectedly

changed: Corfu, a key Venetian dominion that controlled the entrance of Adriatic,

was attacked by the Ottoman forces. Despite the political tension between the Porte

and the Serenissima by 1532 and the existence of the frontal and maritime conflicts,

the Ottomans and Venetians had not encountered in a war theater since 1503.

Therefore, besides being a decisive Ottoman attack on a key Venetian dominion

controlling the entrance of the Adriatic, the Attack on Corfu also meant the

disruption of 34 years’ Ottoman-Venetian peace. The Island was about to surrender,

but in early September, Süleyman withdrew his forces.

Although the Ottoman maneuvers in 1537 have a multidimensional character,

embracing almost all main themes of academic discussions of the sixteenth-century

political history, such as the discourses of establishing the universal sovereignty and

of the invasion of Italy, rivaling grand-strategies of the two leading dynasties, the

4

Ottomans and the Habsburgs and pragmatic political alliances between the crownedheads

of time, as well as the Ottoman-Venetian relations, the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and Attack on Corfu have not been comprehensively discussed in an

individual study yet. Most of the studies on political, military and the diplomatic

history on the age of Süleyman I, settle for briefly noting the events of 1537 and tend

to evaluate the campaign as the “Corfu Expedition”. This approach mirrors Corfu as

the principal military target for the Ottomans and fails to evaluate the campaign in a

broader perspective and to decipher what the Ottomans really intended to achieve in

1537.

On the other hand, there are few scholars, opening new discussions on 1537: John

Francis Guilmartin Jr.1, Halil Ġnalcık2 and Feridun M. Emecen3 evaluate the

campaign as the Ottoman preparative for the invasion of Italy and explain that Corfu

was intended to be conquered in order to facilitate the Ottoman penetration into the

Italian peninsula. By using such a strategic island as a military base, the Ottomans

also would have secured their future presence in Italy. In reference to the Ottoman

claims to the inheritance of the Roman Empire and to the establishment of the world

empire under the rule of Süleyman, Ġnalcık argues that the campaign was realized by

Süleyman on the ground of dominating Italy and of capturing Rome. Although

Guilmartin Jr. does not discuss the campaign within the framework of Ottoman-

1 John Francis Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean

Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth-Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 264.

2 Halil Ġnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân”, Süleymân the Second and

His Time, ed. by, Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar, (Ġstanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), 59-92, 67-68;

idem, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi, Fransa ve Osmanlı: Avrupa’da “Geleneksel Dostumuz Fransa

Tarihine Ait Bir Olay”, Doğu –Batı (Avrupa), no: 14, (February-March-April, 2001), 122-142, 123,

129-130; idem, “Akdeniz ve Türkler”, Doğu-Batı (Akdeniz), no: 34, (November-December-January,

2005-2006), 133-169, 157, 160; idem; Devlet-i ʿAliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine

Araştırmalar-I: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606): Siyasal, Kurumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişim, (Ġstanbul:

Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 157.

3 Feridun M. Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset, (Ġstanbul: TimaĢ Yayınları, 2009), 159-160.

5

French alliance, Ġnalcık and Emecen show the Ottoman-French agreement for a joint

campaign in Italy as the main source of motivation for the Ottoman maneuvers in

1537 and note the French military support during the attack on Corfu.

Emrah Safa Gürkan, elaborates these analysis by emphasizing the strategic

importance of Corfu for the Ottomans. Gürkan points out that by 1532, the Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry shifted to the western Mediterranean and dominating and

controlling the Mediterranean and pushing the Habsburgs back to defense of their

zones of influence became an important concern in the Ottoman grand strategy.

According to Gürkan, to realize it, Ottomans needed to acquire a secure and fortified

naval base for the imperial fleet, which would facilitate further maneuvers, especially

against Sicily, Naples and the Iberian Peninsula. He evaluates the Ottoman Attack on

Corfu within this perspective and argues that in 1537 Ottomans might have intended

to conquer the island both to protect the shores of Adriatic and to prevent a possible

counter attack that could arise when the imperial fleet was sent away, since the Island

was so close to the coasts of Albania, being the stage of chronic insurrections against

the Ottoman rule.4 By underlining that the imperial navy hosted a good number of

Neapolitan fuoriusciti, Gürkan also argues that Ottomans might have also aimed to

realize a subsequent attack on the Kingdom of Naples, after the conquest of Corfu.5

The aforementioned studies offer historians significant hints that would be helpful in

deciphering the Ottoman plans in 1537 and in analyzing why Corfu might have been

put in the Ottoman agenda of conquest. Indeed, Corfu might have facilitated

4 Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar’ın XVI. Yüzyıl’daki

Akdeniz Siyaseti”, Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası, ed. by Haydar Çoruh, M. YaĢar ErtaĢ and M.

Ziya Köse, (Ġstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 11-50, 26-27.

5 Ibid, 27. Also see: Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy,

Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, Georgetown University, 2012,

(unpublished Ph.D dissertation), 393.

6

subsequent operations towards Italy and been an important naval base for the

Ottomans, considering the fact that Tunis had already been seized by Charles V in

1535. However, one should note that the Ottomans landed in Apulia in mid-July and

Corfu was attacked by late-August. If the principal target was Corfu, to be used as a

stepping stone for the invasion of Italy, why did the Ottomans attack Apulia first?

The historical narrative of the 1537 Campaign clearly demonstrates that the invasion

of Apulia and the Attack on Corfu were not initiated simultaneously. Moreover, the

Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, and the massive land army led by him encamped in

Valona, which was the closest Ottoman dominion to Apulia. Furthermore, a good

number of infantry and cavalry landed at the region in mid-July, under the command

of the Third Vizier of Süleyman and the company of the Neapolitan nobles support

that the Ottomans might have intended to achieve more than spoiling the region by

swift attacks. These lead the historian to think that the Ottomans prioritized the

invasion of Apulia, not Corfu and the campaign was beyond to be a preparative.

In accordance with the aforementioned assumptions, Svatopluk Soucek states that the

immediate target of the Ottomans in 1537 was Apulia and Rome was a possible

ultimate goal; they did not intended to attack Corfu at first. Soucek describes the

Ottoman Attack on Corfu as a “fantastic project” that the Ottomans had initiated after

attacking Apulia for a month and explains that Süleyman scuttled the victory by

ordering the withdrawal. Soucek evaluates this decision, taken despite the

oppositions of Barbarossa, as a significant moment for the future of Ottoman naval

strategy. According to him, since Corfu might have been an efficient naval base for

the Ottomans, it could have facilitated the conquests of Cypus and Crete, which

would be subsequently undertaken by the Ottomans in the following years, even

without a shot fire. Soucek argues that this move of the Ottomans reveals the

7

inefficiency of the Ottoman decision making mechanisms to turn the Empire into a

prominent sea power and of the ghazi-corsairs in convincing the sultans and the

ruling elite for overseas expansions and in adjusting the imperial naval strategy

accordingly in face of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.6

Attacking Corfu meant a clear Ottoman declaration of war against the Republic of

Venice, with whom Süleyman used to have amicable relations since his succession to

the throne. Thus, the Ottoman decision to engage in such a “fantastic project” in

1537 needs to be discussed. Why did the Ottomans turn the fire against a Venetian

territory after a month of attacking Habsburg dominated Apulia? What was the

Ottoman justification for this venture? Without speculating on these questions, it is

not possible to understand the Ottoman campaign of 1537 and to provide a

comprehensive historical analysis of the events.

This dissertation presents a detailed historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and the Attack on Corfu, in the light of new sources and evidences. It

suggests that the Ottoman campaign of 1537 should not be evaluated as an isolated

Ottoman military initiative, on the contrary, the campaign should be discussed within

the framework of Ottoman grand strategy of the early sixteenth-century, grounded by

the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry for universal sovereignty. Therefore, I intend to

evaluate this military initiative in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, through a

comprehensive discussion of the political dynamics of the time. . I argue that an

analysis focusing on the attack on Corfu, instead of evaluating the Campaign of 1537

as the Apulian Campaign misleads the historian in deciphering the actual strategy of

6 Svatopluk Soucek, “Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete”, Studia

Islamica, v. 98-99, (2004), 219-261, 229-233.

8

the Ottomans in 1537 and in determining its importance for the Ottoman political and

military history at the time.

This dissertation mainly aims to interpret what the Ottomans intended to achieve in

1537. By reconstructing a narrative of the events that led to the attack and the

campaign itself, through an examination of relevant sources and with the help of

discussions provided by earlier studies, I will try to associate the Apulian Campaign

to former Ottoman enterprises in Hungary and I will point out a possible fresh

academic discussion by arguing that in 1537, the main motivation of the Ottomans

was to establish some sort of suzerainty in Apulia, which would give an upper hand

to Süleyman in his claims being the “sole inheritor of the Roman Emperors” and the

“Distributer of crowns to the Monarchs of the World.”

Furthermore, the dissertation is specially focused on the Ottoman-Venetian political

relations, in the early sixteenth century. It is intended to discuss how the political

strategies of these two states, elaborated according to their interests and expectations

from each other in face to the actual political conjuncture of the time, resulted in an

Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537. I underline that, the evasion of Venice of

assisting the Ottoman attempts in the Mediterranean, its inability to control Andrea

Doria’s maneuvers and its insistence to be out of the French-Ottoman alliance

convinced the Ottomans for the existence of a secret Venetian-Habsburg cooperation.

Although the Ottomans put the Republic under diplomatic pressure to act according

to the terms of existing ahidnâme several times before the campaign, the Doria’s and

Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships in 1537 led an Ottoman-Venetian war after 34

years’ of peace. In that context, I argue that the attack on Corfu should be evaluated

as an outcome of the 1537 campaign, an argument that challenges the earlier studies,

pointing Corfu as one of the principal target of the Ottoman campaign in 1537.

9

Accordingly, this dissertation also focuses on the question of whether the Ottomans

intended to conquer Corfu or not and the reasons behind Süleyman’s decision of

withdrawal, as well as stating how the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537 influenced

the Ottoman-Venetian relations.

Finally, the dissertation employs the Ottoman and Venetian chronicles, produced in

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the accounts of the eye-witnesses

of the campaign, to complete the historical narrative and to support the main

arguments. By a close reading of the Ottoman and Venetian narratives that discuss

the campaign, I will also delineate both the Ottoman and the Venetian perceptions

about the political developments of the time and introduce new sources to be used for

further academic studies.

1.1. Historiography and Sources

This dissertation aims to reconstruct the information about the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the

early sixteenth century, in the light of the earlier academic studies and new

evidences. Along with the classical studies on the reign of Süleyman and on the

sixteenth-century Ottoman history, recent scholarly publications covering various

aspects of the Ottoman history and of the reign of Süleyman which are cited in the

narrative are consulted extensively.

Numerous recent studies contributed significantly to the academic literature of the

field by offering new interpretations on the reign of Süleyman I and the formulation

of the Ottoman discourse of universal sovereignty. Among these, the works of Ebru

10

Turan7 and Kaya ġahin8 are important monographs that analyze how in the sixteenthcentury,

the Ottoman political discourse was formulated and reflected by the

Ottoman bureaucrats, in face of new challenges forcing the Ottomans to re-position

themselves in the political arena. Ebru Turan, in her work, discusses the role and

influence of Ġbrahim Pasha in the formulation of the Ottoman imperial strategy. By

focusing on the political developments up to 1526, Turan explains how the Ottomans

created the discourse of universal sovereignty in reference to the sixteenth century

expectations of a God-ordained monarch who would establish the world empire

before the End Time. This present work also intends to contribute to Turan’s analysis

by underlining the role and the influence of Ġbrahim Pasha in the Ottoman military

enterprises after 1526 and his policies towards the Republic of Venice and the French

Kingdom. In this context, this dissertation evaluates the Apulian Campaign as a

project of the Magnificent Grand Vizier of Süleyman I, which was realized following

his execution.

For the use of historical and ideological motives for the image building for Süleyman

I, the classical studies of Cornell H. Fleisher9 and Gülrû Necipoğlu10 are consulted.

The latter’s analysis on the representation of power during the German Expedition11

of Süleyman in 1532 shows the historian how the Ottoman policy-makers were

7 Ebru Turan, The Sultan‟s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Sovereignty in

the Reign of Sultan Süleyman (1516-1526), University of Chicago, (March 2016), (unpublished Ph.D

Dissertation).

8 Kaya ġahin, Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar: Celalzade Mustafa ve 16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı

Dünyası, (Ġstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014).

9 Cornell Fleisher, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of

Süleymân”, Soliman le Magnifique et Son Temps, ed. by. Gilles Veinstein, (Paris: La Documentation

Française- Éditions du Louvre, 1992), 159-177.

10 Gülrû Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificient and the Representation of Power in the Context of

Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry”, The Art Bulletin, v. 71. no 3, 1989, 401-427.

11 Alaman Seferi.

11

familiar with the political and ideological discussions of the time and symbolisms of

the Christian world, as well as their efficiency in using them to formulate and mirror

the Ottoman political discourse.

As was mentioned above, the dissertation aims to correlate the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign with the Ottoman enterprises in Hungary by 1526. In order to evaluate the

imperial strategy towards Hungary, the studies of Pál Fodor12, M. Tayyib

Gökbilgin13, Rhodes Murphey14 and French Szakály15 that offer comprehensive

discussions on both the Ottoman initiatives and on how Hungary became a war

theatre of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry are consulted.

Although the emergence and the influence of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry have

been discussed in numerous studies dealing with the political, military and

diplomatic history Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth-century, only a few scholars

have produced analytical works on the rivalry, its formulation and immediate impact

on the political, diplomatic, military, socio-cultural mechanisms of Ottoman and

Habsburg Empires. Among those, the studies of Andrew C. Hess16, discussing the

12 Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum

Hungaricae, v. 45, no: 2/3, (1991), 271-345; idem, “The View of the Turk in Hungary: The

Apocalyptic Tradition and the Legend of the Red Apple in Ottoman-Hungarian Context”, In Quest of

the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire,

(Ġstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 71-104; idem, İmparatorluk Olmanın Dayanılmaz Ağırlığı, (Ġstanbul:

Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016). Fodor books also offers an interesting discussion for the historian on the

concept of “Early Modern” and on the studies, intending to mirror the Ottoman Empire as an Early

Modern state.

13 Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman’ın Macaristan ve Avrupa Siyaseti’nin Sebep ve Âmilleri,

Geçirdiği Safhalar”, Kanunî Armağanı, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2001), 5-40.

14 Rhodes Murphey, “Süleyman’s Eastern Policy”, Süleymân the Second and His Time, 229-248;

idem, “Suleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny of Delayed Reaction to

Charles V’s Universalist Vision”, Journal of Early Modern History, v. 5, no: 3 (2001), 197-221.

15 Ferenc Szakály, “Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács (1365-1526),

Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, no: 33 (1979), 67-85.

16 Hess focuses on the North Africa as the new stage of encounter between these two great powers of

the period and discusses how the Moriscos in Spain acted as the secret agents of the Ottomans,

challenging the Habsburg authority, by getting in alliance with North African corsairs. See: Andrew

12

role Ottoman-Habsburg relations in North Africa, the article of Paulino Toledo17 on

the Ottoman and Habsburg perceptions of universal sovereignty, the article of Robert

Finlay18 discussing how the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry was shaped by circling

prophecies and the role of intermediary agents and diplomats were consulted together

with the works of Özlem Kumrular19 that focus on the political history of the period

and the reciprocal perceptions, providing the historian with the portrait of the rivalry

between these two leading dynasties of the time and discuss how it was shaped by

the complex political structure of the sixteenth-century along with its transformative

effects on the socio-political and cultural history of the period.

The studies of the scholars mentioned above discuss the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry

within political, diplomatic and socio-cultural frameworks, however, they do not

discuss how the Ottomans formulated and applied an imperial strategy to face with

the Habsburgs, in detail. In this regard, the article of Gábor Ágoston entitled

“Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in

C. Hess, “The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain, The American

Historical Review, v. 74, no: 1 (1968), 1-25; idem, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth

Century Ibero-African Frontier, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

17 Paulino Toledo, “Osmanlı-Ġspanyol Ġmparatorluklarında Dünya Ġmparatorluğu Fikri”, İspanya-

Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Rekabet ve Dostluk, ed. by, Pablo Martìn Asuero, (Ġstanbul: Kitap

yayınevi, 2006); 15-30.

18 Robert Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman and the Habsburg

Embassy of 1533-1534”, Journal of Early Modern History, v.2, no: 1, (1998), 1-31.

19 Özlem Kumrular, Las Relaciónes Entre el Imperio Otomano y la Monarquía Católica entre los

Años 1520-1535 y el Papel de los Estados Satéllites, (Ġstanbul: Editorial Isis, 2003); eadem, El Duello

Entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnifíco (1520-1535), (Ġstanbul: Editorial Isis, 2005), eadem,

“Kanuni’nin Batı Siyaseti’nin Bir ĠzdüĢümü Olarak Türk Ġmajı, Dünyada Türk İmgesi, ed. by Özlem

Kumrular, (Ġstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), 100-128; eadem, eadem, V. Carlos’un Türkiye’deki

Ġstihbarat Kaynakları, İspanya-Türkiye, 31-42; eadem “Orta Avrupa’nın Kaderini DeğiĢtiren SavaĢ:

Mohaç, Öncesi Sonrası ve Kastilya’da Yankısı”, Belleten, v. 71, no: 261, (2007), 537-574; eadem,

Türk Korkusu: Avrupa‟da Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni, (Ġstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008); eadem, “XVI.

Yüzyılın Ġlk Yarısında Orta ve Batı Akdeniz’de Üstünlük Mücadeleleri”, Türk Denizcilik Tarihi, 155-

172. Kumrular also publised a book in Turkish in which she puts her articles focusing on the

Ottoman-Habsburg rivaly together. See: Kumrular, Yeni Belgeler Işığında Osmanlı-Habsburg

Düellosu, (Ġstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011).

13

the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry”20 deserves a special attention. Ágoston

evaluates the sixteenth-century Ottoman policies in the context of imperial “grand

strategies” that requires a global vision of geopolitics and military, economic, and

cultural capability. To Ágoston, the reign of Süleyman I witnessed the formulation of

an imperial ideology and universalist vision, fed by efficient information-gathering,

which helped the integration of the Ottomans into European politics and political

culture, by the elaboration of the foreign policy and imperial propaganda, for which

human and economic resources, as well as the imperial military power are mobilized.

Ágoston argues that this imperial policy, formed by the claims of universal

sovereignty could be evaluated as the grand strategy of the Ottoman Empire, which

was applied very pragmatically and flexibly.21 By discussing how the Ottomans

gathered information within and outside the imperial borders, the agents in the

information-gathering networks and the meaning, the scope of the universal

sovereignty in the reign of Süleyman and how the imperial strategy was dissolved in

Central Europe, in accordance with the political and economic developments

affecting these two great powers of the time, Ágoston presents a comprehensive

analysis of the sixteenth-century.22

Ágoston’s views on the formation of grand strategy mainly based on close

observation of the ongoing developments that were linked to the efficient

information-gathering mechanisms of the Ottomans have recently been elaborated by

20 Gábor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in

the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry”, The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, ed.

by, Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75-103.

21 The author also underlines that many elements of the Süleyman’s “grand strategy” were already

present under his predecessors, however the rise of the Habsburg and Safevid threats required the

required adjustments in imperial strategy. See: Ibid, 76-77.

22 See also: Ágoston, “The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality to Empire”, The Practice of Strategy:

From Alexander the Great to the Present, ed. by John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2011), 105-131.

14

Emrah Safa Gürkan, focusing on the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. In the light of

a wide range of Ottoman and European sources, Gürkan opens new discussions on

how and why the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry transferred to the western

Mediterranean by 1530s23, the roles of Levantine corsairs in North Africa in the

formulation of the sixteenth-century Ottoman naval strategy to face the rise of the

Habsburgs24 and displays a colorful portrait of the secret diplomacy held by spies,

between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that was one of the major components

of the formulation and implementation of the imperial strategies of the states.25 By

discussing the differences between the Habsburg and Ottoman secret services,

Gürkan argues that the Ottomans successfully developed a functional information

gathering mechanism, which enabled the state to formulate its policies in the

sixteenth-century. In the Ottoman mechanism, however, the responsibility of

gathering information was delegated to high-ranking state officers, pashas and court

favorites, who established their own intelligence networks that served to the masters’

interests rather than of the state. Ottoman system, therefore, was quite different from

the institutionalized and standardized secret services of the Habsburgs.26 Gürkan’s

23 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”.

24 Gürkan, Ottoman Corsairs in the Western Mediterranean and Their Place in The Ottoman-

Habsburg Rivalry (1505-1535), Bilkent University Department of History, 2006, (unpublished M.A.

Thesis); idem, “The Center and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in

the Sixteenth Century”, Turkish Historical Review, v.1, no:2, (2010), 125-163

25 Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean.

26 Apart for his Ph.D dissertation, Gürkan undersigned three articles and a book in Turkish on the

theme. See: Gürkan, “The Efficacy of the Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the 16th Century”, Acta

Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, v. 65, (2012), 1-38; idem, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı

Korsanlığı ve Gaza Meselesi”, Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi, no: 33,

(2012), 173-204; idem, “Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-betweens and Cross-Confessional

Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560-1600, Journal of Early Modern History, no: 19, (2015), 107-128;

idem, Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the Mediterranean Faction (1585-

1587)”, Journal of Ottoman Studies, no: 45, (2015), 57-96; idem, “L’Idra del Sultano: Lo Spionaggio

Ottomano Nel Cinquecento”, Mediterranea-Richerche Storiche, no: 38, (2016), 447-476; idem,

Sultanın Casusları: 16. Yüzyılda İstihbarat Sabotaj ve Rüşvet Ağları, (Ġstanbul: Kronik Yayıncıık,

2017).

15

works are important to be consulted not only to see how the Habsburgs and

Ottomans formulated their own imperial policies against each other by the flow of

information about the actual developments, state intentions and plans carried by

numerous agents including the agents of other European nations (i.e. Venetians) but

also to decipher how the other European states positioned themselves in face to

Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and to what extent the Ottoman strategies shaped the

European political, diplomatic and economic history.

The Ottoman-French political convergence in the early sixteenth-century needs to be

analyzed to contextualize the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in

1537, since the Apulian Campaign was formed according to the French proposals. In

this context, the work of Charrière27, in which a wide range of correspondences

between Francis I and his embassies in Rome, in Venice and in Constantinople, the

French ambassadorial letters and the accounts of the French travelers are compiled,

provides the researcher important evidences for both Ottoman-French relations in the

sixteenth-century and international politics of the time.

The first academic publications on the Ottoman-French relations in the sixteenthcentury

were produced in the first decade of the twentieth-century by V.-L.

Bourrilly28 and J. Ursu29, whose works have been accepted as the pioneering studies

27 Ernest Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, Mémoires et

Actes Diplomatiques des Ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et Des Ambassadeurs, Envoyés

ou Résidents à Divers Titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie,

Crimée, Syrie, Egypte, etc., et Dans Les États de Tunis, d'Alger et de Maroc, 4 vols. (Paris:

Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-60). The work offers a wide range of correspondences, travel accounts,

copies of official documents, composed between the years of 1515 and 1589 and conserved in the

French archives.

28 V.-L Bourrilly, “La Première Ambasade d’Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)”, Revue

d‟Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, (1900-1901), 23-44 ; idem,

“L’Ambassade De La Forest et De Marillac à Constantinople (1535-1538), Revue Historique, T. 76,

Fasc. 2, (1901), 297-328, ; idem, “Les Diplomats de François Ier : Antonio Rincon et la Politique

Orientale de François Ier (1522-1541), Revue Historique, tom. 113, (1913) 64-83, 268-308.

29 J. Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François Ier (1515-1547), (Paris : Honoré Champion, 1908).

16

of the field. These two scholars evaluated the agreement held between the French

Ambassador Jean de la Forest and Ġbrahim Pasha, on diplomatic and commercial

privileges granted to the French by Süleyman I in 1536, concluding the secret

negotiations between these two for the Ottoman military assistance, needed by the

French King to face Charles V. Their works were elaborated by D. L. Jensen30 in

1985, who asserts that the French King was the first European crowned-head,

abandoning the traditional idea of Christian alliance against the Ottomans by making

them an active partner in his foreign policy. Jensen also discusses how the

“scandalous alliance” of the French King with the Ottoman Sultan against their

common enemy Charles V, gradually granted the French a long term commercial

privileges, which would restore the economic order of the French Kingdom after the

civil wars of the early seventeenth-century.

The first phase of the Ottoman-French diplomatic relations and political alliance are

also discussed by Ġsmail Soysal31, Halil Ġnalcık32, Édith Garnier33, and recently by

Christine Isom-Verhaaren34 within the context of Ottoman-French joint military

30 De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy”, The Sixteenth

Century Journal, v. 16, no: 4,( Winter 1985), 451-470.

31 Ġsmail Soysal, “Türk Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetlerinin Ġlk Devresi”, İstanbul Üniversitesi

Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, v. 3, no: 5-6, (1953), 63-94.

32 Ġnalcık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi”; idem, “Avrupa Devletler Denge Sistemi ve Osmanlı-Fransız

Ġttifakı, 1524-44: Barbaros Hayreddin PaĢa Fransa’da”, Muhteşem Süleyman, ed. by Özlem Kumrular,

9-24. In his studies, Ġnalcık underlines that the Ottoman-French alliance, its formulation and

politically implementation shows how the Ottomans were active in the European politics in the 16th

century, they even dominate it. The interference of the Ottomans according to the author leaded to the

spring of European political concept of balance of power, in which the weak supported against the

powerful in order to secure the political pluralism in the continent.

33 Édith Garnier, L‟Alliance Impie: François Ier et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles V, (Paris:

Éditions du Félin, 2008).

34 Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Barbarossa and His Army Who Come to Succor All of Us”: Ottoman

and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543-44”, French Historical Studies, v. 30, no:3,

(2007), 395-425; eadem, Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth

Century, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

17

operations in the time of Süleyman against the Habsburg Emperor. Isom-Verhaaren

elaborated the subject by a special emphasis on how the Ottoman-French alliance

and joint operations was perceived in Europe, and how it was defined and

legitimized by the French.35

As stated above, this dissertation intends to decipher why and how an Ottoman-

Venetian war took place in 1537 after a long period of peace. This requires a close

consideration of the Venetian policies of the early sixteenth-century and of the

Ottoman-Venetian political diplomatic and commercial relations. These works on the

history of Venice are numerous.36 On the other hand, the modern scholarly

publications on Venice clearly demonstrate that the Republic was an important

political power of the sixteenth-century thanks to its stabilized bureaucratic system,

effective military apparatus, enriched by a good number of condottieri and its famous

arsenal, making the Serenissima an unrivaled sea-power and its extensive

commercial network in the Levant.37 Active participation of the Republic into the

35 About the perception of Ottoman-French alliance in Spain, Özlem Kumrular also penned an article

within the light of Spanish documents and chronicles. See: Kumrular, “Avrupa’nın ĠnĢasında Osmanlı

Ektisi: Habsburg Gücüne KarĢı Osmanlı-Fransız Ġttifakının Avrupa’daki Fransa Ġmajına Katkısı ve

Fransa’nın Majestik Orbis Christianus Ġdeasının ÇöküĢündeki Rolü”, Doğu-Batı. Osmanlılar II, no:

52, (February, March, April, 2010), 25-46.

36 For some examples see: Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, (Baltimore & London: The

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Roberto Cessi, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, (Florence:

Giunti Martello, 1981); John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice, (London: Penguin Books, 2003);

Alvise Zorzi, La Republica del Leone: Storia di Venezia, (Milano: Tascabili Bompiani, 2008).

37 There is a large literature on Venetian history. Following studies are useful to be consulted for

general information about the history, organization, state system, economic structure and bureaucracy

of the Republic of Venice, form its formation up to the eighteenth century. See: Eliyahu Ashtor, “The

Venetians Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-colonialism?”, Journal of European

Economic History, no: 3, (1974), 5-53; Edward Muir, Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice, (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1981); Dennis Romano, Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations

of the Venetian State, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Manfredo,

Tafuri, Venice and the Renaissance, (USA: MIT Press, 1989); Benjamin Arbel, Trading Nations:

Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Mediterranean, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); John Martin,

Dennis Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State,

1297-1797, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Ivone Cacciavillani,

La Serenissima: Una Republica Burocratica, (Venice: Corbo e Fiore Editori, 2003); Andrea Zannini,

Burocrazia e Burocrati a Venezia in Età Moderna: I Cittadini Orginari (Sec. XVI-XVIII), (Venice:

Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2003).

18

ongoing international politics, to secure its independence and economic prosperity

thanks to overseas trade, facilitated the establishment of the effective Venetian

diplomatic apparatus, fed by extensive networks of representation, communication

and spying.38

With the introductory article of Halil Ġnalcık39, the works of Paolo Preto40, Kenneth

M. Setton41, the books undersigned by Carla Coco and Flora Manzonetto42, by

Lucette Valensi43, by Marrie F. Viallon44, and by Eric R. Dursteler45 provide the

historian with comprehensive analysis on the Ottoman-Venetian political and

diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the articles of Robert Finlay46 help the researcher

to analyze the how the Venetian foreign policy evolved to a defensive strategy based

38 See: M. Armand. Baschet, La Diplomatie Venitienne, (Paris: Henri Plon, 1862) ; Garrett Mattingly,

Renaissance Diplomacy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955); Paolo Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia,

(Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1994); Peter Burke, “Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and

Communication” Venice Reconsidered, 389-419.

39 Ġnalcık, “An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations.”, Venezia, Centro di Mediazione tra Oriente e

Occidente (Secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e Problemi, ed. by, Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas,

and Agostino Pertusi, vol. 1, (Florence: Olschkieditore, 1977), 83-90.

40 Preto, Venezia e i Turchi, (Florence: G.C. Sansoni Editore, 1975).

41 Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571), vol. 3, (Philadelphia: American

Philosophical Society, 1984).

42 Carla Coco, Flora Manzonetto, Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche

dell‟Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli, (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1985).

43 Lucette Valensi, Venise et la Sublime Porte, (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1987).

44 Marie F. Viallon, Venise et la Porte Ottomane (1453-1566): Un Siècle de Relations Vénéto-

Ottomanes de la Prise de Constantinople à la Mort de Soliman, (Paris: Economica, 1995).

45 Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity and Coexistence in the Early

Modern Mediterranean, (Baltimore-Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). See also:

Idem, “The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps”,

Mediterranean Historical Review, v. 16, no:2, (2001), 1-30.

46 Finlay, “Politics and Family in Renaissance Venice: The Election of Doge Andrea Gritti”, Studi

Veneziani, no:2, (1978), 97-117; idem, “Al Servizio del Sultano: Venezia I Turchi e il Mondo

Cristiano, 1523-1538, Renovatio Urbis: Veneto nell‟Età di Andrea Gritti (1523-1538), ed.by,

Manfredo Tafuri, (Roma: Officina Edizioni, 1984, 78-118; idem, “Fabius Maximus in Venice: Doge

Andrea Gritti, the War of Cambrai and the Rise of Habsburg Hegemony 1509-1530, Renaissance

Quarterly, v. 53, no: 4, (Winter 2000), 988-1031.

19

on the Republic’s neutrality in the struggles between other states of the time in the

sixteenth-century and the impacts of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Venetian

politics.

In this dissertation, I used the studies of Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, who contributed to

earlier studies by providing rich archival evidences, extensively. Especially her book,

entitled In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di

Constantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia 47, discussing the Ottoman representation in

Venice from 1453 to 1645, delineates how the Ottomans pursued reciprocal

diplomatic relations with the Republic of Venice. In contrast to the common

perception that Ottomans did not send diplomatic representatives to Europe before

the 18th century, Pedani points out that even in the 15th century the Ottoman Empire

sent more than 175 delegates, ambassadors, envoys or messengers, to Venice.48

Pedani’s works on the Venetians in Constantinople and Ottoman merchants in

Venice clearly demonstrate the close cooperation, confrontations and reciprocal

relations between these two states during the sixteenth-century.49 Recently, E.

47 Maria Pia Pedani, In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di

Constantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia, (Venice: Deputazione Editrice, 1994). Pedani’s book recently

translated into Turkish by the edition of Nevin Özkan. See: Pedani, “Osmanlı Padişahının Adına”.

İstanbul‟un Fethinden Girit Savaşı‟na Venedik‟e Gönderilen Osmanlılar, ed. by Nevin Özkan,

(Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2011).

48 Pedani’s work is based on the Venetian documents and some Ottoman historical narratives.

Therefore it is criticized to talk about the Ottomans from Venice without hearing their own voices. For

a review of the study see: Eric Dursteler, “In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia

della Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia, Review”, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 26, no:

4, 1995, 975-976.

49 See: Pedani, “Veneziani a Costantinopoli alla Fine del XVI. Secolo”, Quaderni di Studi Arabi, v.15,

(1997), 67-84; eadem, Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy, Turcica, v. 32, (2000), 9-32;

eadem, “Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Age”, Mediterranean World, v. 18,

(2006), 7-21; eadem, “Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterranea in Età Moderna”, Mediterraneo

in Armi (Secc. XV-XVIII), ed.by, Rosella Concilla, (Palermo: Associazione Mediterranea, 2007), 175-

205; eadem,“Ottoman Merchants in Adriatic: Trade and Smuggling”, Acta Historiae, v.16, no:1-2,

(2008), 155-172, eadem, Pedani, Venezia Porta d‟Oriente, (Bologna: Societa Editrice il Mulino,

2010); eadem, “Ottoman Ships and Venetian Craftsmen in the 16th Century”, Seapower, Technology

and Trade: Studies in Turkish Maritime History, ed. by, Dejanirah Couto, Feza Gunergun and Maria

Pia Pedani, (Ġstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2014), 460-464.

20

Natalie Rothman50 also contributed to the field by her noteworthy studies on the

trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Constantinople such as commercial

brokers, religious converts and official interpreters (dragomans). Rothman discusses

the multiple connections, convergence, and how the Ottomans positioned themselves

in the European politics and culture of the sixteenth-century.

In addition to the secondary sources, I also employ both Ottoman and Italian sources

in this dissertation. The 58 volumes’ compilation of Marino Sanudo51, the documents

published by Ernest Charrière52, the relazioni53 of the Venetian baili, published by

Eugenio Albèri54, some early chronicles in Italian and several Ottoman documents,

pertinent to the main discussions, are cited in the text. The backbone of the

dissertation is formed by the Ottoman and Venetian chronicles, composed in the

sixteenth-century. To verify the gathered information and to exemplify how the

events of 1537 echoed a hundered years later two Ottoman and Venetian

seventeenth-century chronicles are also consulted. I will study these chronicles in

50 E Natalie Rothman, “Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern

Mediterranean”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, v. 51, no: 4, October 2009, 771-800;

eadem, Brokering the Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul, (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2011).

51 Marino Sanudo, I diarii di Marino Sanuto (MCCCCXCVI-MDXXXIII) dall' autografo Marciano

ital. cl. VII codd. CDXIX-CDLXXVII, 58 vols. (Venice: F. Visentini, 1879-1903).

52 Eugenio Albèri (ed.), Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante Il Secolo

Decimosesto, (Florence: Società Editrice Firoentina, 1840-1855), s. 3, v. 1-3. Albèri’s compilation

provides the historian the main texts of summaries of the relazioni of the Venetian ambassadors to

Constantinople in the sixteenth century. Pedani contributed his compilation by publishing inedited

relazioni on the Ottoman Empire, composed by the early sixteenth century up to 1789. See: Pedani

(ed.), Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato- Constantinopoli (1512-1789), v. 16, (Padua:

Bottega d’Erasmo-Aldo-Ausilio, 1996).

53 For relazioni, see: Donald E. Queller, “The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni”,

Renaissance Venice, ed. by, J. R. Hale (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 174-196.

54 Charrière, v.1.

21

two individual chapters. In Chapter Four, the accounts of Lütfi Pasha55, Matrakçı

Nasûh56, Celâlzâde57, Mustafa Âli58, Ġbrahim Peçevi59 and Kâtip Çelebi60 and Seyyîd

Muradî’s Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa61 will be discussed. In Chapter Five, the

chronicles of Andronikos Nountsios62, Paolo Paruta63, Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni64,

Thedore Spandugino65, Andrea Marmora66, the report of Francesco Longo67 and

lastly an anonymous pamphlet published by Francesco Sansovino68 will be

delineated.

55 Lütfî PaĢa, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, (Ġstanbul: Matbaa-ı Âmire, 1923).

56 Davut Erkan, Matrâkçı Nasûh‟un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537), Marmara University Institute of

Turkic Studies, 2005, (unpublished MA. Thesis).

57 Celâlzâde Mustafa (Koca NiĢâncı), Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kânûnîs von 1520 bis 1557 oder

Tabakât ül-Memâlik ve Derecât ül-Mesâlik, ed. by, Petra Kappert, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag

GMBH, 1981).

58 Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, Künhü‟l Ahbâr, Dördüncü Rükn, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2009).

59 Peçevî Ġbrahim Efendi, Tarîh-i Peçevî, (Ġstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980).

60 Kâtip Çelebi, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, ed. by, Svatopluk Soucek, (Princeton:

Markus Wiener Publishers, 2011).

61 Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa, ed. by Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen: Verlag Shaker, 1993).

62 Nicandre de Corcyre, Le Voyage d‟Occident, tras.by Paolo Odorico, (Toulouse: Anacharsis

Éditions, 2002).

63 Paolo Paruta, Historia Vinetiana, (Venice, 1703).

64 Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, Historia Venetiana Scritta Brevemente da Gio.Niccolò Doglioni delle

Cose Successe dalla Prima Fondation di Venetia fino all‟Anno Christo 1592, (Venice, 1598).

65 Theodore Spandounes, On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors, trans. and ed. by, Donald M. Nicol,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

66 Andrea Marmora, Della Historia di Corfu, (Venice, 1672).

67 Francesco Longo, “Decrizione della Guerra Seguita tra la Serenissima Republica di Venetia e

Sultan Solimano Imperator de Turchi l’Anno 1537”, Commissiones et Relationes Venetae, ed.by.

Simeon Ljubić, v.2 in Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, v.7, (Zagreb,

1877), 113-131.

68 “I Fatti di Solimano Dopo la Presa di Rhodi Fino all’Anno MDXXXIII”, Historia Universale

Dell‟Origine et Imperio dei Turchi Raccolta da M. Francesco Sansovino, (Venice, 1568).

22

1.2. A Chapter-by-Chapter Outline

This dissertation examines the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu in

1537 in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in four voluminous chapters.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two aims to draw the framework of the

Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu. This second chapter analyzes

the reasons of the Ottoman Apulian campaign and the root causes of the apparent

mistrust that started to dominate Ottoman-Venetian relations by 1532. Firstly, the

rise of Süleyman I and Charles V to power, the formulation of Ottoman and

Habsburg grand strategies, based on the discourses of universal sovereignty and the

main political actors, playing the prominent roles in the Ottoman and Habsburg

policy and decision making mechanisms are reviewed. Besides, the Ottoman

challeng of the Habsburgs in Hungary and in western Mediterranean is also briefly

discussed and the Ottoman policy towards Hungary is delineated to evaluate the

Ottoman Apulian Campaign in 1537 within the context of Ottoman gradual method

of conquest. Secondly, this second chapter discusses the Ottoman-French

convergence in the early sixteenth-century, which led the Ottoman-French alliance of

1536 for a joint campaign in Italy. Finally, this chapter examines the Ottoman-

Venetian relations of the time and discusses how the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry

created a political tension between the Porte and the Serenissima, with the aim of

setting the ground for Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537.

The next chapter, Chapter Three, provides the historical narrative of the Ottoman

Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537. First, I discuss the Ottoman-French

alliance of 1536 and the position of the Republic of Venice. Here, I intend to

demonstrate how the Porte diplomatically pressured the Serenissima to actively

support the Ottoman initiatives against the Habsburgs. Secondly, the Ottoman

23

Apulian Campaign of 1537 is delineated. By discussing the course of the campaign,

it is underlined that the main target of the Ottomans in 1537 was the region of Apulia

and Corfu came out as a second one, in 1537, as the Sultan’s response for the

disingenuous Venetian polices concerning the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In this

context, I demonstrate that the Ottoman attack was the direct outcome of the existing

political tension between these two states and was justified by the Venetian attacks

on the Ottoman ships during the campaign. In this regard, this third chapter

challenges the previous studies which state Corfu as the principal target for the

Ottomans in 1537. Finally, the chapter re-analyzes the Apulian Campaign and Attack

on Corfu within the context of Ottoman “gradual method of conquest” and suggests

an answer to the question of what Ottomans might have intended to achieve in 1537.

The fourth cnahpter focuses on the Ottoman chronicles, composed in the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries and discusses the Ottoman point of views about the

reasons, preparation, process and the efficacy of the campaign of 1537. It aims to set

out how the Ottomans perceived and legitimized the military operations in Apulia

and the subsequent attack on Corfu. Therefore, in this chapter I intend to support the

main arguments of the dissertation asserted in the previous chapter. Before

discussing each chronicle, I provide brief information about the authors/composers,

the time of composition of the accounts and the genre, according to which each work

is classified.

Chapter Five examines the Venetian chronicles, composed by Venetians or Corfiots

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to provide a complementary analysis of

the 1537 campaign. In this chapter, the Venetians’ and Corfiots’ evaluations and

reflections of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and particularly the Ottoman attack on

Corfu in 1537 are discussed. As it is done in the fourth chapter, this chapter also

24

provides details about the origins of the authors, their positions, if they had, in the

Venetian administration and their social status to assess the reliability of the source.

The sources are also important in terms of portraying the cultural atmosphere of the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Venice and provide more detailed information in

comparison to the Ottoman sources. This fourth chapter also works as a check up for

the information provided by the Ottoman chronicles and underlines similar and

different views on 1537 events. By this chapter, I intend to complete the historical

narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu, as well as

introducing new primary sources for further studies.

1.3. Notes on the Languages Used for Names and Terms and on the Translations

The dissertation adopts commonly used English versions/names for most of the

monarchs, kingdoms, cities, towns and islands. For the Ottoman sultans and pashas

and officers Ottoman usage is preferred. For the Ottoman capital, Constantinople is

used. The term Serenissima, meaning the most serene, is used to refer to the Republic

of Venice, since the official name of the Republic was Serenisima Republica di

Venèta. The historical coat of arms of the French Kingdom was the fleur-de-lis on a

blue field, so the term Fleur-de-lys, used in the text refers to the French Kingdom.

For the titles and terms in Ottoman, Venetian /Italian and Spanish used in the

chapters, I do not give the English equivalents in the text, if it is not so necessary to

be explained in the narrative, to produce an easy-reading account. For the titles and

terms, a glossary was added to the Apendices. (Appendix A)

The use of the term of “Turk” also needs to be clarified. In the narrative, I

intentionally refrain from using “Turk” for the Ottomans since the Ottomans used

this appellation in different meanings and called themselves as “Ottomans”.

25

However, in most of the contemporary Italian sources Ottomans were referred to as

Turks. For that reason, especially in the Chapter Five, dealing with the Venetian

sources the usage is secured but it is put in quotation marks.

Lastly, the translations from Ottoman, Italian and French throughout the text are

mine if it is not cited in an individual work and not clearly mentioned in the

footnotes. In the direct quotations from Ottoman Turkish, I adopted a simplified

transliteration style showing the long vowels by (^) and hemze and ʿayn are indicated

by (ʾ) and (ʿ).

26

CHAPTER II

CONTEXTUALIZING 1537: OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY IN THE

EARLY SIXTEENTH-CENTURY AND SURROUNDING STATES

In July 1537, when the Ottoman forces, commanded by his Third Vizier, Lütfi Pasha,

landed on the southeastern Italian coasts of Apulia, Sultan Süleyman I was

manifesting that he was the only power attempting a decisive intervention in Italy.

Earlier the site of an invasion by his ancestor, Mehmed II, the region of Apulia was

carefully chosen to be the goal, since the region was part of the Kingdom of Naples,

directly bound to the Spanish realm of the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. The

campaign had been already planned as an Ottoman-French joint venture in Italy in

1536 against the rise of the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. However, by mid-August

of 1537, the course of the campaign was changed: the Ottoman fire unexpectedly

turned on Venetian Corfu. This was the first Ottoman-Venetian encounter in the

reign of Süleyman, ending the period of 34 years of peace between the Ottoman

Empire and the Republic of Venice.

This dissertation argues that the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu

cannot be evaluated as isolated military maneuvers of the Ottoman Sultan. On the

contrary, they were direct products of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the early

27

sixteenth-century, according to which other crowned-heads and states of the time

needed to adapt, including, above all, the Republic of Venice. Therefore, to analyze

the 1537 Campaign, one should first analyze the nature and scope of the rivalry

between these two leading dynasties of the early sixteenth-century and the events of

the time, along with the rivalring political discourses to understand the 1537

Campaign.

This chapter intends to contextualize 1537 and of discuss how these encounters had

their source in Ottoman and Habsburg imperial strategies. In this regard, in order to

decipher why the Ottoman attack on Apulia in 1537 took place, the political and

ideological rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V needs first to be delineated to

show how this rivalry resulted in numerous Ottoman-Habsburg military encounters

in Central Europe and Western Mediterranean. Secondly, the Ottoman-French

convergence that led to the 1536 Ottoman-French alliance for a joint campaign in

Italy will be detected. Lastly, Ottoman-Venetian relations in the early sixteenthcentury

and Venetian political thinking in the face of the Ottoman-Habsburg alliance

will be discussed. This will explain why suspicions and doubts arose between the

Ottomans and the Venetians, setting the stage for the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in

1537.

2.1. One World, Two Emperors: A Brief Analysis of the Ottoman-Habsburg

Rivalry in the Early Sixteenth-Century

In 1520, when Süleyman (r.1520-1566)69 succeeded his father Selim I (r.1512-1520),

the Ottoman Empire already possessed a world empire. In the reign of his greatgrandfather

Mehmed II (r.1451-1481), the Ottoman State had become a de facto

69 For a classical study on Süleyman, see: Roger Bigelow Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-

1566, (Cambridge & Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1944).

28

empire, with the conquest of the Byzantine capital Constantinople and consolidation

of imperial rule both in Anatolia and Rumelia. In the late fifteenth-century, the

Empire had expanded to the natural frontier of the Danube. Moreover, the imperial

armies had started to penetrate into Central Europe and Italy. In 1456, Belgrade was

besieged unsuccessfully, and between the years of 1468 and 1473 Ottoman raiders

attacked Venetian Friuli in Northeastern Italy.70 In May 1480, the Island of Rhodes

was besieged and in June 1480, Ottoman raiders, led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha71,

landed in Apulia and captured the city of Otranto. They also attacked on the towns of

Brindisi, Lecce and Taranto.72 Although the Ottomans evacuated Otranto the

following year, after the death of Mehmed II, this attack was an unforgettable trauma

for the Italians.73

With the reign of Selim I between 1512 and 1520, the Ottoman conquest changed its

direction towards the Eastern territories. In 1516 and 1517, the Mamluk Sultanate

was dominated and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were taken under the

Ottoman control. Beyond the maritime periphery of Rum “[…] the conquest of the

Mamluk Sultanate in 1516-1517 extended the empire’s waterfront along the coasts of

Syria and Egypt, and crossed the Isthmus of Suez to include the Red Sea, at whose

70 For the Ottoman raids in Friuli, see: Maria Pia Pedani, “Turkish Raids in Friuli at the end of the

Fifteenth Century”, Acta Viennensia Ottomanica, ed. by. M. Kohbach, G. Prochaska-Eisl and C.

Romer, (Vienna: Im Selbrstverlag des Instituts fur Orientalistik, 1999), 287-291. For how the Ottoman

invasion was reflected by the Papal and Venetian literary works: Mustafa Soykut, Image of the

“Turk” in Italy. A History of the “Other” in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683, (Berlin: Klaus

Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 54-59.

71 Gedik Ahmed Pasha was the Grand Vizier of Mehmed II. In 1477, he was removed from his office

because of his reluctance for the future campaign over Albania. In the following year, however, he

was appointed as the Chief Captain and the Governor of Valona. For detailed information, see: Hedda

Reindl Kiel, “Gedik Ahmed PaĢa”, DİA, v.13, 543-544.

72 Franco Cardini, Europa e Islam: Storia di un Malinteso, (Roma & Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli :

2008), 290.

73 Ibid.

29

southern end conquest of Yemen pushed that waterfront to the shores of the Arabian

sea […]”74. To secure the connection lines between Constantinople and newly

dominated Syria, Egypt and the Holy Lands, the Ottomans stepped further to

dominate the Eastern Mediterranean by preventing the penetration of the corsairs.75

Hence, the Republic of Venice and other trading entrepreneurs, became dependent to

the Ottoman ports and shipping lanes fanning out from them, also to the good will of

the Sultan.76 This transformed the Ottoman State, being a regional power, into a

world empire controlling the crossroads of three continent and the isthmus between

eastern and western seas.77

The rule of this large empire was taken over by young Süleyman in 1520. Since he

was the sole candidate for the Ottoman throne, he peacefully succeeded this father;

but the empire that he took over was not so in peace: the Ottoman rule in newly

conquered Egypt and Syria was not definitely consolidated. The insurrection led by

Canberdi Gazali78 in Syria was his first challenge to face. Furthermore, among the

Ottoman ruling elite, Süleyman was not treated to be an influential and powerful

74 Svat Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, (Ġstanbul: The Issis Press, 2015), 15. Andrew C.

Hess evaluates the conquest of Egypt as a turning point in the history of the Mediterranean. According

to Hess, the Ottoman conquest of Egypt brought about the economic prosperity to fuel further military

expeditions and the new mean of legitimation to rule large population living within the Ottoman

realm. According to Hess, this eased the Empire to struggle with politically divided Europe and Spain

in particular, having continuous economic problems and gave the Ottomans in the Ottoman Habsburg

rivalry in the sixteenth century. See: Andrew C. Hess, “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and

the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War”, International Journal of Middle East Studies,

v.4, no:1, (January 1973), 55-76.

75 Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 19.

76 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 47.

77 Ibid., 16.

78 Following the death of Selim I, the Beylerbeyi of Damascus, Canberdi Gazali declared his

independence entered in Aleppo. For detailed information, see: Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, Kanunî‟nin

Cülûsu ve İlk Seferleri, (Ankara: TTK, 1961), 7-14; Feridun M. Emecen, “Canberdi Gazali”, DİA, v.

7, 141-143. For a recent study, introducing Venetian perceptions on Canberdi Gazali revolt, see:

Turan, The Sultan‟s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha, 38-52.

30

emperor, comparing to his father, known as “the Grim”.79 Not only the Ottomans, but

also the Europeans suspiciously approached the young sultan. The death of Selim I,

who had intimidated the Christendom by his exhausting aggressive policy, released

the Pope80 and led him to advocate for a new crusade against the “Turks”.81 Since he

had not been active in world politics in the time of his father, Süleyman was

perceived as an impotent successor, not able to threaten the Christendom. Italian

intellectual and historian Paolo Giovio notes that “for everyone, it seemed that an

aggressive Lion had left a meek lamb as successor”82 All they would realize soon

that they had underestimated the young sultan and would give him the title of “the

Magnificent”.

This atmosphere led Süleyman to build himself a sultanic image. His first step was

re-orienting the Ottoman war machine against Christendom to show his power. In

1521, he conquered Belgrade, known as the gate opening to the Central Europe. His

next step was the conquest of Rhodes in 1522. Besides having an ideological

importance as the seat of the Kinghts of St. John of Jerusalem, the island was a

strategic goal for Süleyman. Rhodes would serve the Ottoman Sultan as a police

station, securing the sea-connection between Constantinople and Hijaz and as the

79 Ebru Turan mentions that since Süleyman did not accompany his father in any campaigns, he could

not show his military skills and his leadership qualities. For detailed discussion of the reaction of the

Ottoman to Süleyman’s succession in the light of Ottoman and Venetian sources, see: Turan, The

Sultan‟s Favorite: Ġbrahim Pasha, 52-71.

80 “[…] staremmo hora in pace et la cristianità potra star sicurà.” Sanudo, v. 29, col. 343.

81 For the efforts of Pope Leo X to organize a crusade against the Ottomans between the years of

1517-1520, see: Setton, v.3, 172-193.

82 “Et certamente pareva a tutti che un Leon arrabiato havesse lasciato un mansueto agnello per

successore per esser Solimano giovane, imperito et di quietissima natura […]”. Paolo Iovio [Giovio],

Comentario de le Cose de’Turchi, (Rome, 1538), Hii,

https://archive.org/stream/bub_gb_rvcZNdMyHLEC#page/n61/mode/2up, retrieved, on December 6,

2017.

31

principal Ottoman naval base in the eastern Mediterranean.83 In a very short time

after having ascended to the Ottoman throne, Süleyman was able to complete the

project of his great grand father Mehmed II: two important dominions which would

be also used by the Ottoman as the stepping stones for their further military

operations were taken under the imperial control. It was officially declared that the

young Sultan intends to follow the route of Mehmed II.

Secondly, the Sultan, was able to consolidate his supreme authority by eliminating

all remnant bureaucrats from his father’s administration, who were frequently acting

as the channels of opposition. In his third year on the throne, he issued a surprising

appointment: He gave the imperial seal to his close friend and servant, Ġbrahim. From

that time onwards, Ġbrahim became the most important actor in the Ottoman politics

after the Sultan; he gained the right of supervision over all the state units and played

decisive role in the formulation and implementation of the domestic and international

strategies of the Empire.84 From 1523 to 1536, Süleyman and Ġbrahim would rule the

Empire in harmony and establish an imperial strategy, which will also revive the

projects of Mehmed II.

The rise of Süleyman coincided the rise of another powerful in the west monarch

who would be perceived as Süleyman’s “mortal enemy”: Charles V, the Habsburg

and the Holy Roman Emperor. When the young Duke of Burgundy, Charles of

83 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 48. For the conquests of Belgrade and Rhodes see: Yurdaydın,

15-44; Palmira Brumett, “The Overrated Adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman Naval Power”, The

Historical Journal, v.36, no:3 (1993), 517-541.

84 Ġnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, (London: Phoenix, 2000), 96-

97.Sixteenth century Ottoman chronicler Kemal PaĢa-zâde notes how influential was Ġbrahim over the

SüĢeyman’s political decisions even before having the imperial seal. See: Kemal PaĢa-zâde, Tevarih-i

Âl-i Osman, X. Defter, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), 159-163. For an interesting

analysis on how Süleyman consolidated his authority and built a sultanic image for himself via

Ġbrahim Pasha, see: Ebru Turan, The Sultan‟s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha.

32

Habsburg85 (1500-1558), came to the Spanish throne in 1516, at the age of 16,

perhaps a few contemporary believed that he would become one of the two

protagonists in the sixteenth-century political theater. Thanks to the clever dynastic

marriages of his ancestors, Charles inherited an almost world empire, as Süleyman

did. Charles mother Juana was the third child of Isabella I of Castile (1451-1505)

and Ferdinand II of Aragon (1542-1516); his father Philp, the Handsome, of

Habsburg (1478-1506) on the other hand was the son of Holy Roman Emperor

Maximillian I (r. 1508-1519) and Mary of Burgundy.86 The unexpected death of his

father and his grandfather offered him a large realm composed by the Burgundian

inheritance, centered in Netherlands, the Habsburg dominions, including Austria

within the Empire and Hungary outside it, the Franche-Comté, the entire peninsular

Spain and its dominions in the North Africa, the Italian kingdoms of Naples, Sicily,

Sardinia and the dominions in the New World.87

Charles V also had to face challenges against his authority within his realm in his

first years. In 1517, the Castilian Cortes recognized him as the king of Spain but the

Spanish ruling elite secured their suspicions over the young monarch. For them, the

best alternative for the Spanish crown had been Charles’s brother Ferdinand, who

was a Spaniard and had been also King Ferdinand’s favorite.88 Charles was an

outsider of Spain, he did not even speak Spanish. His primary attempts to regularize

85 Charles I, as King of Spain and Charles V, as the Holy Roman Emperor. See: Karl Brandi, The

Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World Empire, (London: Jonathan

Cape, 1949); Pierre Chanu, Michèle Escamilla, Charles Quint, (Paris: Fayard, 2000); James D. Tracy,

Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy International Finance and Domestic

Policies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); William Maltby, The Reign of Charles V,

(New York: Palgrave, 2002); Willem Pieter Blockmans, Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558, (London&

New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

86 Maltby, 6-8.

87 Henry Kamen, Spain 1469-1717: A Society of Conflict, (Harlow: Pearson-Longman, 2005), 67.

88 Ibid, 66.

33

new tax codes and his failure of implementing parliamentary accords triggered the

communero revolt in 1520, when he left Spain to seek the imperial title.89 The revolt

paralyzed the government in Castile for over a year and could only be suppressed by

1522. From then, the Emperor made Spain his seat for 7 years; he learnt Spanish;

reconciled the Castilian Cortes by reforming the court, reorganizing the

administration and initiating a significant cultural revival.90

Here, it should be underlined that the Charles’ Empire was a mosaic of different

states, having their own judicial and administrative mechanisms, with which the

Emperor should act in harmony. He had to respect the local judicial privileges

(fueros) and parliaments (cortes); moreover, he should recognize the authority of

regional kings and dukes to guarantee vital revenues.91 For that reason, Charles could

not fully consolidate his authority in his entire realm and established a centralized

administration. Only in Castile, he was able to consolidate his authority. Even there,

he governed through numerous administrative and advisory councils.92

These different territories and styles of administrations were united only under the

principle of obedience to the same dynastic ruler. However, this dynastic rule ought

to face foreign challenges too. By his election as Holy Roman Emperor, he had

already defeated his main rival, Francis I of Valois, the French King, who had been

89 Ibid, 67-68. For the communero revolt and how Charles V incorporated his political, administrative

and financial politics into Spain and his policy of North Africa see: Aurelio Espinosa, “The Grand

Strategy of Charles V (1500-1558): Castile, War and Dynastic Priority in The Mediterranean”,

Journal of Early Modern History, v. 9, is. 3-4, (2005), 239-283; idem, The Empire of the Cities,

Emperor Charles V, the Communero Revolt and the Transformation of the Spanish System, (Leiden

&Boston: Brill, 2009)

90 Kamen, Spain 1469-1714, 85-87.

91 Maltby, 14-16.

92 Besides the royal council of Castile, being the highest administrative body, there were also councils

of Inquisition, military orders, and crusades. In 1523 a new council of finance (Hacienda) was created

in order to manage the finances of the realm. See: Kamen, Spain 1469-1714, 87-88.

34

mainly supported by many of the German electors.93 However, this election brought

about a Habsburg-Valois rivalry, which would mainly staged as a power conflict in

the Italian peninsula. The Protestant influence had been increasing among the

German rulers and in the East, the Ottomans continued to expand their zones of

control towards the Mediterranean and Central Europe. All these facilitated the

formulation of the Habsburg imperial strategy of the early sixteenth-century and

initiated an image building process for Charles V, which would not only form the

politics of the time, but led the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.

2.1.1. The New Caesar versus the Second Charlemagne: Rival Grand Strategies

and the Discourses on Italy

As was stated above, in 1520s an imperial image was built for Süleyman. This

process overlapped with the formulation of Süleyman’s imperial strategy and they

both sustained each other. According to Gabor Ágoston, in early 1520’s, the

Ottomans engaged in the establishment of a grand strategy involving the formulation

of an imperial ideology and universalist vision of empire, which helped the

integration of the Ottomans into European politics and political culture, mainly

following the emergence of the Habsburgs and Safevids as the new and important

rivals.94 This strategy required the use of all human, economic and military resources

of the empire for the realization of the foreign policy and large propaganda fed by the

information about the outside world and current circumstances. Ágoston also

mentions that the Ottoman grand strategy was advanced more effectively by Grand

93 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 190-192.

94 Ágoston, “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power”, 77.

35

Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha.95 Pasha’s main political advisor was a Venetian born in

Constantinople: Alvise Gritti96, the illegitimate son of the Doge of Venice.

Ġbrahim Pasha, deeply interested in ancient history and philosophy identified his

master with Alexander the Great and was persuading him that he would revive

Alexander’s empire under his authority.97 This was also announced to the Christian

world, acting as the press office of the time: in one of his meetings with the Venetian

bailo98 to Constantinople, Ġbrahim told that when they were young, he and his master

95 Ibid, 77-78.

96 Alvise Gritti was one of the most colorful characters of the early sixteenth century and became an

influential political figure thanks to his close relations with Ġbrahim Pasha. On Gritti, see: Francesco

della Valle, Una breve narracione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice morte

dell‟Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di

Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell‟esercito Regno,

appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d‟Ongaria, (Venice,

c.1525), BNM, Itt. Cl. 6. Cod. 122 (6211). This biography was published with the edition of Iván

Nagy: Francesco Della Valle, Una breve narracione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice

morte dell‟Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di

Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell‟esercito Regno,

appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d‟Ongaria, , Magyar

Történelmi Tár, ed. by Iván Nagy v. 3 (Pest: 1857), 9-60. On Gritti, see also: Aurel Decei, “Aloisio

Gritti au Service de Soliman Le Magnifique d’aprés des documents Turcs Inédits (1533-1534),

Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu, ed. by Jean Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Christina FeneĢan, v. 3

(1992), 1-103; Ferenc Szakály, Lodovico Gritti in Hungary; Özlem Kumrular, “Osmanlı Sarayında ve

Avrupa Siyasi Sahnesinde Venedikli Bir Sınır Diplomatı: “Mir-i Venedik Oğlu” Alvise Gritti.” Tarih

ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, no. 6, (Autumn 2007-Winter 2008), 39-59, Gizella Nemeth Papo,

Adriano Papo, Ludovico Gritti: Un Principe Mercante del Rinascimento tra Venezia I Turchi E La

Corona D‟Ungheria, (Friuli: Edizioni della Laguna, 2002); Elvin Otman, The Role of Alvise Gritti

within the Ottoman Politics in the Context of “Hungarian Question” (1526-1534), Bilkent University,

September 2009, (unpublished M.A. Thesis); eadem, “Beyoğlu’nda Bir “Bey Oğlu”, İstanbul

Araştırmaları Yıllığı, no:1, (2012),127-144. Contemporary Italian sources mention that Gritti became

of the political advisor of Ġbrahim Pasha because the Pasha was inexperienced in political affairs. See:

Albèri, s.3, v.1, 30; Benedetto Ramberti, Libri Tre Delle Cose dei Turchi, (Venice: 1539), 35v-36r.

97Ágoston, “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power”, 99. Ġbrahim Pasha could be

evaluated as a good example of “versatile individual” in the Renaissance world. Apart from his

political identity, he had keen interest in art and literature. His splendid palace, which was built upon

the order of Süleyman at Hippodrome hosted numerous poets and artists, and he patronized a large

network of Muslim and Christian intellectuals. For the term of “versatile individual”, see: Jacob

Burckhardt, La Civilità del Rinascimento in Italia, (Rome: Newton Compton Editori, 2008), 112. For

Ġbrahim Pasha’s patronage of art and literature and his palace see: Nurhan Atasoy, İbrahim Paşa

Sarayı, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Basımevi, 1975); Walter G. Andrews, Mehmet Kalpaklı, The Age of Beloveds:

Love and the Beloved in Early Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society, (Durham &

London: Duke University Press, 2005), 238; Esma Tezcan, Pargalı İbrahim Paşa Çevresindeki Edebi

Yaşam, Bilkent University, Department of Turkish Litterature, June 2004 (unpublished M.A. Thesis).

98 Pietro Bragadin.

36

Süleyman read a story in an ancient book in which it was narrated that a man named

Ġbrahim, holding no office before would be appointed as the Grand Vizier and

Beylerbeyi of Rumelia and in the time of this Ġbrahim the Ottoman sultan would

achieve great success that none of his ancestors had been able to; he would conquer

the Roman Empire by the will of God and then there would be only one faith,

liberating everyone with peace and love.99 Following the conquest of Constantinople,

the Ottoman sultans had already claimed to the inheritance of the Roman Empire

defining themselves as the “Kayser-i Rûm”. This symbolism of being the new

“Caesar”, reflecting the Ottoman claim to be the successors of the Roman Emperors,

was in a sense enriched by the Grand Vizier and Süleyman was represented as the

one who would establish a world empire from the east to the west, as the Alexander

the Great had done in the antiquity. This claim was also visually displayed in the

Ottoman social atmosphere. “Süleyman reintroduced Roman-style spectacle into

Constantinople once again with spectacular displays on state occasions and triumphal

processions in the hippodrome.”100 The splendid ceremonies, celebrations and

festivals, well-attended by the high ranking state officials, diplomatic missions and

people, were preferential occasions for the sovereigns of the Renaissance Period to

build and reflect the image and power of the potentate.101

99 Sanuto, v. 41, col. 95

100 Warwick Ball, Sultans of Rome: The Turkish World Expansion, (Northampton& Massachusetts,

Olive Branch Press, 2013), 117. Also see: Christine Woodhead, “Perspectives on Süleyman”,

Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World, ed. by.

Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, (London & New York: Longman, 1995), 164-190, 169.

101 For detailed information, see: Edward Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2005). Kaya ġahin notes that, Islamic Empires were also familiar with

this tradition, strengthening the ideological and cultural ties between the emperor and its subjects. See:

ġahin, Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar, 63. Here it is interesting to note that the very first

example of those spectacles was the glorious festival held with the personal presence of the Sultan on

the occasion of marriage of Ġbrahim Pasha. For detailed information about the marriage of Ġbrahim

Pasha and its meaning in terms of building an imperial image for himself and for Süleyman, see: Ebru

Turan, “The Marriage of Ġbrahim Pasha (ca. 1495-1536): The Rise of Sultan Süleyman’s Favorite to

37

Moreover, the information-gathering network was improved and enlarged. Local

information was gathered via Janissaries acting like police force within the empire

and the Ottoman officers in the border territories. To have a close contact with the

outside of the empire, the Ottomans benefitted from the representatives of the

European states, resident or visitor on occasion, intermediary agents and spies, along

with the official envoys charged by the imperial administration.102

The grand strategy was also decorated with messianic/apocalyptic prophecies,

circulating around the early sixteenth-century world. The conquest of Constantinople

had already fournished the Ottoman dynastic strategy with apocalyptic/messianic

discourses: the military conflicts with Christians in the time of Mehmed II had been

treated as signs of tribulations, preceding the End Time.103 It had widely been

believed that the Ottomans would eventually conquer the Red Apple, symbolizing the

city of Rome.104 On the other hand, Rome was not the sole goal of the Ottomans

Grand Vizierate and the Politics of the Elites in Early Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, Turcica,

v. 41, 2009, 3-36.

102 Ágoston, “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power”, 78-92. Emrah Safa Gürkan

comprehensively discusses the roles of spies and intermediaries in the information gathering and how

they served for the formulation and realization of the imperial strategies of the both Habsburg and the

Ottoman Empires in the sixteenth century. Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean. It is

known that Ġbrahim Pasha and Alvise Gritti had close contacts with the information-gatherers, even

they established their own networks. See: Ibid, 370-376.

103 ġahin, 71. For the prophecies rooted from the conquest of Constantinople and reflecting Mehmed

II as the apocalyptic warrior, see: ġahin, “Constantinople and End Time: The Ottoman Conquest as

Potent of the Last Hour”, Journal of Early Modern History, v. 14, no: 4 (2010), 317-354.

104 The Red Apple, narrated in the Turco-Mongolian legends symbolized the dreamed city of the tribes

running away from the sand and snow storms. Cardini, 181. The legend was incorporated in the

Ottoman culture and in the early fifteenth-century, and the city which would bring the eternal

happiness and peace was defined as Rome. See: Kenneth M. Setton, Western Hostility to Islam and

Prophecies of Turkish Doom, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992), 32-35. On the

other hand, Pál Fodor argues that the “Red Apple” symbolized the city of Constantinople before the

mid-fifteenth century and took its origin from the symbolism of the statue of Justinian. Following the

capture of Constantinople the “Red Apple” became a threefold symbol, referring first to the other

cities, royal residences which were to be conquered, secondly to the ultimate and mystical place which

would conclude the Ottoman conquests and thirdly the universal sovereignty. The author argues that

the Ottomans had far a long time avoided defining the “Red Apple” which they placed it somewhere

far in the Occident and only began to identify it with Rome in the second half of the seventeenth

century. Pál Fodor, “The View of the Turk in Hungary: The Apocalyptic Tradition and the Legend of

38

according to the sixteenth-century contemporaries: since the Kingdom of Hungary

that was defined as the “bulwark of Christianity” was the main rival of the Ottomans

before the Battle of Mohacs, in 1520s, these prophecies were widely in circulation in

Hungary. It was perceived the Red Apple of the Ottomans referred to Hungary and

Transylvania, in particular to the city of Buda.105 In the early sixteenth century, all

these symbolisms, prophecies and predictions were articulated to the imperial

character of Süleyman I. Thanks to the efforts of his Grand Vizier, Ġbrahim and to the

general athmosphere of the time, both inside and outside of the Empire, Süleyman

was displayed as the protagonist for a new world empire. He was even reflected as

the Messiah, who would establish the eternal peace of Islam with his glorious

conquests.106

By the late fifteenth-century, Ottoman sultans tended to define themselves as

Pâdisâh-ı Rûy-ı Zemîn (Halîfe-i Rûy-i Zemîn of Hâlife-I Müslimîn) Zillullâh-i fî‟l-

ʿarz (the sultan/ caliph of the whole World/ of all Muslims, the shadow of God’s

countenance on earth), claiming a position of supremacy in the Islamic world in

reference to their glories in protecting and in expanding the domain of Islam against

infidels that had never achieved by any other Islamic state. By the annexation of the

Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Ottoman sultan also wore the title of the Servitor of

the Red Apple in Ottoman-Hungarian Context”, In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology,

Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire, (Ġstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 71-104,

96.

105 Fodor, “The View of Turk in Hungary”. Ebru Turan states that by the time of Bayezid II, the

Ottomans were aware that the Hungarians were playing active role in conceiving crusading plans and

carrying them out. For that reason, they came to identify the Hungarians as “Blond Races”, the people

would appear in the Last Days and attack the Muslims to destroy them. This made Hungary a target

for the Ottomans, defining themselves as the champions of Islam and especially in the reign of

Süleyman, the war against Hungary was perceived as the war for “Red Apple” which would grant the

universal sovereignty. For detailed information on how the Ottomans elaborated the messianic

discourse in the literary and historical works of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, see:

Turan, The Sultan‟s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha, 325-335.

106 See: Cornell Fleisher, “The Lawgiver as Messiah"159-177.

39

the two Holy Sanctuaries, (Mecca and Medina).107 Ġnalcık notes that “Süleymân took

this title in all seriousness as the basis of his claim to universal caliphate and declared

that it was his prime duty to keep the pilgrimage routes to the Holy cities open for all

Muslims in the world.”108 According to Ġnalcık, this set the ground for the

establishment of an aggressive policy against the European expansion in the

Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Indonesia and Africa and Eurasian steps and it was

the extension of the earlier frontier ghaza policy.109 Furthermore, these claims were

strengthened by another title, attributed to Süleyman. Besides his being the Messiah

of the End Time, he started to be called as sâhib-kırân (the master of the auspicious

conjunction), who was thought to been mighty and politically fortunate, which was

first used by Timur.110 In the first years of the Süleyman’s reign, the Ottomans

deployed this title for Süleyman and used it against the Habsburg claims of universal

sovereignty.111

Süleyman’s discourse of universal sovereignty was multi-dimensional: the

ideologically decorated grand-strategy comprehended a wide-range military plan to

both secure the imperial territories against any actual or potential threat and to

enlarge the Ottoman influence over the Christendom and the Muslim East. This

opened Süleyman various theaters to perform his political ideals and military

107Ġnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, 68.

108 Ibid. 68-69.

109 Ibid. 69.

110 The term had been used to define individuals who had been born under the conjunction of Jupiter

and Saturn and had its roots in early Ottoman, Safevid and Mughal cultures, as an amalgamation of

apocalypticism and prophecies circling around the Iran, Eastern Anatolia, and Mesopotamia in the

fourteenth and fifteenth century. ġahin, Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar, 72. The term

symbolized the political-religious universal sovereignty.

111 Ibid. 73. See also. Barbara Flemming, “Sâhib-kıran und Mahdî: Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im

ersten Jahrzehnt der regierung Süleymâns”, Between the Danube and the Caucasus, ed. by Györy

Kara, (Budapest, Akadémai Kiadó, 1987), 43-62.

40

capacity, including the Indian Ocean and Caucasus, along with the Central Europe

and the Mediterranean, where he met a rival, having interests and ideals, similar to

his: Charles V of Habsburg, the Holy Roman Emperor.

As was done for Süleyman, in his first years as the new King of Spain, an image

building process was also initiated for Charles V, in which another influential

statesman of the sixteenth-century, Mercurino di Gattinara, Charles V’s Grand

Chancellor, played an important role.112 Di Gattinara’s political vision was based on

the incorporation of the Roman Catholic vision with the Italian humanism into the

political requirements of the time. He advocated that the establishment of the world

empire under an able and powerful emperor had already be promised in the Holy

Bible. In 1516, he undersigned a prophetic book, entitled Supplicatory Oration

Including a Dream of the Last World Monarchy and the Triumph of Christianity,

Broadly Stated, With the Means of Accomplishing It, directed at the King Charles.113

In this book, di Gattinara underlined that the universal world empire could/should be

formed by a talented potentate who would be able to unite all independent kingdoms

and states under his authority, and by securing their rights and acquisitions with the

implementation of a just system of law and administration, he would have their

consent to be under his authority. This would be the last world monarchy before the

apocalypse.114

112 Mercurino di Gattinara was an Italian, Roman Catholic humanist and scholar of jurisprudence. He

acted as the advisor and diplomatic delegate of Margaret of Savoy, the daughter of Habsburg Emperor

Maximillian I, until 1518. Following the coronation of Charles as the King of Spain, Maximillian

appointed him as the Grand Chancellor for his nephew. For detailed information see: Rebecca Ard

Boone, Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire, (London& New York:

Routledge, 2016).

113 Ibid., 30.

114 Charles succeeded the Kingdom of Spain in 1516. For detailed information about the book, which

was considered as an example for the literature of the “mirror for princes”, see: Ibid., 30-41; John M.

Headley, “Rhetoric and Reality: Messianic Humanist and Civilian Themes in the Imperial Ethos of

41

Di Gattinara’s discourse was the reproduction of the existing prophecies on the

apocalypse and on the establishment of the worldly empire, circulating in Italy by the

late fifteenth century. Especially after the Ottoman invasion of Otranto, in 1480, the

prophecies about the “Turks” coming into the heart of Christianity started to be

circulated and the image of the powerful monarch, was to liberate the entire

Christendom was created. This monarch would be the “Second Charlemagne”, victor

over both Europe and Asia, who would end his life on the hill of cavalry for the

liberation of Christendom.115 This prophecy modified and Charles V was reflected as

the expected Second Charlemagne by di Gattinara.

For di Gattinara, who had portrayed himself as the prophet setting the ground for the

last emperor116, the universal world empire would be established by Charles,

designated by Jesus Christ, the Jews and Pagans would be converted to Christianity

in his time and he will initiate the millennium.117 This was also a part of the Charles’

imperial propaganda. Charles was mirrored as a devoted worrier of Christendom

against the “Turk”. In his public address to the German ambassadors in 1519,

announcing Charles’ election as Holy Roman Emperor, di Gattinara announced that

the election of Charles was divinely inspired and the Emperor will restore the

Sacrum Imperium, with the recovery of the Holy Land, Jerusalem.118

Gattinara”, Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period, eb.by Marjorie Reeves, (Oxford:

Clarendon Press; 1992), 241-269.

115 Ottavia Niccoli, Prophecy and People in Renaissance Italy, (Princeton& New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, 1990), 172-173. Niccoli notes that that there were numerous prophecies about the”

Turks”, converting to Christianity after having seized Italy.

116 Ibid.

117 Ágoston, “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power”, 97.

118 Ibid, 97-98.

42

The grand strategy of Charles V had two main components, the suppression of the

Protestant threat, shaking the Habsburg inherited territories and the consolidating the

authority of the Emperor over the Christendom, by which all Christian monarchs

would accept his political authority. The strategy was designed basically according to

the actual needs of Charles V, struggling with the Protestants and the French King,

Francis I of Valois, who had also been a candidate for the crown of the Holy Roman

Empire and claiming the right of inheritance over Milan and Naples, bound to realm

of Charles V. Thus, in the Habsburg imperial strategy, designed mainly by di

Gattinara, the pacification and liberation of Italy by Charles V, reflected as the

“Defensor Fidei”119 was vital. Italy would be the most important stepping stone for

the eternal victory since the pacification of the peninsula, shaken by the Italian

Wars120 from the late fifteenth century would not only end the Habsburg-Valois

struggle in Italy but also herald the Emperor, the desired universal sovereignty by the

revival of the Roman Empire under his authority and the opportunity to restore the

Christian faith in the traditional Roman lands.

As was briefly discussed above, the roles attributed to Süleyman I and Charles V,

which were also warmly hugged by themselves, formed the Ottoman and Habsburg

imperial strategies of the early sixteenth-century. The conflicting claims of the Sultan

119 Defender of the Faith.

120 The Italian Wars were grounded by the Venetian expansion towards Milan. In order to prevent a

Venetian attack, the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza invited the French King, Charles VIII to invade

Italy, claiming the inheritance of the Kingdom of Naples. The course of struggle changed with the

intervention of the Italian States and the Holy Roman Emperors and in the sixteenth century the wars

turned into a Habsburg-Valois struggle over Milan and Naples. The wars grounded also the formation

of leagues and alliances, in which the Papacy and other Italian states needed to position themselves

according to their interests. In the sixteenth century, by the rise of Charles V, the Habsburg-Valois

struggle for the domination of Italy reached a new momentum. The struggle would only be concluded

by 1559, with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, by which the French would renounce all the claims on

Italy. For detailed information about the Italian Wars, see: Francesco Guiccardini, Storia d‟Italia, ed.

by, Silvana Siedel Menchi, 3 vols., (Turin: Einaudi, 1971). For a recent study, see: Michael Mallett,

Christine Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe,

(London & New York: Routledge, 2014).

43

and the Emperor inevitably transferred the ideological rivalry to a military one which

would be staged in various theatres of war that these super-monarchs of the time

tried to settle their accounts. Süleyman challenged the Emperor by initiating military

campaigns in Hungary and by attacking on the traditional Habsburg center of

Vienna, the Austrian borders and on Tunis. Before discussing the Ottoman military

campaigns realized between the years of 1526 and 1535 which laid the groundworks

of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign in 1537, two colorful scenes reflecting both

Charles V’s and Süleyman I’s imperial discourses and self-representations are

intended to be briefly delineated to help the researcher to observe how the

ideological rivalry between these two sovereigns were materialized; the coronation

of Charles V in 1530 and Süleyman’s response to in his German Expedition of 1532.

Forcing the French King to abandon all his claims on Italy by the end of 1528,

Charles V was able to consolidate his rule over the Italian peninsula. On February

24, 1530, he was crowned by the Pope, Clement VII, as the Holy Roman Emperor in

Bologna. Three months before the ceremony, the Pope with his court came to

Bologna from Rome to meet the Habsburg Emperor when he reached the Papal

States.121 On December 6, 1529, Charles V entered Bologna.

Every resource of the Renaissance had been enlisted to do him honour. Every

statue and façade in the wealthy town was hung and garlanded. Triumphal

arches spanned the streets, enriched with symbolic sculptures, depicting with

a wealth of classical allusions the whole history of land and people.122

Charles V, with his vassals and some imperial electors123, entered the city from the

periphery, from western city gate at San Felice, and stopped by the city-center. This

121 Konrad Eisenbichler, “Charles V in Bologna: The Self-Fashioning a Man and a City”, Renaissance

Studies, v.13, no: 4, (December 1999), 430-439, 430.

122 Brandi, 283.

123 For detailed information see: Ibid., 288.

44

was the ancient Roman practice of the imperial entries.124 The Emperor was

presented to public not so much a Habsburg but as a Roman Emperor like Caesar,

Octavian, Titus and Trajan, with whose figures the triumphal arch of the gate San

Felice was decorated.125 People watching the parade were shouting as “Cesare,

Cesare, Carlo, Carlo, Imperio, Imperio”.126

On February 22, Charles received the iron crown of Lombardy and two days later he

was crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor by the Pope127 in the Basilica of San

Petronio. “For the last time in history, the world saw two highest dignitaries of

Christendom, Emperor and Pope in the full splendor of their ceremonial robes […].”

After Charles V, no Holy Roman Emperor would be crowned by the Pope128 and his

coronation would be “depicted a hundred times in fresco on the walls of churches

and town halls over all Italy”129. The Christendom was then a “papal” approved

leader. This would be challenged by the leader of the Islamic World, only two years

later.

124 Eisenbichler, 432.

125 “Caesar, Caesar, Charles, Charles, Empire, Empire”. See: Ibid., 432-433.

126 Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificient and the Representation of Power”, 410.

127 Clement VII crowned Charles V in 1530 but he was not so eager to do this. The growing influence

of the Habsburg Emperor in Italy was a threat for the Papacy; moreover, three years before the

imperial armies had sacked Rome and taken the Pope as prisoner. G. de Gramont, the Bishop of

Tarbes narrates the ceremony as follows: “[…] the Pope tried to show him the best cheer possible,

giving him the sword, and putting the first crown on his head; but I think he never in his life

performed a ceremony which touched him so near the heart, nor of which less good is likely to come

to him. For, several times, when he thought no one saw him, he heaved such sighs that, heavy as his

cope was, he made it shake in good earnest.” See: “The Letter of G. De Gramont, Bishop of Tarde to

Brion on February 25, 1530”, Henry VII, February 1530, 16-27, in Letters and Papers, Foreign,

Domestic, Henry VIII, v.4, 1524-1530, ed. by. J. S. Brewer, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London,

1875, 2791-2811, 2806. British History Online, http://www.british.history.ac.uk/letters-papershen8/

vol4/pp2791-2811, retrieved on December 5, 2017. The words of the Bishop clearly points out

that the alliance between the Habsburg Emperor and the Pope was desperately needed by both parties.

The Pope needed the Emperor for his acquisitions and security and the Emperor needed the papal

approval for his legitimacy in his struggles both with the French King and with the Protestants.

128 Eisenbichler., 431.

129 Brandi, 288.

45

The coronation of Charles V by the Pope as the Holy Roman Empire was replied by

Süleyman with a splendid power display in his German Expedition in 1532, in which

he challenged the Habsburgs in Hungary and in Austrian border territories. The

military campaign was also enriched with an ideological representation of power,

mainly planned by Ġbrahim Pasha. Pasha had already presented to Süleyman a

regalia, produced by his own enterprise. In the regalia there was also golden helmet

having four crowns.130 It bore a striking resemblance to Papal tiara. Ġbrahim Pasha

had already announced the Venetian bailo, Pietro Zen, that he had acquired the

helmet-crown because it was a trophy of Alexander the Great.131 Besides the golden

helmet, a jewel decorated throne and scepters, ceremonial canopies, horse

furnishings were presented by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan to be displayed in the

German Expedition.132

Along with the regalia, the Ottomans designed another triggering response to

Charles V: Ġbrahim Pasha, assured the foreign delegates in the imperial camp,

including the envoys of the Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand I, who was the brother

and lieutenant of the Emperor, to witness the parade of the Ottoman armies in the

city of Nis.133 The grandiose parade of the Sultan with high commanders and soldiers

130 For the details about the regalia, the process of its production and cost and used symbolisms see:

Otto Kurz, “A Gold Helmet Made in Venice for Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent”, Gazette des

Beaux-Arts, Anné” 111, v. 84, (Paris-New York, 1969), 249-258. In the regalia there were also a

golden throne, decorated with pearls and jewels, an ornamented saddle and a royal purple brocade

caftan. See: Necipoğlu, 401.

131 Sanudo, v.57, col. 634.

132 The regalia was produced by a consortium of Venetian goldsmiths, merchants and artists in Venice

and most of them were in the network of Alvise Gritti. See: Ibid, 405-408.

133 Celalzâde Salih Çelebi notes that the envoys watched the parade of the army with great admiration

and seen the might of the Ottoman Sultan, which was not compatible to any Christian monarchs’. See:

Celalzâde Salih Çelebi, Târîh-i Sefer-i Zafer-Rehber-i Alaman [Kanunî Sultan Süleyman‟ın Alaman

Seferi (1532)], ed. by Fatma Kaytaz, (Ġstanbul: Çamlıca Basım-Yayın, 2016), 29-34. Otto Kurz notes

that the crown-like helmet was also displayed to the Ferdinand’s envoys. After having been waited for

a long time in the imperial camp, on July 5, 1532, they were admitted to kiss the sultan’s hand, sitting

46

will be echoed in the accounts of the diplomats and announced to the European

palaces.134

According to Gülrû Necipoğlu, the aforementioned enterprise was the outcome of a

very clever plan to show the magnificence of the Sultan, to all crowned-heads,

especially to Charles V and the Pope Clement VII by using their own tools of

representation of power in the rivalry of universal supremacy right after two years

from the coronation of the former as the Holy Roman Emperor.135 The splendid

regalia was displaying the Süleyman’s claim to be the sole emperor, uniting all

political and spiritual power in his personality and the military parade was the

Ottoman response to the Charles V’s entrance into Bologna, where he had been

greeted as the “Caesar”. Necipoğlu notes that “this event marked the beginning of an

Ottoman preoccupation with Western emblems of sovereignty as a means to

challenge European rivals […]”136.

The helmet was a clear challenge for Charles V’s claims to be the world emperor,

especially after his coronation in Bologna, two years ago. His emperorship was never

appreciated by the Ottomans; neither Sultan, nor Ġbrahim Pasha called him as

“emperor”. Ġbrahim Pasha, in his diplomatic contacts with Venetian and Habsburg

embassies always underlined that there was one empire and one emperor in the

world; and there was no one than his master, Süleyman could claim to it.137 Charles

V was always called as the “King of Spain” by the Ottoman court, not the Emperor.

on a golden throne. In the tent, there was also a special chair for displaying the imperial helmet. See:

Kurz, 256.

134 For the accounts, see, Necipoğlu, 409.

135 Ibid., 410-417.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid., 411.

47

For the Ottomans, the sole legitimate emperor was Süleyman, himself. This

perception set the political and ideological grounds for Süleyman’s military

challenges against the Habsburgs.

2.1.2. Süleyman’s Responses to Charles V: Ottoman-Habsburg Military Rivalry

in Hungary.

The first theatre of war for Süleyman’s imperial strategy for universal sovereignty

was Hungary. The Kingdom of Hungary had been the only influential power

resisting the Ottoman advance in the Balkans from the fifteenth century. Thus, along

with Rome, the Hungarian Kingdom, in particular the city of Buda was perceived by

the Ottomans as another Red Apple, heralding the universal sovereignty.138 Hungary,

considered to be the “bulwark of Christianity” and prone to ally with the Habsburg

Emperor, was a threat for the Ottomans to be eliminated. Moreover, the Kingdom

was indirectly bounded to the realm of the Habsburg Emperor, since the King, Lajos

II, was married to the sister of Charles V and had no heir to succeed him. This made

the Kingdom open to the direct Habsburg possession. The conquest of Belgrade had

already facilitated the Ottomans to enter into the Central Europe and taking the

Kingdom of Hungary under the Ottoman control became an important concern of the

Ottoman imperial strategy.139

138 Fodor, “The View of Turk in Hungary”, 94-103. For another interesting study on how the

Ottomans were perceived by the Hungarians in relation to prophecies, rumors and military conflicts

and it reflection via poetry see: Ágnes Drosztmér, Images of Distance and Closeness: The Ottomans

in Sixteenth-Century Hungarian Vernacular Poetry, Central European University, 2016, (unpublished

Ph.D Dissertation).

139 It should be noted that following the conquest of Rhodes, the Ottomans started to consider a

campaign against the Hungarian Kingdom. In his relazione, dated to April 8, 1522, Marco Minio, the

Venetian Orator, mentions that the Ottomans decided to attack Hungary. Albèri, s.3, v.3, 75-76. For

further information about the Ottoman-Hungarian relations before the Battle of Mohacs, see: Ferenc

Szakály, “Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare”.

48

In August 1526, the Ottoman forces, situated in Belgrade, marched towards the plain

of Mohacs. The forces of Lajos were harmed in a day and the King himself was

killed. Following the Battle of Mohacs, the Ottomans conquered the city of Buda, the

royal center of the Hungarian Kingdom.140 To replace the King Lajos having no heir

to succeed, the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian Estates, known as the

opponents of the murdered King, elected, Janos Szapolyai, the Voivode of

Transylvania, as the new King of Hungary. This election seems to be organized or

supervised by Ottoman Sultan, who was intending to take Hungary and Hungarian

King under Ottoman vassalage and eliminate a possible Habsburg claim on the

Hungarian throne.141

However, Ferdinand I of Habsburg, the Archduke of Austria and brother and

lieutenant of Charles V, did not recognize this election by claiming his right of

inheritance over the Hungarian Kingdom. He seized Buda and he was crowned as the

king of Hungary on November 3.142 This would start an active diplomatic traffic

between Süleyman, Szapolyai and Ferdinand. In order to consolidate their authority

140 About the Battle of Mohacs, see: Géza Perjés, Mohaç Meydan Muharebesi, ed. by, ġerif BaĢtav,

(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,1992); Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman’ın Macaristan ve

Avrupa Siyaseti’nin”; Kumrular, “Orta Avrupa’nın Kaderini DeğiĢtiren” For military conditions and

the comparison of Ottoman-Hungarian forces, see: Feridun M. Emecen, “”Büyük Türk”e Pannoia

Düzlüklerini Açan SavaĢ Mohaç, 1526”, Muhteşem Süleyman, ed. by. Özlem Kumrular, (Ġstanbul.

Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 45-92.

141 It is possible to think that the election was realized under the Ottoman supervision. The Ottoman

Sultan and Ġbrahim Pasha had the idea of replacing King Lajos with Szapolyai before the Battle of

Mohacs. The letter of Alvise Gritti sent to the Venetian Senate dated to February 4, 1526, reveals that

during the preparations for the campaign, Szapolyai was perceived as the new authority in Hungary by

the Ottoman Porte: “[…] se mettiamo in hordine per andar in canpo et iudicho che per tutto el futturo

mese se mettaremo a chamino per andar in sochorso del re Zuane […]”; “[…] we are preparing us to

go to the campaign and I say that altogether in the next month we will hit the road to go to the aid of

King Zuanne”. Letter of Alvise Gritti to the Senate, February 4, 1526, ASV, Dispacci degli

Ambasciatori al Senato, f. 1-A. Here it is important to note that in the letter the year was written as

1525. However, the Venetian documents were dated according to the Venetian calendar, more veneto,

in which the new year started on March 1. To find the exact dates, one should add one year to the

years noted on the documents concerning the months of January and February.

142 Ferenc Szakaly mentions that most of the supporters of Janos Szapolyai changed side and started to

act with Ferdinand after the return of the Ottoman army. Szakaly, 42.

49

in the Hungarian territories, both Szapolyai and Ferdinand would initiate negotiations

with the Ottoman Porte via theirs representatives. In the meetings, closely followed

by Ġbrahim Pasha, Alvise Gritti would play a very active role first as the intermediary

for Szapolyai’s delegate, then as an Ottoman representative charged for

strengthening Szapolyai’s authority.143

On the other hand, Süleyman reached his aim. The Kingdom, shaken with the

political turmoil would never be a threat for the Ottoman borders. Moreover, the

rivalry between Szapolyai and Ferdinand would give the Sultan the legitimation for

entering into Central Europe and challenge the Habsburg authority. Furthermore,

Constantinople would became the center of negotiations, where the Ferdinand’s and

Szapolyai’s delegates would defend the causes of their sovereigns. This would make

the Sultan, and his other-self Ġbrahim Pasha, the primary figure in the sixteenth

century politics and diplomacy.

Following long negotiations of his envoys with the Ottoman government, Janos

Szapolyai agreed to be the vassal of the Ottoman Sultan and invited Süleyman to

restore his authority in 1529. On August 18, the Szapolyai met with Süleyman I on

the Mohacs steps and marched into the city of Buda. Following the re-conquest of

Buda, in the late September, Vienna was besieged, for 20 days. The strong resistance

of the Habsburg soldiers intercepted the Ottoman capture of the city. The war

became a defense of Christendom: Even Martin Luther, changed his mind on war

143 Gritti appeared in the diplomatic negotiations as the Hungarian orator. Then he was appointed by

Ġbrahim Pasha as the Ottoman orator for the Hungarian issues. When he was killed in 1534, he was

the Governor General and Treasurer of Hungary. For detailed information about the role of Alvise

Gritti in the Hungarian Question, see: Szakály, Lodovico Gritti in Hungary, Barta “Gritti

Ludovicus’un Macar Valiliği”; Otman, The Role of Alvise Gritti.

50

against the Turks and invited his followers to resist.144 Besides the strong resistance,

the lack of provisions and the climate conditions changed the course of war. The war

season had already passed, heavy rails had started to harm the Ottoman forces and

Vienna did not surrender. Having no significant gain, Süleyman ordered the

withdrawal. The armies headed to Buda.

The Siege of Vienna was the first Ottoman attempt to challenge the Habsburg in their

main and key territory; it was the first clear demonstration of the imperial plan,

claiming universal supremacy. However, the attempt resulted in a real fiasco.

Süleyman, then, would desperately need an ally in Hungary. Hence, after his return

to Buda, he crowned Szapolyai as the King of Hungary.145 The Sultan, also wearing

also the title of “Distributer of Crowns to the Monarchs of the World”146, reaccentuated

his supremacy in world politics by granting the crown of St. Stephen, to

144 Martin Luther, in his first orations, declared that to wage war against the Turks meant to challenge

the Divine will since the Turks were sent by God to punish the Christians for their sins. However,

when the Ottoman threat approached to Vienna he invited his followers to resist the enemy to secure

the Christianity. See, Soykut, 63-64. Another triggering factor for the Protestant assistance to

Ferdinand was the declaration of Charles V, accentuating that decisive imperial action would be

against the Protestants if they failed to support the Archduke in his hour of need. See: Stephen A.

Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555, (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1959), 65. Fischer-Galati clearly demonstrates that the Ottoman-Habsburg wars in

Central Europe offered the Protestants to demand concessions and facilitated the consolidations of

Protestantisim in Germany. For the Ottoman impact on Protestantism, see also: C. Max Kortepeter,

Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus, (New York: New York

University Press, 1972). For the percepition of the Ottomans on Protestans, challenging the “Spanish

King”, see: Isom-Verhaaren, “An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New

Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V”, Turcica, no:

28, (1996), 299-318.

145 Ġnalcık, Classical Age, 35-36. Peçevî notes an interesting detail about the Hungarian crown. He

narrates that, via his envoys Szapolyai sent the royal crown, symbol of the Medieval Hungarian

Kingdom to the Sultan since Süleyman had conquered Buda. The crown was taken, registered to the

imperial treasury and sent back to Szapolyai. The one chosen by Süleyman for such a symbolic

ceremony, was Alvise Gritti. See: Peçevî, 138-139.

146 Necipoğlu, 416. The Sultan use the aforementioned title even before the Hungarian campaigns. In

his letter to Francis in 1525, the Sultan had defined himself as the “tâc-bahş-i hüsrevân-ı rûy-i zemîn”.

See: Annie Berthier, “Un Document Retrouvé : La Première Lettre de Soliman au François Ier

(1526)”, Turcica, v.27, (1995): 263-266., 264. In 1538, after his Moldavian campaign, in the Bender

inscription he would accentuate that he had taken the land and the crown of the Hungarian king and

had granted it to one of his humble servants. See: Ġnalcık, “State and Sovereignty”, 68.

51

his vassal. This was the clear declaration of Süleyman of his being the sole authority

over Hungary and a symbolism curtaining the inefficiency of the 1529 Campaign.

Following the Siege of Vienna, and the coronation of Charles V of Habsburg as the

Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, the Ottoman again turned its attention to Hungary

and Austria. Ġbrahim Pasha convinced Süleyman I to force Ferdinand I to abandon all

his claims on Hungary and face with Charles V with a new expedition towards the

German territories.147 In the campaign of 1532, known as the German Expedition, the

Ottoman forces captured the Castle of Güns, in which the key of Vienna was

conserved; Süleyman invited Charles V, being in Lintz into the battlefield.148 A

branch of the army besieged the Castle of Esztergom with the Sultan’s order. By this,

it was intended to divide the Habsburg forces into two different branches and break

the resistance.149 In accordance with the land forces, the Ottoman navy sailed to the

Port of Preveza, to take precaution for any possible attack from the sea. As it was

discussed above the campaign was also enriched with a splendid power display,

challenging the coronation of Charles V two years before.

However, the campaign was another military fiasco. Neither Süleyman, nor Charles

V assumed the risk of a battle. Vienna could not be captured and beside the attacks

on Austrian border territories and castles, Ottomans could not achieve any fruitful

gain. On the other hand, the spread of Protestant uprisings in Germany prevented the

Emperor to transfer his forces to assist Ferdinand. Instead, he advised his brother to

negotiate with Sultan upon Hungary as soon as possible. On the other hand, the

Ottoman eastern borders were heated by the Safevid penetrations. Accordingly,

147 For Ġbrahim Pasha’s anti-Habsburg policy, see: Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman’ın”, 8.

148 Gökbilgin, “Kanun’i Sultan Süleyman’ın”, 22.

149 Kumrular, “Orta Avrupa’nın”, 59.

52

Süleyman ordered the retreat by emphasizing that the war season ended and Charles

V had no show in the battlefield. The campaign had no fruitful outcome for the

Sultan; but it resulted in with a significant loss, which would change the war theatre

of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry:150 Following the retreat the Ottoman armies,

Andrea Doria, who had been waiting in Sicily during the entire summer season

occupied Corone, considered as a key point in the Morea.151 The loss of such an

important strategic island alerted the Ottoman court to strengthen the imperial

armada and have a serious naval strategy. This event marked the opening of a new

war theatre: by 1532, the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V would be staged

in Western Mediterranean and this would introduce a new actor in the sixteenth

century Ottoman politics, a clever, opportunist and aggressive corsair, which would

be the Grand Admiral of the Sultan: Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Before discussing the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the western Mediterranean, here,

one should briefly analyze the Ottoman policy towards Hungary, which would also

help the historian to evaluate the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on

Corfu in 1537. The significance of the Kingdom of Hungary for the Ottomans was

briefly stated above. Besides being a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Habsburg

realms, Hungary was perceived to be used as a stepping stone for further Ottoman

penetration into the Central Europe. However, the Battle of Mohacs and the

subsequent Ottoman campaigns in Hungary in 1529 and in 1532 clearly demonstrate

that the Ottomans refrained from taking the Kingdom into the direct imperial control;

instead they sought some sort of suzerainty over Hungary. This policy led to the

150 Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics”, 13-14.

151 Although Süleyman sent 60 galleys to recapture the island, Andrea Doria had an upper hand.

Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti”, 24.

53

constant power struggles between Szapolyai and Ferdinand I made the Hungarian

territories a theatre of war for the Ottomans, until 1541.152 The long-lasting and

exhausting struggle over Hungary would result in the division of the kingdom into

three zones of influence and the Ottomans would eventually settle for having the

central part, including Buda under direct control.

In this context, the question of why the Ottomans did not aimed to control the entire

Hungary should be discussed. It can be argued that the main intention of the

Ottomans in the early 1530’s was to apply the traditional Ottoman method of

conquest in Hungary, which they had successfully implemented in the Balkans

before. In his article, entitled “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”153, Halil Ġnalcık reevaluates

the Ottoman policy of istimâlet154, derived from the Seljukid political

tradition, with a new concept of a gradual conquest. Ġnalcık asserts that the Ottoman

conquests had two distinct stages, which were applied almost systematically: The

Ottomans firstly sought to establish some sort of suzerainty over the states that they

intended to dominate. The states were taken under the political and military

protection of the Empire, against domestic and foreign threats and a branch of

Ottoman garrisons were situated to assist the local governors, securing their position.

These tributary vassal states both created buffer zones between the main territories of

152 See: Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary”.

153 Halil Ġnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, v. 2, 1954, 103-129.

154 İstimâlet means gaining good-will. The policy based on gaining the confidence and loyalty of the

non-Muslim subjects of the newly conquered territories by granting them religious freedom and

favorable taxation. The policy was successfully implemented in both Anatolia and the Balkans. See:

Mücteba Ġlgürel, “Ġstimâlet”, DİA, v. 23, 362-363. For recent studies discussing the theme, see: Murat

Tuğluca, “Osmanlı Hukukunun Yeniden Üretiminde Balkan Fetihleri ve Ġstimâlet Politikası”, Studies

of the Ottoman Domain, v.4, no:6, (February 2014), 21-38.Tom Papademetriou, Render unto Sultan:

Power, Authority and the Greek Orthodox Church in the early Ottoman Centuries, (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2015), 54, 63-106;

54

the Empire and Dârü‟l- Harb and were utilized as the stepping stones for the further

Ottoman expeditions. In the second phase, these vassal states were gradually taken

under the direct control of the Empire, by the elimination of local dynasties and by

the establishment of the tımar system.155 From that point of view, instead of

controlling the entire Hungarian territory, the Ottomans preferred to create a vassal

buffer zone between the Austrian Habsburg and Ottoman realms, which they would

use as a military base for future Ottoman maneuvers to Central Europe and to

gradually incorporate it into the Ottoman realm. It should be noted that in this policy

the Ottomans preferred to use Alvise Gritti, the political advisor of Ġbrahim Pasha,

who became an influential figure in the Ottoman policy towards Hungary by 1526, as

an Ottoman agent to control and limit the Ottoman vassal king Szapolyai and set the

grounds for Ottoman direct control over the region in the following years.

According to Pál Fodor, this strategy displays that the real intention of the Ottoman

Sultan was not entirely possessing Hungary; instead Süleyman engaged in a personal

rivalry with the Habsburg Emperor on the Habsburg lands, which would be beyond

the limits of Ottoman war machine.156 Logistical limitations did not ease Süleyman

to manage long-lasting campaigns in Austria and it became obvious in 1532 that the

Hungarian question could not be solved by capturing Vienna157 and with the swift of

the warfare from Central Europe to the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans missed

the opportunity for the entire control of Hungary and making it an important military

155 Ġnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, 103-104.

156 Fodor, “Ottoman Policy”, 333. Fodor also notes that upon the Sultan’s desire challenge Ferdinand

in Vienna, Ġbrahim Pasha warned him uttering that he would not be able to get food with a large army

like that. However the Sultan aimed at showing his capability to Ferdinand. See: Ibid, 285.

157 Ibid. 298.

55

base and defense line for the Empire.158 In this context, Fodor evaluate the imperial

strategy as partly rational in itself but immature to prioritize the actual needs and

reasonable gains of the Empire.159

2.1.3. A New Theatre in the Western Mediterranean: The Ottoman-Habsburg

Struggle over Tunis (1534-1535)

The Ottoman-Habsburg transferred to the western Mediterranean, especially after the

Habsburg Grand Admiral Andrea Doria’s occupation of Corone, following the

German Expedition in 1532. Actually, western Mediterranean became more

important for the Ottomans after the conquests of Syria and Egypt in 1517. From

then, eliminating any possible threat of the Christian corsairs at sea, shaking the

Ottoman authority in its sphere of influence became one of the major items in the

Ottoman political agenda.160 Palmira Brummett, in her book entitled Ottoman

Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, states that at the turn of

the sixteenth century, the Ottomans firmly and decisively set out to use the naval

power as an avenue to the world hegemony.161 By the reign of Sultan Bayezid II

(1481-1512), in which a powerful navy, capable of defending and supplying the

empire, had been built up, the Ottoman Empire became a seaborne empire, acting on

158 Pál Fodor, İmparatorluk Olmanın Dayanılmaz Ağırlığı, 101. Fodor argues that by 1532, with new

war-fronts in western Mediterranean, the Empire had to be present in various fronts and this led a

severe economic burden and resulted with no significant gain.

159 Fodor, “Ottoman Policy”, 284-285.

160 Andrew C. Hess, “The Moriscos”, 19.

161 Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, (Albany: State

University of New York Press), 90.

56

the eastern Mediterranean in the world history.162 The Empire, possessing a large

territory, had a significant advantage -in compassion to other states of time- in terms

of material and human sources for the production of sizeable armada in a relatively

short time, which were directly organized and controlled by the central government,

although it required a serious budgeting. In the building process, the government did

not hesitate to take the technical support from the foreign specialists; especially

experienced Venetians.163 On the other hand, the lack of skilled and trained seamen

to staff the armada was one of the most important problems that the government had

to figure out. For that reason, in times of war, the Empire incorporated the fleets of

Levantine corsairs into the imperial naval forces, acting with the permissions of the

Sultan, either temporarily or permanently.164

The political rivalry in the early sixteenth-century facilitated the corsairs to enlarge

their sphere of activity and to incorporate themselves as important political agents

into the rivalries between the leading states of the time. “They developed

independent political bodies and preserved their autonomy even when they were

operating under the aegis of empires, North African corsairs under that of the

162 Brummett evaluates that the need for a powerful navy was not only related with defending and

supplying the empire. To combat with Venice, leading the Mediterranean and to face with new actors

at sea such as France and Portugal pushed the imperial government to organize a compatible naval

force. For the discussions for the need of a powerful navy, building and financing processes, the

measures taken by the Ottoman government and the engaged operations. See: Ibid, 90-121.

163 For example, by the end of 1503, three galleys were constructed by an Italian ship-builder Andrea

Dere. See: Ibid, 93. In 1531, Giovan-Francesco Guistinian was unofficially sent to Constantinople by

the Venetian Republic to advise the Ottoman administration to engage in war with the Portuguese on

the Red Sea. Gusitinian, having the favor of the Grand Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha, was charged to build

new galleys and he became the advisor of the Ottoman arsenal and worked there until at least 1534.

See: Alberi, s.3, v.1, 19-20, 23; Alain Servantie, “Giovan-Francesco Giustinian: Osmanlı

Donanmasına Venedik Teknik Yardımı (1531-1534)”, Türkler ve Deniz, 147-162.

164 Brummett, 95-96. Ġdris Bostan mentions that the activities of the corsairs in Mediterranean lied to

early 15th century. Ġdris Bostan, “Beylikten Ġmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği”, Beylikten

İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği, (Ġstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 13-32, 24.

57

Ottomans and the Knights of St. John and the Uskoks165 under that of the

Habsburgs.”166 Emrah Safa Gürkan pointed the Ottoman collaboration with the

Levantine corsairs in the turn of the sixteenth century, should be evaluated as similar

the former policy of the employment of irregular military units (akıncı) to facilitate

the penetration into the Balkans, made in the fifteenth century.167 The Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry in the early sixteenth-century facilitated the employment of another

generation of the Levantine corsairs, operating in North Africa.168 This maneuver

enlarged the Ottoman sphere of operation through western Mediterranean and

opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry169, especially with the rise of

165 Uskoks were Christian refugees settled in Croatian mountainous territories following the Ottoman

conquests of Balkans. They were supported by the Habsburgs to engage in wars in the Ottoman

borderlands. Their mainle based in Senj. Uskoks also operated corsary in Albania. The raids of

Uskoks were dangerous both for the Ottomans and Venetians, having possessions in Albania and

became a problem between two states since the Ottomans used to consider that Uskoks were

supported by the Venetian Republic. Uskoks also acted as spies for the Habsburgs. About the Uskoks,

their activities and relations with Venice and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, see: Gunther E.

Rothenberg, “Venice and the Uskoks of Senj: 1537-1618”, The Journal of Modern History, v. 33, no:

2, 1961, 148-156; Philipp Longworth, “The Senj Uskoks Reconsidered”, The Slavonic and East

European Review, v. 52, no: 3, July 1979, 348-368; Catherine Wendy Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj:

Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1994); Ġdris Bostan, Adriyatik‟te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575 -1620,

(Ġstanbul: TimaĢ Yayınları, 2009) .

166 Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean, 111. Corsairs should not be confused with

pirates, whose operations were not supported by a legitimate political authority. The presence and the

activities of the corsairs were legitimized by the aegis of the states and corsairs should operate

according to the existing rules and traditions of navigation and the international treaties between the

states. See: Bostan, “Beylikten Ġmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği”, 24; Gürkan, “Batı Akdeniz’de

Osmanlı Korsanlığı”, 174.

167 Gürkan, “The Center and the Frontier”, 128.

168 Ibid.

169 A discussion on the spring and the activities of the Muslim corsairs in North Africa, their relations

with the Ottoman Empire and the process of incorporation exceeds the limits and scope of the present

study. For that reason, the author needs to settle for citing the recent studies of Emrah Safa Gürkan,

discussing in detail the role of corsairs in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century in the light of

the political conjuncture of the time and within the perspective of holy war against Christendom. See:

Gürkan, Ottoman Corsairs in Western Mediterranean; idem, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”;

idem, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, idem, “The Center of Frontier”.

58

one of the most famous corsairs of the time as the new Grand Admiral of Süleyman

by 1533: Hızır Hayreddin Reis170, alias Hayreddin Barbarossa171.

A native of Mytilene, Hızır was one of the four sons172 of Yakub, an Ottoman

cavalry in the region. In his youth, he engaged in trading between Mytilene, Salonica

and Euboea, by his own ship and occupied with the navigation in the Aegean Sea

with his brother Oruç, under the aegis of the prince Korkud, of Sultan Bayezid II. In

the reign of Selim I, Oruç and Hızır enlarged their sphere of influence in North

Africa and stated to use the port of Halkü‟l- Vâd, La Goulette173 by entering the

service of the Sultan of Tunis, Abu Abdullah Muhammed of Hafsid dynasty. In

1516, Barbarossa brothers engaged in wars with Spanish Habsburgs dominating the

region, controlled Algiers, and Oruç was declared as the Sultan of Algiers. Following

the death of Oruç, Hızır had to leave Algiers and sought the aegis of Sultan Selim in

1519, who would name him Hayreddin174 and appoint him as the Beylerbeyi of

Algiers. Barbarossa became the vassal of the Ottoman Sultan and therefore, Algiers

became, nominally, a part of the Ottoman realm.175

170 For some modern studies and biographical information about Hayreddin Barbarossa, see: A.

Galotta, “Khayr al-Din (Khıdır) Pasha, EI2; ġerafettin Turan, “Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha”, DİA, v.5,

65-67; Daniel Panzac, “Barbaros Hayreddin”, EITHREE; Soucek, “Remarks on Some Western and

Turkish Sources Dealing with the Barbarossa Brothers”, Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi,

is. 1, 1973, 63-76; idem, “The Rise of the Barbarossas in North Africa”, Turcica, v.7, 1975, 238-250;

Nicolas Vatin, “Comment Êtes-Vous Apparus, Toi et Ton Frère?”: Note Sur Les Origines des Frères

Barberousse”, Studia Islamica, v. 106, no: 1, (2011), 77-101

171 Barba rossa, red beard in Italian. The epithet was originally used for Oruç, the elder brother of

Hızır Hayreddin Pasha and after the death of Oruç, his epithet started to be used for his brother Hızır.

Soucek, “The Rise of the Barbarossas”, 249.

172 Ġshak, Oruç, Hızır and Ġlyas.

173 La Goletta (it.); la Goleta (spa.)

174 Hayr’üd-dîn means favorite of the faith.

175 Gürkan, “The Center and the Frontier”, 130.

59

However, the Ottoman cooperation with Hayreddin was limited before 1533.

Hayreddin had to face with local oppositions and a new wave of Spanish penetration

into the North Africa. In 1520, he had to leave Algiers. On the other hand, in 1520’s

the Ottomans the main objectives of the Ottomans were to secure the

communications between Constantinople and newly conquered Syria and Egypt and

to consolidate the Ottoman authority over Hungary.176 However, the reinforcement

of the Habsburg navy by the volte-face of Andrea Doria from the French to the

imperial camp in 1528, the military failures in 1529 and in 1532 and the Doria’s

attacks on the Ottoman coasts and his conquest of Corone changed the primary

concerns of the Ottoman imperial strategy.177

This would be a new phase in the carrier of Hayreddin Barbarossa: the famous

corsair, was called to Constantinople by the Sultan and following his meetings with

Ġbrahim Pasha, being in Aleppo for the Ottoman Campaign against Safevid Persia, he

was appointed as the Kapudân-ı Deryâ, Grand Admiral and the Beylerbeyi of

Mediterranean Islands178 on February 1534.179 The famous corsair, was charged of

176 Ibid, 132. According to Gürkan the lack of interest of the Ottoman administration on the western

Mediterranean prevented the spring of a fruitful alliance, between Hayreddin and other corsairs such

as Aydın Reis and Sinan Reis, recruited by Barbarossa to facilitate the Ottoman domination in the

western Mediterranean, which would have been an upper hand for the Ottomans in their rivalry with

the Habsburgs.

177 Ibid, 132-133.

178 The province, put under the administration of Barbarossa, was named as Cezâyir-i Bahr-ı Sefîd, the

Islands of the Mediterranean Sea. The word cezâyir is the plural form of the Ottoman word of cezîre,

meaning island. Since, Algiers is also named in Ottoman and modern Turkish also as Cezayir;

Barbarossa was wrongly referred to be as the Beylerbeyi of Algiers by some scholars. For detailed

information about the province see: Bostan, “Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid Eyaletinin KuruluĢu (1534)”,

Tarih Dergisi, is. 38, (2003), 61-77.

179 Bostan, “Barbaros Hayreddin: Ġlk Deniz Beylerbeyi (1534)”, Türk Denizcilik Tarihi, ed. by Ġdris

Bostan and Salih Özbaran, v.1, (Ġstanbul: Deniz Basımevi Müdürlüğü, 2009), 143-154, 145-148.

60

re-organizing the imperial arsenal, supervising the renovation of the Ottoman ships

and of facilitating the building of new ones.180

The first sphere of military maneuver in the Western Mediterranean, in which the

Ottomans and Habsburgs would settle their accounts was the city of Tunis. Tunis had

been put on the service of the Ottoman Sultan in the first decades of the sixteenthcentury

by Hayreddin Barbarossa and his brother Oruç; however, it was not taken

under the direct Ottoman control, in spite of the use of the port La Goulette, as a base

for wintering for the aforementioned corsairs serving to the Sublime Porte.181 The

appointment of Barbarossa as the Chief Admiral by the Ottoman Sultan in 1533,

made Tunis a target for the naval operations with the intention of creating a strong

naval base to secure the Ottoman sea frontiers and orienting the struggle to the ones

of the Habsburgs, which would facilitate the Ottomans to take the future military

initiatives into their own hands.182 In summer 1534, Barbarossa took Tunis under

Ottoman control.

The expedition of Tunis, operated by Hayreddin Barbarossa was the first Ottoman

attempt to dominate the Western Mediterranean.183 Indeed, it was an opening salvo

for an upcoming extended operation into the Italian peninsula. Tunis, controlling the

Gulf of Sicily, the passage between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean,

especially the port of La Goulette, would be an important port for the Ottomans, was

180 The appointment of Barbarossa to the command of the imperial Ottoman navy was related to the

“inexperience” of the Ottomans in navigation and their “fear” of Christian fleets by the contemporary

Venetians. For being a corsair, Barbarossa was perceived as “unaware” of the traditions of navigation

and in a sense “incapable” to have the risks for further maneuvers at sea in face to Christian navies

commanded by “noble” seamen. The Venetians would soon realize that they lapsed in their first

evaluations. See: Albèri, s.3, v.1, 18; Paruta, p.1, l.7, 336-337.

181 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 23.

182 Ibid, 25.

183 Ibid.

61

enabling to reach the Habsburg territories in a night-time.184 Before sailing to Tunis,

Barbarossa reached first Naples and Calabria; he destroyed numerous coastal castles

and towns; plundered them and took prisoners.185 Then, he sailed through Messina;

he attacked Sperlonga186, where he took 10.000 prisoners, plundered Sardinia, turned

and sailed towards the port of Bizerte in Tunis.187

Tunis was experiencing political struggles at the mentioned time: the kingdom was

under the control of the King Hasan of Hafsid Dynasty, since 1526. His brother

RaĢid had already gone to Constantinople with Barbarossa to ask the alliance of

Süleyman in order to restore his kingship against his brother, creating insecurity

among the Tunisian people. Barbarossa, being aware of the political situation there

and intending to obtain a strong naval base for the future Ottoman expeditions in the

Mediterranean, directed to La Goulette by declaring that RaĢid was in his company

to take the support of the local people. The King was routed and fled and leaving the

castle of La Goulette, Barbarossa entered the city of Tunis. The people discovering

the absence of RaĢid started to resist to the Admiral’s forces; however, with the

assistance of reinforcement troops coming from Algiers by the order of Barbarossa,

the Admiral could be able to control the city in the summer of 1534.188

184 Ibid.

185 Barbarossa’s forces attacked the towns of Calabria, namely San Lucido and Cetraro, where the

Papal galleys were situated, Procida in Naples and bombed Gaetà of today’s Lazio. Guglielmotti, v.1,

384. Giuglielmotti, mentions that the real motivation of Barbarossa was to go into Rome. He also

adds Barbarossa entered into the city of Fondi to kidnap Gulia Gonzaga, the Countess of Fondi,

known by her beauty. However, the Countess escaped in a night.

186 Coastal town in southwestern Italy being about half way between Rome and Naples.

187 Kâtip Çelebi, 93-94. Katip Çelebi notes that the main intention of Barbarossa was to expedite

towards Malta. After having plundered the coasts of Italy, the Admiral intended to sail towards

Algiers and because of the inconvenient winds, he reached the coasts of Tunisia.

188 See for the details: Ibid, 94-95. For an analysis of Barbarossa’s expedition of Tunis in 1534 in the

light of Spanish and Italian sources, see: Kumrular, “Ġspanyol ve Ġtalyan ArĢiv Kaynakları IĢığında

62

Emrah Safa Gürkan points out that the expedition of Tunis was decided personally

by Barbarossa, it was not an imperial strategy. The main motivation of the seaexpedition

leaded by him was to find a secure fortified naval base for the Ottoman

fleet for the future initiatives over Italy.189 As the other navies of the sixteenth

century, the main component of the Ottoman armada was galley. However, the

galleys, carrying large crew and having little hulls had to touch the shore often in

order to replenish the stocks of food and water for their large crews.190 So a galley

was unable to operate at sea for extended periods without having necessary supplies.

Thus, in the sixteenth-century, the galley fleets of the sixteenth-century needed wellfortified

secured naval bases from which they could operate.191 For that reason,

Barbarossa was also in search for a naval base, enabling him to operate in western

Mediterranean easily.

Barbarossa first attacked the costs of Naples. Since he could not be able to find a

convenient nearby base, he turned his face to Tunis. Gürkan also points out that if

Barbarossa had intended to seize Tunis as a main target, he would have taken RaĢid,

having claims on the Tunisian throne and being in Constantinople at that time, with

him and would pretend to be accompanied by him.192 The Admiral, experienced

deeply in sea matters seems to be eager to have an upper hand instead of Habsburg

naval forces, taking into consideration the strategical importance of the region. The

Barbaros’un 1534 Seferi, Türkler ve Deniz, ed. by Özlem Kumrular, (Ġstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007),

187-200.

189 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 26.

190 Ibid, 14-15; idem, “The Center and the Frontier”, 133.

191 See: Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys, 96-97.

192 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 26. See also: Soucek, Ottoman Maritime

Wars, 51-52. Kâtip Çelebi notes that Barbarossa had already have the idea of taking Tunis under the

Ottoman control and convinced the Ottoman Sultan to take it into the imperial agenda. See: Kâtip

Çelebi, 94.

63

conquest of Tunis was the direct response of the Admiral to Andrea Doria’s capture

of Corone following the German Expedition in 1532 and a threat for Italy and Spain.

Just for that reason, the Habsburgs did not fall behind to reply.

The Habsburg Emperor, Charles V, was alerted by the fall of Tunis, since Sicily and

Naples became open to the Ottoman attacks.193 With all his forces, he engaged a sea

expedition over Tunis. The Papacy, Genoa, Portugal, Tuscany and Malta also sent

their forces under his command.194 A gigantic armada, about 300 vessels, sailed out

with the Emperor himself on May 30, 1535. Charles V was the supreme commander,

Andrea Doria, held the naval command and the Marquis del Vasto was the

commander of the troops; the target was La Goulette.195

The siege of La Goulette continued about 30 days. Barbarossa had already strengthen

the Castle and sent numerous soldiers196 to defend it. The defense, mainly

commanded by Aydın and Sinan Reis197, was broken in the mid-July and the

Emperor entered Tunis on July 21. On August 8, Hasan, the overthrown King of

Tunis came to the camp of Charles V, kissed his hand and accepted to be his vassal

with an annual tribute of 12.000 ducats, six Moorish horses and 12 foals; thereby his

authority was restored. Charles V, actually had to chance of marching towards

Algiers; however, he preferred to deal with the struggles in Italy and came Rome

through Naples to celebrate his victory.

193 See: Guglielmotti, v.1, 398.

194 Guglielmotti, v.1, 415. For the Italian and Spanish Dukes participated into the expedition of 1535,

see: Alfonso Villoa, Vita del‟Invitissimo e Sacratissimo Imperator Carlo V, (Venice: Bottegha d’Alba,

1575), 137a.

195 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 53.

196 Guglielmotti,v.1, 417. Villoa gives the number of the Barbarossa’s soldiers as 6000. Villoa, 138a.

197 Ibid.

64

The conquest of Tunis was projected as a legendary victory, to enable the future

conquests of Constantinople and Jerusalem, to revive the spirit of crusade against the

Ottomans by Charles V and the Papacy. The existence of tapestries, romances,

gravures and portraits198 reflecting the scenes of war and Charles V, himself, proves

that the conquest was used as a mean of propaganda by Charles V for his claims to

be the leader of Christendom and universal supremacy. The propaganda, indeed,

curtained the genuine political intentions.199 The conquest was actually a part of the

strategy of forward defense against the Ottomans. Charles V never intended to

conquer the entire city, or the entire country, instead he turned his face to Europe.

According to Soucek, “Charles V’s main concerns were dynastic, territorial and

religious affairs on the European continent.”200 For that reason, he lost the chance of

making Tunis a strong Habsburg naval base.201

In the new course of encounter in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the

Mediterranean, in the early sixteenth century, Charles V attempted to maintain his

own possessions in the face of Ottoman hegemony in the Maghreb.202 Tunis, to be a

Habsburg possession until 1574, was the only Spanish acquisition in North Africa of

any significance; however, the conquest did not go beyond to create a vassal

198 See: Ceciliq Paredes, “Du Texte à l’Image: Les Tapisseries de la Conquête de Tunis et les

Gravures des Moeurs et Fachons des Turcs”, L‟Empire Ottoman dans l‟Europe de la Renaissance, ed.

by Alain Servantie, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 123-150. The conquest of Tunis was

also echoed in Spanish romances. See: Kumrular, “XVI. Yüzyılın Ġlk Yarısında”, 168.

199 For a detailed analysis about the conquest of Tunis, its initiation and reflections see: Sylvie

Deswarte-Rosa, “L’Expédition de Tunis (1535): Imagges, Interprétations, Répercussions Culturelles”,

Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance, ed. by Bartolomé Bennassar and Robert Sauzet, (Paris:

Champion, 1992), 75-132.

200 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 56.

201 Ibid.

202 Devereux, 286.

65

kingdom.203 The conquest initiated the Emperor’s cautious defense strategy in the

Mediterranean against the Ottoman attacks.204

The loss of Tunis in 1535 opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry: As

he did earlier, Süleyman would respond Charles V with a decisive military

campaign. This time the war theatre would be the Italian Peninsula. The military

failures in Vienna and Austrian border made apparent that the Ottomans had no

chance a decisive victory against the Habsburgs in Central Europe. Moreover, the

loss of Corone alerted the Ottoman government about the possible cooperation of the

Christian subjects of the Ottomans in Albania and in Morea with the Habsburg

Emperor. The next campaign would also intend to consolidate the Sultan’s authority

in these regions and the Ottoman war machine would turn against Apulia of the

Kingdom of Naples. While Süleyman would revive his ancestor’s project, he would

also attack his “mortal enemy” by underlining that he was the sole emperor, the real

Caesar, who would decide on Italy.

2.2. Footsteps towards 1537: Ottoman-French Convergence in the Early

Sixteenth Century, Directed against Charles V

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign in was the product of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry

in the early sixteenth century. As it was briefly discussed above, the Ottoman-

Habsburg imperial claims and military encounters between the years of 1526 and

203 Colin Imber mentions that the Spanish Habsburgs never wholeheartedly carried the reconquest in

North Africa but occupied only a few points on the coasts. The preoccupations about the European

mainland dominions inevitably turned their attention away from North Africa by the end of the

sixteenth century. According to him, North Africans preferred to cooperate with the Ottomans, since

they were Muslims and the enterprises of the corsairs weakened the Habsburg influence in the region.

Imber, “The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent”, 223.

204 Espinosa, “The Grand Strategy”, 276.

66

1535 grounded a new military enterprise in Italy, by which Süleyman would intend

to challenge Charles V, in one of the politically and ideologically important

dominions of his realm in 1537. However, neither the Apulian Campaign nor the

earlier military initiatives in Central Europe and western Mediterranean could be

evaluated as an isolated Ottoman moves from the actual political competitions of the

time; on the contrary, the Ottoman maneuvers were the products of the complex

political conjuncture of the early sixteenth century, in which the crowned-heads and

states of the time needed to position themselves accordingly. The competition

between the sovereigns and the states both gave the Porte a legitimate ground for the

implementation of its imperial policy and in a sense, invited the Ottomans to

intervene with the politics of Christendom. The most important one was the

Habsburg-Valois rivalry over Italy.

2.2.1. Habsburg-Valois Rivalry in Italy

The rivalry between the Habsburg and Valois dynasty of France had already been

initiated by the ancestors of Charles V and Francis I on the domination of the Duchy

of Milan and Kingdom of Naples and made the politically fragmented Italian

Peninsula a war theater. The possession of Milan was the essential issue for both

Francis I and Charles V. “For Francis it meant escape from encirclement and the

door to Italy and Naples, for Charles it was once the preservation of an imperial fief

and the maintenance of a line of communication between Spain via Genoa and

Germany.”205 In 1515, Francis I had taken Milan by force. To break the influence of

205 Hayward Keniston, “Peace Negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537-1538),

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, v. 102, no: 2 (April 30, 1958), 142-147, 147.

67

Francis I, not willing to give up his claims over Milan and Naples and not

recognizing the election of Charles V as the Holy Roman Emperor, the Emperor sent

his imperial troupes to Milan in 1521. Francesco Sforza was restored as the Duke of

Milan, hope to be a client of the Habsburg Emperor. The French response came three

years later: Francis I marched to northern Italy in October 1524 and seized Milan.

The first encounter between Charles V and Francis I re-started the Italian Wars and

forced the Italian states to enter unsteady alliances for the sake of their independent

states. The Republic of Venice perceived the rise of Habsburg as a threat for its

independence. The Emperor had already possessed Austria and Naples; if Milan

would be controlled Charles V, the Republic would be caged. On the other hand, the

Papacy had concerns on Charles V. The imperial project based on the unification of

Christendom could also threaten the independence of the Papal State. In November

1524, the Pope signed a treaty with the French King against the Emperor, in a month

the Republic of Venice also joined into the alliance.206 However, Charles V did not

quit the war theater: the imperial troupes attacked on the French camp in Pavia,

destroyed most of the French army on February 25, 1525 and the French King

Francis I was taken captive.207

2.2.2. The Fleur-de-Lys at the Porte: The Ottoman-French Relations (1525-

1534)

206 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 223-228.

207 Ibid, 229.

68

Francis’ defeat at Pavia and rising influence of Charles V in Italy did not only lay

ground the establishment of the League of Cognac208, but also invited the Ottoman

Sultan, Süleyman to the war theatre: Louis of Savoy, the mother and regent of

Francis I, opened a new diplomatic traffic with the Ottoman Sultan to ask his

assistance for the release of his son. Simultaneously, Francis I sent his own envoy to

Constantinople to inform the Sultan about the ongoing circumstances. Two French

envoys were sent to the Porte; only one, could safely arrive.209 Jean Frangipani, the

French envoy, presented two letters to Süleyman and with one another, addressing

the French King, he returned to France. In his letter, Süleyman declared Francis as

the following:

[…] Now, it is not something to be amazed about for the kings to be defeated

and taken prisoner. Keep your spirit up and do not be sad. Under these

conditions our great ancestors […] never refrained from expeditions to

always repulse the enemies and to conquer countries. We also on their course

and are always conquering countries and precipitous fortresses. Day and

night, our horses are always saddled and we carry our swards at our waists.210

The letter was announcing that Süleyman would appear at the theatre soon to help

the French King. One year later he defeated the Hungarian King, Lajos II at the

Battle of Mohacs and conquered Buda. As it was discussed above, the Ottomans had

already planned the invasion of the Kingdom of Hungary. However, the French seek

for assistance offered the Sultan a legitimate ground to engage in an imperial

208 The League was establish on May 22, 1526 by the Kingdom of France, The Republics of Venice

and Florence and the Duchy of Milan, against the Habsburg Emperor. Three months later the Papacy

also joined the League. Ibid, 241.

209 Charrière, v.1, 112-113. For the letter of Francis, see: Ibid, 119-121.

210“[…] İmdî padişâhlar sınmak ve habs olunmak „aceb değildir, gönlünüzü hoş tutup azürde-hatır

olmayasız. Eyle olsa, bizim âbâ –yi kirâm ve ecdâd-i izâmımız […] def‟-i düşmân ve feth-i memâlik

için seferden hâli olmayub biz dahi anların tarîkine sâlik olub her zamanda memleketler ve sa‟b ve

hasîn kaleler feth eyleyüb gece gündüz atımız eyerlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmıştır.” Cited in: Ġnalcık,

Turkey and Europe in History, (Ġstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2006), 155-156. Charrière gives the French

and Ottoman version of the letter, see: Charrière, 116-119. The letter was published in French also by

Annie Berthier. See : Berthier.

69

campaign. In 1526, Süleyman did not only pursue a holy war against an important

Christian dominion, but also position himself as the leader of the anti-Habsburg

league in the early sixteenth century. From then, Francis I would be one of his

partners in his almost life-long rivalry with Charles V and the French would be a

protégé of the Ottoman Sultan. This initiated the political Ottoman-French political

rapprochement against the Habsburg Emperor in the following years, which would

be resulted in an alliance for a joint attack on Italy in 1537.

Before 1525, the diplomatic relations between the Porte and the French Kingdom

used to be handled by the intermediary agents.211 With the office of Frangipani, the

French King could be able to set the direct contact with the Ottoman government. In

1528, another French envoy, Antonio Rincon212 was sent by the French King to

Sultan via Hungary. The mission of the ambassador was to facilitate the restitution of

the Christian Church in Jerusalem, which had been converted to a mosque and to

ratify the commercial privileges, to be granted by the Sultan, for the French

merchants.213 However the hidden agenda of these meetings was to encourage the

Sultan to engage further military operations against the Habsburg Emperor.214 Thus,

211 V.-L. Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 297.

212 Antonio Rincon, born in Medena del Campo, Spain used to be in the service of Charles V, as a

military commander. He revolted again Charles V in 1520 and the following year he escaped to

France. After having entered the service of the French King he acted as counselor and chamberlain.

He was murdered in Italy in 1541 by Charles V’s troupes, while on diplomatic mission for the French

King to the Ottoman Sultan. See: Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel, 63. As a qualified diplomat,

he undertook numerous missions in Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Before his meetings

within the Ottoman Port, he went to Hungary, to Transylvania and Poland; encouraged the

Transylvanian potentates and King Sigismund for military operations against the Austrian Habsburgs,

by the request of Francis. For the first diplomatic mission of Rincon, see: V.-L. Bourrilly, “La

Première Ambasade d’Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)”, Revue d‟Histoire Moderne et

Contemporaine (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, 1900-1901, 23-44.

213 Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 297-298. Süleyman did not accept the restitution of the

Church but confirmed the privileges granted to the French merchants in Egypt before. See: Jensen,

“The Ottoman Turks”, 453.

214 Bourilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 298.

70

the Ottoman initiative in 1529 was evaluated in Italy and in the Habsburg milieux, as

the French call of Turkish threat within Europe.215

2.2.3. The French Invite the Sultan into Italy

The Ottoman military failure in Vienna alerted the French King. By 1529, he had

already lost his Admiral Barbarossa to Charles V and forced to abandon all his

claims over Milan and Naples in favor to the Habsburg Emperor. The Siege of

Vienna clearly demonstrated that the Ottoman war machine was not capable to seize

the traditional Habsburg territories and to break the defense. Even the Protestants

started to resist the Ottoman invasion. For Francis, a further Ottoman attack on

Hungary or Austrian lands was no more beneficial. In order to restore his control

over Milan he needed to orient the Ottoman fire directly to Italy. In 1532, Antonio

Rincon was charged once more to negotiate with the Ottoman Sultan and was sent to

Constantinople. His mission was to persuade the Sultan to invade Italy. However

when he came to the Ottoman capital, the Sultan had already initiated the German

Expedition.216 He could not be able to persuade the Sultan for an invasion of Italy in

1532; however, he successfully communicated the message to the Ottoman

government.

The Ottoman-French plans for a joint attack on Italy started to be uttered even in

1532. As it was mentioned above, the German Expedition was designed as the

215 Ibid. Rincon was in the imperial camp during the Siege of Vienna and returned to France with

precious presents granted by the Ottoman Sultan, in 1530. See: Jensen, 454.

216 Bourrilly notes that the French King intended to encourage Süleyman via his diplomat to engage

in a campaign against Italy, by declaring that Charles V had a more vulnerable position there. This

would also grant the King the dominions on which he claimed the right of inheritance. See: Bourrilly,

““L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 298-299.

71

Sultan’s response to the coronation of Chares V by the Pope. This had been already

announced to Venice by Ġbrahim Pasha, stating that they would ruin both Charles V

and Clement VII, who had agreed to ruin the Ottomans.217 The clear declaration of

the Grand Vizier was swiftly announced to Italy via Venice. The Papacy was deeply

worried about an Ottoman attack to Bologna or directly to Rome. The rumor was put

on a solid ground by the French King: Francis I announced the Venetian ambassador

that the Sultan hates the Emperor and the Pope; he would make a naval expedition

and would enter in Rome to prove his being the real Caesar.218

This would have been a joint Franco-Turkish attack on Hapsburgs, for which

the grand vizier requested access to Venetian ports through Alvise Gritti. It

was believed that after this coordinated attack, the sultan would take Italy

under his protection, making Francis the legitimate sovereign of north Italy,

and appointing a vassal king to south Italy- a post thought to be destined for

Alvise Gritti. Ġbrahim Pasha confidently told Pietro Zen that after conquering

Rome, he would come to visit “the nobles of Venice who love the Sultan so

much”.219

The aforementioned passage clearly demonstrates that even by 1532 an Ottoman-

French joint attack on Italy had been negotiated and the region of Apulia was shown

as a target for the Ottoman fire. By 1532, the French started to loudly utter the

Ottoman intervention in Italy. In order to purse the Ottoman government, the French

King also initiated negotiations with Hayreddin Barbarossa. In 1534, it is know that

Barbarossa met a French ambassador in Modone and he accompanied the Admiral to

Tunis. Moreover, Francis I did not hesitate to send logistical support to the

Ottomans: Özlem Kumrular points out that, when Charles V entered La Goulette in

217 Necipoğlu, 411.

218 Ibid.; Finlay, “Al servizio”, 92-93.

219 Necipğolu, 411.

72

1535, it was noticed that numerous arms, used against the Spanish forces were

decorated with the coat of arms of French arsenals.220

It could be argued that the Ottoman military failures in 1529 and in 1532 led the

Porte to take the French King’s proposal more seriously. The loss of Tunis to Charles

V was also a triggering factor. The Sultan responded the Charles V election with the

Battle of Mohacs, his coronation with the German Expedition. The conquest of

Tunis, under his personal command would be responded by the invasion of Italy, by

a campaign personally leaded by Süleyman and the French would officially assist the

Sultan. The “Distributer of the Crowns” had also a say on the Italian crowns and the

campaign would show that Süleyman, as the sole inheritor of the Roman Emperors

would decide on Italy. The plan, which had been already announced by the French

King to the Venetian ambassador in 1532, would be restructured and realized in

1537, as an important step of the Ottoman imperial strategy of the early sixteenth

century. However, in this process, Süleyman would like to see another protégé of his

with himself; the most favorite Italian state for the Ottomans: the Republic of

Venice.

2.3. Walking on a Tightrope: The Serenissima and the Ottoman-Habsburg

Rivalry

The rise of Charles V claiming to establish universal sovereignty, was not only

disturbing for the Ottoman Sultan; but also for the Venetians. Among the Italian

states, it could be argued that in the early sixteenth century, the most powerful one

was the Republic of Venice, possessing also the Dalmatian Coast from Istria to

220 Kumrular, “Avrupa’nın ĠnĢasında Osmanlı Etkisi”, 43.

73

Albania and Ionian Islands controlling the Adriatic and Western Mediterranean, apart

from the Venetian lagoon.

Besides the territorial supremacy, Venice was also advantageous in economic and

military terms in comparison to the other Italian powers. Thanks to the long distance

commerce, especially with the Ottoman Empire and the oriental ports, by which the

Republic prospered in wealth, Venice could supply an effective military power

composed of great numbers of condottieri and an unrivaled navy to secure its

independence221 until the late eighteenth century. Although Venice was a Catholic

state, the religious affiliations were not the primary determinants of its policies.

Venice, for centuries, unlike the other states of the Peninsula, was a great power,

independent during most of its history; which was tightly linked with the Eastern

World rather than the Western political powers.222 To secure its political

independence and its territorial integrity, along with the economic prosperity, the

Republic established close contacts with first the Byzantine223 and then the Ottoman

Empires and became a major political actor in the Christendom, resisting the

authority of the Holy Roman Empire, intending to unite the Christian European states

under a sole political umbrella.

Since the Levantine trade was the raison d‟être of the Venetian economy, for the

Republic, establishing good relations with the Ottoman Porte was always an

important matter of policy. Cooperating with the Venetians was also important for

221 See: Robert Finlay, “The Immortal Republic: The Myth of Venice during the Italian Wars (1494-

1530)”, The Sixteenth Century Journal, v. 30, no: 4, Winter 1999, 931-944.

222 Adda B, Bozeran, Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient Near East to the

Opening of the Modern Age, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 457-459.

223 For the Venetian-Byzantine relations and how the Republic was influenced by the traditional

Byzantine Diplomacy, see: Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and

Cultural Relations, (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

74

the Ottomans. Venice was also politically supported, since it was the sole Italian state

resisting the rising hegemony of Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. In this regard,

the Republic was perceived as a useful agent, preventing the political unification of

the Christendom, which would threaten the Ottoman presence both in the Balkans

and in the Mediterranean. In the reign of Mehmed II, several lucrative commercial

and diplomatic privileges were given to Venetian merchants and residents within the

Ottoman realm.224 The ahidnâmes, given to the Republic were renewed by each

successor of the Ottoman throne.225 Even after the Ottoman-Venetian war between

the years of 1499 and 1503, the Republic immediately initiated diplomatic

negotiations with the Ottoman administration and could be able to have an extensive

ahidnâme.

Parallel to the commercial relations, diplomatic relations between the Serenissima

and the Ottoman Empire had also peculiar characteristics. By 1454, the Venetians

were privileged to have a resident bailo in Constantinople, and established consulates

in key commercial ports. Beside the official representation of the Republic, the bailo

in Constantinople was responsible to protect the rights and interests of Venetians and

secure the ongoing trade.226 This led the establishment of a wide-range Venetian

communication and information-gathering network within the Ottoman Empire, in

which numerous spies, trans-imperial agents and state officers played important

224 Halil Ġnalcık, “İmtiyazat”, EI2, v.3, 1179; Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, “Ahidnâme”, DİA, v.1, 536-540.

225 For brief information about the ahidnâmes given to Venice, see: Metin Ziya Köse, 1600-1630

Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik: Akdeniz‟de Rekabet ve Ticaret, (Ġstanbul: Giza Yayınları, 2010), 64-67.

226 For the Venetian baili and their role in Constantinople, see: Carla Coco, Flora Manzonetto, Baili

Veneziani alla Sublime Porta; ġakiroğlu, “Venedik Cumhuriyeti’nin Ġstanbul’daki Temsilcileri”, 44;

idem, “Balyos”, DİA, vol. 5, 43; Gino Benzoni, “A Proposito dei Baili Veneziani a Costantinopoli:

Qualche Spunto, Qualche Osservazione”, Studi Veneziani, no: 30, (1995), 69-77; Eric R. Dursteler,

“The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps”;

Tommsaso Bertelè, Venedik ve Konstantiniyye: Tarihte Osmanlı Venedik İlişkileri, (Ġstanbul: Kitap

Yayınevi, 2012). For the consulates, see: Maria Pia Pedani, “Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria”;

eadem, “Consoli Veneziani nei Porti”.

75

roles, besides the official diplomats.227 The bailate of Constantinople, especially after

the mid fifteenth century, was the center where the information was gathered,

analyzed, evaluated and spread and worked as a press office announcing the news

about the Ottoman Empire to Europe via Venice and also the agent of information

for the Ottomans informing the Porte about the developments in the West.228 The

information gathered in the Ottoman capital were directly orientated to Venice in

forms of letters, dispatches, notes and reports mostly by the Venetian baili and their

famiglie. These reports created an important collection of relazioni229, reports written

by Venetian baili, or other delegates and read before the Venetian Senate, following

their return to Venice. These reports, with the auxiliary sources of letters, dispatches,

notes, orders or travel accounts, can be considered as one of the most important

sources of information about the Ottoman socio-political, economic, financial and

cultural world.230

2.3.1 Defending the Serenissima: Venetian Policy in the Early Sixteenth Century

By the late fifteenth century, Venice pursued an aggressive expansionist policy in

Italy. The first phase of the Italian Wars was the product of the Venetian

expansionism towards Milan and led the establishment of an anti-Venetian league,

227 See: Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia; Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects.

228 Henry J. Kissling,“ Venezia come Centro di Informazioni sui Turchi.”, Venezia Centro di

Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente, Secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e Problemi v.1, ed. by, Hans Georg Back,

Manoussos Manoussacas and Agostinio Petrusi, (Florence: L.S. Olschkieditore, 1977), 97-109; Peter

Burke, “Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information”.

229 See: Queller, “The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni”, 174-196.

230 See: Ġnalcık, “An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations”; ġakiroğlu, “The Importance of the

Venetian Archives for Turkish-Arab Studies”, Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, no: 2, (1987), 91-

94.

76

by which the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the

Habsburg dynasty, intervene in the Italian affairs. Consequently, the defeat of

Agnadello231 in 1509 opened a new phase in the Venetian politics: by having to quit

its aggressive expansion policy in Italy, the Republic started to focus on defending its

own possessions. The Venetian policy of the early sixteenth century was based on

two main principles: fortifying the defense of Venetian dominions, including the

lagoon city, and preventing any foreign attack by using the Venetian diplomatic

network extensively. According to these principles, the Republic did not hesitate to

take its part in entangling alliances, and supporting the rivalry between other political

actors. The architect of this policy was Andrea Gritti, elected as Doge in 1523, who

would tend to follow a Pro-French and Pro-Ottoman policy during his office.232

Under the reign of Süleyman, the Ottoman-Venetian relations gained a new

momentum. As was mentioned above, Venice acted as the press office of the early

231 The Republic was the unrivaled Italian sea power. In the early sixteenth century, Venice started to

follow an expansion policy towards the Po Valley, to make the Republic the most important territorial

power of the Peninsula. However, the Venetian imperialism was considered more dangerous than a

foreign invasion. The allied forces of the League of Cambrai (Papal, Habsburg, Mantuan, Ferrarese,

Milanese and Spanish), organized by the Papacy ruined the Venetian army in Agnadello and Padua.

The defeat was a traumatic event for the Venetians and deeply influenced the Venetian politics.

Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli points out that in Agnadello “[…] in only one day Venetians lost what

they had conquered in eight hundred years with enormous efforts”. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe,

(Milan: Pillole Bur, 2006), 135. For the defeat of Agnadello and its impacts on the Venetian politics,

see: Lester J. Libby Jr., “Venetian History and Political Thought after 1509”, Studies in Renaissance,

v.20 (1973), 7-45; M. E. Maller, J. R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice

c. 1400 to 1617, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1984), 221-222; Edward Muir, “Was

There Republicanism in the Renaissance Republics?: Venice after Agnadello.” Venice Reconsidered,

137-167.

232 Andrea Gritti was perceived a hero by the Venetians thanks to his efforts for the peace negotiations

with the Ottoman Porte following the Ottoman Venetian war between 1499 and 1503 and for the

recovery of the Venetian terraferma after the defeat of Agnadello. As a residing merchant in

Constantinople, using his extensive network Gritti conducted the peace negotiations with the

Ottomans and sent as the ambassador for the ratification. Not only the Venetians but also the Ottoman

administration appreciated Gritti. After Agnadello, he undertook various offices; he served as

Provveditore Generale and as Procuratore di San Marco. In 1514 he acted as the Capitano del Mare

and recaptured Brescia and Verona in 1517, completing the recovery of Venetian terraferma. He wore

the cap of Doge upon the death of Antonio Grimani and conducted his office until his death in 1538.

For Andrea Gritti, see: Niccolò Barbarigo, Vità del Serenissimo Andrea Gritti, Prencipe di Venezia,

(Venice, 1686); Finlay, “Fabius Maximus in Venice”; idem “Politics and the Family in Renaissance

Venice”, 97-117. For the relazione of Andrea Gritti, dated to 1503 see: Albèri, s.3, v.3, 1-44.

77

sixteenth century: The succession of Süleyman was announced to Europe via Venice.

The Republic was also able to renew the ahidnâme, in 1521233 and secure the

favorable positions of the Venetians in the Ottoman realm. The appointment of

Ġbrahim Pasha to the Grand Vizierate and the rising influence of Alvise Gritti, who

was the son of the Doge and became an influential political figure of the time, gave

the Republic an upper hand to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Sultan.

Ġbrahim Pasha, known as the “friend of the Venetian government”234, during his

office, followed a pro-Venetian policy that “[…] gave the Venetians unconditional

protection both in Ottoman domains, including sometimes even sparing them from

the wrath of other pashas and also in international politics.”235 Alvise Gritti, on the

other hand, was used as an agent by the Serenissima to announce the ongoing

struggles in Italy and the needs of Venice and he became the major actor of the

Ottoman-Venetian alliance against Charles V.

On the other hand, securing the peace with the Habsburg Emperor was also vital for

the Republic’s interest. While informing the Ottoman Sultan about the developments

in Italy, the Republic did not forget to congratulate the Habsburg Emperor for his

great victory at Pavia.236 The main logic of this reciprocal disingenuous policy was

233 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 199. For the text of ahidnâme, see: ASV, Documenti

Turchi, Busta 14 (b.1, fasc.2, pezzi 3), s. 1, Capitulatione, in Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet ArĢivindeki

Türkçe Belgeler”, 42-46. For the ahidnames given to Venice, see: Metin Ziya Köse, 1600-1630

Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik: Akdeniz‟de Rekabet ve Ticaret, (Ġstanbul: Giza Yayınları, 2010), 64-67.

234 Albèri, s.3, v.3, 101. Since he was born in Parga, an earlier dominion of the Republic,

contemporary Venetians related the sympathy of Ġbrahim Pasha towards Venice with his origin. For

an example, see: Sanudo, v.35, col.259.

235 Turan, The Sultan’s Favorite: Ġbrahim Pasha, 273.

236 “The Venetian ambassador Gasparo Contarini offered him [Charles V] the Republic’s

congratulations as well as his own, “which ended with a wish that he might ere long, be crowned at

Constantinople.” In thanking Contarini for his kind words, Charles assured him “that I (have) never

had any other wish but to pacify Christendom and turn my forces against the infidel.” Setton, The

Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 229.

78

provoking these two rivals to engage in a battle, keeping them away from Italy and

the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Venetian territories could be secure from any

possible foreign invasion. The first attempt was successful; the Ottoman army, under

the command of Süleyman, himself, marched towards Buda, the heart of the

Hungarian Kingdom in 1526. The Republic also played an important role in the

Ottoman Campaign of 1529. The Habsburg imperial forces had sacked Rome in May

1527 and by the end of 1528, Francis I had been forced to sue for peace with the

Emperor by abandoning all his claims.237 The Republic of Venice, on the other hand,

hoped for the Ottoman victory at Vienna.238 In his letters to his son Alvise, Gritti

mentioned the desperate situation of the Republic and asked him to inform Ġbrahim

Pasha accordingly. In the letters, the Doge also notes that the Venetian ports could be

opened to the Ottomans and the fleet could assist them, if needed.239 The Republic

hoped for the Ottoman advance in 1529; however, the Siege of Vienna resulted in a

military fiasco.

2.3.2. Suspicious Neutrality

By 1529, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry became dangerous for the sake of the

Republic, despised as the “concubine” of the Ottoman Sultan, in Spain.240 The

Republic could no longer resist the Habsburg authority in Italy: In the absence of a

definite Ottoman victory against the Habsburgs, the Republic, caged by the Habsburg

237 Setton, v.3, 222-223.

238 Ibid, 223.

239 Andrea Gritti’s letters to Alvise (1529), ASV, Miscellanea Ducali ed Atti Diplomatici, Busta 22.

240 Preto, I Servizi Segreti, 117.

79

Emperor, who had consolidated his authority in the Italian Peninsula, by defeating

French and by being crowned by the Pope, started to pursue a more pro-Habsburg

foreign policy not to trigger Charles V to attack Venice for its being in alliance with

the Ottoman Sultan. In December 1529, the Serenissima came to terms with Charles

V. In order to persuade the Emperor, for Venice’s sincerity in not cooperating with

the Ottomans against him, the also declared Charles V that despite he was the son of

Doge Gritti, Alvise Gritti only served serving Szapolyai and the Ottoman Sultan in

Hungary.241

Accordingly, apart from informing the Ottoman government, mainly Ġbrahim Pasha,

about the deeds of Charles V, in 1532 the Republic did not play an active role in

1532. For a possible attack on the Venetian dominions, the Venetian government

reorganized and strengthened its defense ranks and sent 60 armed galleys to Corfu

under the command of the Captain General Vicenzo Capello. The Senate ordered

him to stay completely neutral and never intervene in any confrontation of the two

parties, unless the Venetian forces were directly attacked by any of them.242

Moreover, the Venetian fleet did not assist the defense of Corone and Andrea Doria

could easily operate with no Venetian opposition.

The Venetian policy of neutrality in face to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry by 1532

blurred the Venetian image in the eyes of the Ottomans and Venice started to be

suspected to be in secret alliance with Charles V. Especially, Andrea Doria’s

occupation of Corone was evaluated in the Ottoman court as the connivance of the

Venetians. The Ottoman Nişancı, Celâlzâde mentions in his chronicle that Corone

241 Sanudo, v. 53, col. 362.

242 Paruta, p. 1, l. 7, 327-328.

80

was captured by the Venetians.243 Venetian presence at the Gulf of Corfu with wellarmed

galleys could cause such an illusion, however, as Emrah Safa Gürkan

underlines, without Venetian cooperation, the Habsburgs could not take initiatives

for free sail across the waters under the Ottoman control.244 Accordingly, in

December 1532, Dragoman Yunus Bey, was sent to the Serenissima both to

announce the conquests and victories of the Ottoman Sultan245 and to warn the

Republic to act according to the Sultan’ demands.246 Following the loss of Tunis to

Charles V, the suspicions about Venice started to be uttered more loudly. Venice did

not trigger the Emperor but its policy of neutrality was not welcomed by the

Ottomans. From then on, the Republic, would be paralyzed between two fires and

had to adjust its policy towards the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, which would set the

ground for an Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537, to be discussed in the following

chapter of the present study.

243 Celâlzâde Mustafâ, Geschichte Sultan Süleyman, 284b-285a.

244 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 16-17.

245 See: Sanudo, v.43, cols.51-52; v. 52, cols. 370-372 and vol. 57, cols. 330-331. Traditionally,

fetihnâmes, letters describing the conquests and successes of the Ottoman sultans were sent via

Ottoman envoys to Venice. By them, the Ottomans intended both to inform the Republic, considered

to be an Ottoman ally and protégé about the victories of the Sultan and to challenge the Christian

sovereigns of the time, by using Venice, being the center of information in the sixteenth century, as an

Ottoman spokesman. Following the Battle of Mohacs, the Campaign of 1529 and the German

Expedition in 1532 fetihnâmes sent to Venice. For detailed information, see: Maria Pia Pedani,

“Ottoman Fetihnames: The Imperial Letters Announcing a Victory”, Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi, v.13,

no:1, (1998), 181-192.

246 Bilgin Aydın, “Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanları ve Osmanlı Kültür ve Diplomasisindeki Yerleri”,

Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi, no: 29, 2007, 41-86, 49. Venice was reminded that Venetian subjects

jumped to the Habsburg galleys in the course of war and the Republic was warned to control its

subjects well in order not to harm the Ottoman possessions. See: Paruta, p.1, l. 7, 332.

81

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the formulation of the Ottoman and Habsburg imperial

strategies, based on the sixteenth century expectations for a powerful God-ordained

monarch who would establish the universal peace and the Ottoman-Habsburg

military encounters in Central Europe and in the western Mediterranean from 1526 to

1535, to contextualize the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in

1537. It had been stated that the imperial claims of Süleyman I and Charles V led to

the rivalry between these two potentates and the other crowned-heads and the states

of the time adjusted their policies accordingly.

It was clearly demonstrated that the Habsburg-Valois rivalry for the domination of

Italy and for the political leadership of the Christendom paved the way to the

Ottoman intervention into the struggles between Christian powers. The French

demands of assistance gave Süleyman a legitimate ground for his desired projects

over Hungary and Italy and by emphasizing his being the real Caesar and the

“Distributer of the Crowns to the Monarchs of the World”. Sülyeman pursued a

policy against the rising influence of Charles V and tried to create vassal states for

his own to enlarge the Ottoman sphere of influence. The joint French-Ottoman attack

to Italy, though to be discussed behind closed doors in 1532 would elaborated in the

following years and in 1537 Süleyman would again try to establish some sort of

suzerainty this time in Italy.

The chapter has stated that the Ottoman maneuvers both in Hungary and in the

western Mediterranean were characterized as responses to the deeds of Charles V.

Süleyman responded to Pavia with the Battle of Mohacs, the sack of Rome with the

Siege of Vienna, the coronation of Charles V with the German Expedition, turned

82

into a splendid power display and Andrea Doria’s occupation of Corone with

Barbarossa’s conquests of Tunis. The Habsburg conquest of Tunis, by the personal

command of the Emperor, would be replied by an Ottoman campaign, personally

leaded by Süleyman in 1537. On the other hand what made the Italian Peninsula as

the new theatre of war for the Ottomans was both the Ottoman imperial claims over

Italy and the military failures in Vienna and that of the German Expedition.

It was demonstrated that in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, the Republic of Venice

played an important role. According to its policy of defense and neutrality by not

triggering any foreign power against Venice, the Serenissima, which was caged by

the Habsburg threat secretly supported an Ottoman-Habsburg war outside Italy and

provided the Sultan with information about the deeds and plans of Charles V. In the

mentioned period, the Ottoman Court, especially the Grand Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha

intended to secure the Ottoman-Venetian peace and to use it as an Ottoman agent in

Italy. Thanks to the favor of Pasha and the cleverly formulated Venetian foreign

policy, these two states never encountered at a war theatre before 1537. However, the

absence of a definite victory in 1529 and 1532 would push Venice to follow a more

pro-Habsburg foreign policy and to stay neutral in Ottoman-Habsburg encounters in

the western Mediterranean. Hence, especially after the loss of Corone and Tunis, the

Republic would be accused of being in secret alliance with Charles V by the

Ottoman administration, since it did not prevent the enemy’s penetration and it did

not assist the Ottoman fleet in its operations. This would ground the Ottoman-

Venetian encounter in 1537.

This chapter has discussed the grounds of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the

Attack on Corfu in 1537 to replace it the Ottoman military initiative within the

Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the early sixteenth century. Next chapter will focus on

83

1537 campaign, its formulation and realization with a special focus on Ottoman-

Venetian relations between 1532-1537 to decipher the main intentions of the

Ottomans in 1537 and to discuss in detail the Ottoman diplomatic pressure over

Venice and why an Ottoman attack of Corfu took place.

84

CHAPTER III

THE CRESCENT AGAINST THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE

OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU (1537)

A new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry opened in 1537 with the Ottoman

Apulian Campaign and the subsequent attack on Corfu. In the previous chapter of

this dissertation, the political developments and military maneuvers, influenced by

the discourse over the universal sovereignty between the years of 1526 and 1535

were discussed in detail to frame the Ottoman military initiative in 1537. This

chapter aims to offer a new historical narrative of 1537 to evaluate the Ottoman

campaign and to analyze it in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Accordingly,

the prelude of the campaign, its formulation and realization with a special focus on

Ottoman-Venetian relations to state why and how the Ottoman fire turned against a

Venetian dominion and how the campaign changed the course of Ottoman-Venetian

relations by 1537 will be discussed. The chapter also aims to reveal what the

Ottomans really intended to achieve in 1537 and to challenge the former studies,

evaluating the campaign as the Corfu Expedition.

85

In this context, the prelude of war is first taken under examination. Under the first

subtitle, the author discusses the establishment of the Ottoman-French alliance,

finalized in 1536, for a joint venture in Italy against Charles V to argue that the 1537

Campaign was the direct outcome of Ottoman-French alliance. Secondly, the author

intends to discuss why and how the Ottoman-Venetian relations were wounded by

1532 and how the Ottoman administration placed the Serenissima under pressure to

choose its side in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Accordingly, the reasons behind the

Ottoman perception of a secret alliance between Venice and Charles V is elaborated

in the light of new evidence. The author argues that the Venetian insistence on

staying neutral in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry intensified anti-Venetian approaches

within the Ottoman government and paved the way for an Ottoman attack on Corfu.

Secondly, the chapter discusses the campaign in detail. The Ottoman march to

Albania, the war preparations in Italy, especially in Venice, the invasion of Apulia,

commanded by Lütfi Pasha are narrated, along with the Venetian and Andrea Doria’s

attacks on the Ottoman ships and the subsequent Ottoman attack on Corfu. By

discussing the details of the campaign the author argues that the attack on Corfu was

the direct consequence of the existing tension between the Porte and the Serenissima,

and of the Venetian attacks on Ottoman ships.

Thirdly, the author aims to re-analyze the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on

Corfu and its effects on the Ottoman-Venetian relations. In this context, the author

offers to evaluate the Apulian Campaign as a venture to establish a vassal state in

Apulia, which would enable the future Ottoman domination in Italy, just as they had

intended to establish a vassal state in Hungary.

86

3.1. Moving towards 1537: The Ottoman-French Alliance and Tension between

the Porte and the Serenissima

It was obvious that Süleyman would respond the Charles V’s conquest of Tunis with

a new campaign. In 1529 and with the subsequent German Expedition of the

Ottoman Sultan had made no significant break in the Emperor’s authority. On the

contrary, Charles V had consolidated his authority over Italy. This led the Ottomans

to engage in a new strategy, in which the French King would have an active role.

3.1.1. My Enemy’s Enemy is My Friend: The Ottoman-French Alliance for a

Joint Operation in Italy (1533-1536)

It will not be an exaggeration to argue that the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 was the

direct outcome of the Ottoman-French convergence against the rise of Habsburg

power in the early sixteenth-century. Before 1525, the diplomatic relations between

these two states had been handled by intermediary agents.247 The previous chapter

has briefly discussed how the French King, Francis I, sought the assistance of

Süleyman after his defeat at Pavia248 as well as the subsequent Ottoman Campaign in

Hungary in 1526. As was mentioned before, this was the first implication of the

Ottoman-French convergence against the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. After 1525,

Francis I started to establish direct contacts with the Porte. In 1528, Antonio

Rincon249 was sent by the French King to the Sultan Süleyman via Hungary. The

247 V.-L. Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest et De Marillac a Constantinople (1535-1538), Revue

Historique, T. 76, Fasc. 2, 1901, 297-328, 297.

248 Remember the mission of Frangipani. See: Chapter Two.

249 Antonio Rincon, born in Medena del Campo, Spain used to be in the service of Charles V, as a

military commander. He revolted again Charles V in 1520 and the following year he escaped to

France. After having entered the service of the French King he acted as counselor and chamberlain.

He was murdered in Italy in 1541 by Charles V’s troupes, while on diplomatic mission for the French

87

mission of the ambassador was to facilitate the restitution of a church in Jerusalem,

which had been converted to a mosque and to ratify commercial privileges for the

French merchants.250 However the hidden agenda of these meetings was to

encourage the Sultan to engage in military operations against the Habsburg

dominions.251 For that reason, the Ottoman initiatives in 1529 were evaluated in Italy

and in the Habsburg milieu, as the result of French encouragement of Turkish threats

within Europe.252 In 1532, Rincon was charged once more to negotiate with the

Ottoman sultan and was sent to Constantinople. However when he came to the

Ottoman capital, the sultan had already been in Belgrade, in contrast to the desire of

the French King, who aimed to orient the Sultan to Italy.253

The military initiatives in Hungary and Germany were not totally unsuccessful for

the Ottoman Empire, but they did not bring about a definite victory either. Moreover,

the loss of Corone, occupied by Andrea Doria in 1532, had already alerted the

Ottoman administration to follow a serious towards over the Mediterranean; resulting

King to the Ottoman Sultan. See: Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel, 63. As a qualified diplomat,

he undertook numerous missions in Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Before his meetings

within the Ottoman Port, he went to Hungary, to Transylvania and Poland; encouraged the

Transylvanian potentates and King Sigismund for military operations against the Austrian Habsburgs,

by the request of Francis. For the first diplomatic mission of Rincon, see: V.-L. Bourrilly, “La

Première Ambasade d’Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)”, Revue d‟Histoire Moderne et

Contemporaine (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, 1900-1901, 23-44.

250 Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 297-298. Süleyman did not accept the restitution of the

Church but confirmed the privileges granted to the French merchants in Egypt before. See: Jensen,

“The Ottoman Turks”, 453.

251 Bourilly, “L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 298.

252 Ibid. Rincon was present in Vienna during the Ottoman Campaign and returned to France with

precious presents granted by the Ottoman Sultan, in 1530. See: Jensen, 454.

253 Bourrilly notes that the French King intended to encourage Süleyman via his diplomat to engage

in a campaign against Italy, by declaring that Charles V had a more vulnerable position there. This

would also grant the King the dominions on which he claimed the right of inheritance. See: Bourrilly,

““L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 298-299.

88

in the appointment of Hayreddin Barbarossa as the Chief Admiral.254 This also

accelerated French-Ottoman contact; the Ottomans were finally persuaded to take

Francis’ s proposals more seriously.

The main reason for the French-Ottoman convergence was the idea of reducing

Habsburg authority. From the French point of view, the alliance was more than

necessary because the King had lost the support of Henry VIII, the Pope and the

German Princes in his struggle with the Habsburg Emperor. For the Ottomans, on the

other hand, France was perceived as an important agent who could exhaust the

Habsburg forces on various fronts. As was mentioned before, in the loss of Corone to

Andrea Doria in 1532, the Ottomans started to question the sincerity of the Venetian

Republic, the friend, partner and the most important political ally of the Ottoman

Empire. The Republic, following a policy of neutrality in Ottoman-Habsburg

confrontations, did not give the upper hand to the Ottomans in their initiatives. For

that reason a new partnership with the French King seemed to be favorable. This idea

would be echoed in the Ottoman capital and communicated to the Sultan by a new

actor in the Ottoman administration, who intended to limit the Republic’s influence

within Ottoman politics: Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Barbarossa sent his envoys to Le Puy in France in July 1533.255 In November 1534,

another embassy from Barbarossa met with Francis I at Châtellerault and

accompanied the King to Paris. In the negotiations apart from the matter of

commercial privileges for the French merchants, an effective military plan against

the Habsburgs was also negotiated and a petition sent to Süleyman by Barbarossa

254 Halil Ġnalcık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi”, 129.

255 “Because of this embassy when Hayreddin captured Tunis in 1534 the Spanish claimed that he had

done so with the encouragement of François [Francis I].” Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel,

117.

89

communicating the articles dealt with the French King.256 In February 1535, Francis

sent his first official French diplomatic mission to Barbarossa and then to the

Ottoman Sultan, the ambassador Jean de la Forest.257 The mission of the ambassador

was to propose to the Sultan a joint French-Ottoman campaign against Italy, the

Kingdom of Naples in particular. De la Forest would thank Barbarossa for his help

and communicate that the French King would march towards Genoa, of which he

demand the rights of inheritance, the following year and would send 50 vessels to

join the admiral’s forces for his operations, as well as the necessary food and

munitions. The French King asked the Admiral to persuade the Sultan to engage in a

naval campaign against Italy while he would make a land expedition towards Genoa,

to assist the French King for restoring his authority in Sicily and Sardinia. Francis

also demanded for a financial support about 1.000.000 ducats for the aforementioned

operations which would, according to him, realize the universal peace. In response,

the King guaranteed his life-time friendship to the Sultan. The admiral would also be

asked to facilitate the safe travel of de la Forest to Constantinople.258

256 Ibid; Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 300.

257 Jean de la Forest was born in Auvergne in the late fifteenth century was a knight of the order of St.

John and the apostolic pronotary and abbot of Saint-Pierre-le-Vif-Lis-Sens. See: Jensen, “The

Ottoman Turks”, 455. De la Forest studied in Italy and he had the opportunity of being in Rome,

Florence and Venice before. He was familiar with the Ancient Greek and Italian languages. In his

appointment his competency in the Renaissance culture, politics and diplomacy could have played an

important role according to Bourrilly. See: Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 302.

258 The main demand of the French King was to persuade the Sultan to directly attack the Kingdom of

Naples instead of Hungary, where the Austrian Habsburgs could have the support of the German

princes. In that aspect, even the Sultan would refuse to give financial aid, he should be persuaded to

engage in campaign. Asking that, the ambassador also warned the Admiral about Andrea Doria who

had been planning to attack Tunis. For the instructions given by Francis I to Jean de la Forest, see:

Charrière, v.1, 255-263; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 392-393, 400. See also: Bourrilly,

“L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 303-305.

90

Jean de la Forest, with his cousin Charles de Marillac, the advocate of the French

Parliament, Guillaume Postel259, the humanist scholar, and his numerous companions

came to Constantinople in May 1535. Since the Sultan and the Grand Vizier Ġbrahim

Pasha was on campaign against Persia, he sent one of his attendants to Ġbrahim Pasha

in order to communicate the preparations of Charles V.260 The capture of Tunis by

Andrea Doria, in July 1535 and the death of Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan

made the French offer more favorable for both sides.

In February 1536, Jean de la Forest was able to negotiate a treaty with Ibrahim

Pasha. The treaty was presented as a commercial pact between the two countries but

indeed it was the document of a secret alliance against the Habsburg Emperor.261 By

the treaty, free trade between the countries was arranged under the guarantee of the

two sovereigns. The French King would be allowed to send a resident ambassador to

Constantinople, who would deal with the judicial issues of the subjects of the King,

the enslaved subjects of the two sovereigns would be set free, the French and

Ottoman ships would salute each other when they met. Besides these, a joint

259 Guillaume Postel accompanied the French ambassador to Constantinople to purchase rare objects

for Francis I. Postel is known with his studies on mathematics and oriental languages. He worked at

the Royal College as professor. In 1550’s, he published several books but he was forbidden to teach

because of his unorthodox beliefs. He, then, travelled to Italy. There, the Inquisition declared him to

be insane and imprisoned him for 4 years. He published a book on the Ottoman Empire, entitled, De

La Republique des Turcs in 1560. After his return to France in 1562, he was placed under home arrest

until 1581, when he died. See: Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 167-168. Postel evaluates

the Ottoman-French alliance in 1536 as the first step in obtaining the universal peace. His work

demonstrates that he had positive views about the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, especially in terms of

his justice on the state and international politics. He declares that the French was devoted to establish

the world peace and the Turks were triggered to be a part of it. He also underlines that the Turks

would convert to Christianity eventually. For detailed information about Guillaume Postel and his

works, see: William Bouwsma, Concordia Mundi: The Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel

(1510-1581), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

260 Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 306-307.

261 Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 117.

91

campaign was also agreed; the King would attack Lombardy and the Ottoman Sultan

would engage in a campaign against Naples.262

The Ottoman-French cooperation in the Mediterranean became visible right after the

official contacts. In the summer of 1536, the Spanish fortification of Cazaza in North

Africa controlled by the Muslim corsairs and a coalition of thirteen French and eight

Ottoman galleys attacked the Catalan coast near Barcelona. The coalition plundered

Ibiza in August and French pirates captured a Spanish ship containing gold bullion

from Peru.263 The attacks of the corsairs would result in an official military

expedition towards Italy in 1537.

In a broader sense, the alliance accord, agreed between Jean de la Forest and Ġbrahim

Pasha, was important in terms of officially inviting the Ottoman Sultan to join a

struggle in Christendom for the first time invited by a Christian crowned-head.

According to De Lamar Jensen, this “scandalous” alliance laid the foundation for a

long term cooperation between a Christian and a Muslim country that seemed to have

nothing in common other than their hatred and fear of the Habsburgs.264 On the other

hand, the French King and his ambitious policy were harshly criticized in European

circles, emphasizing that “the most Christian King’s” initiatives knifed Charles V’s

discourse of Pax Christiana. Here, the comment of the Habsburg Emperor deserves a

special attention: “During my entire life, I worked to bring an end to religious

262 For the details of the treaty, see: Charrière, v.1, 283-294. The treaty was dated as February 1535 in

Charrière. Here it should be underlined that the New Year in the French calendar did not begin until

Easter. For that reason, the date should be corrected as February 1536 according to the Gregorian

calendar. See: Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 455.

263 For detailed information, see: Espinosa, “The Grand Strategy of Charles V”, 276.

264 Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 453.

92

conflicts and to protect Christendom from the Turkish threat. Francis I gave his all to

strengthen the Turks and to extend the religious conflicts though.”265

As was mentioned above, the Ottoman-French Treaty of 1536, besides the

commercial privileges offered to the French and the right of representation at the

Ottoman Capital, is widely evaluated as solid proof of Ottoman-French political

cooperation against the Habsburg advance. According to the articles, on which both

sides agreed, Jean de la Forest stayed in Constantinople as the first French resident

ambassador. His cousin, Charles de Marillac returned to France, for the ratification

of the agreement, right after the meetings with Ibrahim Pasha.266 However, because

of the death of the Grand Vizier, executed in March 1536, the treaty was not ratified

by Süleyman.267 The first extended commercial privileges, known as capitulations,

which would hide again a political agenda on the eve of the campaign against

Cyprus, would be given to France in 1569, by which all Europeans, except the

Venetians, would trade with the Empire under the French flag.268

Here it should be underlined that the validity and the authenticity of 1536 treaty is a

matter of discussion in modern studies. Gaston Zeller points out that the terms of the

treaty did nor resemble the privileges given by the Ottoman Sultan, in accordance

with the other forms of ahidnâmes and the capitulations; instead the text has the

nature of a bilateral agreement, showing two sovereigns as equals to each other. The

absence of a manuscript document either in Paris or in Constantinople leads Zeller to

265 Gertrude Schwarzanfeld, Carlos V, Padre de Europa, (Madrid: 1958), s.266 cited in Kumular,

“XVI. Yüzyılın Ġlk Yarısında”, 168.

266 Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 456-457.

267 See: Halil Ġnalcık, “Ġmtiyâzât”, DİA, v.22, 245-252, 248.

268 Ibid.

93

suggest that the ambassador personally invented the treaty. Moreover, the draft of the

1536 agreement was brought to light for the first time in 1777 by Count François de

Saint-Priest, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, editing the important

documents of French diplomacy and it was published a hundred years later from the

documents found by him in the Library of the King.269 On the other hand, De Lamar

Jensen argues that “the text of the agreement itself reads very much as we would

expect it to as a unilateral grant of privilege from the sultan alone.”270 In that respect,

the author evaluates the articles of 1536 as the predecessors of the ones in the 1566

Capitulations. By showing two imperial edicts indicating the privileges given to the

French, which were written to Sancakbeyis and Kadıs of Jerussalem, in July 1536

and May 1549, Joseph Matuz shows the validity of the articles of 1536.271 Although

Zeki Arıkan indicates that these two imperial edicts do not prove the validity of the

Treaty of 1536, the indications in the 1569 Capitulations proves that the articles

agreed on 1536 were put in practice by the Ottoman administration.272

Apart from the discussions as to what extent the commercial privileges granted by

the Sultan were put into practice and the official ratification of the Treaty, issued by

Ġbrahim Pasha and Jean de la Forest, it could be argued that the meetings in 1536 and

269 Zeller points out that the absence of a long preamble enumerating the powers and dominions of the

Sultan in the text should lead the researcher to question the document about its authenticity. For that

reason, the author prefers to define the 1536 Treaty as the legend of “pseudo capitulations”. See:

Gaston Zeller, “Une Légende qui a la Vie Dure: Les Capitulations de 1535”, Revue d‟Historie

Moderne et Contemporaine, v.2, no: 2, April-June 1955, 127-132.

270 Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 455-456.

271 Joseph Matuz, “À Propos de la Validité des Capitulations de 1536 entre l’Empire Ottoman et la

France”, Turcica, no: 24, 1992, 183-192.

272 Arıkan evaluates how 1536 privileges were evaluated by the historians of the Turkish Republic in

his paper presented in the 8th International Congress of the Social and Economic History of Turkey

held by Uludağ University, in Bursa, on June 18-21, 1998. According to him the aforementioned

imperial edicts refers to the commercial privileges granted to the French in 1528 for Egypt, not the

agreement of 1536. See: Zeki Arıkan, “Cumhuriyet Ġdeolojisi ve 1536 Kapitülasyonları”, Papers-

VIIIth International Congress on the Economic and Social History of Turkey, (Morisville: Lulu Press,

2006), 145-156, 149-152.

94

the bilateral agreement, concealed by the treaty based on commercial privileges, on

the French-Ottoman military alliance against the Habsburg Emperor in Italy prepared

the ground for the Ottoman Campaign of Apulia in 1537. This would be the first

Ottoman-French joint venture against the Habsburgs. The French attacks in Northern

Italy, the presence of the ambassador de la Forest within the Ottoman imperial camp

in Valona273 and the participation of the forces of the Baron of Saint Blancard in the

Ottoman armada, to be discussed in detail in the following pages, support this

argument. The Treaty, or accord of alliance with the French King in particular is

evaluated as the last political enterprise of Ibrahim Pasha, playing the most important

role in Ottoman policymaking until 1536. The strategy designed by Ġbrahim Pasha,

on the other hand, would be realized by his successors, mainly by Hayreddin

Barbarossa.

3.1.2. The Lion between Two Fires: (1534-1536)

While the Ottomans were negotiating with the French, Ottoman-Venetian relations

entered a new phase. In the previous chapter the Venetian policy of neutrality in the

face to the struggles of great powers was discussed. As stated before, Venice, after

the defeat at Agnadello, had already started to strengthen the defense of the lagoon

and the Venetian dominions and to use diplomatic channels extensively. The policy

required an alliance with the Ottomans, in terms of both securing the gains of the

ongoing commerce and having the political support of the Ottoman Sultan to face

with any possible threat against the territorial integrity of the Republic. While

keeping its relations with the Ottoman Empire, the Republic had been also evading

273 Vlora/Vlorë (alb.)

95

any confrontation with the Habsburg Emperor, whereasconsolidating his authority in

the Italian Peninsula. When the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry reached a higher level

following the German Expedition in 1532, Venice needed to follow a more cautious

policy and finally came to terms with Charles V.

The suspicions about Venice, about its willingness to maintain the peace with the

Ottoman Sultan brought another challenging question forward: was the Republic in

secret alliance with Charles V? The Corone incident laid the groundwork of the

question. The conquest of Tunis by Andrea Doria in 1535 made this suspicion more

apparent though. Here it should be underlined that, here, the French ambassador,

Jean de la Forest, played a principal role: Before Doria’s conquest the ambassador

was able to convince the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, especially Ġbrahim

Pasha, that the Venetians were in a secret alliance with Charles V, and they would

unite their forces with the Emperor’s to attack the Sultan’s dominions in Greece.274

In addition to this suspicion, the ongoing conflicts on sea between Ottoman and

Venetian commercial ships augmented the Ottoman diplomatic pressure over the

Republic.

In March 1535, by a letter sent to the Doge, Andrea Gritti, by the Grand Vizier

Ġbrahim Pasha275, after having shared the information about the victory in Iraq and

Safevid territories, Venice was informed that the next Ottoman military initiative

would be by sea, to be commanded by Barbarossa. Moreover, the Republic was

274 Paruta, p. 1, l.7, 343.

275 ASV, Documenti Turchi, Sala Regina Margherita, Turchia Firmani, s. 4 XXXVI, n. 6, in, M.

Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet ArĢivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle Ġlgili Diğer

Belgeler”, Belgeler, v. 6-8, no. 9-12, 1968-1971, 1-152, 54-56. The letter was sent from Bagdad.

Ġbrahim Pasha was there because of the Ottoman expedition of Iraq at that time. In the letter, Pasha

used the title of “serasker sultan”, “commander-in-chief sultan” for himself. This choice of title would

be used to convince the Sultan about the Pasha’s intention of replacing himself by his opponents and

be a strong argument in his murder in the following year.

96

asked to act with the Ottomans, as the old-established friendship between the states

and the existing ahidnâme required. Ġbrahim Pasha addresses the Doge, as

following:

[…] it is required that according to your old-established friendship and to the

ahidnâme, you may also warn and confirm your men in your own ships to

move in cooperation; to act in a good accordance and alliance with the

aforementioned Hayreddin Pasha, [and you may] be in good alliance and

accord in terms of seizing the ships of pirates and corsairs, related to the

enemy when [they] sailed at sea. […] it is required that you may never omit

to communicate the accurate news about the enemy and various parties, [you

may not] to hold back constantly announcing [them] to the house [of the

Sultan], being the door of happiness.276

Thus the Republic was asked by the Porte to act in alliance with the Ottomans and to

inform the Empire about the maneuvers of the “enemy”. However, the Republic did

not totally meet that requirement. Another letter of Ġbrahim Pasha dated in May 1535

to the Doge reveals that news about the arrival of the “Spanish King” into the

German lands had reached the imperial capital but since the Serenissima had

remained silent about the issue, the Ottoman government did not properly relieve it.

Ġbrahim Pasha reminded the Doge and other Venetian nobles in the government that

according to the existent peace, Venice should have informed the Ottoman

government about the actual state of affairs before any other agent and asked for the

Venetian response on whether the news is accurate or not and the details about the

actions of the “seditious king”.277 A couple of months later, in November 1535

276 “[…] gerekdir ki, siz dahî kadîmi dostluğunuz üzere ve ʿahdnâme mûcebince kendü gemilerinüzde

olan adamlarınıza tenbîh ve teʾkîd idesiz ki müşarünileyh Hayreddîn Pâşâ deryâ yüzüne çıkdukda

sizin gemilerinüz dâhî anlar ile böyle olub, yek-dil ve yek-cihet olub, düşmâna müteʿalik olan harâmî

ve korsân gemilerini ele getürmek bâbında hüsn-i ittifâk ve ittihâd üzere olasız […] gerekdir ki dâimâ

düşmân câniblerinden ve sâir etrâf ve cevânibinden sahîh olan haberleri eksük itmeyüb muttasıl

âsitâne-i saʿâdet-i âşiyânelerine îʿlâm eylemekten hâlî olmayasız.” Ibid, 55. In the same passage,

Ġbrahim Pasha mentions that in addition to the forces of Barbarossa, it is agreed that an auxiliary fleet

would be sent from Constantinople too and under the command of the Sancakbeyi of Euboea,

Mehmed Bey. The Republic should act in accordance with these ships too.

277 ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 7, s. 8, fasc. 29, pez. 4, in, M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet

ArĢivindeki Vesikalar Külliyatında Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri”, Belgeler, v. 1, no. 2,

1964, 119-221, 156.

97

another letter of reproach and warning was sent to Andrea Gritti by the Grand Vizier.

In that letter, Ġbrahim Pasha underlined that the Sultan had sent Hayreddin

Barbarossa and his forces to help Venice and the Kingdom of France against the

Habsburg threat. However, when the Ottoman sea forces were faced with the attacks

of the enemy, the Habsburgs, in the campaign in North Africa, the Republic only

settled for informing the Ottoman government about the circumstances; it did not

offer any kind of help and assistance to Barbarossa. This was against the nature of

the existent friendship and peace between the two states. The Ottoman government

was capable of defining this via various sources; therefore, as a friend and ally,

Venice should have done more. It should have assisted the Ottoman sea forces since

the presence of the Ottomans in the mentioned zones was indeed a real guarantee of

the serenity and welfare of the Republic.278

The letters of the Grand Vizier clearly demonstrate that the attitude of the Venetian

government had already started to trouble the Ottoman administration concerning

Venice’s sincerity.279 In the last years of his grand vizierate, Ġbrahim Pasha started to

change his tune and tried to force the Serenissima to participate in the Ottoman-

French alliance against the Habsburg Emperor. The change in his attitude was

echoed too in a relazione of 1534. In the earlier reports, Venetian representatives

referred the Pasha with the title of “il magnifico”, like Sultan Süleyman and praised

him. However, the relazione of Daniello de Ludovisi dated to 1534, described

278 ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 7, s. 1, fasc. 28, pez. 3, in, Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman

Devri Belgeleri”, 162.

279 Besides the uncovered expectations, between the years of 1534 and 1536, the documents reveal

that the Ottoman and Venetian commercial ships had also conflicts at sea. Some of the Ottoman ships

were attacked by the Venetian commanders and corsairs, thought to be sailing by the consent of the

Republic and seized. Corsairs, authorized by the Porte, also attacked Venetian ships and enslaved the

crew inside. In this respect, the Ottoman administration issued several orders to the local governors to

decrease the tension and to prevent a possible chaos between the states. For some examples for the

conflicts, see:, Ibid, 142-143, 182, 184, 186-190 and Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet ArĢivindeki

Vesikalar”, 14-15, 18-20, 70-71, 75,80, 88.

98

Ibrahim Pasha as a devious character who did not hesitate to eliminate all talented

bureaucrats and soldiers in the state government just to secure his own authority also

alleging that he misled the Sultan about the military power of the Empire and invited

the lack of discipline and quality in the army just so as to be the sole actor in the

government.280 Ludovisi also emphasizes that in this situation the Pasha asked the

friendship of the Republic because he was aware that any confrontation would

dissolve the system and the state would experience a great chaos.281 The report

shows a clear change of perception about Ġbrahim Pasha. Here, one should keep in

mind that in the mentioned period, Ġbrahim Pasha was subject to strong criticisms of

the Ottoman high ranking bureaucrats because of his decisions and initiatives and

attitude. For that reason, Ludovisi could only reflect the views of the Ottomans.

However, it is highly possible that the threatening warnings of the Grand Vizier in

the face of Venetian maneuvers and his political pressure exerted to the Republic,

could also change the perceptions of the Venetian.

In any case, the peace with the Ottoman Sultan was favorable for the Republic.

However after 1535, not triggering the anger of the Habsburg Emperor against

Venice became more crucial for the Venetian government. The tough political

situation created a dilemma for Venetian politics too. A group of senators insisted on

being at peace with Charles V.282 After the conquest of Tunis, the Habsburg Emperor

280 See: Alberi, s.3, v.1, 10-13.

281 Ibid, 13.

282 The idea of making an alliance with Charles V was not the product of 1535; among the Venetian

nobles, there were numerous names favoring the alliance with the Habsburg Emperor in the earlier

years too. For instance, in his aforementioned report, Ludovisi announced Venetian Senate that the

land army of the Ottoman Sultan could never be superior to the German armies and the Ottomans

were not experienced in the affairs of sea since they were not active in commerce. Their armada was

not strong enough, even Hayreddin Barbarossa had strengthened it. Therefore, a strong Christian

armada under the command of Habsburg Emperor would easily defeat the Ottomans. Ludovisi notes

that informing Charles V about the actual situation of the Ottoman State might be the Senate’s

decision. See: Ibid, 17-19; 26-28.

99

suggested to the Venetian Senate that entering into the league, organized by the

Papacy against the Ottomans was more beneficial for the interest of the Republic.283

After a detailed consideration, the Senate replied to the Emperor that Venice always

worked for Christendom, but the conditions of the Republic were not suitable for

them to in a war with any state.284

The Ottoman administration was not satisfied with the neutrality of Venice; the

Sultan desired to have a clear answer as to which side Venice would position itself in

face of the new encounter planned to be realized in 1537. The French ambassador in

Venice tried to persuade the Senate to join the Ottoman-French alliance and to let the

Ottoman armada to penetrate into the Adriatic and to attack Apulia.285 In the fall of

1536, Yunus Bey was sent once more as Süleyman’s ambassador to Venice to force

the Republic to join the Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg Emperor.286

The Republic was stranded: Alvise Gritti, the son of the Doge, working for Süleyman

had already died in 1534; the Grand Vizier, known for his favor to the Republic had

just been executed by the Sultan; the influence of Barbarrossa, apparently utilizing a

discourse against Venice was rising; in other words, Venice had lost all its supporters

at the Ottoman Porte.287 The Senate explained to the ambassador that Venice had no

intention of disrupting the peace with the Ottoman Sultan, but since the Republic had

to sign a peace with Charles V in 1529, it ought to send military forces to Milan and

Naples against Francis I, in case of the Emperor’s call. Besides that the Republic

283At the same time, Charles V forced the Pope Paul III to excommunicate the French King, since he

had allied with the Ottoman Sultan. Taking into consideration the rise of Protestantism in Germany,

harming the Papacy, the Pope refused to do that. See: Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 401.

284 See: Paruta, p. 1, l.7, 344-347.

285 Ibid, p. 1, l.8, 352; Ursu, 101.

286 For the details of the mission of Yunus Bey, see: Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 407-410.

287 Ibid, 407-408.

100

respected the French King in all his deeds. However, the Republic could not be in an

alliance against the Habsburg Emperor; being at peace with all sovereigns was the

sole policy to be followed by the Venetian administration. The Senate also asked

Yunus Bey to communicate the desire of the Republic to renew the peace with the

Ottoman Sultan. This was not the reply that the Ottoman Sultan desired to have.

Yunus Bey left Venice on January 1537 promising that he would do his best to meet

the requests of Venice. However, the Republic had already realized that the war was

at door.288

On November 1536, the Venetian Senate voted to increase its navy of 27 galleys to

50, since the Ottoman Sultan, the French King and the Habsburg Emperor had

already started to increase the numbers of their own naval forces.289 On the other

hand, the Republic informed the Papacy about the war preparations of the Ottomans,

and called for the Pope to do his best to for secure Christendom since the Ottomans

would definitely attack Italy290, as well as asking financial support. In the meantime,

like the French King and the Ottoman Sultan, Charles V also pushed the Republic to

choose a side in the upcoming confrontation. In April 1537, a Habsburg ambassador

sent to Venice informed the Senate that the Emperor could send Andrea Doria in

case of an Ottoman attack to a Venetian possession. To inform the Admiral, the

Emperor wanted to have a clear answer to his offer. After long discussions in the

Senate, through expressing appreciation for the generous considerations of the

Emperor for Venetian interests, the government replied to the ambassador that the

288 Ibid, 409-410.

289 The Senate also proposed to maintain galleys at Candia, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Venice and in

Dalmatian waters. See: Ibid, v. 3, 402.

290 The Republic also sent to the Pope Paul III the copies of 25 letters about the Ottoman preparations,

sent from Constantinople to show how the situation was serious via his ambassador. Ibid.

101

Republic should proceed prudently in order not to run headlong into the blows and

perils that the Republic was about to encounter.291

The above mentioned discussions prove that on the eve of 1537 campaign, taking

into consideration the recent circumstances and tension with the Ottoman

government, the Serenissima realized that it should not blindly trust in peace with the

Ottomans. The policy of neutrality, basically formulated and well-implemented by

the Doge of Venice, Andrea Gritti, would not keep the Republic away from fire,

since Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry had entered a new phase, which might force Venice

to choose a side. The government was aware this Venetian attitude was not

welcomed by the Ottoman Sultan and that suspicions about Venice, had begun to be

voiced among the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, especially after the death of

Ġbrahim Pasha. By ordering his execution in 1536, the Sultan demonstrated that he

would overthrow anyone trying to misuse his trust. Although the Republic did not

directly ally with the Habsburg Emperor against the Ottomans and the French, the

needle of Venetian policy was tilting slightly closer to the side of Charles V. The

Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537 would complete that process.

3.2. The Crescent against the Eagle and the Lion: The Ottoman Campaign of

1537

The accord for a joint campaign against Charles V mobilized both the French King

and the Ottoman Sultan. For a land and naval expedition for 1537, war preparations

were accelerated. The Ottoman fleet would be one of the most important actor in the

plan: Hayreddin Barbarossa was charged to supply and strengthen the Ottoman fleet.

291 Ibid. 423-424.

102

It was also known that the Sultan even personally observed the arsenal in

Constantinople.292 The French King, on the other hand, did not wait for the Sultan’s

move. Surprisingly, in February 1536, Francis I moved his land armies towards

Milan, following the unexpected death of Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan.293

The French troops, with the participation of the Swiss soldiers too, quickly invaded

Savoy and marched on Turin.294 However, in July, the French initiative was

answered by Charles V295 with a disastrous invasion of Provence.296 Simultaneously

with the Habsburg invasion of Provence, Barbarossa attacked and raided Calabria in

September. Barbarossa’s attack was not a part of a joint operation, but it was obvious

that his presence weakened the hand of Habsburg Emperor and clearly showed the

Ottoman-French coordination and cooperation against him.297 These events were the

vivid ouverture for the summer of 1537, when the Crescent would encounter with the

Eagle and the Lion.

292 Bourrilly; “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 313.

293 Francesco Sforza had no heir. For the claims of Francis, I and Charles V over Milan at the

mentioned time, see: Tracy, 158-159.

294 Ibid.

295 The Habsburg Emperor also tried to mobilize the Papacy to call a league against the Ottomans and

the French allying with them. The French initiative was against the terms of peace on 1529. However,

Pope Paul III preferred to be neutral in the French-Habsburg confrontation in 1536, since the war

preparations of the Ottomans, echoed in the Holy See had been worrying the Pope. See: Paolo Giovio,

Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo di Mons. Paolo Giovio da Como, Vescova di Nocera-Seconda Parte,

(Venice: Al Segno della Concordia, 1608), l. 35, 399.

296 By September, Charles V ordered the retreat. The invasion was indeed a fiasco. The Lombardian

troupes of the Emperor had dome gains in Piedmont and attacked Genoa. But, Aix could not be

controlled as it had been desired and the French army marching back to Avignon, could not be

defeated. Moreover, most of the soldiers suffered great hardships and illness. See: Brandi, 380; Tracy,

160-162.

297 Jean de Monluc, a French ambassador in Rome, claimed that Barbarossa realized the attacks

according to the will of the French King. See: Charrière, v.1, 327. However, Ursu mentions that

despite the existence of his letters, there is no clear evidence supporting Jean de Monluc. Ursu, 99. On

the other hand, the Admiral’s attack of a Southern-Italian region, while the French King had been

marching into Piedmont could be evaluated as a limited rehearsal of the 1537 Campaign and a clear

demonstration of Ottoman-French cooperation.

103

3.2.1. Initiating the Campaign: The Ottoman Move on Valona

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign commenced in May 1537: the armada, composed of

160 galleys and 60 large vessels and carrying Ottoman troops, sailed from

Constantinople towards Valona in May under the command Lütfi Pasha, the Third

Vizier of Süleyman I. Hayreddin Barbarossa, the Chief Admiral, also participated

into this naval expedition with his own forces.298 Following the armada, on May 17,

Sultan Süleyman, with his two sons Mehmed and Selim, set out with his land army

from Constantinople to Albania, which had been considered as the western frontier

of the Ottoman realm, following the route of Çatalca, Adrianople, Plovdiv299, Skopje

and Elbasan.300 With the participation of the Rumelian army, the Ottoman land army

was thought to be composed of 200.000 soldiers.301 While these numbers cannot

necessarily be believed, it was obviously a very substantial force. The French

ambassador Jean de la Forest also accompanied the army.302 The navy reached the

298 Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 314-315. Lütfi Pasha was appointed as the headcommander

of the Ottoman navy and the soldiers and Hayreddin Barbarossa was the Chief Admiral.

During the expedition they were ordered to act in accordance to each other. See. Giovio, Delle Istoria

del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 423; Ġdris Bostan, “Corfu”, DİA, v. 26, 201-202, 201; Ġsmail Hami DaniĢmend,

İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, v.2, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945), 192-193.

299 During the Sultan’s stay in the city, the representative of the Hungarian King Szapolyai visited the

imperial camp and presented the King’s loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. DaniĢmend, 193.

300 The rûznâme, diary of the 1537 campaign gives all details about the Ottoman voyage and camps on

the route of Valona. See: Ahmed Feridun Bey, Mecmu‟a-ı Münşeat, v.1, 598-602.

301 Ibid, 192. The number of the soldiers was also stated as 200.000 by the contemporary, Paolo

Giovio. See: Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l.36, 423.

302 Jean de la Forest had the chance of directly observing the Ottoman campaign and continued to send

informative letters to the King and French authorities. The ambassador, however, could not keep

himself away from the plague epidemic and died in Valona in September 1537, before the culmination

of the Ottoman campaign. Following his death, Charles de Marillac replaced him. In 1538, Francis I

would send Antonio Rincon as his ambassador to Constantinople. See: Bourilly, “L’Ambassade de la

Forest”, 324; Jensen, 457. For Antonio Rincon, see: V. –L. Bourrilly, “Les Diplomats de François Ier :

Antonio Rincon et la Politique Orientale de François Ier (1522-1541), Revue Historique, tom. 113,

1913, 64-83, 268-308.

104

port of Valona two days before the land army, on July 11, an impressive feat of

coordination.303

Albania, especially Valona, was not a random choice for the imperial center for

operations of the 1537 Campaign. Valona had been a sancak of Ottoman Rumelia

since 1417 and Albania was mostly under the Ottoman control. The port of Valona,

situated opposite of Brindisi, was the nearest Ottoman dominion from which to cross

to Apulia and beneficial for the armada in terms of supplying the necessary food,

munitions and auxiliary forces. Moreover, Albania was an item on the Ottoman

policy agenda since chronic local unrest especially in the mountainous

countryside,304 had been shaking the control of the Ottoman governors.305 The

Ottomans overrun northern Epirus by the late fourteenth-century however the regions

close to the Adriatic shores were not under the strict Ottoman control. The towns like

Himara306 and Buthtotum307, opposite Corfu from the mainland, were controlled by

the local authorities being in close contacts with the Venetians, as well as the

Habsburgs. Thus, in order to consolidate the imperial rule in the entire Albanian

territory and to suppress the insurrections, the Ottomans needed to limit the sphere of

influences of the local authorities. In that context, the maneuver of the Ottoman

303 DaniĢmend, 193.

304 Mainly the insurrections and attacks headed by Uskoks.

305 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 25. See also: Machiel Kiel, “Avlonya”, DİA,

v.4, 118-120; idem, “Avlonya” EITHREE, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaof-

islam-3/avlonya-COM_23858, consulted online on November 13, 1017.

306 Himara (Himera) was the name of the ancient city in southern Albania, situated between Ceraunian

Mountains and the Ionian Sea. The people of the city, after the Ottoman control over the region,

refused to pay taxes to the Ottoman government, escaped to the high mountainous regions and

organized as small bandit groups. See: Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 425-426. Setton, v.

4, 903. The city is called as Cimara or Cimera in the Italian texts.

307 Buthrotum (Butrinto (it)) was an ancient Greek and Roman city in Epirus, which is situated in the

Vlorë County in Albania, close to the Greek border. The city was the closest point tying Corfu to the

mainland.

105

Sultan had two main dimensions: the navy would reach Apulia via Valona, as had

been agreed with the French delegate in 1536, and with the presence of the Sultan,

the region would be intimidated and totally controlled by the Ottoman land forces.

The Ottoman land army and the naval forces met at Valona in mid-July and there, the

Sultan called together his court to plan specific military maneuvers.308 Accordingly,

Süleyman ordered Lütfi Pasha309 to take the lead of the Ottoman armada, carrying

the high-ranking commanders of Rumelia and numerous Janissaries and cavalrymen

to attack Habsburg possessed Apulia. Thereby, although southern Italian regions

were used to experiencing numerous attacks by the Ottoman corsairs, even

Barbaossa’s as it was briefly discussed above, for the first time after 1480, Apulia

would be the stage for an organized Ottoman campaign. In other words, Süleyman

would revive the plan of Mehmed II, his great-grand father.

3.2.2. “The Turk” in Italy: Reactions to the Ottoman Campaign and the

Military Maneuvers in Apulia

Thanks to the information-gathering networks and the efforts of the diplomatic

mission, the aviso on the Sultan’s organization of a campaign in the Italian Peninsula

had already been disseminated throughout Italy and the Habsburg Empire. The fear

of a possible Ottoman attack had resulted in the neutrality of the Pope in Habsburg-

308 Before the Sultan’s arrival at Valona, a letter by Yunus Bey was sent to Venice, in which the

Republic was asked to send an ambassador to the imperial camp to salute the Sultan. The bailo of

Venice, Tommaso Mocenigo was on his way of return; thus, the Senate charged Valerio Orsini. Orsini

would reach Valona when the campaign had already initiated. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3,

424.

309 Most of the sources discussing the Ottoman attack of Apulia in 1537, Hayreddin Barbarossa is

noted as the commander of the armada, directly participating into the attacks. However, the accounts

of Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa, consulted by the author of the present study, clearly

demonstrate that the famous Admiral was in charge of watching over the sea-front and the Ottoman

navy during the Apulia campaign. The reader may find the details in the following chapter, discussing

how the Ottoman sources evaluate the Campaign of 1537. See: Chapter Four.

106

Valois encounter in 1536. The defense of Italy was vital for the Holy See. In the light

of some of the news voiced by the French diplomats in Rome.310 Pope Paul III even

considered evacuating Rome.311

Venice was also on alert: especially after the death of Ġbrahim Pasha, relations with

the Ottoman Empire entered a new phase. The refusal of the Venetian Senate to ally

with the French King and the Ottoman Sultan to attack the Habsburg dominions

increased political tension. The Republic had been accused of being in secret alliance

with the Habsburg Emperor by the Ottomans. Süleyman had already declared to the

Venetian bailo in Constantinople via his pashas that the attitude of the Republic in

terms of favoring the Habsburg Emperor and assisting him, apparently or in secret,

had been noticed by himself and he would directly declare war on Venice if the

Republic insisted on violating the rules of the existing ahidnâme.312 The Republic, as

usual, tried to deal with these problems diplomatically; but in 1537, most of the

channels were blocked. Therefore, the Republic strengthened the defense of Venetian

possessions. The number of galleys was increased to 100 and Girolamo Pesaro was

appointed as the Captain General of the Venetian armada. 10 galley-captains, elected

by the Consiglio dei Dieci, would also assist Pesaro, who would be in full command

of all matters of navigation, discipline and the administration of justice.313 The

310 A possible Ottoman attack to Rome was also speculated. For detailed information see: Charrière, v.

1, 330-340.

311 Ibid; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, v. 2, (Ġstanbul: Yeditepe

Yayınevi, 2011), 546.

312 Ursu, 100-101.

313 Paruta, p.1, l.8, 355. The Venetian Senate invested full authority to Pesaro concerning the Ottoman

Campaign of 1537. The General was authorized to open all letters sent to the Venetian government to

take necessary measures in time. Pesaro should confer with Alessandro Contarini and Francesco

Pasqualigo, other provveditori of the fleet but in all matters related to navigation, discipline and the

administration of justice he was in full command. He was given the authority of punishing anyone,

even to capital punishment. Pesaro was responsible for the food and munition supply for the fleet and

107

extensive power given to Pesaro by the Venetian government reflects how seriously

the Republic evaluated the actual situation. In the summer of 1537, Venetian galleys

would head to the Adriatic and Pesaro would sail for Corfu.314

Another close observer of the Ottomans was Andrea Doria. In response to the call of

the Papacy, Charles V agreed to put Andrea Doria in charge of the defense of Italy.

In the summer of 1537, Doria, with his forces, sailed towards Corfu. In his letter to

Minister Figuerda, dated July 14, 1537, Andrea Doria informed the Emperor that the

Ottoman armada was followed by supply ships and ships carrying many armed

soldiers sent from Alexandria. The Admiral also states that after having checked and

organized his forces, he would leave the port of Corfu.315 His presence in the

Adriatic would change the course of war.

As was noted above, the target of the Ottoman armada was Apulia. Instead of wellfortified

Brindisi or Otranto, the Ottoman forces landed at Taranto first316, eight

miles from Otranto. From Italian chronicles and further studies discussing the

Ottoman Campaign of 1537, it seems that this advice was gathered from an Italian

attendee of the Ottoman armada: Troilo Pignatello, a noble of Naples, whose brother

had been beheaded by the Viceroy of Naples, Pietro di Toledo. According to the

in case of necessity he would remind the commander of the Ottoman fleet that Venice had the right of

custody over Naxos and other islands in the Archipelago, according to the existing peace with the

Ottomans. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 423.

314 Doria’s use of the port of Corfu might have annoyed the Ottomans considering that thanks to their

efficient information gathering networks they most probably got informed about the Venetian

permission for the use of their main naval base. It might be also considered as a proof for Habsburg-

Venetian alliance by the Ottomans. Next chapter of this present study will discuss how the Ottomans

viewed the Habsburg-Venetian cooperation in 1537. See: Chapter Four.

315 Muzaffer Arıkan and Paolino Toledo published the correspondences of Andrea Doria and Spanish

Generals conserved in the Spanish archives. See: Muzaffer Arıkan, Paolino Toledo, “Türk Deniz

Tarihi ile Ġlgili Belgeler V: III. BarıĢ ArayıĢı: Andrea Doria ile Hayrettin PaĢa Arasındaki

Müzakereler (1537-1540)”, OTAM, No.6, 1995, 387-407. For the Doria’s letter mentioned in the text

see: Ibid., 391.

316 The town had been the possession of Mercurino Gattinara, died in 1530.

108

story they narrate, Pignatello came to Constantinople with his men and applied to the

Ottoman Sultan to restore his authority in Naples in 1533.317 His presence with the

Ottoman armada was thought to be important so as to have the support of local

people and opponents of the Viceroy, which would give the Ottomans the upper hand

in trying to control the region.318 Approximately 10.000 Ottoman soldiers moved

then to Castro and Otranto. Numerous small fortresses were captured, the towns were

burned and plundered and many people were captured, including women.319 Giovio

notes that “[…] such that from Taranto to Brindisi, the entire territory of Otranto was

troubled by fear and great danger […]”320.

The attacks on Apulia were realized by a relatively small branch of the Ottoman

imperial army, recruited for 1537. According to Kenneth M. Setton, the attack on

Apulia may have been a diversion, or an exploratory thrust to observe whether the

French forces were ready to attack Piedmont, as had been agreed, upon the forces of

Charles V in the Po Valley.321 However, in April and May 1537, Francis I moved his

317 Iacomo Bosio mentions that Pignatello was a brave and opportunist Neapolitan warrior. He

persuaded the Sultan by announcing that the forces of Charles V had been in Piedmont, dealing with

the French, and he could easily invade Naples, since the Neapolitans were suffering from the high

taxation pursued by the Emperor they would revolt against him following his invasion. Iacomo Bosio,

Dell‟Istoria della Sacra Religione et Illustrissima Militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano, p.3, l.9,

(Rome, 1602), 169. As the commander of light cavalry, Pignatello had also participated into the

Italian wars and fought with Papal and Habsburg forces in Vicenza in 1516 and in 1521. See: Sanudo,

v.22, cols. 81, 226; v. 31, col.232.

318 See: Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 424; Villoa, 147b-148a; Guglielmotti, v.1, 434.

The story of Pignatello was also discussed in the Venetian accounts on Ottoman Campaign of 1537,

which will be discussed in the Chapter Five. Here, it should be noted that in the Ottoman chronicles,

consulted for this study, there is no reference to Troilo Pignatello.

319 DaniĢmend, 194; Zinkeisen,, 546; Renzo Sèrtoli Salis, MuhteĢem Süleyman, (Ankara: Ankara

Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), 152.

320 “[…] talche da Taranto fino a Brindisi, tutta terra d‟Otranto era travagliata da paura e pericolo

[…]”. Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l.36, 425.

321 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 431.

109

forces to Picardie and Artois in northern France.322 By late July, the Ottomans were

now in southeastern Italy but there was no sign of the French in the northern Italy.

When the Ottoman land army came to Valona, the French Ambassador, Jean de la

Forest, received a letter from Francis I announcing that despite the fact that he had

captured most of Flanders, after having been informed that the Ottoman Sultan had

set out on campaign in accordance with the plans made a year before, he left the

region; returned to Lyon and was waiting for the army that he would use to attack

Italy. The French King also mentioned that he had ordered his fleet, composed of 30

galleys, 12 bastardas and a number of barcas and cogs to proceed to meet the

Ottoman armada.323 However, the operations in Piedmont could not be initiated

simultaneously with the Ottoman attacks. Even the aforementioned French fleet,

sent to operate with the Ottoman armada, under the command of the Bertrand

d’Ornezan, Baron of Saint-Blancard did not sail east from Marseilles until August

15.324

The Ottoman-French joint venture of 1537 was indeed a fiasco: The French King

could not send his army to Italy in July because Charles V had counterattacked at

Thérouanne in northern France. When Francis left for Italy325, it was too late to

coordinate his campaign with the campaign of the Ottoman Sultan.326 The French

322 Ibid, 430; Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 118.

323 “Report of the news sent from king of France to his ambassador”, TSMA, E. 2990 cited in Isom-

Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 118. For brief information about the differences between the

ships, see: Appendix A.

324 Ibid. For the Baron of Saint-Blancard, see: Pierre Grillon, “La Croisière de Baron de Saint-

Blancard, 1537-1538” Revue d‟Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, vol. 15, no : 4, 1968, 624-661.

325 The fire between the Habsburg and French forces stopped after the Peace of Bomy, dated July 31,

1537. Grillon, 628.

326 Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 119.

110

fleet, on the other hand, met with Hayreddin Pasha near Prevesa on September 9.327

Baron de Saint-Blancard reached the Ottoman imperial camp, but he was not able to

persuade the Ottoman Sultan to plunder not only Apulia but Sicily and the Marches

of Ancona as well. French forces would invade Italy and recapture Piedmont only in

October 1537 after the Ottoman campaign had ended.328 The absence of the French

also changed the course of Ottoman campaign. The attacks in Apulia could not go

beyond a substantial plundering expedition.329

3.2.3. All ll Roads Lead to Corfu?: Encounters at Sea and the Ottoman Siege of

Corfu

As was mentioned in the previous pages, the gigantic armada sent to the Adriatic and

the large army led by the Sultan alarmed the Papacy, the Republic of Venice and the

Habsburg Emperor. However, Ottoman military machine prevented each party to

engage in any attack on Ottoman forces, which might orient the Ottoman fire to their

own territories. Instead, not only the Habsburgs, but also the Venetians and Papacy

preferred to be in defense for any possible Ottoman attack. For that reason, all forces

were watching the circumstances and trying to position themselves accordingly.

Venice had to act cautiously: the suspicions of the Ottomans about Venice could

easily change the target of the campaign to a Venetian dominion. Therefore, when

the Serenissima sent its forces to watch over the Ottoman maneuvers and to defend

the strategical Venetian dominions, the Captain General of the Venetian armada

327 Grillon, 639.

328 Isom-Verhaaren, Alliance with the Infidel, 119.

329 Actually, if the Ottomans had actually landed an army in the Marches of Ancona, the Habsburg

situation would have been much more serious. Apulia was always a strategically bad target for any

real cooperation because of the geographical limitations.

111

Girolamo Pesaro was clearly warned not to disrupt the peace, by engaging in an open

conflict with any of the belligerents, which would overtorn the neutrality of Venice.

However, the personal initiatives of the Venetian captains changed the course of the

campaign of 1537. The Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships, followed by Doria’s

attacks. While the Ottomans were ravaging Apulia and capturing towns and castles,

the maritime theatre suddenly heated up.

3.2.3.1. Violating the Peace: Ottoman-Venetian Encounters in Adriatic and the

Role of Andrea Doria

The Ottoman armada reached the Port of Valona in mid-July through the Gulf of

Corfu, where a number of Venetian galleys under the command of Pesaro had been

positioned to watch the events and to assist in the defense of the Venetian dominions

and the Adriatic, without any Venetian opposition: the Ottoman and Venetian ships

had saluted each other according to sea custom and to the requirements of the peace

between the states.330 However, the commander331 of the galley of Zadar took an

aggressive stance against the Ottoman cargo ships, schirazzi332, coming from

Alexandria and carrying provisions for the campaign, on July 13.333 This was not

acceptable to Süleyman: Venice should act according to the requirements of the

existing peace and promptly recompense the loss.

330 Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l.36, 424.

331 Sopracomito (it.)

332 Schirazzo (it.), schriazzi (pl.)

333 Guglielmotti, v.1, 436. Giovio, on the other hand, noted that the attack was realized by Andrea

Doria, sailing around Cefalonia. See: Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 425.

112

To pass the aforementioned request of the Sultan, Yunus Bey was sent to Admiral

Pesaro at Corfu, by two galleys and a galeotta. However, Venetian captains securing

the Channel attacked the Ottoman ships. The galley of the Ottoman ambassador was

chased and landed at Himara. The majority of the crew in the galleys were killed and

the rest of them, including Yunus Bey, were imprisoned.334 General Pesaro, after

having noticed the incident, sent Francesco Zeno to rescue the ambassador by paying

ransom to the Himarans and to send him back to the Valona.335 Venice tried to

apologize by punishing the actors in the attack severely and corresponding with

Giacomo da Canale, Venetian ambassador in the Ottoman imperial camp at Valona,

to persuade the Sultan of the Republic’s willingness to secure the peace with him.336

However, the Venetian captains could not be totally controlled: during the course of

campaign Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships continued and caused the loss of

soldiers and a significant amount of provisions. In addition to the Venetian attacks,

Ottoman ships came under Doria’s fire in late July: on July 22, Andrea Doria met 12

Ottoman galleys, left behind by the main body of ships at night, while he was sailing

around the Diapontia Islands.337. The forces of Doria attacked the galleys; plundered

them and in the conclusion of a bloody battle most of their crews either died or

jumped into the sea.338 In his letter to Charles V, dated to July 29, 1537, the Admiral

334 Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 425-426; Guglielmotti, v.1, 437-438.

335 Giovio reflect this attack also as a deed of Andrea Doria. See: Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo,

l.36, 425-426. Following the incident, Pesaro wrote to Venetian Senate to ask the permission of

punishing the responsible of such a provocative venture. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, 425.

336 Ibid.

337 Diapontia Islands are island complex in the Ionians Sea, in the northwest of Corfu. (six km. to

Corfu) One of the main islands among them is the island of Ereikoussa, Merlera in Italian. In the

contemporary Italian texts, the islands are called as the Islands of Merlere (isole Merlere).

338 Paruta, l. 7, 369. Alfonso Villoa and Paolo Giovio mention that the attacks were commanded by

Antonio Doria, cousin of Andrea Doria and add that the Admiral frustrated in face to such an event

since it could trigger Barbarossa, being closer to the Doria’s forces. See: Villoa, 148b; Giovio, Delle

113

pointed out that despite he had the chance of capturing all the Ottoman galleys by the

extraordinary efforts of his forces, Ottomans ha left his galleys in a very vulnerable

position. To protect his forces, he had to retreat to Messina. Doria also adds that he

needed to stay there to secure his forces and to offer his best for the Emperor as

required.339

The aforementioned encounters at sea during the Ottoman Campaign convinced the

Sultan, and his commanders that Venice was in secret alliance with the Habsburg

Emperor and his admiral, Doria, and had broken the peace with the Ottoman sultan.

In addition to the attacks, the Barbarossa’s men had captured two letters written by

Andrea Doria to the Venetian captain general, Pesaro.340 In his study of the history of

the Ottoman Empire, Zinkeisen, who consulted mainly the records of the Venetian

Senate and correspondences between the ambassadors and state officers, argues that

Doria intentionally transmitted the letters into the hands of the Ottoman couriers in

the course of struggles, to provoke the Ottomans against Venice. By this tactical

maneuver by the Admiral, the Apulian territories would be secured from the Ottoman

Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 426-427. Antonio Doria was a Genovese captain who had officially

joined the Habsburg Imperial fleet and become a vassal of Charles V in 1533. He also undersigned a

work narrating military and political events taking place in the reign of Charles V. His account was

composed on 1560’s, and first published in 1571. Antonio Doria, Compendio d‟Antonio Doria delle

Cose di Sua Notitia e Memoria Occorse al Mondı nel Tempo dell‟Imperatore Carlo Quinto, (Genoa:

Bellone, 1571). For further information about Antonio Doria and a detailed analysis of Compendio in

comparison to other contemporary Italian narratives about the theme within the context of the concept

of “universal Empire”, see: Matteo Salonia, “Charles V’s Universal Empire in the Compendio of

Antonio Doria, Renaissance Studies, (first published online, August 19, 2017), DOI: 10.1111/rest.

12324, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rest.12324/epdf , accessed on November 18, 2017.

339 “Letter of Andrea Doria to the Emperor”, Muzaffer Arıkan, Paolino Toledo, “Türk Deniz Tarihi ile

Ġlgili Belgeler”, 392. Giovio and Villoa also note that the Admiral first sailed to Paxos and, after

having noticed that Barbarossa was coming on his forces, Doria retreated to Messina. Giovio, Delle

Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 426-427; Villoa, 148b.

340 Bourrilly, “L’Ambassade de la Forest”, 324.

114

threat by redirecting it to the dominions of the Republic, which had been trying to

secure the peace with the Ottoman Sultan at any cost.341

Such an analysis based on the official attitude of the Republic, seems to be consistent

at first sight; however, one should keep in mind that in the process of war,

communication between the commanders, watching out for the same threat, could

not be regarded as so strange. Taking into consideration that the Venetian Captain

General Pesaro, had been already authorized to open all letters sent to the

Serenissima to take necessary measures, and given the supreme authority in naval

operations by the Venetian government, his sharing of intelligence about the moves

of the Ottomans with the Habsburg Admiral would not be totally impossible. The

presence of Andrea Doria, so close to Corfu is meaningful too. Although the

Venetian forces were ordered not to be a part of struggles between Habsburg and

Ottoman forces, Pesaro’s ineffectiveness in preventing such an encounter near Corfu

should be evaluated beyond his limited foresight: Venice was also at peace with the

Habsburg Emperor and the Republic ought to share information with the Habsburgs

as well. Any confrontation with the Habsburgs might have put the Republic in

another difficult situation, hard to be faced.

As was mentioned above, the Republic had already been accused of being in secret

alliance with the Habsburg Emperor by the Ottoman government. The Venetian

attacks on Ottoman ships, the capture of Yunus Bey, coupled with the deeds of Doria

in July 1537, when the Ottomans were in an offensive against the Habsburg Emperor

in Italy, were seen as breaking of the existing peace and as a casus belli by the

Ottoman Sultan, advised in this mainly by Barbarossa. The war against Charles V

341 Zinkeisen, v.2, 549. Pierre Grillon also agrees with that hypothesis. Grillon, 638.

115

turned against Venice and the island of Corfu became the new stage: this would be

the end of 34 years of peace between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman

Empire.

3.2.3.2. The Crescent Attacking “a Crescent”: The Ottoman Siege of Corfu

The Island of Corfu, possessed by the Venetians since 1386, became the new target

of the Ottoman campaign, in August 1537. The question of whether the crescent

form of the island, being under the Christian cross, was another motivation for the

Ottomans is open to speculation, though with no actual evidence. However, besides

its being the closest Venetian dominion, which could easily be reached by the

Ottoman forces, in the course of 1537 Campaign; the strategical importance of the

island and its meaning for the Serenissima made it obviously an important target for

fire. Corfu, thanks to its position, was perceived as one of the most important

Venetian dominions, watching over the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and the sea

route to and from the lagoon city. For that reason, the island was well-fortified

against attacks by the Venetian government. Even before the Ottoman campaign in

1537, as was discussed earlier, the defense of the island had been strengthened and

the captain general of Venice had been sent to Corfu to watch the moves of the

Ottomans. In that context, the loss of Corfu to the Ottomans and the consolidation of

Ottoman power in the Adriatic would have created vulnerability for Venice, as well

as for the entire Italian Peninsula.

Here, it should be underlined that the island was not initially on the Ottoman agenda

for 1537 though the strategic position of Corfu had already been observed almost a

century ago. Following the conquest of Modone in 1499, Corfu started to be

116

considered as the key the Adriatic by the Ottomans, opening the route to the Gulf of

Venice. Even in the time of Sultan Bayezid II, the Ottomans had an eye on Corfu

with a view of breaking the hegemony of the Venetians in the Mediterranean.342 The

relazione of Pietro Zen, the Venetian orator and vice bailo in Constantinople, dated

to 1524, demonstrates that the former Grand Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha and other Ottoman

pashas had also plans for Corfu. Since the Grand Vizier was in the Ottoman

campaign in Egypt in 1524, Zen could have been able to consult with the Third

Vizier of Süleyman, Mustafa Pasha. Zen informed the Serenissima that although

Ġbrahim Pasha was intending to secure the peace existing between Venice and the

Ottoman Sultan –since the Ottoman armada was not powerful enough- he and other

pashas in the government who had an eye on Corfu, perceived the island as a

stepping stone to reach all that the Ottomans desired to have. Zen also underlines

that he was advised by Mustafa Pasha to warn the Republic to act according to the

will of Sultan, by taking into consideration the aforementioned desire of conquering

Corfu and by remembering the fact that the Sultan had already conquered Belgrade

and Rhodes, by which Süleyman had showeh his power to realize his desires. His

conversations with the Pasha led Zen to advise the Venetian Senate to take necessary

measures for Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia, already in 1524.343

The Third Vizier might have intended to intimidate the Venetian ambassador by

“revealing” the imperial plans over Corfu and Venetian possessions in general, in

342 In the famous book of Pîrî Reis, Kitâb-ı Bahriyye, it is mentioned that the famous Admiral of

Bayezid II, used to point out that Venice had two eyes; the left one being the castle of Modone and the

right one being the Island of Corfu and by taking his advises the Sultan engaged in a campaign for the

conquest of Corfu but he could not have accomplished it because of the end of the sea season for war.

Bostan, “Korfu”, 201. Maria Pia Pedani also cites the related passage in her article. See: Pedani,

“Ottoman Merchants in Adriatic”, 156. Katip Çelebi, whose work on Ottoman Maritime Wars, which

will be discussed in detail in the following chapter of this study also notes the statements of Pîrî Reis.

See: Kâtip Çelebi, 50-51.

343 See: Alberi, s.3, v.3, 93-97, 96-97. The Venetians had been afraid from a possible Ottoman attack

to Corfu even in 1533. See: Sanudo, v. 58, col. 12.

117

order to force the Republic to act according to the will of the Sultan. However, the

statements of Mustafa Pasha, noted by Pietro Zen also reveal that possessing Corfu

was a matter of discussion within the Ottoman government. The policy-makers of the

Ottoman Empire were the high-ranking state bureaucrats and one should remember

that in the sixteenth-century they were closely following developments and

formulated their strategies accordingly.344 In that context, the strategical importance

of the island as a naval base345, which was needed by the Ottomans for their future

plans could not have been overlooked by the Ottoman government, especially by

Ġbrahim Pasha, formulating the “grand strategy” of the early sixteenth-century.

However, what motivated the Ottomans to attack Corfu was the disappointing

venture of Apulia and Doria’s and the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during

the Ottoman campaign in 1537. In mid- August, the Ottoman campaign was far from

its actual targets: the French army had not shown itself in northern Italy; thus the

Ottomans did not transport the rest of its soldiers to the Peninsula. The attacks on

Apulia remained as ad-hoc expedition of pillage. The Ottomans had been in Valona

with a gigantic land army. Their only meaningful success was the suppression of the

rebellious Albanians by the efforts of the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha and the Second

Vizier Mustafa Pasha, while the armada was in Apulia.346 Such a great campaign,

designed to be a display of power to Charles V needed to be concluded with

significant gains. For that reason, the attacks of Venetians and Andrea Doria created

the pretext for the Ottomans to open a new front in the course of campaign: it would

be also a punishment for Venice for its betrayal.

344 Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 14.

345 Remember the discussions on galley warfare in the sixteenth-century and on the need for secured

fortified naval bases for the gallet fleets of the states. See: Chapter Two.

346 See: Chapter IV

118

According to the Italian chronicles, the one who wholeheartedly advocated the attack

on Corfu was Hayreddin Barbarossa.347 Following the return of the armada headed

by Lütfi Pasha to Valona348, Süleyman ordered the Pasha and Barbarossa to attack

Corfu; he moved, with the land army, to the city of Buthrotum, opposite Corfu on the

mainland.

The Venetian Senate, at that time, was desperate to prevent the war, using its wellknown

diplomacy. In a letter dated to August 23, the Senate writes to the bailo

Alessandro Orsino, being in the imperial camp of Süleyman, as following:

[…] having received the present letter you should go to the magnificent

pashas to whom you will insist beginning with such general and affectionate

words as shall seem best to your prudence […] that our Signoria has felt and

feels the greatest displeasure and distress at the disorders that have occurred,

which are truly events (succesi) contrary to our expectation and desire, which

is firmly and immutably fixed upon observing inviolably the peace which we

have the most serene Grand Signore […]349

However it was too late: two days later, the Ottoman Attack on Corfu commenced.

On August 25, 25.000 soldiers and 30 cannons were transferred to Corfu by the

Ottomans.350 Four days later Ayas and Mustafa and Mehmed Pashas- the latter was

the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia- with their forces joined the attack.351 During the first

assault, a commercial ship of a Corfiote merchant was also captured and the

merchant sent to the city center to ask for the surrender of the island, to secure the

347 Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 427; Villoa, 148b. Zinkeisen points out that the Grand

Vizier Ayas Pasha insisted on securing peace with the Venetian Republic but Barbarossa was able to

convince the Sultan that the Venetian should be punished for their deeds. Zinkeisen, v.2 550.

348 August 14 See: Feridun Bey, Mecmu‟a-i Münşeat, 600.

349 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 425.

350 DaniĢmend, 195; Bostan, “Korfu”, 202.

351 Ġdris Bostan mentions that in order to transfer the soldiers and the munitions, the ships were

probably bound each other and created a bridge between the main land and the coast of the Island.

According the Bostan, the total number of the soldiers, landed on Corfu was 50.000 and the

bombardment was conducted by 50 cannons. Bostan, “Korfu”, 202.

119

lives of the local people and their properties. However, the Corfiots reacted to the

Ottomans with a bombardment. This was the start of the bloody events.

Ottoman cannons bombarded the castles; the walls were partly destroyed, by which

time the soldiers started to penetrate inside. The villages, houses and the market of

the Island put under fire; local people had to enter into the well-strengthened castles;

the rest were captured by the Ottoman raiders. According to Villoa, 16.000 Corfiots

were taken prisoner by the Ottomans, among them there were also women and

children.352 The Ottomans were almost in the city center; all the forts were destroyed

except the Castle of Sant’Angelo. The Venetian officers, commanding the defense of

the Island, Luigi da Riva and Simon Leone, were worried because the food and

munitions supply of the island would not be sufficient for a long resistance. 353 The

Corfiots needed assistance against the Ottomans.

The defense of Corfu was desperately important for Venice. Under such a threat, the

Venetian Senate asked the Pope and Andrea Doria to assist in the defense of the

Island, for the sake of Christianity by underlining that if Corfu fell into the hands of

the Ottomans, their next step would be Brindisi and Messina.354 The Senate wrote to

the local governors of Corfu that food and the fleet were on their way to their

relief.355 Captain General Pesaro had already been ordered to proceed to Brindisi in

order to unite all Venetian ships and the fleet of the Papacy. The Republic also

increased the size of its naval armament; but no plans were made for a direct attack

352 Villoa, 149b.

353 Giovio, Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo, l.36, 429.

354 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, 426.

355 Ibid, 425-426.

120

upon the Ottoman fleet and soldiers on Corfu.356 Moreover, instead of joining the

Venetians, Andrea Doria sailed to Genoa for any possible attack by the French. The

Corfiots were alone against the Ottomans.

Not the Habsburg Emperor, but the Ottoman Sultan aided the Corfiots: although the

Ottoman soldiers penetrated into the island and almost all castles were destroyed the

Sultan ended the expedition, on the grounds that the season for war had already

concluded and heavy rains and epidemics had started to harm the Ottoman soldiers.

Although Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa tried to persuade him against this by

saying that the conquest was about to be completed, on September 6 the attacks

ended and in nine days all forces were evacuated from Corfu.357

The liberation of Corfu, the “most important and loveliest” dominion of the Venetian

Republic, from the Ottoman threat was enthusiastically celebrated in Venice. On the

morning of September 29, Venetian senators gathered at the Piazza San Marco with

the “greatest concourse” of the citizens to render thanks for the news of the

Süleyman’s failure in Corfu. The Senate wrote a rhetorical letter of appreciation to

the local government of Corfu for heroically resisting the Ottoman attacks.358 The

wholehearted defense of the Corfiots and the return of the Ottoman forces back to

Constantinople also relieved the Papacy. Pope Paul III invited the Venetian

ambassadors in Rome to dinner to celebrate the victory.359 He also had stamped a

356 Ibid, 427.

357 Feridun Bey, Mecmu‟a-i Münşeat, 601.

358 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v.3, 427.

359 Ibid.

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symbolic medallion representing a dolphin that overwhelmed a serpent, in memory

of the victory of Christianity.360

3.3. Re-Analyzing the Ottoman Campaign of 1537

Did the “dolphin” really overwhelm the “serpent”? Was the Ottoman withdrawal

from Apulia and Corfu a turning point for the history of Italy and that of

Christianity? Apulia was severely ravaged, as was the island of Corfu, many people

died in battles and the peace between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman

Empire was breached after 34 years. If there was a victory who had the greatest part

of it? What was the significance of the 1537 campaign for Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry

and for Ottoman-Venetian relations? The narrative of 1537 gives the historian

relevant information about the Ottoman campaign and how the Ottomans turned their

arms on Venetian Corfu. However, in order to analyze and place the campaign within

the Ottoman-Venetian-Habsburg relations of the early sixteenth-century, the

historian needs to discuss the aforementioned questions.

The ones who celebrated victory in 1537 were not only the Pope and the Venetians;

the Ottomans too perceived the campaign as successful. Eyyûbî, a sixteenth-century

Ottoman poet, describes the Ottoman campaign as a great conquest that the hearts of

the “infidels” were fired.361 Taking into consideration the destruction of the cities and

360 Guglielmotti, v.1, 445.

361 “[…] Asıl Polya‟da olmuştur temâşa/Yakup yıkdukda anı Lütfi Paşa/ Esir oldı anun hep cümle

vârı/ Oda yandı anun deyr ü diyârı/ Ki andan geldi Körföz‟e donanma/ Diyeyim sana anı dinle amma/

Yıkub başdan başa yakdılar anı/ Esir oldı anun pîr ü civânı/ Donanma hod denizde kimi buldı/ Döge

döge anı hep cümle aldı/ İşidicek bu fethi cümle küffâr/ Belâ vü rence oldular giriftâr/ Didiler bize

yakın geldi âfet/ Yüreklerinde şimdi bu cerâhat.” Eyyûbî, Menâkıb-ı Sultan Süleyman (Risâle-i

Pâdişâh-nâme), ed. by. Mehmet AkkuĢ, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991), 90. For detailed

information about Eyyûbî and his work see: Robert Anhegger, “Eyyûbî’nin Menakıb-ı Sultan

Süleymanı”, İ.Ü Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, v.1, no: 1, (1949), 119-138.

122

towns in Apulia and the Ottoman penetration into Corfu, the respectable amount of

booty, numerous captives, the subordination of the Albanians and the attempts of

Barbarossa to take the other Ionian Islands under Ottoman control on his return

journey were enough to give at least partial satisfaction to both the Sultan and his

soldiers. However, what the Ottomans got in 1537 was hardly whar they intended to

achieve.

The narrative of the Campaign clearly demonstrates that the main intention of the

Ottoman Sultan was to invade Apulia in 1537. The campaign was planned to be a

joint Ottoman-French attack to Italy. If the French had penetrated into Lombardy, the

Habsburg and Italian defense would have been divided into two separate fronts, thus

the Ottoman could have easily controlled the region. However, the French had not

arrived in Lombardy by mid-July when the Ottoman soldiers landed at Apulia. After

having been informed about a possible Ottoman attack to Italy, the Kingdom of

Naples had already strengthened the defense lines and auxiliary Spanish corps had

been already located in the region to assist its defense.362 Therefore, the Ottoman

invasion could not result in a complete control of the region; the attacks remained as

merely an Ottoman display of power, not different than the previous attacks of

Barbarossa.

Here, it is necessary to discuss why the Ottomans intended to invade Apulia in 1537.

Was it an attempt to invade Italy and to capture Rome? According to Halil Ġnalcık,

the actual plan was set on the conquest of Italy, in particular of Rome.363 Although,

362 See: Mambrino Rosea, Tommaso Costo, Del Compendio Dell‟Istoria del Regno di Napoli-Seconda

Parte, (Venice, 1591), 82b-83a. Sicily also assisted the defense of the region. The Sicilian parliament

gave financial support to the Emperor and sent 10.000 soldiers to assist the defense. See: Gioseppe

Buonfiglio Costanzo, Prima Parte dell‟Historia Siciliana, (Venice: Bonifacio Ciara, 1604), 449.

363 Ġnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, 68; idem, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi”, 129-130; idem,

“Akdeniz ve Türkler”, 160.

123

there is no clear evidence to prove this argument, beside some addresses attributed to

Süleyman in the Italian sources, the historian should keep in mind the imperial policy

of the Ottomans in the sixteenth-century, based on the claims of universal

sovereignty, to be achieved by the conquest of “Red Apple”.364 The author argues

that the 1537 initiative was formulated against the rising power of Charles V in Italy

and in the western Mediterranean. As was discussed in the previous chapter,

following his coronation in Bologna, Charles V had personally commanded in Tunis

and was able to overthrow Ottoman control by restoring the authority of the Hafsid

Dynasty, to be his vassal and his victory was celebrated in Italy as a victory of

Christendom, as a new crusade against the “Turks”. His conquest was a decisive

maneuver for the defense of Spain and southern Italy, but more importantly it

assured his image as “world emperor” and as “defender of the faith”. In this context,

it would not be wrong to believe that Süleyman might have intended to respond –like

he did in 1526, 1529 and in 1532- in a region that Charles V would have considered

his inherited realm, in the center of Christianity. Moreover, the reports of the French

ambassador in Venice, suggests that the Ottomans had already planned an attack on

Italy, even in 1532. The reports of the Venetian baili in Constantinople also prove

that Italy was a main item in the Ottoman agenda of conquest.365 Taking into

consideration all these elemets, it could be argued that in 1537, the Ottomans only

began to put into operation a plan that they had already made.

364 See: Chapter Two.

365 See: Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics”, 12. The relazione of the Venetian bailo Marco Minio could

exemplify this perception: “[…] il Signor voleva far tre imprese l‟una di Rodi, l‟altra di Ungheria, le

quali ha fatte, la terza manca a far, la qual non può esser altro che Italia.” (“[…] the Signor wanted

to make three conquests, one of Rhodes, the other of Hungary, which he had realized, the third, which

culd not be other than the conquest of Italy, is waiting for to be realized.” See: Albèri, s.3, v.3, 116

124

Here it should be also underlined that the campaign, designed here to be a joint

Ottoman-French maneuver in both northern and southern Italy was a reproduction of

the Mehmed II’s maneuvers in the late fifteenth-century. Similarly, Mehmed II had

tried to penetrate into Venetian Friuli by swift attacks of Ottoman raiders and the

Ottoman fleet had invaded Otranto in 1480. The former attack was not a

simultaneous coordinated Ottoman operation. The invasion of Otranto was realized

almost seven years after the raiders’ attacks into Friuli, the death of the Sultan in the

imperial camp prevented the successful culmination of the campaign. In 1537, by a

simultaneous attack, this time simultaneously with the French forces, Süleyman

might have intended a swift and successful result.

In that context, the question of why the Sultan engaged in a joint operation with the

French King needs to be discussed. As was discussed above, the complex political

conjuncture of the early sixteenth century had already laid the milestones for the

Ottoman-French convergence against the common enemy, Charles V. The Ottoman-

French alliance did not appreciate in the Christian milieu; but for the Ottomans it was

more than beneficial. The French King had planned to force the Emperor to engage

in multiple expeditions in Italy. Moreover, he also provided for the Ottomans a

legitimate base for their intervention in the struggles between these two Christian

monarchs promising some local support in the Kingdom of Naples.366 As was

mentioned before, the German expedition the Sultan was reflected by Ġbrahim Pasha

as an attempt for securing the French and Protestants, who were facing the

persecutions of Charles V, who had even destroyed Rome.367 From that perspective,

366 Ursu, 33.

367 Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics”, 12.

125

the Sultan was presented as the protector of the oppressed Christians by his supreme

power and authority. Rhoads Murphey notes the following:

Süleyman was astute enough not to risk alienating his numerous Christian

subject population by engaging in a frontal attack against Christian Europe

until, and unless, the provocation and justification for adopting such a stance

were apparent. His main policy adviser in the period between 1523 and 1536

was the Grand Vizier, “Frenk” Ġbrahim Pasha, who skillfully steered the

sultan away from acts unprovoked aggression against the West that would

tarnish his domestic image and reputation as protector. […] Furthermore, in

spite of the exaggerated rhetorical claims voiced by political advisers

representing both sides, the conflict between Charles V and Süleyman, rulers

of the two great superstates of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean world

was never simple or straightforward as a battle between cross and crescent.

Because of their global interests and multiple as well as widely dispersed

strategic positions both rulers were forced into co-operative agreements and

alliances that paid little heed to the niceties of doctrinal purity or pious

claims of their image makers.368

One should remember that the plan of 1537 was first discussed and elaborated during

the Grand Vizierate of Ġbrahim Pasha. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the

campaign was designed cleverly by the Pasha upon the French request as an

assistance for the French King to restore his authority in Lombardy and in Naples as

well as to display the power of Süleyman, being the “Kayzer-i Rûm” and the

“Pâdişâh-ı Rûy-i Zemîn” as the sole authority to decide on Italy.369

The campaign was elaborated upon the French request; however, Francis I was not

the only person seeking Ottoman assistance against the Emperor. Emrah Safa Gürkan

notes that “Neapolitan nobles in exile allied themselves with the Ottomans as a part

of Ottoman-French alliance that would relieve Naples from the Habsburg rule.”370

Gürkan mentions that in 1537 the Ottoman armada hosted a good number of

Neapolitans including Prince of Melfi, his son, the Duke of Soma and the Count of

368 Murphey, “Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary”, 199.

369 For Ġnalcık’s analysis overlapping with the interpretation above, see: Ġnalcık “Akdeniz ve

Türkler”, 157; Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset, 159-160.

370 Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean, 393.

126

Nicastro.371 The Italian chroniclers, consulted for this dissertation, highlight the name

of Troilo Pignatello, also thought to have encouraged the Sultan to attack Apulia

guaranteeing that the anti-Habsburg nobles suffering from heavy taxation would

rebel against the Habsburg rule in face of the Ottoman invasion, as it was stated

above. The Neapolitans gave Süleyman the second mean of justification. The

Ottomans would march into Apulia to rescue the Neapolitans from the Habsburg

“tyranny”.

Thus, this dissertation argues that the Ottoman Apulian Campaign could be discussed

within the framework of the Ottoman gradual method of conquest. There is no

evidence to suggest that Süleyman intended to immediately conquer Rome, but in the

light of the above information, gathered from various sources, it could be argued that

Ottomans intended to establish some sort of suzerainty in Naples, through Apulia. In

comparison with the former Ottoman attempts in Hungary, it could be argued that the

1537 Campaign might have intended to create a second Hungary for the Ottomans in

Apulia, where French King would act as the second Szapolyai, protecting the

Neapolitans in the name of Süleyman. In this regard, it could be argued that the

Ottomans aimed to use these fuoriusciti to get the consent and support of the

Neapolitans. Therefore, both Süleyman could challenge the Emperor’s authority in

Italy and by creating a satellite state in southern Italy, the Ottomans could acquire a

significant naval base in the western Mediterranean for further Ottoman offensives

against Spain. Here the information given by Gülrû Necipoğlu should be

371 Ibid. Also see: Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 27. In this article, the author

argues that the presence of the Neopolitan fuoriusciti with the Ottoman fleet proves that the Ottomans

intended to invade Naples, following the “Corfu Expedition”. However, one should keep in mind that,

the Ottomans attacked Apulia in mid-July and the Ottoman Attack on Corfu was initiated by mid-

August.

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remembered.372 Even in 1532, Ġbrahim Pasha had announced to the Venetian

ambassador, Pietro Zen, an upcoming Ottoman-French attack on Habsburgs to make

Francis I the legitimate sovereign of north Italy and to appoint a vassal king to south

Italy.373 This joint attack on Italy was realized in 1537. In the Apulian Campaign,

Süleyman most probably intended to realize the plan uttered by his former Grand

Vizier and the Neapolitans in exile, who had asked the Sultan’s assistance would be

used as the Ottoman agents in Apulia. Since the Ottomans coud not take Apulia

under the imperial control for a long time because of the logistic limitatations and

possible counterattacks of the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor, the region would

be given to the French supervision considering the fact that Francis had claims of

inheritance on the Kingdom of Naples. This would also enable the indirect Ottoman

supervision over the region and their penetration into Italy. However, the plan was

severely wounded when the French King delayed his support in Lombardy.374

Because of the absence of the French forces in Lombardy in the summer of 1537, the

Ottoman invasion of Apulia could not go beyond being a destructive attack. Apulia

could not be transformed into a second Hungary, but became a second Vienna for the

Sultan in 1537.

If the main target of the campaign was Apulia, why did the Ottoman fire turn on

Venetian Corfu? Was the attack on Corfu a part of the military plan? Previous

studies discussing the Ottoman campaign of 1537 state that the main intention of the

372 See: Necipoğlu, 411.

373 Ibid. At that time this post had been thought to be destined for Alvise Gritti.

374 Ġnalcık and Emecen state that the French forces assisted the Attack on Corfu. See: Ġnalcık “Akdeniz

ve Türkler”, 157; Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset, 159. However, the French sources, cited

above, demonstrate that the fleet under the command of the Baron of St. Blancard sent by the French

King in July was able to reach the Port of Prevesa by early September and it did not participate in the

Ottoman operation.

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Ottomans was to conquer the island of Corfu to facilitate the invasion of Italy.375

Emrah Safa Gürkan points out that by invading Corfu, the Ottoman might have

intended to protect the Adriatic coasts and confront a possible counter-attack that

could arise when the fleet would be sent away, since the Island was so close to the

Albanian shores, an area of chronic insurrections against the Ottoman rule.376

Gürkan’s analysis clearly demonstrates that Corfu was not a random choice for the

Ottomans. As was discussed in the previous pages of this chapter, Corfu had already

entered into the Ottoman agenda of conquest as a target because of its strategic

location. When the Ottomans accepted to challenge the Habsburgs in the western

Mediterranean by 1532, the need for a secure and fortified naval base changed the

priorities of the Empire. As was demonstrated with the example of Tunis, the first

attempts of Barbarossa, becoming the key figure in the formulation of Ottoman naval

strategy, should be evaluated within this context. Therefore, Corfu might have been

perceived by the Ottomans as a fruitful gain. However, one should keep in mind that

the attacks commenced by mid-August, following the invasion of Apulia. Moreover,

the Ottoman fleet reached Valona via Corfu without any Venetian opposition. The

Sultan prioritized the invasion of Apulia, not the attack on Corfu. Moreover, the

imperial camp was in Valona, having a clear view of the Apulian costs of Apulia.

Valona, in a sense, was used as a both a departure port and shelter in the campaign.

These demonstrates that Corfu was not the principal target of the Ottomans in 1537.

The author of the present study argues that the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537 was

the direct outcome of the tension between the Porte and the Serenissima and the

375 See: Guilmartin Jr., 264; Ġnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, 68; idem, “Avrupa Devletler

Sistemi”, 129-130; Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset, 159.

376 See: Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 27.

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Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during the Apulian Campaign. As was

discussed above in detail, by 1532 the Republic started to pursue a more pro-

Habsburg policy and did not participated into the Ottoman-French alliance. The

suspicions about a secret Venetian-Habsburg alliance became apparent for the

Ottomans in the course of the campaign because of Doria’s and Venetian attacks on

the Ottoman naval forces. This was used as the justification for the Ottoman attack

on a Venetian dominion, since it was thought that Venetians had already broken the

peace. Corfu, strategically important for the Ottomans, was the best and closest

alternative for an Ottoman offensive. Moreover it might have also been a significant

naval base for the future operations. Without Corfu, the Ottomans would not be able

to establish a longlived control in the coasts of Apulia. The attacks also showed that

the Ottoman fleet desperetly need Corfu to secure the Ottoman presence in Apulia

since without having a close naval base, the Ottoman forces would be open to a

counter-attack. Moreover, one should keep in mind that in Albania, the Ottomans

intended to suppress the local insurrections and strengthen the Ottoman rule. The

establishment of the sancak of Delvina should be evaluated within this perspective.

Therefore, the author agrees with Gürkan on that the conquest of Corfu might have

been initiated to protect the Adriatic shores and to confront a counter-attack in

Albania. Therefore, that might have been an aim to prevent possible Venetian and

Habsburg penetrations into the region, where the Ottomans intended to consolidate

their authority.

However, the attack on Corfu was not successful either. Although the Ottoman

soldiers penetrated in the island and the main castle was mainly destroyed, the Sultan

ended the expedition on grounds of inclement weather, despite the opposition of

Hayreddin Barbarossa. Svatopluk Soucek, evaluates the decision of Süleyman in

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1537 as proof of the weakness of the Ottoman naval strategy in the sixteenth-century.

According to Soucek, this weakness was camouflaged during the first three quarters

of the sixteenth century by two important factors, namely the success of the Ottoman

ghazi corsairs and the disunity of the European states in the face of the Ottomans.

Ottomans might have used this disunity to their advantage; however the Ottoman

naval strategy did not evolve from an ad hoc policy, limited to short spurts of

conflict and raids, to the strategy of overseas expansion, since the Empire focused

more on land campaigns.377 Soucek notes as follows:

In contrast to the unrealistic and wisely aborted campaign to conquer Italy,

its subsequent target, Corfu, made perfect sense if conceived of in strategic

naval terms. […] It would be hard to exaggerate the significance of this

moment for the fate of Ottoman sea power. While Tunis had the potential of

becoming a key base for an Ottoman seaborne empire, Corfu could have

functioned as a base from which to definitively eliminate Venice as a naval

power. In comparison with this self-inflicted defeat, the Ottoman victory at

Prevesa the following year (1538) loses much of its significance. […]Had

Süleyman allowed his admiral to take Corfu, and used the genius of this

finest seaman of the age to let him establish there a Turkish base from which

to control the Adriatic, the next two targets, […] Cyprus and Crete, would

have fallen like ripe fruit, perhaps even without a shot fired, into the lap of

the Ottoman Empire.378

As seen above, Soucek evaluates the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the

island by the order of Süleyman is a real failure. Here, asking him a question may

help the historian to analyze why the Sultan decided on ending the attacks: did

Süleyman really intended to conquer Corfu? The sources consulted for this

dissertation do not give a clearly affirmative answer to this question. Besides all the

importance, strategic, economic and political, the author of the present study argues

that Süleyman did not aim to bind the island to the Ottoman realm. The sources led

her to assume that Ayas Pasha, replacing Ġbrahim by 1536, did not advocate an

377 Soucek, “Naval Aspects”, 229-232.

378 Ibid, 230-231.

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Ottoman-Venetian encounter either.379 It seems that the attacks were realized to

punish the Venetians for misbehaving in the face of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and

to intimidate the Republic to position itself as an active power supporting the

Sultan’s enterprises against Charles V. Thus, the Sultan settled for the damaging

Corfu and in order not to waste his soldiers and resources, ended the expedition by

early September. This intention to secure the Ottoman-Venetian peace could be also

observed in the light of his letter, penned right after the attack. Even before he

returned to Adrianople, from Didymoteicho380, he informed the Venetian Doge that

the gates of Constantinople were open to his envoys for peace negotiations.381

The Ottomans intended to pressure the Serenissima to act in harmony with the Sultan

against the Habsburg Emperor; but the attack brought about an unintended

consequence: As was noted above, right after the Ottoman attack, the Republic

initiated negotiations with the Pope for the establishment of a league against the

Ottomans. For the first time after the Ottoman-Venetian peace of 1503, Venice came

to terms with the Papacy and the Habsburg Empire against its main political and

commercial ally, the Ottoman Empire. Although, Hayreddin Barbarossa would

overwhelm the allied forces at Prevesa the following year and the Republic would

restore peace with the Ottomans by the ahidnâme of 1540, Venice would gradually

lose its influence in Ottoman politics in favor of the French. The Ottoman-French

379 See: Zinkeisen, v.2, 550; Soucek, 230. The Ottoman choronicles also assert that the attacks were

concluded by the advices of Ayas Pasha. See: Chapter Four.

380 Dimetoka (ott.)

381 The letter reveals that the Venetian bailo in Constantinople (Tommaso Mocenigo) sent an envoy to

the Ottoman imperial camp before, to declare the Republic’s demand for sending an envoy to Sultan.

“[…] hâliyâ mahrûse-i İstanbul‟da bulunan baylosun südde‟-i saʿâdetime âdemisin gönderüb senin

tarafından yüce dergâhıma ilçi gelmek istedüği iʿlâm idüb ol bâbda izin ve icâzet taleb eylemiş idi,

benim ulu âsitânem dâimâ açukdur, kimesnenin gelmesine ve gitmesine red ve mâniʿ yokdur […]”

ASV, DT, Busta 3.I 40.4, XVII, in Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet ArĢivindeki”, 152.

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political alliance would provide the basis for further joint attacks against the

Habsburgs and the French would become as the most important Christian ally of the

Ottoman Sultan, economically privileged and favored as the active representative and

protector of the rights of Christians residing within the Ottoman realm.

Indeed, the Campaign of 1537 brought about fruitful outcomes for neither the

Ottomans, nor the Venetians and the French. The ones, who benefitted from 1537

were the Pope and the Habsburg Emperor. Italy was rescued from an Ottoman

invasion; the Pope could finally convince the Republic of the need for an offensive

against the Ottomans, though this would be a short-lived alliance. Moreover, without

wasting his forces by engaging a direct war with the Ottoman fleet, Andrea Doria

was able to redirect the Ottomans against the Venetians by his attacks. The Ottoman

Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu did not end the Ottoman-Habsburg

rivalry in the sixteenth-century though; it only opened a new phase in which the two

potentates would challenge each other on various fronts with exhausting battles,

which would lead both empires to bankruptcy.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign

and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 by arguing that the campaign was the outcome of

the Ottoman-French alliance aimed at a joint offensive against the Habsburg

dominions in Italy, elaborated in 1536. In this context, in order to decipher why and

how the Ottoman offensive turned against Venetian Corfu, the author has discussed

Ottoman-Venetian relations between the years of 1534 and 1537 in order to

contextualize the attack on Corfu, asserted to be caused by the existing tension

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between the Porte and the Serenissima, as well as by the maritime conflicts near

Corfu during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia in 1537.

The chapter has argued that in Apulia, the Ottomans might have sought to establish

some sort suzerainty, as they had already had in Hungary. In this regard, the author

has evaluated the campaign within the context of the Ottoman gradual method of

conquest and the existing discourses concerning the ultimate aim of Rome, “Red

Apple”, incorporated into the Ottoman grand-strategy of the sixteent-century, as the

basis of an ideological justification. The author has also asserted that the campaign

did not intend to a complete invasion of Italy or the immediate conquest of Rome;

instead by creating new spheres of influences, the Ottomans might have aimed to

taking part in the Habsburg-Valois power struggle in Italy, emphasizing the Sultan’s

claim to be the desicive factor in the future of the peninsula.

Secondly, the author has challenged former studies that have tended to regard the

campaign as the “Corfu Expedition”, in the light of the narrative of the campaign,

offering new evidence. The attack on Corfu was contextualized as the Ottoman

response to the Venetian Republic, suspected to be in secret alliance with the

Habsburg Emperor an in break of the current agreemnent with Süleyman. In this

context, the author argued that the attack might have been intended to intimidate the

Republic’s administration to adjust its policy according to Ottoman expectations; not

primarily to conquer Corfu, even though the latter could be an important naval base

for the Ottoman fleet.

This chapter has offered the historian a new analysis of the 1537 campaign. The next

chapter will focus on the Ottoman sources to decipher how the Ottoman chronicles of

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the sixteenth and seventeenth century narrate and legitimize the campaign, to offer

new evidence supporting the arguments and the interpretations of the author.

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CHAPTER IV

THE OTTOMAN VIEW: THE APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON

CORFU ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN CHRONICLES

This chapter will have a closer look at the Ottoman perception about the campaign

and the Attack on Corfu to discuss how the Ottomans defined, narrated, reasoned and

legitimized the campaign and the encounter with Venice, in the light of the Ottoman

literature. By a deeper analysis of the Ottoman chronicles, the author intends both to

substantiate her arguments and to produce a comprehensive historical narrative by

incorporating the Ottoman view.

To detect the Ottoman perception, the author intends to analyze the histories written

by the Ottomans who personally participated in the campaign of 1537 and also the

chronicles produced in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The works are

classified according to the identity of the authors and their positions in the Ottoman

government, if they had them, and the genre of the works and their time of

composition. In these discussions, the author provides the reader brief information

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about the authors of the chronicles and their positions in the Ottoman administration

or cultural milieu to evaluate better the reliability in the accounts.

Lastly, the author will attempt to compare and contrast the narrations of the eyewitnesses/

actors of the campaign and of the subsequent historians, derived from the

earlier documents or existing texts. For that reason, the story, narrated by each

chronicle, is intentionally portrayed in detail, except for the views shared by all the

chronicles.

4.1. Voices from the Front: The Actors in the Theatre of War

As was mentioned before, the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu

in 1537 was not a single Ottoman military enterprise against Christian dominions.

The campaign was mainly designed to be challenge for Süleyman’s “mortal enemy”,

Charles V and evolved to an Ottoman-Venetian encounter. To analyze why the

Ottomans engaged in this campaign, how they decided to attack a Venetian dominion

and how they evaluated the circumstances, first, it is important to analyze the

accounts of two commanders being in the theatre of war in 1537, who had played

influential roles in Ottoman decision making: Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Born in Albania, near Valona c1488, Lütfi Pasha, was an important Ottoman highranking

bureaucrat in the early sixteenth-century, who became the grand vizier in

1539.382 He entered in the imperial palace in the reign of Bayezid II. Following his

service and in palace education, he undertook several offices in the Ottoman palace.

He acted as the Sancakbeyi of Karaman, participated in the Süleyman’s campaign of

382 For detailed information about Lütfi Pasha, see: M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Lütfi PaĢa”, İA, v. 6,

(Istanbul: ,1970), 96-101; Colin H. Imber, “Lutfi Pasha”, EI2, v. 5, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), 837-

838; Mehmet ĠpĢirli, “Lütfi PaĢa”, DİA, v. 27, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), 234-236.

137

Rhodes in 1522 and was appointed as the Beylerbeyi of Karaman in 1534. Two years

later, he was appointed as the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia and the Third Vizier. Following

the death of Ayas Pasha in 1539, he was charged as the Grand Vizier of Süleyman

and until 1541, he acted a decisive role in the modification of domestic and

international politics.383

Apart from administrative offices, Lütfi Pasha is also known as an important man of

letters producing noteworthy works discussing the Ottoman history and the state

system. After his dismissal from the Grand Vizierate in 1541384, he produced his

famous Âsafnâme, known as one of the earlier example of the nasihatnâme385genre,

to introduce the Ottoman state system from its origin and its practices to the

subsequent bureaucrats. His Âsafnâme also discusses the problems and misbehavior

of the bureaucrats.386 He also wrote a pamphlet, in Arabic, on the incorporation of

the Islamic Caliphate to the Ottoman Empire.387 This chapter will discuss one of his

prominent works, namely Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân388, The History of the Ottoman

Dynasty, focusing on the Sultans and events in the Ottoman history up to year of

1553.

Lütfi Pasha, during his offices, found the chance of observing the military initiatives

and political issues, held in the early sixteenth-century. Therefore, his Tevârîh based

383 Imber, “Lutfi Pasha”, 837; ĠpĢirli, 234.

384 For the reason of his dismissal, see: ĠpĢirli, 234.

385 Mirror for the Princes.

386 Ibid, 235-236. For detailed information about Âsafnâme, see: Mehmet ĠpĢirli, “Âsafnâme”, DİA,

v.3, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1991), 456.

387 ĠpĢirli, “Lütfi PaĢa”, 235. Also see: H. A. R. Gibb, “Lutfı Pasha on the Ottoman Caliphate”,

Oriens, v. 15, 1962, 287-295.

388 Tevârîh-i Âl’i Osman is also name of the Ottoman histories from the rise of the Empire to the time

of their composition, or noted events or Sultan. See: Abdülkadir Özcan, “Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân”, DİA,

v. 40, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2011), 479-581.

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on his personal observations and experiences along with the former histories

produced by the earlier Ottoman scholars,389 provides the historian an extended

portrait of the Ottoman history, especially for the sixteenth-century. Since, he was a

member of the imperial council by 1536, the Pasha also presents important details

about the political and diplomatic discussions and decisions of the Empire, as well as

the competitions among the military figures.

In 1537, Lütfi Pasha was the Third Vizier of Süleyman and he was charged of

commanding the soldiers in the attacks on Apulia. For that reason, in this chapter, the

author analyses first how 1537 was discussed by Lütfi PaĢa in his Tevârîh390, to

decipher the reasons behind the campaign and its realization, as well as to portray

how the campaign was perceived by the imperial administration in the eyes of one of

the most important eyewitnesses, the commander of 1537.

Lütfi Pasha, opens the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 to discussion by underlining the

letter of the French King, Francis I to the Sultan.391 According to the Pasha, French

King communicated by the latter, the following:

The request from Sultan Süleyman, the Padishah of Islam is the following:

Spain, of cursed religion, troubled and harmed [me,] your sincere friend so

much. Thus, […] if the imperial armada via sea, and the land army, with the

Padishah of Islam, by land come to the Port of Valona and then to Apulia,

our galleys, [between the number] of 40 and 50, [will] sail [towards there], as

it is decided.392

389 For his sources, see: ĠpĢirli, “Lütfi PaĢa”, 235-236.

390 In the present study, the text corrected and edited by Âli Bey is consulted. See: Lütfî PaĢa, Tevârîh.

391 “[…] ve bu yılda França vilâyetlerinin kralı olan Françeşko pâdişâha mektûb ile âdem

gönderüb[…]”, ibid, 358.

392 “[…] İslâm pâdişâhı Sultân Süleymân‟dan temennâ budur ki, bu muhibb-i bî-riyânızı İspânya dîn-i

meʿlûn hayli bî-huzûr idüb incitdi. Şöyle ki denizden donanmâ-ı hümâyûnu pâdişâh-ı İslam saʿadetle

karadan Avlonya iskelesine gelüb dahî Pûlyâ vilâyetine ve denizden dahî kırk elli pâre kadırgalarımız

dahî gelmek mukarrerdir.” Ibid.

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Lütfi Pasha notes that the aforementioned letter encouraged the Sultan for engageing

in a campaign against Spain. For this campaign, a powerful armada was prepared.

Pasha underlines that before that, the Empire never composed an armada such that

great in number. Along with the new constructed and repaired ships, numerous

soldiers from almost every region of the Empire with their military commanders

were called to duty. Hayreddin Barbarossa also joined the imperial fleet with his

forces, household and the volunteers under his command.393 The Pasha emphasizes

that the navy, carrying the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia and the Rumelian army, as well as

Hayreddin Pasha, his forces and numerous Janissaries, artillery and munitions were

put under his command. The navy from Constantinople to the ghaza of

Mediterranean394 and came to the Port of Valona, passing Preveza and Corfu.

Simultaneously, Süleyman, with the land army composed of the soldiers of Anatolia

and Rumelia headed fro Valona from Constantinople, on May 17, 1537. 395

Lütfi Pasha continues that when the Sultan arrived at Valona, on July 9396, he ordered

him the Pasha and the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia, Mehmed Pasha, the invasion of

Apulia. He underlines that with the company of potent cavalry, he was able to ravage

more than 360 villages and captured 30 castles erected between Otranto and

Gallipoli.397 The villages were put on fire, they were ruined and sacked by the

Ottoman soldiers, who took numerous slaves.398 While Lütfi Pasha is narrating his

393 Ibid, 359.

394 “[…] ve Lütfî Pâşâ bunların cümlesine baş ve buğ ta‟yîn olunub Akdeniz gazâsına gönderdi.” Ibid.

395 Ibid.

396 “[…] ve tarîhin tokuz yüz kırk dördünde muharremü‟l-harâm aynının evâhirinde Avlônya‟ya

varıcak […]”, ibid.

397 Ibid. Gallipoli was near to Lecce.

398 Ibid, 359-360.

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“brave and successful” campaign in Apulia, he also notes- a grouse, perhaps- that

when he landed in Apulia, Hayreddin Barbarossa did not join the imperial fleet;

instead the sailed back towards the costs of Epirus, such as Preveza and Modone399,

which were situated on the way of Constantinople. So, he got devoid of such a ghaza

and impressive booty.400

In the course of campaign, the Pasha also notes an Ottoman-Venetian encounter. He

states that in a night, numerous Venetian galleys attacked on the Ottoman ships. Lütfi

Pasha, with the ships and soldiers under his command, responded to the Venetians.

In the conflicts, four Venetian galleys were captured; the rest sailed towards Corfu.

Lütfi Pasha mentions that he stayed in Apulia for almost a month and informed the

Sultan about his victories and the booties that had been gathered.401 The Sultan who

satisfiyed with the expedition called him back to Valona, by mentioning that the

Venetians broke the peace and rebelled.

In his Tevârîh, Lütfi PaĢa also gives brief details about the operations of the land

army in 1537. He points out that when the imperial army was attacking on Apulia,

Sultan Süleyman ordered the soldiers to suppress the obstinate Albanians, refusing

the authority of the Sultan. Albanians, having noticed the Sultan’s arrival, fled to

high mountains.402 On the other hand, he notes that during the Ottoman campaign in

Apulia, with the request of the Spanish King, Charles V, Ferdinand, Archduke of

Austria, sent his troops of 25.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry, to besiege the castle of

399 Modone (ve.)

400 Lütfî PaĢa, 360.

401 Ibid.

402 Ibid.

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Osijek, as a responsive maneuver.403 Hüsrev Bey, the Governor of Bosnia, and

Mehmed Bey, the Governor of Semendre, whose forces were disadvantageous in

number, stayed inside the castle. In order not to stay under the Ottoman

bombardment, the Habsburg troops attacked on the villages and small castles in the

region; ravaged them, instead of attacking on the main castle. Thanks to the heavy

rains disabling them to move, while they had been on the way of Belgrade, the

Habsburg soldiers withdrew. Some soldiers, left behind the main corps, were killed

by the soldiers of Hüsrev and Mehmed Bey. Numerous horses and artillery, so

special that no one had never seen before, were also captured. These events and the

courage of his soldiers were appreciated by Süleyman and he awarded the

commanders with precious dresses, swords and horses, as well as promoting them.404

These details given by Lütfi, Pasha are noteworthy. But his views on Hayreddin

Barbarossa that he states right after this discussion are noteworthy:

Even when the soldiers, accompanying the Sultan, refuge of the World came

this much at the Albanians, the name and the sign of Hayreddin Pasha was

unknown. After a long time, he also came with his vessels, joined the

imperial armada and the soldiers aided by God.405

Pasha’s sentences reveal that Hayreddin Pasha came to Valona, right after him.

However, the question of where Barbarossa and his vessels were during the Apulia

Campaign was not clearly mentioned by Lütfi Pasha.

403 Ibid, 362.

404 For detailed information about the confrontations, see: Ibid, 263-264.

405 “[…] ve pâdişâh-ı ʿâlem-penâh hazretleri yanında olan ʿasker Arnâvudlara bu kadarleşker idüb

dahî Hayreddin Pâşa‟nın nâm ve nişânı nâ-malûm idi. Niçe zâmandan sonra Hayreddin Pâşa dahî

gemiler ile gelüb donanmâ-ı hümâyûna ve ʿasakîr-i mansûreye mülhak oldı.” Ibid, 361.

142

According to Lütfi Pasha, Sultan Süleyman ordered the Attack on Corfu, following

the return of Barbarossa to Valona.406 Lütfi Pasha with the soldiers under his

command and Hayreddin Barbarossa with his attendees, went to Corfu. The attack

was a punishment for the disloyalty of Venetians. The Sultan, on the other hand,

came to a town opposite Corfu.407 Lütfi Pasha reports that, after a long and

exhausting bombardment, the main castle of the island was destroyed but since the

cold was untimely started, the attack ended by the order of Süleyman. Soon after, the

Sultan and the he land army headed towards Constantinople. The rest, returning by

vessels attacked and pillaged the Venetian islands, captured the girls, boys and

women. Some islands were put under the Ottoman tribute.408

The account of Lütfi Pasha clearly demonstrates that the Ottoman military initiative

of 1537 was realized to face the Habsburg Emperor, the Spanish King as the

Ottomans called him that had been encouraged by Francis I of France. Valona and

Otranto were also showed by the French King as targets to the Ottomans, according

to the author. However, Lütfi Pasha does not give any detail about the French

participation into the Ottoman campaign, although Francis I had promised to do so in

his letter cited by the Pasha. The attack on Corfu, on the other hand, was described as

the Sultan’s response to the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman forces during the

campaign.

The notes in Tevârih about the attacks of Ferdinand’s troops is also noteworthy.

Although, they were faced by the local Ottoman military forces, the attacks might

have resulted in a chaos and in a loss of munitions for the Ottomans. Since Lütfi

406 Ibid.

407 Buthrotum.

408 Ibid, 361-362.

143

Pasha does not mention when attacks on Osijek was started, it will be only a

speculation to argue that the Habsburg initiavite facilitated the Ottoman withdrawal

from Apulia. The Pasha only mentions that the Sultan was announced about the

Habsburg attack and the victory of his soldiers in Osijek after the Ottoman

withdrawal from Corfu. On the other hand, these events can be evaluated as the

Habsburg response to the Ottoman attack on Apulia.

It is clear that Lütfi Pasha criticizes Hayreddin Barbarossa for being absent in the

important phases of the military initiatives of 1537, except the Attack on Corfu. To

compare and contrast the information given by Lütfi Pasha, here, it is critical to listen

to the second important actor of the campaign, Hayreddin Barbarossa. In the

previous chapter of the present study, the life and the rise of Barbarossa in the

Ottoman military and bureaucratic history was briefly discussed. To remind the

reader his position in the Ottoman military affairs and decision making, here, it

should be underlined once more that the Pasha was appointed as the Beylerbeyi of

Cezâyir-i Bahr-ı Sefîd, and the Grand Admiral in 1533.409 On May 1537, Sultan,

Süleyman, ordered Barbarossa to sail with the imperial armada through Valona, with

Lütfi Pasha. For that reason, as an eyewitness and the commander of the imperial

armada, Barbarossa’s notes on the campaign could also enlighten the historian to

decipher both the Ottoman motivations in 1537 and the personal views of one of the

leading sea warriors of the early sixteenth-century about the ongoing struggles

between the Ottomans, Habsburgs and the Venetians.

409 For the brief discussion about Barbarossa and his rise in Ottoman military and bureaucracy, see:

Chapter 3.

144

The memories of Hayreddin Barbarossa was collected in the Gazavât-ı Hayreddin

Pasha410, considered to be composed first in 1541, which was directly dictated by

Barbarossa to Seyyid Muradî Reis411, contemporary sea-warrior in Barbarossa’s

network. It is considered to be the sole original source on Barbarossa and his

campaigns.412 The work is considered to be one of the prominent examples of the

gazavatnâmes413 that discusses the life and campaigns of Barbarossa. 414

On the other hand, Emrah Safa Gürkan underlines that Gazavât should be evaluated

as a work of propaganda, which were composed to introduce the corsairs as ghazi

warriors and to legitimize their deeds in the context of ghaza.415 This can also be

observed in the memories of Hayreddin Barbarossa: in Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Pasha,

Barbarossa was portrayed as a victorious warrior having mystical powers ordained

by God. The events are not discussed chronologically; victories, miracles and

personal successes of Barbarossa are highlighted and the author refrains from giving

410 There are several published editions of the Gazavat-I Hayreddin Paşa, composed in verse and in

prose. For detailed information, see: Aldo Galotta, “Gazavât-ı Hayreddin PaĢa”, DĠA, v.13, (Ġstanbul:

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1996), 437-438. In the present chapter, Mustafa Yıldız’s edition of the text in

prose will be consulted. Gazavât-ı Hayreddin PaĢa, ed. by Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen: Verlag Shaker,

1993). For recent simplified versions of the text in modern Turkish, also see: Seyyid Muradî Reis,

Kaptan Paşa‟nın Seyir Defteri: Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa, ed.by Ahmet ġimĢirgil, (Ġstanbul: Babıali

Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2003); Seyyid Muradi Reis, Kaptan-ı Derya Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa‟nın

Hatırları, (Ġstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2014).

411 Seyyid Muradi Reis, raised in Ottoman navy, was a poet of sixteenth century Ottoman Empire. He

was in the service of Hayreddin Barbarossa. He wrote Barbarossa’s memories directly from his words

during his service. The first part of the book was composed in 1541 and the second part in 1546. For

detailed information, see: Galotta, “Gazavât-ı Hayreddin PaĢa”, 437.

412 Ibid.

413 Gazavatnâme is the general name of the accounts discussing the wars with the enemy. Along with

the narration of the campaigns and wars, engaged against the enemy, the accounts generally contains

epic stories and glorifications. The accounts could be composed as the wars and campaigns of the

Sultans or important high-ranking bureaucrats or commanders. For detailed information and examples

of gazavatnames in Islamic and Ottoman literature, see: Mustafa Erkan, “Gazavatnâme”, DİA, v. 13,

439-440. See also: KurĢat ġamil ġahin, “Gazavâtnâmeler Üzerine Yapılan ÇalıĢmalar Hakkında Bir

Bibliyografya Denemesi”, Turkish Studies, v.7/2, Spring 2012, 997-1022.

414 Galotta, “Gazavât-ı Hayreddin PaĢa”, 438.

415 Gürkan, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”, 178-180.

145

historical background, reasons and consequences of the discussed events. Gürkan

states that the account was the product of the rivalry between the Admiral and the

Ottoman ruling elite.416 By this book the Grand Admiral intended to show his power

and victories to the Ottoman bureaucrats challenging him and to aims to consolidate

his position in Constantinople. For that reason the book should not be considered as a

chronological and accurate historical narrative.417

The views of Barbarossa on the Ottoman campaign of 1537 discussed in the Gazavât

supports the analysis of Gürkan. In the Gazavat, the campaign of 1537 is presented

as the “Expedition of Valona”. Barbarossa underlines that in early spring of 1537, the

Sultan called himself to his presence and declared him that he would engage in an

expedition to Valona in spring. Barbarossa does not explain the reasons for the

decision of the Sultan. On the other hand, it is mentioned that since he had already

enhanced the imperial fleet right after his appointment as the Chief Admiral, made

repaired the old vessels and built thirty new in the form of his own galley, the fleet

was ready for such a great campaign.418 He notes that the Beylerbeyis of Anatolia and

Rumelia419 sent 80.000 soldiers for the campaign and the fleet sailed from

Constantinople to Valona under his command.

416 For the rivalry between the corsairs and Ottoman ruling elite, see: Gürkan, “The Center and the

Frontier”, 147-149.

417 Gürkan, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”, 179.

418 Gazavât-ı Hayreddin PaĢa, ed.by Mustafa Yıldız, 220.

419 In the text, the name of the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia is indicated as Hüsrev Pasha. However, the

Pasha was appointed to the office in 1538. In 1537, he was the Beylerbeyi of Anatolia. Since, Muradî,

wrote down the memories in 1541, he might get confused about the titles. See: Abdülkadir Özcan,

“Hüsrev PaĢa, Deli”, DİA, v.19, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1999), 40-41, 41.

146

After having arrived at the port of Valona, Hayreddin Pasha narrates that he was

called to collaborate in the land battles in Albania, by the Beylerbeyis of Anatolia and

Rumelia. However, the Pasha refused to do so by underlying the following:

The Sultan, my majesty, did not charged me to the land; he appointed me to

the armada at sea. Now, I will touch on land by leaving the armada

unatended, this is not a maritime custom. Who knows, this is sea, everyone

get to occupy with his own duty.420

Barbarossa points out that he refused to join the land army because he had to be

ready to face any possible attack on his forces considering that the Venetians had 36

vessels ready to move, in the Gulf of Corfu. He emphasizes that the following events

proved that he had foreseen the danger: According to him, Albanian rebels were in

close contact with the Venetians and they falsly informed the Venetian Captain

General that the Ottoman fleet was vulnerable since Barbarossa had joined the land

army. Accordingly, the Venetian ships sailed towards Valona.421 Barbarossa notes

that he did not respond quickly when he saw the Venetian ships coming. He deceived

Venetians getting closer to the Porte. Therefore the well-armed Ottoman ships was

able to circle the Venetian ships, attacked them like a hungry wolf in the ship flock.

16 ships were taken, 14 sank, and 6 of them fled away. Barbarossa mentions that one

of these was the ship of the Venetian Captain General.422 His great success

encouraged the land army to take the Albanian region under control and all high-

420 “Beni şevketlü pâdişâhum karaya ta‟yîn eylemedi, deryâda donanma-yı hümâyûn üzere ta‟yîn

eyledi. İmdi ben donanmayı boş bırağam da karaya çıkmak deniz yolı değildür. Kim bildün deryâ

hâlidür her kes me‟mur oldugı hizmetin üzerinde mukim olmak gerekdir […]”, Ibid, 220. He also

points out that the Pashas resented him because of his negative reply.

421 Here, it is interesting to note that Barbarossa notes his dream that he had before the maneuver of

Venetians. In his dream, he had been riding on a red-sorrel horse towards the enemy, holding a

baronet by which he killed 30 men. He made the dream interpreted, to his preacher and he foresaw

that Barbarossa would gain a great victory soon, since the red-sorrel horse signed victory and divine

help. See: Ibid, 220.

422 Ibid, 220-221. In the text Barbarossa also points out his own thought about what Venetian General

had said about him: “Barbarossa was praised to be an intelligent men; [but] this seems to be the work

of an animal; I will never debark my soldiers on land not the give the enemy the change of sinking

me. Even a man being never at sea in his lifetime can distinguish profit from damage.” See, Ibid. 221.

147

ranking officials, including the two aforementioned Pashas, appreciated his genious

in warfare.423

The account of Barbarossa concludes with the note that in 1537, the Ottomans had

fruitful gains both in land and at sea. They took Valona entirely under Ottoman

control; the rebels were suppressed. Following the return of the land army, he notes

that he returned to Constantinople, with his forces and the 16 ships taken from the

Venetians, after a simple repair by his sincere efforts. On his way, he captured

numerous islands, sacked and put them under taxation.424 Here, it is interesting to

note that, after his return, Barbarossa narrates that Sultan Süleyman congratulated

him for his great victories and mentioned that he should re-organize the fleet for next

spring since the Venetian Captain General could attack Barbarossa as a revenge for

this victory.425

The account of Barbarossa completes, in various aspects, the Tevârîh of Lütfi Pasha.

These two accounts clearly show that Barbarossa and the forces under his command,

did not take part in the attacks on Apulia. It seems that Barbarossa was charged of

securing the Adriatic and the Gulf of Corfu to prevent and to face a possible attack

on Ottoman ships and that on Valona. The transportation of numerous soldiers, the

army of Rumelia with the Beylerbeyi and the artillery to Apulia was left to Lütfi

Pasha. This also supports Süleyman might have intended an immediate control of the

region; not an attack limited to pillaging. For that reason, Barbarossa might have

423 Ibid., 220-221. He also quotes that so-called sentences of the Pashas: “It was seen that Hayreddin

Pasha has not been strolling unconsciously like us.” See: Ibid.

424 Ibid., 222.

425 “Göreyim seni gâzî Hayreddin lâlâm in-şâ‟a-llâh evvel-i bahara kadar gemileri çek çevir. Venedik

keferesine „avn-i Hakk ile mikdârın bildürelim zîrâ cenerali olan köpek “Barbaroşo beni kancıkladı,

ben ana adam kancıklamayı göstereyim” diyü öğünür imiş. İmdi siz dahî basiret üzere olasız didü.”

Barbarossa also tells the stories about the jealousy and enmity of other Pashas, against him, since he

has the favor of the Sultan. See, Ibid.

148

been charged of the supervision and defense of the imperial fleet rather than joining

the attack. The story about his refusal of joining the land army in Albania, which was

criticized by Lütfi Pasha as well, also shows the character of his duty in the 1537

Campaign. As Lütfi Pasha, Barbarossa also underlines the Venetian attacks on the

Ottoman forces. Since he mentions that that he was at the Port of Valona when the

Venetian ships attacked the Ottoman forces, it can be argued that the Venetians

opened the fired on the Ottomans in two different fronts, Apulia and Valona.

However, as was stated above, Barbarossa’s notes need to seriously be controlled not

to lapse in stating this.

Barbarossa’s silence on Corfu is interesting though. In the Gazavât there is no

mention of the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537. His reluctance of discussing it can

be in the context of Gürkan’s analysis briefly discussed above: It seems that

Barbarossa intended to narrate his personal victories only. Since the attack on Corfu

was not concluded with the conquest of the island, or with a definite success such as

putting the island under Ottoman tribute, Barbarossa might have put it aside and

focused on his success in face of the Venetian attacks, as well as the Ionian Islands

that he captured. His choice of referring the 1537 Campaign as the “Expeditipn of

Valona” can also be evaluated within this perspective.

4.2. From the Campaign to the Future: Süleymânnâme of Matrakçı Nasûh and

Tabakâtü’l-Memâlik fi Derecâtü’l-Mesâlik of Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi

The two aforementioned accounts of the two important commanders of the 1537

Campaign help the historian to analyze how the military initiative was planned,

contextalized, realized and legitimized by the Ottomans. However, the accounts were

149

limited with the knowledge and views of the Pashas. Therefore, to understand deeply

the Ottoman point of view about the campaign, the accounts of other eyewitnesses of

1537, the ones who are thought to be participated in the campaign, are worth to be

analyzed. In this context, the chronicles composed by Matrakçı Nasûh and Celâlzâde

Mustafa in the sixteenth-century deserves a special attention.

Matrakçı Nasûh, one of the versatile personalities of the sixteenth-centuty, was a

well-known an Ottoman knight, mathematician, calligrapher, painter and historian. It

is assumed that he was born in Bosnia in the late fifteenth-century.426 Since he was

called with his father’s name427, it is thought that he was a son of a devshirme. In the

reign of Sultan Bayezid II (r.1481-1512), he entered in the imperial palace and

studied in Enderun. In 1517, he wrote his first book on the Divan numerals that were

used in the Ottoman finance and accounting to introduce and teach them to the

Ottoman scribes.428 In the same period, he also came into prominence as a good manat

arms. For that reason, by 1520, he was sent to Egypt by Sultan Süleyman to

compete with Arab knights in the games of combat.429 His competency in the use of

426 For detailed information about Matrakçı Nasuh, see: Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, Matrakçı Nasûh,

(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Ġlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963); idem, “Matrakçı Nasuh”, DİA, v.

28, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), 143-145, Salim Aydüz, “Nasuh Al-Matrakî, A

Noteworthy Ottoman Artist-Mathematician of the Sixteenth Century”,

http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/nasuh-al-matrak%C3%AE-noteworthy-ottoman-artistmathematician-

sixteenth-century , retrieved 3.10.2017.

427 Nasuh bin Abdullah, Nasuh son of Abdullah. In the works he is also cited as Nasuh bin Abdullah el

Priştevi (from Pristina) or el Bosnevi (from Bosnia). He also used the epithet of his father, Karagöz, in

his works. Yurdaydın, Matrakçı Nasûh, 17.

428 For the Divan numarals, see: Halil Salihlioğlu, “Divan Rakamları”, DİA, v. 9, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye

Diyanet Vakfı, 1994), 433-435. Nasuh’s book on Divan numerals are composed of two separate

booklets namely Cemâlü‟l-Küttab and Kemâli‟l Hüssâb. A copy of the book is conserved in the

Ġstanbul University Library. For detailed information, see: Yurdaydın, “Matrakçı Nasuh”, 144.

429 His competency was also rewarded by Sultan Süleyman in 1529 with a berat, an imperial decree,

stating that he was an unrivaled knight. See: Yurdaydın, Matrakçı Nasûh, 10-11.

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arms, especially in the military lawn games of matrak430, gave him the title of

Matrakçı431. In this period, he also began his career as a historian. Besides working

on the translations of the famous Arab histories, in 1533, he participated in the

Ottoman campaign of Iraq and he wrote the history of it while painting the

townscapes of the imperial camps, in which the army stopped during the

expedition.432 “He also described every city visited on the route from Istanbul to

Baghdad via Tabriz including those cities captured from the Safavids. […] The

distance between each encampment was given in miles instead of hours of travel.”433

One of the most important works of Nasûh was his Süleymânnâme, discussing the

deeds and the conquests of Sultan Süleyman434. His account covers the Süleyman’s

reign till 1561.435 He prefers to narrate the events in separate fascicules differently

entitled. The events between the years of 1520 and 1537 are discussed in the first

part of his Süleymânnâme, entitled Matla‟-ı Dâsitân-ı Sultân Süleymân436, which is

assumed to be composed between 1537 and 1538. After 1538, he continued his

430 Matrak literally means cudgel or stick. In the games of matrak, the players use wooden tenpinshaped

cudgels, instead of swords and try to hit the head of the competitor. The main purpose of the

widely-known game was to train the soldiers for war.

431 The one, playing matrak. Since he was even a musketeer, he was also called as el-Silâhî, gunman.

432 See: Nasûhü’s Silâhi (Matrakçı), Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn, ed.by. Hüseyin Gazi

Yurdaydın, (Ankara: TTK, 2014). In the introduction part of this edition, Yurdaydın extensively

discusses the life and the works of Nasuh as well.

433 Aydüz.

434 Süleymânnâmes were the books discussing the events and conquests happened in the reign of

Sultan Süleyman (1520-1566). The Süleymânnâme of Bostan Çelebi can be considered as a good

example of the genre. For detailed information about the genre and the works, see: Abdurrahman

Sağırlı, “Süleymannâme”, DİA, v. 38, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010), 124-127.

435 Yurdaydın, “Matrakçı Nasuh”, 144.

436 Matla‟-ı Dâsitân-ı Sultân Süleymân means the Rise of the Epic of Sultan Süleyman. The

manuscript of the work is conserved in the Library of Topkapı Palace Museum in Ġstanbul, see.

TSMK, Revan KöĢkü, no. 1286. The manuscript was transcript into the Latin alphabet and published

by Davut Erkan. Davut Erkan, Matrâkçı Nasûh‟un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537), Marmara

University Institute of Turkic Studies, 2005, (unpublished master’s thesis).

151

studies in different fields, he penned numerous chronicles, as well as completing his

Süleymânnâme.437 He also consulted earlier studies. For example, for his

Süleymânnâme, it is thought that he used the history of KemalpaĢazâde, anonymous

histories on the Ottoman Dynasty, the history of Celâlzâde that will also be discussed

in this chapter and the Süleymânnâme of Bostan Çelebi.438 When considered the time

of composition of his works and the events discussed, it is assumed that he died after

1561.

As was stated above, the first part of Nasûh’s Süleymânnâme is assumed to be

composed between the years of 1537 and 1538. The account concludes with the

narration of the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537. At the end, Nasûh lists the names

and describes the towns in which the Ottoman army camped in its way of return.

Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, who studied extensively on Nasûh and his works, argues

that he might have participated into the Ottoman campaign of 1537, considering that

he left spaces between the names of the towns. According to him, this show that he

had planned to draw the towns later.439 On the other hand, in his Master’s thesis on

the first part of Nasûh’s Süleymânnâme, Davut Erkan mentions that there is no clear

evidence supporting Nasûh’s personal participation in the campaign, but it is known

that his son Mehmed was a member of the infantry corps.440

The campaign is narrated by Nasûh, right after his notes on the execution of Ġbrahim

Pasha in 1536. The author discusses the subject as the departure of the Ottoman

437 For the list of the works of Nasûh and brief information about them, see: Ibid, xxviii-xliv.

438 Davut Erkan demonstrates that Nasuh, in the some parts of his account, directly quoted from

previous sources. See, ibid, xlvi-lvii.

439 Nasûhü’s Silâhi (Matrakçı), Beyân-ı Menâzil, 11.

440 Erkan, xxii. In his Master’s thesis, Davut Erkan offers the researchers a full transcription of the

first part of Nasûh’s Süleymânnâme. In this chapter his transcription will be used to discuss the views

of Nasûh on 1537 Campaign.

152

Sultan in the direction of Corfu for the conquest of the provinces of Spain that had

lapsed from the true faith.441 He mentions that Sultan Süleyman ordered to execute

an expedition towards Apulia, in which the King of Spain, known by his sinfulness

and enmity towards the Muslim religion, had castles and charged Hayreddin Pasha,

the Beylerbeyi of Algiers, who were always engaging in wars against the Frenks, of

commanding the Ottoman fleet.442 By the order of the Sultan, the fleet departed with

the help of convenient winds and on May 17, 1537, the Sultan with the land army left

Constantinople in the direction of Corfu.443 The first stop of the Sultan and the army

was the city of Adrianople. Nasûh states that there the Sultan convened the imperial

court for two days, listened to the complaints of his subjects and got information

about the provisions of the province.444 During the imperial camp in Adrianople, the

Sultan also got informed about the ongoing circumstances at sea. Nasûh narrates as

following:

[…] and there, the messengers came from the sea front and reported [the

Sultan] that since Spain [of the] cursed religion had a great armada at sea,

might the Sultan of the soldiers of Islam, with the help of God, reach Valona

by stopping once instead of twice [on the route]. [The Sultan being] the

emperor of the world and the zenith of the saints of the time departed by [his]

fortunate desideration and blissed magnificence, on the eighteenth of the

aforementioned month445, from Adrianople to Plovdiv.446

441 Ibid, 191.

442 Ibid.

443 “[…] sene-i selase ve erba‟în ve tis‟a mi‟e Zi‟l-hiccesinün yedinci güni […] Konstantiniyye‟den

[…] Korfos cânibine azimet gösterdi.” Ibid, 192.

444 Ibid. Nasuh also mentions that in Adrianople, also the levy of Transylvania was conceded to the

imperial treasury.

445 The dates are given according to the Islamic lunar calendar. 18 zilhicce 943 falls on May 28, 1537.

446 “ve deryâ cânibinden ulaklar gelüp, İspânya-i dîn-i laʿînün deryâda ziyâde tonanması var padişâhı

islâm asker-I nusret-ecnâmla iki menzili bir idüp gelüp Avlonya‟ya irişmek üzere olsunlar deyü

haber virdiler. Hudâvend-i cihân ve kutb-ı dâ‟ire-i zaman hazretleri yümn ü ikbâl ve saʿâdet ü iclâl ile

Edirne‟den Filibe cânibine mâh-ı mefsûrun on sekizinde azîmet gösterdi.” Ibid.

153

According to Nasûh, the army stopped in Plovdiv for five days and there Hüsrev

Pasha, the Beylerbeyi of Anatolia also participated in the expedition with the forces

under his command and informed the Sultan about the trouble created by Diyak

Mihal, the custodian of the castle of Valpovo, in the region of Srem447 that was taken

under control by his forces.448 From Plovdiv, the army marched into Skopje. There,

the Sultan got informed via the messengers that in Bagdad, the Safavid Shah was

creating disturbances. Therefore, the imperial orders were sent to the governors in

Diyarbakır and Bagdad to take necessary measures.449 After having listened to the

complaints and demands of his subjects and controlled the provisions of the

province, the Sultan left the city and reached Valona. The imperial fleet came to

Valona one day after. The Sultan called the imperial court then and after the meeting

Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Pasha (Barbarossa) were charged for attacking the castles

of the Spanish King, in Apulia, for destroying them and for capturing his subjects.450

These two Pashas departed for Apulia, on July 12 1537. They were accompanied by

the soldiers of Rumelia commanded by Ayas Mehmed Pasha.451

Four days later, the vizier Mustafa Pasha, with his household, and Hüsrev Pasha with

the soldiers of Anatolia were ordered to attack Albania.452 Nasûh mentions that in

Albania, the rebels fled to high mountains. The roads and passages were too narrow

and impenetrable, not easy even for ants and snakes to pass. For that reason, the

447 The region between Serbia and Croatia. It was taken under the Ottoman rule by 1521. See: Nenad

Moacanın, “Srem”, DIA, v.37, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009), 423-424.

448 Erkan, 193-194.

449 Ibid, 194.

450 Ibid, 195.

451 Ibid.

452 Ibid, 196.

154

soldiers were not able to control the region; even the talented horses, compatible with

the horse of the Prophet, perished. Many soldiers were killed by the bandit groups.

The branch of the army returned to the imperial camp without having a significant

success.

Nasûh continues his account by giving information about the attacks on Apulia. He

states that Lütfi Pasha destroyed the castles of Castro and Otranto; the commanders

and people within the castles could not resist to the heavy attacks and ran away. The

Ottoman soldiers sacked and put under fire 80 villages in the region, as well as

capturing many people. On the other hand, numerous ships of the Spanish King were

also attacked, harmed and pillaged. After having devastated the region of Spain and

its ships, Nasûh notes that the armada gloriously returned back to Valona.453

[…] then there occurred the betrayal of the infidels of the Castle of Corfu and

even their alliance with Spain, their lie and strife, and it was realized that

they intended to harm the imperial armada with numerous galleys, thus

aforementioned Lütfi Pasha, Hayreddin Pasha and Mehmed Pasha, the

Beylerbeyi of Rumelia were sent [and they] engaged into the siege of the

castle and confrontation with the unbelievers inside it.454

Simultaneously with the fleet, the Sultan, himself, also moved to Delvina and

camped in a town opposite the island, mentions Nasûh. Moreover, the Sultan sent

Salih Reis and his men towards Apulia and Messina to control the Spanish, Papal and

Venetian455 fleets.456 Nasûh notes that they reported to the Sultan that close to

453 Ibid, 196-197.

454 “[…] baʿdehû Korfos kalʿasınun keferesinün hıyâneti ve öte İspânya ile ittifâkı ve hîle vü nifâkı

opu dahi nice pare kadırga ile donanma-ı hümâyûna zarar irişdirmek sevdâsında oldukları ma‟lûm

olunup ol sebebden mûmâ-ileyhüm Lütfi Paşa‟yla Hayreddin Paşa ve Rûmili beglerbegisi Mehemmed

Paşa irsâl olunup varup muhâsara-i hisâra mübâşeret içindeki bî-dinlere mübâdaret idüp durdılar.”,

Ibid, 197.

455 In the text, Davut Erkan trasnkripted the sentence as “[…] İspânya kralının, pâpâs-ı makruhun ve

Ferendik-i mahzûlun donanmalarının ahvâlini maʿlûm idinmek için […]”. In the light of the context

and the using the adjective mâhzûl, meaning distraught, it is assumed that the Nasûh referred Venice.

Ibid.

456 Ibid, 197-198.

155

Apulia, Andrea Doria was ready with 55 galleys to collaborate with the Venetians

and the Christian Kings were preparing numerous ships, since they had allied to

attack the Ottoman fleet and Muslim territories.457 When this information was

echoed in the imperial camp, the army was attacking Corfu. According to Nasûh, the

battles continued from August 16 to September 28, the soldiers attacked each side of

the main castle of the island. Ayas Pasha was able to ruin some of its bastions. Nasûh

notes that although numerous Ottoman soldiers were killed during the attack, the

viziers and the commanders, accepting even to sacrifice their lives, devoted

themselves to conquer the Island.458

According to Nasûh, the course of the attack on Corfu was changed by the aviso of

Salih Reis. Salih Reis watching the maneuvers at sea informed the Sultan that the

Venetian and Papal fleets were close to Corfu. After having learnt this, the Sultan

decided to postpone the conquest considering the fact that the season for war was

about to end. Following the imperial order, the artillery and the soldiers were

embarked into the ships and left the island.459 The day after, the Sultan called the

Divân, and awarded the Pashas, the captains of the fleet, the cavalry and the

Janissaries for their achievements. He took the road of Constantinople on September

30.460 Nasûh concludes narrating the event, as well as the first part of his

Süleymânnâme, with listing the names of the towns in which the Sultan camped on

his way of return and briefly describing them.461 The account ends with the following

457 Ibid, 198.

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid, 199.

460 Ibid.

461 Ibid, 199-206. Nasuh also mentions the date in which the Sultan arrived at each town.

156

sentence: “thereby, the first part of the epic of the world-sheltering sultan ended with

the aforementioned expedition of Corfu”.462

Another important personality, thought to be present in the campaign with the Sultan,

is Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi463, the “Koca Nişancı”464 of Sultan Süleyman.

Celâlzade, born in near 1491, was the elder son of Kadı Celâleddin. By using his

family network, he entered in the Ottoman bureaucracy in 1516 as the scribe of the

imperial council. In the first years of Sultan Süleyman, he also participated in the

expeditions of Belgrade and Rhodes between the years of 1521 and 1522.465 He went

to Egypt with the Grand Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha in 1524. He devotedly worked for the

regularization of the Egyptian code; this offered him both the favor of the Pasha, for

his life time and the office of Reisü‟l-küttâb in the following year. He also

participated in the expeditions against the Safevids in 1534. The favor of Ġbrahim

Pasha facilitated his rise in the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was appointed to the office

of Nişancı in 1534 and continued his office for twenty three years, until 1557, when

he resigned. In the last expedition of the Sultan, following the death of his successor,

Eğri Abidzâde Mehmed Bey, he was re-appointed and work for thirteen months until

his death in 1567.

462 “Eyle olsa, padişâh-ı âlem-penâh hazretlerinün dâsitân-ı evveli bu zikr olunan Korfos seferi ile

tamâm oldı.” Ibid. 207.

463 For detailed information about Celâlzâde, see: Mehmet ġakir Yılmaz, “Koca Nişancı” of Kanuni:

Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and “Kanun” in the Reign of Suleyman the Magnificent

(1520-1566), unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Bilkent University Department of History, September

2006.

464 He was known with the title meaning the Great Nişancı in the Ottoman milieu. For encyclopedic

information about Celâlzâde, see: Celia J. Kerslake, “Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi”, DİA, v. 7, (Ġstanbul:

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993), 260-262.

465 For the critics of his perception of the aforementioned expeditions and how they were reflected by

Celâlzâde, see: ġahin, Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar, 45-59.

157

As a principal member of the imperial council, Celâlzâde, had the opportunity of

both witnessing the state decisions, plans and strategies directly, recording them in

regular basis, codifying the law and regulations, and participating into the important

military initiations with the Sultan himself. Celâlzâde also chronicled his erudition

and penned important works on ethics and history. He also translated Persian works

into Ottoman language. Like most of the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, he was

interested in classical poetry and had a divan, personal cahier of poetry.466

In this chapter, to analyze how Celâlzâde evaluates the Ottoman campaign of 1537

and the subsequent attack on Corfu, in his famous chronicle entitled Tabakâtü‟l

Memâlik fi Derecâtü‟l Mesâlik467, in which Celâlzâde discusses the socio-political,

administrative and international issues of the Ottoman State in the reign of Sultan

Süleyman until 1555 will be discussed. The studies on the author mentions that the

work was composed first in 1534 and the final chronicle was composed in his

retirement. Tabakât is classified as an example of Süleymânnâme, discussing the

important events, conquests, bureaucrats, scholars, military organization, financial

situation and administrative and social structure of the Ottoman Empire, in the reign

of Süleyman I. The work was composed of 30 tabakas, chapters and 275 dereces,

subtitles. It is generally assumed that since he was a high-ranking bureaucrat,

466 Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Kanunî‟nin Tarihçisinden Muhteşem Çağ: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman-

Tabakaâtü‟l Memâlik ve Derecâtü‟l Mesâlik, ed. by. Ayhan Yılmaz, (Ġstanbul: Kariyer Yayıncılık,

2011), 9-10. Ayhan Yılmaz adds a simplified edition of the Tabakât in this edition. The book is useful

to be consulted since the original Ottoman composition is difficult to understand taking into

consideration the complex explanations and definitions of Celâlzâde. However, the author seems to

err in some translations in terms of simplifying and paraphrasing the long sentences. This may

mislead the researcher to understand the main statement. In the present chapter some of them will be

demonstrated in the foot notes. Therefore, it is strongly be suggested to check the original Ottoman

edition before stating major arguments.

467 In this chapter the edition of Petra Kappert will be consulted. Celâlzâde Mustafa (Koca NiĢâncı),

Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kânûnîs von 1520 bis 1557 oder Tabakât ül-Memâlik ve Derecât ül-

Mesâlik, ed. by, Petra Kappert, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1981). Kappert offers the

researcher the facsimile of the copies of the Tabakât, conserved in the State Library of Berlin, Natinal

Library of Wien and the Library of Istanbul University.

158

Celâlzâde reflects his own views, witnessing and experience, enabling himself to

portrait the soul of the time that he lived.

Celâlzâde discusses the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu under

the subtitle of “[…] the ghaza of the Corfu Island, being a strange-consequence”468.

Celâlzade starts with a large description of Venice and its dominions. He underlines

that Venetians have a fertile, prosperous country. Their state had border to Bosnia

and to Herzegovina that were under the Ottoman rule. He underlines that Venetian

having unlimited ships were powerful at sea and had numerous islands in the

Mediterranean. Celâlzâde continues his description as the following:

[…] however, although they represent themselves as the friends [of them],

they harmed the Muslims. It is often noticed that they have been in alliance

with the enemies of the faith; they are known with their despicableness of

infidelity; they are hypocrites [so] they ameliorate [their relations with] the

Muslims because it is compulsory [for them]. In the affairs of Modone and

Corone, their accord is decided; their alliance with the cursed Spain is

certain. They revolted and disobeyed.469

The aforementioned statements are important both to understand how Venice was

perceived by the Ottomans, indeed by the Ottoman administration, and how the

author tries to explain the background of the Ottoman-Venetian confrontation

following the Apulian Campaign. Celâlzâde continues with the vivid description of

Apulia470, which was under the rule of the infidels despite the fact that it had been

468 “[…] sefer-i ʿacayîb-eser olan Körfos gazâsı beyanındadır.”, Ibid. 284b.

469 "[…] ammâ ʿÂl-i İslâm‟a zararları dûstlık şeklinde, âʿdâ-i dîn ile ittihâd ve haberleri eksik

olmayub, küfr-i zalâletde sâbıklar, ehl-i İslâm ile iltiyâmları zarûrî olub, münafıklardır. Motôn ve

Korôn hâdiselerinde ittifâkları mukarrer, İşpânyâ-ı lâʿîn ile ittihâdları muhakkakdır. ʿİsyân ve tuğyân

eylediler.”, Ibid, 284b-285a.

470 Celâlzâde mentions that Apulia is very near to Sancak of Valona. “Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i

Pâdişâhî‟den Avlonya sancağı ki leb-ideryâda vakîʿ olub, memâlîk-i küfriyeden ânâ karîb Pulyâ

vilâyeti maʿmûr olub […]”. Ibid, 285a. Ayhan Yılmaz, editing and simplifying the original text

demonstrates Apulia as a Venetian dominion: “Yeşil Deniz‟in (Adriyatik) kuzeyinde Venediklilere ait

olmak üzere Dalmaçya‟ya bitişik, Polya (Pula) adlı meşhur bir vilayet vardır.” Furthermore, the

author reads all the definitions of the author on Venice, as the picture of Apulia. See: Celalzade

Mustafa Çelebi, Kanunî‟nin Tarihçisinden Muhteşem Çağ, 221. This statement may lead the

159

captured by Gedik Ahmed Pasha in the times of Mehmed II. He mentions that since

its entire control of the region could not be completed because of the unexpected

death of Mehmed II, in 1537, Sultan Süleyman decided to engage in a campaign

towards Apulia.471 Accordingly, numerous ships of different forms were prepared

and Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa were charged for commanding the

imperial fleet, carrying a crowded army composed by Janissaries, cavalries led by

some Sancakbeyis of Rumelia and Anatolia.472

He states that with the company of his princes Mehmed and Selim, the Sultan, with

his soldiers left Constantinople for the campaign on May 17. First destination was

Adrianople.473 Then, the Sultan reached Plovdiv, Skopje and Elbasan, where the

Sultan engaged in hunting with their companies.474 On July 14, the Sultan stopped by

Valona.475

Celâlzâde mentions that Valona had been already taken under the Ottoman rule;

however, it was the theatre of many insurrections wounding the Empire. The

Albanians often revolted against the state and mistreated the Muslims living there,

killed and captured them and pillaged their goods. Furthermore, the author underlines

that the attitudes of some of the high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats also led the

troubles happening there. Beylerbeyis and even viziers of Albanian origin used to

researcher to assume that the Ottomans aimed principally to attack a Venetian dominion, rather than a

Habsburg territory.

471 See: Celâlzâde Mustafâ, Geschichte Sultan Süleyman, 285a.

472 Ibid, 285a-285b.

473 Ibid, 286a. Celâlzâde states that, there the Sultan stayed for five days. On the other hand, the Sultan

and the army were welcomed by the people of the city enthusiastically. However, the strong rain falls

affected the ceremonies. The banner holder of the tailor’s guild lost his life by a stroke of lightening.

See. Ibid, 286a-286b.

474 Ibid, 286b-287a. Celâlzâde narrates the hunting of the Sultan and his companies as Nasûh does.

475 Ibid, 287a.

160

curtain the ongoing insurrections, mistreatments of Albanians and did not take the

necessary measures. They even mislead the Sultan about the current situation. These

enable the rebels to ally with the enemies of the Sultan. Celâlzâde underlines that the

power vacuum in the region led the Albanian rebels to cooperate with the “infidels”,

who was able to land in the coasts easily.476

According to Celâlzâde, Ayas Pasha, his Albanian origin Grand Vizier, advised the

Sultan Süleyman to engage in an expedition to face the rebellious Albanians.477 The

Pasha emphasized that the presence of the Sultan in Albania and his new measures

would prevent insurrections in future and the alliance of the Albanians with the

enemy, threatening the borders of the Empire. In the course of the expedition, Ayas

Pasha was able to suppress the rebels and the people having share in the rebellions

were condoned by the Sultan. Therefore, the peace was reestablished in the region.

Moreover, Delvina became an Ottoman dominion and by the establishment of the

sancak system there, the region was taken under the direct control of the Empire.478

Right after the discussions on the achivements of the Ottoman land forces in Albania,

Celâlzâde notes the information about the Apulian Campaign, held simultaneously.

The Ottoman soldiers under the command of Lütfi Pasha and Barbarossa captured

many villages and castles, took numerous prisoners and goods in Apulia. However,

the author undelines that twelve Ottoman galleys commanded by Ali Reis, the

chamberlain of the captains of Gallipoli, encountered the famous corsair of the

476 See: Ibid, 287a-287b.

477 “Vezîr-i âʿzam âyâs Pâşâ ol tâʾîfeden olub aslda Avlônyâ hâkînden imiş. Hazret-i Hüdâvendigâr-ı

ʿâlem-I kendü vatanları tarafına tahrîk [idüb] […]”, ibid, 287b.

478 Ibid, 287b-288a.

161

“infidels”, Andrea Doria, and the Venetian ships near Corfu.479 The enemies attacked

on the Ottoman ships. He notes that although the Ottoman crews fought bravely, the

ships sank and many of them died. This event led the Sultan to call the imperial fleet

back to Valona and to order the Attack on Corfu.480 The attack commenced on

August 14. The walls of the main castle in different sides were destroyed. However,

the changing weather conditions prevented a definite Ottoman conquest. The Sultan,

closely observing the conditions, decided to stop the fire. The army took the road of

Constantinople, on September 12.481

Celâlzâde notes that Süleyman arrived at Adrianople on October 25 and stayed there

for a while to celebrate the success of the campaign. On November 25, Arslan Bey,

the son of the governor of Semedre (Bosnia) came to his presence and declared that

the forces of his father defeated the Habsburg guards commanded by Johann

Katzianer.482 He notes that the Sultan was very glad to hear that and appointed the

Governor of Semendre, Mehmed Bey, as the Sancakbeyi of the region. Celâlzâde

concludes his notes on 1537 Campaign by noting that the Sultan arrived at

Constantinople on November 22.

The accounts of Nasûh and Celâlzâde unanimously state that the Ottoman campaign

of 1537 was not primarily designed to be an Ottoman attack on a Venetian dominion;

instead they both underline that the Sultan engage in an expedition to the region of

Apulia, dominated by Charles V. In that respect, the Attack on Corfu is reflected as a

479 Ibid, 288b.

480 Ibid, 289a

481 “[…] hevâya şiddet ü bürüdet müstevlî olmağın fermân-ı cihân-muta ile hisârdan ferâgat

olunub[…]”,ibid.

482 For detailed information see: 289b-290b.

162

response of the Ottoman Sultan to the Venetian alliance and cooperation with the

Habsburgs. Celâlzâde’s statement of “strange-consequence” for the attack on Corfu,

shows that the main target of the Sultan was not Corfu but the events that the

Ottomans had faced during the campaign led the Ottoman-Venetian encounter at

Corfu.

However, these two authors give different reasons for Süleyman’s motivation for the

attack on Corfu. Nasûh mentions that information carried by Salih Reis about the

crowded Spanish and Venetian fleets in sea persuaded the Sultan on the Habsburg-

Venetian alliance and led the Attack on Corfu in 1537. On the other hand, Celâlzâde

underlines that Andrea Doria’s attack on the ships commanded by Ali Reis urged the

Sultan to attack Corfu as a response, since he thought that this event could not be

happened without a Venetian assistance considering the fact that the galleys were so

close to Venetian Corfu. In this regard, it can be asserted that Celâlzâde agrees with

Lütfi Pasha. Although they both indicate the end of the war season as the reason of

the Ottoman withdrawal from the island, Nasûh highlights that the aviso came to the

Sultan about the Christian fleet, coming towards Corfu persuaded Süleyman on

stopping the attack. In the light of information given by Nasûh, it can be argued that

the Sultan might have decided on the withdrawal not to put the fleet and the soldiers

in danger in face of an allied Christian forces coming to assist the defense of Corfu.

Thus, the Ottoman attack did not result on the conquest of the island: instead, the

soldiers were satisfied with booty and numerous slaves and Süleyman showed his

power to the “disloyal” Venetians

Nasûh and Celâlzâde have also different views about the land operations in Valona.

Nasûh states that the Sultan’s arrival at Valona was upon the request of the

messengers, informing him that there had been numerous Spanish ships in the sea.

163

Nasûh portrays the Ottoman initiative in Albania as partly an unsuccessful attempt

since the Albanians fled to high mountains and exhausted the Ottoman soldiers

aiming to suppress them to prevent their future alliance with the enemies of the

Sultan. On the other hand, Celâlzâde narrated the expedition of Albania was one of

the principal motivations of Süleyman in 1537 and emphasized the role of Ayas

Pasha persuading the Sultan on engaging in such an operation. Unlike Nasûh,

Celâlzâde evaluates the Ottoman initiatives against the Albanian rebels successful,

underlining the establishment of the sancak of Delvina.

It can be asserted that Celâlzâde’s accounts overlaps with the accounts of Lütfi

Pasha’s more than the ones of Nasûh’s. This resemblance could be related with their

position in the Ottoman administration. As two important members in the state

politics, they seem to have detailed information about the formulation of the

campaign and the current events. For instance, the Habsburg response to the Ottoman

campaign as the Siege of Osijek is not mentioned by Nasûh. In this context,

Celâlzâde’s silence about the Ottoman-French alliance is interesting. The question of

why he does not tell anything about it is a matter of speculation. The absence of the

French in Lombardy, as it had been planned, and the redirection of the Ottoman

forces to Corfu without having a definite success in Apulia might have led the author

not to mention the French encouragement for a joint Ottoman-French operation

against the Habsburgs and to reflect the 1537 Campaign as an individual Ottoman

military initiative against the “infidel”.

164

4.3. The Reverberations of the Campaign: 1537 in the Books on Ottoman

History

To make the picture drawn by the actors and eyewitnesses of 1537 clearer and to

answer the question of how the Ottoman Campaign of Apulia and the attack on

Corfu in 1537 was narrated in the Ottoman historiography, the question of how the

Ottoman military initiative is echoed by the other chronicles composed in sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries need for further discussion. It is known that the early

modern chroniclers were prone to use earlier studies, as well as the works of their

contemporaries. Hence, it can be assumed that the sources, to be discussed below,

most probably mainly consulted the accounts of Lütfi Pasha, Hayreddin Barbarossa,

Celâlzâde and Nasûh. This fact should not be evaluated as only a repetition of what

had been narrated by the predecessors; indeed, by comparing and contrasting the

existing sources in the light of the subsequent developments, the chronicles discussed

under this subtitle evaluate the Ottoman Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537

within a broader perspective. In this context, here the author of the present study

intends to consult two examples of the books on Ottoman history, such as the

chronicles of Mustafa Âlî, and Ġbrahim Peçevî.

One of the important books of history in the Ottoman literature is the comprehensive

account of Mustafa Âlî, Künhü‟l- Ahbâr, which was composed as a detailed world

history discussing the events from the creation of the universe up to the year of

1596.483 Mustafa Âlî, born in 1541 in Ottoman Gallipoli, was an important Ottoman

bureaucrat and historian. He entered into state service in the imperial palace in the

483 Since Âlî was born in Gallipoli, he is also known as “Gelibolulu Âlî”, Âlî from Gallipoli. Künh‟ül

Ahbâr means the Essence of History. For detailed information about Künhü‟l- Ahbâr, see: Jan

Schmidt, “Künhü-l Ahbâr”, DİA, v.26, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002), 555-556.

165

reign of the Sultan Selim II. He worked as the scribe of the imperial council. The

studies on him mention that his great ambition to get a high position in the Ottoman

bureaucracy disabled him to get the support of the sultans, Süleyman and Selim II.

He was first worked as scribe in Aleppo, Yemen and Bosnia. He desired to be

appointed as Nişancı in the late sixteenth-century, but he was refused. He then

became the Sancakbeyi of Amasya and Defterdar of Rumelia. In his last years, he

was appointed as the Sancakbeyi of Jeddah, where he died c.1600.484 Besides his

administrative positions, he also engaged in literary studies and penned numerous

works on poetry, politics and ethics.485

The Künhü‟l- Ahbâr of Âlî was composed of four parts. The first part deals with the

creation of the universe, the mountains, seas, waters and climates; the second

discusses the history of Islam and Arabs and the third narrates the histories of Turks

and Mongolians. The fourth part of the work discusses the history of the Ottoman

Empire, from its rise to the year of 1596 and the biographies of the prominent

statesmen, scientists and poets of the mentioned period.486 The account is

chronologically divided under the name of the sultans and discusses the events and

important developments happened in each sultan’s reign.487 Before discussing the

views of Âlî on the Ottoman campaign of 1537, the views of Cornell H. Fleischer,

published a comprehensive book on Âlî, over the atmosphere of the time of

484 See: Bekir Kütükoğlu, “Âlî Mustafa Efendi”, DİA, v.2, (Ġstanbul, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989),

414-416, 414.

485 Ibid, 414-416. For further information about Mustafa Âlî and his works consult the prominent

studies on him: Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The

Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), (Princeton & New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1986);

Mustafa Ġsen, Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988).

486 Kütükoğlu, “Âlî Mustafa Efendi”,415; Ġsen, Gelibolulu Musfata Âli, 11-13.

487 In the present study, the printed version of the original text is consulted. See: Gelibolulu Mustafa

Âlî, Künhü‟l Ahbâr, Dördüncü Rükn, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2009).

166

composition that figured Âlî’s perception and the style Künhü’l- Ahbâr should be

remembered:

At the very start of the year 1000 of Hijra, Âli began to write a history of the

world and the Ottoman Empire. The millennium marked the end of an era, an

end that many thought world would usher in the apocalypse. But the

apocalypse did not arrived, and so the year of 1000 also inaugurated a new

age. It was a time for retrospection and perhaps introspection. Âli mediated

on the society, he had served as a man of learning, a bureaucrat, and a soldier

for all his adult life. He saw it to be in the grip of a moral apocalypse, a

cultural and political crisis, a decline from an ideal order that had existed in

fact but a few decades before. This retrospective perspective led Âli to

articulate in his history and social commentaries, the ideals that lay at the

heart of Ottoman society at its height; he had to enunciate what he saw as the

central distinguishing features of the Ottoman system in order to analyze

their corrosion and failure.488

The Ottoman campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu is discussed by Âlî in the

fourth book, under the title of “the 35th incident”. Âlî names the event as “the

expedition for the conquest of the Corfu Island”.489 He gives detailed information

about the preparation of the imperial armada for the expedition, the types of ships490,

the qualities of the commanders and soldiers. He also mentions that before the

departure of the Sultan, his sons Mehmed and Selim, and the land army, on May 17,

1537 and the imperial fleet led by Lütfi Pasha sailed towards Mediterranean. The

forces commanded by the Great Admiral, Hayreddin Barbarossa also moved to

follow the fleet.491 Âlî notes that the main target of the Ottoman fleet the shores of

Apulia.492

488 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 7-8.

489 “Korfos cezîresi fethine tevecchüh-i hümâyûnlarıdır ki […]”Ibid, 305b.

490 Ibid.

491 “[… ]Lütfî Pâşa tonanmây-ı hümâyuna serdâr ve kapûdan[…] mücâhîd-i cezâyîristân Hayreddin

Paşa ânlar kele-i- hidmet-i feth-i teshîre] fermân […]”, ibid.

492 Ibid., 305b.

167

In the following passages, Âlî gives information about the route of the land army, the

hunting game performed by the Sultan, his sons and the soldiers in Elbasan,

Albania.493 The next destination was decided to be Valona, thus, the Sultan ordered

the imperial fleet to reach to the port of Valona after having attacked and conquered

Apulia. According to Âlî, the choice of Apulia was not an unexpected decision. The

Republic of Venice had already signed an ahidnâme with the Ottoman Empire to

pursue the ongoing trade and eliminate the fear of a sudden attack.494 However,

Venetians breaking the terms of the peace were secretly in alliance with the Spanish

King495 and they had been harming some ships of Muslim merchants. That situation

created an insecurity about them in the eyes of the Sultan. According to him, it was

also known that the Venetians used the region of Apulia, dominated by the Spanish

Kingdom, as a base in cooperation with the Spanish.496 Therefore, taking the region

under the Ottoman control was thought to be both a punishment for Spain and

Venice allying against the Ottoman Sultan and the re-initiation of the plan of

Süleyman’s great grand father, Mehmed II, on conquering Apulia, which had been

failed because of his unexpected death.497

According to Âlî, the course of the campaign was changed by an unexpected attack

of the Spanish Admiral, Andrea Doria and of the Venetian forces situated in the port

of Corfu. The ship of Sinan Kethüda, sent as an envoy to Valona by Lütfi Pasha, was

attacked by the allied forces. Besides this event, twelve Ottoman galleys under the

493 Ibid., 305b-306a.

494 Ibid, 306a.

495 “[…] ve yine hafiyyen İspânya krallarıyla nifâkda ittifâk idüb […]”, ibid.

496 “[…] bu tâ‟ifey-i hafiyeye tâ‟bî Polya yakaları […]”, ibid.

497 Ibid.

168

command of Ali Kethüda that had stayed behind the imperial fleet on the way of

Apulia, were put under fire by them. The battles were bloody; Muslim soldiers

resisted and damaged the Christian forces, but they were not able to survive. Most of

them were killed and the rest was taken as slaves.498 A soldier, named Ahmed

rejected to live as a slave; jumped at sea. With the help of God, he could hang on a

wood piece and reach a running Ottoman ship. Ahmed immediately informed Lütfi

Pasha about the attack.499 These two attacks were accepted as casus belli by

Süleyman and led him to order the Pashas the attack on Corfu.500

Âlî also gives information about the maneuvers of the land army in Albania: while

the fleet was dealing with Apulia and struggling with the Christian attacks, the land

army was able to take Albania under the Ottoman control, notes the author. He points

out that the region had been in a turmoil since the Albanian rebel groups disobeying

the Ottoman rule and frequently supported by the Venetians created unrest in towns.

According to Âlî, the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha and the Ottoman statesmen of

Albanian origin had an important share in these insurrections, since they covered the

incidents, winked at the power of the regional elites and misinformed the Sultan

about the ongoing situation.501 Therefore, the military measures taken in Valona was

evaluated as an important maneuver to prevent a future chaos by Âlî.502

498 Ibid, 306a-306b.

499 Âlî mentions that, Ahmed was noticed by the people of a Karamürsel ship of the Ottomans,

patrolling the coasts and ported to Lütfi Pasha. Ibid, 306b.

500 Ibid 306b.

501 The author mentions that the attacks of the Ottoman ships proved the betrayal of the Venetians.

“[…] Venedik küffârının hıyânetlerinde şüphe kalmadı[…]”. Ibid.

502 Ibid, 306b-307a.

169

The author narrates that right after having issued the imperial order for the attack on

Corfu and his victory in Valona, Sultan Süleyman came to a town having a clear

view of Corfu to supervene the attacks of the imperial fleet. The castle of the island

was severely damaged by the fire opened from the fleet and the soldiers got close to

conquer it. However, the author indicates that in the meantime, autumn rains started

to fall and heavy thunderstorms damaged the soldiers and the caissons.503 Moreover,

fire opened the Ottoman soldiers by the Corfiots started to harm the army. In one

bombing four Ottoman infantry soldiers died. All these pursued the Sultan on ending

the attacks. In addition to this, the season for war for the Ottomans was about to end.

Considering all these, Süleymann sent Ayas Pasha to Corfu to inform Lütfi Pasha

and Hayreddin Barbarossa that the Sultan ordered the retreat of both the land and sea

forces from the island and the withdrawal of the conquest.504 Upon this, according to

Âlî, Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa insisted on that the conquest was about to

be concluded and the efforts of soldiers should not be wasted. However, Süleyman

uttered as follows: “[…] I do not exchange my one ghazi for a thousand such castles

[…]”505.

Thereby, the Ottoman forces retreated and the imperial fleet contended itself with

attacking and pillaging the island of Cephalonia on the way return. The Sultan

reached Adrianople on October 25. Âli concludes his account on the campaign by

mentioning that in Adrianople, fethnâmes were written and sent to all governors of

the Empire to announce the victory of the Ottoman army in the campaign. The Sultan

returned to Constantinople on November 22, 1537.

503 Ibid, 307a.

504 Ibid.

505 “[…] ben bir mücâhid kulumı bin böyle hisara değüşmezük buyurulub […]”, ibid.

170

Here, it is useful to discuss another important example of the Ottoman books of

history, the chronicle of historian Peçevi Ġbrahim Efendi. Ġbrahim Efendi was an

important Ottoman chronicler, born in Pecs in 1574.506 He studied in Bosnia and in

Buda when he was a child. Upon the death of his father, he entered in the household

of Lala Mehmed Pasha, acting as Beylerbeyi of Anatolia and Rumelia to be

appointed as the Grand Vizier of Sultan Ahmed I and lived over many years in

Hungary. He acted as scribe for Pasha. For that reason, he could find the chance of

participating in spme Ottoman expeditions, especially to Austria, with the imperial

army and get the information about the Ottoman state decisions at the first glance.

Following the death of Lala Mehmed Pasha, he returned to Constantinople and

undertook several offices in the financial bureaucracy and in the imperial

government. In 1631, he was appointed as Defterdar of Anatolia, and started to be

called with the title of Pasha. His last office was the Defterdar of TimiĢoara507, in

Romania. After 1641, he was discharged from his office because of his age.

Although the date is unclear, it is known that he died c. 1648.508

In 1640, he devoted himself to write his chronicle, comprehending the wars of

Süleyman I. Later, with the recommendation of the Beylerbeyi of Buda, Musa Pasha,

he developed the chronicle with the discussions preceding events up to his age and

the details of war treaties. He did not give a special name to his history, so the

account has been known as the History of Peçevi. He extensively consulted

numerous books of history, written before, including the accounts of Celâlzâde and

506 For that reason he was called as Peçûyî, from Pecs. In time, the epithet turned into Peçevi. Peçevi’s

mother was from the famous Sokollu family, whose members held high-ranking positions in the

Ottoman administration.

507 Temeşvar in Ottoman use.

508 Erica Hancz, “Peçûylu Ġbrahim”, DİA, v. 34, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 216-218,

217.

171

Mustafa Âlî, which was discussed above.509 For the details of the war treaties, he also

used the Hungarian chronicles and documents.510 Another interesting point about the

work is that Peçevi indicates the names of the Ottoman chroniclers, consulted by him

in the text, unlike the other Ottoman scholars of the time. The author also narrates

some anecdotes or short stories in the text. By its comprehensiveness and accuracy,

the History of Peçevi, was used by numerous subsequent Ottoman chroniclers, even

it was translated and published in Hungary.511

In the History of Peçevi512, the Ottoman campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537

is discussed under the title of “the Extract of the Imperial Campaign to the Island of

Corfu and the Departure of the Sultan”.513 Peçevi starts the story with the description

of the city of Venice and characteristics of the Venetians. He underlines that most of

the Venetian dominions, except the lagoon city, were close to the borders of the

Ottoman dominions. Thus, Venetians had to follow a disingenuous policy towards

the Ottomans in order to satisfy their needs, such as food supplies, and to ally with

the Ottoman Sultan to be safe from a possible Ottoman threat against his

dominions.514 The author mentions that Venice was “[…] an enemy bay, friend in

appearance because of the necessity. They are the enemy of the faith among the

509 For details about the sources that the author consulted, see: Ibid.

510 Ibid, 217-218.

511 Ibid, 218.

512 The History of Peçevi had several editions. In 1968, Murat Uyaz adopted the text in modern

Turkish. See: Ġbrahim Peçevî, Peçevî Tarihi, v.1-2, (Ġstanbul: NeĢriyat Yurdu, 1968). In the present

study, the 1580 edition of the original text, in Ottoman script, will be used. Peçevî , Tarîh-i Peçevî.

513 “Ġcmâl-i Sefer-i Hümâyûn be Cezîre-i Korfos ve ʿAzîmet-i Hümâyûn”. Peçevi Ġbrahim, 194.

514 Ibid.

172

infidels, [having] aggravated hostilities.”515 The Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, knew

their hostility and he sent the imperial fleet under the command of Lütfi Pasha and

the Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa to attack the region of Apulia.516 As Mustafa Âli,

the author evaluates the Sultan’s decision by pointing out the former expedition in

the late fifteenth-century, realized by Gedik Ahmed Pasha. Since, the death of

Mehmed II prevented the entire control of the region, Süleyman, intended to

complete the conquest by reconqueing the towns captured by Gedik Ahmed Pasha.517

The History of Peçevi discusses the campaign in two separate parts. In the first part,

the author narrates the voyage of the Sultan leading the land army.518 According to

Peçevî, the ongoing insurrections caused by the Albanian bandit groups motivated

the Sultan to expedite on Valona. He notes that since the region had not been taken

under the direct control of the Ottoman State yet, the insurrections within the region

could not come to an end and this gradually harmed the Ottoman government.519

Moreover, he underlines that thanks to its geographical position, the port was also

used by the enemies supporting by the rebellions against the Ottomans.520. Peçevî

asserts that the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha convinced the Sultan on marching towards

Valona521 and he mentions that by the efforts of the Ottoman commanders, the rebels

515 “[…] bi‟l zarûrî dostlûk suretinde bir düşman koydur. Sâʾir kefereden ʿadâvetleri müşted dîn

düşmanlarıdır.” Ibid.

516 Ibid.

517 Ibid.

518 The author narrates in detail that the Sultan hunted in the mentioned town. However, the animals

were wretched, some of them are domesticated and friendly to people. For that reason, Süleyman

banned the hunt in the region. See. Ibid, 195-196.

519 Ibid, 196.

520 The author, here, mentions the Venetians.

173

were punished, the city was taken under the direct control of the Ottoman State by

the implementation of the sancak system. There, the Sancak of Delvina was

established and its governor and kadı were appointed.522

In the second part, Peçevî narrates the sea expedition in 1537. He mentions, the

region of Apulia was attacked and destroyed by the forces of Lütfi Pasha and

Hayreddin Barbarossa. Peçevî narrates the stories of Ali and Bostan Kethüda, as

Mustafa Âlî does in his account, to show how the campaign was redirected to Corfu.

He mentions, twelve galleys of Ali Kethüda523, fell behind the main corps of the

fleet, were attacked by the forces of Andera Doria524 which had been at the port of

Corfu.525 Subsequently, the galley commanded by Bostan Kethüda526 who sent by the

Ottoman Sultan to Corfu was captured by the Venetians.527 Lütfi Pasha informed

Süleyman about these attacks and accordingly, the Sultan ordered the attack on

Corfu. The fleet massively bombed the main castle in the island and the land army

was able to open breaches to penetrate in Corfu.528

Peçevî also relates the Ottoman withdrawal from Corfu with the inconvenient

weather conditions. He notes, when the Sultan moved from Valona to a town

521 “[…] vezir ʿâzam olan Ayas Paşa kendüsi dahî cinslerinden olmağla saʿâdetlü pâdişâh-ı ʿalempenâhı

ol sefere tahrik idüb nefsü‟l emrde ol memlekete gelünmekle nice fevâʾîd ve nafʿi ve aʿvâîd

tahsil olunmağa baʿis ve bâʿdi oldular.” Ibid.

522 Peçevî, 196.

523 Ibid, 196-197.

524 Peçevî calls him as the famous corsair of the infidels. Ibid, 197.

525 Ibid.

526 He also worked as a chamberlain of the imperial shipyard of Gallipoli.

527 Here, it is interesting to note that Peçevî narrates the story of an Ottoman slave, jumping at sea and

rescuing from death by holding a piece of wood, exactly in the same way and words with Mustafa Âlî.

See: Ibid 197.

528 Ibid, 197-198.

174

opposite Corfu, because of the massive rains and thunderstorms, there were no tent,

horse or man remained uninjured.529 According to author “there was neither the

capacity for [preventing] the failure, nor time for the expedition”530 All these were

interpreted as the signs, offering the delay of the expedition, by the Sultan. He sent

Ayas Pasha to the island to declare the commanders the imperial order. Although

Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa tried to convince him by saying that the

conquest was about to be completed, and asked the Pasha two more days, the death

of four warriors in a bombardment led the final decision of the Sultan: Sülyeman said

that he would never exchange one of his warriors to thousand of such a castle.531

Here, it should be noted that Peçevî underlines that he had this passage from the

history of Mustafa Âli. However, he also indicates that he did not believe in that

story, since ghaza also required martyrdom and adds that the sultans could have

uttered these kinds of sentences for having the favor of the soldiers and solacing

them.532 He concludes his story by mentioning the attacks of Barbarossa on

Cephalonia.533

529 Ibid, 198.

530 “[…] ne akâmete kâbiliyyet ve ne sefere müddet kaldı.” Ibid.

531 Ibid, 198.

532 Ibid, 198-199.

533 Ibid. 200.

175

4.4. A History of the Maritime Subjects for the Great Ones: Katip Çelebi

Narrating 1537

Along with the aforediscussed books on Ottoman History, comprehending the entire

history of the Ottoman Dynasty, from its rise to the date of the composition of the

accounts, the Campaign of 1537 was also discussed by Katip Çelebi in his account

on the maritime issues of the Ottoman Empire. Katip Çelebi is a widely known

Ottoman scholar and geographer in the seventeenth-century, who penned numerous

works on history and geography.534 Since his father was among the Ottoman military

class, he had found the chance of education in the palace school; he became a

member of the households of the important Ottoman high ranking bureaucrats,

including the Grand Vizer of Sultan Murad IV, Hüsrev Pasha and observed the

Ottoman campaigns.535

One of his prominent works is Tuhfetü‟l Kibâr fi Esfâri‟l Bihâr536offering the

researcher important details about the Ottoman naval warfare, till 1656.537 “The

Tuhfetü‟l- Kibar consists of two parts (kısım): the first part is narrative, the history

proper; the second part is topical, covering various aspects of naval matters.”538 It is

534 Orhan ġaik Gökyay, “Kâtib Çelebi”, DİA, v.25, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002), 36-40, 38-

40.

535 Ibid, 36-37.

536 Gift to the Great Ones on the Subject of Maritime Campaigns. The original text was translated into

English in 1831 by James Mitchell. Haji Khalifeh, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks,

trans.by. James Mitchell, (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1831). In the present, the edited,

corrected and expanded version of this translation of Svatopluk Soucek will be used. Kâtip Çelebi,

The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, ed. by, Svatopluk Soucek, (Princeton: Markus Wiener

Publishers, 2011).

537 Kâtip Çelebi, also known as Haci Halife, see: Kâtip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında

İncelemeler, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.)

538 Kâtip Çelebi, The History of the Maritime Wars, 7.

176

know that the author consulted the works of Hoca Saadeddin539, Hayreddin

Barbarossa, Piri Reis540 and Seydi Ali Reis541 extensively.542 Although, the main

focus of the author was the wars in the Mediterranean, the book of Kâtip Çelebi is

considered one of the most important books discussing the Ottoman seafaring.

In Tuhfetü‟l-Kibâr, Kâtip Çelebi gives interesting descriptions of the island of Corfu

and he empahisizes that Kemal Reis had already recommended to Sultan Süleyman

the capture of Corfu at first place:

It is hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is a celebrated and wellpopulated

island, and has a strong fortress built in the sea, but connected on

one side with the land. In former times this island passed by right of

inheritance from one of the Christian princes who governed Albania into the

hands of a woman, but in A.H. 803 (A.D. 1400), the Venetians becoming

victorious, succeeded to stratagem in wresting it from her, and having

fortified the castle, they made it a guard island for the Gulf, and a general

rendezvous for their army and navy. Near to it, in the mouth of Gulf, is a

watch-tower, and Kemal Reis observing that the Venetians had their eye

upon it, repeatedly suggested the late Sultan Soleiman Khan the necessity of

capturing it; in consequence of which in 943 of the Hejra (A.D. 1536), the

illustrious emperor proceeded thither by sea and land, and completely

besieged it.543

539 Hoca Saadeddin was the Grand Vizier and prominent historian of the Ottoman Empire in the

sixteenth century and wrote Tâcü‟t- Tevârih, the Crown of the History, discussing the history of the

Ottoman Empire from his rise to 1520. For detailed information see: ġerafettin Turan, “Hoca

Sâddeddin Efendi”, DİA, v. 18, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998), 196-198.

540 Pîrî Reis, the Ottoman admiral, commander and cartographer of the sixteenth century, is widely

known by his Kitâb-ı Bahriye, Book of Navigation and his accurate charts showing the important

ports in the Mediterranean and the Oceans. For encyclopedic information, see: Ġdris Bostan, “Pîrî

Reis”, DİA, v.34, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 283-285.

541 Seydi Ali Reis, was the Ottoman admiral and navigator, who also commanded the imperial armada

in the Battle of Preveza in 1538. He was known with his travel book Mirâtü‟l Memâlik, Mirror of the

Conuntries, composed in 1557, discussing the places that he saw in his return from India to

Constantinople. He also studied on astronomy and its effects on navigation. For detailed information

see: Mahmut Ak, “Seydi Ali Reis”, DİA, v.37, (Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009), 21-24.

542 Kâtip Çelebi, 4-5.

543 Ibid, 50-51.

177

The aforementioned passage cited from Kâtip Çelebi’s chronicle is the statements of

Piri Reis. By noting his accounts on the Ionian Islands, Çelebi copies the passages

from Kitab-ı Bahriyye by giving reference and adds his own explanations.

The castle of Corfu, as described in Bahria, […] is a very strong fort, and has

within it and in the suburbs about eighteen thousand houses. Within the walls

the Venetians have built, upon two hills, two towers of stone with a

subterraneous passage between them, so that when necessary they are able to

render assistance to each other. Its walls are surrounded by the sea, and it has

also a harbor, into which the smaller vessels enter, but the galleys lie outside.

Between this island and the coast there is a small strait, by which when

necessary an army may pass.544

These passages are cited from the first chapter of the book. The Ottoman campaign

of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu is discussed by the author, on the other hand, in one

of the subsequent chapters entitled “Sultan Süleyman’s Expedition to Corfu”. As the

motivation for this expedition, the author highlights Süleyman’s desire for

conquering Apulia that had been subdued firstly in the reign of Mehmed II, by his

Grand Vizier Gedik Ahmed Pasa and for controlling the territories of Valona and

Delvina that were important border zones in Albania, opposite Apulia.545 The author

underlines once more the Kemal Reis’ recommendation of the capture of Corfu. This

demonstrate that he reasons the subsequent attack on Corfu with the Kemal Reis’

advices.

He notes that on May 1537, Lütfi Pasha commanding the imperial fleet, and

Hayreddin Barbarossa sailed for the Mediterranean with 280 pieces of ships, 135

galleys and other vessels and the Sultan, with his sons, left Constantinople on May

544 Ibid, 51.

545 Kâtip Çelebi, 99.

178

17 for Valona. According to Kâtip Çelebi, “never before had so large a fleet

sailed.”546 30.000 sailors had been collected from all parts of the Empire.547

According to Kâtip Çelebi the main motivation of the Sultan in Albania was

suppressing the Albanian rebels who had been plundering inhabitants of the region

and allying with the “enemy” of the Sultan. Since the region of Valona was bounded

on the west by the sea, the natives and rebellious groups had close contacts with the

ships of the “infidel”. Considering this fact, the region was entirely subjugated; the

rebels in Delvina were suppressed. Moreover, the sancaks of Valona and Delvina

were established.548

Kâtip Çelebi notes that during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia, Hayreddin Barbarossa

sailed to watch over 60 vessels carrying provisions from Egypt. He notes 40

Venetian vessels observing the move of Barbarossa assumed that the imperial fleet

withdrew from Apulia and took the route of Constantinople. They immediately

moved towards Corfu to meet other Venetian ships of the main fleet. However, they

were circled by the forces of Lütfi Pasha. Two of them was captured, two sank and

the rest was able to flee to Corfu. After having brought the provisions and munitions

from Egypt to the port of Prevesa, Barbarossa’s forces also joined the imperial fleet

which had been assembled at Valona.549

Çelebi also gives interesting details about the Venetians and their relations with the

Ottoman Porte:

546 Ibid.

547 Ibid.

548 Ibid, 100.

549 Ibid.

179

The Venetian infidels are a people famous for their great wealth, their

extensive commerce, and their deceit and perfidy in all their transactions.

Having by treachery taken most of the islands in their possession from the

Hungarian princes, and these islands being on the borders of the Ottoman

dominions, and deriving their subsistence and trade from them, the Venetians

from necessity maintain a show of friendship, but in reality the most

inveterate of all the enemies of the faith.550

Kâtip Çelebi also narrates the stories of the Ali and Bostan Kethüda, and the attacks

of Andrea Doria collaborating with the Venetians that are also discussed by Mustafa

Âlî and Peçevî.551 Similarly, he relates the Ottoman declaration of war against

Venice and the Attack on Corfu with these events triggered by the Venetians. Kâtip

Çelebi notes that Corfu was surrounded by sea also attacked by land for 43 days and

nights.552 The warriors were able to destroy the walls of the main castle, but the

season change started to disable the Ottoman soldiers. Heavy rains, extreme cold that

fell suddenly were evaluated as the signs for the retreat by the Sultan. Moreover, the

death of four Ottoman soldiers by a cannon ball, pushed the Sultan to stop the fire.553

Kâtip Çelebi also quotes the sentence of Süleyman: “I would never exchange one of

my brave warriors for a thousand such castles”.554 According to him, Lütfi Pasha and

Hayreddin Barbarossa did not consented on the withdrawal since the conquest

seemed to be so close, but they obeyed the imperial order. On September 30, the

Sultan, the land army and the forces of Lütfi Pasha took the road of

Constantinople.555

550 Ibid.

551 Ibid., 100-101.

552 Ibid., 101.

553 Ibid, 101-102

554 Ibid., 101-102.

555 Ibid, 102.

180

Kâtip Çelebi notes that subsequently Hayreddin Barbarossa engaged in the conquest

of Greek islands. He attacked Cephalonia; plundered the island and took massive

booty. Then he conquered Kythira, Aegina and after four days of siege, Kea, Paros

and Naxos was controlled. Six small islands were put under annual Ottoman tribute.

Pasha was able to gather important amount of gold and clothes, including capturing

numerous girls and boys.556 Çelebi concludes his account on the campaign by noting

the arrival of Hayreddin Barbarossa in the presence of the Sultan. The morning after

his arrival, the Pasha, with a great ceremony, kissed the hand of the Sultan and was

presented with splendid, precious robes and “received highest marks of honour; for

never at any period had any capudan done such signal service”557.

4.5. Conclusion

Although at first glance, the Ottoman chronicles composed in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries that were discussed in this chapter seem narrating the Ottoman

Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 similarly, by a detailed analysis

the historian encounter various different points of view, especially on the reasons for

the campaign and why an Ottoman-Venetian encounter took place. Therefore, to

state the main motivations of the Ottomans in 1537, the nature of the military

initiative and the resons for the attack on Corfu, one should compare and contrast the

information given by the Ottoman chronicles, taking into consideration the positions

of the authors, their roles in the campaign and the date of the composition of the

accounts.

556 Ibid.

557 Ibid, 103.

181

The chapter reveal that almost all sources discussed above unanimously indicate that

the Campaign of 1537 was designed as an attack on Apulia, bound to the realm of the

Habsburg Emperor, who was called by the Ottomans as the “King of Spain”. On the

other hand, most of the sources mention that Süleyman also intended to suppress the

insurrections in Albania that had been threthening the Ottoman influence in the

region and enabling the Albanian cooperation with the enemies of the Sultan. As

stated before, Valona being opposite Apulia was the closest Ottoman dominion to

Apulia. This shows that the Ottomans intended to use the Port of Valona as the

military base for the 1537 Campaign. For that reason, the suppression of the local

unrest there became crucial for the Ottomans to not only consolidate the Sultan’s

authority in Albania, but also to secure the Ottoman moves towards Apulia. In this

regard, it should be underlined that the 1537 Campaign had two principal targets;

Apulia and the Albanian towns that had not been taken under Ottoman control yet.

On the other hand, the numbers of the ships and soldiers, given by the sources prove

that Süleyman did not plan a military expedition for only showing his power to his

enemies and for suppressing the Albanian rebels. Such a fleet, great in number and

the crowded army, mentioned by all sources, should have been mobilized for a more

complex military plan.

In this context, the statements of Lütfi Pasha about the request of the French King

stand out: The French promise of military alliance on the condition that the Sultan

agreed to expedite towards Valona mirrors that the behind the choice of Apulia and

Valona, there was the French encouragement. Taking into consideration his position

in the Ottoman government, it could be argued that the account of Lütfi Pasha

reflects the state policies more than its equivalents discussed in this chapter. The

silence of the other chronicles about the Ottoman-French alliance, encouraging the

182

Ottoman campaign, especially that of the former studies using Lütfi Pasha’s account

is noteworthy though.

The sources also reveal that Barbarossa did not personally participated in the attacks

on Apulia. He was mainly charged to observe the circumstances, patrol the Ottoman

operation from the sea, protect navy and to secure the transportation of the provisions

from Egypt. He also kept an eye on Venetian and Habsburg moves. His duty was

more defensive than offensive. The Ottoman initiative in Apulia was mainly

commanded by Lütfi Pasha and realized a large branch of the Rumelian army.

Although the chronicles do not give significant evidence for Sultan’s intention of

invading Italy, in most of the accounts the attacks on Apulia in 1537 were related

with the attacks of Gedik Ahmed Pasha occured in the reign of Mehmed II and

Sultan Süleyman was reflected as completing his ancestor’s desired project. Since

the invasion of Apulia did not bring about fruitful outcomes, except the booty and

slaves taken from the region and the Ottoman display of power, the chroniclers are

silent about the details of the attacks. However, their emphasis on Gedik Ahmed

Pasha’s former initiative proves that one of the most important factors motivating the

Sultan for engaging in such a campaign was his desire of declaring that he had a say

on the future of Italy, as his great grand father.

All chronicles indicate that Venice, showing itself as the friend of the Ottoman

Empire, was in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor and they never hesitated

to harm the Ottomans, ships, territories and Muslims in any cases. In the

insurrections in Albania, Venetian were thought to have played major roles.

Celâlzâde clearly accuses Venetians for being in betrayal in the losses of Modone

and Corone during the German Expedition in 1532. For that reason, the sources

highlighted that behind the Sultan’s decision for the suppression of the Albanian

183

rebels was also an intention of preventing a future Venetian-Albanian cooperation

against the Ottomans and of strengthening the western borders of the Empire. The

disingenuous policy followed by the Venetian government was interpreted as the

betrayal and it was shown as the principal reason for disrupting the peace between

these two states. This clearly demonstrates that the Attack on Corfu was the outcome

of the political tension between two states and gained its grounds by the Doria’s and

Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during 1537 Campaign that are narrated in

detail in all chronicles, consulted for this chapter.

In that context, the account of Kâtip Çelebi offers the researcher a different aspect:

He mentions that before the Campaign, Kemal Reis, a well-known Ottoman captain,

recommended the Sultan that Corfu should be attacked at first place. However, other

accounts do not show any evidence supporting this information. In any case, as a

well-known Venetian controlling the Adriatic, Corfu might have been targeted by the

Ottomans considering that they needed for a secured and fortified naval base for the

further operations of the imperial fleet in the western Mediterranean. However, in

1537, there is no clear evidence proving that the Empire principally intended to

conquer the island. Considering the fact that the attack on Corfu commenced after

the Apulian Campaign, it can be asserted that Corfu was not the immediate target of

the Ottomans in 1537; indeed the attack was the outcome of the Ottoman-Venetian

confrontations at sea during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia.

For the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the Island, the authors unanimously

show the end of the season of war as the main reason. However, the “failure” in

Corfu, continuing approximately 40 days according to the sources, seem to be related

with the strong defense of the island and the lack of sufficient provisions, since the

Campaign endured almost for four months. Here, the statement of Nasûh,

184

underlining the move of the allied Spanish and Venetian ships towards the island is

also interesting. In that respect, the Sultan seems to stop the fire not to lose more

time, men, as well as for preventing a possible Christian attack on the Ottoman

forces. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Attack on Corfu could not go beyond a

show off of the Sultan, an Ottoman challenge to the Venetian misbehavior.

As was demonstrated, the Ottoman chronicles treated the 1537 Campaign as a

successful military initiative of Süleyman. The promotion and rewarding of the

participants of the campaign by the Sultan, the fethnâmes penned right after the

army’s return and the notes of the authors about the satisfaction of the Sultan show

that the Ottomans celebrated the campaign. Considering the fact that Süleyman

displayed his power in Italy and established the imperial control in Albania by the

establishment of the sancak system in Delvina, the 1537 Campaign can be evaluated

as a successful attempt of the Ottomans. However, one should keep in mind that the

Campaign was designed to be an Ottoman-French joint operation in Italy and

primarily aimed an immediate Ottoman invasion of Apulia. In this context, it will not

wrong to argue that the Ottomans settled for the attacks of plundering and for the reconquest

of Albania. The success displayed by the Ottomans was only a camouflage

for the break of the original plan. Here, the historian should also remember how the

Siege of Vienna in 1529 was treated by the Ottoman sources: it is known that the

Ottomans celebrated their victory in 1529, sent a fethnâme to Venice to inform the

Senate about the victory of Süleyman. The German Expedition in 1532 was also

treated as a decisive victory of the Sultan. However, all these expeditions did not

result in fruitful outcomes for the Ottomans concerning the Ottoman grand-strategy

of the early sixteenth-century. This also reveals the fact that to understand the

meaning and the importance of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on

185

Corfu in 1537, the historian should deeply analyze the political structure of the time

and the imperial discourse on the universal sovereignty, contextualized by Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that most of the chronicles discussed in this

chapter narrated the 1537 campaign as the Sultan’s “Expedition of Corfu”. This

misleads the researcher to decipher the real motivation of the Ottomans in 1537, by

reflecting the outcome as the target. In this context, it can be asserted that earlier

studies treating the 1537 campaign as the “Expedition of Corfu” might have

primarily relied on the Ottoman sources. As was stated before, to produce a detailed

narrative and a clear analysis of the campaign, the researcher should also consult

other complimentary sources. Since the 1537 Campaign resulted in an Ottoman-

Venetian encounter, the views of the Venetians are worth to be discussed to draw the

extended portrait of the Ottoman initiative. This also helps the reader to decipher

how the Venetians perceived the Ottoman initiative in 1537 that disrupted 34 years

of peace between the Empire and the Serenissima. Next chapter will analyze the

Venetian chronicles produced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to control

the information gathered by the Ottoman sources and to find persuasive answers for

the questions, on which the Ottoman chronicles keep their silence.

186

CHAPTER V

ECHOES IN THE SERENISSIMA: THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN

OF 1537 AND THE ATTACK ON CORFU ACCORDING TO THE

VENETIAN CHRONICLES

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the subsequent attack on Corfu in August 1537,

can be evaluated as a turning point in the Ottoman-Venetian relations in the sixteenth

century since it disrupted the peace between these two states, which had been

carefully sustained for a period of 34 years. As stated in the previous chapters,

although the Republic of Venice had taken all necessary measures in order not to

face an Ottoman aggression towards Venetian dominions, the Apulian Campaign in

1537 resulted in an Ottoman attack on the Venetian Corfu. The Island of Corfu, the

key Venetian base in the Adriatic, had to resist to the devastating Ottoman attacks

and heavy bombardment. The Island was spoiled and ruined by the Ottoman forces;

many Corfiots died and a significant number of them needed to flee to Venice. This

would not only be a sorrowful experience to be lamented by the Corfiots, even by the

next generations, but also a turning point in Venetian foreign policy concerning the

Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, encouraging the government of the Serenissima to ally

187

with the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor Charles V against the Ottomans in the

following year.

The previous chapter has examined Ottoman chronicles discussing the Apulian

Campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu. This chapter intends to decipher the

views of the Venetians and to delineate the war and how it was reflected in the light

of the equivalent Venetian accounts. It should also be underlined that Venetian

chronicles give significant hints about the actual politics of the time concealed in the

Ottoman equivalents and also mirror the sixteenth-century cultural athmosphere in

Italy, helping historians produce a detailed narrative of 1537.

The accounts to be discussed in this chapter were all produced either by Venetian

citizens or by Corfiots and they were all published first in Venice. Since Venice was

considered to be the center of information, thanks to its being a crossroads of the

time and to its communication network fed by diplomatic missions, merchants and

spies, the accounts discuss the policies of states and the military conditions of the

period, as well as the political controversies among the politicians and decisions of

the Venetian government in detail. Futhermore, the initiatives of the Venetian

decision makers and the captains of the Serenissima, who were in the theatre of war

in 1537 were clearly stated. In this regard, it would not be wrong to argue that the

Venetian accounts are crucial for analyzing the significance of the Ottoman

campaign for both Ottomans and Venetians, but also for understanding the general

socio-political and cultural conjuncture of the sixteenth-century. In this context, this

chapter also aims to introduce some new primary materials, which will be useful for

researchers in this field.

188

5.1. Witnessing the War: The Ottoman Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in

the Eyes of Contemporaries

To begin with it will be useful to listen to a Corfiot, Andronikos Nountsios, right in

the theatre of war. Andronikos, known as Nikandros Noukios of Corfu558 was a

Corfiot of Greek origin, who experienced the Ottoman attack in 1537. Since he was

one of the less known and studied personalities of the early sixteenth-century the

findings about his early life are sparse. It is assumed that he was born in Corfu in the

first decade of 1500. Studies show that he, with his family, left Corfu after the

Ottoman attack in 1537 and moved to Venice, as many other Corfiots did. Although

his family moved back to the island right after the danger was over, Andronikos

preferred to stay on in Venice.559

In his first years in Venice, Andronikos edited and translated Greek works into

Italian, having close contacts with people of Greek origin, settled in the city like

himself, who introduced the Corfiot into the intellectual life. “From at least 1541 to

1543, he appears as a Reader in the Greek Church of St George as well as an active

member of the Greek community and the Secretary of the Greek Brotherhood.”560 In

the same years, he entered into the service of Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza,

Spanish ambassador to Venice, known as a famous private collector of Greek codices

of the time, as a copyist of Greek manuscripts by the recommendations of his close

558 For detailed information about Andronikos and his work see: Evro Layton, The Sixteenth Century

Greek Book in Italy, (Venice: Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 1994).

559 Maria Kostardiou, “Hodeoporicon, Periegesis, Apodemia: Early Modern Greek Travel Writing on

Europe”, Balkan Departures: Travel Writing from Southeastern Europe, ed. by Wendy Bracewell and

Alex Drace-Francis, (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 25-46, 27.

560 Ibid.

189

friends.561 Between the years of 1542 and 1545, he worked as an editor and corrector

of the Greek press, Damiano di Santa Maria, specially focused on the production for

the Greek audience.562

The year of 1545 symbolizes a turning point for the life of Andronikos: Charles V

sent Gérard van Veltwyck, a well-known humanist and member of the private

council of the Emperor, as ambassador to the Ottoman Porte to negotiate the terms of

armistice and peace with Sultan Süleyman about the Hungarian Question.563 Van

Veltwyck, on his way to Constantinople, had to stop in Venice, where he met with

Andronikos.564 Andronikos asked him to enter his household. There is no

information how and with which title he participated in Van Veltwyck’s equipe but

it’s clear that in the summer of 1545 he left Venice with the Spanish ambassador

until 1547.565

Andronikos came to Constantinople with Gérard von Veltwyck on September 7,

1545 via Ragusa and the Balkans. He returned in the following autumn via Germany.

He travelled extensively through Europe; he even reached the British Isles by

crossing the English Channel. His long and adventurous journey encouraged him to

write his own travel accounts after 1547, which would be turned into his

Apodemiai566, to be discussed here. His primary aim was to produce a continuation of

561 Ibid, 11; Nicadre de Corcyre, Le Voyage d‟Occident, 11.

562 Kostardiou, 27-28.

563 For detailed information about the mission of van Veltwyck, see: ġahin, Kanuni Devrinde

İmparatorluk ve İktidar, 121-122.

564 Kostardiou, 28.

565 Nicandre de Corcyre, 11-12.

566 Apodemiai come from the Greek word apódēmos, which means away from one’s people, going

abroad. The term defines the travel writings of the author.

190

ancient Greek travel writing. Accordingly, as a Greek intellectual in touch with

Renaissance thinking and style, he also changed his personal signature from

Andronikos Nountsios to Nikandros Noukios in reference to ancient Greek

spelling.567

The Apodemiai of Andronikos, composed in Greek in the original, does not give

details about his voyage to Constantinople and his sojourn in the Ottoman capital.

Instead, he focuses on his journey to Europe and describes Switzerland, Italy,

Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the British and French Kingdoms, their people,

their habits including the socio-political conditions of the countries and the

international relations of the time. The account is divided in three books, which

discusses different stages of the travel and each of them was composed in the form of

long letters to a friend whose name was never announced. Andronikos also reflects

his personal feelings and views about the themes discussed; in a sense, he also

narrates his personal voyage as well.568

Although it could be considered an important literary production of sixteenth-century

Europe, it should be underlined that the Apodemiai of Andronikos could not reach a

large audience. The second book, discussing the voyage in British realm was

published in English in 1841 by J. A. Crammer. For that reason, Andronikos could

be partly visible, only to researchers familiar to English language.569 The modern

full-text edition in Greek was undersigned by J. A. Foucault in 1962.570 However,

since the modern edition was still in Modern Greek, it could not be widely consulted.

567 Nicandre de Corcyre, 12.

568 Ibid, 12-13 ; Kostadiou, 29-30.

569 Nicandre de Corcyre, 6.

570 Ibid.

191

To introduce Andronikos, and his valuable Apodemiai, to a considerably large

audience, in 2002, Paolo Odorico published the French translation of the full-text

with the notes and comments of Joël Schmapp, which is used by the present study as

well.

In the third book of Apodemiai, focusing on the Kingdom of France and Italy,

Andronikos discusses the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the attack on

Corfu. He starts the book with a vivid description of the French Kingdom, the

regions and the towns, the city of Paris and the characters of King Francis I, Andrea

Doria, and Hayreddin Barbarossa within the perspective of the desires and projects of

the French King in the early sixteenth-century. Andronikos mentions that the deeds

of Francis I turned often “into a demoniac intervention and sometimes a divine

punishment”, which fell upon the unfortunate Greek people. 571

Andronikos mentions that in order to have the support of the Ottoman Sultan against

Charles V, the French King sent an envoy and numerous presents to the Ottoman

Sultan. This was the initiation of the Ottoman-French alliance. Andronikos notes that

these two states agreed on a plan to be realized in 1537: the French King would

attack the Italian cities with his powerful army and the Sultan would invade Illyria as

well as attacking the region of Apulia and the Italian Peninsula by moving on the city

of Valona under the Ottoman control.572 He also adds that the Sultan, accepted to

leave the Italian coastal cities, possessed by the Emperor under the domination of the

French King. According to Andronikos, the impulse behind such a plan by the

Ottoman Sultan was the French King.

571 “[…], tantôt d‟une intervention démoniaque, tantôt d‟une punition divine qui s‟est alors abattue

sur notre malheureux peuple grec.”, Ibid, 193.

572 Ibid, 216.

192

To realize the aforementioned plan, Andronikos notes, the Sultan organized an

armada of 300 vessels, including ships for transportation and provision, and

appointed Lütfi Pasha as the commander in-chief of the campaign.573 Hayreddin

Barbarossa was charged with participating in the expedition with his forces, as the

Grand Admiral. Lütfi Pasha, who was charged with the execution of the campaign

and with the command of embarked soldiers would meet with Barbarossa at Valona

and was strictly warned by the Sultan that he would not engage in any military

operation without having the consent of Barbarossa.574

Andronikos mentions that simultaneously with the armada, a land army of

approximately 70.000 soldiers, led by the Sultan himself, left Constantinople for

Valona, crossing Thrace and Macedonia. At the same time, Süleyman ordered some

of this troops to attack the city of Himera, to capture all the inhabitants of the

Ceraunian Mountains and the lands of the Molosians575 as well as capturing the

castles and powerful villages. However, the Ottoman initiative could not have a

remarkable result, since the Ottomans did not know the region well. Andronikos

points out that the soldiers were pushed back from the mountainous regions and they

returned to the imperial camp with dishonor.576

The author underlines that the Ottoman navy, after having left Constantinople and

having met the rest of the naval forces at Gallipoli, sailed into the Aegean Sea,

passed around the Peloponnese via Cephalonia, Crete, other Greek Islands and

573 The author refers to Lütfi Pasha as the “admiral” of the campaign. See: Ibid.

574 Ibid.

575 The Molossian tribe was one of the Ancient Greek tribes living in the region of Epirus. Even in the

Roman period, Molossians were famous with the dogs they bred, named Molossus which has been

generally accepted as the ancestor of mastiff-type dogs in Europe. See, Nicadre de Corcyre, 217.

576 Ibid.

193

Corfu, dominated by the Venetians and reached the coast of Valona. Andronikos

emphasized that the Ottoman ships met no opposition at sea, since the Republic of

Venice was at peace with the Ottoman Empire.577

Andronikos also gives information about the Habsburg Emperor and Venice. He

notes that Charles V, at that time, was in Spain and did not prefer to organize an

armada to confront the Ottomans. However, he charged his admiral Andrea Doria to

watch every single movement of the Ottoman ships. Moreover, the fortifications of

the coastal cities and the defense capacity of the Spanish army was strengthened.578

Following the order of the Emperor, Doria sailed with his 27 galleys579 into the

Ionian Sea. Doria did not directly attack the Ottoman navy; instead, watching the

circumstances, he laid ambushes for small groups isolated from the main body.580

The Republic of Venice, on the other hand, put a redoubtable armada under the

command of Girolamo Pesaro and sent it to Corfu. The Republic ordered Persaro to

reinforce the defenses around the city of Corfu and not to engage in any movement

against the belligerent parties.581

The course of the Ottoman initiative changed after the following according to the

author: Doria attacked 10 Ottoman vessels582 and captured those on them. However,

577 Ibid, 217-218.

578 Ibid, 218.

579 Trirèmes (fr.). Trirèmes were larger galleys, having three banks of oars rowed by three oarsmen on

each bench. Thus they could carry more soldiers and guns to the desired targets. See: Theresa M.

Vann, “The Fifteenth-Century Maritime Operations of the Knights of Rhodes”, The Military Orders-

Volume 4: On Land and by Sea, ed. by, Judi Upton-Ward, (England & USA, 2008), 215-220, 217.

580 Nicadre de Corcyre, 218.

581 Ibid. 219.

582 In the text, Andronikos first notes them as 100 vessels. In the following pages, by narrating the

same story he corrects the number as 10. Joël Schnapp who adds historical notes for the consulted

edition mentions that considering the rest of the account and other sources discussing the topic, 10

attacked vessels seem to be more logical. See, Ibid.

194

the Ottomans, for the attack of Andrea Doria, accused the Venetians with assisting

him. The Sultan sent Yunus Bey, with two galleys, as ambassador to Pesaro to ask

whether this attack was made by his initiative or not, since he should normally be in

alliance with the Ottomans against the enemy according to the existing peace. Yunus

reached the port of Corfu; met the Venetian galleys securing the Island and to reach

Pesaro boarded a boat with his men. Andronikos mentions that the crews of the

galleys, with great stupidity and silliness, attacked them. Yunus, with his men,

returned to his galleys and, in order to report the event to the Sultan, headed to

Valona, but on the road he met with the vessels of Doria.583 They could not get past

and eventually beached their galleys below Himara.584 Most of the people

accompanying the ambassador were killed by the people of the region; some of them

died while they were defending themselves. The ones remaining in the galleys were

beheaded by the swords of Doria’s soldiers. Yunus Bey had to reveal himself and his

duty, to save himself. After his identity was learned he was liberated and sent to the

Ottoman Sultan with many apologies. Yunus Bey reported all that happened to the

Sultan and underlined that the Venetians were responsible for the attacks.585

This vivid scene of maritime conflicts continues in the text with a third shocking

event. After the capture of the galleys carrying the Ottoman ambassador, Andrea

Doria was informed that 12 Ottoman galleys were sailing behind the main armada in

the Ionian Sea. He immediately sailed to the neighborhood of Corfu and, performing

a strong attack in the morning, sunk the Ottoman galleys. The crew, soldiers and

people in the vessels were killed. Soon after the attack, Doria sailed to Messina with

583 Ibid, 219-220.

584 Ibid, 220.

585 Ibid.

195

the vessels that he had with him.586 When Hayreddin Barbarossa noticed the bloody

struggle, he immediately moved his forces to meet Doria but he was not able to find

him. Then he sailed to Apulia. There, the Ottoman galleys met the Venetian forces.

Contrary to the existing peace conditions and tradition, one of the well-armed

Ottoman galleys coming from Gallipoli did not salute the Venetian forces and was

attacked by Alessandro Contarini, their commander-in-chief. The crew, swimming

away, were killed and Contarini returned to Corfu. Hayreddin reported all that had

happened to the Sultan to convince him to punish the Venetians with good reason.587

Andronikos does not give details about the deeds of the Ottoman forces in Apulia.

He only mentions that, after all that had happened, Hayreddin met Lütfi Pasha in

Apulia and they engaged in the siege of a small city named Castro. The Ottomans

sacked the castles and the villages, killed or enslaved the inhabitant and pillaged the

region greedily.588 Meanwhile, the Venetian galleys were in the Adriatic. According

to the author, because of the inexperience or mostly the “stupidity” of the Venetian

individual commanders, the galleys could not find the shortest route to return Corfu,

the main Venetian naval base and when the night fell, they encountered the forces of

Hayreddin moving from Apulia.589 Some of them were able to flee, including the one

carrying Pesaro and reached Corfu. However, the forces of Barbarossa captured 4

Venetian galleys coming from Corfu, Cephalonia, Zakynthos and Venice. Their

586 Ibid.

587 Ibid, 221.

588 Ibid.

589 Ibid, 221-222.

196

crews were either killed or enslaved and the galleys were taken.590 This would be the

starting gun of the upcoming Ottoman-Venetian war.

Andronikos narrates the rest of the story with great sorrow: He points out that

following the forementioned incidents, Sultan Süleyman ordered his admirals to

attack Corfu and he personally set out from Valona with the land army. The Corfiot

laments as “Allas! My country”591. The land army marched into the villages of

Epirus. “At the same time the inhabitants of the fortified castle of Butrothum learned

of the arrival of Süleyman; their governor and the “Turks” of his entourage asked for

asylum and fortunately they reached it.”592 On the other hand, Lütfi Pasha and

Hayreddin Barbarossa took the lead of the naval forces and directed them to

Corfu.593

In the first assault, the Ottoman soldiers easily penetrated the zone outside of the city

called, “Bazaar” since it was a vast space full of houses, not surrounded by strong

city walls.594 The people living in the city, instead, ran into the fortresses and

bastions, closed the gates and prepared themselves for the siege.595 The ones who did

not know where to escape, ran to the Cape of Isidore, east of the city. However

590 Ibid, 222.

591 Ibid.

592 “Au même moment, les habitants du château fort de Bouthrôto apprirent l‟arrivée de Soliman; leur

chef et les Turcs de son entourage demandèrent asile, et, à leur grand bonheur, l‟obtinrent.” Ibid,

222. Buthrotum (Butrinto (it)) was an ancient Greek and Roman city in Epirus, which is situated in the

Vlorë County in Albania, close to the Greek border. It is just the closest point to pass into the Corfu

Island. For that reason, the Ottomans might prefer to move the land army and the imperial camp to

that city.

593 Andronikos notes that Barbarossa also transported an important number of the land soldiers, came

in Buthrotum, to Corfu. See: Ibid.

594 Ibid, 223.

595 Ibid.

197

almost all of them met the Ottomans, just coming from the mainland with no

mercy.596

The Ottoman intrusion into the Island was a tragedy for Andronikos, hard for him to

relate. He continues his account as following:

But how could I remember without tears the tragedy that fell upon you, o

my sweet country? How could I write these events down that I saw with

my own eyes? Please, God, I wish I would have never seen them! I

would not have this much sorrow if I had learned them from another

person; now, I oblige myself, to tell the tragedies of my country, griefstricken

as how I am and even I am far away, abroad. It would be absurd

to keep silent to the events worth to be remembered, which were related

with our history, so in my account I talked about what happened to the

other peoples.597

The statement above clearly shows that the Ottoman attack on Corfu and the

circumstances under fire deeply affected the author. On the other hand, in the text

Andronikos does not accuse only the Ottomans for the damage, but also Venetians

and Italian mercenaries, charged with assisting the Corfiots for the defense. These

are also matters of sharp criticism, for facilitating the Ottoman attack, even in some

cases for being actors in it. He points out that the Venetian admiral in Corfu, Pesaro,

left the island and sailed into the Adriatic Gulf to meet the other Venetian captains

coming from Dalmatia, after having learnt that Süleyman would attack the Island.598

596 Ibid.

597 “Mais comment pourrais-je sans larmes rappeler à la mémoire le malheur qui s‟est abattu sur toi,

ô ma douce patrie ? Comment pourrais-je mettre par écrit ces événements que j‟ai vus de mes propres

yeux ? Plaise à Dieu que je ne les eusse jamais vus ! Je n‟aurais pas autant de chagrin si je les avais

appris de quelqu‟un d‟autre ; cependant je m‟empresse de raconter les malheurs de ma patrie,

accablé de chagrin comme je le suis, et bien que je me trouve au loin, à l‟étranger. Il serait absurde

de taire des événements dignes de mémoire qui ont trait à notre historie alors que, dans mon récit,

j‟ai parlé de ce qui était advenu à d‟autres peuples. ” Ibid, 223-224.

598 Ibid, 222-223. The Venetian admiral, Pesaro, was not the sole person who quitted the island before

the Ottoman pillage. Some of the Corfiot families, including the family of Andronikos as well, left

their homelands and went to Venice right before the Ottoman invasion of the island, taking into

consideration of two omens spreading around: According to the author, right before the pillage, a

wise, pious villager, known by his honesty and affability, had told that he saw a big, appalling serpent,

wearing a golden crown decorated with brilliant stones. The serpent had been followed by small ones

and left his imprints on soil. The author notes that only few people believed the wise man and saw the

198

He narrates the corruption of the Italian mercenaries in a separate part by

accentuating that he could not understand how people, having the same faith,

believing the same God, could have been as cruel as the “barbarians” against the

Corfiots. He mentions that they were not pleased with the money they received; they

always asked more money from the people, while running away to a safer place.

They took all the money and gold on the people asking to enter their own houses.

Instead of helping the people, trying to secure their lives as well as the country, the

mercenaries exploited the food stocks, abused the helpless women, and locked the

doors of the fortresses. They took advantage of the people’s misery.599

Andronikos points out that the attack started with the fire opened by the Ottoman

cannons. The Ottoman vessels were situated near the small island in front of the west

of the city center. The refugees situated on Cape Isidore were under heavy Ottoman

bombardment: “this was an insupportable tragedy”600 notes the author. People,

contrained in a small space and not having enough food and clean water to drink

were left to die while seeing the death of their loved ones.601 The Ottoman soldiers

burnt all that they found, the houses and the market places, a strong wind fanning the

flames.

imprints. However, he states, another omen convinced the Corfiots: a convict whose eyes had been

burst out in public had started to walk around the city with new, fresh eyes, saying that the God of

Seas had replaced his eyes. All these had been the signs of a misfortune approaching to the Island.

Therefore, many people immediately decided to leave Corfu. These omens revealed their real meaning

with the Ottoman attack: the big serpent was Süleyman, himself, followed by small ones, his cruel

soldiers. For the omens narrated by Andronikos, see: Ibid, 231-233.

599 For detailed discussions about the Italian mercenaries and their activities during the Ottoman

attacks on Corfu, see: Ibid, 226-227.

600 Ibid, 227.

601 Ibid.

199

The Ottomans set the city on fire and sacked the island but they were not able to

conquer it. Winter had already started. Above all, Andronikos underlines, Andrea

Doria, whom the Ottomans intended to encounter, did not come to the Venetians’

aid. Moreover, the army was exhausted by the long operations as well as by

epidemics. Lütfi Pasha and other commanders; having different opinions from these

of Hayreddin Barbarossa and being jealous of the familiarity and benevolence, the

Sultan showed towards him, convinced the Sultan to stop the attack and leave the

Island.602 They underlined that they had ruined the city, had put it under fire and

blood; just a revenge for the faults of the dishonored Venetians and the Sultan would

be able to ravage the Island on a different occasion later.603 Therefore, Süleyman

ordered Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa to stop the fire and return to

Constantinople, authorized the soldiers to pillage the city as much as possible and

ordered the navy to attack all Venetian possessions on their road of return604 and he

returned to Constantinople with the land army.

Andronikos continues his account with a touching description of the pillage: He

mentions that the Ottoman soldiers penetrated onto the Island, got all they found that

was precious to take, including, prisoners, women of different ages and animals,

especially well-trained white horses.605 They killed the wounded and ill people;

launched all dead people and animals into the sea, which turned into a remittable

602 Ibid, 227-228. For Ottoman pashas’ the jealousy of Barbarossa, see Barbarossa’s Gazavât and

Lütfi Pasha’s Tevârîh, discussed in the previous chapter of the present study. See: Chapter Four.

Andronikos’ notes on the different opinions and clash of interests among the Ottoman high-ranking

officers, especially criticisims on Barbarossa’s initiatives and thoughts support that the Ottoman

Admiral was not warmly welcomed to the decision-making mechanisms by the Ottoman ruling-elite

even in his fourth year as the Grand Admiral and this was closely observed by the Venetians.

603 Ibid, 228.

604 Ibid.

605 Ibid, 228-229.

200

cemetery. Andronikos also notes that the Ottomans did not damage the vineyards,

fruit trees and other plants, situated near the Bazaar and adds: “[…] because, I think,

they did not have the time to do so since Sultan’s order to leave the island came

suddenly.”606

Andronikos concludes his account of the Ottoman attack on Corfu with his notes on

how the Ottomans sacked the island and how the Corfitos ought to leave their

homelands to save their lives. The author mentions that although the island did not

surrender to the Ottoman “menace”, the Ottoman threat on the Venetian dominions

did not end by the withdrawal of the Ottoman soldiers from Corfu. On his way back,

Hayreddin Barbarossa, in accordance with the order of the Ottoman Sultan, attacked

Cephalonia and Zakynthos and took numerous prisoners. He, then sailed round the

Peloponnese and occupied all the small Aegean islands possessed by the Venetian

Republic except for Tenos and Mykonos. Then, he obliged the governor of Naxos to

pay tribute to the Ottomans. He got many prisoners and much booty from the islands

that he had attacked. He finally sailed to Constantinople via the Dardanelles.607

Andronikos continues his story with the Ottoman-Venetian conflicts in the following

years and the peace in 1540 in his following pages.

As was discussed above in detail, the Apodemiai of Andronikos draws a finely

embroidered portrait of the Ottoman military initiative in 1537 and how it turned into

the attack on Corfu. As he was a Corfiot, and finding a chance of observing the

changes in circumstances, it would not be wrong to argue that Andronikos mirrors

the Ottoman deeds in Corfu as a tragedy, not a surprise. In the account, it is clearly

606 “[…] parce que, je crois, ils n‟en eurent pas le temps, tellement l‟ordre du sultan de quitter l‟île

était arrivé soudainement.”, Ibid, 230.

607 Ibid, 233.

201

shown that the Ottomans, at first, did not intend to invade the island or to fight with

the Republic of Venice. He underlines that the Ottoman Sultan was moved by the

French King to engage in the original campaign. The actual motivation of the Sultan

was to attack the possessions of Charles V in Apulia and to leave the region under

the French control upon the King’s request. The author evaluates the Ottoman

initiative as a response to a French request for assistance. He directly accuses the

French King of inviting the Ottomans into the Adriatic. According to him, the poor

Corfiots, themselves, paid the cost of his demonic and impractical plans.608

According to Andronikos, the Venetians, though perhaps not the Venetian Republic

as a state, were also equally responsible for the Ottoman attack on Corfu. The

random attacks of the Venetian admirals on Ottoman vessels created a hostile

atmosphere. Andrea Doria’s initiatives were attributed to the Venetian commanders

by the Ottomans. The capture of the Ottoman ambassador Yunus Bey and the

suspicions about the Venetian assistance to Doria motivated the Ottoman Sultan to

attack a Venetian possession. Corfu was the nearest one. Furthermore, Venetian

admirals, charged with defending the island, remained unable to face the enemy; they

even escaped and left the people to face the enemy. The notes about the Italian

mercenaries also emphasises that Andronikos has the impression that, although it had

been an important Venetian possession, Corfu was first made a target and then was

abandoned to its fate.

Here, listening to a Venetian, a member of the Venetian government gives the

historian the chance of visualizing how the events, narrated by Andronikos in detail,

were echoed in Venice and the responses of the Republic and its policies. In this

608 Ibid: 193-194.

202

context, the brief account of Antonio Longo, thought to be composed right after the

Ottoman-Venetian peace in 1540, is a good example.

Antonio Longo was a Venetian noble, a member of the Consiglio dei Dieci who died

in 1582. He registered the events, discussions and decisions taken by the Venetian

government in form of a diary.609 His elder son, Francesco, combined and edited his

accounts after 1551610 and copied the memories of his father about the war of 1537

under the title of Decrizione della Guerra Seguita tra la Serenissima Republica di

Venetia e Sultan Solimano Imperator de Turchi l‟Anno 1537.611 In the account, the

author discusses the Ottoman-Venetian war that started in 1537 and concluded with

the Venetian-Ottoman peace in 1540, with details about the conversations in the

Venetian Senate, the reports and letters of the ambassadors, commanders, and nobles

and decisions of the Venetian government. Longo focuses more on the establishment

of the League against the Ottomans, in which the Republic joined right after 1537

and the war in the Adriatic in 1538, followed by the new Ottoman-Venetian

convergence. Francesco Longo respected the accuracy of the events registered by his

father, and diligently reported Antonio’s opinions, which had been sometimes shaped

by his personal feelings.612

Longo starts his accounts mentioning that the rivalry between Charles V and Francis

I for the domination of Milan, as Andronikos did. He notes that according to the

terms of peace in Naples in 1535 between Venice and Charles V, the Republic was

609 Marco Foscarini, Della Letteratura Veneziana, v.1, l.2, (Padova: Stamperia del Seminario, 1752),

180.

610 Ibid.

611 Francesco Longo, “Decrizione della Guerra”, 113-131.

612 Foscarini, 180.

203

obliged to send 6000 infantry in case of need for Milan. In 1537, Charles V had

intended to march into Milan against the French King but he needed to deal with the

turmoil in Florence. Charles V decided that such an initiative could put Naples,

Genoa and Florence at risk and he did not ask Venice to send the infantry.613 Against

Charles V, the French emperor encouraged the Ottoman Sultan, who regarded the

enemies of the Habsburg Emperor as his friends.614 The main motivation of the

French King was to disract Charles V with the Ottomans to create a power vacuum in

Milan. Accordingly, the Ottoman Sultan initiated an expedition to Valona for the

conquest of Apulia.615

Longo notes that Sultan Süleyman asked the Republic to cooperate with him;

however, after careful consideration the Venetian government refused the Ottoman

request with cautious words. The reply of the Venetian Republic to the Sultan’s

request and French persuasions changed the attitude of the Sultan toward Venice.616

The Republic, to watch the moves of the Ottomans and secure its dominions,

launched an armada of 200 galleys; 40 of them would sail to the waters of Corfu.

Girolamo Pesaro was charged to command those galleys and the rest were put under

the command of Giovanni Vitturi. On the other hand, the Sultan organized an army

of 100.000 soldiers and his armada was composed of 400 ships, including galleys,

and other vessels, carrying munitions under the command of Lütfi Bey and

Hayreddin Barbarossa.617 Longo notes that, before leaving Constantinople, the

613 Longo, “Descirizione della Guerra”, 113-114.

614 Ibid, 114.

615 Ibid.

616 Ibid.

617 Ibid, 114-115.

204

pashas of Süleyman told the Venetian ambassador Tommaso Mocenigo, sent to

congratulate the Sultan for his conquests in Persia, that the Sultan would maintain the

peace with the Venetians. The captains, sailing near Corfu, repeated that to Pesaro

too.618

However, as Longo narrates, the Himarans619 killed two Ottomans, on a galley and

captured the galley. That incident created the opinion that the subjects of the

Venetians, who created that annoyance, should similarly be punished.620 After having

been informed about the ongoing circumstances, the Venetian government ordered

all its generals to avoid from encountering the “Turks” and in case of an inevitable

encounter, to show signs of friendship.621 In contrast to the intention of the Venetian

Republic on securing peace with the Ottoman Sultan and its clear declaration to

Venetian commanders in charge, there occurred several adverse events changing the

course of war. Longo explains them, as follows:

At first, a galley of Zadar encountered a Turkish ship going to Valona that

had been loaded with munitions and sank it, since it did not want to lower its

sails, as it ought to do so for being inferior; this [incident] made the Turkish

Signor extremely upset, and [he] Yunus Bey, his dragoman, with two galleys

to [the presence of] Pesaro, who had been in Corfu, in order to say him [his]

complaint and ask him for compensation, and as that was the case, an evil

came up becase of something different that these aforementioned two galleys

encountered our [galleys] and were driven out by Sir Zusto Gradenigo622,

individual commander, [who] was commanding, at that time other galleys

that he had, thus the aforementioned two [Turkish] galleys stroke ground in

618 Ibid, 115.

619 Cimerioti (it.)

620 Ibid.

621 Ibid.

622 Giusto Gradenico.

205

the land of Casopo of Himera and were captured by Himarans, who were the

enemies of the Turk.623

After having had the news about the incidents and informed about the resentment of

the Sultan accusing him of inefficiency, Pesaro immediately sent another Venetian

captain, Francesco Zeno, to rescue Yunus Bey and others, imprisoned by the

Himarans with a ransom of 500 ducats.624 However, after his safe return to Valona,

the Dragoman told the entire story to the Sultan and accused the Venetians.

Süleyman called Giacomo da Canal, bailo present in the imperial camp and asked his

justification for destroying the peace. He also ordered to arrest and punish the

offenders involved severely before sending him to Pesaro.625 The bailo sent

Alessandro Orsino to Corfu to inform Pesaro that the Ottoman Sultan would declare

war on Venice, unless the Venetians showed their respect and provided

compensation for their deeds.626

However, Longo notes, the waters did not cool down: Pesaro had already taken all

measures to prevent any possible confrontation at sea. He immediately sailed from

Corfu, to unite all Venetian galleys in the Adriatic when he learnt that Barbarossa

sailed from Zakynthos to meet and protect the ships coming from Constantinople,

loaded with provisions and munitions. He had taken all measures not to encounter

Barbarossa’s forces. However, he could not prevent a new Venetian offensive;

623 “Il primo fu, ch‟una galea Zarantina s‟incontrò in un naviglio turco, il quale andava all‟Valona

carico di vettovaglie; et perche non li volse calar le velle, come doveva fare per essere inferiore, lo

getto a fondi, di che si monstrò sommamente alterato il Signor Turco, ed expendi Gianusbei suo

dragomano con due galee a Pesaro, che era in Corfu, per far secco querella e domandargli

rifacimento, et come avvine, che un male va dietro all‟altro fece, che le dette due galee s‟incontrono

nelle nostre, et furono fugate da Meser Zusto Gradenigo sopra comito, al quale toccò quel giorno

comandare alle altre sue conserve, di maniera che dette due galee diedero in terra su la Cimera di

Casopo et furono fatti prigioni dall‟Cimeriotti, quali si trovavono esser nemici del Turco.”, Ibid.

624 Ibid.

625 Ibid.

626 Ibid, 116.

206

Alessandro Contarini, Provveditore of the Venetian armada, encountered an Ottoman

galley, left behind by the main naval corps on the way to Valona, and opened fire.

Pesaro ordered all forces to return to Corfu but the Venetian armada was blocked by

120 Ottoman galleys. The armada was able to return to the island but four galleys

were taken by the Ottomans.627

Longo narrates that all these events created great disappointment in the Venetian

Senate, though. By a letter, the Senate ordered Pesaro to put Contarini and Giusto

Gradenico, whose name was noted by Longo as the one who had attacked the galleys

carrying Yunus Bey to Corfu, in chain and to immediately send them to Venice. The

Captain General was also asked to send Alessandro Orsino to the Ottoman camp to

explain to the Ottoman Sultan that the Republic had never intended to destroy the

peace. Meanwhile, the Senate started to negotiate with the Papacy for the

establishment of a league for the defense of Italy and Corfu. However, all these

efforts were fruitless: on August 26, the Sultan ordered the attack on Corfu.628

When the war became inevitable, Longo notes that the Venetian government ordered

all captains of the naval forces to be on alert, sent soldiers to Zadar and Naples,

called the Dalmatian tribal leaders to help the Venetians and ordered them to declare

that the Uskosks could freely turn to piracy at sea.629 To conduct the war, the

Republic was also in need of military and financial support. The negotiations of the

league with the Pope was far from a fruitful attempt. The Republic turned its face to

the Venetian nobles and local governors. Pietro Badoer and Albertino, the Doctor,

was asked to pay 4000 ducats, to be paid back in a couple of years at a favorable

627 Ibid.

628 Ibid.

629 Longo, “Descrizione della Guerra”, 116.

207

interest. Camilio Orsino, the Governor of Zadar, was asked to send 300 infantry and

500 light cavalry. 17.000 ducats were requested from the Duke of Urbino.630

The actual plan of the Venetian government, according to Longo’s account, was to

unite all Venetian and Papal naval forces at Brindisi, by also having the assistance of

Charles V and Francis I with the establishment of a Christian league against the

Sultan and to assist the defense of Corfu. Accordingly, the Government had already

ordered Pesaro, who had left Corfu before the Ottoman attack, to reach the Gulf of

Korcula631, uniting with the forces under the command of Francesco Pasqualigo and

reach Corfu. While the Republic was conducting the negotiations for the league via

his agents in Rome and in Germany, on September 10, the Ottoman attack on Corfu

ended. He ordered the armada to return to Constantinople via Preveza. The French

Captain Brancadoro632 also participated in the armada with his 12 galleys.633

Longo states that the Ottoman attack had also changed the dynamics of Venetian

policies: the traditional policy based on securing peace with the Ottoman sultan

started to be questioned among the Venetian senators. The bailo in Constantinople

was ordered to start the peace negotiations with the Grand Vizier, upon his request.

However, most of the senators were arguing that the Republic should participate in

the Christian league, headed by the Papacy. After long discussions, the Venetian

ambassador in Rome was authorized to conclude the treaties for the establishment of

a league, despite the fact that the conditions offered by the Ottomans were more

630 Ibid, 117.

631 Curzola (it.). A Croatian island in the Adriatic Sea.

632 Baron of St. Blancard. See : Chapter Three.

633 See, Longo, “Descrizione della Guerra”, 116-117.

208

favorable for the Republic.634 This decision would ground the next Ottoman-

Venetian encounter in the following year, discussed in detail by Longo in the

subsequent pages of his account.

The aforementioned discussions, portrayed by Longo, mostly overlaps with

Andronikos’ account. Longo also makes clear that the real motivation of the Sultan,

in the beginning of the campaign, was not to attack a Venetian dominion. The

Ottoman armada focused on Apulia and the reason behind the choice of Valona for

the imperial camp was the city’s strategic position, facilitating the transportation of

the troops. The author argues that the conflicts between the Venetian captains and the

attacks of Andrea Doria motivated the Sultan to attack a Venetian dominion to

punish the Republic for misbehaving. Longo underlines that the Venetian attacks

were not made with the consent of the Republic. Pesaro, head of the Venetian

armada, was often warned to act according to the peace terms and after the attacks,

the Republic tried to compensate for the damage and to persuade the Sultan of the

Republic’s loyalty to him.

Contrary to Andronikos, Longo disputes the argument that the Republic left the

island alone when the war became inevitable. He notes that during the attack on

Corfu, besides having ordered all Venetian commanders to help Corfu, the Republic

sought the assistance of the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor to fight the Ottomans.

With that mind, the Venetian ambassadors engaged in negotiations for the

establishment of a league.

634 Ibid.

209

5.2. Historians at Work: 1537 in Venetian Historiography

The accounts of the eyewitnesses of the war and its political ramifications in 1537,

discussed above, draw the general portrait of the Ottoman campaign and the

Ottoman-Venetian encounter. These were also discussed in the books on the history

of Venice produced in the sixteenth-century. These were important to be analyzed to

understand how the data provided by the contemporaries of the discussed events was

viewed by the Venetian intellectuals. Considering the aim and the scope of this

study, here, two chronicles from the late sixteenth century will be analyzed, as

examples of the genre.

The first example is the account of Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni. Giovanni Niccolò

Doglioni, a chronicler and notary born in 1548, was a member of a Venetian

patrician family. He studied in Venice and Padova.635 After having survived the

plague that devastated Venice in 1576, he worked as the chancellor of mines and was

a consultant to the Consiglio dei Dieci.636 In these years, he focused on historical

studies and engaged in writing a universal history up to 1594, discussing the events

chronologically.637 He also published a book on the history of Hungary638, which had

been partially ignored by his predecessors. He was known for his publications about

cosmology and the calendar reform of Pope Gregory XIII in 1582.

635 Marco Foscarini, Della Letteratura Veneziana, v.1, l.3, (Padova: Stamperia del Seminario, 1752),

277.

636 Maria Romanello, “Doglioni, Giovanni Niccolò”, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, v. 40,

(1991), from the online access: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-nicolodoglioni_%

28Dizionario-Biografico%29/, retrieved, 23.09.2017.

637 In the present study, his edition of 1601 was consulted. Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, Compendio

Historico Universale di Tutte Le Cose Notabili Già Successe nel Mondo dal Principio della Sua

Creatione Fin‟hora di Gio. Niccolo Doglioni, di Nuovo da Lui Medessimo Riveduto, Corretto &

Ampliato con aggiunto fino all‟Anno 1600, (Venice, 1601).

638 Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, L‟Ungheria Spiegata, (Venice, 1595). See also: Foscarini, v.1, l.4,

366.

210

The Historia Venetiana639 of Doglioni, evaluated as an early example of the “general

history of Venice” composed in the sixteenth-century. The source exmanines the

history of the Venetian Republic from its foundation till the year of 1597 and it was

first published in Venice in 1598. Dogiloni divided his work into 18 books,

chronologically discussing the phases of the history of the Republic in relation to the

international politics and diplomacy. Beside the historical narrative, Doglioni, in the

last book, also gives the reader important data about the administrative system of

Venice, the duties of the offices and officials and the structure of the state.

Doglioni narrates the Ottoman campaign of 1537 in the thirteenth book of his

chronicle.640 Unlike the previous authors discussed above, Doglioni interestingly

notes that the Ottomans engaged in such a campaign in Italy, with consideration to

the ongoing political chaos within the Italian states. He mentions that what motivated

Süleyman for the invasion of Italy was the political turmoil in the peninsula. He

underlines that the Republic of Florence was shocked by the assassination of

Alessandro di Medici, the Duke, who was married to the daughter of Charles V by

his cousin Lorenzino di Medici. This created a chaos in Florence, suppressed only

after the succession of Cosimo di Medici. Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Naples also

became a theartre of a political conflict: the Viceroy of Naples killed the brother of

Troilo Pignatello, a distinguished Neapolitan nobleman. Pignatello, with great

sorrow and indignation, applied to Süleyman, always willing to dominate Italy, and

encouraged him to initiate a campaign against Naples.641

639 Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, Historia Venetiana.

640 The Ottoman military campaign of 1537 was also discussed by the author in his Compendio

Historico Universale. See: Doglioni, Compendio Historico Universale, p.5, 531-532.

641 Doglioni, Historia Venetiana, 680.

211

Using this opportunity, Süleyman sent his armada to Italy under the command of

Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa, and he personally marched into Valona.

Doglioni mentions that Pignatello also accompanied the Ottoman armada, during the

attacks on Otranto, Taranto and on Castro.642 Violating all faiths, the “Turks” sacked

the region and imprisoned many Christians, who would be liberated by Süleyman

later.643

At that time, Doglioni notes, Alessandro Contarini of Venice met “Turkish” galleys,

sailing by not saluting him, which meant the violation of the rules of the actual

convention, fought with them and destroyed two galleys. Soon after, other individual

Venetian commanders also took two “Turkish” galleys. Simultaneously, Doria met

many schriazzi, carrying provisions from Alexandria for the camp of Süleyman and

fought with 12 galleys left behind near the Island of Ereikoussa.644 All these events

encouraged Süleyman, believing that Venice was responsible for the attacks, to

declare war against the Serenissima. Accordingly, he called his armada back from

Apulia, and ordered the attack on Corfu, governed by Simon Leone and Luigi Ripa at

that time. The Captain General of Venice Girolamo Pesaro, had already predicted a

possible Ottoman attack and had fortified the Island by laying in soldiers and

munitions.645 Since the defense could not be broken, Süleyman stopped the invasion

soon not to waste his soldiers anymore and returned to Constantinople, concludes

Doglioni.646

642 Ibid.

643 Ibid, 681.

644 Ibid. The author uses the Italian name, Merlera. The island is in the northwest of Corfu.

645 Ibid.

646 Ibid.

212

The information gathered by the account of Doglioni could be elaborated in the light

of Historia Vinetiana, a detailed history of Venice, which embraces the years 1513 to

1551. The work was requested by the Venetian government, as the continuation of

Pietro Bembo’s narrative, from the Paolo Paruta.647 Paolo Paruta was born at Venice

in 1540 and from his youth, was devoted lo literature, philosophy and poetry. He also

participated in the political life of the Republic. In 1562 he accompanied the

ambassador Michele Suriano to the Court of Maximilian II of Habsburg, the King of

Bohemia who would be crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1564. He held the

office of the official historiographer of the Venetian Republic.648 Then he was made

Savio di Terraferma, and became a senator. Between the years of 1590 and 1592, he

acted as the Governor of Brescia. Until 1595, he was the ambassador at Rome.

Following his return to Venice, he was appointed as the Procuratore di San Marco in

1596.649

During his administrative offices, he started to compose Historia Vinetiana, one of

his masterpieces.650 The distinguishing feature of the work is that Paruta consulted

many documents beside the accounts of his predecessors. Dispatches, releazioni, and

other registers detailed and enriched the text; furthermore, he gives researcher the

chance of following the discussions in current Venetian politics, as well as the

647 Umberto Benigni, “Paolo Paruta”, The Catholic Encyclopedia, (New York: Robert Appton

Company, 1911), 510a-512a, accessed through, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11510a.htm,

retrieved 23.09.2017.

648 During his office he performed a funeral oration for the victims of the battle of Lepanto in 1572.

See: Ibid.

649 Ibid.

650 For his works, see: Ibid. Here, it is important to note that Paruta wrote another book on the war of

Cyprus, as a continuation of this history of Venice, which could be evaluated as an important source

for the researchers. See: Paolo Paruta, Guerra Fatta della Lega dei Principi Christiani Contro Selino

Ottomano per Occasione del Regno di Cipro, (Venice, 1599).

213

international relations of the time. Umberto Benigni, in his biography, mentions that

Paruta’s works reflect the thoughts Macchiavelli about the Italian equilibrium.651

Accordingly, the author’s inclination towards the unification of the Italian powers

against common threats could be detected by the reader in numerous chapters. His

history was composed of 12 books and discussed events up to 1551. The book was

published in Venice in 1605, after the death of the author in 1598.652

Paolo Paruta evaluates the Ottoman military campaign of 1537 and the attack on

Corfu in the eighth book of the first part of his Historia Vinetiana. After having

discussed the rivalry between the King of France and Charles V before, he starts the

book by underlying that the King Francis sought new alliances against the Emperor

in 1536. The Republic of Venice, though, was known to follow a policy of neutrality

in the conflicts of other princes. Therefore, King Francis sent Monsignor Rodes to

address to the Venetian Senate, in order to ask for the cooperation of the Republic in

his war against Charles V. The King of France was at peace with the Ottoman Sultan,

as was the Republic of Venice. So, the Republic should act in accordance to the

French needs in order to secure the peace with the Ottomans, which was crucially

important for the Venetian interests.653 The French demand was clear: the Venetians

would let the Ottoman navy safely reach Apulia and the other dominions of Charles

V. Thereafter, benefitting from the weakened defense caused by the threat in the

south, the French armies would enter Milan easily.654

651 Benigni.

652 Ibid. For Paruta’s biography, also see: Arturo Pompeati, “Per la Biografia di Paolo Paruta”,

Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana, n. 45, 1905, 48-66; Marco Gianni, Paolo Paruota: Il

Lessico della Politica, Scuola di dottorato in Scienze Umanistiche, Universitá Ca’Foscari, 2011,

(unpublished Ph.D Dissertation).

653 Paruta, Historia Vinetiana, p.1, l.8, 351-352.

654 Ibid, 352.

214

In accordance with the aforementioned project, King Francis sent another

ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan in succession to Jean de la Forest, Don Serafino di

Gozi Ragusero, with new requests and large promises.655 In his meetings with the

important Pashas, having great authority, Ragusero suggested an Ottoman expedition

towards the Kingdom of Naples, which was under Spanish control to decrease the

power of Charles V.656 The Ottoman armies would pass to Apulia from Albania.

Ragusero found the chance of discussion with Lutfi Bey and Ayas Pasha, having

great reputation as the Grand Vizier. Paruta underlines that the Ottoman viziers,

especially after the death of Ġbrahim Pasha, were keen on an expedition against

Christians.657 For that reason, the proposal of the French ambassador encouraged

them to convince the Sultan to engage in the conquest of Italy once more, following

the example of his ancestor Mehmed II, who had acquired the city of Otranto and

had sacked Apulia.658 Now, Sultan Süleyman had more power to make Ottoman

conquest a reality. Moreover, the wars in Persia and in India were not obstacles; they

were treated as insignificant ventures. For the dignity of the Sultan and the reputation

of his forces, such a great expedition against the Christians would be much more

effective and meaningful.659

According to Paruta, on that point the French ambassador also underlined that the

Republic of Venice should definitely leave the league of Charles V.660 In the

655 Ibid.

656 Ibid.

657 Ibid.

658 Ibid.

659 Ibid, 353.

660 Ibid.

215

meantime, Yunus Bey was sent to Venice by the Ottoman Sultan. His mission was to

declare to the Venetian Senate that the Sultan had asked the Republic to ally with

himself and his ally, the King of France, in that case. Paruta states the response of the

Senate as the following:

[…] It has been dearest to be in peace for the Republic with all Princes and

principally with the Ottoman Signors with whom it has been conserving the

friendship for a long time with a free and useful commerce between the

subjects: that same desire continues now, so constant and steady, which does

not need another major declaration.661

According to the author, the real intention of the Sultan was to fight against Charles

V. Since he was aware of the potential and the weaknesses of his naval forces, an

attack against Venice was never planned. However, the course of the Ottoman

campaign changed and the fire turned against Venice because of the misbehavior of

the Venetian officials who did not respect the dignity of the Sultan and the utility of

the Venetian-Ottoman peace.662

According to the author, in order to have more information about the upcoming

Otttoman initiation, the Venetian Senate sent Tomaso Mocenigo as the ambassador

of the Republic to Constantinople. As an ordinary task, the ambassador would

congratulate the Sultan for his victories in Persia and his return to Constantinople.663

Mocenigo had the chance to meet Ayas Pasha too and got the information that the

661 “[…] carissima essere stata sempre alla Republica la pace con tutti i Prencipi & principalmente

con i Signori Ottomani, con i qualli s‟haveva lungamente conservata l‟amicitia con un libero & utile

commercio tra‟ sudditi : continuare hora la medessima volontà, cosi costante & ferma, che non

faceva bisogno d‟altra maggiore dichiaratione.”, Ibid.

662 Here, Paruta gives details about the Venetian commercial ships creating problems during their visit

the Ottoman lands. According to the author the violation of the peace conditions by the Venetian ships

created an atmosphere in the Ottoman government about the Venetian cooperation with the

Habsburgs. See: Ibid.

663 Ibid, 354.

216

Sultan desired to secure the existing peace with the Republic although the next

Ottoman campaign would be against a Christian territory.

Paruta notes that the news coming from Mocenigo and the other agents of the

Venetian information gathering network in the Ottoman Empire did not comfort the

Senate though; on the contrary, the rumors about the target of the Ottoman campaign

created great suspicions. The Senate was aware that, in Constantinople, many people

were saying that the target of the Ottoman armada would be the coasts of Apulia or

the Gulf of Venice, the latter possibility of worse alarming. Paruta also notes an

interesting detail that has not been mentioned in the aforementioned chronicles:

according to him, some intelligence suspected that Hayreddin Barbarossa was

planning an attack on Corfu.664

All these urged the Senate to strengthen the Venetian strategic fortifications. A

number of 800 infantry were hired and ships were immediately repaired in the

arsenal working with extraordinary diligence.665 However, that urgent and

extraordinary preparation needed to be financed. Thus, the Republic collected

extraordinary taxes, asked financial contributions from the Venetian nobles in the

government, even of the Papacy, since fighting with the “Turks” meant fighting for

the Christianity.666

The war preparations of the Ottomans also urged Charles V to strengthen his

dominions. Paruta notes that he sent a great number of Spanish infantry to his

dominions in Italy, especially to Sicily and Naples.667 Charles V, struggling with the

664 Ibid, 354-355.

665 Ibid, 355.

666 For further information see, Ibid, 355-357.

667 Ibid, 356.

217

French armies, charged Andrea Doria with organizing the imperial armada and

leading it against the Ottomans in case of an attack.668

When the Ottomans appeared at Valona, the Ottoman military machine frightened

the Venetians, since where they would attack was still unclear. Doria, unable to have

the assistance of the Papal galleys had returned to Messina after having left a number

of vessels to observe the enemy. The Republic of Venice was anxious about the

ongoing situation. Pesaro was already in Corfu; Giovanni Vetturi, commanding the

galleys of Dalmatia was charged with checking the Ottomans. Meanwhile, the

French King, Francis I, sent another ambassador, Guido Rangone, to Venice to ask

the Republic’s support for his war against Charles V, by guaranteeing the

Serenissima its claims over Milan and Naples.669 In front of a possible Ottoman

threat towards Venetian dominions, the Collegio and the Venetian Senate debated

this proposal extensively. In the following pages, Paruta quotes two orations of the

members of Collegio, namely Marc Antonio Cornaro, Savio di Terraferma, and,

Lunardo Emo, Savio di Consiglio. The orations are interesting to analyze, as they

show how the Venetian government tried to keep the balance via its policies in order

to secure its own territories. In his address, quoted by Paruta, Cornaro advocates that

the Republic should secure the balance between Charles V and the Ottoman Sultan; it

should definitely refrain from any intervention in the ongoing military conflicts, and

from the proposal of Francis I since allying with one party could result in the loss of

Republic’s independence. The victory of Charles V against the French King could

open his way towards the Venetian lagoon, since he already controlled Italy. On the

668 Ibid. Doria would command of the Spanish armada was enriched with the forces of Sicily, Naples

and the Cavalries of the Hiyerosolymitan Order.

669 Ibid, 359.

218

other hand, facilitating the Ottoman authority in Italy was even more dangerous and

almost impossible to justify in the eyes of the Christianity.670 Contrary to Cornaro,

Emo favored the alliance with the French King, reminding the Senate that the French

Kingdom had assisted the Republic in recovering Verona. According to Emo,

preventing the increasing authority of Charles V in Italy, in conjunction with mighty

French and Ottoman forces, would be more beneficial for the Republic, considering

the fact that the major commercial partner of the Venetians was already the Ottoman

Empire.671

In addition to these discussions, the debates among the Venetian nobles about

sending letters to the Ottoman Sultan, accentuating the Serenissima’s friendship and

desire of securing peace672, are also noted by Paruta in the following pages. These

demonstrate how the Venetian government experienced a dilemma on how to

position itself according to the actual circumstances. However, the conflicts at sea

would force to Republic to choose a side.

Paruta notes that the Ottoman armada safely sailed through the Channel of Corfu;

saluting the fortresses, thus observing the military customs. At first, there was

nothing extraordinary. However, the attack of Simeone Nassi, commander of the

galley of Dalmatia, on an Ottoman ship carrying provisions, for not lowering its

sails, increased the tension between the Republic and the Ottoman Government.673 In

response to that incident, Sultan Süleyman and his Pashas decided to send Yunus

Bey, the Dragoman, to Pesaro to ask for an indemnity of 30.000 ducats, with 2

670 For the details of the oration of Cornaro, see: Ibid, 360-364.

671 For the oration of Emo, see: Ibid, 354-366.

672 See: Ibid, 367.

673 Ibid, 368.

219

galleys and a fusta.674 However, they too were attacked by Venetian commanders

such as Guisto Gradenico, Michele Grimani, Giacomo di Mezzo and Girolamo

Michiele, who were charged to secure the Channel.675 The majority of the crew died

and the few of them, including Yunus Bey, who reached the lands of Himara, were

imprisoned. As soon as he noticed the incident, Pesaro sent Francesco Zeno to rescue

the ambassador by paying tribute and sent him back to the Sultan.676

These frustrating incidents raised doubts about the Venetians in the Ottoman camp.

Paruta notes that the Venetian bailo, in Valona at that time, was sent by the Ottoman

Sultan to Corfu in order to report his discontent about the Venetian deeds, which had

definitely broken the peace between two states. It was asked that Pesaro should

immediately explain the main reason behind the attacks, and to inform the Venetian

Senate that the Sultan was more than ready to shelve the friendship and peace.677

However, the chaos continued: while the Ottoman armies had been marching into

Apulia and attacking Otranto, Branditto, Taranto and Castro678, 28 Ottoman galleys,

carrying provisions to Valona from Alexandria, were attacked by the Venetians.

Then, the forces of Alessandro Contarini, composed of 15 galleys met an imperial

galley, under the control of Bostan Reis. The Ottomans, on board, provoked the

Venetian crew viva voce.679 The captains of the galley did not enter into

conversation; however Contarini, “because of his indignation or as a definite zeal of

674 Ibid. For the differences between a galley and a fusta, see: Appendix 1.

675 Ibid. Paruta notes that the Venetian commanders did not know the title and office of Yunus Bey.

676 Ibid.

677 Ibid, 368-369.

678 Paruta notes that Castro had been under the possession of Mercurino Gattinara. Ibid, 369.

679 The author mentions that the galley was for the personal use of the Sultan. Ibid, 369-370.

220

honor”680, notes Paruta, opened fire. The galley sunk, more than 300 people died. A

few days later, the Ottomans captured four Venetian galleys; but most importantly,

they intercepted a letter, written by Andrea Doria to Pesaro, identifying the locations

and travel routes of the Ottoman armada. The letter showing the intelligence-sharing

between Doria and the Venetian captain, persuaded the Ottomans, mostly the Sultan,

that the betrayal of the Republic was clear.681

Paruta’s history also portrays the reaction of the Venetian government to the deeds of

the individual commanders. He notes the arrest of Giusto Gradenico, which had

captured Yunus Bey and the appointment of Alessandro Orsino as bailo to the

Ottoman camp to persuade the Sultan of the good intentions of the Republic for

securing the peace, which were cited in Longo’s account in the previous pages, as the

last maneuvers of the government to prevent the war.682 According to Paruta, the

Venetian Government knew that the deeds of the Venetian commanders had

provoked war against the Republic. The incidents were the initiatives of the opposing

patricians, preferring the alliance with Charles V. Paruta mirrors the general opinion

in Venice, as following:

These incidents were generally perceived in Venice with great sorrow, as a

hard serious thing [to handle] the imprudence and the temerity of the

minority disturbed the peace of the majority by conducing to a greatly serious

and dangerous war with the operations, which were fully in contrast to the

intention and decision of the Senate, […] the Princes only knew well to

impute often the faults, of themselves own, to their ministers.683

680 “ò da sdegno,ò da certo zelo di honore”. Ibid, 370.

681 Ibid.

682 For this important duty, Vicenzo Grimani was elected by the Senate. Ibid, 372.

683 “Furono questi succesi à Vinetia generalmente intesi con grandissimo dispiacere, parendo duro, &

grave cosa, che l‟imprudenza & temerità di pochi doveste turbare la tranquillità di tutti, dando

occasione con operationi tanto contrarie all‟intentione, & alla deliberatione del Senato, ad una

gravissima, & pericolosissima guerra, […] sapersi benissimo essere soliti i Prencipi di gettare molte

volte ne‟ministtri qualle colpe, che sono le sue proprie,[…]” Ibid.

221

Paruta underlines that there was a dichotomy among the Ottoman governors too.

Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa returned to Valona. In order to take the

decision for war against Venice, the Sultan called his commanders and asked their

own opinions. Ayas Pasha, advised that securing the peace with the Venetians would

be more beneficial because in case of a Venetian alliance with the forces of Doria

and the Papacy, the Ottoman forces would most probably be ineffective in war, taken

into consideration that the season for war was about to finish and the army needed

more provisions. On the contrary, Hayreddin Barbarossa advocated war, citing the

harm given by Doria to his forces, which had been facilitated by the Venetians in

alliance. The Venetians should and could have prevented the attacks, but they had

not. They also established an intelligence network with Doria. The peace had already

been broken on their part. After having considered all opinions, Sultan Süleyman

decided to declare war on Venice.684 The target would be the Island of Corfu.

Venice was entirely alone against the Ottomans: when the Venetian ambassador

asked for the assistance of the papal forces, the papacy required the Republic to

participate in the league with Charles V. It was desperately accepted, but Doria was

at Naples and replied that he needed to watch developments and secure Genova.

Paruta notes that if the forces could have united against the Ottoman armada Corfu

would not have been a war zone, but the Christians left the island to its own limited

defense in order to secure their own forces, reputation and interests.685

Paruta notes that Süleyman moved to Buthrotum, adjacent to Corfu, with his army on

August 26, says the author. Barbarossa, with a part of the armada, transported around

684 For the details about the Ottoman discussions on war, see: Ibid, 372-373.

685 Ibid, 375-377.

222

1000 cavalry686, 25.000 soldiers and 30 pieces of artillery to the island.687 The

Ottomans cruelly attacked the fortresses of the Island, cut the trees, ruined the

houses, plundered the animals and seized many people to serve themselves. The

Corfiots, deprived of food and clean water, needed to run away into the castles,

mainly to Sant’Angelo, to save their lives. Lots of people starved to death. Heavy

rains started right after the Ottoman attack and worsened the situation.688

On the other hand, the Ottoman could not entirely break the defense of the Island.

During the siege of the main castle, Ayas Pasha came to the island twice and

observed the battles. After having seen that the army needed more time and provision

to seize the island entirely, he recommended the Sultan to end the war. Most

importantly, the winter had just began and the army had lost many soldiers

already.689 The Venetian bailo, in the Ottoman camp, was called and charged to

inform the Republic about the response of the Sultan to the deeds of the Venetians

during the expedition. The Republic was also asked to send a bailo to Constantinople

to restore the peace, in the following days.690 Shortly after, the Sultan set off back to

Constantinople with his forces. On the other hand, Hayreddin Barbarossa, with the

entire armada together with 12 French galleys of Baron of St. Blancard, who had

joined the Ottoman forces at Valona during the attack, sailed to Prevesa.691 Paruta

concludes the story by saying that the news about the liberation of Corfu from the

686 Ibid, 373.

687 Ibid, 377.

688 Ibid, 378.

689 Ibid.

690 Ibid, 378-379.

691 Ibid, 379.

223

danger raised the spirits of the Venetians, abandoned by Doria. The virtue of the

defenders caused the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Island and broke the

reputation of the Sultan as well. Venice, every part of the city, celebrated this great

victory.692

The aforementioned two examples of Venetian histories, discussed in detail, proves

the argument that the Venetian Republic perceived the Ottoman military initiative of

1537 as a result of the Ottoman-French alliance against Charles V and its

transformation into an attack on the Republic as a consequence of the conflicts at sea

between the Venetian commanders and the Ottomans. The accounts also reveal the

request of Pignatello of Naples for the Ottoman attack to Apulia, different from the

accounts of the eyewitnesses. Paruta’s underlyning of the death of Ġbrahim Pasha as a

factor in the Ottoman war on Christians is also noteworthy.

While Doglioni keeps quiet about the French moves during the procedure, Paruta

mentions that the French Kingdom, via its ambassador in Venice, encouraged the

government to ally with Francis I and the Ottoman Sultan. Moreover, Paruta also

noted that the French ambassadors played important roles in convincing the Ottoman

Sultan about the Venetian alliance with Charles V. In that context, beside the deeds

of Venetian commanders, the French persuasion of the Ottoman Sultan is reflected as

the reason for the Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537, by Paruta. His notes about the

league with the Papacy also differ from the notes of Longo. According to him, the

Papacy forced the Republic to enter into the league with the Emperor, and this was

not a policy the Venetians sought.

692 Ibid.

224

5.3. Studying the Ottomans: Discussions of 1537 in Venetian Books on Ottoman

History

In the sixteenth-century, numerous books and pamphlets about the Ottomans were

produced and published in Venice. As well as the works introducing the customs of

the Ottomans to the Venetians, books on the Ottoman Sultans and their deeds

reached a wide audience. 693 The Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on

Corfu in 1537 are also discussed in those accounts.

Among these works, the account of Theodore Spandugino has a distinguished place.

Spandugino is an interesting character: he was a member of a Byzantine refugee

family who had settled in Venice after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in

1453. His mother, who had moved to Italy before the fall of Constantinople, was

from the Byzantine Kantakouzenos family694, well-known to be one of the

distinguished imperial families in the history of Byzantium, and his father, Matthew

Spandounes or Spandugino served as a stradioto, Greek cavalrymen in the service of

Venice.695 Donald M. Nicol, studied extensively on the Kantakouzenos family and

on Spandugino, points out that Theodore Spandugino was probably born in Venice

and, following the death of his father by 1511, he was sent to be a ward of his greataunt

Mara or Maria, given in marriage to the Ottoman Sultan Murad II and was

693 See, Bassano da Zara.

694 For detailed information about the Kantakouzenos family and his members shaping the Byzantine

History, see: Donald M. Nicol, The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca.1100-

1460: A Genealogical and Prospographical Study, (Washington D.C. : Dumbarton Oaks Studies,

1968); idem, “The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos: Some Addenda and Corrigenda”, Dumbarton

Oaks Papers, v.27, 1973, 309-315. Donald M. Nicol also published the biography of Joannes

Kantakouzenos, known as John VI, Emperor of Romans in Constantinople between the years of 1347-

1354. See: Nicol, The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and

Monk, c. 1295-1383, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

695 Spandounes, On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors, ix-x.

225

living as a wealthy widow at that time in eastern Macedonia.696 Here, Theodore

learnt some Turkish and “acquired his interest in the history and customs of the

Ottoman people and their rulers.”697 He probably visited Constantinople in 1503 to

help his brother Alexander, engaged in commerce in the Ottoman Empire.698 This

helped Spandugino a lot to have more information about the Ottomans and their

culture. This would create the base of his treatise.

Spandugino never lost his Greek origin but he lived more as a devout Christian than

a Greek patriot. Donald M. Nicol points out that his patriotism “is not in doubt; but it

was a patriotism for the whole Christian world, east and west alike, Roman as well as

Greek.”699 Greece for him symbolized Europe700 and it should not be left to the

Ottomans for many generations like Anatolia.701 As a Greek scholar born in Venice,

he felt bound to alert the Christians in the west to the danger of the Ottomans ruining

Byzantium and he undertook to compose an account about the Ottoman Empire to

evoke them to struggle against it. His religious persuasion oriented him to the Roman

Church and he could have strong connections with the Popes, and princes tied to the

Papacy, as well as their envoys and ambassadors.702 He served as a confidante and

696 After the death of Sultan Murad II, Mara was granted her freedom by Mehmed II. Mehmed II was

very attached to her a mother figure according to Nicol and in the end he settled her on her estate at

Jezevo in Macedonia, near the city of Seres. The author mentions that the ambassadors from Venice

and elsewhere in the west would often visit Mara to seek her advice and support considering her

affinity to Mehmed II. Ibid, x. For detailed information about her see: Nicol, The Byzantine Lady. Ten

Portraits, 1250-1500, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110-119.

697 Spandounes, x.

698 Ibid, x-xi.

699 Ibid, xi.

700 Ibid.

701 Ibid.

702 Ibid, xi-xii.

226

advisor to Popes Leo X, Clement VII and Paul III between the years of 1513 and

1549703.

Spandugino wrote his account in Italian. The first version of Spandugino’s treatise

was sent to the French King Louis XII and to Pope Leo X before the 1520s. Its

Spanish version was dedicated to Charles V and was published as early as the 1520s.

Spandugino edited and finalized his account in 1538 and sent it to Henry of Valois,

who would be crowned as King Henry II of France in 1547. The account was

published in Lucca in 1550 and in Florence in 1551. In 1556, Francesco Sansovino

edited and published the account in Venice.704 The modern edition of the full text

was published by Constantine N. Sathas in 1890.705 The account was re-edited and

translated into English by Donald M. Nicol in 1997. In this study, the views of

Spandugino will be mirrored via Nicol’s edition.

According to Spandugino, the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 intended the

invasion of the Kindom of Naples706, as underlined by other sources discussed in the

previous pages. Sultan Süleyman prepared a great expedition by land and sea. Lütfi

Bey, captain-general of Gallipoli, was in command of the naval forces and the Sultan

accompanied by his prince son and the land army headed to the Albanian lands. The

imperial camp was near the city of Valona. On the other hand, Barbarossa was

charged with carrying supplies to the imperial camp with his ships from

Negroponte.707 In accordance to the plan of the expedition, Lütfi Bey sailed for the

703 Ibid, viii.

704 Ibid, xiii, xxv.

705 Constantine N. Sathas, “Documents Inédits Relatifs à l‟Histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge, v.9,

(Paris : 1890), 133-261.

706 Spandounes, 75.

707 Ibid.

227

Kingdom of Naples and reached Otranto without any considerable opposition.708

From there he went on to Castro, Tre Case and other Neapolitan towns in Apulia,

which were surrendered after some resistance.709

Spandugino mentions that at the same time the Republic of Venice was on the alert:

The Venetian Senate appointed two captains-general of the sea: Girolamo Pesaro,

being at Corfu with 44 galleys and Giovanni Vetturi, being at the Gulf of Kotor with

approximately 50 ships.710 Venetians did not open fire against the Ottomans at first.

However, Barbarossa, with his cargo ships and provisions on his way to Valona,

encountered Andrea Doria in the Adriatic. Doria followed Barbarossa’s forces and

seized 17 of his vessels. Barbarossa pressed on to Zakyntos and from there he sailed

to Corfu with his cargo ships. Since the Venetians were not at war at that time,

Barbarossa did not face any opposition during his sail but “off Corfu one his small

craft was sunk when the Venetian galley called Zarantina opened fire.”711 Barbarossa

was able to reach to Valona with the supplies but this attack caused great indignation

in the Ottoman camp.712

Spandugino repeats the fact that Sultan Süleyman sent Dragoman Yunus Bey as

ambassador to Pesaro in order to demand compensation for the loss of the goods in

the sunken ship713 and for the Venetian attack on the ambassador’s galleys with the

708 Ibid.

709 Ibid. The names of the towns were deciphered by Nicol as Virento and Galatole.

710 Ibid, 76.

711 Ibid.

712 Ibid.

713 Ibid.

228

forces of Andrea Doria.714 The story of the capture of Yunus Bey, by Himarans and

his rescue in return for an indemnity of 500 ducats by Pesaro was mentioned by

Spandugino too.

About the Sultan’s declaration war on Venice, Sapndugino narrates as follows:

As a consequence Suleiman again declared war on Venice. He ordered his

army which had been fighting in the Kingdom of Naples to report forthwith

at Valona, which they did, though not before they had done considerably

more damage in the region of Otranto. For this Suleiman had their four

leaders arrested and executed at Valona. In anticipation of the Turkish attack

on Corfu, Pesaro made for Cephalonia. Suleiman brought his troops by land

down to Butrinto; an on 27 August 1537 his fleet sailed over Corfu. There

they created havoc; but after eighteen days they gave up the struggle and

sailed off to Constantinople taking with them 20.000 prisoners.715

Spandugino does not give details about the Ottoman attack on Corfu, what happened

in the island or why the Ottoman Sultan decided to end the war. The question of why

Spandugino did not give the details of the Ottoman attacks on the island needs to be

speculated, however. Taking into consideration that the text was formulated nearly in

1538, the author seems to be partly aware of the details of the Ottoman attack, as

well as the other accounts discussing them.716 He mentions that he narrated all that

happened before he left Venice.717 On the other hand, he concludes his account by

announcing that the Pope had finally arranged a peace settlement between Charles V

and Francis I. As he clearly mirrors in the text his advice on the necessary unification

of the Christians against the Ottoman advance, this agreement seems to be a crucial

point for Spandugino. For that reason, he may also intentionally avoid discussing the

damage created by the Ottomans in 1537. The lack of a mention of the Ottoman-

714 Ibid.

715 Ibid, 76-77.

716 For a brief discussion about the sources consulted by Spandugino, see: Ibid, xvii-xxv.

717 Ibid, 79.

229

French alliance should also be evaluated from that perspective. Since he was in

Venice in the relevant period, he should have been aware of the French-Ottoman

negotiations, known in the Venetian atmosphere. However, the author prefers to

show the French in alliance with the Papacy and the Emperor in the text.

Another example of a treatise on the Ottomans, discussing the incidents of 1537 is a

chapter in the book entitled Historia Universale Dell‟Origine et Imperio de

Turchi718, collected by Francesco Sansovino, famous scholar and man of letters born

in Rome in 1521, who moved to Venice after the sack of Rome by Charles V in

1527. The title of the chapter is “The Deeds of Süleyman after the Conquest of

Rhodes to the End of the Year of 1533”.719 Despite the title, the chapter reveals

important details about the Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537. The author of the

chapter is unknown. Although at first sight one could easily think that the chapter

had been written by Sansovino, himself, the names of the authors in titles of the other

chapters were directly mentioned, including Sansovino himself. So, the

aforementioned chapter is thought to be anonymous, copied from another

contemporary source and reorganized at the time of collection and/or publication

since the content of the chapter extended to the year of 1538, asynchronous with the

original title. Since Sansovino conducted his work in Venice, this study assumes that

the chapter was written by a Venetian, most probably.

After having discussed the first military attempts and conquests of Süleyman, his

close relation with the former Grand Vizier Ġbrahim Pasha and his attitude towards

Hungary and Charles V, the text gives brief information about the Ottoman military

718 Sansovino (ed), Historia Universale Dell‟Origine.

719 “I Fatti di Solimano Dopo la Presa di Rhodi Fino all’Anno MDXXXIII”, Historia Universale

Dell‟Origine, l. 2, 267a-273b.

230

initiation of 1537. The author mentions that the target of the Sultan was both Valona,

which had been the center of Ancient Macedonia and the region of Calabria720,

which was under the rule of the Kingdom of Naples, attached to the Spanish

Habsburgs. The Ottomans, with a troop composed of 30.000 soldiers, landed in the

city of Barletta721 and conquered the province by violence.722 This triggered Emperor

Charles V to send an enormous armada and Spanish soldiers to the region. The

“Turks”, noticing the Emperor’s response, did not want to wait for the Spanish and

with dishonor, retreated and abandoned the capture.723

The failure in Italy provoked the Ottoman Sultan to break the peace with the

Republic of Venice, according to the author. Süleyman sent an armada of 400 vessels

into the Channel of Corfu in July 8, 1537.724 Moreover, he took his land army

through the village of Riglia725, which was also fundamentally ruined by the Ottoman

soldiers.726

At that time, the Venetian armada was situated at the shores of Paxi.727 The Venetian

government, for security, decided to send two ships, one of Zara and one of Candia,

720 Sansovino, 269b. Calabria is the name of the southwestern region of the Italian Peninsula,

generally defined as the “toe” of the boot shaped territory.

721 Barletta is a city of southeastern Italy, in the region of Apulia, which was located in the Adriatic

coast. See , Ibid.

722 Sansovino, 269b.

723 Ibid.

724 Ibid.

725 Ibid. Riglia is a small village of Stoupa, a village in the southern Peloponnese.

726 Ibid.

727 Ibid. Paxi Islands are the smallest island groups within the Ionian Islands. Paxo is the name of the

largest island of the group.

231

to meet the Ottoman armada. 728 In the course of sailing, those Venetian ships

encountered three Ottoman galleys. As a result of a battle between them, one

Ottoman galley was able to escape and the other two were sunk by the Venetians.729

The text informs the researcher that after that incident, on July 13, near Parga,

Andrea Doria attacked ten Ottoman schirazzi, in the gulf in front of Parga. The ships

were seized, some of them were sunk; the “Turks” were captured and some of them

were killed. This drew the Ottoman Sultan into great sorrow since he lost important

munitions and the backbone of his armada.730 Five days later, the forces of Andrea

Doria, composed of 22 well-armed galleys, found two Ottoman ships, one galley

carrying Yunus Bey, the ambassador of the Sultan and a galeotta, smaller fusta,

following him. Although, they tried to defend themselves, these two ships were

controlled without fire and Yunus Bey was taken on the land of the Himarans. After

being imprisoned Yunus Bey was sent to Venice.731 On July 22, Andrea Doria, found

twelve Ottoman galleys between Parga and Riglia. After a bloody combat, 11

Ottoman ships were destroyed and numerous people died –the sea became red

because of the dead bodies- and the captain of the galleys, Ali Reis, was captured.

Since, the galleys had been in charge of carrying an important amount of money to

pay the soldiers, munitions and necessary goods to the Ottoman camp, that incident

728 Ibid.

729 Ibid, 270a.

730 Sansovino, 270a.

731 Sansovino, 270a.

232

distressed the Ottoman Sultan as much as the destruction of the schirazzi.732 By his

great virtue, Andrea Doria also liberated the Christian slaves in the galleys.733

In the course of these naval conflicts, Venetian Provveditore Alessandro Contarini,

commanding a Venetian galleon and three galleys, came across an Ottoman galleon

followed by three other galleys which had been coming from the Sancak of

Gallipoli.734 The fire between the forces led to the capture of two Ottoman galleys

and great casualties among the “Turks”.735

The text also reflects the general panorama of the Venetian armada. The author

mentions that the Venetian ships came altogether near Otranto in the last days of July

and targeted the Ottoman naval force. However, the Ottoman armada had the

advantage: the Venetian armada had 40 galleys but the Ottomans had more than 270.

Considering that and the need to protect their own forces, the Venetian galleys

reoriented to the Island of Corfu to watch the manoeuvers of the enemy.736

732 Ibid.

733 Ibid.

734 In the text, the author narrates that the “selisguir” of Gallipoli was in the Ottoman galleon. “[…] su

la qual veniva Selisguir Sangiacco di Galipoli […].”In the course of the present research, I could not

be able to decipher what the aforementioned word means or represents which name or title in

Ottoman. The context of the story makes me think that the author refers to the captain of the Gallipoli

ships, however, the term needs to be clarified. See: Ibid.

735 The author also mentions that the aforementioned “selisguir” that was captured alive told Contarini

that most of his people were killed. Ibid.

736 The author narrates another interesting story too: On August 1, Andrea Doria captured another

Ottoman galley, carrying an imperial astrologer who was one of the favorites of Sultan Süleyman. The

man was a Christian renegade of Dalmatian origin, converted to Islam and raised in the imperial

palace in the time of Mehmed II. He had found the chance of studying in Athens and Adrianople.

What is attractive in the story is that the astrologer revealed to Doria that Sultan Süleyman was about

to die or to be imprisoned before the year 1559 and following that the Christian princes would unite

and enter into Greece by having the support of the Greek people against the “Turks”. See: Ibid, 270b.

The text does not reveal what happened to the astrologer after capture but the short passage discussed

above is thought to be a good example of prophecies floating over the Christian world about the

unification of the Christians for the collapse of the Ottomans that which were briefly discussed in

Chapter Two of the present study. See: Chapter Two.

233

Following the conflicts at sea, the Sultan was also informed that, in the East, the

Safevid Shah was about to attack the Ottoman borderline and kill numerous soldiers

with the help of Spanish and Italian contingents. These soldiers were paid by the

Shah and helped him a lot with their more advanced techniques.737 This encouraged

the Sultan, for the conquest of the Island of Corfu and victory in the West would

compensate the failure in the East.738

After having noted the names of the Ottoman commanders in charge and the number

of the ships and soldiers participating in the attack, the author mentions that after

three days of raids on the island, the “Turks” started to withdraw back to their

armada. However, the Venetian cavalry and infantry, who were in charge of guarding

the city did not let the “Turks” go in this way. The city had already been fortified

with munitions and provision for two years by the Republic of Venice and letting the

“Turks” go with an advantage was not acceptable. The author narrates the reaction of

the Venetian as follows:

[…] [The Venetian soldiers] followed and pressed the Turkish [soldiers]

during their retreat, killed most of them by fighting so bravely and shouting

Marco, Marco, kill [them], kill [them] and when the dark night fell, they

retreated to the city; the Venetian armada, itself, did the same, it did his own

part of harming the enemy.739

According to the author, during the conflicts many “Turks” died: while 12.000

“Turkish” soldiers died, only 200 Christians lost their lives. This led Sultan

Süleyman to engage in a second, more destructive attack by two bands which would

737 Sansovino, 271a.

738 Ibid.

739 “ […]seguitando i Turchi diede lo incalzo et ne ammazzò molti di quelli, combattendo

valorosamente, et gridando Marco, Marco, ammazza, ammazza, et poi sopravendo l‟oscura notte si

ritiravano alla città, facendo il medesimo l‟armata Venetiana, la quale anchora essa haveva fatto la

parte sua, di danno negli nemici.”, Ibid.

234

be greater and more vigorous.740 However, the second attack was not successful

either and in order not to lose more time, the Sultan decided to withdraw his

forces.741 Here, it is interesting to note that the author underlines that Sultan

Süleyman, before declaring his decision of retreat, convened a meeting with all his

pashas and captains, aware of the importance of this conquest and explained his

reasoning in details. Pages 271b and 272a are left to the assumed speech of

Süleyman told by the author firsthand as if he had listened to it or had it in writing.

The direct translation of the entire part was intentionally avioded so as not to drag the

reader into strenuous reading; however, some parts and the basic motives

accentuated by the author will be paraphrased here to detect the perception of the

author on 1537.

By the sentence “I have no doubt, my friends and brothers, that none of us knew and

understand the strength of our enemy […]”742, the Sultan opens his speech according

to the author. The main concern of the Sultan is the power of the Emperor Charles V

and the other Christian potentates allying with him. The author narrates from the lips

of the Sultan that the Christians had a united armada composed of more than 400

ships opposed to the 200 ships of the Ottomans.743 Moreover, the Pope, the Emperor,

740 Ibid.

741 Ibid, 271a-271b.

742 “Non dubito punto amici e fratelli miei, che ogni uno di noi non sappia et intenda la potenza de gli

nemci nostri […]”, Ibid., 271b.

743 The author interestingly gives the numbers of the galleys and ships of the Christian potentates as if

the Sultan had listed to his audience. According to him, the Kingdom of Catalonia (in the city of

Barcelona), had 30, the Spanish Kingdom had 14, Andrea Doria, referred as his mortal enemy by the

Ottoman Sultan vocalized by the author, had 15, Genoa had 10, the Papacy had 10, the Kingdom of

Sicily had 10, the Kingdom of Naples 12, the Knights of St. John had 8, Antonio Doria had 5,

Palermo had 4 galleys. With the galleys of the other Christian princes, in total, the Christians had 130

well-armed galleys and many big vessels including with an important amount of munition and

provisions. In addition to them, the Venetians had 100 galleys in order and many fuste and vessels.

See, 271b-272a.

235

the King of France and the Italian potentates had just come together in a league

against the Ottomans.744 In the East, the Safevids had started once again to harm the

Ottomans. For that reason, the Sultan recommends to retreat to Greece and to focus

on defense of the Ottoman lands instead of insisting on the conquest of Corfu.745

Moreover, the winter time was ahead. He concludes his speech admitting as follows:

“There was a time that the Christians were afraid of us, but right now it is the

contrary […]”746.

The author narrates that, after having listened to the speech of the Sultan to the

Ottoman pashas and captains, they consented that withdrawing from the attack would

be the best solution to secure the remaining military force, and also the Ottoman

territories in Greece. They pointed out that only in Corfu, more than 20.000 soldiers,

with the causalties in Calabria, more than 30.000 soldiers in total, died that year

besides the vessels and galleys attacked by the enemy747. They left the final decision

to the will of the Sultan and Süleyman “not to lose more time, decided to raise

immediately the attack on Corfu, where they left without harassing the Christians for

some days and let the Venetian Seniors live in peace, and to take the route to

Constantinople with his forces, with disappointment that they had never had.”748

With the aforementioned comment, the author concludes the story of 1537 and starts

to discuss the Ottoman-Portuguese confrontation in the Indian Ocean and the Diu

744 Ibid., 272a.

745 Ibid.

746 “Gia fu il tempo che i Christiani havevano paura di noi, ma hora è al contrario […] ”, Ibid.

747 Ibid., 272a-272b.

748 “[…] per non perder piu tempo si levò subito d‟attorno Corfu et andò alla rotta di

Constantinopoli col suo essercito, ove stete quieto senza molestar i Christiani per alcuni giorni,

lasciando viver in pace i Signori Vinitiani, da‟quelli niun dispiacere non ricevuè mai.” Ibid., 272b.

236

Expedition of 1538749, the final subject discussed in the chapter. The author mentions

that the failure of the Ottomans both in Calabria and then in India was not related

with the Sultan’s fear of Charles V. With all their forces, well-composed and

organized, the Ottomans had been able to march into Hungary, even to Vienna, but,

with the help of God, they had not been successful. The author underlines that that

was a sort of message from God, a notice, for the Christian potentates to awaken and

consolidate their powers instead of fighting with each other in their territories.

However, the author does not discuss the Ottoman expedition to Wallachia and the

success at Prevesa, in autumn 1538. This leads the researcher to conclude that the

text could be composed just before the war. On the other hand, the author could also

remain intentionally blind to that since it refutes his arguments about the superiority

of the Christians. Therefore, the author seems to insist on alerting the Christian

milieu against the possible Ottoman attack in the future and to emphasize the

importance of unifying their forces, probably under the command of Charles V,

reflected as the most powerful rival of the Ottoman Sultan.

It can be argued that both the account of Spandugino and the anonymous chapter

published by Sansovino use the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the attack on

Corfu as a matter of propaganda for the unification of the Christian states against the

Ottomans. Both of them offer the reader limited information, in some cases fantasies

and rumors, about the events but portrait a glorified Christian success. The silence of

the sources about the Ottoman-French alliance should also be evaluated within that

perspective.

749 For further information about the expedition and the Ottoman initiatives towards the Indian Ocean,

see: Salih Özbaran Ottoman Expansion towards the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth Century, (Ġstanbul:

Ġstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 80-92.

237

5.4. The Voice of a Seventeenth-Century Corfiot: Andrea Marmora and Della

Historia di Corfu

To understand how the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu

was evaluated in the Venetian atmosphere, it is important to listen to the story

narrated by another Corfiot in the late seventeenth-century, who wrote the first book

on the history of Corfu from the earliest times to the loss of Crete by Venetians to the

Ottoman Empire in 1699: Andrea Marmora.750 Andrea Marmora, came from a noble

Greek family, whose ancestors had been rewarded with governorships in

Peloponnese early in the times of the imperial Byzantine Family of Komnenos. It is

known that the family settled in Corfu in the late fifteenth-century and, by

participating in governmental and military affairs in the island, it gradually became

one of the most prominent Corfiot families in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. Although we don’t have satisfactory information about the early life of

Andrea Marmora, thanks to the brief chapter written by Cretan Vincenzo Mazzoleni

about the Marmora family751 we understand that he was well-educated and, as a

noble Corfiot, he also undertook some governmental and military duties and obtained

titles besides his dedication to literary works. He was also defined as an intellectual

of his time.752

750 Andrea Marmora, Della Historia di Corfu.

751 The short chapter about the Marmora Family written by Vincenzo Mazzoleni was published in the

introduction of the book of Andrea Marmora. See, Marmora, x-xvi.

752 Giuseppe Baretti, The Italian Library Containing An Account of the Lives and Works of the Most

Valuable Authors of Italy, (London, 1757), 156.

238

Encouraged by his deep patriotism, Andrea Marmora undersigned his Della Historia

di Corfu and offered it to the Doge and the Senate of the Venetian Republic. The

book is composed of 8 separate books, chronologically discussing the historical

periods of the Island from Antiquity to the seventeenth century. By evaluating the

history of Corfu, Marmora intended to show how the Island, an ancient territory of

the Eastern Romans, gradually became a loyal dominion to Serenissima and its being

a key point in the Adriatic, between Latin West and Greek East or Venice and the

Ottoman Empire due to its geographical position. In the book, Marmora

demonstrates how Corfu was transformed into the new capital of the Venetian

Levant after the Ottoman conquest of Crete in 1699. He tries to underline the ties

between the Byzantine Greeks and Venetians and deals with the heroic, honored

deeds of the Corfiot governing class. The book also contains a map of Corfu, a list of

Corfiot noble families and several illustrations.

There is no accurate information about the sources that the author had consulted;

however, taking into consideration his social status and ties with the local

government of Corfu, including his desire for learning, it can be assumed that he was

aware of the existing works on history, beside his personal knowledge coming from

his family and traditions. On the other hand, Marmora’s style of writing, his

tendency towards inventing some details about the discussed subject and his

intention of glorifying the Venetian Republic were criticized by subsequent

authors.753 “But his work is quaintly written and he thoroughly reflects the feelings

753 Miller, 212. For example, Frances Maclellan notes the following: “I wish you understood Italian,

were it only that you might read this book and amuse yourself with the simple, confiding character of

its author. Do not you admire the manner in which he frequently breaks off the thread of his history, to

apostrophize his heroes? Very often, too, he gives us, not only their speeches that any one might do,

but even their very inmost thoughts.” Frances Maclellan, Sketches of Corfu: Historical and Domestic;

Its Scenery and Natural Productions: Interspersed with Legends and Traditions, (London: Smith,

Elder and Co. Cornhill, 1835), 377.

239

of his class and era.”754 For that reason, the account of Marmora should be evaluated

as an important source not only to follow the history of Corfu, and of Venice as well,

but also decipher how it was being perceived and reflected in the late seventeenth

century Corfiot/Venetian cultural atmosphere from the eyes of the nobility, the

natural component of the administration.

The fifth book of Della Historia di Corfu deals with the consolidation of Venetian

rule, the transformation of the administration and the establishment of Venetian

aristocracy on the island. Concluding the discussion Marmora mentions that he

briefly narrated this long period to settle the scene for the year of 1535, from when

some deplorable catastrophes, which he was in great sorrow to remember, had

started.755 Following such an impressive entry, Marmora introduces the most

prominent political actors of the time: Süleyman, the Emperor of the Orient and

Charles V, the Emperor of the Occident.756 He briefly notes the political and military

rivalry between them, the struggle for Hungary, the Ottoman capture of Corone,

Andrea Doria’s participation in the Habsburg forces and the Venetian desire of

securing peace with the Ottomans, shaping the politics of the Serenissima.757 The

author interestingly relates the events of 1537 with the death of Ġbrahim Pasha.

Marmora defines the Pasha as “Turk” in appearance but internally Christian since he

had been born among the Greeks and favored the things about the Christians. His

death instigated the Ottomans and caused damage to the Christians.758 Another

triggering factor underlined by the author is the conquest of Tunis by Andrea Doria.

754 Miller, 212-213.

755 Marmora, 286.

756 Ibid.

757 Ibid, 287.

758 Ibid, 288.

240

Therefore, the Ottoman Sultan decided to initiate a campaign against Valona and

Naples and then attacked the Island of Corfu.759

In the last pages of the fifth book, Marmora discusses the measures taken by the

Venetian government, intending to remain outside the rivalry of the two potentates,

for a potential attack. The defense lines of the Island were fortified and Girolamo

Pesaro was charged with commanding the armada and he put two Corfiot galleys

between Corfu and Cephalonia in order to observe the maneuvers of the Ottomans.760

He concludes the book by underlining that the Turks devastated and pillaged the

island, but they could not be able to conquer it. Corfu should be perceived as a key

point on the route to and from Venice and if, he points out, the Ottomans had been

able to conquer the Island, they most probably would have entered into the Venetian

lagoon.761 By mentioning that, Marmora leads the reader to the sixth book,

discussing the details of the war and “the cruelty of a mighty barbarian”.762

The sixth book starts with the Ottoman initiatives in Albania during the military

campaign of 1537. The first deed of the Ottoman Sultan, camping in Valona, was to

suppress the Himarans and conquering the lands they possessed.763 However, most of

them escaped to the mountainous zones to secure themselves, and attacked the

759 Ibid.

760 Ibid, 289-290.

761 Ibid, 291.

762 Ibid.

763 Ibid, 293.

241

Ottoman soldiers leaded by Ayas Pasha and the Head of Janissaries: The result

would not satisfy the Ottoman Sultan.764

While the land army was in Albanian territories, the Ottoman armada sailed into the

Mediterranean. The vessels passed by the Riviera of Corfu, without facing with any

difficulty or attack. The Venetian and Ottoman ships friendly saluted each other in a

friendly fashion. He says, at first, nothing was abnormal; but no one could deeply

trust in the peace, since the “barbarians” were generally unpredictable.765 Marmora

points out that the armada of Süleyman was in the command of Lütfi Pasha and the

famous corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa. The armada reached the beaches of Otranto

towards Taranto and disembarked soldiers for the siege of Castro, which was

encouraged by Troilo Pignatello.766 They ruined the city and enslaved the citizens

without respecting their ages, though they were liberated later by the Sultan.767

During the Ottoman attacks in Albania, Marmora underlines that an Ottoman ship,

carrying munitions and not hauling the sails down, met a Dalmatian ship and because

of the beadledom of the cannon of Corfu, the ship made sunk.768 The Ottoman

government accused Venice about the incident, since the forces of Republic should

control the ships on sea and guarantee the security of the Ottoman vessels according

to the existing peace with the Porte.769 Marmora’s explanation about the Venetian

764 For the details about the Ottoman struggles with Cimmerioti, see: Ibid, 293-294. Dealing with the

subject, Marmora narrates an interesting story about a Cimmerioto spy, named Damianno, who

penetrated through the Ottoman camp at night. Damiano was captured by the Ottomans and executed.

Marmora mirrors him as a hero to be remembered by the Cimmerioti. See: Ibid, 294-295.

765 Ibid, 293.

766 Ibid, 295.

767 Ibid.

768 Ibid.

769 Ibid, 295-296.

242

attacks by the Venetian galleys and the capture of Yunus Bey, sent by the Sultan to

Corfu after the aforementioned incident, echoes with the accounts of Longo and

Paruta, discussed above.

Marmora also narrates the attacks of Andrea Doria, similar to Longo and Paruta:

Andrea Doria, the “falcon of the sea” says the author, met 12 Ottoman cargo ships,

coming from Alexandria. Following a bold and bloody conflict the ships were

destroyed; only two of them ran away. 770 “The events, supported by the Venetians

though, since [they] had happened in their seas and near their lands, convinced

Süleyman that the Republic had colluded with Doria and consequently with the

Christian Emperor.”771 Moreover, an Ottoman galley, under the command of Hasan

Reis was asked to pay tribute and after the refusal, was attacked by the forces of

Alessandro Contarini; 300 Janissaries died.772

On the other hand, the author mentions that Andrea Doria tried to convince the

Republic to cooperate several times but his offers were refused by the government.

During the conflicts at sea, a letter written by Doria to Admiral Pesaro offering the

unification of the forces against the forces of Süleyman, was intercepted and

deciphered by the Ottomans. This urged the Sultan to initiate the attack on Corfu.773

According to Marmora, the “Turks” attacked, burned and pillaged the lands of

Naples, but they were not able to conquer the entire territory. Beside the

aforementioned incidents, their incapability in Apulia also motivated the Sultan to

770 Ibid, 297.

771 “Avvenimenti, che, benche non fussero spagllegiati da‟Veneti, per esser fatti ne‟loro mari, e vicini

a‟loro paesi, persuasero Solimano, che la Republica se l‟intendesse co‟l Doria, e in conseguenza con

l‟Imperator Christiano.”, Ibid, 297.

772 Ibid.

773 Ibid, 298.

243

attack another territory of the Christians.774 Hayreddin Barbarossa first sought Doria

and his forces, returning back to Messina; then turned back to Valona and

encouraged the Sultan to attack the Venetians. Marmora interestingly underlines that

Yunus Bey and Ayas Pasha had different opinions about breaking peace with the

Venetians but Barbarossa affected the Sultan and after 3 days of political discussions

Süleyman decided to attack the Island of Corfu, belonging to the Republic of

Venice.775

At the same time, the island was prepared for the attack: five galleys were disarmed

in order to fortify the castles and more than 300 houses were torn down to prevent

the entrance of a land army. Not only the crew, but also the Corfiot men and women

participated into the defense of their lands. They were organized under the command

of noble colonels. Giacomo Novello, the captain, and Luigi da Riva, provveditore

straordinario, were in charge of leading the military forces.776 The troops were led

by Simone Leone and the sea fortresses were defended by Andrea Faliero. Moreover,

Andrea Doria sent a letter to Pesaro and the Venetian Senate to unite the forces

against the Ottomans. The Republic, in desiring the peace with the Ottoman Sultan,

finally accepted that project in order to defend the Island.777 According to the plan,

Pesaro near Corfu and Doria near Cephalonia would meet the Ottoman ships. The

Dalmatian forces under the command of Giovanni Vitturi would also participate

them.778

774 Ibid.

775 Ibid, 299.

776 Ibid, 300.

777 Ibid.

778 Ibid, 301.

244

However, the plan could not be realized, noted Marmora. The Venetian and

Habsburg imperial forces got never united and faced the Ottomans. On August 25,

the forces commanded by Hayreddin Barbarossa reached the shores of Corfu and the

soldiers landed on beaches. The author expresses his wonder at why Pesaro did not

assist the defense of the Island. According to him, with the imperial forces, the

Christians would have the advantage in number and power; furthermore, the season

had been complicating the camping of the Ottomans. Following his narration, one

could easily understand that Marmora criticizes the attitude of the admirals leaving

the island to their own struggle:

I want to persuade myself that they waited for the new reinforcements from

Venice, or, they had been repairing the ships that had recently suffered the

long resistance in the waters and the encounter with the galleys of the

infidels, […] I could not imagine laziness in a Captain, whose fame flatters

on being determined in his magnanimous ventures.779

Marmora continues his narration with a vivid visualization of the Ottoman attacks:

the forces of the Hayreddin Barbarossa were strengthened by the Sultan with the

imperial ships located at Valona. Ayas Pasha was charged to command the attack

and 25.000 Ottoman soldiers started to ruin the Island. The city and the Castle of

Sant’Angelo were destroyed. Here the author accuses the Corfiot Governor of not

effectively using the provisions and defending the castle.780 The city center was on

fire and many people died. The author underlines how the Corfiots, men, women,

even the children bravely participated in the defense of their own lands. Some of

them were taken captive by the “Turks”, but even in that condition, they refused to

779 “Voglio persuadermi ch‟egli aspettasse da Venetia nuovi rinforzi, ò che fusse astretto à

racconciare i legni, c‟havean patito non poco per la lunga dimora dell‟acque, e nell‟incontro con le

galee infedeli, […] non potendo immaginarmi pigritia in un Capitano, cui la fama vanta di risoluto

nelle sue magnanime imprese.” Ibid, 301-302.

780 Ibid, 303.

245

convert to Islam to secure their lives.781 The Venetians did the same too. The defense

of the island increased the tension and the “Turks” villainy stomed the city, cut the

fruit trees, er all the houses on fire and captured all people of any age and sex that

they had found.782 During the siege of the main castle, people in the Church of

Sant’Angelo had found a chance of rest and reorganization. Soon after they started to

attack the Ottoman soldiers.

The defense was entirely commanded by Simon Leone and Luigi da Riva. Admiral

Pesaro, although he had to move, did not assist the Corfiots. The author mentions

that Pesaro declared that the Ottoman ships had already been in front of the island in

order and fighting with them would be dangerous for the sake of his forces.783

Moreover, he should think of the Republic’s future and independence and other

Venetian dominions such as Cyprus, Crete and Dalmatia. In case of defeat, they

could have been under threat from the Ottomans. Marmora notes that the loss of

Corfu to the Ottomans would both have opened the way for the Venetian lagoon and

terraferma and been a new Ottoman base to attack Naples. His sentences clearly

show that he criticizes the Venetian Admiral for his wrong, narrow-minded

decision.784

Marmora related the defense and the Ottoman decision to withdraw, along with the

brave, eager and honorable efforts of the Corfiots. Since the Ottomans could not

easily finalize the conquest as they had envisioned, the change of the season and the

781 Ibid, 304.

782 Ibid, 305

783 Ibid, 306.

784 For further information about the reasoning of Pesaro and the criticisms of Marmora, see: Ibid,

306-307.

246

fatigue of the soldiers forced the Ottoman commanders to recommend to the Sultan

to conclude the expedition. Especially Ayas Pasha, who had already opposed such a

venture, asserted that the army should not waste more time. However, the Sultan did

not want to retreat. Marmora quotes his sentences as following:

Could you say, from your heart, what the Christians will say? Süleyman was

defeated by the Corfiots! I, [looking at] the face of Charles, took Buda, will I

run away from Corfu? My glories sailing floods of praise, in one obstacle,

will have broken, made you such a low failure? Will a small island have the

praise of defeating the Signor of a world?785

According to the author, the principal reason for the Ottoman failure in Corfu was

the defense of the Corfiots who did not surrender to the “Turkish menace”.786 The

Ottomans had neither compassion nor fear; they were not afraid of the league, which

united the Papacy, the Habsburg Emperor and the Venetians.787 However, they were

not be able to take Corfu. A decisive attack of 15 days was just a simple show of the

failure, itself. Taking into consideration that 15 years before the Ottoman Sultan

conquered Rhodes, a stronger island in comparison to Corfu, one should admit that

the Corfiots had a good reputation among other Christian in those years defending

their fate.788 Here, the interesting point is that the author expresses all his comments

through the oration of Ayas Pasha to Süleyman in order to convince him to return to

Constantinople. Accordingly, he mentions that after having listened to Ayas Pasha,

the Sultan decided to withraw his forces from the island.789 Marmora concludes the

785 “Che diranno, potea dir nel suo cuore, I Cristiani? Solimano vinto da‟Corciresi! Io, che in faccia

di Carlo hò preso Buda, fuggirò da Corcira? Mie glorie, che solcaste un mare di lodi, in uno scoglio

rompendovi, faceste così vile naufragio ? Un Isoletta si vanterà di havere fronteggiato il Signore di

un mondo ? » Ibid, 308-309.

786 Ibid, 311.

787 Ibid.

788 Ibid, 310-311.

789 For the details about the so-called address of Ayas Pasha to the Ottoman Sultan evaluating the

Ottoman deeds in Corfu, which is voiced by Marmora, see: Ibid, 309-311

247

part about 1537 by discussing the reorganization of the city, new regulations and the

trauma faced by the islanders. Moreover, he gives a list of the Venetian nobles

having offices and houses in Corfu.

It can be argued that Andrea Marmora, the author of the first history of Corfu

composed in the late sixteenth century, re-pronounced and, in a way, approves the

views of Andronikos, witnessing the events. Marmora, using the advantage of his

position within the political milieu of the Republic, seems to have gathered more data

about the actual situation of the Venetian government, the measures taken, and the

correspondences during the Ottoman attacks.

On the other hand, as Andronikos as did Marmora puts the Venetians under question

by taking individual, narrow-minded decisions without considering the sake of

Venetian subjects, facing the danger, more than the citizens in the lagoon. He clearly

mentions that the island was made an open target of Ottoman fire, by the Venetian

initiatives, which had encouraged the Sultan to attack a Venetian dominion, though

he had not planned to at the very beginning. In that context, Girolamo Pesaro, not

engaging into the defense of Corfu is sharply criticized.

Not only the Venetians, but also the Papacy and Andrea Doria, triggering the events

with his deeds are criticized by the author. Doria is mentioned as he betrayed the

Christianity, not only the Venetians, by not assisting the defense of the island. On the

other hand the author is silent about the Ottoman-French alliance and the role of

Francis I, in the outbreak of the wars in 1537, different than his former compatriot

Andronikos.

Marmora, in his account, emphasises the importance of Corfu for Venice; according

to him fall of Corfu would have brought about the fall of the lagoon. For that reason

248

he evaluated the defense as a victory, saving Venice too. As a Corfiot, Marmora

deals with the events of 1537 in a more sentimental way than other sources. Both in

his analysis, and in the scenes about the Ottoman attacks, it is possible to argue that

the author incorporates his feelings in his studies.

5.5. Conclusion

The Venetian sources, deeply evaluated in this chapter, give detailed information

about the Ottoman military initiative and attack Corfu of 1537. First of all, the

sources provide the researcher with empirical data that can be verified by other

examples and the documents of the time. From the numbers of soldiers and ships

possessed by the forces to the main themes and balances in the actual politics, the

authors draw an extended framework within which, to analyze the events. In that

context, the Venetian sources fill in the blanks of the Ottoman narratives, especially

in the analysis of international relations, and look at the events from a different

angle.

On the other hand, the sources have some controversies. The numbers of vessels and

soldiers possessed by the Ottoman Sultan differs in the accounts. As was

demonstrated in the examples of the anonymous chapters and Marmora, in order to

draw the reader’s attention, the authors sometime invent stories about the events

under discussion. For that reason, they should be compared and contrasted with each

other and evaluated in the light of complementary materials.

Here, it should also be underlined that the identities and the socio-political positions

of the authors shaped their accounts. The Corfiots, Andronikos and Marmora, discuss

the events of 1537 while reflecting their feelings about their country and people. In

249

these texts, the criticisms of the authors concerning the Venetian politics and actors

in the war come out clearly. On the other hand, as it was seen in the examples of

Longo and Paruta, the sources, produced by Venetian citizens participating into the

administration of the Republic give the researcher a more comprehensive analysis of

the Venetian policies and the approach of the government to the current

developments.

It is important to note that the accounts consulted in this chapter unanimously

mention that the main motivation of the Ottoman Sultan in 1537 was to initiate a

campaign against Apulia, under the domination of Charles V and against Albania,

not against the Venetian Republic. The reason behind that decision was, by most of

the authors, regarded as the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the sixteenth-century and

Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg. The Ottoman ideal of conquering

Italy and the attempts in the past was also discussed in some sources. These support

the main arguments of this dissertation.

As with the Ottoman sources, the Venetian accounts do not give details about the

Ottoman deeds in Albania; it is only noted that a branch of the land army struggled

with Himarans and Molosians, opposing the authority of the Sultan. The choice of

Albania for the military camp of the Ottoman army was related by the authors with

the region’s vicinity to Apulia: Valona was the closest city to Apulia where the land

army could reach, and from there the Ottomans aimed to realize the transportation of

the soldiers into the Italian Peninsula on ships.

The sources are also silent about the French, during the campaign. The question of

why the French did not initiate a campaign towards Milan, in accordance with the

terms of alliance was not answered by the authors. Only Longo, Doglioni and Paruta

250

underline that in the process of the campaign a French captain participated with his

forces in the Ottoman armada at Valona, only when the Ottomans were about to

withdraw the attack. Therefore, as the Ottoman sources do, the Venetian sources

confirm that the French forces had no role in the Apulian Campaign and in the

Attack on Corfu, contrary to the claims of former academic studies on 1537.

The sources clearly demonstrate that the Venetians perceived the Ottoman Attack on

Corfu as the direct result of the conflicts at sea between the Venetian and Ottoman

ships. They indicate that the attacks of Doria were also perceived by the Ottomans,

as the violation of the peace by the Venetians, since the Venetians ought to have

secured the waters near to its possessions and assisted the Ottomans, by giving even

necessary intelligence. In this regard, it has been stated that Doria’s free moves

within the Adriatic was evaluated as being with the connivance of the Venetians,

allying with the Habsburg Emperor. The sources underline that that perception,

reflected to the Sultan by his officers, especially by Barbarossa, persuaded him of the

Venetian betrayal. In that context, it should be mentioned that the Venetian sources

overlap with the Ottoman narratives.

The accounts of Longo, Doglioni and Paruta, on the other hand, display the presence

of the discussions in the Venetian government on allying with the Emperor Charles

V, rather than securing the peace with the Ottoman Sultan. However, all sources

underline that the Republic had no intention, nor made any decision to breake peace

with the Ottomans. The orders of the government sent to the admirals and individual

commanders about not violating the terms of peace could be shown as a proof of that

argument. However, the Republic avoided from agitating the Habsburg Emperor as

well; the sources unanimously agree on that reflecting the difficult position the

Venetians found themselves in.

251

The chronicles portray neither the Ottomans nor the Venetians as having gained a

victory in 1537. According to the authors, the successful defense in Corfu, not letting

the Ottoman invasion succeed, made the Ottoman initiative an ineffective and

misdirected adventure of the Ottoman Sultan, unable to read the conditions and

power of his forces accurately. Most of them show Hayreddin Barbarossa as the

chief protagonist of the invasion of Corfu, by manipulating the Sultan in terms of

punishing the Venetians for their betrayal. On the contrary, Avas Pasha, the Grand

Vizier, was reflected as a wiser commander, taking into consideration that the

majority of sources indicate that the decision to withdraw was taken through Ayas

Pasha’s persuasion of Süleyman to limit further harm to the Ottoman army. The

notes in the sources about the different opinions of Hayreddin Barbarossa and other

Ottoman rulling elite about the war against the Serenissima and some authors’

emphasizing on Barbarossa’s “hate” of the Venetians are noteworthy too. In this

context, it can be argued that the Venetian sources supported the argument that

Barbarossa played the crucial role in convincing Süleyman for an attack on a

Venetian key dominion and Corfu became a target by his recommendation. Although

the Venetian sources did not indicate a concrete victory in 1537 for any war party, as

they underline that the liberation of Corfu from the Ottoman invasion was celebrated

in Venice as a victory. This shows that the Venetians found themselves successful as

did the Ottomans, considering the course of the 1537 events.

The Venetian chronicles also demonstrate that the Ottoman Attack on Corfu created

an atmosphere that supported the Venetian alliance with Charles V and the

unification of the Christians against the Ottomans. As was seen in the accounts of

Paruta, Spandugino and the anonymous chapter of Sansovino’s book, the Ottoman

attack was also portrayed as a sign for Christian states to unite against the common

252

enemy. These were also supported by some circulating prophecies, which portray the

early-sixteenth century cultural atmosphere. The participation of the Serenissima in

the league with the Papacy and Habsburg Emperor to re-encounter the Ottomans the

following year should be evaluated as the direct outcome of the 1537, which led the

Republic to re-position itself with the Christian powers against its traditional Muslim

political and commercial partner.

253

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has reconstructed the Ottoman military initiative of 1537, including

the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu, in the context of Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry. By a comprehensive analysis, it is tried to demonstrate that the

1537 campaign should not be evaluated as an isolated Ottoman enterprise against

Christian lands. On the contrary, the campaign was designed and perceived by the

Ottoman administration as a significant step within the Ottoman grand strategy of the

early sixteenth-century, grounded in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry over universal

sovereignty. To decipher the significance of the campaign for the Ottomans, for the

Habsburgs and for the Venetians, it is necessary to understand the origins and

evolution of the rivalry between the first two, and how the third accordingly had to

position itself. This dissertation contributes to earlier academic studies in the field

by offering a detailed historical narrative of the 1537 Campaign, a task which has not

been undertaken before, and by re-placing it into the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry as an

important turning point in early sixteenth-century politics.

254

It has been demonstrated that the early sixteenth-century expectations of a political

and spiritual renewal under the rule of a powerful monarch, ordained by God, and the

prophecies about the End Time, circulating both in Muslim and Christian milieux,

contributed the rise of Süleyman I and Charles V as protagonists for establishing a

world empire, which would revive the Roman Empire under one faith and one rule.

The imperial claims of both sovereigns made the Italian Peninsula, traditional center

of the Roman Empire a target, heralding the universal supremacy for both of the

sovereigns. Undertaking almost identical processes of consolidating their authority

within their own realms and of building of the imperial images to justify their

political and military deeds in their first years of reign, these two sovereigns

appeared at several war theaters, challenging each other, as well as other states, to

secure their political, territorial and economic interests. The almost life-long rivalry

between Süleyman I and Charles V led to a complex political conjuncture, in which

all crowned-heads and states of the time needed to enter entangled alliances with

each other.

Accordingly, the Ottoman-Venetian relations and Ottoman-French political

convergence in the early sixteenth-century has been evaluated as an Ottoman attempt

to form an anti-Habsburg league, which would give Süleyman an upper hand for his

personal struggle againt his “mortal enemy”, Charles V. In this regard, it has been

argued that the existing political, diplomatic and commercial relations between the

Porte and the Serenissima gained momentum in the studied period, since the

Republic of Venice was perceived by the Ottoman administration as the only state of

the Italian peninsula resisting the Habsburg hegemony. Therefore, the Republic was

politically supported and favored. The Venetian documents portray that the Ottomans

even offered military support to the Republic against the Habsburg threat in the first

255

decades of the sixteenth-century. The Ottoman-French alliance should also been

evaluated within this perspective. The rivalry between Charles V and Francis I,

preventing an alliance against the Ottoman realm was beneficial to be supported in

terms of the Ottoman imperial strategy. Moreover, the dissertation has asserted that

the wars between two crowned-heads for the political domination in Italy gave

Süleyman I an opportunity to interfere in the rivalry between Christian powers to

further his claim to be the Padişâh-ı rûy-ı zemîn and Zillullâh fi‟l ʿarz. Thus,

Süleyman, claiming to be the only monarch who would decide on the states and

identifying himself as the sole inheritor of the Roman emperors, found a solid and

legitimate ground for intervening the political turmoil in Italy.

By a brief discussion of the Ottoman policy towards Hungary and Ottoman

initiatives against Austria, I have intended to delineate the Ottoman challenge to the

rise of Charles V, by 1526. The invasion of Hungary, also perceived as the Red

Apple by the Ottomans, gave the Sultan an upper hand for his desired world

domination and by establishing suzerainty over Hungary, Süleyman intended both to

create a buffer zone between Ottoman and Austrian Habsburg realms and to

strengthen his image of Distributers of Crowns to the Monarchs of the World. The

dissertation shows that the Hungarian campaigns of Süleyman were generally

planned as responses to Charles V’s deeds and were grounded by the French or

Szapolyai’s demands of assistance against Charles V or Ferdinand I. It should be

also mentioned that, in each campaign the discourse of Sultan’s being the only

political and religious authority in the world was emphasized, as it has been observed

by the example of the splendid regalia and display of power, decorated by the

imperial symbolisms during the German Expedition of Süleyman in 1532. This also

supports that in the early sixteenth-century, the Ottoman imperial strategy was not

256

alienated from the discourses, perceptions, symbolisms of the west; on the contrary,

it was an amalgamation of Islamic, Near Eastern and Roman traditions and

challenged the Habsburg Emperor by using the power representation and imperial

symbols of his world.

On the other hand, it has also been stated that the priorities of Süleyman I and

Charles V were different from each other. Unlike Süleyman I’s aggressive policy of

expansion in his early years or reign, Charles V prioritized suppressing the French

and Protestant challenge, breaking his authority in his hereditary lands in the Italian

peninsula and in traditional Habsburg territories of Austria and Germany. The

pacification of Italy was crucial for the Emperor to consolidate his authority.

Therefore, the discourse of a new crusade against the Ottomans to restore the

Christian rule in Constantinople and in Jerusalem was mainly used as a mean of

propaganda. His conquest of Tunis in 1535 strengthen his image of Defensor Fidei

and revived the hopes of Papacy for a new crusade. However, it has been claimed

that his initiative was merely defensive, realized to secure the Italian and Iberian

shores from further Ottoman attacks. His reluctance, or inability, to resist the

Ottoman initiatives in Hungary, which had even threatened Vienna, supports that, for

Charles V, facing the challenges within Christendom was more important than a

direct struggle with the Ottoman threat.

I have argued that the Ottoman military initiative against Italy was led by Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry and it was realized in 1537 because of the unsuccessful Ottoman

attempts to invade Vienna and to secure Tunis as an important naval base for further

moves. Vienna was targeted to challenge Charles V in the traditional lands of his

dynasty and it was perceived to be a stepping stone for Ottoman penetration in Italy.

257

The Ottoman failure in Vienna, and Andrea Doria’s occupation of Corone transferred

the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry to the western Mediterranean from Central Europe

and led to the incorporation of the Ottoman corsairs into the Ottoman imperial navy,

as well as to the rise of another important figure, who would play instrumental role in

the Ottoman decision making processes: Hayreddin Barbarossa. Ottoman

collaboration with the corsairs operating in North Africa and the rise of Barbarossa

should be evaluated as the requirements of the Ottoman imperial strategy focusing on

dominating the Western Mediterranean.

In this context, the dissertation also examined the nature of the galley warfare. As

was stated before, galley, carriying soldiers and guns to the targeted zones, was the

most important component of the sixteenth-century navies. Considering its operation

capacity and logistical needs, galleys need to touch shore frequently. This required a

secure and fortified naval base, close to the desired targets, for the galley fleets of the

states. Accordingly, the dissertation has underlined that the shift of Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry to the Western Mediterranean grounded the need for a fortified and

secure naval base for the imperial fleet, which would also facilitate further imperial

enterprises in the Mediterranean and in Italy against the Habsburgs. Therefore,

Barbarossa’s earlier attempts of attacking on Apulia and Tunis should be evaluated

as the natural consequence of the requirements of the galley operations.

As discussed, the military failure in 1529 and in 1532 and the loss of Tunis led the

Ottomans to prioritize a new project in which they would cooperate with another

anti-Habsburg political figure, Francis I, the French King. The Ottoman-French

alliance for a joint campaign in Italy, on which both parties had agreed in 1536,

mainly planned to be an invasion of the Charles V’s territories in Lombardy and

258

Apulia. By such an operation, the French would have the opportunity to control

Milan, over which Francis I had been claiming to inheritance and the Ottomans

would penetrate into the Neapolitan realm of Apulia that they had already invaded in

1480. The joint campaign, proposed to the Ottoman Sultan by the French King,

intended to divide the Habsburg defense in Italy into two separate fronts and would

challenge the Emperor’s authority in Italy. Furthermore, the Ottomans could have

also control a naval base in southeastern Italian shores, facilitating futher initiatives.

It has been also demonstrated that the Apulian campaign was planned as a military

initiative, directly led by Süleyman, himself, which would be the Sultan’s response

for the Habsburg conquest of Tunis in 1535 that was personally commanded by

Charles V.

Furthermore, the dissertation has offered new interpretation on the question of why

the Ottomans agreed on the aforementioned plan, proposed by the French King. It

have been suggested that evaluating the Apulian Campaign in the context of Ottoman

grand strategy of the early sixteenth-century helps the researcher to decipher the

main motivation of the Ottomans in 1537. Therefore, the dissertation has correlated

the Apulian Campaign with the Ottoman policy towards Hungary and has asserted

that Süleyman mainly intended to establish some sort of suzerainty in Apulia, like he

already did in Hungary, to facilitate further operations in Italy, which would give the

Ottomans an upper hand to enlarge its sphere of influence in the peninsula. The

Neapolitan fuoriusciti, hosted by the imperial navy in the course of campaign and the

use of an effective number of soldiers during the invasion support this argument.

Considering the French claims of inheritance to the Kingdom of Naples, it has also

been argued that, by having the support of the aforementioned Neapolitans, suffering

from the Habsburg taxation and seeking the Sultan’s assistance, Süleyman might

259

have intended to control the region and to leave it under the control of Francis I, who

would be forced to act as an Ottoman vassal king in Italy. The dissertation has

argued that the Ottomans, knowing well their military and and financial resources, as

well as the logistical capacities and the current socio-political conditions of the time,

might have been aware that they could not control Apulia for extended periods;

therefore, collaborating with the French might have been more beneficial for the

Empire.

In this context, it was evaluated that the Apulian Campaign in 1537 turned to another

military fiasco for the Ottomans, since the French had no show in Italy contrary to

the original plan and the Ottomans were not able to control Apulia by breaking the

strong defense, as it had intended. Moreover, by indicating that the French fleet,

under the command of Baron of St. Blancard reached Valona by early September, the

dissertation has also challenged earlier studies arguing that the French fleet assisted

the Ottoman forces in 1537. The dissertation has shown that the absence of French

changed the course of the Ottoman campaign. The Habsburg defense could not be

divided into two different fronts and the the Ottomans were not be able to establish

the French in Apulia as an Ottoman vassal. Moreover, the struggles at war between

the Ottoman, Doria’s and Venetian ships resulted in losses of a significant amount of

provision and munitions for the Ottomans. As revealed by the contemporary

chronicles, the Habsburgs were also able to open a new war theater in Bosnia.

Instead of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans had to struggle with the attacks in different

fronts. Therefore, the Ottoman attacks in Apulia remained as the attempts of spoiling

and plundering, instead of being a permanent invasion of the region.

260

The narrative of the campaign clearly demonstrates that, in 1537, Charles V pursued

again a defensive policy. The Habsburg forces did not initiate an offensive to the

ones of the Ottomans. Even Doria’s attack was a sneak night raid on the Ottoman

forces alienated from the main corps of the fleet. The sources also show that the

attack was not intended by Doria himself, it was merely realized by his cousin

Antonio. Moreover, apart from supporting the region’s defense by more Spanish

soldiers, Charles V did not personally intervene with the defense of Apulia. The

defense was left to the local governors of the Kingdom of Naples and in order not to

harm the imperial armada, Doria preferred to wait at Messina. On the other hand, I

have argued that this wait and see tactic and the clever timing for an attack on the

Ottoman ships resulted in a significant success for the Habsburgs: the Ottomans

turned the fire towards Venetian Corfu, accusing them for letting Doria to harm the

Ottoman forces. This was perceived by the Ottomans a clear evidence for the secret

alliance between the Serenissima and the Habsburg Emperor. While the Ottomans

were intending to divide Habsburg forces into two fronts of struggle, by the attacks,

the Habsburgs were able to change the course of war, led the Ottoman-Venetian

encounter and secured their Neapolitan realm.

I have argued that the 1537 Campaign targeted mainly Apulia. Broadly, it has also

challenged the former studies on 1537 Campaign, tending to reflect the main target

of the Ottoman military initiative as the Venetian Corfu by taking into consideration

the island’s strategic location for being a secure and fortified naval base for the

Ottoman fleet and to evaluate the attack as a preparative for the invasion of Italy. It

has been stated that, even the strategic importance of Corfu had already been

recognized by the Ottomans, the Attack on Corfu in 1537 was not specifically

designed as a preparative for the invasion of Italy and was not intended to be

261

captured by Süleyman I even in the eve of the campaign. On the other hand, I have

evaluated the Attack on Corfu as the direct outcome of the tension between the Porte

and the Serenissima. By discussing the Venetian politics in face to the Ottoman-

Habsburg rivalry, I have discussed that, especially after 1532, the Republic started to

pursue a more cautious policy towards the Ottomans and pro-Habsburg advocates

became more visible and effective within the Venetian government. Venetian

neutrality in face to Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and its refusal to take an active part in

the Ottoman-French alliance created suspicions in the Ottoman administration and

Venetians were perceived as being in secret alliance with the Emperor. Although the

suspicions did not result in a military encounter before 1537, the Venetian attacks on

the Ottoman ships during the campaign led the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537,

which was perceived by the Ottoman Sultan and the rulling-elite as the Ottoman

response for “misbehaving” of the Venetians. Accordingly, I have underlined that

Corfu was not the main target of Süleyman in 1537 and I have supported this

argument with the information given by the Ottoman and Venetian contemporaries

and their views on 1537.

Accordingly, the dissertation has also delineated how the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and Attack on Corfu were narrated in both the Ottoman and the Venetian

chronicles, to not only support its main arguments, but also reveal the perceptions of

both parties, in two individual chapters. It has been stated that the Ottoman and the

Venetian chronicles complete each other. The chronicles also reflect the political

tension between the states. On the other hand, Venetian chronicles insistently note

the Venetian government’s desire of securing peace with the Ottoman Sultan and

evaluated the Venetian attacks on Ottoman ships in the course of the Apulian

Campaign as the personal initiatives of individual commanders who transgreed the

262

strict orders of the Republic’s government. In this context, the ones, who put Corfu

in the Ottoman fire are reflected by the Venetian sources as the disobedient captains,

not the Republic’s policies.

I have argued that the Attack on Corfu should be evaluated as an important turning

point in the Ottoman-Venetian relations since the Ottoman attack supported the pro-

Habsburg tendencies in the Venetian administration and led the establishment of the

Venetian alliance with the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor against the Ottomans,

for the first time after the Ottoman-Venetian peace of 1503. Although, Hayreddin

Barbarossa would overwhelm the allied forces at Prevesa, the following year and the

Republic would restore the peace with the Ottomans by the ahidnâme of 1540,

Venice would gradually lose its influence in the Ottoman politics in favor of the

French. This process would enter in a new phase with Ottoman-French further joint

attacks against the Habsburgs and the French would rise as the most important

Christian ally of the Ottoman Sultan, economically privileged and favored, as well as

being the active representative and protector of the rights of Christians, residing

within the Ottoman realm. In this context, I have asserted that the Ottoman Attack on

Corfu meant more for Ottoman-Venetian relations, besides being a spark kindling 34

years of peace.

This dissertation has produced a comprehensive narrative of the Ottoman Apulian

Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537 in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry

and has offered new interpretations of the Ottoman policies in the early sixteenthcentury.

However, it should be underlined that this dissertation has been framed

mainly by Ottoman and Venetian chronicles and has intentionally focused on only

the Ottoman deeds in Apulia and the Attack on Corfu. The Ottoman initiatives in

263

Albania, the socio-political factors leading the Ottomans to take measures to

consolidate the imperial control in the region exceed the scope and the limits of the

present work. Therefore, the arguments stated and supported in this dissertation need

to be elaborated by further archival evidence and also by investigating chronicles that

reflect the Habsburg and French points of view. Moreover, a comprehensive study on

the Ottoman Albanian policy might also merit further research to complete the

portrait drawn by this dissertation.

264

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APPENDICES

A. Glossary

Ağa (ott.): Civil or military leader. Head of Janissaries. (Yeniçeri Ağası)

Ahidnâme (ott.): The letter of privileges and safe conducts granted by the Sultan to

a non-Muslim community or state.

Bailo1 (ve.): Venetian resident ambassador in Constantinople. Beside his diplomatic

mission, the bailo was also the official head of the Venetian community living in

Constantinople, responsible to protect the commercial and judicial rights of the

Venetians.

Bailo2 (ve.): Venetian governor in the Venetian dominions of the Ionian Islands.

Barça (ott.)/ Barca-Barza (ve.): War ship usually needed to be accompanied by

transports composed or larger units for logistical purposes.

Bastarda (it.): Larger galleys reserved for the fleet’s commander.

Bey (ott.): Title used for ones having offices in the administration or governors of

the Ottoman districts.

Beylerbeyi (ott): Governor-general of Ottoman provinces.

Capitano Generale del Mare (it.): Chief Commander at Sea, charged to command

the entire Venetian naval forces at war.

Condottiere (it.): Mercenary captain/commander hiring a group of soldiers. Most of

the Italian states enriched their military forced with condottieri.

Consiglio dei Dieci (it.): Council of Ten. Venetian governing body responsible from

the security of the Republic.

Çavuş (ott.): Military officer.

Corte (sp.): Council.

Dârü’l-Harb (ott.): The territories not under the rule of Islam, which the Ottomans

would introduce the Muslim rule by conquests.

Divân-ı Hümâyûn (ott.): Ottoman Imperial Council.

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Doge (ve.): Duke. The head official of the Republic of Venice, who was elected for

life.

Enderûn (ott.): The palace school situated in Topkapı Palace

Fetihnâme (ott.): Imperial letters announcing a conquest of war success.

Fuoriusciti (it.): Neapolitan rebels, against the Habsburg authority, in exile.

Fusta (it.): Narrow, light and fast ship with shallow draft/small galley.

Galiotta (it.): Small galleys, mostly preferred by corsairs.

Kethüda (ott.): Chamberlain

Nişancı (ott.): Court calligrapher or sealer and the original duty of the niĢancı was to

seal royal precepts. NiĢancı is a high post in the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Moriscos (sp.): Iberian Muslims forced to convert to Christianity.

Oratore (it.): Orator. Extraordinary envoys sent for a specific mission.

Reisü’l-Küttâb (ott.): Head of Scribes. It was a high post in Ottoman Bureaucracy.

Sancak (ott.): Ottoman province.

Sancakbeyi (ott.): Governor of Ottoman sancak.

Schirazzo (ve?): Small cargo ship with rectangular sail, used in 16th century.

Serenissima (it.): The Most Serene. The term is used to refer to the Republic of

Venice since its official name was la Serenissima Republica di Venezia.

Stato da Màr (ve.): Venetian colonies of the Ionian Islands.

Presidios (sp.): Spanish garrisons in North Africa.

Procuratore di San Marco (it.): The second important office in the Venetian

administration, responsible from the administration of St. Mark Basilica.

Provveditore (it.): Governor.

Provveditore Generale (it.): Supreme Governor.

Relazione (it.): The reports of the Venetian baili on the states, where had been

stayed for their diplomatic missions. The reports were read before the Venetian

Senate.

Reis (ott.): Captain of galley, or a personal fleet.

Terraferma (it.): Venetian territories outside of the lagoon city of Venice.

Vezir (ott.)/Vizier (eng.): Sultan’s minister, being the member of the Ottoman

Imperial Council. The Grand Vizier was the most important authority after the

Sultan, heading of the Imperial Council, by the name of the Sultan.

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B. Map 1

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C. Map 2